Argument and Identity Change in the Atlantic Security Community
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Abstract: The Atlantic community shares more than just dependable expectations of peaceful change. It also shares a reflexive political community within which the members see their security as intertwined and have a sense that their community is worth preserving in and of itself. Existing accounts of the security community have identified the importance of renewed emphasis on the values community as a factor in preserving and expanding the security community after the Cold War. But debates at the end of the Cold War also turned on the question of what the allies would do together and what responsibilities they had to each other and to other states. I outline a discursive framework as well as a set of rhetorical strategies used by the community members which explain how they worked to maintain and change their community during debates about their mandate for co-operation. I apply this framework to the Atlantic community's debates over common action during the Yugoslav wars.

Security Community and Reflexive Political Community

Fifty years after Karl Deutsch and his team articulated the liberal theory of security communities and applied it to the North Atlantic Area it is clear that the transatlantic relationship comprises much more than "dependable expectations of peaceful change" (Deutsch et al., 1957:5). The no-war community, within which states find using violent conflict against one another unthinkable, continues to expand to include the countries of Eastern Europe and possibly even Russia (Pouliot, 2007; Williams, 2007). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, within which member states pledge to come to one another's assistance in the event of an attack, has likewise grown to twenty-six countries. The NATO alliance forms the institutional core of the Atlantic Community—a reflexive political community of states which have, over time, come to see not only their security but also their destiny as intertwined. These three groups have overlapping but not identical membership, and each depends on the other to some extent.

In this paper, I first establish that there is a necessary connection between the no-war community and the reflexive political community in the realm of security, and that this work is

properly situated in the theoretical literature about security communities. Next, I review the literature on change within security communities to see what it can tell us about change within the political community. I outline a discursive approach to show how the member states used rhetorical strategies within the context of existing discourse, then apply it to the transatlantic disagreements over the Yugoslav wars.

At the heart of the transatlantic relationship is the "identity-based no-war community" (Waever, 1998:71) which moderates the anarchy of the international system to generate peaceful relations rather than a balance of power. Within the security community, the security dilemma no longer applies; that is, states no longer describe actions, such as military build-up by other states, as potential threats to their own security. Deutsch and his colleagues hypothesized that this occurred through a process of integration facilitated by the broad compatibility of major values, the capacity of states to respond to each other's needs and messages quickly and well, their ability to predict each other's behaviour accurately (Deutsch et al., 1957: 66-67). Together these generated a sense of community, defined by Deutsch as consisting of "mutual sympathy and loyalties", "we-feeling", "trust and mutual consideration", and "partial identification in terms of self-images and interests" (Deutsch et al., 1957: 36). Working within the constructivist tradition, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett hypothesized that dependable expectations of peaceful change developed when precipitating factors led states to increase their common security, then structural factors, such as a powerful state acting as an attractive pole, and procedural factors such as an increase in the quality and quantity of transactions and the development of institutions, ultimately led to the development of a common identity (Adler and Barnett, 1998:38). A security community is about one thing: developing and maintaining expectations of peaceful change. Recent research suggests that, contra to Adler and Barnett's hypothesis, it may not even depend on much of a common identity (Pouliot, 2007). But as Deutsch et al. noted in their original study, "men have often wanted more: they have wanted a

political community that would not merely keep the peace among its members but that would also be capable of acting as a unit in other ways and for other purposes" (Deutsch et al., 1957: 31). This seems intuitively right; states which share values and identities, trust and mutual consideration, common institutions and interact on a regular basis are likely to share much more than a no-war community.

As has become particularly clear since the end of the Cold War, the states of the Atlantic community see themselves as such a political community beyond the security community. Not only do they share dependable expectations of peaceful change, they see their security as intertwined, and seek to act together to preserve that security. I will not attempt here to enumerate a list of countries which are members of the Atlantic community. Suffice it to say that it is clearly not coterminous with the zone of dependable expectations of peaceful change in the Euro-Atlantic area (which may exclude, say, Greece and Turkey because of their fraught bilateral relationship, and include states like Sweden, Switzerland, and possibly even Russia) or with the North Atlantic Alliance (which does not uniformly see its security as entwined: would NATO's Article 5 commitment really extend to a skirmish on the Russian-Georgian border, if Georgia becomes, as NATO has said it will, a NATO member?). But the Atlantic community defines a group of states geographically situated in the Euro-Atlantic area, with a history of common interaction and common institutions, of which the most important is NATO, which shares common interests and a common identity and a self-conscious or reflexive sense that the community is worth maintaining. It is properly studied in the context of security community theory because the no-war community underlies the political community and differentiates it from an alliance, where security may be intertwined without a sense of common destiny or a self-consciousness about the intrinsic value of the community. A common identity may be unnecessary in all but the thinnest sense in a security community, but it is certainly necessary in a political community in the realm of security. The political community in the realm of security would

not be so strong without the underlying security community. Michael Williams has shown that the liberal content of the security community and the no-war democratic ideal provide a motivation for growing the community (Williams, 2007: 63). Similarly it provides the foundation for the identity-based Atlantic community.

