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## Ramerican Political Science Review (Vol. 3, 2018)

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


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Political Science Review

vol. 3, 2018

THE AMERICAN  
POLITICAL SCIENCE  
REVIEW



VOLUME 3  
2018

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Katilyn Thomas, VCU

The sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of host communities by UN peacekeepers is a type of post-war violence that has been growing over the years. SEA is an important issue in many peacekeeping missions and it has defined UN peacekeeping for a while. Thus, this article considers whether gender mainstreaming, the approach of promoting gender equality to troops, can decrease the amount of SEA. This research will use a most similar systems design case study to analyze the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMIS/UNMISS). Drawing on data of SEA accusations between 2007 and 2015, as well as analyzing gender training implementation, female high-ranking positions, and gender divisions available within these two cases, this research examines SEA through the lens of gender mainstreaming. Particularly, this article indicates that SEA lessens when gender mainstreaming is implemented and enforced and discusses how a peacekeeping mission, which brings its own ideals and socializing practices, may promote the development and duration of SEA.

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Thomas Fratkin, George Washington University

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which higher education for women influences economic development in Bangladesh. Two models using OLS regressions were employed to evaluate the strengths of two critical relationships. The first probed the connection between higher education in women and the Female Labour Force Participation Rate (FLFPR), while the second tested the relationship between higher education in women and GDP per capita. The first key finding is that there is no statistically significant relationship between higher education in women and FLFPR. The second main finding is that there is a statistically significant relationship between higher education in women and GDP per capita. The results imply that a good path forward in Bangladesh's development may lie in making more concentrated efforts to strengthen female tertiary education programs.

Saffeya Ahmed, VCU

A narrative of “Islamic terrorism” has risen globally and in the U.S. since the increase of terrorist attacks following 9/11. With over 385 terrorism charges in the U.S. since 2001, these violent acts have run rampant throughout the nation. Media in the form of print/online news, broadcast, radio, and podcasts plays a major role in the representation of terrorist attacks to the general public. Of interest is to explore apparent trends in media framing as news outlets cover terrorist attacks differently based on the identity of the perpetrator. The framing of an individual based on his or her identity, which is composed of race, religion, or political ideology, feeds into creating a false narrative regarding these specific identity characteristics. In order to analyze the portrayal of terrorists in the media based on their identities, this study conducts a two-pronged longitudinal content analysis following the *New York Times*’ coverage of ten terrorist attacks occurring in the U.S. post-9/11. The study’s findings indicate that a terrorist’s identity is significant in the framing of said individual; terrorists who are Muslim and/or of non-Anglo-Saxon descent are framed in a more politicized and racialized manner than terrorists who are non-Muslim and/or of Anglo-Saxon descent, who are framed in a more humanized manner.

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Kevin Breiner, VCU

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In 2011, the Obama administration employed a lethal drone strike against Anwar al-Aulaqi, both a US citizen and known terrorist. The “drone memo,” authored by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, seeks to justify this drone strike as an appropriate use of wartime power by the Commander-in-Chief. In doing so, the memo distorts the scope of presidential authority granted by the Constitution and Congress, and ignores fundamental elements of Constitutional due process guarantees. To preserve the constitutional integrity of all three branches of the federal government, judicial review must be made available to the targets of overwhelming executive power.

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The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world, which has deleterious effects on those incarcerated and takes a toll on American taxpayers. There are significant racial disparities in these rates, as people of color constitute over 60% of those incarcerated. In order to contextualize this problem, sources such as congressional records, President Reagan’s rhetoric, statements from his adviser, data from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, search warrants for narcotics, medical journals comparing physiological and psychological effects between crack and powder cocaine, and media coverage of the “crack epidemic” were examined. These sources showed that, because of Congress’s failure to fact-check the media hysteria regarding crack, law enforcement’s targeting of Blacks at higher rates than Whites, and the subtly racist political sentiment apparent during the Reagan presidency, it seems plausible that the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act was intentionally passed to target racial minorities.

Call for Papers

## Letter from the Department of Political Science

The Department of Political Science at Virginia Commonwealth University is proud to present Volume 3 of *The Ramerican Political Science Review*. This journal presents some of the best undergraduate work produced by students during the 2017-2018 academic year.

Political science students ask normatively important questions impacting politics at home and abroad, and the six papers featured in this volume are examples of the extensive research and the systematic investigations conducted in order to begin answering those questions.

This calendar year began with a Winter Olympics that saw North and South Korean players skating together as one team; the historic event renewed interest in the prospect of Korean Reunification across the globe. **Hayne Noh** explores this possibility and asks what the economic consequences of such an outcome might be.

**Katilyn Thomas** and **Thomas Fratkin** take an international perspective in looking at issues facing women in the twenty-first century. Thomas' article investigates whether the promotion of gender equality can decrease instances of sexual abuse and exploitation by UN peacekeepers abroad, while Fratkins' article continues a long lineage of scholarly research that studies the potential impact that gender equality concerning access to education might have on a country's economic development.

We shift our attention back home, focusing on the seventeen-year War on Terror, through the work of **Saffeya Ahmed** and **Kevin Breiner**. Ahmed's article highlights biased media framing of terrorist attacks based on the perpetrator's identity, while Breiner's compels us to consider whether the increased scope of presidential authority when conducting drone strikes has violated the U.S. Constitution.

And **Maryum Elnasseh** evaluates archived sources and contemporary data to better contextualize accusations of intentional racial discrimination when Congress began waging the War on Drugs.

The questions political science students ask encompass a range of sub-fields and use a variety of theoretical approaches and political science methods. Ahmed's article uses an extensive longitudinal content analysis in order to test the hypothesis that media narratives change depending on the identity of actors involved in terrorist schemes. Fratkin's article showcases the importance of quantitative methodology when conducting a regression analysis of secondary data points, while Thomas' article illustrates the pivotal nature of qualitative methodology by adopting a case study approach.

We hope that these articles not only help to provide better understanding of relevant questions concerning the state of our politics, domestically and abroad, but also that they help inspire new questions for our readers. Furthermore, we hope that the work of this volume's researchers will encourage other students to conduct their own political science research, and to submit it for consideration to *The Ramerican Political Science Review* next year, whether exploring American politics, international relations, comparative politics, public policy or political theory.

While the journal is supported by the Department of Political Science and the contributions of our alumni, the final product is the work of a student editorial board that solicits and reviews manuscripts in a double-blind fashion. The researchers featured in this issue went through a “revise and resubmit” process, wherein they made content and style changes that were requested by the editorial staff. The articles were then edited once more by the editorial staff prior to publication. This final product is a testament to their immense efforts during the summer months. The Department of Political Science would, therefore, like to thank this year’s editorial board:

**Madeline Doane**, Class of 2020

**Thomas Kipp**, Class of 2019

**Sneha Krish**, Class of 2019

The Department of Political Science would also like to thank Dr. Alexandra Reckendorf for advising our student editorial board as they worked through the process of critiquing submissions and formatting this journal.

VCU Department of Political Science  
August 2018

## **TO WHAT EXTENT WILL PEACEFUL KOREAN REUNIFICATION IMPACT BOTH THE NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMIES?**

Hayne Noh, Virginia Commonwealth University

### **Abstract**

After nearly 65 years, officials from both North and South Korea have vowed to end the Korean War. Although the Korean War is yet to be officially over, this historic event raises the critical question of whether Korean reunification is imminent and, if so, what economic results will come from reunification. The topic of Korean reunification, and the implications of such an event, however, have largely been evaluated through the lens of case studies and are therefore limited in the quantitative predictions surrounding reunification. The present study addresses this literature gap by investigating the predicted effects of peaceful reunification on the North and South Korean economies using a forecasting model in SPSS to predict GDP growth (%) following reunification. Results of the study suggest that South Korea will likely bear a heavy monetary burden following Korean reunification, while North Korea will benefit from the influx of welfare among other financial advantages. Future studies may consider a multidisciplinary approach to the topic of Korean reunification by accounting for other major factors, in addition to economics, such as political or cultural implications of reunification.

### **Introduction**

Breaking news surrounding North and South Korean relations has dominated the media in recent months. At the start of 2018, during the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics held in South Korea, North Korea announced it would send athletes to the games in an amicable move that loosened years of diplomatic tensions. Not only did North Korea send athletes to the games, but North and South Korea formed a joint women's hockey team. Athletes from both Koreas walked in the Olympic ceremony under a unified, One Korea flag. Events following the Winter Olympics in South Korea suggested a swift positive change in relations between the two Koreas. North and South



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Korea are closer to reunification than ever before and because of the increasing potential to reunify, it is imperative to address the question: To what extent will peaceful Korean reunification impact both the North and South Korean economies?

North and South Korea were formed following the ceasefire armistice agreement in 1953 after years of back and forth military combat. To this date, an official peace treaty has still never been signed, but an agreement has been made to work towards an official end to the Korean War (Chan, 2018). As evidenced by the lack of the signing an official peace treaty after the war, not many believed the division between the Koreas would last as long as it has. In the decades following their division, relations between North and South Korea have fluctuated, falling anywhere within the spectrum of neutral to aggressive.

In the weeks following the Olympics, Kim Jong Un announced a desire to meet with both South Korea's and the United States' presidents in order to discuss diplomatic relations and denuclearization in North Korea, paving the way for a new era of diplomacy between both the Koreas and the United States. Despite the uncertainty of such a diplomatic summit, Kim Jong Un attended a South Korean K-pop concert held in North Korea, much to the surprise of South Korea and the rest of the world. Furthermore, in the days following the concert, Kim Jong Un began meeting with high-level South Korean officials and finally met with South Korean President, Moon Jae-in, in a summit on April 27<sup>th</sup>, 2018. Most shocking, was the announcement that North and South Korea intend to sign an agreement calling for the official end to the Korean War, a historic step forward in Korean relations (Sang-hun & Perlez, 2018). At the summit, Kim himself suggested the possibility of reunification: "Using one language, one culture, one history, North and

South Korea will be joined as one nation,” paving the way for a new relationship between the two Koreas (Chan, 2018). Such active diplomatic movement has made it clear that North Korea’s ambitious rhetoric has moved beyond mere contemplation. North Korea took steps to meet with U.S. President, Donald Trump. North Korean officials first met with then CIA director Mike Pompeo in a classified meeting in April 2018 in order to initiate talks with the United States.

Reunification in Korea would mean the complete integration of North and South Korea in terms of political, cultural and economic factors. In terms of political factors, this integration would require the unification of North Korea’s autocratic and South Korea’s democratic government into one central government. The unification of North and South Korea’s distinctive cultures would be necessary for complete reunification. Economically, the two distinct market models of North and South Korea would need to fall under one integrated market model, combining the flow of GDP, human capital, and resources into one state. North Korea is marked by closed trade, a small economy, and a comparatively poor economy. South Korea, on the other hand, is characterized by fairly open trade policies, a much larger economy, and a stable GDP over the past decade. Although political and cultural factors are indeed important in deciding whether reunification will be feasible, economic determinants may have ripple effects beyond the Korean economy.

This paper will analyze current literature surrounding the ramifications of Korean reunification, specifically focusing on monetary or GDP considerations. The theoretical framework for the research question: “To what extent will peaceful Korean reunification impact both the North and South Korean economy?” will be discussed following the literature

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review. After the theoretical framework, which argues that South Korea will bear the burden of reunification, the methodology used will be outlined, including a justification for the analytic technique and forecasting model utilized in the body of the paper. Finally, the explanation of results and findings will comprise of an evaluation of the study's limitations and potential directions for future studies.

## **Literature Review**

While integration implies the need for a cost-benefit analysis before finalizing reunification agreements, of interest is the likelihood of reunification in the first place. Scholars, such as Bruce W. Bennett in a report titled, "Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse", asserted it is rational to expect the collapse of North Korea's government in the near future by using the limited poverty and famine data available from the enigmatic country to support their assertion (2013). As one of the last socialist systems of the Soviet era, or "Soviet-like" economies still standing, North Korea's economic collapse becomes more likely as time passes, just as other Soviet era economies, like the USSR and China, have fallen one by one (Barna, 1998). Although the possibility of military force to achieve reunification is indeed possible, North Korea's susceptibility to famine and overall economic instability serve as evidence for a growing body of experts who believe it is North Korea's collapse or deterioration in the foreseeable future that would make Korean reunification more likely to occur (Bennett, 2013; Harvey, Kiessling, & Moeller, 2013; Noland, 2007). Vast differences exist between North and South Korea as North Korea has built its market infrastructure on self-sufficiency, while South Korea has developed its model on global development and international trade (Noland, 2007). In the years following its policy reform, South Korea

saw an age of impressive GDP growth, while North Korea experienced famine and the accumulation of debt to its socialist supporters like the Soviet Union and China (Noland, 2007). Moreover, several major world players have major interest in the situation unfolding in Korea, including the United States, China, and Russia, due to trade agreements and business partnerships, suggesting these countries will have an influence in any agreements and development opportunities that may come as a result of Korean reunification (Tkachenko, 2015).

Much of the literature surrounding the topic of Korean integration has used German reunification as a case study, as several parallels have been drawn between the unification of East and West Germany in 1990 to the potential impact of an integration in North and South Korea. Just as the unification of West and East Germany led to West Germany's wealthier and more globalized economy carrying the burden of East Germany's economy, South Korea will likely be required to do the same for North Korea (Blum, 2001; Estrada, Park, Ndoma, & Kim, 2015; Song, 2003). Since the gap between North and South Korea's economy and development is so extensive, the cost of reunification in Korea is estimated to exceed the cost of Germany's 2 trillion-euro reunification by close to double that amount (Mun & Yoo, 2012). The towering fiscal burden would likely fall on South Korea or otherwise require aid and investments from foreign nations (Choi, Merrill, Yang, & Chang, 2001.).

Similarly to German reunification, Korea's reunification will be heavily influenced by the United States, Russia, and China. Russia in particular, following the 2014 Ukrainian conflict with the United States, has turned its attention to maintaining the "status quo" in the Korean peninsula by discouraging attempts at reunification and fueling the Kim autocracy

(Tkachenko, 2015). In fact, it has been suggested that the topic of Korean reunification is reminiscent of the power struggle that existed between the United States and the former Soviet Union over East and West Germany (Tkachenko, 2015). China, which is presumed to have the greatest political influence over North Korea due to its proximity, also has a vested interest in the potential reunification of the Koreas (Garrett & Glaser, 1995). Not only is China North Korea's biggest trade partner, it is also interested in protecting its borders and its "communist" partner (Garrett & Glaser, 1995). The United States, on the other hand, is one of South Korea's greatest allies and would need to contend with China if a power struggle over Korea were to arise (Tkachenko, 2015). As such, Korean reunification is not limited to domestic matters, but international interests as well.

Although many factors affect the willingness of the Koreas to reunify, the uncertainty over the costs and benefits of reunification serves as a significant barrier. Using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) to model the integration between the Koreas, Noland et al. suggested in a study titled, "Modeling Korean unification", that product market integration would largely reduce famine costs in North Korea, while having an insignificant impact on South Korea in terms of potential monetary gains (2000). However, recent investigations contradicting the notion that reunification will be inconsequential to South Korea, have been suggested. For example, Cheong asserted that integration may lead to benefits for the South Korean economy through the increase in the availability of North Korea's natural resources, such as North Korea's largely untouched mineral wealth (2015). To further complicate the potential situation that will unfold in the event of Korean reunification, studies have found that South Korea would likely be burdened, or negatively impacted, by the responsibility of developing North

Korea, suggesting that reunification would only be possible on South Korea's own terms (Song, 2003; Mun & Yoo, 2012).

### **Theoretical Argument**

The present theory framing the logical argument behind this study will assert first that Korean reunification is not only possible, but will likely, considering current circumstances, occur through peaceful means. Accounting for current events, past literature results, and historical applications, reunification is a possibility in Korea's future. With this possibility in mind, the need to consider the implications of Korean reunification will be of particular utility to North and South Korea as they evaluate the potential outcomes of reunification on their respective economies. The second section of the theoretical framework will discuss the benefits and costs for North and South Korea independently, in order to hypothesize the impacts of Korean reunification.

#### *Key Reunification Concepts*

Reunification is the full political, cultural, and economic integration between two formerly distinct states into one internationally recognized entity. Korean reunification implies that Korea would be fully economically integrated, politically under one national government, and function as a single country or state to the extent that was present before the Korean division at the 38th parallel. The ideal standards of reunification would occur through peaceful means, either through negotiation or treaty, and without the use of military force to damage or deter the other side, as this method of reunification would accrue the lowest additional cost. Not only would a peaceful form of reunification be less costly compared to waging war, but it is the route of integration suggested by North Korea's recent amicable

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behavior compared to its historically hostile nature. The immediate impact on the economy will be determined by the amount of predicted GDP growth, stagnation, or decrease, using South Korea's current GDP numbers as the baseline figures projected to 2030. This will be done in order to accurately assess the immediate impact following disruption of both the North and South Korean economies, if reunification were to occur in 2018. Due to North Korea's secrecy and the difficulty in obtaining accurately reported data, improvements made in GDP growth will be compared to South Korea's current status.

### *The Possibility of Korean Reunification*

Because Korean reunification entails the integration of political, cultural, and economic factors, reunification could occur under favorable political, cultural, and economic conditions. When North and South Korea were partitioned in 1945, the intention was to one day be reunified, as only a ceasefire agreement was signed. While the desire to be reunified has prevailed since the division, obstacles to reunification often came in the form of North Korea's hostility and a lack of continuous communication between the two sides. In addition, a lack of urgency has prevented major strides towards Korean reunification. However, current events point to both an increasing urgency to reunify, a decrease in North Korea's hostility, and increased communication not only with North and South Korea, but also major foreign players such as the United States.

Politically speaking, North Korea's autocratic ruler, Kim Jong Un, has made recent attempts to establish intentional diplomacy with South Korea and the United States, by extending open invitations to continue meeting with each nation's leader within the next year. In fact, Kim Jong Un stated in his own words that he wanted to "write a new history of national

reunification”, suggesting the two Koreas are entering a new era with respect to diplomatic relations (Berlinger, 2018). Not only will a direct phone line between North and South Korean officials be established within April of 2018, but news reports suggest that the two Koreas will announce a peace treaty officially ending the Korean War in the months following a summit that was held in April, 2018 (Lee, 2018). Although an official peace treaty ending the war has yet to be signed, North and South Korean leaders are currently discussing their intentions to pursue permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Although North Korea has strict control over media and the information flow into the country, some forms of foreign media have penetrated the closed-off country. This influx of information suggests that as time moves forward, North Korean propaganda techniques and government media may have a weaker influence on their North Korean civilian audience. South Korea’s political arena has recently experienced a bout of political corruption, which consequently led to public disinterest. For example, South Korea’s former president, Park Geun-hye, was ousted for due to abuse of power, corruption, and bribery. Since there has been a longstanding interest in reunification since the war, South Korean politicians have now set their gaze on reunification as a method to win public favor, as is the case with South Korea’s current President, Moon Jae-in. President Moon’s personal connection to Korean reunification is evident in his own upbringing, in addition to his stance on reunification. Moon himself was separated from relatives as his parents were North Korean refugees who fled to the South because of the Korean war (Rogin, 2017). Moon’s story resonates strongly with millions of Koreans who were separated before,



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during, and after the war, and who still hold strongly to possibility of seeing their family once again.

A significant portion of the literature reviewed suggests that North and South Korean reunification is not only possible, but also imminent (Barna, 1998; Bennett, 2013; Harvey, Kiessling, & Moeller, 2013; Noland, 2007). However, scholars have also offered an opposing view to Korean reunification, suggesting that North Korea will remain in its current state until dramatic military force or provocation leads North Korea to be overtaken by their allies. Questions linger as to why North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, has suddenly attempted to form diplomatic ties with the U.S. and South Korea. It is shocking, both economically and politically, that North Korea has sustained itself for as long as it has (Koh, 2012). Almost no other Soviet-like regime still stands today, with the exception of North Korea's unexpected endurance (Barna, 1998). The two major Soviet era powerhouses, the former USSR and China, which are also the two states that should have had enough prowess in order to sustain themselves, have drastically altered their market models to adapt to the ever-globalizing marketplace, while North Korea's isolationist model has remained stagnant for decades. Secondly, North Korea's prolonged sustainment has come not without a price. Famine stricken areas in North Korea have become commonplace and support from Russia and China, North Korea's two closest allies, has become scarce (Magid, 2000). The role of foreign aid in North Korea has, in part, contributed to its prolonged sustainment, but Russia and China's oversight in North Korea has decreased rapidly in recent years. In addition, the trend of increased globalization continues to move forward with little sign of slowing down. This movement suggests that countries with

isolationist policies, who lack knowledge and information, may be left behind in terms of technological advancements.

The likelihood of a North Korean regime collapse, paired with the country's poor financial situation, makes the conditions for peaceful reunification optimal. The total cost of reunification will differ based on the events leading to reunification itself. Potential outcomes include full-scale war between North and South Korea, military takeover by one side, or peaceful reunification in which neither side uses military force in order to negotiate terms of reunification. Under current circumstances, North Korea is unable to fund a sustained war against South Korea, particularly in the wake of scarce foreign aid. North Korea's GDP falls at around \$40 billion GDP (power purchasing parity) and ranks at 118 in the world ("The World Factbook"), far from South Korea and its closest ally, the United States, which both consistently appear in the top 15 economies in the world. South Korea would not be the first to provoke military conflict because of their legitimacy, in the same vein as to why the United States would not instigate a nuclear attack in North Korea unless first provoked by the other side. Scholars have suggested that peaceful reunification will be the most likely outcome, particularly in the event of North Korea's collapse and South Korea's assumption of responsibility or an extended negotiation process without the use of coercive military force on either side (Garrett & Glaser, 1995). A lack of clarity exists on the mechanism through which peaceful reunification will occur. Whether reunification will occur through North Korean collapse or diplomacy and negotiation between the two sides is unknown. However, it is clear that, ultimately, neither side's first choice would be war.

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The evidence points to the likelihood of reunification in Korea's future, with North Korea's collapse a plausible and reasonable outcome. It is imperative to consider the potential economic implications of Korean reunification and whether these impacts could incentivize or deter reunification from occurring. From a rationalist perspective, positive gains from reunification will incentivize the Koreas to reunify, while clear losses with little benefit from reunification may offset the course to reunify. Although economic factors alone cannot fully explain the intent to reunify, and political and cultural variables will certainly play a role, economic factors will undoubtedly be discussed during any reunification agreement or negotiation.

#### *Economic Costs and Benefits of Reunification*

The major barrier to a reunified Korea is cost. Reunification is an expensive endeavor that requires significant financial capital and investment. For example, in the case of German reunification, the total cost was around 2 trillion euros (Mun & Yoo, 2012), and the burden to pay these costs was largely placed on West Germany. West Germany, much like South Korea, was far more developed than its counterpart, which directed the vast majority of financial cost on the state that had the means to pay for reunification. Predictions regarding Korean unification have suggested the Korean reunification cost will likely exceed Germany's cost by nearly twice the amount, even after the cost was adjusted for inflation, because the difference between North and South Korea is significantly greater than that of East and West Germany (Mun & Yoo, 2012). More recent analyses conducted by researchers assert that the cost will likely be close to \$3 Trillion dollars USD (Revesz, 2017). Even with such wide ranges of estimates, it is clear that Korean reunification will be costly. Part of the cost of reunification

comes from the cost of building new infrastructure, such as highways, buildings, and transit systems connecting the two formerly separated countries. The raw materials, human capital, and oversight into these endeavors will be expensive. Another cost will stem from the provision of aid and welfare to North Korea's undernourished and impoverished population. In addition, there will be the added cost of integrating the formerly separated government structures. With no clear reunification plan presently in place, the cost of combining or equitably partitioning government roles and positions will also need to be considered.

The primary issue that will need to be confronted in the event of reunification is that North Korea does not have substantial financial capital, while South Korea has the means to carry a significant burden. There exists an undeniably large disparity between North and South Korea's markets, not only in terms of the market system used in each country, but also in terms of the development categorization and status. Countries may fall into one of three, mutually exclusive, categories: underdeveloped, quickly developing, or developed (Vokina et al., 2016). Under this classification system, the North Korean economy is considered underdeveloped, while South Korea, as the world's 11th largest economy in terms of nominal GDP ("Rankings"), is considered economically developed. Furthermore, the World Bank categorizes North Korea as low income while categorizing South Korea as high income ("Databank"). The two Koreas are not simply different, but fall on complete opposite sides of the development and wealth spectrums. The longitudinal GDP of North Korea is largely unknown, as the country does not regularly release information regarding their economy, and when data is released, the data's validity is often called into question. On the other hand, the GDP of South Korea, which, in 2015, totaled over one trillion USD

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("Databank"), has been fairly stable since the 1990s. This stability is extremely important, as it may offset an unsteady transition during the reunification process. Since North Korea simply does not have sufficient funds to sustain reunification, South Korea will have to pay for the bulk of reunification costs.

