INFORMATION TO USERS

8228846

Nugent, Jane Elizabeth

THE HUMAN CONDITION OF THE GAME

The University of North Carolina at Greensboro   ED.D.   1982

University
Microfilms
International 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

THE HUMAN CONDITION

OF THE GAME

by

Jane Elizabeth Nugent

A Dissertation submitted to
the Faculty of the Graduate School at
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Education

Greensboro
1982

Approved by

_____
Dissertation Advisor

ABSTRACT

NUGENT, JANE ELIZABETH.   The Human Condition of the Game.
(1982)
Directed by: Dr. Gail Hennis.   Pp. 244.

The central question of this inquiry is: What happens
when people join in a game?   The methodology used throughout
the study is based upon hermeneutical inquiry.   Textual in-
terpretation of the two primary foci of the study, namely,
the game and the human condition, is used to reveal sig-
nificant standpoints for consideration.   The two major
points of interest are interpreted, at first separately;
then an effort is made to join various ideas into a paradigm
for the human condition of the game.

Understanding the game is approached through history,
descriptions, and metaphors.   The human condition is exam-
ined through the written works of Hannah Arendt, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, Michael Polanyi and Elizabeth Sewell.   Dis-
closures about game and the human condition are made in
light of some problematic concerns from the history of ideas
in Western civilization, such as the relations between mind
and body, action and contemplation, and work and play.

The claim of uniqueness is given to the game because
1) the quality of agon or contest is inherent in its struc-
ture, 2) the game produces nothing material, and 3) skilled
performance in the presence of others, both players and
spectators, allows players a way to distinguish themselves

through action. The structure, made by and taken up by persons, connects players to past performances, provides for outstanding deeds to be performed during play, and preserves the structure for others and their actions of the future. The game as a cultural activity has a durability because of its immaterial result and because of its passage onwards from one generation of players to another. The conditions of the game, which provide a space wherein people can appear in distinctly human fashion, are those of action, performance, skills, boundaries, personal knowing, unpredictability, contest, intentionality, perception, embodiment, and communication with objects and other people.

APPROVAL PAGE

This dissertation has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

Dissertation
Adviser _____

Committee Members _____

_____

_____

_____

_____
Date of Acceptance by Committee

_____
Date of Final Oral Examination

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Drs. Kate Barrett, Gail Hennis, Benjamin Ladner, James Macdonald, E. Doris McKinney, Elizabeth Sewell, and Celeste Ulrich: appreciation is expressed for your scholarly and imaginative guidance of this work and the ideas which preceded it.

To Phyllis Atkinson and Barbara Casey, my good friends: sincere thanks are offered for your never-ending support and encouragement.

To my family, and in particular to my parents, Mary and William Nugent: I am grateful that you tried to understand why this work was important to me.

Without the assistance of all these people, this dissertation would not have taken shape. But it is to my parents, who, throughout the years of all my projects, have never discouraged me from doing or trying things, that I pay particular tribute. They have, in every instance, offered whatever support was needed. And, as distinguished games-players themselves, they embody, in my view, "The Human Condition of the Game."

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study issues from the discipline of physical edu-
cation. The area of the "game" is located within the dis-
cipline as an integral part of its activity base. When
human beings enter the structure of "game" through perfor-
mance, multiple interpretations and meanings arise. The
concern of this study will be to explore what kinds of
understandings of the game emerge when it is seen through
the perspective of persons in action.

In order to reveal some of these meanings in a coherent
fashion, game must disclose itself as the phenomenon that it
is, and persons must be spoken of as the beings that they
are. Should these things happen during the course of this
inquiry, then the game, which beckons actors and spectators
to inform its structure, can be seen as a space appropriate
for human appearance. The concept of "human appearance"
then becomes an important one in this inquiry. It is a con-
cern with space which is appropriate for public display that
commands a central position within this discussion.

Therefore, the title of the inquiry, "The Human Con-
dition of the Game," suggests the two main foci of the
study. The two important words are game and human. The

structure of the boundaried space of game and the realm of human affairs will be looked at separately, and then a joining of the two primary areas will be undertaken in order to see if a claim can be made for the game providing a space of appearance where people can appear in their human condition. From the various standpoints which will be established, one question becomes critical. Simply put, what happens when people join in a game? When the form of game and the intentional activities of human beings are combined to become one whole endeavor, what is revealed? And how does what is revealed increase our understanding of both game and human action?

In order to discuss these matters, standpoints will have to be established throughout the study to help guide it toward order and coherence. Networks of relationships among words, events, people, and ideas will have to be woven. Since this study is not primarily a definitional effort, its claims invite careful discerning and judging and rest on a kind of phenomenological methodology which suggests that both descriptions and important distinctions be made throughout the course of the inquiry.

The game will be explored through concepts offered by Johan Huizinga and Roger Caillois primarily; the human condition will be examined by drawing on the thoughts of Hannah Arendt, Michael Polanyi, Elizabeth Sewell, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty in that order. Other texts have been

utilized to support the ideas and relationships of these primary authors. "The road that walks," as Heidegger once referred to the process of discovery, is a brief and somewhat enigmatic phrase that appropriately describes the method that was used during the collecting of the data and the writing of the work. A discussion of such a method as it applies to this kind of a study is an important one. At the outset, some key words, texts, and concepts were identified, yet the precise movement of the inquiry remained largely unknown. It has been a process of following barely discernible clues which played the crucial role in a subsequent establishment of arrival, connecting, and departure points. This process is an important one to attempt to understand, and, as such, an effort will be made to describe the methodological approach which this study took, even as the method itself is in the process of disclosing other meanings.

But, in order to lay a bit more ground for the inquiry, it is important to suggest why the game is the crucial structure on which this study hinges. The game is a cultural form made up by persons and entered into by persons. Games have been transmitted from age to age and region to region throughout both Eastern and Western civilizations. Games and their legacies have provided fecund ground for the work of artists, poets, historians, novelists, scientists, and philosophers. Generated from the earliest of Olympic

encounters and continuing to the most contemporary of games, the structures and instruments which people choose to take up through games also inform their lives with meaning. These activities, at once playful and serious, provide a direct linkage to the traditions and people of the past. They provide a space for common public appearance in the present; and, so long as we continue to engage in them, they insure that similar events will exist in the future in which as yet unknown performances can occur.

While many are involved in the conduct of games, the physical education teacher often provides a significant share of the understandings which emerge during the course of their play. And it is to those who teach physical education and also to those who are involved in the game setting that this study is addressed. What makes the area of game problematic for such people is that games are buffeted by and brush incessantly against many different kinds of forces. For example, two such powerful forces are reflected in the words 'play' and 'sport.' When these forces clash or exist in unresolved tension, a blurring of the rightful shape of game occurs and it becomes very difficult to tease out the distinctions that are appropriate to understanding games. Difficult as it may be though, when these distinctions are established, something unique can be discerned about game which makes the space of game an ennobling one for human beings to enter. For it is this structural and rule-guided

space of contest which can provide a setting for grasping the larger significance of the human condition. It is this agonal space, one which is orderly yet paradoxical, oftentimes unpredictable and unproductive, which can nonetheless allow for heroic deeds to be performed among a common people. An uncovering or recovering of game, a lifting of the weight of other pressures from its distinct shape, will have to be undertaken during this study in order to move us toward understanding both the mystery and manner of its form and of the people who take it up.

This researched paradigm or image of game viewed through the prism of human activity, contains the implications of this work. The model will bear inevitably the marks of philosophical inquiry. The model may in the end raise more questions than it provides answers, but this would not be inconsistent with the declared methodology of this treatise. It is intended to be one perspective among many which inform this study and against which this study will be judged. To both the credit and sometimes discredit of the game, many interpretations have been and will continue to be generated. And while the certainty of its ongoing rich yield seems assured, what makes for a further problem is often just this richness. One cannot finally retreat to a position of utter relativity when theorizing or conceptualizing about the game. Rather, at some point a commitment must be made to uncover what is there, to see

what is given, and to scrape away layers of possible mis-representation.

The data, then, will emerge from meanings of words, written texts, myths, and from people and events from the past. The discourse will be one which circles, spirals, somersaults, and lines out. Not all the ideas will be fully connected; some go so far and no further. But all have relation to understanding the human condition of the game. All are moving toward answering the basic questions of this study: What happens when the game comes alive, when people are called to appear as performers among others? What happens in a game when human beings are pulled upward on their own slope of discovery to tell more than they know through their movement, to become more than they are by their deeds?

CHAPTER II

ON METHOD

In General

> Now, of all acts the most complete is that of con-
> structing. A work demands love, meditation,
> obedience to your finest thought, the invention of
> laws by your soul, and many other things that it
> draws miraculously from your own self, which did not
> suspect that it possessed them. This work proceeds
> from the most intimate center of your existence, and
> yet it is distinct from yourself.[1]

The scientist-philosopher Michael Polanyi echoes the

sentiments of the poet Paul Valéry when he says, in a

similar vein, "Heuristic passion seeks no personal posses-

sion. It sets out not to conquer, but to enrich the

world."[2] Somewhere within these thoughts lies a concept of

method which guided this study. It was and continues to be

a way of discovery which emphasizes a world of "est and

non," an active tension between to be and not to be. The

recurrent image of "est and non" seems appropriate for this

study as it was portrayed by Muriel Rukeyser in her bio-

graphical look at the voyager - explorer of the seventeenth

century, Thomas Hariot. Hariot's life was constituted by

making connections between his deeds and his thoughts. His

world was not one of either-or, and in the words of his

biographer Rukeyser, it was described this way:

> Traces of a lifetime . . . the opening of the world
> to word and deed, the ways in which the poetry, the
> science, all exploration, a personal relation to the
> unknown, are claimed and lived. The place where the
> country of Est and the country of Non Est are seen to
> meet and be alive, as a door to a continually opening
> new world.[3]

The concept of method about which we will speak is akin to Hariot's work of putting together a set of relationships based upon an active exploration of the world of his concerns. It is a process of discovery which goes forward and backward, up and down, over and around again, at all times seeking ways of making connections. It is a world where the *vita activa* and the *vita contemplativa* are seen to be partners in discovery and not separated because of the nature of the work. Being on full alert and yet quiet enough to hear the signals, watching and waiting, feverishly reading and then sewing together relationships are all important parts of this method. The poet Elizabeth Sewell describes it as "a continual, profound and lonely struggle . . . moving from native disorder toward a creative order, out of which grow the human self and our own lives and thoughts."[4] She suggests that discovery relies on an incessant hunt for clues through a groping forward, image by image, toward prophecy, vision, and questions. All this, she claims, is partly method, partly philosophy, and partly education. The movement is one of constant unmaking and remaking. Sewell says:

Great men do not create systems they regard as final.
They have enough of the poet in them to be ready al-
ways to call everything back into play again, never
to sit down before the system they have made and say
'Here is an end of the matter.'[5]

By way of agreement, the scientist Michael Polanyi also
speaks about the process of exploration: "We feel the slope
toward deeper insight as we feel the direction in which a
heavy weight is pulled along a steep incline. It is this
dynamic intuition which guides the pursuit of discovery."[6]
This way of pursuing something aptly describes an approach
toward method in that it seeks to make sets of relationships
out of clues which lead an investigator toward a reality
upon which they bear. By contrast, in modern modes of
inquiry there is an almost exclusive reliance on deducing,
analyzing, pre-ordering, defining, or categorizing. Bernard
Boelen states that "The actual beginning of any method is
non-methodical, and is like any beginning, an unforeseeable,
original and creative moment in the spontaneity of our im-
mediately lived experience."[7]

This vision of a hidden reality guides a researcher but
has an essentially indeterminate character at the outset.
For the writer Flannery O'Connor, the process of discovery
involves descending far enough into oneself to reach the
underground springs that will give life to the work. She
describes the descent as one "through the darkness of the
familiar into a world where, like the blind man cured in the
gospels, he sees men as if they were trees but walking.

This is the beginning of vision."[8]

Hannah Arendt speaks of her teacher Martin Heidegger as one who laid down pathways and trail marks which were always conducive to opening up new dimensions of thought.[9] She characterizes Heidegger as a passionate thinker, who never thought 'about' something, rather, he thought something. Heidegger himself calls this a 'releasement toward things,' an openness to the mystery of them. He contrasts this kind of passionate, wonder-filled contemplation with calculative thinking. "Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next. Calculative thinking never stops, never collects itself. Calculative thinking is not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is."[10]

Meaning is crucial to the discovery process. The recognition of meaning does not indicate naive intuitionism. Rather, the arduous task of interpretation is one which attempts to uncover what lies concealed beneath the familiar. No longer merely to take for granted the experiences of everyday life is to begin to marvel at their capacity for yielding the unusual and the extraordinary. But, as Boelen says, these interpretations cannot be based on sheer inspiration. He suggests that the process "involves all our potentialities, such as: sensitivity, technical skills, hard work, discipline, laborious research, profound concentration, intersubjective dialogues, love, humility, respect,

asceticism and wonder."[11] As the brilliant poet Rainer

Rilke says in describing his own exhausting and difficult

times with writing:

> For the sake of a single verse, one must see many
> cities, men and things, one must know the animals,
> one must feel how the birds fly and know the gesture
> with which the little flowers open in the morning.
> . . . And yet it is not the memories themselves.
> Not till they have turned to blood within us, to
> glance and gesture, nameless and no longer to be
> distinguished from our selves - not till then can it
> happen that in a most rare hour the first word of a
> verse arises in their midst and goes forth from
> them.[12]

This act of incorporating or embodying phenomena is

called "indwelling" by both Polanyi and Heidegger. Sewell

describes it as 'two becoming one.' She says:

> This union of the self and the object it is contem-
> plating may seem strange at first sight. . . . By
> an ever increasing number of transformations during
> which, however, identifying is never wholly lost, the
> self will be made one with whatever it is in contact
> with, provided only that it allows the imagination
> to operate. . . . Do not misunderstand this; it is
> not an invitation to an infantile and dilettante
> game of whimsical make-believe. It is an invitation
> to the universe.[13]

And yet, unfortunately, it is precisely this concept of em-

bodying or joining with the objects of our concerns that we

have grown to mistrust. As if to foretell the loss of the

belief in the act of indwelling, T. H. White, in his magical

story of the young King Arthur, says, "For in those days

even the grown-ups were so childish that they saw nothing

uninteresting in being turned into snakes or owls, or in

going invisibly to visit giants."[14]

Sewell invites us to return to the world of children and 'savages' to recover the use of the imagination as it works to affirm what often seem to be contrary states of being. This power of the imagination to sally forth and close gaps, as Polanyi says, provides us with the ability to think about things that are not yet present. Polanyi says:

> When recognizing a problem and engaging in its pursuit, our imagination is guided by our dynamic and strategic intuition; it ransacks our available faculties. . . . But . . . the first step is to remember that scientific discoveries are made in search of reality - of a reality that is there, whether we know it or not. The search is of our own making, but reality is not. We send out our imagination deliberately to ransack promising avenues, but the promise of these paths is already there to guide us.[15]

Polanyi, like Sewell, insists that the powers of both indwelling and of the imagination are integral to discovery.

Furthermore, all knowing, for Polanyi, is personal, not made but discovered. What saves personal knowing from being subjective is the fact that something really and objectively exists. In commitment to seeking the reality of that which is there, a universal intent is expressed through such commitment. This commitment, says Polanyi, cannot be totally formalized, for, "you cannot express your commitment noncommittally."[16] This means that taking up the responsibility for discovery precludes divesting ourselves from its shape or results by merely setting up objective criteria of verifiability.[17]

Richard Gelwick describes these ideas further:

> We are not free to do as we please but called to
> respond to the clues and problems that can be ascer-
> tained by us and other competent persons. Our
> satisfaction is not in pleasing ourselves but in our
> contact with aspects of reality that can be found
> by others and offer prospect of further discovery.[18]

So when we talk of things like knowledge being personal,

embodiment, indwelling, and the exercise of the imagination

in discovery, we are not speaking of mere whimsy, naive

intuitionism, or radical subjectivity. In speaking of the

kinds of decisions which, for example, scientists make dur-

ing the discovery process, Polanyi claims:

> The choices are made by the scientist; they are his
> acts, but what he pursues is not of his making:
> his acts stand under the judgment of the hidden
> reality he seeks to uncover. His vision of the
> problem, his obsession with it, and his final leap
> to discovery are all filled from beginning to end
> with an obligation to an external objective. . . .
> His acts are personal judgments exercised respon-
> sibly with a view to a reality with which he is
> seeking to establish contact. This holds for all
> seeking and finding of external truth.[19]

This is an important point. For, all knowledge within

the range of both the arts and sciences, in fact in all

epistemic activity, proceeds on the basis of both personal

commitment and universal intent to make contact with an as-

pect of reality that truly exists. Despite our modern habit

of appealing to empirical data as wholly objective and in-

trinsically true, Polanyi points out that "the content of

any empirical statement is three times indeterminate. It

relies on clues which are largely unspecifiable, integrates

them by principles which are undefinable, and speaks of a reality which is inexhaustible."[20] These three indeterminacies inevitably defeat any attempt at a strict theory of objectivity or a wholly empirical basis for scientific validity.

Part of the modern problem of assigning the label of objectivity to, for example, numbers and measurement techniques, and the label of subjectivity to, for example, anything that emerges from personal observations, experiences, stories, myths, or the senses, stems from what we have come to assume about the nature of facts. "What is imagined must be a transformation or a reorganization of what is directly given. This is as true for religion as it is for science. Facts are the ordinary data of universal human experience."[21] So says the philosopher John Macmurray. He goes on to indicate that the scientist, artist, and religious person alike start from a range of common experience and it is from this that facts are drawn and formulated. "The data of science are not themselves scientific, nor are the data of religion religious."[22] Starting from a world of common fact, people within, for example, science, art, and religion move in different directions because each deals with the facts differently.

Thomas Kuhn speaks at length about the importance of a paradigm to the process of scientific discovery. His use of this term is similar to Macmurray's idea of a particular

configuration of facts which frames an area of understand-

ing. For Kuhn, the acceptance of a new paradigm is based

less on past achievement than on future promise, and the

decision to accept its authority is made on faith that the

new paradigm will succeed in its ability to come close to

the reality upon which it claims to bear.[23] This parallels

closely some remarks by Polanyi:

> The vision which guided the scientist to success
> lives on in his discovery and is shared by those
> who recognize it. It is reflected in the confidence
> they place in the reality of that which has been dis-
> covered and in the way in which they sense the depth
> and fruitfulness of a discovery.[24]

Suzanne Langer puts it this way:

> The construction of a coherent theory - a set of
> connected ideas about some whole subject - begins
> with the solution of a central problem; that is
> with the establishing of a key concept. There is
> no way of knowing, by any general rule, what con-
> stitutes a central problem. . . . But the best sign
> that you have broached a central philosophical issue
> is that in solving it you raise new interesting
> questions. The concept you construct has implica-
> tions and by implications builds up further ideas,
> that illuminate other concepts of the whole subject,
> to answer other questions, sometimes before you even
> ask them.[25]

Before we can establish the central problem of this

inquiry, we must ask a set of questions about the nature of

our intellectual and embodied commitment. How do we value

a method of discovery which supports Rilke's words: "Live

the question now. Perhaps you will gradually, without

noticing it, live along some distant day into the answer,"

or, "that which now still seems to us the most alien will

become what we most trust and find most faithful?"[26] Do we
trust the work of the imagination and do we have the faith
to accept what it finds? Do we have the time to wait for
disclosure? Are we prepared to go in search of the self-
unravelling clue, to set off for regions as yet unseen, to
discourse with a road that walks? Will we visit a giant,
turn into a toad, or make the mysterious passage past the
dragon in order to tell our story?

The method proposed suggests a movement between both
disclosure and appropriation, or, in the words of Flannery
O'Connor, a discourse between mystery and manner. She sug-
gests that you find the manner from the texture of the
existence that surrounds you, and the mystery is revealed
when you are called to go through the surface of what you're
looking at.[27] This method has the capacity to change our
relation to the world; it is a search for radical founda-
tions and roots. Thévenaz suggests that this type of
method, which he calls phenomenological, is animated by a
power of going beyond and digging deeper in an exhausting
struggle to find a beginning.[28] To recognize that human
beings are bound up in the flux of everyday life and to ask
some central questions about the relationship of person to
world is the direction which this method takes. The some-
times inchoate responses suggested as answers should not be
considered ground for failure. For the matter which will
be addressed is a complex one upon which many things bear.

And the tissue of images created from this study may appear frail at times. But it is toward a vision that the work moves, toward a network of relationships which heretofore has not been proposed about the subject matter under consideration.

As Elizabeth Sewell says, "the work is to master and be mastered by one's idea, a passionate process. . . . This Work has to do with language and metaphor, with the cosmos and the figuring self in relation. It is a living, thinking, growing, remembering work, between [the self] and the real world."[29]

In Particular

. . . the act of beginning necessarily involves an act of delimitation by which something is cut out of a great mass of material, and made to stand for, as well as be, a starting point.[30]

To find a point of departure and to choose events, texts, and people which support an inquiry such as this one become matters of extreme consequence. For it is within that kind of frame or paradigm that a perspective will be formed. The task of the imagination in this kind of endeavor is "to build in words a structure such that it shall conform in ways sensed as well as reasoned, dreamed as well as cogitated, to the total shape of some event or being as the human spirit perceives it."[31] Or, as Coleridge put it, "the task of the imagination is to apprehend the 'unity in multeity' of the objective world."[32] Buchler calls this

"a power to manipulate complexes in a perspectival order,"

and suggests:

> Plans may either precede methodic activity entirely
> or emerge articulately in the course of it; a
> structure may either be envisioned beforehand or
> fall into place gradually as though its parts were
> independently animate and mutually harmonious. . . .
> Method cannot be either purely mechanical or purely
> fortuitous.[33]

The plan of this study now needs to be elucidated more

pointedly, and more specific configurations must be cut out

from the mass of material. We are making preparations, in the

words of Elizabeth Sewell, "to lend our lives to the figure[s]"

we will be contemplating, and to learn a little bit more

about ourselves in the process of our explorations.[34]

The company I will keep during this journey includes,

at the fore, Miss Sewell, Hannah Arendt, Michael Polanyi and

Johan Huizinga. Also, Roger Caillois, Paul Ricoeur,

Maurice Merleau-Ponty and a host of other characters will

lend their visions of reality to the endeavor. Written

texts have been chosen for their relation to the primary

subject areas of the game and the human condition.

Having cut out this particular set of materials from a

mass, a tentative plan emerges for the generation of what

might be called a conceptual model. In outline fashion at

this point, Chapter Three will involve laying the groundwork

for what constitutes the essence of the game. Chapter Four,

"The Human Condition," will deal with the theories of,

primarily, Arendt, Polanyi, Sewell, and Merleau-Ponty. It
will also draw on a number of other authors who speak to the
concept of the human condition. These two chapters bear the
brunt of defining and describing terms which might be
necessary for the remainder of the study. Of particular
concern in this chapter will be the concepts of intentional-
ity and embodiment. They are important to this study as
characteristics of human beings who make choices and move
their bodies based on such volitions.

Chapters Three and Four will then be woven together as
Chapter Five, "The Human Condition of the Game." It will
be at this time in the discussion where points of connection
and sets of relationships will be established in the placing
of the structure of game into the realm of human affairs.
The question of what happens when people join in a game will
be addressed as a result of the web of relations woven be-
tween the previous two chapters. The construction of this
chapter will be interpretive in design, and will also lay
stress on teasing out the meanings which seem appropriate to
the particular configuration established. Chapter Six will
conclude this study and will lend itself to a discussion of
significance and implications of such a work as this.
Fleshing out this skeletal structure will be the appointed
work for the imagination, my imagination, and the images of
others joining in the soundless dialogues which might pro-
duce such a study.

Before all this can take place one more piece must be fitted into position. A question must be both posed and answered. The question is this: What is the premise upon which any of this plan rests? The answer simply is that the undergirding for all of this work lies in the tacit acceptance of the importance of textual exegesis. Textual interpretations, meanings, and understandings fall within an area of discovery often termed hermeneutics. Janet Harris suggests the following about hermeneutics:

> The major focus of hermeneutics is upon human processes of interpretation. This focus is defined broadly by some scholars to include the study of interpretation of cultures in general, and it is more narrowly confined by others primarily to the study of interpretation of literary texts.[35]

And Paul Ricoeur says that:

> Interpretation is the work of thought which consists in deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of meaning implied in the literal meaning. . . . there is interpretation wherever there is multiple meaning, and it is in interpretation that the plurality of meanings is made manifest.[36]

When the essential characteristics of phenomena appear to lie in concealment, an uncovering of meanings not immediately apparent must be effected by a process which involves more than just intuition. This is why the process of looking at texts and people and events is important. And it must be understood that this way of looking "always takes place within a tradition, a community, or a living current of thought, all of which display presuppositions and

exigencies."[37] The stream of everyday life in which we move
and participate contains the subjects and objects for con-
sideration. Interpretations are made standing in a present
which is composed of a past filled by images, ideas, and
stories which we somehow embody. Consequently, theories
generated do not stand over and against or independent of
the subjects and objects under consideration. "This implies
essentially 'to say what is', to recognize phenomena in
their facticity in a phenomenal sense rather than to con-
strue it from an epistemic stance."[38]

At the very heart of the matter is a crossing of
"facts," in Macmurray's sense, with "interpretations," in
Ricoeur's sense. The effort to draw out hidden meanings and
also to wait for disclosure constitutes the interpretive
process. Richard Palmer describes it this way:

> The method appropriate to the hermeneutical situation
> involving the interpreter and the text is one that
> places him in an attitude of openness to be addressed.
> . . . The attitude is one of expectancy. . . . He
> recognizes that he is not a knower seeking his object
> and taking possession of it. . . . The event that
> comes to language in the hermeneutical experience is
> something new that emerges. . . . In this event, made
> possible by the dialectical encounter with the mean-
> ing of the transmitted text, the hermeneutical
> experience finds its fulfillment.[39]

The critical word for consideration throughout this
brief discussion of hermeneutics has been 'text.' A
critical question to be asked, then, is what constitutes a
text? For an answer to that crucial question, the support
of Clifford Geertz, Paul Ricoeur, and Elizabeth Sewell will
be enlisted.

Ricoeur offers a paradigm for text which includes speech and performances. These two events, namely, words and deeds, constitute meaningful action.

> My claim is that action itself, action as meaningful, may become an object of science, without losing its character of meaningfulness, through a kind of objectification similar to the fixation which occurs in writing. [Action] constitutes a delineated pattern which has to be interpreted according to its inner connections.[40]

We begin to see here a claim made about meaningful action/ performances which are considered as worthy of interpretation as would be a literary text. Regarding performance, Hans-Georg Gadamer feels that "text is understood not because a relation between persons is involved but because of the participation in the subject matter that the text communicates."[41] It is precisely these claims of participation and performance in meaningful action that will form the basis of a hermeneutic inquiry which looks at game as text.

Geertz's now well-known study on the Balinese cockfight also takes up this concept of game, as meaningful action, as text. He says, "to put the matter this way is to engage in a bit of metaphorical refocusing of one's own for it shifts the analysis of cultural forms from an endeavor in general parallel to dissecting an organism . . . to one in general parallel with penetrating a literary text."[42] Harris offers a note on this kind of method: "The major goal of hermeneutic social research is to understand inter-subjective meanings which are formed by, and which form,

culture. Unlike the natural science research model, hermeneutic research is not directed toward <u>prediction</u> of cultural phenomena."[43]

Now another key term comes into focus here: in addition to text we are now concerned with the word 'culture.' For the present, culture will be taken in Arendt's sense: "Culture [is] the mode of intercourse of man with the things of the world."[44] The concern with culture revolves around that which "every civilization leaves behind as the quintessence and the lasting testimony of the spirit which animated it."[45] Ricoeur relates to this notion of culture through a hermeneutic approach. "Existence arrives at expression, at meaning, and at reflection only through the continual exegesis of all the significations that come to light in the world of culture."[46]

By treating the cockfight (as Geertz does) as game, as text, as cultural form, in which 'the saying something of something' takes place, there is the possibility of gaining access to meanings of human events and how they uphold culture. This concept of game as text as cultural form will become a pivotal concern later on in this paper. But for now, let us accept this as an important point in beginning our inquiry. That is, as a text appropriate for interpretation, game is a structure informed by people in action, and also gains significance due to its status as a cultural event.

The concept of language might be another way to see the interpretation of game as parallel to interpretation of modes of communication. The idea of text, constituted by language taken to be significant is an important one for Sewell. The word significant means, literally, that which makes signs. This includes for Sewell a world of people, things, and all the languages. These signs "have a bearing on the future, but they require interpretation before any-thing can be done with them."[47] And, for Sewell, all forms of communication and language make signs of some sort. Sewell interprets language to be constituted by five formal ways of making figures or signs: 1.) dance and ritual, where the body as a whole is employed formally; 2.) music and rhythm; 3.) plastic arts; 4.) mathematics; and, 5.) word-language.[48] For Sewell, relationships, ranging from the totally abstract to the fully corporeal, are made through these kinds of figuring or language systems.[49] But it is specifically the system of formal movement, inclusive of dance and ritual, with which I am concerned. For it is here that the game can be added as a mode of communication in need of interpretation. Sewell says, "the body can have and invent for itself a complete language of its own [through movement]. . . . It is not just any movement, but the understanding that from particular movements signifi-cances can arise."[50] And it is with this point, that Sewell parallels Ricoeur on the importance of a paradigm for

text and language which includes the interpretation of events tied to both words and deeds.

Since "the most important factor in the construction of a hermeneutic is the starting point,"[51] I would propose that a beginning has been established. A framework has been constructed through which this study will be articulated, and a number of pivots have been positioned on which this study will turn. The starting point of game as text, as cultural form, was made in good company. And many of the matters discussed so far invite further thought. Dwelling within this frame of reference means that a commitment has been made toward searching for some understanding of what is significant about our human lives.

> Our commitment is an expression of responsibility
> to our passion for knowledge and our self-set
> standards for accuracy, consistency, and relevance.
> . . . Without this personal commitment, our con-
> vivial sharing in the creative and unpredictable
> adventure of seeking the key to the mysteries of
> the [world] could not be carried on.[52]

What is proposed is to speak about action. We will find out what we know about movement, through myth, metaphor, and model. The game is the significant event and the human being is perceived as a figurer of performances. The phenomenon of agonal living, as a dimension of human experience, will be watched for its disclosure of what it means to interplay people, rules, and things.

By exercising our capacity to remember and judge, we will discern what constitutes a good fit for the emerging

paradigm. Discovery will be made "in two moves: one deliberate, the other spontaneous, the spontaneous move being evoked in ourselves by the action of our deliberate effort."[53] Radical roots will be exposed to a new rain of images as the model develops.

This may mean being united with magicians and madmen, children and 'savages.' But it is this very risk of joining dreams with scholarship that we must embrace if we want the chance to be a part of the game. For "it is this world which is the real world; not the world of fact but the world of significance; the world of fact become possibility, become existence with a meaning, a future, and a destiny. For a fact known is no longer merely a fact. It is a possibility of transformation."[54]

Captains ready?

Players ready?

Play

NOTES

CHAPTER II

[1] Paul Valéry, Dialogues, trans. William M. Stewart (New York: Pantheon Books, 1956), p. 145.

[2] Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 150.

[3] Muriel Rukeyser, The Traces of Thomas Hariot (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 299.

[4] Elizabeth Sewell, To Be a True Poem, ed. William E. Ray (Winston-Salem, N.C.: Hunter, 1979), p. 74.

[5] Elizabeth Sewell, "Land of Graven Images," Thought, 27, No. 106 (Autumn, 1952), 354.

[6] Michael Polanyi, "The Creative Imagination," Psychological Issues, 6, No. 2 (1969), 60.

[7] Bernard J. Boelen, Existential Thinking (New York: Herder, 1971), p. 72.

[8] Flannery O'Connor, Mystery and Manners, ed. Sally and Robert Fitzgerald (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1969), p. 50.

[9] Hannah Arendt, "Martin Heidegger at Eighty," in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, ed. Michael Murray (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1978), p. 296.

[10] Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Colophon-Harper and Row, 1966), p. 46.

[11] Boelen, p. 165.

[12] John J. L. Mood, <u>Rilke on Love and Other Difficulties</u> (New York: Norton, 1975), p. 94.

[13] Elizabeth Sewell, "The Death of the Imagination," <u>Thought</u>, 28, No. 110 (Autumn, 1953), 424-425.

[14] T. H. White, <u>The Sword in the Stone</u> (New York: Dell, 1939), p. 250.

[15] Polanyi, "Creative Imagination," pp. 66-67.

[16] Polanyi, "Creative Imagination," p. 69.

[17] Polanyi, <u>Personal Knowledge</u>, p. 65.

[18] Richard Gelwick, <u>The Way of Discovery</u> (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977), p. 76.

[19] Michael Polanyi, <u>The Tacit Dimension</u> (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor-Doubleday, 1966), pp. 76-77.

[20] Polanyi, "Creative Imagination," p. 69.

[21] John Macmurray, <u>The Structure of Religious Experience</u> (New Haven, 1936; rpt. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1971), p. 1.

[22] Macmurray, p. 3.

[23] Thomas S. Kuhn, <u>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions</u>, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 158.

[24] Polanyi, "Creative Imagination," p. 54.

[25] Suzanne K. Langer, <u>Problems of Art</u> (New York: Scribner's, 1957), p. 3.

[26] Mood, pp. 25, 13.

[27] O'Connor, pp. 103, 41.

[28] Pierre Thévenaz, What is Phenomenology? trans. James M. Edie et al., ed. James M. Edie (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962), pp. 91, 104.

[29] Sewell, To Be a True Poem, pp. 125, 127.

[30] Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Random House, 1978), p. 16.

[31] Sewell, "Land of Graven Images," p. 359.

[32] Owen Barfield, "Imagination and Inspiration," in Interpretation: The Poetry of Meaning, ed. Stanley Romaine Hopper and David L. Miller (New York: Harcourt, 1967), p. 73.

[33] Justus Buchler, The Concept of Method (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1961), p. 101, 53-55.

[34] Sewell, To Be a True Poem, p. 141.

[35] Janet C. Harris, "Hermeneutics, Interpretive Cultural Research, and the Study of Sport," expanded version of a paper presented to The North American Society for the Sociology of Sport (Denver, October, 1980), p. 3.

[36] Paul Ricoeur, "Existence and Hermeneutics," trans. Kathleen McLaughlin, in The Conflict of Interpretations, ed. Don Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1974), p. 13.

[37] Ricoeur, "Existence and Hermeneutics," p. 3.

[38] Ernst Vollrath, "Hannah Arendt and the Method of Political Thinking," trans. Hans Fantel, Social Research, 44, No. 1 (1977), 163.

[39] Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1969), p. 209.

[40] Paul Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text," Social Research, 38, No. 3 (1971), 538.

[41] Palmer, p. 185.

[42] Clifford Geertz, "Deep Play: Notes on a Balinese Cockfight," Daedalus, 101, No. 1 (1972), 26.

