University of Nevada, Reno

Three Essays in Regional Economics

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor

of Philosophy in Economics

by

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August, 2020

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Three Essays in Regional Economics

be accepted in partial fulfillment of the
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Abstract

This dissertation combines three studies of policies and behaviors in the context of different geographic regions to better understand their causes or effects on the economy. The first study examines the relationship between neighborhood poverty rates and both the density and revenue of Video Gambling Terminals (VGT) in Illinois. Using a combination of linear regression methods, I find evidence that VGT revenue and density are greater in neighborhoods with higher poverty rates. In the second study, I use a seemingly Unrelated Regression approach to analyze the correlation between immigrant populations in the member countries of the European Union and changes in voting for far-right parties. The results show no consistent evidence of a relationship between the number of immigrants in a country and voting for far-right parties. Finally, the third study estimates the impacts to Nevada's economy from an increase in the minimum percentage of electricity which come from renewable sources mandate by the state's Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS). I use a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to estimate the impacts of the RPS and a $10 per ton carbon tax, and find that the RPS achieves smaller reductions in CO_2 emissions by the electricity generation sector than the carbon tax, but also does not reduce activity in the sector by as much.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The development of the local and regional economy is a concern that unites everyone that works or lives there. The challenge lies in the fact that there is no simple, uniform prescription for growing a region's economy due to the myriad geographical, cultural, political, and institutional differences even within small areas. This necessitates research on how different events or policies will effect the economies of unique regions to more accurately decide what actions should be taken to anticipate those effects. Contributing to the current knowledge of regional economics, I perform three studies that analyze the effects of institutional changes in various regions on their respective economies.

In Chapter 2, I examine the adoption of Video Gambling Terminals (VGTs) in non-casino establishments across Illinois. VGTs provide a significant source of revenue for businesses, municipalities, and the state. However, the implementation of this policy may place a greater tax burden on certain sociodemographic groups if VGTs are not distributed uniformly across the region.

In Chapter 3, I study the recent increase in support for right-wing political parties and ideologies in the European Union. Particularly, parties with anti-immigrant agendas have gained more votes in recent elections, and therefore more representation in national parliaments across Europe. Is the rise of the right related to changes in immigrant populations in Europe?

Finally, in Chapter 4, I explore the effects of implementing green policies on the state

economy of Nevada. Across the world, various approaches are being taken to combat the effects of global climate change by reducing carbon emissions. Within the U.S., many states now require a minimum percentage of electricity to be generated by renewable sources. However, it is unclear whether the benefits associated such policies outweigh the costs, or whether other carbon policies would be more efficient in practice.

It is my hope that the findings of these three studies can be used to inform policy decisions for any administration that is considering adopting new forms of gambling, immigration restrictions, or emission reduction targets.

Chapter 2

Neighborhood Characteristics and Video Gambling Terminal Placement and Spending in Illinois

with Mark Nichols[1]

2.1 Introduction

Gambling in various forms is being legalized in more states to generate additional tax revenue for state and local governments (Walker, 2009). Past research has shown that introducing new forms of gambling to an area could have negative effects such as cannibalization of the market currently served by casinos (Phipps et al., 2018; Walker & Jackson, 2008), and the spread of problem gambling behavior (Dowling et al., 2005; Holtgraves, 2009; Walker, 2009). More centrally to this study, gambling as a taxation instrument may be regressive, particularly when it is more available (Anderson, 2005; Borg et al., 1991; Suits, 1977). Suits (1977, p.28) observed, "It would appear that, once the game is readily at hand, poor people are more attracted than rich people to slot machines and casino tables."

This study examines how density and revenue per capita of Video Gambling Terminals

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(VGT) in non-casino establishments relate to poverty rates and other sociodemographic characteristics of local areas. It contributes to the literature by using non-casino VGT data from Illinois which has not been studied previously and by being the first application of spatial regression methods to the topic. Additionally, we use Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) to select the best spatial weight matrix to use in the spatial regressions. We also account for the possibility of selection bias by using a sample selection model.

As of 2017, 40 states have legalized VGTs (also called Electronic Gaming Machines, or EGMs) of which 24 allow VGTs in commercial casinos, 28 allow VGTs in tribal casinos, and only 10 allow VGTs in non-casino establishments (American Gaming Association [AGA], 2018). Illinois legalized the use of VGTs in certain non-casino establishments in 2009 ("The Video Gaming Act, 230 ILCS 40", 2009), but has had legal casino gambling in the form of riverboat casinos since 1991 (Dudzinski, 2017). Licenses for the operation of at most five VGTs can be given to retail establishments that serve alcohol, as well as truck stops, fraternal halls, and veterans' halls, all of which are required to report detailed use and revenue data for their VGTs to the Illinois Gaming Board (IGB). These data are automatically collected and stored by each VGT's software per state law, and can be remotely and locally verified by state compliance officers, ensuring accuracy.

The first ten licensed establishments in Illinois began reporting revenue from 50 total VGTs in September 2012, and five years later at the end of 2017, the number of establishments had grown to 6,248, operating 27,849 total VGTs, which together generated over $1.3 billion in total Net Terminal Income (NTI) for that year. By law, the state taxes NTI at a rate of 30%, and of that amount five-sixths goes to the State Capital Projects Fund, while the remaining one-sixth goes to local governments proportional to the amount of NTI generated by VGTs inside their jurisdiction. During 2017, the state received over $325 million, and local governments received over $65 million in tax revenue from VGTs, making them a significant source of tax revenue for Illinois.

The benefits of legalized gambling are readily seen and well documented, particularly for total tax revenue. The burden of that taxation is less clear and in need of research. This study focuses on the burden of VGT gambling as related to the geographical characteristics

of gambling establishments. We hypothesize that VGT expenditures and density of machines will vary between socioeconomic groups. However, the direction of this variation is not clear, a priori. If VGT gambling is a normal good, we would expect greater expenditures and machine density in areas with higher income, whereas if VGT gambling is an inferior good we would expect greater expenditures and machine density in lower income areas.

Illinois presents a unique combination of pervasive VGT use and detailed revenue and location data that, to our knowledge, no other U.S. states offer. According to an industry report (AGA, 2018), only 10 states have VGTs in non-casino locations, and, of those states, Illinois has by far the most machines, even surpassing Nevada (28,271 versus 18,719, respectively). Unlike Illinois, Nevada does not report VGT revenue or number of machines by establishment. Analysis of VGT activity and neighborhood characteristics is therefore not possible for Nevada. While several states have more VGTs if casinos are included, we contend that VGTs in non-casino locations are important to study because of how pervasive and accessible they can be, particularly in states with very few casinos.

There are only 10 casinos in Illinois, but over 6,000 non-casino establishments with VGTs spread all across the state, making VGT gambling much more accessible in general, and Illinois an ideal case to study the tax burden of VGT gambling based on the sociodemographic characteristics of neighborhoods generating the most revenue and with the highest machine density. To our knowledge, this will be the first study of VGT gambling and neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics using these data from Illinois, and the first to use spatial regression methods.

However, it is important to note that we do not have data on individual gamblers, nor do we know for certain who is actually playing VGTs or their incomes, but given the widespread diffusion of VGTs compared to casinos (see Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3), it seems like a reasonable assumption that people are likely to play the machines that are in their neighborhood, and that the sociodemographic characteristics of the neighborhood are representative of the individual players.

While it may be important for policy makers to account for the average tax incidence in the state, this study does not examine how the VGT tax compares with other taxes in

Illinois. Future work on the fiscal impacts of this, or similar policies, could address this concern, but we feel it is outside the scope of this study.

2.2 Literature

Legalized gambling is an attractive tax revenue generator, but the benefit should be weighed against the moral and social costs it brings. Gaming tax rates in Illinois vary from 15% to 50% for revenues exceeding 200 million ("The Illinois Gambling Act, 230 ILCS 10", 2009). Much of the gambling literature is devoted to uncovering the causes of problem gambling, or gambling addiction, and which gambling activities are most associated with problem gambling (Blaszczynski, 2013; Dowling et al., 2005; Fang & Mowen, 2009; McCormick et al., 2012; Wheeler et al., 2006).

The literature appears to agree that all gambling activities have harmful effects related to problem gambling, but there is some evidence that VGTs in particular are important enablers of problem gambling (Dowling et al., 2005). Inconclusive evidence of harms unique to VGT gambling suggests that this issue is worth further examination, however, our data does not enable us to analyze problem gambling incidence associated with VGTs.

There is also some evidence that gambling has disproportionately large effects on disadvantaged groups. Fang and Mowen (2009) find that slot machine gamblers tend to be less educated, but find no such association with skill games or sports betting. There is evidence that total gambling expenditures increase with income (Hu et al., 2008), however, when examined as a proportion of total income, expenditures on lotteries (Blalock et al., 2007), and gambling in general (Castrén et al., 2018) have been found to be negatively correlated with income. Similarly, there is evidence that higher proportional expenditures on lotteries and parimutuel betting may be positively associated with income inequality in an area (Bol et al., 2014).

Very few studies that we know of examine the effects of VGTs operated outside of casinos. Non-casino VGTs can provide greater access to gambling than those inside casinos, and establishments may be more or less likely to operate them depending on characteristics

of their customers. Some researchers have found that areas with greater VGT density have greater prevalence of problem gambling (Storer et al., 2009) and greater VGT expenditures (Delfabbro, 2002), but others have found no such evidence (McMillen & Doran, 2006). Additionally, the removal of some VGTs from establishments resulted in increased total VGT revenue and revenue per VGT (Delfabbro, 2008).

Another experimental study finds that gamblers believe that fewer non-casino VGT establishments would reduce their frequency of gambling, and that low income gamblers are more likely to have problem gambling behaviors (Ladouceur et al., 2005). Researchers in New Zealand found that more non-casino VGTs are located in areas with the highest decile of a "deprivation index" consisting of income, education, unemployment, and access to amenities (Wheeler et al., 2006). Similar research in Canada finds a negative association between Video Lottery Terminal (VLT) density and socioeconomic status of the surrounding areas (Gilliland & Ross, 2005; Wilson et al., 2006).

Since we cannot identify individuals in this study, we must rely on other research to justify our assumption that the gamblers patronizing VGT establishments live in the immediate area. We know of only a few studies attempting to define catchments of VGT establishments which makes it difficult to determine a consensus. One such study surveyed VGT gamblers to find out which establishment was the primary gambling location (Marshall et al., 2004). Another used GIS methods and a gravity model to predict the collective catchment of VGT establishments using establishment characteristics and area demographics as predictors (Doran & Young, 2010). These studies found that VGT establishments drew customers from within a 1 kilometer radius to 8 kilometers or more, and those catchments have non-uniform radii.

The wide range of estimated catchments may be explained by evidence that individual establishment characteristics are important determinants of VGT effects (Blaszczynski, 2013; Markham et al., 2014; M. Young et al., 2012; M. Young & Tyler, 2008). Of specific relevance to this study is the finding by Markham et al. (2014) that the number of VGTs is an important attribute in attracting VGT gamblers to a venue. Also, M. Young et al. (2012) find that frequency of visits, and number of different games played had a inverse

relationship with the distance to a player's home. Due to the lack of consensus on the size and shape of catchment areas, and the possibility that venues with fewer machines have smaller catchments, our study assumes that VGT gamblers are more likely to go to nearby establishments and therefore the expenditures on VGTs come from residents of the same zip code.

The previously summarized literature finds ambiguous evidence on the relationship between VGT location and local demographics. However, there is agreement that gambling in general is disproportionately harmful to disadvantaged groups, and that greater availability of gambling activities leads to increased gambling expenditures. It is these findings which suggest that the taxation of gambling revenue is a regressive tax policy, but none of them consider the greater accessibility to gambling provided by non-casino VGTs. Our study adds to this discussion by exploring where access to gambling, in the form of non-casino VGTs, is located, and whether or not VGTs are located in such a way as to potentially exploit the disproportionate gambling expenditures of lower income individuals.

A related body of literature is focused on the market cannibalization effects VGTs may have on casino revenues. According to a systematic review of literature on substitution effects in gambling industries there is evidence that casinos affect non-casino VGT use negatively, but the opposite has mixed evidence (Marionneau, Nikkinen, et al., 2017). There is also evidence that the introduction of non-casino VGTs in Illinois decreased casino visits, and casino slot machine revenue (Phipps et al., 2018). However, other findings suggest that introducing new VGT options has no effect on the number of existing machines (Paton & Vaughan Williams, 2013). Due to the possibility of substitution effects, we include a control for proximity to casinos in our analysis of VGT locations and demographics of the surrounding area.

In section 3, we discuss the data used in the analyses. In section 4, we present the methods of our analysis. In section 5, we discuss the results. Section 6 contains concluding remarks and possibilities for future research.

2.3   Data

The VGT data we use is reported monthly, but due to the form of our analysis, described in more detail below, we aggregate to the annual level and analyze the distribution and expenditures of VGTs in 2017. The most important variables are the number of VGTs, and the total funds inserted into VGTs (funds-in) for each licensed establishment which are used to calculate the two main dependent variables in our analysis, VGTs per 10,000 population and funds-in per capita.

We include demographic data from the most recently available 2016 5-year American Community Survey (ACS) at the Zip Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) level as independent variables. ZCTAs are highly, though not perfectly, coterminous with zip codes, and for our purposes they are effectively the same, thus we use the terms ZCTA and zip code interchangeably. After legalization by the state, municipalities could opt-out of VGT legalization by ballot measure, while for unincorporated areas a county board could decide. Analysis at the zip code level could be problematic due to the simple fact that some zip codes could and do contain multiple small municipalities of which some approved the use of VGTs and some did not. Ideally, we would have liked to have used smaller spatial units such as block groups or blocks, however we chose the zip code level because data from the ACS for finer spatial units are measured with much larger margins of error which we felt were unacceptable.

There are currently 10 non-tribal riverboat casinos in Illinois, which are spread out across the state (see Figures 2.1 – 2.3). The law that introduced VGTs to Illinois stipulates that establishments within 1,000 feet of existing casinos, and certain institutional buildings[2], are not permitted to receive licenses to operate VGTs. However, this restriction is likely not sufficient to eliminate the potential substitution effects that exist between casinos and non-casinos with VGTs. Therefore, we control for the substitution effect of casinos by including driving distance in kilometers from the centroid of each zip code to the centroid of each zip code with a casino obtained using the Google Distance Matrix API. We only

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[2]Establishments within 100 feet of a school or place of worship are not permitted to operate VGTs, unless the license is granted prior to a school or place of worship moving to such a location.

keep the minimum distance to a casino for each ZCTA since the closest casino is the most likely substitute. Of the 1,383 zip codes in Illinois, 367 were not found by the Distance Matrix API. For those zip codes, we calculated straight line, centroid to centroid, distances to casino zip codes using GIS tools as an approximation.

We present descriptive statistics of our data for the year 2017 in Table 2.1. Due to some missing values of the demographic variables our sample is reduced from 1,383 zip codes to 1,369. Additionally, we restrict our analysis to only those zip codes with VGTs which further reduces the sample size to 920. There are, on average, about 28 VGTs in each zip code. *Funds-in* refers to the quantity of money inserted into a machine, and *Amount Played* refers to the total amount of money wagered in all plays. The two can differ because VGT players can place bets with their winnings or "house money", thus making the amount played greater than or equal to funds-in for any given player depending on their luck and play habits.

In 2017, VGT *funds-in* averaged \$446,998 per zip code, and about \$12,400 per VGT, but this figure ranged from only \$600 to over \$70,000 per VGT. The amount played, as discussed, is a much larger \$1.4 million per zip code. VGTs generated on average about \$114,000 in NTI, or *Net Terminal Income*, which is the total amount lost by players and thus received as income by the VGT operator. The distributions of VGT density and expenditures are highly skewed due to a single outlier zip code with only 19 people, and a single bar with 5 VGTs that generated \$79,409 of revenue. We include this outlier in our analysis because we think it is interesting, and excluding it does not significantly change our results when using OLS. Per state law, NTI is taxed at 30%, which resulted in an average of \$28,500 and \$5,700 in state and local government tax revenue, respectively, per zip code.

The average composition of establishment types per zip code leans heavily toward Regular Establishments (about 90%), those being retail establishments, such as bars, that serve alcohol and do not allow minors. Fraternal Halls (1.6%), Truck Stops (4.3%), and Veterans' Halls (4.8%) make up a small minority on average, but in outlying cases make up the entirety of VGT operators. The population in zip codes with VGTs is, on average, 87% white, 5.5% black, about 45% High School or less educated, and 12.6% in poverty. Also,

poverty rates range from as little as 0% to as much as 79.9%, and the population ranges from 19 to 57,388.

2.4 Methods

In our first analysis, to check if gambling expenditures for VGTs and the number of VGTs in zip codes are significantly correlated with demographic characteristics, we perform t-tests on the means of each demographic characteristic of interest between zip codes in the top and bottom deciles of funds-in per capita and VGTs per 10,000 people. This provides a comparison of the demographic characteristics of the neighborhoods where VGT expenditures and density are highest and lowest.

Second, we use OLS regression to estimate the following equation conditional on having any VGTs in the zip code:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 Poverty_i + \beta_2 UER_i + \beta_3 White_i + \beta_4 Black_i + \beta_5 LTHS_i$$
$$+ \beta_6 HS_i + \beta_7 Veteran_i + \beta_8 Casino_i + \beta_9 Casino_i^2 + \beta_{10} PCINC_i + \varepsilon \quad (2.1)$$

Here, y_i is either the natural log of funds-in per capita, or the natural log of VGTs per 10,000 people in zip code i. $Poverty_i$ is the percentage of the population living at or below the poverty level in zip code i which is a key variable of interest. UER_i is the unemployment rate in zip code i which we include to control for general economic conditions in the zip code. $White_i$ and $Black_i$ are the percentages of the population that are white and black, respectively, in zip code i, and they control for racial differences in gambling preferences relative to all other races (i.e. Asian, Native American, etc.), which are the omitted category. $LTHS_i$ and HS_i are the percentages of people with less than a High School education, and exactly a High School education in zip code i. These control for educational effects of gambling preference relative to the omitted category which is the percentage of the population with more than a high school education (i.e. some college,

bachelor's degree, etc.). $Veteran_i$ is the percentage of veterans in the population of zip code i, which we include as a potentially disadvantaged group which could be more susceptible to problem gambling. $Casino_i$ and $Casino_i^2$ are the distance and squared distance to the nearest zip code with a casino from zip code i, which controls for possible substitution effects between casino and non-casino VGT gambling. Lastly, $PCINC_i$ is the per capita income in zip code i which controls for the neighborhood's average standard of living.

Next, we use a sample selection model estimated by maximum likelihood to account for possible bias of zip codes self-selecting into allowing VGTs. For this, we need to find an instrument that is correlated with the decision to allow VGTs, but uncorrelated with VGT density and expenditures. We suspect that the decision to allow VGTs should be at least partially driven by a region's tax revenues prior to legalization by the deduction that regions with lower revenue would be more interested in new potential revenue streams. There are undoubtedly other factors that would influence the decision, such as aggregate moral attitudes or propensity to gamble, but we lack data on these variables.

We obtain state and local income tax revenue amounts by zip code from the IRS for use in our sample selection model. The tax revenue amounts are reported in 2010 and thus describe revenue from incomes earned during 2009. Due to various disclosure protection procedures, there are 1,222 usable observations (869 with VGTs and 353 without). We see no reason why income tax revenue from before the introduction of VGTs should influence either VGT density or expenditures in 2017, but we do think that it should be an indicator of how likely a given zip code would be to later allow or not allow VGTs.

The sample selection model is specified as (Greene, 2003):

$$z_i = V_i\gamma + u_i \tag{2.2}$$

$$y_i = X_i\beta + \rho\sigma_\varepsilon\lambda_i(\alpha_u) + \varepsilon_i \tag{2.3}$$

Where Z_i is 1 if zip code i has any VGTs and 0 otherwise. Total state and local income tax paid by residents of zip code i is included in V_i along with all regressors that make up X_i. Equation 2.3 is the same as equation 2.1 with the addition of the Inverse Mills Ratio,

$\lambda_i(\alpha_u)$, the inclusion of which makes OLS a consistent estimator of β. Although the system is theoretically identified even when $V_i = X_i$, it is close to unidentified and, in practice, an exclusion restriction is recommended (Greene, 2003).

Finally, we expand on our analysis using spatial regression methods to account for suspected spatial auto-correlation in our observations. It seems likely, given the nature of our zip code level data, that observed values of the number of VGTs in a zip code, and the revenue generated by VGTs in a zip code, are correlated with those of surrounding zip codes. Spatial auto-correlation is also possible in our independent variables if, for example, factors such as poverty and income are correlated across zip codes. If spatial dependence exists, then OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent (J. P. LeSage & Fischer, 2008). A look at the spatial distribution of VGTs and VGT revenue in Figures 2.1 – 2.2 appears to confirm our suspicions, but still requires a formal statistical test.

The estimated spatial regression equation is as follows:

$$y_i = \rho W y_i + \alpha \iota_N + X_i \gamma + W X_i \theta + \varepsilon \tag{2.4}$$

where Y_i and X_i are the same as described in Equation 2.1. W is the $i \times i$ spatial weight matrix, ρ is the spatial autoregressive coefficient, and θ is a $k \times 1$ vector of spatial spillover effects. Again, poverty rate is a key regressor of interest, and is contained in X in Equation 2.4. If the estimate of ρ is significant, then the existence of spatial auto-correlation in the dependent variable is confirmed and $\hat{\beta}_{OLS}$ may be biased. Similarly, the elements of vector θ, if significant, confirm spatial auto-correlation in their respective regressors.

To test for spatial dependence, we must first define "neighboring" zip codes and generate a spatial weight matrix. The literature suggests that testing different forms for the spatial weight matrix is advisable given that there is no clear theoretical reason to choose one form over another (Elhorst, 2010). Therefore, we apply Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA), as described by J. LeSage and Pace (2009), to five models differentiated by their specification of W being one of the following: 32km distance, 22km distance, 5 nearest neighbors, 10 nearest neighbors, and queen contiguity. We selected 32km distance because it is roughly

equivalent to a one hour drive, then included 22km distance because it is the smallest distance possible without resulting in zip codes with zero neighbors. Our intuition leads us to believe that a distance based definition of W would be best, due to the previous findings of proximity to a venue being highly attractive to VGT gamblers.

BMA is not capable of finding the true form of W, but it can tell us which of the specifications under consideration best describes the spatial correlation in the data (Elhorst, 2010). Results from the BMA process are presented in Table 2.6. In the case of funds-in per capita, the 22km distance based weight matrix obtained the highest posterior model probability (PMP) (75.73%), while for VGTs per 10,000 people, the 32km distance based weight matrix had the highest (99.9%). The posterior model probabilities obtained for VGTs per 10,000 people are highly skewed with forms of W other than 32km distance obtaining less than 0.01% PMP. Since BMA cannot say which weight matrix represents the true data generating process, it is only clear that 32km distance is a significantly better representation of the spatial correlation than the other forms of W. Thus, in agreement with our intuition, we conclude that 22km distance and 32km distance are the best forms of W for funds-in per capita and VGTs per 10,000 people, respectively.

Next we formally test our models for spatial auto-correlation using a two-sided Moran's I test (Moran, 1950). The test clearly rejects the null hypothesis of randomly located observations for both dependent variables using the neighbor definitions suggested by BMA. Subsequently, we use robust LM tests (Anselin et al., 1996) to check which spatial model provides a better fit for our data.[3] In the case of funds-in per capita, the robust LM error test is significant at 5%, and the robust LM lag test is significant at 10%.[4] For VGTs per 10,000 people, the robust LM lag test is significant at 5%, but the robust LM error test is insignificant.[5] Thus, as suggested by Elhorst (2010), we estimate a Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) which assumes spatial auto-correlation in the dependent variable as well as the independent variables.

The advantages of using the SDM are that it protects against omitted variable bias,

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[3]Test statistics are distributed $\chi^2_{(1)}$ with critical values of 3.84 ($p = 0.05$) and 6.63 ($p = 0.01$).

[4]Robust LM error = 5.55, Robust LM lag = 2.95

[5]Robust LM error = 0.06, Robust LM lag = 4.80

and it produces unbiased coefficients even if the true data generating process is the spatial lag or spatial error model (Elhorst, 2010). However, Elhorst (2010) also indicates that the previous tests for spatial auto-correlation, which are performed on OLS estimates, are inferior to the statistical significance of the estimate of ρ in a spatial regression, so we report these below.

To confirm our choice of the SDM, we test two additional hypotheses using Likelihood Ratio tests. The first, tests the hypothesis $H_0 : \theta = 0$, which if not rejected, indicates the spatial lag model is best. The second tests the hypothesis $H_0 : \theta + \rho W = 0$, which if not rejected, indicates the spatial error model is best. If both hypotheses are rejected or the LR tests do not agree with the robust LM tests described previously, then the SDM is best (Elhorst, 2010). Both null hypotheses are rejected for the funds-in per capita model[6] and the VGTs per 10,000 people model[7] confirming in both cases that the SDM should not be collapsed to the spatial lag or spatial error model.

2.5   Results

Table 2.2 reports means, and t-stats for differences of those means, of our independent variables between zip codes in the top and bottom deciles of funds-in per capita for only those zip codes that have VGTs. The two means for poverty rate are significantly different with 15.17 percent in the top decile and 9.8 percent in the bottom, suggesting that zip codes in Illinois with the highest (top 10%) spending per capita have a significantly higher poverty rate. Zip codes in the top decile also have a statistically significant $6,039 lower per capita income. Interestingly, there is no significant difference between the average unemployment rate at the two deciles, but all other variables do have significantly different means. In particular, the means of distance to casino are 86.5 km and 58.78 km in the top and bottom deciles respectively. This indicates that zip codes closer to a casino have lower VGT expenditures, which is consistent with casinos and non-casino VGTs being substitutes. Additionally, zip codes with greater percentages of veterans, and people with less than a

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[6]Funds-in per capita: $H_0 : \theta = 0$, $LR_{(10)} = 35.4$; $H_0 : \theta + \rho W = 0$, $LR_{(10)} = 33.1$).
[7]VGTs per 10,000: $H_0 : \theta = 0$, $LR_{(10)} = 29.8$; $H_0 : \theta + \rho W = 0$, $LR_{(10)} = 33.9$).

high school education also have higher VGT expenditures. Interestingly, zip codes with greater proportions of white residents have higher VGT expenditures, while zip codes with greater proportions of black residents have lower VGT expenditures.

Table 2.3 reports differences in the density of VGT machines, measured by VGTs per 10,000 people, for zip codes with VGTs. This is done to analyze how the supply of machines is distributed as opposed to the amount of spending. Here, the means for poverty rate are significantly different at 15.29 and 10.28 for the top and bottom deciles respectively. The means of per capita income are significantly different between the top and bottom deciles with $7,094 lower average per capita income for zip codes in the top decile of VGTs per 10,000 people. This confirms that more VGTs are being located in areas with higher poverty rates and lower income.

Distance to a casino is also significantly different between the top and bottom deciles with means of 89.71 km and 41.3 km respectively. This result further suggests that casinos and VGTs are substitutes since more VGTs are being operated farther away from casinos. Other results indicate that zip codes with more VGTs per capita also have almost 11 percentage points fewer black residents, 24 percentage points more white residents, and 3 percentage points more veterans. The results in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 suggest that both per capita VGT expenditures and machine density are significantly and positively associated with areas (zip codes) of higher poverty and lower income and education.

To test the robustness of these results we also test for differences in the means of the top and bottom decile of both dependent variables while excluding the top centile from the top decile (ie. 90th to 99th percentiles)(see Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix). We also perform a similar test between the 2nd and 8th deciles of both dependent variables. In each case, our previous results hold (see Tables A.3 and A.4 in the appendix).

OLS estimation of Equation 2.1 for funds-in per capita are presented in Table 2.4. Since one of our key variables of interest is poverty rate, the first column presents a simple regression on the poverty rate only with additional controls included in later regressions. The result in column 1 indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the poverty rate is associated with a 1.99 percent increase in funds-in per capita, which is significant at the

1% level. Adding controls in the subsequent columns reveals that the magnitude of the estimate for poverty is relatively robust to their inclusion and only loses a small degree of significance. Column 4 shows the preferred regression specification which estimates that a 1 percentage point increase in poverty rate is associated with a 1.39 percent increase in funds-in per capita. These results suggest that higher spending per capita is occurring in neighborhoods (zip codes) with higher poverty rates, ceteris paribus.

Table 2.4 also shows that funds spent on VGTs are approximately 0.9 percent lower for each percentage point increase in the percent of the population that is black, ceteris paribus. Spending per capita is also higher in zip codes with a greater percentage of residents that have a high school education compared to college-educated or higher with, with a 1 percentage point increase in the population with only a high school degree increasing per capita expenditure by nearly 2%. Veteran status is not a statistically significant correlate once other factors are controlled for, but the substitution effect between casinos and VGTs remains, with expenditures per capita increasing with greater distance from casinos, albeit at a decreasing rate.

Estimation of Equation 2.1 using VGTs per 10,000 people are presented in Table 2.5. The simple estimate in column 1 indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the poverty rate of a zip code is associated with a 1.8 percent increase in the number of VGTs per 10,000 people. With the inclusion of additional controls, the estimate drops to 1.56 percent more VGTs per 10,000 people for a 1 percentage point higher poverty rate and remains significant at the 1% level. Machines also appear to be more concentrated in zip codes with lower percentages of college graduates, with both greater percentages in the population with a high school and, in two specifications, less than high school, being associated with more machines per capita. As expected if VGTs and casinos are substitutes, there are more machines in zip codes that are further away from casinos. Finally an increase in per capita income is associated with fewer machines per capita.

The results in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 suggest that VGT spending and density are significantly greater in zip codes with greater poverty rates, lower average income, and a lower percentage of college educated population. To the extent that residents of these zip codes are the

individuals playing the VGTs (something we cannot verify), these results suggest that VGTs are likely a regressive form of taxation and placed in more economically disadvantaged areas. The results of our sample selection models in column 5 of Tables 2.4 and 2.5 do not differ significantly from the OLS estimates. This suggests that the selection into allowing or not allowing VGTs does not significantly bias the OLS estimates.

From the spatial regression, we present only the estimated direct, indirect, and total impacts (Elhorst, 2010; J. LeSage & Pace, 2009). The direct impact is the effect in the host zip codes whereas the indirect impact is the spillover to other zip codes. For example, a change in the poverty rate in zip code i may impact VGT revenue and density in zip code i, but also in neighboring zip codes, and vice versa. Direct impacts are the average effect of a change in the regressor (e.g. poverty rate) on the dependent variable over all zip codes. Indirect impacts are the *average cumulative effect* of a change in the regressor across all neighbors. Again, since the elements of W vary for each zip code the cumulative indirect impact varies for each zip code by the number of neighbors surrounding that zip code. Thus, the reported indirect impact is the average of these cumulative effects across all neighboring zip codes. The total impact is simply the sum of the direct and indirect impacts, and is the cumulative impact on host zip codes and their neighbors averaged over all host-neighbor sets.

The estimated impacts on VGT funds-in per capita compared with the previous OLS estimates are presented in Table 2.7. We estimate that the direct impact of a 1 percentage point increase in the poverty rate is associated with a 1.47% increase in their own funds-in per person on average. The indirect and total impact of an increase in the poverty rate of zip codes with VGTs on their contiguous neighbors' VGT funds-in per person is not statistically significant. This suggests that a change in poverty rate in a zip code has minimal spillover effects to other zip codes and vice versa. The estimate of the direct impact is slightly larger than the OLS estimate though not statistically different. The estimate of $\rho = 0.134$ ($p = 0.03$) confirms the existence of a small degree of spatial auto-correlation in the dependent variable. Relative to the average funds-in per capita of \$446,998, the direct impact represents an increase of about \$6,570 per percentage point of poverty rate.

The direct and indirect impacts for less than high school education counter each other leaving the total impact statistically insignificant. In the case of those with high school education, the indirect effect is insignificant, but mitigates the significant direct effect to make the total effect smaller in magnitude but still significant. Opposite direct and indirect impacts are also found for distance to casino. It is not clear why a host zip code's distance to the nearest casino would effect funds-in of its neighboring zip codes differently than its own.

Table 2.8 presents estimated impacts on VGTs per 10,000 people. The estimated direct impact of a 1 percentage point increase in the poverty rate of zip codes with VGTs is associated with a 1.17% increase in the number their own of VGTs per 10,000 people on average. Estimates of the indirect and total impacts are statistically insignificant. The estimate of the direct impact is slightly smaller than the OLS estimate, but not statistically different. This regression obtains an estimate of $\rho = 0.197$ ($p = 0.02$) confirms the existence of spatial auto-correlation across zip codes in the number of VGTs per 10,000 people. The direct impact of poverty rate on the number of VGTs per 10,000 people, relative to the mean of 76.2, represents an increase of about 1 VGT per 10,000 people for a 1 percentage point increase in the poverty rate.

We also estimate a significant direct impact of the unemployment rate, which suggests that VGT density is greater in zip codes with greater rates of joblessness. Less than high school education has a marginally significant positive direct impact, but high school education has positive and significant direct and total impacts. Higher per capita income is also associated with lower VGT density in host zip codes. These results further suggest that VGTs are concentrated with zip codes with more economically disadvantaged, less educated individuals. The positive total impact of distance to a casino on VGT density further confirms the substitutability of VGT gambling and casino gambling.

2.6 Conclusions

This study finds that there is a statistically significant relationship between local poverty rates and both the density of VGTs and expenditures on VGTs. The selection of allowing VGTs does not significantly bias the estimates made using OLS. We also determined that spatial auto-correlation exists at the zip code level for both dependent variables, but the estimates of the relationships between them and local poverty rates are not statistically different from those of OLS.

There is evidence that, on average, zip codes with more high school educated people and their neighboring zip codes have higher VGT density and funds-in per capita, but very low education zip codes have no spillover effects on their neighbors, in the case of VGT density, or opposite signed spillover effects, in the case of funds-in per capita. Additionally, zip codes with higher per capita incomes have lower VGT density and funds-in per capita indicating that VGT gambling is an inferior good in this case. Together these findings suggest that, on average, VGTs and expenditures on them are more concentrated in zip codes with greater proportions of economically disadvantaged populations.

Additionally, we find evidence that VGT density and per capita expenditure both increase with greater distance to the nearest casino, which suggests that VGT gambling is a substitute for casino gambling. Over the last decade, casino revenue in Illinois has declined to levels far below VGT revenue (Phipps et al., 2018). With this in mind, the state may have traded one source of revenue for another. Other states contemplating a similar expansion in gambling should keep the case of Illinois in mind when considering VGT adoption as a tax revenue source because, once implemented, it can be more difficult to undo.

The results of our analysis have interesting implications for gambling establishments and for state and local governments. While we cannot know for certain that lower income individuals are the ones playing VGTs, our findings suggest that VGTs are being operated in areas with more low income individuals. Thus, while VGTs can generate significant tax revenue for state and local governments, the tax on VGT income is likely regressive.

Illinois's VGT law does address undue market concentration, but only with respect

to competition among VGT operators and casinos. It does not address the effect of VGT concentration on consumers, in particular those consumers who would be disproportionately impacted. It is also historically easier to lose money more rapidly while playing VGTs than during other gambling activities such as the lottery and the results of this paper suggest these machines are concentrated in areas comprising a population vulnerable to rapid money loss.

Further research would be helpful in more fully understanding the effects uncovered by this study. First, it may be worth investigating how the poverty rates changed over time and whether or not those changes have a significant relationship with VGT expenditure and density using panel data analysis methods. We did not feel that ACS 5-year estimates were appropriate to use in an annual panel analysis. Second, more precise demographic variables are available at larger spatial units, e.g. counties, than we obtain using zip codes with 5-year ACS estimates, which would allow analysis of changes over time. However, finer spatial units than zip codes may be necessary to identify potential spillover effects.

Third, we cannot establish a causal relationship between the dependent variables and poverty rates. We do not contend that VGTs are being placed in lower income neighborhoods because they are disadvantaged or vice versa, but that even a correlation of this nature is profoundly important if it unintentionally results in a greater tax incidence being placed on low income people. Fourth, future work should study the state and local fiscal impacts of VGTs while particularly examining whether the areas with high poverty rates are benefiting proportionally to their VGT expenditures. Finally, our data does not allow us to analyze the effect of the expansion of VGTs in Illinois on the incidence of problem gambling, which, as previous literature suggests, may be different from other forms of gambling.

2.7 Tables

Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for zips with VGTs

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Funds in	920	446,998.20	730,659.90	1,207.25	6,380,287.00
Funds in per VGT	920	12,444.38	7,266.18	603.62	70,778.36
Funds in per capita	920	84.58	153.89	0.63	4,179.42
VGT count	920	27.67	36.44	2.00	267.67
VGTs per 10,000 pop	920	76.20	109.43	0.94	2,631.58
VGTs per square km	920	4.83	13.78	0.004	187.38
Amount Played	920	1,443,084.00	2,318,992.00	5,589.30	18,716,802.00
NTI	920	114,309.10	183,512.80	518.42	1,525,896.00
State Share	920	28,577.35	45,878.48	125.16	381,475.80
Local Share	920	5,715.46	9,175.68	25.04	76,295.09
Number of Establishments	920	6.27	7.98	1.00	58.33
Distance to Casino	920	77.77	51.03	0.00	249.06
Unemployment Rate	920	7.46	4.65	0.00	75.00
Per Capita Income	920	28,070.84	8,670.43	3,951	104,947
% White	920	87.02	19.26	0.00	100.00
% Black	920	5.49	14.36	0.00	100.00
% Asian	920	1.60	3.63	0.00	39.30
% Other Race	920	5.89	9.40	0.00	90.20
% Hispanic	920	4.95	9.36	0.00	89.50
% Veteran	920	9.12	3.12	0.00	24.90
% Less than HS Education	920	10.18	6.14	0.00	46.82
% HS Education	920	35.54	9.21	0.00	66.42
% Some College	920	33.15	5.74	9.30	63.16
% Bachelors or greater	920	21.14	12.24	0.00	74.62
% Regular Establishments	920	89.23	19.92	0.00	100.00
% Fraternal Halls	920	1.61	5.44	0.00	50.00
% Truck Stops	920	4.32	13.98	0.00	100.00
% Veteran Halls	920	4.85	13.11	0.00	100.00
% Poverty	920	12.59	8.37	0.00	79.90
Population 18 and over	920	6,968.26	9,428.00	19	57,388
Population Density	920	0.23	0.47	0.002	4.06

Table 2.2: Top decile vs Bottom decile of Funds in per capita, zips with VGTs

Variable	Top decile mean	Bottom decile mean	Difference	T-stat	p-value
Poverty Rate (%)	15.17	9.8	5.38	3.52	0.001
Unemployment Rate (%)	8.04	6.64	1.4	1.38	0.17
% White	91.8	84.84	6.96	2.7	0.008
% Black	2.93	7.24	-4.32	-2.18	0.031
% Less than HS Education	10.6	8	2.61	2.99	0.003
% HS Education	39.81	29.85	9.96	6.4	1e-09
% Veteran	9.35	8.71	0.63	1.36	0.176
Distance to Casino (km)	87.44	59.48	27.96	4.11	6e-05
Per Capita Income ($)	27100.45	33139.53	-6039.09	-3.61	4e-04
% Bar	86.15	91.57	-5.41	-1.57	0.117
% Fraternal Hall	0.61	0.66	-0.05	-0.1	0.919
% Truck Stop	10.24	2.26	7.98	3.22	0.002
% Veteran Hall	3	5.52	-2.52	-1.04	0.301

Table 2.3: Top decile vs Bottom decile of VGTs per 10,000 people, zips with VGTs

Variable	Top decile mean	Bottom decile mean	Difference	T-stat	p-value
Poverty Rate (%)	15.29	10.28	5.01	3.13	0.002
Unemployment Rate (%)	8.35	7.09	1.26	1.19	0.235
% White	95.74	72.63	23.11	8.94	1e-14
% Black	1.2	11.57	-10.37	-4.72	8e-06
% Less than HS Education	11.11	9.51	1.6	1.43	0.154
% HS Education	41.44	25.08	16.36	11.91	2e-24
% Veteran	9.52	7.22	2.3	4.69	6e-06
Distance to Casino (km)	90.55	41.8	48.75	8.03	1e-13
Per Capita Income ($)	27255.38	34350.2	-7094.82	-4.37	3e-05
% Bar	93.49	90.7	2.79	1.01	0.314
% Fraternal Hall	0.35	1.11	-0.76	-1.51	0.133
% Truck Stop	3.52	3.33	0.19	0.1	0.917
% Veteran Hall	2.64	4.86	-2.23	-1.09	0.279

Table 2.4: Regression of VGT Expenditures

	Dependent variable:				
	Log of Funds in per capita				
	OLS				_Selection_
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Poverty Rate (%)	0.0199***	0.0156***	0.0143**	0.0139**	0.0109*
	(0.0038)	(0.0054)	(0.0056)	(0.0055)	(0.0065)
Unemployment Rate (%)		0.0096	0.0100	0.0098	0.0048
		(0.0087)	(0.0085)	(0.0084)	(0.0110)
% White		0.0024	−0.0019	−0.0023	−0.0081*
		(0.0040)	(0.0042)	(0.0041)	(0.0045)
% Black		−0.0057	−0.0083*	−0.0090**	−0.0106**
		(0.0043)	(0.0043)	(0.0042)	(0.0050)
% Less than HS Education		0.0110	0.0086	0.0059	0.0001
		(0.0070)	(0.0070)	(0.0071)	(0.0087)
% HS Education		0.0214***	0.0189***	0.0175***	0.0141***
		(0.0051)	(0.0050)	(0.0049)	(0.0048)
% Veteran		−0.0119	−0.0129	−0.0144	−0.0210*
		(0.0118)	(0.0118)	(0.0119)	(0.0127)
Distance to Casino (km)			0.0090***	0.0088***	0.0110***
			(0.0020)	(0.0019)	(0.0023)
Distance to Casino Squared			−0.00004***	−0.00004***	−0.00004***
			(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
Per Capita Income ($1000)				−0.0084*	−0.0008
				(0.0049)	(0.0046)
Constant	3.7732***	2.8121***	2.9869***	3.3636***	4.2358***
	(0.0603)	(0.3153)	(0.3139)	(0.3316)	(0.3897)
Observations	920	920	920	920	1,222
R^2	0.0307	0.1010	0.1185	0.1235	
Adjusted R^2	0.0296	0.0941	0.1098	0.1139	
Log Likelihood					−1,772.8990
ρ					−0.9244*** (0.0165)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2.5: Regression of VGT Density

	Dependent variable:				
	Log of VGTs per 10,000 pop				
	OLS				Selection
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Poverty Rate (%)	0.0180***	0.0171***	0.0160***	0.0156***	0.0131**
	(0.0041)	(0.0050)	(0.0052)	(0.0051)	(0.0055)
Unemployment Rate (%)		0.0114	0.0115	0.0113	−0.0006
		(0.0103)	(0.0101)	(0.0100)	(0.0089)
% White		0.0183***	0.0144***	0.0141***	0.0084**
		(0.0039)	(0.0041)	(0.0040)	(0.0039)
% Black		0.0033	0.0011	0.0004	−0.0003
		(0.0044)	(0.0044)	(0.0043)	(0.0043)
% Less than HS Education		0.0148**	0.0126**	0.0100	0.0070
		(0.0062)	(0.0063)	(0.0064)	(0.0071)
% HS Education		0.0329***	0.0307***	0.0293***	0.0270***
		(0.0045)	(0.0044)	(0.0044)	(0.0037)
% Veteran		0.0029	0.0019	0.0004	0.0007
		(0.0100)	(0.0100)	(0.0101)	(0.0091)
Distance to Casino (km)			0.0083***	0.0081***	0.0098***
			(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0018)
Distance to Casino Squared			−0.00004***	−0.00004***	−0.00004***
			(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
Per Capita Income ($1000)				−0.0082**	−0.0040
				(0.0034)	(0.0033)
Constant	3.7287***	0.6974**	0.8474***	1.2164***	1.9624***
	(0.0615)	(0.2984)	(0.2998)	(0.3362)	(0.3471)
Observations	920	920	920	920	1,222
R^2	0.0284	0.3360	0.3531	0.3585	
Adjusted R^2	0.0273	0.3309	0.3467	0.3514	
Log Likelihood					−1,566.1960
ρ					−0.8619*** (0.0269)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2.6: BMA Results

	Funds in per capita		VGTs per 10,000	
	PMP (Exact)	PMP (MCMC)	PMP (Exact)	PMP (MCMC)
Distance, 32km	23.57	23.79	1.00	9.99
Distance, 22km	76.02	75.73	0.00	0.00
KNN, 10	0.09	0.11	0.00	0.00
KNN, 5	0.03	0.36	0.00	0.00
Contiguity	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Table 2.7: Spatial Impacts of Funds in per capita

	OLS	Direct	Indirect	Total
Poverty Rate (%)	0.0139**	0.0147***	-0.0184	-0.0038
	(0.0055)	(0.005)	(0.0133)	(0.0142)
Unemployment Rate (%)	0.0098	0.011	0.0113	0.0224
	(0.0084)	(0.0081)	(0.0195)	(0.0206)
% White	-0.0023	0.0023	-0.0073	-0.0049
	(0.0041)	(0.0048)	(0.0109)	(0.0102)
% Black	-0.009**	-0.0097**	0.011	0.0012
	(0.0042)	(0.005)	(0.0123)	(0.0118)
% Less than HS Education	0.0059	0.014**	-0.0286*	-0.0147
	(0.0071)	(0.0068)	(0.0166)	(0.0168)
% HS Education	0.0175***	0.0156***	-7e-04	0.0149*
	(0.0049)	(0.0044)	(0.0092)	(0.0086)
% Veteran	-0.0144	-0.0126	0.0264	0.0139
	(0.0119)	(0.0111)	(0.0263)	(0.0266)
Distance to Casino (km)	0.0088***	-0.0114**	0.0271***	0.0157***
	(0.0019)	(0.0056)	(0.0065)	(0.003)
Distance to Casino Squared	-4e-05***	2e-05	-1e-04***	-1e-04***
	(9e-06)	(2e-05)	(3e-05)	(1e-05)
Per Capita Income ($1000)	-0.0084*	-0.0094**	0.011	0.0016
	(0.0049)	(0.0037)	(0.0118)	(0.0127)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 2.8: Spatial Impacts of VGTs per 10,000 pop

	OLS	Direct	Indirect	Total
Poverty Rate (%)	0.0156***	0.0117***	-0.0043	0.0074
	(0.0051)	(0.004)	(0.0126)	(0.0136)
Unemployment Rate (%)	0.0113	0.0148**	0.0019	0.0168
	(0.01)	(0.0065)	(0.0168)	(0.0183)
% White	0.0141***	0.0075**	0.0134	0.0209**
	(0.004)	(0.0038)	(0.0094)	(0.0089)
% Black	4e-04	-0.0064	0.0193*	0.0129
	(0.0043)	(0.0041)	(0.0107)	(0.0105)
% Less than HS Education	0.01	0.01*	-0.0157	-0.0057
	(0.0064)	(0.0055)	(0.0147)	(0.0151)
% HS Education	0.0293***	0.0261***	0.0024	0.0285***
	(0.0044)	(0.0033)	(0.0081)	(0.008)
% Veteran	4e-04	-0.0064	0.0251	0.0187
	(0.0101)	(0.0088)	(0.0231)	(0.0236)
Distance to Casino (km)	0.0081***	-0.01**	0.0208***	0.0108***
	(0.0016)	(0.0043)	(0.0053)	(0.0027)
Distance to Casino Squared	-4e-05***	2e-05	-1e-04***	-5e-05***
	(7e-06)	(2e-05)	(2e-05)	(1e-05)
Per Capita Income ($1000)	-0.0082**	-0.0062**	0.0061	-1e-04
	(0.0034)	(0.003)	(0.0104)	(0.0114)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

2.8   Figures

Figure 2.1: Number of VGTs across Illinois in 2017

Figure 2.2: Number of VGTs per capita across Illinois in 2017

Figure 2.3: Expenditures on VGTs per capita across Illinois in 2017

Chapter 3

Immigration and Voting Patterns in the European Union

with Todd Sørensen[1], Marta Pachoka[2], Jan Misiuna[3]

3.1 Introduction

There is a widespread perception that anti-immigrant sentiment has been increasing in many countries across Europe and the Americas. Concurrently, there has been an increase in the prominence and support for far-right populist political parties with anti-immigration agendas. A notable example in France is the nationalist party, Front National, which has gained in recent elections propelled by French anti-immigrant sentiments (Goodliffe, 2012). Anti-immigration sentiment is thought to be at least partially responsible for citizens of the United Kingdom voting to leave the EU in 2016 (Abrams & Travaglino, 2018), and for the election of U.S. President Donald Trump (Mayda et al., 2018).

Research suggests that anti-immigration beliefs, xenophobia, and racism are not necessarily coincident, where anti-immigration beliefs on their own may be driven by economic factors rather than plain dislike of other ethnicities, and voting for the far right may be

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driven mostly by anti-immigration beliefs (Rydgren, 2008). For some, there may be a perception that immigrants threaten the cultural and economic stability of natives (Malone, 2014). This view was reported by popular media to have increased support for far-right parties across Europe as a response to the European refugee crisis in 2015 (Baboulias, 2015; Bremmer, 2015; Tharoor, 2015). Other mechanisms for far-right voting could be linked to notions of national identity and pride (Lubbers & Coenders, 2017).

Naturally, researchers have sought to determine how immigration, and immigrant populations in a region affect anti-immigrant beliefs of natives in that region. Theoretically, the effect of immigration on beliefs could be positive, or negative. In one case, larger immigrant populations could reduce prejudice against immigrants by making the native population more familiar with them, but in the other case, conflicting values between groups could lead larger immigrant populations to increase prejudice toward them. In either case, changes in racial prejudice may be correlated with changes in voting behavior on issues pertaining to immigration, or candidates supporting pro or anti-immigration policies.

Most related to our work is Georgiadou et al. (2018), which, like our study, does not attempt to show causation between immigration and voting. Rather, both studies only seek to find evidence of a correlation between immigrant populations and voting behavior. We contribute to this literature by being one of very few studies on this topic using data from all European Union member countries, and European Parliament elections. A novel contribution of our work is our identification of party ideologies which is consistent across countries. We also link political parties with their associated party group in the European Parliament, and their ideologies, to use as dependent variables in regression analysis. EP group association is voluntary and thus can be considered a revealed preference of individual parties for certain ideologies.

Our results suggest very little evidence that immigrant population shares are correlated with voting shares for any EP groups or right-wing party ideologies. We believe this to be attributable to the relatively small sample size when using national level observations as well as the fact that immigrant population shares have very little variation over the study period.

3.2   Literature

There are two different theoretical models in the psychology literature regarding attitudes toward immigrants and how they might explain how natives vote either for or against issues related to immigration: the contact hypothesis, and realistic conflict theory. The contact hypothesis states that contact between majority and minority groups can decrease prejudice, under certain conditions. This theory would predict a decrease in prejudice to cause native voters to shift away from the political right toward more immigration friendly parties or candidates as a result of contact with non-native groups. However, if the conditions of equal status, common goals, and support from an authority are not present then the contact may increase prejudice (Allport, 1954).

The opposite effect is described by realistic conflict theory, which, formalized by Donald Campbell in 1965 (as cited in Dustmann et al., 2016), has been studied in relation to far-right voting (Abrams & Travaglino, 2018; Arzheimer, 2009). It suggests that contact between members of different groups could lead to increased prejudice if there is real or perceived competition between those groups for resources. If the contact between immigrants and natives increases prejudice, we expect that native voters would shift to the political right.

It is important to keep in mind that while the effects of these two theories have opposite signs, it is theoretically possible for both to be exerting some influence on voting behavior simultaneously. People respond to immigration differently, as exemplified by the range of attitudes toward refugees across the political spectrum (van Prooijen et al., 2018). Therefore it is important to bear in mind that any positive or negative finding might be considered a net effect.

An additional possible effect is that of aggregate voting patterns shifting because more naturalized immigrants are voting in favor of pro-immigrant parties and policies which would bias an OLS estimate of the effects of migration on natives' attitudes. In addition, underlying sentiments may drive both voting patterns as well as the attractiveness of a potential migration destination, causing omitted variables bias. In the literature, this endogeneity is typically addressed with using various novel instrumental variables (Barone et al., 2016;

Edo et al., 2019; Halla et al., 2017; Mayda et al., 2018; Mendez & Cutillas, 2014; Moriconi et al., 2018; Otto & Steinhardt, 2014), however we do not address this because we are only attempting to find correlation rather than causation.

Recently, there have been a number of studies in the Economics literature looking at this phenomenon in various European countries and the U.S., however, with the exception of Georgiadou et al. (2018), no other study that we are aware of has examined the issue over as long a time period or with such a comprehensive set of countries as exist in the data we have collected. In fact, most recent studies consider elections in only one country, but tend to use finer geographic units such as municipalities or provinces. Our study uses the share of immigrants in the national population for elections from 2005 through 2018. Therefore, our sample covers the crucial period since 2014 during which many events occurred that are thought of as the cause or emblematic of the rise of the right in Europe, including the European refugee crisis and Brexit.

A portion of the literature finds evidence of the contact hypothesis having a greater effect on voting behavior than the Realistic conflict theory in the United States (Mayda et al., 2016), France (Vertier & Viskanic, 2018), Spain (Mendez & Cutillas, 2014), and across the EU (Georgiadou et al., 2018).

Other parts of the literature support the hypothesis that realistic conflict theory has a greater influence than contact hypothesis. Although positive findings related to realistic conflict theory have been questioned in the past (Rydgren, 2008), there have been recent studies that have supported it with evidence from Austria (Halla et al., 2017), Denmark (Dustmann et al., 2016), France (Edo et al., 2019), Germany (Otto & Steinhardt, 2014), and Switzerland (Brunner & Kuhn, 2018).

Still other studies in the literature found mixed, or more nuanced effects that do not necessarily support either theory holding more influence over voting (Barone et al., 2016; Della Posta, 2013; Harmon, 2018; Mayda et al., 2018; Moriconi et al., 2018; Steinmayr, 2016). The study by Moriconi et al. (2018) includes 12 countries and a total of 28 elections, and individual data from the European Social Survey. The authors created an index of "nationalistic preference" to measure each political party's ideology by text mining each

party's manifesto. While the authors' method of identifying party ideology is novel and interesting, we instead rely upon categorization done previously by political scientists.

There does not appear to be a dominant conclusion in favor of either the contact hypothesis or realistic conflict theory, thus the question warrants further exploration. However, one conclusion supported by several of the previously discussed studies is that low-skill or low-education immigrants tend to increase far-right voting, while high-skill or high-education immigrants have the opposite effect or none at all.

There is also evidence that support for the far right is mitigated by generous unemployment benefits in countries with high proportions of immigrants (Arzheimer, 2009). Other evidence indicates that immigration is more of a focal point when distrust of politicians is high (Abrams & Travaglino, 2018), but there are no clear findings on "protest voting" being an explanation for this (Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007). Another study finds the blame is not actually immigrants in a region that cause shifts to far-right voting, but rather sudden economic changes that create economic insecurity (Georgiadou et al., 2018). Clearly immigration is not an isolated issue, but rather perceptions of its merits are related to other economic and political conditions.

Our research contributes to this literature on immigration and voting behavior by taking a wider perspective over more elections, and by including EU parliamentary elections, which is only done by a handful of previous studies.[4] In addition, our general cross-nation approach motivates the need for a consistent coding of ideology. Using Nordsieck (2018), we are able to do so.

To our knowledge, our data set is the first that uses a comprehensive comparable information source which links vote share for political parties to their ideologies and associated EP groups in the European Union. Other studies have obtained party vote shares from the European Election Database[5] which curates election results from across Europe down to the NUTS 3 level. While this source is extensive and detailed, it has not been updated to include elections after 2014 limiting its utility for future research.

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[4](Georgiadou et al., 2018)

[5]https://nsd.no/european_election_database

3.3 Data and Methodology

Our analysis uses annual data for over 400 parties from the 28 European Union member States over the period 2005 to 2018. We collected data on their national elections, and their European Parliamentary (EP) elections from Nordsieck (2018). This source provides vote shares for each political party in every European election since 1945 and consistently categorizes party ideologies across countries. It also links parties to their associated political group in the European Parliament.

The vote share and seats won for every individual party with 1% or more of the vote during each election were recorded in a spreadsheet. Then each party's ideology, and EP group affiliation as of 2018 were added. We continue to use those EP group affiliations for the sake of continuity despite the fact that some EP groups have changed names, or are no longer officially recognized groups.[6]

For elections in which parties ran collectively as a coalition, the primary party name was recorded, and the orientations and EP groups of each other party in the coalition were added to its own. For parties that were renamed, the name, ideologies, and EP group affiliation as of 2018 were used, and vote shares were traced back to any previous names and recorded under the current name. We include national parliamentary elections for Croatia (joined EU in 2013), and Romania and Bulgaria (both joined in 2007), for the entire period.

To measure the political climate of each member state, for each election we use the total share of votes won by parties associated with selected political ideologies, and EP groups. Our explanatory variables and control variables were obtained from the Eurostat database.[7] The explanatory variable of interest is share of the population born in any non-EU member country (non-EU-born share).[8] Additional control variables include total population, real gross domestic product, unemployment rate, Gini coefficient, and share of the population

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[6]Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD): no longer officially recognized; Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE): succeeded by Renew Europe (RE); Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF): succeeded by Identity and Democracy (ID).

[7]ec.europa.eu/eurostat

[8]In the appendix we include results using the population share of any foreign-born immigrant as the regressor of interest.

65 and older.

EP elections take place every five years, and during the observed period there were two elections, in 2009 and 2014.[9] Thus for the EP elections, our analysis contains 55 country-election observations.[10] National elections are held at different intervals across the included countries, so the number of observed national elections per country is non-uniform. In the case of Greece, we observe seven national elections which is the most of any country and includes two elections during 2012, and two during 2015. All other countries have three to five elections each. In total, we analyze 106 national parliamentary country-elections which is more than nearly all other studies on this topic have used in the past and could give our estimates better statistical precision (see Table 3.2). The years of each election in the data are shown in Table 3.1, however 2019 elections are not included in the analysis due to immigrant and demographic variables being unavailable at the time.

As of 2018, there are nine party groups in the European Parliament of which the Members of the European Parliament (MEP) are collected under common ideologies. We recorded a total of 45 unique ideologies including communism, conservatism, and libertarianism. Others are more granular such as 'united Ireland', which obviously is unique to Ireland and Northern Ireland, and various minority interest ideologies that each represent a specific ethnic minority. We link the vote-shares for each party with each of their listed ideologies and their associated EP group. Since many parties have overlapping ideologies, and EP groups are associated with many parties, we use the cumulative vote-share of an ideology/EP Group in each election as our dependent variables. In particular, we are interested in ideologies associated with politically right-leaning parties. Thus we focus on vote-shares for parties with far-right, right-wing populism, nationalism, euroscepticism, regionalism, and populism ideologies, and collectively refer to them as "Right" ideologies. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.2.

As an exploration of the data, in Figure 3.1 we compare the first and last election in the

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[9]We include 2019 EP and national elections in descriptive statistics, but exclude them from our analysis because immigrant population shares and demographics are not yet published for 2019

[10]Each country is observed in both EP elections, with the exception of Croatia which is only observed in the 2014 EP election.

sample for each country to detect overall changes in vote-shares for the right and immigrant population shares. This is a simplification which ignores any intervening variation, but it does provide an initial impression of general trends. When averaged over all countries in our data, we find that there has been a three percentage point increase in vote-share for right-oriented parties which is mostly attributed to right-wing populist and regionalist parties. Figure 3.1 shows there has also been about a 1.5 percentage point increase in foreign born population shares which almost entirely consists of immigrants from other EU countries. However, when taking an average weighted by country population, change in right-oriented vote-share increases to about 4.5 percentage points, and the average change in foreign born population share drops slightly to about 1.25 percentage points with about half of that coming from outside the EU.

Figure 3.2 presents results from a further investigation into the T-statistics of the estimates showing they are approximately normally distributed, and centered at 0. This suggests that the significant estimates may be due to nothing more than random chance. This preliminary result shows no aggregate evidence of a relationship between immigrant populations and voting behavior.

We explore the lack of relationship between these two variables further in the next section. This may be explained in part by the fact that we see very little within-country change of immigrant population shares from the first to last elections, as is shown in Figures B.1 to B.4. If we consider the population shares of all foreign-born immigrants, the average change is only 1.89 percentage points. Most countries in the study had only a slight increase in immigrant population shares, but Luxembourg had by far the largest with an increase of 13.3 percentage points from 2009 to 2017. Excluding Luxembourg, the largest increase was 7.48 percentage points, and the average change of all countries that had an increase was 2.71 percentage points. There were only six countries that experienced a decrease in immigrant population share, and all decreases were very small with the greatest being -2.48 percentage points, and the average decrease was -1.09 percentage points. Non-EU foreign-born population shares follow a similar pattern, but with a narrower range.

On the other hand, within-country vote-shares of EP groups (Figures B.3 and B.4) and,

to a lesser extent, political orientations (Figures B.1 and B.2) have changed much more than immigrant population shares. In some countries, the EP group vote-shares changed by 20 to 30 percentage points, but on average there appears to have been a shift from left groups to center-right groups. The 1.4 percentage point average change in vote-share for right parties provides further evidence of this shift. The largest ideological shift is attributed to eurosceptic parties which gained an average of 2.44 percentage points.

Using all observations we can see the trend of vote-shares for EP party groups individually in Figure 3.3 and in groups according to political leanings in Figure 3.4. These figures show a fairly steady trend of a decline in vote-share for center groups and a small increase in vote-share for the right and left. Figure 3.5 shows a similar time series for each right ideology individually and in the aggregate. We see here an increase in vote-share for all right ideologies, which when taken individually appears to be mostly driven by an increase in vote-share for eurosceptic and right-wing populist parties. However, in Figure 3.6 we see only small increases in the population share of either all foreign born or non-EU born immigrants which do not visually appear to match the variation in vote-shares over the same period.

Our next analysis uses all observations except in the case of Greece. Greece had two national parliamentary elections in each of 2012 and 2015. We only use the results of the second election in each of these two years because the representatives elected in the first election only sat on the Hellenic Parliament for less than a year before the second election. We use a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) framework with either the total vote-share for parties associated with each of the nine EP groups, or the total vote-share for parties with right-leaning ideologies as the dependent variables, and non-EU-born share as the primary explanatory variable. SUR is described by Cameron and Trivedi (2005) where there are G dependent variables, K regressors, and N observations as the following system of regression equations:

$$y_{i,g} = X_{i,g}\beta_g + u_{i,g}, \quad g = 1, \ldots, G$$

where $y_{i,g}$ is a $N \times 1$ vector of either the vote share of EP group or ideology g in country i; $x_{i,g}$ is a $N \times K$ matrix of regressors which contains immigrant population share, and β_g is a $K \times 1$ vector of parameters to be estimated; u_g is a $N \times 1$ vector of error terms. If β_g is significant, then it would indicate the correlation between its associated regressor and the dependent variable.

The analysis is performed separately on national elections, and EU parliamentary elections. Additionally, seven specifications of increasing controls are used. Our base specification includes only the non-EU born population share. The second specification adds a time trend control. Next (third, fourth, and fifth, respectively), we separately include year fixed effects, and country fixed effects, and then both fixed effects together. The final specification adds economic and demographic control variables along with the year and country fixed effects. For each specification we test the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of the primary explanatory variable across the regression equations are jointly equal to zero.

SUR is known to collapse to OLS when the same regressors are used in each equation (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005), however there can still be efficiency gains to using SUR if the residuals are correlated across equations (Albon & Valentine, 1977). We perform a χ^2 test of this condition for each set of regressions and the null hypothesis of uncorrelated errors is consistently strongly rejected justifying the use of SUR (Breusch & Pagan, 1980).

3.4   Main Results

We now describe a set of regressions that we have run to test for a systematic relationship between immigration patterns and voting patterns. We will proceed to first discuss results in national elections, and following that we will examine results in European Parliament elections. For each type of election, we will analyze regressions with either EP group vote-share or ideology vote-share as the dependent variable.[11]

It is possible that voters may react differently to migrants who come from more culturally

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[11]Similar regressions to those discussed here are performed with weighting by population, votes cast, and voter turnout percentage. We also performed the same analysis using all foreign born persons as the regressor of interest. The results are similarly inconsistent and are presented in the appendix.

distant origin countries. We assume that EU member states are not averse to immigrants from other EU member states given that open borders are a condition of being part of the EU economic block. Card et al. (2012) look at 21 European countries with data from the European Social Survey and find that cultural differences are more important than wages or taxes in determining natives' attitudes toward immigrants. A similar conclusion has been found by single country case studies of Switzerland (Brunner & Kuhn, 2018), United Kingdom (Dustmann & Preston, 2007), and Spain (Mendez & Cutillas, 2014). We are not able to control for this effect because detailed regions/countries of origin are not reported by Eurostat for many EU countries, including Ireland, France, and Germany. However, it is because of this evidence that we choose non-EU immigrant population share as our regressor of interest.

