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# Authenticity in Finitude: Interpretation of Heidegger

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Authenticity in Finitude: Interpretation of Heidegger


submitted to
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for
Senior Thesis
2020 Spring
September 21, 2020

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**Introduction**

Before going into the argument, it is important to understand the question at hand. Martin Heidegger's investigation of human existence stems partly from his frustration with the prevalent Cartesian/Kantian account which grounds the subject in a realm transcendental to worldly objects. Descartes' thinking self or Kant's transcendental soul all depend on there being something beyond the worldly. For Heidegger, this sort of philosophical inquisition on human existence is hasty and meaningless when the question of 'Being', or what it means to exist, hasn't yet been properly addressed. Heidegger aims to explore the ontological question of human existence, and in his process of articulating the usually glossed-over question of 'Being', he establishes the human being not as an aloof Cartesian subject but as an inherently social being that is fundamentally involved in the world. He calls this human existence "Dasein", or being-there. Through the analysis of Dasein, Heidegger advocates an authentic existence—the best possible way of human 'Being' that is constantly in danger of being clouded.

When we think of distinguishing the authentic self from the public social self, we tend to think of something that is private and out of reach of other people. The classic element to distinguish the pure origin from the merely relational is infinity. The way Descartes' God (associated with infinity) is prior to our human existence (merely finite), the necessary would be ordered before the contingent, and independent before dependent. However, Heidegger takes a different route. In the German philosopher's work *Being and Time*, he keeps infinity out of the picture as he uncovers authenticity. This paper will first establish Heidegger's argument for the

authentic self in finitude before exploring how it could be maintained based on the authentic self's particular relation to time.

Heidegger's argument for authenticity will be portrayed in this paper as a two-step process with two binaries. First is the binary between ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. The examination of Dasein's characteristic of Being-in-the-world shows that Dasein errs on one side over the other. The Cartesian/Kantian account looks for the essence of existence in the realm of present-at-hand, but Heidegger claims that it is actually the other way around. Embedded in and engaged with the world, Dasein encounters things, including its own existence, as ready-to-hand instead of present-at-hand.

The second binary will distinguish the authentic self from the they-self. The familiar mode of our being, ready-to-hand, will reveal how Dasein structures its world. A quick summary of this complicated function would be: Dasein, as an initially factical being, is thrown into the world with preexisting engagements (Being-in-the-world). It interprets the world it is thrown into in terms of projection: understanding in terms of possibilities. However, as a social being with access to prevailing interpretations of the world, Dasein is susceptible to 'falling', or having authentic possibilities drowned out by the 'they.' This is where the second binary comes in. The second step toward authenticity is to distinguish, within the realm of Being-in-the-world, the authentic self from the simple Being-with (as the 'they'). Heidegger brings in the anticipation of Death as the distinguishing factor. As a possibility that we would have to face alone, Death, or the anticipation of Death, helps us break free of the 'they' and recognize our ownmost possibilities.

       The two binaries for authenticity reveal Heidegger's simple and strong criterion of finding and owning the best quality of possibilities for the individual within the temporal realm. However, the dual usage of temporality in establishing the two binaries (present-at-hand vs. ready-to-hand and Being-with-others vs. Being-with-others-authentically) will need to be clarified. The first section of this paper will illustrate the two binaries to clarify the structure of Heidegger's argument for authenticity. The second section will focus on Dasein's temporality and how the two binaries could be maintained with their seemingly contradictory relationships with time. This paper aims to make coherent Heidegger's unique account of authenticity, with infinity out of the picture and fully in finitude.

**Section 1 Heidegger's two binaries to delineate authenticity**

Note: Heidegger's philosophy on authenticity lands closer to a phenomenological description than to an argument designed for attack and defense. The jump he makes from this phenomenological description to a hard ontological truth is hard to follow. We won't delve too deep into the possible objections, aside from some that would need to be addressed for clarity. Obvious concerns would be addressed, but the overall goal in this section is coherency.

Binary #1: Ready-to-hand vs. Present-at-hand

Ready-to-hand and present-at-hand are two modes of being drawn from the entities Dasein encounters in the world. We should not mistake this binary as a categorization of everything that exists. Even though the binary is for the entities in the world, it does not include the being of Dasein, which is what is in question for Heidegger. Instead, this binary is for the entities Dasein encounters and takes issue with. Clarifying the hierarchy between ready-to-hand and present-at-hand will first, restructure the notion of being and second, illustrate how Dasein has an inherently relational structure, as a 'self' that fits into the 'world.'

It is important to differentiate between 'entities' and 'being.' Entities are what there is and being is the 'is.' Heidegger's process toward authenticity reiterates the question of being and illuminates Dasein not as an 'entity' (such as the biological human body) but as a self that understands 'being.' "Being-in-the-world...gets its ontological understanding of itself in the first

instance from those entities which it itself is *not* but which it encounters 'within' its world, and from the Being they possess" (Heidegger 85). Note that the concern isn't just for 'entities' but rather the 'being.' 'Being' is processed through 'entities' that Dasein encounters, and this understanding gives insight into Dasein's own being. Dasein functions outside and with the analysis of being. Exploring the binary between ready-to-hand and present-at-hand will show how Dasein works with the beings of the entities it encounters and help provide insight into the structure of Dasein.

Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, has two notions for us to work with: the 'self' and the 'world.' The binary between ready-to-hand and present-at-hand is an analysis on the second, the 'world.' Having these two concepts, the 'self' and the 'world', can push us toward the Cartesian account in which the two are separate entities that can exist without the other, when in fact Heidegger claims that the two are interconnected for Dasein. That ready-to-hand is prior to present-at-hand will emphasize how Dasein is a relation, a function, between the 'self' and the 'world.'

**Ready-to-hand (RTH)** is the kind of being associated with equipment and its participation in the world. For example, a hammer is encountered in terms of its use, hammering, and "the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become" (Heidegger 98). When we are focused on hammering, the hammer becomes almost invisible. When we actively engage with the equipment it blends into the context.

**Present-at-hand (PAH)** is the being that is revealed in the lack of these engagements. In the case of the hammer, instances of its PAH being would be: a categorical definition of a

hammer, the average length in inches it can be, etc. Observations and measurements such as these can be removed from context and make the object into something independent with properties. This PAH account of being lands closer to the more dominant Cartesian account, which holds the world as a collection of entities with relational properties.

It is easier to think of entities in PAH terms, but Heidegger prods us toward a structure where RTH takes priority. Instead of a collection of PAH entities, the world could be viewed as a collection of RTH tasks. Heidegger's explanation of equipment shows how relations can take priority over objects. He says that "strictly speaking, there never 'is' *an* equipment," and that "equipment is essentially something 'in-order-to'" (Heidegger 68). The same way a hammer only exists because there are nails to drive in boards, these equipment are essentially part of a larger task involving other equipment. The PAH account of these entities attempts to remove them from the context that is crucial for RTH when the first and foremost identity of these objects are equipment within a task.

A strict Cartesian would have trouble accepting this. S/he would claim that the relations and tasks only exist because of the objective entities. In this view, the tasks are made up by a subjective mind that interprets the objective world. Without the physical objects in time and space, there is nothing for the mind to work with; it is only because the metal and wood are arranged, carved, and connected in a certain way that the hammer exists for the human being to use. The same way language and words (and therefore our perception) point to the equipment and not the task is a testament to how the entities are the core particles. The Cartesian would say that entities are prior to the relations because relations need entities in the first place.

It's true that PAH terms, with the Cartesian space-time coordinates, are more universal. Even the language we use pushes us towards this thinking. This is a subject too big to be explored in this paper, but simply put, words are categorizations that take equipment out of context. Even the word equipment refers to a categorization for all things that function within a task. Numbers, as concepts, is another example of categorizations that translate across different contexts. Having these objective groundings (words, categorizations, numbers, etc) push us towards the structure in which equipment is independent to the task, with different properties that help us categorize them.

When Heidegger proposes RTH priority over PAH, he takes care not to deny the existence of physical objects or the PAH account as a whole. He just illuminates it as a secondary interpretation. Dasein works with both the RTH and PAH; they're just different accounts for the beings of entities it encounters. The PAH appears in the lack of engagement, such as when one takes a step back to record the way a scientist might organize data into a coherent graph. However, the organization of data for comprehension, or the delineation of properties in order to categorize, etc, are actually all tasks for Dasein. INTRODUCTION "The presence-at-hand which makes itself known is still bound up in the readiness-to-hand of equipment" (Heidegger 104). The hands-on use and engagement, which turns even the analysis (PAH) into a tool, are what make up the world. This is a reference to the second section of this paper, but to clarify the priority of tasks over equipment, we would have to talk about time. **Tasks need time as a horizon**, and we're bringing it in as the essence.

Heidegger makes this claim that RTH is prior to PAH on the basis of two reasons: a) PAH occurs only when RTH is interrupted and b) RTH can turn into PAH but not the other way around.

**a) PAH is only revealed when RTH is interrupted**, such as when a piece of equipment is missing and our task is hindered. In the case of the hammer, we don't really think about it when we are hammering a nail into a board. It is nestled within the task 'hammering', until it malfunctions or goes missing when we need it. "The helpless way in which we stand before it is a deficient mode of concern, and as such it uncovers the Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more of something ready-to-hand" (Heidegger 103). PAH only emerges when the equipment is taken out of context, and the focus shifts from the ongoing task to the object. Since what we deal with everyday is not the entity (equipment) but rather the work, the PAH is a secondary interpretation of equipment that would have otherwise been invisible.