[43] Harris, p. 8.

[44] Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1968), p. 213.

[45] Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 201.

[46] Ricoeur, "Existence and Hermeneutics," p. 22.

[47] Sewell, To Be a True Poem, p. 157.

[48] Elizabeth Sewell, The Orphic Voice (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 29.

[49] Sewell, To Be a True Poem, p. 175.

[50] Sewell, "Death of the Imagination," p. 428.

[51] David M. Rasmussen, Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical Anthropology (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 119.

[52] William T. Scott, "The Gentle Rain - A Search for Understanding," in _Intellect and Hope: Essays in the Thought of Michael Polanyi_, ed. Thomas A. Langford and William H. Poteat (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 273-274.

[53] Polanyi, "Creative Imagination," p. 65.

[54] Macmurray, p. 72.

CHAPTER III

THE GAME

"Here begins the Great Game."[1]

Before the text of the game can be identified, it is
necessary to re-search what has emerged regarding some
events and ideas important to an understanding of the game.
The material gathered appears to suggest a three-step un-
folding. The first section deals with the myths and his-
tories of game; the second direction attempts to describe,
define, and delineate what game is; and the third part sug-
gests the use of game as a metaphor or model for explaining
points of view not necessarily directly related to an in-
vestigation of game. But this is not to suggest that clear
lines of demarcation exist for each of the three segments.
One part does not end precisely at a point where the next
part begins. Myths, descriptions, and models cannot be
partitioned out in simple separation from one another, be-
cause they, all together, bear on the nature of the game.

If Kipling was correct when he said, "The Game is so
large that one sees but a little at a time,"[2] then a way has
to be found through this labyrinthine structure in order to
uncover bits of evidence which will lead toward establishing
the text of game needed for this reading. The tripartite

rendering of the game, as one method for recovering its posture, will yield information from which a text of game will emerge. An overview of this sort is not intended to be exhaustive of the existing literature. Rather, it is intended to present a picture of what appears to have emerged over time concerning the enigmatic and complex phenomenon called game.

Concerning the method of this chapter, judgments were made regarding the best way to make sense of the material. Since the literature is extensive and cuts across many disciplines, some approach that suggested reasonable order needed to be found. No evidence indicates that previous work on game has been approached in the manner which will follow. To judge that the material falls out in three ways is the way I see it. This is not necessarily the way others have seen it or even would see it should they have the opportunity to undertake a similar study.

Numerous configurations of the data were looked at before the present one was settled upon. With such a huge number of events and writings to choose from, the selection of materials representing the game became a major problem. For it is upon this selection and its subsequent organization that this dissertation takes its stand. The judgmental risk implies that the essence of game as it bears upon reality issues from its myths, its definitions, and its metaphors. Also implicit within the judgments of the

subsequent pages is a personal commitment to laying out a
model-text which best represents the phenomenon of game.

Myths and Stories

For the time being, a suspension of the lines of demar-
cation among play, game, and sport will have to be accepted.
Additionally, the activity of dance will form part of the
discussion. The reason for this suspension of delineation
is due to the fact that our starting point for looking at
games incorporates these kinds of activities in order to
represent some more comprehensive ideas. The stories and
myths which have clustered around the game also involve
play, sport, and dance. All forms at the moment have some
bearing on the constitution of game. Where one form leaves
off and another begins is as much a problem for the method
of this chapter as it is for understanding the nature of
the phenomenon. How much success is evidenced in cutting
out a true game, separate from the other forms, will be
determined at a later point in discussion.

The starting point, then, will revolve around some rec-
ollection of earlier events which seem to be appropriate.
These events come to us in the form of myth and story which
are taken from both Eastern and Western civilizations. It
is important to remember that myth is not synonymous with
make-believe; rather, a myth seeks to give a real account
of phenomena and also provides a way for ordering any

civilization's way of seeing, including our present one.
David Miller suggests, "Without myth there is no meaning,
nor life at all. It is simply that our myth-framework has
shifted. . . . We are technological, and so, whether we
realize it or not, is our functioning mythology."[3] In
Benjamin Ladner's words, "Myths must be taken seriously as
ways of ordering man's experience in the universe."[4] Myths
from older worlds and those from the present-day must be
considered important to research, to telling what we know,
and to explaining what we do.

At the heart of every civilization is a foundation myth.
Jürgen Moltmann says, "The primeval becoming has the char-
acteristics of a game. Gods and men appear in the totality,
as if they were part of the game."[5] An important Hindu
theme is līlā which is associated with divine play and sport.
David Kinsley suggests that the gods create the world in
play, and that, "The gods as players are revealed to act
spontaneously, unpredictably, and sometimes tumultuously."[6]
Hugo Rahner feels that "We cannot grasp the secret of homo
ludens, unless we first in all reverence, consider the
matter of Deus ludens, God the creator, who, one might say,
as a part of a gigantic game called the world of atoms and
spirits into being."[7] Myths about play thus start as myths
about beginning. Or, as Miller puts it, "Both Eastern and
Western religious thought contain creation stories which
rely on the word 'play' as a basic metaphor for understand-
ing our world."[8]

Folk games and ritualized games form a mode for acting
out stories of the gods. Gerardus Van der Leeuw calls this
concept one of <u>sacer</u> <u>ludus</u> in which:

> Man stylizes the events of his life through pre-
> determined movement, and connects this with something
> which took place in primeval times. A work of art
> arises which we call dance, game, drama, but also
> liturgy, and for which I suggest the same <u>sacer</u> <u>ludus</u>.
> . . . The <u>sacer</u> <u>ludus</u> occurs in innumerable vari-
> ations. . . but always finally returns to a unity
> from the multiplicity and confusion of human affairs.[9]

This sacred or divine connection to game prompts Kinsley to
say, "In both play and religion man exercises and is cap-
tured by his world creating, imaginative faculty. And I am
indeed reluctant to call this faculty a vestigial aspect of
man's racial childhood."[10]

The significance of play, game, and dance being tied
to sacred and cosmic origins has been well explored by
Huizinga, Kinsley, Moltmann, Miller, Rahner and Van der
Leeuw. Biblical references such as ". . . and the people
sat down to eat and to drink, and rose up to play," to
"David leaping and dancing before the Lord,"[11] suggest the
linkage between religion and game. The connection between
game and the divine myth of creation is an important one
with the observance of revelry, ritual, and myth central to
religion.

Certain Greco-Roman myths include stories of game. A
saying of Heraclitus is: "Time is a child playing, moving
counters on a game board. The kingdom belongs to the

child."[12] Zeus is often portrayed playing with a ball, and

Dionysus is the playful, boisterous child who, in many ways,

is likened to the god Krsna, the embodiment of līla, in the

Hindu religion.[13] The poet Ovid relates the legend of

Hyacinth throwing the discus with Phoebus in a friendly

contest:

> Then, when the youth and Phoebus were well stripped,
> And gleaming with rich olive oil, they tried
> A Friendly contest with the discus. First
> Phoebus, well-poised, sent it awhirl through air,
> And cleft the clouds beyond with its broad weight;
> From which at length it fell down to earth,
> A certain evidence of strength and skill.
> Heedless of danger Hyacinthus rushed
> For eager glory of the game resolved
> To get the discus. . . .[14]

Miller claims that "The origin of ideas about play is

in religion."[15] For Van der Leeuw sacer ludus is linked to

the parade, the dance, and the game. "When one wishes to

describe the course of the world," he says, "one cannot

avoid reaching back to the image of ordered movement. It is

for this reason that the Muses and Graces dance, Apollo and

Dionysus, Shiva and Krishna."[16] Van der Leeuw states

further, "Among primitive men, every game . . . is a

religious activity, a contact with invisible powers."[17]

Within the area of philosophy, the writings of Plato

contain many references to play, game, athletics, and dance.

One such from Laws is: "Life must be lived as play, playing

certain games, making sacrifices, singing and dancing."[18]

Athletics was another important concern. Daniel Dombrowski

suggests that "For Plato, athletics is meant not only for personal fitness, but also as a public endeavor."[19] Plato believed that studies for children should include dance and wrestling. In a particularly famous quotation from Laws he says that "Man is a plaything in the hand of God, and truly this is the best thing about him."[20] Miller contends that Plato's ideas represented a transition from living under a Homeric mythology to living based upon the ideals of philosophy.[21] In this shift, play, games, dance, and athletics continued to maintain a strong and central position in life. However, historically this transition resulted in the start of some dualistic concepts which have influenced the course of thinking in Western civilization. The consequences of this dualistic approach toward being--namely, the separation of mind from body, myth from reality, primitive from civilized, and the serious from the frivolous--will be examined later in this inquiry.

Johan Huizinga feels that "The two ever-recurrent forms in which civilization grows in and as play are the sacred performance and the festal contest."[22] Therefore, dancing, singing, and the playing of games as part of these festivities and celebrations must be considered important. The ultimate representation of this notion lies in the importance accorded the four great national athletic meetings of ancient Greece, held at regular intervals at Olympia, at Delphi, on the Isthmus of Corinth, and at Nemea. "These

games were in each case part of one of the four Panhellenic

festivals, the most important of all the religious festivals

of ancient Greece."[23] Linking games to the sacred and to

celebration was a consistent characterization of the ancient

games, and would continue to be a dominant theme for the

playing of games for many centuries. In fact, the secular-

ization of play did not begin to take hold until the seven-

teenth and eighteenth centuries when the rise of dualistic

thinking began to have its effects.

Judith Swaddling reports on the Olympic games:

> Every fourth year for a thousand years, from 776 B.C.
> to A.D. 395, the pageantry of the Olympic festival
> attracted citizens from all over the Greek world. . . .
> The Games were held in honour of the god Zeus, the
> supreme god of Greek mythology, and a visit to
> Olympia was also a pilgrimage to his most sacred
> place, the grove known as the Altis.[24]

Epictetus recorded in his <u>Dissertations</u>:

> There are enough troublesome things in life; aren't
> things just as bad at the Olympic festival? Aren't
> you scorched there by the fierce heat? Aren't you
> crushed in the crowd? . . . Doesn't the rain soak
> you to the skin? Aren't you bothered by the noise?
> . . . But it seems to me that you are well able to
> bear and indeed gladly endure all this, when you
> think of the gripping spectacles that you will see.[25]

The poet Pindar composed a number of Odes in honor of the

victors of various events in the games. The Ode was written

to be accompanied by music and a dance. Geoffrey Conway

tells that "The athletic contest celebrated by the poem is

not directly described, but it often colours the metaphors

and similes used. . . . The poem proceeds to praise the

victor and his success. . . . A due tribute to the tutelary god of the Games in which the victory was won - to Zeus, Apollo or Poseidon as the case may be - was always included by Pindar."[26] An example of one of Pindar's Ode's follows:

> For the Gods give all the means of mortal greatness.
> They grant men skill,
> Might of hand and eloquence.
> My praise is ripe for One:
> I do not mean
> To make a No-Throw with the javelin's bronze cheek
> That quivers in my hand,
> But with a great cast to outdistance all the field.[27]

For Pindar, according to the translator C. M. Bowra, victory in the games "illustrated the fact of glory as something which came from the Gods and the reality of success which is won by a proper use of natural gifts and laborious effort."[28]

About the games, M. I. Finley and H. W. Pleket make an important point: "The ancient world never knew anything like the modern idea of a separation between church and state. One of the community's main functions was the regular and proper performance of a variety of religious duties. . . . Religious games were official public activities, the responsibility of the controlling community who were normally laymen, not priests."[29] Swaddling puts it this way, "There is no modern parallel for Olympia; it would have to be a site combining a sports complex and a centre for religious devotion, something like a combination of Wembley Stadium and Westminster Abbey."[30] Peter Brown says that "The modern reader . . . hoping to find an equivalent in

ancient Olympia to the modern events . . . under the same name is bound for a great surprise: it would be as if a sports correspondent, setting out to cover the Montreal Olympics, should find that he had been sent, instead, to cover the Holy Week ceremonies at Seville."[31]

Many of the events of the ancient game continue to exist, for example, running events, discus throwing, javelin throwing, the long jump, wrestling, boxing, and horse racing are all part of the current sporting world. Prize-giving, training sessions, stadia, gymnasia, and swimming baths also remain in the contemporary world from the ancient games. But the games of antiquity also included ritual sacrifices, feasting, processions, parades, prayers, musical contests, singing, ceremony, and revelry.[32] Thus, the link of game to a world of the sacred and the festal remained. It is also important to understand the nature of games as contests as viewed by the Greeks. Huizinga says, "That the majority of Greek contests were fought out in deadly earnest is no reason for separating the agon from play, or for denying the play-character of the former. The contest has all the formal and most of the functional features of the game."[33]

Finley and Pleket report that the origins of the Greek passion for competitive games may be found in Homer's Iliad, which tells of the games Achilles organized to accompany the burial rites of Patroclus. "The games in the

Iliad reveal that as far back as our evidence goes the
Greeks did not draw the line between the sacred and the
secular. . . . There was no inconsistency between worship
and competitive games as parts of a single religious cele-
bration."[34] Finley and Pleket note that, "Greek (and Roman)
society was shot through with the competitive spirit. The
normal Greek word for an athletic contest . . . was _agon_,
which could be used for any contest or struggle. . . .
Choruses and playwrights competed, as did runners or
wrestlers."[35]

But the gods finally did desert Olympia and the games
of passionate contest declined. Lucian, during the second
century A.D., wrote in his book Anacharsis:

> If the Olympic Games were being held now . . . you
> would be able to see for yourself why we attach
> such great importance to athletics. No-one can
> describe in mere words the extraordinary . . .
> pleasure derived from them and which you yourself
> would enjoy if you were seated among the spectators
> feasting your eyes on the prowess and the stamina
> of the athletes, the beauty and power of their
> bodies, their skill, strength, courage, and
> tenacity. You would never stop . . . applauding
> them.[36]

We now move in this inquiry from the days of the ancient
games to the Middle Ages. Roger Caillois cites various
implements and playthings which marked the games of the
Middle Ages, such as masks, kites, dice, tops, checkerboards,
and swings. And he speaks of games such as tag, hopscotch,
climbing greasy poles, string games, pantomimes and
roundelays as being prominent.[37] All these games and their

implements were still linked to festival and celebration.
Important among medieval festivals was the Feast of Fools
which survived until the sixteenth century. This cele-
bration, in its revelries and rituals, was still related to
"cosmic history and the stories of man's spiritual quest."[38]
"On that colorful occasion . . . priests and townsfolk
donned masks, sang . . . and generally kept the whole world
awake with revelry and satire."[39] Harvey Cox says, "Only
man celebrates. Festivity is a human form of play through
which man appropriates an extended area of life, including
the past, into his own experience. . . . Fantasy is a form
of play that extends the frontiers of the future."[40]

Rahner has researched the medieval rituals of the
Seville cathedral boys "dancing in groups of six; they per-
form the dance before God according to strict and sacred
rules that have come down from time immemorial."[41]
Medieval mysticism takes up the theme of the dance:

> Tomorrow shall be my dancing day;
> I would my true love did so chance
> To see the legend of my play,
> To call my true love to the dance.[42]

This verse designates Christ the Redeemer as "the Great
Dancer who came to earth to teach man how to celebrate."[43]
Rahner recounts the sacral dance and ball games carried out
by bishop, clergy, and townspeople after Mass on Easter day
in various French towns during the Middle Ages.[44]

Huizinga says, "Mediaeval life was brimful of play: the joyous and unbuttoned play of the people."[45] The themes of play, dance, festivity and celebration abound. Henry Suso, a fourteenth-century German mystic, describing heaven as a playground,wrote: "Here are harps and fiddles; here they sing, and leap and dance, and play all joyful games."[46] Writing of Śiva, Allama, a medieval Hindu poet and saint said: "I saw him juggle his body as a ball in the depth of the sky, play with a ten-hooded snake in a basket."[47] The extraordinary was real and the connection to other worlds was made possible through play, dance, and festival during the Middle Ages.

In Elizabethan England, people of all classes enjoyed a variety of simple sports and amusements particularly at local fairs and festivals. "If Elizabethans had to work long hours at hard tasks, they nevertheless found time for play and gaiety."[48] Early forms of cricket, handball, hurling, and soccer were in evidence. Fencing, archery, and fishing took on the elements of contest, and golf, tennis, and running were part of the official curricula at some schools in Scotland during the sixteenth century.[49] But simple amusements and recreations were often associated with festivals celebrating special occasions such as the end of harvest, sheepshearing time, or the start of spring. The games were played in public and open to all people in the community. Many of the children's games from these times

still survive in some form today. For example, blindman's buff, hopscotch, tag, and ring-around-the-rosey continue to be played, and, playthings such as marbles, pegs, and tops continue to be used in games.[50]

John Betts cites the Irish playing a form of hockey, the Spanish playing ball games, the Greeks playing a form of rugby and the Persians playing polo from very early times.[51] Bowling, billiards, cock-fighting, hunting, racquet games, ball games, horse racing, and sailing contests all had their roots well established by the Middle Ages. Literally hundreds of games, sports, dances, amusements, and contests can be cited throughout the annals of all cultures to these earlier points in history. Poets, painters, potters and journalists have been telling the tales of game endeavors for centuries, and artifacts of their work remain from which a picture of game emerges.

What appears to be clear, at least into the seventeenth century, is the existence of a link between play, game, sport, dance on the one hand, and festivity, celebration, ritual, the sacred, community, special occasions and seasonal events on the other. The calendar was full of festival days, and it is not hard to imagine that as difficult as life must have been in its labor, its activity in public was surely enjoyable.

In more contemporary times, namely, the eighteenth through our own century, it is important to note a change in

character in the events surrounding game. Prior to the eighteenth century, what held a community together was its festivity, its religion, its celebration, and its special occasions. Part of that revelry was linked directly to playing and dancing together and in public. The movement into the industrial and technological age caused a secularization of play, a splitting off of play from the significant events in the life of a community, and a tendency to characterize play as frivolous and unnecessary to life. As the shift toward progress and production was made, play became an adjunct to the so-called "real" and serious matters of life within many cultures of Western civilization.

This study cannot catalogue the history of Western civilization, even in dealing with matters which bear so directly on the development of culture (namely, play-game-sport-dance). Yet, before moving into times which are a bit more familiar, a few events have to be noted. It was suggested earlier that the seeds had been planted for the secularizing of play. The either-or dualisms initially evidenced in Greek philosophical works in fact were established when the ancient games of Greece were in full flower. Another event of importance occurred during Greco-Roman times. From 350-300 B.C., during the time of the overwhelming conquests of Alexander the Great, the Greeks imposed their language and customs on the people of their conquered lands. The conquest of the Middle East resulted

in some Hebrew scriptures being lost and the remainder
being translated into Greek. Jews were forced to speak
Greek, and Greek ways of life were forced upon all people
who fell under Greek domination.[52] The Biblical writer,
John, chose the Greek word logos to represent "The Word."
In Greek logos meant to reckon, to think or to reason; in
Hebrew The Word or dbr meant action, deeds, dynamic move-
ment, or speech in the form of negotiation between God and
people. This use of logos was a forerunner of the word
"logic." The Romans translated logos by the Latin word
ratio, from which we get the word "rational."[53] The
effects of these subtle linguistic alterations were not, of
course, felt immediately. But, they set the stage for the
splitting of mind from body, rationality from action, and
work from play.

Now, says E. A. Burtt, "The cosmology underlying our
mental processes is but three centuries old - a mere infant
in the history of thought - and yet we cling to it with the
same unembarrassed zeal with which a young father fondles
his new born baby."[54] What Burtt is referring to is the
taking up of the Cartesian cogito, the method of doubting
in order to establish knowledge, Galileo's mathematical ac-
count of the universe, and the invention of the first
scientific instruments including the telescope. Heretofore,
as Burtt points out:

> The Middle Ages man was in every sense the centre
> of the universe. The whole world of nature was
> believed to be teleologically subordinate to him
> and his eternal destiny. Toward this conviction
> the two great movements which had become united in
> the medieval synthesis, Greek philosophy and Judeo-
> Christian theology, had irresistibly led. The
> prevailing world-view of the period was marked by
> a deep and persistent assurance that man, with
> his hopes and ideals, was the all-important, even
> controlling fact in the universe.[55]

This prevailing medieval world-view changed radically in light of the work of Copernicus, Kepler, Descartes, Galileo, and Newton. They all challenged the legitimacy of using unaided sense experience for making nature seem fully intelligible and immediately understandable.

While history bears the marks of the accuracy of their challenge, Western civilization also bears the scars for having had its whole cosmology turned upside down. Human beings were no longer to trust their senses, were no longer of central importance in the universe, came to rely on abstract mathematics and technical instruments for knowledge, and began their epistemological enterprises methodologically with doubt. Logos was reduced to logic, cause-effect thinking came into vogue, and the body became a problem for the mind.

To return to the story of game at this point in history places us at a problematic juncture. Once again, it is difficult to draw exact lines of demarcation concerning a cosmology which embraced play as integral to its well-being, as opposed to one which split play away from its central

focus. The events which took place during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had their effect on the game. What effect that was must be left to a later point in the discussion.

The competitive team and communal games of England were, like much of its culture, imported to the American colonies. The seventeenth century also witnessed the rise of Puritanism in the colonies. While it is often reported that that attitude toward games was repressive, it would be unfair to suggest that the Puritans suppressed sports and games entirely in early America. The problem of the Puritans lay in their beliefs about "temporals." Temporals were regarded as God's gifts of cheering pleasures and restoratives, and were to be enjoyed richly but in their proper time and place. Games and sports fell under this concept of temporals; so it wasn't the suppression of these activities as much as an attitude of properly placing them that prevailed.[56] Betts reports that sports were both enjoyed and legislated against in the major colonial towns for a century prior to the American revolution.[57] Accounts of bowling, shooting, foot races, golf, cockfighting, sleigh-riding, singing, dancing, horse racing and billiards can be found in the records of seventeenth and eighteenth-century America. But as Betts points out, the combination of certain religious convictions coupled with the clearing of new lands and the building of towns left little time for merry-making during the founding days of America.[58]

Edwin Cady contends that the ball games and team sports of England made their important resurgence in America during the early part of the nineteenth century.[59] Betts concurs with this in saying, "Only after two centuries of settlement in this New World was sport to emerge as an important institution in American life."[60] It is interesting to note that Huizinga states:

> What we are concerned with here is the transition from occasional amusement to the system of organized clubs and matches. . . . The great ball-games in particular require the existence of permanent teams, and herein lies the starting point of modern sport. . . . That the process started in nineteenth-century England is understandable. . . . England became the cradle and focus of modern sporting life.[61]

Somewhere between the shifting cosmology of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe and the subsequent colonization of America, replete with its religious convictions and ethical concerns about hard work and industry, lies a change in the position and shape of game in culture. Emerging from the early nineteenth century and onwards is a marking off of game and sport into a posture which most closely resembles that which we see today. Part of this posture suggests a separating of the adult play world from that of the child in both structure of events and attitude toward them. Whereas during the Middle Ages, for example, people were involved in celebration and the play that accompanied communal festivity, the increasing contemporary secularization of play and its separation from the rest of

life meant that the nature of play seemed to be affected based upon whether one was young or old. The particularizing of play, game, sport, and dance had begun, and efforts to shape each according to content, intent, age levels, and reasons for participation continue to this day.

The splitting of the adult play world from that of the child becomes important for consideration. The literature suggests this direction by referring often to the imaginative play-game world of children and the more organized game-sport world of the adult. It is game, though, which still retains a central place at least in this trio of words, play-game-sport, and now has to link all these modes of activity together in some way and for some reason.

But, before embarking on this next bit of the investigation, note must be taken of the historical and geographical movement of the discussion so far. Game and its associated activities were the sources for myths and stories in both Eastern and Western civilizations from very early times. The focus of this essay began to narrow to Western civilization inclusive of Greco-Roman days. For the Middle Ages, Western Europe was primary to the discussion. The final movement toward England and the United States is deliberate. For it is primarily the British and American tradition of games that now realizes a central place in the contemporary paradigm of game in Western civilization. The three events which have been identified as being important

to both a changing and emerging nature of game are the living of life under the ideals of Greek philosophy, the imposition of Greek language and customs upon the Judaic world, and the mathematical and scientific revolutions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. All these events in their own ways influenced the resultant British/American paradigm of game.

It is this conception of game toward which a turn is made in order to find the final pieces for this historical overview. Children's games, particularly those associated with rhymes and chants, have been handed on from generation to generation. William Newell feels that most of the games and songs of American children are of English origin.[62] While there is a certain invisibility of children's culture, still embedded in their playing is an allusion to myths of the past. Newell's research indicates that many games have always belonged to children themselves, but no clear line can be drawn for every game, because for centuries many of the same games, rhymes, dances, and songs were favored by men and women as well as children.[63] However, an acting out of stories through ballads, songs, dances, rituals, and games has passed in many quarters from the adult world to the world of children, where children in turn have the responsibility of passing on to other children these traditional activities. It is within this child-to-child complex that many songs, games, and dances of past generations have flourished.

Iona and Peter Opie are concerned in their research with street play and games where nothing is needed but the players themselves. They characterize the spirit of street play with words such as zest, variety, contradiction, and disorderliness.[64] They count on oral tradition being in operation within the world of children, and say:

> Although some games have disappeared, and many have altered over the years, it can still be said that the way to understand the 'wanton sports' of Elizabethan days, and the horseplay of even earlier times, is to watch the contemporary child engrossed in his traditional pursuits on the metalled floor of a twentieth-century city.[65]

Newell holds that the games of children reflect an affectionate taking up of the past, and the inheritance of games left to children by children is one which involves the elements of the sacred, the mysterious, and the serious.[66] Huizinga says, "The unity and indivisibility of belief and unbelief, the indissoluble connection between sacred earnest and 'make-believe' or 'fun' are best understood in the concept of play."[67] He sees within the child's play-world a sense of mystic unity between the child and the plaything. The Opies suggest, "When children play in the street they not only avail themselves of one of the oldest play-places in the world, they engage in some of the oldest and most interesting of games, for they are games tested and confirmed by centuries of children, who have played them and passed them on, as children continue to do, without reference to print, parliament, or adult propriety."[68] Newell

concurs by saying, "The old games, which have prevailed and become familiar . . . are recommended by the quaintness of formulas which come from the remote past, and strike the young imagination as a sort of sacred law."[69]

What seems to be significant about the child's play world is that it continues to embody the spirit of the play world from the Middle Ages and prior times when play, game, song, dance, ritual, and joyous celebration were linked to tradition and myth, which were linked to the cosmos and the sacred. Newell, Huizinga, Caillois, and the Opies all claim for the child's world an importance to carrying on the significant activity of play. The Opies feel that:

> We overlook the fact that as we have grown older
> our interests have changed, we have given up
> haunting the places where children play, we no
> longer have eyes for the games. . . . Unlike the
> sports of grown men, for which ground has to be
> permanently set aside, children's games are ones
> which the players adapt to their surroundings and
> time available.[70]

It may be that Rilke has captured it best:

> . . . with the child's disposition, with what
> he has received. Received on long days of confiding,
>   in those countless
> hours of confessing play, when he lifted and proved
>   himself
> against the unenvying, distantly fashioning You--
> came by dividing his strength with another, to
>   experience himself
> and his own freshly growing reserves.
>
> Expanses of playing! Then the ripening self passed
>   further on
> in more blissful discovery . . .
> Is Cosmic space for a child too small: space for
>   the feelings
> you stretch in amazement between you, intensified
>   space.[71]

The separating of a child's world of games from the adult world of games seems to have taken place effectively from the eighteenth century onwards, at least in both Britain and the United States. William Blake, the eighteenth-century poet, suggests the separation in a fragment of one of his poems from <u>Songs of Innocence and Experience</u>:

They laugh at our play,
And soon they all say,
Such were the joys,
When we all girls and boys,
In our youth time were seen,
On the Ecchoing Green.[72]

For adults, in the United States particularly, the impact of the Industrial Revolution and the urban movement of the middle years of the nineteenth century led to an extensive establishing of organized competitive games and activities of all sorts. The pastimes of agrarian and village communities started to give way to the more organized games of cities and large masses of people. Huizinga says, "Ever since the last quarter of the nineteenth century games, in the guise of sport, have been taken more and more seriously. The rules have become increasingly strict and elaborate. Records are established at a higher, or faster, or longer level than was ever conceivable before."[73] Cady believes that basic to the American experience are the themes of agonism and fraternity. He suggests that all kinds of experiences and activities, including those of

religion, agriculture, the arts, child-rearing, family, business, law, politics, pleasure, and social groupings are lived out under some formula containing <u>agon</u> and fraternity. He says of pre-industrial America in particular, "All [experiences] were both [agonal and fraternal], all ambivalent and therefore laden with tension and conflict."[74]

Betts says that the English preceded us by several decades during the nineteenth century in the organization of sport, and it was their influence which was a major factor in the rise of organized sport in the United States.[75] Cady states:

> Competitive sports of all sorts 'took off' in Great
> Britain during the second half of the nineteenth
> century. Not cricket, soccer, and rugger alone,
> but almost everything now in the Olympic Games to-
> gether with sports that are not, like tennis, be-
> come more than past-times. . . . The rest of the
> English-speaking world, including the United
> States, followed eagerly, inventing games of their
> own.[76]

Merlyn, the magician in T. H. White's book, <u>The Sword and the Stone</u>, was rumored to say:

> The trouble with the English Aristocracy is that
> they are games-mad, that's what it is, games-
> mad.[77]

And while the boys, Wart and Kay, practiced tilting and horsemanship, Merlyn grumbled about their athletics saying, "Nowadays people seemed to think that you were an educated man if you could knock another man off a horse. . . . The craze for games was the ruination of true scholarship."[78]

But in celebration of the athlete, Walt Whitman wrote in 1867:

> On a flat road runs the well-train'd runner;
> He is lean and sinewy, with muscular legs;
> He is thinly clothed - he leans forward as he runs,
> With lightly closed fists, and arms partially rais'd.[79]

In 1896, A. E. Housman published his famous poem, "To An Athlete Dying Young." A verse from that poem reads:

> The time you won your town the race
> We chaired you through the marketplace;
> Man and boy stood cheering by,
> And home we brought you shoulder-high.[80]

On a more cynical note, Sarah Cleghorn wrote in 1917:

> The golf links lie so near the mill
> That almost every day
> The laboring children can look out
> And see the men at play[81]

Rudyard Kipling in his nineteenth-century novel Kim praises Kim for the love of the game for its own sake. The love of the purposeless Great Game runs as a theme through-out the novel, and prompted Hannah Arendt to call the novel Kim the only one of the imperialist era in which a sense of genuine brotherhood existed.[82] Lewis Carroll, the nine-teenth-century author, used the games of croquet and chess in his famous Alice stories. A fragment from Adventures in Wonderland reads, "Alice thought she had never seen such a curious croquet-ground in her life: it was all ridges and furrows; the croquet balls were live hedgehogs, and the mallets live flamingoes."[83]

In the twentieth century Hermann Hesse wrote his
masterpiece Magister Ludi or The Glass Bead Game. This
novel about Joseph Knecht, The Master of the Game, won Hesse
the Nobel prize in 1946. Play, game, and sport continued
to demand the attention of writers attempting to sort out
its mysteries, its themes, its magic. And with the rise of
magazines and newspapers during the nineteenth century, and
radio and television during the twentieth, many people held
witness to the events of games and sport. Moreover, the
rise of both the industrial and technological complexes dur-
ing the twentieth century have resulted in a larger and more
affluent middle class with increased money and time to spend
on games and sports. "The leisure classes," as Cady says,
"were of many intermediate grades from the farm boy playing
ball after chores to the banker with a boat."[84]

Games and sports became part of the fabric of school
life. Instructional physical education, intramural, inter-
scholastic and intercollegiate activities provided young as
well as older people with extensive sport and game programs.
Betts says, "The penetration of sport into every level of
our educational system, into programs of social agencies and
private clubs, and into leisure-time pursuits has been so
progressively successful as to mark it as one of the im-
portant social trends [of the twentieth century]."[85] Ellen
Gerber characterizes the rise of sport, women's in particu-
lar, in one century's time by saying, "It has encompassed

activities ranging from simple recreational pastimes to high level international competition."[86]

Concerning the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, W. H. Auden's words seem apt: "And, Homo Ludens, surely, is your child."[87] But just what is the nature of Homo Ludens, considering the developments of the last two hundred years? Certainly, at the adult level, words like competition, organization, leisure-time, recreation, teams, pleasure, equipment, money, skill, training, social, and strict rules seem, on the surface, to have replaced the words sacred, mystical, communal, festival, dance, song, celebration, cosmic, and revelry. Additionally, massive levels of both participation and spectating are recorded in relation to all kinds of game events. Game language has pervaded virtually every walk of life. Sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, economists, politicians, theologians, and philosophers have taken to deriving theories from game and about game. A range of explanations have come to account for why people play and what play is. Some of these will form the basis for the next section of this inquiry.

Descriptions and Definitions

While the previous section followed a more or less chronological route, the one which seems to serve this section best is a thematic approach. The literature comes predominantly from twentieth-century writers. Once again,

the words play, game, sport and dance will be mixed to-
gether, often without any attempt to suggest what each might
mean in isolation. That this complex of words has aroused
the critical, analytical, and theoretical world should not
be surprising, especially in light of the events discussed
in the last section.

The literature can be grouped in three ways. The first
group of writers is concerned with meanings of words and the
definitions of events. For purposes of this discussion, the
work of Johan Huizinga is considered seminal. Prior to
Huizinga's work on play during the 1930's, theories about
why people played were suggested by authors such as Groos,
Schiller, Mead, James, Watson, Freud, Dewey, and a number of
other physiologists, and behavioral and social scientists.
This material was written during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, and, as R. B. Alderman concludes,
it "centered around play as a biological phenomenon, instinc-
tive in nature, and physiological in function," with a sub-
sequent movement toward explanations relating to "psycho-
analysis, behaviorism, and cognition."[88]

These positions, while interesting, are not the focus
of this study and no more than mention can be made of their
importance in establishing the area of play as a viable
field of study. For it is the work of Johan Huizinga, who
took up the position that play is a basis of culture, which
is important to this inquiry.

The work of Huizinga became, for many, the centerpiece for subsequent definitions and descriptions of play, its meaning and importance. It is this group of writers who will give shape to the first part of this section.

The second group of writers appears to extend the work of Huizinga, first by accepting it unquestioningly, and then by grafting their own conceptions of play, game, or sport onto it. One feels almost a sigh of relief from these authors that Huizinga took an enormous and difficult burden from their shoulders by proposing his theory. It was left then to take up his work and move with it intact toward the development of more reasons for the play of people.

The third grouping of material offers a more critical stance toward some parts of Huizinga's work and also contains more proposals to explain why people play. It is within this group of authors that some important questions are re-asked about the nature of play. The method which characterizes this work is that of joining the play world with the human world of action thus giving to play a status of primary importance.

