Hidden Migration: Livelihoods, Identities and Citizenship: Malawians in the City of Durban

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DECLARATION

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hereby declare that this thesis entitled "Hidden Migration: Livelihoods, Identities and Citizenship: Malawians in the City of Durban" is the result of my own investigation and research and that it has not been submitted in any part or in full for any other degree or to any other University.



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ABSTRACT

Hidden Migration: Malawians in the City of Durban

This thesis is an investigation into the undocumented migration of Malawians to the city of Durban, and the influences on their livelihoods, identities and continued links to Malawi. In this context the thesis raises the issue of migration and citizenship. In the past Malawians were involved in contract migration system tightly controlled by the mining industry and the state, and in which their freedom of movement and association was circumscribed. This thesis argues that there is a new, emerging new form of migration, which may be termed transnational migration that has taken root since the early 1990s. It involves a web of links and networks created by transmigrants between Malawi and Durban. For a variety of reasons this transnational migration pattern is less visible, and largely hidden from the official gaze of the state.

The reasons for migrating to Durban are mainly, through not exclusively economic ones, that is, about creating a livelihood, or multiple livelihoods. Malawian migrants become enmeshed in a series of livelihood itineraries as part of the chain of migration from towns and villages en route to, and in Durban. In pursuing their livelihood itineraries they begin to use their networks and other resources such as their ethnic and religious identities, family and friendship ties, nationality, accumulated experiences, skills and entrepreneurship to insert themselves in the city, and in the process, seek, find or create work in both the formal and informal sectors of the local economy. In this context they develop a sense of belonging to and being part of the city and begin to institutionalise their presence, contributing in many ways, both socially and economically to the city. The thesis argues that their presence, practices, dispositions and accomplishments in the city of Durban, and continued links to Malawi raise pertinent issues around the question of citizenship and migration.

Keywords: undocumented migration; transnational migration, migrants; livelihoods; citizenship; identity.

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my wife Rooksana,
and children
Mikhael and Danyal
Without whose love and support
It would not have been finished.

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CHAPTER ONE
AFRICAN CONTINENTAL MIGRANTS IN THE CITY

The most striking thing about African cities is the sheer amount of work people are doing in order to eat. They are not sitting by. There is something going on, efforts being made to come up with new ways of earning a living, of helping each other out, and trying to make city survival a collective effort. Abdou Malique Simone

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This thesis is entitled "Hidden migration: Livelihoods, Identities and Citizenship: Malawians in the City of Durban". It is a paradoxical title, and, perhaps, even ambiguous and contradictory, for claims to identities, citizenship and entitlements to making a living is a very public encounter, yet as foreign migrants in this country this must be hidden. It is unlike the formal contract migration that prevailed in the mining industry in the past. There is a new form of migration that is less visible to the public gaze. This migration is hidden for a number of reasons. It is hidden because most of this migration is undocumented, that is, migrants entering into this country has not been documented at official entry points or international border posts, or that having entered into the country on a tourist visa, it expires and they become overstayers. Overstayers are in violation of their visa conditions. As undocumented migrants by law they should not be in any kind of employment. Whatever employment they find, such migrants would prefer it to remain opaque to the gaze of officialdom. As foreign migrants they also prefer to be unobtrusive than to be victims, or potential victims, of xenophobic attacks and discrimination. For these reasons it is better to be hidden away from the state's gaze, and to pursue various livelihood strategies in an unobtrusive way. This thesis is about these undocumented migrants. It is not about legal immigrants or contract migrants. It is about the temporary sojourners who come to Durban, or eThekwini Municipality as the current metropolitan municipality is now called, to find and engage in a variety of livelihood projects.

The subjects of this research are mainly undocumented migrants, yet they contribute in many ways as workers, entrepreneurs, as external agents of social change to the transformation of

the country. They are here out of necessity, but many would prefer to be in the towns and villages of Malawi. If their national identity is revealed, they become targets of suspicion. Yet many would profess to be law abiding citizens, and offer deep respect for a country that has a functioning system of laws and independent judiciary. They act as citizens, yet are treated as outsiders. They participate through making a living for themselves in the city of Durban yet have no public voice. Indeed they cannot, and perforce have to remain hidden. It is these ambiguities of foreign migrants lives, as they go about making their living out of 'temporary necessities'[1] that is explored in this thesis.

1.2 A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF MIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Migration of Africans into and within Southern Africa goes back centuries. This usually took the form of a search for new land for agricultural and pastoral purposes, as well as for trading. This kind of pre-colonial migration needs to be distinguished from migration that took place since colonial boundaries and states were created. At the very least immigration and migration in the modern era can be traced back at least 150 years to the beginning of diamond and gold mining.[2] In this sense immigration and migration into South Africa is not a new phenomenon. South Africa's industrial revolution over the last 150 years has significantly benefited from migrants from all parts of the world. Indeed it might be argued that without the migration of all manner of people with a diverse range of skills – from the highly skilled engineers and miners to the manual and unskilled labourers, the level of the development of South Africa's economy may not be what is today. One may note in passing that if the quality of the low-grade ore found in South Africa had been found in other colonial countries such as Canada, Australia or the United States it probably would have remained untapped, or mined at a very superficial level. It was the presence of a large unskilled workforce drawn from both within, and without the borders of modern day South Africa in a highly controlled way, and put to work under extreme exploitative conditions, that made a low-grade gold producing country

[1] I borrow this term from Maxine Reitzes' 1998 study of cross border migrants in Gauteng and North-West-Province.

[2] In the 19th century there was no state known as Republic of South Africa with its current borders. There were British colonies and Boer republics, and until the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, many African chiefdoms and states continued to exist as more or less autonomous political entities within the boundaries of these colonial states, or on their margins. An exception was Lesotho, which was never conquered but became a British protectorate.

into one of the world's largest producers[3]. Various scholars such as Legassick, Wolpe, and Johnstone have argued that it is the exploitation of cheap labour, a fundamental feature of South African's political economy, upon which the entire edifice of segregation and apartheid has been built. One fundamental element to the mining industry was the recruitment of foreign migrant labour from nearby countries – Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Swaziland. In the last few decades of the 20th century the mining industry began to see a decline. The demand for labour also fell, and hence too the need to recruit vast numbers foreign migrants from countries such as Malawi, Mozambique, and Lesotho. In any event as far as Malawian migration to the mines is concerned there was already a steady fall in demand for their labour since the early 1980s, and it had all but ceased in the late 1980s, hence the decline for foreign contract labour. But as we have already noted migration into South Africa has a long history of diverse forms. Migration and immigration into South Africa in the late 19th and 20th centuries took many forms ranging from contract migration as formalised in the mining industry to informal undocumented migration. In recent times, according to the media, it would appear that informal undocumented migration has been on the increase to the detriment of South Africa's development needs and plans.

But of course South Africa is a different place from the apartheid era. Its once tightly controlled borders are porous. There is no longer the controlled movement of labour through a battery of laws such as the Urban Areas Act, the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act, to name but a few. There is a constitution and a Bill of Human Rights that guarantee fundamental individual freedoms such as movement, association, free speech, and the right to own property. The momentous changes in South Africa as experienced in the last decade of the 20th century did not mean that migration suddenly ended. What then, is new about continental African migration to this new democratic South Africa? If one has to believe the media, some social scientists and certain pronouncements of politicians, it is that South Africa is swamped or flooded by foreigners coming from many more diverse countries as far afield as West Africa (e.g. Senegal, Ghana, Gabon, Cameroon, Nigeria, Mali etc), from East Africa (e.g. Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania), Central Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi) and Southern Africa (e.g. Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho). In the public view, fuelled by most media reports, and questionable

[3] Gold was mined in what is now the eastern part of South Africa in Limpopo province, in the pre-colonial era. This was long before the establishment of the Boer Republic of the Transvaal, and its subsequent annexation by the British.

assertions by politicians that all these migrants, immigrants and refugees are 'illegal aliens', 'illegals', and 'aliens' and more often than not involved in crime, taking away jobs from locals and a drain on the social and welfare services of the country. The veracity of these contentions is highly questionable as there are no reliable statistics either as a headcount, or as to what exactly are continental African skills, occupations, professions, or what exactly they do in South Africa to make a living. Nor is there much exploration in the public discourse as to why they are here, except to assume that they are criminals, or if not engaged in criminal activity, then they are stealing local women and frustrating locals by taking away jobs. In short they are undermining the social and economic fabric of South Africa. In any case undocumented migration is not susceptible to social science counting procedures, and as shall be argued in chapter four, it is difficult to research as to what exactly they do to make a living. In any event the outcome of most of these pronouncements in the mass media and by politicians is that anyone with a dark or black skin complexion and/or speaks and dresses differently is an 'alien', and consequently there has been a significant rise in xenophobia and racism since the early 1990s. The use of xenophobic and racist terms to describe anyone suspected of being non-South African is a somewhat ironic development in the post-apartheid period. In chapter four these issues of counting migrants and immigrants, of defining who is migrant, immigrant, or not, and what is the purpose of them being here in South Africa is further explored.

What is new about migration to South Africa is not just the decline in procurement of formal contract migrant labour for the mining industry by the Employment Bureau for Africa (TEBA), but that people arrive from all over Africa, and other parts of the world. That people from all over Africa come to South Africa is indicative of a number of macro processes underway that prompt these new waves of migration, such as flexible production – unregulated international free movement of capital and goods - and globalisation. Although my focus in this thesis is not on flexible production or globalisation per se, aspects of globalisation as it influences migration streams will be reviewed. I suggest that what is being witnessed now is a new form of migration – that of transnational migration, which simply means that migrants do not simply cross from a point of origin to a point of destination, but maintain a constant flow and influence through the networks and institutions they set up between two of more countries. In chapter three various theories are reviewed to explain some of these new waves of migration, such as transnationalism. It will be shown that a number of conditions have been set in motion for these streams of migration from the rest of Africa to

South Africa. The first sets of conditions are essentially push factors in the country or place of origin. Among this first set of push factors is political instability, prompting a stream of refugees. These are mainly from the civil wars and political problems experienced in various parts of Africa, but mainly in the Great Lakes region encompassing the countries of Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, but also from places such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria and Ivory Coast. Unlike other countries, South Africa does not have refugee camps, and so refugees, once they have affirmed their status with the Department of Home Affairs, are left very much on their own to fend for themselves. They may seek and accept employment or be self-employed within the confines of the law. The refugees, despite their official status, become like migrants – temporary sojourners seeking employment. In chapter four the issue of refugees as migrants is analysed. The second set of conditions is located in the myriad ways in which African economies have collapsed, either through structural adjustment programmes, or through inadequate or corrupt state administration and management, prompting a stream of people migrating to find new livelihood opportunities. This is not to suggest that every one in a particular country or state moves to seek new opportunities, but that there a sufficient number who make the decision to migrate, often in association with families or friends. These are economic migrants. Many of these choose to come to South Africa because they have heard or been exposed to the media that portrays it as a powerful economy with plenty of opportunities. For some such migrants, South Africa is their second or third choice of destination after Europe or the United States of America, because of the tightened immigration laws in Europe and restrictive conditions for emigrating to the USA, and the sheer expense and trouble of getting into such places. A third set of conditions is that some migrants simply seek to explore what conditions exist in the new South Africa. The miracle of democratic transition and continuing stability exerts a powerful attraction for African adventurers, professionals and entrepreneurs to seek out opportunities ranging from post-secondary school education, investment and employment opportunities in sectors such as universities, professional services, retail and manufacturing to acting as consultants to industry and government.

There is no doubt that there is a visible increase in continental migrants and immigrants in South Africa, particularly since the early 1990s, as will be shown in chapter four. This thesis is about those who come to South Africa not to work in the mines or to pursue their professional middle class careers and high flown entrepreneurial and investment visions but those migrants, who out of necessity and choice, come to South Africa, and in particular settle

in the eThekwini municipality. These are the poor, the underclass, the disadvantaged, the ones struck down by economic or political circumstances in their places of origin, who seek to pursue their livelihoods in another country which by comparison to their own, has vastly more economic opportunities, in their view, for recreating their sense of well being for themselves and their families. The emphasis in this thesis is not on the numbers that have come to South African or the xenophobia per se, but on their relative freedom and capacity to pursue livelihood strategies in a diverse set of circumstances. Given the changing condition in Southern Africa, and the continent as a whole in relation to macro processes mentioned above, these migrants are not just undocumented but represent a new and different kind of migration, that of transnational migration. This represents not just a political problem of defining who is or is not an 'alien', or migrant, and the emotive political consideration this invokes, but also a broader question of who is a citizen, by what criteria, and what rights and entitlements does it inhere into the itineraries, agendas, social interactions and practices of the migrants. For the purposes of this thesis it locates them not in any specific industry (as would the older contract form of migration), but within an urban context – the metropolitan city of Durban, or as it is now known, the eThekwini municipality, and the research focuses on a particular group of migrants in the municipality, Malawians.

1.3 THE CORE ISSUES

The city, once symbolised as the pre-eminent icon of modernity, has in recent years been replaced by an image of a place of sprawling inner-city decay, crime and anonymity. Often, as in the South African context, the evidence proffered for this representation of the city is its abandonment by its former residents. Associated with this is a sense of loss of identity, community, and rights to urban space. Migrants (and/or poor, and/or black) are often the symbolic representation of all the negative elements of the modern city. But a scientific assessment of the city lies not in these polar opposite ideal-types, but in the very ambiguities of the transitions of the 21st century city life, the image captured so evocatively in the quote above by Abdou Malique Simone. It is true that there is inner-city decay, and a host of associated social and economic problems, and those migrants perpetrate and are victims of some of the worst excesses of city life. It also evident that migrants arrive in the city with hardly a clear idea of what it is they are going to do to make a living in the city, except that somehow it must be better than what they left behind. Yet at the same time as they try to make a living in the city, incoming migrants appropriate it and change it, they bring new

vitality to urban existence and pose new challenges to local and city authorities in spheres such as providing services, housing, employment, markets and other public spaces. Migrants challenge existing regimes of regulations, and in their everyday practice offer glimpses of new worlds of the possible, thus raising new theoretical and practical challenges as citizens within a highly differentiated urban population, and challenge conceptualising the city as a place of productive capacity and inclusiveness.

The fact is that almost all Black people living in the city centre of Durban, and on its periphery are recent in-migrants, whether they are local migrants or foreign migrants. Given its history of white urban exclusivity until the abolition of apartheid legislation in the early 1990s, all people of colour were not allowed to stay in the city centre except if they were employed and working as domestic servants or in the hotel, tourist, harbour and associated industries. Currently most local and foreign African migrants are marginalized and poor, struggling to survive and adapt to a new, different and rapidly changing environment, where new issues have become the focus of public debate. These new issues relate not only to black and white relations race relations, but also to poverty, lack of employment opportunities, income generating activities, residence and housing rights, among other issues that affect the metropolitan municipality. In the main, many continental African foreign migrants are found in city centres because it is the only place where there are better opportunities for making a living and where they have access to resources to ensure a measure of protection. But Malawian migrants, as regional (Southern Africa) citizens have an ambiguous relationship with the centre-city, and the city at large. The city centre occupies the middle ground in a sense in the socio-spatial hierarchy that structures the life trajectories of different groups of people, between the townships and informal settlements on the one hand and the former white-only suburbs on the periphery on the other. But the city centre is actively contested by large sections of the established population across the different 'race' groups, who tend to consider foreign migrants, poor people and informal users of the city as illegitimate residents, unqualified to reside in a 'modern' urban environment and responsible for the grime and very high level of criminality. Some Malawians have abandoned this contested spatial terrain for residence and work on the periphery of the city, namely Mariannhill. This is where a substantial portion of the research for this project has taken place. This does not mean that some of the eThekwini's municipality's economic development policies, which tend to lead to a contestation between targeting affluent international consumption such as International Conference Centre, tourism, and the north pier and waterfront developments, and various

affluent 'gated communities', clashing with the presence of socio-economically marginalized groups of urban dwellers. It is just that those Malawians who have removed themselves or absented themselves from those contestations have found another way of making a living: hidden, but not absent from developments in the city.

For many foreign migrants, be they economic migrants or refugees and asylum seekers, the idea of coming to South Africa was attractive, not least because of the promises of the new government to make provision for the citizenry. But xenophobia and limited opportunities, the difficulty of accumulating some capital in order to re-start their lives, both here and back home, or send back remittances are at first a horrible shock. Expectations of plenitude, sympathy and solidarity, if ever present as is often the case with refugees/migrants having experienced other countries' refugee policies on the continent[4] are rapidly removed from their consciousness. But many, rather than return empty handed to their places of origin or move on to other pastures, stay and exploit whatever opportunities do exist. But such opportunities are not a supermarket shelf of commodities to choose from. They exist, but in highly prescribed and socially conceptualised ways. It is in this context that this research must be located.

1.4 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

This thesis raises three major issues.

1) The first is that continental African migrants take whatever opportunity presents itself beyond the immediate needs of securing accommodation and some form of means of survival. Those, like many of the Malawians, who move beyond welfare dependency, and overcome barriers of 'race', xenophobia, and skill and regulation disadvantages, appear to find strategies that enable them to secure their residence and livelihoods, including: the use of networks for accessing finance, information on jobs and other economic opportunities, mobilising social capital and family members to work in their enterprises, exploiting opportunities in state policies and procedures in areas like housing and utilities services provision, working for below legal minimum wages,

[4] For many refugees the camps that have been set up for them by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) are cauldrons of mal-administration, starvation, corruption, political infighting, boredom and death traps if you are perceived to be the wrong ethnic group or political supporter.

hard work (and long hours), overcoming xenophobia by employing local people in their enterprises, marrying local women and relying on religious solidarity to build links across race and ethnic lines.

2) The second is that migrants do build up a stake in the city, as they exploit the opportunities that it offers. This is not to deny that links or networks of links tie them to their places of origin. In some cases maintaining links to their places of origin is important not just to maintain family or village contact and to remit any surplus capital for investment, but also to recruit 'unfree' wage labour, or more finance, or both, and of course to maintain a sense of root and destination for their life. But while some migrants often see their initial situation as desperate and rely heavily on their networks and support of their fellow nationals, as well as welfare agencies and religious organisations to assist them in their needs, many migrants are forced to face the fact that they have to move beyond the expectation and dependency on handouts and welfare.

3) The third issue is that of citizenship as it flows from the very participation and predicaments that migrants experience in the city of Durban. Citizenship is a key institution in exploring the issue of inclusion in city life, as at its heart is the identification of belonging to place in which there is an assumption of participation in governance. Formal citizenship conceived in conventional terms means having the right to vote, being treated equally before the law, and having an entitlement to certain benefits of government supplied services. It also entails certain obligations such as paying taxes and to obeying the laws of the land. While this conception implies inclusion, there are certain ambiguities that need to be highlighted and explored further in the context of migrants' productive role and contribution to the city. There is usually the formal exclusion of immigrants and foreign migrants as citizens. Yet immigrants contribute to the city as workers, tax payers, family members, employers etc. in a particular place, develop a sense of belonging, yet are denied full political participation rights and basic rights. In South Africa while the constitution covers all people, certain rights are granted only to citizens. Most foreign migrants are excluded from citizenship, and therefore cannot participate in the political sphere at any level: national, provincial or local government. In cities such as Durban this affects them

directly as at that formal level they have no public defence against any challenges to their human rights and participation in the local economy and society.

These issues focus attention on the stake migrants carve out for themselves. This is the central point of analysis. It reduces the idea of 'victim' – temporary migrant sojourner, refugee, asylum seeker, retrenched worker or landless peasant – to the actual practices of migrants and the evolution of their particular strategies in response to overcoming the limitations and constraints in an urban environment to their advancing their livelihood strategies, and their claims to citizenship.

1.5 HYPOTHESES

This research problem may be put into a series of hypothesis.

1. The presence of undocumented Malawian migrants in Durban displays the characteristics of transnational migratory patterns.
2. The main push-pull factors in continental African migration to South Africa are not only economic, but are a complicated ensemble of economic and political circumstances.
3. The decision to migrate is often made at an individual and household level with the general aims of improving their general welfare (primarily income), accumulating savings and returning home.
4. Foreign migrants such as Malawians, despite the obstacles they face, find ways to create livelihood strategies.
5. Although migrants see themselves as temporary sojourners, they build up a stake in the city.
6. Participation in the social and economic life of the city entitles them to claim human and citizenship rights.
7. Current policies of the state are exclusionary and offer little or no protection to the defence of their interests

The significance of this study is that it approaches the study of undocumented foreign migrants in trying to unpack what it is that they actually do, and distinguish between macro economic and political events, which may be causally linked to migration patterns or streams,

and the actual lived empirical experience of migrants. Hence the study focuses very closely on how Malawian migrants experience the movement from the places of origin in towns and villages of Malawi to the streets of Durban and suburbs of eThekwini, and the implications this holds for concepts like citizenship.

1.6 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS

In chapter two I outline the research methods used to collect the data. These methods are: the literature review, observation, informal interviews and conversations, in-depth semi-structured interviews, and a social survey. I explain the social and political context in which the methods evolved, and emphasize the triangulation or multiple methods approach to collecting data. A primary consideration in collecting data was winning the trust of foreign African migrants, particularly those that are undocumented, in order to collect reliable data.

In chapter three I undertake a review of the literature with the aim of showing how these theories apply in an international context, and within South Africa. The emphasis is to draw on the international experience of migrants in the ways in which they cope with a new social and political environment, the use various strategies to make a living, particularly the connections and networks established both within the new place of destination, and the continued links with their places of origin. Coping here needs to be understood, not as a strategy limited to the duration of a crisis such as food or financial shortage, but to a series of strategies, or multiple strategies to secure livelihoods for multiple goals or purposes. A further issue that is reviewed is that of citizenship as a consequence of participation in the economy and society of Durban.

Chapter four reviews a selection of current literature on African continental migration to South Africa. The chapter analyses some of the debates on undocumented migration and immigration. A distinction is made between migrant and immigrant and the implication of this has for undocumented migrants in practice and in terms of current legislation. Other important issues considered are debates around how many such migrants there are, whether they displace local South Africans as regards employment prospects, and whether they see themselves as temporary or permanent migrant workers. This literature review covers some studies of foreign migrant informal street traders, and those in formal employment in the

construction and services sector of the economy, mostly in the city of Johannesburg, Gauteng and North-West provinces.

Chapter five introduces the case study of Malawians by providing a detailed demographic and statistical analysis of a number of variables drawn from the survey conducted. Variables such as age, gender, educational levels, income, employment history, including informal work, family and household structures and remittances are analysed. It also elicited information on the reasons for coming to Durban, (rather than say Johannesburg), their itineraries or step migratory process from Malawi to Durban, and giving an indication of the kind of networks or connections with people that assisted in providing accommodation and work. The survey shows some of the differentiation that is taking place among the Malawians migrants themselves, and the degree of identification with their places of origin, and Durban as a city, and South Africa in general.

The survey results are further analysed in chapter six in terms of the employment, unemployment and other work strategies that are pursued by the Malawians. The survey gives insights into the broad livelihood strategies and opportunities pursued, ranging from informal street trading, home based industries, such as tailoring, to trading in crafts and various commodities, and formal employment. The chapter also gives an insight into problems that they have or perceive to have such as xenophobia and lack of trading permits, and whether they will return to Malawi or not, and whether their return plans may or may not have changed.

Chapter seven provides a detailed analysis of the data collected from the in-depth interviews, and uses a number of individuals to illustrate the long historical connections that exist between Malawians and Durban, their contemporary relevance, and the specific ways in which the various individuals pursued their goals as a consequence of migrating to Durban. It also gives an indication of the use of multiple social identities that are used in the pursuit of these goals, and raises the issue of the permanence or temporary nature of their stay, their participation in the economy and society into which they have inserted themselves, and their sense of belonging and identification with local people across ethnic and race barriers. This chapter expands with greater depth, through the narratives of the various individuals, the sense of eThekwini (Durban) as a place of interactions and flows of human beings going about their daily lives as citizens or residents, and as transnational migrants.

Chapter eight takes up the question of citizenship through participation of the Malawians in the local economy of eThekwini and interest groups of which they are a part. This chapter revisits the concept of citizenship, outlines various models of citizenship, and its applicability to people who are involved in transnational migration. The chapter outlines the current legal and constitutional position of citizenship in South Africa, and identifies ambiguities with regard to citizenship and the bill of rights, and explores the tension between state centred territorialized based citizenship rights, and citizenship rights of migrants earned through participation, a sense of belonging and the defence (or lack) of their localised interests.

Chapter nine is the final chapter. This chapter provides a summary, synthesis and assessment of the findings. Its contribution to the study of migration in southern Africa, and to South Africa and Durban in particular, seeks to advance the debate on understanding continental African migration in an era of global transformation as it affects, and is influenced by developments in Southern African and the African continent as a whole.

1.7 LIMITATIONS

This is an empirical case study of a particular group of continental African migrants, Malawians, in the period mid 1999-2001. It is also by and large confined to Malawians from the south, mainly from the Mangochi district. As such it cannot claim to represent all foreign migrants in every respect. Yet the processes, events, itineraries, ways of insertion and making a living, while different from the way, for example refugees enter the country, also highlight similarities in the experiences of continental African migrants. Despite the limitations of studying a single group of African continental migrants, the ethnographic detail of this study, and the issues it raises should be seen as a contribution to the growing literature on contemporary migration processes in Africa, and southern Africa in particular.

CHAPTER TWO
RESEARCH METHODS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the research methods that were employed to collect the data for this research project. It describes the context of the research and the reasons for employing the methods. The most appropriate way of describing the methods employed in collecting the data is that it involved a triangulation of methods, or multiple methods of data collecting. Except for the social survey, these methods by and large involve what anthropologists call ethnography, or ethnographic fieldwork. The methods may be broadly categorised as qualitative and quantitative, and involved the use of the following:

- A literature review, including the use of secondary data and documents
- Conversations and meetings with groups of respondents
- Interviews, both formal and informal
- A social survey, and
- Participant and non-participation observation.

In the following sections the context of the research will be described as well as the location of the field – the places in which the fieldwork took place. A review of the advantages and limitations of multiple methods, or the triangulation of methods follows. Each method will in turn be described, as well as its advantages and limitations in the context of this research project.

2.2 THE CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH

This thesis flows out of a larger multi-national, multi-institutional research project, "Governance, Urban Dynamics, and Economic Development: A Comparative Analysis of the Metropoles of Durban, Abidjan and Marseille", funded largely by the Institut Français de Recherche pour le Development (IRD), Paris, and the National Research Foundation (NRF), Pretoria. The area of my concern in this project was migrants to the city of

Durban with particular reference to foreign migrants. Hence the subject of this thesis: Malawian migrants in the city of Durban.

Conducting research among foreign migrants, particularly continental African migrants, many of whom are undocumented, is fraught with difficulties. The first difficulty encountered was to allay the suspicions that migrants have of anyone who seemed interested in their lives. As it will be evident in the following chapters undocumented migrants or refugees, or asylum seekers, or simply legal immigrants in South African are very suspicious of researchers. This is not unreasonable given that they face many problems and difficulties ranging from finding accommodation and jobs to xenophobic attacks and harassment by police and other state officials. Xenophobic attacks are well documented and these range from verbal abuse to physical attacks that have led to injury, destruction of property and homicide. Given this scenario, it is extremely difficult for an outsider, such as this researcher, simply to expect migrants to provide information to satisfy the data collecting queries of a local South African researcher. Hence the subjects of the research were very suspicious of the researcher fearing that either I was a spy from the Department of Home Affairs or a police agent trying to infiltrate their community. This is not an unreasonable assumption given that there is a widespread public view, fed by media reports and politicians pronouncements, that foreigners are involved in crime and/or are a drain on society and therefore are unwelcome. (For an analysis of the myths and realities of xenophobia, and media reports on xenophobia, see Danso and McDonald, and McDonald et. al. 2001.) Winning their confidence took a considerable amount of time. In some cases six months and in others over a year. It required many meetings and conversations to reassure the migrants of my *bona fides*. During this time mainly informal discussions, informal interviews and observation (mainly non-participatory observation) was possible. While this 'entering the field' period yielded insights, these had to be crosschecked when the formal interviews and social survey was conducted. It did provide the basis for an ongoing relationship of trust that was built up over time.

The second problem that was encountered was the question of which research techniques to adopt as appropriate to the circumstances. There was no textbook approach that was

possible. Indeed as part of the larger project, some continental African migrants simply refused to participate in any form of social surveys, as was the case with the Senegalese and Congolese. Others would make appointments for interviews and not keep them, or simply say they were too busy to be interviewed. Re-scheduled interviews were often kept but at other times simply avoided. In the case of the Malawian migrants assurances of my *bona fides* was made easier by the fact that I was introduced by a colleague of Malawian descent from the University of Durban-Westville to the Malawian community among whom he lived. His attesting to my *bona fides*, and the fact that I was a Muslim and had a personal relationship with one or two local Islamic scholars greatly facilitated my entry into the world of the Malawian migrants. Yet there was hesitancy; the Malawians refused permission for any interview or conversation to be taped. Nevertheless this introduction by a colleague who came from the community assisted in beginning the process of formal interviews and conducting a survey much earlier than I anticipated (given the previous months experiences of the Senegalese, Congolese and local rural migrants). In the two years (mid-1999 to 2001) that the data collecting phase of this research was conducted the methods of research had to be adapted to the circumstances constantly.

A third issue was the location of the fieldwork research. The unquestioned assumption of fieldwork research is that it takes place in a defined bounded area, or among a clearly defined group of people. This research is not based on an understanding of research located in a particular spatially and territorially bounded area, such as a factory, or a block of apartments, a defined administrative neighbourhood or district, or a well defined ethnic (presumably homogenous) community. This was not the case for this research. This is not an entirely new phenomenon in immigration research, particularly on those matters that relate to culture and its reproduction in a new place or point of destination. But what is new is that these migrants, the Malawians in this case, evince not the certainty of departure and/or return, or immigrating from point of origin to point of settlement, but to a curious mix of local and non-localised elements and of constant movement across boundaries, national and within a locality in relation to creating a livelihood, often stretching from Durban to a town or village in Malawi. It also entailed

the crossing of metaphysical and symbolic boundaries of social and cultural transitions and translations. As Appadurai has commented on the general problem that ethnography or fieldwork must face in a globalised world:

> As groups migrate, regroup in new locations, reconstruct their histories and reconfigure their ethnic projects, the *ethno* in ethnography takes on a slippery, non-localized quality... The landscapes of group identity – the ethnoscapes – around the world are no longer familiar anthropological objects, insofar as groups are no longer tightly controlled territorialized, spatially bounded, historically unselfconscious, or culturally homogenous (1996: 44).

Such a view is apposite for this research. Nominally the research on the subject of Malawian migrants was located in three areas, namely, Mariannhill, Overport and the city centre. As critical life choices are made by migrants, the search for fixed points of reference can be frustrating, both for the subjects of research, and the researcher. Rather than only *habitus*, as Bourdieu puts it – the more or less tacitly reproduced ensemble of practices and arrangements to make sense of everyday life – there is space for conscious choice about what should or should not be done, what strategic relationships to undertake, create, and maintain, or tactics or stratagems to pursue in securing work or accommodation, and of course the justification, legitimation and representation regarding those choices. Methodologically this research used a variety of research techniques to capture this fluid quality of foreign migrants pursuing livelihood strategies in an urban area such as Durban.

2.3 COLLECTING THE DATA: A TRIANGULATION OF METHODS, USING MULTIPLE RESEARCH METHODS

2.3.1 Choosing the Research Tools

As indicated above, it is/ was the circumstances, and social and political context of continental African migrants daily lives and the research problem that dictated the adoption of the research methods and techniques. As Burgees, quoting Wax states:

> Strict and rigid adherence to any method, technique or doctrinaire position may, for the fieldworker, become like confinement in a cage. If he is lucky or a very cautious, a fieldworker may formulate a research problem so that he

> will find all the answers he needs within his cage. But if he finds himself in a field situation where he is limited by a particular method, theory, or technique he will do well to slip thorough the bars and try to find out what is really going on (Wax, 1971, quoted in Burgess, 1984)

This was certainly the case for this research. However, it still meant collecting data through a systematic use of a variety of techniques. Data may be conceived as any systematic collection of information to elucidate a particular research problem. Apart from the non-participatory observations and informal discussions and conversations, the primary techniques used were the literature review, including documents and legislation to sharpen the focus on the key issues and questions that needed to be addressed, and the use of interviews (in-depth formal and informal) and a social survey of the Malawian migrants. In short a combination of qualitative and quantitative research techniques were adopted for this research project.

2.3.2 Qualitative and Quantitative Research: Triangulation

As is evident from the above description of entry into the field, a number of research methods were adopted. These may be collectively and formally termed 'multiple research methods' (Burgess, 1984) or 'triangulation' (Bryman, n.d.; Gittins, n.d). Bryman defines triangulation as the

> Use of more than one approach to the investigation of a research problem in question in order to enhance confidence in the ensuing findings. Since much social research is founded on the use of a single research method and as such may suffer from the limitation associated with that method or from specific application of it, triangulation offers the prospect of enhanced confidence. Triangulation is one of several rationales for multimethod research. (n.d: 1)

The collections of such data may be conceived as falling within qualitative or quantitative methodological frameworks. Qualitative and quantitative research can be conceived as two distinct approaches to social research.

Qualitative data is often associated with participant and non-participant observation and semi-structured and unstructured interviews (such as in ethnography); focus group interviews; language and discourse analysis; and detailed analysis of texts (e.g. Leach's

analysis of biblical texts, Foucault's use of historical documents). Qualitative research methods tend to approach the study of society through the 'thick-description' of social and cultural contexts (e.g. Geertz), the situated, constructed and contingent character of society as the outcome of individuals and groups in interaction with one another, or as an unfolding process. Quantitative data collection is more associated with social surveys, that is, structured interviewing and questionnaires; structured observation and experimentation; analysis of official statistics and other 'hard' data sources and content analysis.

Both these approaches reveal different epistemological and theoretical positions. Quantitative research techniques reveal a concern with patterns, measurement, causality and generalisation, revealing its roots in positivist, natural science approaches to the study of society. Qualitative approaches, stated in very general and bald terms, reject the natural science model of society, and finds philosophical expression in, for example phenomenology, and theoretical positions in social science such as symbolic interactionalism, ethomethodology, transactionalism, interpretative, critical theory (e.g. Habermas), and Foucaultian approaches.

It has been advocated that despite these very different philosophical and theoretical approaches, it is the very strengths and weaknesses of both quantitative and qualitative techniques for data collection that can be fruitfully used (Bryman, 1995). It is their very limitations and strengths that make it possible for them to be integrated or interwoven to investigate particular research problems. Thus, for example, Bryman argues that quantitative data may reveal unexpected patterns, which may need to be followed by using in-depth interviewing of key informants, or to follow up initial survey research with detailed ethnographic studies. Conversely what appears to be specific and idiosyncratic in qualitative research may be part of wider and/or significant emerging patterns that may require further investigation to uncover the nature, extent and characteristics of the social phenomenon through the use of quantitative techniques. Such an approach also fits in with a grounded theory approach which moves back and forth between data collection and theory, although its emphasis is on building theoretical explanations in areas where

there is very little known of the topic, problem, or where new ideas can be tested (Gittins, n.d. 6-7).

2.3.3 Limitations and Advantages of Triangulation

The attraction of such a triangulation of methodological techniques is that the validity of findings can be stated with greater confidence. While this may be the major attraction of the multiple methods approach, it cannot be assumed that such a combination of methods is without its problems such as findings contradicting one another. The approaches are different, both philosophically and theoretically, and therefore will yield different insights, but which may not be comparable. But then it suggests that further research is required. Thus a pre-structured social survey interview schedule is designed as an instrument to elicit information on a one-to-one basis between interviewer and interviewee and to measure and count statistically to reveal patterns, whereas in-depth interviewing and observation elucidates insider perspectives, process and contexts. The data that results from this kind of research may not be comparable to data obtained by observation of public events or group interviews in which some participants may dominate, or in which individuals may hold back in expressing the opinions.

Yet as I have tried to show, there are advantages to using a combination of methods. The findings from one can be used to check the other, and adding richness and complexity to an inquiry (Bryman, n.d: 4). Qualitative data can be used to amplify the results of quantitative data. In this thesis the variable patterns of livelihood strategies of migrants in Durban drawn from the social survey is further amplified through illustrative case material drawn from in-depth interviews. Further more, the particular situation that a researcher finds himself, itself a product of particular social and political contexts, should not bind a researcher to a ruthless pursuit of a 'doomed to failure' research method.

The methodology employed for this project is a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research. The reasons for reliance on this mixed methodology are the difficulties encountered in the field as alluded to above, but also to collect first hand accounts of the reasons and decision making involved in migrating in the first place, and their

experiences as individuals and their interactions both among themselves, and with different actors such as state agencies and local South Africans in securing their livelihoods and integrating or assimilating themselves into a host society, or indeed, returning home. Such data, particularly biographical details, can be collected only by conducting in-depth interviews with a number of respondents (Lawson, 2000: 173-189, McHugh, 2000: 71-89). The quantitative data was needed to give a clear indication of the basic variables involved in trying to assess their capacity to make a success, or failure, of the migratory process. Such variables as skills, educational levels, size of household and families, income earned and remitted are important not only to illustrate the social composition of the migrants themselves, but also towards assessing how these were used as part of their livelihood strategies. This basic data, together with their strategies at being 'good' workers, employees and petty entrepreneurs, is needed to enhance our understanding of the entrainment or flows of Malawian migrants to Durban, the construction of their multiple, and often ambivalent, identities, their situational responses to the strictures imposed upon them in setting up livelihoods and the implications this holds for different models of citizenship.

Underlying such a research procedure is the assumption that migration is a flexible journey, and not the highly controlled contractual process as it was when thousands of Malawian migrants worked on the mines, and lived in tightly controlled compounds, during the apartheid period. Controlled migration by the state and mining industry migrant recruitment agency, TEBA (The Employment Bureau of Africa), circumscribed migrant's movements, and denied them their rights to freedom of movement and association. Those times are now past and very different circumstances prevail for foreign migrants. As a sub-set of residents in South Africa they were easily accounted for in surveys and census data in the past. As McHugh has argued, surveys, particularly census data, by their very nature circumscribe a class of human being termed 'migrants', but do not tell us much about the migration process, the circulation of migrants, nor do they reveal the 'lived experiences embedded within social-cultural' and political contexts. Following the example of Glick, Schiller et al (1994), among others, he advocates an ethnographic approach which seeks to capture migrations as a fluid process where

individuals and groups forge new connections, embracing networks of people across social fields and boundaries (2000: 72-3).

2.3.4 The ethnographic approach

Ethnography usually involves fieldwork among a people or institutions that are the subject of direct observation and participation in its or their activities over a period of time, usually a year. In its classic sense fieldwork involves living and working in a setting dissimilar from the researcher's on the assumption it aids in collecting data without prior assumptions and requires the suspension of prejudices and bias. Participation can be active or passive. Fieldwork involves obtaining data from observations, which lead to conversations, interviews (formal and informal/ structured, semi-structured and unstructured) with key informants. Ethnography does not eschew the collection of data through surveys or census type questionnaires, but this is considered as a part of the ensemble of methods that can be used in the fieldwork process. Nor does fieldwork exclude the use of documents or texts of various kinds ranging from religious texts to official statistics.

2.3.5 Observations, Conversations and Informal Interviews

Observation usually entails the ethnographer's gaze over the physical setting (the natural and built environment), the behaviour or social interaction of people, their particular activities as individuals or in groups, at work or at leisure as well as the symbolic manifestations of their behaviour. These observations are then discussed with the ethnographer's subjects or collaborators. All this provides crucial initial information on which questions are posed in the future. During this phase the emphasis is on gathering information through dialogue, rather than the extraction of data. This can then form the basis of semi-structured interviews with key informants and others, as well as inform the structure of a questionnaire based social survey.

In the case of this research entry into the field was a difficult process, but had the virtue of giving this researcher a considerable amount of time to observe migrants in a variety of settings, their actions and social interactions with various people, in both their places

of work and accommodation. This period also allowed for many conversations and informal interviews on the basis of the initial observations. All of these observations, conversations and informal interviews formed the basis of the more formal semi-structured and structured interviews. The last mentioned form of interviews constituted the social survey that was undertaken among the Malawian migrants.

2.3.6 Semi-Structured In-depth Interviews

As indicated above a number of informal interviews, conversations and observations were conducted throughout the two-year period of data collecting. This constituted part of the total database. However as indicated above not all of this could be used until it was tested against more formal interviews. Observations in itself can be a very rigid form of data. It is only when a question is asked about what is observed that it can meaningfully be said to constitute a relevant piece of information. During this time 13 formal interviews were conducted by this researcher with a range of Malawian migrants. This included interviews with **key informants**. Key informants are people who are said to have a particular insight or depth of knowledge of the topic under research. Key informants range from ordinary people to those who have specialist knowledge or people in power. These formal in-depth and key informant interviews usually lasted for between one and two hours. Some were longer, but only because there were constant interruptions during the interviews. These semi-structured interviews allowed for following up and exploring issues and problems at greater length than could be captured in a social survey. In certain cases, where it was possible, follow-up interviews were held between six months and a year later. These interviews form the basis of chapter 7. These interviews reveal the complex nature, not only of the decision to migrate but that of inserting oneself into a new society, finding accommodation and work, whether this is of an entrepreneurial nature or simply working for someone else, as well as decisions about family matters such as bringing one's family to Durban, to marry someone locally and dealing with a myriad of daily minutiae and larger issues such as xenophobia and potential police harassment.

2.3.7 The Social Survey:

These interviews, conversations and observations were complemented by a social survey of 119 Malawians living in Mariannhill, Overport and the city centre. A social survey is usually conducted in terms of a sample of a population, in this case the Malawian migrants living in Durban. Usually sampling techniques may be divided into probability and non-probability techniques. Probability techniques usually refer to the possibility of every element or characteristic of a population being included in the sample. It assumes a known clearly defined and bounded population. Conversely, non-probability sampling refers to the fact that some elements have little or no chance of being included in the sample. In the case of this research two important points must be noted. The total universe or population of Malawians living in Durban is unknown. Secondly, not every Malawian, even if they could be identified, is likely to submit to a process of interviewing. Therefore drawing a relevant and valid sample from the population was not possible. The sampling technique adopted for this research was based on snowballing, that is a non-probability technique. Hence no rigid method of selecting the probability of including every possible element or characteristic was possible. However, it is the view of this researcher that given the large number of respondents, from three different areas of the city, and that in terms of the actual sample a fair variety of age categories, incomes, skills, educational levels and types of occupations were uncovered, that a representative sample has been captured. Many of the results of this survey are consistent with the main characteristics of African or Asian migrants elsewhere, such as in Europe, evaluated in terms of variables such as age, the types of occupations engaged in, entrepreneurship and remittances (social capital). It is also possible to construe the results of the survey as confirming elements of the capital maximising and the 'myth of return' hypotheses.

The snowballing technique was conducted in stages. First, a number of respondents who had already been introduced and were known to the researcher were interviewed as part of beginning the survey. This was largely conducted in the Mariannhill area. Thereafter, with the assistance of a Malawian migrant with a post-high school qualification, a number of other migrants were interviewed. Sixty respondents were interviewed. In the second stage the survey moved location to Overport and the city centre. Here two

research assistants and the researcher were involved in identifying and interviewing the migrants. Thus it came to be that 119 respondents were interviewed. However in this second stage, on several occasions between September 2000 and December 2001 in the Overport and the city centre areas the survey process was held up because there were police raids, or the threat of such raids, which caused disruptions to migrants own lives, and they in turn treated with suspicion the purpose of the survey, which both disrupted its implementation and delayed completing it. This was so despite the fact one of the interviewers was a Malawian, and that many respondents had agreed in advance to be interviewed. Thus it took a considerable amount of time and effort to complete the second stage of the social survey, particularly in the city centre and Overport areas.

2.3.8 Administering the Questionnaire

The questionnaire was used to obtain basic biographical data and to systematically uncover a range of data on the movement of migrants (for example, the routes they followed to Durban), the structure of households and families, occupations, other income generating activities and the use of income, including remittances. The questionnaire consisted of both open-ended and closed questions.