The Cartesian might argue that relational RTHs are actually distractions from the essence which lie in the PAH. S/he would claim that PAH is the essence while relational properties are simply subjective colorings to the original object. Of course Dasein would encounter RTH before PAH; as a mere entity encountering a different entity, the human being would encounter first and get distracted by mere properties. For the Cartesian, the order in which Dasein encounters things (RTH before PAH) wouldn't serve to establish RTH as prior.

For Heidegger, the order matters because we are analyzing from Dasein's point of view. While this line of argument is not as solid, the epistemological automatically turns into ontological in this first person perspective of the world. The following passage shows how the object-property view can be misleading.

"The 'indicating' of the sign and the 'hammering' of the hammer are not properties of entities. Indeed, they are not properties at all … Anything ready-to-hand is, at the worst, appropriate for some purposes and inappropriate for others; and its 'properties' are, as it were, still bound up in these ways in which it is appropriate or inappropriate, just as presence-at-hand, as a possible kind of Being for something ready-to-hand, is bound up in readiness-to-hand." (Heidegger 114-115)

Tasks such as hammering are what Dasein deals with, and where equipment fits in for Dasein's world. The tasks in which equipment are RTH for are not just properties to something PAH as the Cartesian might think, but rather something that defines equipment as 'appropriate' or 'inappropriate.' The base point is different for Heidegger. Tasks define equipment and make the so-called properties.

The disturbances of RTH reveal the PAH and the totality of the task. In case of the hammer going missing, "our circumspection comes up against emptiness, and now sees for the first time *what* the missing article was ready-to-hand *with*, and *what* it was ready-to-hand *for*. The environment announces itself afresh." (Heidegger 105). The PAH account is important because it reveals the tasks that the equipment is RTH for. Without the disturbances that would reveal the PAH of equipment, the tasks themselves would be invisible to the Dasein. This theme of disturbances revealing totalities is to be explored further in the second binary for authenticity; Heidgger brings in death (a disturbance) as something that would reveal Dasein's own totality.

Another reason for RTH being prior to PAH is that **b) RTH can turn into PAH but not the other way around.** Unlike the Cartesian view where we start off with an object (PAH) and discover its multiple properties (RTH), Heidegger's view has RTH as the base point with PAH only forming afterwards when the context is stripped away. The everyday equipmental meaning (RTH) can be morphed into a PAH concept, but no matter how many properties we add to the PAH concept, it will never amount up to the RTH being. Heidegger expresses how adding on properties to the PAH concept pushes the terrain further into PAH and not RTH:

> "Adding on value-predicates cannot tell us anything at all new about the Being of goods, but would merely presuppose again that goods have pure presence-at-hand as their kind of Being. Values would then be determinate characteristics which a thing possesses, and they would be present-at-hand" (Heidegger132)

'Value-predicates' is a term Heidegger coined, but we can replace it with 'properties' for this discussion. Adding properties to the PAH concept cannot change our encounters with it into an encounter with equipment. In the same way reading about a tree and its scientific classification never amounts to having a favorite childhood tree that we'd climb, feeling the bark, or associate moods and seasons with the changing colors of the leaves, the PAH concept and properties also don't make the being any more intelligible to us. In this case, the reading-about-the-tree might be a RTH task for an exam, but the tree exists only as a PAH concept within the text—it is impossible to pull it down to RTH unless we start from ground zero and interact with an actual tree ready-to-hand. The logic behind this is this: PAH + PAH = PAH. We cannot add anything to

PAH concepts except other PAH concepts. Equipment that is RTH can become PAH but the reverse is impossible. This means that we have to start off from RTH, which makes it prior to PAH. The order automatically translates into priority because by priority, Heidegger means what is closer to Dasein.

The claim here is that the Cartesian search for essence with the contextual details stripped away makes the mistake of remaining in PAH. There still remain some questions to be addressed, such as how the world can be objective and shared if there is such a heavy dependence on context. The Cartesian might admit that relations and functions are important in the subjective point of view, but s/he would claim that in order for the world to be shared, there has to be those bare entities (with specific space coordinates, as simple objects that can take up different relationships) in the first place. An image to represent the picture in his argument would be: pins on a board holding up yarn to form a pattern. Since the pins are what hold the shape of the yarn up, even if it's the string that creates the image we can understand, the pins are prior to the yarn. It is the xy coordinates of the pins in the board that makes the shape, not the yarn.

To this Heidegger would reply that he isn't undervaluing the importance of the pins. However, the PAH account (coordinates of the pins) is a secondary mode for Dasein. Remember, we are analyzing from the Dasein's point of view. It is Dasein's interaction that makes the world visible. The pins aren't encountered as points in space unless one of them falls and the engagement (yarn-shape) is disrupted. For Dasein, the pins are primarily corners of the drawing, not coordinates.

To the question whether the world can be objective, the answer would be: if objective means shared with others, then yes, the world can be objective even if equipment is interpreted

with context/task. Moving away from the Cartesian account of space coordinates doesn't mean solipsism. Equipment is shared in its role. The concept of space coordinates would be replaced with the appropriateness of the equipment for the given role. It is true that there is a radical rethinking of Cartesian spatiality to turn it into the spatiality of Dasein. We will go over this in a few pages, when we take a better look at the structure of Dasein.

To summarize, while RTH and PAH are two modes of the same things (entities in the world), Heidegger views the Cartesian PAH being as the secondary construct. The way chess pieces are only that because of the function they perform, and the pins in the mentioned image are primarily corners of the shape and not points on the board, Heidegger places the so-called 'essence' in the function. The relational functions, manifested as tasks for the Dasein, are prior to the individualized concepts taken out of context. The structure of how Dasein encounters things in the world makes RTH prior to PAH.

Now that we've taken a good look into the world, where RTH beings are prior to PAH for Dasein, it is time to shift our focus to the other part of Dasein; the 'self' that interacts with the world. As mentioned above, Dasein has an inherently relational structure. We have broken free of the dominant Cartesian account of being and recognized the relational part that usually gets glossed over. Now that we are aware of another notion of being, we can now take a better look at the structure of Dasein as a relation between the self and the world. Dasein is prior to the self and the world the same way relations are prior to entities. Of course, Dasein is more complicated as an understanding that works with the different kinds of beings encountered in the world.

However, it still shares one thing with the entities whose beings we just explored (RTH vs. PAH): being-in-the-world.

> "Dasein is never 'proximally' an entity which is, so to speak, free from Being-in, but which sometimes has the inclination to take up a 'relationship' towards the world … This state of Being does not arise just because some other entity is present-at-hand outside of Dasein and meets up with it. Such an entity can 'meet up with' Dasein only in so far as it can, of its own accord, show itself within a world." (Heidegger 84).

Here Heidegger tries to shift the common structure of me vs. the world into Dasein as being-in-the world. Despite having these different labels (Dasein and the world it takes up relationships with) that push us towards the subject-object relationship of PAH, the structure actually shows an interconnectedness between Dasein and these 'objects' in the world. Being-in-the-world is not just a property of Dasein the same way a PAH entity might have properties. Rather, Dasein is made up of these instances (relations) in the world.

This might be better explained by examining how the equipment in the world relates to Dasein. The shift from the Cartesian objects with properties to equipment with appropriate/inappropriate roles shows that it is interdependence, not independence, that determines being. "That with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work … this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered" (Heidegger 99). The RTH equipment is essentially an in-order-to for a task. The task is both an in-order-to and an RTH as well. From this follows the question: what

is the next step of the in-order-to after tasks? We haven't determined yet where this chain stops, or how the totality forms—we've only secured the relational in-order-to of interdependence. The equipment is for the task, the task is for the environment, etc…

We've focused on the equipment encountered in the world and realized that Dasein is actually more concerned with tasks. Now we need to expand our view to the structure of the task and how the Dasein fits in. This passage illustrates how the Dasein (in terms of other human beings) fits in the in-order-to's.

> "Along with the work, we encounter not only entities ready-to-hand but also entities with Dasein's kind of Being—entities for which, in their concern, the product becomes ready-to-hand; and together with these we encounter the world in which wearers and users live, which is at the same time ours. Any work with which one concerns oneself is ready-to-hand not only in the domestic world of the workshop but also in the public world. Along with the public world, the environing Nature is discovered and is accessible to everyone. … Our concern discovers Nature as having some definite direction." (Heidegger 100)

The public world is brought in, where we encounter not just the equipment Dasein uses for tasks but also the human beings that the tasks are meant for. These human beings (other Daseins) are the arrival point for the for-which; they are what the tasks are meant for. We will put a tab on the latter part of this passage (Nature as the objective shared world that will replace the space coordinates of the Cartesian account) to first recognize the totality of the in-order-to's.

Dasein makes this totality possible. In the world live the "wearers and users," or the Daseins the tasks are meant for. The public world where Dasein is with other Dasein is to be explored in the second binary, but for now what is important is how these Daseins are also in the world with the tasks. This Being-in-the-world of the Dasein completes the totality of the tasks that make up the world. We have already clarified the priority of the relational and showed how involvement has to be outlined before the entity (equipment). Heidegger explains the completion of the totality of the involvements as:

> "The totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a "towards-which" in which there is no further involvement: this "towards-which" is not an entity that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose Being is defined as Being-in-the-world, and to whose state of Being, worldhood itself belongs." (Heidegger 116)

While the hammer is for hammering, the hammering for shelter against bad weather, etc, this network of equipment and tasks isn't groundless; Dasein is the end goal for these movements. Dasein is not a RTH being but rather a sort of entity that is "defined as Being-in-the-world" and that the worldhood itself belongs. We noted above that Dasein has to be in the world for the RTH equipment and so tasks can latch onto it. However, it seems as though Dasein is fundamentally different from the other RTH that simply refers to tasks, other equipment, etc. It is not just a stopping point within the world but rather something "to whose state of Being, worldhood itself

belongs." This suggests that Dasein, by being in the world to be on the receiving end of the in-order-to's, owns the interconnectedness because it completes the totality.