### *Benefits and Costs for South Korea*

South Korean officials would need to account for the benefits and costs of reunification if, and when it happens, by creating a reunification plan to ensure the best possible outcome for both North and South Korea. Benefits of proposed reunification, for South Korea in particular, are potential GDP growth, access to natural resources and undeveloped land, and an influx of human capital from North Korea. South Korea's GDP growth has been stagnant for years now and such a drastic change may revive economic stagnation in South Korea. Reunification will also give South Korea access to North Korea's natural resources. The availability of raw material will be one of North Korea's largest contributions to Korean reunification. Excess land will also provide more areas for development, as overcrowding is a familiar problem to South Korea. In addition, the combination of the working population will benefit both Koreas, as there are more people available to build the infrastructure and government institutions required for reunification.

South Korea will have to lead the charge to properly integrate the two Koreas because North Korea, under the presumed circumstances, does not have the means to do so. Therefore, South Korea will pay for the development of infrastructure and programs that target mass welfare and aid to North Korean civilians. The human capital required to mend two formerly separate nations will also incur a cost on South Korea. Whether

these benefits outweigh the projected costs, while excluding extraneous variables such as cultural costs and benefits, is of particular interest when determining whether South Korea will favor reunification.

### *Benefits and Costs for North Korea*

Several benefits for North Korea exist in the event of reunification. One such benefit is that the area formerly known as North Korea, when integrated, may assume a “developed” or, at minimum, a “developing” status, which could attract foreign investment to the previously isolated area. Underdeveloped nations often are less attractive to investors, so the affiliation with South Korea’s advanced market model may serve as a key benefit to North Korea in terms of growing its economy compared to years previously (Vokina et al., 2016). Secondly, the transfer of technology and globalization that will influx into the former North Korea in a manner unseen in the country since its conception, may have a positive impact on the overall integrated Korean economy. As a result of globalization, another benefit would be free access to this technology that will help advance the development of North Korea. Finally, as South Korea would likely move to develop land in North Korea and urbanize the area much like itself, it would first need to address the issue of famine and poverty before it is able to assume the land for new business endeavors.

In these circumstances, North Korea would have to make significant sacrifices in terms of political oversight into the economy, especially in an increasingly globalized economy. South Korea historically certainly has the upper hand in successfully developing an economy. However, the monetary costs of Korean reunification on North Korea is undetermined. The sacrifice will stem from the question of whether formerly North Korean businesses will be able to compete with South Korean businesses on the global stage. If

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these businesses are unable to transition from an isolationist to a globalized model, they will likely be unable to compete with South Korean companies and the influx of foreign corporations. However, direct economic difficulties for North Korea will largely rest on the reunification plan itself, which has yet to be conceived. Lack of evidence prevents the extrapolation of North Korea's costs without a set reunification plan, and therefore, unlike South Korea's costs, the expense cannot be predicted. Such a subject is more appropriately addressed in a discussion of the long-term, rather than immediate, impacts of Korean reunification.

### *Hypothesis*

Under the presumed peaceful reunification circumstances, evidence that suggests the benefits following reunification would outweigh the costs for South Korea is lacking, although the benefits of reunification for North Korea's economic status are relatively abundant. Therefore, it is hypothesized that, due to the strength and stability of the South Korean economy, North Korea's economy will significantly benefit at the expense of South Korea's economy immediately after reunification.

## **Research Design**

### *Data Collection*

Data were gathered from the World Bank Organization (WBO), the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The datasets used were gathered from globally available sources for their accuracy and reliability as widely recognized international entities. GDP growth (%) for South Korea and working population size data for both North and South Korea was gathered from the WBO. GDP data for North Korea was gathered from the CIA. Finally, data regarding natural resource use for South Korea was drawn

from the OECD data set. Due to the lack of data available from North Korea regarding market growth, South Korea's baseline data for GDP growth (%) was used. No primary data was collected by the researcher.

### *Variables of Interest*

The outcome variable in this study was GDP (%) growth of the reunified Korea. Baseline longitudinal data for South Korea's GDP growth (%) from the WBO (2017) beginning in 1961 until 2016 was used to predict the outcome variable. South Korea's longitudinal GDP growth (%) was used as baseline data points in order to determine the extent to which reunification would alter the GDP growth (%) of South Korea, assuming reunification occurs within the year 2018.

Several predictor variables were used in order to account for factors that may impact GDP growth of Korea following reunification. Among a multitude of factors, the size of the country's population or human capital, the availability of natural resources owned and used by the state, and the current GDP growth (%) were used as predictors for future GDP growth (%). The study considered North and South Korea's current working population, aged 15-65 (WBO, 2017), as well as South Korea's Total Domestic Extraction Used (OECD, 2018), as a measure of the natural resources available and used in South Korea over 5-year increments. To the best of the knowledge of the researcher, all the available information on North and South Korea's market data came from reliable resources, which were sought and used in order to address the research question.

### *Statistical Analyses*

Data were projected until the year 2030, in order to assess the immediate effects of reunification following the anticipated immediate shock to the Korean economy. In order to predict potential GDP growth (%)



to 2030, and address the research question of the study, data was analyzed in the statistical software, SPSS 24, using the Brown's forecasting model. The forecasting model accounted for the predictor variables of working population size in North and South Korea and natural resource use in South Korea and allowed the extrapolation of baseline data to project the Korean GDP growth in years following reunification. A null model was created in order to assess the results of Korean reunification without accounting for the predicted cost of reunification. The null model would suggest a "best" case scenario for South Korea after reunification. In other words, the model would outline the GDP growth of a reunified Korea compared to the baseline South Korean GDP growth if there was little to no cost of reunification. From this analysis, it will be feasible to extrapolate whether peaceful reunification would be beneficial or detrimental to South Korea's current GDP status.

## **Results and Discussion**

### *Results*

Table 1. depicts the projected GDP growth (%) of a reunified Korea from 2017 to 2030. Model 1 was conceived using the Brown Forecasting Model, with the known data points from South Korea's GDP growth (%) beginning in 1961 until 2016. The R-squared value of the model was 0.787, suggesting an adequate mode of fit for Model 1.

The overall GDP growth (%) trend, as depicted in Figure 1., suggests that the GDP growth (%) of a reunified Korea would visibly decrease compared to the baseline GDP growth (%) of South Korea from 1961-2016. The final GDP growth (%) in 2030 was predicted to be 0.29%, whereas South Korea's current GDP growth (%) is around 2.80%. The forecasting model suggests that a reunified Korea, compared to South Korea in modern day,

would experience a 2.51% decrease in GDP growth over the 14-year span after reunification.

Although a GDP growth decrease of 2.51% may seem small, or tolerable for an established economy, South Korea's GDP growth (%) has been relatively stable throughout the 2000s, fluctuating only once as a result of the 2008 world financial crisis. This stability is a sign of a robust, developed economy. Well developed countries tend to show stable annual growth between years unless there is a global fiscal crisis or unexpected domestic event. The reunification of North and South Korea may lead to a negative effect on the overall Korean economy compared to years when the economy of the two countries were independent. Even in decades after the event of reunification, South Korea's GDP growth (%) is projected to steadily decrease.

#### *Discussion*

Given the analysis, South Korea's GDP growth (%) is projected to significantly decrease in the years following Korean reunification. Considering the cost of reunification as well as the benefits to both North and South Korea, it is clear that South Korea will benefit less than North Korea economically. Therefore, assuming South Korea will act rationally, South Korea will not agree to reunification terms for economic reasons because the costs of reunification would far outweigh the benefits.

Model 1 of the analyses was a prediction of the "best" case scenario for South Korea. Even in a null model, in which South Korea would not personally bear any of the costs of reunification, it is clear that the reunification event itself would potentially decrease the GDP growth (%). Since it is more realistic that South Korea would bear the majority of the financial cost of the reunification, reunification may lead to a steeper

decrease than predicted in the model. Although benefits, such as the increase in total working population and the influx of natural resources may help buffer the negative impacts, the results suggest the GDP growth will likely experience long term decrease before these benefits may take place. Thus, South Korea would be dissuaded from pursuing reunification purely for economic means as it would have to bear the cost of reunification while North Korea would reap many benefits.

This finding, however, is not an assertion that South Korea will never agree to reunification because of the refusal to carry a monetary burden for the sake of a reunification agreement. In addition to certain economic factors, there may be political or cultural considerations not discussed within the scope of this study that may outweigh economic cost and incentivize South Korea to reunify with North Korea. For example, in the event of a North Korean government collapse or overthrow of the dominant party, South Korea may see a cultural responsibility to intercede. Likewise, in the event of North Korean regime collapse or a peaceful reunification agreement, it is also possible that Korean political leaders may seek an opportunistic movement to reunify in order to gain public support for themselves and eliminate some of the public distrust of the government, particularly in an era where government corruption and public disillusionment is high. Reuniting families, a moral sense of responsibility, or political victories are among the many political and cultural reasons why South Korea may still opt for reunification in spite of the fiscal burden. Therefore, although South Korea may be dissuaded from pursuing reunification with North Korea, there may be cultural or political factors, beyond the scope of this study, that may incentivize reunification independent of potential economic losses or gains for either country.

## **Conclusion**

The findings of the study indicate that in the event of reunification, South Korea's economy would be negatively affected. More specifically, while North Korea would benefit from welfare and aid flooding into the country, and while South Korea would benefit through the influx of raw materials and population growth, South Korea's GDP growth is predicted to decrease significantly following reunification. Therefore, the hypothesis that North Korea would benefit from reunification at the cost of South Korea was supported. Following this logic, South Korea should not pursue reunification as this will have a negative impact on their economy. South Korea may, however, consider other potential benefits, beyond economic gains, in order to address whether or not to pursue reunification negotiations with North Korea. This study outlined the predicted quantitative GDP trend impacts on both North and South Korea following the event of reunification. The predictions discussed may aid North and South Korean officials by clarifying the certainty of the future of North and South Korean diplomatic relations.

## *Limitations*

The current study was not without limitations. Firstly, economic matters were assessed, but political and cultural matters were largely not considered. Political and cultural factors are two important factors beyond the scope of this study, but are still valuable to address in a holistic evaluation of the probability and implications of reunification. Secondly, limited data from North Korea prevented a longitudinal assessment of North Korea's growth. The accuracy of the available data coming from North Korea is questionable because of the inability to verify data from

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North Korean sources. Therefore, a null model using South Korean data was utilized instead, which may have left out some key variables contributing to Korea reunification.

A major assumption of the study was that the two Koreas would unify by peaceful means. Although evidence supports this theory, there remains some uncertainty regarding reunification by peaceful means. Unforeseen circumstances, such as accidental or unintentional provocation of either side could certainly alter this assumption. In addition to the assumption that the Koreas would reunify via peaceful means was also the belief that this reunification would likely happen through North Korean collapse.

However, logically speaking, there exists an inherent impossibility to predict *without a reasonable doubt* that the collapse of North Korea is imminent. Using past literature and abstracting from current events, it is possible to suggest the likelihood or probability of a reunification outcome, but there exists a margin of error that must be acknowledged. There are other potential avenues, not addressed within this study, through which reunification could occur, if at all. Although there is utility in predicting potential outcomes of reunification, a true evaluation of the implications of such an event can only occur after the alliance between the countries itself becomes a reality.

### *Future Studies*


Future studies regarding Korean reunification may investigate how the results from this study potentially have reverberations on a global scale. An in-depth analysis on the role of the United States, China, and Russia, major countries that may influence the process of reunification, may be useful in determining the political reasons behind why the Koreas

may or may not unify. Studies may also address the cultural implications of reunification, in terms of the language, norms, and value differences that now exist between the two Koreas, and how such cultural differences will need to be addressed in order to fully integrate two formerly separate, and drastically different, nations. Additional studies may consider the political changes that would need to take place in order to smoothly transition two government types into one. Further studies may also examine this topic from an interdisciplinary standpoint to investigate, simultaneously, the political, cultural, and economic impact of reunification on Korea, building upon the analysis completed within this paper.

## Tables and Figures

**Table 1.** The Projected GDP % Growth of a Reunified Korea from 2017-2030.

<b>Year</b>	<b>Projected GDP % Growth</b>
2017	2.58
2018	2.40
2019	2.22
2020	2.05
2021	1.87
2022	1.70
2023	1.52
2024	1.35
2025	1.17
2026	1.00
2027	0.82
2028	0.64
2029	0.57
2030	0.29



**Figure 1.** Graphical Representation of the Projected Reunified Korea GDP % Growth to 2030.

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## **THE IMPACT OF GENDER MAINSTREAMING ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE BY UN PEACEKEEPERS**

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### **Abstract**

The sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of host communities by UN peacekeepers is a type of post-war violence that has been growing over the years. SEA is an important issue in many peacekeeping missions and it has defined UN peacekeeping for a while. Thus, this article considers whether gender mainstreaming, the approach of promoting gender equality to troops, can decrease the amount of SEA. This research will use a most similar systems design case study to analyze the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMIS/UNMISS). Drawing on data of SEA accusations between 2007 and 2015, as well as analyzing gender training implementation, female high-ranking positions, and gender divisions available within these two cases, this research examines SEA through the lens of gender mainstreaming. Particularly, this article indicates that SEA lessens when gender mainstreaming is implemented and enforced and discusses how a peacekeeping mission, which brings its own ideals and socializing practices, may promote the development and duration of SEA.

### **Introduction**

The United Nations has deployed over 65 peacekeeping operations around the world since 1948 (The UN 2016). In the initial years, peacekeeping missions were mainly deployed to help solidify peace agreements and utilize political resources to settle warfare in a peaceful way. Yet, the limelight has now turned towards the unexpected side effects of peacekeeping (Nordas and Rustad 2012). The earliest reported case of sexual exploitation and abuse enacted by UN peacekeepers was throughout the United Nations Mission in Liberia mission in Cambodia in 1992 (Whitworth, 2004). Statements started to emerge that UN peacekeepers had taken part in sexual violence and the rise of prostitution (Whitworth, 2004).

Local residents also started to complain about the growth of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) as UN peacekeepers vacationed in Thailand and came back with HIV and other infections, which circulated across the local communities (Martin, 2005). The UN hospital administered to roughly 5000 occurrences of STDs within the mission (Martin, 2005). In Kosovo, East Timor, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the former Yugoslavia, the emergence of UN peacekeepers coexisted with the emergence of sex trafficking and brothels almost immediately. In each of these missions, it is UN peacekeepers that participated in trafficking and establishing brothels from which UN Peacekeepers made a profit (Allred, 2006; Vandenberg, 2005; Koyama & Myrtinnen, 2007).

At the start of the twenty-first century, the UN began to acknowledge the issue of SEA. In 1995, the UN started developing a protocol response to the increasing issue of sexual exploitation and abuse. The UN created various divisions pertaining to women, peace, and security, which started to alter the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In 2001, the United Nations Economic and Social Council adopted the approach of gender mainstreaming, which advocates for gender equality and the inserting of women, as well as men, in all realms of peacekeeping operations (UN gender, 2016). In 2003, the United Nations enforced a pledge to a zero tolerance policy for SEA written by the Secretary-General (Kanetake, 2010). The Secretary-General assured that all peacekeepers found responsible of SEA would be dismissed and penalized promptly. This pledge came after social shock that many UN peacekeepers that had been found responsible of sexual misconduct were frequently given a small reprimand and then brought back to active duty in the peacekeeping mission (Kanetake, 2010). Even then, it was not until 2005 that the Department of Peacekeeping

Operations installed the Conduct and Discipline Team, and began to instruct the peacekeepers to conform to the new protocol (Karim and Beardsley, 2016).

This research will focus on assessing how the approach of gender mainstreaming has functioned in preventing SEA. The theoretical argument of this analysis implies a history of the subjugation of women through the liberal feminist theory and indicates that a particular group culture emerges within peacekeeping forces. This group culture may contribute to a kind of militarized masculinity, which could establish acceptance for sexual abuse (Martin, 2005). In this paper, it will be argued that gender mainstreaming will help build awareness and insight among the peacekeepers, which would potentially shift the masculine culture and lessen SEA. The research will be conducted by analyzing how UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and Sudan/South Sudan (UNMIS/UNMISS) have implemented gender mainstreaming and have experienced variations in the levels of SEA in each mission.

## **Literature Review**

It is often argued that sexual exploitation and the abuse of women in wartime go hand in hand. In 'Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape,' Brownmiller, a feminist author, clarifies, in line with the Feminist Theory, that actions of sexual violence are impressions of male dominance and the patriarchal rationale that women are the natural possession of men (1975). During war, women can be seen as sexual commodities for enemy soldiers, which relates to the perception of women in traditional cultures as being men's possessions. Norman Naimark, author of 'The Russians in Germany,' a book analyzing rape within war, explains that the rape of a woman is a

“theoretical castration of men who couldn’t protect their women” (1995). This is a perpetuation of Brownmiller’s argument that “the body of a raped woman becomes a ceremonial battlefield” (1975). As the battleground, women are used as a platform for soldiers to attack and discipline enemy combatants (Secretary-General, 2006). Thus, SEA, in the framework of security organizations, may be a crucial manifestation of militarized masculinity, an aggressive form of masculinity needed for warrior culture to flourish (Enloe, 1990). SEA is common in military establishments because the military’s administrative design is split based on gender (division of labor) and is male controlled (proportionately). That said, the military uses the gender division and hegemonic masculinity as a way to inflict authority over the use of violence (Stiehm, 2001). In ‘Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives,’ Sjoberg and Via, assistant professors at University of Florida and Ferrum College, mention that productive combat demands the warrant of hegemonic masculinities, combativeness, conformity, stoicism, and allegiance over feminine behavior (2010).

Some feminist scholars, such as Cynthia Enloe (2000) and Sandra Whitworth (2004) argue that masculinity of male soldiers adjusts throughout their training course, conceiving a specific character they call “militarized masculinity.” “Militarized masculinity” is a mixture of characteristics and attitudes that are hyper-masculine, hegemonic, and linked mostly with military soldiers. Whitworth contends that militaries are acknowledged for promising to “make men out of soldiers” and she conveys that people associate the military with being able to instill manhood, while soldiering itself comes second (2004). Further, Whitworth states that by enlisting in the military, many men feel they are validating their manliness to others and to themselves (2004).

Whitworth, who has analyzed both militarism and masculinity, has proposed that there is a distinct association between military establishments and hegemonic portrayals of masculinity. She analyzes hegemonic illustrations of masculinity within the military, including dehumanizing the “enemy,” in order to become emotionally ready to defeat the opponent during war (2004). Whitworth argues that in order to dehumanize the enemy, one must first defeat the “other” within themselves. She states that dehumanizing the “other” expressed as “feminine” becomes threatening, as it can lead to violence outside the domain of military combat, such as sexual exploitation and abuse of women (2004). In times of battle, women face a heightened risk to their safety, partly because they are “othered” through their gender and cultural identities (Whitworth, 2004). The belief that soldiers deserve sexual encounters with women correlates with militarized masculinity. In addition to the general association between militarized masculinity and SEA within war and military institutions, an additional link applies to peacekeeping forces.

With the expansion of more intricate peacekeeping operations, soldiers are asked to do work that had previously been done by civilians. For example, soldiers may be asked to advocate for human rights or coordinate elections during peacekeeping operations (UN duties, 2016). Soldiers are predicted to do what some consider to be everyday work that might lead to ‘identity crises’, which are demonstrated in sexual exploitation and abuse (Carreiras, 2010). Whitworth (2004) states that when soldiers are incapable of achieving their duty as soldiers trained for combat, they may turn to sexual exploitation or violence against the local population, sexual harassment of other members of the UN mission, or even engage in human trafficking rings.

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With sexual relationships so fixed on male peacekeeper identities, Sarah Martin, author of 'Must Boys Be Boys? Ending Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Operations,' has implied that a 'hyper-masculine' society that stimulates tolerance for severe sexual attitudes has increased within peacekeeping missions (2005). Indeed, the military (and peacekeeping operations) has brushed off misconduct as normal for a male-oriented establishment. For instance, in Cambodia, in the early 1990s, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Yasushi Akashi, acknowledged worries about sexual misconduct by UN peacekeepers to NGOs by saying, "boys will be boys" (Simm, 2013).

In spite of the UN's zero tolerance policy and clear notice against SEA by peacekeepers, it is still a crucial issue during peacekeeping missions. There continues to be an immense level of transactional sex that could be seen as an exchange of gifts, favors, or money for sex, between peacekeepers and regional women. Thus, when men participate in transactional sex, they may be more likely to enact sexual abuse or rape (Dunkle et al., 2006). Nordås and Rustad, authors of "Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: Understanding Variation," introduced the earliest statistical study that examines the problem of what can account for fluctuations in recorded SEA within peacekeeping operations. Their analysis suggests that SEA is more common in larger missions, in less developed host countries, and in conflicts with fewer battle-related deaths (Nordås and Rustad 2013).

This paper seeks to discover a way to alleviate SEA related to diminishing patriarchal ideals and militarized masculinity by investigating the potential effects of gender mainstreaming on SEA by peacekeepers. Gender

mainstreaming has mainly been studied in relation to the increase of female peacekeepers and involving women in peace operations. UN officials have indicated that adding female peacekeepers may have an impact in lowering SEA (Bridges and Horsfalls, 2009). This approach to weakening SEA offenses, however, is restricted because the percentage of women in peacekeeping missions is very low and is unlikely to rise in the near future because there are more men in military institutions than women (Crawford, Lebovic, and Macdonald, 2015).

Despite the significance of adding more women to peacekeeping operations, it cannot be concluded that increasing the amount of women is an acceptable solution to SEA. Firstly, as Johanna Valenius, author of “A Few Kind Women: Gender Essentialism and Nordic Peacekeeping Operation,” asserts that since peacekeeping personnel currently have growing contact with the local communities, there is an increasing urgency for awareness about the duties men and women have in their host country (, 2007). Broadening the awareness on gender issues through gender mainstreaming will be displayed within the theoretical argument.

### **Theoretical Argument**

This theoretical argument will outline two terms that will be used throughout the paper and then a clarification of how gender mainstreaming is thought to affect SEA perpetuated by peacekeepers. The correlation is made clear with the following theories: the feminist theory, militarized masculinity, and group culture. Researchers like Martin (2005) have mentioned that the group culture that emerges when peacekeeping forces are established generates a masculine norm which can create tolerance for SEA. SEA, or Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, is characterized as “any actual or



attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially, or politically from the sexual exploitation of another” (SGB, 2003). Sexual abuse details “the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions” (SGB, 2003).

A possible solution would be establishing gender equality, or Gender Mainstreaming, within these masculine spaces, thus creating a path to lessen SEA. Gender Mainstreaming is an approach that was enacted in 2001 by the United Nations Economic and Social Council to guarantee that gender viewpoint is acknowledged in all work (UN gender, 2016). While peacekeeping operations are comprised of a mixture of state militaries, Whitworth admits that each military has a shared commonality between masculine systems (2004). Presently, peacekeeping camps are masculine territories. The camps are ruled by men and, more accurately, are surrounded by a militaristic kind of masculinity. Although this militaristic masculinity is not something all men and women within the operation define themselves with, everyone has to abide by it to get by in day-to-day life.

The feminist theory created by Mary Wollstonecraft, author of “A vindication of the rights of woman,” targets women’s ability to advocate for equality through their actions (1996). This research displays many examples in which the women of the population are challenged with ideals dictating that they are, by some means, inferior than men, and thus, not given equal opportunities. For this reason, women are seen as lesser. By examining the SEA through a liberal feminist theory, the injustices in UN peacekeeping missions are more quickly identified and the problems that the female

community are challenged with, like rape and forced prostitution, display how women are subjected to an inferior role. The liberal feminist theory additionally mentions that women's subordination is grounded in legalized restraints that limit women's access to success (Mudzingwa, 2013). Many of the undeveloped countries where UN peacekeeping operations have been occupied have transmitted female subordination as a "traditional" family quality and adopted them as justifications to forbid women from advancing in the society.

The militarized masculinity theory, coined by Sandra Whitworth, asserts that the masculine roles and beliefs instilled on young men in the military; characterizing some of the most combative, prejudiced, and destructive elements of men, are to blame for offensive conduct during peacekeeping missions (2004). Many feminist theorists consider the rise of hyper-masculine characteristics in the military as the prime perpetrator surrounding repeating abuse in peacekeeping missions (Lopes 2013, 5). According to Whitworth, soldiers are not innate, they are made; and a piece of what goes into the creation of a soldier is the glorification and support of some of the most threatening and shaky features of masculinity: those that advocate "violence, misogyny, homophobia, and racism" (Whitworth, 2004). This creation of a warrior, prepared to attack on demand, helps men endure war and brutal combat, but can quickly turn to extreme and entitled attitudes outside those military circumstances (Lopes, 2013).