The questionnaire was designed according to the objectives and hypotheses of the study, pre-tested and administered after the necessary corrections were completed. As mentioned above the questionnaire was administered by the researcher and two research assistants in face-to-face situations with the respondents. Interviews were conducted in English. All Malawian migrants speak good and in many cases very fluent English. No questionnaires were left to be filled-in by respondents themselves. Confidentiality of the information given by respondents was guaranteed, and this ensured that the respondents gave the appropriate answers and personal opinions of their experiences.

2.4 ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

Computer software programmes were used to handle all data. This ensured speed and accuracy of data analysis. In the case of the qualitative data the Nvivo software

programme was used. In the case of the quantitative data the software programmes SPSS and Microsoft Excel were used to produce a variety of descriptive statistics such as frequencies, percentages, averages, as well as cross-tabulations and graphs.

2.5 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

To achieve good quality data on foreign migration and immigration research in South Africa requires patience. No foreigner, especially from the continent of Africa, will readily submit to detailed questioning no matter how credible one's *bona fides* are. It is this that was the main problem encountered in the research – establishing *bona fides*, trust and guaranteeing anonymity in the reporting stage of the research. It is for this reason that all names of persons in this thesis are pseudonyms.

2.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter provided a social and political context in which to locate the research and the results as reported in this thesis. This indicated the problems encountered, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the chosen methods of collecting data. Both qualitative and quantitative methods were employed and it was shown that such methods are not inimical to ethnographic fieldwork. The social survey had to adopt a snowball technique for eliciting certain kinds of data, and in large measure this was confirmed by an analysis of the data that was yielded from the semi-structured in-depth interviews that were also undertaken. The in-depth interviews revealed the greater complexity and richness of life as an African continental migrant in the city of Durban. It is this complexity of migrants lives that needs to be appreciated, located theoretically (the subject of the next two chapters) and as their story unfolds in the following chapters the extraordinary practices of the daily lives of migrants as it contributes in a multiplicity of ways to their sense of well-being, belonging and to the general social fabric of life in Durban.

CHAPTER THREE
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON MIGRATION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The popular image of a migrant generally is a transient who comes only to work, whose stay is temporary and will eventually return home. The image of an immigrant is one who presents a permanent break, a physical and emotional rupture with his land or country of origin, and settles permanently in a new country. This distinction also finds its way into legislation, sometimes as in the case of South Africa, privileging definitions of immigrant, rather than migrant[1]. These terms as they are used in public and policy debates in the South African context are analysed in chapter four. Yet often these terms are used interchangeably, and sometimes do not reflect the reality. Migrants are the ones who are supposed to develop networks that extend from their village of towns of origin to their present places of settlement and work, while immigrants have a very loose (if not romanticised) connection to their places of origin. Today this might not be strictly true as immigrants who become permanent residents of another country retain their citizenship, and extend their contact and networks with their countries of origin, and play active roles in both their countries of origin and newly settled countries. Many a migrant may become a permanent resident, perhaps illegally, of the host country. All this suggests that perhaps the conceptions that we have inherited both historically and in the development of social science need revision to describe a new reality in understanding movements of people, immigrants and migrants, who interact across national boundaries in a multiplicity of ways, shaped in part by processes of globalisation and their reactions, but also by trying to shape the terms in which their reactions, responses and interactions are situated.

This review will not necessarily be a comprehensive overview, but a selective one which has as its main focus the following: the reasons for migration, what migrants do in the place of destination, including the process of incorporation or assimilation into host society, the emergence of a sense of belonging in their new environment and

[1] In chapter four I shall review the specific South African literature on this question of defining migrant and immigrant.

their continuing links with the place of origin. In the final section of the chapter, consideration is given to the literature on migration and citizenship. In order to assess the literature the chapter is divided into different sections: the macro approaches to migration, the meso-level and micro-level approaches. This is done to distinguish between macro- or global level factors that affect migration, and the actual decision making about migration made by individuals, groups, or households and the migratory processes.

3.2 HISTORICAL SKETCH Of EARLY MIGRATION THEORIES

3.2.1 Ravenstein's Laws of Migration

Ravenstein's laws of migration were first published in the last quarter of the 19th century. They were initially based on British, European and United States census data. He identified 11 major laws. These were as follows:

- The majority of migrants only go a short distance.
- Migration proceeds step by step.
- Migrants going long distances generally go by preference to one of the great centres of commerce or industry.
- Each current of migration produces a compensating counter current.
- Females are more migratory than males within the kingdom of their birth, but males more frequently venture beyond.
- Most migrants are adults: families rarely migrate out of their country of birth.
- Large towns grow more by migration than natural increase.
- Migration increases in volume as industries and commerce develop and transport improves.
- The major direction of migration is from the agricultural areas to centres of industry and commerce.
- The major causes of migration are economic.

Excluding the fifth point, Boyle, Halfacree and Robinson (1998: 60) comment that these laws are more or less accurate empirical observations for the 19th century, and many still apply today. However, these laws might today be more accurately employed as hypothesis for empirical investigation. I shall have occasion to comment

on the accuracy of some of Ravenstein's observations during the course of this thesis. For now, it should be noted that these observation or laws do not in any great detail explain the economic causes, nor do they explain the impact of migrants on the place of destination except to observe that large towns grow more by migration than natural increase, and that such towns tend to be dominated by industry and commerce. While this links migration flows to distance, population size, and economic opportunities, it will be seen that there is much more to migration than these factors alone. Nevertheless, Ravenstein's idea of a city's growth, and by implication its importance, as a result of migration is also suggestive of the influence and impact of migrants beyond simply as a quantifiable size of migrant labour units.

3.2.2 Migration: Pre-colonial, Colonial and Post-colonial

Underlining Ravenstein's laws of migration is a view that migration is a unilinear movement of people from one place to another, as in various people of European origin migrating to America. However, as Coquery-Vidrovitch suggests, one needs to be wary of imposing a Eurocentric conception of migration as in Africa mobility and long distance trade are 'two major phenomena' on the African continent, particularly in the pre-colonial period (1977: 79). These movements of people in Africa come to an end with colonial expansion and consolidation of the colonial state's boundaries. But whether the conceptions of these migrations and movements or trade are unilinear, or expansionist waves within and between regions or different parts of the African continent or the planet, in pre- or post-colonial periods, it is necessary to distinguish between the voluntary element in the movement of people and those that emanate from forced migration. Voluntary migration could be explained by orthodox economic explanations that labour and traders moved to where there was the possibility of jobs, a livelihood through trading opportunities and a new beginning. This theory could, for example, explain the movement of people from Europe to the colonies, particularly settler colonies such as America, South Africa, Kenya, Australia and New Zealand among others. It could possibly explain migrating Arab traders and Swahili settlements on the east coast of Africa, and trade with Asia, predating the Portuguese by a several centuries. Nevertheless, this migration as expansionist, colonial and voluntary must be distinguished from involuntary migration as a result of colonial conquest.

Migration in these colonies is exhibited as internal forced or controlled migration (Freund, 1988: 14-18, Lacey, 1981; Zegeye and Ishemo, 1989). The classic case of internal forced migration is the apartheid state, but elements of forced labour and migration appeared in different parts of Africa (Zegeye and Ishemo, 1989). One of the most sustained debates over the effects and impacts of migration, positive and negative, both on rural and urban populations can be seen in a series of case studies by the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in the 1930s and 1940s in Zambia. I shall have occasion later to analyse and comment on these studies as it applies to the central concerns of this thesis. Another central focus on forced or controlled migration has been South Africa. Until about the late 1980s migrants and migration was very much the focus of sustained empirical research beginning with the assumptions set out in series of seminal articles by Legassick (1974), Wolpe (1972), and among others (e.g. Johnstone, 1970, 1976, Jeeves, 1975). The theoretical framework of the new revisionist approach in Southern African studies dominated studies of migration in the 1970s and 1980s. The central thesis of these writers was that controlled, or forced, migration led to lower wages and hence super-exploitation of workers, and was key to understanding capitalist development and the entire edifice of segregation and apartheid, including the development of major cities such as Johannesburg, and Durban. (Swanson, 1964; Smith, 1992)

The continued existence of migration patterns, albeit changing in the 1990s, seemed to receive considerably less independent academic attention. One needs to note here the studies of foreign migration by Lewis in relation to trade and skills development (n.d. Chapter 9 "Labour Migration" of the Commission to Investigate the Development of a Comprehensive Labour Market Policy), Cross on internal migration in Durban (n.d. The City as a Destination), and Gelderblom on how rural-urban migration reinforces inequalities (2000). Indeed today, the public debate is less about migration *per se*, but about infra-structural development, housing and service provision. When migration is considered, it is framed in the context of illegal immigrants, refugees, street children, squatters and crime as social problems rather than the continued structural existence of migration patterns, both internally within the country and more recently of international migrants coming to the country.

Migration has changed from those early waves of migration from the old world to the new world, from the metropolitan countries to the colonies, and within the colonies. Today, with globalisation, there are whole new kinds of migration taking place, which require new kinds of research with different theoretical explanations of these new migratory patterns. Principally people move, not just from point A to point B, but also circulate and crossing many different kinds of boundaries. Such boundaries would include physical boundaries, border posts, cultural and political boundaries. This is not to suggest that such kinds or types of migratory patterns did not occur in the past, except that the volume of such migration today is probably more intense, but also uncertain by comparison with the past. Furthermore, the incorporation of these new migrants into the host society by the state is not uncontested and without social and political implications. The attempt by the state to control migration, especially illegal migration, is not just contested, but often has the unqualified and uncritical support of the host population on grounds of protecting employment, lack of resources and xenophobia.

The main focus of the chapter will be to review some of the theoretical approaches to migration, which developed some of the insights of Ravenstein that placed an emphasis on the mobility of migrants and their underlining economic causes. These macro level structural theories initially were drawn from neo-classical economics (Boyle, Halfacree, and Vaughan, 1998: 61) that attached importance to employees responding to wage differentials. Structuralist approaches influenced by Marxism, are critical of neo-classical theories of migration. Structural Marxism sought to explain the larger political and economic context within which various classes of people, particularly workers, or segments of the working class, and peasants predisposed to move either because they are forced, for example as indentured labourers, refugees or asylum seekers, or because they have to follow the contours of capitalist investment trajectories to find and secure employment.

More recent explanations of migration based on what Grosfoguel and Cordoso-Guzman (1999) call the new sociology of international migration consider a number of approaches, namely (1) assimilationist, (2) pluralist, (3) the context of reception, (4) the social capital and (5) transnational approaches. These approaches will be outlined below with a view to consider the reasons for moving that are suggested

within their particular perspective, and what, in turn, it suggests migrants do when they arrive in their destinations and begin to unpack their experiences and skills to cope with the new social, economic and political environment they have to confront and interact with in order to survive. A central feature of these new approaches is not necessarily to eschew older structural approaches, but to build on those insights with new methodologies such as biographical perspectives and insights derived from a body of post-modernist and post-colonial writing. Although many of the finer points of these theories draw from and are applicable to the United States and Europe, there are elements of these theories that may be considered useful to explore in the unfolding debate on migration in South Africa. More specifically, the debates about incoming migrants, undocumented and documented, illegal and legal migrants, immigrants, refugees and political asylum seekers from a host of countries beyond the immediate borders of South Africa needs to be broadened to focus more precisely on what do these migrants do when they arrive, and what implications does this have for both the migrants as bearers of human rights and citizens. The converse of this is what implications do these practices of migrants have for the host society specifically state policies.

At an empirical level of individuals it is relatively simple to point to the reasons why people migrate – the desire to escape oppression, famine, or civil war, to seek new opportunities for wealth, education of children, family reunification, earning additional income for rural households, and so on. One can compile a list of push and pull factors and assign the appropriate percentages to each category of reasons. However, this does not explain patterns of movement such as return or circulatory migratory patterns, or the association of certain socio-economic or cultural/ethnic characteristics, which inform the particular identities that migrants have and use. Nor does it explain the emergence of associations, social networks and differentiated ways of incorporation or exclusion into the mainstream of the host society: in short the structural factors that explain a pattern of movement, or the diversity of movements over time. Furthermore, and what is central to this work, is the convergence of economic and political constraints with the strategies that migrants create to deal with and overcome them. Such issues need to be explained in structural and experiential terms, or what Wright (1995: 171) calls, drawing from the work of Giddens, 'the mutual dependency, rather than opposition, of human agency and social structure'. In

addition to such explanations, the implications of the experiences of migration and practices in the specific context and for larger societal issues such as citizenship and identity need to be explored.

3.3 MACRO LEVEL APPROACHES: STRUCTURAL APPROACHES: EQUILIBRIUM, MODERNISATION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

3.3.1 Classical and Neo-Liberal Theories.

Most early theories of migration explained the movements observed by Ravenstein in terms of neo-classical economies. In conventional neo-classical terms the structural equilibrium model of migration is seen in supply and demand terms between different spatially defined units. In principle, it is argued that migration restores the balance or equilibrium between spatially organised labour exporting and labour absorbing units. The stress was on seeing workers as responding in rational ways to new economic opportunities in terms of wage differentials from low-wage areas to high wage areas. Migration was simply a rational labour allocation mechanism responding and correcting an imbalance in wages. Over-supply in one area was corrected by offering high wages in another area of lower labour supply. In theory, the whole process begins once again when wages drop and workers move to other areas offering higher wages. In some cases this process of regulation is described as decreasing the pressure of population in low economic growth areas, and transferring population to areas with high economic growth to satisfy both human and capital needs, thus restoring the balance between areas, zones, or regions. These areas, zones or regions may be defined within a country or between different geographical areas on a larger scale such as nation states. In conventional economic terms migration is defined as a self-regulating mechanism through which labour demand and labour supply adjust themselves. The emphasis in these theories is that the wage differentials between the labour exporting and labour importing, is the main cause of migration: higher wages are paid in urban areas, which stimulates migration out of low wage rural areas. While initially these high wages are the attraction, as the demand for labour is saturated, an over-abundance of labour, all things being equal, will lead to a rapid decline in wages. This in turn should stem the flow of rural-urban migration, as wages are no longer attractive compared to the benefits of subsistence in rural economy. However, this theory does not explain why some workers are constrained to move

principle pull factor or inducement to migrate. This in turn allows capitalists to generate high profits leading to further capitalist investment and accumulation, thus drawing in more workers until the surplus rural labour is absorbed, and industrial production is entrenched. Although the Lewis model implicitly recognised an impoverished exploited rural economy, the theory still posits a principle that suggests smoothing out of the relationship between wages and labour supply (Gelderblom, 2000: 12). However, Todaro (1969, 1976) applied neo-classical theory to developing economies, based on his work in East Africa where he extended the idea of wage differentials to include the possibility or probability of finding work. This was recognition that the market in developing countries was not perfect between wages and labour supply as the original theory implied. This invoked the idea that wages are a poor determinant or indicator of migration, and that in fact the effect of migration is to increase the level of urban unemployment, because of the persistence of wage differentials between urban and rural areas (Gelderblom, 2000: 12-14).

Within sociology the theory of migration has been explained in terms of modernisation. Western values and forms of consumption lead to new aspirations. In rural areas the realisation of these aspirations means that people have to move to the city. The city is the place where the prospect of modern lifestyles can be most concretely and consistently enjoyed. Modernisation, in its application to migration, thus accepts the split between a modernised urban city and the backward or traditional rural area. Migration settles the balance between those who want to be part of and accept the values of the advanced modern world, and those who stay behind in the tradition dominated rural areas.

Within the context of South Africa, Houghton's work is an example of a neo-classical migration theory. As Wright summarises the argument: 'population movement migration is understood as a rational and individual response to the disparities in labour productivity and labour returns, between the subsistence economy of tribal areas which have failed to adapt and the mines and industries which form the core of the modern exchange economy of the nation' (1995: 773). Wright comments that Houghton acknowledges that there is no tendency towards labour productivity equilibrium because African urbanisation is not permanent, in that the migrant regularly returns to the rural areas. However, Houghton fails to mention the structural factors and legislative constraints that enforce oscillating migration patterns. He

simply accepts as given the dual economy because of the distribution of existing resources, skills and attitudes, but does not examine its basis. Other factors such as expected and real incomes earned, expected benefits of moving to a city/town and remaining in a rural area, and the often differential treatment of migrants along national, ethnic and race lines through the implementation of migration policies by governments were not given consideration, all of which affected the process of incorporation and ability to make a living. Theorists of underdevelopment and world systems approaches take up the issues arising out of structural constraints.

3.3.2 Marxist and World Systems Approaches

The equilibrium theory of classical orthodox liberal economics has been subject to severe criticism. Magubane (1971) has, for instance, critiqued lifestyles as indices of modernisation and for failing to analyse social change as occurring in both urban and rural areas as part of a larger political economy. A large part of the criticism has focused not just on the destination, the urban metropole, but also on the origin of migratory populations, the periphery and its function in the service of capitalism. Rather than see the rural area as a backward zone of tradition and unchanging values, it was conceived as an area from which resources, both human and other physical, were siphoned off. The rural periphery, as it became characterised, is not a static entity but in fact is subject to a process of underdevelopment as surplus is drained off in a series of exploitative satellite-metropolis relationships (Frank 1969). Other writers such as Baran (1957), Furtado (1971), Amin (1976) argued that economic relationships between advanced and peripheral areas and countries did not inevitably lead to equilibrium between them, but rather to unequal exchange and subordination. While the surplus of the peripheral areas was constantly drained off to the advanced urban or metropolitan zones, the peripheral zones (including smaller towns and cities) stagnated (Frank, 1969), or grew at very marginal rates (Amin, 1976, 1977; Cardoso, 1979).

The insights developed by the dependency/underdevelopment school had its own counterpart in Southern Africa. Early revisionist writers such as Wolpe (1972), Legassick (1974) and Johnstone (1976) problematised the relationship between the capitalist sector and the so-called non-capitalist or rural and traditional sector, and shifted the analysis from race and nation to one based on the primacy of class. Labour migration is a consequence of the development of capitalism in South Africa,

following the discovery of gold and diamonds and the need for cheap labour to ensure its extraction. In broad terms the argument put forward was that the migrant labour system developed as a result of state sponsored coercion, a direct system of forced labour, and indirectly induced though the constraints imposed by capitalism. Unlike Houghton's image of rational individuals exercising their free choice to migrate to the urban centres, these early revisionist studies explained migrant labour as a structural phenomenon, where migrant black labour functioned to serve the mainly white capitalist class in the urban centres. Rather what is offered is the 'cheap labour thesis'. Drawing on the work of the French anthropologist, Meillassoux (1972), it was further argued that the full reproductive costs of labour were not directly borne by the state or the employers, but by the subsistence economy of rural migrants. In other words, wages were calculated on the costs of maintaining a single worker in an urban area, rather than a family. It was in the interests of the state to maintain the agricultural base of migrants through the reserve and 'homelands' systems. To this end the continuation of elements of the pre-capitalist system, and a legislative framework that prevented permanent urbanisation, underscored the argument of the cheap labour contributing to the spectacular development of capitalism in South Africa. However, the end of apartheid did not see the end of the migrancy, although as a system enforced by the state it was officially abolished in 1986. Nor was this outcome unique to South Africa. Zegeye and Ishemo (1989) attest to the continuation of migration well after colonial rule and independence in other African states. They further suggest, notwithstanding the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s, that in fact 'migrant labour and certain forms of unfree labour are in the process of being reproduced' in contemporary times despite decades of independence and attempts by independent African states to 'autocentric' [indigenise] their economies (1989: 26-27). Potts also points to the continued existence, or rather resurgence of migrant labour in Zimbabwe (2000), and recent work in South Africa by Murray (1999) and Cross (1998) also report the continued existence of migrant labour, albeit in new and differentiated forms.

While the underdevelopment/unequal exchange thesis did present a coherent argument which incorporated the rural and urban areas as a single whole in an exploitative system, it was still premised on the notion that migration occurs between two distinct and spatially separate areas: one which is underdeveloped, exploited and exports labour, and the other which receives and exploits labour. This conception is

still static: the primary flow of capital and labour is in one direction, although the periphery is included as part of the system. The theory indicates only the dependent and stagnant nature of the periphery, and therein lay the origins of migration. The problem, as O'Brien (1975: 24) has identified, is to overcome the circular argument that dependent countries lack autonomous development, which they lack because they are dependent. Migration merely perpetuates dependency[2].

Analysts such as Amin (1977), among others, have acknowledged the changed rural structure with new ruling elites emerging, albeit under certain conditions peculiar to their peripheral status in a world economy. Under such changed conditions in rural areas, migration to urban areas is not just about being locked into a stagnant dependency relationship. Portes (1978, 8-9) has argued that once capitalist techniques of production have penetrated into agricultural production, the point when migration begins is when population exceeds the productive carrying capacity of the land forcing surplus population to move or face pecuniary constraints. Similarly Amin (1977) points to rural capitalism changing relationships based on patronage, paternalism and labour tenancy to those of employer-employee relations. The change in social relationships, combined with mechanisation had the effect of displacing agricultural labour, who were then forced to leave the land and move to regional or national centres, and sometimes to emigrate to foreign countries. Thus, while capitalist agricultural production increased to supply the necessary food for the urban market, the increasing displaced population of rural areas was forced to move either to some other areas within the rural economy or move to the urban centres. In the case of South Africa under apartheid forced removal was to so-called homelands. For others in the developing world the move was to the shantytowns, *bidonvilles* and *favellas* of the urban centres.

Underdevelopment and dependency theory does not adequately grasp the implications of changed migratory practices, including continued links between urban and rural areas, return or circulatory migration, physically split families and changed gender

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[2] There are other more general criticisms of underdevelopment theory, such as Laclau (1977) who has pointed out that dependency theory does not specify how surplus is produced and how the transfer takes place to the metropolis. He suggests that capitalism has developed in third world countries albeit in a uneven manner and often in an unfinished manner wherein elements of non-capitalist forms of production, such as communal land tenure persist, providing part of the livelihood for workers and other groups of people. Warren (1980) has suggested that rather than see the whole process as under or unequal development, it is merely a stage in the

relations. Furthermore it plays down the creation of new forms of stratification in rural areas, and hence multi-layered migrant populations with changing identities in urban centres. A focus on the comprador bourgeoisie dependent on international corporations and the state to the exclusion of what migrants actually do in urban settings fails to recognise that individuals and groups make, create and forge new ties in very different social fields across expanses of space and time.

Thus within nation states rural-urban migration followed the flow of economic goods and resources to urban centres, reflecting the exploitation and decline of rural areas. In South Africa this migration was not free flowing and the pass system and migrant labour system ensured a controlled migratory process (as far as it could be controlled until the mid-1980s when it was abolished). For international migration the process was similar, except that migrants had greater difficulty in gaining access to, and being incorporated into the advanced industrialised countries, unless the policy of individual countries permitted relatively unrestricted entry as illegal and undocumented immigrants. For South Africans the experience of international migration is only beginning to be felt with the presence of migrants from Africa and other parts of the world.

3.3.3 World Systems Theory and Migration

As a general body of scientific literature and theoretical understanding of the world in the post-colonial period, world systems theory provides the broad generalised theoretical understanding of current debates on globalisation. It also provides, within its general perspective, a way of viewing the multiple sites and reasons for migration from peripheral areas to core areas. While Wallerstein (1974; 1979) emphasises unequal exchange between different units of the world capitalist system, the idea of a global world integrated by a single dominant mode of production might be more useful perspective in explaining both and the current division of labour (Cohen, 1987; Portes, 1978) (rather than underdevelopment or dependency theories). Wallerstein's central expression of the division of the world is that of core - areas that dominate and profit from international divisions of labour, and periphery - areas of the world that are subordinated within the world system. Such a global level of analysis seems very similar to Frank's metaphorical sense of a single connected strand of exploitation

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development of capitalism, not dissimilar from that of comparable periods in Europe's own economic and social development.

stretching from isolated rural hamlets to international centres of capital. However, it is possible to conceive of a core area as not just a European or American industrial area, city or state, but any area or site such as a rural village or town that has resources or factories which becomes in relation to its 'natural' rural constituency a core area (Wolf, 1992: 99-104). Although the relationship between core and periphery can be structured and graded in a variety of ways world systems theory tends to reduce migration to labour migration and immigrants to workers. It is this reduction of migrant mobility to labour units that needs to be challenged.

The challenge is to build on the perspectives of world systems theory, as well as the subsequent critiques and clarifications of underdevelopment and dependency theories (Wallerstein, 1974; Laclau 1977; Warren, 1980). At first glance world systems theory does not appear to allow for the scrutiny of the particular impact such forces have on regions, colonies, countries/states on the periphery, cities, towns, villages, homesteads and households. Clarifications by Comaroff (1982), Worsley (1984) and Sharp (1985), among others, clearly demonstrated that world systems theory would be inadequate if not contextualised with reference to more particularistic impacts, interactions, outcomes, and influences at the local level. Thus, for example, Sharp (1987) has shown how the changing nature of the transport beginning in the early 1980s, in particular the taxi industry, as well as the differentiated levels of investment by migrants in rural places of origin, have changed the reasons for migration and intensified stratification between places such as Qwa Qwa, a former homeland area, and the places of work in the industrial and mining heartland of the Witwatersrand. Gelderblom has shown how migration reinforces inequality, rather than reduces such disparities in rural areas (2000: 199-206). One may even add the spatial patterns of unequal but inextricably linked parts of the world system are equally important to take into account (Smith, 2000). Further afield, Wolf (1992) shows how rural industrialization in Java attracts female migrant workers from other areas. She then demonstrates the impact of such migrant workers in terms of gender and household dynamics. Wolf's work demonstrates that it is the subordinated areas, and rural areas in particular, that experience new kinds of capital penetration, particularly for the extraction of raw materials and manufacture of products for export in a new international division of labour and manufacturing. In contextualising the global level of analysis with particular histories, the movements of people in a specific period of time may be understood. Basch et al (1995: 11) argue that by adopting a new nuanced

perspective, it is possible to link waves of migration to new forms of capital concentration and penetration, and to the particular actions of migrants.

There are a number of implications that flow from this capitalist penetration of rural areas from a world systems perspective for studies on migration. Firstly the goods embodying the core-periphery relationship circulate around the world. Thus in peripheral areas of the world economy where the manufacture of commodities such sportswear (Nike, Reebok etc) or jewellery, watches and clothes take place, they become core areas to their hinterlands. Secondly, such sites of manufacture become simultaneously core and periphery, providing the attraction for possible employment from outside the local village. Thirdly, in making the forward linkages, the manufactured commodities from these peripheral areas of the developing world are appropriated by a variety of traders on a worldwide scale. Some of these traders at the end of the forward linked chain may well be itinerant migrants and immigrants peddling such commodities on streets and informal markets in the core areas of the world system, whether this is in Durban, Marseille, New York or Abidjan. Fourthly, the impact of such industrialisation and migration changes the social relationships at a variety of levels from personal to household, both in place of origin and the place of destination. It is the third and fourth points here that will be of some consideration when analysing the experiences and survival strategies of recently arrived migrants in the city of Durban.

I do not want to suggest that this literature privileges rural societies. It is not an in-depth analysis of capitalist penetration of rural economies, or the collapse of rural and/or agricultural sectors, and hence the migration of surplus labour. However, pointing to capitalist penetration of rural areas is not just to underscore insights that Laclau, Amin or Warren have offered, but to note that changes in the rural society and resultant migration of people are not the result of a single factor of either a 'push' or 'pull'. At this point it is important to highlight commodity exchange as the central mechanism embedded in push-pull factors, but not to derive from this structural feature a model that homogenises migrant experiences into a single structural pattern, into which reality must be forced. It suggests a level of analysis below that of the macro perspectives of some underdevelopment, dependency or world systems theorists.

3. 4. MESO-LEVEL PERSPECTIVES: BEYOND STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

One possible way of avoiding the pitfalls of homogenising migrant experiences into a structural pattern without paying attention to their individual biographies is to go beyond understanding the migrant within the confines of the nation state, and to take the world system as a globalising phenomenon seriously. Within this system it is possible to identify the diverse transmigration experiences as internal, local, regional and worldwide, rather than simply as bi-national or urban-rural dichotomous modes of existence.

Analysing the internal reasons for the success or failure of various individual migrants is a legitimate research concern. Portes (1978) has argued that the social relationships that encompass the economic lives of migrants are an important, and often a neglected aspect of migration studies, particularly when applied to the informal sector. Using migration or rather case studies of immigrants to illustrate the embeddedness of the economic in social relationships is not difficult to understand. Migrants, lacking the skills in a new country's labour market and not confident in the language of the host society, tend to turn inwards to their own migrant communities for economic, financial and social well-being. Rotating credit schemes and setting up networks of and for employment are examples of embeddedness. What this specifies is the context, or the range of 'contextual factors' that underlie individual economic actions.

3.4.1 Embeddedness and Social Capital

Drawing on the work of Mark Granovetter (1985) and Karl Polanyi, Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) develop the concept of social capital as a specific manifestation of embeddedness. They argue that previous uses of the term were vague and subject to an instrumentalist view suggesting that social relationships or social structures facilitate rational economic motives and actions. They define social capital as "expectations for action within a collectivity that affect economic goals and goal seeking behaviours, even if these expectations are not orientated towards the economic sphere" (1993: 1323). What they seek to emphasize is that social capital may have both negative and positive outcomes; it can both promote and constrain economic behaviour. Grosfoguel and Cordero-Guzman (1999) argue that much of the literature has focussed on how social capital has been mobilised to produce a

successful outcome. In particular the focus has been on the micro-networks of migrants, that is, on the internal dynamics that give rise to successful entrepreneurs and incorporation into the main stream of host society. This may be contrasted with internal social relationships that limit integration into the mainstream of formal economic life. The implication here is that some social capital is positive, whereas in other cases it is negative. For Grosfoguel and Cordero-Guzman (1999: 355) this assumes an unproblematic wider environment without legal or discriminatory impediments to full participation in the economic life of a society. The problem with this kind of research focus is that it assumes that micro-networks are divorced from broader social structures that constrain or enable access to capital, information and resources by a community's micro-networks. In other words 'discrimination', 'marginalisation' and exclusion are not related to broader social, economic and political forces that shape and structure the micro-networks. Part of this thesis is to specify those broader social-economic and political forces in which diverse ranges of migrants have set up their social capital networks. The success or failure of these networks does not depend only on their internal mobilisation of resources, but also the external environment in which they operate.

3.4.2 Migration in Africa: Colonial Contexts

While Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) and Grosfoguel and Cordero-Guzman (1998) appear to point to new approaches within the context of America, elements of such approaches have been attempted within the Southern African context. Social anthropologists working in Zambia and in South Africa in the 1950s and 1960s were among the first social scientists to investigate the question of labour migration and social and cultural relations. The theoretical paradigm of structural functionalism and the disciplinary perspectives and methods of social anthropology tended to see them grouped into studies of rural decline, rather than as complex set of intersection and exchanges. This anthropological work gave the impression that the research focussed on a rural perspective, on the necessity of migration to urban centres, or to studies of the consequence of migration for rural areas. There is also the oft mentioned colonial imperative of such research that colonial governments not only sponsored such research but were concerned to understand the migration process in order to keep it going (Moore, 1994: 20-21). However, from the 1950s onwards questions about 'urbanism' in Africa, and in particular in Southern Africa began to make an appearance within the anthropological literature. An important problem that these

anthropologists raised was concerned with how migrants' consciousness of tribal origins affected their new lives in the urban area (Moore, 1994: 51; 55). This was originally posed as a question of 'detribalisation' or how much of the tribal culture was imported into the urban setting? Or put another way, how much of the new ideas learnt and encountered in the colonial situation replaced tribal customs, and ideas[3]. The approaches to the question of 'detribalisation' is of some importance as it links to the question of embeddedness and social capital raised by Portes and Sensenbrenner in the sense of carrying and unpacking cultural baggage into a new setting, and reliance on one's own ethnic group and networks to cope, survive and, if possible, prosper. There is also an implicit question about the differentiated way in which migrants find their way into a host society. Grosfoguel and Cordero-Guzman have pointed out that a shortcoming of emphasizing the cultural logic of migrants' behaviour, without linking it to wider political and economic issues, does not fully explain migrant behaviour. With this in mind it will be useful to examine, briefly, the debate on 'detribalisation'.

Monica and Geoffrey Wilson made an early approach to this problem in their book The Analysis of Social Change (1945). They argue that there were two kinds of societies, the tribal or primitive society, and the industrial or civilised society, each being internally coherent under ideal circumstances. Once tribal societies came into contact with industrial societies destabilisation ensues, where the old was not yet fully given up, while new becomes adopted. This process was referred to a detribalisation. The Wilson's were careful to point out the these uneven changes were as a result of systematic connections between circulatory movements of labour, impoverishment of rural areas, the demographic shifts between rural and urban areas and industrial (capitalist) developments in urban areas. However, inherent in their work is the idea of two societies in tension with one another and that these tensions are most evident in the urban centres where the pressures of colonial domination and resistance to it,

[3] This issue addressed by social anthropologists - what happens to the 'culture' of people, once it becomes disconnected from its original rural environment, and how is it re-constructed to accommodate itself in a new urban environment - can be placed in a wider theoretical debate about the adequacy of Durkheimian structural-functional models. As the anthropologists posed it, this question was a continuation of both the field research bias (rural areas), as it was of the Durkheimian structural-functional model of cohesion in tribal and industrial societies. Social anthropologists were able to demonstrate, contra to Durkheim's postulation of simple cultural homogeneity, that the cohesion of rural societies depended on an articulation of a number of kinship groups, villages and networks of individuals engaged in intricate system of exchange (and by implication a complex division of labour). This approach was the theoretical parallel to Durkheim's occupational division of labour in industrial society. The assumptions underlying this approach were carried over into the early studies of migrants in urban areas. (See Moore, 1994: 51-55)

particularly by African labour, was most keenly felt. This often exploded into riots, marches and strikes. The link between the explosive anger and detribalisation was felt, but not systematically explored or explained.

The Mayer's in their study of Xhosa of East London, accept the dual model of the Wilson's, but continue to pursue the issue of 'tribal survivals' in an urban setting. They draw the distinction between 'school' and 'red' Xhosa people. According to the Mayer's 'school' people are quite happy to engage with new or 'European' institutions and ideas, e.g. educational and religious institutions of modern civilised society. The 'red' people on the other hand are reticent to get 'mixed-up' in things that obscure the distinction between real Xhosa and foreigners (primitive, tribal society). 'School' people on the other hand don't make the distinction. 'Red' people, in an urban setting try to retain as much of their rural traditions as possible. In other words they unpacked their urban behaviour in accordance with a reconstructed version of the rural setting of cultural patterns of behaviour. What is revealing about the ethnographic work is not so much the fact that these two ideological positions exist among the Xhosa of East London, but the model that the Mayer's are working with. 'School' people make choices from an array of offerings in a modern society, whereas 'red' people work within a system of ascribed statuses and given modes of behaviour of a tribal society. There is no doubt that in fact both 'school' and 'red' people are making choices, but the Mayer's work reflects as if these choices are made freely. In fact, much of their ethnographic data can be read in opposition to this perspective. It can be argued that the choices made by either 'red' or 'school' people was within a highly controlled migrant labour system within a larger system of economic, political and legal determinants. These determinants are constraints, which allow 'school' people certain limited choices, and made the red people, i.e. the migrants, all the more dependent on their rural ties and hence the reason for maintaining strong cultural traditions in the urban areas. Thus the social relationships such as homeboys, networks, ties of kinship and village in East London strongly reflect their rural origins and dependency.

There was an entirely different way of looking at the issue. Rather than focussing on survivals among migrants, Gluckman, and his colleagues Watson, Mitchell and others at the Institute for Social and Economic Research in Lusaka, Zambia, eschewed the idea of culture loss and conflicting cultural systems approach. Rather they saw rural

and urban settings as part of one system, in which Africans, including migrants, are learning, experiencing and discovering new knowledge and new skills, in addition to those they already have. Watson argued that the notion of detribalisation implied Africans must choose between two systems. In fact his work among the Mambwe showed that people participate in both the modern and the traditional 'conjointly'. Young Mambwe men when in need of cash would migrate to urban centres to earn such an income, and return once the task was accomplished. Mitchell in an important monograph The Kalela Dance made the point that urban centres are not necessarily ethnically homogenous, because of the multiplicity of people migrating to the copper belt. Mitchell argued that while African people did interact on the basis of ethnicity, the ethnic reference categories were of broad politically dominant areas or spaces, rather than fine distinctions or specific places that different ethnic groups or tribes occupy. In fact ethnic identity became exaggerated in a heterogeneous urban setting, rather than as a taken for granted quality of social relationships in rural areas. However, he pointed out that in Black-White relations ethnicity seemed to be less important than the industrial system. It was the industrial system that formed the basis of trade union activity in the copper belt mines, and targeted for abolition the ethnically based employees' representative system set up by the mine management. Mitchell pointed to the very different uses of tribalism in urban and rural settings. In an urban area, belonging to a tribe, however defined, depended on various situations. This situational logic of tribalism revealed only one aspect of a very complex urban identity. Moore (1994: 65) comments "Mitchell did not treat tribal connections and categories as a form of conservatism, a traditionalism in which fragments of the past were retained in a rapidly changing milieu". Rather migrants were part of a wider social system, in which he, and others, began to highlight different and new forms of social relationships. This gave rise to a whole new research agenda on migrants, workers and social order (see for example, Eades, 1987)[4] An important aspect that was inspired by the work of Mitchell was the study of networks, social situations and transactions (Kapferer, 1972). Networks focussed on the chain of friends and friends of friends, and the content of each social situation and the specific transactions that

[4] Some other specific areas of research were: migrant identity (Hart, 1971); on formal voluntary associations, like trade unions, were studied as to how they were formed, and how they operated, (Peace, 1979); specific categories of workers, such as railway men (Grillo, 1973) domestic workers (Hansen, 1989), or miners and compounds (Gordon, 1977). For reviews of urban anthropology and developments in the field of labour see Freund, B The African Worker (1988) Sanjeck, (1990) 'Urban Anthropology in the 1980s: a World View' Annual Review of Anthropology; Coquery-Vidrovitch, (1991)' The Process of Urbanization in Africa' African Studies Review, vol 34 and Moore, Anthropology and Africa (1994).

individuals engaged in for economic or non-economic ends. Portes (1978) has also called for closer attention to networks in migrant research. In Portes' and Sensenbrenner's (1993) work, networks within ethnic groups became part of the social capital that either assists or constrains endeavours of individuals and groups.

It is possible to re-read the early anthropological work on migrants and networks through the lens of the social capital approach. While Mayer's work took norms, values and customs as the primary driving force informing migrants' 'conservative' behaviour in the town, Mitchell and his colleagues' work began to focus on agency, on individuals, on the way in which cultural ideas and urban exigencies were in a constant process of negotiations, where people's lives were constantly constructed and re-structured within a broader complex of social, political and economic circumstances. Crucially from a migrant labourer's perspective, making decisions based on a network of people supplying information on where they could find the best areas to work in for the cash they needed, not just as remittances, but for possible entrepreneurial activities funded in part by cash wages (Kapferer, 1972: Peace, 1979). In those circumstances where coercion and control was a necessary corollary to migration, research on the place of work, such as on the mining compounds, was a logical progression (Gordon, 1977; Moodie, 1983). Here the activities of migrants had to be understood in terms of the formal and informal organisation of work and leisure activities which allowed migrants the space to be involved in a network of various intense money making and other activities (Gordon, 1977). Moodie analysed other aspects such as sexual activities among men in the compounds as subversive of the official authority structures of the mine (1983, 1988). Retention of links to the rural areas could be interpreted as a defence (or resistance) against full proletarianisation, or maintaining a link to rural livelihood strategies, the politics of rural elites and their entrepreneurial activities (Sharp, 1986). However, these works tended to locate migration both within territorial colonial and post-colonial state boundaries, and as a function of those states' economies. It has not considered these migration patterns as part of broader pattern of international migration.

Given these insights into the multiple cultural dimensions of migrancy, it is possible for this earlier work to be reinterpreted, or new insights and hypotheses to be developed. The thick descriptive quality of their ethnographic work makes it possible to reinterpret the issue of migrants within a broader political economy with all the

constraints and possibilities inherent in state control of urbanisation, but also the embeddedness of migrant labour in the social relationships that stretches from rural to urban areas. 'Tribal survivals' become a resource (rather than an aspect of ascribed behaviour), the social capital (cf Portes and Sensenbrenner) that sustains a social field of relationships across the divide between rural and urban areas. On the other hand too close a focus on the micro-networks approach that Mitchell and his colleagues developed, with its close attention to individual choice might equally undermine the crucial insight that the Wilson's drew attention to: that migrant labour is embedded in a wider, uneven and ever changing capitalist system, from which capitalists benefited immensely having to pay only the immediate subsistence costs of an individual worker (Murray, quoted in Wright, 1995).

In more recent times rural-urban migration, and inter-regional, cross-border migration in Southern Africa as a consequence of, for example structural adjustment programmes, or political instability, have began to be examined. The wider impact of, for example, compulsory deferred payments as part of the system of remittances of foreign based migrants to neighbouring countries have been examined (Crush, J. Contract Migration to South Africa: Past, Present and Future: 5). The impact of foreign migrants being retrenched from the mining industry and seeking alternative means of employment have been analysed by Chirwa (1997: 628-654). He analysed the survival strategies that emerged in Malawi after miners were retrenched in South Africa. Potts (2000) has raised the issue of urban links to the rural areas as providing the means of survival from the impact of structural adjustment programmes, directly as a consequence of declining urban-based employment possibilities. But these studies looked at the result of the decline or ending of highly structured and institutionalised systems of migration instituted by employers and recognised by the state, or as a result of the implementation of state driven economic policies. The 'voluntary' immigrant or refugee migration of African continental people to South Africa, and their survival strategies in South Africa, and the continuing links to places of orgin has had a less systematic focus in empirical and theoretical terms. This cross-border, or transnational migration, is the subject of much of the rest of the thesis. In the next chapter some of the literature on this topic is reviewed. Below I review some central concepts that have been used to describe and analyse the new forms of international migration.

One such theory that offers a new explanation has been labelled transnational migration. It is defined principally by the fact that people cross two or more boundaries, and who do not necessarily lose touch with their countries of origin. In many cases migrants make frequent return trips. The principal work upon which this is based is that of Basch, Schiller and Szanton-Blanc (1994). They define transnationalism in the following terms:

> We define "transnationalism" as the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasize that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural and political borders. Immigrants who develop and maintain multiple relationships - familial, economic, social, organisational, religious and political - that span borders we call transmigrants. An essential element of transnationalism is the multiplicity of involvements that transmigrants sustain in both home and host societies...... Transmigrants take actions, make decisions, and develop subjectivities and identities embedded in networks of relationships that connect them simultaneously to two or more nation-states. 1994: 7)

There are several implications of the definition that I shall list below. Only some of these are important for this work, and will be analysed.

Firstly, the focus and analysis is on the lived experience of individuals, especially the fluidity of their 'travelling' experiences. These experiences reflect transnational processes, although individuals and communities may not speak of transnationalism. Secondly, their identities are not tied solely to the location they come from or find themselves in. Although identity is often tied up to place or geographical setting, as home (family), homeland, or home community, migrants are 'travelling', in terms of the definition above, identity becomes relational and dislodged from a distinct position (Appadurai, 2000: 231). Thus while identities are defined in relation to borders and boundaries, the identities cannot be taken for granted as fixed. Where, who and what you are is not only defined by the others such as a state or in relation to the formal criteria of national citizenship or in relation to social interaction with local citizens, but is also made explicitly conscious by oneself. Identities can become markers for inclusion or exclusion, not just for belonging to particular groups and places, but also for access (or denial) to resources. Thirdly, national identities, or the nation state identity still functions. The nation state still functions to represent identity, even though the idea of nationality is being undermined by the emergence of

post-national or post-colonial identity. But as Basch et al. point out some national states, such as the Haitian Republic, have used or rather re-constructed the arena of their operation beyond the formal boundaries of the state. By appealing to Haitian migrants in the United States as citizens to contribute to the development and progress of their country of origin, the idea of an identity circumscribed by fixed territorial boundaries is undermined (1994: 210-221). The South African government has also attempted, although not in any consistent manner, to recruit the South African diaspora of skilled and professional people to contribute to the development of the country, albeit from a distance, and not necessarily by returning to the country permanently. Fourthly, the concept of transnationality calls into question the tied notion of nation-state and citizenship. On this last point I shall expand later in the section on citizenship and in chapter eight. Fifth, the social networks or multi-stranded relationships imply connections to people in multiple places, looking both backward and forwards simultaneously. The fluidity of such social relationships postulates that the future may be uncertain, that economic opportunities are not guaranteed, and that a migrant or refugee from a world turned upside down is not left behind by the act of migration. Indeed the social capital embodied in such relationships needs to be constantly created, recreated and retained in the case of catastrophes or disasters. In some cases the social capital is the foundation upon which their success, or indeed the very act of survival in the modern world becomes possible (Portes and Borocz, 1989; Portes, 1997). Today migrants can remain connected through networks, organisations, e-mails, fax, phone, radio and remittances. This is an implied critique of earlier assimilation migration theories that postulated a successful, mainly unproblematic linear incorporation of migrants from a rural traditional background into a modern urban society, albeit with a variety of obstacles and constraints that immigrants face.