What responsibility do the members of the Atlantic community have to each other, and what is the scope of their action together? This question has been the central one at many points in the history of the Atlantic community, at no point more so than at the end of the Cold War when the existence of the political community, the Alliance, and the no-war community were all in question. Ultimately this matter of responsibility is a question of identity: the question of 'who we are together' defines the question of what we do together. The existing literature on security communities, though it is concerned principally with developing and maintaining dependable expectations of peaceful change, provides some guidance for studying identity change in the political community. Change in the political community is change of a lesser degree than dissolution of the security community. The Atlantic community could dissolve without threatening the dependable expectations of peaceful change which constitute the security community. Change in the Atlantic community will be change in what it means to be a member of the community, without losing the reflexive sense that there is an Atlantic community.

Within the constructivist tradition, Thomas Risse argues that it is the domestic liberal democratic identity of the transatlantic states which led them to form "*democratic international institutions* whose rules and procedures are aimed toward consensual and compromise-oriented decision-making respecting the equality of the participants." (see also Risse-Kappen, 1995:4-5; Risse-Kappen, 1996:368). However, one cannot simply read domestic structures onto international structures. What matters is that the democracies of the Atlantic community argue that it is their democratic nature which matters to the structure of their international community. They could have

chosen some other point of identity; at the formation of the community, for instance, Christendom was still a popular concept in the Atlantic community. Indeed, to the extent that the Atlantic community overlaps with NATO, not all states were democracies through the entire Cold War. When they were not, as in the case of Portugal and Greece, the allies made arguments about why they were nonetheless part of the Atlantic Community.

Risse suggests that the mechanism by which collective identities change is "truth seeking" and reasoned consensus (Risse, 2000:1). This, he argues, is most likely to occur when actors have to figure out what the situation is, which norms apply, or choose between conflicting rules. They work out whether their assumptions about the world are correct, and which norms are relevant. This means that at least one actor must be open to having its mind changed (Risse, 2000:6-7). However, Risse's logic of argument depends on having some way of knowing when an actor has changed its mind because it has been persuaded by the better argument. It might also have changed it because doing so maximized utility (the logic of consequences) or because it was following a rule or norm (the logic of appropriateness). Moreover, when seeking agreement the allies are not, as Risse would have it, truth-seeking, but rather *truth-creating*. So the allies are not just looking for consensus based on which of a set of rules and norms drawn from a 'common lifeworld' apply (Risse, 2000:15), but rather actively creating that common lifeworld. Risse's account does not *necessarily* preclude the idea that actors create truth and identity through argument. For instance, he argues that a socially constructed security community provides a common lifeworld. But as Krebs and Jackson have pointed out, we do not need to rely on persuasion, with its hard-to-study motives (Krebs and Jackson, 2007). Furthermore, as Janice Bially Mattern contends, there is plenty of evidence that power, and not persuasion, is at work in the development of security communities.

Bially Mattern argues that it is by communicative exchange that personal opinions or observations about the world are turned into (potential) social facts, and through the process of

"verbal fighting" that a collective 'truth' is decided (Bially Mattern, 2005:597). Like other strands of security communities theory, Bially Mattern's theory of international order focuses on identity. She holds that "identities are the products of *authors* who *choose* to inscribe the narratives that form and maintain them" (Bially Mattern, 2005:12) and that identity is a process, not a condition (Bially Mattern, 2005:50). Through the use of representational force, in which the wielder identifies and exploits contradictions in the victim's various identities such that they are forced to uphold a particular identity for fear of losing their sense of Self, identity can be cemented through times of intense crisis. Bially-Mattern applies her theory of representational force to situations of disorder, what she calls "unsettled times", where the relationship between two states in a security community has deteriorated to such a state that dependable expectations of peaceful change are at risk (Bially Mattern, 2005:31). However, she acknowledges that there are other strategies which may be in use in situations where they are not threatened (Bially Mattern, 2005:106). Strategies such as tolerance, Risse's persuasion above, and the ones I will describe below may be useful to maintain or change the community.

Michael Williams also shows how after the Cold War, the allies re-wrote and mobilized their identity as guarantor of Western civilization. This gets close to the idea of the political community in the realm of security. He argues that visions for the future of the Alliance (the most important institution of the political community) emerged from the redefinition of security as cultural (rather than physical) security and the redefinition of threat to be from the lack of democratic structures rather than the balance of power (Williams, 2007: 74). Michael Williams reminds us that this does not always need to be the case. In his book, he argues that the states of the NATO alliance have disciplinary power over outsiders (and, by extension, powerful states within the Atlantic community have power over less powerful ones). As Williams puts it, "the call is for states inside—and especially outside—to recognize their true identities as part of a security community whose

principles are chosen and freely accepted, not dictated. The call is to return to, or move towards, what one really wants to be (and should want to be): a liberal-democratic state operating within the agreed rules and structures of the community" (Williams, 2007: 60). This disciplinary power is certainly power to maintain and change the community, but of a different order than forcing adherence to dependable expectations of peaceful change. This explanation underlies NATO enlargement, but can also be extended to underlie changes in the responsibilities states argued they had to one another and the scope of their action in the world.

