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THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIALITY

by

Jan Charles Bertholf

A thesis submitted
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree Master of Science
Major in Geography

South Dakota State University
1983

THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIALITY

This thesis is approved as a creditable and independent investigation by a candidate for the degree, Master of Science, and is acceptable for meeting the thesis requirements for this degree. Acceptance of this thesis does not imply that the conclusions reached by the candidate are necessarily the conclusions of the major department.

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CHAPTER I


INTRODUCTION

Origins of the Palestinian Question

The land of Palestine has been the object of conflicting claims by numerous peoples and religions for millennia. This small, arid place generally consisting of territory east and west of the Jordan River has been ruled and coveted by Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Each now possesses historical, cultural, and religious attachments to the land. The Jewish claim to Palestine rests on their conquest of the "promised land" in 1451 B. C. E. and their 1500-year occupancy which ended with the Diaspora in 71 A. D. Christian occupation during the crusades and the importance of the land that Jesus walked also gives Christians some claim to the area, particularly the holy sites. The Arabs assert, however, more recent property rights based on their control of the area from the seventh to the twentieth century. Since Israel's rebirth as a state in 1948, Arabs and Jews have fought four major wars and numerous minor engagements over rights to Palestine.

During the late 19th century, nationalism unified peoples in Western countries, and Jews dreamed of reuniting their people. "A land without a people for a people without a land," was the slogan adopted by the early Zionist leaders to promote massive Jewish immigration to Palestine in the early 1900s.¹ But the ancient Jewish homeland

¹The phrase adopted at the First Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland 1897. Cited by Nadav Safran, Israel, The Embattled Ally (Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1978), p. 20.



was not vacant when modern Jews returned. For centuries, the land had been inhabited by Arabs. Ironically the reconstitution of a Judaic state displaced much of the Arab population. Now after four major Arab-Israeli wars the Arabs of Palestine are "a people without a land."

About four million Palestinian Arabs live throughout the world today, most of them outside the state of Israel which was created when the United Nations partitioned Palestine in 1947. When the Jews declared statehood a year later, a civil war broke out during which the Jewish nationalists defeated the Palestinian Arabs and the armies of seven surrounding Arab states. The Arabs refused to accept the existence of Israel and desired to "throttle it at birth."²

Approximately a million Palestinian Arabs live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip regions, occupied by Israel since the 1967 war. The rest of the 4 million have taken refuge among neighboring Arab states. The United Nations Relief Works Agency reported about 1.6 million Palestinian Arabs registered as refugees in 1977. Many were displaced for the second time in 1967. The victims of repeated Arab defeats, living in bitterness and often in poverty, and lacking a territory to call their own, these people have captured the attention of the world.

Responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian problem is a matter of perspective, depending largely on the allegiance of those involved. Those sympathetic to the Israelis argue that the Palestinians could have had a national homeland in 1948 and that the Israelis

²Golda Meir, "Israel in Search of Lasting Peace," Foreign Affairs 51 (April 1972): 451.

accepted the establishment of a Palestinian state and were ready to live in peace with it.³ According to this group, the neighboring Arab states, however, invaded Palestine in order to crush Israel. The Palestinians, consequently, were the victims of the outside Arab states. A totally different Arab viewpoint maintains that in 1948 Zionist underground forces attacked Arab towns and villages in order to drive out all non-Jewish inhabitants.⁴

Most diplomats believe that if the Palestinian issue is resolved, peace will come to the Middle East.⁵ On the other hand, Golda Meir suggests, "There can be no greater mistake in assessing the current situation in the Middle East than to assume that the conflict continues because of a specific political Arab grievance: the plight of the Arab refugees."⁶ Meir points out that the hatred and reluctance of the Arabs to accept Israel's very existence is the principle crux of the problem. There were no refugees prior to the war of 1948. Nevertheless, the unresolved Palestinian issue has become so intense that the search for peace in the Middle East, according to many diplomats, necessitates the

³Palestine was divided up into a proposed Jewish state and a proposed Arab state by the U. N. General Assembly in 1947.

⁴Fawaz Turki, "Portrait of A Palestinian State," Toward Peace in Palestine, (Washington, D.C.: Palestine Information Office, 1981), p. 32. He recounts the events of his family's run from Haifa north to Lebanon.

⁵The Camp David Framework for Peace in the Middle East and the United Nations Resolutions 338 (1973) and 242 (1967) are based on the solving of the Palestinian Question as a prerequisite for final Middle East Peace. See Appendices A and D.

⁶Meir, "In Search of Lasting Peace," p. 451.

formation of some sort of Palestinian entity as a prerequisite to stability in this region of the world.⁷

Competition for this region has affected states great distances from the Middle East. This struggle for dominion today has threatened to embrace the super-powers. "The search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East is one of the highest priority items on the foreign policy agenda of our country," said United States Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, in 1976. President Jimmy Carter said, "To let this opportunity [for a settlement] pass could mean disaster not only for the Middle East, but perhaps for the international political and economic order as well."⁸

Carter and Vance expressed a desire to help arbitrate a solution but stressed the United States' unwillingness to impose a settlement on Arabs and Israelis; however, former Under Secretary of State George Ball emphasized the necessity for our country's leadership in this arena:

What the United States does about the Middle East would be the acid test of political courage and decisiveness. If America should permit Israel to continue to reject inflexibility any suggestion of a return to earlier boundaries and the creation of a Palestinian state, and to refuse even to negotiate about Jerusalem, we should be acquiescing in a policy hazardous not only to Israel but for America and the rest of the world. That would not be responsible conduct for a great power."⁹

⁷"Entity" throughout this paper will be used to signify the basic idea of Palestinian area, whether it will be in the form of federal, binational, or separate partitioned state.

⁸Congressional Quarterly, Inc., The Middle East (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1979), p. 3.

⁹George W. Ball, "How to Save Israel in Spite of Herself," Foreign Affairs 55 (April 1977): 471.

President Carter was the first president to recognize that the concept of a Palestinian homeland was a central issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict. "The Framework for Peace in the Middle East," concluded at Camp David September 17, 1978 by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, established steps to implement self-determination of the occupied territories, the West Bank and Gaza.¹⁰ The next five years produced no visible autonomy for the Palestinians. Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the subsequent forced evacuation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) army from Beirut, President Reagan introduced in November 1982 an initiative for a Palestinian homeland in the form of a West Bank entity in loose confederation with Jordan.

The Israeli realization of statehood is well documented. J. C. Hurewitz presents the most complete account of the events leading up to and including Israeli independence in the Struggle for Palestine.¹¹ Netanel Lorch's Israel's War of Independence focuses on the political and military aspects of the 1948 War including each major engagement.¹² In Israel, the Embattled Ally, Nadav Safran produces a well respected political view from the standpoint of Israeli-American relations through 1978.¹³ Additionally, Richard F. Nyrop edits an

¹⁰See Appendix A for the key provisions for the Framework of Peace.

¹¹J. C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York: W. W. North and Co., 1950).

¹²Netanel Lorch, Israel's War of Independence (Hartford: Hartmore House, 1961).

¹³Nadav Safran, Israel, the Embattled Ally (Cambridge: Balknap Press, 1978).

accurate social, historical, and physical work from the Jewish perspective.¹⁴ The Palestinians, however, have not attained a territory of their own, and a need exists for an examination of their situation. This paper consequently addresses the Palestinian question within the context of political space.

A binding agreement by all concerned parties is essential to creating a Palestinian political area. Before this can occur, a careful analysis of the territory which might comprise that state and the potential boundaries which may define it must be carried out. This analysis would facilitate stability and limit friction between peoples. Stephen B. Jones addresses this latter aspect in his handbook for statesmen, treaty editors, and boundary commissioners. He presents four stages in preparation of a boundary: (1) the political decisions on the allocation of territory, (2) delimitation of the boundary in a treaty, (3) demarcation of the boundary on the ground, and (4) administration of the boundary.¹⁵

Jones suggests that territorial allocation and boundary-making can only be accomplished properly when the area's "general situation" is understood. The conditions in any given locality, both physical and

¹⁴Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Israel, A Country Study (Washington, D. C., The American University Press, 1979).

¹⁵Stephen B. Jones, Boundary Making (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945), p. 5. There is difference of opinion within the field of political geography regarding the meaning of the words "delimitation" and "demarcation". The first refers to the choice of a boundary site and its definition in a treaty. The second is a field operation performed by a commission to survey and make final adjustments to the boundaries.

cultural, are so unique that territorial allocation and boundary delimitation can only be accomplished as a result of customized research.

It is a fact that a boundary even in the earliest stage of territorial allocation, is a structure-to-be, a future functional feature of the inhabited earth, that requires that so much of so many kinds of information be brought to a focus on each problem. The best means of insuring that this information is complete, significant, and up-to-date, and, also, of bringing the information quickly to a sharp focus, is to make field observations at the earliest possible stage.¹⁶

The first step prior to field observation, therefore, is the necessity for statesmen and diplomats charged with establishing some form of Palestinian entity, to gain a thorough understanding of the Palestinian general situation. The purpose of this paper is to provide a synthesized geographic analysis of selected aspects of the Palestinian question as part of the first stage of boundary making. This study will aid the reconnaissance commissions, tasked with determining boundaries, particularly if its members are unfamiliar with this region.

This paper will examine three facets of the Palestinian struggle for political area. The first point of study is the historical development of Palestinian nationalism and identity from the turn of the twentieth century. The second concerns the Palestinian society and assesses the affects of its distribution, repression, cleavage and cohesion on attempts to form a coherent society. Finally, the study will conclude with an examination of several territorial alternatives such as a binational Arab-Israeli state, a total Palestinian Arab state, and repartition into separate Arab and Israeli states. These three aspects are

¹⁶Ibid, pp. 6-7.

interrelated; by understanding them, those entrusted with the task of solving the complex, illusive problem of a Palestinian political area will grasp the nature of Palestinian territoriality and be more prepared to develop effective, feasible solutions.

Geographic Boundary Studies and Functions

Diplomatic history is replete with examples of state-making in the absence of a general understanding of the land or its people.

Impatient monarchs and ministers have often established military, political, or natural barriers in an attempt to delineate the boundaries of a state. Errors in judgement and hardships among peoples were often the product. The boundary-making process does not imply going to a map and arbitrarily drawing a circumference around an area and declaring the birth of a state. In fact, the concepts of delineating a state area by establishing either military, political, or natural barriers is old and results in numerous errors in judgement and hardships to communities throughout the world. In order for reconnaissance commissions to be successful, it is crucial for its members to appreciate the nature of boundary studies and particularly the functions performed by the state within the area defined by boundaries.

World War I and the tide of nationalism which followed changed the international boundary picture significantly. More nations were created and more boundaries were drawn during this period than during any other time in history. In the Middle East alone the European powers divided the Ottoman Empire into numerous mandates administered by European powers. Geographers have examined boundaries as a facet of the state, primarily to prevent the mistakes of the past. Possibly their most impressive contribution to territorial allocation and boundary pre-delimitation was "The Inquiry" of the United States Government undertaken in 1919 in preparation for the Paris conference. The study was

enormous and of great value to the peace conference; however, much of the information was encyclopedic and statistical in form and lacked cohesion and geographical analysis in terms of data interrelationships. The work, nevertheless, served as a model for subsequent boundary problems and has influenced this study of the Palestinian Problem. The topics are listed in Appendix B.¹⁷

Studies of boundaries have changed since World War I. Early views of boundaries emphasized their nature in terms of being "good" or "bad" from a politico-military perspective. Many statesmen erroneously claimed that the best boundary was one that could separate diverse peoples and prevent friction. The most familiar concept was the "natural boundary". Many diplomats believed rivers, deserts and mountains were the "best" boundaries. Jones maintained, however, that "there are no intrinsically good or bad boundaries."¹⁸ This is not to suggest that natural features should not be examined or analyzed in the boundary-making process. The examination of natural features, however, must be considered in terms of each particular situation. The result of the natural barrier mentality among statesmen led to many problems. In 1921, Winston Churchill, then British colonial secretary, convened a high-level conference in Cairo to subdivide the Palestine Mandate into two parts: one for a Jewish national homeland, the other for Arabs. The conference delimited the two entities along the Jordan River - Gulf

¹⁷"The American Geographical Society's Contribution to the Peace Conference," Geographical Review 7 (1919): 4.

¹⁸Jones, Boundary Making, p. 3.

of Aqaba line (the most obvious), thereby causing a split in jurisdiction of the watershed of the Jordan¹⁹. This later precipitated numerous armed confrontations between Israel and Jordan.

Statesmen have also considered mountains to be good barriers to movement and settlement of people, hence making them a boundary option. However this may be convenient but is not always true. Deserts and swamps may pose more serious obstacles to surface circulation. Desert peoples often traverse toward mountains for the water they afford. Settlers may seek mountains for the same reason, or for power, minerals or timber, as in much of the Middle East. Mountains in arid regions may form the homelands of unified peoples and therefore constitute poor sites for boundaries. The League of Nations commissioned the Iraq-Syria investigation in 1932 to decide whether the mountains known as Jebel Sinjar should be divided or given entirely to one country or the other. The commission unanimously recommended that the mountains should be allocated as a unit based upon circulation patterns of the people who lived there.²⁰ The assumption that a natural barrier reduces friction is unfounded. For example, most of the boundary separating Canada and the United States, is a geometric line rather than a natural obstacle. It is one of the world's most peaceful and cooperative lines between two states.


Friction actually arises when political systems and boundaries are inappropriately superimposed upon existing cultural areas. The

¹⁹Robert Rhinehart, Jordan A Country Study, Richard Nyrop, ed. (Washington, D. C., The American University, 1980), p. 21.

²⁰Jones, Boundary Making, p. 98.

demarcated boundaries throughout the Middle East are good examples of the Western powers' unfamiliarity with the human geographical landscape. For instance, the Supreme Allied Council, meeting in San Remo, Italy, in April, 1920, partitioned the Arab world into mandates to be administered by Britain and France. In the Syrian Mandate, the French sought to increase their strength by supporting and separating the religious groups. Using religion as boundary criteria, France originally planned to establish four sectarian states: an Alawite state in the north, a Sunni Muslim state in the center, a Druze state in the south, and a Christian state in the area of Mount Lebanon. The first three eventually merged to form a federal Syria leaving the Christian state of Lebanon with a precarious balance of religious minorities that continue to confront each other.²¹ Modern Syria still claims Lebanon and hopes to incorporate it. The fact of the matter was that France tried to superimpose new boundaries in Syria based on Western ideas of organization. Their unfamiliarity with the Arab culture demonstrated by the delimitation of their mandate into a Christian state (Lebanon) and a Muslim state (Syria) is a classic example of judgemental errors due to misunderstanding the general situation. Another case of inappropriate boundaries which caused friction was the United Nations General Assembly plan for partition of Palestine in 1947 (Map 2). This delimitation consisted of a ludicrous fragmentation of geographic areas proposed for both a Jewish and a Muslim state. More will be said on this later.

²¹Laraine N. Carter, Syria a Country Study, ed. Richard F. Nyrop, (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1979), p. 22.



As a result of the numerous conflicts which ensued as a result of inappropriate location of boundaries, political geographers took a hard look at the concept of boundaries. A shift of emphasis was necessary. Before World War II they focused on boundary classification and type. Nicholas Spykman introduced the concept of boundaries as "points of contact of territorial power structures" as opposed to the traditional approach which characterized them as lines of demarcation between legal systems.²² Spykman contended that the position of a boundary could become a quantifiable index to the power of the separated countries. S. Whittemore Boggs' classification of boundary types during the same period consisted of phenomenological criteria such as physical, geometrical, anthropogeographical, and complex types.²³ Richard Hartshorne proposed a sequential classification. Borrowing from William Morris Davis' geomorphological language, he applied erosion terms to boundaries according to their relationship with the cultural landscape at the time of their establishment. He said that boundaries may be antecedent or subsequent to periods of occupation.²⁴ An antecedent boundary precedes development of the cultural landscape. The 49th parallel boundary between Canada and the United States was subsequent to

²²Nicholas, J. Spykman, "Frontiers, Security and International Organization," Geographical Review 32 (July 1942): 437.

²³S. Whittemore Boggs, International Boundaries (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1966), pp. 25-26.

²⁴Richard Hartshorne, "Suggestions on the Terminology of Political Boundaries," Annals, AAG 26 (March 1936): 56-57.

Indian occupation but antecedent to farming.²⁵ The Belgium-France boundary was subsequent to agricultural settlement but antecedent to industry. Furthermore, a boundary along a natural barrier is said to be consequent upon that barrier. The 1922 boundary in Upper Silesia was instituted after industry so it is superimposed on the industrial area.²⁶ This was the first classification of boundaries by function rather than physical type. By the end of World War II, the emphasis shifted completely from criteria for drawing boundaries to the functions performed by them.

This shift away from the nature of a boundary to the functions performed within and across the boundary enables the scholar to more accurately assess current problems and provide realistic solutions. A list of boundary functions today could almost duplicate a list of human activities: mail service, telephone connections, natural gas pipelines, road networks, recreational locations, television viewing, and money coinage, to name several. The increasing influence of government in all phases of life, makes boundary functions increasingly sharp. As the state continues to assume an increasing number of functions, people become more and more conscious of its presence, its functions, and its institutions.²⁷ For example, King Hussein of Jordan, and the British

²⁵Landsat photographs clearly reveal the divergent land-uses between the Canada-U.S. boundary attributed to establishing the boundary antecedent to farming.

²⁶Ibid. p. 56.

²⁷Hans W. Weigert, ed., Principles of Political Geography (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1957), p. 110.

before him, instituted a policy of almost total recruitment (a military function) within the ranks of the nomadic, uncohesive Beduin tribes in order to build a national consciousness. Similarly, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), as an institution, became a nationalistic rallying point to the people in the West Bank and Gaza even though no de jure boundaries for a Palestinian state have been drawn (a belonging function). In the 1950s the Israeli government required all immigrants to live and work on the Jewish agricultural cooperatives. In order for crop production to be successful, the government required the Jewish settlers to utilize the Jewish National Fund and the Zionist Organization in which to sell their products (a trade function).²⁸

Boundary-making, therefore, is no longer linear, but areal in nature. Merely studying the facets of terrain in order to locate lines which may form barriers of minimum friction between people cannot bring success to the Palestinian dilemma. The formation of any Palestinian entity, whether it becomes a sovereign state or a canton under another government, cannot be realized with the old assessment of a linear feature (boundary) or even zones adjacent to it. The answer must be investigated by a regional method which can consider all the functioning ingredients (cultural, economic, and political) within a given area or region. Jones maintains that as a method leading directly to the discovery of boundary sites, the regional method probably will not be successful. He suggests, however, that since the concept has proven its

²⁸Dorothy Willner, Nation-Building and Community in Israel (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 303-379.

value in scholarly studies both as a method of analysis and of synthesis of information, it can contribute significantly to recommendations of field and office investigations; hence, the regional method is a useful tool in this paper as a preliminary step for reconnaissance commissions.²⁹

²⁹Jones, Boundary Making, p. 20.


The Palestinian Region

Members of reconnaissance commissions must be able to view Palestine on a regional basis. Their observations should be from an extrinsic standpoint in order to be both discerning to actual fact and objective during decision making. The regional concept can provide this means of objectivity if the criteria defining the region are clear. To do this, regions may be based on the "homogeneity of the geographical landscape or on coherence of organization."³⁰ For example, homogeneity of landscape may be a space defined by the Arabic language or the Sunni Muslim religion. A space defined by its organization (functioning) could be the industrial trade area of Haifa Bay in Northern Israel. The challenge to the reconnaissance commissions will be their ability to discern a Palestinian entity in a space which has Arab and Israeli overlapping or competing regional criteria.

The Palestinian problem can be limited on an areal basis to the four countries containing the majority of Palestinians: Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan (Map 3). Since the Arab peoples who call themselves Palestinians do not possess an actual state, but are scattered into many settlement pockets, it is necessary to define a concept of Palestinian territoriality.

The territorial principle is the innate command, according to Robert Ardrey, in The Territorial Imperative, to defend one's property. He demonstrates in numerous examples, mankind to be as territorially

³⁰Jones, Boundary Making, p. 3.



MAP 3
The Palestinian Region

possessive as the animal world.³¹ The contest between Israeli and Arab is not due to natural and historic enmity, but specifically for space. Ardrey describes the Jew prior to 1948 as nothing other than a de-territorialized man possessing the personality of a bundle of mannerisms that preserved his identity for 2000 years of Diaspora.

If a territorial interpretation of the Israeli and the Palestinian carries validity, then certain theoretical consequences should be evident. Ardrey lists several principles which lend credibility to the territorial principle in Palestine.

First, a territory is a defended area. To defend it one must have hostile neighbors. The Arab League, happily for the Jew, presented ... the opportunity to make legitimate his territory in the strictest biological sense.

Second, if civilized man is to respect someone else's title to a territory, he needs evidence He needs ... to see the proprietors in defense of their land slaughter a maximum number of their fellow human beings.

Third, acquisition and defense of a territory have brought the usual enhancement of energy to the Israeli. It did. The Promised Land was as unpromising a collection of rocks, gravel, malarial swamps, and out-and-out desert as the Mediterranean littoral can provide ... Yet a people who for 2000 years had been denied ownership of land, had lived almost entirely in towns and lacked both farming tradition and experience, have made themselves very nearly self-sufficient on food supply and are capturing one European market after another with their agricultural exports.³²

Ardrey concludes by explaining that the Arab's persistent desire to expel the Israelis from Palestine will actually work, as in nature,

³¹Robert Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1966), p. 252.

³²Ibid., pp. 305-313.

to create a stronger, more determined Israeli commitment to retain their new territory. The same is also true of the Palestinians. Now they are the de-territorialized people striving for a place. The question of cultural unity and sense of purpose for the Palestinians as a people is a major factor in their ability to either extricate the Israelis or persist in carving out a territory of their own somewhere in the Palestinian region.

The concept of spacial control can also be expanded in two different ways. The American anthropologist Lewis Henry Morgan in his classic 1878 work, Ancient Society, saw two fundamentally distinct sorts of organization in the early development of man's control of area: personal control and territorial control.

The first, in the order of time, is founded upon persons, and upon relations purely personal, and may be distinguished as a society ... The second is founded upon territory and property, and may be distinguished as a state ... Political society is organized upon territorial areas, and deals with persons through territorial relations.³³

These two concepts between personal and territorial government contrast in the Middle East. Rule over men, regnum, is different from rule over territory, dominium.³⁴ The traditional Arab socio-political organization arose out of "group feeling", asabiyah, supported by kinship and tribal allegiance. Israel rules over the West Bank territory by its military dominance; however, the PLO rules over the West Bank people through a

³³Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient Society (New York: Henry Holt Company, 1878), p. 218.

³⁴Edward F. Bergman, Modern Political Geography (Dubuque: William C. Brown Company, 1975), p. 42.

combination of fear and iconography.³⁵ Even the King of Saudi Arabia, a territorially defined state, governs through personal relations. The Saudi family's rule is through approximately 5,000 male members in every tribe and corner of the kingdom. Kenneth Boulding has suggested adopting a worldwide regnum political system "wherein political units claim jurisdiction over a defined set of citizens wherever they might be, instead of territory no matter who is in it."³⁶ The Palestinian region in 1983, therefore, can be defined territorially in both of the ways mentioned above. In the sense of the rule over territory, the Palestinian region is characterized by the four governments which control their respective states. In the sense of rule over men, the Palestinian region is also characterized by the stateless Arabs who live in these four states and persistently lay claim to parts of Israel.

Given a cultural concept of territoriality for the Palestinian people living in settlement pockets within the countries, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, I loosely define this as the Palestinian region.

For the purpose of analysis and synthesis, this study focuses on the Palestinian region and examines characteristics of functional uniformity in terms of both homogeneity (language, common history, land-use, family customs, religion, political expectation, etc.) and organization (drainage, movement, trade, circulation, government, and military

³⁵Joseph Alpher, "Why Begin Should Invite Arafat to Jerusalem," Foreign Affairs, 60 (Summer 1982): 1116.

³⁶Kenneth Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," Journal of Conflict Resolution 3 (1959): 123.

security.) The following questions of functional uniformity will be answered in the chapters ahead: Who are the Palestinians? What is their common history? Where do they live? Where do they desire to live? Is there any distinction between Palestinians and other Arabs? What binds them together as a culture? Given nation-state status, what location would provide optimum viability within the framework of the political situation of the region?

Reconnaissance commissions and statesmen should understand that the formation of political area within the Palestinian region involves two basic assumptions. The first is almost axiomatic, with the precedent being set numerous times this century, that outside forces will most likely play an important role in the arbitration/decision-making process. The United States and moderate Arab countries presently retain this responsibility. The other assumption involves the idea of self-determination. According to James Downs, self-determination is one of the ideas which, unfortunately, has been accepted rather uncritically by people all over the world (particularly the Middle East) without Western attempts to export it. Downs maintains that the idea now is almost sacred, "Everyone has the right to self determination, but no one yet has been able to set exact boundaries within which that right may be exercised."³⁷ Jones insists that the greatest difficulty with self-determination in practice is that it makes "nationality the basic criterion for territorial division in a world suffering from too much

³⁷James F. Downs, Cultures in Crisis (London: Collier MacMillan Publishers, 1975), p. 88.

nationalism."³⁸ Practically speaking, while cultural and linguistic boundaries are seldom clear-cut, political boundaries must be.

The debate over the idea of self-determination has been rendered irrelevant today due to its acceptance in world society. National self-determination was an expression of principle during the Paris Conference of 1919. Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points contained broad support for the self determination concept, especially rights of small nations. The principle was later reiterated in the third article of the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941. In the 1980s, self-determination continues to be accepted particularly because of the turbulence and misery in areas where self-government has been denied. Reconnaissance commissions will obviously need to consider the political desires of the inhabitants before allocating territory.