Other writers have used migration, in particular transnational migration, to problematise concepts of culture, nation, citizen and identity (Clifford, 1988; Bhabha, 1990; Chambers, 1994; Appadurai, A. 1996). Clifford in fact goes one step further to argue that migration patterns or diasporic spaces in a globalising world might even be considered emancipatory because mobility induces ambivalent and multiple identities, which the very presence of such migrants acts or represents a form of critique of postcolonial nationalism. However, Fabricant (1998: 25-52) has questioned the emancipatory intent of transnationalism. While there may be an

opaque idea of emancipation buried within the actions and experiences of international migrants, she finds the idea of migration as a symbol or metaphor embodying a homogenous and undifferentiated quest for cosmopolitanism less than warranted. Instead she has proposed that a distinction be made between a 'highly literate and sophisticated audience of travellers...that inhabit a world seemingly without constraints' [hotel bookings, airline tickets and credit cards in one hand and laptop in the other] and those 'immigrants who experience poverty and hardship when they leave their native lands ostensibly in pursuit of freedom and opportunity' (1998: 29-31). It is this latter category of migrants that this thesis explores. The idea of people becoming mobile in 'pursuit of freedom and opportunity' suggests what Marshall Berman calls the 'vital experience of modernity shared by all men and women all over the world'. To be modern, he says 'is to find ourselves in an environment that promises us adventure, power, joy, growth and transformation of ourselves and the world - and at the same time ...threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are ...a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish' (1981:15). Thus even for migrants who leave their homelands in pursuit of freedom and opportunity, theirs is a response to modernity's endless transformations, *'fighting to make ourselves at home in this world'* (1981: 348). Migrancy in such a perspective is not an end point upon arrival, because arrival can also mean the start of another journey beyond the physical act of moving. The point is that the mobility of such migrants can only have meaning in a particular political-economic context, or rather in a series of political and economic contexts, each of which requires unpacking one's social and cultural baggage and accommodating to, and learning from new environments. The first context is always that which produced the migrations, and the discourse surrounding it, and, secondly, most importantly for this study, the complex experiences of individual incorporation, exclusion, resistance and struggle to belong in a particular place, locality, group, or community in making a home in this world. The most concrete expression of making a home is by making a living. Making a living implies a place, a location to settle, in order to find employment or engage in business or the informal sector, or indeed a combination of employment and informal business activities. However, it should not imply that home and making a living needs to be necessarily in the same place. In the case of South Africa under apartheid, migration meant that making a home and making a living did not occupy the same spaces. And to some extent this continues to be the practice. Following

Zegeye's and Isemo's argument above concerning the entrenchment of migration in Africa during the post colonial period, what once appeared to be South African exceptionalism may prove to be the norm. This second context thus may have as many empirical referents as there are places in which migrants have struggled and continue to struggle to make their home, to make a living, to confront the Janus-face of modernity. Thus a migrant - a refugee, asylum seeker, employment seeker, traveller or businessman - moving from Central Africa to Durban, may find many places en-route to settle temporarily, and from which he/she has to, or chooses to, move in order to meet the requisites of 'making a home in the world'. It is to this question of 'betweeness', the fluidity and ambiguity of being a migrant that we now turn. This 'betweeness' refers to a sense of belonging (in a place within a network of social relations composed of kin, friends, townsmen or fellow nationals) and being excluded (ethnic status, income, nationality or xenophobia), of being marginal (unemployed, low income jobs and neighbourhoods) and formally affiliated (officially required permits, tenancy, employment contracts)

With regard to the complex experiences of migrants, Lawson (2000: 174) has suggested that research into transnational migration highlights processes of belonging, exclusion and affiliation. By exploring the processes of belonging, exclusion and affiliation through the ways in which migrants create their survival and livelihood strategies issues and questions about their incorporation into a society, processes of assimilation and marginalisation can be posed simultaneously. It also poses, as I suggest later the very vital question of linking a sense of belonging to citizenship.

3.5 MICRO-LEVEL PERSPECTIVES: BETWEEN STRUCTURE AND DECISION MAKING.

Many of the studies that shed light on the processes of insertion, belonging, survival strategies, and exclusion still contain the limitation that all migration is about movement from one point (origin) to a point of destination. For example, the original assumptions of world systems theory tends to reduce migration to labour migration and immigrants to workers, thus playing down any discussion and theoretical reflections on racial, ethnic or national identities which shape their consciousness, actions and habitual practices. The classical liberal approach shares similar

assumptions, but argues that such identities become erased or reduced as migrants and immigrants become incorporated into the mainstream of the host society. They become assimilated over time. To all intents and purposes migrants become facsimiles of the host population: they lose their origin identities. A variant of this approach argues that ethnic identity is not necessarily erased, but modified. This variant has been called the culturalist pluralist approach. What is of interest is the creation and use of ethnic identities among immigrant and migrant groups for securing livelihoods and upward mobility.

3.5.1 Migration and Identities

The culturalist pluralist approach argues that while migrant ethnic groups lose their language and customs, their ethnic identity continues in a new form in a new context. In the American context it becomes a hyphenated identity: Irish-Americans, African-Americans, Jewish-Americans, Cuban-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, etc. It is suggested that these ethnic identities serve other functions such becoming internally organised for economic support and upward mobility, and acting as lobby and pressure groups within the wider political system at both a national and local level. They are able to engage in such activity because they have legal citizen status. This approach argues that ethnic identity is grounded in the internal workings – the micro-networks – of a bounded ethnic community that establishes the social capital for overcoming the adversity of being poor immigrants or, perversely, constraining access to resources. Ultimately such ethnic identities are conceived as positive assets assisting in the assimilation of migrants/immigrants as citizens into the dominant values of the host society. For the purposes of this thesis, there are two important opposing perspectives to consider which inhibit the progress of ethnic immigrant and migrant groups. The first is that it might be argued that cultural practices of ethnic groups that constrain access to resources or limit assimilation constitutes a socially constructed 'culture of poverty' (Grosfoguel and Cordero-Guzman, 1998: 353-54). This means that certain ethnic groups pull back their members from taking advantage of opportunities to advance beyond their current status, and hence all members of the ethnic group have relatively the same standard of living. While not denying the existence of such a sociological levelling phenomenon, labelling the effect 'culture of poverty' is, in effect, to blame the 'victim' for their own lack of assimilation, success and open acceptance of the values and norms of the host society. It suggests that the host society, in particular the state as the agency of rules and regulations regarding

migrants, is benign. The second perspective is that the micro-networks and internal dynamics of ethnic communities cannot be fully understood without linking them to meso- and macro-level mediating structures and social relationships that shape the labour market for incorporating such ethnic groups (Grosfoguel and Cordero-Guzman, 1998: 355). For example, racial discrimination or xenophobia, which may not be legally sanctioned, can act as mechanisms of exclusion from incorporation into the society, and perpetuates migrants' marginal status. In countries that do not legally or constitutionally endorse racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, such barriers to incorporation induces a focus on other reasons that inhibit migrants' participation in the mainstream. In the next sub-section I examine this proposition, and question the state's response to immigration and migration as benign.

3.5.2 The Context of Reception Approach

Thus far this exposition has focussed on the migrants themselves. One crucial aspect of migration is the actions and policies of the state, particularly their regimes of incorporation of migrants and immigrants (Soysal, 1994, 29-40, Freeman, 2003). Grosfoguel and Cordero-Guzman (1998: 357-58) broaden the discourse on policy and institutional aspects of migration to include:

- Reactions and to and perceptions of immigrants by public opinion; and
- Presence or absence of an established ethnic community to receive immigrants.

This approach, called the context of reception approach, provides the framework within which a diverse set of modes of incorporation of immigrants takes place, especially within the labour market. Such a state policy also rests on a unilinear conception of migration. It assumes a point of departure and a point of arrival, and designs policy to accommodate, control or reverse such trends.

For international migrants, reception refers to the formal aspects such as the official process of documenting the arrival and reason for migrants entering the country - whether people are refugees, asylum seekers, work seekers, students, researchers, and business people. Reception also refers to the state policies of incorporating migrants into the host society, such as providing information on how to find accommodation and work, or in the case of refugees and political asylum seekers, initial assistance with accommodation, work, or the means to find work, language services (if there are language barriers) and social and welfare services. State reception policies and

actions may also refer to implementation, or simply the lack of provision of any services at all beyond the documentation of migrants. Reaction to and perceptions of migrants by the public can take their cue from government policies and actions. While a government may have humane policies regarding migrants, their actual implementation, or lack of proper implementation, may be the result of the dialectic of local citizens' perceptions and pressure to limit foreign incoming migrants, and government action, or more likely inaction, to carry out their policy commitments. Thus, for example, official commitment to treat refugees with compassion and dignity may well be undermined by actions, official, unofficial, formal or informal, which treat foreigners as less than welcome, thus inciting and exacerbating xenophobic attitudes and condoning ill-treatment of foreign migrants by the state's population. The comparison and analyses of state policies on immigration and migration is useful in understanding the way the state receives migrants, how their responsibilities are meet, or how they absolve themselves from such responsibilities (Kobayashi, n.d: 9; Freeman, 2003: 6-8). In the case where the state absolves or delegates, or deflects its responsibilities, there usually already exists a substantial ethnic or national groups which takes responsibility for assisting newly arrived migrants. The ethnic community becomes the conveyor belt of reception. Indeed part of the reception and incorporation of migrants into the urban centres is to introduce them to the network of people from the same ethnic group or sympathisers who will assist and advise on a range of issues, principally on matters of accommodation and making a living. In this sense they carry out the responsibilities of the state in terms of the initial provision of welfare services, accommodation and perhaps employment as well. At this point the context of reception approach begins to appear more like the social capital approach.

However, as Grosfoguel and Cordero-Guzman (1998: 358) have pointed out, the state's interest in receiving migrants may be biased in favour of some groups over others for economic and/or geo-political reasons. Such an instrumental view or policy is often silent on complex circulatory dynamics, including global patterns of migration. Such circulatory and global patterns of migrations cannot easily be reduced to simple push-pull economic or instrumental factors. The way the state responds to such issues also raises questions about its policy on migration, immigration and citizenship. The question of citizenship as a concept is introduced later in this chapter. The issue of the link between citizenship and migration as a theoretical and policy issue is analysed in chapters four, seven and eight.

3.5.3 Biographical Approaches to Migration

While there is a need to understand state policies and their implementation and their articulation with new complex patterns of migration, there is also a need to understand how migrants react, anticipate, circumvent, or indeed use state policy to their advantage. Such a perspective which recognises the limitations and constraints on migrants but which incorporates individual responses to overcome the constraints, or to engage with those structural limitations has been termed biographical approaches (Boyle, Halfacree, and Robinson, 1998: 80). Methodologically the focus is on the biography of individual migrant's story – its narrative structure – drawn from in-depth interviews. There are three important elements of the biographical approach. Firstly, migration is seen as action in time, in that the decision to migrate is not about the instant that the decision made, but about the build up to that moment, which involves both the migrants' past and anticipated future. Secondly, the specific migrations involve multiple reasons and causes for moving, and thirdly, it is embedded within the individual's wider social, economic and cultural relationships (Boyle, Halfacree, and Robinson, 1998: 80-81).

The biographical approach is not antithetical to a transnational approach as outlined by Basch et. al. It allows for identifying those critical variables in the transnational approach, namely

- Crossing of boundaries and regions
- Establishing and maintaining social relationships across national boundaries
- Developing networks
- Engaging in activities/practices with people who span the generations and spatial divide
- Developing multiple identities and ideologies
- Investing in particular patterns of living - accommodation, work leisure activities

A focus on these variables suggests the following. Firstly, a primary element of transmigration is the multiple relationships between place of origin and place of settlement involving a network of family, friends and business associates through which remittances; information, capital and commodities are passed. It implies communication to be more than merely personal contact, but also supporting business initiatives, or building homes, acquiring land, being consulted on the use of

remittances, and other resources. Secondly, there is the issue of boundaries. While it is fairly clear when migrants cross international or nation-state boundaries, there are other boundaries to consider. The transnational experience consists of much more than a simple crossing of legal-political boundary. Once people have made those legal national state crossings, a diverse set of experiences of incorporation bring with them a diverse set of practices informed by different ideological and cultural experiences, commodity exchange, remittances, and movement back and forth from places of origin and destination. Hence it would be misleading to emphasise cultural assimilation as the main means of incorporation into a host society, as it would be to emphasize economic or capitalist intentions as the primary push or pull factors for migration. Migrants bring with them a diverse set of practices, but all these take place within a set of structural conditions in the context of core-periphery relations. The analytical value of recognising transnational migration, and within that biographical approaches, is that it enables distinctions to be made among patterns of migration within and between nation-state boundaries, and more to the point, migrants' experiences as socially constructed and situated in particular political-economic and sociocultural contexts.

There are two critical aspects of these contexts that are implicit in much of the concepts and theoretical positions reviewed here. The first is that the actions of individual migrants, the networks that they belong to, and the locality or localities in which they operate become a set of well established and accepted set of practices. In undertaking the activities they do, to make a living for example, it leads them to become incorporated as part of the broader social structure. The second point is that as a result of their actions, migrants develop a sense of belonging to a particular locality through their participation in its economic and social life. Belonging, even as a transnational migrant, imagines a place as part of their sense of being there. Belonging within a locality, here defined as the place of destination, implicitly raises the question of citizenship as the right to participate and contribute to its social and economic life. It is to this question that I now briefly turn to introduction the link between citizenship and migration. I shall in chapter seven give an extended discussion on citizenship as it relates to Malawian migrants in Durban.

3.6 CITIZENSHIP AND PARTICIPATION

Until recently migration and citizenship, and their inclusion and exclusion from participation in a society have been treated as separate and discrete topics. In recent times the link between migration and immigration has been made, usually in the context of discussing xenophobia, race relations, multi-culturalism, and identities, (Castles and Spoonley, 1997; Giddens, 1982; Benmayor and Skotnes, 1994). Citizenship as a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion has also been raised (Tilly, 1996; Kabeer, 2002). This issue has been highlighted in Europe where questions about immigration, minorities and citizenship in the context of the European Union, and the influx of migrants from within the European Union, and outside of it from central and eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East and parts of Asia. It is now high on the political and policy agendas of European countries (Brubock, 1997; Solomos and Schuster, 2001: 1). The most explicit and sustained arguments for the link between citizenship and migration have been by Soysal (1994), Castles (1997), as well as by Klusmeyer (2000). More recently citizenship as part of the process of globalisation has received attention (Urry, 1999; United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 1996; Giddens, 1998; Falk, 2003; Hindness, 1998).

Underlining this burgeoning scholarship is the understanding that citizenship as represented by an individual with a singular identity and membership of a nation state is no longer adequate. In the past, citizenship within the nation state with a democratic system was easily understood as having the right to vote, equality before the law, and entitlements to certain welfare and social rights, and the discharge of certain obligations and responsibilities such as to pay taxes and obey the laws of the nation state. But this commonplace understanding is not without its limitations. The classic version of the mid-20th century theory on citizenship is that of T. H. Marshall's "Class, Citizenship and Social Development". Although Marshall's theory is distilled from the British experience, his argument is that there are three dimensions of citizenship rights: civil, political and social, which manifest themselves at different stages in human development towards achieving full equal citizenship. **Civil** refers to liberty of the individual, freedom of speech and religion, to own property, and to be treated equally before the law. **Political rights** refers to the those rights which create the opportunity to participate in the exercise of political power, and **social rights** refers to economic and social security measures to ensure living a life in accordance with the prevailing norms or standards at a given time.

Drawing from 19th century liberal philosophy, Marshall attempts to address a central weakness identified by J.S. Mill as the 'incompatibility between the claims of equal human development and the existing class inequalities of power and wealth' (Macpherson, 1977: 49). Marshall acknowledges that there are class and other forms of discrimination and inequalities that hinder the full enjoyment of citizenship as equality of rights and treatment by the state and ruling classes. In addressing this contradiction, Marshall argues that the expansion of rights of citizenship takes place in social and class struggle, albeit mediated through a parliamentary or representative democracy. This has the effect of flattening or blunting class divisions, but does not necessarily reduce inequality. However this classic conception of citizenship has been called into question, by showing the multiple dimensions of citizenship. Giddens has criticised Marshall's theory of citizenship on the grounds that each dimension or bundle of rights is a precondition for the next bundle of rights, giving the impression of a linear model of progression in the development of human rights (1982:171-3; 1985: 204-5). Furthermore such a developmentalist conception plays down the role of contestation and conflict, without problematising the relationship between the state and its citizens (Giddens, 1982: 176; 1985: 205).

While class struggle in the Marshallian viewpoint is the crucible in which rights are forged, Turner has pointed to the different groups and class interests that civil and political rights represent. Liberal rights to freedom of speech, religion, movement and ownership of property as won through bourgeois struggles are not the same as political and social rights fought and won in the main by the workers movement (Turner, 1990: 192). Giddens has gone further to insist that civil rights, including freedom of movement, need to be separated from industrial rights, rather than be treated as successive stages in the expansion of rights of citizens (1982: 172-3). In South African history, civil rights and political rights did not coalesce and nor did they follow sequentially as bundles of rights. For the most part of the 20th century these civil and political rights were differentiated and mediated though state-imposed racial and ethnic categories. For example, during the 1980s, while workers in South Africa were stamping their own identity on the issue of industrial rights, outside the workers' movement, in the anti-apartheid struggle demands for social rights were termed community struggles. These struggles were based on the principle of local community activism and democratic participation. The principle feature of such community activism in the 1980s and early

1990s was cast in a language of resistance to the state and critique of existing society. In the post-apartheid era this strand of libertarianism and dissent of community struggles against the state has been grafted into the new government policies that conceives of, or imagines, the 'community' as a set of self-identifying individuals who are to be active subjects or co-partners in governance.

This does raise the question of the state as an actor in the citizenship and rights debate rather than as the only interpreter of rights, implementer of regulations and policies. Turner (1990: 197-180) argues that there are three critical aspects of modern citizenship: Firstly, the way the state subordinates ethnic minorities and/or natives of a country in the construction of citizenship. Secondly, the ways in which culture or tradition, such as religious or moral precepts, provide the discourse for the terms of participation in social, economic and state matters. Thirdly, citizenship as a consequence of social struggles over resources. Citizen rights are the outcome of struggles over disproportionately distributed resources (see also Kabeer, 2000). Such action in the creation, assertion or defence of their rights to resources may be related to the degree that people actively or passively accept the outcome of their claims as citizens. This implies that the relationship of citizens to the state is a complex one, which should not be coloured by preconceptions of the state as an institution that either guarantees or dispenses citizenship rights, and that dissent is a legitimate characteristic of citizenship. Many theorists have highlighted class, or more specifically the labour movement, as the single most important variable around which action against the state is precipitated or on the basis of which public participation and 'emancipatory politics' takes place. However, Giddens (1990:158-163) has pointed out that it is also social movements incorporating a diverse range of supporters from women and environmental pressure groups to peace activists that contribute to an expansion of social rights. The heterogeneity of social movements, of groups forming and individuals taking action, illustrate that citizenship is not a unitary phenomenon. Based on a variety of contingent factors, social groupings and individuals may be either active or passive, engaged or disengaged in the practice of citizenship. However this does not mean that active or passive dimensions of citizenship are an "either/ or" situation. Indeed mixtures of activity and passivity, engagement and disengagement, and militancy and accommodation produce the conditions for exploiting differences in approach that may challenge and unsettle dominant forms of governance. The very ambiguity and possible contradictions that are inherent in the interactions and combinations of interactions emphasize the multiple dimensions of citizenship.

This citizenship-state debate, particularly as it is premised on an expansion of democratic participation within a nation-state, is still fundamentally about rights that exist, or are constitutionally guaranteed. But as pointed out above, the ambiguities of citizenship have become more pronounced in recent times, and have begun to undermine the idea that the state is the sole guarantor of citizenship rights. At the same time, as Urry (1999: 311-2) points out, globalisation as a process of flows of information, commodities and people across national borders at an increased pace began to challenge the understanding of citizenship as bounded within a territory and state. Migrants, particularly transnational migrants, and their multiple lives in countries of origin and destination are a growing index of the ambiguities of citizenship. Their lives highlight that the dynamic of economic life transcends those boundaries, and political events at a distance from one's place of origin can impinge and influence local politics. The assumption that the state can regulate both economic and political participation within a territorial space has been ruptured. Because of the flow of people across boundaries, both national and symbolic, there are now collectivities of people with multiple identities claiming entitlements based on ethnicity, religion, gender, locality and sexual preference such that the state cannot act as if is the sole arbiter of what constitutes the culture of a nation.

The rupture of the links between citizenship, rights and the state has prompted new perspectives on the citizenship, particularly that of post-national citizenship. Writers such as Soysal (1994) argue for non-territorial citizenship rights based on universal notions of human rights guaranteed by multi-lateral international institutions such as the United Nations. Another perspective is to argue for citizenship identities based not on state-given rights, but on relational (Tilly, 1996) and agonistic (Tully, 1999) perspectives. I shall be discussing these in greater detail in chapters seven and eight. Suffice to say that Tilly argues for citizenship identity as relational interaction and practice in which the single most important attribute of citizenship is that it is the outcome of 'a set of mutual, contested claims between agents of the state and members of socially constructed categories such as race, gender, nationalities and others'. It is public and interactional in that it locates citizenship identity in a network of individuals and groups, based on a shared sense of understanding of whom they are, where they come from, and to represent themselves. In this Tilly echoes Turner and Giddens by insisting that ideas or representations of citizenship identities are contested, but he argues that strategic interactions do not guarantee an anticipated outcome particularly in relation to the state.

Tully (1999), on the other hand, has argued that citizenship is not generated by the possession of rights, justice principles, constitutional safeguards, shared values, norms, or understanding of differences in national of cultural or religious identities, or any process that gives validation to these principles, but by participation of citizens in ways in which their conduct is conditioned by the exercise of power in any system or governance practice. Their conduct in the form of participation involves dialogue, negotiating, and contestation, including having a say, presenting petitions, conducting referenda, meeting and discussing issues, and civil disobedience such as engaging in marches, boycotts, withdrawal of support. It asserts the right to dissent with whoever has power, and over how that power is exercised. It is this participation in the process of who exercises power and how it is exercised that promotes the identity of citizenship. Both Tilly and Tully shift the focus from an exclusive focus on the formal legal and constitutional definition of citizenship as the possession of rights, to a perspective of how participation in economic and political processes informs the sense of belonging. Agonistic participation, as Tully insists, in whatever form, underlines the sense and identity of citizenship. Such a notion of citizenship does not tie down citizenship to rights alone, nor does it depend on territorially defined concepts, but rather to practice within a context of governance and holds out the possibility of co-participation in governmental decision making. The image is not one of democratic institutional triumphalism, but rather of minimal recognition of actors and stakeholders as participants, and acceptance of forms of interaction, including conflict and negotiation. The implications of such perspectives for the debate on migrants and citizenship is explored through the actions, forms of livelihood practices and the sense of belonging that Malawian migrants build up in the city of Durban.

3.7. CONCLUSION

This chapter has two aims. The first is to review various theories of migration, or theories in which elements of migration theory appear. The second is, in reviewing these theories, to place the actions, practices and behaviours of migrants as individuals and groups within a broad context. Although a distinction between the incidence of migration (individuals' decisions to migrate, and act in ways that indicate their migrant status) and the patterns of migrations was implicitly drawn, it was argued that these indices and patterns occur within a social-political and economic context. It was further argued that this context is never static, and interacts with, and is influenced by a range of political, economic and social factors as well as the actions and practices of migrants themselves.

The chapter critically analyses a number of approaches to the question of migrancy. It begins with a critique of structuralist approaches. This includes perspectives on migration inspired by liberal economic orthodox paradigms, as well as radical perspectives based on critical conceptual approaches such as underdevelopment, dependency and uneven development. The common theme for all of these structuralist accounts is that they conceive of migration as a series of steps from a place of origin to a place of destination. When radical approaches do deal with migrants in the city there is a tendency to see them as reflective images playing a role in a linked chain of satellite-metropolitan exploitative relationships. Indeed, the actions and practices of migrants are seen as no more than set pieces in a series of primarily economic exploitative relationships. What migrants actually do to change, challenge, reinforce, or ameliorate their conditions of existence is hardly ever addressed as a central concern, and the whole migration process is conceived as moving from a place of origin to urban settlements, that is, a one-way trip. Neither does it distinguish between different categories of migrants such as nationality, ethnicity, refugee, political asylum seeker, or economic migrant. Nor is there a precise differentiation along lines of class, income, mode of survivals and strategies.

The chapter goes on to argue that a global perspective such as world systems theory has greater potential as a theoretical framework. The central concept of core-periphery in world systems theory is not confined to the notion that exploitative and dependent relationships exist only as a chain of metropolitan-satellite ties from which surplus is extracted. Originally world systems approaches conceived of migration as a movement from one place to another, and migrants as nothing more than labour units in the service of global capitalism. However, re-conceptualising cores and peripheries as existing simultaneously and in a variety of ways has led to new ways of understanding migration. It becomes possible to think of migration as not confined to a movement from core to periphery, but as involving the crossing of many cores and peripheries, or just many peripheries. The implication of movement or mobility inherent in such a conception allows for a more differentiated view of migrants, as more than just labour units. Recent theories of migration, such as transnationalism, sought to interrogate and incorporate an explanation of the new patterns and multiple movements of migrants on a world scale. While world systems theory gives a conceptual global structure to these patterns and multiple movements, it also offers a

context for migrants' experiences, desires, identities, and everyday struggles to make a home in the world. 'Making a home' means that migrants have to make sense and structure the place and spaces they occupy as meaningful to them in terms of residence and working for a living. Such processes reveal practices of belonging, exclusion, inclusion and affiliation to specific places in which they settle and associations that migrants form of which they are members, and in which their identities are formed, re-formed and negotiated. The way in which migrants engage and interact in these spheres have implications for citizenship and governance.

In order to explore these issues - the context of migrants' experiential dilemmas and their concrete practices - a number of recent theories of migration are analysed. Each of these theories - social capital, context of reception and transnational approaches were analysed in terms of the particular perspective adopted, and what limitations and positive contributions to they add to the debate on migration. The social capital approach highlights the resources available to migrants from within their network of friends and relatives, including the national or ethnic group they belong to. In chapters five and six this is analysed. While the making of social capital can be instrumentalist in its application, it does highlight the dependence of migrants on a limited network of people, and implicitly the relative success or failure of migrants practices in an urban area. However, social capital in itself abstracted from the broader socio-economic and political context fails to underscore the external environment in which migrants have to operate. The context of reception approach is useful in that it specifies the political and legal dynamics that surround the migrants' lives, and the framework within which migrants have to unpack their social and cultural baggage and the likely impact it may have on the host society. In chapter four this general framework – the rules, regulations and implementation of policies - is reviewed as to its influence on migrants' actions. This is taken further in chapter seven where these actions are related to citizenship

Migrants unpacking their social and cultural baggage is not without its own ambiguities. In some ways resorting to reliance on the social capital of one's own ethnic or national group may be construed as a defence and coping mechanism against the challenges of a new environment defined by the regulations of a state. Yet while power relations and dominance, particularly that of the state, underline the context of reception approach, they do not preclude migrants from creating their own

ways of seeing the world. The human practices of migrants, that is, the collection of thought, imaginations and actions, daily activities, habits, and representations, can lead to the creation of their own ideology and identification, which may implicitly challenge the hegemony of the state. Such challenges may not necessarily be open and publicly voiced, yet are significant for they elicit responses from the state and local people. It is the transnational approach, which widens the terrain within which migrants operate allowing for an exploration of issues leading directly to questions of citizenship. Firstly, the transnational approach operates on a wider social field. Such an approach transcends nation-state boundaries, without necessarily dismissing them. For the purposes of this study, this is an important consideration where the state's responses to migrants are not reduced to unsubstantiated notions of a primordial, national or ethnic character. Secondly, other boundaries relating to social, political and cultural spheres become problematised, rather than accepted as such. In short, the contestation of boundaries becomes embedded in a swirl of social, cultural, political, and identity issues that constantly shifts the boundaries of affiliation. Thirdly, this in turn can lead to questions of social differentiation within and between migrant groups, and of issues of inclusion and exclusion, and rights, responsibilities and obligations.

These questions of membership and association raise one of the fundamental issues of this study, that is, of citizenship, because it defines who belongs and who does not, to organisations, localities and places in the city (and, by extension, to the nation-state as a whole). Before analysing and discussing the empirical data, I present, in the next chapter, the issue of defining migrants and immigrants, the use of official and unofficial terms to refer to such actors, and the counting procedures to enumerate undocumented migrants. In a review of some of the literature on refugees and migrants, I offer an alternative perspective on what migrants and refugees actually do in the country, and lay the broad framework of regulations that migrants operate in. This review sets the context of how migrants relate to their own ethnic and national groups, to local people and the state, and the parameters for the substantial discussion of the research data in chapters five, six, and seven.

CHAPTER 4
IMMIGRANTS, MIGRANTS, FOREIGNERS, ALIENS AND ILLEGALS: COUNTING WHO IS WHO IN SOUTH AFRICA, OR WHO IS DOING WHAT TO SURVIVE.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter I argued that defining who are migrants and immigrants is important to clarify ambiguities and to know which set of actors are the subjects of this research. It is also important because of the way in which regulations are used, and misused, and the way the public debate, driven by the media and politicians, is conducted on the issue of immigrants and migrants. Furthermore, as I pointed out in chapter two, undocumented migrants are not easily susceptible to conventional enumeration techniques. I suggested that counting is perhaps not as important as discovering and documenting what migrants actually do, what possible impact they might have on the host society, and the implications this has for their continued participation in the social and economic spheres and as citizens.

The central proposition of this chapter is that it is more meaningful to debate and discuss what foreign migrants and immigrants actually do, what their practices are, particularly with regard to their economic well-being or livelihoods and raise issues about the impact such activities might have on local economic and political activity, and ultimately about questions of rights and citizenship in terms of these concrete practices of migrants and immigrants. This chapter will, firstly, analyse some of the definitions of the terms used, and show the confusion of the use of terms such as 'migrant', 'alien', 'illegal alien', 'foreigner' and 'immigrant' interchangeably in official and public discourse, thus rendering any meaningful and helpful debate misleading and ultimately useless. Secondly, it will subject to a critique the notion that counting or enumerating migrants is a real possibility. Undocumented workers, by their very nature do not make themselves available for enumeration. Counting who is an immigrant, migrant, foreigner, alien and

illegal or undocumented migrant, refugee or displaced person in the 1990s in South Africa is a business fraught with difficulty. Even today, in the early 2000s with the last official census data still largely unpublished, it is difficult to say with what reliability or indeed validity these data generated by official statistics, and various other institutions and agencies is reliable. The fact that various agencies, such as the Human Sciences Research Council, the South African Police Services, and the Department of Home Affairs, have published figures of wide variation suggests that they are less than accurate. However, the political import of such figures used by the media and politicians without questioning their reliability, or indeed their credibility, I suggest, feeds into the rising tide of xenophobia. I do show that the only reliable figures on foreigners in South Africa are those collected at the various points of entry – border posts and airports. These do provide a breakdown of the foreigners by country, and show the changes in immigration patterns over a 15-year period spanning the last years of apartheid, and the first few years of the post-apartheid era. They show in particular the rise in African continental migration to South Africa. Thirdly, I review and analyse a number of studies of foreign migrants and refugees in South Africa, to show what problems they experience in South Africa (such as xenophobia and constraints on pursuing their livelihood strategies), what such people actually do to make a living, and whether this is a real or perceived drain on the resources and employment prospects of local South Africans.

4.2 DEFINING IMMIGRANTS, MIGRANTS, FOREIGNERS, ALIENS AND ILLEGALS

If one assumes that generally a migrant is any person who leaves his or her country of origin to live for an extended period of time, or temporarily resides without official residency status or citizenship in another country, then enumerating such persons in South Africa is a very difficult exercise. In a piece of research such as this enumeration is difficult because such persons, which I shall collectively call foreign migrants for now, have no interest in participating in such a census exercise precisely because their status legal, or illegal, is a precarious one (Reitzes, 1998: 21). Furthermore official statistics on cross-border transitions from other parts of Africa into South Africa is either incomplete,

or extremely difficult to rely on because of the variety of terms used to designate who is a visitor, immigrant, migrant, undocumented migrant, refugee, asylum seeker, alien, and undocumented immigrant / migrant. Indeed a host of scholars have called into question official statistics (Wilmot, et. al, 1997; Bernstein, et. al. 1997; Bouillon, 2001: 20-21).

A number of terms are in current use to designate someone who is not South African. For example, 'foreigner', 'alien', 'immigrant', 'illegal' are used loosely and interchangeably in public discourse, in the media and in political circles. Danso and McDonald make the point that media coverage of immigration is 'largely anti-immigrant and unanalytical, often reproducing racial and national stereotypes' (2001: 1-2). An alien is not a foreigner, and in turn is not the same thing as an immigrant or migrant (Reitzes, 1998: 20-21). Some foreigners are immigrants, but many foreigners in South Africa have no desire to live here permanently, or even for extended periods of time that may qualify them as 'immigrants'. Indeed some foreigners may not qualify as immigrants given the strict limitations in law as to who is an immigrant and who is not. There is also the issue that some immigrants become naturalised citizens, but at the same time do not give up their previous nationality, or passports (or in many of such cases carry two different passports). This last category of person may more accurately be described as 'foreign nationals'.

However for the purposes of this thesis, the major consideration is who is an immigrant and who is a migrant. Later I shall make finer distinctions about refugees and asylum seekers, and how best, for the purposes of this research should they be conceptualised in terms of the immigrant/migrant dichotomy.

An 'immigrant' in South African legal terms is a foreign resident who is not naturalised, but can become a South African, remain a foreigner, or combine both options (as suggested above). An immigrant is generally considered a person who intends to live permanently in the country, and assimilate into the general population. During the years prior to 1994 assimilation implied a white person of good standing and health. (For an analysis of the legislation relating to immigration and its changing racial configurations

see Peberdy and Crush, 1998). Although the cruder aspects of race have been repealed from the legislation of the new South Africa, an immigrant aspiring to be a permanent resident must have 'a good reputation' and be 'desirable'. In addition the immigrant is subject to the Aliens Control Act (No 96, 1991, as amended, Act no 76, 1995), which apart from its surveillance intent, stipulates that such immigrants must satisfy the needs of the country. In other words they must not compete with nationals for employment if there is already an abundance of similar skilled people.

Historically, a migrant in South African terms meant a person who was temporarily in the country to serve specific needs usually in terms of a labour contract. The term 'migrant' in South Africa is closely associated with the apartheid system of internal migration from rural areas to serve the needs of the mining or manufacturing sectors of the urban economy, or the contracts for mine workers from neighbouring countries such as Malawi, Mozambique, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho. In these terms migrants were always temporary sojourners, working on fixed contracts, usually of 12 months duration without any rights to family life, permanent residence or access to property, and enjoying no other rights save those which were minimally granted to them in terms of their contract, or negotiated by their trade union, while living in hostels and compounds. It should also be noted for many rural migrants, it was argued by the apartheid regime, could exercise their citizenship rights in the so-called independent homelands, but not in white South Africa. However if they wished to travel abroad they could do so on South African passports. (The independent homelands were not recognised internationally.) In short in the decades prior to 1994 both local rural migrants and migrants from other countries working in South Africa enjoyed no basic rights associated with citizenship. One should add that while an immigrant, usually white and from Europe, could, in a short space of time became a citizen of South Africa, a migrant (usually black) could never legally attain that status. To add to the confusion, it was possible under apartheid for urban black South African residents to attain citizenship, but no associated rights such as the vote, freedom of movement or association. However, the idea of temporary or transient workers is probably what best describes contemporary migrants from other parts of Africa in South

Africa, whether they are here voluntarily, that is, they came here of their own volition, or as refugees and asylum seekers.

This perverse set of binary opposites, immigrant and migrant, white and black, citizens and non-citizens, still resonates through the public discourse on foreigners in South Africa. There is a widespread tendency to label all immigrants coming from Africa as 'illegal', 'aliens' or 'illegal aliens'. This indiscriminate use of terms does not distinguish among legal immigrants, foreign Africans who legally enter the country, refugees and asylum seekers, those that enter the county clandestinely or illegally and those that enter legally but outstay their visa conditions. The last two categories of migrants may be termed, in less emotional and more neutral language, undocumented workers or migrants. Nor does this usage of terms distinguish between immigrants who intend to settle or reside permanently in the country, and migrants who are here temporarily. This lack of clarity between immigrant and migrant is also echoed in the Aliens Control Act, which is silent on policy towards temporary migrant workers, but nevertheless currently renders them all illegal (Reitzes, 1998: 20-21). Further confusion is added when displaced people like the civilian refugees from the decades-long armed struggle in Mozambique (in which the former South Africa regime instigated and provided assistance to RENAMO) were not, until recently, recognised under international conventions as refugees, which curtailed their freedom of movement and ability to find work in South Africa. (They did, however, enjoy the concession that they could work for white farmers near the borders at lower rates of pay.) This added to the image of Mozambique's displaced people in South Africa as quintessentially legal vagabonds, thieves and a drain on the country's resources. This image is easily transferred to migrants from other African countries.

Furthermore, from the point of view of African migrants themselves, having a passport is not necessarily an indication of their place of origins. In a continent with large movements of people, many forced because of wars, coups, and massacres, others because of their own volitional movements, nationality becomes arbitrary and ambiguous. In these cases nationality and citizenship depend on situational circumstances and how place of origin, parents' nationality, permanent residency, land

ownership (or lack of it), religion and language becomes an ensemble of elements in constructing one's identity. Other factors that have to do with the presentation of identity to enter a country are associated both with the perception and reality of how difficult or simple it is to enter into a country. These become consideration as people make decisions what migration route to take, and changes both to the route taken and the identity adopted en route. Thus as Bouillon points out (2001: 23), migratory movements may be one or more of several possibilities depending on circumstances and possible alternatives: 'irreversible' movements (a single change of residence); 'reversible' movements of long duration (organised work migration); renewed reversibility (daily and seasonal movements); sporadic reversibility (movements depending on opportunities and situations to respond to) and movements with uncertain reversibility.

Given these considerations about the public and legal understanding or misunderstanding of who is a foreign migrant, immigrant, refugee or asylum seeker, and various situations and circumstances such people find themselves in, it is very difficult to know what exactly that is being measured in terms of the current nomenclature that is being used by the South African state, and what exactly is being debated in public.

However that has not stopped people - researchers, cabinet ministers, politicians, the media and the public - from estimating what is inaccurately and clumsily described as 'foreigners', 'illegals', and 'immigrants'. These terms are used interchangeably or as compound nouns (illegal foreigners, illegal immigrants). Bouillon (2001: 23-24) has summarised these pronouncements on the number of illegal immigrants for the period 1989 to 1994 thus:

> In less than a decade the estimated number of illegal immigrants according to government and other influential sources increased from approximately 1 million to 5 million and then to 9.5 million. In 1988/9 the South African Yearbook estimated – on the basis of unspecified sources – that there were 1.2 million illegal black immigrants; in 1992 the estimate increased to 2.5 million; in 1993 to 3 million and in 1994 to 5 million.

Politicians did not query these figures. Danie Schutte, the Minister of Home Affairs in 1993, stated that according to the census of 1991 (which is regarded as a flawed census)

there were 906 000 foreigners in South Africa, including 245 000 illegal aliens. His successor in the new democratic government of 1994, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, said in parliament that there were two million illegal foreigners. He followed this claim with a statement in January 1995 that 'either we chase the foreigners out of the country, or it's the end of the RDP'. He later conceded that it is not possible to get an exact number of undocumented immigrants, but they, the Department Home Affairs, had to rely on estimates and projections to formulate policy (Parliamentary Media Briefing, February, 1998, p5, quoted in Reitzes 1998: 7). It is precisely this need to quantify, in whatever form, that is critiqued as a misplaced focus of policy attention (Reitzes, 1995; 1997, 1998; Crush and Peberdy, 1998; Bouillon, 2001).

One might excuse the excesses of politicians when it comes to inflating immigrant figures, but the South African Police Services released a press statement in June 1995 claiming that there were 8.5 million 'illegals' in the country, a figure that is approximately 20% of the total South African population. The International Labour Organisation's office in Pretoria called the latter figure 'astounding", and the National Labour Market Commission stated the figures were unreasonable (1997: 1). One might have thought this would spur a debate on South Africa as a nation of immigrants, but in fact the very opposite took place, of a nation swamped and infested with immigrants. Adding to the notion of being swamped by 'illegals' was perhaps the worst estimate of the number of foreigners and illegals in the country. This was by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) researchers Minnaar and Hough. They estimated, on the basis of very dubious methods, a sub-set of statistics culled from four surveys conducted between December 1994 and October 1995, that there were between 5.1 and 9.5 million illegal immigrants in South Africa. Taking the higher figure of 9.5 million people, this would mean that the numbers of immigrants are roughly a quarter of the country's population, which at face value seems grossly exaggerated. Minnaar's and Hough's methods, based on perception and a technique called 'spotting' have already been repudiated (see Crush, 1997; Bouillon, 2001; Orkin, 2002; De Klerk, 2002). But this kind of research is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, the HSRC is the premier social science research institute in the country, whose research methods are expected to

be flawless. The research results therefore lend an aura of authority to the conclusions reached, and are therefore believed by many from government ministers, to bureaucrats and the public. Secondly, the stamp of authority associated with HSRC means that their research may be used for policy formulation, and implementation of those policies by the state. Although this research was subsequently repudiated by the HSRC, it is surprising is that it took almost 6 years for such a repudiation. Indeed the release of such statistics, real, imagined or halfbaked did have social and political consequences. These are briefly summarised below.

The context and consequences of releasing such figures in a climate of increasing xenophobia and racism served only to increase tension, and create a climate of hostility and in many cases unwarranted harassment of African foreigners by both those in authority, such as the South African Police Services and officials of the Department of Home Affairs, and by the public, particularly local street traders and the unemployed.

Given the Minister of Home Affairs position on 'foreigners' (as quoted above), it is not surprising that there has been an attempt at greater surveillance and control of illegal immigrants. This is evidenced by the greater control given Home Affairs officials in terms of the Aliens Control Act, and the greater efforts made at deporting 'illegals' (and it might be argued with less parliamentary accountability and oversight). Officials at border posts took a stronger interest in African arrivals and departures, particularly after 1993/4. This increased control over foreign migration and immigration is evidenced in the increasing number of repatriations taking place, the building of the famous, or now infamous, Lindela Holding Centre, and debate over how to patrol the very porous South African border[1]. It has been reported that 180 000 illegal immigrants are deported every year (15 000 every month or 500 a day) to about 92 countries world-wide. Most of these are from Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and that in 1999 approximately 87% of the 120 000 undocumented immigrants in the Lindela Holding Centre were from these two countries (Guyevu, 2002: 2). It should be noted that very few illegal immigrants are

[1] There are 350 registered airports but thereare police at only a few of them. There are official border crossing posts with all neighbouring countries (Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mozambique, and Namibia), but many more unofficial crossing points.

deported to other African countries (Bouillon, 2001: 32). The 200km electric fence bordering Mozambique has been extended (there was a debate within ANC circles as to whether it should be switched on or not). An agreement with the Mozambican government made allowances for the South African army to pursue and track down drug traffickers and illegal immigrants.