Military institutions are hierarchical and possess a rigid chain of command. In 2005, the UN announced an extensive release by Prince Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, prior UN peacekeeper, who examined and implemented suggestions for the zero tolerance policy (Prince, 2005). The release indicated the first time that there was an exhaustive examination into the

issue of sexual exploitation during a peacekeeping mission. Yet, in Prince Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein's release, he mentioned that whenever the UN begins an investigation into an accusation, UN peacekeepers, in addition to officers of high rank, do whatever they can to block the investigation (Prince, 2005). It is not abnormal for peacekeepers to attempt to payoff eyewitnesses into altering their statement, intimidate investigators and withhold naming accused persons (Prince, 2005). One female soldier, characterizing her involvement with a mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, states that once she found out that trafficking by UN soldiers had become rampant, she tried to warn the appropriate authorities (Bolkovac and Lynn, 2011). Her officer instantly lowered her in rank and the whole unit tried to vilify her (Bolkovac and Lynn, 2011).

Inside the framework of a peacekeeping mission, there is no supervision of units of troops and, frequently, a state will note an absence of proof when challenged about the lack of any evidence (Aoláin, 2011). Sadly, only the most notorious cases that captivate the international press are prone to draw in any actual penalties. It has even been discussed that the repercussions of SEA involving women and children are so small that men enter peacekeeping missions as a kind of sexual travel (Aoláin, 2011). The militarized masculinity theory goes on to convey that sexually abusing women becomes a method for the soldiers to socially connect and to confirm their masculinity. These acts can establish a surrounding in which behaviors, ideas, and feelings that are usually not recognized as suitable, become tolerable (Rubinstein, 2008).

In peacekeeping forces, the theory of group culture, formulated by Sarah Martin, introduces compliance for severe sexual behavior. Individuals of social groups usually act from cultural standards which involve

understanding the “acceptable” way of acting in their surroundings and establishing emotional reactions to their encounters (2005). In order to act in an appropriate way within a cultural standard, one must understand the standards by observing and acting within the group (Rubinstein, 2008). For instance, Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn, authors of “On The Frontlines: Gender, War, and Post-Conflict Process,” suggest that the kind of group bonding needed to create a unified and stable military unit can coincide to the proclivity of men inciting other men to do risky actions, including sexually abusing women (Aoláin et al, 2011).

The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, enacted in 2000, was the earliest pursuit to focus on the problem of sexual violence and exploitation of women in war zones and to demand for the addition of women in peacekeeping operations (Ghimire, 2017). The inclination was evident that women are unjustly harmed by conflict, and when women are removed from the peacekeeping operations, the result ignores gendered needs in the rebuilding process and possibly adds to maintained volatility.

For example, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia started in 1992 and operating until 1993, but did not contain any women peacekeepers (Ghimire, 2017). During the mission, Cambodia experienced extreme amounts of prostitution, sexually transmitted diseases, sexual assault, and romantic relationships between the host population and peacekeepers (Ghimire, 2017). The peacekeepers that committed sexual violence or exploitation unfolded the social and familial frameworks for some civilians, leaving countless Cambodians with the impression that peacekeepers had arrived only to change Cambodian women into sex workers (Ghimire, 2017). The lack of women peacekeepers made it hard for Cambodians to disclose

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occurrences of sexual violence or exploitation committed against them by peacekeepers, which negatively impacted the mission's efforts to focus on the impacts of the war zone on women (Whitworth, 2004). Even today, the UN is a male controlled institution with only 13% women in executive seats in the Secretariat by the end of 1994 (DeGroot, 2001). Further, a UN article pointed out that, in 2010, female peacekeepers had increased to 7%, and female military officers had risen to 2%. During 2012-2015, 3% in the military were women and 10% of peacekeepers were women (Pruitt, 2016).

Expanding the gender diversity and training in peacekeeping operations minimizes incidents of exploitation, sexual abuse, and violence against women in war and volatile post-war territories for at least two reasons. First, the host population is less probable to regard women as trespassers or subjugators and they have a civilizing impact, characterizing a resemblance of a home community with similar norms that could lessen SEA (Olsson, L., Tryggestad, T. L. eds., 2001). Second, a peacekeeping force comprised of women and men seems less threatening to the host population than just men. Under the prevailing idea of UN gender mainstreaming, involving more women in male-dominated missions enhances the appearance of the peacekeeping force within the host population (DeGroot, 2001).

The existence of women active in deployed military and police units creates proximity to real life and, therefore, decreases the combative inclinations of peacekeepers who may alternatively find themselves influenced by the violent, hyper-masculine essence of post-conflict volatility (Carvajal, 2010). Yet, it is not just about adding women into missions. Gender mainstreaming must be practiced on the ground, and within the training sites, to have any real benefit. If gender mainstreaming can establish a new

group culture with principles and advocate a different behavior from the common masculine trend of peacekeepers, the tactic might work in minimizing SEA. Therefore, the hypothesis is: The more gender mainstreaming is enforced in a UN peacekeeping operation, the less SEA will be executed by the military peacekeeping personnel.

### *Methods*

This research implements a qualitative study looking at two different cases using the method of structured focused comparison. The structured focused comparison is a method utilizing a list of fixed questions. The same list of questions is asked to each case, to provide a parameter of comparison for results (George and Bennett, 2005). The cases are selected using the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) (Meckstroth, 1975). MSSD means selecting cases that are as similar as possible in all ways except the independent and dependent variables. Choosing cases by this method allows for the analysis of the variable that interprets the dependent variable (Meckstroth, 1975). To rule out other viable reasons for the incidence of SEA, the cases will be controlled for three other components.

Firstly, the cases selected have limited variation on their TCCs. This means each member nation of the UN, also named the troop contributing countries (TCCs) has its own culture and norms, which prompts to contrasting behaviors about women, sex, alcohol, etc. (Martin, 2005). The cultural behaviors the peacekeepers carry from their home nation could change the amount of SEA charges thus limiting the variation. The second variable will be the size of the mission. Nordas and Rustad's variation study discovered that SEA is more prevalent in sizable missions (2013). The third control variable is the amount of female peacekeepers. Women have been systematically withheld from peacekeeping forces, as the soldiers know it

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threatens the masculinity of the mission (Sion, 2008).

The two cases chosen for this study are the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and United Nations Mission in Sudan/United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMIS/UNMISS). In this research, UNMIS and UNMISS are treated as the same mission because when South Sudan acquired their independence in 2011, UNMIS concluded and all materials and personnel were moved from UNMIS to UNMISS (UNMIS 2016). UNMIL and UNMIS/UNMISS were selected based on the variety of the dependent variable, or the recorded SEA accusations in each mission. In UNMIL, the recorded SEA accusations have dropped almost every year since 2007. In UNMIS/UNMISS, the recorded accusations have been fluctuating up and down and there is no indication of the SEA accusations dropping regularly (UN Stats 2016). The missions were chosen with some disparities in how UNMIL and UNMIS/UNMISS worked with gender mainstreaming to guarantee some variation in the independent variable. UNMIL and UNMIS/UNMISS were initiated after the UN enacted gender mainstreaming as an approach in 2001 (UN gender, 2016). Picking cases after 2001 is useful because it will clarify the measuring of the independent variable.

The local population of Liberia and Sudan/South Sudan is another distinction. Liberia's host population is considerably lower than Sudan/South Sudan with roughly 30 million more people in South Sudan (UN, 2018). This is valuable because the population size displays the "estimated opportunity" that UN Peacekeepers could have in committing sexual abuse within these two cases. Similarities between the cases are that they both have had prior peacekeeping operations (Farrall, 2012) (UN peacekeeping 2016). The time frames for the case studies are from 2007 to 2015 and this time frame was

chosen since prior years of when the missions were established in 2003 had scarce SEA data.

The dependent variable will be measured as high or low by using the Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) and their records of SEA accusations. The independent variable of this study, gender mainstreaming, will be measured through gender training before deployment, and gender application during the mission. These distinct measures will display the variation in the independent variable. Gender training before deployment is guided from what kind of training the peacekeepers have before the missions. The UN does not have their own military and are consequently contingent on the member nations. Therefore, the member nations, also called 'the troop contributing countries' (TCC), are accountable for the training before deployment (UN prevention, 2016). Training before deployment is intended to give the peacekeeping personnel all essential understanding and expertise that is needed to be productive peacekeepers. Gender application during the mission involves the training during the missions.

With UNSCR 1325 and the adoption of gender mainstreaming, peacekeeping missions have been supplied with gender advisors and gender divisions. The usual job includes observing gender proportion and supplying gender training for mission personnel and locals during the mission. They also promote conferences and events where local women can get organized around social movements (Whitworth, 2004). Thus missions that focus on gender advisors and/or divisions, along with women in powerful positions, will be examined. With the method of structured focused comparison, I created five questions about the independent and dependent variables, examined each case, and then analyzed how they differ.



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*Gender training before deployment*

- I. Is gender training operated in the TCCs before deployment? What kind of training (discussions/classes)?
- II. Is gender training operated by the mission before deployment? What kind of training (discussions/classes)?

*Gender application during the mission*

- I. Are women in powerful positions?
- II. Are gender divisions/advisors established?

*SEA Question*

- I. How many SEA accusations are recorded each year?

*UNMIL: Independent Variable*

The UNMIL operation had evidence of gender work in the entire mission, yet, there has been fluctuation as to what degree the work has been implemented and how it has been accepted. Liberians have asserted a positive opinion about UNMIL. A common belief is that UNMIL's work, which entailed increasing knowledge of gender issues and sexual abuse, have lowered the amount of SEA (Nduka-Agwu, 2009). In more current years, UNMIL has worked more to add women in peace operations so that it becomes a more receptive environment for men and women (Nduka-Agwu, 2009).

The UN's examination of how gender training is operated in the TCCs displays that the countries of north Liberia have more improved gender training more than countries of south Liberia, yet, there is a shortage of data on how, and to what degree, the TCCs involved gender training before deployment (Lyytikäinen, 2007). The major TCCs in UNMIL during 2007-2015 were Bangladesh and Pakistan (UN resources, 2016). The gender training in

Bangladesh is held by the Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training, in which the trainers recognize every peacekeeping mission and order is different. Still, there is no data of any particular gender training for the peacekeepers (BIPSOT, 2003). The Peacekeeping Training Cell in the School of Infantry and Tactics operates the peacekeeping training in Pakistan, yet training is restricted to military peacekeepers and mostly targeted military leaders. Training for police peacekeepers is unavailable (Bellamy & Williams 2013). There is no evidence of any particular gender training being operated in Pakistan (Pakistanarmy, 2016).

When UNMIL's sanction was drafted, the UNSCR 1325 had already been enacted. In this manner, gender mainstreaming was already an integrated approach in all UN peacekeeping missions. In UNMIL, this at least produced the addition of an Office of the Gender Advisor (OGA). The OGA organized a required two-day gender-training meeting for all arriving mission personnel (Nduka-Agwu, 2009). The training presented ways to incorporate gender viewpoints into all strategies, decisions and plans (Nduka-Agwu, 2009). Over the years, the training on SEA before deployment in UNMIL has evolved and advanced toward a more unified and extensive training (Neudorfer, 2015).

During the time-period 2007-2015, UNMIL had three female heads of mission and during 2008-2012, UNMIL had a female as Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN 2014). Also, UNMIL was the first UN mission with an all-female police-unit. The unit was deployed in 2007 and the peacekeepers came from India (Ghimire, 2017). The initiative to add more women and the acknowledgement of sexual violence has been an important part of UNMIL's sanction (Dharmapuri, 2013). By 2007, UNMIL

educated 3,360 personnel on attitudes towards and the prevention of SEA (Neudorfer, 2012). Additionally, between 2007-2010 various advancements were made in SEA prevention training executed by the Conduct of Discipline Team (CDT) (2012). In the coming years, the in-mission training persisted to be included and in 2010 and 2011, more than 5000 personnel had training each year (2012). To increase knowledge about the issue with SEA, the gender division in UNMIL had implemented a specific manager training class. The commander's accountability for peacekeeper's behavior had been highlighted, so if allegations of SEA are disclosed and the manager seems to be passive, he or she will also be considered a perpetrator (Nduka-Agwu 2009).

#### *UNMIL: Dependent Variable*

UNMIL acquired an overall number of 61 SEA allegations by military and police personnel in 2007-2015 with the topmost amount of SEA in 2009, when the mission had 13 SEA allegations. When assessing the amount of accusations each year, it became clear that the amount of SEA has lowered every year since 2007, except for 2009 (UN stats, 2016). The zero-tolerance policy appears to have had fluctuating impact on SEA by peacekeepers. On one hand, it appears the prostitution has remained unchanged however, the data displayed that brutal kinds of SEA had been lowered (Neudorfer, 2015). A survey administered in Monrovia, Liberia in 2012 displayed that transactional sex was very prevalent among women aged 18-30 years old (Beber et al, 2016). With the population of Liberia being roughly 49% female, over half (58%) of the women had been entangled in a sexual transaction with UN personnel for money (Beber et al, 2016; UN, 2018).

*UNMIS/UNMISS: Independent variable*

UNMIS/UNMISS was initiated in 2005, the same year that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations set up the CDT and began to train peacekeepers by the zero-tolerance policy (Karim & Beardsley 2016). This implies that before deployment an in-mission initiation training was required for all peacekeeping personnel. Yet, the TCCs were accountable for having training before deployment for military and police peacekeepers (UN prevention, 2016). The degree of gender training in the TCCs for UNMIS/UNMISS is similar to the results for UNMIL. Since two of the major TCCs in both UNMIL and UNMIS/UNMISS are Bangladesh and Pakistan, they are partly alike (UN resources, 2016). The third major TCC in UNMIS/UNMISS is India, which has begun to give tailored training for their female peacekeepers (UN India 201; UN resources, 2016). Since 2011, UN women in India formed over 20 training meetings on gender (2013). The training sessions targeted sexual or gendered violence, how to prevent it, and how to react; however, India did not have any gender training for men and it is evident that sexual assault is not just a woman's problem (2013). Also, India's female peacekeepers only amounted to 1-3 percent of the force in UNMISS during 2011-2012, so their training was hardly notable (UN resources, 2016).

However, UNMIS/UNMISS got their first female head of mission in 2011(UN South Sudan 2016). When UNMIS was initiated, the Office of the Gender Advisor had been created already. Yet, there is a lack of in-mission training data in Sudan and South Sudan. As reported by the UN Security council's report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, 140 UNMISS personnel had been trained on gender mainstreaming in 2012. Also, UNMIS/UNMISS had a noticeable issue with UN personnel harming children,

which prompted the UN to initiate the UNMISS Child Protection Unit, which works to defend children from sexual violence (UNMISS 2016). The Unit is operated in association with the government, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and other collaborators (2016). The division's intention is to guard children from conflict; however, it is not stated if children are guarded from UN too (2016).

#### *UNMIS/UNMISS: Dependent variable*

UNMIS/UNMISS have acquired 29 SEA accusations by military and police personnel in 2007-2015. The population size in Sudan roughly was around 37 million during that time frame, exceeding UNMIL's population size while exhibiting less SEA accusations (UN, 2018). Even though there were a lesser amount of SEA accusations in UNMIS/UNMISS compared to UNMIL, there was no apparent decline in SEA by peacekeepers over 2007-2015. Each year, the SEA accusations were fluctuating, with the largest amount of accusations being 7 and the lowest being 1 (UN stats 2016). In 2007, they had already questioned 13 peacekeepers for offenses and 4 Bangladeshi peacekeepers had been shipped home with related accusations (BCC 2007). There have also been various allegations of UNMIS/UNMISS peacekeeping personnel sexually assaulting children (FOXNEWS 2007).

#### **Comparison**

The case studies display a variation in both the amount and kind of SEA that has been perpetuated by peacekeepers. UNMIL and UNMIS/UNMISS are two out of four UN peacekeeping missions that have had the highest amount of SEA accusations (Inspection, 2015). Analysis of the dependent variable with data from CDU displayed that UNMIL have had

a dropping number of SEA allegations during the time-period 2007-2015. UNMIS/UNMISS, however, have had a fluctuating amount of SEA during the same time-period. Additionally, investigation revealed that UNMIL's personnel have been entangled in transactional sex with a high amount of Liberian women. At the same time, UNMIS/UNMISS acquired allegations of abusing children with records of SEA accusations of UNMIS personnel directly after arrival (FOXNEWS 2007). Examining the results of the independent variable, there is some correlation in how both missions have executed work with gender mainstreaming. Both missions were initiated in the twenty first century when gender mainstreaming and the zero-tolerance policy had become an incorporated portion of a mission. Yet, the data revealed that UNMIL had a more extensive record of gender training during the mission than UNMIS/UNMISS. UNMIL reacted to the issue of SEA by broadening the gender training and adding more personnel. There has been a consistent expansion of gender training in UNMIL during the time-period of this study. Yet, the reaction of UNMIS/UNMISS is that the gender training that has been operated is primarily the requirements of protocol from the UN without further implementation.

The hypothesis of this research stated that 'the more gender mainstreaming is incorporated in a UN peacekeeping operation, the less SEA will occur by military peacekeeping personnel'. In UNMIL, the gender training continued during the mission, began to involve more personnel, and raised awareness for gender issues, while the level of SEA continually lowered. In contrast, the gender training in UNMIS/UNMISS had not been as extensive as it was in UNMIL and the amount of SEA in UNMIS/UNMISS had been fluctuating without a steady decrease. The data provides some backing to the hypothesis but it is not sufficient enough to confirm

anything. To conclude if this thesis is supported additional research will need to be done. The tables below display that was found.

**Table 1. Dependent variable**

SEA accusations & Population size for 2007-2015	UNMIL: SEA	UNMIS/UNMISS: SEA	UNMIL: Pop. Size	UNMIS/UNMISS : Pop. Size
2007	10	7	3.45 Mil	33 mil
2008	7	3	3.59 mil	34 mil
2009	13	1	3.7 mil	34.8 mil
2010	9	3	3.8 mil	35 mil
2011	7	5	4 mil	36 mil
2012	4	1	4.1 mil	37 mil
2013	6	2	4.2 mil	38 mil
2014	4	6	4.3 mil	38.9 mil
2015	1	1	4.4 mil	39 mil

**Table 2. Independent variable**

Case	UNMIL	UNMIS/UNMISS
Gender training in TCC?	No particular gender training	In 2011, India had organized gender training for female peacekeepers
Gender training by mission?	Yes, expanding more over time.	Yes, required by CDU
Women in powerful positions?	Yes, three female head of mission between 2007-2015	Yes, two female head of mission between 2011- 2014
	Female special representative of the secretary general	Female special representative of the secretary general
	An all-female unit in 2007	
Gender divisions/advisors?	Yes	Yes

(UN STATS 2016 & UN 2018)

## **Conclusion**

The intention of this research was to qualitatively analyze the effect of gender mainstreaming on SEA committed by peacekeepers. The study focuses on finding solutions to SEA instead of analyzing the causes of SEA that has mainly been researched. The main conclusion of the study demonstrates that gender mainstreaming has the largest effect on SEA when it is carried out as gender training during the mission. The cases are comparable in most features of gender mainstreaming except for the training that was coordinated during the mission. The evidence displays that UNMIL has had more extensive and established gender training during the mission than UNMIS/UNMISS. Additionally, SEA has dropped in UNMIL, while in UNMIS/UNMISS the amount has been fluctuating during the whole time-period.

A weakness of this study includes other explanations for the amount of SEA. For instance, the amount of SEA could be an economic need by the host population. For example, in Liberia many women were entangled in transactional sex with peacekeepers, so the amount of SEA by peacekeepers could be related to women's efforts to enhance their economic status. Another weakness was that gathering data on UNMIL was much easier than for UNMIS/UNMISS. The bulk of data for UNMIS/UNMISS was collected by the UN, which leads to a potential bias issue. Clearly, the UN wants to illustrate a positive image, which may develop in the record of gender mainstreaming that is fabricated. For further research, it would be beneficial to advance this study by looking at many cases with contrasting variations in gender mainstreaming and SEA.



To conclude, there is an obligation to broaden gender training for all peacekeeping personnel and take action to increase the attention and understanding about gender issues around the globe. Not only is this a women's issue, but also a worldwide issue that impacts all people, communities, and institutions. We need additional policies that advocate for the inclusion of every gender and perspective in order to truly penetrate the hyper-masculine norms and disciplines that surround peacekeeping, thereby better serving the nations that need protection.

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## **BANGLADESH AND ITS QUEST TO BECOMING A MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRY: An Evaluation of the Relationship Between Higher Education in Women and Economic Development**

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### **Abstract**

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which higher education for women influences economic development in Bangladesh. Two models using OLS regressions were employed to evaluate the strengths of two critical relationships. The first probed the connection between higher education in women and the Female Labour Force Participation Rate (FLFPR), while the second tested the relationship between higher education in women and GDP per capita. The first key finding is that there is no statistically significant relationship between higher education in women and FLFPR. The second main finding is that there is a statistically significant relationship between higher education in women and GDP per capita. The results imply that a good path forward in Bangladesh's development may lie in making more concentrated efforts to strengthen female tertiary education programs.

### **Introduction**

At the age of 17, Afroza Khatun did something that girls in Bangladesh rarely do, refused her marriage proposal.<sup>1</sup> Like many girls her age, she had a strong desire for pursuing higher education, and knew that an early marriage would make this dream unobtainable. It took courage to resist the formidable custom and community pressure that is prevalent throughout Bangladesh. Unfortunately, 75% of girls in Bangladesh are married before turning 18, and about 33% are married before the age of

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<sup>1</sup> Naimul Haq, "Afroza's story: refusing marriage, choosing education" last modified January, 2010.

15.<sup>2</sup> Child marriage is one of the most significant impediments to women attaining a higher education. In the case of Afroza, UNICEF and BRAC's Adolescent Empowerment Project Program informed her community of the rights and laws protecting adolescent girls, reminding them that it is illegal for girls to get married prior to the age of 18.<sup>3</sup> As a result of this initiative, her refusal to being married was accepted by her community, and Afroza now has the luxury of being able to focus on her studies.

Broadening the scope to Bangladesh as a whole, improving higher education in women not only benefits the human capital and well-being of impoverished girls like Afroza, but it also provides dividends for everyone in the country. For instance, according to the World Bank, "the economic returns for higher education graduates are the highest in the entire education system- an estimated 17 percent increase in earnings as compared with 10 percent for primary and 7 percent for secondary education."<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, advancing higher education for women has the additional benefits of future children having higher quality healthcare and education, bolstered participation in the labour market, and fewer children.<sup>5</sup> The key question this research paper seeks to answer is: to what extent does higher education for women influence economic development in Bangladesh? The main argument is that higher education for women to a great extent influences economic development in Bangladesh through both its strong effect on GDP per capita and its relationship to the female labour force participation rate.

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> The World Bank, "Higher Education" last modified October 5, 2017.

<sup>5</sup> The World Bank, "Girls' Education" last modified September 25, 2017.



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Moving forward, this paper will be divided into the following sections: Literature Review, Data Description for Model 1, Model 1 Econometric Methodology & Results, Model 2 Econometric Methodology & Results, and Conclusion. In the Literature Review section, three essential research papers will be examined, which provide insight on the relationship between education in women and the female labour force participation rate. The analysis will build and extend from their findings. In Data Description for Model 1, important graphs and tables of the data for the first model will be illustrated, contextualized, and explained. In the Econometric Methodology sections for both models, the reasoning behind the parameters of the linear regression analyses will be revealed, and their two respective research hypotheses that the female labour force participation rate will be influenced by higher education in women and that the GDP per capita will be significantly affected by higher education in women will be analyzed.

In the Results portion of each model, all of the key findings from the ordinary least squares regression (OLS) tests will be displayed and followed by an in-depth discussion of their implications and limitations. Finally, in the Conclusion section, the chief findings of the research and future avenues of study will be presented, as well as policy recommendations designed to expedite Bangladesh's quest to become a middle-income country. Before moving onto the method and analysis, it is vital to review the previous literature on women's education in Bangladesh.