As tensions over territory increase in this region over the unresolved Palestinian issue, the need for knowledgeable, sensitive statesmen is imperative. The ideas for establishing a Palestinian entity must be carefully placed in light of the historical, cultural and spacial contexts. The reader must be cautioned not to view this paper as a complete history or an analysis of the Palestinian situation in order to make immediate judgement on a specific place for a homeland in the Middle East. As a preliminary framework, however, this study can form the infrastructure as a briefing for diplomats and those sent to this area as investigators.

The first aspect to establish this framework and to depict the

³⁸Jones, Boundary Making, p. 27.

setting, is the historical development of the Palestinians. The next three chapters examine the volatile period from 1900 to the present. Two major themes are interwoven throughout these chapters, the growth of Palestinian identity and nationalism, and the allocation of political space by outside forces.

Those unfamiliar with the short but complex history of the Palestinians can best understand the "general situation" by examining three distinct phases of their national sentiment. The first period is from shortly before World War I to the creation of the Israeli state in 1948. The second identifiable phase of Palestinian national maturation takes place from their disastrous loss during the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 to the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War which caused massive displacement of people and loss of territory. During the last phase from 1967 to the present, the refugees began to crystalize into "Palestinians".

CHAPTER II

FROM SYRIANS TO PALESTINIANS

The current Middle East milieu is the product of historical processes. Any effort to resolve current difficulties without an understanding of the past is doomed to failure. The creation of a possible Palestinian state requires an awareness of the evolution and nature of the Palestinian national identity.

The basis for Palestinian identity can be traced through a common language, culture, and history prior to and following the emergence of Israel in 1948. Before the twentieth century this whole region at the eastern end of the Mediterranean which included the contemporary states of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel, was called Syria, a name given by ancient Greeks to the geographical land bridge that links three continents. Historians and political geographers refer to the term Greater Syria to denote the area in the prestate period. The region was a marchland separating empires from all three continents and contributed to the theological background for most of the world. The historian Philip K. Hitti noted:

Especially because of the inclusion of Palestine and Phoenicia within its ancient boundaries, it has made more significant contribution to the moral and spiritual progress of mankind than any other comparable land. Small as it appears on a map or a globe, its historical importance is boundless, its influence universal."¹

A recurring theme in this region's history was the East-West cultural interaction. Phoenicians competed with the Greeks for trade

¹Philip K. Hitti, History of Syria (New York: McMillan, 1951), p. 1.

dominance; Greeks vied for power with the Persians; and Romans fought for control against the indigenous people for centuries. During the medieval period this competition intensified as the religious point of view became entangled in the question of rights to the land.

Christian Byzantines contended with Moslem Arabs, and later European crusaders fought with Muslim Arabs for land they all held sacred.²

By the time western powers divided the region after World War I, eighteen different empires held dominion over the area. They were desert peoples, Hebrews, Assyrians, Neobabylonians, Greeks, Egyptians, Seluecids, Syrians, Romans, Hasmoneans, Romans, Byzantines, Muslims, Seljuq Turks, Christian crusaders (England and France), Mamlukes (Egypt), Ottoman Turks, and British/French. This historic domination by foreign powers over the people of Palestine for millennia created an absolute mistrust and hatred for the outsider. Viewed as western foreigners, the European Jew who migrated into Palestine in five major waves during the last century became not only the catalyst but the sustaining factor for Arab Nationalism and unity.

²Carter, Syria, A Country Study, p. 4.

Arab Nationalism and Zionism

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, two separate movements developed that were to effect all the Middle East, Pan-Arabism and Zionism. Both aimed at uniting their peoples into a national homeland. They were to converge geographically in the land of Palestine where some hoped to achieve their expectations in a spirit of mutual accommodation. However, they were to prove incompatible. This is a major point of this study.

Arab nationalism and Zionism derive their origin from the worldwide historical period in which the dominant characteristic was the political phenomenon known as nationalism. Most historians agree that this phenomenon in its earliest forms advanced more speedily in western Europe than in the rest of the world, taking place in the high Middle Ages (ca. eleventh-fourteenth centuries). This early form of nationalism became known in the West as feudalism and was characterized according to Marc Bloch as an "interplay of evolving political, economic and social arrangements, the total culture of the Middle Ages."³ One lord commanded the loyalty and obedience of a small number of people generally at the provincial level far away from emperors and popes. With improved communication and transportation (e.g., roads and bridges) feudal societies declined, and major lords or kings increased their dominion over numerous provincial areas. As a result of increased commerce from distant places and the invention

³Marc Bloch, cited by Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism: Its Nature and Interpreters. (Washington, D.C.: AHA Pamphlet, 1976), p. 19.

of the printing press, some would suggest that differences among people became more noticeable. A new political organization consequently evolved, that of monarchical rule known as etatisme (ca. fifteenth-eighteenth centuries). The further improvement of roads, harbors, and ships coupled with new bureaucracies, courts, and administrative systems facilitated the age of nations and nationalism (ca. 1789 to the present).

In the twelve centuries following the Arab conquests, Palestine "virtually dropped out of history."⁴ Throughout the Ottoman era from 1517 until the end of World War I, Palestine was considered by the Constantinople government to be an unimportant backwater of the Turkish empire. In 1875, a small group of Western-oriented Muslim and Christian Arab intellectuals in Beirut urged the study of Arab history, literature, and language in order to revive Arab identity. Secret publications aroused an Arab consciousness by exposing harsh Ottoman rule. At the same time a Jewish revival in Europe called for the return of the Jews of the Diaspora to their historic homeland.⁵ Several Jewish intellectuals, impressed by the spread of nationalism among Europeans, wrote books and articles advocating Jewish nationalism. In

⁴Don Peretz, The Palestine State (New York: Kennikat Press, 1977), p. 4.

⁵The Diaspora refers to Jews living in the scattered communities outside Israel. The Jews have been scattered in three major dispersions: The Babylonian captivity 586 B.C., after the destruction of the 2nd Temple by the Romans in 70 A.D., and the Bar Kokhba War in A.D. 132-135. Josephus in 70 A.D. gives an eyewitness account of almost 1,000,000 Jews taken to all parts of the Mediterranean in slavery. When the word is applied in the lowercased form, it usually pertains to non-Jews, such as Palestinian Arab refugees.

1882, Leo Pinsker, a Russian physician, published his work, Auto-Emancipation, which expressed the view that Jews would never be able to integrate with the societies they lived in because the societies were so thoroughly anti-Semitic. Borrowing from Pinsker, a journalist named Theodor Herzl, in his book, The Jewish State, argued that even if Jewish separateness in religion and social custom were to disappear, the Jews would continue to be treated as unrespected strangers. Herzl believed that a Jewish state could be founded as a "new Switzerland."⁶

As a result of his book's favorable reaction among Jewry, Herzl convened the First Zionist Congress at Basel, Switzerland in 1897. Its aim was the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, one secured by public law. At the end of the congress Herzl wrote in his diary: "In Basel I founded the Jewish State. If I were to say this aloud I would meet with general laughter; but in another five years, and certainly in another fifty years, everyone will be convinced of this ..."⁷ He was wrong by a year.

Arab nationalists also called for the reestablishment of Arab identity. However, not all Arabs in the region shared identical sentiments. Arabs from Jerusalem, Jaffa, Nablus, and other Palestinian towns, regarded themselves as Syrians, not Palestinians. In 1905 Najib Azuri, a Palestinian living in Paris, published a book entitled Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe which demanded a renewed Arab empire from

⁶Nadav Safran, Israel The Embattled Ally, p. 20.

⁷Peretz, The Palestine State, p. 4.

Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean. He introduced for the first time the inevitability of future Jewish-Arab confrontation in the Middle East. While nationalism was gaining momentum among both Arab and Jew, entrenched in Palestine at the turn of the twentieth century was the Ottoman Empire. The conflict between Arabs and Turks made the claim for territory more complex, but more importantly, became the catalyst which transformed the Syrian Arabs into Palestinian Arabs.

The Ottomans and World War I


Syrian nationalism developed just prior to World War I in response to harsh Turkish policies. Though fellow Muslims (Turks are not Arab), the Constantinople government tried to centralize administration by intensifying the "turkification" of western Middle East. Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909), sometimes known as Abdul Hamid the Damned, earned the reputation as the most oppressive Ottoman sultan in modern history.⁸ Taxes became heavy and opponents died quickly. He tried to obtain the loyalty of his subjects by instilling Pan-Islamic ideas and by completing the Hejaz Railway between Istanbul and Medina in 1908. However, the Sultan's cruelty, coupled with that of his deputy in Acre, known in Syria as "The Butcher," set the stage for the emergence of an Arab identity. World War I set in motion events that began to congeal Arab Nationalism.

Arab opposition to the nationalizing policies of the Ottomans showed itself in two different ways. One developed among intellectuals in Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus. Demanding limited autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, they formed political committees that formulated the ideas of a new Arab nationalism. One such committee was the Young Arab Society.⁹ These political groups were soon forced to operate as clandestine societies, especially where their objective became Arab

⁸Carter, Syria A Country Study, p. 20.

⁹Jamiyat al Arabiya al Fatat. This should not be confused with the contemporary PLO organization, Al Fatah.

MAP 4
ARAB CHALLENGES TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE



independence. The desert tribes of Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula became the other form of opposition to Ottoman centralization. These nomadic tribes had a strong history of resentment to foreign control.

The link between the urban intellectual committees and the desert tribesmen was Hussein ibn Ali, the grand sharif and amir of Mecca. He was the hereditary custodian of the Muslim holy places. Hussein, head of the Hashemite branch of the Quraysh tribe, claimed descent from the Prophet.¹⁰

Hussein's two sons Abdullah and Faisal contacted the Arab nationalists in Syria and negotiated the so-called Damascus Protocol. The nationalists, who acknowledged Hussein as the "Father of the Arabs," accepted the Hashemites as spokesmen for the Arab cause in return for the promise to deliver them from the Turks. In February, 1914, Abdullah visited Cairo and inquired about the possibility of British support if his father should organize a revolt against the Turks. Lord Horatio Kitchener, the senior officer in Egypt was non-committal since Turkey was a friendly power. When war broke out in August, Kitchener returned to Britain to become Secretary of State for war. In Cairo, Sir Henry MacMahon, British High Commissioner, became Kitchener's successor and maintained extensive ties with Hussein. In a letter to MacMahon in July 1915 Hussein claimed the Arabian Peninsula, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq for his future kingdom.

¹⁰Robert Rinehart, Jordan, A Country Study, ed. Richard F. Nyrop (Washington D.C.: American University, 1980), p. 17.

In his reply MacMahon declared British support for postwar Arab independence.¹¹

On the morning of May 6, 1915 another event happened that created unity within the Arab peoples and had far-reaching effects. Jamal Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Syria tightened his control by ruthlessly attacking and arresting many members of the underground Al Fatat. That morning, twenty-one Arabs were hanged in the city squares of Damascus and Beirut. Martyrs' Day remains a national holiday in Syria and Lebanon.¹²

In May 1916, the British and French concluded the secret Sykes-Picot agreement which formulated a post-war Arab state in Arabia and approved an accord for the internationalization of Jerusalem. Essentially the arrangement carved up the Middle East between these two powers, this only six months after vaguely promising Hussein an Arab kingdom.¹³

The Ottoman Empire's alliance with Germany threatened the geopolitical left flank of Britain's route to India through the Suez Canal. When the Gallipoli campaign against Turkey failed (a frontal assault into central Turkey,) Britain decided on a campaign from the South¹⁴ (Map 5).

¹¹Ibid.


¹²Carter, Syria, A Country Study, p. 20.

¹³Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Israel A Country Study, p. 31.

¹⁴William B. Quandt, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), p. 7.

MAP 5

World War I in Palestine



In June 1916, Hussein launched the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire and, by October, proclaimed himself "King of the Arabs."¹⁵ Britain provided supplies, money, and advisors to help the Arab forces led by Abdullah and Faisal. T. E. Lawrence, Lawrence of Arabia, became one of the best known advisors.

With British support, Hussein drove the Turkish garrison out of Mecca in the opening weeks of the Arab revolt. Faisal's forces captured Al Aqabah in July 1917 and the British expeditionary force, under General Sir Edmund Allenby, entered Jerusalem in December. For Hussein, the campaign was a war of liberation in which the British were actively cooperating with the Arabs. For the British command, however, the Arab army was merely a supporting force in the major Allied offensive in Palestine. The Arabs were to draw Turkish attention to the East Bank while Allenby concentrated on the resistance on the West Bank and Galilee in preparation for a strike on Damascus. In September 1918 the British army decisively defeated the Turks at Megiddo.¹⁶ Lawrence captured Daraa opening up Faisal's opportunity to capture Damascus. The Ottoman government consented to an armistice on October 1918, bringing the war to a conclusion in the Middle East. The Hashemite Family brought great honor, ird, to the Arabs of

¹⁵The Allies considered him to be king of Hejaz, only. The eastern peninsular Arabs, the Saudis, rejected the title.

¹⁶Megiddo, located in contemporary Israel, is a location of countless historical battles fought throughout millennia. Interestingly, it forms the rootword for the word Armageddon, a byword used through the centuries to depict the horrors of war. Biblical eschatologists maintain the final world battle will center here because of its strategic approach to Jerusalem.

Palestine and gave them a sense of unity. It is significant that Britain did much of the fighting west of the Jordan which became the Jewish state. The Arabs did much of the fighting east of the Jordan which became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Arab nationalism was further stimulated when Britain recognized the national aspiration of another group, the Jews.

The Balfour Declaration

In November 1917 British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour wrote a letter to Zionist leader Lord Lionel Rothschild concerning the Jewish quest for a homeland. The letter became known as the Balfour Declaration and consisted of one sentence:

His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object; it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing nonJewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.¹⁷

This declaration laid the foundation for the Jewish state.

Although painstakingly worded, both sides interpreted it differently. It contained two incompatible points, the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jews and the preservation of the rights of the existing Arab population. The Jewish community in Palestine grew from 56,000 divided and bickering people, scattered in two dozen settlements at the end of World War I, to a "disciplined embryonic nation of 700,000 that was able to withstand the combined assault of all the surrounding Arab states in 1948."¹⁸ This document also intensified the almost absolute hatred between Arab and Israeli which remains after six decades. Although the Arabs had achieved a degree

¹⁷Letter from Arthur J. Balfour to Lord Rothschild approved by the War Cabinet on 2 November 1917 cited by Doreen Ingrams, Palestine Papers, 1917-1922 (New York: George Braziller, 1973), p. 18.

¹⁸Safran, Israel the Embattled Ally, p. 24.

of unity by ousting the Turks, there existed no solid Arab nationalistic sentiment throughout Palestine. The Arab intellectual committees which negotiated with Hussein were few. Hussein himself was an outsider. The bond which would unite the Arabs was not internal, but solely dependent on the hatred toward their common enemy, the Jew.

Post World War I Boundary Delimitation Politics

The political agreements signed after the war and the mechanisms those agreements created both promoted Arab nationalism and stifled it. At the Versailles Peace Conference, Woodrow Wilson asked that Arab claims to independence be given consideration, and the great powers asked Faisal to speak for Arab interests. He met with Chaim Weizmann of the Zionist Organization and signed an agreement (written in English with T. E. Lawrence serving as his interpreter and adviser) pledging mutual cooperation under the Balfour Declaration. Faisal, however, wrote in Arabic on the document that he agreed in principle to the provisions, "Provided the Arabs shall obtain their independence as demanded ... I shall concur in the above articles. But if the slightest modification or departure were to be made, I shall not then be bound by a single word of the present Agreement."¹⁹ Because Arab independence never materialized, most Arabs have held the agreement to be invalid.

An American group called the King-Crane Commission, appointed by President Woodrow Wilson, investigated the disposition of Ottoman territories and the assignment of mandates. After extensive boundary surveys in Palestine and Syria, the commission reported intense opposition to the Balfour Declaration among the Arab majority. They advised against permitting unlimited Jewish migration or creating a separate Jewish state. The commission submitted its report in

¹⁹Ingrams, Palestine Papers, 1917-1922, p. 55.


August 1919; however, the conference did not consider it and placed Britain in charge over Palestine, the East Bank, and Iraq. France became the mandatory power over Syria and Lebanon.²⁰

Hussein and his sons opposed the concept of a mandate on the ground that Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant adopted at Versailles had endorsed Wilson's principle of self-determination. The Arab leaders maintained that this article logically supported the cause of Arab independence in Palestine. Because Hussein had been promised a realm, he had pledged his support for Jewish settlement. Now that this promise had been denied, the Arabs felt betrayed.

European rejection of Arab independence and fear of Zionist aspirations, prompted the General Syrian Congress, in 1920, to proclaim independence with Faisal as its King. Iraq also announced its independence and proclaimed Faisal's brother, Abdulla, as its King. The League of Nations Council rejected both pronouncements. France immediately dispatched troops and quelled the rebellion by force, prompting Faisal's exile. This failure to establish an independent Arab state led to a unified desire by Arab leaders to reorient their Palestinian political attention. The Arabs began to understand European aspirations for economic colonies more clearly. A reorientation of the Hussein family's territorial goals also was caused by the competing Arabs from the eastern Arabian Peninsula. This pressure came as a result of the religious awakening among the eastern Arab

²⁰Rinehart, Jordan a Country Study, p. 19. The King-Crane Commission's report was not made public until 1922.

Muslims known as the Wahhabiah²¹ (Map 6).



This reorientation toward cohesiveness became evident in the demands of the Third Arab Congress at Haifa in 1921. This Congress dispatched a Muslim-Christian delegation to London which emphasized the following: (1) formation of a national government responsible to a parliament elected by the native population, Muslim, Christian, and Jewish; (2) abolition of the Jewish national home principle; (3) cessation of Jewish immigration until the national government is formed, and decides on immigration policy; (4) administration of Palestine to be governed according to prewar Ottoman law, not the

²¹J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1969), p. 243. The Wahhabi religious awakening was carried out by the Saud family. This conservative Muslim belief swept over all of Arabia and soon threatened the Husseini domination of the Hejaz. The Wahhabi denounced the numerous gods and saints which kept into the Muslim faith.

postwar British regulations; and (5) unification with neighboring Arab states.²² The Arabs contended, perhaps for the first time in a spirit of unity, that it was unjust to allow a minority to overrule a majority. They maintained that the Arab occupation of Palestine from the seventh to the twentieth century presented a more valid historical claim to the region than that of Zionism. The Arabs further suggested that Europe and America, in attempting to correct social justice in Europe, did so at Arab expense. The unified Arab Congress believed that the World War I pledges to them were formal agreements and superior to the Balfour letter which led to the Mandate.²³ Under unified Arab pressure, the British Colonial Office made preparations to delimit the boundaries of Palestine.

Several proposals for boundaries were presented by Jewish representatives and British diplomats. In November, 1918, the Zionist Organization proposed boundaries of a Jewish homeland to the Foreign Office (Map7) for the attention of the Peace Conference:

... In the North, the northern and southern banks of the Litany River, as far north as latitude 33° 45'. Thence in a southeasterly direction to a point just south of the Damascus territory and close and west of the Hedjaz Railway.

In the East, a line close to and west of the Hedjaz Railway.

In the South, a line from a point in the neighborhood of Akaba to El Arish.

²²Muslim-Christian Delegation statement, handed to the Colonial Secretary in London, August 12, 1921 (CO 733/14), cited by Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, p. 16.


²³Nyrop, Israel a Country Study, p. 32.

In the West, the Mediterranean Sea.

The details of the delimitation should be decided by a Boundary Commission, one of the members of which should be a representative of the Jewish Council for Palestine hereinafter mentioned.

There should be a right of free access to and from the Red Sea, through Akaba, by arrangement with the Arab Government ...²⁴


The Peace Conference came to an end without a treaty being signed with Turkey and without a decision on the Palestine boundaries.



At the same time, Ormsby-Gore, a British political officer in Palestine, suggested to the Foreign Office that Palestine should include those areas where "Jewish national consciousness is expressed in the existing Jewish colonies, and must not include any of those areas such as Lebanon, Jebel Druze, or the Plateau of Trans-Jordania, where

²⁴Zionist Organization Proposals to the British Foreign Office November 1918 cited by Ingrams, Palestine Papers, 1917-1922, pp. 52-53.

the Syrian and Arab consciousness is dominant." He suggested that the northern boundary of Palestine be drawn from the mouth of the Litani River due east to the Lake Huleh marshes (Map 8).



The eastern boundary should be along the western slopes of the hills which rise out of the Jordan Valley. He further advised making the southern boundary a line drawn due east from Rafah to the Dead Sea.²⁵

²⁵Ormsby—Gore, Proposal to the Foreign Office (371/3395) August 1918 cited by Ingrams, Palestine Papers, 1917-1922, p. 38.


As the basic decisions concerning the territorial allocation had not even been concluded, British Prime Minister, Lloyd George called a meeting on September 10, 1919, to discuss the question of frontiers. Present at this meeting was the Prime Minister, Field Marshal Allenby, High Commissioner in Egypt Major-General Sir John Shea, and other representatives from the War Office and the Cabinet. The discussion that took place (Appendix C) clearly reveals the British motivation for Palestine involvement -- strategic military protection for the Suez Canal and world-wide prestige.²⁶

In March 1921, Winston Churchill's conference in Cairo subdivided the Palestine Mandate along the Jordan River-Gulf of Aqaba Line (Map 9). The eastern portion was called Transjordan, administered by Arabs with Abdullah as amir. A British memorandum in September 1922, approved by the League of Nations Council, excluded Jewish settlement east of the Jordan. The further truncation of the territory originally promised as a Jewish homeland (three-fourths of the original Palestine area was severed for Transjordan) sought to satisfy British wartime pledges and stabilize the region.²⁷

The European allies (Britain in the case of Palestine) thus unilaterally drew the boundaries and, in the Arab view, retained a

²⁶Minutes taken 10 September 1919 at Manoir de Clair fontaine-Hennequeville, Traville, France, cited by Ingrams, Palestine Papers, 1917-1922, pp. 75-78.

²⁷Meir, "In Search of Lasting Peace," p. 450.



certain measure of responsibility in resolving the deep-seated problems. When Britain abdicated this responsibility to the United Nations later in 1948, the experience left a deep bitterness against the West and an inclination toward unity due to colonial exploitation.

Between the Wars

British rule in the period between the world wars created the climate which brought the Palestinian Arab society together at least in loose form. When the British military turned over the government in Palestine to civil servants in 1920, the population consisted of 83,000 Jews, 589,000 Muslims, and 71,000 Christians. In the 1920s, the Arab population swelled and moved to cities in the western portion of the country. As more people became socially and politically interdependent, a distinguishable stratification of society evolved. Three groups composed the Arab society: the "effendi" or governing class, the urban professionals, and the "fellahin," or peasant farmer.

The small aristocracy of Muslim landowners, known earlier among the Turks as the "effendi," or notables, dominated Arab society. They were wealthy, well educated, and possessed a Western sophistication due to their extensive European contacts. Although they played a significant part in Palestinian history, traditional rivalries among the leading families hindered their cohesion as a politically effective class. The two most notable groups or families were the Husainis and the Nashashibis. These influential landowners had assumed leadership during the Ottoman years and continued that leadership in the British Mandate. They controlled the organized political, religious, and social life of the Arab community.

The next class of influence consisted of urban professionals and businessmen. They controlled the few small industries, owned fruit groves in the plains, and operated the local newspapers. This

class generally cooperated with one or another of the notable Muslim families. A number of middle class professionals, physicians, lawyers, editors, and government employees, were Christian. The two non-Arab foes, the British and Jews, lessened the traditional social distance between Muslim Arabs and Christian Arabs.

The last group, which constituted the majority of Palestinians, were called fellahin or peasant. They worked as hired laborers on the estates of the effendi class. Some owned small agricultural plots. At the lowest social level were the Bedouin desert nomads. Largely pastoral and clinging to desert culture these "badu" consisted of approximately 100,000 people. Technological and social changes decreased their influence and importance to the development of Palestinians west of the Jordan.²⁸

These three components of the Arab society remained separated throughout the inter-war period. Their failure to bond brought about rising expectations, poverty, and frustration. The fellahin were overwhelmingly rural with three-fourths of them living in the countryside.²⁹ The barrenness of the soil, antiquated agricultural methods, outdated land holding systems, and an ever increasing population growth rate impoverished the fellahin.²⁹ In 1939 the Johnson-Crosbie report showed that 30 percent of rural families were

²⁸Peretz, The Palestine State, p. 6.

²⁹The land laws of the Muslim culture has led to extensive fragmentation of property. Unlike the European practice of primogeniture, the Arabs continued to divide land among generations of inheritors. Sometimes this division resulted in one family cultivating a hundred plots scattered widely around a village.

landless and that they had less than the minimum required caloric intake. In contrast to the fellahin, it was not unusual for the wealthy Palestinian families to own between 30,000 and 60,000 dunams (a dunam = $\frac{1}{4}$ acre). In the entire country, the 250 largest landowning families owned about the same amount of land as 60,000 peasants. This concentration of the land to the hands of the few forced large numbers of small farmers and landless peasants to the cities to search for employment. This resulted in a rapid process of urbanization where the Arab city increased by 85 percent between 1931 and 1944. Haifa's Arab population grew by 87 percent between 1922 and 1931. Jaffa's grew by 63 percent. The increase in urbanization was too rapid for the towns to handle and resulted in poverty and discouraged expectations among the poor. The 1935 Haifa population, for example, contained 11,160 Arab workers living in 2,500 gasoline-can huts.³⁰ Only the middle class and new industrialists benefitted economically, while the majority lived in poverty and destitution. It was this urban unemployed who contributed to unrest and ultimately to riots.

