

# PERSPECTIVE IN HISTORY

W. K. HANCOCK



# **PERSPECTIVE IN HISTORY**

Never before, in all the centuries of  
scholarly endeavour, has any man's  
book been rejected by so many publishers.

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W.K. HANCOCK

W. K. H

*For Ralph Elliot*

Department of Economic History  
Research School of Social Sciences  
The Australian National University  
Canberra 1982

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## Preface

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In preparing this book for publication I have had in mind readers of two kinds: first my own small circle of students and teachers; secondly, the wider circle of thoughtful people who seek knowledge and understanding in history and who read it— why not?—for pleasure. Two thousand five hundred years ago, Herodotus won for our studies their place in the Greek trinity—science, philosophy, history. His word, historeo, meant two things. I learn by inquiry, or—as we say today—I undertake research. And then I tell my story.

The sweep and balance which Herodotus achieved have survived many challenges. To cite an example from the eighteenth century: while diligent antiquarians in France and Britain were building the foundations of archival research, philosophers were writing historical narratives unencumbered by that 'Rough and Barbarick part of learning'. No contact was made, or even sought, between the erudits and the philosophes, until Gibbon built his magnificent bridge. Then once again the traffic flowed between the particularists and the generalists, the men of research and the men of ideas.

Today, the same challenge confronts us. Every chapter of this book is a battle in the rearguard action which has to be fought in defence of Gibbon's bridge. In too many of our universities, teachers of history—of history only?—have been falling disproportionately in love with short-period courses of specialist study. Too many young pedants feel put upon if they are asked to teach outside what each is pleased to call 'my period'. Too many students read no other language than their own and know no other time than recent time. If we don't take care, we shall turn history into a dead language.

Corruptio optimi pessima. Precision, which is most easily taught and tested within a short period of study, is a basic virtue; this book puts repeatedly on record the evil consequences of arithmetical, linguistic and logical imprecision. Even so, precision by itself is not enough. It becomes a vice when it is not reinforced by the balancing virtue which we may call span. Perspective is an alternative name for span. The historian who lacks perspective resembles a traveller who enters unknown territory with no other guide than an inch-to-the-mile map. From the moment his journey brings him into territory which the map does not cover, he will be lost.

Perspective is both longitudinal and lateral: it places the object of immediate and intense study in its proper relationships—of time, space and theme—with the other objects, near or far, which enlarge and illuminate its meaning. How this happens can be seen in the published work of three master-craftsmen, the classicist M.I. Finley, the mediaevalist Marc Bloch and the modernist H. Trevor-Roper.

Let us start with the man in the middle, Marc Bloch. His longitudinal perspective spans all the centuries of feudal Europe and moves forward to the Renaissance and Reformation. His lateral perspective is revealed in a statement which his students found memorable.

Do you expect to know the great merchants of Renaissance Europe, vendors of cloth or spices, bankers of kings and the Emperor, by knowing their merchandise alone? Bear in mind that they were painted by Holbein, that they read Erasmus or Luther. To understand the attitude of the medieval vassal towards his seigneur you must inform yourself about his attitude towards his God as well.

Bloch was a Jew, a patriotic Frenchman and a noble European. He fought with the French army in the two great wars of this century. When France fell in 1940 he joined the Resistance. In 1944 the Gestapo trapped him, tortured him and killed him. Meanwhile he had written his last book, Strange Defeat. It is both a soldierly and a scholarly contribution to 'the history of our times'. Bloch, as he wrote at white heat, was well aware that his book would contain errors both of commission and omission. He regarded himself as a witness giving honest evidence on the basis of such knowledge as he possesses. 'History', he declared, 'is essentially a progressive movement of the human intelligence.'

Finley's perspectives are revealed in the closely linked studies of his book, The Use and Abuse of History. In some of the studies he addresses himself to his fellow-specialists in Greek history. In other studies he enters the territory of his modernist colleagues. For example, he reflects upon the continuing appeal to an 'Ancestral Constitution'—in Athens at the close of the fifth century B.C., in England during the mid-seventeenth century, in the America of F.D. Roosevelt. In each of these instances, 'something fundamental about human behaviour' reveals itself. Athenian oligarchs appealing to the constitution of Solon, Puritan revolutionaries appealing to 'the good laws of Edward the Confessor', American politicians appealing to their father-figure, Thomas Jefferson—all of them use 'bogus history' as an instrument of present-day political warfare. In order to take the measure of his own historical territory, Finley moves forward from past time to present time. For the same reason, as will appear later in this book, the modernist may find himself constrained to move in the reverse direction.

In the work of some historians—Fernand Braudel and his colleagues in the Annales school are conspicuous examples—the search for perspective is explicit; but some master-craftsmen reveal their understanding of it in a few sentences, or even a few words. To cite an English example: Trevor-Roper made brilliant use of his exceptional opportunities to put on record what actually happened in Hitler's bunker during the last eleven days of April 1945. We can scarcely envisage a task of research more closely confined within narrow boundaries of time and space; yet on the first page of The Last Days of Hitler we read that the Führer was the master of a court, not the chairman of a cabinet—an observation which brings to mind Machiavelli's contrast between the corrupt and the uncorrupted commonwealth. Again, in the concluding pages of the book, a story is told of the Greek philosopher Empedocles,

...who, in the interest of his reputation, plunged secretly down the crater of Mount Etna, confident that his bereaved fellow citizens, remembering his own judicious prophecies, would suppose him translated to Heaven. But the citizens of Girgenti came to no such conclusion. Finding a shoe of the prophet casually ejected by the volcano, they satisfied their curiosity without recourse to miracles.

Trevor-Roper tells this story of 2,500 years ago in the hope—but not the 'sure and certain hope'—that his labour in establishing the facts has forestalled the fabrication of a false and dangerous myth. His book has helped me to find my compass-bearings in two chapters of this book.



The linked studies of this book follow a single track of exploration through seven separate territories. Almost every study has taken shape both in the spoken word and in the written word. I thank the students, teachers and friends who have shared the exploration with me, both formally in class and in many lively conversations.

The book has taken a long time growing. To cite an example: half a century has passed since I prepared Roma Caput Mundi as an informal talk to a dining-club in Adelaide; thirty years later, I prepared it as a formal lecture to the Dante Alighieri Society in Canberra. Many of the other studies took shape, when the time was ripe, as commissioned lectures or articles. I thank the following editors and/or publishers who have permitted me to bring them together in this book.

The Sydney University Press  
The Australian National University Press  
The University of Queensland Press  
The Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies  
The University of Texas Press  
The University of Nottingham Press  
The Australian Journal of Science  
The South African Institute of Race Relations  
The University of Western Australia Press  
The International Journal of Environmental Studies

Postscripts to some of the studies, and the book's concluding chapter, contain evidence that my search for deeper and broader perspectives has not yet come to a dead stop.

W.K.H.

Canberra  
April 1982

# I

## To Be An Historian

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### 1. Learning and Teaching

The University of Melbourne had started work in 1855 with 3 professors and 16 students. In 1919 the enrolment in half a dozen or more Faculties was 1,840, of whom 443 were women. Included in the total were many fighting men newly returned from the Western Front and Palestine. The increase in the number of teachers had not kept pace with the increasing number of students. Moreover, almost all the teaching was at undergraduate level. The university's paymasters were still taking it for granted, notwithstanding the good publishing performance by some members of the academic staff, that research was a thing that people did overseas.

Students in the Faculty of Arts came well prepared for the three years of study which were required for the degree of B.A. The majority were the sons and daughters of parents who were maintaining them at a considerable sacrifice, not because the university charged high fees, but because the young people would not be able to maintain themselves until they graduated. In the homes of nearly all students there were books—predominantly novels; but there would also be the plays of Shakespeare, the poems of Tennyson, Browning and Banjo Patterson, and—of course—the Bible. Fervent Christians were not the only Bible-readers; ardent rationalists found in Genesis useful ammunition for their neo-Darwinian propaganda. According to Thomas Huxley, to whom chiefly we owe the word 'agnostic', they found a good deal more than that. The Bible, he once wrote, 'forbids the veriest hind who never left his village to be ignorant of other countries and other civilisations, and of a great past stretching back to the limits of the oldest civilisations of the world'.<sup>1</sup> Yes indeed—but Bible-readers today are a shrinking minority in our homes, our schools and our universities. Most of us are living on a narrow shelf of time.

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<sup>1</sup>

Quoted by A.S. Cook in the Cambridge History of English Literature, Vol.IV, p.43.

Half a century ago, students in the Faculty of Arts had received a firm grounding in Victoria's schools. Ever since 1872, education had been compulsory, secular and free at the primary level. Children in the State schools were put through the hoops of mental arithmetic, spelling bees and the multiplication table; they learnt poetry by heart and recited it in class; they were drilled in parsing and analysis. Those elements of numeracy and literacy were a useful preparation for secondary education; but this was the privilege of a minority. Parents who could afford the fees sent their children to Grammar Schools which the Churches had established in the nineteenth century. Not until the twentieth century did the government begin to establish a few High Schools where fees were not required and the quality of teaching was comparable with that of the 'independent' schools. Aspirants for a university education stayed at school until they reached what was then called the Sixth Form. In the mid-nineteenth century, there had been a 'Classical Sixth' and a 'Mathematical Sixth'; but in the course of time a less austere division took shape between the Arts and the Sciences. At the end of World War I Latin and Greek were still flourishing in Victoria's schools; but the language required from entrants to the Arts Faculty could be either ancient or modern.

In a lively university, students learn as much from each other as they learn from their teachers. At the end of World War I the returning soldiers made a quiet but vital contribution to student life in Melbourne. These men had a great deal to forget. During the war, an Australian population still a fair way short of 5 million had raised a volunteer army well above 400,000. The American population at that time was well above 90 million; but the total of American deaths in battle (50,585) was lower than the Australian total (55,400). Australian casualties (killed and wounded) were 68.5 per cent of the men sent overseas; the corresponding British figure was 52.5 per cent. The social composition and the hierarchies of the Australian fighting forces were unique in the annals of war. To cite an example: a schoolboy saying farewell to his brother was guided to a bell tent in Broadmeadows camp. In this tent 8 men were reclining at ease on their bedding. Each of these men was a university graduate. The schoolboy's brother achieved the rank of lance-corporal. He was blown to pieces at Pozierès in the battle of the Somme.

The political convictions of these fighting Australians corresponded closely with those of the civilians at home. In the two conscription referenda of World War I, the civilians voted No by a narrow margin; by a still narrower margin, the soldiers voted Yes. Australians had entered the war as a united people; but at its end their unity was severely strained. Abroad, there were the appalling casualties of trench warfare, the Easter Rising in Ireland, the Bolshevik Revolution, President Wilson's Fourteen Points and their anticlimax at the Paris Conference. At home, there was inflation and consequential industrial unrest, a Prime Minister who talked a lot but seldom listened, and a ruinous split in the Labor Party. In the University of Melbourne, students anxiously debated the question, 'Where do we go from here?' In these debates the returned soldiers were a moderating influence. Each one of them had his own urgent problem, to re-educate himself for civilian life.

The University's senior members were wisely tolerant of controversy outside the classrooms; but the best service they rendered to their students was in class. At the University of Melbourne, as in the other Australian universities, the curriculum bore both a Scottish and an English stamp. In the ancient universities of England the pass degree was a consolation prize or a merry jest; but in Edinburgh and Aberdeen it was the measure of genuine achievement. So it was also in Melbourne and Adelaide, where by far the larger number of Arts students aimed no higher than the pass B.A. Most of these students, when they had cleared that hurdle, spent a further year working for a Diploma of Education, without expense to themselves or their parents, provided they pledged themselves to teach in the State's schools. The small minority of Honours students pursued the courses of

study prescribed for Pass students and at the same time did extra work which in its quality, if not its quantity, was comparable with the work required in the Honours Schools of Oxford and Cambridge.

In the department of History, fifty years ago, Honours students received a superb education in the balancing virtues of precision and span. In that faraway time three teachers only, Professor Ernest Scott, Miss Jessie Webb and Professor Harrison Moore, were coping with classes which varied in size from 100 or more—for Pass and Honours jointly—to twenty or less—for Honours students only. Moore was head of the Department of Law, but students in that discipline were required to study for two years in the Faculty of Arts before proceeding to their vocational training. Moore took very seriously his task as a bridge-builder between legal studies and the humanities.

Each of these three teachers delivered from the start to the finish of every academic year a 'main-stream' course of lectures. Scott's subject in the first year was British History from the Anglo-Saxon invasions to the early twentieth century, a course identical with the one still offered (although it is no longer a one-man performance) to students in their first year at Edinburgh. Miss Webb's course was Ancient History, beginning in the Mycenaean period—she taught her students that history could mean 'digging up the past' in the literal meaning of those words—and ending with the advent of Augustus. Moore's subject was English Constitutional History and Law from Norman times to the present. The apparent superficiality of such long surveys was corrected by concentrated work in special periods or on special problems, and by the obligation imposed on every student to explore some of the printed primary materials. Moore's students spent long hours in the Law Library, taking notes on the statutes and cases cited in his lectures and following his suggestions for more spacious reading: some at least of them read Maitland's expositions of the reception of Roman Law in Europe and the conflict in England between the Romanising Lord Bacon and Chief Justice Coke, that ardent champion of the Common Law; they also read Brierly's exposition of the historical origins and theoretical foundations of Public International Law. Scott offered them fare of a different kind: he had a flair for individual persons and had made good use of it in his books on Australian history; but in 1919 his theme for Honours students was British colonisation in America. The students wrote long essays for him on John Winthrop, Roger Williams, Ann Hutchinson and other notable Puritans; to this day, these people and America's still-surviving inheritance from them remain vivid in the minds of Scott's pupils. Miss Webb prescribed for special study the period of political balance and cultural cross-fertilisation which intervened between the death of Alexander the Great and the Roman advent. Students who had grown up with the Old Testament now discovered the Maccabees and wrote essays for her on cooperation and conflict between Jews and Greeks. She was teaching them, although she could not possibly have known it, how to confront the urgent challenges to thought and action in their own tumultuous century.<sup>2</sup>

These three teachers impressed upon their pupils, by example rather than by precept, two basic rules of the historian's calling:

1. Within your field of specialist study, master the primary evidence.
2. Read widely outside and beyond your specialist field.

Of course, the young men and women who would find their lifework in historical research were only a small minority; but for every student, history, as taught in those years at Melbourne, contained the elements of a liberal education.

When the warclouds were gathering again in the late 1930s Sir Ernest Scott retired, not from his calling as historian but from his professorial chair. His successor, R.M. Crawford, was just getting into stride when he was called away to a wartime task in the Australian embassy in Moscow. When the war was over, and a great flood of soldiers, sailors and airmen reinforced the student body, Crawford made some memorable additions to the teaching curriculum. In his own classes, he brought vividly to life the Italian Renaissance. Dr Kathleen Fitzpatrick brought vividly to life the democratic ferment in Cromwell's army. At the same time, Crawford was recruiting colleagues who opened up new territories of study: for example, Norman Harper introduced to the curriculum American history, hitherto untaught in Australia. These new explorations did not breach the traditional continuities of learning and teaching, but amplified them. The lecturer in Ancient History, John O'Brien, taught his pupils, as Miss Webb had taught them, that history has its roots in prehistory. One of O'Brien's pupils, a demobilised air navigator named John Mulvaney, submitted for the M.A. degree a thesis on the Iron Age in Britain. The Australian National University awarded a scholarship to Mulvaney and allowed him to pursue his archaeological quest under the supervision of Graham Clark in Cambridge. There he not only continued his studies of the Iron Age but joined a dig in Libya which stimulated his interest in the Stone Age. In 1949 he began to teach Australian prehistory in the University of Melbourne. In 1956 he conducted the first of his pioneering excavations at Fromm's Landing on the river Murray.

Prehistory, as Mulvaney expounded it, was not merely a new teaching 'unit', but an integral element of the coherent curriculum. Since every branch of the human family had once belonged—as some branches still belong—to the Stone Age, prehistory was universal history. Since Stone Age Man in various regions of the world had been enduring throughout the past four centuries the weight of Western dominance, prehistory was interwoven with modern European history. Since Stone Age Man had been resident in Australia for many thousands of years, prehistory was Australian history. Every historian of Australia, hitherto, had begun his book with the European discoverers of the continent and the arrival, less than two centuries ago, of the First Fleet; but that truncated perspective no longer made sense. To cite an example: Aboriginal land-use must become henceforward the starting point of the answer which competent historians seek to a crucial question—'how have Australian people used the land on which they live?'

While Mulvaney was digging up the past he was also writing modern history. In two magisterial articles<sup>3</sup> he portrayed the changing attitudes of European thinkers, explorers and colonists to the aboriginal peoples of the South Pacific—from the early 17th century to the early 20th century. The Greeks had called their Asian neighbours barbarians; the modern Europeans called the Stone Age people savages. Before that noun they put adjectives which varied from period to period and sometimes from person to person. To Quiros in 1606, the aborigines of Austrial Del Espiritu Santo were good savages, ready for conversion to the true faith. To every Dutch navigator, the Australian aborigines were useless savages, because they had no goods to offer in trans-oceanic trade. To the Englishman Dampier, they were loathsome savages. To European romantics of the eighteenth century, they were noble savages. To the British settlers who were annexing their land, they were murdering savages. Thereafter, they became for most Australians

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See his two articles, 'The Australian Aborigines 1606-1929: Opinion and Field-work', reprinted in Historical Studies of Australia and New Zealand, Selected Articles (M.U.P. 1964 and 1967). Mulvaney and the art historian Bernard Smith were working at this time in close companionship, to their mutual profit and enjoyment. Smith was then revising for publication his A.N.U. thesis on European Vision and the South Pacific. It is a splendid book (1960).

beggarly savages. There was, nevertheless, an interlude of hope and happiness. Some intelligent pastoralists in Western Victoria employed them as boundary riders and taught them cricket. In 1868 an Australian team—the first ever—played at the Oval and Lords and toured the counties. The players were black. They drew good crowds and received a warm welcome. W.G. Grace, 'that high Tory of English cricket' praised their skill. In Cricket Walkabout (1967) Mulvaney tells their story. He also tells the story of destructive bureaucrats who threw away that golden opportunity.

Not all European observers saw Aboriginal society through the distorting veil of their own preconceptions or their own interests. With good reason, Mulvaney identified Captain James Cook as the 'first ethnologist' and identified J.R. Forster, naturalist on Cook's second voyage, as 'the first anthropologist of Oceania'. A new era of scientific observation was opened in 1859 when Charles Darwin published The Origin of Species. Henceforward, the unity and continuity of human development became axiomatic in the disciplines of physical anthropology and social anthropology. The word 'savages' fell out of use. Nevertheless, too many scientists of the Darwinian family continued, like their less sophisticated predecessors, to view the Australian Aboriginal through the distorting lens of dogma. They took it for granted that he was 'primitive man', 'fossil man', 'static man', and therefore—by implication—inferior man. The clear, objective gaze of Captain Cook was too often missing from their studies. But in 1929, the terminal year of Mulvaney's narrative, Herbert Hale and Norman B. Tindale gave a magnificent hoist to our knowledge of the Aboriginal past. Their archaeological survey at Devon Downs on the river Murray was 'the first systematic attempt, in Australia, to apply stratigraphic rather than conjectural principles, to the uncovering of aboriginal prehistory'.

Prehistorical research and teaching have immensely enlarged the perspectives of Australian self-knowledge, both longitudinally and laterally. We now know that Aboriginal Man has inhabited our continent for more than 40,000 years and that he has responded successfully throughout these millenia to every new challenge—except to the superior force of white Australians, whose time-span of occupation has been barely 1% of the total. The prehistorians, Mulvaney declares,<sup>4</sup> 'have comprehended the seamless web of intellect, linking anthropology, archaeology, history and environmental studies.... More importantly still, they are striving to live in mutual understanding with the people among whom they work.' The Australian contribution to prehistory is comparable in its depth and breadth with the Australian contribution to astrophysics. More than 50 prehistorians are now at work in Australian universities.

The mid-1950s stand out as a dividing range in the history of higher education in Australia. In 1957 the total of university students was 36,465—lower in proportion to population than the enrolment in Britain, fantastically low in comparison with the American enrolment. Moreover, the great majority of these students were aiming no higher than a pass degree. Honours students were a small minority. Postgraduate students hardly existed, except in the four Research Schools of the recently established Australian National University. Yet Australia was enjoying at that time full employment, vigorous economic growth, reasonably stable prices and the prospect—or so it seemed—of these blessings continuing for many years to come. The times were propitious, Prime Minister Menzies concluded, for a creative forward leap in higher education. On 19 December 1956 he appointed a committee—the Murray Committee—to report to the Commonwealth government on the present situation and the future prospects of the

4

See Australia Before the Europeans, the second Gordon Childe Memorial Lecture, delivered by J.D. Mulvaney in London on 1 March 1977 (Bulletin of the Institute of Archaeology, No.15).

Australian universities. The committee submitted its support in September 1957.<sup>5</sup> There followed two decades of exuberant expansion in the number of universities and the other institutions of higher learning, in the number of students and teachers, in the libraries, in the laboratories and—not least—in the programmes of research and post-graduate education. In the late 1960s, most people were taking it for granted that the expansion would continue indefinitely. In the late 1970s, it came to a dead stop.

I have no competence to write even one sentence which would shed light on the entire tangle of problems—demographic, economic, social, political—which now confront the framers of educational policy. However, I shall tender some evidence which is relevant to learning and teaching at the postgraduate level. I returned to Australia in the year of the Murray Report and ever since then I have enjoyed intimate contact with many candidates for the degree of Ph.D. Few of them could read a foreign language; otherwise, they were all well qualified for the three-year course of postgraduate education. Nearly all of them achieved the doctorate. In the years of exuberant expansion, it was a matter almost of routine that every person who possessed that label would quickly find employment in one or other of the State universities. There, too often, he was both permitted and even encouraged to 'teach his own subject'. The 'God Professor' of an earlier time would not only have advised him to read outside his own subject, but would have persuaded him to teach outside it. Fifty years ago—even twenty-five years ago—our curricula of learning and teaching were coherent. Too often today they are a jumble of specialist odds and ends.

I particularly regret the disappearance of the main-stream courses which meant so much to me when I was a student at the University of Melbourne. Must it remain forever a vain regret? To begin with, I see scope for a mainstream course on Australian history which could well become an object lesson both of probing scholarship and of the great sweep of human endeavour. 'Triumph of the Nomads'—that is to say, the millennial experience of Black Australians—would be the opening theme. There would follow the story of white Australians arriving with their European impedimenta and gradually discovering both the opportunities and the constraints confronting them in their new environment. Very soon, these perspectives—mainly longitudinal—would become intertwined with the lateral perspectives of European power-struggles in the Pacific region.<sup>6</sup> Towards the end of the course, the story would be told of Australians discovering themselves as a community of predominantly European culture living in near neighbourhood with the civilisations of Asia.

The course which is proposed will be a combined operation, led by historians of established achievement in research and publication. These historians will do well from time to time to call upon younger colleagues to give two or three lectures. That will jerk them away from their doctoral theses! To begin with, they may know very little about the content of the mainstream course; but soon they will want to know more. Lecturing is as much for the benefit of the lecturer as it is for those lectured at. Moreover, the admixture of youth with age will be stimulating for the students. They will make an important discovery—that the university teacher, if he is any good, is also a learner.

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Students of the Murray Report should compare it with the far more substantial Robbins Report which was produced in Britain a few years later.

6

See The Spanish Lake, by O.H.K. Spate (A.N.U. Press 1979), a magisterial synthesis of geographical and historical scholarship. Other volumes will follow.

## 2. Ordeal by Thesis\*

I wish simply to give evidence. In Oxford, London and Canberra during the past twenty years I have taught 500 or more graduate students. Needless to say, I have not supervised the research of all these people, but I have known each one of them as a student and as a person both inside and outside the seminar room. Not all of them have been historians. Not all of them have been thesis-writers. Nevertheless, 300 of them at least have been historians at work on theses for the D.Phil. or the Ph.D. degree. I sometimes ask myself what kind of education my colleagues and I have been offering them.

Degrees by thesis were firmly established on the continent of Europe and in America before the British universities instituted them. Oxford instituted the D.Phil. in 1917 and Cambridge the Ph.D. in 1920; at Oxford, the lesser thesis degree of B.Litt. had come earlier, but at Cambridge the comparable degree of M.Litt. came later. At these ancient universities recognition of the research thesis was not only tardy but grudging. Even after the second World War, some heads of Colleges at Oxford—including, as I well remember, a Vice-Chancellor of that time—were still maintaining that the university's proper business was to teach undergraduates. The same distaste for organized graduate research lingered on at Cambridge, and even today you will still find it there in the more comfortable academic backwaters. As a member of the Cambridge Senate has recently explained—

An Arts student already at home in a College of the best sort, provided with older friends to advise him and younger ones whom he can teach, will use his time to write a Fellowship dissertation, and then withdraw from the undignified and unnecessary pursuit of a higher degree. His registration will have served its purpose; white silk is more lordly than red flannel.<sup>1</sup>

I was once a snob of that stamp. Yet snobbery was never the whole explanation of the antipathy to the ordeal by thesis which was rife among the dons of my generation. We were clinging to the traditional values of a broad, liberal education. We denounced the research thesis as a breeding ground for pedants. A.D. Hope has spoken for all of us.

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\* Annual Lecture delivered to the Australian Humanities Research Council, 4 November 1965.

1

This and all subsequent quotations from, or references to the discussions in Cambridge and Oxford have their source in the Cambridge University Reporter of 11 March 1962, 16 February and 18 March 1964; and the Oxford University Gazette of 22 May 1962.



The modern critics of the maggot breed  
 Writhe in their carcasses and seethe and feed.  
 Laborious, timid, tedious at once  
 Each purblind scholar and each well-trained dunce,  
 From the Old World and from the New they come  
 To search the rubbish heaps of Christendom!  
 Is there a minor poet by others missed  
 Dull sermoneer or maudlin novelist  
 Some corpse to build a reputation on?  
 A thesis swallows them and they are gone.  
 Round greater tombs they mine and countermine:  
 One shrieks 'Stand off, his first ten years are mine!'  
 'And mine the floreat!' Number Two replies;  
 'Well then', shrieks Three, 'I've got him till he dies!'

.....

The scabs scratched off by genius, sought with care  
 Stuck back again earn Doctor Budge a chair;  
 And now Professor Budge, his claim made good,  
 He works like dry rot through the Sacred Wood;  
 Or like dead mackerel, in a night of ink  
 Emits a pale gleam and a mighty stink.<sup>2</sup>

If you think these shafts of saeva indignatio misdirected, read the long lists of doctoral barbarities which Abraham Flexner published.<sup>3</sup>

But that was a generation ago. We should like to think that we in our generation are wiser. Are we? Only three years ago, a committee on postgraduate research at Oxford was still lamenting 'the proliferation of detailed studies of persons and issues of little importance, to the neglect of more central topics.' One would at least have expected that the research workers who undertook these trivial tasks would prove able to complete them; but the opposite has been happening. In the academic year 1953-4 entrants on the arts side for the degrees of D.Phil. and B.Litt. numbered 205: during the next 7 years, only 92 of those 205 entrants achieved degrees. These figures signify a 55 per cent wastage. During the same period, the wastage of research students on the science side was only 20 per cent. Such a contrast of performances within the same university cries out for explanation.

Do similar contrasts exist elsewhere? The statistical data are sparse; but the figures published at Cambridge, incomplete though they are, seem to repeat Oxford's dismal story. London has published no comparable figures; but such information as I have garnered suggests an emphatically lower rate of wastage among research students on the arts side.<sup>4</sup> In the Research School of Social Sciences at Canberra, the wastage rate of Ph.D. students from the mid 1950s up to now has been below 10 per cent. How shall we explain these contrasts? Why have

2

I am grateful to Professor Hope for permission to quote from a revised version of these unpublished couplets. Since published in Dunciad Minimus (Melbourne 1970).

3

In Universities: American, English, German (New York, 1930).

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I am indebted to the Principal of the University of London, Sir Douglas Logan, for figures showing the performance, up to 1964-5, of internal students of the Faculty of Arts registered in 1955-6 for the degrees of M.A. and Ph.D.

the thesis-writers done better in London than in Oxford and Cambridge? Why have they done better still in Canberra?

From my experience as a teacher in three of these universities and as an examiner in the fourth, I am convinced that variations in the standard of their research degrees, if they exist at all, are minimal. Consequently, we must seek elsewhere our explanations of the widely varying performances. To me it seems reasonable to inquire whether or not teachers in these different universities are giving to their research students equivalent amounts of time? At Canberra we normally require three years of residence for the doctorate, whereas the English universities quite often require only two years of residence. Moreover, in the Research Schools at Canberra our primary obligation is to pursue research and to train graduate students in the methods of research; whereas the primary obligation of nearly all the dons at Oxford and Cambridge is to teach undergraduates. That, at any rate, has been the established doctrine until recently. London began to challenge the doctrine in the early 1920s, when A.F. Pollard established the Institute of Historical Research. Other Institutes followed. They set a new standard of research training in the humanities and social sciences. I am speaking now from personal experience. As Director of one of the London Institutes from 1949 to 1956, I enjoyed opportunities in the field of graduate education which would have been closed to me during the same period at Oxford.

I must not draw these contrasts too much in black and white. Since the time of Vinogradoff's seminar—to go no further back than my own memory—Oxford has offered some glorious exemplars of inspired graduate teaching. Nevertheless, the 1962 committee found much that was amiss. In its view, the chief single cause of wastage among research students on the arts side was the failure of so many of them to make sufficient progress with their theses during the period of residence, while they were still enjoying comparative freedom from competing cares and duties. This failure, in turn, was due chiefly to the University's haphazard attention to their capacities and needs. The committee emphasized the far happier situation on the science side, where conditions in the laboratories necessitated the most rigorous selection and supervision of every research student.

Moreover, [it reflected]...his individual subject is bound to be integrated within the research programmes of his laboratory. He has the stimulus of constant association with his contemporaries and his seniors as well as with his supervisor.

In contrast with this, on the arts side, the average D.Phil. student ...works mostly in isolation. He often has little or no contact with either seniors or contemporaries researching in adjacent subjects.

Isolation was the key word of those sad sentences. At a meeting of the Cambridge Senate that same year, a sensitive humanist lamented the University's 'wasteful and inhuman neglect of the best students of each generation in the vacant interstellar dark of three years' research'.

Amongst the remedies that it proposed, the Oxford committee laid particular stress upon a tightening of the traditional supervisor-student relationship, and upon the reinforcement of that relationship by the provision of more and better seminars. The committee's guiding purpose was to combat the excessively 'cellular' character of research on the arts side. When it used the word 'cellular' it had in mind two evils: not only the isolation of research students, but also the fragmentation of research topics. Too many of the topics, it said, were too far distant from the main highways of the advancement of learning. For this, it put part at least of the blame upon the regulations for the D.Phil., which required 'an original contribution to knowledge'; originality, it said, was too easily and too often equated with some trivial task which nobody had hitherto tackled. At Cambridge, where the Ph.D. regulations have contained a similar

requirement, some dons have made a similar protest. One of them proposed recently to strike out the word 'original' and substitute the word 'substantial'. But what change for the better would that be? A Cambridge philosopher has pointed out that every Englishman whose contribution to philosophy may plausibly be called substantial can feel confident—when he is old enough—of winning admission to the Order of Merit.

But that neat quip misses the main point. Whether they know it or not, most universities require from their doctoral students theses which must be at one and the same time original and substantial. The double requirement can too easily produce triviality at book length, more and more about less and less, the exhaustive and exhausting exposition of next to nothing. We are back again with Dr Budge. I dare say the incidence of his infestation is just as high in historical as in literary research. A year or two ago I held a conversation rather like the following with a graduate student in an English university—

What are you working on?

Lord Binks's policy towards Upper Canada.

And what will you do when you have finished that?

Lord Binks's policy towards Lower Canada.

This young man had been pursuing his university studies at public expense for six years. He was about to apply for a seventh year of subsidized study. After that, he told me, he hoped to gain a university post. He was already making plans for his first course of lectures, upon the theme—you have surely guessed it—of Lord Binks's policy towards Upper and Lower Canada.

Myopia is the occupational disease of thesis writers. How shall we cure it, or better still, prevent it? One possible remedy would be to invent a totally new postgraduate degree. Indeed, Oxford made such an invention in 1946, when the philosophers and theoretical economists persuaded it to establish the B.Phil. The road to this degree is not—at least not primarily - research and the submission of a thesis, but an examination after two years of advanced study.<sup>5</sup> I well remember the discussions of 1946. The philosophers quoted Alexander's dictum that thinking also is research and told their colleagues in other Faculties that the new degree would be designed to broaden young minds instead of narrowing them. Possibly they were right. Certainly, the B.Phil. has achieved some conspicuous successes. Its products have been in strong demand as university teachers. Of 100 philosophers who achieved the degree between 1946 and 1958 almost all are now holding academic posts and some have achieved academic distinction. Other Faculties in Oxford have followed the lead of the philosophers. Cambridge, with its current proposals for a new degree of M.Phil., seems likely to follow the same lead.

Nevertheless, Oxford has witnessed no general flight from the D.Phil., and I have been told that even the philosophers are nowadays not quite so satisfied with the B.Phil. as they seemed to be some years ago. Moreover, the 1962 committee on postgraduate studies felt moved to propose that the submission of a research dissertation should become compulsory for all B.Phil. candidates. The committee made its conviction clear that every graduate student remains half educated unless and until he produces some work—if only a short one—of research and exposition. Along this road, there might well occur a close interpenetration of B.Phil. training with D.Phil. training. Supposing that a reciprocal move were to be made from the D.Phil. side? That would mean, for some doctoral postulants, shorter theses and more course work. I do not find that

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In all Faculties a short dissertation is optional for the B.Phil. and in some Faculties it has been made compulsory. The examination has occasionally been attempted after one year of study.

notion shocking. As I shall demonstrate later, I am a believer in flexibility and variability of the requirements which our regulations impose upon research students.

Nevertheless, in what immediately follows, I shall assume that the ordeal by thesis required the composition of a work which may run to 100,000 words. I shall assume also—as does the Oxford committee, despite its pervading gloom—that to attack such a task can be, and often is, magnificent training. The research student achieves rigorous precision. He achieves it within the limits of a small topic. His small topic, if he has chosen it well, contains or reflects large issues. Precision need not be myopic. It may be microcosmic. As investigators and teachers, our endeavour must be to combine precision with span. But how? The evidence from Oxford prompts me to seek inspiration in the laboratories. I shall choose as my exemplar a great physiologist who also loved and wrote poetry, philosophy and history.

It was to those who worked in his laboratory [Graham Brown has written] that Sherrington gave and showed most. The research student would enter it, timidly, with a mental picture of the author of the Integrative Action as a man who must dwell in a sphere of his own making, difficult to attain or to travel in—a man necessarily aloof and out of common reach, 'academic', coldly intellectual. But the disarming spirit of equality with which the recruit was received at once destroyed a mental barrier which could not in any case have for long withstood the sympathetic friendship which was offered by Sherrington and earned lasting friendship in return. There was no pomp, no vestige of that Olympian arrogance which was so evident in some of the larger German institutes of the time. The laboratory life was a continuing adventure with always widening horizons ... he would be moved ... by the beauty of an experiment or of an ingenious technical method. And always there was originality and insight.<sup>6</sup>

This passage portrays the human quality of a creative teacher. Human quality is personal; it is not a thing which other teachers can copy. Intellectual quality is a different matter; it expresses itself in principles and methods which are likely to prove valid for workers in various fields. What was it, apart from his quality as a man, which made Sherrington a creative teacher? The passage which I have just quoted suggests an answer in three words: technique, theory, imagination. The young physiologist needs this trinity. The young historian needs it no less.

Without technique nobody can even begin to be an historian. By original definition and continuing practice the historian is a questioner. His technique constitutes his capacity to frame questions and pursue them as far as they will take him. Acquiring this capacity, like acquiring any other—the capacity to swim, for example—is a delightful experience. Early this year I watched a brilliant teacher at work with a group of aspiring palaeographers. To begin with, these young men and women appeared mistrustful of their capacity ever to make sense of mediaeval handwriting; but after a few days I saw on their faces the dawn of hope, and after a few weeks the dawn of joy as they began to find themselves at home in a new world of experience. Mastery of a difficult technique always creates new confidence and joy. Historians of the modern world are for this reason less fortunate than their mediaeval colleagues; the techniques which they require are—to first appearances at least—less demanding, and consequently less exhilarating. Even so, there is genuine pleasure in finding one's way to

C.O.123/97/Q, or whatever the document may be which will tell us precisely what Lord Binks had in his head on the morning of 23 September. Even a pedestrian inquiry has value when it is pursued carefully and fair-mindedly; to get the record right, so far as the evidence allows, is not only a mental but also a moral achievement. Precision and honesty, by which our civilization stands or falls, are not to be despised even in small topics of research. Moreover, as I suggested earlier, small topics may reflect large issues. To identify and explore these issues may well require a whole battery of techniques. I have found pleasure recently in watching the progress of a thesis about settlement in the Riverina—a commonplace topic, I thought at first; but I changed my mind as I saw significance flowing into the topic from the watersheds of geography, economic history, demography and political science. There has been nothing 'cellular' in this investigation nor in the intellectual and personal life of the investigator.

On the contrary, it is I who find myself regretting my missed opportunities. I could so easily have arranged a seminar on techniques which would have been common to the whole Research School—a lawyer, an economist, a statistician, a political scientist, an historian, a philosopher, each offering in two or three successive meetings a preliminary review of the techniques of investigation which he employs. Each preliminary review could have introduced a continuing inquiry into each technique. Each student could have been encouraged to acquire at least the rudiments of some technique ancillary to his own. Such an exercise, I believe, would have been a unifying influence among the research students and their teachers. For some of them it would have extended the horizon of opportunities. An alternative method of extending the horizon, and one which I have experimented with both in London and in Canberra, is the interdisciplinary seminar, in which people whose techniques are diverse mobilize them in a combined attack upon some common problem. Sometimes the attack will be mounted at the post-doctoral level, with the clear intention to advance knowledge; but it may also be mounted at the lower level of doctoral training.<sup>7</sup>

Technique has some at least of its roots in theory. Some years ago I had two students at work on research topics with an economic content. The first student possessed sufficient technique for locating documents and making notes and excerpts from them. I was invited to admire an impressive collection of cards, all tidily arranged and indexed; but the cards proved quite useless because the information which they recorded was at best only accidentally related to the problems under investigation. It was all my fault: before I approved the research topic I should have made quite certain that the student possessed sufficient capacity in economic theory to frame relevant questions and, in consequence, to collect relevant information. Things went better with my second student. He had a difficult subject which involved both the intricacies of German party-politics after the first World War and the even more baffling intricacies of international monetary transfers; but his theoretical insight spotlighted the problems which would repay investigation. By sharply focused research and steady reflection he produced an independent and illuminating thesis. You may have observed from

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The 'common problem' may be industries (e.g. the wool industry) or regional (e.g. Buganda) or sociological (e.g. urbanization). *The Simple Fleece*, ed. Alan Barnard (Melbourne University Press, 1962) reveals the work done in a seminar at the higher level. This was 'the wool seminar' held at Canberra between 1957 and 1959. Of the book's 40 closely related chapters half were contributed by natural scientists and half by social scientists. They discovered ways and means of communicating with each other and they learnt a good deal about each other's methods of research.

At some of the London Institutes, interdisciplinary seminars at the lower level are normal instruments of graduate education.

these two examples that I lay stress on the heuristic, or exploratory value of theory. Some historians, no doubt—for example, Thucydides, Maitland, Meinecke, Heckscher—have possessed the capacity to make not only factual but also theoretical statements; but most of us pursue theory not as an end in itself but as the essential instrument of our particular inquiries. Such theoretical competence as we achieve is implicit, not explicit; it gives coherence to our narratives and analyses. We acquire it as we come to need it; but as the teachers of young historians we have perhaps left rather too much to chance. The better students, of course, will learn for themselves such theory as is relevant to their investigations; but even for them a limited dose of formal theoretical training might prove invigorating.

Nevertheless, theory ranks lower in my order of values than imagination. Even in practical affairs the imaginative leap quite often comes first and its theoretical or statistical justification afterwards. I feel convinced that M. Jean Monnet, a main architect since the war of French economic recovery and of the European Economic Community, works frequently by flair. I have studied many of the war-economic documents which he composed from 1940 onwards as the basis of British-American planning; in appearance, they are theoretical and statistical demonstrations, but in the intricate processes of their creation I have repeatedly discerned the inspired imaginative leap. For historians, as for other people, the spirit bloweth where it listeth and understanding comes not merely by practising a technique and applying a theory but also in the flash of recognition, like the sudden illumination of a dark room. Werner Sombart used to say 'No theory, no history'; but it would be truer to say "No imagination, no history". Some historians, including some of the best, have a deep-rooted antipathy to theory; their mental and emotional dispositions urge them not towards savoir but towards connaître—a direct and intimate acquaintance with this person, this place, this situation, this event. The narratives of these historian will be rather a succession of images than a succession of explanations. When we encounter a pupil of this disposition, we should not inflict theory on him but should encourage him to give some of his time to archaeology or to learning a new language or exploring some new world of the imagination. We should encourage even our theoretically-minded students to save some part of their time for reading imaginative literature. To the historian, the danger of theory— if he has it all the time in his head—it is contemporaneity. It belongs so much to our own time that it may build a barrier between us and the people of other times—the very people whom we, as historians, are trying to understand.

Not only our theorizing but our affluence, our gadgetry, our urbanization, our secularization are building this barrier between our time and past time. Barrier, perhaps, is not the right word for the thing; I call it the cellophane curtain. Carl Bridenbaugh, in his presidential address a few years ago to the American Historical Association, called it 'The Great Mutation'.<sup>8</sup>

The Great Mutation, or historical change, [he said] has taken place so rapidly, and life has sustained such sudden and radical alterations ... that we are now suffering something like historical amnesia. In the present century, first Western civilisation and now the entire globe have witnessed the inexorable substitution of an artificial environment and a materialistic outlook on life for the old natural environment and spiritual world view that linked us so irrevocably to the Recent and Distant Pasts. So pervading and complete has been this change, and so complex has life become ... that it now appears probable that mid-nineteenth-century America or Western Europe had more in common with fifth-century Greece (physically, economically, socially,

mentally, spiritually) than with their own projections into the middle of the twentieth century.

Carl Bridenbaugh felt moved to put two questions to professional historians:

Can we reasonably assume that future historians will be able to capture enough of a sense of the past to enable them to feel and understand it and to convey to their readers what this past was even remotely like?

How much longer will Society continue to support History as a useful branch of knowledge?

His answer to both questions was pessimistic.

I sometimes share his pessimism. Not one of my students nowadays knows Aeschylus in Greek and not many of them know the Bible in English. On the other hand, many of them know and love music and painting. I cannot believe that the springs of the imaginative life are everywhere drying up. And yet I hate to think what the effect would be on the inflow of our graduate students if we in Australia were to do what Carl Bridenbaugh asks Americans to do: 'In the future,' he proposes, 'students entering at the graduate level should be required to produce evidence of a broad and ranging general culture before admission'. In our schools and universities, soft options and misdirected specialization—that sinister combination—are becoming dangerous enemies of culture and, consequently, of our capacity to understand the past.

But I must return to ordeal by thesis. We cannot organize seminars to teach our thesis-writers insight. Its deep springs are in their own lives of the imagination. The springs will dry up if they spend the whole of their time in the grind of specialist research. I want them to spend some of it in climbing mountains, wading rivers, exploring Aboriginal middens, making music and listening to it, producing plays and acting in them, reading poetry, novels and the Reith lectures—not all of these things, of course, for every student, but at least one or two of them. I also want the students, as I have already made clear, to spend more of their time than in the past on learning techniques and exploring theory—or something else, if theory happens not to suit them. In short, I want them to take more time off from their theses. The question inevitably arises whether or not they have this time to spare.

The answer might seem at first sight to be a matter of simple arithmetic. To take an extreme case: suppose that a student is proposing to give to his thesis each single day of his three years in residence, but that under my proposals he would be able to give to it only two in every three of those days: it would appear to follow that he must either be granted a fourth year of residence or be allowed to cut the length of his thesis by one third. But the arithmetic is not so simple as that. Length of time depends in large measure upon what a man makes of his time. Research students too often flatter themselves that the community owes them time; they see visions of the perfect thesis and can hardly believe that their pursuit of perfection will be untimely cut short. They need to learn that two things are necessary for creative work: first, the ideal of perfection; secondly, the acceptance of limitations. I sometimes read to them the passage from the preface to the Dictionary in which Dr Johnson confesses that The Lexicographer is Fallible.<sup>9</sup> Johnson started work on the Dictionary with an ideal of perfection, but discovered, as he puts it—

that thus to pursue perfection was like the first inhabitants of Arcadia, to chase the sun, which, when they reached the hill where he seemed to rest, was still beheld at the same distance from them.

I then contracted my design [he continues] determining to confide in myself ...; by this I obtained at least one advantage, that I set limits to my work, which would in time be ended, though not completed.

Teachers and students alike, we need to learn and re-learn the lesson that 'completion' is a word unknown to science and scholarship. We bring our specific tasks to an end. Our reward, if we have done them well, is the knowledge that another worker will someday make our work his starting point.

We need to teach ourselves and our students a second lesson about the management of time: namely, that total concentration upon a single task sometimes slows the work down instead of speeding it up. This Law of Reversed Effort, as a Cambridge don named it recently, can operate so drastically as to produce a total blockage of the mind and the threat of a nervous breakdown. Many of my students in London and Canberra would have done not only better but also quicker work had they not made an obsession of their ordeal by thesis. Course work, within carefully defined limits, is not an impediment but a stimulus to research and writing. At Canberra, course work is already compulsory for historians and I believe that we can require rather more of it from them while still maintaining our present rules about time. I recognize some exceptions, but for most students the present allocation of time seems to me right: three years of full-time work, with the possibility of two more years, at most, for completing and submitting the thesis.<sup>10</sup> For all these reasons, and for others which I need not now explain, I rule out one alternative method—more time in residence for all and sundry—of relieving the pressure on thesis-writers. I also rule out the common American practice of holding the student back from his thesis until he has done two preliminary years of course work. To be sure, the course work of American graduate schools is at its best a splendid preparation for research. American doctoral students, when at last they start on their theses, are well supplied with sharp knives. Too many of them, however, seem to have lost their zest for cutting up the joint. After a good deal of reflection, I have reached the conclusion that it is usually sound practice to allow course work and thesis work to proceed concurrently. This does not mean that every student has to fling himself into research within his first six weeks; on the contrary, many a good student will spend as many months in discovering and defining the research that he proposes to do.

I promised to say something about the length of theses. As an historian, I owe a debt of gratitude to many theses of book length; yet some of them would have been better had they been shorter. We all know the student who fears to take even one step—and he insists on taking so many—without the support of his documentary crutches. As teachers, it is our business to train athletes, not to rear cripples. However, I am beginning to wander along a bypath of my argument and must return to the highroad. Chiefly we need a variety of thesis lengths because we need a variety of educational experiments. Let me cite just one experiment. My colleague Eleanor Searle has given me the following brief account of the course designed by Etienne Gilson at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in the University of Toronto.

The course is normally a four-year one, though the thesis can be submitted at the end of three years. The student's time for the first two

Social Anthropologists at the Australian National University are allowed four years on the ground that they have a special commitment—to explore a new culture, which includes learning its language and requires two tours of field work. On similar grounds, we allow a little extra time to historians undertaking field work in India, and we might consider similar mitigations of the rule in favour of some other historians: for example: mediaevalists. For historians working on Australian topics we stick firmly to the rule.



years is spent on seminar work and in acting as research assistant for various staff members.

The seminar work is designed to force students out of a narrow specialization and to equip them with mediaeval languages. Besides having to satisfy examiners on his reading knowledge of two modern European languages and of Latin (which he must do for himself), each student is also required to study one 'mediaeval language'—e.g. Provençal, Old English or Middle English, Tuscan, Greek or mediaeval Arabic. The other courses, designed to widen his appreciation of mediaeval civilization, are not lecture courses, but advanced seminars to which he is expected to read at least one scholarly paper—for an historian, for example, the seminars might be on philosophy, law or art history. Theses, by the way, sometimes begin in these papers. In addition, the student is required to do a two-year seminar on palaeography and textual criticism.

Most commonly the student's thesis will arise out of his research assistant work. Each term for two years he works with one faculty member in his particular field of interest on the current research of the faculty member. The work is not merely leg-work ... Student and faculty-member, on the contrary, work as a research team, with frequent discussions of the significance of the project and its wider context, as well as of the source material and the techniques of doing that particular project. The student is expected to read deeply in the field of the project and to make a positive contribution to it. It is expected that normally the student will pursue an aspect of one such subject for his thesis.

The thesis...is not so long as the theses normally required in British and Australian universities. Indeed, there is no required length—it is the quality and originality that are judged. A long and original article is considered to be proof that the student is worthy of the research degree ... The thesis must be defended before internal and external examiners in a public Defense, and must be accepted for publication.

Perhaps someday, in some field of study, we in Australia may attempt a comparable enterprise of graduate education. If and when we do, we shall doubtless find ways and means of convincing external examiners that we have sound reasons for sending them theses sometimes as long as 100,000 words and at other times as short as 10,000 words.

The young historian at work with Gilson, it seems to me, enjoys an experience not so far removed from that of the young physiologist at work with Sherrington or, to go still further into the past, the young painter at work with Verrocchio—do you not remember the angel that Leonardo painted in the bottom left-hand corner of Verrocchio's Baptism? Then and now the educational principle was, and is the same—apprentice work leading to the masterpiece and to membership of the master's guild: or, at a more general and a higher level, ars leading to scientia. In the Middle Ages, ars signified technique; scientia signified the structure of ideas and images which constitute human civilization. Ars was preparation for scientia. It still is.<sup>11</sup>

Ordeal by thesis has its place in a long tradition. Sometimes it produces perversions and absurdities; but they are remediable. Its starting point is technique. That gives it a basic honesty. History without technique is a fraud.

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Cf. James S. Ackerman, 'On Scientia, in Daedalus, Winter 1965, pp. 14-23. [Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 94, No. 1.]

History starting from technique is one of the roads to scientia, even though we and our pupils may never reach that high country.

### 3. Cases and Persons\*

I find it delightful, but also alarming to be back again in Western Australia. Forty years ago, as a young historian in his first post, I had a tiny workroom in one of the wooden huts in Irwin Street. In those days the University was small and poor; but it possessed the things which matter most—enthusiasm, the habit of hard work, a lively student body, a devoted academic staff. I find it delightful to recall those times, those places, those men and women, those dreams which have come true in the great University of today; not least its thriving Medical School and its creative partnership with the Royal Perth Hospital.

But this is where my alarm sets in. It is the Royal Perth Hospital which has called me back to Western Australia. I appreciate the honour which it has done me; I am enjoying its hospitality; but amidst all the kindnesses which are heaped upon me I cannot quite forget my fear of going in to bat on a strange wicket. I have engaged myself to lecture to an audience which represents the many and varied skills and services of a great modern hospital. What in the world can I find to say which my audience will find worth listening to?

I had it in mind, to begin with, to speak about 'the two cultures' which, it is alleged, never meet. In a recent discourse upon this theme, C.P. Snow has lamented the deep gulf of mutual incomprehension which, he declares, our educational system has dug between natural scientists and 'literary intellectuals'.<sup>1</sup> Snow thinks it tragic that the former find no joy in the poetry of T.S. Eliot, while the latter cannot describe the Second Law of Thermodynamics. But why should I carry in my head the Second Law of Thermodynamics if it has no immediate bearing upon the problems which continually engage me as an historian, a teacher and a citizen? Or why should you flog yourselves into reading The Waste Land, if you have discovered other ways of understanding nature and man? You and I may still enjoy music together. We may go together to a cricket match or to an exhibition of contemporary painting. We may mobilise our separate skills of economics or ecology to safeguard the natural resources and the natural beauty of our country. We may find ourselves allies, each with an essential contribution to make, in the campaign against the poverty and fear, the sickness and suffering of mankind.

Not that I deny the flaws and failures which Snow sees in our educational system; on the contrary, I shall spend some time, later on, in looking for remedies. All the same, I do not take these flaws and failures quite so tragically as he does. Whereas he sees one fathomless, catastrophic chasm separating

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An Address delivered at the Ninth Annual Meeting of Royal Perth Hospital, Western Australia, on 11th October, 1961. Supplement to the Royal Perth Hospital Journal, December 1961.

<sup>1</sup>  
The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, by C.P. Snow: the Rede Lecture, 1959.

science from the arts, I see an intricate criss-cross of cracks and crevasses dividing this science from that, this art from the other. I also see bridges across some of the crevasses, and opportunities for building more bridges.

Bridge-building will be my concern this evening. I hope to make you see that you in your professions and I in mine can work together in constructive enterprises. It is my strong conviction that our methods of work are not nearly so alien from each other as many people seem to think.

Let me talk for a short time about my own work. I think that I can explain its method in terms which some of you may find familiar. Is history a science? If so, it is one which demands more art than do any of the other sciences. Is history an art? If so, it is an art which demands more science than do any of the other arts. So I say to myself. Perhaps you say to yourselves about your hospital work pretty much the same thing?

The historian, like the student and practitioner of medicine, is concerned with cases and persons. Let me discuss historical case work. A few of my colleagues in Canberra have saved from destruction, have collected, cleaned, arranged in good order and catalogued the records of many business firms and trade unions. In this magnificent collection they find materials for studying the aggregate growth of the Australian economy and the individual growth of many diverse enterprises. They have some theory to guide them in their researches; for example, the theory of the business firm. This theory, however, is more formal and symmetrical than the actual experience of any particular firm, which lives and grows (or sometimes dies) not merely in conformity with economic laws, but by responding to all kinds of challenges which arise in the economic, political and social environment. It is fascinating to study a great firm—Goldsborough Mort, let us say—as an individual, or 'a special case'. It is just as fascinating to set one case alongside the next, to search out and classify their resemblances and differences, to reflect upon these comparisons and use them with intent to amplify and refine the theory of the firm. Similarly with trade unions: it is fascinating to study the Coalminers' Union (let us say) as 'a special case', and equally fascinating to look for repetitions and regularities in the experience and behaviour of half a dozen unions. Or sheep stations—from the materials available to us in Canberra we can, if we wish, write a score or more individual station histories: we can, if we wish, draw upon this material to elucidate the problems of investment, marketing and management which have concerned the wool industry as a whole. Again: we can consider the statistics of the wool industry as an aggregate, combine them with the statistics of all the other Australian industries and enterprises, public and private, and thereby compose a statistical map which will help us to understand the rate and processes of the nation's economic growth from the 1860s, (let us say) up to recent time. This, too, we can look upon as a case study, whose findings will flow back into a body of theory—the theory of economic growth—which nowadays greatly preoccupies economists and has urgent relevance to the present condition and the future destinies of mankind.

All the researches which I have sketched are being pursued with creative zeal by colleagues of mine and their pupils in Canberra. My own researches lie nowadays in a different field; but they, too, contain a good deal of historical case work. There stand upon my shelves approximately thirty volumes, produced under my editorship, describing the economic, social and administrative experience of the United Kingdom during World War II. Each of these volumes incorporates thousands of case histories and each can be looked upon as a case history in the large, illuminating the focal points of a nation's war effort. All these highly specialist researches add up to a systematic body of knowledge which can be distilled into a theory of war economy. For me, however, this has ceased to be a major interest. I have found it more interesting to classify wars, big wars and little ones, according to their different types: to study their origins and their conclusions: above all, to study the social forces and institutions in which

humanity may someday discover (not too late in the day, let us hope) remedies for war. This last study has led me, among other things, to Gandhian non-violence. Here again I find myself immersed in case work, because I see no chance of measuring the possibilities and limitations of Gandhi's technique except by observing its operation and effects in the successive campaigns of non-violence which he conducted.

But how can I study Gandhi's technique without studying Gandhi? How can any student of human affairs separate cases from persons? Well, we have to admit that the separation can be made, at any rate provisionally: indeed, that it must be made, if we are to achieve progress in the scientific understanding and control of human affairs. Impersonality is a word which we sometimes use to convey approval, as when we say of an upright judge or a conscientious administrator that he is 'no respecter of persons'. And yet, in another sense, we want him to respect persons; we want to feel that his impersonal handling of cases has roots in the understanding of personal rights, needs and aspirations.

These diverse and seemingly contradictory qualities, which we look for in our courts of law and our public offices, we look for also in our hospitals. They are the qualities which Sir William Osler described in his famous address: Aequanimitas.

'Cultivate then, gentlemen, such a judicious measure of obtuseness as will enable you to meet the exigencies of practice with firmness and courage, without, at the same time, hardening "the human heart by which we live".'

I do not regret the impersonal case work which I have done in the past and am still doing; but casework without any mitigation or intermission would drive me mad. Fortunately for my sanity, I am now deeply committed to an exacting task, the biography of General Smuts. This biography, it so happens, is interwoven with many of my case studies, for war absorbed one year in four of Smuts' political life but peace was his constant search. He has brought to life for me, with a vividness which I should never have found in impersonal study, the agonising problems of war and peace which now face humanity. It is through him that I have discovered Gandhi, his antagonist throughout eight years of creative conflict and his friend for life. None of this is accidental. Smuts handled cases; but he set more store upon persons. Casework belonged to his legal training and his scientific cast of mind—a questing mind of great distinction, which was recognised in 1933, when the British Association for the Advancement of Science made him its President. Even so, he remained as much the humanist as the scientist. He valued the human person as highly as the scientific law. More highly, I believe. In his student essays during the early 1890s and in an exciting book which he wrote (but did not publish) about fifteen years later, he put personality at the apex of the evolutionary process. Darwin and his successors had confined their evolutionary studies within the range of organic phenomena; but Smuts emphasised the evolutionary continuity of atom, cell, mind, personality. Does this mean that the pebble, the plant, the animal and the person can be studied and explained by the same methods? To this question Smuts answered both yes and no. Complicated organisms are certainly physical and chemical in their constitution; but they cannot be reduced to physics and chemistry. Something essential—something which Smuts conceived to be both structural and 'inward'—has been added in the evolutionary process. Personality conforms to the laws of biochemistry; but it is not contained within those laws. A person is biochemistry plus.

On this note I stop telling you about my work and start asking you questions about yours. To begin with: does not your code instruct you to treat both the disease and the patient? Are you not occupied every day of your working lives both with cases and persons?