3.4.1 National Elections

In the first half of our our main analysis, we focus upon results in national elections. Later, we will turn our attention to the results from EU elections. Here, we will examine how immigration affects the votes received by parties of selected ideologies; later we will turn our attention to votes received by different party groups. Each row of Table B.21 displays the estimated coefficient on the immigrant share variable in a regression of a measure of right voting based on parties' described ideology. The first measure that we report is the share (from 0 to 100) voting for *any* of our measures of right orientation. In the rows below, we present results for our specific right orientation measures: *euroscepticism*, *regionalism*, *far-right*, *nationalism* and *right-wing populism*. We completely describe the structure of the regression tables in the following subsection, but since all of the results are layed out the same way, we will only focus on the most detailed specification from each in subsequent subsections.

We present our first set of regression result in Table B.21. Here, our independent variable is a measure of the share of non-EU born individuals in the country in question in the year of the election. In the first column, we present results from a regression with no controls using the 106 national elections that occur during our period of study. We find no evidence

of a positive correlation between immigrant share and right voting. In fact, three of the six estimated coefficients are negative, and only one (*far-right*) is significant. To measure the overall fit of the model, at the bottom of the table we also present the results of an F-test on the joint significance of the immigrant share on all of the right voting measures. For this specification, we find that the p-value is around 0.17, suggesting that we cannot reject a null that immigration has no overall explanatory power.

It is possible that immigration and right voting have both been changing over time, leading to a spurious correlation between the two variables. In order to examine how this may be affecting our results, we report results from a specification including a time trend in our second column, and from a specification using annual indicator variables in the third column. Overall, the magnitudes of our coefficients do not change substantially, and accounting for changes over time provides a slightly better fit for the model. Again, our analysis reveals no evidence of a positive relationship between right voting and immigrant population shares.

In the fourth and fifth columns, we control for another potential confounding factor: unobserved time invariant heterogeneity across countries. We would expect that countries that were generally more xenophobic during our period would be less attractive for immigrants. In addition, it would be reasonable to expect that, apart from whatever effect immigration might have, these countries would be more likely to vote for right-oriented parties. Failing to control for such a xenophobic undercurrent would tend to lead to a downward bias in our estimated coefficients.

Constructing a set of controls that would fully measure the degree of xenophobia in a country would be a very challenging exercise, a fixed effects strategy provides a straightforward and feasible alternative. Our results now thus estimate the relationship between *changes* in immigration and *changes* in right voting, rather than examining the relationship between these two variables from a levels on levels approach. In column 4, we present results from the set of regressions which include indicator variables for each EU country, without any control for time trends. Column 5 presents results from regressions which include both country and year indicators.

In column four, only the coefficient on *right-wing populism* is positive and significant, and remains that way in column five, once we control for time effects. Overall, the model has very little predictive power, with p-values smaller than 0.1, but the significance of the estimate associated with *right-wing populism* appears to gain significance.

Finally, we examine the robustness of our results to the inclusion of several detailed controls (population, GDP, unemployment rate, Gini coefficient, and percentage of the population 65 years of age and older). As there are a small number of missing values for these control variables[12], we first present the results that we obtain from re-running the specification in column five on the subsample of observations for which we have complete details on our control variables. In column seven, we report results from regressions which include these controls. When looking at the apples-to-apples comparison between columns six and seven, we see that the inclusion of the detailed controls leads to lower magnitude coefficients in four of the six regressions. Now, we find no positive and significant results in this estimation, and the F-test on the joint significance of the immigrant share shows just as little evidence of predictive power as we have seen in previous models.

Political parties in the EU member countries self-organize into political groups in the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2019). This fact is beneficial to our study because it dramatically reduces the opportunity to miss categorize one of the groups. Additionally, the groups are arranged in the parliament seating chart from left to right both politically and physically which makes identification of the left, center, and right rather straight forward.[13] We use these groups in our analysis to attempt to estimate shifts to or from any particular position on the political spectrum. To our knowledge, this is a unique contribution of our study.

Looking at the association between EP group vote-shares and the share of non-EU immigrants, we see entirely inconsistent estimates in Table B.61. Only the estimate for S&D is negative and marginally significant in the most detailed specification.

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[12]The Gini coefficient was unavailable for several countries in some years.

[13]https://www.europarl.europa.eu/hemicycle/

3.4.2 European Parliament Elections

Next, we examine the same combinations of variables in the two European Parliament elections. We consider the regressions using political ideologies first. In Table B.101, we see no evidence of a relationship between non-EU immigrant shares and vote-shares for any of the right political orientations in EP elections.

Finally, we look at regression results using EP party group vote-shares in EP elections. The regressions using non-EU immigrant shares are shown in Table B.141. Non-EU immigrant shares appear to have no relationship with EP group vote-shares after the inclusion of detailed control variables.

3.5 Conclusions

The results from this study do not provide support for the hypothesis that changes in immigrant populations are related to changes in voting for parties or ideologies on the right. While our analysis does occasionally find significant results, they are sporadic and inconsistent between regressions. Furthermore, this means there is no clear evidence that either the contact hypothesis, or realistic conflict theory have had an effect on voting behavior, at least in the aggregate. This does not rule out the possibility that the two are having equal effects of opposite sign that cancel each other out in our estimates.

It is possible that a relationship of this nature simply cannot be observed at the national level. If in fact there is not a relationship between changes in immigrant populations and changes in voting behavior, then future research should try exploring other mechanisms for shifts in anti-immigration attitudes.

3.6 Tables

Table 3.1: Elections By Country

Country	EU Elections	National Elections
Austria	2009, 2014, 2019	2006, 2008, 2013, 2017
Belgium	2009, 2014, 2019	2007, 2010, 2014, 2019
Bulgaria	2009, 2014, 2019	2005, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017
Croatia	2014, 2019	2007, 2011, 2015, 2016
Cyprus	2009, 2014, 2019	2006, 2011, 2016
Czechia	2009, 2014, 2019	2006, 2010, 2013, 2017
Denmark	2009, 2014, 2019	2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019
Estonia	2009, 2014, 2019	2007, 2011, 2015, 2019
Finland	2009, 2014, 2019	2007, 2011, 2015, 2019
France	2009, 2014, 2019	2007, 2012, 2017
Germany	2009, 2014, 2019	2005, 2009, 2013, 2017
Greece	2009, 2014, 2019	2007, 2009, 2012.5, 2012.6, 2015.1, 2015.9, 2019
Hungary	2009, 2014, 2019	2006, 2010, 2014, 2018
Ireland	2009, 2014, 2019	2007, 2011, 2016
Italy	2009, 2014, 2019	2006, 2008, 2013, 2018
Latvia	2009, 2014, 2019	2006, 2010, 2011, 2014, 2018
Lithuania	2009, 2014, 2019	2008, 2012, 2016
Luxembourg	2009, 2014, 2019	2009, 2013, 2018
Malta	2009, 2014, 2019	2008, 2013, 2017
Netherlands	2009, 2014, 2019	2006, 2010, 2012, 2017
Poland	2009, 2014, 2019	2005, 2007, 2011, 2015
Portugal	2009, 2014, 2019	2005, 2009, 2011, 2015
Romania	2009, 2014, 2019	2008, 2012, 2016
Slovakia	2009, 2014, 2019	2006, 2010, 2012, 2016
Slovenia	2009, 2014, 2019	2008, 2011, 2014, 2018
Spain	2009, 2014, 2019	2008, 2011, 2015, 2016, 2019
Sweden	2009, 2014, 2019	2006, 2010, 2014, 2018
United Kingdom	2009, 2014, 2019	2005, 2010, 2015, 2017

Years represent the year of each observed election for every country and each
type. Croatia joined the EU on 1 July 2013. In the case of Greece, decimal
values indicate the number of the month of any election that occurred in a
year when multiple elections were held.

Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Count
GUE/NGL vote-share	6.92	9.52	0.00	41.80	161
Greens/EFA vote-share	4.68	6.07	0.00	26.60	161
SD vote-share	24.15	11.02	5.30	58.60	161
ALDE vote-share	14.05	13.68	0.00	58.60	161
EPP vote-share	29.27	12.97	0.00	70.10	161
ECR vote-share	5.03	8.71	0.00	42.40	161
EFDD vote-share	2.42	6.00	0.00	32.70	161
ENF vote-share	2.00	5.17	0.00	26.00	161
NI vote-share	10.24	13.15	0.00	92.30	161
Right vote-share	15.04	14.86	0.00	71.30	161
Far-Right vote-share	1.81	5.41	0.00	41.40	161
Nationalism vote-share	4.09	6.67	0.00	41.40	161
Right-wing Populism vote-share	4.39	7.05	0.00	28.20	161
Euroscepticism vote-share	5.05	10.53	0.00	51.40	161
Regionalism vote-share	2.79	9.37	0.00	55.70	161
Populism vote-share	0.30	2.83	0.00	32.70	161
Foreign-Born Population Share	10.73	7.40	0.00	46.54	161
Non-EU-Born Population Share	6.72	4.17	0.00	24.18	161
Population in Millions	18.27	22.89	0.41	82.52	161
GDP per capita	24231.70	15405.03	4184.70	81743.18	161
Gini Coefficient	30.14	4.01	22.70	40.20	157
Unemployment Rate	9.45	4.85	2.90	26.50	161
Share of population 65 and over	17.14	2.39	10.80	22.60	161

EP groups are mutually exclusive. Ideologies are not mutually exclusive.

Table 3.3: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Unweighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.146	0.112	0.0552	0.0858	0.127	0.244	0.0723
	(0.343)	(0.340)	(0.356)	(0.641)	(0.683)	(0.650)	(0.699)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.183	-0.193	-0.167	-0.129	-0.0122	0.00425	-0.0542
	(0.241)	(0.242)	(0.241)	(0.404)	(0.440)	(0.458)	(0.490)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.387	0.381	0.378	-0.0316	-0.0662	-0.0330	-0.132
	(0.247)	(0.248)	(0.262)	(0.284)	(0.323)	(0.324)	(0.347)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.181*	-0.192*	-0.199*	-0.129	-0.0809	-0.0661	0.0470
	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.236)	(0.264)	(0.269)	(0.285)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.117	-0.124	-0.148	-0.148	-0.183	-0.173	-0.164
	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.150)	(0.264)	(0.308)	(0.314)	(0.344)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.169	0.161	0.126	0.389*	0.491**	0.515**	0.358
	(0.152)	(0.153)	(0.162)	(0.221)	(0.234)	(0.232)	(0.228)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	106	106	106	106	106	102	102
F	1.53	1.61	1.57	0.66	1.13	1.33	1.12
p-value	0.167	0.142	0.155	0.680	0.346	0.244	0.349

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

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Table 3.4: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Unweighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.876***	0.868***	0.887***	0.182	0.228	0.223	0.644
	(0.208)	(0.209)	(0.213)	(0.369)	(0.406)	(0.419)	(0.395)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.149	0.142	0.170	0.0571	0.169	0.0825	0.0531
	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.141)	(0.233)	(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.272)
SD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.306	-0.277	-0.165	-0.582	-0.399	-0.451	-0.930*
	(0.255)	(0.251)	(0.266)	(0.493)	(0.534)	(0.551)	(0.549)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.664**	0.671**	0.692**	0.512	0.200	0.211	0.340
	(0.315)	(0.316)	(0.338)	(0.503)	(0.554)	(0.504)	(0.531)
EPP vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.560*	-0.532*	-0.580**	-0.695	-0.501	-0.415	-0.162
	(0.287)	(0.285)	(0.293)	(0.567)	(0.589)	(0.562)	(0.567)
ECR vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.0456	-0.0822	-0.0968	0.732	0.873*	0.904**	0.698
	(0.200)	(0.191)	(0.199)	(0.454)	(0.448)	(0.458)	(0.466)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.0598	-0.0662	-0.0973	-0.0988	-0.161	-0.178	-0.207
	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.133)	(0.316)	(0.349)	(0.321)	(0.342)
ENF vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.195*	0.189*	0.203*	0.0231	-0.0344	-0.0253	-0.0360
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.117)	(0.166)	(0.180)	(0.141)	(0.147)
NI vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.345	-0.376	-0.306	-0.716	-0.663	-0.628	-0.563
	(0.331)	(0.328)	(0.339)	(0.726)	(0.801)	(0.773)	(0.846)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	106	106	106	106	106	102	102
F	4.65	4.56	5.04	0.87	0.83	0.79	1.23
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.550	0.587	0.625	0.274

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table 3.5: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Unweighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.345	0.325	0.325	-0.603	-0.681	-0.941
	(0.500)	(0.499)	(0.499)	(1.067)	(1.041)	(1.431)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.0715	-0.0754	-0.0754	-0.502	-0.535	-0.701
	(0.366)	(0.369)	(0.369)	(0.793)	(0.799)	(1.078)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.256	0.250	0.250	-0.0392	-0.0489	0.179
	(0.170)	(0.171)	(0.171)	(0.331)	(0.336)	(0.524)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.00457	-0.0103	-0.0103	-0.129	-0.125	0.0577
	(0.224)	(0.225)	(0.225)	(0.324)	(0.330)	(0.465)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.0164	0.00826	0.00826	-0.337	-0.353	-0.721
	(0.262)	(0.263)	(0.263)	(0.536)	(0.543)	(0.817)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.320	0.315	0.315	0.397	0.360	-0.406
	(0.265)	(0.267)	(0.267)	(0.624)	(0.619)	(0.774)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.02	0.99	0.99	0.37	0.35	0.37
p-value	0.411	0.431	0.431	0.898	0.907	0.897

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table 3.6: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Unweighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.562*	0.563*	0.563*	0.793	0.788	1.192
	(0.298)	(0.301)	(0.301)	(0.676)	(0.689)	(0.798)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.531**	0.531**	0.531**	-0.902*	-0.902*	-0.952
	(0.212)	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.482)	(0.493)	(0.756)
SD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.351	-0.345	-0.345	0.290	0.342	0.688
	(0.357)	(0.360)	(0.360)	(0.976)	(0.973)	(1.231)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.317	0.323	0.323	-0.484	-0.433	1.076
	(0.450)	(0.454)	(0.454)	(1.144)	(1.149)	(1.404)
EPP vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.769*	-0.762*	-0.762*	-0.678	-0.612	-0.635
	(0.455)	(0.459)	(0.459)	(1.405)	(1.409)	(1.931)
ECR vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.158	-0.178	-0.178	-2.199*	-2.343**	-2.277
	(0.301)	(0.294)	(0.294)	(1.189)	(1.062)	(1.627)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.00322	-0.00674	-0.00674	0.0953	0.0677	-0.466
	(0.238)	(0.240)	(0.240)	(0.713)	(0.719)	(0.966)
ENF vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.197	0.193	0.193	-0.00195	-0.0347	-0.597
	(0.189)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.530)	(0.524)	(0.734)
NI vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.0678	0.0577	0.0577	0.0226	-0.00640	-0.162
	(0.329)	(0.330)	(0.330)	(1.163)	(1.181)	(1.694)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.13	2.08	2.08	1.65	2.21	1.51
p-value	0.026	0.030	0.030	0.103	0.022	0.146

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

3.7 Figures

Figure 3.1: First and Last Elections (National): Changes in X and Y

Note: "Total" is a combination of the selected ideologies.

Figure 3.2: Density of T-stats

Figure 3.3: Average EP Group Vote Share

Note: Vote-shares weighted by population of each country

Figure 3.4: Average EP Group Vote Share, Grouped

Note: Vote-shares weighted by population of each country

Figure 3.5: Average Party Ideology Vote Share

Note: Vote-shares weighted by population of each country. "Total" is a combination of the selected ideologies.

Figure 3.6: Average Immigrant Population Share

Note: Shares weighted by population of each country

Chapter 4

Impacts of the Renewable Portfolio Standard in Nevada

4.1 Introduction

In April 2019 Nevada's Governor signed a bill into law that will increase the minimum percentage of electricity distributed in the state which must be generated from renewable energy sources. This type of law, which has been adopted in 29 states and Washington D.C. (Mai et al., 2016), is known as a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS). Nevada's energy distributors were previously required to obtain at least 20% of their energy from renewable sources, and that requirement would have increase to 22% in 2020, then to 25% in 2025 ("NRS 704.7801-7828", 2009). The new law revised those requirements by increasing the minimum percentage of electricity generated by renewable sources to 24% in 2021, 29% in 2022, 34% in 2024, 42% in 2027, and then to 50% in 2030 ("SB 358", 2019).

RPSs are intended to reduce fossil fuel use by the electricity generation sector, and ultimately reduce emissions of pollutants. The exogenous imposition of a requirement for electricity to come from specific sources forces the energy sector to adjust production processes away from its unregulated state. This creates frictions in labor and capital markets as energy companies shift to retrain or hire new workers, and build new renewable power plants while decommissioning potentially unprofitable fossil fuel power plants. These frictions can

cause changes in factor and commodity prices, output quantities, household welfare, and government revenue and spending which could be positive or negative. Estimating the potential impacts of a policy change prior to its implementation is useful for anticipating and countering negative effects on the economy. Obtaining meaningful estimates is challenging due to the many interconnected agents with competing interests which make up the economy.

A Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, which consists of a system of equations representing the equilibrium behavior of markets and institutions, can simulate the economic response to changes in policies and provides a platform to model the economy with as much detail as desired. A more detailed model can more realistically capture the observed workings of the economy, however there is a trade off between realism and practicality. Creating a CGE model from the ground up takes a significant amount of time. Therefore a model should be as simple as possible with sufficient detail to model the specific institutions and agents of interest.

This study estimates the economic, distributional, and fiscal impacts in Nevada from the increased RPS using a state-level CGE model with detailed electricity generation and distribution industries to evaluate the costs and benefits of the policy. It also compares the impacts of a RPS with a carbon tax on the electricity generating sectors, and considers the effect of removing renewable generation subsidies with both policies. The goal of the study is determine which policy or combination of policies best achieves the goal of reducing emissions with the least cost placed on the total economy. The results could be used by state policy makers to target future aid to industries or households which may be adversely affected by the RPS, or to guide the adoption of alternative policies to achieve similar emission reduction targets. The model is flexible enough to easily estimate impacts from any RPS percentage and any level of carbon tax. It could also be adapted to compare other types of policies. To my knowledge, this is the first study of its kind in Nevada, and the first state-level CGE model of Nevada which I hope will provide a jumping off point for future researchers in energy or other policy analysis in the state.

A Carbon tax, generally considered to be the ideal alternative to a RPS, charges pro-

ducers a fee based on the quantity of $CO2$ they emit. The policy is based on the idea that emissions of $CO2$ and other greenhouse gases impose a cost on society that the producer does not pay. Theoretically, if producers were forced to bear the cost of this externality, then their costs of production would be equal to the social cost and the "optimal" amount of emissions would be achieved. A wide range of estimates have been calculated for the social cost of carbon from \$1 to \$50 per ton (Tax Policy Center [TPC], 2020). This study evaluates the impact of a \$10 per ton carbon tax on the electricity generation sector to compare with the RPS.

There is evidence that a carbon tax or cap-and-trade policy would be less costly, and reduce emissions by more than a RPS (Lyon & Yin, 2010; D. Young & Bistline, 2018). Considering that either of those policies are less politically feasible to implement, RPSs represent a "second best" policy in that they are not optimal, but they are feasible. Therefore, I will present estimated changes in $CO2$ emissions that result from each policy scenario for comparison. Furthermore, RPSs are predicated on the assumption that it is more expensive per kilowatt-hour (kWh) to produce electricity using renewable sources than using fossil fuels, however renewable generation technology is advancing and costs have been declining. In fact, some renewables, after federal tax credits, have a lower cost of generation per kilowatt-hour than many fossil fuel technologies for newly constructed plants (U.S. Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2018b). Further advancement of this technology may render the RPS policies of some states non-binding unless existing tax credits are allowed to sunset.

In 2017, renewable electricity generators could take advantage of a Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC) which reduced the tax burden of electricity producers by \$0.01 to \$0.02 per kWh depending on the type of renewable technology (Sherlock, 2020). Since this subsidy has ended for most renewable generators, I account for the removal of it in the CGE model, but I also perform analyses of policy scenarios where a similar subsidy still exists by 2030 when the RPS comes into effect.

Input-Output models are another widely used tool for regional policy analysis, because they are readily available and provide valid economic insights. However, restrictive assump-

tions of fixed prices, fixed coefficients, no input substitution, and no capacity constraint on production usually cause them to overestimate the response to an exogenous shock or supply change such as with an RPS. Another drawback of Input-Output is that it is only designed to estimate changes in production as a result of a shock and can't evaluate the effect on household welfare or income which is possible with CGE. Thus, impacts from a RPS and other carbon policies can be estimated with greater realism using a CGE model (Rose, 1995).

This CGE model simulates the impacts on the entire state economy of increasing renewable electricity generation with an electric utility which distributes the electricity and maintains transmission infrastructure. Endogenous prices adjust until factor and commodity market equilibrium conditions are satisfied. It models utility maximizing households and profit maximizing producers which interact under the constraint that supply and demand must be in equilibrium for all goods in the economy (Sue Wing, 2004). CGE models have been used in research on energy policies such as carbon taxes (Benavente, 2016; Guo et al., 2014), Feed-in Tariffs (Böhringer et al., 2012), cap-and-trade (Morris et al., 2010), and Renewable Portfolio Standards (Hannum et al., 2017; Li et al., 2019; Morris et al., 2010; Suttles et al., 2014); and at provincial, national, and global scales. CGE is well suited to this type of policy analysis because it captures indirect effects; allows prices to adjust; models decisions by households, firms, and governments simultaneously; and allows estimation of distributional impacts.

Compared to fixed-price models, CGE models can be made more consistent with modern economic theory by allowing greater flexibility in the specification of economic behavior, and therefore generally yielding a more moderate estimate of economic impacts. Thus, a CGE model is useful because it allows researchers to model institutional structures more specifically, and allows for more margins of adjustment than other models that make it better able to represent realistic economic functions.

4.2   Nevada's Energy Sector

The electricity sector operates differently across the U.S. depending on the region and state. Some states have competitive electricity markets while others are highly regulated, and results of studies in one state may not be directly applicable to another if their markets are structured differently. For this reason, studies of individual states should be performed to obtain valid and useful estimates of the impacts of policy changes.

In the U.S. and Canada, the grid is made up of three interconnections shown in Figure 4.1 which operate largely independently from one another (EIA, 2018c). Within the Western Interconnection, Nevada's major electric utility, NV Energy, acts as a regional balancing authority by ensuring that the supply of electricity balances with the demand for electricity in their region at all times. They accomplish this by generating electricity from their own generation facilities, or by purchasing it from other neighboring balancing authorities that have excess capacity in the wholesale electricity market.

In Nevada, electric utilities operate as regulated monopolies which gives one utility exclusive rights to retail electric service in an area. However, utility customers that have an average annual load of 1 megawatt (MW)[1] or more have the option of applying for exemption from the monopoly provider to obtain electricity from an alternative provider. MGM Resorts, Wynn Resorts, and Switch have applied for, and received, such exemptions from the Public Utility Commission of Nevada (PUCN) ("NRS 704B", 2001). These entities still receive distribution services from NV Energy, but they purchase electricity from out-of-state providers which are subject to the same RPS requirement ("NRS 704.7801-7828", 2009; NV Energy, 2018). The effects of large utility customers becoming their own provider would be an interesting and important event study, but is beyond the scope of this study.

Annual peak load in Nevada typically occurs in July or August, and minimum load occurs in February as seen in Figure 4.2[2]. Over the last decade, the minimum load has been between 50% and 60% of peak load reflecting the enormous seasonal variation in

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[1]A watt measures the amount of energy at a point in time. 1 megawatt = 1,000,000 watts.

[2]Homes in Nevada are typically heated by natural gas or heating oil.

demand for electricity. Variability of demand for electricity makes the use of easily adjusted sources of electricity generation, such as natural gas, more cost efficient than sources that are not quick to adjust like coal and nuclear. This demand responsive capability of natural gas generation is also valuable because intermittent generation sources like solar and wind cannot be turned on when needed (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [FERC], 2015).

Figure 4.3 shows how Nevada's electricity demand is met by different sources of generation. With the decline of coal, natural gas has become the dominant source of energy in the state. Natural gas is increasingly used to meet peak electricity demand because it emits less pollution than other fossil fuels and natural gas generators are more easily adjusted to increase or decrease output (FERC, 2015).

Nevada is mostly powered by fossil fuels, but has the most prime solar generation potential in the nation (EIA, 2018d). In 2017, 69.7% of Nevada's electricity was generated by natural gas, 4.8% was generated by coal, and 25.3% was generated by renewable sources (EIA, 2017). Of Nevada's 7.9 gigawatt-hours (GWh) of renewable generation in 2017, about 50% was from photovoltaic solar, 41.4% from geothermal, and 4.5% from wind (State of Nevada, Governor's Office of Energy [NVGOE], 2019).

Each kilowatt-hour of electricity generated by a renewable source creates a renewable energy credit (REC) which a utility can use to meet the RPS requirement ("NRS 704.7801-7828", 2009). RECs in excess of the required amount may be carried forward to subsequent years. Any excess RECs over 10% of the required amount may be sold or carried forward, and RECs over 25% of the required amount must be sold. Additionally, any deficit of RECs in a given year must be carried forward to subsequent years for future fulfillment ("SB 358", 2019).

In 2017, total energy consumption in the state was 40,194,905 megawatt-hours (MWh) of which 7,963,545 MWh (19.8%) was generated by renewable energy sources (NVGOE, 2019). If energy demand remained at the level of 2017, then an additional 12,133,908 MWh of renewable generation would be needed to meet the RPS requirement of 20,097,452 MWh by 2030 (an increase of 252%). This increase could be met by constructing new renewable generation facilities in the state, importing electricity from neighboring areas, applying

RECs carried forward from previous years, or purchasing RECs. The model used in this analysis does not directly model RECs, but that would be a useful addition and has not, to my knowledge, been done in the literature. The annual time frame of the model also ignores seasonal variation in demand, which would be important to model at smaller time frames.

As mentioned previously, renewable electricity generation technologies have become much more competitive relative to fossil fuel technologies in recent years. Figure 4.6 from the Annual Energy Outlook 2018 EIA (2018b), shows the extent to which renewable technologies have surpassed fossil fuel technologies in cost competitiveness, albeit with the help of federal subsidies. This indicates that switching to renewables may not negatively impact the economy as much as it would have in the past.

4.3 Literature

Research on Renewable Portfolio Standards has been growing around the world. Much of the literature has sought to answer the question of whether or not RPSs achieve the ultimate goal of reducing emissions and at what cost. Evidence indicates that existing RPS requirements have reduced greenhouse gases, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and particulate matter emissions, and will continue to do so in future scenarios (Barbose et al., 2016; Mai et al., 2016; Rouhani et al., 2016; Suttles et al., 2014). Cole et al. (2018) and Mai et al. (2016) and other studies by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory use a specialized linear program designed to model only the electricity sector, but with great detail, and therefore do not model the rest of the economy (Cohen et al., 2018).

However, other findings indicate that obtaining similar emission reductions with technology-neutral portfolios would be more efficient than a RPS (D. Young & Bistline, 2018). The literature identifies costs and benefits of using RPSs to meeting emission reduction targets including increased electricity costs, higher employment, decreased electricity demand, and lower GDP (Li et al., 2019; Rouhani et al., 2016; Suttles et al., 2014; Upton Jr & Snyder, 2017). Also, some studies estimate impacts to social welfare, finding that RPSs reduce total

welfare (Morris et al., 2010) except when a high carbon price is assumed (Rouhani et al., 2016).

CGE has been used to study the effects of RPSs, but in only a few cases at the sub-national level (Hannum et al., 2017; Li et al., 2019; Morris et al., 2010; Suttles et al., 2014). Hannum et al. (2017) use CGE to estimate the implied price of carbon under a RPS in Colorado. Morris et al. (2010) estimate the impacts of a RPS combined with a cap-and-trade policy with a global CGE and find that the two policies would reduce welfare, but leave emissions unchanged. Suttles et al. (2014) introduce wood residue byproducts used in bioenergy production to a multi-regional CGE to estimate the economic effects of an RPS and renewable transportation fuel policies adopted by the U.S. and European countries. They find that woody biomass is a viable substitute for fossil fuels to reduce emissions. Li et al. (2019) evaluate the impacts of various RPS targets in China finding that all of them reduce real GDP.

Although analyses of other state RPS laws have been done (Hannum et al., 2017), Nevada is different from other states in many ways that make it an interesting case study. Nevada has a unique mix of generation technologies that is heavier in geothermal and lighter in coal, and the most potential for solar generation expansion in the country (EIA, 2018d). The passage of the new RPS makes Nevada the 8th state with a renewable energy requirement of 50% or greater, none of which have yet been analyzed with CGE (Barbose, 2018).

CGE has been criticized for being a "black box" which prevents practitioners from knowing what is driving a particular result. This criticism has been attributed to incomplete explanations of CGE models' underlying theory or calibration procedures, or concealment of questionable assumptions (Sue Wing, 2004). This study will therefore provide a detailed description of the model and calibration procedures, and present equations with clear explanations of their underlying assumptions. The model is not a perfect representation of the Nevada economy, but I think it does provide useful and valid results for policy consideration.

Models of an economy that use highly aggregated data are known as "top-down" models, because they use a few broad sector definitions that include many individual industries,

which are subsequently used to parameterize the model. These models are useful in determining the effects of policy or economic shocks on economies as a whole. More detailed "bottom-up" models attempt to more accurately simulate the functioning of a select few industries of interest by using data on specific production processes of those industries. This level of specificity enables researchers to obtain more accurate estimates of changes in the economy from a policy change. In this case, engineering data such as electricity generation capacity and utilization, fuel cost per unit of output, and operating costs, which reflect the realities of generating electricity with specific technologies and fuel sources are used.

By combining the "top-down" and "bottom-up" approaches, researchers can analyze an entire economy with detailed production functions for industries of interest and aggregated production functions for ancillary sectors with a "hybrid" model (Böhringer & Rutherford, 2008; Sue Wing, 2008). Hybrid models are now used more commonly in energy policy literature due to the recognition that electricity generation processes have differing costs, input resources, emissions, and flexibility of scaling to meet demand (Cai & Arora, 2015).

Technological characteristics are vital considerations in production processes of the energy sector. Utilities generate power from the cheapest sources first then turn on more expensive sources to meet electricity demand as necessary. Power plants can have enormous differences in fixed and variable costs, for example nuclear plants have high fixed costs, but low variable costs, and are typically running constantly because they are slow and expensive to ramp-up. On the other hand, certain natural gas plants have low fixed costs but high variable costs depending on the type of generator being used, and can be ramped-up quickly which makes them better suited to being turned on and off to follow peak demand (FERC, 2015).

Fossil fuel plants can use steam turbine generators which have high capacity, but long start-up times, combustion turbines which are small, but ramp up quickly and have high costs, or combined cycle turbines which are a hybrid of the previous two technologies with greater efficiency and fewer emissions (FERC, 2015). The considerable variability of capacity, costs, and efficiency between generators necessitates a balanced portfolio of energy sources for an electric utility.

4.4 Methods

In this section I present simplified equations to convey the theory of the model, while full equations are presented in the appendix. The CGE model is defined as a mixed complementarity problem which solves a system of n equations and n unknowns for equilibrium prices, production quantities, and incomes (Mathiesen, 1985). The equations in the model are classified as: zero profit conditions, market clearing conditions, and income balance conditions. Zero profit conditions ensure that costs equal revenues for all production activities with positive output. Market clearing conditions ensure that the total demand for commodities and factors is less than or equal to their total supply. Income balance conditions require the incomes of final-demand agents to equal their expenditures. I use the General Algebraic Modeling System with the *MPSGE* subsystem (Rutherford, 1999) and the *PATH* solver to solve for the equilibrium of the model.

Electricity production, shown in Figure 4.4, and non-electricity production, shown in Figure 4.5, are modeled as a series of nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions where each node of the tree represents a production process which combines the inputs below it. The nested CES provides greater flexibility by allowing the modeler to specify different elasticities of substitution between inputs within one production process. Production activities minimize their costs subject to these production functions. The CES function collapses to a Leontief fixed coefficients function when the elasticity of input substitution is 0, and to a Cobb-Douglas function when it is 1. All sectors are calibrated to exhibit constant returns to scale with a productivity parameter equal to 1.

Electricity generation sectors produce either renewable or fossil fuel derived electricity via a Leontief production function of labor (L), capital (K), and natural resource fuel (R) for those sectors that use any.

$$Y_{gre} = min\{(a_{gff})^{-1}L, (b_{gre})^{-1}K\} \tag{4.1}$$

$$Y_{gff} = min\{(a_{gff})^{-1}L, (b_{gff})^{-1}K, (c_{gff})^{-1}R\} \tag{4.2}$$

where a, b, and c are technological constants. The subscripts gre and gff index the renewable and fossil fuel generation industries respectively, and gen indexes the set of all generation industries. The generation of electricity is constrained by the RPS equation which requires the output of the renewable electricity sector in kilowatt-hours to be greater than or equal to a certain percentage of total electricity production determined by the RPS.

$$\sum_{gre} \varepsilon_{gre} Y_{gre} \geq \phi \sum_{gen} \varepsilon_{gen} Y_{gen} \tag{4.3}$$

where ϕ is the minimum percentage of renewable electricity set by the RPS and ε is the amount of electricity produced in kilowatt-hours per dollar of output in a given generation industry. This formulation follows Böhringer and Rutherford (2008), and models the RPS as an endogenous tax on fossil fuel generation industries which is paid to renewable generation industries. This modeling choice is a simplification that does not include RECs, but will be improved upon in future work. It is important to note that this formulation imposes the RPS constraint on the production of electricity, but the Nevada RPS actually places the minimum requirement on the quantity of electricity consumed in the state. Since the majority of electricity consumed in Nevada is generated in-state, I feel that this is still an appropriate method of modeling the RPS, but could be modified in the future. Another auxiliary constraint requires total electricity generation to be less than or equal to exogenous total capacity.

The outputs of renewable and fossil fuel generation are combined into a homogeneous electricity commodity with a high, but not infinite (Sue Wing, 2006), elasticity of substitution reflecting their nearly perfect substitutability.

$$Y_e = \{a_e Y_{gre}^{\frac{\sigma_e-1}{\sigma_e}} + (1-a_e) Y_{gff}^{\frac{\sigma_e-1}{\sigma_e}}\}^{\frac{\sigma_e}{\sigma_e-1}} \tag{4.4}$$

where σ_e is the elasticity of substitution between renewable and non-renewable electricity.

The operations of the electric utility are captured by the Transmission and Distribution (TD) sector which minimizes costs subject to a CES technology. TD purchases wholesale

electricity which is either produced locally as described above or imported from neighboring states. Wholesale electricity is combined with capital, labor, and intermediate inputs to produce retail electricity which is then consumed by households, used as an input to production in the non-energy sectors, or exported to neighboring states.

$$Y_{td} = \{a_{td}Y_e^{\frac{\sigma_{td}-1}{\sigma_{td}}} + b_{td}KL_{td}^{\frac{\sigma_{td}-1}{\sigma_{td}}} + c_{td}M_{td}^{\frac{\sigma_{td}-1}{\sigma_{td}}}\}^{\frac{\sigma_{td}}{\sigma_{td}-1}} \qquad (4.5)$$

Non-energy sectors each produce commodities with constant elasticity of transformation (CET) technologies, which allows each sector to produce multiple commodities, and CES production functions of a capital-labor composite and energy-intermediate input composite to minimize costs.

Regional output is converted by a CET disposition equation into local commodities, exports to the rest of the US, and the rest of the world. Local commodities, US commodities, and foreign imports are combined in an absorption equation to create local input commodities which are used as inputs to production or consumed by households.

Households receive utility from consumption of commodities, including retail electricity, and minimize expenditures subject to a Cobb-Douglas utility function.

$$U = \prod_i c_i^{\beta_i} \quad \forall i = 1, \ldots, C \qquad (4.6)$$

where β_i is the share of expenditures on commodity i, and $\sum_i \beta_i = 1$. Households are endowed with generic labor and capital inputs which are used directly by producers.

I evaluate the model under five different counterfactual policy scenarios to compare with the baseline scenario, which reflects the current policy conditions of Nevada and assumes no changes. Thus, there are federal subsidies for renewable generation, a 20% minimum percentage of renewables (which is non-binding), and no carbon tax at the baseline. The five counterfactual scenarios consist of combinations of federal subsidies for renewables, a 50% minimum of renewables, and a $10 per ton carbon tax on the electricity generation sector imposed by the state government.

The carbon tax is modeled as a tax on the output of the generation industries that emit

CO2. The renewable subsidies, being production tax credits, are modeled as a negative tax on the eligible industries.

4.5 Data

CGE models typically rely on a matrix of industry purchases and receipts called a social accounting matrix (SAM) to calibrate the model's equations. A SAM contains rows and columns for each productive industry, households, and governments. Columns of the matrix represent payments, or purchases of goods or services, while rows represent receipts, or sales. In this way, the SAM captures how all transactions flow through an economy. Since a given column represents all purchases of a single sector, summing all of those purchases and dividing each entry in the column by that sum obtains the shares of each input in the sector's production. These shares are then used in the CGE model's production and utility functions for each sector and each household group.

Models of the entire U.S. economy can take advantage of publicly available, and frequently updated, national SAMs. Smaller regional models must utilize more creative sources sometimes involving extensive custom data collection depending on the level of analysis. Many regional models begin with SAMs derived from the input-output modeling software, IMPLAN, which creates regional SAMs at the state or county level. However, IMPLAN uses a certain amount of estimation and interpolation from national SAMs to create its smaller regional SAMs making them less than ideal, and when used are typically augmented with data from government agencies (Waters et al., 1999; Watson & Beleiciks, 2009).

I start with a Nevada SAM from IMPLAN, but improve upon it by using confidential employment and compensation data obtained from the Nevada Department of Employment, Training, and Rehabilitation (DETR) for every business in Nevada. Due to the fact that non-covered employment (workers whose wages their employer does not have to pay unemployment insurance taxes on) is not included in the DETR data I supplement this with data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) which does include both covered and non-covered employment. However, the BEA only reports this for NAICS 2-digit sec-

tor aggregates, so I scale up the DETR data proportional to the sector totals reported by the BEA thus making the total employment and compensation consistent with government sources.

Additionally, IMPLAN does not include the Hydroelectric generation or Biomass generation industries in their model of Nevada. This is likely because the Hoover Dam, being the largest hydroelectric plant in the state, is federally controlled, and the Biomass generators in Nevada are operated by waste management companies whose employment is classified under the waste management sector. Therefore, I add the Hydroelectric and Biomass generation industries to the model by shifting the employment and estimated output from their respective industries.

Energy sector data comes from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Prices of fossil fuel inputs and capacity utilization factors come from the Electric Power Annual (EIA, 2018a). Capacity utilization factors capture the percentage of total generator capacity that is actually utilized during generation. Generators do not typically run at full capacity due to fluctuations in energy use, and the significantly higher cost of restarting generators after being completely shut off, which makes running generators at low capacity cheaper than turning them off and on as needed. This also means that total capacity constraints are typically non-binding.

Additional energy sector data for the year 2017 comes from the Assumptions to the Annual Energy Outlook (EIA, 2018b) including generator capacity and heat rate, emissions, construction cost, and variable and fixed operation cost by generation technology. Capacity, measured in megawatts (MW), is the maximum instantaneous energy produced by a generator. Heat rate, measured in BTUs per kilowatt-hour, is the conversion rate of fuel to energy. Construction, and variables costs, are attributed to capital and labor, respectively, as per Sue Wing (2008). Carbon emissions by Nevada energy producers are reported in metric tons per year by fuel type used in production which includes coal, petroleum, natural gas, and geothermal generators. Carbon tax rates are based on emissions reported for each type of electricity generation technology at \$10 per ton of CO_2 emitted (EIA, 2018b).

From the starting point of a state level SAM for Nevada in 2017, I adjust the employ-

ment and employee compensation using the data from DETR and the BEA. To ensure that the SAM captures the engineering realities of electricity generation and distribution, those industries are disaggregated by energy source and generation technology following Sue Wing (2008) using data from the EIA. I also assume a 20% growth of gross regional product economy wide and a 20% increase in electricity generation capacity to project the SAM to the 2030 baseline. This projection assumes that no existing fossil fuel capacity is decommissioned from now until 2030 which may be a conservative assumption. If any of those plants do in fact cease operation within the next ten years, then my results may underestimate the impacts.

Sue Wing (2008) describes a method of disaggregating the energy sector for national SAMs produced by the BEA which report all electric generation, and transmission and distribution industries in one aggregate account. I modify his methods due to the different structure of the SAM from IMPLAN as described by Nadreau (2015). Table 4.1 shows how the structure of the energy sector is adapted from IMPLAN to use in the model. IMPLAN's *Fossil Fuel* industry is disaggregated into coal, oil, and natural gas by technology. Coal and oil generators in Nevada use steam turbine technologies. Natural Gas generators use combined cycle, combustion turbine, internal combustion, and steam turbine technologies. Finally, the *Solar* industry will be disaggregated into photovoltaic solar and thermal solar.

All other IMPLAN energy industries including hydroelectric, geothermal, wind, and biomass generation; and transmission and distribution have a one-to-one correspondence with those of the model. Technologies such as nuclear and fuel cell generation do not exist in Nevada and are therefore excluded from the model. Thus, the energy sector will consist of 12 electricity generation industries, and the transmission and distribution industry. Non-energy industries with similar production processes are aggregated into seven accounts to allow for some differentiation of impacts to other industries.

The rest of the SAM consists of labor and capital, nine household groups defined by income brackets, federal government, state and local government, the rest of the U.S., and the rest of the world.

4.6 Results

In this section I present results from the CGE model to show the impacts to Nevada's economy in the baseline and five counterfactual scenarios. Baseline results represent the projected conditions of the Nevada economy in the year 2030 with no changes in current policy. The first counterfactual scenario assumes renewable generation subsidies remain in effect and the 50% RPS is enacted. Scenario two assumes subsidies remain and a $10/ton carbon tax on electricity generation is enacted. Scenario three assumes the renewable generation subsidies are removed and no other policy is adopted. Scenario four assumes only a 50% RPS, and scenario five assumes only a $10/ton carbon tax. All results represent the functioning of the Nevada economy for one year with each particular set of policies in place.

Table 4.2 shows how the percentage of renewable electricity changes in each scenario. Both RPS scenarios (1 and 4) achieve the 50% minimum required by the policy. Scenario three, which removes the existing renewable generation subsidies, results in a percentage of renewables 1.2 percentage points below the baseline. Both of the $10/ton Carbon Tax scenarios (2 and 5) result in a higher percentage of renewables than the baseline and the RPS scenarios, but removing the existing subsidies decreases its impact by 1.6 percentage points. In this light, it is clear that if simply reducing the percentage of fossil fuel generation is the goal, then either a RPS or a carbon tax can achieve it.

The impacts of each policy scenario on net electricity generation by technology are shown in Table 4.3 with baseline results reported in terrawatt-hours (TWh) and counterfactual results reported as percentage changes from baseline. With the renewable generation subsidy unchanged, both the RPS (scenario 1) and the carbon tax (scenario 2) decrease fossil fuel generation and increase renewable generation, however with the carbon tax there is a much greater reduction in the technologies with the highest emission rates. Coal steam turbine generation is reduced by 33.06% and 95.03%, and generation by oil steam turbines is reduced by 32.61% and 89.09% in the scenarios 1 and 2 respectively.

In the case of the RPS, hydroelectric (108.52%) and biomass (111.83%) generation

increase the most. The increases in renewable generation appear to be more uniform under the carbon tax. Hydroelectric, solar PV, solar thermal, and wind generation increase by about 99% each. Geothermal generation only increases by 90% due to the carbon tax and the small amount of CO_2 that is emitted by this activity. Interestingly, the RPS causes total in-state generation to increase by 0.55%, while the carbon tax causes it to decrease by 7.56%.

Removal of the renewable generation subsidies in scenario 3 results in a small increase in all fossil fuel generation on the order of just under 1%, and is accompanied by reductions in renewable generation with the exception of Biomass technologies which sees a small increase. Notably, the two solar generation technologies are effected more (-7.19% and -7.22%) than wind and geothermal (-5.70% and -5.13%), and much more than hydroelectric (-0.53%). This is likely because solar, wind, and geothermal technologies receive the most benefit from the subsidy. There is also a decrease in total in-state generation of 0.59%, in this scenario.

The RPS and the carbon tax without renewable subsidies (scenarios 4 and 5), show interesting differences from scenarios 1 and 2 where the subsidies for renewable generation remain in effect. The RPS causes all fossil fuel generation to decline by about 33% each, which is a slightly larger decrease than with the subsidies. This could be explained by the fact that the RPS is modeled as a tax on fossil fuel generation that is paid to renewable generation. Thus, if the federal subsidy is removed, there is a greater burden placed on fossil fuel generators to make up the difference in meeting the RPS.

Generation by the renewable technologies is much more varied after subsidies are removed. Hydroelectric (115.58%) and biomass (120.54%) increase at the greatest rates under the RPS (scenario 4). Solar, wind, and geothermal increase by less in meeting the RPS than with the subsidies. The carbon tax (scenario 5) now causes an even greater 8.91% reduction in total generation in Nevada. Fossil fuel generators follow a similar pattern to scenario 2, but with slightly smaller decreases. There is also a much smaller increase in geothermal generation of 81.96%. These results clearly indicate that the policies under consideration have very different impacts on the electricity generation sector though all of them shift

production from fossil fuel to renewable sources.

The changes in electricity generation found by the model result in changes in the carbon emissions by those industries which are presented in Table 4.4, and may be the most important result considering the goal of each policy is to reduce emissions. In the baseline scenario, electricity generators in Nevada emit 15.98 million metric tons of CO_2. The carbon tax results in the greatest reduction in total CO_2 emissions, when the renewable subsidies remain in effect, at -44.13%. The reduction in emissions caused by the RPS is about 13 percentage points smaller at -31.27%. Removal of the renewable subsidies causes a slight greater reduction with the RPS (-32.01%) and a slightly smaller reduction with the carbon tax (-43.22%). These results suggest that the RPS has a greater impact on emissions when combined with subsidies supporting renewable generation, but carbon taxes have a greater impact on emissions than a RPS. However, it is important to bear in mind that the carbon tax also results in large reductions in overall electricity generation sector activity.

Impacts to the output of production sectors are presented in Table 4.5. Most of the non-electric sectors in the model are only marginally affected (less than ±1% change) in each counterfactual scenario with the exception of electricity Transmission and Distribution (TD), and Mining. Nevada's Mining sector activity drops by about 2.5% in each RPS scenario, and by about 3% in each carbon tax scenario. This isn't surprising considering the shift from fossil fuel use that both policies are intended to provoke. However, TD sector activity is positively affected by the RPS by about 2.9%, but negatively affected by the carbon tax by 5.3% to 5.4%. Overall, removing the renewable generation subsidy has little effect on state GRP, and there is less of a reduction in GRP with the RPS than the carbon tax.

Changes in employment are shown in Table 4.6. Since there is no unemployment or migration yet included in the model, the are no changes to total employment and labor is only shifted from some sectors to others. Thus the current model likely underestimates the true impacts to employment that would occur if workers were allowed to leave the state or not work. However, the pattern that emerges from Table 4.6 is that the fossil fuel based generators lose the most employment when a RPS or a carbon tax is enacted with the

lost labor moving to renewable based generators. The Mining sector loses 2.5 to 3 percent employment with either policy. TD gains about 1.5 percent employment with the RPS, but loses nearly 3 percent under the carbon tax. If unemployment and migration were included, there would likely not be a perfect shifting of workers between sectors in Nevada. Instead, I expect that the gains would fall short of making up for the loses resulting in fewer overall jobs, and in that case, the RPS would minimize job losses.

The distributional impacts of the policies are very small, as shown in Table 4.7. However, the carbon tax appears to reduce income for all household groups, while the RPS increases income for all but the highest income households. The RPS appears to provide the greater overall benefit to households than the carbon tax, and although distributional effects are small in either case, the RPS benefits lower income groups at the expense of higher income groups, and the carbon tax results in a cost to all.

Finally, the fiscal impacts of each scenario are presented in Table 4.8. The estimated impacts are small in magnitude, but there is an increase in federal government revenue and a decrease in state and local government revenue from the RPS. Whereas the carbon tax results in a decrease in revenue of the federal government and an increase in revenue for state and local governments. This could be a reason why there has been little support for a federal carbon tax. However it appears that states may be adopting RPS laws to their own fiscal detriment.

4.7   Conclusion

This study estimated the impacts to the Nevada economy from the imposition of a 50% RPS, and a \$10/ton carbon tax on CO2 emissions in the electricity generation sector to weigh the costs and benefits of the two policies. It also evaluated the impact of the two policies with and without existing federal subsidies for renewable generation. The results indicate that the RPS achieves modest emission reductions with less disruption to the total output of the generation sector. The carbon tax achieves greater emission reductions, but at the cost of significantly lower total activity in the generation sector. The RPS has an

estimated negative effect on the Mining sector, but also a positive effect on the Transmission and Distribution sector. The carbon tax negatively affected the activity in both Mining and Transmission and Distribution, and resulted in a 0.22% reduction in state Gross Regional Product. Removing the existing subsidies for renewable generation had negligible effects. The RPS has less of a negative effect on state GRP than the carbon tax.

While the impacts to employment are a wash in total due to the limitations of the current model, the RPS results in less job market shifting than the carbon tax. When unemployment and migration are allowed in the model, it is likely that the losses will outweigh the gains to employment which would make the RPS the better option.

Estimates of the distributional and fiscal impacts of the policies were minor. Although, the carbon tax had a small negative effect on all household income groups while the RPS had a small positive effect on all bu the highest income group. Also, the RPS negatively affected state and local government revenue, and a negative effect on federal revenue while the carbon tax had the opposite effect.

Based on the results of this study, either a RPS or a carbon tax could be preferable depending on the specific goals of policy makers. If reducing CO_2 emissions is the primary goal, then the carbon tax is much more effective at achieving it, but it won't be very effective in generating tax revenue for the state due to the dramatic reduction in fossil fuel electricity generation that it causes. If distributional effects are also important, then the RPS clearly causes a small redistribution of wealth from the highest income group to the rest, but it does not achieve as much of a reduction in CO_2 emissions as the carbon tax.

There are some limitations of the model that could be improved upon in future studies. There are important features of Nevada's RPS that I anticipate adding into future iterations of the model, but have thus far been unable to incorporate. The current formulation of the model uses a tax/subsidy mechanism to meet the RPS constraint which creates transfers from fossil fuel to renewable generators that would not occur using RECs as the mechanism. The next step in improving the model would focus on this shortcoming. Additionally, since RECs are tradable between utilities, incorporating a mechanism to allow purchasing RECs from other states would make the model more realistic and provide an alternative to capacity

expansion. It may be important to incorporate sector specific labor and capital in the short run to reflect the fact that employees and investments are not easily transferable between sectors in a short time frame.

Currently the results of the RPS and Carbon Tax scenarios may not be directly comparable because they result in different percentages of renewable generation. A future version of the model ideally would endogenously determine the carbon tax rate to achieve an equivalent renewable generation percentage to that specified by the RPS.

There is also room for improvement in the fact that the capacity constraint is technology agnostic, but could be written in a technology specific form in a future iteration of the model to allow finer control over each technologies generating capacity. This change would require data on technology specific capacity projections, which I have not seen published. There are also no restrictions on the potential capacity of any generation technology. It may be more realistic to limit the expansion of hydroelectric and geothermal technologies due to most of these resources in Nevada being already in use, whereas solar technologies have much more potential for expansion (EIA, 2018d). Also, the results may change if generation capacities were to be modeled endogenously with costs of construction being passed on to the utility's customers, and would be a logical next step in this research.

The distributional effects, though small, may be different if health or quality of life effects from emissions reduction were incorporated into the household utility function, and could be added in future work. However, total emissions in Nevada are low compared to other states (EIA, 2018d) and the majority of fossil fuel generators are located far from population centers. This makes the connection between generation sector emissions and utility somewhat tenuous for residents of Nevada.

4.8 Tables

Table 4.1: Energy Sector Structure

IMPLAN	Model
Fossil Fuel	Coal - Steam Turbine
	Oil - Steam Turbine
	Natural Gas - Combustion Turbine
	Natural Gas - Internal Combustion
	Natural Gas - Steam Turbine
	Natural Gas - Combined Cycle
Solar	Solar - Photovoltaic
	Solar - Thermal
Hydroelectric	Hydroelectric
Wind	Wind
Geothermal	Geothermal
Biomass	Biomass
Transmission and Distribution	Transmission and Distribution

Table 4.2: Actual % Renewable Generation

Scenario	Baseline	1	2	3	4	5
Subsidy	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
RPS	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Carbon Tax Account	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
%	25.4	50.0	54.0	24.2	50.0	52.4

Table 4.3: Net Generation

Scenario	Baseline	1	2	3	4	5
Subsidy	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
RPS	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Carbon Tax	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Account	(TWh)	(% Change)				
Gen. Coal, Steam Turbine	2.24	-33.06	-95.03	0.97	-33.79	-94.93
Gen. Oil, Steam Turbine	0.01	-32.61	-89.09	0.95	-33.33	-88.89
Gen. Natural Gas, Combustion Turbine	0.73	-33.09	-39.63	0.97	-33.82	-38.50
Gen. Natural Gas, Internal Combustion	0.35	-32.89	-39.59	0.97	-33.62	-38.46
Gen. Natural Gas, Steam Turbine	0.55	-32.86	-39.51	0.96	-33.59	-38.38
Gen. Natural Gas, Combined Cycle	30.33	-32.56	-39.31	0.95	-33.28	-38.19
Gen. Hydroelectric	2.18	108.52	99.79	-0.53	115.58	100.54
Gen. Solar Photovoltaic	4.78	92.52	99.78	-7.19	86.35	87.10
Gen. Solar Thermal	0.19	92.81	99.90	-7.22	86.58	87.15
Gen. Wind	0.43	96.37	99.88	-5.70	93.00	90.19
Gen. Geothermal	3.95	98.85	90.15	-5.13	96.62	81.96
Gen. Biomass	0.11	111.83	100.29	0.17	120.54	102.44
Total	45.84	0.55	-7.56	-0.59	-0.52	-8.91

Table 4.4: CO2 Emissions

Scenario	Baseline	1	2	3	4	5
Subsidy	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
RPS	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Carbon Tax	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Account	(Mill. Metric Ton)	(% Change)				
Gen. Coal, Steam Turbine	1.76	-33.06	-95.03	0.97	-33.79	-94.93
Gen. Oil, Steam Turbine	0.00	-32.61	-89.09	0.95	-33.33	-88.89
Gen. Natural Gas, Combustion Turbine	0.32	-33.09	-39.63	0.97	-33.82	-38.50
Gen. Natural Gas, Internal Combustion	0.15	-32.89	-39.59	0.97	-33.62	-38.46
Gen. Natural Gas, Steam Turbine	0.24	-32.86	-39.51	0.96	-33.59	-38.38
Gen. Natural Gas, Combined Cycle	13.34	-32.56	-39.31	0.95	-33.28	-38.19
Gen. Geothermal	0.17	98.85	90.15	-5.13	96.62	81.96
Total	15.98	-31.27	-44.13	0.89	-32.01	-43.22

Table 4.5: Output

Scenario	Baseline	1	2	3	4	5
Subsidy	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
RPS	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Carbon Tax	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Account	($ Million)	(% Change)				
Agriculture	1,145.25	-0.23	-0.35	0.01	-0.23	-0.34
Mining	7,748.29	-2.60	-3.13	0.08	-2.65	-3.04
Gen. Coal, Steam Turbine	91.76	-33.06	-95.03	0.97	-33.79	-94.93
Gen. Oil, Steam Turbine	0.43	-32.61	-89.09	0.95	-33.33	-88.89
Gen. Natural Gas, Combustion Turbine	30.72	-33.09	-39.63	0.97	-33.82	-38.50
Gen. Natural Gas, Internal Combustion	13.84	-32.89	-39.59	0.97	-33.62	-38.46
Gen. Natural Gas, Steam Turbine	23.16	-32.86	-39.51	0.96	-33.59	-38.38
Gen. Natural Gas, Combined Cycle	1,266.25	-32.56	-39.31	0.95	-33.28	-38.19
Gen. Hydroelectric	260.92	108.52	99.79	-0.53	115.58	100.54
Gen. Solar Photovoltaic	26.09	92.52	99.78	-7.19	86.35	87.10
Gen. Solar Thermal	1.04	92.81	99.90	-7.22	86.58	87.15
Gen. Wind	27.34	96.37	99.88	-5.70	93.00	90.19
Gen. Geothermal	202.66	98.85	90.15	-5.13	96.62	81.96
Gen. Biomass	27.90	111.83	100.29	0.17	120.54	102.44
Elec. Transmission and Distribution	3,295.96	2.88	-5.30	-0.07	2.96	-5.43
Other Utilities	1,009.56	-0.02	0.15	-0.00	-0.02	0.15
Construction	22,017.09	-0.07	0.01	0.00	-0.07	0.01
Manufacturing	23,643.46	-0.20	-0.38	0.01	-0.20	-0.37
Trade	32,519.11	-0.03	-0.11	0.00	-0.03	-0.10
Services	226,779.92	-0.07	-0.04	0.00	-0.07	-0.03
Total	320,130.75	-0.08	-0.22	0.00	-0.08	-0.22

Table 4.6: Employment

Scenario	Baseline	1	2	3	4	5
Subsidy	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
RPS	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Carbon Tax	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Account	(Employees)	(% Change)				
Agriculture	8,760	-0.18	-0.25	0.01	-0.18	-0.24
Mining	22,440	-2.54	-3.07	0.07	-2.60	-2.98
Gen. Coal, Steam Turbine	55	-33.06	-95.03	0.97	-33.79	-94.93
Gen. Oil, Steam Turbine	1	-32.61	-89.09	0.95	-33.33	-88.89
Gen. Natural Gas, Combustion Turbine	18	-33.09	-39.63	0.97	-33.82	-38.50
Gen. Natural Gas, Internal Combustion	8	-32.89	-39.59	0.97	-33.62	-38.46
Gen. Natural Gas, Steam Turbine	13	-32.86	-39.51	0.96	-33.59	-38.38
Gen. Natural Gas, Combined Cycle	749	-32.56	-39.31	0.95	-33.28	-38.19
Gen. Hydroelectric	300	108.52	99.79	-0.53	115.58	100.54
Gen. Solar Photovoltaic	36	92.52	99.78	-7.19	86.35	87.10
Gen. Solar Thermal	1	92.81	99.90	-7.22	86.58	87.15
Gen. Wind	14	96.37	99.88	-5.70	93.00	90.19
Gen. Geothermal	331	98.85	90.15	-5.13	96.62	81.96
Gen. Biomass	30	111.83	100.29	0.17	120.54	102.44
Elec. Transmission and Distribution	2,544	1.59	-2.92	-0.04	1.63	-2.98
Other Utilities	1,944	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.17
Construction	124,800	-0.02	0.08	0.00	-0.02	0.09
Manufacturing	65,880	-0.18	-0.26	0.01	-0.18	-0.25
Trade	258,000	0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.00
Services	1,590,000	-0.02	0.05	0.00	-0.01	0.05
Total	2,075,926	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Table 4.7: Household Income

Scenario	Baseline	1	2	3	4	5
Subsidy	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
RPS	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Carbon Tax	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Account	($ Billion)	(% Change)				
Households < 15k	6.79	0.42	-0.15	-0.01	0.44	-0.16
Households 15k to 30k	13.38	0.21	-0.15	0.00	0.22	-0.15
Households 30k to 40k	10.46	0.11	-0.17	0.00	0.12	-0.16
Households 40k to 50k	9.95	0.07	-0.19	0.00	0.08	-0.19
Households 50k to 70k	19.71	0.06	-0.21	-0.00	0.07	-0.21
Households 70k to 100k	26.28	0.10	-0.22	-0.00	0.10	-0.23
Households 100k to 150k	26.03	0.07	-0.24	-0.00	0.07	-0.24
Households 150k to 200k	11.24	0.05	-0.25	-0.00	0.05	-0.26
Households > 200k	12.89	-0.22	-0.27	0.00	-0.23	-0.28

Table 4.8: Government Revenue

Scenario	Baseline	1	2	3	4	5
Subsidy	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
RPS	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Carbon Tax	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Account	($ Billion)	(% Change)				
Federal Gov	35.20	0.15	-0.18	0.01	0.17	-0.17
State and Local Gov	33.45	-0.20	0.05	0.00	-0.21	0.05

4.9   Figures

Figure 4.1: North America Interconnections

Source: Western Electricity Coordinating Council, wecc.org

Figure 4.2: Nevada Monthly Electricity Demand

Retail sales of electricity, monthly

million kilowatthours

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

Figure 4.3: Nevada Monthly Electricity Generation

Net generation, Nevada, all sectors, monthly

thousand megawatthours

Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

Figure 4.4: Nesting structure of Energy Sector production

Figure 4.5: Nesting structure of Non-Energy Sector production

Figure 4.6: Estimated levelized cost of electricity for new generation resources entering service in 2022 (2017 \$/MWh)

Plant type	Capacity factor (%)	Levelized capital cost	Levelized fixed O&M	Levelized variable O&M	Levelized transmission cost	Total system LCOE	Levelized tax credit[1]	Total LCOE including tax credit
Dispatchable technologies								
Coal with 30% CCS[2]	85	84.0	9.5	35.6	1.1	130.1	NA	130.1
Coal with 90% CCS[2]	85	68.5	11.0	38.5	1.1	119.1	NA	119.1
Conventional CC	87	12.6	1.5	34.9	1.1	50.1	NA	50.1
Advanced CC	87	14.4	1.3	32.2	1.1	49.0	NA	49.0
Advanced CC with CCS	87	26.9	4.4	42.5	1.1	74.9	NA	74.9
Conventional CT	30	37.2	6.7	51.6	3.2	98.7	NA	98.7
Advanced CT	30	23.6	2.6	55.7	3.2	85.1	NA	85.1
Advanced nuclear	90	69.4	12.9	9.3	1.0	92.6	NA	92.6
Geothermal	90	30.1	13.2	0.0	1.3	44.6	-3.0	41.6
Biomass	83	39.2	15.4	39.6	1.1	95.3	NA	95.3
Non-dispatchable technologies								
Wind, onshore	41	43.1	13.4	0.0	2.5	59.1	-11.1	48.0
Wind, offshore	45	115.8	19.9	0.0	2.3	138.0	-20.8	117.1
Solar PV[3]	29	51.2	8.7	0.0	3.3	63.2	-13.3	49.9
Solar thermal	25	128.4	32.6	0.0	4.1	165.1	-38.5	126.6
Hydroelectric[4]	64	48.2	9.8	1.8	1.9	61.7	NA	61.7

[1]The tax credit component is based on targeted federal tax credits such as the PTC or ITC available for some technologies. It reflects tax credits available only for plants entering service in 2022 and the substantial phase out of both the PTC and ITC as scheduled under current law. Technologies not eligible for PTC or ITC are indicated as *NA* or not available. The results are based on a regional model, and state or local incentives are not included in LCOE calculations. See text box on page 2 for details on how the tax credits are represented in the model.

[2]Because Section 111(b) of the Clean Air Act requires conventional coal plants to be built with CCS to meet specific CO2 emission standards, two levels of CCS removal are modeled: 30%, which meets the NSPS, and 90%, which exceeds the NSPS but may be seen as a build option in some scenarios. The coal plant with 30% CCS is assumed to incur a 3 percentage-point increase to its cost of capital to represent the risk associated with higher emissions.

[3]Costs are expressed in terms of net AC power available to the grid for the installed capacity.

[4]As modeled, hydroelectric is assumed to have seasonal storage so that it can be dispatched within a season, but overall operation is limited by resources available by site and season.

CCS=carbon capture and sequestration. CC=combined-cycle (natural gas). CT=combustion turbine. PV=photovoltaic.

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, *Annual Energy Outlook 2018*.

Chapter 5

Summary

The studies presented in this dissertation examine policies and behaviors as they relate to economic conditions in three different regions. The findings of each could be applied to contemporary policy decisions affecting any region.

The first study looks at how neighborhood poverty rates relate to the density and revenue of VGTs in Illinois. Using OLS, we estimate that a percentage point higher poverty rate is associated with 1.4% higher VGT revenue per capita and 1.6% higher VGT density. We also find that neither selection into adopting VGTs, nor spatial auto-correlation significantly bias the OLS results. Thus, we conclude that VGTs are more geographically concentrated in neighborhoods with lower average income, and the VGTs that are located in lower income neighborhoods also generate disproportionately higher revenue. This indirectly places a greater burden on lower income individuals through the taxation of VGT revenue.

This burden could be shifted to a more equal or more progressive distribution with careful construction of such policies by Illinois or other states considering adopting VGT gambling. Specifically, restrictions on the type of businesses that may operate the machines should be made with the average client demographic of those businesses in mind. If bars are going to be allowed to operate VGTs, then the fact that bars tend to be located in urban centers with greater population density and lower average incomes should be considered. It may be balanced out by allowing businesses which tend to be located in suburban areas, such as country clubs and supermarkets, to operate them as well. It may also help to

limit the number of machines per business, and the amount that an individual can lose, to prevent and disperse large losses.

The next study tries to find evidence of a correlation between immigrant populations in the member countries of the EU and changes in voting for far-right parties and political ideologies in national and EU elections. We use SUR to perform a battery of tests to show that many different regression specifications can be used, but no consistent evidence can be found of a relationship between the two. Therefore, we cannot conclude that either the contact hypothesis or realistic conflict theory can describe the behavior of voters in the EU. If there truly is no relationship between immigrant populations and voting for the far-right, then there may be some other mechanism causing the rise of far-right parties and anti-immigrant sentiment. This finding does not lend itself to specific policy recommendations, but it does suggest that further research needs to be done on this topic to explore other possible causes for recent increases in far-right voting.