Serious riots began as early as 1920 and 1921. The British replied the following year with a new interpretation of the Balfour Declaration known as the Churchill White Paper. This document excluded Transjordan from Jewish settlement (See Post WW I Boundary Delimitation Politics). The paper stated that the Jewish community in Palestine was there "as of right, not on sufferance," and that its

³⁰Joel S. Migdal Palestinian Society and Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 26.

development did not mean the imposition of Jewish nationality and culture on the previous inhabitants of the land.³¹

As a result, seven years of comparative peace ensued in Palestine. However, in 1929, Arab religious and national feeling resurfaced over a conflict involving the Wailing Wall.³² Attacks by Arabs on the Jewish population resulted in two more British investigative commissions: the Shaw Royal Commission in 1929 and the Hope-Simpson Royal Commission in 1930. Both recognized that the basic problem was the conflicting goals of Zionism and Arab nationalism. They recommended qualifications and restrictions on Jewish immigration, favoring the rights of Arabs over those of Jews.

Once again there was a seven-year period of relative peace followed by another outburst of Arab violence. The Arab outburst occurred primarily because of their rising fears of becoming a minority in the area (Table 1). Jewish population had increased dramatically following Hitler's rise to power.³³ In addition to natural increase and legal immigrations, many illegal immigrants were entering the country, aided by the Jewish guerrilla band known as the Irgun.

³¹Ingrams, Palestine Papers, 1917-1922, p. 165.

³²The Wailing Wall or Western Wall is the only remaining part of the 2nd Jewish Temple destroyed in A.D. 70 by the Roman General, Titus. It became the most holy shrine to the Jews with worshippers weeping and placing written prayers within the cracks of limestone. The Jews have been denied access to The Wall for 19 centuries until their seizure of Old Jerusalem in 1967. The wall is adjacent to the Dome of the Rock, holy to Muslims.

³³The Jewish Agency submitted an application for 11,200 Jewish visas in the semi-annual immigration schedule April-September 1936.

Table 1. Population Estimates for Palestine, Selected Years, 1800-1939
(in thousands)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Jewish</u> <u>%</u>	<u>Arabs</u>	<u>Total</u>
1800	5	2	255	260
1880	24	5.3	426	450
1914	85	12.4	600	685
1917	50	7.5	610	660
1922	84	11.1	668	752
*1935	320	25.4	941	1,261
1939	445	29.7	1,056	1,501

*note the rapid rise

Source: Israel A Country Study by Richard Nyrop, ed.

In order to combat the Jewish immigration, strike committees formed in the cities of Nablus, Jaffa and Jerusalem in November 1935. In the same month the first Palestinian guerrilla group, a forerunner of al-Fatah, was formed. It was led by Shaikh Izz al-Din al-Qasim, who has since been immortalized as the founder of Palestinian Arab resistance. Under slogans of militant pan-Arabism, anti-Westernism, and anti-Zionism, Qasim organized a revolt combining the landless fellahin and urban proletariat against the British and Jews.³⁴ Although the uprising was quickly crushed by British authorities, he helped to create a Palestinian identity.

Organized Arab opposition to the British and Jews generally tended to coalesce around the notable families. Membership tended to be determined by family ties rather than on individual political consciousness. The Husaini family became the more dominant when one

³⁴Peretz, The Palestine State, p. 16.

of them, Hajj Amin, became Mufti of Jerusalem and President of the Supreme Muslim Council, the ruling religious and political body. The position gave them access to the entire Muslim community and considerable financial support. The Nashashibis, on the other hand, although a less prestigious family, commanded an extensive following in the new, rising middle class. Citrus growers, small industrialists, and merchants gave their support to the Nashashibis, whose goal was the capital development of the country. They viewed compromise with the British authorities as the quickest way to independence. By the late 1930's several other parties manifested themselves around other prominent families. The Reform Party associated with the Khalidi family; the National Bloc centered around a grouping of leaders from the city of Nablus; and the Congress Executive of Nationalist Youth (an organization encouraging participation of youth in the Nationalist movement) focused around a well-known Ramlah family. The Istiqlal (independence) Party had a following in Jenin and Nablus and was led by Awni Bey, a Jerusalem lawyer.

The Istiqlal party was the only one that developed a political program. Composed of the young Muslim intelligentsia, (lawyers, teachers, physicians and government officials) the party advocated the merger of all Arab states. Its chief aim was immediate and full independence from the foreign powers with Palestinian unification with Syria. The party opposed family interests and feuds because families prevented unity for liberation. The formation of the Istiqlal in

1932 was a harbinger of conflict with the Husainis.³⁵ Ultimately, Palestine contained seven major parties; all basically agreed on the national goal of independence but were divided on the path.

The parties obtained a peak of unity during 1936, when miraculously, all the previously divided families and parties joined in an economic boycott of the Jewish Yishuv (the entire Jewish community in Palestine). Gradually the strike developed from sporadic acts of violence to open rebellion, especially in the rural hill districts of southern and central Palestine (later known as the West Bank). Here armed bands of guerrillas derailed trains, barricaded and mined roads, and cut telephone wires. They even cut the oil pipeline from Iraq. Joined by volunteers from Iraq and Syria and led by experienced guerrilla leaders, the rebels sniped at urban traffic, British soldiers and police, and assaulted outlying Jewish villages, setting fire to forests and crops. Arab guerrillas destroyed 13 Jewish-owned factories and workshops valued at more than \$500,000; thirty-eight others located in Jaffa shut down under pressure.³⁶

The economic and guerrilla action taken against the Yishuv was severe. The construction of new buildings slackened, Arab workers on Jewish citrus farms left, and difficulties with transportation adversely effected commerce. The Arab community, however, suffered even greater losses than the Yishuv. Jaffa, the most thriving Arab town,

³⁵Ibid., p. 15.

³⁶J. C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1950), pp. 70-72.

lost much of its harbor traffic and most of its commercial and industrial enterprise. Coupled with distress in agriculture, unemployment rose sharply throughout Palestine with the interruption of tourist trade and business. In the villages, the fellahin not only had to give up the Jewish lucrative market, but also had to incur the costs of billeting the guerrillas. Arab citrus growers perhaps financed the rebellion more than any other single group, and with the approach of the fall citrus season, they brought pressure on the Arab Higher Committee to slacken the resistance.³⁷

The hopelessness of the armed conflict and economic position reflected the weakening of Arab political unity. The first signs of intra-communal strife appeared between families when they took the opportunity to seek revenge among themselves for old grievances. The murders of Nasser al-Din Nashashibi, deputy mayor of Hebron, Hajj Khalil Taha, chairman of the Jaffa National Committee and Michel Mitrie, head of a Jaffa trade union were examples of this intertribal war of revenge.³⁸ This intertribal warfare typifies the role family grievances has played in thwarting Palestinian unity. (See society analysis, Chapter V). A promise of a British investigation, finally brought a semblance of peace to the country.

The British dispatched the Peel Royal Commission in 1937 to investigate this uprising. The Peel Commission's exhaustive report


³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Peretz, The Palestine State, p. 17.

in 1937, stated unequivocally that the Arab grievances about Jewish immigration and land acquisition were correct. The mandatory's failure to allow self-governing institutions, "cannot be regarded as legitimate under the terms of the Mandate." However, the commission warned that the obligations to the Jews could only be fulfilled by a policy of British repression against the Arabs. The group concluded that the Palestinian Arabs were committed to national independence, since their surrounding Arab neighbors had already experienced self-rule. Equally assertive, the Palestine Jews were also vigorously pursuing the goal of a national home. The Commission considered the Jew and Arab positions as irreconcilable and the Palestine Mandate (begun in 1923) unworkable.³⁹ Peel recommended partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states.

The Peel Commission recommended that the Jewish state comprise the Galilee, the Jezreel Valley, and the Coastal Plain to a point midway between Gaza and Jaffa (Map 10). This represented about 20 percent of the area of Palestine. The British would maintain a Mandate over Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth (to protect the Holy Places), a narrow corridor from Jerusalem to the Coast, and the principle heterogeneous towns of Safad, Tiberias, Acre, and Haifa. The Arabs would receive all the rest of the area which would also include Transjordan. The British Government issued a White Paper expressing general agreement with the findings.

³⁹Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 73.



... irreconcilable conflict between the aspirations of Arabs and Jews in Palestine ... cannot be satisfied under the terms of the present Mandate, and that a scheme of partition on the ... [suggested] lines ... represents the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock.⁴⁰

The plan came under fire in both houses of Parliament which recommended that the issue be given to the League of Nations. The Twentieth Zionist Congress also rejected the proposed boundaries, but agreed in principal to partition.

With old quarrels weakening concensus, the Palestine Arab Community had difficulty weighing the partition plan. Four days prior to the release of the report, the National Defense Party (Nashashibi Family) dissociated itself from the Higher Committee, composed of a coalition of religious leaders and wealthy families. The split occurred primarily because Raghīb al-Nashashibi, the party's president and Adullah, ruler of Transjordan, favored the partition. Abdulla was allegedly motivated to expand his lands, while Nashashibi aspired to high office.

Nevertheless, other Arabs considered partition incompatible with Arab national interests. Objections to the proposal were numerous. The Peel Commission was awarding the most fertile and developed part of the country to the Jews⁴¹. A substantial proportion of

⁴⁰British White Paper, 1936-37 (md. 5513, cited by Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 76.

⁴¹The Jezreel Valley, allocated to the Jews, is considered the bread basket of Israel. Its development in the first 3 decades of the 1900s from swamps and clogged rivers to a productive farm area is attributed to the early Jewish pioneers and not Arab farmers, whom the Jews maintain, let it deteriorate for centuries.

Arabs were to be subjected to Jewish rule; yet the holy places and many Arab villages were to be placed under permanent mandate. In the proposed Jewish state, the Arabs held title to four times as much land as the Jews. Seven-eighths of the Arab-owned citrus groves would also be located there. The Arab town of Jaffa would be completely isolated. The Arabs would also have to worry about the Jewish expansion into the mandate zones. Significantly, the Peel Partition Plan, although challenged by all three participating groups, was the first attempt to define a Palestinian state.

In spite of the opposition, the British government approved the plan and sent a technical demarcation team to make a detailed plan. This team, called the Woodhead Commission, tasked with the realities of dividing Arab and Jewish lands, reversed the Peel Commission's findings and reported in November 1937 that partition was impracticable.⁴² They were confronted with the problem of either relocating large numbers of people or reversing the Peel decision.

The British government then returned to the concept of trying to accommodate both Arab and Jew by calling a summit to break the deadlock.

Meanwhile, inter-Arab hostilities continued, caused by Husaini attempts to get all Palestinians to follow their lead. Husaini followers executed several hundred fellow Arabs and subjected many others to intimidation and abduction, especially the Nashashibis.

⁴²Nyrop, Israel A Country Study, p. 35.


Many Arabs left the country.⁴³ By 1938, Husaini-organized guerrilla bands had taken over large areas of the country including Hebron, Beersheba, and the Old City of Jerusalem with its holy places. To improve the rebels' mobility, Arab religious leaders read an edict in every mosque to abandon the traditional red fez and adopt the native headcloth or kafiya worn by the fellahin and Bedouin. The kafiya became a symbol for Palestinian national identity and is still used by present day PLO commandos. However, dissent within guerrilla ranks coupled with the usual political fragmentation weakened the nationalist efforts. The British suppressed the rebellion by the end of the year. Many insurrectionist leaders such as Hajj Amin, Mufti of Jerusalem, and other notables were deported.

International crisis, in 1939, overshadowed another conference in London. Hitler had just annexed Czechoslovakia and British leaders realized war was inevitable. In this context Britain's primary concern was to protect the oil flow from the Middle East which required Arab goodwill. The conference failed to achieve Arab or Jewish satisfaction and the White Paper that followed extended British rule over Palestine for another ten years. The paper's purpose was to transform the Mandate into an independent, predominantly Arab Palestine with a constitution protecting Jewish rights. In the interim, Jewish immigration was limited to 75,000 in the first five years, after which it would depend on Arab consent.⁴⁴

⁴³Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 93.

⁴⁴Safran, Israel the Embattled Ally, p. 30.

Britain's issuance of the Land Transfer Regulations divided Palestine into three zones (Map 11). The regulations prohibited the sale of Arab-owned land to Jews in 63% of the land area comprising the hill country and the predominantly Arab subdistricts of Jaffa, Gaza, and Beersheba. Uncontrolled land transfers could occur in the Coastal Plain (5% of the country). The restricted zone limited Jewish purchases only from non-Palestine Arabs (31% of the country.)⁴⁵



⁴⁵Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, p. 136.

As a result of the 1936-37 Arab revolt and the subsequent British decisions over the next four years, the sponsors of the Arab revolt obtained two major political victories: 1) the admission by Britain that the Palestine Mandate was unworkable and 2) the dismissal of the Peel partition scheme even before any attempt was made to implement it. The Arabs had learned that the use of violence as a political weapon got results, especially when other methods had failed. This had far reaching consequences in the Palestinian movement for the next three decades when extremism would be the only option they would pursue.

Relative calm marked the early 1940s with the Arabs acquiescing to their political victories. During World War II, Palestine experienced tremendous prosperity. Britain expended a great deal of money to expand the economy in both agricultural and industrial sectors. However, growing prosperity also brought about indifference among the Arab nationalist parties. The Jews had been held back causing a decrease in Arab political activism. The war, however, brought some fundamental attitude changes in favor of the Jews among the world community. The Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, had made an important contribution to the war effort.⁴⁶ The world was horrified at the fantastic extent of Jewish genocide by the Nazis.

⁴⁶Palestinian Jews provided 32,000 volunteers for the British forces. In 1944 their effort was rewarded by the establishment of the Jewish Brigade Group, an independent fighting formation, which saw service in Italy. In 1942 when Rommel was at El Alamein and the Vichy French still controlled Syria, Jewish forces were organized in Palestine to carry out resistance in the event the Germans overran the country. This organized military greatly gave the Jewish forces an advantage in 1948 over the disunited Arabs.

President Truman consequently exerted pressure on the British government to allow 100,000 survivors from Nazi extermination camps admission to Palestine.⁴⁷ An American Commission examining the Palestinian question recommended their entrance and the British government finally agreed, contingent upon the disarming of Arab and Jew illegal armies. This world sentiment in favor of the suffering Jew reawakened Arab fears of Jewish dominance in Palestine and forced the British to consider further changes.

After another committee, another plan, and another conference, the "question" got nowhere and tension between terrorist organizations in Palestine increased. The Haganah (Jewish underground army under Yishuv leadership) participated in sabotage and orchestrated the operation of numerous unauthorized immigrant ships. The British declared martial law, implaced a curfew, and arrested Yishuv leaders. Another Arab-Jewish-British conference collapsed and the British decided on April 2, 1947 to place the whole Palestine Problem before the United Nations.

⁴⁷Safran, Israel, the Embattled Ally, p. 31.

United Nations Partition

A special session of the United Nations General Assembly met on May 15, 1947, and appointed a United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). The Commission consisted of an eleven-nation investigative board composed of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. UNSCOP conducted hearings throughout Palestine for six months under tremendous pressure. One major obstacle was Arab intransigence; the Higher Committee led by Jamal al-Husaini ordered all Arabs to "abstain from collaboration [with] and desist from appearing before" UNSCOP.⁴⁸ Several protest strikes in the Arab community also ensued. Jewish terrorism during this time period increased as never before. The British hanged four Jewish Irgunists at Acre prison, and less than three weeks later, the Irgun blasted open the prison walls releasing 251 inmates. Five of the Jewish terrorists were captured; three received a death sentence. A few days later the Irgun abducted two British sergeants and warned that if the sentence against the Irgunists was carried out, the sergeants would receive the same. Britain had given in twice to similar threats earlier in the year, but this time they remained resolute and executed the Irgunists in July, 1947. The bodies of the sergeants were found by authorities two days later.⁴⁹

⁴⁸Lt. Col. Netanel Lorch, Israel's War of Independence (Hartford: Hartmore House Inc., 1961), p. 6

⁴⁹Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 290.

UNSCOP received testimony in Beirut from six Arab league states.⁵⁰ Hamid Bey Franjiyyah, the Lebanese Foreign Minister, speaking for the Arab government, warned that "the partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish State would result only in bloodshed and unrest throughout the entire Middle East."⁵¹ In addition to gathering information in the region, the Committee later toured the Jewish Dispossessed Persons Camps in Germany and Austria. The Committee recommended twelve guiding principles. The following were the most significant:

- (1) The Mandate should be terminated with independence granted as early as practicable.
- (2) The political structure of the new state or states should be representative in nature.
- (3) Economic unity of Palestine is indispensable.
- (4) The sacred character of the holy places must be preserved.
- (5) The General Assembly should initiate immediately an international arrangement for solving the problem of 250,000 displaced Jews in Europe.
- (6) The solution for Palestine cannot be considered a solution for the general Jewish problem.⁵²

However, the Committee was divided on the appropriate applica-

⁵⁰The Arab League was formed in Cairo in 1945 as an outgrowth of a vision for a unified Arab Nation. Originally composing Transjordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen, it remains today an association of sovereign Arab states without any real unifying principle other than its opposition to a Jewish State.

⁵¹Ibid, p. 295.


⁵²UNSCOP, Report I, 42-46 [The Twelve Principles], cited by Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 295.

tion of these principles. The majority (delegates of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay) recommended partition. The minority (delegates of India, Iran, and Yugoslavia) recommended federalism. The delegate from Australia abstained. The minority believed partition unworkable and anti-Arab. They suggested a strong central government with a bicameral legislature.

The majority plan, political partition with economic union, basically envisioned independent Arab and Jewish states with an internationalized zone of Jerusalem (Map 12). The Arab area was to comprise western Galilee, the hill country of central Palestine (the West Bank), with the exception of the Jerusalem area, and the Coastal Plain from Isdud to the Egyptian border. The Jewish territory was to consist of eastern Galilee, the northern Coastal Plain from a point south of Acre to one north of Isdud (including the Arab town of Jaffa), and the Negev Desert. Jerusalem and Bethlehem with their rural suburbs were to come under a United Nations permanent trusteeship. Economic unity of the country was to continue for ten years with common customs, currency, and communications. UNSCOP also recommended the formulation of a joint economic plan in the areas of irrigation, soil conservation, and land reclamation.⁵³

The U. N. General Assembly voted on the Palestine issue after 14 meetings and 24 days of open discussion in which the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency participated. The Arab states

⁵³Ibid, pp. 297-298.



rejected both partition and federalism plans and advocated a unitary Arab Palestine state. The Jewish Agency formally accepted UNSCOP's partition plan. After modification, the General Assembly voted in favor of partition by a vote of 33 to 13.⁵⁴

Refinement of the plan chiefly concerned questions of boundaries. The proposed Jewish state was reduced from 6,000 to 5,500 square miles which equalled roughly 55 percent of the total Palestine land area. The most significant territorial changes included the transfer to the Arab state of the city of Jaffa and 500,000 acres of Negev land including the city of Beersheba.⁵⁵ The resulting Jewish state included not only areas of principle Jewish settlement, but also a number of Arab-inhabited areas. Consequently, nearly half of the population of the Jewish state was Arab. The Arab community completely rejected the UN Partition Plan. On the next day, November 29, 1947, Arab riots and attacks on the Jewish community began.

Many people, including Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank today, lament their failure to take their "state" when the opportunity presented itself. J. Bowyer Bell summed up the Palestinian dilemma that seems to pervade the Arab attitude:

In retrospect it is all too easy to point out the Arab blunders, their missed opportunities, their intransigence. It is only just, however, to note that it is easy to urge someone else to give up half a loaf of his own bread. Surely the Arab argument had much justice. Shorn of Biblical quotations, emotional references to the "final solution," and loaded statistics, the Zionist

⁵⁴Nyrop, Israel a Country Study, p. 39.

⁵⁵Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 302.

case looked no stronger, and probably somewhat weaker, than the Arab case to disinterested observers. To the Arabs the demand for an Arab Palestine seemed neither novel nor extreme; it seemed just and in accordance with international practice. That there were two competing "rights" all agreed; but that what had been the feebler, the minority, position could be chosen seemed incredible. Whittled down to basics, the Zionist position was that, given the Palestine dilemma, they would settle for half whereas the Arabs unfairly continued to demand all.⁵⁶

The United Nations Partition Plan left no recourse for the Arabs, but armed conflict.

⁵⁶J. Bowyer Bell, The Long War: Israel and the Arabs Since 1946 (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 67.

The First Arab-Israeli War, 1948

The war began on December 1, 1947, immediately following the UN partition resolution. There were two distinct phases of conflict, a five and a half-month civil war between Jews and Palestinian Arabs, and an eight-month international war involving the newly proclaimed state of Israel and its neighbors. In both phases, Arab objectives, like those a decade earlier, focused on severing communication lines, isolating outlying villages, and disrupting urban life. Their goal was to force the Zionists to accept a final settlement on Arab terms.

Internal strife within the Arab community abated with the outside challenge of war; but their struggle for political independence only went as far as a military undertaking. The Zionists, on the other hand, began a well organized transformation of government services and provided for security measures in the event of an Arab attack. Plans involved ranged from drafting a constitution and legal code to establishing a school for diplomatic and administrative personnel. Jewish leaders also interviewed Arab, British, and Jewish people for possible service in a future Jewish government.⁵⁷

The Jews focused their efforts on gaining control over the territory allotted to them by the United Nations, preserving intact areas of Jewish settlement in non-Jewish zones, and keeping lines of communication (especially to Jerusalem) open. The Arab tactics essentially were disruptive in nature; the Jewish plan called for control

⁵⁷Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 310.

of territory.

The Arabs gained initial success with their strategy of random killings and highway ambushes. When Jewish forces reached 20,000, the Jewish High Command launched a series of successful large-scale operations to seize Arab-controlled territory assigned to the Jewish state. When Irgunists and Jewish Freedom Fighters massacred a hundred women and children in the Jerusalem Arab suburb of Dayr Yasin the Arabs became demoralized. By the end of May, almost 200,000 Palestinian Arabs had fled their homes, seeking refuge in neighboring countries, and creating the great "Palestinian Problem."⁵⁸

The British Mandate came to an end on May 14, 1948. Jewish forces had achieved their territorial objectives and defined the borders of the State of Israel until 1967. That same day the Provisional Government under the leadership of David Ben Gurion issued its declaration of independence and announced the creation of the state of Israel in the partitioned area of Palestine. As before, the Palestinian Arabs refused to set up a state in the Arab zone.⁵⁹

With the declaration of Israel's statehood, the second phase, international war, began. The next day, May 15, 1948, the regular forces of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq crossed the boundaries of Palestine. Their invasion was totally uncoordinated and became chaos. Mutual mistrust among the partners was so deep that Egyptian and Transjordanian forces did not even pretend to coordinate

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 314.

⁵⁹Jordan, A Country Study, p. 26.

their actions "and indeed they guided their respective operations as much by the desire to frustrate each other's suspected intentions as by the requisites of defeating the enemy."⁶⁰ Once the Israelis discovered their enemies had no real central command or unified plan they directed their effort to defeat the Arab forces one at a time.

After the UN cease-fires (there were four until an armistice was signed), the State of Israel encompassed much more territory than the original partition plan. Jewish forces seized Galilee, the Negev and half of Jerusalem (Map 13). By Spring, 1949, over 40 countries including the Big Five recognized Israel. The part of Palestine remaining in Arab hands consisted of the area known today as the West Bank (2165 square miles) held by Transjordan, and Gaza, a narrow strip of territory of only 140 square miles held by Egypt⁶¹.

Abdullah, King of Transjordan, son of Hussein, annexed the West Bank and took the title, King of Jordan. In April, 1949, he directed the official name of his country, including the East and West Banks, be changed to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Jerusalem became a divided city. The Old City, The Wailing Wall, the site of the Jewish Temple upon which stands the Muslim Mosque (Dome of the Rock)⁶² remained in Jordanian hands. The Israelis took control of the western part, known as the New City.




The period of Palestinian history from the turn of the 1900s


⁶⁰Safran, Israel the Embattled Ally, p. 49.

⁶¹Congressional Quarterly, "The Middle East" p. 26.

⁶²Third most holy shrine of the Muslims.

MAP 13
ARMISTICE 1949

-  Israel and area under its control
-  Jordan and area under its control
-  Area under Egyptian control



through the 1948 Arab-Israeli War had several significant developments. Jewish and Arab nationalism developed concurrently in Palestine. A large measure of Arab nationalism, though initiated by oppressive Turkish rule immediately preceding World War I, was attributed to the presence of a vibrant Jewish colony, the Yishuv. Following World War I, conflicting boundary claims, national aspirations, and unkept British agreements resulted in the creation of mandates for the region and Arab disenchantment. The Arab reaction between the wars in the form of riots brought some unity among the landless fellahin and the urban unemployed. After the suppression of each uprising, British investigative commissions sought solutions by recommending major boundary changes. After 27 years of Mandate and numerous investigations with no acceptable solution, the British gave the whole complex problem to the United Nations. Failure to reach an equitable territorial solution led to the first Arab-Israeli War which created the State of Israel leaving the Palestinians scattered with nothing.