That, at any rate, is the impression which I get from my reading of medical biography and autobiography. Let me recall an episode in the life of a famous clinician who began his career of research and teaching eighty years ago in McGill University, Montreal. One bitter cold day a battered and bleary drunk stopped this young man in the street and asked him for money.

'You old rascal, why should I give you money to drink yourself to death?'

'Well, Sir, it lightens the road going'.

'There's only one thing of value about you and that's your hobnailed liver'.

'I'll give it to you, Sir, I'll give it to you'.

The young man laughed, handed over some silver, advised the drunk to get some hot soup into himself before starting on the gin, and continued his walk. But then he looked round and saw the old derelict shuffling and shivering along the frozen street. He ran after him and gave him his coat.

'You may drink yourself to death but I won't let you freeze yourself to death'.

'Tell me your name, Sir'.

'William Osler, and don't forget to leave me that liver'.

A few weeks later the old man died; but in preparation for death he had made a will which contained this sentence:

'I leave my overcoat and my hobnailed liver to my good friend William Osler'.

The coat, after it had been fumigated, was good for the rest of that winter and for some winters to come. Osler did an autopsy upon the liver.

In his twelve years of service at Montreal, first as Lecturer in Medical Institutions and later as Professor, Osler performed nearly eight hundred autopsies. He kept the record of them in five large quarto volumes. Of these, three volumes survive in his own handwriting, with every case numbered and precisely described and every volume carefully indexed. His biographer, Harvey Cushing,<sup>2</sup> has acclaimed these volumes as a monument to Osler's genius and the foundation of his achievement in morbid anatomy. Osler himself would have looked upon them simply as the record of his hard work in hospital ward and laboratory. In 1902, he addressed the medical students of Toronto under the title, 'The Master Word in Medicine'. The master word, he told them, was work—work in their lecture rooms, their laboratories, their hospitals; work upon their cases; work with their patients. Osler never forgot the patients, the persons. The mighty arch of his achievement in the study, practice, teaching and organisation of medicine, in Canada, the United States and England, rests squarely upon the two strong pillars of his science and his humanity.

In my miscellaneous reading I have discovered widespread acceptance of Osler's teaching about cases and persons, together with a growing alarm at the difficulties which make the teaching ever harder to follow. Let me cite as witnesses an Englishman, an Australian and an American. The Englishman is a distinguished surgeon, Sir Heneage Ogilvie, who has distilled his professional and personal experience into a book entitled No Miracles amongst Friends.<sup>3</sup> This book contains a particular interest for all those who have watched with compassion the ravages of that fierce enemy, cancer. It possesses also a general interest in accord with the theme of this lecture. 'The life of a surgeon', says Ogilvie, 'is one darned case after another'. Case work, as he understands it, signifies the scientific handling of experience. It rests upon observation; upon the classification of its results; upon its deliberate re-enactment by the experimental method—a

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Life of Sir William Osler, by Harvey Cushing; 2 vols., 1924; single vol. edition, 1940, p 54. The story of the old man with the hobnailed liver came from Osler's sister, Marian (Mrs. Osborne).

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London, 1959: see especially pp. 26, 34, 43, 152-3 and (on cancer) 72, 112-115.

method which you in your laboratories follow every day, but which I in my historical researches find few, if any, opportunities of following. Even so, you and I alike must admit the limitations of our methods: according to Ogilvie, one of the essentials of scientific medicine is the ability to recognise the point where experience, no matter how disciplined, reveals its insufficiency; where ignorance sets in. It may be that Osler had the same thought in mind when he told his students, as he was always wont to do, that their profession was not merely a science but also an art.<sup>4</sup> From both these viewpoints, the claims of human personality take a central place in the medical picture.

'We learn by experience', says Ogilvie, 'the simple truth that our task is to treat the patient and not the disease, that very often the trouble that is so obvious is not the trouble that is worrying the patient, or perhaps is just part and not the most important part, of a general derangement of function.'

If this is true, it must follow that to treat the patient merely as 'a case' is not only inhumane but also unscientific. Yet it is the inhumanity which sticks in Ogilvie's throat. He imagines an eminent surgeon telling one of his colleagues over drinks—

'There's a grand new operation for ulcer in the current number of the Patagonian Medical Journal. I'll get my registrar to lay on a couple of dozen duodenals and try it out.'

Then he imagines the retort—

'The twenty-four men who are to be "laid on" to prove or disprove the brain wave of an unknown Patagonian are fellow-men with immortal souls, human beings with their sorrows, hopes and fears, with wives and families to support. Life to them is sweet. They came to hospital in the blind faith implanted by the work of generations of honest doctors. They trust us to treat their bodies as we would treat our own, to tend them with all the skill and care we know. Each of these men is too important to be treated as one of a series. Each presents a problem that requires long and anxious thought before the right decision is reached and the right advice given.'

This, by and large, is the conclusion of my Australian witness, the late Herbert Moran, a surgeon of Sydney, who in two volumes of autobiography has painted a distinctly sombre picture of his profession.<sup>5</sup> The ill man, he says, 'is a person burdened with pain, afflicted with a grave disquiet, disturbed in mind, craving assistance....He wants that human understanding which an anonymous institution, however competent, can never give'. He tells himself that he and his professional brethren will be judged, not by 'our little learning, but by our great humanity'.<sup>6</sup> This affirmation, it seems to me, points the contrast too sharp. Patients look to their physicians and surgeons for learning and humanity in unity with each other. It seems to me that they are in the right. To treat the patient merely as a case, not as a person, is not only inhumane but also unscientific. The

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In the address Teacher and Student, reprinted with Aequanimitas and other essays, he said: 'There are two aspects in which we may view the teacher—as a worker and instructor in science; and as practitioner and professor of the art.'

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Viewless Winds (London 1939) and In My Fashion (London, 1946).

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Viewless Winds, pp. 313-320.

point is made with emphasis by my American witness, Dean Berry, of the Harvard Medical School.

'Our preoccupation with scientific medicine', he writes, 'has tended to let the patient fade into a faceless nebulous creature, often no more than a number on a test tube or an entry on a chart. Such an attitude is not consistent with the best medicine. Moreover, it is not "scientific".'

While the student is learning a great deal about the patient's 17 ketosteroids, undeniably important, he tends to overlook the patient's anxieties and hatreds, his attitudes in his family setting, and the pressures that hem him in. These, too, are important. They must receive greater attention. In brief, scientific medicine is a misnomer, I think, when it is exclusively preoccupied with the physical and chemical condition...

Man shall not live by bread alone—the orthodox medical sciences, though more and more important, are less and less the whole story.'<sup>7</sup>

It is not for me to assess the value of these self-criticisms. Let me merely say that every doctor whose aid I have invoked in time of trouble has possessed the gift of treating both the disease and the patient, the case and the person.

I personally owe a great deal to specialists; but I owe still more to general practitioners. It has been well said that the 'specialism' of a general practitioner lies in his personality.<sup>8</sup> He is a person to his patients and they are persons to him. So, at any rate, it used to be. But is it so still? In the books which I have been reading the lament continually arises that the G.P. is becoming increasingly a movements officer, with little more to do than pass his patients on to one or other of the neighbouring specialists. This specialist, in his turn, will quite likely pass on the patient to another specialist. If I may repeat a familiar quip—

'Yes', says the nose and throat specialist to a patient, 'your left tonsil needs taking out. I wish I could do it. But I only take out right tonsils.'

In my experience as a patient things are not nearly so bad as that. All the same, I cannot but take seriously the many complaints which I have heard, both from laymen and experts, about the increasing de-personalisation of medicine. Conservative people in England sometimes put all the blame upon the National Health Service; but this diagnosis can hardly be sufficient, seeing that Americans lament just as loudly the de-personalisation of medicine. Professor Richard Titmuss, whose Essays on 'The Welfare State' I most earnestly commend to you, lays stress upon the multiplying administrative complexities observable in every modern community which recognises the health of its people as a matter of public concern. In the United Kingdom, the National Health Service has added to these complexities and underlined them; but it has not created them; they may be studied with almost equal profit in the United States—for example, in the modern American hospital, which has justly been called 'one of the most complex and

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Quoted by Francis Cooke Macgregor in Social Science in Medicine (New York, 1960), p.26.

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Essays on 'The Welfare State', by Richard M. Titmuss (London 1958), p.191. As member of the team of war historians mentioned on p. 20 above, Titmuss wrote a book, Problems of Social Policy (London 1950) which combined meticulous case work with vivid human understanding.



dynamic instruments of modern society'.<sup>9</sup> Alas, it is only too easy, amidst all this complexity and dynamism, for human ends to get choked by administrative means; for the patient to feel lost, as a person, amongst all the experts who are treating and recording him as a case.

Insofar as this may be happening, the causes are to be sought, not merely in the widening ramifications of administration nor in the forward thrust of public policy, but in the acceleration of fundamental scientific research and its immense impact upon medical practice.

'As physics has split from chemistry', writes Titmuss, 'and as chemistry itself, for example, splits into so many parts that the specialist in one branch has difficulty in understanding the language of his colleague, so new problems arise from the division of medical labour. Existing specialisms become too broad for one man to comprehend or to practise as a separate skill....Surgical specialisms multiply inside the hospital. Clinical work divides and sub-divides by disease and its treatment (physical and psychological) by anatomic region, by the age of patients (pediatricians, geriatricians and so forth), and by the social or administrative setting (industrial, educational and so forth.)'<sup>10</sup>

Nobody, I imagine, is so naive as to imagine that this clock can be put back or that it would be a good thing to put it back. Science and the specialisms which it creates have given and are giving to humanity great boons in the mitigation and alleviation of sickness and suffering. At the same time, they have created difficult problems for practitioners of medicine—problems, for example, of the relationships between different branches of the profession and their relative rates of remuneration. They have created more difficult problems still for patients. As Titmuss puts it—

'An increase in the division of labour means that more people with different functions and skills to perform are brought into contact with the patient. Each separate function to be performed, for out-patient as well as in-patient, involves the sick person in a personal contact with more people—more "experts"...What is it that patients complain of more than anything else in relation to the hospital?—"No one told me anything"—"Nobody asked me"—"I don't know". How often one comes across people who have been discharged from hospital, bewildered, still anxious and afraid; disillusioned because the medical magic has not apparently or not yet yielded results, ignorant of what the investigations have shown, what the doctors think, what the treatment has been or is to be, and what the outlook is in terms of health....

Why Should all this be so?'<sup>11</sup>

It need not be so. Titmuss appeals to 'the greatest authority of all time on hospital administration', Florence Nightingale.

'In her Notes on Nursing, published in 1859, she wrote, "Apprehension, uncertainty, waiting, expectation, fear of surprise do a patient

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Dr Edward Churchill of the Massachusetts General Hospital, quoted by Titmuss, op.cit., p.119.

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Titmuss, op.cit., pp.187-8.

11

Ibid., pp.124-6.

more harm than any exertion. Remember he is face to face with his enemy all the time, internally wrestling with him, having long imaginary conversations with him". What remarkable insight for someone who spent most of her life administering and handling facts and figures.'<sup>12</sup>

If we in our generation are vouchsafed comparable insight, humanity and perseverance, we may feel confident of achieving victories comparable with those that were won a century ago in the England of Florence Nightingale.

In these more complicated times, however, individual devotion will not be enough; we shall also need team work. This brings me to the first practical suggestion which I venture to put to you this evening. When we are framing our budgets for research, let us remember that we need creative people of the Titmuss stamp. If, in our assault upon disease and suffering, we are to advance on all fronts, we must use not only the natural sciences, which enlarge our understanding of cases, but also the humanities and social sciences, which enlarge our understanding of persons: of the societies to which these persons belong and the social institutions (not least the hospitals) which minister to their needs.

How much room can be found for the humanities and social sciences in the teaching curricula of our Medical Schools? Some of you may be inclined to say, 'No room at all. Our curriculum is overcrowded already'. Maybe: but is this overcrowding really necessary? How much of it is due to low standards of lecturing? In all the Universities to which I have belonged there were lecturers who would waste weeks in the dreary enumeration of details. But surely this is wrong? It is understanding of principles, of methods, which your students will need, if and when the time comes for them to make themselves specialists.

I said 'your students'; but I might just as well have said 'my students'. Some students of history will become eminent specialists; but I see no reason in this for inflicting premature specialisation upon all of them. I underline the word premature. Specialisation, I am well aware is a necessity—at times it may be the glory—of our civilisation. For this very reason, I want to see it firmly grounded upon a broad base of principle and, so far as can be achieved, upon a common culture.

These ideals are not utopian. They can be achieved. Thirty years ago, when I was a professor in Adelaide, my Vice-Chancellor, Sir William Mitchell, made himself the advocate of a common matriculation for all Faculties—four basic subjects for everybody, he used to say: English as the medium of expression; a foreign language; mathematics; 'heat' (which was his shorthand for the physics which he wanted to see taught). Sir William used to say that the boys and girls of the matriculation class would still have time, after mastering these four basic subjects, to study history, or literature, or biology, or whatever it might be that attracted them. The practical people of that time said that these notions were moonshine; but now, just after he has reached his century, Sir William sees them embodied in principle, if not fully in detail, in the educational policy of South Australia.

If this South Australian experiment succeeds, we shall have proof that premature specialisation can be expelled from our schools. In our universities, we have a different problem to tackle. There, specialisation can no longer be postponed; indeed, it is presupposed by our organisation into Faculties—of Medicine, Engineering, Science, Architecture, Arts and the rest. What we have to do, therefore, is to provide within each Faculty a frame of reference broad enough to enable our students to see the significance of their specialist studies in relation to scientific principle and to the needs and aspirations of man as a social animal.

If I am right, it follows—so it seems to me—that you who belong to the Medical Faculty must think about ways and means of making some room for history. It may be different from the history which I used to teach to undergraduates; Hippocrates, Harvey, Florence Nightingale, Pasteur, Lister, Florey, may be in the centre of it. Still, it will be history. You may decide that you need it. That has been the decision of the Universities of Queensland and Adelaide, whose recent experiments in this direction I commend to your careful attention. It has been the desire of all the thoughtful medical men whose books I have recently been reading. Sir William Osler, that ardent student and bibliographer of medical history, used to invite his pupils into his library and adjure them to 'read for inspiration'.<sup>13</sup> Herbert Moran, with his customary gloom, used to lament that 'the average medical practitioner', because of his ignorance of history, was little more than a technician.<sup>14</sup> Hans Zinser, One of the outstanding bacteriologists of recent times and the author of that exciting book, Rats, Lice and History, used to declare that students and practitioners of medicine must jump the ruts of their 'grooved professionalism' in order to discover in man's spiritual and artistic experience the inspiration of their calling.<sup>15</sup> It was in history—not only in the reading but also in the writing of it—that Sir Charles Sherrington, that giant of modern physiology, used to seek his compass bearings as a scientist and a man.

I could go on for some time throwing examples at you; but I have an uneasy feeling that I have been talking out of my turn. You may think it presumptuous of me, an un instructed layman, to meddle so much with your problems. Still, I have been, and shall be again, a patient. I have also watched with wonder and gratitude the skill and tenderness with which doctors and nurses have ministered to persons whom I have loved. My experience has taught me to look upon the professions of healing as blessed among human callings.

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The Great Physician. A Short Life of Sir William Osler, by Edith Gittings Reid (O.U.P., 4th edition, 1947), p.27.

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Moran, In My Fashion, p.229.

15

As I Remember Him, by Hans Zinser (London, 1940), pp.194, 262, 312-13, 351-2.

## II

# Historians of War

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### 1. Charles Edwin Woodrow Bean\*

No military historian nowadays could hope for higher praise than to be told that his work will stand comparison with C.E.W. Bean's work. Bean edited the Australian Official History of the War of 1914-1918 and wrote six of its twelve volumes. The series could properly be called official because the Australian Government commissioned and financed it; but Bean claimed and received immunity from official censorship. Moreover he approached the official war reports with a Tolstoyan scepticism.

It has naturally been the tendency of military historians [he wrote in 1938] to regard the despatches of the high commanders as the most authoritative source of information—and so they are, or may be, as to matters that came within the commander's notice. But especially in the battles of the late War, the Commander-in-Chief—or even the commander of a battalion—had usually no personal knowledge of what happened when his troops were in contact with the enemy.

...Commanding officers, for example, constantly—and naturally—believed and reported that some movement made by their troops was the result of an order issued by them, when it had actually been initiated by a company commander or one of his men on the spot, before the order arrived—if it ever did.

Bean accepted the despatches of a commander as trustworthy evidence of what that commander had done or ordered to be done; but he considered them to be no more than hearsay evidence of what had happened in battle. As historian of Australian soldiers in battle, he made it his rule to seek evidence 'from the front line as well as from the rear'.

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In Memoriam for the Australian Humanities Research Council (Sydney University Press 1969).

By temperament he was a man of the front line and by training he had acquired the skills which a front-line historian needs. Born in 1879, he spent his early boyhood at Bathurst, where his father, an Englishman with a sound classical education, was headmaster of All Saints' College. In 1889 the father suffered a breakdown in health and went with his family to Europe; for the next two years the son was temporarily exempt from school. He spent the winters in Brussels learning French and drawing, and making frequent visits to the battlefield of Waterloo. In 1891 he resumed his formal education at his father's new school in Essex; in 1894 he went as a boarder to Clifton; in 1898 he won a classical scholarship to Hertford College, Oxford. After graduation he sat for the Indian Civil Service examination but just missed a place. He then read for the bar examinations and in 1903 became a barrister of the Inner Temple. Next year he returned to Australia. He was discovering himself as a man in love with two soils.

Contemporaneously he was discovering himself as a man in love not with the law but with writing. He wrote a book on the theme of an Australian returning to his native land, failed to get the book published, but quarried eight articles from it for the Sydney Morning Herald. On the basis of that small success and after taking counsel with Banjo Paterson he decided to make journalism his career. He equipped himself with shorthand, took a reporter's job on the Herald and rapidly achieved a position of trust on the staff. How he tackled his tasks may be seen in some sentences that he wrote years later about an investigation into the wool industry which the editor asked him to make in 1910.

I thought it a dull subject...still it had to be done and one day it struck me—the industry can be described by describing the processes, which is dull; but it can surely also be described by telling of the life's work of the men who are engaged in the processes—the boss of the sheep station, the shearer, the boundary rider. If you tell of the boundary rider you must tell of his work.

On the same principle, Bean in his maturity demonstrated that telling of the soldier and telling of the soldier's work were one and the same thing.

His articles on the wool industry grew into those two small classics of pastoral Australia, On the Wool Track and Dreadnought of the Darling. When war came in 1914 his fellow journalists nominated him for appointment as official war correspondent with the AIF. He was ashore at Anzac Cove on the first day. On 6 August, when the Anzacs were attacking the slopes of the Sari Bair range, he stopped a Turkish bullet in his right leg. In the opinion of his helper and friend, A.W. Beazley, it was just as well that he did stop it, for in the darkness he had got ahead of the advance and was heading straight for the Turkish lines.

His achievements as a war correspondent had their root in the relations of absolute trust which he established with officers and men at every level and in every activity of the AIF. In France, he made it his practice before each attack to establish himself in a shell hole or some other convenient front-line position. There, as the battle proceeded, he would make his sketches and record his observations and—as opportunity offered—his interviews. These records became indispensable material for the histories that he wrote later. Not even Xenophon could have improved upon his courageous, patient and skilled work as participant-observer.

Yet it must not be inferred from this that he undervalued the records. He once measured the documentation of the fighting at Pozieres and settled himself to the task of reading every paper within a heap 4 ft x 2 ft at the base and 2 ft high. It is to him, more than to any other man, that Australians owe not only their War Memorial but also their Commonwealth Archives. In documentary research, as in all the other skills of the military historian, he was a master craftsman.

The last volume of his war history appeared in 1942. He wrote on the last page

The Old Force passed down the road to history. The dust of its march settled. The sound of its arms died. Upon a hundred battlefields the broken trees stretched their lean arms over sixty thousand of its graves....

What these men did nothing can alter now. The good and the bad, the greatness and smallness of their story will stand. Whatever of glory it contains nothing now can lessen. It rises, as it will always rise, above the mists of ages, a monument to great-hearted men; and, for their nation, a possession for ever.

Yet it required the skill, persistence and devotion of C.E.W. Bean to make that possession secure for the Australian nation.

## 2. The History of Our Times\*

The invitation to give this lecture came to me first from Professor Laski, who died last March and is deeply missed both in the great School that the Webbs founded and in the political party that has absorbed so much of their thought. Another name is in our minds today, that of George Bernard Shaw, whose death early this month has reminded us that early-Fabian England, in which the Webbs began their wonderful partnership, though far removed from us in its social structure and outlook, is not, after all, so very remote in time. In this room today are men and women who have enjoyed the friendship of Sidney and Beatrice Webb and shared their work of social study and political action. This experience I never had. They had written their pioneering books of English social history before I had outgrown 'bushrangers' and the other favourite games of Australian urchins, and they had made history in this country before I came here. Nor can I now produce from my store of study anything that closely touches their work. But this, Professor Laski assured me, would not have troubled the Webbs. No founders of a great school were ever less proprietorial. Life, they believed, must go on and thought must open up new paths; in uniformity of doctrine there is no virtue but in good craftsmanship there is much. They would not have taken it amiss that the first lecture of this series should be a craftsman's report.

I hope that my audience will not take it amiss if I present my report, or some part of it, in the first person singular. I am well aware that this form of address can become irritating if it is too frequently employed; a friend of mine once commented in a three-word curse upon a draft I had shown him: "Damn your I's", he said. But sometimes a forthright 'I' and 'you' are less annoying in speech and print than 'the lecturer' and the 'intelligent audience' and the other stock figures of deprecatory communication. Today I shall choose the handiest forms of speech for reporting to you my own experience in 'the history of our times'.

What does the phrase mean? Precision in the use of words is not, unfortunately, an ordinary virtue of the historical profession. Some American historians, a few years back, appointed a research officer to classify the meanings commonly given to some fifty words the profession favours; but the investigation revealed such wild inconsistencies of usage and abuse that the historians called in a philosopher to tell them the meanings they ought to give to these words, or at least to some of them. Fortified by his advice, they tried to draw up a code of practice. They wrote down some meanings which properly belong to the word history itself: 'history-as-actuality', or things that have happened; 'written history', or the books and articles that historians produce; 'recorded history', or the documents on which written history is based.<sup>1</sup> The list of permissible usages was a bit longer than this; but it did not include the splendid

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The Webb Memorial Lecture delivered on 21 November 1950, published by The Athlone Press, University of London, 1951.

original meaning that has not grown stale in all the centuries that separate us from Herodotus—'history-as-inquiry', or, as we say nowadays, research. This is the meaning I shall most emphasize today. And 'the history of our times'? The complete phrase, as I shall use it, does not mean research into the present as distinct from the past. All history is of the past. Thucydides tells us that he began his history of the Peloponnesian War 'at the moment when it broke out'; but that moment, surely, was already past before he could begin to find out what happened in its passing. To Thucydides as historian it was not the events that were present, but evidence about the events—the evidence of the participants and witnesses (himself sometimes included) whom he called for cross-examination. Nowadays, the historian is trained to cross-examine documents rather than persons. But suppose the men who wrote the documents are still alive? They will be able to answer the historian back; they will turn the cross-examination into a reciprocal thing. This stimulating and salutary discipline was, no doubt, familiar to Thucydides. I shall say more about it later on; here I merely mention it in order to make my theme clear. The history of our times, as I shall use the phrase today, signifies research into a past so close to me that I may call to evidence not merely documents, but men.

This kind of history was orthodox once, but nowadays is a trifle heretical. Fortunately, we historians are a tolerant brotherhood; we don't rend and tear each other as some cannibal anthropologists do; we hold fast to the motto: dog doesn't eat dog. We do, however, snap at each other just a little. The history of our times is a favourite bone of mine which some dogs of my pack would like me to drop, not because they want it themselves but because they think it's a rather nasty bone which no good dog ought to gnaw; they snap at me for my own good. Why can't I go back to my nice Italian bone? Well, this other bone happens to have come my way and I have found nothing wrong with it.

Historians who dislike the history of our times have committed themselves very little in print.<sup>2</sup> So far as I can make out, their objections fall under two heads: first, difficulties of approach to the historical evidence; secondly, difficulties of the evidence itself. Under the first head, the historian is told that perspective and detachment are his proper virtues but that he cannot exercise them upon events which are close to him in time; he cannot see the wood for the trees; he cannot even see the trees clearly, because his vision is clouded by a mist of feeling. Under the second head, he is told that he ought to wait until the archives are open to him: alternatively, if they are open to him, he is told that he ought still to wait until time has curtailed their unmanageable bulk.

Now, one cannot easily discuss evidence and the historian's approach to it as quite separate things; but I may as well begin the discussion with a few sceptical questions about detachment and perspective. Is it true that historians and their readers find it progressively easier to govern their emotions and prejudices as events recede in time? Marc Bloch tells a cautionary tale about two teachers of his youth. 'After 1830, one of them used to say, 'there's no history ... only

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1  
Theory and Practice in Historical Study. A Report of the Committee on Historiography, Social Science Research Council, New York, 1946. See especially the opening statement by Charles A. Beard, and Sidney Hook's discussion of words.

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Professor V.H. Galbraith grumbled a little in his inaugural lecture, History and the State (Oxford, 1948). Professor Herbert Butterfield has stated his suspicions more fully (though chiefly with regard to the publication of Foreign Office documents) in a paper entitled 'Official History: Its Pitfalls and Its Criteria'. This paper was read at Trinity College, Dublin, on 14 December, 1948, and published in Studies, June, 1949.



politics.' The other used to warn him: 'You're safe enough in the nineteenth century; but look out for trouble when you get back to the wars of religion!' I once had the experience of having my lectures boycotted by a sect which disliked my handling of Calvin's Institutes; the Communist party could do no more about my lectures on Lenin's Imperialism. Sometimes we attach ourselves with zest to the men and the books and the great causes of other times; sometimes the happenings of our own time leave us completely bored. Distance in time does not always make our detachment cooler.<sup>3</sup> Does it make our perspective truer? Precisely how far must events recede before the perspective is perfect? Professor Geyl's review of Buonapartist studies hardly encourages us to believe that each successive generation achieved a clearer view of Napoleon than its predecessor did.<sup>4</sup> Or consider what successive generations have said about the causes of the American Civil War: one fashion of interpretation has followed another; historians at one time have emphasized the conspiracies of wicked men, at another time the conflict of groups with their separate interests and ideologies, at another time the psychological stuff of popular passion and bungling leadership—and within each fashion the old sympathies and antipathies of North and South have persisted.<sup>5</sup> This failure to achieve finality need not depress us unless we fool ourselves with the illusion that somewhere in time there exists for every historical problem the perfect vantage point of vision. Our successors, if they tackle the same problems as we do, will see them in different proportions, but not necessarily in truer ones. To cite an example: the history of the British coal industry in this century may take a very different shape if it is re-written at some future time when the tides and atomic energy are supplying the power to drive British factories; but meanwhile, there is nothing to prevent us from finding a clear perspective at the other end—that is to say, in the nineteenth century, from which the British coal industry has inherited so many of the problems that vex it today.<sup>6</sup>

But will not the historical materials defeat us? You will remember that this objection takes two forms, which demand separate treatment. It is said, in the first place, that the historian cannot practice his craft competently so long as the archives are closed to him. Is this objection valid?

Every historian—indeed, every scientific worker—has to distinguish between some questions which it is silly to formulate because the evidence permits no answer to them, and other questions which may be asked and in some degree answered, provided the available evidence is handled intelligently. The closed archives—whether they belong to His Majesty's Government or Messrs. Unilever Ltd.—contain the records of many important transactions; but other important transactions have left an unconcealed deposit of record. The confidence with which we may tackle the historical problems of our time is bound to vary with the nature and location of the evidence.

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See Marc Bloch, Apologie pour l'histoire ou metier d'historien (Paris, 1949), pp. 11-16.

4

Napoleon: For or Against, by P. Geyl (trans. G. Renier) (London, 1949).

5

See Howard K. Beale, 'What Historians have said about the Causes of the Civil War'. (In Theory and Practice of Historical Study.)

6

See Coal, by W.H.B. Court (History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series).

A great deal of evidence is already available about international relations between the two wars, and historians have already made good use of it. They need to use it with circumspection. Although Professor Namier has told us that many important secrets of state are already in print, we must remember that many others are still withheld from print. Some states, by publishing their own diplomatic documents and 'enemy documents' that they have captured, are rapidly extending the opportunities for historical knowledge; but other states are not so obliging. Moreover, diplomatic documents, even when they are competently and honestly edited (as they are in this country), do not by themselves tell everything that is relevant to the course of foreign policy: for example, a British cabinet, at a time of international crisis, will consider what comes to it from the Chiefs of Staff as well as what comes from the Foreign Office. For these and other reasons I should feel bound, if I were a diplomatic historian, to exercise some restraint in explaining the course of British foreign policy in the years preceding the Second World War. Still more should I feel bound to caution in explaining what the Russians intended. This does not mean that it is too early to publish books on the history of international relations from 1919 to 1939; it means simply that the writers of these books should take special pains (as good historians always do) to warn their readers when the evidence is getting thin and intelligent speculation, rather than firmly grounded knowledge, is holding the narrative together.

There are other fields in which the historian's task is comparatively straightforward. I did not often feel frustrated for lack of evidence when I was examining constitutional change in the British Commonwealth between the two wars. Even this story, it is true, has diplomatic byways which are still hidden away in the archives; but anybody may follow the main highway of record, for it is open. Anybody can read the Statute of Westminster and the long constitutional series in which it is a landmark. Anybody can read the Irish constitutional documents from the disruption of the United Kingdom up to the time of republican secession. If we want legal comment on these documents, we can find as much of it as we care to handle. If we want to get beneath law into politics, we can study the Hansards of three parliaments and as many newspapers and pamphlets as we care to digest; moreover, we can get in Dublin and Belfast and the country villages as much talk as we want, with or without whiskey. And we can strike an alliance with the political scientists, who nowadays are refining their methods of measuring the movements of public opinion.<sup>7</sup> There is thus a great deal of constitutional and political history that may be investigated and written before the archives are fully opened. This written history will not, of course, be final and complete; but no written history, whatever its period may be, ever is final and complete.

The economic history of our own times ought certainly to be tackled now. The economists, in their own way, are tackling it; if we historians tell them that we are too high-minded to go beyond 1900 or 1920, they will conclude that we are too timorous. And they will be right. Incompleteness of the evidence has not prevented economic historians from writing many useful books and articles—we still need more—about the rise of new industries, the migrations of capital and labour, the level of real wages, the fluctuations and main trends of the British economy during the first half of the nineteenth century. For the first half of the twentieth century we can already find evidence upon these same problems that is both more plentiful and more systematic. When I was investigating economic policy within the British Commonwealth between the two wars, I found myself more frequently vexed by my own shortcomings as an analyst of economic evidence than by gaps in the evidence itself. Is it not more seemly for historians to prove

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See, for example, R.B. McCallum and A. Readman, The British General Election of 1945 (London, 1947).

their capacity to handle the materials they already have than to make a noisy fuss about the absence of other materials, which they might be incompetent to handle?

The fuss is sometimes disingenuous. Those historians who contend that nothing can be done, so long as the archives are closed, do not always change their tune when they are opened. For the past nine years, the archives of twenty departments of government have been open to me and to my colleagues who have been studying the economic, social and administrative performance of the United Kingdom during the Second World War. The conservatives, if they were consistent, ought to be crying to us, 'Go to it!' Instead, they still cry, 'Wait! Your documents are now too many. Wait until time has reduced their unmanageable bulk!'

To English archivists, bulk is a familiar bugbear; in the new Guide to the Public Records it is calculated that an indexer handling fifty documents a day would need one million days, or two thousand years, to get through all the documents already in the Public Record Office. But think of what is coming to the Public Record Office! The Deputy Keeper has calculated that the mass of unweeded documents now 'in the limbo' between Whitehall and Chancery Lane occupies sixteen miles of shelf-space—just about the same area as accommodates all the records of English history accumulated from the very beginning.<sup>8</sup> The Deputy Keeper's calculation is too flattering. According to what I have been told, one single department, the Board of Trade, has erected sixteen miles of shelves to hold its twelve million files of war-historical material. Can you not picture the wretched historian wandering up and down these sixteen miles, flicking through a file here and grubbing at another there? Won't somebody buy him a motor bicycle? But how will he know when to get off? Perhaps he would do better never to get on. Let him leave the job to his grandson. Time, the great weeder, will somehow or other reduce these miles of paper to furlongs or chains with which a hard-working grandson may be able to cope.

In this country, Time does his weeding through the agency of officials working by rules. The Public Record Act of 1875 declares: 'It is expedient to prevent the Public Record Office from being encumbered with documents of not sufficient value to justify their preservation in the Public Record Office.' In accordance with the powers conferred upon him by this Act and subject to the safeguards laid down, the Master of the Rolls has made rules for the destruction, or the disposal in some other way, of the 'insufficiently valuable' documents. Unfortunately, the criteria of value are variable and subjective: for example, our own generation values the documents of economic history more than its predecessor did, but it has been deprived of many important series because the weeders and inspecting officers of an earlier generation thought them insufficiently valuable for deposit in the Public Record Office. Our generation, in its turn, will no doubt do a good many things that its successors will regret. Moreover, the task of the weeder is far more burdensome in our day than it used to be. When the Act of 1875 was passed, departmental staffs were still reckoned by the hundreds and copying was still by hand; but nowadays the staffs are reckoned by thousands or tens of thousands and the typewriters of many devoted girls copy everything in triplicate. This is a new situation and I doubt whether the old procedures of the Public Record Acts can cope with it. It certainly got out of hand during the war. Some of the most precious grain of war-historical record never got into the registered files and therefore may never come to the Public Record Office: conversely, in the registered files of the war period there are tares by the million; but good wheat is mingled with the tares. How can they be separated?

There exists no perfect solution for this problem. Imperfect solutions will no doubt be found some day; but finding and applying them will take time and meanwhile some of the good wheat will be lost. Here is one compelling reason for some

of us to get to work at once. The books we produce, imperfect though they are bound to be, will create a body of 'accepted history'—it is Professor Renier's phrase<sup>9</sup>—which historians of a later age may use as the starting-point of their researches and revisions. I do not see how our successors will ever get anywhere unless we do some pioneering now.<sup>10</sup> Suppose that fifty years from now the wartime records of the Board of Trade are thrown open to research workers in the Public Record Office, and suppose that judicious weeding has meanwhile reduced them from twelve million files to three million—or, if you prefer the other measurement, from sixteen miles of shelves to four miles? These four miles will still be quite a hopeless journey for historians if they don't know where to begin. How does an historian ever begin? He begins by asking useful questions. If he can't think of any, he won't make historical sense even of a single charter; if he can think of plenty, he will make sense even of the massed records of the Board of Trade. The most compelling reason for attacking these records now is that questions are easy to come by now; indeed, there are many questions that are clamouring to be answered.

How are the answers to be pursued and found—or sometimes found? What is the method? If I am to give a brief and clear report about method, I must lapse into autobiography, going back to the autumn of 1941, when I was called to an historical parish consisting of twenty departments of government. Each of these departments was putting ink to paper no less zealously than the Board of Trade: each, moreover, was linked with other agencies—subordinate controls, local authorities, county agricultural committees, industries—whose experience was an essential part of war-historical evidence. The parish was certainly too vast for a single pastor! Before long I was permitted to look for colleagues to the number of ten—half an historian to a department. Towards the end of the war our numbers were appreciably increased, but they still remained small in comparison with the work we were struggling to do. All the same, I hope to show that our task—assuming our willingness to work with fanatical application—has been no more unmanageable than the task that any other team of historians might set itself in any other period.

One of the first things the editor had to do was to identify the subjects, potentially the books in a series, that would occupy individual historians. This job proved quite manageable. It is a commonplace of British archivists that a correspondence exists between the structure of the state and the run of record: a history of the public records will show by reflection the way in which the institutions of government have taken shape; conversely, if you know how the government is organized, you will know where to look for the main classes of record. This rule, of course, cannot be applied mechanically; in twentieth-century war history it would not work well on a simple departmental basis—one department,

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History: Its Purpose and Method, by G.J. Renier (London, 1950) pp. 88-93. Professor Renier wisely insists that 'to learn, one has to know a great deal already'. Accepted history, 'the story of civilized human societies down to the present day as told by historians', is the starting-point of new research and also its returning-point: both in its details and its focus, the story is accepted on the condition that it is subject to constant emendation.

10

Since the records of the Board of Trade, even in peacetime, are accumulating at the rate of a quarter of a million a year, and since other departments are multiplying their records similarly, a case might be argued for keeping historians at work on the problems of peace as well as those of war. They might then play some part in weeding material for the Public Record Office. These questions, however, are too far-reaching for discussion in this lecture.

one history. At the time of the First World War, three departments were closely concerned with the blockade, and three histories of the blockade were written; unfortunately, each department believed that its own history was the only authentic one. There are many other spheres of governmental activity in which the main problems overlap departmental boundaries. This indeed is a matter of common experience. In 1940, ordinary manufacturers were bothered by the conflicting claims that different departments made upon their resources of materials, manpower and plant; ordinary citizens, when they were bombed out, had to make a weary round from one set of offices to another before they could fit together the broken pieces of their daily lives. What ordinary people felt was realized, with varying degrees of promptitude, in Whitehall. The committee structure built around the War Cabinet transcended departmental separatism and thereby focused study and action upon the central problems of the nation at war—production, shipping, civil defence and so on. The records of these committees, since they were confined to the salient issues of policy, were manageable in bulk. By studying them, an editor could quickly get a pretty good view of the main highroads of research.<sup>11</sup> Sometimes these highroads would lead into territory that was common to many departments; at other times a single department might have two separate highroads running through it.<sup>12</sup>

What would the historian do when he entered a department and found that its records were measured in miles? He too would need a plan of work. He too would soon discover that the organization of government is a useful guide (though not an infallible one) to its functions and its records. If he were wise, he would make it his first task, not to read paper but to meet people. He would interview the heads of divisions or sections and ask them some very simple questions: 'What are your main tasks and problems? What used they to be?' Of course, these questions would invite autobiography, which as historical evidence has defects that we all know; but at this stage of his work the historian would be seeking not so much the evidence, as clues to its location. So he would ask a concluding question: 'What records have been left by the activities you have described?' Then he would go away to sample the records. Within a few weeks he would have notes of many conversations and clues to many lines of record. Where necessary, he could study these notes alongside others that had been similarly collected in departments with overlapping interests. Then he could make the first rough plan of his history. The men with whom he had been talking would be very willing, if they were asked, to say whether or not they thought it made sense. Of course, it could make at best only provisional sense. Historical investigation is not engineering. The historian's plan is not a blue-print; it is a useful and necessary way of getting an inquiry started, not an attempt to predetermine its course.<sup>13</sup>

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An American editor would have had a more difficult task, for the United States administration has not yet reached what we in this country may call the post-Hankey age: that is to say, it has not yet equipped itself systematically with those instruments of oversight and central control which are a convenience not only to the co-ordinators of policy but to its historians.

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War production, for example, was a very large historical subject that for its adequate treatment would demand many volumes; it was closely interwoven with the records of four government departments at least. On the other hand, one department, the Ministry of War Transport, provided material for separate histories of land transport and shipping. Moreover, it proved convenient to link the tanker story with the oil story—i.e. with the records of the Ministry of Fuel and Power.

The course of investigation has varied from department to department: some historians have been able to work steadily along continuous lines of record, but others have had to struggle with a dispersed and intractable documentation. How have they coped with its vast bulk? All of them, I think, have used similar tactics of selection, discard and concentration. The experienced historian, whatever his period may be, always knows that he cannot know everything. There are some lines of research which he can safely leave to 'the Ph.D.s' of a future time; there are others which he need not pursue beyond the point where accumulation of detail yields steeply diminishing returns. For example, of those twelve million files of the Board of Trade, approximately three million record individual applications for export licenses: the historian of civil industry and commerce will need to explain the objectives, phases and methods of export licensing, but to do this he need consult only a very small sample drawn from the three million files. Similar opportunities of discard, though not always on the same scale, will present themselves elsewhere. In this we may see the operation of a tendency to which Professor Galbraith has drawn attention: as the records grow in bulk, the importance of the series tends to increase and that of the individual document to decrease.<sup>14</sup> If this tendency is sometimes a merciful dispensation even to the medievalist, you can guess what it can mean to the modernist. It can save him from going crazy. But it cannot save him from the need to work with close concentration upon the detail of his chosen problems. Afflicted though he is by the great weight of record, he will sometimes find himself held up because he cannot trace a particular document. Sometimes he may even set about manufacturing a document for his own special use! Does this sound sinister? In case it does, I had better give you an example. During the war, considerable success was achieved in narrowing the gap between the programmes that were made for importing specific commodities and the arrival of these commodities in British ports; but the records of the Ministry of War Transport were not compiled in such a way as to measure the extent of the progress that was achieved. My colleague on the shipping history believed that exact knowledge of so important an achievement would be valuable, and she convinced the Ministry's statisticians that it might be grasped. They attacked the statistical records together and made a new historical document—a list of commodities, with the import programmes and arrivals for successive years recorded in columns and with a final column showing the margins of difference, plus or minus, between plan and achievement. In its accuracy and clarity this is a beautiful document. Its existence adds something substantial not only to historical knowledge but to the administrative brain. It demonstrates the creative partnership which historians and administrators may achieve with each other.

I must briefly discuss the terms and procedures of this partnership, which is something of a stumbling-block to some distant critics of 'official history'. What these critics have expected and perhaps still expect is the kind of history that pliant historians will write in order to please strong-minded bureaucrats—or seductive ones, who bind the historians (I quote a critic's *ipsissima verba*) 'with soft charms and with subtle, comfortable chains'. These subtle, charming, formidable officials stroll past the historians at tea parties and let them know, 'with nothing more than a hint or a wink', what they must not put into their

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A good many of the plans referred to above were made by the editor before the historians were appointed, and subsequently modified by them when they came to grips with their research problems.

## 14

Studies in the Public Records, by V.H. Galbraith (Thos. Nelson and Sons, 1949), p. 26.

books.<sup>15</sup> How enchanting I should find these tea parties! Alas, I have not been bidden to any. The critic's delicious fancies and my own unglamorous experience make a sad contrast.

But let me not evade a serious question because it is put in a silly way. Is it true that historians best protect the integrity of their judgment by holding themselves aloof from the men who can speak to them about their problems—either through the records of a distant past or face to face, here and now? Many years ago I argued in print that attachment, not detachment, is the historian's first virtue.<sup>16</sup> I meant by this that he needs a warm sympathy as well as a cool head and that, before delivering his Olympian judgments, he should make himself closely intimate with the people of his history and the things they were trying to do. This conviction first came to me when I was studying Italian political history during the revolutions of the nineteenth century; it has been strengthened by my study of British economic history during the Second World War. I feel completely certain that historians enjoying free access to British official records of the recent past are likely to make their worst mistakes by missing chances to talk with the persons who made the documents. In my experience, distance rather than intimacy is the chief cause of historical error. Intimacy, no doubt, has its own dangers. In all periods of historical study, its claims may become exclusive and partisan if they are not closely watched. In the period and in the milieu that I have been discussing these claims might become corrupting if they were left undefined. The historian who practises his craft inside a government office needs to know very clearly what he is called upon to do and what he is not called upon to do; what his duties are and what his rights are.

On the civil side of the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office we have had this firm knowledge. It was the editor's job to draft instructions for himself and his colleagues and to submit them, if they raised questions of principle, to a committee of officials meeting under the chairmanship of a minister, and to an advisory committee of eminent British historians. The instructions, thus composed, have told us the things we have needed to know about our rights and duties, our objectives and procedures. In the early days of our research, when publication was only a distant possibility, they told us to write in such a way as 'to fund experience for government use'. They went on to tell us that our writing would not achieve this purpose unless we followed the proved critical methods of the historical profession, not only in matters of technique, such as the citation of documents, but also in matters of substance. It was our business not to tell a 'success story', but to examine critically the main problems that confronted administrators, the methods proposed and adopted for tackling them, and the results achieved. These were the rules of our game. The civil servants got used to them. Many civil servants, as I suggested earlier, have helped us to play our game intelligently.

When the Government decided to publish a series of histories, some additional rules had to be made. They could not always be foreseen in advance of experience and they were not always made easily. Perhaps for this very reason they now add up to a pretty firm code of practice.

The first rule of the United Kingdom War Histories is printed opposite the title page of every volume in the 'Civil' series:

The authors of the Civil Histories have been given free access to official documents. They and the editor are alone responsible for the

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See Professor Butterfield's article in Studies, June, 1949, p. 136.

16

'A Note on Mary Kingsley', republished in Politics in Pitcairn (Macmillan 1947).

statements made and the views expressed.

This means that the historians write their books under the control of the editor, not that of government departments.

However, the editor is producing his series under a commission from the government and in accepting this commission he accepted some self-denying ordinances on his own behalf and that of his colleagues. These limitations have already been explained in published print; but one of them may be cited here, since an impetuous reviewer has declared it to be both unnecessary and damaging.<sup>17</sup> This reviewer would like to see the United Kingdom's War Histories plentifully bespattered with the names of the civil servants who served their country well. But, if the historians allowed themselves the luxury of issuing top marks to some civil servants, it would be hard for them to refrain from issuing lower marks to others, and a disposition might grow up among civil servants to relax their concentration upon public business and give part of their attention to the things likely to be said about them by the historians who are following them so close at heel. The rule of an impersonal civil service, like the rule of collective Cabinet responsibility, is so essential to the good working of our constitution that the historians who enjoy full access to the official records should not claim the liberty to impair it. But this is not all. If the rule did not exist in our country's constitutional practice, I should wish to invent it for my own historical practice. Pen portraits of civil servants may have their day later on; but the historian who is trying to wring meaning from those twelve million files of the Board of Trade has for the present more urgent tasks to perform.

What about 'security'? In commissioning these histories, the government presumably decided that our people have more to gain by self-knowledge than they have to lose by revealing themselves a little more (for a country which enjoys freedom of speech and printing inevitably reveals a great deal) to hostile eyes. Nevertheless, our times are hazardous and it would be the duty of officials to challenge the publication of war-historical research if they were deeply convinced that publication would endanger the state. On the other hand, the editor has pledged himself that the work to be published in his series will be full and frank, within those limits that have been defined in the preface to the first volume, or may be defined in prefaces to future volumes.<sup>18</sup> Perhaps there may still be scope for some further definitions which would not involve conflict between official duty and historical duty; but I suppose one ought to envisage the possibility of circumstances arising in which the Government might reverse its decision to publish the war histories, or the editor might decide that he could no longer accept responsibility for his series.

This is speculation: as the facts now stand, it is the duty of the historians to produce, for publication, work which is 'accurate in fact, penetrating in analysis, balanced in judgment and proportion, clear in statement'. I quote these phrases from a document which was drawn up to guide discussion upon the advanced draft of a book whose merits and demerits as history were pretty hotly disputed. The parties to all discussion of this kind are the historian, the editor, and officials who have read and criticized the draft. Their criticisms are in effect a challenge to the historian to re-examine the evidence in support

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See The Economic Journal, March 1950, p. 114: review by Austen Robinson of British War Economy, by W.K. Hancock and M.M. Gowing. The preface to this book, which was the first of the Civil Series to be published, explains the self-denying ordinances referred to above.

18

See again the preface to British War Economy.



of facts and interpretations which seem open to question. The process of re-examination may be long or short; but it must always follow the methods in which historians are trained. Some criticisms are likely to be proved valid, others invalid. Sometimes it may be necessary to emphasize still further facts and interpretations that have been challenged; sometimes it may be necessary to correct and revise them. Whatever the upshot, the book when it appears will bear more firmly than before the stamp of historical value.

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One might at this point reflect upon a system of government which accepts historical truth as a value to be pursued. If the lecture were to take this course, its end would be political philosophy.

If somebody with a different training were giving the lecture, its end might be epistemology; for it has raised questions which concern the nature of historical knowledge as well as the means of acquiring it. But today's lecturer is a craftsman. He has been presenting a matter-of-fact report and the most useful thing he can now do is to indicate a few practical problems which arise from it. Team work is the first of these problems and it leads naturally to the second: mutual aid between historians and social scientists.

Team work nowadays is very much in fashion and inevitably so; for when the evidence is great in bulk it can only be mastered if the efforts of many workers are combined. Yet combination means direction—whereas experience seems to show that the best work is done by individuals exercising their own initiative. I believe that this dilemma can be overcome if individuals are given responsibility for large tasks within the larger task of the team. It is a good thing for a man to write his own book. If he is working in a lively team he should be able to write a better book than the one he would produce in isolation; for just as he helps his neighbours in the team, so also do they help him. I believe that this maxim is valid not only for the seniors who write the big books but also for the juniors who are receiving apprenticeship training. They can be taught how to draft chapters, which will be trial exercises for the books of their own that they will write later on. Of course, one sometimes meets persons who are happiest and most useful when they are 'devilling' for somebody else: workers of this stamp are a godsend and their help should always be fully acknowledged. Most research assistants, however, will want sooner or later to attempt a consecutive task. To deny them the chance is both wasteful and inhumane. If it is right that people should serve purposes larger than their own, it is also right that they should be treated as ends and not as means.

That particular team whose activities I have described today has been very diverse; it has included workers trained in economics, the law, public administration, social statistics and a good many types of history. In consequence, I have been moved to reflect a little about the relationship between history—a firmly established discipline—and the newer 'social sciences' which nowadays are expanding so rapidly in our universities and institutes. Perhaps I can give my reflections point by referring to the doctrine of the late R.G. Collingwood, a philosopher-historian who went almost to the length of denying any validity at all to the social sciences, as distinct from history.<sup>19</sup>

According to Collingwood, the method pursued by students of physical nature—who observe particular things from the outside, group them into classes, and link them together in relations of cause and effect—becomes unsatisfactory when it is

copied by students of human nature. The events which the former observe can be described in terms of bodies and their movements; but events which the latter observe must also be described in terms of mind: as Collingwood puts it, they have an 'inside' as well as an 'outside'. The student of men in their societies, unlike the student of physical nature, may begin at the outside of the event but must penetrate to the inside—to the thought of human agents. When an investigator has discovered that Caesar crossed the Rubicon at a certain date, his work is merely beginning: to complete it he does not collect and classify other river-crossings made by other rebellious commanders, but tries to think out the problem—let us say the constitutional problem—which Caesar was attempting to solve. In short, he works as an historian.

In Collingwood's view, the social sciences have no meaning outside of history. Although their practitioners may observe and measure and classify certain types—economic, political, religious—of human behaviour, these types recur 'only so long as minds of the same kind are placed in the same kind of situations': that is to say, only so long as the same kind of social structure persists.<sup>20</sup> But a social structure is an historical fact. It follows that Aristotle's reflections on the causes of revolutions, Machiavelli's maxims about the expansion of sovereign power, or Adam Smith's observations upon the division of labour, are not the laws or even the hypotheses of a timeless social science; they are time-bound observations about the city states of classical Greece, the principalities and republics of Renaissance Italy, the capitalist society of Britain on the eve of the Industrial Revolution.

We may applaud Collingwood's attachment to the thought that lies on the inner side of human action: indeed, we may go further than he did (for in this matter he was austere intellectualist) and try to understand not only the mental texture but also the emotional tone of human behaviour.<sup>21</sup> Anthropologists, like historians, seem to work this way. But other social scientists do seem too often to work merely upon the outside of events. Some economists, for example, give the impression of not knowing the masters and the men, the getters and the spenders of whom they discourse, but of merely knowing about them: their reasoned system of knowledge (*savoir*) lacks the foundation of close acquaintance (*connaitre*).<sup>22</sup> Knowledge by acquaintance is the historian's strength and in pursuing it he engages his whole personality—not only his reasoning faculties, important though they are, but also his affections and the experience he has gathered in leading a full life.<sup>23</sup> History is therefore a remedy for that remoteness from

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Op. Cit. p.223.

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Collingwood (op. cit., pp. 302, 308-9) insists that the subject-matter of history is confined not merely to thought but to reflective or conscious thought: nor is the historian concerned with the 'immediacy' of the experience in which this conscious thought is embedded. I cannot accept this. As an historian I feel myself concerned not merely with the thoughts, but with the feelings of Frenchmen in 1793 or Englishmen in 1940. I also believe that a skilful historian, without lapsing into rhetoric, can tell a story which at least suggests the quality of these feelings.

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William James, in *The Principles of Psychology* (London, 1891), Vol.I, p. 221, emphasizes this distinction between 'knowledge about' and 'knowledge by acquaintance' and points out that English is almost the only language that has not distinct words for these distinct things.

life into which social scientists, with all their counting and classifying and abstracting, can so easily drift.

To state this is not to support Collingwood in his attack upon the social sciences. They cannot be absorbed into history so easily as he suggests. They are, of course, time-determined. We need to read the Politics and the Prince and the Wealth of Nations as documents produced in particular societies at particular periods; but their significance is not completely tied to these particular societies and periods. If time is change, it is also a continuum; between different centuries and societies of human history there is not only separation but also—to quote Marc Bloch—'solidarity'.<sup>24</sup> Stasis was a chronic disease of the Greek city state which no less afflicts the national and multi-national states of our own time. Four centuries of experience have emphasized the truths that Machiavelli told, not only about the power-conflicts of Renaissance Italy, but about those that are fought today on a world scale. Adam Smith's exposition of war economy spans human experience throughout many successive phases of social organization.

I have chosen these examples from the economics and politics of conflict, because conflict has been, in recent years, the theme of my own research; but different examples chosen from different spheres of human activity would show equally well how the hypotheses of social science may give point and direction to historical inquiry. Indeed, there are many inquiries which the historian will be quite unable to pursue unless he brings into action the theories and techniques of social science. How, for example, can he hope to write a coherent history of the Irish famine without the aid of demography?<sup>25</sup> Demographers may or may not stick to the outside of human behaviour in the way that Collingwood denounces; but unless they get the outside into some coherent shape, historians will never be able to tell any convincing 'inside story'.

This lecture shows signs of breaking the bounds of that brief period which I have called 'our times'; but periods, as Lord Acton said a long time ago, matter a good deal less than problems. May our Faculties of History for ever challenge the myopic provincialism in time that so often disfigures contemporary sociological research! The historian who makes himself a close neighbour of this research should bring with him the freshness of wider landscapes. He will prove himself a sterile student of his own time if his imagination and thought are unrefreshed by a continuing study of other times.

I feel that an apology is due to those members of this audience—perhaps some of its younger ones—who may have come to this lecture expecting words of prophecy. The historian is neither a prophet nor a priest. Let us hope that he has a religion or philosophy for ruling his own life; history alone will not guide him through its perplexities, nor qualify him as a guide to others. The historian is not a man who knows all the answers but one who knows how to search for some of them. If his search is fruitful, the frontiers of truth will here and there

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Henri Pirenne, arriving at Stockholm for the first time, went first to see the new town hall rather than monuments of an earlier period. 'I'm not an antiquarian', he told his companion, Marc Bloch, 'but an historian—and therefore I love life'.

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Apologie pour l'Histoire, p. 13.

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See The Population of Ireland, 1750-1845, by K.H. Connell (Oxford, 1950). This is the nearest approach that has yet been made towards a convincing exposition of the causes of the famine.

advance a little. A little—the word has to be used, since the Sahara of our ignorance is so vast; but it may be an encouraging, an exhilarating word. In human history, English local government is only a little thing; but how important in the record of our national self-knowledge and self-mastery is English Local Government, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb.

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### Thirty Years Later<sup>26</sup>

In the years immediately following World War II historians at work within the British government were challenged to defend both their competence and their honesty. 'Contemporary history', it was suggested, may have been permissible for the Athenian Thucydides and the Frenchman Marc Bloch, but it was out of bounds for respectable British scholars. 'Official history', it was alleged, could be nothing better than a mish-mash of academic research and bureaucratic dictation.

In 1950, these allegations were discussed in the Webb Memorial Lecture. In 1956, the editor of the Civil Series of the British war histories submitted a report which was printed as a cabinet document and is available today for critical study. By that time, 26 volumes of the series had been published or were with the printers. No more than 4 or 5 'stragglers' remained to complete the series. The total cost of the work from 1941 to 1956 was a little below £250,000—an average of £30 per annum for each of the 20 departments within which the work had been done. The return on this investment could be measured, not only by the record of publication and the verdict of competent reviewers, but also by the tally of unpublished studies—approximately 300—which government departments were keeping for the potential use of administrators and research workers.

Today, complaints against 'contemporary history' are no longer heard; on the contrary, this difficult art is much practised in Britain, America and other countries which call themselves Western. As for 'official history', it still retains a significant foothold in the British Cabinet Office and the demand for it is growing, not only in government departments but also in nationalized industries and in public corporations. Professor Margaret Gowing's volumes on the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority—a series which is not yet complete—have won the acclaim of historians, of social scientists, and of natural scientists. The call nowadays is for more work of this calibre.

In the Webb Memorial Lecture much attention was paid to archival problems. The point of desparture was the Public Records Act of 1875. At that time there existed no Cabinet records worth mentioning; departmental staffs could still be measured in hundreds; the typewriter had not yet been invented. By contrast, the historians of World War II were compelled to come to grips with records which occupied very many miles of shelf-space.

Since the early 1960s, the problem of storage has to some extent been eased by the new technology of computers and magnetic tapes, which produce machine-readable records. Even so, the basic archival and academic problems remain what they have always been: how to sift the good grain from the chaff and how to make good use of that good grain. Well considered proposals for solving these problems were offered by the Grigg Committee, which reported in 1954, and by the Wilson Committee, which reported in 1981. Each of these reports will repay close study both by the keepers of public records and by the potential users.

In this brief postscript there is room for no more than a few sentences concerning the right of access. The United States, Sweden and some other countries have passed laws to establish 'Freedom of Information'. In Britain, the Grigg Committee's recommendations on access were embodied in an Act of 1958, which laid it down that records would be opened to public scrutiny normally after 50 years—a period that was reduced by an Act of 1967 to 30 years. People began to talk of the 50 years rule and, later, the 30 years rule. If they had taken the trouble to read the Acts, they would have discovered in them nothing more than a norm. Today, some records may be withheld from public inspection for more than 30 years; most of the others may be made available here and now.

The opportunity exists for a creative partnership between the keepers and the users of Britain's public records. Practical suggestions about the ways and the means have been made by the Wilson Committee.