### **Literature Review**

In Mohammad Hossain and Clement Tisdell's academic article, "Closing the gender gap in Bangladesh: inequality in education,

employment, and earnings,” they aimed to assess trends in the status of women with regards to a few macro-level indicators, some of which are: educational attainments, women’s labour force participation, and earnings alongside men. When evaluating the correlation between women’s education and workforce participation, their estimated correlation coefficients highlighted two key findings. The most pertinent of the two, for the purpose of this paper, was that there was near perfect correlation (1.06) between Female-Male Enrollment Ratio (FMER) and Urban Female-Male Labour Force (FMLFU), indicating a positive association between closing the gender gap in education and closing the gender gap in labour force participation.<sup>6</sup> Hossain and Tisdell were quick to caution, however, that the reasons behind this association need further investigation. They stressed how educational access leading to a convergence in male and female productivity (according to Human capital theory<sup>7</sup>) cannot be assumed because most formal employment in Bangladesh consists of unskilled or low-skilled jobs.<sup>8</sup>

The most significant result derived from this study, one that pertains to the topic discussed, is that there is a strong correlation between female labour force participation and women’s education. That there exists a strong correlation between higher education in women in Bangladesh and the female labour force participation rate is of critical interest to the

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<sup>6</sup> Mohammad A. Hossain and Clement A. Tisdell. “Closing the Gender Gap in Bangladesh: Inequality in Education, Employment, and Earnings,” *International Journal of Social Economics* 32, no. 5 (2005): 450

<sup>7</sup> Human capital theory refers to the “aggregate stock of competencies, knowledge, social, and personal attributes embodied in the ability to create intrinsic and measurable economic value.” For more, consult Becker (1993).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

paper's investigation. The author's analysis, presentation of, and cautions to this finding will be imperative when interpreting the results. In particular, being mindful of the alternative reasons they proposed to explain this correlation, reasons such as education serving as a useful screening device for employers, and increased education leading to a rise in women's confidence in pursuing employment, will be of great importance.<sup>9</sup> Further, the women's rise in high-skilled job participation and the narrowing of gender earning gaps are both promising signs of progress being made for women, which can be juxtaposed with Bangladesh's progress in development.

In Humaira Husain's academic paper, "Economic development, women empowerment, and U shaped labour force function: time series evidence for Bangladesh," he provides support for the legitimacy of the nonlinear quadratic U-shaped function between economic growth and the female labour force participation rate in Bangladesh over the time period of 1991-2012. Husain examines the U hypothesis<sup>10</sup> by applying both OLS and instrumental variable approach to estimate the equation of FLFPR<sup>11</sup>, utilizing two regressors: natural log of per capita real GDP and the square of natural log of per capita real GDP (per capita real GDP is accepted widely

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<sup>9</sup> Mohammad A Hossain. and Clement A. Tisdell. "Closing the Gender Gap in Bangladesh: Inequality in Education, Employment, and Earnings," *International Journal of Social Economics* 32, no. 5 (2005): 450-451

<sup>10</sup> The U hypothesis is a "relationship between womens' educational attainment and advances of economic development," where the "declining portion of U is explained by the income effect" and the "rising portion of the U is explained by the substitution effect." For more see Husain (2016), p. 720.

<sup>11</sup> Female Labour Force Participation Rate.

as a proxy for economic growth).<sup>12</sup> Husain also incorporates the three major GDP sectors as explanatory variables: agriculture, manufacturing, and service. The key result found relevant to the hypothesis was that the estimated coefficient of service value added was found to be both positive and statistically significant, indicating that more women are obtaining white collar jobs in both the public and private sector.<sup>13</sup> Husain concluded that female labour participation accelerated economic growth in Bangladesh, and recommended giving women better access to high quality education and more effective job training in order to raise women empowerment and female labour force participation.

The analysis and results of this article relate to the topic lies within the finding that female labour force participation has a positive impact on economic growth in Bangladesh. As higher education for women is one of the key factors in the female labour force participation rate, it is likely that higher education for women also has an effect, albeit to a different degree, on economic growth in Bangladesh. Moreover, the author attributes women's advancement above secondary level education to be a possible cause of more women being absorbed in white collar jobs. This finding is valuable because it reveals another avenue that can be taken in exploring the relationship between higher education for women and economic development: testing the strength of the relationship between women's progress above secondary level education and the obtainment of more white collar jobs.

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<sup>12</sup> Humaira Husain. "Economic Development, Women Empowerment, and U Shaped Labour Force Function: Time Series Evidence For Bangladesh," *Asian Economic and Financial Review* 6, no. 12 (2016): 721

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, p. 724.

In Rushidan Rahman and Rizwanul Islam's working paper, "Female Labour Force Participation in Bangladesh: Trends, Drivers and Barriers," they explore the legitimacy of the hypothesized U-shaped relationship between economic growth and women's employment, as well as the underpinnings of other drivers and impediments to labour force participation in Bangladeshi women. One of their chief findings is that evidence from Bangladesh does not, in fact, support the U-shaped hypothesis, with a rise in female labour force participation taking place with accelerated economic growth since the 1990s.<sup>14</sup> Another significant finding uncovered was that the elasticity of employment growth, with regards to output growth, increased sizably for women in the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of the 2000s, despite declining for the overall population<sup>15</sup>. This suggests sizable progress has been made for female participation in the labour force and warrants further inquiry.

Of particular interest in this working paper is its insight on the relationship between women's education and the female labour force participation rate. After performing a logit regression analysis in order to assess the connection between education and the FLFPR, while controlling for household assets, they discovered that the four levels of education (primary, secondary, above secondary, and technical) have gradually increasing positive coefficients.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, education as a whole had a positive impact, with the reasoning being that education leads to an increase in productivity, which thereby raises wages/salary, and then

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<sup>14</sup> Rushidan I. Rahman and Rizwanul Islam. "Female Labour Force Participation in Bangladesh: Trends, Drivers and Barriers," *ILO Asia-Pacific Working Paper Series*, (2013): xi

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*, p. xi.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, p. 36.

increases FLFPR by its substitution effect.<sup>17</sup> The intent of the paper is to build off in particular Rahman & Islam's and Hossain & Tisdell's findings on the relationship between women education and FLFPR, by honing in on higher education in particular, evaluating the magnitude of its influence on not only growth (by using FLFPR as a proxy), but economic development as well. Before delving into the econometric methodology and the analysis of the first model, the data that will be utilized must first be described.

### **Data Description for Model 1**

The data from which the analysis for the first model will be performed is derived from from two sources. The first provides female educational attainment for population aged 15 and over in Bangladesh from the years 1950-2010 in 5 year intervals. This was obtained from the Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset, which provides data for seven levels of schooling: no schooling, incomplete primary, complete primary, incomplete secondary, complete secondary, incomplete tertiary, and complete tertiary. In addition, it gives the average years of total, primary, secondary, and tertiary schooling alongside the population of female students in Bangladesh for each year in the five-year intervals. The data for incomplete and complete tertiary educational attainment will be of significant value when evaluating the magnitude of the relationship between higher education for women and the female labour force participation rate. Below is a table of the aforementioned data, and on the following page there is a graph documenting the trends of female educational attainment in Bangladesh from the time period of 1950-2010:


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<sup>17</sup> The substitution effect in this context refers to the phenomenon of how "a rise in wage rates may persuade women to substitute leisure with work." Ibid.

Table 1: Bangladesh Female Educational Attainment (% , 15+) 1950-2010

Year	No Schooling	Total Primary	Complete Primary	Total Secondary	Complete Secondary	Total Tertiary	Complete Tertiary
1950	92.3	6.9	0.7	0.8	0.3	0.0	0.0
1955	91.9	7.3	0.7	0.9	0.3	0.0	0.0
1960	90.5	8.4	0.9	1.0	0.3	0.0	0.0
1965	90.4	8.1	4.5	1.4	0.5	0.1	0.0
1970	89.9	7.9	6	2.1	0.7	0.1	0.1
1975	88.9	7.4	6.3	3.5	1.3	0.2	0.1
1980	79.6	13.1	11.7	7.0	1.6	0.3	0.2
1985	70.6	18.1	16.6	10.2	3.3	1.1	0.6
1990	64.6	20.5	18.9	13.4	5.5	1.6	0.8
1995	58.0	21.8	20.1	17.9	8.9	2.3	1.3
2000	48.9	21.9	20.2	26.2	14.9	3.0	1.6
2005	42.6	19.8	18.7	34.5	21.3	3.1	1.7
2010	35.2	21.5	20.5	40.2	28.8	3.2	1.8

Source: Barro-Lee Version (2.0) 2011.



Source: Barro-Lee Version (2.0) 2011.

In the figure above, a few key trends are worth noting. First, from Year 6 to Year 13 (1975 to 2010) there was a significant decline (53.7%) in the percentage of women with no schooling. Second, from Year 6 to Year

13 (1975-2010) there was a significant incline (>30%) in the percentage of women with total or completed secondary education level attainment. The most plausible explanation for such a drastic shift is the procurement of Bangladesh's independence in 1971. Third, although difficult to observe from the scaling of the figure, total and completed tertiary education attainment increased by 2% and 3% respectively from Year 5 to Year 13 (1970-2010). While this seems quite small when compared to the percent changes in the secondary and no schooling levels, it is important to note that for quite some time, zero women had attained higher education. With total and complete tertiary levels continuously increasing since 1970, this paper seeks to investigate what impact this specific change has had on economic development.


The second main resource for the data belongs to the International Labour Organization database, and was accessed through the World Bank Databank. They provided estimates for the female and male labour force participation rate for ages 15 and up in Bangladesh from the years 1960 to 2010. It must be stated that the data provided by ILO is not as complete as that from Barro-Lee, in that no information was given for the years: 1950, 1955, 1965, and 1970. Therefore, the sample size is considerably smaller, and this limitation will be evaluated in greater detail during the Results and Conclusion section. Below is a table with the female and male labour force participation rates data in addition to a graph for displaying noteworthy trends from 1960-2010:



**Table 2: Female vs. Male labour force participation rate (% of population, ages 15+) in Bangladesh 1960-2010**

Year	Female	Male
1960	18.15	93.00
1975	3.44	90.20
1980	4.48	84.10
1985	8.33	88.58
1990	61.93	88.70
1995	56.31	87.53
2000	54.25	86.03
2005	48.12	84.12
2010	42.0	82.33

Sources: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market database ISLOSTAT database, World Bank Databank, 2013, 2016.



Sources: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market database ISLOSTAT database, World Bank Databank, 2013, 2016.

Two important observations can be made from the figure above. First, while the male labour force participation rate has been relatively flat (small decline) over the course of fifty years, the female labour force participation rate has had more volatility. The most striking finding is the more than six-

fold increase between 1985 and 1990. It is also worth noting the 20% decrease that has occurred in the FLFPR from the time period of 1990 to 2010. In addition, while the MLFPR has always been sizably greater than the FLFPR, the gap between the two shrank considerably since the 1985-1990 FLFPR growth spurt. Determining the magnitude to which and understanding why higher education in women affects the female labour force participation rate, may help lead to more effective policy measures being taken to shrink the labour force participation rate gap further in the future. Now that we have a clearer picture of the data, the econometric methodology and analysis can be introduced for the first model.

### Econometric Methodology for Model 1

The research hypothesis being tested in Model 1 is that the female labour force participation rate will be influenced by higher education in women. The null hypothesis is that the female labour force participation rate will not be influenced by higher education in women. The simple principle model that will be tested is the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 FLFPR_i = & \alpha + \beta_i x_i + C_1 NS_i + C_2 TP_i + C_3 CP_i + C_4 TS_i \\
 & + C_5 CS_i + C_6 CT_i + C_7 P_i \\
 & + C_8 GDPpercapitag_i + C_9 Remitt_i \\
 & + C_{10} ExportpercGDP_i + C_{11} Exportg_i + \varepsilon_i
 \end{aligned}$$

where FLFPR (the dependent variable) is the female labour force participation rate (in %),  $\alpha$  is the FLFPR intercept,  $x_i$  (the independent variable) is total tertiary education for women,  $\beta_i$  is the slope (Beta coefficient) for  $x_i$ ,  $C_1$  through  $C_{11}$  are the coefficients for the 11 control variables, and  $\varepsilon_i$  is the residual. The value of  $\beta_i$  is critical, because it will indicate the magnitude of the hypothesized relationship between higher

education for women and FLFPR. Dependent upon this value, it can be extrapolated how significant of a role higher education for women in Bangladesh plays for determining FLFPR, as well as its potential impact on economic development.  $\beta_i$  is predicted to be positive ( $\beta_i > 0$ ), based on the findings and evidence from some of the key literature of the literature review, which found education for women to have a positive association and impact on the female labour force participation rate.

In order to best observe the relationship between FLFPR and higher education in women given the data described previously, an ordinary least squares regression test will be performed, with total (incomplete) tertiary educational attainment as the explanatory variable  $x_i$ . All other variables will be held constant: no schooling, total and complete primary, total and complete secondary, complete tertiary, population, GDP per capita, remittance (% of GDP), exports (% of GDP), and export growth. Evaluating the strength of the relationship can shed insight on whether or not higher education in women should be more strongly emphasized and targeted in future policymaking. Furthermore, an ordinary least squares regression was chosen because the dependent variable, FLFPR, is not a “0/1” indicator variable; the regressors of total and complete tertiary education are exogenous and the data is normally distributed. Below is a summary of the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of the FLFPR, total female tertiary, and 11 control variables computed in STATA:

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
FLFPR	9	33.00111	24.12932	3.44	61.93
NoSchooling	13	72.56923	20.72319	35.2	92.3
TotalPrimary	13	14.05385	6.552432	6.9	21.9
CompletePr~y	13	11.21538	8.236994	.7	20.5
TotalSeco~y	13	12.23846	13.60046	.8	40.2
CompleteSe~y	13	6.746154	9.305519	.3	28.8
TotalTerti~y	13	1.153846	1.315051	0	3.2
CompleteTe~y	13	.6307692	.7227086	0	1.8
Population	13	25947.08	12926.44	11697	50848
GDPpercap~g	10	1.28	3.456009	-6	5
Remittance~P	7	4.221429	2.795296	1.87	9.41
Exportsper~P	11	9.205455	4.081393	2.9	16.02
ExportGrowth	10	13.156	4.65563	-5.19	43

As can be observed above, the FLFPR from 1960-2010 in Bangladesh has quite a large standard deviation compared to the total tertiary variable. This is not surprising given the sharp rise that occurred in the FLFPR between 1985 and 1990. From the above summary, it is also clear that the total tertiary variable has a smaller variance than the FLFPR variable, which will be something important to keep in mind when analyzing the results of the OLS regression tests. Now that the econometric methodology and summary statistics have been articulated, the results of the findings can be presented and evaluated.

### Results for Model 1

Below are the results of the OLS regression test performed with FLFPR as the dependent variable and the total tertiary educational attainment levels as the explanatory variable for the model:

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	9
Model	2852.52308	1	2852.52308	F(1, 7)	=	11.06
Residual	1805.27021	7	257.895745	Prob > F	=	0.0127
				R-squared	=	0.6124
				Adj R-squared	=	0.5571
Total	4657.79329	8	582.224161	Root MSE	=	16.059


FLFPR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
TotalTertiary	14.42843	4.33837	3.33	0.013	4.169815	24.68704
_cons	9.274359	8.919193	1.04	0.333	-11.81618	30.3649

Source: STATA, Barro-Lee 2011, ILOSTAT Database, World Bank Databank.

The first piece of information worth interpreting is the R-squared value of 0.6124 and the adjusted R-squared value of 0.5571. The R-squared is a metric that describes how close the data are compared to the fitted regression line and can be defined as the percentage of variation in responses for the dependent variable. In this case, only 61.24% of the model explains the variability of the response data. It is important to note the critical limitations of the R-squared metric, which dictate that it cannot ascertain whether or not the coefficient predictions and estimates are biased. Thus, the 0.6124 result should not be taken at face value. Furthermore, given that total tertiary level education and the Female Labour Force Participation Rate are dealing with human behavior, a high R-squared value is not to be expected.


The next key result is the Prob > F value of 0.0127. This value is less than the p-value for total tertiary, 0.013, which suggests that there is not sufficient evidence that the regression model fits the data better than a null model with no independent variable. From this, it can be inferred that the model's predictions are not an improvement versus using the mean,

and that the correlation between total tertiary level education and FLFPR is not statistically significant. Below is a graph depicting the linear regression for total tertiary vs. FLFPR:



Source: STATA, Barro-Lee 2011, ILOSTAT Database, World Bank Databank.

A third component that must be assessed in order to properly determine if there is a strong relationship between the total tertiary explanatory variable and FLFPR are the residual plots. If there are any non-random patterns in the residual plots, the regression coefficients and quantitative results cannot be trusted. On the following page is an illustration of the residual plots for this OLS regression test:



Source: STATA, Barro-Lee 2011, ILOSTAT Database, World Bank Databank.

Inspecting the residual plot closely, we can observe that there is no clear pattern around zero for the complete range of fitted values. Normally, from this observation, it can be deduced that the residuals are random in the regression analysis and that the regression coefficients can be trusted. However, given the very small sample size, it is difficult to discern the degree to which the residuals are random. Thus, nothing conclusive regarding the trustworthiness of the regression coefficients can be drawn.

The fourth result to analyze is the actual regression coefficient value, juxtaposed with the p-value. The p-value for this regression is 0.013, which is smaller than the significance level of 0.05. Typically, from this finding it would follow that the total tertiary predictor variable is statistically significant. However, because the Prob > F value is less than the p-value, we are not able to reject the null hypothesis that total tertiary has no correlation with the female labour force participation rate. Additionally, because the regression coefficient is about 14.428, there seems to be a positive relationship between total tertiary and FLFPR. For each 1%

increase in the level of total tertiary education, the FLFPR increases by approximately 14.4%.

While this overall result is not significant, it is still vital to discuss some of the serious limitations of this regression test. The largest limitation lies in the small sample size of the data. Unfortunately, the Female Labour Force Participation rates for Bangladesh could only be found for nine different years that overlap with the data available for trends in total tertiary education attainment. Thus, even if there was a positive correlation between the total tertiary level and FLFPR, which there is not, the strength and magnitude of the relationship could not be calibrated with confidence. Another limitation is the inconclusive reading of the residual plot, making it unknown to what degree and whether or not there is stochastic error. To gain a better understanding of the influence of higher education in women on economic development, we must turn to Model 2.

### **Econometric Methodology for Model 2**

The research hypothesis being tested in Model 2 focuses on how the GDP per capita (in current US dollars) will be affected by higher education in women. The null hypothesis is that the GDP per capita will not be affected by higher education in women. Although economic development can be measured in a multitude of ways, it was decided that GDP per capita was the most appropriate metric due to both the density and volatility of Bangladesh's population. While the Human Development Index and Multidimensional Poverty Index take a more holistic approach and can give a more in depth examination of poverty and economic development, adequate amounts of data were not obtained within such measures in order to cover the scope required for the study. Because female tertiary



enrollment per 100,000 inhabitants was found to have the largest quantity of data available to track changes in higher education levels for women between 1970 to 2014, it was chosen as the independent variable, after examining a wide range of women tertiary education indicators (see appendix).

Due to GDP per capita being influenced by a variety of factors, it is critical that a sufficient number of variables are controlled in order to properly calibrate the degree to which higher education plays a role in influencing this key metric for economic development. The control variables selected are: female enrollment in primary education, male enrollment in primary education, female enrollment in secondary education, male enrollment in secondary education, male enrollment in tertiary education, GDP per capita growth, life expectancy at birth, population, exports (% of GDP), remittances (% of GDP), and export growth. Below is the regression model that will later be tested:

$$GDPpercapita_i = \alpha + \beta_i x_i + C_1 FP_i + C_2 MP_i + C_3 FS_i + C_4 MS_i + C_5 MT_i + C_6 GDPpercapitag_i + C_7 LifeExpB_i + C_8 P_i + C_9 ExportspercGDP_i + C_{10} Remitt_i + C_{11} Exportg_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where  $GDPpercapita_i$  (the dependent variable) is the GDP per capita rate,  $\alpha$  is the GDPpercapita intercept,  $x_i$  (the independent variable) is female enrollment in tertiary education,  $\beta_i$  is the slope (Beta coefficient) for  $x_i$ ,  $C_1$  through  $C_{11}$  are the coefficients for the eleven control variables, and  $\varepsilon_i$  is the residual. The value of  $\beta_i$  is critical because it will indicate the magnitude of the hypothesized relationship between higher education for women and GDP per capita. Depending upon this value, the significance of the role of higher education for women in Bangladesh on economic

development can be extrapolated.  $\beta_i$  is predicted to be positive,  $\beta_i > 0$ , based on the findings and evidence from some of the key literature cited, which found that education for women has a positive association and impact on economic growth and development.

Just like the previous model, an OLS regression will again be utilized to test this relationship. Below is a summary of the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of the dependent, independent, and control variables:

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
GDPpercapit~s	57	356.1351	291.1827	88.7	1358.8
FemalePrim~y	24	67.86667	22.56646	36.1	115.1
MalePrimary	24	88.78333	8.448034	74.1	108.7
FemaleSeco~y	25	31.128	20.41628	6.2	57
MaleSecond~y	25	37.196	10.05591	26	50.2
FemaleTert~y	32	329.0437	314.916	36.2	1097.1
MaleTertiary	32	763.0094	336.9194	318.8	1542.9
GDPpercapit~h	56	1.917857	3.887608	-15.5	7.7
LifeExpect~h	56	57.93375	8.657416	45.83	72.22
Population	57	103.2447	36.30521	48.2	162.95
Exportsper~P	57	9.997018	4.72573	2.9	20.16
Remittance~P	41	4.563659	2.951488	.19	10.59
ExportGrowth	56	8.653214	20.68397	-31.77	85.75

An important thing to note from the summary above, besides the wide range in standard deviation, mean, and minimum/maximum, is the significantly higher number of observations there are for this model compared to the previous one. As a result of having higher degrees of freedom, resulting from having a larger sample size, the results from the ensuing regression analysis will be more statistically significant than the previous model.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Refer to appendix at the end of paper to see the data that was used for the regression analysis in Model 2.

## Results for Model 2

Below are the results of the OLS regression test performed with GDP per capita as the dependent variable and female tertiary as the explanatory variable of the model:

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	32
Model	1659871.1	1	1659871.1	F(1, 30)	=	637.68
Residual	78089.0458	30	2602.96819	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.9551
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9536
Total	1737960.15	31	56063.2306	Root MSE	=	51.019


  

GDPpercapita	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
FemaleTertiary	.7347872	.0290977	25.25	0.000	.6753618	.7942127
_cons	126.3135	13.15341	9.60	0.000	99.45063	153.1763

Source: STATA, World Bank Education Indicators, World Bank Development Indicators

The first results that stands out is the R-squared value of 0.9551 and the adjusted R-squared value of 0.9536. While this 0.9551 value is extraordinarily high and indicates that 95.51% of the model explains the variability of the response data, it is inherently limited in that it cannot distinguish whether or not the coefficient predictions and estimates (in this case, the coefficient estimate is about 0.7348) are biased. Therefore, the R-squared value alone is unable to confirm that this result is statistically significant. Another important piece of information to interpret is the Prob > F value of 0. This value is equal to the p-value for female tertiary (0), indicating the there is adequate evidence that the regression model fits the data better than a model with no independent variable. Thus, the model's predictions are an improvement from using the mean, and the correlation between female tertiary education enrollment and GDP per capita is

statistically significant. Below is a figure illustrating the linear regression generated by the model for female tertiary vs. GDP per capita:



Source: STATA, World Bank Education Indicators, World Bank Development Indicators

The lack of any significant outliers in the previous figure further supports the fact that the tested relationship is statistically significant. Another important confirmation that must be made is to see whether or not there are non-random patterns in the residual plots. If patterns are determined to be non-random, it can be deduced that the regression coefficients can be trusted. On the following page is a figure depicting the residual plots for this OLS test:



Source: STATA, World Bank Education Indicators, World Bank Development Indicators

When examining the above residual plot, there does not appear to be a clear pattern around zero for the range of fitted values. That being said, having 32 observations, while that is a significant improvement from the number of observations in the previous model, is not enough to draw any convincing conclusions. The residuals are more random than nonrandom, but the overall trustworthiness of the regression coefficients cannot be definitively stated.

Finally, when comparing the female tertiary coefficient value (0.7348) to the p-value (0.0), it is clear that the female tertiary predictor variable is statistically significant. This is due to the p-value being smaller than the significance level of 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis that GDP per capita will not be influenced by female tertiary can be rejected. Furthermore, because

the coefficient value is approximately 0.7348, there does exist a positive relationship between female tertiary and GDP per capita, and for every 1% increase in the level of female tertiary enrollment, the GDP per capita increases by about 0.7348%, assuming, of course, that the residual plot is random.

