

Revolution, Imperialism, and the Hawaiian Monarchy: Reconsidering American-  
Hawaiian Affairs during the Late Nineteenth Century

By

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A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty  
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MASTERS OF ART IN HISTORY


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## THESIS APPROVAL


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## ABSTRACT

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**Title of Thesis:** Revolution, Imperialism, and the Hawaiian Monarchy: Reconsidering American-Hawaiian Affairs during the Late Nineteenth Century.

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After 100 years, the Hawaiian kingdom's collapse continues to garner not only academic debate, but also long-standing hostilities rooted in deep-seated sentiments of Pacific Nativism and American Nationalism. From this enduring conflict, two historical interpretations have developed that reflect the polarized views of nineteenth century Western capitalists and the modern Native Hawaiians. Although antagonistic in nature, their narratives reject accepted historical methods in favor of promoting their specific social, religious, and political principles. Using government documents, newspaper and journal articles, as well as the manuscripts of key historical agents, the thesis reexamines the events corresponding to the cessation of Hawaii's monarchy and its sovereignty five years later. Contrary to the competing primary historical narratives, it examines the often-ignored complex social, political, and economic factors that created a tempestuous, but economically profitable, relationship between the kingdom's privileged native class and the elite foreign subjects. The evidence indicates the 1893 coup d'état resulted from multiple domestic conflicts, independent of American foreign policies, but garnered international attention when a rogue US diplomat aided the Caucasian insurgents. Furthermore, the material suggests American imperialists in 1898, not a policy of imperialism, used their country's increased nationalism during the Spanish-American War to appropriate the Hawaiian Islands as a military asset. The true victim, as with most

global historical narratives, remained the islands' neglected commoners caught in the drive to elevate financial standings.

## Introduction and Historiography:

On January 15, 1993, President Bill Clinton signed *United States Public Law 103-150* that formally apologized to the Hawaiian people for the nation's partial culpability in the overthrow of Queen Lydia Liliuokalani through the "participation of agents and citizens of the United States."<sup>1</sup> The resolution's failure to provide the first step towards reconciliation among pro-sovereignty advocates in Hawaii demonstrated the continued relevance the United States' acquisition of the islands preserves to this day. Not only an academic debate, the US actions represents a source of hostility rooted in deep-seated sentiments of Pacific Nativism and American nationalism. At the conflict's heart reside questions whether the archipelago's appropriation violated the islanders' right to self-determination and whether this act abrogated America's founding principles. Over the past century, this enduring question created two conflicting historical interpretations. The first reflects the interpretations of the kingdom's nineteenth century American and European subjects who led the *coup d'état* against the monarchy. As the instigators of the Pacific society's collapse, their account has become a target of contemporary native scholars dedicated to revising what they consider a racist and misrepresentative narrative. The vying accounts, although antagonistic in nature, share the tendency to abandon accepted historical methods to promote their specific social, religious, and political principles.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Apology Resolution, United States Pub. L No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993).

<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, these represent the popular accounts concerning the events that constitute this pivotal moment in evolution of the two cultures.

Contrary to the competing primary historical narratives, this work examines the often-ignored complex social, political, and economic factors that created a tempestuous, but economically profitable, relationship between the kingdom's native elite and the privileged Western subjects. The 1893 coup d'état resulted from multiple domestic conflicts, independent of American foreign policies, but garnered international attention when a rogue US diplomat aided the Anglo insurgents. Furthermore, the material suggests American imperialists in 1898, not a national strategy of imperialism, used their country's increased nationalistic fervor during the Spanish-American War to appropriate the Hawaiian Islands as a military asset.

### **The Nineteenth Century Narrative**

The pro-Western narrative concerning the transformation and later acquisition of Hawaii originated in the published works of the American missionaries who arrived in the islands in 1820. Ministers like Hiram Bingham and Rufus Anderson of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions held strong racial prejudices encouraged by their conservative religious and political philosophies. Consequently, they condemned those who failed to convert to Christianity as sub-humans demanding of salvation or condemnation.<sup>3</sup> The numerous books, which followed, perpetuated the Boston missionary's romanticized description of their work in the Pacific.<sup>4</sup> Although written

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<sup>3</sup> American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions was a conservative religious group that sponsored the American missions to Hawaii. Ralph Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1778-1854* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1996), 171; Hiram Bingham, *Sandwich Islands; Civil, Religious, and Political History of Those Islands* (New York: H.D. Goodwin, 1855); Rufus Anderson, *A Heathen Nation Evangelized: History of the Sandwich Islands Mission* (London: Potter and Stoughton, 1872); Rufus Anderson, *The Hawaiian Islands: Progress and Condition under Missionary Labors*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 1864).

<sup>4</sup> The books identified in this overview represented only a few of the many published by the members of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission. Additional books included, *History of the Sandwich Islands* by Sheldon Dibble and *Life in the Sandwich Islands: The Heart of the Pacific as It was and Is* by Reverend Henry Cheever. Henry T. Cheever, *Life in the Sandwich Islands: Or,*



decades later, Rudyard Kipling's poem, *The White Man's Burden: The United States and The Philippine Islands* reflects their sentiment towards their mission and the Hawaiians.<sup>5</sup>

The men viewed themselves as agents of God and democracy, entrusted with the duty to civilize the brutish and barbaric Pacific islanders. Their writings became a source of cultural comparisons that advocated the re-socialization of the native's characteristics, which denigrated the archipelago's rich history and diminished its people integrity. From these works formed the foundational interpretation that influenced the official narratives for the next 120 years.<sup>6</sup>

Between 1850 and 1890, the number of literary works regarding the kingdom dwindled as the American and Hawaiian populace focused upon their respective internal problems. However, as revolutionary sentiment increased and eventually brought about the society's collapse, the islands experienced a resurgence in Western popular media. The initial works that originated from the former kingdom, outside newspaper or journal articles, represented the revolutionary doctrine that led to the uprising. William DeWitt Alexander's *History of Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy and the Revolution of 1893* signified the first major publication concerning the *coup d'état*.<sup>7</sup> A descendent of an American missionary, Alexander offered a firsthand account based upon Western

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*the Heart of the Pacific, as It Was and Is*. (London: Richard Bentley, 1851); Sheldon Dibble, *A History of the Sandwich Islands* (Lahinaluna, Hawai'i: Press of the Mission Seminary, 1843).

<sup>5</sup> Rudyard Kipling, "The White Man's Burden: The United States and the Philippine Islands," *McClure's Magazine*, February 1899.

<sup>6</sup> Historians like Samuel Manaiakalani Kamakua, David Malo, and John Papa ʻĪ published books and newspaper articles which chronicled their people's past based upon their own experiences and the testimony of surviving witnesses. The collected works indicated they initially welcomed the missionaries and the social modifications, but questioned the future impact upon their society. Samuel Kamakau, *The People of Old* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1964); Samuel Manaiakalani Kamakau, *Ruling Chiefs of Hawaii* (Honolulu: Kamehameha Schools Press, 1992); David Malo, *Hawaiian Antiquities (Moolelo Hawaii)*, trans. N. B. Emerson (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette, 1898); John Papa ʻĪ, Mary Kawena Pukui, and Dorothy B. Barrere, *Fragments of Hawaiian History: As Recorded by John Papa ʻĪ*; trans. Mary Kawena Pukui; Edited by Dorothy B. Barrere (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1959).

<sup>7</sup> William D. Alexander, *History of Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy and the Revolution of 1893* (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette Company, 1896).

perspectives, despite his attempt to “state the facts... in their true relations and in their just proportions.”<sup>8</sup> The use of phrases like “the better class of citizens” to describe the American businessmen belied his alliance to the insurrectionists and their forefather’s commitment to Social-Darwinism.<sup>9</sup> He attributed the Pacific society growth and increased value to Western. The author attributed the monarchy’s fall to its widespread corruption, incompetence, and the White community’s persecution. Their actions, he claimed, forced the foreign subjects to reluctantly assume a mission similar to the 1776 American revolutionaries who sought to right the social and political wrongs of the unjust British imperial culture.<sup>10</sup>

Alexander’s work ironically, represented advancement in historical literature by shifting the focus away from the previous centuries’ providential and mythopoetic accounts to a patria-centric foundation that reflected the Progressive Era’s effects upon American society.<sup>11</sup> As the United States entered into a new industrial revolution, scientific and political ideology overshadowed the divine as the foundation of American exceptionalism. Just as the Christian religion’s introduction intended to assure the natives’ salvation, men like Alexander considered the American-Hawaiian subject’s acts as a noble mission to advance the once primitive people into the modern world, albeit kicking and screaming.

### **Twentieth Century American Discourse**

The contemporary discourse concerning the Hawaiian kingdom’s collapse echoes a larger international discussion that originated with its appropriation at the close of the

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<sup>8</sup> Alexander, *History of Later Years*, ix.

<sup>9</sup> Alexander, *History of Later Years*, 27.

<sup>10</sup> Alexander, *History of Later Years*, 27.

<sup>11</sup> Patria-centric: A historical account written to idealize a country’s history.

nineteenth century. A year and a half after the Spanish-American War, the United States gained control of Hawaii, the Philippines, Porto Rico, and part of Samoa, thus becoming a dominant power in the Pacific and the Caribbean. During the three decades that followed Hawaii's acquisition, Americans who questioned the direction of US policy regarded the new territory as merely a symptom of a larger problem related to commercial and military development.<sup>12</sup> The academic debates mirrored the American public's divided opinions regarding foreign policy. Anti-expansionists pointed to incongruities between the nation's democratic and imperialistic foreign policy. Furthermore, identifying its military lacked the infrastructure to support an empire especially in terms of sea power. Others maintained concerns about the threats posed by Asians to racial purity and employability should Pacific territories fall under US governance.<sup>13</sup>

The pro-expansionists considered Hawaii's strategic location required its annexation to facilitate operations against Spanish forces in the Pacific. For these individuals however, after the cessation of hostilities the archipelago provided an advanced defensive base to counter Asian growth and provided an instrumental port to supported US commerce. They declared the United States held an obligation to spread its political and capitalist values throughout the world; as it represented the pinnacle of a modern society especially in the face of incompetent Hawaiian leadership, not to mention the growing Japanese and Chinese influence in the Pacific region.<sup>14</sup> The twentieth

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<sup>12</sup> The bulk of the modern debate revolves around the social characteristics as it pertains to the Hawaiian people.

<sup>13</sup> Francis G. Couvares et al., eds., *Interpretations of American History: Patterns and Perspectives*, vol. 2, 8<sup>th</sup> ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2009), 96.

<sup>14</sup> Couvares et al., *Interpretations of American History*, 96.

century represented a period of American exceptionalism that demanded its expansion for the world's benefits.

In 1899, popular journalist, Edmund Carpenter, published *America in Hawaii: A History of the United States Influence in the Hawaiian Islands* that chronicled the kingdom's perceived advancement into the modern era.<sup>15</sup> The work reflects the romantic views of American nationalistic apostles and their view of US interests, which advocated the spread of democratic ideals and capitalism throughout the world.<sup>16</sup> His arguments represent nearly 100 years of Anglo-American intervention in Hawaii and reflected the strident narratives that embraced expansionism. Carpenter concludes, as did many annexationists, the archipelago's appropriation remained inevitable considering the close relationship between the two nations and the presence of American businessmen in the islands.<sup>17</sup>

Building upon Carpenter's historical assessment, Charles Morris' multi-volume historical work, *The Great Republic*, addresses both the patrio-centric views and the lingering doubts concerning American colonialism.<sup>18</sup> Although he provided a quick acknowledgement of the anti-annexations argument that commercial and military benefits were present, "without annexation, as well as with it," the book largely supports the expansionists' platform.<sup>19</sup> Morris states, "for many years the Hawaiian Islands (had) been

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<sup>15</sup> Edmund Janes Carpenter, *America in Hawaii - A History of the United States Influence in the Hawaiian Islands* (Milton Keynes, UK: Lighting Source UK, 1899).

<sup>16</sup> Many historians adopted the romanticism of American history as a reaction to the cold and clinical approach of the growing academic approach to enlightened rationalism. Caroline Hoefflerle, *The Essential Historiography Reader* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2011), 68.

<sup>17</sup> Carpenter, *America in Hawaii*, 251.

<sup>18</sup> Charles Morris, ed., *The Great Republic: The Complete History of the United States and the North American Continent, Comprising Carefully Chosen Extracts from the Pens of Those Who Were Active Participants, Or Whose Study Best Fitted Them to Write of the Subjects Treated*, vol. 4 (New York: Syndicate Publishing Company, 1914).

<sup>19</sup> Morris, *The Great Republic*, 163.

drifting by natural law under the American flag.”<sup>20</sup> The once “semi-savages” remained “incapable of governing and unfit for the condition of civilization.”<sup>21</sup> Through his assessment, Morris’ assigns the weight of the pro-expansionists’ drive to annex Hawaii to the need for reliable leadership to further American commercial enterprises in the Pacific. The “white” race, he cited Arthur C. James, should be the natural leaders in the region. This racial tone existed throughout the pro-Western rhetoric and over time drew considerable criticism from progressive minded scholars, and later contributed to the modern-Hawaiian narrative concerning America’s perceived objectives.

In his 1931 essay, *The United States and Hawaii during the Spanish-American War*, Thomas Bailey questioned the pro-annexationists’ reasoning.<sup>22</sup> He deduced the Spanish American War benefited the expansionists, rather than the nation’s security. Bailey stated Pearl Harbor’s importance in the annexation debates maintained little relevance, as the harbor lacked the needed facilities or coal to service American warships. He added the US Navy retained access to an effective resupply point on the island of Kiska, within the Aleutians to the north.<sup>23</sup> The author concludes that in the absence of conflict in the Pacific region during 1898, Hawaii’s appropriation possibly would have never occurred.<sup>24</sup>

As academics debated the ethics of American foreign policy in the 1930s, the revolutions two primary instigators published books that chronicled the events leading to the uprising in Hawaii. Lorrin A. Thurston’s *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution* and

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<sup>20</sup> Morris, *The Great Republic*, 149-50.

<sup>21</sup> Morris, *The Great Republic*, 162.

<sup>22</sup> Thomas A. Bailey, "The United States and Hawaii during the Spanish-American War," *The American Historical Review* 36, no. 3 (April 1931): 552-60.

<sup>23</sup> Bailey, "The United States and Hawaii:" 555.

<sup>24</sup> Bailey, "The United States and Hawaii:" 560.

Sanford B. Dole's similarly named book both created a romanticized account concerning their actions while vilifying the islands' political leaders.<sup>25</sup> Nearly identical to William Alexander's book, Thurston and Dole shared the assertion that the monarchy lacked the ability or moral foundation to effectively lead their country. The revolution, they stated, represented the community's moral duty in the face of tyranny and annexation to the United States served to further Hawaii's growth. Prior to its commitment to paper, the insurrectionists' attitudes encouraged the ideology held by Carpenter, Morris, and the American politicians who sought to benefit from the islands' strategic importance. The revolutionaries shared rhetoric justifying the monarchy's overthrow represents the final chapter to the first official narrative established by their fathers nearly a hundred years earlier.

In 1936, a University of Hawaii professor and member of the Hawaiian Historical Society published the first, of a three-volume history dedicated to the islands. Ralph Kuykendall's series reflects the established historical research methodologies of the period. The first volume, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1778-1854*, explores the archipelago's transition from a feudal system of warring chiefs to a unified kingdom under King Kamehameha the Great and provides the reader an understanding of Hawaii's transformation through the adoption of Western culture and governance, under King Kamehameha III.<sup>26</sup> *Twenty Critical Years, 1854-1874*, the second in the succession, surveyed the monarchy's often-neglected "middle period." Kuykendall exploration drew critical attention to the rise of racial, political, and economic conflict, while examining

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<sup>25</sup> Sanford B. Dole and Andrew Farrell, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution* (Honolulu: Advertiser Publishing, 1936); Lorrin A. Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution* (Honolulu: Advertiser Publishing, 1936).

<sup>26</sup> Ralph Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1778-1854* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1936).

the United States' changing attitudes towards the islands.<sup>27</sup> The final volume, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, provides an in-depth analysis concerning the Kalakaua Dynasty between 1874 and 1893 and Queen Lili'uokalani's eventual overthrow.<sup>28</sup>

Although his work avoids the pro-Western providential philosophy and moral condemnation, he fails to examine political and economic corruption prevalent on both sides of the political and economic divide. Unlike the previous works, the author remained critical towards the American-Hawaiians, but eventually concluded their actions remained in the best interest of the local people. Maintaining some balance, Kuykendall also questions the monarchy's moral character, yet in his survey neglected to address the kingdom's unique evolution to modernity and the presence of US expansionist groups who encouraged the 1893 revolution and the archipelago's 1898 cession. Despite his support of the Western agents, his works came to represent the first neutral narrative concerning the events surrounding Hawaii's monarchy period.

Two years before the posthumous publication of Ralph Kuykendall's final volume, an African American historian, Merze Tate, published *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Political History*.<sup>29</sup> The author's book continued Kuykendall's shift away from the ethno-centric and patria-centric narratives through her sympathetic representation of the Hawaiian people and their monarchy, but did not provide new insight to his conclusions. Within the same decade, a second University of Hawaii professor, Gavan Daws wrote, *Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands*. The

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<sup>27</sup> Ralph Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1854-1874* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1953).

<sup>28</sup> Ralph Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967).

<sup>29</sup> Merze Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Political History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

book added to the growing impartiality towards Hawaiian history, but like Tate, fails to provide information worthy of renewed discussion.<sup>30</sup>

Thirty years after Thomas Bailey published his essay, Thomas Osborne presented numerous journal articles and a historiography concerning the US acquisition of Hawaii. In his book entitled, "*Empire Can Wait: American Opposition to Hawaiian Annexation, 1893-1898*," the author describes a cohesive expansionist movement that benefited from international conflict and the anti-annexationists inability to form an effective coalition.<sup>31</sup> The archipelago, in his opinion, represented the drive of a limited, but powerful elite class that sought to expand their influence and open future markets to exploitation. In his 1970 journal article, *The Main Reason for Hawaiian Annexation in July 1889*, Osborne continued his theory that commercial interests in the Pacific motivated the US annexationists, rather than the rhetoric for national security.<sup>32</sup>

Modern historians routinely, in the aggressive re-socialization's aftermath, often justifiably denounced the Anglo-Americans for their former exploits. The adoption of pervasive critical analysis found encouragement with the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War and the consequential national debate concerning American foreign relations. Throughout the twentieth century, historians, scholars, and politicians revisited 1890 American expansionist policies. From the discourse, during the 1960's academics representing the political left coined the term "American Imperialism" to describe

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<sup>30</sup> Gavan Daws, *Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1969).

<sup>31</sup> Thomas J. Osborne, "*Empire Can Wait: American Opposition to Hawaiian Annexation, 1893-1898*" (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1981), 135.

<sup>32</sup> This theory was repeated in another journal article, *Trade or War, American's Annexation of Hawaii reconsidered*. Thomas J. Osborne, "The Main Reason for Hawaiian Annexation in July, 1889," *Oregon Historical Society* 71, no. 2 (June 1970): 161; Thomas J. Osborne, "Trade or War, American's Annexation of Hawaii Reconsidered," *Pacific Historical Review* 50, no. 3 (August 1981): 286-307.



instances of negative US economic, military, and cultural influence upon other countries or its indigenous cultures. The idiom and its implementation challenged the pro-Western narratives established during the nineteenth century, which often ignored cultural relativism in favor of Anglo-American exceptionalism.<sup>33</sup>

Historian William Appleman Williams' work reflects this radical challenge to conservative scholars who promoted US expansionism.<sup>34</sup> An advocate for the "New Left," Williams represents a political and academic movement that sought to implement a broad range of civil and political reforms, he solidifies the term "American Imperialism." The progressive historian's "Open Door thesis" determined Secretary of State John Hay's Open Door Note, which proposed to keep China open to trade with all countries on an equal basis, served to create an informal American empire that violated the nation's perceived morals.<sup>35</sup> Williams also stated that despite President Grover Cleveland's opposition to the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, he supported the development of American influence, both commercial and diplomatic. His administration wanted the advantages of colonization, but not the responsibilities associated with its management.<sup>36</sup>

In contrast to Williams and the Hawaiian narrative he contributed to, the twentieth century American debate concerning annexation generally concluded that expansionist minded political and commercial groups, not the country as a whole, drove the nation towards an aggressive foreign policy. Hawaii represented the ongoing national discourse that questioned the United States' role on the global stage and the limitations, if any, upon capitalism. The majority of contemporary US scholars endorsed the work of

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<sup>33</sup> Couvares et al., *Interpretations of American History*, 98-9.

<sup>34</sup> William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1962), 11.

<sup>35</sup> Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 208.

<sup>36</sup> Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 36.

Thomas Osborne and Thomas Bailey as the patria-centric narrative no longer garnered serious support in the light of the 1960s social and political transformation. As a result, the nineteenth century pro-Western narrative that promoted white supremacy and capitalism no longer retains historical value. Despite this fact, from the perspective of a twenty-first century historian, the material of the previous periods represent important resources for the understanding of the factors that shaped the Hawaiian monarchy.

### **Twenty-First Century Hawaiian Historical Interpretation**

Empowered by the academic move to the political left and the growing civil rights movement, a renewed sense of nativism among the United States' indigenous peoples inspired their historians to revise the pro-Western historical descriptions, which created negative connotations of their ancestors. Their combined works led to a complete reassessment of American history and the native peoples' portrayal in academia and popular media. Unfortunately, in recognition of the old maxim that no good deed goes unpunished, numerous twentieth and twenty-first century scholars began to create a sweeping historical narrative that linked the negative experiences of Native Americans, Africans, Asians, and Pacific Islanders to the modern concept of Western imperialism. These accounts ignored the individual social, political, and economic characteristics of the various groups by packaging them together as perceived victims of Euro-American domination.<sup>37</sup>

In Hawaii, the global narrative serves as the foundation for its growing sovereignty movement's attempt to gain independence from the United States. Secession-

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<sup>37</sup> The French philosopher, sociologist, and literary theorist Jean-François Lyotard first coined the term meta-narrative to identify the process of applying a totalizing/comprehensive account to various historical events, experiences, and social/cultural phenomenon based upon the appeal to universal truth or universal values. Jean-François Lyotard, *The Post-Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 1984).

mindful advocates and academics portray Western-Hawaiian relations during the late eighteenth and nineteenth century as, “high drama, romance, heroic Native figures, villainous *haole*, and a soulless imperium-bent America consummating the relationship with its reluctant, even hostile bride.”<sup>38</sup> The greatest source of dissatisfaction emanates from their cultures’ perceived suppression by American missionaries.

If you can imagine something within your own culture that is tremendously important to you, that is suddenly done away with. Just totally ripped out and gone. If you can imagine yourself relating to something like that, that's what we went through... They were able to simply rip out the essence of that which our native soul related to. And cast it down and said now you relate to this, which was the new culture they had brought in. And if the missionaries were like Jesus Christ, it would have worked beautifully... But they were not, they were human beings.<sup>39</sup>

Much of the contemporary Hawaiian historical assessment derives from the foundation established from the only work that openly challenged the established nineteenth century Western narrative. Lydia Lili'uokalani and her 1898 book, *Hawaii's Story by Hawaii's Queen* provides the Western reader an understanding into the kingdom's people and culture amidst aggressive foreigners. The former Queen sought to gain support from Americans who looked unfavorably upon the overthrow of the monarchy and the islands' possible annexation to the United States. Her writings affirmed their sovereignty and the principles of self-government advocated in liberal American newspapers. For the first time in Hawaiian history, the American missionaries' interventionism came into question through the favorable presentation of the indigenous

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<sup>38</sup>The Hawaiian word *haole* means visitor, but is usually describes people of European descent. For the purpose of the thesis, the word specifies Euro-American subjects of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Jon K. Osorio, *Dismembering Lāhui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002), 1.

<sup>39</sup>*The American Experience*, “Hawaii's Last Queen,” aired January 27, 1997, on PBS, DVD (PBS, 2006).

people. Unfortunately, the monarch's memoir provided the first and last pro-Hawaiian narrative for nearly sixty years.<sup>40</sup>

During the 1990s, two publications established by sympathetic Americans reflected the developing modern-Hawaiian narrative. Rich Budnick's *Stolen Kingdom, and American Conspiracy* and Michael Dougherty's *To Steal a Kingdom, Probing Hawaiian History*, advocated an intentionalist historiographical interpretation related to the archipelagos' appropriation at the turn of the century. They affirmed the collapse of the society, arguing it resulted from a scheme perpetrated by foreign merchants and American missionaries to assume absolute control over the islands' rich resources.<sup>41</sup> Budnick and Dougherty challenged the established historical accounts when they asserted the pre-contact Pacific society maintained little discord as their social, political, and economic systems ensured its overall functional requisites. Despite the historical records, they maintained that throughout the monarchical period (1810-1893) the Hawaiians regarded their leadership as beloved members of society, who sustained their respect through their dedication to protecting the people from the "criminal capitalists."<sup>42</sup> This became the reoccurring theme throughout the popular contemporary narratives of Hawaii's twenty-first century historians.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Queen Liliuokalani, *Hawaii's Story* (Rutland, VT: C.E. Tuttle, 1964).

<sup>41</sup> Michael Dougherty, *To Steal a Kingdom, Probing Hawaiian History* (Waimanalo, Hawai'i: Island Style Press, 1992); Rich Budnick, *Stolen Kingdom, and American Conspiracy* (Honolulu: Aloha Press, 1992).

<sup>42</sup> In 2006, Stephen Kinzer's *Overthrown: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq*, augmented the two previous writers through his description of a nation unable to prevent the intrusion of outside influences. The former New York Times correspondent used the story of the monarchy's demise as one of several examples intended to support his thesis the US maintained a policy of world domination. Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrown: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2006).

<sup>43</sup> In the same year that Budnick and Dougherty published their books, Thurston Twigg-Smith disputed the native-influenced narrative in his book, *Hawaiian Sovereignty: Do the Facts Matter? An Attempt to Untangle Revisionism*. A descendant of two major players in the history of the islands, who

University of Hawaii Professor Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio's *Dismembering Lahui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887* provides support for Budnick and Dougherty's intentionalism theory.<sup>44</sup> Osorio's work focuses upon the introduction of Western law to the Hawaiian civil system and its negative effects upon their sovereignty. His thesis asserts the American missionaries compelled the local leaders to adopt policies, which deteriorated the strong relationship between the islands' king, his chiefs, and their subjects. The analysis suggests the Anglo immigrants' success, despite their limited population, in transforming the society resulted from their suppression of the Hawaiian elite's opposition. Consequently, placing the burden of responsibility for the political and social instability upon the Pacific kingdom's white community, while ignoring Kamehameha III and David Kalakaua's encouragement of foreign development.<sup>45</sup>

Jonathan Osorio's colleague Noenoe Silva supported his theories through her examination of resistance to Western influence. Her 2004 book, *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* described a social structure that legitimized elite power over commoners; portraying the former chiefs as selfless

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Thurston sought to defend the actions of his ancestors and their coup against the Pacific realm. Unaware that strength of emotion does not equate to truth, he reestablished his ancestors acted against the will of the Hawaiian people while in search for a political alliance that benefited only themselves. Thurston Twigg-Smith, *Hawaiian Sovereignty: Do the Facts Matter? An Attempt to Untangle Revisionism* (Honolulu: Goodale Publishing, 1998).