From 1900 to 1948, the Arabs in the region evolved from Syrians, with no political allegiance, to Palestinians with a sense of homelessness. A sense of territoriality, or longing for the land, took shape by 1948, yet the identity as a unified people had definitely not formed. It would require the test of suffering over the next two decades to develop a Palestinian consciousness as shall be explored in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

THE PALESTINIAN DIASPORA

Palestinians Become Refugees


During the Mandate period the Arabs had developed at least a loose identity, calling themselves Palestinian Arabs. Clearly, nationalism, caused primarily by Britain and Jewish designs, provided the unifying ingredient. Unity of purpose however, seemed to be dwarfed by their refusal, as early as the 1920s, to accept self government. Even following the 1948 war, political parties were not evident in Arab circles. Coherent opposition to the mandate and the Jewish National Home never developed into cooperative political forms due to rivalries between notable families. An alliance between the former Mufti of Jerusalem, al-Hajj Amin, and the Nazis did not help the Arab image among world opinion. Furthermore, his reinstatement as president of the All-Palestine Government located in Gaza, meant "adherence to the original nationalist dogma of the exclusive rights to Palestine" and a return to the semi-feudal family power establishment.¹ Defeat in the 1948 war terminated the Palestine Arab movement. Its leadership became discredited and scattered throughout the Arab states.

Unity among the adjacent Arab states also suffered. The Arab league condemned the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank and in 1951, Abdullah was assassinated, reportedly by a Palestinian hired by

¹Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 317.

relatives of Hajj Amin. Only two countries recognized the West Bank annexation, Britain and Pakistan. In Cairo, a coup d'etat carried out by the military, led by Gamal Abdul Nasser, overthrew the Farouq monarchy in 1952. By 1954, Syria had undergone four military coups.²

Although there is strong debate over exact refugee figures, the U. N. Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East reported that, in the summer of 1949, only 133,000 Arabs of an original population of 859,000 remained. Approximately 470,000 Arabs, who abandoned their homes, found temporary refuge in the West Bank and Gaza. Forty percent of these crowded into the later. Another 250,000 fled to near-by Arab states; Lebanon received 100,000, Jordan 75,000, Syria 70,000, Egypt 7,000, and Iraq 4,000 (Map 14).³



MAP 14
Palestinian Arab Dispersal 1948

²Disunity within and between Arab states is a dominant theme in Middle East history. Since 1948, there have been 20 attempted coups in Syria; ten were successful. Carter, Syria A Country Study, p. 29.

³U. N. Economic Survey Mission, Interim Report, A/1106, App. B & C, pp. 22-85 cited by Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 321.

Debate between Palestinian Arabs and Israelis continues over the reasons the Arab refugees left. Israelis generally place the blame on Arab governments which invaded in the first place and Arab propagandists who broadcasted radio messages for Arabs to leave. The Arabs, in contrast, explain that the Jews ruthlessly set out to drive hundreds of thousands of Arabs from their homes. Arab soldiers had no recourse but to order civilian evacuation to prevent a Jewish takeover and protect the Palestinian civilian population.⁴ Regardless of who is to blame for the massive Arab exodus, there are several established causes.

1. Some were forced physically from their homes during the fighting by Jewish forces.
2. Some left in panic because they feared Jewish acts of violence.
3. Many left believing Arab propaganda on broadcasts from Cairo, Damascus, Amman, and Beirut which promised a punishment to any Arab who stayed (supposedly as collaborators).
4. Many left because as the Commander of British troops, General Sir Hugh Stockwell, put it, "The Arab leaders left first, and no one did anything to stop the mass exodus, which became first a rush and then a panic."
5. Many left, especially early in the fighting, because they believed the war would soon be won by the Arabs, and they would be able to return in a short time.⁵

The image of the Palestinian became universally one of a displaced person. Approximately one-third of the refugees lived in camps organized and run by the United Nations. Dismal tent cities became symbols of Palestinian life: "mud-soaked in winter, turning to

⁴Hany A. Hilmy, "Re-Partition of Palestine: Toward a Peaceful Solution in the Middle East," Journal of Peace Research (May 1972): 135.

⁵Terence Prittie, The Palestinians, Michael Curtis, ed. (New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction Books, 1975), p. 54.

desert encampments in summer."⁶ The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) converted the fifty or so camps to less makeshift places. Shelters with roofs, walls and floors replaced tents; utilities such as water and electricity were introduced; a network of social welfare and child care centers, clinics, and feeding stations as well as an elementary school system were established. Even though these efforts brought better social conditions, the displaced person image worsened. UNRWA medical authorities reported a high incidence of psychosomatic illness generated by frustrated expectations. The realities of everyday refugee life coupled with the constant propaganda, emphasizing a return "home," developed a diaspora mentality among the Palestinians similar to that of many Jews living in Europe just after World War II.⁷

Throughout more than two decades of international efforts to help solve the refugee problem, the mere mention of "resettlement" has been enough to undermine the projects. In August, 1949, Israel offered to take back 100,000 refugees. The Arab states immediately rejected the offer.⁸ In 1950, UNRWA proposed resettling 150,000 Gaza refugees in Libya. Egypt blocked the proposal. In 1951, UNRWA concluded an agreement with Egypt to move 70,000 refugees from the Gaza Strip to El Arish in the Sinai. Not wanting to be seen

⁶Peretz, The Palestine State, p. 25.

⁷Ibid, p. 26.

⁸Immediately following the 1948 war, 70,000 Arabs who wished to rejoin their families did so.

cooperating (by the other Arab states, such as Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia), Egypt withdrew from the agreement. In 1952-54 UNRWA tried to negotiate a resettlement project for 850,000 refugees living in Lebanon and Syria. Even though financing was to come from international funds, Syria refused. In 1955, a special engineering envoy of President Dwight Eisenhower, Eric Johnston, concluded an agreement with technical experts from Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon for a massive irrigation scheme of the Jordan Valley. The plan envisioned resettlement of 240,000 refugees, but the Arab League rejected the proposal. In 1959, UNRWA reported that its rehabilitation fund of \$200 million, set aside since 1952 for homes and jobs for Palestinian refugees had been unused.⁹ It is clear that the adjacent Arab states viewed the UNRWA with suspicion. Possibly the record of European unkept promises and the ubiquitous mistrust of non-Arabs played a key role in the uncooperative spirit of Palestinian resettlement. Chapter V will explore this mistrust in detail. It is also apparent that the developing culture of the Palestinian had become one of strong grass roots attachment and nostalgia for their lost homeland. Although the adjacent Arab states did much to prevent resettlement, it seems that the Palestinians decided to accept nothing less than the whole of Palestine.

⁹Prittie, The Palestinians, pp. 66-67.

Palestinian Identity

Between 1948 and 1967 Palestinian national consciousness intensified. Most institutions had been destroyed when the Palestinians were uprooted. The only social institution left intact was the family. In the refugee camps the hamula (clan) network relayed information and distributed UNRWA services. Refugees intermarried with refugees, and social and business contacts grew primarily because of family ties. There was little contact with Arabs who were not Palestinian. Doctors, welfare workers, ration distributors, teachers, and supervisors in the UNRWA schools were Palestinian. Slogans, symbols, and flags constantly reminded them of their lost land.¹⁰ The concept of the "return" to Palestine was deep and widespread throughout all the camps. Palestinian children were taught that their homeland was a particular village or town and when asked about their identity, they responded with the name of the Palestinian town even though they had never seen it.¹¹

The unwelcome attitude among the host Arab countries, also supported the Palestinian consciousness. Unlike Indians, Pakistani, German and other post-1945 refugees, the Palestinians were not systematically resettled in their host countries.¹² The only Arab country

¹⁰Peretz, The Palestine State, p. 27.

¹¹Congressional Quarterly, The Middle East, p. 5.

¹²Pittie in The Palestinians cites approximate figures of resettlement of other situations accepted by the world with no cry of "return". From India and Pakistan -- 15 million refugees; from Finland -- 400,000; from Czechoslovakia -- 1.5 million; from Poland -- 2.8 million; from East Germany -- 7.5 million.

to extend citizenship to the displaced Palestinians was Jordan. King Hussein critically redressed his Arab counterparts in an Associated Press article in January 1960:

"Since 1948 Arab leaders have approached the Palestine problem in an irresponsible manner. They have not looked into the future. They have no plan or approach. They have used the Palestine people for selfish political purposes. This is ridiculous and I could say, even criminal.¹³

Ralph Galloway, former head of UNRWA in Jordan in August 1958 said,

The Arab States do not want to solve the refugee problem. They want to keep it as an open sore, as an affront to the United Nations as a weapon against Israel. Arab leaders don't give a damn whether the refugees live or die.¹⁴

Today, the Palestinian Arabs have a saying based upon outsider's selfish motives, "no peace, no war." Keeping the Palestinian problem unsolved keeps belligerents at each other's throat. The Arab countries, because of injured egos, wish to terminate hostilities only to the point of an armistice instead of a final peace. They maintain that there has been only one war over Palestine, not four. S. L. A. Marshall, in the Forward to Lorch's Israel's War of Independence correctly muses, "Who remembers now that the refugee problem, with the assent of Arab states, was an issue for settlement in a final peace and not a bargaining point at the truce table?"¹⁵

¹³Ibid, p. 71.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵S. L. A. Marshall, Forward to Israel's War of Independence, by Netanel Lorch (Hartford: Hartmore House, 1961), p. xlii.

Soviet policies also seem to focus on polarizing Arab states and Israel by maintaining tension. With a settlement involving the Palestinian refugee issue, tension would abate and the Arab's "need" for Soviet aid would lessen, resulting in a weaker Soviet sphere of influence.¹⁶ Societal and economic reasons in the Middle East also play a part in keeping the Palestinian "sore" open. A complete assimilation of the 100,000 refugees into Lebanese society would have destroyed its delicate political and religious balance. Many Syrians consider the Palestinians unruly and undesirable as citizens. Granting them citizenship would be conceding the loss of Palestine. Egypt, already overpopulated with most of its people crammed into 4% of the land, could not spare space in the Nile Valley.

A sense of territoriality is expressed in education and the arts. Love for the homeland remains deep in Arab consciousness created during three decades of dispersement. Many educational tools are biased. The Arab identity with Palestine frequently is emphasized in the UNWRA textbooks (particularly history and geography books). A Palestinian child does not find the term Israel used or printed on any map; instead, territories constituting the state of Israel are designated as the "usurped portion of Palestine."¹⁷

A survey conducted by sociologists from Hebrew University among Israeli Arabs during 1967, reveals a close attachment to the land:

¹⁶Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension, p. 493.

¹⁷Peretz, The Palestine State, p. 28.

This individual (or familial) bond between Israeli Arabs and their land was frequently transformed into a collective bond. Holding on to the land which is a national Arab possession turns the fact of remaining in Israel from a routine personal attachment into a national aim.¹⁸

In the literature created by Israeli Arabs during the last 20 years, there is frequent use of natural symbols (familiar mountains, lakes, streams) with a national connotation. Love for a girl, for the village, and the homeland, are perceived by many Israeli-Arab poets as a single, invisible emotion. The literature describes the 1948 war as the destruction of a rural idyll (conceived in romantic and nostalgic images) and a separation from a familiar and beloved landscape. Those who remain behind must watch over the inheritance for those who have been scattered.¹⁹

A yearning to return to their homeland is evident in the literature of Palestine Arab writers and artists. Poets, singers, and authors bring out themes which are not political or material. According to A. L. Tibawi of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard, repatriation is a deep spiritual aspiration in the soul of every Palestinian in exile. A poem by Ahmad Fahmi provides an excellent example:

Sons of the fatherland!
Do you remember our homes in Safad?
Do you remember its dreamy days,

¹⁸Yochanan Peres and Nira Yuval-Davis, "Some observations on the National Identity of the Israeli Arab," Human Relations 22 (June 1969): 221-222.

¹⁹Ibid.

Its majestic Jarmaq,²⁰
 The mornings in the heights of Galilee,
 The happiness of the days at Dair al-Asad?
 Do you remember also Lydda wounded, and Rumlah,
 And their people smitten by sorrow?
 Do you remember the noble hills,
 In whose soil the martyrs lie?²¹

Mahmud al-Hut, who was born in Jaffa and received his Master of Arts from the American University of Beirut, chronicles the first three years of the life of the refugees.

O lost paradise! You were never too small for us,
 but now vast countries are indeed too small.
 Torn asunder your people,
 Wandering under every star.²²

A survey done by sociologists from the American University of Beirut also emphasizes the strong Palestinian attachment to their homeland. Typical expressions refer to children. "Your country is like your child ... You cannot be separated from it for a long time. Your country is where you were born and no other country could be dearer to your heart." The survey also shows that many infants born in refugee camps received names like Zeeyyz (name of a refugee camp), Jihad (struggle), Harb (war), and Aida (the one who is returning.)²³

²⁰Name of the high mountain near Safad.

²¹Ahlam al'Audah (Damascus, 1957) cited by A. L. Tibawi, "Visions of the Return, the Palestine Arab Refugees in Arab Poetry and Art," The Middle East Journal 17 (Autumn 1963):511-512.

²²Al-Mahzalah al'-Arabiyyah (Baghdad, 1951) cited by A. L. Tibawi, "Visions of the Return," p. 513.

²³Peter Dodd and Halim Barakat, "River Without Bridges: A Study of the Exodus of the 1967 Palestinian Arab Refugees", (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1968), pp. 59-60. Cited by Peretz, The Palestine State, p. 30.

A sense of territoriality or strong attachment to the land was not the only occurrence that took place as a result of the Palestinian diaspora. During the 1950s and 1960s three social and economic changes took place throughout the Arab countries in terms of settlement, education, and livelihood. First, as trade and small industries grew, urbanization took place. Unskilled Palestinian tenant farmers left their lands and gravitated toward the cities. Refugee camps adjacent to cities grew enormously. One refugee camp (Ayn al-Hilwah) in Southern Lebanon quickly grew to 25,000.²⁴ Second, as social norms restricted upward mobility to only those with property, education was the one avenue to satisfy rising expectations. In 1968, about 50,000 Palestinians attended colleges and universities. A phenomenal 80 to 90 percent of the eligible children participated in primary and secondary school.²⁵ Third, people's orientation from farm professions changed to city occupations. Many former fellahin became lawyers, physicians, engineers, and technicians. Just as the Jews became the quasi-elite in their Diaspora, many Palestinians became technicians and professionals and migrated throughout the Middle East, particularly in the oil-rich nations. Unable to obtain citizenship in these countries, these migrant workers still retain their "Palestinian designation." Many send wages back to families in refugee camps. In 1978, Kuwait had

²⁴Charles H. Winslow, "An empirical road to a Normative Barrier," The Middle East Journal, 34 (winter 1980): 25.


²⁵The average for the Arab world as a whole was only 53% in 1968, Peretz, The Palestine State, p. 32.

250,000 Palestinians, Saudi Arabia 50,000, and other Gulf States
75,000.²⁶

²⁶Emile A. Nakhleh, The West Bank and Gaza (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979) cited in Congressional Quarterly, The Middle East, p. 4.

Where are the Leaders?

Despite the strong love for the land, a high level of education, and a large number of professionals, no significant political leadership emerged. The Palestinians have formed a sense of identity but without a catalyst to bring cohesiveness or unity-of-purpose for nation-building. Palestinian Arabs from 1948 to 1967 actually became just so many dispersed people, and the most notable problem during this time period was the persistent lack of social stratification.



Villages left to own devices

Development of autonomous village institutions and stratification.

No central infrastructure so population remained village bound.

Insecurity resulted in concentration in mountain villages.


MAP 15

Early 19th Century Palestine
Arab Social clustering

Source: Migdal, Palestinian Society and Politics, p. 10-35.

The lack of leadership is explained best by quickly following the changes that took place in the structure of Palestinian society

before and after the 1948 war. During early Ottoman rule, inhabitants of Palestine tended to cluster in inward oriented villages. Ottoman neglect forced the fellahin to rely on the village and family systems for livelihood. People clustered in hill and mountain regions, today known as the West Bank, and relied on subsistence living (Map 15, on previous page). Just before World War I significant changes occurred. Power left the tribal shayks and village chiefs and went into the hands of notable families in the towns, primarily because the inhabitants began experiencing an increasingly interactive and economically dependent society.



Population began a westward move toward the coastal plain and prominent towns.

Ottoman government initiated a campaign to end private armies and undermine the local Shayks, resulting in increased security and population growth.

British government also initiated investment policies that encouraged Arabs to seek jobs on the coast.

MAP 16

Late 19th Century - Early 20th Century Palestine Arab Westward Orientation

Source: Migdal, Palestinian Society and Politics, pp. 10-35.

Between the wars the British, used to westernized, centralized authority concepts, established political alliances with the notables

much as the Ottomans had. The British gave legitimacy, institutions, and revenues to notables which solidified the latter's hold on Arab political leadership. Large Jewish and British investments led to a westward population shift toward the cities on the coast (Map 16 and Table 2).

Table 2. Growth of Arab Population in Districts with More than 25,000 Arabs.

	1922	1931	1944
Eastern Districts*	362,231	414,935	540,700
Western Districts**	235,456	340,581	518,750

* Includes Beersheba, Hebron, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Ramalla, Tulkharm, Nablus, Jenin

**Includes Gaza, Jaffa, Ramle, Haifa, Acre

Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, (Jerusalem: Central Bureau Statistics, 1979). p. 716.

With this trend to the cities came a new urban elite, but only one with limited social control. Despite the new socio-economic ties, a coherent pattern of class stratification failed to develop. Joel S. Migdal explains the Palestine social structure in the first five decades of the twentieth century as being an uncoordinated

joint venture by those controlling crucial resources. Instead, political power becomes a venture in denying others preeminent positions. As long as no leadership is sufficiently entrenched so as to mobilize power in exchange for the social resources it can offer, politics is marked by factionism and attempts at intimidation.²⁷

²⁷Migdal, Palestinian Society and Politics, p. 10-35.


Several reasons can explain why a unified social class never emerged. The presence of both British and Jewish companies attracted Arab workers with relatively high wages and hindered the development of competitive Arab firms. Another factor inhibiting the establishment of an Arab urban elite was the Arab political reaction against the British and the Jew. Instead of having a well balanced political, social, and economic program, the notables (especially the Mufti) directed all political effort against the problem of British rule and Jewish immigration. Those who sought a different basis for Palestinian politics were accused of being traitors to the Palestinian people in their struggle against outsiders.²⁸ Consequently, initiative became stifled and a feed-lot mentality among Arabs became the status quo.

The 1948 War further undermined Palestinian leadership. With the dispersion of the Arabs, social control was lost and the small economic and social infrastructure in the coastal areas was destroyed. Additionally, the war reversed two trends that had characterized Arab society in Palestine for three-quarters of a century, the movement from east to west and urbanization (Map 17).

When Abdullah annexed the West Bank he stemmed the centralizing tendencies in Palestinian society begun by the Ottomans and the British. Instead of running the West Bank on a society-wide basis, he sought to

²⁸Ibid, p. 33.

ensure fragmentation to prevent Palestinian overthrow of his regime.²⁹ The focus of Jordanian policy went back to the earlier Ottoman policy of alliances with local Shayks, resulting in physical and geographical fragmentation which prevented the rise of second-echelon leadership so critical to an independent society.




MAP 17
1948 Palestine Eastward Orientation

Jordan's investment policy also restricted the emergence of leadership. The government focused on development of the East Bank

²⁹Before the West Bank was incorporated into Jordan, the population of Jordan was 400,000. After annexation, Palestinians consisted of two thirds of the Jordanian population.

instead of the West Bank. Despite having a more literate, skilled population, the West Bank stagnated, and the economy reverted to self-subsistence and service. In 1948, the East Bank had no industrial base; by 1965, three-quarters of all industrial output in Jordan was in the East Bank.³⁰ The result was a population outmigration from the West Bank to the East Bank and to other Middle Eastern countries, especially of young men³¹ (Map 18).



By 1967, a new leadership began to emerge in the Palestinian refugee camps, but with two important characteristics that prevented

³⁰Migdal, Palestinian Society and Politics, p. 89.

³¹From 1952-1961, the West Bank population grew at an average rate of .85 percent, compared with 2.84 percent for all of Jordan. The West Bank does not begin positive rate of yearly increase until 1969 when Israel began its new economic investments. Statistical Abstract of Israel; The Administered Territories (Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1979), p. 717.

it from establishing power. First, it was a leadership whose only resource was education. It lacked a means to control material and social resources. Second, it was a leadership based, for the most part, outside the West Bank. In fact, it was outside most of the major Palestinian population concentrations.³² With leaders lacking material and social resources, unable to implement any political unity, the frustrated Palestinians turned to force to attempt unification and create a territory.

³²Migdal, Palestinian Society and Politics, p. 42-43.

Rise of the Palestinian Liberation Organization

Resentment and frustration contributed to the creation of numerous terrorist groups in the early 1950s. Arab governments financed and trained groups of Palestinian guerrillas. Egyptian intelligence established the first battalions of "Palestinian Fedayeen" from among Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.³³ Their mission was to conduct sabotage and terror missions by 1955-1956. Israel's decision to go to war in 1956 was precipitated in their refusal to evacuate the Gaza Strip until assurances could be made that fedayeen action would halt.³⁴ After the war Egypt formed regular Palestinian army brigades commanded by Egyptian officers. The Syrians, on the other hand, concluded that the best way to fight the Israelis was not with conventional warfare, but with small guerrilla operations.

According to Palestinian writer, Fawaz Turki, "the first clandestine organization that was a truly Palestinian expression" was Al Fatah (conquest), formed in Gaza in the early 1950s by Palestinian students who graduated from Stuttgart University in West Germany.³⁵ One of these students and founders was Yasir Arafat, alias Abu Ammur, who left Jerusalem with his family after the 1948 war and settled in Gaza. Arafat became convinced that the Palestinians must look to themselves, not other Arab governments in order to recover

³³More accurately, fida 'iyyun, meaning those who are willing to sacrifice themselves for their cause.

³⁴Safran, Israel the Embattled Ally, p. 266.

³⁵Fawaz Turki, The Disinherited: Journal of a Palestinian Exile (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 100.

their homeland.³⁶

Terrorist attacks by Al Fatah and other groups continued in the 1950s. By the early 1960s a need for more developed political action emerged in the form of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The recognition of the PLO actually came about due to confrontation concerning the Jordan watershed and its use. Early in 1964 Arab governments and Palestinians became seriously alarmed by an Israeli project to draw water from the Sea of Galilee to irrigate the Negev Desert. (The 1954 Eric Johnson plan). Nasser called an Arab summit conference in Cairo to discuss the Jordan water problem. War was rejected because the Arab states lacked a unified command. Instead, three courses of action were decided: (1) to divert the sources of the Jordan in Lebanon and Syria; (2) to establish a United Arab Command under an Egyptian commander; and (3) to recognize the new Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of Palestine resistance against Israel.³⁷ Al Fatah also became the military arm of the PLO.

Jordan and Egypt supported the PLO for their own political purposes. Both Hussein and Nasser had decided, in advance, that the Arab world needed a group of Palestinians which could counteract the militant, emotional Syrian Baathist leaders who constantly provoked Israel and threatened to draw an unprepared Jordan and Egypt into war. Although the PLO became the most representative Palestinian group since 1948, it

³⁶Congressional Quarterly, The Middle East, p. 29.

³⁷Rinehart, Jordan a Country Study, p. 33. The technical plan to divert water from the Israelis never materialized.

failed to mold mass support or the backing of all Arab leaders.³⁸

During the period between 1948 and 1967, known as the Palestinian diaspora, the Palestinians experienced refugee camp hardships; they developed a concept of "return"; they developed symbols of a national consciousness as evidenced in their songs, literature, and textbooks. The refusal by other Arab states to assimilate them, further forced the Palestinians together as one people. However, the past policies of the Turks, British, Jews, and Jordanians restricted the development of middle-class, or second echelon, leaders. Coupled with the constant movement from east to west, and then west to east, the Palestinians had no stable material assets from which a middle class could grow even though they were well educated. Out of frustration, the PLO became the only expression for political action. The use of armed struggle seemed their only solution to regain a territory.

In the final analysis no genuine Palestinian Arab nationalist movement existed from 1948 to 1967, but a Palestinian consciousness had been born. However, no centralizing leadership emerged, and no coherent stratification of class society necessary for the structure of a nation materialized. The next chapter will explore the Palestinian attempt at forming a nationalist movement from the 1967 war to the present.

³⁸Peretz, The Palestine State, pp. 38-41. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia initially boycotted support for the PLO.

CHAPTER IV



WAR AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXPATRIATE NATIONALIST GROUPS

The Six Day (1967) War

Perpetual tension between Israel and its Middle East Arab neighbors flared into the third major Arab-Israeli war.¹ During the Israeli-initiated, but Arab caused, Six Day war, Israel destroyed a substantial part of the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria.² Israeli planes, in the first "preemptive" strike, destroyed the bulk of Egyptian air forces while still on the ground. Israeli ground troops in a lightning attack broke the Egyptian blockade and occupied the banks of the Suez Canal. In the east, Israeli forces defeated Jordanian forces, driving them from Jerusalem and the West Bank. In the north Israel captured the Golan Heights, the heavily fortified crossroads area linking Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. From the heights, guerrilla bands had harassed Israel's Galilee area for two decades. The war left three indelible imprints which affected the Palestinian question for the next decade and a half: territorial boundary changes, the rebirth of Palestinian nationalism, and U. N. Security Council Resolution 242.

¹Immediate cause was the failure of diplomatic efforts to lift the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. Israeli shipping had been using the gulf since 1956 guaranteed by the U. N. Emergency Force stationed at the Gulf's mouth. Nasser demanded the U. N. forces be removed from Gaza and the gulf outpost. Large Egyptian forces then moved into the Sinai.

²Most analysts believe that the constant terrorist attacks by the PLO, financed and encouraged by the other Arab states was the cause of the 1967 War. Israel made a pre-emptive attack after the Egyptian Army crossed the Suez, thus starting the war.