The final study estimates the costs and benefits of a 50% RPS, a \$10/ton carbon tax, and the removal of federal subsidies for renewable electricity generators in Nevada. I use a CGE model with detailed electricity generation and transmissions and distribution industries to estimate the economic, distributional, and fiscal impacts of the policies. Removing the existing federal subsidies has only a small impact on the economy, but supports the RPS in reducing emissions. The RPS reduces CO_2 emissions by 31 to 32 percent with small impacts to generation sector output. The carbon tax reduces CO_2 emissions by a greater 43 to 44 percent, but also reduces total generation sector output by 7 to 8 percent. Both policies have a small impact on state GRP with the RPS reducing GRP by 0.08% and the carbon tax reducing it by 0.22%. The policies have very small distributional impacts, but the RPS appears to redistribute income from the highest household income group to the rest, with the lower income groups receiving more of the benefit. The carbon tax uniformly reduces income per household and welfare by 0.1 to 0.2 percent.

The results of this study indicate that the carbon tax can achieve greater reductions in CO_2 emissions, but perhaps with greater costs to welfare than the RPS. If Nevada policy makers are especially concerned about welfare effects of their decisions, then this study

indicates that the RPS may be the preferred method of emission reduction. However, in the light of recent concerns about global climate change, the carbon tax would meet emission reduction targets faster and with only a small cost to households and governments.

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Appendix A

Appendix to Chapter 1

Table A.1: Top decile vs Bottom decile of Funds in per capita, zips with VGTs, excluding the top 1%

Variable	Top decile mean	Bottom decile mean	Difference	T-stat	p-value
Poverty Rate (%)	13.68	9.8	3.88	3	0.003
Unemployment Rate (%)	6.95	6.64	0.31	0.55	0.584
% White	92	84.84	7.16	2.73	0.007
% Black	2.65	7.24	-4.59	-2.32	0.022
% Less than HS Education	10.47	8	2.47	2.82	0.005
% HS Education	40.29	29.85	10.44	7.01	6e-11
% Veteran	9.55	8.71	0.84	1.87	0.063
Distance to Casino (km)	88.05	59.48	28.57	4.06	7e-05
Per Capita Income ($1000)	27.13	33.14	-6.01	-3.53	0.001
% Bar	85.2	91.57	-6.37	-1.79	0.076
% Fraternal Hall	0.69	0.66	0.03	0.06	0.955
% Truck Stop	10.87	2.26	8.62	3.27	0.001
% Veteran Hall	3.24	5.52	-2.28	-0.92	0.359

Table A.2: Top decile vs Bottom decile of VGTs per 10,000 people, zips with VGTs excluding the top 1%

Variable	Top decile mean	Bottom decile mean	Difference	T-stat	p-value
Poverty Rate (%)	15.2	10.28	4.92	3.1	0.002
Unemployment Rate (%)	7.93	7.09	0.84	1.03	0.304
% White	95.9	72.63	23.27	9.01	1e-14
% Black	1.09	11.57	-10.47	-4.77	6e-06
% Less than HS Education	11.15	9.51	1.65	1.47	0.143
% HS Education	42.14	25.08	17.06	13.31	3e-28
% Veteran	9.65	7.22	2.44	5.03	1e-06
Distance to Casino (km)	92.62	41.8	50.82	8.02	2e-13
Per Capita Income ($1000)	27.15	34.35	-7.2	-4.39	2e-05
% Bar	92.7	90.7	2	0.7	0.484
% Fraternal Hall	0.4	1.11	-0.71	-1.38	0.17
% Truck Stop	3.95	3.33	0.62	0.33	0.741
% Veteran Hall	2.96	4.86	-1.9	-0.9	0.37

Table A.3: 8th decile vs 2nd decile of VGTs per 10,000 people, zips with VGTs

Variable	8th decile mean	2nd decile mean	Difference	T-stat	p-value
Poverty Rate (%)	13.07	10.96	2.11	2.13	0.035
Unemployment Rate (%)	7.27	7.28	-0.01	-0.02	0.987
% White	92.06	73.84	18.22	7.17	8e-12
% Black	2.51	11.5	-8.99	-5	1e-06
% Less than HS Education	11.4	9.89	1.51	1.72	0.087
% HS Education	40.99	27.93	13.06	12.9	5e-29
% Veteran	9.59	7.64	1.95	5.01	1e-06
Distance to Casino (km)	88.67	50.38	38.29	6.59	4e-10
Per Capita Income ($)	26305.3	31364.99	-5059.69	-4.84	2e-06
% Bar	89.72	89.6	0.13	0.05	0.959
% Fraternal Hall	1.04	1.24	-0.2	-0.3	0.768
% Truck Stop	3.97	4.34	-0.37	-0.24	0.813
% Veteran Hall	5.27	4.83	0.44	0.24	0.81

Table A.4: 8th decile vs 2nd decile of Funds in per capita, zips with VGTs

Variable	8th decile mean	2nd decile mean	Difference	T-stat	p-value
Poverty Rate (%)	14.93	11.96	2.97	2.43	0.016
Unemployment Rate (%)	8.25	7.07	1.18	1.97	0.051
% White	86.81	86.45	0.37	0.12	0.907
% Black	5.94	5.27	0.67	0.3	0.767
% Less than HS Education	12.3	10.18	2.12	1.96	0.051
% HS Education	37.35	34.02	3.33	2.96	0.003
% Veteran	9.33	9.2	0.13	0.29	0.77
Distance to Casino (km)	85.86	77.26	8.6	1.14	0.254
Per Capita Income ($)	28041.86	26613.26	1428.6	1.23	0.22
% Bar	88.27	89.76	-1.49	-0.49	0.623
% Fraternal Hall	1.69	1.15	0.53	0.82	0.415
% Truck Stop	4.86	3.43	1.43	0.71	0.476
% Veteran Hall	5.18	5.65	-0.47	-0.22	0.829

Table A.5: Zip codes with VGTs vs zip codes without VGTs

Variable	With VGTs	Without VGTs	Difference	T-stat	p-value
Poverty Rate (%)	12.59	12.5	0.09	0.15	0.882
Unemployment Rate (%)	7.47	7.24	0.23	0.58	0.562
% White	87.02	86.45	0.57	0.46	0.648
% Black	5.5	5.47	0.03	0.03	0.978
% Less than HS Education	10.19	9.58	0.61	1.53	0.126
% HS Education	35.64	34.21	1.43	1.78	0.076
% Veteran	9.19	9	0.2	0.58	0.559
Distance to Casino (km)	77.55	82.02	-4.47	-1.47	0.141
Per Capita Income ($)	28088.14	30432.08	-2343.94	-3.02	0.003

Appendix B

Appendix to Chapter 2

Table B.1: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Unweighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.124	-0.201	-0.125	0.473	-0.00276	0.409	0.221
	(0.200)	(0.201)	(0.212)	(0.503)	(0.578)	(0.584)	(0.619)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.132	-0.157	-0.0532	0.152	0.212	0.276	0.109
	(0.140)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.319)	(0.371)	(0.412)	(0.434)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.134	0.125	0.125	-0.0376	-0.204	-0.110	-0.178
	(0.145)	(0.149)	(0.157)	(0.225)	(0.273)	(0.292)	(0.307)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.105	-0.131**	-0.129*	0.0766	-0.0550	-0.0195	0.0652
	(0.0636)	(0.0639)	(0.0684)	(0.187)	(0.224)	(0.243)	(0.253)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.148*	-0.166**	-0.170*	0.0340	0.0343	0.0791	0.128
	(0.0816)	(0.0831)	(0.0879)	(0.209)	(0.261)	(0.284)	(0.305)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0715	0.0571	0.0610	0.327*	0.127	0.209	0.102
	(0.0892)	(0.0911)	(0.0969)	(0.175)	(0.205)	(0.216)	(0.206)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	106	106	106	106	106	102	102
F	1.57	2.00	2.05	0.72	0.41	0.31	0.22
p-value	0.154	0.063	0.058	0.634	0.873	0.929	0.969

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test
of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.2: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Unweighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.874	-0.716	-1.025	0.482	0.295	0.775	0.345
	(2.620)	(2.582)	(2.843)	(2.635)	(3.093)	(2.933)	(3.374)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.761	0.535	0.919	-0.0329	-0.355	-0.392	-0.0990
	(2.633)	(2.596)	(2.862)	(2.401)	(2.764)	(2.592)	(3.005)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.873	0.942	0.156	-0.733	-0.0250	0.138	0.205
	(1.781)	(1.777)	(1.864)	(1.659)	(1.987)	(2.068)	(2.371)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-1.008	-1.107	-0.218	0.770	0.165	0.0679	-0.0930
	(1.790)	(1.786)	(1.877)	(1.512)	(1.776)	(1.828)	(2.112)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.909	-0.900	0.610	0.0718	0.214	0.274	0.206
	(1.921)	(1.932)	(2.143)	(1.182)	(1.466)	(1.473)	(1.667)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.042	1.029	-0.491	-0.101	-0.403	-0.364	-0.347
	(1.931)	(1.942)	(2.158)	(1.077)	(1.310)	(1.302)	(1.485)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.856	-0.806	-0.698	-0.507	-0.901	-0.880	-0.629
	(0.833)	(0.821)	(0.922)	(0.979)	(1.202)	(1.222)	(1.370)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.761	0.688	0.580	0.552	0.764	0.774	0.598
	(0.838)	(0.825)	(0.928)	(0.892)	(1.074)	(1.080)	(1.220)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.010*	-1.980*	-2.365**	-0.401	-0.576	-0.529	-0.807
	(1.049)	(1.050)	(1.154)	(1.081)	(1.386)	(1.413)	(1.637)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.894*	1.851*	2.239*	0.429	0.555	0.557	0.854
	(1.054)	(1.056)	(1.162)	(0.985)	(1.239)	(1.249)	(1.458)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	1.229	1.254	0.450	1.352	1.373	1.489	0.902
	(1.160)	(1.164)	(1.300)	(0.902)	(1.082)	(1.069)	(1.111)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-1.176	-1.212	-0.396	-0.971	-1.154	-1.177	-0.701
	(1.166)	(1.170)	(1.309)	(0.822)	(0.966)	(0.945)	(0.989)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	97	97
F	1.05	1.25	1.39	0.47	0.34	0.29	0.22
p-value	0.403	0.247	0.165	0.934	0.981	0.990	0.998

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.3: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Unweighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	3.526	2.826	3.616	-0.0872	0.657	0.463	-0.118
	(3.828)	(3.796)	(4.408)	(3.875)	(4.408)	(4.057)	(4.455)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-5.319	-4.398	-5.121	-0.109	-1.263	-0.891	-0.225
	(4.477)	(4.445)	(5.120)	(4.394)	(4.909)	(4.505)	(4.879)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	1.740	1.453	1.439	0.613	0.0825	1.502	1.346
	(1.446)	(1.435)	(1.547)	(1.123)	(1.234)	(1.415)	(1.562)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	3.334	2.967	2.161	-1.030	-0.742	-0.553	-0.589
	(2.508)	(2.505)	(2.757)	(2.350)	(2.725)	(2.837)	(3.157)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-4.177	-3.694	-2.514	0.800	0.738	0.549	0.498
	(2.933)	(2.933)	(3.202)	(2.665)	(3.035)	(3.150)	(3.458)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.756	0.605	0.316	0.433	0.0772	0.289	0.475
	(0.948)	(0.947)	(0.967)	(0.681)	(0.763)	(0.989)	(1.107)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.680	-0.605	2.275	0.321	1.362	1.344	1.137
	(2.879)	(2.909)	(3.403)	(1.797)	(2.143)	(2.157)	(2.365)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.212	0.114	-3.194	-0.383	-1.918	-1.833	-1.546
	(3.367)	(3.407)	(3.952)	(2.037)	(2.387)	(2.395)	(2.591)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.640	0.670	1.098	-0.00884	0.281	0.681	0.492
	(1.088)	(1.100)	(1.194)	(0.521)	(0.600)	(0.752)	(0.829)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.180	-1.393	-1.514	-1.020	-1.467	-1.551	-0.641
	(1.247)	(1.239)	(1.465)	(1.340)	(1.588)	(1.603)	(1.770)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.180	1.461	1.764	1.012	1.419	1.542	0.664
	(1.458)	(1.451)	(1.701)	(1.519)	(1.769)	(1.780)	(1.938)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.107	-0.194	-0.388	0.0516	-0.0177	0.0316	-0.0372
	(0.471)	(0.469)	(0.514)	(0.388)	(0.444)	(0.559)	(0.620)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.992	-2.193	-2.829	-0.233	-0.306	-0.530	0.0447
	(1.516)	(1.517)	(1.760)	(1.461)	(1.777)	(1.787)	(2.014)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.750	2.015	2.897	0.103	0.103	0.367	-0.189
	(1.773)	(1.776)	(2.044)	(1.656)	(1.979)	(1.985)	(2.206)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.132	0.0497	-0.211	0.0709	0.0373	0.0139	-0.143
	(0.573)	(0.574)	(0.618)	(0.423)	(0.497)	(0.623)	(0.706)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	3.571**	3.473**	2.644	0.663	0.889	0.909	-0.0853
	(1.677)	(1.692)	(2.006)	(1.176)	(1.352)	(1.324)	(1.391)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-4.024**	-3.895**	-3.164	-0.526	-0.734	-0.739	0.274
	(1.962)	(1.982)	(2.330)	(1.334)	(1.506)	(1.470)	(1.523)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.477	0.437	0.550	0.101	-0.141	0.170	0.113
	(0.634)	(0.640)	(0.704)	(0.341)	(0.379)	(0.462)	(0.487)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	88	88
F	0.81	0.92	0.90	0.30	0.28	0.57	0.49
p-value	0.695	0.554	0.579	0.998	0.999	0.919	0.962

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test
of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.4: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Unweighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share	-0.1131	-0.1809	-0.1064	0.4494	-0.0596	0.3829	0.2456
	(0.2096)	(0.2092)	(0.2201)	(0.5708)	(0.6768)	(0.6855)	(0.7288)
Euroscepticism vote-share	-0.1353	-0.1650	-0.0617	0.0369	0.1400	0.2059	0.1123
	(0.1425)	(0.1440)	(0.1443)	(0.3595)	(0.4348)	(0.4834)	(0.5123)
Regionalism vote-share	0.1334	0.1295	0.1185	-0.0292	-0.1896	-0.0901	-0.1404
	(0.1537)	(0.1565)	(0.1660)	(0.2562)	(0.3207)	(0.3442)	(0.3602)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.0956	-0.1174*	-0.1179*	0.0451	-0.1368	-0.1053	-0.0308
	(0.0667)	(0.0665)	(0.0714)	(0.2120)	(0.2630)	(0.2856)	(0.2960)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.1160	-0.1291	-0.1261	0.0282	-0.0208	0.0281	0.0475
	(0.0839)	(0.0851)	(0.0894)	(0.2341)	(0.3034)	(0.3304)	(0.3536)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.0532	0.0424	0.0540	0.3819*	0.2187	0.3117	0.2009
	(0.0928)	(0.0943)	(0.1007)	(0.1954)	(0.2367)	(0.2498)	(0.2399)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	97	97
F	1.05	1.25	1.39	0.47	0.34	0.29	0.22
p-value	0.403	0.247	0.165	0.934	0.981	0.990	0.998

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.5: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Unweighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share	-0.0529	-0.1192	-0.0655	0.4161	-0.5235	1.0738	1.0021
	(0.2400)	(0.2395)	(0.2518)	(0.8289)	(0.9913)	(1.2894)	(1.3673)
Euroscepticism vote-share	-0.0874	-0.1222	-0.0374	0.2028	0.0729	0.2842	0.3836
	(0.1572)	(0.1580)	(0.1575)	(0.5027)	(0.6127)	(0.9014)	(0.9690)
Regionalism vote-share	0.1720	0.1790	0.1790	-0.0708	-0.2749	0.1922	0.0830
	(0.1805)	(0.1835)	(0.1944)	(0.3843)	(0.4819)	(0.6855)	(0.7260)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.1066	-0.1269	-0.1376	0.0431	-0.0658	0.0225	-0.0148
	(0.0782)	(0.0782)	(0.0837)	(0.2866)	(0.3572)	(0.5095)	(0.5432)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.1101	-0.1292	-0.1431	-0.0592	-0.1662	-0.1497	-0.2865
	(0.0950)	(0.0957)	(0.1006)	(0.3125)	(0.3996)	(0.5680)	(0.6181)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.0241	0.0149	0.0303	0.2380	0.0132	0.3401	0.3024
	(0.1051)	(0.1068)	(0.1146)	(0.2516)	(0.3041)	(0.4208)	(0.4268)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	88	88
F	0.81	0.92	0.90	0.30	0.28	0.57	0.49
p-value	0.695	0.554	0.579	0.998	0.999	0.919	0.962

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.6: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Population Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	1.030***	0.741*	1.014***	1.519	-0.290	0.940	0.158
	(0.383)	(0.385)	(0.343)	(1.067)	(1.268)	(1.267)	(1.444)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.198	0.0863	0.0825	0.953	0.851	0.906	-0.258
	(0.338)	(0.350)	(0.309)	(0.660)	(0.870)	(0.946)	(1.066)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.904***	0.868***	1.124***	-0.0211	-0.568	-0.195	-0.229
	(0.319)	(0.332)	(0.291)	(0.282)	(0.391)	(0.393)	(0.452)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.112	-0.132*	-0.129*	-0.0751	-0.182	-0.259	0.113
	(0.0678)	(0.0702)	(0.0733)	(0.180)	(0.314)	(0.333)	(0.377)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.158	-0.174	-0.190*	-0.102	-0.0749	-0.174	0.00446
	(0.111)	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.295)	(0.457)	(0.492)	(0.555)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.292**	0.206	0.219*	0.823**	0.140	0.424	0.0666
	(0.130)	(0.132)	(0.127)	(0.332)	(0.410)	(0.423)	(0.404)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	106	106	106	106	106	102	102
F	5.09	4.39	8.89	1.39	1.00	0.54	0.88
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.216	0.425	0.781	0.510

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.7: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Population Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.837	-2.941	2.005	1.131	0.563	0.434	-0.138
	(4.217)	(4.095)	(4.178)	(4.120)	(4.150)	(3.912)	(4.871)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.049	3.928	-0.846	0.724	-1.708	0.385	0.823
	(4.329)	(4.189)	(4.236)	(4.364)	(4.066)	(3.893)	(4.626)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	6.948*	5.922*	6.060*	-0.707	2.116	2.110	-0.289
	(3.562)	(3.574)	(3.585)	(2.524)	(2.844)	(2.911)	(3.611)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-6.886*	-5.969	-6.077*	1.515	-1.456	-1.389	0.167
	(3.656)	(3.656)	(3.635)	(2.674)	(2.787)	(2.897)	(3.429)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-5.221	-5.428	0.0874	-0.414	-1.908	-1.950	-1.341
	(3.549)	(3.615)	(3.689)	(1.096)	(1.259)	(1.189)	(1.515)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	6.333*	6.518*	1.140	0.505	0.962	1.590	1.046
	(3.643)	(3.698)	(3.741)	(1.161)	(1.233)	(1.184)	(1.439)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.446	-0.600	-0.542	-0.617	-0.779	-0.760	-0.600
	(0.757)	(0.766)	(0.922)	(0.699)	(1.038)	(1.034)	(1.263)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.334	0.471	0.409	0.633	0.552	0.412	0.420
	(0.777)	(0.783)	(0.935)	(0.740)	(1.017)	(1.029)	(1.200)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.564**	-2.640**	-3.874***	-0.252	-0.384	-0.359	0.207
	(1.206)	(1.228)	(1.329)	(1.093)	(1.475)	(1.490)	(1.853)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.535**	2.603**	3.821***	0.356	0.206	0.00872	-0.207
	(1.238)	(1.257)	(1.348)	(1.158)	(1.445)	(1.483)	(1.760)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.950	-1.398	-2.175	0.987	1.259	1.226	1.323
	(1.439)	(1.440)	(1.585)	(1.277)	(1.335)	(1.300)	(1.331)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.261	1.661	2.454	-0.0699	-1.309	-0.852	-0.850
	(1.477)	(1.473)	(1.607)	(1.353)	(1.308)	(1.294)	(1.264)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	97	97
F	3.26	3.12	4.87	0.77	0.88	0.86	0.79
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.679	0.563	0.586	0.660

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.8: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Population Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.271	-2.363	4.292	2.271	1.916	2.184	3.321
	(5.345)	(5.222)	(5.471)	(5.181)	(5.327)	(4.984)	(6.011)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-1.998	2.334	-6.384	-3.446	-6.418	-5.692	-5.296
	(9.443)	(9.207)	(9.397)	(8.553)	(7.885)	(7.404)	(7.788)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	3.000	1.069	3.326	3.413	2.061	4.360	4.517
	(5.397)	(5.234)	(5.116)	(4.712)	(4.094)	(4.020)	(4.063)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	10.64**	9.450**	8.460*	1.305	3.504	3.751	2.139
	(4.428)	(4.467)	(4.622)	(3.087)	(3.591)	(3.757)	(4.595)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-17.81**	-15.85**	-12.23	-4.046	-4.728	-5.132	-3.351
	(7.823)	(7.875)	(7.939)	(5.095)	(5.316)	(5.581)	(5.953)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	7.282	6.408	3.816	4.191	2.236	2.721	2.588
	(4.471)	(4.477)	(4.322)	(2.807)	(2.760)	(3.031)	(3.106)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-7.770*	-7.742*	0.646	-0.696	-0.987	-0.863	0.588
	(4.509)	(4.608)	(4.898)	(1.336)	(1.622)	(1.572)	(1.923)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	12.34	12.30	-0.280	1.044	-0.765	-0.599	-1.504
	(7.966)	(8.124)	(8.412)	(2.206)	(2.401)	(2.335)	(2.491)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-3.418	-3.398	0.921	-0.142	1.039	1.687	1.907
	(4.553)	(4.618)	(4.579)	(1.215)	(1.246)	(1.268)	(1.300)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.473	-0.636	-0.678	-0.850	-1.398	-1.480	-0.564
	(0.969)	(0.985)	(1.228)	(0.729)	(1.117)	(1.144)	(1.394)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.246	0.515	0.719	0.934	1.464	1.682	0.851
	(1.712)	(1.737)	(2.109)	(1.204)	(1.653)	(1.700)	(1.806)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.112	-0.00833	-0.176	-0.187	-0.636	-0.756	-0.761
	(0.979)	(0.988)	(1.148)	(0.663)	(0.858)	(0.923)	(0.942)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.460	-1.753	-3.549**	-0.0642	-1.394	-1.626	-0.631
	(1.457)	(1.478)	(1.674)	(1.063)	(1.360)	(1.406)	(1.659)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.366	0.847	3.523	0.0101	0.579	1.052	0.723
	(2.574)	(2.606)	(2.876)	(1.755)	(2.013)	(2.089)	(2.149)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	1.052	0.838	-0.0450	-0.0511	-0.772	-0.997	-1.492
	(1.471)	(1.481)	(1.566)	(0.967)	(1.045)	(1.135)	(1.121)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.770	-1.398	-2.501	0.895	1.376	1.396	1.393
	(1.836)	(1.837)	(2.090)	(1.519)	(1.616)	(1.610)	(1.704)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.677	1.710	3.128	-0.726	-2.293	-2.203	-1.610
	(3.243)	(3.238)	(3.589)	(2.507)	(2.392)	(2.392)	(2.207)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.379	-0.0819	-0.375	0.629	0.272	0.661	0.649
	(1.853)	(1.841)	(1.954)	(1.381)	(1.242)	(1.299)	(1.151)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	88	88
F	2.05	2.06	3.02	0.72	1.15	0.92	1.02
p-value	0.007	0.006	0.000	0.788	0.308	0.552	0.439

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.9: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Population Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share	1.2115***	0.9867**	1.1591***	1.8554	-1.1450	0.8187	0.6859
	(0.4307)	(0.4188)	(0.3646)	(1.4941)	(1.6235)	(1.6741)	(1.8719)
Euroscepticism vote-share	0.0624	-0.0472	-0.0171	0.8084	0.6602	0.7206	-0.1221
	(0.3638)	(0.3655)	(0.3128)	(0.9155)	(1.1128)	(1.2455)	(1.3877)
Regionalism vote-share	1.1120***	1.0899***	1.2277***	0.0906	-0.9456*	-0.3605	-0.2955
	(0.3625)	(0.3697)	(0.3219)	(0.3975)	(0.4924)	(0.5090)	(0.5822)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.1124	-0.1289*	-0.1329*	0.0162	-0.2272	-0.3475	-0.1804
	(0.0773)	(0.0783)	(0.0805)	(0.2534)	(0.4062)	(0.4423)	(0.4856)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.0293	-0.0374	-0.0534	0.1040	-0.1779	-0.3503	-0.0002
	(0.1232)	(0.1256)	(0.1160)	(0.3963)	(0.5770)	(0.6375)	(0.7123)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.3108**	0.2630*	0.2790**	0.9176**	-0.0499	0.3741	0.4724
	(0.1470)	(0.1473)	(0.1383)	(0.4632)	(0.5224)	(0.5562)	(0.5114)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	97	97
F	3.26	3.12	4.87	0.77	0.88	0.86	0.79
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.679	0.563	0.586	0.660

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.10: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Population Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share	1.2724***	1.0403**	1.2331***	2.2376	-2.4403	0.8521	2.5419
	(0.4614)	(0.4511)	(0.3897)	(1.8545)	(2.3025)	(2.4407)	(2.9465)
Euroscepticism vote-share	0.1172	0.0122	0.0455	1.4503	1.0120	1.3398	1.3762
	(0.3823)	(0.3859)	(0.3292)	(1.1047)	(1.5522)	(1.8398)	(2.2522)
Regionalism vote-share	1.1548***	1.1572***	1.2862***	0.2059	-0.7132	0.2256	0.9908
	(0.3893)	(0.3981)	(0.3488)	(0.4783)	(0.7010)	(0.7698)	(0.9425)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.1151	-0.1296	-0.1355	-0.1042	-0.5700	-0.5538	-0.4738
	(0.0837)	(0.0851)	(0.0875)	(0.2610)	(0.4827)	(0.5605)	(0.6831)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.0416	-0.0674	-0.0708	-0.1052	-1.5871***	-1.5711**	-1.4001*
	(0.1258)	(0.1277)	(0.1192)	(0.3805)	(0.5879)	(0.6888)	(0.8131)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.2857*	0.2303	0.2523*	0.7981	-0.6462	-0.1449	0.4330
	(0.1585)	(0.1587)	(0.1488)	(0.5436)	(0.6985)	(0.7887)	(0.8350)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	88	88
F	2.05	2.06	3.02	0.72	1.15	0.92	1.02
p-value	0.007	0.006	0.000	0.788	0.308	0.552	0.439

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.11: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.209	-0.282	-0.144	0.379	0.0206	0.181	0.00567
	(0.186)	(0.189)	(0.202)	(0.398)	(0.490)	(0.530)	(0.565)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.150	-0.180	-0.0713	0.123	0.186	0.261	0.112
	(0.132)	(0.136)	(0.141)	(0.276)	(0.341)	(0.373)	(0.398)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0834	0.0779	0.115	-0.0506	-0.159	-0.134	-0.191
	(0.140)	(0.145)	(0.156)	(0.184)	(0.239)	(0.257)	(0.274)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.105*	-0.134**	-0.142**	0.0662	-0.0903	-0.0485	0.0390
	(0.0594)	(0.0599)	(0.0656)	(0.164)	(0.208)	(0.222)	(0.232)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.149*	-0.170**	-0.182**	0.0248	-0.0519	-0.0244	0.0231
	(0.0760)	(0.0778)	(0.0843)	(0.178)	(0.233)	(0.248)	(0.269)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0385	0.0264	0.0490	0.283*	0.112	0.126	0.00995
	(0.0893)	(0.0919)	(0.100)	(0.155)	(0.191)	(0.209)	(0.201)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	102	102	102	102	102	99	99
F	1.83	2.38	2.11	0.81	0.28	0.22	0.13
p-value	0.090	0.028	0.050	0.559	0.948	0.971	0.992

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test
of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.12: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.818	-1.612	-1.821	-0.121	0.546	0.830	0.949
	(2.378)	(2.358)	(2.642)	(2.175)	(2.716)	(2.773)	(3.228)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.622	1.351	1.702	0.439	-0.539	-0.648	-0.856
	(2.391)	(2.374)	(2.661)	(1.985)	(2.428)	(2.454)	(2.884)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.222	0.332	-0.565	-0.675	0.0317	0.225	0.507
	(1.650)	(1.647)	(1.785)	(1.501)	(1.892)	(1.951)	(2.276)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.374	-0.519	0.494	0.700	0.0977	-0.0146	-0.369
	(1.660)	(1.658)	(1.797)	(1.370)	(1.692)	(1.726)	(2.034)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.889	-0.888	0.724	-0.136	0.243	0.242	0.199
	(1.820)	(1.832)	(2.069)	(1.011)	(1.332)	(1.355)	(1.557)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.972	0.970	-0.618	0.0798	-0.380	-0.354	-0.351
	(1.830)	(1.844)	(2.084)	(0.923)	(1.191)	(1.199)	(1.392)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.925	-0.846	-0.764	-0.502	-0.928	-0.912	-0.588
	(0.763)	(0.751)	(0.864)	(0.901)	(1.157)	(1.163)	(1.314)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.830	0.725	0.634	0.536	0.756	0.777	0.544
	(0.767)	(0.756)	(0.870)	(0.822)	(1.034)	(1.030)	(1.174)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.945**	-1.897**	-2.074*	-0.408	-0.563	-0.582	-0.660
	(0.957)	(0.958)	(1.085)	(0.966)	(1.285)	(1.292)	(1.511)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.823*	1.759*	1.928*	0.417	0.459	0.502	0.621
	(0.962)	(0.965)	(1.092)	(0.882)	(1.149)	(1.143)	(1.350)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.866	0.897	0.195	1.171	1.524	1.590	1.105
	(1.140)	(1.146)	(1.310)	(0.838)	(1.039)	(1.071)	(1.129)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.841	-0.882	-0.149	-0.840	-1.298	-1.342	-0.976
	(1.146)	(1.153)	(1.319)	(0.765)	(0.929)	(0.948)	(1.009)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	96	96	96	96	96	94	94
F	1.28	1.51	1.54	0.51	0.31	0.28	0.19
p-value	0.227	0.116	0.105	0.907	0.987	0.992	0.999

$*$ $p < .10$, $**$ $p < .05$, $***$ $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.13: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	2.475	1.905	2.723	-0.938	0.362	0.691	0.491
	(3.630)	(3.631)	(4.309)	(3.318)	(3.907)	(3.946)	(4.482)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-4.169	-3.430	-4.219	0.728	-0.918	-1.184	-0.852
	(4.184)	(4.193)	(4.913)	(3.759)	(4.345)	(4.380)	(4.909)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	1.551	1.324	1.433	0.500	0.518	1.296	0.960
	(1.285)	(1.288)	(1.408)	(0.888)	(1.039)	(1.337)	(1.482)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	2.701	2.283	1.588	-0.875	-0.554	-0.390	-0.170
	(2.432)	(2.427)	(2.789)	(2.231)	(2.652)	(2.726)	(3.147)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-3.474	-2.931	-1.906	0.679	0.498	0.331	0.0479
	(2.803)	(2.802)	(3.180)	(2.528)	(2.949)	(3.026)	(3.446)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.665	0.498	0.264	0.352	0.0630	0.283	0.354
	(0.861)	(0.861)	(0.911)	(0.597)	(0.705)	(0.924)	(1.040)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.729	-0.589	2.405	0.0629	1.294	1.312	1.314
	(2.856)	(2.888)	(3.465)	(1.633)	(2.009)	(2.034)	(2.303)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.293	0.111	-3.268	-0.140	-1.818	-1.805	-1.725
	(3.292)	(3.334)	(3.951)	(1.850)	(2.235)	(2.258)	(2.522)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.555	0.611	1.037	-0.0125	0.331	0.504	0.288
	(1.011)	(1.024)	(1.132)	(0.437)	(0.535)	(0.689)	(0.761)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.355	-1.595	-1.807	-0.964	-1.483	-1.556	-0.586
	(1.194)	(1.186)	(1.441)	(1.287)	(1.557)	(1.543)	(1.759)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.376	1.688	2.112	0.954	1.432	1.537	0.594
	(1.376)	(1.369)	(1.643)	(1.458)	(1.732)	(1.713)	(1.927)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.127	-0.223	-0.461	0.0450	-0.000197	0.0457	-0.0253
	(0.423)	(0.420)	(0.471)	(0.344)	(0.414)	(0.523)	(0.582)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.247	-2.418*	-3.079*	-0.210	-0.283	-0.450	0.170
	(1.456)	(1.464)	(1.750)	(1.407)	(1.744)	(1.731)	(2.013)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.067	2.289	3.256	0.0699	0.102	0.300	-0.304
	(1.678)	(1.691)	(1.995)	(1.594)	(1.940)	(1.922)	(2.205)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.0618	-0.00651	-0.343	0.0646	0.0901	-0.00482	-0.162
	(0.516)	(0.519)	(0.572)	(0.376)	(0.464)	(0.587)	(0.666)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	3.486**	3.431**	2.732	0.420	0.967	1.116	0.105
	(1.719)	(1.739)	(2.123)	(1.125)	(1.333)	(1.359)	(1.494)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-3.987**	-3.916*	-3.353	-0.309	-0.835	-0.988	0.0576
	(1.981)	(2.008)	(2.421)	(1.274)	(1.482)	(1.509)	(1.636)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.496	0.474	0.654	0.0807	-0.0182	0.175	0.0961
	(0.608)	(0.617)	(0.694)	(0.301)	(0.355)	(0.461)	(0.494)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	88	88	88	88	88	86	86
F	0.94	1.10	1.06	0.33	0.31	0.60	0.49
p-value	0.525	0.351	0.391	0.996	0.997	0.896	0.962

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.14: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share	-0.1957	-0.2614	-0.1197	0.3180	0.0071	0.1819	0.0924
	(0.1935)	(0.1956)	(0.2093)	(0.4512)	(0.5759)	(0.6243)	(0.6674)
Euroscepticism vote-share	-0.1517	-0.1868	-0.0715	0.0252	0.1294	0.2107	0.1379
	(0.1343)	(0.1366)	(0.1414)	(0.3113)	(0.4012)	(0.4392)	(0.4706)
Regionalism vote-share	0.0834	0.0829	0.1066	-0.0560	-0.1370	-0.1115	-0.1523
	(0.1481)	(0.1520)	(0.1639)	(0.2098)	(0.2824)	(0.3051)	(0.3220)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.0953	-0.1205*	-0.1303*	0.0335	-0.1724	-0.1357	-0.0439
	(0.0621)	(0.0623)	(0.0684)	(0.1868)	(0.2453)	(0.2619)	(0.2716)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.1224	-0.1378*	-0.1458*	0.0088	-0.1042	-0.0803	-0.0383
	(0.0778)	(0.0795)	(0.0859)	(0.2005)	(0.2725)	(0.2909)	(0.3124)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.0250	0.0151	0.0459	0.3314*	0.2261	0.2486	0.1290
	(0.0927)	(0.0950)	(0.1038)	(0.1738)	(0.2203)	(0.2412)	(0.2335)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	96	96	96	96	96	94	94
F	1.28	1.51	1.54	0.51	0.31	0.28	0.19
p-value	0.227	0.116	0.105	0.907	0.987	0.992	0.999

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.15: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share	-0.1430	-0.2011	-0.0628	0.2898	-0.0379	0.8034	0.5992
	(0.2255)	(0.2279)	(0.2439)	(0.6392)	(0.8502)	(1.2123)	(1.2962)
Euroscepticism vote-share	-0.1078	-0.1505	-0.0532	0.1556	0.0071	0.2234	0.2317
	(0.1510)	(0.1523)	(0.1579)	(0.4298)	(0.5771)	(0.8375)	(0.9100)
Regionalism vote-share	0.1189	0.1332	0.1743	-0.0901	-0.1922	0.0115	-0.1222
	(0.1774)	(0.1813)	(0.1962)	(0.3146)	(0.4373)	(0.6249)	(0.6660)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.1065	-0.1310*	-0.1571*	0.0354	-0.0505	0.0274	-0.0177
	(0.0742)	(0.0744)	(0.0816)	(0.2479)	(0.3388)	(0.4741)	(0.5088)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.1179	-0.1354	-0.1663*	-0.0752	-0.0906	-0.1545	-0.2962
	(0.0904)	(0.0919)	(0.0990)	(0.2710)	(0.3796)	(0.5319)	(0.5823)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	-0.0051	-0.0107	0.0325	0.1921	0.1147	0.3029	0.2583
	(0.1067)	(0.1091)	(0.1202)	(0.2166)	(0.2900)	(0.4176)	(0.4320)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	88	88	88	88	88	86	86
F	0.94	1.10	1.06	0.33	0.31	0.60	0.49
p-value	0.525	0.351	0.391	0.996	0.997	0.896	0.962

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.16: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.905**	0.674*	0.935***	1.023	0.329	0.383	-0.585
	(0.386)	(0.397)	(0.348)	(0.766)	(1.181)	(1.234)	(1.431)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.114	-0.0491	0.0320	0.815	0.926	0.917	-0.243
	(0.356)	(0.370)	(0.339)	(0.601)	(0.878)	(0.915)	(1.062)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.881**	0.875**	1.078***	-0.134	-0.203	-0.172	-0.185
	(0.353)	(0.371)	(0.306)	(0.200)	(0.334)	(0.346)	(0.407)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.142**	-0.168**	-0.178**	-0.0907	-0.418	-0.383	-0.0911
	(0.0712)	(0.0743)	(0.0755)	(0.173)	(0.317)	(0.326)	(0.370)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.197*	-0.231**	-0.237**	-0.152	-0.641	-0.628	-0.664
	(0.108)	(0.113)	(0.111)	(0.230)	(0.396)	(0.410)	(0.479)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.284**	0.225	0.248*	0.680**	0.335	0.330	-0.0332
	(0.133)	(0.139)	(0.140)	(0.271)	(0.408)	(0.424)	(0.427)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	102	102	102	102	102	99	99
F	5.43	4.67	8.35	1.74	1.06	0.98	1.01
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.109	0.388	0.438	0.417

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.17: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.877	-4.834	-2.433	-1.907	0.0446	0.0532	-0.293
	(3.960)	(3.935)	(4.280)	(2.943)	(4.128)	(4.205)	(5.159)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	5.009	5.786	3.569	3.286	-0.166	-0.120	-0.0921
	(4.072)	(4.034)	(4.343)	(3.104)	(4.079)	(4.165)	(4.922)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	4.485	3.608	5.487	-0.567	1.624	1.606	-0.304
	(3.583)	(3.559)	(4.028)	(2.314)	(3.081)	(3.130)	(3.828)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-4.477	-3.764	-5.538	1.207	-0.835	-0.848	0.178
	(3.684)	(3.649)	(4.088)	(2.441)	(3.044)	(3.101)	(3.652)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-5.993	-5.915	-2.922	-1.282*	-0.328	-0.315	0.494
	(3.703)	(3.753)	(3.946)	(0.772)	(1.177)	(1.187)	(1.462)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	7.103*	7.040*	4.134	1.280	-0.0678	-0.0485	-0.668
	(3.807)	(3.847)	(4.005)	(0.814)	(1.163)	(1.176)	(1.395)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.711	-0.837	-0.882	-0.632	-1.126	-1.107	-0.956
	(0.751)	(0.754)	(0.967)	(0.674)	(1.117)	(1.117)	(1.299)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.577	0.679	0.706	0.627	0.535	0.579	0.473
	(0.772)	(0.773)	(0.981)	(0.711)	(1.104)	(1.107)	(1.239)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.222**	-2.331**	-3.622***	-0.284	-1.428	-1.415	-1.236
	(1.121)	(1.132)	(1.364)	(0.858)	(1.334)	(1.348)	(1.672)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.129*	2.219*	3.501**	0.234	0.414	0.423	0.247
	(1.152)	(1.161)	(1.385)	(0.905)	(1.319)	(1.335)	(1.595)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.675	-0.805	-1.436	0.187	1.840	1.827	1.839
	(1.394)	(1.409)	(1.786)	(1.046)	(1.412)	(1.430)	(1.489)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.975	1.080	1.736	0.624	-1.628	-1.653	-1.511
	(1.433)	(1.444)	(1.813)	(1.103)	(1.395)	(1.417)	(1.420)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	96	96	96	96	96	94	94
F	2.89	2.80	4.95	1.36	1.17	1.12	0.81
p-value	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.181	0.306	0.341	0.639

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.18: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.882	-3.462	-0.236	-0.433	1.273	1.437	2.448
	(4.876)	(4.936)	(5.261)	(3.643)	(5.059)	(5.222)	(6.181)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-1.147	1.715	-2.295	-1.969	-3.999	-4.270	-3.917
	(8.451)	(8.572)	(8.478)	(6.074)	(7.186)	(7.470)	(7.876)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	4.240	2.797	3.778	4.030	2.415	2.751	2.756
	(4.839)	(4.884)	(4.592)	(3.350)	(3.532)	(3.913)	(3.988)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	8.467*	6.863	8.056	0.970	2.218	2.384	1.002
	(4.350)	(4.385)	(4.926)	(2.836)	(3.783)	(3.893)	(4.676)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-15.50**	-12.59*	-11.25	-3.034	-3.009	-3.398	-1.869
	(7.540)	(7.614)	(7.938)	(4.728)	(5.373)	(5.569)	(5.958)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	7.129*	5.665	3.201	3.229	1.652	1.955	1.737
	(4.318)	(4.338)	(4.300)	(2.608)	(2.641)	(2.917)	(3.017)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-7.880*	-7.467	-2.491	-1.244	0.379	0.411	1.547
	(4.594)	(4.715)	(4.930)	(0.989)	(1.488)	(1.522)	(1.845)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	11.59	10.84	2.156	1.044	-1.785	-1.779	-2.392
	(7.963)	(8.188)	(7.945)	(1.648)	(2.114)	(2.177)	(2.351)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-2.577	-2.200	1.640	0.266	1.016	1.101	1.176
	(4.560)	(4.665)	(4.303)	(0.909)	(1.039)	(1.141)	(1.190)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.731	-0.949	-1.045	-0.839	-1.490	-1.562	-0.319
	(0.937)	(0.955)	(1.212)	(0.693)	(1.185)	(1.187)	(1.405)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.560	0.957	1.063	0.891	1.507	1.725	0.571
	(1.623)	(1.658)	(1.954)	(1.155)	(1.684)	(1.698)	(1.791)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.0294	-0.170	-0.201	-0.173	-0.586	-0.701	-0.741
	(0.930)	(0.945)	(1.058)	(0.637)	(0.827)	(0.890)	(0.907)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.824	-1.938	-3.744**	-0.289	-1.527	-1.742	-0.296
	(1.379)	(1.416)	(1.686)	(0.974)	(1.447)	(1.465)	(1.692)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.845	1.051	3.528	0.0842	0.812	1.261	0.302
	(2.390)	(2.458)	(2.717)	(1.625)	(2.056)	(2.095)	(2.156)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.891	0.787	0.102	0.0244	-0.728	-1.136	-1.626
	(1.369)	(1.401)	(1.472)	(0.896)	(1.010)	(1.098)	(1.091)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.400	-0.702	-1.685	0.227	2.155	2.157	1.698
	(1.728)	(1.768)	(2.219)	(1.240)	(1.691)	(1.732)	(1.841)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.278	0.825	2.380	-0.403	-2.715	-2.789	-1.823
	(2.995)	(3.070)	(3.575)	(2.067)	(2.403)	(2.477)	(2.346)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.394	0.118	-0.433	0.771	0.312	0.294	0.259
	(1.715)	(1.749)	(1.936)	(1.140)	(1.181)	(1.298)	(1.188)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	88	88	88	88	88	86	86
F	1.87	1.81	3.13	0.81	0.86	0.94	1.23
p-value	0.016	0.022	0.000	0.692	0.624	0.527	0.240

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.19: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share	1.1322***	0.9528**	1.1368***	1.3783	-0.1212	-0.0671	-0.3846
	(0.4251)	(0.4294)	(0.3643)	(1.0421)	(1.5196)	(1.5858)	(1.8299)
Euroscepticism vote-share	0.0085	-0.1560	-0.0511	0.6394	0.7896	0.7587	-0.1259
	(0.3847)	(0.3883)	(0.3430)	(0.8196)	(1.1341)	(1.1805)	(1.3579)
Regionalism vote-share	1.1098***	1.1244***	1.2120***	-0.0013	-0.3958	-0.3631	-0.1738
	(0.3975)	(0.4094)	(0.3359)	(0.2735)	(0.4332)	(0.4479)	(0.5186)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.1339*	-0.1574*	-0.1761**	-0.0045	-0.5903	-0.5282	-0.4833
	(0.0806)	(0.0822)	(0.0823)	(0.2387)	(0.4113)	(0.4215)	(0.4606)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.0921	-0.1127	-0.1206	-0.0502	-1.0140**	-0.9919*	-0.9890*
	(0.1203)	(0.1236)	(0.1162)	(0.3040)	(0.4912)	(0.5084)	(0.5932)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.2998**	0.2755*	0.3003**	0.8106**	0.2124	0.1740	0.3279
	(0.1496)	(0.1537)	(0.1521)	(0.3703)	(0.5199)	(0.5395)	(0.5281)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	96	96	96	96	96	94	94
F	2.89	2.80	4.95	1.36	1.17	1.12	0.81
p-value	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.181	0.306	0.341	0.639

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.20: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share	1.2100***	1.0498**	1.2468***	1.6271	-0.3118	-0.0816	1.2877
	(0.4560)	(0.4633)	(0.3892)	(1.2844)	(2.1799)	(2.4234)	(2.9209)
Euroscepticism vote-share	0.0981	-0.0644	0.0091	1.1661	0.8603	0.9411	0.8698
	(0.4068)	(0.4115)	(0.3644)	(0.9998)	(1.6300)	(1.8065)	(2.2098)
Regionalism vote-share	1.1303***	1.1721***	1.3048***	0.0659	-0.3894	-0.2669	0.3299
	(0.4297)	(0.4426)	(0.3647)	(0.3486)	(0.6412)	(0.7064)	(0.8718)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.1411	-0.1633*	-0.1830**	-0.1215	-0.5682	-0.5378	-0.4894
	(0.0876)	(0.0896)	(0.0897)	(0.2443)	(0.5107)	(0.5510)	(0.6641)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.0880	-0.0995	-0.1129	-0.1803	-1.4435**	-1.6167**	-1.6200**
	(0.1290)	(0.1329)	(0.1248)	(0.3436)	(0.6237)	(0.6797)	(0.7994)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.2725*	0.2418	0.2625	0.5952	-0.2471	-0.3376	0.1336
	(0.1616)	(0.1659)	(0.1641)	(0.4371)	(0.7289)	(0.8036)	(0.8701)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	88	88	88	88	88	86	86
F	1.87	1.81	3.13	0.81	0.86	0.94	1.23
p-value	0.016	0.022	0.000	0.692	0.624	0.527	0.240

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.21: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Unweighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.146	0.112	0.0552	0.0858	0.127	0.244	0.0723
	(0.343)	(0.340)	(0.356)	(0.641)	(0.683)	(0.650)	(0.699)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.183	-0.193	-0.167	-0.129	-0.0122	0.00425	-0.0542
	(0.241)	(0.242)	(0.241)	(0.404)	(0.440)	(0.458)	(0.490)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.387	0.381	0.378	-0.0316	-0.0662	-0.0330	-0.132
	(0.247)	(0.248)	(0.262)	(0.284)	(0.323)	(0.324)	(0.347)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.181*	-0.192*	-0.199*	-0.129	-0.0809	-0.0661	0.0470
	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.236)	(0.264)	(0.269)	(0.285)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.117	-0.124	-0.148	-0.148	-0.183	-0.173	-0.164
	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.150)	(0.264)	(0.308)	(0.314)	(0.344)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.169	0.161	0.126	0.389*	0.491**	0.515**	0.358
	(0.152)	(0.153)	(0.162)	(0.221)	(0.234)	(0.232)	(0.228)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	106	106	106	106	106	102	102
F	1.53	1.61	1.57	0.66	1.13	1.33	1.12
p-value	0.167	0.142	0.155	0.680	0.346	0.244	0.349

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test
of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.22: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Unweighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	7.248**	6.570**	7.860**	2.004	0.908	1.703	1.034
	(3.259)	(3.257)	(3.587)	(3.532)	(4.042)	(3.819)	(4.283)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-6.760**	-6.118**	-7.428**	-1.773	-0.759	-1.349	-0.827
	(3.104)	(3.101)	(3.416)	(3.144)	(3.569)	(3.358)	(3.701)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.640	1.352	1.701	-0.920	0.0395	0.0893	0.158
	(2.268)	(2.286)	(2.399)	(2.219)	(2.600)	(2.696)	(3.010)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.735	-1.462	-1.795	0.658	-0.103	-0.134	-0.205
	(2.160)	(2.177)	(2.284)	(1.975)	(2.296)	(2.371)	(2.601)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	3.175	3.131	4.310	0.360	-0.880	-0.629	-1.265
	(2.414)	(2.445)	(2.719)	(1.580)	(1.923)	(1.918)	(2.115)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-2.670	-2.628	-3.752	-0.354	0.722	0.529	1.032
	(2.299)	(2.329)	(2.589)	(1.407)	(1.698)	(1.687)	(1.827)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.166	-1.424	-1.225	-0.580	-0.888	-0.748	-0.0147
	(1.061)	(1.055)	(1.195)	(1.310)	(1.574)	(1.594)	(1.743)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.950	1.194	0.992	0.403	0.716	0.604	0.0123
	(1.010)	(1.004)	(1.138)	(1.166)	(1.389)	(1.402)	(1.506)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.998	-1.145	-0.691	0.342	0.957	1.122	1.221
	(1.369)	(1.383)	(1.545)	(1.444)	(1.805)	(1.832)	(2.071)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.884	1.023	0.565	-0.434	-1.016	-1.147	-1.252
	(1.304)	(1.317)	(1.471)	(1.285)	(1.594)	(1.611)	(1.789)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	4.380***	4.307***	4.056**	1.850	1.545	1.674	0.717
	(1.417)	(1.434)	(1.626)	(1.205)	(1.384)	(1.358)	(1.380)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-4.044***	-3.974***	-3.765**	-1.327	-0.951	-1.041	-0.257
	(1.349)	(1.366)	(1.549)	(1.073)	(1.222)	(1.195)	(1.192)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	97	97
F	1.78	1.78	1.69	0.60	1.09	1.13	0.94
p-value	0.048	0.048	0.067	0.845	0.367	0.332	0.511

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.23: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Unweighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	6.609	6.361	8.103*	0.631	1.024	0.469	0.429
	(4.224)	(4.175)	(4.728)	(4.008)	(4.624)	(4.285)	(5.068)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-5.037	-4.945	-6.358	0.655	0.612	0.584	0.600
	(4.847)	(4.789)	(5.227)	(4.484)	(4.939)	(4.587)	(5.381)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-1.019	-0.922	-1.282	-0.750	-1.936	-0.778	-0.881
	(1.815)	(1.794)	(1.880)	(2.026)	(2.085)	(2.154)	(2.233)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.789	1.649	1.483	-1.289	-0.746	-0.733	-0.701
	(2.827)	(2.809)	(3.014)	(2.438)	(2.873)	(2.962)	(3.569)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.700	-1.648	-1.570	1.485	1.029	0.918	0.780
	(3.244)	(3.222)	(3.332)	(2.727)	(3.068)	(3.170)	(3.790)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.137	-0.0819	0.0501	-0.122	0.0141	0.210	0.257
	(1.215)	(1.207)	(1.199)	(1.232)	(1.295)	(1.489)	(1.572)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	2.436	2.467	4.680	0.592	0.0594	-0.0169	-0.186
	(3.164)	(3.182)	(3.631)	(1.854)	(2.258)	(2.263)	(2.661)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.383	-1.395	-2.778	-0.537	0.0288	0.132	0.351
	(3.631)	(3.650)	(4.014)	(2.074)	(2.412)	(2.422)	(2.826)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.470	-0.482	-1.290	-0.165	-0.709	-0.638	-0.784
	(1.359)	(1.367)	(1.444)	(0.937)	(1.018)	(1.137)	(1.173)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.385	-1.458	-1.043	-0.941	-0.902	-0.867	0.780
	(1.390)	(1.380)	(1.604)	(1.384)	(1.681)	(1.682)	(1.989)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.027	1.054	0.517	1.035	0.867	1.008	-0.669
	(1.595)	(1.582)	(1.774)	(1.549)	(1.796)	(1.801)	(2.112)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.131	0.160	0.266	-0.230	-0.239	-0.415	-0.367
	(0.597)	(0.593)	(0.638)	(0.700)	(0.758)	(0.846)	(0.877)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.618	-1.680	-1.266	0.441	1.127	1.091	2.425
	(1.722)	(1.721)	(1.975)	(1.502)	(1.853)	(1.840)	(2.208)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.381	1.404	0.860	-0.530	-1.243	-1.036	-2.408
	(1.976)	(1.974)	(2.183)	(1.680)	(1.979)	(1.969)	(2.345)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.129	0.153	0.269	-0.285	-0.438	-0.691	-0.743
	(0.740)	(0.739)	(0.785)	(0.759)	(0.835)	(0.925)	(0.973)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	4.935***	4.895***	4.780**	0.470	0.772	0.628	-0.998
	(1.822)	(1.829)	(2.137)	(1.203)	(1.414)	(1.366)	(1.531)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-4.091*	-4.077*	-4.260*	0.207	0.121	-0.0219	1.664
	(2.090)	(2.098)	(2.363)	(1.346)	(1.510)	(1.462)	(1.626)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.596	-0.580	-0.325	-0.0148	-0.358	0.137	0.0267
	(0.783)	(0.786)	(0.850)	(0.608)	(0.638)	(0.687)	(0.675)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	88	88
F	1.08	1.10	1.06	0.67	0.84	0.94	0.91
p-value	0.374	0.346	0.389	0.843	0.652	0.531	0.566

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.24: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Unweighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share	0.4878	0.4516	0.4319	0.2304	0.1490	0.3541	0.2075
	(0.3761)	(0.3735)	(0.3911)	(0.7631)	(0.8427)	(0.8029)	(0.9174)
Euroscepticism vote-share	-0.0951	-0.1105	-0.0942	-0.2623	-0.0638	-0.0450	-0.0474
	(0.2617)	(0.2622)	(0.2615)	(0.4794)	(0.5421)	(0.5669)	(0.6446)
Regionalism vote-share	0.5054*	0.5031*	0.5577*	0.0061	-0.1587	-0.1000	-0.2328
	(0.2785)	(0.2804)	(0.2964)	(0.3415)	(0.4010)	(0.4034)	(0.4529)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.2158*	-0.2295*	-0.2336*	-0.1764	-0.1724	-0.1441	-0.0025
	(0.1224)	(0.1210)	(0.1302)	(0.2831)	(0.3280)	(0.3351)	(0.3733)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.1137	-0.1215	-0.1263	-0.0928	-0.0587	-0.0247	-0.0316
	(0.1580)	(0.1585)	(0.1684)	(0.3120)	(0.3763)	(0.3851)	(0.4435)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.3369**	0.3329**	0.2918*	0.5232**	0.5935**	0.6327**	0.4598
	(0.1635)	(0.1645)	(0.1773)	(0.2605)	(0.2885)	(0.2856)	(0.2956)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	97	97
F	1.78	1.78	1.69	0.60	1.09	1.13	0.94
p-value	0.048	0.048	0.067	0.845	0.367	0.332	0.511

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.25: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Unweighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share	0.5536	0.4941	0.4630	0.5358	-0.2996	0.2748	0.1480
	(0.4244)	(0.4207)	(0.4389)	(1.4343)	(1.5712)	(1.5958)	(1.6696)
Euroscepticism vote-share	-0.0481	-0.0817	-0.0360	0.0743	0.2974	0.3947	0.3355
	(0.2841)	(0.2830)	(0.2798)	(0.8725)	(0.9762)	(1.1031)	(1.1758)
Regionalism vote-share	0.5827*	0.5901*	0.6111*	-0.1100	-0.6211	-0.5236	-0.6192
	(0.3179)	(0.3207)	(0.3371)	(0.6636)	(0.7674)	(0.8428)	(0.8768)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.2268	-0.2441*	-0.2596*	-0.1359	-0.2746	-0.2750	-0.2563
	(0.1397)	(0.1390)	(0.1489)	(0.4954)	(0.5714)	(0.6265)	(0.6554)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.1082	-0.1232	-0.1365	-0.3738	-0.5536	-0.6360	-0.7256
	(0.1730)	(0.1734)	(0.1833)	(0.5375)	(0.6296)	(0.6852)	(0.7275)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.2475	0.2379	0.1948	0.6614	0.5352	0.7433	0.6930
	(0.1831)	(0.1843)	(0.1984)	(0.4306)	(0.4805)	(0.5088)	(0.5045)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	88	88
F	1.08	1.10	1.06	0.67	0.84	0.94	0.91
p-value	0.374	0.346	0.389	0.843	0.652	0.531	0.566

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.26: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Population Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.672***	1.295**	1.560***	2.430	-0.471	0.676	-0.486
	(0.562)	(0.560)	(0.499)	(1.597)	(1.532)	(1.505)	(1.637)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.325	0.179	0.113	1.041	0.379	0.343	-0.757
	(0.499)	(0.513)	(0.452)	(0.996)	(1.058)	(1.129)	(1.205)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.324***	1.266***	1.624***	0.116	-0.319	0.0870	0.00728
	(0.472)	(0.487)	(0.426)	(0.423)	(0.479)	(0.466)	(0.514)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.183*	-0.209**	-0.202*	-0.175	-0.275	-0.344	0.0922
	(0.0999)	(0.103)	(0.107)	(0.270)	(0.379)	(0.394)	(0.428)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.146	-0.159	-0.200	-0.0918	-0.262	-0.367	-0.387
	(0.165)	(0.170)	(0.164)	(0.443)	(0.551)	(0.581)	(0.627)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.504***	0.393**	0.364**	1.391***	0.617	0.906*	0.346
	(0.191)	(0.192)	(0.185)	(0.492)	(0.490)	(0.492)	(0.457)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	106	106	106	106	106	102	102
F	5.23	4.50	7.81	1.58	0.96	0.84	1.05
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.152	0.450	0.536	0.394

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test
of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

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Table B.27: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Population Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.708	-0.667	7.934	5.339	-0.470	1.340	-0.0907
	(6.036)	(5.835)	(6.140)	(6.275)	(6.639)	(6.287)	(7.180)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.140	2.206	-6.178	-1.797	-0.828	-0.613	0.0635
	(6.088)	(5.873)	(6.134)	(6.178)	(6.122)	(5.769)	(6.500)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	2.970	1.645	2.575	-1.674	3.044	2.984	0.128
	(5.216)	(5.188)	(5.405)	(3.880)	(4.554)	(4.685)	(5.301)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-2.611	-1.457	-2.509	2.526	-2.765	-2.746	-0.868
	(5.261)	(5.221)	(5.399)	(3.820)	(4.200)	(4.299)	(4.799)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.878	-1.044	8.945*	0.614	-3.653*	-3.044	-2.279
	(5.182)	(5.253)	(5.421)	(1.681)	(2.031)	(1.910)	(2.222)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	2.280	2.424	-7.195	-0.284	2.846	2.909*	2.193
	(5.227)	(5.287)	(5.416)	(1.655)	(1.873)	(1.753)	(2.012)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.131	-1.305	-1.553	-0.986	-1.478	-1.566	-1.288
	(1.084)	(1.091)	(1.360)	(1.072)	(1.652)	(1.651)	(1.854)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.946	1.098	1.342	0.842	1.007	0.968	0.948
	(1.094)	(1.098)	(1.359)	(1.056)	(1.524)	(1.515)	(1.678)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-2.500	-2.523	-4.324**	0.0451	-0.461	-0.595	-0.373
	(1.763)	(1.788)	(2.022)	(1.678)	(2.354)	(2.388)	(2.719)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	2.475	2.495	4.243**	0.173	0.102	0.0577	-0.0983
	(1.778)	(1.799)	(2.020)	(1.652)	(2.171)	(2.192)	(2.462)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.523	0.0495	-0.348	2.109	1.663	2.127	1.451
	(2.064)	(2.060)	(2.373)	(1.908)	(2.121)	(2.032)	(1.926)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.0461	0.366	0.737	-0.136	-0.832	-0.765	-0.412
	(2.082)	(2.073)	(2.371)	(1.879)	(1.956)	(1.864)	(1.744)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	97	97
F	2.46	2.32	4.08	1.37	1.08	1.10	0.91
p-value	0.004	0.007	0.000	0.180	0.380	0.362	0.534

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.28: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Population Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.367	-3.725	6.153	6.153	0.794	3.287	3.671
	(7.390)	(7.136)	(7.674)	(7.323)	(7.746)	(7.150)	(8.391)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	5.893	9.451	-2.716	-4.964	-7.690	-8.503	-6.546
	(12.22)	(11.79)	(11.95)	(11.35)	(10.66)	(9.892)	(10.61)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-2.484	-4.007	-1.522	4.359	4.325	6.439	4.759
	(6.832)	(6.575)	(6.182)	(6.641)	(5.695)	(5.381)	(5.498)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	3.894	2.616	2.259	0.866	4.150	4.320	1.962
	(6.349)	(6.311)	(6.678)	(4.407)	(5.207)	(5.423)	(6.405)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-7.534	-5.606	-3.149	-4.610	-6.357	-6.830	-4.172
	(10.50)	(10.43)	(10.40)	(6.833)	(7.162)	(7.503)	(8.099)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	4.076	3.251	1.033	6.194	3.094	3.459	2.368
	(5.870)	(5.815)	(5.379)	(3.997)	(3.828)	(4.082)	(4.197)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-4.961	-4.858	7.760	0.0475	-2.765	-2.072	-1.216
	(6.358)	(6.435)	(6.837)	(1.910)	(2.346)	(2.268)	(2.684)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	12.15	11.99	-3.856	1.272	0.513	0.377	0.446
	(10.52)	(10.63)	(10.65)	(2.961)	(3.227)	(3.138)	(3.394)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-5.630	-5.563	-2.025	-0.744	1.462	1.966	1.568
	(5.877)	(5.929)	(5.508)	(1.732)	(1.725)	(1.707)	(1.759)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.174	-1.315	-1.584	-1.502	-2.039	-2.034	-0.186
	(1.343)	(1.353)	(1.726)	(1.039)	(1.608)	(1.644)	(1.935)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.855	1.067	1.345	1.787	2.149	2.412	0.457
	(2.221)	(2.235)	(2.688)	(1.612)	(2.212)	(2.274)	(2.447)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.128	0.0369	0.0236	-0.623	-1.036	-1.185	-0.768
	(1.242)	(1.247)	(1.391)	(0.943)	(1.182)	(1.237)	(1.268)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.281	-1.492	-3.996*	0.332	-1.439	-1.313	1.069
	(2.055)	(2.070)	(2.419)	(1.524)	(2.028)	(2.092)	(2.341)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.0300	0.349	3.710	-0.237	0.157	0.401	-0.977
	(3.398)	(3.420)	(3.767)	(2.362)	(2.790)	(2.894)	(2.960)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	1.213	1.076	0.197	0.00947	-0.472	-0.504	-1.046
	(1.899)	(1.907)	(1.948)	(1.382)	(1.491)	(1.575)	(1.534)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.172	-0.353	-0.950	1.626	1.930	2.543	1.082
	(2.547)	(2.529)	(2.979)	(2.096)	(2.361)	(2.266)	(2.285)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.601	1.393	1.803	-0.346	-2.757	-3.197	-0.400
	(4.212)	(4.178)	(4.640)	(3.250)	(3.248)	(3.134)	(2.889)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.311	-0.650	-0.485	1.099	1.454	2.102	1.073
	(2.354)	(2.330)	(2.400)	(1.901)	(1.736)	(1.705)	(1.497)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	88	88
F	1.60	1.57	2.49	1.19	1.06	0.90	1.00
p-value	0.056	0.063	0.001	0.263	0.397	0.581	0.458

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.29: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Population Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share	1.8476***	1.5396***	1.7556***	3.5414	-1.2976	0.7273	-0.0272
	(0.6080)	(0.5911)	(0.5157)	(2.2364)	(2.0778)	(2.0700)	(2.1913)
Euroscepticism vote-share	0.3596	0.1877	0.0658	0.8513	0.2789	0.2377	-0.7393
	(0.5255)	(0.5255)	(0.4539)	(1.3828)	(1.4254)	(1.5425)	(1.6177)
Regionalism vote-share	1.4015***	1.3799***	1.7504***	0.3300	-0.8077	-0.1346	-0.0863
	(0.5220)	(0.5322)	(0.4553)	(0.5991)	(0.6355)	(0.6290)	(0.6782)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.1846*	-0.2072*	-0.2108*	-0.1439	-0.4706	-0.5981	-0.3399
	(0.1092)	(0.1105)	(0.1142)	(0.3821)	(0.5171)	(0.5437)	(0.5658)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.0253	-0.0283	-0.0811	0.2186	-0.3582	-0.5370	-0.4710
	(0.1776)	(0.1811)	(0.1698)	(0.5979)	(0.7367)	(0.7864)	(0.8298)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.4767**	0.4153**	0.3890*	1.9723***	0.8310	1.3620**	1.0392*
	(0.2079)	(0.2087)	(0.1993)	(0.6802)	(0.6639)	(0.6689)	(0.5879)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	97	97
F	2.46	2.32	4.08	1.37	1.08	1.10	0.91
p-value	0.004	0.007	0.000	0.180	0.380	0.362	0.534