Dasein both belongs to the world and the worldhood to Dasein. Instead of having the world and the self as separate entities tentatively reaching out to form a relation, Heidegger establishes the relation as Dasein. The structure is almost reversed, with the world fitting into the self; Dasein is made up of the relations in the world, as something that completes the totality of the tasks that make up the said world.

Before we wrap up Heidegger's first binary between RTH and PAH that helped restructure our notion of being and lent an insight into Dasein's structure, I would like to expand on the tab made earlier: on Nature being the shared space instead of the Cartesian space-coordinates. This is both to address the possible objections from a Cartesian and to start on the project of restructuring our notion of time (to be fully taken on in the second section of this paper in order to reconcile Heidegger's two binaries). Having the constituents of the world be tasks and relations, those that ultimately belong to Dasein, requires a radical rethinking of the common Cartesian space-time coordinates. Simply put, Dasein has more power over space; space is to be taken as spatiality.

To answer the question on how the world could be shared and not subjective when it is ultimately made up of relations, Heidegger zeroes in on what makes the Cartesian world objective, space, and restructures it in terms of Dasein. Proximity is changed from having space-coordinates that are near to being encountered earlier (being equipment that is accessible

at any time) "When something is close by, this means that it is within the range of what is proximally ready-to-hand for circumspection." (Heidegger 142) Both the pepper spray and the receipt from last week's grocery shopping could be in the same pocket and therefore the same distance from us. However, the pepper spray is considerably closer as the tool for protection we would constantly reach for. It is closer to us because it is more ready-to-hand. Recognizing these equipment in terms of their function means that there is a different notion of placement than what the Cartesian might think, with matter being in certain coordinates in space. Heidegger explains place as this: "Equipment for something or other has its place...as one place out of a whole totality of places directionally lined up with each other and belonging to the context of equipment that is environmentally ready-to-hand" (Heidegger 136). Because the units we are working with is the equipment determined by function, the context is what determines the place the equipment takes up. Each equipment has to belong to a place because of its context and function. The basis is not the space-coordinates but rather the Dasein ordering equipment for a function or allocating spaces for equipment.

This new allocation is still shared, although the Cartesian might dismiss it as simply subjective. The same way the public world connects entities together with functions defined by other Daseins, who complete the totality of the chain of in-order-to's. As stated earlier, nature is also "discovered and accessible to everyone" (Heidegger 100). Heidegger expresses a slight aversion to organizing the world in an 'objective' way when the public world or the totality of tasks can get glossed over. He says:

"When one is oriented beforehand towards 'Nature' and 'Objectively' measured distances of Things, one is inclined to pass off such estimates and interpretations of severance as 'subjective.' Yet this 'subjectivity' perhaps uncovers the 'Reality' of the world at its most Real." (Heidegger 141)

What the Cartesian might dismiss as subjective is where Heidegger finds the reality of the world. Heidegger's main argument for the relational world is how PAH concepts lack (further away from Dasein, devoid of contexts). To the possible Cartesian objective that the relational is subjective and lacks the groundedness of the objective, he would say that the relational world is very much shared and grounding; everyone and everything would have to be linked in the chain of in-order-to's to access the 'subjective' world.

In the binary between RTH and PAH, the two kinds of beings of entities that the Dasein concerns itself with, we have explored a hierarchy. The RTH is closer to Dasein and therefore prior than PAH in the relational world in which the functions tie entities together as equipment. This view needs breaking free of the Cartesian notion of being that holds PAH as the essence. With RTH prior, the world isn't composed of PAH beings in coordinate space with relational properties; it becomes a totality of relationships, roles, and functions. This led to the analysis on the role of Dasein, and its structure in the world; Dasein and alongside and embedded in the world as a completion of the totality of the relations. It is what every task in the world is catered toward, the last step in the in-order-to. We touched on the rethinking of Cartesian space to make

sure holding relations as the essence can still structure a shared world. Through all this, we have tested the coherency of Heidegger's account of being. RTH, as the relational and involved being, is prior to PAH because it is closer to Dasein—the Dasein that encompasses the relation between the 'self' and the 'world', the being that takes all the RTH and PAH beings as an issue, and ultimately the totality of all the tasks that make up the world.

Binary #2: They-self vs. Authentic self

The structure of RTH being prior to PAH establishes Dasein as being-in-the-world. The emphasis is placed on involvement and roles. It is clear Heidegger avoids the classic route of holding something like infinity above merely relational human occupations. In the interconnected world of tasks, RTH in finitude is upheld instead of the non relational concepts. PAH is something for which Dasein has "no time" (Heidegger 220). There is another underlying structure at work here, where time functions as the horizon for both Being and our understanding of it, but this is to be further elaborated in the second section of this paper when we discuss how time fits in with the two binaries. What we have established for now is that RTH is closer and more real to Dasein than PAH. The pure object (PAH) with properties is a mere construct for Dasein that unconvers beings RTH.

However, we have to be careful not to let this relational structure reduce Dasein to a merely social and relational self. It's true Heidegger doesn't agree with the Cartesian notion of the self being a separate entity independent to the world. In Heidegger's view, Dasein cannot exist outside of the world because it is not an entity; it is a way of existing that needs the world as its basis. However, this doesn't mean that the self only consists of roles the way RTH beings are defined by their tasks. The next step towards Heidegger's authenticity involves distinguishing the social self and the authentic self: the they-self versus the authentic self.

Unlike the first binary, this binary doesn't work against a flagrant opposition. In fact, it may sit better with most people who believe there should be some distinction between the social self and the private self. Like the first binary, however, we will mostly be focusing on the

coherency and not on the argumentative soundness. Since Heidegger's work on authenticity lands closer to a phenomenological interpretation than a combative argument, we will be exploring the nooks and crannies of this second binary to test out the coherence of these two modes of self for Dasein.

Recognizing the RTH tasks as closer to Dasein than PAH concepts isn't enough to get us to authenticity. Even as we recognize the PAH concepts as secondary and live among the ready-to-hand tasks—occupied by them, living with others the tasks are for—there is still the danger of living in such a way that is a loss for Dasein. The same way PAH is a loss of meaning through context, living as the they-self is a loss for Dasein; Heidegger uses the same structure of preferring one end of the binary over the other because of this loss. One difference for this binary is that while the they-self is a loss, this inauthentic mode is actually inevitable due to Dasein's structure as living with Others and sharing tasks. PAH has a secondary status to RTH because it is a step away from Dasein's initial understanding of being. For this binary, however, both the inauthentic mode and the authentic mode are on the same level in terms of closeness to Dasein. In fact, we spend most of our time in the they-self. Heidegger describes how this they-self is constantly in danger of what he calls 'falling.' In the final step towards authenticity, Heidegger explains how we must constantly strive to break free of the 'they-self.'

In order to understand the 'they-self' and 'falling', we need to turn our attention to the self of Dasein. The observations on Dasein as a self differs from the analysis on other entities in the world because Dasein has another dimension to it that isn't defined by its interactions: understanding. Dasein has a first-person perspective. We recognize the distinction between myself and others, and this lucid delineation of the first and third person is not there in

equipment. We also choose and interpret our roles, unlike equipment made for its use. Heidegger puts it as: "We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity is *in each case mine.*" (Heidegger 67) There's the owning factor to Dasein that differentiates it from other entities. Dasein is the one bringing up the question of being, after all, and the task of being is an issue for Dasein as long as it lives.

The reason Being is described as 'cases' in the latter part of the quote is because Dasein isn't a single instance with a set amount of properties; as a shifting way of living through time, there are multiple possibilities that it understands itself with. The connection between understanding and the continuous becoming as Dasein moves through time can be clarified with this passage:

"The kind of Being which Dasein has, as potentiality-for-Being, lies existentially in understanding. Dasein is not something present-at-hand which possesses its competence for something by way of an extra; it is primarily Being-possible. Dasein is in every case what it can be, and in the way in which it is its possibility." (Heidegger 183)

Because Dasein is open to the different ready-to-hand tasks in the present, it is what it can do. The possibilities aren't just a collection of properties of a PAH entity, but rather instances of Being that Dasein can choose to follow through. This isn't to set up an idea of an absolute freedom where we can wake up one day and become a possibility. Instead, we usually already find ourselves in the movement, following through a role that is set up for us in a given setting. For example, because a student is born into an environment where education is valued highly and

parents send their kids to school, s/he is prompted to do his/her duty as a student by studying. There are many responsibilities attached to this role, such as how a student should act toward teachers, how they should spend their time at school etc. However, s/he is not static in this state because s/he can actively choose which future to follow through and prepare for a career. Like this, there are cases we already are and cases we are choosing to become. Dasein understands itself through possibilities because it is what it can do, and it has to choose which ones to own.

While each case of Dasein is its own possibility, some can be clouded from understanding. What is available and disclosed to Dasein can differ depending on how awake and aware Dasein is. This is where the 'Others' and the 'they-self' come in. The public interpretation limits the number of possibilities that is revealed to Dasein, and therefore influences the way of living for the individual.

This is actually an easy trap to fall into because being with these Others that control interpretation and understanding is the basic state of being-in-the-world. The world is made up of tasks, and tasks are for Dasein. "The world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a *with-world*. Being-in is *Being-with* Others." (Heidegger 155) Because Dasein is social and functional, the world of tasks automatically translates being-in-the-world to being-with-others. The Others are what the tasks are for, and the they-self naturally follows from the interconnected world of RTH tasks explained in the first binary.