Territorial Boundary Changes (The West Bank)

Israel's shape is awkward and vulnerable (Map 20). It looks like an irregular triangle standing on its apex, connected by a long, narrow, irregular rectangle to a small, irregular square. Freezing the battle lines in 1948 produced clumsy frontiers for Israel. For a territory of 8,000 square miles, Israel had 613 miles of land frontier in addition to 158 miles of seafront. At the tip of the triangle, the country was only 8 miles wide; at the base, it spreads only 69 miles from border to border. In the long, north-south rectangle, the width varied between 9.5 miles to 16 miles; and in the north, the square was never wider than 41 miles. The oddity of the boundaries, and the fact that the country connected with four Arab countries had much to do with the frequent border incidents which characterized the obsession which Israeli leaders had with national security.

The 1967 cease-fire lines changed the boundary situation greatly. With the Sinai, Israel brought under its control 26,500 additional square miles, more than three times the original 8,000. Oddly enough, the land demarcation lines became shortened by nearly 25 percent to 471 miles. The shoreline increased two and a half times to 564 miles.

With the occupation of the West Bank, Israel gained control of the central mountain region which averages an altitude of 3,000 feet and extends for nearly 100 miles (Map 19). This region was the heartland of the ancient Kingdoms of Judah and Israel. The coastal plain during Muslim times was generally settled by non-Jews. In this century, the situation reversed, making the West Bank almost exclusively Arab while the Jews settled the plains and the coast. This Jewish

settlement gave rise to what is presently the core area or the Israeli state. More will be said about the significance of the core area regarding security in Chapter VI. This industrial and economic sub-region is located between Haifa and Tel Aviv, inclusive.³

In the northern portion of the West Bank (Israelis call it Samaria), the plateau soil has been eroded into valleys, many of which are fertile. In the south, (which Israelis call Judaea), rainfall is reduced, streams are less frequent, and hills are more bare. The West Bank as a whole was heavily populated even before it received several hundred thousand Arab refugees during the 1948 war. It produces enough agricultural surplus for export to the East Bank and to neighboring Arab countries.⁴ A chain of towns runs along the spine of the plateau including Nablus (Arab population, 50,000) and Ramalla (Arab population 25,000). In the South, the chain continues including Bethlehem, the site of Christ's birth, (Arab population 35,000) and Hebron, the burial site of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (Arab population 40,000).

In the center of the plateau is, of course, Jerusalem. Its history extends over four thousand years. The name means "City of Peace," yet no other city has been fought over so much. It has been besieged 40 times. It has served as a holy center for the three monotheistic religions. To any visitor, the city brings to mind the


³Hans W. Weigert, Principles of Political Geography, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1957), p. 147.

⁴In 1977/78 the West Bank produced 421,900 tons of fruit and vegetables. 1% went to Gaza, 14% went to Israel and overseas, and 18% went to Jordan. (The rest was for local consumption). Abstract of Israel 1979, p. 746.

key figures of each religion. Here David founded the Jewish capital and Solomon built the famous Temple of the Lord. Here Christ was crucified outside its gates. Muhammad is said to have made his night flight into heaven from the city (Map 21).

Despite its significance as the Holy City, the 1948 War left it divided into two isolated parts. The old walled city together with the northeastern suburbs became part of Jordan, while the new city on the west became the capital of Israel. Before 1967, according to Nadav Safran,

Jewish Jerusalem was a curious city: it was the center of government and the seat of many of the country's most important cultural and religious institutions -- the Hebrew University, the National Museum, the Chief Rabbinate, tens



of religious colleges, and so on; but it was a city that led nowhere. The world literally ended at some mined ravine or ugly cement wall ...⁵

Being separated from the coastal trade areas, Jerusalem never became an economically important city. To speak of it in terms of a regional core area for Israel prior to 1967, seemed only possible in a psychological sense because of the religious appeal the Israelis placed on their ancient capital. Despite its high birthrate, the Arab population in Jerusalem actually declined during Jordanian sovereignty from 1948-1967.⁶ The number of Christians living in Jerusalem dropped from 25,000 to 9,000. Fourteen years after the unification of Jerusalem, this number increased to 12,000, the first reversal since the large Christian exodus started about 1900. Since 1967, the Arab population has increased by 90 percent, also a significant reversal.⁷ Since the Israeli occupation in 1967, Jerusalem has become a different city. It is now a growing cultural, economic, and scientific capital of Israel. The growth of the total population gives evidence to this. It grew from 170,000 Jews and 60,000 Arabs in 1967, to a total population of 340,000 eight years later.

Despite the Israeli initiation of better living conditions for Arabs in Jerusalem and the West Bank, Israel's military victory and control over Palestine, produced a traumatic effect on the

⁵Safran, Israel the Embattled Ally, p. 73

⁶Limited economic opportunities forced many Muslims and Christians, particularly the educated, to leave.

⁷Teddy Kollek, "Jerusalem: Present and Future," Foreign Affairs 59 (Summer 1981): p. 1046.

Palestinians. They still had no territory to call their own. Over 400,000 were displaced from their homes, about half of these for the second time in twenty years. Most fled to the East Bank of Jordan where conditions approximated those in 1948: hopelessness, flimsy tent cities, and UNRWA operations. One aspect was different. In 1948 Israel only retained a small portion of Arabs within its borders; however, in 1967, almost a million and a half fell under Israeli control (Gaza 400,000, West Bank 800,000, Arab-Israelis 300,000). This meant that the Arab citizenry inside Israel comprised nearly half of the 2.5 million Palestinian Arabs then in the Middle East. In Jordan the demographic population image also changed. In East Jordan, at least three-fourths of the population became Palestinian, half of them refugees.⁸ The Palestinian population was significantly large in both Israel and Jordan, yet in 1967 the possibility of a homeland, a country to belong to, seemed remote and a sense of anguish grew.


⁸Don Peretz, A Palestine Entity? (Washington, D. C.: the Middle East Institute, 1970), p. 43.

Rebirth of Palestinian Nationalism

In September, 1967, an Arab summit conference, held in Khartoum, Sudan, met to find alternatives for the Palestinians. The conference, however, produced no workable decisions for the Palestinians other than some economic support for the "front line" Arab states. Palestinians began to realize that they were alone. The charismatic Nasser of Egypt and the pan-Arabic Baathists of Syria had failed. Conventional military tactics by large scale armies had also failed. Attempts to isolate Israel with economic and diplomatic methods seemed only to toughen Israel's resolve. Encouraged by the successes of "wars of liberation" in Vietnam and Africa, the Palestinians, mostly outside Israeli controlled territory, felt no other recourse but to organize for protracted guerrilla warfare. Although the emerging leadership lacked social resources and a physical base, a new ideological consensus regarding the nature of the Palestinian problem took shape.

This leadership and ideology came from the young Palestinian intelligentsia. They were not organized in any cohesive pattern or centralized structure. What they wanted was a means to redeem themselves for the disgrace at the hands of the Israelis. By 1968, there were thirty-six groups, all asserting Palestinian identity and seeking vengeance and the replacement of Israel with a secular Palestinian Arab state. Most of these groups were located in the Arab states adjacent to Israel (Map 22).

When the ideological goal of eliminating Israel became accepted by all the different Arab terrorist groups, then the PLO emerged as an



equal among Arab states. This acceptance occurred in 1968. The Palestinian National Charter, first adopted at Cairo in 1964 and ammended in 1968, reflected the militant objectives of the PLO.

Article 9 stated that:

Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it. They also assert their right to normal life in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-determination and sovereignty over it.⁹

The fedayeen (Palestinian guerrillas) proclaimed not only the liberation of the Israeli occupied territories but also the destruction of Israel. Disagreement over the means of achieving the goals led to a great deal of confusion and division. Those educated in Germany, France, and the United States had embraced the philosophies of Mao, Che Guevera and Franz Fanon. Attempting to conduct operations analogous to the popular liberation wars of Algeria, Cuba, and Vietnam, the guerrillas failed to recognize the geography and topography differences between the various models. They did not consider that their bases in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan could be reached by Israeli forces. Also the lack of vegetation and cover permitted the Israelis to quickly track down fedayeen when withdrawing from their operations. Unlike Vietnam, where much of the countryside provided refuge and support for the guerrillas, the population, including Israel proper, consisted of a Jewish majority not

⁹Nyrop, Jordan A Country Study, Appendix D, p. 267ff.

dependent on a minority Arab population. Nevertheless the fedayeen presented Israel with daily security problems particularly in the West Bank.¹⁰

By 1970, signs of cohesive organization among the various commando groups became evident. The number had decreased from 36 to 12 (Appendix E). The most important of the fedayeen organizations was the Palestine National Liberation Movement called Fatah.¹¹ Initially, Fatah like other fedayeen forces, was small in number and carried out only limited operations. In March, 1968, Israel conducted an attack on the Fatah base at Karameh on the East Bank in retaliation for Arab commando activities. Even though Israel destroyed the base, Fatah forces, in concert with the Jordanian army, inflicted heavy casualties on the Israeli force and claimed a victory.¹² Karameh became a symbol throughout the Arab world. The Arabs needed a win desperately; as the once proud Arab people had not won major military victories since the Crusades. As a result of Karameh, volunteers flooded to Fatah and, by 1970, their forces grew to approximately 10,000 armed men. The influence of this single engagement reached other commando resistance organizations as well. Total estimates of trained volunteers ranged from 30,000 to 50,000.

An effort to unify the numerous commando organizations took

¹⁰Safran, Israel the Embattled Ally, p. 267.

¹¹Meaning "conquest". It is a reversed acronym for Palestine National Liberation Movement -- Harakat at-Tahrir al-Filastini.

¹²Quandt, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, p. 57.

place at the Palestine National Council in Cairo in 1968. A merger took place between the PLO and Fatah with Yasir Arafat, the Fatah commander, appointed as leader. The next year most of the other commando organizations agreed to coordinate their actions. However, the second most significant commando group, The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by George Habash, refused to join.¹³

Habash emerged as a dominant figure in the Arab Nationalist Movement. He and the PFLP proclaimed a class-struggle ideology calling for the overthrow of governments throughout the Middle East by revolutionary means. Although sympathetic to the injustice in Palestine, Habash's involvement in pan-Arab nationalism contrasted with Arafat's distinctly Palestinian activities. This more general revolutionary theme was probably rooted in the fact that Habash is not a Muslim; his parents were Greek Orthodox. A shift in PFLP ideology after the 1967 War toward the Marxist-Leninist movement occurred. The more radical of these guerrilla groups split off in 1969 and formed the third largest guerrilla organization, The Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP).¹⁴ Under the leadership of Nayef Hawatmeh, the PDFLP became the strongest advocates at applying the principles of revolution exported from Vietnam and Cuba.

The creation of the PFLP and the PDFLP demonstrated that there were more divisive issues in the militant Palestinian movement than

¹³Peretz, The Palestine State, p. 52

¹⁴Chaim I. Waxman, "Varieties of Palestinian Nationalism," The Palestinians, Michael Curtis, ed. (New Brunswick: American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1975), p. 116.

unifying ideas. In fact the only issue they completely agreed on is the "hostility toward Zionism and the need for armed struggle to redress what they saw as the unbearable injustice to Palestinians."¹⁵ There were conflicts between individual guerrilla leaders, differences between the groups and other Arab states, and disagreement over the nature of the desired Palestinian state.

Both the Habash (PFLP) and Hawatmeh (PDFLP) groups believe that struggle in Palestine was linked with social and political conditions in the Middle East. They maintained that the overthrow of reactionary regimes (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon) was a prerequisite to liberation of Palestine. They disagreed between themselves, on the other hand, on the means to implement the revolution. The PFLP wanted to unite the masses by armed conflict; the PDFLP placed initial importance on political and educational strategy then followed by armed struggle. Fatah, however, has attempted neutrality in internal matters of individual Arab states. They have tried to steer a middle ground path and not risk cutting off their support from other Arab governments.¹⁶ The exception was in 1970-71 and 1980-83.¹⁷

A second ideological issue separating the fedayeen was the nature of the Palestinian state. The PLO's National Covenant said their objective was a democratic, non-sectarian Palestinian state.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Quandt, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, p. 62.

¹⁷See Fedayeen Geographical Relocation 1967-1983, this chapter.

There were many interpretations particularly on the fate of the Jews. Article 19 states that in the new state "the Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians."¹⁸ Although the first Jewish immigrants arrived in the 1880's, Palestinians have used various cut-off dates to determine which Jews could remain: 1917 the Balfour Declaration, 1947 partition. In other articles the extermination of the Jewish people appeared to be a consistent theme. After examination of much Palestinian material, one clear observation is the fact that the PLO, the only recognized political institution for the Palestine people, only produced plans of reaction; there were no proactive or constructive plans of government, law, or norms of social behavior.

The fedayeen groups were not the only ones who expressed Palestinian nationalism after 1967. In the West Bank, many traditional leaders who had remained as part of the merchant class claimed to speak for the Palestinians. In reality their influence extended only as far as their town or city, and they proved unable to organize any effective political groups. Israeli occupation and fear of being branded as political collaborators by the fedayeen outside of the West Bank limited their influence. Therefore, the organized expression of Palestinian nationalism remained almost completely in the hands of the fedayeen resistance movement.

¹⁸Palestine National Covenant (1964, 1968, 1977) cited in Nyrop, Jordan A Country Study, Appendix D, p. 267ff.

Resolution 242 and World Recognition

On November 22, 1967, the U. N. Security Council unanimously approved a British resolution called Resolution 242. Its principle objective was peace in the Middle East. The resolution (see Appendix D) called for withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories; an end to hostility between Arab nations and Israel; acknowledgement of and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of every nation in the area; the establishment of secure boundaries; a guarantee of freedom of navigation in international waters; and a just settlement of the refugee problem.

In spite of a considerable debate over the precise meaning of "withdrawal from territories" the resolution provided a basis for the establishment of some form of Palestinian autonomy. The resolution reflected the growing sympathy for the Palestinian people. Empathy with the refugee problem has brought more esteem to the PLO, although they denounced the resolution. After the 1973 war, the PLO picked up considerable world esteem.¹⁹ They recognized the "refugee" problem as a fight for national identity. By 1977, the PLO had become the twenty-first full member of the Arab League, and had gained recognition from 100 countries.

¹⁹The 1973 Arab-Israeli War was specifically caused by the desire to recover the Golan Heights and the Sinai by Syria and Egypt respectively. The West Bank was not a goal for Jordan who mobilized, but generally stayed out of the war.

Fedayeen Geographical Relocation 1967-1983

Following the occupation of the West Bank by Israel, the guerrilla organizations were located in the urban areas of Gaza, northern Jordan, Syria, and southern Lebanon (Map 22). During the next sixteen years the Fedayeen groups, organized loosely around the PLO (Fatah), increasingly lost their base of support in the countries utilized as staging areas for their commando raids into Israel.

After Nasser's acceptance of the cease-fire in 1970, the fedayeen lost Egyptian support. Witnessing the decline of internal stability in Jordan, the guerrilla forces shifted their concentration to Jordan in order to gain control of the country. After "Karamah," the Arab victory which inspired such tremendous support and volunteers for the resistance, the fedayeen increased their guerrilla activities by controlling strategic positions (Az Zarqa oil refinery), calling for a general strike, and organizing a civil disobedience campaign. During the ten-day civil war known as "Black September," Syrian President Jadid supported the guerrillas with 200 T-54 tanks. King Hussein of Jordan counter-attacked with his air force and routed the Syrians.²⁰

While Fatah was trying to regain control of itself after their defeat in September, 1970, Hussein began driving the guerrillas from their strong points located in the towns. Fighting continued through the winter until guerrillas lost control of Jarash, Irbid, and Amman. By April, 1971, Fatah issued a statement contradicting their earlier

²⁰Rinehart, Jordan A Country Study, p. 41.

policy of noninterference within the internal affairs of an Arab state and demanded the overthrow of the Jordanian "puppet separatist authority." It became evident that PLO leaders were seriously trying to form a partial Palestine state out of Jordan.²¹ Following the evacuation of Amman, the resistance forces in Jordan were confined by Hussein to a forested region between Jarash and Ajlun. In early June 1971, King Hussein directed Prime Minister Tal to "deal conclusively and without hesitation with the plotters who want to establish a separate Palestinian state and destroy the unity of the Jordanian and Palestinian people."²² After sharp fighting, the Jordanian army arrested 2000 fedayeen, stopping the resistance movement in Jordan.


After the loss of Jordan as a "secure base" another had to be found.²³ In Syria the government, fearing PLO interference in their internal affairs, wanted to contain the resistance movement by creating their own guerrilla organization (Sa'iqa), and simultaneously curtailing the activities of other fedayeen groups. The Syrian government infiltrated other PLO groups operating in Syria (probably several thousand in number).

²¹Quandt, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, p. 133.

²²New York Times, June 3, 1971 (Later Prime Minister Tal was assassinated for this operation.)

²³Fuad Jabber presents four prerequisites the PLO sought in a secure base: (1) under total control of Resistance, (2) near to Israel to carry out operations, (3) in areas populated by large numbers of Palestinians who would be the main source of support and manpower denied them on the West Bank, and (4) in locations that would enable the PLO to resist seige and annihilation operations of the enemy. The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, p. 190.

MAP 23
Fedayeen Relocate to Lebanon



The Syrian restrictions on guerrilla incursions into Israel, forced the PLO to concentrate their main efforts in obtaining a secure base in Lebanon (Map 23).

Unwelcome in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria the PLO's control of southern Lebanon was a matter of survival. Southern Lebanon was the one area in which the Palestinians could confront the Israelis openly without interference from other Arab states. In fact, in 1969, Lebanon recognized the Palestinian autonomous presence in their country and their right to engage in operations from Lebanese territory.²⁴ However, the 400,000 Palestinians and their fedayeen leaders upset the precarious balance of Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims, and Druzes. The Maronite Christians, in particular, have resented the

Palestinians whom they blame for Israel's retaliation strikes into Lebanon. The complex situation was summarized by a Beirut newspaper editor quoted by Norman F. Howard in Current History: "... here we are with three armies, two police forces, 22 militias, 42 parties, nine Palestinian organizations, four radio stations, and two television stations."²⁵ This ethnic imbalance led to Lebanese civil war.

The 1975-76 Lebanese civil war was caused by inequitable distribution of power between Christian and Moslems but was precipitated by the Palestinians. They were drawn into the conflict in order to survive in a country in which they really did not belong. As a result, the PLO became an open antagonist to the Syrians, its forces were on the verge of total defeat, and its prestige among the Arab world suffered greatly.²⁶

In 1978, Syria took on the responsibility to keep peace in Lebanon, but could not keep the Palestinians out of southern Lebanon. The Israelis strongly insisted they would not accept a return of the Palestinian guerrillas to "Fatah Land" (Southern Lebanon). In March, 1978, Israelis invaded southern Lebanon with 20,000 troops in order to rid the area of the PLO which repeatedly attacked northern Israel from

²⁴Jabber, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, p. 193.

²⁵Norman F. Howard, "Tragedy in Lebanon", Current History (January 1977):2.

²⁶The Syrians did not want a radical regime in control of Lebanon. The Syrians were entrusted by the Arab League to bring peace. If they failed, Syria's prestige as a leader within the Arab world would have suffered. The PLO stood in the way of that peace trying to topple the Lebanese government.

its Lebanese camps. In 1979, after many raids by Israelis, the PLO forces were again in shambles. Arafat announced the PLO would leave Lebanon and conduct its raids from Jordan (even though it had been extricated from Jordan in 1971.) The PLO didn't leave, however, and moved to an area north of the Litani River and south of the Syrian lines where they could have relative freedom of movement to reorganize.


In the next ten years the PLO rebuilt its army, moved into Beirut, and became a principle power faction in Lebanese politics. The Palestinians, in essence, created a state within a state, realizing a form of territoriality. In his 1982 report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Charles Percy, Chairman, indicated that most Lebanese were fearful that the Israelis, Syrians, and Palestinians would force the country to partition into religious territories. They suspected the Israelis of a desire to control the waters of the Litani, the Syrians of plotting to reassert their historic claim to Lebanon, and the Palestinians of planning control and settlement in much of southern Lebanon.²⁷

The PLO's bid for a Lebanese territory came to an abrupt halt with Israel's invasion in June, 1982. By August, 6,000 guerrillas had become trapped in beseiged West Beirut. By September, the PLO was dispersed by the Israelis into nine different Middle Eastern countries, the bulk of the guerrillas going to Tunisia (1100), Jordan (2000),

²⁷U. S., Congress, Senate, The Middle East, A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, by Senator Charles H. Percy, Chairman. 97th Congress, 2d sess., 1982.

Syria (2000), South Yemen (1000), and Sudan (500) (Map 24).²⁸

MAP 24
1982 Fedayeen Disruption



By 1983, the Palestine guerrilla movement had only two countries to turn to, Syria and Jordan. The Syrian army, now trained and supplied by the Soviet Union, no longer feared Palestinian attempts to dislodge their government which was prone to the coup d'etat. Considered by the rest of the Arab world as the last anti-Israeli, front-line state, Syria accepted responsibility of "putting up" the PLO. Jordan, looking to reinstate their Arabness and obtain financial support, also welcomed the PLO. General Abdul Razzak al Yahya, head of the PLO in Jordan, indicated that the PLO would "make changes and

²⁸Time, December 13, 1982. (Half of the guerrillas, it is estimated, have returned to Jordan-Syria-Iraq by December.)

reorganize itself internally in accordance with the lessons of Lebanon." He further predicted the PLO would launch terrorist raids against the Israelis. He said, "Jordan is the bridge for the West Bank."²⁹ In the view of the PLO senior military commander, Abu Jihad, before their ouster from Beirut, the Palestinians will "be forced to go back to the tactics of a decade ago."³⁰ Translation: hijackings, hostage taking, and assassinations. Without a state of their own, the PLO has returned to a point in space and frame of mind it had ten years before.

The active, recognized arm of the Palestinians, the PLO, therefore, has not been successful in meeting their stated goals of eliminating Zionism or mobilizing the West Bank Palestinians through popular armed struggle. However, the issue of the Palestinian national claims has been raised to the center of international attention as a Middle East peace prerequisite (Camp David 1977 and Reagan's Plan 1982).

By 1983, the resistance movement has left a mark on Palestinian territoriality. The attributes of Palestinian nationalism and identity indeed includes such objective criteria as common language, cultural tradition, attachment to a distinct territory, and religious-social heritage. Their unwelcomeness in neighboring Arab countries indicates a distinctive identity separate from their Arab brothers. Perhaps the most significant criteria as a distinct people is their recent history of rejection, war, and tribulation.

²⁹Time, September 6, 1982.

³⁰Time, June 21, 1982.

The subversive alternatives tried in the past have failed. The tactic of going underground and seeking to overthrow Jordan kept the PLO small and vulnerable to Hussein's military. The attempt to establish a foothold in a bid to create a state within Lebanon also did not work. The formation of a conventional army consistently ran the risk of defeat by a superior force. In 1983, the only untried alternative remaining, that of forming a broadly-based political and diplomatic corps, seems to be the Palestinian's only hope for a home. This goal quite naturally will require a tremendous amount of discipline, forgiveness, and compromise -- cultural traits extremely hard to come by in the Arab society, as shall be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

PALESTINIAN SOCIETY

The Palestinians have emerged from a violent history of estrangement. Unassimilated throughout the Middle East, their stressful experience has thrown them together under the name Palestinian. To the world, and perhaps even to themselves, their society has been an enigma. Efforts to define the Palestinian society have proven difficult. Constant geographic dispersion, lack of an effective census, and disagreement on who is to speak for them have contributed to the enigma of definition. This chapter will present the myriad of ingredients that describe a society. Beginning with their location, population, and livelihood, reconnaissance commissions and statesmen will understand some of the Palestinian struggle for a homeland. Elements of cultural cleavage and cohesion among the Palestinian people concludes the chapter. The most contested areas are in the Israeli occupied territories; consequently, much of the discussion is in the context of Israel and focuses on the West Bank.

Over the last thirty-five years, six Palestinian groups have emerged according to Bernard Lewis. First are those who remained in Israel when the state was established in 1948, and have remained there ever since. These are Israeli citizens and enjoy, in theory, many though not all the rights of citizenship. The second group lives in the areas annexed by Jordan in 1951 and conquered by Israel in 1967. The third group resides in the Gaza Strip occupied and subsequently lost by Egypt. The fourth is found in Lebanon. The members of this body constituted the main support of the militant fedayeen until the

guerrilla ouster in 1982. A fifth group comprises those scattered in various Arab countries, especially in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. These Palestinians constitute what Arabs call the ghourba¹ and form the intellectual and revolutionary elite, hence the fedayeen leaders and authors (Arafat, Habash, and many intellectuals). A sixth group, not often mentioned, but of significant importance, is composed of inhabitants of the East Bank. Nearly 65 percent of the Jordanian population are Palestinians. In a sense, the people of the East Bank may be regarded, according to Lewis, as Palestinians just as those from the West Bank can be labeled Jordanians. "The difference between the two [Banks] is ideological and programmatic rather than national or even geographical."² In total, all six groups comprise approximately 4 million Palestinians (Table 3). Strangely enough, the Israeli Jewish population is about the same.

¹Arab equivalent to the Jewish Diaspora, Fawaz Turki, "Portrait of a Palestinian State," Toward Peace in Palestine, Hatem I. Hussaini, ed., (Washington, D. C.: Palestine Information Office, 1981), p. 37.

²Bernard Lewis, "The Palestinians and the PLO," Commentary 59 (January 1975): 37-38.

Table 3. Distribution of Palestinians.