### III

## Views of Empire

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### 1. The Word

The subject matter and high quality of this book<sup>1</sup>—indeed, the fact that it was ever written—are to be explained in large measure by Richard Koebner's character and personal experience. He first became widely known among English-speaking scholars through the brilliant opening chapter which he had contributed from his Chair in Breslau to Volume 1 of the Cambridge Economic History of Europe. The volume was a long time in preparation, and, when at last it appeared in 1941, Koebner had been for some years professor of history in the Hebrew University at Jerusalem. There he found himself separated from his mediaeval source material. Moreover, although he was a loyal Jew, he also found himself, as the years went by, increasingly aloof from the passionate nationalism of his fellow Jews, including his own students. Like his Vice-Chancellor, Dr Magnes, he put to them the question—'Like other nations?' They wanted a national state of their own and were determined at all costs to achieve it. His aim was a joint Jewish-Arab state in Palestine and a constructive partnership between Jews and the Arabs throughout the Middle East. Consequently, he was able to understand the problems of the Mandatory Power, which had obligations towards the Arabs as well as towards the Jews. Amidst the revolutionary turmoil in which the state of Israel was forged, could anybody have been more lonely than Koebner was? And yet he never lost the trust and respect of his students.

Moreover, he discovered a new and satisfying research task. If nationalism was not an absolute, something still remained to be said for empire. But precisely what? In his own lifetime, empire had come to mean different things to different people. The history of the word, Koebner concluded, might throw new light upon the history of thought. And not only of thought. For the word had

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EMPIRE. By the late Richard Koebner. London, Cambridge University Press, 1961, reviewed in Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol.I, No.3, November 1962.

always been a slogan, charged, as Thomas Hobbes would have said, not only with the 'conceptions' but also with the 'affections' of men. Could its history illuminate the states of feeling, as well as the states of mind, which belong to the changes and chances of political life? A few historians, but only a few, had raised similar questions. According to Collingwood, the past could be 're-enacted' as thought; but not as feeling. Koebner did not rate so high as Collingwood did the historian's power of 're-enactment'; but, such as it was, he believed it to include both the emotional and the intellectual elements. In the history of such words as despotism or imperialism, the two elements were fused.

In a series of learned articles in the 1940s and '50s Koebner effectively made his point; but a doubt remained in the minds of his friends whether he would ever produce his great book upon Empire. There seemed to be no limit to the Germanic thoroughness of his research; the vast weight of his knowledge seemed likely to overwhelm him, particularly as his Germanic style of writing English prose was prone to clog the expression of his thought. Yet now, some years after his death, we have this volume, lucid as well as learned, which traces the usage of the word empire from Roman to Napoleonic times. We are also promised a second volume, to be prepared from his notes by one of his former pupils, which will continue the history right up to our own times.

The present volume, by itself, represents a great achievement, a creative fusion of meticulous scholarship with spaciousness of theme. The first chapter identifies the three main elements in the Roman concept of empire—juristic, the legal power of command; territorial, the complex of provinces and peoples subject to this command; personal, imperium populi Romani or imperium Romanum, the name and designation of the legal personality in which the power of command was vested. The 'semantic intermixture' of these three elements, always varying with the different circumstances of time and place, has been repeated in the histories of all those political constructions—mediaeval and modern, German, British, French and Austrian—which have inherited the word empire from the Romans.

When Rome fell, there survived a widespread craving (by Saxon kings in England among others) for the imperial title; but it was translated specifically (not quite uniquely, as Koebner says, for there was also Byzantium) to the Frankish and later to the German emperors. Their universalist claims, which so powerfully deflected the national destinies of Germany and Italy, are reviewed in the second chapter. In reaction against them, and still more against the universalist claims of the Papacy, the rising national states of western Europe appropriated to their own purposes the original juristic meaning of imperium. Rex est imperator in regno suo, declared Philip the Fair of France, and two centuries later Henry VIII's 'Reformation Parliament' declared England to be an empire.

In the usage of the Act of Appeals, empire meant simply—as we should put it to-day—national independence or sovereignty, unfettered by external jurisdiction. But the second and third meanings of its Roman ancestry soon accrued to it. As early as the mid-sixteenth century, some Englishmen (for example, the Protector Somerset) were envisaging a territorial empire brought into being by the union of England and Scotland. During the following century, this 'Britannic Empire' came to be envisaged not only 'with all her Daughter Islands about her', but with a new and 'true greatness' rooted in the New World.

These phrases of Milton and Bacon have an emotional surge. Before the end of the seventeenth century it was becoming the surge of the sea—of Britannia ruling the waves. By the mid-eighteenth century, it had become the surge of British expansion in America. There, exclaimed Benjamin Franklin in 1770, lay the 'foundations of the future grandeur of the British Empire'.

Sixteen years later, these same foundations supported the independence and grandeur of the United States of America. The core of Koebner's book lies in the two middle chapters which record an immense emotional revolution: in America, the word empire becomes at last a word of reproach, instead of glory; in Britain, the word is glorified too late. By his meticulous bibliographical research and his

zeal for digging into the emotional sub-strata of thought, Koebner has enlarged our understanding of the American revolution. Not altogether, however, without cost. When states of mind are fused with states of feeling as the object of historical study, something is lost in critical rigour. The extent of the loss may be measured if Koebner's story of these decisive years is contrasted with the story as told by a political theorist, such as McIlwain, or a constitutional historian, such as Schuyler. In digging deeper than they did into the emotional roots, Koebner has sacrificed some of the intellectual clarity which they achieved.

Koebner, in defiance of Burke's opposit natura, shows a bias towards the projects of imperial federation advanced in the earlier stages of the British-American dispute by Franklin, Otis, Bernard and others. He lays less emphasis upon the Sister Kingdom theory of the imperial relationship, which might, perhaps, have saved the first British Empire from splitting on the rock of sovereignty. This second theory was propounded in all sincerity by John Adams, Stephen Hopkins, Thomas Wilson and, for a time, by Benjamin Franklin himself. It also had deep roots in the emotional and intellectual soil of Irish Protestantism. Koebner's Irish chapter, learned and perceptive though it is, would have been better had it looked back from Grattan and Flood to Molyneux and Swift.

When the promised second volume carries us forward to the twentieth century, shall we find Koebner taking the side of Lionel Curtis and Sir Joseph Ward against Richard Jebb and General Smuts? This would seem to follow from the preferences he has shown in handling the controversies of the eighteenth century. But we shall see.



## 2. Colonial Self-Government\*

### I.

I must warn my audience at the very outset: you are going to be disappointed, not to say shocked, if you have come here expecting a scholarly lecture. I shall have no time to be scholarly. I propose to examine our present-day policies of colonial self-government in the light of British experience from the foundation of Virginia right up to now—three and a half centuries of history to cover in fifty-five minutes! I invite you to sharpen your critical wits for the puncturing of my rash generalisations and the dissection of my verbal inexactitudes. Yet I beg also for a little charity. Don't, for example, take me too literally when I start talking about the Rights of Englishmen, for I shall be using this phrase not in a lawyer-like way but symbolically, in the hope that you will be patient enough to absorb rather slowly the intention of my symbol.

In return for such patience, I think it only fair to give you immediate notice of the meaning I shall give to the world self-government. The Oxford English Dictionary says that it means "the administration by a people or state of its own affairs without external direction or interference." By this definition, Mussolini's Italy, Stalin's Russia, Mr Strydom's South Africa and the newly emergent Sudan would all belong to the class of self-governing peoples or states—for nobody could say that any one of them was subject to external direction or interference. But what about internal direction or interference? Are the Soviet peoples self-governing under the Communist Party? Are the Bantu of South Africa self-governing under baasskap? Are the southern Sudanese self-governing under the rule of Khartoum? They may become so—it will depend on the share they are permitted to take or permit themselves to take in the active life of the state. For surely there can be no self-government without participation and the feeling of participation? Let me therefore eliminate the word external from the definition I have quoted. To my mind, self-government is something more than a synonym for sovereign independence: it excludes not only foreign domination but domination inside the state by a man or a party or a class or a race: it means democratic, or at any rate constitutional government under the rule of law.

A very English definition, you may say. Admittedly: and the words that I shall now quote—they are the text of this evening's sermon—are also very English. I heard them two summers ago from the lips of a man who carries heavy responsibilities within the British Colonial Empire. "The only justification for our presence in these places", he said, "is to train the peoples for self-government." A striking declaration of faith!<sup>1</sup>

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The Cust Memorial Lecture delivered in the University of Nottingham on 3rd February 1956.

But rather high falutin'? Let me play the devil's advocate for a while and probe the weak points of this declaration. First, it ignores, or seems to ignore, the down-to-earth and day-to-day experience of the British Colonial Service. An agricultural officer may well think his presence justified in Basutoland or Kigezi if he is training the people to terrace their hillsides and to do the other things that are necessary to save their soil. A medical officer may think his presence justified if he is doing something to defeat the nastier diseases of the tropics and to increase the survival rate among young children. A financial officer may think his presence justified if he is maintaining a prudent balance between the rising overheads of public expenditure and the rising national income. A Governor may think his presence justified if he is developing the economic resources of his territory and maintaining peace, order and good government within its boundaries. These, after all, were considered not so long ago to be the primary duties of a Governor. And do not the Imperial Authorities in London perform the same duties on a grander scale? It is their task to develop production and trade throughout the Empire. It is their task to keep the trade routes safe. Will anybody say that the only justification of the British presence in Gibraltar is to train the Gibraltarians for self-government?

This leads me as devil's advocate to my second argument: the declaration I have quoted ignores, or seems to ignore, 'British interests'—those economic and strategical inducements which in varying degree explain the overseas expansion and the continuing exercise of imperial power. I say explain, I do not say justify, for I am speaking of historical processes and situations, in which right and wrong are always considerably mixed up. British interests in themselves are neither right or wrong: no more are the interests of other nations, nor the interests of private persons like you or me; interests belong to the stuff of life, which we make good or bad by the other things that we add to the mixture: if we add stupidity, violence and greed, we make the stuff bad; if we add intelligence, justice and persuasion, we make it good. When I reflect on the words and deeds of imperial statesmen like Lord Lugard (to go no further back) I feel that they added good things to the mixture. They pursued, and in some measure achieved, a reconciliation between British interests and British duties. I feel that they defined these duties intelligently and imaginatively, for they had continually in mind the interests and aspirations both of the entire society of nations and of the particular peoples under British rule or protection. This, at any rate, was the thought of Sir Eyre Crowe when he wrote his famous despatch about the "harmonisation" of interests. It was Lugard's thought when he wrote The Dual Mandate in Africa. Please note the adjective dual. In contrast, the sentence that I quoted just now affirms a single purpose: instead of the dual mandate we have "the only justification"; instead of a subtle interplay between Great Britain, her dependencies and the community of nations we have a one-way obligation of Great Britain towards her dependencies. Is not this an over-simplification?

I have a third criticism of the text. It ignores, or seems to ignore, the diversity of mankind. We British are invited to justify our presence in Africa, South-East Asia and all the other places by the success we achieve as political schoolmasters. What then is the curriculum that we offer to our pupils? We cannot teach them things that we do not know ourselves. We ought perhaps to teach them how the exemplary Swiss manage their political affairs—a helpful friend did in fact advise me two summers ago to bring some Swiss rabbits out of my borrowed Buganda hat. Since I had grown up in Australia, I found it impossible to perform this feat... Suppose I had grown up in France? I might then have been able to open a lively debate on the Rights of Man. But alas! the Rights of Man are far above

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The reference is to the late Sir Andrew Cohen, a main pacemaker of British 'decolonisation', particularly in Africa.

the head of anybody who has been grounded on English constitutional history. You will find scarcely a mention of them in the great seventeenth-century debates on the English constitution: Anglican and Puritan, Monarchist and Republican, Cromwellian and Leveller—they are clamouring, all of them, not for the Rights of Man but the Rights of Englishmen. Our constitutional wisdom today, such as it is, still remains a very English thing—not a universal good founded upon abstract principles but a particular good inherited from the national past, a "birth-right", or so our ancestors called it. Is a birthright exportable? Is it the sort of thing that other peoples desire or can accept? Can we teach it and can they learn it? I remember reading about twenty-five years ago a useful book called The New Democratic Constitutions of Europe; there were a dozen or more of these constitutions and they were all very admirable on paper; but within ten years every one of them had gone down the drain. I remember reading the memoirs of an English clergyman who visited Sicily during the Napoleonic Wars to see how Lord George Bentinck was training the Sicilians in the arts of parliamentary government. He found all the M.P.s in a heap on the floor of Parliament House pummeling and biting each other. This no doubt was in those days the Sicilian way. Should we in these days be so very surprised if the way of M.P.s in British Guiana is rather different from the way of M.P.s at Westminster?

This will be the last of my rhetorical questions. Looking back on my performance as devil's advocate, I don't believe that it amounts to much. It has perhaps shown that statements of policy should not begin with the words, "The only justification..." But let us now assume that these words were carelessly used, and that the real intention of the speaker was something like this—"Our most urgent and rewarding task in the British Colonial Empire is to train the peoples for self-government." Here is a statement of policy that I am ready to defend.

The policy is expedient. It is, to begin with, expedient from the diplomatic point of view. Let me just mention the slogan "Anti-Colonialism"—I don't very much like it, because it doesn't help me to think straight, it begs many of the questions about Colonial societies and governments that I as an historian think important; but all the same, I have to recognise it as a powerful force in the contemporary world. It is a weapon of political warfare that has been used throughout the past ten years with damaging effect against the Commonwealth, not only by enemies but by friends, not only by Stalin, Khrushchev and Chou En Lai but by Roosevelt, Truman and Nehru. At the General Assembly of the United Nations any orator can quickly raise a shindy against the Colonial Powers; whenever a Latin American or an Asian or an Arab gives a bang on the Anti-Colonial drum most of the rest join the noise and in the excitement that follows reasoned apologies or explanations get a poor hearing. What does get a hearing is hard fact—the hard fact of sovereign independence in the erstwhile Indian Empire, and of rapidly expanding self-government in the British West Indies or British West Africa. In so far as Britain is able to promote self-government in these and other places, she enhances her own prestige and improves the diplomatic strength of the Commonwealth.

The policy is expedient from the military point of view. Diplomatic strength is related—not of course exclusively but very closely—to military strength. Great Britain is not so strong today, in comparison with other nations, as she used to be even a decade or two ago. She cannot afford too many "emergencies" in places like Malaya or Kenya or Cyprus. She no longer has Indian divisions at her disposal to send to South East Asia or the Aden Protectorate or East Africa or the fringes of the Mediterranean; she has two-year conscription of her own youth; she keeps four divisions in Germany; she has responsibilities in every continent and ocean; she lacks, or until recently she lacked, a mobile reserve at home. In consequence of all this, she must practice economy of force. This, I believe, is not a bad thing nor is it a new thing; I should be prepared to argue that the greatest leaders of the British people—for example, Queen Elizabeth and William Pitt and

Winston Churchill—have been master practitioners of the economy of force. True economy signifies a stiff and continuous resistance to avoidable spending, but willingness at all times to spend a carefully reckoned something, and in times of supreme crisis to spend if need be everything. By this criterion the British record has its bad patches; there have been some phases of uneconomical cheese-paring (for example, in nineteenth century South Africa) and other phases of disastrous extravagance (for example, the War of American Independence). Yet, by and large, economy of force belongs both to the naval and to the financial tradition of the British nation. In the British Imperial tradition the same initial propensity to economise force has been interwoven with a strong propensity towards political decentralisation and local self-government. There is no more extravagant waste of force than the attempt to govern powerful subjects against their will; the long chapter of political experience which stretches from the Independence of America to the Independence of India testifies that the path of self-government, wherever it can be followed—this is a necessary reservation—is also the path of economy. Self-government has its multiplier, it produces from time to time windfalls of power—the Anzacs on Gallipoli, the Canadians on Vimy Ridge, a Boer patriot in the uniform of a British Field Marshal. Thus the transmutation of force into persuasion, of Empire into Commonwealth, becomes the masterstroke of the nation of shopkeepers.

Perfide Albion! In the game of power politics, colonial self-government is the trump card which the British continually produce from up their sleeves; in the war of everyman against everyman, self-government is their secret weapon. Statesmen like Lord Durham, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Lord Attlee outsmart Machiavelli and all the rule-of-thumb calculators of *raison d'état*... This is the cynical interpretation of the emergent Commonwealth. It contains part of the truth. But surely not the whole truth? Durham, Campbell-Bannerman and Attlee economised British power very shrewdly; but when you study from the inside what they were trying to achieve in Canada, South Africa and India you will discover that they were pursuing not merely the policy they thought expedient but the policy they thought right. In the history of British colonial self-government, the calculation of expediency and the concept of right are interwoven strands of a thread that is continuous for more than three centuries.

## II.

And so I turn to history. I am well aware that I have as yet said nothing about the diversity of mankind and its alleged incompatibility with self-government of the British stamp; nor have I answered all the other arguments that I put forward when I was playing the part of the devil's advocate. I can only hope that the answers will somehow or other emerge as my story proceeds.

The story starts in April 1606, when the colonists of Virginia received by Royal Charter "all liberties, franchises and immunities of Englishmen." Of Englishmen: nobody foresaw the time when Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Negroes, Indians and even Red Indians would enjoy under the British Crown the same liberties, franchises and immunities. Nobody foresaw the time when these Rights of Englishmen (such a modest birthright then) would grow into the sovereign independence of nations.

Let me rapidly survey this process of growth, the progressive injection of a global content into the Rights of Englishmen. The liberties, franchises and immunities of the Royal Charter of 1606 signified no more than the rights of private persons under the common law. Twelve years later they came to signify the right of Virginians to send elected members to a representative Assembly. Remember, I am not speaking as a lawyer; I am not pretending that common law rights and political representation hang together inevitably in logic and law; but I do believe that they hang together historically, in the sense that Virginians and

all other American colonists from 1618 onwards claimed both together as their English birthright. They did not, either in the seventeenth century or in the eighteenth, claim the thing that we call responsible government; indeed, the English themselves were hardly aware until a later time of what the thing meant. But the Canadians claimed it in the eighteen-thirties and -forties. How very modest, how very English, the claim sounded! It was, said Robert Baldwin, the "plain common sense and practical view"; it was "the genius of the English race in both hemispheres to be concerned in the government of themselves". Joseph Howe put the same point into a question—the kind of question a patient teacher addresses to rather slow pupils who cannot see the obvious; "Why", he asked, "should we... govern on one side of the Atlantic by principles the very reverse of those found to work admirably on the other?" In this calm Canadian advocacy we recognise the Whig doctrine of "assimilation", which Burke expressed in dazzling rhetoric:

When this child of ours wishes to assimilate to its parents, and to reflect with a true filial resemblance the beautiful countenance of British liberty; are we to turn to them the shameful parts of our Constitution? Are we to give them our weakness for their strength? our opprobrium for their glory...?<sup>2</sup>

A thousand times NO! The answer is not only Burke's; it is the answer, by and large, of three centuries of British history. Let Englishmen overseas possess the liberties of Englishmen at home. The political content of these liberties varies with time and circumstance—representative government at one time, responsible government at another time, sovereign independence in the fullness of time. Setting aside the great American catastrophe and the anxious, intermittent niggling of some lawyers and politicians (including Burke himself) the story in its broad outlines is just like that. We see its culmination today in the rapid march of Canada towards the opportunities and responsibilities of an influential Power.

Of course I recognise my monstrous over-simplifications; but I am trying to give you merely the feeling of the story. The constitutional side of it seems to me reasonably straightforward; it is the other side that I find really difficult—not the enlargement of the birthright in constitutional terms but the sharing of it amongst the Gentiles. Are Scots Gentiles from an English point of view? Until 1707 they certainly were; after that, as I am well aware, we ought to rub out English and write British (though I cannot at this late hour start talking about the Rights of British men). What about those other Europeans, the Spaniards of Jamaica or the French of Grenada, who came quite early into the British Empire by conquest or cession of territory? It became the rule that they should retain their own laws and institutions until the Crown decided otherwise—which the Crown usually did, not because it wanted to do these ex-foreigners a good turn, but because it wanted to attract British immigrants and knew that it would not get them without promising them the common law and a representative Assembly. Burke let the cat right out of the bag in May 1774 during the debate on the Quebec Act:

'Do you propose', he cried, 'to take away liberty from the Englishman, because you will not give it to the French? I would give it to the Englishman, though ten thousand Frenchmen should take it against their will.'<sup>3</sup>

Actually, the Quebec Act did the deed that Burke denounced. In it we recognise the first great departure from the Rights of Englishmen, the first foreshadowing of Crown Colony government.

The reasons are instructive. Through the previous century and a half, the Virginian rule, as we may call it—English common law and an elected Assembly—had prevailed almost everywhere in the Empire because natives and negroes counted for nothing and non-British Europeans counted for little. But in Canada there were 60,000 French inhabitants and they counted for a great deal, both as a strategic counterpoise to the mutinous American subjects of George III and as a community with a strong claim in equity to live the life they wanted to live. They certainly did not want to live under the English common law or under an Assembly of "Loyal and well affected Protestants";<sup>4</sup> they interpreted the Whiggish propaganda of English liberty as a crude attempt to undermine their religion, language and laws and to make them subservient in their own country to the thrusting British immigrants.<sup>5</sup> Their interpretation was on the whole correct; this perhaps was the first clear case in British colonial history—there have been many cases since—of agitation for self-government as a minority racket. The Quebec Act dealt firmly with the racket by concentrating all powers of administration, legislation and finance in the Governor and a nominated Council.

But the Quebec Act lasted a bare seventeen years. It proved impossible to refuse representative institutions to the United Empire Loyalists who flocked into Upper Canada after the American war. And Lower Canada, French though it was by majority of population, must needs be shaped to the same pattern. A fateful decision! By the Canada Constitution Act of 1791, says Professor Zimmern, 'ius sanguinis, a right of Englishmen as Englishmen, came to be acknowledged as ius soli, a system inherent in the territories under British sovereignty and direction.'<sup>6</sup> .... Well, it took more than one act of parliament to achieve this creative mutation. The Canadian French spent two generations in making such a mess of the Rights of Englishmen that Lord Durham wanted to swamp them in an overflow of British population. It was not until the late eighteen-forties that Canadians, French and British, agreed with each other to navigate the stream of history in the same political ship; it was not until the eighteen-sixties that they designed their ship to the scale of nationhood. No problem of modern history, I believe, better repays close study than Canadian constitutional life from the Durham Report to the British North America Act. In retrospect, we forget the almost miraculous quality of the Canadian achievement and we leap too easily to the conclusion that other peoples can easily copy it. If Frenchmen can absorb the Rights of Englishmen, why not Boers? Why not any community of European

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Kennedy, W.P.M., Documents of the Canadian Constitution, 1759-1915 (Toronto, 1918), p. 131.

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Kennedy, op. cit., Document VIII, Petition of the Quebec Traders. (But note that Fox, while supporting the demand for an Assembly, did not support Catholic exclusion).

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The Whigs favoured 'assimilation' of colonial to British institutions; but from Fox to Durham they failed to separate this progressive constitutional principle from the oppressive principle of 'racial' assimilation, i.e., denationalisation.

6

Zimmern, A., The Third British Empire (3rd Edition, London, 1934), p. 26.

descent? But why the restriction of 'European descent'? Why not Indians and Pakistanis? Why not Nigerians and Baganda? Why not South African Blacks? Why not black Australians?

Imperial statesmen of the nineteenth century never dreamed that they were opening the floodgates to such a torrent of logic: on the contrary, they eschewed abstraction and generalisation, emphasising instead the diversity of mankind, the variety of historical experience, the relativity of political wisdom. When we look back upon their British Empire, we do not see what Professor Zimmern saw and acclaimed in 1952—a procession of self-government:<sup>7</sup> we see rather two contrary processions, one moving towards self-government, the other moving, or seeming to move, in the opposite direction. Remember the settlement that closed the Napoleonic wars: sixteen new territories passed under British sovereignty and all of them except one bore the Crown Colony stamp.<sup>8</sup> Remember the eighteenth-sixties and -seventies, when many ancient and proud legislatures of the British West Indies accepted sentence of death. Remember the eighteen-eighties, when Crown Colony government became the rule throughout the vast African territories that passed under British sovereignty or protection. Above all, remember India and what Lord Morley said barely forty years ago about her political future—a future in which he saw no place at all for 'English political institutions'.<sup>9</sup>

Yet all these memories are of appearances upon the surface of a short bend in the stream of history. Beneath that surface there was occurring something of profound importance—a 'reception' of the Rights of Englishmen, analagous perhaps to that great historical event which Maitland illuminated, the reception of Roman law in northern Europe. I cannot better express the consequences of the reception in Asia and Africa of British political method than by quoting some words that Pandit Nehru spoke on 16th May, 1949 in the Indian Constituent Assembly:

'Here I am', he said, '...speaking in this Honourable House in the English language. No doubt we are going to change that language for our use, but the fact remains that I am doing so and the fact remains that most other members who will speak will do so. The fact remains that we are functioning here under certain rules and regulations for which the model has been the British Constitution.'<sup>10</sup>

These words, and words of similar import that might be quoted from other speakers in other countries, alter the terms of the argument about the diversity of mankind. It ceases to be our argument about what we think good or bad for other peoples; it becomes their argument about what they think good or bad for themselves. They tell us that British institutions are good for them—not perhaps an

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Zimmern, op. cit., p. 8.

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The exception was Tobago, which reverted to the status it had possessed under British rule between 1763 and 1783.

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Recollections, by John, Viscount Morley (London, 1924), Vol. II, p. 172. Lord Morley did however go on to say: 'But the spirit of English institutions is a different thing....'

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Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952, Edited by Nicholas Mansergh (Oxford University Press, 1953, for Royal Institute of International Affairs), pp. 853-854.

unmixed good: Pandit Nehru looks forward to a blending between British teaching and Indian tradition; this, no doubt, is what will happen not only in India but in Uganda<sup>11</sup> and in many other places. We may not always like the blend; but our likes and dislikes are not of very great significance. What is significant is our history—the history we have lived a thousand years and more in these small islands, the history we have lived more recently in America and Australia, in Asia and Africa. Our very presence in those places has created the demand for self-government and has created some capacity at least for making the demand good in practice.

Let us therefore accept colonial self-government as a commitment that comes to us out of our own history.

### III.

No commitment could be more exhilarating—nor more difficult.

In taking stock of the difficulties, it may be helpful to look rather more closely at that bend in our history when some British dependencies were moving towards self-government but others seemed to be moving away from it. I do not believe that it was a doctrine of race or colour that divided the sheep from the goats; no British statesman to my knowledge ever proclaimed the opposite in very emphatic terms. There is also the test of practice: some coloured people were admitted to the Rights of Englishmen; some white people gained at best a precarious admittance. On the one hand, we have the 'mixed' constitution devised by Methodist missionaries for the Tongans, or the 'colour blind' franchise of Cape Colony; on the other hand, we have the servile status of New South Wales and Tasmania in the early years, the relapse of Newfoundland in quite recent years, the snakes-and-ladders game of constitutional life which we played with the Maltese for pretty near one hundred years. The explanation of such variations, so it seems to me, must be sought not in doctrine but in circumstances.

Strategical circumstances were important in some territories. As Sir Winston Churchill once said about Malta, 'it is not easy to make a constitution for a battleship'. Today, British and Maltese are still at work on that teasing task. In Cyprus British, Greeks and Turks are in tragic conflict. If only the strategical element could be substracted, the constitutional problem of Cyprus—cr, for that matter, of Malaya and Singapore—would become more manageable. But the strategical element cannot be substracted.

Economic circumstances were important in many territories. The fashionable word nowadays is 'viability', by which is meant a mass of resources sufficient to support the defence establishment, the administrative services, the public utilities, the health services, the educational programme that is necessary for manning these various activities, and all the requisites of a genuine, as distinct from a fictitious political independence. A very small territory, such as a West Indian island, can hardly be viable; but the unit may be sufficiently enlarged if a sizeable group of neighbour territories are able and willing to pool their resources within a political Union or Federation. Their ability to do this must depend upon the reality of their neighbourhood, which depends in turn upon the state of communications; West Indian communications were so poor during the nineteenth century that federation was ruled out; they remain poor today, but perhaps sufficiently improved to make federation practical politics. However, nothing will ever make it practical politics for the Pitcairn Islanders, who have no neighbours of any kind and no communications at all except the ships that put in for an hour or two once or twice a year. Pitcairn is the extreme case of a



considerable number of British territories that are too small to stand alone and too remote to combine with anybody else. The highest political status to which these territories can aspire is local self-government under a continuing imperial sovereignty.

Extent of territory is of course only the crudest index of viability; what matters far more is the quantity and quality of natural resources in relation to the quantity and quality of the human population. The British West Indies were thought to be under-populated as recently as 1897, when a famous Royal Commission reported on their economic troubles. These troubles were ascribed chiefly to their excessive dependence upon one unremunerative crop. Their sugar industry had survived, albeit precariously, both emancipation and free trade; but it seemed unlikely to survive foreign bounties. Nobody has demonstrated as yet a precise correlation during the nineteenth century between the decline of sugar and of representative government in the West Indies; but it seems reasonable to postulate some connection between the economic and political aspects of retrogression in those days, and of progress in these days. We need not define the connection too rigidly; but we can at any rate feel sure that the prospects of self-government will be pretty gloomy in any country where population is increasing more rapidly than capital and skill. A rising or at least a stable national income per head of the population becomes in consequence a criterion not only of economic but also of political advancement.

Unfortunately, acceptance of such a criterion condemns us to explore the immense literature of the past decade about the position and prospects of the so-called 'under developed' countries. A great deal of this literature is poor stuff but some books and papers of good quality have appeared in recent years. Their effect has been on the whole to damp down the great expectations that were widely held ten years ago. The rich countries of the world, it would appear, cannot do the whole economic job, or the greater part of it, by dosing their poor relations with capital; the poor countries need imported capital, but to perpetuate it and make it fructify they must do a great deal for themselves. One of the most painful things that they must do for themselves is to speed their domestic accumulation of capital by saving of their own, even out of their poverty. At this point of the argument an alarming thought intrudes—can it be that the 'under developed' countries are becoming more prone nowadays to copy the consuming, rather than the saving and investing habits of western society?<sup>12</sup>

This fear, should it prove to be well grounded in fact, need not always become an argument for retarding colonial progress towards self-government; on the contrary, it might at times become an argument for acceleration. Responsible Ministers in the Gold Coast have been able in recent years to take a tougher line with their own people on some critical issues of agricultural practice than alien bureaucrats would ever have dared to take. I could cite similar evidence from other countries—but also some evidence to the contrary. The economic problem, which I have touched upon so superficially, varies immensely from territory to territory: so does the political problem: so does the interplay between the two. General principles have their importance; but so do the circumstances of place and time.

I have mentioned some strategical and economic circumstances, and must now mention some sociological circumstances, which may retard or arrest the progress of a colony towards self-government. If we read what British ministers and officials of the nineteenth century wrote in rebuttal of colonial demands for constitutional advancement, we shall often find that the impediments they had most prominently in mind arose from the constitution of colonial societies. I am

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Cf. Ragnar Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Under-developed Countries, (Oxford, 1953).

thinking at present chiefly of the sugar colonies, where small minorities of European stock had enjoyed the Rights of Englishmen in unbroken continuity from the seventeenth century. In the opinion of British reformers, they had enjoyed them too long. At the very beginning of the century the imperial authorities decided that newly conquered territories in the West Indies must be governed on a new system. They gave their reasons very forcibly. For illustration, let me summarise what a Chief Justice of Trinidad wrote in 1810. He analysed the society of Trinidad: five-sixths of the population were slaves; of the remaining sixth, two-thirds were free persons of colour; consequently, the whites who were agitating for an Assembly were only one-eighteenth of the total population—a tiny minority with its own sinister interest. What Trinidad needed, according to the Chief Justice, was not the Rights of Englishmen but protection against those Englishmen who were clamouring for those Rights—protection which could be given 'only by an authority over which the master of the slave has no control, and to which he must submit.'<sup>13</sup> In short, what Trinidad needed was Crown Colony Government. And that was what it got. Before the century was out, that was what all the British West Indies got—excepting always 'the three Bs'.<sup>14</sup> They got it because the Imperial Government perceived a contradiction to exist between representative institutions and the deep cleavage of West Indian society. Slave owner and slave, master and servant, white man and coloured man, rich man and poor man, educated man and ignorant man—each one of these contrasts except the first survived the Emancipation Act of 1833. In a society so divided, political rights for the few appeared inequitable, oppressive and dangerous; political rights for the masses, had anybody demanded them, would have appeared plain suicide.<sup>15</sup>

If universal suffrage seems to us today the proper basis of West Indian self-government, the explanation lies partly in the triumph of political democracy in Great Britain, partly in West Indian demands for equal and identical treatment, partly in changes that have taken place in the fabric and feeling of West Indian society. I have the impression that a considerable ironing out has occurred of those cleavages within society—cleavages both material and psychological—that wrecked representative institutions during the nineteenth century. To verify or correct this impression would demand meticulous research into the social history of the past generation or two; meanwhile, our plans for constitutional progress in the West Indies tacitly assume the existence of a reasonably cohesive society. Is this assumption well grounded? Pessimists may quote recent happenings in British Guiana; optimists may cite the more stable situation of Jamaica or Trinidad. We shall soon begin to learn which party is closer to the truth.

Naturally, I am not attempting this evening to forecast the destinies of any particular territory or region: my sole purpose in these reflections on the West Indian past and present has been to emphasise a basic condition of self-government, which people in the nineteenth century used to call "common interest",<sup>16</sup> and we today call social solidarity. Self-government assumes the presence of a 'self' which exists as a social fact and can be translated into a

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British Colonial Developments, 1774-1834, Select Documents, by Vincent Harlow and Frederick Madden: II.A.8, George Smith, C.J., to Lord Liverpool, 14 February, 1810. And cf. II.A.11, 12 and 24.

<sup>14</sup>

Bermuda, Bahamas, Barbadoes.

<sup>15</sup>

On the eve of the Jamaican 'rising' of 1865 and the subsequent relapse to Crown Colony government, the population of Jamaica was approximately 450,000 while the electorate numbered 1,902.

political fact. If the population of a territory contains two or more deeply divided 'selves', the forms of self-government are unlikely to produce the reality of self-government; they may produce instead the rule of a capitalist oligarchy, or the dictatorship of the proletariat, or the domination of a master race—the thing that Mr Strydom calls *baasskaap*. Alternatively, they may produce civil war and territorial disruption, such as we have already witnessed in Ireland, Palestine and India. I assume that we desire to fend off these dangers in the Gold Coast, Uganda, Malaya and all the other territories for which we still retain some responsibility. Their frontiers may be artificial in origin; but they contain the framework of emergent states—orderly administrations, coherent systems of transport and marketing, a field of tolerable security for the attraction of capital and skill—all the things that belong to economic viability, which is, as we have seen, a condition of political independence.

Consequently, our policies of colonial self-government must temper their radical principles with some conservatism and a respect for the varying circumstances of time and place. The mixtures of East Africa, to cite one example, contain many tribal 'selves' and three racial 'selves' (if the word racial may be allowed); but Uganda differs from its neighbours in the wealth of its agricultural resources and its tradition of Christian martyrdom and devotion, in the special relationship that history has bequeathed between British and Baganda, in the consequential sensitiveness of some other tribes, in the comparative tractability of the immigrant problem. Among the special peculiarities of Tanganyika is the legacy of German rule, which helps to explain among other things the comparatively slow awakening of African political self-consciousness. The timing of political advancement in Uganda and Tanganyika has to be different because their past histories and present circumstances are different. Heaven knows what the timing should be in Kenya!

The imperial time-keeper's task is complicated because of economic development, educational advancement, the manning of public services, the demand for change among the few, the absorption of change by the masses—all these things have different time lengths. The time-keeper's task is invidious, because he is subjected to intense and often contrary pressures, both internal and external. It must always be an object of policy to convince colonial leaders that the time factor is not an invented but an inherent thing, which they themselves must learn to measure and manage. This is the road to self-government.

If we intend self-government seriously, we cannot simply walk out and leave these places wide open to territorial disintegration, foreign conquest, domestic tyranny, or a combination of these evils. The object of the operation is nation building. I have compiled a formidable catalogue of obstacles. In more places than one we face the forlorn hope. I rather expect in the coming years some painful reverses and—almost as hard to bear—some nagging, dragging frustrations. But I also expect some better things. After all, the forlorn hope is not a new thing in our history. Canadian self-government was once a forlorn hope. The Commonwealth of Nations contains today eight fully sovereign members. I should expect to see some new arrivals during the next decade or two.

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Chief Justice Smith assumed that the House of Commons, in contrast to West Indian legislatures, 'represents the whole people and has but one common interest with its constituents'. Rousseau would never have accepted this assumption; Marx and Engels would have ridiculed it; but Elie Halevy might have been prepared to say something in its defence.

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**Postscript, August 1981**

In two respects, the statements with which this lecture concluded were falsely optimistic.

First, Britain no longer possessed the power to make good her programme of orderly decolonisation; later in 1956, that brute fact was dramatised at Suez.

Secondly, what I called 'The Rights of Englishmen' have received a mixed reception in the liberated colonies. A question therefore arises. After Mr Paolo Kavuma, how and why President Idi Amin?

I see no need to alter my long-length historical survey; but I recommend its concluding speculations as a cautionary tale for historians.

### 3. The Moving Metropolis

We are met together in Texas from many countries near and far to honour Walter Prescott Webb and to discuss his book, The Great Frontier: An Interpretation of World History since Columbus. I love the splendour of this title. Splendour, span, audacity—these qualities are out of favour nowadays amongst the scribes and pharisees of our profession. 'History-writing today', says Sir Steven Runciman, 'has passed into an Alexandrian age, where criticism has overpowered creation. Faced by the mountainous heap of knowledge and by the watchful severity of his colleagues, the modern historian often takes refuge in learned articles or narrowly specialised dissertations, small fortresses that are easy to defend from attack.... I believe that the supreme duty of the historian is to write history, that is to say, to attempt to record in one sweeping sequence the greater events and movements that have swayed the destiny of man'.<sup>1</sup> In Webb's work, I have observed various 'fortresses' which might be captured by local assault; but such small-scale operations do not interest me today. The 'sweeping significance' of The Great Frontier will be my theme.

Let me, at the outset, confront Webb's view of the frontier with Turner's. Turner proclaimed the significance of the frontier in American history; Webb proclaims its significance in world history. To Turner the American frontier was a unique thing; to Webb it is one of a class. Turner emphasised its separateness from the European homelands; Webb links together Great Frontier and Metropolis within the complex interplay of shared historical experience.

It would be foolish to judge one of these views true and the other false, for each view has illuminated different aspects of truth. Still, here are two hypotheses; and the historian must decide which of the two will be the more fruitful for his inquiries. His answer is likely to vary with the varying circumstances of time and place. Let me illustrate some of the possibilities.

Afrikaner historians of the dominant school would certainly plump for Turner. For example, J.P. van der Merwe of Stellenbosch has written in true Turner vein three substantial volumes on the theme of trek—not merely or chiefly that dramatic cataclysm called the Great Trek, but the whole 'sweeping sequence' of pastoral expansion which carried the Boers right up to and even beyond the political boundaries of present-day South Africa.<sup>2</sup> Van der Merwe's trekkers are the very image—possibly the exaggerated image—of Turner's frontiersmen. In their relations with each other they are individualistic, independent, democratic; in their relations with the other groups and tribes of South Africa

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The New World Looks at its History, eds A.R. Lewis and T.F. McGann (Univ. of Texas Press 1963) pp. 135-141.

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Steven Runciman, History of the Crusades (3 vols., Cambridge, England, 1951-1954), I, xiii.

they are the master race. The economic ties which bind them to the metropolis, and even to the areas of old settlement around Cape Town, are of the slightest. As they move ever deeper into the African hinterland they discard piece by piece their European impedimenta—saving always their firearms and their Bibles, those indispensable titles of their dominion over land and people. They discard even the memory of Europe. They call themselves Afrikaners.

The above is a highly simplified epitome of a complicated story. Moreover, as van der Merwe and other critical historians very well realise, trekking is not by any means the whole of South African, nor even of Afrikaner, history. Nevertheless, it dominates the nationalist propaganda which too often passes for history. The epic of the trekkers' frontier is appropriated by the politicians of apartheid. Did any similar alliance ever arise in America between frontier historiography of the pre-Webb era and the politics of isolationism?

In Australia, such an alliance could not possibly arise. Australians are constrained by the facts of economic geography and history to view their frontier through Webb's eyes rather than through Turner's. Their hinterland did not grant them the American boon of plentiful quarter-sections in rich homesteading country; but neither did it inflict upon them the South African bane of economic isolation. Paradoxically, the squatting wave which swept westward from Sydney was running towards its markets. Wool tethered the squatters to the world.

"When the clipper fleet comes over  
 When the scent is on the clover,  
 And the scarlet streaks the blue;  
 When the Western sheds are ringing  
 And the Western men are singing  
     As their rolling teams come through,  
 Then it's ho, ho—Wool ho!  
 For the busy shears are clipping, and a stir  
     is in the shipping,  
 And it's yo ho—Wool ho!"

E.J. Brady's ballad paints a romantic picture of the Australian grasslands, which never had the scent of clover in them until these latter decades of pasture improvement; but it paints a realistic picture of transport and trade. The squatter's frontier, like every other Australian frontier that followed it, was from the very beginning linked indissolubly with the European metropolis.

The same is true of the Canadian frontiers. In this gathering on North American soil I feel moved to express my admiration for one of the truly great historians of this continent, the late Harold Adams Innis. Consider his first large study of the Canadian staples, The Fur Trade in Canada. The wealth that can be mined from this book is truly astonishing—elucidations so penetrating of the economics of transport and of commercial organisation that they have remained for nearly thirty years the starting point of new research: interpretations of the technological and social interplay between Red Indian and European society which are of equal illumination to the historian and the social anthropologist: a vision of the making of Canada, not in spite of geography (as historians used to say) but along the massive geographical grain of the rivers and lakes, portages, trails, and passes of the Dominion. Innis saw the axis of Canadian nation-building running east to west across the North American continent; but he saw it also running west to east across the Atlantic, back to the European homelands. It was the demand in European markets for beaver hats that set the fur-traders on the

trail of the beavers and of the Indians in their retreat westwards. So it was with the whole procession of Canadian staples—furs and fish, lumber, wheat, and metals: it was the demand of metropolitan markets that set the frontiers moving.

So far I have been performing one of the exercises which Webb proposed for non-American historians; I have been mobilising evidence from various countries of the New World in order to test his hypothesis—that part of the hypothesis, at least, which emphasises the interdependence of Great Frontier and Metropolis. But what about the metropolitan evidence? Webb insists upon the two-way interaction of influences. He ascribes to the Great Frontier a decisive role in breaking down the hierarchies and corporate institutions of European society. He insists still more upon the dominant part it played in promoting the great 'boom' of economic expansion which continued from the time of Columbus right up to the present century.

I must confess that I find it difficult to bring these theories to a precise test. On the social and political side I see, for example, no way of measuring the degree of American influence upon the French Revolution, or upon the 'revolution from above' which Stein and Hardenburg carried through in Prussia, or upon the widespread revolutionary ferment of the 1840s. The evidence is, in the nature of things, predominantly literary and subjective—for example, the impressions of sensitive observers like Tocqueville, who discovered in democratic America the shape of things to come in Europe.

The economic evidence, on the other hand, lends itself more easily to weighing and measuring. It does not, however, invariably favour the illustrations with which Webb supports his argument. For example, he makes a great deal of 'wind-falls'. No doubt they fell easily into the lap of some fortunate first-comers; but, in the half dozen or more trades which I have studied, the average rate of return upon capital was never sensational. Admittedly my first-hand studies fall altogether within the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; for the earlier periods I have to rely on secondary sources. Still, the impression I gain from Innis is that the fur trade required a very heavy investment of capital, and I believe that the slave trade—'the lottery of Liverpool', as it came to be called—was constantly afflicted by a high rate of bankruptcy. Certainly, there were no 'gifts from the gods' in any of the African trades—palm oil and kernels, cocoa, cotton, groundnuts—which fall within my own period of study: even on the fabulous gold-fields of the Witwatersrand the average return upon capital amounted in the period 1887-1923 to a bare 4.1 per cent.<sup>3</sup> Does Webb imagine that the Great Frontier offered to the Metropolis a surplus not only of land but also of capital?<sup>4</sup> How then could one explain the net import of capital which developing countries usually show in their international accounts? Australia, to take the example which I know best, remains to this day a capital-importing country. Throughout the nineteenth century her development depended almost as much upon the British investor as it did upon the British immigrant.

Webb ought to feel pleased if some of the controversial detail in his book suggests new research tasks for economic historians, for it has been his purpose 'to open a subject, not to close it'.<sup>5</sup> However, I doubt whether many people will feel moved to controvert his central theme. After all, the boom hypothesis is

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See S.H. Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa (London and New York, 1938), p. 91.

4

Walter P. Webb, The Great Frontier (Boston, 1951), p. 12.

5

Ibid., p. 409

essentially a restatement, in more moderate terms, of Adam Smith's resounding generalisation: 'The discovery of America and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind.... By uniting, in some measure, the most distant part of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another's enjoyments, and to encourage one another's industry, their general tendency would seem to be beneficial'.<sup>6</sup>

So far from being too expansive, Webb is more restrictive than Adam Smith in his view of the oceanic discoveries and their economic consequences. He excludes Asia and Tropical Africa. Every historian, of course, is free to choose his own field of study and to define it in words which he finds convenient: Webb's Great Frontier is 'an empty land, a vacancy inviting occupancy',<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, the historian of metropolitan activities such as shipping, banking, and investment is bound to include not only the 'vacant' but also the populous countries. The process of economic expansion and the sum total of its results cannot be fully envisaged from the metropolitan point of view if countries such as India, China, and West Africa are omitted from the inquiry. For this reason I felt myself constrained, in researches which I was pursuing twenty years ago, to choose the more comprehensive framework of Adam Smith.<sup>8</sup> At the same time, I found it convenient in exposition to borrow and perhaps to embellish Turner's metaphor of moving frontiers: the settlers' frontier led me into South Africa; the traders' and planters' frontier led me into Tropical Africa; the missionaries' frontier was with me all the time in both regions.

The missionaries' frontier? Here is a complicated theme which I have no time to pursue, beyond stating my belief that the Metropolis is not merely an economic system but also a system of ideas. One consequence of its expansionist energies has been an intermingling of civilisations and cultures on a scale unknown to humanity since Hellenistic and Roman times. Here is a fascinating field of study for historians and other students of mankind.

If you protest that such explorations are remote from those of Turner and Webb I can only state my belief that they are linked within a system of ideas. If you think that I am misusing the Turner-Webb phraseology I am ready to discard it and use a different one.<sup>9</sup> For it is the ideas, not the phrases, that matter most.

Today I am coining a phrase of my own, 'The Moving Metropolis'.<sup>10</sup> I do not take the phrase too seriously and I shall not be cast down if nobody ever uses it again. It does suggest, however, an idea which I should like to see discussed. Let me recall the economic functions of the Metropolis: it is a provider of markets, of population, and of capital. Now let me recall the cattle ranchers in Webb's book, The Great Plains. These men are Americans. So far as I can see,

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Adam Smith, ...The Wealth of Nations, ed. by Edwin Cannan (5th ed., 2 vols., London, 1904), II, 125.

7

Webb, op. cit., p. 284.

8

W.K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, II (London and New York, 1940 and 1942).

9

Turner would have tolerated frontiers in the plural but Webb says (op. cit., p. 284): 'There is no plural for the frontier'.



their capital is home-supplied. They drive their cattle to market in Abilene, Kansas. Surely their Metropolis is upon American soil?

Webb's Great Frontier is empty land—'a vacancy'. What takes the place of the vacancy as it becomes filled? Turner's moving frontier is a 'procession'. What happens after the procession has passed by? Let me suggest the answer by an Australian illustration. Half a century ago, some relatives of mine moved into the heavily forested mountain country of southern Victoria. They lived hard—assailed the tall timber with axe and fire, ploughed the land, and sowed the grain between the smoking stumps of the devastated forest. Here was the American drama of the frontier, reenacted in another continent and in another century. Today, these Victorian hills are bare of timber and as velvety as the rolling grasslands of the English west country. Thriving townships serve the needs of prosperous dairy farmers. A motor journey of an hour and a half along the South Gippsland Highway brings the farmers and their produce to Melbourne, a commercial and manufacturing city of one and a half million people, a powerhouse of economic activity throughout Australia. The frontier has passed by. The state of Victoria, with its great city and encircling countryside, has become metropolitan.

I do not think of The Metropolis as an inert slab of geography - unchanging Europe confronting the unchanging New World. I think of it as a function—mobile, flexible, and increasingly dispersed throughout the whole western world, in Europe, in Australia; above all, in America, that great powerhouse of metropolitan energies.

Following the moving metropolis is a game that one might play in other societies than our own. Might not we follow it from Rome eastwards to Byzantium, northwards to Moscow, eastwards again to Tokyo and Peking?

I thought that there was some novelty not only in my phrase but in my idea until, after writing this paper, I read 'Frontiers, Metropolitanism and Canadian History', by J.M.S. Careless, Canadian Historical Review, XXXV (March, 1954), 1-21. To Professor Careless and other Canadian historians the Metropolis is frequently a 'chain', with links both in the New World and in the Old. These historians are not system-builders, but are carrying further a method and point of view whose great utility was demonstrated by Innis.

## IV

# South African Perspectives

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### 1. South African Elections, 1919-1948\*

South Africa is microcosmic. Its history contains all the conflicts of our time. But my paper is myopic. The large issues will not appear in it except incidentally. I hope to demonstrate, by a niggling operation on a narrow front, how much hard work historians still have to do before they can come closely to grips with the large issues. I have besides a methodological axe to grind, a few modest proposals to make for mutual aid between historians and political scientists.

Let me begin with some reflections upon style. The fashions change with the generations. Thirty years ago, at a conference of historians in Birmingham, I heard a silver-haired and silver-tongued colleague protest, with gentle malice, 'So many people in our profession seem to think that ability to write the King's English is an unfair advantage which a few historians enjoy over the others'. Nowadays, things seem better. Most of us pay lip-service, at least, to literacy.

Numeracy—if you will allow the word—is a different matter. The very notion of number makes some historians mad. A year or two ago the president of the American Historical Association warned us against 'that Bitch-goddess, QUANTIFICATION'. Reading and writing, he suggested, were permissible exercises for historians; but not arithmetic.<sup>1</sup>

I believe that we need all three R's. Doing sums is not a sin. The economic historian has to spend a good deal of his time doing them. The political historian can dodge them if he wants to, but it is a pity if he does. Consider elections. Like war, they are the continuation of policy by other means. They register the comparative force of competing political thrusts. They cannot be

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Presidential Address, Section E of the ANZAAS Conference, 1964, reprinted from The Australian Journal of Science, Vol. 28, No.3, Sept. 1965.

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C. Bridenbaugh (1963): The American Historical Review, 68, 326.

understood except by doing sums. Throughout the past two decades political scientists have been doing these sums with zeal and skill. They have coined a new name—psephology—for the arithmetic of elections. This name has an impeccable Greek ancestry; but it is, perhaps, just a shade pompous. It has not yet won its way into the dictionary. Until it does, nobbery will remain my name for the arithmetic of elections. Nobbery means counting nob.

Nobbery, like national income accountancy, was employed, to begin with, in contemporary studies; but later it became retrospective. This has been a stroke of luck for historians: not least, for Australian historians. A colleague of mine in Canberra, Dr Colin Hughes, has been engaged for some years past upon the quantitative analysis of Australian elections—Colonial, State and Federal—from the 1890s to the 1960s. Unfortunately for me, no enterprise of comparable scale is under way in South Africa; but I have persuaded a colleague in Cape Town, Miss Clodagh O'Dowd, to make some pioneering studies of South African elections since Union. Her investigations, I hope, will bear fruit later on in publication. Meanwhile, they are helping me in my biography of Smuts.

I must explain how this happens. My biography moves through triumph into tragedy. Even when I am with Smuts in imagination on the high peaks of power, I feel a premonition of his impending fall. In the figures of successive elections I see the moving finger of his fate. Let me quote one simple series which records the advance of the National Party. This party represents the forces of nationalist Afrikanerdom which challenged Smuts and in the end overthrew him.

<u>Elections</u>	<u>Seats won by</u> <u>National Party</u>	
1915	27	
1920	44	
1921	45	
1924	63	
1929	78	
1933	75	(the figure fixed in the Hertzog-Smuts pact of coalition)
1938	27	(the total of 'Purified Nationalists'—Mahan's men, not Hertzog's)
1943	43	
1948	79	(National and Afrikaner Parties combined)

The figures for the period 1933-1943 may seem to contradict the predestinarian interpretation of biography and history which I suggest just now. Indeed, these figures demonstrate the activity of two historical elements which bigoted predestinarians are loath to recognize; in history the unexpected does happen: in history persons do count. The unexpected which happened in the early 1930s was the economic blizzard; the persons who counted were Hertzog and Smuts. The unexpected which happened in the late 1930s was Hitler's war; the person who counted was Smuts. Smuts brought his divided country into the war. He held the Cape route open throughout the years when the Commonwealth could not have survived without it. On the home front he won a resounding triumph in the elections of July 1943.

The United Party under me [he wrote] is more than double the Nats and in addition we have the Labour and Dominion and Native representatives, which gives us in all a majority of 67 in the House compared with 13 when I went to war in September 1939. And when I think of my years in the wilderness, and at sunset I find such recognition of what

I have stood for and suffered for, I feel that at last I have been repaid with more than compound interest ... It is indeed a 'famous victory'.<sup>2</sup>

Smuts believed that the elections of 1943 would prove decisive for all time of his country's destiny.

He was deceiving himself. Five years later his enemies won the last battle of the long campaign. They had never for one moment doubted that they would win it. Not even the elections of 1943 shook their confidence. In their view, Hitler's war was an irrelevant interlude, an eddy on the surface of the deep oceanic current which was sweeping them to power. Their assurance of victory had arithmetical roots. First they made a demographical count: the count of Afrikaners. Secondly they made a political count: the count of ware Afrikaners—that is to say, of their own supporters or potential supporters. The first count was strictly statistical; the second was a mixture of statistics and the will to believe.

Dr Verwoerd's paper, Die Transvaler (26 April 1943) dramatized the count of Afrikaners in a succinct table which showed the ratios between successive age groups of English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans.

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>Afrikaans-speakers</u> <u>(English-speakers,</u> <u>100)</u>
Over 21	115
7-21	185
Under 7	212

Those figures left not much room for argument. The progressive numerical ascendancy of Afrikaners was a fact. In contrast, the political ascendancy of ware Afrikaners still remained a prophecy. But the Nationalists were confident prophets. The only thing that they did not predict was the date when their prophecy would be fulfilled. Fulfilment came in the elections of 1948.

Ever since then, predestination has exercised sovereign rule over South Africa—so we are bound to say, unless we believe that the unexpected can happen in history. Even then, the 1948 elections would still remain the most important South African event since Union. Yet they were a close call. The electoral arithmetic of 1948 suggests some interesting reflections upon an historical might-have-been:

	<u>Members Returned</u>	
<u>For Malan</u>		<u>For Smuts</u>
National Party	70	United Party 65
Afrikaner Party	9	Labour Party 6
Total	<u>79</u>	Total <u>71</u>

Malan's majority was 8—or 5, if the 3 Native Representatives were counted. This was a narrow majority. Still, at the previous election (1943) Smuts had won a majority of 54. The swing to Malan was immense.

Nevertheless, Smuts won more votes.

<u>Votes</u>			
(including estimates for uncontested seats)			
<u>For Malan</u>		<u>For Smuts</u>	
National Party	420,447	United Party	588,518
Afrikaner party	<u>41,885</u>	Labour Party	<u>32,164</u>
Total	<u>462,332</u>	Total	<u>620,682</u>

Votes that were cast for small groups or for independent candidates were rather more than 6 per cent of the poll. In the direct confrontation between Malan and Smuts the percentage figures were as follows:

<u>For Malan</u>		<u>For Smuts</u>	
National Party	36.24%	United Party	50.72%
Afrikaner Party	<u>3.61%</u>	Labour Party	<u>2.77%</u>
Total	<u>39.85%</u>	Total	<u>53.49%</u>

If each vote had possessed the same value, the apportionment of seats in parliament would have been

<u>For Smuts</u>	<u>For Malan</u>	<u>Independents and Others</u>
80	60	10

By and large, the third group was pro-Smuts; but he could have got along comfortably without its support. On the one vote one value basis, he would have won the straight fight with Malan by 20 seats, instead of losing it by 8 seats.<sup>3</sup>

In Australia we are familiar with governments holding power for long periods of time with the aid of 'gerrymanders' which over-represent them in the constituencies by as much as 8 per cent;<sup>4</sup> but the bonus enjoyed by the Afrikaner Nationalists was very much larger. When the Smuts government fell in 1948 it was far more heavily under-represented in the constituencies. Throughout nine consecutive years of power Smuts had tolerated that anomaly, notwithstanding his bitter experience of its consequences in the elections of 1929. The historical might-have-been which I mentioned just now would have been a decision by Smuts to rectify—so far as he had the power<sup>5</sup>—this built-in bias against his own side.

In my mind's eye, I can see the chapter headings of a monograph within the field of comparative politics: a study of the electoral systems and their working in Australia and South Africa. The task would be intricate and rewarding; but I am not so much in love with nobbery as to tackle it. Nor do I now propose to spend

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I owe these calculations to Miss Clodagh O'Dowd. I have not described their processes; but I should point out that the totals of votes cast include the figures estimated on a uniform principle for all uncontested seats.

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See for example Davis, S.R. (Ed.), The Government of the Australian States (Longmans, 1960), especially Chapter 8, section ii, "'Gerrymandering' Triumphant' (pp. 576-578). See also: Hetherington, R. and Reid, R.L., The South Australian Elections 1959 (Adelaide, 1962), pp. 16-18, 29-31, 120-139.

5

He could not prevent birds of his particular feather from flocking together, and thereby wasting many votes.

any more time on figures. Perhaps I have spent just enough time on them to indicate that quantification is neither a goodness nor a bitch nor a mixture of the two; but an honest working woman. When historians choose to employ her, she will give them useful service, within the limitations of her capacity.