By 'Others' Heidegger doesn't mean people aside from myself, but rather means a particular mode of self that I can be as well. The "I" doesn't stand out from Others; "they are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does *not* distinguish oneself—those among whom one is too." (Heidegger 154) When we live in the world, our primary concern is with our

environment and discovering things ready-to-hand. The Others, even though they are the Dasein that is the landing point for these RTH tasks,  are discovered in the same way ready-to-hand tasks are discovered. For example, the book I have next to me is a gift from a friend that is only here because the friend cared enough to mail it. It is thanks to the people in the post service that I received it. The mail carrier, as s/he was carrying out the delivery service, most likely stuck to the paved roads and steered clear of people's property. In this way, both the objects we encounter and our actions are influenced by Others. In this view, we would see ourselves as just one of many, filling out a role in this interconnected world. "One's own Dasein, like the Dasein-with of Others, is encountered proximally and for the most part in terms of the with-world with which we are environmentally concerned." (Heidegger 163) While the with-world is what we are primarily concerned with as a social and functional Dasein, Heidegger warns that this 'Others' is not who we truly are. Dasein is more than just a social function, and we have to be careful not to misinterpret Heidegger's stressing of the RTH as solidifying Dasein as merely social.

The they-self lacks because it clouds certain possibilities from Dasein, which is continuously in the task of understanding and choosing. The problems can be roughly divided into: a) the they-self dictates what to do b) makes it seem as if we own all possibilities (in PAH terms) when in fact we're not even owning our own, and c) stresses the shared present and prompts Dasein to disregard its temporality. Heidegger calls this entire state 'fallenness.'

**A) The they-self dictates what to do.** This isn't just in terms of the shared RTH tasks, but rather stems from communication and interpretation that comes from living in a society with Others. Heidegger describes the self of the 'Other' not as a simple external force but as a subject that everyone takes up and contributes to:

*"Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in subjection to Others. It itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the Others. Dasein's everyday possibilities of Being are for the Others to dispose of as they please. These Others, moreover, are not definite Others. ... One belongs to the Other oneself and enhances their power...The "who" is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, the "they". (Heidegger 164)*

Because the Other is a subject that has to embrace everyone, the individual is watered down to what anyone can understand, even if they haven't lived the context with the person. The public space fosters an average intelligence. Actions are dictated because we take them as the 'they.' If we go back to the student example, the student acts as the 'they' if s/he thinks that his/her identity as a student is the only way of being for him/her, just because authority tells them to and everyone their age goes through the same thing.  One might still regard this as a phenomenon of the with-world, but the 'they', is actually more invasive. Heidegger explains the impact the 'they' can have on the individual:

*"Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. Overnight, everything that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has been well known...Every secret loses its force. This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the "levelling down" of all possibilities of Being." (Heidegger 165)*

There is a lot packed into this passage, including cultural tradition, current discourse, and the personal effect these interactions have on us. Traditions impose practices that are the result of past interpretations (not ours), and current discourse could dismiss private revelations (such as anxiety in the face of death) as a passing mood. Even if Dasein is physically alone in a given moment,it is still subject to the 'they' if it acts in a way that has to be understandable to the public. The term Heidegger uses is "levelling down"; as Dasein modifies itself to fit the average model proposed by the 'they', it suppresses certain possibilities.

This phenomenon is closely tied to language and talk, through which the average intelligibility surfaces and dominates. The way we have common expressions for certain situations or common patterns of thought show how language "preserves an understanding of Dasein-with and one's own Being-in." (Heidegger 211) There are problems with understanding coming in pre-packaged terms like this, which brings us to the next problem of the they-self.

**B) The they-self makes it seem as if we own all possibilities (in PAH terms) when in fact we're not even owning our own.** The current discourse calls for taking interest in distant situations and shifting through them one after another. Having gotten information through these translated resources (the news, other people's accounts) and having summarized them in words, Dasein mistakes actual understanding for everything it comes across. Heidegger sums it up as: "Versatile curiosity and "restlessly knowing it all" masquerade as a universal understanding of Dasein. But at bottom it remains indefinite *what* is really to be understood, and the question has not even been asked." (Heidegger 222) Understanding, as clarified above, is closely tied to possibilities. These possibilities are personal and individual in that they have to matter to the individual in terms of how they came about and what the individual can do about them.

However, this common understanding in discourse masks everything as present-at-hand, something that is merely so and something everyone can grasp. "Universal understanding" runs counter to how possibilities fit in with Dasein's time; the information is dumped on Dasein even before the question has been asked. Understanding is clouded because what is supposed to be RTH and individual gets morphed into PAH entities. The they-self covers up Being, both for other entities and itself, as PAH. The disconnection with individual possibilities is described as "never dwelling anywhere" (Heidegger 217), most likely to contrast from the embedded being-in. In this state, Dasein is unattached and constantly uprooting itself from genuine RTH relationships with the world.

A good example to illustrate this phenomenon is a celebrity death. Once it is on the news, it becomes a happening that is included in current discourse. Other celebrity tributes on the life of the deceased celebrity and expressions such as RIP in the comment section all work to make this happening comprehensible. The continuous discourse makes it seem as if anyone could understand the happening, even if they haven't ever interacted with the passed celebrity in person. Seeing how a person's life and their impacts could be judged, we are prompted to re-evaluate our own lives and how it would be judged in the same fashion. Both the celebrity as a person and our own lives are reduced into simplified judgements from external standards and clipped statements on the roles when we take up this attitude of the 'they.'

One might disagree with calling this inauthentic because in the above discussion on possibilities, we described understanding and possibilities in terms of the roles we fill out. If what we are is defined by what we do, then it should be viable to recognize and judge people in terms of their actions. However, viewing ourselves only in terms of possibilities is actually a

reduced version of the first-person subject of Dasein. Putting Dasein in terms of what it can do makes it seem as if we'll be fine as long as we keep in motion. However, even this isn't safe from 'falling.' Mistaking the hustle of constantly attending to things one after another as living a genuine life is also something to watch out for. The motion directed by the they "constantly tears the understanding away from the projecting of authentic possibilities, and into the tranquilized supposition that it possesses everything, or that everything is within its reach" (Heidegger 223) The authentic possibilities are to be explained soon, but the basic reality is that only a certain number of possibilities can be mine; constantly being in motion and thinking that everything is within reach equals being 'uprooted' from my owned possibilities. We have to be careful not to lose sight of what is mine and owned.

**C) The they-self stresses the shared present and prompts Dasein to disregard its temporality.** Another problem of the they-self, one that isn't as explicitly described, is how the they-self reduces Dasein to actions, and therefore to the present. This is to be distinguished from how discourse makes us think in PAH terms and not RTH. The phenomenon here is that, while the present actions take importance, the they-self leads Dasein to forget both its past and future. "In that with which we concern ourselves environmentally the Others are encountered as what they are; they *are* what they do." (Heidegger 163) The Others which we are as well are reduced to mere actions in the present. Making everything present-at-hand (as discourse described in b) does) strips away the division between having been(past), present, and the anticipating (future). The present becomes a shared time that's constant for everyone, when in fact individual Dasein would each experience it differently considering that it has different pasts and chooses different futures. "The average everydayness of concern becomes blind to its possibilities, and tranquilizes

itself with that which is merely 'actual.'" (Heidegger 239) The everyday self of Dasein

tranquilizes precisely because it reduces Dasein to present actions. Dasein is disburdened from

its continuous work of interpreting the past and anticipating its future when it is the everyday

they-self. "The Self of everyday Dasein is the *they-self*, which we distinguish from the *authentic*

*Self*—that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way." (Heidegger 167). By

being the everyday go-to, the they-self diminishes the personal dimension to Dasein's

temporality.

These problems all point to the everyday they-self covering up possibilities available to

Dasein by levelling everything down to the same standards. Others influence our actions,

discourse makes everything seem present-at-hand, and the shared present makes us disregard our

past and future. 'Falling' is the direction we're pushed toward in everyday Being-in-the-world.

Wrapped up in what it is doing and having access to the conventional understanding of the world

around it, Dasein tends to go with the flow. This is a loss because we are giving up the ability to

delve into things in our own manner, bringing in both our pasts and futures to an authentic way

of living.

The tricky thing about authenticity is that it is hard to define except in terms of negation.

Even as we explore the individual aspect of Dasein, (how it sees, understands, and owns its

possibilities) Dasein still remains public. Understanding can be either inauthentic or authentic,

but the Dasein is always linked to and in the world. "*Authentic* existence is not something which

floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such

everydayness is seized upon." (Heidegger 224) Authenticity involves building off inauthenticity and individualizing this intitually public self.

So how is the authentic self different from the they-self? Heidegger distinguishes the two by bringing in ownedness. To put it short, the authentic self is owned by me while the they-self is owned by noone. The problem with the they-self is that it levels down all possibilities and blurs the boundary between what is mine and what isn't. Death, or rather awareness of our own mortality, helps recognize our finite number of possibilities. The authentic self of Dasein recognizes its ownmost possibilities among the generalized ones by accepting its death as the uttermost possibility.

Heidegger describes what this might look like by zeroing in on 'anxiety.' Anxiety is usually dismissed as a passing mood that distracts from tasks. It's seen as a weakness, or even meaningless since it is counterproductive. There is no place for it in the world of continuous tasks—but this is the viewpoint set up by the 'they.' It is comfortable to take up this attitude because the they-self sweeps us up into unquestioned belonging. As we perform the roles given to us, the familiar setting and familiar routines embed us in the world, bringing a tranquilized assurance. Anxiety is a step back from this state. It puts the familiar in a different light and reveals that my role was just that, a role. In this state we are the opposite of comfortable. We are brought to the sheer uncanniness of the situation we find ourselves in.