Increased control has not stopped the arrival of immigrants and migrants from many African countries. Such migration occurs, much to the surprise of newly arrived foreign migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, in a social climate of xenophobia, hostility and outright racism from many South Africans towards their northern neighbours. And while the new immigrants and migrants go about re-establishing their lives as best they can, particularly as no assistance is offered by the state to asylum seekers and refugees, there is a constant stream of daily harassment by the police force. In indication of this is seen in a number of incidents of police raids, and the problems immigrants face trying to obtain the correct 'papers' from officials in the Department of Home Affairs. The media has also participated in this xenophobia by constantly publishing letters from readers who make accusations that foreigners take away jobs, and business opportunities from street traders, abuse social services such as health and education, and steal local women, without much rebuttal or editorial columns challenging this point of view (see Bouillon, 2001: 25-26, for discussion on this point). In this chapter, and in the thesis as a whole, some of these accusations will be shown be less than credible.

What is clear from the above analysis is that it is impossible to produce reliable statistics on migrants, and in particular illegal immigrants. As Mike de Klerk, Executive Director of the HSRC's research programme on Integrated Rural and Regional Development, noted,

> Precisely because undocumented immigrants have an interest in concealing or misrepresenting their status in surveys or official enquiries, there cannot be a reliable method for estimating their extent. (25 April 2002, press release).

Repudiation of the HSRC's discredited statistics has not stopped government officials and newspapers from continuing to cite them (Crush and Peberdy, n.d.: 10). What is clear is that the production of 'statistics' is done by those agencies of the state that have the most interest in inflating such numbers such as the police, security forces, and government departments such as the Department of Home Affairs who are responsible for producing and implementing immigration policy. Terms such as 'aliens' and 'illegal immigrants' are then used as negative conceptual categories which in turn feed into the decades-long racial consciousness of the public, thus contributing to and feeding off intolerance and outright hostility to anyone who is remotely not considered one of 'us', and thus a threat. Such people so designated, and sometimes quite mistakenly including South Africans who are a few shades darker than the local black African population, are all aliens and by definition 'illegals'. In this sense it is possible to present caricatures of 'foreigners', forestalling any meaningful analysis and discussion of why and how such people arrive in South African, and what such foreigners do to assimilate or insert themselves into the economy and society. (For an analysis of the media role in perpetuating these images, see Danso and McDonald, 2001)

This thesis will focus attention on issues why, how and what foreign migrants from Africa do in practice, specifically migrants from Malawi living in Durban. A further issue will be what implications this has for policy, and more importantly citizenship. Cognisant of the pitfalls of using rigid quantitative methods, data was collected by combining both qualitative techniques such as long-term participant observation and the use of in-depth key informant interviews, and a limited and careful use of a survey by using a snowballing technique. The data produced in this way will not give any absolute enumeration of foreign migrants, but endorses the point of view expressed by Mike de Klerk that:

> Prospective policy can rather seek to attend flexibly to the reasons for such immigration, how immigrants are treated, *what immigrants do when they are here, and the implications* (25 April 2002, press release).

The point really is that foreign migrants are here anyway. As a highly developed economy, relative to other African countries, and perceived as having greater

opportunities, combined with the attraction of democracy and the rule of law, migrants from other countries are more than likely to be attracted here (see also Guyevu, 2002, 160-6; 182-83, for a similar argument about the 'pull' factors that exert such a powerful attraction to South Africa).

This study can be seen as part of a slow but growing literature on foreign migrants in South Africa. The rest of this chapter will focus on official data on legal foreigners, and refugees and asylum seekers for the 1990s. This will provide additional context in which to locate the Malawians and other African migrants in Durban. The review will then focus on those studies undertaken, mainly, though not exclusively, in Johannesburg. This study, located in relation to those studies in Gauteng, should also be seen as part of widening our understanding of foreign migrants, particularly in another major South African urban centre, namely Durban.

4.3 STATISTICS ON LEGAL IMMIGRANTS

Since the Second World War there has been wide fluctuations in documented migration to South Africa. In 1945 there were 2 949 immigrants, reaching a peak in the 1940s of 36 734 in 1948, the year the Nationalist party took control of the country and introduced apartheid. There after there were periodic peaks in 1964 (40 896 immigrants); 1966 (48 051); 1970 (41, 523) and in 1975 (50 464) immigrants. This last figure according to Statistics South Africa was 'largely due to a doubling of the number of immigrants from the UK between 1973 and 1975, and to some extent immigration into South African from Mozambique after that country gained independence in that year' (Report Number 03-51-03, iv). This dropped, but picked up again in 1982 when 45 784 immigrants arrived which was 'largely due to immigration from the UK, China and Portugal'. After this there has been a steady drop in immigration. However immigration to South Africa in the 1990s is nowhere near the levels of the mid 1970s, or early 1980s.

Very clearly immigration from the highs of the 1970s and early 1980s has dropped dramatically. The bias of immigration policy in the past was that it encouraged white

immigration during the years of apartheid, and as we shall see immigrants arrive in smaller numbers from a wide range of countries, including the African continent and Asia. However by the early 1990s documented immigrants dropped below the 10 000 persons per annum, and between 1997 to 2001 to below 5000 per annum (see table 4.1 below).

The table below gives the figures of documented immigrants from 1985 to 2001.

Table 4.1 : Documented Migrants 1985 - 2001

Year	***Number***
1985	17284
1986	6994
1987	7953
1988	10400
1989	11270
1990	14499
1991	12379
1992	8686
1993	9824
1994	6398
1995	5064
1996	5407
1997	4103
1998	4371
1999	3669
2000	3053
2001	4832

It is interesting to note the inflow of immigrants from the Asian continent beginning in the mid 1980s (STATSSA Documented Immigrants, Report Number 03-51-03, iv) which from the point of view of apartheid policy was something to avoid at all costs. But as noted by Hart (2002: 144-161) that during the 1980s various towns, cities and manufacturing centres such as Newcastle and Ladysmith in the province of Kwazulu-

Natal began to restructure their local economies into functional regions. The bureaucrats of this restructuring exercise sought to bring in Asian, particularly Taiwanese, capital to South Africa, and this meant that a rise in Asian immigration was inevitable.



Figure 4.1

In the table below the details of immigration are given on a continental basis, with specific reference to countries from Africa for the year 2001.

Table 4.2: Documented Immigrants By Continent and Permanent Residence, Birth Place and Citizenship: 2001			
Continent	**Previous Permanent Residence**	**Birth Place**	**Citizenship**
Europe	**1714**	**1717**	**1753**
North America	172	169	185
Central and South America	41	42	40
Australasia	51	49	60
Middle East	109	111	107
Asia	**1289**	**1290**	**1281**
Indian Ocean Islands	31	31	32
Africa	**1419**	**1422**	**1374**
Unspecified	6	1	0
Total	**4832**	**4832**	**4832**

Source: STATSSA Documented Immigrants, Report Number 03-51-03

It is very clear from table 4. 2 and the pie graph below that while Europe still represents a significant source of immigrants (36%) (although today Europe includes Central and Eastern European countries, which was not always the case between 1948 until the mid-1980s). Africa accounts for 28% of official documented migrants. However, Africa and Asia together accounts for 55% of total immigration for 2001, which represents a significant shift away from receiving the bulk of immigrants from Europe. In table three the breakdown by country is given for Africa.



Figure 4.2

Table 4.3: African Immigrants by Previous Permanent Residence, Birth Place and Citizenship: 2001				
Country	**Previous Permanent Residence**	**Birth Place**	**Citizenship**	**%**
Algeria	23	23	23	1.6
Angola	14	14	14	1
Benin	2	2	2	0.1
Botswana	21	21	22	1.6
Bukina Faso	1	0	1	0.07
Burundi	3	3	3	0.2
Cameroon	29	28	28	2
Comoros	2	2	2	0.1
Congo	49	50	50	3.6
Cote d'Ivore	11	11	11	0.80
Dem Rep of Congo	18	17	18	1.3
Egypt	44	43	41	2.9
Ethiopia	5	5	5	0.36
Gabon	1	1	1	0.07
Ghana	125	126	126	9
Guinea	1	1	1	0.07
Kenya	60	60	58	4.2
Lesotho	118	115	112	8.15
Liberia	2	2	2	0.1
Libya	12	12	12	.87
Malawi	33	33	33	2.4
Mali	3	3	2	0.1
Morocco	45	45	42	3
Mozambique	40	39	33	2.4
Nambia	2	1	1	0.07
Nigeria	198	198	191	13.9
Rwanda	1	1	1	0.07
St Helena	1	1	1	0.07
Senegal	5	5	5	0.36
Somalia	9	9	9	0.6
Sudan	3	3	3	0.2
Swaziland	31	31	31	2.2
Togo	1	1	1	0.07
Tunisa	2	2	2	0.1
Uganda	79	79	79	5.7
Tanzania	13	13	13	0.9
Zaire	18	17	18	1.3
Zambia	86	89	78	5.7
Zimbabwe	326	326	315	23
Unspecified	6	1	0	0
Total	**1419**	**1422**	**1374**	**+/-100**

Source: STATSSA Documented Immigrants, Report Number 03-51-03

The countries from which the largest documented immigrants (with citizenship) that came to South Africa in 2001 were Zimbabwe (23%), Nigeria (14%), Lesotho (8%), Zambia (6%) and Uganda (6%). As a whole these numbers add up to 775 or 56% of the total immigrants from Africa. One may note that the number of documented Malawians is only 33 or 2.4% of the total.

4. 4 REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS

General international practice is that asylum seekers and refugees are allowed into a country for humanitarian reasons. Although refugees and asylum seekers they have a measure of protection under various United Nation protocols, they have very limited rights in the country of refuge. Such a situation opens the way for their exploitation by employers, agencies of the state and others.

Historically, the largest refugee population in South African has been from Mozambique. These are refugees as a direct consequence of the civil war in Mozambique that raged between RENAMO and the FRELIMO government from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. The apartheid regime during those years supported the RENAMO movement in opposition to the Mozambican government, and in so doing created a refugee crisis.

Acknowledgement of this fact by the South African government led the UN High Commission to implement between March 1993 and March 1995, together with the South African government, a voluntary repatriation scheme which saw 32 000 refugees return to Mozambique. However it was estimated that about 90 000 decided to remain in South Africa (Bouillon, 2001:29)

Table 4.4: Application for Asylum September 1993-1996*			
Country	**Application**	**Processed**	**In Process**
Angola	3 477	3 015	462
Zaire/DRC	2 282	1 855	528
Nigeria	1 849	266	1 623
Somalia	1 667	933	734
Pakistan	1 513	1 093	420
India	1 141	514	627
Senegal	669	41	628
Ethiopia	592	465	127
Rwanda	495	200	295
China	404	151	253
Burundi	338	47	291
Ghana	334	71	263
Other	2 945	729	2 216
Total	**17 807**	**9 340**	**8 467**

*Adopted from Bouillon, 2001: 29

It is very obvious from the table 4.4 that, firstly, during the period 1993-1996, the greatest number of refugees came from Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo, rather than any other African country. This is not surprising seeing that civil wars ranged in both countries. Secondly, refugee status is obtained with some difficulty. For the period 1993-96, just over 52% obtained their official refugee status (48% was still outstanding). For the period 1994-1996, as reported by the Department of Home Affairs, 26 000 people applied for asylum, of these only 10 600 (or 41%) were processed, and 5 200 (20%) were rejected and 3 300 (less than 13%) were accepted (Bouillon, 2001: 29-30). Refugee status is usually granted indefinitely, for two years or for periods up to six months. Those that have 2 year or six month refugee permits need to renew them continuously. Asylum seekers are usually allowed into countries on humanitarian grounds, but whose legal status is in constant limbo, and whose rights are non-existent, and are therefore open to exploitation by employers with little or not protection under the labour laws of the land.

Added to the unprocessed asylum seekers are those whose visas expire, and stay on in the county illegally. These are the over-stayers, on which Bouillon comments (2001: 30) are perhaps the only precise figure of the 'illegals' or 'irregulars'.

Clearly official documented data on immigrants does not adequately reflect the changes that are taking place in terms of the number of foreign African people in country. However, the argument that is being presented here is not that better counting of undocumented foreigners needs to be done, but rather that given that it is unlikely that counting, official or otherwise will yield any significantly accurate results, it is far better to begin to understand what it is that foreign migrants do in South Africa, and what implications this holds in terms of the ways in which foreign migrants and/or immigrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, insert themselves into the society and economy, social interaction between locals and foreigners, and what kinds of contribution such people make in terms of employment and trading opportunities. And thus what needs to be done in policy terms. In the next section I shall review literature on foreign migrants in South Africa. This literature will distinguish between legal categories of migrants and immigrants, and between linguistic categories of francophone and anglophone foreign migrants, between regional origins of non-SADC and SADC migrants, and the types of work, occupation and forms of employment that they become involved to make a living in South Africa. Some discussion on social relations between South African and foreigners will also take place. The main focus is on how, what and why they become involved in certain kinds of economic activities, and what implications this might have in terms of their contributions to economy and society, and for their rights as local residents, economic actors and therefore as citizens.

4.5 AFRICAN CONTINENTAL IMMIGRATION INTO SOUTH AFRICA, WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO FRANCOPHONES IN JOHANNESBURG.

While immigration policy and practice, according to Peberdy and Crush (1998) and Bouillon (2001) has not changed significantly, despite the sweeping political and social changes in South African society as a whole, the movement of African continental people

into South Africa has changed the way informal business is conducted on the city streets, and the social and ethnic composition of many an inner city neighbourhood. As noted above, a key shift in immigration to South Africa has been the immigrants coming from Africa. But this is not just a rush from continental Africa to the borders of South Africa *en masse*. As we shall show through a number of studies undertaken in primarily in Johannesburg, but in other areas as well, there are differences in the kinds of people emigrating to South Africa, and the beginnings are not to be found in post-1994 period.

An important publication dealing with immigration of continental Africans into South Africa is African Immigration to South Africa: Francophone migration of the 1990s by Morris and Bouillon (2001). The book gives a finely textured analysis of who are the francophone immigrants and migrants are, why they came to South Africa, their first encounters with the xenophobic attitudes of South Africans, and the ways in which they have strategised to find accommodation and the means to make a living, and deal with the immense hostility from local people and the agencies of the state that they encounter daily, namely the police and the officials of the Department of Home Affairs. The book also deals with issues related to their evolving relationship with South Africans, particularly black South Africans[2].

As a key category of people coming to South Africa, the francophone Africans have in certain respects changed the character of certain suburbs of Johannesburg such as Hillbrow, Berea, Yeoville, Bertrams (Morris, 2001: 13). Immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers have also come from Senegal, Nigeria, Mali, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Cameroon, Mozambique, and Malawi to name but a few of the other major émigré countries. Bouillon has argued that the francophone African immigrants came in a series of waves beginning in the mid-1980s, and represented a very different kind of grouping to that of the those coming from South Africa's immediate neighbours, Mozambique,

[2] 'Black' as a social and political category has become ambiguous. During the anti-apartheid struggle black referred to all oppressed people regardless of ethnic status. That is, 'black' referred to black Africans, Indians and Coloureds. Today this category has little relevance, and legislation condoning affirmative action specifically categories people into various hierarchical categories of disadvantage, including that of gender. In this context 'black' retains its former meaning, but also specifies, for example in chapters 7 and 8, the social category of Indian, and further, religious groups such as Muslim. These new usages are integral to new identity formation in the post-apartheid period.

Swaziland, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Malawi. South Africa's immediate neighbours all form part of the Southern African Development Community. Generally the francophone Africans represented a well educated, urban, and initially middle to upper income group of people. In the mid-late 1990s more working class and people with a peasant backgrounds arrived.

There are different periodisations of these waves of immigrants and migrants from Africa to South Africa. Kadima (2001: 92-98) argues that in the case of the waves of Congolese immigrants arriving in South Africa can be divided up into five periods. These periods are intimately related to the political and economic instability in the Congo from the late 1980s onwards. The periods are: (1) 1988/89 - a trickle of Zairians came into South Africa; (2) 1990 - the ending of one party rule in Zaire, but political instability and the Massacre of Lubumbashi prompts a number of students to flee to South Africa. Some of the middle-class business and professionals begin to arrive; (3) 1991 - widespread political turmoil precipitated a socio-economic meltdown. Business companies closed and European and American embassies stopped issuing visas to Zairians. This signalled the first real wave of Zairians to South Africa; (4) 1992 - a lull in emigration to South Africa, while the outcome of the election of Etienne Tshisekedi as Prime Minster takes shape. (5) 1993 - Zaire plunges into chaos and a flood of Zairians/Congolese arrives in South Africa. However, this concerns only the Congolese immigrants, and has less relevance in trying to understand the waves of migration as a whole, than specifically with the Congolese. Bouillon (2001) takes a different perspective, and focussing on francophone Africa as a whole, argues that there were three waves or periods of emigration to South Africa from the francophone countries. The first wave was dominated by former Zairian political elites, businessmen and professionals such as engineers, medical doctors, academics, teachers and other professionals. Other such professionals also came from anglophone countries such as Uganda and Nigeria. Many found jobs in business corporations and universities. Soon they were joined by a similar groupings of people from Rwanda, Ivory Coast and Gabon. Although there was a policy of academic boycotts and sanctions against the apartheid regime, these elites were welcomed and were muted in their criticism of government policies at the time.

The second wave began as soon as the transition to democracy was established in South Africa. It also occurred at a time when other African countries tried to institute democratic reforms. However, worsening economic conditions, and massive political instability soon saw many of the middle classes migrating towards South Africa. While many saw South Africa as a beacon of hope and stability, it was also the case that many found it increasingly difficult to gain access to European countries because of the tightening of immigration laws. This period was also dominated by the elite and middle class of former Zaire. Nigerians were also part of this wave, initially mainly academics, and later other professionals and entrepreneurs arrived. In the late 1980s and early 1990s it was easier for Nigerians and Zaireans (now DRC Congolese) to enter South Africa (Morris, 2001: 71). The South African government in order to stem the tide of Zaireans began to increase the visa application payments from $1 000 in 1993 to $2 000 in 1996. However, the lucrative diamond, cobalt and copper trade ensured that there were always some Zairians who could afford such hefty visa payments. As political and economic conditions began to worsen in countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Ivory Coast, and others countries the first waves of refugees and asylum seekers began to filter through. This represented the third wave of African continental immigration into South Africa. This third wave also found another grouping: those working class or peasant background, with modest incomes, many of them informal traders who saw in South Africa a possible land of greater or new economic opportunities.

What then were the reasons for this migration? Bouillon (2001: 45-46) offers five reasons: (1) to pursue their studies, which in their own countries had been disrupted, or could not be furthered due to disruptions and civil war; (2) to escape the political and economic instability, particularly in countries such as Burundi, Rwanda and the former Zaire; (3) to seek employment or better trading opportunities – professionals sought employment, and the less educated and entrepreneurial types sought trading opportunities; (4) to explore new opportunities - as part of a globalised economy many saw South Africa as part of a widening scope of opportunities; and finally (5) others left to follow their families, or were forced to leave by their families to join husbands, or

siblings or other kin. In the case of Nigerians, three major reasons are given for coming to South Africa. These are lack of job opportunities in their home country, the desire to continue or pursue additional studies, and their fear of political persecution (Morris, 2001: 71)

The choice of South Africa for francophones' migration is, at first, surprising, given the language difficulties. According to Guyevu (2002: 183), language differences did not deter migration from francophone countries. However a number of reasons have been offered for this francophone immigration and migration to South Africa. For many it was not their first, but rather a second or third choice of destination. Kadima's research shows that for more than three quarters of the Congolese, Europe or America would have been their first choice but they were unable to emigrate because of the difficulties in getting entry, or being refused entry, or that it was financially impossible (2001: 96). South Africa was closer and cheaper, and its border were much more open than 'fortress Europe'. Others made a conscious choice of South Africa, in part because of the opportunities it represented, and as part of a solidarity exercise. South Africa was, and in many respects is still held as the example of the way out of Africa's quagmire of despotic regimes and economic mismanagement. A third reason for choosing South Africa is because it represents the land of opportunity – the 'new Eldorado' as Bouillon puts it (2002: 47) – for economic and trading opportunities, as well as education and employment opportunities for the middle class professionals and businessmen. Some saw it as a land to which to extend their continental and global trade networks, both legal and illegal.

While these choices were being made, very few knew what the real South Africa was like, and although many, especially refugees, are grateful for the chance to re-build their lives or expand their opportunities professionally and economically, most would probably not want to reside permanently in this country. Unlike other countries, refugees and asylum seekers are not confined to camps, but are free to find employment or work for themselves. While this does give them a sense of freedom of movement, in reality it is

very difficult to do so because they do not have a thirteen-digit identity number to enable them to be registered as a work seeker, or take up any employment offered.
Although I have outlined above the tough social and political context in South Africa in which these francophone migrants inserted themselves, as well as the difficult economic conditions that prevails in South African economy, the kinds of work that many of these migrants engage in must also be distinguished: the elite and upper middle class migrants/immigrants, the middle class and working class/peasant migrants (see Bouillon 2001: 36-44) for a discussion on the class components of continental immigration to South Africa). This is necessary because the strategies for making a living are different, and the focus of this thesis is more on those from working class and peasant backgrounds, than the elite and middle classes. Nevertheless it is important to describe and analyse the range of economic activities related to both the circumstances and income and class position that these immigrants came from or found themselves in.

Kadima (2001:99-100) has shown that a group of professional managers and business men from Zaire were able to find work easily in South Africa as the link between South African businesses and their counter-parts in the francophone world. Thus they were able to assist South African companies' entry into African markets, and according to him, assist 'with the aim of investing and/or opening up new markets' in Southern, Central and East Africa within which 250 million people live. These francophones were able in turn later to work as export consultants on their own or set up their own import-export companies (Kadima, 2001: 100). While the well connected political elite and upper middle classes that fled places like Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) were able to easily insert themselves into the South African economy by setting up businesses or as professionals, including buying upmarket luxury apartments and residences in the suburbs (Bouillon, 2001: 48-50), others such as the refugees from the Great Lakes area and places such as Somalia[3], did not have these options. For many of them, even though well educated and professionals such as teachers, nurses, administrators, economists etc, had/have a more difficult time in finding employment. For many of them they have had

[3] Somalia is not a francophone country, but is mentioned here because, like in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a civil war produced a flood of refugees.

to resort to street trading, trading in fleamarkets, and for the more entrepreneurial import-export businesses linked to their country of origin.

Those that were more entrepreneurial found that they could act as informal middle men between Angolan or Congolese business men and South African business leaders, acting as translators, interpreters and purchasing and sales managers. This necessitated in many instances developing a network of friends in the business world. A point worth noting, in the light of the critique above of attempts to enumerate immigrants, legal or otherwise, is that the researcher Kadima, himself a Congolese, found it difficult to obtain information relating to issues of profitability of Congolese businesses, or the precise details of business transactions. As he states:

> The entrepreneurs became suspicious when asked questions relating to the profitability of their businesses. Some suspected that the interviewer was undertaking preliminary research to enter the same business, whereas others feared that the information given could be used against them" (2001: 102).

This is to be expected, but it did indicate not only the fearfulness of immigrants about what information is given, how it may be used, and against whom, but that business transactions with the rest of Africa are more than likely to be undocumented and under-reported.

Those who engaged in street trading, or the informal sector, out of necessity did not find it difficult to adapt. Kadima reports that 70% of the Congo economy already was informal, and therefore was familiar to the Congolese in South Africa (2001: 100). But the informal sector in Congo is probably qualitatively different from South Africa. However, what is necessary to understand is that there are different categories of people involved in these activities. Firstly, there are those involved in the import-export business, but who carry out their market selling activities on the streets and fleamarkets of Johannesburg. Many of these people were not traders per se, but through circumstances became street traders. They come, according to Kadima, from a number of different professional fields such as mathematics, engineering, accountancy, and pilots

(2001: 102). The type of goods they import and sell on the streets are malachite, wooden crafts, curios, and Congolese clothing, all of which is obtained by 'wholesalers' who import directly by air-freighting the goods which necessitates customs duties and ground transport. These are then sold to retailers, for cash or credit, before being sold on the street. There are also those who import cloth, West African textiles and clothes. This often means partnerships with other francophone immigrants from Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali or Ghana, and the designers in those respective countries. These Congolese also export South African manufactured goods such as cosmetics, textiles, electronic and food products to the Congo, as well as other central African countries. The second category of street traders are asylum seekers and students who during and after the civil war in the Congo ran into financial difficulties. Congolese students whose income from the DRC had been cut off have come to depend on these very informal economic activities to pay their university fees, and sustain their families (Kadima, 2001: 103). For asylum seekers and refugees working in the informal economy is their only means of earning a livelihood. However it did necessitate developing a network of traders, often through friends and relatives, to provide the initial advice and start-up capital. The type of goods sold range from imported artefacts from Congo or West Africa, such as malachite, curios and textiles, made up West African garments to hand bags, belts, and shoes. There is also a growing number who import clothing from south-east Asia and sell them in fleamarkets, neighbouring townships and smaller towns outside Johannesburg. However, unlike the Congolese elite, their residential and living conditions were/are confined to the densely populated inner cities, partly to find protection and security from the hostility of locals and officials, and partly because of easy access to their trading places in the city. In Johannesburg this means living in places such as Hillbrow, Bertrams, Berea and to a lesser extent Yeoville. For many in this strata of migrants such conditions represented a downward mobility. Yet Kadima's work shows that many Congolese who start modestly become successful at their business, and provide employment for at least two additional persons (2001: 107). But at the same time their success, despite the lack of state support for small, micro and medium enterprises of immigrants, attracts the hostility of local traders who accuse them of using unfair and illegal practices (2001: 105).

Yet not every Congolese informal trader or immigrant is a success story. For some this downward mobility (compared to their status in the DRC) means that survival translates into dependence and sharing of resources with family and friends, and living in cramped conditions at subsistence levels of comfort. This point of sharing resources shall be examined in detail as it applies to the Malawians who are the main group of migrants researched for the purposes in this thesis. The third broad category of immigration has been from the working and peasant classes of countries such as Senegal, Mali and Malawi. Here one needs to distinguish between the professional traders, whose informal trading is a network based on import-export business across the continent and globally, and those who are small traders but who sell goods on the street and fleamarkets, reliant on local wholesalers to purchase the goods they sell, in order to make a living. Both groups remit money in dollars, or euros (in the past, francs) to their families back home. As far as educational levels are concerned, this can range from university graduates and professionals to illiterate peasants who are sent by their families to earn money. Both these groupings are represented by the Senegalese, and to lesser extent the Malawians. For the 'professional' international street traders among the Senegalese they have an extended global network based on the Muslim Mouride brotherhood. These traders have a double status of being traders and international migrants (Bredeloup, 1995:21). The Senegalese single subsistence trader on the street also has access to the Mouride brotherhood, expressed through a community network known as the *dahira,* (or *di'ira*) and which in its local context, such as in Durban, Johannesburg, or Cape Town provides a place to meet, for prayer and the collections of funds to provide for emergency assistance to any member. For the Malawians, the distinction between professional international traders and the subsistence trader is less clear, but nevertheless there are these basic categories. There is also an additional category that includes those who seek and find formal employment in South Africa in vast range of occupations ranging from gardening to factory floor worker, from shop assistants to tailors and mechanics. These are foreign migrants who seek and find employment (as employees in many cases), rather than as entrepreneurs as was described above for the Congolese and Senegalese. A case study of foreign migrants in the construction, hotel, catering, retail and domestic sectors will be described later.

However there are Malawian and Senegalese traders' and entrepreneurs' economic activities which would be classified as informal, e.g. street and fleamarket traders, informal retailers, wholesalers, motor mechanics and tailors. The range of educational levels among the Malawians tends to be less or lower than the Senegalese. In the following chapters greater details on the Malawians will be outlined. In both the cases of the Senegalese and Malawians there are those, who despite the problems of xenophobia, hostility and intolerance, and associated problems of finding employment and living spaces, are beginning to see their stay in South Africa as more long term, perhaps even permanent rather than transitory, short term, or temporary and is evidenced in the case of the Senegalese by the purchase of a house to establish a permanent base for the *dihira*, the beginning of establishing formal business premises. Some have began to marry local women. In the case of the Malawians setting up businesses, acquiring property and marrying local women are indicators that migrancy can turn out to be permanent residency. In short, rather than seeing the hostility as an insurmountable problem, for some immigrants/ migrants, ways have been found to overcome such problems and still make a more than comfortable living (though this is not to underplay their problems of racism, xenophobia and outright hostility from South Africans towards them, and their associated problems of insertion and assimilation into South African society).

For all African immigrant/ migrant groups in Johannesburg the importance of trading cannot be underestimated. In a study done by Rogerson of immigrant entrepreneurs in Johannesburg in 1996-67 it was found that they contributed 'to the revitalisation of the declining economy of the city centre' and consider Johannesburg a city 'full of opportunities and appropriate for doing business' (Rogerson, 1997: 9). Between November 1996 and February 1997 seventy immigrants involved in informal trade in central Johannesburg were interviewed. They came from the following countries: Mali, DRC (Zaire), Senegal, Guinea, Congo, Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Gambia and Uganda, and their main trading or business activities centre around 'the production or retailing of clothes and curios, motor-car repairs and panel beating, the selling of specialist foods [usually to their own national or ethnic groups] running restaurants,

hairdressing salons and import-export enterprises' (1997: 19). The following points are worthy of consideration, especially in the light of accusations that they take away jobs and are a drain on the social services of the county.

1. They have a high level of education – 50% of the sample have tertiary education (1997: 7, 11).
2. They are connected and are inserted in a widespread international network, which assists in starting and maintaining their businesses and shapes their business strategies both in Africa and beyond (1997: 13).
3. 60% of them brought their initial capital with them, and some from working as employees within South Africa (1997: 12).
4. Some were already established entrepreneurs, both in their own countries and in South Africa (1997: 2).
5. They exploit niche markets, including their own ethnic markets (main markets being black and white South African markets and tourists) (1997: 11).
6. They employ on average 4 persons, half of whom are South African (1997: 14-15)
7. Most of their profits are re-invested with only about a quarter being remitted. (1997: 17).

Rogerson makes the point that the study also highlights differences in those that come from the SADC countries and those from the non-SADC countries. The differences he notes are:

1. Businesses operated by non-SADC migrants are integrated into and supported by an international migrant network. In this they mimic multi-national corporations. SADC migrants tend to operate independently.
2. SADC migrants have smaller, less well capitalised operations compared to their non-SADC counterparts
3. The non-SADC businesses, particularly francophones, capitalise on 'ethnic business' – i.e. trading in goods that are targeted to specific national or ethnic groups.

4. The non-SADC entrepreneurs have higher educational qualifications than those from the SADC countries, and considerably 'wider horizons' in their business development strategies. (1997: 10-11).

The question of differences in terms of place of employment and the type or sector that foreign migrant workers find themselves in is explored in two studies as reported below, that of Reitzes (1998) and Geyevu (2001).

4.6 FOREIGN MIGRANTS AND FORMAL WORK

Reitzes (1998) has undertaken an industrial sectoral study of migrants and immigrant workers namely in the construction, hotel, restaurant, domestic and retail sectors in North West province and Gauteng provinces. This study is important for a number of reasons:

- Firstly, it investigates foreign immigrants and migrants beyond the urban metropolitan city centres, and in sectors where foreign African immigrants tend to be employees, rather than the self-employed urban entrepreneurs as is the case in many of the studies presented above in Morris' and Bouillon's book (2001) and that of Rogerson (1997) These are also sectors that migrants, immigrants and guest workers are likely to enter in many of the countries in Europe.
- Secondly, it was undertaken to 'shed light on foreign migrants'' reasons for choosing particular economic activities, and the extent to which such 'choices were determined by their skills and experience and their ability to manage particular work environments' (Reitzes, 1998: 5).
- Thirdly, the study tests the of ease of entry into these sectors.
- Fourthly, it investigates the kind of workplace relations that might exist between locals and the foreign migrants and immigrants.

It should be noted that the kind of economic activities that immigrants /migrants are involved in the city centre of Johannesburg, and those that Reitzes investigates are not the only sectors where foreign immigrants and migrants may be found. But as Reitzes' study is not a scientific sampling of the selected industrial sectors, it cannot be claimed as a representative sample of all industrial sectors, or of these specific sectors. However it

must be noted that such qualitative studies such as Reitzes' and others are important because they illustrate the issues that face migrants, albeit, in different contexts and sectors of the economy which cannot be gained from sampling procedures for the same reasons already outlined in chapter two and above.

In Reitzes' study 83 migrants were interviewed, 50 in Gauteng and 33 in North West. They came from a wide range of countries in Africa: Mozambique (32), Lesotho (6), Ethiopia (5), Botswana (11), Zimbabwe (8), Togo (3), Zambia (3), Zaire (DRC) (2), Malawi (5), Comoros (1), Liberia (1), Nigeria (1), Ghana (1), Swaziland (1), Cote d'Ivoire (3). Clearly the largest group comes from Mozambique, and their views and perspectives dominate the study (1998: 11). My review here will concentrate on the construction and hotel and catering sectors. The retail sectors seems to reflect very much the same trends and issues covered by Morris and Bouillon (2001) and Rogerson (1997), that many are self-employed entrepreneurs. The domestic sector is reviewed briefly below in the context of women migrants.

The profiles of the migrants indicate that they mostly men and are aged between 20 and 40 (1998: 12). Although most of the respondents arrived in the 1990s, Reitzes comments that a closer examination of the patterns of arrival indicate some differences.

- Firstly, three quarters of those who are in Gauteng arrived after 1990, with a little over half in the North West province. This indicates a longer historical and significant cross-border migration in the North West province, largely because of the mines employing foreign migrants. (Reitzes, 1998: 15)
- Secondly, when separated between the SADC countries and non-SADC countries, most migrants from the latter countries arrived after 1995, which confirms Rogerson's earlier findings for foreign immigrant entrepreneurs in Johannesburg (1998: 12).
- A third observation is the presence of women migrants. There often appear to be few or no women migrants from the African continent, which suggests confirmation of Revenstein's hypothesis that women rarely migrate over long distances. There are in fact women migrants, but in Reitzes study these are few

and tend to be in the domestic sector (1998: 48; 50). While their status as foreigners and women may have been factors in their ease of access to employment, it appears that for many of these women this was a conscious choice because of the potential free accommodation and food, which predisposed them to choosing this sector. This issue of migrants and immigrants choosing a particular sector for employment will also be covered in the construction and hotel sectors.

The construction industry seems to be relatively easy to enter for migrants, and tends to be dominated by Mozambicans, although there were also migrants from Botswana, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Togo (Reitzes, 1998: 35 and 42). The sector is dominated by SADC migrants. Although their educational qualifications ranged widely from illiterate to degrees and diplomas in engineering and building science, most tend to have lower qualifications such as primary and high school. This finding is not dissimilar from Malawians as will be seen in the next chapter. In short "levels of education did not correlate with skills". For example a 42 year-old Mozambican, although illiterate, works in the informal sector as a self-trained builder, while on the other end of the scale there is a chemical engineer trained in Germany who plies his building and construction skills in South Africa because there is steady supply of work earning a mere R1 000 per month. (1998: 36). They have multiple skills learnt on the job, and perform a variety of tasks such as plastering, roofing, paving, rough-casting, painting, and bricklaying. Some perform specialised tasks such as electrical work, welding and plumbing. (1998: 36). Many claim that they are taxed, although some say they have no deductions from their salaries. A few contribute to a pension fund, but by far the most common complaint is that they do not know if they are taxed or what benefits they enjoy, if any at all.

The reasons offered for being in this sector is that it offers a range of advantages, some of which relates to them being undocumented migrants and illegal workers.

- There are low entry requirements: basically unskilled labour is needed for work such as sweeping, passing bricks, mixing cement, but additional skills can be learnt on the jobs.

- Accommodation is usually provided free on building sites in toolsheds, or semi-completed buildings (1998: 37).
- Such accommodation also
  - Provides a measure of protection because they do not have to interact with local citizens, or contend with harassment from state officials (1998: 37).
  - They feel protected from the rampant crime. (1998: 37).
  - As many are employed by the same contractor, they can speak in their own language, thus avoiding detection by locals as foreigners (1998: 37).
- There is a network of contacts to inform about jobs and to recruit new employees. This applies particularly among Mozambicans, whose network of contacts provides a stream of information on employment prospects (1998: 38).
- For those in the informal sectors of the construction industry, they have learnt to manipulate rules and loopholes in the construction industry regulations to undertake a variety of small but productive building related jobs because of the housing shortages and the ability to give lower quotations. (1998: 38).
- There are opportunities for self-employment once the necessary skills have been learnt. At the very least, especially for those in formal employment, there is the opportunity to be informally employed doing odd jobs on weekends and holidays.
- The short-term nature of the building contracts enabled them to return home more often than if it was a 12 month contract with a mining company.

Given these reasons for entry into the construction industry, Reitzes (1998: 42) comments that foreign workers have a relative advantage over local workers in the construction industry, because of their more vulnerable status, and the perception that they are more hardworking (or exploitable). However it is precisely the difficulty to regulate short-term contract work in the construction industry that makes it insecure and exploitative for all workers. The presence of foreign workers precipitates a downward spiral on wages: 'their wages further depresses already poor conditions and wages, resulting in ever-increasing low wage competition'. Thus employers can draw from an ever widening pool of unemployed and undocumented workers who are prepared to accept the low wages and poor working conditions. While South Africans may not accept such conditions, it does

not displace them from jobs in the construction industry. This particular set of circumstance also places in context the foreign-migrant interaction. A close reading of Reitzes work shows the interaction to be varied, from outright hostility to friendly and co-operative relations. However, much of the employment in this sector appears to depend on two contrasting images. One is that South African employees are 'arrogrant, lazy and pompous' in contrast to Mozambicans who are perceived by employers (and to an extent by Mozambicans themselves) to have a better work ethic than the locals (1998: 39; 41). Secondly, South African employers are in general harsh, abusive to all, foreigners and local labourers alike, but especially to immigrants. A common complaint seems to be that they do not pay wages on time, and not always the correct amount. This unfair treatment is sometimes deflected by locals towards the foreign migrant workers as if it is, or was their fault that employers do not pay wages on time. However foreign workers are willing to do almost any work for some money, and hence have easier access to jobs in construction industry.

In the hotel, restaurant and catering sector the entry level skills are low, which is the reason many of the foreign workers gave for joining this sector. Some claimed that the free meals and tips were also an incentive to enter the industry. Another reason given was that many had experience of this sector in their own country which predisposed them to enter this industry (1998: 44-5, 47). Again, in terms of the sample of respondents, it is dominated by foreign migrant workers from the SADC countries (1998; 44, 46). Those who came from non-SADC countries were better educated and at least one person, an Ethiopian women with a teacher's diploma entered the sector for entrepreneurial reasons, claiming to make a gross earning of R14 000 per month (1998: 45; 48). However skills and training varied from having a diploma in teaching to having no education. The varied educational backgrounds did not correspond to their multiple jobs as waiters, cooks, dishwashers and barmen in the formal sector (1998: 45). Very few of Reitzes' respondents ran their own catering businesses (1998: 45). As with the construction industry foreigners, particularly Mozambicans, tend to be recruited via networks (1998: 45).

It seems that those formally employed in this sector had greater security as far as regular payment of salaries and wages is concerned, and were taxed. From their earnings they remitted as little as R300 to as much as R1 000 a month. Most claimed that the social relationships with South Africans were cordial, although any hostility seemed more racist than xenophobic (1998: 46, 48). However there was the often repeated comment that South African are not as dedicated to their work in comparison to foreign workers.

Reitzes' study is important for it gives an important insight into the kind of skills that foreign migrants have, their reasons for entering specific industrial sectors, and the implications this might have for the industry. It also makes important distinctions between SADC and Non-SADC foreign migrants. The following points are important to note:

1. Non-SADC migrants seem to have higher educational levels than migrants from SADC countries.
2. The construction, hotel, catering and domestic sectors where most SADC migrants are found to have a low skill entry requirement.
3. Experience and acquiring of skills is an attractive incentive to enter these sectors of the economy.
4. Acquiring skills means that migrants have flexibility in finding work, and can work in both formal and informal sectors.
5. Although poorly paid, there is remittance of a portion of wages or profits of all foreign migrants to their home countries. This contradicts the commonly held notion that all revenue is remitted, thus draining the local economy.
6. Recruitment through networks is prevalent in the construction, hotel, catering and restaurant sectors.
7. Some respondents have deliberately chosen these sectors either because they have the skills, or acquired the skills, or feel that they can exploit a niche market.
8. Many, especially those from non-SADC countries seem to be overqualified for the jobs that they do.

9. Non-SADC migrants tend to want to invest in entrepreneurial activities, rather than simply work as employees. Such investments may create employment for local people, or least, much needed economic activity.
10. Not all foreign migrants are low skilled, low wage workers. Some are highly qualified but fail to find jobs.
11. The presence of foreign migrant workers in industries such as construction does tend to depress wages, but is probably a consequence of the way the industry is organised to accept low skilled, poor educated exploitable workers. (Reitzes, 1998: 55-6).

Geyevu (2001) has undertaken research on migrants in four urban areas, namely Umtata, Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town. This research was based on interviewing 20 migrants from Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and 10 each from Ghana, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Swaziland and Senegal. (n=100). Although his main focus was on questions of push-pull factors, xenophobia, and policy implications, it contains useful information on what migrants actually do when they arrive and take steps to meet their subsistence needs.

The basic profile of the immigrants and migrants in Geyevu's sample is as follows:

1. Most of the migrants, some 85%, are between the ages of 15 and 34 years, and are mostly male (85%) (2002: 152).
2. There is more or less equal distribution of those with a matric and below qualification (53%, although 8% have not complete their high school education), and those with a technical diploma (47%). (It is not clear whether this is a post-high school diploma). No one in the sample has a university degree. Geyevu does indicate that West African migrants had a higher level of education than those from Southern Africa. However he includes Congolese in his Southern African subset, which as shown above have not only different economic or political reasons for being in South Africa, but also higher levels of education than those from other SADC countries. (2001: 154-156; 181-182)

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3. 49% arrived in the post 1994 period, while others (51%) arrived in South Africa at varying dates in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
4. Most of the respondents (60%) arrived by road through Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Botswana. (2001: 149), with up to 75% travelling in groups, while the balance (25%) making individual journeys. Other modes of transport to South Africa were by air and sea (2001: 158-9).
5. Local associations of their country folk do assist in finding jobs, providing financial assistance to start businesses, and ways of protecting themselves from arrest by police (2001: 156).
6. The main reasons for migrating to South Africa were given as follows: 60% economic, 22% political, 10% economic and political and having a tourist visa, 8%. The exact kind of economic or political reasons are not given by Guyevu.
7. 75% of the respondents indicated that they do not wish to stay in South Africa. 41% indicated that they would prefer to be in some other place in Europe or America (2001: 161). This confirms the findings of Kadima that for many Congolese South Africa is a staging post to other countries, especially Europe and America.
8. As far as employment is concerned, Geyevu reports that 83% of them are self-employed, while the remaining 17% are employed in the security industry as security guards or officers (2001: 166). The following are the types of self-employed occupations they are involved in: trading in leather goods – watch straps, belts, leather shoes (25%); cobbler – shoe repairs (18%); hawking fruit and vegetables (15%); barbering (13%); trading in artefacts (10%); sewing (7%) and hairdressing (4%). Guyevu makes the point that these are not occupations in which most self-employed South African informal traders are involved, [except hawking and trade in various kinds of artefacts] and are those for which immigrants nor migrants are quite likely to have been (2001: 167).

Guyevu's work is useful in that it underscores many of the points made by other cases studies reviewed in this chapter. However the presentation of his data does not often distinguish between SADC and non-SADC countries, or between francophones and

anglophones, points which are highlighted in both Morris' and Bouillon's collection on francophone immigrants, and in Reitzes' work on migrants in the different sectors of the economy. He also does not distinguish between the category of migrant and immigrant. These differences and distinction are important because it informs the movements, strategies and practices adopted by migrants and immigrants to make a living in South Africa.

4.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter began with a critical review of the value of quantifying undocumented immigrants and migrants. The historical meaning of a migrant as a rural based eleven-month contract worker in the mining or manufacturing sector with few or no rights was shown to be inadequate to describe the new patterns of migration from African countries to South Africa. Attempts to quantify the 'problem', it was argued, are misplaced, and accentuate a misleading debate on who is legally or illegally in the country, without attempting to understand the underlining reasons for migration from African countries to South Africa. Indeed the debate exacerbates racism and xenophobia, rather than contributing to an understanding of the problem. It was shown that there is a huge gap between estimates of undocumented immigrants and official statistics on legal immigrants, and that it is impossible to bridge this gap by technically dubious research techniques at quantifying the problem. Rather, it has been argued, the focus should be on why, how and what migrants and immigrants do when they come to themselves in the economy and South African society.