These three small units are not necessarily chronological in nature. Rather, Huizinga's work is the start, and is the centerpiece for the consideration of the authors in other sections. The work which continues today on the nature of play still has Huizinga's thought very much in focus, and has since Homo Ludens was first published in 1938.

Miller calls Huizinga's work "a most startling revolution in human meaning."[89] The book <u>Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture</u> was conceived while Huizinga, the rector of Leyden University, was working on a cultural history of the Middle Ages. It has become the focal point for an emerging mythology, a <u>lingua ludica</u>, from which models of game give rise to explanations of human meaning. For Huizinga, play was found to be a basis of culture. At three different points in his book, Huizinga describes play as follows:

> Summing up the formal characteristics of play we might call it a free activity standing quite consciously outside 'ordinary' life as being 'not serious', but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly. It is an activity connected with no material interest, and no profit can be gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner.[90]

> Such a concept [play] seemed to be tolerably well defined in the following terms: play is a voluntary activity or occupation executed within certain fixed limits of time and place, according to rules freely accepted but absolutely binding, having its aim in itself and accompanied by a feeling of tension, joy and the consciousness that it is 'different' from 'ordinary life'.[91]

> Let us enumerate once more the characteristics we deemed proper to play. It is an activity which proceeds within certain limits of time and space, in a visible order, according to rules freely accepted, and outside the sphere of necessity or material utility. The play-mood is one of rapture and enthusiasm, and is sacred or festive in accordance with the occasion. A feeling of exaltation and tension accompanies the action, mirth and relaxation follow.[92]

Huizinga did not identify play with sport nor did he say that play was an essential element in sport. But he did link play to games, which he further identified as matches or contests. These he called agonistic activities.

> The agon in Greek, or the contest anywhere else in the world, bears all the formal characteristics of play, and as to its function belongs almost wholly to the sphere of the festival, which is the play-sphere. It is quite impossible to separate the contest as a cultural function from the complex 'play-festival-rite'. . . . In short the question as to whether we are entitled to include the contest in the play-category can be answered unhesitatingly in the affirmative.[93]

This concept of the Greek agon Huizinga couples with the Latin word ludus. "Latin has really only one word to cover the whole field of play. . . . Ludus covers children's games, recreation, contests, liturgical and theatrical representations, and games of chance."[94] The word play he traces to the Anglo-Saxon word plega meaning "to vouch or stand guarantee for, to take a risk, to expose oneself to danger for someone or something."[95] Huizinga concludes, "Play, and danger, risk, chance, feat - it is all a single field of action where something is at stake."[96]

He moves to the relationship between play and contest by saying that, "In English you play a game. . . . In order to express the nature of the activity the idea contained in the noun must be repeated in the verb. . . . Playing is no 'doing' in the ordinary sense; you do not 'do' a game . . . you play it."[97] And while Huizinga does not trace

thoroughly the words <u>agon</u> or game, a quick glance at the

<u>Oxford English Dictionary</u> offers this information:

1.) <u>Agon</u>: any contest or struggle, a public celebration of

games, of or pertaining to athletic contests, a gathering

for the public games; and, 2.) Game: play, delight, sport,

merriment, a diversion of the nature of a contest, played

according to rules, and displaying in the result the superi-

ority either in skill, strength or good fortune of the

winner or winners.[98] According to Miller, the word "win"

comes from various European words meaning to struggle, gain

by effort, wish, or desire.[99]

For Huizinga play makes sense and has meaning. It lies

outside the categories of serious and non-serious. Huizinga

removes play from the domain of antitheses by saying, "Play

lies outside the antithesis of wisdom and folly, and equally

outside those of truth and falsehood, good and evil."[100]

He suggests that its domain includes "contests and races,

performances and exhibitions, dancing and music, pageants,

masquerades and tournaments."[101] But when games become

systematized, regimented, and very serious, the world of

sport takes over and pushes itself further and further away

from the play-sphere.

> In modern social life sport occupies a place along-
> side and apart from the cultural process. . . .
> The ability of modern social techniques to stage
> mass demonstrations with the maximum of outward
> show in the field of athletics does not alter the
> fact that neither the Olympiads nor the organized

sports of American Universities nor the loudly
trumpeted international contests have, in the
smallest degree, raised sport to the level of a
culture-creating activity.102

Huizinga speaks of play-element, play-sense, and play-
form as being rooted in ritual, rhythm, contrast, honor,
magic, mystery, heroic longings, dignity and harmony. He
uses such words as mirth, zest, merry, sacred, joyful,
spontaneous, ecstasy, enchantment, rapture, order, movement,
tension, grace, fun and primordial when talking about the
play world. He says, "Here the ideas of contest, struggle,
exercise, exertion, endurance and suffering are united. . . .
To dare, to take risks, to bear uncertainty, to endure ten-
sion - these are the essence of the play spirit."103
Huizinga takes what he considers the best characteristics
of the ancient Greek contests and couples these with the
best traits of the Middle Ages. What emerges are events
called games and a spirit called play.

Huizinga calls into question the rise of modern sport
which he locates from the nineteenth century onwards, and
claims that modern sport cannot be called a basis of cul-
ture. His language changes drastically when he starts to
refer to the contemporary period. Words like over-serious,
regimented, social, massive, systematize, strict, elaborate,
organized, unholy, calculation, commercialization, tech-
nology, self-conscious, and propaganda creep into the
dialogue. He never denies the importance of contests in

which skill, strength, or perseverance are present, but he
feels that they have become profaned due to the dominant
themes of contemporary civilization, namely, social con-
sciousness, educational aspirations, and scientific judg-
ment.[104] He says, "More and more the sad conclusion forces
itself upon us that the play-element in culture has been on
the wane. . . . Civilization to-day is no longer played."[105]

Many themes are wrapped into Huizinga's work, several
of which have provided the basis for subsequent approaches
to defining and describing the complex play-game-sport.
Roger Caillois, a French sociologist, extends Huizinga's
work into his own system of classifications. His book, Man,
Play, and Games, first published in the late 1950's, attempts
to uncover principles by which games can be classified.
Caillois says of Huizinga's work, "His work is not a study
of games, but an inquiry into the creative quality of the
play principle in the domain of culture, and more precisely,
of the spirit that rules certain kinds of games - those
which are competitive."[106] Caillois is eager to set forth
a theoretical system of games--namely, agon or competition,
alea or chance, mimicry or simulation, and ilinx or vertigo.
He also suggests a second type of classification system
which moves on a continuum for what he calls paidia, charac-
terized by improvisation, freedom, exuberance, joy,
spontaneity, and impulsiveness, to that which he calls ludus,
which is characterized by rules, order, effort, patience,

discipline, and skill. Caillois comments on this continuum by saying, "As for _ludus_ and _paidia_, which are not categories of play but ways of playing, they pass into ordinary life as invariable opposites."[107] All these concepts, namely, _agon_, _alea_, mimicry, _ilinx_, _paidia_ and _ludus_ were borrowed "from one language or another" in order to suggest for Caillois the most meaningful and comprehensive term possible for each category.[108]

Caillois also mixes the terms play and game together within his discussion:

> A characteristic of play is that it creates no wealth or goods. . . . At the end of the game, all must and can start over again at the same point. Nothing has been harvested or manufactured. . . . An outcome known in advance, with no possibility of error or surprise is incompatible with the nature of play. Constant and unpredictable definitions of the situation are necessary. . . . The game consists of the need to find or continue at once a response which is free within the limits set by the rules.[109]

He goes on to state that play is defined as an activity which is free, voluntary, separate within defined limits of space and time, uncertain and undetermined as to results, unproductive of elements of any kind, governed by rules, and make-believe as against real life.[110] Caillois finds, according to Miller, that "Playing and being playful about human activity tend to remove the secrecy and mystery that might be involved in that activity."[111] Miller also feels that Caillois has moved from Huizinga's position of a cultural approach toward games to that of deriving a sociology

based on games.[112] But Miller feels that Caillois is at-
tempting the impossible in his research by trying to affirm
Huizinga's judgment that play is the basis of culture and
also to affirm the contrary judgment that play is the
result of culture.

Caillois says, "Play is a total activity. . . . The
central problem posed by the indivisibility of the world of
play . . . is the primary basis for the interest in
games."[113] He believes that there is a deep-seated relation-
ship between his class of games called agon and his way of
playing called ludus. The socialized form of this relation-
ship he calls sport.[114] Within the category called agon,
Caillois identifies a class of games which are competitive,
which involve a sense of rivalry, and which presuppose
training, experience, discipline, perseverance, and skill.[115]
It is the category of agon within Caillois' system that this
study seeks to align with the similar word used by Huizinga.

Caillois speaks of the games of agon taking place with-
in defined limits and rules which apply equally to all con-
testants. He also says, "Since the chances of the competi-
tors are as equal as possible, the result of agon is
necessarily uncertain."[116] Agonal activity is the vindica-
tion of personal responsibility according to Caillois, since
it takes place under a set of conditions which strives for
equality to be accorded to its players. Paul Weiss sug-
gests that Caillois is implying the following:

> It is only when play is rule-governed and well
> controlled that one can be said to play in a game.
> Such play is engaged in by those who, for the
> moment at least, have detached themselves from an
> attempt to achieve something in daily life or from
> the pursuit of some career, to attend instead to
> the rule-controlled demands of an activity re-
> quiring bodily excellence and a union with equip-
> ment in situations which challenge and test.[117]

As for Caillois' gradation of play and game from paidia to ludus, Peter McIntosh feels that this is an attempt "to show a progressive formalization of play from the spontaneous activities of children to the organized play of adults."[118]

Moving beyond the work of Caillois, John Loy proposes that sport is a special type of game, one which is institutionalized and occurs as a social situation. In order to arrive at his definition of sport, Loy relied extensively on the material provided by both Huizinga and Caillois. Loy concludes:

> In a game the contestants act as if all are equal
> and numerous aspects of 'external reality' such
> as race, education, occupation and financial status
> are excluded as relevant attributes for the duration
> of a given contest. . . . In games obstacles are
> artificially created to be overcome. . . . In a
> play or game situation all of the structures and
> processes necessary to deal with any deliberately
> created obstacle and to realize any possible al-
> ternative in the course of action are potentially
> available. . . . Games are playful in nature in
> that they typically have one or more elements of
> play: freedom, separateness, uncertainty, unpro-
> ductiveness, order, and make-believe. In addition
> to having elements of play, games have components
> of competition.[119]

Sport for Loy is an institutionalized game affected by organization, technology, representative teams, sponsorship,

external governance structure, high level of physical skill, equipment and uniforms, the presence of coaches, trainers, assistants, spectators, and elaborate training procedures. Furthermore, sport involves the presence of both producers and consumers. Loy describes the producers as the players, coaches, trainers, managers, officials, media technicians, service personnel and club owners. The consumers are the spectators who view the sport through actual attendance, through the media, or read of sport events in newspapers or magazines.[120]

The work of Paul Weiss offers additional insight into the nature of play, game, and sport. He sums up Huizinga's and Caillois' work by saying:

> Play is a distinctive activity carried on with no intent to do anything other than follow out the created rationale of a controlled area arbitrarily bounded off from the rest of the world.[121]

Weiss contends that only if one submits to a game as having its own rules, and actually lives through its prescribed beginning to its prescribed ending, does one then play a game.[122] Sport as we know it, he suggests, is little more than a hundred years old in its history. Weiss feels that games become sports only when they exhibit a stabilized and historic set of rules which cannot be violated.

Weiss calls sport a structure for a series of games which are unitary and episodic; "a sport needs more than one occasion when its rules are exemplified."[123] He links game

to contest and notes that such contests are well-bounded, rule-abiding, unitary events having a number of distinct yet interrelated parts. Weiss also believes "We tend to forget that the justification of contests is their provision of opportunities to find out who one is in relation to other men in a bounded situation."[124]

Another sort of classification system has been proposed by Peter McIntosh. He begins his work by saying, "The effort to conquer an opponent, the self or an environment in play and only in play gives to sport its peculiar satisfaction and its especial virtue in human life."[125] McIntosh suggests four categories in which sports and types of physical activity can be placed. The first involves those activities which provide an opportunity to prove onself better than an opponent or an opposing team, for example tennis, football, or cricket. In the second group he includes combat sports such as wrestling and fencing. The third class he describes as conquest sports such as hiking, cycling, and climbing. The fourth category is one of physical activity but not of a sporting nature. He identifies the object of this class as one of expressing or communicating ideas and feelings through movement such as in drama, dance, or gymnastics.[126]

McIntosh feels that the play element is a feature of sport and that systematization and organization do not undermine sport. Moreover, he says, "There is a risk that

concentration on techniques and technical knowledge may ob-
scure the element of play in sport, but the majority of
those who play are not noticeably corrupted by being informed
why and how they do what they do."[127]

Eleanor Metheny has created a whole mythology around
dance, sport, and exercise. These non-verbal modes she
feels are significant for millions of people who are inter-
ested in such artificially made human forms for the meaning
they give to their lives. While she does not speak of game
per se (neither does McIntosh) her discussion of sport
offers the following:

> A sport form is an organization of effective
> actions. The conception of these actions is de-
> noted in a code of rules. .... . In this code,
> every element of mass, space, and time that enters
> into the performer's conception of the task is
> clearly identified . . . and counted in the
> determination of the score. . . . A sport form
> is a self-chosen and rule-governed task which in-
> volves an attempt to overcome the inertia of
> certain substantial forms in certain specified ways.[128]

Metheny feels that the rules of sport "eliminate the demands
of necessity . . . and all need for consideration of
material values by defining a futile task that produces
nothing of material value."[129] She goes on to say that

> The rules of sport provide each performer with a
> rare opportunity to concentrate all the energies
> of his being in one meaningful effort to perform
> a task of his own choosing, no longer pushed and
> pulled in a dozen directions by the many impera-
> tives he may recognize in his life. . . . Secure
> in the knowledge that the world will not be
> changed by his performance, . . . he may value the
> experience of pursuing a trivial task in the
> symbolic world of sport for what it is in its own

right, he may value it because it creates a mean-
ingful image of himself at his utmost.[130]

Both Metheny and McIntosh have produced views about
sport which seem to parallel the work of Caillois and
Huizinga on game while using the word sport for their
description. Loy and Weiss are attempting to look at sport
as distinct from game. Loy is much clearer on delineating
a pattern called sport based upon the degree of organization
and production which results because of the event. Weiss
attempts to investigate sport as a pattern which emerges
through historical means and through increasingly more rule-
bound repetitions of the same game format.

The final piece of work for inclusion in this section
on basic description and definition moves toward a concept
of leisure. Josef Pieper's book Leisure: The Basis of
Culture parallels in some ways Johan Huizinga's book Homo
Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture. Pieper
makes his case philosophically while Huizinga makes his
historically and anthropologically, but their premises are
related. The difference is that Pieper applies his argument
about leisure and culture to the discipline of philosophy
by suggesting that philosophical inquiry is a basis for cul-
ture. He suggests that philosophy involves contemplation,
wonder, not being busy about things, and is also non-
utilitarian. Pieper links the word leisure to its Greek
counterpart skole and its Latin counterpart scola from which

we get the English word 'school.'[131] Culture, Pieper suggests, is

> . . . the quintessence of all natural goods of the
> world and of those gifts and qualities which,
> while belonging to man, lie beyond the immediate
> sphere of his needs and wants. All that is good
> in this sense, all man's gifts and faculties are
> not necessarily useful in a practical way.[132]

"Leisure," Pieper says, "is not a Sunday afternoon idyll, but the preserve of freedom, education, and culture."[133] The soul of leisure, in Pieper's opinion, is celebration and it is within this celebration that truly human values are saved and preserved. "The sphere of leisure is no less than the sphere of culture in so far as that word means everything that lies beyond the utilitarian world."[134] Leisure in Pieper's sense is not simply the result of spare time, a holiday, a week-end, or a vacation. In fact, it is bound up in taking the time to celebrate and experience the serenity which results. "The serenity springs precisely from our inability to understand from our recognition of the mysterious nature of the universe; it springs from the courage of deep confidence, so that we are content to let things take their course."[135] For Pieper, when human beings step beyond the chain of ends and means relationships, they approach what he calls "the frontier of experience."[136] For Pieper as for Huizinga the concept of freedom in taking up the world lies within what we constitute to be basic to culture.

This section on description began with the work of
Johan Huizinga who claimed that play is a basis of culture.
It concluded with the work of Josef Pieper who claimed
leisure to be a basis of culture. The confluence of the
vita activa and the vita contemplativa may suggest that the
base upon which human freedom and human values rest is
bound up with play and leisure. This is another idea which
needs to be explored at a later point in the discussion.

There is an additional group of writers who also are
interested in offering descriptions of play, game, and
sport. They lean heavily on the work of Huizinga and
Caillois. When investigating the topic of game, the works
of Huizinga and Caillois stand out as seminal to inquiry,
and the profundity of Huizinga's work especially has yet to
be fully realized.

"Games are a means of coping with the world."[137] Says
John Lahr, "Sports have a fictional appeal in a society
whose organization fractures work and puts a premium on
efficiency rather than imagination. Sports recast man in a
heroic mold."[138] For the Opies, games that attract addition-
al rules and formalities become sport, which to their way of
thinking is fatal to the game. For the game becomes pro-
gressively more elaborate, the playing of it demands further
finesse, and the length of time needed for its completion
increases.[139]

Arnold Beisser feels that we deepen our understanding

of play by contrasting it with its opposite work, that sort
of labor which is directed toward some end.[140] "Within the
sports stadium we can see order and excitement in contrast
to the often meaningless tasks of contemporary work. We
sense continuity, for what we play as children, we watch as
adults."[141] In speaking about game, George Leonard says,
"Rules, limits, and constraints of all kinds are, at the
heart of it, strategies for the creation of order and
beauty. . . . At the interaction between content and con-
text, there the game is."[142]

It seems that once the burden of description has been
lifted, writers begin to shift their focus toward what is
valuable about play, game, and sport, with little attention
paid to how each word differs. For example, Peter Berger
calls play a signal of transcendence. He says:

> Play always constructs an enclave within the
> 'serious' world of everyday life. . . . Joy is
> play's intention. When this intention is
> actually realized, in joyful play, the time
> structure of the playful universe takes on a
> very specific quality - namely, it becomes
> eternity. . . . It is his ludic constitution
> that allows man to regain and ecstatically
> realize the deathless joy of his childhood.[143]

Thomas Green, in speaking of the importance of play, has
some misgivings about game: "We all recognize that when
playing a game becomes strongly enough related to the
object of winning, it is precisely then that we are inclined
to say that participating in the game has ceased to be play
and has instead become work."[144]

In summarizing a number of descriptions of play, Celeste Ulrich settles on four generalizations which characterize the literature:

1. Play is always engaged in as a voluntary act.
2. Play is always fixed within limits of time and space.
3. Play is never a real-life situation; play has no cause to serve.
4. Play creates its own world; it is a secret world which has its own tensions.[145]

Cady contends that the Big Game is characterized by the player who can be called: "homo agonistes, the aggressor and competitor, but, simultaneously, homo fraternalis, the team worker and altruist, and homo ludens, the player, worshipful and agonic."[146]

All these ideas about play, game, and sport reflect concepts of both Huizinga and Caillois. Some are contradictory and confusing, but some will be useful to the model of game toward which this discussion is moving. However, a lack of clarity among authors is evident concerning the grammatical usage of the words play, game, sport. All three words, according to dictionary citations, are both verbs and nouns, and each word can become an adjective, namely, playful, game, and sporting. Now when words can move about in so many ways with little attempt to establish in what sense each is being used, the reader is left in a quandary of how best to grasp the intent of the literature. If this problem can be sorted out, the reader is confronted then by a conceptual problem. That is, play-game-sport as a complex

describing an activity often appears to be antithetical to work, real-life, seriousness, usefulness and purposefulness.[147]

What may be helpful at this juncture of the discussion is to recapitulate the kinds of problems which have beset investigators attempting to arrive at some appropriate understanding of this phenomenon, namely the play-game-sport complex:

1. The effects of Platonic philosophy separating reality into two realms, the spiritual and the material, and dividing the self into mind and body. Coupled with this is the effect of imposing Greek culture and language on a large portion of civilization during the conquests of Alexander the Great.

2. The effects of the scientific revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in fostering an acceptance of dualistic thinking and in changing the dominant theory concerning epistemology from one of trusting sense experience to one of doubt and mistrust of sense experience.

3. With the rise of organized sport from the early nineteenth century onwards, the effects of splitting the child and adult world of play.

4. The effects of the industrial and technological revolutions from the late nineteenth century onwards resulting in a greater secularization of play and more elaborate organization of the play world.

5. Definitional efforts clouded by the use of the words play-game-sport as nouns, verbs, and adjectives.

6. Conceptual descriptions which split play from real-life into a framework of make-believe, and non-serious frivolity set in opposition to the world of work.

It will be the work of this study to tackle some of these problems, but several authors have proposed interpretations of the nature of play-game-sport with these issues

in focus. These authors will be the last group of writers
investigated concerning definitions and descriptions.

Jürgen Moltmann suggests that if games are merely
looked upon as a means of escape from the real world, then
they can be overlooked in terms of their social and political
connections.[148] Francis Hearn agrees with this point by
arguing that play should claim a central place in the world
of critical social theory. He says, "Play is more than a
preparation for mature activities (adults as well as
children have the capacity to play), and play refers not to
specific activities but to a context, a set of principles
around which personal and collective experience is meaning-
fully organized."[149] For both Hearn and Moltmann their
analyses move play and game into a viable connection to both
social and political theory.

David Kinsley suggests that in the world of play
"bondage of necessity does not exist."[150] And this makes
the play world not one of leisure in the contemporary sense,
but one where freedom and transcendence are experienced.
And Hugo Rahner's work attempts to join some problematic
dualisms by claiming that

> Homo Ludens . . . poised between gaiety and gravity,
> between mirth and tragedy [is] the grave-merry man.[151]

"Play," he says, "is a human activity which engages of
necessity both body and soul. It is the expression of an
inward spiritual skill, successfully realized with the aid

of physically visible gesture, audible sound and tangible matter."[152]   For both Rahner and Kinsley, play is connected to the transcendent, to a world of players joined in body and soul, mind and movement.

Gerardus Van der Leeuw offers a similar proposal when he says, "A view of life which shrinks from the body cannot stand for beautiful movement."[153]   He believes that, "The history of the world is the play of God and man, movement and countermovement of the protagonist and his opposite."[154] Miller's work fits in here; he argues that play has suffered a twenty-five century loss of place as a primary term of human meaning.   He, like Van der Leeuw, feels that an emergence of aesthetic interpretation is needed in play theory in order to rediscover the human sense of coherence, harmony, and significance which results in the play world.

To recapitulate, Moltmann and Hearn are seeking political explanations of play and game, Kinsley and Rahner seek theological reasons, and Van der Leeuw and Miller use aesthetic modes of inquiry into the nature of play and movement.   The term sport has not been mentioned yet; the words now are play, game, and beautiful movement.   Also words like political, social, religion, art, culture have entered the discussions of these authors.

Moving in another direction, some authors have looked at the problem of linking play to the world of illusion and make-believe.   This group of writers includes Jacques

Ehrmann, Eugen Fink, William Morgan, David Roochnik and

Kenneth Schmitz. Morgan feels that Huizinga's position of

play being 'not real' was intended "to convey the point that

the fundamental disposition of play differs, in a signifi-

cant measure, from the instrumental demeanor of ordinary

(real) life. . . . Play is of a different order of being

than those activities that make up the fabric of daily

life."[155] But this analysis does not touch the heart of the

matter. Roochnik begins to close in on the problem:

> Play is the very opposite of illusion, for it is
> a deepening of the experience of the world. . . .
> If play is grounded upon illusion and the sus-
> pension of the natural world, then it is precluded
> from becoming a mode of being toward that world. . . .
> A full involvement in any situation will give
> rise to a unique world of distinctive temporality
> and spatiality.[156]

Modifying that notion somewhat, Schmitz says, "Play cele-

brates the emergence of a finite world that lies outside

and beyond the world of nature while at the same point

resting upon it."[157]

Fink's work is potentially as profound as Huizinga's.

For him, "Play is an essential element of man's ontological

makeup, a basic existential phenomenon. . . . The decisive

phenomena of human existence are intimately related to each

other. They do not exist in isolation, rather they inter-

act and interpenetrate."[158] He goes on to say, in an im-

portant statement:

> The play world does not form a curtain or a wall
> between us and all that is around us, it does not
> obscure or hide the real world. . . . The play

> world possesses its own internal space and time.
> And yet again, while playing we consume real time
> and need real space.[159]

While it appears that the word play is being used almost exclusively, Morgan, Roochnik, and Schmitz do use the words game and sport throughout their arguments. Fink, though, deals primarily with a concept of play, but does speak of both games and their playthings.

For Roochnik,

> A game has an end. In the midst of the game the
> player is aware of the end that is to come. Yet
> this does not in any way detract from his full
> commitment to the present. . . . Rather, the fact
> that the game ends heightens the urgency and the
> intensity of the activity.[160]

Morgan uses the concepts of play and sport synonymously in his essay. Schmitz says, "The objectives of sport and its founding decision lie within play and cause sport to share in certain of its features - the sense of immediacy, exhilaration, rule-directed behavior, and the indeterminacy of a specified outcome."[161] For these three authors (Morgan, Roochnik, and Schmitz), it appears that sport is an equivalent word for game and includes emphasis being placed on skillful performance within the context of a contest.

Fink feels that too often adult games represent a flight from boredom, but "traditional games," he says, "are often bound up with collective imagination, with self-commitment rooted in the deep primordial patterns of common experience."[162]

Ehrmann suggests that Huizinga's concept of play as make-believe and Caillois' notion of play being fictive need to be re-examined. He says that they write as if reality is "corrupting, contagious, perverting, and impure."[163] Ehrmann feels that "They [Huizinga and Caillois] fail to see that the interior occupied by play can only be defined by and with the exterior of the world. . . . Play cannot be isolated as an activity without consequence."[164] For himself, Ehrmann concludes that play as a text contains within itself its own reality. "Play is not played against a background of a fixed, stable reality which would serve as its standard. All reality is caught up in the play of concepts which designate it."[165]

While Ehrmann leans heavily on the use of the word play, he does speak of the game. Ludus for him is play in action, and he claims that Huizinga and Caillois erred in never doubting "that the player is the subject of play; in believing that, present in the game, at the center of play, they dominated it. They forgot that players may be played: that as an object in the game, the player can be its stakes and its toy."[166]

For Ehrmann, as well as for the other four writers, the problem of play-game-sport becomes both cultural and ontological. While they support much of the work of Caillois and Huizinga, they do represent a group of critics beginning to call some of that work into question. The direction of

this last group of authors, from Moltmann to Ehrmann, also indicates that analyses of play-game-sport are moving into many realms, particularly political, aesthetic, philosophical, and theological. This multiplicity of perspectives once again points to the richness of the play-game-sport world and what it seems to mean to people who are looking directly at the phenomenon.

Metaphors and Models

What characterized the discussion in sections one and two of this chapter was looking at the play - game - sport world directly. From its historical events to its definitional attempts, the game world has been uncovered. What characterizes authors of this third section is the tendency to use game in a modeling or metaphorical way. In other words, these writers appear to have a grasp of what game is, and they use that insight in a way other than by identifying events or delineating descriptions about the phenomenon. The section will be by no means exhaustive of the material which exists concerning this metaphorical approach. Rather, it is indicative of the way in which the word game (and play, sport, and dance, too) has moved into many dimensions of human thought. When writers such as Rainer Rilke, W. H. Auden, Thomas Merton, Hermann Hesse, Rudyard Kipling, William Blake, Lewis Carroll, and so many others make reference to play-game-sport in some fashion, note has to be

taken. For, in part, those understandings cannot be ig-

nored, and will also help fashion the model of game which

will emerge in the last section of this chapter.

Karl Jaspers, while worrying about sport as a mass

phenomenon, nevertheless, feels that sport has a soaring

quality even though the connection to the divine has been

severed. He describes sport as a way for people to express

themselves.

> We feel in the sport movement something that is . . .
> great. Sport is not only play and the making of
> records; it is likewise a soaring and a refresh-
> ment . . . . Contemporary human beings wish to
> express themselves . . . they rise in revolt
> against being cabined, cribbed, confined; and
> they seek relief in sport.[167]

Michael Novak says, "What is true of achievements in sports

is also true in painting, writing, in architecture, in

understanding, in judgment, in action. . . . Many persons

cherish those achievements which fulfill their own identity;

these are the most precious they attain."[168] For Jaspers,

the player is one who "strikes a blow in his own behalf,

stands erect to cast his spear."[169]

Hannah Arendt also takes up the theme of the game and

states:

> I cannot enter the game unless I conform; my motive
> for acceptance is my wish to play, and since men
> exist only in the plural, my wish to play is
> identical with my wish to live.[170]

In another of her works, Arendt comments,"When one is dead

life is finished, not before, not when one happens to

achieve whatever he may have wanted. That the game has no ultimate purpose makes it so dangerously similar to life itself."[171] David Riesman suggests that the subverting of sport, drama, feast days, and ceremonies has undermined the competence to play. He says also, "It is quite clear that it is childhood experience that will be most important in making possible true adult competence at play."[172]

It is important to remember that these authors--namely, Jaspers, Novak, Arendt, and Riesman--are not writing books about play, game, or sport. But in order to highlight certain points which for these people are connected to philosophy, religion, politics, and sociology, they all make use of the words play, game, and sport.

Henry Bugbee, in his journal, talks of the gracefulness and absorption of a person playing a game, and says, "That which is alertly and gracefully done can teach us of faithfulness, and of reasonableness, in their connection."[173] Of music, poetry, dance, painting, architecture, and games, Henri Lefebvre asks the question, do they express the secret nature of everyday life?[174] Smith, the Borstal boy in Alan Sillitoe's story, may answer the question when he says, "I knew what the loneliness of the long distance runner running across country felt like, realizing that as far as I was concerned this feeling was the only honesty and realness there was in the world."[175] Robert Pirsig, in his best-selling book, _Zen and the Art of Motorcycle_

Maintenance, speaks of how abnormal the world would be if
the fine arts, poetry, and games were subtracted from it.[176]
These things he feels make the world common to us all and
give the world a sense of quality. For Hermann Hesse, the
Game became a symbol of the human imagination operating
according to strict rules yet with supreme virtuosity.[177]

It may be that the poets express best what needs to be
said. Rainer Rilke, on play, writes:

> Play by yourself, throw, catch, throw, ever and ever--
> That's inessential knack, no gain at all.
> Not till that sudden start when you endeavor
> To catch and hold an immortal playmate's ball
> She's aimed you, right at center, in a sweep
> So justly gauged it might be one progression
> In God's great bridging, leap on leap--
> Then first, catch-as-catch-can becomes possession.
> Not yours; that of a world.. And if the sheer
> Courage and strength sufficed, and back you threw it,
> Or better yet, had thrown before you knew it,
> Courage and strength forgotten...(as the year
> Throws all abroad the birds.' migrating legions
> Whom older warmth, subduing younger regions,
> Explodes across the oceans --) only so
> You're stamped true player and assume full risk.
> Do you then make the throwing easier? -no,
> Nor harder for yourself. The blazing disk
> Has left your hands and meteors to its orbit...[178]

About game, Robert Fitzgerald writes:

> In the sunburnt parks where Sundays lie
> Or the wide wastes beyond the cities
> Teams in grey deploy through sunlight.
>
> Talk it up boys, a little practice.
>
> Coming in stubby and fast, the baseman
> Gathers a grounder in fat green grass,
> Picks it stinging and clipped as wit
> Into the leather: a swinging step
> Wings it deadeye down to first.
> Smack. Oh, attaboy, attyoldboy.

Catcher reverses his cap, pulls down
Sweaty casque, and squats in the dust:
Pitcher rubs new ball on his pants,
Chewing, put a jet behind him;
Nods past batter, taking his time.
Batter settles, tugs at his cap:
A spinning ball, step and swing to it,
Caught like a cheek before it ducks
By shivery hickory: socko, baby:
Cleats dig into dust. Outfielder,
On his way, looking over his shoulder,
Makes it a triple. A long peg home.

Innings and afternoons. Fly lost in sunset.
Throwing arm gone bad. There's your old ball game.
Cool reek of the field. Reek of companions.[179]

And the poet W. H. Auden says:

The peasant may play cards in the evening while
the poet writes verses, but there is one
political principle to which they both subscribe,
namely, that among the half dozen or so things
for which a man of honor should be prepared if
necessary, to die, the right to play, the right
to frivolity is not the least.[180]

In describing the joys of sport at Oxford, Allan Seager says,
"Slowly I began to comprehend the English attitude toward
sports which is this: sports are for fun. If you are good
at one or two of them, it is somewhat in the nature of a
divine gift. Since the gift is perpetual, it is there every
day and you can pull out a performance very near your best
any time."[181]

What a number of people from diverse backgrounds see
in play, game, and sport is obviously something special. It
would be unfair to criticize them for interchanging the
words play, game, and sport, for their insights do not con-
fuse the issue of this section. That is to say, the

something great that Jaspers speaks of is what all these people speak of. Definition is defied here, as well it may have to be, and yet some kind of soaring quality is being described by many people in many ways. For all the criticisms levelled against modern-day games, they justifiably pale in light of the significance that game has or can have for the contemporary world. Even in the midst of a national intercollegiate basketball championship, Timothy Healy, president of Georgetown University, remarked:

> The last place on earth that alchemy should work
> is in the abstract and windy shape of a modern
> urban university. Yet, it is precisely in the
> university, in its puzzlements and hungers, that
> the alchemy of sports does work . . . a marvelously
> useless competition . . . where rules are objective-
> ly enforced, here a victory that does not entail a
> loss. Here is all the fullness God meant for us,
> if only we could dream hard enough, if only we
> understood what those youngsters on the court are
> up to.182

Marvin Cohen puts it this way: "Performance tells. . . . The home run wasn't hit because the hitter's father was the vice-president of the team. . . . The no-hitter was pitched with no quarter given, by token of no favor. . . . There's no debating what happened; it happened."183 Great things happen because of people, people finding a better performance than they believed possible within themselves and yet believing all the while in the possibility of the game.

For Jaspers, "The self-preservative impulse as a form of vitality finds scope for itself in sport. . . . Through bodily activities subjected to the control of the will,

energy and courage are sustained, and the individual seeking contact with nature draws nearer to the elemental forces of the universe."[184] For Weiss, "The athlete is a man of action who responsibly tries to bring about a public result. . . . The athlete is content . . . to be judged by men. . . . The athlete engages in acts which preserve the past of his sport."[185]

Somehow, these themes of greatness, vitality, fullness, courage, exuberance, connection to both a past and a future, and integral to both human life and culture, weave their way into the works of these authors. And yet, for the most part, many do not write directly from an explicit historical or definitional interest in play, game, or sport.