While anxiety is ultimately to be tied to the recognition of our own death, it is not just fear of an upcoming event; "Anxiety 'does not know' what that in the face of which it is anxious is….What oppresses us is not this or that, [but] rather the *possibility* of ready-to-hand in general; that is to say, it is the world itself." (Heidegger 231) Anxiety can't be traced to just a single event

we are afraid of; it's a basic state that comes with Being-in-the-world itself. Before the totality of involvements, we are aware of ourselves as an existence that can be other than the way it is. In anxiety we are torn away from the familiar absorption in the world and thrown back into ourselves. Dasein comes "face-to-face with itself as Being-in-the-world" (Heidegger 238) It's not just an event in the world that scares us, but our existence itself that brings about anxiety. This is the key to individualizing Dasein that is initially factical and public. Anxiety "brings Dasein face to face with its *Being-free* for the authenticity of its Being." (Heidegger 237) We are pulled from the tasks that we thought defined us and prompted to look at our existence that arches over everything and at the uncomfortable freedom we prefer to ignore.

The freedom is heavy because our impending death adds a definite weight in adopting something in a limited scope. This gravity comes from facing our own death. We have to be careful to distinguish death from the interpretation the tranquilizing 'they' provides. In the 'they', Death usually gets converted into an instance of death, just something that marks the end of life. For the individual Dasein, however, death is not just a public occurrence but a possibility that is mine from the start. We are born into dying, and this possibility has always been mine. The same way anxiety is anxiety before our existence as a whole and not just a single event, death is an existential condition, a sure possibility that is ours from the very beginning.

Death individualizes Dasein because it is "non-relational." No one can be my representative for my death. (Heidegger 308) Realizing that the people we live for will not save us from our impending demise reveals the basic state of Dasein's being-in-the-world. It frees us from blind participation. "When...one becomes free *for* one's own death, … one is liberated in such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand and choose among the factical

possibilities lying ahead of that possibility which is not to be outstripped." (Heidegger 308) With its particular relationship to time in that it is a termination of Dasein's possibilities, and that it cannot be outstripped, death colors all other possibilities for the Dasein. Death is certain and hangs over every moment. It is my ownmost possibility, and recognizing this grand prospect that arches over every other possibility we take up is the key to becoming authentic. Facing up to our mortality will liberate us from the trivialities of the 'they.'

We pause from the analysis on death to insert a reminder that the 'they' is actually inevitable, and that the authentic self can't be detached from the world. What we are working on here is individualizing the self that is initially relational and public. For Dasein, there are still roles to fulfill. The authentic self involves choosing between these public possibilities. The three main problems listed on the 'they' were: a) the they-self dictates what to do, b) it makes us think we own all possibilities when in fact we don't own our own, and c) it stresses the shared present over our temporality. Notice that the authentic self has nothing to do with retreating from the world the way a Cartesian thinking Being might. Heidegger's authentic self contrasts from the they-self because Dasein a) is aware that it tends to do what the 'they' dictates, b) realizes there's only a finite number of possibilities for it and not the infinite PAH array in discourse, and c) recognizes its temporality beyond the stressed present. Here we zero in on c) to explore what our temporality is.

Before our own death, our past and future matter as much as our present. Before Others there is only the present, dominated by discourse and the tasks to be done. Authenticity involves tracking the Dasein through time and owning both past and future possibilities as well as the present.

This is confusing to wrap our minds around because Dasein is constantly open to future possibilities as long as it exists. It's not like we can have a satisfying bundle once it is topped off by death when we won't exist after death. There will always be future possibilities as long as we exist, but how can these future possibilities be owned if they haven't happened yet? To answer how Dasein can be whole, Heidegger brings in the example of a ripening fruit. The fruit may not be ripe yet, but both the unripenss and the ripeness of the fruit are constituents of the fruit's being with the same importance. Dasein is similar to a ripening fruit in that it is headed toward a future that it isn't yet. Even if the future hasn't come, this 'not-yet' is still something constitutive for Dasien. "Just as Dasein *is* already its "not-yet", and is its "not-yet" constantly as long as it is, it *is* already its end too. The "ending" which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein's Being-at-an-end, but a *Being-towards-the-end*." (Heidegger 289) The difference between the fruit and Dasein is that the ripe fruit fulfills its ripeness in the end while Dasein gets itself taken away once it ends. For Dasein, ending has to have a different meaning. 'Ending' for Dasein refers not to the period at the very end of its timeline, but to the continuous motion towards the end. Dasein can be whole when, instead of merely waiting for a future possibility to come, it actively takes up the motion towards it; this motion can encompass all in every moment. Dasein can be whole because it is a Being-towards-its-end. It *is* already its end.

Dasein is still very much factical. We are still what we do. It's true that Dasein can be represented by an Other within a range of environment, the way a student can be represented as a student of the same school because they are defined by their roles in a given setting. For the whole Dasein, however, it's a different story. The "coming-to-an-end implies a mode of Being in which the particular Dasein simply cannot be represented by someone else." (Heidegger 286) No

one can be my representative for my death. In the same vein, no one can be my representative in this process I am in towards death, the '*Being-towards-the-end*.' When Dasein stands before its being-towards-the-end, "it has been fully assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being … all its relation to any other Dasein have been undone." (Heidegger 294) Standing before this ownmost possibility undoes the normally unquestioned relationships to the 'they.' It makes Dasein not at home, but also able to look at Being-there afresh. The only issue for Dasein in this state is Being-there, its ownmost and uttermost possibility. "Thus death reveals itself as that *possibility* which *is one's ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped.*" (Heidegger 294) Being before death is mine, non-relational, and something that cannot be escaped.

Understanding the authentic self (as opposed to the fallen they-self) involves a shift from recognizing RTH tasks (from PAH) to recognizing our temporality. Inauthenticity and authenticity is distinguished by whether we take our temporality into account. We can spell out the difference between the two modes in regards to time by examining the internal change anxiety brings about. Anxiety reveals that:

-my own existence is an issue to me, and I have to choose. (future)

-I already have an identity and settings that I am familiar with. I will have to exist on the basis of what I already am. (having a past)

-I am normally absorbed in daily tasks, oblivious to my future/having a past. Being-at-home amid entities is our usual way of present. (present)[1]

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[1] Reference Polt 99

Through anxiety we realize our usual state in inauthenticity. We realize that we usually forget the past, get absorbed in the present, and simply await the future. The authentic self, on the other hand, retrieves the past, has this moment of vision in the present, and actively chooses its future. The authentic self does not isolate us from the RTH world of involvement, but instead makes it an urgent problem for us. What differentiates it from the involved inauthentic self is that it ties in the bundle of our possibilities better. This is the way to being aware of and owning the limited number of possibilities before our death.

The 'owning' factor is internal. The psychological aspect may be confusing to fit in with Heidegger's world view where RTH tasks and factical Dasein take priority. The question of Heidegger's authenticity is still in discussion today, but for the purposes of wrapping up this rough binary between the authentic and the inauthentic self, we can touch briefly on how authenticity would look to the outside eye. Heidegger reminds us constantly that authenticity "does not detach Dasein from its world" or makes it a "free-floating "I"," but instead "brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand." (Heidegger 344) Instead of taking radical actions or retreating to one's own mind, the authentic self shows up in a more active participation of the same activities as the inauthentic self. The factical world stays the same for Dasein. "The 'world' which is ready-to-hand does not become another one...nor does the circle of Others get exchanged for a new one." However, with the revelation from the authentic self, we can perform "[our] Being towards the ready-to-hand understandingly and concernedly, and [our] solicitous Being with Others are now given a definite character in terms of their ownmost potentiality-for-Being-their-Selves." (Heidegger 344) If we apply this model to

the student example, the person realizes that the student identity does not define him/her. Instead, s/he decides what s/he will get out of this role of being a student, and returns to the usual duties as a choice and not a mere routine. (reference Polt 99) The authentic mode fits into the everyday inauthentic mode by owning the possibilities within our scope.

We spend more time in the everyday they-self because routines and passing interests are easier than committing to choices on who we are. The way the world is interconnected with RTH tasks, possibilities are linked to the 'they.' However, when we stand before our own death and the possibility of coming-to-an-end, we are able to individualize ourselves from the 'they' and take a fresh look at what we are doing. This state of not being at home is more primordial than the tranquilizing being at home with the 'they' because we can never depend on an unshakeable foundation from the world. The only thing that is real and certain for me is that I am headed towards my death. The way RTH is closer to Dasein than PAH, the authentic self is closer than the inauthentic self because it deals with our uttermost possibility of Dasein, Being-there.

Summarizing the First Section

To get at Heidegger's authenticity, we have looked at two binaries.

❏ The first binary (**RTH vs. PAH**) explains the world and enlightens us on possibilities.

For Heidegger, Dasein is temporal and is made up of possibilities in the world.

*"We have Interpreted the world ontologically by going through what is ready-to-hand*

*within-the-world; and this Interpretation has been put first, because Dasein, in its everydayness*

*(with regard to which Dasein remains a constant theme for study) not only is in a world but*

*comports itself towards that world with one predominant kind of Being." (Heidegger 149)*

❏ The second binary (**They-self vs Authentic Sel**f) explains how we can own the select

few number of possibilities that belong to us, instead of letting our possibilities bleed into

the 'they.'

Because Dasein is made up of possibilities in the world, which includes other Dasein, it can't

help but get caught up in the 'they.' This can cloud the view on its ownmost possibility before

death.

*Dasein is the possibility of Being-free for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Its Being-possible*

*is transparent to itself in different possible ways and degrees. (Heidegger 183)*

❏ The two binaries reveal Heidegger's path for authenticity as figuring out what we should

own and how to own them (my possibilities within the world).