<u>Area</u>	<u>Population</u>
West Bank	825,000*
Gaza Strip	450,000
Israel	500,000
Jordan	1,100,000
Lebanon	350,000
Syria	250,000
Kuwait	250,000
Saudi Arabia	50,000
Other Gulf States	75,000
Americas and Europe	<u>175,000</u>
Total	4,025,000

*includes Jerusalem

Source: Congressional Quarterly, The Middle East, July 1979.

Population of the West Bank and Gaza


The most significant of the six groups are the Palestinians in the Israeli occupied areas of the West Bank and Gaza (Table 4). These two occupied areas have become increasingly important in the world's eyes in that their autonomy has been seen as a prerequisite for Middle East Peace. The final status of the West Bank and Gaza, the location of boundaries, and the nature of security as well as self governing authority constitute the "Framework for Peace" issued at Camp David in 1978 (Appendix A). The inclusion of these two territories into a Palestinian State or entity forms the latest proposal for peace to date.

The West Bank and Gaza are almost exclusively Arab populated areas (Table 5). While the present Israeli administration encourages immigration into the West Bank, the Arabs still comprise a 97% majority.³ Half of the people are under the age of 14, and while two-thirds of the West Bank population is rural, there are seven or eight large towns, where about 35 percent of the population lives. About 50,000 refugees still live in camps. Only about 30,000 of the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank are Christians; the rest are Muslim, mostly from the Sunni branch.⁴

³Time, January 7, 1983. By the middle of this year 6,000 new housing units will be completed for an expected 35,000 Israelis. Officials predict 100,000 by 1987.

⁴Amnon Cohen, "West Bank Sentiments," The Palestinians, p. 88

Figure 1. Composition of population by age groups, 1960.



Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 11, 1960.

Table 4. Estimated Population in the Occupied Areas in 1983.

	<u>Arabs</u>	<u>Jews</u>
Gaza	450,000	500
West Bank	825,000	30,000
Golan	9,000	3,000

Adapted from G. H. Blake and W. W. Harris "Israelis come to stay", Geographical Magazine 51 (November, 1977): 85.

Table 5. Population in the West Bank (excluding Jerusalem) 1944-1978. (in thousands)

	<u>Muslims</u>	<u>Christians</u>	<u>Others</u>	<u>Total</u>
1944	406.3	25.9	0.3	432.8
1961	709.9	34.9	0.2	743.0
1967	565.9	29.4	3.3	598.6
1978	652.7	28.6	---	681.2

Source: Daphne Tsimhoni, "Demographic Trends of the Christian Population in Jerusalem and the West Bank 1948-1978," The Middle East Journal 37 (Winter 1983): 58.

The Palestinians, A Demographic Time-Bomb

The Israeli desire to incorporate the Arab territories into Israel, portends future doom for the Israeli state. If such an event occurs, the high Arab birth rates eventually will make the Jews a minority in their own country. With the election of the Likud government in June 1977 led by Menachem Begin, Israel began a new national policy, the incorporation of the West Bank within the Israeli state.⁵ Officially the occupation is for security reasons, but the present coalition of conservative-religious leaders considers this area to be Jewish historic Samaria and Judea. Begin pledged to the Knesset (and reiterated numerous times since) that "never again would settlements be disbanded by Israel."⁶

The numerous Israeli settlements throughout the West Bank portend a new struggle for Palestine. By January, 1983, the Israelis have managed to build 103 fairly modest condominium-style settlements in an extraordinary crash program to colonize the West Bank. By the middle of 1983, 6,000 new housing units will be completed and 35,000 Israelis are expected to move into this occupied territory, thus raising the Jewish population to more than 60,000.⁷ Israeli officials make no

⁵The present Israeli ruling government is the Likud Coalition, composed of the National Religious Party and other minor parties. They are center-right and view the retention of the occupied territories. The Labor Party, entrenched for ten years prior to the Likud, believed peace with the Arabs could be attained only by trading territory.

⁶Boston Sunday Globe 9 May 1982. He declared this after settlements in the Sinai were dismantled to affect the peace process between Egypt and Israel.

⁷Time, 17 January 1983.

secret of their plans. Their short-range goal of placing 100,000 Israelis in the West Bank by 1987 will make it much harder for moderate Israelis who oppose annexation to give up the land for a Palestinian entity (Map 25).


The Israelis have a history of confiscating Arab property and immediately converting it into Israeli property. Estimates in 1948 indicate that Jews owned only 8% of the total area of Palestine, obtained primarily by purchase from Arab farmers. Most of Palestine before the 1948 war was actually British administered property. As Arabs did not own this land, after the war, most of it went to Jewish immigrants. In addition to the state areas, the government of Israel also took control of the extensive land holdings and other property abandoned by over 700,000 Arab refugees who fled the territory. Between 1948 and 1953, of the 370 new Jewish settlements, 350 were on Arab absentee property.⁸ Returning the confiscated property after thirty years of Jewish ownership seems out of the question and is not even considered as a viable alternative to peace. Yet the fact that Israelis are living in former Palestinian homes increases bitterness and animosity.

Israeli public opinion also is strongly moving in the direction of the need to retain the West Bank. Those who want retention base their case on a combination of historical and security arguments. (See

⁸Don Peretz, "Israeli/Arab Ethnic Numbers Game," Ethnicity 8 (September 1981): 248.

MAP 25

Israeli West Bank Settlements 1982



Chapter VI). Many observers both Arab and Israeli, however, are concerned that peace will never come between the two peoples especially since their animosity is so long-standing.⁹

Perhaps the most significant impact of Israeli retention of the West Bank has been its creation of a "demographic time-bomb." With 700,000 Arabs living in Israel proper and another 1.3 million in the occupied territories, Arabs are more than one-third the population of the Israeli state including the West Bank. Historically the Palestinian Arab birth rate has been one of the highest in the world (3.7-4.8%). They are expected to double their numbers in 17 years, as compared to 44 years for the Jewish population.¹⁰ Many Israelis are worried about a shift from the founding ideology of Zionism and Jewish identity. They feel that the original goal of a Jewish state will be impaired. The state would no longer be founded on a religious ideology, but a secular one. By 1993 the percent of Arab population of Israel will increase from the present 14% to 21% (not including the West Bank), even with expected substantial Jewish immigration.¹¹ This means that Israel could easily become a de facto binational entity. Dwight James Simpson, professor of international relations at San Francisco State University, said, if the trend of the 1970s continued,

⁹U. S. Congress, Senate, A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, by Senator Charles H. Percy, Chairman, August 1982.

¹⁰Terence Smith, "Reflections on a Troubled People," Saturday Review 5 February 1977, p. 18.

¹¹Peretz, "Israeli/Arab Ethnic Numbers Game," p. 241.

"Jews could be a minority in Israel by the year 2000 if Israel retained control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip."¹²

¹²Dwight Simpson, "Israel After Thirty Years," Current History, January, 1979, p. 4.

West Bank Economic Changes

Many sources suggest that West Bank and Gaza are not viable economic entities. They cite as proof the absence of natural resources and the dependence of subsistence agriculture by the working population.¹³ There are few minerals other than building materials in the Arab areas. However, since Israeli occupation after 1967, economic conditions have improved dramatically. Expanding markets and Israeli technical assistance has benefited West Bank agriculture. While under occupation, a tenfold increase in the number of tractors since 1967 (from 120 to 1,200) indicates a positive change in commercial agriculture. Agricultural production has increased 12 percent annually in real terms, and the West Bank's gross national product has risen by an average of 18 percent annually since 1967.¹⁴

The increase in agricultural productivity and gross national product is due in large part to Israeli economic policies. The most significant policy is the open border between the occupied territories and Israel for Palestinian day laborers. Slightly more than 30 percent of Gaza and West Bank Palestinians work in Israel. Because they are cheap workers, Palestinians have become a vital part of the Israeli economy. They receive about 45% less wage than Israelis. Within the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli economic and social policies have prompted

¹³Richard J. Ward, "The Economics of a Palestine Entity," The Palestine State (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1977), pp. 114ff.

¹⁴These are the Bank of Israel's figures. Brian VanArkadie, Benefits and Burdens, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977), p. 38 tones down these figures to 7 percent annual GNP rise.

a departure from subsistence agriculture. In 1969, Moshe Dayan, the Cabinet Minister for the Occupied Territories, relaxed restrictions on roadblocks, travel, and curfews.¹⁵ He also implemented an economic policy that forced some diversification in the economy (Figure 2).

In addition to opening up their own economy to Arab labor, the Israelis utilized the West Bank as a market for Israeli products, opened up Israel to most Arab products, and instituted an "Open Bridges" policy that allowed commerce between Jordan and the West Bank.¹⁶ Although the Palestinian standard of living increased, these policies actually prevented the emergence of unified leadership and cohesion.

These decisions produced an economic boom for the West Bank. This boom, however, did not create a West Bank economic infrastructure (outside the agricultural sector) composed of financial institutions with capital and middle managers with independent responsibility. Furthermore, contact with the Israeli economy turned 40,000 Palestinians into a giant labor pool. This inhibited the comprehensive stratification of the Palestinian society. Joel Migdal expresses the social situation as "a high technology, managerial group (Jews) hierarchically situated above a less developed, working group (Arabs).¹⁷ The pattern is reminiscent of the Mandate when the workers

¹⁵Shabtai Teveth, Moshe Dayan, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), pp. 346ff.

¹⁶Migdal, "The Effects of Regime Policies on Social Cohesion and Fragmentation," Palestinian Society and Politics (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 46.

¹⁷Ibid, p. 47.

Figure 2. Employees by Selected Branch of Palestinians Living in the West Bank and Gaza, 1978.

Arabs Living In	Percent Working in Israel					Percent Working in Occupied Territories				
	Constr.	Indust.	Agric.	Other	Total	Constr.	Indust.	Agric.	Other	Total
West Bank	46%	23%	11%	19%	36,800	11%	15%	34%	40%	94,000
Gaza	44%	20%	23%	12%	314,000	7%	15%	21%	56%	48,700

Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, The Administered Territories (Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1979), p. 712.

began streaming from the central hill country toward the urban coastal areas. Instead of a developing Arab entrepreneurial class on the coast as in the Mandate, the Arabs now commute back into the hills after work. Despite increased economic conditions on the West Bank, Palestinians continue to be frustrated and feel repressed.

Struggle and Repression

The Palestinian struggle for territory and their subsequent repression are perhaps the common denominator which best describes the Palestinian society. Struggle for sovereignty by Israelis and Palestinians in Israel has created constant tension and competition for world approval. Once considered an island of valiant but outnumbered underdogs surrounded by militant foes seeking their destruction, the Israeli image has changed. Numerous articles in the press have recounted bitter conditions in the West Bank caused by harsh Israeli military policies. With the 1982 Israeli invasion into Lebanon, the unfortunate massacre in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, and the eroding U.S.-Israeli relationship, Israel has now attained the image of the oppressor.

Despite Israeli efforts to give more democratic freedom to the Palestinians including the initiation of the "village leagues," Palestinians in the West Bank perceive themselves as being repressed. The Israelis designed the village leagues in 1978 for Arabs who do not want the PLO to speak for them. However, Elias Freij, the moderate Palestinian mayor of Bethlehem, said the village leagues are "a name without a body."¹⁸ Freij is the only elected Palestinian mayor of an important town who has not been dismissed by Israeli occupation authorities. He insists that the Israeli settlement program has created an anxiety that stops just short of panic. "We are fighting against time. The Israelis want to grab as much land as they can.

¹⁸Boston Globe, May 9, 1982, p. 24.

They want to make it impossible for us to have autonomy, not to mention a state. We are at five minutes to midnight, and this is our last chance."¹⁹

Like the Israeli grab for territory, impingement on Arab academic freedoms has contributed to a frustrated society. The acting president of Najah National University, W. F. Abboushi, an Arab American, recounts the Israeli oppressive policies during school year 1981-82. Najah is one of three Universities on the West Bank (Bethlehem and Bir Zeit are the others). He explains that the Israeli military forced the professors to sign a pledge not to aid the PLO. This raised a tremendous debate (participated in by U. S. Secretary of State George Shultz) over freedom of thought. The Israelis expelled twenty-two foreign teachers and threatened 100 more because they refused to sign.²⁰ Moreover, Abboushi said,

I was refused a work permit. When my three month visa expired, I had to leave the West Bank and come back to get another visa. I did this three times in one year. I was determined to keep a low profile and not make an issue of my particular situation. I remembered that three years earlier, when I taught at Bir Zeit University, I made an issue of a similar problem and was beaten by Israeli soldiers, along with another American, right in front of the military governor's office.²¹

In addition, the universities could not purchase books without approval. Many periodicals and books were denied or censored because they were critical of Israel. The most pressing problem was the routine beatings

¹⁹Time, January 17, 1983, p. 22.

²⁰Washington Post, November 19, 1982, p. A28.

²¹Christian Science Monitor, November 30, 1982, p. 23.

of Palestinian students. Abboushi indicates over one-third of the Najah student body had been in Israeli jails, which students jokingly referred to as "The Hilton." During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon the military authorities used real bullets to disperse student demonstrations protesting the invasion.²²

Often protests degenerate into violence with an eye for an eye being the only guideline. In the holy city of Hebron, birthplace of King David and burial place of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, tensions mounted in 1979, when Arabs killed six Israelis in front of a community center occupied by Jewish squatters.²³ Nearly fifty years before, Arab residents massacred 60 Jews in the same city. After the murder of the six Israelis the military government bulldozed the two Arab houses where the ambush was initiated. So it goes; one turn deserves another with the outcome only intensifying hatred.

The arrest of hundreds of students, the smashing of locks on shops closed by strikes, and the establishment of Jewish settlements in the territories, may appear to restore order and give Israel strength. A more careful analysis reveals that a perceptible growth of confidence may finally be emerging -- not from the PLO led Palestinians outside the Israeli borders -- but among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who have remained relatively quiet. Violence does not seem to be the modus operandi of this new nationalism conditioned by Israeli repressive measures. A new inner-strength seems to be appearing. An

²²Ibid.

²³Boston Globe, May 9, 1982.

officer of the military government in November 1980, visiting Bir Zeit University, ordered the administration to dismantle an exhibition of drawings by Palestinian prisoners on the grounds that "they're prisoners, not artists." Despite the Israeli Defense Force's reasoning for the order, the exhibition organizers saw it as another sign of Israeli weakness. It appeared that the military government could be intimidated by an art exhibit.²⁴ An observer in the West Bank saw an Arab girl who had been wounded in the leg by Israeli fire during the breakup of a demonstration. She was hopping along on her other leg, calming her friends with shouts of "It's OK, it's OK!" Rafik Halabi, an Israeli Druze working for the National Television News Service, noted the poise, presence of mind, and the look of triumph on her face despite the pain.²⁵ The Palestinians may be coming together in response to Israel's tough policies.

²⁴Rafik Halabi, The West Bank Story, Ina Friedman trans., (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981), p. 282.

²⁵Ibid.

The Holocaust Complex -- Israeli Society

An informed view of Palestinian territoriality, or owned space, cannot be approached without the regard for the competing society, the Israelis. The strong territorial conviction of the Israelis has, in itself, contributed to the response of the same convictions for the land in the Palestinian society. The Israeli society's will to maintain control of Palestine through tough and often repressive policies has, in effect, placed the Palestinian Arabs in the same stress situation experienced by the Jew for 2000 years. The product of a society which survives under pressure has generally been shown to be strong. The Israeli society is one of the best examples of this. The common societal stress that the Jews underwent is termed the Holocaust complex.

Whenever the subject of Israel and Arab destiny is raised, the discussion seems to turn to the Holocaust. To the Israelis, their history of persecution throughout millennia has been more severe than that of any people. A conviction has arisen among Israelis that in order to prevent a recurrence of pogroms and the Holocaust, the Jews must remain the masters of their own destiny. The Israelis commission their new military officers every year on the rock of Masada which has become a Jewish defiance symbol, much like the Alamo was to Texans. The motto, "Masada shall not fall again!", reveals the determination to maintain sovereignty over the promised land.²⁶ In politi-

²⁶800 Jewish Zealots committed mass suicide in the desert fortress of Masada in A. D. 73 rather than surrender to certain execution by the Romans.

cal terms, the Jews believe they can achieve security only by the maintenance of a Jewish state where Jews constitute an absolute and overwhelming majority.²⁷

To understand the Israeli national psychology, a cursory look at the historical magnitude of the diaspora is in order. Comprehending the Jewish mind and the singular importance of the "chosen people" can be a massive project requiring years of research. James A. Michener suggests reading Deuteronomy five times over.²⁸ The warning given by Moses, recounted in Deuteronomy, to his people if they fail to acknowledge the Lord God, has taken place with amazing accuracy:

And the Lord shall scatter thee among all people, from the one end of the earth even unto the other ... And among these nations shalt thou find no ease, neither shall the sole of thy foot have rest: but the Lord shall give thee there a trembling heart, and failing of eyes, and sorrow of mind: And thy life shall hang in doubt before thee; and thou shalt fear day and night, and shalt have none assurance of thy life.²⁹

The rest of the Old Testament depicts the Jewish failure to acknowledge God. As a result, the Jews have undergone dispersal and persecution for 2500 years throughout the world.

597-586 B. C. Nebuchadnezzar conquers Jerusalem and destroys the first Temple. A huge number of Jews were taken into exile known as the Babylonian Captivity.

²⁷Shai Feldman, "Peacemaking in the Middle East: The Next Step," Foreign Affairs 59 (Spring 1981), p. 757.

²⁸James A. Michener, The Source (Greenwich, Conn., Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1965), pp. 193-197.

²⁹Deuteronomy 29:64-66 (King James version).

- A. D. 70 Revolt against Rome culminated in destruction of the second Temple. Josephus reports 1 million Jews taken into the slave markets bound for all parts of the Mediterranean.
- A. D. 132-135 Bar Kokhba War resulted in the third major dispersal of Jews throughout the Roman Empire.
- A. D. 632 Byzantine Emperor Heraclius promulgated a Law calling for forced conversion to Christianity of all Jews in the empire.
- 1096-1099 First Crusade. Before leaving on the Crusade, some soldiers massacred Jews in Rhineland.
- 1182 Jews expelled from France, property confiscated.
- 1290 After several decades of persecution, including blood libel trials³⁰ Jews expelled from England.
- 1300-1600 Massacres, forced conversions, and expulsions in most countries of Western Europe. Conditions in Spain perhaps worst, culminating in the Spanish Inquisition in 1480 and expulsion in 1492. Jews expelled from Sicily, 1493; Lithuania, 1495; Portugal, 1496-97; Brandenburg, 1510; Naples, 1541; Prague, 1541. In 1544 Martin Luther launched attacks on Jews on charges of deicide.
- 1648-49 Estimated 100,000 Jews killed and 300 communities destroyed in the Ukraine.
- 1670-1789 Expulsions and persecutions common throughout Europe. In 1715 Pope Pius VI issued "Edict concerning the Jews," which alluded to deicide charges and extended restrictions on Christian-Jewish relations.
- 1800-84 Russian pogroms resulted in beginning mass Jewish emigration mostly to North America. Between 1880 and 1914 about 2.6 million East European Jews fled to North America.

³⁰Blood libel is the medieval Christian belief that Jews engaged in ritual murder of non-Jews (usually youths) to obtain blood for passover. Trials and persecutions on this issue were common throughout most west European countries during the Middle Ages. The idea lingered in East European countries as late as the nineteenth century Nazi officials revived the belief.

on May 27, 1967, that the object of the war was "the destruction of Israel," the effect on Israeli citizens could be nothing other than fatalism and survival.³³

As a result of the 1967, 1973, and 1982 Wars, only three Arab states, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, have given de facto recognition to Israel's existence. The refusal by the Arab League and the PLO to recognize the existence of the Jewish state is the root issue which causes apprehension and fear in the Israeli mind. Palestinian society must be understood in view of the Holocaust Complex rooted in recent Jewish history.

³³Meir, "Israel in Search of Lasting Peace," p. 451.

Cultural Cleavage and Cohesion

Although the Palestinians possess a sense of territoriality for Palestine, their failure to obtain the land over the past 70 years questions their society's ability to obtain it. In the event of an imposed settlement, the question also arises concerning their ability to maintain a state structure. This section considers the cultural cohesion and cleavage within the Palestinian society.

Territorial allocation for a Palestinian state will prove difficult because the Palestinians lack coherent organization within their culture. Karl Deutsch defines a society as a group of persons who have learned to work together. He further explains that a community is composed of persons who are able to communicate information to each other effectively over a wide range of subjects.³⁴ The nature of Palestinian society, with its deep, traditional sources of distrust and division, is introspective at the hamula or clan level and resists communication and cooperation outside of their "family space."

Many Middle East social geographers, such as Stephen Longrigg, have classified Middle Eastern society as a mosaic of distinct, often conflicting groups.³⁵ There appears to be no consistent social system or set of attitudes which bind a majority of the people into one unit. The Palestinian situation is probably more fragmented than most because

³⁴Karl W. Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration," The Structure of Political Geography, Roger E. Kasperson, ed., (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969), p. 211.

³⁵Stephen Longrigg, The Middle East: A Social Geography, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 2nd ed., 1970), p. 9.

of the dislocation endured by many.

Although many students of Arab culture have overstated the influence of the "spirit of the desert," one cannot dismiss the many cultural traditions which have come from the Bedouin tribes. Even though most Palestinians live in villages, towns, or metropolitan areas, the principle organizing function within Arab society is centered around kin groups. In most villages and even cities the descendants of a common, relatively distant ancestor form the hamula or clan. The hamula is the repository of family honor and also tends to be endogamous, that is, each person is expected to marry within one's lineage. Hence, the son or daughter of one's father's brother is considered the most appropriate mate. For centuries the ibn am (son of father's brother) married bint am (daughter of father's brother). Although values are changing, particularly in the urban areas, the male still has the presumptive right to marry his first cousin and may be paid by the girl's other suitor to release her from this obligation. Even if they are not related, as is the case in some urban centers, the husband and wife affectionately call each other ibn ammi and bint ammi.³⁶

Descent is held to be of utmost importance. Reckoned through men, or patrilineally, the Arab society is founded on bloodlines. Allegiance within the clan is much more important as a source of cohesion than job, institution, or even religion. A man's name includes his paternal genealogy and often indicates either his family name, his ancient tribal affiliation, or his village. For example, a man

³⁶Irving Kaplan, Jordan A Country Study, p. 68.

named Abd al Rahman ibn Qasim ibn Muhammad Al Quds would be recognized as the son of Qasim, the son of Muhammad from Jerusalem (Al Quds).

Arabs value family solidarity highly; being a good family member means automatic loyalty to kinsmen and obedience by children. There is not a similar feeling, however, of loyalty toward a job, employer, co-worker, or even a friend. A widespread conviction exists that the only reliable people are kinsmen. Politicians, guerrilla leaders, and minor officials will often appoint their kinsmen over outsiders mainly because of a sense of responsibility and trust. Commercial establishments, small industries, and agricultural enterprises are basically family operations.³⁷

One particular illuminating concept within the Arab culture is their passion for honor, ird, as it relates to political execution. Any injury to a member of one clan is an injury to all the members. Family reputation, therefore, is derived from the good repute within the kin group, and injuries can only be erased by appropriate revenge. In the past, bloody feuds between tribes and assassinations were commonplace within Arab culture. Even the Muslim schism between Sunni and Shia began with assassination.³⁸ When Ali, Muhammad's son in law, became the holy successor, he was murdered. Fratricide, according to Hurewitz, became commonplace. He describes one Muslim Caliph, Mehmed III (1595-1603), who executed nineteen brothers and two sons, to

³⁷Nyrop, Syria, a Country Study, pp. 70-71.

³⁸The word, assassin, comes from an ancient Arab killer group called Hashashin.

reduce the number of claimants and ensure succession of the throne.³⁹ Peter Gubser, in a study of Al Karak, a Jordanian town, describes a special group called the Khamsah, formed by Sharia Law, the Muslim law code. This body was responsible for avenging the death of an individual or collecting compensation.⁴⁰ Although Jordan made the Khamsah illegal in 1976, the idea of honor and payback is deeply rooted in the Arab society, not necessarily as a social evil, but as a distinct characteristic of their culture. This cultural trait explains why the region accepts terrorism and murder as normal behavior within its society.

At this point it must be understood that the Palestine resistance movement and the right of armed struggle is not the issue here. Reliance on armed struggle is a fundamental principle accepted by most societies.⁴¹ The United States drew from such a principle to justify its revolution. The crux of the present issue deals mainly with the internal cooperative spirit among the Palestinian Arabs and their ability to fuse into a coherent organization.

It is unwise to consider violence a culture trait of a group of people regardless of the socio-historical evidence. However, Muslim

³⁹Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension, p. 19. Mehmed was Ottoman and Muslim, but not an Arab. Nonetheless, the taking of life became legitimate throughout the Middle East.

⁴⁰Peter Gubser, Politics and Change Al-Karak, Jordan, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), cited by Kaplan, Jordan, A Country Study, p. 71.

⁴¹Emile A. Nakhleh, "The Anatomy of Violence," The Middle East Journal 25 (Spring 1971): 186.

religious tradition legitimizes violence. Perhaps the earliest factor which legitimizes violence is the religious tradition of Muslim militancy advocated in the Quran: "And fight in the way of Allah with those who fight with you and do not exceed this limit." (2:190) "And fight with them until there is no persecution and all religions are only for Allah (8:39)." "He it is who has sent His Messenger with the guidance and the true religion that He may make it overcome all (other) religions." (61:9).⁴² The Manual of Hadith, a companion book of explanations to the Quran on what the Prophet said, did, or approved, described the Jihad or Holy War as carrying a two-fold significance, attempting peaceful missionary-type activities and, when necessary, physical force.⁴³

Although the Quran emphasizes that the sword should not be used to force Islam on others (2:256), many Imams, spiritual successors to the Prophet, have used the sword for expanding the Muslim Empires. Iran is using the term Jihad today in its purge of all vestments of the Shah's reign.