Mention has been made of the use of game as a text in Clifford Geertz's anthropological work. About a decade prior to the time that Geertz suggested his theory of game as text, Robert Gahringer was proposing the following:

> The game has to be understood as a fundamental
> form of communication, i.e. as a language. The
> game is an instrument through which persons
> communicate with one another.[186]

It was in the decade of the 1950's that Richard McKeon proposed a modern speculation toward dreams, play, and games: "Fantasy is the source not only of science and art but of reality; life is fundamentally play, and we con-struct theories of games to solve its problems."[187]

C. S. Lewis speaks of the central paradox of the

vision of the poet John Milton. Discipline, for Milton,

exists for the sake of its seeming opposite--for freedom.

To illustrate this, Lewis offers the following as represen-

tative of Milton's respect for obedience:

> The pattern deep hidden in the dance, hidden so
> deep that shallow spectators cannot see it, alone
> gives beauty to the wild, free gestures that fill
> it. . . . The heavenly frolic arises from an
> orchestra which is in tune; the rules of courtesy
> make perfect ease and freedom possible between
> those who obey them. Without sin, the universe
> is a Solemn Game; and there is no good game
> without rules.[188]

Thomas Merton picks up the idea of linking play, game, and

dance to the cosmos, and says:

> The Lord plays and diverts Himself in the garden
> of creation, and if we could let go of our own
> obsession with what we think is the meaning of
> it all, we might be able to hear his call and
> follow Him in His mysterious, cosmic dance. We
> do not have to go far to catch echoes of that
> game. . . . No despair of ours can . . . stain
> the joy of the cosmic dance which is always there.
> Indeed, we are in the midst of it, and it is in
> the midst of us, for it beats in our very blood,
> whether we want it to or not.[189]

The use of the words play, game, sport, and dance to

represent both very specific ideas and very global concerns

characterizes the work of the writers in this section.

These authors speak from many disciplines and use the words

as models or analogies to help better understand their own

interests, which for the most part do not have to do with

either physical education or organized sport per se.

This third prong of the current chapter completes the

look at game. Such a view is composed of events,

definitions, and metaphors. The final section of this chapter will focus on fashioning from the material a model of game which will be carried forward for further investigation.

The Text of Game

It is now time to look at the word game to see what it means. The words play, sport, and dance will not be carried throughout the rest of this work. However, from the preceding three sections it is apparent that the whole complex of words is a difficult one to untangle. The fact that this study is not intended to be a definitional effort of game makes the ensuing task even more problematic, for what follows will be the characterization of game using, from the materials already laid out, relevant concepts which will form the text of game. Not all the thoughts will be connected, nor can every nuance be accounted for regarding the word complex play-game-sport-dance.

The widest possible latitude will be given to the concept of game, yet boundaries will be established and critical traits will be described as being integral to the game structure. A reminder is given at this point that the intent of Chapter Five will be to extend the model of game based on the material presented next in Chapter Four. Giving wide berth to a concept of game now merely allows the discussion to retain a flexibility which will be

important later on. Consequently, a very simple and open-
weave texture will appear throughout this section. There is
no intention of producing a set of definitions against which
every form of play, game, sport, athletics, and dance can
be judged. For, what is at issue concerns the distinctness
of the game as a cultural form and as a space appropriate
for public appearance, and the meanings which arise when
human beings enter such a structured world.

A start is made toward establishing game as a distinct
cultural form by focusing on the word "structure." A struc-
ture implies boundaries and also suggests space. What fills
up this structured and boundaried space constitutes the
final bit of discussion for this chapter. The format to
follow is one of picking away at the material already pre-
sented in order to lay out a distinct shape for game.

A game proceeds within its own proper boundaries ac-
cording to a set of fixed rules. Games are identified as
matches or contests of some sort, and Huizinga's concept of
agon is accepted to establish this idea. The rules of the
game are freely accepted and become binding to its players.
The word play is to be used as a verb when accompanying the
nouns game and player(s), so that a game (noun meaning in-
animate form) is played (verb meaning action) by players
(noun meaning human beings). This confirms Huizinga's
position on the origin of the word play or plega, and also

his statement that one does not 'do' a game, rather, one
plays a game.

The dictionary definition of <u>agon</u> is acceptable in its
entirety, and that of game is modified to be a contest played
according to rules, and displaying in the result, the
superiority either in skill or good fortune of the winner
or winners. The essence of the play spirit must underline
the game, and Huizinga's discussion of this matter must be
included as explanatory. Play in this noun sense is to be
viewed as an essence, spirit, attitude, trait or character-
ization of the players engaged in the game.

Game is involved with performance of skills and in some
cases involves the use of special equipment like bats, balls,
racquets, nets, and so on. Games, their rules, skills, and
equipment are made by human beings and engaged in voluntarily
by human beings.

Caillois' continuum characterizing <u>paidia</u> to <u>ludus</u> is
accepted in its entirety as being appropriate for game, and
not as a sliding scale to indicate a difference between play
and game or a difference between the so-called child's
world of play and the so-called adult world of play.
Caillois' category of <u>agon</u> is accepted as game due to its
essential words, experience, competition, and perseverance.
Caillois' statements on agonal activity being uncertain as
to outcome and equal as to conditions at the outset are
appropriate.

Game is a structure which is entered into with no intent to do anything other than live through a prescribed beginning to a prescribed ending with no material gain or productivity realized. Sport in Loy's sense, bound up in production and consumption, and all the other traits Loy mentions, is not acceptable for inclusion in this framework of game. That kind of structure, namely sport, needs a separate set of interpretations, for, to be sure, there is meaning associated with what Loy calls a highly institutionalized game. Sport in McIntosh's and Metheny's sense is acceptable and appropriate for consideration as part of the game framework. The work of Weiss on sport is acceptable for its stress on history and repetition of events, and his justification of why contests take place is quite appropriate.

The classification system of McIntosh is very helpful to this study in sorting out different kinds of sports and physical activities. The use of the word game for the word sport can be made within the work of McIntosh, Metheny, and Weiss. It is Loy's concept of sport that aids most in helping to separate out an activity pattern which does not belong under game's umbrella. A problem could arise, though, when looking at the players themselves. While Loy's highly institutionalized game, called sport, cannot be included within the structure of game under present consideration, is it possible that the play spirit may still be

present within such an activity? The answer to that ques-
tion is not within the scope of this study and must be left
to the author who attempts to untangle the play-game-sport
complex from the perspective of sport.

Game does not stand in an opposing relationship with
'real life,' and is not taken up just because spare time is
available and needs filling in some way. Game is a world
of the grave and merry; paradox, ambiguity and uncertainty
exist within its prescribed order. What is distinct about
game is that the bondage of necessity does not exist. The
game world is not one of labor, nor does it rely on a fully
established set of means-ends relationships for its being.
The world of game is different from the world of labor or
job-holding, but that does not make it any less real than,
for example, those activities.

The works of Moltmann, Kinsley, Hearn, Miller, Van der
Leeuw, Rahner, Ehrmann, Fink, Morgan, Roochnik, and Schmitz
offer ideas which are appropriate for this text of game.
There is no problem here with substituting the word game for
sport in their studies, and the sense of play as a noun of
structure may use the substituted word game, with the sense
of play as a noun meaning play-spirit being reserved for
players.

One word which has drifted across the discussion has
been dance. Where dance in the noun form is part of a
structured game, it can be taken within the game model. But

dance, like sport, needs its own perspective on this matter
to be articulated. This does not preclude from game
qualities of dancing such as harmony, rhythm, grace, or
beauty of movement.

What might be a key notion for this framework concern-
ing inclusion/exclusion may lie in the concept of agon or
contest. Simplistically put, is it fair to suggest that
too much agon equals sport, too little agon equals play, no
agon equals dance, and just the right amount of agon equals
game? Using terms like too much or too little is problem-
atic surely, but it may be that the notion of contest is
a pivotal one for sorting out events for inclusion. Cer-
tainly, the production-consumption understanding helps ex-
clude inappropriate activities. And the use of play or
dance qualities help characterize the players of game.
Also, a quirk of the English language, as Huizinga points
out, is that the word play as a verb characterizes the doing
of a game; one does not dance a game, nor does one sport a
game. Additionally, movements within a game may be viewed
as dance-like, gestures may be considered sporting, or
expressions might be seen as playful.

What makes the verb form of the word play somewhat
problematic lies in engaging in activities that McIntosh
calls conquest sports, for example, hiking, cycling,
mountain-climbing, running, canoeing, and the like. To
bring these activities in under the name of game does

require a leap of the imagination. For each activity by
title designates its own structural form, its own action
form, and its own participant form, for example, a hike, to
hike, and hiker. Certainly, public contests are held
around these events, so the concept of agon is fulfilled,
and where there are others taking part, the concept of
fraternity is satisfied. In fact these events can be moved
under the umbrella of the game world if acceptance is given
to the different mode of describing the activities lin-
guistically.

Concerning game myths and events, the link to another
sort of world is made. This game world is linked to
festivity and also to tradition. Contests and matches make
up games, with extraordinary performances always being a
possibility for the participants. Being open to the public
and being played out in public are characteristics of these
events. There is a certain indivisibility within the game
world due to the clarity of its being marked off by a
definite beginning and end. People come together on a
voluntary basis and become connected to traditions by virtue
of repeating a game which has already been played by many
others in times past. This connection to a past through
playing in a present ensures the possibility of the future
of a game. A game is meant to be communal in nature in that
two or more are involved, and from this communality a com-
munication of meaning can be made. Cady's concept of agon-
ism and fraternity do mix within the game setting.

Celebration of skillful performance is appropriate:
records may be kept, pictures may be taken, spectators may
applaud, stories may be told. These, in addition to re-
peated playing, are ways of extending the tradition of game.
Songs, paintings, poems, sculptures, and legends fit into
the model of game. From generation to generation games are
passed on in varied ways, and all these ways become important
to the cultural understanding of the text of game.

While the game seems to have suffered a disconnection
from the divine, Jasper's "soaring" quality seems an ap-
propriate replacement toward some kind of cosmic link. The
cherishing of achievement and a sense of complete absorption
can be identified within the game. By choosing the
boundaries of game, a certain sense of freedom is experi-
enced. Zest, exuberance, and vitality, as well as patience
and discipline, are all part of the game world.

The last stanza of Fitzgerald's poem suggests some
significant ideas about a game:

     Innings and afternoons. Fly lost in sunset.
     Throwing arm gone bad. There's your old ballgame.
     Cool reek of the field. Reek of companions.

A set of images combine to speak of pain and pleasure, nature
and history, sights and smells, space and time, past and
present. Implicit is the image of hope for a future, a
repeating of the game, a belief that it will happen again.
All these things are the game.

While this last section has not reviewed every

reference of the previous three sections, a sense of what
is appropriate for further consideration has been conveyed.
Many authors echo the sentiments of others, some offer new
points of view, but it is Huizinga's work which threads its
way through so many studies. In any event, from a huge
array of material, a text of game has been proposed. Sig-
nificant use of language has been underlined by a belief
that game has something to say.

Essentially, a form or structure has been talked about,
and in a small way the player has been as well. The game
is played by its players; the player as a human being is
affected by the realm of human affairs. This realm will
be called the human condition and it is this concept which
will form the primary focus of the next chapter.

NOTES

CHAPTER III

[1] Rudyard Kipling, <u>Kim</u>, in <u>Kipling: A Selection of His Stories and Poems</u>, ed. John Beecroft, Vol. I (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), p. 109.

[2] Kipling, p. 125.

[3] David L. Miller, "Playing the Game to Lose," in <u>Theology of Play</u>, by Jürgen Moltmann (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 104.

[4] Benjamin Mance Ladner, "Elizabeth Sewell: Poetic Method as an Instrument of Thinking and Knowing," Diss. Duke University 1970, p. 10.

[5] Jürgen Moltmann, <u>Theology of Play</u> (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 15.

[6] David R. Kinsley, <u>The Sword and the Flute</u> (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1975), p. 74.

[7] Hugo Rahner, <u>Man at Play</u> (New York: Herder, 1972), p. 9.

[8] David L. Miller, <u>Gods and Games</u> (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1970), p. 99.

[9] Gerardus Van der Leeuw, <u>Sacred and Profane Beauty</u>, trans. David E. Green (New York: Holt, 1963), pp. 79-80.

[10] David R. Kinsley, <u>The Divine Player</u> (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), p. ix.

[11] The Holy Bible: King James Version (New York: James Pott, 1902), pp. 83, 363.

[12] Miller, Gods and Games, pp. 102-103.

[13] Kinsley, The Divine Player, p. 257.

[14] William Brewer, Ovid's Metamorphoses (Boston: Marshall Jones, 1941), II, 469.

[15] Miller, Gods and Games, p. 103.

[16] Van der Leeuw, pp. 79, 66.

[17] Van der Leeuw, p. 112.

[18] Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (Amsterdam, 1939; rpt. Boston: Beacon, 1950), p. 19.

[19] Daniel A. Dombrowski, "Plato and Athletics," Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 6 (Fall 1979), 33.

[20] Rahner, p. 13.

[21] Miller, Gods and Games, p. 105.

[22] Huizinga, p. 48.

[23] Geoffrey S. Conway, ed., The Odes of Pindar (London: Dent, 1972), p. xi.

[24] Judith Swaddling, The Ancient Olympic Games (London: British Museum, 1980), p. 7.

[25] Swaddling, p. 6.

[26] Conway, p. xix.

[27] The Odes of Pindar, trans. C. M. Bowra (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), p. 133.

[28] The Odes of Pindar, p. xii.

[29] M. I. Finley and H. W. Pleket, The Olympic Games (New York: Viking, 1976), p. 17.

[30] Swaddling, p. 7.

[31] Peter Brown, "Violence in Olympia," rev. of The Olympic Games: The First Thousand Years, by M. I. Finley and H. W. Pleket, New York Review of Books, 25 Nov. 1976, p. 23.

[32] Swaddling, p. 37.

[33] Huizinga, p. 48.

[34] Finley and Pleket, pp. 19-20.

[35] Finley and Pleket, p. 21.

[36] Swaddling, p. 79.

[37] Roger Caillois, Man, Play, and Games, trans. Meyer Barash (New York: Schocken Books, 1961), pp. 59-61.

[38] Harvey Cox, The Feast of Fools (New York: Perennial Library-Harper and Row, 1969), p. 3.

[39] Cox, p. 1.

[40] Cox, p. 7.

[41] Rahner, p. 83.

[42] Van der Leeuw, p. 29.

[43] Kinsley, The Divine Player, p. 270.

[44] Rahner, pp. 83-86.

[45] Huizinga, p. 179.

[46] Kinsley, The Divine Player, p. 269.

[47] A. K. Ramanujan, Speaking of Śiva (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1973), p. 152.

[48] Lilly C. Stone, <u>English Sports and Recreations</u> (Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1960), p. 1.

[49] Stone, pp. 33-34.

[50] Caillois, chap. 5, passim.

[51] John R. Betts, <u>America's Sporting Heritage</u> (Reading: Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1974), p. v.

[52] Murray Arndt, "Introduction to Jewish History," English 371, Univ. of North Carolina at Greensboro, 12 Jan. 1981.

[53] Benjamin Ladner, "Madness and Spirit," Rel. 695, Univ. of North Carolina at Greensboro, 7 Feb. 1980.

[54] E. A. Burtt, <u>The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science</u>, 2nd ed. (1952; rpt. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1980), p. 15.

[55] Burtt, p. 18.

[56] Edwin H. Cady, <u>The Big Game</u> (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1978), p. 18.

[57] Betts, p. 5.

[58] Betts, p. 5.

[59] Cady, p. 21.

[60] Betts, p. 5.

[61] Huizinga, pp. 196-197.

[62] William W. Newell, <u>Games and Songs of American Children</u> (New York: Harper, 1903), p. 2.

[63] Newell, p. 7.

[64] Iona Opie and Peter Opie, <u>Children's Games in Street and Playground</u> (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969), p. vi.

[65] Opie and Opie, p. ix.

[66] Newell, p. 13.

[67] Huizinga, p. 24.

[68] Opie and Opie, p. 1.

[69] Newell, p. 27.

[70] Opie and Opie, pp. 14-15.

[71] Rainer Maria Rilke, <u>The Duino Elegies</u>, trans. S. Garney and J. Wilson (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 86.

[72] William Blake, "The Ecchoing Green," in <u>Songs of Innocence and of Experience</u>, introd. Sir Geoffrey Keynes (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967), n. pag.

[73] Huizinga, p. 197.

[74] Cady, p. 25.

[75] Betts, p. 20.

[76] Cady, p. 37.

[77] White, p. 85.

[78] White, p. 81.

[79] X. J. Kennedy, <u>An Introduction to Poetry</u>, 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), p. 64.

[80] Kennedy, p. 354.

[81] Kennedy, p. 23.

[82] Hannah Arendt, <u>The Origins of Totalitarianism</u>, new ed. (New York: Harcourt, 1973), p. 217.

[83] Lewis Carroll, <u>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass</u> (New York: Signet-New American Library, 1960), p. 79.

[84] Cady, p. 37.

[85] Betts, p. 308.

[86] Ellen W. Gerber et al., <u>The American Woman in Sport</u> (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1974), p. 3.

[87] W. H. Auden, <u>Selected Poetry of W. H. Auden</u>, 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), p. 155.

[88] R. B. Alderman, <u>Psychological Behavior in Sport</u> (Philadelphia: Saunders, 1974), pp. 26, 32.

[89] Miller, <u>Gods and Games</u>, p. 2.

[90] Huizinga, p. 13.

[91] Huizinga, p. 28.

[92] Huizinga, p. 132.

[93] Huizinga, pp. 3, 49.

[94] Huizinga, p. 35.

[95] Huizinga, p. 39.

[96] Huizinga, p. 40.

[97] Huizinga, p. 37.

[98] James A. H. Murray, ed., <u>A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles</u> (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), pp. 37, 187.

[99] Miller, "Playing the Game to Lose," p. 106.

[100] Huizinga, p. 6.

[101] Huizinga, p. 7.

[102] Huizinga, p. 198.

[103] Huizinga, p. 51.

[104] Huizinga, p. 192.

[105] Huizinga, p. 206.

[106] Caillois, p. 4.

[107] Caillois, p. 53.

[108] Caillois, p. 13.

[109] Caillois, pp. 5, 7, 18.

[110] Caillois, pp. 9-10.

[111] Miller, Gods and Games, p. 22.

[112] Miller, Gods and Games, p. 23.

[113] Caillois, p. 175.

[114] Caillois, p. 41.

[115] Caillois, pp. 14, 15.

[116] Caillois, p. 18.

[117] Paul Weiss, Sport: A Philosophical Inquiry
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1969), p. 138.

[118] Peter C. McIntosh, "Theories of How and Why," in
Sport in the Sociocultural Process, ed. Marie Hart, 2nd ed.
(Dubuque: Brown, 1976), p. 11.

[119] John W. Loy, "The Nature of Sport: A Definitional
Effort," in Sport, Culture, and Society, ed. John W. Loy, Jr.
and Gerald S. Kenyon (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 59, 60.

[120] Loy, p. 69.

[121] Weiss, Sport: A Philosophical Inquiry, p. 138.

[122] Weiss, <u>Sport: A Philosophical Inquiry</u>, p. 140.

[123] Weiss, <u>Sport: A Philosophical Inquiry</u>, p. 144.

[124] Weiss, <u>Sport: A Philosophical Inquiry</u>, p. 151.

[125] McIntosh, p. 12.

[126] McIntosh, p. 13.

[127] McIntosh, p. 17.

[128] Eleanor Metheny, <u>Movement and Meaning</u> (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 57, 60-61.

[129] Metheny, p. 63.

[130] Metheny, pp. 63, 76.

[131] Josef Pieper, <u>Leisure: The Basis of Culture</u>, trans. Alexander Dru (New York: Mentor-New American Library, 1963), p. 20.

[132] Pieper, pp. 17-18.

[133] Pieper, p. 46.

[134] Pieper, p. 61.

[135] Pieper, p. 41.

[136] Pieper, p. 73.

[137] John Lahr, "The Theatre of Sports," in <u>Sport in the Sociocultural Process</u>, ed. Marie Hart, 2nd ed. (Dubuque: Brown, 1976), p. 199.

[138] Lahr, p. 203.

[139] Opie and Opie, p. 9.

[140] Arnold Beisser, <u>The Madness in Sports</u>, 2nd ed. (Bowie, Md.: Charless, 1977), p. 10.

[141] Beisser, p. 143.

[142] George Leonard, <u>The Ultimate Athlete</u> (New York: Viking, 1975), p. 159.

[143] Peter L. Berger, <u>A Rumor of Angels</u> (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor-Doubleday, 1969), pp. 58-59.

[144] Thomas F. Green, <u>Work, Leisure, and the American Schools</u> (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 159.

[145] Celeste Ulrich, <u>The Social Matrix of Physical Education</u> (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 101-102.

[146] Cady, p. 52.

[147] Jacques Ehrmann, "Homo Ludens Revisited," trans. Cathy and Phil Lewis, in <u>Game, Play, Literature</u>, ed. Jacques Ehrmann (Boston: Beacon, 1968), p. 41.

[148] Moltmann, p. 6.

[149] Francis Hearn, "Toward a Critical Theory of Play," <u>Telos</u>, 30 (Winter 1976-1977), 150.

[150] Kinsley, <u>The Sword and the Flute</u>, p. 78.

[151] Rahner, p. 9.

[152] Rahner, p. 6.

[153] Van der Leeuw, p. 54.

[154] Van der Leeuw, p. 331.

[155] William J. Morgan, "On the Path Towards an Ontology of Sport," <u>Journal of the Philosophy of Sport</u>, 3 (Sept. 1976), pp. 27-28.

[156] David L. Roochnik, "Play and Sport," <u>Journal of the Philosophy of Sport</u>, 2 (Sept. 1975), 40.

[157] Kenneth L. Schmitz, "Sport and Play: Suspension of the Ordinary," in Sport and the Body, ed. Ellen W. Gerber and William J. Morgan, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Lea and Febiger, 1979), p. 25.

[158] Eugen Fink, "The Oasis of Happiness, Toward an Ontology of Play," trans. Ute and Thomas Saine, in Game, Play, Literature, ed. Jacques Ehrmann (Boston: Beacon, 1968), p. 19.

[159] Fink, "The Oasis of Happiness," p. 24.

[160] Roochnik, p. 41.

[161] Schmitz, p. 27.

[162] Eugen Fink, "The Ontology of Play," trans. Sister M. Delphine, in Sport and the Body, ed. Ellen W. Gerber and William J. Morgan, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Lea and Febiger, 1979), p. 78.

[163] Ehrmann, "Homo Ludens Revisited," p. 38.

[164] Ehrmann, "Homo Ludens Revisited," p. 42.

[165] Ehrmann, "Homo Ludens Revisited," p. 56.

[166] Ehrmann, "Homo Ludens Revisited," p. 55.

[167] Karl Jaspers, Man in the Modern Age, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor-Doubleday, 1951), p. 70.

[168] Michael Novak, Ascent of the Mountain, Flight of the Dove, rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 205.

[169] Jaspers, p. 71.

[170] Hannah Arendt, Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt, 1972), p. 193.

[171] Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 217.

[172] David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1961), p. 301.

[173] Henry G. Bugbee, The Inward Morning (New York: Colophon-Harper and Row, 1958), p. 82.

[174] Henri Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, trans. Sacha Rabinovitch (New York: Torchbook-Harper and Row, 1971), p. 20.

[175] Alan Sillitoe, The Loneliness of the Long-Distance Runner (New York: Signet-New American Library, 1959), p. 37.

[176] Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (New York: Bantam Books, 1974), p. 211.

[177] Theodore Ziolkowski, Introd., Magister Ludi, by Hermann Hesse, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Bantam-Holt, 1969), p. ix.

[178] Rainer Maria Rilke, Sämtliche Werke, Vol. II, trans. Elizabeth Sewell (Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1956), p. 132.

[179] Lloyd Frankenberg, Invitation to Poetry (Garden City, N.Y.: Dolphin-Doubleday, 1956), pp. 240-241.

[180] W. H. Auden, The Dyer's Hand and Other Essays (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 89.

[181] Allan Seager, "The Joys of Sport at Oxford," in The Norton Reader: An Anthology of Expository Prose, gen. ed. Arthur M. Eastman (New York: Norton, 1965), p. 14.

[182] Timothy Healy, "It was a golden moment . . . the alchemy of sports," Providence Evening Bulletin, 31 March 1980, p. A18.

[183] Marvin Cohen, "The Baseball Encyclopedia," rev. of The Complete and Official Record of Major League Baseball, The Village Voice, 5 Feb. 1970, p. 6.

[184] Jaspers, p. 68.

[185] Paul Weiss, "A Metaphysical Excursus," in Sport in the Sociocultural Process, ed. Marie Hart, 2nd ed. (Dubuque: Brown, 1976), pp. 396-397.

[186] Robert Gahringer, "Can Games Explain Language?" The Journal of Philosophy, 56, No. 16 (1959), 663.

[187] Richard McKeon, Thought, Action and Passion (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 191.

[188] C. S. Lewis, A Preface to Paradise Lost (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1942), p. 81.

[189] Thomas P. McDonnell, ed., A Thomas Merton Reader, rev. ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 504-505.

CHAPTER IV

THE HUMAN CONDITION

Now that the structure of game has been looked at, the
realm of human affairs will be the next concern. For it is
within this domain that the players of the game reside.
Once again, the literature is vast and complex regarding
matters such as being, knowing and doing. Three primary
authors--Hannah Arendt, Michael Polanyi, and Elizabeth
Sewell--have been selected to address the concerns of the
human condition. Again, the work of each author alone sug-
gests too much material for the scope of this study. So
from the work of each writer only certain points will be re-
viewed, that is, those best applicable to the particular
topic of game.

In addition to the three writers chosen, one more con-
cern will be addressed as a separate topic at the end of
this chapter. Mentioned earlier in the text were the per-
plexing concepts of embodiment and intentionality. Inherent
in these concerns lie the problematic notions of mind-
body or embodiment, and willing or intentionality. Each
of the authors already identified addresses one or both of
these matters, and an additional author--namely, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty--will be called upon to reveal some ideas
pertaining to embodiment and intentionality which might be

of help to this study.

The chapter, then, will have four sections. The work
of Hannah Arendt, Michael Polanyi, and Elizabeth Sewell will
comprise the first three sections, each author being viewed
separately. The fourth section will include the concerns
of embodiment and intentionality addressed by the three
authors, Arendt, Polanyi, and Sewell, and the work of
Merleau-Ponty will be introduced at this point.

From the work of Hannah Arendt, action, public space,
commitment, promise, remembrance, agon, culture, appearance,
authority and tradition will be explored. From Polanyi's
work, the concept of tacit-explicit knowing will be examined
as well as his idea of the master-apprentice relationship.
These relate to Polanyi's discussion of the performance of
skills. Sewell's notion of game as a system of nonsense, and
her understanding of the importance of human images will be
examined. Merleau-Ponty's thesis of enfleshed being or
embodiment will be looked at in light of Polanyi's idea of
indwelling, Sewell's concept of "two becoming one," and
Arendt's discussion of the problematic relationship of the
vita activa and the vita contemplativa. Intentionality or
willing will be linked to the voluntary entrance into the
game structure in the sense of choosing to do something,
moving the body to do it, and accepting the unpredictable
consequences of the choice. Arendt and Merleau-Ponty
primarily will address this issue.

It is important to remember that none of the authors chosen for this section of work is concerned about game per se. Arendt writes from a political stance, Polanyi from a scientific background, Sewell from a poetic perspective and Merleau-Ponty from a phenomenological approach. But they all have something to say which has an important bearing on how a model of game might be expressed. And they are concerned with the human condition and with our being-in-the-world.

Hannah Arendt

Hannah Arendt was a political philosopher, and her "one solution," quoted often from her profound book, The Human Condition, is this:

> What I propose is a reconsideration of the human condition . . . it is nothing more than to think what we are doing.[1]

Her writings encompassed many political topics, but, as Alan Anderson suggests:

> She offers us but one solution for our predicament.
> It is as simple as our problems are elementary.
> It is . . . to reconsider, to rethink, the
> fundamental experiences and capacities of men --
> and it is to this task that she has devoted
> herself.[2]

The themes of her work center on authority, tradition, worldliness, freedom, revolution, labor, work, action, speech, thinking, willing, judging, plurality, totalitarianism, the banality of evil, the public and the private realms, remembrance, promises, constitution, natality,

mortality, immortality, and eternity.[3] Though her writing

career spanned four decades, it is from The Human Condition

that the first major insights are gained for this study.

Elisabeth Young-Bruehl characterizes Arendt's concept

of the vita activa, the active life, in this way:

> She emphasized man's properly political capacities,
> action and speech, and distinguished these from
> work and labor. Arendt considered these activities
> in light of the fundamental conditions of human
> existence - plurality, natality, mortality, life
> itself, worldliness, and earthboundness - and in
> light of a vast historical shift, from the clas-
> sical period, when each activity had its place in
> the private or the public realm, to the modern
> period when both private and public realms atro-
> phied and a hybrid realm, called the social,
> emerged.[4]

For Arendt, the three categories of labor, work, and action

were critical to her own study. She proposes that

> Labor is the activity which corresponds to the
> biological process of the human body. . . .
> Work provides an 'artificial' world of things,
> distinctly different from all natural surround-
> ings. . . . Action . . . corresponds to the human
> condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not
> Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world. . . .
> Labor assures not only individual survival, but
> the life of the species. Work and its product,
> the human artifact, bestow a measure of permanence
> and durability. . . . Action . . . creates the
> condition for remembrance.[5]

Arendt's category of action is the one which most con-

cerns this study. For it is within this sphere that Arendt

deals with such issues as public appearance, freedom, agon,

plurality, speech and deeds, courage, and risk-taking. She

calls the public space of action "politics" and models the

space on that of the Greek concept of the polis.

> Politics, she believed, is not simply or even
> primarily the domain that holds the monopoly of
> force, or the sphere that determines who gets
> what. Rather, it is the arena of excellence and
> responsibility where, by acting together, men can
> become truly free. It transcends the domains of
> interest, and power in the usual sense by pro-
> viding citizens with the opportunity of achieving
> a greatness and nobility that may be revered and
> remembered forever. Thus, for her, politics estab-
> lished the context for tradition and authority as
> well as culture and judgment in the widest sense.[6]

Arendt describes the Greek _polis_ as a place where

citizens met other citizens on equal terms.

> Equality existed only in this specifically public
> realm, where men met one another as citizens and
> not as private persons. . . . The Greeks held that
> no one can be free except among his peers. . . .
> The reason for this insistence on the intercon-
> nection of freedom and equality in Greek political
> thought was that freedom was understood as being
> manifest in certain . . . human activities, and
> that these activities could appear and be real
> only when others saw them, judged them, remembered
> them. The life of a free man needed the presence
> of others. Freedom itself needed therefore a place
> where people could come together - the _agora_, the
> market-place, or the _polis_, the political space
> proper.[7]

The human activities to which Arendt refers are those

of speaking and doing. "What makes man a political being,"

she says, "is his faculty of action; it enables him to get

together with his peers, to act in concert, and to reach

out for goals and enterprises that would never enter his

mind, let alone the desires of his heart."[8] Margaret

Canovan feels that Arendt's concept of action means that,

in the company of others, people often take initiatives

which require courage and the taking on of responsibilities

which then move people out of the realm of predictable
behavior and toward the realm of freedom.[9] In the company
of others, Arendt is concerned that we ask the question what
equalizes us, for, she says, "People are not born equal in
their private lives."[10] But task and place can equalize
those who come together over a common matter.

> Throughout his life man moves constantly in two
> different orders of existence; he moves within
> what is his own, and he also moves in a sphere
> that is common to him and his fellowmen. . . .
> The main characteristic of the common with respect
> to the individuals who share it is that it is much
> more permanent than the life of any one individual.[11]

Permanence coupled with durability and remembrance
relates directly to culture and tradition. "Culture in the
sense of developing nature into a dwelling place for people
as well as in the sense of taking care of the monuments of
the past, determine even today the content and the meaning
we have in mind when we speak of culture."[12] The relation
of culture to durable objects and things which are the
products of work and fabrication can be contrasted with
actions, stories, and memories of action which are not,
properly speaking, products. For action has no product as
an end result. Action stands outside the chain of means-
ends relationships. But,

> . . . action . . . 'produces' stories . . . as
> naturally as fabrication produces tangible things.
> These stories may then be recorded in documents
> and monuments, . . . they may be told and retold
> and worked into all kinds of material.[13]

Concerning remembrance of these stories, Arendt says,

> Experiences and even the stories which grow out
> of what men do and endure, of happenings and
> events, sink back into the futility inherent in
> the living word and the living deed unless they
> are talked about over and over again. What saves
> the affairs of mortal men from their inherent
> futility is nothing but this incessant talk about
> them, which in turn remains futile unless certain
> concepts, certain guideposts for future remembrance
> and even for sheer reference, arise out of it.[14]

Tradition, culture--indeed, worldly reality itself--are
constituted by coupling the world of objects with the
memories of people's words and deeds. "The whole factual
world of human affairs," Arendt contends,

> depends for its reality and continued existence,
> first, upon the presence of others who have
> seen and heard and will remember, and second on
> the transformation of the intangible into the
> tangibility of things.[15]

The presence of others she identifies with those who
spectate. In this regard, she quotes a parable which was
ascribed to Pythagoras and reported by Diogenes Laertius:

> Life . . . is like a festival; . . . some come to
> the festival to compete, some to ply their trade,
> but the best people come as spectators.[16]

She traces the word for spectator to the Greek word,
theatai, which later became the word for theory. "The word
'theoretical' until a few hundred years ago meant 'contem-
plating,' looking upon something from the outside."[17] Dolf
Sternberger suggests that the German version of her book,
The Human Condition, contained a passage which showed

> . . . the individual, the citizen of the polis, in
> the dual role of actor and spectator, existing in
> an auditorium in which everyone is watching and
> spectating at the same time.[18]

Arendt accords the spectator a privileged place in the
public world by suggesting that actors are concerned with
parts while spectators can see the whole performance.