I want now to emphasize those limitations. Even in the study of elections numeracy is not enough. Literacy is also required. The literate historian has a story to tell of how people voted and what moved them to vote that way. Aggregates, fractions, percentages, the analysis of interests—all the skills of the political scientist—may bring essential grist to the historian's mill; but they will not tell his story for him. Before he can tell it he must find his way, so far as he can, into the thoughts and feelings of the politicians and the voters. Thoughts and feelings are, perhaps, rather more likely to find expression in a cartoon than in a column of figures. Of course, there are cartoons and cartoons. More often than not they are artistically and politically trivial. But suppose that a particular cartoon puts into a nutshell what one of the parties is all the time asserting and re-asserting in its manifestoes, its pamphlets, its platform oratory, its newspaper propaganda. We can take steps to ensure that the quantitative evidence and the qualitative evidence support each other. After we have done that, we may feel able to say, with a high degree of confidence, that the cartoon tells us what the election was about.

What were South African elections about in the period between the foundation of the Union and the triumph of Afrikaner Nationalism? A sweeping and much-quoted generalization proposes the following answer: Up to the end of World War II, it says, South African politics were a debate among Afrikaners about what to do with the British; since then they have become a debate among the whites about what to do with the blacks. Some crystal-gazers anticipate a third phase when they will become a debate among the blacks about what to do with the whites.

I shall not join the crystal-gazers. For the purposes of this paper, my period ends in 1948. Looking backwards from that date, I see some initial plausibility in the generalization. Afrikaner leadership was predominant in politics but the Afrikaners split: one section approved the Botha-Smuts conciliation policy; the other section approved Hertzog's two-streams policy. These were rival Afrikaner programs for dealing with English-speaking South Africans and with the British Empire; they were not rival programs for dealing with black Africans. The white politicians kept telling each other that they ought to keep the Native Question, as they called it, out of politics. The Afrikaner nationalists, like nationalists everywhere else, were xenophobic; but the most conspicuous target of their xenophobia remained for many years to come the British Empire: witness the Afrikaner myths, monuments and martyrologies; witness even the history books. Among the Afrikaner historians—so we have been told on high scholarly authority<sup>6</sup>—anglophobia remained the driving impulse up to the end of the Second World War; not until then did the negrophobic impulse take pride of place. Between this view of Afrikaner historiography and the generalization which I quoted just now about Afrikaner politics, the correspondence is close.

Nevertheless I cannot accept this packaging of folklore, history and politics into separate chronological slabs. There were occasionally—I admit—changes of tone and emphasis; but there was also an original and continuing entanglement of the diverse ideological strands. I should be prepared to argue this general proposition by citing particular exemplars of Afrikaner legend and history: Slagter's Nek, for example: or A Century of Wrong, the diatribe which Smuts let fly against the British Empire when he was at the high tide of his nationalist fury on the eve of Milner's war. However, Afrikaner legend and history in their long sweep are not my concern here. My restricted theme is the elections of three

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L.M.T. Thompson (1962): Journal of African History, 3, 125.

decades. Let me now state dogmatically what they were about. In the elections of 1920, 1921 and 1943 the British connection was the dominant issue. In the elections of 1929 and 1948 colour was the dominant issue. In the elections of 1933 and 1938 the issues, as I have already shown, were confused by a reshuffling of the parties. In the elections of 1924 the issue of colour—camouflaged as the 'civilized labour policy'—was already prominent, if not yet predominant. This chronology of election issues does not show the orderly sequence of phases that has been suggested; on the contrary, it is irregular, staccato. It reveals the interpenetration in time of the two great debates: the debate among Afrikaners about what to do with the British; the debate among the whites about what to do with the blacks.

The general election of June 1929 shows the second debate in full swing nearly two decades before its alleged starting date. It has been called the Black Peril election, and it deserves that name. There were of course some other issues. The government claimed credit for five continuous years of vigorous economic upswing. The opposition tried to prove that the government's proposed trade treaty with Germany was a threat to the British connection. But these were side issues. The Nationalists staked their fortunes on a gigantic campaign to convince the country that white civilization was in danger. I have not time to examine their campaign in detail, but the cartoons which they published in Ons Vaterland and Die Burger contain its essence. One cartoon in the former paper (8 March 1929) pictured a lone white couple among a crowd of blacks, all dressed in smart city clothes; underneath was the caption 'If the S.A.P. gets its way'. Another cartoon in the same paper (21 March 1929) showed a Griqua soldier with a white bride on his arm; the caption explained that a Smuts victory would bring the country to that. A week before the election, Die Burger published the cartoon of a farmer gazing with dismay at an election poster supposedly put out by the South Africa Party:

S tem vir die S wart A frica P arty

That was the warning and the battle cry reiterated week after week and day by day on every Nationalist platform and in the headlines, leading articles and correspondence columns of the Nationalist Press. To vote for Smuts meant voting black. To vote for Hertzog meant voting white. Stem wit vir 'n witmansland! Vote White for a white South Africa!

Parliamentary elections, of course, are everywhere and always a contest between rival parties for political power, not a combined operation of the parties for the discovery of truth. Nevertheless, the Black Peril campaign of 1929 established a new record of South African electoral mendacity. Later that same year, Smuts demonstrated in his Rhodes Lectures at Oxford how very unlikely it was that he would be the man to surrender white supremacy in South Africa; on the contrary, he made clear his ambition to extend white influence far beyond the Union's borders. It was precisely this ambition which made him vulnerable to Nationalist propaganda. In a speech at Ermelo on 17 January 1929 he said, or was reported to have said: 'Let us cultivate feelings of friendship over this African continent, so that one day we may have a British Confederation of African States ... a great African Dominion stretching through Africa'. He denied later on that he had used the words 'African Dominion'; but it was too late. Day after day from January to June the Nationalist politicians and journalists quoted those words against him. If he got his way, they cried, South Africa would be drowned in the Black North; if he got his way, South Africa would soon begin to look like a little spot on the point of the tail of an immense pitch-black African dog.<sup>7</sup>

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7

Die Burger, 21 January 1929, '... 'n sterk pikswart hond met 'n wit kolletie an die puntjie van sy stert'.

This melodramatic propaganda paid a rich dividend on polling day; but not long afterwards the Nationalists ran into a long patch of bad luck. They had to wait nearly twenty years before they got the chance of staging a repeat performance of their 1929 campaign.

Their schism in the 1930s purified them—purified was their own word—but it also set them back almost to their starting point. After six years of fighting they were still no further forward than they had been at the end of the First World War, when Hertzog was leading them. Then came the Second World War. Suddenly, they saw the chance of a short-cut to power. The reunion of Afrikanerdom, a separate peace, the Republic of South Africa, secession from the Commonwealth—in 1940 all those glittering prizes seemed within their grasp. Alas for their hopes, they had miscalculated the power factor, both in the wide world and within South Africa. In the elections of 1943 they paid dearly for their miscalculation.

But they learnt their lesson. It was a lesson about the ordering of priorities. They realized that the debate among Afrikaners about what to do with the British was not yet an election winner for their side; the way to win was to make the elections a debate among the whites about what to do with the blacks. Hertzog's National Party had learnt that lesson in the early 1920s. Malan's National Party re-learnt it in the mid-1940s.

Nationalist propaganda changed its tone and its target even before the war ended. The clamour for a separate peace, for the Republic, for a break with Britain and the Commonwealth suddenly died down. The party began to show concern for the future well-being of the men in the armed forces. It began to send political missionaries into the English-speaking constituencies. It began publishing an English newspaper, the New Era. As the elections approached Nationalist spokesmen insisted that republicanism and secession were not this time the issue. They made a specific pledge never again to force that issue, but to let it be decided in a referendum. The government's supporters, naturally, resisted their attempts to bury the past. The Cape Times made an anthology of their most damaging wartime statements and published it under the title 'Things they would rather forget'. Nevertheless, there were many people, even in Smuts's camp, who did forget.<sup>8</sup>

As manipulators of the popular mood, the Nationalists showed a flair that came close to inspiration. They invented a powerful incantation, the word apartheid. That word expressed an ideology, not a theory. An ideology can jumble different theories together, without any danger to its own political effectiveness, provided it possesses strong emotional driving force. Apartheid was a jumble of academic propositions, of political calculations, of vulgar prejudices, all held together by the emotional urge of white South Africans to fight for their own survival as the dominant race. To the high-minded academics of the SABRA group at Stellenbosch, apartheid meant the progressive achievement of freedom—not only for the whites but also for the blacks—by the means of their territorial separation.<sup>9</sup> To Dr Malan, apartheid meant 'two separate spheres, not necessarily with an absolute dividing line, not separate territorial spheres.'<sup>10</sup> To the vulgar white South African, apartheid meant keeping the black man in his place.<sup>11</sup>

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In Natal the National Party won three seats which it could not possibly have won without some support from English-speaking voters.

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SABRA stands for Suid-Afrikaanse Buro vir Rasse-Angeleenthede (South African Bureau of Racial Affairs). For its insistence that apartheid means territorial separation see the resolutions of its 1950 and 1952 congresses, printed in the pamphlet Integration or Separate Development.



Apartheid was a chameleon word. Smuts and his friends wasted a lot of their time in refuting it as an academic theory. They demonstrated—as the statistics of population and industry still demonstrate year by year—that the SABRA program of territorial separation was a fraudulent Utopia. It made no difference. Any Nationalist politician could say, as Malan said, that what he meant by apartheid was different from what the professors meant.

When I began work on this lecture I had it in mind to go fully into the 1948 campaign; but I must now content myself with some brief comment on two Nationalist cartoons. On polling day Die Burger published a cartoon which showed Smuts casting a shadow, not of himself, but of Hofmeyr. Smuts was 78 and nearly worn out. He was not likely to stay the course of the next parliament. Nobody knew that Hofmeyr, the Deputy Leader of the United Party, had an even shorter expectation of life. Hofmeyr was in his middle fifties. For the past fifteen years or thereabouts he had been working his way slowly and painfully towards a liberal point of view. He had shared Holy Communion with black Christians; he had opposed Hertzog's bill (and Smuts had done the same) for removing native voters from the common roll in the Cape; he had niggled about the restrictions placed on Indians; he had denounced the mentality of herrenvolk. He had said and done some other things that had the smell of gelykstandigheid, racial equality. The Nationalists published a pamphlet about him, 'Hofmeyr the Future Leader. His Past, Present and Future'. In their political melodrama, Hofmeyr was First Bogyman.

Communism was Second Bogyman. During the last fortnight of the campaign the official party organ, Die Kruithoring, made a passionate appeal to all true Afrikaners: 'Obliterate the red hordes. A vote for Jan Smuts is a vote for Joe Stalin'.<sup>12</sup> That news would have astonished the Russians; but in Nationalist propaganda it appeared matter of fact. What kind of people, the Nationalists asked, were supporting Smuts? First the Springbok Legion, an organization of war veterans which had Communists among its leaders. Secondly the Coloured voters,<sup>13</sup> whom Malan was proposing to remove from the common roll of Cape Province; they were being corrupted, the Nationalists asserted, by Communist infiltrators. Thirdly the Labour Party—but this time the Communist taint was not so easy to identify; for Labour was in schism and one of its sects was attacking Smuts for dealing too gently with the Indians; still, the majority sect was supporting him and its political hue, if not flaming red, was pinkish. On 17 May Die Transvaler published a cartoon of Smuts propping up a horse: the animal is his own United Party, but its four legs are Communism, the Springbok Legion, the Coloured voter, the Labour Party. All four legs are on the one side; on the other side Smuts is pushing against the animal's weight. Hofmeyr is holding the halter and Smuts

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10

Speech of 2 October 1948, House of Assembly Debates.

11

J.G. Strijdom was a robust exponent of this point of view. Some of his characteristic outbursts may be found by using the index to Alan Paton's Hofmeyr (Oxford University Press, 1964).

12

I owe the quotation—as, indeed, much else in this paper—to Miss O'Dowd. The Cape Times (15 May 1948) reprinted this startling appeal.

13

On polling day there were 46,051 registered Coloured voters in the Cape. The evidence suggests that the majority of them favoured Smuts, though without enthusiasm.

cries to him, 'Trek HOFFIE! Die ding wil kantel!' ('Pull HOFFIE! The creature will tip over!')

An incantation and two bogymen—they give us a picture of the Nationalist attack, but they leave the defending forces in darkness. They leave much else in darkness. I could list a score of questions about this memorable general election which political scientists might fairly put to me. Suppose that I could answer them all; how much more should we know about the realities of South African politics? Not so very much more.

Election studies tell us next to nothing about the politics of black South Africans. As late as 1948 the contending parties were still taking it for granted that the black man was merely the object of the white man's politics. But the black man by now had different ideas in his head. In August 1946 the Natives Representative Council—a consultative body heavily weighted in its composition towards the status quo<sup>14</sup>—had declared once and for all that it would no longer play the part assigned to it in the white man's political game. 'We have been fooled', cried Councillor Mosaka, 'We have been asked to co-operate with a toy telephone. We have been speaking into an apparatus which cannot transmit sound and at the end of which there is nobody to receive the message'. By the unanimous vote of its African members the Council called upon the government forthwith to abolish all discriminatory legislation affecting non-Europeans in South Africa. The Council then adjourned. It never met again.<sup>15</sup>

This resolution of 15 August 1946 recorded a seismic shift of race relationships in South Africa. In the same year India's attack on white South Africa at the United Nations recorded a seismic shift of international relations. These events were cataclysmic. But the election campaign of 1948 showed only a few distorting shadows of them.

Election studies, if taken by themselves, would give a distorted picture of South African history even within the limited sphere of the white man's politics. Elections are orderly; but the history of white South Africa has been disorderly, heroic, tragic, explosive. It has been a history not only of electoral and parliamentary struggle but of war, rebellion, revolution. It has been a passionate history.

Am I now trying to state that the study of elections in South Africa is a waste of time? I do not think this is true. In the book that I am now writing, I shall make use of election studies in perhaps one in five of my chapters. I find these studies indispensable—but only, as I gave notice at the beginning, on a narrow front of investigation.

All of us have to do a good deal of our investigating on narrow fronts. That does not matter, provided we keep touch with investigators on neighbouring fronts and remain responsive to human history in depth. In our 'quiet continent', this second proviso is not so easily fulfilled. Our own history has been so orderly that it is hard for us to realize how chaotic, how elemental human history has been and in many places still is. In Australia, more than in most countries, the historian needs a vivid imagination.

14

The Natives Representative Council was instituted by the Hertzog legislation of 1936. It had 6 (white) official members, 4 African nominated by the Governor-General, and 12 Africans chosen by indirect election. It had limited powers of advising the Minister of Native Affairs and Parliament upon matters of African interest.

15

See Shadow and Substance in South Africa by C.M. Tatz (University of Natal Press, 1962), pp. 115-116 and Chapter 7 passim.

All of us have our own ways of nourishing our imaginations. Greek history remains part of my nourishment. I have just re-read the story told by Thucydides of revolution and war in Corcyra. It is a story of domestic conflict and foreign intervention, of clashing interests and erupting passions. Thucydides tells it so vividly that I have the feeling it is all happening now. Yet his thought and style are cool. He is, I think, not only an early master of historical narrative but the first political scientist. He suggests to me a handy definition of political science: 'cool thought about hot stuff'.

Political scientists in our generation seem to prefer cool thought about cool stuff. I can think of one or two exceptions; but the great majority of them keep safely within the limits of the calculable. Interests appear calculable; passions appear incalculable. Nevertheless, interests and passions both belong to the stuff of politics. Unless political scientists make room for both they will fall heavily out of balance on the side of calculation and rationalization.

We historians are not so insidiously tempted. Our danger is probably the opposite one, of not calculating when we should, or of calculating unskillfully. Let me repeat what I said at the start: numeracy is a virtue in our profession. Nevertheless, literacy remains the higher virtue. It is our life line.

## 2. Are There South Africans?\*

During the month of Munich, twenty-eight years ago, Alfred Hoernlé and I got to know each other across a conference table in Australia. When the conference was over, a research task brought me to South Africa. I still retain a vivid memory of the friendship and help which both the Hoernlés gave me throughout the six months of my stay. This evening, I must do my best to deliver a lecture conformable with their standard of scientific and personal integrity. They would have wished me, I think, to lecture upon a South African theme. Yet their knowledge of South Africa possessed a precision and depth which I cannot approach. If they were here this evening, I could tell them nothing about their country that they did not know already. I could only ask them questions. But that, precisely, is our procedure in the academic world: we are all the time asking questions, not to score points against each other but to test our hypotheses; not to establish some case, but to make such progress as we can along the difficult path of knowledge.

The theme of my lecture is expressed in a question: Are there South Africans? You may think this question conspicuously un-academic: indeed, I am bound to confess that a journalist suggested it to me—but what of that? Some journalists possess an eye for the essential which is not invariably the gift of academic persons. The journalist whom I now have in mind is a Natal man, G.H. Calpin, who produced during the second World War a book entitled There are No South Africans. He began by citing the cumbersome language his fellow-countrymen almost always used when they tried to designate themselves as a people: true Afrikaners, good South Africans, English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans or Afrikaners—they seemed incapable of naming themselves without some qualifying adjective or phrase: yet other peoples, such as the British or Germans or French, felt no similar need for adjectival props. Calpin concluded that South Africans were still in doubt and in dispute with each other about their own identity as a nation—if indeed they were a nation; he saw two nations within the framework of one state.

Only two nations? If Calpin were writing his book today he would have to state his views on the emergent Bantustans. And he would have to face a question which twenty-five years ago did not bother him: Ernest Renan's question, Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation? Tonight, I have little time for discussing this question in terms of theory; but I must at least enumerate some elements of nationhood: first, the territory; secondly, the culture; thirdly, the polity; fourthly, the subjective consciousness of nationality—le plebiscite de tous les jours, as Renan called it. Among European nations, only the English, French and Spaniards have had the good fortune to possess all those elements of nationhood without having to fight hard for them. Up to the nineteenth century, the Italians and Germans possessed the territorial and cultural elements, but not the political element. Up to the

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\* South African Institute of Race Relations: The Alfred and Winifred Hoernlé Memorial Lecture, 1966.

twentieth century that, by and large, was the situation of the Irish.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile, Jewish national feeling—but is 'national' the right word?—remained a millennial miracle. The Jews possessed no territory. Linguistically and racially they had become multiform. Yet they remembered Zion. In our own time, they have made Zion the shrine of a Jewish national state.

All this is background. I am trying to spot-light a few concepts which will help me to transmute Calpin's generalised proposition, and my generalised question, into a series of particular questions. In tackling the task, I have found little help from the famous nationalist writers. Mazzini, for example, was not a systematic thinker but an evangelist who took for granted the God-given identity of state and nation and the God-given harmony of national states. He believed that the nations would become a united brotherhood so soon as they could all be sorted out the one from the other. He failed to see how resistant they were to being sorted out. Except in western Europe and a few other favoured regions, the world's nations and potential nations are so mixed up with each other that they cannot all possess their own separate territories and polities. They are compelled to look for ways and means of sharing these blessings. For Homo sapiens as a species, this need is now urgent. Mazzinian fission has become an explosive force in other continents besides Europe. Moreover, it has become coincident in time with nuclear fission. Xenophobic nationalism and the bomb make a dangerous combination.

This last reflection may seem rather off the track of my lecture, but I have wanted to drive home one point: South Africa with her medley of peoples should think twice before committing herself too far to the theory that each nation should have a separate state, or—alternatively—to the theory that nations living in one state should coalesce. The world map shows many examples of the two-nation or multi-national state: Switzerland, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Canada, Soviet Russia—one could easily enlarge the list. In some of these states, most notably Switzerland, the diverse nations lead a stable life together; in others, such as Belgium and Canada, tension seems at present to be on the increase. In any diagnosis of its causes, one would need to examine both the political and the cultural components of nationality. Since Mazzini's day, they have been systematically studied and I ought by rights to spend a little time on them now: for example, I ought to remind you what a slow-growing plant cultural nationality is, until urbanisation and education become its forcing house. But I cannot afford any longer to stay shivering on the brink.

Are there South Africans? I shall put this question in terms successively of law, politics and economics. In doing so, I shall be asking what are the integrative and what the disintegrative elements of South African life. I am aware that these adjectives have acquired emotional and polemical overtones; but I cannot help that. I shall use them as my dictionary prescribes, purely as terms of description. Integration I shall take to mean the combination of elements into a whole; disintegration I shall take to mean the breaking of a whole into fragments or parts.

In law, there are South Africans. Your Statute Book confutes Calpin. Act No. 44 of 1949 declares, in effect, that almost every person whom you meet when you walk down the street, whether he be white, black, brown or brindle, is a South African citizen. His passport, if he has one, declares his citizenship to the wide world, no matter what his colour is.

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<sup>1</sup> The Irish had almost lost their language, but were none the less insistent upon their separate cultural identity. To them, an Irish national state seemed, among other things, the indispensable instrument of national revival in the cultural sphere.

This colour-blind definition of citizenship surprised me at first. A revised definition of nationality, based upon Act No. 40 of 1927, would have served your government's essential purpose: namely, to identify the categories of persons subject to South African jurisdiction. According to juristic theory, the concept of nationality has its roots in the relationship of sovereign and subject: the concept of citizenship, on the other hand, has egalitarian connotations.<sup>2</sup> On a famous occasion 1,900 years ago, St. Paul made the latter point. Your own Minister of the Interior made it on the 10th June 1949 in his speech on the second reading of the South African Citizenship Bill. 'Citizenship,' he declared, 'not only has duties and responsibilities, but citizenship also consists of a bundle of rights which belong to the proud possessor of South African citizenship. Foremost among those rights is the right of franchise.'<sup>3</sup> Somebody might well have interjected: 'Are you including the non-white citizens? If you are, you must give them their bundle of rights. If you are not, you must stop calling them citizens.' To that interjection Dr T.E. Donges would doubtless have replied that the specific rights of citizenship belong to the domain réservé of domestic jurisdiction. In law, that answer would have been correct. In logic, it would have been a non sequitur from the statement he had just made about the content of citizenship.

In law, the answer still stands. Although Act No. 48 of 1963 establishes a separate citizenship for the Transkei, Section 7 of the Act makes this citizenship subordinate to South African citizenship. Sub-section (3) reads as follows: 'The Republic shall not regard a citizen of the Transkei as an alien in the Republic and shall by virtue of his citizenship of a territory forming part of the Republic of South Africa regard him for external purposes in terms of international law as a citizen of the Republic and afford him full protection according to international law.' Transkeians, it is clear, remain just as much South Africans as they ever were.

Nevertheless, the leader of the United Party denounced the Transkeian Constitution Bill as a fatally disintegrative measure. Upon what grounds? So far, upon no good grounds in law. But law follows politics. Can it be true, as the Opposition alleges, that the present political course is disintegrative?

The questions which I shall ask about the integrative or disintegrative trend of politics will have not merely a territorial but also a sociological reference. I shall be trying, so far as I can, to clear my mind first about the politics of colour, secondly about the politics of culture. As a prelude to each inquiry, I shall look quickly at the historical landscape.

For the politics of colour, the Cape's Ordinance No. 50 of 1828 and the Cape franchise of 1853 give a convenient compass-bearing. These measures are integrative in the sense of being colour-blind. Their origins were metropolitan; but recent research has revealed that, for whatever reasons, a low non-racial franchise qualification was favoured by most white inhabitants of the Cape in 1853. For the following eighty-three years, the colour-blind franchise remained a

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See Clive Parry, Nationality and Citizenship Laws of the Commonwealth and of the Republic of Ireland (London 1957), pp. 3-22. South Africa's Act No. 44 of 1949 was in line with the citizenship legislation of the other Commonwealth Members at that time. It did not, however, contain the common clause, explicitly linking the citizenship of a Commonwealth country with the status of British subject. That link was maintained in practice by other means. cf. Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg, Vol. 26 (1963), pp. 44-9: 'A Transkeian Citizen of South African Nationality?', by J.F.H.

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House of Assembly Debate, Second Session Tenth Parliament, col. 7587.

stabilising influence upon the Cape's political life. Leaders in each section of the people—John X. Merriman, F.S. Malan, Abdullah Abdurahman, Davidson Don Jabavu—acclaimed it as a constructive approach to the politics of race. But that is not to say that its principles struck deep root in South African soil. The Voortrekkers repudiated them. So, in a circuitous manner, did English-speaking Natal. So did Lord Milner, Lord Selborne and their expert advisers. So did the northern trade unions and the Labour Party. To be sure, most Cape men remained faithful to their principles; but they also remained steadfast in their resolve never to press those principles to the point of endangering white supremacy.<sup>4</sup>

In consequence of all this, there was never ground for expecting Cape principles to permeate South Africa. The entrenchment of the Cape franchise in the constitution of the Union, although at the time very few Cape men saw it, was the first of a series of rearguard actions. Are there any actions still to be fought in that long campaign?

Or am I asking the wrong question? Military metaphors never quite fit political phenomena. But no more do mathematical metaphors fit them. General Hertzog used to talk about 'solving' the 'Native Problem'. For example, point 4 of his 1924 election manifesto contained his pledge to produce the solution. Did he produce it? ... General Smuts believed that no once-for-all solution would ever be found for the innumerable and intolerably complex political, economic and social entanglements of South Africa's diverse races and cultures.

Between the two World Wars the favourite slogan was the one about letting the Natives develop along their own lines. Social anthropology in those days seemed to lend some plausibility to the slogan and General Smuts in South Africa—like Lord Lugard and others in England—made some use of it. However, Smuts outgrew it. Creswell, Madeley and their associates never outgrew it. The naivete of those Labour stalwarts fascinates me. They asserted over and over again that everything would come right when the blacks were sent back to their own areas. What areas? How many blacks? At what economic cost? They never asked those questions. In consequence, one has to assume that they were bluffing.

The politics of separate territorial development cannot be taken seriously unless and until the politicians start to wrestle with the quantities. General Hertzog played with the quantities in a small way. Twenty years later, Dr Verwoerd started to wrestle with them. The Tomlinson enquiry of the mid-1950's was a sign that the government meant business. But what kind of business? Areas of Bantu self-government within the unitary South African State? Or areas of sovereign independence outside that state? Which of these two? In an article of March 1959 in *Optima*, the Secretary of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Dr W.W.M. Eiselen, proclaimed the first objective but repudiated the second. On 20th May 1959, in his speech on the second reading of the Bantu Self-Government Bill, the Prime Minister, Dr H.F. Verwoerd, repudiated that repudiation. Dr Eiselen's article, he explained, had been written some months before the government had formulated its new policy. That policy was to promote Bantu self-government all the way to full sovereign independence. The consequence of that would be 'the same kind of situation as exists in Europe'. The Prime Minister did not find that prospect frightening. Common interest, he believed, would hold the separate sovereign states together. Or, if it did not, he would rather have a smaller white state in South Africa capable of fighting for its own survival than a larger state which had already surrendered to Bantu domination?<sup>5</sup>

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For example, in 1892 James Rose-Innes took the initiative in stiffening the tests for the Cape franchise: in 1930 J.H. Hofmeyr proposed in a Joint Select Committee that Native voters in the Cape should never exceed 10 per cent of the Provincial electorate.

That statement is definitive. Your government stands committed to the independence of the Bantu 'homelands'. But it does not stand committed to any timetable of independence, or to any programme of ways and means. On 6th March 1963, in his speech on the second reading of the Transkeian Constitution Bill, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr de Wet Nel, managed to say in the same sentence that the Transkei would remain 'for many generations to come', and that it would remain 'always', a part of the Republic of South Africa.<sup>6</sup> That expectation, as I have discovered during the past five months, is shared by many white South Africans. It expresses or implies the theory of indefinite postponement.

You must forgive my Australian realism. Let me tell you a story of my country. We once had 'our own little Republic'. In 1854, when alluvial gold was running short at Ballarat, the police were hounding the diggers for their licences. The diggers revolted. They set up a flagpole eighty feet high and hoisted their flag, the stars of the Southern Cross on a blue ground. They elected Peter Lalor as 'Commander in Chief of the diggers under arms'. They drilled. They built their legendary Eureka stockade. They were brave men; but inexperienced in war. Before dawn on Sunday the 3rd December 1854, after ten minutes of bloody fighting, their stockade fell to the assault of nearly 400 soldiers and police. A policeman named John King climbed to the top of the flagpole and tore down the flag. But that was not the end of the story. Next year the Colony of Victoria acquired not only a new constitution but also the power to amend that constitution. Responsible government followed almost at once. Victorians took charge of their own police. Peter Lalor, minus one arm, became a Minister of the Crown. In 1900 the new Australian nation adopted without controversy a flag which embodies both the Union Jack and the stars of the Southern Cross.

Today, the Transkeians have their own national flag, not to mention their national anthem. Do they have their own police? At the present time, a police bill is being discussed at Umtata; but Proclamation 400 emanates from Pretoria. Meanwhile, the nominated chiefs, who draw government pay, are holding nearly a 3 to 2 predominance in the Transkeian Legislature. An Australian is bound to notice things like these. It so happens that my government is following in New Guinea more or less the same policy of decolonisation as your government has proclaimed for the Transkei. We in Australia have not, so far as I know, uttered that magic word 'independence'; but when I compare what we are doing with what you are doing in such fields as economic development and education, I feel it a safe bet that the New Guineans will achieve a more substantial independence than the Transkeians will. Of course, I realise the immense differences in the circumstances of our two countries. From one point of view, our task seems easy in comparison with yours. We have only to let slip an adjacent island, but you have to dismember your own body politic, your own soil. From another point of view, you have a flying start over us in the independence race. You have been producing an educated middle class—families like the Jabavus—for more generations than we have been in New Guinea. The Bantu have been in the iron age for more than 1,000 years; but the Papuans are just emerging from the stone age.

I wonder whether I was not too sardonic just now in my comments on the theory of indefinite postponement. Perhaps it is only a minority of South Africans who fool themselves that way. During his speech of 20th May 1959, Dr Verwoerd replied as follows to a question thrown at him by Sir de Villiers Graaff:

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House of Assembly Debate, 19th May 1959, cols. 6214 to 6241.

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House of Assembly Debate, 6th March 1963, col. 2240.



I say that if it is within the power of the Bantu and if the territories in which he now lives can develop to full independence, it will develop in that way. Neither he nor I will be able to stop it, whether our policy is accepted or whether the policy of the United Party is accepted.

Provided we forget the millions of black Africans who live in 'White Man's Country', that statement seems realistic. Already, black politicians in the Transkei are taking the initiative. They are proclaiming their own independence timetable. In March 1963 Mr de Wet Nel said that independence, if ever it came, would not come for generations; but in May 1966 Chief Kaiser Matanzima proclaimed A.D. 2000 as independence year.<sup>7</sup> He proclaimed it under pressure from Transkeians who are a good deal less patient than he is himself. He has also let it be known that the present territorial definition of the Transkei does not satisfy him. Are we then to expect an irredentist movement? All those hundreds of thousands of Xhosa outside the boundaries of the so-called "independent" Transkei? Under the constitution, they are citizens of the Transkei. The Sudeten Germans were never citizens of Bismarck's Reich... These, I know, are disturbing thoughts; but I have seen some sensational maps of a partitioned South Africa. These maps represent the speculations of white South Africans.<sup>8</sup> Does anybody know the speculations on this subject of black South Africans?

The politics of colour, it seems to me, after their integrative start in the nineteenth century, are now well along the road towards the territorial disintegration of this country. Will you please tell me if I am wrong?

The politics of culture now become my theme. The phrase is not a good one; but it will do no harm provided I tell you what I intend by it. Here I have nothing to say about the traditional cultures of the Xhosa or the Zulus; I want merely to raise some questions about the two highly self-conscious cultural groups of white people. I could, of course, call each of these groups a nation, as Calpin sometimes does; but that would mean begging my main question: is there or is there not one composite white South African nation?

Indisputably an Afrikaner nation exists. Afrikanervolkseenheid is a central theme—some people would say the central theme—of the history of this country. After two centuries of acclimatisation to South Africa and of slow, inarticulate growth as a community, Afrikaners leapt forward at one bound to national self-consciousness. It happened round about the 1870's. My choice of the symbolic year, if I had to make a choice, would be 1875, when the Rev. Stephanus Jacobus du Toit of Paarl founded Die Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners and its newspaper Di Patriot. An Afrikaans grammar followed the next year, an Afrikaans school reader two years later. In the meantime, S.J. du Toit was writing the first history book in Afrikaans, Die Geskiedenis van Ons Land in die Taal van Ons Volk. Linguistic self-assertion, Calvinist theology, republican aspiration, the mythology of Slagter's Nek dressed up as history, journalistic propaganda, a programme for the schools—du Toit in his own person embodied all those elements of the Afrikaner cultural resistance movement. It had a close coincidence in time with the Trans-

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Daily Dispatch, 21st May 1966.

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Mr Jan de V. Graaff has made the most interesting of these maps. It is based on the concept of a 'demotomic line' and demarcates two areas of majority rule, the one for whites, the other for blacks.

vaal's political resistance movement. For du Toit, the Transvaal became a magnet. After Majuba, he went north to found Christian National Education.

A generation later, the same battles had to be fought a second time against Lord Milner. Fighting them became a habit. Other countries have had the same experience. In the history of every nationalist movement that I have studied, a time can be identified when the defenders became the aggressors. Has the same thing happened here?

I have been reading recently Professor van Jaarsveld's critical studies of what I shall call the S.J. du Toit period of Afrikaner nationalism.<sup>9</sup> Professor van Jaarsveld destroys many myths but perpetuates the central myth. At least, that is how I interpret him. He records an Afrikaner monologue. But surely there was a dialogue? Du Toit's voice was not the only one raised among Cape Afrikaners in the 1870's and 1880's. There was a more influential voice. Du Toit founded the Afrikaner Bond; but J.H. Hofmeyr took possession of it.<sup>10</sup> Hofmeyr made the Bond his instrument for achieving linguistic and cultural equality between the two sections of the European population. What was more, he made it his instrument for achieving a partnership between the two peoples. That was a broader purpose than any that du Toit envisaged. The confrontation of du Toit and Hofmeyr became a contest between two conceptions of nationhood: on the one side, Afrikanervolkseenheid; on the other side, Suid-Afrikaanse Volkseenheid.

This contest continued for the next half century and more. Perhaps its most tragic episodes were General Hertzog's exclusion or self-exclusion in 1938 from the Voortrekker celebrations and in 1941 from the Herenigde Nasionale Party. How and why those things happened would be stories worth telling. But my task now is to follow the du Toit-Hofmeyr contest right up to present times. Does the contest still continue? Or has Afrikanervolkseenheid delivered its knock-out blow? Does anything survive of the old Suid-Afrikaanse Volkseenheid? If not, what future has the English culture in this country?

Nationalist Afrikanerdom, in the far-off days of its cultural resistance movement, built a hard shell around itself. Today it no longer needs that shell; but it still clings to it. For example, it still retains in all essentials the programme of child education which the Rev. S.J. du Toit formulated nearly a century ago. General Hertzog's unforgiveable sin, as the Afrikaner Broederbond sees it, was to have made himself the champion of bilingual schools. How many of them still survive in the Transvaal? From the strictly educational point of view they were stimulating to young intelligences. That truth was demonstrated in the 1930's by dispassionate educational research.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, nationalist Afrikanerdom felt the urge to segregate its children from non-Afrikaner influences. The urge found expression in a parliamentary debate of April 1944 which I have had occasion to study. I have not had occasion to study the final assault on bilingual education but I can observe its consequence: the erection of a wall which makes it impossible for Afrikaner and English-speaking children even to play together. What separate versions of their country's history the separate sections of children learn, I do not know.<sup>12</sup> Presumably, they resemble the

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See especially F.A. van Jaarsveld, The Awakening of Afrikaner Nationalism 1868-81 (Cape Town 1961).

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In comparison with Hofmeyr, du Toit lacked steadfastness. He ended his political career after the Jameson Raid in Rhodes's camp.

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A distillation of this research is given in E.G. Malherbe, The Bilingual School (Longmans 1946).

separate versions which the S.A.B.C. offers to the separate radio audiences. It so happens that I was invited after my arrival here to contribute to the radio programme on General Smuts. I did not accept that invitation, but I decided to listen both to the English and Afrikaans versions of the broadcast and of some other programmes in the same series. Because I have an unpractised ear for Afrikaans, I organised a small listening party divided 50-50 between the two language groups. We all found this exercise informative. To mention one example only: the English version of the Botha story was more or less a distillation of Dr Engelenburg's book. But the Afrikaans version? You will get some idea of what it was like if you can imagine Dr Goebbels calling a meeting of the best radio actors and the best producers in Germany and telling them, 'Go to it boys! I want a programme on Winston Churchill'.

These phenomena fascinate me.<sup>13</sup> I cannot discuss them this evening at any length; but the programme on Louis Botha comes right into the middle of my present inquiry. Botha did in South Africa what Laurier did in Canada: he created a party which brought the two language groups together. On the premises of Suid-Afrikaanse Volkseenheid, that was both a practical and a patriotic thing to do; but on the premises of Afrikanervolkseenheid it branded Botha as a renegaat, a volksvreemde Afrikaner, a traitor to his own people. It is an axiom of Afrikanervolkseenheid that every true Afrikaner votes nationalist.

That axiom, if it is accepted, produces the Milner situation in reverse. Milner said in 1900 that he would feel satisfied if by 1910 South Africa had three men of British race to every two men of Dutch race. Half a century later, the opposite situation existed. On the Milnerite principle of top-doggery, Afrikaners were by now the master race. Not all Afrikaners accepted that principle, but those who did had a clear view of its implications for the English-speaking underdogs. Let me quote a classic statement from Die Transvaler of 30th April 1941:

Ons verwerp dus geheel-en-al die opvatting dat alle Suid-Afrikaners saam as een volk gereken moet word: Die Afrikanerdom is vir ons die volk van Suid-Afrika, en die res van die Suid-Afrikaners is, vir sover hulle blank is, of potensiele Afrikaners, of vreemdelinge...<sup>14</sup>

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Since writing this sentence I have discovered that Mr F.E. Auerbach knows something: see his book, The Power of Prejudice in South African Education (Cape Town 1965).

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There exists already at least one Xhosa version of South African history. When they get their own Transkeian broadcasting service it will be interesting to listen in to their version of—for example—the Nongqause cattle killing of 1856-7. I wonder if the newly-formed South African Historical Association would think it worthwhile to appoint a committee, in even linguistic balance, to report annually upon the use and abuse of history by broadcasters and the writers of textbooks? The American Historical Association maintains a committee which is vigilant in this sphere.

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I first saw this sentence quoted in M. Roberts and A.E.I. Trollip, The South African Opposition 1939-45 (London 1947). I then read it in its full context. The writer, Professor L.J. du Plessis, is reputed to have been in 1941 high in the councils of the Afrikaner Broederbond but to have fallen from grace since then. That does not mean that his ideology has fallen from grace.

"Therefore we reject altogether the view that all South Africans together are to be regarded as one people. Afrikanerdom is for us the people of South Africa, and all the other South Africans are—insofar as they are white—either potential Afrikaners or foreigners."

For the descendants of the 1820 settlers, this is a harsh choice to have forced on them—either to become Afrikaners or to become aliens on their own soil.

I realise, of course, that Afrikanerdom has meant different things to different people. Once Jan Hofmeyr defined an Afrikaner simply as a loyal South African and General Hertzog once or twice used or implied the same definition; but it is not the definition of the Afrikaner Broederbond.<sup>15</sup> Consequently, a Grahamstown man may find himself puzzled at having notice served on him to turn himself into an Afrikaner, or else clear out. Does it mean that he has to stop speaking English? I do not think so. The ultimatum is ideological. Grahamstown people can keep the language of Milton, provided they throw overboard Milton's *Arcopagitica*, along with Magna Carta and all the rest of their foreign impedimenta.

Whether or not they are submissive to this ultimatum is a matter for dispassionate investigation. If I were the investigator I should employ an heuristic device which I call Milner's Law. Within six months of his arrival in South Africa, Milner made a diagnosis of the interplay between the politics of culture and the politics of colour. In reply to a call from Asquith for the restoration of good relations both between Britons and Boers and between whites and blacks, he pointed out that 'object No. 2' was the principal obstacle to the attainment of 'object No. 1'. 'You therefore have this singular situation,' he continued, 'that you might indeed unite Dutch and English by protecting the black man, but you would unite them against yourself and your policy of protection.' In other words, colour is fundamental: not culture.

I see Milner's law conspicuously operative today in the reaction of white South Africans to events in Rhodesia. That disastrous but intelligent proconsul would feel no surprise if he could see the 'I hate Harold' stickers on East London motor cars. He would feel no surprise at South African reactions to the United Nations. He would see his law operative everywhere. Consider, for example, the symbols of nationhood. It is proper that English-speaking South Africans should respect the Republic; but the republican ardour of many ex-Jingos astonishes me, until I remember Calpin's quip about their loving the Union Jack more than anything else in the world, except the Colour Bar. Or consider the arithmetic of elections. It suggests a steady seepage of English-speaking voters to the National Party. How can we account for it? According to Milner's law, these new recruits to Nationalism are voting white. At least, they think they are voting white.

Must we then conclude that the politics of colour, like a gigantic anaconda, are swallowing the politics of culture? The election figures, when you take a second look at them, do not support a conclusion quite so extreme as that. And even if they did support it, they would not record the end of the debate on values. Majority vote has never decided the fundamental issues with which our civilisation has been wrestling with ever since Socrates raised them in Athens and Jesus raised them in Jerusalem.

If I am to fulfil my promise of raising a few economic questions, I shall have to move fast. I therefore propose to pack my questions into two propositions:

1. That the programme for Transkeian independence contains no adequate economic component.

2. That continuing economic growth in South Africa presupposes continuing economic integration.

These are propositions for debate. They are not assertions but Aunt Sallies. Will you please shoot at them?

To start with, you may reject the premises of my first proposition. They are the premises of 'economic viability'. My country, like yours, has earned its keep. To my way of thinking, a state which has no prospect of earning its keep is only fictionally independent. I am aware that many people nowadays think differently. On the world map of today we see many conspicuously unviable states. Too often, they become vortices of power conflict and nuisances to their own people. Is South Africa creating more of them?

If present trends continue, the Transkei will be an economic cripple when it achieves political independence. In all the Bantu homelands, the conditions of economic progress, according to the Tomlinson Commission, are twofold: an agricultural revolution: an industrial upsurge. To achieve the agricultural revolution—so the Commission argued—it is essential to liquidate communal land use, to reduce by scores of thousands the number of production units, and thereby to raise the level of agricultural productivity per man. This programme involves an immense displacement of persons from the land. The displaced persons will have to find employment in secondary and tertiary industry. To provide this employment, the Bantu homelands will need white capital, skill and business ability... This, I think, is the gist of the Tomlinson doctrine. Whether or not the doctrine is sound is not for me to say; nor is it for me to say whether or not the government had sound economic reasons for rejecting some of its fundamental articles. I simply record the fact that neither the agricultural revolution nor the industrial upsurge is observable in the Transkei. No more has there been any significant economic growth on the Transkeian borders: if you want to see the new border industries, you must go to Natal and the Transvaal. Output per head of the population in the Transkei is falling.<sup>16</sup> If income per head is not falling, the explanation must lie in the remittances received year by year from the 200,000 or more Transkeian migrants who are working and living in faraway places where the Republic's economic life is dynamic. And yet, the whole object of the operation—not only as the Tomlinson Commission saw it, but as the government sees it—is to settle these Transkeian citizens, or as many of them as possible, in their own territorial home.<sup>17</sup>

I should like to see the operation proceeding more successfully than it seems to be doing. Nevertheless, too much success might prove awkward. What would be the effect upon the Republic's economic growth if all the expatriate Transkeians and all the other black expatriates—I do not like that word, but it expresses official thought—could be sent back to their Bantu homelands? Ever since the diamond discoveries of a century ago—to go no further back in time—the availability of non-white labour has been an essential condition of white prosperity. You will find the classic exposition of that truth in the Report of the Economic and Wage Commission, 1926. The truth remains self-evident. In 1964, employment in the modern exchange economy of the Republic exceeded 5.75 millions. Of that total, more than 4.5 millions were non-whites. Your most recent Economic

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16

Stephen Enke in the South African Journal of Economics of March 1962 estimates a declining per capita output for the Bantu areas as a whole.

17

This paragraph is based upon the statistical and economic analysis contained in a recent paper by Mr Trevor Bell of Rhodes University. I hope that Mr Bell will prepare his paper for publication and that he will in the meantime tolerate my raid upon it. He has no responsibility for my over-simplifications.

Development Programme, starting from the assumption that a growth rate of 5.5 percent per annum can be sustained throughout the years ahead, estimates that the labour requirement will rise by 1970 to 7 millions. If this requirement is to be met, the proportion of non-whites in the total will need to be higher than it was in 1964. Moreover, a rising proportion of the non-whites will need to be skilled workers. Even now, there is an observable seepage of black labour through your industrial colour bar. Can this mean that South Africa is already making an economic choice which contradicts her political doctrine? Can it mean that she is putting economic growth first, and separate development second?

The Republic's labour-hunger produces demographic consequences. These have many significant facets which I have no time to discuss; but let me remind you of some trends in the geographical distribution of your African population. At the time of the 1951 census, the distribution was reported (erroneously?) as follows:

<u>In the Bantu Areas</u>	<u>On White Farms</u>	<u>In Urban Areas</u>	<u>Total</u>
3.6m	2.3m	2.6m	8.5m
(=43%)	(=27%)	(=30%)	(=100%)

The Tomlinson Commission produced those figures. What the figures are today nobody knows. Your official statisticians seem almost to believe that demography should be kept in the dark. But perhaps this is an unkind interpretation; perhaps they are just conservative persons, clinging to their old-fashioned classification by magisterial districts. Be this as it may, demographic and economic research still manages to get to the truth in a rough and ready way. Die verswarting van die Platteland is proceeding apace. In the regions of industrial growth, the ratio of non-whites to whites is steadily rising.

Against this economic and demographic background, let us look again at citizenship, first as seen from Umtata<sup>18</sup> and secondly as seen from Pretoria. You will recall that all Xhosa persons, excepting the minority which belong to some other jurisdiction, are by law citizens of the Transkei, no matter where their residence is in the Republic. And what now holds good for a Xhosa person—so your government has declared—will some day hold good for every Bantu person in the Republic: according to his ethnic definition, he will possess his rights as a citizen in one or other of the Bantu states. What do those rights add up to? I have had it explained to me that they are just like the rights which a Jew of the dispersion enjoys in the state of Israel. I do not follow that explanation. Jewish persons in Australia have the same rights as all the other Australians. They have votes in Australia. They have no votes in Israel. If they did have votes in Israel, I fail to see what good they could get from them. Tell me, please, what good can an expatriate Xhosa get for himself and for his family by voting in the Transkeian elections? During the past six months, I have been living in an area of Cape Province where population is growing faster than employment. All around me I see Xhosa in distress. I do not see anything that Umtata can do to help them. Of course, the position may change. Remember those maps. Some of them put the Xhosa who are my neighbours inside a big Xhosa state. If and when that happens, their citizenship will become of some practical use to them.

And now for South African citizenship. However the quantities work out in practice, the Republic, if it sticks to its present course of policy, will have on its soil many millions of black persons whose citizenship lies elsewhere. I foresee practical difficulties. The Bantu states will inevitably show concern with the treatment meted out to their citizens in 'white man's country'. Does this mean that labour relations in the Republic will become international relations?

Naturally, I am not forgetting the realities of power. The power of the Republic is beyond challenge in this part of the world. All the Bartu states together will be a weak bundle. For a long time to come, the Republic need anticipate no trouble in bringing recalcitrants to heel. But in doing so, it will have to invoke the Milnerite doctrine of paramountcy.

Before resigning themselves to that, white people in this country might think it worthwhile to try to untie the economic-demographic-citizenship knots in their thinking.

### Postscript, May 1979<sup>19</sup>

Towards the end of that Hoernlé Lecture the attempt was made to express in figures the racial composition of the Republic's population as it would be in A.D. 2000, if the differential trends of population growth in the mid-1960s remained constant throughout the following decades. That highly speculative exercise will not be repeated. Instead, some figures of the mid-1970s will be selected to illuminate some basic realities of race-relationships in South Africa.

Something must first be said about the rapidly changing perspectives of South African historiography. All the societies of southern Africa now share the stage with the conquering and ruling white people. Old-style documentary research has been reinforced by the methodologies of linguistics, social anthropology, archaeology, prehistory, the economics of development, the economics of under-development. These changes do not signify neglect of the white society and the white man's politics: on the contrary, the probing analysis of capitalist interests and enterprises which Geoffrey Blainey pioneered in the mid-1960s is being carried further (though not always with Professor Blainey's skill) by a group of neo-Marxist historians, most of whom now live in Britain.

These new approaches and new increments of knowledge, welcome as they are, do not supersede those basic requirements of historical craftsmanship, numeracy and literacy. In what now follows I shall try to bring my Hoernlé lecture up to date under two heads: numbers, to begin with, and after that, words.

#### Numbers

##### 1. The Population of South Africa, 1978

<u>Whites</u>	<u>Coloureds</u>	<u>Asians</u>	<u>Blacks</u>	<u>Total</u>
4,408,000	2,494,000	778,000	16,214,000	23,894,000

These figures were cited on 19 December 1978 in a News Release by the Department of Statistics. Its arithmetical basis is at variance in one important respect from the basis of 13 years ago (or indeed 2 years ago) since it excludes the residential populations of Transkei and BophuthaTswana, those two 'bantustans' whose independence has been proclaimed in South Africa but is recognised nowhere else. Had these two territories been included, the tally of Black South Africans would have been not far short of 19 millions.

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Professor Rodney Davenport of Rhodes University, Grahamstown, has criticised successive drafts of this Postscript. I deeply appreciate his aid. Such errors of omission and commission as the Postscript contains are my own.

## 2. Educational Disparities

Comprehensive statistics under this head are given in Table I of the Report of the Education Commission of the South African Institute of Race Relations, 1979. For present purposes a simpler illustration of the disparities will be sufficient.

Expenditure (Rands per pupil) on the Education of Children

	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Average</u>
White (1971-72)	366	624	461
Indian (1972)	112	156	124
Coloured (1972)	91	130	94
African (1971-72)	21	113	25

These figures are quoted from official sources on page 576 of Education in South Africa, Volume 2, (1923-1978). The author, Dr E.G. Malherbe, is superbly literate in Afrikaans and English and also superbly numerate. He has held, among other appointments, the Directorship of the Department of Census and Statistics.

## 3. Population and Land Ownership

	<u>Percentages of Population 1975</u>	<u>Percentages of Land Ownership 1975</u>
Whites	17.00	85.00
Coloureds	9.2	nearly nil
Asians	2.9	nearly nil
Blacks	70.9	15.00

The land-ownership entry for Coloureds requires a small qualification, since it embodies no reference to the small 'reserves' established by missionaries during the nineteenth century. The land-ownership entry for Blacks may seem at first sight to require a substantial qualification, since it excludes the former British Protectorates which are now sovereign members of the international community. Those three territories, nevertheless, remain *de facto* satellites of the Republic of South Africa. Swaziland is more than half owned by white South Africans; Botswana is predominantly a desert; Lesotho, a towering but eroded watershed, exports most of its men to work for low wages in the Republic and exports its life-giving water (and soil) for no money at all. By and large, the economic and political realities of land-ownership can best be stated in two terse sentences. In the nineteenth century, victory and defeat in war decided the shares which the foregoing table summarises. Thereafter, the white owners possessed the power to buy black labour predominantly on their own terms.

Had space permitted, a fourth table would have summarised the urban and rural distribution of the different sections of the population. Instead, let it suffice to say that what happens in Soweto possesses, as things now are, more historical, economic, political and human significance than what happens in Transkei.<sup>20</sup>

## Words

The names of such things as affect us...are in the common discourses of

August 1979. I have just had news of one significant change, the institution of 99-years leasehold tenures for residents in Soweto. However, the right of children born in Soweto to inherit the leasehold properties appears, as things now stand, disputable.



men of 'inconstant' signification... And therefore in reasoning a man must take heed of words, which, besides the signification of what we imagine their nature, have also a signification of the nature, disposition and interest of the speaker. (Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Book I, Chapter 4)

Conformably with this wise counsel I now propose to my South African colleagues and friends that they start work on a Dictionary of South African Politics. I can envisage no more salutary check on the obscurities, muddles and evasions of our thinking, speaking and writing. Running quickly through my Afrikaans and English dictionaries I have found at least one useful entry under every letter of the alphabet from A to Z. Under some letters I have found a dozen or more entries; but in what now follows I shall start and end with A.

A for Apartheid. The Afrikaans-English dictionary which I bought in 1938 did not include that word. As I have already explained,<sup>21</sup> the SABRA group of intellectuals made it current coin in the mid-1940s. Like Jane Austen's Emma, these people found anchorage in the coherence theory of truth. They paid little if any attention to the factual data which contradicted their central proposition, namely, that territorial separation, with little if any change in the shares of land-ownership, was the royal road to freedom for the blacks no less than the whites. This intellectual flaw was no impediment to their word proving itself a winner in the elections of 1948. The word's appeal was not to reason, but to the emotions of white voters.

For Dr Hendrik Verwoerd that was not enough. To be sure, he both retained and amplified the programme of territorial separation; but he did not close his eyes to the basic realities of demography and economics. The rapidly increasing majority of black South Africans, he knew, were destined to work and live in "white man's country". In a two-hour speech of May 1954 he spelt out the meaning of apartheid for these people.

Apartheid comprises a whole multiplicity of phenomena. It comprises the political sphere; it is aimed at Church matters; it is relevant to every sphere of life. Even within the economic sphere it is not just a question of numbers. What is of importance there is whether one maintains the colour bar or not.

Thus expounded, the word apartheid became the exact equivalent of one Afrikaans word, baasskap, and two English words, white supremacy.

Apartheid also became a boomerang. Ministers and officials who held responsibility in the field of foreign policy learnt very soon that the word was a gift to the rapidly increasing number of their country's enemies. These prudent people could not change the economic, social and political facts of apartheid; but they found a new label for those facts—aparte ontwikkeling. The English translation of those words is 'separate development', or 'parallel development'. The policies thus described had once appeared respectable. In his Rhodes Memorial Lectures at Oxford in November 1929, General Smuts had persuaded the larger part of his audience that they were both realistic and humane. Nevertheless, the gap which separated his theory and practice from that of SABRA and Dr Verwoerd—a gap which grew wider as Smuts grew older—may be demonstrated by quoting from the Rhodes Lectures one forthright sentence.

I do not think that there can be, or that at bottom there is, among those who have given the subject serious attention, any doubt that in the supreme legislature of a country with a mixed population all classes and colours should have representation.

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21

See p. 77 above.

That sentence identifies what became in the present century the crucial political issue: whether or not the right to vote for the the supreme legislature, together with all the associated rights of citizenship, should be established and maintained as the exclusive monopoly of white South Africans.<sup>22</sup>

The line of division on this issue was never identical with the line of linguistic division between Boers and Britons. One could recite the names of Afrikaner writers and politicians who fought a rearguard action for the Cape's colour-blind franchise. One could recite the names of English-speaking writers and politicians, from the time of Milner and his young men to the time of C.F. Stallard and G.H. Nicholls, who did much of the spadework for apartheid. Unfortunately, full and convincing proof would require far more detail than this post-script can contain. In what now follows I shall more briefly consider, not the crucial political issue, but the crucial economic issue.

The colour-bar in industry originated in Kimberley under the Union Jack. From the Kimberley diamond fields English-speaking workers carried it to the gold reefs of the South African Republic. The historical explanation of these facts must be sought, not merely or chiefly in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, but in the first half-century of European colonisation, when slavery and the trekkers' frontier produced a society in which manual labour was despised by white people as 'Kaffir work'. The notorious wages gap of industrial South Africa was thereby predetermined. The labour requirements of the mining industry were met in the higher ranks by immigrant whites and in the lower ranks by indigenous blacks. Kimberley's white diggers acclaimed that division of labour and reward in a slogan:

A pound a day for the white man, a pound a week for the black man.

That gap was immensely widened on the reefs of the Rand under pressure of the white miners' trade union. In 1914 the union's secretary, Thomas Matthews, gave evidence as follows to the Dominions Royal Commission.

If Australia can keep out the Chinaman...we have the same right here. Because the Kaffir is here already we have no right to say it is his land. The Kaffir ousted the aboriginals ahead of him, and the Bantus ousted the Hottentots, and the Dutchmen ousted the Kaffir, and we are now trying to oust the Kaffir from those spheres of industry which we maintain are the proper sphere of the white man...

Well, seeing that the Kaffir is bred as a slave, he has no right to usurp our position as free men... I hold that the Kaffir should be allowed to get free, but in the interim, as he is here as a semi-slave, I have a right to fight him and oust him just as the Australian ousted the Chinamen and the Kanakas.<sup>23</sup>

The intellectuals of the Afrikaner Broederbond and the politicians of the Nasionale Party, it is becoming clear, did not launch their programme of

22

August 1979. At the last election the government produced a scheme which did not provide any representation at all for Blacks, but plenty of representation for Coloureds and Asians—in separate parliaments. South African experience has proved to the hilt that representation, without power to back it, is nothing more than a 'toy telephone'.

23

In Australia, young historians are being encouraged to study their country's participation in the Anglo-Boer War. They would be better employed in an investigation of Australian reinforcements to the ideology and leadership of white labour in South Africa.

apartheid out of the blue. In 1914 the English-speaking Labour Party had made the very first appeal to South African voters on a programme of total territorial separation. In 1923 the communist-led Fordsburg commando had marched through the streets of Johannesburg under the banner:

WORKERS OF THE WORLD UNITE  
AND FIGHT FOR A WHITE SOUTH AFRICA

If this short story of the industrial colour bar were to be continued, it would have to include two new themes: first, the takeover of the white miners' union by an Afrikaans-speaking labour force and leadership; secondly, the enactment of discriminatory legislation which granted almost everything that Thomas Matthews had demanded in 1914. Yet today, 4 May, 1979, I have listened to an astonishing announcement over the air. The colour bar in industry, we are told, will be abolished. If this declaration can be believed—but there are signs already of a retreat from it—the Republican Government has accepted at long last the central argument of the mine-owners and the economists, namely, that the politics of white labour contradict the economics of growth.

In further illustration of the advantages which would accrue to historians and many other people from a Dictionary of South African Politics, let us now briefly consider the names which the Whites have given to the Blacks and the names which the Blacks have given to themselves. Until the early years of this century most white people called black people Kaffirs. The original spelling of this word was Caffre, a corruption of the Arabic word Kafir, which means infidel (i.e. non-Moslem). The more decorous name, Natives, became official usage with the establishment of the Union in 1912; but Bantu, which originally signified a group of languages, took its place when the Nasionale Party came to power in 1948.