Examining the extent to which the female tertiary variable affects GDP per capita would be incomplete without comparing it to how the control variables affect GDP per capita. Below is a table that provides the coefficients, standard error, t-value, p-value, and 95% confidence intervals for each control variable with respect to the dependent variable:

<b>GDPpercapita</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>P&gt; t </b>	<b>[95% Conf. Interval]</b>	
<b>FemalePrimary</b>	-1.339981	3.817025	-0.35	0.738	-10.67991	7.999943
<b>MalePrimary</b>	9.302581	4.153895	2.24	0.066	-.8616339	19.4668
<b>FemaleSecondary</b>	-2.24902	10.41277	-0.22	0.836	-27.72815	23.23011
<b>MaleSecondary</b>	-8.39094	10.84496	-0.77	0.468	-34.92759	18.14571
<b>MaleTertiary</b>	.2629992	.0588942	4.47	0.004	.1188901	.4071082
<b>GDPpercapitag</b>	-2.766314	5.977221	-0.46	0.660	-17.39205	11.85942
<b>LifeExpB</b>	76.73139	31.38354	2.44	0.050	-.0613673	153.5241
<b>Population</b>	-11.22633	7.728256	-1.45	0.197	-30.13669	7.68403
<b>ExportspercGDP</b>	6.896973	7.787114	0.89	0.410	-12.15741	25.95136
<b>Remitt</b>	-9.760051	24.27212	-0.40	0.702	-69.15178	49.63168
<b>Exportg</b>	-1.594084	1.133026	-1.41	0.209	-4.366499	1.178331

Source: STATA, World Bank Education Indicators, World Bank Development Indicators

The only control variables that have a positive relationship with GDP per capita (like the independent variable, female tertiary) are male primary, male tertiary, life expectancy at birth, and exports (% of GDP). A

strong positive relationship between life expectancy at birth and GDP per capita makes sense intuitively, because if the population in Bangladesh lives longer, more consumption and production will be take place, which boosts GDP. While the increase in life expectancy at birth from 1960 to 2016 contributed to an increase in population size (which negatively impacts GDP per capita), the growth in GDP per capita during this time period was significantly higher than the growth in population size.<sup>19</sup> This suggests that the life expectancy at birth variable may have had a stronger effect on GDP than population size, which further explains its robust positive relationship with GDP per capita. Similarly, a positive relationship between exports, as a percentage of GDP, and GDP per capita is logical, as an increase in exports leads to an increase in GDP, which in turn translates into a rise in the GDP per capita.

What is surprising to note is how the coefficients for both male primary and male tertiary are positive, while the coefficient for female primary is negative. From this finding, a few implications can be derived. First, female primary education does not appear to contribute to GDP per capita in Bangladesh.<sup>20</sup> Second, both male primary education and male tertiary education could have significant positive influences on GDP per capita. Determining the degree to which these two variables affect GDP per capita warrants further research with a richer sample size than this study has access to. In addition, it is important to highlight that the p-values for the male primary and male tertiary control variables (0.066 and

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<sup>19</sup> From 1960-2016, GDP per capita in Bangladesh increased approx. 15-fold whereas population growth only increased approx. 3-fold. Consult Tables 2 and 4 in the Appendix.

approximately 0.004 respectively) are greater than the p-value for female tertiary (0), and likely have a weaker relationship to GDP per capita than female tertiary education. From this it could be inferred with some trepidation that future policy should prioritize developing female tertiary education more than other levels of education.

Before any conclusions can be drawn from these results, some of the paper's limitations must be discussed. To begin, using GDP per capita as a proxy for economic development in Bangladesh is a significant assumption that is quite contentious. While some positive externalities can result for the impoverished with a boost in GDP per capita, many of the underlying root causes that construct poverty traps that are very difficult for the extreme poor to get out of are not resolved. Other indicators such as the Human Development Index and Multidimensional Poverty Index tend to give a more precise picture of economic development by pinpointing specific areas a country or region may be extraordinarily weak in. As mentioned previously, one of the main challenges encountered in the research was finding enough data for these holistic measures in order to conduct statistically significant tests. Nevertheless, at the end of the appendix<sup>21</sup>, two tables that track Bangladesh's progress in terms of human development from 1990-2015 and in multidimensional poverty in the years 2004, 2007, and 2011 were included. Interestingly, while Bangladesh's HDI has steadily improved in the past two decades, its HDI rankings with respect to the rest of the world has *decreased* in recent years. Also, the country has shown consistent progress in diminishing its MPI for a little less

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<sup>20</sup> It is important to note that there were only 24 observations for the female primary education variable, and thus this implication should be refrained from guiding policy decisions.

<sup>21</sup> Tables 5 and 6.



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than a decade. If more data became available for future research, it would be interesting to see to the extent to which higher education in women influences human development and multidimensional poverty.

## **Conclusion**

The purpose of this paper was to assess the degree to which higher education in women influences economic development in Bangladesh. With respect to the first model, from the offset, it had high hopes for finding a direct causal relationship between higher education in women and the female labour force participation rate, given the promising findings in the relevant literature. After performing an OLS regression test on the most pertinent data available, the null hypothesis could not be rejected and the research hypothesis that the Female Labour Force Participation Rate will be altered by higher education in women could *not* be convincingly supported. For future research, it is recommended that more comprehensive data is gathered on the Female Labour Force Participation Rate in women from the time period of 1950-2010 in order to perform a more rigorous statistical analysis from which definitive conclusions can be drawn.

With respect to the second model, the research hypothesis that GDP per capita would be affected by higher education in women, which was measured by the female tertiary education enrollment indicator, was to some extent supported. The null hypothesis was satisfactorily rejected, the residuals appeared to be random, and the R-squared value was an impressive 0.9551. That being said, it must be noted that the study's sample size was still not quite large enough for any conclusions to be made with confidence. Similar to the first model, it is recommended that future

research expands the data on female tertiary education levels. Only after statistically robust analyses can serious policy recommendations be made. However, the results from the control variables' coefficients table of the second model shows promise and indicates that placing more focus on improving, developing, and accelerating tertiary female education may be the best path forward.

Improving access to higher education for women in Bangladesh is critical for empowering them to escape formidable poverty traps and live more enriching lives. The positive externalities that would result from increasing the female tertiary levels are significant and should be prioritized. Higher education for women may be a vital ingredient in catalyzing Bangladesh's ascent towards becoming a middle-income country. This is why it is essential that more scrupulous research in the future be undertaken to study the relationship between higher education in women and economic development in Bangladesh. Imagine the progress the country could make if more girls were empowered like Afroza Khatun.

## Appendix

*Table 1: Bangladesh Female vs. Male Gross Enrollment Ratio in Primary & Secondary Education, and Enrollment Tertiary Education (per 100,000 inhabitants) 1970-2014*

Year	Female Primary (%)	Male Primary (%)	Female Secondary (%)	Male Secondary (%)	Female Tertiary	Male Tertiary
1970	36.1	74.1	~	~	36.2	318.8
1972	44.5	81.4	~	~	44.7	351.7
1974	49.0	96.6	~	~	55.2	463.3
1976	55.0	102.7	8.6	26.0	55.6	373.6
1977	55.3	91.6	7.3	26.7	67.8	412.0
1978	54.5	89.8	~	~	56.7	340.1
1979	54.1	88.4	6.8	26.5	83.3	498.0
1980	53.5	87.0	9.0	27.7	83.8	499.5
1981	57.3	80.9	6.2	26.3	83.0	493.9
1982	58.8	81.7	~	~	151.1	536.4
1983	54.3	88.4	~	~	164.9	702.3
1984	57.7	82.2	11.9	28.7	177.3	775.9
1985	55.5	80.1	11.5	28.4	193.5	786.6
1986	54.8	79.6	12.6	26.8	190.9	772.6
1987	53.8	78.2	12.7	27.4	156.9	679.4
1988	69.1	86.2	13.0	27.0	117.0	601.0
1989	69.4	85.8	13.1	26.4	116.6	592.0
1990	74.0	87.8	13.7	26.8	132.9	674.6
1999	~	~	46.5	46.9	363.1	731.0
2000	~	~	48.8	47.4	365.3	734.2
2001	~	~	51.3	47.5	453.8	851.5
2002	~	~	53.0	48.1	410.3	836.7
2003	~	~	52.7	47.9	413.7	843.7
2004	~	~	47.5	46.2	375.3	783.1
2005	100.9	96.5	47.0	44.1	434.8	833.4
2006	102.2	96.7	47.4	44.9	515.5	932.1
2007	102.2	95.2	48.1	45.7	554.0	1001.7
2008	99.5	93.7	47.6	42.3	622.2	1117.2
2009	102.2	97.5	50.4	46.7	790.4	1314.0
2011	115.1	108.7	54.5	47.3	1070.5	1542.9
2012	~	~	57.0	50.2	1097.1	1522.7
2014	~	~	~	~	1096.0	1500.4

Source: Education Statistics, World Bank Databank.

**Table 2: Bangladesh GDP per capita, GDP per capita, PPP, and GDP per capita growth rate, 1960-2016**

Year	GDP per capita (current US\$)	GDP per capita, PPP (current int. \$)	GDP per capita growth rate (annual %)
1960	88.7	~	
1961	97.1	~	3.1
1962	99.6	~	2.5
1963	101.3	~	-3.3
1964	99.5	~	7.7
1965	105.8	~	-1.5
1966	111.7	~	-0.7
1967	121.7	~	-5.1
1968	121.5	~	6.0
1969	133.6	~	-1.7
1970	138.2	~	3.0
1971	131.8	~	-7.4
1972	93.0	~	-15.5
1973	117.7	~	1.7
1974	179.0	~	7.7
1975	272.7	~	-6.0
1976	138.6	~	3.2
1977	128.8	~	0
1978	172.4	~	4.1
1979	196.4	~	1.9
1980	222.6	~	-1.9
1981	241.9	~	4.4
1982	215.4	~	-0.6
1983	199.3	~	1.1
1984	208.5	~	2.0
1985	239.0	~	0.6
1986	227.4	~	1.4
1987	247.1	~	1.0
1988	263.2	~	-0.3
1989	277.8	~	0.2
1990	297.6	832.4	3.0
1991	284.7	869.3	1.1
1992	285.1	916.5	3.1
1993	291.7	961.2	2.4
1994	290.7	998.0	1.7
1995	319.6	1048.2	2.9
1996	382.9	1092	2.3
1997	389.5	1136.4	2.3
1998	395.3	1183.4	3.0
1999	397.4	1232.4	2.6
2000	405.6	1301.5	3.3
2001	402.6	1372.4	3.1
2002	400.6	1420.4	1.9

Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank Databank.

**Table 3: Bangladesh GINI Index, 1983-2010**

Year	GINI Index (annual)
1983	25.9
1985	26.9
1988	28.9
1991	27.6
1995	32.9
2000	33.4
2005	33.2
2010	32.1

Source: Poverty and Equity Database, World Bank Databank

**Table 4: Life Expectancy at Birth and Population, total in Bangladesh 1960-2016**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Life Expectancy at Birth (yrs)</b>	<b>Population, total (in millions)</b>
1960	45.83	48.20
1961	46.46	49.59
1962	47.08	51.03
1963	47.69	52.53
1964	48.25	54.13
1965	48.68	55.83
1966	48.89	57.67
1967	48.83	59.62
1968	48.53	61.58
1969	48.05	63.42
1970	47.52	65.05
1971	47.14	66.42
1972	47.03	67.60
1973	47.29	68.69
1974	47.93	69.88
1975	48.87	71.31
1976	49.98	72.99
1977	51.10	74.93
1978	52.08	77.03
1979	52.88	79.24
1980	53.48	81.47
1981	53.92	83.72
1982	54.29	86.01
1983	54.68	88.34
1984	55.10	90.73
1985	55.58	93.20
1986	56.11	95.74
1987	56.66	98.34
1988	57.23	100.98
1989	57.81	103.60
1990	58.41	106.20
1991	59.04	108.73
1992	59.71	111.22
1993	60.41	113.70
1994	61.13	116.18
1995	61.87	118.71
1996	62.61	121.27
1997	63.34	123.85
1998	64.04	126.45
1999	64.70	129.03
2000	65.33	131.58
2001	65.90	134.11
2002	66.45	136.60
2003	66.97	139.02

Source: World Bank Databank.

**Table 5: Bangladesh HDI and HDI Ranking, 1990-2015**

<b>Year</b>	<b>HDI</b>	<b>HDI Ranking</b>
	0.386	122
1991	0.393	121
1992	0.400	119
1993	0.408	119
1994	0.415	119
1995	0.423	120
1996	0.432	120
1997	0.441	118
1998	0.450	116
1999	0.459	114
	0.468	126
2001	0.476	127
2002	0.484	128
2003	0.491	127
2004	0.499	127
2005	0.506	133
2006	0.513	136
2007	0.520	136
2008	0.523	134
2009	0.535	136
	0.545	143
2011	0.557	141
2012	0.565	143
2013	0.570	142
2014	0.575	142
2015	0.579	139

Source: Human Development Reports, UNDP.

**Table 6: Bangladesh Multidimensional Poverty 2004, 2007, 2011**

<b>Year</b>	<b><math>MPI_T</math></b>	<b><math>H_T</math>(Incidence)</b>	<b><math>A_T</math>(Intensity)</b>	<b><math>H_T^D</math>(Destitute)</b>
2004	0.364	67.1	54.3	29.0
2007	0.306	59.1	51.8	23.1
2011	0.245	49.6	49.3	17.4

Source: OPHI Country Briefing 2017, Bangladesh.

**Table 7: Bangladesh Exports, Remittances, & Export Growth 1960-2016**

Year	Exports (% of GDP)	Remittances (% of GDP)	Export Growth (%)
1960	10.0	~	~
1961	10.78	~	-11.5
1962	10.75	~	20.8
1963	9.98	~	4.83
1964	10.03	~	3.74
1965	9.66	~	-5.19
1966	10.28	~	14.33
1967	9.31	~	-11.77
1968	8.33	~	4.00
1969	8.15	~	4.60
1970	8.31	~	10.48
1971	6.29	~	-27.62
1972	5.67	~	-22.89
1973	6.54	~	85.75
1974	3.70	~	-29.44
1975	2.90	~	12.17
1976	4.75	0.19	24.77
1977	7.04	0.82	25.45
1978	5.56	0.87	-7.67
1979	6.11	1.10	16.5
1980	5.49	1.87	0.14
1981	5.13	1.88	-31.77
1982	5.08	2.84	-4.46
1983	5.60	3.65	9.24
1984	3.40	2.65	-0.94
1985	5.38	2.26	7.90
1986	5.18	2.65	-1.15
1987	4.99	3.08	1.90
1988	5.43	2.87	10.68
1989	5.54	2.63	8.90
1990	5.91	2.46	17.79
1991	6.66	2.49	-3.09
1992	7.59	2.88	21.85
1993	9.02	3.04	16.39
1994	9.00	3.41	3.68
1995	10.86	3.17	30.72
1996	9.71	2.90	8.08
1997	10.52	3.16	14.32
1998	11.76	3.21	12.27
1999	11.76	3.52	2.25
2000	12.34	3.69	14.4
2001	13.39	3.90	14.9
2002	12.41	5.22	-0.13
2003	11.43	5.31	-1.70

Source: World Bank Databank.

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## **FRAMING BIAS AND IDENTITY CHARACTERISTICS IN THE PORTRAYAL OF TERRORISTS IN AMERICAN NEWS MEDIA**

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### **Abstract**

A narrative of “Islamic terrorism” has risen globally and in the U.S. since the increase of terrorist attacks following 9/11. With over 385 terrorism charges in the U.S. since 2001, these violent acts have run rampant throughout the nation. Media in the form of print/online news, broadcast, radio, and podcasts plays a major role in the representation of terrorist attacks to the general public. Of interest is to explore apparent trends in media framing as news outlets cover terrorist attacks differently based on the identity of the perpetrator. The framing of an individual based on his or her identity, which is composed of race, religion, or political ideology, feeds into creating a false narrative regarding these specific identity characteristics. In order to analyze the portrayal of terrorists in the media based on their identities, this study conducts a two-pronged longitudinal content analysis following the *New York Times*’ coverage of ten terrorist attacks occurring in the U.S. post-9/11. The study’s findings indicate that a terrorist’s identity is significant in the framing of said individual; terrorists who are Muslim and/or of non-Anglo-Saxon descent are framed in a more politicized and racialized manner than terrorists who are non-Muslim and/or of Anglo-Saxon descent, who are framed in a more humanized manner.

### **Introduction**

Major news outlets have a significant role in shaping the political reality for individuals. In the United States, news outlets have been part of the force creating a fabricated connection between Muslims and terrorism, specifically since 9/11. The false narrative of “Islamic terrorism” and “Islamic extremism” running rampant in the U.S. has risen since the actions of al-Qaeda in 2001. Feeding into islamophobia, American news media have failed to recognize the real perpetrators committing terrorist acts

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within the bounds of our country.

A news report from The Nation Institute's Investigative Fund and The Center for Investigative Reporting's Reveal found the number of terrorist attacks by right-wing extremists in the U.S. (2008-2016) almost doubled compared to the amount carried out by extremists associated with Islam<sup>1</sup>. As an influential force, news media should provide a voice for those who would otherwise be silenced. In the case of Muslim and foreign-born communities, several major news outlets have done the opposite by spreading a rhetoric rooted in hate. Additionally, American news outlets skew the image of the Muslim and immigrant persona by failing to amplify the voices and concerns of these communities. Members of these communities should be given ample opportunities to speak for and about themselves in order to achieve accurate representation, rather than leaving the images presented by misguided news commentary to serve as the main source of representation.

Since news media have heavy influence over their readerships' perceptions of certain concepts, people, and events, this study seeks to explore the bias in the portrayal of terrorists on the basis of identity characteristics present in news media post-9/11. For this study, major news outlets and media sources are narrowed down to print news media specifically; major is defined by the newspaper's circulation level. Previous research has not tackled the question of portrayal based on identity characteristics using the comparison of multiple attacks. This study seeks to analyze the portrayal of terrorists in print news media based on identity

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<sup>1</sup> Ruiz-Grossman, S. (2017, 23 June). Most of America's Terrorists are White, and Not Muslim. The Huffington Post.

characteristics such as race, religion, and political ideology.

### **Literature Review: Media Framing, Agenda-Setting, and Priming**

Goffman's frame analysis explains the way that individuals organize and order their most salient personal events and experiences. Individuals structure ideas to understand their underlying concepts, guiding future action.

...definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principals of organization which govern events, and our subjective involvement in them;

frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify... (Goffman, 1974)

A key component in creating said "frames" is information filtering, a tactic used by media outlets to influence audiences. The information fed to the general public is actively consumed and enforced, therefore allowing media sources to have enormous power in controlling what people know and what conclusions they are able to draw from the information provided. When these "frames" address both the diagnosis and prognosis of a problem, as well as an attempted resolution to said problem, they are called collection actions, a type of framing proposed by Snow and Benford following Goffman (1988).

In terms of media influence, framing goes hand-in-hand with agenda-setting theory, defined as the ability of mass media to ultimately define the salience of specific events, experiences, and topics for its audiences by the way it organizes its public agenda. McCombs and Shaw claim the way news is chosen and displayed plays an important part in shaping individuals' political reality (1972). Through repetition of certain ideas, use of specific language, and implementation of specific framing techniques, media

outlets are able to influence a readership's beliefs about certain groups, concepts, and topics. News outlets most easily do so by constant association of ideas and/or people previously unassociated by readers. The consistent association of two ideas with no pre-existing correlational/causal relationship, called priming, is a key component in both agenda-setting and framing. Priming is the association of specific concepts together due to constant dual exposure. Grounded in cognitive psychology and rooted specifically within conditioning concepts, media priming is defined by how the human memory stores an idea or concept because of its previous associations. These associations are often manipulated by news media through frames used to portray individuals, experiences, and events (Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2012).

In the case of American media coverage of terrorist attacks occurring globally, priming plays a part in readership association between the concepts of terrorism and extremism with Islam, Muslims, and darker-skinned or foreign-born individuals. Combining priming and information filtering, news editors decide what will and will not be included in news articles, in turn determining what associations will be formed between concepts for their readerships (Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2012; Goffman, 1974). In a framing bias study, Robert Entman illustrated the link between agenda-setting, priming, and framing as tools of power for media outlets. Directly related to the phenomena of bias and news slant, each of these concepts affect how audiences perceive messages due to both the selection of information provided as well as how it is presented (Entman, 2007).

### *Critical Race Theory*

Critical Race Theory plays a significant role in the framing of terrorists

through American news media, providing an explanation as to how social institutions, including news outlets, instigate microaggressions as a tool of oppressing multicultural and minority groups (Cappiccie, Chadha, Lin, & Snyder, 2012). Developed by a group of scholars in the 1970s, critical race theory serves to provide a lens of ethnicity, prejudice, and structural inequity through which concepts regarding race and class can be examined (Cappiccie, Chadha, Lin, & Snyder, 2012). In the case of media framing, framing components – specifically word choice and use of stereotypical language – if used strategically, have the power to oppress minority groups existent within a society. In news media, neutral reporting can be plagued by the use of harsh verbs and descriptors as well as small remarks playing on existent stereotypes. While they might be potentially unnoticeable in singular instances, these microaggressions feed into visualizing a specific persona behind certain identity characteristics (Jeffries, D. & Jeffries, R., 2017).

### *Relevant Literature*

A handful of studies have considered the variance in framing of terrorist attacks and their respective perpetrators in Western media due to the persona of the perpetrator. Most, however, have been case studies examining a specific attack and the news coverage following it. Several previous studies examined the coverage of the terrorist attack by Anders Breivik in Norway, 2011. Studies by Berntzen and Sandberg (2014) and Falheimer and Olsson (2015) exposed how “lone-wolf” terrorists need to be seen as acting from rhetoric embedded in a much larger social movement. The categorization of a terrorist as a “lone-wolf” is detrimental in preventing similar acts in the future because the “lone-wolf” narrative makes the perpetrator an outlier; the odd one out of many (Berntzen &

Sandberg, 2014). If an actor is considered the odd one out of many, an entire group's (i.e. Anglo-Saxon, non-Muslim) potential to commit terrorist acts is swept under the rug as simply "out of the ordinary." Berntzen and Sandberg's study did not hone in on any specific news outlet or gather data specifically from certain articles published by a singular outlet. Instead, their case study focused only on Breivik's attack and provided a structure as to how collective action framing played a part in the news coverage of his attack. Falkheimer and Olsson focused on Norwegian news media, conducting content analysis on 924 news articles from two major Norwegian newspapers in the two weeks following Breivik's attacks (2015). The study concluded the framing utilized to depict Breivik resulted in the depoliticized portrayal of Breivik and his attacks, portraying him as a sole – and potentially mentally unstable– actor (Falheimer & Olsson, 2015).

Previous studies related to inaccurate media representation addressed the issue of skewed framing and portrayal in the U.S. and Canada of terrorism through broadcast coverage, a medium form where framing, priming, and agenda-setting play a major role (Wittebol, 1992). Information filtering, for individuals, can often times be attributed to the content on their nightly news channels. The capacity of conducting a study like Wittebol's using broadcast sources is far more complex as more factors play into portrayal of certain individuals over others – amount of screen-time, use of mugshots, length of clips played/at what time, interviews/soundbites used, etc.

In this paper, a comparative procedure similar to that used by Schildkraut and Muschert in their comparison of the effects of media salience in the framing of mass murders in schools (2013) is used. Thus far, there has been limited literature providing solid comparisons on the topic

of terrorist portrayal and identity characteristics, however Schildkraut and Muschert compare print news coverage of two major mass school shootings. In "Media Salience and the Framing of Mass Murder in Schools: A Comparison of the Columbine and Sandy Hook Massacres," Schildkraut and Muschert address the concept of "issue-attention cycle." Proposed by Anthony Downs, "issue-attention cycle" explains the process by which events make their way into the news, gain salience from readership and/or viewers, and are then replaced by new events and stories (1972). "Issue-attention cycle" directly relates to agenda-setting, and is relevant for this study in terms of assessing headline content as headlines may be more or less politicized or racialized due to their salience at the current time in the current media. The experimental design for this study will be grounded in running content analysis similar to those run by Falkheimer and Olsson. A comparative procedure similar to that of Schildkraut and Muschert will be implemented.