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.30: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Population Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share	2.0425***	1.7189***	1.9152***	5.5480*	-2.5719	1.2232	1.8838
	(0.6651)	(0.6476)	(0.5632)	(3.0744)	(3.3250)	(3.2759)	(3.5511)
Euroscepticism vote-share	0.4363	0.2610	0.1431	2.4503	0.8866	0.9486	0.1581
	(0.5714)	(0.5727)	(0.4901)	(1.8504)	(2.2349)	(2.4847)	(2.7106)
Regionalism vote-share	1.5557***	1.5699***	1.8781***	0.5763	-0.7910	0.2701	0.7979
	(0.5721)	(0.5840)	(0.5017)	(0.8018)	(1.0070)	(1.0392)	(1.1360)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.1915	-0.2108*	-0.2155*	-0.3392	-0.9261	-0.8075	-0.4972
	(0.1209)	(0.1228)	(0.1267)	(0.4364)	(0.6904)	(0.7530)	(0.8188)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.0379	-0.0669	-0.0895	0.1053	-1.7538**	-1.4162	-0.9541
	(0.1849)	(0.1879)	(0.1775)	(0.6397)	(0.8706)	(0.9585)	(0.9906)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.4611**	0.3891*	0.3679*	2.3785***	0.6272	1.4486	1.7550*
	(0.2292)	(0.2295)	(0.2186)	(0.8800)	(1.0134)	(1.0380)	(0.9668)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	88	88
F	1.60	1.57	2.49	1.19	1.06	0.90	1.00
p-value	0.056	0.063	0.001	0.263	0.397	0.581	0.458

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.31: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.0416	0.0166	0.0170	-0.00160	0.228	0.280	0.175
	(0.342)	(0.341)	(0.355)	(0.517)	(0.581)	(0.593)	(0.640)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.192	-0.202	-0.199	-0.126	-0.0461	-0.0270	-0.0585
	(0.243)	(0.244)	(0.246)	(0.357)	(0.406)	(0.419)	(0.452)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.318	0.315	0.364	-0.0563	-0.0498	-0.0381	-0.127
	(0.255)	(0.257)	(0.271)	(0.237)	(0.284)	(0.289)	(0.311)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.197*	-0.207*	-0.218*	-0.127	-0.0877	-0.0751	0.0391
	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.116)	(0.212)	(0.247)	(0.248)	(0.262)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.150	-0.156	-0.174	-0.155	-0.132	-0.129	-0.0989
	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.150)	(0.229)	(0.276)	(0.278)	(0.304)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.153	0.148	0.123	0.344*	0.515**	0.524**	0.388*
	(0.163)	(0.164)	(0.175)	(0.200)	(0.217)	(0.224)	(0.222)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	102	102	102	102	102	99	99
F	1.35	1.43	1.48	0.72	1.31	1.35	1.14
p-value	0.231	0.200	0.184	0.633	0.251	0.233	0.336

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.32: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	5.956*	5.340*	7.287**	0.973	0.325	0.895	0.564
	(3.107)	(3.145)	(3.444)	(3.122)	(3.686)	(3.765)	(4.235)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-5.587*	-5.007*	-6.867**	-0.911	-0.124	-0.578	-0.321
	(2.932)	(2.968)	(3.252)	(2.768)	(3.234)	(3.291)	(3.642)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.176	0.830	1.477	-0.942	0.00198	0.132	0.295
	(2.183)	(2.216)	(2.365)	(2.144)	(2.571)	(2.656)	(2.988)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.295	-0.969	-1.599	0.687	-0.0863	-0.184	-0.321
	(2.060)	(2.091)	(2.233)	(1.900)	(2.256)	(2.322)	(2.569)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	2.787	2.803	4.277	-0.00422	-0.787	-0.636	-1.221
	(2.378)	(2.425)	(2.702)	(1.445)	(1.814)	(1.845)	(2.046)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-2.345	-2.360	-3.707	-0.0464	0.653	0.529	0.986
	(2.244)	(2.289)	(2.552)	(1.281)	(1.591)	(1.613)	(1.759)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.361	-1.692*	-1.687	-0.558	-1.136	-0.972	-0.190
	(1.006)	(1.005)	(1.150)	(1.289)	(1.573)	(1.583)	(1.727)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.112	1.424	1.405	0.385	0.927	0.792	0.161
	(0.949)	(0.948)	(1.086)	(1.142)	(1.380)	(1.384)	(1.485)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.264	-1.458	-1.324	0.252	0.279	0.426	0.640
	(1.299)	(1.319)	(1.492)	(1.379)	(1.744)	(1.754)	(1.980)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.090	1.272	1.130	-0.364	-0.361	-0.484	-0.677
	(1.226)	(1.244)	(1.409)	(1.222)	(1.530)	(1.533)	(1.702)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	4.263***	4.247***	4.247**	1.808	1.610	1.683	0.766
	(1.442)	(1.470)	(1.680)	(1.195)	(1.372)	(1.415)	(1.442)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-3.909***	-3.894***	-3.917**	-1.320	-0.976	-1.031	-0.275
	(1.361)	(1.387)	(1.587)	(1.059)	(1.203)	(1.237)	(1.240)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	96	96	96	96	96	94	94
F	1.63	1.68	1.72	0.66	1.11	1.06	0.89
p-value	0.079	0.067	0.060	0.792	0.352	0.390	0.562

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.33: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	4.809	4.572	7.386	-0.748	0.0724	0.148	0.639
	(4.219)	(4.213)	(4.741)	(3.624)	(4.284)	(4.328)	(5.216)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-3.590	-3.471	-5.707	1.476	0.711	0.784	0.183
	(4.763)	(4.751)	(5.133)	(3.933)	(4.469)	(4.537)	(5.467)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.766	-0.706	-1.220	-0.486	-0.996	-0.956	-1.010
	(1.629)	(1.626)	(1.701)	(1.607)	(1.770)	(1.997)	(2.083)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.267	1.066	0.992	-1.407	-0.941	-0.929	-0.639
	(2.852)	(2.833)	(3.117)	(2.435)	(2.906)	(2.966)	(3.657)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.232	-1.131	-1.092	1.664	1.259	1.155	0.730
	(3.219)	(3.196)	(3.374)	(2.643)	(3.031)	(3.109)	(3.833)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.0931	-0.0420	0.0525	-0.199	-0.149	0.0158	0.0844
	(1.101)	(1.094)	(1.118)	(1.080)	(1.201)	(1.369)	(1.460)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.848	1.928	4.999	0.348	0.120	0.132	0.286
	(3.273)	(3.291)	(3.779)	(1.776)	(2.206)	(2.216)	(2.660)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.966	-1.006	-3.144	-0.475	-0.299	-0.151	-0.323
	(3.695)	(3.712)	(4.091)	(1.927)	(2.301)	(2.323)	(2.788)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.360	-0.380	-1.242	-0.0800	-0.428	-0.606	-0.697
	(1.264)	(1.270)	(1.356)	(0.788)	(0.912)	(1.022)	(1.062)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.694	-1.799	-1.707	-0.996	-0.990	-0.973	0.688
	(1.382)	(1.370)	(1.616)	(1.400)	(1.714)	(1.687)	(2.035)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.314	1.367	1.170	1.063	0.924	1.084	-0.603
	(1.560)	(1.546)	(1.750)	(1.520)	(1.788)	(1.768)	(2.133)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.124	0.150	0.232	-0.191	-0.212	-0.397	-0.348
	(0.534)	(0.529)	(0.580)	(0.621)	(0.708)	(0.778)	(0.813)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-2.179	-2.240	-2.158	0.382	0.929	0.922	2.269
	(1.723)	(1.729)	(2.012)	(1.523)	(1.894)	(1.856)	(2.274)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.895	1.926	1.760	-0.514	-1.111	-0.854	-2.256
	(1.945)	(1.950)	(2.178)	(1.653)	(1.976)	(1.945)	(2.383)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.121	0.137	0.197	-0.260	-0.347	-0.709	-0.757
	(0.665)	(0.667)	(0.722)	(0.676)	(0.783)	(0.856)	(0.908)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	4.928**	4.902**	5.216**	0.167	0.693	0.719	-0.823
	(1.946)	(1.959)	(2.310)	(1.212)	(1.449)	(1.467)	(1.703)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-4.182*	-4.169*	-4.681*	0.365	0.0263	-0.115	1.466
	(2.197)	(2.210)	(2.501)	(1.315)	(1.511)	(1.537)	(1.784)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.493	-0.486	-0.312	0.0306	-0.168	0.0719	-0.0297
	(0.752)	(0.756)	(0.829)	(0.537)	(0.599)	(0.677)	(0.680)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	88	88	88	88	88	86	86
F	0.98	1.05	1.14	0.75	0.77	0.90	0.83
p-value	0.476	0.399	0.305	0.758	0.737	0.581	0.663

$* \ p < .10$, $** \ p < .05$, $*** \ p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.34: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share	0.3694	0.3335	0.4201	0.0617	0.2014	0.3175	0.2435
	(0.3829)	(0.3834)	(0.3977)	(0.6339)	(0.7429)	(0.7611)	(0.8776)
Euroscepticism vote-share	-0.1189	-0.1390	-0.1219	-0.2551	-0.0843	-0.0524	-0.0262
	(0.2691)	(0.2701)	(0.2731)	(0.4353)	(0.5182)	(0.5370)	(0.6191)
Regionalism vote-share	0.4418	0.4427	0.5705*	-0.0507	-0.1337	-0.1072	-0.2353
	(0.2931)	(0.2956)	(0.3120)	(0.2934)	(0.3656)	(0.3731)	(0.4239)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.2485**	-0.2678**	-0.2822**	-0.1736	-0.2095	-0.1807	-0.0289
	(0.1240)	(0.1225)	(0.1328)	(0.2616)	(0.3170)	(0.3201)	(0.3579)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.1746	-0.1859	-0.1944	-0.1114	-0.0821	-0.0582	-0.0374
	(0.1600)	(0.1608)	(0.1723)	(0.2799)	(0.3516)	(0.3546)	(0.4103)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.3539**	0.3530**	0.3300*	0.4877**	0.6336**	0.6521**	0.4906
	(0.1777)	(0.1792)	(0.1940)	(0.2426)	(0.2764)	(0.2860)	(0.2988)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	96	96	96	96	96	94	94
F	1.63	1.68	1.72	0.66	1.11	1.06	0.89
p-value	0.079	0.067	0.060	0.792	0.352	0.390	0.562

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.35: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share	0.4520	0.3948	0.4587	0.2416	-0.2126	-0.0242	-0.1872
	(0.4354)	(0.4369)	(0.4470)	(1.1357)	(1.3462)	(1.4809)	(1.5676)
Euroscepticism vote-share	-0.0583	-0.1068	-0.0473	0.0582	0.1692	0.2424	0.1752
	(0.2943)	(0.2938)	(0.2939)	(0.7631)	(0.9131)	(1.0149)	(1.0991)
Regionalism vote-share	0.5223	0.5415	0.6127*	-0.2074	-0.6079	-0.6249	-0.7341
	(0.3378)	(0.3413)	(0.3563)	(0.5566)	(0.6932)	(0.7583)	(0.7994)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.2565*	-0.2817**	-0.3061**	-0.1233	-0.2789	-0.2866	-0.2632
	(0.1427)	(0.1421)	(0.1524)	(0.4388)	(0.5387)	(0.5772)	(0.6117)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.1628	-0.1777	-0.2012	-0.3913	-0.5291	-0.6418	-0.7438
	(0.1778)	(0.1793)	(0.1897)	(0.4773)	(0.5953)	(0.6349)	(0.6833)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.2531	0.2468	0.2221	0.5629	0.5509	0.6759	0.6131
	(0.2009)	(0.2032)	(0.2178)	(0.3797)	(0.4552)	(0.5018)	(0.5116)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	88	88	88	88	88	86	86
F	0.98	1.05	1.14	0.75	0.77	0.90	0.83
p-value	0.476	0.399	0.305	0.758	0.737	0.581	0.663

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.36: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.570***	1.277**	1.495***	1.322	0.355	0.385	-0.669
	(0.570)	(0.581)	(0.507)	(1.153)	(1.387)	(1.435)	(1.560)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.302	0.102	0.0836	0.877	0.442	0.390	-0.684
	(0.532)	(0.547)	(0.499)	(0.907)	(1.039)	(1.072)	(1.154)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.321**	1.301**	1.585***	-0.156	-0.0482	-0.00432	-0.0961
	(0.527)	(0.548)	(0.450)	(0.301)	(0.394)	(0.403)	(0.445)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.229**	-0.261**	-0.267**	-0.193	-0.469	-0.430	0.0128
	(0.106)	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.259)	(0.373)	(0.379)	(0.403)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.226	-0.261	-0.286*	-0.193	-0.610	-0.586	-0.546
	(0.163)	(0.169)	(0.164)	(0.345)	(0.468)	(0.480)	(0.527)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.478**	0.403**	0.390*	1.078***	0.877*	0.872*	0.322
	(0.198)	(0.204)	(0.205)	(0.404)	(0.469)	(0.483)	(0.464)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	102	102	102	102	102	99	99
F	5.05	4.30	6.94	1.79	1.19	1.12	1.23
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.098	0.312	0.351	0.292

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test
of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.37: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-3.714	-4.588	2.955	-2.153	1.033	1.105	0.563
	(5.609)	(5.552)	(6.038)	(4.669)	(6.724)	(6.857)	(7.756)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	5.455	6.102	-1.282	3.981	-0.776	-0.804	-0.891
	(5.654)	(5.588)	(6.029)	(4.549)	(6.240)	(6.356)	(7.115)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.101	-0.954	0.311	-1.691	2.080	1.939	-0.208
	(5.145)	(5.079)	(5.768)	(3.666)	(5.040)	(5.126)	(5.742)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.428	1.060	-0.263	2.328	-1.734	-1.678	-0.470
	(5.187)	(5.113)	(5.759)	(3.572)	(4.677)	(4.751)	(5.268)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-2.078	-1.990	6.575	-1.475	-0.848	-0.745	-0.192
	(5.357)	(5.403)	(5.579)	(1.235)	(1.928)	(1.947)	(2.206)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	3.480	3.415	-4.878	1.390	0.699	0.658	0.153
	(5.400)	(5.439)	(5.570)	(1.203)	(1.789)	(1.804)	(2.023)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.405	-1.513	-2.180	-1.051	-2.230	-2.097	-1.449
	(1.064)	(1.064)	(1.356)	(1.066)	(1.814)	(1.818)	(1.960)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.179	1.258	1.907	0.880	1.427	1.374	1.003
	(1.072)	(1.071)	(1.354)	(1.039)	(1.683)	(1.685)	(1.798)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-2.333	-2.398	-4.182**	-0.138	-1.672	-1.565	-0.744
	(1.620)	(1.633)	(1.970)	(1.360)	(2.217)	(2.243)	(2.550)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	2.199	2.247	3.989**	0.0811	0.725	0.683	-0.0443
	(1.634)	(1.644)	(1.967)	(1.325)	(2.057)	(2.079)	(2.339)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.219	0.102	0.827	0.308	3.152	3.090	2.168
	(1.982)	(1.994)	(2.538)	(1.622)	(2.237)	(2.274)	(2.209)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.238	0.324	-0.414	1.204	-1.823	-1.797	-1.185
	(1.998)	(2.007)	(2.534)	(1.580)	(2.076)	(2.108)	(2.026)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	96	96	96	96	96	94	94
F	2.16	2.08	3.99	1.86	0.94	0.87	0.82
p-value	0.012	0.017	0.000	0.037	0.502	0.577	0.633

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.38: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-6.701	-7.886	-0.535	-1.099	1.569	1.826	3.138
	(6.804)	(6.769)	(7.402)	(5.309)	(7.521)	(7.731)	(9.236)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	10.15	12.42	5.194	-1.477	-4.884	-5.356	-4.457
	(11.11)	(11.07)	(11.03)	(8.250)	(9.803)	(10.21)	(11.28)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-1.460	-2.758	-2.765	5.612	3.645	4.053	2.395
	(6.183)	(6.166)	(5.611)	(4.867)	(4.962)	(5.316)	(5.397)
Euroscepticism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.208	-0.122	-0.225	0.0926	2.124	2.120	0.675
	(6.258)	(6.173)	(7.091)	(4.140)	(5.633)	(5.777)	(6.992)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-4.906	-2.361	-0.184	-2.707	-3.262	-3.639	-1.790
	(10.22)	(10.10)	(10.56)	(6.434)	(7.342)	(7.633)	(8.543)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	4.129	2.673	0.534	4.575	2.059	2.280	1.035
	(5.687)	(5.624)	(5.375)	(3.796)	(3.717)	(3.973)	(4.086)
Regionalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-6.192	-5.841	4.510	-1.542	-0.391	-0.276	0.742
	(6.540)	(6.605)	(6.947)	(1.464)	(2.231)	(2.274)	(2.780)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	13.10	12.43	-0.00418	1.487	-1.123	-1.123	-1.400
	(10.68)	(10.81)	(10.35)	(2.274)	(2.908)	(3.004)	(3.396)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-5.327	-4.944	-2.637	0.0211	1.113	1.170	0.881
	(5.943)	(6.017)	(5.266)	(1.342)	(1.472)	(1.564)	(1.624)
Far-Right vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.392	-1.530	-2.196	-1.568	-2.183	-2.149	0.142
	(1.312)	(1.319)	(1.699)	(1.007)	(1.751)	(1.753)	(2.093)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.029	1.294	1.763	1.804	2.210	2.487	0.0802
	(2.143)	(2.159)	(2.531)	(1.565)	(2.283)	(2.316)	(2.557)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.123	-0.0286	0.151	-0.605	-1.024	-1.171	-0.796
	(1.193)	(1.202)	(1.288)	(0.923)	(1.155)	(1.205)	(1.223)
Nationalism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.900	-1.929	-4.332*	-0.317	-1.538	-1.555	1.754
	(1.972)	(1.995)	(2.432)	(1.430)	(2.214)	(2.254)	(2.571)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.625	0.681	3.805	0.0285	0.464	0.773	-1.779
	(3.220)	(3.263)	(3.622)	(2.221)	(2.886)	(2.978)	(3.142)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	1.140	1.108	0.351	0.0882	-0.488	-0.680	-1.205
	(1.792)	(1.817)	(1.843)	(1.311)	(1.461)	(1.550)	(1.503)
Right-wing Populism vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.239	-0.457	-0.0230	-0.0945	3.036	3.111	1.191
	(2.426)	(2.443)	(3.142)	(1.755)	(2.487)	(2.542)	(2.684)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.158	1.574	1.407	0.393	-2.933	-3.318	-0.189
	(3.961)	(3.997)	(4.680)	(2.728)	(3.242)	(3.358)	(3.279)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.475	-0.712	-0.997	1.349	1.301	1.567	0.671
	(2.205)	(2.226)	(2.382)	(1.609)	(1.641)	(1.748)	(1.568)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	88	88	88	88	88	86	86
F	1.47	1.45	2.55	1.26	0.66	0.63	0.93
p-value	0.094	0.104	0.001	0.214	0.846	0.875	0.546

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test
of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.39: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share	1.7408***	1.5141**	1.6725***	1.8281	0.2568	0.3009	-0.3280
	(0.6055)	(0.6092)	(0.5207)	(1.5750)	(1.8652)	(1.9130)	(2.0433)
Euroscepticism vote-share	0.3271	0.1057	0.0487	0.6369	0.3455	0.2616	-0.6780
	(0.5555)	(0.5574)	(0.4974)	(1.2367)	(1.3981)	(1.4301)	(1.5129)
Regionalism vote-share	1.4023**	1.4250**	1.6963***	-0.0852	-0.1492	-0.0876	-0.0383
	(0.5783)	(0.5929)	(0.4811)	(0.4165)	(0.5349)	(0.5431)	(0.5811)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.2268**	-0.2548**	-0.2738**	-0.1712	-0.8030	-0.7234	-0.4455
	(0.1148)	(0.1168)	(0.1169)	(0.3596)	(0.5032)	(0.5071)	(0.5164)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.1346	-0.1515	-0.1937	-0.0574	-0.9464	-0.8826	-0.7882
	(0.1750)	(0.1792)	(0.1699)	(0.4589)	(0.6149)	(0.6257)	(0.6718)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.4568**	0.4264*	0.4133*	1.5116***	1.3295**	1.2925**	0.9827*
	(0.2140)	(0.2188)	(0.2189)	(0.5470)	(0.6207)	(0.6344)	(0.5819)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	96	96	96	96	96	94	94
F	2.16	2.08	3.99	1.86	0.94	0.87	0.82
p-value	0.012	0.017	0.000	0.037	0.502	0.577	0.633

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.40: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Right vote-share	1.9893***	1.7745***	1.8941***	3.0366	0.3305	0.5232	1.0759
	(0.6639)	(0.6692)	(0.5673)	(2.1705)	(3.0715)	(3.2170)	(3.5144)
Euroscepticism vote-share	0.4311	0.1901	0.1252	1.9611	0.9205	0.7610	-0.0807
	(0.6106)	(0.6103)	(0.5435)	(1.6926)	(2.3005)	(2.4041)	(2.6605)
Regionalism vote-share	1.5773**	1.6407**	1.8690***	-0.0344	-0.4017	-0.2293	0.2233
	(0.6381)	(0.6530)	(0.5324)	(0.5984)	(0.9112)	(0.9462)	(1.0577)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.2399*	-0.2650**	-0.2824**	-0.3687	-0.9967	-0.8328	-0.5742
	(0.1280)	(0.1304)	(0.1302)	(0.4117)	(0.7152)	(0.7294)	(0.7962)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.1351	-0.1404	-0.1757	-0.2003	-1.5616*	-1.4617	-1.2304
	(0.1924)	(0.1972)	(0.1864)	(0.5844)	(0.9041)	(0.9378)	(0.9784)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.4443*	0.4049*	0.3865	1.6472**	1.4051	1.3605	1.6728
	(0.2367)	(0.2416)	(0.2408)	(0.7177)	(1.0157)	(1.0577)	(1.0212)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	88	88	88	88	88	86	86
F	1.47	1.45	2.55	1.26	0.66	0.63	0.93
p-value	0.094	0.104	0.001	0.214	0.846	0.875	0.546

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.41: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Unweighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.264**	0.252*	0.316**	0.0814	0.00405	-0.00638	0.113
	(0.129)	(0.132)	(0.135)	(0.292)	(0.344)	(0.379)	(0.358)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.283***	0.278***	0.292***	0.101	0.0589	-0.148	-0.254
	(0.0717)	(0.0734)	(0.0788)	(0.184)	(0.216)	(0.229)	(0.239)
SD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.138	-0.0817	-0.0503	0.140	1.055**	1.149**	0.955**
	(0.149)	(0.150)	(0.159)	(0.393)	(0.435)	(0.477)	(0.482)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0469	0.0585	0.0963	-0.713*	-0.989**	-1.010**	-0.836*
	(0.188)	(0.192)	(0.206)	(0.392)	(0.453)	(0.436)	(0.458)
EPP vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.158	-0.104	-0.200	-0.683	-0.0774	-0.0280	0.232
	(0.170)	(0.172)	(0.177)	(0.445)	(0.502)	(0.509)	(0.502)
ECR vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.00835	-0.0668	-0.0184	0.707**	0.261	0.358	0.364
	(0.117)	(0.114)	(0.119)	(0.356)	(0.389)	(0.424)	(0.418)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0669	-0.0826	-0.117	-0.108	-0.337	-0.328	-0.464
	(0.0732)	(0.0746)	(0.0787)	(0.250)	(0.293)	(0.287)	(0.298)
ENF vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.103	0.0922	0.104	0.0676	-0.177	-0.123	-0.219*
	(0.0662)	(0.0677)	(0.0702)	(0.131)	(0.151)	(0.126)	(0.127)
NI vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.307	-0.381**	-0.333*	-0.0714	-0.665	-0.625	-0.690
	(0.192)	(0.193)	(0.200)	(0.577)	(0.677)	(0.697)	(0.747)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	106	106	106	106	106	102	102
F	3.18	3.06	3.68	1.12	1.62	1.47	1.55
p-value	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.344	0.105	0.157	0.128

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.42: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Unweighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.095	-1.084	-0.251	-0.363	-0.264	-0.357	2.646
	(1.693)	(1.702)	(1.824)	(1.531)	(1.851)	(1.910)	(1.880)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.346	1.331	0.560	0.430	0.257	0.337	-2.351
	(1.701)	(1.711)	(1.836)	(1.395)	(1.654)	(1.689)	(1.675)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	1.163	1.174	1.299	-0.475	0.0279	-0.459	-0.549
	(0.941)	(0.945)	(1.060)	(0.962)	(1.159)	(1.150)	(1.299)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.888	-0.904	-1.019	0.515	0.0122	0.245	0.274
	(0.945)	(0.950)	(1.068)	(0.877)	(1.036)	(1.017)	(1.157)
SD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	2.473	2.388	1.993	0.460	3.754	3.884*	1.830
	(1.907)	(1.896)	(2.105)	(2.004)	(2.281)	(2.352)	(2.532)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-2.647	-2.525	-2.104	-0.291	-2.494	-2.519	-0.788
	(1.916)	(1.907)	(2.120)	(1.826)	(2.038)	(2.079)	(2.255)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.619	-1.629	-0.874	-0.302	-3.804	-4.145*	-4.369*
	(2.400)	(2.414)	(2.711)	(1.982)	(2.327)	(2.145)	(2.427)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.705	1.719	0.992	-0.321	2.575	2.844	3.169
	(2.412)	(2.427)	(2.730)	(1.806)	(2.079)	(1.897)	(2.162)
EPP vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.902	-1.035	-0.237	-2.592	-0.237	0.101	0.814
	(2.205)	(2.173)	(2.360)	(2.043)	(2.249)	(2.291)	(2.589)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.708	0.898	0.00663	1.898	0.317	0.118	-0.440
	(2.216)	(2.185)	(2.376)	(1.862)	(2.009)	(2.026)	(2.306)
ECR vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	1.683	1.822	1.553	1.649	1.204	1.377	0.320
	(1.530)	(1.467)	(1.607)	(1.568)	(1.803)	(1.864)	(2.125)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-1.701	-1.900	-1.580	-1.111	-1.030	-1.140	-0.102
	(1.538)	(1.475)	(1.618)	(1.429)	(1.611)	(1.647)	(1.893)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.221	-0.192	-0.0754	-0.370	-0.515	-0.773	-0.817
	(0.965)	(0.965)	(1.066)	(1.292)	(1.540)	(1.402)	(1.598)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.160	0.117	-0.0357	0.221	0.121	0.354	0.334
	(0.970)	(0.970)	(1.073)	(1.177)	(1.377)	(1.240)	(1.423)
ENF vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.408	0.424	-0.761	0.726	0.0262	-0.0176	0.125
	(0.877)	(0.880)	(0.952)	(0.683)	(0.810)	(0.634)	(0.685)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.310	-0.332	0.878	-0.605	-0.190	-0.0952	-0.294
	(0.881)	(0.885)	(0.958)	(0.622)	(0.724)	(0.561)	(0.610)
NI vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-5.472**	-5.323**	-4.297*	-2.230	-4.722	-4.834	-5.530
	(2.421)	(2.384)	(2.605)	(3.009)	(3.594)	(3.456)	(3.988)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	5.267**	5.054**	4.068	2.029	3.692	3.814	4.422
	(2.433)	(2.397)	(2.623)	(2.742)	(3.211)	(3.055)	(3.552)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	97	97
F	1.81	1.78	1.95	0.60	0.98	1.00	1.17
p-value	0.020	0.024	0.010	0.901	0.486	0.453	0.281

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.43: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Unweighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-7.473***	-7.721***	-7.270***	-2.251	-1.760	-1.854	1.463
	(2.277)	(2.287)	(2.614)	(2.290)	(2.677)	(2.756)	(2.641)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	8.123***	8.450***	8.162***	2.898	2.231	2.371	-0.517
	(2.663)	(2.678)	(3.035)	(2.597)	(2.982)	(3.060)	(2.893)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.327	-0.429	-0.526	-0.151	-0.106	0.00462	-0.945
	(0.860)	(0.865)	(0.917)	(0.664)	(0.749)	(0.961)	(0.926)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	3.007**	2.990**	3.525**	-1.036	-0.280	-0.804	-0.330
	(1.376)	(1.391)	(1.644)	(1.397)	(1.645)	(1.607)	(1.723)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-3.367**	-3.346**	-3.754**	0.777	0.159	0.623	0.243
	(1.609)	(1.628)	(1.910)	(1.584)	(1.832)	(1.785)	(1.887)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.640	0.634	0.500	0.540	0.317	-0.556	-0.727
	(0.520)	(0.526)	(0.577)	(0.405)	(0.460)	(0.561)	(0.604)
SD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	8.031***	8.447***	9.525***	5.137*	7.745***	7.744***	5.272*
	(2.624)	(2.615)	(3.034)	(2.648)	(2.911)	(2.991)	(2.765)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-8.390***	-8.937***	-10.24***	-5.538*	-7.604**	-7.545**	-5.789*
	(3.069)	(3.062)	(3.524)	(3.003)	(3.242)	(3.321)	(3.028)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.147	0.318	0.564	-0.121	0.718	0.931	2.337**
	(0.991)	(0.989)	(1.065)	(0.767)	(0.815)	(1.043)	(0.969)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.376	-3.153	-3.195	-3.341	-6.632**	-6.848**	-7.991**
	(3.529)	(3.559)	(4.236)	(2.837)	(3.235)	(2.933)	(3.159)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.654	2.361	2.269	3.342	6.096*	6.454**	7.870**
	(4.127)	(4.168)	(4.920)	(3.216)	(3.603)	(3.257)	(3.460)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.866	0.957	1.146	-0.221	-0.144	-0.0395	-0.457
	(1.333)	(1.346)	(1.486)	(0.822)	(0.905)	(1.023)	(1.107)
EPP vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.221	-2.696	-1.279	-0.863	0.476	0.741	0.811
	(3.225)	(3.211)	(3.679)	(2.817)	(2.992)	(3.056)	(3.437)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	4.642	3.952	2.397	0.538	-0.309	-0.550	-0.601
	(3.772)	(3.760)	(4.273)	(3.194)	(3.332)	(3.393)	(3.764)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-1.644	-1.429	-1.387	-0.659	-0.167	-0.0648	0.0300
	(1.218)	(1.214)	(1.291)	(0.816)	(0.837)	(1.066)	(1.205)
ECR vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	3.296	2.698	2.279	-0.0763	-0.754	-0.232	-2.112
	(2.271)	(2.203)	(2.549)	(2.204)	(2.441)	(2.471)	(2.665)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-3.662	-2.875	-2.142	0.527	1.487	0.988	2.831
	(2.656)	(2.580)	(2.961)	(2.499)	(2.719)	(2.744)	(2.919)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.330	0.0844	-0.197	0.512	-0.156	0.601	0.912
	(0.858)	(0.833)	(0.895)	(0.639)	(0.683)	(0.862)	(0.934)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.167	0.0393	0.696	0.112	1.466	0.808	0.561
	(1.427)	(1.435)	(1.667)	(1.752)	(1.976)	(1.864)	(2.077)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.344	-0.175	-1.089	-0.243	-2.057	-1.411	-1.252
	(1.668)	(1.681)	(1.937)	(1.986)	(2.201)	(2.069)	(2.275)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.131	0.0781	0.306	-0.105	0.0316	-0.360	-0.223
	(0.539)	(0.543)	(0.585)	(0.508)	(0.553)	(0.650)	(0.728)
ENF vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	1.273	1.203	-0.972	0.875	0.452	0.0835	0.371
	(1.285)	(1.296)	(1.476)	(0.897)	(1.014)	(0.755)	(0.802)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-1.589	-1.497	0.749	-0.928	-0.611	-0.233	-0.550
	(1.502)	(1.518)	(1.714)	(1.017)	(1.129)	(0.838)	(0.879)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.424	0.396	0.359	0.0239	-0.236	-0.247	-0.203
	(0.485)	(0.490)	(0.518)	(0.260)	(0.284)	(0.263)	(0.281)
NI vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-8.054**	-8.638**	-8.378**	-2.821	-6.460	-7.337	-5.988
	(3.557)	(3.540)	(4.083)	(4.479)	(5.142)	(4.906)	(5.515)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	7.902*	8.670**	8.896*	2.409	6.467	7.430	5.888
	(4.159)	(4.145)	(4.743)	(5.079)	(5.727)	(5.447)	(6.040)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.0497	-0.289	-0.753	0.125	-1.379	-2.454	-2.407
	(1.343)	(1.338)	(1.433)	(1.298)	(1.439)	(1.711)	(1.933)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	88	88
F	2.27	2.25	2.18	0.70	0.89	1.01	1.27
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.866	0.631	0.452	0.171

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.44: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Unweighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.2513*	0.2467*	0.3094**	0.0670	-0.0077	-0.0200	0.2958
	(0.1354)	(0.1379)	(0.1412)	(0.3318)	(0.4050)	(0.4466)	(0.4062)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.2741***	0.2694***	0.2806***	0.0403	0.0400	-0.2137	-0.2749
	(0.0752)	(0.0766)	(0.0821)	(0.2085)	(0.2536)	(0.2689)	(0.2806)
SD vote-share	-0.1735	-0.1368	-0.1110	0.1691	1.2605**	1.3652**	1.0428*
	(0.1525)	(0.1537)	(0.1630)	(0.4341)	(0.4991)	(0.5498)	(0.5470)
ALDE vote-share	0.0863	0.0904	0.1187	-0.6233	-1.2290**	-1.3007***	-1.2005**
	(0.1920)	(0.1956)	(0.2100)	(0.4295)	(0.5092)	(0.5015)	(0.5243)
EPP vote-share	-0.1936	-0.1363	-0.2302	-0.6945	0.0803	0.2190	0.3742
	(0.1764)	(0.1761)	(0.1827)	(0.4427)	(0.4921)	(0.5356)	(0.5593)
ECR vote-share	-0.0184	-0.0784	-0.0279	0.5384	0.1737	0.2363	0.2181
	(0.1224)	(0.1188)	(0.1245)	(0.3397)	(0.3946)	(0.4357)	(0.4590)
EFDD vote-share	-0.0615	-0.0742	-0.1112	-0.1486	-0.3938	-0.4187	-0.4831
	(0.0772)	(0.0782)	(0.0826)	(0.2798)	(0.3371)	(0.3278)	(0.3451)
ENF vote-share	0.0987	0.0921	0.1173	0.1207	-0.1637	-0.1128	-0.1698
	(0.0701)	(0.0713)	(0.0737)	(0.1479)	(0.1772)	(0.1483)	(0.1481)
NI vote-share	-0.2050	-0.2692	-0.2294	-0.2010	-1.0299	-1.0204	-1.1088
	(0.1937)	(0.1932)	(0.2017)	(0.6519)	(0.7864)	(0.8078)	(0.8615)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	97	97
F	1.81	1.78	1.95	0.60	0.98	1.00	1.17
p-value	0.020	0.024	0.010	0.901	0.486	0.453	0.281

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.45: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Unweighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.3226**	0.2991**	0.3659**	0.4959	0.3649	0.5226	0.0012
	(0.1428)	(0.1443)	(0.1493)	(0.4899)	(0.6020)	(0.8756)	(0.8107)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.2796***	0.2781***	0.2706***	0.2807	0.1960	-0.7369	-0.8141
	(0.0862)	(0.0877)	(0.0939)	(0.2988)	(0.3699)	(0.5108)	(0.5289)
SD vote-share	-0.2115	-0.1721	-0.1509	-0.5214	0.8594	1.1294	1.8199**
	(0.1645)	(0.1650)	(0.1734)	(0.5665)	(0.6545)	(0.9505)	(0.8486)
ALDE vote-share	0.1439	0.1650	0.2193	-0.2210	-0.6796	-0.4341	-0.5787
	(0.2212)	(0.2245)	(0.2420)	(0.6068)	(0.7275)	(0.9320)	(0.9695)
EPP vote-share	-0.2232	-0.1735	-0.2686	-0.9839	0.0006	0.1268	0.2408
	(0.2022)	(0.2026)	(0.2102)	(0.6026)	(0.6728)	(0.9712)	(1.0548)
ECR vote-share	-0.0359	-0.0926	-0.0602	0.9633**	0.5775	1.3578*	1.6305**
	(0.1424)	(0.1390)	(0.1457)	(0.4715)	(0.5490)	(0.7853)	(0.8180)
EFDD vote-share	-0.0459	-0.0580	-0.0872	-0.2367	-0.5593	-0.9626	-0.9134
	(0.0894)	(0.0906)	(0.0953)	(0.3747)	(0.4444)	(0.5922)	(0.6376)
ENF vote-share	0.1084	0.1018	0.1369	-0.0295	-0.3954*	-0.3963*	-0.3827
	(0.0805)	(0.0818)	(0.0843)	(0.1919)	(0.2279)	(0.2398)	(0.2463)
NI vote-share	-0.2013	-0.2566	-0.2348	-0.2870	-1.3716	-2.3612	-2.5064
	(0.2229)	(0.2233)	(0.2333)	(0.9581)	(1.1563)	(1.5589)	(1.6926)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	88	88
F	2.27	2.25	2.18	0.70	0.89	1.01	1.27
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.866	0.631	0.452	0.171

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.46: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Population Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.481***	0.451***	0.470***	0.0849	-0.789	-0.921	0.0465
	(0.153)	(0.159)	(0.160)	(0.383)	(0.579)	(0.628)	(0.643)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.595***	0.568***	0.620***	0.138	-0.283	-0.446	-0.802
	(0.114)	(0.118)	(0.111)	(0.317)	(0.438)	(0.474)	(0.534)
SD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.209	0.412*	0.430**	-1.087	2.344***	2.760***	1.365
	(0.215)	(0.211)	(0.211)	(0.669)	(0.891)	(0.953)	(0.944)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0189	0.00983	-0.0198	-1.290**	-2.200**	-2.533**	-1.702
	(0.243)	(0.253)	(0.261)	(0.607)	(0.975)	(1.001)	(1.126)
EPP vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.796***	-0.510*	-0.429*	-2.801***	-0.661	-0.703	-0.885
	(0.294)	(0.287)	(0.256)	(0.818)	(1.067)	(1.093)	(1.000)
ECR vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.206	-0.0382	-0.0939	3.324***	2.069*	2.053*	2.623**
	(0.274)	(0.271)	(0.248)	(0.708)	(1.054)	(1.144)	(1.118)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0307	-0.155	-0.0863	-0.0720	-0.896	-0.128	-0.957
	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.148)	(0.592)	(0.761)	(0.734)	(0.733)
ENF vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.243**	0.173	0.165	0.304	-0.741**	-0.232	-0.487*
	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.108)	(0.314)	(0.339)	(0.267)	(0.280)
NI vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.089***	-1.237***	-1.224***	0.972	-1.148	-1.778	-1.705
	(0.250)	(0.254)	(0.257)	(0.803)	(1.198)	(1.233)	(1.428)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	106	106	106	106	106	102	102
F	11.07	10.07	12.63	4.43	2.16	1.46	1.73
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.023	0.158	0.080

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.47: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Population Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.969**	-4.227**	-3.967**	-1.652	-2.170	-2.162	2.224
	(1.638)	(1.662)	(1.952)	(1.472)	(1.904)	(1.943)	(2.010)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	4.556***	4.786***	4.496**	1.936	1.273	1.066	-2.185
	(1.682)	(1.700)	(1.979)	(1.560)	(1.865)	(1.934)	(1.908)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.177	-0.433	1.342	-3.986***	-3.813***	-3.822***	-4.553***
	(1.270)	(1.284)	(1.392)	(1.123)	(1.360)	(1.383)	(1.702)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.808	1.036	-0.723	4.346***	3.364**	3.136**	3.590**
	(1.303)	(1.314)	(1.411)	(1.190)	(1.332)	(1.376)	(1.617)
SD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	3.931*	5.101**	6.801***	3.856	8.349***	8.334***	1.738
	(2.292)	(2.220)	(2.507)	(2.426)	(2.681)	(2.678)	(2.860)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-3.929*	-4.974**	-6.645***	-5.085**	-5.666**	-4.926*	0.119
	(2.352)	(2.271)	(2.542)	(2.570)	(2.626)	(2.665)	(2.716)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	2.158	2.246	0.131	-2.976	-8.508***	-8.472***	-6.853*
	(2.622)	(2.671)	(3.177)	(2.276)	(2.950)	(2.880)	(3.660)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-2.300	-2.379	-0.245	1.972	6.020**	5.697**	4.449
	(2.691)	(2.733)	(3.222)	(2.411)	(2.890)	(2.866)	(3.476)
EPP vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-5.757*	-3.839	-0.709	-0.636	-0.217	-0.156	-1.273
	(3.232)	(3.072)	(3.201)	(2.626)	(2.312)	(2.322)	(2.953)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	4.991	3.278	0.164	-1.404	1.505	1.197	1.651
	(3.318)	(3.143)	(3.245)	(2.781)	(2.265)	(2.311)	(2.804)
ECR vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	7.772***	6.524**	6.282**	-0.516	-0.510	-0.501	-2.140
	(2.975)	(2.932)	(3.100)	(1.959)	(2.603)	(2.666)	(3.226)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-7.855**	-6.740**	-6.490**	2.214	1.977	2.136	4.084
	(3.054)	(2.999)	(3.143)	(2.075)	(2.550)	(2.653)	(3.063)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.280	-2.175	-0.234	1.040	5.503**	5.385***	4.340**
	(1.938)	(1.896)	(1.867)	(2.258)	(2.143)	(1.952)	(2.156)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.333	2.133	0.211	-1.515	-7.719***	-6.618***	-5.858***
	(1.989)	(1.939)	(1.893)	(2.392)	(2.099)	(1.942)	(2.047)
ENF vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.105	-1.534	-3.403***	1.846	-0.158	-0.231	0.373
	(1.292)	(1.290)	(1.314)	(1.202)	(1.102)	(0.831)	(0.921)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.407	1.790	3.667***	-1.488	-0.909	-0.0320	-0.600
	(1.326)	(1.319)	(1.332)	(1.273)	(1.080)	(0.827)	(0.875)
NI vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-5.645**	-6.606**	-8.541***	-1.050	-6.521*	-6.415*	-5.570
	(2.605)	(2.586)	(2.939)	(3.041)	(3.845)	(3.707)	(4.722)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	4.943*	5.802**	7.739***	2.874	5.178	4.095	3.264
	(2.673)	(2.646)	(2.980)	(3.221)	(3.767)	(3.689)	(4.484)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	97	97
F	5.53	5.43	6.61	2.37	3.11	2.57	2.06
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.007

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.48: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Population Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.920	-3.258	-3.649	-0.116	-1.805	-1.917	1.437
	(2.007)	(2.040)	(2.490)	(1.806)	(2.472)	(2.589)	(2.619)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.490	1.047	2.410	-2.232	-0.133	0.00550	-1.906
	(3.545)	(3.597)	(4.276)	(2.981)	(3.659)	(3.847)	(3.393)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	3.059	2.811	1.808	3.070*	0.764	0.472	-0.185
	(2.026)	(2.045)	(2.328)	(1.642)	(1.899)	(2.089)	(1.770)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.736	0.537	2.009	-2.019	-2.659	-2.751	-3.420
	(1.601)	(1.631)	(1.842)	(1.259)	(1.687)	(1.770)	(2.146)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-2.338	-2.009	-2.550	-1.511	0.198	0.322	1.176
	(2.828)	(2.876)	(3.164)	(2.079)	(2.498)	(2.629)	(2.780)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	2.235	2.088	1.163	4.309***	2.194*	2.107	1.505
	(1.616)	(1.635)	(1.723)	(1.145)	(1.297)	(1.428)	(1.451)
SD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	5.588**	6.858**	8.419***	4.076	8.996***	9.430***	3.354
	(2.825)	(2.782)	(3.245)	(2.889)	(3.381)	(3.439)	(3.324)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-6.914	-9.004*	-9.623*	-4.136	-6.189	-6.361	-2.372
	(4.991)	(4.904)	(5.574)	(4.769)	(5.005)	(5.109)	(4.306)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	1.349	2.280	1.376	-1.562	0.495	1.547	2.961
	(2.853)	(2.788)	(3.035)	(2.627)	(2.598)	(2.774)	(2.247)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	2.592	3.045	0.195	-2.513	-6.763*	-6.655*	-6.517
	(3.311)	(3.373)	(4.186)	(2.770)	(3.732)	(3.701)	(4.566)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-4.542	-5.287	-1.138	-0.213	1.314	1.239	0.331
	(5.850)	(5.946)	(7.189)	(4.573)	(5.525)	(5.498)	(5.915)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	1.787	2.119	0.819	1.525	2.950	2.571	3.062
	(3.344)	(3.380)	(3.914)	(2.519)	(2.868)	(2.986)	(3.086)
EPP vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-10.02**	-7.600**	-2.194	-1.947	-0.179	0.220	0.910
	(4.044)	(3.862)	(4.236)	(3.121)	(2.712)	(2.800)	(3.562)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	17.25**	13.26*	3.906	3.476	1.831	1.308	0.265
	(7.144)	(6.808)	(7.275)	(5.152)	(4.014)	(4.159)	(4.615)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-7.959*	-6.183	-2.226	-4.088	0.430	0.863	1.207
	(4.083)	(3.870)	(3.960)	(2.838)	(2.084)	(2.258)	(2.408)
ECR vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	10.24***	8.804**	8.111**	0.566	-0.0584	0.480	-0.707
	(3.768)	(3.750)	(4.112)	(2.366)	(3.245)	(3.376)	(3.834)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-15.02**	-12.65*	-10.67	-1.479	1.220	0.483	1.309
	(6.657)	(6.611)	(7.062)	(3.905)	(4.803)	(5.015)	(4.968)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	4.672	3.617	2.341	3.224	1.434	2.386	4.127
	(3.805)	(3.758)	(3.845)	(2.151)	(2.494)	(2.723)	(2.592)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.236	-2.346	0.747	0.365	7.266***	6.899***	5.142*
	(2.471)	(2.433)	(2.467)	(2.431)	(2.247)	(2.216)	(2.618)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.549	2.374	-2.503	-0.136	-9.505***	-8.631***	-6.798**
	(4.365)	(4.290)	(4.238)	(4.012)	(3.327)	(3.291)	(3.392)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.757	-0.0566	1.753	-0.714	-0.164	-0.0810	-0.978
	(2.495)	(2.439)	(2.307)	(2.210)	(1.727)	(1.787)	(1.770)
ENF vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.493	-2.060	-4.644***	1.350	-0.506	-0.693	-0.341
	(1.639)	(1.640)	(1.703)	(1.431)	(1.241)	(0.955)	(1.000)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.082	3.013	6.304**	-0.557	-0.209	0.408	0.537
	(2.896)	(2.891)	(2.926)	(2.362)	(1.837)	(1.419)	(1.295)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.288	-0.703	-1.398	-0.557	-1.028	-0.631	-0.950
	(1.655)	(1.643)	(1.593)	(1.301)	(0.954)	(0.771)	(0.676)
NI vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-6.357*	-7.775**	-10.96***	0.422	-9.968**	-10.53**	-11.87**
	(3.266)	(3.225)	(3.769)	(3.698)	(4.757)	(4.741)	(5.701)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	7.639	9.972*	14.59**	-1.479	10.26	10.99	12.28*
	(5.771)	(5.685)	(6.473)	(6.104)	(7.042)	(7.044)	(7.386)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-2.052	-3.091	-4.511	3.283	-3.606	-5.237	-7.607**
	(3.298)	(3.232)	(3.524)	(3.363)	(3.656)	(3.825)	(3.853)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	88	88
F	4.23	4.02	4.42	2.89	3.22	2.70	2.17
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.49: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Population Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.5864***	0.5589***	0.5288***	0.2847	-0.8967	-1.0960	0.0382
	(0.1673)	(0.1700)	(0.1703)	(0.5340)	(0.7447)	(0.8314)	(0.7723)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.6307***	0.6034***	0.6183***	0.3609	-0.4490	-0.6862	-0.9636
	(0.1297)	(0.1313)	(0.1215)	(0.4073)	(0.5319)	(0.5916)	(0.6542)
SD vote-share	0.0014	0.1264	0.1558	-1.2289	2.6834**	3.4084***	1.8570*
	(0.2341)	(0.2270)	(0.2187)	(0.8797)	(1.0486)	(1.1460)	(1.0991)
ALDE vote-share	-0.1418	-0.1325	-0.1142	-1.0038	-2.4887**	-2.7750**	-2.4039*
	(0.2678)	(0.2732)	(0.2773)	(0.8255)	(1.1541)	(1.2322)	(1.4065)
EPP vote-share	-0.7659**	-0.5610*	-0.5455*	-2.0407**	1.2876	1.0401	0.3772
	(0.3301)	(0.3142)	(0.2793)	(0.9522)	(0.9045)	(0.9935)	(1.1347)
ECR vote-share	-0.0828	-0.2161	-0.2081	1.6984**	1.4678	1.6358	1.9448
	(0.3039)	(0.2998)	(0.2705)	(0.7104)	(1.0183)	(1.1408)	(1.2397)
EFDD vote-share	0.0536	-0.0420	-0.0228	-0.4752	-2.2165***	-1.2333	-1.5177*
	(0.1980)	(0.1939)	(0.1629)	(0.8188)	(0.8382)	(0.8351)	(0.8284)
ENF vote-share	0.3018**	0.2560*	0.2641**	0.3578	-1.0672**	-0.2632	-0.2270
	(0.1320)	(0.1319)	(0.1147)	(0.4359)	(0.4313)	(0.3554)	(0.3539)
NI vote-share	-0.7015***	-0.8042***	-0.8023***	1.8242*	-1.3432	-2.3200	-2.3056
	(0.2660)	(0.2645)	(0.2565)	(1.1029)	(1.5043)	(1.5861)	(1.8145)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	97	97
F	5.53	5.43	6.61	2.37	3.11	2.57	2.06
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.007

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.50: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Population Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.6297***	0.5999***	0.5685***	0.7220	-1.1744	-1.4397	-0.6533
	(0.1732)	(0.1763)	(0.1773)	(0.6464)	(1.0684)	(1.2681)	(1.2836)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.6332***	0.6156***	0.6220***	0.7797*	-0.2669	-0.3217	-0.7392
	(0.1382)	(0.1409)	(0.1312)	(0.4508)	(0.7293)	(0.8668)	(1.0519)
SD vote-share	0.0228	0.1347	0.1722	-1.6217	3.3016**	4.6158***	3.9440**
	(0.2439)	(0.2403)	(0.2311)	(1.0340)	(1.4613)	(1.6843)	(1.6292)
ALDE vote-share	-0.1628	-0.1229	-0.1233	-1.2013	-2.4982	-2.8454	-3.1243
	(0.2859)	(0.2914)	(0.2981)	(0.9915)	(1.6132)	(1.8126)	(2.2379)
EPP vote-share	-0.7324**	-0.5190	-0.5137	-2.5579**	2.0820*	2.3907*	2.3812
	(0.3491)	(0.3336)	(0.3017)	(1.1171)	(1.1720)	(1.3710)	(1.7461)
ECR vote-share	-0.1019	-0.2287	-0.2199	2.3109***	2.5958*	3.3485**	4.7289**
	(0.3253)	(0.3240)	(0.2928)	(0.8467)	(1.4025)	(1.6533)	(1.8795)
EFDD vote-share	0.0701	-0.0277	-0.0029	-0.4848	-2.4033**	-1.8130*	-2.6335**
	(0.2133)	(0.2102)	(0.1757)	(0.8700)	(0.9713)	(1.0850)	(1.2834)
ENF vote-share	0.3001**	0.2502*	0.2621**	0.2362	-1.7437***	-0.9160*	-0.7537
	(0.1415)	(0.1416)	(0.1213)	(0.5122)	(0.5364)	(0.4678)	(0.4901)
NI vote-share	-0.7696***	-0.8946***	-0.8802***	2.2258*	-3.3096	-4.7725**	-7.1975**
	(0.2820)	(0.2786)	(0.2684)	(1.3236)	(2.0561)	(2.3219)	(2.7943)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	88	88
F	4.23	4.02	4.42	2.89	3.22	2.70	2.17
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.51: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.176	0.167	0.255*	0.0696	-0.0259	-0.0303	0.0531
	(0.125)	(0.129)	(0.134)	(0.258)	(0.323)	(0.350)	(0.331)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.289***	0.286***	0.291***	0.108	0.0379	-0.158	-0.264
	(0.0706)	(0.0729)	(0.0798)	(0.174)	(0.214)	(0.223)	(0.235)
SD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.131	-0.0776	-0.0785	0.154	1.121***	1.195***	1.035**
	(0.143)	(0.146)	(0.157)	(0.350)	(0.408)	(0.441)	(0.451)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0455	0.0604	0.102	-0.610*	-0.993**	-1.026***	-0.875**
	(0.173)	(0.179)	(0.195)	(0.330)	(0.403)	(0.383)	(0.408)
EPP vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.101	-0.0524	-0.194	-0.608	-0.0656	0.0529	0.291
	(0.164)	(0.167)	(0.175)	(0.375)	(0.453)	(0.456)	(0.451)
ECR vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0209	-0.0628	-0.0128	0.596*	0.177	0.277	0.286
	(0.112)	(0.109)	(0.117)	(0.320)	(0.369)	(0.397)	(0.394)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0581	-0.0585	-0.0475	-0.0734	-0.0939	-0.148	-0.230
	(0.0479)	(0.0494)	(0.0519)	(0.161)	(0.197)	(0.215)	(0.228)
ENF vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0841	0.0816	0.115*	0.0527	-0.112	-0.165	-0.273**
	(0.0646)	(0.0666)	(0.0690)	(0.0955)	(0.113)	(0.122)	(0.123)
NI vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.304*	-0.390**	-0.344*	-0.0389	-0.770	-0.668	-0.769
	(0.177)	(0.178)	(0.187)	(0.497)	(0.603)	(0.614)	(0.663)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	102	102	102	102	102	99	99
F	3.26	3.15	3.21	1.16	1.75	1.74	1.77
p-value	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.318	0.075	0.078	0.072

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.52: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.479	-0.473	0.460	-0.309	-0.388	-0.462	2.571
	(1.607)	(1.618)	(1.767)	(1.418)	(1.799)	(1.840)	(1.815)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.640	0.631	-0.219	0.363	0.336	0.404	-2.331
	(1.616)	(1.629)	(1.780)	(1.294)	(1.609)	(1.629)	(1.622)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.829	0.841	0.920	-0.345	-0.0606	-0.566	-0.668
	(0.912)	(0.917)	(1.052)	(0.951)	(1.191)	(1.169)	(1.332)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.546	-0.561	-0.636	0.403	0.0752	0.340	0.371
	(0.917)	(0.924)	(1.060)	(0.868)	(1.065)	(1.035)	(1.190)
SD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	2.147	2.046	1.283	0.183	3.569	3.650	1.593
	(1.802)	(1.803)	(2.041)	(1.863)	(2.211)	(2.261)	(2.480)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-2.300	-2.166	-1.405	-0.0149	-2.243	-2.251	-0.489
	(1.812)	(1.815)	(2.055)	(1.700)	(1.977)	(2.001)	(2.216)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.567	-1.583	-0.611	0.363	-2.706	-3.089	-2.859
	(2.163)	(2.177)	(2.500)	(1.737)	(2.170)	(1.985)	(2.296)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.660	1.680	0.739	-0.855	1.563	1.871	1.775
	(2.175)	(2.192)	(2.517)	(1.585)	(1.940)	(1.757)	(2.051)
EPP vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.380	-0.555	-0.480	-2.272	-0.277	0.101	0.852
	(2.081)	(2.066)	(2.274)	(1.787)	(2.092)	(2.134)	(2.437)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.246	0.477	0.262	1.654	0.330	0.152	-0.451
	(2.093)	(2.079)	(2.290)	(1.631)	(1.870)	(1.888)	(2.177)
ECR vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	1.248	1.473	1.263	1.528	1.173	1.386	0.559
	(1.436)	(1.374)	(1.550)	(1.482)	(1.771)	(1.811)	(2.105)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-1.251	-1.547	-1.284	-1.046	-1.039	-1.176	-0.347
	(1.444)	(1.383)	(1.561)	(1.352)	(1.583)	(1.603)	(1.881)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0672	-0.0713	0.466	-0.580	-0.105	-0.257	-0.908
	(0.617)	(0.621)	(0.680)	(0.860)	(1.060)	(1.090)	(1.252)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.0111	0.0165	-0.514	0.449	-0.0173	0.0605	0.622
	(0.620)	(0.625)	(0.685)	(0.785)	(0.947)	(0.965)	(1.119)
ENF vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.167	0.163	-1.104	0.481	0.0704	-0.0604	0.208
	(0.839)	(0.845)	(0.908)	(0.522)	(0.630)	(0.644)	(0.693)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.0876	-0.0813	1.235	-0.394	-0.165	-0.0971	-0.425
	(0.844)	(0.850)	(0.915)	(0.476)	(0.563)	(0.570)	(0.619)
NI vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-4.991**	-4.752**	-3.415	-1.813	-4.340	-4.475	-4.769
	(2.194)	(2.157)	(2.395)	(2.713)	(3.320)	(3.178)	(3.708)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	4.766**	4.451**	3.148	1.658	3.230	3.436	3.652
	(2.207)	(2.171)	(2.412)	(2.476)	(2.968)	(2.812)	(3.314)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	96	96	96	96	96	94	94
F	1.79	1.76	1.71	0.64	0.98	1.03	1.16
p-value	0.023	0.026	0.033	0.872	0.487	0.418	0.289

$* \ p < .10$, $** \ p < .05$, $*** \ p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.53: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-7.925***	-8.219***	-7.592***	-2.357	-2.226	-2.309	1.568
	(2.205)	(2.214)	(2.628)	(2.229)	(2.657)	(2.701)	(2.657)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	8.722***	9.103***	8.654***	2.982	2.725	2.841	-0.754
	(2.542)	(2.556)	(2.997)	(2.525)	(2.956)	(2.999)	(2.910)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.554	-0.671	-0.770	-0.195	-0.188	-0.152	-0.993
	(0.781)	(0.785)	(0.859)	(0.596)	(0.707)	(0.915)	(0.879)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	2.907**	2.927**	3.452**	-0.948	-0.318	-0.873	-0.278
	(1.388)	(1.405)	(1.713)	(1.452)	(1.741)	(1.672)	(1.847)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-3.365**	-3.391**	-3.792*	0.671	0.177	0.706	0.159
	(1.600)	(1.622)	(1.953)	(1.645)	(1.937)	(1.856)	(2.023)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.757	0.765	0.624	0.590	0.334	-0.599	-0.768
	(0.492)	(0.498)	(0.560)	(0.388)	(0.463)	(0.566)	(0.611)
SD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	8.840***	9.254***	10.11***	5.539**	8.062***	8.069***	5.347*
	(2.543)	(2.542)	(3.046)	(2.549)	(2.834)	(2.873)	(2.758)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-9.192***	-9.729***	-10.95***	-5.990**	-8.058**	-8.024**	-5.883*
	(2.931)	(2.935)	(3.473)	(2.888)	(3.152)	(3.189)	(3.021)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.125	0.290	0.667	-0.0793	0.894	1.103	2.358**
	(0.900)	(0.902)	(0.995)	(0.682)	(0.754)	(0.973)	(0.912)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.752	-3.574	-3.219	-3.225	-5.671*	-5.969**	-6.910**
	(3.322)	(3.358)	(4.101)	(2.557)	(3.056)	(2.732)	(3.029)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	3.080	2.849	2.274	3.429	5.352	5.762*	7.061**
	(3.829)	(3.877)	(4.676)	(2.896)	(3.399)	(3.033)	(3.318)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.847	0.918	1.199	-0.258	-0.268	-0.167	-0.552
	(1.176)	(1.191)	(1.340)	(0.684)	(0.813)	(0.926)	(1.002)
EPP vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.342	-1.904	-1.481	-0.197	0.923	0.947	1.279
	(3.187)	(3.197)	(3.736)	(2.529)	(2.808)	(2.876)	(3.334)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	3.646	3.078	2.532	-0.137	-0.978	-0.975	-1.308
	(3.673)	(3.692)	(4.260)	(2.865)	(3.124)	(3.193)	(3.651)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-1.477	-1.303	-1.325	-0.605	-0.162	-0.00181	0.144
	(1.128)	(1.134)	(1.221)	(0.677)	(0.747)	(0.974)	(1.102)
ECR vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	2.789	2.114	1.857	-0.346	-0.828	-0.252	-2.332
	(2.235)	(2.163)	(2.592)	(2.197)	(2.457)	(2.440)	(2.717)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-3.126	-2.250	-1.646	0.778	1.530	0.952	3.066
	(2.576)	(2.497)	(2.956)	(2.489)	(2.733)	(2.709)	(2.975)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.320	0.0507	-0.268	0.435	-0.187	0.641	0.901
	(0.791)	(0.767)	(0.847)	(0.588)	(0.654)	(0.827)	(0.898)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.429	0.460	1.926*	-0.429	0.924	0.696	-0.240
	(0.938)	(0.949)	(1.078)	(1.335)	(1.536)	(1.559)	(1.768)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.557	-0.598	-2.210*	0.352	-1.226	-1.011	-0.158
	(1.081)	(1.095)	(1.229)	(1.512)	(1.708)	(1.730)	(1.936)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.0800	0.0926	0.247	-0.0918	0.145	-0.250	-0.0989
	(0.332)	(0.336)	(0.352)	(0.357)	(0.409)	(0.528)	(0.585)
ENF vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	1.058	1.075	-1.514	0.542	0.255	0.105	0.595
	(1.283)	(1.299)	(1.470)	(0.648)	(0.780)	(0.783)	(0.854)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-1.385	-1.407	1.165	-0.604	-0.401	-0.260	-0.798
	(1.479)	(1.500)	(1.676)	(0.734)	(0.867)	(0.869)	(0.935)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.420	0.426	0.521	0.0212	-0.0316	-0.290	-0.246
	(0.454)	(0.461)	(0.480)	(0.173)	(0.207)	(0.265)	(0.282)
NI vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-7.925**	-8.544**	-8.205**	-2.155	-5.385	-6.400	-4.716
	(3.367)	(3.353)	(3.968)	(4.275)	(4.944)	(4.648)	(5.387)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	7.721**	8.524**	8.703*	1.743	5.310	6.438	4.581
	(3.881)	(3.872)	(4.524)	(4.843)	(5.499)	(5.160)	(5.900)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.00657	-0.254	-0.764	0.171	-1.402	-2.341	-2.431
	(1.192)	(1.189)	(1.297)	(1.144)	(1.315)	(1.575)	(1.781)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	88	88	88	88	88	86	86
F	2.47	2.47	2.25	0.78	0.77	0.97	1.29
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.782	0.796	0.516	0.155

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test
of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.54: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.1603	0.1582	0.2409*	0.0544	-0.0523	-0.0579	0.2398
	(0.1308)	(0.1342)	(0.1400)	(0.2941)	(0.3816)	(0.4143)	(0.3754)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.2834***	0.2798***	0.2837***	0.0578	0.0146	-0.2266	-0.2968
	(0.0742)	(0.0761)	(0.0833)	(0.1973)	(0.2526)	(0.2632)	(0.2755)
SD vote-share	-0.1526	-0.1204	-0.1221	0.1683	1.3255***	1.3996***	1.1041**
	(0.1467)	(0.1496)	(0.1617)	(0.3864)	(0.4688)	(0.5090)	(0.5128)
ALDE vote-share	0.0926	0.0976	0.1274	-0.4919	-1.1426**	-1.2178***	-1.0838**
	(0.1760)	(0.1806)	(0.1980)	(0.3603)	(0.4602)	(0.4469)	(0.4747)
EPP vote-share	-0.1340	-0.0782	-0.2188	-0.6173*	0.0523	0.2528	0.4011
	(0.1694)	(0.1714)	(0.1801)	(0.3707)	(0.4436)	(0.4804)	(0.5039)
ECR vote-share	-0.0024	-0.0739	-0.0204	0.4818	0.1343	0.2103	0.2123
	(0.1168)	(0.1140)	(0.1228)	(0.3073)	(0.3755)	(0.4078)	(0.4353)
EFDD vote-share	-0.0561	-0.0548	-0.0477	-0.1313	-0.1222	-0.1960	-0.2864
	(0.0502)	(0.0515)	(0.0539)	(0.1784)	(0.2247)	(0.2454)	(0.2589)
ENF vote-share	0.0799	0.0814	0.1315*	0.0867	-0.0947	-0.1574	-0.2168
	(0.0683)	(0.0701)	(0.0720)	(0.1082)	(0.1336)	(0.1450)	(0.1433)
NI vote-share	-0.2254	-0.3015*	-0.2672	-0.1551	-1.1104	-1.0387	-1.1168
	(0.1786)	(0.1789)	(0.1897)	(0.5626)	(0.7040)	(0.7154)	(0.7668)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	96	96	96	96	96	94	94
F	1.79	1.76	1.71	0.64	0.98	1.03	1.16
p-value	0.023	0.026	0.033	0.872	0.487	0.418	0.289