Not one of these names has proved acceptable to the black people. They could hardly help realising that the word Kaffir, more often than not, was spoken in contempt. Up to the mid-1930's most of them, it seems, acquiesced in being called Natives; but as early as 1912 an educated minority, the founding fathers of The African National Congress,<sup>24</sup> began to call themselves Africans. In 1939 a far more conservative body, the government-sponsored Native Representative Council, formally requested General Hertzog's government to drop 'Native' and use 'African' instead. Since that word was acquiring for the Blacks the same emotive force as the word 'Afrikaner' possessed for the nationalist Whites, it was anathema to the Nasionale Party. Smuts, by contrast, began to use 'Native' and 'African' as synonyms. In a parliamentary speech of 3 March 1947 he declared:

They call themselves Africans and why not? I call myself an African. I do not see why people should not call themselves by the name they like, so long as you know what they are.

But from 1948 onwards they had stuck upon them the label Bantu—Bantu Administration, Bantu Education, the Bantustans—until Dr C.F. Mulder, who is now an outlaw from his party, realised that the black people loathed the label as much as his colleagues loved it. When he was Minister of Bantu Administration he renamed his department the Department of Plural Relations. A new name, Department of Cooperation and Development, has now been invented. But words are not things. It is easier to change a few words than it is to change a policy. My impression is that all the sections of the population who in one way or another are suffering the impact of discriminatory legislation and administration—the

Coloureds, the Asians, the Africans—are now joining forces. In effect they are saying, 'What the hell! Let us all call ourselves Blacks!'

But do they really mean it? Cape Town's most beautiful buildings embody the skills of Coloured craftsmen. Basil Oliveira would have brought distinction to his country in Test cricket had not the white cricketers barred him. Yet the Coloured people were enjoying until quite recently equal rights in the Cape's trade unions and a modest share of voting rights in the Union of South Africa. Do they now really propose to join the united front of resistance? And do the Indians and the Zulus of Natal recognise each other as blood brothers? South Africa contains a diversity of communities with diverse histories and diverse aspirations. As a consequence, real opportunities exist for the dominant white people to pursue the policy of 'divide and rule'. Moreover, white South Africa possesses an overwhelming predominance of military power in the southern half of the African continent. If it does not yet possess the Bomb, it possesses the means to make it.

The preceding paragraph has moved to a Machiavellian conclusion. Yet Machiavelli himself was well aware that naked power is a brittle instrument. His ideal commonwealth was the Roman Republic, where power had its roots—so he believed—in the consent of patriotic citizens and in a just order of society. Can South Africa achieve a comparably just order if it continues along Dr Verwoerd's road to perpetual white supremacy? In South Africa, no less than in wartime Britain, justice means 'fair shares'. Fair shares of what? Of land—that, we have seen, is basic;<sup>25</sup> but it is basic in long term. To offer the Blacks more land will remain an empty gesture unless and until they first possess the technological and economic capacities to use the land productively. The same hard fact of life governs the opportunities of black participation in commerce and industry, where technical knowledge and managerial ability are essential requirements. For this compelling reason, education must head the list on the agenda for immediate action. Part IV of E.G. Malberbe's great book rams this truth home.

The nationalist ideologues and politicians have never crossed their pons asinorum, the indissoluble unity of the South African economy. Even today, their much advertised plans for the consolidation of KwaZulu show no awareness of the shattering effect it could have on Natal's multi-million sugar industry. But there is no more room in this Postscript for facts and figures. Since words have been so much our concern, let us in conclusion borrow the German tongue-twister, schicksalgemeinschaft. It signifies a 'community of common fate'. For as far ahead as can be foreseen, all South Africans—the Whites, the Blacks, the Coloureds, the Asians—will be sailing on the same ship through dangerous seas.<sup>26</sup>

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25

See table on p. 93 above.

26

I owe the German tongue-twister and its English translation to my colleague, Dr A. McAdam.

## V

# Environmental Perspectives

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## 1. Economists, Ecologists and Historians\*

More than half a century ago I started practising my craft as an apprentice to Edward Shann. In his workshop I discovered the delights and the duties of my calling. The delights? Suffice it to say that I asked myself then, as I ask myself now, why in the world anybody should pay me for doing the things I want to do. The duties? Let me spell them out. Universities have a threefold purpose: the preservation, dissemination, and advancement of knowledge. From this it follows that the members of an academic staff have three primary tasks to perform: to read and think, to teach, and to pursue research.<sup>1</sup> In addition, they are called upon to play some part, be it large or small, as academic policy-makers and administrators.

So it was then, so it is now; but circumstances now are immensely different from what they were when my apprenticeship began. In your university you have today a Department of History with an academic staff of about twenty and a Department of Economics with an academic staff of about thirty. Edward Shann, by contrast, held the two chairs of History and Economics single-handed until I joined him in 1920 as Assistant Lecturer in History. Moreover, as a foundation professor he had played a creative part from 1913 onwards in setting the new university on course. During those seven years he had written in his own hand—as was the practice of his great contemporary, R.H. Tawney—every word of every lecture which belonged to his half-dozen carefully planned courses in History and Economics.

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Edward Shann Memorial Lecture, 19 September 1974, University of Western Australia Press.

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These primary academic tasks are mutually supporting: research helps teaching, teaching helps research, and—to quote Samuel Alexander—'thinking also is research'.

That practice may suggest vain repetition but Shann like Tawney spoke the living word. He put first his duty as teacher and made close contact with students both inside the lecture room and outside it. On my first evening in Perth I met in his house not only his adorable wife and daughters but four or five students, including two young women—are they still alive, I wonder?—of quite astonishing beauty. A month or two later I was a fellow-actor with him and a dozen young people in a play which he had produced for the students' dramatic society. He was then its president.

As an academic person and as an active citizen he lived his life with gusto, yet still made time for steady reading and thinking. Marshall's Industry and Trade was on his desk within a month or two of its publication in England, and I remember him telling me how it would help him to revise his lectures on applied economics. Still more do I remember the research task he set me when I was getting ready to join him in Perth. 'Give yourself a week or two in Adelaide', he wrote, 'and do some fossicking for me in the records of the base-metals industry'. At that time I did not know what base metals were; but in retrospect I can see that he had already in his head an important theme for his pioneering book, An Economic History of Australia.

'I am an historian and therefore I love life'. A distinguished European historian of that time, Henri Pirenne, said those words one day in Stockholm to his fellow-mediaevalist Marc Bloch. Shann could have said them. Love of life, especially love of life in his own country, was the starting point of every task he set himself as a citizen, teacher and author. With him the task came first. After the task came theory, which enabled him to see the task in clear focus. After theory came technique—as much technique as was required for the task as he saw it. Today that order of priorities is too often reserved. In nearly every university of the English-speaking world you can feel pretty sure that clever young technicians are sharpening their carving-knives for joints of meat which they will never cut up.

In the jargon now fashionable Shann could be called a problem-oriented economic historian. Prominent among the problems which engaged his interest were banking and land-use. To me it seems that he was more at home, emotionally and intellectually, with the latter than with the former. By way of illustration I shall cite, not the Economic History, conspicuous though it remains as a landmark of Australian authorship in the 1930's, but Cattle Chosen, a small, beautiful book which a few discerning readers still treasure.<sup>2</sup> It appeared in 1926 and provoked the affectionate mockery of a friend—'What? Cattle chosen by Edward Shann? I'll bet they were scrubby cattle'. So, to begin with, they must have been. Shann's book records the back-breaking struggles of a pioneering family, the Bussells, who fought their way through adversity to achievement and stamped their name on a landscape which all of you know and many of you love.<sup>3</sup> Shann calls himself 'the compiler' and does his utmost to let the Bussells tell their own

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Among these discerning few I feel sure that I can include Marnie Bassett and Alexandra Hasluck, who may well have had in Shann's book their first meeting with that wonderful woman, Mrs Molloy of Augusta. I also think it likely that Paul Hasluck found in the book useful pointers to some questions which he raised in his pioneering study of white-black relationships in Western Australia. To say this does not, of course, imply that these and other writers have not been critical of Shann's work.

3

A wandering cow named Yulika led George Bussell to the site of the family's new home on the Vasse River; hence the name 'Cattle Chosen'. Today, those acres are within the boundaries of Busselton.

story in their own words; but his self-effacement does not conceal the artistry with which he has made and arranged his selections from their copious correspondence and diaries. No more does it conceal the intellectual acuteness of his brief explanatory interventions. His book opens with a description (which present-day ecologists would approve) of four narrow zones of land differing sharply from each other in their geological formation, the quality of their soil, their canopy of trees and their ground-cover. He shows the Bussells learning by trial and error that they will starve in the karri country but thrive in the tuart country. It also shows them aesthetically sensitive to the untamed landscapes of south-western Australia, but determined none the less to tame them in English fashion.<sup>4</sup> Shann elucidates the economic implications of their determination. With microscopic scrutiny of detail he explains the relationship between 'penury of pence' and the arrangement of a short-term loan at 25 per cent interest. With an imaginative sweep, which calls to mind some famous passages of The Wealth of Nations, he identifies the successive stages of economic growth from hunting and gathering to production for sale in a world-wide system of 'traffic and exchange'.<sup>5</sup>

On page 69 of Cattle Chosen you will find those two words, 'economic growth'—words which are today on every infant's tongue. In 1926, when Shann published his book about the Bussells, you seldom if ever heard them. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s short-period analysis was the main preoccupation of most economists. As a teacher of economics and as an adviser to bankers and ministers Shann accepted the conventional wisdom of his time; but as a teacher and writer of economic history his heart and mind were with the founding father of political economy. Adam Smith used matter-of-fact words—'improvement' and 'progress' were his favourites—but the processes of economic growth in long term were the main objective of his inquiry. In our day those processes have resumed their central position in the research and teaching of economists.

Adam Smith did not attempt to measure economic growth; but some of his contemporaries measured it. What we today call economic statistics they called political arithmetic.<sup>6</sup> Arithmetic, I learnt at school, means doing sums, all sorts of sums: addition, subtraction, multiplication, simple division, long division, nasty things like square roots and vulgar fractions. For the practitioners of political arithmetic addition held pride of place. They added up the things which they considered politically important. The sum of these things was national wealth. Wealth to what end? Adam Smith asked that question. He gave two answers to it. 'The progressive state', he declared, 'is in reality the cheerful and healthy state to all the orders of society'; but he also declared that defence is more important than opulence. In other words, wealth can be used to promote both the welfare of society and the power of the state; but when a choice has to be made between the one and the other, power must come first.

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4

The wildflowers of the limestone country reminded George Bussell, when he first saw them in 1831, of a richly coloured Indian carpet. Four years later his sister Fanny wrote enthusiastically of the 'improvements' made since then. 'They would almost make you forget', she declared, 'that you are in Australia'.

5

See, e.g. book iii, chap. 4 and book v, chap. 1 of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations.

6

Political Arithmetic was the title of a treatise published by Sir William Petty in 1660. The term was still current in the time of Adam Smith.

The politics of power, I propose to argue, have remained throughout the past two centuries the forcing-house of endeavour to measure the thing which we today call Gross National Product. At the climax of British resistance to the Napoleonic Empire, Patrick Colquhoun asked himself how it could happen that a population of only 17 million (including a problematical 4 1/2 million for Ireland) could expect to beat the 100 million of people ruled by Napoleon? He found his answer in the 'New Property ... annually created by the Labour of the people'; he found it, that is to say, in the figures of national income and outlay. When the war was over, a like-minded investigator, Joseph Lowe, asked the same question and arrived at the same answer. Lowe improved Colquhoun's statistics and pushed further his inquiry into causes. British victory seemed to him explainable in terms of British productivity. He saw three causes for its sensational increase: first, the census returns bore witness to a very fast growth of population; secondly, common observation revealed that many men 'who from deficient activity or mediocrity of parts would, in a state of peace, have necessarily remained unemployed, were brought by the war into situations attended by income'—as we today would put it, war had created the conditions of full employment; finally, Lowe emphasized the fact that the expansion of employment had occurred for the most part in industries of rapidly increasing productivity. To readers who had followed this three-pronged argument it would appear no cause for wonder that Napoleon should be spending the evening of his life on St Helena.<sup>7</sup>

Comparative economic strength, it need hardly be said, is never the sufficient explanation of victory or defeat in war; but it is always a necessary element of the explanation. For this reason it may seem surprising that the concepts and techniques of measurement which Colquhoun and Lowe had pioneered were not refurbished and employed in the so-called Great War of 1914-18. Yet the reason is not far to seek. Between 1815 and 1914 none of the wars which the British fought required full mobilization of the available economic resources. For example: whereas Britain's effort against Napoleon had come close to the maximum which could be achieved her effort in the Crimean war put no strain worth mentioning upon conventional budgetary finance. Throughout the hundred years after Waterloo the British remained forgetful of what it means to have to fight 'a great war'. In World War I they had to start learning that lesson again. In World War II they learnt it thoroughly.

National income accountancy thus became at long last a permanent part of their mental furniture. That rather lonely master craftsman, A.L. Bowley, was reinforced during the 1930s by Colin Clark and other eager apprentices. When World War II broke out, Britain possessed a sufficient supply of competent statistical practitioners to satisfy the strong demand for their skills in the War Cabinet Offices, the Treasury and elsewhere in Whitehall. And so it came about that the first White Paper on National Income and Outlay was issued in 1941.<sup>8</sup> Among the practical purposes which it served were the following: first, to measure the progress of economic mobilization and, so far as possible, to compare it with the progress in enemy and allied countries; secondly, to plan the continuing shift of resources from production for civilian use to war production; thirdly, to measure the 'inflationary gap' caused by more money chasing fewer goods and thereby to

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P. Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Wealth, Power and Resources of the British Empire (London 1814); Joseph Lowe, The Present State of England in Regard to Agriculture, Trade and Finance (2nd ed, London 1823).

8

In response to the prompting of Keynes, the White Paper was compiled in the Offices of the War Cabinet by J.E. Meade of the Economic Section and J.R.N. Stone of the Central Statistical Office.



sharpen the edge of anti-inflationary policies such as taxation, free and forced saving, price control, rationing and the equitable allocation of civilian supplies. It would be incorrect to suggest that monetary measurements were a sufficient guide to thought and action in these fields: as British mobilization approached its peak, manpower-budgeting proved itself a more powerful instrument of economic planning and control. Nevertheless, the accounts of national income and outlay still remained for the British an indispensable instrument. In America, where the economy was less tightly stretched and the need for manpower budgeting never arose, GNP continued unaided to do the job of measuring. As Charles J. Hitch and other American economists have explained in close detail, it continued to do the same job throughout the years of the Cold War.<sup>9</sup>

Enough has now been said to reveal the close historical relationship between the calculations of national income and the politics of power. This, perhaps, is one of the reasons why GNP has recently become a dirty word for some people. Were I to agree with them, I should have to censure the British people because for year after year they spent more than half their GNP in fending off Hitler; furthermore, I should have to censure the Australian people because they still include military preparedness among the objectives of national policy—not, of course, the overriding objective, but a question of more or less. Through all the swings of circumstance, it still remains the task of statesmanship to allocate scarce economic resources between the alternative ends or values which we as a nation acknowledge. But for the present enough of this; something remains to be said about GNP as a fashionable dirty word. For this nonsense quite a lot of the blame belongs to 'the latter-day saints of laissez-faire'.<sup>10</sup> Like the Children of Israel who worshipped the golden calf, these people have bowed their heads and worshipped GNP. That, of course, is not only sinful but silly. GNP is no more than a measuring rod. Some things it measures adequately; other things it measures inadequately, if at all. Among the latter are the social and ecological costs of economic growth.<sup>11</sup>

I propose now to stop talking about economists and start talking about ecologists. To judge from the noisy controversies of our time, you might think that these two groups of scientists were at war with each other. This is not so. The sciences of economics and ecology both derive their names from the Greek word oikos, which means house or household. Scarce economic resources are the proper study of economists, scarce natural resources are the proper study of ecologists. So much for the affinities. Differences also exist. To begin with, ecology is a recent arrival among the sciences; the first reference to it in the Oxford English Dictionary is dated 1873 and must be looked for under the letter O (Oecology). Economics, by contrast, was named and its scope defined 2300 years ago by Aristotle; for him it signified the art and science of household management, whereby the means of life are provided so that man may go forward to 'the good life'. Aristotle puts man into the centre of the picture. No economist, so far as I know, has ever put him anywhere else. Ecologists, on the

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See Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defence in the Nuclear Age (The RAND Corporation, 1960). See also Appendix I to my Four Studies of War and Peace in this Century (C.U.P. 1961).

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This phrase was coined by Benjamin Higgins and used by him in the Edward Shann Memorial Lecture 1972.

11

Some attempts are being made, with limited success so far, to provide a new measuring rod: a 'welfare index'.

other hand, have appeared quite often to be in two minds about the place of man in their science.

The pre-history of ecological science can be traced back through American, German, English and French students of nature and man all the way to Plato;<sup>12</sup> but its formal history began only sixty-one years ago—to be precise, on 12 April 1913, when the British Ecological Society was instituted with George Arthur Tansley as its founder-president. In his classic Introduction to Plant Ecology, Tansley thus defined the young science:

In the widest meaning, ecology is the study of plants and animals in their natural homes, or better perhaps, the study of their household affairs, which is actually a secondary meaning of the Greek word.<sup>13</sup>

This sentence puts the spotlight upon a significant difference in the major premisses of economists and ecologists—at any rate, some ecologists. In 'the household' as economists see it, man is the manager; but in 'the household' as Tansley saw it half a century ago, the manager is 'nature'.

Like herbs, grasses, shrubs, trees, animals invertebrate and vertebrate, insects on the wing, creeping things in the grass and bacteria in the soil, man belongs to the world of nature. Yet he is also nature's master. He has made some of the most beautiful and some of the ugliest landscapes on the surface of the earth. He has augmented and he has pillaged the earth's resources for sustaining life. It is quite impossible to regard man simply as one among the many members of nature's household, or as an irritating intruder. Ecologists soon began to realize that they must treat more seriously the duality of human nature. Sir Arthur Tansley himself realized it. In 1949 he became at the age of seventy-five the founder-president of England's Nature Conservancy, which in the ensuing quarter century achieved fame not only by purchasing and preserving 'natural' areas but also by its research into man-made pressures upon the natural environment, for example, its research into pesticides.<sup>14</sup>

Ecologists, no less than economists and other members of the academic family, are in duty bound not merely to advance knowledge but also to disseminate it. Some of them feel called upon not merely to teach, but also to preach the ecological word .... It is not easy to combine the roles of Charles Darwin and the

12

My American is G.P. Marsh (mid-nineteenth century); my German, Alexander von Humboldt (early nineteenth century); my Englishman, John Evelyn (seventeenth century). All three wrote important books about man's impact upon the natural environment. My Frenchman, the administrator Colbert (seventeenth century), took steps in his Forest Ordinance to mitigate the destructiveness of that impact, which Plato had vividly depicted more than 2000 years earlier in the dialogue Critias.

13

See p. 15 of the books' 3rd edn and 6th impression (1972). The 1st edn was published in 1923 with a slightly different title.

14

The Nature Conservancy divides its quite substantial income 50-50 between its Conservation Branch and its Research Branch. The maturity of ecology as a science which includes in its field of research human impacts and their consequences is superbly demonstrated by Charles S. Elton in The Pattern of Animal Communities (London 1966). This book reports thirty years of study on Wytham Hill near Oxford, where I have often walked, but with no vision of the life abounding there.

prophet Jeremiah. Amongst the few ecologists who have combined them with success I put first Rachael Carson. Her book, Silent Spring, has touched the hearts and stimulated the minds of scores of thousands of men and women in every continent of the world.<sup>15</sup> She wrote with passion and compassion, yet always with the rigorous scientific logic in which she had been trained. How did she achieve that difficult combination? She achieved it, I believe, by sticking to her own last as a biologist. She built her argument on findings of research which had been published, but too often ignored. She cited the precise evidence by which those findings could be verified or confuted. I call this method microcosmic and I feel discomfort when academic persons follow the opposite method of proceeding from the universal to the particular. This seems to me the fatal flaw of A Blueprint for Survival, the much-publicised manifesto recently addressed to the human species by thirty-three eminent Britons.<sup>16</sup> These gentlemen believe that our road forward will lead us back to Arcadia. They invite us, among other things, to eschew urban life and resettle ourselves in little towns of about 5000 people. What they have forgotten to do is to provide signposts and milestones along the road from the London of today to the London of Edward the Confessor.

After reading Blueprint I opened The Closing Circle by Barry Commoner. Here I encountered a man of integrity, reporting scientific fact as he sees it, and thinking his own thoughts about its significance in the world of nature and of man. All this is good, but the book has flaws. The publisher's blurb introduces Barry Commoner as 'a professor with a class of millions'. To often he 'talks down' to his multitudinous audience. In his opening chapter he tells them about 'laws' which bear little if any relation to the laws referred to in scientific discourse. For example:

The third law of ecology:  
nature knows best.

Who is this dame Nature? Is she a thinking person like you and me? When I try to answer those questions the picture comes into my head of Mother Cary, the fairy-godmother in Charles Kingsley's story, The Water Babies. I find myself just as much at sea with:

The first law of ecology:  
everything is connected with everything else.

Those eleven words, perhaps, make sense for mystics; but they do not make sense for scientists or philosophers or practical people with specific tasks to perform in this workaday world. As Abraham Lincoln might well have said, we can study some things all of the time, and we can at least try to study all things some of the time; but we certainly cannot study all things all of the time. So at least it seems to me; but I have still to teach myself computer-programming. With the computer, as with God—I may be told—all things are possible.

All things? Well, nearly all. The computer-aided technique of systems-analysis, as practised in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology by Professors Jay W. Forrester, Denis L. Meadows and their associates, is an instrument of thought purporting to explain the pattern of all the dynamically interacting man-made pressures upon the finite resources of 'planet earth'. The Limits to Growth, a short book which has sold hundreds of thousands of copies, dramatizes this new knowledge in forty-two diagrams or 'figures'. Each fully developed diagram,

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Silent Spring was first published in 1962 by Houghton Mifflin and has been many times reprinted in paperback editions.

16

This manifesto was published in the Ecologist, vol. 2, no. 1, January 1972. Among the thirty-three signatories there was only one economist and one political scientist. No agronomist was included.

irrespective of its particular content, possesses the same basic structure. Its first conspicuous feature is a downward sloping line running across the page from left to right: this line signifies the diminishing capacity of our small world to satisfy the demand of our swarming species for food, the demand of our aggressive technology for raw materials and energy, the demand of our throw-away society for garbage-tips. The second conspicuous feature of the standardized diagram is a bell-shaped curve which cuts the line of diminishing global capacity at two points: on the left-hand side the soaring curve overshoots the line; on the right-hand side the collapsing curve plunges across the line headlong to a floor of ruin.<sup>17</sup>

Limits (as I shall call the book from now on) proclaims two fundamental truths which Homo sapiens had better read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest: first, that the exponential growth of population, pillage and pollution cannot continue for much longer; secondly, that collapse, if it comes, is likely to come with a rush. The authors do not assert that collapse will come; their model is only conditionally predictive. Its purpose is to demonstrate how, in one way or another, and when, how much sooner or how much later, collapse will come unless the restraints on exponential growth—they are many and various—become effective. This purpose is laudable; but whether or not those bell-shaped curves contain the proof of success is a question open to dispute. After spending two or three days trying to understand the complicated curves of the World Model (Figure 26 of Limits) I called to aid my enviably numerate and literate friend Geoffrey Leeper, a soil chemist of widely recognized achievement. 'I think these computer jobs', he told me, 'very bad. Everything that matters can be said with a few simple sums plotted on log paper'.

My grouse with Limits is a bit different from Leeper's; at any rate, it finds expression in a different way. In attempting to explain everything at once, it seems to me, the authors explain nothing in particular. Whatever I may be looking for in any of their diagrams, I can never see the trees for the wood. To be fair, they do from time to time look in a cursory way at this tree or that; but what they see bears little if any relation to what is seen by ecologists or by economists. Consider, for example, their passing references to the agricultural component of pollution: they seem to take it for granted that all pesticides and all chemical fertilizers are not only pollutants, but pollutants in all circumstances and in the same degree. Rachael Carson, not to mention the ecologists of England's Nature Conservancy and Australia's CSIRO, knew better than that. Or consider their discussion of the economic costs of bringing pollution under control: in their attempt to prove that even the richest country in the world will find these costs a burden almost too heavy to bear, they quote from the second report of the United States Council on Environmental Quality an intimidating money figure, but they do not quote the reassuring percentage figure which is given a page or two later. Economists show more care than that in their figuring. They also show more care in their theorizing. As J.E. Meade has suggested, the authors of Limits could have studied with profit the work which economists have been doing in recent years on such matters as the theory of decision-making in conditions of uncertainty, and the use and misuse of 'aggregation' in model-building.<sup>18</sup>

When I complained just now that I could not see the trees for the wood, I was saying in effect that Professor Meadows and his colleagues are excessively addicted to aggregation. Their World Model obliterates many distinctions of crucial significance in the real world—matters of fact and theory which still remain in

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As an uninstructed layman I first encountered systems-analysis in three books by Jay W. Forrester, particularly World Dynamics (Massachusetts 1971). The Limits to Growth, by Denis L. Meadows and others (New York 1971, London 1977) is sponsored by the Club of Rome.

dispute among natural scientists; the subtleties of interplay between positive and negative feed-back loops; the multitudinous variety of natural resources both renewable and non-renewable; the immense contrasts between the needs and opportunities of different societies in different regions of the world. This random list could run to much greater length, but perhaps it is long enough to illustrate the danger we run when we paste the label global on every environmental problem. To do that seems to me not only a methodological, but also a political and a psychological error. It is a political error because the instruments of political action on the global scale still remain, at best, rudimentary.<sup>19</sup> It is a psychological error because we fall into despair when we see that action is needed, yet see no way of taking it with effect. Despair is the unforgivable sin.

Do historians, I ask myself, have any contribution worth making to the debates I have been reporting? To judge from a despairing correspondence which was conducted throughout 1972 Notes and News of the American Historical Association, they would do well to keep their mouths shut. 'We have been writing The Epic of America', the dismal johnnies lamented. 'We should have written The Rape of America'. Those two tendentious propositions tell me nothing, except that some of my American colleagues—a small minority, I hope—are making frantic efforts to get off one handwaggon and onto another. Historians of land-use in Europe, by contrast, have had no need to worry about bandwaggon. In their scholarly tradition equal weight has always been given to the economic and the ecological implications of what has been called 'Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth'.<sup>20</sup>

At this last turning point of my discourse I feel moved once again to acknowledge the debt which I owe to Edward Shann. Thanks in large measure to his encouragement, I kept alive my interest in the problems of land-tenure and land-use throughout the long years when the political issues of imperial rule and national revolt, of international order and disorder, of peace and war, were absorbing the greater part of the time available to me for historical research. Yet even then the buried stream of my love for the land came sometimes to the surface in specialist articles or in chapters of the books I was writing about regions of the world as widely separated from each other as hilly Tuscany from the flat Canadian prairies or the high veld of South Africa from the steaming West African coast. And now at long last, in my old age and in my own country, the stream of

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J.E. Meade, Economic Policy and the Threat of Doom (The Galton Lecture 1972). Meade's argument may be illustrated by the reference made above to the aggregation of all pesticides and chemical fertilizers into a single agricultural pollutant. Such an aggregate model must spell sudden crisis when the (single) pollutant exceeds the (single) absorptive capacity of our world. If, on the contrary, our forecasting is uncertain, we shall not rashly commit ourselves to a single policy, but hedge our bets.

19

Nevertheless, the functional organizations of the United Nations do necessary and useful work. So also do agreements between sovereign states, such as the 'load on top' agreement which has greatly mitigated the pollution of sea-water caused by discharge of oil from tankers.

20

This is the title of a famous collection of papers edited by William J. Thomas Jr. (University of Chicago Press, 1956). It reports the proceedings of a symposium in which geographers played a leading part—a useful reminder of 'the old alliance' between geography and history and of our need to maintain it.

this compelling interest rushes exuberantly through mountain valleys, or flows sedately through pastureland and ploughland.

What I most want to say about my findings as a historian has been anticipated by biologist Rene Dubos. Man, he believes, hardly ever reacts passively to external forces.

The most characteristic aspect of his behaviour is that he responds not only actively but often unexpectedly and creatively. He is the more human the more vigorously he converts passive reactions into creative responses.<sup>21</sup>

Half a century ago, when I was working in the archives and walking in the vineyards of Brolio in Tuscany, I discovered that truth almost without looking for it. A few years later I spelt it out in a specialist article.<sup>22</sup> The story which I then told in detail I shall now recapitulate in a few sentences. The earliest Tuscans, when first they attempted to wrest a living from the land, despoiled it by their ignorant assaults on the soil-cover of the watersheds and steep slopes. How then has it come about that 'garden Tuscany' is today not only a richly-productive Italian province but also one of the loveliest landscapes anywhere in the world? You can see the answer in the superb compositions of the Tuscan painters. Their most conspicuous feature is the terraced hillside. Learning the lessons of survival is the hard school of experience, the Tuscan landowners and peasants saved their soil by building terraces and digging drains. Spoiling, restoring, improving, conserving: that has been the rhythm of their history.

The story that I have thus briefly told justifies the stand which I take with Rene Dubos; but I could tell some sombre stories. In South Australia across Goyder's Line and in Canada across Palliser's Line I have seen man-made devastation so hideous that restoration would seem to be at best a far-off divine event. Still, that was forty years ago; for all I know, Canadians and South Australians may have taught themselves since then how to co-operate with nature. Be this as it may, the Australian land-users whom I know best have learnt the lesson. In Monaro I have rediscovered the Tuscan rhythm. I believe, although I am not yet completely certain, that the precious but fragile watersheds of the Snowy Mountains, together with their native flora and fauna, are safe for as long ahead as we can foresee. On the plateau below the Snowy Mountains skilful pastoralists are making three blades of grass grow where one had grown before. In doing so, they are repairing the damage done by squatters and selectors who had been forced to cope as best they could without any aid at all from men of science.<sup>23</sup> Today the man-made pastures of Monaro, set in their native Australian frame, are not only fruitful, but beautiful.

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Rene Dubos, So Human and Animal (English edn, London, 1970). p. 132.

22

W.K. Hancock, 'Italian Metayage' in Economic History Supplement No. 3, Economic Journal, January 1928.

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For the properties which I know at first hand, the figure 3 is close to the average of increased return from the improved pastures. It is only fair to add I have also visited properties which are still inefficiently managed; but these are a rapidly diminishing minority.

I propose now to make some remarks about what is called historical method. Historians, of course, write histories of every conceivable subject from medicine to music; but I shall speak from my own recent experience. My task of research in Monaro claimed most of my working time throughout four strenuous years. In telling the story which emerged from this research I had to make it intelligible both to economists and ecologists, amongst other people. Yet did I not say or suggest only a few minutes ago that every sound scientist or scholar will stick to his own last? True enough; but let me now add that every imaginative scientist or scholar will also cultivate the art of living with his neighbours. The historian's last is to study pertinaciously and critically the empirical evidence—not all of it in documents<sup>24</sup>—which is relevant to his immediate task. The historian's neighbours are as many and various as his fields of study. When my study was nationalist revolt, my neighbours were gunmen; when it was constitutional change, they were lawyers and politicians; when it was land-use, they were landowners and landworkers, economists and public servants, geneticists and botanists. As a schoolboy it had been my astonishing good luck to spend my holidays on a farm, where I learnt to harness the horse, to guide the plough, to milk the cow, to tail the lambs, to stook the sheaves and to build the haystack. Technique has changed since then, but I can still speak the language of men and women on the land. As a result I have a clear idea in my head of what is bothering them when they seek help from the research workers of CSIRO or the State Department of Agriculture.

I cannot, however, speak any of the languages which the men of science use. The most that I can hope for when I read a botanist's learned article or talk with a soil-chemist is to get the general hang of what his objective is and how he is approaching it. For this reason I am all the more grateful to the kind neighbours who have enlightened my ignorance of matters essential to my study, such as the species of plants which were dominant in Monaro when the first squatters rode in and the very different species which are dominant today. Occasionally, I have been able to make a small return by putting precise dates on things of interest to them—for example, a population explosion among marsupials, or the pressures of men and their animals which changed sweetly flowing streams into degraded water-courses.<sup>25</sup> Even so, I have written far too many pages about things which they know at first hand, but I know only at second hand. This goes against my conscience and is the reason for the suggestion, made more than once in my book, that if anybody should ever again be rash enough to attempt a task in any way comparable with mine, he should attempt it as leader or member of a team.<sup>26</sup>

Today, a team is hard at work upon a task immeasurably larger and far more urgent than any that I would ever have dreamt of. My professional concern, as you by now will understand, has been land-use in country areas; but it is in the great urban agglomerations of our time that human pressures on the natural environment are making or marring the future of our species and of the biosphere in which we live and move, and have our being. Professor N.G. Butlin, who has defined the above-mentioned task, now leads the taskforce. His achievement as an economic historian is outstanding: moreover, in his published work the growth of cities

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A great historian and great Englishman, R.H. Tawney, said on a famous occasion that historians of land-use need not only more documents but stronger boots. By this he meant that they must look for their evidence not only in archives and libraries but also in paddocks and fields.

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W.K. Hancock, Discovering Monaro (C.U.P. 1972), pp. 65, 109-11, 115.

26

Ibid. p. 9, 111, 200.

holds a central place. He, if anybody, possesses the imagination, the persistence, the span of conceptual thought and the technical skill which can carry through to success what we now call the Botany Bay Project.

Even so, academic competence will not by itself ensure success. Let me briefly survey the administrative and political background. The three Australian academies sponsor and govern the project. The commonwealth government has backed it financially. The government of New South Wales has backed it by an undertaking to grant access to indispensable research data in its official records. These interlocking obligations were freely accepted. Should they not be met we shall all have to think again. But let me return to strictly academic ground. The Botany Bay Project exemplifies the strategy of disaggregation, scientifically and realistically applied to urgent economic, ecological, historical and social problems. As an input-output study of pollution in Australia's most densely industrialized urban area it occupies middle ground between the world-modelling of Meadows and the provincial fossicking of Hancock.

At the end of my discourse I return to the beginning. For Edward Shann, as for Adam Smith, economic growth was 'the cheerful and hearty state to all the orders of society'. That optimistic assumption was more than once called into question by Adam Smith's successors. From the law of diminishing returns in agriculture, Ricardo reached the conclusion that landlords were bound to become a disproportionately hearty order of society. From the natural propensity of mankind to multiply its numbers, Malthus foreboded misery for the masses. In the mid-nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill turned his back on Adam Smith to the extent that he saw virtue not in the progressive state of society, but in the stationary state. I wonder what Mill's response would have been to that vociferous slogan of our time, zero economic growth?

Let me suggest that we can clear our minds of cant by asking a few simple questions. Economic growth of what kind? Economic growth to what end? No economist, so far as I know, has ever disputed Adam Smith's assumption that economic growth—or progress, as he called it—is the way to wealth; but the definitions of wealth by economists and others are many and various. Some of them are naive. Believe it or not, you will find it taken for granted on page 107 of The Limits to Growth that wealth and 'industrial output per capita' are one and the same thing. John Stuart Mill knew better than that. Wealth, he insisted, meant better conditions of life for England's poor people. In Australia today it means not only our daily bread, butter, aspirin, whisky and gadgets but armed forces commensurate with our interests and responsibilities as a nation; prisons which will help to protect society against criminals and also help criminals to amend their lives; better hospitals and schools; cleaner air and water than we are given now; more safety in factories and on the roads; protection of wildlife; national parks—these are only a few items from the long list of our needs. Some needs may be met by distributing the national income more wisely: less for the superfluties of lucky individuals and, let me add, lucky countries; more for the necessities of poorer people and for the decencies and graces of life in a civilized community. That, I take it, was Mill's idea; but I think he went astray if he imagined that a national income which has ceased to grow can meet the growing demand upon it for the satisfaction of so many claims which are just, prudent, humane—but competitive with each other.

I make no apology for raising these political issues. Edward Shann would not have shied away from them. Today, Professor Butlin and his colleagues are hard at work upon problems of urgent public concern. To identify and elucidate these problems is the cooperative endeavour of highly competent social scientists, natural scientists, humanists: a team far more various in its specialist abilities than has been suggested by my troika of economists, ecologists and historians. I shall not call the Botany Bay Project interdisciplinary, because that word nowadays is too often devalued by academic persons who possess no last worth sticking to. Suffice it to say that each participator in the project is



applying his technical skill and his human understanding to the co-operative elucidation of hideously tangled problems which are the common concern of all.

Within the wide field of environmental studies the objectives of our endeavour are both theoretical and practical. Whether we plough lonely furrows or work with a team, we seek knowledge not only for its own sake but also as a guide to action. This must be so, because our species leads to double life: we are a member of nature's multitudinous household, yet no ordinary member; upon our shoulders lie the responsibilities and the risks of management. Two and a half thousand years ago, Plato emphasized the risks. The Athenians, he said, had mismanaged their natural environment; by doing that, they had brought ruin upon their city-state.<sup>27</sup>

To what extent the Athenians accepted that explanation of their misfortunes I cannot say; but for us it rings the alarm bells. For them, time ran slow; for us, it runs fast. Centuries went by before the pressure of men and their animals upon the high country of Attica reached its destructive climax; but mechanized tourism in our high country could despoil the watersheds within a few decades. In my book, Discovering Monaro, the historical elucidation of a zoning plan to save the Snowy Mountains becomes in effect a call for action. The debate on policy, I say, concerns everybody.

Even the man who says 'I don't care' is party to the debate; he is giving his vote for a policy of drift. The man who says 'Leave it to the future' is doing the same. The future is now. What we do now or fail to do now is making the future or wrecking it.<sup>28</sup>

Those four sentences, I believe, correctly state our responsibilities of management, not only at the headwaters of our rivers, but also in the urban agglomerations on our coasts. In facing those responsibilities we have cause both for hope and for fear. On a recent visit to Adelaide, I saw the city's future being made. What, I wonder, shall I see in your city?

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See note 12 above. One speech in one dialogue does not, of course, make Plato an Athenian Barry Commoner. For philosophico-historical perspective upon the issues discussed in this lecture see John Passmore's book, Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (New York, 1974).

28

Op. cit. pp. 181, 189.

## 2. The Botany Bay Project\*

Botany Bay, a name reverberant in Australian history, signifies in this paper not only the oceanic port but its metropolitan hinterland, a drainage area of 500 square miles extending from the watershed to the coast and containing Australia's largest concentration of industry and more than half of Sydney's population.

### Preamble

'The Botany Bay Project' took shape in the early 1970's as an inquiry into human pressures on the natural environment, and their consequences for human welfare. The three Australian Academies—of Science, of the Humanities, of the Social Sciences—sponsored and guided the Project. The story of this combined operation may conveniently be prefaced by a brief reference to C.P. Snow's much-quoted lecture, The Two Cultures (1959). Because Snow failed to make crystal clear what he was trying to say, a great deal of the ensuing controversy was beside the point. Some of it was vituperative. After keeping silence for four years, Snow thought it time to take 'a second look' at his argument.

It is something like this. In our society (that is, advanced western society) we have lost even the pretence of a common culture. Persons educated with the greatest intensity we know can no longer communicate with each other on the plane of their major intellectual concern. This is serious for our creative, intellectual and, above all, our normal life. It is leading us to interpret the past wrongly, to misjudge the present, and to deny our hopes for the future.

It is making it difficult or impossible for us to take good action.<sup>1</sup>

Quite reasonably, Snow looked to educational reform as a remedy for the inadequacies of cultural communication. Not quite so reasonably, he saw hope in the development of 'something like a third culture' within which social historians—for example— would be on speaking terms with natural scientists. Once again, he was failing to bring his thought, or at any rate his prose, to the point of precise statement. What he really wanted, I feel sure, was not a new 'culture' with a new Academy to encase it, but co-operation between workers on different fronts within their inherited common culture. Co-operation of this kind is not a wistful dream: as readers of Daedalus will know, it is day-to-day business within the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. In Britain, it is increasingly on the agenda of the Royal Society and the British Academy. In

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Published in the International Journal of Environmental Studies, Vol. 14, pp. 27-36, July 1979.

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The Two Cultures and a Second Look (C.U.P., 1965), p. 60.

Australia, co-operation between the three Academies which launched the Eotany Bay Project has tough roots in a decision that was taken in 1970.

In that year, problems arising from human impact upon the natural environment were conspicuously on the agenda of the International Biological Programme and—in parallel—on the agenda of the Australian Academy of Science. The membership of that Academy did not, however, include persons who had made any professional study of such matters as land law, the allocation of economic resources, public administration, political decision, human geography, human history, or the philosophical elucidation of ideas that are relevant to the activities of man as the maker and marrer of environments. To make good such deficiencies it would be necessary to mobilise skills which were widely dispersed within and beyond the three Australian Academies. Prompt recognition of this fact of life produced prompt action. In September 1970 the will to work together for common purposes within the common culture took institutional shape in a Consultative Committee of the Academies.

The Consultative Committee went immediately to work on some practical tasks which need not be reported in this paper. On the front of environmental study it took prompt initiative which led in due course to publication of a useful book,<sup>2</sup> The Murray Waters : Man, Nature and a River System. Material for the book was prepared in draft papers submitted in May and July 1971 to seminars which included geographers, historians, economists, lawyers, agronomists, soil scientists, botanists, zoologists, hydrologists, professional administrators, professional investigators of wildlife. The practitioners of these far-flung specialisms found themselves speaking to each other in the language of their common culture. This happened quite easily, and for a simple reason. Each member of the seminar was bringing his expert knowledge to bear upon a problem of concern to all the other members : how best to care for the main supplier of fresh water to the world's driest continent. Looking back, one sees room for closer integration of the separate studies. Even so, this first venture in co-operation was encouraging.

After the Murray Waters, what next? Even before the July seminar met, answers to that question were being sought, not only at formal meetings of the Consultative Committee but in leisurely talk between friends, more often than not after a meal together. During these conversations contrasting approaches to environmental problems came under review. The first approach may be called global. That word occurs like a refrain in Limits to Growth, a book sponsored by the Club of Rome and produced in 1971 by the systems-analysts of Boston, Massachusetts. The book sold in hundreds of thousands and stimulated thought on urgent economic and ecological problems. Its publication was well-timed, seeing that a world conference on ecological problems was due to meet the following year in Stockholm. Moreover, it is obvious that some very urgent problems—oceanic pollution, for example—call for action on the global scale. Nevertheless, some critics of the book discerned in it the flaw of "premature aggregation". Translating that criticism into simple language, we could say that environmental problems are of a different order in the valleys of the Ganges, the Mississippi, and the Murray. Or we could say: "The best help that we Australians can give in clearing up the world's environmental mess is to clear up the mess in our own country". Language such as this may seem to be the prattle of babes and sucklings; but it can be translated into the language of adults. The multi-disciplinary study of a specific environment, competently planned and conducted, will be microcosmic.

Rather in this way the talk between friends kept flowing between opposite points of view and alternative assessments of opportunity, until the decision was made to undertake a rigorous study of man's impact upon the environment within a context specifically Australian. The further decision was made that this context would be urban, since it is predominantly in the great urban agglomerations of present time that human pressures on the environment are most conspicuous and most massive in their impact on human welfare. A third decision designated the geographical area of research. Thus the Botany Bay Project was brought to birth. Before the end of 1971, it was approved by the Consultative Committee and by the Councils of the three Academies.

### **Making a Start**

A Provisional Project Committee was appointed to prepare the programme of research. It was a small committee, chaired by the economic historian N.G. Butlin. From its deliberations there emerged a programme which was comprehensive in scope and precise in detail—not least in the detailed estimation of financial cost. Meanwhile, discussions of crucial importance were being held with the Minister for Environmental Control in New South Wales, the Hon. J.G. Beale M.L.A. In a letter of 29 May, 1972, he put on record the promise of unrestricted access to all the relevant official records. In addition, he promised departmental assistance in locating and assembling those records.

The only remaining impediment to immediate action was financial. Applications for aid were submitted to the Foundations; but in vain. An anonymous donor made a grant of \$34,000 for economic research; but no other benefactor followed suit. Nevertheless the provisional committee soldiered on. It established close contact with scientists and scholars in Sydney's three Universities, in the Australian National University, and in seats of learning further afield. A good number of these people professed themselves eager and able to concentrate their research within the field of the Botany Bay Project. These professions, provided they were made good, would take some of the strain off the budget; but they fell far short of the financial need. The Project would not get off the ground unless and until money became available for the appointment of a Director and the multi-disciplinary team which he would lead. That prospect did not come into sight until the end of 1972.

In December of that year the Commonwealth electorate voted into power a Labor government led by the Hon. E.G. Whitlam Q.C., M.H.R. On 11 January, 1973, the new Prime Minister and three of his cabinet colleagues received a small deputation of the three Academies, listened attentively to their exposition of the Botany Bay Project and invited them to submit a written statement of its purposes, methods and financial requirements. That same night the statement took shape as a letter addressed to the Prime Minister. It was signed by N.G. Butlin on behalf of the three Australian Academies. It is dated 12 January, 1973, and must be quoted at some length.

The basic purposes of the proposed study are to attempt to define the forms of policy and techniques of control at Commonwealth, State, and local levels, of national environmental damage that we believe to be one of the most serious problems affecting the immediate and long-run welfare of the mass of Australians. We propose to try to integrate results of several inquiries—e.g. in Westernport or in our own preliminary explorations of the problems of the Murray River—with the primary area that we plan to use for our field study, the Botany Bay catchment. "Botany Bay" will, therefore, be the focus of our research activity. This area was chosen, after prolonged discussion, as one raising major existing and future environmental problems comparable

with those in other situations elsewhere in Australia—a developed but also developing industrial-commercial-residential area housing a large and growing population. It invites consideration of redevelopment of blighted conditions, examination of the form and extent of future population and economic growth, the impact of large public facilities in the proposed marine port and in Mascot, the appraisal of the possibilities and the need for decentralisation on a much larger scale, and other outstanding policy issues directly affecting the welfare of a large number of people.

None of these policy issues can be dealt with by an individual discipline or even by a few. Nor is it satisfactory to try to deal with particular issues in a given area without taking account of extensive ramifications and inter-relations of each. We hope to develop the modes of analysing the complex problems that are presented, to bring a considerable number of disciplines together in cooperative directed research, to suggest forms of policies for control of environmental damage in the particular area and, hopefully, to integrate our findings with other enquiries and situations elsewhere so that our studies may have both regional and national relevance. These tasks have not been attempted before in this manner.

Within the Botany Bay Project, thus defined, 'three basic sub-projects', relating control of environmental damage with human welfare, were identified.

The letter emphasised the opportunities for thorough research which were contained in the promise made by the Minister for Environmental Control in New South Wales to grant unrestricted access to the relevant official records. In its application to the Commonwealth for financial support it laid the main emphasis upon two basic requirements: first, the appointment of a Director and the establishment of his headquarters; secondly, the recruitment of a "core group" of full-time professional research workers. An additional requirement which it specified was consultation with a large number of specialists and the recruitment of some of them for contract-work. In an itemised statement which ran to two pages of single-space typescript, all the requirements were spelt out in dollars. On the basis of these detailed estimates, the request was made for a grant of \$1,070,000 to be spent within five years, starting in the financial year 1973 and ending in 1977. That request was met promptly and in full.

#### **Anticlimax**

In July 1975 the Commonwealth government cut by half its funding of the Botany Bay Project and reduced the period of its grant from five years to three. In the first draft of this paper, the story of how and why this happened was told in full detail; but what now follows will be no more than a terse statement of four causes. First, the three Academies were slow to take the measure of their managerial task: whereas the small Provisional Project Committee had been a workshop, its unwieldy successor became from time to time a talking shop. Second, the Commonwealth government not only paid the piper but showed early and unmistakable signs of wanting to call the tune: its administrative instrument, the Department of Science, claimed the right to "programme", "overview" and "approve" the work of the academic managers. Third, the State government swung suddenly and violently from active support of the Project to implacable hostility: following a general election in which Mr Beale did not stand, it repudiated the promise which he had given of unrestricted access to the official research-data. The fourth cause was fundamental. Hostilities broke out between the Commonwealth government and the State government. The Botany Bay Project was caught in their cross-fire.

Towards the end of 1974 these frustrations became a matter of public knowledge. The Botany Bay Project, many people believed, was dead. On 8 March 1975 a Minister of the State government, Sir John Fuller, joined forces with a Minister of the Commonwealth government, Mr W.L. Morrison, in the ceremonies of a public burial. Interviewed on the A.B.C.'s radio programme, Innovations, they were asked to explain how and why the Botany Bay Project "went wrong". Sir John spoke bluntly: academic people, he asserted, "desire to have as much taxpayers' money made available to a research team as they think fit, without any basic responsibility to anyone". Mr Morrison spoke suavely: the programme of the three Academies, he said, had seemed at first to be very attractive, but it was novel and there was "a lack of expertise in the management of such a programme ... it has fallen down in the difficulties (the newness, I suppose) of the funding and of the management of this type of study". He expressed the hope that better results would be achieved by the Bureau of Environmental Studies which was being planned within the department of his ministerial colleague, Dr Cass.

### Survival

That radio programme had got off on the wrong foot. The Botany Bay Project had not "gone wrong", nor had it "fallen down". While the politicians were performing its obsequies, it was taking a new lease of life.

How did it happen? In answering this question we must return to the early months of 1973, that time of great expectations. The Botany Bay Project Committee, despite its excessive size and its high cost in money and time, rendered indispensable service. The Committee's chairman was Professor Frank Fenner of the Australian National University. The deputy-chairman, Professor Rupert Valentine of the University of New South Wales, held the fort whenever Fenner was called away on duties overseas. From start to finish, in good times and in bad, these men remained steadfast. Yet both of them found themselves contending with many frustrations. A full-time Director was urgently required to get the Project off the ground. No time was lost in advertising the post and applications came in quickly from three continents; but the task of vetting the applicants could not be rushed and was not completed until June 1973. Professor Butlin was then invited to apply. His appointment as Director was announced in August. In form, the appointment did not take effect until New Year's Day 1974; but Butlin went immediately into action. Advertisements were issued for positions on the core staff, excellent applications were received and the first appointments were made. Contracts for specialist research were let. Preparations were made for the establishment of research headquarters within the Botany Bay region. After exploring various possibilities, Butlin opened negotiations for the purchase of a property at 1-3 Eurimbla Avenue, Randwick, just across the road from the University of New South Wales, which maintained from start to finish a close partnership with the A.N.U. in the Project. The property had been shared by a shop and a Chinese restaurant. It had suffered much neglect, but was structurally sound. The costs of purchase, repair and furnishing were low enough to make it a sound investment.

Here let me put on record a personal experience. In April 1974 I made my first visit to the premises at Eurimbla Avenue. The carpenters were still at work and the furniture so far installed was sparse—some filing cabinets, a typewriter, a few tables, a few chairs. Nevertheless, six or seven people were already at work and I met them 'in class'. We all sat on a dingy carpet in a large room where customers of the Chinese restaurant had recently eaten their dinners; but now it was the conference room. One by one, each member of the team described his or her task of research. In the discussions that followed each particular task acquired wider significance as an essential element of the common task. Everybody was making friends with opposite numbers in the public service and everybody was

making a rich haul of research-data. The wind seemed set fair for a prosperous voyage.

Had my ear been closer to the political ground I should have heard the first rumblings of a storm. Only two months later, the Director of the State Pollution Control Commission protested that Professor Butlin and his colleagues were making intolerable inroads into the working time of the State's public servants. Next month he followed up that protest by calling a meeting of the senior technical officers within his area of jurisdiction. The meeting imposed a ban on collaboration of any kind with the Botany Bay Project. For the newly recruited workers in Eurimbla Avenue the news of that decision was alarming; but they kept their nerve and continued hard at work. For three more months their relations with many middle-ranking public servants remained unimpaired and the flow of research materials into their filing cabinets, so far from drying up, accelerated. For this suspension of sentence there were two explanations: first, the Pollution Control Commission was only one of six public authorities which held responsibility within the wide field of environmental policy; second, the ban raised an issue of high policy which required ministerial decision. The Project Committee appealed to Sir John Fuller. He postponed his answer until 24 September. At a meeting that day with two spokesmen for the Project he made the ban total, irrevocable and immediate.

In Canberra, the Botany Bay Project Committee held its last meeting on 23 October 1974. Professor Butlin tendered his resignation as Director, to take effect on 31 December. To the reading and listening public, the news of these decisions spelt capitulation; but the opposite was true. The overgrown Project Committee gave place to a small Management Committee, with Professors Fenner and Vallentine still serving as Chairman and Deputy-Chairman. The breakdown of relations with the State government made the managerial task far simpler than it had been in recent months. The Commonwealth government could not compete with the State government in slashing its commitment to the Project by one sharp stroke: the full-time staff and the scientists who had accepted contract-work had to be paid until their employments could be terminated. Early in November 1974 the new Management Committee submitted to the Minister of Science detailed proposals for financing the work on a reduced scale. Negotiations dragged on until 1 July 1975, when the Acting-Minister of Science in one short sentence wrote *finis* to the partnership between the academics and the politicians: "I am now in a position to let you know that the Australian Government's grant in support of the Project will be maintained only until 31 December 1975".

When the final break was made by the State government, the members of the research team had packed up their documents and gear and moved to new headquarters in Professor Butlin's department in the A.N.U's Research School of Social Sciences. There they were given formal status within an Urban Environment Study Group established by the University Council. It made no difference at all that Butlin was no longer styled 'Director of the Botany Bay Project'. Under his leadership the same work not only continued as before but gathered momentum.

### Achievement

In mid-1976 the first fruits of these labours appeared in published print.<sup>3</sup> Today, 30 July 1978, the list of work so far published (there is more on the way) stands as follows:

D.J. Anderson (editor)  
A Handbook of the Botany Bay Region

## REPORTS

- No. 1 N.G. Butlin (editor)  
Sydney's Environmental Amenity 1970-1975  
No. 2 N.G. Butlin (editor)  
Factory Waste Potential in Sydney  
No. 3 N.G. Butlin (editor)  
The Impact of Port Botany

## WORKING PAPERS

- Pamela Coward  
Environmental Law in Sydney  
C. Joy, W. Hickson and M. Buchanan  
Liquid Waste Management  
W. Ryder  
Air Pollution Control  
M. Johnson  
Natural Water Quality

Report No. 1, a volume of approximately 140,000 words, contained a closely integrated survey of the policies of environmental control in Sydney and of the types of administration that were needed. The following quotation from the editor's preface will throw light upon the methods of research and composition which were embodied not only in this early volume of the series, but also in the Reports and Working Papers that would follow it. After acknowledging the generous help received directly or indirectly from officials of the State government, the editor wrote:

The value of this Report depends, however, essentially on the hard work of the research staff and contractors. It is important to understand how the volume was assembled (and others are being prepared). Work projects were designed on a cooperative basis and tasks were distributed to individuals and small groups. In the preparation of papers, some of which ran to 200 pages, each person was free to pursue his or her own specialised objective, to examine city environmental policy as an instrument of social welfare. Co-operative discussions occurred on the design and on successive drafts of each paper and each was progressively amended by the authors to interrelate with other papers.

It was my task to put the papers together into a single volume. In this editorial work, I have had to rely on the authors for clarification and at times for the assembly of supplementary information. I have to thank them for their tolerance in responding to these requests...

Because of the focus of the Report, with its concern for policy and social welfare, a good deal of the technical detail of some papers has been omitted. This is to be regretted because much of this information is very valuable and would help to clarify the condensed or simplified versions presented here. To cope with this, it was decided to produce ... several of these papers as Working Papers in their original form...

The merits of the volume depend on a mix of inter-disciplinary co-operation and individual effort. So that the contributions of individuals are not obscured, the list of contributors is indicated in this Preface.

Similar acknowledgments are made in the prefaces to all the publications that have been listed above.



### Brief Review of a Typical Publication

Report No. 3, The Impact of Port Botany, was written at high speed and produced by the A.N.U. Press within a few weeks. For this haste there was a sufficient reason: namely that a committee appointed by the State government was expected very soon to give its judgment on the case for and against the addition of a coal-loader to the installations of Port Botany. The editor and publisher won their race against time and within a few weeks the first printing of the Report was sold out. Meanwhile it had sparked off a vigorous controversy in the columns of The Australian Financial Review. The committee of inquiry into the proposed coal-loader then arranged a special meeting in Sydney and had three hours of discussion with Professor Butlin. Was the upshot of this discussion in the mind of the cabinet when it made the decision that Port Kembla, not Port Botany, would best serve the interests not only of the coal industry, but of the whole State? I can only guess the answer to that question.

However, I do know that the efficiency of every port in the world is determined, not merely by the installations and storages on or near its own waterfront, but by the network of roads, railways, storages and distribution-centres which alone make possible the sure and speedy transfer of goods on the wharves to their users in the hinterland, together with the return traffic of products from the farms, the mines and the factories. This lesson was driven home to me during the 1940s, when I was doing historical work in Britain's Offices of the War Cabinet. In 1940 and in the first six months of 1941, when German submarines and bombers had available to them the whole Atlantic Coast from North Cape to the Bay of Biscay, the British suffered as heavy a loss of imports from congestion in the ports as they suffered from cargoes sunk. That additional and intolerable loss occurred when shipping had to be switched from the vulnerable east coast ports to the safer west coast ports. It demonstrated the indissoluble unity between port capacity and inland transport. The planners of Port Botany—if the uncoordinated responses of different authorities to different problems and pressures can be called planning—showed little if any understanding of that unity, within the period covered by The Impact of Port Botany. Their failure is diagnosed in chapter 4 of that Report. Possible remedies are examined in chapters 7 and 8.4

The linkage between economic, environmental and social problems is made clear throughout the book and may best be illustrated by some brief quotations.