> Withdrawal from direct involvement to a stand-
> point outside the game (the festival of life) is
> not only a condition for judging, for being the
> final arbiter in the ongoing competition, but also
> the condition for understanding the meaning of the
> play.19

The word competition in Arendt's political sense re-
lates to the word agon. Sheldon Wolin says that for Arendt,

> Politics was essentially dramaturgic. It con-
> sisted of public performances staged in a clearly
> defined public realm and witnessed by an audience
> of equals engrossed in what was taking place and
> indifferent to calculations of material benefits
> or consequences. Political men were not, however,
> actors reading lines; they were men engaged in a
> contest, an agon, a striving for excellence in
> terms of praiseworthy acts.20

Arendt herself felt that the agonal impulse was important
to the public realm, and says, "It is the desire to excel
which makes men love the world and enjoy the company of
their peers, and drives them into public business."21 Peter
Fuss suggests that the agonal thrust of The Human Condition
needs to be coupled with the accommodational emphasis of
another of Arendt's books, On Revolution, in order to under-
stand a realm where individual initiatives can be reconciled
with joint decision-making and plural responses and
enactments.22

The human achievements of action are not pursued for
ends other than those which lie within the performances

themselves. Embedded in the performance is its meaning, and, as Arendt says, "The 'product' is identical with the performing act itself."[23] She speaks of courage being present in the mere willingness to speak and act. "To insert oneself into the world and begin a story of one's own,"[24] ties people into a web of human relationships. These relationships are unpredictable as to outcomes, and always contain for those involved the possibility for great-ness to emerge within a forum of plural appearances. Fuss characterizes Arendt's notion of the public realm by saying:

> Acting and speaking within the human community,
> allowing oneself to become part of the larger
> web of human relationships, requires courage, a
> willingness to take risks, and faith. Courage is
> needed to expose and disclose one's self in pub-
> lic, risk is involved in that one is not master
> of what he thus reveals; and one must have suffi-
> cient faith in the community of one's fellow men
> to entrust to its care this precious self.[25]

What saves the public space of action and deeds from sheer unpredictability and radical chaos is the structure of laws, boundaries, and conditions which are taken up by people upon entry into the public world. This act is one of contract-ing or covenanting with others and is an act of promising to abide by the rules. Arendt maintains that "I may wish to change the rules of the game . . .; but to deny them means no mere 'disobedience,' but the refusal to enter the human community."[26] Where people gather and bind them-selves together through promises, covenants and pledges, a foundation for freedom is established. As a worldly

reality freedom exists only in the public realm, and to find public spaces for its appearance constitutes a kind of world-building. To make and keep promises provide stability for the public world, "where uncertainty and unpredictability may break in from all sides."[27]

Arendt believes that "Freedom of movement is . . . the indispensable condition for action, and it is in action that men primarily experience freedom in the world."[28] Similarly, she says, "Freedom as an inner capacity of man is identical with the capacity to begin, just as freedom as a political reality is identical with a space of movement between men."[29] For Arendt, contacts and contracts with other people are essential for public happiness. The function of the public realm is "to throw light on the affairs of men by providing a space of appearances in which they can show in deed and word, for better and worse, who they are and what they can do."[30] These spaces of appearance can find a proper location almost at anytime and anywhere. The "space of appearance" is "the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly."[31]

Arendt speaks of virtuosity in action where accomplishment lies in the performance itself and where the excellence of people shows in their responses to the opportunities presented by the public realm. She says that "The Greeks

always used such metaphors as flute-playing, dancing, heal-
ing, and seafaring to distinguish political from other
activities, that is, they drew their analogies from those
arts in which virtuosity in performance is decisive."[32] For
Arendt, this connection to the past is important. For,

> The world we live in at any moment is the world of
> the past; it consists of the monuments and the
> relics of what has been done by men for better or
> worse. . . . It is quite true that the past
> haunts us; it is the past's function to haunt us
> who are present, and wish to live in the world
> as it really is, that is, has become what it is
> now.[33]

As communal beings, we belong to others and to the
surrounding world, and it is our responsibility to take care
of such a world, a world which has to provide for the
fragility of human affairs. By evaluating objects and
judging what is to stay in the world, by enacting words and
deeds and remembering stories of action, we keep the world
fit for human habitation. Also we keep continuous a past
which can be handed over from generation to generation. We
await, then, the appearance of new people in the public,
worldly realm. Both stability and change can be accommodated
in this process. It is a process of humanizing the world
by a continual discourse among people in a present recall-
ing a past and giving space for the as yet unseen future
stories to be enacted. And, in Arendt's words,

> It remains the greatest prerogative of every man
> to be essentially and forever more than anything
> he can produce or achieve, not only to remain,
> after each work and achievement, the not yet

exhausted, sheer inexhaustible source of further
achievements, but to be in his very essence be-
yond all of them, untouchable and unlimited by
them.[34]

According to Young-Bruehl, Arendt contrasts the politi-

cal space as one "in which men act purposively through

words and deeds, with what she called the 'social,'" by

which she means "the relations men develop for the mainte-

nance of life."[35] Political space is characterized by the

"sovereignty of a body of people bound and kept together,

not by an identical will which somehow magically inspires

them all, but by an agreed purpose for which alone the

promises are valid and binding."[36] Wolin feels that such a

body of people in Arendt's sense could also be called an

audience and that such spectators should be taken "for the

political community whose nature is to be a community of

remembrance."[37] Furthermore, for Arendt, Wolin suggests

that

> Political action and labor signified primordial
> opposites: freedom versus necessity; extra-
> ordinary action versus repetitive activity; life-
> risking versus life-sustaining; action occurring
> in the bright light of the public stage versus
> activity hidden away in private places and private
> transactions; and finally, action constituted and
> signified by utterance and preserved in remembrance
> versus activity that is speechless, that issues in
> products destined to be consumed and forgotten.[38]

Within the public realm of action, authority is vested

in people by virtue of position and tradition. But, says

Arendt, "Its hallmark is unquestioning recognition by those

who are asked to obey; neither coercion nor persuasion is

needed."[39] Arendt recalls the importance of both tradition
and authority in the Greek context of action:

> Tradition preserved the past by handing down
> from one generation to the next the testimony
> of the ancestors, who first had witnessed and
> created the sacred founding and then augmented
> it by their authority throughout the centuries
> . . . to act without authority and tradition,
> without accepted, time-honored standards and
> models, was inconceivable.[40]

Change occurs for Arendt when people act in concert and take
up the power they have by virtue of being together in order
to begin again, to reconstitute the space for appearance
after liberating themselves from a particular set of bonds.

For Arendt, the Greek _polis_, the political and public
realm, offered to people a chance for equality, freedom,
change, stability, action, remembering, promising and for-
giving. In her words:

> . . . it was the _polis_, the space of men's free
> deeds and living words, which could endow life
> with splendor.[41]

Michael Polanyi

From the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt, we move
to an examination of the epistemological premises of Michael
Polanyi. Arendt believes that, "Wherever knowing and doing
have parted company, the space of freedom is lost."[42] For
Polanyi, knowing and doing are never separated.

> I regard knowing as an active comprehension of the
> things known, an action that requires skill.
> Skilful knowing and doing is performed by sub-
> ordinating a set of particulars, as clues or tools,
> to the shaping of a skilful achievement, whether
> practical or theoretical.[43]

Polanyi sets out to establish a comprehensive epistemology of personal knowing, claiming that "by elucidating the way our bodily processes participate in our perceptions we will throw light on the bodily roots of all thought."[44]

Since we live in terms of meanings and significances, the enterprise of personal knowing points toward endeavors of comprehension rather than those of particularizing knowledge per se. In all acts of understanding there is a personal participation of the knower. Of his thesis in Personal Knowledge, Polanyi says,

> I have shown that into every act of knowing there enters a passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known, and that this co-efficient is no mere imperfection but a vital component of his knowledge.[45]

He also says that, "any attempt to avoid the responsibility for shaping the beliefs which we accept as true is absurd."[46]

The theory of personal knowledge which ties together relations of parts to wholes is summed up this way by Polanyi:

> The theory of Personal Knowledge offers an interpretation of meaning. It says that no meaningful knowledge can be acquired, except by an act of comprehension which consists in merging our awareness of a set of particulars into our focal awareness of their joint significance. Such an act is necessarily personal, for it assimilates the particulars in question to our bodily equipment; we are aware of them only in terms of the things we are focally observing.[47]

It is the concept of tacit knowing which is critical to Polanyi's work. The structure of tacit knowing always

involves two components; some of the words which Polanyi uses to describe the two poles are tacit-explicit, proximal-distal, subsidiary-focal, and from-to. He says that "in an act of tacit knowing we attend <u>from</u> something for attending <u>to</u> something else."[48] For example:

> . . . we are relying on our awareness of a com-
> bination of muscular acts for attending to the
> performance of a skill. We are attending from
> these elementary movements to the achievement of
> their joint purpose, and hence are usually unable
> to specify these elementary acts.[49]

The explicit or focal awareness is always upheld by a sub-sidiary or tacit understanding. In other words, we don't look <u>at</u> particulars but <u>from</u> the particulars <u>to</u> their joint meaning. We rely on the particulars of a situation in order to determine the larger meaning. The particulars are always rooted in the unclear, non-explicit, tacit dimension of knowing. And for Polanyi, this rooting of the tacit is primarily a bodily rooting.

> Our body is the ultimate instrument of all our
> external knowledge, whether intellectual or
> practical. . . . Our own body is the only thing
> in the world which we normally never experience
> as an object, but experience always in terms of
> the world to which we are attending from our body.[50]

Furthermore,

> Our body is always in use as the basic instrument
> of our intellectual and practical control over
> our surroundings. . . . To be aware of our body
> in terms of the things we know and do, is to
> feel alive. This awareness is an essential part
> of our existence as sensuous active persons.[51]

Regarding the body as the ultimate though tacit ground for knowing provides a basis for understanding the body not only explicitly, but as the unspecifiable yet primary condition for coming to know the world. The process of attending from the body to the particulars of the world is exemplified in the way we use tools or implements or learn physical skills. "We use instruments," Polanyi says, "as an extension of our hands and they may serve also as an extension of our sense. We assimilate them to our body by pouring ourselves into them."[52] By contrast, "the skilful use of a tennis racket can be paralysed by watching our racket instead of attending to the ball and the court in front of us."[53] Polanyi explains:

> Scrutinize closely the particulars of a comprehensive entity and their meaning is effaced. . . . Admittedly, the destruction can be made good by interiorizing the particulars once more. . . . But it is important to note that this recovery never brings back the original meaning. It may improve on it. Motion studies, which tend to paralyze a skill, will improve it when followed by practice. . . . The detailing of particulars which by itself would destroy meaning, serves as a guide to their subsequent integration and thus establishes a more secure and more accurate meaning for them.[54]

In other words, it is appropriate to focus on isolated components in tool or skill learning, but the effects of such particularizing will be noted meaningfully only in the context of the re-constituted whole performance.

This use of a tool or implement, when it becomes assimilated to the body in order to experience its use, also

changes the body in that the body expands into a new mode of being-in-the-world. In other words, the body touches the world in a different way and the world shapes the body differently because of the artifact's shape and assimilation to the body.

> We keep expanding our body into the world by assimilating to it sets of particulars which we integrate into reasonable entities. Thus do we form, intellectually and practically, an interpreted universe populated by entities, the particulars of which we have interiorized for the sake of comprehending their meaning in the shape of coherent entities.[55]

Therefore, not only does the body change slightly in this recognition, but so does the world.

In learning skills, "The aim of a skilful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which are not known as such to the person following them."[56] Using swimming and riding a bicycle as examples of skill learning, Polanyi concludes that neither the swimmer nor the cyclist can give a full account of their performances in terms of particulars. This is because the particulars on which we rely for the performance of the skill are integrated into a more comprehensive meaningful act.

> This effort [i.e. riding a bicycle] results in an amazingly sophisticated policy of which we know nothing. Our muscles are set so as to counteract our accidental imbalance at every moment, by turning the bicycle into a curve with a radius proportional to the square of our velocity divided by the angle imbalance. Millions of people are cycling all over the world by skillfully applying this formula which they could not remotely understand if they were told about it.[57]

This is the basis for Polanyi's famous idea that we know far more than we can tell.

Polanyi proposes that all knowing takes place in the same way that people learn skills and use tools. A bi-polar process is in operation at all times, which involves both the tacit and the explicit. The importance attached to the unfocalized and ambiguous state of the body in knowing, whether involved with practical or theoretical concerns, cannot be underestimated. For Polanyi, the subsidiary and bodily level of tacit knowing is primary. In making sense of the world, Polanyi claims, "We rely on our tacit knowledge of impacts that the world makes on our body and of the responses of our body to these impacts. Hence the exceptional position of our body in the universe."[58]

For Polanyi, knowledge is upheld by tradition, in community and under a sense of authority. This structure offers a kind of check and balance system whereby personal knowledge is saved from being merely subjective. Since the Cartesian norm of uni-polar or objective knowledge is not valid, and since the possibility of radical relativity besets subjectively based knowledge, the two poles of personal knowing must be accommodated and must seek a framework which takes into account the irreducibility of the subjective-objective paradox. To be sure, the reality which one seeks in a process of discovery is objective, but as soon as it is claimed to be real, the subjective element

appears. This paradox is unresolvable, says Polanyi. Con-
sequently, he prefers to call knowledge personal and seeks
a structure of tradition, community, and authority for its
unfolding.

Polanyi uses the example of the master-apprentice
relationship to help elucidate these concepts.

> All skilful performances can be taught by rely-
> ing on the pupil's effort to imitate and catch
> the knack of it.[59]

> To learn by example is to submit to authority.
> You follow your master because you trust his
> manner of doing things even when you cannot
> analyse and account in detail for its effective-
> ness. By watching the master and emulating his
> efforts in the presence of his example, the
> apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of
> the art.[60]

Traditions passed on from one generation to another in this
way preserve a fund from which personal knowledge draws.
Initially, one must submit to the authority of another be-
fore one knows explicitly what is to be learned. Also, one
accepts the responsibility of emulating the traditions which
the master embodies. These acts of submission and respon-
sibility are themselves forms of personal knowing. Polanyi
speaks of them in terms of commitment:

> The extent to which each of us accepts and relies
> on the existing medium of society for shaping
> his own thoughts and aspirations is therefore an
> ultimate tacit component of ours. I acknowledge
> this commitment myself as the framework of
> declaring myself thus committed. This is, indeed,
> merely to accept for myself the situation which
> I have defined as the calling of man.[61]

Traditions are embodied by masters and carried by them
to each succeeding generation. Again, Polanyi uses skill-
ful performance as an example:

> The performer co-ordinates his moves by dwelling
> in them as parts of his body, while the watcher
> tries to correlate these moves by seeking to
> dwell in them from outside. He dwells in these
> moves by interiorizing them. By such exploratory
> indwelling the pupil gets the feel of a master's
> skill.[62]

Polanyi feels that "In order to share this indwelling, the
pupil must presume that a teaching which appears meaningless
to start with has in fact a meaning which can be discovered
by hitting on the same kind of indwelling as the teacher is
practicing. Such an effort is based on accepting the
teacher's authority."[63]

Polanyi argues for confidence in a kind of authority
which provides for transmission of traditions in culture.

> Only a small fragment of his own culture is direct-
> ly visible to any of its adherents. Large parts
> of it are altogether buried in books, paintings,
> musical scores, etc., which remain mostly unread,
> unseen, unperformed. The messages of these
> records live, even in the mind best informed
> about them, only in their awareness of having
> access to them and of being able to evoke their
> voices and understand them. . . . all these immense
> systematic accumulations of articulate forms
> consist of the records of human affirmation.
> They are the utterances of prophets, poets,
> legislators, scientists and other masters, . . .
> who, by their actions, recorded in history, have
> set a pattern for posterity.[64]

Polanyi believes that a convivial order must be maintained
wherein the authority of masters and the traditions they
tacitly embody can be revealed. In this convivial setting,

fellowship and joint participation in the affairs of personal knowing come into play. Clarke Cochran states that Polanyi's belief in personal knowledge is predicated upon "belonging to a community, believing in its traditions, and understanding the experience which engendered them."[65] In this context, rituals play a significant role.

> By fully participating in a ritual, the members
> of a group affirm the community of their existence,
> and at the same time identify the life of their
> group with that of antecedent groups, from whom
> the ritual has descended to them. . . . It af-
> firms the convivial existence of the group as
> transcending the individual, both in the present
> and through times past.[66]

Within the structure of tradition, authority, and community, change occurs when apprentices move beyond their masters through acts of discovering new levels of reality. The action of personal knowing is one of searching for deeper levels of understanding, prompted by an urge to break through fixed conceptual frameworks.

> Human beings develop this desire for tension in
> a variety of forms. Man is one of the few
> animals who continue to play throughout adult
> life. Men have also at all times gone out in
> search of adventure. . . . We . . . enjoy in in-
> numerable ways the sudden relaxation of a tension
> in which we have become involved.[67]

For Polanyi, knowing always involves doing and action. Indeed, William Poteat feels that

> Since Polanyi is willing to explore the analogies
> between the structure of cognitive acts and that
> of motor acts . . . new relations are made notice-
> able to him. . . . This is possible because
> Polanyi has chosen to view both cognition and
> motility under the category of action. . . . In

> this unfamiliar permisiveness - that is, think-
> ing of cognitive acts (of what the tradition
> would call the human mind) and the motor acts (of
> what the tradition would call the human body) as
> analogously embodying rationality - Polanyi
> shows yet another way in which he innovates.[68]

As previously discussed, knowing involves two facets, both

of which are involved in the endeavor, one being tacit and

unspecifiable and the other being explicit and particular.

Personal knowing is based on both facets, is bodily rooted,

and results in fashioning a coherent meaning toward which

one has been aiming. But, as Marjorie Grene explains:

> . . . from-to knowledge cannot be instantaneous;
> it is a stretch, not only of attention, but of
> effort; effort must be lived, and living takes
> time. . . . In the from-to stretch by which we
> grope our way forward out of and into and within
> a world, we both make and are made, possess and
> are possessed, in tension, indeed, and even
> paradox, but not in contradiction.[69]

Grene claims that Polanyi has solved the Cartesian

dilemma posed by using doubt as the basis of knowing and

issuing in the body-mind "problem." The solution, outlined

in Personal Knowledge, emerges in the act of taking up the

responsibility for being the active center of discovery.

She contends that "Knowing turns out to be the way in which

we grope our way forward, relying on clues within ourselves

to comprehend the complex patterns of the real world."[70]

And Polanyi concludes that

> The whole universe of human sensibility . . . is
> evoked . . . by dwelling within the framework
> of our cultural heritage. Thus our acknowledgment
> of understanding as a valid form of knowledge
> foreshadows the promised transition from the study

of nature to a confrontation with man acting responsibly, under an over-arching firmament of universal ideals.[71]

Elizabeth Sewell

At about the same time as the publication of Arendt's Human Condition (1958) and Polanyi's Personal Knowledge (1962), Elizabeth Sewell's opus The Orphic Voice (1960) was released. In this book she states:

> Modern thought supposes that human beings are capable of two sorts of thinking, the logical and the imaginative. . . . Science and poetry, mathematics and words, intellect and imagination, mind and body: they are old, they are tidy, they are mistaken. . . . The human organism, that body which has the gift of thought, does not have the choice of two kinds of thinking. It has only one, in which the organism as a whole is engaged in all along the line. There has been no progression in history from one type of thought to another.[72]

While The Orphic Voice stands as one of Sewell's greatest works, her publishings extend over a thirty-year period, ranging from fiction to literary criticism to poetry. William Ray finds in Sewell's writings

> . . . a mind that remains alive to the method and to the divinest madness which is sense - in metaphor, magic, dream, identification, all the elements with which imagination builds 'private and public structures for living in.' . . . Voyager, exile, hero - the terms fit Elizabeth Sewell's life and work. . . . As with Coleridge, her commitment is to the acts and the living language of imagination - to words as 'living powers,' 'powers of our own body and mind, energies of our own.'[73]

Of Polanyi and Arendt, Sewell suggests:

Michael Polanyi would save us from dislocation from
our instruments of power or idolatry of them by
a new inquiry into, and affirmation of, human
thought as mind and body, with faith and personal
commitment as the foundation of all learning and
knowing. Hannah Arendt would save us from self-
generated automatism by offering us freedom in its
essential form, the power to initiate new be-
ginnings, in thought and action.[74]

She says of Polanyi:

It has now been put forward, by a scientist, that
science with its distinctive form of logical
thought depends on an act of affirmation by the
scientist, personally, in what he is doing, and
that this basic assertion of personal commitment
can never be verified by any logical means. This
is the theme of Polanyi's Personal Knowledge. . . .
It is the restoration of science once more to the
company of the arts, giving science for its
foundation the mythic or metaphoric or poetic
situation where figure and agent become one and
the same.[75]

Of Arendt, Sewell contends:

In The Human Condition Hannah Arendt invites us to
look at ourselves as human beings, individual,
social, and political. . . . She is concerned in
this work, she says, with activity, the kind of
activity which is accessible to all average human
beings. . . . Human beings, at the level of
thought and action, have always at their disposal
one resource, both simple and 'miraculous' in the
exact sense: the power to initiate action, . . .
to begin the new and improbable.[76]

Much of Sewell's work is about method, the figuring of

relationships based upon a personal trust in the use of

one's own imagination.

Method? body the mind and its ways (us all)
          in figures
                And study them so.[77]

137

This is an act of both making and unmaking, or as Sewell

says, it means "to arise and unbuild again"--and again, and

again. It is typical of her to give the clues for her

method in a poem:

> The rule, we find,
> Is to be permeable: marbles stain:
> Light filters through packed crystals; someone's pain
>   Threads our interstices.
>   Creatures of all kind
> Are porous, breathe, fuse with their media;
>   Closures but seem.
>   Given a mind,
> Much more so; tides of the universe have play;
> Stars sift across our system once a day;
>   Cosmos and chaos all we do.
>   Then, Soul, defined
> As other, yet materially fleshed,
> Thy proper form retaining, o be meshed-
>   What flood of love, air, fire,
> Weep if thou will for shame and for desire,
>   Shall stream thee through.78

Of Sewell's method, called "postlogic," Ladner believes:

> The question of method must always be a question
> about man. . . . It is because man is already
> a form-giving and form-receiving being by virtue
> of his own earth-rooted form as body-mind that he
> is able to go on forming any questions at all
> about how he ought to question. . . . For Sewell
> to speak of poetic method is not for her to ask
> us simply to consider the novelty of relying
> upon poetic verse as an interesting method of
> seeing what might otherwise have been ignored.
> It is her way of speaking about man's relation
> to the world. And postlogic or poetic method is
> the human instrument for discovering and develop-
> ing this relation.79

In this linking of person to world through language,

through poetic method, Sewell says that skill in using the

imagination to make connections is required and, as with any

skill, this requires doing and practice. Additionally, she

maintains that

> What is needed is the patient cherishing of one's
> own flesh and blood and bones . . ., the listen-
> ing to what it has to say, the faithful helping
> of the body to think and to contribute all it
> can to the life of the mind.80

The use of the imagination is the primary methodological

means for establishing systems of relationships, and

language is the paradigmatic expression of this process.

Sewell often uses the metaphor of a dance when speaking

about language:

> Every word or group of words is at once a mean-
> ing, a history, and the occasion of activity in
> the mind. . . . This then is our field, where
> everything is in action and movement, and you
> cannot 'tell the dancer from the dance.'81

She likes the metaphor of dance because it implies that in

the act of thinking the body is passionately involved and

moving in a stylized yet free way, thus establishing a dance

of relations. Sewell looks at language as activity or myth

and says that "mind-bodies work and unite with figures in

order to learn and discover."82

Since language is integral to the realm of human af-

fairs and is also bodily rooted, both complexity and ambi-

guity surround any discussion of its meaning. The poet and

poetic method help in establishing both universal relation-

ships and personal transformations which come about through

language. Sewell says, in quoting Valéry,

> 'The Poet, without being aware of it, moves in an
> order of possible relationships and transformations.'
> Here is the final and noblest game of skill and

hazard, the wager against odds, number, and calcu-
lation versus change and probability. . . .
Poetry is the exquisite and brief moment between
order and disorder.[83]

Two metaphors used often by Sewell are those of game
and dance, and throughout her work there are allusions to
movement, activity and bodied involvement. All these
metaphors relate to her primary field of inquiry, that of
language and the use of the imagination as its method for
making relationships. Sewell believes:

> The imagination cannot work and the wholeness of
> the human being will be ruined if mind wars
> against body . . ., for since the imagination is
> a unifying agent in all its operations it needs
> body and mind together in a reasonable prelimi-
> nary harmony before it can proceed with the rest
> of its work, the multiplication of unitive
> relations between that harmony and all external
> things.[84]

For Sewell, three great resource areas must be tapped
constantly as we seek to make meaningful relations and sense
of who we are to and in the world. These resources are
tradition, metaphors, and personal experience, or, in
Sewell's terms, inheritance, images as signs or figures, and
what is immediately known and lived.[85] By drawing from
these three areas, formulations of relations emerge which
lead to discoveries, self-revelations, solutions to prob-
lems, and which enhance the human understandings we come to
rely upon for making and taking up the world. This is a
dynamic process which involves the movement and interchange
of figures from at least five formal language-communication

systems: dance and ritual; music and rhythm; plastic arts; mathematics; and word-language.[86]

But, according to Ladner, for Sewell, "the body is the primary form from which and by means of which formalizing, meaningful human activity is performed."[87] On this matter, Sewell states that

> The world, the universe, is to the human mind a universe of figures. . . . Out of this appear the figures bright and beautiful, great and small, of the natural world. After them comes man. He shares with all things in nature the character of having a specific and recognizable figure of his own; . . . He differs from them completely in that he appears as a figure to himself. The sheer fact of so appearing gives him a unique double figure, a body, which is a figure in itself, infused with a capacity, which we call mind, to perceive, invent, transmit, match and contrast, and act our figures, and to do so with conscious purpose.[88]

Or,

> Put it this way: there are men on a venture. After? one could say they are after cosmos and kingdom. Where? where else but the living rock-vaults of mind and body.[89]

Discovery, as Sewell describes it, takes place on two levels; one level is in relation to the universe and the other is in relation to the self. In this regard, she speaks of following the "self-unravelling clue," a phrase Coleridge used to describe clues which unravel a problem of inquiry and also unravel the self of the seeker.[90] The power of interpretation is involved here and includes both a self-making or self-constructing and an attempt to interpret something about the universe. What Sewell is searching for,

again in Coleridge's words, is "an other world that now is."
She feels that a world derived from conventional dualisms by
which we conduct our methodological affairs is not the real
world. To have split science from poetry, analysis from
synthesis, mathematics from words, intellect from the imag-
ination, and body from mind has resulted in methods of
inquiry which no longer make connections that result in
meaningful and diverse ways of experiencing the world. So
she says,

> We are leaving a world, which is not the world.
> We have constructed . . . with two-ness and a
> method appertaining, a world. If we can hold
> to a, to that an, letting go of the, we can
> begin to search.91

The "two-ness" of which Sewell speaks implies the
resultant dualisms which have plagued research in the con-
temporary, technological world. For Sewell, there are other
ways of being in a world, and it is the work of the imagina-
tion to discover such ways. The problem faced by the imagi-
nation because of such a fragmenting and particularizing of
the world is this:

> The imagination can work only by putting together;
> it has no other mode of operation. Consequently
> all the food that is offered to it which splits
> mind and body is useless to it.92

The union of the self and the object it is contemplat-
ing or concerned with is the essence of poetic method for
Sewell, and closely parallels Polanyi's thoughts on in-
dwelling. One of Rilke's poems helps to clarify this idea,
and Sewell is fond of it for that reason:

> Dance the orange.
> . . . You have possessed it.
> It has been deliciously converted to you.
>
> . . . Create the relation
> with the pure, reluctant rind,
> with the juice that fills the happy fruit![93]

Sewell has explored the relations of order to disorder, sense to nonsense, logic to nightmare, and numbers to dreams. In her book The Field of Nonsense, she uses the metaphor of game to describe nonsense and relates it to the language structures and verses of Lewis Carroll and Edward Lear. At the outset of the book Sewell proposes the following:

> The assumption that you know what sense is, and
> consequently what nonsense is, depends not on
> the acceptance or rejection of blocs of fact
> but upon the adoption of certain sets of mental
> relations. Whatever holds together according
> to these relationships will be sense, whatever
> does not will be nonsense.[94]

Nonsense could be dismissed as either a deviation from reality or as an annihilation of relationships. But for her own work, she believes that nonsense is held together through a set of valid relationships.

> We are going to assume that Nonsense is not mere-
> ly denial of sense, a random reversal of ordinary
> experience and an escape from the limitations of
> everyday life, into a haphazard infinity, but is
> on the contrary a carefully limited world, con-
> trolled and directed by reason, a construction
> subject to its own laws.[95]

In looking at the nonsense verse of Carroll and Lear for the particular kinds of valid relations, Sewell proposes an analogy to game. She asks:

> Could Nonsense be an attempt at reorganizing
> language, not according to the rules of prose
> or poetry in the first place but according to
> those of Play? I do not mean here the simplest
> forms of games and energy and horseplay, but the
> more highly developed and complicated types of
> play. Each game of this type is an enclosed
> whole, with its own rigid laws which cannot be
> questioned within the game itself; if you put
> yourself inside the system which is the game,
> you bind yourself by that system's laws, and so
> incidentally attain that particular sense of
> freedom which games have to offer.[96]

Sewell explores the notion of freedom through a phrase of

Valéry's: "The poet is most free when he most loads him-

self with chains."[97] Sewell talks of this idea being "a

piece of strange insight. . . . I found myself defining

freedom, for myself, as the voluntary acceptance of apparent-

ly arbitrary limitation."[98]

Returning to the game, she ties some of these ideas to-

gether by formulating a definition:

> A GAME: the active manipulation, serving no use-
> ful purpose, of a certain object or class of
> objects, concrete or mental, within a certain
> limited field of space and time and according to
> fixed rules, with the aim of producing a given
> result despite the opposition of chance and/or
> opponents.[99]

Sewell speaks of players who voluntarily consent to play,

their need to manipulate playthings with some sort of con-

trol, and the game structure being separated into distinct,

small, and separate units. All of these features of games

and their players result in the production (or attempts at

such) of some kind of ordered series of relationships. The

opposition, on the other hand, attempts to inject disorder

into the opponent's scheme of relations while attempting
to produce its own network of successfully ordered movements.
The actions of ordering and disordering are necessary to the
dynamic of a game.

But game, for Sewell, means enclosure and fixed rules,
and she suggests that the safety experienced inside the game
because of the imposed limitations must at some point come
to an end. Game is not a metaphor for life here. Game is
a limited world which serves no productive purpose and in-
corporates clearly defined units of skills and objects which
have specific functions within the game. In the nonsense
world of game, a weaving of relationships, establishing
associations and identifying elements compatible with one
another, and a drive toward ordering them takes place against
the tension-producing, disordering probability of an
opponent.

While many of these kinds of things do go on within our
daily lives, Sewell feels that a danger lurks in staying
within the game metaphor for too long. The danger is that
perfect nonsense or perfect order creates "a universe which
will be logical and orderly, with separate units held to-
gether by a strict economy of relations, not subject to
dream and disorder with its multiplications of relationships
and associations."[100] Taken to its extreme, nonsense limits
emotions, paradox, ambiguity, accommodation, passivity for
contemplation, and the multiplicity of perspectives

possible through other forms. This is why for Sewell a game must come to an end, and one must step out of it. There are many systems of relationships and game is just one of them. To end a game at its appropriate point and then leave it means to "unbuild" it so that it can arise again when re-played and can be experienced for its own unique arrangement of things and people.

Games, in Sewell's view, also have a larger cosmological significance.

> We thought we were on safe ground with these
> logical games, so numbered and orderly; but Siva
> dices with the world, and if, in terms of
> mythology, the gods play games with the universe,
> then any play on our part is a shadowing of
> theirs. . . . So any game is at one and the same
> time an exercise of skill and manipulative
> ability, a way of finding out how God deals with
> the universe, and a dangerous make-believe with
> holy things.[101]

Understanding game as myth and metaphor takes her from a world of orderly relationships between and among small parts to a connection with the cosmos. And this connection is linked to the body:

> The logical type of play is a manipulation of
> things . . .; but this other type of play is a
> putting of oneself into things, not the moving of
> bodies (be they card or counters . . .), but per-
> haps something to do with the body itself and
> movement.[102]

The notion of the body becoming one with its object of concern was put forward by Sewell in the early stages of her writing on the imagination. It is interesting to note that Polanyi came to the same idea (under the rubric of

"indwelling") toward the end of his writing career. Both emphasize the importance of the body in every instance of knowing.

Sewell's writings suggest a constant and dynamic intercourse between the abstract and the concrete, between intellectually perceived relations and the corporeal fabric of the enfleshed body. Her work is concerned with establishing relationships and with joining seemingly disparate entities. She relies on the language of myth and metaphor, the language of play, game and dance, and of movement, body, and action to inform her inquiry.

Embodiment and Intentionality

The discussion in this chapter so far has centered on action, skills, and appearances undertaken within voluntarily chosen, yet rule-bound, settings. Embodied knowing and sensate understandings have also been emphasized. The human condition reveals facets of both volition and an active unity between mind and body. Communication through word-speech and movement-speech in the presence of others condition the appearances of human beings. Persons as embodied, intentional, acting beings decide with others about making and taking up the forms of the world. Hannah Arendt says:

> Men are conditioned beings because everything
> they come in contact with turns immediately into
> a condition of their existence. The world in

which the 'vita activa' spends itself consists
of things produced by human activities. . . .
In addition to the conditions under which life
is given to man on earth, and partly out of them,
men constantly create their own, self-made con-
ditions. . . . Whatever touches or enters into
a sustained relationship with human life im-
mediately assumes the character of a condition
of human existence.103

The human condition which has formed the basis for
exploration so far in this chapter concerns human beings in
performance. Action in the public space is constituted by
enacted skills. These often require instruments and oppo-
sition for their achievement and are located within a game
structure. The body as the ultimate, tacit instrument of
knowing becomes one with its objects of concern, and in the
presence of other enfleshed beings finds performances
within itself which at times are miraculous.

To conclude this chapter, the words "embodiment" and
"intentionality" will be explored. Philosophers continue
to be plagued and confused by the complex and problematic
status of both. Consequently, this part of the discussion
is not meant to be comprehensive in terms of the literature
which exists, nor is it intended to untangle the deeper
mysteries behind such terms as mind-body, perception, con-
sciousness, will, or intention. Rather, the nature of em-
bodiment will be explored through some of the ideas offered
by Arendt on the vita activa, by Polanyi on indwelling, and
by Sewell on mind-body. Maurice Merleau-Ponty's work will
be plumbed for his understanding of enfleshed beings. These

ideas are important to the nature of this study, since human beings as players of games are embodied persons in action in a chosen field. The meaning of intentionality will also be explored through positions taken by Arendt and Merleau-Ponty, since the volition of the embodied player is also of interest to this study.

The Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty's most important book, was published in English in 1962 though first published in French in 1945. Richard Zaner believes it is the corporeal scheme which is of fundamental importance to Merleau-Ponty. Such a scheme is constituted by means of concrete tasks carried out through bodily movements with a concurrent unity between body senses, organs, and objects.[104] The phenomenon of language is also particularly interesting to Merleau-Ponty. Garth Gillan says that Merleau-Ponty writes with two foci always in view: "the language of philosophy and its self-discovery within the corporeal texture of language itself, the flesh of language."[105] Probably no other modern philosopher has devoted so much attention to the status of the enfleshed being-in-the-world. Like Arendt, Polanyi, and Sewell, Merleau-Ponty challenges the epistemological and ontological methods of inquiry into knowing and being which have resulted from an acceptance of Cartesian doubt as a methodological starting point, with the subsequent emphasis on mind being separate from body.