The relational constituents (RTH) of Dasein are prior to PAH that interferes with its possibilities, which makes Being-with-Others in the world equiprimordial for Dasein. Another element that can drown out the possibilities is the "they," since anticipating the possibility of death, which the "they" blocks out, is needed for authentic possibilities. Being-with-Others is pruned down to Being-with-Others-Authentically because the former drowns certain possibilities. Infinity is nowhere in the picture for the Dasein that is fundamentally embedded in time. Heidegger argues for the authentic self, first by contrasting RTH from PAH to find Being-with-Others, then by contrasting the authentic self from the they-self within time (Being-with-Others in the world) to reach the final authenticity where Dasein is liberated and all possibilities are heightened. The final stage is Being-with-Others-Authentically in light of death.

The second section of this paper will be on time. In this view where the world is made up of relations that Dasein owns, there would have to be a modification to the objective Cartesian time for it to fit in with the two binaries for authenticity. The second section will discuss Dasein's temporality and how it can be a reframing of time.

## Section 2 Authenticity and Time

Note: This section aims to structure a view on temporality that resolves the contradiction of the two binaries in regard to time. The account on temporality also happens to be Heidegger's main thesis in *Being and Time*: it is the basis for Being and our understanding of it.

There is not enough space in this paper to properly go over the psychological and phenomenal aspects of the authentic self under this new account of time. It might be unsatisfying not to explore them, especially since the second binary (authentic self vs. the they-self) depends heavily on relatable psychological conditions for coherence. However, there are too many questions surrounding the authentic self to properly explore them all. In this section we will focus specifically on temporality, with the same goal of coherence as the first section. There will be parts where the language comes off strong, since Heidegger does explicitly claim that his account of temporality is primordial. This paper will first explain the account on temporality that will make the previous accounts (from the two binaries) coherent and address the concerns surrounding this new account. Only after the account is made coherent will we then provide possible reasons to take up this entire view.

Structural overview

Heidegger's interpretation of human beings as initially relational beings, whose social mode is an indispensable constituent of its being in the world, connects them more profoundly to

the world and other people than the Cartesian essence or Kant's transcendental soul. In the structure set by the two binaries, we saw how the world is made up of possibilities and how we can own our finite number of possibilities. Facing our own Death allows us to be authentic. The two binaries involve accepting an account that is usually put down as merely subjective or contingent. RTH is prior to PAH, the authentic self more primordial than the inauthentic they-self. Overall, 'truth' and clarity for the individual (subjective) is valued over the so-called 'objective' that is backed up by universal consensus. Dasein's interpretation and perspective is the basis of the view. For clarification, we will refer to RTH and PAH as 'accounts', the entire picture of how they fit in (one being prior to another) as a 'view.' Heidegger's view doesn't deny the PAH account or the they-self the same way a Cartesian view might dismiss the RTH account or the subjective. Heidegger's view acknowledges the accounts as an understanding we may refer to; however, his view clearly puts the accounts in a hierarchy. The RTH is prior to PAH, and the authentic self is more primordial than the they-self.

Strictly speaking, there is no strong reason yet to take up this view, aside from its coherence. As mentioned earlier, it is hard to make Heidegger's phenomenal interpretation argumentative. What reasons are there, then, for its validity? We can roughly list three: 1) it is coherent, 2) it creates a holistic picture that incorporates other accounts, and 3) it makes sense psychologically for us as Daseins. We will primarily focus on the first reason, the coherency, as we further clarify Heidegger's view with his particular account of temporality. By discussing Heidegger's temporality, we will see that this account resolves the contradiction and makes the overall view coherent. Admittedly, the coherency would not amount up to an invalidation of the Cartesian view, however compelling the description. There is no strong argument that would

convince a strict Cartesian to take up this view, which is unfortunately so because the starting

premises and priorities are completely different in the two views. The best we can do for now is

1) make Heidegger's view as coherent as possible 2) address the different accounts and see how

it fits in with the view, and 3) see that it makes sense psychologically.


Temporality as the underlying assumption of the two binaries


There is a contradiction in the two binaries regarding time that prevents Heidegger's view

from being coherent just yet. Even as we were going over the authentic self, we tripped over

terms such as 'non-relational' and 'across time.' The authentic self was established as

owning—or individualizing—an initially public and factical self by owning the bundle of

possibilities before its own death. Despite the emphasis on how this self isn't a detachment from

the world (see page 20), there still remains the fact that 'owning' is internal. Also, when we are

assigned to our ownmost potentiality-for-Being, "all [our] relation to any other Dasein [is]

undone." (Heidegger 294) While this quote helped clarify how standing before our ownmost

possibility undoes the normally unquestioned relationships to the 'they,' this seems counter to

the Being-in-the-world we established through the RTH vs. PAH binary. The ownmost

possibility of death analysis made sense in the way we were able to own our possibilities, but

there are multiple elements that run counter to what was established in the first binary. There are

looming questions such as: how can the authentic self deal with a non relational possibility or

perform something internal such as 'owning' when such detachedness was dismissed as the

PAH? What is the difference between the nonrelational PAH and the self that breaks its relations to Others? How can the authentic self still be viewed in terms of possibilities, or cases in the world, when there seems to be another function that ties the bundle of possibilities across time?

We can cull these questions into a pointed statement on how two binaries are a contradiction to each other. PAH is inferior to RTH and further away from Dasein's Being because it is a) less involved in time, and b) non relational. However, the authentic self or the ownmost possibility of Death is also a) less absorbed in the present and is b) non relational. The unpreferred ends of the two binaries have conflicting notions of time and relation. Granted, the authentic self is not 'less' involved in the present, but it is still true that it is just as concerned with the 'past' and the future,' which runs counter to RTH tasks in the present. How can the two binaries be reconciled with each other with such conflicting notions?

In order to resolve this, we need to look directly at the underlying basis for the two binaries that we naturally assumed: time (temporality). This is important to go over because Heidegger claims that we are radically temporal. Heidegger states from the beginning that "temporality [is] the meaning of the Being of that entity which we call "Dasein." (Heidegger 38) The analysis on Dasein shows that the structural totality of Dasein's Being needs temporality to become existentially intelligible. This will be clarified in the coming paragraphs, but Heidegger's ultimate conclusion is that temporality rises out of us as a structure of our Being.

Taking a careful look at both binaries will reveal the underlying assumption that time is the basis for both. We will start off with the first binary. What distinguishes the RTH and PAH entities is whether they are involved or not. When Heidegger illuminates PAH as the secondary interpretation, he puts forward tasks as the bridge between the entities and the self. Because the

RTH tasks are what closer to Dasein, and PAH appears in the lack of engagement, PAH is depicted as a secondary construct. This opposes the usually unquestioned Cartesian account of independent objects with properties. What we haven't touched on in the first section is how time is the distinguishing factor. When the relational is emphasized, time is brought into the equation. The PAH entities, with properties that can be owned even if they aren't acted out, don't strictly need time to exist. The RTH tasks, however, do. If the hands-on use and engagement (that turns even the PAH account into a tool) is to make up the world, they need to be performed—which means that time is necessary as a horizon for tasks. We note here that we work with an implicit understanding of linear time. This understanding has not been clarified yet. What we see for now is that our implicit understanding of time, or of performing for the task, is linked to RTH tasks while Dasein has 'no time' for PAH. (Heidegger 220) When we bring the relational structure as the essence, time becomes the distinguishing factor. Simply put, RTH needs tasks. Tasks need time. Time needed as the horizon both for the distinction between RTH and PAH and for the view that the RTH account is prior to PAH.

Time is more explicitly involved in the second binary (authentic self vs. the they-self) through notions of past, present, and future. Since the they-self leads Dasein to forget both its past and future, the they-self was described as a loss for Dasein the same way PAH was a loss of meaning through context. 'Falling' is in the present; the 'they' reduces the present Dasein to actions for tasks. Discourse makes everything present-at-hand to the understanding and strips away the division between the past and future, which are what would individualize Dasein. It is only before our own death that we take up our authentic temporality again. Because authenticity is about owning the right possibilities, we need to be on guard against the they-self that forgets

the possibilities linked to the past and future. The two modes of temporality of the inauthentic and authentic self are expressed as this:

|  | Past | Present | Future |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inauthentic | Having forgotten | making-present | awaiting |
| Authentic | Repetition (retrieval) | Moment of vision | anticipation |

The inauthentic self, involved in the present tasks, forgets its past and how it relates to the task as a possibility. Because it understands itself in terms of what it does, the future is turned into simply awaiting results of its actions in the present. The inauthentic self is an "awaiting" which "forgets and makes present." (Heidegger 389) The authentic self, on the other hand, is well aware of its ownmost possibility that carries it toward death. The possibility is overarching; the self has been and is still in the process. That is why in "the moment of vision," (Heidegger 387) Dasein is torn away from everyday objects of its concern and sees how it is situated in between its birth and death. The "never-dwelling-anywhere" that is the characteristic of falling (see page 15) is changed into authentic being-there. Like this, time, or temporality, is used as the distinguishing factor for the second binary.

We took a look at the two binaries and saw that both needed time to distinguish between the two accounts and to establish one as prior. We also saw that there are two temporalities, each associated with the authentic and the inauthentic self respectively. Now the problem can be made clearer: The inauthentic self in the present is fully ready-to-hand, and involved with Others. This

comes from Dasein's basic structure of Being-in-the-world. How is the authentic self different from PAH when what delineates PAH is being detached from Others (non relational) and having a presence that doesn't depend on tasks within time? We can organize the accounts (RTH, PAH, authentic self, and the they-self) as the following:

-Takes up time in the present, involved in tasks: RTH, Inauthentic self with the 'they'

-New account of temporality that recognizes possibilities beyond the present task , deals with the non relational possibility (death): Authentic self

-Non relational, "no time": PAH

From this we see that the difference between the authentic self and PAH lies in this new account of temporality.