Also working in the Bourdieusian tradition, Vincent Pouliot provides a slightly different explanation for diplomacy and non-violence in security communities. He suggests that they are habits and part of common sense knowledge rather than based on interest or identity. This habitus—the historical, inarticulate, intersubjective knowledge held by elites in a security community—disposes them to resolve disputes non-violently (Pouliot, 2008). The habitus or background knowledge in turn determines the types of practices, or "meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity" deemed acceptable to the elites of a security community (Adler, 2008: 198). Within a security community, the relevant practice is something along the lines of "self-restraint" (Adler, 2008: 204). Crisis can occur, according to Bjola and Kornprobst, one state perceives another state's practice to be incompatible with the habitus of the community, leading to disagreement about the collective identity (Bjola and Kornprobst, 2007: 286). The identity they refer to is quite clearly one that exists beyond the dependable expectations of peaceful change of the security community and helps to define the reflexive political community.

This review of the literature on security communities gives us some clues as to what explains identity change in the Atlantic community. First, the link between the security community and the political community is not unimportant. It provides the background knowledge and habits which form the foundation for a reflexive community which acts together, and defines the range of logical

options. However, the political community, being conscious and reflexive rather than defined by habits, can be studied through political talk. Second, rhetorical action can be an important substitute for material action which does not depend on the use of force which is unthinkable in a security community. Third, moments of crisis or tension are important not just as times when dependable expectations of peaceful change may be threatened, but also as times when members of the community are engaged in the process of negotiating and re-negotiating the extent of their responsibility to each other and the boundaries of their common action.

Analysing Identity Change

Against the stable background of the mature security community, within the institutional context of NATO, identity change in the Atlantic community is best studied through public talk by security elites. This is so for a number of reasons. First, identity is reflexive and intersubjective. That is, it exists only as long as states consciously see themselves as having the Atlantic identity, and it exists in the relations between states (Jackson and Nexon, 2001: 8). The members of the Atlantic community construct their identity relationally and reflexively by defining what threatens them, by demarcating the geographical boundaries of their community, and by how they construct responsibility to each other and to third parties.[1] They work these things out mostly in debate. Second, focusing on talk has the advantage that it does not rely on knowing the motivations of actors or being able to judge whether they have been persuaded (Krebs and Jackson, 2007: 36). Third, rhetorical action is not only a substitute for material force, per Bially Mattern's argument, but also the principal realm of action where the community members work out their identity. Policy makers in particular connect identity and action, because their words have the authority to define policy (Hansen, 2006:28-29). In democracies in particular, policy makers are required to defend their

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[1] This framework is adapted from Lene Hansen's useful one which suggests identity is constructed on the dimensions of space, time, and ethics (Hansen, 2006).

decisions before their citizens in order to be re-elected, thus public arguments will show their reasons and justifications for choosing a particular policy. These publically given reasons simultaneously construct the boundaries of community, because they define the scope and basis of co-operative action. This is true despite the fact that most of the substance of the transatlantic relationship occurs at a bureaucratic level and is rooted in personal and institutional relationships between policy makers and experts. Eventually, policies must be debated and justified in public.

Public talk forms the structures, expressed through language, that condition what can and cannot legitimately be said, and how it can be said, in the public political sphere (Foucault, 2002(1969):130-131). Discourse is important to the study of security communities because the creation of discursive structures is one of the ways community is constructed.[2] A discourse can be seen as the set of rhetorical resources a speaker can reasonably draw on to make plausible-sounding statements. Discourse frames problems in particular ways, and makes possible certain kinds of arguments about policy while shutting out others. But discourses do not form identities simply by being in the air. Actors must mobilize these resources into reflexive arguments about their community and policy arguments about the kinds of actions they should take. By making legitimizing arguments about their preferred course of action, the allies come to consensus about action or they make decisions about how to behave in the absence of consensus. It is also through this process of argument that they change the discourse and their identity. Discourse is connected to behaviour because it legitimizes certain actions over others, and is linked to identity because it helps define appropriate behaviour for members of the community.

Methodologically, a discursive analysis means that I looked at public statements made by foreign policy elites in states which are uncontroversially members of the Atlantic community:

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[2] There are also many objective, non-discursive ways that community is constructed: we visit each other, we work together, we construct tangible and intangible common institutions, we establish "many-sided and direct relations" (Adler and Barnett, 1998:32). Ultimately, however, these material facets of community matter because of the meanings we attach to them and the arguments we use to give them legitimacy as parts of our community.