It was also shown that foreign African immigrants and migrants are not a homogenous category of people. Not only do they come from different countries, but may also be distinguished by income, language, and region of origin such as francophone, anglophone, non-SADC, SADC, West African, Southern African, as well as by their occupational training, educational levels and actual work experiences, and place of work. Foreign migrants are traders (global and local), entrepreneurs, professionals, students, and employees in formal and informal businesses, and are found in a variety of different sectors of the economy. An obvious distinction had to be made between legal

immigrants who come to work with a view to permanent residency in South Africa and migrants who find work in South Africa as a necessity, or as part of a contract of employment for specific period of time. These differences also inform the kind of strategies and practices employed by immigrants and migrants. It should be noted that for some the choice of survival strategy or occupation is largely 'structured' in terms of networks bringing into the market friends and relatives, as well limitations on possible jobs that are available, some migrants making deliberate choices as to which sector to find employment. This is not just for income reasons, but also to learn and train for a variety of skills, which give greater flexibility to their future options within South Africa, in their own country, or other countries.

While these differences are important to consider in terms of why, how and what migrants do in South Africa, it is also important to outline what are their general characteristics. Most of the migrants are within the age category of 15 to 35 years and are (or desire to be) economically active. Many have found their jobs, or initial work, through a network of family and friends, or through their local associations. These networks and associations also provide the initial start-up capital, when necessary, for a migrant to enter into street trading. Many foreign migrants are well educated, although non-SADC migrants and immigrants tend to be better educated than SADC migrants. However, education levels range from university degrees to illiteracy. Furthermore, in practice their training and professional occupational status may not match actual work or occupation.

Depending on their work situation and income earned nearly all migrants send remittances back home. Contrary to popular perception this is not a removal of a substantial portion of income and hence vast sums of foreign exchange from the economy. One main reason for sending remittances is to support a family back home, but other reasons are to raise sufficient capital to start their own enterprises in their own countries. Working and learning different skills also enables them put into practice these skills in their own country. Also contrary to popular belief, most migrants are not a drain on society. They support themselves, and indeed many a foreign migrant trader or

entrepreneur on the street actually employs some local people. However, in those sectors such as construction where they are employees, rather than self-employed, they are easily exploited, and do push down wages. As it was shown, this is a result of the way the construction industry is structured, rather than simply an issue of super-exploitable foreign migrants who will work for any kind of money.

In general it was shown through a review of the literature that foreign migrants make a contribution by their participation in the economy and society of South Africa, and in fact are not a drain on the resources of the country. Yet it is clear that the immigration system discriminates not just against those with few skills and educational qualifications but also those who have advanced skills. But many migrants, such as the Mozambicans in the construction industry, have been able through a variety of means to acquire the experience and skills to apply in niche markets, and in the process support both themselves and their families. Although many face the problems of xenophobia, and constraints to operating a formal business, or being employed formally, they have not allowed it to become a deterrent to making a livelihood. However it is clear that as refugees and as undocumented migrants many would not qualify for permanent residence, and eventually formal citizenship.

In the next chapter many of these characteristics will be explored more fully with reference to a Southern African Development Community of migrants, namely Malawians. While these Malawians, as it will be seen, have many similarities with the migrants studied by Reitzes, Geyevu, Bouillon, Rogerson and others, there are also differences. Malawians have a longer history of contact with South Africa, and their networks are more deeply rooted, or have become resuscitated in a more active way since the early 1990s in the wake of the transition and easier entry into the country. In the main they are not to be found in the construction industry, and very few trade visibly on the street as informal traders. They do, however, work in the retail and services industry either as employees, or as entrepreneurs. As they are not refugees, asylum seekers, or immigrants, a central platform of their livelihood strategies is to be unobtrusive, to remain hidden, but to engage at an economic level and participate through their local

connections with local communities and associations in projects of mutual concern. One of those associations is with local Muslims. This ambiguity, of being hidden, yet connected to public civil society associations, as well as other issues will be explored in chapters five and six through a detailed statistically based account of the Malawians, providing information on their places of origin, biographical details, their movement and insertion into Durban's economy and society, the creation of their livelihood strategies through networks and their own efforts, and continuing contacts with Malawi. It will illustrate the new pattern of migration that is emerging, that is, transnationalism, but will also show some of the differentiation within Malawian migrants. Chapter five and six will form the baseline for subsequent chapters which give a richer textured account of the way Malawians arrived, insert and participate in Durban and raising important issues about the use of identities, including that of citizenship identity.

CHAPTER FIVE

MIGRATING TO DURBAN:
A STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Malawians have a long history of migration to South Africa and have contributed significantly to its economic and political development. Since the discovery of diamonds, Malawians along with other Southern African peoples would walk to find work on the diamond mines. One of the more famous of the early Malawian migrant workers was Clements Kadalie who started the first mass based African trade union, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union in the 1920s. Later, in the 1960s and 1970s, migrant workers from Malawi formed a significant segment of South Africa's mining contract labour force, although from 1974 this began to drop, and had virtually ceased by 1988. During the years of apartheid the South African state had a very open and friendly relationship with Malawi. This long history of association at various levels forms the backdrop for a different wave of migration of Malawians into South Africa. Malawians, by their own testimony, have easier entry into South Africa than other people from the African continent. The other context that forms the backdrop to this migration is the efforts to restructure the Malawian economy through structural adjustments programmes through the 1980s and 1990s and their effects on the agricultural basis of the economy and employment (see Cromwell, 1992; Cromwell and Winpenny, 1993; Ahmed and Lipton, 1997, New Agriculturalist On-Line, and SARPN). Yet this new wave of migration from Malawi is more often hidden than apparent, and it is the specificity of this paradoxical, quasi-legal migration, rather than those who are legal immigrants, or who claim asylum or refugee status that is the focus in this chapter and in chapter six.

This chapter will describe these new migrants in one city in South Africa, that is, Durban, and highlight some of the important social and economic characteristics of this group. Indeed as will become apparent it is a specific group of Malawians, mostly from southern

Malawi, and from the district of Mangochi in particular. The chapter provides a detailed, statistically based account of the Malawians, providing information on their places of origin, biographical details, their movements from the villages and towns of Malawi, through various other Southern African countries, to Durban. It is interesting that many, once they leave Malawi, come to Durban, rather than attempt to settle in the industrial heartland of South Africa, Gauteng, where presumably the economic opportunities might be greater. The chapter then describes their insertion into Durban's economy and society through the creation of livelihood strategies using both their networks and their own efforts, finding employment and working as informal traders and entrepreneurs. The chapter also gives some indications of the problems they face, and their perspectives on continuing contacts with and possibilities of returning to Malawi. It will illustrate the new patterns of migration that are emerging, and form the baseline for the subsequent chapters giving a more textured account of Malawian participation in Durban's economy and society, including that of citizenship identity.

This research cannot claim that the statistics that are presented here are a representative sample of all Malawian migrants. As hinted above, much of this migration is hidden, or if not hidden, then at the very least quiet and unobtrusive. This survey of 119 respondents, is, as mentioned in chapter two, based on a snowball technique, with respondents located spatially. By spatially I mean that interviewing of the migrants was carried out in three different locations within the metropolitan boundaries of Durban between December 1999 and October 2001. These were Mariannhill, the city centre, and Overport. It should be noted that as the laws regarding migration were and still are very vigorously implemented, and with high levels of xenophobia, it is not surprising that Malawians were not keen to be interviewed. The problem of xenophobia has already been illustrated in chapter four, and will be alluded to in this, and subsequent chapters. It is mentioned here as a problem in obtaining data, requiring the building of trust before the survey could be undertaken. For these reasons strict sampling techniques were not possible to implement. Although a hundred and nineteen Malawians were interviewed, which apart from being spatially dispersed in various parts of the city, yielded results showing a variety of characteristics in terms of age, income, educational levels, skills, and

occupations. While attempts were made to include as many women as possible, there is a preponderance of males, 111, and only 8 women. This may have a built-in male bias, but would not be inconsistent with the tendency in patriarchal societies for the males to act as household head spokespersons. However from my own observations and interviews I conducted, it is also clear that there is a preponderance of male Malawians.[1] Conceived as a minimum sample size the survey yields a sufficient basis to limit what Mehan calls 'the anecdotal quality of field reports' (quoted in Silverman, 1985: 12). The presentation of the data in tables and illustrated in graphs in this chapter thus retains the basic material on which the analysis proceeds, and avoids what Silverman calls 'the temptation to use merely supportive gobbets of information to support the researchers interpretation' (1985:17). The interviewing was done face to face in order to achieve a high quality of information as opposed to quantity. Thus the survey tried to achieve a degree of randomness that would ensure representivity.

The substance of the chapter has two main sections. Section one begins with a social profile of the Malawians, giving details of their place of origins and proceeds to examine their biographical details, including their arrival and accommodation strategies. The next section proceeds to examine their migratory movements from Malawi to Durban, and illustrates the number of migratory moves before arrival in Durban in terms of the reasons for each move, and the employment and accommodation practices at each place of destination en route to Durban. A distinction is drawn between those who come straight to Durban and those who make a number of stops before arriving in Durban. This is often referred to as step migration (Parnwell, 1993: 13), where a mover arrives at a destination after a series of short-term moves to other locations, often moving from village to urban centres. However the emphasis here is not just on the moves that are made, but the experience this involves, the construction and use of networks, and return migration. This experience informs their ability to construct livelihood strategies in Durban. In the following chapter (six) the construction of livelihoods, the strategies that are pursued, their continued contact and their perspectives on returning to Malawi are analysed.

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[1] For an analysis of gender and women's migration to South Africa see Dodson, B. (1998)

5.2. THE SOCIAL PROFILE OF MALAWIANS

The social profile of the Malawians is described in terms of the place of origins, their ages, gender (predominantly male), their reasons for migration, how they travelled and if they had any travelling companions, their current residence patterns, particularly whether they share accommodation with family, relatives and friends. This begins to build a picture of the Malawians in terms of their social networks, and their work activities. In the next section the social context of their movements from Malawi to Durban is described, showing how current social networks and work activities have been influenced, extended, or amended.

5.2.1. Places of Origin

The table (5.1) below gives a list of towns and villages from where the 119 respondents came from in Malawi. It is very clear that the majority of the migrants interviewed, 66%, come from the town and surrounding areas of Mangochi. Mangochi is in the southern part of Malawi, on the edge of Lake Malawi. It is not absolutely clear why there is this preponderance of people from this area, but it does indicate a probable and significant thick and dense network of friends and relatives stretching from Durban to the villages and towns of Malawi. Even the next highest numbers of migrants (10%) originates from the nearby town of Machinga. There is one other important characteristic that needs to be mentioned. People from the Mangochi district, who are mostly from the Yao ethnic group, tend to be mostly Muslim. In following the Islamic faith, their religious identity as a resource becomes important when unpacked in the context of Durban. This will be analysed in chapters seven and eight. For the moment, it is important to note that this is a factor in explaining the preponderance of Malawians from southern Malawi in certain areas of Durban, and the social networks that evolved.

Table 5.1: Places of Origin			
Place	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
Mangochi	79	66.4	66.4
Machinga	13	10.9	77.3
Dedza	5	4.2	81.5
Ntcheu	4	3.4	84.9
Balaka	4	3.4	88.2
Salima	3	2.5	90.8
Blantyre	3	2.5	93.3
Zomba	2	1.7	95.0
Chipoka	1	.8	95.8
Chilipa	1	.8	96.6
Unknown	1	.8	97.5
Lilongwe	1	.8	98.3
Nkhotakota	1	.8	99.2
Mwanza	1	.8	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

In terms of age the greatest number of people who come to South Africa are in the 25-34 age group (55.5%).

Table 5.2: Age of Migrants			
Age Categories in Years	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
15-24	32	26.9	26.9
25-34	66	55.5	82.4
35-44	18	15.1	97.5
45-55	3	2.5	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

Together with those in the 15-24 age category, this gives the migrants a distinctively youthful appearance (82% under the age of 34). This confirms reports of other researchers (e.g. Reitzes, 1998: 10, 12; Peberdy, & Crush, 1998: 15; Geyevu, 2001: 152).

5.2.2. Educational Levels

The educational levels (table 5.3) show that that not one of the migrants has reached university entrance level qualification, although 74% have a high school education of some sort.

Table 5.3: Education Levels			
Standard/grade	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
n/a	1	.8	.8
No education	16	13.4	14.3
Std0/grade 1/2	1	.8	15.1
Std1/grade 3	1	.8	16.0
Std2/grade 4	6	5.0	21.0
Std3/grade 5	6	5.0	26.1
Std4/grade 6	8	6.7	32.8
Std5/grade 7	8	6.7	39.5
Std6/grade 8	14	11.8	51.3
Std7grade 9	12	10.1	61.3
Std8/grade 10	46	38.7	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

Basically it means that, barring those with no education and a basic standard 1-2 (grades 1-4) education, they can all read and write in English. It also means that for a large number of them it is possible, and indeed probable, that they have the ability to do some kind of post-high school diploma, or basic technical training.

Figure 5.1. Levels of Education



What clearly dominates this bar graph (figure 5.1) is the high percentage of those with standard 8 or grade 10 high school education, which means that they are more than simply or barely literate and numerate, indicating a grasp of abstract concepts. It should be noted however that 13.4% of this sample do not have any education. Lack of education is not necessarily an impediment to migration, but quite clearly in this case those with less than adequate reading and writing skills are not a dominant feature of this sample of respondents.

5.2.3 Arrival and Insertion in Durban

The years of arrival for the Malawian migrants reflects the distinctive shift in politics in the sub-continent. Malawi begins to experience the effects of structural adjustment, such as unemployment, while South Africa moves towards liberation and democracy.

Table 5.4 below clearly indicates that the majority of Malawian migrants arrived in the post-1994 period, the period when 'they came for Mandela'. In the period up to the release of former President Nelson Mandela and the beginning of the negotiations only 5 percent of the respondents had arrived.

Table 5.4: Year of Arrival			
Years	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
< - 1989	6	5.0	5.0
1990-1994	23	19.3	24.4
1995-1999	77	64.7	89.1
2000- >	13	10.9	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

This picks up rapidly in the period 1990 to 1994 when 19% arrive, and the following five years when 64% of the respondents undertake the long migration route from Malawi to Durban. It is interesting to note that official immigration from Malawi to South Africa in 2001 was 33 persons (see table 4.3, chapter 4: 82), or just over 2% of all continental African immigration. Contrast this with my research data: 13 migrants (10% of the sample) arrived in 2000, and 77 (65%) between 1995 and 1999 – approximately 13 for each year.

Table 5.5: Transport to Durban			
	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Bus	35	29.4	29.4
Bus, taxi	27	22.7	52.1
Bus, taxi, private car	1	.8	52.9
Bus, taxi, train	2	1.7	54.6
Bus, train	1	.8	55.5
Private car	50	42.0	97.5
Taxi	1	.8	98.3
Truck	1	.8	99.2
Truck, taxi	1	.8	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

The most used forms of transport between Malawi and South Africa are the hire of private cars, the bus, or taxi, or in some cases a combination of these. There are number of points to bear in mind about these figures. Firstly, 42% of the respondents hired a private car – an informal taxi – to transport them from Malawi to Durban. This is the most efficient way to travel. Unfortunately, it was difficult to obtain information on how direct such a trip was, and how much such a trip would cost. However, one informant said that between R500 and R600 was the usual charge. Each private car would take four or five people. Secondly, given the demand for transport to Durban, this was a business enterprise for some of the drivers/car owners, albeit an informal one. Thirdly, the use of a bus, or buses is a second favourite. Many said they use a bus. In truth there is no direct bus from Durban to Malawi. There is a bus that connects Johannesburg to Malawi. For some the trip consists of a car ride to Johannesburg, and then a bus to Durban. Public transport such as trains are not favoured, especially since the xenophobic murder of Senegalese on trains in Johannesburg in 1999. While the murder of the Senegalese was not raised specifically in the social survey, at least two key informants mentioned this incident in my informal conversations with them as a reason for not using the trains. It is not certain how widespread this incident was among the consciousness of the Malawians interviewed here.

Table 5.6: Reasons for Migration

Reasons	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Business	3	2.5	2.5
Employment	101	84.9	87.4
Follow husband	7	5.9	93.3
Visit	3	2.5	95.8
Visit, employment	2	1.6	97.5
Work, capital to start business	3	2.5	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

Most Malawians came to Durban for economic reasons, such as to seek work, or work to accumulate capital to start their own businesses in Malawi (90%) (see table 5.6 above). A few, seven women, migrated because their husbands were already here. This is probably an indication that they were going to stay permanently. As an indicator this is only 6%.

5.2.3.1 Travelling Companions

Given the high number of people travelling from the same district or town of origin, such as Mangochi, it is surprising that most migrants, nearly 77% travelled alone (see table 5.7 below).

Table 5.7: Traveling Companions (a)

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
With companion	27	22.7	22.7
Other	1	.8	23.5
Without Companion	91	76.5	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

Only 23% travelled with someone they knew. There are a few explanations for this. Some of them have already made this trip before, and so it is not an unknown journey for them.

Table 5.8: Traveling Companions (b): Friends and Family

Category of Companion	Frequency	Percent
Brother	6	21.4
Cousin	1	3.5
Father	1	3.5
Husband	6	21.4
Mother	1	3.5
Sister	1	3.5
Uncle	1	3.5
Other family	1	3.5
Sub-total: Family	**18**	**64.2**
Friends	10	35.7
Total	**28**	**100**

For others, when questioned closely about the journey, not only were they involved in a step migration process, it would seem they received detailed instructions as to how to proceed, an indication of the link between migrants in Durban and their families or business associates in Malawi. Yet others, while they may not have consciously decided on who should be their travelling partners, the other passengers were not unknown, given that they were more than likely to be travelling with people from the same district. That is, even if they did not know their travelling companions personally, the knowledge of family, kinship and friendship links made them less than unknown. For those that did travel with some one they knew, the most frequent travelling partner was a family relative (64%), followed by friends (35%). (See table 8 above). These represent only 25% of the 119 migrants interviewed.

5.2.3.2 Accommodation Strategies

Migration from one country to another produces anxiety about a large number of issues: crossing borders, obtaining visa or permits, and acceptance into the host society, amongst others. One of the most pressing issues that immediately confronts economic migrants is not so much whether they will find employment, but rather accommodation. Given the extensive networks that already exist, this, in theory, should not pose a serious problem for the Malawians. It might even be suggested that family and kinship connections play a prominent part in securing accommodation. But in table 5.9 below the figures suggest that accommodation with friends and kin was only marginally less than 50% (47%) of the total sample. It suggests that there is a more or less equal division between being accommodated by family and friends and finding alternative forms of accommodation.

Table 5.9: Accommodation with Family and Kin

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Other (not with friends & relatives)	60	50.4	50.4
Friends and Relatives	56	47.1	97.5
n/a	3	2.5	100
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

Malawians seem to have found other ways of accommodating themselves. Qualitative evidence does not necessarily contradict this but suggests that initially, in the first few days, new arrivals are indeed accommodated by friends, relatives, or someone from the district of origin. However, it is very clear that because an additional person who does not have an income has to be housed and fed, this can produce a strain on resources, and that alternative arrangements have to be made. Accommodation patterns then might vary according to when one arrived, and the choices of how to make a living, and hence where one eventually decides to stay, as well as whether children or spouses are left behind in Malawi. In the next section some of this variability in the process of migrating to Durban is presented. Further examples will be presented in chapter seven.

In table 5.10 below, accommodation with friends and relatives shows a wide variety of circumstances and suggests individual combinations of people at a household level and family structures in order to maximise resources and sharing of accommodation costs. The nuclear family mode accounts for 31%. Sharing accommodation with members of the extended family, including siblings, accounts of 11% of the sample, and this is followed by other arrangements, such as with friends and girl friends (10.8%).

It should be noted that sharing with a girl friend is almost the same as the co-operative nature of a nuclear family. Since I have not investigated the strength of these bonds I have treated it separately, and not included it as part of the nuclear family type situation. A significant number of 44 migrants, or 37%, did not answer this question.

For a slim majority of the migrants, their network of family and friends (53%) enabled them to find accommodation: 42.5% with family (nuclear and extended) while a further 10.8% make arrangements with friends and girlfriends. Approximately 47% either live on their own, or preferred not to answer the question. This may be because they were fearful of divulging information of a confidential and sensitive nature.

Table 5.10. Accommodation with family and friends in Households			
Type of Family and Friends	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
Wife	12	10.1	10.1
Wife, children	17	14.3	24.4
Husband	3	2.5	26.9
Husband, children	3	2.5	29.4
Father	2	1.7	31.1
Nuclear family	**37**	**31.1**	
Brother's family	1	.8	31.9
Brother	6	5.0	36.9
Brother, cousin	1	.8	37.7
Sister	1	.8	38.5
Sister, brother	1	.8	39.3
Sister, cousin	1	.8	40.1
Cousin	1	.8	40.9
Uncle	1	.8	41.7
Uncle, aunt, cousins	1	.8	42.5
Extended family	**14**	**11.4**	
Girlfriend, children	1	.8	43.3
Friends	8	6.7	50
Girlfriend	3	2.5	52.5
Others	1	.8	53.3
Other arrangements	**13**	**10.8**	
N/a	44	37.0	90.3
None	11	9.2	99.5
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

This is not to say that Malawians do not share accommodation. When asked about sharing accommodation almost 60% said they do, and 40% did not (see table 5.11 below). Sharing accommodation, whether in a family type situation, or with friends is a strategy of survival in that the costs of accommodation are brought down. All families (husband, wife, children and close kin) do not necessarily consider living in the same household as necessarily sharing, so much as an obligation or responsibility. However one should caution against the interpretation that living alone implies a physical

separation. Living alone must be contextualised. In a place such as Mariannhill, living alone means living in a one-room rented accommodation, among a group of other Malawians, but in Overport or the city centre it means living as a single person among a group of other Malawians or foreign migrants in an apartment. All probably contribute to the rented accommodation, but usually have to find their own food.

Table 5.11. Sharing Accommodation

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
N/a	1	.8	.8
Sharing	71	59.7	60.5
Not sharing	47	39.5	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

Although one of the first acts of any migrant is to find accommodation, as the migrant becomes more familiar with his surroundings and finds a job, residence patterns are expected to change. This evidence, at face value, suggests that living with family and friends increases rather than decreases. Living alone does not dominate, and further emphasizes the fact of the necessity of sharing accommodation as a means of sharing the burden of rent and the possibility of maximising household resources and income which can be remitted to Malawi, or invested as savings before returning home.

To emphasize the nature of migrants' life as temporary and transitory, table 5.12 clearly indicates that the majority of migrants are tenants. Very few are owners of land or homes, and those that are occupants are usually there because they are dependent on family and friends for a place to stay. In other words they do not pay rent.

Table 5.12: Tenancy

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Occupy	11	9.2	9.2
Owner	6	5.0	14.3
Tenant	101	84.9	99.2
Unclear	1	.8	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

5.3 MIGRATORY MOVEMENTS FROM MALAWI TO DURBAN

What was outlined above is a profile of the Malawians, as they currently exist in Durban. In this section I suggest that there is a relationship that exists between migratory moves, work or occupations, and accommodation practices. I demonstrate that not all Malawian migrants come directly to South Africa, or Durban in particular. I want to detail how they came to arrive in Durban, and if they made a number of stopovers en route to Durban, and whether this entailed any work, or livelihood experience. The focus on residence and accommodation is to indicate the social context, particularly the networks of family and friends that operate in the migratory movements. The number of migratory moves before reaching Durban is important to understand as it gives an insight into the type of experiences that such migrants have before coming to Durban. I suggest that this experience is valuable when they begin to create livelihood strategies because, firstly, they already have been exposed to the rigours of making a living as migrants elsewhere. The anxiety of being exposed to a new and untested environment is lessened. I am not suggesting that the environment of Durban is exactly the same as other places, but simply that for majority of them relocating is not an entirely new phenomenon. Secondly, the constraints and problems they encounter, for example, whether imposed by the state or by being exposed to xenophobia or exploitation, are conceived as hurdles to be overcome, not insurmountable limitations. Thirdly, the experience of living and working in places other than their home towns and villages, equips them with skills. This last point takes up the issue that migrants arrive with few or no skills, take up largely unskilled work in direct competition with local people, accept lower wages, and in effect push local people out of jobs. I suggest that in fact a large portion of Malawians migrants arrive with skills and experience. (By contrast local rural-urban migrants have difficulty adjusting to conditions in the city, particularly in times of financial constraints on social and welfare services, and to build up a bank of reliable knowledge of working the system to their advantage. (See Vawda, S. 2002 on this point.) It is likely that foreign migrants may undercut the wage rates, or may be employed illegally, but they provide a very attractive option for many employers. However, their numbers may not warrant policies and

strategies that target them as illegal aliens, and reduce them to even greater desperation to find any job, which in turn further militates against them by pushing down their wages in proportion to their desperation for employment, and further undercutting local people from finding employment.

5.3.1 The number of migratory movements

In presenting the data on migratory movements of the Malawians to Durban I shall, firstly, analyse all those that made their first migratory move, and then, secondly, analyse those who came directly to Durban. I shall proceed in a similar fashion in analysing three subsequent migratory moves. The purpose of this is to link the movements of the migrants to their destination in Durban, not in a linear deterministic fashion, but to show how the movements occurred, and how it has influenced their settlement and working in Durban.

I have already indicated above, in table 5.1, the places of origin for the migrants. In the table below I illustrate the number of migratory moves that the Malawians made in the period under discussion. This is a static representation of moves, including direct moves to Durban from Malawi, as well as those Malawians that migrated from other Southern African countries and within South Africa. Those who made one move to Durban and remained without making another move, voluntarily or forced, constitute 16% of the sample (see table 5.14 below). Those that made two migratory moves 37%, and three migratory moves 27%. Those who made four moves before finally coming to Durban accounted for 11.8% of the sample. Only 7.5% made 5 or 6 migratory moves. The vast majority of migrants made between two and four moves.

The following table and graph confirms that the vast majority of the respondents, 92.4%, arrive within four moves from their places of origin.

Table 5.13: Number of migratory moves			
Moves	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
1.00	19	16.0	16.0
2.00	44	37.0	52.9
3.00	33	27.7	80.7
4.00	14	11.8	92.4
5.00	6	5.0	97.5
6.00	3	2.5	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

Figure 5. 2: Number of migratory moves: Number and Percentage



These particular statistics above do not necessarily capture the flow and movement of migrants. In the next section an attempt is made to capture this fluidity in terms of four different destinations and stopover points that migrants make between Malawi, Durban,

and elsewhere. There are some migrants who made up to six moves, but they do not differ significantly, and will not be analysed here. In the following section the number of movers that are analysed include those who are deported and return, those who return to Malawi, visitors, taxi and informal cross-border traders, and a few who move within cities of South Africa and other Southern African countries. Hence the numbers of moves do not necessarily occur in a time specific period, nor are they a linear progression from Malawi to Durban. It is precisely the opposite, and that the fluidity – part of transnational migration – that I wish to illustrate in the context of pursuing livelihood strategies in Durban.

5.3.2. Making the first move

The majority of the Malawians, approximately 61%, made their first move because they wanted in one way or another to find employment, or economic opportunities (table 5.14). A closer examination of the reasons offered for migration, while dominated by prospects of employment also show a complex set of reasons, with people offering a combination of reasons for migrating to Durban, which include education, employment and further training (18.5%), business opportunities (60.5%), visiting (12%), as well as following spouses (6%) and parents (2%).

Table 5.14: Reasons for first move

Reasons	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Education, employment	1	.8	.8
Education, further training	21	17.6	18.5
Employment, work, business opportunities	72	60.5	79.0
End of visit	1	.8	79.8
Follow husband	2	1.7	81.5
Follow parents	6	5.0	86.6
Unknown	4	3.4	89.9
To Visit	12	10.1	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

From a glance at table 5.15 it would appear that most migrants, except for a handful, do not appear to be gainfully employed in their places of origin. They appear to be living with the parents at home (56%), and most are either in school or in some form of training or apprenticeship (34%). Less than 1% appear to be in any kind of full-time employment or work. Hence it is not surprising that close to 80% offered a combination of various

kinds of economic opportunities as the main reason for migrating. It should be noted that most of the migrants are young, 55% being under the age of 35 years (see table 5.2 above). Levels of education for these potential migrants (at this stage – pre-migration decision making) are also barely high school level (see table above). Most have a high school education between standard 6 – 8 (grades 8-10). No one has completed his or her high school career.

Table 5.15: Work Activities at Place of Origin.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Education	30	25.2	25.2
Education/work	4	3.4	28.6
Home	66	55.5	84.0
Home/work	4	3.4	87.4
Visit	4	3.4	90.8
Work	1	.8	91.6
N/a	10	8.4	100
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

In the table (5.16) below we can see that almost all migrants, that is, 97%, resided with their family or extended family in their place of origin.

Table 5.16. Residence/place of accommodation Before First Migration Move

Residence	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Boarding school	1	.8	.8
Family, extended family	115	96.6	97.4
N/a	3	2.5	100
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

Being accommodated by family or kin is a trend that continues through out the migratory process. Given that most have a high school education, low levels of skill, and consequently low levels of employment potential, the following sections which detail their migratory progress will show what changes occur. I shall also show how networks of family and friends assist, particularly in providing accommodation at virtually no rental cost, and that this provides the basis from which to seek and secure work.

5.3.3 The First Place of Destination

The first choice for slightly less than 75% of the respondents is to move within their own country (72.3%), or to other countries in Southern Africa, other than South Africa (see table 5.17). Approximately 25% make South Africa their first choice.

Table 5.17: First Place of Destination			
Place	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
Town/city in Malawi	86	72.3	72.3
Southern Africa Country	3	2.5	74.8
Durban	29	24.4	99.2
Other South African City	1	.8	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

Of the 119 informants, only 29 came directly to Durban (approximately 24%). The rest migrate to places in Malawi, the vast majority going to Blantyre (29%) and Lilongwe (26%). Significantly Blantyre and Lilongwe are the country's two largest cities. As noted above, the reasons for this migration are mainly economic. And this is demonstrated in the working activities that they engage in wherever they settle down. This can be seen in table 5.18 below.

Table 5.18: Work Activities: First Place of Destination			
Activities	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
Education, living with parents	16	13.4	13.4
Education	3	2.5	16.0
Employed by others	34	28.6	44.5
Business - retail and service industries	30	25.2	69.7
Business - production	14	11.8	81.5
Visiting	11	9.2	90.8
Unknown	11	9.2	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

From a situation were very few of the respondents were employed or involved in any kind of self-employment or business in their places of origin, after their first move, 78% are now, as they reported, either in some one's employ (34%), or involved in business related activities such as in the retail and services sector (25%), or in their own production capacity, such as tailoring or sewing (11.8%). A significant proportion are still being educated and living with their parents. It appears that the parents migrated and

the children followed. Those who are visiting (11%) may decide to remain, rather than return to wherever they came from.

For over 68% of these migrants their first place of destination could not detain them for longer than five years. Of those who stayed longer, 19% stayed in their first place of destination for between 6 and 10 years, 8% for between 11 and 15 years, and less than 5% for longer than 16 years (see table 5.19 below).

Table 5.19: Duration of Stay After First Migratory Move			
Time In Years	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
<1-5 years	81	68.1	68.1
6-10 years	23	19.3	87.4
11-15 years	10	8.4	95.8
16-20 years	1	.8	96.6
20+ years	4	3.4	100.0
Total	119	100.0	

Being accommodated, or having some form of residence is an important aspect of any migratory move. In table 5.20, 66% of respondents lived with parents or some member of the family (family being defined very broadly to include parents, siblings, uncles, aunts, cousins). Significantly 20% lived alone, while 8% lived with friends. Excluding those living alone, almost 76% lived with friends, family or an employer. These people, particularly friends and family, provide the first set of networks, which provided the social base that assisted in the initial migratory move.

Table 5.20: Accommodation in First Place of Destination			
	Frequency	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
Alone	24	20.2	20.2
Boarding school	5	4.2	24.4
Employer	1	.8	25.2
Friends	10	8.4	33.6
Parents, family	79	66.4	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

These accommodation strategies are further broken down by city and country in the next sub-section, and specific attention is given to Durban as a place of destination.

5.3.3.1 Direct Migratory Move to Durban

Table 5.21 breaks down the accommodation into the various places of destination, namely towns and cities in Malawi, other Southern African countries, Durban and other South African cities.

Table 5. 21: Accommodation Strategy in First Place of Destination

	Destination								Total	
Reside With	Town/city in Malawi		Southern Africa Country		Durban		Other South African City			
		%		%				%		%
Alone	18	20.9			6	20.7			24	20.2
Boarding school	5	5.8							5	4.2
Employer					1	3.4			1	.8
Friends	1	1.2			8	27.6	1	100	10	8.4
Parents, family	62	72	3	100	14	48.3			79	66.4
Total	**86**	**100**	**3**	**100**	**29**	**100**	**1**	**100**	**119**	**100**

The meaningful comparison is between cities and towns in Malawi with Durban. Those who made a town or city in Malawi their first destination constitute 86 (72%) of the total number of respondents, while 29 (24%) people moved directly to Durban. In terms of accommodation practices, as an index of their social networks, some 73% resided with friends and family, while in Durban 76% engaged in a similar practice. Significantly a higher number lived with friends in Durban, 28% compared to 1% in Malawi. In both places those who lived alone was very similar at approximately 21%.

A further comparison may be made between the time spent in a city or town in Malawi, and that of Durban (see table 5.22). While 67% of migrants spent between a year and five years in Malawi before committing themselves to a second move, 72% of those that moved to Durban resided for less than five years. Those who have lived for between six and ten years in a Malawian town or city, 19%, brought a wealth of experience with them as they migrated towards Durban. It should be noted however that already in Durban there are people who form the bridgehead for the wave of Malawian migrants to follow. Some 24% of the 29 people who came directly to Durban had already been here for between 6 and 10 years. However it is the accumulated experience of being migrants that is brought to Durban that is important to highlight here.

Table 5.22: Duration of Stay in First Place of Destination										
	Destination									
Duration of stay: Years: First Place	Town/city in Malawi		Southern Africa Country		Durban		Other South African City		Total	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No*	*%*	*No*	*%*	*No*	*%*
<1-5 years	58	67.4	1	33.3	21	72.4	1	100	81	68
6-10 years	16	18.6			7	24.1			23	19.3
11-15 years	8	9.3	1	33.3	1	3.4			10	8.4
16-20 years			1	33.3					1	0.8
20+ years	4	4.7							4	3.36
Total	**86**	**100**	**3**	**100**	**29**	**100**	**1**	**100**	**119**	**100**

In table 5.23 below this subset of 29 migrants that moved directly to Durban is analysed in terms of their actual working activities.

Table 5.23: Work Activity and Length of Employment in Durban. First Destination													
Work Activity	**Years**												**Total**
	0.10	*0.20*	*0.30*	*0.50*	*1.00*	*1.50*	*2.00*	*3.00*	*5.00*	*6.00*	*7.00*	*12.00*	
Auto-electrician					1								**1**
Baker		1											**1**
Casual labourer								1			1		**2**
Employed				1			2				1		**4**
Seeking employment			1							1			**2**
Gardener					1								**1**
Housewife								2					**2**
Mechanic							1						**1**
Painting							1						**1**
Sales assistant				1	1	1					1	1	**5**
Self-employed										1			**1**
Service								1					**1**
Sewing										1			**1**
Tailoring					1		2						**3**
Welder					1								**1**
Unknown	1								1				**2**
Total	**1**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**5**	**1**	**6**	**4**	**1**	**3**	**3**	**1**	**29**

Of the 29 people who made Durban their first destination, 23 (79%) are in some kind of employment, in the formal and informal economy. There are others who are either housewives (2), seeking employment (2) or it is unclear what they do (2). Two important observations need to be made. The first is that the vast majority of them (23) are actually in some form of work activity, for example, sewing, tailoring, sales assistant, baker, or some kind of self-employed business. The second observation is that most of them found and sustained their employment status.

Economic migration and using friends and relatives in assisting with accommodation clearly dominates the first migratory move. It is important to note the shift to a greater reliance on friends in Durban to provide accommodation than was the case in Malawi. The central theme of migration for economic reasons continues for those that made second and subsequent moves.

5.3.4 The Second Migratory Move

Of the 119 respondents, 98 or 82% made a second move (see table 5.24 below). Of these 69% of the migrants made the move primarily to find better or different kinds of employment, work or business opportunities. A further 12% moved to improve their education standards and/or skills by engaging in further training.

Table 5.24: Reasons for Second Move

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Education, further training	12	12.24	12.24
Employment, work, business	68	69.38	81.62
Visit family and friends	4	4.08	85.70
Follow husband	4	4.08	89.78
Return home	2	2.04	91.82
Too expensive	2	2.04	93.86
Deported	2	2.04	95.90
To be free	1	1.02	96.92
Evicted	1	1.02	97.94
Unknown	2	1.02	98.96
Total	**98**	**98.96**	

It should also be noted that 2% were deported, another 4% that they wanted to return to Malawi or found living in Durban too expensive. Some were evicted from their accommodation, and one person, curiously said that he wanted 'to be free'. Others

followed their husbands from Malawi, or were visiting family and friends. Those who visit may change their minds about returning, preferring to stay in the country and look for jobs or follow up economic opportunities, and thereby invalidate their visa obligations. They become over-stayers.

Of the 98 respondents who made a decision to make a second migratory move, approximately 46% decided to come to Durban (see table 5.25). The majority had decided to move to another town in Malawi.

Table 5.25: Second Place of Destination			
	Frequency	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
Town/city in Malawi	52	53.06	53.06
Southern Africa Country	1	1.02	54.08
Durban	45	45.9	99.98
Total	**98**	**99.98**	

Most migrants spend less than five years in the second place of destination. Table 5.26 indicates that almost 85% spent a period of less than five years in their choice of second destination. The percentage of those who stay longer is reduced. Those who live in their second place of destination for between six and ten years is 12%, and those who stay longer are only 3% of the total, compared to the 19% and 12% for the first move.

Table 5.26: Duration of Stay in Second Place of Destination			
Years:	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
1-5 years	83	84.7	84.7
6-10 years	12	12.2	96.9
11-15 years	2	2.0	99.0
16-20 years	1	1.0	100.0
Total	**98**	**100.0**	

Although 6% did not respond to the question of the accommodation choices (table 5.27), what is significant is that 41% live alone, whereas 53% rely on friends, parents and family for their accommodation needs. Thus living alone increases over the first move. This would suggest that family and friendship networks are not as strong as in the first destination.

Table 5.27: Accommodation in Second Place of Destination			
	Frequency	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
Alone	40	40.8	40.8
Friends	7	7.1	47.9
Parents, family	45	45.9	93.8
Not Available	6	6.1	100
Total	**98**	**100**	

The accommodation strategy is further broken down when compared with the actual places of destination (see table 5.28), particularly in relation to Durban. Table 5.28 shows work activities and length of employment in the second place of destination. The kinds of work related activities show that 24 or approximately 25% are self-employed in informal retail and services business, (13.3%) and production activities (11.2%), while 38.8% are employed by other businesses. Significantly 5.1% of migrants report themselves as unemployed, although it should be noted that the majority are in some form of education, training and employment (76%). Those people that report themselves as visiting (7.1%) can easily to being employed if the opportunity arises. In relation to the length of time in the second place of destination, the majority have spent less than five years. I shall pick up these issues as the analysis proceeds through the migratory moves.

Table 5.28: Work Activities in Second Place of Destination			
Work Activities	**Frequency**	**Percentage**	**Cumulative Percent**
Home, education, living with parents	5	5.1	5.1
Education	8	8.2	13.3
Employed by others	38	38.8	52.1
Self employed business - retail and service industries	13	13.3	65.4
Self employed business – production	11	11.2	76.6
Visiting	7	7.1	83.7
No data reported	11	11.2	94.9
Unemployed	5	5.1	100
Total	**98**	**100**	

5.3.4.1 Durban as the Second Destination

Forty five of the 98 migrants making a second move make Durban their destination. The accommodation options are depicted in table 5.29. While residing with family and friends is still the overall dominant accommodation strategy in making the second migratory move (46%), when it is broken down into its components parts of Durban and Malawi, a

new feature emerges, and that is that living alone takes prominence among approximately 39% of the migrants.

Table 5.29: Accommodation Strategy in Second Place Destination

Accommodation strategy	Destination						Total	
	Town/city in Malawi		Southern Africa Country		Durban			
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Alone	22	42.3	1	100	17	37.8	40	40.8
Friends					7	15.6	7	7.1
Parents, family	29	55.8			16	35.6	45	45.9
Not available	1	1.9			5	11.1	6	6.1
Total	**52**	**100**	**1**	**100**	**45**	**100**	**98**	**100**

Being accommodated by parents and family accounts for 35.6% and friends 15.6% of migrants. If the categories friends and family are combined then this amounts to over 51%. While clearly living on one's own has emerged as an accommodation option, the social networks of family and friends in the lives of migrants still dominates. However, living alone should not imply lack of sharing accommodation, or the splendid isolation of the individual migrant. As mentioned above this should be contextualised in that migrants might share the rent of an apartment in the Overport or city centre areas, but eat separately, or live as an individual in a rented room in Mariannhill, in a community of their fellow migrants. I shall touch on this point again later in this analysis.

Table 5.30 shows that the duration of living in the second place of destination tips marginally towards Durban (89%), rather than Malawi (82%). Those who have settled for between six and ten years are more or less equally balanced at 11.1% (Durban) and 11.5 % (Malawi). One person lived in Malawi in the second place of destination for between sixteen and twenty years before migrating.

Table 5.30: Duration of Stay in Second Place of Destination by Town, City, and Country								
Years	Destination						Total	
	Town/city in Malawi		Southern Africa Country		Durban			
	No.	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
<1-5 years	43	82.7			40	88.9	83	84,7
6-10 years	6	11.5	1	100	5	11.1	12	12.2
11-15 years	2	3.8					2	2.04
16-20 years	1	1.9					1	1.02
Total	**52**	**100**	**1**	**100**	**45**		**98**	**100**

This second move, especially as it concerns Durban needs to be further analysed in terms of work activities (table 5.31). The actual work activities that these migrants find is as follows: 39% are employees (employed by some else), 25% are self-employed in the informal sectors of the economy, mainly in retail and services and production of commodities, mainly clothes. 13.3% are living with parents or family and are still in the education system. What is significant in this table is that approximately 11% report being unemployed in Durban.

Table 5.31: Work Activities and Second Place of Destination								
Work Activities	Town/city in Malawi		Southern Africa Country		Durban		Total	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Home, education, living with parents					5	11	5	5.1
Education	8	15.4					8	8.2
Employed by others	21	40.4	1	100	16	35.6	38	38.8
Business - retail and service industries	8	15.4			5	11	13	13.3
Business – production	4	7.7			7	15.6	11	11.2
Visiting	6	11.5			1	2.2	7	7.1
No data reported	5	9.6			6	13.3	11	11.2
Unemployed					5	11	5	5.1
Total	**52**	**100**	**1**	**100**	**45**	**100**	**98**	**99.9**

The most important points that emerged from this second migratory move are that, firstly, there is a marginal shift toward Durban as the preferred place of migratory destination; and, secondly, this shift is related to the main reason given for migrating, that is to find better economic opportunities either to trade or find employment. Thirdly, in making the migratory move social networks of family and friends are important, particularly as it concerns accommodation options. Fourthly, that living on one's own is an option, but as

was mentioned in the case of Durban, it is needs to be contextualised within the enclaves of Malawian migrants found in various parts of the city. Fifthly, not all migrants find that arriving and finding work in Durban is as they expected. A few have indicated that they wanted to return to Malawi, while a number have found they are unemployed.

In the next section I shall analyse the third move, and these points will be taken up further.

5.3.5 The Third Move

There are 59 migrant individuals who made a third move. In contemplating this move, the dominant economic reasons for the initial and subsequent moves repeat themselves here. (See table 5.32). Approximately 73% of the migrants moved to a third destination for greater employment, work or business opportunities. The reasons previously given such as education and training drop. Only 5% said they moved for further educational or training. Approximately 7% indicated that they were visiting, but as mentioned above this needs to be treated with caution as a visitor may take up opportunities which invalidate their visitor status in terms of immigration regulations. These were the major reasons for making the third move.