But in this essay it is Hannah Arendt who will first
delineate the nature of the problem of the body and conse-
quently the problem of action versus contemplation, or body
versus mind. Arendt states:

> The primacy of contemplation over activity rests
> on the conviction that no work of human hands
> can equal in beauty and truth the physical
> 'cosmos,' which swings itself in changeless
> eternity. . . . This eternity discloses itself
> to mortal eyes only when all human movements and
> activities are at perfect rest.[106]

She feels that such a conviction was held by the philoso-
phers of Greek antiquity and resulted in the placing of con-
templation in a hierarchical position above the status of
action. This notion has ruled the tradition of metaphysical
inquiry throughout the ages of Western civilization. Arendt
adds:

> Christianity, with its belief in a hereafter
> whose joys announce themselves in the delights
> of contemplation, conferred a religious sanction
> upon the abasement of the vita activa to its
> derivative secondary position.[107]

Arendt also believes that since thinking is swift and
immaterial, philosophers have always had a certain hostility
toward the body because the body is viewed as an obstacle
toward achieving the clarity which contemplation brings.
Since the flesh is rooted in both organic demands and an
ambiguity which can never be fully explained, the body is
sometimes regarded by philosophers as a hindrance to the
non-sensate and invisible activity of thinking. Thought
requires quiet, solitude, and stillness; action requires

movement, others, and tension. All thinking demands a
stopping, a ceasing of doing. And, as Arendt says, "While
you are thinking, you are unaware of your own corporeal-
ity."[108] The thinker's own body seems absent in the action
of thinking. Awareness of others, or of one's own sensate
flesh, interrupts the thinker. This awareness of the body
moves the thinker into the realm of the vita activa whether
it be in the form of labor, work, or action.

Arendt feels that the distrust of the vita activa, as
an adequate way to experience the world, has its origins in
philosophers who fostered the notion that contemplation was
more important than action. Mind over matter is one way of
stating this position. The radical disconnection of mind
from matter occurred in the philosophical work of Descartes.
As Descartes would have it, the cogitating mind (res
cogitans) was divided from the extended body (res extensa)
in which it happened to be housed. Grene says of this
Cartesian error:

> There is no such thing as a mind by itself; there
> is no such thing in the living world as a body
> by itself. It is from this cardinal metaphysical
> error of Descartes that his epistemological
> errors, with all of their misleading consequences,
> flow.[109]

One of the misleading consequences of Cartesian method-
ology has been to reduce the universe to mathematical and
analytical treatment. Arendt speaks of the mathematical
web which has been spun around reality:

> It certainly is neither a demonstration of an
> inherent and inherently beautiful order of
> nature nor does it offer a confirmation of the
> human mind, of its capacity to surpass senses
> in perceptivity or of its adequateness as an
> organ for the reception of truth.[110]

But Arendt is quick to point out that the _vita activa_ and

the _vita contemplativa_ are both woven into the condition of

being human. She suggests that the capacities of labor,

work, and action are as important to human beings as the

capacities of thinking, willing, and judging. In fact, much

of Arendt's philosophical work is devoted to exploring the

relationship between the life of the mind and the life of

action. She states that

> Men . . . subject to labor in order to live, moti-
> vated to work in order to make themselves at
> home in the world, and roused to action in order
> to find their place in the society of their fellow-
> men can mentally transcend all these conditions,
> but only mentally. . . .   They can judge
> affirmatively or negatively . . .; they can will
> the impossible . . .; and they can think.[111]

The problem of mind and body, Arendt contends, is as

old as the first philosophers of Western civilization, name-

ly, Parmenides, Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle. A consequence

of the problem has been a distrust of the senses. For

Descartes and for those who first invented sense-substitut-

ing instruments, a loss of trust in the senses was ac-

companied by a distrust of common sense. Of Descartes,

Arendt says:

> It was thought that destroyed his common-sense
> trust in reality, and his error was to hope he
> could overcome his doubt by insisting on with-
> drawing from the world altogether . . . concen-
> trating only on the thinking activity itself.[112]

By "common sense" Arendt means the following:

> The only character of the world by which to gauge
> its reality is its being common to us all, and
> common sense occupies such a high rank . . . because
> it is the one sense that fits into reality as a
> whole our strictly individual senses. . . . It
> is by virtue of common sense that the other sense
> perceptions are known to disclose reality and are
> not merely felt as irritations of our nerves or
> resistance sensations of our bodies.[113]

For Arendt, our senses tell us something and are inte-

grated into a perception of reality by a sixth sense which

is common sense. Thinking withdraws us from the world which

is sensorily given and thus from the feeling of reality

which is given by common sense. Arendt says that the

common sense experiences which a person has in company with

others guarantee a sense of reality about being and about

the world.

> The reality of what I perceive is guaranteed by
> its worldly context, which includes others who
> perceive as I do . . . and by the working to-
> gether of my five senses on the other. What . . .
> we call common sense . . . is a kind of sixth
> sense needed to keep my five senses together. . . .
> This . . . 'sixth sense' because it cannot be
> localized as a bodily organ, fits the sen-
> sations of my strictly private five senses . . .
> into a common world shared by others.[114]

What precipitated the modern distrust of the senses was

the invention and subsequent reliance on the instrument of

the telescope. Galileo's instrument began to uncover what

lay beyond the world of ordinary sense experience. The
stage was set for a loss of faith in the senses to tell us
anything reliable about reality. What became common to
human beings was no longer the belief in the truth of sense
experience but the belief that each person possessed a com-
mon faculty called reason which could never be made common-
ly accessible to the senses. With the telescope, the body
conspired against itself to confirm "with its own eyes" the
unreliability of ordinary vision. "Truth," "knowledge,"
and "meaning" retreated inward into the recesses of the
abstract mind.

As a result of the mind-body split, reality has been
fragmented into analyzable bits of information made known
through mathematics and scientific technology. Ladner main-
tains that

> In order for this state of affairs to have emerged
> so thoroughly and indisputably the whole context
> of meaning and reality had to shift radically
> from the locus of man's own body and speech as
> the paradigmatic place of understanding to the in-
> finity of space with its appropriate language.[115]

To recover "the paradigmatic place of understanding,"
Polanyi proposed his theory of personal knowledge which re-
instated the primacy of the body's actions in coming to know
the world. As we have seen, integral to Polanyi's thesis
is his discussion of indwelling.

> When we make a thing function as the proximal
> term of tacit knowing, we incorporate it in our
> body-or extend our body to include it-so that we
> come to dwell in it. . . . Indwelling, as

derived from the structure of tacit knowing, is
a far more precisely defined act than is empathy,
and it underlies all observations.[116]

To bring out an essential point about indwelling,

Polanyi continues to employ the example of skillful use of

instruments.

> We use instruments as an extension of our hands
> and they may serve also as an extension of our
> senses. We assimilate them to our body by pour-
> ing ourselves into them. . . . Everytime we
> assimilate a tool to our body our identity under-
> goes some change; our person expands into new
> modes of being.[117]

For Polanyi there is a reliance on bodily awareness in order

to attend to the performance with which it is concerned. In

speaking about Polanyi's work, Grene says, "every comprehen-

sive entity, no matter how complex . . ., depends, Polanyi

would insist--and rightly insist--on lower levels of reality

for its existence. All reality, so far as our situation

shows us, is body-bound."[118] Grene also suggests that:

> In every comprehensive entity, a skilful perfor-
> mance, a life history, the growth of an
> institution, or whatever it be, something not
> yet born is striving toward a being that pulls
> it forward to maturity.[119]

Polanyi believes that skillful doing and knowing in-

volve an intentional change of being and that this change

comes about due to a pouring of the self into the object of

concern. He proposes that

> The arts of doing and knowing, the valuation and
> the understanding of meanings, are seen to be only
> different aspects of the act of extending our
> person into the subsidiary awareness of par-
> ticulars which comprise a whole.[120]

The domain of legitimate knowledge, for Polanyi, includes
intentions and actions and the meanings and understandings
which come from them. He also claims that "What we perceive
is an aspect of reality, and aspects of reality are clues
to boundless undisclosed, and perhaps yet unthinkable,
experiences."[121] And when we indwell completely some aspect
of reality which we perceive, Polanyi reasons that there is
a resultant striving to seek further levels of reality. It
is the body which indwells or pours itself into the object
or theory or framework or tool of its concern in order to
interiorize it and know it.

This fusion of self with its concerns also forms a
focus for the work of Elizabeth Sewell. The joining of mind
and body is sought through the active use of the imagination.

> I have repeated one essential thing about which
> I conceive to be the true life of the imagination,
> that in it the life of the mind depends for its
> liberation upon a kind of submission to the life
> of the body (and the human), and that the two
> must live together, according to the way of man
> and not of angels or demons. This submission is,
> superficially, a scandal, but, more profoundly
> viewed, it is a way of freedom.[122]

The imagination, for Sewell, is linked inextricably to
method, which is a process of making and finding meaningful
relationships. About this, Sewell contends:

> This method calls in consciously the whole figure
> of the human organism of mind and body, and from
> this builds up its thought in an organic and
> human frame by which the human being and his
> universe are to be related and interpreted.[123]

The concept of mind-body working together through the imagination is expressed in a fragment of one of Sewell's poems:

> We look for knowledge and experience.
> Holy things both, as is the earth itself,
> And every man. Our word is 'Keep together.'[124]

Another one of Sewell's poems indicates that, "Man only feels his mind / In-fibrilled in the flesh."[125] For Sewell, the body thinks, the human being as a whole enters into both the formation and taking up of its images.

> If, for the living individual, the body is the original generator of forms, first its own structure and behavior, then forms which are in varying degrees separated from itself and which accordingly offer the mind-body scope for its formalizing tendencies, it may be true to say that all formal activity in the human mind has its origin and roots always in the physical. The mind-body may generate forms as language or terms for metaphoric activity by which to understand itself and its experience, but all form, no matter how apparently abstract and intellectual, may never lose its connection with, its message for, the body.[126]

There is no liberty in chaos and it is the work of the imagination to bring some order to diversity. Within this ordering, freedom of action and its possible fruitfulness can be experienced. The imagination puts things together and builds structures of relationships out of seeming disparities. About the imagination Sewell believes that

> It is its nature to multiply relationships in every possible way, and to accept contradictions. And so there is no reason to be surprised if we see that it requires the self to unite and identify with whatever it may be contemplating in fact or in image.[127]

This unity of body with image is analogous to Polanyi's sense of indwelling in that the person feels an embodied union with an object or theory or instrument.

Sewell contrasts two methods of inquiry in one of her poems, one stanza suggesting the Cartesian approach of abstract, formal inquiry and the other stanza suggesting a discovery process of bodily enactment.

"The Two Kinds"

I have sat down with the Entities at table,
Eaten with them the meal of ceremony,
And they were stamped with jewels, and intuned
        God's ordered praises.

But now the Activities hand me to the dancing,
Brown naked bodies lithe and crimson-necklaced
And tambourines besiege the darkened altars,
        In what God's honour?[128]

In discussing Sewell's work, Ladner says that

The recovery of the whole human form--including
body, world, dreams, logic, imagination, language--
involves the development and extension of what
Sewell calls 'the human metaphor' (which is
poetic metaphor) to every area of our existence
as thinking and knowing beings.[129]

Ladner goes on to indicate that "Poetic method starts at the point of overcoming the dichotomies that most philosophers, poets, theologians, and critics since the seventeenth century seem inevitably to have been left with, for the unity of the knower and the known, the subject and object in this method is precisely what is pre-supposed in understanding man's epistemic activity."[130] In Arendt's words, such unity means "mind and body, thinking and sense experience, the invisible and the visible, belong together, are 'made' for each other."[131]

The final word on these matters, for this chapter, belongs to the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Freedom, he says, cannot be found in the act of breaking away but only by engagement in situations. The body is joined to the world in this engagement through movements into and inside of projects. Merleau-Ponty says, "Our body is not in space like things; it inhabits or haunts space. . . . For us the body is much more than an instrument or a means; it is our expression in the world, the visible form of our intentions."[132] Klaus Meier indicates that for Merleau-Ponty, "Meanings arise through the body's power of expression. . . . The lived-body always possesses the possibility of unfolding more projects and participating in more meaningful activities."[133]

Merleau-Ponty's theory of the body, which affirms the priority of "I am" to "I-think," is related to his theory of perception. "To perceive," he says, "is not to experience a host of impressions . . .; it is to see, standing forth from a cluster of data, an imminent significance."[134] Since human beings move about in space, which is inhabited by both objects and other persons, multiple perspectives and interpretations of what is happening must inevitably arise. In order to be present to things and people through one's body, perceptions must be relied upon to help make sense of the relationships which unfold during experience. Commenting on Merleau-Ponty's theory of perception, Gillan says:

> Perception is the original, unmediated relation-
> ship with existence, for it is within this per-
> ception that what exists and is meaningful first
> appears. Existence is thus the category of the
> seen, the heard, the touched, the smelled, and
> the tasted. The role of perception as the realm
> of existence is identical to its role as the
> original domain of meaning.135

Grene compares Polanyi's work to that of Merleau-Ponty's and
concludes that the thesis common to both philosophers is
this:

> Sensory immediacy has its directness, its
> reliability, not from its being cut off, 'in my
> mind,' but from the very fact that it is out
> there: it is my most concrete, dramatic,
> pervasive manner of being in the world.136

Immersion in the world through the attentive body en-
gaged in the speech and action of its projects offers to
human beings significance and meanings. Also, the kinds of
projects and forms people take up through active engagement
provide the situation in which a person's potential ability
can be explored. We normally lend our bodies to the world
and inhabit the world without any intention of appropriating
it or possessing it. What the world provides is a space for
movement, structures which make it up, other people who
also want to appear, and a natural environment. All these
together provide a many-layered and complexly textured field
of reality into which we insert ourselves in order to make
discoveries about who we are and from which we gain per-
ceptions about our relation to the reality of such a world.

For Merleau-Ponty, the body rootedness of our being-in-the-world is fraught with ambiguity and perplexity.

> Ambiguity is the essence of human existence, and everything we live or think has always several meanings. . . . There is in human existence a principle of indeterminacy. . . . Existence is indeterminate in itself, by reason of its fundamental structure, and in so far as it is the very process whereby the hitherto meaningless takes on meaning . . . chance is transformed into reason. . . . Existence never utterly outruns anything, for in that case the tension which is essential to it would disappear.[137]

In a sense, claims Merleau-Ponty, we are condemned to meaning and the tension of actively taking up the world will always result in many perspectives on reality by virtue of being a body acting with other bodies. He says, "The world is not what I think, but what I live through. I am open to the world, I have no doubt that I am in communication with it, but I do not possess it; it is inexhaustible."[138] Zaner adds, with reference to Merleau-Ponty's work,

> My body-proper manifests me to the world, puts me at the world, by means of my various senses. . . . To act on the world is to disclose the world as a contexture of possible ways-to-be. . . . To be embodied, and thus to be sensuously perceptive of objects, and to be able to act on them, is to belong to the world in the sense of being engaged in a body which places me at things themselves, with no intermediary.[139]

To be placed "at things themselves" can be interpreted as being at one with them, another kind of indwelling. "As I contemplate the blue sky," says Merleau-Ponty, "I am not set over against it . . . .; I do not possess it in thought . . . ., I abandon myself to it and plunge into this mystery,

it 'thinks itself within me.'"[140] In this way, being in the
midst of things, the body is present to the world and the
world's presence is opened to the body. The body thus
experienced is a center of action. And the larger the
body's potential for action, the more insightful will be the
set of meanings which comes from any authentic appearance
among people and objects. For Merleau-Ponty, the embodied
self is the locus where lines of meaning converge to help
discern the texture and patterns of the reality of the world.
He believes that "My body is the fabric into which all
objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to the
perceived world, the general instrument of my 'comprehen-
sion.'"[141]

The perceived world of which Merleau-Ponty speaks is
filled with all sorts of colors, shapes, sounds, and smells,
and it is against this kind of background that acts stand
out to reveal their own distinctive shape. Although such
action presupposes a diversity of resultant meanings, there
is always a kind of unity of events which are undertaken by
embodied beings. Relationships are established in a face-
to-face communication of person to others or person to
objects which are not mediated by entrepreneurs or instruments
which rob the body of its trust in the senses. As Merleau-
Ponty puts it,

> Our task will be to rediscover phenomena, the
> layer of living experience through which other
> people and things are first given to us . . .;

to reawaken perception and foil its trick of
allowing us to forget it as a fact and as a per-
ception in the interest of the object which it
presents.[142]

In other words it is not knowledge of particulars which
is revealed to us; rather, a revelation of the meaning of
being-in-the-world in some unified way is presented to us.
Grene states that

There is no absolute, once for all, knowing by
human beings. . . . There are only ourselves
using all the means at our disposal: bodily
orientation, sensory images, verbal formulations
. . . and, finally, our deepest, widest vision of
the world we dwell in: using all these as clues
to the nature we are in a given instance trying to
understand.[143]

So we keep coming back to meanings and interpretations,
understandings and perspectives, all rooted in the ambiguous
embodied self. And this self is an active seeker of re-
lationships with the world and its objects. The movement of
person into the world is characterized, says Merleau-Ponty,
by intentional threads which run from the body to its
projects and through its actions. He says, "Ahead of what
I see and perceive, there is, it is true, nothing more
actually visible, but my world is carried forward by lines
of intentionality which trace out in advance at least the
style of what is to come."[144]

Merleau-Ponty identifies a broadened notion of in-
tentionality which includes both the voluntary taking up of
a position and the movement toward the unity of the world
which is already there. That is to say, we go forward with

an intentional plan of action but also recognize that the

world has its own intention. Yet, there is a conscious

movement toward the world by the body and intentional

threads from the body link a person to the world. Paul

Schilder speaks of human action being directed toward an aim

through some sort of plan, but he suggests that it would be

wrong to believe that the plan exists in the full light of

consciousness.

> We do not know clearly, but still have an in-
> stinctive insight where this intention may lead
> to. . . . This germ of the plan to a movement
> finds its development only during performance of
> the action, and the sensations provoked by the
> action will have a developing influence on the
> plan. In this plan the knowledge of one's own
> body is an absolute necessity.[145]

Stuart Hampshire puts it this way:

> More often than not we have not previously ex-
> pressed to ourselves our intention, or formulated
> it in words. But it is the possibility of our
> declaring, or expressing, our intention from
> moment to moment, and if the question is asked,
> that gives sense to the notion of intention itself.
> Without this possibility, the notion of intention
> becomes empty.[146]

In this light, Merleau-Ponty claims that it is important

to understand motility as basic intentionality. Movement

is not thought about movement, and every voluntary movement

takes place in some sort of setting so that the "I can"

intention is allowed to find its actuality in "I am able to

and I do it." But the intention to act may not result in an

"I am able." When we try to follow up our intentions they

have a tendency to modify themselves based upon the situation

encountered so that at every moment new intentions may

spring afresh from the body.[147] Moreover, intention is not

simply a desire, a wish, or a choice. Hampshire writes

about complexities of the concept of intention:

> The notion of the will, of action, the relation
> of thought and action, the relation of a person's
> mind and body . . . - all these problems find
> their meeting-place in the notion of intention.[148]

The connection of willing to intention also interests

Hannah Arendt. According to her, the will as an invisible

faculty of the mind transforms a desire into an intention,

and the willing ego is the driving force behind intention-

ality, which subsequently becomes the driving force behind

action. Her discussion on willing centers on the idea that

"the will anticipates what the future may bring out but is

not yet."[149] For Arendt, the will is connected to future

projects and to freedom:

> The decision the will arrives at can never be
> derived from the mechanics of desire or the de-
> liberations of the intellect that may precede it.
> The will is either an organ of free spontaneity
> that interrupts all causal chains of motivation
> that would bind it or it is nothing but an il-
> lusion. . . . It is impossible to deal with the
> willing activity without touching on the problem
> of freedom. . . . It is the will, whose subject
> matter is projects, not objects, which in a sense
> create the person that can be blamed or praised
> and anyhow held responsible not merely for its
> actions but for its whole 'Being,' its character.[150]

Willing is not a substitute for thinking nor is it a

substitute for wishing. When Arendt speaks of the connection

of willing to freedom, she suggests that, like the connection

of mind to body, the matter of the relationship has plagued philosophers throughout Western history. She says, "We can no more trust men of thought to arrive at a fair estimate of the Will than we could trust them to arrive at a fair estimate of the body."[151] The body cries out for its basic organic necessities to be met, but these necessities interrupt the thinking self and the will stretches the thinker into a future where no certainties exist.

The will, for Arendt, is the spring of action and provides the impetus for being able to begin something anew with all its inherent indeterminacies. The problem with this future orientation of the will is that no matter how high the level of predictability, there is always a basic uncertainty about the as yet not experienced. And, importantly for Arendt, the projects of the future as concerns of the will can just as easily be left undone as be undertaken. Arendt says that the will is our mental organ which has a connection to both freedom and a future, both of which are fraught with indeterminacy but which also always hold out for the possibility of the new to occur.[152] She says that the mood of the willing ego is that of impatience and disquiet. There is a worry prior to moving into a project due to the will's wish for the "I-can" to be converted into an "I-do."[153] The will always wills to do something and pushes forward into a future with some tension due to the unknown ability of being able to turn volition into the aimed at performance.

There is no tranquility in the act of willing, for tied into this faculty is the desire to appear, to perform among others. The will prepares the ground for action, and the cessation of willing means a start to doing something. It is not choice between this or that which characterizes the will; rather, there is a suggestion of tenseness and impatience toward a future set of actions which involves a plan but also faces the realm of contingency once action begins.

Finally, as Merleau-Ponty says, "to understand is to experience the harmony between what we aim at and what is given, between the intention and the performance."[154] The body is the anchorage in the world, and the motility of the body enables intention to be converted to performance. And while the possibility of contingency and unpredictability haunt our future projects, the faculty of will nevertheless prods the body to surge forth into uncertain situations in order to experience the harmony of self in relation to the world. This kind of action is not caught in a series of means-ends relationships. Rather, willing and performing move out of the realm of necessity or habit and into a realm of discovery where the "I-can" and the "I-do" have a chance to meet, though not causally and not in full certainty of outcome.

Neither the discussion on intentionality by Merleau-Ponty nor the one on willing by Arendt suggest that desire,

simple choice, or cause-effect motivation characterize the action of the invisible faculty. In the realm of human affairs, the performances drawn from the body in action due to its pull of intention are always capable of being unpredictable and extraordinary. For both Arendt and Merleau-Ponty, intentionality is linked to freedom and also to the future. The result of intentionality or willing is a doing, a doing which is movement, action, performance. Merleau-Ponty says that it is "by willing what I will and doing what I do, that I can go further."[155] For Arendt,

> Every volition, although a mental activity, relates to the world of appearances in which its project is to be realized; in flagrant contrast to thinking, no willing is ever done for its own sake or finds its fulfillment in the act itself. Every volition not only concerns particulars but - and this is of great importance - looks forward to its own end, when willing-something will have changed to doing-it.[156]

The problems of body and will have been just that-- problems for centuries and for many philosophers. The intent of this section has been to present a perspective on these problems which is relevant to this study. The intent of this chapter has not been one of attempting to undercut the importance of contemplation, mathematics, science, or technology. Rather, a recovery of the importance of the status of the body in relation to knowing and being has been attempted. A claim has been made for the importance of the body in action as it relates to the condition of being human.

The body with its senses and its movements cannot distrust itself regarding what it knows and what it has to tell about reality. The body is not involved in a losing competition with the mind, nor does action deserve a minor standing in relation to contemplation. The movement of the body to its projects and in its projects is profoundly significant, and yields an understanding of the world which is just as important as--indeed, provides the ground for--the kinds of relationships which are mediated by instruments, mathematics, and abstract logic. The concreteness of the lived-body in its actions and in its perceptions also presents a way of ordering relationships from which meanings arise. Just because the body presents us with an irreducible ambiguity and mystery is no reason to distrust the perspectives which result from its way of grasping the world. On the contrary, we have seen how all forms of meaning have an irresolvable connection to and take their orientation from this irreducible ambiguity.

Elizabeth Sewell is right when she says there needs to be a loving unity between mind and body. In Hannah Arendt's words, the life of the mind and the _vita activa_ are made for each other. But, what have been problems for ages will not be solved in this one small paper. Still, an effort to recover the importance of the field of action through intentional movements by embodied human beings has been made. The particular structure for action is, in this study, the

game. In the next chapter, an attempt will be made to establish a connection between the structure of game and the conditions of being human.

NOTES

CHAPTER IV

[1] Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 5.

[2] Alan B. Anderson, "Hannah Arendt: An Introduction," American Society of Christian Ethics, Richmond, Virginia, 21 Jan. 1973, p. 3.

[3] Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, "Arendt, Hannah," in Notable American Women: The Modern Period (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1980), pp. 33-37.

[4] Young-Bruehl, "Arendt, Hannah," p. 35.

[5] Arendt, Human Condition, pp. 7-8.

[6] Peter Stern and Jean Yarbrough, "Hannah Arendt," The American Scholar, 47 (Summer 1978), 380.

[7] Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1965), p. 31.

[8] Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 179.

[9] Margaret Canovan, The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt (New York: Harcourt, 1971), pp. 12-14.

[10] Hannah Arendt, "Public Rights and Private Interests," in Small Comforts for Hard Times, ed. Michael Mooney and Florian Stuber (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1977), p. 105.

[11] Arendt, "Public Rights and Private Interests," pp. 104-105.

[12] Arendt, <u>Between Past and Future</u>, p. 213.

[13] Arendt, <u>Human Condition</u>, p. 184.

[14] Arendt, <u>On Revolution</u>, p. 220.

[15] Arendt, <u>Human Condition</u>, p. 95.

[16] Hannah Arendt, <u>Thinking</u>, Vol. I of <u>The Life of the Mind</u> (New York: Harcourt, 1978), p. 93.

[17] Arendt, <u>Thinking</u>, p. 93.

[18] Dolf Sternberger, "The Sunken City: Hannah Arendt's Idea of Politics," trans. E. B. Ashton, <u>Social Research</u>, 44, No. 1 (1977), 134-135.

[19] Arendt, <u>Thinking</u>, p. 94.

[20] Sheldon S. Wolin, "Hannah Arendt and the Ordinance of Time," <u>Social Research</u>, 44, No. 1 (1977), 96.

[21] Arendt, <u>On Revolution</u>, p. 120.

[22] Peter Fuss, "Hannah Arendt's Conception of Political Community," in <u>Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World</u>, ed. Melvyn A. Hill (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), p. 173.

[23] Arendt, <u>Human Condition</u>, p. 207.

[24] Arendt, <u>Human Condition</u>, p. 186.

[25] Fuss, pp. 162-163.

[26] Arendt, <u>Crises of the Republic</u>, p. 193.

[27] Arendt, <u>On Revolution</u>, p. 175.

[28] Hannah Arendt, <u>Men in Dark Times</u> (New York: Harcourt, 1968), p. 9.

[29] Arendt, <u>Origins of Totalitarianism</u>, p. 473.

[30] Arendt, _Men in Dark Times_, p. viii.

[31] Arendt, _Human Condition_, pp. 198-199.

[32] Arendt, _Between Past and Future_, p. 153.

[33] Hannah Arendt, "Home to Roost: A Bicentennial Address," _New York Review of Books_, 26 June 1975, p. 6.

[34] Arendt, _Men in Dark Times_, p. 257.

[35] Young-Bruehl, "Arendt, Hannah," p. 36.

[36] Arendt, _Human Condition_, p. 245.

[37] Wolin, p. 97.

[38] Wolin, p. 98.

[39] Arendt, _Crises of the Republic_, p. 144.

[40] Arendt, _Between Past and Future_, p. 124.

[41] Arendt, _On Revolution_, p. 281.

[42] Arendt, _On Revolution_, p. 264.

[43] Polanyi, _Personal Knowledge_, p. vii.

[44] Polanyi, _Tacit Dimension_, p. 15.

[45] Polanyi, _Personal Knowledge_, p. viii.

[46] Polanyi, _Tacit Dimension_, p. xi.

[47] Michael Polanyi, _The Study of Man_ (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 44.

[48] Polanyi, _Tacit Dimension_, p. 10.

[49] Polanyi, _Tacit Dimension_, p. 10.

[50] Polanyi, _Tacit Dimension_, pp. 15-16.

[51] Polanyi, _Study of Man_, p. 31.

[52] Polanyi, _Study of Man_, p. 31.

[53] Polanyi, _Study of Man_, p. 31.

[54] Polanyi, Tacit Dimension, p. 60.

[55] Polanyi, Tacit Dimension, p. 29.

[56] Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 49.

[57] Polanyi, "Creative Imagination," p. 63.

[58] Michael Polanyi, "Tacit Knowing: Its Bearing on Some Problems of Philosophy," Reviews of Modern Physics, 34, No. 4 (1962), 606.

[59] Michael Polanyi, "On Body and Mind," The New Scholasticism, 43, No. 2 (Spring 1969), 196.

[60] Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 53.

[61] Polanyi, Study of Man, p. 87.

[62] Polanyi, Tacit Dimension, p. 30.

[63] Polanyi, Tacit Dimension, p. 61.

[64] Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 375.

[65] Clarke E. Cochran, "Authority and Community: The Contributions of Carl Friedrich, Yves R. Simon, and Michael Polanyi," The American Political Science Review, 71, No. 2 (1977), 555.

[66] Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 211.

[67] Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 196.

[68] William H. Poteat, appendix, in Intellect and Hope: Essays in the Thought of Michael Polanyi, ed. Thomas A. Langford and William H. Poteat (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 453-454.

[69] Marjorie Grene, "Tacit-Knowing and the Pre-Reflective Cogito," in <u>Intellect and Hope: Essays in the Thought of Michael Polanyi</u>, ed. Thomas A. Langford and William H. Poteat (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 35-36.

[70] Grene, "Tacit-Knowing," pp. 55-56.

[71] Polanyi, <u>Study of Man</u>, p. 39.

[72] Sewell, <u>The Orphic Voice</u>, p. 19.

[73] William E. Ray, Introd., <u>To Be a True Poem: Essays by Elizabeth Sewell</u> (Winston-Salem, N.C.: Hunter, 1979), pp. vii-viii.

[74] Elizabeth Sewell, <u>The Human Metaphor</u> (South Bend, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1964), p. 31.

[75] Sewell, <u>The Orphic Voice</u>, p. 32.

[76] Sewell, <u>The Human Metaphor</u>, pp. 29-31.

[77] Elizabeth Sewell, <u>Signs and Cities</u> (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1968), p. 27.

[78] Sewell, <u>The Human Metaphor</u>, p. 5.

[79] Ladner, "Elizabeth Sewell," p. 126.

[80] Sewell, "Death of the Imagination," pp. 426-427.

[81] Sewell, <u>The Orphic Voice</u>, pp. 24-25.

[82] Sewell, <u>The Orphic Voice</u>, p. 27.

[83] Elizabeth Sewell, <u>The Structure of Poetry</u> (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), p. 58.

[84] Sewell, "Death of the Imagination," p. 426.

[85] Sewell, <u>The Human Metaphor</u>, p. 17.

[86] Sewell, The Orphic Voice, p. 29.

[87] Ladner, "Elizabeth Sewell," p. 128.

[88] Sewell, To Be a True Poem, pp. 174-175.

[89] Sewell, Signs and Cities, p. 23.

[90] Sewell, To Be a True Poem, p. 64.

[91] Sewell, To Be a True Poem, p. 110.

[92] Sewell, "Death of the Imagination," p. 438.

[93] Rainer Maria Rilke, Sonnets to Orpheus, trans. M. D. Herter Norton (1942; rpt. New York: Norton, 1970), p. 45.

[94] Elizabeth Sewell, The Field of Nonsense (London: Chatto and Windus, 1952), p. 1.

[95] Sewell, The Field of Nonsense, p. 5.

[96] Sewell, The Field of Nonsense, pp. 25-26.

[97] Sewell, To Be a True Poem, p. 121.

[98] Sewell, To Be a True Poem, p. 121.

[99] Sewell, The Field of Nonsense, p. 27.

[100] Sewell, The Field of Nonsense, p. 114.

[101] Sewell, The Field of Nonsense, p. 186.

[102] Sewell, The Field of Nonsense, pp. 188-189.

[103] Arendt, Human Condition, p. 9.

[104] Richard Zaner, The Problem of Embodiment (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p. 169.

[105] Garth Gillan, "In the Folds of the Flesh: Philosophy and Language," in The Horizons of the Flesh, ed. Garth Gillan (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1973), p. 2.

[106] Arendt, Human Condition, p. 15.

[107] Arendt, Human Condition, p. 16.

[108] Arendt, Thinking, p. 85.

[109] Marjorie Grene, The Knower and the Known (New York: Basic Books, 1966), p. 88.

[110] Arendt, Human Condition, p. 267.

[111] Arendt, Thinking, pp. 70-71.

[112] Arendt, Thinking, p. 52.

[113] Arendt, Human Condition, pp. 208-209.

[114] Arendt, Thinking, p. 50.

[115] Ladner, "Elizabeth Sewell," p. 40.

[116] Polanyi, Tacit Dimension, pp. 16-17.

[117] Polanyi, Study of Man, p. 31.

[118] Grene, Knower and the Known, p. 249.

[119] Grene, Knower and the Known, p. 246.

[120] Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 65.

[121] Polanyi, Tacit Dimension, p. 68.

[122] Sewell, "Death of the Imagination," p. 443.

[123] Sewell, Human Metaphor, p. 200.

[124] Sewell, Signs and Cities, p. 29.

[125] Sewell, Orphic Voice, p. 415.

[126] Sewell, Orphic Voice, pp. 36-37.

[127] Sewell, "Death of the Imagination," p. 424.

[128] Sewell, Orphic Voice, p. 416.

[129] Ladner, "Elizabeth Sewell," pp. 152-153.

[130] Ladner, "Elizabeth Sewell," p. 153.

[131] Arendt, <u>Thinking</u>, p. 109.

[132] M. Merleau-Ponty, "An Unpublished Text by Maurice Merleau-Ponty," trans. Arleen B. Dallery, in <u>The Primacy of Perception</u>, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964), p. 5.

[133] Klaus V. Meier, "Cartesian and Phenomenological Anthropology: The Radical Shift and Its Meaning for Sport," <u>Journal of the Philosophy of Sport</u>, 2 (Sept. 1975), 63.

[134] M. Merleau-Ponty, <u>Phenomenology of Perception</u>, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 22.

[135] Gillan, p. 4.

[136] Grene, <u>Knower and the Known</u>, p. 45.

[137] Merleau-Ponty, <u>Phenomenology of Perception</u>, p. 169.

[138] Merleau-Ponty, <u>Phenomenology of Perception</u>, p. xvii.

[139] Zaner, <u>Problem of Embodiment</u>, pp. 181-183.

[140] Merleau-Ponty, <u>Phenomenology of Perception</u>, p. 214.

[141] Merleau-Ponty, <u>Phenomenology of Perception</u>, p. 235.

[142] Merleau-Ponty, <u>Phenomenology of Perception</u>, p. 57.