<sup>44</sup> Jon K. Osorio, *Dismembering Lāhui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002).

<sup>45</sup> This may be in part to his association to major advocates for Hawaiian sovereignty, Haunani-Kay Trask and Lilikalā Kame'eleihiwa. The work of the two women served to galvanize and rally sentiment towards the contemporary expression of disempowerment, loss, and anger regarding what they perceive as the United States of America's military occupation of their kingdom. Paul D'Arcy, "Review of *Dismembering Lahui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887*, by Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio," *The Contemporary Pacific* 16 (2004): 186.

advocates for the rights of the people.<sup>46</sup> Silva, in the process of creating a biting indictment of the United States' international relations policies, understates political and economic divisions within the native community that existed prior to the arrival of Captain James Cook or American missionaries. Although her work draws critical attention to the tension evident in Hawaiian society regarding cultural suppression, like Osorio, her research appears politically biased as she concludes her book, “We *Kanaka Maoli* have now suffered more than one hundred years of nearly total US hegemony: of being made into a minority without voting power in our own land.”<sup>47</sup>

### **Methodology**

The subsequent chapters reexamine the events corresponding to the cessation of Hawaii's monarchy and its sovereignty five years later. This assessment of Hawaiian history offers a synthesis built from the previous nineteenth century works and the contemporary Hawaiian revisions. Using government documents, personal accounts, and newspapers as well as accredited secondary sources a new interpretation is offered that draws attention to the complicated relationship that formed between the Hawaiian social and political elite, its Anglo subjects, and the United States government. As this author maintains the Hawaiian common class retained little influence upon the kingdom's progress, their accounts are not included.

Chapter one explores the seventy-four years that constitute the monarchy's formation and its developing relationship with the maritime powers of the United States, Great Britain, and France. This period provides an understanding of the dramatic

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<sup>46</sup> Noenoe Silva, *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

<sup>47</sup> Silva, *Aloha Betrayed*, 202.

transformations that resulted from the adoption of Western cultural practices at the expense of long established Hawaiian norms. As such, it offers critical insight the racial, social, political, and economic conflicts created the turbulent, but mutually profitable relationship between the Hawaiian elite and the kingdom's Euro-American families. Concurrently, the section explores the association between the United States and the Pacific nation through a review of the multiple failed commercial treaties and annexation attempts.

The second chapter analyzes the reign of David Kalakaua and the American-Hawaiian subjects' first revolutionary act against the monarchy in 1887. Although the final and most divisive uprising occurred under Queen Lydia Liliuokalani in 1893, the events related more to her predecessor rule rather than her own policies. The king's corrupt cabinet and the former missionaries' racial intolerance towards the Hawaiians and the growing number of Asian immigrants created the perfect storm in a society already suffering under the division between the political and economic systems critical to a civilization's survival. This section also explores the indifferences exhibited by the United States government concerning the kingdom's increasing instability. At the same time, it provides insight into the limited influence of American Expansionism.

Chapter three examines the reign of Queen Lydia Lili'uokalani and the final uprising that facilitated the political and social collapse of the system. It also explores the extent to which the United States may have influenced the revolution, especially through the actions of its foreign minister to Hawaii and the captain of the USS *Boston*. In this section, and the next, along with the identification of the key players and their

motivations become critical to gaining clear understanding as to who owns responsibility for the kingdoms' demise.

The fourth chapter scrutinizes the American evolving responses to the revolution and its relation to the eventual appropriation of the Hawaii by the United States. Because the former kingdom's political and social circumstances remain consistent after 1893, its story becomes less relevant compared to the grand debate regarding the future role of US interests on the global stage. The section examines the American public's opinions, the economic issues, in addition the responses by Presidents Benjamin Harrison, Grover Cleveland, and William McKinley. It also studies the effects of the Spanish-American War in relation to the question of US expansionism beyond its continental borders and how it provided the annexationists with the opportunity to find victory despite decades of opposition.

The two primary interpretations, which contribute to the modern debate concerning Hawaii's lost sovereignty, remain flawed as the narratives are intentionally incomplete and ripe with political passion. Each version of the Hawaii's monarchical period advocates for a particular social and political ideology that ignores the need for cultural relevance and the normal effects of cultural diffusion. Although no historian is truly neutral in their work, they are obligated through ethical and professional standards to provide their readers with the most accurate representation of history as possible. To ignore that responsibility is to purposely create chaos in the understanding of the past, and its value as a lesson to future generations. The ongoing discourse between the United States and its two indigenous populations, the Hawaiians and the Native Americans, serves as evidence of the impact history interpretation has on a society and its relations.



## Chapter One:

### In the Beginning: The Kamehameha Line of Monarchs and the Lunalilo Sovereignty

The period between 1778 and 1874, witnessed the foundation of the Hawaiian Kingdom's relationship with the Western nations. The early-Western narrative asserts that these critical years began in 1820 with the Boston missionaries' arrival. The accounts suggest that their work found support among the Hawaiian people as did their transition from pious evangelicals to the islands' powerful economic leaders. For authors like Rich Budnick and Stephen Kinzer, who characterize the modern native narrative, the process of imperialism began with Captain James Cook's arrival in 1778.<sup>1</sup> They maintain the United States methodically undermined the kingdom's leadership with the ultimate goal of gaining complete control over the archipelago. In actuality, the United States appeared apathetic towards the islands until the 1840s when Great Britain and France unsuccessfully exerted military force to attain predominant influence with the monarchy. Despite the evangelical's limited numbers and opposition from Anglo merchants, the royal family provided the radical Christians the opportunity to change Hawaii's social and political landscape in favor of their own Western civil construct.<sup>2</sup>

For the maritime powers of France and Great Britain, contact with the Hawaiian Islands coincided with a time of disarray in Europe and the Americas.<sup>3</sup> The American and French Revolution forced the great empires to ignore the newly discovered Pacific region

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<sup>1</sup> Budnick, *Stolen Kingdom*, 8-10; Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow*, 8-11.

<sup>2</sup> The pro-American bias that obscures the historical narrative of the period finds balance in the diplomatic documents, Native-Hawaiian works, and foreign reviews that challenge the meta-narratives created by the missionaries.

<sup>3</sup> "The Sandwich Islands," 230.

in favor of their existing possessions.<sup>4</sup> As Western governments remained preoccupied with their own struggles, Anglo-American merchants found inspiration from the 1784 publication of James Cook's voyages.<sup>5</sup> The book hinted at the isles' strategic position within the vast ocean and its potential to increase wealth through the growing Chinese market.<sup>6</sup> While the initial introduction represented the two cultures random meeting through exploration, the merchants encouraged reciprocal trade and social exchange.<sup>7</sup>

By 1788, commercial ships made regular stops to replenish their provisions and extend their operations, in addition to their profits, in exchange for clothing, metal, and occasionally guns.<sup>8</sup> *Ali'i*, or chiefs, like Kamehameha recognized both the tactical and strategic advantage of sustaining good relations with the foreigners and he rapidly mastered the art of bartering, thus improving his standing among the traders (See Picture 1).<sup>9</sup> The low-ranking chief's transactions provided his warriors access to an arsenal of firearms that facilitated his rapid expansion throughout the neighboring islands and by

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<sup>4</sup> Robert L Beisner, *From Old Diplomacy to The New, 1865-1900*, 2nd ed. (Illinois: Harlan Davidson, Incorporated, 1975), 3-4; Couvares et al. eds, *Interpretations of American History*, 97.

<sup>5</sup> James Cook and James King, *A Voyage to the Pacific for Making Discoveries in the Northern Hemisphere, under the Direction of Captains Cook, Clerke, and Gore in the Years 1776, 1777, 1779, and 1780*, vol. 3 (Edinburgh: William Reid and Son, 1784).

<sup>6</sup> Harold W. Bradley, "The Hawaiian Islands and the Pacific Fur Trade, 1785-1813," *The Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (July 1939): 275.

<sup>7</sup> With any society in history, the establishment of trade routes bring about the process of normal social/cultural modification as it remains an unavoidable consequence of two societies engaging commercial exchange.

<sup>8</sup> International Bureau of the American Republics, *Hawaii* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1897), 10; "Description of Owhyhee," 121.

<sup>9</sup> The Hawaiian word, *ali'i* refers to the chiefs of various ranks who controlled areas of land and specific groups of people. After Kamehameha, they became advisors and political leaders and later became the islands' privileged class. To differentiate between Hawaii's white and the Hawaiian elite, the word *ali'i* will be used throughout the thesis. To help differentiate the island of "Hawaii" from the archipelago of "Hawaii," the island's spelling will reflect the more traditional form, Hawai'i. Kamakua, *Ruling Chiefs of Hawai'i*, 142.

1810, the eight major isles' *ali'i* acknowledged his authority as Hawaii's first absolute sovereign (See Picture 2).<sup>10</sup>

After forty years of cultural diffusion encouraged by King Kamehameha and his favorite wife, Ka'ahumanu, the established Hawaiian social system neared its eventual collapse (See Picture 3).<sup>11</sup> The rapid transformation from a system of power based upon multiple warring chiefs, to the rule of one, in conjunction with the weakened civil religion, disrupted the delicate social structure.<sup>12</sup> Although the Native-Hawaiians maintained political control over their kingdom, the privileged classes' enchantment with Western popular culture caused the traditionalists to become outsiders within their own nation.<sup>13</sup> For the royal families who embraced Anglo-American culture, their only exposure involved a unique sub-culture, if not a counter-culture, of merchantmen, sailors, and whaling men. Impressed by their technology and material wealth the *ali'i* identified the foreigners as the reference group for the popular lifestyle they aspired to adopt.<sup>14</sup>

In spite its developing economic value, the kingdom's exposure to the European empires and the United States of America remained limited to sea-faring entrepreneurs.<sup>15</sup> The Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812 added to the distractions that deterred

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<sup>10</sup> Kamakua, *Ruling Chiefs of Hawai'i*, 110; "Description of Owhyhee," 121. Kingdom of Hawaii, Minister of Foreign Relations, *Report of the Minister of Foreign Relations to the Legislature of 1855*, Session of 1855 (Honolulu, 1855), 13; "Sandwich Islands," *The North American Review* 22, no. 51 (April 1826): 338.

<sup>11</sup> Resembling the effects of the Great Plague upon medieval Europe, the arrival of Captain Cook and the diseases that infected the Hawaiian people weakened the societal systems as many questioned their validity and strength in the face of their new experiences. Kamakua, *Ruling Chiefs of Hawai'i*, 231.

<sup>12</sup> Bureau of the American Republics, *Hawaii, Handbook No. 85* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1897), 11.

<sup>13</sup> Later in the history of the islands, the Monarchy also became a minority group to the dominance of the Western capitalists.

<sup>14</sup> Kamakua, *Ruling Chiefs of Hawai'i*, 304; Hiram Bingham, *Sandwich Islands*, 73.

<sup>15</sup> In 1816 King Kamehameha I commissioned the Hawaiian Flag, which reflected his desire for open relations with the west. Hawaii's official flag was a hybrid of the English and American flags as it consisted of red, white, and blue strips and a Union Jack in the corner. Kamakua, *Ruling Chiefs of Hawai'i*, 209.

maritime powers from expanding their political interests into the Pacific Ocean.<sup>16</sup> By 1819, however, the termination of open hostilities between the governments allowed the powers to look towards the east as China, Japan, and India promised economic growth and territorial expansion. Consequently, by the start of the nineteenth century's second decade Hawaii's strategic location gained their interest as a key port.

If King Kamehameha I signified waning ancient traditions, his death, and Ka'ahumanu's rise signified their termination. On May 8, 1819, Hawaii's first monarch died and his reign passed on to Ka' lani Kua-Liholiho, who assumed the title Kamehameha II. Whether to protect the monarchy or to pursue her own personal ambitions, as the young monarch lacked the *ali'i nui's* respect, Ka'ahumanu challenged the strict cultural gender restrictions and declared herself as queen regent.<sup>17</sup> Two months after her rise to power, she abolished the strict cultural norms governing gender, which in turn, rendered the religious laws meaningless and brought about the religious system's collapse.<sup>18</sup>

Months after Ka'ahumanu's actions created a spiritual and cultural vacuum in her society, representatives from the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions set sail from Boston, Massachusetts, to Hawaii.<sup>19</sup> Inspired by the Second Great

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<sup>16</sup> Beisner, *From Old Diplomacy to the New*, 3-4.

<sup>17</sup> Liholiho pursued personal rather than state interests. Debate remains whether or not she did so with the blessing of her former husband, but the failure of the primary *ali'i* to challenge her, indicates she maintained their support. This does not mean that she went unchallenged as many of the former king's opponents rebelled in what became a second civil war that lasted several years. James J. Jarves, *History of the Hawaiian Islands*, 4th ed. (Honolulu: Henry M. Whitney, 1872), 542.

<sup>18</sup> Historians and anthropologists classify this moment of Hawaiian history as, "The Hawaiian Cultural Revolution." Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom: 1778-1854*, 66-8; Kamakua, *Ruling Chiefs of Hawai'i*, 222-5; "Sandwich Islands," 339.

<sup>19</sup> The inspiration of the organization emanated from the passages of Mark 16:15-16, which declared, "go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, *First Ten Annual Reports of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions: With Other Documents of the Board* (Boston: Crocker and Brewster, 1834), 10, 13, 35.

Awakening, the organization formed, “for the purpose of devising ways and means, and adopting and prosecuting measures, for promoting the spread of the gospel in heathen lands.”<sup>20</sup> Upon the missionaries’ appearance, the archipelago’s *ali’i* mistakenly anticipated the continuation of the reciprocal respect they shared with the merchants. The new arrivals’ fundamentalist views, however, encouraged an extremely conservative system that allowed little room for individuality.<sup>21</sup> Consequently, the former relationship the Hawaiians enjoyed became all but impossible as the ministers’ mission to propagate the gospel prevented cultural relativism (See Picture 4).<sup>22</sup> Through their selective perception, they determined the indigenous people existed in a realm “of darkness, as darkness itself; and of the shadow of death without order, and where the light is as darkness.”<sup>23</sup> Their existing intolerance viewed Kamehameha the Great’s death and the resulting termination of the long established spiritual system by Ka’ahumanu as a gift from their Judeo-Christian God.<sup>24</sup>

In 1824, King Kamehameha II traveled to London to resubmit a formal request to establish Hawaii as a protectorate under the empire, but during the visit, he succumbed to

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<sup>20</sup> American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions Prudential Committee, *Instructions of the Prudential Committee of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to the Sandwich Islands Mission* (Lahainaluna: Press of the Mission Seminary, 1838), 25.

<sup>21</sup> In the scope of the thesis, the word conservative relates to an ideology that embraced traditional (1700-1900) Protestant Christian values and viewed the white race as the world’s leaders. They were resistant to ideas that question or threatened their authority. Unlike the Catholic Church that sought to ease the conversion of foreign cultures into their flock by adopting their traditions and beliefs into the religion, the absolutism/totalitarianism of the Protestant missionaries required the complete and rapid suppression of established beliefs. If the missionaries had adopted the methods of the Catholics, the racial tension might have been avoided or reduced.

<sup>22</sup> The practice of cultural relativism or the process of examining a culture on its own terms was never contemplated by the evangelists, although their organization, to some extent, directed them to do so. The missionary’s perceived ideal culture that they wished to obtain and spread throughout the world was far from the real norms maintained by people throughout their own society. Kamakau, *Ruling Chiefs of Hawaii*, 412, 428; Prudential Committee, *Instructions of the Prudential Committee*, 8.

<sup>23</sup> Bingham, *Sandwich Islands*, 22; Prudential Committee, *Instructions of the Prudential Committee*, 19, 26.

<sup>24</sup> Bingham, *Sandwich Islands*, 59.

measles.<sup>25</sup> On May 6, 1825, the HMS *Blonde* arrived in the islands to return the king's body and to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Hawaiian Kingdom.<sup>26</sup> The pledge of friendship represented the first official diplomatic correspondence between the new monarchy and the maritime powers. A year later, the US Navy's Pacific Squadron's Commodore Isaac Hull dispatched Thomas Catesby Jones and the USS *Peacock* to conduct a "friendly inspection" of Hawaii.<sup>27</sup> On December 23, 1826, Captain Jones negotiated a commerce treaty with Queen Ka'ahumanu, but the treaty never received ratification by the United States Congress, as Jones lacked the authority to establish formal diplomatic relations. The document, however, formed the legal foundation of the two countries' relations for several decades.<sup>28</sup>

With Liholiho's death, eleven-year-old Kamehameha III assumed the title of King Kamehameha III, and like his brother shared the monarchy with Elizabeth Ka'ahumanu (See Picture 5).<sup>29</sup> Because of England's unwillingness to assimilate Hawaii as its protectorate, despite the regent's request, the responsibility fell upon the native rulers to

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<sup>25</sup> "Report Upon the Official Relations of the United States with the Hawaiian Islands from the first Appointment of a Consular Officer there by this Government, US Department of State," *Foreign Relations of the United States, Affairs in Hawaii* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1894), 8-9. Hereafter *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*.

<sup>26</sup> The declaration from King George IV established the official relationship between the two nations. It declared the Sandwich Isles had a right to their sovereignty without interferences from the English crown. The empire assured the new kingdom that if a foreign country attempted to obstruct its interests on the islands, it preserved the option to resort to military force. This marked a unique arrangement with Britain and an alteration from their normal foreign policies. "The Sandwich Islands," 230; John Bowring, "The Hawaiian Islands," *The Gentleman's Magazine: And Historical Review* (May 1868): 788.

<sup>27</sup> Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1778-1854*, 91-2.

<sup>28</sup> Unlike Africa, Latin America, India, and Australia in the 1800s, Hawaii escaped Western colonization and remained an independent nation. Treaty of Commerce, US-Hawaii, December 23, 1826, 8 U.S.T. 861-3; "Report Upon the Official Relations...", *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 8; Robert H. Stauffer, The Hawai'i-United States Treaty of 1826, *The Hawaiian Journal of History* 17, (1983): 53-5.

<sup>29</sup> During this period, Ka'ahumanu converted to the protestant religion of the missionaries and assumed the name Elizabeth. "The Sandwich Islands," 230; Bowring, "The Hawaiian Islands," 788.

create their kingdom's new guiding principles.<sup>30</sup> She adopted European civil and religious edicts, which challenged the popular culture encouraged by the merchants and sailors.<sup>31</sup> In response, they and numerous Hawaiians rebelled against the shifting influences. The regent, the missionaries, and their advocates among the native people suppressed the violent civil conflict and established a permanent conservative social order throughout the islands.<sup>32</sup>

After Kamehameha III's full assumption of the throne after the Ka'ahumanu's death on June 5, 1832, a series of foreign relation blunders occurred, which hastened America's political favor among the Hawaiian leadership.<sup>33</sup> Between July 9, 1839, and November 11, 1843, the French and British exercised military actions against the Hawaiian Kingdom.<sup>34</sup> In each event, the United States provided political support for the weak monarchy and ensuring its commitment to the country's independence. Soon after the hostilities' ceased, France and England signed official treaties to honor the Hawaiian

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<sup>30</sup> The material referred to in the research of this paper failed to find out why the English repeatedly ignored the attempts of Hawaii to gain the sea power's official protection. Kamakua, *Ruling Chiefs of Hawaii*, 306.

<sup>31</sup> She advocated for the termination of all worship other than Christianity and outlawed the sacred dance of the hula to encourage the cultural leveling of Hawaii to the United States and England. Ka'ahumanu's desire to adopt American and European forms of governance and religion, while allowing the people to administer the new system, indicated a lack of foresight, which decades later led to the annexation of her kingdom by the Westerners she idealized. Kamakua, *Ruling Chiefs of Hawai'i*, 304.

<sup>32</sup> Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1778-1854*, 100-1.

<sup>33</sup> Concerned over the power of England's influence in the islands, in 1829, Captain William B. Finch of the USS *Vincennes* visited the archipelago bearing presents and an official letter from President John Quincy Adams. The communication renewed the American's desire to continue a relationship of "peace and kindness, and justice" between the Subjects of the United States and the Pacific kingdom. It also assured the monarchy that the US intended to enforce Hawaii's sovereignty and native laws. "Report Upon the Official Relations..." *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 8.

<sup>34</sup> Lorrin A. Thurston, "The Sandwich Islands: The Advantages of Annexation," *The North American Review* 156, no. 436 (March 1893): 267; American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, *Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Presented at the Thirty-second Annual Meeting: Held in the City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Sept. 8, 9, & 10, 1841* (Boston: Crocker & Brewster, 1841), 151; Kingdom of Hawaii, *Report of the Minister of Foreign Relations to the Legislature of 1855*, 13-8.

Kingdom's independence.<sup>35</sup> The United States refused to participate, as it wanted to avoid establishing political alliances with their formal rivals.<sup>36</sup> Despite the absence of an official treaty, the US stated the "Tyler Doctrine" confirmed their pledge to Hawaii's autonomy and thus negated the requirement of an official document.<sup>37</sup> By the 1840s, the kingdom's sovereignty remained protected through the maritime powers mutual jealousy, yet, the true threat to the island's independence was not from external forces, but rather internal exploitation.<sup>38</sup>

As the monarchy realized its increasing value among the nations of the west, Kamehameha III and his Chief Council looked towards the missionaries and other respected foreign residents for guidance in modifying its political, legal, and economic systems.<sup>39</sup> Based upon their suggestions, on October 8, 1840, the king and his council formed a parliamentary monarchy based upon England's government.<sup>40</sup> The legislative body consisted of two branches, a House of Representatives that served the common

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<sup>35</sup> "Report Upon the Official Relations..." *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 10; Kingdom of Hawaii, *Report of the Minister of Foreign Relations to the Legislature of 1855*, 18.

<sup>36</sup> "Report Upon the Official Relations..." *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 10-1.

<sup>37</sup> The Tyler Doctrine involved the speech that President John Tyler gave to congress where he recognized the emergence of the Hawaiian kingdom as a civilized nation and declared that the islands were entitled to the same privileges enjoyed by all members of the community of nations. The United States government sought "no peculiar advantages, no exclusive control over the Hawaiian Government, but is content with its independent existence and anxiously wishes for its security and prosperity." However the president stated that "any attempt by another power, should such attempt be threatened or feared, to take possession of the islands, colonize them, and subvert the native Government" would be perceived as an hostile act against the United States' interests and thus the islands fell under the Monroe Doctrine." Thurston, "The Advantages of Annexation," 266; John Tyler to the House of Representatives, December 30, 1842, US Senate, *Papers Relating to the Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States*, S. Exec. Doc. 77, 52<sup>nd</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1893), 104 (Serial Set #3062). Hereafter *Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands*.

<sup>38</sup> "Communicated," *The Polynesian*, December 26, 1840.

<sup>39</sup> It is important to note that the move to a more structured form of government also resulted from the pressure placed upon the King and the chiefs by the missionaries who disliked the ancient traditions of rule and ship captains who pushed for an official legal system in the islands. Queen Liliuokalani, *Hawaii's Story* (Rutland, VT: C.E. Tuttle, 1964), 177.

<sup>40</sup> Bureau of the American Republics, *Hawaii, Handbook 85* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1897), 17.



people and the House of Lords that encompassed the council of chiefs and the king.<sup>41</sup> In the absence of Western educated Hawaiians, Kamehameha III appointed foreigners residing in the islands to head the critical offices, while Hawaiian *ali'i* assumed the role as legislators.<sup>42</sup>

The Hawaiian government and economy remained under the native leaders' direction until 1845, but as the decade closed, the power dynamic in the islands experienced numerous transformations.<sup>43</sup> Through a series of land reform bills, the king, guided by the prominent American missionaries, opened the sections of land to the island's commoners and select foreigners.<sup>44</sup> The 1845 Great *Mahele*, established a Land Commission and Court of Claims to administer the divisions, but due in part to different cultural notions of property, the *kanaka*'s claims were never established, allowing numerous foreigners to acquire large tracts.<sup>45</sup> The new agencies concluded the feudal relationship between the *ali'i* and the commoners as the ultimate authority emanated from an unfamiliar legal system that few Hawaiians understood. The newly established officers, all of whom were of Western descent and maintained interests in the Hawaiian economy, replaced the chiefs as the king's intermediaries.<sup>46</sup> Islanders expressed their anxieties regarding the king's policies, as many feared that the continued Westernization

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<sup>41</sup> Only the legislature's House of Representatives were elected to office. The House of Nobles was appointed by the King and consisted of 20 men plus the four cabinet ministers. Elections were held every two years. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1776-1854*, 168-9; Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 190.

<sup>42</sup> Foreign advisors to the king held no authority and served at his pleasure. Kingdom of Hawaii, *Report of the Minister of Foreign Relations to the Legislature of 1855*, 11-2.

<sup>43</sup> Osorio, *Dismembering Lāhui*, 38-9.

<sup>44</sup> The Hawaiian word, *Mahele* means to divide or portion. Mary K. Pukui and Samuel H. Elbert, *New Pocket Hawaiian Dictionary, With concise Grammar and Given names in Hawaiian* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1992), 88.

<sup>45</sup> The word *kanaka* refers to the common Hawaiian individual. This term will be used to identify the islands' lower social and economic classes that lacked representations. The ongoing epidemics contributed to the native land dispossession. "To All Claimants of Land in the Hawaiian Islands," *The Polynesian*, January 15, 1848.

<sup>46</sup> Osorio, *Dismembering Lāhui*, 34-8.

of their society risked their sovereignty.<sup>47</sup> They also maintained concerns that if foreigners became entrenched in the archipelago's institutions, their influence could never be realistically reversed.<sup>48</sup> Despite their concerns, Kamehameha III continued to pursue the Anglo-Americans' guidance and by the end of the 1840s, he empowered foreigners with the privileges of a subject. These individuals, along with those who followed, maintained dual citizenship with their countries of origin, and as a result, sustained no true loyalty to the Hawaiian Kingdom.<sup>49</sup>

On August 24, 1850, both the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States ratified a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation.<sup>50</sup> It marked a turning point in Hawaii's economic future as the demand for coffee, sugar, and other goods during the California Gold Rush created increased profits for the numerous local plantations (See Picture 6 and 7).<sup>51</sup> As the new businesses promised lucrative futures, the evangelists who once pledged to forsake personal gain to honor God's glory, abandoned their oaths to become Hawaiian capitalists.<sup>52</sup> As the foreigners, or *haole* as the Hawaiians referred to them, discarded from their spiritual mission, the superordinate goal of forming a pluralistic society grew more distant.<sup>53</sup> The motivation of profit and their prevailing xenophobic values only

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<sup>47</sup> Liliuokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 180.

<sup>48</sup> Kamakau, *Ruling Chiefs of Hawaii*, 399-400.