Table 5.32: Reason for Third Move

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Employment, work, business	43	72.9	72.9
Education, further training	3	5.0	77.9
Visiting	4	6.8	84.7
Follow husband	1	1.7	86.4
Deported (later returned)	1	1.7	88.1
Home	1	1.7	89.8
Ill health	1	1.7	91.5
Parents moved	1	1.7	93.2
Rent expensive*	1	1.7	94.9
Return home	1	1.7	96.6
To join friends	1	1.7	98.3
Too far from city**	1	1.7	100
Total	**59**	**100**	

* This individual wanted to move from the central city area to the periphery because the rent for the apartment was too expensive. This is not a migratory move in the sense of moving from one country city, town or village to another.

**This particular individual was not contemplating a migratory move in the sense of moving to another country, city or town or village, but rather moving from the periphery of Durban to the city centre as he had a job as a sales assistant in a clothing retail store, and felt the journey to and from the city tiring.

Following this were a clutch of idiosyncratic reasons, including the desire to return home, following parents or spouses, joining friends, ill-health, to escape the high cost of rent, travel to the city and being deported. Some of the reasons included here illustrate the often diametrically opposed reasons for making a move, and to indicate the pressures under which migrants operate, and that returning home or another city or town is an option.

The emergence of a shift in migration to Durban (and other South African cities) picked up in the previous migratory move becomes clear and unequivocal in this third move. (See table 5.33).

Table 5.33: Third Place of Destination

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Town/city in Malawi	18	30.5	30.5
Southern Africa Country	3	5	35.5
Durban	35	59.3	94.8
Other South African City	3	5	100
Total	**59**	**100**	

Approximately 59% of the 59 migrants making the third move chose to come to Durban. A small number of 3 people (5%) move to other South African cities. Another 5% move to other Southern African countries, and close to 31% migrate within Malawi to other cities and towns.

Almost 92% reside for 5 or less years in this third place of destination. (See table 5.34). There is a small number, four people (6.8%), who have lived for between six and ten years in one of the towns and cities of Southern Africa. Only one person has lived for over 10 years in the third place of destination.

Table 5.34: Duration of Stay: Third Place of Destination

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
1-5 years	54	91.5	91.5
6-10 years	4	6.8	98.3
11-15 years	1	1.7	100
Total	**59**	**100**	

Table 5.35, below, gives a breakdown of the accommodation strategies. Those residing in the third place of destination are evenly distributed between those living alone and those living with parents and family: 37% respectively. Only 11% live with friends. Eight people did not report on where they were accommodated. This information will be cross-tabulated with exact locations below (table 5.37).

Table 5.35: Accommodation Strategy: Third place of Destination

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Alone	22	37.3	37.3
Friends	7	11.9	49.2
Parents, family	22	37.3	86.5
Unknown	8	13.6	100
Total	**59**	**100**	

In table 5.36, below, the dominant forms of work activities are being employees (45.8%), followed by self-employed people in the retail and services, 17%, and 11.9% of self-employed entrepreneurs are in the production of commodities. There is an increase in those who report that they are unemployed. Later in this chapter, in a separate section, work or employment prospects are analysed. By the third move that in education or living with parents becomes nearly negligible (3.4%). There are still people who are visiting (6.85%).

Table 5.36: Work Activities in Third Place of Destination

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Home, education, living with parents	1	1.7	1.7
Education	1	1.7	3.4
Employed by others	27	45.8	49.2
Self employed business - retail and service industries	10	17	66.2
Self employed business - production	7	11.9	78.1
Visiting	4	6.8	84.9
Unemployed	9	15.2	100
Total	**59**	**100**	

There is an unmistakable shift in the migration to Durban by the third move. Some of these characteristics are explored below.

5.3.5.1 Durban as the third place of destination

Table 5.37, below, shows the third move that migrants made in terms of accommodation and actual place. Those who continue to make a Malawian town their destination rely less on family and parents for accommodation. In Durban reliance on family and parents still dominates accommodation strategies (36%), followed by living alone (27.8%). Being accommodated with friends constitutes 19%. However, if friends, family and parents are taken together, this forms a substantial 55% who rely on this network for their accommodation needs.

Table 5.37: Accommodation Strategies and Third Place of Destination Town, City and Country

Accommodation Strategy	Town/city in Malawi		Southern Africa Country		Durban		Other South African City		Total	
	No	*%*	*No*	*%*	*No*	*%*	*No*	*%*	*No*	*%*
Alone	11	61.1			10	27.8	1	33.3	22	37.3
Friends					7	19.4			7	11.8
Parents, Family	6	33.3	3	100	13	36.1			22	37.3
No data	1				5	16.7	2	66.6	8	13.6
Total	**18**	**100**	**3**	**100**	**35**	**100**	**3**	**100**	**59**	**100**

Table 5.35 above showed the duration of the stay in the third place of destination. In the table 5.38 below this duration is cross-tabulated with the actual places of settlement in various towns and cities. The majority of migrants (91.5%) have lived for five or less year, in the cities and towns of Malawi and Durban, and other South African cities. In both the towns and cities of Malawi and Durban this segment of the migrants is 89% and 91% respectively. Considerably fewer people have settled in these towns and cities for between six to ten years (6.8%), and even fewer for longer than that (1.7%).

Table 5.38: Duration In Third Place of Destination by Town, City, and Country

Duration	Town/city in Malawi		Southern Africa Country		Durban		Other South African City		Total	
	No	*%*	*No*	*%*	*No*	*%*	*No*	*%*	*No*	*%*
<1-5 years	16	89	3	100	32	91.4	3	100	54	91.5
6-10 years	1	5.5			3	8.6			4	6.8
11-15 years										
No response	1	5.5							1	1.7
Total	**18**	**100**	**3**	**100**	**35**	**100**	**3**	**100**	**59**	**100**

In terms of work activities in these various towns and cities the dominant form was to be employed by someone else: 38.9% in Malawian towns and cities, and 51% in Durban, confirming a trend emerging from the second move of working for others (table 5.39). This would also apply to migrating to other South African cities. In terms of self-employment there is little difference between Malawi and Durban. For those in the self-employed informal retail and services sector, the percentages for Malawian towns and cities and Durban are respectively 16.7% and 17%. Those who engage in small scale production, such as sewing, the percentages are respectively 16.7% and 11%. However, most Malawian migrants still find work as employees rather than being self-employed.

Table 5.39: Work Activities and Third Place Destination: Towns, Cities and Country

Work Activities	Town/city in Malawi		Southern Africa Country		Durban		Other South African City		Total	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Home, education, living with parents			1	33.3					1	1.7
Education			1	33.3					1	1.7
Employed	7	38.9			18	51.4	1	33.3	26	44.
Self employed business - retail and service industries	3	16.7	1	33.3	6	17.1			10	16.9
Self employed business - production	3	16.7			4	11.4			7	11.9
Visiting	4	22.2							4	6.8
Unknown	1	5.5							1	1.7
Unemployed					7	20	2	66.6	9	15.2
Total	**18**	**100**	**3**	**100**	**35**		**3**	**100**	**59**	**100**

Interestingly, no one reported being unemployed in Malawi, but unemployment is a feature in South African cities. For example in table 5.39, above, 20% of the migrants reported being unemployed.

The most important points that emerged from this third migratory move are that, firstly, there is a decisive shift to Durban as the place of destination for migrants, for much the same economic reasons given above, that is, better employment and business opportunities. Thirdly, in making the migratory move social networks of family and friends continue to be important, particularly as concerns accommodation options.

Fourthly the gap between living on one's own, or being responsible for oneself, takes on a greater prominence. Fifthly, the majority of the migrants are employed by other people (44%), although 28% are self-employed. Fifthly, more than 90% of the migrants that make this third move have resided in their chosen areas for five or less years, an indication of how recent the move was, particularly to Durban. Sixthly, there is an increase in reporting unemployment status.

5.3.6 The Fourth Move

Table 5.40 shows the reasons offered for the fourth move. Again, those who make the fourth move, twenty nine migrants, do so mainly for employment and economic opportunities (75.9%). Other reasons offered were to follow their parents, wanting to return home, finding that the cost of living, particularly rent, too high (and presumably unsustainable), and to visit. These account for the other 24% of the respondents.

Table 5.40: Reason for Forth Move

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Employment, work, business	22	75.9	75.9
Follow parents	2	6.9	82.8
Return home	1	3.4	86.2
Rent expensive	2	6.9	93.1
Visiting	1	6.9	100
Total	**29**	**100**	

The dominance of Durban as a destination is clearly visible from table 5.41, below. Eight two percent of the migrants that wanted to move chose Durban as their next destination, instead of remaining in their country, or moving to another country.

Table 5.41: Fourth Place of Destination: Towns and Cities

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Town/city in Malawi	8	27.6	27.6
Durban	16	55.1	82.7
Unknown	5	17.2	100
Total	**29**	**100**	

However this dominance of Durban as a place of destination is a fairly recent phenomenon, as can be seen in the table 5.42 below. Table 5.42 indicates that the

majority of the migrants from this fourth wave, 69% have spent five or less years in the place of the fourth migratory destination.

Table 5. 42: Duration of Stay in Fourth Place of Destination			
	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
1-5 years	20	69	69
6-10 years	1	3.4	72.4
11-15 years	1	3.4	75.8
Unknown	7	24.1	100
Total	**29**	**100**	

In terms of accommodation strategies there does not appear to be a dominant preference (see table 5.43). Being responsible for oneself and living alone accounts for 34% of the respondents (albeit contextualised as already mentioned) now dominates the fourth move. Yet using networks of friends (10.3%) and family (27.5%) still accounts for a large number of accommodation strategies. Combining both family and friendship networks accounts for 37.8%. A little more than a quarter of respondents did not provide information.

Table 5.43: Accommodation strategies in Fourth Place of Destination			
Accommodation strategy	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
Alone	10	34.5	34.5
Friends	3	10.3	44.8
Parents, family	8	27.5	73.4
Unknown	8	27.5	100
Total	**29**	**100**	

Unlike those who made the previous moves, self-employment seems to have been less of a livelihood strategy. This is depicted in table 5.44. Almost 45% of the migrants are employed by someone else and less than 25% are self-employed. A large percentage obviously did not report on their economic status (27.6%).

Table 5.44: Work Activities in Fourth Place of Destination			
Work Activities	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
Employed	13	44.8	44.8
Business - retail and service industries	4	14.2	59
Business – production	3	10.3	69.3
Visiting	1	3.4	72.7
Unknown	8	27.6	100
Total	**29**	**100**	

However data on work activities need to be disaggregated for the different locations that the migrants moved to. This is depicted in the next section on Durban as a destination for the fourth move.

5.3.6.1 Durban as the Fourth Place of Destination

By the fourth move Durban dominates as the preferred place of destination. (See table 5.45 below.) Of the 29 migrants making this fourth journey, 16 or 55% arrive in Durban, and 28% migrate within Malawi. There are no migrants that either go to another Southern African country, or another South African city or town. The split in terms of work activities in the different towns and cities of Malawi and Durban mirror the global figures given in Table 5.43. Most are employed by other people; 75% in Malawi and 43.8% in Durban. This might reflect that there are migrants who think that being self-employed entrepreneurs in Durban has better chances of success than in Malawi. Indeed there is only one self-employed person in Malawi after this fourth move, compared to 6 in Durban.

Table 5.45: Work Activities in Fourth Place of Destination by Town, City and Country

Work Activities	Destination						Total	
	Town/city in Malawi		Durban		unknown			
	No	*%*	*No*	*%*	*No*	*%*	*No*	*%*
Employed	6	75	7	43.8			13	44.8
Self employed business - retail and service industries			4	25			4	14.2
Self-employed business – production	1	12.5	2	12.5			3	10.3
Visiting	1	12.5					1	3.4
Unknown			3	18.8	5	100	8	27.6
Total	**8**	**100**	**16**	**100**	**5**	**100**	**29**	**100**

The accommodation strategies of these migrants are depicted in table 5.46 below. Those finding their own accommodation in Malawi amount to 62.5% of the migrants making the fourth move, where as in Durban this is 31.3% of the migrants arriving in Durban. In Durban living with parents dominates the Malawian migrant population (37.5%). If this is added to living with friends, the percentage figures amounts to 50% of the migrants in the fourth move. It can be seen quite clearly that social networks of friends and relatives continue to provide an important asset in the accommodation strategies of the migrants.

Table 5.46: Accommodation Strategies In Fourth Place of Destination								
	Destination							
Accommodation strategy	**Town/city in Malawi**		**Durban**		**Unknown**		**Total**	
	No	***%***	***No***	***%***	***No***	***%***	***No***	***%***
Alone	5	62.5	5	31.3			10	34.5
Friends	1	12.5	2	12.5			3	10.3
Parents, family	2	25	6	37.5			8	27.6
Unknown			3	18.8	5	100	8	27.6
Total	**8**	**100**	**16**	**100**	**5**	**100**	**29**	**100**

In summarising the most important points of this fourth move, the importance of economic factors as the primary reason for migrating is underlined. This is reflected in the type of employment sought and obtained, either as employees or as self-employed entrepreneurs. What is significant is that as more migrants arrive there is an increase in reporting unemployment. It is curious that this is not reported in terms of work activities in Malawi. This may be because they did not want to appear as desperate or in dire straits. But it may also be that only a select few can in fact migrate – those who can afford to and those who receive assistance from their networks of friends and relatives. Earlier it was mentioned that one-way travel between Malawi and Durban can cost as much as R600, a sum which may be beyond the reach of most poor people in Malawi. A reflection of this cost is in the accommodation strategies. Residing alone or living with friends and relatives are more or less evenly distributed as accommodation strategies.

5.3.7 Summary: Migratory Movements to Durban[2]

The primary reason for moving from place to place, en route to Durban, has been for better employment prospects and business or other economic opportunities. This has remained consistent throughout this analysis of the movements and destinations of the Malawian migrants. This aspect as it pertains to their livelihood activities in Durban is given detailed analysis in the next section. A second important feature of the migratory movement has been the reliance on networks of friends and relatives, especially for

[2] There were a few people who made a fifth move, but these will not be analysed as the numbers are very small and not statistically interesting. They migrate for much the same reasons as outlined above, and provide no new insights.

accommodation. In the next and subsequent chapters I shall show the importance of networks in the job situation. However, there is also a significant number who live alone, that is, they are not dependent on anyone for accommodation. As noted, this does not mean they live in isolation from other Malawians, or friends and relatives as they live in enclaves or in groups in various parts of the city, and indeed for many of the self employed entrepreneurs who occupy themselves within these areas as well. A third aspect of this analysis that is important to note is that the majority of the Malawian migrants are employees, but that there is an equally significant number who are small scale entrepreneurs. In the first move the majority of the migrants were self-employed entrepreneurs, but as they migrate more of them seek and take on jobs as employees. In some cases they are both, as I shall show in chapter seven. There is also some reporting of unemployment as an indication of social problems. Some Malawians migrants have indicated a need to return to Malawi because of these problems. I shall deal with the social problems that they encounter in chapter seven. In the next chapter the analysis proceeds to their employment, unemployment and return migration, and in which their experience and skills gained are put to use in a new country, and different social and economic environment.

5.4. CONCLUSION

Most of the migrants arrived in the post-1994 period, although there appears to be a drop in migrants coming from Malawi to Durban after 1999. The context for these waves of migration was the consequences of a restructuring Malawian economy (structural adjustment programmes taking effect on employment prospects) and the opening up of South Africa in the post-1994 period. These waves of migrants to Durban may be accounted for in terms of these push and pull factors.

Most migrants are young men between the ages of 20 and 35 years of age, and have a reasonably good high school education. Most tend to be single, and migrate from their parents home, often in a series of steps from village to small town before moving to other urban centres before making the journey to Durban. However, about a third of them

arrived in Durban directly from their place of origin. Female migrants are not a significant part of the migration pattern, but those that do migrate tend to be married in the first instance, and hence migrate to join their families. Some of these characteristics are not dissimilar to other continental African migrants to Europe or America.

The largest number of migrants arrive in a step migration process from southern Malawi, with a substantial proportion coming from Mangochi district. It is not clear why such a high percentage of these migrants come from southern Malawi, rather than anywhere else. However it clearly indicates that there is a network of social ties that extend from Mangochi, and other surrounding districts, to Durban. The step migration coincides with the emergence of a chain or linkage between the points of origin in Malawi and their destination in Durban, with the initial settlement by new migrants coming to Durban in the first half of the 1990s. This initial wave provided the hidden bridge for subsequent waves through out the 1990s. This linkage suggests that an initial core of friends and relatives in Durban provide newly arrived migrants, and those still intending to migrate from Malawi, with information about Durban, places to stay or assistance in finding accommodation and jobs, as well as the necessary social support for adjustment to local conditions. Continuation of this linkage between specific places and identifiable groups of people between southern Malawi and Durban suggests a particular field or stream of migratory movement with specific aims of providing accommodation and information on employment prospects. Thus, for example, upon arrival the first major hurdle to over come was finding accommodation. Malawian migrants seem to be more or less equally divided in finding accommodation through their own means (which in most circumstances means living on their own, but within the context of other Malawians in apartments in the inner city, in a high density suburb, or on the outskirts of the city), or living, initially at least, with friends and relatives. Having settled the issue of finding accommodation, their attention is directed towards making a living. Although their educational levels seem low (very few having post secondary school qualifications), the ability to speak English is an important asset in seeking and securing jobs. This contrasts with French speaking West and Central African migrants whose distinctive language and

appearance sets them apart from local and other foreign migrants, and immediately puts them at a disadvantage in securing employment.

Language and appearance are issues which confront Malawian migrants as well, but they tend to assimilate themselves to local conditions, but, as I shall show in chapter seven and eight, without undermining their own sense of identity. There is a suggestion that religion as an identification tag plays role in the emergence and establishment of these networks. In chapter seven I shall, though an analysis of some of the individual biographies of migrants, show the extent of these connections extending to migrants that came to Durban a number of decades ago.

Almost all migrants are economic migrants seeking work, formal or informal, or the opportunities to be self-employed. A few arrive to advance their education careers or obtain further training or skills, while others followed their spouses or parents. Except for approximately a third of the sample, most migrants arrived in Durban after making two or three stops at different points in their migration to the coast. The importance of this is that it provided a learning experience in the world of work, and hence accustomed them to cope better with the rigours of a continental African migrant's life: their arrival and insertion in Durban's society and economy. This is confirmed when it seen that for the vast majority of the Malawians some form of work experience was acquired prior to migrating to Durban. Acquisition of work experience, formal or informal, is not to under play the issue of dire economic circumstances or poverty as the force driving the migration process. It is this very issue of finding employment, and sustaining it for a period of time, thus substantially achieving the aims of their migration and returning to Malawi that is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

WORK, UNEMPLOYMENT AND RETURN MIGRATION

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I expand on some of the ideas encountered in the previous chapter, namely employment in the formal and informal sectors of the economy, and unemployment. This section will also touch on the kinds of occupations that many of the Malawians took up in Durban. Finally we shall assess the ideas that they have about return migration. I link the kind of success they have as economic migrants to the desire to return and make some assessment of it.

6.2 FORMAL EMPLOYMENT

In table 6.1 below the percentage of those employed in formal employment is 51%, whereas those without formal employment is 40%. (Approximately 8% did not answer the question adequately.)

Table 6.1: Formal Employment

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	48	40.3	40.3
N/a	10	8.4	48.7
Yes	61	51.3	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

That a little more than half of the respondents are formally employed is consistent with the analysis made above. I shall detail the occupations below. Before that there is a need to understand where these Malawians worked.

Initially it seemed to this researcher that they were either confined to the outskirts of the city centre, which given their immigration status, provided the prefect opportunity to be

invisible from the prying eyes of the police and the Department of Home Affairs officials. However a perusal of the widespread areas in which they find jobs suggests that this initial observation needed to be amended. However, a closer examination of these widespread places of occupation suggests that the principle of being less visible still holds in some instances. This is indicated by the close to half of respondents not responding to the question. However, more than half did respond, and shows that Malawian migrants have found employment in the areas to the north, south and west of Durban.

Table 6.2: Places of Employment

		Frequency	Percent
Durban	City Center	33	51
Morningside	North Durban	1	2
Overport		1	2
Verulam		2	3
Chatsworth	South Durban	3	5
Clairwood		4	6
Isipingo		2	3
Hillcrest	West Durban	1	2
Mariannhill		8	12
Pinetown		7	10
Shallcross		1	2
Westville		1	2
Total		**64**	**100**

Figure 6.1: Places of Employment



It is clear that most Malawian migrants work all over the city (table 6.2), but are concentrated in central Durban (51%). They also work in a number of different parts of the city: Chatsworth, Clairwood, Isipingo in the southern part of the city, Hillcrest, Mariannhill, Pinetown, Shallcross and Westville in the west, and Overport, Morningside, and Verulam in the north. (Overport and Morningside being closer to the Durban city centre than any of the other northern suburbs.) (See pie graph, figure 6.1, above for detailed breakdown by percentage.) It should be noted that these are also areas that were formerly designated Indian or white group areas, and dominated by people of these designated racial categories. The spread of Malawian migrants is very different from

other foreign migrants who tend to be concentrated in the city centre. It may even suggest that enclaves of Malawians are not a pronounced phenomenon as in cities of Europe or America. While enclaves often suggest dense networks of support, with a fair proportion of social capital formation among such national groupings, it would seem that this is not a significant issue. However, the qualitative evidence suggests that networks do exist and operate, but perhaps not in a dense and totally supportive and institutionalised way as in the case of the Senegalese (Vawda, 2000: 112).

Table 6.3: Occupations

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Accountant	1	.8	.8	.8
Baker	1	.8	.8	1.7
Bricklayer	3	2.5	2.5	4.2
Cashier	1	.8	.8	5.0
Casual	1	.8	.8	5.9
Delivery	1	.8	.8	6.7
Domestic servant	2	1.7	1.7	8.4
Gardener	2	1.7	1.7	10.1
Labourer	1	.8	.8	10.9
Machine operator	6	5.0	5.0	16.0
Mechanic	3	2.5	2.5	18.5
Mechanic assist	1	.8	.8	19.3
N/a	54	45.4	45.4	64.7
Packer	1	.8	.8	65.5
Painter	1	.8	.8	66.4
Sales/marketing	1	.8	.8	67.2
Shop assistant	16	13.4	13.4	80.7
Stock clerk	1	.8	.8	81.5
Tailoring	20	16.8	16.8	98.3
Technician	2	1.7	1.7	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

Furthermore there is a wide range of occupations, from accountants/book-keepers to domestic servants (see table 6.3, 'Occupations' above). This wide range of occupations

suggests that Malawians have a wide base of skills, level of education (including the ability to speak fluent English) and experience to draw on in order to secure jobs. While this table suggests that many of the Malawians have a job, or access to a job based on their skills and experience, the issue of whether they find such jobs within relatively short spaces of time was tested. A question on how long they were unemployed was asked. However given the sensitive nature of such information, with its implications of how they obtain jobs, under what conditions they work, and the time they spend in South Africa in relation to their visa conditions has made it difficult to obtain accurate information. Very few respondents were willing to divulge such information. Those who did answer the question seem to indicate that while it seems clear that the ability to find work, and being more than accommodating and compliant of employer demands ensures to a very great extent their access to jobs, it by no means guarantees 'full' employment. Not all Malawians obtain jobs. In the table 6.4, below, approximately 33% are unable to find work within 6 months of their arrival, and some as long two years.

Table 6.4: Length of Unemployment in SA

	Frequency	Percent
1 month	1	11
2 months	2	22
3 months	1	11
4 months	1	11
6 months	3	33
2 years	1	11
Total	**9**	**100***

*Percentage rounded off.

However, given the analysis in chapter 5 above of the number of migratory moves made before arrival in Durban there is a strong suggestion that most Malawians find jobs within 6 months to a year.

This notion is further supported by the fact that for many Malawians previous employment in Durban is not a strong feature of their work biography. For many Malawians previous employment in Durban (or South Africa) exists only on a very

limited scale, either because they have recently arrived and have not had the opportunity to have another job, or because they are 'loyal' employees knowing that jobs are scarce and cannot easily expect to get another job as economic migrants, especially where there is high unemployment. (The caveats that apply to obtaining answers to the question of unemployment would apply in this case as well.) Table 6.5 gives the previous employment for 15 of the respondents.

Table 6.5: Previous Employment/Occupation

	Frequency	Percent
Accountant	1	6.6
Bricklayer	2	13.3
Casual labourer	1	6.6
Cleaner	1	6.6
Delivery	1	6.6
Factory	1	6.6
Gardener, delivery	1	6.6
Machinist	1	6.6
Mechanic	1	6.6
Painter	1	6.6
Sales clerk	2	13.3
Sewing	1	6.6
Shop assistant	1	6.6
Total	**15**	**100.0**

Previous employment (table 6.5) again covers a wide spectrum of occupations, but excludes those who are self-employed. Interpretation of these figures must be cautionary, but must be seen in the context of the length of previous employment.

Table 6.6: Length of Previous Employment		
	Frequency	Percent
1.5 months	1	11
1.5 years	1	11
6 months	1	11
1 year	1	11
2 years	1	11
3 years	1	11
6 years	1	11
8 years	1	11
9 years	1	11
Total	**9**	**99**

It is important to note that people have worked for as little as 1 month to as much as 9 years (table 6.6). This range gives some indication of the time and commitment of Malawians to the jobs they have either undertaken or accepted. Implicit in these lengths of employment is the fact that as foreign migrant workers they are willing to work for less than local people with all the vulnerability it implies: vulnerable to the threat of exposure to the authorities, vulnerable to threats of xenophobic attacks on their person, and to continuing earning lower wages than their South African colleagues. However this is not to suggest that they would like to continue to live in South Africa on a permanent basis. The issue of return migration is analysed in the next section.

6.3 RETURN MIGRATION

When asked if they would return to Malawi, 49% indicated that would be a goal, while 41% indicated that they have no desire to return. 10% were not committed to any particular option (table 6.7, see also figure 6.2)).

Table 6.7: Return to Malawi			
	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No return	49	41.2	41.2
Uncommitted	12	10.1	51.3
Yes, return	58	48.7	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

Figure 6.2: Return Migration



When probed as to whether they would return if given the choice and what reasons they advance for such a choice, it became clear that in practical terms not many wanted to return. Reasons advanced for not returning were financial constraints, no money to travel, not achieved their goals, not ready to leave, or if they did return to Malawi it would be simply to visit family and friends (see table 6.8). However some were keen to leave to start their own businesses in the land of their birth, while others were deported.

The reasons advanced for either returning or not returning are illustrated in table 6.8. In terms of the reasons given, 48% would return, but of that 39% indicated that it would to visit family and friends. Returning to Durban would be a priority. Others, approximately 36%, indicated that they were unsure because they just arrived, or had not achieved what they set out to do, were not ready to leave or did not have enough cash to make the return trip. This means a large number will probably return, but continue to engage in target and circular migration. If those that indicated they would return are added to those who intend to return once their goals are achieved, then at least 33% will probably return. (There was a 16% no response to the question).

Table 6.8: Return Migration: Reasons For, and Against Returning to Malawi

Reasons for Returning to Malawi	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Return home	3	2.5	2.5
Start own business	6	5.0	7.5
Visit family and friends	46	38.7	46.2
Work/visit family	1	.8	47
Financial	1	.8	47.8
Sub-total	***57***	***47.8***	
Reasons for *not* Returning to Malawi			
Just arrived	10	8.4	56.2
No money to travel	1	.8	57
Not achieved goal	3	2.5	59.5
Not ready to leave	26	21.8	81.3
Undecided	1	.8	82.1
Deported	2	1.7	83.8
Sub-total	***43***	***36.1***	
N/a	19	16.0	100
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

6.4 INFORMAL TRADING

One of the options for migrants and refugees to make a living is to engage in informal trading. For some migrants this is a serious option. However, among the Malawian migrants this option is exercised only by a small number, 22, or 18% of the sample (see table 6.9 below). The others 82% thought of themselves either as formally employed (as indicated above), or more rarely unemployed. (Note that a number of traders refused to answer the question on when they began as informal traders.) Most of the informal traders began trading in the period 1994-2001, although one person began in 1987. It can be seen that the post-apartheid period was seen as an opportunity to engage in economic activity. In table 6.10 the number of actual traders is given, and their places of trade.

Table 6.9: Informal trading: start date		
	Frequency	Percent
1987	1	5.5
1994	2	11.1
1995	3	16.6
1997	2	11.1
1998	5	27.7
1999	2	11.1
2001	3	16.6
Total	**18**	**100.0**

The first places that these Malawians migrants used for the purposes of engaging in informal trade were the centre of Durban, and other places nearby: the beachfront, central Durban flea markets, outside Durban shops and on the streets. This accounted for 54% of the traders. A further 36% (8 people) traded in places such as Chatsworth, Effingham, Overport, Sydenham and the Umgeni Night Market.

Table 6.10: First Trading Place				
Places		**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
Durban beach front	City Centre	1	4.5	4.5
Durban flea markets		2	9	13.5
Durban outside shops		1	4.5	18
Durban streets		8	36.3	54.3
Umgeni Night Market		1	4.5	58.8
Chatsworth		1	4.5	63.3
Overport		4	18.1	81.4
Sydenham		1	4.5	85.9
Effingham		1	4.5	90.4
Pietermaritzburg		1	4.5	94.9
Malawi		1	4.5	99.4
Total		**22**	**99.4**	

The first places of trade confirm their widespread use of the city. There is also an indication of going beyond the boundaries of the city. One of these traders carried out

international trade between South Africa and Malawi, while another traded in Pietermaritzburg. In their second and third places of trade we see this trend continue.

Once again the streets of Durban dominate as the second and third places (tables 6.11 and 6.12) of choice for trading, except the weekly market at Mandeni and the middle-class suburbs of Clare Estate and Parlock are added. Also one of these entrepreneurs has attempted to expand to Johannesburg.

Table 6.11: Second Trading Place

Place	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Durban streets	3	33.3	33.3
Clare Estate	1	11.1	44.4
Mandeni	4	44.4	88.8
Mansel Road	1	11.1	99.9
Total	**9**	**99.9**	

Table 6.12: Third Trading Place

Place	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Alice Street	1	20	20
Durban flea markets	1	20	40
Jo'burg	1	20	60
Mansel Road	1	20	80
Parlock	1	20	100
Total	**5**	**100**	

The type of commodities that they trade in (table 6.13) is mostly retail services ranging from selling clothes (including brand new and second-hand clothing) to offering services such as car repairs, panel beating. Some are involved in the production of wooden commodities because of their carpentry skills, and clothes as tailors.

Table 6.13: Goods and Production Services Provided			
	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percentage
Auto-electrical	1	4.5	4.5
Carpentry	1	4.5	9
Clothes	12	54.5	63.5
Mechanic	2	9	72.5
Panel beating	3	13.6	86.1
Tailoring	1	4.5	90.6
Various goods	2	9	99.6
Total	**22**	**99.6**	

Most of the purchases for these goods (table 6.14) that the Malawians traders provided are obtained from local Durban shops, wholesalers, flea-markets, and for a few of the traders further afield from the adjacent suburbs and industrial estates at Phoenix, Verulam, and the inland industrial town of Newcastle.

Table 6.14: Purchase of Commodities			
	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percentage
Durban shops, wholesalers	16	72.7	72.7
Phoenix, Pinetown	1	4.5	77.2
Local tailors, flea market	1	4.5	81.7
Newcastle	1	4.5	86.2
Phoenix, Verulam	1	4.5	90.7
N/a	2	9	99.7
Total	**22**	**99.7**	

Most of the Malawians traders denied that they employed anyone, less still employ a local South Africa, or 'Zulu', as they would put it (see table 6.15). But at least 10 of the 22 Malawians traders say that that employ someone, more or less permanently, but most refused to elaborate on this issue beyond a mere acknowledgement of the fact that some people are employed.

Table 6.15: Providing Employment			
	Frequency	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percentage**
No employment	11	50	50
Occasional	1	4.5	54.5
Yes employment	9	40.9	95.4
N/a	1	4.5	99.9
Total	**22**	**99.9**	

However my qualitative data and observations suggest that there are considerable amounts of employment, and/or sharing of resources with locals, especially local women street traders. (A few Malawians traders refused to answer the question). Given the complexity of labour law in the country, and the fact that they are foreign migrants and traders, it is not surprising that many refused to elaborate on the employment and/or co-operation that exist amongst them. Of course if they do not employ anyone, then they cannot say how many they employ. The answer to that question was a total 'not applicable'. However in the next two chapters, using the qualitative data I shall unpack the relationship between Malawian traders and their South Africa employees. I shall now turn to the issue of their remuneration for their work activities.

6.5. INCOME AND REMITTANCES

Income ranges from no earnings (zero) to over R6000 per month. But, according to my informants, earnings are highly variable, and change from month to month depending on business, and various other factors such as time spent on the streets, police and Home Affairs monitoring of their movements which inhibit their earning capacity. The average or mean income is R2 924. The median is R3000 (see table 6.16). In terms of income brackets (table 6.17), most of these Malawian migrants earn between R501-1000 (50%), followed by 17% who earn between R1-500, 10% who earn between R1001-R1500, 4% who earn between R1501-2000. A small number earn above R2000. Interestingly 7% of the sample earn well above R3000 per month. It should be noted that 28% do not have an income and rely on family and friends to make ends meet. Differentiation on the basis of

income exists, and is visible in the size and quality of houses in places such as Mariannhill.

Table 6.16: Income: Mean, Median, Mode		
N = 119	Valid	119
	Missing	0
Mean		2.924
Median		3.000
Mode		3.0

Table 6.17: Income			
	Frequency	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
R0.00	28	23.5	23.5
R1-500	17	14.3	37.8
R501-1000	50	42.0	79.8
R1001-1500	10	8.4	88.2
R1501-2000	4	3.4	91.6
R2001-2500	1	.8	92.4
R2501-3000	2	1.7	94.1
R3001 +	7	5.9	100.0
Total	119	**100.0**	

A central theme in much of the migration literature is the remittances that migrants make to their families, homes, villages, and towns of origin. The Malawians under discussion here are not an exception. However not all of them remit monies back home: 39% do not remit any money while 50% do. There is also no response from about 12% of the respondents (table 6.18).

Table 6.18: Remittances			
	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No remittances	46	38.7	38.7
N/a	14	11.8	50.4
Yes, remittance	59	49.6	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

Further interrogation of the data on remittances reveals interesting insights in who engages in remittances and who does not, and for what reasons (see table 6.19 below).

Table 6.19: Income and Remittances					
			REMITTANCES		
INCOME	***Number***	***%***	***No remittances***	***N/a***	***Yes, remittances***
R0.00	28	23.5	11 (9%)	12 (10%)	5 (4%)
R1-500	17	14.3	9 (7.5%)		8 (8%)
R501-1000	50	42.0	20 (17%)	2 (1.6%)	28 (23%)
R1001-1500	10	8.4	4 (3.3%)		6 (5%)
R1501-2000	4	3.4	1 (0.8%)		3 (2.5%)
R2001-2500	1	.8			1 (0.8%)
R2501-3000	2	1.7	1 (0.8%)		1 (0.8%)
R3001 +	7	5.9			7 (5.8%)
Total	**119**	**100.0**	**46 (38.8%)**	**14 (12%)**	**59 (50%)**

Table 6.19 reveals the following:

1. Those who did not reply to the question or for which there is no data available are unlikely to remit any monies because the categories of people involved are those who either earn no income, or very low incomes (R1-1000).
2. Those in lower income categories are the largest numbers of people who remit a portion of their income (40% = (R0 – R1000)). At the same time 46% do not remit any income to Malawi.
3. Approximately 15% of people in the higher income categories (R1000- +R3000) remit some income to Malawi. Only 6% of people in these income categories do not remit income.

It has been difficult to elicit information on how much is remitted, especially on a monthly basis. This makes it difficult to gauge if this is done on a regular basis, and in fixed amounts. What is very clear is that no fixed regular amounts are sent back to Malawi. Most informants said that they accumulate certain amounts of money and then send it back home at irregular intervals. Furthermore, contrary to the table above that indicates that 50% of the people are sending back money to Malawi, table 6.20, below, indicates that the actual number is only about 48%. There is some gap between the intention and the actual remittances.

Table 6.20: Amounts Remitted

Amount	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	74	62.2	62.2
100	1	.8	63.0
150	1	.8	63.9
200	2	1.7	65.5
210	1	.8	66.4
300	3	2.5	68.9
400	4	3.4	72.3
450	2	1.7	73.9
500	6	5.0	79.0
550	1	.8	79.8
700	3	2.5	82.4
800	1	.8	83.2
1000	6	5.0	88.2
1200	2	1.7	89.9
1500	4	3.4	93.3
2000	3	2.5	95.8
3000	3	2.5	98.3
4400	1	.8	99.2
5000	1	.8	100.0
Total	**119**	**100.0**	

In the table 6.20, above, it can be seen that the amounts remitted vary enormously from a hundred to thousands of rands per month. Taking these figures at face value, and

assuming there are monthly remittances, the average remittance would be R416 per month per person.

There is an enormous gap in this analysis on remittances. To understand it in its context requires an analysis of the current household or individual income and expenditure to be able to say something sensible about the remittances. For example, what proportion is being spent on living in Durban, and what proportion of income is remitted? For this analysis the social survey did not obtain the required data.

6.6 CONCLUSION

Malawian migrants work and live in a wide variety of places within the Durban Metro. While their living spaces might be little enclaves of Malawians, their work places are spread widely over the Durban Metro area. There is, however, a concentration of Malawians working in the Durban city centre.

Given their quasi-legal (they have visa preferences coming from an SADC country), and in some cases illegal status, their ability to find work may be related to the lesser resistance they offer with regard to less than satisfactory wages and working conditions. Ability to find work is also related to other important factors such as the ability to speak English, educational levels suitable for skilled and semi-skilled work, and a willingness to work harder and longer hours, and exploit opportunities as they arise. Most migrants find some kind of work within 6 months to 2 years.

Malawians tend to fill a wide variety of occupations ranging from cleaner to factory worker, from bookkeeper to self-employed entrepreneur. Income levels range from less than R100 per month to over R3 000 per month. Unemployment does not appear to be significant, although some have reported this as part of their problems. However they have the option of migrating elsewhere or returning home in order to secure better economic or employment prospects.

Surprisingly fewer than expected by this researcher are self-employed entrepreneurs in the informal sector. Yet I would argue that they make an important contribution as entrepreneurs. It is an issue that is analysed at greater length in chapter seven. Those that are self-employed entrepreneurs engage in economic activities which generates some level of employment for local people, but whose economic activities also act as a low level multiplier in the purchase and sale of goods and services.

It is not clear how much of the income earned is remitted to Malawi, although the sketchy evidence points to it being important for families in Malawi. Migrancy routes are also conduits for transferring savings as capital to start businesses or to make investments in family homes (in Malawi). Those who wish to return after meeting their initial objectives (e.g. obtaining the start-up capital etc.) may be termed target migrants, that is, they may return to migrancy as the means to obtain or reach new objectives in support of activities back home. Others who return to Durban regularly with no precise or fixed agenda may be called circular migrants. Their migration is not just a means to an end. There appears to be a minority who have began to make their life in Durban, and have no intention of returning to Malawi, except as visitors.

What the actions and responses of migrants suggest – whether target and circular migrants, or permanent residents - are ongoing migratory processes between what is effectively a centre (Durban, South Africa) and a periphery (Malawi, southern Malawi, Mangochi district). Such a perspective, as suggested in chapter three, can incorporate the multiple ways in which transmigration is beginning to occur. It suggests the elaboration and construction of multiple social relationships through migration and construction of identities between places of origin and destination, the movements of people, artefacts, and money, and its reciprocal, albeit uneven impacts and influences across national, social and cultural boundaries. Structurally, at the level of the state, these transnational relationships occur in a highly skewed relationship between a struggling developing third world country, Malawi, one the poorest countries in the world, and South Africa, a middle income developing country, whose status in this context is that of a metropole in a centre-periphery relationship. However, as the evidence has shown, there is a very

specific and direct field of migratory relations between southern Malawi (Mangochi district in particular) and Durban, in which nation-state boundaries and regulations are simply barriers to overcome. It is between Durban and southern Malawi that centre-periphery relationships are further enmeshed with issues of identity and participation in its economy and society. These issues are further explored in the context of individual biographies in chapter seven, and as part of the debate on citizenship and migration in chapter eight.

CHAPTER SEVEN
VULNERABILITY, OPPORTUNITIES AND INCLUSION: A MALAWIAN COMMUNITY IN THE CITY OF DURBAN

7.1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I take up a number of the issues raised in the conclusion of the last chapter, particularly those related to how their resources, or livelihood strategies, are used to construct a living for themselves in Durban. In chapters five and six I outlined the transnational migratory patterns between Malawi and Durban, their insertion into an urban environment, their strategies to defend themselves against their vulnerability, seek opportunities, build a resource or livelihood base to sustain themselves, and for the majority of them to remit monies back home, accumulate capital and goods for reinvestment in Malawi, or in some other country. In this chapter I principally want to explore through the use of qualitative and some quantitative data the following:

1. The existence of long-term established networks of information and contact with Durban, or other long-established migrants, as important to why many Malawians chose Durban as a place of destination.
2. Whether their particular identities, as Malawians, as ethnic Yao (and people from southern Malawi), and as Muslims, provide an additional set of resources to enable to pursue their aims of being traders and workers in a different country.
3. The effect and affect as migrant entrepreneurs and/or workers on their proclaimed status as permanent, circular, or target migrants.
4. How do they see their activities, as entrepreneurs and/or employees as contributing to, and/or taking advantage of the development of the city?

In making this contribution, or taking advantage of the city's resources, the idea of citizenship for migrants, as illustrated by the Malawians, as an agonistic practical participation in an economy interpolated by work, whether legal, illegal, formal or informal, will be introduced. This notion of citizenship as a societal participative contribution from below (rather than a set of state-sponsored rights and obligations from

above), contributing to the development of the city through work, albeit currently contested on a number of levels, is explored in the following chapter.

Following the theme of work for a moment, previous sociological analyses which made sharp and often rigid analytical or theoretical division between different groups of social actors involved in the production process, principally as workers and capitalists, will have limited applicability in this analysis. This suggests a need for revision of these conceptual categories in the context of developing economies and urban expansion. However, in this analysis the issue of work is related to the theme of livelihoods, which includes not just the provision of life's necessities such as food and shelter, but also other resources which both structure and influence the way livelihood strategies are pursued. These include the way in which people are included in local development issues, principally around the benefits derived from municipal services (roads, water, electricity), and access to resources such as housing/shelter/accommodation and the use of identity or identities, particularly as constructed and used by those who are from the Yao ethnic group and Muslim Malawians. This issue of identity will be explored again in the following chapter through the prism of citizenship.

I also will show that Malawian migration to Durban, although it demonstrates many of the central characteristics of continental African migration to South Africa, as suggested in chapter 4, has specific features that distinguishes it them from, say, francophone or West African migrants. In the next section I outline some of the principal features that distinguish the different groupings of continental African migrants in the city of Durban. In locating the specificity of the Malawian experience of migration, I return to review some of the theoretical insights developed in chapter three, principally that there is a need to focus on the micro level decision making that prompts people to migrate thousands of kilometres away from their homes to make a living for themselves, their families, or to start a new life altogether.

7.2. COMPARING CONTINENTAL AFRICAN MIGRATION STRATEGIES.

Continental African migrants do not see themselves as simply one kind of immigrant. Their arrival at a border post is often simplified to satisfy the one-dimensional criterion for the purposes of entry (business, study, work, tourist, asylum seeker, refugee). Many continental African migrants are here as economic refugees because of the economic circumstances in their respective countries, often exacerbated by political instability. In other words their situation is a complex intertwining of political, economic and sometimes personal reasons for leaving their countries of origin and fleeing thousands of kilometres to the southern tip of Africa. Thus many Senegalese migrants said that they are political asylum seekers because of their oppositional role in politics to the previous regime in their home country, but also they cannot find work. Asylum seekers may claim to be victims of their political activities, but they also seek refuge from the constraints of a less than robust economy. Others such as the Malawians are forthright in their reasons for coming to South Africa: they come to seek work. What are the options for livelihood generation by foreign migrants in South Africa? Often denied access to jobs that they have been trained for in their countries of origin such as teachers, medical personnel, engineers, economists, and technicians of various kinds, most have turned to working for themselves in the informal sector as street traders, car guards, street hair salons, tailors and security guards. This is not to deny that many migrants come to the country without any apparent skills at all, such as some of the Malawians. Unskilled or barely skilled migrants are vulnerable to unscrupulous employers, who make them work under onerous conditions illegally.