[143] Grene, <u>Knower and the Known</u>, p. 33.

[144] Merleau-Ponty, <u>Phenomenology of Perception</u>, p. 416.

[145] Paul Schilder, <u>The Image and Appearance of the Human Body</u> (New York: International Universities Press, 1950), p. 51.

[146] Stuart Hampshire, <u>Thought and Action</u> (New York: Viking, 1960), p. 97.

[147] Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 389, 165.

[148] Hampshire, p. 96.

[149] Arendt, Thinking, p. 76.

[150] Arendt, Thinking, pp. 213-215.

[151] Hannah Arendt, Willing, Vol. II of The Life of the Mind (New York: Harcourt, 1978), p. 34.

[152] Arendt, Willing, p. 18.

[153] Arendt, Willing, p. 37.

[154] Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 144.

[155] Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 456.

[156] Arendt, Willing, p. 37.

CHAPTER V

THE HUMAN CONDITION OF THE GAME

Two boys uncoached are tossing a poem together,
Overhand, underhand, backhand, sleight of hand,
    every hand,
Teasing with attitudes, latitudes, interludes,
    altitudes,
Make him scoop it up, make him as-almost-as-
    possible miss it,
. . . make him scramble to pick up the meaning.[1]

This fragment of a poem suggests the movement of this

chapter. It is now time to make some connections, to weave

a network of relationships from the previous chapters. This

study has arrived at a point of having established a number

of significant ideas generated by many people. Threads of

these ideas will be woven together in this chapter from a

framework of words determined to be important. Within the

configuration of words about to be written, there lies a

meaning which will be caught if at all possible. A commit-

ment was made early in this inquiry to uncover an appropriate

understanding of game and its relation to the human con-

dition. An effort will be made to deal with the problems

raised by this study in relation to the human condition of

the game as well.

The procedure to be followed in this chapter will

emerge in two movements. The first section of the chapter

will be a joining of the relations between game and the

human condition. The question, "What happens when people join in a game," which was posed at the start of the discussion, is now being readied for possible answers. The second section of this chapter will address the problems which beset the proposed model due to its place in the contemporary world. The discussion will take a critical look at how the game and its players have been affected by some of these difficulties.

Both sections of this chapter will draw on the connections made from the material already outlined. The ideas, words, notions, and phrases have been supplied by many authors. But it is now time for me to undertake a "dance of relations," to interpret what has gone before. The web of connections which I will formulate about game and its players is made by standing on the shoulders of many authors who have informed this work. My personal knowledge of games after a lifetime of their play and a few years of their study will couple with the ideas of many to form one more perspective in the study of games.

A Paradigm

We have been considering the nature of action, action taken up by players of a game. The game has been described as a structure with rules and practices. Players come together with other players to find out who can achieve what. Skills are performed and equipment is often used. A ground

is prepared and then run upon, walked upon, jumped upon, and fallen upon. The ground is a defined one, the rules are set, the skills are practiced in advance. Tension mounts before and during a game, and after the game is over there is a kind of satisfying calm before it all happens again. There are beginnings and middles and endings that all contain sets of relations peculiar to that game.

Games bring people together. Players appear because of a commonly accepted concern, namely, a game. There is a contest, there is opposition, there is sometimes achievement and sometimes frustration. To risk displaying one's skills, knowing that a good or not-so-good performance may result, gives the game both vitality and seriousness. People want to appear both as themselves and in the presence of others. The uncertainty of outcome in a game and the fear of not performing at one's best do not doom the game. Rather, unpredictability and tension draw people into its realm in order to satisfy the personal urge to know. During a game, as people play with others, they come to grasp facets of their own identity and their own abilities. They see in their achievements, in contests, a result of their practice. The skills people learn from those who know them are placed in relation to an opponent's skill in a game in order to find out who best can achieve what one knows.

When people join in a game they also take up the past. They embrace centuries of traditions and customs which

remain inherent in games played today. Performances from
the past become embodied in players seeking the same kinds
of challenges that drew people into that same game years
ago. In many cases the same kinds of equipment and imple-
ments are used by players today that were handled by people
of antiquity. The stuff of games, their playthings, are
taken up by the player as an extension of the body. There
is a feel for the tools of the game. One knows the bat,
ball, or racquet and connects with it immediately upon
sensing it.

The discovery of one's ability to achieve something
never done before is always possible in the game, and, more
often than not, is probable. The player promises to abide
by the rules of the game, and in so doing becomes free to
explore the kinds of relations in the game which can allow
for a great performance to take place. This is a serious
matter for the player even though a game may be fun. There
is a zesty and exuberant quality to this seriousness as the
player explores self-competency and experiences a kind of
self-revelation as well. This is not a frivolous or unim-
portant state of affairs for human beings. Games are real
and intense, and within their non-productivity, do serve the
purpose of providing a space wherein revelation, discovery,
and freedom can be attained.

Every game has its own ordering of time and space in
relation to both its players and things. Within this setting

of time, space, bodies, and things, action is encouraged, and full attention is paid to the particular kinds of orders each game contains. When the game stops, people turn to some other kind of time-space-person-object reality. But engagement in the game, given its own peculiar but accepted ways, provides the player with a mode of being not experienced in any other setting. Therefore, games are unique; each one unto itself and all together. Games allow people to come together, to move, and to communicate. In an artificially created space, voluntarily taken up and contested, people must appear with others and communicate something about their skillfulness by moving their bodies among others and with things. The primacy of the acting, embodied self, moving in a boundaried space and in concert with others, taking up traditions of the past and rules of the present, performing competently and intently, freely and expressively within limits, finds its actualization in the playing of a game.

The intensity of a game comes about because players willingly enter into its structure with an aim toward being active and performing to their utmost. There is an urge to engage in the pursuit of one's intentions, a desire to put to a test, with others involved, what one has practiced. And yet a game is not played out of necessity; the choice to play is voluntary. The game produces nothing material. The result of a game is in the play itself and not in an

outcome which will be used for something else. In a sense, the action of the game results in futility, in nothing produced for consumption or use. When the game ends, the players disperse and the highly charged space of the game's play lies inert until the game is begun anew by another set of players. The game is special because people find out that they can do special things in action. When people start a game afresh, they rediscover a unique kind of coherence and also come to know a bit more about their own abilities within such order.

While the people and their performances live on through stories, the inanimate outline of game would quickly become a dusty and forgotten relic of the past if players didn't concretely embody its structure. Through stories, artifacts, records, and performances games continue to remain alive. In a way, these might be construed as its products. But these products are not for consumption; rather, they are for preservation. They become the permanent and durable facts which insure that a game continues. This is the connection of game to culture, to a world which is durable because of the structures and artifacts preserved from generation to generation. Such judgments of preservation and remembrance continue to be made by players of the game, and, in particular, by those who take on the mantle of authority whereby they pass the game on to others because of their mastery of the game. Such people include teachers of the

game, players of the game, and those responsible for its record keeping of stories, performances, and rules.

What characterizes such people is competency of skills, knowledge of traditions and customs, and a genuine passion or love for the game. By taking on the responsibility of passing the game from one generation to the next, those in authority do not have to coerce players for respect. The combination of tradition and authority binds together the community of players who are committed to the game, not for personal gain as such, but for preserving the game from violation or disappearance. Players commit themselves to this willingly because the game has been the space of appearance which has provided them with both personal achievement and which has disclosed the mystery of their own bodies.

Despite the unpredictability inherent in the movement of bodies among others, the game allows a player to come to trust the body and its perceptions within the game setting. The game uses for its ground the earth, and roots the body to its soil or to a floor which is just above it. The engagement in action because of the moving, sensate, earth-rooted body takes on significance because of the game's unique structure. The significance is one which encourages trusting both the earth and the senses even though no ultimate predictability will ever be possible within the game.

There is a special way that the game allows for re-
lationships to develop among people. Communication takes
place through the language of intentional and purposive move-
ment. This takes place in an agonal setting, a setting of
contest, of competition which is not necessarily predicated
solely on winning or losing. The contest is filled with
opportunities to find out many kinds of things in relation
to one's body, other objects, and other people. There
exists within the game an ordering of people, numbers, space,
time, things, rules, boundaries and skills. The urge to
find out about them and to determine one's relation to them
influences the intent to join in a game. And yet a player
may never be able to make explicit all the kinds of con-
nections or realizations experienced in a game.

A game is not all that there is; it is not a metaphor
for life. The game structure is one among many within which
people can become involved and act. The game does provide
a certain way of ordering things and people and skills. The
kinds of discoveries which can be made personally, within
the public realm, because of what a game is may also be made
by taking up other humanly constructed forms, though not
quite the same way. While games are unique, many other con-
figurations of the human imagination also have their own
distinctness. For example, to act in a play, to sing in a
choir, or to play a musical instrument in an orchestra,
provide ways of relating the body in action to skillful

performance among others. But each is different; each is separate from the other because unique ways of making relationships exist within each. While connections can be made among these human enterprises, they cannot be lumped together as one thing nor can they be relegated into a category of insignificance. Care must be exercised within all of these endeavors to extend their metaphorical relationships appropriately. Life is not a continuous tennis game nor is it the ongoing playing of a flute.

What connects these kinds of humanly created forms is their emphasis on performance, performance which is an end in itself. There is movement of the body in concert with various objects and with other people. What separates the game from other performances and gives important status to it is not, for example, a claim to democratic ideals or morality or any number of psychological, sociological or physiological theories, though these all may have merit for what they tell us about game. What makes a game special is the element of contest; game creates an agonal space wherein people try to give the best performances they are capable of in relation to some sort of opposition. It is the deliberate attempt of the player, within the rules of the game, to reckon with such opposition so that a particular intention might be achieved, and this is accomplished through skilled action.

Make no mistake about this; it is not narcissism or
ego-boosting that is being suggested here. Rather, it is a
genuine and serious endeavor to play well among and because
of others and not in spite of them. It is an honest and
intense effort to see what a player can do skillfully when
in relation to others. By contesting with others, not for
gain or prizes, players find out about their competencies
and thus about themselves. Because of this peculiar ar-
rangement within games, that is the competitive setting,
revelation through skillful performance gives an indication
to a player of what capabilities are possessed.

The element of contest, of _agon_, rests on a "being-
better-than," a standing out. It is interesting to note
that the word ecstasy means just this--to stand out--and is
taken from the Greek word _ek-stasis_. There is an ecstatic
quality to good game play, even if only for a brief moment,
as players realize what it is "to-be-better-than." This
should not be construed as a metaphor for production-based
models of human affairs. The error of so taking the con-
cept of _agon_ lies in the fact that this "being-better-than"
due to either personal or team achievement within the game
results in nothing. No material thing emerges as an end-
product of a game. The "end" of the game is in the perfor-
mance itself and not in something which goes forward for use
or consumption. Herein lies the problematic use of game
language as a metaphor for enterprises where it is

inappropriate. What does belong within such enterprises is
the language of highly organized sport. Sport which is con-
stituted by production, consumption, technology, institution-
alization, patronage, and attempted predictability, contains
the language which is much more appropriate to, for example,
business, industry, and the military complex. But it is not
the language of a non-productive and an immaterial game
which should be used by these kinds of institutions.

Game language should be reserved for those endeavors
which seek to demonstrate something about human beings in
action, action which is public, unpredictable, immaterial
and offers equality to participants at the point of entry.
Game language tells us something about culture, about tra-
ditions, about competitive endeavors which result in nothing
but a better understanding of self and a world of relations.
A clearer perspective about the human body, a trusting of
its senses, a realizing of its potential and its ability to
grasp reality because of its relation to both others and
things, can issue from a game.

What allows a game to provide the conditions in which
people appear is its capacity to permit under rules, speech
and action of distinction. The game sanctions contesting to
do this; it allows the body a way to say something through
competition and to find out how well something can be said.
A certain kind of freedom within order is experienced in a
game, and the enjoyment of being with others is felt even

though one attempts to stand out from them through skilled
performance. To engage in this type of action requires
courage, for while the player may do extraordinary things
during a game, there is always the risk of failure. But
people take up this kind of tension, because even in the
smallest ways, people experience a kind of transformation
in a game.

People become more than they are by playing a game;
every new thing experienced, every new relationship made, no
matter how slight, changes them and also changes the world.
Different images are embodied, and as such lend another
shape to the reality of the experienced world. The ability
to undergo such change is due to movement; the game is not
predicated on statically pre-positioned formations. And be-
cause of the dynamism of the game's motion, the future
within any game is uncertain; the enterprise of ultimate
prediction of a game's movement is doomed to failure.

The initiative that one takes to participate in a game
springs from an intention to play. The willing player not
only voluntarily makes the choice to play a game and accept
its consequences, but also takes the chance that the
"I-intend-to" may not be translatable into an "I-am-able-to."
But in the attempt to achieve a goal of being an able-body,
the player relies on his personal knowledge of skills which
are guided toward success based upon the clues and per-
ceptions that emerge during the game's play. The skillful

player is at one with whatever objects, rules, or conditions frame that game.

To be a games-player implies being a citizen of the world. The word citizen has to do with the word city; the word city also relates to the words civic and civil. Consequently, to be a games-player also implies being civilized. The civilized games-player is "city-fied," which means, in the Greek sense, that a player takes seriously the responsibility of contributing, by action, to the well-being of a polis. Also, what the civilized player finds out is that through dignified performance, enacted in the presence of others, reality unfolds. For within a games-polis, or space wherein people act together, appearances are authentic. Such authenticity discloses realities about people, nature, and the world. When people act together out of a common concern, committed to upholding certain traditions and rules, they find ways of fitting their perceptions into a web of relationships which are genuine.

While games are played out under an element of contest, players continue to offer respect and courtesy to their opponents. In a way, the unspoken rules of a game--in other words, the etiquette of a game--are as important to the situation as are the written rules. For in upholding the etiquette of a game, a player acts out of respect for both the traditions of a game and all its players. Even though competition enters into a game, the play of it proceeds not

at the expense of others but because of others. While the
element of _agon_ is inherent in games, care must be taken by
those responsible for game events to ensure that all players
are accorded a dignity befitting the courage it takes to
perform.

The agonal impulse of "to-be-better-than" does not just
mean winning for a player. Rather, at any moment in a game,
something unexpected may happen, a player may at any time
"be-better-than" he or she ever was before. Competition is
as much concerned with the small moments of discovery and
change as it is with a desire to win. This is the element
of contest experienced at its fullest, that is, the awareness
of doing something one has never done before. It is a kind
of "ah-ha" moment, a moment of revelation, when something
never before performed is accomplished.

This embodied knowing is personal and connects the
players of a game to past performances either of self-making
or those of other players. Every breakthrough or new per-
formance is predicated upon a prior one. But this perfor-
mance is a whole new endeavor and is not simply a summative
effect of putting together isolated bits from the past.
What gives a game unity is that it relies on whole perfor-
mances, on the completion of skills in relation to rules,
tools, people, and space. The game is not practice; it is
not played out by isolating parts from other parts. Rather,
there is a drive toward unity which players undertake as

they seek a comprehension of the total activity. Each game represents a unified whole endeavor, complete with a beginning and an end; and during its play, performers seek for their own unified effort to be fulfilled. There is a certain rhythm and harmony to a game, and, when well-played, both a grace and beauty of movement dignify its players.

Game is connected to the real world. While its relation to the divine or to the cosmos has been diminished in contemporary times, there is still a transcendent or soaring quality about the game. While games root bodies to the earth, at the same time, the characteristic of ecstasy prevails in a game. Through the game, people become linked to one another, to certain objects, and to a world. The history of games suggests that players have believed in a connection of their play to something beyond the self. And contemporary approaches to games still aspire for the attainment of something which is beyond the self.

One connection beyond the self is the link with others, the covenanting or pledging with others to abide by a set of rules for the sake of what may be achieved. People become responsible to one another not to break their promise of accepting the rules. The connection of game to the world is made by embodied beings who are placed inside traditions when they take up a game. There is the responsibility to uphold what is integral to a game and preserve it for others within their culture. The connections which are beyond the

self to, for example, earth, other people, past, future,
culture, and traditions, keep the game linked to the realm
of human affairs by assuring that the game does not serve
the interests of one person or one group alone.

Myths of games suggest connections to things and beings
of another realm. This remains viable even in a world where
secularization and atomization form contemporary approaches
for knowing and doing. Games have an internal cohesiveness
and also connect to a larger realm which considers people
in action together to be significant. There is a unity
within a contested game and because of its constitution
people always enjoy the possibility of experiencing some-
thing new while playing.

Games, essentially, remain simple in form and imple-
ments. Each game is a coherent whole, a complete structure
among many other games. All games are connected in the
larger realm of human affairs to those similar kinds of
endeavors which take performance to be of value and meaning-
ful. The whole realm of such affairs, which considers
action to be important, provides the conditions for entering
the world of appearances in human ways. People join a game
on equal terms with others at the outset, and all have the
chance of finding out who they are because of their actions
together.

The community of people who join in games authorize
some of its members to teach others game skills and to pass

on traditions of the game. By demonstrating a mastery of
what game is, a person comes to dwell in a game and thereby
has the authority to demonstrate it to others. One such
person is the physical education teacher. The responsibility
of knowing games and demonstrating their various forms is
assumed by the teacher in recognition of why games are an
important, imaginative enterprise, and why they must be
passed on to others. A physical education teacher believes
in the primacy of action, performance, skills, practice and
perceptions. These teachers help people to realize their
capacity for the "I-am-able" experiences. The teacher of
physical education embodies personal knowledge and offers
to others the possibility of indwelling in the kinds of dis-
covery which games offer.

The game is unique and proves the setting wherein
people act together and yet strive to stand out. The body
says something by virtue of its ability to move skillfully
in competition with others in a game. The person tells
others who he or she is in personal performance. The game
produces nothing other than these performances, and is taken
up willingly because of this. Games begin, go on, and end
according to rules and special sets of configurations of
skills, tools, space, time, and other people. Each game has
a unity unto itself; each game has an element of contest
which challenges people to risk personal display in order
"to-be-better-than." Although tension is felt, there is

enjoyment in playing a game. People might do things they've never done before within a game, and, in so doing, become transformed by the experience. They reveal to themselves through others a bit more about who they are. There is an intensity about players engaged in a game, and yet, there is a quality of zest and exuberance which often marks their play. Ambiguity and uncertainty must be embraced in a game. The body is rooted in paradox, and moving bodies and objects intensify the unpredictable nature of both the game and its players.

The language which describes the game is pregnant with meaning. But interpretation of the words of game must be made carefully before extending game language into other realms of human affairs. Particular caution must be exercised around the word contest. While this is a key word for understanding game, it is also the word which has suffered the most misuse. The problem of competition is a contemporary one for games; the problem of action is an ancient one. These and other difficult matters have plagued attempts to understand games. For the implications and consequences of these problems, an effort will be made to uncover the pressures which push and pull against the integrity of games.

Critical Problems

The difficulty in seeing the rightful shape of game is due to a number of factors. Many of these have been alluded

to during the course of the inquiry, and their effect has
been felt in attempting to determine just what is the right-
ful shape and status of game. At the point where the myth
of game begins, at least in Western civilization, so too do
the problems. What follows is a critical look at some of
the difficulties which surround game as it has developed
particularly in Western cultures.

The paradigm of the human condition of the game is one
of interpretation. Woven into this interpretive design are
concepts about what it means to be human as presented
earlier in the discussion by a number of contemporary phi-
losophers. Games have been interpreted through stories and
language usage. What is problematic for both strands of the
design, namely, game and the human condition, is the body
and the status of action. The body in movement, acting
willingly, has posed difficulties for the philosophers of
Western civilization from the days of antiquity to the
present.

The conceptual separation of mind-body-soul within
Greek philosophical thought has "progressed" to the contem-
porary radical split of mind from body. The moving and
excited person destroys the stillness and quiet character
assigned to the contemplative. Thinking about pure form and
ideas is not possible when the body is agitating to do some-
thing. And since it is the clarity of ideas which has been
placed above the unpredictable and zesty movement of the

body, the status of action finds itself relegated to a secondary position at best.

What may have superseded action in the contemporary world is the importance assigned to the fabrication of goods, the ability to produce a material end-result. To be sure, there is no material result of genuine action. The work of completing and providing an actual product for use or consumption may have crept above action, second only to, and possibly even challenging the old superiority of, contemplation. What seem to be, in a sense, futile, unnecessary, or immaterial performances are being diminished in value. If game can be placed in the realm of such action, of non-productive ends, it too falls under the confusion surrounding the status of deeds that yield nothing other than the possibility of revelation through performance.

The split between body and mind, or action and contemplation, has been further exacerbated by the ensuing distrust of what sense experience can reveal. How we fit into the given world of others, objects, and nature has come to be doubted if the reality of such disclosure is left to sense perception. Part of this doubt stems from the increasing level of instrumentation and statistical data which configure the world in such a way as to "prove" the senses inaccurate. Instead of taking the arrangement of facts under a particular paradigm which sees things in one way, technological and mathematical approaches have been given

precedence in the declaration of what is to be taken as
real. Since game employs neither statistics nor techo-
logical instrumentation during its play, and also encourages
reliance on immediate sense perception for successful per-
formance, it occupies an increasingly perplexing position
in the realm of human affairs.

What has resulted because of these difficulties is a
placement of the world of game in opposition to the world of
labor. Game has taken refuge in the realm of leisure-time
or social activities and has come to rely on the justifi-
cation given them as things to do when not producing things
for use or consumption. Filling up spare time has afforded
game a place and also has provided for numerous social and
physiological theories which legitimate game. There are
many reasons offered for why people do and should play games
which are assumed to be opposite to work. Most of these
reasons, however, are inaccurate.

The inaccuracy of the value which has been ascribed to
game has also resulted in the misuse of its metaphorical
possibilities. Coupled with this inappropriate use of game
language is its own internal word problem, since most
literature lumps play-game-sport together as if all combi-
nations were possible. Game has been pulled linguistically
out of shape and also suffers theoretically from its in-
clusion into every conceivable discipline of inquiry.

The attempt to justify game, to accord it a valued place, has been characterized by a drive which parallels the cause-effect and controlling nature of scientific methodologies. The aim of predictability is a futile one for game. The outcome is never known for sure in advance of its play; and the sheer fact of having bodies interact with other bodies presupposes an uncertainty within which the new can occur. To link game with people in a world of action which produces nothing and is filled by ambiguity suggests that its justification must lie outside the realm of necessity or means-ends relationships.

The paradoxical nature of game in which grave but merry people play becomes problematic in a world striving for clarity, rationality, and logic. The many perspectives which result within the game setting stand in opposition to the aim of achieving clear objectives toward which all are striving in one way. The simple fact of contesting undermines uni-dimensional methods of play. And since the game is played by people who embody not only formality but also the unexplainable, the game is an act of personal knowing and doing and can rest easily upon that claim. Yet, in a world which likes to believe that the subjective can be separated from the objective, a dimension of action which manifests the personal can be suspect.

What to connect game to is a problem of the status of action and the body. And yet, it seems that many people do

recognize that there is an importance about games. The translation of this importance suffers as the misunderstanding of purposeful and personal doing continues. To link game to flesh, to earth, to the senses, to indwelled instruments, is to move away from the realm of technology and away from a universe conquered by science, even though the structure of game is an artificial creation.

Games are played in public. They begin at a point which takes all its players to be equal as to the conditions of its play. Games are played out among people who are open to judgment by others. Spectators may be present, pictures may be taken, records may be kept. Games are played among people who gather together outside of the private realm. There is no privacy in games and the light of the public world shines on its players so that many can see the action. The quiet and solitude of private contemplation are not present in the movement of games. People are tense and excited and all together in the game space. In a world where viable spaces for public appearances are either disappearing or becoming merely social, and where the retreat to the safe, controllable private realm is encouraged, the game world stands as one of the few remaining public spaces for personal appearance.

The community of games-players who respect a certain authority for the game's conduct and also take up a game's traditions willingly do so, in contemporary times, in light

of a fading belief in all three, namely, community, tradition, and authority. No one is coerced to play a game; it must be played among others; and many of the actions of games are based upon similar ones of many years past.

In a time when promises are made in abundance and often just as quickly forgotten, games stand on the tradition of all people agreeing to play by the rules. To promise to one another is a form of pledging that to the best of one's ability, the game will be played honestly and according to its laws. One cannot forget in the game the promise made to others; for, if players break their promise either by cheating or by being "spoilsports," the game is destroyed.

Within the bounds of a game, which are voluntarily accepted, a certain kind of freedom is experienced. This is not the freedom of breaking away to do whatever one pleases; rather, this is the freedom that comes because of limitations and the presence of others. To find out who one is by playing with others in public in a game under contesting conditions stands contrary to the kind of so-called freedom espoused through retreating into the solitude of one's own privacy or contemplation.

Unfortunately, frivolity and the non-serious are characteristics which have been assigned to the game. Yet, what is re-presented in images which people take up through movement should not be underestimated in either seriousness or intensity. Some games encourage the taking on of roles

while others concentrate on seeking skilled performances through artificially made-up formations of people and objects. Whatever configurations find their way into a game in the way of skills, tools, or states of being, all have the capacity to reveal something about reality. A game is not a frivolous matter in the sense of suggesting something which is unimportant. A game is both serious and enjoyable, yet immaterial to the necessities of living. A game is about human action and encompasses a realm of uncertainty in which people performing together, yet under opposition, find out a lot more about themselves than they ever would in private. The discourse through movement, among others, is a way of communicating about oneself. And while the interpretations of such revelation may be numerous, the significance of the kinds of personal knowing revealed in performance cannot be underestimated for their value.

The drive toward predictability, logic, and objectivity will never be achieved by playing a game. Means-ends relationships do not constitute the stuff of games. When a whistle first blows, a clock first starts, or a score is first posted, the outcome and progress of a game is still in doubt. The times are not calm during the playing of games. There is always an uncertainty about playing a game because of the risk of revealing one's skills in relation to others. And yet a game is a telling time. Players tell what they know by skillfully moving, and very often they tell more

than they felt they knew. Performances always have the possibility of being the best ones ever given by a player. In order for this to happen, other people must be present so that the game can be played and the stories of it re-told after its ending.

The problems of valuing action, intentional movement, and skillful performance are those faced by the explorers of the significance of game. A world which values predictability, material possessions, and logic cannot see the value of games in an appropriate way. The filling up of spare time is, for example, not the right way to see game. The statistics kept by the columns-ful are not the way to tell about performance. The value lies in the performance itself with no end-product other than skilled play and the story of that skilled play re-told. The preservation of games relies on the durability of its myths and not on the recitation of numbers.

To find out about the why of things and of existence must take place through speech and deeds among others. Retreating to privacy or making contrived social appearances will not tell us much about nature, the world, or the world's people. In order to think about what we do, to experience the calm of personal reflection, we must be committed to doing something among others first. From these actions of communication we can then take the opportunity to contemplate what they mean. These actions are not mediated

by entrepreneurs; rather, they are direct, face-to-face, encounters among people in the light of the public domain.

When human understanding pushes toward separating action from contemplation, will from freedom, and reason from imagination, it is not difficult to comprehend why the game stands in a problematic place. For, in effect, playing has a lot to do with each of the so-called polar points of such separations. When knowledge is valued for its explicitness and its predictability, it is easy to see why comprehending the meaning of a game poses a problem--not least because of its reliance upon ambiguous bodies moving in an uncertain setting. When being private is considered the way to be free, the public playing of games in the company of others becomes circumspect as a mode for freedom. When the language of game is reduced to competitive productivity over and against others, the metaphoric value of the game world suffers inappropriate forms of usage. How the game rises above the problems of a contemporary world to claim its valid and rightful position is a difficult matter, and is made more difficult as the usurping effect of highly organized sport, in particular, takes hold.

If game was the last stop in a configuring of competitive performance, the problems would still be present as judgmental ones. But when the productive and consumptive realm of sport becomes the predominant model for the placement of skillful performance against and at the expense of

others, game faces the predicament of trying to hold onto
a valid position, particularly in terms of competition, in
spite of the powerful pull from sport. The problem sport
must confront is with its product; goods are made, consumed
or used up, and disappear. Sport, because of its consumable
products, runs the risk of its own disappearance. Game, if
it follows the sport model, will also meet the possibility
of being lost to culture, because the genuinely unrepeatable,
yet memorable, actions of individuals within a game will
give way to the predictable and repetitive needs of the
masses of producers and consumers of sport. So, not only
does game face the problems assigned to the status of the
body in action, it also confronts the difficulty of how to
respond to the strength of its seemingly close neighbor,
sport.

What has been presented in this chapter is an interpre-
tation of game and its play by persons. The problems that
confront such a configuration of bodies in action within
structure were then posed. Neither of the two sections
within this chapter is intended to be the final word.
Answers to questions and solutions to problems are tentative,
and are offered in a spirit which invites further response.
The matters for discussion within this inquiry are both
complicated and perplexing. Yet games continue to be im-
portant; people say something when they are engaged in them.
Together, people experience in public and in common what it

means to reveal their humanity by playing a game. Such humanity is marked by communication, transformation, and personal knowing. Game is only one mode which provides for such a human appearance; and each game is but a tiny whole in the entire realm of human affairs. Nevertheless, important things happen to people because of people and the game structure together, and this importance cannot be underestimated for its potential significance to persons.

The end of this study is now in sight. The final chapter will not provide absolute conclusions about the topic of game or the human condition or their joint enterprise. The movement toward finishing this inquiry is made with full awareness that many questions will continue to haunt the reader. A movement will be made, however, toward suggesting some implications which might be drawn from an investigation such as this.

NOTES

CHAPTER V

[1] Kennedy, p. 6.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

>The mark of true discovery is not its fruitful-
>ness but the _intimation_ of fruitfulness.[1]

What Michael Polanyi alludes to in this quotation is applicable to a study even as small as this one. The fruitfulness of an inquiry such as this lies not so much in providing complete answers to questions as identifying and pursuing intimations of directions to be taken for a deeper exploration and understanding of games. The recovery of game through myth and under the aegis of language has taken place by drawing from a number of disciplines, namely, politics, science, poetry, and philosophy. Throughout the inquiry, game has revealed aspects of its structure and its play not often recognized.

Understanding the game as a contest and as a method of personal knowing, based upon skilled performances by persons in action with others, has been the fundamental focus of this study. The preservation of the game through its stories and conditions gives it significant status as a cultural activity. The limits of the game, which people accept voluntarily, make possible a kind of freedom for its participants. This paradoxical relation of limitation to freedom nonetheless allows the game to become a context

where people can appear as distinctly human selves.

The game, which is non-productive, yet taken up in earnest and filled with intense <u>agon</u>, enables persons to stand out from others by virtue of their skill. The performances given in public by players are marked by pledging to abide by the rules and conditions of the game in order to achieve distinction. The revelation that 'one can do' and 'do well,' comes about because of and in the challenging yet convivial presence of others. The dynamic interaction of doing and knowing begins with deeds and words of communication. The type of communication exhibited by skillful performance in the confines of a game is characterized by the personal will to succeed. The combination of these characteristics makes the game structure unique in the realm of human affairs.

In speaking of the content of public life, Hannah Arendt claims that all too often,

> We remain unaware of the joy and gratification
> that arise out of being in company with our peers,
> out of acting together and appearing in public,
> out of inserting ourselves into the world by word
> and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our per-
> sonal identity. . . . It is only by respecting
> its own borders that this realm, where we are free
> to act and to change, can remain intact, preserving
> its integrity and keeping its promise.[2]

The notions of freedom because of limits, and identity because of others are embodied concretely within the realm of a game. By preserving the integrity of game structures, people transmit games from one generation to the next,

thereby providing durable forms for culture. It is only when games are used to meet the demands of productivity or necessity that they risk being consumed by society rather than being preserved for culture.

In speaking of play as a basis of culture, Johan Huizinga says, "For many years the conviction has grown upon me that civilization arises and unfolds in and as play."[3] What Huizinga and others see in the playing of a game is a paradigm for the durability and preservation of the world. The forms of play which have survived link people to concerns beyond those of self. Games have survived for centuries in cultures due to the effort to preserve rather than to consume. Arendt maintains, "We understand by culture . . . the mode of intercourse prescribed by civilizations with respect to the least useful and most worldly of things, the works of artists, poets, musicians, philosophers, and so forth."[4] The "and so forth" must include the realm of game as a worldly structure, and the mode of intercourse within the game is the skillful playing among people.

Concerning skillful playing, Michael Polanyi believes that achievement in performance is also a paradigm for knowing. Knowing and doing are joined through the enterprise of skillful action. Polanyi contends:

> It would seem that we can move our body only indirectly by thrusting forward our imagination which then evokes subsidiarily the means of its own implementation. . . . The cyclist's striving imagination, which has discovered within a few

> weeks a whole tacit system of balancing, may well
> be credited with the performance of instantly
> reapplying this system to the new conditions.[5]

The whole game, including the performances which occur
within it, represents a model for personal knowing. It is
a totality of order and coherence of a particular sort,
never fully explainable or predictable. The whole game
exists because of its traditions, its reliance on authorized
teachers, and its display of practiced skills within a com-
munity of players.

Acts of skilled performance are guided by the imagi-
nation. The forms of games are humanly constructed and
imaginatively dwelled in during play. The particular
systems of numbers, objects, and rules made up by people and
then voluntarily taken up by them, represent the imagination
at work within any game. The joining of body and mind in
willful action, the judging of performances and thinking
about their meaning, find a unity in the setting of the
game, before, during, and after its play. Elizabeth Sewell
says that, "The contemporary imagination will not be healed
or recover its freedom until it restores to life the Body-
Mind relationship."[6] The game is one form where the action
of joining body and mind occurs, relying as it does on the
imaginative effort of dwelling in skills, objects, rules and
performances.

Within the game we have discovered a method for coming
to understand sets of relationships made and then lived in

by persons voluntarily and willingly, as well as a model for the creation of a coherent structure of boundaries within which people find a certain kind of satisfaction and freedom. While played under a strict set of rules, and as a contest, the game is never fully predictable, and always retains the capacity to surprise its players and spectators. The "never-before-done" is always a possibility for the games-player due to the number of configurations offered within a game setting and the variety of responses which have not yet ever been attempted.

This imaginative union of body-mind with objects, rules, skills, and people is easily seen in the play of children. Children become trains, snakes, waves, and trees in their games. Likewise, in adult games there is an embodied and trusted connection to the game and its configurations. This is not the result of a machine-like or habituated kind of behavior. Rather, it is a mature kind of indwelling which is made possible by games. Merleau-Ponty describes this indwelling as a blending:

> There is a human body where, between the seeing and the seen, between touching and the touched, between one eye and the other, between hand and hand, a blending of some sort takes place.[7]

The blending of people and things in a game takes place as human beings, caught up in the intensity of playing, give full attention to expressions of the self and to receiving the expressions of others through performance.

To do something well, and then to extend it toward new areas of discovery, is possible every time a game begins. Because this is so, the game haunts its players and beckons them to attempt new performances. Even a seemingly insignificant moment in a game may be the occasion for a player's intense striving and self-investment. One well-placed drive or one crisply hit serve might be enough to draw a player back into the charmed circle of a game again and again. Both the mystery and the manner of the game, the tacit and the explicit, work in tandem for a player. Together, the explainable and the uncertain press a player to be as good as he or she can be.