American, British, French, and German officials with the authority to influence decision making directly, which were preferably widely covered in the media, and which contained clear statements about identity and policy (Hansen, 2006:82-87). This means that they were usually debates, interviews, speeches, or press conferences given by individuals rather than press releases or other statements written by the government. I looked for direct references to how the allies conceived of the Atlantic identity, what they expect of each other in their role as allies, and how they wish to change the community.

Mechanisms for Change

Discourse limits the range of things which can or cannot legitimately be said, and discursive change constitutes identity change. Actors uphold the Atlantic identity by making argument about what it means to be Atlantic, and what that identity means for how good allies behave. The constraints of discourse do not mean that community members do not behave strategically. Discourse limits what makes sense against the background of what has been said before, and the identity of the security community. Within this range of plausible arguments, policy makers choose the rhetorical strategy most likely to convince others (Schimmelfennig, 2003).

International relations theorists have proposed a number of rhetorical mechanisms actors may use to change or maintain the community's identity. Persuasion and representational force were discussed above. Patrick T. Jackson argues that short phrases called "rhetorical commonplaces" are drawn upon by policy makers to legitimize particular policies. These commonplaces constrain discourse because there are only a limited number in operation at a given time, restricting the way things can be said (Jackson, 2006:76). These claims to legitimacy cause social outcomes, argues Jackson, because giving reasons is part of a process of drawing and re-drawing social boundaries that creates actors as well as actions (Jackson, 2006:41). The mechanisms of specification (a vague

rhetorical commonplace is made more precise), breaking (one party highlights inconsistencies in another's position), and joining (one party tries to undermine another's position by linking its rhetorical commonplace to a different position) do the causal work of stabilizing an identity (Jackson, 2006: x).

Emanuel Adler refers instead to practices: "knowledge-constituted, meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity embedded in communities, routines, and organizations that structure experience". Practices are not merely rhetorical action but encompass also the things actors do together, though they are not separate from discourse (Adler, 2008: 198). Adler argues that the practice of self-restraint defines the North Atlantic security community, and that shared values and norms alone will not sustain or grow a security community in the absence of shared practices (Adler, 2008: 220). Indeed, as Deutsch noted in his original research, shared values do not seem to be particularly important for the development of a security community, as long as fundamental values are broadly shared (Deutsch et al., 1957: 66).

Here, I focus on one broad category of things actors do together: talk and debate. Adler describes the micro-mechanism sustaining the growth of a security community through the spread of background knowledge as changes in expectations and dispositions, developed through mutual engagement, defining what the community is about, and creating and breaking routines (Adler, 2008:204). In the Atlantic community, a very large chunk of this work happens through public debate. Through public talk the members of the community sustain and change their identity through arguments about the kinds of threat they faced, about whether NATO should have a role in out-of-area interventions and what kinds of responsibilities they had to each other and to third states. At the same time, they are overwhelmingly concerned with maintaining the political community in the face of dispute. The argumentative strategies I outline here are not exhaustive, but rather examples. They explain outcomes because they help to shape discursive structures

(Jackson, 2006:41)which, in turn, constrain the range of policy options which make sense (Schimmelfennig, 2003).

Certainly the members of the community use rhetorical commonplaces in the way Jackson describes, in particular to *extend the frame* of their debates. Jackson discusses *specification,* whereby a vague rhetorical commonplace is made more precise within a specific policy debate (Jackson, 2006:44). Extending the frame works in a similar way. The way a policy is framed is important because it may influence the direction of debate. If a policy maker looking for support for a potentially contentious policy can situate that policy within an existing frame; that is, if he can draw upon phrases and arguments which already have resonance within the community, he may be able to connect a new policy to well established ones. This is a technique useful for maintaining the continuity of the community in the face of changing circumstances. New ideas are rendered like old ones.

The members of the community have also used the strategy of *grand design*. Unlike extending the frame, which seeks to situate policy arguments within existing frameworks emphasizing *sameness*, grand design is a technique designed to change the discourse through rhetorical innovation which builds on discursive structures and adds to the rhetorical resources available to policy elites making arguments. To be sure, a grand design cannot be plucked from the air, independent of all other ideas in the community. As with all other arguments, it must make sense in the context of existing discursive structures. But they do tend to offer a fairly comprehensive vision of the community designed to reinvigorate it or move it in radically new directions. Examples from the Atlantic community include NATO itself, Kennedy's Grand Design, Charles de Gaulle's *grandeur*, Kissinger's Year of Europe, and so on. At the end of the Cold War, members of the community proposed various visions for the post-war Atlantic architecture, but not all of them survived the when faced with rapidly unfolding events on the ground. When grand designs are articulated, they provide a

framework onto which new policies can be joined and new ways in which an identity can be produced and reproduced. In the Atlantic community, grand designs have frequently been attempted when the allies are dissatisfied with the status quo of alliance relations, or when global changes (such as the end of the Cold War) force a reconsideration of the boundaries of community. As a rhetorical strategy, grand design may highlight not just a grand vision but also points of contention within the community and provide a way for allies to discuss them in the abstract. Even if an entire grand design does not get translated into policy, it may provide the rhetorical material for the creation of new concepts or ideas which may shape discursive structures in the future.