<sup>49</sup> Kamakau, *Ruling Chiefs of Hawaii*, 410.

<sup>50</sup> Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, US-Hawaii, December 20, 1849, 8 U.S.T. 864-71.

<sup>51</sup> Siler, *Lost Kingdom*, 26.

<sup>52</sup> Kamakau, *Ruling Chiefs of Hawaii*, 377-8.

<sup>53</sup> A superordinate goal is a shared objective that necessitated cooperative effort. In the case of the missionaries, this was to create a pluralistic society where the two cultures, could exist among each other yet maintain their cultural differences. This in itself was impossible as their mandate countered this concept, but it did call for them to accept aspect of the other culture.

worsened the one-sided relationship between the Native-Hawaiians and the Anglo-Americans.<sup>54</sup>

During 1850, France resumed its aggressive program against Hawaii to gain favorable trade considerations.<sup>55</sup> In desperation, on March 11, 1851, after meetings in France failed to reach a favorable resolution, the king's ministers provided Luther Severance, the Commissioner of the United States in Honolulu, a deed of cession. The document requested the Americans annex Hawaii until the satisfactory conclusion of hostilities.<sup>56</sup> In response, United States Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, directed the navy to enhance its presence in the Pacific Ocean to deter further French aggression.<sup>57</sup> In a confidential dispatch of the same date, Severance received directions to return the deed to the kingdom as an American pledge to its independence.<sup>58</sup> The fear of supplementary French aggression prompted Kamehameha III, as a failsafe, to increase his ties with the United States. To this end, President Franklin Pierce's Secretary of State William L. Marcy examined establishing a reciprocity treaty or pursuing the Hawaiian Kingdom's annexation.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Kamakau, *Ruling Chiefs of Hawaii*, 404-5.

<sup>55</sup> "Published by Authority," *The Polynesian*, December 30, 1848, 2-3; "Published by Authority," *The Polynesian*, January 6, 1849, 2-3; Kingdom of Hawaii, *Report of the Minister of Foreign Relations to the Legislature of 1855*, 33.

<sup>56</sup> Kingdom of Hawaii, Foreign Minister, *Report of the Minister of Foreign Relations, to the Nobles and Representatives of the Hawaiian Islands, in Legislative Council Assembled, Session of 1853* (Honolulu, 1853), 74-5; Thurston, "The Advantages of Annexation," 267.

<sup>57</sup> The US navy never acted upon the secretary of state's directive. Bowring, "The Hawaiian Islands," 789-90; "Report Upon the Official Relations...", *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 13.

<sup>58</sup> "Report Upon the Official Relations...", *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 14; Bowring, "The Hawaiian Islands," 790.

<sup>59</sup> The fear of creating international conflict also influenced the United States to officially shelve the first of many proposals in 1851. Thurston, "The Advantages of Annexation," 267.

Both proposals received strong opposition from southern American sugar plantations who saw the treaty as a threat to their profits.<sup>60</sup> British and French consuls to the islands also protested the strict alliances with the United States violated international treaties and warranted possible military responses in the preservation of their national interests in the Sandwich Isles. Overwhelmed with domestic racial, political, and geographic conflicts, US officials placed the annexation discussions on hold.<sup>61</sup> Any hope for the two proposals' immediate resurrection ended with Kamehameha III's death on December 15, 1854, along with the successful exercise of foreign influence.<sup>62</sup>

The subsequent reigns of 'Iolani Liholiho Keawenui (King Kamehameha IV) and Lot Kapuāiwa (King Kamehameha V) strained the relationship between the kingdom's Western subjects and the Hawaiian people.<sup>63</sup> It emanated from the brothers' concern that the growing white elite social class posed a threat to the monarchy's power and eventually the people's sovereignty. To strengthen the Native-Hawaiian's unity, the kings encouraged a cultural renaissance to revive the traditional practices suppressed under Ka'ahumanu's reign.<sup>64</sup> Their distrust of the Americans developed from a negative encounter they experienced with racism in Washington, DC. While the princes rode in their official train car, a conductor forcibly removed them because of their skin color.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> William D. Alexander, *A Brief History of the Hawaiian People* (New York: American Book, 1899), 278.

<sup>61</sup> The President indicated that he failed to support the annexation of Hawaii because of the lack of support in the Senate; Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1778-1854*, 426-7; Thurston, "The Advantages of Annexation," 267.

<sup>62</sup> William L. Marcy to David L. Gregg, January 31, 1855, *Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands*, 129.

<sup>63</sup> The two kings marked the end of the Kamehameha line of monarchs.

<sup>64</sup> Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1854-1874*, 124-5.

<sup>65</sup> Siler, *Lost Kingdom*, 54.

The future Hawaiian kings lost faith in the America's civil equality rhetoric and their promises to honor Hawaii's right to self-determination.<sup>66</sup>

Their resistance to foreign influence coincided with a growing movement in America that advocated expanding the country's sphere of influence beyond its continental boundaries.<sup>67</sup> Although they constituted a minority of the US population, their ideology encouraged the American-Hawaiian subjects to pressure the United States to explore the island's annexation. The movement's leaders, consisting of primarily Republicans, noted that men of foreign birth or heritage ran a large majority of the Hawaii's offices. Their concern, they reported, was that US influence was waning and required immediate action to avoid the kingdom's loss.<sup>68</sup>

During Kamehameha V's reign the American Civil War provided the kingdom increased financial access to the United States' markets.<sup>69</sup> The demand for sugar, wool, and rice after the loss of southern agriculture forced the embattled Federal government to turn the islands' plantations. As the economic leaders, the surge in trade solidified the former missionaries place within Hawaiian society. The businessmen, unfortunately, failed to consider the newfound prosperity as product of the country, but rather the consequence of their own ability and racial superiority. Their ethnocentric attitudes and

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<sup>66</sup> While the island's native population gradually decreased from disease and alcoholism, the foreigners in the kingdom grew as Americans, Europeans, and Asians began to settle in the archipelago. For Kamehameha IV, the question remained, how much longer could his kingdom maintain its sovereignty. To stem the growth of American influence in the islands, Alexander Liholiho Keawenui, sought to refresh the kingdom's stagnate relations with Great Britain. Kāwika K. Kamake'e'āina, "The History of the Census In Hawai'i Pre-Annexation - NHGSoc," *The History of the Census In Hawai'i Pre-Annexation - NHGSoc*, 2010; *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, February 14, 1874, 3; James McBride to William Henry Seward, October 9, 1863, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1863-64: Volume XXIV*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1864), 134. Hereafter *FRUS*.

<sup>67</sup> These expansionists primarily consisted of republicans who wished to extend the Monroe Doctrine into the Pacific Ocean, Central and South America, and the Caribbean.

<sup>68</sup> "Report Upon the Official Relations..." *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 14.

<sup>69</sup> Sumner J. La Croix and Christopher Grandy, "The Political Instability of Reciprocal Trade and the Overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom," *The Journal of Economic History* 57, no. 01 (1997): 166-7.

position of economic importance elevated the racial tension to the detriment of the Pacific nation's longevity.<sup>70</sup>

Hawaii's social, political, and economic fragility became apparent with the American agricultural markets' reunification that created an abundance of sugar.<sup>71</sup> By 1866, the steep drop in prices triggered a critical economic depression in the islands.<sup>72</sup> In the face of their declining influence and the industry's potential collapse, the American-Hawaiian businessmen formed an organization to challenge what they perceived as a native movement against the white community's right to property and unlimited profit.<sup>73</sup> The majority of the members included former missionaries who gained a critical place within the monarchy under Queen Ka'ahumanu and Kamehameha III. Their strong prejudice against the *kanaka* encouraged the belief the ruling family constituted a "mere shell" and the islanders' independence was a gift from the white landowners.<sup>74</sup> As full subjects of the crown, the "Missionary Boys," as they called themselves, maintained the opinion they held the right to speak freely for the indigenous people despite their American or European heritages. This perceived justification to interfere in the kingdom's sovereignty extended to the point of advocating its transfer under another

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<sup>70</sup> "The Overthrow of a Queen: Work of Missionaries," *The New York Times*, November 21, 1893, 1; La Croix and Grandy, "The Political Instability of Reciprocal Trade," 167.

<sup>71</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 68.

<sup>72</sup> To promote their presence and to gather intelligence regarding the state of political, social, and economic affairs of the island, the US Navy received orders to conduct frequent visits to the Hawaiian Islands in the late 1860s. Unfortunately, this acted against the best interests of the United States as it served to fuel the monarchy's concerns related to American political and military intervention as well as intimidation. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1854-1874*, 147, 207.

<sup>73</sup> "The Hawaiian Islands, Glance at the Political Situation," *The New York Times*, March 27, 1874, 2.

<sup>74</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 277; John Tyler Morgan Report to Senate, February 26, 1894, *Report from the Committee on Foreign Relations and Appendix in Relation to the Hawaiian Islands, February 26, 1894, submitted by Mr. Morgan*, S. Rep. 227, 53<sup>rd</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1894), 364-365 (Serial Set 3167). Hereafter *Morgan Report I*.

flag.<sup>75</sup> To that end, the organization entered into negotiations with the United States' government to reexamine the annexation question without regard towards the native people's wishes.<sup>76</sup>

Agriculture served as the "life of the nation, not only from its profitable returns, but as tending directly to the increase of the population, and the prolongation of vigorous life."<sup>77</sup> Although, the natives controlled the political system, the *haoles* directed the economy. The removal of one group from their position of power risked the social scheme's delicate balance and thus the Hawaiian Kingdom's collapse. As a result, Hawaii's future remained torn between two completely separate ideologies without the possibility for compromise.

In acknowledgement of Hawaii's dire economic state, Kamehameha V encouraged a renewed attempt to establish a Hawaiian-American reciprocity treaty. The negotiations encountered repeated resistance as they failed to garner support within both countries.<sup>78</sup> The greatest threat to the treaty, ironically, emanated from the same men that promised to benefit from its success, the American-Hawaiian businessmen.<sup>79</sup> For these individuals, it represented a seven-year reprieve from the American duties where

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<sup>75</sup> Liliuokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 178.

<sup>76</sup> The missionary party's racial views created a skewed view regarding who constituted the "Hawaiian public." People that constituted the measured masses were viewed as men of foreign descent or their supporters. This created confusion in understanding who actually supported the growing conflict. To avoid confusion the thesis uses the terms *haole* and *kanaka*. The British Minister to the Hawaiian Kingdom, Theo H. Davis, noted that the issues of, "annexation has its origins entirely amongst naturalized Americans doubtless encouraged by the mere presence of so many United States officials." Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1854-1874*, 220-1, 248-9.

<sup>77</sup> His Majesty's Speech at the Opening of the Legislative Assembly, April 30, 1872, *FRUS 1873-74*, Vol. I, 480-1.

<sup>78</sup> "Report Upon the Official Relations..." *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 14-15, 19.

<sup>79</sup> Part of the Hawaiian opposition grew from the ill-advised policy enacted a year earlier that sought to keep American warships in the region to monitor the islands and their waning political interest in the United States. The constant presence of the USS *Lackawanna* and its Captain William Reynolds sparked anger in the monarchy as it was viewed as an attempt by the United States to intimidate the pacific nation into signing the treaty. "Report Upon the Official Relations..." *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 15.

annexation to the US represented a permanent solution and promised to end Hawaiian opposition that continued to threaten their profits and power.<sup>80</sup> Despite the loud calls for annexation among the islands' *haoles* and American expansionists, it lacked popular support among Hawaii subjects and American citizens. The Hawaiian Club of Boston, an organization that promoted the kingdom's businesses, noted there was little support for annexation from the American public, especially if obtained through force.<sup>81</sup> This realization compelled Secretary of State William H. Seward to concede that, "American sensibly continues to be fastened upon the domestic questions... The public mind refuses to dismiss these questions even so far to entertain the higher, but more remote question of national expansion and aggrandizement."<sup>82</sup>

On December 11, 1872, the Kamehameha family's line passed from existence with the monarch's death on his forty-second birthday. Without a declared successor, the Kingdom of Hawaii turned to the electoral process to determine its next ruler. On January 8, 1873, the Hawaiian legislature unanimously voted William Lunalilo to assume the throne (See Picture 5).<sup>83</sup> As the new king welcomed the "missionary influence," the tides of Hawaii's political and traditional values shifted once again.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> John Patterson, "The United States and Hawaiian Reciprocity, 1867-1870," *Pacific Historical Review* 7, no. 1 (March 1938): 14-5.

<sup>81</sup> Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1854-1874*, 224.

<sup>82</sup> The purchase of Alaska lacked the opposition that Hawaii's annexation maintained. Additionally it represented a far greater benefit to the US as did the Hawaiian Islands. William H. Seward to Zeph S. Spalding, July 5, 1868, *Morgan Report II*, 952.

<sup>83</sup> Queen Emma's full name was Emalani Kalanikaumaka'amano Kaleleonālani Na'ea. The two candidates represented a growing movement in Hawaiian society that desired the return of Hawaiian nationalism. "H.M. The King of the Hawaiian Islands," *The Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Review* 1 (April 1864): 526; Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 16.

<sup>84</sup> Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1854-1874*, 107.



Like his predecessors, Lunalilo continued to advocate for a treaty of reciprocity with the United States in hopes of ending the debilitating depression.<sup>85</sup> To exploit the archipelago's desperate economic situation, the American government added a *quid pro quo* modification to the negotiation that called for the monarchy to allow the US to lease O'ahu's Pearl Harbor for fifty years.<sup>86</sup> Because the treaty appeared as the saving grace for the Missionary Boys, who remained overly dependent on the American market, approximately thirty Anglo-American subjects, without Hawaiian representation, attended a meeting with US officials in Washington, DC.<sup>87</sup> Although President Ulysses S. Grant supported US expansionism, he refused to entertain ideas of military intervention.<sup>88</sup> His administration informed the envoys that unless the Hawaiian monarchy requested annexation, they needed to induce the people to overthrow their government to establish a new republic willing to facilitate a formal request for annexation.<sup>89</sup> The treaty never found the support it required as the king altered his position upon receiving overwhelming opposition from the Hawaiian public, but the president's statement served as a revolutionary blue print for the annexationists.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> David Kalakaua, "To the Editor of the Pacific Commercial Advertiser," *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, December 13, 1873, 3.

<sup>86</sup> The offer of the lease also reduced the American government's interest in annexation as it provided the naval power a key harbor in the Pacific without the difficulties of political or military intervention in the monarchy's sovereignty. Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 69; David Kalakaua, "To the Editor of the Pacific Commercial Advertiser," *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, December 13, 1873, 3.

<sup>87</sup> Many Hawaiians, such as Queen Emma, saw these men and their agenda as a threat to their sovereignty as a nation. Theo H. Davies, "The Hawaiian Revolution," *The Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review*, (May 1893): 831.

<sup>88</sup> "Report Upon the Official Relations..." *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 16.

<sup>89</sup> These words were prophetic as it would be this logic that would contribute the overthrow of the monarchy in 1893. For the purposes of the paper, his statement will be referred to as "The Grant Doctrine" in later chapters. Franklin Peirce to Hamilton Fish, February 17, 1873, *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 244.

<sup>90</sup> David Kalakaua, "To the Editor of the Pacific Commercial Advertiser," *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, December 13, 1873, 3.

On February 3, 1874, Lunalilo died from complications brought on by tuberculosis and alcoholism.<sup>91</sup> In his wake, the divide between Hawaii's rulers and the *haole* businessmen became increasingly complicated as the older generation gradually departed from positions of government and commercial leadership.<sup>92</sup> In their place entered natural born subjects who represented full-blooded Hawaiians, persons of complete Caucasian descent, and individuals of mixed Hawaiian-Caucasian birth educated in government service and commerce. More so than before, the contemporary local leaders blurred the line between who constituted a native or foreigner and who held the legal right to determine the Pacific nation's future.<sup>93</sup>

The new generation formed two opposing groups whose ideologies encouraged the social and political manifestation of deep seeded racial tensions.<sup>94</sup> Men who maintained full or partial Hawaiian genealogy generally populated the Hawaiian legislature and sought to ensure the indigenous people's sovereignty through the restriction, if not removal, of *haole* involvement in government offices. Males with strong family and commercial ties to the United States largely represented the Missionary Party and its desire to unseat the monarchy or pass the kingdom's administration to the US. Like their fathers, they commanded the economy and perceived the *kanaka* attempts to retain control as an indication of a growing anti-white movement that threatened their lives and property.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 33.

<sup>92</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of Lorrin A. Thurston*, 3; Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 5-6.

<sup>93</sup> Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 187; "Government Reform!" *The Hawaiian Gazette*, July 5, 1887, 1, 8.

<sup>94</sup> Davies, "The Hawaiian Revolution," 831-2.

<sup>95</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of Lorrin A. Thurston*, 19.

The era proceeding King David Kalakaua's reign and the Hawaiian monarchy's eventual collapse, under his sister Queen Lydia Liliuokalani, provided evidence as to Hawaii's complexity. Unlike the historical narratives of many Native-American and African tribes, the Hawaiian Islands benefited from the normally aggressive Anglo-American governments' indifference. This allowed Kamehameha the Great, Ka'ahumanu, and Kamehameha III to exercise their right to self-determination as the presence of Westerners in the Pacific increased. Initially a rapport based upon reciprocal trade encouraged the normal effects of cultural diffusion between the two societies, but after 1820 the relationship transformed into one of aggressive re-socialization as the American missionaries worked to suppress the ancient culture in favor of their own radical religious construct. The Hawaiian elite, captivated by foreign material wealth aggressively encouraged the adoption of Western cultural norms before and long after the Boston evangelicals' arrival to facilitate the growth of Hawaii as an economic power in the Pacific. Independent of the American government and in violation of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions mandate, the missionaries used their developing influence among the inexperienced native leadership to incorporate themselves into the islands' upper class. By the time the Hawaiian monarchy realized the danger their Western subjects posed to the kingdom's sovereignty, the *haole* businessmen's role in the islands' success proved too critical to risk their removal. Because the United States government continued to lack the desire to assume responsibility for a new territory, the conflict remained domestic in nature. As the new monarchy approached, the animosity among the islands multi-racial community planted the seeds of revolution, which came into bloomed under King David Kalākaua.

## Chapter Two: King David Kalākaua and the Bayonet Constitution

The reign of King David Kalākaua revealed the Hawaiian political system's weaknesses and the former missionaries' increased influence. It also demonstrated the contempt the privileged Caucasian class maintained regarding the native people's desire to regain a sense of identity. Unfortunately, at a time that demanded competent leadership, the king exasperated the tensions. The monarch's solicitation of support from both sides of the islands' racial divide and his eventual betrayals, created an environment conducive to rebellion. In the chaos, the former missionaries manipulated the liberties they gained through the previous leaders to undermine the kingdom, at the native people's expense.

With King Alexander Lunalilo's passing, and no assigned heir to the throne, the 1874 election called attention to the newly formed ethno-political organizations inspired by the social, cultural, and economic shifts of the previous twenty years. The two candidates, Queen Emma Rooke and Colonel David Kalākaua, served as evidence of growing racial tensions in the islands. Both contenders descended from families of distinction among the former chiefs and possessed Western educations. Their previous roles in the kingdom's governance indicated that they were fully capable of leadership.<sup>1</sup> As advocates for the "Hawaii for Hawaiians" movement during the previous election and throughout Lunalilo's rule, their rhetoric opposed the missionary party's annexationist

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<sup>1</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 34-5.

policies. Each embodied the promise of Hawaii's increased independence from the United States and the return of its suppressed culture.<sup>2</sup>

The former wife of Kamehameha IV, Queen Emma remained the most popular of the electorate, especially on Oahu, the capital island. Her close ties to the people and the respect she garnered among the foreign diplomats garnered her great support, but her strong alliances with Great Britain created concern among the *haole* subjects dependent upon the US commercial markets.<sup>3</sup> Despite his heritage and his government service, her opponent failed to maintain the same respect.<sup>4</sup> David Kalākaua's fall from the *kanaka* began as Lunalilo neared his death. Despite his pro-sovereignty rhetoric and numerous attacks against Lunalilo for siding with the foreigners, he submitted a letter to the *Pacific Commercial Advertiser* that indicated he maintained no animosity against the Missionary Boys and their supporters. He further stated that although he questioned the policies related to Pearl Harbor's lease to the United States, he never lost faith in the US government's good intentions.<sup>5</sup> The candidate showed additional signs of conciliation when he reversed his promise to replace the *haole* government officials with Native Hawaiians.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> For the English diplomats carefully watching the unfolding events, they maintained confidence that their empire would soon replace the United States and the primary foreign influence in the Pacific nation. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 12; Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 33-34.

<sup>3</sup> Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 14.

<sup>4</sup> King Kamehameha V considered Kalākaua a "damned fool" and questioned his integrity. Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 14.

<sup>5</sup> *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser* was a newspaper owned by the island's business community. The letter was written two months before the death of Lunalilo. David Kalākaua, "To the Editor of the Pacific Commercial Advertiser," *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, December 13, 1873, 3.

<sup>6</sup> He also promised to prevent the sale of intoxicating liquors to Hawaiians and enforce the observation of the Sabbaths, which had been positions he once intended to repeal. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 7.

Faced with the prospect of choosing the lesser of two perceived evils, the Euro-American subjects placed their backing and money on David Kalākaua and provided him the edge he needed to overcome Queen Emma.<sup>7</sup> On February 12, 1874, the legislature elected Kalākaua (See Picture 8).<sup>8</sup> Upon the announcement, Emma's supporters rioted outside the legislature and attacked the representatives who voted against her. Without an established professional army to respond, American and British military vessels deployed troops throughout the city of Honolulu to quell the uprising. When the demonstrators disbanded and the threat of additional public demonstrations ended, the troops returned to their ships.<sup>9</sup> The next day the former queen congratulated her opponent and directed her supporters to respect the election's outcome.<sup>10</sup> The events of that February day caused the *kanaka* to believe the American-Hawaiians' influence continued to sway their legislature and their monarch symbolized that power.<sup>11</sup>

In November 1874, David Kalākaua moved further away from the Native Hawaiians when he traveled to Washington, DC, to personally advocate for a reciprocal trade accord and repair the frail relationship between the two countries.<sup>12</sup> Eager to obtain Pearl Harbor and revive their influence in the region, President Ulysses S. Grant and Secretary of State Hamilton Fish extended the monarch every privilege throughout his

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<sup>7</sup> Theo H. Davies, "The Hawaiian Revolution," *The Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review*, May 1893, 832; Alexander, *History of Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy*, 3.

<sup>8</sup> "Proclamation," *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, February 14, 1874, 2.

<sup>9</sup> The failure of the two countries to use the unrest in Hawaii does indicate an over-riding policy that respected the sovereignty of Hawaii.

<sup>10</sup> "God Save the King," *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, February 14, 1874, 2; "Riot of the Queenites," *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, February 14, 1874, 3.

<sup>11</sup> England's minister to the islands, stated that he shared the Native Hawaiian's concerns, which viewed the Treaty of Reciprocity as a threat to the island's continued independence. Alexander, *History of Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy*, 3; "God Save the King," *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, February 14, 1874, 2.

<sup>12</sup> "Hawaii and America," *Hawaiian Gazette*, February 24, 1875, 2; William Alexander, *Kalaka'ua's Reign: A Sketch of Hawaiian History* (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette Company, 1894), 6; Henry Peirce to Hamilton Fish, October 05, 1874, *FRUS, 1875-76*, 671.

mission.<sup>13</sup> Upon his return, he informed his subjects the treaty promised to increase the islands' wealth and demonstrated Hawaii deserved its independence. He warned the people that for the country to survive, it could not return to its lost heritage while the world around it advanced into the modern age. Its success, Kalākaua declared, relied upon the west's material culture and their ability to accept Western culture.<sup>14</sup>

The largest opposition to the treaty in the United States originated from the domestic sugar industries. As before, they perceived the accord provided the foreign nation with an unfair advantage that held the potential of reducing the domestic growers' revenue.<sup>15</sup> To reduce the resistance, the two countries agreed to limit Hawaii's exportation of refined sugar. The new commercial arrangement called for the Pacific plantations to ship their unprocessed sugar to San Francisco refineries. Under the agreement, the islands' sugar producers continued to gain a profit, while the US west coast companies maintained their control of the processed product. The compromise reduced the strength of the Refiners and Planters Lobby to only the southern states, which allowed the treaty to gain ratification on September 9, 1876.<sup>16</sup>

The most important stipulation, which forever changed the United States' role in the archipelago, existed in the treaty's fifth article. It declared that, "so long as this treaty shall remain in force, he (the monarch) will not lease or otherwise dispose of or create

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<sup>13</sup> Green to Peirce, February 17, 1875, *FRUS, 1875-76*, 673.

<sup>14</sup> "His Majesty's Address," *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, February 24, 1875, 2.

<sup>15</sup> This was primarily expressed in the southern states from both sugar and rice growers. They became a strong opposition force against the treaty. As the treaty progressed, it suffered a major delay at the hands of Senator J.S. Morrill who declared any reciprocity agreement as unconstitutional. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 30, 36-7.

<sup>16</sup> Additional opposition surfaced from members of congress who opposed the treaty for they saw it as a gateway to the admission of Hawaii as a territory or state, while others found fault because they felt that it hindered the annexation of the islands. The treaty's advocates within the US government further gained political support by indicating that the failure to ratify the treaty afforded England the opportunity to gain influence over the US in Hawaii. "Report Upon the Official Relations...", *FRUS, Affairs in Hawaii*, 20; Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 30-8.

any lien upon any port, harbor, or other territory in his dominions, or grant so special privilege or right of use therein, to any other power, state, or government.”<sup>17</sup> Because of the Pearl Harbor proviso, the reciprocity accord represented more than an economic or commercial agreement, as it maintained strong political consequences for both countries. Kalākaua and the Hawaiian legislature’s support facilitated the United States’ monopoly over the archipelago’s economy by closely aligning itself with the sugar trade. With the swipe of a pen, Washington, DC not only regained, but also multiplied its influence at the expense of the competing European powers, in particular Great Britain. Because England acted as the maritime counter-balance to the US, the monarchy’s actions increased the kingdom’s political and commercial isolation.<sup>18</sup>

During the last half of the 1870s, the increased commercial ties between the two countries attracted numerous entrepreneurs who hoped to capitalize from the islands’ sugar trade. One such American businessman from San Francisco, Claus Spreckels, gained the established plantation owners’ resentment for the financial sway he maintained over the king.<sup>19</sup> To protect his relationship with Spreckels amidst the growing criticism, the monarch dismissed his royal cabinet over the legislature and public’s objections.<sup>20</sup> The controversial relationship with Spreckels represented the official break

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<sup>17</sup> Commercial Reciprocity, Article Four, US-Hawaii, January 30, 1875, 8 U.S.T. 876.

<sup>18</sup> While the tensions between the European and American diplomats increased, rumors began to circulate regarding the possible annexation. In response, President Rutherford B. Hayes’ Secretary of State, William M. Evarts informed the Minister to the Hawaii, James M. Comly, on August 6, 1878, to “endeavor to disabuse the minds of those who impute to the United States any idea of further projects beyond the present treaty.” Great Britain objected to the treaty, but over time dropped its opposition. “Report Upon the Official Relations...,” *FRUS, Affairs in Hawaii*, 21.