#### The Economy:

What is expected to be the rate of return to the public as well as the private capital to be committed to the Port and its uses? What is the expected rate of return relative to other port development in Port Jackson and elsewhere in New South Wales? These questions have never been asked, let alone answered. (p. 23)

#### The Environment:

The environmental inquiries of the N.S.W. Coalition Government ... have been presented in such a way as to allow no comparisons with alternatives to Port Botany.... Each environmental evaluation has been confined to one proposed use in isolation from others. The environmental criteria have been limited to physical and technical issues, incompletely specified, and without effective concern for the basic

The Report pays close attention, as the planners had failed to do, to the difficult problems arising from the intersecting axes of the north-south flow of traffic to and from Mascot airport and the east-west flow to and from Port Botany.

problems of amenity for city dwellers. The effects that were considered were confined narrowly to the immediate Port location. Until the effects of the various uses are added together, the environmental impact cannot be comprehended.... Until environmental amenity and the 'internal' costs and benefits are merged, no adequate consideration of alternative costs and benefits—the sine qua non of project evaluation—can be made. (p. 23)

#### The Society:

In any major change generated by a development project there are losers and gainers. The way losses and gains are distributed between different groups in society confuses the process of project evaluation because political judgements are needed to evaluate the equity implications.... Because opinions differ, it has been argued, the problems cannot be dealt with. In opposition to this view, the issues to be presented in this chapter are that the conflicts between gainers and losers are central ... and that the consideration of equity leads to the need to plan in a preventive manner, to take steps to ameliorate disadvantageous effects and to provide compensation where prevention and amelioration fail. (p. 68)

Noise, smells, dirt, congestion—chapter 6 enumerates inflictions such as these and examines their impacts upon particular neighbourhoods and particular social groups—the richer and the poorer, the landlords and the tenants, the young people and the old people. From start to finish the book bears the stamp of numeracy, literacy, logical rigour and human concern. Its topographical detail is meticulous, but the thrust of its thought is global. In the questions which it asks and in the method of its search for answers it challenges not only Sydney people, but the people of many other coastal cities—of Liverpool, Los Angeles, Naples, New York, Tokyo.

Of the strictly specialist studies in the series it can be said that each one possesses the virtues which are appropriate to its subject-matter. Of the entire Botany Bay Project it can be said that the academic team proved itself able to carry to a successful conclusion the larger part of its programme, in the teeth of persistent opposition and in the harsh climate of Commonwealth-State confrontation.

### LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE

Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes. (Oscar Wilde).

We often discover what will do, by finding out what will not do; and probably he who never made a mistake never made a discovery. (Samuel Smiles).

I choose those two aphorisms as my text in the following brief discourse on the lessons to be learnt from The Botany Bay Project. In any comparable enterprise there must always be three partners: first, the academic managers and workers; second, the financial backers; third, the custodians of research materials.

#### (1) The Academic Managers and Workers

The three Academies made no mistake when they launched the Botany Bay Project, but nearly two years went by before they repaired their original mistake of management. Nothing need be added to the story already told of the Project Committee, except to say that it had no fixed address. The Department of Science addressed its letters sometimes to Professor Fenner as that committee's chairman, sometimes to the Academy of Science, which managed the Project's finances, and

once at least—its last letter—to the chairman of the Consultative Committee of the three Academies. Had the correspondence been flowing in one familiar channel, the Department of Science might have shown more understanding—and more courtesy. When next an academic enterprise of national significance is launched, either by the Academies or by some other combination of scientists and humanists, its managerial headquarters should be established at the start within a university—if possible, within the university which will house the Director and his team.

To turn now from the problems of management to the problems of research: on the Project's 'core staff' more than half-a-dozen disciplines were represented—engineering, chemistry, biology, geography, urban planning, demography, economics, political science, history. In the preface to Report No. 1 the statement was made: 'The merits of the volume depend on a mix of inter-disciplinary co-operation and individual effort'. That word, 'inter-disciplinary', may sometimes trip too readily off the tongue of an academic weakling; I once identified it as the alibi of a second-rate economist or historian 'who possesses no last worth sticking to'. Yet I went on to say that every imaginative scientist or scholar will 'cultivate the art of living with his neighbours'.<sup>5</sup>

Precisely this was achieved by Professor Butlin's team. The achievement did not come easily. In proof of that let me quote some comments on the first draft of this paper made by a member of the team, Dr Dan Coward:

Not only were we all trying to get to know more about each other—warts and all—but we were struggling to give coherence and meaning to 'inter-disciplinary' academic studies. Personality and age differences were inevitably tangled up with differences of viewpoint between disciplines and between natural and social scientists. We had to learn to put our egos aside: in the 'in-house' seminars criticism was of the work, not of the person. This took a lot of painful effort and considerable time... I suppose we all thought we knew what to do when we applied for our jobs. In practice it turned out to be a difficult task to steer our different disciplines in the same direction.

I like that verb, steer. It precisely defines the academic and human task of the leader of an interdisciplinary team. Some members of the team will learn the helmsman's art. All the members will learn to see their particular tasks in a broader and deeper perspective. In due course they will return with new zest and vision to their customary employments within or beyond the academic world.

## (2) The Financial Backers

Throughout the past half-century, to go no further back in time, many successful enterprises of scientific and scholarly research have been sponsored and funded, both in America and Britain, by the great Foundations. Let me cite two American examples. Gunnar Myrdal's epoch-making study of America's black people was launched and paid for by the Carnegie Corporation. Again, in almost every number of Daedalus, acknowledgement is made to the Ford Foundation or some comparable institution which has given generous financial aid. In Britain, similar support for science and scholarship has come from the Nuffield Foundation, the Leverhulme Fellowships Trust, the Houblon-Norman Fund of the Bank of England and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. A great deal of my own research would never have been carried through to publication had it not been for the help which I have received from sources such as these. Much the same could be said by scholars whose work has been supported by business institutions. I have in mind,

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See above, Chapter V(1) passim.

for example, the important contributions to the history of banking which have been made in Britain by R.S. Sayers and in Australia by the late S.J. Butlin.

Even so, in every advanced economy the main support for research comes from the public revenues—that is to say, from the taxpayers. Some of the money goes direct to individuals, but by far the larger part goes to Universities. Between them and the individual recipients of aid, the Academies occupy an intermediate position. In the United Kingdom, the Royal Society and the British Academy are recipients of substantial government grants. They must render an account of their spending; but the British government entrusts to them unfettered academic responsibility. Until recently the Commonwealth government has followed the same code of conduct in its dealings with the Australian Academies. Not until they combined their forces in the Botany Bay Project did it advance a claim to 'programme', 'overview' and 'approve' an academic task. That experience suggests the need for a clearer understanding of the reciprocal rights and duties.

### (3) The Custodians of Research Material

Now we come to the most crucial problem: how best to reconcile the rights and duties of the academic workers with those of the persons or institutions who hold custody of documentary and other evidence which must be used if the tasks of research, writing and publication are to be performed competently and honestly. Here I can bear witness on the basis of a wide-ranging experience, for I have used materials made available to me by two formidable families, by a large multinational corporation, by the Department of Lands in New South Wales and by the United Kingdom government. To take first the last-named experience: as planner and editor of the "civil series" of British official histories of World War II I had to teach myself how best the academic and the political animals can learn to live together. That knowledge does not always come easily. Tension must sooner or later arise between the two duties of an official historian—his professional duty as the member of an honourable guild and his civic duty as a member (whether full-time or part-time) of the public service. Tension may also arise within the mind of a senior administrator: he claims no right of censorship, but histories which are inaccurate or which may endanger the national security must not be sent to press. In my experience, these tensions are resolved by frankness on both sides and a precise definition of the reciprocal rights and duties. The gist of the definition is this: the historians accept such limitations as the editor, on his own behalf and theirs, states publicly: within these limitations they write history according to the recognised standards of their profession.<sup>6</sup>

In his preface to Report No. 1 of the Botany Bay Project, the editor expressed regret that he and his colleagues had been debarred from exposing their drafts to official criticism. When the promise of cooperation with the Project was suddenly and totally repudiated, I was taken by surprise, for I had recently enjoyed a relationship of mutual respect and understanding with a Department of the State government. The Hon. T.L. Lewis M.L.A., when he was Minister of Lands, had given me unrestricted access both to the departmental records in Sydney and to the records of the Kosciusko National Park. When I suggested that he should read and criticise my draft chapters before I revised them for publication he replied that history was my job, not his. To our mutual profit and enjoyment our talk was usually about the problems of Park management, the proposals for zoning, or the smokey chimney in the Tin Hut on the route of the langlauf from Kiandra to Kosciusko.

Looking back, we can see two explanations of the very different experience of Professor Butlin and his colleagues. One explanation—passionate conflict between Canberra and Sydney—has already been sufficiently considered; the other requires some observations on the structure of government in New South Wales. My research-task had been straightforward because I was dealing with only one departmental Minister and his officials. Professor Butlin, by contrast, had to look for firm ground in a bureaucratic morass. The following list of the authorities which have a finger in the pie of the State's environmental policy reveals an administrative fragmentation which makes it almost impossible for any authority to take the true measure even of its own task, let alone the intermingling tasks of its near neighbours.

<u>The Authority</u>	<u>Date of Establishment</u>	<u>Area of Operations</u>
Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board	1888	Sydney and Wollongong
Maritime Services Board	1936	The waterfronts of all ports
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority	1971	Sydney and its expanding suburban area
State Pollution Control Commission	1971	The State
Health Commission of N.S.W.	1973	The State
N.S.W. Planning and Environment Commission	1974	The State

This tabulated information understates the complexities: for example, it makes no mention of the Local Authorities. Nevertheless it does put the spotlight on one salient fact. No single channel of information and advice exists which would enable the State government to gather together the bits and pieces of technological detail and translate them into a coherent policy appropriate to the economic, environmental and social needs of the community.

In illustration of the administrative and intellectual muddle, let us recall that the jurisdiction of the Maritime Services Board ends at high-water mark and therefore denies the indissoluble unity between port capacity and inland transport. However, we shall never fully understand the muddle until we explore its historical origins. Dr Dan Coward is at work on the concluding volume of the Botany Bay Project—a work of basic research, which is entitled Sydney's Environmental Policy 1850-1970. Here is a selective preview of the story which his book will tell. Technological solutions for social problems have been sought piecemeal as the problems began to be troublesome; but the demographic and economic growth of the metropolis very soon turned each solution into a new problem which was at least as troublesome as its predecessor had been. The accumulation of human excreta and the problem of their 'disposal'—a word of ill omen—is a case in point. In 1851 the metropolitan population was only 53,900, living within an area of about 9 square miles; but it was already suffering many discomforts and also—everybody then believed—hazards to health from the noisome privies and cesspits. Sewers were built during the 1850s to 'dispose' of the excreta; but they soon ran into unexpected difficulties. They discharged at several outlets into Sydney Cove, Darling Harbour and other parts of Port Jackson. Tons of silt scoured from Sydney's unpaved streets threatened the working of the port. Dredges were kept constantly at work. Moreover, in the absence of tides and currents to remove the excreta, accumulations of sewage built up along the waterfront. The place stank abominably. As before, these stinks kept alive the fear of disease. In 1877 a solution was sought and eventually adopted: to

build a main sewer to Bondi and let the Pacific Ocean 'dispose' of Sydney's human excreta. In the following decades a further solution was sought by installing water-borne sewers which would carry the excreta to the ocean or to empty land—after all, there seemed to be plenty of both. But by 1881 the population of the city and its suburbs had grown to 225,000 and had spread to nearly 49 square miles. By 1971 the population had grown to 2,700,000 and had spread to 1,573 square miles. The problem of disposal had not been solved. It had become a headache.

Human excreta are not the only wastes which are potentially pollutants: they are one of a family which includes the wastes of factories, mines, oil-refineries, motor vehicles, aeroplanes, ships—the list could be made much longer. Sydney is not the only city which is suffering the headache; every city suffers it. And in every city a search—sometimes purposive and intelligent, but in very poor countries only a fumble—is being made for remedies. In the course of this search the emphasis is shifting from the output and 'disposal' of pollutants to their input and—in consequence—to their prevention or mitigation at source. Report No. 2 of the Botany Bay Project is entitled Factory Waste Potential in Sydney. By taking for concentrated study one sector only of the pollutant complex, it spotlights the present inadequacies of statistical record and other research-data which must be made good before any conclusions and recommendations can be more than 'preliminary'. Nevertheless the Preface to the Report contains the following statement: 'The work of the Botany Bay Project in this area appears to demonstrate that environmentally relevant measures that are highly significant for policy purposes could be generated at relatively small cost'.

Let us cling to the hope that the misunderstandings and conflicts which nearly wrecked the Botany Bay Project will be forgotten. Ministers and officials in New South Wales may discover in the Project's publications new instruments of thought and action. And may not the time be ripe for the academic and political animals to renew their attempt at learning to live together? My thought returns once more to the Cabinet Office in London. Throughout the war and for some years afterwards a creative partnership existed between permanent civil servants and academic persons on short term loan to the government. The gains were reciprocal: for ministers and officials, an increment of disciplined thought; for the dons, an enlarged understanding of government as 'the art of the possible'. Since then, massive reorganisations have been made in the governmental structure, but the flow of intellectual traffic still remains vigorous between the academic and the administrative professionals.

Is a comparable partnership conceivable in the government of New South Wales and in other Australian governments?

#### **Note on Sources**

A full record of the meetings, negotiations and correspondence referred to in the text is contained in the files of the Academies and of the committees which successively managed the Botany Bay Project. I have had no access to the relevant records of the Commonwealth and State governments.

## VI

# Millennial Perspectives

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### 1. Rome, Caput Mundi and Italian Capital\*

I feel it an honour, but also an ordeal, to deliver this address commemorating the centenary of Italian unity. I love Italian history; but for a generation past I have loved it from a distance. If only I had been able to revisit Italy this commemorative year! In the bookshops, the seminar rooms, the lecture theatres, I should have discovered the Risorgimento coming exuberantly to life around me.

Even across these thousands of miles of distance, clamorous echoes reach me or ardent affirmations and urgent controversies. Scholars and publicists are contending with each other about the time span of the Risorgimento. How shall we define it as an historical period? When did it begin? When did it end? The second question is debated more fiercely than the first because of its living and immediate significance in contemporary politics. In a series of recent articles in *Civiltà Cattolica*, Salvatore Lener has argued that the Risorgimento must be conceived as a 'processo giuridico-storico' which reached its end, if not on 11 February 1929, the date of the Lateran Pacts, then on 1 January 1948, the date of the Constitution of the Republic of Italy.<sup>1</sup> Why? Because the essential condition of true Italian unity, as Lener sees it, was the establishment of an order in which Italians would be able to reconcile their obligations as citizens with their obligations as Catholics. This, the end to which the Risorgimento strove

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Address delivered to the Dante Alighieri Society, Canberra, on 5 September 1961, and to the Istituto Italiano di Cultura, Melbourne, on 15 November 1961. Twenty years later, I ask myself whether I have quoted Italian authors at excessive length; but almost all my listeners were readers, and many were speakers of Italian (5 September 1981).

1

See, e.g. '1861-1961: dall'unificazione territoriale all'unità del popolo', in *Civiltà Cattolica*, 15 June 1961.

and by which it must be defined, was achieved by the Lateran Pacts and their embodiment, eighteen years later, in the republican Constitution.

But was this really the end for which the Risorgimento strove? Mazzini, to mention just one of its heroes, would never have admitted it. Mazzini has no place at all in the Risorgimento as Lener defines it; but Mussolini, negotiator of the Lateran Pacts, has a place in the front rank. Such a conclusion must appear intolerable to the men of the Resistance, who in the name of the Risorgimento fought against Fascism. It must appear intolerable to that mixed array of socialists, liberals, and anti-clericals who acclaim the Risorgimento as la rivoluzione da completare—the national struggle which still goes on, and will go on until it has achieved its full programme of social justice.

Both these conceptions of the Risorgimento dissatisfy me. The clerical one distorts the Risorgimento as a process; the anti-clerical one destroys it as a period. As a working historian, I believe that I can save myself much confusion and waste of words by accepting the traditional definition, in which process and period agree with each other. The Risorgimento, as Cavour understood it, fulfilled itself in 1861, when the Italians achieved their national state, and in 1870, when they fixed the capital of their state in Rome.

By taking my stand on this issue with Cavour, I cut myself free from one of the controversies of this centennial year; but I find myself immediately and deeply involved in a second controversy, the perennial and passionate dispute between filoromanesimo and antiromanesimo.<sup>2</sup> My attempt to identify the main points in the dispute will take the whole of this lecture. Let me, to begin with, report the arguments of a violent anti-Romanist of these days, Giuseppe Prezzolini.<sup>3</sup> In blunt, not to say brutal terms, he raises the question: L'Idea Perenne di Roma—Ispirazione o Maledizione per l'Italia? His answer is uncompromising: throughout all the centuries of Italian history, he declares, the memory of Rome has been a curse.

Dal Petrarca al Mazzini, Roma ha servito sempre come punto di riferimento per la critica, per i confronti, per le speranze, per le nostalgie e specialmente per consolare gli Italiani. 'Cio che noi non abbiamo compiuto, lo hanno fatto i Romani. Noi siamo servi, ma i nostri antenati furono padroni del mondo!' Con questo concetto del passato a loro conforto, gli Italiani cercarono di sfuggire ai problemi del presente.<sup>4</sup>

In a series of staccato propositions, Prezzolini tries to destroy the illusion of continuity between ancient Rome and modern Italy. In biological descent, the Italians are no closer to the Romans than the French or the Spaniards are. In linguistic derivation, Italian is no closer to Latin than French and Spanish are. In civilisation and culture, the Italians are at the opposite pole from the Romans: they are artists, whereas the Romans were not; they are anarchists, whereas the Romans were law-makers; they are a disunited, unmilitary people,

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Luigi Salvatorelli, Unita d'Italia: saggi storici (Torio, 1961).

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L'Italia Finisce: ecco quel che resta (Firenze, 1959). This is a translation by the author of his Legacy of Italy, written ten years earlier for American readers.

4

Op. cit., p. 10.



whereas the Romans unified as much of the world as they could conquer. What then remains, asks Prezzolini, of Italy's continuity with Rome? Only rhetoric.

Let us admit the rhetoric. The Risorgimento was soaked with it. In 1842, Gioberti acclaimed Italy as the saviour nation, the eldest born of the peoples, the moral and spiritual centre of the world—Italy and Rome together, interpenetrating each other and destined to re-enact in the approaching time their ancient, sacred drama of world redemption. This was, precisely, the same drama of Rome-Italy as Mazzini envisaged, except that Mazzini chose for his protagonist not the Pope, but the People.

Yonder, [he wrote in 1859] like a lighthouse in the immensity of the ocean, there rises a sign of distant greatness. Bend your knee and worship: there, in eternal dignity, stands Rome. That salient point upon the horizon is the Capitol of the Christian world. And a few steps from it stands the Capitol of the pagan world. These two adjacent worlds await a third, greater and more sublime than they, which will arise from among their ruins. This is the Holy Trinity of History, and their word is Rome ... Although many cities have perished, and all in turn may pass from this earth, Rome, by design of Providence and as the People have divined, is the Eternal City, to which is entrusted the mission of disseminating the Word that will unite the world. Her life will be reproduced on an ever widening scale. And just as, to the Rome of the Caesars, there succeeded the Rome of the Popes, which united Europe and America in the realm of the spirit, so Rome of the People will succeed them both, to unite, in a faith that will make Thought and Action one, Europe, America and every part of the terrestrial globe....<sup>5</sup>

Yes: rhetoric and filoromanesimo (in one variant or another) were dominant throughout the Risorgimento. Still, a note of sceptical antiromanesimo sometimes made itself heard, particularly in Tuscany. G.B. Niccolini, the uncrowned king of the Tuscan theatre, poured scorn upon the Giobertian gospel and upon those credulous enthusiasts who acclaimed Pio Nono as its embodiment. In 1847, when the neo-Guelf propaganda was at its height, Niccolini shut himself up in his villa in a rage: either all the world is mad, he said, or I am mad; and in contemplating this dilemma he made himself ill.<sup>6</sup> Ferdinando Ranalli, a true Italian patriot, but one who had developed to an extraordinary degree the Tuscan spirit of contradiction, could not endure filoromanesimo, in its Giobertian, or its Mazzinian, or in any other of its manifestations: in 1870, when all the world was crying Roma! Roma! he told himself that, if he had it in him to become a conspirator for anything, he would become a conspirator for the abolition of capital cities. What a superb explosion of antiromanesimo this is! But what a muddle! Ranalli, who had begun by attacking the rhetoricians, now finds himself at war with that superb realist, Cavour.

The slogans of filoromanesimo and antiromanesimo, we begin to see, are a vehicle of heat, not of light. As historians, we can make no serious use of them until we have identified the various and contradictory ideas which are hidden within them. Rome-Italy is not a single concept, but a cluster of concepts, each of which has had its own distinct history.

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Quoted by G. Salvemini, Mazzini, translated by I.M. Rawson (London, 1956), pp. 83-4.

6

A. Vannucci (ed.), Ricordi della vita e delle opere di G.B. Niccolini (Firenze, 1866), vol. 1, p. 74.

This history, even in its twentieth-century expressions, has deep medieval roots. Moreover, the medieval people looked back to classical times. This, Prezzolini says, was very foolish of them. Still, they did it. Prezzolini acclaims the medieval communes as the only original political creation of the Italian people. But did the men of the communes see themselves as innovators? No: they believed themselves to be doing Roman work. Giovanni Villani declares that it was his visit to Rome in the Jubilee year of 1300 which inspired him to begin his *Chronicles of Florence*. He tells how Florence became a special foundation of Rome; how she became the 'little Rome', built from the ruins of rebellious Fiesole. Florence, the always-faithful city, deserves the names *Caesarea* and *Augusta* conferred upon her by Imperial Rome. Even this is too little of the Roman glory which Villani craves. In his mythology, Fiesole is the mother, not only of Florence, but of Troy. And Troy is the mother of Rome. What splendour of kinship! Dante has enshrined it in the fifteenth canto of the *Purgatorio*, where he pictures a Florentine woman at her spinning wheel, musing upon the Trojans of Fiesole and of Rome:

Favoleggiava con la sua famiglia  
De' Troiani di Fiesole e di Roma.

Villani, like the chroniclers of other Italian cities, has gathered up the legends woven by his fellow-citizens to satisfy their pride of descent. Everything great must come from Rome. We encounter the same pride in Villani's contemporary, Dante. In the first book of the *Convivio*, Dante calls Florence 'the fairest and most renowned daughter of Rome'. He, the Florentine poet, chooses a Roman poet as his guide through the dread realms of Hell and Purgatory.

Classical historians have emphasised the appropriateness of this choice. To Virgil, as J.W. Mackail pointed out fifty years ago, *Italus* and *Romanus* were interchangeable terms. Virgil's ideal was 'the inter-substantiation of Rome and Italy—the creation of a Roman Italy which should also be an Italian Rome'. Indeed, this was not merely an ideal; it had already become a fact. Following the Social War of 91–87 B.C., Roman citizenship had been extended to all the cities of Italy. Because of this event, Virgil belonged to two *patriae*—to Mantua, the city of his birth; to Rome, the *communis patria* of his citizenship.<sup>7</sup> Virgil cannot, of course, be called an Italian nationalist, but he can truly be called an Italian patriot. No poetry, ancient or modern, has ever excelled those passages of the *Georgics* which express his love for the land of Italy—her cities and towns, her mountains and rivers and lakes, her fields and their harvests of fruits and men—

Salve, magna parens frugum, Saturnia tellus,  
Magna virum.

It meant everything to Virgil that these men of Italy, in virtue of their citizenship, had become sharers in the Roman task of subduing the strong and sparing the weak—a task, be it emphasised, not of a national state, but of a city grown to the dimensions of universal empire.

In his linked conceptions of Italy as a country and Rome as an empire, Dante, as we shall soon see, echoes the historical Virgil. He also echoes an imaginary Virgil, who belongs, not to history, but to Christian mythology.

Iam redit et virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna,  
Iam nova progenies caelo demittitur alto.

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See Edward T. Salmon, *The End of Roman Imperialism* (Australian Humanities Research Council, Occasional Paper No. 4, 1961).

These lines of the Fourth Eclogue, put by Virgil into the mouth of the Sybil of Cumae, were accepted by medieval Christians as a prophecy of the birth of Christ under the dominion of Augustus Caesar—an event which sanctified both the poetry of Virgil and the imperial rule of Rome. As Dante sees it, this event gives Rome her title deeds as *Caput Mundi*. In the third book of *De Monarchia*, he passes in review the signs and miracles, recorded by Virgil and Livy, which show that God was preparing Rome for her part in the great drama of universal redemption. 'If the Roman Empire did not exist by right', he concludes, 'Christ in being born presupposed and sanctioned an unjust thing'.

Dante assumes an unbroken continuity between the Roman and the Holy Roman Empires, between Augustus Caesar and the German rulers who claim his title. He assumes an unbroken continuity between Virgil's Italy and his own. I need waste no time in exposing these illusions. In historical fact, the breaches of continuity were shattering. In Dante's mind, they did not exist. My concern this evening is with Dante's mind.

Dante's Italy, with its Christian Church, its vigorous, faction-riven communes, its emerging language and culture, was far removed from Virgil's Italy; but Dante's feeling for it was very close to Virgil's. Like Virgil, he loves the land of Italy and sees it as a geographical unity, defined by its encircling mountains and waters—

il bel paese  
Ch' Appennini parte e'l mar circonda e l'Alpe.

Like Virgil, he emphasises the bonds of language which hold together all the stocks of his favoured land, 'il bel paese la dove il si suona'<sup>8</sup> or, as he expresses it in *De Vulgari Eloquentia*, the land where people affirm with the sord *Si—'si affirmando loquuntur'*. Dante hopes for the perfection of this common language; he hopes that it will become *illustre, curiale*. But is it not foolish, he asks, to aspire to a courtly Italian, when there is no Italian court—'cum curia careamus'? 'Licet curia in Italia non sit', he answers, 'membra tamen eius non desunt; curiam habemus, licet corporaliter sit dispersa'. This means, in modern language, that the peoples of Italy are culturally, if not politically, a nation. Dante calls this nation at different times Italian, Roman, Latin. He knows that it is diverse in its ethnic origins, but to him this makes no difference: Tuscans, Umbrians, and Lombards are all united in their Latinity. 'Io fui Latino', declares the Sienese Umberto.<sup>9</sup>

Dante is not a prophet of the Risorgimento. Like Virgil, he is a patriot, but not a nationalist. Like Virgil, he looks upon Italy not as a state but as the seat of empire. This is equally his teaching in the *Comedy*, the *De Monarchia*, and the Letters—especially the three great letters which acclaim the advent of Henry VII, the new husbandman who is coming to restore order and justice in 'the garden of the Empire'.

Henceforth let thy heart be joyful, O Italy! [he exclaims] who deserveth to be pitied even by the Saracens, but who straightway shall be looked upon with envy throughout the world, because thy bridegroom, the solace of the earth and the glory of thy people, the most clement Henry, Divine, Augustus, Caesar, hastens to the nuptials ...

8

Inferno XXXIII, 79.

9

E.g. Inferno XXII, 65, 97; Purgatorio XI, 58. Cf. Letter IX, to the Cardinals, where he says that 'the capital of Latium ought dutifully to be loved by all Italians, as the common source of their civility'. And in the Convivio he speaks indifferently of 'gente latina', 'romana gente', 'popolo santo'.

Rise up to meet your King, O inhabitants of Italy, reserving yourself not only for his Empire, but as a free people, for his guidance.

In case we should be tempted to interpret these passages as an outburst of Italian nationalism, let us remind ourselves that vengeance against Florence, the city which has driven him into exile, is high upon the list of Dante's plans for the Emperor's campaign. Dante loves the land of Italy; but his political thought swings between the two poles of universalità and municipalismo.

All the same, it is as an Italian that he laments the collapse of the hopes which had been so high in 1310. In Canto VI of the Purgatorio he laments the ruin of Italy in words destined to become a trumpet call to Italian warriors of a later time—

Ah! serva Italia, di dolore ostello  
nave senza nocchiero in gran tempesta,  
non donna di provincie, ma bordello!

In Canto XXX of the Paradiso, Beatrice points out to him the seat reserved for Henry VII,

ch'a drizzare Italia  
verrà in prima ch'ella sia disposta.

Italy, truly, was not ready, nor would she ever be ready for the imperial triumph of Dante's Ghibelline dream. Nor would she ever be ready for the Papal triumph of the Guelfic dream—the dream which Boniface VIII had embodied. His exorbitant claim to be supreme over princes had collapsed in 1305, when the Papacy was led captive into France. In the Papal Court at Avignon, Petrarch echoes Dante's laments for Rome, vedova e sola, bereft of both her luminaries.<sup>10</sup> Petrarch hated the climate and the situation of Avignon—'melancholy Avignon, built upon a rugged rock, on the banks of the windiest of rivers'. He found scant consolation in his pursuit of Laura (a stolid matron, it would seem) or in the sonnets that he addressed to her—'trivial verses', so he described them, 'filled with the offensive praise of women'. What did far more console him was the search for ancient manuscripts and the composition of Africa, his long epic in Latin hexameters recounting the exploits of Scipio Africanus. When he visited Rome, it was not the tombs of the saints, nor those of the Caesars which allured him, but the tomb of Scipio. Not that he repudiated Christian and Imperial Rome: but he did not, as Dante had done, give it the central place in his imagination. The Rome which most fascinated him was Pagan and republican.

On the Easter Monday of 1341, Petrarch was crowned Poet Laureate upon the Capitoline Hill. It is likely that the ceremony was witnessed by Coladi Rienzo, an innkeeper's son who cherished an ardent passion for classical and republican Rome. It is certain that Petrarch and Rienzo met each other in 1343, when Rienzo came to Avignon on a mission to inveigle the Papal court back to Rome. The two men began forthwith a famous correspondence which reached its climax in 1347. In May of that year Rienzo declared himself Tribune of the Roman People and in June Petrarch wrote him the hortatoria, a long Latin letter which ended with the promise that an Italian poem would follow it. This poem, surely, is a beautiful canzone, Spirito Gentil. In all the letters and poems, Latin and Italian, which Petrarch wrote during these months to Rienzo, the dominant feelings are love of Rome and the joyous expectation of her resurrection. Alas, he learnt before the year was out that the expectation was vain—'a glorious beginning', but nothing more.<sup>11</sup>

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Purgatorio VI, 112-13: Letter IX, to the Italian Cardinals.

Cola di Rienzo, it has been said, was a man 'whose only greatness was his dream'.<sup>12</sup> A number of historians have observed how prophetic this dream of Mazzini's Terza Roma. Rienzo, like Mazzini, was a republican, a unificationist, a universalist. As a republican, he venerated Cassius and Brutus (whom Dante has put with Judas between the crunching jaws of Lucifer) and dated his letters from the Capitoline Hill in the first year of the restoration of liberty—datum in Capitolio liberatae republicae anno primo. As a unificationist, he called upon the governments of all the Italian cities to accept from Rome the commissions for their exercise of power, and he proclaimed the extension of Roman citizenship to the Alps. As a universalist, he summoned to Rome the princes of the Empire and the Emperor himself, upon the theory that the power of appointing Emperors belonged by ancient usage and eternal right to the Roman People. Universalism is the common factor in all the theories which we have reviewed. In De Monarchia, Dante declares it a self-evident truth that nature has ordained Rome—the Rome of the Emperors—for universal sovereignty. In the Bull Unam Sanctam, Boniface VIII makes the same claim for Rome of the Popes. In his letters and proclamations, Cola di Rienzo makes it for Rome of the People.

Roma, Caput Mundi,  
Regit Orbis Frena Rotundi

Imperialists, Papalists, and Republicans were all agreed upon that. What they could not agree upon was a programme for translating their boast into fact. Each destroyed the other's programme. Each destroyed Italy's chances of achieving unity, power, and peace upon the national basis.

This, precisely, became the achievement of Italy's neighbours to the west and north. In reply to Pope Boniface VIII, Philip the Fair of France had declared: Rex est imperator in regno suo. Every king his own emperor: every kingdom sovereign upon its own soil. This declaration of independence, reiterated many times in France, England, and Spain, proclaimed the advent of a new age—the age of the sovereign, national state.

In Italy, a man who welcomed the new age most ardently was Niccolò Machiavelli. State-building was the object of all his study. I have discussed on other occasions the theoretical aspects of this study<sup>13</sup> and must confine myself this evening to the emotional impulses which drove Machiavelli to undertake it. Intellectual curiosity was one of them. But there was another and a stronger impulse, which is revealed in all his writings and is concentrated to explosion point in the passionate last chapter of The Prince. This was his Italian patriotism or—at long last we can confidently identify the new force—his Italian nationalism.

In 1508, Machiavelli had undertaken a mission to the headquarters of the Emperor Maximilian, who was then planning his descent upon Italy; but neither then nor later did he pay any serious attention either to Maximilian or to his office.

11

See M.E. Cosenza, Francesco Petrarca and the Revolution of Cola di Rienzo (University of Chicago Press, 1913), and the authorities there cited, especially G. Carducci, Rime di Francesco Petrarca sopra argomenti storici, morali e diversi (Livorno, 1876); and A. Gabrielli, Epistolario di Cola di Rienzo (Roma, 1890: Fonti per la Storia d'Italia).

12

Johan Huizinga, Men and Ideas, translated by J.S. Holmes and H. van Merle (London, 1959), p. 114.

13

Machiavelli in Modern Dress and other essays, reprinted in Politics in Pitcairn (London, 1947).

So far as he was concerned, the Roman Empire had ceased to be a factor in the politics of Italy and of Europe; it was dead. But the Roman Papacy? As a political scientist, Machiavelli knew that it was very far from being dead; as an Italian nationalist, he would have liked to kill it—to kill, that is to say, the Temporal Power, which he regarded as the root cause of foreign intervention in Italy and the main obstacle to national unity. The Roman Republic, then? Was he a champion of that? To be sure, he loved it as ardently as Cola di Rienzo had done and commented at length upon its achievements as narrated by Livy; but he had no expectation of witnessing its resurrection. Perhaps, if the Italians trained themselves as citizen soldiers, they would achieve the glories of republican citizenship—someday; but not yet. In a corrupt age, nation-building must be the work of princes.

Thus, under every head, Machiavelli rejected the universalist dream. To him, Rome was no longer Caput Mundi. He would have exulted, we may feel sure, at seeing her Italy's capital. For that, the Italians had to wait another three and a half centuries. Then they remembered Machiavelli. As Lord Acton has said: 'Machiavelli's time had come. The problems once more were his own: and in many forward and resolute minds the spirit also was his, and displayed itself in an ascending scale of praise'.<sup>14</sup> Not least in his own Tuscany. In 1859, when Ricasoli, Tuscany's 'iron baron', took charge of her destinies with the intent to fuse them in the destinies of Italy, one of his first acts was to order a new and complete edition of Machiavelli's works. The same Ricasoli exclaimed, a few years later, when he was Cavour's successor as Italian Prime Minister, 'Italy without Rome is nothing'.<sup>15</sup>

It will be worth our while to spend a few minutes inquiring how this opinion had come to be held almost unanimously by Italian patriots. If we had been living in the years of disillusionment after Quarantotto, to what ideas of the Italian past would we have turned for inspiration and hope? The Ghibelline idea? Three generations later, Mussolini appealed in many speeches to Rome's imperial tradition; but the appeal possessed no substance—vox et praeterea nihil; in 1806, Napoleon had rubbed off the map of Europe even the name of the Roman Empire. The Guelf idea? As we saw earlier, it had returned to life during the 1840s in the propaganda of Gioberti, who urged the Italians to seek national independence and European primacy under Papal leadership; but this shining idea became irretrievably tarnished (even for Gioberti himself) on 29 April 1848, when Pius IX published an Allocation exposing the incompatibility between his duty towards the whole family of Christian nations and the demands made upon him by Italian nationalists. The republican idea? In 1849, Mazzini, Garibaldi, and other brave men had fought for it gloriously in Rome. But they had failed. To Mazzini, that made no difference; he still proclaimed the approaching triumph of the Divine People and the advent of Terza Roma. But when? How? Mazzini could give no answer. Garibaldi demanded realistic action in the here and now. He achieved it—although it was a close call—within the framework of Cavour's political ideas.

Italy, then, became a united nation under the banner of the House of Savoy and upon the basis of the Piedmontese Constitution of 1849. This happened one hundred years ago. But the work of nation-building was not yet complete. The great architect of national unity, Cavour, declared in the first Italian Parliament that Italy would not be fully a nation until she had established her capital in Rome.

14

Arthur Burd (ed.), Il Principe by Niccolò Machiavelli (Clarendon Press, 1891). Introduction by Lord Acton, p. xxxiv.

15

W.K. Hancock, Ricasoli and the Risorgimento in Tuscany (London, 1926) p. 292.

In his famous speech of March 1861 he quoted some sentences from the message which the Italian Government had in mind to send to the Pope:

Holy Father, for you the possession of temporal power is no longer a guarantee for independence. Renounce it, and we will give you that freedom which you have sought in vain for three centuries from all the great Catholic Powers ... we come to offer you in full measure something that you have never been able to obtain from those Powers which boasted that they were your allies and your devoted children. We are ready to proclaim throughout Italy this great principle: 'A Free Church in a Free State'.<sup>16</sup>

These words announce a theme too complicated and too controversial for me to enter upon tonight. Let me simply record the fact that Cavour's policy reached its climax nine years after his death—in 1870, when Italy achieved Rome as her capital.

How great was this achievement? Viewed in the long history of Rome's universalist pretensions, it may appear trivial. For Caput Mundi, national status is not promotion; it is demotion. But was Rome ever Caput Mundi in strict fact? Certainly she was once the political centre of a great civilisation. So, contemporaneously, was the imperial court of China. Each of these civilisations liked to think of itself as co-terminous with the world. To the student of comparative civilisation, each of them appears the victim of egocentric self-deception.

To the student of Christian history, Caput Mundi may still appear an appropriate title for Rome, seeing that she remains to this day the centre of a world-wide Church which no territorial frontiers contain. For this very reason, one is surprised that the Church should have wanted so much to remain also an Italian State—one of many—with territorial frontiers of its own. I leave it to others to argue this paradox in terms of theory. Looking back upon the violent times through which my generation has lived, I think it fortunate for the Church that she has not been hampered in her spiritual mission by the need to deploy diplomacy and force for the defence of her Temporal Power. Upon this issue I take my stand with Cavour.

The Risorgimento, as I see it, rendered a great service to the Church Universal. But that was not the immediate purpose of its leaders. They saw themselves as the makers of Italy, the nation and the state. In the long perspective of Italian history, what does their national work add up to? Let me quote again, as I did at the beginning of this lecture, from that self-styled enemy of rhetoric, Giuseppe Prezzolini:

L'Italia del Risorgimento, la parentesi unitaria di questo disunito paese, appare finita. Ma l'Italia universale—quella che importa di più—continua ad occupar e preoccupar le nostre menti per opera dei singoli individui italiani, sempre mirabili nel cavarsi d'imbarazzo e nel corregger le situazioni penose e gravose nelle quali i loro capitani li conducono.<sup>17</sup>

In these words, Prezzolini reveals himself to be as incorrigibly universalist as any of the Romanising rhetoricians whom he castigates. Italian history, as he understands it, contains far more grandeur than the Italian state can absorb. In

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See A.C. Jemolo, Church and State in Italy, 1850-1950, translated by David Moore (Oxford, 1960), p. 23. Cavour's statement had been in large measure anticipated the previous year by Ricasoli (Hancock, op. cit., p. 286).

17

L'Italia Finisce: ecco quel che resta, pp. xii-xiii.

this millennial story, the Risorgimento is only a fleeting episode; Italia Una only a brief parenthesis.

There is something to be said for Prezzolini. Whether he knows it or not, he is a disciple of Toynbee. He has discovered 'his intelligible field of study', not in any state, but in the civilisation which is common to all the states of Western Europe. He looks forward to the day when these states will surrender their separate identities to constitute themselves the United States of Europe. If that day comes soon, the achievement of the Risorgimento will have endured for little more than one century. So Prezzolini says. It is a pity to see him missing an additional point which he might have found ironically appropriate: namely, that the new super-state of Europe, when it is achieved, will have as its foundation-stone the Treaty of Rome. Of Rome!

But will there be a new super-state of Europe? Surely it is far too soon to predict the precise form which the move for European unity will take. Many alternative forms may be imagined. The choice will be with the national states themselves. It is they who must make the plans for establishing upon firmer ground their life together as a family of nations. I cannot envisage them making plans with the intent to drain all meaning from their distinctive national histories.

Be this as it may, the achievements of a nation are not to be measured merely by their duration of time. They possess intrinsic quality. I once followed from day to day the struggle of the Tuscans, in the critical years 1859-1860, to give themselves to Italy. At that time, my mood was sceptical. Rhetoric displeased me then just as much as it now displeases Giuseppe Prezzolini. All the same, I concluded my study with the conviction that the Risorgimento constitutes one of the noblest chapters in the history of modern Europe.



## 2. Jews and Christians\*

Permit me to start with two statements in the first person singular. One short sentence will sufficiently explain my commitment as a human individual. At Matins in my parish church I join in the General Confession.

My commitment as a historian requires a longer explanation. Throughout the past half century the issues of peace and war have been a main objective of my research and teaching. In the aftermath of World War I, I put defeated Germany first on the list of my proposed European explorations. So in my first long vacation at Oxford I set out with a Jewish friend for Jena, the site of a famous Napoleonic victory. We arrived when the German people were plunging into a fearful abyss of monetary inflation. The causes of that disaster, I now know, were complicated; but in 1922 I put the entire blame on the reparations chapter of the Treaty of Versailles.

In 1930, when I was on leave for 12 months from the University of Adelaide, I spent nearly half that time in the charming town of Marburg, a centre of the theological exposition, historical research and political conservatism. Once again, my arrival coincided with the onset of a crisis: grinding deflation, mass unemployment, the death-rattles of Weimar democracy. In the election campaign of August and September I listened night after night to the candidates of more than half a dozen parties, thereby furthering both my linguistic and my political education. I listened with particular attention and with deep foreboding to the Nazi orators. In late September, when I left Germany, I had in my suitcase not only Meinecke's great book on Staatsräson, but also Hitler's Mein Kampf. Moreover, I had in my briefcase that day's edition of Streicher's anti-Semitic newspaper, Der Stürmer. It had been my intention to show it to my friends, as a warning of things to come if the Nazis achieved power in the Reich; but on the Channel steamer I became ashamed of having in my possession a rag so sadistic and so obscene. I threw it overboard.

In March 1934 I made my third visit to Germany. I set out, this time, from Birmingham; but my destination once again was Marburg. There I found lodgment in a tavern much frequented by young men of the Sturmabteilung (S.A.), Hitler's brown-shirted stormtroopers. Many of them were starry-eyed dreamers who trusted their Leader not only to restore to Germany her power and prestige in Europe and throughout the world, but also to establish at home a new social order of true freedom and equality—for everybody, except the Jews. Night after night those young men bombarded me with the words which I had read that same morning in Der Stürmer. The time came at last when I would no longer listen. 'I am a Jew', I told them. 'General Monash is a Jew and he defeated your best generals. In Australia we are all Jews. We are the lost ten tribes of Israel.' In the crazy argument which followed I called to witness the Egyptian pyramids.

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I have been at work on this study throughout the past three years. The present interim report took shape on 21 October, 1981, as the Hobson Lecture of St. Mark's Institute of Theology, Canberra.

Next morning I left Germany, never to return. It was the end of March, 1934. In June that same year Hitler destroyed the left-wing leaders of the S.A. and power began at once to shift from the brown shirts to the black shirts, the totally submissive and totally ruthless Schutzstaffel (S.S.). In August, Hitler achieved power as Chancellor and Führer of the German Reich and People, and as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

Back among the free and gentle British people, I studied Mein Kampf and listened to every speech of Hitler's which the B.B.C. relayed from Germany. The speech most relevant to my present inquiry is the one he made to the Party Rally at Nuremberg in September 1935. When the Rally was over he summoned the Reichstag to Nuremberg and secured its unanimous assent to the infamous Nuremberg Laws. Those laws will be my starting point when I have written just one more paragraph of these preparatory explanations.

When the Nazi New Order collapsed in ruin I had no interest at all, either professional or personal, in the story of its rise, decline and fall. I read none of the documents which were shedding new light on its doings and misdoings. I read none of the articles and books which the specialists in this sombre field of historical research were publishing. I took it for granted that my concern as a student and teacher of history was far removed from all that. But today it is very much my concern. The sign of the swastika is stamped once again on pamphlets and books—written and published in America and England, not in Germany—which are spreading the news that the Nazis murdered no Jews but were themselves the innocent victims of a 'frame-up'. As a citizen, I feel some concern with this evil propaganda, the more so as university libraries in my country are now accepting samples of it as a free gift; but as an historian I cannot take it seriously. However, I must pay close and critical attention to the documentary explorations of Mr David Irving. In his latest book, The War Path: Hitler's Germany 1933-39 (London 1978) he emphasises the monstrous evil of the mass-murders; but absolves Hitler from any share of guilt. Both in his preface, and on pp. 159-170 of his text, he seeks to prove his point by telling the story of 'the night of the broken glass'—a story of arson, looting, rape and murder which gangs of Nazis perpetrated on 9 November 1938. It was Goebbels, Mr Irving argues, who had let that horror loose, in the mistaken belief that it would please the Führer. On the very next morning, however, express orders were issued, 'at the highest level of all', that there must be 'no more arson or the like, whatever, under any circumstances'. Mr Irving prints a photostat copy of that order, in the naive belief that it contains sufficient proof of Hitler's innocence. Is it sufficient? Goebbels remained high in Hitler's favour. No Nazi gangster was punished. The Jewish community was condemned to pay a crippling fine of a thousand million marks. Finally, on 24 January 1939, a Central Emigration Office was established, with Heydrich as its head, to organise the deportation of Jews from Germany. Here began the hideous road to Auschwitz.

Mr Irving has discovered no document which would prove Hitler's complicity in, or even his knowledge of, the atrocious happenings in Auschwitz and the other camps. To this I could reply that every word about the Jews which Hitler wrote or spoke, from the early chapters of Mein Kampf to the last sentence of the Political Testament, pointed to murder as the near-inevitable consequence.

'The Jewish Problem', as Hitler expounded it, had two prongs, one external, the other internal.

1. There was 'the conspiracy of World Jewry'—a hydra-headed monster of financial, propagandist and political power—to attack and destroy the German Reich.
2. There was the internal corruption of 'subhuman Jewry', contaminating the pure 'Aryan' blood of the German Folk.

The first threat was met by making Germany the predominant military power in Europe—an achievement which took four years. The second threat was met by the Nuremberg Laws, which established two classes of inhabitants on German soil: the Reichburger, who must be of pure Aryan blood, and the Staatsangehöriger, a person of contaminated blood who for this reason could be no more than a subject, never a citizen of the Reich. This classification was given sharp point in 'the law for the protection of German blood and honour', which made it a criminal offence for a citizen and a non-citizen to marry. In Hitler's Table Talk, 1941-1943, there is the record of a debating point which Hitler said that he had made against two bishops who ventured to criticise these laws. He told them that he was merely putting into effect what Christianity had preached and practised for the past two thousand years.

In the Table Talk there is a mine of evidence to prove that Christianity was a close-runner-up to Judaism as the object of Hitler's hatred. The ancient world, he asserted, was pure and serene because it knew nothing of those two great scourges, the pox and Christianity. Christianity was the invention of sick brains. Christ was an Aryan; but the damned parsons had distorted his teaching. He, Adolf Hitler, would shoot the lot of those filthy reptiles if they became a 'danger to the Reich'. And so on ad nauseam. Hitler was rather more restrained in his public utterances than he was in his private conversation; but if those two bishops had read Mein Kampf and had listened to Hitler's broadcast speeches they must have screwed up their courage before they dared to challenge him. They made no response to the challenge which Hitler flung back at them.

Who did respond? Jehovah's Witnesses—the men, the women and the children—resisted Hitler and paid the price of their courage in the concentration camps; but Jehovah's Witnesses do not call themselves Christians. What response was made by the Christian Churches? In the Catholic Church, Bishop Preysing of Berlin fearlessly denounced the so-called euthanasia killings; but he received little if any support from the Vatican. The Catholic Church, by and large, walked warily with the Nazis. The majority of Protestant pastors walked with the Nazis willingly—so long as the going was good. These people—the German Christians, as they called themselves—achieved a decisive victory in the Church elections of 1933. It was their purpose to expunge from the Bible everything that was Jewish or 'servile'. Hitler, they asserted, was completing Martin Luther's Reformation.

Yet there was a minority of German Protestants who did not bow their knees to Baal. Karl Barth inspired them, Martin Niemöller led them into action. In 1933 he organised the Pastors' Emergency League. In 1934 these pastors held their first Synod at Barmen. There they issued a Declaration affirming the Revelation of God in Jesus Christ and repudiating any subordinate revelation, either in nature or in history. They called themselves The Confessing Church. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, whose Letters and Papers from Prison are a classic of Christian witness, is their most famous martyr. Hanns Lilje prepared himself for martyrdom while Hitler was preparing himself for suicide. Men such as these were the redeemers of Germany.

### Faith and Fratricide<sup>1</sup>

Let me take one last look at that brutal, up-and-coming Hitler who told those gentle bishops that he was merely putting into effect what the Christian Church had been preaching and practising for the past two thousand years. Had he been sufficiently acquainted with Holy scripture and the writings of the Christian

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Cf. Rosemary Reuther, Faith and Fratricide: The Historical Roots of Anti-Semitism (New York, 1974).

Fathers, he could have barbed his taunt with some apt quotations. The widening rift between the Church and the Synagogue is spotlighted in Chapters 6 and 7 of the Acts of the Apostles. The deacon Stephen, we there read, had been preaching sermons which so infuriated 'certain Jews' that they 'caught him and brought him to the Council'. There he was called upon to answer a charge of blasphemy; but in a harangue of inordinate length he flayed not only his accusers and judges but also their ancestors from the beginning of recorded history up to the present time.

Ch.VII,V.51 Ye stiffnecked and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost: as your fathers did, so do ye.

.52 Which of the prophets have not your fathers persecuted? and they have slain them which shewed before the coming of the Just One, of whom ye have been now the slayers and the murderers.

Stephen's tirade needs to be studied in its historical context. Jewish society, as portrayed both by Josephus and by scholars of our own time, was riven by bitterly contending factions. The Council which Stephen harangued was dominated by a priestly establishment which included the unpopular Sadducees. Moreover, it was an instrument of Roman rule. Stephen was at war with this sinister combination, not with the Jewish people.

He was himself a Jew. Jesus, his 'Just One', was a Jew. Stephen's speech, nevertheless, has remained for eighteen centuries a quarry of argument for those fanatical Christians who put upon the Jews sole responsibility for killing the Messiah, the Christ. They searched the Jewish scriptures to prove that the Jews are no longer God's chosen people, but his rebellious and rejected people. Here indeed are the historical roots of anti-Semitism.

From Stephen's testimony let us now leap forward two centuries to the testimony of St. John Chrysostom. Almost every acre of this spacious territory has been dug and cross-dug by the specialists of a dozen or more disciplines; but the distance must here be bridged in a few paragraphs. Ever since the Babylonian Captivity of the 6th century B.C., to go no further back in time, Jewry had survived in two segments: Jews of the Temple in the land which the Romans called Palestine; Jews of the Dispersion, far flung not only in the Roman Empire but also beyond its boundaries. For Jews of the Temple the first century of the Christian era was calamitous: in A.D. 70 the Romans destroyed the Temple and with it the priesthood; in A.D. 135 they destroyed Jerusalem and established in its place Aelia Capitolina, a Roman city. Nevertheless Jewry not only survived but made an astonishing recovery. The synagogues and the rabbis served and saved the Jewish faith and the Jewish people. In Galilee and in Mesopotamia dedicated scholars, continuing studies which were already well advanced, created the Mishnah and the Talmud. Patriarchs inherited the administrative and diplomatic functions which the priests had formerly performed. Jewry, no longer mutinous, found itself for some time not only a tolerated, but in some degree a privileged community within the Roman Empire.

Christianity, by contrast, found no way of accommodation with Rome's pagan gods and her deified Emperor. From the reign of Diocletian onwards, Christians suffered intermittent but savage persecutions. Despite them, or perhaps because of them, the church outmatched the synagogue in the field of missionary endeavour. Half-way through the first century A.D. Paul had begun to tramp the Roman roads and to proclaim in every city the crucified and risen Christ. He called himself a Jew of the Jews, and he did not 'turn to the Gentiles' until he was driven from the synagogues. Even then, his mood could be compassionate and conciliatory when he contemplated the Jews.

God brought upon them a numbness of spirit: he gave them blind eyes and deaf ears, and so it is still....I now ask did their failure mean complete downfall? Far from it! Because they offended, salvation has come to the Gentiles, to stir Israel to emulation.<sup>2</sup>

But that was not the mood and message of St John Chrysostom, when he delivered his 'homilies against the Jews' in the last decade of the fourth century A.D. Early in that century the Christian Church had achieved partnership in power throughout the territories of Roman Rule.

From henceforth the contemptuous toleration which the Roman government had hitherto shown towards Judaism changed slowly but steadily, culminating in drastic penal laws.<sup>3</sup>

Chrysostom was a devout Christian and an eloquent preacher. A later generation of Christians called him 'golden tongued'. "Saint Chrysostom's Prayer", the concluding prayer of Matins and Evensong, is still repeated in Anglican Churches.<sup>4</sup> In the closing years of the 4th century A.D. he was appointed Patriarch of Constantinople, the New Rome inaugurated in A.D. 330 by the Emperor Constantine. Before that he had served as a priest in Antioch and it was there that he delivered his 'homilies against the Jews', which will now be selectively quoted.

#### The First Homily

If someone killed your son, could you stand the sight of him or the sound of his greeting? Wouldn't you try to get away from him as if he were an evil demon, as if he were the Devil himself? The Jews killed the Son of your Master....Will you so dishonour Him as to respect and cultivate his murderers, the men who crucified Him?

#### The Sixth Homily

para 1...The martyrs especially hate the Jews, for the reason they love so deeply the One who, by them, was crucified.

The Jews, Chrysostom asserts, are no longer God's chosen people. He continues his thunderous oration as if he were speaking to them face to face.

paras 2,3...It is because you shed the precious blood that there is no restoration, no mercy anymore and no defence...This is why you are being punished worse now than in the past....If this were not so, God would not have turned his back on you so completely.

In support of these assertions he argues that God had permitted the Jews to worship Him in the Temple at Jerusalem, but only there. When God through Roman action destroyed the Temple, the Jews no longer had the right to worship him

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Epistle to the Romans, ch.XI, v.8-9, 11. These verses are the climax of a sustained argument in chs.9-11.

3

A.H.M. Jones, Constantine and the Conversion of Europe (2nd ed., Oxford 1972), p. 162. Only in the provinces which followed Arius—e.g. Visigothic Spain before A.D. 586—were the penal laws relaxed.

4

Bishop Garnsey has told me that Chrysostom did not compose this prayer. It belongs to the Byzantine Liturgy.

anywhere. Their covenant with God is cancelled. They no longer have a temple; their Law is lawless; their Patriarchs and their Rabbis are fraudulent.

para 5...Don't talk to me about those 'Patriarchs' of yours, those hucksters and traders, men full of wickedness. What sort of priest can there be, pray tell, when that ancient unction is no more, nor any other ritual? These men called patriarchs among the Jews are not priests but only pretend to be such and play as if they were in the tabernacle...it is quite clear that the Jewish priest today is unordained and impure and that he is a provocation to God.

The torrent of denunciation flows on. But whom is the preacher denouncing? He is a Christian priest preaching in his own church to his own people. Too many of them are 'judaising' Christians. They have been keeping the Jewish feast days—the Jewish New Year, the Feast of Tabernacles and even the Passover, which is confused in their minds with the Christian Easter. Chrysostom is violent because he is fearful for his flock. In polyglot Antioch, it would seem, the rift between church and synagogue is not yet final.<sup>5</sup>

### The Wandering Jew

Starting at the crack of Hitler's whip, I have made a backwards leap of two thousand years to the frontiers of theological study; but I have not crossed those frontiers. On the return journey from past to present I shall now approach and may sometimes cross the frontiers of demographical study. The successive surges of Jewish migration will become my concern. So here, to begin with, is a much repeated generalisation. In all times and places, the propensity of people to seek new homes in strange lands may be explained either by the push of adversity, or by the pull of opportunity, or by some combination of both.

Jews of the Dispersion found many new homes, sometimes in lands of the Cross, sometimes in lands of the Crescent. In the seventh century A.D. a great surge of migrating Jews followed the Islamic armies westwards through the southern coastlands of the Mediterranean and northwards into Spain, a country already familiar to migrating Jews. For some centuries past a flourishing and indeed a privileged Jewish community had been settled in Egypt, and we may suppose that some of its members moved west; but the main outflow was from Mesopotamia and Syria-Palestine. If the farm lands of that region were already suffering natural and man-made erosion, that would indeed have been a powerful push. No push came from the conquering and governing Mohammedans, for they required reinforcements to their own overstrained resources of experience and skill. For these reasons, the pull of opportunity must be the main explanation of this new Jewish exodus. In Spain, the migrants found a wide field of opportunity. Jews became and remained for five centuries an indispensable component—numerical, economic, cultural—of the Arabic Caliphate. Moreover, in the small kingdoms which established themselves during the Christian reconquista, Jewish life and learning continued to flourish until the end of the fourteenth century.<sup>6</sup>

Another surge of Jewish migration, this time into northern Europe, got under way in the ninth century A.D. Once again, the Jews were responding to the pull of opportunity. They possessed a sheaf of skills—commercial, financial,

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This is why the title usually given to these sermons has been cited above in inverted commas—'homilies against the Jews'. I had imagined that Chrysostom was addressing an audience of Jews until my mistake was corrected by Professor E.F. Osborn, of the University of Melbourne. Cf. C. Baur, John Chrysostom and His Time (Eng. trans. London 1959), vol. 1, ch.26.

intellectual—which were serviceable to the Emperor Charlemagne and to his French and German successors in their task of state-building. According to the Belgian historian Pirenne, their mercantile skill was so much in demand that the words Judaeus and mercator became almost synonymous; the Jews, with their Oriental connections, were the sole importers of the spices, the fabrics, the incense and the other precious commodities which were considered necessities of life by the higher orders both of the laity and the clergy. In all the lands of western Europe, the Jewish communities enjoyed for three centuries security and prosperity. Segregation from their Christian neighbours was not as yet imposed on them; by their own free choice they lived companionably with their kinsfolk and within easy walking distance of the synagogues. The English word Jewry (in old French, juierie) signified not a walled enclosure but a street which was predominantly, but not exclusively, inhabited by Jews. The Old Jewry is still marked on London's street-map and there were similar streets in Lincoln, York, Norwich, Oxford and other thriving towns.

