

Technology or Incentives? Bycatch Avoidance in the BSAI Groundfish Fishery

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Rights-based Management in Multi-species Fisheries

Additional complexity: catch-quota balancing

Ex ante examinations: weak targeting potential

⇒ challenges for rights-based management

Squires (1987), Pascoe (2007, 2010)

Ex post examinations: stronger targeting potential than previously thought

Sanchiricho (2006), Branch (2008)

Rights-based Management in Multi-species Fisheries


Hypothesis:

Conventional models of fishery production reflect more about the *incentives* for substitutability than the *technological* possibilities of cross-species substitution.

Ability to target confounded with *incentive* to target.

Conventional Production Function:

$$\text{catch} = F(\text{labor}, \text{capital}, \text{duration})$$



Fishing production depends on temporal and spatial choices...

BSAI Non-Pollock Groundfish Fishery

Did rights-based management induce bycatch avoidance?



The Bering Sea Groundfish Fishery

Pre-Amendment 80 (prior to 2008):

- Target species TACs allocated as common property over multiple “sub-seasons”
- TAC for PSC (e.g. halibut) allocated to target species fisheries
- Target fisheries typically closed due to binding PSC TAC


The Bering Sea Groundfish Fishery

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

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Post-Amendment 80 (2008 and after):

- Target species and PSC allocations vested directly into cooperatives or limited access fishery
- Initially one cooperative formed: 16 vessels, 7 companies





Species	Color
Yellowfin Sole	Dark Blue
Atka Mackerel	Dark Red
Cod	Green
Rock Sole	Orange
Flathead Sole	Teal
Pollock	Red
Other	Light Purple





Change in Fishing Practices

Abbott et al. (2013) found:



- large scale movements out of halibut-rich areas
- finer scale movements after hauls with a large proportion of halibut
- less fishing at night when halibut bycatch is more prevalent



Changes in Bycatch Intensity



Changes in Bycatch Intensity



Reduced Form Fishery Production Function

A Hyperbolic Distance Function Approach

Transformation Function: $T(x, y, b) = 0$

$x = \text{inputs}$

$y = \text{good outputs}$

$b = \text{bad outputs}$

Reduced Form Fishery Production Function

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
$y = \text{good outputs}$

$b = \text{bad outputs}$

*Hyperbolic Output
Distance Function:*

$$D^H(x, y, b) = \min_{\theta} \{ \theta > 0 : T(x, y/\theta, b\theta) \leq 0 \}$$

$$0 < D^H(x, y, b) \leq 1$$



Reduced Form Fishery Production Function

Hyperbolic Distance Function: Identification

$$D^H(x, y, b) = \min_{\theta} \{ \theta > 0 : T(x, y/\theta, b\theta) \leq 0 \}$$

Reduced Form Fishery Production Function

Hyperbolic Distance Function: Identification

$$D^H(x, y, b) = \min_{\theta} \{ \theta > 0 : T(x, y/\theta, b\theta) \leq 0 \}$$

Distance is latent, so.....

$$y = y^* e^{v-u} \quad \text{and} \quad b = b^* e^{u-v} \quad \text{where} \quad D^H(x, y^*, b^*) = 1$$

$$\implies D^H(x, ye^{u-v}, be^{v-u}) = 1$$

$$\implies D^H(x, y, b) = e^{v-u}$$

since $D^H(x, y, b)$ is almost homogeneous of degrees 1,1,-1,1

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since $D^H(x, y, b)$ is almost homogeneous of degrees 1,1,-1,1

$$v \sim N(0, \sigma_v) \quad u \sim \Gamma(1, \sigma_u)$$

Reduced Form Fishery Production Function

A Hyperbolic Distance Function Approach

$$\begin{aligned}\ln D_{its}^H(\mathbf{x}_{its}, \mathbf{y}_{its}, \mathbf{b}_{its}) &= \alpha_o^{is} + \alpha_x^{s'} \ln \mathbf{x}_{its} + \alpha_y^{s'} \ln \mathbf{y}_{its} + \alpha_b^{s'} \ln \mathbf{b}_{its} \\ &+ \frac{1}{2} \ln \mathbf{x}'_{its} \mathbf{A}_{xx}^s \ln \mathbf{x}_{its} + \frac{1}{2} \ln \mathbf{y}'_{its} \mathbf{A}_{yy}^s \ln \mathbf{y}_{its} + \frac{1}{2} \ln \mathbf{b}'_{its} \mathbf{A}_{bb}^s \ln \mathbf{b}_{its} \\ &+ \ln \mathbf{y}'_{its} \mathbf{A}_{yb}^s \ln \mathbf{b}_{its} + \ln \mathbf{x}'_{its} \mathbf{A}_{xy}^s \ln \mathbf{y}_{its} + \ln \mathbf{x}'_{its} \mathbf{A}_{xb}^s \ln \mathbf{b}_{its} \\ &= \varepsilon_{its} = v_{its} - u_{its},\end{aligned}$$

x = Fishing Time, Vessel Length

i = Individual

y = Rock Sole, Yellowfin Sole, Cod, Other

t = Day of season

b = Halibut

s = Season

Reform-induced “technological” change left latent

Stochastic Production Function

Measures of Substitution

$$y = \text{rock sole} \quad b = \text{halibut}$$



$$\text{Marginal Rate of Transformation:} \quad MRT_{by} = \frac{\partial y}{\partial b} = - \frac{\partial D(\cdot) / \partial b}{\partial D(\cdot) / \partial y}$$

Larger MRT implies a greater shadow value of halibut reduction.



$$\text{Transformation Elasticity:} \quad subs_{by} = \frac{\partial \ln y}{\partial \ln b} = - \frac{\partial \ln D(\cdot) / \partial \ln b}{\partial \ln D(\cdot) / \partial \ln y}$$

Smaller elasticity implies greater potential to substitute rock sole for halibut reduction.


Marginal Rate of Transformation





Relative Substitutability



Frontiers: Rock sole-Halibut Space



Frontiers: Rock sole-Halibut Space



Conclusion

Targeting “ability” in prior to A80 primarily determined by lack of incentives to avoid halibut bycatch

- Ex ante predictions likely reflect far more about *incentives* for substitutability than *technological* possibilities for substitutability
- Need to understand what the relevant margins of production are, which are fishery and context specific



Acknowledgements



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