Finally, community members use the rhetorical strategy of *legitimizing dissent* to repair the community when it is strained because of a dispute between members that threatens the reflexive community, though not the dependable expectations of peaceful change. Unlike the mechanisms of rhetorical force, breaking and joining identified by Bially Mattern and Jackson, it does not seek to undermine an opponent's position but rather to accommodate it without harming the community. It is a variant of *extending the frame* above, in that it emphasizes sameness, but works specifically by transforming a perceived weakness (public disagreement over policy) into a strength. Other members of the community build discursive structures which bind the community together in spite of the dispute or even if one member is not actively producing and reproducing the community. At various points throughout the history of the Atlantic community, such as when France withdrew from NATO's integrated command, and during the Iraq war crisis of 2003, policy elites argued that their propensity to public argument and even crisis demonstrated the democratic nature of their community. *Legitimizing failure,* similarly, works to maintain the political community when it has failed to act or has acted in ways which are inconsistent with its identity.

Identity change at the end of the Cold War

By the end of the Cold War, it was clear that the security community in the North Atlantic area had been supplemented by a reflexive political community in the realm of security. From the early 1980s the members of the community argued that the maintenance of the community was an end in itself. The destruction of the community itself was consistently presented as a threat.

Karin Fierke shows how at the end of the Cold War NATO's survival was related to the way it argued for its continued relevance (Fierke, 1998: 173). NATO tried to lay down the rules for its survival, but because the alliance did not act in a vacuum, the decisions and manoeuvres of other actors also influenced the outcomes of its actions. NATO was forced to take particular actions because it was also constrained by arguments that had been made before. The Alliance was portrayed as the victor in the ideological war, and dissidents in Eastern Europe were portrayed as allies sharing their ideals. Finally, after so many years of arguing that Eastern Europe's captive peoples were part of Europe, they were no longer captive, and it was difficult to justify not extending the community to include them. This is a classic example of the strategy of extending the frame. The West had won, and had to take this rare third chance to get Europe right by preparing NATO and Europe for the future (Bush, 1989; Christopher, 1994a, 1994b; Dumas, 1990; Genscher, 1988; Thatcher, 1988).

This new mission of socialization, argues Fierke, implied political expansion though not necessarily military expansion, which NATO initially resisted (Fierke, 1998: 174). However, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe became suspicious and articulated their hope that the political dialogue would eventually lead to membership in the Alliance. The Partnership for Peace became a way for NATO to navigate a middle course between the fear of mobilizing Russian nationalism and the pressure from Eastern European states to which NATO members had already articulated a responsibility, all without the necessity of enlarging the Alliance. However, as Fierke

shows, the Partnership for Peace gave momentum to those arguing for expansion, and eventually it became not only thinkable, but inevitable (Fierke, 1998: 173-180). As enlargement proceeded, the NATO allies also needed to signal to Russia that it was not hostile. This, says Fierke, forced NATO to rethink its commitment to collective defence (Fierke, 1998: 186). Expansion became necessary to ensure NATO's survival, but at the same time it weakened the Article 5 collective defence provisions of the Alliance: if the European allies doubted the Americans would sacrifice New York to save Berlin, it was even more doubtful in the case of Budapest (Fierke, 1998: 207).

Fierke does not pursue this point to examine the implications of the post-Cold War identity shift for the political community and for the way the members of the community chose to act together beyond mutual defence. As the members of the Atlantic community negotiated the boundaries of their action together they likewise found that their grand designs floundered in the face not just of events on the ground, but disputes among themselves.

Identity Change and the Bosnian War

This process of identity change and boundary redefinition was clearly in evidence during the dissolution of Yugoslavia, when the allies were forced to decide how far their responsibility to their Eastern European and Balkan neighbours extended. The dynamics outlined by Williams and Fierke above set the stage for the preservation of the Atlantic security community and its continued transformation as a reflexive political community in the realm of security. The survival of NATO and the socialization of Central and Eastern Europe into the West led to an emphasis on the values community; the wars in Yugoslavia solidified a mandate for the political community of states which wished to act together for crisis management and humanitarian aid. The Atlantic (security) identity at this moment was not strategized solely strategized in grand design, but hashed out by community members in the creation of particular policies in reaction to pressing problems on the ground.