The range of occupations listed above is not a menu of options. Often the choice of livelihood depends, at least in the initial stages of their stay, on the country of origin, what networks of friends and relatives that they connect with in South Africa, and how long they are prepared to persevere in finding the kind of work they are comfortable with, or prepared to do. Thus one finds that many of the street traders are Senegalese and Somalis, whereas the Congolese, Burundians and Rwandese tend towards being car guards on the streets of Durban and security guards for homes, offices, factories and

various institutions. Some of them run street hair salons, and engage in tailoring, as do some of the Ghanaians and Cameroonians. Malawians, because of the longer ties that they have with South Africa tend to be able to connect with a well-established network of their own nationals. These networks provide them with advice on employment opportunities, or access to South African employers mainly in various retailing, tailoring, dressmaking and clothing manufacturing sectors. Some Malawians have subsequently branched out to work on their own, and create employment.

Although asylum seekers and refugees are generally grateful to be accepted into the country, it has been a difficult experience for the first few of them to find accommodation and establish a means of livelihood. Given the paucity of State assistance, they have had to rely on a number of strategies to finding accommodation, various means of survival and employment or self-employment. These strategies are:

1. Identifying their own countrymen, as in the case of francophones - French speaking immigrants, such as the Congolese.
2. Arriving with an address of a friend or relative, which many do, particularly the Congolese, Senegalese and Malawians.
3. Locking into an established network, good examples being the Senegalese and Malawians.
4. Finding their way to church sponsored-refugee centres, such as the Jesuit Refugee Services. This service is for all refugees, but particularly those affected by the genocide and continuing conflict in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa (Congo, Burundi, Rwanda), and in East Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan). Malawians to my knowledge do not use these services.
5. In the case of Muslims immigrants such as the Malawians from the Mangochi district (where the Yao Muslims predominate), connecting and seeking assistance from Islamic charitable organizations or mosques has been a major consideration in starting to develop a new life. This also applies to some extent to the early Somali arrivals.

Using one or a combination of these strategies to settle the primary requisites of accommodation and their visa conditions (usually with the assistance of one or more of the above mentioned groups, friends or institutions), they are now in a position to seek employment or to become self-employed. It is at this point that the ability to exercise their economic right to employment becomes severely limited. Unable to find employment (as formal employees) because of legal constraints and prevailing prejudices in the host society many of the migrants resort to one or more broad strategic options. One option is the refugee centre, a church-funded project based in the Durban Ecumenical Centre. Those who have sought assistance from organizations such as the Jesuit Refugee Services JRS) and the Japanese Voluntary Committee (JVC) have been mainly, though not exclusively, people from Central Africa, particularly Congolese, Rwandans, and Burundians. Others such as Ethiopians, and Somalis have also sought their assistance. No doubt the traumatic experience of their war-torn countries, their flight to safety, and their lack of resources means continued reliance on these welfare organizations. Whereas in the past the Red Cross provided financial assistance, the services provided by the JRS and the JVC have been structured so as to encourage refugees to engage in self-help projects. Training, seed money and advice is provided to encourage them to undertake projects that will lead to establishing their own means of livelihood. However, in the interim some level of financial assistance is provided for accommodation and the nutritional and educational requirements of children. The JVC is an application-based educational fund for adults who want to obtain diplomas and other advanced certification to be able to enter the local job market with marketable skills, and provide for their own livelihoods in the medium to long term. Those refugees and migrants who make use of the refugee centre have been organised into a group called the Refugee Forum, which ostensibly has representation from every national group in Durban. However groups like the Senegalese and Malawians (and even some Congolese) have never heard of, or if they have, can claim only some vague knowledge of the Refugee Forum.

The Senegalese and the Malawians illustrate very different options for survival. Virtually from the moment they arrive, they rely on their own networks and entrepreneurial

experience to fend for themselves. While the Senegalese (and the Congolese) have opted to live and work in the city centre, the high cost of living in the city centre meant that many Malawians exercised the option of moving their residence (and in some cases their enterprises) out of the city centre to the margins of the Durban Metro region such as in Mariannhill. (For an account of the Senegalese, see Vawda, 2000: 113-115.) This chapter shall focus on the Malawians rather than any other group of foreign immigrants. Malawian migrants are not refugees, or political asylum seekers, and because of their circumstances do not openly or publicly state their immigration status.

7.3 REVIEWING THEORETICAL INSIGHTS

In the chapters reviewing the international and local literature it was argued that macro theories of migration (neo-classical theories such as Todaro 1969, Harris and Todaro, 1970, and Marxist approaches such as Shrestha, 1988, Portes, 1978, and world system theorists such as Wallerstein, among others) tended to treat migrants and immigrants as a homogenous amorphous category of people who have little choice but to migrate. That is, what is suggested by these theories is that in general terms migrants move from a economically depressed area to an urban centre of economic activity, or in labour terms, where labour moves from an areas of under-utilised abundance, to areas where there are labour shortages, particularly in the unskilled and semi-skilled categories of work. In general this was from rural areas to urban areas, and it was often assumed to be a one-way movement from place of origin to place of destination. In that chapter it was argued that these theories do not explain why, particularly in developing countries, where in structural terms all people face the same circumstances, some people move, and not others, and why migration does not occur in the same direction, that is to the most economically advanced areas. Indeed as shown in the chapter five the direction of movement of Malawian migrants is multi-pronged before arriving in Durban. Furthermore Durban is not the largest or economically most advanced of the South African cities. There are other factors than the mere pull of the prospects of higher wages or better employment prospects that contribute towards the movement of people to their chosen destination.

Lee's model of origin and destination with intervening factors sought to identify those factors that affect the decision to migrate in the place of origin and the place of destination, and intervening factors which are obstacles to migration (1966). Drawing its inspiration from Ravenstein's laws of migration, Lee's model points to some of the main factors that influence the decision to migrate. Although the model tends to simplify various complex processes of decision making (and is cast in a structurally deterministic mode), the merit of Lee's work is that it points to sets of factors that influences the decision either to stay or to migrate. In general terms Lee argues that the decision to migrate usually takes place when the negative conditions in the place of origin makes life so uncomfortable that the promise, or anticipated improved conditions that might prevail once migration is undertaken to a new place (of destination) are seen in a very positive way. In other words migration is seen as a better alternative than enduring the present conditions in the current place of residence. It is not difficult to cast the factors in a push-pull framework, and provides a list of the factors. However it is the complex interplay of these factors and individual decision-making and personal circumstances that eventually 'determines' the decision and actual migration. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s population pressure or population growth in rural areas was often cited as a push factor in migration from rural to urban areas (Parnwell, 1993: 79). However, it is not the population growth per se, but this in combination with a number of other factors that influences the decision to migrate. It was thought following the neo-classical model that surplus population or labour, as a result of demographic changes would migrate to areas where labour was scarce. However, other factors in rural areas also affect migration. While population may increase, there is also the pressure on land resources (Portes, 1978). Where land resources are no longer sufficient to absorb the increase in population by providing a sufficient level of livelihood, then migration will more than likely take place. Lack of land resources in turn may have to do with one or more factors such as lack of secure land tenure, fertility or quality of the land, environmental conditions, patterns of land inheritance, land reform policies in newly developing countries, particularly those imposed through structural adjustment policies, technological change and agricultural productivity. In the case of Malawi, Ahmed and Lipton (1997: 23) report

on the impact structural adjustment programmes have had on the use of marginal land, and lower rates of productivity of the soil. The complexity of factors may also be illustrated with reference to circular migration. In such circumstances, migrants retain a plot of land in order to retain their stake in their home community, communal or family land. In such a case, as in Qwa Qwa or among the Mabwe (Zambia), quoted above (chapter 3), permanent migration does not take place, but rather circular migration. Alternatively, if there is permanent migration, then an individual loses rights of access to land held communally or within a family. This influences not only the type of migration, but also permanence of movement from the place of origin.

While there are these 'push' factors, there are 'pull' factors operating simultaneously, the decision to migrate to an urban centre is underpinned by economic reasons such as to earn more money for a variety of reasons such as to build a house in the place of origin, to earn money to assist the family or individual family members, to repay a debt, to earn money to pay for marriage ceremonies, bridal wealth, or to pay for education, or to learn new skills, to explore other job opportunities among others. But there are other factors which prompt migration. These may take place against the structural context, but highlight the particular reasons relating to individuals, family or households migrating. In part the decision to migrate relies on imperfect information about the place of destination (Sjaastad, quoted in Boyle, Halfacree and Robinson, 1998: 62), which is unlike their knowledge of the place of origin. Even though potential migrants do not have perfect or good knowledge of the possible opportunities available, it has been shown that migration increases their chances of better livelihood resources significantly, even if they are unemployed for extended periods of time (Parnwell, 1993: 86-87). Indeed migrants do spend their first few weeks or months unemployed, relying on networks of support, or begging. The point, as Todaro points out, is that migrants would rather endure the short-term deprivations such as unemployment, no income and reliance on others, in order to enhance their long-term prospects. Thus even through knowledge or awareness of the tough economic conditions in urban centres may not be perfect, the long-term view coincides substantially with reports they receive from earlier waves of returning migrants, and/or the media images seen and heard about the city. In short their prospects may

improve significantly. On the other hand many people do not move precisely because they do not have the information to decide on whether a move is good or bad as they do not know anyone or know sufficient people to confirm for them that to migrate will result in increasing their life's chances at a better standard of living. But it precisely this set of contacts, or network of contacts, that is important in making decisions to migrate. This aspect is explored in more detail in this chapter.

As already demonstrated, migration is not uniform, but consists of two basic types of people: those who wish to take advantage of potential new prospects, and those who are forced to move, such as refugees either from conflict or environmental disasters, or because of a clear and distinct lack of usable assets and access to resources such as land. I do not want to suggest that people simply move because they face insurmountable problems at home, or in a place of origin. Indeed most people do not migrate, and for some action is taken *in situ* over the problems they face such as land shortages, prompting political action such as land invasions, occupations, strikes, marches, or resorting to guerrilla warfare rather than migration. However, whatever the exact permutations inspired by wider global forces, these push and pull factors in the literature still assume a certain homogeneity of migration from mainly rural to urban areas, and underline a certain inevitability of movement, suggesting that people merely respond to the stimuli generating in the place of destination, and then pushed by events or circumstances at home.

However, it is at the level of the individual or family or household that a decision to migrate is taken. If social and economic differentiation of the areas from which migration takes place is taken into account, then it suggests that no two people face exactly the same problems, although they might all be responding to the general structural conditions as outlined above. Such differentiation may relate to income levels, size of land holding, cohesiveness of family, networks and contacts in urban areas, stage of life cycle, cultural factors such as role of male and females in providing for the family or household. Thus many other variables have to be taken into account as to why people migrate, and what they do once they arrive in the place of destination. Following this brief recap of the

literature, I now want to turn to explore in greater detail than the previous chapter the move to Durban by Malawians, and the ways in which they go about creating a new set of livelihoods for themselves. The previous chapter covered a broad range of issues that affect and are affected by Malawian migrants. The issues covered, broadly, were the places of origin, their levels of education, the reasons for migration, the routes of migration and means of travelling and the number of stops made on the way, their accommodation strategies, and how this relates to work and saving or remittances, the types of employment, both formal and informal, that they find. The previous chapter also identified a number of problems that they encounter, particularly xenophobia and racism, while pursuing their objectives. The chapter also pointed to the temporary nature of their stay in Durban, and their eventual return to Malawi. That analysis was based on survey data, and did not go into some of the ethnographic details such as the existence of networks, the reasons why some people seek trading or employment opportunities, and how they see or identify themselves with the city, and what they think they contribute towards its development.

7.4 MIGRANTS: MARGINALISATION AND OPPORTUNITIES

Constant change, Moser (1996: 23-24) suggests, as applied to the marginalized and vulnerable poor living in working class communities, often generates increasing risk and uncertainty, leading to 'declining self respect'. But there is the probability that changes also generate opportunities, or at least the 'resilience' to take the possibilities offered to resist and/or recover from the perceived negative changes (1996:19). However, such resilience depends on the kinds of resources or 'assets' that are available. The more the resources or assets, the greater the chance of survival, persistence, resistance and recovery from poverty. One set of those resources is the socio-economic characteristics of the respective communities presented here are incomes, age, household size, and the main sources of income. Included in these characteristics of the community concerned are their networks of mutual assistance provided by such communities to those in need, as well as the limits of that assistance. These networks are self-defined. The second set of resources or other assets is basic public infrastructure provided by the local state in which

both the living and working conditions of Malawian migrants prevails. A third set of resources are their identities which are closely tied up to the way the state recognises them, and the associated rights, or lack of such rights, and their reception and perceptions of themselves based in large measure on public notions of 'illegal' foreign migrants, race, and xenophobia.

Often migrants are perceived as marginalized groups of people, and within a changing urban environment as vulnerable victims of processes beyond their control. Yet changes also represent new opportunities, resistance to threats of undermining livelihoods and self-respect, and new hope. These different dimensions are explored both in terms of the households and individuals from the foreign migrant communities of Mariannhill. The construction of livelihoods will also highlight the contribution that such migrants make to the local economy, picking up on the points of entrepreneurship and employment. This contribution will show both the exploitative nature of migrancy, particularly for those that are undocumented migrants, but also how Malawian migrants exploit the opportunities that are available. This chapter focuses more on the opportunities and chances of recovery from the impact of economic crises experienced in Durban and in their country of origin. Although the chapter generally addresses the issue of the survivalist or coping strategies of foreign migrants, which by conventional terms can be seen as the most marginalized and vulnerable in an urban society, this chapter paints an image of Malawian migrants as strategising agents who refuse to accept an ascribed position as marginalized poor by taking up opportunities offered in a changing environment, as workers and entrepreneurs. While acknowledging that vulnerable individuals and households within this community are generally susceptible to the economic afflictions of a modest developing country suffering a general crisis of insufficient or sustained growth, they do benefit substantially from a country, and more directly a city, which has far more opportunities, in their view, than their village, town or city or country of origin. Durban represents for them hope and opportunities beyond mere survival.

This chapter shall have a more ethnographic feel because it relies on fieldwork in a particular locality, Mariannhill, and used traditional research techniques associated with the discipline of anthropology, such as participant observation and in-depth interviewing of respondents. It is based on 13 in-depth interviews, as well as a sub-sample from the statistical survey of the previous two chapters. The 13 in-depth interviews were conducted through the use of a snowballing technique. This was necessary as each interview depended on the personal contacts and knowledge that other people known to the potential interviewee were also interviewed. All interviews were conducted without tape recorders. Hand written notes were made of the interviews based on a set of issues, problems and questions that were used as a guide for the interview. This set of interviews together with the sub-set of statistical data offer a sufficient basis to explore the similarities and differences in perceptions and actions of the respondents regarding their daily life and experiences of Durban. Whereas in the previous chapter, the data analysed was obtained using a survey technique, the data used to explore the above mentioned issues were obtained from key informants and limited participant observation in a particular area. Some of the data obtained through the survey will be analysed to provide a context for the more qualitative data analysis.

7.5 MARIANNHILL AND MALAWIAN STRATEGIES: LIVING AND WORKING ON A URBAN PERIPHERY

Mariannhill is a township located on the urban periphery, some 35 km from the centre of Durban. Most of my Malawian informants live in a neighbourhood known as Mamtakaqzi. There are other areas within Mariannhill, such as a place commonly known as Desai where other Malawians live. Some fifteen to twenty years ago Mariannhill was a peri-urban settlement (more rural than urban) of mixed races. Although some Indians moved out just prior to the 1994 elections, the area remains racially mixed with Indians, Zulu-speakers and Malawians living together. During the late 1970s and 1980s it was an area where the really poor working class who could not afford a house in the urban townships lived alongside small-scale rural farmers, and, consequently, it was a very underdeveloped area where many did not have basic essentials such as running water and

electricity. A vivid description of the areas prior to 1994 was given by one of the interviewees:

> The area was, and still is very poor. Most people lived in tin houses. There was no running water. People had to travel to the IDM centre [a nearby business and retail centre] to get water, [or] to get water from the mosque. There was no electricity and telephones. (Interview 8 July 1999).

He could have added that apart from the main road, there were no properly constructed roads to the residences, particularly up the steep ridges. The area has since 1994 benefited from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of the first post-apartheid government where land was bought from landlords, developed and given with freehold title to the occupants. While the RDP may have conferred certain assets, such as land and cement block houses, as well as access to services such as roads, water and electricity, this is still an area populated by indigent people of either working class origin or rural migrants. This is the area that Malawians have begun to populate and live in since at least the early 1990s, and for some even earlier. The advantages or limitations of the RDP for some foreign migrants will be analysed later in this chapter. A cursory glance at the levels of income and age of the Malawians indicate that they do not differ much from the socio-economic profile described in this paragraph. Most migrants are 29 years of age and sustain themselves through earning an income. For the majority of Malawian migrants in Mariannhill this income is less than R2 000.00 per month either working in the formal or informal sectors, and for many their income is less than the theoretical subsistence level of R1 500, 00 per month. However, rather than present a set of basic statistics, this chapter will analyse of the production of income, and other assets and resources used as part of their livelihood strategies, as it occurs in a set of social relationships defined from the very beginning by their entry into the Malawian community in Durban through their social networks and located structurally within the economy and society of Durban. It is these social networks and social and economic factors that condition and influences the way individuals react, grapple and interact to make a living and fulfil their objectives as migrants that is the focus of the chapter.

7.5.1 Use of networks.

One of the striking aspects of the results of the survey, as analysed in the previous chapter, is that these Malawian migrants have a long-established network of people that they can connect with when they arrive in Durban. This network of social relations that connects migrating people between the multiple places of origin (bearing in mind that a large proportion of Malawian migrants make up to an average of four stops en route to Durban, where each stopover becomes a new place of origin, while at the same time it once was a place of destination) and destination has been described variously as a 'spider's web' (Eades, 1987:8), a veritable collection of connected people. Portes and Walton have described this circulation or network of migrants as a response to capitalist development as "tie-in groups distributed across different places *maximising their economic opportunities through mutual aid and multiple displacements*" (1981: 60) (my emphasis). Basch, Schiller and Szanton-Blanc have argued that there is need to locate the networks, or social relations beyond mere description, as a 'social field' which sees migrants as active agents in which such linkages are maintained, renewed and reconstituted, whether through social ties and/or the passing of material goods from one locality in a nation state to another, and in which identities are constructed and reappropriated through their daily practices to maximise their specific strategic intentions, whether these be in the context of families, organisations, economic activities, or business and financial investments (1994: 28-30). In applying this insight to the networks that Malawians have built up over the decades within South Africa, and Durban in particular, migrants' networks should be seen as part of a process which constructs, reconstructs and appropriates different aspects of their social relations, in order to insert themselves into the new local economy and society, and simultaneously retain contact with one or more places of origin. It shall be seen that the social tie-ins do not imply that migrants actually have to move physically between two or more nation states, but that it can involve migrants who have made Durban their home, but retain various kinds of ties or levels of social relations with people in their country of origin. In other words they make the space for simultaneous living in two or more worlds in which the practices, social relations and multiple identities are embedded. One of the obvious outcomes of

these networks or spider web connections is the bi-directional flow of ideas, information and events.

The ties that bind Malawians to South Africa, and Durban in particular, are various and multiple. In this first part of this section a brief outline of the types of connections and intersections with South Africa will be described. This provides the platform to describe and analyse some of the individual case studies that follow.

7.5.2 Malawian historical connections with South Africa

One of the more famous trade union and political leaders in South Africa, Clements Kadalie, was from Malawi. Kadalie, the descendent of Chief Chiweyu, was born some time in the 1890s, in the village of Chifira on the western shores of Lake Malawi (or Lake Nyasa as it was then known) (Kadalie, 1970: 31). Upon arrival in South Africa, Clements Kadalie inaugurated during the early 1920s one of the most extensive and influential national trade union movements. In the first half of the century people from Nyasaland obviously came as workers or seeking economic opportunities in the mining and the early manufacturing economy of South Africa. Indeed Clements Kadalie mentions that all his brothers ended up in South Africa, so powerful was the economic attraction of South Africa a little less than century ago. It still retains that powerful attraction as has been demonstrated in the previous chapter. In more contemporary times there is the internationally acclaimed musician, Ray Chikapa Phiri, the son of a Malawian immigrant. Ray Phiri worked a succession of jobs, including being a mine policeman, before making a name for himself as a musician in the 1970s and 1980s, playing with amongst others, Paul Simon, Laurie Anderson, Joan Baez, Willie Nelson, Mory Kante and Miriam Makeba. Apart from the famous such as Kadalie and Phiri, there are other links, significant but less spectacular, including contact between Indian traders in Malawi and Durban (Dhupelia-Mesthrie, 2003: 30). Malawians have, and continue to contribute significantly to South Africa in a number of ways.

7.5.3 Making the Connection

The familiarity with Indians and the seeking of work opportunities, other than mining, resonates in the story by Adama Mosal, a Malawian who came to South Africa in 1952. Adama Mosal claimed that he came to South Africa from the village of Dowa, and worked in a succession of jobs in the Eastern Transvaal, and then in Durban. He lived in Clairwood, a mixed, but predominantly Indian residential and commercial suburb, before ending up in retirement in Mariannhill.

> *Interviewer:* What did you do when you came to South Africa?
> *Mosal:* I worked in the Eastern Transvaal first in one of the sugar mills for about 20 years. I arrived in Durban in 1972. I first stayed in Clairwood at 93 Pine Road. I had relatives in Clairwood. From Clairwood I moved to Mariannhill. I first stayed in Desai, and then I moved here.
> *Interviewer:* How long have you been here?
> *Mosal:* I have been here 7 years. I arrived in 1992.
> *Interviewer*: What work did you do in Durban?
> *Mosal:* I worked in a factory in Jacobs called Beddings. I worked for 6 years from 1972 to 1978. Then I worked at the Protea factory for three years in the workshop. I then lost my job in 1980. I have been unemployed ever since. I left Clairwood in about 1980 to come to Desai [a suburb of Mariannhill] because Clairwood became Indian....
> *Interviewer:* How did you know, when you came from the Eastern Transvaal, to find your relatives in Clairwood?
> *Mosal*: I did not have an address. I just found them there. I had no idea how to find them. I was working for a white guy, Mr F. Gillio. We were on a contract doing temporary jobs. I did not know there were Malawians living in Clairwood, but he said that there were people that looked like Malawians. So I went with him and spoke to them in Yao and Chewa, and they replied. That's how I found them. They invited me to come live with them. They were from different districts in Malawi.
> *Interviewer:* You moved with your family from Clairwood to Desai?
> *Mosal:* The whole family moved from Clairwood to Desai. I only got married in 1972 [to a Zulu woman]. I stayed alone for almost 26 years. I have two children, a boy 13 years old, and a daughter 25 years old. I had one child in Clairwood and one here. He goes to the local school.
> *Interviewer:* How did local people respond to you?
> *Mosal:* Local people responded well. There were no problems. I even learnt to speak Zulu.
> (Interview, 13 July 1999)

This story of Adama Mosal encapsulates some of the central themes of this chapter. The powerful attraction to find work in South Africa, the construction of multiple identities – national and ethnic, and its connection to locality or place, and the incorporation or assimilation into the local population through work, language and marriage. It also hints at the perverse nature of apartheid (the Group Areas Act as it applied to Clairwood, and subsequent removals), and the vagaries of the economy in early 1980s when he was retrenched, and then unable to find employment. Although Adama Mosal was formally unemployed, he was among the first in the area to start up and run a successful 'spaza' shop. This entrepreneurial theme, a consideration in Malawian livelihood strategies, is also a feature of this chapter. There is a major difference in that today's migrants tend to be temporary sojourners, transnational migrants living between two or more countries, whereas Adama Mosal was once an immigrant, and now a permanent resident with no intention of returning to Malawi. But as he says, 'I think of myself as South African, although I still speak Chewa...I am not regarded as a 'Muntu''[a South African person, or Zulu person, depending on the context]. Nevertheless his story illustrates the beginnings of the Malawian community in Mariannhill in a period of South Africa transition and reconstruction, and the multiple connections that provide the enduring quality of the ties and networks that flourish today for migrants.

Clearly there has been a lesser-known flow of Malawian migrants and immigrants to South Africa over a long period of time. In a period a little earlier than Kadalie's explosive entry into South Africa's politics, or that of Adama Mosal's epic journey from Malawi to Mariannhill, there was an example of early forced migration. A shipload of slaves, allegedly from somewhere in East Africa, was rescued by a British naval vessel near the island of Zanzibar. They could have been from the then Nyasaland (now Malawi), but what is important to note is that they were Muslim and became known as Zanzibaris. Although continental Africans, they were allowed to reside, first on the Bluff, near Clairwood (a residential area of poor Indian working class people), and later under apartheid, in Chatsworth, an Indian-only township created in the early 1960s. Although an enclave within a Indian township, many of these Zanzibaris integrated themselves within the Indian community, particularly the Muslim sector, as well as maintaining

contact with the wider black population, thus establishing the dual identity of black/African Muslims. They worked among Indian people, and some became Islamic religious leaders, officiating in mosques and Muslim rituals throughout Durban, a historical role among African Muslims which can be traced back to the first black converts during the time of the Prophet Mohammad in Arabia.

The link between Malawians and Islam religious practices can also be seen in the proselytising activities of one Malawian migrant, Sheikh Abbas Phiri, who in the 1940s came to work on the coal mines of KwaZulu-Natal. He also worked on the sugar plantations and on a fishing trawler. When he retired from his formal occupation in the early 1970s, he began his proselytising activities in the township of Inanda, north of Durban. Phiri had received a formal Islamic education in Malawi, that is, his father forbade him to receive a modern western education on the grounds that it would make him lose his Islamic faith, or worse turn him into a Christian. When he came to South Africa, Phiri married a local woman, but unlike the Zanzibaris with whom he lived for a while on the Bluff (at King's Rest), he set up home in Inanda. It was from his home that he began to convert the local population to Islam with the assistance of the mainly Indian, though politically left leaning, Muslim Youth Movement. Although there is a close identification of Islam with Indians, these proselytising activities began to shift the identifiers, eventually resulting in Sheikh Phiri's son becoming the Imam (religious leader) of the small black Muslim community in another nearby black township of KwaMashu (Vawda, 1994). The missionary connection takes a particularly ironic twist in the 1990s as illustrated in two cases. The first case is when one of the few woman Malawian migrants, Kiri Banda, said that one of the reasons she was able to come to Durban was because she had the address of a Muslim Indian woman who had engaged in Islamic missionary work in Malawi and was able to stay with her until she was able to fend for herself. The missionary apparently had worked for Islamic Propagation Centre[1]. She also had the address of her brother, but did not reside with him initially (interview, 27 July 1999). The second case is when a Sudanese-trained Islamic scholar, Said

[1] The Islamic Propagation Centre is based in Durban and apparently carries out missionary work in various parts of Southern Africa.

Muhammad, comes to Durban to minister to the needs of Malawian Muslims in Mariannhill. He was employed by the International Dawah Movement, also based in Durban, as a religious teacher and leader among the Malawians of Mariannhill on the grounds, as stated by Said Muhammad, that "Malawians [in Durban] had limited knowledge of Islam. The response was very good. Malawians began to learn new aspects of Islam." He then began to convert many of the 'Zulu' in Mariannhill (Interview 8 July 1999). But Said Muhammad, as we shall learn shortly, was not just a consummate religious leader and teacher, but a man of considerable entrepreneurial flair. What is important here is to highlight his initial contact and the expansion of his network of connections with Durban based Malawian migrants. His employment as a religious teacher was prompted by the intervention of another Malawian who had migrated to South Africa in 1945, Moses Chindu, and who had close a relationship with Dr Dadoo, an official of the International Dawah Movement. This served as the basis of his considerable community involvement, and network of friends and contacts, not only in religious matters, but also in community matters such as providing literacy classes for the youth and the translation of religious texts from English to Zulu (a language which he also leant very quickly to enable him to proselytise among the Zulu speakers of the community).

While religion, as practised in missionary activities, provides a basis of contact for a number of migrants, there is the more mundane traditional bipolar flow and exchange of information between long-settled Malawian migrants in Durban, and their family and friends in their places of origin. For example, Said Muhammad's original contact with Moses Chindu, was based on the latter's visit to his family to Salima in Malawi 'every now and then' since 1945. He was able to get the address, and reside for one and half months with Chindu before he was employed officially by the International Dawah Movement, and able to find his own accommodation.

There were others who followed similar means of using friendship and kin ties as the initial means of entry into Durban. They would not ordinarily have left Malawi to come to Durban if they did not know already someone, and had some idea of what conditions

were like. For example Kiri Banda, a woman migrant, felt very at ease coming to Durban because she had the addresses of her brother Sheikh Banda, and that of the Indian missionary befriended in Malawi. She is unusual, as not many women migrants travel alone, and she did so for much the same reasons as men – to find employment or economic opportunities in Durban. On the basis of being accommodated rent free, initially with her missionary friend (see above) and later with her brother, she was able to set up a hairdressing salon in the city centre from which she made a living for several years. Others, such as Jamie Mdala, travelled directly to Durban by hired car, passing through Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Upon his arrival, he made contact with his brother Dawood Mdala in Mariannhill. Aslaam Kadalie came to tend to his sick uncle in Johannesburg, before coming to Durban. When his uncle passed on he returned to Malawi, but could not further his post-high school education because of lack of family finance. Unable to find a job or obtain a scholarship or funds to enter university, he arrived in Durban to live with a friend in Overport and to find work. Later they both found cheaper accommodation in Mariannhill. While all of the above individuals are in the age group 25 to 35 years of age, there is the occasional exception. Tayoob Manyele arrived in Durban in 1994, already past his retirement age. His choice of coming to Durban seemed to be spurred on by the fact that his family was already or nearly all dispersed. He said "I came from Malawi alone. I left my family in Malawi, I was married in Malawi with a wife and nine children ...My children are all big. They can look after themselves. My daughters are all married." He came to Durban because he knew a friend of his, Abdul, whom he telephoned when he arrived. Abdul, he said, provided him with 'a place to sleep, food and clothing'. He stayed with Abdul for a year, while they both found work as trouser makers, first in Victoria Street and later in Ajmeri Arcade making uniforms and trousers. Both places of work are in the Grey Street complex, an area dominated by Indian businesses. He only worked for a year, but then retired for a second time. He married a local woman and set up a small sewing business in Mariannhill, which he said provides a modest means of a livelihood. He does not intend to return to Malawi, although his son did once come to Durban. His son worked for a year then returned to Malawi.

Not everyone travelled with a clear understanding of whom they would connect with in Durban. Others relied on the fact that they knew someone, or that there was a community of Malawians on whom they could call on for assistance. This is especially the case for many from the Yao ethnic group from the Mangochi district in Malawi. As Jamie Mdala says: "Many people from my district [Mangochi] come to Durban. There is always someone we know in Durban, so we come" (Interview, 27 July 1999). Similarly, EB Malazi, already living and working in Durban for two years, had travelled with his friend Hossan without any clear knowledge of whom he will connect with in Durban, find accommodation or work. But he knew that he would be able to connect with someone from his district. He said: "I came with a friend who knows the place [Mariannhill]. He is from Malawi and has already visited the place. He travels up and down from Malawi to Durban all the time". But EB Malazi already was connected to someone, Hossan, a regular traveller and trader between Mangochi district in Malawi and Durban, who consequently knew the ropes of entry, finding accommodation and work. He lived with Hossan while looking for a job, and then rented accommodation from Sheikh Banda, another Malawian. (Interview, 3 August 1999). Thus imperfect knowledge of the actual conditions in Durban is not a fundamental deterrent to migration. Rather knowledge of a community of individuals in sufficient numbers from the place of origin, whether these be friends or family on whom to call, becomes an asset - a resource - to rely on, at least during the initial shock of arrival, finding accommodation, and explore what possibilities exist from talking to one's compatriots, and begin the process of finding work or economic opportunities – the main reason for migration.

What the interviews with Mosal, Ndala, Malazi, Kiri Banda, Said Muhammad, and the associated contacts of Hossan, Banda and others, highlight is the reliance on a place, Mangochi, or even an invented one as in the case of Adama Mosal, in Malawi, and Mariannhill in Durban as well as identities, such as Malawian, Yao, Muslim as markers for the provision of assistance to recently arrived migrants. This applies particularly in the first instance of finding accommodation and later with work opportunities. However these networks are not guarantors of accommodation or jobs. While it is possible that similar national or ethnic background may give one access to jobs, this is not always the

case. Thus, for example, Shoponda, although a bookkeeper by training was able, through a network of information only, to find a job as unskilled packer in a chemical factory in Jacobs. Malawians are subject to the same vagaries of the economy as any other person. The edge they have is that they have a reputation for honesty, working harder, and being less demanding when it comes to wages. It is this reputation, based on employers' own bias and prejudices, in combination with a network of information passed on by various Malawian migrants within the community of Mariannhill, that enabled a range of informants to find employment in small sweatshops, factories, and with building contractors and shop owners. Of course being an immigrant or a migrant from another country, does limit the options as to the kinds of wages (or work, but that is not a primary consideration for many Malawians) one is prepared to accept.

The next section will elaborate on the way these networks of connections and contacts, marked as they are by national, ethnic, and religious identities, assist in finding accommodation and jobs. It is in this context that income or earnings will be discussed. I shall present some of the statistical findings, before discussing, by way of three individual cases, the ways in which Malawians have been able to find jobs, or exploit economic opportunities for trade.

7.6 NETWORKS AND EARNING A LIVING

In order to place in context the networks and case studies, and the capacity to earn a living, or pursue livelihood strategies, this section will provide a social profile of the Malawians in terms of the following: income, employment and unemployment, occupations, educational levels. The household structures as they inform their capacity to accumulate various resources including savings will also be briefly examined.

7.6.1 A Social Profile of Malawians in Mariannhill.

7.6.1.1 Income

What strikes one when analysing the levels of income (see table 7.1 below) is that these are mostly well below the theoretical subsistence level of approximately R1 500, 00 for

black families in the Durban area. In Mariannhill 22% of Malawians living there appear to have no formal income, while the majority, 37% earned between R1 and R999; 11% between R1 000 and R1 999, and 3% between R2 000 and R4 000. In short 78% of the foreign migrant households had someone employed earning an income.

Table 7.1 Formal Household Income Categories		
Income category	**Mariannhill**	**%**
0	13	21.66
1-999	37	61.66
1000-1999	7	11.66
2000-4000	3	5.0
Total	**60**	**100**

The small number of people in the upper income brackets illustrates that over 90% of Malawians households in the settlement earn between zero and R2000.00 a month. Within the settlement there is the obvious difference between the poorest of the poor, i.e. unemployed, and those who are employed either in the formal economy or occupy themselves in the informal economy. Lack of formal money income, as shall be shown later, and as explained by Todaro above, does not mean that migrants are on the threshold of sustenance disaster. Rather it is an indication of the postponement of immediate income with a long-term view that at some point in the future they will find employment or some means of economic sustenance. It also means that they will have to rely on mutual aid and support of family and friends until such time that they can support themselves (and of course return the favour later). It is also possible that they can, at some point in the future, depending on the circumstances of their hosts, exhaust friends' and relatives' patience and generosity.

The point is not really about the low level of income earned, but the belief that they will find economic opportunities that are better than in their place of origin, or their last place of settlement, and attempts are made to save some portion as remittances, or invest in some economic opportunity or material asset for future benefit to themselves and their families. Thus as Sheikh Banda commented:

> Malawians can stay in town [or anywhere]. They will suit any conditions. They have no complaints with the conditions. All they need is beans, salt and water to cook and eat. Whatever Allah provided they will accept. We are a simple people (Interview 13 July 1999).

Indeed it was difficult to elicit information on the expenditure patterns of the Malawians in Mariannhill, although attempts were made. It is a sensitive matter, and suspicions as to what use may be made of such information is fairly widespread. Although the survey did record that a number of them remit some of their income to Malawi, the survey did not record their household assets other than the house they occupied. From my observations while conducting interviews it appears that they own very few durable assets. In many cases the very poor barely had anything except a place to sleep, store their clothes and some cooking utensils, although such a judgement should be tempered by the fact that as circular or target migrants, durable goods such as stoves and fridges, including assets such as vehicles, are a liability in that the costs and logistics of transport would make it difficult and probably prohibitively expensive to take them to Malawi. However, there were migrants who had radios, beds, tables, stoves, and the occasional fridge. Some had televisions, and very few, if any, owned cars. Taxis and busses are the major modes of transport. For the large durable items such as stoves and fridges it would make sense for migrants to own such goods only if they intend long-term residence in the county, or to use the assets as a means of storing value to be sold to raise cash before returning home.

Whatever income they do earn depends on what employment prospects there are for them to exploit. In the next section the issue employment and unemployment is briefly analysed.

7.6.1.2 Employment and Unemployment

It would be anticipated that foreign migrants must have greater obstacles to overcome in trying to obtain jobs in an economy that has shed jobs rapidly since 1994. They faced the further difficulty of having to find and retain jobs, or intensify their earning capacity by other means, such as additional jobs or informal trading, in an increasing climate of general xenophobia. I shall have occasion later to distinguish between the general climate

of xenophobia and the specifics of working with local South Africans, which tempers the reaction of Malawians to xenophobic comments and physical attacks. All this would suggest that it is difficult to find and retain jobs, that economic opportunities are few and far between and that life is indeed very precarious for them. Yet a perusal of the table on employed and unemployed reveals a very different picture (table 7.2 below).

Table 7. 2: Mariannhill: Employed/Unemployed Malawians

	Number	%
Employed	35	58.3
Unemployed	23	38.3
N/a	2	3.3
Total	**60**	**100**

7.6.1.3 Occupations

The majority of foreign migrants (58%) living among the Mariannhill community find themselves in one or other form of employment located in a variety of traditional

Table 7. 3: Type of Occupations In Metro Durban: Malawians

	No.	%
Tailoring (some are self-employed)	15	43
Shop assistant	7	20
Salesman	3	9
Stock clerk	1	3
Clothing factory worker	1	3
Bricklayer	1	3
Casual	1	3
Domestic	1	3
Checkout operator	1	3
Mechanic	2	6
Machine operator (factory)	1	3
Gardener	1	3
Total	**35**	**102***

* Percentages rounded to nearest whole number.

industrial and commercial zones in the Durban area: Pinetown, Durban Central, Mobeni, and Jacobs. Furthermore the kinds of jobs that these Malawians have are very different from mere casual employment. Their occupations are wide ranging: tailoring, shop assistants, salesman, stock clerk, mechanic and checkout operator in a supermarket (see table 7.3 above). These jobs suggest a different level of education and skill from basic primary school education.

7.6.1.4 Educational Levels

Among the Malawians 22% have a lack of basic formal education (table 7.4 below)

Table 7.4: Malawians in Mariannhill: Education Levels

	No	%
No education	13	22
Std 1/grade 3	0	0
Std 2/ grade 4	3	5
Std 3/ grade 5	2	3
Std 4/ grade 6	5	8
Std 5/ grade 7	7	12
Std 6/ grade 8	9	15
Std 7/ grade 9	2	3
Std 8 / grade 10	18	30
"O" Levels	1	2
	60	**100**

Some interviewees explained that in southern Malawi, where most of them originate, they were not always encouraged to go to school. However 48% of respondents have some form of high school education.

However the focus of this chapter is not so much on the relationship between skill, education levels and work opportunities (as employees or self-employed). Instead the focus is on the embedded nature of finding work through a network of friends and relatives, especially in the first instance. Although accommodation/shelter is an important

pre-requisite before work can be found, the structure of households is an important consideration in any migrant's view. It does determine the level at which a migrant will spend and save money.

7.6.2 Individuals, Households and Family Among the Malawians

In Mariannhill half of the people interviewed lived alone, i.e. without any family or friends. These tended to be single rooms rented from various people, both local and their own country folk. Significantly the rest, slightly less than 50%, live with family, that is, spouse, brother, sister, or other family. Very few live with friends. (See table 7.5)

Table 7.5: Malawians in Mariannhill: Accommodation

	No.	%
Alone	30	50
Wife /husband	7	12
Family	13	22
Brother /Sister	7	12
Friends	3	5
Total	60	101

The 60 households consist of only 126 individuals, 95 adults and 31 children. The average size of the household is 2. However, this ranges from 1 to 7 persons per household. Most commonly there are two persons per household. While there are 6 who claim they own the house, 52 households claim to be tenants. (There are a few who did not answer the question.)

Of those interviewed 42 (70%) said that they were married, and 18 (30%) claimed to be unmarried. However, only 7 of the 42 married individuals said that they lived with their spouses and children in Mariannhill. In other words most of them are classic single migrant workers who have come to the urban centre to earn money and send remittances home. There are two important implications that arise from this set of data. The first is that as single migrant workers whose intention is to work and send back remittances or to purchase goods and take it back home, they may change their minds through a set of

circumstances and become permanent residents or permanent circular migrants rather than simple target migrants whose working prospects in Durban are restricted to this single one-off migrancy encounter. The second important point is that as a number of households are made up of single men or two persons; there is very little opportunity to exploit members of the household as cheap unpaid labour. This is not to suggest that it does not occur or that it will not occur in the future, but at the moment this is not a serious option for any of the households.

While household structures may not be important as a resource for the majority of the Malawians living in Mariannhill, the network of contacts between friends and relatives that does exist is crucial as an information stream as to where there are vacancies and possibilities of jobs, as well as learning from these connections new skills in order to survive. Finding employment and learning new skills will be illustrated with three case studies. In the following section we shall by way of case studies or apt illustration highlight the different aspects of individuals involved in the decisions to migrate and the ways in which they have gone about strategising to make a living.

7.7. CASE STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL MALAWIAN MIGRANTS

7.7.1. Case Study One: Sheikh Bwana Banda Relying on the Umah (a community or brotherhood of Muslims).

In the above stress was placed on the fact that there is a long and tangible link that Malawians enjoy with South Africa, and Durban in particular, with their home country, district, town or village. In the following case of Sheikh Bwana Banda, the prior existence of a contact to whom he could connect with once in Durban was not there. Instead he relied on an innate belief in Muslim brotherhood to see him through the anxious moments of arrival, finding accommodation and beginning the process of finding a job. He arrived literally a few years after the formal contracts of labour organised by TEBA for the mining industry came to an end. However, it was not ending of the TEBA contracts that directly affected him. Although a native of Mangochi district, he lived and

worked in Blantyre, working as a professional tailor. But he could not survive, so he felt he had to leave to find a way to support himself. As he says:

> I did not want to leave Malawi, but because of financial problems I had to leave. I lived in Blantyre. I sew. I am a tailor. I was renting a shop and a house. I was married and had to put food on the table. Financially it was very bad and could not make it. I came to South Africa. (Interview May 1999)

While the TEBA contracts were a formally organised means of getting employment, it was specifically designed for the mining industry. But as shown by Chirwa, it did not prevent miners from engaging in other entrepreneurial activities (1997: 633-636). Chirwa calls them 'investing labour migrants' who contributed through both their remittances and income from other trading activities that they engaged in on weekends towards their rural households, creating and in some cases entrenching a rural elite in Malawi. Sheikh Banda, although originally from the rural district of Mangochi, was making a living in Blantyre, did not have this option. As quoted above he had to leave for financial reasons and came to Durban. Once he made the decision to migrate, he, and his travelling companion, had to find his own way, and rely on his wits and belief that Muslims would assist him.