<sup>19</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 84.

<sup>20</sup> The replacement of his cabinet without the support of the legislature became a common issue in his monarchy. In the first four and a half years of his monarchy, twelve people held four cabinet positions. Between 1882 and 1887, thirteen people held the same positions. Such actions received criticism from both Hawaiian and American-Hawaiians. Alexander, *History of Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy*, 4; Kuykendall, *Hawaiian Kingdom 1875-1893*, 188-9.



between Kalākaua and the *haole* community. In 1880, he again came under scrutiny for his questionable association with another foreign businessman named Celso Caesar Moreno.<sup>21</sup> Under Moreno's guidance, the monarch encouraged the legislature to authorize a ten-million dollar loan through the Chinese government.<sup>22</sup> Native leaders, including Queen Dowager Emma and her supporters, as well as the Missionary Party's members condemned the alliance.<sup>23</sup> US Minister Comly, shared their concerns in an official statement that displayed his frustrations, but also served to demean the pro-sovereignty representatives.

If this cabinet represents anything it represents what is just beginning to be called here the young Hawaiian party - embodying a Hawaiian know nothing sentiment of opposition to the foreign influence in the government. It suits the extreme native organization, and is looked upon with apprehension and dread by the foreigners who do business and pay taxes in the country.<sup>24</sup>

Under the controversial partnership, the king and Celso Moreno introduced three key bills before the legislature. The proposals related to the authorization of opium-licenses and the sale of liquor to *kanaka* received mixed responses in and outside the government, but the measure to provide Moreno's Trans Pacific Cable Company a \$1,000,000 bonus brought widespread anger throughout the populace.<sup>25</sup> In August 1880, the legislature voted down the bills. Walter Gibson, as the king's supporter, responded to

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<sup>21</sup> Alexander, *History of Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy*, 35.

<sup>22</sup> Told him that China was the "treasure house of the world," where he could borrow all the money he wanted.

<sup>23</sup> Alexander, *History of Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy*, 5-6.

<sup>24</sup> Americans had special cause for alarm, when it is considered in addition to this that the natives in the legislative assemblies succeeded in defeating a conservative American for the president of that body, and elected Mr. Godfrey Rhodes and Englishman whose "aversion to Americans and the United States amounts to mania." Merze Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Political History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 62-3.

<sup>25</sup> Additionally they sought to establish a Hawaiian military force sponsored through the ten million dollar loan. Jacob Adler and Robert M. Kamins, "The Political Debut of Walter Murray Gibson," *The Hawaiian Journal of History* 18 (1984): 108-9.

the loss with a motion of "want of confidence," which, after a lengthy debate, failed by a vote of 32 to 10. However, on August 14, the king dismissed his ministers and appointed a new privy council with Moreno as its premier. Despite Kalākaua's attempt to promote him as a man who sought to return the archipelago to the native people, he conceded to the masses and on the September 19, 1880, Moreno resigned.<sup>26</sup>

On January 20, 1881, David Kalākaua embarked on an extended world tour of the major Asian and European powers.<sup>27</sup> Upon his return nine months later, he perused strengthening relations with Great Britain, Japan, China, and Australia.<sup>28</sup> The king also displayed a new appetite for personal aggrandizement as he envisioned his nation obtaining the riches and influence similar to England and the Asian empires. Kalākaua sustained the belief that he could unite the Pacific islands under his leadership. Unfortunately, his new goal undermined the rocky relationship he maintained with the American businessmen as he disregarded their control over the kingdom's financial resources.<sup>29</sup>

As in the past, the Missionary Party turned to the American minister to express its grievances and seek his help. James Comly relayed their concerns to James G. Blaine, President James A. Garfield's secretary of state.<sup>30</sup> On June 30, 1881, Blaine stated the new administration's policy served to ensure its support of the Hawaiian government "in the faithful discharge of its treaty obligations," but it maintained a compulsion to protect its interests at all cost, despite France or Great Britain's claims.<sup>31</sup> Six months later, the

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<sup>26</sup> Alexander, *History of Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy*, 5-6.

<sup>27</sup> Liliuokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 76.

<sup>28</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 45-6.

<sup>29</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 76.

<sup>30</sup> "Report Upon the Official Relations..." *FRUS, Affairs in Hawaii*, 22.

<sup>31</sup> "Report Upon the Official Relations..." *FRUS, Affairs in Hawaii*, 22-3.

secretary restated his policy and added the Hawaiian Islands remained the “key to the dominion of the American Pacific, and as such the US demands their benevolent neutrality.”<sup>32</sup> In the event that the monarchy moved from a place of neutrality, he stated, the “Government would then unhesitatingly meet the altered situation by seeking an avowedly American solution.”<sup>33</sup>

The growing unrest in the islands brought concern to the next American president, Chester Arthur. In September 1882, his minister to Hawaii, Roland M. Daggett, assessed the four assemblages that opposed the king and his ministry. The first group he identified involved the *kanaka* who favored Queen Emma. He stated the group failed to pose a threat to the monarchy as the natives no longer represented a controlling physical force in the kingdom.<sup>34</sup> The next population included Americans who once served as government officials and were willing to accept profitable public positions held by others. This class characterized the missionary influence that maintained little interest in the growing political conflict.<sup>35</sup>

The final two groups he identified marked the opposition’s strength. The zealous and outspoken annexationist movements numbered around 400. The majority of the members favored the reciprocity treaty’s retraction, in favor of annexation. The most powerful challenge to Kalākaua involved the Anglo-American property owners. Their opposition however, questioned the kingdom’s administration rather than the current

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<sup>32</sup> “Report Upon the Official Relations...,” *FRUS, Affairs in Hawaii*, 23.

<sup>33</sup> “Report Upon the Official Relations...,” *FRUS, Affairs in Hawaii*, 23.

<sup>34</sup> The American-Hawaiian subjects formed the Honolulu Rifles to serve as a para-military force in the islands. Despite their pro-American views, their existence was never discouraged by the government.

<sup>35</sup> Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 268-9.

form of government. They charged the king with extravagance and the ministry with failing to curb its growth.<sup>36</sup>

With Moreno's departure, Walter Gibson's devotion to Kalākaua placed him at the king's right hand as his Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs.<sup>37</sup> Despite his American nationality, his appointment angered the businessmen. Gibson claimed he understood the Hawaiian's grievances and supported the monarch's wish to restore the crown's lost power through the revival of nativism. However, the elite class viewed the king's new ally as an opportunist who desired to accumulate as much power within the islands as possible.<sup>38</sup> In 1882, government expenditures drew concern from all sides of the political spectrum, but failed to garner resistance within the legislature.<sup>39</sup> The greatest expenditures derived from the monarchy's desire reinvent itself with the commission of a new palace, the creation of a standing military force, and an official coronation to reestablish his reign.<sup>40</sup> During the following two years, the national debt rose from \$299,200 in March 31, 1882, to \$898,800 by April 1, 1884, and thirty days thereafter it reached a total \$1,048,800.<sup>41</sup>

The coronation on February 12, 1883, further revealed the discontent between the king, the native Hawaiian populace, and the Western subjects. Critics stated the ceremonies constituted an unnecessary expenditure after three years of rule and served

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<sup>36</sup> Rollin M. Daggett to Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, September 20, 1882, *FRUS, 1882-83*, 347.

<sup>37</sup> Adler and Kamins, "The Political Debut of Walter Murray Gibson," 113.

<sup>38</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 76-7.

<sup>39</sup> The pro-American newspaper *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser* post an article in February 1874 that called for the reduction of all the expenditures of the Hawaiian government as a way to bring prosperity to the islands. It is evident that they maintained reservations about the salaries and budgets of the *ali'i* dominated political system. *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, February 14, 1874, 3.

<sup>40</sup> The Iolani Palace became the most modern of its kind as it had electricity and plumbing (See Picture 11).

<sup>41</sup> Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 259; Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 65, 257; Daggett to Frelinghuysen, April 30, 1884, *FRUS, 1884-85*, 284.

only to satisfy his vanity at the taxpayers' expense.<sup>42</sup> In an attempt to draw the *kanaka*'s support, the two-week long celebration embraced the return of old traditions first resurrected under Kamehameha V.<sup>43</sup> The former missionaries considered the resurrection of beliefs their families labored to remove as a "retrograde step of heathenism and a disgrace to the age."<sup>44</sup> Kalākau's coronation and the debt's it incurred ended any semblance of balance between the political and economic systems within the kingdom.

By October 1883, the nation approached bankruptcy, but found salvation from a last minute injection of money by Claus Spreckels.<sup>45</sup> The demands placed upon the business community by the legislature's unchecked spending threatened commercial profits through increased taxation.<sup>46</sup> The *haole* questioned their lack of representation in a government they perceived survived off their success. The American-Hawaiian subject's sentiments regarding the monarch's disregard towards their value within the kingdom maintained some ethical legitimacy. Their xenophobic philosophies, however, negated much of their argument as they failed to accept the leadership of a king and the legitimacy of the Hawaiian people as a whole. For men like Lorrin A. Thurston and Stanford Dole, the money from the plantations belonged to the white community alone and their property represented the United States, not the country from which it resided

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<sup>42</sup> Individuals like Queen Emma, and the predominant *ali'i* Ruth Keelikolani, and Bernice Bishop as well as Thurston and Dole avoided the ceremonies. Alexander, *History of Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy*, 8-9; Queen Liliuokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 104.

<sup>43</sup> Liliuokalani defended her brothers actions as his expenses as necessary for the development of national pride and Hawaiian solidarity. Liliuokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 103-5.

<sup>44</sup> Alexander, *History of Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy*, 8-9.

<sup>45</sup> As the year closed, the cabinet once again lost three members over issues of corruption. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 266-8.

<sup>46</sup> As owners of 80 percent of the kingdom's lands, they represented 26 percent of the electorate. The foreigners numbered 400 of the 1500 electorates in 1891. Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 118-9.

(See Picture 9-10).<sup>47</sup> To protect their interests, the economic leaders established a reform movement that sought to increase their influence within the legislature.

Throughout 1884, the discord between the economic and political leadership intensified. In an attempt to demonstrate his break from the businessmen, David Kalākaua rejected the United States' exclusive right to Pearl River Harbor as a condition for the 1875 Reciprocity Treaty's reinstatement. His threats corresponded with opposition to the accord's renewal in the US, which heightened the debate over the power of the islands' currency.<sup>48</sup> On June 16, the finance committee released a report that revealed gross negligence in government spending, but a move to remove the cabinet floundered.<sup>49</sup> As the financial picture worsened, the *haole* Reform Party gained seats in the 1884 election.<sup>50</sup> Although the king's Palace Party retained control, the opposition dictated the official committee's nominations.<sup>51</sup>

The 1886 election served as evidence of the increased conflict displayed with each election after 1874. Although David Kalākaua remained unpopular among the island's elite and much of the growing middle class, his break from the American-Hawaiian businessmen brought support among the pro-sovereignty movement's members. Throughout the process, bribery allegations were leveled against the two major parties.<sup>52</sup> At its conclusion on February 3, Gibson and the native movement held eighteen

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<sup>47</sup> Alexander, *History of Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy*, 86.

<sup>48</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 61; Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 279.

<sup>49</sup> *The Hawaiian Gazette*, June 25, 1884, 2; *The Hawaiian Gazette*, July 2, 1884, 2.

<sup>50</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 46.

<sup>51</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 68.

<sup>52</sup> "Victorious," *The Pacific Advertiser*, February 4, 1886, 2; "The Election," *The Daily Honolulu Press*, February 4, 1886, 2; Alexander, *History of Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy*, 12.

of the twenty-eight seats, while their adversary, the American businessmen's representatives occupied the remaining nine.<sup>53</sup>

The session marked a chaotic legislature as the *haole* minority challenged measures they regarded as inconsistent with the public welfare.<sup>54</sup> As political opposition against the king intensified, Kalākaua's allies Spreckels and Gibson, became liabilities. The main source of discontent involved the premier's call for a two million dollar loan amidst the budget deficit.<sup>55</sup> His request met with unilateral displeasure from the political and commercial representatives, including Claus Spreckels who questioned the expenditures after his previous financial rescue.<sup>56</sup> With broad support in the legislature, a no confidence vote of the ministry passed, but saw limited success as the premier survived the purge.<sup>57</sup>

After years of being labeled Spreckels' puppet, David Kalākaua broke from his benefactor and sought financial assistance from London to free himself from the American's influence.<sup>58</sup> With his ally's absence and his cabinet's termination, Walter Gibson lost the support he previously mustered under the Reform Party's constant pressure.<sup>59</sup> The loan passed through the assembly on October 13, 1886, and marked Spreckels' loss of influence over the islands.<sup>60</sup> In victory over the king's allies, the

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<sup>53</sup> "Victorious," *The Pacific Advertiser*, February 4, 1886, 2; "The Election," *The Daily Honolulu Press*, February 4, 1886, 2.

<sup>54</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 46; "The Loan Bill," *The Daily Herald*, September 2, 1886, 2.

<sup>55</sup> "The Loan Bill," *The Daily Herald*, September 2, 1886, 2.

<sup>56</sup> "More Shuffling," *The Daily Herald*, October 14, 1886, 2.

<sup>57</sup> "The Sequel," *The Daily Herald*, October 14, 1886, 2; "Legislative Summer," *The Daily Herald*, October 15, 1886, 2.

<sup>58</sup> Alexander, *History of Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy*, 15.

<sup>59</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 90.

<sup>60</sup> Spreckels' economic interest continued in the islands, but they could no longer be extended by preferential treatment from the government. After 1886 his financial investments in the islands slowly

opposition faced a new concern, Hawaii's potential debt to the British government gave the maritime power advantage over Kalākaua. Based on the misspending, the possibility of defaulting risked England using the public revenues as collateral security.<sup>61</sup> In the United States, the situation brought concern to Grover Cleveland's administration. The US minister, George Merrill, asserted Kalākaua was working to replace the government with Hawaiians and diminish their influence.<sup>62</sup> Using the exclusive privileges granted under the reciprocity treaty, the US successfully blocked the loan.<sup>63</sup>

Lacking voting power in the parliament, there seemed no hope for the American-Hawaiian subjects to enact reforms through legislative methods.<sup>64</sup> In late 1886, *haole* displeasure led to the established of the Hawaiian League. Thirteen of its members formed an executive committee, which governed the political group operation and policies.<sup>65</sup> Originally formed to effect change in the ministry and reforms in the old constitution, as membership increased, the League assumed a revolutionary tone.<sup>66</sup> Within the party, two ideologies fought for control. One group advocated the monarchy's overthrow, the establishment of a republic, and the annexation to the United States, while the less radical wing sought to retain independence, but felt that the king's power required limitation through a new constitution.<sup>67</sup>

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started to decline until his death in 1908. Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 71; "More Shuffling," *The Daily Herald*, October 14, 1886, 2.

<sup>61</sup> Bayard to Merrill, January 8, 1887, *Morgan Report II*, 1973; Stevens to Blaine, August 19, 1890, *Morgan Report II*, 1141.

<sup>62</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 81; Thomas F. Bayard to George W. Merrill, October 15, 1886, *FRUS, 1886-87*, 528.

<sup>63</sup> "Report Upon the Official Relations . . .," *FRUS, Affairs in Hawaii*, 25.

<sup>64</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 47.

<sup>65</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 132.

<sup>66</sup> The league was in part inspired by the French revolution. Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 130.

<sup>67</sup> They choose to remain secret to prevent opposition or oppression of white subjects of the kingdom. They also sought to support their growing militia's superiors in their efforts to protect the Euro-



To avoid interference or discovery, the meetings took place at night and rarely twice in succession at the same location.<sup>68</sup> Upon their discovery in June 1887, the organization used the press, public platforms, and petitions to garner support.<sup>69</sup> The tensions multiplied when the Anglo militia, the Honolulu Rifles, joined the League (See Picture 12).<sup>70</sup> As their rhetoric amplified tensions, the Hawaiian League suppressed the more radical members in favor of preserving the monarchy.<sup>71</sup> By June 26, 1887, the executive committee felt that their armed forces remained sufficient to bring about a revolt.<sup>72</sup>

As the US Minister to the Kingdom of Hawaii, George Merrill counseled both the monarchy and the American-Hawaiian radicals. He advised the League that moderation and the adoption of peaceful measures remained the best method to gain popular public support. Additionally, he warned the men not to encourage or participate in any act whereby trade or commerce risked interruption. The minister also reminded them that he lacked the authorization to determine the United States' response to their plans.<sup>73</sup> Plagued with rumors of a pending military revolt and a lack of confidence in his council, on the night of June 27, 1887, Kalākaua sent for Merrill. Upon reviewing the situation, the minister acknowledged the people's dissatisfaction and proposed he heed the voices related to those who maintained the country's wealth. He further indicated that Gibson's

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American community. Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 47; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 131, 137-8, 608.

<sup>68</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 48.

<sup>69</sup> They made charges that public funds which should have been expended on internal improvements were diverted to the useless Samoan mission, to support extravagant and useless officials, as well as unnecessary visits abroad. *The Hawaiian Gazette*, March 24, 1887, 4.

<sup>70</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 48; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 142; "Honolulu Rifles," *The Daily Herald*, January 7, 1887, 3.

<sup>71</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 49-50.

<sup>72</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 141-2.

<sup>73</sup> Merrill to Bayard, July 30, 1887, *FRUS, 1887-88*, 582.

removal would pacify their anger and avoid a conflict. Upon his departure, it was understood Kalākaua intended to change his cabinet within 12 hours, but it never materialized.<sup>74</sup>

On June 30, 1887, a public meeting took place in the Honolulu Rifle's armory. Lorrin Thurston accused the monarchy of corruption and incompetence regarding the protection of personal and property rights.<sup>75</sup> He identified the League's membership as Hawaiians who acted in sympathy with, and on behalf of all, the kingdom's "right minded citizens, residents, and taxpayers."<sup>76</sup> The meeting's leaders submitted a resolution that called for Walter Gibson's dismissal, and called for the king to no longer inhibit or unduly influence the legislature.<sup>77</sup> They also discouraged Kalākaua from interfering with the administration of his cabinet and the use his official position or patronage for private ends.<sup>78</sup> Upon the declaration's unanimous support, the Committee of Thirteen presented the document to Kalākaua and allotted him twenty-four hours to answer their demands. The monarch responded the declaration was unnecessary as their demands were already instituted on June 28.<sup>79</sup> He indicated his willingness to submit the whole subject to the new cabinet and to act accordingly on their advice.<sup>80</sup> David Kalākaua acceded to each of the specific ultimatums and assured the committee of his readiness to cooperate with "our

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<sup>74</sup> "A Cabinet Shuffle," *The Daily Herald*, June 29, 1887, 2; "Reform!," *The Daily Herald*, July 1, 1887, 3; "Mass meeting," *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, July 1, 1887, 2-3.

<sup>75</sup> "Reform!," *The Daily Herald*, July 1, 1887, 3; "The New Ministry," *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, July 2, 1887, 2.

<sup>76</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 50-1; "Reform!," *The Daily Herald*, July 1, 1887, 3.

<sup>77</sup> The desire to modify the existing constitution of the Hawaiian nation found debate from the members. Many from the outer islands encouraged a slow process of modification within the government that involved using the legislature to remove members of the cabinet and over a period modified the constitution. However, the members from Honolulu, such as Thurston, pushed for immediate change. Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 51. Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 149-50.

<sup>78</sup> Throughout these pages is clear that the leaders of the Hawaiian League were all American or of Western descent. Throughout Dole's book it is an infringement upon their rights and not the rights of the people that generated their anger. Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 52.

<sup>79</sup> "Reform!," *The Daily Herald*, July 1, 1887, 3.

<sup>80</sup> "The King's Reply," *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, July 2, 1887, 2.

counselors and advisors as well as our intelligent and patriotic citizens in all matters touching the honor, welfare, and prosperity of our kingdom.”<sup>81</sup>

In the presence of illegally armed men patrolling the streets, David Kalākaua sent for the American, British, French, Portuguese, and Japanese diplomatic representatives, and expressed his desire to temporary annex the kingdom to their nations on July 1. As the diplomats encouraged his continued leadership, the foreign representatives declared their unwillingness to accept his request. Since the king previously agreed to the revolutionaries’ demands, the ministers advised him to form the new ministry.<sup>82</sup> Throughout the meeting, Merrill remained indifferent, if not hostile to the Reform Party, but at the last moment changed to a position of neutrality.<sup>83</sup>

On July 6, 1887, less than a week after the American-Hawaiians exerted force upon the king to yield his policies and cabinet, the new constitution received Kalākaua’s official acceptance.<sup>84</sup> Written by Lorrin Thurston, it implemented sweeping changes to the kingdom’s administration. Although the charter provided for the monarchy’s continuance, the power dynamic shifted in the Privy Council’s favor. It stated monarchical directives lacked legitimacy unless endorsed by a cabinet member. The law specified the royal council served at the legislature’s pleasure rather than the kingship.<sup>85</sup>

In response to the revolution, Secretary of State Bayard stated he regretted the “existence of domestic disorders in Hawaii,” but the United States retained no legal

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<sup>81</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 53-55; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 149-50.

<sup>82</sup> “The New Ministry,” *The Daily Herald*, July 2, 1887, 3.

<sup>83</sup> Throughout the revolution, no violence occurred throughout the islands. Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 87-9.

<sup>84</sup> Alexander, *History of Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy*, 375.

<sup>85</sup> Thurston, *The Fundamental Law of Hawaii*, 184-7.

grounds to interfere in the nation's domestic affairs.<sup>86</sup> He reminded the American minister, "no intent is cherished or policy entertained by the United States which is otherwise than friendly to the autonomous control and independence of Hawaii."<sup>87</sup> Although the US respected the inhabitants and their government's right, the secretary acknowledged the islands' importance to American interests. He cautioned that if the situation showed any indication of interfering with United States or its citizens' welfare the US maintained a duty to protect.<sup>88</sup> In August 1889, under Merrill and Wodehouse's advice, King David Kalākaua accepted his Supreme Court's decision that in effect he held no constitutional right to exercise his discretion or withhold his approval of policies embraced by his ministers.<sup>89</sup>

Lorrin Thurston and William DeWitt Alexander's post-script writings asserted the constitution was not in accordance with the Hawaii's laws created by their forefathers, but in their opinion neither was the United States' Declaration of Independence from Britain. The men declared that both represented revolutionary documents, which required force to implement and ensure longevity.<sup>90</sup> For the native people, the 1887 revolt created the "Bayonet Constitution."<sup>91</sup> Ironically, King David Kalākaua, not the American-Hawaiian subjects experienced the people's anger regarding the shift in power. The legislators provided little, if any, resistance to impede the League constitutional modification, which created the impression that they supported the businessmen. Despite

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<sup>86</sup> Bayard to Merrill, July 12, 1887, *FRUS, 1887-88*, 580.

<sup>87</sup> Bayard to Merrill, July 12, 1887, *FRUS, 1887-88*, 581.

<sup>88</sup> Bayard to Merrill, July 12, 1887, *FRUS, 1887-88*, 580-1

<sup>89</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 91, 100.

<sup>90</sup> Lili'uokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 180-1; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 153; "Appointment of a New Cabinet," *The Hawaiian Gazette*, July 5, 1887, 4.

<sup>91</sup> Lili'uokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 182.

the lack of protest, the divide between the *kanaka* and the *haoles* increased with the intensification of racial hatred.<sup>92</sup>

David Kalākaua's reign undermines the romanticized narrative regarding Hawaii's last king. His weaknesses incensed Native and American-Hawaiians alike and served to increase the tension between the political and economic leaders. At a time when the *kanaka* needed a strong leader like Alexander 'Iolani Liholiho or Lot Kapuāiwa, they instead suffered under an opportunist lost in the privileges of his title. Nevertheless, the Western subjects' deep entrenchment within the society begs the question, what options remained available to reduce the Missionary Boys influence?<sup>93</sup> The 1887 revolution demonstrated the *haoles*' hypocrisy and their disregard towards the political system their ancestors instituted. Conversely, it also displayed the Hawaiian leadership's enduring corruption and inexperience. The long delay in action against the businessmen encourages the question; did the legislature support the coup? After 1887, the Native Hawaiians and their future monarch sought to regain their lost influence through the limitation of the white communities' power. For the Committee of Thirteen, their overriding priority involved maintaining their newly obtained positions of authority in the face of their weakening stature. The fight for Hawaii's destiny was now underway, but unfortunately, the future promised more turbulence that forced a final show down between the two groups.

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<sup>92</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 100; Merrill to Blaine, August 6, 1889, *Morgan Report II*, 1092; Merrill to Blaine, September 7, 1889, *Morgan Report II*, 1096.

<sup>93</sup> To place the blame squarely upon the shoulders of David Kalakaua and the American-Hawaiians who perpetrated the coup over simplifies the events as it fails to account for the actions of their multi-ethnic predecessors who established the dysfunctional culture from which the divisions emerged.

### Chapter Three: The Hawaiian Monarchy's Collapse

The *haole* businessmen's forceful attainment of increased influence within the monarchy provided only limited advantages that over the succeeding five years dissipated from their own shortcomings and the lack of their closest allies' support. New obstacles arose during their decline that paled in comparison to the problems that inspired the 1887 uprising. The arrival of an American diplomat on a personal mission to undermine the Hawaiian government added to the tension that continued to debilitate the already tumultuous relationship between the political and economic leaders. Inspired by the official's support and motivated by their ethnocentric and capitalistic ideologies, the Anglo-American community placed the blame for the islands' problems upon monarchy for which the 1887 constitution relieved all practical power. By 1892's conclusion, the economic situation in the islands, Queen Lydia Lili'uokalani's attempt to regain power through the legislature, and the growth of foreign influence in the kingdom, stirred the American-Hawaiian businessmen to once again violate their own constitution through another revolution. To achieve lasting political power and increased commercial profits, they abandoned all restraint and committed to the Hawaiian sovereignty's complete collapse in favor of eliciting permanent American control.

Despite the sweeping reforms that placed additional power with the Western subjects, the Bayonet Constitution failed to ensure their complete control of the government for the Hawaiian legislature maintained the authority to remove the ministers from office and undo the new charter. However, no such attempt took place in the years that followed as it appeared the parliament and the *kanaka* viewed David Kalākaua as the

greater of two evils. The Wilcox Revolution of July 29, 1889, provided evidence for the people's discontent in their king. Led by Robert Wilcox, an armed force attempted to acquire possession of the Iolani Palace and force the king's abdication in favor of his sister, Princess Lydia Lili'uokalani (See Picture 13).<sup>1</sup> Although the Wilcox Revolution failed, it rejuvenated the pro-Hawaiian political movement and initiated a gradual repeal of the American-Hawaiian subject's power.<sup>2</sup>

The 1890 parliamentary elections provided the Palace Party a partial victory and secured their renewed control over the political committees. Within three years of their revolution, the pro-American politicians once again constituted the minority within the government. Because the legislature did not attempt to reverse the 1887 modifications to the constitution or remove the League members from the privy council Kalakaua's success did little to strengthen his position.<sup>3</sup> As the islands entered the new decade, it appeared that the monarchy was no longer a political factor in Hawaiian politics. The shifting power, however, alarmed men like Lorrin Thurston that the royal party retained the possibility to force their ministry's resignation.