The process of adapting Yugoslavia's economic and political structures after the end of the Cold War was fraught. Economic difficulties, a desire for autonomy by the constituent governments of the federation, and increasingly strident attempts by the Serbs to dominate the federation were compounded by the problem of dealing with national minorities in the republics. Several rounds of constitutional debates did not produce a solution. The instability in Yugoslavia was not a territorial threat on the same scale as Soviet troops coming across the Fulda Gap, but certainly unrest in the 'Balkan Powderkeg' at a time of transition and fragility in Russia put European countries on alert. Deutsch suggests that foreign threat plays little role in security community building (Deutsch et al., 1957: 45), but even if it did, discourse of the time suggests that this was not the primary reason for action by the members of the community.

By the end of the Cold War, conflict in Southeastern Europe had been redefined as conflict in *Europe*, and thus the instability brought with it reminders of Europe's past, and the urge to do something, especially as human rights came to be seen as more and more important in the narrative of the transatlantic identity.[3] The killing in Yugoslavia had to be stopped not because it posed a direct threat to European or transatlantic security (though it did pose an indirect one), but rather because it posed a threat to Atlantic sensibilities and the narrative of the values-based identity

The Yugoslav crisis was not initially seen as a transatlantic issue for the Atlantic Community to solve. Instead it was seen as an opportunity to test the grand designs of the post-Cold War security architecture. Initially, it was hoped that the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe's new conflict resolution mechanisms could be put to the test, proving the CSCE as the best design for post-war security in Europe. This was not to be, and the European Communities were the next to try to solve the crisis in Yugoslavia. Success would have been a victory for the grand design of the fledgling Common Foreign and Security Policy encompassed in the 1992 Maastricht

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[3] See, for example: (Bush, 1989; Genscher, 1988; Juppé, 1994b).

Treaty on European Union. France in particular favoured a grand design which would show that

Europe could deal with its own crises when the United States could not or would not participate

(Tardy, 1999). The Germans, newly unified, supported European mechanism for intervention, but

they had to balance the moral conviction that intervention was the right thing to do and the need to

show their allies that they could have a normal foreign policy with the domestic prohibitions on

deploying troops abroad and a perceived history as an aggressor in the Balkans (Libal, 1997; Maull,

1996). The British tended to see the conflict as a civil war and were not disposed to intervention; on

the other hand, they did not want Americans to have to intervene in a conflict in Europe's backyard

('United Nations Operations (25 Sept),' 1992). Such a grand design met American interests as well:

the long-standing desire for burden-sharing could finally be fulfilled. Early and efficient European

action could "demonstrate that not every crisis need become a choice between inaction and

unilateral American intervention" (Christopher, 1993).

Unfortunately, Europeans themselves could not agree on the scope of their co-operation

abroad, and it soon became clear that the European security architecture was too new to manage the

conflict. NATO became progressively more involved. The fighting was at its worst in Bosnia, where

continued fighting, ethnic cleansing, and hostage taking led to an intense debate on the use of air

power as a tool of coercive diplomacy to force the warring parties to peace talks. The United

Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) had a mandate to protect humanitarian aid delivery on the

ground, and from 1993, NATO agreed to launch air strikes at the behest of the UN under a 'dual

key' scenario, but there was little political will to actually do it.

The Americans, skittish about committing ground troops to Yugoslavia for various reasons

including the violent death of 18 American soldiers during the October, 1993 Battle of Mogadishu,

publically ruled their use. The policy of 'lift-and-strike'—lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian

Muslims, and striking Serbian positions—gained prominence in official Washington if not public

support from the newly elected President Bill Clinton. The Americans continued to expect

European states to take a leadership role (Gow, 1997: 95). For their part, the British and the French

argued that the use of air strikes would threaten the delivery of humanitarian aid. Here the

Europeans had the moral high ground, because it was their troops which anchored UNPROFOR.

At least they were actually 'doing something', while the Americans were merely talking.[4] Britain and

France used the threat of extracting UNPROFOR to prevent the United States Congress from

lifting the arms embargo and beginning air strikes. The French and British repeatedly proclaimed

that a decision to lift the arms embargo would end UNPROFOR, because their forces could not

stay in the former Yugoslavia as the fighting inevitably escalated with the influx of arms.[5] While the

British referred to a policy of "lift and pray", the French called it "lift and withdraw" (Juppé, 1994a).

The situation deteriorated through 1994, as did relations between the transatlantic allies as

they tried to work out what to do. In November of that year, the United States ceased to enforce the

arms embargo and stopped sharing information about arms shipments with its allies. NATO began

to make plans to extract UNPROFOR in case the embargo was lifted. A ceasefire negotiated by

former American President Jimmy Carter held over the winter of 1994/1995, but broke in the

spring. Bosnian Croat and Bosnian forces in Bosnia, who were receiving covert assistance from the

Americans, began to make significant territorial gains, while Bosnian Serbs were weakening. Bosnian

Serbs took UN peacekeepers hostage, humiliating the member countries of UNPROFOR who had

done little to protect UN-designated safe areas and who could barely protect themselves. Despite

threats of air strikes (and the occasional actual strikes), the Bosnian Serbs began to attack safe areas.