## **Methods**

To address a question not fully answered by previous associated literature, this study proposes the question: *To what extent do major news outlets in the U.S. construe the portrayal of terrorists based on the identity of the perpetrator of the attack post-9/11?* Previous research addressed the question of skewed media framing for specific attacks, yet failed to compare framing between attacks on the basis of identity characteristics: in this case, specifically race and religion. Of interest is to explore and compare the differences in levels of politicization and racialization of a perpetrator's media framing as per the ethnicity and/or religious affiliation of the perpetrator of a terrorist attack. Analyzing the question through the lens of print media, specifically *The New York Times*, is relevant to the



perception of the concept of terrorism as a whole to the newspaper's readership. The lens through which news media frame perpetrators of terrorist attacks based on identity characteristics influences the way the American public views these identities. Focusing on *The New York Times* for this study is pertinent due to its influence on the American population as the second most highly circulated print/online newspaper in the nation.<sup>2</sup> Additionally, as a paper with a left-leaning perspective, it is expected that *The New York Times* would be less likely to frame perpetrators based on their religious or racial backgrounds than that of a right-leaning counterpart.<sup>3</sup>

In order to analyze the portrayal of terrorist in the media on the basis of identity, a qualitative longitudinal content analysis is conducted on *The New York Times'* immediate coverage of attacks federally labeled "acts of terrorism" post-9/11. Analyzing a total of ten attacks from 2001-present, this study surveys the framing of the articles and their respective headlines published by *The New York Times* in the 15-day period following the attack, including the day of the attack. The content analyses are run to test the hypothesis that if a perpetrator of a terror attack is Muslim and/or of non-Anglo-Saxon descent, the framing of the perpetrator will be more politicized and racialized than if the perpetrator is non-Muslim and/or of Anglo-Saxon descent.

A total of 107 articles<sup>4</sup> and their respective headlines are analyzed and rated using a five-point Likert Scale measure to survey the articles' and

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<sup>2</sup> State of the News Media 2016. (2016). Pew Research Center.

<sup>3</sup> Jutel, O. (2016). The liberal field of journalism and the political—The New York Times, Fox News, and the Tea Party. *Journalism: Theory, Practice, and Criticism* 17(8), 1129-45.

headlines' racial and political content in regards to the framing of the perpetrators of said attacks.<sup>5</sup> The five points of the scale include: *positive*, *neutral-positive*, *neutral*, *neutral-negative*, and *negative*.<sup>6</sup> The basis for rating lies in specific wording, tone, article structure, use of stereotypical language, re-emphasis of key ideas and identity characteristics through repetition, and use of visuals. Attacks are chosen using a purposive and convenience sampling method on the basis of similarities in attack methodology, weaponry, and number of fatalities/casualties.<sup>7</sup> All attacks

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<sup>4</sup> All articles surveyed are from the News section of The New York Times. Articles cross-published on the Times' website are not surveyed. Similarly, articles from the Opinion, Reader Center, and other Times sections are not surveyed.

<sup>5</sup> The five-point Likert Scale utilized is based off of that used by Perry in a research study following The New York Times' coverage of pre-primary Black presidential candidates. Perry, R. (2010). First Impressions, "American's Paper" and Pre-Primary Black Presidential Candidates: The New York Times Coverage of Rev. Jesse Jackson (1983), Rev. Al Sharpton (2003), and Sen. Barack Obama (2007) Campaign Announcements and Initial Days. *Ethnic Studies Review*, 33(2), 83-108.

<sup>6</sup> To analyze article and headline content, a five-point Likert Scale was created where *positive*, *neutral-positive*, *neutral*, *neutral-negative*, and *negative* were assigned to each article and its respective headline chosen for the study based on the content coded in each. *Positive* articles frame the attack's perpetrator in a depoliticized manner without stereotypical language, failing to mention or focus on race, religion, political ideology, and/or extremist affiliation. Further than purely depoliticized, *positive* articles humanize the perpetrator, focusing on details about the perpetrator's personal life and quality characteristics. These articles also use passive verbs and nouns to characterize the attacker and his/her actions. *Positive* articles fail to categorize the attack and its respective perpetrator as an act of terrorism and terrorist, respectively. If a visual is used, it is a personal photograph, rather than a mugshot. *Neutral-positive* articles depoliticize the image of the perpetrator by focusing more on the attack victims. These articles stray away from stereotypical language and use passive verbs and nouns to characterize the attacker and his/her actions. *Neutral-positive* articles do not necessarily humanize the perpetrator, however do not focus/reemphasize the perpetrator's race, religion, political ideology, and/or extremist affiliation as is relevant. *Neutral* articles do not attach stereotypical language to the identity characteristics mentioned and a mugshot, if any photo, is used. *Neutral* verbs and nouns are used to characterize the attacker and his/her actions. *Neutral-negative* articles frame the perpetrator in a more politicized and racialized manner than the previous three. These articles focus on and stress the race, religion, political ideology, and extremist affiliation of the perpetrator. *Neutral-negative* articles may use slight stereotypical language in characterizing the perpetrator. These articles may categorize the attack and its respective perpetrator as terrorism & terrorist, respectively. A mug shot is typically used, and the articles focuses on the attacker's motive and method of attack rather than the attacker's personal life or the attack victims. *Negative* articles frame the perpetrator in a highly politicized and racialized manner with a heavy emphasis and focus on race, religion, political ideology, and/or potential extremist affiliations/tendencies. The content repeatedly uses politically- fueled words like "terrorism", "terrorist", "extremist", and uses harsher verbs than the previous ratings. *Negative* articles use a heavy amount of stereotypical language and fail to create any sort of humanized identity behind the perpetrator. *Negative* articles also see use of a mugshot to visualize the perpetrator.

<sup>7</sup> The attacks analyzed include: 2002 Los Angeles International Airport shooting, Knoxville Unitarian Universalist church shooting (2008), Wisconsin Sikh temple shooting (2012), 2014 Pennsylvania State Police barracks attack, 2014 Las Vegas shootings, 2014 Queens hatchet attack, 2015 Chattanooga

chosen to survey fall within the post-9/11 time period and are federally labelled “acts of terrorism” by the F.B.I. or associated authorities.<sup>8</sup> The sample of ten attacks is split up into two groups—Group [A] and Group [B] for comparative analysis purposes.<sup>9</sup>

Obstacles for the current experimental methodology exist within the time limitation. This limit specifically leads to a smaller sample size, smaller time frame of analysis, and ability to survey content from only one form of news media (i.e. print) and one specific outlet (the *New York Times*). A separate obstacle exists in the heavy influence of researcher’s bias as the researcher surveys each article and respective headline. The articles and headlines are further influenced by being rated on a Likert scale created by the researcher. The results are most likely skewed slightly due to the data collection method being based in human judgement/choice.

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shootings, Ohio State University attack (2016), Unite the Right rally (2017), and 2017 Lower Manhattan attack.

<sup>8</sup> Articles selected are all identified as “acts of terror” by the F.B.I. or associated authorities. The attacks not federally labeled as terrorism or fail to charge the perpetrator with terrorism include: the Knoxville Unitarian Universalist church shooting (2008) and the vehicular attack at the 2017 United the Right rally. The perpetrator of the vehicular attack was formally charged with second-degree murder and other crimes. Despite these charges, the attack was formally denounced as “domestic terrorism” by the current U.S. Attorney General and Justice Department (Myre, G. (2017). Why the Government Can’t Bring Terrorism Charges in Charlottesville. National Public Radio.) The Knoxville Unitarian Universalist church shooting falls directly under the federal definition of terrorism. Similarly, the perpetrator’s letter of motive found after the attack is comparable to that of the manifesto of Anders Breivik, found post-terror attacks in Norway, 2011 (Berntzen L. E. & Sandberg, S. (2014). The Collective Nature of Lone Wolf Terrorism: Anders Behring Breivik and the Anti-Islamic Social Movement. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26, 759-79.)

<sup>9</sup> Attacks are split up on the basis of the religious affiliation (if known) and ethnicity of the respective perpetrator for comparative analysis purposes. Group [A] is composed of attacks committed by perpetrators who are non-Muslim and/or of Anglo-Saxon descent. [A] includes: Knoxville Unitarian Universalist church shooting, Wisconsin Sikh temple shooting, 2014 Pennsylvania State Police barracks attack, 2014 Las Vegas shootings, and United the Right rally. Group [B] is composed of attacks committed by perpetrators who are Muslim and/or of non-Anglo-Saxon descent. [B] includes: 2002 Los Angeles International Airport shooting, 2014 Queens hatchet attack, 2015 Chattanooga shootings, Ohio State University attack, and 2017 Lower Manhattan attack.

## Data Results

In running content analysis on each article and respective headline, ratings are applied with a focus on word choice – specifically verb and descriptor tone, use of stereotypical language, repetition, and use of visuals. In reporting terrorist attacks, print news outlets typically release articles to cover the following: a ‘breaking news’ story with the run-down of the attack including who was involved, attack methodology, number killed/injured, etc.; anywhere from one to three profile stories on the perpetrator, some assessing attack motive, others focusing on personal life; a profile story on the victims and/or victim community; and updates by the F.B.I. and/or political officials later on in the fifteen days following the attack with information about the investigation.

### *New York Times Coverage of non-Muslim/Anglo-Saxon Perpetrators: Group [A]*

Of the five attacks sampled for Group [A], 55 articles and headlines were analyzed. In analysis, a trend of humanizing and neutral language, use of visuals aside from a mugshot, and emphasis on personal characteristics is apparent. In the first few articles released following an attack, several of the articles left identity characteristics out when describing the perpetrator, and often times did not mention a name. Typical descriptors included the presumed age and gender of the perpetrator; i.e. “a 41-year old man,” “an Ohio man,” “a 31-year old man,” etc. Race and religion is typically not mentioned for the Anglo-Saxon perpetrators; if either characteristic is, they are not repeated and emphasized to the extent that Group [B] sees. Profile articles for Group [A] perpetrators are where most of the positive ratings arise. In journalism, profile stories are a type of feature story which focus on a specific person. In the case of these perpetrator profiles, reporters focus on different aspects of these

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individuals' lives than would be expected in visualizing a terrorist. The profile stories contained the most humanizing descriptors and details about the terrorists to make them seem like everyday people.

In framing terrorist Wade M. Page, responsible for the Wisconsin Sikh temple shooting in 2012, the repeated character descriptors throughout articles were "Army veteran" and "rock singer" – misleading descriptors when depicting the perpetrator of a terrorist attack. Additionally, personal details unaffiliated with the attack or motive of the attacker at all were largely included in Group [A] articles.

Peter Hoyt, 53, a neighbor of Mr. Page's in Cudahy who often stopped to chat with him during his morning walks, said he was "stunned" that the man he had known could have done something so violent. Mr. Page, he said, told him that he had broken up with a girlfriend in early June.

In an article addressing Page's ties to the white supremacist movement, descriptions about his music career became the central ideas rather than his extremist affiliations.

Mr. Page's life as a white power musician playing violence-inciting songs was surprisingly open. He did interviews, posted photos on MySpace pages (one shows him playing guitar with a noose in the background), performed at festivals and even spoke candidly about his beliefs with an academic researching the movement.

When describing Page's affiliations with the white supremacist movement, largely neutral language (i.e. "his beliefs," "the movement," etc.) and sometimes *positive* language (i.e. "white power," insinuating a form of personal empowerment behind the movement) is largely used, gaining Page's articles *positive* ratings.

Similarly, several articles received *neutral-positive* ratings on the basis of the articles' inability to describe the perpetrator as a "terrorist" directly, using more neutral descriptors in place. Neutral terms such as "suspect," "gunman," "survivalist," "driver," and "man" were chosen as descriptors for the perpetrators rather than more politically-fueled words such as "terrorist" or "extremist." These passive nouns made a hefty appearance in headline content, specifically (mentioned below).

Articles that were not profile stories which used these types of descriptors automatically became neutral in nature, and ended up being assigned *neutral-positive* or *neutral-negative* based on other framing details. For example, in the case of James Alex Fields, perpetrator of the vehicular attack at the Unite the Right rally in 2017, word choice and humanizing language played a part in determining the article's rating. The article's use of humanizing descriptors and inability to mention that the case was being investigated as an act of domestic terrorism, mentioning him only as a "driver," creates a less politically and racially fueled frame. Describing him as "a very bright kid," "quiet teenager," and a "very quiet little boy," the article's focus on Fields' childhood creates an image of a young man whose actions are completely out-of-line with what would be expected. The framing implemented in Fields' case feeds into the "lone-wolf" rhetoric (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014), pushing the fact that despite ties to right-wing extremist groups, Fields was a lone actor – disassociated from a larger movement from any source.

Group [A]'s headlines consisted of a great deal of neutral language – often written in passive voice – leading to *positive* and *neutral* ratings. A trend in headline content is the typical use of neutral terms in place of "terrorist" or "extremist" or "terror attack"—typically words like "suspect,"

“man,” or “driver” were used instead. In several articles, the perpetrator is not mentioned with a neutral term at all; rather he/she is completely removed and disassociated from the headline. Headlines which did so received *positive* or *n/a* ratings, depending on the rest of the framing of the headline.

*New York Times Coverage of Muslim/non-Anglo-Saxon Perpetrators: Group [B]*

In comparison, the five attacks sampled for Group [B] had 52 articles and headlines analyzed. Key trends in analysis formed in the use of stereotypical language, harsh descriptors, and the repetition and emphasis on race and religion. Stereotypical language played an influential role in Group [B]’s ratings. Specific wording and phrases included within articles and headlines contributing to existing stereotypes about the perpetrator’s religion and/or ethnic background were generally rated *neutral-negative* if the amount of stereotypical language was generous; if it was superfluous and combined with harsh language and politicized/racialized descriptors, the rating dropped down to *negative*. Opposing the humanizing language and descriptors generally characterizing most of Group [A]’s profile stories, Group [B] profile stories emphasized the perpetrator’s roots outside of the U.S., and their background in foreign countries— feeding into the stereotype that terrorists are a foreign-born agent. In the case of the 2015 Chattanooga shootings, articles regarding perpetrator Mohammad Youssuf Abdulazeez saw a fair share of stereotypical language.

On Friday, Ossama Bahloul, the imam of the Islamic Center of Murfreesboro, said the attack in Chattanooga ‘was shocking to everyone’ because Mr. Abdulazeez seemed so American, having grown up and gone to school in Tennessee.

The inclusion of the information above feeds into a stereotype that the

terrorist attack committed by Abdulzeez are acts “Americans” are incapable of committing. The association between foreign-born bodies and terrorism is primed for a medium’s readership through descriptors like these. This article used stronger verbs and wrote in an active voice rather than passive (which several of Group [A]’s articles were written as), using verbs like “dominated,” “pummeling,” “killed” and “slaughter.” The use of hard verbs and heavy stereotypical language resulted in several of the articles for the 2015 Chattanooga shootings receiving *negative* and *neutral-negative* ratings. Any articles in which the words “terrorist,” “terrorism,” “extremist” or “extremism” were used heavily or superfluously received *negative* ratings due to how politically-charged each of those words are; contributing to the association of certain groups with these politically charged words.

The *negative* rating when these politically-charged words are used superfluously was specifically evident in Group [B]’s headlines analysis. Compared to Group [A] headlines, which leaned towards neutral nominal descriptors for the perpetrators, Group [B] headlines saw “terrorist,” “terror attack,” or “extremist” mentioned in a hefty number of headlines – therefore receiving *negative* ratings. A headline’s word choice plays a large role in the framing of the article as a whole (Jutel, 2016): the way the article is introduced by its title sets the stage for how the reader will approach the article’s content itself (Jutel, 2016). Similarly, headlines serve as clickbait. The more striking the wording used, the more circulated an article becomes. The more striking the headline is worded, the more salient it seems to a reader (Schildkraut & Muschert, 2015). Salience leads to the emphasis of the content in the article, which is ultimately more politicized and racialized in nature for Group [B].



## Findings & Implications

Following the analysis and rating of 107 articles and respective headlines<sup>10</sup>, the results of the attacks committed by perpetrators of Muslim and/or non-Anglo-Saxon descent and those of Anglo-Saxon descent and/or other religious affiliations are compared. The results are as follows:

TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF ARTICLE CONTENT ANALYSES<sup>11</sup>

	Positive	Neutral-Positive	Neutral	Neutral-Negative	Negative	n/a	Total
Group [A]	6	15 (27.3%)	16 (29%)	3	2	13	55
Group [B]	2	2	6	14 (26.9%)	21 (40.4%)	7	52

TABLE 2: COMPARISON OF HEADLINE CONTENT ANALYSES

	Positive	Neutral-Positive	Neutral	Neutral-Negative	Negative	n/a	Total
Group [A]	16 (29%)	7	14 (25.4%)	1	1	16	55
Group [B]	0	1	18 (34.6%)	9	21 (40.4%)	3	52

A total of 55 articles and headlines are surveyed for Group [A], while a total of 52 articles and headlines are surveyed for Group [B]. A majority of Group [A]'s articles rated either *neutral-positive* (27%) or *neutral* (29%). A majority of Group [B]'s articles rated either *negative* (40%) or *neutral-*

<sup>10</sup> Appendix available upon request

<sup>11</sup> Articles are left unlabeled (n/a) if the content is relevant coverage of the attack, however does not mention/is not focused on the perpetrator of the attack. Examples include victim & victim community profiles, released statements by law enforcement officials and political authorities, and updates at the attack site. Headlines are also left unlabeled (n/a) if the headline fails to include any language regarding the perpetrator. All articles labeled n/a received headline ratings of the same.

*negative* (27%). For headline content, a majority of Group [A]'s article headlines rated either *positive* (29%) or *neutral* (25%); while a majority of Group [B]'s article headlines rated either *negative* (40%) or *neutral* (35%). The results indicate a trend consistent with the proposed idea that *negative* framing is associated with individuals who are Muslim and typically foreign-born. With forty percent *negative* ratings for attacks perpetrated by such individuals, the Times' immediate framing leaned very politicized and racialized. Compared to the twenty-nine and twenty-seven percent *neutral* and *neutral-positive* article ratings, respectively, and twenty-nine percent positive headline ratings for perpetrators of the opposite group, there is a clear difference in reporting techniques and information filtering used depending on identity characteristics.

Consistent with the originally-proposed hypothesis, results shift from relatively neutral article content to highly *negative* content as the perpetrator's identity shifts. Similarly, a shift from highly *positive* headlines to highly *negative* headlines occurs with the same identity shift. An anticipated result of majority *positive* ratings for Group [A] was disproved in article content; only 6 articles, or eleven percent, received *positive* ratings. Notable in rating is that the only type of articles that received *positive* ratings were profile articles on the perpetrators; for both groups. Additionally notable is that articles which received *negative* ratings received headline ratings of the same. The anticipated result of majority *positive* ratings for Group [A] was proven in headline analysis with 16 articles, or twenty-nine percent, rated *positive*. Group [A] sees a far larger share of neutral reporting across both analyses in comparison to Group [B]—however, Group [B] saw a substantial amount of neutral headlines,

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with 18 articles, or thirty-five percent.<sup>12</sup>

The implications of research lie in the necessity of eradicating the bias in reporting on foreign-born and Muslim bodies—the skewed portrayal of non-Muslim and Anglo-Saxon attackers has left focus off of the right-wing extremists. The highly politicized and racialized content features throughout the reports regarding attacks by Muslims and/or foreign-born individuals has fed into the stereotype that extremists are only associated with Islam. Through the use of priming and agenda-setting, media outlets have provided a false association of Muslims and/or individuals of non-Anglo-Saxon descent, whether terrorists or not, with the concepts of terrorism and extremism. Meanwhile, the alternate group has become associated with the “lone-wolf” rhetoric: he/she is one actor of a group who could never come to represent the group as a whole. News outlets should strive to neutrally report on every event as it occurs, providing its readership with the most accurate, impartial information as possible. While all judgement could not possibly be extracted, the use of specific verbs, descriptors, stereotypical language, and visuals changes the entire frame personifying an individual. Expansions of this study could provide more specific evidence as to why certain attacks receive slanted coverage compared to others.

This study provides a generous amount of room to be expanded upon. Confounding variables for this study may lie in the lack of access to information by reporters assigned stories, other pressing events and news

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<sup>12</sup> Group [B] result percentages for headline content analyses are of greater value than those of Group [A] due to the amount of unlabeled (n/a) headlines that Group [A] received. With sixteen unlabeled articles, Group [A] percentages are skewed, as 29% of the headlines were not labeled. Rather than comparing the literal values of the percentages obtained, categories which received the highest number of ratings are compared within each group.

stories occurring alongside the attack, and potentially the communities affected by the attack. Eliminating and/or accounting for these in a study able to focus solely on the independent and dependent variable at hand would be most preferred and reliable. Expansions of the research would be the study conducted without its main two obstacles: time limitations and judgement bias. This study conducted without a time limitation would provide the ability to sample a larger number of attacks, potentially more representative of different ethnic and religious groups, as well as provide the ability to survey articles from a longer time period post-attack. Lifting time restrictions could also provide the opportunity to survey article and headline content through a different news outlet, or multiple outlets and compile data from all.

While it is not physically possible to eliminate any and all judgement bias when using a man-made scale and allowing human judgement to analyze content, a way to potentially improve the study would be to allow multiple individuals to analyze and provide ratings, and/or provide a strict measurement scale based solely on specific word choices, number of words, and use of visuals (measurements that can be strictly enumerated or answered yes or no) in order to avoid the use of excessive judgement in rating. Intriguing for further research within the topic's bounds would be exploring the correlation between the identity characteristics of reporters with the rating portrayal of attackers. It would also be interesting to survey solely profile articles to see if the trend noticed in this study does necessarily exist outside of the scope of this project.

## **Conclusion**

The findings of this study are consistent with the original hypothesis that if the perpetrator of a terrorist attack is Muslim and/or of non-Anglo-

Saxon descent, the media framing of the perpetrator will be more politicized and racialized than if the perpetrator is not Muslim and/or is of Anglo-Saxon descent. As a highly-circulated newspaper with a huge readership, *The New York Times* is influential in the priming of readers through the choice of framing used. After examining the news coverage in the fifteen days following ten separate terrorist attacks which occurred in the U.S. post-9/11, it is clear there is a difference between the framing techniques *The New York Times* uses to cover perpetrators of one racial/religious background in comparison to another. The data results show that more politicized and racialized content in the form of stereotypical language, active verbs, and fueled descriptors/visuals appear in articles and headlines covering attacks perpetrated by individuals who are Muslim and/or of non-Anglo-Saxon descent. The opposite is found for individuals who are non-Muslim and/or of Anglo-Saxon descent, where articles and headlines are flooded with humanizing vocabulary, neutral descriptors, passive verbs, and *positive* images. News media hold a great deal of power in visualizing a political reality for their readerships. The elimination of news slant in the portrayal of terrorist attacks is particularly necessary for the mobilization and success of marginalized ethnic and religious groups who get the runt end in the current reporting style. Language, visuals, tone, and other content must be chosen precisely so as to portray individuals in the correct light as is deemed necessary, and to carry out the true purpose of the media – to impartially inform and educate.

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## **THE “DRONE MEMO” AND THE TARGETED KILLING OF ANWAR AL-AULAQI**

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### **Abstract**

In 2011, the Obama administration employed a lethal drone strike against Anwar al-Aulaqi, both a US citizen and known terrorist. The “drone memo,” authored by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, seeks to justify this drone strike as an appropriate use of wartime power by the Commander-in-Chief. In doing so, the memo distorts the scope of presidential authority granted by the Constitution and Congress, and ignores fundamental elements of Constitutional due process guarantees. To preserve the constitutional integrity of all three branches of the federal government, judicial review must be made available to the targets of overwhelming executive power.

### **Introduction**

While recent presidential administrations have garnered much criticism for their use of unmanned drones as a means of waging the global war on terror, perhaps no single incident has become so infamous as the targeted killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi. In addition to being a senior member of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), with verifiable links to known terrorist plots, al-Aulaqi was a US citizen. The Obama administration, considering him an imminent threat to national security, targeted al-Aulaqi in a lethal drone strike in 2011. His death reignited a debate with roots in the nation’s founding, concerning both the scope of presidential power and the extent to which the Constitution protects civil liberties in extraordinary times. The Obama administration, in response to congressional pressure and litigation brought by the ACLU, released its legal rationale for the strike in the “drone memo,” a document which justifies the targeting as an appropriate exercise of wartime power by the Commander in Chief. In



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doing so, the memo distorts the scope of presidential authority granted by the Constitution and Congress and ignores fundamental elements of Constitutional due process guarantees.

### **The President in Foreign Affairs**

Although the framers of the Constitution envisioned a government in which most power flowed from the legislature, they nonetheless endowed the chief executive with a great degree of independence and autonomy in the realm of foreign affairs (O'Brien, 2017). Both Alexander Hamilton and James Madison acknowledged in *The Federalist Papers* that, in preserving national security, the president is not strictly limited to his or her enumerated Constitutional powers (O'Brien, 2017). Indeed, it is common practice for Congress, the Supreme Court, and the public to defer to the president in making decisions that involve international diplomacy or foreign threats (O'Brien, 2017).