The advent of a new and terrible time for Jewish people was announced, albeit by implication only, in November 1095 at the Council of Claremont, where Pope Urban II preached a Crusade 'to recover the Holy Land and its shrines from the infidel'. What immediately followed may be read in the first volume of Sir Steven Runciman's History of the Crusades. Thousands of Jews were massacred before a single Moslem was slain in battle and when at last the Crusaders stormed Jerusalem they drove the surviving remnant of Palestinian Jews into the synagogues and set the synagogues on fire. Fanatical preaching from Christian pulpits had been, if not always by direct intention, an incitement to murder. The senior ecclesiastical authorities did not condone the murders; on the contrary, many Jews found refuge within the walls of abbeys and bishoprics along the route of the crusading armies. As for the Papacy, its hands remained clean until late in the twelfth century, when the unity of the church was challenged by the Poor Men of Lyons, the Cathars and other heretical sects. In the reactive tightening of church discipline, the Jews also suffered. In 1215 the Fourth Lateran Council and a Papal Bull which was issued later that year made it obligatory for every Jew to wear a distinguishing badge. That badge made him the target of murderous assault by Christian gangs, whenever the rumour went round that that the Jews of their locality had perpetrated a ritual murder or some other hideous crime.

Religious fanaticism was not the only cause of Jewish vulnerability and suffering. Christian Europe had needed the Jews in the ninth century; but three centuries later this need was no longer conspicuous. The words Judaeus and mercator ceased to be synonyms. As early as the 10th century Venice, Amalfi and other Italian cities were managing their import-export business without Jewish aid; before long, Bruges and other northern cities were doing the same. In Feudal Europe there had never been a place for Jews in the chain of fealty and service, and consequently no place for them on the manorial lands. There was never a place for them in the emergent merchant guilds and craft guilds, because the rituals of those fraternities were Christian. They retained their primacy in one field only of economic activity—in finance, 'the most unhonoured and least popular of pursuits'. For a comparatively short interval of time that field remained their own because of the ban which the church imposed on usury, the lending of money at interest. Jewish financiers were granted royal protection for the sufficient

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Here and in the following pages I owe a special debt to the late Cecil Roth. In the 1920's he and I were near neighbours in our studies both at Oxford and in Florence. Thereafter he became Reader in Jewish Studies at Oxford, a main contributor to the Jewish Encyclopedia, and later its editor. I am also in debt to the scholarly works of Salo Wittmeyer Baron, especially to Ancient and Mediaeval Jewish History (Rutgers University Press, 1972).

reason that kings could not conduct the business of government—in particular, the business of war—without the support of credit. They were granted status of a kind as servi camerae regis, 'serfs of the king's court'.<sup>7</sup> For this precarious status they paid a double price. They became a conspicuous target for attack by the king's discontented subjects. They remained altogether at the king's mercy. By arbitrary taxation, forced loans and confiscations he eroded their economic capabilities and when they were no longer of use to him he drove them from the realm. The Jews were expelled from England in A.D. 1290. They were expelled from France in A.D. 1360. From Germany, 'the classic land of Jewish martyrdom', they could not be so easily expelled because Germany was fragmented in a crazy patchwork of political units.

The surge of Jewish migrants from north-western Europe to eastern lands, both of the Crescent and the Cross, was due in part to a pull.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, as has already been explained, the Jews were pushed out of north-western Europe. South of the Pyrenees that push came later; but it was if anything more savage. The Christian kingdoms of northern Spain grew ever more militant in the faith as they gathered their strength for the knock-out blow against the Moors. From the late fourteenth century onwards, many Jews took the only course that was open to them of saving their lives; they professed and called themselves Christians. The Spaniards called these converts Maranos (=swine) and suspected them of practising Jewish rites in secret. In 1478 Ferdinand and Isabella, those architects of Spanish unity under the Cross, received Papal permission to appoint a clerical commission with unfettered jurisdiction over heretics. Next year the Spanish Inquisition performed its first Act of Faith (Auto da Fê). It was a public burning of Maranos. In 1492, Spain expelled the entire Jewish population. Five years later, Portugal followed suit. The immediate sequel was a return journey of many Jews from the Christian west to the Islamic east where, like the Christians, they found safety—precarious at times—as second-class subjects of the Sultan of Turkey. A few decades later, other Jews sought and found not only safety but freedom and opportunity in the maritime states of northern Europe.

### Venetian Interlude

Even in the worst periods, the condition of Jews under Christian rule was not all of one piece. In the seaborne commerce of Venice and its Mediterranean dependencies, Jews continued for many centuries to play an active part. Some of them were not only permitted, but were encouraged by the Venetian Senate to provide credit for the poorer citizens at low rates of interest which were stipulated from time to time in a short-term instrument called the condotta. To begin with, these Jewish bankers lived in the mainland port of Mestre and made frequent journeys to the man-made metropolis of islands and canals; but this arrangement had drawbacks both for the lenders and the borrowers. Moreover, early in the sixteenth century the Republic became entangled in a war between rival

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S.W. Baron puts these words into inverted commas. They signify no status comparable either with slavery or villeinage. Their original intent was protective.

8

Richard Koebner, in a classic contribution to the Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol. I, explained the eastward migration of Germans largely by the pull of economic demand in the Slav lands. This must also have been a factor in the immigration of Jews, both from the west and the south.



coalitions and its forces were driven from the Venetian terra firma. The Senate then decided that the loan-banks must be shifted to a less vulnerable situation.

It now becomes appropriate to report the entry of a new word into the vocabulary of every European nation. Too many historians have used the word ghetto loosely; but it only began to acquire its modern meaning in A.D. 1515. In that year the Venetian Senate found security for the Jewish bankers in the Ghetto Nuovo (the New Foundry) which, like its predecessor, the Ghetto Vecchio, was no longer serving the needs of industry and war. Even when the two ghettos were brought together, as happened before very long, their combined area was small in proportion to the number of inhabitants. So the Ghetto took shape as a proto-Manhattan, with houses which towered above the surrounding palazzi. In the 17th and 18th centuries its sky-line became a main attraction for gentlemen who were making the grand tour.

The ghetto was enclosed by walls, its gates were locked at night by Christian turnkeys and its surrounding canals were patrolled by Christian boatmen. Nevertheless the segregation was incomplete: some Jews continued to reside on the terra firma and in Venetian cities overseas; many residents of the ghetto did much of their business on the Rialto. Moreover, life inside the ghetto retained throughout the three centuries of its existence many elements of freedom. The Venetian Senate devolved upon the Università degli Ebrei—the Jewish corporate body—such legislative, administrative and judicial functions as were requisite for the orderly and seemly conduct of the affairs of daily life. At the apex of this local self-rule was an assembly which represented the well-to-do residents. Both inside the ghetto and outside it, Jewish merchants were prominent, and possibly predominant, in the Republic's overseas commerce. For this there were two reasons: the Jewish merchants had many close connections with their co-religionists in the Turkish Empire, and many sons of Christian merchants were beginning to think themselves a cut above the business of the counting house. To be sure, Jews were excluded by law from the traditional crafts; but they were specifically authorised to pioneer new industries—a liberty which they used to good affect in civil engineering, chemical compounds, the silk manufacture, the cutting and the selling of precious stones. Of course, there were also many much poorer Jews inside the ghetto—for example, the strazzioli who had a near-monopoly in the trade in old clothes, and the clever needlewomen who used the good pieces of cloth as material for making truly beautiful new dresses. One may assume that they worked long hours for low pay. Moreover, one may doubt whether the loan-bankers continued to maintain their original rate of profit when Christian financiers began to enter the same business at uncontrolled rates of interest in almost every Italian city.

When all this has been said, it seems likely that people in the ghetto were living at a standard comparable with that of their Christian opposite numbers in the cities of northern Italy. Nor is there any doubt that their life was full of interest. It centred on the synagogues, where services were held every morning and evening. Under the tolerant rule of the Venetian Senate the people enjoyed unfettered religious freedom. There were no forced conversions, no clerical inquisitors, no accusations of ritual murder. Religious life was both serious and exuberant—adult education classes (if the anachronism may be permitted) conducted by the learned Rabbis; Hosannas, Hallelujahs and Glorias on the festival days of the Jewish calendar. To all this one significant fact must be added: there was no linguistic separation between Jew and Gentile. Everybody spoke Italian. Even the Rabbis used Italian in their sermons, which they translated into Hebrew when their scholarship and eloquence justified publication.

Despite all this, some basic elements of equality, security and freedom were lacking. Jews were locked in at night. They were compelled to wear the hated badge—or the hated hat, which in the course of time was prescribed in place of the badge. Jews were debarred from owning land. They could not own the houses in which they lived but had to pay rent to the Christian owners. Collectively, the

Jewish community possessed no security of tenure because the condotta, which was its title of residence in the ghetto, had to be re-negotiated every five or six years. Throughout the eighteenth century the power and the wealth of Venice were rapidly declining, and as a consequence the price which the Jews had to pay at each renewal of the condotta was raised against them. The push of adversity in Venice and the pull of opportunity both in Turkey and in north-western Europe set in motion another stream of migration. In 1797, when Napoleon's soldiers entered Venice, a much diminished population of Jews welcomed them as Liberators.

The French brought with them the Rights of Man. Throughout the nineteenth century Jewish Italians played an equal part with their Christian brethren in fighting both for Italia Una and also, they persuaded themselves, for universal human rights. Nevertheless, events not far distant in history were destined to prove, not least to Jewish people, that the Rights of Englishmen had tougher roots.

### New Hopes and Old Hatreds

For English and Scottish Puritans of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Bible was quite literally the Word of God. For many Puritans it was most thunderously His Word in the Old Testament. These radical Christians honoured the Jews as 'the People of the Book'. They baptised their children with the names of Old Testament heroes and prophets. Some of them looked forward to the approaching time when the Jews would return to the land of their forefathers: in 1621 Sir Henry Finch published The World's Great Restoration, or Calling of the Jews, inviting God's Chosen People to return to the Promised Land and summoning the Christian monarchs of Europe to pay homage to them. Other radical Puritans, such as the preacher Hugh Peters and the soldier-politician John Lilburne, thought it sufficient for the time being to invite the Jews back to England. For reasons both of principle and policy, Cromwell did that in 1658. Six years later, the Privy Council of Charles II ratified Cromwell's act.

The Jews who came to England suffered the same disabilities as were imposed upon the dissenting communities of Christians; but they were also sharers in the expanding freedom which in the course of time abolished every religious test.<sup>9</sup> In the second half of the 17th century, the basic principles and practices of religious toleration were proclaimed and established in Britain (although not in Ireland). Leaders of the non-conformist churches had led the way; the established church gave ground: in 1689 John Locke published his First Letter on Toleration. From that time onwards English and Scottish philosophers went into action as the advocates of rational inquiry and the theory of a tolerant, secular state: in their teaching, religious and racial prejudice was anathema. The philosophers of Britain's continental neighbours followed suit. It was the Age of Enlightenment.

Alas, the Enlightenment had a narrow range both in space and time. It struck no deep roots in eastern Europe, where large concentrations of Jewish people were living in ghettos which lacked the saving graces of their Venetian prototype. Once again, the entry of a new word into the European languages became a sinister historical landmark. That new word was pogrom. It is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as 'an organised massacre in Russia for the destruction or annihilation of any body or class'. The first reference which the O.E.D. cites is to the Times of 17 March 1882, which asserted that the 'Pogromen' against Jews must be stopped. But the pogroms were not stopped. The expectation of murderous assault became a fact of daily life for Jews in the Polish Pale and other

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The final freedom—for an elected Jew to take his seat in the House of Commons—was won in July 1858.

provinces of Czarist Russia. In their thousands and tens of thousands they fled for refuge to the western lands of the Enlightenment. Too many of them fled no further than the lands where people spoke German.

### Eretz Israel

The Enlightenment, with its message of liberty, equality and fraternity, was losing ground not only in Germany but in France. It was losing ground everywhere, except in the countries of north-western Europe and the transoceanic continents which those countries had colonised. A Viennese Jew, Theodore Herzl, made this discovery in the 1890's, when he was reporting the Dreyfus trial in Paris for the Neue Freie Presse. Hitherto it had been his firm conviction that Jews and Gentiles would learn to live together as equals 'in our Austrian Fatherland'; but on 18 June 1895 he told the Viennese Rothschilds that the Jews would never achieve security from mob violence, either in Russia or Germany or Austria or France or any other land of the Gentiles. 'They will chase us out of these countries', he wrote, 'and in the countries where we take refuge they will kill us.' In 1896 he published a pamphlet, The Jewish State. Its concluding sentences were a call to action: 'The Maccabees will rise again...We shall live at last as free men on our own soil and die peacefully in our own beds.' Next year at Basel a conference of more than 200 Jews founded the Zionist Organisation and defined its task' to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.'

Here again it is necessary to 'take heed of words'. A distinction needs to be drawn between a home in Palestine for the Jewish people and a Jewish national state. To Herzl's disappointment, the first Zionist Conference opted for the home, not for the state. The Balfour Declaration of 1916 promised them the home, not the state. The Mandate granted by the League of Nations to Great Britain did not go beyond that promise; on the contrary, it insisted that the Mandatory Power had a threefold obligation—to the Jews, to 'other sections of the population', to the promotion of Palestinian self-government. In logic, these three objectives could be achieved only within the framework of a multi-cultural state on the model of the Swiss Confederation or the Dominion of Canada. Herzl, by contrast, had demanded for the Jewish people a separate state, unfettered in sovereignty, free to determine its own form of government and to raise its own armed forces. He had proclaimed Israel Resurrected and Israel Militant. His heroes were the Maccabees. Yet one wonders how much he knew of Maccabean history. Its span in time was barely 100 years, beginning in B.C. 166 with heroic resistance to the Syrian oppressor; continuing for a few decades with wars which extended Jewish frontiers to the north, the east and the south; ending in B.C. 63 when Pompey's army overwhelmed Jerusalem. Already foreshadowed was Israel's tragic destiny as a rebellious Roman province...Absit omen.

Memories such as these may help to explain the slow response of European Jewry to the Zionist call. In Britain, for example, many prominent Jews feared committing themselves to a dual loyalty which might put in jeopardy the rights and opportunities which they possessed already in the land of their citizenship. Both in Britain and on the Continent, the majority of migrating Jews voted with their feet when they walked through the doors of the shipping offices. In the first decade of the twentieth century a million Jews crossed the Atlantic; but less than 100,000 went to Palestine. Not until the Balfour Declaration was proclaimed and the British Mandate established in Palestine did the new Exodus begin to gather momentum. When the Nazis achieved power in Germany, Eretz Israel did indeed become the lodestar for Jews in their hundreds of thousands; but for an equal, if not a larger number, America still remained the lodestar. In each of these categories frustration followed for many would-be immigrants. The British government imposed and the Royal Navy enforced a strict limit to the number of Jewish entrants to Palestine. The United States government administered an

immigration quota which sternly restricted the number of Jews who would ever see the Statue of Liberty.

Since the end of World War II Israel Restored and Israel Militant has achieved brilliant victories. Moreover, it is widely believed that Israel already possesses the capacity wage nuclear war. Be this as it may, military power contains a demographic component. Let me briefly summarise some contemporary demographic facts.

1. The Jewish population of Israel is barely one fifth of the population of World Jewry.
2. It has not yet reached 4 millions and in recent years has been suffering a net loss by emigration.
3. The Arab minority within the state of Israel is still below one-fifth of the total population; but its rate of increase is double the rate of Jewish increase.
4. In the strategically crucial northern area, where the Israelis are confronting the Syrians, the P.L.O., and what still survives of Lebanese government, the Arab population is already a quarter of a million larger than the Jewish population.
5. In the Occupied Territories of the West Bank, the census of 1978 recorded an Arab population of 690,000 and a Jewish civilian population of 7,400.<sup>10</sup>

Israel today, like its Maccabean prototype, must assert its right to survive within a world balance of power which is conspicuously unstable. What will the Israelis do, we may ask, if and when their local predominance of military force begins to shrink? And what will the Arabs do when their reservoirs of oil begin to dry up? Can no alternative be found to never-ending conflict in the Middle East? In the mid-nineteen-thirties a small group of teachers in the Hebrew University was anticipating this question. These people called themselves Brit Shalom, 'The Covenant of Peace'. In 1936 I made close contact with three members of Brit Shalom: the American Jew J.L. Magnes, Vice-Chancellor of the Hebrew University, and two members of the professorial staff, the German Jew Richard Koebner and the English Jew Norman Bentwich. Their political programme, insofar as they defined it, was Arab-Jewish partnership in an independent federal state. The Peel Commission of 1937 'ruled out' that programme and recommended the partition of Palestine into two separate sovereign states, one Jewish, the other Arab. Today, the political programme of Brit Shalom belongs to the irrecoverable past. So also does the political programme of the Peel Commission. Nevertheless, the vision of Brit Shalom could still make sense in a new context, as a programme of economic cooperation between Arabs and Jews throughout the spacious territories of the Middle East. When the oil revenues dwindle, the Arab states will have on their hands urgent demographic, economic, and environmental problems—steeply rising populations, steeply rising bills for imported food, steeply falling returns from their eroded soils. In anticipation of this time of troubles, it would be sound policy to harness the present-day financial strength of the Arabs with the proven capacity of the Jews to reclaim desert soil and make it fruitful.<sup>11</sup>

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In the late 1930's I attempted a quantitative and qualitative study of Jews and Arabs in the Mandated Territory. See Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Vol. 1 (O.U.P. 1937) pp. 429-483. For the figures quoted above see John Stebbing's article on 'The Demographic Jigsaw Puzzle' in International Relations, Vol. VI, No.6, November 1980.

Our inquiry now returns to its starting point. What happened to European Jews in World War II has become a challenge to believing Christians, to believing Jews, and to students of history who, irrespective of their religious belief or disbelief, are bound to employ the well-tested rules of their profession in the handling of factual evidence.

In Great Britain, Archbishop Temple confronted the challenge. On 2 July 1942 he submitted to the Chief Rabbi, Dr Joseph Hertz, proposals which brought to birth the Council of Christians and Jews.

My own approach to this matter [he wrote] is governed by the consideration that neither Jews nor Christians should in my judgement combine in any such way as to obscure the distinctiveness of their witness to their own beliefs. There is much that we can do together in combatting religious and racial intolerance, in forwarding social progress and in bearing witness to those moral principles which we unite in upholding.

No responsible head of any Christian Church had ever before made a statement so forthright. Today, the Council of Christians and Jews speaks for all the churches and synagogues of Great Britain. From 1942 up to the present it has worked quietly but persistently to further the purposes affirmed by Archbishop Temple.

In Rome, Pope Pius XII evaded the challenge. He knew what was being done to the Jews, and he kept silence. Communism was his bugbear and a strong Germany, no matter how governed, was in his view the main bastion of Christian resistance to communism. Much has been written about the causes and the consequences of his policy; but here one sentence must suffice. Whereas the Church had suffered no harm because Pope Pius VII fell out with Napoleon, it suffered serious and long-continuing harm because Pope Pius XII did not fall out with Hitler.<sup>12</sup>

In 1962 Pope John XXIII made it his task to remove the stumbling block, not merely of the Vatican's wartime record, but of the doctrine preached for so many centuries from so many pulpits—that the Jewish people had been rejected by God. The true doctrine, Pope John believed, was contained in chapters 9, 10 and 11 of St Paul's Epistle to the Romans. He instructed Cardinal Bea to prepare for the Second Vatican Council a document reaffirming St Paul's teaching. What finally emerged from the deliberations of Vatican II was a more widely-ranging 'Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions'.<sup>13</sup>

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I am indebted to Dr M.R. Brett-Crowther for introducing me to the extensive literature which discusses the economic and environmental challenges now confronting all the states of the Middle East. See, for example, John Stebbing's 'THE CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN ARAB STATE AS PART OF A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT', in International Relations, Vol. VI, No.3, May 1979. This article distils 6 years of down-to-earth (and down-to-water) research into the demographic, economic, social and political challenges in what used to be called the Palestine land-bridge.

12

I am aware that similar harsh assessments of the Vatican's wartime policy have been disputed. I also admit that I have not studied the original documents. I rely heavily on Professor Owen Chadwick's review article, "Weizacker, the Vatican and the Jews of Rome" (Journal of Ecclesiastical History vol. 28, no. 2, April 1978), and on Gitta Sereny, Into That Darkness (London 1974).

The opening and concluding paragraphs of the Declaration are ecumenical in spirit: all men comprise a single community and each of the world-religions reflects 'a ray of that truth which enlightens all men'. Specific reference is made to the Hindu, Buddhist and Moslem religions. Even so, the core of the Declaration and two-thirds of its contents are in paragraph 4.

As this sacred synod searches into the mystery of the Church, it recalls the spiritual bond linking the people of the New Covenant with Abraham's stock...

The Church, therefore, cannot forget that she received the revelation of the Old Testament through the people with whom God in his inexpressible mercy deigned to establish the Ancient Covenant. Nor can she forget that she draws sustenance from the root of that good olive tree onto which has been grafted the wild olive branches of the Gentiles.

The appeal is to St Paul's teaching in the Epistle to the Romans.

...Since the spiritual patrimony common to Christians and Jews is thus so great, this sacred synod wishes to foster that mutual understanding and respect which is the point above all of biblical and theological studies, and of brotherly dialogue....Although the Church is the new people of God, the Jews should not be represented as repudiated or cursed by God, as if such views followed from the holy Scriptures....The Church repudiates all persecutions against any man. Moreover, mindful of her common patrimony with the Jews...she deplores the hatred, persecutions and displays of anti-Semitism directed against the Jews at any time and from any source.

The voting on this Declaration was as follows:

- (1) on the proposition that the Jews must not be regarded as repudiated or cursed by God—

<u>For</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Invalid</u>
1824	245	14

- (2) on the repudiation of religious and racial discrimination—

<u>For</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Invalid</u>
2064	58	6

It can fairly be said of this Declaration that it pleaded for the amendment of Christian life. But it did not preface that plea by a confession of the sins committed by Christians throughout the 15 centuries which had run between the Roman Emperor Constantine and the Roman Pontif Pius XII. The Declaration, Alan Ecclstone has written, 'did little to provide an unequivocal rejection of the ancient charge of deicide made against the Jews, and still less to condemn the anti-semitic persecution that had sent millions to a horrible death'.<sup>14</sup>

That indictment is perhaps too stern. Inevitably, the politics of the Vatican are more complicated than those of a Cathedral Chapter in England. Visitors to Lincoln Cathedral, if they do not hurry too much, will find in the south aisle of the chancel a printed notice which marks the site of a ruined shrine. It had once contained the bones of a little boy called Hugh, the only son of a widowed mother.

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13

The Documents of Vatican II, general editor, Walter M. Abbott, S.J.; translation editor, Msgr. Joseph Gallagher (New York 1966).

14

The Night Sky of the Lord (London 1980) p. 108.

One day in August 1255 Hugh did not return home and three weeks later his body was found in a cesspool near the house of a Jew named Coppin. The rumour spread through Lincoln that the boy had been the victim of a ritual murder perpetrated by the Jews. The Christian citizens proclaimed 'Little Saint Hugh' a martyr. His sanctity and suffering became the theme of many popular ballads and of a beautiful passage in Chaucer's Prioress's Tale. In an 'explanatory note' the Dean and Chapter have put briefly on record the bare facts of the boy's death and its aftermath. Their statement concludes with eleven words of the Litany.

Remember not, Lord, our offences,  
nor the offences of our forefathers.

Yes—but the concluding words of this lecture must not be comfortable. Uncomfortable words were spoken three and a half centuries ago by the Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral, London.

Any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankind; And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.<sup>15</sup>

The bell tolls for Jews, Christians and Moslems. It tolls for atheists and agnostics. It tolls in Moscow and Washington, in Berlin, Paris, and London. It tolls in Canberra.

Our global village has inherited from the Second World War two words of evil omen, Holocaust and Hiroshima. Winston Churchill called the first atomic bomb The Second Coming in Wrath. Today we have in our military arsenals some 40,000 thermonuclear bombs.

We have named our species Homo sapiens. Too confidently, perhaps?

What is Man, that Thou art mindful of him?<sup>16</sup>

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15

John Donne, Devotions, XVII.

16

Psalm VIII, 4.

## VII

# Where Do We Go From Here?

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### 1. The Tasmanian World-Empire\*

Professor Vischer's book, "The Tasmanian World Empire", appears fittingly for the centenary celebrations of that beneficent hegemony which has blessed the world with unbroken peace for the last 100 years.

Professor Vischer is the first scholar to gain access to the Tasmanian archives. He has also had many discussions with some of the heroes of 100 years ago, most of whom still survive, thanks to the extraordinary efficiency of Tasmania's new medical science and health policy.

The greatness of Tasmania may be traced to her secession from the Commonwealth of Australia, and her secession may be traced to Australian economic policy.

Tasmania, more than most countries, had suffered under the curious system by which every nation attempted to exclude from its own markets goods which had been made abroad, while attempting to force into the markets of its reluctant neighbours goods which it had made at home.

By the year 1935 this policy had ruined the industry of every civilised country. In Europe, America, and Australia half the population was unemployed and the other half had been forced to accept a 70 per cent cut in wages.

At the same time mountains of wheat, pyramids of coffee, towers of dried fruits, heaps of motor-cars, each heap a mile long and 100 feet high, artificial lakes full of wine, rivers of beer, headlands composed entirely of dancing shoes and capes built up by endless layers of fashionable drapery, had entirely changed the coastal scenery of Costa Rica and Liberia, which were the only remaining low-tariff countries in the world. The Costa Ricans and the Liberians, simple creatures that they were, enjoyed their good fortune and kept perpetual festival.

It was the never-to-be-forgotten statesman, Simon Fish, who first sounded a clarion call to all Tasmanians to follow the example of the Costa Ricans and Liberians, and to improve on it. "Why", he cried passionately, "should we reject the motor cars which the foolish Americans are willing almost to give away? Why

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A Book Review in "The Advertiser" (Adelaide), 110 Years Hence.



scorn the butter of the New Zealanders, the silks of Japan, the prime beef of Argentina, birds' nests from China, and the cuckoo-clocks of the Swiss?"

"I long for the time," he continued—and his voice broke into an emotional quiver which can be achieved only after years of practice in public oratory—"I long for the time when a plane will be in every garage and two electric dish-washers in every kitchen, when every Rotarian shall have his private yacht, and the lowliest in the land shall drink champagne." To his less cultured audiences the great statesman repeated over and over again his popular slogan, "Wealth without Work".

It is truly astonishing to read the fascinating pages in which Professor Vischer describes the events which followed. Simon Fish was returned to Parliament as the leader of a compact majority facing an opposition of two members, both of whom were later declared to have been fraudulently elected.

Within a week he had broken away from Australia and had opened Tasmania's ports to the shipping of the world. From every continent there poured in the necessities and luxuries of a complicated civilisation. The Tasmanians welcomed them all. As Fish had prophesied, there were two planes in every garage and champagne on every cottage table. The fierce competition of sellers in the narrow Tasmanian market cut prices to an absurdity. Tasmania was able to pay on the nail for everything she bought by the work of three professors who, with fine public spirit, produced between them every month a new book on economics, for which there was insatiable demand.

This was the Liberian and Costa Rican example. But Simon Fish was determined to improve on that example. Fish did not intend to let Tasmania sink into an effete luxury, which would leave her a prey to the first marauding host that bore down upon her shores. His dream was to renew in Hobart and Launceston the glory and the heroism of ancient Athens and Sparta. Let the world supply for Tasmanians the baser necessities of life, as formerly the slaves of Greece had supplied them for their masters. Meanwhile, the Tasmanians, like the Greeks, would be free to cultivate the arts of war and of peace.

Tasmania's cultural triumphs are duly appraised in Professor Vischer's sober pages. Nor can we refrain from quoting one of his measured tributes:—"Hobart's Perkins has dimmed the glories of Athens' Plato; in Tomkins the world has acclaimed a subtler and more daring Aristotle; the genius of Hopkins transcends that of Euripides; Simpkins surpasses Sophocles; and Sappho's ecstasies pale into insignificance when compared with the voluptuous swoonings of Amelia E. Mush".

Moreover, as the professor frequently reminds us, the Tasmanians, like the ancient Greeks, were ardent in their devotion to manly games. Throughout the long Antipodean summer the entire population was marched every day to the island's 10,000 cricket fields, there to undergo at least three hours of compulsory coaching.

Fish proclaimed a Five-Year Plan for cricket. And long before the five years had elapsed a Tasmanian eleven had thoroughly asserted its supremacy over the Australians, especially on that famous occasion when Larton, the Tasmanian express, dismissed the whole Australian side for the wretched total of 14. Even this score was more than half composed of leg-byes, while seven of the Australian side were carried off the field in stretchers and spent the rest of the season in hospital.

The victory was decisive. The half-starved population of continental Australia forced its Government to petition Simon Fish for annexation to Tasmania. Over Canberra's temporary hotels floated the Tasmanian emblem, a russet apple on a green field.

All this time Fish had been buying munitions, importing foreign scientists to speed up the production of poison gas, and training every Tasmanian to be an officer. For he had always believed that Australian soldiers, led by cultured Tasmanian officers, would overthrow any army in the world.

The opportunity to put his theory to the test soon came. The world war which had begun in 1931 with the Japanese occupation of Manchuria was, by 1940, drawing to its close. The Russo-Chinese millions, welded by Communist fervour and anti-foreign hatred into an invincible horde, had long since taken Tokyo and exterminated the entire Japanese population. They were now sweeping across America. Chicago was already a smoking ruin.

Fish decided that the time had come to strike. He had no difficulty in showing that his action was justified by the Kellogg Pact; for the fall of Chicago had cut off the supply of rocking horses on which Tasmanian children depended, and the Government of Tasmania was reluctantly compelled to act in its own defence.

The details of the war need not delay us. Within six months the Chinese were driven out of America, Nanking and Peking fell a few weeks later, and in less than a year the Tasmanian apple was floating over the Kremlin. Tasmanian science and Australian valor had proved their mettle; more than three hundred million of the enemy population had been slaughtered in a year.

In Europe, Fish was accepted as a deliverer. The whole world gratefully accepted the Pax Tasmaniana.

And now we come to the most moving part of the story. Fish might well have taken the crown of an Alexander, or a Napoleon; but his loyal heart had never faltered in its allegiance. He laid his trophies at the feet of His Majesty the King.

And this is why we see today the British lion glaring across Tasmania's shield at a russet apple on a green ground; this is why the House of Hanover, which once ruled gloriously in London, rules today even more gloriously in Hobart. Its rule, as ever, is strong and gentle. Not force, but freedom, is its watchword. England is granted the priceless boon of Dominion status, and, thanks to the Fish Fellowships, promising young Englishmen may acquire at the University of Hobart Tasmanian culture and the Tasmanian art of ruling. Some of them even marry into noble Tasmanian families.

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Government of Tasmania  
From the Under Secretary, Hobart,  
to Professor W.K. Hancock, 7 July 1952.

A print of "Tasmania's World Empire" was privately circulated long ago to a small group of distinguished people in Hobart, such as Historians and Judges, all carefully chosen.

When a copy of the masterpiece reached the Governor recently, through irresponsible channels, he asked if he would be entitled henceforth to style himself Emperor of Tasmania, in addition to the customary title of His Excellency.

## 2. Our Interests and Obligations in Peace and War\*

### I.

#### Are there 'Lessons of History'?

For the time being, at any rate, I see this paper merely as a postscript to the Wiles Lectures which I delivered in Belfast twenty years ago.<sup>1</sup> I began by quoting two catchwords.

Preparing for the Last War. This familiar gibe is aimed at the brass hats; but it might just as well be aimed at the historians, who encourage people to peer into the past (so it is said) instead of looking forward to the future. The gibe assumes that no substantial bridge exists between past, present and future; that history never repeats itself; that human experience is discontinuous, chancy, unpredictable. And so it often is. Whoever could have predicted that Hitler would be gassed during the First World War, but not gassed badly enough to spoil his voice? Whoever could have predicted the ruin which that voice would inflict upon Germany and the whole world?

Funding experience. I have a vested interest in this second catchword, for I used it in 1941 to explain the purpose of my historical work to my masters in the British war Cabinet, and subsequently I put it into the preface to my series of war histories.<sup>2</sup> The phrase assumes that history does to some extent repeat itself, in that similar situations (not identical ones) tend to occur. It assumes that an element of continuity can be observed in human experience alongside the element of contingency. It assumes that the historian can be a forward-looking person, using his understanding of the past to identify problems which are likely to arise in the future.

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This paper was presented to a conference on 'Australian Defence Policy for the 1980's'. The conference was organised by the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University. It was in session from 6 to 9 July 1981 and its proceedings are being published by the University of Queensland Press.

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Four Studies of War and Peace in this Century (Cambridge University Press 1961).

2

This series, called the 'Civil Histories' ran to 30 volumes. Volume I, British War Economy, by W.K. Hancock and M.M. Gowing, was published in 1949.

Let me now call to witness Adam Smith. In The Wealth of Nations, Book V, Chapter 1, he expounded the theory and practice of war economy. So far from ignoring the social and technological discontinuities, he emphasised them. Primitive societies, he believed, made their decisions for war or peace below the level of conscious thought. A tribe of hunters and gatherers has no capacity and no need to change its way of life if it encounters a hostile tribe; all its members are ready at once to join the fray with such weapons as they possess. This is total war, if I may use this nasty modern phrase; but it is total war of feeble intensity, because hunting societies are small and their members cannot afford to take off much time from the task of keeping themselves alive. Pastoral societies, on the other hand (Smith had in mind the Tartars and other Asian nomads) are able to wage war with fierce intensity; for they are large in numbers, well supplied with food and able to devote their full energies to battle as they advance with their flocks and herds through enemy country. Agricultural societies—to climb still another step on the technological ladder—are compelled by their static character to wage war in a different way; even if the men of fighting age can give most of their time to war, the women and the older men must stay at home to look after the farms. The principle of the division of labour begins to operate in war, as in the other pursuits of society. It operates with increasing force as agriculture becomes more developed and as manufacture grows up alongside it, until at last the fighting men become a minority of the people, dependent upon other classes for food, clothing and weapons. By this time it has become necessary for the government to intervene as paymaster both of the armed forces and of many workers who produce goods and services for their support. War has become an 'expense of the sovereign'.

The pace of economic and technological change has gathered momentum throughout the two centuries which have elapsed since Adam Smith published his great book. In the Napoleonic era, the military timetable was determined by wind-power at sea and by horse-power on land. In World War I it was mainly determined, to begin with, by steam propelled ships at sea and railway engines on land. In World War II it was predominately determined at sea, on land and in the air by the internal combustion engine. In World War III, if or when it breaks out, it will be determined by computer-coded technicians with their fingers on the nuclear button. The destinies of us all may be decided within a few hours.

Even so, these shattering discontinuities remain embedded within the continuity of historical experience. Adam Smith spotlighted the urgent economic problem which has confronted every human society from the age of stone axes to the age of killer satellites: how shall the society allocate its resources between the competing claims of 'defence' and 'opulence', between its desire as a group for security, and the desires of its members for subsistence and well-being? This problem is with us all the time. We make a mistake when we pack our thought into chronological slabs, here a slab of war, there a slab of peace, so many years of war, so many years of peace. Wars are not switched on and off like the electric light, but are lost or won years before the fighting breaks out. The Battle of Britain was fought in the early autumn of 1940; but the British gave themselves the chance of winning it in the winter of 1935-36, when they took the decisions which gave them their Radar network and their squadrons of Spitfires and Hurricanes. If they had postponed those decisions until the following winter, they would almost certainly have lost the Battle of Britain four years in advance. Peace, similarly, or the pursuit of it, is a continuing activity of the human spirit. Its image is in our minds even while we are fighting and finds institutional embodiment alongside the institutions of war. Were it otherwise, we should have no hope at all of rebuilding the security of mankind, no materials at all with which to build. Yes—defence and opulence, war and peace, are with us all the time as alternative ends of policy, alternative activities of government, alternative postures of society. It is a question of degree: how much of the one and of the other can we afford to have, or run the risk of not having, at one time

or the other? The choices which we make are recorded every year in the figures of national income and expenditure.

How does a society make its decisions on the issues of peace and war? In the literature of history, philosophy, politics and law we encounter once again the intermingling of contingency and continuity, of time-determined particulars and timeless regularities.

## II.

### Power, Justice, Law

Let me start with Thucydides, who wrote his history of the Peloponnesian War 2,400 years ago. The action which he records takes place on a stage which seems to us tiny, a small fragment of the Mediterranean world. Even so, the leading actors, Athens and Sparta, face each other in a posture which contains little difference that I can see from the posture of today's global giants, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. The Russians and the Americans, although late entrants into the war against Hitler, played decisive parts in his eventual overthrow. Thereafter they found themselves in contention with each other for dominant power in what each envisaged as 'one world'. In the microcosmic world of classical Greece, Athens and Sparta had won equal glory in defeating the invading Persians; but they too soon found themselves in competition for dominant power. Each became the leader of a confederacy. Within each confederacy there arose tensions of ideology and class—oligarchs against democrats—which sometimes erupted into civil war. In his second chapter, Thucydides tells the story of a civil war in Corcyra which led to intervention and counter-intervention by the leading powers. As I read this chapter in the late 1930's, when Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were intervening on one side in the Spanish civil war and Soviet Russia on the other side, I felt in my bones that World War II was imminent.

Thucydides, the Athenian, is an historian of his own time and for all time. In chapter 9 he tells the story of Mitylene, a member of the Athenian confederacy which attempted to change sides. In Athens, the democratic assembly voted to put to death the whole adult male population of Mitylene and to make slaves of the women and children. However, 'the morrow brought repentance' and the assembly in a second meeting imposed on the rebellious community a much milder punishment. Twelve years later, when the people of Melos made a bid to stay neutral in the war, the Athenians had no second thoughts. If there was any debate at all in the Athenian assembly, Thucydides did not think it worth reporting. What he did report was the debate between two Athenian generals and a delegation of the defeated Melians.<sup>3</sup> The generals dictated the terms of that debate. 'You know as well as we do', they asserted, 'that right, as the world goes, is only between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak do what they must.' Thus defined, the debate ran to its inevitable conclusion. All the adult males were slaughtered, the women and children were enslaved, Melos became an imperial fortress manned by Athenian colonists.

We shall never understand the Melian debate unless we recognise it as the turning point—not only in time but in logic—of the tragic history which Thucydides is writing. When the war breaks out, Pericles speaks for Athens. His watchwords are honour, freedom, justice. When Pericles dies, demagogues persuade the Athenians that power is the only thing that matters. Melos is the signpost along

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There was, of course, no verbatim record of the proceedings at Melos; but Thucydides knew his contemporaries and the working of their minds. His report of the debate has the ring of truth.

that road to ruin. Thucydides shows us that signpost in his seventeenth chapter. In the chapter immediately following he reports the Athenian decision to invade Sicily. Nemesis was waiting for the Athenians at Syracuse. Their bid for imperial mastery collapsed in horror and shame.

I do not see Thucydides as the advocate of ruthless power, but as a man deeply rooted in the traditional wisdom of his people. It found expression in the dramatic confrontation of two words, hubris and phthonos. Hubris signifies a man's inordinate pride in his own strength; phthonos signifies the 'jealousy' of the gods and their determination to punish that man. The Athenians had provoked the gods to anger. Their punishment was dire.

Their own philosophers explained to the Athenians where they had gone wrong. Plato's Republic opens with the tirade of Thrasymachus, a blustering sophist who argues that justice is 'the interest of the stronger'. Socrates tears that argument into tatters. Plato's successors, the Athenian and Roman Stoics, discover justice and law in the divine and natural order of the universe: deus sive natura—those two nouns meant pretty much the same thing. Many centuries earlier, the priests, the lawyers, the poets and the historians of Israel had made a closely related discovery. 'In the beginning' God creates the world. Man disobeys God; but remains subject to God's law. God punishes him when he breaks the Covenant, pardons him when he repents. The gap between Greek philosophy and Jewish imagery may seem unbridgeable, but may we not perceive in both the rhythms of hubris and phthonos?

Be this as it may, Jews and Greeks in partnership established the Christian Church within the Roman Empire. For two centuries and more they remained deeply suspicious—sometimes with good reason—of their pagan rulers. What duty did they owe to Caesar? The theologian Tertullian, whose long life spanned the second and third centuries A.D., asked some difficult questions. Can a Christian serve in the Roman army? Can he plead in a Roman court? God, not Caesar, is sovereign ruler of the universe. God's law governs both the natural world and human society. But man has defied God's law. In the story of the Fall of Man, as told in the third chapter of Genesis, Tertullian discovers an exit-gate from the divinely ordered world into the world-as-it-is.

Two centuries later, Saint Augustine discovered in Tertullian's gate a programme for the Church Militant. Because of Adam's Fall the Christian stands condemned to live in an evil world; but he is challenged to resist evil. He must accept the stern necessities of life and give them a deeper meaning by subduing them to the dictates of God's will and man's God-implanted gift of reason. Government and property have become necessary propter lapsum. War has become necessary. The Church cannot permit brute power to flout divine and natural justice. Justice must arm itself with power. Christian theologians set themselves the task of defining bellum justum. Thus there arises an elaborate structure of moral and juristic definition. A 'Roman' war, a war of Christians against infidels, is just. A 'judicial' war, a war of Christians fighting with the sanction of a judge against other Christians, is just. A war of Christians against Christians without the authority of law is 'presumptuous'. A war of Christians against Christians in defiance of the law is 'temerarious'. A war of Christians fighting to defend themselves is 'necessary', and therefore just. Underlying all these definitions is the postulate that human society is a unity which reflects the unity of God; that every earthly ruler, so far from making and enforcing his own law, holds his power sub deo et lege. God's justice reigns supreme over the princes of this earth.

But who will judge between the princes? Who will declare and uphold the law? For this supreme authority there were two contenders, the Holy Roman Emperor and the Roman Pontiff. The Emperors, although Dante supported their claim, were spasmodic and feeble contenders. The Popes won some notable successes; but their bid for power collapsed in A.D. 1303, when Philip the Fair of France kidnapped Pope Boniface VIII and hustled the Papal court to captivity in Avignon. Philip's

legal servants proclaimed a new law for the new times—Rex est imperator in regno suo. Before long, every secular ruler was making the same assertion of sovereignty. The Popes themselves made it in their petty Italian state. Early in the sixteenth century Caesar Borgia waged brutal war in the name of the Holy Father.

Caesar Borgia was applauded for his political and military skill by Niccolo Machiavelli, the naughty Florentine who has remained, from the early sixteenth century up to the present, the Old Nick of folklore and the enfant terrible of political science. Francis Bacon praised him for expelling the word ought from the political vocabulary. That, certainly, is what he set out to do. The theologians could keep on saying, as they had said for centuries, that princes ought to keep faith; but what they said had nothing whatever to do with the world-as-it-is. 'There's a certain prince of our time', Machiavelli wrote, 'whom it is best not to name; he preaches incessantly peace and good faith and is the arch-enemy of both; and if he had practised either it would have cost him his kingdom.' A man who wishes to be good had better keep out of politics; he had best enter a monastery. Why? Because God's justice does not rule the world. That postulate was basic in his Discourses on Livy, in The Prince, his brilliant tract for the times, in the Florentine Histories and all his other writings on politics and war. He did not deny God. He did not dethrone justice. He simply took it for granted that God was absent, that the throne of justice was empty. He had his own pagan deities. Necessità was supreme ruler of the world; she set the tasks which men had to tackle and fixed the limits of their achievement. Virtù, the courage and cunning of individual men, made history under the pressure and lash of necessity. Fortuna played her constant and incalculable part. Luck was half the story of human action. Caesar Borgia never made any political or military mistake that Machiavelli could see, but he ran out of luck.

Machiavelli invoked the goddess Fortune in a beautiful little poem. He wrote lively and perceptive letters to his friends. I see him as a frustrated Italian patriot. All appearances to the contrary, he was a muddled thinker. After all, a theory of politics which finds no place for justice is plain crazy. Machiavelli knew it. In his biggest book, the Discourses on Livy, he insisted from start to finish that a free commonwealth founded on justice is more powerful than an arbitrary tyranny: witness republican Rome, whose virtues he desired ardently to re-establish in his own Italy. Yet, according to his own teaching, power is the reality, justice an illusion. How could he possibly found a reality upon an illusion? All that he could with consistency offer was the puerile notion of "seeming good"—in modern terms, pretence and propaganda. That did not satisfy his fundamentally honest mind. He believed that Roman duty and freedom were real. So he threw consistency to the winds and called in as founders of his ideal commonwealth legendary benefactors miraculously endowed with real goodness. Thereby he transgressed the boundaries of his own political map.

The Englishman Thomas Hobbes launched a more sophisticated attack upon the word ought—indeed, upon any and every word which expresses the affections, hopes, fears, desires and loyalties of individual human persons.

For what one man calleth "wisdom" another calleth "fear", and one "cruelty" what another "justice" and one "prodigality" what another "magnanimity". And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination.<sup>4</sup>

Could any remedy be found for this Babel of discord? Hobbes was a timid creature. Condemned to live in revolutionary times, he flitted to and fro between France and England in search of a funk-hole. In Leviathan he designed a funk-hole for 'everyman'. Within each separate territorial state an absolute sovereign would

declare the law and enforce it. The sovereign's subjects, provided they were docile, would enjoy perfect peace. This could happen, if and when the sovereign possessed spacious territories and rich resources. It could happen in France. But it could not happen in the petty principalities immediately to the east of France. No more could it happen in Mexico, in Peru, or—if the chronological leap may be permitted—in Tasmania.

The Hobbist funk-hole was a privilege of the fortunate few. The majority of the earth's inhabitants remained in what Hobbes had called or miscalled 'the state of nature', where life is poor, nasty, brutish and short. Thinkers who remained deeply rooted in Stoic and Christian teaching refused to bow their heads to the new Baal, raison d'état. The lawmakers of this world, they insisted, remained subject to the law of Nature and God. Early in the sixteenth century, the Spanish lawyer Victoria defied the Spanish king by insisting that the conquered inhabitants of Mexico and Peru had to be treated as if they were Christians. Early in the seventeenth century, Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of Common Pleas, infuriated King James I by quoting against him a sentence from the great lawyer Bracton—'Quod Rex debet esse non sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege'. About the same time, Hugo Grotius was writing his famous treatise De Jure Belli et Pacis. In his endeavour to prove that international law is a mandatory system, Grotius called to witness not only natural law but established custom and the actual practice of states as expressed, for example, in the treaties which they made with each other.

To all this legal argument the rulers of the separate sovereign states found a shrewd retort. They hired the lawyers. The lawyers of Queen Elizabeth argued for mare liberum against the Spaniards; the lawyers of her successors argued for mare clausum against the Dutch. 'I have ordered my troops to march' declared Frederick the Great of Prussia, 'the question of justice is a matter for my ministers'. He might just as well have said, 'my lawyers'. A century later, American lawyers found sufficient reason for upholding the principle of self-determination in Texas, cynical though its manipulation had been; but they saw no reason why the same principle should prevail in the Confederate South. Half a century later, when President Theodore Roosevelt ordered the invasion of Panama in defiance of his country's treaty obligations, the eminent American lawyer John Bassett More praised him for performing 'a service to mankind'. Must we then conclude that international law is as long as Queen Elizabeth's foot, or Frederick the Great's foot, or Theodore Roosevelt's foot, or Joseph Chamberlain's foot, or Joseph Stalin's foot?

Support for that conclusion may be found in some textbooks of international law. 'In the last resort', wrote the English jurist Hall, 'almost the whole of the duties of states are subordinated to the right of self-preservation'. In refutation of that statement a more scholarly English jurist, J.L. Brierly, quoted Rex v. Dudley and Stephens, 1884 (a case against two shipwrecked sailors who had killed and eaten the cabin boy) to show that English law does not uphold an absolute right of self-preservation. No more does international law uphold it. Statements such as Hall's, Brierly declared, "would, if they were true, destroy any system of law, for they make all obligation to observe the law merely conditional".<sup>5</sup> Brierly found anchorage for international law in the teaching of the Stoics, of the early Christian fathers, of the mediaeval theologians who had wrestled with the problem of bellum justum. He also found it in the rights and duties acknowledged by sovereign states in ordinary diplomatic practice and as members of the League of Nations and signatories of the Kellogg Peace Pact. If he had lived longer, he would have found it in the Charter of the United Nations. In the fifth century A.D., Saint Augustine had asked the question, 'Without justice,

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J.L. Brierley, The Law of Nations (Oxford, 1929) p. 159.



what are kingdoms but great robber bands?'<sup>6</sup> Late in the day, but not too late, Britain and her partners in the Commonwealth of Nations made the decision to defy Hitler's robber band.

I have been running the risk of attempting something more ambitious than a postscript to the Wyles Lectures which I delivered twenty years ago. Nevertheless I see myself excused from writing a book. All that I have said just now has been said already, and said much better, by a distinguished scholar of Harvard University, Michael Walzer. His book is entitled Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations.<sup>7</sup> Every page of his argument merits the closest scrutiny; but I shall limit myself to quoting one short sentence on page 23.

Jus ad bellum requires us to make judgements about aggression and self-defense; jus in bello about the observance or violation of the customary and positive rules of engagement.

In these twenty five words I find clear guidance, not only as a historian of 'war and peace in this century', but as an Australian citizen and as a member of that endangered species, Homo sapiens.

### III.

#### Rise and Fall of the Pax Britannica

Too often, the rules of right conduct which philosophers, theologians and lawyers have defined are more honoured in the breach than in the observance. The separate territorial states still remain afflicted by terrorist violence and civil war. The community of states is still torn asunder by aggressive and barbarous war-makers. Hebrew prophets, grieving for the afflictions of their people, saw visions of perpetual peace.

And He shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people: and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.<sup>8</sup>

The community of mankind has not yet enjoyed this perfect peace; but fragments of mankind have from time to time enjoyed something akin to it. Throughout the early centuries of the Christian era, travellers setting out from London or Paris to Athens or Jerusalem enjoyed the shelter of the Pax Romana. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries a merchant, missionary or scholar could travel all the way from Budapest to Canton in the shelter of the Pax Mongolica. Sovereign rulers in the Middle East, China and other regions of the world have at various times established comparable areas of peace in a world afflicted by war. Their achievement was great; but not quite so great as they believed. Time and time again they flattered themselves that their empires were co-terminous with the civilised world. They exaggerated no less the degree and the durability of peace within their own borders. The Persian Empire and the Roman Empire suffered

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City of God, Book IV, Chapter 4.

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Pelican Books, 1980.

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Isaiah, chapter II, verse 4.

corrosion by provincial rivalries and military revolts. China has suffered three partitions and has only recently achieved her fourth unification.

The Pax Britannica, like all its predecessors, was an amalgam of achievement and illusion. Its sheet-anchor was the Royal Navy, which had achieved supremacy on the world's oceans in the wars of the mid-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The innovating energies of a conspicuously dynamic society made this achievement possible. In agriculture, trade, and industry Great Britain led the world; but from the mid-nineteenth century onwards other nations began to catch up with her. By this time, however, one third of the world's land was marked red on the map and was called—or miscalled—the British Empire.<sup>9</sup> In reality, it was an untidy patchwork of naval bases, coaling-stations, trading companies, Protectorates, Crown colonies and self-governing Dominions rapidly advancing to equality with Great Britain both in law and in fact. Moreover, 'informal' empire co-existed with the areas marked red on the map. In some ways, Argentina was at least as much a participator in the Pax Britannica as Australia was. British capitalists owned and managed the Argentinian railways; by contrast, the Australian States were both the owners and the managers.

'The Expansion of England', as Professor Seeley called it, was in large measure the 'peaceful penetration' of weaker societies; but it was usually backed by military force. In the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 Britain was the guilty party under each of the two heads, jus ad bellum and jus in bello. At the Bloemfontein Conference of May 1899 Sir Alfred Milner wrung from old President Kruger the despairing cry, "It's my country you want". That was true; Milner wanted the Transvaal just as much as Hitler wanted Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. In anticipation of Hitler, Milner planned a war of brutal aggression. In their conduct of the war, Britain's military commanders anticipated Hitler's brutalities. Let me quote from the diary which General Smuts scribbled on the backs of railway forms as he led his little commando through the Orange Free State into Cape Colony.

Aug 7. Last night at Zandspruit. Dams full everywhere of rotting animals; water undrinkable. Veld covered with slaughtered herds of sheep and goats, cattle and horses. The Horror passes description. But the saddest sight of all is the large numbers of little lambs, staggering from hunger and thirst around the corpses of their dead and mangled mothers ... Surely such outrages on man and nature must move to a certain doom.

Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener had not planned these outrages, but drifted into them. Under the laws of war it was permissible to strike at enemy sources of supply. When Smuts and the other commando leaders were fighting their guerilla war, they were dependent for supply on the Boer farms. Lord Roberts ordered his soldiers to burn the farmhouses and lay waste the land. He believed that he would thereby shorten the war; but Smuts believed that he lengthened it by driving desperate men into the commandos. The women and children were left wandering across the veld. Kitchener issued orders to round them up and confine them in concentration camps. A name of evil omen! Yet Kitchener, we may feel sure, believed that he was saving lives. In the event, the death rate in the camps reached its peak at 430 per 1,000. This happened, not because British officers

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The world empire first appeared in the dictionary of English political discourse in Henry VIII's Act of Appeals. Its meaning then was national independence. Disraeli, Joseph Chamberlain and their like inflated the word to signify 'dominion over palm and pine'. Englishmen first used the word imperialist as an expression of contempt for the upstart Napoleon III.

and soldiers were brutal, but because the British War Office had never absorbed the teaching of Florence Nightingale.

Before the war ended the death rate in the camps had been brought down to 20 per 1,000. The credit for this achievement belongs first and foremost to an English lady, Emily Hobhouse. When rumours of the horror reached her in England she took ship for South Africa with intent to establish the facts. On her return to England she broadcast them in the newspapers and in public meetings. On 14 June 1901 she talked for two hours with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, leader of the hitherto divided Liberal Party. That same evening he stood up in the House of Commons and asked and answered the question, 'When is a war not a war? When it is fought by the methods of barbarism in South Africa.' The conservative government transferred management of the camps from the War Office to the Colonial Office—that is to say from Kitchener to Milner, who was—to give him his due—a competent administrator.

Eleven years later a monument to the women and children who had died in the camps was unveiled at Bloemfontein. In 1926 Emily Hobhouse died and her ashes were brought to South Africa for burial at the foot of the monument. Speaking first in Afrikaans, Smuts recalled her mission of mercy and healing.

We stood alone in the world, a small people ranged against the mightiest Empire on earth. And then one small hand, the hand of a woman, was stretched out to us. At that darkest hour, when our race seemed almost doomed to extinction, she appeared as an angel, as a heaven-sent messenger. Strangest of all, she was an Englishwoman.

Concluding his speech in English, Smuts declared that Emily Hobhouse had made herself the symbol of reconciliation 'between kindred peoples who never should have been enemies'. Her life was proof, he said, that patriotism is not enough: that a wider loyalty is requisite for the redemption of mankind.

For Smuts, the word Commonwealth symbolised that wider loyalty. In the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer war and even before the war ended he was using it in his private correspondence. During World War I he gave it currency in London as an alternative name for the British Empire. In 1926 and 1931 the word achieved official recognition as the true description of those nations within the British Empire which had already achieved equality of status with Great Britain. During World War II the idea rapidly gained ground, even within the Colonial Office, that every community within the area marked red on the map was destined, sooner or later, either to join the Commonwealth or to strike out on its own as a separate sovereign state. Looking back to the Anglo-Boer war and its sequel, we may reasonably conclude that the achievement of Milner and Kitchener was ephemeral in comparison with the achievement of Emily Hobhouse and Campbell-Bannerman.<sup>10</sup>

In 1926, when Smuts made his speech at the Bloemfontein Monument, Britain no longer ruled 'the mightiest empire in the world'. In the first decade of the twentieth century her relative decline as an industrial and commercial nation had produced its political consequences in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty and the ententes with France and Russia. The Royal Navy could no longer posture as sole guardian of peace on the world's oceans. In the Washington Treaties which followed World War I the United Kingdom and the United States agreed on parity of naval armaments, with Japan number 3 on the list and predominant in its own region. In the third decade of this century, the Japanese began to align their policies with those of Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy.

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On the wall behind the great desk of his study at Doornkloof Smuts hung a large photograph of Campbell-Bannerman. It still hangs there.

When Britain declared war on Germany in 1914 all subjects of the Crown—the 'common Crown', as it then was—had also found themselves legally at war, although the Canadians had declared and established the right of their own parliament to decide whether or not they would join the British in battle. In 1939 the situation in law and in fact was different: each self-governing Dominion possessed the right—although the Australian Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies, did not proclaim it—to make its own decision between war and neutrality. In Dublin, the government and parliament chose neutrality. In Cape Town, the government split and the parliament voted for war after three days of divisive debate and only by an extremely narrow margin—80 votes to 67. Had South Africa stood neutral the Cape route would have been closed to British warships, transports and supply ships. Almost certainly, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy would have achieved mastery of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. What then would have been the task confronting those two late-comers to battle, Soviet Russia and the United States of America?

When World War II broke out in October 1939 the United States possessed a one-ocean navy to defend their security and interests on two oceanic fronts. They had been spending on national defence less than 2 percent of their national income. The British Empire and Commonwealth bought for them two years and four months of time. On 7 December 1941 time ran out for them. In the aftermath of Pearl Harbour the United States declared war on Japan. They did not declare war on Germany. Hitler declared war on them. That was his biggest blunder. He had made it inevitable that victory in Europe would be item one on the agenda of the United States at war.

What now follows will be a brief review of the British war economy, starting with a terse summary of the tasks which confronted the government when it declared war on Nazi Germany. It had to draw into useful employment all unused resources. It had to withdraw large numbers of men and women from their normal peaceful occupations and steer them into the armed services and the war production industries. Within this war-zone, it had to settle the competing bids made by the Service and Supply Departments for labour, raw materials, factory space, machinery, and all other requirements of the ravenous war machine. Finally, it had to allocate such resources as were retained within the civilian zone in such a way as to maintain the people's health, strength and will to endure, always remembering that fair shares—even of a much diminished total—are conducive to good morale.

Britain's abnormal dependence upon imported commodities was a main impediment to the performance of these tasks. Her partners in the Sterling Area eased that difficulty by accepting deferred payment for the goods and services which they provided; these 'sterling balances', although they were becoming in the sixth year of the war a most troublesome headache, helped the British to achieve the peak of their war effort early in the war's fourth year. The Canadians, who belonged not to the sterling area but to the dollar area, found very effective means of giving the British substantial financial aid. By contrast, the Americans were inhibited throughout the first 17 months of the war from supporting the British either in the procurement or in the transport of the food, raw materials, steel, weapons, and all the other commodities which they most urgently needed. America's neutrality legislation of 1935-39 embodied the principle of Cash and Carry. 'You must pay spot cash', in effect they told the British, 'for everything that you buy and your own ships must ferry the stuff across the Atlantic'. To raise the cash, the British struggled to maintain at least a trickle of exports and they put on the market a rapidly growing mass of their long-term overseas investments. Getting the ships to British ports became a hazardous task when France fell and the enemy's air fields and submarine bases stretched all the way from North Cape in Norway to the southern end of the Bay of Biscay. The British merchant crews were civilians. They stuck to their guns.