Temporality and time has been cropping up as the basis, but we haven't looked at temporality itself. We have been using the usual notion that comes with the word 'time', which is the Cartesian notion of an objective linear time. As we explore temporality itself, we will see that this notion lands closer to the inauthentic temporality. We will first expand on our notion of time and flesh out the inauthentic temporality, which will reveal how it complicates the path towards authenticity. What will resolve the complication with the two binaries in regard to time and relation will be authentic temporality. Like the previous binaries, Dasien works with both accounts (inauthentic and authentic temporality) in a hierarchy. Both inauthentic and authentic temporalities exist, but authentic temporality will be clarified as prior. This will provide a solution for the contradiction stated above; Dasein's being would be connected to temporality itself, so there would be no need to worry about the tension between unity in the present (RTH) and unity across time (authentic self). The unity in Dasein comes prior to those notions of time

fragments. In Dasein's authentic temporality, the authentic self and the tasks fall in line with each other.

The following exposition on the two accounts of temporality and their hierarchy is tricky because PAH and RTH (nor authenticity over inauthenticity) have not been established as ontological truths for the world in this paper. Even though Heidegger sets them down as ontological truths, the accounts are still interpretations for the Dasein in our view because we have only established their coherence, not invalidated the opposing view. From a Cartesian point of view, they could still be dismissed as epistemological, not ontological. Therefore, when we talk about time, it is hard to make it a constant the way Cartesian space coordinates are a container for worldly objects. Even as we delineate the temporalities, the Cartesian would see it as a filtered perspective from a human being on objective time. We will still be expanding on the coherence for the coming discussion on temporality. Heidegger's view has Dasein as the base point. It is Dasein's care that formulates the world. The discussion of time will step away from the prevalent conception of it as an objective constant, and keep to the formulation of Being with Dasein as the base point.

Inauthentic and Authentic temporality

Although we have been using the terms present, future, and past, we have not yet asked what the terms really mean. When we think of time, we normally think of a timeline, where a

sequence of 'now's make up the points in the line. The present is typically thought of as a single moment we exist in, and the past and future as the points that are either behind or ahead of the present moment. It is on the basis of this objective time that is constant for everyone that we have been trying to organize the accounts on. However, this runs counter to Heidegger's overall goal of establishing Dasein's temporality as the basis of Being.

Our preconception of time is not the same as inauthentic temporality explained above, where Dasein forgets its past and awaits the future. However, Heidegger implies that in inauthenticity is the process of how this preconception came about. While the Cartesian account of objective time is not to be muddled with inauthentic temporality, (the former sets hard coordinates outside of Dasein and the latter is a mode of Being that Dasein is subject to) both are accounts we need to be on guard against. Heidegger says that this inauthentic account of temporality is an understandable phenomenon and an easy trap to fall into.

The time we are concerned with came about from having to accommodate for everyday tasks with Others. In acting out tasks, we direct ourselves toward time that is public, or somehow a sort of thing anyone can come across. Because the tasks involve Others, time has to be shared. This 'public time' is the kind of time in which entities within the world are encountered by the Dasein for tasks. These entities (that are not Dasein but are either RTH or PAH) are within time the same way they are within tasks. The everyday they-self awaits understands time in terms of daily work, and simply awaits whatever involvement that would come. Time is thought of in terms of what task is appropriate for it. Heidegger explains how this evolves into something public:

"This dating of things in terms of the heavenly body which sheds forth light and warmth, and in terms of its distinctive 'places' in the sky, is a way of assigning time which can be done in our Being with one another 'under the same sky,' and which can be done for 'Everyman' at any time in the same way, so that within certain limits everyone is proximally agreed upon it." (Heidegger 466)

Public time is formed by watching the days and nights go by, ordering the tasks accordingly, and realizing that the ordering is "under the same sky" and for "'everyman." The assigning of this public time itself can be agreed upon because it can be done at any moment by anyone. Because it is built upon the shared tasks in the world, it has a worldly character; it belongs to the world.

This public time is easily shifted into a collection of 'now's. Because it is public and available for anyone at any time, time is spread out into a numbered timeline with points of the same values. Instead of being interpreted in terms of appropriateness or inappropriateness like ready-to-hand tasks, "this time which is universally accessible in clocks is something that we come across as a *present-at-hand multiplicity of "nows*."" (Heidegger 470) The Cartesian account of objective time is similar to this time from clocks. The ordinary understanding shows time as a "sequence of "nows" which are constantly 'present-at-hand' … Time is understood as a succession [of "nows"]." (Heidegger 474) This account shears the significance of the 'now' that comes from appropriateness or inappropriateness. The 'nows' are supposed to be datable in relation to Dasein's tasks, but they become "shorn of these relations … they simply range themselves along after one another so as to make up the succession." (Heidegger 474) The clock-time makes the flow of time meaningless and empty; it is disconnected from human

concerns and simply becomes a container. "The sequence of "nows" is taken as something that is somehow present-at-hand." (Heidegger 475) In this way public time becomes something akin to a PAH concept.

We have not even touched on how this view of temporality lacks in the light of Dasein's structure with possibilities and care. The process of building this inauthentic account of time already shows that it is a modification from an 'original' temporality, a modification that is a loss for Dasein.

The clock-time can be thought of as the Cartesian account of objective time. In this view, time is a sequence of 'nows' that is endless on 'both sides'. The preceding and subsequent moments that arrange themselves on either side of the 'now' create a structure of a world that is independent to Dasein. The linear timeline is present-at-hand and something constant. This view only comes about when "the full phenomenon of the "now" has been covered up with regard to its datability, its worldhood, its spannedness, and its character of having a location of the same kind as Dasein's so that it has dwindled to an unrecognizable fragment … From this one infers that time *is* infinite." (Heidegger 476) While one might infer that the linear timeline is somehow realer than world-time because it is 'infinite' and more independent, Heidegger stresses that it only comes from a shearing of significance. The linear timeline is not fully independent but comes from a modification of something that is closer to Dasein. On top of it being a mutilation of Dasein's time, it is also a loss. "The Being which has been thrown and is alongside the ready-to-hand is grounded in temporality. Temporality is the reason for the clock." (Heidegger 466) Heidegger insists the clock-time (that can also be the Cartesian objective time) is not

radically independent of human life, or "more real"; instead, it arises out of Dasein's initial temporality.

This clock-time of the successive and abstract 'nows' also holds the danger of translating Dasein into something Present-at-hand. As possibilities within time, Dasein would turn into a mere collection of 'nows' if time is turned into PAH; it would deprive Dasein of the rich connections between the past, present, and future described in authentic temporality. Dasein does not simply run its course in time. It "can never establish itself as a fact which is present-at-hand, arising and passing away 'in the course of time', with a bit of it past already." (Heidegger 376) Dasein has to collect its past and carry itself into the future. In this account of clock-time, Dasein does not have to take up this function but can simply wait for the present-at-hand time to pass. The passivity and unawareness lands very close to the fallenness of the they-self Dasein has to beware of.

We saw that the inauthentic temporality (closely associated with the Cartesian objective time) actually stems from another temporality that is closer to Dasein. Even with the concept infinity, which is usually held up as prior, associated with the linear time, the concept is still lacking for the Dasein. The account is a modification to a temporality that is closer and more real to Dasein. We need to properly address authentic temporality to see what the original version of this modification is.

The sequence of 'nows' to represent the past, present, and the future does not work with the initial function of Dasein with the said terms. There already exists a function within the

Dasein that divides up the past, present and the future; the division arises from Dasein itself. These conceptions only come from the authentic way of understanding time, or, in other words, they come from Dasin that temporalizes. Authentic temporality requires moving away from the picture of an ordered sequence of time. Instead, there is no succession. "The future is not later than having been, and having-been is not earlier than the Present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in a process of having been." (Heidegger 401) We will bring in the chart of inauthentic and authentic temporality from earlier to clarify what this means.

|  | Past | Present | Future |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inauthentic | Having forgotten | making-present | awaiting |
| Authentic | Repetition (retrieval) | Moment of vision | anticipation |

While the inauthentic temporality depicts Dasein as passive to a PAH time, with Dasein forgetting its past moments and awaiting the new ones to come, the authentic temporality has a stronger unity between the three categories. Anticipation for the future requires that Dasein acknowledge the past as a constituent of who it is, because Dasein has to project itself into one of the options established by what it is thrown into. The present is also brought in as the "moment of vision" for this function.

"The character of "having been" arises from the future, and in such a way that the future

which "has been" (or better, which "is in the process of having been") releases from itself

the Present. This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as "temporality." Only in so far as Dasein has the definite character of temporality, is the [authentic self] possible for Dasein itself. Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care." (Heidegger 374)

Dasein's temporality itself is the unity "of a future which makes present in the process of having been." In anticipation of its own death, Dasein pulls away from the distractions of the they and focuses on meeting this ownmost possibility through 'having been.' Authentic temporality refers precisely to this movement that forms the basis of the past, present and future.