Illustrative of this trend, the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in *US v. Curtiss-Wright* established that Congress did not unconstitutionally delegate its power by authorizing the president to impose an arms embargo on Paraguay and Bolivia (1936). The outcome of the case rested largely on the fact that the federal government was acting in the foreign, rather than domestic, realm (*Curtiss-Wright*, 1936). As the executive branch is the only unified branch of government, the Court determined that the framers intended it to act as the nation's sole representative in the context of international affairs (*Curtiss-Wright*, 1936). In consideration of this mindset, the majority concluded that it is appropriate for Congress to defer to the president concerning matters of national security (*Curtiss-Wright*, 1936). This decision set an important precedent supporting the

dominance of executive authority, whenever it is exercised to pursue foreign policy interests (*Curtiss-Wright*, 1936).

Further cementing the chief executive's central role in the conduct of international relations, the Court, in *Dames & Moore v. Regan*, ruled that the president acted appropriately in ordering the termination of all US court proceedings against the Iranian government, as a means of pursuing a hostage agreement (1981). After determining that the president had neither acted with nor against the *explicit* will of the Constitution or Congress, the majority turned to the specific facts of the case and subsequently decided that the president had acted upon an *implied* grant of power found in existing law (*Dames and Moore*, 1981)<sup>1</sup>. In justifying this use of executive authority, the Court again upheld the principle that, unless specifically constrained, the president has substantial discretion in managing the nation's relationship with the global community (*Dames and Moore*, 1981).

Beyond these traditional exercises of diplomacy, however, one must also understand presidential power in the context of war. Although the Constitution divides the power to wage war between the executive and legislative branches, the president has nonetheless ordered troops abroad on numerous occasions without explicit Congressional approval (O'Brien, 2017). The Court validates this practice in *The Prize Cases*, in which it

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<sup>1</sup> In this case, President Carter acted under the authority of the International Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). While *Dames & Moore* noted that this act did not explicitly authorize the president to suspend court claims against another nation, the Court concluded that such an action was consistent with Congress' intent in passing IEEPA (O'Brien, p.235-236, 2017).

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determined that President Lincoln had the authority to enact a blockade on the ports of rebellious Southern states, even in the absence of a Congressional declaration of war (1863). Although the Constitution specifically delegates the power to declare war to the legislative body, the majority held that the existence of a “state of war,” coupled with implied Congressional approval<sup>2</sup>, justified extraordinary measures deemed appropriate by the president (*Prize Cases*, 1863).

### **Presidential War Powers Curbed by Due Process Guarantees**

However extensive presidential power may be in conducting war or other foreign policy activities, the Court has acknowledged that such power still must bend to accommodate certain Constitutional protections (O’Brien, 2017). Specifically, the conflict between military necessity and due process rights has been the subject of numerous definitive cases (O’Brien, 2017). Historically, the Court has ruled that although war may dictate a need for expanded presidential power, it does not justify the elimination of a basic due process framework (O’Brien, 2017).

The Court expresses its willingness to check the president’s wartime power in *Ex Parte Milligan*, where it notes that a state of war does not allow for the circumvention of all traditional due process rights (1866). In this civil war case, the executive branch used the laws of war to justify the sentencing of Milligan, a suspected traitor to the Union, by military commission (*Ex Parte Milligan*, 1866). As Indiana, the state in which

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<sup>2</sup> The Court used two statutes, passed in 1795 and 1807, to decide that Lincoln was acting with Congress’ approval (O’Brien, 2017). These laws allowed the president to use the military to protect against foreign invasion and suppress rebellions (O’Brien, p. 288-289, 2017).

Milligan was apprehended, was not in rebellion against the Union, and as the federal civil courts remained open, the Court determined that the state of national emergency was not so great as to warrant the application of martial law (*Ex Parte Milligan*, 1866). Even further, the president did not have the authority to replace civil courts with his own military tribunal in the absence of Congressional authorization (Tribe & Katyal, p. 1292-1293, 2002).

Perhaps more relevant to present-day concerns, *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld* examines due process rights as applied to the global war on terror (2004). In this case, the majority determined that Hamdi, a US citizen detained by government authorities based on his Taliban connections, was entitled to some means of challenging his confinement (*Hamdi*, 2004). In its reasoning, the Court employed *Mathews v. Eldridge*, which determined that the extent of due process given is a product of balancing the interests of the accused against the interests and burdens of the government (1976). This balance, in light of the specific case facts, demanded that Hamdi be given some measure of protection (*Hamdi*, 2004). In determining the extent of such protection, the majority turned to *Cleveland v. Loudermill* (1985), which stated that one must at least be provided with information pertaining to the basis of his detention and an opportunity to challenge those accusations before an impartial audience (*Hamdi*, 2004).

Tangentially related, the case of *Boumediene v. Bush* considers whether or not suspected terrorists held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have Constitutional *habeas corpus* rights (2008). While the government claimed that such rights were not applicable to those held outside of the United States, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion made the pointed observation that the US government exercised effective control over the territory and

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thus was limited by the Constitution in its conduct there (*Boumediene*, 2008). Furthermore, in attempting to replace the *habeas* rights of the Guantanamo inmates with the use of tribunals that did not provide a reasonable and timely review, Congress exceeded its Constitutional authority (*Boumediene*, 2008).

Thus, in review of the relevant Supreme Court precedent, it is readily apparent that the president enjoys immense power during times of war and in the conduct of foreign affairs. He or she may terminate an entire class of judicial proceedings to fulfill an agreement with a foreign nation (*Dames & Moore*, 1981), or even blockade ports within the US mainland in times of grave civil unrest (*Prize Cases*, 1863). Executive power, however, faces perhaps its most stringent limitations where it conflicts with due process guarantees. Although the commander in chief may pursue those who seek to harm national security, he or she may not entirely dispose of the Constitution's most fundamental safeguards on the rights of life, liberty, and property.

### **Executive Power as Applied by the Drone Memo**

In seeking to resolve the specific dilemma in question, the drone strike conducted against Anwar al-Aulaqi, the Obama administration leans heavily on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), passed by Congress in 2001 (U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ]). Indeed, the AUMF authorizes the president to take "all necessary and appropriate force" against those that he or she identifies as having been involved in the 9/11 attacks (Somin, p.2, 2013). This measure, as acknowledged by all three branches of the federal government, created a state of war between the United States and al-Qaeda (Somin, 2013), and imposed no specific

geographical limits on this new conflict (DOJ). The Obama administration thus claims that its war-making authority extends to any area in which al-Qaeda or an associated force has a cohesive ability to plot attacks against the United States (DOJ). The drone memo also highlights the fact that, as conceded in *Hamdi* (2004), one's citizenship may not exclude a participant in hostile activities from appropriate government retribution (DOJ).

In light of these particular facts, as well as the voluminous body of Supreme Court precedent establishing executive dominance in foreign affairs, one may justifiably conclude that the president should be given wide latitude in targeting enemy combatants. However, the drone memo fails to acknowledge many key dilemmas stemming from its use of the AUMF as a justification for the killing of a U.S. citizen (Fitzpatrick, 2012). While *Curtiss-Wright* (1936), *Dame & Moore* (1981), and *The Prize Cases* (1863) all affirmed the authority of the chief executive, each one of these cases rested in part on the reasonable assumption that Congress approved of his or her actions. In particular, *Dames & Moore* cited *Youngstown* (1952) in noting that presidential power was subject to immense scrutiny when employed against the will of Congress (1981).

It is, therefore, singularly important that the AUMF specifically avoids the word "war" and states explicitly that the authorized use of force is limited to those that were involved in attacks against the United States on 9/11 (Tribe & Katyal, 2002). AQAP, the affiliate of al-Qaeda to which al-Aulaqi belonged, did not become a major presence until 2009, a full eight years after these infamous attacks were conducted (Fitzpatrick, 2012). Furthermore, in *Hamli v. Obama* (2009), the DC District Court stated that AQAP does not qualify as an "associated force" of al-Qaeda, as it is not actively and structurally connected to its activities (Fitzpatrick, 2012). If al-

Aulaqi was not intimately associated with any group that implemented the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, then the language of the AUMF is too narrow to sanction his death (Fitzpatrick, 2012). Indeed, if the executive was correct in its assertion that the AUMF applied to any terrorist with remote connections to al-Qaeda, then presidential authority could be stretched to unusually expansive proportions, potentially even reaching the streets of major European or American cities (Flaherty, 2015).

Nonetheless, the Department of Justice seeks to claim further protections for the president in suggesting that his or her actions regarding the targeting of suspected citizen-terrorists are exempt from judicial review (DOJ). Citing *Baker v. Carr* (1962), the drone memo notes that a judicial decision unfavorable to the administration could seriously curtail the president's ability to make decisions involving combat with enemy forces, and therefore diminish powers that the Constitution designated solely to the executive branch (DOJ). This idea is certainly not without merit; one District Court judge explains that members of the federal judiciary are not qualified to make decisions related to the targeting of enemy forces (*al-Aulaqi v. Obama*, 2010).

However, while *Baker* protects the powers of the legislative and executive branch from inappropriate judicial interference, it also makes clear that a branch of government may not escape the Court's judgement on the sole grounds that a case involves foreign affairs (1962). Rather, Supreme Court precedent relating to the global war on terror suggests that this case may present constitutional due process questions that the judiciary may not justifiably ignore (Fitzpatrick, 2012).

## Due Process Debate

First, the administration correctly acknowledges in its memo that the due process rights of US citizens apply abroad, as decided in *Reid v. Covert*<sup>3</sup> (DOJ). It then goes on, however, to argue that they do not necessarily protect a citizen when he or she engages in the formulation of attacks against the United States from abroad (DOJ). Using the method of reasoning found in *Hamdi* (2004), the drone memo employs the *Mathews* (1976) balancing standard, which requires that the government weigh its own interests and burdens against those of the individual at risk in determining what constitutes appropriate due process (DOJ). Moreover, while the Justice Department accepts that no interest is more central to an individual than his or her life, it claims that the interest of national defense may prove even more compelling (DOJ). Therefore, if an individual sufficiently connected to al-Qaeda and suspected of terrorist activity: (1) presents an imminent threat to national security (2) cannot be captured, and (3) a drone strike would follow the laws of war, then both the threat the individual poses and the difficulties involved in applying due process would justify the lethal use of force (DOJ).

Viewed through such a lens, the targeting of a U.S. citizen linked to al-Qaeda may appear to be a reasonable compromise between the rights of an enemy combatant and the great interests and burdens of his government. However, the Justice Department misapplies the *Mathews*

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<sup>3</sup> The Court in *Reid v. Covert* (1957) found that the trial of a US civilian by court-martial in a foreign country was an unconstitutional violation of her due process rights. Importantly, the plurality decision established that the United States government is bound by the Constitution in all of its dealings with citizens abroad (*Reid v. Covert*, 1957).



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standard to this scenario by failing to fully acknowledge a crucial second part of this controlling majority opinion (Flaherty, 2015; Jaffer, 2016). This part of the ruling states that the government must also consider the risk of erroneously depriving one of his or her rights, and the value of additional safeguards that could mitigate such a risk (Flaherty, 2015; Jaffer, 2016).

The value of measures that could potentially prevent a fatal mistake is necessarily enormous when one considers the fundamental nature of one's right to life and the irreversibility of death (Fitzpatrick, 2012). Further, if detainees in both *Hamdi* (2004) and *Boumediene* (2008) were entitled to some form of due process in challenging their confinement, then it follows that those facing the possibility of instantaneous death should receive an equal or greater amount of constitutional protection (Jaffer, 2016). Particularly the decision in *Boumediene* (2008), stating that noncitizen detainees are entitled to some due process protection, should motivate an even more scrupulous review of action taken against citizens (Fitzpatrick, 2012).

The executive may respond that the application of additional due process could impose an intolerable burden on the government's wartime operations. However, as the Justice Department already conducts extensive investigations before targeting any individual in a drone strike, submitting evidence that is the product of such investigations to judicial review should not add significantly more friction to the procedures already in place (Fitzpatrick, 2012). Indeed, as approximately six months elapsed between the placement of al-Aulaqi on a kill list and the drafting of the drone memo in 2010, and the lethal strike did not occur for another full year (in Sept. 2011), it is doubtful that the threat he posed was too urgent to allow time for a robust and careful debate ("Anwar al-Awlaki Fast Facts",

2017; Jaffer, 2016). It is also worth considering that the decision in *Cleveland* (1985) allows for a form of due process that is only procedural, and that escapes the complications of a full criminal trial (Fitzpatrick, 2012). This, and the balancing standard in *Mathews* (1976), provides for the possibility of an expedited judicial review that would accommodate the urgency of compelling government interests (Fitzpatrick, 2012).

Finally, the memo proposes that the inter-executive process which identifies potential suspects before they are cleared for targeting already constitutes sufficient due process, and renders judicial review unnecessary (Fitzpatrick, 2012). However, in claiming that it can provide its own due process, the executive attempts to establish itself as "judge, jury, and executioner" (Jaffer, p. 55, 2016). In this new role, the president becomes a court of his own making, independent of the judicial or legislative branch.

This situation is analogous to two cases. First, the Court in *Milligan* (1866) held that the use of military commissions, where they are unauthorized by Congress, and where civil courts are open, is not constitutionally permissible (Katyal & Tribe, 2002). Second, the Court in *Hamdan* stated that a military commission not authorized by Congress or the Constitution had unconstitutionally tried Hamdan (2006). Even though the Obama administration never established a formal tribunal to try those targeted for strikes, it did create a functionally similar process by which the executive branch alone defines crimes, decides guilt, and determines a proportionate sentence, all absent Congressional authorization (Jaffer, 2016). Such a system violates not only decisions made in *Milligan* and *Hamdan*, but the fundamental separation of powers as well (Katyal & Tribe, 2002).

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## Solutions

Recognition of a problem demands a discussion of plausible solutions. Many scholars have responded to this obligation and generally proposed two possibilities. The first is before-the-fact judicial review, in which the government must submit evidence to a court and gain approval before placing a US citizen on a kill list (Flaherty, 2015; Fitzpatrick, 2012). This type of review could take place in a court newly created by Congress or incorporated within existing judicial forums, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court<sup>4</sup> (Flaherty, 2015; Fitzpatrick, 2012). The second possibility is after-the-fact judicial review, in which parties could challenge the justification for a strike after it has occurred, perhaps to seek damages for an unjust killing (Jaffer, 2017).

To begin with before-the-fact judicial review, Flaherty (2015) makes clear that this method would only be appropriate if the government was not under immediate pressure to respond to an imminent threat, per the consideration of government interests in *Mathews* (1976). In the case of individuals like al-Aulaki, however, who are placed on a kill list after extensive interagency debate and not targeted for an indefinite time afterwards, the government is in no position to claim such imminence (Flaherty, 2015). Furthermore, while it is unlikely that the government

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<sup>4</sup> This court (FISC), established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, approves requests by the government to surveil and collect data from potential terrorists and spies (“What is the FISA Court and why is it so Secretive,” 2017). Some commentators view the FISC as an appropriate venue for the approval of drone strikes because it is closed to the public and could accommodate the government’s need for secrecy (Fitzpatrick, 2012).

could provide the exact form of procedural due process found in *Cleveland* (1985), which includes notifying the individual of the charges and providing them an opportunity to respond, Supreme Court precedent does require some equivalent procedure (Flaherty, 2015). This should include a court-appointed representative that may receive and respond to notice of a potential strike on the targeted individual's behalf (Flaherty, 2015; Fitzpatrick, 2012).

In before-the-fact review, the executive branch should be required to demonstrate that the individual in question presents an imminent threat, that it is necessary to kill them rather than pursue other defensive measures, and that capture is infeasible (Fitzpatrick, 2012). These are all conditions that the drone memo concedes must be met before the government can conduct a targeted killing (DOJ). Additionally, a court established to review the placement of an individual on a kill list may bar its proceedings from the public record to protect state secrets, and may provide expedited hearings to accommodate the government's need to respond to threats in a timely fashion (Fitzpatrick, 2012). Thus, the government would not face undue burdens in applying due process based on time constraints or the need to protect classified information (Fitzpatrick, 2012; *Matthews*, 1976).

In some situations, however, the executive branch may need to respond to immediate threats that do not allow for any time to seek before-the-fact judicial review (Flaherty, 2015). The drone memo notes that domestic police officers are entitled to use lethal force if they are facing the imminent possibility of serious bodily injury and suggests that the same principle should apply to drone strikes (Jaffer, 2017; DOJ). Nonetheless, even police officers responding to a dire threat may be held

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accountable for mistakenly taking a suspect's life in the context of after-the-fact judicial review (Jaffer, 2017). Likewise, there must be some judicial forum in which parties may hold the government accountable for erroneously targeting an individual in a drone strike (Jaffer, 2017). The availability, at a minimum, of after-the-fact judicial review would help bind the government to the rule of law and alleviate concerns regarding the separation of powers, while also allowing the executive branch to respond effectively to new threats (Jaffer, 2017).

## **Conclusion**

A lack of transparency within the executive branch, not uncommon surrounding sensitive foreign policy issues, complicates the present discussion (Krishnan, 2013). In opting not to disclose evidence concerning the targeting of enemies abroad, the government makes it difficult for the public to determine which of its activities are justified and which are not, or to apply a consistent standard of accountability to the targeting process (Krishnan, 2013).

The drone memo, in justifying this lack of accountability, contradicts a principal central to the nation's founding – that no branch of government ought to possess arbitrary or unchecked power. The Obama administration attempted to wield power of exactly that nature by abusing the AUMF to expand presidential authority beyond recognized limits, failing to adequately account for due process concerns, and attempting to change the very nature of due process by placing its full dispensation in the hands of the executive. To preserve the constitutional integrity of all three branches of the federal government, judicial review must be made available to the targets of overwhelming executive power.

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## **THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE WAR ON RACE: The Relationship between the Reagan Administration's Racial Sentiments and The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986**

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### **Abstract**

The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world, which has deleterious effects on those incarcerated and takes a toll on American taxpayers. There are significant racial disparities in these rates, as people of color constitute over 60% of those incarcerated. In order to contextualize this problem, sources such as congressional records, President Reagan's rhetoric, statements from his adviser, data from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, search warrants for narcotics, medical journals comparing physiological and psychological effects between crack and powder cocaine, and media coverage of the "crack epidemic" were examined. These sources showed that, because of Congress's failure to fact-check the media hysteria regarding crack, law enforcement's targeting of Blacks at higher rates than Whites, and the subtly racist political sentiment apparent during the Reagan presidency, it seems plausible that the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act was intentionally passed to target racial minorities.

### **Introduction**

On October 27<sup>th</sup>, 1986, amid media frenzy over the "crack epidemic," President Ronald Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 into effect (Vagins 2). Only four months earlier, in June of that year, Americans had seen the deaths of two young Black professional athletes—Len Bias and Don Rogers—due to crack and cocaine overdoses, leading media coverage of crack cocaine to skyrocket to its peak (Reinarman and Levine, *Crack in America* 48). This heightened media coverage resulted in a flood of widespread myths about crack cocaine, namely that it was "instantly addictive," caused violent behavior, and resulted in mothers giving birth to "crack babies" (Reinarman and Levine, *Crack in the Rearview*



Mirror 184-191). Although this was not the first time that the United States had seen exaggerated media coverage of crack or cocaine—a *New York Times* article dating back to 1914 claimed that cocaine made Black people “resistant” to gun bullets—the media hysteria of the 1960s was so widespread that congressional records from 1986 show Congresspeople quoting newspaper articles to cite information regarding the crack epidemic (E. Williams; Cong. Rec. 21 Mar. 1986 E 944).

As a part of the “War on Drugs,” the Anti-Drug Abuse Act established new mandatory minimum sentences for possession of various drugs, including heroin, cocaine, freebase or crack cocaine, PCP, and marijuana. Additionally, the Act created a 100:1 ratio of disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine—a person sentenced for possessing a specific amount of crack cocaine receives an equivalent sentence to someone possessing one hundred times more powder cocaine (Nunn 396). The disparity proves to be problematic as various studies, such as the 1996 study published by the Journal of American Medical Association, have shown that there are no major physiological or psychological differences in the effects of powder cocaine versus crack cocaine (Vagins 4).

At the time of the act’s introduction and subsequent passage, Reagan had just begun his second presidential term, following his 1984 campaign, in which he had declared “the South shall rise again,” a Confederate slogan. In office, Reagan condemned busing for school integration, opposed affirmative action, and threatened to veto a proposed extension of the Voting Rights Act, all of which exemplify the racial polarization that characterized his presidency (J. Williams). Furthermore, Reagan’s use of phrases such as “Chicago welfare queens” and “strapping young buck” have been characterized as “dog whistle politics”—coded

racial appeals—that evoke stereotypical images of “a lazy, larcenous Black woman ripping off society’s generosity without remorse” and a “threatening, physically powerful Black man who defies White authority and who lusts for White women” (Haney-Lopez).

In the four decades since the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the United States has seen a 500% increase in its prison population; in fact, although the United States holds less than 5% of the world’s population, it currently makes up almost 25% of the world’s prison population (Brown). Although crime rates are actually decreasing, the US continues to lock up more people than any other nation (Gramlich). This mass incarceration has been felt the strongest by the Black community, as data shows that not only are its members more likely to use crack cocaine, while White Americans are more likely to use powder cocaine, but also that law enforcement has targeted Black Americans at a higher rate than Whites (Benner 109).

Due to its creation of a 100:1 ratio disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 led to mass incarceration that intentionally and disproportionately affected Black Americans. Because of Congress’s failure to fact-check the media hysteria regarding crack cocaine, law enforcement officials’ targeting of Black Americans at higher rates than Whites, and the, at times, subtly racist political sentiment apparent during the Reagan presidency, it seems plausible that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 was passed with the intention to target racial minorities.

### **Comparing Physiological Difference between Powder and Crack Cocaine**

Although studies have shown very minimal differences between the effects of powder cocaine and crack cocaine, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act

of 1986 created a 100:1 ratio difference between sentencing for the two; a person sentenced for possessing five grams of crack cocaine receives a five-year sentence, while someone possessing 500 grams of powder cocaine receives that equivalent sentence (Chambers 150; Nunn 396). However, according to a study published by the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1996, cocaine's physiological and psychological effects are similar regardless of whether it is in its powder or crack form. While crack is prepared by dissolving and treating powder cocaine with an alkali such as baking soda, the fact remains that both are constituted of the same drug (Vagins 4-5). Furthermore, writer Kristin Zimmerman asserts that prior to the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, powder cocaine and crack were "indistinguishable" (4).

At the time of the Act's passage, there was a popular belief that crack was so much more addictive than powder cocaine that it was actually "instantly addicting" (Vagins 5). This belief that crack is a different drug than cocaine is not true, as crack was simply a new form of the old substance—its main difference being that it is smoked, rather than snorted like its powder form (Reinarman and Levine, *Crack in the Rearview Mirror* 184). Although cocaine enters the bloodstream quicker when smoked and thus "yields a more intense rush" than snorting it, crack is not more harmful than powder cocaine, as it has the same effects on users, according to data provided by the U.S. Sentencing Commission (184). In fact, even the negative effects of prenatal crack exposure were identical to those of prenatal powder cocaine exposure (U.S. Sentencing Commission E-1-E-6). Furthermore, according to a written statement by Glen R. Hanson, the Acting Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, to the U.S. Sentencing Commission in 2002, cocaine yields the same physiological and

psychotropic effects once it reaches the brain, regardless of its form (U.S. Sentencing Commission 17).

### **Socioeconomic Differences in Users of Powder Cocaine versus Users of Crack Cocaine**

Despite there being no significant difference between powder cocaine and crack in terms of their physiological effects, there is a major difference between the users of the two, as crack cocaine is significantly cheaper and more accessible to low-income users (Reinarman and Levine, *Crack in the Rearview Mirror* 184). In the mid-1980s, powder cocaine was usually sold for one hundred dollars per gram while crack was sold in small rocks for five to ten dollars. Thus, while powder cocaine was used most often among affluent people, crack was sold to a “whole new class of people on inner-city street corners” (184). Furthermore, crack use did not expand outside “impoverished inner-city neighborhoods” due to its intense high, which is quickly followed by a painful low (187). Since this often leads to bingeing, which many people cannot regularly participate in without “disrupting their lives,” it is predominantly those “at the margins of society...people without education, jobs, or life chances, people in pain and despair” who are more likely to use crack (188). Eventually, more people began to recognize this, as *The New York Times* reported in October 1989 that crack is mainly limited to “poor urban neighborhoods” (188).