The League's weakness emanated not from the Hawaiian people or their representatives, but rather from their own members. Constant internal conflicts regarding the party's mission undermined its cohesiveness at a time when the native populace's apathy towards the white community gradually gave way to resentment. In October 1890, the party experienced a second loss that promised to undermine their achievements over the previous four decades. The United States implementation of the McKinley Tariff Act

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<sup>1</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 60, 65; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 181-2.

<sup>2</sup> The Reform Party represented the *haole* Businessmen who sought to reduce the power of the monarchy or terminate it all together.

<sup>3</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 102.

ended the 1875 American-Hawaiian treaty of Reciprocity by raising the average duty on imports nearly 50 percent.<sup>4</sup> The differential advantage Hawaiian sugar enjoyed in the US market diminished with disastrous consequences as the price of raw sugar dropped from \$100 to sixty dollars per ton, resulting in the reduction of production, a drop in wages, and an increase in unemployment.<sup>5</sup> With the economic scheme of the Pacific nation in chaos, any change that promised a chance to preserve the haole businessmen's standing remained preferable to their foreseeable devastation.<sup>6</sup>

In 1891, the Palace Party's momentum suffered a temporary setback with King David Kalakaua's death during a visit to San Francisco on February 22.<sup>7</sup> Nine days later the monarchy passed to his sister, Lydia Lili'uokalani.<sup>8</sup> The fifty-three year old queen appeared well fitted to administer the government as she maintained a reputation as a dignified leader and her devout Christian beliefs ensured her support among many Westerners.<sup>9</sup> Her strong avocation for Hawaiian nationality, however, created panic among the foreign businessmen as the Pacific nation slipped deeper into an economic depression.<sup>10</sup> US President Benjamin Harrison's newly appointed Minister to the Islands John L. Stevens maintained these concerns regarding the new monarch. In his numerous

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<sup>4</sup> The act, sponsored by the Republican Party, served to shield domestic industries from foreign competition. Lorrin Thurston, *The Fundamental Law of Hawaii*, 196.

<sup>5</sup> Hawaiian Kingdom, Minister of Foreign Relations, *Report of the Minister Foreign Affairs to the Hawaiian Legislature*, Session of 1892 (Honolulu: Elele Publishing Co. 1892), 16; Stevens to Foster, November 20, 1892, *FRUS, Affairs in Hawaii*, 382-3.

<sup>6</sup> As US commerce grew increasingly hostile to Hawaiian goods, increased commercial ties with Canada and Australia afforded Great Britain with renewed influence in the islands. Several key foreign residents in the Pacific kingdom advocated for closer ties despite the possible effects upon US-Hawaiian relations. Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 118; Stevens to Foster, November 20, 1892, *Affairs in Hawaii*, 383-5.

<sup>7</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 66; "Report Upon the Official Relations..." *FRUS, Affairs in Hawaii*, 28.

<sup>8</sup> Lili'uokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 208-11.

<sup>9</sup> In the opinion of this author, the new queen maintained the potential to be a strong leader, but her lack of experience and hesitation to be aggressive served as her primary weakness. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 479.

<sup>10</sup> John L. Stevens to James Blaine, February 22, 1891, *FRUS, Affairs in Hawaii*, 343.



communications with Secretary of State James G. Blaine and John W. Foster, the minister stated his displeasure with the new monarch and advocated increased American intervention (See Picture 15).<sup>11</sup>

The president's administration characterized the political pendulum's swing from the former Democratic President Grover Cleveland's restrained diplomatic policies to the aggressive expansionist views embraced by Harrison's Republican Party. The members considered Hawaii an indirect territory in both title and influence. They reasoned the majority of the realm was American owned, educated, and governed. Furthermore, men like Stevens noted the kingdom also relied mainly upon US trade and thus its existence depended upon his country. Under such conditions the expansionist politicians surmised, Hawaii's appropriation seemed inevitable.<sup>12</sup> The problem remained that the United States was not the only country with interests in Hawaii. Any aggressive actions towards domination violated international laws and risked an international incident with European nations capable of devastating economic or military retaliation.<sup>13</sup>

The official mandate for the US minister to Hawaii dictated the promotion of positive relations between the two counties without the degradation of the monarchy's absolute independence. In the event the native leadership drifted from their influence or

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<sup>11</sup> John Stevens was a longtime friend of the secretary of state and shared his strong American expansionist views. Both sought to bring Hawaii under US control, but lacked the support in congress. Secretary of State James Blaine left office to run for the Republican Party's presidential nomination in 1892. Charles W. Calhoun, *Benjamin Harrison: The American Presidents Series: The 23rd President, 1889-1893*, 1st ed. (New York: Times Books, 2005), 125.

<sup>12</sup> A small group of the native population also favored annexation. These individuals consisted of liberal leaders who failed to retain the confidence of Lili'uokalani. Like their American-Hawaiian counterparts, they had nothing to lose, but everything to gain from civil decent and revolution. "Force was Never Intended; this is Shown by the Message of the President. Hawaiian Case Strongly Set Forth," *New York Times*, December 19, 1893; Lorrin A. Thurston, "The Sandwich Islands," 280; Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 567-8.

<sup>13</sup> As indicated in the previous chapters, the multiple western interests in the islands served as its best defense. Grant's unofficial doctrine provided the only way to circumvent a conflict. If the local leadership requested annexation then few options existed for the other countries without violating the sovereignty of the islands themselves.

another country attempted to take possession of the archipelago, their orders urged the use of aggressive diplomatic, not military, action to ensure American political dominance.<sup>14</sup> Contrary to these instructions, John Stevens displayed open contempt towards Queen Lili'uokalani.<sup>15</sup> In April 1892, he interfered with the conviction of two Americans who plotted the Hawaiian government's overthrow. Five months later, the minister displayed "uncouth" and "ungentlemanly" behavior when he demanded the queen mandate all criticism regarding his policies and actions in the islands' private newspapers become illegal, as it constituted insults against the United States.<sup>16</sup> The insolent actions gained criticism at home and abroad. As a diplomat, his violation of accepted etiquette warranted potential recall, but "the queen good-naturedly over looked the insult and forgave his ignorance and ill-temper."<sup>17</sup> Despite her forgiveness and the displeasure of the *ali'i* and *kanaka*, Stevens continued to engage in public speeches condemning the kingdom and its place in a modern society.<sup>18</sup>

The minister's open contempt for the queen, coupled with the mounting economic depression and the general unease within the kingdom, encouraged the return of revolutionary thoughts among the Anglo-American subjects. In spring 1892, the new generation of conservative *haole* businessmen and politicians in Honolulu organized small secretive group known as the Annexation Club (See Picture 14).<sup>19</sup> The organization's objective involved ensuring a quick judicious response in the event

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<sup>14</sup> Kingdom Of Hawaii, Minister Foreign Affairs, *Report of the Minister Foreign Affairs to the Hawaiian Legislature*, 1892 Session (Honolulu, 1892), 12.

<sup>15</sup> Stevens to Foster, November 20, 1892, *Morgan Report II*, 1185-91.

<sup>16</sup> "Facts in Relation to the Revolution of 1893, and the Causes which Linked to it," January 16, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 1023-4.

<sup>17</sup> The queen's failure to remove Stevens from Hawaii, indicates her lack of aggressiveness in the midst of a potential threat. "Facts in Relation to the Revolution of 1893...", January 16, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 1024.

<sup>18</sup> "Facts in Relation to the Revolution of 1893...", January 16, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 1024.

<sup>19</sup> They referred to themselves as the Downtown Boys. Lili'uokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 178.

prominent native islanders precipitated action that threatened to further degrade the white community's influence in the kingdom.<sup>20</sup> Unlike the disorganized Hawaiian League, its small membership of thirteen predominant businessmen guaranteed a cohesive administration. Its members consisted of pro-business white lawyers, merchants, planters, bankers, directors and part owners of large corporations with millions of dollars in their own names or as trustees.<sup>21</sup>

On March 29, 1892, Annexation Club representative Lorrin Andrews Thurston sailed to Washington to meet with government leaders.<sup>22</sup> With a letter of introduction from John Stevens, he met with James Blaine to advise the secretary of state regarding the organization's mission. Thurston assured the secretary the members sustained no intention of precipitating action in Honolulu, but warned the preservation of peace remained impossible because of Lydia Lili'uokalani's desire to promulgate a revised constitution. He indicated in such an event his supporters intended to seek annexation to the United States provided the proposal sustained the State Department's endorsement.<sup>23</sup> When Blaine referred the envoy to Benjamin Harrison, the president refused to see him, but through the Secretary of the Navy passed on the administration's sympathy.<sup>24</sup>

As the 1892 Hawaiian election neared, no one political group commanded a majority in the legislative body.<sup>25</sup> In a time of financial regression and racial tension, an

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<sup>20</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 229.

<sup>21</sup> US Secretary of State John Foster described the men as "The Americans of Hawaii are loyal and patriotic sons of the fatherland." John W. Foster, *Diplomatic Memoirs*, Vol. II (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909), 171; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 230.

<sup>22</sup> *The Evening Star*, January 28, 1893, 6; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 230.

<sup>23</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 117.

<sup>24</sup> Within seven months of Lauren Thurston's delicate exploratory mission to Washington, the Harris administration advanced a proposal to pay Queen Lili'uokalani and those connected with her the sum of \$250,000 for the assignment to the United States of the sovereignty of Hawaii, Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 231-2.

<sup>25</sup> Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 547.

epidemic of distrust rendered the government ineffective as neither side maintained the willingness to reach a compromise. The principal issue during the campaign among the plantation owners, businessmen, and the Western subjects, involved the reestablishment of free trade with the US.<sup>26</sup> Their opposition maintained three objectives, which included a new constitution, the incumbent cabinet's replacement, and a challenge to the United States' exclusive and permanent control of Pearl Harbor as they feared it endangered the kingdom's sovereignty.<sup>27</sup> Many *kanaka* and *ali'i* criticized the monarch for yielding to the *haoles'* influence and ignoring the indigenous people's needs.<sup>28</sup> In reaction the queen stated, "to have ignored or disregarded so general a request, I must have been deaf to the voice of the people, which tradition tells us is the voice of God."<sup>29</sup> No true Hawaiian chief would have done other than to promise a consideration of their wishes."<sup>30</sup>

At the session's opening on May 28, 1892, Lili'uokalani declared her commitment to the 1887 constitution and asserted her dedication the subjects' rights and privileges. In recognition to the Native Hawaiians, the queen pledged to also preserve the kingdom's autonomy.<sup>31</sup> The legislative dysfunction provided an ominous sign of the Pacific nation's desperate future.<sup>32</sup> More so then the session's two major issues, a fight to control the cabinet and proposals to modify the constitution, the failed 1886 lottery and

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<sup>26</sup> Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 523.

<sup>27</sup> Under pressure from a large population of Native Hawaiians, Queen Lili'uokalani's primary political platform called for the reversal of the Bayonet Constitution. Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 122.

<sup>28</sup> Out of the possible 9,500 registered voters, an estimated 6,500 requested a constitutional convention. Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 155; Lili'uokalani, *Hawaii Story*, 230-1, 384.

<sup>29</sup> The queen received 10,000 petitions related to modifying the constitution in favor of the Hawaiian people. "Facts in Relation to the Revolution of 1893..." January 16, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 1026-7.

<sup>30</sup> Lili'uokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 231.

<sup>31</sup> "The House," *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, May 30, 1892, 4.

<sup>32</sup> During the session, accusations from all parties identified corruption and bribery throughout the Hawaiian legislature. "Facts in relation to the Revolution of 1893..." January 16, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 1024-5.

opium licensing bills gained the greatest press within the islands.<sup>33</sup> On November 4, 1892, after nearly eight months of debate, the Reform Party retained their control over Lili'uokalani's Privy Council with her final acceptance of four pro-American subjects. The appointment of the cabinet represented not only a victory over the queen, but proof of US ascendancy over British and other anti-American sentiments.<sup>34</sup>

With the ministry under the *haole* businessmen's control, annexation rumors ran through the kingdom. A general understanding existed concerning Minister Stevens' willingness to support the monarchy's removal and the support he engendered from the naval ship USS *Boston's* captain, Gilbert Cornwall Wiltse. The United States man-of-War arrived in the islands on with orders to ensure an official American presence in the islands throughout the perceived unrest (See picture 16).<sup>35</sup> What many failed to know, concerned US Secretary of State John W. Foster's directive to Stevens. It stated that since the situation remained so chaotic, an attempt to facilitate change in the islands held little chance of success considering the minimal amount of time left in the Harrison Administration. Foster felt the annexation question was too complicated to find quick passage in the American Congress, especially when President-elect Glover Cleveland's anti-expansionist policies condoned such an enterprise.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Unlike the previous five years, the apathy that ensured the Hawaiian League's continued political advantage transformed into frustration towards the white community's arrogance and disrespect concerning the Native Hawaiians. "Lost a Crown," *Morning Call*(San Francisco), January 28, 1893, 2.

<sup>34</sup> The conservative ministry enjoyed the confidence of the propriety class and remained acceptable to the moderates of the parties. The new body, more positively American than any since the fall of the reform ministry in June 1890, was expected to exercise its power in a conservative manner until the 1894 elections. Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 126; Stevens to Foster, November 8, 1892, *Morgan Report II*, 1184.

<sup>35</sup> Lucien Young, *The Boston at Hawaii: The Observations and Impressions of a Naval Officer during a Stay of Fourteen Months in Those Islands on a Man-of-War* (Washington, DC: Gibson Brothers, 1898), 28; Stevens to Foster, September 14, 1892, *FRUS, Affairs in Hawaii*, 183-4.

<sup>36</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 242 – 3.

On November 21, 1892, T. T. Williams, a nationally known editor of San Francisco's *Examiner*, published his story investigating the kingdom's social and political upheaval. His survey of the forty-two Hawaiian House of Common's members revealed only ten desired annexation, while thirty-two favored autonomy.<sup>37</sup> The representatives serving in the House of Nobles' responded to the same question based upon their property interests. Some suggested only the United States retained the ability to return the sugar trust, while others remained convinced a large majority of the Hawaiian people opposed appropriation and asserted Great Britain never received serious consideration as a new protectorate.<sup>38</sup> In his final analysis, Williams concluded the kingdom's majority populations opposed a union with the United States and that much of the partisan crisis in Honolulu resulted from Stevens' meddling.<sup>39</sup>

In the United States, the Hawaiian question brought mixed responses from congress and the public. Individuals who supported annexation followed the general attitudes of the Harrison administration and the American-Hawaiians, while those who opposed maintained multiple motivations.<sup>40</sup> The agricultural interests remained the greatest opponent, as the islands' appropriation promised to undo everything they fought to gain through the McKinley Tariff Act. The commercial concerns were followed by the

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<sup>37</sup> Among the general population, the Americans who objected to the appropriation of Hawaii by with the US supported maintaining Japanese labor on their sugar plantations. Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 142-3.

<sup>38</sup> The British diplomat to Hawaii, sought to increase England's influence, but he failed to maintain official support as his nation as it determined the US overshadowed their influence. As long as they retained access to Honolulu's ports, they were not going to risk open conflict. Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 237-8.

<sup>39</sup> Others felt that the termination of the contract labor system would entail a greater loss on the sugar industry in any benefit, which possibly derived through annexation, but this will be discussed in Chapter five. "The Portable Meddling by the United States Minister Stevens and the Captain of the Cruiser *Boston*," *The Examiner*, November 17, 1892; Stevens to Foster, September 14, 1892, *FRUS: 1892*, 52<sup>nd</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., 183-4.

<sup>40</sup> Foster, *Diplomatic Memoirs*, 167.

numerous Americans who questioned if colonial aspirations violated the US Constitution's foundation of anti-imperialism. Finally, many within the conservative parties assumed the absorption of people of non-Caucasian heritage threatened the country's already tarnished racial purity.<sup>41</sup> With strong opposition against annexation in both countries, the Hawaiian League's long-range goals seemed nothing more than a fantasy.

In January 1893, however, a new eruption from the long restrained simmering tension seemed inevitable. The government's disarray and worsening racial relations continued to fuel discontent as the McKinley Tariff Act persisted to wreak havoc upon the kingdom's economy. The divide between its *haole* and native representatives prevented the possibility of compromise for the kingdom's benefit.<sup>42</sup> As the Reform Party controlled ministry continued to suppress the queen's policies, throughout December 1892 and January 1893, the Hawaiian dominated legislature's attempts to remove the Privy Council failed to gain the required votes.<sup>43</sup>

The controversial lottery and opium bills served as the trigger, which eventually returned the power to the queen and signaled to the foreigners that their influence in the islands neared its conclusion.<sup>44</sup> Although their objections to the two bills maintained a moral slant, the businessmen's actual fear related to the potential threat to their economic and political position. They recognized the legislations' ability to produce enough revenue to render the monarch independent of their influence. Additionally, the income

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<sup>41</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 144.

<sup>42</sup> "The Legislature," *The Daily Bulletin*, January 7, 1890, 3.

<sup>43</sup> "Want of Confidence," *The Daily Bulletin*, January 4, 1890, 3; "Be Consistent or Nothing," *The Daily Bulletin*, January 9, 1890, 3.

<sup>44</sup> These two bills sought the formation of a lottery and the legalization of opium sales in the kingdom. The two proposals sought to sell rights to specific individuals seeking to control the market.

maintained the potential to reduce the islands' financial distress perpetrated by the McKinley Tariff and thus diminish annexation's advantages.<sup>45</sup> On January 11, 1893, the lottery bill passed 23 to 20 thus signifying a major defeat for the Reform Party. As a minister in the queen's cabinet, Lorrin Thurston unleashed repeated condemnations of the numerous Hawaiian and Anglo-American representatives who supported the bill. With each angry rant, he damaged his platform's floundering support. By the day's end, Thurston's histrionics resulted in a 25 to 16 vote of no confidence against the Privy Counsel.<sup>46</sup>

The success of the native-dominated Liberal Party in establishing the lottery and opium bills emboldened Queen Lili'uokalani. For the first time she openly discussed implementing modifications to the 1887 constitution. In response, the white community again resorted to revolution to restore their waning influence.<sup>47</sup> They alleged the islands' prosperity required the permanent establishment of favorable leadership and demanded United States intervention to secure the "stability of government" to facilitate an immediate "influx of capital and institute a period of prosperity."<sup>48</sup> Over the next three days, the two groups worked to form their respective strategies.

On Saturday, January 14, 1893, word permeated throughout Honolulu concerning Lili'uokalani's planned promulgation of a revised constitution.<sup>49</sup> Composed of clippings from the 1864 and 1887 statutes, the document mirrored the instrument under which

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<sup>45</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 223.

<sup>46</sup> The success of the lottery bill in the last week of the 1892 session was attributed by its opposition as the result of bribery. *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, January 12, 1893; "After only Sixty-Six Days Defeat of the Ministry," *The Daily Bulletin*, January 12, 1893, 3; "The Legislature," *The Daily Bulletin*, January 12, 1893, 3.

<sup>47</sup> "The Great Mass Meeting," *Morgan Report II*, 1604-5.

<sup>48</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 140.

<sup>49</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 70-1; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 245.



David Kalakaua ruled prior to the 1887 political coup.<sup>50</sup> The week before the legislature's closing, each of the American-Hawaiian cabinet nominees gave the sovereign assurances of their support.<sup>51</sup> At ten o'clock the next morning, the queen informed the ministers of her intention to officially propagate the new accord.<sup>52</sup> After the announcement, the ministry rescinded their support under the assumption it might trigger another uprising. Lili'uokalani recollected, "They had let me out to the edge of the precipice, and now they were leaving me to take the step alone. It was humiliating."<sup>53</sup> When she indicated her willingness to assume the blame, her advisors requested an additional evening to re-examine the statutes and make necessary changes. After a long argument, the queen yielded, but called attention to the precedent the Reform Party created through their 1887 revolution.<sup>54</sup>

As the monarch debated with her Privy Council, the annexationists drafted a declaration that stated her "subversion" represented an attempted coup against the Pacific nation's principles.<sup>55</sup> On the afternoon of January 14, 1893, the American-Hawaiian businessmen formed a new committee inspired by the French Revolution's Committee of Public Safety. Mirroring advice provided by President Grant decades earlier, the

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<sup>50</sup> Lili'uokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 23, 383, 391.

<sup>51</sup> Lili'uokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 384-5; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 246.

<sup>52</sup> The queen maintained the impression that she required the signatures of her ministers to make her propose action legal, based on article forty-two of the proposed constitution. It declared that no act of the Queen should have any effect unless a minister, who, by that signature, makes himself responsible, countersigns it. Lili'uokalani's actions revealed her concern for the adherence of the legal process. Her commitment to the procedures of the legislature and the existing constitution benefited men like Thurston who stated that her views prevented her taking a more aggressive approach that would have denied them the time they needed to respond to her plans. Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 159; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 274.

<sup>53</sup> Lili'uokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 385.

<sup>54</sup> "Facts in Relation to the Revolution of 1893 . . .," *Morgan Report II*, 1026-7; Lili'uokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 385-6.

<sup>55</sup> Once again, as what occurred in 1887, the America-Hawaiian subjects sought to ignore the governmental processes they demanded the queen follow, upon their realization of their waning power. Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 249; Young, *The Boston at Hawaii*, 174.

organization sought to remove the queen from power and form a provisional government with the explicit objective to formally request annexation to the United States.<sup>56</sup> The committee's leadership comprised many of the 1887 revolution's former Hawaiian League and the Honolulu Rifles participants.<sup>57</sup> Once committed to action, the organization informed Minister Stevens of the situation and inquired as to his intended response to their proposed uprising. Failing to gain his immediate support, the Annexation Club met again to ascertain their access to military force.<sup>58</sup> Although the Honolulu Rifles exceeded one hundred well-armed men, Lorrin Thurston suspected without the assistance of troops from the USS *Boston*, their cause remained in jeopardy.<sup>59</sup>

When Marshal Charles Burnett Wilson, the head of the island's law enforcement, requested permission from the queen and her cabinet to arrest the agitators they unanimously opted to avoid a direct confrontation. Mirroring The Committee for Public Safety, the Hawaiian officials queried John Stevens about his planned course of action in the event of an armed coup. The minister responded that he backed the American-Hawaiian businessmen, but failed to provide the specific details regarding his strategy.<sup>60</sup> Recognizing the situation's complexity, the Lili'uokalani sought to gain the advice of conservative businessmen friendly to the monarch and the diplomatic representatives of

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<sup>56</sup> The revolutionaries primary goal was to obtain annexation quickly, but should that not occur, they looked to establish a republic until such a time as annexation was possible. Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 74, 163; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 250-1.

<sup>57</sup> The Honolulu Rifles, officially disbanded in 1890, reformed in order to assist the pending revolution. Its leader V.V. Ashford represented the most radical of the two organization's leadership. He advocated the assassination of the monarchy and the subjugation of the *kanka*. He escaped conviction for treason in April of 1892 with the help of Minister Stevens.

<sup>58</sup> Statement of W.O. Smith of events prior to January 17, 1893, *FRUS, Affairs in Hawaii*, 955; Young, *The Boston at Hawaii*, 177.

<sup>59</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 248, 250.

<sup>60</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 168.

the various countries represented in Hawaii.<sup>61</sup> In response, they advised that the best course of action dictated the reform's abandonment until a later date and a public proclamation assuring the community of the delay.<sup>62</sup>

At 10:00 A.M. the following day, The Committee for Public Safety authorized its members to take whatever measures considered necessary to protect their public interest.<sup>63</sup> After the meeting, Thurston called on John Stevens to inform him of the revised strategy. The minister cautioned the committee that legally, he lacked the authority to recognize the revolutionary administration until it became fully established, and the United States forces could not take sides.<sup>64</sup> According to Hawaiian law and precedent, a military landing required the request of the government in authority. In acknowledgment of Stevens' situation, and his implied support, Thurston withdrew their official request regarding the USS *Boston*. Despite the extraction, Captain Wiltse concluded troops were required and prepared for their deployment. For the first time in the kingdom's history, American forces prepared to land in the islands despite the existing government's vehement opposition.<sup>65</sup>

At 9:00 A.M. on Monday, January 16, 1893, the committee met to organize a mass meeting for that afternoon. Lacking the authorization to arrest its members, Marshal Wilson attempted personally to persuade the businessmen to end the revolt. Wilson informed the group that they exceeded the legal scope of action since the matter of the

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<sup>61</sup> As word spread of a possible uprising, Marshall Wilson met with Attorney General Peterson regarding the committee of safety's members and the issuance of warrants. Peterson resisted the tactic as he maintained concerns that such action would precipitate a conflict with American troops and result in their deployment. "Facts in Relation to the Revolution of 1893...", *Morgan Report II*, 1029-30.

<sup>62</sup> Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 585.

<sup>63</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 169.

<sup>64</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 75; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 252.

<sup>65</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 170.

constitution no longer existed. The marshal argued the foreign representatives accepted the queen's declaration, and thus, so should they.<sup>66</sup> Thurston responded, "I'm sorry for the country, but what guarantee have we that this will not happen again? It is living on a volcano; there's no telling when it will explode."<sup>67</sup>

As word disseminated regarding the American-Hawaiian subject's contemplated revolution, the *kanaka* began to take up arms to protect Liliuokalani's monarchy and their sovereignty. Despite Marshal Wilson's continued call to meet force with force, Lili'uokalani and her cabinet issued a proclamation asking for peaceful protests. She assured the public that changes to the constitution remained her desire, but the hostility that permeated the island required its postponement. The Hawaiian leadership solicited the people to accept the monarch's assurances and ensure the safety of the populace.<sup>68</sup>

At 2:00 P.M. that day, the two parties held meetings in Honolulu. The first occurred at the former Honolulu Rifles Armory, which attracted an estimated crowd of 1,000 people. Nearly all white, the attendees represented the majority of the annexationist movement. Lorrin Thurston read a series of preambles and six resolutions drawn up by the Committee of Thirteen. They condemned the monarch and called upon the membership to use any means possible to "secure the permanent maintenance of law and order and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii."<sup>69</sup> The rhetoric declared the kingdom resembled a slumbering volcano, which maintained the potential "to spew out blood and destroy us all."<sup>70</sup> In the course of the meeting, a messenger arrived with a

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<sup>66</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 171; Young, *The Boston at Hawaii*, 179.

<sup>67</sup> "Facts in Relation to the Revolution of 1893....," *Morgan Report II*, 1031-2.

<sup>68</sup> "Facts in Relation to the Revolution of 1893....," *Morgan Report II*, 1032-3.

<sup>69</sup> "How We Revolt," *The Daily Bulletin*, January 17, 1893, 3; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 259-62.