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.55: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.2432*	0.2131	0.2915*	0.4303	0.3112	0.3801	-0.1789
	(0.1370)	(0.1389)	(0.1488)	(0.4292)	(0.5783)	(0.8299)	(0.7685)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.2994***	0.3014***	0.2842***	0.3133	0.1925	-0.7667	-0.8871*
	(0.0862)	(0.0882)	(0.0970)	(0.2796)	(0.3789)	(0.5136)	(0.5342)
SD vote-share	-0.2278	-0.1855	-0.1745	-0.5301	0.8972	1.1477	1.8216**
	(0.1580)	(0.1596)	(0.1724)	(0.4910)	(0.6168)	(0.8826)	(0.7977)
ALDE vote-share	0.1746	0.1928	0.2539	-0.0547	-0.5868	-0.3743	-0.4001
	(0.2063)	(0.2108)	(0.2321)	(0.4925)	(0.6650)	(0.8395)	(0.8760)
EPP vote-share	-0.1735	-0.1288	-0.2742	-0.9394*	-0.2170	-0.0301	0.1146
	(0.1980)	(0.2007)	(0.2115)	(0.4871)	(0.6112)	(0.8836)	(0.9642)
ECR vote-share	-0.0164	-0.0853	-0.0573	0.8668**	0.5149	1.3411*	1.6352**
	(0.1388)	(0.1358)	(0.1467)	(0.4232)	(0.5347)	(0.7497)	(0.7857)
EFDD vote-share	-0.0481	-0.0449	-0.0367	-0.1685	-0.1570	-0.5653	-0.4971
	(0.0582)	(0.0595)	(0.0610)	(0.2572)	(0.3342)	(0.4789)	(0.5113)
ENF vote-share	0.0927	0.0944	0.1718**	-0.0411	-0.1781	-0.4445*	-0.4488*
	(0.0797)	(0.0815)	(0.0832)	(0.1248)	(0.1696)	(0.2405)	(0.2470)
NI vote-share	-0.2107	-0.2739	-0.2668	-0.2413	-1.4765	-2.3027	-2.5663*
	(0.2091)	(0.2105)	(0.2246)	(0.8235)	(1.0760)	(1.4281)	(1.5579)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	88	88	88	88	88	86	86
F	2.47	2.47	2.25	0.78	0.77	0.97	1.29
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.782	0.796	0.516	0.155

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.56: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.400**	0.365**	0.414**	0.0721	-0.775	-0.784	-0.0802
	(0.164)	(0.171)	(0.172)	(0.368)	(0.596)	(0.622)	(0.632)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.584***	0.543***	0.605***	0.105	-0.404	-0.487	-0.971*
	(0.119)	(0.124)	(0.119)	(0.322)	(0.457)	(0.475)	(0.546)
SD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.235	0.457**	0.441**	-1.127*	2.580***	2.711***	1.225
	(0.217)	(0.214)	(0.217)	(0.614)	(0.907)	(0.938)	(0.924)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0372	0.0685	0.0470	-1.022*	-2.255**	-2.294**	-1.232
	(0.237)	(0.249)	(0.262)	(0.544)	(0.941)	(0.932)	(1.056)
EPP vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.764**	-0.496	-0.492*	-2.511***	-0.701	-0.405	-0.421
	(0.310)	(0.312)	(0.275)	(0.693)	(1.060)	(1.055)	(0.977)
ECR vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.194	-0.110	-0.109	2.954***	1.872*	1.863	2.466**
	(0.293)	(0.289)	(0.274)	(0.663)	(1.106)	(1.149)	(1.109)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0126	-0.0208	0.0109	0.0117	0.314	0.301	-0.185
	(0.0732)	(0.0769)	(0.0766)	(0.227)	(0.404)	(0.423)	(0.471)
ENF vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.235**	0.223*	0.212*	0.180	-0.299	-0.328	-0.719**
	(0.109)	(0.114)	(0.110)	(0.169)	(0.259)	(0.269)	(0.283)
NI vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.992***	-1.257***	-1.197***	0.998	-2.161*	-2.077*	-2.402*
	(0.250)	(0.247)	(0.252)	(0.708)	(1.119)	(1.141)	(1.343)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	102	102	102	102	102	99	99
F	9.26	8.81	11.22	3.96	1.66	1.62	1.92
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.095	0.107	0.048

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.57: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-4.309***	-4.480***	-4.214**	-1.645	-2.434	-2.425	2.752
	(1.647)	(1.664)	(2.126)	(1.428)	(2.097)	(2.133)	(2.038)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	4.823***	4.961***	4.684**	1.877	1.510	1.512	-3.097
	(1.694)	(1.705)	(2.158)	(1.506)	(2.072)	(2.113)	(1.944)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.547	-1.764	0.0255	-3.947***	-2.978*	-2.993*	-3.675*
	(1.238)	(1.242)	(1.519)	(1.154)	(1.574)	(1.590)	(1.881)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.199*	2.376*	0.594	4.236***	2.352	2.241	2.466
	(1.273)	(1.273)	(1.542)	(1.217)	(1.556)	(1.575)	(1.794)
SD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	4.860**	5.547***	6.538**	4.542**	10.11***	10.15***	3.515
	(2.134)	(2.087)	(2.663)	(2.186)	(2.798)	(2.807)	(2.941)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-4.809**	-5.367**	-6.334**	-5.799**	-7.020**	-6.864**	-1.414
	(2.194)	(2.140)	(2.702)	(2.305)	(2.764)	(2.781)	(2.806)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0599	0.110	-1.921	-2.594	-7.541**	-7.472**	-5.914
	(2.412)	(2.445)	(3.233)	(2.045)	(3.055)	(2.998)	(3.671)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.0377	-0.0787	1.965	1.913	4.768	4.885	4.096
	(2.480)	(2.506)	(3.281)	(2.157)	(3.018)	(2.970)	(3.503)
EPP vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-4.667	-3.532	-1.503	0.616	3.036	3.068	2.255
	(3.233)	(3.140)	(3.496)	(2.097)	(2.382)	(2.401)	(3.010)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	3.937	3.015	0.909	-2.499	-2.035	-1.887	-1.622
	(3.324)	(3.219)	(3.548)	(2.211)	(2.354)	(2.378)	(2.872)
ECR vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	5.911*	4.877*	5.796*	-0.778	-0.679	-0.684	-2.405
	(3.028)	(2.948)	(3.507)	(1.788)	(2.801)	(2.848)	(3.366)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-5.981*	-5.141*	-6.015*	2.358	1.981	2.031	4.611
	(3.113)	(3.022)	(3.560)	(1.885)	(2.768)	(2.821)	(3.211)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.712	0.682	2.702***	-0.564	1.560	1.553	0.519
	(0.753)	(0.763)	(0.905)	(0.813)	(1.215)	(1.235)	(1.485)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.697	-0.673	-2.684***	0.418	-1.786	-1.829	-1.068
	(0.774)	(0.782)	(0.918)	(0.857)	(1.201)	(1.223)	(1.417)
ENF vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.498	-1.460	-4.484***	0.578	-0.134	-0.143	0.462
	(1.137)	(1.152)	(1.322)	(0.656)	(0.915)	(0.927)	(0.991)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.800	1.769	4.816***	-0.308	-0.234	-0.281	-1.039
	(1.169)	(1.181)	(1.341)	(0.692)	(0.904)	(0.918)	(0.946)
NI vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-4.793*	-5.884**	-6.915**	-0.157	-6.432*	-6.360*	-5.265
	(2.490)	(2.359)	(3.019)	(2.726)	(3.836)	(3.815)	(4.625)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	4.099	4.985**	6.053**	1.696	3.491	3.626	1.875
	(2.561)	(2.418)	(3.063)	(2.874)	(3.790)	(3.780)	(4.412)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	96	96	96	96	96	94	94
F	4.98	4.88	6.57	2.19	2.02	1.96	1.47
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.008	0.010	0.095

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.58: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.329*	-3.700*	-4.226*	-0.234	-2.420	-2.517	2.484
	(1.954)	(1.998)	(2.549)	(1.751)	(2.639)	(2.721)	(2.598)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.974	1.647	3.141	-2.050	1.073	1.292	-2.583
	(3.387)	(3.469)	(4.108)	(2.920)	(3.749)	(3.892)	(3.311)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	2.936	2.597	1.602	2.948*	0.148	-0.0327	-0.853
	(1.940)	(1.977)	(2.225)	(1.610)	(1.842)	(2.039)	(1.676)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.327	-0.620	0.805	-2.007	-1.986	-2.086	-2.264
	(1.518)	(1.551)	(1.896)	(1.298)	(1.917)	(1.974)	(2.320)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-1.630	-1.098	-1.597	-1.709	-0.302	-0.157	0.195
	(2.630)	(2.694)	(3.055)	(2.165)	(2.723)	(2.824)	(2.956)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	2.619*	2.351	1.418	4.423***	2.083	1.872	1.181
	(1.506)	(1.535)	(1.655)	(1.194)	(1.338)	(1.479)	(1.497)
SD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	5.555**	6.782***	8.274**	4.459*	11.27***	11.57***	4.219
	(2.586)	(2.573)	(3.232)	(2.591)	(3.389)	(3.429)	(3.304)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-5.887	-8.109*	-9.564*	-3.969	-9.239*	-9.585*	-3.670
	(4.482)	(4.468)	(5.208)	(4.320)	(4.814)	(4.905)	(4.210)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.432	1.552	1.536	-2.188	1.255	1.913	2.763
	(2.567)	(2.546)	(2.821)	(2.383)	(2.366)	(2.570)	(2.131)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	0.649	0.897	-1.853	-2.394	-6.220*	-6.191*	-6.217
	(2.984)	(3.063)	(4.015)	(2.455)	(3.703)	(3.676)	(4.362)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-2.059	-2.508	1.008	0.372	1.913	2.182	1.736
	(5.172)	(5.319)	(6.470)	(4.093)	(5.260)	(5.258)	(5.557)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	1.410	1.636	0.877	1.194	1.269	1.430	2.335
	(2.962)	(3.030)	(3.504)	(2.258)	(2.585)	(2.754)	(2.814)
EPP vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-8.984**	-7.093*	-2.829	-0.913	2.943	3.175	3.661
	(3.924)	(3.900)	(4.359)	(2.376)	(2.716)	(2.763)	(3.445)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	16.40**	12.97*	4.477	3.059	-1.894	-2.183	-2.849
	(6.802)	(6.773)	(7.024)	(3.963)	(3.858)	(3.952)	(4.390)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-8.151**	-6.425*	-2.229	-4.531**	0.330	0.833	0.986
	(3.895)	(3.859)	(3.804)	(2.185)	(1.896)	(2.070)	(2.223)
ECR vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	8.483**	6.703*	7.265*	-0.130	-1.342	-0.859	-3.671
	(3.739)	(3.719)	(4.390)	(2.158)	(3.353)	(3.428)	(3.721)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-13.08**	-9.858	-9.058	-0.173	3.077	2.180	4.900
	(6.480)	(6.459)	(7.074)	(3.598)	(4.763)	(4.903)	(4.741)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	4.523	2.899	1.567	2.443	1.048	2.002	3.855
	(3.711)	(3.680)	(3.831)	(1.984)	(2.341)	(2.569)	(2.401)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	1.111	1.085	3.554***	-0.458	2.390	2.297	0.959
	(0.922)	(0.947)	(1.092)	(1.020)	(1.479)	(1.522)	(1.811)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-1.825	-1.777	-4.604***	0.133	-3.519*	-3.378	-2.259
	(1.597)	(1.644)	(1.761)	(1.701)	(2.101)	(2.177)	(2.308)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.744	0.720	1.086	0.0973	0.660	0.467	0.213
	(0.915)	(0.937)	(0.954)	(0.938)	(1.032)	(1.141)	(1.169)
ENF vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.439	-1.421	-5.361***	0.488	-0.00954	-0.177	0.459
	(1.407)	(1.446)	(1.623)	(0.731)	(1.024)	(1.038)	(1.033)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.600	1.566	6.604**	-0.453	-0.316	-0.0500	-0.320
	(2.439)	(2.510)	(2.616)	(1.219)	(1.455)	(1.484)	(1.317)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.136	0.153	-0.927	0.0726	-0.532	-0.876	-1.289*
	(1.397)	(1.430)	(1.417)	(0.672)	(0.715)	(0.778)	(0.667)
NI vote-share							
Current Foreign Born Share	-5.636*	-7.610**	-9.719***	1.316	-8.092*	-8.629*	-7.254
	(3.063)	(2.961)	(3.732)	(3.385)	(4.773)	(4.788)	(5.527)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	5.959	9.534*	12.91**	-3.042	7.475	8.761	7.258
	(5.309)	(5.142)	(6.014)	(5.644)	(6.780)	(6.848)	(7.042)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-1.087	-2.888	-4.124	3.764	-3.868	-4.837	-7.404**
	(3.040)	(2.930)	(3.257)	(3.113)	(3.332)	(3.588)	(3.565)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	88	88	88	88	88	86	86
F	4.05	3.81	4.53	2.66	1.71	1.70	1.76
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.016	0.017	0.012

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.59: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.5134***	0.4814***	0.4704***	0.2318	-0.9243	-0.9139	-0.3450
	(0.1769)	(0.1815)	(0.1810)	(0.5057)	(0.7719)	(0.8043)	(0.7230)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.6524***	0.6116***	0.6198***	0.2886	-0.6260	-0.7520	-1.2090*
	(0.1330)	(0.1355)	(0.1294)	(0.4087)	(0.5796)	(0.5998)	(0.6671)
SD vote-share	0.0514	0.1801	0.2045	-1.2568	3.0886***	3.2903***	2.1005**
	(0.2291)	(0.2278)	(0.2267)	(0.7741)	(1.0298)	(1.0587)	(1.0433)
ALDE vote-share	0.0222	0.0316	0.0447	-0.6805	-2.7733**	-2.5865**	-1.8184
	(0.2590)	(0.2667)	(0.2752)	(0.7243)	(1.1245)	(1.1307)	(1.3023)
EPP vote-share	-0.7297**	-0.5167	-0.5939**	-1.8832**	1.0002	1.1816	0.6328
	(0.3471)	(0.3426)	(0.2977)	(0.7425)	(0.8769)	(0.9054)	(1.0677)
ECR vote-share	-0.0701	-0.2641	-0.2182	1.5803**	1.3026	1.3475	2.2061*
	(0.3250)	(0.3216)	(0.2986)	(0.6330)	(1.0312)	(1.0740)	(1.1939)
EFDD vote-share	0.0147	0.0091	0.0181	-0.1456	-0.2258	-0.2765	-0.5486
	(0.0809)	(0.0832)	(0.0770)	(0.2879)	(0.4473)	(0.4658)	(0.5269)
ENF vote-share	0.3018**	0.3090**	0.3317***	0.2701	-0.3681	-0.4235	-0.5763
	(0.1221)	(0.1257)	(0.1125)	(0.2322)	(0.3367)	(0.3495)	(0.3516)
NI vote-share	-0.6949***	-0.8994***	-0.8617***	1.5398	-2.9410**	-2.7347*	-3.3900**
	(0.2674)	(0.2574)	(0.2570)	(0.9651)	(1.4119)	(1.4390)	(1.6405)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	96	96	96	96	96	94	94
F	4.98	4.88	6.57	2.19	2.02	1.96	1.47
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.008	0.010	0.095

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.60: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.5809***	0.5433***	0.5166***	0.6639	-1.1990	-1.2578	-0.9523
	(0.1828)	(0.1875)	(0.1886)	(0.6174)	(1.1372)	(1.2625)	(1.2278)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.6623***	0.6325***	0.6262***	0.7069	-0.2047	-0.3706	-0.8886
	(0.1419)	(0.1456)	(0.1403)	(0.4578)	(0.8260)	(0.9161)	(1.0964)
SD vote-share	0.1002	0.2245	0.2458	-1.6970*	3.2828**	3.8935**	3.3111**
	(0.2418)	(0.2415)	(0.2391)	(0.9135)	(1.4604)	(1.5912)	(1.5613)
ALDE vote-share	0.0001	0.0253	0.0333	-0.8288	-3.0374*	-2.5788	-2.1468
	(0.2791)	(0.2875)	(0.2970)	(0.8656)	(1.5957)	(1.7057)	(2.0611)
EPP vote-share	-0.7386**	-0.5469	-0.5804*	-2.3850***	1.3779	1.8243	1.7977
	(0.3670)	(0.3661)	(0.3225)	(0.8379)	(1.1703)	(1.2821)	(1.6281)
ECR vote-share	-0.0748	-0.2551	-0.2261	2.1407***	2.7827*	3.3236**	5.0850***
	(0.3497)	(0.3491)	(0.3248)	(0.7608)	(1.4450)	(1.5906)	(1.7585)
EFDD vote-share	0.0308	0.0281	0.0371	-0.2283	-0.4683	-0.6136	-1.0870
	(0.0862)	(0.0889)	(0.0808)	(0.3597)	(0.6372)	(0.7064)	(0.8560)
ENF vote-share	0.2962**	0.2981**	0.3157***	0.1072	-0.8569*	-1.1031**	-1.1491**
	(0.1316)	(0.1357)	(0.1201)	(0.2577)	(0.4414)	(0.4815)	(0.4883)
NI vote-share	-0.7642***	-0.9642***	-0.9293***	2.0376*	-4.4846**	-4.7055**	-7.3995***
	(0.2865)	(0.2779)	(0.2761)	(1.1935)	(2.0568)	(2.2217)	(2.6116)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	88	88	88	88	88	86	86
F	4.05	3.81	4.53	2.66	1.71	1.70	1.76
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.016	0.017	0.012

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.61: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Unweighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.876***	0.868***	0.887***	0.182	0.228	0.223	0.644
	(0.208)	(0.209)	(0.213)	(0.369)	(0.406)	(0.419)	(0.395)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.149	0.142	0.170	0.0571	0.169	0.0825	0.0531
	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.141)	(0.233)	(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.272)
SD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.306	-0.277	-0.165	-0.582	-0.399	-0.451	-0.930*
	(0.255)	(0.251)	(0.266)	(0.493)	(0.534)	(0.551)	(0.549)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.664**	0.671**	0.692**	0.512	0.200	0.211	0.340
	(0.315)	(0.316)	(0.338)	(0.503)	(0.554)	(0.504)	(0.531)
EPP vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.560*	-0.532*	-0.580**	-0.695	-0.501	-0.415	-0.162
	(0.287)	(0.285)	(0.293)	(0.567)	(0.589)	(0.562)	(0.567)
ECR vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.0456	-0.0822	-0.0968	0.732	0.873*	0.904**	0.698
	(0.200)	(0.191)	(0.199)	(0.454)	(0.448)	(0.458)	(0.466)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.0598	-0.0662	-0.0973	-0.0988	-0.161	-0.178	-0.207
	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.133)	(0.316)	(0.349)	(0.321)	(0.342)
ENF vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.195*	0.189*	0.203*	0.0231	-0.0344	-0.0253	-0.0360
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.117)	(0.166)	(0.180)	(0.141)	(0.147)
NI vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.345	-0.376	-0.306	-0.716	-0.663	-0.628	-0.563
	(0.331)	(0.328)	(0.339)	(0.726)	(0.801)	(0.773)	(0.846)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	106	106	106	106	106	102	102
F	4.65	4.56	5.04	0.87	0.83	0.79	1.23
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.550	0.587	0.625	0.274

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.62: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Unweighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-3.516*	-3.718*	-2.227	-0.755	0.283	0.342	4.251*
	(1.995)	(2.015)	(2.208)	(2.042)	(2.412)	(2.479)	(2.324)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	4.186**	4.377**	2.970	0.889	-0.0105	-0.0647	-3.188
	(1.900)	(1.919)	(2.102)	(1.818)	(2.129)	(2.180)	(2.008)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	4.073***	3.996***	4.703***	-0.0736	0.284	-0.217	-0.545
	(1.215)	(1.230)	(1.382)	(1.291)	(1.511)	(1.504)	(1.662)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-3.769***	-3.696***	-4.342***	0.0987	-0.114	0.249	0.521
	(1.158)	(1.171)	(1.316)	(1.149)	(1.334)	(1.323)	(1.436)
SD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	6.444***	7.066***	8.227***	4.511*	8.233***	8.157***	6.504**
	(2.338)	(2.315)	(2.569)	(2.569)	(2.882)	(2.956)	(3.056)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-6.526***	-7.115***	-8.127***	-4.739***	-7.923***	-7.882***	-6.578**
	(2.226)	(2.204)	(2.447)	(2.287)	(2.545)	(2.599)	(2.641)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.523	1.563	1.304	-1.313	-4.191	-3.719	-3.848
	(2.982)	(3.021)	(3.422)	(2.660)	(3.133)	(2.904)	(3.174)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.740	-0.778	-0.527	1.767	3.977	3.592	3.717
	(2.840)	(2.877)	(3.258)	(2.368)	(2.766)	(2.554)	(2.742)
EPP vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-3.651	-2.949	-2.611	-1.019	0.288	0.622	1.969
	(2.742)	(2.721)	(2.993)	(2.764)	(2.931)	(2.978)	(3.283)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	2.870	2.205	1.872	0.425	-0.550	-0.800	-1.877
	(2.612)	(2.591)	(2.850)	(2.461)	(2.588)	(2.619)	(2.837)
ECR vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.374	0.675	0.937	1.923	2.738	2.909	2.127
	(1.954)	(1.898)	(2.087)	(2.103)	(2.294)	(2.355)	(2.642)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.378	-0.715	-0.981	-1.255	-1.816	-1.930	-1.282
	(1.861)	(1.807)	(1.987)	(1.872)	(2.025)	(2.071)	(2.283)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.525	0.397	0.663	-0.304	0.647	0.587	0.360
	(1.230)	(1.243)	(1.389)	(1.729)	(2.033)	(1.844)	(2.060)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.547	-0.427	-0.713	0.169	-0.744	-0.702	-0.511
	(1.172)	(1.183)	(1.323)	(1.539)	(1.795)	(1.622)	(1.780)
ENF vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	2.331**	2.257**	1.376	0.711	-0.519	-0.476	-0.504
	(1.092)	(1.105)	(1.225)	(0.917)	(1.068)	(0.829)	(0.888)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-2.043**	-1.973*	-1.110	-0.619	0.441	0.410	0.443
	(1.040)	(1.052)	(1.167)	(0.816)	(0.943)	(0.729)	(0.767)
NI vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-8.086***	-8.960***	-8.261**	-9.259**	-11.07**	-10.65**	-11.98**
	(3.072)	(3.032)	(3.334)	(3.877)	(4.555)	(4.354)	(4.884)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	7.542**	8.370***	7.745**	7.721**	9.357**	9.002**	9.961**
	(2.925)	(2.887)	(3.175)	(3.451)	(4.021)	(3.829)	(4.220)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	97	97
F	3.94	3.98	4.13	1.01	1.29	1.21	1.54
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.444	0.185	0.248	0.074

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.63: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Unweighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-2.707	-2.793	-1.320	-1.532	-0.427	-0.389	5.090*
	(2.456)	(2.457)	(2.765)	(2.361)	(2.795)	(2.843)	(2.844)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.169	0.201	-1.139	1.513	-0.0607	-0.0843	-5.655*
	(2.819)	(2.818)	(3.057)	(2.642)	(2.986)	(3.043)	(3.020)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	3.195***	3.229***	3.176***	0.936	1.340	1.636	1.900
	(1.055)	(1.055)	(1.100)	(1.194)	(1.260)	(1.429)	(1.253)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	4.534***	4.503***	5.658***	-0.541	-0.437	-0.485	0.416
	(1.572)	(1.579)	(1.814)	(1.443)	(1.666)	(1.678)	(1.939)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-3.732**	-3.721**	-4.686**	-0.818	-1.103	-0.896	-1.898
	(1.804)	(1.811)	(2.005)	(1.614)	(1.779)	(1.796)	(2.059)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.570	-0.558	-0.689	1.337*	1.675**	1.112	1.213
	(0.675)	(0.678)	(0.721)	(0.729)	(0.751)	(0.843)	(0.854)
SD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	8.124***	8.272***	9.492***	5.972**	8.568***	8.603***	6.129*
	(2.974)	(2.955)	(3.360)	(2.731)	(3.074)	(3.107)	(3.250)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-8.526**	-8.580**	-9.763***	-5.888*	-6.863**	-6.565**	-4.138
	(3.412)	(3.389)	(3.714)	(3.055)	(3.283)	(3.326)	(3.451)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.377	0.319	0.468	-0.349	-0.753	-1.269	-1.430
	(1.278)	(1.269)	(1.336)	(1.381)	(1.386)	(1.562)	(1.432)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.601	-0.498	-0.0286	0.0889	-1.846	-1.573	-2.006
	(3.853)	(3.863)	(4.530)	(2.956)	(3.510)	(3.195)	(3.761)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	2.931	2.893	2.924	-0.806	0.809	1.275	1.893
	(4.421)	(4.431)	(5.007)	(3.307)	(3.749)	(3.420)	(3.993)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-1.473	-1.513	-2.066	-0.0275	-0.679	-1.294	-1.345
	(1.655)	(1.660)	(1.801)	(1.494)	(1.582)	(1.606)	(1.657)
EPP vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-2.898	-2.690	-2.002	0.625	0.00615	0.262	0.190
	(3.570)	(3.531)	(3.985)	(2.944)	(3.159)	(3.195)	(3.881)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	2.311	2.234	1.800	-1.686	-0.193	-0.228	-0.130
	(4.097)	(4.050)	(4.405)	(3.293)	(3.374)	(3.420)	(4.121)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.111	-0.193	-0.443	-0.199	0.103	0.0988	0.213
	(1.534)	(1.517)	(1.585)	(1.488)	(1.424)	(1.606)	(1.710)
ECR vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	2.694	2.464	3.128	0.540	2.372	2.391	0.536
	(2.540)	(2.448)	(2.763)	(2.282)	(2.509)	(2.511)	(2.979)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-2.955	-2.870	-3.751	0.692	-1.138	-1.536	0.383
	(2.915)	(2.807)	(3.054)	(2.553)	(2.681)	(2.687)	(3.164)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.158	0.248	0.464	0.379	0.340	1.233	1.393
	(1.091)	(1.052)	(1.098)	(1.154)	(1.131)	(1.262)	(1.313)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.604	0.561	1.139	-0.111	2.508	2.162	2.174
	(1.593)	(1.597)	(1.833)	(1.808)	(2.052)	(1.911)	(2.289)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.463	-0.447	-1.106	-0.241	-2.886	-2.676	-2.767
	(1.828)	(1.831)	(2.026)	(2.023)	(2.192)	(2.045)	(2.431)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.120	-0.104	-0.0509	-0.0889	-0.591	-0.767	-0.778
	(0.684)	(0.686)	(0.729)	(0.914)	(0.925)	(0.960)	(1.009)
ENF vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	2.160	2.129	0.567	0.658	0.199	-0.0822	0.264
	(1.407)	(1.412)	(1.603)	(0.927)	(1.082)	(0.790)	(0.900)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.528	-1.517	-0.253	-0.502	-0.227	-0.204	-0.614
	(1.614)	(1.620)	(1.772)	(1.037)	(1.156)	(0.846)	(0.956)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.339	-0.327	-0.0232	-0.264	-0.442	-0.184	-0.174
	(0.604)	(0.607)	(0.637)	(0.469)	(0.488)	(0.397)	(0.396)
NI vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-13.47***	-13.66***	-13.12***	-10.87**	-12.50**	-12.10**	-13.47**
	(3.864)	(3.841)	(4.363)	(4.423)	(5.262)	(5.027)	(6.081)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	13.89***	13.96***	13.70***	9.877**	9.564*	9.903*	11.15*
	(4.434)	(4.406)	(4.823)	(4.948)	(5.621)	(5.381)	(6.457)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.794	-0.720	-0.953	-0.00475	1.591	1.389	1.240
	(1.660)	(1.650)	(1.735)	(2.236)	(2.373)	(2.527)	(2.679)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	88	88
F	2.72	2.68	2.82	0.80	1.41	1.32	1.51
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.750	0.085	0.133	0.052

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.64: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Unweighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.6698***	0.6590***	0.7431***	0.1331	0.2721	0.2774	1.0639**
	(0.2302)	(0.2310)	(0.2406)	(0.4413)	(0.5028)	(0.5211)	(0.4977)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.3042**	0.3001**	0.3610**	0.0251	0.1697	0.0312	-0.0241
	(0.1403)	(0.1411)	(0.1506)	(0.2789)	(0.3150)	(0.3163)	(0.3559)
SD vote-share	-0.0818	-0.0486	0.1005	-0.2284	0.3104	0.2755	-0.0740
	(0.2698)	(0.2655)	(0.2801)	(0.5551)	(0.6009)	(0.6214)	(0.6546)
ALDE vote-share	0.7832**	0.7854**	0.7765**	0.4537	-0.2140	-0.1269	-0.1310
	(0.3441)	(0.3465)	(0.3730)	(0.5747)	(0.6532)	(0.6106)	(0.6797)
EPP vote-share	-0.7810**	-0.7436**	-0.7388**	-0.5933	-0.2627	-0.1782	0.0918
	(0.3165)	(0.3120)	(0.3262)	(0.5974)	(0.6110)	(0.6262)	(0.7031)
ECR vote-share	-0.0036	-0.0409	-0.0443	0.6678	0.9229*	0.9792**	0.8452
	(0.2254)	(0.2176)	(0.2275)	(0.4544)	(0.4782)	(0.4952)	(0.5658)
EFDD vote-share	-0.0223	-0.0291	-0.0493	-0.1349	-0.0973	-0.1146	-0.1513
	(0.1420)	(0.1425)	(0.1515)	(0.3735)	(0.4238)	(0.3877)	(0.4412)
ENF vote-share	0.2886**	0.2847**	0.2657**	0.0915	-0.0785	-0.0659	-0.0607
	(0.1260)	(0.1267)	(0.1335)	(0.1981)	(0.2227)	(0.1744)	(0.1901)
NI vote-share	-0.5441	-0.5907*	-0.5166	-1.5379*	-1.7109*	-1.6450*	-2.0170*
	(0.3545)	(0.3477)	(0.3635)	(0.8377)	(0.9495)	(0.9155)	(1.0460)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	97	97
F	3.94	3.98	4.13	1.01	1.29	1.21	1.54
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.444	0.185	0.248	0.074

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.65: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Unweighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.6573***	0.6368**	0.7174***	0.9170	0.8525	1.1624	1.3354
	(0.2469)	(0.2475)	(0.2567)	(0.8451)	(0.9500)	(1.0588)	(0.9371)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.2313	0.2240	0.2833*	-0.0218	0.1344	-0.2694	-0.2684
	(0.1580)	(0.1591)	(0.1684)	(0.5163)	(0.5660)	(0.6247)	(0.6388)
SD vote-share	-0.0252	0.0103	0.1963	-0.2655	0.9516	0.7696	0.5614
	(0.2988)	(0.2977)	(0.3119)	(0.9774)	(1.0445)	(1.1572)	(1.0707)
ALDE vote-share	0.8566**	0.8813**	0.8296**	-0.7449	-1.7164	-1.5924	-1.4579
	(0.3872)	(0.3893)	(0.4205)	(1.0580)	(1.1927)	(1.1899)	(1.2390)
EPP vote-share	-0.6985*	-0.6487*	-0.6446*	-1.2603	-0.0845	0.1333	0.2732
	(0.3588)	(0.3558)	(0.3699)	(1.0535)	(1.0734)	(1.1899)	(1.2787)
ECR vote-share	-0.1030	-0.1581	-0.1585	1.6107**	1.5735*	2.0877**	2.3122**
	(0.2553)	(0.2466)	(0.2564)	(0.8167)	(0.8528)	(0.9350)	(0.9816)
EFDD vote-share	0.0203	0.0100	-0.0182	-0.4411	-0.9693	-1.2813*	-1.3709*
	(0.1600)	(0.1609)	(0.1701)	(0.6472)	(0.6974)	(0.7115)	(0.7542)
ENF vote-share	0.2926**	0.2853**	0.2907*	-0.1081	-0.4705	-0.4700	-0.5237*
	(0.1414)	(0.1423)	(0.1488)	(0.3319)	(0.3678)	(0.2943)	(0.2965)
NI vote-share	-0.3685	-0.4136	-0.3805	-0.9935	-1.3496	-0.8113	-1.0832
	(0.3883)	(0.3871)	(0.4050)	(1.5828)	(1.7882)	(1.8721)	(2.0035)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	88	88
F	2.72	2.68	2.82	0.80	1.41	1.32	1.51
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.750	0.085	0.133	0.052

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.66: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Population Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.887***	0.853***	0.879***	0.265	-0.357	-0.414	0.750
	(0.219)	(0.226)	(0.227)	(0.573)	(0.708)	(0.755)	(0.723)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.720***	0.669***	0.757***	0.200	0.00240	-0.105	-0.402
	(0.175)	(0.180)	(0.171)	(0.476)	(0.531)	(0.565)	(0.616)
SD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.267	0.527*	0.524*	-2.064**	0.942	1.155	-0.362
	(0.319)	(0.311)	(0.311)	(0.993)	(1.127)	(1.196)	(1.090)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.112	0.158	0.121	-1.085	-0.972	-1.119	-0.326
	(0.359)	(0.371)	(0.382)	(0.928)	(1.218)	(1.239)	(1.303)
EPP vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.215***	-0.837**	-0.685*	-3.912***	-0.569	-0.468	-0.985
	(0.433)	(0.419)	(0.373)	(1.240)	(1.291)	(1.298)	(1.135)
ECR vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.179	-0.148	-0.236	4.233***	1.629	1.438	2.327*
	(0.406)	(0.397)	(0.362)	(1.103)	(1.295)	(1.378)	(1.293)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.0265	-0.131	-0.0506	0.0179	-1.169	-0.413	-0.878
	(0.255)	(0.255)	(0.216)	(0.887)	(0.918)	(0.868)	(0.836)
ENF vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.426**	0.337**	0.286*	0.590	-0.695*	-0.180	-0.562*
	(0.170)	(0.171)	(0.157)	(0.468)	(0.415)	(0.318)	(0.318)
NI vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.538***	-1.715***	-1.643***	1.147	-0.546	-1.036	-0.765
	(0.372)	(0.377)	(0.383)	(1.208)	(1.456)	(1.479)	(1.637)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	106	106	106	106	106	102	102
F	10.13	9.09	11.06	2.96	0.71	0.28	1.49
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.699	0.979	0.149

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.67: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Population Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-4.503*	-4.737**	-4.676*	-2.171	-4.062	-4.127	1.082
	(2.315)	(2.340)	(2.823)	(2.259)	(3.052)	(3.139)	(2.977)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	5.447**	5.651**	5.570**	2.681	3.552	3.533	-0.340
	(2.335)	(2.355)	(2.820)	(2.224)	(2.814)	(2.880)	(2.695)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	2.710	2.388	6.253***	-4.797***	-5.261**	-5.493**	-5.599**
	(1.892)	(1.902)	(2.080)	(1.787)	(2.207)	(2.256)	(2.569)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.996	-1.715	-5.486***	4.867***	4.818**	4.824**	4.729**
	(1.908)	(1.914)	(2.078)	(1.759)	(2.036)	(2.070)	(2.326)
SD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	3.824	5.075	7.234*	3.068	12.05***	12.56***	3.755
	(3.329)	(3.232)	(3.812)	(3.732)	(4.469)	(4.544)	(4.291)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-3.747	-4.836	-6.977*	-5.274	-10.39**	-10.37**	-3.607
	(3.357)	(3.253)	(3.808)	(3.674)	(4.121)	(4.170)	(3.885)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	4.481	4.631	1.924	-0.930	-7.785	-7.743	-3.282
	(3.764)	(3.815)	(4.718)	(3.558)	(5.002)	(4.951)	(5.619)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-4.490	-4.620	-1.923	-0.0323	5.906	5.811	2.394
	(3.797)	(3.839)	(4.713)	(3.503)	(4.613)	(4.543)	(5.088)
EPP vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-5.952	-3.660	1.513	-4.517	-3.366	-3.743	-5.441
	(4.677)	(4.395)	(4.732)	(3.980)	(3.724)	(3.731)	(4.296)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	4.631	2.636	-2.366	0.981	3.643	3.544	4.716
	(4.718)	(4.423)	(4.728)	(3.919)	(3.435)	(3.424)	(3.890)
ECR vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	4.130	2.525	2.065	0.765	3.073	3.106	1.719
	(4.415)	(4.299)	(4.702)	(3.007)	(4.170)	(4.299)	(4.842)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-4.104	-2.707	-2.321	1.806	-1.224	-1.222	0.264
	(4.453)	(4.326)	(4.698)	(2.960)	(3.846)	(3.945)	(4.384)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.253	-2.231	-0.736	1.492	7.556**	8.716***	7.587**
	(2.793)	(2.728)	(2.772)	(3.473)	(3.587)	(3.182)	(3.221)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.365	2.216	0.775	-1.741	-9.307***	-9.127***	-8.197***
	(2.817)	(2.745)	(2.769)	(3.420)	(3.308)	(2.920)	(2.916)
ENF vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.082	0.643	-2.450	3.986**	-1.637	-0.865	-0.563
	(1.853)	(1.848)	(2.001)	(1.810)	(1.797)	(1.335)	(1.359)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.634	-0.252	2.797	-3.021*	0.546	0.663	0.247
	(1.869)	(1.860)	(1.999)	(1.782)	(1.657)	(1.225)	(1.230)
NI vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-9.052**	-10.05***	-12.04***	-1.972	-11.75*	-12.42**	-10.91
	(3.750)	(3.723)	(4.444)	(4.699)	(6.112)	(5.940)	(6.934)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	7.957**	8.822**	10.84**	3.982	10.58*	10.39*	9.107
	(3.782)	(3.747)	(4.439)	(4.627)	(5.636)	(5.451)	(6.278)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	97	97
F	5.07	4.89	6.14	1.89	2.03	1.85	1.38
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.014	0.007	0.018	0.134

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.68: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Population Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-3.141	-3.393	-4.096	-0.833	-4.366	-4.450	1.550
	(2.773)	(2.797)	(3.466)	(2.625)	(3.601)	(3.758)	(3.656)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.417	0.797	2.795	-0.809	3.252	3.428	-1.847
	(4.587)	(4.621)	(5.398)	(4.070)	(4.953)	(5.198)	(4.623)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	3.692	3.530	2.225	2.929	0.277	0.116	1.071
	(2.564)	(2.577)	(2.792)	(2.380)	(2.647)	(2.828)	(2.396)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	3.129	2.889	6.748**	-2.237	-3.297	-3.378	-2.639
	(2.324)	(2.342)	(2.627)	(1.867)	(2.358)	(2.459)	(2.917)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-4.174	-3.812	-6.790*	-3.746	-2.396	-2.454	-2.583
	(3.845)	(3.869)	(4.091)	(2.895)	(3.244)	(3.401)	(3.688)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	1.757	1.602	0.803	6.666***	5.160***	5.159***	4.502**
	(2.149)	(2.158)	(2.116)	(1.694)	(1.734)	(1.850)	(1.911)
SD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	5.480	6.507*	7.973*	3.635	11.76**	12.46**	1.293
	(3.990)	(3.918)	(4.744)	(4.197)	(5.106)	(5.216)	(4.877)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-7.723	-9.273	-9.031	-5.314	-7.312	-7.074	1.736
	(6.599)	(6.474)	(7.388)	(6.508)	(7.024)	(7.217)	(6.166)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	2.411	3.074	1.399	-1.123	-1.287	-1.011	-1.275
	(3.688)	(3.610)	(3.822)	(3.807)	(3.754)	(3.926)	(3.195)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	5.439	5.863	2.619	0.0677	-4.919	-4.867	-1.495
	(4.600)	(4.639)	(5.922)	(4.028)	(5.658)	(5.609)	(6.579)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-7.655	-8.295	-3.621	-4.658	-4.290	-4.283	-7.470
	(7.608)	(7.664)	(9.223)	(6.245)	(7.783)	(7.759)	(8.318)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	2.110	2.383	0.937	2.409	5.738	5.509	6.632
	(4.252)	(4.274)	(4.770)	(3.653)	(4.160)	(4.221)	(4.310)
EPP vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-8.892	-6.586	1.075	-6.614	-5.037	-5.181	-6.783
	(5.742)	(5.382)	(5.982)	(4.352)	(3.951)	(4.059)	(4.925)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	14.12	10.65	-0.520	7.931	7.962	8.150	8.967
	(9.498)	(8.892)	(9.316)	(6.747)	(5.435)	(5.616)	(6.228)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-6.469	-4.980	-1.360	-6.612*	-2.030	-2.301	-2.516
	(5.309)	(4.959)	(4.819)	(3.947)	(2.905)	(3.055)	(3.227)
ECR vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	5.616	4.137	3.831	2.842	5.195	5.692	2.457
	(5.438)	(5.322)	(5.951)	(3.335)	(4.691)	(4.884)	(5.526)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-8.931	-6.700	-6.158	-4.587	-5.191	-6.000	-3.281
	(8.995)	(8.793)	(9.269)	(5.170)	(6.453)	(6.757)	(6.987)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	3.277	2.322	2.013	5.888*	3.567	4.227	5.475
	(5.027)	(4.904)	(4.794)	(3.024)	(3.449)	(3.676)	(3.621)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.757	-2.695	-0.184	-0.103	8.472**	9.052***	8.097**
	(3.447)	(3.373)	(3.495)	(3.489)	(3.447)	(3.307)	(3.661)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.809	3.225	-1.094	1.077	-11.08**	-10.82**	-10.01**
	(5.701)	(5.572)	(5.443)	(5.409)	(4.742)	(4.575)	(4.629)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.0979	-0.508	1.345	-1.437	-0.499	-0.133	-0.719
	(3.186)	(3.108)	(2.815)	(3.164)	(2.534)	(2.489)	(2.399)
ENF vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.501	0.0528	-4.079	3.134	-1.967	-1.322	-0.774
	(2.277)	(2.266)	(2.478)	(1.999)	(1.889)	(1.409)	(1.412)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.502	1.178	6.051	-0.882	1.189	1.197	1.436
	(3.767)	(3.743)	(3.859)	(3.099)	(2.599)	(1.950)	(1.785)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.543	-0.833	-1.598	-1.080	-1.039	-0.529	-1.173
	(2.105)	(2.087)	(1.996)	(1.812)	(1.389)	(1.061)	(0.925)
NI vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-9.466**	-10.58**	-13.95**	0.139	-13.87**	-14.33**	-12.18
	(4.554)	(4.485)	(5.458)	(5.303)	(6.983)	(7.014)	(8.454)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	9.871	11.56	16.41*	-1.633	13.48	14.27	13.22
	(7.531)	(7.410)	(8.500)	(8.223)	(9.606)	(9.703)	(10.69)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-1.586	-2.307	-3.737	4.910	-1.972	-2.846	-4.029
	(4.209)	(4.132)	(4.397)	(4.810)	(5.134)	(5.279)	(5.539)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	88	88
F	3.58	3.39	3.99	2.72	2.46	2.17	1.55
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.042

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.69: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Population Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.9442***	0.9138***	0.8943***	0.5104	-0.5100	-0.5939	0.7418
	(0.2332)	(0.2370)	(0.2371)	(0.8050)	(0.9551)	(1.0334)	(0.9086)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.7143***	0.6725***	0.7671***	0.0703	-0.4435	-0.6690	-0.8706
	(0.1906)	(0.1927)	(0.1747)	(0.6368)	(0.6908)	(0.7428)	(0.7840)
SD vote-share	0.0769	0.2390	0.2565	-2.2060*	1.6539	2.1870	0.1487
	(0.3353)	(0.3274)	(0.3201)	(1.3301)	(1.3986)	(1.4962)	(1.3096)
ALDE vote-share	-0.0086	0.0109	0.0015	-0.9621	-1.8793	-1.9317	-0.8884
	(0.3792)	(0.3865)	(0.3962)	(1.2680)	(1.5656)	(1.6303)	(1.7150)
EPP vote-share	-1.3206***	-1.0233**	-0.8525**	-3.5356**	0.2768	-0.1993	-0.7242
	(0.4712)	(0.4453)	(0.3974)	(1.4185)	(1.1657)	(1.2285)	(1.3112)
ECR vote-share	0.0259	-0.1823	-0.2559	2.5705**	1.8491	1.8837	1.9829
	(0.4447)	(0.4355)	(0.3949)	(1.0717)	(1.3052)	(1.4157)	(1.4779)
EFDD vote-share	0.1124	-0.0144	0.0391	-0.2486	-1.7510	-0.4111	-0.6107
	(0.2813)	(0.2764)	(0.2328)	(1.2379)	(1.1227)	(1.0477)	(0.9831)
ENF vote-share	0.4482**	0.3913**	0.3469**	0.9648	-1.0912*	-0.2012	-0.3162
	(0.1867)	(0.1872)	(0.1680)	(0.6450)	(0.5625)	(0.4395)	(0.4146)
NI vote-share	-1.0954***	-1.2243***	-1.2073***	2.0104	-1.1709	-2.0304	-1.8049
	(0.3778)	(0.3772)	(0.3732)	(1.6750)	(1.9128)	(1.9559)	(2.1163)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	97	97
F	5.07	4.89	6.14	1.89	2.03	1.85	1.38
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.014	0.007	0.018	0.134

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.70: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Population Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.9679***	0.9334***	0.9238***	1.2874	-0.8368	-0.9058	0.7735
	(0.2496)	(0.2538)	(0.2544)	(1.1020)	(1.5456)	(1.7215)	(1.5472)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.7123***	0.6794***	0.7621***	0.6827	-0.5333	-0.6729	-0.7197
	(0.2092)	(0.2125)	(0.1928)	(0.7840)	(1.0123)	(1.1263)	(1.2343)
SD vote-share	0.1672	0.3081	0.3412	-2.8020	3.1591	4.3786*	1.7533
	(0.3590)	(0.3556)	(0.3481)	(1.7622)	(2.1917)	(2.3899)	(2.0637)
ALDE vote-share	-0.1069	-0.0487	-0.0653	-2.1817	-3.4708	-3.6412	-2.3329
	(0.4139)	(0.4210)	(0.4346)	(1.6911)	(2.4287)	(2.5696)	(2.7839)
EPP vote-share	-1.2371**	-0.9207*	-0.8042*	-5.2948***	0.8947	0.6680	-0.3315
	(0.5168)	(0.4884)	(0.4390)	(1.8271)	(1.6961)	(1.8598)	(2.0843)
ECR vote-share	-0.0387	-0.2416	-0.3135	4.1429***	3.5709*	3.9195*	4.6518**
	(0.4894)	(0.4830)	(0.4367)	(1.4000)	(2.0136)	(2.2378)	(2.3386)
EFDD vote-share	0.1503	0.0215	0.0676	-0.4632	-3.1064**	-1.9052	-2.6326*
	(0.3102)	(0.3061)	(0.2565)	(1.4647)	(1.4798)	(1.5151)	(1.5493)
ENF vote-share	0.4599**	0.3984*	0.3728**	1.1728	-1.8161**	-0.6542	-0.5108
	(0.2050)	(0.2056)	(0.1818)	(0.8391)	(0.8109)	(0.6456)	(0.5974)
NI vote-share	-1.1812***	-1.3345***	-1.2805***	3.4156	-2.3556	-2.9042	-2.9838
	(0.4098)	(0.4070)	(0.4005)	(2.2266)	(2.9975)	(3.2135)	(3.5776)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	88	88
F	3.58	3.39	3.99	2.72	2.46	2.17	1.55
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.042

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.71: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.880***	0.875***	0.895***	0.161	0.213	0.211	0.582
	(0.213)	(0.214)	(0.219)	(0.333)	(0.383)	(0.391)	(0.366)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.130	0.123	0.143	0.0695	0.141	0.0681	0.0495
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.149)	(0.225)	(0.253)	(0.250)	(0.269)
SD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.346	-0.322	-0.231	-0.644	-0.495	-0.552	-0.998*
	(0.261)	(0.259)	(0.273)	(0.446)	(0.510)	(0.519)	(0.518)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.681**	0.688**	0.709**	0.619	0.413	0.400	0.582
	(0.310)	(0.311)	(0.333)	(0.429)	(0.500)	(0.452)	(0.476)
EPP vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.528*	-0.508*	-0.563*	-0.664	-0.559	-0.464	-0.229
	(0.295)	(0.295)	(0.303)	(0.487)	(0.533)	(0.507)	(0.511)
ECR vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.0248	-0.0590	-0.0829	0.680	0.791*	0.819*	0.671
	(0.204)	(0.195)	(0.204)	(0.415)	(0.428)	(0.433)	(0.439)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.0596	-0.0587	-0.0776	-0.0837	-0.0596	-0.0789	-0.183
	(0.0881)	(0.0886)	(0.0909)	(0.208)	(0.235)	(0.242)	(0.259)
ENF vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.186	0.184	0.212*	-0.00121	0.0127	0.000142	0.00742
	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.123)	(0.135)	(0.139)	(0.145)
NI vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.376	-0.405	-0.310	-0.590	-0.548	-0.519	-0.436
	(0.326)	(0.323)	(0.331)	(0.637)	(0.723)	(0.691)	(0.758)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	102	102	102	102	102	99	99
F	4.72	4.65	5.01	1.11	0.90	0.86	1.39
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.354	0.521	0.564	0.188

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.72: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-4.036**	-4.282**	-2.545	-0.823	-0.131	-0.0610	3.889*
	(1.922)	(1.954)	(2.171)	(2.020)	(2.436)	(2.493)	(2.332)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	4.649**	4.881***	3.256	0.914	0.338	0.276	-2.905
	(1.814)	(1.844)	(2.051)	(1.791)	(2.137)	(2.179)	(2.006)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	4.269***	4.194***	4.670***	0.228	0.337	-0.301	-0.697
	(1.222)	(1.245)	(1.412)	(1.363)	(1.615)	(1.598)	(1.766)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-3.940***	-3.869***	-4.301***	-0.160	-0.189	0.308	0.636
	(1.153)	(1.175)	(1.333)	(1.208)	(1.416)	(1.397)	(1.519)
SD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	6.543***	7.273***	8.111***	4.568*	8.826***	8.675***	6.802**
	(2.271)	(2.271)	(2.545)	(2.532)	(2.891)	(2.951)	(3.095)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-6.585***	-7.272***	-7.998***	-4.782**	-8.448***	-8.341***	-6.843**
	(2.144)	(2.143)	(2.403)	(2.245)	(2.536)	(2.580)	(2.661)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.724	1.765	1.719	-1.590	-4.433	-4.046	-3.650
	(2.775)	(2.830)	(3.232)	(2.470)	(3.015)	(2.781)	(3.059)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.898	-0.936	-0.892	2.085	4.351	4.022*	3.735
	(2.619)	(2.671)	(3.052)	(2.190)	(2.644)	(2.431)	(2.630)
EPP vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-3.407	-2.683	-3.124	-0.997	0.694	1.210	2.646
	(2.683)	(2.699)	(2.969)	(2.584)	(2.820)	(2.887)	(3.184)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	2.651	1.969	2.364	0.413	-0.976	-1.383	-2.527
	(2.533)	(2.547)	(2.804)	(2.290)	(2.474)	(2.524)	(2.737)
ECR vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.060	0.150	0.401	2.026	2.645	2.929	2.492
	(1.900)	(1.852)	(2.071)	(2.117)	(2.338)	(2.385)	(2.693)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.047	-0.189	-0.451	-1.347	-1.752	-1.966	-1.591
	(1.793)	(1.748)	(1.956)	(1.877)	(2.051)	(2.085)	(2.316)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.282	0.338	1.179	-0.877	0.351	0.209	-0.654
	(0.818)	(0.833)	(0.899)	(1.229)	(1.441)	(1.488)	(1.654)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.316	-0.370	-1.183	0.696	-0.387	-0.277	0.409
	(0.772)	(0.786)	(0.849)	(1.090)	(1.264)	(1.301)	(1.422)
ENF vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	2.130**	2.167*	1.524	0.355	-0.603	-0.740	-0.751
	(1.085)	(1.106)	(1.212)	(0.750)	(0.858)	(0.882)	(0.943)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.846*	-1.881*	-1.235	-0.319	0.555	0.662	0.691
	(1.024)	(1.043)	(1.145)	(0.665)	(0.753)	(0.771)	(0.811)
NI vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-7.260**	-8.409***	-7.880**	-7.686**	-10.59**	-10.11**	-11.23**
	(2.903)	(2.872)	(3.151)	(3.764)	(4.388)	(4.193)	(4.712)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	6.628**	7.710***	7.287**	6.363*	8.946**	8.540**	9.351**
	(2.739)	(2.710)	(2.976)	(3.337)	(3.849)	(3.665)	(4.052)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	96	96	96	96	96	94	94
F	4.11	4.20	4.15	1.13	1.44	1.35	1.60
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.318	0.109	0.155	0.056

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.73: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-3.463	-3.581	-1.938	-1.938	-1.238	-1.141	4.799
	(2.456)	(2.458)	(2.824)	(2.419)	(2.881)	(2.897)	(2.947)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.061	1.120	-0.383	1.884	0.696	0.615	-5.467*
	(2.773)	(2.773)	(3.058)	(2.625)	(3.005)	(3.036)	(3.089)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	3.030***	3.060***	3.024***	0.884	1.394	1.680	1.974*
	(0.949)	(0.949)	(1.013)	(1.073)	(1.191)	(1.336)	(1.177)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	4.944***	4.909***	5.906***	-0.394	-0.470	-0.573	0.518
	(1.655)	(1.664)	(1.937)	(1.582)	(1.832)	(1.823)	(2.143)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-4.149**	-4.131**	-4.962**	-0.920	-1.031	-0.743	-2.002
	(1.868)	(1.877)	(2.097)	(1.717)	(1.911)	(1.911)	(2.246)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.557	-0.548	-0.670	1.384**	1.680**	1.102	1.257
	(0.639)	(0.642)	(0.695)	(0.702)	(0.757)	(0.841)	(0.856)
SD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	8.666***	8.858***	9.747***	6.507**	9.013***	8.981***	6.180*
	(3.032)	(3.020)	(3.477)	(2.778)	(3.140)	(3.132)	(3.376)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-8.924***	-9.021***	-10.15***	-6.381**	-7.356**	-6.977**	-4.224
	(3.422)	(3.406)	(3.765)	(3.014)	(3.275)	(3.283)	(3.538)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.258	0.210	0.611	-0.487	-0.722	-1.296	-1.443
	(1.171)	(1.165)	(1.248)	(1.232)	(1.297)	(1.445)	(1.348)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.190	-1.065	-0.0275	-0.0492	-1.405	-1.308	-1.183
	(3.751)	(3.767)	(4.453)	(2.817)	(3.424)	(3.073)	(3.676)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	3.667	3.604	3.181	-0.168	0.848	1.310	1.368
	(4.235)	(4.248)	(4.821)	(3.056)	(3.571)	(3.221)	(3.852)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-1.537	-1.569	-2.260	-0.190	-0.902	-1.354	-1.317
	(1.449)	(1.454)	(1.598)	(1.249)	(1.415)	(1.418)	(1.468)
EPP vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-2.210	-1.991	-2.626	1.243	0.574	0.640	0.907
	(3.663)	(3.653)	(4.142)	(2.788)	(3.087)	(3.132)	(3.876)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.670	1.560	2.155	-2.140	-0.691	-0.735	-0.980
	(4.135)	(4.120)	(4.484)	(3.025)	(3.220)	(3.283)	(4.062)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.151	-0.207	-0.189	-0.401	-0.157	0.0250	0.170
	(1.415)	(1.410)	(1.486)	(1.237)	(1.275)	(1.445)	(1.547)
ECR vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	2.399	2.062	2.643	0.113	2.116	2.239	0.436
	(2.596)	(2.493)	(2.876)	(2.385)	(2.622)	(2.575)	(3.110)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-2.588	-2.418	-3.159	1.125	-0.822	-1.361	0.562
	(2.931)	(2.811)	(3.113)	(2.588)	(2.735)	(2.699)	(3.259)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.101	0.187	0.350	0.365	0.252	1.207	1.366
	(1.003)	(0.962)	(1.032)	(1.058)	(1.083)	(1.188)	(1.242)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.355	0.375	2.010*	-0.723	1.408	1.327	0.176
	(1.092)	(1.099)	(1.200)	(1.448)	(1.658)	(1.661)	(1.997)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.275	-0.285	-1.655	0.276	-1.698	-1.469	-0.306
	(1.233)	(1.240)	(1.300)	(1.571)	(1.729)	(1.741)	(2.093)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.0766	-0.0819	-0.344	0.0529	-0.325	-0.784	-0.928
	(0.422)	(0.424)	(0.431)	(0.642)	(0.685)	(0.766)	(0.797)
ENF vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.831	1.835	0.355	0.341	0.0102	-0.0233	0.567
	(1.463)	(1.474)	(1.649)	(0.703)	(0.846)	(0.854)	(0.986)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.268	-1.270	-0.149	-0.375	-0.350	-0.260	-0.948
	(1.652)	(1.662)	(1.785)	(0.763)	(0.883)	(0.895)	(1.033)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.270	-0.271	0.123	-0.152	-0.0586	-0.243	-0.207
	(0.565)	(0.569)	(0.592)	(0.312)	(0.350)	(0.394)	(0.394)
NI vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-13.23***	-13.48***	-12.90***	-9.728**	-11.40**	-11.18**	-12.12*
	(3.823)	(3.804)	(4.351)	(4.481)	(5.311)	(4.996)	(6.183)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	13.31***	13.44***	13.14***	8.869*	8.537	8.803*	9.603
	(4.316)	(4.291)	(4.710)	(4.863)	(5.540)	(5.237)	(6.480)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.509	-0.444	-0.689	0.0228	1.494	1.546	1.413
	(1.477)	(1.468)	(1.561)	(1.988)	(2.195)	(2.305)	(2.469)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	88	88	88	88	88	86	86
F	2.84	2.83	2.95	0.85	1.33	1.25	1.49
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.680	0.129	0.185	0.057

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.74: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.6134***	0.5990**	0.7113***	0.0907	0.2070	0.2146	0.9843**
	(0.2369)	(0.2382)	(0.2507)	(0.4101)	(0.4909)	(0.5040)	(0.4833)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.3299**	0.3255**	0.3692**	0.0676	0.1484	0.0063	-0.0615
	(0.1506)	(0.1518)	(0.1630)	(0.2768)	(0.3254)	(0.3231)	(0.3660)
SD vote-share	-0.0416	0.0009	0.1126	-0.2138	0.3773	0.3342	-0.0404
	(0.2800)	(0.2769)	(0.2938)	(0.5142)	(0.5825)	(0.5967)	(0.6412)
ALDE vote-share	0.8267**	0.8291**	0.8267**	0.4950	-0.0815	-0.0243	0.0845
	(0.3421)	(0.3450)	(0.3732)	(0.5015)	(0.6075)	(0.5622)	(0.6339)
EPP vote-share	-0.7567**	-0.7146**	-0.7597**	-0.5840	-0.2823	-0.1728	0.1195
	(0.3307)	(0.3290)	(0.3428)	(0.5246)	(0.5684)	(0.5837)	(0.6597)
ECR vote-share	0.0139	-0.0392	-0.0498	0.6784	0.8928*	0.9624**	0.9006
	(0.2341)	(0.2258)	(0.2391)	(0.4299)	(0.4712)	(0.4823)	(0.5581)
EFDD vote-share	-0.0345	-0.0312	-0.0037	-0.1816	-0.0364	-0.0678	-0.2452
	(0.1008)	(0.1016)	(0.1038)	(0.2496)	(0.2903)	(0.3008)	(0.3428)
ENF vote-share	0.2838**	0.2860**	0.2885**	0.0357	-0.0474	-0.0779	-0.0598
	(0.1337)	(0.1348)	(0.1400)	(0.1522)	(0.1729)	(0.1784)	(0.1954)
NI vote-share	-0.6317*	-0.6987**	-0.5928	-1.3232*	-1.6439*	-1.5735*	-1.8770*
	(0.3577)	(0.3501)	(0.3638)	(0.7643)	(0.8843)	(0.8477)	(0.9764)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	96	96	96	96	96	94	94
F	4.11	4.20	4.15	1.13	1.44	1.35	1.60
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.318	0.109	0.155	0.056

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.75: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.6274**	0.5990**	0.7027***	0.8288	0.8525	1.1543	1.3050
	(0.2535)	(0.2550)	(0.2663)	(0.7580)	(0.9054)	(0.9911)	(0.8857)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.2387	0.2303	0.2741	0.0698	0.1793	-0.2132	-0.2267
	(0.1708)	(0.1726)	(0.1826)	(0.4958)	(0.5756)	(0.6238)	(0.6441)
SD vote-share	0.0006	0.0469	0.2048	-0.3615	0.9356	0.7080	0.5123
	(0.3129)	(0.3132)	(0.3279)	(0.8704)	(0.9866)	(1.0716)	(1.0144)
ALDE vote-share	0.9392**	0.9694**	0.8943**	-0.4072	-1.4601	-1.3522	-1.1315
	(0.3871)	(0.3906)	(0.4199)	(0.8826)	(1.0758)	(1.0516)	(1.1046)
EPP vote-share	-0.6906*	-0.6379*	-0.6594*	-1.2985	-0.2743	-0.0699	0.0969
	(0.3780)	(0.3789)	(0.3905)	(0.8736)	(0.9699)	(1.0717)	(1.1647)
ECR vote-share	-0.0875	-0.1688	-0.1660	1.6037**	1.5458*	2.0848**	2.3639**
	(0.2679)	(0.2585)	(0.2711)	(0.7473)	(0.8239)	(0.8809)	(0.9346)
EFDD vote-share	0.0033	0.0083	0.0121	-0.3944	-0.6152	-0.9261	-1.0578*
	(0.1127)	(0.1140)	(0.1132)	(0.4537)	(0.5210)	(0.5682)	(0.6001)
ENF vote-share	0.2925*	0.2934*	0.3284**	-0.1855	-0.3987	-0.5258*	-0.5868**
	(0.1510)	(0.1528)	(0.1555)	(0.2203)	(0.2659)	(0.2922)	(0.2963)
NI vote-share	-0.4274	-0.4887	-0.4530	-0.8363	-1.3723	-0.8265	-1.1062
	(0.3946)	(0.3945)	(0.4102)	(1.4043)	(1.6691)	(1.7095)	(1.8581)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	88	88	88	88	88	86	86
F	2.84	2.83	2.95	0.85	1.33	1.25	1.49
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.680	0.129	0.185	0.057

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.76: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.838***	0.804***	0.851***	0.246	-0.277	-0.262	0.761
	(0.237)	(0.246)	(0.244)	(0.552)	(0.709)	(0.732)	(0.681)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.710***	0.637***	0.729***	0.175	-0.141	-0.179	-0.509
	(0.185)	(0.190)	(0.183)	(0.483)	(0.540)	(0.556)	(0.609)
SD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.315	0.590*	0.553*	-2.048**	0.808	0.858	-0.731
	(0.324)	(0.319)	(0.321)	(0.912)	(1.129)	(1.162)	(1.018)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.263	0.316	0.278	-0.747	-0.796	-0.794	0.125
	(0.353)	(0.366)	(0.384)	(0.831)	(1.152)	(1.134)	(1.165)
EPP vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.194***	-0.846*	-0.755*	-3.329***	-0.890	-0.511	-0.889
	(0.461)	(0.459)	(0.403)	(1.061)	(1.244)	(1.226)	(1.060)
ECR vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.194	-0.202	-0.233	3.780***	1.365	1.249	2.089*
	(0.438)	(0.427)	(0.401)	(1.031)	(1.317)	(1.357)	(1.231)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.00761	-0.0170	0.0204	-0.0405	0.306	0.295	-0.197
	(0.109)	(0.114)	(0.112)	(0.341)	(0.476)	(0.492)	(0.513)
ENF vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	0.393**	0.377**	0.325**	0.218	-0.216	-0.229	-0.620*
	(0.161)	(0.167)	(0.161)	(0.254)	(0.306)	(0.316)	(0.316)
NI vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-1.449***	-1.768***	-1.644***	1.225	-1.361	-1.230	-1.031
	(0.375)	(0.369)	(0.377)	(1.068)	(1.342)	(1.354)	(1.501)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	102	102	102	102	102	99	99
F	9.09	8.59	10.63	2.63	0.34	0.28	1.50
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.960	0.980	0.145