In spite of--perhaps even because of--the problems posed by games, they weave an alluring web for the participants. If new generations of participants are to experience the intrinsic integrity and inherent values of the game as disclosed in this study, the game must withstand the challenges of highly organized sport. Sport has its own place in the social world, where players are producers for spectators who are consumers. But games must preserve for public endeavor the common striving toward excellence in performance with no other result than the action itself. The integrity of the world, not just games, depends on preserving domains wherein human affairs, though frail and uncertain at times, can be conducted apart from the drive toward predictable means-end relationships.

In contemporary Western society, game has been placed opposite work as a way to fill up spare time. It has also been placed alongside sport as if it were natural kin. Both relationships are problematic for the game. How the problems are resolved is, in part, a responsibility for those who teach games to others. As one who has the authority to pass on the skills and traditions of games, the physical education teacher, for example, must recognize and attempt to untangle the problems posed by sport and leisure-time activities in relation to meanings which are appropriate to the unique human activities provided by games.

This study has attempted to understand the game from the standpoint of its relation to the human condition. The methodology of the inquiry has unfolded during the course of the investigation and has disclosed its own particular shape which, it is hoped, has followed the contours of the material presented. The movement has been from textual interpretation to a joining of ideas into a coherent understanding of both the game and the human condition. The human condition of the game emerged as a unified and plausible idea both because of the nature of the phenomena and because of a methodology which has encouraged a union of ideas rather than the separation of findings into bits of information.

This study has purposely worked with general areas of concern rather than reducing such large patterns to their smallest components. Wherever particulars have been

presented in this study, an attempt has been made to relate them to a larger, fuller perspective. It is on this whole presentation that the central meaning of this inquiry rests.

The plurality of perspectives generated within a community of investigators committed to revealing what is, provides for researchers such as myself the context for constructing another perspective about the reality of certain phenomena. This diversity of view is encouraging and needs to be encouraged, for it is within multiplicity and plurality that the real world exists. There is a level of uncertainty about all truths; every layer of truth uncovered reveals another stratum to be further explored. Methods for uncovering what is actually there proceed in many ways and from many perspectives. Those involved in science, mathematics, poetry, architecture, art, physical education, anthropology and the like seek to discover the truth of their concerns.

A fresh way of seeing something has the power to transform understandings of issues. Investigations of phenomena which offer renewed interpretations of things can help people to see another layer of meaning concerning what they do and why they do it. The heuristic surge to find out about things and self characterizes human exploration. Methods for satisfying the desire to know are varied, to be sure, but all are upheld by personal commitment and competencies. People

select problems and methods for researching them based upon personal interests and skills. As Polanyi points out, this is the way knowledge moves, through personal commitment to uncover what is, and by selecting methods which best suit the problem and the skills of the researcher.

A hermeneutic method which has utilized phenomeno-logical approaches has been used in this study, based upon interests, skills, and the nature of the matter explored. It is hoped that the interpretations revealed throughout the study can result in other people looking at the phenomenon of game in a different way.

A game is a space where persons can appear to each other as themselves. Yet, a game is not everything; there are many limitations within a game, and at some point people must stop playing games. But while the game goes on, important things happen to people because people are acting.

Game faces problems which are both old and contemporary in nature. The future of the game rests on the integrity of its structure as well as the recognition of this integrity by its participants. Games have survived for centuries and continue to draw people to their play. People who take up the responsibility for preserving the meaning and significance of a game must do so with insight into what a game can be for people. It is possible that a study such as this can provide a greater understanding of the importance of the game,

as well as how and why people conduct themselves within it
and on its behalf.

> The Game is ascent and descent. Advance and with-
> drawal. . . .   The Game 'asks' to be played. . . .
> Belief, feeling, thought and action intermix. . . .
> Beginnings, ends and fresh beginnings come to-
> gether again. . . .   The Game is not definitive,
> it is not the last word. . . .   It remains . . .
> the undivulged, the impracticable. It plays with
> us, impels us toward action. . . .   The wandering
> truths of the world and the true wanderings of
> man confront each other and compose this game.[8]

NOTES

CHAPTER VI

[1] Polanyi, _Personal Knowledge_, p. 148.

[2] Arendt, _Between Past and Future_, pp. 263-264.

[3] Huizinga, p. ix.

[4] Arendt, _Between Past and Future_, p. 213.

[5] Michael Polanyi, "Sense-Giving and Sense-Reading," in _Intellect and Hope: Essays in the Thoughts of Michael Polanyi_, ed. Thomas A. Langford and William H. Poteat (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 424-425.

[6] Sewell, "Death of the Imagination," p. 413.

[7] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and Mind," trans. Carleton Dallery, in _The Primacy of Perception_, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964), p. 163.

[8] Kostas Axelos, "Planetary Interlude," trans. Sally Hess, in _Game, Play, Literature_, ed. Jacques Ehrmann (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 17-18.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

<u>Method</u>

Apple, Michael W. "The Process and Ideology of Valuing in
    Educational Settings." In <u>Educational Evaluation:</u>
    <u>Analysis and Responsibility</u>. Ed. Michael W. Apple, et
    al. Berkeley: McCutchan, 1974, pp. 3-34.

Arendt, Hannah. "Martin Heidegger at Eighty." In <u>Heidegger</u>
    <u>and Modern Philosophy</u>. Ed. Michael Murray. New Haven:
    Yale Univ. Press, 1978, pp. 293-303.

Atkinson, Phyllis. "The Interrelatedness of Playfulness,
    Communion, and Human Transcendence: A Philosophical
    Inquiry." Thesis. Univ. of North Carolina at Greens-
    boro, 1980.

Barfield, Owen. "Imagination and Inspiration." In
    <u>Interpretation: The Poetry of Meaning</u>. Ed. Stanley
    Romaine Hopper and David L. Miller. New York:
    Harcourt, 1967, pp. 54-76.

Blake, William. <u>Songs of Innocence and of Experience:</u>
    <u>Shewing the Two Contrary States of the Human Soul,</u>
    <u>1789-1794</u>. Intro. Sir Geoffrey Keynes. London:
    Oxford Univ. Press, 1967.

Boelen, Bernard J. <u>Existential Thinking</u>. New York:
    Herder, 1971.

Brown, Francis, et al. A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the
    Old Testament. Oxford: Clarendon, 1972.

Buchler, Justus. The Concept of Method. New York:
    Columbia Univ. Press, 1961.

Edie, James M., ed. What is Phenomenology? By Pierre
    Thévanes. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962.

Frost, Robert. "Education by Poetry: A Meditative Mono-
    logue." In The Norton Reader: An Anthology of
    Expository Prose. Gen. Ed. Arthur M. Eastman. New
    York: Norton, 1965, pp. 215-224.

Gelwick, Richard. The Way of Discovery: An Introduction
    to the Thought of Michael Polanyi. New York: Oxford
    Univ. Press, 1977.

Gibaldi, Joseph and Walter S. Achtert. M L A Handbook.
    New York: M L A, 1980.

Glaser, Barney G., and Anselm L. Strauss. The Discovery of
    Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research.
    New York: Aldine, 1967.

Harris, Janet C. "Hermeneutics, Interpretive Cultural Re-
    search, and the Study of Sport." Expanded version of
    a paper presented to the North American Society for
    the Sociology of Sport, Denver, October, 1980.

Heidegger, Martin. Discourse on Thinking. Trans. John M.
    Anderson and E. Hans Freund. New York: Colophon-
    Harper and Row, 1966.

Hill, Brian V. Education and the Endangered Individual.
     New York: Dell, 1973.

Ihde, Don, ed. The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in
     Hermeneutics. By Paul Ricoeur. Evanston: North-
     western Univ. Press, 1974.

Kuhn, Helmut. "Personal Knowledge and the Crisis of the
     Philosophical Tradition." In Intellect and Hope:
     Essays in the Thought of Michael Polanyi. Ed. Thomas
     A. Langford and William H. Poteat. Durham: Duke Univ.
     Press, 1968, pp. 111-135.

Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
     2nd. ed. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970.

Ladner, Benjamin Mance. "Elizabeth Sewell: Poetic Method
     as an Instrument of Thinking and Knowing." Diss. Duke
     University, 1970.

Langer, Suzanne K. Problems of Art. New York: Scribner's,
     1957.

Lofland, John. Analyzing Social Settings. Belmont, Calif.:
     Wadsworth, 1971.

Macdonald, James B. "Theory-Practice and the Hermeneutic
     Circle." Paper presented at The Curriculum Theory
     Conference, McClean, Virginia, Fall 1980.

----------, Bernice J. Wolfson, and Esther Zaret. Reschool-
     ing Society: A Conceptual Model. Washington: ASCD,
     1973.

Macmurray, John. The Structure of Religious Experience.

New Haven, 1936; rpt. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books,

1971.

McCarthy, Mary. "Saying Good-by to Hannah." New York

Review of Books, 22 Jan. 1976, pp. 8-11.

McCurdy, Harold G. "Personal Knowing and Making." In

Intellect and Hope: Essays in the Thought of Michael

Polanyi. Ed. Thomas A. Langford and William H. Poteat.

Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1968, pp. 315-340.

McKeon, Richard. Thought, Action and Passion. Chicago:

Univ. of Chicago Press, 1954.

Mood, John J. L. Rilke on Love and Other Difficulties:

Translations and Considerations of Rainer Maria Rilke.

New York: Norton, 1975.

Murray, James A. H., ed. A New English Dictionary on

Historical Principles. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901.

O'Connor, Flannery. Mystery and Manners. Ed. Sally and

Robert Fitzgerald. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1969.

Palmer, Richard E. Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in

Schleiermacher, Dilthy, Heidegger, and Gadamer.

Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1969.

Pirsig, Robert M. Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance:

An Inquiry into Values. New York: Bantam Books, 1974.

Polanyi, Michael. "The Creative Imagination." Psycho-

logical Issues, 6, No. 2 (1969), 53-70.

Prosch, Harry. "Cooling the Modern Mind: Polanyi's

Mission." Skidmore College Bulletin, 56, No. 4 (1971),

5-33.

Rasmussen, David M. Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philo-

sophical Anthropology: A Constructive Interpretation

of the thought of Paul Ricoeur. The Hague: Martinus

Nijhoff, 1971.

Ricoeur, Paul. "Existence and Hermeneutics." Trans.

Kathleen McLaughlin. In The Conflict of Interpreta-

tions: Essays in Hermeneutics. Ed. Don Ihde.

Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1974, pp. 3-24.

----------. "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action

Considered as a Text." Social Research, 38, No. 3

(1971), 529-562.

Rukeyser, Muriel. The Traces of Thomas Hariot. New York:

Random House, 1970.

Said, Edward W. Beginnings: Intention and Method. New

York: Basic Books, 1975.

----------. Orientalism. New York: Random House, 1978.

Scott, William T. "The Gentle Rain-A Search for Understand-

ing." In Intellect and Hope: Essays in the Thought

of Michael Polanyi. Ed. Thomas A. Langford and William

H. Poteat. Durham, Duke Univ. Press, 1968, pp. 242-274.

Sewell, Elizabeth. "The Death of the Imagination."

Thought, 28, No. 110 (Autumn 1953), 413-445.

----------. "Land of Graven Images." Thought, 27, No. 106
    (Autumn 1952), 350-364.

----------. Personal conversations with author. Autumn,
    1980-Spring, 1981.

----------. The Structure of Poetry. London: Routledge
    and Kegan Paul, 1951.

----------. To Be a True Poem: Essays. Ed. William E.
    Ray. Winston-Salem, N.C.: Hunter, 1979.

Solomon, Robert C., ed. Phenomenology and Existentialism.
    Lanham, Md.: Univ. Press of America, 1980.

Stern, Peter, and Jean Yarbrough. "Hannah Arendt." The
    American Scholar, 47 (Summer 1978), 371-381.

Thévenaz, Pierre. What is Phenomenology? Trans. James M.
    Edie et al. Ed. James M. Edie. Chicago: Quadrangle
    Books, 1962.

Valéry, Paul. Dialogues. Trans. William M. Stewart. New
    York: Pantheon Books, 1956.

Vollrath, Ernst. "Hannah Arendt and the Method of Political
    Thinking." Trans. Hans Fantel. Social Research, 44,
    No. 1 (1977), 160-182.

White, T. H. The Sword in the Stone. New York: Dell, 1939.

Young, David, trans. Duino Elegies. By Rainer Maria Rilke.
    New York: Norton, 1978.

Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth. "Arendt, Hannah." In Notable
    American Women: The Modern Period. Ed. Barbara
    Sicherman and Carol H. Green. Cambridge, Mass.:
    Belknap Press, 1980, pp. 33-37.

Game

Alderman, R. B. Psychological Behavior in Sport. Phila-
delphia: Saunders, 1974.

Auden, W. H. The Dyer's Hand and Other Essays. New York:
Vintage Books, 1968.

----------. Selected Poetry of W. H. Auden. 2nd ed. New
York: Vintage Books, 1971.

Axelos, Kostas. "Planetary Interlude." Trans. Sally Hess.
In Game, Play, Literature. Ed. Jacques Ehrmann.
Boston: Beacon, 1968, pp. 6-18.

Beisser, Arnold. The Madness in Sports. 2nd ed. Bowie:
Md.: Charless, 1977.

Berger, Peter L. A Rumor of Angels: Modern Society and the
Rediscovery of the Supernatural. Garden City, N.Y.:
Anchor-Doubleday, 1969.

Best, David. Philosophy and Human Movement. London: Allen
and Unwin, 1978.

Betts, John R. America's Sporting Heritage: 1850-1950.
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1974.

Brewer, William. Ovid's Metamorphoses. Vol. II. Boston:
Marshall Jones, 1941.

Brown, Peter. "Violence in Olympia." Rev. of The Olympic
Games: The First Thousand Years, by M. I. Finley and
H. W. Pleket. New York Review of Books, 25 Nov. 1976,
pp. 23-24.

Cady, Edwin H. The Big Game. Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1978.

Caillois, Roger. Man, Play, and Games. Trans. Meyer Barash. New York: Schocken Books, 1961.

Carroll, Lewis. Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass. New York: Signet-New American Library, 1960.

Champlin, Nathaniel L. "Are Sports Methodic?" Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 4 (Fall 1977), 104-116.

Cohen, Marvin. "The Baseball Encyclopedia." Rev. of The Complete and Official Record of Major League Baseball. The Village Voice, 5 Feb. 1970, p. 6.

Conway, Geoffrey S., ed. The Odes of Pindar. London: Dent, 1972.

Cox, Harvey. The Feast of Fools: A Theological Essay on Festivity and Fantasy. New York: Perennial Library-Harper and Row, 1969.

Dombrowski, Daniel A. "Plato and Athletics." Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 6 (Fall 1979), 29-38.

Ehrmann, Jacques, ed. Game, Play, Literature. Boston: Beacon, 1968.

----------. "Homo Ludens Revisited." Trans. Cathy and Phil Lewis. In Game, Play, Literature. Ed. Jacques Ehrmann. Boston: Beacon, 1968, pp. 31-57.

Fink, Eugen. "The Oasis of Happiness: Toward an Ontology
of Play." Trans. Ute and Thomas Saine. In Game, Play,
Literature. Ed. Jacques Ehrmann. Boston: Beacon,
1968, pp. 19-30.

----------. "The Ontology of Play." Trans. Sister M.
Delphine. In Sport and the Body: A Philosophical
Symposium. Ed. Ellen W. Gerber and William J. Morgan.
2nd ed. Philadelphia: Lea and Febiger, 1979, pp.
73-83.

Finley, M. I., and H. W. Pleket. The Olympic Games: The
First Thousand Years. New York: Viking, 1976.

Frankenberg, Lloyd. Invitation to Poetry. Garden City,
N.Y.: Dolphin-Doubleday, 1956.

Gahringer, Robert. "Can Games Explain Language?" The
Journal of Philosophy, 56, No. 16 (1959), 661-667.

Geertz, Clifford. "Deep Play: Notes on a Balinese Cock-
fight." Daedalus, 101, No. 1 (1972), 1-37.

Gerber, Ellen W., et al. The American Woman in Sport.
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1974.

Green, Thomas F. Work, Leisure, and the American Schools.
New York: Random House, 1968.

Healy, Timothy. "It was a golden moment... the alchemy of
sports." Providence Evening Bulletin, 31 March 1980,
p. A18.

Hearn, Francis. "Toward a Critical Theory of Play." Telos,
     30 (Winter 1976-1977), 145-160.

Herrigel, Eugen. Zen in the Art of Archery. New York:
     Vintage-Random House, 1953.

Hesse, Hermann. Magister Ludi: The Glass Bead Game.
     Trans. Richard and Clara Winston. New York: Bantam-
     Holt, 1969.

The Holy Bible: King James Version. New York: James Pott,
     1902.

Huizinga, Johan. Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element
     in Culture. Amsterdam, 1938; rpt. Boston: Beacon,
     1950.

Hyland, Drew. "Competition and Friendship." Journal of the
     Philosophy of Sport, 5 (Fall 1978), 27-37.

----------. "Modes of Inquiry in Sport, Athletics and Play."
     Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 1 (Sept. 1974),
     123-128.

Kennedy, X. J. An Introduction to Poetry. 4th ed. Boston:
     Little, Brown, 1978.

Kinsley, David R. The Divine Player. Delhi: Motilal
     Banarsidass, 1979.

----------. The Sword and the Flute. Berkeley: Univ. of
     California Press, 1975.

Kipling, Rudyard. Kim. In Kipling: A Selection of His
     Stories and Poems. Ed. John Beecroft. Vol. I.
     Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956, pp. 3-211.

Lahr, John. "The Theatre of Sports." In Sport in the
Sociocultural Process. Ed. Marie Hart. 2nd ed.
Dubuque: Brown, 1976, pp. 199-209.

Lardner, Ring. "Sport and Play." In Civilization in the
United States. Ed. Harold E. Stearns. New York:
Harcourt, 1922, pp. 457-461.

Leonard, George. The Ultimate Athlete. New York: Viking,
1975.

Lewis, C. S. A Preface to Paradise Lost. New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1942.

Loy, John W. "The Nature of Sport: A Definitional Effort."
In Sport, Culture, and Society. Ed. John W. Loy, Jr.
and Gerald S. Kenyon. London: Macmillan, 1969, pp.
56-70.

Martens, Rainer. Social Psychology and Physical Activity.
New York: Harper and Row, 1975.

McDonnell, Thomas P., ed. A Thomas Merton Reader. Rev. ed.
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974.

McIntosh, Peter C. "Theories of How and Why." In Sport in
the Sociocultural Process. Ed. Marie Hart. 2nd ed.
Dubuque: Brown, 1976, pp. 5-17.

Meier, Klaus V. "Cartesian and Phenomenological Anthro-
pology: The Radical Shift and Its Meaning for Sport."
Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 2 (Sept. 1975),
51-73.

Menke, Frank G. The Encyclopedia of Sports. New York:
A. S. Barnes, 1955.

Metheny, Eleanor. Movement and Meaning. New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1968.

Miller, David L. Gods and Games: Toward a Theology of
Play. Cleveland: World Publishing, 1970.

----------. "Playing the Game to Lose." In Theology of
Play. By Jürgen Moltmann. New York: Harper and Row,
1972, pp. 99-110.

Moltmann, Jürgen. Theology of Play. New York: Harper and
Row, 1972.

Morgan, William J. "On The Path Towards an Ontology of
Sport." Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 3 (Sept.
1976), 25-34.

Newell, William W. Games and Songs of American Children.
New York: Harper, 1903.

The Odes of Pindar. Trans. C. M. Bowra. Baltimore:
Penguin, 1969.

Opie, Iona, and Peter Opie. Children's Games in Street and
Playground. Oxford: Clarendon, 1969.

Pieper, Josef. Leisure: The Basis of Culture. Trans.
Alexander Dru. New York: Mentor-New American Library,
1963.

Potter, Stephen. The Theory and Practice of Gamesmanship.
Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1947.

Rahner, Hugo. Man at Play. New York: Herder, 1972.

Rilke, Rainer Maria. The Duino Elegies. Trans. S. Garney
and J. Wilson. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

----------. Sämtliche Werke. Vol. II. Trans. Elizabeth
Sewell. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1956.

----------. Sonnets to Orpheus. Trans. M. D. Herter Norton,
1942; rpt. New York: Norton, 1970.

Roochnik, David L. "Play and Sport." Journal of the
Philosophy of Sport, 2 (Sept. 1975), 36-44.

Schmitz, Kenneth L. "Sport and Play: Suspension of the
Ordinary." In Sport and the Body: A Philosophical
Symposium. Ed. Ellen W. Gerber, and William J. Morgan.
2nd. ed. Philadelphia: Lea Febiger, 1979, pp. 22-29.

Seager, Allan. "The Joys of Sport at Oxford." In The
Norton Reader: An Anthology of Expository Prose. Gen.
Ed. Arthur M. Eastman. New York: Norton, 1965, pp.
6-17.

Sewell, Elizabeth. The Field of Nonsense. London: Chatto
and Windus, 1952.

Sillitoe, Alan. The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner.
New York: Signet-New American Library, 1959.

"Sport: Eight Writers in Search of an Answer." The Sunday
Times (London), 23 March 1975, p. 30.

Stade, George. "I've Been Reading: Game Theory." Columbia
University Forum, 9, No. 4 (Fall 1966), 40-43.

Steel, Margaret. "What We Know When We Know a Game." Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 4 (Fall 1977), 96-103.

Stone, Lilly C. English Sports and Recreations. Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1960.

Swaddling, Judith. The Ancient Olympic Games. London: British Museum, 1980.

Thomson, Patricia L. "Ontological Truth in Sport: A Phenomenological Analysis." Diss. Univ. of Southern California, 1967.

Ulrich, Celeste. The Social Matrix of Physical Education. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968.

Van der Leeuw, Gerardus. Sacred and Profane Beauty: The Holy in Art. Trans. David E. Green. New York: Holt, 1963.

Vandenberg, Brian. "Play as Curriculum." Journal of Curriculum Theory, 1, No. 2 (Summer 1979), 229-237.

Weiss, Paul. "A Metaphysical Excursus." In Sport in the Sociocultural Process. Ed. Marie Hart. 2nd ed. Dubuque: Brown, 1976, pp. 395-400.

----------. Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1969.

Zaner, Richard M. "Sport and the Moral Order." Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 6 (Fall 1979), 7-18.

Ziolkowski, Theodore, introd. <u>Magister Ludi: The Glass</u>
    <u>Bead Game</u>. By Hermann Hesse. Trans. Richard and Clara
    Winston. New York: Bantam-Holt, 1969.

Human Condition

Anderson, Alan B. "Hannah Arendt: An Introduction."
    American Society of Christian Ethics, Richmond,
    Virginia. 21 Jan. 1973.

Arendt, Hannah. <u>Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises</u>
    <u>in Political Thought</u>. Middlesex, England: Penguin,
    1968.

----------. <u>Crises of the Republic</u>. New York: Harcourt,
    1972.

----------. <u>Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality</u>
    <u>of Evil</u>. Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1964.

----------. "Home to Roost: A Bicentennial Address." <u>New</u>
    <u>York Review of Books</u>, 26 June 1975, pp. 3-6.

----------. <u>The Human Condition</u>. Chicago: Univ. of
    Chicago Press, 1958.

----------. <u>Men in Dark Times</u>. New York: Harcourt, 1968.

----------. <u>On Revolution</u>. Middlesex, England: Penguin,
    1965.

----------. <u>The Origins of Totalitarianism</u>. New Ed. New
    York: Harcourt, 1973.

----------. "Public Rights and Private Interests." In

Small Comforts for Hard Times. Ed. Michael Mooney and

Florian Stuber. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1977.

----------. Thinking. Vol. I of The Life of the Mind.

New York: Harcourt, 1978.

----------. "Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture."

Social Research, 38, No. 3 (1971), 417-446.

----------. "Understanding Politics." Partisan Review, 20,

No. 4 (1953), 377-392.

----------. Willing. Vol. II of The Life of the Mind. New

York: Harcourt, 1978.

Arndt, Murray. "Introduction to Jewish History." English

371, Univ. of North Carolina at Greensboro, 12 Jan.

1981.

Auden, W. H. Making, Knowing and Judging. Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1957.

Bachelard, Gaston. The Poetics of Reverie: Childhood,

Language, and the Cosmos. Trans. Daniel Russell.

Boston: Beacon, 1969.

----------. The Poetics of Space. Trans. Maria Jolas.

Boston: Beacon, 1964.

Barrett, William. The Illusion of Technique. Garden City:

N.Y.: Anchor-Doubleday, 1979.

----------. Irrational Man. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor-

Doubleday, 1958.

----------. <u>Time of Need: Forms of Imagination in the</u>
<u>Twentieth Century</u>. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

Barrow, Robin. <u>Common Sense and the Curriculum</u>. London:
George Allen, 1976.

Berger, Peter, et al. <u>The Homeless Mind</u>. New York:
Vintage-Random House, 1973.

Boyle, Milton. Letter to author. 4 March 1981.

Bronowski, J. <u>The Identity of Man</u>. Garden City, N.Y.:
Natural History Press, 1966.

Bugbee, Henry G. <u>The Inward Morning: A Philosophical</u>
<u>Exploration in Journal Form</u>. New York: Colophon-
Harper and Row, 1958.

Burtt, E. A. <u>The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern</u>
<u>Science</u>. 2nd ed. 1952; rpt. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.:
Humanities Press, 1980.

Canovan, Margaret. <u>The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt</u>.
New York: Harcourt, 1974.

Cassirer, Ernst. <u>An Essay on Man</u>. New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press, 1944.

Cochran, Clarke, E. "Authority and Community: The Contri-
butions of Carl Friedrich, Yves R. Simon, and Michael
Polanyi." <u>The American Political Science Review</u>, 71,
No. 2 (1977), 546-558.

Denneny, Michael. "The Privilege of Ourselves: Hannah

Arendt on Judgment." In Hannah Arendt: The Recovery

of the Public World. Ed. Melvyn A. Hill. New York:

St. Martin's Press, 1979, pp. 245-274.

Edie, James M., introd. The Primacy of Perception. By M.

Merleau-Ponty. Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press,

1964.

Eliade, Mircea. The Sacred and Profane: The Nature of

Religion. Trans. Willard R. Trask. New York: Harvest-

Harcourt, 1959.

Flew, Antony, ed. Body, Mind, and Death. New York:

Macmillan, 1964.

Frampton, Kenneth. "The Status of Man and the Status of His

Objects: A Reading of the Human Condition." In

Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World. Ed.

Melvyn A. Hill. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979,

pp. 101-130.

Freemantle, Anne. The Age of Belief: The Medieval

Philosophers. New York: Mentor-New American Library,

1954.

Friere, Paulo. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Trans. Myra

Bergman Ramos. New York: Seabury Press, 1970.

Fuss, Peter. "Hannah Arendt's Conception of Political Com-

munity." In Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the

Public World. Ed. Melvyn A. Hill. New York: St.

Martin's Press, 1979, pp. 157-176.

Gillan, Garth. "In the Folds of the Flesh: Philosophy and
Language." In The Horizons of the Flesh. Ed. Garth
Gillan. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press,
1973, pp. 1-60.

Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.
Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor-Doubleday, 1959.

Gray, J. Glenn. "The Abyss of Freedom - and Hannah Arendt."
In Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World.
Ed. Melvyn A. Hill. New York: St. Martin's Press,
1979, pp. 225-244.

----------. "The Winds of Thought." Social Research, 44,
No. 1 (1977), 44-62.

Greene, Maxine. Landscapes of Learning. New York:
Teachers College Press, 1978.

Grene, Majorie. The Knower and the Known. New York: Basic
Books, 1966.

----------. "Tacit Knowing and the Pre-Reflective Cogito."
In Intellect and Hope: Essays in the Thought of
Michael Polanyi. Ed. Thomas A. Langford and William H.
Poteat. Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1968, pp. 19-57.

Guardini, Romano. Freedom, Grace, and Destiny. New York:
Pantheon Books, 1961.

Habermas, Jürgen. "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept
of Power." Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Social Research,
44, No. 1 (1977), 3-24.

Hampshire, Stuart. _Thought and Action_. New York: Viking, 1960.

"Hannah Arendt - Inspiration, Provocateur, Respected Foe." _The New York Times_, 11 Oct. 1981, p. E9.

Hill, Melvin A. "The Fictions of Mankind and the Stories of Men." In _Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World_. Ed. Melvyn A. Hill. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, pp. 275-299.

----------, ed. _Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World_. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.

Ihde, Don. _Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur_. Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1971.

Inglis, Fred. _Ideology and the Imagination_. London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1975.

Jaspers, Karl. _Man in the Modern Age_. Trans. Eden and Cedar Paul. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor-Doubleday, 1951.

Jonas, Hans. "Acting, Knowing, Thinking: Gleanings from Hannah Arendt's Philosophical Work." _Social Research_, 44, No. 1 (1977), 25-43.

Kariel, Henry S. _Saving Appearances: The Reestablishment of Political Science_. North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1972.

Kenniston, Kenneth. "The Mood of Americans Today." Rev. of _The Inner American_, and, _Mental Health in America_, by Joseph Veroff, Elizabeth Douvan and Richard A.

Kulka. <u>The New York Times Book Review</u>, 8 Nov. 1981,
pp. 7, 44-45.

Ladner, Benjamin. "Madness and Spirit." Religion 695,
Univ. of North Carolina at Greensboro, 7 Feb. 1980.

Laing, R. D. <u>The Divided Self</u>. Middlesex, England:
Penguin, 1969.

Langer, Susanne K. <u>Philosophy in a New Key</u>. New York: New
American Library, 1951.

Lefebvre, Henri. <u>Everyday Life in the Modern World</u>. Trans.
Sacha Rabinovitch. New York: Torchbook-Harper and
Row, 1971.

Leonard, George B. <u>Education and Ecstasy</u>. New York:
Delta-Dell, 1968.

Major, Robert W. "A Reading of Hannah Arendt's 'Unusual'
Distinction Between Labor and Work." In <u>Hannah Arendt:</u>
<u>The Recovery of the Public World</u>. Ed. Melvyn A. Hill.
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, pp. 131-155.

Marcuse, Herbert. <u>One Dimensional Man</u>. Boston: Beacon,
1964.

May, Rollo. <u>Love and Will</u>. New York: Dell, 1969.

Merleau-Ponty, M. "Eye and Mind." Trans. Carleton Dallery.
In <u>The Primacy of Perception</u>. Ed. James M. Edie.
Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964, pp. 159-190.

----------. <u>Phenomenology of Perception</u>. Trans. Colin
Smith. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962.

----------. "The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical
    Consequences." Trans. James M. Edie. In The Primacy
    of Perception. Ed. James M. Edie. Evanston: North-
    western Univ. Press, 1964, pp. 12-42.

----------. "An Unpublished Text by Maurice Merleau-Ponty:
    A Prospectus of His Work." Trans. Arleen B. Dallery.
    In The Primacy of Perception. Ed. James M. Edie.
    Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964, pp. 3-11.

Novak, Michael. Ascent of the Mountain, Flight of the Dove:
    An Invitation to Religious Studies. Rev. ed. New
    York: Harper and Row, 1978.

----------. Belief and Unbelief. New York: Mentor-New
    American Library, 1965.

----------. The Experience of Nothingness. New York:
    Colophon-Harper and Row, 1970.

Polanyi, Michael. "On Body and Mind." The New Scholastic-
    ism, 43, No. 2 (Spring, 1969), 195-204.

----------. Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical
    Philosophy. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962.

----------. "Sense Giving and Sense-Reading." In Intellect
    and Hope: Essays in the Thought of Michael Polanyi.
    Ed. Thomas A. Langford and William H. Poteat. Durham:
    Duke Univ. Press, 1968, pp. 402-431.

----------. The Study of Man. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago
    Press, 1959.

----------. _The Tacit Dimension_. Garden City, N.Y.:
Anchor-Doubleday, 1966.

----------. "Tacit Knowing: Its Bearing on Some Problems
of Philosophy." _Reviews of Modern Physics_, 34, No. 4
(1962), 601-616.

----------, and Harry Prosch. _Meaning_. Chicago: Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1975.

Poteat, William H., appendix. In _Intellect and Hope:_
Essays in the Thought of Michael Polanyi. Durham:
Duke Univ. Press, 1968, pp. 449-455.

----------. "Myths, Stories, History, Eschatology and
Action: Some Polanyian Meditations." In _Intellect and_
Hope: Essays in the Thought of Michael Polanyi. Ed.
Thomas A. Langford and William H. Poteat. Durham:
Duke Univ. Press, 1968, pp. 198-231.

----------. "Upon First Sitting Down to Read _Personal_
Knowledge." In _Intellect and Hope: Essays in the_
Thought of Michael Polanyi. Ed. Thomas A. Langford and
William H. Poteat. Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1968,
pp. 3-18.

Ramanujan, A. K. _Speaking of Śiva_. Middlesex, England:
Penguin, 1973.

Ray, William E., introd. _To Be a True Poem: Essays by_
Elizabeth Sewell. Winston-Salem, N.C.: Hunter, 1979.

Reagan, Charles E., and David Stewart, eds. _The Philosophy_
of Paul Ricoeur. Boston: Beacon, 1978.

Reisman, David. The Lonely Crowd. New Haven: Yale Univ.

    Press, 1961.

Rilke, Rainer Maria. Duino Elegies. Trans. David Young.

    New York: Norton, 1978.

----------. Letters to a Young Poet. Trans. M. D. Herter

    Norton. Rev. Ed. New York: Norton, 1954.

Rosen, Diane. "Hannah Arendt: The Homeless Mind." The

    Village Voice, 30 Sept. 1981, pp. 36, 38.

Schilder, Paul. The Image and Appearance of the Human Body.

    New York: International Universities Press, 1950.

Sewell, Elizabeth. The Human Metaphor. South Bend, Ind.:

    Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1964.

----------. The Orphic Voice. New York: Harper and Row,

    1960.

----------. Signs and Cities. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North

    Carolina Press, 1968.

Shklar, Judith N. "Rethinking the Past." Social Research,

    44, No. 1 (1977), 80-90.

Sternberger, Dolf. "The Sunken City: Hannah Arendt's Idea

    of Politics." Trans. E. B. Ashton. Social Research,

    44, No. 1 (1977), 132-146.

Straus, Erwin. Phenomenological Psychology. New York:

    Garland, 1980.

----------. The Primary World of the Senses. New York:

    Macmillan, 1963.

Wolin, Sheldon S. "Hannah Arendt and the Ordinance of Time."
    Social Research, 44, No. 1 (1977), 91-105.

Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth. "From the Pariah's Point of View:
    Reflections on Hannah Arendt's Life and Work." In
    Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World. Ed.
    Melvyn A. Hill. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979,
    pp. 3-26.

Zaner, Richard. The Problem of Embodiment: Some Contri-
    butions to a Phenomenology of the Body. The Hague:
    Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.