<sup>70</sup> "How We Revolt," *The Daily Bulletin*, January 17, 1893, 3.

statement from Queen Lili'uokalani that promised to postpone the constitutional revisions and assured the men that the modification would only occur through the legal processes designated in the 1887 statutes. The declaration received no consideration from the committee members who questioned the value of her assurances and asserted it was “not her fault that the streets have not run red with blood.”<sup>71</sup>

The second meeting that assembled on Palace Square represented the Palace Party's supporters. Nearly 2,000 people came to the meeting, which displayed a greater diversity of nationalities and a less belligerent tone. Lili'uokalani supporters complemented the crowd on their good behavior over the previous days and renewed the call for law and order. Regarding the abandoned constitutional changes, the speakers asked the people for their patience and promised the debate's return at some point in the future.<sup>72</sup> The queen's commitment to Hawaiian sovereignty remained intact, despite the momentary surrender to ensure the public's safety. Both meetings acted as a “safety valve” which allowed the populace to vent their frustrations and greatly contributed to the “calm after the storm.”<sup>73</sup> By 4:00 P.M., the streets were quiet and life seemed to return to normal.<sup>74</sup>

At the closure of their meeting, the Committee of Public Safety wrote to Stevens to request his assistance as they lacked the ability to “protect ourselves without aid and,

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<sup>71</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 76-7; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 261-7; *The Daily Bulletin*, January 16, 1893, 3; Cornwell to Blount, April 24, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 1301-3.

<sup>72</sup> “Popular Meeting,” *The Daily Bulletin*, January 17, 1893, 2; “The Talk of an Officer Shot,” *The Daily Bulletin*, January 17, 1893, 3.

<sup>73</sup> “Facts in Relation to the Revolution of 1893...,” *Morgan Report II*, 1033-4.

<sup>74</sup> “Facts in Relation to the Revolution of 1893...,” *Morgan Report II*, 1033-4.

therefore, pray for the protection of the United States forces” in an environment of “general alarm and terror.”<sup>75</sup> In response to Thurston and the committee, Stevens wrote:

The conditions are so serious, and the possibilities of trouble so great, that it is my duty to protect the lives and property of American subjects with every available means within my power; and I am going to land American troops immediately for that purpose. I’ve already given orders to that effect, and it will not be long before the troops are here. That’s all I have to say.<sup>76</sup>

At 4:30 P.M., Gilbert Wiltse received orders from John Stevens to deploy his forces into the city of Honolulu.<sup>77</sup> The 164 men consisted of three companies of naval blue jackets, an artillery group, and a marine contingent. A small squad deployed to protect the American legation and consulate, while the others positioned themselves around the city in full view of Queen Lili’uokalani (See Picture 17).<sup>78</sup> In later testimony, Hawaiian Minister of Finance William H. Cornwell observed, “If the troops were landed solely for the protection of American property, the placing of them so far away from the center of property of Americans and so very close to the property of the Hawaiian government was remarkable and very suggestive.”<sup>79</sup> His concern received support from United States Steamer *Portsmouth* Commander, J. S. Skerritt, who stated, the troops were

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<sup>75</sup> Citizen’s Committee of Safety to John L. Stevens, January 16, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 1309.

<sup>76</sup> Despite the letter he sent to Stevens, Thurston stated that they did not want the *USS Boston*’s troops in Honolulu and Stevens acted on his own. Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 68-9.

<sup>77</sup> Lt. Young, of the *USS Boston*, gave another version of the decision in order to land forces. He stated on Sunday Capt. Wiltse came to the conclusion that troops should be landed, and he acted on his own authority. At about 10:30 am on Monday he was convinced that the Queen’s government could not protect life and property and decided that he would order his men ashore. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Wiltse, January 16, 1893, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Compilation of Reports of Committee 1789-1901: Diplomatic Relations with Foreign Nations-Hawaiian Islands*, S. Doc. 321, Pt. 6, 56<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1901), 893 (Serial Set #4052) Hereafter *Hawaiian Islands*.

<sup>78</sup> Chief Justice Alfred F Judd stated that the location chosen maintained no significant indication of any intention on the part of the United States troops to defend any uprising against the Queen’s government. Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 178-9; “Of What Are They Afraid?” *The Daily Bulletin*, January 17, 1893, 3.

<sup>79</sup> John Cornwell to James Blount, April 24, 1893, *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 493-6.

positioned to ensure the free movement of the provisional government, rather than the protection of American subjects and their property.<sup>80</sup>

During the US forces' landing, the queen's cabinet informed Stevens the monarchy maintained the personnel to protect the public and to suppress the rebellion, but the minister replied that since the troops remained committed, their recall was not required. When asked if he intended to support the Committee of Public Safety, he answered that he maintained no such intention and the military served only to preserve Lili'uokalani's authority. When the cabinet again emphasized displeasure with the armed servicemen's deployment, Stevens instructed them to, "Make a protest in writing and if you make it in a friendly spirit I will answer it in the same tone."<sup>81</sup> Upon receiving the formal written protest, Stevens acknowledged the following day whatever the United States diplomatic "representatives have done or may do," shall be guided by the kindest feelings.<sup>82</sup>

The O'ahu Governor, Archibald Scott Cleghorn, also protested the landing of armed forces without the monarchy's permission violated international law. In the past, he reminded the minister, the deployment of American troops for drill purposes failed to require official authorization, but on this occasion, the circumstances remained different. "Ostensibly the present landing is for the discharge of functions which are distinctly responsible duties of the Hawaiian government."<sup>83</sup> Stevens responded, the US diplomatic

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<sup>80</sup> "Of What Are They Afraid?" *The Daily Bulletin*, January 17, 1893, 3; Lili'uokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 386.

<sup>81</sup> Colburn to Blount, April 15, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 1306-9.

<sup>82</sup> John L. Stevens to Samuel Parker, January 17, 1893, *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 1058.

<sup>83</sup> Archibald S. Cleghorn to John L. Stevens, January 16, 1893, *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 1038.

and navy representatives assumed a regard for the islanders' welfare.<sup>84</sup> As the night of January 16, 1893, ended, Lili'uokalani maintained her authority, but took no action based upon her fears of challenging the naval personnel.<sup>85</sup>

Around 2:30 P.M. the next day, the Committee of Thirteen read their formal proclamation in the presence of the council's members, their clerks, and one *ali'i* legislative member. The announcement asserted they represented all Hawaiians and acted for their common good. It declared that a representative and responsible administration able to protect itself from revolutionary uprisings and aggression was no longer possible under the queen and her cabinet.<sup>86</sup> The document stated change remained necessary to avoid further damage to the island's credit and to avoid ruining the overstrained financial system. They demanded the monarchy's resignation and the installment of a provisional government "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon."<sup>87</sup> Immediately after the proclamation's presentation, forty to sixty volunteers from the Honolulu Rifles took key positions throughout the city, without hindrance from the American troops. The militia cleared the grounds of spectators and positioned themselves at the gates. Within an hour, an additional 100 to 200 riflemen assumed stations in front of the federal building and, upon the securing of the facility, the provisional government established their official headquarters.<sup>88</sup>

A short time after the proclamation, American Lieutenant Lucien Young delivered a message from Captain Wiltse extending his complements to the Committee of

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<sup>84</sup> Stevens to Cleghorn, January 17, 1893, *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 1038; Office of the Governor of Oahu to Stevens, January 16, 1893, *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 1038.

<sup>85</sup> The Queen requested the assistance of the US troops to quell the uprising, but her request was denied. Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 77.

<sup>86</sup> Lili'uokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 386-9.

<sup>87</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 185.

<sup>88</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 186; Young, *The Boston at Hawaii*, 200.



Public Safety and inquiring if they maintained absolute control of the police and National Guard.<sup>89</sup> The provisional government's president, Stanford Dole, responded they failed to have control of the military and police facilities, but maintained a sufficient force to sustain their command of the federal building. Young responded that if they failed to secure the monarchy, the US lacked the legal authorization to provide any assistance to their provisional government.<sup>90</sup> When Dole requested the US troops, both Stevens and Captain Wilkse informed him the provisional government lacked official recognition until it gained possession of the police station and the army barracks.<sup>91</sup>

Fifteen minutes after the reading of the proclamation James S. Walker, the president of the legislative assembly, apprised the queen that the opposition party requested she abdicate. Lili'uokalani responded that held no intention to relinquish her throne. John Stevens informed the Hawaiian representatives of his official acknowledgement of the new leadership and advised her surrender.<sup>92</sup> With the understanding that the US minister recognized the provisional administration, the monarch, and her cabinet under protest relinquished their authority pending a resolution from Washington. Their decision resembled the "life of the land" policy of Kamehameha III, who upon the kingdom's invasion of British troops, yielded until England reversed the actions of its rogue commander. The queen also planned to acquiesce to the United

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<sup>89</sup> Whether confused, panicked, or just uncertain, Queen Lili'uokalani and her cabinet failed to reach a unified plan to respond to the revolution. They failed to place guards in the federal buildings as they maintained that the proximity of United States troops to possible conflict sites endangered the lives of the men from the Boston and risked bloodshed among her subjects. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 601-2; Young, *The Boston at Hawaii*, 200.

<sup>90</sup> Young, *The Boston at Hawaii*, 202.

<sup>91</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 83-4; Young, *The Boston at Hawaii*, 201-2.

<sup>92</sup> Lili'uokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 387; Cornwell to Blount, April 24, 1893, *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 493-6.

States' superior military under the control of John L. Stevens until the US president reversed the scheme.<sup>93</sup> The royal protest concluded:

Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces and perhaps the loss of life, I do, under protest, and impelled by said forces, yield my authority until such a time as the government of the United States shall, upon facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representatives and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian islands.<sup>94</sup>

At 7:00 P.M., approximately three hours after Minister Stevens acknowledged the provisional government, President Stanford Dole received the queen's protest and under her directive, Marshall Wilson relinquished the police station, the barracks, and all federal property under his control (See Picture 18). On January 17, 1893, the Hawaiian Islands shifted from majority Hawaiian control, to the *haole* minority and the end to the people's sovereignty.

The United States' abandonment of the 1874 Treaty of Commercial Reciprocity, the Missionary Boy's loss of power within the government, and the queen's attempt to modify the constitution signified defining moments that lead to the final confrontation. In the end, the privileged Hawaiian classes' inexperience gave way to the xenophobia, arrogance, and greed of the Anglo-American subjects. As Hawaiian borne subjects who maintained commercial and legal ties to the kingdom, their actions represented the domestic conflict independent of American foreign policy. However, the actions of US Minister to Hawaii John L. Stevens, whether he acted independently or not, blurred the line between an internal struggle and American imperialism. His role as an American diplomat and his involvement of American marines implicated the United States government in the *coup d'état*. The critical events, which followed the revolution and

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<sup>93</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 189-90.

<sup>94</sup> Lili'uokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 387-8.

determined the future of the fallen kingdom, occurred not in the islands or through the discourse of its people, but rather within the public and political realm of the United States. For the next five years, the Hawaiian Islands' right to self-determination became lost in the center of an American debate as to whether or not its physical influence should expand beyond the borders of the continent. Throughout the process, the actions of the American congress and three presidents further blurred the line between American imperialism and a series of unfortunate events that maintained no malice or intent towards the former monarchy and its society.

## Chapter Four: The Appropriation of the Hawaiian Republic

The placement of the Pacific kingdom's future in the United States government's control was the American-Hawaiian revolutionaries' intentional final stage to formally end the islands' monarchy and sidestep the tariffs that crippled their markets. After the revolution the Hawaiian Question transformed into an American discourse over the national narrative regarding its foreign policy and moral representation before the world. Throughout the debate, Lili'uokalani and her native subjects experienced a roller coaster ride resulting from the United States government's shifting opinions over several presidential administrations. In the end, an unforeseen international conflict provided the American expansionists and the Hawaiian annexationists with a critical advantage that forever changed the role of the US on the global stage. Without the Spanish American War and the Republican Party's majority in the US House, Hawaii's appropriation may never have occurred.

With Hawaii under the provisional government's control, the second phase of the unofficial Grant Doctrine went into effect on January 19, 1893.<sup>1</sup> A commission representing the American-Hawaiian businessmen procured the inter-island steamer *Claudine* to sail to the United States. Their mission sought to petition the administration of President Benjamin Harrison to annex the former kingdom (See Picture 19).<sup>2</sup> Lacking access to a private ship, Queen Lili'uokalani's delegation departed for Washington on

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<sup>1</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 90; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 283.

<sup>2</sup> The ship was owned by a sugar magnate who supported the Annexation membership. "Latest Intelligence: The Revolution in Hawaii," *The Times London*, January 31, 1893, 5; "The Claudine Departs," *The Daily Bulletin*, January 19, 1893, 3.

February 1, 1893, on the commercial ship *SS Australia*.<sup>3</sup> The thirteen-day lead allowed the provisional government's envoys the time to carefully shape and disseminate their narrative to the American public without challenge. In their meetings with numerous reporters, they asserted the queen engaged in a political coup to subvert the 1887 constitution. As "responsible citizens," the white community maintained no other option but to terminate the troublesome monarchy.<sup>4</sup> The commission stated the role of the US Minister to Hawaii, John Stevens, and the USS *Boston*'s troops remained limited to the protection of American citizens and their property. Stevens, they insisted, acted only in the capacity as a diplomat, not as a fellow revolutionary intent upon the monarchy's collapse.<sup>5</sup>

When Washington received word regarding the coup on January 28, 1893, the Harrison administration hurried to ascertain its response to the developing events. After meetings between Secretary of State John W. Foster and the Hawaiian representative to the United States, Mott Smith, the president chose to support the annexationists through two possible actions.<sup>6</sup> His options included assuming the role as a protectorate or the islands' appropriation as a territory or state. The president favored the latter course for it represented the best action to secure his country's interests in the region. Harrison and Foster anticipated favorable press reaction to the revolution and prompt congressional

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<sup>3</sup> "Australia's Departure," *The Daily Bulletin*, February 1, 1893, 3; "Passengers," *The Daily Bulletin*, February 1, 1893, 3; Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893*, 616.

<sup>4</sup> For the American public and congressional leaders, this became the first and only account, which they would hear for nearly a month.

<sup>5</sup> "Minister Thurston Talks," *New York Times*, November 13, 1893, 4.

<sup>6</sup> Based upon the reports of the newspapers, it is evident that messages between Hawaii and the United States required approximately nine days. Considering the rapidity of the events, it remains possible that the American Government played no part in the revolution. The Harrison administration long maintained pro-expansionist views. "A Hawaiian Revolution," *The Evening Star*, January 28, 1893, 6; "From Washington," *Alexandria Gazette*, January 28, 1893, 2.

approval appeared a reasonable possibility.<sup>7</sup> The major obstacle, as they earlier feared, remained the limited time left in their term to overcome the anti-annexationist and anti-expansionists in the Congress.<sup>8</sup>

On Capitol Hill, the sentiment split generally along partisan lines and resurrected the debates of the previous four decades. The Republican Party considered the union a natural result of a century of close political and commercial relations between the two countries.<sup>9</sup> They identified the islands' importance to the United States in securing Pacific trade and naval supremacy in support of the Monroe Doctrine, which served as one of the party's cardinal principles.<sup>10</sup> In their interpretation of the influential foreign policy, Hawaii represented the key to ensure US rights in the Pacific region and its national security from European or Asian encroachment. The pro-expansionists' arguments tended to lack specifics and instead maintained foundations of general ideals rather than concrete justifications. The lack of hostilities undermined the islands' military value. Furthermore, domestic agricultural aggressively argued Hawaii provided a negative impact upon the American economy.<sup>11</sup>

The Democratic Party, in contrast, questioned the policy on multiple grounds. As in the previous eras, they viewed the added competition from the archipelago's

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<sup>7</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Political History*, 205.

<sup>8</sup> Despite their support of annexation, many questioned the course pursued by minister Stevens in ordering the USS *Boston*'s troops onshore without explicit instructions from Washington. Merze Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Political History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 196.

<sup>9</sup> Foster, *Diplomatic Memoirs*, 168.

<sup>10</sup> Carl Schurz, "Manifest Destiny," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine* 87, no. 521 (October 1893): 738; *Washington Post*, January 29, 1893.

<sup>11</sup> In the end, their argument revolved around abstract concepts of destiny and fate. Tom Coffman, *Nation Within: The Story of America's Annexation of the Nation of Hawai'i* (Kāne'ohe, Hawai'i: Tom Coffman/EPICenter, 1998), 4-5.

agricultural businesses as a threat to domestic farming.<sup>12</sup> Other members maintained concerns the United States needed to focus on needs within its own borders rather than protecting outlying territories.<sup>13</sup> Additionally, they believed policies that encouraged expansionism violated the fundamental American policies condemning colonization foreign countries.<sup>14</sup> In the earlier debates, the Democrats repeatedly achieved success in preventing annexation proposals and most commercial treaties.<sup>15</sup> Such a fact should have caused the Harrison administration concern, but their rhetoric ignored the precedent.<sup>16</sup>

The anticipation of the European and Asian powers' possible reaction initially slowed the treaties advancement as American political leaders awaited the foreign countries' diplomatic responses. After the coup, indications from the British minister to the archipelago and members of the press created alarm that the Western empires and Japan might respond to the Pacific nation's upheaval by demanding the US abandon the kingdom.<sup>17</sup> It became evident, however, that as the months passed, Europe abandoned its competition for influence in Hawaii. As long as the maritime powers retained access to the island's ports, who controlled the government garnered little concern.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> "Hawaii and the Sugar Question," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 6, 1893, 2.

<sup>13</sup> John W. Foster, *Diplomatic Memoirs*, 172; "In Hotel Lobbies," *The Washington Post*, February 2, 1893, 4; *San Francisco Morning Call*, February 1 and 2, 1893.

<sup>14</sup> "Latest Intelligence: The Revolution in Hawaii," *The Times London*, January 31, 1893, 5; "Opposition to the Treaty" *Washington Post*, February 17, 1893, 1.

<sup>15</sup> The Republican Party won a victory with the reciprocity treaty of 1874, but its construction and amendments served the demands of the United States far more extensively than it did the Hawaiians based upon the democratic parties influence.

<sup>16</sup> "Hawaii May Come In," *The Washington Post*, February 16, 1893, 1.

<sup>17</sup> "Latest Intelligence: The Revolution in Hawaii," *The Times London*, January 31, 1893, 5; *Morning Call*, January 31, 1893; Merze Tate, "Great Britain and the sovereignty of Hawaii," *Pacific Historical Review* 31 (1962): 339.

<sup>18</sup> The mutually assured protection was no longer in place. England considered the United States a formidable power and maintained little desire to sour its relations. "Latest Intelligence: The Revolution in Hawaii," *The Times London*, January 31, 1893, 5; Hawaii: An Anglo-American Question," *The Speaker: The Liberal Review* 7 (March 18, 1893): 300; "No Protests Yet," *The Evening Star*, January 31, 1893, 6.

Another obstacle to the rapid progression of Harrison's agreement emanated from the prevailing racism that continued to plague the nation. On both sides of the political aisle, many questioned the admission of a country that maintained a large population of non-white subjects. Laws in the US excluded Asians from the country, but in Hawaii, the racial groups numbered well in excess of 20,000.<sup>19</sup> To accept annexation, was to accept them and thus undermine the protection of the Caucasian purity and job security.<sup>20</sup> The Pacific plantation owners would not end their practice of using cheap foreign labor, as the Hawaiians and the Euro-Americans tended to be ill suited for the work. The impasse created heated debate in Congress and in the newspapers that contributed to the deceleration of the bill through the Senate.<sup>21</sup>

Amidst the nation's softening enthusiasm, the House introduced four resolutions, which called for the support of annexation.<sup>22</sup> On February 4, 1893, Secretary of State Foster provided the provisional government's commissioners a tentative draft related to the official treaty. It addressed only the basic question of whether the archipelago deserved annexation to the US and excluded key points requested by the envoys.<sup>23</sup> The scaled down version emanated from his anticipation that with the session's termination, the only hope of success required the omission of controversial material that might lead to its defeat.<sup>24</sup> As a result, the administration dropped sections concerning tariff elimination and modified the immigration wording to state the existing islands' labor

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<sup>19</sup> "Obstacles in the Way," *The Evening Star*, February 1, 1893, 1.

<sup>20</sup> "Obstacles in the Way," *The Evening Star*, February 1, 1893, 1.

<sup>21</sup> "Hawaii's Labor Demands," *New York Times*, August 13, 1897, 5.

<sup>22</sup> "The Hawaiian Resolution," *The Evening Star*, January 31, 1893, 6; "The Annexation of the Sandwich Islands," *The Review of Reviews* 17 (January 1898): 35; "Final Rush in Congress," *The Washington Post*, February 27, 1893, 1; Cong. Rec., February 9, 1893, 52 Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess, S1093.

<sup>23</sup> "They Saw Mr. Foster," *The Evening News*, February 4, 1893, 1, 6; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 284.

<sup>24</sup> "The Annexation of the Sandwich Islands," *The Review of Reviews* 17 (January 1898): 35; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 285.



system would continue until changed by future legislation.<sup>25</sup> As the terms set forth in the draft differed vastly from their original instructions, the American-Hawaiian representatives refused to accept the convention.<sup>26</sup> Because of their concerns, the issues the secretary hoped to avoid returned to slow the process and build opposition. Exactly thirty-one days after the revolution started, and with less than a month left in the Fifty-Second Congress, on February 14, 1893, the modified agreements gained the provisional government's support and moved on to the president for his approval.<sup>27</sup>

The revolution's American-Hawaiian dominated narrative formed the basis of John Foster's letter that accompanied the proposed treaty upon its submission to Benjamin Harrison. Without consulting the monarchy, the president accepted the biased particulars and passed the treaty to the Senate with his own assessment.<sup>28</sup> Harrison stated he not only respected, but also encouraged, the continuance of Hawaii's independence provided it ensured protection of American life and property while maintaining the stability to provide adequate security against domination from other powers. He denied involvement in the monarch's overthrow and accused Lili'uokalani of unscrupulous practices that placed her country in serious peril, thus ensuring her restoration remained undesirable.<sup>29</sup> To facilitate the treaty's rapid progression, Harrison and Foster warned Congress against lengthy discussion concerning the legal, moral, or ethical aspects concerning the revolution or the kingdom's admission into the United States.<sup>30</sup> A day

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<sup>25</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 286-7.

<sup>26</sup> "New Plea for Hawaii, Commissioners Again Confer with Secretary Foster," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 8, 1893, 5.

<sup>27</sup> "Hawaii May Come In," *Washington Post*, February 16, 1893, 1.

<sup>28</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 203-4.

<sup>29</sup> Coffman, *Nation Within*, 143; "The Hawaiian Annexation Treaty," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 17, 1893, 4; "United States," *The Guardian* (London), February 22, 1893, 2.

<sup>30</sup> The document provided by Foster to the senate maintained the assurances that the State Department had no hand in the proceedings at Honolulu; that no officers or troops of the United States have

after its arrival upon the president's desk and with less than a month before the new administration took office, it officially advanced to the Senate.<sup>31</sup>

Lili'uokalani's letter of protest along with her mission's arrival further slowed the accord's progression. As new accounts regarding the revolution became public, an opinion prevailed in Congress that it remained "indispensable that both sides of the question should be candidly heard."<sup>32</sup> The royal narrative regarding the revolution created questions concerning the actions of John Stevens and the USS *Boston*'s officers.<sup>33</sup> Additionally, the Hawaiian delegation provided a petition signed by 3,411 qualified electors against the provisional government, which undermined the earlier reports the coup maintained the native people's support.<sup>34</sup> The commission received reinforcement from the arrival of the heir to the throne, Princess Kaiulani, and her distinguished guardian, former British minister to the archipelago, Theo H. Davies (See Picture 20). Kaiulani appealed to the American people to support the fallen monarchy.<sup>35</sup> She reminded the country that for seventy years, Christians from Boston provided her kingdom with civilization, and in return, her people welcomed the Westerners without conflict.<sup>36</sup>

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been present at the time of the provisional government took position of the government. He reiterated that the annexation proposal was voluntarily offered to Washington by the special commission. Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 203-204; Cong. Rec., February 17, 1893, 52<sup>nd</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., S1720.

<sup>31</sup> Cranstoun Metcalfe, "The Story of a Political Crime," *The New Century Review* 4, No. 23 (November 1898): 352; "The Annexation Treaty," *The New York Times*, February 17, 1893, 8.

<sup>32</sup> Liliuokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 252-3; "Editorial," *The Washington Post*, February 10, 1893; "Envoys of the Queen Bring Different Story," *New York Herald*, February 10, 1893.

<sup>33</sup> "Pleading for Lilly," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 20, 1893, 6.

<sup>34</sup> *San Francisco Morning Call*, March 10, 1893; Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 215.

<sup>35</sup> "Hawaii's Young Princess," *The Washington Post*, March 9, 1893, 2.

<sup>36</sup> "Princess Kaiulani Here," *New York Times*, March 2, 1893, 1.

As Grover Cleveland's presidency drew closer, he assumed increased interest in the Hawaiian crisis (See Picture 21). A friend of Lydia Lili'uokalani and the islands' new provisional president, Stanford Dole, he maintained concerns related to the rapidity with which the treaty advanced through the Senate. On February 22, 1893, the president-elect as well as his future secretary of state, Walter Clinton Gresham, conferred regarding the monarch's letter and the kingdom's latest intelligence. Several days later, with little resistance from Congress, Cleveland used his influence to postpone the statute.<sup>37</sup> Upon his assumption of office, he officially withdrew the accord and ordered a review of the events that led to the kingdom's overthrow.<sup>38</sup> Based upon the new president's actions, the provisional government's commission returned to the islands to await the future developments from an administration that maintained a history of challenging their political and commercial ideology.<sup>39</sup>

Initially after the revolution's announcement in January 1893, the American public mirrored the divisions found in Congress, however, as the monarchy's accounts found publication, opposition concerning the treaty grew. On February 9, a letter written by Lili'uokalani's former Minister of Interior, John F Colburn, received multiple publications throughout the country. Articles like the *Herald's* "A Wail from Honolulu" and *The World's* "Was Hawaii Stolen?," both questioned the provisional government's accounts relating to the coup, and accused Stevens of maintaining an active role in the

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<sup>37</sup> As not more than a third of the Senate favored the treaty, Cleveland's letters requesting the treaty's dismissal were effective. "Treaty Withdrawn," *New York Times*, March 10, 1893, 5; Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 214.

<sup>38</sup> Cleveland also withdrew the treaty with Nicaragua for the construction by the United States of a canal through the Nicaraguan territory. He also withdrew pending reciprocity treaties with Spain and the Dominican Republic. "Doesn't Like the Treaty," *Washington Post*, March 10, 1893, 2; "Hawaii: An Anglo-American Question," *The Speaker: The Liberal Review* 7 (March 18, 1893): 300.