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.77: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-4.866**	-4.973**	-4.789	-2.163	-5.329	-5.251	1.759
	(2.301)	(2.317)	(2.923)	(2.262)	(3.411)	(3.474)	(3.126)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	5.759**	5.838**	5.645*	2.554	4.811	4.780	-1.098
	(2.320)	(2.333)	(2.918)	(2.204)	(3.166)	(3.220)	(2.868)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.571	1.340	5.385**	-4.894***	-4.141	-4.241	-3.966
	(1.853)	(1.847)	(2.181)	(1.891)	(2.598)	(2.633)	(2.917)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.865	-0.693	-4.642**	4.859***	3.591	3.630	3.093
	(1.868)	(1.859)	(2.177)	(1.842)	(2.411)	(2.440)	(2.676)
SD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	5.136*	5.716*	6.643*	4.730	16.06***	16.32***	7.335
	(3.083)	(3.024)	(3.852)	(3.489)	(4.792)	(4.835)	(4.478)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-4.942	-5.371*	-6.303	-6.644*	-14.27***	-14.37***	-7.212*
	(3.108)	(3.044)	(3.846)	(3.399)	(4.447)	(4.482)	(4.108)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	2.791	2.884	0.509	-0.514	-6.722	-6.192	-3.294
	(3.421)	(3.449)	(4.577)	(3.293)	(5.311)	(5.228)	(5.697)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-2.568	-2.638	-0.277	0.0318	5.061	4.849	3.100
	(3.449)	(3.472)	(4.570)	(3.208)	(4.929)	(4.845)	(5.226)
EPP vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-3.665	-2.542	1.361	-1.639	0.762	0.950	-0.622
	(4.627)	(4.451)	(4.942)	(3.325)	(3.961)	(4.014)	(4.549)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	2.374	1.543	-2.274	-1.184	-0.936	-1.011	0.0962
	(4.665)	(4.480)	(4.935)	(3.239)	(3.676)	(3.720)	(4.173)
ECR vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	1.709	0.673	-0.209	-0.0327	3.413	3.364	1.244
	(4.402)	(4.247)	(5.048)	(2.829)	(4.564)	(4.651)	(5.205)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.658	-0.891	-0.0333	2.402	-1.716	-1.696	0.742
	(4.437)	(4.274)	(5.040)	(2.756)	(4.236)	(4.311)	(4.775)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.325	-0.364	2.069	-1.982	1.460	1.429	-0.198
	(1.077)	(1.086)	(1.330)	(1.271)	(2.011)	(2.049)	(2.263)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.393	0.422	-1.979	1.728	-1.328	-1.316	-0.0901
	(1.086)	(1.093)	(1.327)	(1.238)	(1.866)	(1.900)	(2.076)
ENF vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.170	-0.125	-2.942	1.112	-0.579	-0.629	-0.0598
	(1.631)	(1.645)	(1.977)	(1.040)	(1.502)	(1.527)	(1.528)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.587	0.553	3.321*	-0.723	0.352	0.371	-0.339
	(1.644)	(1.655)	(1.974)	(1.013)	(1.393)	(1.415)	(1.402)
NI vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-7.473**	-8.406**	-9.880**	0.220	-12.54**	-12.01*	-8.598
	(3.545)	(3.379)	(4.322)	(4.351)	(6.324)	(6.296)	(7.139)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	6.335*	7.026**	8.569**	1.495	10.01*	9.795*	6.529
	(3.574)	(3.402)	(4.315)	(4.239)	(5.869)	(5.836)	(6.549)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	96	96	96	96	96	94	94
F	4.70	4.61	5.90	1.68	1.03	0.97	0.68
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.039	0.424	0.495	0.833

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.78: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-3.257	-3.443	-4.168	-0.938	-5.963	-5.922	2.390
	(2.729)	(2.753)	(3.543)	(2.600)	(3.917)	(4.022)	(3.962)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.195	0.551	2.681	-0.919	5.302	5.426	-2.524
	(4.455)	(4.505)	(5.277)	(4.041)	(5.105)	(5.314)	(4.840)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	3.992	3.789	2.372	2.988	0.0275	-0.0252	0.821
	(2.480)	(2.508)	(2.685)	(2.384)	(2.584)	(2.766)	(2.315)
Greens/EFA vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	2.076	1.796	5.784**	-2.444	-2.403	-2.470	-0.521
	(2.265)	(2.272)	(2.724)	(1.947)	(2.739)	(2.809)	(3.352)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-3.319	-2.783	-5.732	-4.266	-3.136	-3.179	-4.688
	(3.698)	(3.717)	(4.057)	(3.025)	(3.570)	(3.711)	(4.095)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	1.954	1.647	0.684	7.199***	5.071***	5.064***	4.345**
	(2.058)	(2.070)	(2.065)	(1.785)	(1.807)	(1.932)	(1.959)
SD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	5.325	6.095*	6.820	4.690	15.75***	15.93***	4.886
	(3.711)	(3.665)	(4.717)	(3.894)	(5.307)	(5.377)	(5.118)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-5.759	-7.231	-7.655	-4.811	-11.93*	-11.53	-2.290
	(6.059)	(5.996)	(7.026)	(6.051)	(6.918)	(7.104)	(6.253)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.784	1.626	1.316	-2.384	-0.904	-1.051	-1.779
	(3.372)	(3.339)	(3.576)	(3.570)	(3.502)	(3.698)	(2.991)
ALDE vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	3.775	3.990	1.000	0.267	-3.887	-3.253	-1.524
	(4.189)	(4.231)	(5.690)	(3.650)	(5.742)	(5.703)	(6.717)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-5.040	-5.451	-1.437	-3.872	-3.693	-3.882	-5.401
	(6.838)	(6.921)	(8.475)	(5.672)	(7.485)	(7.535)	(8.207)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	1.391	1.626	0.602	2.021	3.625	4.051	5.687
	(3.806)	(3.854)	(4.313)	(3.346)	(3.789)	(3.922)	(3.925)
EPP vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-6.667	-5.114	1.395	-4.004	-0.758	-0.690	-1.717
	(5.644)	(5.470)	(6.170)	(3.409)	(4.108)	(4.189)	(5.187)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	12.30	9.328	-0.952	7.296	3.278	3.602	3.807
	(9.215)	(8.949)	(9.191)	(5.298)	(5.354)	(5.535)	(6.337)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-6.859	-5.158	-1.325	-7.655**	-2.636	-2.795	-3.008
	(5.129)	(4.984)	(4.677)	(3.125)	(2.710)	(2.881)	(3.031)
ECR vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	3.433	1.982	1.095	1.392	4.108	4.412	-1.795
	(5.413)	(5.258)	(6.323)	(3.105)	(5.015)	(5.139)	(5.856)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-6.708	-3.932	-2.721	-2.211	-2.831	-3.647	2.529
	(8.837)	(8.602)	(9.418)	(4.825)	(6.536)	(6.789)	(7.154)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	3.260	1.672	1.329	4.674	2.359	2.994	4.429
	(4.919)	(4.790)	(4.793)	(2.847)	(3.309)	(3.534)	(3.422)
EFDD vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.454	-0.507	2.547	-2.153	1.851	1.795	-0.374
	(1.307)	(1.321)	(1.625)	(1.467)	(2.241)	(2.302)	(2.745)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.504	0.605	-2.977	1.506	-3.471	-3.444	-1.203
	(2.134)	(2.161)	(2.420)	(2.279)	(2.921)	(3.042)	(3.353)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.0508	-0.00677	0.538	0.139	1.214	1.170	0.541
	(1.188)	(1.204)	(1.232)	(1.345)	(1.479)	(1.583)	(1.604)
ENF vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-0.419	-0.388	-4.701*	0.832	-0.619	-0.744	0.714
	(1.992)	(2.015)	(2.415)	(1.066)	(1.561)	(1.594)	(1.603)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.948	0.889	6.672*	-0.501	0.600	0.762	-0.113
	(3.252)	(3.296)	(3.597)	(1.656)	(2.035)	(2.107)	(1.959)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.0998	-0.0660	-1.566	0.0196	-0.666	-0.824	-1.483
	(1.810)	(1.836)	(1.831)	(0.977)	(1.030)	(1.096)	(0.937)
NI vote-share							
Current Non-EU Share	-7.789*	-9.018**	-11.60**	2.068	-13.02*	-12.64*	-7.076
	(4.316)	(4.170)	(5.387)	(4.963)	(7.300)	(7.333)	(8.981)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	6.481	8.833	12.88	-4.796	10.87	11.40	6.524
	(7.046)	(6.821)	(8.024)	(7.713)	(9.515)	(9.689)	(10.97)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.0667	-1.279	-2.649	5.849	-1.331	-1.455	-2.701
	(3.922)	(3.799)	(4.083)	(4.550)	(4.816)	(5.043)	(5.248)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	88	88	88	88	88	86	86
F	3.49	3.31	3.90	2.50	1.35	1.28	1.04
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.114	0.161	0.415

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.79: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.8931***	0.8654***	0.8567***	0.3912	-0.5179	-0.4709	0.6609
	(0.2484)	(0.2543)	(0.2521)	(0.7631)	(0.9464)	(0.9692)	(0.8236)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.7068***	0.6468***	0.7431***	-0.0349	-0.5493	-0.6110	-0.8731
	(0.2001)	(0.2027)	(0.1881)	(0.6379)	(0.7207)	(0.7345)	(0.7686)
SD vote-share	0.1940	0.3443	0.3409	-1.9140	1.7966	1.9484	0.1227
	(0.3328)	(0.3318)	(0.3322)	(1.1770)	(1.3292)	(1.3490)	(1.1796)
ALDE vote-share	0.2224	0.2468	0.2325	-0.4825	-1.6604	-1.3427	-0.1939
	(0.3693)	(0.3785)	(0.3947)	(1.1107)	(1.4734)	(1.4585)	(1.5009)
EPP vote-share	-1.2905***	-0.9993**	-0.9131**	-2.8231**	-0.1746	-0.0606	-0.5255
	(0.4996)	(0.4884)	(0.4262)	(1.1216)	(1.0989)	(1.1198)	(1.1985)
ECR vote-share	0.0508	-0.2180	-0.2424	2.3690**	1.6968	1.6681	1.9867
	(0.4752)	(0.4660)	(0.4353)	(0.9542)	(1.2662)	(1.2977)	(1.3714)
EFDD vote-share	0.0674	0.0574	0.0897	-0.2533	0.1325	0.1133	-0.2878
	(0.1163)	(0.1192)	(0.1147)	(0.4287)	(0.5578)	(0.5718)	(0.5963)
ENF vote-share	0.4169**	0.4286**	0.3791**	0.3884	-0.2275	-0.2577	-0.3988
	(0.1761)	(0.1805)	(0.1705)	(0.3508)	(0.4166)	(0.4260)	(0.4027)
NI vote-share	-1.1381***	-1.3801***	-1.3111***	1.7146	-2.5357	-2.2166	-2.0688
	(0.3827)	(0.3708)	(0.3727)	(1.4678)	(1.7544)	(1.7566)	(1.8808)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	96	96	96	96	96	94	94
F	4.70	4.61	5.90	1.68	1.03	0.97	0.68
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.039	0.424	0.495	0.833

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.80: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (National Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.9300***	0.8963***	0.8857***	1.1316	-0.6334	-0.5218	0.6863
	(0.2663)	(0.2722)	(0.2715)	(1.0631)	(1.5996)	(1.6737)	(1.5073)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.7104***	0.6596***	0.7353***	0.4890	-0.4687	-0.5849	-0.8648
	(0.2210)	(0.2246)	(0.2087)	(0.7959)	(1.1186)	(1.1688)	(1.2754)
SD vote-share	0.3508	0.4902	0.4809	-2.5052	2.9226	3.3580	0.8168
	(0.3621)	(0.3624)	(0.3615)	(1.5919)	(2.1674)	(2.2375)	(1.9475)
ALDE vote-share	0.1263	0.1653	0.1646	-1.5839	-3.9549*	-3.0842	-1.2378
	(0.4087)	(0.4183)	(0.4361)	(1.4921)	(2.3451)	(2.3733)	(2.5560)
EPP vote-share	-1.2252**	-0.9437*	-0.8812*	-4.3633***	-0.1161	0.1173	-0.9181
	(0.5507)	(0.5408)	(0.4729)	(1.3937)	(1.6776)	(1.7432)	(1.9736)
ECR vote-share	-0.0150	-0.2779	-0.2967	3.8548***	3.6364*	3.7590*	5.1634**
	(0.5281)	(0.5198)	(0.4846)	(1.2694)	(2.0480)	(2.1384)	(2.2280)
EFDD vote-share	0.1011	0.0915	0.1081	-0.5079	-0.4055	-0.4785	-1.0360
	(0.1276)	(0.1306)	(0.1245)	(0.5996)	(0.9152)	(0.9580)	(1.0444)
ENF vote-share	0.4298**	0.4354**	0.4051**	0.3510	-0.6845	-0.8058	-0.8821
	(0.1944)	(0.1992)	(0.1851)	(0.4357)	(0.6376)	(0.6635)	(0.6101)
NI vote-share	-1.2417***	-1.4645***	-1.3743***	3.1214	-3.4778	-2.6977	-3.2533
	(0.4211)	(0.4122)	(0.4129)	(2.0291)	(2.9811)	(3.0515)	(3.4174)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	88	88	88	88	88	86	86
F	3.49	3.31	3.90	2.50	1.35	1.28	1.04
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.114	0.161	0.415

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.81: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Unweighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.185	-0.210	-0.210	0.123	-0.353	-0.858
	(0.262)	(0.261)	(0.261)	(0.697)	(0.744)	(0.823)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.104	-0.109	-0.109	0.162	-0.0128	-0.440
	(0.191)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.519)	(0.573)	(0.629)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0393	0.0328	0.0328	-0.0327	-0.102	-0.116
	(0.0909)	(0.0912)	(0.0912)	(0.215)	(0.238)	(0.306)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0759	-0.0828	-0.0828	-0.0803	-0.0711	-0.106
	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.211)	(0.235)	(0.270)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.143	-0.153	-0.153	-0.196	-0.335	-0.403
	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.349)	(0.384)	(0.478)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0566	0.0515	0.0515	0.278	0.0860	-0.0262
	(0.140)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.406)	(0.443)	(0.455)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.80	0.82	0.82	0.31	0.26	0.33
p-value	0.571	0.552	0.552	0.931	0.953	0.922

$*\ p < .10,\ **\ p < .05,\ ***\ p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.82: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Unweighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.061	-2.647	-2.647	-1.753	-1.770	-1.116
	(2.663)	(2.685)	(2.685)	(1.607)	(1.583)	(2.209)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.961	2.512	2.512	1.961	1.548	0.261
	(2.729)	(2.754)	(2.754)	(1.518)	(1.527)	(2.067)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.279	-1.207	-1.207	-1.030	-1.036	-0.296
	(1.959)	(1.997)	(1.997)	(1.206)	(1.224)	(1.687)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.210	1.132	1.132	1.247	1.118	-0.146
	(2.008)	(2.049)	(2.049)	(1.139)	(1.181)	(1.579)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.864	-0.755	-0.755	-0.887*	-0.888*	-1.309*
	(0.927)	(0.939)	(0.939)	(0.476)	(0.484)	(0.766)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.930	0.812	0.812	0.893**	0.859*	1.208*
	(0.950)	(0.964)	(0.964)	(0.449)	(0.467)	(0.717)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.709	-0.586	-0.586	-0.107	-0.106	0.396
	(1.197)	(1.215)	(1.215)	(0.501)	(0.512)	(0.716)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.652	0.519	0.519	0.0275	0.0383	-0.509
	(1.227)	(1.246)	(1.246)	(0.474)	(0.494)	(0.669)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.257	-1.084	-1.084	-0.0403	-0.0467	0.377
	(1.390)	(1.407)	(1.407)	(0.829)	(0.831)	(1.269)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.147	0.959	0.959	-0.163	-0.315	-0.790
	(1.425)	(1.444)	(1.444)	(0.783)	(0.802)	(1.188)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.355	-0.264	-0.264	0.268	0.260	-0.715
	(1.443)	(1.469)	(1.469)	(0.965)	(0.963)	(1.210)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.423	0.325	0.325	0.0102	-0.190	0.697
	(1.479)	(1.507)	(1.507)	(0.912)	(0.929)	(1.132)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.59	0.56	0.56	0.63	0.54	0.53
p-value	0.846	0.871	0.871	0.811	0.888	0.888

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.83: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Unweighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.151	-1.579	-1.579	-2.034	-3.423	-3.363
	(3.639)	(3.666)	(3.666)	(3.392)	(3.466)	(4.586)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.245	0.506	0.506	2.351	3.778	3.216
	(5.385)	(5.413)	(5.413)	(4.394)	(4.423)	(5.659)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.866	1.008	1.008	-0.189	-1.109	-1.392
	(2.337)	(2.335)	(2.335)	(1.994)	(2.060)	(2.475)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.530	-1.435	-1.435	-0.508	-0.874	1.927
	(2.680)	(2.732)	(2.732)	(2.543)	(2.696)	(3.482)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.685	1.562	1.562	0.524	0.899	-3.068
	(3.966)	(4.033)	(4.033)	(3.295)	(3.441)	(4.297)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.240	-0.216	-0.216	0.350	0.109	1.377
	(1.721)	(1.740)	(1.740)	(1.495)	(1.602)	(1.880)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.288	-0.135	-0.135	-2.126**	-2.377**	-4.065***
	(1.263)	(1.279)	(1.279)	(0.962)	(1.008)	(1.421)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.155	-0.354	-0.354	2.610**	2.868**	4.831***
	(1.869)	(1.888)	(1.888)	(1.246)	(1.286)	(1.754)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.548	0.586	0.586	-0.833	-0.999*	-1.708**
	(0.811)	(0.814)	(0.814)	(0.566)	(0.599)	(0.767)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.780	-0.614	-0.614	-0.549	-0.563	0.385
	(1.638)	(1.662)	(1.662)	(1.053)	(1.122)	(1.498)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.785	0.571	0.571	0.640	0.655	-0.494
	(2.424)	(2.454)	(2.454)	(1.365)	(1.432)	(1.849)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.0672	-0.0261	-0.0261	-0.297	-0.307	-0.00665
	(1.052)	(1.058)	(1.058)	(0.619)	(0.667)	(0.809)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.421	-1.188	-1.188	-1.012	-1.622	-2.124
	(1.902)	(1.925)	(1.925)	(1.736)	(1.794)	(2.571)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.456	1.154	1.154	1.183	1.810	2.498
	(2.814)	(2.842)	(2.842)	(2.249)	(2.289)	(3.172)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.156	-0.0981	-0.0981	-0.653	-1.057	-1.549
	(1.221)	(1.226)	(1.226)	(1.021)	(1.066)	(1.388)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.756	0.891	0.891	1.685	1.188	-1.553
	(1.961)	(1.995)	(1.995)	(2.010)	(2.110)	(2.523)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-1.670	-1.844	-1.844	-1.952	-1.442	1.799
	(2.902)	(2.946)	(2.946)	(2.604)	(2.693)	(3.113)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	1.057	1.090	1.090	0.952	0.623	-0.520
	(1.259)	(1.271)	(1.271)	(1.182)	(1.254)	(1.362)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.50	0.48	0.48	0.83	0.80	0.86
p-value	0.958	0.965	0.965	0.659	0.694	0.623

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.84: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Unweighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share	-0.1001	-0.1345	-0.1345	0.2087	-0.2217	-0.8544
	(0.2728)	(0.2741)	(0.2741)	(0.6918)	(0.7546)	(0.8444)
Euroscepticism vote-share	-0.0688	-0.0748	-0.0748	0.2166	0.0821	-0.4419
	(0.2007)	(0.2039)	(0.2039)	(0.5193)	(0.5833)	(0.6450)
Regionalism vote-share	0.0661	0.0570	0.0570	0.0061	-0.0291	-0.1011
	(0.0950)	(0.0959)	(0.0959)	(0.2048)	(0.2309)	(0.2930)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.0571	-0.0673	-0.0673	-0.0791	-0.0679	-0.1127
	(0.1226)	(0.1240)	(0.1240)	(0.2158)	(0.2439)	(0.2735)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.1101	-0.1245	-0.1245	-0.2033	-0.3619	-0.4127
	(0.1424)	(0.1436)	(0.1436)	(0.3569)	(0.3963)	(0.4852)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.0688	0.0613	0.0613	0.2780	0.0699	-0.0177
	(0.1478)	(0.1500)	(0.1500)	(0.4155)	(0.4590)	(0.4624)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.59	0.56	0.56	0.63	0.54	0.53
p-value	0.846	0.871	0.871	0.811	0.888	0.888

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.85: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Unweighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share	-0.0394	-0.0647	-0.0647	0.1281	-0.7538	-1.5395
	(0.3200)	(0.3201)	(0.3201)	(1.1057)	(1.2509)	(1.4912)
Euroscepticism vote-share	-0.0856	-0.0898	-0.0898	0.3661	0.1343	0.2359
	(0.2357)	(0.2385)	(0.2385)	(0.8291)	(0.9729)	(1.1323)
Regionalism vote-share	0.1044	0.0976	0.0976	-0.3492	-0.5086	-0.9415**
	(0.1111)	(0.1116)	(0.1116)	(0.3135)	(0.3637)	(0.4622)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.0618	-0.0691	-0.0691	-0.2058	-0.2151	-0.1159
	(0.1441)	(0.1451)	(0.1451)	(0.3434)	(0.4049)	(0.4873)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.1210	-0.1313	-0.1313	-0.4819	-0.8691	-1.1752
	(0.1673)	(0.1681)	(0.1681)	(0.5658)	(0.6473)	(0.8359)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.1427	0.1368	0.1368	0.6842	0.3688	-0.2734
	(0.1725)	(0.1742)	(0.1742)	(0.6553)	(0.7615)	(0.8204)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.50	0.48	0.48	0.83	0.80	0.86
p-value	0.958	0.965	0.965	0.659	0.694	0.623

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.86: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.698	0.663	0.663	0.742	-2.074	-2.137
	(0.476)	(0.476)	(0.476)	(2.047)	(2.126)	(2.190)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.283	0.267	0.267	1.840	0.994	1.093
	(0.506)	(0.511)	(0.511)	(1.264)	(1.447)	(1.733)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.315**	0.311**	0.311**	-0.788	-1.368	-0.386
	(0.156)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.889)	(1.019)	(1.253)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0546	-0.0542	-0.0542	-1.041**	-1.105**	-0.508
	(0.122)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.476)	(0.559)	(0.569)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0477	-0.0646	-0.0646	-0.658	-2.173	-3.560*
	(0.224)	(0.224)	(0.224)	(1.485)	(1.637)	(1.975)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.688**	0.667**	0.667**	3.694**	2.739	-0.124
	(0.278)	(0.277)	(0.277)	(1.510)	(1.734)	(1.572)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	3.60	3.49	3.49	3.45	4.10	1.92
p-value	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.083

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.87: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-5.821	-5.025	-5.025	-4.641*	-5.096*	-4.701
	(4.180)	(4.306)	(4.306)	(2.766)	(2.657)	(3.087)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	6.674	5.833	5.833	6.135***	4.344*	2.838
	(4.253)	(4.390)	(4.390)	(2.343)	(2.446)	(2.431)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.209	-2.899	-2.899	0.258	0.120	0.225
	(4.524)	(4.686)	(4.686)	(1.880)	(1.903)	(2.514)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	3.574	3.248	3.248	1.802	1.256	0.962
	(4.602)	(4.777)	(4.777)	(1.593)	(1.752)	(1.980)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.871	-1.871	-1.871	-5.147***	-5.060***	-5.327***
	(1.369)	(1.419)	(1.419)	(0.680)	(0.671)	(0.896)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.238	2.238	2.238	4.967***	5.308***	5.471***
	(1.393)	(1.447)	(1.447)	(0.576)	(0.618)	(0.705)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.243	-0.265	-0.265	-0.616	-0.656	0.411
	(1.097)	(1.137)	(1.137)	(0.716)	(0.729)	(0.776)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.193	0.216	0.216	-0.484	-0.644	-1.018*
	(1.116)	(1.160)	(1.160)	(0.607)	(0.671)	(0.611)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.176	-0.682	-0.682	0.0413	-0.402	-0.350
	(2.009)	(2.060)	(2.060)	(2.256)	(2.101)	(2.689)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.156	0.633	0.633	-0.797	-2.545	-3.555*
	(2.044)	(2.100)	(2.100)	(1.911)	(1.934)	(2.118)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.339	-2.855	-2.855	2.569	2.376	-0.912
	(2.430)	(2.502)	(2.502)	(2.283)	(2.302)	(2.279)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	4.123*	3.612	3.612	1.282	0.521	0.872
	(2.472)	(2.551)	(2.551)	(1.934)	(2.120)	(1.795)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	3.07	2.79	2.79	10.42	10.28	7.51
p-value	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.88: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-7.502	-7.066	-7.066	-4.711	-6.364	-6.390
	(6.045)	(6.082)	(6.082)	(3.980)	(3.896)	(4.708)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	11.08	11.27	11.27	6.305	7.297	6.193
	(12.15)	(12.18)	(12.18)	(7.318)	(6.994)	(7.377)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-2.730	-3.400	-3.400	-0.105	-1.887	-2.040
	(7.038)	(7.100)	(7.100)	(4.265)	(4.177)	(4.224)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-6.111	-5.912	-5.912	2.223	1.875	3.648
	(6.526)	(6.606)	(6.606)	(2.645)	(2.757)	(3.703)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	11.19	11.27	11.27	-3.040	-2.832	-5.837
	(13.11)	(13.23)	(13.23)	(4.863)	(4.949)	(5.802)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-4.714	-5.019	-5.019	2.986	2.612	4.133
	(7.599)	(7.711)	(7.711)	(2.834)	(2.956)	(3.322)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0987	0.0730	0.0730	-5.997***	-5.751***	-7.368***
	(1.945)	(1.971)	(1.971)	(0.947)	(0.968)	(1.212)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-2.928	-2.939	-2.939	7.064***	6.916***	9.525***
	(3.908)	(3.947)	(3.947)	(1.741)	(1.738)	(1.900)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	3.199	3.239	3.239	-1.293	-1.028	-2.465**
	(2.264)	(2.300)	(2.300)	(1.015)	(1.038)	(1.088)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0438	-0.0576	-0.0576	-0.409	-0.540	0.441
	(1.588)	(1.610)	(1.610)	(1.029)	(1.073)	(1.191)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.330	-0.336	-0.336	-0.994	-0.915	-1.076
	(3.192)	(3.224)	(3.224)	(1.891)	(1.926)	(1.866)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.324	0.345	0.345	0.314	0.173	0.0355
	(1.849)	(1.879)	(1.879)	(1.102)	(1.150)	(1.068)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.531	-1.269	-1.269	-1.187	-2.893	-3.916
	(2.908)	(2.914)	(2.914)	(3.227)	(3.010)	(3.970)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.086	2.198	2.198	2.232	3.255	3.528
	(5.844)	(5.836)	(5.836)	(5.933)	(5.403)	(6.221)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.576	-0.979	-0.979	-1.868	-3.706	-4.306
	(3.386)	(3.402)	(3.402)	(3.458)	(3.226)	(3.562)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-4.876	-4.604	-4.604	1.742	0.977	-3.188
	(3.507)	(3.524)	(3.524)	(3.277)	(3.367)	(3.423)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	8.153	8.269	8.269	3.320	3.779	5.394
	(7.046)	(7.058)	(7.058)	(6.025)	(6.045)	(5.364)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-2.496	-2.913	-2.913	-1.257	-2.082	-2.749
	(4.083)	(4.114)	(4.114)	(3.512)	(3.610)	(3.071)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.15	1.96	1.96	7.13	6.97	5.89
p-value	0.005	0.012	0.012	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.89: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share	0.8533*	0.8082*	0.8082*	1.4937	-0.7517	-1.8622
	(0.4800)	(0.4847)	(0.4847)	(1.8718)	(2.1715)	(2.1834)
Euroscepticism vote-share	0.3659	0.3484	0.3484	2.0605	1.3758	1.1863
	(0.5194)	(0.5275)	(0.5275)	(1.2722)	(1.5557)	(1.7780)
Regionalism vote-share	0.3667**	0.3667**	0.3667**	-0.1795	0.2477	0.1443
	(0.1572)	(0.1598)	(0.1598)	(0.4602)	(0.5486)	(0.6333)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.0501	-0.0488	-0.0488	-1.1001**	-1.3006**	-0.6067
	(0.1260)	(0.1280)	(0.1280)	(0.4846)	(0.5957)	(0.5486)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.0208	-0.0487	-0.0487	-0.7558	-2.9475*	-3.9045**
	(0.2307)	(0.2319)	(0.2319)	(1.5267)	(1.7172)	(1.9021)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.7843***	0.7570***	0.7570***	3.8513**	2.8971	-0.0395
	(0.2791)	(0.2816)	(0.2816)	(1.5452)	(1.8820)	(1.6121)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	3.07	2.79	2.79	10.42	10.28	7.51
p-value	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.90: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share	0.8507*	0.8021	0.8021	1.4899	-0.9538	-2.2361
	(0.4840)	(0.4886)	(0.4886)	(1.9166)	(2.2534)	(2.3595)
Euroscepticism vote-share	0.3615	0.3393	0.3393	2.1688*	1.6557	1.9441
	(0.5226)	(0.5307)	(0.5307)	(1.2735)	(1.5946)	(1.8556)
Regionalism vote-share	0.3697**	0.3726**	0.3726**	-0.2264	0.1376	-0.3076
	(0.1557)	(0.1583)	(0.1583)	(0.4561)	(0.5600)	(0.6076)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.0498	-0.0482	-0.0482	-1.0887**	-1.2821**	-0.6001
	(0.1272)	(0.1293)	(0.1293)	(0.4954)	(0.6205)	(0.5967)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.0213	-0.0505	-0.0505	-0.8235	-3.3445*	-4.6941**
	(0.2329)	(0.2341)	(0.2341)	(1.5539)	(1.7406)	(1.9896)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.7820***	0.7517***	0.7517***	3.8057**	2.6740	-0.5435
	(0.2808)	(0.2831)	(0.2831)	(1.5780)	(1.9475)	(1.7156)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.15	1.96	1.96	7.13	6.97	5.89
p-value	0.005	0.012	0.012	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.91: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.336	-0.358*	-0.358*	0.00785	-0.469	-0.696
	(0.206)	(0.206)	(0.206)	(0.529)	(0.575)	(0.676)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.116	-0.122	-0.122	0.0383	-0.150	-0.334
	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.365)	(0.413)	(0.462)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0163	-0.0210	-0.0210	-0.00797	-0.0664	-0.0669
	(0.0692)	(0.0696)	(0.0696)	(0.166)	(0.190)	(0.268)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0845	-0.0887	-0.0887	-0.0547	-0.0637	-0.121
	(0.0809)	(0.0816)	(0.0816)	(0.159)	(0.184)	(0.219)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.151	-0.157	-0.157	-0.146	-0.264	-0.324
	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.263)	(0.299)	(0.410)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0802	-0.0860	-0.0860	0.121	-0.0180	-0.0612
	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.312)	(0.355)	(0.423)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.76	0.84	0.84	0.18	0.25	0.28
p-value	0.605	0.538	0.538	0.981	0.958	0.945

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.92: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.120	-2.877	-2.877	-1.588	-1.551	-0.323
	(2.151)	(2.156)	(2.156)	(1.421)	(1.386)	(2.062)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.879	2.608	2.608	1.748	1.245	-0.379
	(2.215)	(2.222)	(2.222)	(1.447)	(1.449)	(1.972)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.296	-1.232	-1.232	-1.000	-0.987	0.405
	(1.590)	(1.611)	(1.611)	(0.984)	(0.993)	(1.399)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.220	1.150	1.150	1.137	0.963	-0.751
	(1.637)	(1.660)	(1.660)	(1.002)	(1.039)	(1.338)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.756	-0.704	-0.704	-0.747*	-0.745*	-1.352*
	(0.726)	(0.733)	(0.733)	(0.430)	(0.438)	(0.757)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.765	0.707	0.707	0.809*	0.780*	1.305*
	(0.748)	(0.756)	(0.756)	(0.438)	(0.458)	(0.724)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.477	-0.427	-0.427	-0.0601	-0.0593	0.545
	(0.855)	(0.865)	(0.865)	(0.440)	(0.449)	(0.650)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.406	0.350	0.350	0.00585	-0.00512	-0.676
	(0.881)	(0.892)	(0.892)	(0.448)	(0.470)	(0.621)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.125	-1.056	-1.056	0.0579	0.0697	0.629
	(1.083)	(1.095)	(1.095)	(0.726)	(0.729)	(1.230)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.007	0.931	0.931	-0.224	-0.384	-0.967
	(1.115)	(1.128)	(1.128)	(0.740)	(0.762)	(1.176)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.771	-0.704	-0.704	0.147	0.160	-0.826
	(1.269)	(1.285)	(1.285)	(0.862)	(0.866)	(1.278)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.714	0.640	0.640	-0.0278	-0.205	0.777
	(1.307)	(1.324)	(1.324)	(0.877)	(0.906)	(1.223)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.59	0.52	0.64
p-value	0.781	0.777	0.777	0.851	0.897	0.803

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.93: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.328	-2.875	-2.875	-2.381	-4.486	-5.408
	(2.957)	(2.978)	(2.978)	(3.050)	(3.134)	(4.072)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	3.255	2.605	2.605	2.813	5.044	6.117
	(4.258)	(4.288)	(4.288)	(3.895)	(3.917)	(4.917)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.187	0.00115	0.00115	-0.506	-1.882	-2.979
	(1.802)	(1.805)	(1.805)	(1.714)	(1.803)	(2.076)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.565	-1.451	-1.451	-0.981	-1.647	0.986
	(2.185)	(2.224)	(2.224)	(2.115)	(2.294)	(2.913)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.706	1.543	1.543	1.112	1.818	-1.493
	(3.146)	(3.202)	(3.202)	(2.701)	(2.867)	(3.517)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.242	-0.195	-0.195	0.0120	-0.423	0.340
	(1.331)	(1.348)	(1.348)	(1.189)	(1.320)	(1.485)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.498	-0.394	-0.394	-1.676*	-1.981**	-3.900***
	(0.997)	(1.011)	(1.011)	(0.898)	(0.972)	(1.420)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.298	0.150	0.150	2.057*	2.380*	4.560***
	(1.435)	(1.455)	(1.455)	(1.147)	(1.215)	(1.715)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.232	0.275	0.275	-0.593	-0.793	-1.492**
	(0.607)	(0.613)	(0.613)	(0.505)	(0.559)	(0.724)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.817	-0.730	-0.730	-0.389	-0.500	0.533
	(1.174)	(1.193)	(1.193)	(0.943)	(1.034)	(1.355)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.021	0.895	0.895	0.448	0.566	-0.661
	(1.690)	(1.718)	(1.718)	(1.204)	(1.293)	(1.636)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.306	-0.269	-0.269	-0.210	-0.283	-0.00687
	(0.715)	(0.723)	(0.723)	(0.530)	(0.595)	(0.690)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.670	-1.551	-1.551	-1.132	-2.000	-2.891
	(1.485)	(1.509)	(1.509)	(1.537)	(1.616)	(2.379)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.991	1.821	1.821	1.374	2.294	3.530
	(2.138)	(2.172)	(2.172)	(1.962)	(2.020)	(2.873)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.489	-0.440	-0.440	-0.760	-1.327	-2.062*
	(0.905)	(0.915)	(0.915)	(0.864)	(0.930)	(1.213)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.361	-0.228	-0.228	1.031	0.533	-3.128
	(1.743)	(1.772)	(1.772)	(1.841)	(2.004)	(2.591)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.0252	-0.217	-0.217	-1.215	-0.688	3.718
	(2.510)	(2.551)	(2.551)	(2.351)	(2.504)	(3.129)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.368	0.423	0.423	0.564	0.239	-1.348
	(1.062)	(1.074)	(1.074)	(1.035)	(1.153)	(1.321)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.71	0.79	1.04
p-value	0.962	0.961	0.961	0.793	0.708	0.419

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.94: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share	-0.2408	-0.2690	-0.2690	0.1601	-0.3059	-0.7021
	(0.2176)	(0.2185)	(0.2185)	(0.5391)	(0.6085)	(0.6935)
Euroscepticism vote-share	-0.0753	-0.0826	-0.0826	0.1373	-0.0237	-0.3459
	(0.1608)	(0.1632)	(0.1632)	(0.3733)	(0.4363)	(0.4706)
Regionalism vote-share	0.0091	0.0030	0.0030	0.0625	0.0358	-0.0470
	(0.0735)	(0.0743)	(0.0743)	(0.1630)	(0.1923)	(0.2547)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.0711	-0.0769	-0.0769	-0.0542	-0.0644	-0.1310
	(0.0865)	(0.0877)	(0.0877)	(0.1669)	(0.1972)	(0.2185)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.1175	-0.1255	-0.1255	-0.1657	-0.3146	-0.3385
	(0.1096)	(0.1110)	(0.1110)	(0.2755)	(0.3200)	(0.4135)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	-0.0565	-0.0643	-0.0643	0.1189	-0.0448	-0.0493
	(0.1284)	(0.1302)	(0.1302)	(0.3268)	(0.3805)	(0.4300)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.59	0.52	0.64
p-value	0.781	0.777	0.777	0.851	0.897	0.803

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.95: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share	-0.2601	-0.2689	-0.2689	-0.0741	-1.3243	-2.2694*
	(0.2873)	(0.2868)	(0.2868)	(0.9648)	(1.1495)	(1.2839)
Euroscepticism vote-share	-0.1001	-0.1023	-0.1023	0.1429	-0.2529	-0.1668
	(0.2123)	(0.2142)	(0.2142)	(0.6692)	(0.8415)	(0.9184)
Regionalism vote-share	0.0329	0.0309	0.0309	-0.2121	-0.3933	-0.8321*
	(0.0969)	(0.0973)	(0.0973)	(0.2842)	(0.3565)	(0.4478)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.1025	-0.1042	-0.1042	-0.1515	-0.2174	-0.1346
	(0.1141)	(0.1149)	(0.1149)	(0.2982)	(0.3793)	(0.4271)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.1678	-0.1701	-0.1701	-0.5173	-1.0326*	-1.4234*
	(0.1443)	(0.1453)	(0.1453)	(0.4861)	(0.5928)	(0.7502)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	-0.0188	-0.0214	-0.0214	0.3801	0.0848	-0.7587
	(0.1694)	(0.1706)	(0.1706)	(0.5823)	(0.7349)	(0.8169)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.71	0.79	1.04
p-value	0.962	0.961	0.961	0.793	0.708	0.419

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.96: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.411	0.367	0.367	-0.0899	-2.224	-1.923
	(0.499)	(0.498)	(0.498)	(1.857)	(1.854)	(1.857)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.176	0.159	0.159	0.841	0.196	0.371
	(0.521)	(0.527)	(0.527)	(1.065)	(1.167)	(1.387)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.209	0.206	0.206	-0.565	-0.859	0.0491
	(0.177)	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.851)	(0.953)	(1.164)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0974	-0.0971	-0.0971	-0.792*	-0.849*	-0.472
	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.439)	(0.496)	(0.476)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0964	-0.120	-0.120	-0.731	-1.987	-3.053*
	(0.241)	(0.240)	(0.240)	(1.335)	(1.394)	(1.661)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.465	0.442	0.442	2.585*	1.926	-0.276
	(0.303)	(0.304)	(0.304)	(1.407)	(1.562)	(1.400)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.23	1.17	1.17	2.09	3.29	1.70
p-value	0.288	0.324	0.324	0.057	0.005	0.128

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.97: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-4.955	-4.266	-4.266	-5.053*	-5.186**	-4.461
	(3.806)	(3.895)	(3.895)	(2.647)	(2.513)	(2.885)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	5.540	4.794	4.794	5.685**	3.985*	2.628
	(3.897)	(3.997)	(3.997)	(2.324)	(2.372)	(2.299)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.220	-1.973	-1.973	-0.180	-0.227	0.441
	(4.043)	(4.165)	(4.165)	(1.670)	(1.668)	(2.227)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.474	2.206	2.206	1.170	0.570	-0.0721
	(4.140)	(4.274)	(4.274)	(1.466)	(1.575)	(1.775)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.253*	-2.294*	-2.294*	-4.985***	-4.950***	-5.522***
	(1.333)	(1.374)	(1.374)	(0.703)	(0.670)	(0.858)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.543*	2.587*	2.587*	5.063***	5.504***	5.769***
	(1.365)	(1.410)	(1.410)	(0.617)	(0.633)	(0.684)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0684	-0.0738	-0.0738	-0.425	-0.436	0.539
	(0.899)	(0.927)	(0.927)	(0.690)	(0.700)	(0.703)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.0300	-0.0242	-0.0242	-0.420	-0.557	-1.047*
	(0.921)	(0.952)	(0.952)	(0.605)	(0.661)	(0.560)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.006	-0.537	-0.537	-0.0960	-0.225	-0.273
	(1.870)	(1.900)	(1.900)	(2.112)	(1.930)	(2.536)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.939	0.431	0.431	-0.727	-2.371	-2.879
	(1.914)	(1.950)	(1.950)	(1.854)	(1.822)	(2.020)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.299	-2.978	-2.978	1.739	1.688	-1.417
	(2.301)	(2.362)	(2.362)	(2.223)	(2.237)	(2.223)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	3.887	3.539	3.539	0.969	0.320	1.182
	(2.356)	(2.424)	(2.424)	(1.951)	(2.112)	(1.771)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.77	1.59	1.59	9.74	9.99	8.00
p-value	0.053	0.094	0.094	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.98: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-5.262	-4.997	-4.997	-5.655	-7.165**	-6.852
	(5.307)	(5.326)	(5.326)	(3.778)	(3.622)	(4.165)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	6.325	6.695	6.695	7.098	8.416	7.284
	(10.14)	(10.17)	(10.17)	(6.640)	(6.266)	(6.246)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.486	-1.192	-1.192	-0.870	-2.838	-2.838
	(5.793)	(5.859)	(5.859)	(3.818)	(3.710)	(3.534)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.778	-3.667	-3.667	1.093	0.677	2.561
	(5.629)	(5.687)	(5.687)	(2.356)	(2.420)	(3.197)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	6.453	6.608	6.608	-1.818	-1.455	-4.202
	(10.76)	(10.86)	(10.86)	(4.141)	(4.188)	(4.795)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-2.465	-2.762	-2.762	1.839	1.297	2.517
	(6.145)	(6.256)	(6.256)	(2.381)	(2.479)	(2.713)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.175	-0.213	-0.213	-5.718***	-5.396***	-7.212***
	(1.810)	(1.828)	(1.828)	(0.982)	(0.969)	(1.131)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-2.767	-2.821	-2.821	6.783***	6.503***	9.060***
	(3.460)	(3.492)	(3.492)	(1.726)	(1.677)	(1.696)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	3.290*	3.393*	3.393*	-1.059	-0.640	-2.006**
	(1.976)	(2.011)	(2.011)	(0.992)	(0.993)	(0.960)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.00323	0.000377	0.000377	-0.224	-0.325	0.630
	(1.254)	(1.269)	(1.269)	(0.984)	(1.021)	(1.033)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.213	-0.217	-0.217	-0.892	-0.804	-1.224
	(2.397)	(2.423)	(2.423)	(1.729)	(1.766)	(1.549)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.113	0.121	0.121	0.290	0.158	0.108
	(1.369)	(1.395)	(1.395)	(0.994)	(1.046)	(0.877)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.682	-1.497	-1.497	-1.340	-2.853	-3.546
	(2.603)	(2.591)	(2.591)	(2.996)	(2.710)	(3.566)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.668	2.927	2.927	2.194	3.513	3.495
	(4.976)	(4.949)	(4.949)	(5.266)	(4.689)	(5.348)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-1.071	-1.566	-1.566	-1.797	-3.769	-3.885
	(2.842)	(2.851)	(2.851)	(3.028)	(2.776)	(3.026)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.949	-3.820	-3.820	1.174	0.571	-3.455
	(3.206)	(3.227)	(3.227)	(3.171)	(3.249)	(3.196)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	5.547	5.727	5.727	2.294	2.821	5.151
	(6.128)	(6.163)	(6.163)	(5.573)	(5.622)	(4.793)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-1.028	-1.373	-1.373	-0.816	-1.602	-2.419
	(3.500)	(3.550)	(3.550)	(3.204)	(3.328)	(2.712)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.37	1.25	1.25	6.84	6.98	6.19
p-value	0.145	0.220	0.220	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.99: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share	0.5850	0.5280	0.5280	0.6324	-1.2011	-1.8325
	(0.5088)	(0.5141)	(0.5141)	(1.7263)	(1.8906)	(1.8444)
Euroscepticism vote-share	0.2538	0.2333	0.2333	0.9896	0.3428	0.3685
	(0.5406)	(0.5498)	(0.5498)	(1.0888)	(1.2551)	(1.4241)
Regionalism vote-share	0.2893	0.2927	0.2927	0.0785	0.5540	0.2470
	(0.1782)	(0.1814)	(0.1814)	(0.4587)	(0.5042)	(0.5487)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.0984	-0.0979	-0.0979	-0.8454*	-0.9923*	-0.5083
	(0.1202)	(0.1224)	(0.1224)	(0.4498)	(0.5265)	(0.4497)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.0668	-0.1056	-0.1056	-0.8229	-2.5958*	-3.1518*
	(0.2499)	(0.2508)	(0.2508)	(1.3775)	(1.4520)	(1.6212)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.5876*	0.5611*	0.5611*	2.7084*	2.0083	-0.2354
	(0.3077)	(0.3118)	(0.3118)	(1.4493)	(1.6833)	(1.4211)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.77	1.59	1.59	9.74	9.99	8.00
p-value	0.053	0.094	0.094	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.100: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share	0.5763	0.5048	0.5048	0.5737	-1.5874	-2.4051
	(0.5242)	(0.5314)	(0.5314)	(1.7788)	(1.9728)	(1.9938)
Euroscepticism vote-share	0.2095	0.1795	0.1795	1.1138	0.5194	0.8764
	(0.5560)	(0.5674)	(0.5674)	(1.1094)	(1.3184)	(1.5306)
Regionalism vote-share	0.3484*	0.3588**	0.3588**	0.0070	0.4670	-0.1577
	(0.1788)	(0.1824)	(0.1824)	(0.4623)	(0.5280)	(0.5415)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.0964	-0.0956	-0.0956	-0.8258*	-0.9707*	-0.4865
	(0.1239)	(0.1266)	(0.1266)	(0.4631)	(0.5560)	(0.4945)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.0861	-0.1361	-0.1361	-0.9443	-3.1088**	-3.9357**
	(0.2571)	(0.2585)	(0.2585)	(1.4106)	(1.4763)	(1.7072)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.5692*	0.5343*	0.5343*	2.6533*	1.7903	-0.7234
	(0.3167)	(0.3219)	(0.3219)	(1.4930)	(1.7698)	(1.5300)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.37	1.25	1.25	6.84	6.98	6.19
p-value	0.145	0.220	0.220	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.101: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Unweighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.345	0.325	0.325	-0.603	-0.681	-0.941
	(0.500)	(0.499)	(0.499)	(1.067)	(1.041)	(1.431)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.0715	-0.0754	-0.0754	-0.502	-0.535	-0.701
	(0.366)	(0.369)	(0.369)	(0.793)	(0.799)	(1.078)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.256	0.250	0.250	-0.0392	-0.0489	0.179
	(0.170)	(0.171)	(0.171)	(0.331)	(0.336)	(0.524)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.00457	-0.0103	-0.0103	-0.129	-0.125	0.0577
	(0.224)	(0.225)	(0.225)	(0.324)	(0.330)	(0.465)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.0164	0.00826	0.00826	-0.337	-0.353	-0.721
	(0.262)	(0.263)	(0.263)	(0.536)	(0.543)	(0.817)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.320	0.315	0.315	0.397	0.360	-0.406
	(0.265)	(0.267)	(0.267)	(0.624)	(0.619)	(0.774)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.02	0.99	0.99	0.37	0.35	0.37
p-value	0.411	0.431	0.431	0.898	0.907	0.897

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.102: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Unweighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	2.464	2.565	2.565	-0.938	-0.847	-1.111
	(3.146)	(3.135)	(3.135)	(2.200)	(2.148)	(2.174)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-2.041	-2.157	-2.157	0.345	0.172	0.203
	(2.991)	(2.981)	(2.981)	(1.973)	(1.929)	(1.926)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.551	0.571	0.571	0.0439	0.0833	-0.108
	(2.310)	(2.331)	(2.331)	(1.632)	(1.642)	(1.627)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.599	-0.622	-0.622	-0.564	-0.639	-0.712
	(2.197)	(2.217)	(2.217)	(1.464)	(1.475)	(1.441)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.614	0.642	0.642	-0.870	-0.860	-0.675
	(1.076)	(1.077)	(1.077)	(0.656)	(0.666)	(0.751)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.344	-0.377	-0.377	0.857	0.839	1.025
	(1.023)	(1.024)	(1.024)	(0.588)	(0.598)	(0.665)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.0110	0.0173	0.0173	-0.267	-0.271	-0.172
	(1.414)	(1.421)	(1.421)	(0.668)	(0.681)	(0.702)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.00624	-0.0266	-0.0266	0.142	0.151	0.276
	(1.344)	(1.351)	(1.351)	(0.599)	(0.612)	(0.622)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.101	0.141	0.141	-0.361	-0.343	-0.579
	(1.658)	(1.662)	(1.662)	(1.105)	(1.120)	(1.241)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.0814	-0.128	-0.128	0.0245	-0.0113	-0.170
	(1.576)	(1.580)	(1.580)	(0.991)	(1.006)	(1.099)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	2.056	2.079	2.079	0.336	0.379	-0.108
	(1.656)	(1.669)	(1.669)	(1.288)	(1.278)	(1.172)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.672	-1.699	-1.699	0.0627	-0.0196	-0.357
	(1.575)	(1.587)	(1.587)	(1.156)	(1.148)	(1.038)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.63	0.62	0.62	0.39	0.37	0.49
p-value	0.813	0.821	0.821	0.966	0.972	0.918

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.103: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Unweighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	3.360	4.274	4.274	-2.158	-1.346	-0.335
	(4.469)	(4.502)	(4.502)	(2.945)	(2.958)	(3.288)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-3.968	-5.825	-5.825	2.887	1.210	-1.358
	(7.411)	(7.514)	(7.514)	(4.482)	(4.580)	(5.254)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	1.042	1.978	1.978	-1.484	-0.601	0.902
	(3.660)	(3.714)	(3.714)	(2.342)	(2.395)	(2.811)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.615	0.791	0.791	-0.853	-0.532	1.208
	(3.284)	(3.357)	(3.357)	(2.185)	(2.256)	(2.432)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.737	-1.095	-1.095	1.305	0.640	-3.361
	(5.447)	(5.603)	(5.603)	(3.326)	(3.493)	(3.885)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.0743	0.255	0.255	-1.091	-0.741	1.529
	(2.690)	(2.770)	(2.770)	(1.738)	(1.826)	(2.079)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	1.062	1.326	1.326	-1.039	-0.956	-0.665
	(1.526)	(1.545)	(1.545)	(0.883)	(0.917)	(1.139)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.309	-1.846	-1.846	1.210	1.037	1.005
	(2.531)	(2.578)	(2.578)	(1.344)	(1.421)	(1.820)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.522	0.792	0.792	-0.206	-0.115	0.0118
	(1.250)	(1.274)	(1.274)	(0.702)	(0.743)	(0.974)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.273	0.532	0.532	-0.498	-0.564	-0.115
	(2.009)	(2.043)	(2.043)	(0.898)	(0.935)	(1.065)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.605	-1.132	-1.132	0.623	0.759	0.161
	(3.332)	(3.410)	(3.410)	(1.367)	(1.448)	(1.702)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.331	0.596	0.596	-0.281	-0.352	0.0667
	(1.646)	(1.686)	(1.686)	(0.714)	(0.757)	(0.911)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.243	0.597	0.597	-0.761	-0.607	-1.372
	(2.357)	(2.391)	(2.391)	(1.486)	(1.543)	(1.865)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.386	-1.107	-1.107	0.858	0.540	1.425
	(3.908)	(3.991)	(3.991)	(2.262)	(2.389)	(2.980)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.165	0.528	0.528	-0.486	-0.319	-0.921
	(1.930)	(1.973)	(1.973)	(1.182)	(1.249)	(1.595)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	2.229	2.437	2.437	0.507	0.960	-0.594
	(2.354)	(2.402)	(2.402)	(1.738)	(1.753)	(1.770)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-2.045	-2.466	-2.466	-0.293	-1.229	0.621
	(3.904)	(4.009)	(4.009)	(2.645)	(2.715)	(2.829)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.201	0.414	0.414	0.207	0.700	-0.565
	(1.928)	(1.982)	(1.982)	(1.382)	(1.419)	(1.514)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.43	0.44	0.44	0.30	0.30	0.38
p-value	0.981	0.977	0.977	0.998	0.998	0.989

$* p < .10$, $** p < .05$, $*** p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.104: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Unweighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share	0.4235	0.4076	0.4076	-0.5922	-0.6753	-0.9074
	(0.5157)	(0.5139)	(0.5139)	(1.0890)	(1.0642)	(1.5029)
Euroscepticism vote-share	-0.0485	-0.0517	-0.0517	-0.5197	-0.5560	-0.8200
	(0.3787)	(0.3822)	(0.3822)	(0.8080)	(0.8134)	(1.1249)
Regionalism vote-share	0.2692	0.2648	0.2648	-0.0127	-0.0216	0.3504
	(0.1763)	(0.1765)	(0.1765)	(0.3245)	(0.3298)	(0.5191)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.0048	-0.0093	-0.0093	-0.1246	-0.1205	0.1039
	(0.2318)	(0.2329)	(0.2329)	(0.3305)	(0.3374)	(0.4856)
Nationalism vote-share	0.0195	0.0131	0.0131	-0.3367	-0.3538	-0.7491
	(0.2718)	(0.2724)	(0.2724)	(0.5470)	(0.5550)	(0.8580)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.3836	0.3800	0.3800	0.3991	0.3597	-0.4655
	(0.2715)	(0.2735)	(0.2735)	(0.6378)	(0.6332)	(0.8101)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.63	0.62	0.62	0.39	0.37	0.49
p-value	0.813	0.821	0.821	0.966	0.972	0.918

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.105: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Unweighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share	0.4341	0.4263	0.4263	-0.7547	-0.7371	-0.7917
	(0.5217)	(0.5187)	(0.5187)	(1.1318)	(1.1132)	(1.5814)
Euroscepticism vote-share	-0.0478	-0.0493	-0.0493	-0.6392	-0.6322	-0.6237
	(0.3834)	(0.3868)	(0.3868)	(0.8399)	(0.8490)	(1.1696)
Regionalism vote-share	0.2746	0.2723	0.2723	-0.0353	-0.0334	0.3520
	(0.1782)	(0.1780)	(0.1780)	(0.3394)	(0.3453)	(0.5477)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.0014	-0.0037	-0.0037	-0.1553	-0.1568	0.1125
	(0.2345)	(0.2354)	(0.2354)	(0.3453)	(0.3518)	(0.5123)
Nationalism vote-share	0.0212	0.0181	0.0181	-0.3900	-0.3866	-0.8673
	(0.2751)	(0.2755)	(0.2755)	(0.5712)	(0.5805)	(0.8971)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.3857	0.3839	0.3839	0.4219	0.4317	-0.5380
	(0.2748)	(0.2768)	(0.2768)	(0.6680)	(0.6598)	(0.8515)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.43	0.44	0.44	0.30	0.30	0.38
p-value	0.981	0.977	0.977	0.998	0.998	0.989

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.106: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	1.362*	1.330*	1.330*	1.679	-0.201	-0.796
	(0.703)	(0.701)	(0.701)	(3.291)	(3.126)	(3.255)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.518	0.504	0.504	1.694	0.862	-0.212
	(0.758)	(0.764)	(0.764)	(2.092)	(2.101)	(2.545)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.486**	0.482**	0.482**	-0.979	-1.252	0.433
	(0.233)	(0.235)	(0.235)	(1.441)	(1.502)	(1.824)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.0560	-0.0556	-0.0556	-1.431*	-1.345	-0.321
	(0.183)	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.785)	(0.824)	(0.841)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.122	0.107	0.107	0.0946	-0.743	-2.414
	(0.336)	(0.335)	(0.335)	(2.401)	(2.439)	(3.049)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	1.227***	1.207***	1.207***	6.130**	5.126**	0.733
	(0.406)	(0.404)	(0.404)	(2.417)	(2.417)	(2.280)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	4.62	4.65	4.65	2.52	2.25	0.91
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.024	0.042	0.492

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.107: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-3.250	-0.873	-0.873	-4.837	-3.417	-3.200
	(5.862)	(6.391)	(6.391)	(4.298)	(4.330)	(4.546)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	4.630	2.215	2.215	7.300**	4.221	2.765
	(5.841)	(6.387)	(6.387)	(3.360)	(3.944)	(3.611)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-1.935	-0.983	-0.983	-0.449	0.346	-0.423
	(6.344)	(6.967)	(6.967)	(2.914)	(2.975)	(3.609)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	2.463	1.496	1.496	2.402	0.678	0.242
	(6.321)	(6.963)	(6.963)	(2.279)	(2.710)	(2.866)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-1.440	-1.422	-1.422	-5.837***	-6.507***	-5.435***
	(1.938)	(2.131)	(2.131)	(1.507)	(1.466)	(1.699)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.933	1.915	1.915	5.443***	6.895***	6.751***
	(1.931)	(2.130)	(2.130)	(1.179)	(1.336)	(1.349)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.551	-0.687	-0.687	-1.208	-1.290	0.380
	(1.535)	(1.687)	(1.687)	(1.116)	(1.169)	(1.170)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.497	0.635	0.635	-0.250	-0.0719	-0.807
	(1.529)	(1.686)	(1.686)	(0.873)	(1.065)	(0.929)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.220	1.211	1.211	0.472	1.841	1.108
	(2.815)	(3.054)	(3.054)	(3.417)	(3.374)	(4.163)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.343	-1.110	-1.110	-0.423	-3.392	-4.052
	(2.805)	(3.052)	(3.052)	(2.672)	(3.074)	(3.306)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-1.205	0.361	0.361	4.508	5.684*	0.420
	(3.386)	(3.681)	(3.681)	(3.410)	(3.423)	(3.232)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	2.441	0.851	0.851	1.817	-0.731	0.359
	(3.374)	(3.679)	(3.679)	(2.666)	(3.118)	(2.566)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.65	2.52	2.52	3.39	3.72	3.20
p-value	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.001

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.108: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-9.749	-6.682	-6.682	-10.40	-7.970	-5.581
	(10.28)	(10.93)	(10.93)	(6.314)	(6.592)	(6.650)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	21.36	16.85	16.85	23.77*	17.54	9.419
	(22.49)	(23.18)	(23.18)	(14.19)	(15.04)	(13.81)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-10.28	-8.854	-8.854	-10.29	-8.043	-4.020
	(13.33)	(13.48)	(13.48)	(8.621)	(8.761)	(8.043)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-5.663	-4.495	-4.495	-1.899	-0.373	0.242
	(11.17)	(11.95)	(11.95)	(4.389)	(4.608)	(5.311)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	12.06	10.34	10.34	6.695	2.780	-1.613
	(24.44)	(25.34)	(25.34)	(9.865)	(10.51)	(11.03)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-5.895	-5.353	-5.353	-2.683	-1.270	1.121
	(14.49)	(14.74)	(14.74)	(5.992)	(6.123)	(6.423)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	1.581	1.769	1.769	-6.936***	-8.451***	-6.999***
	(3.380)	(3.618)	(3.618)	(2.259)	(2.208)	(2.448)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-5.845	-6.123	-6.123	8.697*	12.58**	11.12**
	(7.393)	(7.672)	(7.672)	(5.078)	(5.036)	(5.085)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	4.776	4.864	4.864	-2.033	-3.436	-2.639
	(4.383)	(4.461)	(4.461)	(3.084)	(2.935)	(2.961)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.618	-0.818	-0.818	-1.486	-1.685	0.582
	(2.708)	(2.898)	(2.898)	(1.686)	(1.808)	(1.721)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.670	0.964	0.964	0.573	1.085	-1.370
	(5.922)	(6.144)	(6.144)	(3.790)	(4.124)	(3.575)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.107	-0.199	-0.199	-0.514	-0.699	0.341
	(3.511)	(3.572)	(3.572)	(2.302)	(2.403)	(2.082)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-5.528	-3.757	-3.757	-2.512	0.0671	-0.270
	(4.883)	(5.173)	(5.173)	(5.101)	(5.207)	(6.114)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	14.01	11.40	11.40	8.415	1.798	-0.203
	(10.68)	(10.97)	(10.97)	(11.47)	(11.88)	(12.70)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-8.394	-7.572	-7.572	-5.523	-3.135	-2.325
	(6.332)	(6.378)	(6.378)	(6.964)	(6.920)	(7.395)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-6.801	-4.852	-4.852	1.033	3.157	-3.776
	(5.897)	(6.258)	(6.258)	(5.065)	(5.259)	(4.555)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	16.85	13.98	13.98	12.11	6.661	12.08
	(12.90)	(13.27)	(13.27)	(11.39)	(11.99)	(9.462)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-8.849	-7.945	-7.945	-6.431	-4.464	-7.083
	(7.646)	(7.716)	(7.716)	(6.916)	(6.988)	(5.510)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.91	1.79	1.79	2.32	2.58	2.21
p-value	0.015	0.025	0.025	0.003	0.001	0.006

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.109: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share	1.3793*	1.3426*	1.3426*	2.4626	0.8036	-0.4349
	(0.7061)	(0.7080)	(0.7080)	(3.0991)	(3.2552)	(3.3230)
Euroscepticism vote-share	0.5273	0.5126	0.5126	1.9522	1.0234	-0.1802
	(0.7641)	(0.7718)	(0.7718)	(2.1015)	(2.2366)	(2.6377)
Regionalism vote-share	0.4933**	0.4930**	0.4930**	-0.3941	0.3879	1.3160
	(0.2334)	(0.2361)	(0.2361)	(1.0869)	(1.1024)	(1.2415)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.0541	-0.0520	-0.0520	-1.4574*	-1.3616	-0.4261
	(0.1849)	(0.1869)	(0.1869)	(0.8049)	(0.8786)	(0.8548)
Nationalism vote-share	0.1229	0.1007	0.1007	0.0492	-1.5504	-2.9437
	(0.3391)	(0.3383)	(0.3383)	(2.4640)	(2.5365)	(3.0425)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	1.2364***	1.2122***	1.2122***	6.3256**	4.9524*	0.7795
	(0.4078)	(0.4078)	(0.4078)	(2.4586)	(2.5728)	(2.3621)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.65	2.52	2.52	3.39	3.72	3.20
p-value	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.001

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.110: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share	1.3382*	1.3104*	1.3104*	3.0793	1.5254	-0.1830
	(0.7109)	(0.7136)	(0.7136)	(3.1161)	(3.3592)	(3.4279)
Euroscepticism vote-share	0.5037	0.4932	0.4932	2.1129	1.1373	-0.2504
	(0.7725)	(0.7803)	(0.7803)	(2.1659)	(2.3478)	(2.7375)
Regionalism vote-share	0.5124**	0.5107**	0.5107**	-0.2723	0.6962	1.4813
	(0.2337)	(0.2362)	(0.2362)	(1.1149)	(1.1252)	(1.2620)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.0545	-0.0527	-0.0527	-1.4266*	-1.2989	-0.4474
	(0.1872)	(0.1892)	(0.1892)	(0.8322)	(0.9214)	(0.8872)
Nationalism vote-share	0.0892	0.0732	0.0732	0.3800	-1.2691	-2.7980
	(0.3376)	(0.3377)	(0.3377)	(2.5173)	(2.6533)	(3.1516)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	1.2010***	1.1833***	1.1833***	6.7109***	5.3531**	1.2233
	(0.4077)	(0.4086)	(0.4086)	(2.4998)	(2.6796)	(2.3481)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.91	1.79	1.79	2.32	2.58	2.21
p-value	0.015	0.025	0.025	0.003	0.001	0.006

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.111: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.183	0.157	0.157	-0.600	-0.912	-1.036
	(0.510)	(0.510)	(0.510)	(0.889)	(0.873)	(1.332)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.00458	-0.0118	-0.0118	-0.506	-0.647	-0.651
	(0.366)	(0.370)	(0.370)	(0.611)	(0.621)	(0.900)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.163	0.157	0.157	-0.00617	-0.0400	0.190
	(0.166)	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.281)	(0.291)	(0.522)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.101	-0.107	-0.107	-0.107	-0.107	0.0394
	(0.197)	(0.198)	(0.198)	(0.270)	(0.281)	(0.430)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.0553	-0.0626	-0.0626	-0.298	-0.357	-0.771
	(0.254)	(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.445)	(0.460)	(0.792)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.204	0.197	0.197	0.199	0.104	-0.627
	(0.290)	(0.293)	(0.293)	(0.528)	(0.542)	(0.813)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.50	0.47	0.47	0.31	0.39	0.38
p-value	0.811	0.829	0.829	0.931	0.883	0.890