Violence, in the name of honor, is not the only culture trait that produces cleavage. Individualism in the Arab leader also produces cleavage. Like the inward-oriented clan groups, Palestinian leadership embraces the cultural values centered on individualism. Two accepted leadership styles are prevalent among the Arabs. The first is the

⁴²The Holy Qur-an, Abdullah Yusuf Ali, trans. (State of Qatar: Presidency of Islamic Courts and Affairs, 1946).

⁴³A Manual of Hadith, Maulana Muhammad Ali, (Lahore, W. Pakistan: The Ahmadiyya Anjuman I Shaat Islam), pp. 252ff.

respected elder statesman who usually uses an interpersonal style to consult with other notables to reach group consensus, shura. The other style is the strong charismatic leader, Za'im, who goes over the heads of equals and deals directly with the masses.⁴⁴ William Quandt explains that the devotion to these two extreme styles of leadership results in the emergence of few disciplined, second-echelon leaders to build coherent organizations in the society.⁴⁵ Joel Migdal agrees. Instead of finding the reason in historic society as Quandt has done, he shows the causes to be from economic, security, and military policies (British, Jordanian, and Israeli).⁴⁶ (See the West Bank and Gaza this chapter.) Thus, the leaders who exist to bring the society together actually tear the society apart by their individualism. They fail to produce second-echelon leaders necessary to unite the Palestinians.

Other cultural characteristics of Palestinian society restrict the creation of effective leadership, and produce cleavage. A harsh critic of Arab society, Sadiq al-Azm, maintains that Palestinians continue to demonstrate a "tribal mentality" where their loyalty never goes beyond that of his own family. Thus Arab leaders are reluctant to subordinate themselves to the interests of a larger society. Al-Azm also condemns

⁴⁴This leadership viewpoint resembles the Blake-Mouton leadership grid expressing differences between the autocratic mission-oriented and the democratic people-oriented leader. Blake and Mouton, "The Military Leadership Grid," Military Review 60 (July 1980): 13-29.

⁴⁵Quandt, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, p. 80.

⁴⁶Migdal, Palestinian Society and Politics, pp. 19-77.

the "fahlawi," character of the Arab. The fahlawi is one who initially may be attracted to some great idea and shows much enthusiasm for it, but when difficulties set in, he frequently backs down into apathy.⁴⁷ Revolutionary zeal is rarely sustained and reflects cyclic activism alternating with abandonment of the cause as has been shown in Chapters II-IV. Karl W. Deutsch points out that "when a union is initiated to counter an enemy, it tends to disintegrate as the threat passes." He further suggests for situations "under threat" that political geographers and statesmen will have to examine conditions for social-unification other than when military pressure is exerted.⁴⁸ The Palestinians were unified to a point when confronted by Ottoman, British, Jewish, and Jordanian policies, but disintegrated following the outbursts of violence.

With a definite imbalance of leadership in the Palestinian society, is unification of the dislocated Palestinian possible? Amitai Etzioni, Professor of Sociology at Columbia University, explains that the necessary ingredients for unification are communication ability, integrating power, an effective distribution of power concentration, and take-off momentum.⁴⁹ The lack of power concentrated in the

⁴⁷Sadiq al-Azm, Self Criticism After the Defeat (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dar at-Taliah, 1968) cited by Quandt, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, p. 80. This fahlawi paradigm resembles Christ's parable of the sower almost exactly, John 8:5-18.

⁴⁸Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community in the North Atlantic Area, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 44-46.

⁴⁹Amitai Etzioni, "A Paradigm for the Study of Political Unification," The Structure of Political Geography, Roger E. Kasperson, ed., (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969), pp. 226-228.

hands of a Palestinian elite is evident by the absence of responsible second-echelon leaders. The complex communication system of the Palestinians composed of radio broadcasts, school literature, and family political discussions, reaches down to even the most rural person. Deutsch points out, however, the need for the recipient of the communication to be able to digest the information and respond effectively.⁵⁰ The Palestinians on the West Bank have recognized the PLO as their spokesman. They have either relied on the PLO to affect the political changes, or avoided comment for fear of being branded a "quisling" by fellow Arabs. The decision-making unit, the PLO, is therefore ideologically rigid, incapable of listening to feedback, and unable to convert West Bank sentiment into power.

The lack of Etzioni's "integrating power," also restricts Palestinian unification. Integrating power has three facets: identification, coercion, and utility. Identitive assets, composed of symbols (the black, red, and green flag, the Kafeyah head-wear, a shared history of conflict, Martyrs Day, etc.) are definitely present in Palestinian society. Coercive assets are weapons and manpower. Lacking however, are the installations or bases from which to operate (Jordan, lost in 1970-71 and Beirut lost 1982-83). Meager utilitarian assets such as economic possessions, technical and administrative capabilities, etc., reveal a distinct weakness in the Palestinian ability

⁵⁰Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community in the North Atlantic Area, pp. 12ff.

to exert integration.⁵¹

Take-off occurs when a "process has accumulated enough momentum to continue on its own, without the support of nonmember units." Sustainment of the PLO by the USSR, the oil rich Arab states, and the adjacent "front line" Arab countries has created an entrenched dependence. Decision-making continues to be based upon the ideology of the supporting entity rather than upon the Palestinian consensus. One take-off determinant is that the flow of people, goods and communications across national boundaries increases prior and during take-off.⁵² Israeli military occupation has prevented significant exchange of this flow of shared activities between the West Bank, the PLO, and refugees. The Arab economic boycott has contributed to this restriction of shared activities in the same way.

Unification of Palestinians to form a separate state has been resisted by Israel, Jordan, Syria, and the USSR. Talcott Parsons in his Essays in Sociological Theory insists that outsiders can hinder the unification process. Their "utilitarian interests and identitive commitments motivate them to support the maintenance of the status quo."⁵³ Israel hinders the process out of a desire for West Bank annexation and the need for national security (see Chapter VI). Jordan also desires recovery of the West Bank for economic and prestige purposes. The West

⁵¹Amitai Etzioni, "A Paradigm for the Study of Political Unification," p. 227.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1954), pp. 138-141.

Bank's agricultural output would be a great asset to Jordan's mostly arid topography. King Hussein's primary fear of a Palestinian state centers around a possible (and probable) challenge to his throne. Syria also fears a radical government on its southern flank which could create internal discord in Syrian factionalized politics. Any territorial decision without Syria to solve the Palestine question would mean a loss in prestige in the Arab World, particularly since Syrian leaders wish to exhibit an image of regional leadership in order to some day unite all the Arab countries in one nation. The USSR also enjoys the fruits of maintaining the status quo. They realize that tension in the region will foster dependence upon the USSR followed by an outlet for arms sales, the export of communist ideology, and the increase of Soviet regional prestige. With a satisfactory solution to the Palestinian problem the USSR would lose the revolutionary catalyst necessary for their doctrine to take root.

Therefore, the internal cooperative spirit among the Palestinian society and their ability to fuse into a coherent organization is thwarted internally and externally by social cleavages and political maneuvering. Given the historical perspective of Palestinian social and political events from 1917-1983, the present fragmentation of ideology (12 different factions in the PLO), the non-stratified, leaderless infrastructure, and the general mistrust between age old families, the Palestinian society does not yet contain the appropriate chemistry to unite.

CHAPTER VI

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIAL ALLOCATIONS

Theoretical Solutions for a Palestinian Entity

Given the development of Palestinian territoriality, there are several options for a Palestinian state, should it be imposed on the region. These options, proposed by Arabs, Jews, and international diplomats, give those charged with recommending national form and territorial limits a wide scope of political geographic ideas which may help resolve this issue. The objective of this chapter is not to arrive at the precise state form, but to contribute to a better understanding and more reasoned attitudes concerning this controversial issue. Three possible types of solution to the Palestinian problem are the total Palestinian state, the binational state, and repartition.

The first of these, the total Palestinian state, was put forward by the PLO. It is basically the creation of an Arab Palestine state in the place of Israel.¹ This state would comprise all of Western Palestine (Israel) and might include the East Bank too. This implies the end also of the Jordanian monarchy.² This proposal, embodied in the charter of the PLO and substantiated 12 times since its adoption in 1968, basically advocates the death of Israel and Zionism (the state

¹Yasser Arafat, "The United Nations Appeal for Peace," Toward Peace in Palestine (Palestine Information Office, 1981), pp. 17-18.

²Maps which appear in the emblems of the PLO show Western Palestine only; but decisions of the Palestine National Council indicate an intention of joining the East Bank as well.


and all institutions except religion) and the rebirth of Palestine.³ Since no state will voluntarily cooperate on its own demise, this solution can only be accomplished militarily, a platform repeatedly attempted by the PLO. To Westerners, such a plan may seem remote, especially after hearing Arafat's speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 1974: " ... I proclaim before you that when we speak of our common hopes for the Palestine of tomorrow we include all Jews now living in Palestine who choose to live with us there in peace and without discrimination."⁴ However, observers of the Arab media, relying on a knowledge of Arabic rather than on translators, are more conscious of the seething hatred between Arabs and Israelis.⁵ Without another Arab-Israeli war in which Israel loses completely, the state envisioned by the PLO certainly seems unlikely.

A second theoretical solution is a binational state composed of Arabs and Jews. Israeli nationalists and Palestinian Arab commandos have offered variations of the binational state idea (Map 26). The Israelis envisage Palestine as a Jewish state, whereas the Palestinians proclaim their objective to be a secular democratic state. Walter Laqueur cautions against the literal interpretation of the PLO formula because it clashes with the Palestinians' insistence that the character of the state must be Arab and that the state should be integrated into


³Walid Khalidi, "Regiopolitics: Toward A U. S. Policy on the Palestine Problem," Foreign Affairs 59 (Summer, 1981): 1060.

⁴Arafat, "The United Nations Appeal for Peace," p. 17.


⁵Bernard Lewis, "Settling the Arab-Israeli Conflict," Commentary 63 (June, 1977): 52.



Dayan's concept of
 "Living together"



Egyptian and Jordanian
 Idea



Democratic Front for
 Liberation of Palestine Concept

the Arab Middle East and not remain an "outpost of the West."⁶ Additionally, the PLO idea for the "secular, democratic republic of Palestine" never speaks of Arabs and Jews, only of Muslims, Christians and Jews. This redefines the Jews as a religious minority, not a national group.

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, one of the more radical guerrilla groups, also urges the establishment of a new state with a federal or confederation structure on the Yugoslav or Czechoslovak type. A staff writer for Free Palestine said he favored

a largely binational socialist state ... socialism is the cement which would have to bind the two groups. When we talk about liberation what we really mean is the destruction ... if you want to say it that way ... of the institutional structure of the state of Israel as it stands today. But we also mean making every effort possible not to disrupt the society of Israel. We would like to preserve Israeli society because nobody, regardless if he is against the whole idea of Zionism, can deny that there is an Israeli society there which has its own fabric and institutions. However, the state, the superstructure, the Palestine Liberation Movement aims at destroying. Within the binational state the movement envisions two "ethnic" groups having their special institutions as far as they relate to one group or another.⁷

Moderate Jewish leaders have also supported the binational state idea. Moshe Dayan put forth the idea among Israelis in the early 1970's that Jews and Arabs should "live together" from the Mediterranean to the Jordan. In an interview on 30 April 1978, Dayan said,

So now this time we come forward with an absolutely different concept about it, not dividing the West Bank between Jordan

⁶Walter Laqueur, "Is Peace Possible in the Middle East?", Commentary 61 (March, 1976): 30.

⁷Free Palestine, Vol. II, No. 2, June 1970, cited by Peretz, The Palestine State, p. 95.

and Israel, but living together, both the Arabs and Israelis living in the West Bank the way we live in Jerusalem now (and no one really is now recommending dividing Jerusalem) so we say the same thing about the entire West Bank.⁸

This proposal differed from the Israeli Labor Party conception of a territorial division of the West Bank between Israel and Jordan leaving a formal border between them. It also differed from the Egyptian proposal: the creation of a formal border between pre-June 1967 Israel and a new Palestinian entity within Jordan. Menachem Begin was influenced by Dayan's approach; this explains some of the complexity of the so-called Begin plan for Palestinian "self-rule" still adhered to by the Israeli Likud coalition government.

Israeli versions of a binational Palestine are numerous. Generally, Arabs and Jews would share equal rights within one unitary state. Various blueprints range from a loose federation of Jewish and Arab cantons, to fusion within Israel, to even an Arab Palestine including Jordan under King Hussein. This later plan envisages a Jewish Prime Minister under an Arab King and a system of government in which Arab and Jewish officials, including the Army, would be balanced.⁹ In many respects, this idea resembles the multi-ethnic state system existing in Lebanon. A problem, however, is that in Palestine ethnic groups are generally concentrated in homogeneous territorial blocks,

⁸Cited by Theodore Draper, "How Not to Make Peace in the Middle East," Commentary 67 (March, 1979): 27-28.

⁹This looks like King Hussein's proposal of a Union between the West Bank and Jordan which influenced Reagan and Schultz. King Hussein "A Jordanian Palestinian Federation," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, (March, 1972): 260.

whereas in Lebanon they are more widely interspersed.

The binational concept has been supported within Israel for many years with positive results. In the 1950's, two principal binationalist groups emerged in Israel. Both stressed the need for accommodating the Arabs while building the Jewish nation. The Ihud advocated numerical parity by controlling Jewish and Arab immigration. They believed peace could never be realized as long as a majority could subordinate a minority. Hashomer Ha-Zair, however, saw no need to limit Jewish immigration, if a balance could be made through political, social and economic parity by raising Arab living standards to that of the Israeli. During the years since 1948, the Arabs within the state of Israel have, in effect, given a type of binationalist status to Israel. The Israeli-Arab population has grown to 450,000. They have become Israeli citizens, with the right to vote, hold office, own property, publish their own newspapers, and send their children to schools where the instruction is in Arabic. The illiteracy rate of Israeli Arabs declined from 90 percent to less than 10 percent.¹⁰ Israeli Arabs, furthermore, did not take part in any of the strikes in the West Bank and Gaza after the outbreak of the 1967 war. They continued to take part in the economic life of Israel as producers and consumers in cooperation with Jewish institutions.¹¹ During the 1967 and 1973 wars, they remained surprisingly loyal to Israel.

¹⁰Terrence Smith, "Reflections on a Troubled People," p. 18.

¹¹Yochanan Peres, "Some Observations on the National Identity of the Israeli Arab," p. 231.

While many positive changes in the lives of Israeli Arabs occurred over the last 35 years, possession of Israeli citizenship has not raised their level to the Jewish average.¹² In fact, full integration has not been achieved. Most live in 107 exclusively Arab villages. They rarely mix with Jews. They comprise 15 percent of the population, but only hold 5% of the seats in the kneset. Finally, they are considered second class citizens by the majority of the Jewish population. Thus far in the region, binationalist government, based on balanced ethnic representation, has proven unmanageable. The case of Lebanon (a Muslim-Christian binational Arab state) with its Christian President and Muslim Prime Minister represents the obstacles facing such a government.

There is some hope for the future, however, for union among groups of heterogeneous peoples. Amitai Etzioni suggests that a large number of nations such as Switzerland and Canada are highly divergent in terms of ethnic origin, cultural tradition, language, and religion. Cultural homogeneity is neither a prerequisite nor a sufficient condition for unification.¹³ However, the record of regional federations is quite poor. Karl Deutsch advanced five basic predictions which have been made for regional federations since 1945:

1. Federations, if they take the place of smaller sovereign states, will make their populations more prosperous. (Economic Growth will be faster if the market is larger.)
2. Larger federations are more open to world trade and culture. (Federalism would help reduce prejudices).

¹²Peretz, The Palestine State, pp. 96ff.

¹³Etzioni, "A Paradigm for the Study of Political Unification," p. 224.

3. The federation will make politics more stable.
4. Federations are more favorable to constitutionalism and democracy, to individual liberty, and to tolerance for religious and racial minorities.
5. Federations teach people within to be more peaceful.¹⁴

Deutsch shows these 5 popular points are not always true.

Examining the main sources of evidence in Europe, America, Africa, and Asia over the last hundred years, he concludes that market size has little effect on economic growth. Instead of being more open to international contact, multi-national states insulate themselves very rapidly from the rest of the world. Stability of federations is doubtful also as evidenced by the American Civil War. The Federations of Germany and Austria were anything but stable between 1930 and 1945. Moreover, there is a long list of abortive federations. Malaysia failed because federalism was incapable of keeping the Chinese of Singapore and the Malays of the peninsula together; Pakistan was a federation of Muslims which quickly tore up its constitution, due to disagreement; Nigeria could not hold the allegiance of the Ibo tribes; Syria and Egypt broke away after 6 years of a United Arab Republic. Finally Greeks and Turks on Cyprus have repeatedly fought each other for control. The fourth expectation of individual liberty is also questionable. The Republic of South Africa is a federation, but the record shows it to be intolerant as far as race relations are concerned. Pakistan is not tolerant to Hindus and India not to Muslims. As to federalism inducing peace, just as many examples can be given to

¹⁴Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternatives, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 115.

reflect discord in multinational states like Iraq and Lebanon.¹⁵ There have been both successful and unsuccessful binational states throughout the world. Whether or not this form is feasible in Palestine, is dependent upon the backing given by both Israelis and Palestinians.

The binational state presently has no strong support either among Palestinians or Israelis. A continuance of the status quo (more Israeli settlements in the West Bank) will inevitably create such a political form. According to Said Hammami, a PLO spokesman in the West, "if he waved a magic wand and said, 'Let all the Palestinian Arabs and all the Israeli Jews live tomorrow in a democratic, secular Palestine,' this would more or less immediately lead to a civil war: 'All these years of conflict and tension are not a good background for the establishment of a peaceful and harmonious coexistence between two communities.'"¹⁶


The third possibility for a Palestinian entity, and the most prevalent in the 1980's, is a new and final partition of the territories which were once placed under the British Mandate. The Palestinian partition idea has two alternatives (Map 27). One is the creation of a new Arab state to be called Palestine which would consist of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The other solution, recently brought forward by President Reagan on September 1, 1982, is to have not three but two states in the area. One would be Israel; the other would be an Arab state on both banks of the Jordan, the

¹⁵Ibid., p. 116ff.


¹⁶Said Hammami, quoted in New Outlook, October–November, 1975.

MAP 27

Two Palestinian Partition Alternatives




Three State Regional Approach



Two State Regional Approach
Palestinian Entity as a Sub-state within Jordan

Palestinian entity being a sub-state within the Kingdom of Jordan.¹⁷

The first territorial partition option for a Palestinian homeland is the so-called "West Bank," the area annexed by Jordan in 1951, and later occupied by Israel after the 1967 War. This alternative could include the densely populated Gaza region with an easement through Israel connecting it to the West Bank (Map 28). East Jerusalem might be either included or excluded.¹⁸ This actually is a separate "mini-state" idea which allows full independence for a country called Palestine. This entity would, most likely, be led by PLO intellectuals



¹⁷Reagan (and Secretary Schultz's) proposal is not original. It has been put forth by Israeli and Arab alike. Arie Eliav in Land of Splendor, 1973, proposed either an independent Palestinian State of the West Bank and Gaza or in some form of association with Jordan. King Hussein has also advocated restoration of Jordanian sovereignty in the West Bank with a large measure of autonomy.


¹⁸Peretz, The Palestine State, p. 80.

and fedayeen, who would take off their guerrilla uniforms and return from exile. Gaza would be included in this structure. With a population of 450,000, Gaza is 45 miles long and 15 miles wide. Its large citrus industry and potential as a port facility would be necessary for the mini-state to become economically viable. The state would then consist of two parts. One part would be the Gaza Strip. The other would be the West Bank bounded on the east by the Jordan River including Samaria and Judaea; the western border would run west of Tulkarm and Kalkilya, east of Lod and Ramla, from there to Jerusalem, then south to Hebron and the Dead Sea. Altogether, the state would comprise some 2,305 square miles.

The economic viability of such a state would be in question. Annual rainfall in the northern part of the West Bank (Samaria) is fairly high (600 mm or 24 inches per year) and has favorable local agriculture, but in the southern lobe of Judaea, rainfall dramatically falls to 400 mm or 16 inches per year (Map 29).¹⁹ The future for industry is not promising. It is almost non-existent except for some light industry in the form of olive oil and soap factories in Nablus and wooden souvenirs and a glass factory in Hebron. Economic potential in Bethlehem and Ramallah is also poor. Their chief source of capital comes from tourists and Holy Land visitors. Given this dismal economic situation, the new state would not be able to absorb more than a token number of returning Palestinian refugees, particularly in the

¹⁹The Atlas of Israel, p. 210.

MAP 29
West Bank Rainfall



Source: The Atlas of Israel, 1970


Gaza Strip, which has one of the highest population densities in the world.²⁰

Israel's Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, proposed another partition plan in the October 1976 issue of Foreign Affairs. Like the mini-state idea, he advocated an autonomous Arab entity on the West Bank.²¹ According to this plan the Israelis would release military occupation duties allowing the Palestinian mayors to assume civil functions such as social welfare, health, education, agriculture, and even local politics. Israel would set up military bases along the Jordan and other strategic points.

The strength of Allon's argument lies in geographic terms. One does not have to be a military tactician to understand the critical security defects for Israel in the armistice lines which existed prior to the 1967 war. Most of these lines have no topographic security value as they are located in low areas. Their geostrategic location also restricts Israel from having a minimum amount of strategic depth. The most serious problem is that West Bank is adjacent to Israel's core area (Map 30). There are three reasons why this is extremely sensitive. The first is its proximity to Israel's population and industrial centers. The strip between the pre-1967 lines and the Mediterranean Sea is only eight to 13 miles wide, and contains 67 percent of Israel's population and about 80 percent of its industrial

²⁰Walter Laqueur, "Is Peace Possible in the Middle East?", p. 29.

²¹Yigal Allon, "Israel: the Case for Defensible Borders," Foreign Affairs 55 (October 1976): pp. 38-53.



Source: Hans W. Weigert,
Principles of Political
Geography, p. 147.

capacity.²² This puts most of Israel's cities within medium artillery range of the West Bank (Map 31). As two-thirds of Israel's military is from the civilian sector, security is dependent on ample warning. The Arab surprise attack in the 1973 Yom Yippur War revealed Israel's weak link to be her ability to mobilize the reserves in time. Strategy for survival, therefore, is based on four prerequisites: maximum distance between Arab military forces; proper strategic warning; the ability to mobilize without interference; and the potential to delay the attacking forces.²³


²²Shai Feldman, "Peacemaking in the Middle East: the Next Step," Foreign Affairs 59 (Spring 1981): 757.

²³Ibid., p. 769.

MAP 31

Israeli Security Vulnerability


Medium Artillery Ranges (Soviet 152 MM)



MAP 32

The Allon Plan (Autonomy with Israeli Military Outposts)

- Allon Plan approximate geographical limits
- populated official settlements
- Official settlements planned or under construction
- unauthorized settlements
- //// United Nation zones
- - - 1967 boundaries
- major urban areas



Source:
 'Israelis Come to Stay' *Geographical Magazine*, November 1977, by G.H. Blake and W.W. Harris
 and 'Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders,' *Foreign Affairs*, October 1976, by Allon.



Allon's plan is a political compromise (Map 32). As a strong Labor Party advocate and one who believes that incorporating more Arabs into Israel would be a detriment to Israel's Jewish character, he advocates no additional Arab population annexation. Therefore, moving the pre-1967 lines eastward (which might seem most logical to gain key military terrain) is out of the question. However, a power does not have to actually occupy an area in order to control it. He proposes setting up military outposts in the arid area on the eastern side of the West Bank. This area is almost devoid of population and runs from the Jordan River to the eastern chain of the Samaritan and Judean mountains. A corridor cutting this zone could run from Jordan to the West Bank via Jericho permitting circulation between Jordan and the West Bank.²⁴ Palestinian identity would be maintained because the population of both banks are generally Palestinian Arab and most of them carry Jordanian passports. (Two-thirds of Jordan's inhabitants are Palestinian.) The Allon plan was an idea to trade territory for peace. Israeli reaction in 1977 at the polls, resolutely denounced this concept. The emergence of the Likud government was a signal indicating Israeli rejection of a possible radical state in the heart of Israel. Although the plan had the merits of compromise, it lacked economic viability, like the mini-state idea.

Another partition solution, advanced by Hany A. Hilmyy, an Egyptian professor at Nehru University, New Delhi, envisions a separate

²⁴Allon "Israel: the Case for Defensible Borders," p. 46.

The Hilmyy Partition Proposal (Peace Through Territorial Concession)

-  ISRAEL
-  Palestine
-  Joint Administration
-  Former Egyptian & Syrian Territories



Source: "Re-Partition of Palestine,"
Journal of Peace Research, March 1972.

Palestinian state comprising more than just the West Bank and Gaza.²⁵ As these two territories only constitute 22.6% of Palestine, economic viability and living space is questionable for such a limited area. Hilmyy proposes a Palestinian state composed of about 40% of the British Mandate west of the Jordan. The Jewish state would compose 60% (Map 33). The basic idea is to satisfy the essential points needed by both sides. For the Palestinians, the new territory is almost double the amount left in Arab hands after 1949. The creation of such an entity might also reverse the bitter sense of humiliation. This partition also represents a more equitable distribution of land according to population. To satisfy the Israelis, this plan would represent, for the first time, an accepted and recognized Jewish state in the Middle East.