Additionally, according to law professor Kenneth Nunn, Black Americans are more likely to use crack, while White drug users are more likely to use powder cocaine. Based on data collected by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, while over 18.5 million White Americans have tried powder cocaine at some time, only 2.8 million of that group have ever tried crack cocaine (Nunn 397; Benner 115-116).

Likewise, the data shows that Black Americans use crack cocaine at a higher rate than Whites; although 214,000 Black Americans had used crack cocaine within one month, only 147,000 White Americans had used it during that same time period (Benner 115-116). Over 1.1 million Whites, however, had used powder cocaine within that month (Benner 115-116). Additionally, according to nationwide statistics obtained by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, Black Americans are more likely to be convicted of offenses relating to crack cocaine, while Whites are more likely to be convicted of offenses relating to powder cocaine (Vagins i; Graham 781). Overall, 80 to 90% of Americans convicted of crack cocaine offenses are Black, while 70% of those convicted of powder cocaine offenses are Caucasian or Latino (Zimmerman 164).

Thus, since there appears to be no major differences in physiological or psychological effects between the two forms of cocaine, it is surprising that there is such a severe difference in sentencing between the two. Once noted that crack cocaine was available to a significantly different user base than powder cocaine, a possibility arises that the harsher sentencing for crack cocaine could have been passed to specifically discriminate against its lower-income user base consisting predominantly of Black Americans. It is also worth noting that the socioeconomic difference in user bases between the two forms of cocaine was known to the 99<sup>th</sup> Congress that created the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. According to records from a 1986 Senate hearing, Charles R. Schuster, former director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, testifies that crack “sells for a lower unit price,” thus attracting “less affluent street customers” than powder cocaine (Graham 773). Additionally, Senator Leahy from Vermont, in a Congressional record from 1986, exclaims that “one hit [of crack

cocaine] costs just ten dollars” (Graham 773). Likewise, in another Congressional discussion, representative Charles Rangel of New York stated that crack can sell “for as little as five dollars” (Chambers 164).

### **Mass Incarceration as a Result of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986**

Over the past four decades—which is approximately the amount of time that has passed since the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986—the United States has seen a 500% increase in its number of inmates (Brown and Patterson). Therefore, it is plausible that these skyrocketing incarceration rates resulted from the “War on Drugs,” which brought about mandatory minimum drug sentences, life sentences without the possibility of parole, and the three-strikes law. For example, in the state of New York, almost 30,000 people are indicted for drug felonies each year and 10,000 are sent to prison (Fellner). In fact, being convicted of a single sale of two ounces of cocaine can lead to a mandatory prison sentence of 15 years to life, which is equivalent to the prison term for murder (Fellner). From 1986 through 2000, incarcerations rates rose every year, not only tripling the prison population but also giving the United States the highest incarceration rate of any modern democracy (Reinarman and Levine, *Crack in the Rearview Mirror* 182). While at the beginning of the Reagan administration, the number of drug offenders was about 50,000, by the beginning of Bush’s second administration, that number had increased to about 400,000; it is important to note that that this population was disproportionately comprised of people of color who had not committed violent crimes (183).

According to Jamie Fellner, who is the Senior Adviser of the U.S. Program of Human Rights Watch, “drug felonies are the single most significant factor underlying the remarkable growth of the prison

populations.” In fact, Fellner claims that New York’s laws “almost guarantee” disproportionate sentences for minor and low-level offenders. For example, an adult convicted of possession of only four ounces of cocaine or selling only two ounces must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years—the maximum is life. Furthermore, for a sale of ten dollars’ worth of cocaine, the court must impose a minimum term of one to three years, but is allowed to sentence higher terms up to 25 years (Fellner). If this ten-dollar sale of cocaine is a second felony, then the lowest sentence that the court could impose is four-and-a-half to nine years long (Fellner). Not only are these possessions or sales of “small amounts of controlled substances” classified as felonies equivalent to murder or rape, but are actually “subject to the same sentences” (Fellner). Fellner argues that there is no way to justify how an “adult selling a couple of ounces of cocaine to other adults has engaged in conduct as harmful or reprehensible, for sentencing purposes, as taking the life or violating the physical integrity of another.”

Even more alarming than this mass incarceration is the severe racial disparity in incarceration rates. Of the aforementioned 30,000 people in New York who are indicted for drug felonies each year, approximately 90% are either Black or Hispanic (Fellner). While some may argue that this is due to a higher use of drugs by Black Americans, various data compilations and studies have proven otherwise. In fact, according to data compiled in 2003 by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, Whites comprise of 7.8% of crack cocaine defendants, while Black Americans made up more than 80%. However, according to the 2004 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, over 66% of crack cocaine users are White or Hispanic (Vagins 1). It is also worth noting that this information has been known for some time—in his dissenting opinion in the 1996 case *U.S. v. Armstrong*, Justice

Stevens notes that despite Whites representing 65% of crack cocaine users, they make up only 4% of the federal defendants charged with trafficking in crack. Alternatively, the percentage of Black crack distribution defendants averaged 84.8% between the years of 1996 and 2000 (Nunn 397).

In fact, this disproportion is so significant that the U.S. Sentencing Commission notes in its 1997 Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy that “sentences appear to be harsher and more severe for racial minorities as a result of this law” (Nunn 397). Furthermore, in 1986, prior to the establishment of federal mandatory minimums for crack cocaine offenses, the average drug sentence for Black Americans across the nation was 11% higher than that for Whites; however, only four years later—after the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986—that average was 49% higher for Black Americans (Drug Policy Alliance). According to Brown and Patterson, 1 million of the 2.3 million people incarcerated in the United States are Black. While one in three Black men will experience prison, “White men’s risk is just 6%” (Brown and Patterson). Overall, this incarceration has detrimental effects on communities and can even impact political power. For example, in 34 states, those who are on parole or probation do not have the right to vote.

Despite the severe impacts of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, supporters argue that such severity is necessary, not because it is the fair and moral consequence to a wrongdoing, but rather because it serves as a deterrent for future drug offenses. However, this becomes a problematic argument when it fails to take into account the principle of proportionality, which dictates that the severity of a punishment must be fitted to the actions and consequences of the crime. Further, since the average minor drug offender causes minimal harm, it is unjust to penalize the



aforementioned individuals so severely (Fellner). Arguing that “the goal of deterrence cannot override the imperative of proportionality between offending conduct and punishment,” Fellner states that, without the principle of proportionality, “egregiously punitive sanctions could be placed on trivial offenses, such as overtime parking, and justified as effective deterrents.” Therefore, criminal punishments must be reasonable to the weight of the actual crime committed. Similarly, Paul Larkin, writing in the *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy*, states that “the racial tensions and distrust generated by refusing to reduce further or eliminate the racial disparities generated by that law might not be worth whatever deterrent effect its severe penalties might have” (291).

In further response to the argument of deterrence, anti-drug laws have not actually shrunk the crack trade, as Larkin argues that new dealers are always willing to take the place of anyone arrested for selling crack “because the remote prospect of future long-term imprisonment is not a deterrent to someone with no other option” (248). In fact, due to the high unemployment and poverty in the inner cities, this mass incarceration ended up actually increasing the number of youth involved in the illegal drug economy (Reinarman and Levine, *Crack in the Rearview Mirror* 183). Despite imprisonment, hard-core drug abuse and overdose deaths are not decreasing (183).

If harsh sentences for crack cocaine offenses have little deterrent impact and contribute to the United States’ alarming level of mass incarceration, why have they been tolerated by mainstream politicians for so long? One of the possible reasons why such severe and inhumane drug sentencing laws have been accepted is because they predominantly impact Black Americans and other racial minorities (Fellner). For example, in New

York, people of color represent over 85% of those indicted for drug felonies and 94% of drug felons sent to prison, while Whites make up just 5.3% of New York's total drug felon population (Fellner). According to Fellner, the "predominantly White state legislature" has not been sensitive to the needs "of people from communities different from their own." Despite declaring their concern for the damage drugs cause in communities, "public officials have ignored the hardship to individuals and their families from unnecessary years of imprisonment" (Fellner). Additionally, this raises the question of whether these "deterrent" laws would still be supported if they were, instead, predominantly impacting White Americans.

### **Racial Disparities in Law Enforcement Targeting**

Discrediting the idea that higher drug usage rates by Black Americans leads to the racial disparity in sentencing, researchers have illustrated that law enforcement actually targets Black Americans at a higher frequency than Whites, augmenting the chances of incarceration for that subgroup of the population. Law professor Laurence Benner asserts that members of the Black community in San Diego were vastly overrepresented as targets of narcotics search warrants, while Whites were significantly underrepresented; although 69-78% of the population in some judicial districts was comprised of White people, 81% of search warrants were issued to people of color (109). Even though Whites made up approximately 55% of San Diego's population at the time, "less than one in five narcotics warrants targeted a White resident" (Benner 111). Blacks, on the other hand, made up just 9% of the population, yet were targeted in almost one-third of the warrants (111). Furthermore, of all the warrants for cocaine, 88% were for crack cocaine, rather than powder cocaine. Of all

narcotics, crack cocaine was searched for the most frequently, accounting for 39% of all narcotic searches in San Diego, while powder cocaine accounted for only 6% of search warrants (105-106). This is interesting because, as previously noted, although over 18.5 million Whites have tried cocaine at some point, only 2.8 million had tried crack cocaine. This record of search warrants in San Diego exemplifies law enforcements' disproportional targeting of Black Americans for drug searches, despite Whites comprising a larger percentage of the population.

Clearly, this is not due to a lack of drug use by White Americans, as the federal government's 1998 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse found that 72% of all drug users were White—only 15% were Black. In that same year, there were almost three times as many White cocaine users than Black cocaine users. In fact, of the searches that were issued for White targets, 53% were successful; however, only 28% of the warrants targeting Black people were successful (Benner 120-121). Since “drug use is not exclusive to any racial group, it might be expected that the race of search warrant targets would mirror the proportion each racial group represents in the population,” yet this “did not turn out to be the case” (110). According to Benner, “drug users purchase drugs from members of their own race,” and “the overwhelming majority of drug sellers are White,” which thus implies that “Blacks and Hispanics do not have a monopoly on either drug use or drug distribution activities” (112-113).

In his examination of the San Diego Judicial District, Benner finds that “less than 3% of all narcotics warrants targeted a predominantly White suburban area” (109). In examining three suburban zip codes where Blacks comprised less than 2% of the population, Benner finds that “in two of these zip codes, there were no warrants issued at all,” and in the third, “all

but one of the warrants were for methamphetamine” (109). It is worth noting that this would, of course, be fair if the drugs were indeed being found in the predominantly Black, inner city of San Diego; however, “despite the frequency with which the inner-city zip code areas were searched, the majority of the search warrants issued in this predominantly non-White area failed to recover the drug police were seeking”—in fact, in one inner city zip code area, three-fourths of the search warrants “failed to recover the drug sought” (109). On the other hand, “although the number of warrants in the predominantly White suburban area was too small to make a statistical comparison, it was observed that two-thirds of these warrants were successful” — all of which were for methamphetamine (109). This illustrates law enforcements’ disproportionate targeting of Black neighborhood for drug searches, despite search warrants being more successful in White neighborhoods.

Additionally, criminal justice system expert and lawyer Paul Larkin cites that while law enforcement officials have meticulously enforced laws against Black crack dealers in “predominantly urban Black communities,” they have neglected to pursue equally intensive enforcement on distribution and use of powder cocaine in predominantly White, suburban areas (247). Across the nation, crack cocaine offenders — who are mainly Black — have “consistently” received significantly longer sentences than those — generally White Americans — serving for powder cocaine offenses, thus “[producing] a prison population with an exponentially larger number of Black than White cocaine trafficking convicts” (Larkin 247). In conclusion, “these aggressive law enforcement efforts take advantage of poor, urban Blacks marginalized by society, deny [them] the economic

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opportunities available to suburban Whites, and shunt [them] off into America's urban ghettos" (247).

### **Political Context of the Passage of the Act**

In the months leading up to the passage of the Anti-Drug Act of 1986, the United States saw a wave of media hysteria, resulting in various, exaggerated myths about crack, namely that it made individuals more prone to violent behavior, was instantly addicting, produced "crack babies" when used during pregnancy, and was quickly spreading into all sectors of society. Contrary to media claims, however, "evidence that crack was neither instantly nor inevitably addicting was available in every government survey on drug use that asked about crack from 1987 on" (Reinarman and Levine, *Crack in the Rearview Mirror* 186). Additionally, even in its peak years, crack was only ever widespread within the urban underclass, according to statistics from 1974-1991 survey data (Chambers 149).

Contrary to claims in various media sources, such as in *Time's* September 1986 issue, that crack was "killing a whole generation of children" data from a National Institute on Drug Abuse survey measuring the prevalence of drug use among young people found that "less than 5% of 18 to 29-year-olds in the U.S. have ever tried it, let alone gone on to use it regularly, abuse it, get addicted to it, or die from it" (Reinarman and Levine, *Crack in the Rearview Mirror* 186). Data from this same survey also found "exceptionally high rates of discontinuation — that is, of those who have ever tried crack, 80% have not used it in the past year, and over 90% have not used it in the past month" (186). Furthermore, according to 1991 data from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, only 0.4% of respondents between the ages of 12-17 had reported using cocaine in the last month, while 2% of those aged 18-34 had, and only 0.5% of those over

the age of 35 (Chambers 149). In that same year, only 3% of high school seniors reported having ever tried crack, and from 1974 to 1990, “the percentage of 18-25-year-olds who had used cocaine in the last 30 days never exceeded 10%” (149). Additionally, media and politicians exaggerated stories about crack babies without scientific reasoning. However, once studies that had larger samples and controlled for confounding variables emerged, “support for the major claims of fetal ‘damage’ either declined or disappeared” (Reinarman and Levine, *Crack in the Rearview Mirror* 192).

Other examples of exaggerated claims about crack can even be found in the rhetoric used by members of the 99<sup>th</sup> Congress, which ultimately passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. For example, media and politicians often used the term “epidemic” when referring to crack, thus referring to it as “a sickness from which the United States needed to be protected” (Chambers 160). These exaggerated claims can also be seen in Congressional records of former New York Representative Robert Garcia, who not only states that cocaine had “increased 500% in the last year” but that crack “probably poses the greatest drug threat to users and society to date, because it is extremely addictive, with addiction taking hold even after a single use” (162). Additionally, crack was referred to as a “plague” and a “scourge,” especially by Senator Byrd of West Virginia, who “then commented on the number of deaths due to crack use” (162).

During Congressional hearings regarding the “crisis of the crack epidemic,” Congress asserted that not only was crack more addictive than powder cocaine, but that it produced different, more dangerous physiological effects (Zimmerman 163). Members of Congress also believed that since crack attracted users who could not afford powder cocaine, it

therefore led to a higher rate of crime and thus should be punished more severely (163). However, this suggests that the politicians oftentimes did not fact-check the claims they were citing in congressional discussions. For example, when voicing his concerns over young people experimenting with cocaine or crack, Representative Lee Hamilton of Indiana prepared a statement to be inserted in the Congressional Record, claiming that “a 1985 survey showed almost two-thirds of high school seniors had used illicit drugs” (Chambers 171). However, Hamilton had been discussing cocaine when referencing the 1985 survey, thus implying that two-thirds of school students had used cocaine (171). This proved to be misleading, as the survey simply referred to “illicit drugs,” which may or may not have included cocaine (171). Chambers further notes that while 1986 surveys indicated that although “only 12.7% of high school seniors had used cocaine in the last year and only slightly more than 4% had used crack cocaine, Mr. Hamilton’s” – as well as other politicians’ – “use of illegal drug use surveys indicating that 61% or more of seniors had used drugs was extremely misleading and made it seem that cocaine and crack use among children was more prevalent than it was” (171-172).

According to Chambers, “given the volume of newspaper and magazine articles whether read or referred to in Congress and submitted to the Record, it is highly likely that for many of the Congressmen the media was their source of information” (177). In fact, this was even confirmed by Senator Paula Hawkins of Florida:

The media, local and national, from one end of the country to the other have been doing their job. They have been educating the public to the scope and nature of the threat. Two of the major networks, CBS and NBC, have aired documentaries on cocaine. The

news magazines – *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *U.S. News & World Report* – have run cover stories on cocaine, and its chemical cousin, crack. Since some of these statements by politicians were made as little as two months before the Anti-Drug Abuse Act was passed, it seems Congress failed to double-check the legitimacy of media allegations before using them for the basis of such an impactful act (Chambers 177-178).

Another important factor that may have played a role in the passage of the act was the death of professional athletes Len Bias and Don Rogers only four months prior to the Act's passage. Due to media hysteria at the time, "Len Bias and Don Rogers became the faces of cocaine, an example of the tragedy that ensues when drugs, specifically cocaine and crack, are abused," with Bias's name being mentioned in at least 34 Congressional discussions (Chambers 187). Despite not being the only two people to ever die from crack or cocaine, Bias and Rogers were flooding the news and thus became the predominant names and faces associated with cocaine-related death (188). Additionally, since both men were Black, and their images were constantly on the news, it is likely that Congressmen would then associate cocaine and crack use with Blacks thus leading to "the face of cocaine and crack" being Black Americans (188).

Around the time of the passage of the Anti-Drug Act of 1986, both the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act had turned 20 years old, and Black people were gaining more political power in the United States. For legislators who either felt threatened by the increasing power for Black people or personally benefited from racial discrimination, an easy way to hinder the expansion of opportunity for Black people in the nation would be to pass an act that has the ability to bring about detrimental social, political, and economic effects on the Black community. In many cases,



drug offenses can be considered felonies and therefore, those who are convicted of such acts could be deprived of their right to suffrage. For example, according to the American Civil Liberties Union, over 200,000 Black men in Florida — 31% of all Black men in the state — were barred from voting during the 2000 Presidential Election because nonviolent drug possession is counted as a felony. Thus, for those politicians who were displeased by the fact that Blacks had recently gained more political power and could now influence presidential elections, passing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 was likely a solid solution. This claim is further supported when noting that Reagan was still able to win the election despite over 90% of Black voters voting against him.

### **The Role of Ronald Reagan**

According to award-winning scholar and law professor Ian Haney-Lopez, racism was enrooted in the Reagan presidency. In a 1981 interview, Reagan's adviser Lee Atwater states that the key strategy to attracting White southern voters is by advocating for policies in which "Blacks get hurt worse than Whites." As early as 1966, during his gubernatorial campaign in California, Reagan utilized dog whistle politics when he severely criticized welfare, opposed government efforts to promote neighborhood integration, and supported a state ballot initiative to allow racial discrimination in the housing market (Haney-Lopez). Furthermore, Reagan's race-baiting continued even when he moved to national politics, launching his campaign just outside of Philadelphia, Mississippi, a town that was still famous for the lynching of civil rights volunteers by the Ku Klux Klan 16 years earlier (Haney-Lopez). Allegedly, this location was suggested by a local official, who had assured the Republican National Committee that this was the best location to win "George Wallace inclined voters," and

when Reagan returned to Philadelphia, Mississippi in 1984, he used the neo-Confederate slogan “the South shall rise again” (Haney-Lopez).

Furthermore, according to Chambers, in response to White backlash following the 1978 *California v. Bakke* Supreme Court decision, the Reagan administration “not only ceased enforcing all affirmative action regulations, but also argued against them in court” (151). Further implying that Reagan was racist, Chambers cites that not only did Reagan only meet once, briefly, with the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and “refuse to meet with them for the remainder of his two terms,” it was also “during Reagan’s administration that the CBC’s funding was challenged, resulting in the loss of their offices on Capitol Hill and some of their power” (152).

Haney-Lopez argues that Reagan proclaimed his racial appeals through criticism of welfare, when he repeatedly told the story of a “Chicago welfare queen” whom he describes by cultivating the “stereotypical image of a lazy, larcenous Black woman ripping off society’s generosity without remorse.” Similarly, Chambers reasons that by propagating the myth of lazy Black women who live off welfare by often referring to them as “welfare queens,” it was easier for Reagan to cut the social services budget (151). Through this, Reagan also implied another stereotype, in which Whites are “the workers, the taxpayers, the persons playing by the rules and struggling to make ends meet while brazen minorities partied with their hard-earned tax dollars” (Haney-Lopez). By using phrases such as “strapping young buck” – which has been long used to evoke the “threatening image of a physically powerful Black man who defies White authority and who lusts for White women” – to describe welfare users, Reagan evoked stereotypes through his rhetoric.

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According to Haney-Lopez, Reagan's racially coded rhetoric and strategy proved effective among voters, as 34% of "Democrats who believed civil rights leaders were pushing too fast" defected from the party to vote for Reagan. Furthermore, 71% of those who felt "the government should not make any special effort to help [Blacks] because they should help themselves," voted for Reagan (Haney-Lopez). Although some may argue that this is because the United States is "historically and at heart" a conservative nation, according to statistics from 2009 survey data on American attitudes towards activist government, the majority of Americans believe it is the government's role to lend a helping hand to its people, therefore making it a fundamentally liberal country (Haney-Lopez). Thus, Haney-Lopez suggests, it is the strength of racism, rather than the strength of conservatism, that allows dog whistlers to gain their victories.

Additionally, Haney-Lopez argues that hostility toward government, oftentimes, is rooted in "racial narratives of freedom in jeopardy," citing how Reagan's appointee to the head of the Justice Department, William Reynolds, who began highly publicized campaigns opposing affirmative action, argued that "race-conscious remedies amounted to impermissible racism against Whites, intervened in school desegregation by encouraging schools challenge court-ordered integration, and defended school segregation." According to Haney-Lopez, Reagan's campaign against affirmative action was yet another form of dog whistle politics, as by attacking affirmative action, the GOP was further able to defend White interests.

## **Conclusion**

Due to Reagan's era of tax and budget cuts, Black Americans suffered more disproportionate income losses than any other population in the country ("Falling Behind" 150-151, 162). According to author and political science professor Clarence Lusane, the drug trade "provided the only glimmer of economic hope" after Black communities were left with a lack of economic and social resources (49). Since anyone who is willing to expose his or herself to subsequent risks can participate in the business, the drug trade is considered by some to be "the most equal opportunity employer in the world" (87). Therefore, the drug trade can be considered a threat to White supremacy, as no other job trades can offer such a "barrier-free opportunity" for Black Americans (Nunn 422).

Furthermore, some scholars argue that drug-taking may be valuable to marginalized groups, as it symbolizes their "defiance of perceived social injustices" (Young 46). According to Nunn, this means drug use by people of color is an act of rebellion "against the authority of the White power structure" and therefore threatens "White social control" (418). Thus, it can be seen that by passing such severe anti-drug laws, not only did the Reagan administration bring about the mass incarceration of a large number of Black people, it also prevented potential defiance of the White power structure. Since cocaine use was associated with Black people and portrayed as something that made them "stronger," it was an even further threat to White power and thus had to be immediately stopped.

Furthermore, logically, it made more sense for lawmakers and law enforcement to focus on cocaine. Since crack is a derivative of cocaine, if "cocaine was the focus and had the harsher penalties, by stopping or decreasing the amount of cocaine, crack would also be decreased" (Chambers 203-20). The fact that this was not the case, however, is

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questionable, especially when paired with previous knowledge that cocaine was more often used by upper-class, White Americans. Likewise, according to Reinerman and Levine:

But this claim [that crack was a new, deeply dangerous drug] was not based so much on the increased intensity of this mode of cocaine ingestion as on its new market niche among the “dangerous class” of impoverished Black and brown people. If the crack scare really had been about a new and extreme high, then freebasing and injecting cocaine would have been made subject to similarly extreme punishments long before anyone had ever heard of crack. (*Crack in the Rearview Mirror* 185)

Additionally, the racist overtone that appeared in media allegations – such as in the claim that cocaine use would cause Black men to rape women – is similar to the dog-whistle politics of the Reagan administration, in which the rhetoric used by Reagan propagated negative stereotypes of Black Americans and “provoked a sense of White victimization” (Haney-Lopez). In both cases, there are instances of those with significant political power – whether Congresspeople or President Reagan, for example – using racist rhetoric to promote political agendas.

Overall, the mid-1980s saw an unprecedented period of mass hysteria regarding the “crack epidemic,” in which politicians did not fact-check the media’s exaggerations and myths. Since the planners and strategists behind the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 most likely already knew this law would predominantly impact lower-income, Black Americans, there was a lack of thorough planning or sympathy for the people whom this law would affect. Given Reagan’s history of racist rhetoric and support

for racist policies, and the Act's political, social, and economic impacts on Black communities, it is likely that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 was passed intentionally to target Black communities and thus advance Reagan's political agenda.

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
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
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