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.112: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.849	0.595	0.595	-0.758	-1.252	-1.622
	(2.816)	(2.824)	(2.824)	(2.191)	(2.127)	(2.093)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.635	-0.417	-0.417	0.163	0.351	0.719
	(2.638)	(2.643)	(2.643)	(2.074)	(1.998)	(1.952)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.0688	-0.00177	-0.00177	0.209	-0.00749	-0.340
	(2.024)	(2.048)	(2.048)	(1.498)	(1.507)	(1.417)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.0699	-0.00953	-0.00953	-0.743	-0.661	-0.383
	(1.896)	(1.917)	(1.917)	(1.418)	(1.415)	(1.322)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.254	0.194	0.194	-0.936	-0.997	-0.829
	(0.916)	(0.923)	(0.923)	(0.662)	(0.675)	(0.764)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.0863	-0.0354	-0.0354	0.967	0.990	1.250*
	(0.858)	(0.864)	(0.864)	(0.626)	(0.634)	(0.712)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.394	-0.448	-0.448	-0.271	-0.273	-0.260
	(1.087)	(1.098)	(1.098)	(0.664)	(0.684)	(0.673)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.278	0.325	0.325	0.171	0.172	0.368
	(1.018)	(1.028)	(1.028)	(0.628)	(0.642)	(0.628)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.212	-0.286	-0.286	-0.202	-0.294	-0.512
	(1.402)	(1.416)	(1.416)	(1.097)	(1.121)	(1.247)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.150	0.212	0.212	-0.0999	-0.0649	-0.318
	(1.313)	(1.325)	(1.325)	(1.038)	(1.053)	(1.163)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	1.278	1.218	1.218	0.259	0.110	-0.258
	(1.596)	(1.614)	(1.614)	(1.303)	(1.322)	(1.277)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.023	-0.971	-0.971	-0.0624	-0.00550	-0.452
	(1.494)	(1.511)	(1.511)	(1.233)	(1.242)	(1.191)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.30	0.28	0.28	0.42	0.45	0.64
p-value	0.989	0.992	0.992	0.956	0.942	0.800

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.113: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	2.525	2.959	2.959	-3.317	-2.915	-3.038
	(4.312)	(4.314)	(4.314)	(3.442)	(3.358)	(3.713)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-3.728	-4.816	-4.816	4.291	3.083	3.110
	(6.558)	(6.602)	(6.602)	(4.754)	(4.689)	(5.499)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	1.479	2.117	2.117	-2.071	-1.379	-1.220
	(2.866)	(2.909)	(2.909)	(2.146)	(2.135)	(2.616)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.298	0.414	0.414	-1.426	-1.261	0.201
	(3.107)	(3.144)	(3.144)	(2.359)	(2.376)	(2.525)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.494	-0.783	-0.783	1.892	1.397	-1.295
	(4.725)	(4.812)	(4.812)	(3.258)	(3.318)	(3.738)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.203	0.372	0.372	-1.323	-1.039	0.466
	(2.065)	(2.120)	(2.120)	(1.471)	(1.511)	(1.778)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.855	0.962	0.962	-1.471	-1.426	-1.311
	(1.402)	(1.410)	(1.410)	(1.050)	(1.069)	(1.356)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.197	-1.463	-1.463	1.829	1.695	2.064
	(2.131)	(2.158)	(2.158)	(1.450)	(1.493)	(2.009)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.531	0.687	0.687	-0.433	-0.356	-0.416
	(0.932)	(0.951)	(0.951)	(0.655)	(0.680)	(0.955)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.353	-0.267	-0.267	-0.778	-0.787	-0.331
	(1.669)	(1.686)	(1.686)	(1.054)	(1.080)	(1.201)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.204	-0.0124	-0.0124	0.989	1.015	0.486
	(2.538)	(2.580)	(2.580)	(1.456)	(1.508)	(1.778)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.0354	0.163	0.163	-0.411	-0.426	-0.0604
	(1.109)	(1.137)	(1.137)	(0.657)	(0.687)	(0.846)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.0896	0.0278	0.0278	-1.150	-1.085	-2.367
	(2.151)	(2.173)	(2.173)	(1.738)	(1.772)	(2.161)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.0770	-0.371	-0.371	1.429	1.234	2.813
	(3.272)	(3.325)	(3.325)	(2.401)	(2.475)	(3.200)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.108	0.281	0.281	-0.767	-0.656	-1.598
	(1.430)	(1.465)	(1.465)	(1.084)	(1.127)	(1.522)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	2.198	2.313	2.313	0.588	0.734	-1.641
	(2.443)	(2.470)	(2.470)	(2.084)	(2.099)	(2.245)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-2.720	-3.008	-3.008	-0.592	-1.031	1.881
	(3.716)	(3.780)	(3.780)	(2.878)	(2.932)	(3.324)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.811	0.980	0.980	0.266	0.517	-1.191
	(1.624)	(1.665)	(1.665)	(1.299)	(1.335)	(1.581)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.25	0.26	0.26	0.40	0.41	0.53
p-value	0.999	0.999	0.999	0.985	0.985	0.939

$* p < .10$, $** p < .05$, $*** p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.114: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share	0.2145	0.1778	0.1778	-0.5943	-0.9004	-0.9025
	(0.5313)	(0.5319)	(0.5319)	(0.9095)	(0.8925)	(1.4086)
Euroscepticism vote-share	-0.0011	-0.0113	-0.0113	-0.5347	-0.6686	-0.7223
	(0.3818)	(0.3858)	(0.3858)	(0.6217)	(0.6323)	(0.9538)
Regionalism vote-share	0.1676	0.1590	0.1590	0.0305	-0.0072	0.4212
	(0.1728)	(0.1739)	(0.1739)	(0.2748)	(0.2834)	(0.5142)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.1151	-0.1231	-0.1231	-0.1001	-0.1017	0.1076
	(0.2051)	(0.2068)	(0.2068)	(0.2755)	(0.2868)	(0.4529)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.0628	-0.0734	-0.0734	-0.3018	-0.3589	-0.8298
	(0.2644)	(0.2666)	(0.2666)	(0.4553)	(0.4704)	(0.8395)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.2552	0.2464	0.2464	0.1969	0.1041	-0.7107
	(0.3010)	(0.3040)	(0.3040)	(0.5408)	(0.5548)	(0.8597)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.30	0.28	0.28	0.42	0.45	0.64
p-value	0.989	0.992	0.992	0.956	0.942	0.800

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.115: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share	0.2756	0.2604	0.2604	-1.0979	-1.2108	-1.1483
	(0.5480)	(0.5463)	(0.5463)	(1.0497)	(1.0234)	(1.5321)
Euroscepticism vote-share	0.0073	0.0032	0.0032	-0.8563	-0.9025	-0.6285
	(0.3948)	(0.3982)	(0.3982)	(0.7193)	(0.7242)	(1.0416)
Regionalism vote-share	0.1895	0.1858	0.1858	-0.0747	-0.0873	0.3375
	(0.1781)	(0.1786)	(0.1786)	(0.3203)	(0.3259)	(0.5596)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.1137	-0.1167	-0.1167	-0.2000	-0.1975	0.0954
	(0.2121)	(0.2135)	(0.2135)	(0.3215)	(0.3291)	(0.4955)
Nationalism vote-share	-0.0583	-0.0624	-0.0624	-0.4883	-0.5065	-1.1518
	(0.2734)	(0.2752)	(0.2752)	(0.5301)	(0.5403)	(0.8916)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	0.2887	0.2847	0.2847	0.2615	0.2205	-0.9506
	(0.3105)	(0.3128)	(0.3128)	(0.6356)	(0.6399)	(0.9261)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	0.25	0.26	0.26	0.40	0.41	0.53
p-value	0.999	0.999	0.999	0.985	0.985	0.939

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.116: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	1.232	1.187	1.187	0.0270	-1.473	-1.673
	(0.779)	(0.778)	(0.778)	(2.981)	(2.816)	(2.873)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.506	0.488	0.488	0.226	-0.357	-1.141
	(0.827)	(0.834)	(0.834)	(1.730)	(1.733)	(2.096)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.412	0.408	0.408	-0.636	-0.786	0.920
	(0.279)	(0.282)	(0.282)	(1.372)	(1.430)	(1.757)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.136	-0.135	-0.135	-1.166	-1.138	-0.406
	(0.184)	(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.711)	(0.744)	(0.736)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.0844	0.0601	0.0601	-0.381	-1.175	-2.839
	(0.383)	(0.382)	(0.382)	(2.154)	(2.139)	(2.655)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	1.104**	1.080**	1.080**	4.380*	3.720	-0.0479
	(0.469)	(0.469)	(0.469)	(2.242)	(2.271)	(2.130)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.48	2.43	2.43	1.77	1.91	1.18
p-value	0.023	0.026	0.026	0.108	0.084	0.321

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.117: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-3.174	-1.184	-1.184	-6.601	-4.851	-4.665
	(5.504)	(5.934)	(5.934)	(4.227)	(4.298)	(4.375)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	4.437	2.394	2.394	7.162**	4.090	3.156
	(5.486)	(5.939)	(5.939)	(3.418)	(3.937)	(3.470)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-1.405	-0.680	-0.680	-1.368	-0.451	-0.782
	(5.870)	(6.373)	(6.373)	(2.625)	(2.704)	(3.259)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.924	1.180	1.180	1.722	0.113	-0.379
	(5.850)	(6.378)	(6.378)	(2.123)	(2.477)	(2.585)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-2.142	-2.341	-2.341	-6.152***	-7.141***	-6.240***
	(1.952)	(2.120)	(2.120)	(1.509)	(1.427)	(1.644)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	2.571	2.776	2.776	5.961***	7.696***	7.555***
	(1.946)	(2.122)	(2.122)	(1.220)	(1.307)	(1.304)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.551	-0.654	-0.654	-1.114	-1.162	0.480
	(1.306)	(1.419)	(1.419)	(1.093)	(1.161)	(1.113)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.418	0.524	0.524	-0.0560	0.0290	-0.935
	(1.302)	(1.420)	(1.420)	(0.884)	(1.063)	(0.883)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.0945	1.336	1.336	-0.0457	1.801	0.594
	(2.723)	(2.910)	(2.910)	(3.310)	(3.240)	(3.995)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.180	-1.288	-1.288	-0.363	-3.604	-3.623
	(2.714)	(2.912)	(2.912)	(2.677)	(2.968)	(3.169)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-1.376	-0.330	-0.330	3.326	4.544	-0.716
	(3.315)	(3.580)	(3.580)	(3.436)	(3.536)	(3.307)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	2.496	1.423	1.423	1.138	-0.998	0.704
	(3.303)	(3.583)	(3.583)	(2.778)	(3.239)	(2.623)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.66	1.58	1.58	3.35	4.37	4.46
p-value	0.074	0.097	0.097	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.118: Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-10.15	-7.515	-7.515	-13.28**	-10.75*	-8.385
	(9.453)	(10.08)	(10.08)	(6.230)	(6.481)	(6.409)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	21.43	17.45	17.45	25.09*	19.70	12.34
	(19.50)	(20.23)	(20.23)	(12.94)	(13.50)	(11.98)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-10.06	-8.759	-8.759	-10.97	-9.276	-5.392
	(11.08)	(11.24)	(11.24)	(7.649)	(7.681)	(6.730)
Euroscepticism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-5.325	-4.458	-4.458	-3.253	-1.802	-0.662
	(10.14)	(10.87)	(10.87)	(3.999)	(4.188)	(4.858)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	11.47	10.17	10.17	6.785	3.688	-0.674
	(20.91)	(21.82)	(21.82)	(8.305)	(8.722)	(9.084)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-5.654	-5.226	-5.226	-3.098	-2.125	0.173
	(11.88)	(12.13)	(12.13)	(4.909)	(4.963)	(5.102)
Regionalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.992	0.890	0.890	-7.801***	-9.656***	-8.695***
	(3.336)	(3.577)	(3.577)	(2.274)	(2.107)	(2.316)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-5.064	-4.910	-4.910	10.39**	14.35***	13.61***
	(6.882)	(7.182)	(7.182)	(4.723)	(4.387)	(4.330)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	4.520	4.470	4.470	-2.708	-3.952	-3.558
	(3.909)	(3.992)	(3.992)	(2.792)	(2.496)	(2.432)
Far-Right vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-1.083	-1.278	-1.278	-1.709	-1.840	0.718
	(2.260)	(2.422)	(2.422)	(1.672)	(1.795)	(1.657)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.714	2.008	2.008	1.542	1.822	-1.522
	(4.662)	(4.863)	(4.863)	(3.472)	(3.738)	(3.098)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.767	-0.863	-0.863	-0.978	-1.066	0.345
	(2.648)	(2.703)	(2.703)	(2.052)	(2.127)	(1.740)
Nationalism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-5.917	-4.078	-4.078	-3.364	-0.403	-1.101
	(4.607)	(4.879)	(4.879)	(5.003)	(5.001)	(5.929)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	14.37	11.59	11.59	8.545	2.225	0.561
	(9.502)	(9.795)	(9.795)	(10.39)	(10.41)	(11.09)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-8.398	-7.491	-7.491	-5.451	-3.465	-2.458
	(5.397)	(5.444)	(5.444)	(6.142)	(5.926)	(6.227)
Right-wing Populism vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-6.288	-4.987	-4.987	0.802	2.727	-4.678
	(5.676)	(6.061)	(6.061)	(5.232)	(5.475)	(4.759)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	14.46	12.50	12.50	7.914	3.805	10.48
	(11.71)	(12.17)	(12.17)	(10.87)	(11.40)	(8.897)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-7.085	-6.444	-6.444	-4.146	-2.855	-5.744
	(6.650)	(6.764)	(6.764)	(6.423)	(6.488)	(4.997)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.29	1.20	1.20	2.47	3.26	3.13
p-value	0.189	0.263	0.263	0.002	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.119: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share	1.2624	1.2098	1.2098	0.5610	-0.7603	-1.5085
	(0.7829)	(0.7864)	(0.7864)	(2.8154)	(2.8941)	(2.8910)
Euroscepticism vote-share	0.5187	0.4996	0.4996	0.3545	-0.3376	-1.1612
	(0.8349)	(0.8446)	(0.8446)	(1.7486)	(1.8208)	(2.1537)
Regionalism vote-share	0.4292	0.4345	0.4345	-0.1917	0.5547	1.3150
	(0.2777)	(0.2810)	(0.2810)	(1.0054)	(0.9606)	(1.0860)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.1330	-0.1303	-0.1303	-1.1697	-1.1332	-0.4552
	(0.1858)	(0.1881)	(0.1881)	(0.7284)	(0.7815)	(0.7354)
Nationalism vote-share	0.0856	0.0478	0.0478	-0.4083	-1.8026	-3.0287
	(0.3873)	(0.3856)	(0.3856)	(2.2051)	(2.1814)	(2.6397)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	1.1209**	1.0932**	1.0932**	4.4648*	3.5458	-0.0111
	(0.4715)	(0.4745)	(0.4745)	(2.2886)	(2.3808)	(2.1854)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.66	1.58	1.58	3.35	4.37	4.46
p-value	0.074	0.097	0.097	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.120: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of Orientations Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right vote-share	1.2204	1.1801	1.1801	0.8404	-0.3318	-1.4407
	(0.7856)	(0.7903)	(0.7903)	(2.7646)	(2.8887)	(2.9199)
Euroscepticism vote-share	0.4951	0.4818	0.4818	0.4334	-0.2394	-1.1634
	(0.8426)	(0.8524)	(0.8524)	(1.7745)	(1.8667)	(2.2136)
Regionalism vote-share	0.4481	0.4497	0.4497	-0.1227	0.7373	1.3598
	(0.2773)	(0.2806)	(0.2806)	(1.0091)	(0.9389)	(1.0552)
Far-Right vote-share	-0.1362	-0.1333	-0.1333	-1.1448	-1.0839	-0.4596
	(0.1878)	(0.1900)	(0.1900)	(0.7417)	(0.8000)	(0.7550)
Nationalism vote-share	0.0506	0.0224	0.0224	-0.2695	-1.6426	-2.9978
	(0.3828)	(0.3827)	(0.3827)	(2.2200)	(2.2289)	(2.7015)
Right-wing Populism vote-share	1.0913**	1.0714**	1.0714**	4.5703**	3.6777	0.0612
	(0.4717)	(0.4754)	(0.4754)	(2.3215)	(2.4404)	(2.1681)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.29	1.20	1.20	2.47	3.26	3.13
p-value	0.189	0.263	0.263	0.002	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.121: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Unweighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.196	0.197	0.197	0.00883	-0.0348	-0.755
	(0.159)	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.451)	(0.503)	(0.462)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.370***	0.372***	0.372***	-0.370	-0.424	-0.518
	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.326)	(0.364)	(0.444)
SD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.234	-0.228	-0.228	-0.483	-0.243	-0.0156
	(0.186)	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.628)	(0.692)	(0.725)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0412	-0.0358	-0.0358	-0.622	-0.409	0.754
	(0.236)	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.736)	(0.816)	(0.815)
EPP vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.156	-0.148	-0.148	-0.0984	0.319	1.130
	(0.243)	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.917)	(1.005)	(1.103)
ECR vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.00836	-0.0301	-0.0301	0.732	-0.0230	0.510
	(0.158)	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.809)	(0.826)	(0.989)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0799	-0.0843	-0.0843	0.0434	-0.130	-0.340
	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.463)	(0.511)	(0.562)
ENF vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0557	0.0510	0.0510	0.0259	-0.183	-0.397
	(0.0993)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.345)	(0.371)	(0.427)
NI vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0304	0.0190	0.0190	0.827	0.802	0.607
	(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.739)	(0.825)	(0.980)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.61	2.56	2.56	0.52	0.33	1.80
p-value	0.006	0.007	0.007	0.862	0.966	0.070

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.122: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Unweighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.209	0.189	0.189	0.443	0.440	1.827*
	(1.634)	(1.666)	(1.666)	(1.068)	(1.088)	(1.061)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.0136	0.00860	0.00860	-0.454	-0.519	-2.614***
	(1.674)	(1.709)	(1.709)	(1.009)	(1.050)	(0.993)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.159	-0.208	-0.208	-1.160	-1.161	-1.141
	(1.085)	(1.106)	(1.106)	(0.756)	(0.771)	(1.182)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.544	0.597	0.597	0.826	0.805	0.630
	(1.112)	(1.134)	(1.134)	(0.714)	(0.744)	(1.106)
SD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	3.991**	3.968**	3.968**	1.161	1.168	1.629
	(1.817)	(1.853)	(1.853)	(1.451)	(1.469)	(1.903)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-4.350**	-4.325**	-4.325**	-1.719	-1.542	-1.665
	(1.862)	(1.901)	(1.901)	(1.370)	(1.417)	(1.781)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.519	-2.678	-2.678	-0.515	-0.506	0.213
	(2.407)	(2.450)	(2.450)	(1.752)	(1.774)	(2.184)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.551	2.724	2.724	-0.112	0.106	0.548
	(2.467)	(2.513)	(2.513)	(1.655)	(1.711)	(2.043)
EPP vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	3.298	3.215	3.215	0.270	0.288	-1.056
	(2.460)	(2.507)	(2.507)	(2.181)	(2.183)	(2.911)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-3.557	-3.467	-3.467	-0.386	0.0342	2.213
	(2.520)	(2.572)	(2.572)	(2.060)	(2.106)	(2.723)
ECR vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.389	-2.011	-2.011	-4.553***	-4.576***	-5.808***
	(1.592)	(1.579)	(1.579)	(1.530)	(1.454)	(2.145)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.451	2.042	2.042	5.525***	4.975***	6.396***
	(1.631)	(1.620)	(1.620)	(1.445)	(1.402)	(2.006)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.898	-0.828	-0.828	-0.0299	-0.0373	-0.398
	(1.270)	(1.293)	(1.293)	(1.103)	(1.110)	(1.510)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.842	0.767	0.767	0.0765	-0.101	0.0592
	(1.302)	(1.327)	(1.327)	(1.042)	(1.071)	(1.413)
ENF vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0683	0.0210	0.0210	0.0384	0.0293	-0.180
	(1.022)	(1.039)	(1.039)	(0.820)	(0.805)	(1.145)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.128	0.0309	0.0309	-0.0131	-0.232	-0.220
	(1.048)	(1.066)	(1.066)	(0.775)	(0.777)	(1.071)
NI vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.131	-1.954	-1.954	-0.448	-0.447	-0.349
	(1.745)	(1.771)	(1.771)	(1.735)	(1.770)	(2.622)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.226	2.034	2.034	1.332	1.365	0.968
	(1.789)	(1.817)	(1.817)	(1.639)	(1.708)	(2.453)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.85	1.75	1.75	2.63	2.73	3.41
p-value	0.018	0.029	0.029	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.123: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Unweighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	1.227	1.211	1.211	1.801	1.740	2.851
	(2.225)	(2.270)	(2.270)	(2.233)	(2.378)	(2.205)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-1.932	-1.911	-1.911	-2.335	-2.272	-3.959
	(3.293)	(3.351)	(3.351)	(2.893)	(3.035)	(2.721)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.968	0.964	0.964	0.912	0.872	0.634
	(1.429)	(1.445)	(1.445)	(1.313)	(1.413)	(1.190)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.427	0.366	0.366	-3.529**	-3.865**	-5.621**
	(1.480)	(1.508)	(1.508)	(1.498)	(1.576)	(2.159)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.559	-0.481	-0.481	4.107**	4.452**	6.520**
	(2.190)	(2.227)	(2.227)	(1.940)	(2.012)	(2.664)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.557	0.542	0.542	-1.591*	-1.813*	-2.776**
	(0.950)	(0.960)	(0.960)	(0.881)	(0.937)	(1.165)
SD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	6.516***	6.514***	6.514***	2.956	3.740	7.550**
	(2.429)	(2.478)	(2.478)	(3.033)	(3.180)	(3.650)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-9.111**	-9.107**	-9.107**	-4.205	-5.011	-9.449**
	(3.595)	(3.658)	(3.658)	(3.930)	(4.058)	(4.504)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	2.404	2.403	2.403	1.206	1.725	3.668*
	(1.560)	(1.578)	(1.578)	(1.784)	(1.890)	(1.970)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.755	-2.973	-2.973	-3.058	-2.629	-1.466
	(3.293)	(3.351)	(3.351)	(3.650)	(3.876)	(4.551)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.996	3.278	3.278	3.410	2.969	2.756
	(4.873)	(4.948)	(4.948)	(4.730)	(4.946)	(5.617)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.225	-0.279	-0.279	-1.708	-1.424	-1.040
	(2.115)	(2.134)	(2.134)	(2.146)	(2.304)	(2.457)
EPP vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	1.607	1.475	1.475	-2.963	-1.949	-0.0160
	(3.346)	(3.411)	(3.411)	(4.543)	(4.782)	(6.089)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.368	-0.197	-0.197	4.093	3.051	0.846
	(4.952)	(5.036)	(5.036)	(5.885)	(6.102)	(7.514)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-1.610	-1.643	-1.643	-2.172	-1.500	0.644
	(2.149)	(2.172)	(2.172)	(2.671)	(2.842)	(3.287)
ECR vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.128	-2.624	-2.624	-0.543	-1.898	-1.720
	(2.172)	(2.156)	(2.156)	(3.092)	(3.140)	(4.353)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	3.845	3.194	3.194	-0.0287	1.363	1.021
	(3.214)	(3.183)	(3.183)	(4.006)	(4.007)	(5.372)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.703	-0.579	-0.579	2.694	1.796	2.533
	(1.395)	(1.373)	(1.373)	(1.818)	(1.866)	(2.350)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.025	-0.931	-0.931	0.527	0.00599	-0.149
	(1.737)	(1.770)	(1.770)	(2.324)	(2.447)	(3.161)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.081	0.961	0.961	-0.694	-0.159	-0.268
	(2.571)	(2.613)	(2.613)	(3.011)	(3.122)	(3.901)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.121	-0.0975	-0.0975	0.374	0.0290	0.154
	(1.116)	(1.127)	(1.127)	(1.367)	(1.454)	(1.706)
ENF vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.762	0.892	0.892	0.271	-0.422	-0.399
	(1.388)	(1.410)	(1.410)	(1.730)	(1.772)	(2.397)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-1.437	-1.606	-1.606	-0.336	0.376	0.0682
	(2.054)	(2.081)	(2.081)	(2.242)	(2.261)	(2.959)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.790	0.822	0.822	0.156	-0.303	-0.136
	(0.891)	(0.898)	(0.898)	(1.017)	(1.053)	(1.294)
NI vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.889	-2.657	-2.657	0.502	0.715	-3.253
	(2.383)	(2.419)	(2.419)	(3.656)	(3.891)	(5.434)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	3.655	3.355	3.355	0.0170	-0.202	4.785
	(3.526)	(3.571)	(3.571)	(4.736)	(4.966)	(6.705)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.721	-0.664	-0.664	0.638	0.779	-1.799
	(1.530)	(1.540)	(1.540)	(2.149)	(2.313)	(2.933)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.49	1.43	1.43	2.73	2.42	3.64
p-value	0.057	0.079	0.079	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.124: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Unweighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.1956	0.1973	0.1973	-0.0109	-0.0789	-0.7867*
	(0.1674)	(0.1701)	(0.1701)	(0.4599)	(0.5187)	(0.4056)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.3854***	0.3896***	0.3896***	-0.3339	-0.3556	-0.5105
	(0.1112)	(0.1129)	(0.1129)	(0.3255)	(0.3678)	(0.4520)
SD vote-share	-0.3589*	-0.3570*	-0.3570*	-0.5579	-0.3735	-0.0359
	(0.1861)	(0.1891)	(0.1891)	(0.6245)	(0.7003)	(0.7275)
ALDE vote-share	0.0323	0.0456	0.0456	-0.6274	-0.4003	0.7610
	(0.2466)	(0.2501)	(0.2501)	(0.7542)	(0.8455)	(0.8350)
EPP vote-share	-0.2584	-0.2515	-0.2515	-0.1152	0.3221	1.1567
	(0.2519)	(0.2559)	(0.2559)	(0.9391)	(1.0407)	(1.1126)
ECR vote-share	0.0623	0.0309	0.0309	0.9725	0.3994	0.5879
	(0.1630)	(0.1612)	(0.1612)	(0.6588)	(0.6929)	(0.8198)
EFDD vote-share	-0.0556	-0.0614	-0.0614	0.0467	-0.1383	-0.3392
	(0.1301)	(0.1320)	(0.1320)	(0.4747)	(0.5293)	(0.5772)
ENF vote-share	0.0594	0.0519	0.0519	0.0253	-0.2029	-0.3997
	(0.1047)	(0.1061)	(0.1061)	(0.3530)	(0.3839)	(0.4378)
NI vote-share	0.0945	0.0798	0.0798	0.8846	0.9181	0.6186
	(0.1788)	(0.1808)	(0.1808)	(0.7468)	(0.8439)	(1.0021)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.85	1.75	1.75	2.63	2.73	3.41
p-value	0.018	0.029	0.029	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.125: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Unweighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.2634	0.2641	0.2641	0.3784	0.3396	-0.4747
	(0.1957)	(0.1982)	(0.1982)	(0.7279)	(0.8582)	(0.7170)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.4244***	0.4271***	0.4271***	-1.0130**	-1.2260**	-1.8764***
	(0.1302)	(0.1317)	(0.1317)	(0.4882)	(0.5688)	(0.7021)
SD vote-share	-0.1907	-0.1906	-0.1906	-0.0433	0.4545	1.7692
	(0.2137)	(0.2164)	(0.2164)	(0.9889)	(1.1475)	(1.1868)
ALDE vote-share	0.0166	0.0263	0.0263	-1.3563	-1.0837	0.2492
	(0.2896)	(0.2926)	(0.2926)	(1.1900)	(1.3987)	(1.4800)
EPP vote-share	-0.3711	-0.3653	-0.3653	-1.0420	-0.3980	1.4738
	(0.2943)	(0.2978)	(0.2978)	(1.4809)	(1.7255)	(1.9800)
ECR vote-share	0.0131	-0.0092	-0.0092	2.1219**	1.2616	1.8342
	(0.1910)	(0.1883)	(0.1883)	(1.0080)	(1.1331)	(1.4154)
EFDD vote-share	-0.0640	-0.0682	-0.0682	0.2062	-0.1244	-0.2633
	(0.1528)	(0.1545)	(0.1545)	(0.7577)	(0.8828)	(1.0279)
ENF vote-share	0.1146	0.1089	0.1089	0.0921	-0.3481	-0.4665
	(0.1221)	(0.1231)	(0.1231)	(0.5640)	(0.6393)	(0.7796)
NI vote-share	0.0441	0.0338	0.0338	1.1568	1.2920	-0.2666
	(0.2096)	(0.2112)	(0.2112)	(1.1917)	(1.4042)	(1.7669)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.49	1.43	1.43	2.73	2.42	3.64
p-value	0.057	0.079	0.079	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.126: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.383**	0.377**	0.377**	-0.221	-1.024	0.466
	(0.184)	(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.785)	(0.865)	(0.685)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.904***	0.909***	0.909***	-1.838**	-2.361**	-1.153
	(0.155)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.915)	(1.056)	(1.268)
SD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.208	0.196	0.196	2.574	2.274	0.292
	(0.284)	(0.286)	(0.286)	(1.856)	(2.180)	(2.007)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0755	-0.0340	-0.0340	-4.003*	-1.386	1.869
	(0.370)	(0.363)	(0.363)	(2.258)	(2.439)	(2.461)
EPP vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.879**	-0.835*	-0.835*	0.220	4.591**	4.001*
	(0.445)	(0.440)	(0.440)	(2.204)	(1.908)	(2.284)
ECR vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.210	-0.240	-0.240	2.498	0.673	0.0469
	(0.315)	(0.312)	(0.312)	(1.848)	(2.047)	(2.265)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.293	0.270	0.270	0.981	-0.962	-0.786
	(0.278)	(0.276)	(0.276)	(1.786)	(1.950)	(2.049)
ENF vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.223	0.197	0.197	0.896	-1.265	-3.089*
	(0.220)	(0.215)	(0.215)	(1.502)	(1.538)	(1.693)
NI vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.768***	-0.753***	-0.753***	-1.648	-0.384	1.447
	(0.224)	(0.224)	(0.224)	(1.851)	(2.117)	(2.346)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	8.87	9.15	9.15	1.88	1.95	2.67
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.056	0.046	0.006

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.127: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.202	-1.100	-1.100	-2.293**	-2.393**	-0.0321
	(1.640)	(1.699)	(1.699)	(1.059)	(1.064)	(0.987)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.623	1.515	1.515	2.360***	1.967**	0.552
	(1.668)	(1.732)	(1.732)	(0.897)	(0.980)	(0.777)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	1.271	1.148	1.148	-5.126***	-5.084***	-5.009***
	(1.392)	(1.441)	(1.441)	(1.079)	(1.103)	(1.370)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.375	-0.245	-0.245	3.748***	3.914***	4.270***
	(1.416)	(1.469)	(1.469)	(0.914)	(1.015)	(1.079)
SD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	3.571	4.160	4.160	7.759***	7.392***	5.950**
	(2.509)	(2.576)	(2.576)	(2.463)	(2.394)	(2.291)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-3.443	-4.065	-4.065	-5.909***	-7.356***	-6.265***
	(2.552)	(2.626)	(2.626)	(2.086)	(2.205)	(1.804)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.870	-2.292	-2.292	-5.699*	-4.906	-2.491
	(3.322)	(3.331)	(3.331)	(3.413)	(3.041)	(3.304)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.813	2.316	2.316	1.933	5.059*	4.828*
	(3.380)	(3.396)	(3.396)	(2.891)	(2.800)	(2.601)
EPP vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	6.372*	5.334	5.334	3.660	4.637*	1.763
	(3.865)	(3.956)	(3.956)	(3.231)	(2.536)	(3.254)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-7.423*	-6.328	-6.328	-3.920	-0.0662	2.479
	(3.932)	(4.033)	(4.033)	(2.737)	(2.335)	(2.562)
ECR vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.022	-0.0815	-0.0815	0.637	0.252	-2.292
	(2.829)	(2.875)	(2.875)	(2.774)	(2.717)	(3.218)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.832	-0.162	-0.162	2.121	0.605	2.590
	(2.878)	(2.930)	(2.930)	(2.350)	(2.502)	(2.534)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.887	-3.329	-3.329	0.198	-0.278	0.980
	(2.427)	(2.493)	(2.493)	(2.715)	(2.583)	(2.935)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	4.280*	3.691	3.691	0.892	-0.984	-1.955
	(2.469)	(2.541)	(2.541)	(2.300)	(2.378)	(2.311)
ENF vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.346	-0.570	-0.570	0.428	-0.123	-1.537
	(1.964)	(1.979)	(1.979)	(2.287)	(2.012)	(2.419)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.606	0.787	0.787	0.533	-1.642	-1.718
	(1.998)	(2.018)	(2.018)	(1.937)	(1.853)	(1.904)
NI vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.716	-3.295	-3.295	-2.728	-2.331	0.526
	(1.991)	(2.033)	(2.033)	(2.808)	(2.745)	(3.411)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.995	2.607	2.607	1.231	2.798	1.020
	(2.025)	(2.072)	(2.072)	(2.379)	(2.527)	(2.686)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	5.28	5.42	5.42	6.35	5.79	5.01
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.128: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.204	0.238	0.238	-1.395	-1.686	1.176
	(2.359)	(2.390)	(2.390)	(1.502)	(1.554)	(1.466)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-2.064	-2.049	-2.049	0.148	0.322	-1.848
	(4.739)	(4.786)	(4.786)	(2.762)	(2.789)	(2.296)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	2.283	2.230	2.230	1.365	1.051	1.459
	(2.746)	(2.790)	(2.790)	(1.610)	(1.666)	(1.315)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	1.973	1.900	1.900	-5.550***	-5.431***	-6.914***
	(2.010)	(2.034)	(2.034)	(1.548)	(1.621)	(2.015)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-2.217	-2.248	-2.248	4.792*	4.721	8.054**
	(4.040)	(4.073)	(4.073)	(2.847)	(2.910)	(3.157)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	1.141	1.253	1.253	-0.644	-0.515	-2.301
	(2.341)	(2.374)	(2.374)	(1.659)	(1.738)	(1.807)
SD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	6.685*	6.951*	6.951*	8.220**	6.925*	7.307**
	(3.582)	(3.602)	(3.602)	(3.541)	(3.525)	(3.490)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-11.61	-11.50	-11.50	-7.046	-6.270	-8.961
	(7.197)	(7.214)	(7.214)	(6.512)	(6.327)	(5.469)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	5.059	4.650	4.650	0.701	-0.694	1.639
	(4.170)	(4.205)	(4.205)	(3.795)	(3.778)	(3.131)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.328	-2.062	-2.062	-6.799	-4.009	-0.610
	(4.810)	(4.715)	(4.715)	(4.901)	(4.473)	(5.035)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.015	1.703	1.703	4.645	2.972	1.092
	(9.666)	(9.442)	(9.442)	(9.011)	(8.029)	(7.890)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.744	0.383	0.383	-1.673	1.334	2.271
	(5.601)	(5.504)	(5.504)	(5.252)	(4.795)	(4.517)
EPP vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	8.491	7.924	7.924	2.768	6.243*	2.347
	(5.582)	(5.575)	(5.575)	(4.642)	(3.706)	(4.991)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-12.98	-13.22	-13.22	-1.722	-3.805	1.318
	(11.22)	(11.17)	(11.17)	(8.536)	(6.653)	(7.821)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	3.443	4.314	4.314	-1.356	2.389	0.706
	(6.499)	(6.508)	(6.508)	(4.975)	(3.973)	(4.478)
ECR vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.440	-1.932	-1.932	5.585	4.582	2.111
	(4.087)	(4.052)	(4.052)	(3.725)	(3.801)	(4.737)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	4.551	4.766	4.766	-10.08	-9.475	-6.155
	(8.212)	(8.115)	(8.115)	(6.850)	(6.823)	(7.423)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-2.303	-3.083	-3.083	7.523*	6.441	5.317
	(4.758)	(4.730)	(4.730)	(3.992)	(4.075)	(4.250)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-4.990	-4.685	-4.685	-0.00132	-1.744	2.661
	(3.508)	(3.518)	(3.518)	(3.907)	(3.781)	(4.473)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	7.172	7.302	7.302	1.385	2.429	-5.295
	(7.049)	(7.046)	(7.046)	(7.184)	(6.788)	(7.009)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-1.791	-2.259	-2.259	-0.303	-2.181	2.031
	(4.085)	(4.107)	(4.107)	(4.187)	(4.053)	(4.013)
ENF vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.576	-1.170	-1.170	-0.0421	-2.080	-3.364
	(2.844)	(2.799)	(2.799)	(3.288)	(2.909)	(3.667)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.211	2.384	2.384	1.693	2.915	1.911
	(5.714)	(5.606)	(5.606)	(6.045)	(5.223)	(5.745)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.375	-0.999	-0.999	-0.715	-2.911	-2.206
	(3.311)	(3.267)	(3.267)	(3.523)	(3.119)	(3.290)
NI vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-4.253	-4.535	-4.535	-3.111	-1.700	-1.038
	(2.867)	(2.867)	(2.867)	(4.039)	(4.040)	(5.212)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	6.027	5.908	5.908	2.175	1.329	4.126
	(5.761)	(5.741)	(5.741)	(7.427)	(7.251)	(8.167)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-2.497	-2.065	-2.065	-0.582	0.939	-1.888
	(3.338)	(3.346)	(3.346)	(4.329)	(4.330)	(4.676)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	3.78	3.85	3.85	5.38	4.75	5.48
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.129: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.4208**	0.4150**	0.4150**	0.0677	-0.4253	0.5196
	(0.1883)	(0.1912)	(0.1912)	(0.7169)	(0.8697)	(0.6980)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.8957***	0.9026***	0.9026***	-1.3786*	-1.1702	-0.7391
	(0.1598)	(0.1622)	(0.1622)	(0.7304)	(0.9012)	(0.9692)
SD vote-share	0.1280	0.0947	0.0947	1.8499	0.0358	-0.3154
	(0.2881)	(0.2899)	(0.2899)	(1.6667)	(1.9572)	(1.6203)
ALDE vote-share	-0.0565	0.0239	0.0239	-3.7662	0.1537	2.3366
	(0.3815)	(0.3749)	(0.3749)	(2.3097)	(2.4861)	(2.3363)
EPP vote-share	-1.0519**	-0.9932**	-0.9932**	-0.2603	4.5710**	4.2416*
	(0.4438)	(0.4453)	(0.4453)	(2.1867)	(2.0726)	(2.3014)
ECR vote-share	-0.1907	-0.2438	-0.2438	2.7581	0.8573	0.2980
	(0.3248)	(0.3236)	(0.3236)	(1.8771)	(2.2208)	(2.2756)
EFDD vote-share	0.3933	0.3617	0.3617	1.0908	-1.2618	-0.9754
	(0.2787)	(0.2806)	(0.2806)	(1.8377)	(2.1113)	(2.0756)
ENF vote-share	0.2606	0.2168	0.2168	0.9614	-1.7648	-3.2555*
	(0.2255)	(0.2228)	(0.2228)	(1.5475)	(1.6447)	(1.7105)
NI vote-share	-0.7211***	-0.6883***	-0.6883***	-1.4972	0.4672	1.5458
	(0.2286)	(0.2288)	(0.2288)	(1.9003)	(2.2438)	(2.4123)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	5.28	5.42	5.42	6.35	5.79	5.01
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.130: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.4229**	0.4190**	0.4190**	0.1172	-0.3126	0.7871
	(0.1889)	(0.1920)	(0.1920)	(0.7233)	(0.8987)	(0.7345)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.8967***	0.9049***	0.9049***	-1.4019*	-1.2254	-1.1609
	(0.1610)	(0.1634)	(0.1634)	(0.7456)	(0.9375)	(1.0097)
SD vote-share	0.1327	0.1031	0.1031	1.8754	-0.0385	-0.0149
	(0.2868)	(0.2894)	(0.2894)	(1.7054)	(2.0385)	(1.7491)
ALDE vote-share	-0.0572	0.0246	0.0246	-3.8268	0.2966	2.7530
	(0.3852)	(0.3788)	(0.3788)	(2.3601)	(2.5868)	(2.5235)
EPP vote-share	-1.0486**	-0.9854**	-0.9854**	-0.3095	4.8270**	4.3710*
	(0.4469)	(0.4479)	(0.4479)	(2.2356)	(2.1434)	(2.5014)
ECR vote-share	-0.1928	-0.2494	-0.2494	3.0309*	1.5473	1.2728
	(0.3272)	(0.3255)	(0.3255)	(1.7940)	(2.1983)	(2.3740)
EFDD vote-share	0.3916	0.3576	0.3576	1.0798	-1.4955	-0.6032
	(0.2809)	(0.2826)	(0.2826)	(1.8815)	(2.1868)	(2.2417)
ENF vote-share	0.2603	0.2150	0.2150	0.9354	-2.0767	-3.6600**
	(0.2277)	(0.2249)	(0.2249)	(1.5832)	(1.6826)	(1.8376)
NI vote-share	-0.7234***	-0.6921***	-0.6921***	-1.5183	0.5678	1.1997
	(0.2296)	(0.2303)	(0.2303)	(1.9451)	(2.3362)	(2.6119)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	3.78	3.85	3.85	5.38	4.75	5.48
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.131: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0448	0.0450	0.0450	-0.0228	-0.132	-0.783**
	(0.146)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.347)	(0.398)	(0.386)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.337***	0.341***	0.341***	-0.332	-0.286	-0.334
	(0.0978)	(0.0988)	(0.0988)	(0.248)	(0.286)	(0.386)
SD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.324*	-0.319*	-0.319*	-0.567	-0.400	-0.178
	(0.174)	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.474)	(0.542)	(0.601)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.00363	0.00145	0.00145	-0.420	-0.161	0.848
	(0.196)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.524)	(0.594)	(0.635)
EPP vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.00332	0.0146	0.0146	0.246	0.696	1.293
	(0.198)	(0.200)	(0.200)	(0.637)	(0.710)	(0.822)
ECR vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0262	0.00935	0.00935	0.171	-0.467	0.354
	(0.126)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.578)	(0.609)	(0.755)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.131	-0.140	-0.140	0.0517	-0.182	-0.313
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.377)	(0.423)	(0.499)
ENF vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.000297	-0.00392	-0.00392	-0.0346	-0.193	-0.341
	(0.0854)	(0.0863)	(0.0863)	(0.258)	(0.290)	(0.367)
NI vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0982	0.0881	0.0881	0.868	0.794	0.371
	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.530)	(0.611)	(0.773)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.85	2.88	2.88	0.79	0.63	2.50
p-value	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.625	0.773	0.010

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.132: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.631	0.635	0.635	0.457	0.469	1.813*
	(1.547)	(1.570)	(1.570)	(0.954)	(0.964)	(0.995)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.607	-0.611	-0.611	-0.526	-0.692	-2.636***
	(1.593)	(1.618)	(1.618)	(0.972)	(1.008)	(0.952)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.634	-0.699	-0.699	-0.824	-0.831	-0.658
	(1.027)	(1.039)	(1.039)	(0.679)	(0.689)	(1.175)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.004	1.076	1.076	0.539	0.627	0.329
	(1.058)	(1.070)	(1.070)	(0.691)	(0.720)	(1.124)
SD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	4.476***	4.465**	4.465**	0.758	0.749	1.383
	(1.714)	(1.740)	(1.740)	(1.279)	(1.301)	(1.796)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-4.965***	-4.953***	-4.953***	-1.452	-1.321	-1.585
	(1.765)	(1.793)	(1.793)	(1.302)	(1.360)	(1.718)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.970	-3.067	-3.067	-0.397	-0.421	0.615
	(2.041)	(2.066)	(2.066)	(1.449)	(1.453)	(1.937)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	3.068	3.177	3.177	-0.0252	0.299	0.237
	(2.101)	(2.129)	(2.129)	(1.475)	(1.519)	(1.853)
EPP vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	3.900*	3.799*	3.799*	0.786	0.747	-0.808
	(2.031)	(2.056)	(2.056)	(1.758)	(1.736)	(2.456)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-4.030*	-3.917*	-3.917*	-0.591	-0.0586	2.134
	(2.091)	(2.119)	(2.119)	(1.790)	(1.816)	(2.349)
ECR vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.259*	-2.068	-2.068	-5.063***	-5.027***	-5.883***
	(1.294)	(1.286)	(1.286)	(1.133)	(1.080)	(1.734)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.363*	2.150	2.150	5.733***	5.248***	6.333***
	(1.333)	(1.325)	(1.325)	(1.154)	(1.129)	(1.659)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.924	-0.818	-0.818	0.00426	0.0256	0.0614
	(1.145)	(1.153)	(1.153)	(1.043)	(1.035)	(1.522)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.820	0.702	0.702	0.0520	-0.239	-0.380
	(1.179)	(1.188)	(1.188)	(1.061)	(1.082)	(1.456)
ENF vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.264	-0.213	-0.213	0.0744	0.0896	0.212
	(0.905)	(0.916)	(0.916)	(0.712)	(0.705)	(1.111)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.273	0.216	0.216	-0.119	-0.326	-0.562
	(0.932)	(0.943)	(0.943)	(0.725)	(0.738)	(1.063)
NI vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.975	-1.867	-1.867	-0.426	-0.425	-1.406
	(1.377)	(1.389)	(1.389)	(1.439)	(1.469)	(2.319)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.144	2.024	2.024	1.418	1.403	1.805
	(1.418)	(1.432)	(1.432)	(1.465)	(1.536)	(2.218)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.28	2.23	2.23	3.70	3.96	4.60
p-value	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.133: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	1.658	1.685	1.685	1.575	1.167	2.956
	(2.116)	(2.158)	(2.158)	(2.035)	(2.225)	(2.052)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-2.461	-2.500	-2.500	-2.027	-1.595	-4.097
	(3.047)	(3.106)	(3.106)	(2.598)	(2.780)	(2.478)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.922	0.933	0.933	0.714	0.447	0.670
	(1.289)	(1.308)	(1.308)	(1.144)	(1.280)	(1.046)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.272	-0.387	-0.387	-3.190**	-3.344**	-5.584***
	(1.410)	(1.433)	(1.433)	(1.351)	(1.483)	(2.055)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.350	0.516	0.516	3.717**	3.879**	6.622***
	(2.031)	(2.063)	(2.063)	(1.726)	(1.853)	(2.482)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.325	0.277	0.277	-1.511**	-1.611*	-2.886***
	(0.859)	(0.869)	(0.869)	(0.760)	(0.853)	(1.048)
SD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	7.443***	7.479***	7.479***	1.848	2.579	6.141*
	(2.276)	(2.320)	(2.320)	(2.737)	(2.980)	(3.516)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-10.32***	-10.37***	-10.37***	-2.916	-3.690	-7.664*
	(3.277)	(3.340)	(3.340)	(3.496)	(3.724)	(4.245)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	2.663*	2.678*	2.678*	0.696	1.173	2.787
	(1.386)	(1.406)	(1.406)	(1.538)	(1.715)	(1.792)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-4.303	-4.512	-4.512	-2.959	-2.243	-1.055
	(2.792)	(2.838)	(2.838)	(3.057)	(3.336)	(4.013)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	5.475	5.775	5.775	3.415	2.657	2.370
	(4.020)	(4.086)	(4.086)	(3.905)	(4.169)	(4.845)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-1.197	-1.284	-1.284	-1.636	-1.168	-0.978
	(1.701)	(1.720)	(1.720)	(1.718)	(1.919)	(2.045)
EPP vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	2.483	2.265	2.265	-2.100	-0.648	-1.648
	(2.777)	(2.822)	(2.822)	(3.720)	(4.006)	(5.116)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-1.472	-1.159	-1.159	3.285	1.746	3.206
	(3.998)	(4.063)	(4.063)	(4.751)	(5.006)	(6.178)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-1.272	-1.363	-1.363	-1.843	-0.894	-0.492
	(1.692)	(1.710)	(1.710)	(2.091)	(2.305)	(2.608)
ECR vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.813	-1.446	-1.446	-0.821	-1.808	-0.0618
	(1.777)	(1.771)	(1.771)	(2.228)	(2.385)	(3.253)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.558	1.031	1.031	0.0353	1.081	-1.103
	(2.558)	(2.550)	(2.550)	(2.846)	(2.980)	(3.928)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.400	0.553	0.553	2.709**	2.064	3.410**
	(1.082)	(1.074)	(1.074)	(1.252)	(1.372)	(1.658)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.463	-1.275	-1.275	0.373	-0.671	-0.487
	(1.571)	(1.589)	(1.589)	(2.239)	(2.390)	(3.170)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.793	1.524	1.524	-0.444	0.663	0.321
	(2.261)	(2.288)	(2.288)	(2.860)	(2.986)	(3.827)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.484	-0.406	-0.406	0.236	-0.447	-0.322
	(0.957)	(0.963)	(0.963)	(1.259)	(1.375)	(1.616)
ENF vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.301	0.408	0.408	-0.219	-1.076	-1.333
	(1.239)	(1.258)	(1.258)	(1.529)	(1.610)	(2.279)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.747	-0.900	-0.900	0.275	1.182	1.411
	(1.783)	(1.811)	(1.811)	(1.953)	(2.012)	(2.752)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	0.507	0.552	0.552	-0.187	-0.747	-0.905
	(0.755)	(0.762)	(0.762)	(0.860)	(0.926)	(1.162)
NI vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.138*	-2.958	-2.958	1.061	1.315	-2.628
	(1.878)	(1.905)	(1.905)	(3.074)	(3.376)	(4.824)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	4.244	3.986	3.986	-0.580	-0.849	3.365
	(2.704)	(2.743)	(2.743)	(3.926)	(4.219)	(5.825)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-1.044	-0.969	-0.969	0.950	1.116	-0.715
	(1.144)	(1.155)	(1.155)	(1.728)	(1.942)	(2.459)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.93	1.91	1.91	3.58	3.18	4.39
p-value	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.134: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.0247	0.0242	0.0242	-0.0686	-0.2227	-0.8235**
	(0.1565)	(0.1591)	(0.1591)	(0.3620)	(0.4232)	(0.3348)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.3699***	0.3775***	0.3775***	-0.2852	-0.2035	-0.3287
	(0.1039)	(0.1052)	(0.1052)	(0.2574)	(0.3024)	(0.3954)
SD vote-share	-0.4886***	-0.4873***	-0.4873***	-0.6935	-0.5726	-0.2022
	(0.1734)	(0.1763)	(0.1763)	(0.4851)	(0.5711)	(0.6041)
ALDE vote-share	0.0980	0.1093	0.1093	-0.4225	-0.1224	0.8521
	(0.2065)	(0.2094)	(0.2094)	(0.5496)	(0.6380)	(0.6515)
EPP vote-share	-0.1302	-0.1184	-0.1184	0.1945	0.6879	1.3259
	(0.2055)	(0.2083)	(0.2083)	(0.6670)	(0.7625)	(0.8262)
ECR vote-share	0.1045	0.0824	0.0824	0.6702	0.2206	0.4505
	(0.1309)	(0.1303)	(0.1303)	(0.4299)	(0.4742)	(0.5833)
EFDD vote-share	-0.1037	-0.1159	-0.1159	0.0562	-0.2130	-0.3185
	(0.1159)	(0.1168)	(0.1168)	(0.3955)	(0.4544)	(0.5119)
ENF vote-share	0.0093	0.0034	0.0034	-0.0450	-0.2360	-0.3499
	(0.0916)	(0.0928)	(0.0928)	(0.2701)	(0.3097)	(0.3738)
NI vote-share	0.1693	0.1568	0.1568	0.9914*	0.9779	0.3989
	(0.1393)	(0.1408)	(0.1408)	(0.5459)	(0.6451)	(0.7801)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.28	2.23	2.23	3.70	3.96	4.60
p-value	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.135: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.1194	0.1189	0.1189	0.2618	0.0193	-0.4711
	(0.2056)	(0.2078)	(0.2078)	(0.6437)	(0.8159)	(0.6470)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.4033***	0.4056***	0.4056***	-0.9844**	-1.0754**	-1.8470***
	(0.1370)	(0.1380)	(0.1380)	(0.4276)	(0.5439)	(0.6481)
SD vote-share	-0.2149	-0.2156	-0.2156	-0.3714	0.0623	1.2644
	(0.2211)	(0.2234)	(0.2234)	(0.8659)	(1.0930)	(1.1085)
ALDE vote-share	-0.0250	-0.0209	-0.0209	-1.1794	-0.7546	0.3376
	(0.2713)	(0.2733)	(0.2733)	(0.9672)	(1.2236)	(1.2652)
EPP vote-share	-0.2609	-0.2566	-0.2566	-0.6583	0.2039	1.0672
	(0.2698)	(0.2717)	(0.2717)	(1.1768)	(1.4691)	(1.6131)
ECR vote-share	0.1457	0.1385	0.1385	1.9239***	1.3376	2.2446**
	(0.1727)	(0.1705)	(0.1705)	(0.7050)	(0.8747)	(1.0257)
EFDD vote-share	-0.1534	-0.1571	-0.1571	0.1653	-0.4547	-0.4877
	(0.1526)	(0.1530)	(0.1530)	(0.7084)	(0.8765)	(0.9993)
ENF vote-share	0.0615	0.0594	0.0594	-0.1317	-0.6403	-0.8260
	(0.1203)	(0.1211)	(0.1211)	(0.4838)	(0.5905)	(0.7185)
NI vote-share	0.0620	0.0584	0.0584	1.4308	1.5817	0.0225
	(0.1825)	(0.1835)	(0.1835)	(0.9725)	(1.2382)	(1.5209)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.93	1.91	1.91	3.58	3.18	4.39
p-value	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.136: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.344	0.333	0.333	-0.243	-0.935	0.381
	(0.214)	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.766)	(0.806)	(0.601)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.883***	0.888***	0.888***	-1.964**	-2.264**	-1.139
	(0.189)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.851)	(0.952)	(1.127)
SD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0161	-0.00481	-0.00481	1.625	0.908	-0.643
	(0.317)	(0.319)	(0.319)	(1.829)	(2.042)	(1.849)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0717	-0.0179	-0.0179	-2.814	-0.438	2.278
	(0.389)	(0.381)	(0.381)	(2.073)	(2.071)	(2.052)
EPP vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.707	-0.639	-0.639	0.778	4.499***	3.208*
	(0.467)	(0.456)	(0.456)	(2.072)	(1.591)	(1.852)
ECR vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0635	-0.0943	-0.0943	2.035	0.965	0.144
	(0.314)	(0.312)	(0.312)	(1.361)	(1.458)	(1.636)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.0612	0.0199	0.0199	0.230	-1.853	-0.872
	(0.312)	(0.306)	(0.306)	(1.845)	(1.851)	(1.865)
ENF vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.205	0.172	0.172	0.245	-1.438	-2.817*
	(0.242)	(0.238)	(0.238)	(1.366)	(1.335)	(1.439)
NI vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.621***	-0.602***	-0.602***	-0.524	0.504	1.989
	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.228)	(1.600)	(1.746)	(1.860)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	5.13	5.17	5.17	1.73	2.39	2.61
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.083	0.013	0.007

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.137: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.611	-0.426	-0.426	-2.320**	-2.356**	-0.111
	(1.656)	(1.702)	(1.702)	(1.089)	(1.078)	(0.955)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.986	0.785	0.785	2.379**	1.912*	0.510
	(1.695)	(1.747)	(1.747)	(0.956)	(1.017)	(0.761)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	1.774	1.710	1.710	-5.108***	-5.092***	-4.955***
	(1.467)	(1.512)	(1.512)	(1.072)	(1.088)	(1.408)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-0.920	-0.851	-0.851	3.601***	3.804***	3.952***
	(1.502)	(1.552)	(1.552)	(0.941)	(1.027)	(1.122)
SD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	2.913	3.496	3.496	6.947***	6.804***	6.012***
	(2.433)	(2.475)	(2.475)	(2.550)	(2.371)	(2.209)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-2.991	-3.622	-3.622	-6.097***	-7.931***	-6.892***
	(2.490)	(2.540)	(2.540)	(2.238)	(2.239)	(1.760)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.302	-1.474	-1.474	-4.713	-4.460	-1.995
	(3.026)	(3.012)	(3.012)	(3.253)	(2.728)	(3.039)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.238	1.507	1.507	2.175	5.412**	4.426*
	(3.098)	(3.091)	(3.091)	(2.856)	(2.575)	(2.421)
EPP vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	5.788	4.614	4.614	4.025	4.333*	0.778
	(3.518)	(3.534)	(3.534)	(3.178)	(2.280)	(2.885)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-6.706*	-5.436	-5.436	-3.720	0.223	2.516
	(3.601)	(3.627)	(3.627)	(2.790)	(2.152)	(2.299)
ECR vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.0897	0.572	0.572	0.765	0.682	-1.673
	(2.440)	(2.474)	(2.474)	(2.135)	(2.087)	(2.571)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	0.0270	-0.689	-0.689	1.454	0.381	1.883
	(2.498)	(2.539)	(2.539)	(1.874)	(1.971)	(2.048)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-4.008*	-3.300	-3.300	-0.339	-0.530	1.974
	(2.359)	(2.382)	(2.382)	(2.925)	(2.624)	(2.873)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	4.202*	3.435	3.435	0.653	-1.781	-2.948
	(2.415)	(2.444)	(2.444)	(2.567)	(2.478)	(2.289)
ENF vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.162	-0.513	-0.513	0.116	-0.0427	-1.171
	(1.875)	(1.880)	(1.880)	(2.168)	(1.869)	(2.258)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.412	0.709	0.709	0.148	-1.877	-1.704
	(1.919)	(1.929)	(1.929)	(1.903)	(1.765)	(1.799)
NI vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-3.521**	-4.073**	-4.073**	-2.459	-2.334	-0.452
	(1.725)	(1.737)	(1.737)	(2.488)	(2.361)	(2.898)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.994*	3.592**	3.592**	2.218	3.818*	2.528
	(1.766)	(1.782)	(1.782)	(2.184)	(2.229)	(2.309)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	3.55	3.59	3.59	5.58	5.36	6.06
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.138: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	0.982	1.035	1.035	-1.432	-1.764	1.005
	(2.286)	(2.309)	(2.309)	(1.534)	(1.563)	(1.354)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-3.084	-3.011	-3.011	0.296	0.585	-1.663
	(4.370)	(4.410)	(4.410)	(2.696)	(2.705)	(2.030)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	2.522	2.382	2.382	1.282	0.850	1.324
	(2.496)	(2.540)	(2.540)	(1.550)	(1.601)	(1.149)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	2.511	2.479	2.479	-6.011***	-5.908***	-7.562***
	(2.041)	(2.063)	(2.063)	(1.509)	(1.570)	(1.882)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-2.804	-2.849	-2.849	5.722**	5.632**	9.028***
	(3.900)	(3.939)	(3.939)	(2.652)	(2.717)	(2.821)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	1.168	1.253	1.253	-1.305	-1.171	-3.094*
	(2.228)	(2.269)	(2.269)	(1.525)	(1.608)	(1.596)
SD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	5.888*	6.076*	6.076*	7.248**	5.694*	6.450**
	(3.338)	(3.343)	(3.343)	(3.641)	(3.446)	(3.242)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-10.59*	-10.33	-10.33	-6.802	-5.447	-7.743
	(6.380)	(6.384)	(6.384)	(6.400)	(5.962)	(4.862)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	4.709	4.208	4.208	0.434	-1.591	0.519
	(3.643)	(3.677)	(3.677)	(3.680)	(3.530)	(2.751)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-2.695	-3.113	-3.113	-6.543	-3.904	-1.348
	(4.192)	(4.106)	(4.106)	(4.617)	(3.978)	(4.460)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	6.349	5.766	5.766	6.469	4.167	3.164
	(8.011)	(7.843)	(7.843)	(8.115)	(6.883)	(6.688)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-3.787	-2.672	-2.672	-2.642	0.797	0.769
	(4.576)	(4.517)	(4.517)	(4.666)	(4.075)	(3.784)
EPP vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	7.413	6.949	6.949	3.622	6.981**	1.623
	(4.894)	(4.810)	(4.810)	(4.538)	(3.236)	(4.231)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	-10.86	-11.51	-11.51	-2.774	-5.705	0.871
	(9.354)	(9.186)	(9.186)	(7.977)	(5.600)	(6.344)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	2.572	3.808	3.808	-0.582	3.797	1.003
	(5.342)	(5.291)	(5.291)	(4.587)	(3.315)	(3.589)
ECR vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-0.836	-0.577	-0.577	5.098*	4.518	2.417
	(3.400)	(3.376)	(3.376)	(2.776)	(2.834)	(3.529)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	1.933	2.295	2.295	-8.715*	-8.208*	-6.083
	(6.497)	(6.447)	(6.447)	(4.880)	(4.903)	(5.292)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-1.181	-1.873	-1.873	6.258**	5.501*	4.855
	(3.711)	(3.714)	(3.714)	(2.806)	(2.903)	(2.994)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-4.672	-4.396	-4.396	-1.065	-3.215	2.259
	(3.287)	(3.251)	(3.251)	(4.173)	(3.749)	(4.220)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	5.898	6.283	6.283	2.356	4.231	-3.502
	(6.282)	(6.208)	(6.208)	(7.335)	(6.487)	(6.328)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-1.051	-1.788	-1.788	-1.048	-3.851	0.338
	(3.588)	(3.576)	(3.576)	(4.217)	(3.840)	(3.581)
ENF vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-1.501	-1.251	-1.251	-0.805	-2.619	-3.584
	(2.613)	(2.567)	(2.567)	(3.086)	(2.622)	(3.221)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	2.278	2.627	2.627	2.308	3.891	2.995
	(4.995)	(4.902)	(4.902)	(5.424)	(4.538)	(4.830)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-0.537	-1.204	-1.204	-1.329	-3.695	-2.864
	(2.853)	(2.824)	(2.824)	(3.119)	(2.686)	(2.733)
NI vote-share						
Current Foreign Born Share	-4.759**	-4.955**	-4.955**	-1.362	0.101	0.313
	(2.392)	(2.369)	(2.369)	(3.540)	(3.372)	(4.251)
1 year ago Foreign Born Share	6.156	5.883	5.883	-0.359	-1.635	1.038
	(4.573)	(4.525)	(4.525)	(6.222)	(5.835)	(6.374)
2 years ago Foreign Born Share	-1.959	-1.438	-1.438	1.586	3.493	0.909
	(2.612)	(2.606)	(2.606)	(3.578)	(3.454)	(3.607)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.80	2.79	2.79	5.55	5.09	6.67
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.139: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.3748*	0.3594	0.3594	0.0591	-0.4447	0.3990
	(0.2214)	(0.2247)	(0.2247)	(0.7101)	(0.8109)	(0.6104)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.8538***	0.8590***	0.8590***	-1.5067**	-1.2880	-1.0034
	(0.1962)	(0.1996)	(0.1996)	(0.6991)	(0.8187)	(0.9000)
SD vote-share	-0.0781	-0.1262	-0.1262	0.8505	-1.1272	-0.8792
	(0.3252)	(0.3267)	(0.3267)	(1.6627)	(1.7842)	(1.4121)
ALDE vote-share	-0.0642	0.0326	0.0326	-2.5379	0.9512	2.4302
	(0.4046)	(0.3976)	(0.3976)	(2.1214)	(2.0524)	(1.9429)
EPP vote-share	-0.9185*	-0.8215*	-0.8215*	0.3054	4.5561***	3.2940*
	(0.4703)	(0.4665)	(0.4665)	(2.0724)	(1.7153)	(1.8447)
ECR vote-share	-0.0627	-0.1174	-0.1174	2.2194	1.0623	0.2091
	(0.3263)	(0.3265)	(0.3265)	(1.3924)	(1.5707)	(1.6438)
EFDD vote-share	0.1936	0.1350	0.1350	0.3132	-2.3103	-0.9735
	(0.3154)	(0.3144)	(0.3144)	(1.9072)	(1.9745)	(1.8367)
ENF vote-share	0.2497	0.1960	0.1960	0.2640	-1.9201	-2.8753**
	(0.2506)	(0.2481)	(0.2481)	(1.4140)	(1.4064)	(1.4437)
NI vote-share	-0.5270**	-0.4814**	-0.4814**	-0.2418	1.4835	2.0760
	(0.2306)	(0.2293)	(0.2293)	(1.6226)	(1.7767)	(1.8528)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	3.55	3.59	3.59	5.58	5.36	6.06
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.140: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in another country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.4200*	0.4058*	0.4058*	0.1457	-0.3290	0.6662
	(0.2258)	(0.2303)	(0.2303)	(0.7223)	(0.8516)	(0.6481)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.8747***	0.8834***	0.8834***	-1.5949**	-1.4473*	-1.6277*
	(0.2016)	(0.2058)	(0.2058)	(0.7103)	(0.8553)	(0.9006)
SD vote-share	0.0064	-0.0443	-0.0443	0.8799	-1.3437	-0.7745
	(0.3297)	(0.3335)	(0.3335)	(1.7146)	(1.8771)	(1.5520)
ALDE vote-share	-0.1322	-0.0194	-0.0194	-2.7164	1.0598	2.5853
	(0.4140)	(0.4097)	(0.4097)	(2.1738)	(2.1669)	(2.1350)
EPP vote-share	-0.8724*	-0.7474	-0.7474	0.2661	5.0728***	3.4964*
	(0.4834)	(0.4799)	(0.4799)	(2.1370)	(1.7630)	(2.0251)
ECR vote-share	-0.0839	-0.1538	-0.1538	2.6423**	1.8110	1.1886
	(0.3358)	(0.3368)	(0.3368)	(1.3072)	(1.5436)	(1.6893)
EFDD vote-share	0.1747	0.1002	0.1002	0.2424	-2.8345	-0.9053
	(0.3246)	(0.3243)	(0.3243)	(1.9648)	(2.0423)	(2.0202)
ENF vote-share	0.2401	0.1726	0.1726	0.1742	-2.4231*	-3.4533**
	(0.2581)	(0.2561)	(0.2561)	(1.4531)	(1.4286)	(1.5419)
NI vote-share	-0.5622**	-0.5094**	-0.5094**	-0.1347	1.9589	2.2594
	(0.2363)	(0.2364)	(0.2364)	(1.6669)	(1.8370)	(2.0349)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.80	2.79	2.79	5.55	5.09	6.67
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.141: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Unweighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.562*	0.563*	0.563*	0.793	0.788	1.192
	(0.298)	(0.301)	(0.301)	(0.676)	(0.689)	(0.798)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.531**	0.531**	0.531**	-0.902*	-0.902*	-0.952
	(0.212)	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.482)	(0.493)	(0.756)
SD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.351	-0.345	-0.345	0.290	0.342	0.688
	(0.357)	(0.360)	(0.360)	(0.976)	(0.973)	(1.231)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.317	0.323	0.323	-0.484	-0.433	1.076
	(0.450)	(0.454)	(0.454)	(1.144)	(1.149)	(1.404)
EPP vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.769*	-0.762*	-0.762*	-0.678	-0.612	-0.635
	(0.455)	(0.459)	(0.459)	(1.405)	(1.409)	(1.931)
ECR vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.158	-0.178	-0.178	-2.199*	-2.343**	-2.277
	(0.301)	(0.294)	(0.294)	(1.189)	(1.062)	(1.627)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.00322	-0.00674	-0.00674	0.0953	0.0677	-0.466
	(0.238)	(0.240)	(0.240)	(0.713)	(0.719)	(0.966)
ENF vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.197	0.193	0.193	-0.00195	-0.0347	-0.597
	(0.189)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.530)	(0.524)	(0.734)
NI vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.0678	0.0577	0.0577	0.0226	-0.00640	-0.162
	(0.329)	(0.330)	(0.330)	(1.163)	(1.181)	(1.694)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.13	2.08	2.08	1.65	2.21	1.51
p-value	0.026	0.030	0.030	0.103	0.022	0.146