In the Hilmyy proposal, the northern part of Israel would become part of the Palestinian state to act as a buffer between Israel and Syria. The partition boundary (Plan A) would run from the Lebanese borders southward passing west of Safad to the northwestern tip of the Sea of Galilee. The previously narrow coastal plain, Israel's industrial core, would be enlarged giving a sense of security and more room for settlement. From the Sea of Galilee the borders run westward to Nazareth then southward incorporating the large Arab towns of Jenin, Nablus, and Ramallah. Jerusalem, according to Hilmyy, would remain a

²⁵Hany A. Hilmyy, "Re-Partition of Palestine: Toward a Peaceful Solution in the Middle East," Journal of Peace Research (International Peace Research Institute, Oslo: 1972), pp. 133-144.

united, demilitarized, and open city under joint administration by Israel and Palestine. The Jewish Holy Places would fly the Israeli flag, the Moslem and Christian Holy Places would fly the Palestinian flag. Jewish and Arab residents of the city would have Israeli and Palestinian citizenship, respectively.²⁶

From Jerusalem, the borderline would continue south and west of Bethlehem and Hebron, south to Beersheba, then eastward to the Dead Sea. This would give Israel access to the valuable minerals already being extracted. The border line from the northern tip of the Gaza Strip southward to the Gulf of Aqaba would allow the Palestinian state to develop a Red Sea harbor. This initiative would require Egypt to cede a small piece of Sinai territory west of Aqaba. Since the Israelis have initiated large agricultural developments in the Negev, they may prefer to keep this area undivided. According to plan B, an enlarged Gaza Strip with a corridor through Israel to Aqaba may be arranged.

In another repartition proposal, Donald W. Davis of Western Michigan University suggests that only by creating a "new structure" in which normalization may occur can peace be attained.²⁷ Like Hilmy's territorial partition, Davis adheres to the idea that a Palestinian state composed of only the West Bank and Gaza is unworkable. The small size of such a state only creates new complications of political

²⁶Ibid., p. 141.

²⁷Donald W. Davis, "Palestinian Arab Sovereignty and Peace in the Middle East: A Reassessment," Journal for Peace Research (International Peace Institute, Oslo: 1974), pp. 95ff.

and economic geography rather than resolving existing ones. Davis maintains the only feasible site is a combination of the eastern portion of the Sinai, the Gaza Strip, and a smaller version of Samaria linked to the rest of the state through Jordan (Map 34).


The western boundary would run from the Red Sea coast north at 34° east longitude to coordinates 34° E, 30° N; from there to intersect the Mediterranean coast at coordinates $33^{\circ} 30'$ E, 31° N. The eastern boundary would remain the 1949 cease-fire line between Egypt and Israel.

Communication between the Sinai and the Samarian enclave (the northern part of the West Bank) would not be through the Negev, where Israel is the widest, but through Aqaba to Amman to Jericho. Davis' principal reasoning for this arrangement, like Hilmyy's, is in the hopes of establishing the Gulf of Aqaba as a focal point for great economic and political importance to help sustain the Palestinian state economy.²⁸ A further advantage to this idea is the physical separation of Egypt and Israel. The consolidation of the West Bank's area through the reduction of the Hebron, Latrun and Jenin Salients, furthermore, places Israel's borders in a more defensible situation. Davis seems to minimize, however, the strategic role played by Sharm el Sheikh, the city from which the Egyptians blocked the Strait of Tiran initiating the Wars of 1956 and 1967. Realistically, as Egypt, Jordan, and Israel, as well as the Palestinians lay claim or possess land envisaged in this solution, the likelihood of agreement appears remote.

²⁸Ibid., p. 104.

MAP 34

The Davis Partition Proposal (West Bank, Gaza, and Some Sinai)



Source: "Palestinian Arab Sovereignty and Peace in the Middle East,"
Journal for Peace, 1974
by Donald W. Davis

A different approach, yet similar to the Allon plan, is founded on the premise that Israel's problems with the occupied territories center on returning population, not territory, to Arab control. Colonel Merrill A. McPeak in a Foreign Affairs article, "Israel: Borders and Security," suggests that "demography is of far greater significance than geography."²⁹ If Israel determines to annex all the West Bank and Gaza Strip, this action would add over a million people to the 500,000 Arabs already living in Israel. Considering the high rate of Arab natural population increase and the little near-term likelihood that the Arabs can "drive Israel into the sea," McPeak reasons there is a significant possibility that they might submerge Israel demographically within present defensive perimeters.

In an area within Israel where Arabs compose most of the population, there can be no doubt that to give Arabs full citizenship rights would mean the eventual end of a Zionist state. On the other hand, if Israel instituted repressive measures to control the Arab population, Israel would come to an end as a democracy. McPeak proposes a formula for returning as much of the population and as little of the territory as possible. The plan views Israel's retention of the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank only a string of towns (Nablus, Ramallah, and Hebron) along the Samaritan-Judean hilltops together with a link to Jordan at Jericho should be returned to the Arabs. As these towns are large Arab population centers, McPeak believes that Israel might take in only a

²⁹Colonel Merrill A. McPeak, "Israel: Borders and Security," Foreign Affairs 54 (April 1976): 432.

half a million fewer Arabs leaving a manageable population for a long time.³⁰ Although this perspective is rather one-sided, its success is founded on the requirement that all returned territory be demilitarized. With this action, he says, "these problems could be seen for what they are: a variety of disputes involving history, emotion, religious belief, and property rights, not security."³¹

³⁰Ibid., p. 433.

³¹Ibid., p. 441.

Partition and Amalgamation

The preceding territorial ideas present the statesmen and members of reconnaissance commissions with several alternatives. Of the two major concepts, a binational state or partition, world opinion indicates preference for partition. Influenced by a delicate political balance of peace between the superpowers, an unsolved Palestinian refugee question, and internal Israeli expansion politics, the United Nations has recently called for the solving of this interminable Palestinian question. Although numerous attempts have been initiated to rectify the problem by boundary solutions and political decisions, world leaders now demand the formation of a political area, a Palestinian entity. On November 24, 1976, the United Nations General Assembly in a 90 to 16 vote called for the creation of a Palestinian state.³² However, without understanding the nature of partition, world leaders may make inappropriate decisions.

Partition is a form of disintegration. Both Deutsch and Etzioni suggest that it is actually integration in reverse. (The binational state concept assumes that integration takes place.) Partition can be defined as "the process of dividing property and giving separate title to those who previously had joint title."³³ The process has been used generally to solve immediate and seemingly irreconcilable problems. Examples in this century are Ireland, Germany, Korea, Vietnam, India,

³²There were 30 abstentions.

³³Websters New World Dictionary (New York: World Publishing Co., 1966).

and Palestine. Partition has also been considered as a solution to the communal conflict in Cypress and the religious conflict in Lebanon.

However, partition may not reduce conflict, and may in fact perpetuate it. All the above states, which were partitioned originally on a temporary basis, are currently areas of world tension.³⁴ In "Partition as a Political Instrument," Ray Johnston demonstrates, through a survey of literature, "that there has not been one instance of the partition of a nation that was not followed by further conflict."³⁵ Johnston produced an empirical conception based upon nine variables which were considered requisite functions to the nation-forming process. This process could be either partition or unification (binational state).

1. Some level of cultural homogeneity and value concensus must be attained.
2. An unknown scope and intensity of "social communication" is required.
3. This social communication is achieved by what has become social mobilization which is a process of breaking down old traditions and making the people available for new patterns of socialization, especially political socialization.
4. A uniformity of message content and cognitive agreement must be produced by mass media and educational institutions.
5. Economic interdependence between agrarian and urban people must be achieved by the development of a "common market place" or "national market place for distribution."
6. The government must manifest a determination and ability to use its power to carry out its policies (authoritarian elite).
7. A political class must be willing and able to lead the non-coalescing majority (paternalism of elite).

³⁴Kasperson and Minghi, The Structure of Political Geography (Chicago: Adline Publishing Company, 1971), p. 203.

³⁵Ray E. Johnston, "Partition as a Political Instrument," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1973, p. 163.

8. A mutual identity between the political class and the governed must come to fruition (identific elite).
9. The political class must be united and the hegemony of this political class cannot be threatened by a counter-elite (consensual elite).³⁶


Applying these precepts to the Middle East, we can define national partition as the political and legal division of people into separate Arab and Israeli territories, who, prior to division, showed low, negative scores on each of these functional requisites (variables). Conversely, national amalgamation, a binational state, would be the political binding of a people who, prior to claims of national autonomy, showed high scores on these same variables.

The statesman can view the empirical conception (Table 6) from two perspectives using subjective analysis based on historical and political factors. The black curve depicts only the internal Palestinian Arab society and their potential for amalgamation. This curve represents a mixed variation of internal unity and disunity. The red curve represents the internal Israeli society, indicating a cohesive people. The blue curve reflects the Arabs and Israelis together. The generally negative scores indicate an inability on the part of the two peoples to culturally integrate. This gives some support for partition.

One can draw other conclusions from Johnston's empirical tool. If partition were to occur, the Israeli curve indicates solidarity and strong national cohesion. The Arab curve, however,

³⁶These eight variables are derived from the works of Karl Deutsch, Claude Ake, C. J. H. Hayes, and Francis Wilson.

Table 6. Positions of Arab and Israeli Potential for Partition and Amalgamation by Structural Requisites of National Integration Variables.



Black Curve represents the Arab community in Palestine.

Red Curve represents the Israeli community in Palestine.

Blue Curve represents the combined Israeli and Palestinian people in Palestine.

Adapted from "Partitions as a Political Instrument" by Ray E. Johnston, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 2: 1973, p. 167.

reflects weaknesses, particularly in commonality of political socialization and consensual elite. This suggests that if a Palestinian state was created by partition, the state government could have difficulty unifying and establishing central authority. Furthermore, Israelis fear the rise of a Palestinian state composed of radical elements adjacent to their borders.

This model can prove to be invaluable to reconnaissance commissions tasked with determining the optimum state form which would have the best chance of success. The need for timely, quantifiable data such as plebiscites, cultural surveys, cash flows, and voting patterns would make this model a strong tool not only for partition - amalgamation decisions, but also for specific locations to delimit boundaries.

A word of warning is appropriate concerning the dividing of states. The use of partition, even temporarily, to solve irreconcilable problems, tends to create imposed boundaries which become relatively impermeable barriers between contrasting and hostile political systems. Hostility, consequently, endures as a long-term imprint on the region as a whole. The boundaries between East and West Germany and North and South Korea confirm the prolonged hostility created by the partition solution. The only hope for partition lies in a change of attitude. Lord Caradon, former British representative to the United Nations and sponsor of the 1967 Security Council resolution on the Middle East, emphasized the need for a new concept in partition, "secure and recognized boundaries are vital, but it is now realized

that boundaries need not and should not be regarded as barriers."³⁷

³⁷Lord Caradon, "To Map Fair Boundaries," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 1971, p. 169. For a complete discussion of boundaries in contact but not in conflict see Jones' Kinnetic and dynamic borders in "A Unified Field Theory of Political Geography". Annals of the AAG 45 (1945): 119.

Warnings to Statesmen and Reconnaissance Commissions

Diplomats seem to have gone full circle for the fourth time this century. (1) Choices between partition and union were debated after World War I by the League of Nations without conclusion. (2) The 1936 Peel Commission's investigation said a solution could only come through partition. (3) The subsequent Woodhead Commission in 1937, rejected this advocating partition impracticable. (4) The United Nations advocated partition in 1947 only to result in war. Today the same choices lie before the participants in Israeli-Arab politics. Statesmen should be warned not to allow history to repeat itself. Some solution must be attempted, either partition or union. If history were truly cyclical, then this dilemma would remain unsolved.

In considering possible solutions, reconnaissance commissions must sort through the complexities that have taken shape over the last 60 years. Today the historical, social, and diplomatic gulfs that separate the Palestinians and the Israelis seem to exist in as virulent form as ever. Terence Smith, returning from four years as the Jerusalem correspondent for The New York Times, notes that:

I came home from those years deeply skeptical about the prospects for an early settlement in the Middle East. It is not that the political problem is beyond solution. That is basically a question of sovereignty versus security that two dispassionate lawyers could resolve ... But the human obstacles -- the deep-seated mistrust on both sides, the fear of annihilation, the wounded national honor -- these are the real stumbling blocks. They are the elements that have prevented a solution in the past and will continue to make one difficult to achieve in the future.³⁸

³⁸Terence Smith "Israeli Journal: 1972-1976. Reflections on a Troubled People," Saturday Review, 5 February 1977, p. 8.

Reconnaissance commissions must be careful not to fall into the same trap as those who have become concerned with the consequences, rather than the causes of conflict in this region. Diplomacy in Palestine has indeed centered on the results of war rather than the circumstances which led to war. This is evident in the fact that the only legal boundary delimitation of Israel's frontiers has been between Egypt and Israel in 1974. Even though Israel has existed as a state since 1948, this is the only internationally recognized border. The others consist of armistice and cease-fire lines. Most of the arbitration over place unfortunately centers around the "consequences of war".

Reconnaissance commissions must also be aware that attempts to impose a unilateral resolution for a peace settlement will fail without Arab or Israeli participation. Only Palestinian and Israeli leaders can resolve the profound issues. If the issue is as it has been for so long, the existence of Israel, then obviously no diplomat could get an Israeli to even participate in a discussion. If, however, the issue is no longer the existence but the size of Israel's borders, then normalization will begin and the opportunity for further discussion will open.

In order for normalization through mutual recognition to succeed, a new leadership must emerge in both the Israeli and Palestinian communities. The rightist Likkud party of Menachem Begin which has suffered internal criticism due to the Lebanese massacres and West Bank settlement policies, may soon be replaced by the moderate Labor Party which has supported the formation of a Palestinian entity. The

Palestinian leadership, as well, must somehow shed the influence of their extremist groups and adopt an alternative path in the direction of diplomacy. Additionally, the Palestine resistance movement must minimize its dependence on other Arab regimes and the many guerrilla organizations whose ideologies constantly contradict each other. This dependence will most likely continue as long as the Palestinians lack structural unity and central pro-active leadership. Once the emergence of some progressive Palestinian Za'im (charismatic leader) occurs, coupled with an equally progressive Israeli government desiring a comprehensive settlement, the opportunity for equitable territorial allocation will be at its greatest point for success.

Conclusion

The Palestinians have developed a sense of "owned space" over the past fifteen hundred years of their tenure in the Middle East. However, not until the Palestinian diaspora began with the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, did they develop a political sense of territoriality. This sense was legitimized by the United Nations proposal for the formation of two states, Arab and Jew. Over the next 35 years, three more wars occurred causing further displacement and loss of territory. During this time the identification with the land was aided and impeded by external interference and internal division. Arab neighbors did not permit assimilation into their countries and refugee camps grew into dismal shantytowns. Out of hopelessness, the Palestinians formed numerous, expatriate nationalist groups whose fundamental objective was to liberate Palestine from the Israelis.

This sense of territoriality is a central issue in the Arab-Israeli confrontation. Although the Palestinians possess an identification with part of the region, the continuing social and political division within the Palestinian people thwart a singular expression of territoriality. In view of the depth of cultural feeling between Arab and Israeli, neither forced partition nor amalgamation of states seems hopeful. The added demand of Israeli security renders the realization of a Palestinian state problematic of this time.

APPENDIX A

Framework for Peace

Following are key provisions of the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" agreed to by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Sept. 17, 1978, at Camp David, Md.:

*The final status of the West Bank and Gaza, the location of boundaries and the nature of security arrangements will be determined by Egypt, Israel, Jordan and elected representatives from these territories after a five-year transition period.

*During the transition period, an elected self-governing authority will replace the existing Israeli military government.

*Israeli armed forces will be withdrawn to specified security locations as soon as the self-governing authority is elected.

*Jordan will be invited to join in negotiating the details of the transitional agreement.

*The "modalities" for admitting Palestinians displaced from the West Bank and Gaza by the 1967 war will be decided by a committee of representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the self-governing authority.

*Arrangements for internal and external security will include a strong local police force which may include Jordanians.

*The United States is invited to participate in negotiating the implementation of the agreement.

APPENDIX B

1919 Paris Peace Conference Preparation

1. Political History.
 - a. Historic rights, including suffrage laws.
 - b. Religious development and customs.
 - c. Rights of minority peoples in composite populations; subordinate nationalities.
2. Diplomatic History.
 - a. Recent political history related to diplomacy.
 - b. Public law, constitutional reforms.
3. International Law.
 - a. Reconciliation of present and former practices.
 - b. Study of treaty texts.
 - c. Geographical interpretation of problems of territorial waters, frontiers, etc.
4. Economics.
 - a. International: raw materials, coaling stations, cable stations, port works, tariffs, etc.
 - b. Regional: industrial development, self-sufficiency, traffic routes in relation to boundaries and material resources, including food, minerals, water power, fuel, etc.
5. Geography.
 - a. Economic geography: strategic frontiers; topographic barriers.
 - b. Political geography: strategic frontiers; topographic barriers.
 - c. Cartography: maps on every kind of distribution bearing on peace problems, such as peoples, minerals, historical limits, railways and trade routes, crops and livestock, cities and industrial centers, religions.
 - d. Irrigation: present development, possibilities for general reconstruction.
6. Education.
 - a. Status in colonial possessions.
 - b. Condition in backward states.
 - c. Opportunities of oppressed minorities.

APPENDIX C

Minutes of the Frontier Meeting
10 September 1919
at Manoir de Clair fontaine-Hennequeville,
Trouville, France.

Present at the meeting were Prime Minister Lloyd George, Arthur Bonar Law who was Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House, Field Marshal Lord Allenby, High Commissioner in Egypt, Major-General Sir John Shea, Colonel W. A. Gribbon, Colonel A. M. Henniker from the War Office, and Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the Cabinet. The discussion that took place was recorded in the following Minutes:

LORD ALLENBY, referring to the boundaries of Palestine, said that the place now known as Banias had been identified as the original Dan. He had reported this to the War Office who had recognized its accuracy.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether it was proposed to include Mount Hermon within the boundaries of Palestine. This appeared to him to be rather excessive.

LORD ALLENBY agreed and gave a further explanation of the line which he would like to draw for Palestine, which would exclude Mount Hermon. He said that the railway route now under survey ran from Abu Kemel on the Euphrates to Haifa. In the desert the country was very easy-going. The Jebel Druse had not been reconnoitred on the ground, as this was considered impolitic in view of our present relations with the French. He had, however, carried out a reconnaissance by aeroplane and one of the aeroplanes had come down and the pilot had been rather roughly treated by the Druses.

COL. GRIBBON urged the great importance of including the headwaters of the Jordan in Palestine.

LORD ALLENBY agreed, and pointed out that the River Yarmuk supplied two-thirds of the water of the Jordan. He said that the Zionists stretched Palestine far to the north and would like to include Hama. Their idea was to fix the boundaries similarly to those of Solomon's empire. He thought, however, that the proper boundary of Palestine on the coast was probably just south of Tyre. The Sykes-Picot Agreement drew the line just north of Haifa and left Lake Tiberias to the French. In his view, however, the Yarmuk Valley was essential to the welfare of Palestine. He pointed out that the French line was drawn considerably south of Bosra so as to include Deraa which had been on the Sykes-Picot line ...

THE PRIME MINISTER instructed Sir Maurice Hankey to telephone to London to ask for the following documents to be sent to meet him in Paris:

Adam Smith's Book on Palestine
Adam Smith's Atlas (containing the boundaries of Palestine
at different periods)
A large scale map of the Sykes-Picot Agreement

(At this point there was an adjournment to enable Colonel Gribbon to draw roughly the Sykes-Picot line on a large scale map containing the French line.)

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the French line included Lake Tiberias within the French zone.

MR. BONAR LAW asked what was the value of Lake Tiberias?

THE PRIME MINISTER said it was essential for the irrigation and

development of Palestine.

COL. GRIBBON suggested that the line ought to be drawn along the edge of the Lebanon.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that M. Clemenceau had promised that the British should have the mandate for Palestine. He wanted a map showing what actually constituted Palestine. He was convinced that this would include Lake Tiberias.

COL. GRIBBON in reply to a question by Sir M. Hankey as to the value of Lake Tiberias to the French, said that the French had drawn up schemes for forcing water up for the irrigation of the south of Syria, and that the Zionists had a scheme for connecting the Jordan with the river Litani.

COL. GRIBBON said that there had been so many different boundaries to Palestine that he doubted whether anyone would agree to recognise any one authority, even Adam Smith.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the French would accept some of the American religious authorities on the boundaries of Palestine.

MR. BONAR LAW suggested that President Wilson should be asked to arbitrate as to the boundaries of Palestine.

LORD ALLENBY said that an American expert, Dr. John Finlay, had been in Palestine and had walked from Beersheba to Dan: he thought perhaps his authority would be recognised.

THE PRIME MINISTER instructed Sir M. Hankey to telephone to London instructions to consult the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton as to the American authorities in regard to Palestine. He said he was inclined to make an offer on

Mr. Bonar Law's lines to accept as an arbitrator someone nominated by President Wilson as regards the boundaries of Palestine.

MR. BONAR LAW asked what was the value of Palestine?

LORD ALLENBY said that it had no economic value whatsoever. Its retention by the British would keep our minds active for the next generation or two. He anticipated great trouble from the Zionists. There had been so much Zionist propaganda that Jews who had been dispossessed in Poland and Russia were actually marching now to Palestine.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the mandate over Palestine would give us great prestige. He asked which the Field Marshal would prefer, Palestine in British or French hands?

LORD ALLENBY said that if the French were in Syria they might almost as well be in Palestine. In any case they would give us great trouble.

GENERAL SHEA said that from the point of view of the air he thought it was essential to have Palestine. The necessity for this was to enable us to break up an air attack on the Suez Canal. Unless our frontier was pushed well out this would be difficult.

THE PRIME MINISTER, reverting to the land defence, asked whether, if the defiles from the Lebanon were held, any march on Egypt would be impossible?

LORD ALLENBY agreed that this was the case. It would be difficult to hold a line further back as the flank was liable to be turned. He did not think we could now give up Palestine without great loss of prestige.

COL. GRIBBON pointed out that it would focus the whole defence of Egypt in these narrow defiles instead of spreading it out over a wide field. It was essential for the British to be astride of the Hedjaz railway. If the French could use this railway it would cause us great trouble. Moreover, he was impressed by the danger of the air threat on the Canal, which made it essential to push forward our aerial defence.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that anyhow it was now impossible for us to give up Palestine.

LORD ALLENBY agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that we could neither give up Palestine nor take Syria.

LORD ALLENBY agreed.

From Palestine Papers by Doreen Ingrams, pp. 75-78.

APPENDIX D

U. N. Security Council

Resolution 242, Nov. 22, 1967

The Security Council

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principle requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(1) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

APPENDIX E

PRINCIPAL PALESTINIAN GUERRILLA GROUPS
(July, 1970)

Name	Estimated fighting strength	Main leaders	Arms sources	Income sources	Ideology
*Al-Fatah, the Palestine National Liberation Movement	15,000	Yasir Arafat Salah Khalef Khaled al-Hassan Mohammed Najjar Hanni al-Hassan Zouheir al-Alami Farouk Kaddomi	Communist China Open market Captured Israeli arms Rockets of own manufacture	Mainly Palestinian private individuals channeling payments through governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Abu Dhabi	No political ideology except liberation of Palestine through armed struggle and creation of a democratic, secular Palestinian state
*Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Palestine Liberation Army (PLA); Popular Liberation Forces (PLF)	10,000	Yasir Arafat Brig. Gen. Abdel Razzak Yahia Shafiq al-Hawt Abu Mahmoud	Same as Al-Fatah; East Europe and Arab governments	Same as Al-Fatah, plus Arab government subsidies decided by Arab League	Same as Al-Fatah
*Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	4,000	George Habash Ahmed al-Yamani Hevtam Ayoubi	East Europe Iraq Open market Captured Israeli arms	Iraq Private	Marxist-Leninist in sense similar to Asian parties
*Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDF) (Broke away from PFLP)	1,000	Najif Hawatmah Salah Ra'afat Adib Abd Rabu Bilaad al-Hassan	Syria East Europe Open market Captured Israeli arms	Miscellaneous	Trotskyist; committed to total revolution in Arab politics and society
*Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine -- General Command (Broke away from PFLP)	500	Ahmad Jabril Fadel Chrorou	Miscellaneous		None except military struggle. Pan-Arabism first then national state.

Name	Estimated fighting strength	Main leaders	Arms sources	Income sources	Ideology
*Al-Sa'iqah (Thunderbolt)	7,000	Zouheir Mohsen Dafi J'mani Ahmad Shahabi Yusuf al-Berji	Syria Soviet Union Open market Captured Israeli arms	Syria	Baathist (Syrian branch)
*Arab Liberation Front (ALF)	3,000	Zayd Haydar Munif al-Razzaz	Iraq	Iraq	Baathist (Iraqi branch)
Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (POLP)	100	Not available	Communist China	Mainly refugees in camps in Syria	Maoist
*Popular Struggle Front (PSF)	200	Bajat abu Gharbiya	Private	Private	Formerly Baathist; now devoted entirely to clandestine action inside Israeli-occupied lands
*Arab Palestine Organization (AP) (Broke away from PFLP)	100	Ahmad Zarour	United Arab Republic	United Arab Republic	Nasserite Socialist
*Action Group for the Liberation of Palestine (Broke away from Al-Fatah)	50	Dr. Isam Sartawi	Iraq Egypt	Egypt	Nasserite Socialist
Ansar (Partisans) (Newly formed communist group)	50	Fuad Nasr Khaled Bagdash	Soviet Union	Soviet Union	Soviet Communist

*Members of Unified Central Committee.

Note: The APO and the Action Group supported acceptance of the August 1970 UN cease fire by other organizations. From Don Peretz, The Palestine State, p. 56-57.

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