In this authentic temporality, the 'now' is different from an instance pulled from a linear timeline. Each moment for Dasein has to be unpacked using all three temporal 'ecstases' (a term for past, present, and future); in fact, even the word 'moment' is misleading. The future or past cannot be earlier or later than the present because they all happen at once. Dasein's function encompasses all three in a given 'moment'. We are already in the world as someone, and our strivings to be involve both our having been and our leaning into the future. Even as we take up a possibility (looking ahead to the future), we are constantly in the process of interpreting our past (past). The way the future is not a simple awaiting for an instance of 'now' to come pass but an active anticipation and therefore is different from the present, the past was not present, either. The past is our interpretation of what we are thrown into and why it matters to us. It is not a sequential past the way an earlier episode is in a tv series. For the authentic self, the past is not "bygone" but it is my "beenness." For example, the past-present-future dimensions I maintained as a child are completely different from what I refer to as my 'childhood' as a current college

student. The latter is a past I interpreted in light of my present, not the actual function of past-present-future that was the child-me. In this way, the past and future are clearly different from the present. Unlike the sequential 'nows' in linear time, the authentic temporality requires all three ecstases for a single case of Dasein's existence ('moment'). The ecstases are not a division that divides up objective time into numerical time in a clock, but are rather a function for the self that interprets Being. Time is not an entity but rather an ontological structure, a temporality for Dasein.

The obvious objection to the authentic temporality described above would be that we still experience time linearly. In our experience, one moment comes after the other at a constant rate, no matter the internal change we go through. Since time passes even as people await inauthentically, doesn't the movement mean that there is something outside of us that carries us forward? Also, how can this temporality be public and shared (basic state of being-in-the-world) when there is such an individual aspect to it? The answer to the first question would be that Dasein's temporality always faces the future; actions and being are always futural as long as Dasein exists. It is because of this that we experience time linearly. The linear and constant passage of time is a construct for the shared tasks that needs to be levelled down for everyone. The forward movement actually comes from within us even when we are in the inauthentic mode. The clock-time of inauthentic temporality is still useful in the way it allows us to organize events with other people, but it is not the author of the forward motion of time. The second question, on how authentic temporality can be public and shared, can be answered in the same way space was reconstructed as spatiality. (See page 9 and 10) Because the answer takes a similar structure and because there are other pressing matters for the discussion of temporality,

we won't delve too deep into this objection. The response to the objection has the same logic of spatiality being re-thought of in terms of relations and involvement so that it can still be the shared objective There won't be objective space-coordinates (time-coordinates), but space (time) can still be shared in terms of tasks.

The Cartesian objective time is much more familiar to us because it aligns the entities in a clear-cut frame. However, Heidegger aims to delineate authenticity, not provide a metaphysical account. In Heidegger's view, the inauthentic temporality (and the now-time) only seems like the default because we are prone to 'falling' and it is easier to be inauthentic than authentic. Time, however, "arises out of original temporality." (Heidegger 377) The preconception of time (clock-time) makes it out to be an abstract container for entities when in fact we pre-theoretically engage with it as an existing Being. Heidegger makes this hierarchy clear: "The ontological origin of the being of Dasein is not 'humbler' than what arises out of it; rather, it towers above the latter in power, and all 'arising out of' in the ontological field is degeneration." (Heidegger 383) Authentic temporality is the origin in which all conceptions of time arise from, and it is prior not only because it is closer to Dasein but because it has a higher order of Being. Heidegger tags the Cartesian objective time and other time concepts as "degeneration." Temporality is the meaning of Being for Dasein. (Heidegger 209)

So how is the contradiction between the two binaries resolved? Both the PAH and the authentic self was described as a) being non relational, and b) being less involved in time (present). This can be clarified with the new account of temporality. a) The PAH is non relational because it doesn't depend on involvement with other entities like the RTH. The authentic self is

non relational in a different way; the non relational undoes the relationships formed in the they-self to Others, but the authentic self is still very much composed of involvements. The authentic self is only non relational in terms of the levelled off 'present'. The authentic temporality which provides a unity across what is conceived as the PAH time allows involvements that may not be linked to the 'they' in the 'present.' The ownmost possibility of death is still very much involved in the world. b) Dasein has "no time" for PAH. This is constant in both the authentic and authentic temporality. The authentic is so called "less involved" in the present, but this is only in terms of inauthentic temporality, where the past and future are conceived as the same levelled-off 'now' in the present. In authentic temporality, however, the present itself takes on a different meaning. It encompasses Dasein's whole. With its past and future giving the present a fresh and deeper meaning, Dasein is actually very much involved in its present and its temporality.

In this way, the authentic temporality saves the authentic self from being accidentally categorized as PAH. Authentic temporality reveals that temporality is linked to Being itself. Dasein, which is the starting point for the whole analysis, "finds its meaning on temporality." (Heidegger 209) We did not get the chance to explore the psychological part of authentic temporality in this paper, but with it we have resolved the contradiction in the two binaries and gained a deeper insight into the underlying structure of Dasein.

<u>Reasons to accept this view</u>

Our main goal has been to make Heidegger's path toward authenticity coherent. Because the priority of authentic temporality to other notions of time takes on the finitude vs. infinity structure that is distinctive, we will expand on it a little before noting external reasons to accept Heidegger's view.

Instead of having infinity being the 'perfect whole' that is existentially prior to the 'contingent' finitude, Heidegger places primordial time in the *finite* (Heidegger 380). It was established earlier that the clock-time stretching infinitely is an abstracted, "degenerated" view in comparison to the original temporality. This is further supported by how time has a forward motion. In inauthentic temporality, time is taken as something that "already 'was' when a man 'came into life'." When Dasein falls into the 'they', it takes up this PAH account of temporality and mistakes that "it always has more time." (Heidegger 477) While the PAH account seems bigger than the contingent human existence, there is a phenomenon it doesn't account for: that time goes in one direction.

"Especially if one  looks exclusively at the stream of "nows," it is incomprehensible in itself why this sequence should not present itself in the reverse direction. The impossibility of this reversal has its basis in the way public time originates in temporality, the temporalizing of which is primarily futural and 'goes' to its end ecstatically in such a way that it 'is' already towards its end." (Heidegger 478)

Heidegger attributes the forward direction of linear time in the sequence of 'nows' to the authentic, primordial temporality that is the basis for this alienated PAH account of time. The forward direction comes from Dasein's structure of heading into the future. Dasein's temporality has to come first.

It is hard to simplify putting the finite before the infinite as valuing the subjective over objective because in Heidegger's view, the shared temporality in the world is neither. Time *is* the world; it is "more objective" than any possible object because it becomes "objectified in an ecstatico-horizonal manner as the condition for the possibility of entities within the world. … One comes across world-time just as immediately in the physical as in the psychical … 'Time' first shows itself in the sky." (Heidegger 471) Time is objective and shared because of the simple fact we encounter entities in the world. The in-the-world is only available with time, and objects themselves (such as stars or the passing sun) manifest time. World-time, moreover, is also "more subjective" than "any possible subject; for it is what makes possible the Being of the factically existing Self." (Heidegger 472) Terms such as 'objective' and 'subjective' can't be applied to temporality; "Time 'is' 'earlier' than any Subjectivity or Objectivity, because it presents the condition for the very possibility of this 'earlier.'"(Heidegger 472) This leads to such questions as whether time itself has any 'Being' if it is what makes Being possible. For now see how temporality can be taken as prior even to such concepts as 'objective' and 'subjective.'

In authenticity in finitud, we value the closer and realer over the concepts divorced of care. Temporality tied to our being. Heidegger's discussion on temporality goes beyond just establishing a priority between authentic and inauthentic temporality; it shows how time itself has to be earlier when radically analyzed in terms of Dasein's understanding. The priority of

temporality that comes from within us prevents Being from being independent to us. Our own temporality is what makes other things, which do not have the same sort of temporality, intelligible to us. Instead of having infinite time be structured from PAH entities, Heidegger establishes our authentic temporality as the basis of all Being.

There could be a worry that, however compelling the description of authenticity in finitude, it is still difficult for a strict Cartesian to take it up. There is no strong argument for taking Heidegger's view over the metaphysical view that establishes time as an independent factor from Dasein. Because the premises and the end goal of this other view is so different from Heidegger's goal of authenticity, reconciling the two views is extremely difficult. Best we could do for now is 1) make Heidegger's view as coherent as possible 2) address the different accounts and show how they fit in with the view, and 3) see that the view makes sense psychologically.

There is a leap from epistemological to ontological that prevents Heidegger's authenticity in finitude from being an argumentative view. We have focused on coherency as the leading point, but as we explained the view there surfaced other reasons to accept this view. First and the most obvious is the coherency. With temporality clarified in Heidegger's terms, the two binaries from the first section fit perfectly together. Second is that it takes other accounts into view. Heidegger's view on temporality explains how inauthentic notions such as the linear PAH time are built up from the original authentic temporality. The holistic account also grounds what may be dismissed as merely subjective, such as anxiety, as primordial. The third and final reason is that as Daseins ourselves, the view psychologically makes sense. Although we did not have the space to explore the relatable psychological aspects of the authentic self in temporality, we saw

coherence for the authentic self in finitude; this coherence is the most compelling aspect of

Heidegger's view.

**Conclusion**

The first section of this paper worked with the different accounts, with RTH and the authentic self being prior to PAH and the they-self. There was a contradiction with the two binaries that would have threatened the paper's thesis that Heidegger's view was coherent; temporality was brought into light to address this. Having the authentic temporality be prior to inauthentic temporality and other accounts of time resolves the problem and makes the hierarchy of all the previously mentioned accounts coherent. Authentic temporality is also closely tied to Heidegger's overall thesis that the Being of Dasein needs temporality to be existentially intelligible.

We did our best to make coherent Heidegger's view that aims to nudge us away from ancient ontology that works with thing-concepts. Dasein temporalizes its Being.

Additional thoughts

There are some limitations in this paper, both because we are working with language that pushes us toward PAH and because academic discourse prioritizes argumentative metaphysical accounts over phenomenological interpretations. What Heidegger advocates for is actually a nudge away from all this. Authenticity gets its fundamental unity and power from its temporality that is ultimately the ground for Being. This gives power to the individual. Heidegger's philosophy strives for an empowering authenticity that we have to find and own on our own.

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