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.142: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Unweighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-5.625***	-5.633***	-5.633***	-1.159	-1.157	-0.932
	(1.669)	(1.685)	(1.685)	(1.320)	(1.347)	(1.017)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	5.958***	5.969***	5.969***	2.015*	2.011*	2.551***
	(1.587)	(1.603)	(1.603)	(1.184)	(1.210)	(0.901)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	2.839**	2.838**	2.838**	-2.880***	-2.885***	-2.760***
	(1.299)	(1.312)	(1.312)	(0.885)	(0.903)	(1.002)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-2.223*	-2.222*	-2.222*	2.041**	2.050**	2.172**
	(1.235)	(1.248)	(1.248)	(0.794)	(0.811)	(0.888)
SD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	3.291	3.266	3.266	2.416	2.359	2.655
	(2.194)	(2.212)	(2.212)	(1.953)	(1.951)	(1.768)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-3.507*	-3.478*	-3.478*	-2.194	-2.085	-2.362
	(2.086)	(2.104)	(2.104)	(1.752)	(1.752)	(1.566)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	3.926	3.903	3.903	1.106	1.050	1.871
	(2.795)	(2.820)	(2.820)	(2.332)	(2.346)	(2.119)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-3.476	-3.449	-3.449	-1.641	-1.533	-0.955
	(2.657)	(2.682)	(2.682)	(2.092)	(2.107)	(1.877)
EPP vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-3.549	-3.585	-3.585	-0.487	-0.562	-0.259
	(2.848)	(2.871)	(2.871)	(2.898)	(2.908)	(2.932)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	2.678	2.720	2.720	-0.197	-0.0519	-0.451
	(2.708)	(2.730)	(2.730)	(2.600)	(2.612)	(2.597)
ECR vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-1.770	-1.676	-1.676	0.884	1.057	0.734
	(1.889)	(1.845)	(1.845)	(2.348)	(2.040)	(2.288)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.552	1.443	1.443	-3.182	-3.514*	-3.617*
	(1.796)	(1.754)	(1.754)	(2.106)	(1.832)	(2.027)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.496	0.513	0.513	0.0690	0.101	-0.143
	(1.500)	(1.513)	(1.513)	(1.471)	(1.483)	(1.464)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.480	-0.501	-0.501	0.0270	-0.0345	-0.387
	(1.426)	(1.438)	(1.438)	(1.319)	(1.332)	(1.297)
ENF vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.909	0.930	0.930	-0.164	-0.126	-0.418
	(1.187)	(1.194)	(1.194)	(1.093)	(1.081)	(1.115)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.686	-0.711	-0.711	0.167	0.0943	-0.215
	(1.128)	(1.135)	(1.135)	(0.981)	(0.971)	(0.987)
NI vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.348	-0.299	-0.299	-0.530	-0.497	-0.858
	(2.077)	(2.082)	(2.082)	(2.396)	(2.435)	(2.564)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.401	0.344	0.344	0.570	0.507	0.837
	(1.974)	(1.980)	(1.980)	(2.150)	(2.187)	(2.272)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.43	2.37	2.37	1.97	2.32	2.97
p-value	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.002	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.143: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Unweighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-3.843	-3.834	-3.834	-0.611	-0.540	1.508
	(2.346)	(2.401)	(2.401)	(1.773)	(1.848)	(1.330)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	2.125	2.108	2.108	0.873	0.726	-2.360
	(3.891)	(4.007)	(4.007)	(2.698)	(2.862)	(2.125)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	2.073	2.082	2.082	0.666	0.744	2.835**
	(1.922)	(1.981)	(1.981)	(1.410)	(1.496)	(1.137)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.236	-0.386	-0.386	-4.225***	-4.397***	-4.447***
	(1.742)	(1.778)	(1.778)	(1.119)	(1.154)	(1.420)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	4.392	4.697	4.697	4.841***	5.196***	5.568**
	(2.889)	(2.968)	(2.968)	(1.703)	(1.787)	(2.269)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-3.577**	-3.730**	-3.730**	-1.635*	-1.822*	-1.961
	(1.427)	(1.467)	(1.467)	(0.890)	(0.934)	(1.214)
SD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	7.920***	7.919***	7.919***	5.010**	4.664*	5.578**
	(2.980)	(3.050)	(3.050)	(2.509)	(2.594)	(2.513)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-13.47***	-13.47***	-13.47***	-7.595**	-6.881*	-8.248**
	(4.942)	(5.090)	(5.090)	(3.818)	(4.016)	(4.015)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	5.386**	5.385**	5.385**	3.152	2.777	3.398
	(2.441)	(2.516)	(2.516)	(1.995)	(2.100)	(2.148)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	4.485	4.311	4.311	2.598	2.163	1.464
	(3.971)	(4.061)	(4.061)	(3.112)	(3.217)	(3.212)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-4.678	-4.325	-4.325	-4.748	-3.848	-0.136
	(6.586)	(6.778)	(6.778)	(4.737)	(4.981)	(5.132)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.650	0.472	0.472	1.814	1.341	-0.473
	(3.252)	(3.350)	(3.350)	(2.475)	(2.604)	(2.746)
EPP vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-6.793*	-7.261*	-7.261*	-2.566	-3.528	-4.657
	(3.998)	(4.070)	(4.070)	(3.857)	(3.903)	(4.218)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	9.657	10.61	10.61	4.133	6.119	8.402
	(6.629)	(6.793)	(6.793)	(5.871)	(6.044)	(6.740)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-3.774	-4.254	-4.254	-2.528	-3.573	-5.111
	(3.274)	(3.357)	(3.357)	(3.068)	(3.160)	(3.606)
ECR vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.956	-0.103	-0.103	0.0458	1.735	2.277
	(2.680)	(2.638)	(2.638)	(3.157)	(2.805)	(3.435)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.199	-1.933	-1.933	-1.436	-4.925	-6.722
	(4.445)	(4.403)	(4.403)	(4.806)	(4.344)	(5.489)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.947	1.820	1.820	-1.019	0.817	1.793
	(2.195)	(2.176)	(2.176)	(2.511)	(2.271)	(2.937)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.865	1.037	1.037	0.240	0.583	0.526
	(2.131)	(2.176)	(2.176)	(1.984)	(2.040)	(2.210)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.274	-1.624	-1.624	-0.329	-1.037	-1.735
	(3.534)	(3.631)	(3.631)	(3.019)	(3.159)	(3.531)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.429	0.605	0.605	0.208	0.580	0.778
	(1.746)	(1.795)	(1.795)	(1.578)	(1.652)	(1.890)
ENF vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.841	1.021	1.021	-0.379	-0.0113	-0.202
	(1.687)	(1.719)	(1.719)	(1.474)	(1.491)	(1.689)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.540	-0.906	-0.906	0.614	-0.144	-0.651
	(2.797)	(2.869)	(2.869)	(2.243)	(2.309)	(2.699)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.0792	0.105	0.105	-0.261	0.138	0.251
	(1.382)	(1.418)	(1.418)	(1.172)	(1.207)	(1.444)
NI vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-2.060	-1.713	-1.713	-2.922	-2.803	-4.280
	(2.933)	(2.985)	(2.985)	(3.147)	(3.281)	(3.732)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	4.085	3.379	3.379	5.550	5.306	7.724
	(4.863)	(4.982)	(4.982)	(4.790)	(5.081)	(5.963)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-1.992	-1.636	-1.636	-2.907	-2.778	-3.976
	(2.402)	(2.463)	(2.463)	(2.503)	(2.656)	(3.191)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.30	2.36	2.36	2.14	2.25	2.68
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.144: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Unweighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.3338	0.3352	0.3352	0.8555	0.8536	1.6191**
	(0.2736)	(0.2763)	(0.2763)	(0.6532)	(0.6675)	(0.7030)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.6161***	0.6162***	0.6162***	-0.8394*	-0.8349*	-0.5880
	(0.2129)	(0.2151)	(0.2151)	(0.4383)	(0.4476)	(0.6927)
SD vote-share	-0.2164	-0.2124	-0.2124	0.2219	0.2742	0.2926
	(0.3597)	(0.3627)	(0.3627)	(0.9669)	(0.9666)	(1.2223)
ALDE vote-share	0.4505	0.4541	0.4541	-0.5344	-0.4830	0.9160
	(0.4581)	(0.4623)	(0.4623)	(1.1543)	(1.1623)	(1.4650)
EPP vote-share	-0.8712*	-0.8654*	-0.8654*	-0.6838	-0.6141	-0.7105
	(0.4669)	(0.4706)	(0.4706)	(1.4348)	(1.4407)	(2.0270)
ECR vote-share	-0.2178	-0.2327	-0.2327	-2.2977**	-2.4567**	-2.8823*
	(0.3096)	(0.3024)	(0.3024)	(1.1621)	(1.0107)	(1.5818)
EFDD vote-share	0.0152	0.0124	0.0124	0.0961	0.0666	-0.5305
	(0.2459)	(0.2479)	(0.2479)	(0.7279)	(0.7349)	(1.0121)
ENF vote-share	0.2229	0.2196	0.2196	0.0032	-0.0316	-0.6334
	(0.1945)	(0.1957)	(0.1957)	(0.5411)	(0.5358)	(0.7705)
NI vote-share	0.0525	0.0447	0.0447	0.0403	0.0101	-0.0217
	(0.3404)	(0.3413)	(0.3413)	(1.1862)	(1.2065)	(1.7728)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.43	2.37	2.37	1.97	2.32	2.97
p-value	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.002	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.145: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Unweighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.3549	0.3549	0.3549	0.9286	0.9301	1.9831***
	(0.2739)	(0.2766)	(0.2766)	(0.6813)	(0.6955)	(0.6395)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.5796***	0.5809***	0.5809***	-1.0186**	-1.0223**	-0.8396
	(0.2034)	(0.2049)	(0.2049)	(0.4300)	(0.4343)	(0.6831)
SD vote-share	-0.1615	-0.1615	-0.1615	0.5673	0.5598	0.7287
	(0.3479)	(0.3514)	(0.3514)	(0.9643)	(0.9761)	(1.2086)
ALDE vote-share	0.4571	0.4586	0.4586	-0.3357	-0.3451	0.8552
	(0.4636)	(0.4679)	(0.4679)	(1.1963)	(1.2106)	(1.5447)
EPP vote-share	-0.9096*	-0.9056*	-0.9056*	-0.9608	-0.9817	-1.3666
	(0.4666)	(0.4689)	(0.4689)	(1.4827)	(1.4688)	(2.0287)
ECR vote-share	-0.2082	-0.2155	-0.2155	-2.4093**	-2.3726**	-2.6523
	(0.3129)	(0.3039)	(0.3039)	(1.2136)	(1.0557)	(1.6522)
EFDD vote-share	0.0196	0.0181	0.0181	0.1188	0.1263	-0.4306
	(0.2488)	(0.2507)	(0.2507)	(0.7625)	(0.7677)	(1.0630)
ENF vote-share	0.2221	0.2206	0.2206	-0.0254	-0.0174	-0.6012
	(0.1969)	(0.1980)	(0.1980)	(0.5664)	(0.5611)	(0.8124)
NI vote-share	0.0322	0.0292	0.0292	-0.2783	-0.2757	-0.5321
	(0.3423)	(0.3439)	(0.3439)	(1.2095)	(1.2348)	(1.7949)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.30	2.36	2.36	2.14	2.25	2.68
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.146: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.609**	0.604**	0.604**	-0.291	-0.785	1.422
	(0.274)	(0.277)	(0.277)	(1.265)	(1.273)	(0.956)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	1.298***	1.300***	1.300***	-3.984***	-4.198***	-2.252
	(0.238)	(0.241)	(0.241)	(1.379)	(1.442)	(1.814)
SD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.309	0.298	0.298	2.985	2.437	-0.227
	(0.426)	(0.428)	(0.428)	(3.043)	(3.176)	(2.920)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.0928	0.130	0.130	-5.913	-3.747	0.227
	(0.554)	(0.543)	(0.543)	(3.673)	(3.463)	(3.629)
EPP vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-1.491**	-1.451**	-1.451**	0.999	3.864	3.144
	(0.659)	(0.650)	(0.650)	(3.547)	(2.956)	(3.498)
ECR vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.375	-0.401	-0.401	1.989	0.399	-0.526
	(0.471)	(0.466)	(0.466)	(3.056)	(2.959)	(3.292)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.536	0.515	0.515	0.349	-1.103	-1.798
	(0.414)	(0.411)	(0.411)	(2.894)	(2.820)	(2.963)
ENF vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.494	0.471	0.471	2.320	0.876	-1.765
	(0.326)	(0.318)	(0.318)	(2.393)	(2.243)	(2.629)
NI vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-1.142***	-1.128***	-1.128***	-3.669	-2.739	0.151
	(0.336)	(0.335)	(0.335)	(2.941)	(3.008)	(3.444)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	8.23	9.34	9.34	1.26	1.72	1.25
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.263	0.085	0.265

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.147: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-3.545	-3.757	-3.757	-3.517**	-3.483**	-0.222
	(2.227)	(2.448)	(2.448)	(1.547)	(1.622)	(1.241)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	4.170*	4.386*	4.386*	3.614***	3.539**	1.892*
	(2.219)	(2.447)	(2.447)	(1.209)	(1.478)	(0.986)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	2.937	3.002	3.002	-8.267***	-8.900***	-7.545***
	(1.985)	(2.183)	(2.183)	(1.532)	(1.507)	(1.876)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.645	-1.712	-1.712	4.798***	6.170***	6.089***
	(1.978)	(2.181)	(2.181)	(1.198)	(1.373)	(1.490)
SD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	3.393	5.104	5.104	8.304**	10.33***	7.287**
	(3.543)	(3.849)	(3.849)	(4.057)	(3.859)	(3.304)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-3.095	-4.834	-4.834	-5.959*	-10.36***	-8.644***
	(3.531)	(3.847)	(3.847)	(3.172)	(3.515)	(2.624)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	3.251	0.0339	0.0339	-5.114	-8.255*	-5.508
	(4.628)	(4.960)	(4.960)	(5.225)	(4.727)	(4.780)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-3.170	0.0968	0.0968	-0.896	5.915	6.598*
	(4.612)	(4.957)	(4.957)	(4.086)	(4.306)	(3.796)
EPP vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	4.169	1.168	1.168	6.389	3.206	1.320
	(5.472)	(5.922)	(5.922)	(4.808)	(4.187)	(4.923)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-5.681	-2.634	-2.634	-6.038	0.864	2.098
	(5.452)	(5.919)	(5.919)	(3.760)	(3.814)	(3.909)
ECR vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-2.674	-0.430	-0.430	-1.694	-0.0811	-1.128
	(3.939)	(4.257)	(4.257)	(4.222)	(4.193)	(4.663)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	2.308	0.0293	0.0293	4.127	0.629	0.693
	(3.925)	(4.255)	(4.255)	(3.301)	(3.820)	(3.703)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-2.709	-1.117	-1.117	-0.610	1.401	0.0430
	(3.443)	(3.744)	(3.744)	(4.111)	(3.930)	(4.157)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	3.257	1.641	1.641	1.075	-3.285	-2.117
	(3.431)	(3.742)	(3.742)	(3.215)	(3.580)	(3.301)
ENF vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.415	1.792	1.792	1.212	3.176	0.354
	(2.728)	(2.896)	(2.896)	(3.393)	(3.108)	(3.661)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.913	-1.328	-1.328	1.241	-3.018	-2.437
	(2.719)	(2.895)	(2.895)	(2.653)	(2.831)	(2.907)
NI vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-3.111	-4.891	-4.891	-4.986	-6.707	-2.475
	(2.801)	(3.014)	(3.014)	(4.171)	(4.103)	(4.806)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.977	3.784	3.784	1.475	5.206	3.020
	(2.791)	(3.013)	(3.013)	(3.261)	(3.737)	(3.816)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	4.81	5.26	5.26	6.04	4.83	4.28
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.148: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-3.180	-3.467	-3.467	-3.924*	-3.892	0.953
	(3.929)	(4.205)	(4.205)	(2.336)	(2.512)	(1.787)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	3.231	3.653	3.653	4.820	4.737	-1.392
	(8.594)	(8.916)	(8.916)	(5.251)	(5.728)	(3.712)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.576	0.443	0.443	-0.753	-0.724	1.984
	(5.095)	(5.184)	(5.184)	(3.189)	(3.338)	(2.161)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-3.983	-4.263	-4.263	-9.182***	-10.60***	-9.471***
	(3.297)	(3.528)	(3.528)	(2.303)	(2.288)	(2.690)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	16.17**	16.59**	16.59**	7.508	11.15**	11.47**
	(7.211)	(7.480)	(7.480)	(5.177)	(5.218)	(5.587)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-10.94**	-11.07**	-11.07**	-1.693	-3.008	-3.251
	(4.275)	(4.349)	(4.349)	(3.145)	(3.040)	(3.253)
SD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	12.05**	14.98**	14.98**	9.287	13.65**	9.375*
	(6.074)	(6.382)	(6.382)	(6.129)	(5.910)	(4.817)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-25.40*	-29.71**	-29.71**	-8.871	-20.06	-14.48
	(13.29)	(13.53)	(13.53)	(13.78)	(13.48)	(10.01)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	13.70*	15.06*	15.06*	1.820	5.859	3.524
	(7.876)	(7.868)	(7.868)	(8.368)	(7.854)	(5.826)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.374	-4.406	-4.406	-1.006	-7.196	-3.525
	(8.150)	(8.485)	(8.485)	(7.820)	(7.321)	(7.011)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	4.237	11.28	11.28	-13.06	2.818	1.058
	(17.83)	(17.99)	(17.99)	(17.58)	(16.70)	(14.56)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-4.548	-6.766	-6.766	7.600	1.870	3.347
	(10.57)	(10.46)	(10.46)	(10.68)	(9.729)	(8.479)
EPP vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	9.366	5.333	5.333	7.220	0.617	-4.292
	(9.613)	(10.15)	(10.15)	(7.267)	(6.451)	(7.012)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-19.06	-13.12	-13.12	-8.500	8.438	17.78
	(21.03)	(21.52)	(21.52)	(16.34)	(14.71)	(14.56)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	8.218	6.347	6.347	1.538	-4.574	-9.473
	(12.47)	(12.51)	(12.51)	(9.922)	(8.572)	(8.480)
ECR vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-2.974	0.236	0.236	1.663	5.383	4.657
	(6.949)	(7.312)	(7.312)	(6.316)	(6.321)	(6.600)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	3.081	-1.649	-1.649	-5.813	-15.36	-15.47
	(15.20)	(15.50)	(15.50)	(14.20)	(14.42)	(13.71)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.474	1.016	1.016	6.211	9.655	9.763
	(9.010)	(9.015)	(9.015)	(8.624)	(8.400)	(7.982)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-2.432	-0.128	-0.128	-0.857	3.342	3.884
	(6.074)	(6.429)	(6.429)	(6.217)	(6.067)	(5.991)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	2.544	-0.849	-0.849	1.807	-8.965	-12.85
	(13.29)	(13.63)	(13.63)	(13.97)	(13.84)	(12.44)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.438	1.507	1.507	-0.457	3.430	6.484
	(7.877)	(7.926)	(7.926)	(8.488)	(8.063)	(7.246)
ENF vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-5.506	-2.609	-2.609	-2.206	1.581	-0.458
	(4.734)	(4.916)	(4.916)	(5.043)	(4.797)	(5.386)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	14.02	9.755	9.755	11.36	1.650	-0.170
	(10.35)	(10.42)	(10.42)	(11.34)	(10.94)	(11.19)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-8.051	-6.707	-6.707	-6.324	-2.819	-1.370
	(6.139)	(6.061)	(6.061)	(6.886)	(6.375)	(6.514)
NI vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-1.708	-4.190	-4.190	-5.080	-8.703	-6.170
	(4.935)	(5.177)	(5.177)	(6.307)	(6.336)	(6.973)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.638	2.020	2.020	1.753	11.05	13.34
	(10.79)	(10.98)	(10.98)	(14.18)	(14.45)	(14.48)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	2.220	1.068	1.068	-0.173	-3.528	-6.236
	(6.400)	(6.382)	(6.382)	(8.612)	(8.419)	(8.433)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	3.88	4.09	4.09	4.38	3.67	3.17
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.149: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.6249**	0.6281**	0.6281**	0.0970	0.0567	1.6697*
	(0.2683)	(0.2712)	(0.2712)	(1.1152)	(1.2194)	(0.9073)
Greens/EFA vote-share	1.2919***	1.2909***	1.2909***	-3.4690***	-2.7298**	-1.4557
	(0.2391)	(0.2418)	(0.2418)	(1.1049)	(1.1329)	(1.3713)
SD vote-share	0.2973	0.2709	0.2709	2.3445	-0.0285	-1.3574
	(0.4268)	(0.4264)	(0.4264)	(2.9254)	(2.9008)	(2.4148)
ALDE vote-share	0.0810	0.1307	0.1307	-6.0092	-2.3397	1.0901
	(0.5574)	(0.5495)	(0.5495)	(3.7679)	(3.5536)	(3.4939)
EPP vote-share	-1.5119**	-1.4655**	-1.4655**	0.3510	4.0697	3.4183
	(0.6591)	(0.6561)	(0.6561)	(3.4672)	(3.1477)	(3.5981)
ECR vote-share	-0.3660	-0.4007	-0.4007	2.4326	0.5483	-0.4352
	(0.4744)	(0.4716)	(0.4716)	(3.0444)	(3.1522)	(3.4085)
EFDD vote-share	0.5486	0.5239	0.5239	0.4649	-1.8846	-2.0744
	(0.4147)	(0.4147)	(0.4147)	(2.9645)	(2.9541)	(3.0386)
ENF vote-share	0.4977	0.4636	0.4636	2.4528	0.1582	-2.0832
	(0.3286)	(0.3209)	(0.3209)	(2.4469)	(2.3364)	(2.6758)
NI vote-share	-1.1346***	-1.1071***	-1.1071***	-3.5106	-1.5002	0.5456
	(0.3373)	(0.3339)	(0.3339)	(3.0077)	(3.0843)	(3.5124)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	4.81	5.26	5.26	6.04	4.83	4.28
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.150: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Population Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.6272**	0.6298**	0.6298**	0.1421	0.1216	1.5454*
	(0.2716)	(0.2745)	(0.2745)	(1.1528)	(1.2799)	(0.9211)
Greens/EFA vote-share	1.2481***	1.2506***	1.2506***	-3.3676***	-2.4599**	-1.2520
	(0.2279)	(0.2303)	(0.2303)	(1.1367)	(1.1658)	(1.3864)
SD vote-share	0.3522	0.3256	0.3256	2.2354	-0.5542	-1.5782
	(0.4199)	(0.4167)	(0.4167)	(3.0246)	(3.0117)	(2.4831)
ALDE vote-share	0.0628	0.1061	0.1061	-6.4645*	-2.5075	0.8804
	(0.5635)	(0.5539)	(0.5539)	(3.8590)	(3.7307)	(3.6135)
EPP vote-share	-1.4790**	-1.4424**	-1.4424**	0.2588	4.4802	4.0118
	(0.6646)	(0.6625)	(0.6625)	(3.5865)	(3.2870)	(3.6141)
ECR vote-share	-0.3679	-0.3970	-0.3970	2.0605	-0.3181	-1.0468
	(0.4804)	(0.4774)	(0.4774)	(3.1172)	(3.2208)	(3.4018)
EFDD vote-share	0.5503	0.5294	0.5294	0.4922	-2.1925	-2.4806
	(0.4199)	(0.4197)	(0.4197)	(3.0679)	(3.0917)	(3.0882)
ENF vote-share	0.4655	0.4392	0.4392	2.8317	0.4112	-1.9974
	(0.3273)	(0.3209)	(0.3209)	(2.4890)	(2.4445)	(2.7760)
NI vote-share	-1.1257***	-1.1032***	-1.1032***	-3.5002	-1.1836	0.9363
	(0.3412)	(0.3380)	(0.3380)	(3.1128)	(3.2283)	(3.5941)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	3.88	4.09	4.09	4.38	3.67	3.17
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.151: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.681**	0.682**	0.682**	0.529	0.491	0.818
	(0.341)	(0.345)	(0.345)	(0.579)	(0.602)	(0.806)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.473*	0.477*	0.477*	-0.721*	-0.668	-0.718
	(0.253)	(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.412)	(0.426)	(0.749)
SD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.563	-0.554	-0.554	-0.314	-0.133	0.139
	(0.426)	(0.430)	(0.430)	(0.823)	(0.838)	(1.174)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.179	0.186	0.186	-0.507	-0.304	1.515
	(0.474)	(0.479)	(0.479)	(0.894)	(0.909)	(1.245)
EPP vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.820*	-0.806*	-0.806*	0.00735	0.235	0.0629
	(0.466)	(0.469)	(0.469)	(1.083)	(1.106)	(1.698)
ECR vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.0175	-0.0413	-0.0413	-1.978**	-2.471***	-2.048
	(0.304)	(0.299)	(0.299)	(0.901)	(0.802)	(1.407)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.0760	-0.0874	-0.0874	0.0841	-0.0603	-0.475
	(0.266)	(0.267)	(0.267)	(0.639)	(0.650)	(0.977)
ENF vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.175	0.170	0.170	-0.104	-0.198	-0.775
	(0.205)	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.437)	(0.445)	(0.709)
NI vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.107	0.0917	0.0917	0.581	0.417	-0.264
	(0.322)	(0.323)	(0.323)	(0.937)	(0.962)	(1.513)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	1.91	1.86	1.86	1.97	3.05	1.83
p-value	0.048	0.056	0.056	0.044	0.002	0.066

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.152: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-6.806***	-6.844***	-6.844***	-1.830	-1.910	-1.973**
	(1.560)	(1.580)	(1.580)	(1.331)	(1.365)	(0.952)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	7.132***	7.164***	7.164***	2.452*	2.483*	3.426***
	(1.461)	(1.479)	(1.479)	(1.260)	(1.283)	(0.887)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	3.377**	3.435**	3.435**	-2.131**	-2.060**	-2.136*
	(1.337)	(1.352)	(1.352)	(0.967)	(0.990)	(1.101)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-2.766**	-2.816**	-2.816**	1.466	1.439	1.740*
	(1.252)	(1.265)	(1.265)	(0.915)	(0.930)	(1.026)
SD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	2.879	2.989	2.989	0.930	1.227	1.721
	(2.304)	(2.328)	(2.328)	(2.011)	(2.020)	(1.789)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-3.279	-3.373	-3.373	-1.293	-1.406	-1.942
	(2.158)	(2.179)	(2.179)	(1.903)	(1.898)	(1.668)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	3.215	3.311	3.311	0.487	0.816	2.184
	(2.584)	(2.614)	(2.614)	(2.193)	(2.202)	(1.954)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-2.893	-2.974	-2.974	-1.033	-1.159	-0.822
	(2.420)	(2.447)	(2.447)	(2.076)	(2.068)	(1.822)
EPP vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-1.838	-1.709	-1.709	1.252	1.622	1.797
	(2.570)	(2.596)	(2.596)	(2.658)	(2.678)	(2.626)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.970	0.860	0.860	-1.294	-1.435	-2.129
	(2.407)	(2.430)	(2.430)	(2.515)	(2.516)	(2.449)
ECR vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-1.833	-2.081	-2.081	1.779	1.029	0.962
	(1.660)	(1.633)	(1.633)	(2.064)	(1.790)	(2.024)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.729	1.941	1.941	-3.905**	-3.620**	-3.695*
	(1.554)	(1.528)	(1.528)	(1.953)	(1.681)	(1.887)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.0519	-0.0595	-0.0595	0.111	-0.117	-0.205
	(1.468)	(1.476)	(1.476)	(1.576)	(1.586)	(1.539)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.122	-0.0266	-0.0266	-0.0284	0.0584	-0.331
	(1.375)	(1.382)	(1.382)	(1.492)	(1.489)	(1.435)
ENF vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.699	0.648	0.648	-0.123	-0.271	-0.532
	(1.131)	(1.143)	(1.143)	(1.077)	(1.085)	(1.116)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.498	-0.455	-0.455	0.0195	0.0757	-0.298
	(1.059)	(1.070)	(1.070)	(1.019)	(1.020)	(1.041)
NI vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.300	0.154	0.154	0.555	0.294	-0.777
	(1.779)	(1.788)	(1.788)	(2.311)	(2.346)	(2.382)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.184	-0.0595	-0.0595	0.0274	0.126	0.629
	(1.666)	(1.673)	(1.673)	(2.187)	(2.204)	(2.221)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.87	2.91	2.91	1.96	2.70	3.45
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.153: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-6.113**	-6.038**	-6.038**	-1.531	-1.450	0.710
	(2.391)	(2.421)	(2.421)	(2.130)	(2.171)	(1.512)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	5.852	5.666	5.666	1.970	1.727	-1.102
	(3.636)	(3.705)	(3.705)	(2.941)	(3.032)	(2.239)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.612	0.721	0.721	0.242	0.381	2.311**
	(1.589)	(1.632)	(1.632)	(1.328)	(1.381)	(1.065)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.196	0.0350	0.0350	-4.402***	-4.518***	-5.393***
	(1.966)	(1.975)	(1.975)	(1.426)	(1.428)	(1.726)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	3.106	3.508	3.508	5.127***	5.476***	7.238***
	(2.989)	(3.023)	(3.023)	(1.970)	(1.994)	(2.555)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-2.807**	-3.043**	-3.043**	-1.837**	-2.037**	-2.806**
	(1.307)	(1.332)	(1.332)	(0.889)	(0.908)	(1.216)
SD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	10.33***	10.32***	10.32***	5.242*	5.060*	6.333**
	(3.254)	(3.299)	(3.299)	(3.009)	(3.045)	(2.903)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-17.03***	-17.01***	-17.01***	-8.246**	-7.702*	-9.727**
	(4.948)	(5.048)	(5.048)	(4.156)	(4.252)	(4.298)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	6.574***	6.564***	6.564***	3.489*	3.177	3.973*
	(2.163)	(2.224)	(2.224)	(1.876)	(1.936)	(2.045)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	3.203	3.054	3.054	2.198	1.930	1.541
	(3.966)	(4.013)	(4.013)	(3.482)	(3.494)	(3.483)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-2.870	-2.496	-2.496	-3.793	-2.989	0.263
	(6.032)	(6.142)	(6.142)	(4.809)	(4.880)	(5.158)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.0108	-0.230	-0.230	1.385	0.924	-0.553
	(2.636)	(2.706)	(2.706)	(2.171)	(2.222)	(2.453)
EPP vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-5.198	-5.474	-5.474	-1.427	-1.829	-3.967
	(3.895)	(3.923)	(3.923)	(4.195)	(4.162)	(4.382)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	7.171	7.864	7.864	3.027	4.232	7.601
	(5.923)	(6.004)	(6.004)	(5.794)	(5.812)	(6.490)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-2.965	-3.371	-3.371	-2.168	-2.860	-4.966
	(2.589)	(2.645)	(2.645)	(2.616)	(2.646)	(3.087)
ECR vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-1.283	-0.883	-0.883	1.551	2.242	4.093
	(2.546)	(2.497)	(2.497)	(3.303)	(2.832)	(3.498)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.714	-0.286	-0.286	-3.537	-5.612	-8.979*
	(3.871)	(3.822)	(3.822)	(4.562)	(3.955)	(5.180)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.485	1.072	1.072	-0.185	1.005	2.697
	(1.692)	(1.684)	(1.684)	(2.059)	(1.801)	(2.464)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.699	0.888	0.888	0.429	0.647	0.793
	(2.250)	(2.260)	(2.260)	(2.522)	(2.517)	(2.731)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-1.317	-1.788	-1.788	-0.540	-1.196	-2.017
	(3.421)	(3.459)	(3.459)	(3.484)	(3.515)	(4.044)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.571	0.848	0.848	0.257	0.633	0.860
	(1.495)	(1.524)	(1.524)	(1.573)	(1.600)	(1.924)
ENF vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.932	1.016	1.016	-0.713	-0.588	-1.210
	(1.735)	(1.753)	(1.753)	(1.716)	(1.727)	(1.982)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-0.930	-1.140	-1.140	0.971	0.597	0.847
	(2.638)	(2.684)	(2.684)	(2.370)	(2.411)	(2.935)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.206	0.330	0.330	-0.477	-0.263	-0.584
	(1.153)	(1.182)	(1.182)	(1.070)	(1.098)	(1.396)
NI vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-2.338	-2.169	-2.169	-3.427	-3.273	-4.665
	(2.687)	(2.710)	(2.710)	(3.545)	(3.609)	(4.101)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	4.686	4.262	4.262	6.448	5.984	7.193
	(4.086)	(4.147)	(4.147)	(4.897)	(5.040)	(6.073)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-2.328	-2.080	-2.080	-3.222	-2.956	-3.350
	(1.786)	(1.827)	(1.827)	(2.211)	(2.295)	(2.889)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.78	2.91	2.91	1.98	2.37	3.19
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.000

$* \ p < .10$, $** \ p < .05$, $*** \ p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.154: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.3260	0.3206	0.3206	0.6224	0.5727	1.4534**
	(0.2942)	(0.2975)	(0.2975)	(0.5525)	(0.5729)	(0.6404)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.6104**	0.6188**	0.6188**	-0.6652*	-0.6207	-0.3957
	(0.2522)	(0.2546)	(0.2546)	(0.4013)	(0.4153)	(0.7408)
SD vote-share	-0.3998	-0.3839	-0.3839	-0.3635	-0.1796	-0.2210
	(0.4345)	(0.4384)	(0.4384)	(0.8345)	(0.8478)	(1.2039)
ALDE vote-share	0.3227	0.3365	0.3365	-0.5467	-0.3426	1.3623
	(0.4874)	(0.4923)	(0.4923)	(0.9103)	(0.9240)	(1.3152)
EPP vote-share	-0.8681*	-0.8494*	-0.8494*	-0.0418	0.1873	-0.3318
	(0.4847)	(0.4889)	(0.4889)	(1.1032)	(1.1239)	(1.7673)
ECR vote-share	-0.1035	-0.1393	-0.1393	-2.1262**	-2.5911***	-2.7329**
	(0.3131)	(0.3075)	(0.3075)	(0.8565)	(0.7511)	(1.3622)
EFDD vote-share	-0.0699	-0.0860	-0.0860	0.0830	-0.0584	-0.5364
	(0.2768)	(0.2780)	(0.2780)	(0.6543)	(0.6653)	(1.0355)
ENF vote-share	0.2002	0.1930	0.1930	-0.1035	-0.1952	-0.8298
	(0.2133)	(0.2152)	(0.2152)	(0.4468)	(0.4555)	(0.7509)
NI vote-share	0.1157	0.0947	0.0947	0.5820	0.4207	-0.1474
	(0.3356)	(0.3367)	(0.3367)	(0.9590)	(0.9845)	(1.6030)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.87	2.91	2.91	1.96	2.70	3.45
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.155: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Turnout (%) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.3513	0.3487	0.3487	0.6812	0.6585	1.9190***
	(0.3038)	(0.3066)	(0.3066)	(0.6495)	(0.6618)	(0.6238)
Greens/EFA vote-share	0.4944**	0.5001**	0.5001**	-1.1119**	-1.0794**	-0.9610
	(0.2498)	(0.2502)	(0.2502)	(0.4349)	(0.4352)	(0.7120)
SD vote-share	-0.1281	-0.1279	-0.1279	0.4849	0.5357	0.5795
	(0.4135)	(0.4177)	(0.4177)	(0.9177)	(0.9281)	(1.1976)
ALDE vote-share	0.3222	0.3275	0.3275	-0.2099	-0.1347	1.2508
	(0.5040)	(0.5083)	(0.5083)	(1.0618)	(1.0651)	(1.4370)
EPP vote-share	-0.9906**	-0.9809**	-0.9809**	-0.5690	-0.4565	-1.3323
	(0.4950)	(0.4968)	(0.4968)	(1.2794)	(1.2686)	(1.8081)
ECR vote-share	-0.0835	-0.0975	-0.0975	-2.1710**	-2.3648***	-2.1896
	(0.3235)	(0.3162)	(0.3162)	(1.0073)	(0.8632)	(1.4432)
EFDD vote-share	-0.0463	-0.0530	-0.0530	0.1455	0.0842	-0.3630
	(0.2859)	(0.2862)	(0.2862)	(0.7692)	(0.7672)	(1.1268)
ENF vote-share	0.2088	0.2058	0.2058	-0.2195	-0.2544	-0.9475
	(0.2205)	(0.2221)	(0.2221)	(0.5234)	(0.5263)	(0.8177)
NI vote-share	0.0195	0.0136	0.0136	-0.2015	-0.2448	-0.8223
	(0.3415)	(0.3432)	(0.3432)	(1.0812)	(1.1001)	(1.6919)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.78	2.91	2.91	1.98	2.37	3.19
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.156: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, no lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.659*	0.647*	0.647*	-0.389	-0.861	1.239
	(0.336)	(0.338)	(0.338)	(1.230)	(1.216)	(0.881)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	1.308***	1.311***	1.311***	-3.940***	-4.040***	-2.088
	(0.309)	(0.312)	(0.312)	(1.284)	(1.341)	(1.693)
SD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.164	0.142	0.142	1.641	0.953	-1.559
	(0.503)	(0.505)	(0.505)	(2.964)	(3.039)	(2.797)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.0310	0.0265	0.0265	-4.128	-2.197	1.653
	(0.618)	(0.605)	(0.605)	(3.348)	(3.048)	(3.192)
EPP vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-1.362*	-1.289*	-1.289*	1.687	4.292*	2.771
	(0.735)	(0.715)	(0.715)	(3.319)	(2.576)	(2.955)
ECR vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.228	-0.261	-0.261	1.643	0.637	-0.457
	(0.498)	(0.495)	(0.495)	(2.255)	(2.181)	(2.485)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.329	0.286	0.286	-0.567	-2.114	-1.738
	(0.494)	(0.485)	(0.485)	(2.961)	(2.772)	(2.824)
ENF vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	0.542	0.507	0.507	0.965	-0.220	-2.700
	(0.380)	(0.372)	(0.372)	(2.187)	(2.028)	(2.310)
NI vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-1.055***	-1.033***	-1.033***	-1.606	-0.875	1.884
	(0.358)	(0.357)	(0.357)	(2.554)	(2.591)	(2.877)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	5.21	6.06	6.06	1.30	2.29	1.75
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.238	0.018	0.082

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.157: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-3.637	-3.645	-3.645	-4.111**	-3.952**	-0.679
	(2.308)	(2.508)	(2.508)	(1.609)	(1.704)	(1.239)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	4.325*	4.334*	4.334*	4.023***	3.743**	2.024**
	(2.300)	(2.510)	(2.510)	(1.301)	(1.561)	(0.983)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	3.870*	4.106*	4.106*	-8.481***	-9.348***	-7.918***
	(2.165)	(2.351)	(2.351)	(1.558)	(1.525)	(1.942)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-2.579	-2.821	-2.821	4.906***	6.428***	6.151***
	(2.158)	(2.353)	(2.353)	(1.259)	(1.397)	(1.540)
SD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	2.833	4.589	4.589	7.669*	10.65***	7.395**
	(3.557)	(3.808)	(3.808)	(4.262)	(3.955)	(3.386)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-2.687	-4.489	-4.489	-6.514*	-11.74***	-9.447***
	(3.545)	(3.811)	(3.811)	(3.446)	(3.623)	(2.686)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	4.249	1.498	1.498	-3.804	-8.026*	-4.574
	(4.354)	(4.616)	(4.616)	(5.146)	(4.488)	(4.588)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-4.309	-1.486	-1.486	-0.350	7.059*	6.570*
	(4.339)	(4.619)	(4.619)	(4.161)	(4.111)	(3.639)
EPP vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	4.051	0.555	0.555	7.414	2.987	0.948
	(5.165)	(5.455)	(5.455)	(4.868)	(4.004)	(4.563)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-5.451	-1.861	-1.861	-6.189	1.580	1.923
	(5.148)	(5.460)	(5.460)	(3.936)	(3.667)	(3.619)
ECR vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-1.704	0.0240	0.0240	-1.160	0.409	-0.387
	(3.531)	(3.781)	(3.781)	(3.384)	(3.402)	(3.866)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	1.486	-0.288	-0.288	3.029	0.276	-0.0738
	(3.519)	(3.784)	(3.784)	(2.736)	(3.116)	(3.066)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-3.198	-1.167	-1.167	-1.220	2.070	1.329
	(3.475)	(3.697)	(3.697)	(4.548)	(4.175)	(4.292)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	3.551	1.467	1.467	0.705	-5.067	-3.236
	(3.463)	(3.700)	(3.700)	(3.678)	(3.824)	(3.405)
ENF vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.137	1.847	1.847	0.401	2.905	-0.274
	(2.701)	(2.838)	(2.838)	(3.358)	(3.049)	(3.516)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.683	-1.353	-1.353	0.609	-3.785	-2.559
	(2.692)	(2.841)	(2.841)	(2.715)	(2.793)	(2.789)
NI vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-4.262*	-6.098**	-6.098**	-4.414	-6.715*	-2.269
	(2.507)	(2.635)	(2.635)	(3.854)	(3.723)	(4.292)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	3.229	5.113*	5.113*	3.035	7.072**	4.383
	(2.499)	(2.637)	(2.637)	(3.116)	(3.410)	(3.405)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	3.46	3.75	3.75	5.91	5.10	5.58
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.158: Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-3.927	-3.959	-3.959	-5.180**	-4.986*	0.536
	(3.995)	(4.284)	(4.284)	(2.454)	(2.635)	(1.804)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	5.031	5.080	5.080	6.891	6.478	-0.974
	(8.241)	(8.601)	(8.601)	(5.096)	(5.487)	(3.373)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-0.418	-0.434	-0.434	-1.756	-1.626	1.761
	(4.681)	(4.780)	(4.780)	(3.012)	(3.122)	(1.894)
Greens/EFA vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-3.656	-3.786	-3.786	-10.82***	-12.52***	-11.74***
	(3.517)	(3.771)	(3.771)	(2.305)	(2.203)	(2.615)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	15.76**	15.95**	15.95**	11.20**	14.82***	15.58***
	(7.254)	(7.571)	(7.571)	(4.787)	(4.588)	(4.888)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-10.85***	-10.92***	-10.92***	-3.850	-4.988*	-5.536**
	(4.120)	(4.208)	(4.208)	(2.830)	(2.611)	(2.746)
SD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	12.53**	15.90**	15.90**	10.09	15.47**	10.44**
	(5.927)	(6.196)	(6.196)	(6.512)	(6.003)	(4.949)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-26.32**	-31.40**	-31.40**	-13.01	-24.50*	-16.96*
	(12.23)	(12.44)	(12.44)	(13.53)	(12.50)	(9.252)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	13.99**	15.65**	15.65**	3.973	7.586	4.414
	(6.944)	(6.913)	(6.913)	(7.995)	(7.114)	(5.197)
ALDE vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-0.296	-4.871	-4.871	-1.650	-8.846	-4.771
	(7.497)	(7.805)	(7.805)	(7.882)	(6.974)	(6.838)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	6.763	13.66	13.66	-6.132	9.226	7.055
	(15.46)	(15.67)	(15.67)	(16.37)	(14.52)	(12.78)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-6.555	-8.811	-8.811	3.538	-1.288	-0.285
	(8.783)	(8.709)	(8.709)	(9.676)	(8.265)	(7.181)
EPP vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	11.91	6.994	6.994	10.01	2.495	-3.161
	(8.840)	(9.250)	(9.250)	(7.443)	(6.224)	(6.669)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	-24.59	-17.18	-17.18	-13.17	2.881	12.06
	(18.23)	(18.57)	(18.57)	(15.46)	(12.96)	(12.47)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	11.33	8.909	8.909	4.269	-0.773	-5.955
	(10.36)	(10.32)	(10.32)	(9.137)	(7.376)	(7.004)
ECR vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-2.965	-0.363	-0.363	2.330	5.341	4.994
	(6.110)	(6.459)	(6.459)	(5.110)	(5.111)	(5.490)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	4.559	0.632	0.632	-6.339	-12.77	-13.35
	(12.60)	(12.97)	(12.97)	(10.61)	(10.64)	(10.26)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-1.819	-0.535	-0.535	5.732	7.752	7.800
	(7.158)	(7.207)	(7.207)	(6.273)	(6.057)	(5.766)
EFDD vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-2.600	0.595	0.595	-1.970	3.709	4.411
	(6.015)	(6.308)	(6.308)	(6.983)	(6.475)	(6.319)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	2.093	-2.727	-2.727	2.720	-9.402	-10.84
	(12.41)	(12.67)	(12.67)	(14.50)	(13.49)	(11.81)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	0.863	2.439	2.439	-1.233	2.577	4.466
	(7.047)	(7.039)	(7.039)	(8.573)	(7.674)	(6.636)
ENF vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-5.495	-2.767	-2.767	-3.140	0.949	-2.047
	(4.585)	(4.780)	(4.780)	(5.067)	(4.710)	(5.209)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	13.74	9.621	9.621	10.12	1.388	1.815
	(9.457)	(9.598)	(9.598)	(10.52)	(9.810)	(9.739)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	-7.728	-6.382	-6.382	-5.818	-3.075	-2.570
	(5.372)	(5.334)	(5.334)	(6.220)	(5.582)	(5.471)
NI vote-share						
Current Non-EU Share	-3.058	-5.832	-5.832	-4.966	-9.023	-4.847
	(4.336)	(4.501)	(4.501)	(5.917)	(5.754)	(6.343)
1 year ago Non-EU Share	0.296	4.480	4.480	4.516	13.18	10.74
	(8.944)	(9.036)	(9.036)	(12.29)	(11.98)	(11.86)
2 years ago Non-EU Share	1.736	0.368	0.368	-0.907	-3.628	-3.736
	(5.080)	(5.022)	(5.022)	(7.264)	(6.819)	(6.661)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.95	3.07	3.07	5.26	4.78	4.69
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses; F values and p-values from test of joint significance of the independent variable of interest across all regressions.

Table B.159: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 1 lag included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.6881**	0.6884**	0.6884**	-0.0887	-0.2090	1.3449
	(0.3283)	(0.3324)	(0.3324)	(1.0716)	(1.1475)	(0.8186)
Greens/EFA vote-share	1.2905***	1.2843***	1.2843***	-3.5747***	-2.9202***	-1.7666
	(0.3080)	(0.3116)	(0.3116)	(1.0375)	(1.0268)	(1.2832)
SD vote-share	0.1460	0.0996	0.0996	1.1554	-1.0927	-2.0523
	(0.5060)	(0.5046)	(0.5046)	(2.8387)	(2.6629)	(2.2372)
ALDE vote-share	-0.0604	0.0123	0.0123	-4.1539	-0.9668	1.9963
	(0.6193)	(0.6116)	(0.6116)	(3.4278)	(3.0215)	(3.0313)
EPP vote-share	-1.3991*	-1.3067*	-1.3067*	1.2252	4.5669*	2.8713
	(0.7347)	(0.7229)	(0.7229)	(3.2425)	(2.6958)	(3.0151)
ECR vote-share	-0.2181	-0.2638	-0.2638	1.8690	0.6848	-0.4609
	(0.5023)	(0.5011)	(0.5011)	(2.2542)	(2.2905)	(2.5544)
EFDD vote-share	0.3533	0.2996	0.2996	-0.5142	-2.9973	-1.9069
	(0.4942)	(0.4899)	(0.4899)	(3.0298)	(2.8108)	(2.8361)
ENF vote-share	0.5462	0.4938	0.4938	1.0102	-0.8799	-2.8337
	(0.3843)	(0.3761)	(0.3761)	(2.2370)	(2.0531)	(2.3233)
NI vote-share	-1.0328***	-0.9843***	-0.9843***	-1.3794	0.3572	2.1134
	(0.3566)	(0.3492)	(0.3492)	(2.5671)	(2.5068)	(2.8362)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	3.46	3.75	3.75	5.91	5.10	5.58
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.160: Sum of Lagged and Contemporaneous Effects from Regression of EP Group Vote Share on share of population born in a Non-EU country (EP Elections, Votes Cast (#) Weighted, 2 lags included)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUE/NGL vote-share	0.6864**	0.6869**	0.6869**	-0.0440	-0.1339	1.3227
	(0.3320)	(0.3360)	(0.3360)	(1.0887)	(1.1742)	(0.8219)
Greens/EFA vote-share	1.2452***	1.2472***	1.2472***	-3.4766***	-2.6897***	-1.6970
	(0.2923)	(0.2958)	(0.2958)	(1.0228)	(0.9818)	(1.1912)
SD vote-share	0.2044	0.1527	0.1527	1.0543	-1.4431	-2.1079
	(0.4926)	(0.4860)	(0.4860)	(2.8897)	(2.6756)	(2.2548)
ALDE vote-share	-0.0878	-0.0176	-0.0176	-4.2440	-0.9073	1.9999
	(0.6230)	(0.6122)	(0.6122)	(3.4975)	(3.1084)	(3.1155)
EPP vote-share	-1.3518*	-1.2764*	-1.2764*	1.1164	4.6026*	2.9463
	(0.7346)	(0.7256)	(0.7256)	(3.3027)	(2.7741)	(3.0386)
ECR vote-share	-0.2257	-0.2656	-0.2656	1.7230	0.3267	-0.5591
	(0.5077)	(0.5066)	(0.5066)	(2.2673)	(2.2779)	(2.5014)
EFDD vote-share	0.3569	0.3079	0.3079	-0.4828	-3.1164	-1.9631
	(0.4999)	(0.4948)	(0.4948)	(3.0986)	(2.8861)	(2.8790)
ENF vote-share	0.5139	0.4721	0.4721	1.1584	-0.7379	-2.8013
	(0.3810)	(0.3750)	(0.3750)	(2.2482)	(2.0994)	(2.3734)
NI vote-share	-1.0256***	-0.9831***	-0.9831***	-1.3563	0.5248	2.1604
	(0.3603)	(0.3530)	(0.3530)	(2.6257)	(2.5646)	(2.8900)
Time Trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Detailed Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55
F	2.95	3.07	3.07	5.26	4.78	4.69
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure B.1: Vote Shares by Political Orientations (Part 1)

Figure B.2: Vote Shares by Political Orientations (Part 2)

Figure B.3: Vote Shares by EP Groups (Part 1)

Figure B.4: Vote Shares by EP Groups (Part 2)

Appendix C

Appendix to Chapter 3

C.1 Mathematical Description of Energy CGE Model

Table C.1: SAM Accounts and Set Definitions

Z	All SAM Accounts
A ⊂ Z	Activities
AGR-A	Agriculture
MIN-A	Mining and quarrying
GENCST-A	Generation of electricity by Coal, steam turbines
GENOST-A	Generation of electricity by Oil, steam turbines
GENNGCT-A	Generation of electricity by Natural Gas, combustion turbines
GENNGIC-A	Generation of electricity by Natural Gas, internal combustion
GENNGST-A	Generation of electricity by Natural Gas, steam turbines
GENNGCC-A	Generation of electricity by Natural Gas, Combined Cycle turbines
GENHYDRO-A	Generation of electricity by Conventional Hydroelectric
GENSOLPV-A	Generation of electricity by Solar, Photovoltaic
GENSOLT-A	Generation of electricity by Solar, Thermal
GENWIND-A	Generation of electricity by Wind
GENGEO-A	Generation of electricity by Geothermal

GENBIO-A	Generation of electricity by Biomass
ELECTD-A	Transmission and Distribution of Electricity
OTHUTIL-A	Non-electric utilities
CONST-A	Construction
MAN-A	Manufacturing
TRAD-A	Wholesale and retail trade
SER-A	Services
$C \subset Z$	Commodities
AGR-C	Agriculture
MIN-C	Mining and quarrying
ELEC-C	Wholesale Electricity
ELECTD-C	Retail Electricity
OTHUTIL-C	Retail Gas and Sewer
CONST-C	Construction
MAN-C	Manufacturing
TRAD-C	Wholesale and retail trade
SER-C	Services
$F \subset Z$	Factors
LAB	Employee Compensation
CAP	Proprietary Income
$INDT \subset Z$	Indirect Business Taxes
$H \subset Z$	Households
HHD1	Household income decile 1
HHD2	Household income decile 2
HHD3	Household income decile 4
HHD5	Household income decile 5
HHD6	Household income decile 6
HHD7	Household income decile 7

HHD8	Household income decile 8
HHD9	Household income decile 9
G ⊂ Z	Governments
FGOV	Federal Govt
SGOV	State Local Govt
INV ⊂ Z	Investment
T ⊂ Z	Trading Regions
DT	Domestic Trade
FT	Foreign Trade

Table C.2: Subsets of SAM Account Sets

NE ⊂ A	All Non-electricity sectors
E ⊂ A	All Electricity sectors
TD ⊂ A	Transmission and Distribution of Retail Electricity
GEN ⊂ A	All electricity generation industries
GFF ⊂ GEN	Fossil Fuel electricity generation
GRE ⊂ GEN	Renewable electricity generation
CNE ⊂ C	Non-electric commodities
CE ⊂ C	Electricity commodity

C.1.1 Zero-Profit   Conditions

Non-energy Sectors:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Pi^y_{ne} = {} & py_{ne} - \tau_{ne,ibt} \\
& - (\theta_{ne} kl_{ne}^{1-\sigma_{ne,klem}} + (1 - \theta_{ne}) em_{ne}^{1-\sigma_{ne,klem}})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{ne,klem}}} \leq 0 \quad \perp qy_{ne} \quad \forall ne
\end{aligned}
\tag{C.1a}
$$

where

$$kl_{ne} = (\gamma_{ne}pf_{L,ne}^{1-\sigma_{ne,kl}} + (1-\gamma_{ne,f})pf_{K,ne}^{1-\sigma_{ne,kl}})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{ne,kl}}} \qquad \text{(C.1b)}$$

$$em_{ne} = (\psi_{ne}pc_{ctd}^{1-\sigma_{ne,em}} + (1-\psi_{ne})m^{1-\sigma_{ne,em}})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{ne,em}}} \qquad \text{(C.1c)}$$

$$m_{ne} = (\sum_{cne} \mu_{ne,cne}pc_{cne}^{1-\sigma_{ne,m}})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{ne,m}}} \qquad \text{(C.1d)}$$

$$py_{ne} = (\sum_{cne} \delta_{cne}py_{cne}^{1+\eta_{ne}})^{\frac{1}{1+\eta_{ne}}} \qquad \text{(C.1e)}$$

Electricity Aggregate Production:

$$\Pi^{ygen} = py_{ce} - (\sum_{gff} \theta_{gen,gff}pfe_{gff}^{1-\sigma_{gen}} + \sum_{gre} \theta_{gen,gre}pre_{gre}^{1-\sigma_{gen}})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{gen}}} \qquad \perp qygen \qquad \text{(C.2)}$$

Fossil Fuel Generation:

$$\Pi_{gff}^{y} = pfe_{gff} - \psi - \tau_{gff,ibt}$$
$$- (\sum_{f} \theta_{gff,f}pf_{f,gff}^{1-\sigma_{gff}} + \theta_{gff,cap}pcap^{1-\sigma_{gff}} + \theta_{gff,mine}pc_{mine-c}^{1-\sigma_{gff}})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{gff}}} \leq 0 \qquad \perp qy_{gff} \qquad \forall gff$$

$$\text{(C.3)}$$

Renewable Generation:

$$\Pi_{gre}^{y} = py_{gre} + \psi - \tau_{gre,ibt}$$
$$- (\sum_{f} \theta_{gre,f}pf_{f,gre}^{1-\sigma_{gre}} + \theta_{gre,cap}pcap^{1-\sigma_{gre}})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{gre}}} \leq 0 \qquad \perp qy_{gre} \qquad \forall gre$$

$$\text{(C.4)}$$

Transmission and Distribution:

$$\Pi_{td}^{y} = py_{td} - \tau_{td,ibt}$$
$$- (\theta_{td,ce}pc_{ce}^{1-\sigma_{td,klem}} + \theta_{td,kl}kl_{td}^{1-\sigma_{td,klem}} + \theta_{td,m}m_{td}^{1-\sigma_{td,klem}})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{td,klem}}} \leq 0 \qquad \perp qy_{td}$$

$$\text{(C.5a)}$$

where

$$kl_{td} = (\gamma_{td}pf_{L,td}^{1-\sigma_{td,kl}} + (1 - \gamma_{td})pf_{K,td}^{1-\sigma_{td,kl}})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{td,kl}}} \tag{C.5b}$$

$$m_{td} = (\sum_{cne} \mu_{td,cne}pc_{cne}^{1-\sigma_{td,m}})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{td,m}}} \tag{C.5c}$$

$$py_{td} = py_{ctd} \tag{C.5d}$$

Disposition:

$$\Pi_c^x = px_{t,c} - (\sum_c \theta_c^x py_c^{1-\sigma_x})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_x}} \leq 0 \quad \perp qx_c \quad \forall c \tag{C.6a}$$

where

$$px_{t,c} = (\alpha_d^x pd_c^{1+\eta_x} + \alpha_n^x pn_c^{1+\eta_x} + \alpha_{fx}^x pfx^{1+\eta_x})^{\frac{1}{1+\eta_x}} \tag{C.6b}$$

Absorption:

$$\Pi_c^m = pc_c - (\theta_{m,c}pfx^{1-\sigma_{m,c}} + (1 - \theta_{m,c})dm_{m,c}^{1-\sigma_{m,c}})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{m,c}}} \leq 0 \quad \perp qm_c \quad \forall c \tag{C.7a}$$

where

$$dm_{m,c} = (\gamma_{m,c}pn_c^{1-\sigma_{m,dm,c}} + (1 - \gamma_{m,c})pd_c^{1-\sigma_{m.dm,c}})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{m,im,c}}} \tag{C.7b}$$

Factor Supply:

$$\Pi_f^{fs} = pfsup_{f,a} - pf_f \quad \perp qfsup_f \quad \forall f \tag{C.8a}$$

where

$$pfsup_{f,a} = (\sum_a \gamma_{f,a}pfs_{f,a}^{1+\eta_f})^{\frac{1}{1+\eta_f}} \tag{C.8b}$$

Household Utility:

$$\Pi_h^w = pw_h - \left(\sum_c \theta_{w,c} pc_c^{1-\sigma_w}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_w}} \leq 0 \quad \perp qw_h \quad \forall h \tag{C.9}$$

C.1.2   Market   Clearing   Conditions

Labor Demand:

$$\sum_h \bar{L}_h \geq \frac{\partial \Pi_{ne}^y}{\partial pf_L} qy_{ne} + \frac{\partial \Pi_{gff}^y}{\partial pf_L} qy_{gff} + \frac{\partial \Pi_{gre}^y}{\partial pf_L} qy_{gre} + \frac{\partial \Pi_{td}^y}{\partial pf_L} qy_{td} + \tau_{FGOV,L} \sum_h \bar{L}_h \quad \perp pf_{L,a} \tag{C.10}$$

Capital Demand:

$$\sum_h \bar{K}_h \geq \frac{\partial \Pi_{ne}^y}{\partial pf_K} qy_{ne} + \frac{\partial \Pi_{gff}^y}{\partial pf_K} qy_{gff} + \frac{\partial \Pi_{gre}^y}{\partial pf_K} qy_{gre} + \frac{\partial \Pi_{td}^y}{\partial pf_K} qy_{td}$$
$$+ \left(\sum_g \tau_{g,K} + \delta\right) \sum_h \bar{K}_h - NX_K \quad \perp pf_{K,a} \tag{C.11}$$

Regional Output Demand:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_a^y}{\partial py_c} qy_a \geq \frac{\partial \Pi_c^x}{\partial py_c} qx_c \quad \perp py_c \quad \forall c \tag{C.12}$$

Wholesale Fossil Fuel Electricity Demand:

$$qy_{gff} \geq \frac{\partial \Pi^{ygen}}{\partial py_{gff}} qygen \quad \perp pfe_{gff} \quad \forall gff \tag{C.13}$$

Wholesale Renewable Electricity Demand:

$$qy_{gre} \geq \frac{\partial \Pi^{ygen}}{\partial py_{gre}} qygen \quad \perp pre_{gre} \quad \forall gre \tag{C.14}$$

Aggregate Commodity Demand:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_c^m}{\partial pc_c} qm_c \geq \sum_{ne} \frac{\partial \Pi_{ne}}{\partial pc_c} qy_{ne} + \frac{\partial \Pi_{td}}{\partial pc_c} qy_{td} + \sum_{gff} \frac{\partial \Pi_{gff}}{\partial pc_c} qy_{gff} + \sum_h \frac{\partial \Pi_{w,h}}{\partial pc_c} qw_h \quad \perp pc_c \quad \forall c \tag{C.15}$$

Foreign Exchange Demand:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_c^x}{\partial pfx}qx_c + \sum_t \sum_i q\bar{f}x_{i,t} \geq \frac{\partial \Pi_c^m}{\partial pfx}qm_c + \sum_t \sum_i qfx_{i,t} \quad \perp pfx \qquad (C.16)$$

National Commodity Demand:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_c^x}{\partial pn_c}qx_c + \bar{q}\bar{n}_{c,RUS} \geq \frac{\partial \Pi_c^m}{\partial pn_c}qm_c + qn_{c,RUS} \quad \perp pn_c \quad \forall c \qquad (C.17)$$

Local Commodity Demand:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_c^x}{\partial pd_c}qx_c \geq \frac{\partial \Pi_c^m}{\partial pd_c}qm_c \quad \perp pd_c \quad \forall c \qquad (C.18)$$

Investment Demand:

$$\sum_i \bar{q}inv_i \geq \sum_i qinv_i \quad \perp pinv \qquad (C.19)$$

Utility Demand:

$$w_h pw_h = rh_h \quad \perp pw_h \quad \forall h \qquad (C.20)$$

US currency Demand:

$$\sum_i \sum_t \bar{q}us_{i,t} \geq \sum_i \sum_t qus_{i,t} \quad \perp pus \qquad (C.21)$$

C.1.3   Income   Balance   Conditions

Households

$$pf_L\bar{L}_h + pf_K\bar{K}_h + \sum_c py_c\bar{q}y_{h,c} + pus\bar{q}us_h + pfx\bar{q}fx_h + pinv\bar{q}inv_h \geq rh_h \quad \perp rh_h \quad \forall h \ (C.22)$$

Government:

$$py_c \bar{q} y_{g,c} + pus \bar{q} us_g + pinv \bar{q} inv_g + pfx \bar{q} fx_g \sum_f \tau_{g,f} f \geq \sum_c pc_c qc_{g,c} \quad \perp rg_g \quad \forall g \quad \text{(C.23)}$$

Investment:

$$\sum_c py_c \bar{q}_{v,c} + \delta K + pinv \bar{q} inv_v + pfx \bar{q} fx_v + pus \bar{q} us_v \geq \sum_c pc_c qc_{v,c} \quad \perp ri_v \quad \text{(C.24)}$$

Rest of the US:

$$\sum_c pn_{RUS,c} \bar{q} n_{RUS,c} \geq \sum_f pf_f f_{RUS} + \sum_c pn_c qn_{RUS,C} + pusqus_{RUS} \quad \perp RUS \quad \text{(C.25)}$$

Rest of the World:

$$\sum_f pf_f f_{ROW} + pfx \bar{q} fx_{ROW} \geq pfxqfx_{ROW} \quad \perp ROW \quad \text{(C.26)}$$

C.1.4   Auxiliary   Constraints

RPS Constraint:

$$\sum_{gre} \varepsilon_{gre} qy_{gre} \geq \phi \sum_{gen} \varepsilon_{gen} qy_{gen} \quad \perp \psi \quad \text{(C.27)}$$

Electricity Generation Capacity Constraint:

$$\sum_{gen} netgen_{gen} \geq \sum_{gen} \varepsilon_{gen} qy_{gen} \quad \perp gencap \quad \text{(C.28)}$$