<sup>39</sup> On April 23, 1893 Lorrin Thurston accepted the position as the Envoy Extraordinary to the United States. Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 90 -1, Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 291, 296.

monarchy's overthrow by far exceeding the scope of his official duties.<sup>40</sup> The newspapers noted Lili'uokalani yielded not to the revolutionists, but to the United States' superior forces. In later editions, the *New York Post*, *The Nation*, and *The World* characterized the kingdom's overthrow as a revolution of sugar, by sugar, for sugar.<sup>41</sup> *The New York Times*, as the new accounts of the revolution became known, cautioned against the president's rush to judgment.<sup>42</sup> Because of the news outlets' changing tones, within two months Americans questioned the revolution's early accounts and annexation itself.<sup>43</sup>

In the face of reduced support, Lorrin Thurston and John L. Stevens openly attacked Lili'uokalani. They described the queen and her predecessor, King David Kalakaua, as semi-barbaric, vicious, and demoralizing leaders who posed a threat to the islands' welfare.<sup>44</sup> The attacks also extended to the Hawaiian people who, based upon the period's prevailing racial thoughts, lacked their white neighbors' intelligence and moral strength. Because of their commitment to Social Darwinism, the annexationists deemed the need for the former kingdom to continue under American control.<sup>45</sup> War hawks like Alfred Thayer Mahan, the president of the Naval War College and the author of *The Influence of Seapower upon History*, supported the provisional government.<sup>46</sup> Although there never existed a history of aggression between the United States and China or Japan, he postulated that if one of the two nations gained control over the isles, American's

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<sup>40</sup> "A Wail from Honolulu," *The Herald*, February 9, 1893, 1-2, "Was Hawaii Stolen," *The World*, February 16, 1893, 1.

<sup>41</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 207-9; "Personal and Pertinent," *The World*, February 10, 1893, 4.

<sup>42</sup> "Likely to be Ratified," *The New York Times*, February 17, 1893, 8.

<sup>43</sup> Annexation continued to receive support throughout the US, but it no longer maintained the percentages needed for congressional or public support. Goldwin Smith, "The Situation at Washington," *The Nineteenth century: A Monthly Review* 34, No. 197 (July 1893): 140.

<sup>44</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 222-3.

<sup>45</sup> Cong. Rec., February 1, 1893, 55<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., S998-9.

<sup>46</sup> Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890).

national security remained at risk. Hawaii, Mahan publicized, served as a key naval post to ensure the west coast security.<sup>47</sup>

On March 10, 1893, President Cleveland appointed former chairperson of the committee on foreign affairs, James H. Blount, as a special commissioner to Hawaii to assess the situation and submit recommendations regarding the United States' response to the crisis (See Picture 22).<sup>48</sup> The commissioner arrived in Honolulu on March 29, 1893, and officially relieved John Stevens of his diplomatic mission. Blount's instructions stated he maintained no authority to restore the queen or to interfere with the islands' domestic policies. Furthermore, the settlement of the annexation issue failed to fall within the scope of the official's duties as the accord remained especially reserved for the president and Congress.<sup>49</sup> Within days of his arrival, Blount ordered the United States flag lowered from the federal building and the troops re-embarked upon the cruiser *Boston*.<sup>50</sup> Over the following three months, his demeanor created apprehension among the provisional government's members, despite their attempts to win his favor.

James Blount informed the president of his mission's completion on July 17, 1893, and provided his report to the State Department.<sup>51</sup> The document, published in the United States Department of State's 1894 *Foreign Relations of United States, Affairs in Hawaii* report, challenged the accounts provided by the provisional government and

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<sup>47</sup> Mahan concerns found support from rear Adm. George E Belknap and numerous other officers within the United States Navy. Daws, *Shoal of Time*, 287; "Letter to the Editor," *The New York Times*, February 1, 1893, 5.

<sup>48</sup> Blount maintained a reputation as an avowed anti-imperialist. Grover Cleveland to Stanford Dole, March 11, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 1277; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 291.

<sup>49</sup> John L. Stevens to Walter Q. Gresham, April 4, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 1271-2.

<sup>50</sup> "Blount in Hawaii," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, April 6, 1893, 1; Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 93-4; Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 305.

<sup>51</sup> Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 306.

former US minister, John Stevens.<sup>52</sup> It stipulated the former minister maintained hostility towards Lydia Lili'uokalani based on his repeated diplomatic letters and personal actions while in the service of the State Department. Stevens, he claimed, failed to confine himself to the duties within his sphere of responsibility by when he precipitate the downfall of the monarchy. It concluded the troops' deployment occurred not to protect American life and property, but rather to aid in the monarchy's overthrow. The coup's success resulted from the USS *Boston's* forces and the provisional authority's recognition before its officials established full control over the islands. As such, the commissioner found, the Hawaiian monarchy's collapse resulted in large part from the US officials' actions.<sup>53</sup>

Based upon the Blount's report, Secretary of State Gresham recommended Cleveland publically acknowledge Hawaii suffered an illegal act under a US diplomat's authority. He asserted Stevens' actions required reversal and the president needed to recognize the islands' sovereignty.<sup>54</sup> On October 18, 1893, the new minister to Hawaii, Albert S. Willis, received orders to inform Lili'uokalani that annexation no longer remained the United States' intention. Through Willis, the president expressed his regret regarding Stevens' unauthorized deployment of US military forces to compel the sovereign's surrender. Cleveland's message assured the queen his administration

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<sup>52</sup> United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of United States, 1894, Affairs in Hawaii*, H.R. Exec. Doc. 1, pt. 1, 53<sup>rd</sup> Cong., 3<sup>rd</sup> Sess., (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1895) (Serial Set #3294) AKA Blount Report.

<sup>53</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 96; "Its Hand is Shown," *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, November 21, 1893, 1.

<sup>54</sup> The American response as indicated through press articles was split. Gresham to Cleveland, October 18, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 1266-70; "Revolution in Hawaii," *New York Times*, November 13, 1893, 5; "Back to her Throne," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, November 11, 1893, 1.

intended to return the monarchy to power, but required she exercise restraint towards the American-Hawaiian subjects who participated in the rebellion.<sup>55</sup>

Grover Cleveland's Attorney General, Richard Olney, and Secretary of Treasury John G. Carlisle, criticized Gresham's policy as being impractical. They cited the revolution's reversal weighed upon the use of the military to reinstate the monarchy. Such actions fell beyond the president's constitutional power, as it represented an act of war upon a foreign country.<sup>56</sup> To use force, sustained problems as the United States as numerous foreign powers officially recognized the provisional government and aggression risked the growth of instability in the Pacific nation.<sup>57</sup> Additionally, the prosecution of individuals who served as Minister Stevens' instruments of transformation promised to bring America disrepute both at home and abroad. Olney stated Hawaiian interests demanded the administration's focus as it maintained "no right to redeem the original wrong by the commission of another still greater wrong to wit, the imposition upon Hawaii of the government not wanted by its people."<sup>58</sup>

To reinstate the monarchy with minimal resistance, Richard Olney persuaded Cleveland that Lili'uokalani needed to guarantee the safety and freedom of the coup's

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<sup>55</sup> *Dole, Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 98; "Hawaii," *American Advocate of Peace* 55, No. 12 (December, 1893): 278; Walter Q. Gresham to Albert S. Willis, October 18, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 1271-2.

<sup>56</sup> Gresham to Willis, December 3, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 1271-2.

<sup>57</sup> The United States recognized the provisional Government, and this recognition remained, likewise it was recognized by all the other powers Mr. Willis bore credentials to this same Government, the only one in the islands. It is a curious position to be in, to hold a Government in recognition, and to be sending ministers to it, and at the same time deliberately planning its overthrow. The administration and undertaking to reinstate the Queen's government by force of arms would be open to the reproach of sacrificing the interests of the country and its people to the interests of the Queen's government and her dynasty." Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 240.

<sup>58</sup> "Hawaii," *American Advocate of Peace* 55, No. 12 (December 1893): 278; Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 240-1.

members upon their removal.<sup>59</sup> Initially, the former queen declared her intention to follow Hawaii's 1887 penal code, which called for individuals convicted of treason to face possible execution and the loss of their property. She stated the individuals in question facilitated the 1887 and 1893 revolutions and thus posed a continued threat to the kingdom's peace.<sup>60</sup> The president responded that while he deemed it his duty to restore the sovereign, his further efforts depended upon her unqualified agreement to prevent the adoption of punitive measures.<sup>61</sup> On December 18, 1893, after several days of discussion, Minister Willis convinced Lili'uokalani to abandon her commitment to punish the American-Hawaiian conspirators.<sup>62</sup>

A day later, Cleveland's representative informed the provisional government's president, Stanford Dole, the administration's determination that he relinquish complete constitutional power to Queen Lili'uokalani.<sup>63</sup> The provisional leader refused to surrender his authority and rejected America's right to interfere in Hawaii's domestic affairs. Dole maintained the position that if the United States illegally used its forces in the revolution, his administration lacked responsibility for another nation's mistake.<sup>64</sup> Furthermore, he

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<sup>59</sup> Gresham to Willis, October 18, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 1271-2; "Instructions to Willis," *New York Times*, December 19, 1893, 2.

<sup>60</sup> "The United States and Hawaii," *The Times London*, January 15, 1894, 5; Willis to Gresham, November 18, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 2108-11; Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham, November 19, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 2112-5.

<sup>61</sup> Cleveland stated the queen's amnesty was critical in obtaining the support of congress and the American public. On November 7, 1883, the provisional government became aware of President Cleveland's intension to abandon the annexation accord with Hawaii. The source of the intelligence originated from an article in the *Chicago Evening Post*, which reported that the queen was to be restored to her throne. Gresham to Willis, December 3, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 1271-2; Liliuokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 254-5.

<sup>62</sup> Dole, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution*, 109-110; Willis to Gresham, December 20, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 2115-6.

<sup>63</sup> Willis to Gresham, December 20, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 2116-7.

<sup>64</sup> The lack of consistency regarding the former Hawaiian League's approach to the implementation of democratic principles and their respect towards the United States government reveals the white communities true focus through the only subject they never deviated from, financial and political prosperity.



declared, Stevens' exploits remained a private matter of discipline between the State Department and its officers and did not involve the members of the islands' new government. Dole assured Minister Willis that Queen Liliuokalani's return to the throne required the use of armed action against the new republic.<sup>65</sup>

By February 1894, President Cleveland recognized the situation's complexity by passing the United States' final answer to the Hawaiian Question to Congress.<sup>66</sup>

Throughout the month, both houses engaged in heated debates regarding the American response. The parties remained divided as the Republicans sought annexation and the Democrats vacillated between supporting Cleveland's policies or committing to a strategy of noninterference. On February 7, the House of Representatives voted on two bills brought forth by Republican Henry William Blair and Democrat James B. McCreary. The resolution forwarded by Blair sought the islands' appropriation, but failed to pass by a vote of 90 to 155.<sup>67</sup> Thereafter, McCreary's measure, which proposed legislation to prevent the executive branch's interference in other countries' government operations, namely Hawaii, failed to find the support it needed among his party by a vote of 94 to 158, with 99 abstentions.<sup>68</sup> It remained clear within the House by the day's end no clear direction existed among the political leaders.

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<sup>65</sup> Rallies with violent tones against the US minister to Hawaii were held. Willis to Gresham, December 23, 1893, *Morgan Report II*, 2121-8.

<sup>66</sup> Although the change in the executive branch represented a reversal in the countries leadership, the House of representative remained democratic and the Senate remained Republican. Goldwin Smith, "The Situation at Washington," *The Nineteenth century: A Monthly Review* 34, No. 197 (July 1893): 131; US Congress, House, *President's Message Relating to the Hawaiian Islands, December 18, 1893*, House Executive Document 47, 53<sup>rd</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1893), 1251-2 (Serial Set #3224) Hereafter *Hawaiian Islands*; "Republicans in the Senate are Not to be Silenced," *New York Times*, December 19, 1893, 2.

<sup>67</sup> "Failed at Quorum," *Washington Post*, February 7, 1893, 1.

<sup>68</sup> A bill from Rep. Hitts calling for any interferences with the Hawaiian government to be considered an unfriendly act also failed to a vote of 102 yeas to 152 nays. "Failed at Quorum," *Washington Post*, February 7, 1; Cong. Rec., February 7, 1894, 53<sup>rd</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., S2000-7.

On February 24, 1894, the Democratic dominated Senate presented a report from its Committee of Foreign Relations concerning the events surrounding Queen Lili'uokalani's overthrow and the US response. Called the Morgan Report, after the committee's chairperson, Democrat John T. Morgan, the majority report reversed the Blount investigation's conclusions and exonerated the American officials' actions (See Picture 23).<sup>69</sup> It attacked Lili'uokalani along with her cabinet by claiming that upon their discussion to move against the 1887 constitution, they abdicated her right to lead.<sup>70</sup> Because of her illegal action, the committee members stated the foreign subjects acted in the Hawaiian nation's best interest. John Stevens and Captain George C. Wiltse's actions also found renewed support as the report indicated a threat existed to the white citizens thus warranting the troops' deployment. The four Republicans, who maintained strong annexationist views, declared President Cleveland's use of James Blount as a special commissioner remained unconstitutional, as he failed to acquire the Senate's approval.<sup>71</sup> They declared the US president maintained no authority to challenge the provisional government's right to rule the islands.<sup>72</sup>

The committee's endorsement of the report, like accords before it, reflected the divide in the country.<sup>73</sup> Four Democratic dissenters within the committee submitted a

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<sup>69</sup> Senator Morgan, although a democrat supported the annexation of Hawaii and questioned the policies of President Cleveland. He later left the party to join the republican establishment. "Everybody Was Right," *The Times* (Philadelphia), February 27, 1894, 4; Committee on Foreign Relations, *Report from the Committee on Foreign Relations and Appendix in Relation to the Hawaiian Islands United States, February 26, 1894, Submitted by Mr. Morgan*, S. Rep. 227, 53<sup>rd</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1894)(Serial Set #3167).

<sup>70</sup> Liliuokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 257.

<sup>71</sup> Furthermore, they found the commissioner's orders to Admiral Skerritt to lower the United States flag and embark the troops on their ships represented an unlawful act.

<sup>72</sup> The report was signed by John Sherman, William P Frye, Joseph and Dolph, and Cushman K Davis. "A Report Upon Hawaii," *The Washington Post*, February 27, 1894, 7.

<sup>73</sup> Four Against, Four in Favor, and One Who Obtained. "A Report Upon Hawaii," *The Washington Post*, February 27, 1894, 7.

minority report, which disagreed with the conclusions presented by the chairman. They stated no irregularities occurred either in the appointment of Commissioner Blount or in the instructions given to him by the president. The report challenged the Morgan Report's findings that Stevens' only substantial irregularity involved his declaration the United States served as a protectorate over the kingdom on February 1, 1893.<sup>74</sup> The four men maintained nothing in international law or in American tradition justified the interference of a government representative in a foreign country's domestic affairs. They remained convinced the minister's political views caused him to exceed the proper limits of his official duties.<sup>75</sup>

The American press reacted to the Morgan Report along the political lines. Republican leaning papers used the committee's findings to further encourage the islands' annexation. The *Chicago Daily Tribune* stated if one "read between the lines," they would determine the report condemned Cleveland's actions towards the American officials and the provisional government.<sup>76</sup> Papers supportive of the Democratic platform ridiculed the report as repetitious and at times contradicting. *The New York Times* described the document as a "rather picturesque bit of patchwork," while *The Philadelphia Record* called it "a mere incoherent yawp of jingoism."<sup>77</sup>

In the last week of May 1894, the Senate joined the House of Representatives in addressing the issue of non-interference with Hawaii. The amendment called for the

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<sup>74</sup> "A Report Upon Hawaii" *The Washington Post*, February 27, 1894, 7.

<sup>75</sup> They reaffirmed that his conduct remained reprehensible and deserving of public censure. The minority report signatures included Matthew C Butler, David Turpie, John W Daniel, and George Gray. Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 225; "A Report Upon Hawaii" *The Washington Post*, February 27, 1894, 7.

<sup>76</sup> "The Morgan Hawaiian Report," *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 28, 1894, 6; Grover's Props Gone," *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 27, 1894, 3.

<sup>77</sup> "Hawaii in the Senate," *The Philadelphia Record*, February 28, 1894, 4; "Various Views as to Hawaii: Reports from the Committee of the Senate," *The New York Times*, February 27, 1894, 6; Cong. Rec., February 27, 1894, 53<sup>rd</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., S2408-21; S. Rep. No. 227, (1894).

United States to maintain neutrality and passed by a vote of 55 to 0, with 30 abstentions.<sup>78</sup> As the debate faded, Washington abandoned its assurances to reinstate the monarchy and for the fourth time in American diplomatic history, Hawaii's annexation failed to find support.<sup>79</sup> On July 4, 1894, the archipelago's interim leadership established itself as the independent Republic of Hawaii.<sup>80</sup> Cleveland's administration provided the islands with renewed economic hope when it signed into law the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894. The act abolished the sugar bounty and reduced the tariff on sugar importation that permitted the republic to regain its original advantageous position under the reciprocity treaty nullified by the McKinley Tariffs.<sup>81</sup>

On January 24, 1895, a resolution by Senator William V. Allen, a Populist from Nebraska, revived the Hawaiian debate through a pro-annexation measure. George Graham of Missouri countered the resolution with a bill that reaffirmed the policy of absolute non-interference and recognized the right of a country to maintain its own form of government. By a vote of 24 to 22, with 36 abstentions, Graham's resolution passed. For the second time in less than a year, the Senate supported a policy of neutrality in the Pacific.<sup>82</sup> Over the following year, the question concerning the archipelago faded from public debate as the United States deemed the country outside its sphere of interest.

As the 1896 presidential campaign gained momentum, the subject of annexation returned to the American debate.<sup>83</sup> The previous four years demonstrated the majority of the public and its representatives failed to support US interventionism, but lacked the

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<sup>78</sup> Cong. Rec., May 31, 1894, 53<sup>rd</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., S5500-1.

<sup>79</sup> Cong. Rec., 53<sup>rd</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., February 7, 1894, HR2000-3; Coffman, *Nation Within*, 151.

<sup>80</sup> Liliuokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 258.

<sup>81</sup> Daws, *Shoal of Time*, 285; "Tariff Bill Passed," *The Washington Post*, August 14, 1894, 1-2.

<sup>82</sup> Cong. Rec., January 25, 1895, 53<sup>rd</sup> Cong., 3<sup>rd</sup> Sess., S1374.

<sup>83</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 264.

commitment to undo former minister John Stevens' actions. Although the pro-expansionists repeatedly suffered defeats, their personal drive far exceeded their opposition's passion and eventually gained the required advantage. Prominent Republicans like Theodore Roosevelt and William E. Russell asserted Hawaii remained a critical component in the construction of a first-class fighting navy.<sup>84</sup> The failure to commandeer the islands, they stated, represented a crime against the United States and white civilization.<sup>85</sup> To signal its support, on May 27, the Hawaiian legislature unanimously adopted a joint resolution declaring the republic's continued favor towards annexation.<sup>86</sup>

The Republican Party's success in 1896, with the election of President William McKinley served as a hopeful sign among the jubilant annexationists (See Picture 24). The renewed potential towards becoming a United States' territory promised to prevent two major concerns the new government maintained. The first involved what the new administration thought constituted a covert attempt by the Japanese to claim the islands through mounting immigration, absorption of trade, and pressure to recognize the rights of Tokyo's nationalists in the archipelago.<sup>87</sup> The second problem involved increased anxiety over the possible reinstatement of American tariffs.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Daws, *Shoal of Time*, 288.

<sup>85</sup> They felt that delay allowed for an influx of nonwhite Americans. Albert Shaw, *Review of Reviews and World's Work*, Vol. 12 (California: Review of Reviews Corporation, No Date), 579; Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 264.

<sup>86</sup> The January 1895 royalist uprising, which aimed to overthrow the Republican, restore the Queen was seized upon by annexationist in Congress, but failed to find the support required to revive the issue. Daws, *Shoal of Time*, 286; Cong. Rec., May 27, 1896, 53<sup>rd</sup> Cong., 3<sup>rd</sup> Sess., S1137, 1639.

<sup>87</sup> Where England once stood as the greatest threat to US influence in the islands, Japan in 1896 and thereafter became the new threat. They represented the worst case scenario as their Asian ancestry added a racial component to their danger. Coffman, *Nation Within*, 249-51.

<sup>88</sup> William McKinley, who had a personal interest in Hawaii as his brother David had acted as United States consul at Honolulu and later served the Republic of Hawaii as counsel at San Francisco. Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 266, 270; Liliuokalani, *Hawaii Story*, 305; "The New Sugar

Eight days after his inauguration, President McKinley discussed with former secretary of state, John Foster, and Maine's senator, William P. Frye, the general features of an annexation treaty and the question of whether the subject should be initiated as a formal accord or joint resolution.<sup>89</sup> Although the new administration supported annexation, it remained clear there existed substantial opposition within the country. McKinley, without a clear victory, abandoned the treaty to pursue domestic affairs over foreign issues. However, when the minister of Hawaii presented the secretary of state an unofficial communication regarding the republic's desire to renew negotiations towards the two nations union, William McKinley resumed his exploration of Hawaii's annexation.<sup>90</sup> In May 1897, the president appointed expansionist William Rufus Day as the first assistant secretary of state.<sup>91</sup> With John W. Foster's help, the State Department prepared a treaty draft on June 16 that went to the Senate with McKinley's approval.<sup>92</sup> In his message, the president indicated the union provided protection for the islands and the US from Asian expansion.<sup>93</sup>

When Senator John Morgan introduced Senate Bill 2263 to provide for and regulate the archipelago's appropriation as a territory on June 23, 1897, two groups responded with strong opposition. The first and most powerful lobby remained the American Sugar Trust.<sup>94</sup> As before, they feared the islands' sugar industry posed a threat

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Duties," *The Kansas City Journal*, March 13, 1897, 4; "Proposed Sugar Schedule," *The New York Times*, March 13, 1897, 14.

<sup>89</sup> Foster, *Diplomatic Memoirs*, 172-3.

<sup>90</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 270; Foster, *Diplomatic Memoirs*, 170.

<sup>91</sup> The new administration failed to maintain the unity of its predecessors. The Secretary of State John Sherman sustained opposition to all acquisitions of territory not in the mainland, hence the appointment of Day served to circumvent his opposition. Coffman, *Nation Within*, 212-3.

<sup>92</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 271; Foster, *Diplomatic Memoirs*, 172-3.

<sup>93</sup> The negotiation of the second treaty rested in the hands of Assistant Secretary Day. Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 272-3, Coffman, *Nation Within*, 212-3.

<sup>94</sup> Daws, *Shoal of Time*, 287.

to the trust's monopoly on US domestic sugar production and distribution.<sup>95</sup> Between December 1897 and July 9, 1898, numerous states, companies, and unions involved with the sugar industry filed petitions against the annexation treaty.<sup>96</sup> Ironically, the former advocate of Hawaiian sugar, Claus Spreckels, became a leading opponent against the republic and wielded great influence in preventing the accord.<sup>97</sup>

Between September 11 and October 2, 1897, the second group, *Hui Aloha Aina* (Patriotic League of the Hawaiian Islands), organized a mass petition drive that collected 21,269 native voter signatures in opposition the islands' annexation.<sup>98</sup> The document served as evidence against the *haole* government's assurances that its population supported union with the United States.<sup>99</sup> In December, Lili'uokalani and four delegates, with the 556-page plea in hand, met with Senator George Hoar, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to present its text to the Senate. The next day the delegation met with Secretary of State John Sherman to submit their formal protest.<sup>100</sup> With their mission's completion, the delegates left Washington on February 27, 1898, confident that with only forty-six senators willing to vote for appropriation, the treaty remained defeated in the Senate as it lacked the required two-thirds majority.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Coffman, *Nation Within*, 232-5; "On Annexation," *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, May 19, 1897, 1; "Sugar Trust Fighting Hawaii," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 2, 1898, 6.

<sup>96</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 292.

<sup>97</sup> Coffman, *Nation Within*, 233-4.

<sup>98</sup> This equated to more than half the 39,000 native Hawaiians and mixed-blood persons reported by the Hawaiian Commission census for the same year. Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 267.

<sup>99</sup> Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom*, 284; Cong. Rec., December 6, 1897, 55<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., S45.

<sup>100</sup> "Protest Against Annexation," *The Washington Post*, December 11, 1897, 4; Liliuokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, 364.

<sup>101</sup> Coffman, *Nation Within*, 240-1; "Still Lacks Enough Votes," *The Washington Post*, January 15, 1898, 4.

On February 15, 1898, the annexationists gained a compelling argument in support of Hawaii's annexation. The deaths of 266 sailors from an explosion that ripped through the USS *Maine* while anchored in Havana Harbor motivated the United States' on April 25, to declare war against the Spanish Empire. The American strategy called for the mobilization against enemy assets in the Caribbean and Pacific Ocean.<sup>102</sup> Because the modern steam powered naval ships averaged operational range of approximately 3,000 nautical miles, campaigns along the Asian continent required a station to replenish their coal reserves. With Spain's territories in the Philippines and Guam, Hawaii looked to become a key military asset to the US Navy.<sup>103</sup> The consensus among the Foreign Relations Committee, however, held that the required two-thirds majority remained a distant possibility despite the Spanish conflict's positive effect upon the debate.<sup>104</sup> Instead, Republicans decided to attempt to bring about the annexation through a joint resolution, following the precedent set with Texas' appropriation in 1845.<sup>105</sup>

Within two weeks of the war initiation, Commodore George Dewey achieved a decisive naval victory in the Philippine's Manila Bay. His success served as another boost to the pro-expansionists, who now championed Hawaii's importance towards the war effort.<sup>106</sup> With American control over the Philippines, Pearl Harbor afforded the US

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<sup>102</sup> Coffman, *Nation Within*, 295.

<sup>103</sup> Pearl Harbor's importance in the annexation debates maintained little relevance as the harbor lacked the needed facilities or coal to service American warships. The US Navy retained access to a more effective resupply point on the island of Kiska, within the Aleutians. Bailey, "The United States and Hawaii:" 555; Foster, *Diplomatic Memoirs*, 173; "Strategic Value of Hawaii," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Aug 16, 1897, 6.

<sup>104</sup> Talk of the annexation of Cuba, via the Spanish –American conflict, created new fears in the American sugar trust that emboldened their stand against Hawaii's appropriation. "Will it Affect Sugar," *Los Angeles Herald*, August 16, 1898, 8.

<sup>105</sup> Foster, *Diplomatic Memoirs*, 174.

<sup>106</sup> "A Message on Hawaii," *The New York Times*, June 10, 1898, 5.