On 5 November 1940 President F.D. Roosevelt was elected to the White House for a third term. On 10 January 1941 he submitted to Congress a bill which embodied the principle of Lend Lease. The Bill became law on 11 March 1941. Its number—H.R. 1776—recalled the year of American independence; its title proclaimed it to be an 'Act to promote the defense of the United States'. That title was realistic. The Act bought for the Americans an additional half-year in which to prepare themselves for battle.

Lend Lease enabled the British to perform far more rapidly than they could otherwise have done their task of shifting their economic resources from the peace zone into the war zone. The dimensions of their effort and achievement are indicated in the attached graph and table.<sup>11</sup> Unfortunately, no sufficiently precise indicators are available of the Russian effort and achievement. We have certain knowledge only of 'the immeasurable wreckage of human lives and happiness and the destruction of homes and cities'.<sup>12</sup>

In March 1941 Churchill acclaimed Lend-Lease as 'the most unsordid act in history'. Nevertheless it had strings attached to it. The Office of Lend Lease Administration in Washington (OLLA) narrowly scrutinised the use which Britain was making of American supplies, for fear that they might be used to sustain a British presence in markets which were now wide open to American businessmen. Far more important in long term was Article VII of the Lend Lease Act, which expressed the recent conversion of the United States to the economic philosophy of free trade within 'one world'.

Throughout the nineteenth century and in the early decades of the twentieth, free-trading Britain had resisted the pressure of the Dominions (with Australia in the van) to join with them and all the other territories marked red on the map in a network of reciprocal tariff preferences. In the early years of the Great Depression the British were at long last converted. The terms of their surrender were defined in 1932 at the Imperial Economic Conference in Ottawa. The exchange of trading preferences agreed upon at Ottawa seemed to some British Commonwealth critics (including the present writer) at best ill-conceived, at worst footling. In America, almost every American politician and businessman felt in his bones that they were wicked. So there was trouble ahead for the British and their closest trading partners when the war ended.

Meanwhile, Lend Lease gave indispensable support to the British and their allies. The cutting edge of their economic effort is demonstrated in a graph<sup>13</sup> which traces from January 1942 to January 1945 the mobilisation and deployment of British and American land forces.

On the eve of D Day, the British Commonwealth and Empire still had more army divisions in contact with the enemy than the United States had. From D Day until the end of the war they not only maintained but increased their combat forces. However, the Americans rapidly outclassed them. That comparative decline of British military power produced important political consequences, as will later appear. Meanwhile, this brief economic story will be followed to its conclusion.

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
British War Economy, by W.K. Hancock and M.M. Gowing (London 1949) pp.369 and 370.

12

Twentieth Report to Congress on Lend Lease Operations, August 1945.

13

See British War Economy, p. 361.




*Mobilisation of the Labour Force of each Country for War, June 1944*

Percentages

	United Kingdom	United States
A. Armed forces . . . . .	22	18½
B. Civilian war employment . . . . .	33	21½
C. Total A + B . . . . .	55	40
D. Other employment . . . . .	45	58
E. Unemployed . . . . .	—*	2
F. Total Labour Force . . . . .	100	100

\* Less than 0.5 per cent.



This graph has a precise statistical basis, which however does not exactly fit the facts of United Kingdom deployment, because Dominion, Indian and European Allied formations in the Western and Eastern theatres are included. On the other hand, British Empire Forces in the Pacific theatre (e.g. the Australians in New Guinea) are excluded.

On 14 August 1945 the Japanese Empire surrendered unconditionally. On that same day, Keynes warned the War Cabinet that Britain would soon be facing 'a financial Dunkirk'. His paper summarised the policies of economic redeployment which would avert disaster. To make these policies operative would take time. The Americans gave the British 16 days of time. Two days after the surrender of Japan President Truman issued a directive which terminated Lend Lease. That directive became operative on 2 September, America's V.J. Day. A few days later Keynes went to Washington as leader of a British mission.

Inevitably, the British were suppliants for financial aid. To be sure, some of their investment in waging war could be turned to good account in peace. Agriculture was an outstanding example: intensive investment in petrol driven machines had raised output per man to a level not even approached by any other European

country. Again, within the zone of war production some new technologies and skills could be used to meet the demands of peacetime consumers, both at home and abroad. These items on the credit side, however, were far outweighed by the items on the debit side of the ledger. Britain's mercantile marine was 30 percent smaller than it had been when war broke out. For the first time in a century and more, plentiful and cheap coal had ceased to be the basis of British industry. Physical destruction and dilapidation were conspicuous in almost every British city. A bare 8 percent of the labour force was engaged in maintaining the nation's capital equipment. A bare 2 percent was employed in the export industries. When the war began, Britain was the world's largest creditor nation. When it ended, she was the world's largest debtor nation.

The negotiations in Washington opened on 11 September 1945. The best short account of them will be found in Douglas Jay's book, Chance and Fortune (London 1980). In the 1930's Jay had been a Fellow of All Souls and a front-ranking contributor, first to the Times and later to the Economist. Throughout the war he managed with conspicuous success the Ministry of Supply's operations on the front of labour recruitment and deployment. When the war ended Prime Minister Attlee installed him in No. 10 Downing Street as his adviser on economic policy. Jay's first task was to participate in the high-level discussions which were held every evening on the telegrams arriving from the British mission in Washington.

The Americans made two proposals which stuck in Jay's throat. They believed that the British should make an immediate move towards cancellation of their sterling debts. On this proposal Jay comments (p. 138) as follows:

It always seemed to me intolerable that we should enter public agreement with our richest creditor, the United States, to default on our debts to our poorest creditors, India and Egypt...

In the end we paid every penny to each of these countries—the first 'aid to developing countries' in the post-war years.

The second American proposal which Jay resisted was that Britain should commit herself to the convertibility of sterling within twelve months of the ratification by the United States Senate of the Loan Agreement. Jay thought it impossible that Britain in so short a time could meet this commitment; but the government accepted the more optimistic forecast of Keynes. The event proved Keynes wrong and Jay right. In the summer of 1947 the British government attempted to make sterling convertible; but the attempt collapsed within 7 weeks. The British were driven back to a meat ration of 1 shilling per week, a fats ration of 4 ounces, and all the other austerities of the war. Here began the decline and fall of the best peace-time government which had served the nation since the time of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman.

In July 1948 General Marshall proposed an Aid Agreement which was accepted by all the nations of Western Europe. Jay calls Marshall Aid "the most far-sighted and constructive initiative since World War II" (p.182). Even so, he takes note that it left Britain still staggering under a heavy burden of debt, whereas France, Germany and the other Continental countries were able to use their Marshall Aid payments to invest in public and private enterprise. Germany was the luckiest country of all; she was unencumbered by debts because she had fed her war machine by pillaging continental Europe from the Bay of Biscay to the Black Sea.

In concluding my short review of America's dealings with the people who had been her main shield while she stayed neutral, and her main partner when she went to war, I perceive no malice, but sweet innocence. There comes into my mind a story told by the most gifted member of a gifted family, Mary Kingsley. Some people have called her an imperialist; but she died of a disease which she caught when she was serving in Cape Town as a nurse for Boer prisoners of war. Her story is of



a kind-hearted she-elephant, who, while walking out one day, inadvertently trod upon a partridge and killed it, and observing near at hand the bird's nest full of callow fledglings, dropped a tear, and saying "I have the heart of a mother myself", sat down upon the brood.<sup>14</sup>

## IV.

**Towards the Pax Americana**

From the time of Louis XIV and Dutch William, to go no further back in history, the British had won their wars—with one shattering exception—not only by their own efforts but also by their skill in building coalitions. In the aftermath of Pearl Harbour, the British and the Americans achieved together not merely a coalition but a combination: The Combined Chiefs of Staff, The Combined Munitions Assignment Board, The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board—they reiterated that word combined as marching orders for half a dozen or more authorities which guided the mobilisation and deployment of British-American military power. On the basis of the facts and figures which they received from Washington and London, the Combined Boards not only performed their administrative tasks but also clarified the issues which called for decision by their political masters, the British Prime Minister and the American President. One issue was quickly decided—victory must first be won in Hitler's Europe. How it would be won remained for some time a matter of contention: whereas the Americans envisaged an early cross-Channel assault, the British insisted that the assault must be postponed until it could be supported by a massive concentration of force at sea, in the air and on land. Meanwhile the combined forces would carry the war from North Africa to Sicily and—if opportunity offered—into Italy.

In January 1943 the President and Prime Minister met in conference at Casablanca. They had invited Stalin to join them, but he replied that he had too much on his hands in driving back the German invaders. Even so, they were able to give him a report of their decisions which he found acceptable. The cross-Channel assault would be launched in the early summer of 1944. Peace would not be made with the Germans, Italians and Japanese until they surrendered unconditionally.

Those assurances to Stalin were made good; but in the meantime a wide political crack in the British-American combination had opened up. The story of how this happened may be read in two very good books, The Struggle for Europe, by Chester Wilmot (London 1952) and Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonisation of the British Empire 1941-1945, by Wm. Roger Louis (New York 1978). Chester Wilmot was an Australian war correspondent who served first in New Guinea, then in the Western Desert<sup>15</sup> and finally in Europe—he made his first broadcast from Normandy on D Day. In his book one recognises both a Thucydidean immediacy and a scholarly mastery of almost everything that was published about the war during the seven anxious years which followed its conclusion. Roger Louis

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West African Studies (Macmillan 2nd Edn., London, 1901) pp. 326-7.

15  
Wilmot was in Tobruk with the British and Australian force which gave Rommel his first taste of defeat. I cannot resist quoting an appraisal of the 9th Australian Division which was made to me by a senior British officer, my colleague in the Historical Section of the War Cabinet, who had fought alongside it. 'Every soldier in that Division', he told me, 'was fit to be an officer.' Wilmot died on 10 January 1954 in the crash of a Comet aircraft.

is an American historian, still at the height of his powers, who has delved more deeply than any other scholar into the wartime archives of Washington and London, Canberra and Wellington. In the books of both authors we see clearly identified two main causes of the widening rift within the British-American combination. The first cause was ideological; the two peoples spoke the same language, but gave different meanings to the same words. The second cause has already been demonstrated in the graphs which plot the rapid rise of American power and the comparative decline of British power.<sup>16</sup> The time was rapidly approaching when the Americans would feel moved to call their own separate tune in the politics of war and peace.

In writing about ideologies one must run the risk of appearing cynical. Machiavelli instructed the rulers of his time in the art of not being good; but he also told them that they would find it profitable to seem good—and still more profitable, he might well have added, if they could seem good to themselves. When Great Britain was waging an unjust war against the South African Republic, the majority of British people seemed good to themselves. When the United States were waging a just war against the German, Italian and Japanese aggressors, the overwhelming majority of American citizens seemed good to themselves. Wendell Willkie, the Republican Party's Presidential candidate, told them that they were fighting for peace and justice in 'One World'. Secretary of State Wallace told them that their victory would inaugurate "The Century of the Common Man". Other people told them—and what was the difference?—that it would inaugurate 'The American Century'. After the war had been won, General Eisenhower told them that they had been fighting a "Crusade". On pages 473-4 of his book<sup>17</sup> he gave more generous praise to the Russians than he gave to the British. The American and Russian peoples, he wrote, had maintained 'an unbroken friendship that dated back to the birth of the United States as an independent nation'. Both peoples, he added—with total ignorance of history—were 'free from the stigma of colonial empire building by force'. Sentiments such as these found expression not only in the broadcasts, pamphlets and books which were addressed to American citizens in the mass; they also found expression, by implication at least, in the official briefing papers which President Roosevelt took with him to the conferences which he held with Churchill, Chiang-Kai-Shek, and Stalin. Churchill, an old-fashioned imperial patriot, made no apologies for that part of the world that was marked red on the map; but he was willing at times to call it the British Empire and Commonwealth, or even the Commonwealth of Nations. As he once put it, 'we keep trade labels to suit all tastes'.<sup>18</sup> In reality, he had even more to fear, as he discovered after the war, from Britain's Mountbatten than from America's Roosevelt.

Towards the end of 1943, Roosevelt's bid for his country's primacy as 'Good Neighbour to the World' found expression in the habit he formed of closing the door on Churchill while he held private talks with more promising partners in service to the Four Freedoms. At Cairo in November 1943 he held private talks with Chiang-Kai-Shek. At Yalta in February 1945 he held private talks with Stalin. Unfortunately, the agreement achieved at Yalta contained an astonishing contradiction with the agreement which had been achieved fifteen months earlier at Cairo.

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See p. 169 above.

17

Crusade in Europe (New York 1948).

18

Louis op. cit. p. 16.

Traditionally, the Americans had regarded the Chinese as their best friends in Asia. The President hoped to promote them to the position of privilege hitherto assigned to the Americans, the British and the Russians in the emergent Charter of the United Nations Organisation. At the Cairo Conference he offered to the Chinese the status of a Great Power. Would they, to begin with, accept possession of French Indochina and British Hong Kong, subject only to the code of conduct which was being drafted for United Nations Trust Territories? Chiang Kai-Shek showed no desire to have such greatness thrust upon his nation. What he really wanted was to recover the territories filched from China by the Japanese. This objective he achieved—or so it then seemed. Roosevelt and Chiang agreed at Cairo

that the four northern provinces of China, Taiwan, and the Penghu Islands [Pescadores] which Japan had taken from China by force must be restored to China after the war, it being understood that the Liaotung Peninsula and its two ports, Lushun (Port Arthur) and Dairen, must be included.<sup>19</sup>

Those were plain words; but fifteen months later equally plain words at Yalta granted to the Russians the rights and powers in North China which had been promised to the Chinese.

In the title of his second-last chapter, Chester Wilmot called the Yalta Conference 'Stalin's Greatest Victory'. That victory was made possible—but not inevitable—by the course which the war was taking both in Europe and in the Pacific area. To consider Europe first: in early winter 1944, Eisenhower's armies were closer to Berlin than were the Russian armies on the Vistula; but Hitler responded by sending his strategic reserve to the western front. When the Yalta Conference met, Eisenhower's armies were regrouping after a heavy defeat; whereas the Soviet armies had advanced through Poland to the eastern frontier of Germany. A puppet government controlled Poland.

In the Pacific, America's naval, air and land forces were in close striking distance of Japan. Their commanders believed that they could enforce unconditional surrender on the Japanese without mounting an invasion of the homeland. In Washington the Chiefs of Staff gave contrary advice to the President: the Japanese would never surrender unless and until they were overwhelmed by an invading army. The cost in American lives would be appalling—they argued—unless the Russians were brought into the war.

So much for the strategic background to the Yalta Conference. China was not represented. Roosevelt, the chosen chairman, saw himself as a mediator between Churchill and Stalin. In February 1945, in a private meeting which he held with Stalin, the price was fixed for Soviet Russia's undertaking to join the war against Japan. In effect, Russia would have restored to her everything that she had lost when she had signed peace, forty years earlier, with the victorious Japanese. She would regain possession of the naval base of Port Arthur, the 'international port' of Dairen, and the southern half of Sakhalin. In addition, she would become sovereign ruler of the Kurile Islands—without any strings of 'trusteeship'—although she had never before possessed the title deeds of sovereignty. As a sop to China, her legal sovereignty in Manchuria was recognised, but 'the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union' were safeguarded by establishing a Soviet-Chinese Company to manage the Manchurian railways.

President Roosevelt, one could say, was shedding his ideological rhetoric and coming to grips with the realities of power. He had discovered his error in nominating Nationalist China as the world's 'Fourth Policeman'. He had discovered the necessity of securing Russian participation in the emergent

world-order of the United Nations Organisation. If this is the correct interpretation of the volte face which he made between the conferences of Cairo and Yalta, it would correspond precisely with the story told by Professor Louis of the course of political argument in Washington. There also the ideologists were yielding ground to the realists. To the former, 'empire' and 'colony' were dirty words; but 'trusteeship' was a clean word, because it signified accountability to an international authority.<sup>20</sup> Precisely for that reason the admirals and the generals loathed the word. American soldiers and sailors, they insisted, had shed their blood to drive the Japanese from their bases in the Pacific Ocean. What American valour had won the American nation must hold, free from the trammels of international inspection and accountability. At the price of a small verbal concession, the military realists won their battle with the political idealists. The Charter of the United Nations Organisation recognises a special category of Trusteeship, that of Strategic Trust Territory. It is indistinguishable from what the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, called a "strategical outpost" of American power.

The conquered Japanese islands were tiny. One of them, Bikini, made the headlines when the Americans used it for testing atomic bombs, but America's strategical outposts have been moved westwards across the Pacific to Australia. It seemed for a time that the strategic planners had bypassed the peoples of Micronesia; but that, as will later appear, is no longer the situation.

The short story that has been told in Section IV of this paper moves now towards an ironic conclusion. Whatever President Roosevelt's motives had been when he made his bid for Stalin's military support against the Japanese—to save American lives, it is generally agreed, headed the list—Stalin got what he wanted without the loss of a single Soviet soldier. How this happened may be demonstrated in a terse chronology of sensational events.

6 August 1945: An atomic bomb is dropped on Hiroshima.

9 August 1945: An atomic bomb is dropped on Nagasaki.

Russia declares war on Japan.

10 August 1945: Japan surrenders unconditionally.

By far the best account of how the atomic bomb was made, and of how the decision to use it was made, will be found in the opening volume, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945, of a magisterial series by Professor M.M. Gowing (London 1964). Some reflections will be offered towards the conclusion of this paper on the significance for Man and for Nature of the events of those five days in August 1945. Meanwhile, let me return to Smuts, whose first-hand evidence on the horrors of war has already been quoted.<sup>21</sup> When the news from Hiroshima and Nagasaki reached him he wrote

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The theory and the practice of trusteeship, as expounded—for example—by Lord Lugard, were of British origin. 'Decolonisation', a later entrant into the vocabulary of politics, was practised by the British in 1864, when they surrendered their sovereignty of the Ionian Islands in favour of the Kingdom of Greece. In the land of Odysseus and Penelope the men still play cricket. What is more, they still bowl underarm.

21

See pp. 164-165 above.

We are now forewarned of what is coming if war is not ended for good. At last a discovery has been made which should put war out of court for good and all.

Two months later, those springs of hope were running dry.

Even the atomic bomb may not be enough to give us peace. It becomes a rivalry as to who can make the most dreadful and destructive atomic bombs. And so we muddle on to the edge of the volcano.

Smuts, like his friend Niels Bohr, was well aware that the Pax Americana would not retain for long its monopoly of the weapons of nuclear warfare.<sup>22</sup>

## V.

### Australia Seeks Shelter in the Pax Americana

The word Pax, as we have been using it, is not a synonym for the Leviathan of Thomas Hobbes. It signifies an area of security far more extensive than the area which is symbolised by a national or imperial flag. To be sure, this area possesses at its centre a government which is pre-eminent both in its armed forces and in the economic resources which sustain them; but in the operations of this government peaceful penetration reinforces formal command. Like our solar system, the central mass of energy attracts orbiting planets.

We have seen the Pax Britannica sinking and the Pax Americana rising. On 27 December 1941 this seismic shift of world power found dramatic recognition in Prime Minister John Curtin's end-of-year message to the Australian people.

...We look for a solid and impregnable barrier of the democracies against the three Axis Powers and we refuse to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must be treated as a subordinate segment of the general conflict... The Australian Government therefore regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the democracies' fighting plan. Without any inhibition of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free from any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom. We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces... But we know too that Australia can go, and Britain can still hold on. We are therefore determined that Australia shall not go, and we shall exert all our energies towards the shaping of a plan, with the United States as its keystone, which will give to our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy.

When Curtin made this statement the President and the Prime Minister with their military advisers were in conference in Washington. There they committed themselves to victory in Europe as the first strategical objective and as the precondition of final victory over the Japanese. They brushed aside Curtin's attempt—as they interpreted it—to overturn their grand-strategical plan. Churchill growled, Roosevelt smelt panic. But they were both wrong. The Australian Prime Minister was not a timid suppliant for American protection. He was talking sense to his own people.

The passage quoted above can be understood only in the complete context of Curtin's statement and of the military tornado which was devastating Australia's Near North. Singapore surrendered on 15 February 1942. In the months immediately following the Japanese overwhelmed both the Philippines and Dutch Indonesia. They established strong forces in New Guinea. Not to have recalled the majority of Australian forces from the Middle East would have been unforgiveably irresponsible. Nevertheless the Australian Ninth Division remained in Egypt to play its indispensable part in the victory of Alamein. More than 40,000 airmen in their dark blue uniforms remained a heartening presence in Britain until V.E. Day.

In March 1942 General Douglas MacArthur established his headquarters in Australia as Supreme Commander in the South-West Pacific. In May and June, the United States Navy in the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway scotched the danger of a direct Japanese assault on Australia. Thereafter American land forces supported the Australian Divisions which bore the brunt of the bitter fighting in New Guinea. Curtin's announcement, 'We look to America', had been proved realistic; but looking to America did not signify looking away from Britain. On the contrary, in August 1943 and again in May 1944 Curtin made proposals to reinforce the consultative procedures of the British Commonwealth with a permanent Secretariat. Australia's partners in the Commonwealth rejected those proposals; but in the very different Commonwealth of today we see them operative.

John Curtin and his successor J.B. Chifley maintained from start to finish their close personal concern with the policies and procedures of the British Commonwealth. With this reservation, they allowed Dr. H.V. Evatt to make the running in Australia's foreign policy. Evatt's concerns were both global and regional. Resentful of Australia's exclusion from the British-American planning of grand strategy, he was determined that Australia's voice would be heard in the planning for peace. He played a leading part in securing for the middle- and low-ranking powers a more effective voice in the United Nations Organisation than had been proposed for them by the Great Powers. He insisted that the concept of colonial dependence could no longer be tolerated and that the concept of the Trust Territory must take its place—everywhere, except in Papua, Australia's colonial dependency. When the war was over, he negotiated a Trusteeship Agreement for Australia's Mandated Territory of New Guinea; but Article IV of that Agreement provided that the territory would be administered 'as if it were an integral part of Australia'. Would it be true to say of Evatt that he was 'liberal abroad, conservative at home'? Certainly, he never found any difficulty in combining his global idealism with Australia's long tradition of expansionist ambitions in the Pacific area. That combination seemed just as natural to the New Zealanders. In 1943 Evatt was contemplating the transfer from Britain to Australia and New Zealand of all the areas that were marked red on the map of the South Pacific. In January 1944 he negotiated with New Zealand the ANZAC PACT, within which global idealism was combined with nationalist self-assertion. The idealism found expression after the war in the South Pacific Commission; but nothing came of the proposal to establish in the South Pacific a 'zone of security' within which Australia and New Zealand would assume 'full responsibility for policing'. In 1948, the year of the Berlin air-lift and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Australians and New Zealanders cherished the hope that their area also would have its NATO. That hope was not fulfilled. The Menzies government, which achieved power in December 1949, pursued a more limited objective. It made its bid for Australian security within the Pax Americana.

Hatred of the Japanese and fear of their resurgence as a predatory nation was common ground for the great majority of Australians and their political representatives. For this reason the Labor government had used its leverage in London to get an Australian appointed as head of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force which was sent to Japan after V.J. Day. But General MacArthur was already there in his capacity as Supreme Military Commander and—in effect—supreme ruler of

the conquered Japanese people. What Australia or any other ally of America might want meant nothing to MacArthur. His main purpose was to bring the Japanese into the American orbit. That meant getting them on their feet again, economically to begin with and in due time politically. In June 1950 the United States government had circulated the text of the Peace Treaty which it proposed for signature by the Allied Nations and by an independent Japanese government. This treaty recognised, among other things, the inherent right of Japan as a sovereign state to 'individual and collective self-defence'. So the Japanese would soon be rebuilding their armed forces? The Australians smelt danger. Partly in fear, partly in hope, they turned once again to America.

On 1 September 1951 a Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States (the ANZUS Treaty) was signed at San Francisco. It was the achievement of Sir Percy Spender, Dr Evatt's successor in the conduct of Australia's foreign policy. The British government disliked the treaty. The American government saw no need for it. Mr R. G. Menzies, Australia's newly elected Prime Minister, felt no enthusiasm for it. Nevertheless he allowed Sir Percy Spender a free hand in negotiating it. Spender had two trump cards to play. First, he warned the Americans that Australia would not sign the proposed treaty with Japan unless she received from the United States reinsurance against the danger of Japanese rearmament. Secondly, he insisted that Australia was not a timid suppliant but a resolute ally. In proof of that he emphasised Australia's military commitment to the defence of South Korea against communist invasion from the North.

Spender's arguments persuaded the Americans to give him what he wanted; but for two reasons they were short-sighted. First, he knew absolutely nothing about the fears and hopes of the defeated Japanese people. They did not want a second round of military adventure. They wanted to get rich. As late as 1981, they were spending on their armed forces not even 1 per cent of their gross national product. As early as 1957, even the Australians gave them formal recognition as a partner in the business of getting rich. The Trade Agreement which was signed in Canberra that year foreshadowed the rapid emergence of Japan as the main market for Australian wool, as a strong bidder for Australian minerals and coal and—some years later—as a leading supplier of capital. As for America, a lot of people there would soon be complaining that the Japanese were growing too rich too quickly, and at their expense.

In the second place, Spender served the Americans ill when he banged the ideological drum. Ideological fervour, as we have already seen, was already their occupational disease. It is invariably a deceitful guide to the statesmen and peoples who are at grips with the crucial issues of peace and war. Queen Elizabeth Tudor understood that basic truth. One of her principal advisers, Mr. Secretary Walsingham, wanted her to commit her country to a struggle all the time of all the Protestants against all the Catholics. "May God save us" she retorted, "from you and your brethren in Christ". She was a believing Christian, an English patriot, and a skilful practitioner of the politics of power. By contrast, John Foster Dulles and Sir Percival Spender saw the crucial issues of war and peace through the distorting spectacles of anti-communist rhetoric. Soviet Russia was indeed a dangerous enemy, not only because its leaders had gone to school with Marx and Lenin, but because they had inherited the expansionist ambitions of the Czars. By contrast, Marshall Tito, who also had gone to school with Marx and Lenin, was a Yugoslav patriot. Might not the Americans have thought twice before they branded Ho Chi Min as a dangerous enemy? And why did they wait until the 1970's before granting diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China? One could ask many other questions such as these, in order to make one simple point. The traditions, needs and aspirations of the different peoples, including those peoples which are labelled communist, are many and various. Both Dulles and Spender were skilful lawyers; but neither of them had any feeling for history.

Enough of this. It is time to examine the ANZUS treaty. Articles III, IV and V constitute its core. Therein the contracting parties pledge themselves to effective self-help and to mutual aid in their preparations to resist aggression; to consultation with each other when aggression is threatened; to action by each signatory 'in accordance with its constitutional processes'. The constitutional processes of Australia facilitate immediate action; the constitutional processes of America facilitate delay. Only an optimist can read into these three articles a firm guarantee of Australia's security. Article VII of the Treaty establishes a Council of Foreign Ministers to consider matters which concern its implementation. Article X declares that the Treaty shall continue indefinitely; but it also declares that any party to it may cease to be a member of the Council after giving one year's notice.

The ANZUS Treaty, like the Methuen Treaty between England and Portugal, could quite easily trundle along for three centuries with its varying ups and downs, its costs and benefits. Dr T.B. Millar has compared it to an insurance policy which requires the regular payment of a premium. As examples of this premium, he has cited the 3 years of Australian military involvement in Korea, the 7 years of involvement in Vietnam, and "the derogation of sovereignty" which successive governments accepted when they permitted the United States to establish on Australian soil their 'strategic outposts'. A critic of Dr Millar's concept has argued that the cost of the premium cannot be precisely measured by his yardstick. She suggests that the benefit—year after year of peace—is being received already.<sup>23</sup> It could just as well be argued that the insurance company will be unable or unwilling to make the payment when it falls due—that is to say, when Australia is threatened by direct and immediate attack.

In the concluding Section of this paper some questions will be raised about those American strategic outposts on Australian soil; but let us now take one last look at the Australian people while they still remained poised between the waning Pax Britannica and the waxing Pax Americana. In 1941, looking to America had not meant looking away from Britain; nor did it mean that in 1951. Only one year previously, pertinacious studies that had been pursued both in Australia and Britain bore fruit in the Colombo Plan for economic and technological cooperation in a wider world. Only one year later, Australia hosted the testing of British atomic weapons in the Monte Bello islands off Australia's north-western coast. Four years later, Prime Minister Menzies was doing his best to get Britain off the hook in the Suez Canal crisis. The Australians sent soldiers, sailors and airmen to South Korea and Vietnam; but they also sent them to Malaya, Singapore and Borneo. It is fair to say that the British stopped looking to Australia before the Australians stopped looking to Britain. In 1967 a British Defence White Paper put on record the precise steps that were being taken to withdraw all their armed forces from East of Suez by the early 1970's. In 1962 the British Government had made its first bid to join the European Economic Community. Its third bid, in 1972, proved successful. By this time, Britain's military, economic and political interests had become predominantly European.

Nevertheless, something more of the Commonwealth of Nations remained than the smile on the face of the Cheshire Cat. Before the end of the 1960's almost all of the Commonwealth's members, irrespective of class and colour, had achieved sovereign independence. In 1980 the elections of Zimbabwe were supervised by some 1,400 Commonwealth soldiers, assisted by 500 British bobbies. When their work was done the police made a farewell gift of their helmets to the people whom they had helped. Those helmets are conspicuous today as the cherished possessions of Zimbabwe's halls, pubs, markets and—for the fortunate few—the homes

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See various articles by Dr. Coral Bell in the Melbourne Age during 1980 and 1981.



of ministers, officials and guerilla fighters. Thirty three years earlier, the parting between India and Britain had taken place, not with this homely informality, but with ceremonial splendour. Nevertheless, when India left the Empire she joined the Commonwealth because, as Jawaharlal Nehru told his people, it has 'a touch of healing'.

We still need healing.

## VI.

### Thermonuclear Strategies

"The explosion at Hiroshima was cataclysmic. It shattered the continuities of history'.<sup>24</sup> Was that statement true or false? Niels Bohr, as we have already seen, foreboded a seismic shift in the destiny of mankind. Sir John Anderson, Lord Halifax, Lord Cherwell and General Smuts shared his foreboding. In the United States, Mr. Justice Frankfurter shared it and so—we may surely assume—did some other well-informed Americans. It was shared by some at least of the scientists and engineers who had made the atom bomb. By contrast, President Truman declared in retrospect that his decision to drop the bomb had cost him not even one night's sleep.

All appearances to the contrary, Truman's statement was not callous. He knew that the bitter fighting on the small island of Okinawa had cost the Americans 80,000 casualties and had cost the Japanese many thousands more. He had been advised that these figures would be multiplied tenfold at the very least if the war were carried into the Japanese homeland.<sup>25</sup> He hoped and believed that the two atomic bombs would achieve the immediate unconditional surrender of Japan and thus write Finis to the Second World War. The event proved him right.

According to the contemporary estimate, 100,000 Japanese civilians were killed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.<sup>26</sup> Earlier that year, conventional fire-bombs and explosive bombs had killed many more people in Dresden and Tokyo. It was therefore possible to consider the advent of nuclear war as a difference not of kind, but of degree. That word of evil omen, escalation, had not yet become current. Escalation, nevertheless, was already written into the record of Britain's Bomber Command. The earliest British raids on Germany had been directed, as international law required, against targets of military significance, such as armaments factories and oil refineries; but the navigational and aiming techniques of that time fell far short of the precision which was required if the bombers were to get anywhere near those targets. To prove that fact took time; but from early 1942 onwards the bombers were under instruction to aim at the centres of German cities. Precision bombing, as originally planned, did not become possible

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W.K. Hancock, Four Studies of War and Peace in This Century (C.U.P. 1961) p. 2.

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Recently, the Allies at the Potsdam Conference had modified their demand for unconditional surrender, but not sufficiently to bring the Japanese to the conference table.

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No estimate was made, nor could it then have been made, of the postponed deaths and deformities caused by genetic damage to inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The estimates which some historians have made of deaths in Dresden and other German cities are disputable.

until the concluding phase of the war, when the British and the Americans were achieving indisputable command of the air.<sup>27</sup>

In the autumn and winter of 1940-41 London, Coventry, Birmingham and other British cities had been at the receiving end of area bombing. The mood of the British people was to hit back. As Churchill put it, '... we shall mete out to the Germans the measure, and more than the measure, that they have meted out to us'. Churchill told the people what they passionately wanted to hear. After listening for so long to the syncopated engine-beat of the incoming German bombers, they found it exhilarating to hear the steadier engine-beat of their own bombers on course for Berlin or Cologne or Nuremberg. Later on, that euphoric mood became shadowed for quite a lot of them by doubt, and even by pity. In the much advertised assault on Hamburg (15 July, 1943) the docks and factories suffered no damage, but in the residential areas scores of thousands of men, women and children perished in an inferno of flame. In the aftermath of the Dresden inferno, the British government at long last cancelled the strategy of area-bombing. Yet there was something unpleasantly furtive in its change of front. The bomber crews had suffered casualties proportionately far heavier than those in any other branch of Britain's armed forces; but they received no adequate recognition of their steady courage. Today, in Westminster Abbey, we may see a plaque which records the name of every fighter pilot who died in service to his country. No plaque records the service and sacrifice of the men of Bomber Command.

The story that has just been told could be used to reinforce the argument that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was no more than a bend in the road along which Homo sapiens was already marching. That argument could be further reinforced if the story were also told of American bombing in Vietnam and Cambodia. But Michael Walzer, after briefly summarising both stories, has reached the opposite conclusion.

A new kind of war was born at Hiroshima... Though fewer people were killed than in the fire bombing of Tokyo, they were killed with monstrous ease. One plane, one bomb: with such a weapon the 350 planes that raided Tokyo would virtually have wiped out life on the Japanese islands. Atomic war was death indeed, indiscriminate and total, and after Hiroshima, the first task of political leaders everywhere was to prevent its recurrence.<sup>28</sup>

The fumbings of the world's political leaders with that task have been measured numerically by Sidney D. Drell in his article,<sup>29</sup> 'Arms Control: Is there still Hope?'. Drell, a theoretical physicist and Director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Centre, writes on his first page as follows:

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See Mr Noble Frankland's short classic, The Bombing Offensive Against Germany (London 1965). It is compulsory reading for every serious student of war in this century.

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Just and Unjust Wars, p. 269.

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Daedalus, Vol. 109, pp. 155-175. Daedalus is the Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the number which contains Dr. Drell's contribution is entitled 'U.S. Defence Policy in the 1980's'.

Thirty five years have passed since the fireballs of the first atomic bombs... lighted the dawn of the nuclear age, the age which Winston Churchill called "the second coming in wrath". Their increase by a factor of one thousand in the scale of destructiveness was followed swiftly by yet another increase—again by a factor of one thousand—in explosive power with the advent of the hydrogen bomb. Since then the world has stockpiled some forty thousand nuclear bombs, about 99 per-cent of which belong to the United States and the Soviet Union. This growth of nuclear stockpiles has occurred at the same time as, and despite, frequent official statements of the nations' solemn commitment to control and reduce the nuclear threat; despite also the realization that we have accumulated so many nuclear weapons that the survival of civilization as we know it would be threatened were our nuclear stockpiles ever unleashed. Indeed, the number of nuclear warheads deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union on our long-range strategic systems has grown to more than fifteen thousand, or by a factor of more than two and one-half since we began the intensive SALT negotiation efforts a little more than ten years ago, with the primary purpose to limit these very same weapons. Not only have they increased in numbers, their prodigious technological improvements have created new difficulties for arms control, for verification and for strategic stability, at a faster pace than negotiations have progressed.

Drell draws a little comfort from the fact that these nuclear weapons have not as yet been used. In the nasty conflicts which have afflicted and are still afflicting the comparatively weak nations of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, the two global giants have backed different sides; but they have stopped short of attacking each other. The knowledge that each of them possesses the power to destroy its rival has kept their fingers away from the nuclear buttons. In the jargon of international diplomacy this knowledge has been labelled M.A.D.—Mutual Assured Destruction. Has the consequential policy of 'deterrence' been merely prudential, or may we discern in it a growing realisation of the responsibility which the nuclear powers hold for the whole community of nations, and for the earth which they are aimlessly despoiling? Whatever may be the answer to this question, M.A.D. and the related posture of "deterrence" now belong to a rapidly vanishing past. Strategic planning is keeping step with the runaway technologies that are spawned by the physicists, the engineers and the military experts. Planning is under way in Moscow and Washington for 'limited' nuclear war, for 'counterforce', principally as response strategies.

The word 'escalation' still remains unfashionable among the planners; but its absence should make us afraid. "Today", writes Dr. Drell, "we are faced with a deadly dangerous dilemma. On the one hand, we have no evidence from history to lead to the conclusion that war in the long run can be avoided. On the other hand, there is also no evidence from history to tell us what a nuclear war would be like."

The second of these statements is not wholly true. As we have already seen, the explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki have told us a good deal about what a nuclear war would be like. The first statement may be challenged, and by anticipation has in fact been challenged, on the basis of evidence which has been submitted, not by a historian, but by a social anthropologist. Her name is Elizabeth Marshall Thomas; her book is entitled The Harmless People (London 1959). In a lecture delivered eight years ago, I called her to witness.

I read last year a fascinating study of the Bushmen who live in the Kalahari desert of southern Africa. These small bands of hunters and gatherers have possessed for many thousands of years a weapon which is as much a threat to their survival as the Bomb is to ours. It is a tiny

arrow, pointed with bone and smeared with a deadly poison. In the hunt it is their main weapon, but they do not use it in war. Their virtues of the heart and of the head have held them back from the threshold of race suicide. For many thousands of years, their small societies have lived peaceably with each other.

What men have achieved once they may achieve again. In the menacing seas of our troubled time I cling to my small spar of hope.<sup>30</sup>

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From now on I shall be writing a good deal in the first person singular and sometimes in the first person plural. My immediate tasks are first, to find out how social anthropologists and prehistorians assess the quality of Elizabeth Marshall's book; secondly, to check the accuracy of some shocking news which has reached me from South Africa. Two people whom I know well have told me that the Republican Government is using those Kalahari Bushmen as trackers and killers in Namibia.

What can I say if this information is proved true, as I believe it will be? No Australian has the right to take the pose of 'Holier than Thou', for not so long ago our white policemen were hiring black subordinates to help them hunt and sometimes kill their fellow blacks. Similar practices were once the norm in almost every European colony. Even so, these white colonists are not alone in the dock. The entire human species stands on trial.

Jonathan Swift is the prosecuting counsel. His Gulliver is cast ashore in the land of the Houynymhms, a race of noble horses who live conformably with the rule of reason. The menial tasks of their society are performed by detestable creatures called Yahoos. When Gulliver reports to the Master Horse the achievements of civilised society, that wise creature comments as follows:

That he looked upon us as a Sort of Animal, to whose Share, by what Accident he could not conjecture, some small Pittance of REASON had fallen, whereof we made no other USE than by its ASSISTANCE to aggravate our NATURAL Corruptions, and to acquire new ones which Nature had not given us.

To his horror, Gulliver recognises himself as a Yahoo. He is denied the felicity of spending the rest of his years with the wise and magnanimous Houynymhms. After many adventures he returns home.

As soon as I entered the House, my Wife took me in her Arms, and kissed me; at which, not having been used to the Touch of that Odious Animal for so many years, I fell in a Swoon for almost an hour.

Of course I was wide of the mark just now when I made Swift a party to formal proceedings in a court of law. He was a loner, a passionate pamphleteer driven almost mad by his horror of la bêtise humaine. He possessed the gift of delighting his readers and at the same time shocking them. His purpose in Gulliver's Travels was to 'vex the world rather than divert it'. Today, our need to be vexed is urgent.

## VII.

**Our Interests, Obligations and Opportunities**

Modern History touches us so nearly, it is so deep a question of life and death, that we are bound to find our own way through it... bearing this in mind, that if we lower our standard in History, we cannot uphold it on Church or State.

[Lord Acton, Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge]  
I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and seeks her adversary, but slinks out of the race...  
[John Milton, Areopagitica]

In what follows I shall take my stand in three capacities: as a human person, as an academic student of peace and war, as an Australian citizen.

Today is Good Friday, 17 April 1981. In the week now ending the space shuttle COLUMBIA was launched at Cape Canaveral. Two days later, it returned safe to earth. Australian scientists in the Orroral valley, barely twenty miles from where I live, have played a useful part in this enterprise. My colleague Professor D.J. Mathewson, head of the Department of Astronomy in the Australian National University, has acclaimed it as an epoch-making achievement of man's unconquerable mind. He looks forward to the establishment in outer space of industrial installations and even cities. For two reasons, I cannot share his euphoria. First, Global 2000, a report presented last year to the President of the United States, prognosticates for the decades immediately ahead an exponential acceleration of the pressures of population, pillage and pollution which are already afflicting Mother Earth. Should we not therefore clean up the mess we are making in the homeland of our species before we shoot the mess into outer space? Secondly, I take note that Professor Mathewson makes no reference to the military significance of the space shuttle. In Washington, the Pentagon has already made good its bid for immediate possession of 60 percent of COLUMBIA's facilities. This week's dazzling technological achievement is making the United States front runner, at least for the time being, in the macabre race for military dominance in outer space.

Let me now look briefly at the global dimensions of thermonuclear strategy as they have taken shape since "the second coming in wrath" at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was in Britain that the Bomb had been proved a feasible wartime project. The British conveyed the information to the Americans and it was in America that the first atom bombs were made. Lord Zuckerman, who was for many years chief scientific adviser to Britain's Ministry of Defence, has stated as follows his conviction on the crucial issue: 'how the community of mankind may be able to live with the Bomb'.

My first point is that one real danger of nuclear war is that we have ceased to understand what we are talking about. How can one imagine the reality? The possible elimination, not only of, say half, the population of the Northern Hemisphere, but also the elimination of the better part of the cultural history of our globe.

Zuckerman's statement is reported in the Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. XXXIV, No. 3 (December 1980).<sup>31</sup> In the ensuing discussion emphasis was laid on three particular dangers—inadvertance, miscalculation, and escalation. "Efforts to bring American policy under central direction", it was stated, "must be said to have failed." It was also stated that the policy of

deterrence (M.A.D.) had yielded place to the more dangerous policy of compellence.

The exploration of nuclear weapons for compellence rather than deterrence provides fertile ground for dangerous miscalculations of capabilities and intentions. Nuclear compellence implies nuclear competition aimed at ascendancy rather than parity.

The threat and counter-threat of launching Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles no longer remains the immediate preoccupation of the global giants.

Perhaps a more likely scenario for the initiation of nuclear conflict would be the employment of nuclear weapons in a limited theatre of war. Escalation would seem to be inevitable unless one supposes that the opponent for some reason might fail to respond in kind—a highly improbable supposition.

Must we believe what Lord Zuckerman and his interlocutors tell us? If we do believe it, what can we say and do? Jonathan Swift, if he could return to earth, would write a new Gulliver to portray the males and females of our species as Yahoos. Thomas Hobbes, if he could return, would be looking for a bomb-proof funk-hole. But where on earth would he find it? Perhaps in Patagonia?

We may respect Hobbes for his rigorous probing of the politics of power; but Thucydides found matter for study in the contending claims of power and righteousness.<sup>32</sup> He had his roots not only in the emergent New Learning of Greek philosophy and science, but also in the Ancient Wisdom of Greek myth and drama. He must surely have witnessed in Athens the enactment of Prometheus Bound, the tragic drama of Aeschylus. In Greek mythology, Zeus alone hurled thunderbolts; but Prometheus stole fire from heaven and provoked the jealousy of the gods. In our time, the prerogative of hurling thunderbolts has been usurped by two thermonuclear giants and a few of the smaller fry. So far, so bad.

It is the interest and obligation of every concerned individual to repudiate this insane rivalry. It is the interest and obligation of every academic student of peace and war to ponder its cause and cure. This, precisely, is the task acknowledged by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. On both sides of the Atlantic, experienced and clear-headed individuals are challenging the thermonuclear contenders to speak to each other and to the entire community of nations in the first person plural and to declare—"We accept the responsibility which history has laid upon us to protect this earth, its green mantle of plants and its communities of men, women and children.

From now on I shall be clearing my mind, so far as I am able, about the present situation and the future prospects of my own country as a western outpost of the Pax Americana. As we have already seen, the ANZUS treaty contains no guarantee that the United States will support Australia if and when she braces herself to resist military aggression. Article IV of the treaty pledges the contracting parties to take action in accordance with their 'constitutional processes'; but America's constitutional processes were designed two centuries ago and therefore embody the then-prevailing doctrine of separation of powers. For this reason the

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This Bulletin reports a discussion of the concluding chapter of The Dangers of Nuclear War, edited by Franklyn Griffiths and John G. Polanyi, University of Toronto Press, 1979.

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The Greek word dikaiosune signifies both justice and righteousness. By equating it with justitia, the Romans may have opened the way to narrower legalistic interpretations.

Senate was enabled in 1919 to dishonour President Wilson's signature of the Treaty of Versailles, to refuse membership of the League of Nations and to force America into hemispheric isolation. In the 1930's, the Neutrality Acts built a legalistic fence around isolationist America. By contrast, America's commitments today are global; but they do not constrain the American government and people to fly to the aid of every endangered ally or client. On 25 July 1969 President Nixon made this crystal clear in a much-quoted statement at Guam. Seven years later Mr George McBundy, formerly the Assistant to the President for Security Affairs, restated the 'Nixon Doctrine' as follows:

The American commitment anywhere is only as deep as the continued conviction of Americans that their interests require it.

Successive Australian governments have long been well aware that the United States acknowledges no obligation to come to their aid in military combat. They might therefore have been expected to adopt a self-reliant posture of foreign policy and to make that posture good by spending more thought and more money on national defence. But they sought an easier and cheaper way of assuaging their fears. Would not a firm American commitment to Australian security be made strategically compulsive if the Americans were granted the right to establish on Australian soil military installations which would extend the range and impact of their global power? In May 1963 an Agreement was signed between the Commonwealth of Australia and the United States of America to establish a United States Naval Communications Station at North West Cape, on a coast which had been charted by Dutch navigators three and a half centuries ago.<sup>33</sup>

Many similar agreements have since been signed; but until recently they have been too little discussed in Australia. Knowledge which is already on record in American Congressional Papers and in the Sunday edition of the New York Times has been withheld from the Australian public. Inevitably, a useful but unpleasant safety valve has been found in 'leaks' of information to journalists by politicians and public servants. In 1980 these leaks were supplemented, and in some degree superseded, by the publication of four or five substantial books. Two of these books, A suitable piece of real estate, by Desmond Ball (Hale and Iremonger, Sydney) and Rethinking Australia's Defence, by Ross Babbage (University of Queensland Press) pass the strict tests for factual accuracy and logical coherence which are employed by the examiners of doctoral theses and the editors of scholarly periodicals.

Desmond Ball is a Fellow in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University. Every page of his book has a wide margin on which is recorded the precise source of every factual statement that he has made on that page of the text. In his 16 chapters he covers the whole range of American strategic installations on Australian soil. They fall into two main groups: (1) installations that directly serve America's nuclear powered and/or nuclear-armed submarines (North West Cape and the emergent Omega station in East Gippsland): (2) installations whose task it is to gather and disseminate information and guidance to military and political users. Because I possess no knowledge at all of electronic communications, but do possess some knowledge of warships and their armaments, I shall confine myself to a few brief statements based chiefly on Dr. Ball's fourth chapter, which deals with the North West Cape Naval Communications station.

When the Americans and the Australians agreed to establish that Station there were few if any nuclear-powered and/or nuclear-armed submarines in the Indian Ocean. Today, we may take it for granted that many of the American submarines have nuclear propulsion and are armed with SLBM's (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles). This contrast between then and now illustrates a fact of life which we

may assume to be operative in every American scientific and strategic installation on Australian soil: the fact of 'inbuilt technological growth'. If the Menzies government became aware of this fact in the 1960's (this we may doubt, since that government was technologically untutored) it kept its knowledge in the dark. In the early 1970's the Whitlam government became aware of the fact, but did not noise it abroad. Instead, it instructed the Minister of Defence, Mr. Lance Barnard, to re-negotiate the North West Cape Agreement. What Mr Barnard achieved may fairly be called cosmetic. Henceforward the United States Commander of the Station would have under him an Australian Deputy Commander, and the Station would be called a 'Joint Facility.' That was only a little face-lifting; but it created quite a flutter in Washington. Admiral Iselin of the U.S. Navy was asked whether North West Cape was now really and truly a Joint Facility? He replied—

No, it is our complex. There are very, very small numbers of Australians who help man the base.

So the Whitlam government had made a brave gesture and had achieved—what? A false label. On page 88 of his book Dr. Ball reproduces an official photograph of the same false label at the entrance to the installation at Pine Gap in Central Australia, which gathers and transmits military and political intelligence for the benefit of various listed users, including America's Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.).

Towards the conclusion of his book Dr. Ball asks two crucial questions. First, what are the implications of these American installations for the global balance of power? In the days of M.A.D. and deterrence, he answers, they were stabilising; but in these latter days of 'limited' nuclear strategy and counter-force the possibility exists that they are destabilising. Secondly, what are their implications for Australian security? Australia, he answers, is now a nuclear target. The Australian government is well aware of this fact, but has been reluctant to discuss it in public. Towards the end of February 1981 the Soviet ambassador in Canberra was more communicative. Australia, he announced, was targeted.<sup>34</sup> So now at last we can see the consequences of this latter-day strategical re-enactment of Australia's colonial cringe. In 1939 it was in our power to make our own decisions on the issues of peace and war. Those decisions are made for us today in Washington and/or in Moscow.

Before calling Dr Babbage to witness I must take my personal stand on one essential issue. In their capacities as thermonuclear giants, I see the United States and Soviet Russia equally constrained by the same strategical logic. As a consequence, there is little difference that I can see, or that Thomas Hobbes would see if he could return to earth, in the politics of power which they both pursue. By contrast, I perceive an immense intellectual and moral gulf which separates American society from Soviet society. The breadth and depth of that gulf may be measured by what I have already written about the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. No comparable fortress of intellectual freedom and moral courage is conceivable in present-day Soviet Russia; nor will it become conceivable until Soviet citizens make the same dash for freedom as their Polish neighbours are now making. We do not yet know whether or not the Polish dash will prove successful. No more do we know whether the Russian people will ever dare to make a similar dash. Meanwhile, let it be clearly understood that the proposals which I shall soon be making as an Australian citizen are conformable not only with my own country's interests and obligations, but also with America's interests and obligations, as I try to understand them.



And now for Dr. Ross Babbage. For his self-imposed task of 'Rethinking Australia's Defence' he is well qualified. A public servant in the Defence Department, he was granted three years of study-leave which he spent in the A.N.U.'s Strategic and Defence Centre, where his supervisors were Robert O'Neill and Desmond Ball. Today he holds a desk in the Office of National Assessments. In his book he makes no reference to classified documents, but he knows the people who wrote them and possesses their respect. His historical perspective is adequate for the task which he is attempting. In the days of the Pax Britannica, he argues, it was realistic for Australia to adopt the policy of 'forward defence': if Britain and her allies were defeated in Europe and the Middle East, Australia would then be wide open to invasion. In the early years of the Pax Americana, forward defence still seemed to be sound policy; but Britain's retreat from east of Suez and America's disaster in Vietnam now make it obsolete. In consequence, the Australians must brace themselves to defend their own territory with their own resources, 'if necessary alone'. The dimensions of the territory are continental; the population of the continent is very small and widely dispersed. We are in consequence severely challenged to assert our determination to survive as an independent nation, to mobilise our resources of will-power and brain-power, to trust God and to keep our powder dry.

Dr. Babbage does not, of course, use this Cromwellean language. In a series of severely factual chapters he discusses the revolution in conventional military technologies—such down-to-earth transformations as the increasing vulnerability of large and obvious targets, the accelerating pace of tactical war, the increasing effectiveness of medium-technology defensive structures. These items are only a small selection from his long lists of challenges to which we must make realistic responses. He makes no secret of his dissatisfaction with the tardiness of the responses which are now being made in crucial areas such as manpower mobilisation, industrial mobilisation, logistical preparation, tactical training and—above all—free and open discussion between the Australian government and the Australian people. 'The contrast between Australia and nearly every comparable Western country', he declares (p. 142) 'is most marked in this respect'. He tells us that we could learn a great deal from the challenges which confront Sweden and the Swedish responses to those challenges.

Timidity is an evil counsellor, particularly in the crucial issues of peace and war. The Curtin government, I have argued, was not timid but prudent when it turned to America; but the Menzies government was both timid and imprudent when it disregarded the limits of the ANZUS treaty and brought Australia into the front line of thermonuclear confrontation between the United States and Soviet Russia. Ever since the North West Cape Agreement was made eighteen years ago, we have witnessed the continuing presence of America's 'strategic outposts' on Australian territory. Throughout this period, every Australian government has maintained the timid policy of Hush Hush. 'In any case', writes Dr. Ball (p. 138) 'whether Australia should allow itself to be a nuclear target on the grounds of "stabilising" the global balance should be a question for the Australian people to decide'. I applaud that statement. I also applaud the pioneering endeavour of Dr. Babbage to identify in detail the salient features of a self-reliant Australian posture of national defence.

I look forward to the advent of a government which will lead us once again along the road to national self-respect and self-reliance. How long we must wait for this government I do not know. No more do I know how long and how hard the road will be. Let me, however, make a modest proposal for the first step to be taken along the road. The North West Cape Naval Communications Station Agreement has still 7 years to run; but we should give advance notice of our determination to resume our rights of possession when the lease runs out. At the same time we should be preparing alternative facilities for communicating with our own submarines. The work which the Americans are doing today at North West Cape could be done with equal efficiency in the Mariana Islands, which are a United States

Trust Territory. The case against such a transfer is neither technological, nor legal, but moral. Should Australia join forces with the United States to push the people of the South Pacific into a target area? My answer to this question is NO! But let me return to technology. Some of the American installations on Australian soil—those at Pine Gap and Nurrangar, for example—belong to a global network which cannot, as things now stand, be unravelled. Even so, 'it is the first step that counts'. Let us now reassert our freedom to make our own decisions, starting at North West Cape.

To my modest proposal I foresee three objections. The first lays stress on 'signals'; a resolutely independent Australia, it alleges, will be signalling to Moscow and to Washington that the balance of power is shifting from the Pax Americana to the Pax Sovietica and will thereby start a new slide towards the Third World War. In rejecting this argument, let me cite the experience of Europe. If the wealthy western nations had made realistic preparations to defend themselves with 'conventional' weapons, the menace of thermonuclear warfare would be more remote than it is today. My proposal has two prongs: nuclear disengagement starting at North West Cape; realistic preparations for 'conventional' self-defence starting immediately. I envisage our partners in ANZUS heaving a sigh of relief. The Australians, they will say, are making themselves at long last a stabilising influence in the Indo-Pacific region.

The second objection to my proposal emphasises the need for national consensus on the issues of peace and war. Consensus, however, is almost always a matter of more or less. The only written record of a perfect consensus will be found in the Gospels of Matthew, Mark and Luke. 'Let us all stick together', the Gadarene swine grunted, and with one accord they rushed down a steep hill and perished in the Galileean lake. Consensus, in so far as it may be achieved, is a virtue only when it has a firm foundation on a nation's real interests and obligations. The British people achieved a large measure of consensus in the early stages of their unjust war in South Africa; but Emily Hobhouse confronted them with the truth. They achieved it again in the 1930's, when they were grovelling to Mussolini and Hitler; but Winston Churchill and Ernest Bevin confronted them with the truth. The Americans—and for that matter the Australians—achieved a large measure of consensus in the early stages of their ill-conceived and unjust war in Vietnam; but few of them today will openly dispute Michael Walzer's judgement on that war. The right and duty of a minority, even a small minority, to contest majority opinion lies at the root of the freedom which we Australians share with the American and the British peoples. It is the life-giving spring from which we draw our national strength.

The third objection troubles me most. We have been buying at a low price, not security, but the illusion of security. Real security can only be bought at a higher price which we may be unwilling to pay. That price can be defined as the proportion of our gross national product which is allocated to national defence; but I prefer to measure it in terms of the manpower (and womanpower) which we allocate to our armed forces and their industrial and logistical supports. It seems to me wishful thinking to expect our small permanent forces to bear the entire brunt of defending our continent and the approaches to it. These forces will require the patriotic and active support, be it voluntary or compulsory, of the people whom we call 'civilians'. In Britain, civilian volunteers and reservists of the three armed services were giving that support well in advance of the two World Wars. In the dangerous interval which elapsed between the fall of France and Hitler's attack on Russia, millions of Britain's Home Guardsmen rendered indispensable service. It goes without saying that I enjoyed Dad's Army as much as did any other television viewer; but I could produce evidence to prove that a Factory Battalion of Birmingham's Home Guard was a competent military force. That, however, was a British improvisation in short term, whereas we Australians have to think of organisation in long term. In the first decade of this century our government established Citizen Forces, but too much of their time was wasted

in parade-ground drill. If or when we take up the same task where Deakin and Fisher left it, we had better go to school with the Swiss or the Swedes or the Israelis.

Our interests and obligations as a self-reliant nation have been the theme of this paper, but let me now conclude with a quick look at our opportunities. Too often the Australian voice is mistaken—most often, perhaps, in India—for THE VOICE OF AMERICA. Yet there is a good deal that we could say for ourselves and a good deal that we could do in partnership with peoples less 'lucky' than we are. Our small population holds possession of rich natural resources which scientific research and technological skill are mobilising for economic use. Thirty one years ago we committed ourselves in the Colombo Plan to combined operations, with peoples of the Third World, in the war against poverty. We were able to offer not merely small sums of money—shrinking sums, until the recent budget—but also skills for which there is a strong demand. Consider, for example, land-use: the annual reports of the Australian Development and Assistance Bureau (ADAB) include items such as the following—animal husbandry, animal diseases, vaccines—crops, grasses, plant-breeding, forests—dam building, electricity generation, water storage, water reticulation. In the deployment of these and many other skills the contracting parties make contact with each other not only in government offices but in the fields, the drainage basins, the villages and the schools. The Australians learn as much as they teach. Some at least of them, I hope, get their tongues around languages which they never spoke at home.

Is all this 'foreign policy'? If so, it is foreign policy with a human face.