In July of 1995, Bosnian Serb forces took control of the city of Srebrenica, which was full of

refugees fleeing ahead of their attacks. Dutch forces handed over about thousands of refugees in

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[4] See the following debates in the British House of Commons: ('Foreign Affairs and Defence Debate (17 November),' 1994; 'Former Yugoslavia (9 May),' 1995).
[5] See Douglas Hurd's comments: ('Former Yugoslavia (9 May),' 1995).

return for the release of 14 Dutch peacekeepers, and then retreated from the area after negotiations between the UN and the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs massacred somewhere around 7000 men and boys over the next few days. This was the last straw—the allies faced threats to their troops, obviously, but could also not maintain their Atlantic identities acting to protect Yugoslav civilians.

The Yugoslav crisis may have been only an Article 4 mission for NATO, but it became seen as a threat to NATO credibility[6] and a test for the ability of the Atlantic Community's institutions of collective security to nurture democracy and prevent ethnic cleansing (Christopher, 1993). The war in Bosnia became a crisis for the community when something they had identified as a vital interest— the preservation of the community—was under threat. Inaction in Bosnia would be not just a threat to the alliance, its credibility and its ability to act in a post-Cold War world, but also a threat to the identity the Atlantic allies had constructed based on liberal democratic values. NATO was more important than Bosnia.[7] No one would push the transatlantic dispute so far as to threaten the political community or the institution, both of which were integral parts of Atlantic identity.

The rhetoric of responsibility and common values they used both justified the survival of the Atlantic community and ultimately led them to a situation where they had to act in order to maintain the identity of that community. They finally did when NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force at the end of August, 1995. Soon the passive definition of responsibility as socialization became a more active definition of responsibility as intervention, because the new post-war Atlantic identity would be untenable otherwise. The community members effectively re-defined the scope of their action together—to include military intervention beyond their borders—in order to stop the erosion of the community's identity, and to protect its credibility for the future. If the allies did not find a new mandate for NATO, the primary institution of the Atlantic community, there would be no

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[6] See Patrick Cormack's comments in: ('Former Yugoslavia (9 May),' 1995).
[7] See Menzies Campbell's comments in: ('Former Yugoslavia (9 May),' 1995).

reason for it to exist. The values community sustained the Alliance, but that pillar of the alliance's identity also forced a re-definition of the scope of action due to the responsibility that the allies had historically constructed to Eastern Europe.

Policies cannot be read directly from identity, but in this case it seems as if the transatlantic states forced themselves into a position where they had to act, or lose something of themselves. This was not Bially Mattern's representational force in the sense that one member of the community threatened another's sense of self, but the Atlantic community members faced a similar imperative. If they did not act to change identity or policy, they would face the death of the Atlantic community—although not necessarily the dependable expectations of peaceful change.

The mechanism of legitimizing dissent was active in the Bosnian crisis. When members of the American Congress were threatening to lift the arms embargo and President Clinton's administration could not agree with other allies on whether or not to introduce American ground forces, the French Foreign Minister stressed the difficulties of the domestic American situation— such as the defeat of the Democrats in Congress in November (Juppé, 1994c). The challenge for everyone, he said, was to act before Congress did. When the Atlantic community members finally did agree on air strikes after the massacre at Srebrenica, the British, like the French, portrayed it as the Americans coming in from the cold, celebrating their ultimate agreement rather than their previous dissent.[8] The Germans and the Americans justified the policy reconciliation by emphasizing the need for American leadership in the world. If stability was in the vital interest of the Atlantic community, American involvement was necessary (Christopher, 1995a; Rühe, 1995).

The strategy of legitimizing dissent allowed the Atlantic community members to paper over their dispute. However, they were still left with the damage done to their community because of their prolonged inactivity before finally acting decisively in 1995 to bring the parties to the war to the

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[8] See Malcolm Rifkind's comments: ('Foreign Affairs Debate (16 November),' 1995).

peace table. By this point, the preservation of the Atlantic community had become an end in itself,

listed as a primary interest in Bosnia along with restoring stability and delivering aid. It was necessary

for them to take action to retain the credibility of their institutions and relationship by *legitimizing*

failure. They hedged their bets by arguing that this was, ultimately, *not* a crisis for their institutions.