Navy full reach of its new territory and the Asian continent.<sup>107</sup> Carried by the momentum of the victory, shortly after the battle the House of Representatives introduced House Resolution 259, which called for the annexation of the Pacific republic.<sup>108</sup> Throughout the debates that waged for an additional month, the demands of the United States Naval forces remained the expansionists' primary motivation. The bill's supporters cited a perceived Japanese threat and the need to protect the continent's west coast. Admiral John J. Walker informed Congress the cheapest way to defend the US involved Hawaii's fortification.<sup>109</sup> Arkansas Senator Hugh Anderson Dinsmore countered the naval argument with the declaration that the US never existed as a "colonial nation."<sup>110</sup> On June 15, the debate ended as the islands' appropriation as a territory gained limited government support by a vote of 209 to 91.<sup>111</sup> The joint resolution transferred to the Senate the following day to face its final hurdle.<sup>112</sup>

Upon its arrival, the resolution received heated debate from Democrats concerning the legality of Queen Lili'uokalani's overthrow, the ethics of imperialism, and the cost of maintaining the islands as a territory. The pro-annexationists resurrected their likeminded representatives' argument regarding Pearl Harbor's military importance, and stated that right or wrong, the war overruled the ethical considerations. On July 6, the Senate voted down resolutions to implemented new leadership in the Pacific nation and allow the Hawaiian population to vote on their country's annexation. The next day the

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<sup>107</sup> Coffman, *Nation Within*, 305; "Hawaii for Defense," *The Washington Post*, May 31, 1898, 3.

<sup>108</sup> Daws, *Shoal of Time*, 289; Joint Resolution for the Annexation of Hawaii, H.R. 259, 55 Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., (1898).

<sup>109</sup> "Hawaii for Defense," *The Washington Post*, May 31, 1898, 3.

<sup>110</sup> Cong. Rec., June 11, 1898, 55<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., HR5776-7.

<sup>111</sup> The voting appeared to follow the party lines. The House of Representatives consisted of 253 Republicans and 94 Democrats. "Big Vote for Hawaii," *Washington Post*, June 16, 1898, 1; Cong. Rec., June 15, 1898, 55<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess, HR6019.

<sup>112</sup> Cong. Rec., June 16, 1898, 55<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., HR6022.

bill granting the appropriation of the Hawaiian Islands passed with 42 in favor, 21 opposed, and 26 abstentions.<sup>113</sup> In the end, the sovereignty's collapse resulted from less than half of the total senators, as two thirds either voted against the bill, or did not vote at all.<sup>114</sup>

On July 8, 1898, President McKinley signed the resolution ending the five-decade annexation question forever.<sup>115</sup> A week later word arrived in Hawaii that it constituted a United States' territory. The islands' pro-business newspapers celebrated, while the *ali'i* and the *kanaka* loyal to their monarchy watched their independence crumble. For the common people, the loss maintained little effect upon their lives, but for the former native elite, the monarchy's collapse equated to a further reduction of their privileged state as the royalty no longer maintained value in the islands.<sup>116</sup> The Republic's official transfer to the United States occurred on August 12, 1898, the same day that hostilities ended with Spain through the signing of the Protocol of Peace. Once again, the celebration reflected the isles' divide as few Native Hawaiians attended the official ceremony.<sup>117</sup> At noon, as Lydia Lili'uokalani and her supporters remained in self-instituted seclusion, the Hawaiian flag descended from the Iolani Palace while the Royal Hawaiian Band played the Hawaiian national anthem, *Hawai'i Pono 'i*. Seconds later, as the American national anthem played the Stars and Stripes rose above the Hawaii's seat of power (See Picture 24).<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Cong. Rec., July 7, 1898, 55<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., S6754.

<sup>114</sup> "Hawaii to Come In," *Washington Post*, July 7, 1898, 1.

<sup>115</sup> Cong. Rec., July 8, 1898, 55<sup>th</sup> Cong., 3<sup>rd</sup> Sess., S6808.

<sup>116</sup> Daws, *Shoal of Time*, 291-2.

<sup>117</sup> Coffman, *Nation Within*, 315.

<sup>118</sup> "Hawaiian Annexation Completed," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, August 24, 1898, 6.

A number of factors associated with the annexationists' rhetoric justifying Hawaii's appropriation raise serious questions as to the treaty's legitimacy. The first major issue involved the Hawaiian provisional government and, its later incarnation, the Republic of Hawaii's questionable authority over the native people who constituted the majority of the populace. Their multiple evasions of the established Hawaiian Constitutions and Lydia Lili'uokalani's numerous petitions demonstrated that a union with the United States failed to embody her former subjects' popular interests. Secondly, the American expansionist minded politicians who used the dubious revolt to their advantage also failed to obtain a clear understanding whether or not the majority of Hawaiian citizens or residents supported the annexation of their country. Furthermore, President McKinley's circumvention of the constitutional process that governed the annexation of foreign territories and the Republican's manipulation of the Spanish-American War contributed to the modern narrative that considers Hawaii's collapse to the exertion of US imperialism. The contemporary account, however, fails to address the complexities that 1893 uprising created for President Cleveland's attempts to return the queen to her throne. In retrospect, there remained little the United States could do to reverse John Steven and the American-Hawaiian's actions against the monarchy.

## Conclusion

In 1835, fifteen years after their arrival in the archipelago, fifty members of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions worked to bring Christianity and Western culture to the nearly 100,000 Hawaiians spread across eight islands.<sup>1</sup> Representing less than 1 percent of the permanent population, the missionaries garner blame and praise for the extensive controversial transformations, which westernized the archipelago.<sup>2</sup> As of 1860, disease and poor living conditions reduced the number of natives to 66,984, while the Western residents numbered 1,600. By 1890, three years before the revolution, 40,622 Hawaiians shared their kingdom with 7,498 *haole* residents amidst political and racial conflict.<sup>3</sup> Based upon the census data, the Anglo-American population never exceeded one-third of the total population.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, their minority status within the Pacific society remained consistent with their representation within the political system. The Western subjects throughout the nineteenth century never exceeded 30 percent of the voting population or gained a majority of either house. Considering their limited numbers and their lack of foreign military or political support, the missionaries and their dependents lacked the power to force the native people to assume changes they thought inappropriate.

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<sup>1</sup> Osorio, *Dismembering Lāhui*, 16.

<sup>2</sup> The missionaries maintained strong opposition from the Euro-American merchants, sailors, and whalers critical of their social agenda. These evangelical families also gained resistance from the representatives from England and France.

<sup>3</sup> Charles T. Rodgers, *Report of the General Superintendent of the Census, 1890* (Honolulu: R. Grieve Printer, 1891), 13; US Bureau of Census, *Thirteenth Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1910: Statistics Hawaii Containing Statistics of Population, Agriculture, Manufactures, and Mining ... Reprint of the Supplement ... Published in Connection with the Abstract of the Census*, vol. 2. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1913), 6.

<sup>4</sup> The missionaries' authoritarian ideology that drove their religious views also shaped their evolving business philosophy.

As such, the responsibility for the Hawaiian society's transformation rests upon not only the Boston evangelicals and their descendants, but also the monarchs and their *ali'i*. The complete and sustained abandonment of a long established culture within a century seems impossible without the native leaders' corroboration. As the modifications brought little, if any benefit to the kingdom's commoners, the new social and political systems intended to further the personal aggrandizement of the elite class.<sup>5</sup> Although the leadership thought they were capable of manipulating the former evangelicals for their advantage, the monarchy's inexperience with Western business practices and laws allowed for critical lapses in judgment. This afforded the *haole* to imbed themselves deep into Hawaii's economic structures. Furthermore, with each privilege the kingdom afforded their new subjects, the former missionaries' commitment to Social Darwinian ideology caused them to view the gift as an acknowledgement of their racial superiority. By the mid-nineteenth century, it remained clear that the early monarchs and the *ali'i* made a foolish pact with a devil dressed in Christian clothing.

The numerous conflicts that occupied the Anglo-American nations throughout the first thirty years of the 1800s provided the newly established kingdom with a freedom often denied for lands that encountered the Western maritime powers. Despite two incidences triggered by French and British naval officers, the archipelago continued their right to self-determination until 1893. The multiple failed attempts by the monarchy to formally align themselves with Great Britain or the United States reveal the Western nation's unwillingness to assume responsibility for the islands, especially when they

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<sup>5</sup> As the kingdom's new civil and social leaders, the *ali'i* eagerly used the American missionaries to expand their kingdom's economy and standing among the Western nations. However, in the haste to propel Hawaii into a place of commercial importance, the native elite class became over reliant upon men who openly held the islanders in contempt. Osorio, *Dismembering Lāhui*, 42.

maintained full access to its numerous facilities. Moreover, at a time when numerous Pacific islands remained under European rule, Hawaii's Anglo subjects remained under the monarchy's authority and direction.<sup>6</sup> The lack of foreign interference further demonstrates the independence of the former missionaries turned businessmen, and their dependence upon the native leaders to further their personal agendas.

The short reigns of the Kamehameha family's last two kings attempted to alter the dynamics that governed the relationship between the kingdom, its foreign subjects, and the United States. Although the monarchs' policies sought to strengthen their rule by reducing the white community's influence, especially after the American Civil War, it exposed long simmering sentiments of anxiety and aggression. As the *haoles* became increasingly insubordinate, the racial and political divide assumed an antagonistic nature. Under such conditions of mutual distrust and contempt, the relationship's latent dysfunction became overt, resulting in open discourse among the multi-ethnic elite class. By the end of 1869, the power the Anglo-American subjects retained over the economy prevented their removal without jeopardizing the nation's financial system and in-turn the society as a whole.<sup>7</sup> Conversely, despite the businessmen's contempt for the Hawaiian people, the lack of support from the United States and their minority status in the islands required them to honor the native government's authority. As neither side held the advantage over the other, the relationship between the privileged *haoles* and former *ali'i* continued despite its growing instability as neither side maintained an advantage over the

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<sup>6</sup> Osorio, *Dismembering Lāhui*, 37.

<sup>7</sup> The last two monarchs of the Kamehameha line likely represented Hawaii's last chance to regain control of their social, political, and economic systems as well as create a hybrid culture that favored their Hawaiian traditions. Their premature deaths prevented them from perusing their renaissance of Hawaiian culture and self-rule.

other. As long as the union between the two groups brought profit, their differences could be overlooked.

However, the reign of King David Kalākaua eventually threatened that prosperity leading to the fragile relationship's collapse. The period's sources indicate the monarch was an opportunist who ineptly attempted to manipulate both the native majority and the Anglo-American minority. The treasury's near bankruptcy, the king's associations to shady businessmen, and his self-aggrandizement not only upset the Western subjects who represented the financial institutions, but also the Hawaiian people who grew ostracized under his leadership. The parliament's legislators seemed to represent the only group benefiting from the crisis as they appeared to profit from the flow of bribes throughout the government. At a time when the kingdom needed effective political and economic leaders, their shared corruption, greed, and intense animosity towards each other exasperated the islands' racial and ideological schism.

Kalākaua's unpopularity among the native populace finds additional substantiation through the parliament's response to the 1887 Bayonet Constitution. Although the legislature preserved its ability to replace the cabinet, six years passed before the revolutionaries lost their positions of power. Their inaction concerning the king's suppression by the foreign minority establishes two strong implications. The first indicates that many in the native controlled political system benefited from the League's influence in the kingdom's affairs in one form or another. David Kalākaua, secondly, remained unpopular among the white and non-white populace, as the Wilcox Revolution demonstrated.

Whether through government sanction or birth, the privileged white community remained long-standing subjects who sustained extensive financial investments in the local economy. As such, despite their skin color, they maintained the right to actively participate in the political process. Nonetheless, the Hawaiian League's desire to guide the legislature's course displayed fantastical thinking. They mistakenly assumed their business interests demanded supplementary representation and their failure to control the kingdom's policies reflected discrimination rather than their minority status among the total population. The *haole* subject's use of force to circumvent the established constitution in 1887 displayed their lack of commitment to the democratic processes established by their fathers.

The pro-revolutionary accounts regarding the 1893 uprising drew parallels between the character of Queen Lydia Lili'uokalani and her late brother, David Kalākaua. The provisional government claimed the insurrection represented the continued battle against monarchical corruption and racial discrimination against the white business community. Such rhetoric failed to acknowledge the Bayonet Constitution's success in reducing the sovereign's role in the political system. Populated by the same men who forcibly replaced Kalākaua's cabinet, the queen's ministry maintained the true power and thus the brunt of responsibility for the kingdom's state.<sup>8</sup> The news articles indicate that their displeasure with Lili'uokalani surfaced only after she challenged their authority and displayed the strength her brother lacked. In reality, the queen maintained a greater respect and commitment to the rule of law and the fundamentals of democracy than the men that sought her elimination.

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<sup>8</sup> They only questioned her leadership when she recognized the popular displeasure of her subjects that the kingdom was close to losing its sovereignty to the white businessmen.



The major difference between the revolution during King Kalākaua's reign and the coup against Queen Lili'uokalani resides in United States Minister to Hawaii John L. Stevens. His support of the *haole* subjects transformed a domestic conflict into an international incident. As a diplomatic officer, he maintained the authority to direct the USS *Boston* to deploy its troops in the event the local government requested their presence or American lives remained in danger. It is clear these issues failed to exist at the time he ordered their landing in Honolulu and as such, his intervention fell outside his duties' *prevue*. Furthermore, without his support, the revolutionaries lacked the political or military advantage required to successfully challenge their government. Unfortunately, Steven's authority provided him the freedom to exert military force without the US president's authorization. During the 1800s, the lack of immediate communications created delays in a government's reactions to foreign events. On average, a message from Honolulu to Washington, DC took sixteen days to cross the Pacific Ocean and the American continent. The distance rendered it impossible for the US to sustain real time information and thus, diplomatic representatives retained limited power to act independently based upon their administration's foreign policies.

Although Stevens' exploits reflected an individual perusing a personal agenda without government support, his position as a US diplomatic agent and his use of the USS *Boston* drew his reluctant country into the domestic conflict, despite the United States' previous policies.<sup>9</sup> The division between revolution and American imperialism further faded with the hasty response of President Harrison to the coup. His administration's attempt to force the former kingdom's annexation through the Senate

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<sup>9</sup> The commander of the USS *Boston* shared the same views as Stevens and the revolutionaries, but he was still bound to follow the directives of the US minister.

before his term ended raises questions as to his involvement in the coup. However, by all indications, he failed to maintain a policy that supported the monarchy's collapse.

American support remained critical to the provisional government's Grant Strategy, which derived from the unofficial or mistaken advice provided by President Grant decades before. Their uprising required not only the monarchy's fall, but also US intervention to ensure that their power would remain intact in the event that the native leadership gained popular support. The 1887 revolt served as a warning that their influence lacked permanence, especially amidst growing Hawaiian discord. The rapid transfer of power to the United States remained the only guarantee for their long-term supremacy. Additionally, the pursuit of annexation remained the only answer to their shrinking profits in the face of the McKinley tariffs. However, the American response was all, but guaranteed as indicated by the Harrison Administration's failure to secure the Hawaiian-American annexation treaty, in 1893.<sup>10</sup>

The uncertainty of the Hawaiian League's strategy was further demonstrated by President Grover Cleveland's attempts to return the monarchy to power. For the native people, unfortunately, the president attempts to undo the former US minister's actions met with numerous legal, moral, and political obstacles. The first hurdle Lili'uokalani and Cleveland needed to overcome related to the European and Asian nations' recognition of the provisional government's legitimacy and thus their authority over the Hawaiians.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Here again, the Modern-Hawaiian Narrative flounders as these realities conflict with imperialism's classical definition. The term describes a country exerting political, commercial, or military force upon a territory to exploit its resources, but that was not possible or desirable among the US population in 1893. Bailey, "The United States and Hawaii," 560.

<sup>11</sup> Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Japan, and China all recognized the provisional government as well as the Republic of Hawaii. This demonstrates the international community's displeasure with the Hawaiian monarchy and their support of the pro-business government. Foreign letters of Recognition of the provisional government, *FRUS: Affairs in Hawaii*, 228-32.

Secondly, the revolution's domestic origins prevented the United States from legally interfering in its affairs. To act against the *coup d'état* members constituted a declaration of war against not only an independent nation, but also American citizens. Consequently, the exertion of military strength against the Republic of Hawaii risked both domestic and international discord.<sup>12</sup> As such, Cleveland's failure to return the monarchy to power failed to constitute the US desire to appropriate the islands, but illustrated the problem's extreme complexity.

During William McKinley's election, the Republican Party returned the Hawaiian Question to the political debate as a part of their platform, but it maintained little connection with the people who populated the discourse's namesake. It instead reflected the national conversation regarding the United States' progression as an international power. Without congress and the public's popular support, McKinley's initial policies towards Hawaii remained nothing more than a personal aspiration, until the Spanish-American War brought a unique moment of opportunity. The annexation's failure in the senate as a formal treaty, demonstrated the Democratic Party's hesitation to become an imperialistic nation. If not for the war's boost to American nationalism, and the strong republican representation in the House of Representatives, the pro-expansionists seemed certain to fail once again. In the end, the appropriation succeeded not by a popular policy that embraced imperialism, but the fortune of the expansionist over their opponents' apathy or unwillingness to challenge a war time measure. This distinction fails to absolve the United States from its role in the insurgency as a responsibility is assigned not just to action, but inaction as well.


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<sup>12</sup> The failure of the Asian and European power to advocate for the monarchy might indicate their displeasure with the Kalakaua and their lack of support for the queen.

In the race to assign blame, the primary interpretations fail to acknowledge the transformation that drove Hawaii from its ancient culture was not a crime against the people, but rather the normal, and at times turbulent, process of cultural interactions. The events that constituted the overthrow of Queen Lydia Lili'uokalani and the cessation of the islands' sovereignty five years later reveal the social, political, and economic complexities that created the turbulent relationship between the native elite and the kingdom's American-Hawaiian subjects. Based upon ethnocentric distrust that created a divide among its political and economic systems, the society's collapse was based not on if it would happen, but rather when. Although the conflict originated in the 1820s, the former missionaries' Social Darwinism ideology, King David Kalākaua's corrupt reign, and the tariffs the United States imposed upon Hawaiian goods, served as the key stresses that instigated the dual uprisings. The diversity of the multi-national agents and their motivations blurred the line between the dysfunctional society's predictable failure and the illegal exertion of US imperialism upon a foreign nation. As such, those responsible consist of the leadership of the monarchy, its American subjects, and the United States government. The only true victims, as with most global historical narratives, remained the islands' *kanaka* who the privileged classes' ignored in the attempt to elevate their financial standings.

## APPENDIX

Picture 1: King Kamehameha the Great



Source: Bos, Carole D. "Kamehameha I." AwesomeStories.com. March 2014. Accessed September 23, 2014. <https://www.awesomestories.com/images/user/4eae587190.jpg>.

Picture 2: Kamehameha and his use of western weapon in the Battle of Nuuanu.



Source: Bayliff, Wayne. "The Royal Hawaiian Hotel Elegantly Preserves Its Heritage on Waikiki Beach." Global Writes. June 24, 2013. Accessed September 09, 2014. <http%3A%2F%2Fglobal-writes.com%2F2013%2F06%2Fthe-royal-hawaiian-hotel-elegantly-preserves-its-heritage-on-waikiki-beach.html>.

**Picture 3: Queen Regent Elizabeth Ka'aumanu**




"The Royal Women of Hawaii." Pacific Island National Parks. March 01, 2013. Accessed September 23, 2014. <http://pacificislandparks.com/2013/03/01/the-royal-women-of-hawaii-2/>.

**Picture 4: One of the original missionary families, Asa and Sarah Thurston.**



Source: "Asa and Lucy Goodale Thurston." Wikipedia. September 17, 2014. Accessed September 23, 2014. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asa\\_and\\_Lucy\\_Goodale\\_Thurston](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asa_and_Lucy_Goodale_Thurston).

**Picture 5: Kings Kamehameha III, Kamehameha IV, Kamehameha V, and Lunalilo**




"Hawaiian Dynasties." Ho'okuleana. June 30, 2012. Accessed September 23, 2014. [http://totakeresponsibility.blogspot.com/2012\\_06\\_01\\_archive.html](http://totakeresponsibility.blogspot.com/2012_06_01_archive.html).

**Picture 6: Port of Honolulu during the 1850s**



Source: "Honolulu Harbor in 1857 by F. H. Burgess1.jpg." Wikimedia Commons. September 17, 2011. Accessed September 23, 2014. [http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Honolulu\\_Harbor\\_in\\_1857\\_by\\_F.\\_H.\\_Burgess1.jpg](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Honolulu_Harbor_in_1857_by_F._H._Burgess1.jpg).

**Picture 7: A sugar plantation on the island of Maui**



Source: "Hana-maui-plantation." Galleryhip. Accessed September 23, 2014.  
<http://www.hawaiipictureoftheday.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/hana-maui-plantation.jpg>.


**Picture 8: King David Kalakaua**



Source: "David Kalakaua, King of Hawaii." Royal Portraits. April 29, 2012. Accessed September 23, 2014.  
<http://3A%2Froyal-portraits.blogspot.com%2F2012%2F04%2Fdavid-kalakaua-king-of-hawaii.html>.




**Picture 9: Stanford Dole**



Source: "Sanford B. Dole." Digital History Project. Accessed September 23, 2014.  
<http://www.digitalhistoryproject.com/2011/10/sanford-b-dole-president-of-hawaii.html>.

**Picture 10: Lorrin Thurston**



Source: "Lorrin Thurston." Honolulu Advertiser. June 02, 2006. Accessed September 23, 2014.  
[http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/dailypix/2006/Jul/02/sesq1thurston\\_b.jpg](http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/dailypix/2006/Jul/02/sesq1thurston_b.jpg).

Picture 11: Iolani Palace



Source: : "Iolani Palace." Wikipedia. August 8, 2014. Accessed September 23, 2014. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iolani\\_Palace](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iolani_Palace).

Picture 12: Honolulu Rifles



Sources: "Honolulu Rifles." Wikimedia Commons. June 28, 2014. Accessed September 23, 2014. [http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/83/Honolulu\\_Rifles\\_%28PP-52-1-022%29.jpg](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/83/Honolulu_Rifles_%28PP-52-1-022%29.jpg).

**Picture 23: Queen Lydia Lili'uokalani**




Source: "Princess Liliuokalani." Wikimedia Commons. March 20, 2011. Accessed September 23, 2014. [http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Princess\\_Liliuokalani\\_retouched\\_photo\\_by\\_J.\\_J.\\_Williams\\_\(Bishop\\_Museum\).jpg](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Princess_Liliuokalani_retouched_photo_by_J._J._Williams_(Bishop_Museum).jpg).

**Picture 14: The members of the Annexation Club**




Source: "Hawaiian Annexation Commission of 1893." Wikimedia Commons. February 21, 2011. Accessed September 23, 2014. [http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hawaiian\\_Annexation\\_Commission\\_of\\_1893.jpg](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hawaiian_Annexation_Commission_of_1893.jpg).

**Picture 15: US Minister to Hawaii John L. Stevens**




Source: "John L. Stevens." Viennahistoricalsociety. Accessed September 23, 2014.  
[http://www.viennahistoricalsociety.com/John\\_L.html](http://www.viennahistoricalsociety.com/John_L.html).

**Picture 16: The United States cruiser USS *Boston*.**




Source: "Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii." Wikipedia. July 17, 2014. Accessed September 23, 2014.  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overthrow\\_of\\_the\\_Kingdom\\_of\\_Hawaii#mediaviewer/File:Boston\\_USS\\_cruiser\\_c1891\\_  
LOC\\_cph\\_3b39622.jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overthrow_of_the_Kingdom_of_Hawaii#mediaviewer/File:Boston_USS_cruiser_c1891_LOC_cph_3b39622.jpg)

**Picture 17: American troops outside the Iolani Palace.**




Source: "The Coup of 1893 and Subsequent Occupation." Maoli Wikispaces. Accessed September 23, 2014.  
<http://3A%2F%2Fmaoli.wikispaces.com%2FCoup%2Bof%2B1893>.

**Picture 18: The disarming of the Royal Guard.**



Source: "Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii." Wikipedia. July 17, 2014. Accessed September 23, 2014.  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overthrow\\_of\\_the\\_Kingdom\\_of\\_Hawaii#mediaviewer/File:Disarming\\_Liliuokalani%27s\\_Household\\_Guards.jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overthrow_of_the_Kingdom_of_Hawaii#mediaviewer/File:Disarming_Liliuokalani%27s_Household_Guards.jpg).

**Picture 19: President Benjamin Harrison**




Source: "Benjamin Harrison." Wikipedia. September 21, 2014. Accessed September 23, 2014.  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin\\_Harrison#mediaviewer/File:Pach\\_Brothers\\_-\\_Benjamin\\_Harrison.jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Harrison#mediaviewer/File:Pach_Brothers_-_Benjamin_Harrison.jpg).

**Picture 20: Princess Victoria Ka`iulani Cleghorn**




Source: "Ka`iulani." Wikipedia. April 20, 2014. Accessed September 23, 2014.  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ka%CA%BBiulani#mediaviewer/File:Kaiulani,\\_photograph\\_by\\_E.\\_Chickering.jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ka%CA%BBiulani#mediaviewer/File:Kaiulani,_photograph_by_E._Chickering.jpg).

**Picture 21: President Grover Cleveland**




Source: "Grover Cleveland." Wikipedia. September 10, 2014. Accessed September 23, 2014.  
[http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ef/President\\_Grover\\_Cleveland\\_Restored.jpg](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ef/President_Grover_Cleveland_Restored.jpg).

**Picture 22: US Commissioner James H. Blount**




Source: "James Henderson Blount." Wikimedia Commons. May 06, 2010. Accessed September 23, 2014.  
[http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:James\\_Henderson\\_Blount\\_-\\_Brady-Handy.jpg](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:James_Henderson_Blount_-_Brady-Handy.jpg).

**Picture 23: Alabama Senator John T. Morgan**



Source: "John Tyler Morgan." Wikipedia. September 20, 2014. Accessed September 23, 2014.  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John\\_Tyler\\_Morgan#mediaviewer/File:John\\_t\\_morgan.jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Tyler_Morgan#mediaviewer/File:John_t_morgan.jpg).

**Picture 24: President William McKinley**



Source: "United States Presidential Election, 1900." Wikipedia. August 28, 2014. Accessed September 23, 2014.  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United\\_States\\_presidential\\_election,\\_1900#mediaviewer/File:Mckinley.jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_election,_1900#mediaviewer/File:Mckinley.jpg).



Picture 25: The lowering of the Hawaiian flag from the Iolani Palace at the annexation ceremony.




Source: Davey, Frank, Lowering the Hawaiian flag at Annexation ceremony, Iolani Palace, Hawaii State Achieve Collection, [http://archives1.dags.hawaii.gov/gallery2/main.php?g2\\_itemId=5596](http://archives1.dags.hawaii.gov/gallery2/main.php?g2_itemId=5596) (accessed September 27, 2014).

Picture 26: Newspaper political cartoons that display the racism towards the Hawaiian people. Note the similarity with African depictions.



Source: Hawai'i Digital Newspaper Project, Google, <https://sites.google.com/a/hawaii.edu/ndnp-hawaii/Home/historical-feature-articles/political-cartoons> (accessed September 27, 2014).

Picture 27: A newspaper editorial that displays the annexation of Hawaii and its relationship to the earlier revolution.



Source: Hawai'i Digital Newspaper Project, Google, <https://sites.google.com/a/hawaii.edu/ndnp-hawaii/Home/historical-feature-articles/political-cartoons> (accessed September 27, 2014).

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