When the European Community/Union initiatives failed, Alain Juppé argued that this was not a

failure of the CFSP, because the CFSP did not yet exist and as such was not tested. Had the

capability to act been there, the Atlantic alliance would not be in this situation: "les moyens donnent

la volonté" (means create will) (Juppé, 1993). Later, Minister of Defence Volker Rühe argued that

the Bosnian crisis was not evidence of the failure of the CFSP, but rather evidence for its urgent

necessity (Rühe, 1995). The allies also argued that while the CSCE, NATO, the EC, and the UN had

not performed as well as everyone had hoped during this crisis, they had still *tried* to succeed – and

often performed better than they ever had.[9] They argued that this was a crisis about Bosnia, and not

about NATO; that the crisis did not mean that NATO was invalid or no longer useful.[10] Having

argued that the Atlantic alliance and its institutions must remain intact for the preservation of the

security of member states and to bring the benefits of the Alliance to the rest of Europe, the

Atlantic governments faced a dilemma when it looked as if they would not be able to live up to that

vision of their community. Preserving the vision by preserving the institutions, and by distancing the

crisis from them (both practically, to solve the problem, as in the creation of the Contact Group, but

also rhetorically) was a way to allow the allies to tell the same stories about their identities in the

future. Thus there was no straightforward line between a sense of victory at the end of the Cold

War, the ensuing responsibility to Eastern Europe, the new narrative of a values-based identity, and

NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia. It was, instead, a conversation about how the members of the

community should act together.

[9] See: (Christopher, 1995b; 'Former Yugoslavia (9 May),' 1995; Mitterrand, 1994).
[10] See, for example, (Christopher, 1994b).

Conclusion

The Atlantic community is more than a security community. Its members are engaged in a positive political project in which they see their security as intertwined and a necessity for common action. The security community provides the foundation for this political community, which would not have the strength it does or the drive to common action without the security community. The task at the end of the Cold War was not just maintaining dependable expectations of peaceful change, but also seeking new arguments for continuing to act together. As others have noted, the necessary emphasis of the values community at the end of the Cold War pushed community members to expand their security community, but also to find ways to continue to act together beyond mutual defence.

While the identity of the Atlantic community provided the impetus and some broad guidelines for action, it did not provide policy prescriptions for action. A checklist of attributes of the Atlantic identity is usefully ambiguous. It would include the common values of democracy, justice, and the rule of law. Because these concepts are not easily defined in a consistent, hard and fast way, they can be drawn upon to extend the frame, legitimize dissent, and generate grand strategies, and thus change discourse and identity. With the main pillars of the Atlantic community so vaguely defined, it is necessary to move down one level of abstraction to see how the allies make arguments about the expectations they have of each other in the abstract, and more importantly, in particular situations when they are trying to come to common policies.

Common values do not constitute an identity if they are latent. Actors must argue that they matter. The reflexive consciousness about the value of the community turns out to be more important than the list of attributes. If the allies argue that their community is normatively valuable and worth preserving, they will seek interpretations of their identity that allow them to find common

ground and preserve it. Identity is worked out in the particular, drawing on ambiguous concepts. When the allies faced disagreements, they could always refer back to the pillars of common values and mutual defence which kept them together, finding particular ways of expressing the identity all could agree on, even if they had different policies.

The Atlantic identity is not a monolithic or unchanging social construct. It must be constantly articulated and re-articulated, and in doing so actors are truth-creating rather than revealing some latent structure. Focusing on public arguments puts the focus squarely on agents. The arguments that members about the threats they face, the responsibility they have to one another, and the scope of their action together make can nudge the identity of the community in particular directions, and rule out certain actions. Policy makers and other constructors of community are the agents of change within the constraints of the decisions they (or other actors before them) have made earlier.

The fact that identity is both ambiguous and actively constructed by agents means that it is sometimes used *strategically*.[11] The Atlantic identity can not only change over time, but it can also support many different policy positions. To argue "we are states who support democracy" can lead to many different policy positions, just as arguing "we are *not* communists" can mean that we *are* many different things. As I argued above, the allies have an interest in not destroying their community, and will not interpret the identity in ways that threaten it. To say that identity is used strategically does not mean that it is always used violently to prevent a state from altering the status quo, or to threaten the identity of another state which has stopped arguing the accepted tenets of the community's identity. Rhetoric is not merely powerfully destructive, but can be powerfully constructive as it was at the end of the Cold War. This does not mean that states are unlimited in their actions and arguments. They are constrained by their own identities and by the discourses of

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[11] See (Bially Mattern, 2001) for another account of the strategic use of identity.

the community (Schimmelfennig, 2003). But a focus on identity does not preclude attention to state interests; actors will do the best they can to maximize their interests within the confines of their identities which, while changeable, are not instantly malleable.

As the security community has held strong and even grown in the North Atlantic area the political community of states which believes it should act together has changed rapidly. As the Atlantic community faces continued challenges in determining the scope of its actions together and the responsibilities its members have to one another, this framework can be used to explain how allies look to change or maintain their communities in times of crisis.

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