> I had no plan to come to any person. I am a Muslim and I was going to rely on other Muslims to assist me. After I got off the taxi at Umgeni Road, I saw a Mosque [the May Street Mosque]. It was Esha time [the evening prayer]. I saw some people coming out of the Mosque. I simply went to them and greet them '*As salaam wa alakum*'. They had to respond. I asked them to tell where 155 Grey Street was [the Grey Street Mosque]. Someone took me there. ...This was the only address I had. I met an old man there who was from Malawi. He worked in the Mosque. He helped the two of us. (Interview, May 1999)

It was from the Grey Street Mosque that he began his exploration of the city, and his first foray into finding a job. He first meal was at the Islamic Propagation Centre International opposite the Mosque he was given tea while watching Islamic videos. However, his first job was not the result of any contact, but rather because of his skill. Banda recounts finding his first job and accommodation:

> ...I walked down Queen Street, passed Valbro Chambers. I went inside, into the building. On the 6th floor I heard machines. I saw small shops. A crippled lady asked me something in Zulu. I did not understand. I said I was a tailor.

> She offered me coffee. That was my second cup for free for the day. This was not the owner. She said I should wait for the owner. When the owner came – her name was Leigh - an African woman. I explained to her that I was a tailor. She gave me a piece of material and told me to make a shirt. I made it and she offered me a job at R600 a month. But I did not have a place to stay. She offered me to stay in the workshop. She said there were water, a stove, and electricity. I stayed there for three months. Then I met Hussain [another Malawian] and asked him if he knew a place I could stay. He introduced me to Dawood. That is his house over there [points to a white brick and mortar house above his galvanised iron constructed tailor shop in Mariannhill]. I rented a room from him for R45 a month. I shared [the room] with a man called Malume. I left the job after 6 months. (Interview, May 1999)

The reasons he left were because he wanted to specialise in making men's clothes, and ultimately start his own business. As he stated his reasons:

> I wanted to specialise. I was sewing women's clothing. I specialise in men's clothing. That's what I do. I found a job at the new Durban Station at a shop called Garment Outfitters in Umgeni Road. They paid me R120 a week. This was less than the R600 at Leigh's workshop. But I got R100 allowance for bus fare. This job did not last long. I went to work for Reddy's tailors in Victoria Street. I worked there until 1998.

Banda also wanted to start his own business, which meant he needed to also accumulate capital to buy a sewing machine, pay the initial rent for a space and the electricity. For six years he worked accumulating experience, building his reputation as a good tailor, and generally familiarising himself with the business of tailoring in Durban, and extending his contacts, as well as trying to accumulate enough capital to set himself up as an independent tailor. This period enabled him to make a number of contacts in the tailoring and clothing manufacturing business that stood him in good stead when he finally took the plunge on his own. One of his former employers often gave him contract work. Initially he had thought that he would set up a shop in the Grey Street complex, but another series of events were unfolding in Mariannhill, particularly in the neighbourhood known locally as Mamtakaqzi.

What is important to note here is that Banda's initial decision to migrate was on the basis that he needed to work in order to generate finances to support his family in Malawi. However, after six years of working and living in South Africa he begins to take a longer

term view which essentially means he saw himself making a living in South Africa. Eventually he decides he no longer wants to return to Malawi, marries a local woman, and begins to build a new life for himself. Banda was philosophical about his abandonment of his Malawian family. He argued that it is one of dilemmas of a migrant: to bring the family or not? Can he afford to bring his family from Malawi? On the other hand she may refuse to come. However, he said, "this is where I can make a living, not in Malawi Eventually a decision has to be made: to divorce or abandon the Malawi family. On the other hand the waiting wife may get tired of waiting and finds another man". (Interview 27 July 1999). Of course he added that as a Muslim he could marry up to four wives, if he could afford it. But this was not the solution. To all intents and purposes he has divorced his wife in Malawi. However, marrying a local woman and having two young children enabled him to gain access to South African residency and eventually citizenship. He has a South African identity document which shows him to be a citizen of Malawi, but a permanent resident of South Africa. While not undermining the integrity of his new marriage, this act is of some strategic importance as will be shown shortly.

The piece of land known as Mamtakaqzi belonged to a Mr Moola, who sold it to the then Inner West Municipal Council of the Durban Metro in the post-1994 period. In that period there was a drive by the Municipality, with the assistance of the Provincial and National Governments to develop the previous disadvantaged or neglected urban black areas. This land was then developed by parcelling up the land into plots big enough to build two-roomed houses with funds from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the Department of Housing. The council provided infrastructure – roads, electricity and water, the last two items having to be paid for by the new landowners and house owners. Access to such housing, facilities and services are restricted to South Africans, that is, apart from the income qualification (earning less than R1 500 per month), an applicant for a house had to have a South African identity document. Given that Banda had decided to stay on in South Africa, and obtain his identity document, together with his marriage to a local woman, he qualified for access and benefited from the Reconstruction and Development Programme's housing programme as it was implemented by the local council. This gave him access to

electricity, and he was able to set up shop in Mariannhill, instead of the city centre, where he initially wanted to set up his tailoring business. Setting up a shop in the city centre would have incurred the additional burden of paying rent and electricity, travel costs from Mariannhill, and run a separate family household. Instead he was able to construct a corrugated iron room at the foot of his plot of land to use as his shop, and live in his new house giving him a substantial saving on the running costs of his business. Having roads and street lighting also meant that his clients from outside the Mariannhill, area were also able to easily have access to him. In addition, he has subsequently been able to expand his dwelling and rent out rooms to other Malawians, thus earning additional income. This also enabled him to build up a client base in Mariannhill, consisting of local people living in Mariannhill, Indians, Zulu speakers and Malawians.

It might be argued that the municipality's decision to develop the area and his marriage (and obtaining a South African identity document) coinciding with his decision to be an independent entrepreneur was serendipitous. But while circumstances might have conspired fortuitously for Banda to establish his first business enterprise on his own land (not his original intention), he was able to take an opportunity, through a combination of historically developing his own local contacts and using information supplied by other Malawians to pursue the objective of becoming an independent tailor. Furthermore he was able to exploit a migrant/immigrant enclave – a captive set of clientele, in combination with local South Africans as his customer base. While not strictly an ethnic entrepreneur, (that is, reliant on a particular ethnic group for his main business) his initial clients were the people in the area, of whom many were Malawian migrants.

While I have sought to emphasize the sustained network of contacts and conduits of information that Sheikh Banda used at every stage of his livelihood strategies, there is also the fact that he did not sustain his full family links to Malawi. Apart from his sister who came to him from Malawi, his initial reasons for leaving Malawi, to provide for his wife and family did not in the end materialise. Indeed his marriage and family life in Malawi broke down. We shall see in the next case that Said Muhammad in fact retained

his family links to the extent of bringing his family and children to live with him in Durban, and strengthening his links with his extended family in Malawi.

7.7.2 Case study two: Said Muhammad: From religious teacher to business entrepreneur.

This case study concerns Said Muhammad, of whom we have already come across (see above p183). Arriving alone in 1992 desperate to find a job and accumulate some capital to return to Malawi, Said Muhammad was able, as shown above, to use a combination of his network contacts from his town of Salima and friends living in Durban to firstly find and secure accommodation in Durban, and with these contacts and his credentials as a Muslim scholar and teacher to secure himself a job with the International Da'wah Movement. A few months later when he had secured appropriate accommodation he brought his wife and children from Malawi to live with him. His dedication to his work as a religious instructor and leader, as shown above was not in question, but was not a sufficient reason for coming to South Africa. Despite his success as a religious instructor, this kind of employment did not advance his other reasons for coming to Durban, that is, to secure sufficient capital to invest in property in Malawi.

> *Said Muhammad:* I have plots in Malawi, one in Blantyre and one in Lilongwe.
> *Interviewer:* What do you mean you have two plots?
> *Said Muhammad:* I want to build on the plots. In Blantyre I started to build, but I need to continue. I have to see what has been done. I just bought a plot in Lilongwe. I gave my younger brother money to buy a plot for 8000 quachas [approximately R1000]. Land is cheaper in Malawi than in South Africa. I need to go and see the land and continue to build on the one and start on the other.
> *What are you going to build?*
> *Said Muhammad:* I am going to build rooms and rent it to people
> (Interview, 29 July 2000)

Clearly he needed additional income to accomplish his property acquisition plans and building projects. Indeed from early on he said he needed to learn a new and practical skill. He commented ironically: 'One thing, our people are not interested in money. Like

Mugabe we are getting degrees, but that is not the end. We have to do manual work. Today people here [referring to the Malawians] know many skills like carpentry'. He could have added sewing, or dressmaking. In order to raise the capital he needed he learnt to sew from Sheikh Bwana Banda.

> I am an Islamic teacher by profession. I learnt dress making here. I had to learn a skill to survive. Banda assisted me, [taught him to sew, a point made by Banda separately]. I am now a part-time dressmaker. (Interview 8 July 1999)

Said Muhammad also rationalised his part time work as part of his duties as a religious instructor, by claiming that he needed to show people, by setting an example, the dignity of work. He said: "Sometimes people look to you for an example. I had to show people about self-employment. I had to show by example. Islam does not allow you to beg when you are physically fit".

While initially survival and ideological influences directed him to find additional means of livelihood, in order to fulfil his long-term ambitions of raising capital for future investments in Malawi, he, unlike Banda the tailor, saw his long-term prospects in both Malawi and South Africa. Speaking as a religious instructor and part-time tailor he said in an interview in 1999:

> I have been back to Malawi in June 1995. Then again in December 1997. My intention is to go in December. I wish I could make an arrangement to be in both places. My people need me in Malawi. But also my work here is going very well. Maybe I should go two times a year, or even once a year. Malawi is very poor; you cannot really make a living. But my heart is still that side.

His desire to be committed to have a presence in two places simultaneously clearly makes him a circular migrant. However, his initial success as a dressmaker with entrepreneurial flair saw him expand his clothing making business. His initial *modus operandi*, while living and working in Mariannhill, was that he would sew dresses and pinafores in the evening when he returned home from his obligations as a religious instructor. He would then leave it to his wife to sell them at the local shopping centre in Mariannhill. He also has an arrangement with a local woman street trader to sell his products in Prince Edward Street and Mansell Road in the city centre. While this did bring in the extra income he

wanted, he expanded his business in a very entrepreneurial way by making the most of the opportunities that present themselves. During the course of the year 2000 he was transferred from Mariannhill to Isipingo Rail to continue his religious instruction and proselytising activities. He used the opportunity to expand his business activities. Isipingo Rail is a railway junction, taxi and bus rank and business centre for a number of townships to the south of Durban. As transport node and business centre a large volume of people pass through it providing an ideal opportunity to sell his dresses and pinafores. He engaged another woman to sell his products. He now had three places in which he sold his products.

The basic way in which his clothes were sold to customers was that he would find a woman who was willing to sell his clothes. They would set the price, for example, R35 for pinafores. The woman street trader would take a cut from this and he would get the balance. While there might be some negotiation over the price of the garment, this is largely determined by the market conditions. Thus for example, Said Muhammad said that he could sell a pinafore for R40 or R45 in Isipingo, but not in the Durban city centre where the price seems to be uniform R35. As he said: "People in town will not pay more than R35. Also it is the unanimous price for pinafores all over town. Nobody will pay more. But it is possible to sell for more outside the town". Having established the terms of reference for trading, he would then collect his share from the sale of the garments from the women street traders every third or forth day.

The selection of a woman street trader to sell his products was not a haphazard choice. Such women are carefully chosen. Usually this is done through a network of Malawians, one or several of whom already knew the women concerned and could vouch for them, either because they have had similar dealings with them and can therefore make an accurate assessment of their trustworthiness and entrepreneurial skills, or because these local women were the marriage partners of the Malawians. In most cases when the local women married Muslim Malawians, they had to convert to Islam, thus further inscribing their loyalty and trustworthiness within a closed network of known street traders that Malawians could use as outlets for their products. However, this should not be

constructed as providing employment, as this was not an employer-employee relationship, but rather one of mutual benefit – a symbiotic trading partnership. It did nevertheless provide the local women with additional incentive for income generation and increased product turnover at their street stalls, and more generally to the informal sector. According to the Deputy Mayor Logie Naidoo, in 1998 there are 20 000 street traders of whom 60% are women, at whose stalls R500 million is spent annually (Naidoo, 2002: 1). In the words of a city official and iTrump leader Richard Dobson: 'The informal sector contributes significantly to the economy of the city, providing an income for many unemployed people' (Metro Beat: 15 May - 15 June, 2003: 17). It is to this sector that Malawian informal traders, such as Said Muhammad, contribute.

But Said Muhammad made his choices of women retail sellers not just on the basis of what his co-religionists and countrymen advised, but also strategically. His first place of trade was in Mariannhill business and shopping centre, where his wife was the initial street trader. The streets chosen in the city centre, Victoria and Prince Edward and Mansell Road, are major thoroughfares and intersections for workers coming into and leaving the city via the transport node of the Warwick Triangle (bus, taxis and trains). His third place of trading in many ways duplicates the city centre, in that it is also a major transport node with light and heavy industry nearby, and hence substantial numbers of workers passing through. Capturing the passing trade potential was precisely what made him successful in his business ventures.

7.7.3 Case study three: Aslaam Kadalie: Beyond Networks.

Networks and family contacts often provide crucial support and information that makes a newly arrived migrant's life much more bearable in a new environment. However is it also the case that such networks of friends and relatives may limit a migrant to a closed circle of contacts. This should not imply that such a network operates like a closed shop. While this may be true in some cases, several interviewees said that they had to apply for jobs themselves or make their own way with very little or no support from their migrant compatriots. This case study will illustrate variance in relying on networks: at some point a migrant has to eventually rely on his own initiatives to make his own living.

Aslaam Kadalie comes from Mangochi district in Malawi. He first came to South Africa in about 1995 at the request of his uncle who lived in Azaadville, a former Indian township near Johannesburg. His uncle had been in South Africa for 20 years and had made regular visits to his village in Mangochi and when he fell ill he requested his favourite nephew to look after him during his illness. After looking after his uncle for about two months, he returned to Malawi to complete his 'A' level university entrance examinations, and was looking forward to obtaining a scholarship to read for a degree in law either in Malawi or in Singapore. But a series of setbacks prevented the realisation of his goals.

His father, a businessman, suddenly fell ill and died. This prevented him from going to university in Malawi, as there was no one to finance his studies. His application for a scholarship was turned down. In addition, soon after his father's death, his uncle in Azaadville (Johannesburg, South Africa) also passed on. Left with very little, he was urged by his family to take his chances in South Africa. As he explained:

> *Interviewer:* Why did you come back [to South Africa]?
> *Aslaam:* Well, there was some pressure at home. They said: "Maybe there is a chance in South Africa". So I left. I said I know how to do some sewing, so maybe I can do that. I stayed a few days – three or four days- in Jo'burg. Then I came down to Durban because I got some friends who were doing sewing. I was going to join them. (Interview, 28 July 1999)

Here is a case of the decision to migrate being made by the family, rather than by the potential migrant himself. Aslaam Kadalie leaves home with the consent of his family, travelling alone by bus and train to Johannesburg and then on to Durban. He comes to Durban because of his network of friends, and immediately links up with one for whom he has an address in Overport. His friend who goes by the adopted name of Dumisani has already been living in Durban for five years. Aslaam becomes part of Dumisani's sewing circle. They soon move to Mariannhill because of the high cost of living in Overport, and the ever-present danger of police raids. Initially he did not know why Dumisani wanted to move, but this became apparent later, especially when Dumisani decided that 'things

were not working out very well' and returned to Malawi. Aslaam was now left to fend for himself without his friend's support. Indeed he finds it difficult to make a living on just selling pinafores as his main product. He explains:

> *Interviewer*: So you are sewing on your own now?
> *Aslaam:* Sometimes I still do sewing, sometimes I do nothing. If I got material, then I sew. If the money is there, then I can buy the material to sew. Otherwise I cannot sew.
> *Interviewer:* What do you sew? Where do you sell it? Do you take orders?
> *Aslaam:* I sew pinafores. I sew and sell. People in town buy them from me. I sew and give it to a girl to sell on the streets.

He went on further to say that the streets are 'crammed with them. They are everywhere, so I cannot sew and pack them. If they are going fast, then I sew. But they are going slowly, and then we wait [the street trader and himself]. I just cannot pack them'. He also added that the street trader, Zandele, also sold pinafores for two other people, which made making a living from sewing very difficult. It is because of this situation, that Aslaam Kadalie sought alternative sources of income. He has worked as a sales assistant to a retail-clothing outlet in the Grey Street area and as a petrol pump attendant at a petrol garage in Chatsworth. He explains the decision to find a job a petrol pump attendant:

> Once I went bankrupt, then I worked in Chatsworth, Unit 11, as a petrol attendant in a garage for one and half months. I got R180 per week. I needed the capital to pay debts and buy more material. If I go bankrupt again, I will have to do this again.

Indeed he had to find alternatives to sewing as a means of livelihood survival several times. While he did not give up the possibility of being an independent small-scale entrepreneur operating from the small room that he rents in Mariannhill, he also realised that the market for pinafores was flooded. He had to have an alternative. Clearly he had to find formal employment as a means to settling debts and accumulating capital to continue his self-employed activity as a small manufacturer of pinafores. Such a strategy was not dissimilar to Sheikh Banda and Said Muhammad when they first started to find the means to survival in Durban, except in Aslaam's case it was a second choice of livelihood strategy While working as an employee gave him access to a steady income, it

left him less in control of his material livelihood production. Another alternative trading activity that he explored was selling cosmetics door to door. This is a trading activity that gave greater control of his time and a sense of independence. He observed that a Malawian friend and neighbour, who had a formal job in a factory, made an additional income from selling cosmetics over the weekend. He learnt from his neighbour about a cosmetic manufacturer in Phoenix Industrial Park, north of Durban's city centre, who sells slightly damaged, but perfectly usable cosmetics to street traders. Aslaam visited the factory, and after convincing the management that he was a bona fide informal trader, he was allowed to purchase for cash a range of deodorants, creams and other items. This was a new venture for him and soon realised that his target market are mainly women who stayed at home during the week and who lived further away from the business centre in Mariannhill. There were several reasons for targeting such women: Firstly, because they were not always allowed outside the home, and had considerable distances to travel (or walk if they had no access to a taxi or bus) they were glad to have a cosmetics salesman come to them. Secondly, men, Aslaam said, did not want to buy deodorants or any cosmetics. At most they would buy underarm sprays or roll on deodorants. Thirdly, he realised that because women stayed at home, they did not always have an independent source of income, he would have to supply cosmetics 'on account', that is, on credit. He discounted the idea that this was dangerous practice, as most informal traders would find it difficult to sustain a credit system with customers. He said because he was selling his cosmetics so cheaply, he found that the women were always able to pay their debts. Furthermore he realised that timing his visits was crucial. He could approach them during the mornings without the suspicions of the husbands or partners being aroused, and that they were willing to purchase cosmetics.

This business, according to Aslaam Kadalie, has become his main source of income because in a week he can earn the same amount that he would in a month of sewing and selling pinafores. It meant that he had to walk and travel more, but he felt it was worth his while to earn the additional income. Aslaam Kadalie had discovered a niche market that had not been tapped into. Unlike Said Muhammad who intensified his labour and expanded his outlets for his goods, Aslaam Kadalie shifted to a completely different

market, retailing a different product for a market that is not easy to reach through conventional retail outlets such as shops (including the ubiquitous spaza shops) and supermarkets.

Aslaam Kadalie represents those Malawians who live alone, without relying heavily on an extended network of friends and relatives to make his way in the world, yet benefiting from the close camaraderie that comes from living in an ethnic enclave. He does not rely on the benefits of sharing accommodation to reduce the burden of rent, and increase the possibility of capital accumulation, having solved that problem in his own way. But he does rely on the information that circulates among the Malawian inhabitants of Mariannhill, and between close friends. Yet he is exceptional in that he has attempted different strategies of survival, and is currently enjoying success. Will this enable him in the future to return to Malawi? On this issue he is ambiguous:

> Yes, I want to go back to Malawi. I prefer to stay in Malawi. Sometimes I see advantages [to stay] here. Sometimes I see advantages in Malawi. It is a competition. I am not sure what the future will be. If I get bankrupt, I will have to stay here. Maybe forever and forever.

Kadalie's experiences have either made him cautious, and probably a bit cynically about future prospects. Unlike Sheikh Banda, or Said Muhammad, he has no basic resource to rely on such as ownership of a house, a skill, or a qualification. Yet he picks himself up every time he gets dealt a blow, and starts again. His gift is his entrepreneurship, his ability to read the market situation for himself fairly accurately and dogged persistence to make a living.

7.8 Commentary

7.8.1 Place and identity

There are different aspects to the notion of place. In the context of pursuing livelihood strategies place of origin, place of destination and use of identity and networks in these places are important to consider. Like most continental Africans such as the Congolese, Nigerians, or Senegalese, they rely on their national identity to enter the country, the

difference being that they, the Malawians, are treated with less suspicion than other African nationals. Secondly, unlike many Congolese, Senegalese[2] and Nigerians[3] they do not claim to be refugees. Refugees have a certain ease of entry and unlike in other African countries have freedom of movement to find work because they are not confined to refugee camps (whatever the horrors of their experiences in their countries of origin and in transit to South Africa). Malawians on the other hand did not, and could not make these claims. They are aware that a declaration to immigration official that they are seeking work in South Africa would be a tactical mistake. Thus obtaining a tourist visa is the least problematic means of entry because they can easily satisfy the test of a name and an address of a relative or friend in South Africa given the long-term contact between the two countries. These are not fictional addresses because that is exactly where they head once they arrive. In any event Malawians are entitled to this, in terms of recent policy changes (not legislative) to admit people from within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) with greater ease of access and residential rights to their respective countries. As Said Muhammad stated in recounting his experience at the Zimbabwe-South Africa border:

> The treatment at the border was very good. There is only one condition: do not say you are coming to look for work. Say you are visiting. You see, in the SADC non-citizens like Malawians have special permission to live here. You can even get an identity book, but you are a non-citizen. (July 1999)

Another informant, Banda confirmed the residency regulation by showing me his resident permit and passport, which was stamped: "Malawian citizen, resident in South Africa". Thus Malawians enter South Africa as nationals without prejudice or special status in terms of refugee legislation. Yet this relative freedom to enter the country on a tourist visa is in reality a means of obtaining access to jobs or economic opportunities. As Sheikh Banda states:

> The general reason why Malawians come here is because South Africa is rich. It is financially good. One can make money here compared to other

[2] Senegalese have also claimed refugee status, as political opponents of the previous regime under the Socialist Party of Sengor and later Abdou Diouf. The 1988 election results, which gave the Socialist Party victory, were disputed and riots ensued. There was also conflict with the southern Casamache region.
[3] There are Nigerians who claim refugee status, especially as opponents of the Abacha regime. See Morris, A (2001: 72)

> southern African countries. This is better than Zambia and Zimbabwe. Although they have good economies, South Africa has a better economy. It also has strong rules.

What is clear is that migrants, whatever their own or other southern African countries currently offer in the form of livelihood possibilities, still see South Africa as the best possible destination. Yet entry as a national of another country does not imply that every migrant wants to settle here permanently. Clearly some do, but retain their ties to their places of origin, and intend, at some future and unspecified time, return to their home – the village, town or city of their country of origin. But they still hold the option of coming back as migrants to seek work for specific purposes – accumulate capital, buy goods for trading or to support a family or business enterprise in Malawi. Official national status, the country of origin, becomes another means to access other livelihood possibilities in other SADC countries, but principally South Africa. These Malawian migrants are transnational migrants.

Upon entry the Malawians adopt different identities in relation to the place of accommodation and work. The fact of nationality is important for entry (the long-term relationships between the two countries and membership of the SADC), but once inside the country, religious affiliation, village or town of origin, work skills, length of stay, and marriage to locals are important considerations in their survivalist strategies. Consideration shall be given to these other identities, especially religion and skills as part of their livelihood strategies below. What is important to highlight here is the fact that many Malawians opt to live in a relatively underdeveloped part of the city. Unlike the studies of Congolese and Nigerians reviewed in Chapter 4 whose livelihoods are integrally bound to the centre of the city, the Malawians who live in Mariannhill do not just occupy a different physical space in the city, but pursue a different way of participating and making a living in the city. Being physically far from the city centre gives them a level of protection from constant raids from the police and home affairs officials, as well as enabling a most modest standard of living. Furthermore there is a sense of community that has developed among the Malawians, as is evidenced by the building of two mosques and a madressa (an Islamic school) to educate children and

adults about Islam, and a network of contacts allowing for a flow of information that enables Malawians to access jobs and economic opportunities. However, unlike the Senegalese who rely heavily on their own internal network, the Dahira, for support, and to which they contribute financially (see chapter 4: pp91-92) the Malawian networks are less formally organised. They do rely on their networks, particularly as points of contact when they first enter the country and to access their first jobs, but they also pursue livelihood strategies without their networks. However it should be noted that not all Malawians pursue this strategy of place and identity, such as Mariannhill, national of Malawi, native of Mangochi district, and /or Muslim, or friend and relative from town of village of origin, as the only means of entry and survival as foreign migrants. A significant number do live in areas such as Overport, a high-density residential area of mainly high-rise apartment blocks. It was previously under apartheid an Indian Group Area. There are also Malawians who live in the city centre. Whereas Senegalese and Congolese are conspicuous, at least initially, by their inability to communicate in either English or one of the local indigenous languages, Malawians speak English, and make the effort to learn Zulu, which allows for a level of integration within the community or residential area of occupation, and easier working relationships with local people.

7.8.2 Income, skills and education

The major source of income is from earnings, either as wage labourers or as entrepreneurs from self-employment or wages in the formal or informal sectors. The majority of adults claimed that they were workers or casual labourers. In Mariannhill most individuals claimed to be in some form of formal employment, although such employment is seen as precarious in that they are employed in jobs from which they could easily be retrenched, or fired without recourse to any legal protection, as they are not legal contract migrant workers. In short many of them are undocumented foreign migrant workers. However, Malawians seem to enjoy certain advantages in the job market, being a reasonably amenable labour force to the delight of local employers. In short, they work harder, and offer less resistance to employers.

While not all the Malawians are highly skilled to enable them to become employed or become self-employed immediately, such as Sheikh the tailor, (see case study above) many have been able to re-skill themselves. For example, many have said they are tailors. In fact it is a skill that they have acquired in Durban, not from Malawi. Furthermore it is not so much tailoring, as being able to cut and sew accurately a set of particular patterns into dresses (pinafores), trousers and shirts. In other words while a few of them, such as Sheikh Banda and Tayoob Mayele, are certified tailors from Malawi, many of them learnt from their compatriots how to cut and sew simple designs for dresses, shirts and trousers. This skill is then either offered to local tailors or sweat shops in the Durban central business district for particular kinds of piece work, or they engage in informal trade by making basic dresses to be sold on the streets of Durban by informal traders as is the case for Said Muhammad and Aslaam Kadalie. In the case of the former by combining his formal employment as a religious instructor with his informal dress making business by expanding his places of trade and increasing the volume of his products. In the case of the latter, not only did he learn to sew, but also re-skilled himself when his dress making business was under threat, and applied his knowledge of salesmanship by selling cosmetics door to door. Kadalie exploited a niche market in an area where supermarkets are few, and was in his view able to offer a 'cheaper' product.

What these examples illustrated are three important aspects of migrants living and working in Durban's outer suburb of Mariannhill: First, through their network of friends and relatives they acquired work opportunities and skills. This has been critical to their success. Secondly, they provided in the form of partnerships with local women street traders the means for retailing the clothes they made, thereby creating local employment, albeit in the cases of Aslaam Kadalie and Said Muhammad the oversupply of pinafores, thus flooding the market. Thirdly, those who came as single migrants were, and in some cases still are, able to satisfy their own individual needs either by sharing accommodation and food, and/or frugal living, thus putting a premium on remitting funds to Malawi, to purchase the necessary goods to take back home.

7.8.3 Households and Work

The sharing of accommodation is not a prominent feature of Malawians living in Mariannhill. For those who are employees earning an income (formal or informal) such a situation is desirable. Apart from the constant risk of deportation which substantially alters the perception of their earning capacity, the Malawians living in Mariannhill do not all have the benefit of an extended family or network of household members to draw on to intensify earning capacity. There is some evidence to suggest it is beginning to occur in the densely populated suburb of Overport. This is evident in the statistical analysis of the previous chapter. In Mariannhill the average household size is two persons, with the most frequently occurring size being one. Indeed as many of them are single migrants, or have very small and young families, it is not possible for them to extract extra labour capacity from the household. This reflects the fact that many are either here as single male migrants who intend to return to Malawi at some indeterminate time in the future. For some the time spent in South Africa is determined by how quickly they can accumulate the resources they require - finance and various commodities such as electrical equipment - before returning. This is not to suggest that the household members, friends and relatives play no role. As seen in table 7.5, 34 per percent of those surveyed claimed they were occupants in the house which belonged to a family member - an uncle, a brother, or some other family relative. This suggests that a network of assistance to friends and relatives. Nevertheless sharing accommodation spreads the burden of rent and subsistence needs in order to save more money.

However for those who are self-employed sharing accommodation and being able to use the labour of the household can become a distinct advantage, particularly if family labour is used as a cheap resource. Said Muhammad who while being paid to undertake the duties and responsibilities of a religious teacher, also learnt to cut and sew and intensify his family labour. His sewing skill earned him an extra income, which enabled him to have his family from Malawi with him. In the meantime his sewing business expanded, and he needed additional help. At first he resorted to using his wife's labour to sell the products he made, but soon needed more assistance and employed an additional Malawian tailor, a distant relative, who also shared the same house. In addition he went

into partnership with two local South African women to sell clothes for him on the street. Not only was he earning an income to meet the needs of his family, but also able through the recruitment of a kinsman, meet his additional labour requirements, increase his turnover and to remit money to his family in Malawi. Some of that money, he said, is to buy property in one of the towns in Malawi. This, he said, was where he saw his long-term future: renting property for accommodation and business in Malawi's towns and cities. He has no long-term intentions to stay in South Africa, but admitted that the possibility always existed of being a future target migrant should the need arise.

But this raises another point. As seen already, most of the Malawians living in Mariannhill are Muslim. It suggests that the network of friends and relatives are people from the same religious background to secure jobs, or rather make use of their knowledge of certain job opportunities for people principally from the same religious persuasion. It is a moot point whether religious values play any role in the work ethics of Malawians. As many interviewers testified one social characteristic, which enables many of them to find jobs among the Muslim and Indian merchants of Grey Street, is that many of the Malawians are their co-religionists. However a similar religious background may pre-dispose Muslim merchants to employ Malawians, but does not necessarily guarantee employment opportunities. Ultimately employment opportunities for the Malawians rest on skill, flexibility, their vulnerability, language and reliability.

But religious identity is important. Religious affiliation operates in a number of ways. Firstly, those Malawians living in Mariannhill are all Muslims, mostly Yao. They have been able to settle here well before the 1994 elections because as Muslims they were allowed to live among Indians. In Mariannhill, there was a predominance of Indians, and using the warped logic of apartheid ethnos theory, Islam was an Indian religion, so therefore it was appropriate for Malawian Muslims to settle among Indians. This community of Malawian Muslims in Mariannhill now has its own Sheikh, mosque and madressa or Quranic School. Secondly, there is a sense of co-operation and responsibility among the inhabitants, collectively known as the Greyvillea Muslim Association for receiving migrants from Malawi into their community. But primary responsibility lies

with the migrant and his or her hosts to accommodate, provide initial sustenance, and direct the migrant to those who might assist in finding work. Thirdly, Muslims in Malawi have established long-term relationships with various local South African Islamic charity and welfare organisations that have been operating in Malawi. In the main these organisations are mostly based in Durban, such as the International Dawa Movement and the International Islamic Propagation Centre, which are supported by local Indian South African Muslims. These contacts are reciprocated when Malawians come to Durban. It is in the context of these contacts that the Malawian immigrants are able to find work from among the local Muslim community. Work opportunities range from casual unskilled jobs to regular fixed salary work as machinists, tailors, shop assistants and domestic servants. As Shafee, a Malawian Muslim said 'As Muslims they give us work, but they also don't pay well. We must thank Allah they give us the chance to get some money, but it is too little.' However another Malawian, Sarah, qualified this by stating that even if wages are low by South African standards, it is much more than they would earn in Malawi. For example, a recent migrant of three weeks, Jim, said that it took him three months to earn enough money, $75 (R750), just to enable him to travel from Malawi to South Africa. Even under exploitative conditions such as for domestic workers, it would take less than two months to earn that amount in South Africa.

7.8.4 Housing as an asset for migrants

New houses provided a variety of new means to making a living. A house could now be conceived as a permanent asset and used in a number of ways, for example, as a base for starting or extending an enterprise from home such as a 'spaza' (informal) shop. It could also be made available for renting accommodation space or sold to raise cash to offset debts. As a home it could provide the base for incorporating new family members, extending social relationships, thereby investing in social capital. Not all of these options have been, or are fully exercised, nor are any of them widespread. In the case studies above, aspects of these 'asset' options are referred to in the context of discussing household social relationships. In the case of Mariannhill land was sold to the Inner West local council that made it available to residents of the area. The infrastructure was put in place by the local authority. Water and electricity was provided, as well as a road

network, replacing foot pathways and roughly made dirt roads. Those who were able to obtain their residence permits or South African citizenship (as a result of being part of the SADC or other creative ways) were entitled to benefit from the housing grants and subsidies made available in the immediate post 1994 period. Some informants, such as Sheikh Banda, who married a local woman and has two children, benefited from the housing policy. While he was able to make ends meet on the basis of his tailoring business, the prospect of finding additional finances to pay for the education of his children has led him to renting out a room to Malawian migrants. Extra income is being earned from ownership of land and home. Sheikh Banda's option was to exploit his security of tenure.

While many Malawians are target migrants, some begin to see their stay less as interim, rather more long term. This does not mean that they will never return to Malawi, but it means that they have developed a more long-term perspective on their stay in South Africa. They become circular migrants, such as Said Muhammad, or permanent residents, legally or illegally.

It is the possibility of living in the urban periphery, with lower accommodation and subsistence costs and with a community support system that enables them to survive on very low wages. But for them it is not just another poverty trap. Like the refugee Congolese or Senegalese street traders who are able to survive on very small profit margins because they live communally in run down city centre apartments, surviving in the semi-urban area of Mariannhill (or rapidly urbanising area) enables them to accumulate some surplus funds by working in poorly paid jobs. It was noted that for a large portion of the Malawian migrants, their earnings are well below the theoretical subsistence level. Even so, Malawians have been able to survive, and many succeed. Income levels as an indicator are useful, but have to be understood as embedded in a wider set of social relationships of community and household, as well as networks and links between the place of origin and the migrants' destination, encumbered by a range of issues from place, identity and skills, to exploiting economic opportunities as they arise on a day to day level. In the case of one of my key informants Sheikh Banda, he was able

to set up his own tailoring business in Mariannhill, after many years of working in a clothing factory and various tailoring establishments. Working from home he was able to accept contract work from some of the Indian owned clothing factories and retailers, as well as casual everyday business. Others such as Aslaam Kadalie and Said Muhammad manufacture pinafores, shirts and trousers for sale on the streets of the city centre. The local street sellers are in partnership with these Malawians. Other Malawian migrants, it seems, buy various goods that are scarce in Malawi: clothes, electronic equipment, household equipment, cosmetics, trinkets, etc. for re-sale in Malawi. Others, such as the recent migrant, Jamie Mdala, are here as target workers. They have in their minds what they want to pursue as their main subsistence or livelihood activities in Malawi, but need to obtain the necessary start up capital or commodities by working in South Africa, and then returning. Thus for some the whole process of migration, work, accumulation and return could be repeated as need arises leading to a pattern of oscillating international migration between their countries of origin and South Africa.

The Malawians present a picture of industrious petty entrepreneurs and workers engaged in a diverse set of occupations removed from the everyday contestation of physical space in the city centre both with other street traders, city officials and the police. The three case studies tend to suggest an almost unproblematic entry, through the use of their networks, into the local economy, and depending on the opportunities presented, making good their original objectives in migrating to Durban, albeit making the necessary tactical changes in the situations they find themselves. But as seen in the last chapter a number of problems that the Malawian face were noted, among the most important being xenophobia and racism. These prejudices directed at them do impact on the way they operate in securing for themselves accommodation and livelihoods. Constructing their livelihood strategies and coping with prejudices is the subject of the next section.

7.8.5. Coping with Prejudice

It has been well documented that continental Africans are often surprised at the xenophobic and racist vitriol directed at them by South Africans, particularly black people. The most common term used by black South African for continental Africans is

'amakwerekwere' – reference to the apparently unintelligible languages that they speak (see Bouillon, 2001, for an expansion on the issue of language and its relationship to African immigration to South Africa). An African person who cannot speak one of the indigenous languages is clearly a foreigner, and often seen as a threat. Furthermore they are marked as different by their physical appearance, bearing, clothing and general demeanour. To say that continental Africans have a difficult relationship with South African, particularly with black people (and especially men) is an understatement. Apart from verbal abuse, they are often accused of stealing jobs and taking the local women, as well as being involved in crime and drugs. The last two aspects are particularly applied to Nigerians and Congolese, who as Morris points are numerically the least significant of the total number of immigrants, refugees or migrants in the country (Morris, 2001: 68), but occupy a significant spot in the media, and mind-set of political leaders and ordinary South Africans, both black and white (Morris, 2001: 77). The Congolese and Nigerians have reacted to such prejudices by defending their national identity, thus reinforcing a cycle of boundary maintenance, stereotyping, and promoting scapegoating among South Africans in a context of sluggish economic growth and high unemployment (Morris, 2001: 75-8). However, unlike Congolese and Nigerians, the Malawians in Mariannhill, while they do experience xenophobia and racism, have developed a different approach to dealing with such prejudices. In the main it has been less openly hostile, and more cautious. Said Muhammad, a man of measured words, had this to say of South Africans:

> I will never forget this country when I go. Generally the people in South Africa are good people. But sometimes they call us *kwerekwere*. But mostly they are good people (29 July 2001).

Adama Mosal echoed these sentiments in much fuller terms:

> I have lived with both Zulus and Malawians. I stayed with Indians in Clairwood. I have been treated well – I stayed very nicely with them. I have no problems here in Mariannhill. I have played soccer with Indian and Zanzibaris. But I am not regarded as a Muntu.

Yet this measured assessment of South Africans, as generally good people, did not hide the perception that there exist below the surface tense race relations in the county. Sheikh

Banda commented on how in any dispute between individuals from different race groups one can pick out the difference in approaches:

> ...when there is a dispute a Zulu will go for this knife or gun to kill, an Indian will go to the police, the English will call a conference to discuss the problem, and the Afrikaner will get his gun and threaten to kill you.

Malawians, he argued have a different approach:

> The Malawians will say, "If you think you are better, then you are". Then walk away. Later they will discuss and resolve the problem.

While such an approach makes for good conflict management, and allows for negotiation and resolution over whatever problem exists, it does not hide the fact they, the Malawians, like the Nigerians and Congolese, have an antipathy for black male South Africans. Sheikh Banda in commenting on relations with local black men and women made this observation, barely disguising his sarcasm:

> Ninety percent of the ladies [local women] treat Malawians well. The response is very good. But the males – that is the problem. They think they are different. They make mountains out of molehills. For example if there is a small accusation of some wrongdoing, they make a big issue of it. But they are the Muntus.

Indeed the relationship with women operates on at least two levels for Malawian migrants. Firstly, as the street sellers of their clothing products. Secondly, as marriage partners. In both the cases of the dressmakers, Said Muhammad and Aslaam Kadalie, the relationship with women street traders is a purely business partnership. Yet this may prompt the violent reaction by black men that they are stealing their women. But as pointed out by many a migrant that they tend to treat women with greater respect, but no less chauvinism. Women are there to serve the needs of men. Nevertheless the underlining fear of violent reaction of black males has prompted Malawian traders to opt for women street traders as the means to sell their products. Furthermore, as shown in case of Said Muhammad the choosing of a woman street trader is not arbitrary, but one of close scrutiny, with the assistance and advice of local women marriage partners of the Malawians.

As marriage partners, local women enable a certain leverage with the Department of Home Affairs to grant residency permits, and also allow for some level of integration into South African society and access to various resources such as housing and greater rights to social service. However this integration should not be exaggerated as the woman is often treated badly by her own people. As Howa Mosal, wife of Adama Mosal explained she was treated as half-Muntu. Although born here, because she married a Malawian Muslim, she is not treated as one of them, that is, a Zulu. She said that she does not blame them for their views because they don't know. Zulus, she said, confuse culture and religion, and that Islam does not deny them their culture.[4]

What is interesting about the Malawian responses to xenophobic and racist verbal abuse is that it has not led to an intensification of Malawian nationalism, as is the case with the Nigerians and Congolese, but rather placing the accent on religious, ethnic and gender identities. What seems clear is that Malawians treated the xenophobic and racist verbal attacks, not so much as an attack on their nationality, but as an obstacle to be overcome situationally. Their response has been largely to live among the local population, learn the language, even adopt local names, and marry local women. This has blunted the vitriol, though not overcome it. For the Malawians the more serious problem is crime and police harassment.

Specifically, with regard to the Malawians it should be noted that:

1. The xenophobic and racist abuse has not dented the self-image of the Malawians. It has put obstacles, but not stopped them from pursuing their intentions and objectives.
2. The situational responses of learning to speak Zulu, marrying local women, and living in a mixed area have greatly assisted their integration to the local community and neighbourhood.

In concluding this section, one may note that generally

[4] One should note in passing that in Kwazulu-Natal, according to official 1996 census statistics, there are more women (4 466 million) than men (3 951 million) (Stats In Brief 2002, STATSSA, Pretoria, 2002)

1. Being a black foreigner is no guarantee that prejudice in the form of xenophobia and racism will be in abeyance. Instead continental Africans can expect the same or greater levels of prejudice and discrimination found in other parts of the world against black people.
2. Although unemployment and a barely growing economy combined with effects of isolation from the rest of the continent have contributed to a less than adequate response by local people to the problems of other Africans, it has prompted a different basis of solidarity for continental Africans around religious, ethnic, and national identities, as well as issues of crime and police harassment. Blackness is not an option for solidarity. Interestingly poverty has not been an issue around which solidarity is built.

7.8. CONCLUSION

Foreign migrant identities are shaped from the moment they arrive at border entry points. From the perspectives of a migrant, state power is most visibly apparent in the whole apparatus of border and passport controls, issuing of visas, residency and work permits, and the rights and obligations attached to it, which officially stamps a migrant with an exclusionary subjected identity and the constant threat of deportation. For foreign migrants there is the additional burden of hostility and xenophobia. This plays a significant role in determining their responses to wages and working conditions, and their social interaction with local people. Malawians are reticent about making claims on the state or engaging in active demands for appropriate wage rates.

The Malawians living in Mariannhill have pursued a strategy of less overt visibility to the authorities, settling among a multi-racial community in Durban with ease and generally benefit from state development of infrastructure. That they are less visible does not mean that they are not subject to the same treatment as the highly visible foreign migrants in the city centre. However, being at some distance from the urban centre, they invite less interference from state authorities in their daily lives and in the pursuance of their livelihoods.

On the other hand local authorities such as Durban have largely reacted to foreign migrants, usually in hostile and negative ways, often on the assumption that foreigners are to blame for a range of inner city problems. Thus, by extension, foreign migrants are an irritant to be ignored and excluded from developmental plans of the local state and can therefore be marginalized. In their several other identities as Muslims, traders, employers, employees and residents they play profoundly different roles as they begin to contest their all-consuming subjected identity.

However inappropriate the local state authorities responses might be presently, it cannot be assumed that in the future such authorities would want to exclude migrants in some kind of formal local enfranchisement process. There are three reasons why this is an important consideration. Firstly, migrants such as the Malawians, particularly those who have married locally and can claim residential rights are not necessarily marginalized, and have benefited from development initiatives. They cannot simply be excluded from local decision-making processes. Secondly, the Muslim Malawians have also benefited from their close associations with other powerful segments of the local population such as the local Muslim welfare agencies and business elites to access employment opportunities, and as benefactors for mosques built in Mariannhill. The building of the mosques and the provision of a religious instructor have led to greater stability within the Malawian community. Although the price to be paid for this may be dependency on patronage of the Muslim elites in the city centre in the future, the process of entwining Malawian migrants to the local business sector cannot simply be undone or ignored. Thirdly, all Malawians in Durban, who have some stake in the economy, either as employees or as self-employed small scale entrepreneurs, might wish to be included in some form of local representation as to their economic rights. Employees might wish to have their exploited status reviewed, whereas entrepreneurs would want to look to how their interests are better served such as with access to trading sites on streets, or market places, and the mutual protection of partnerships between local South African street traders and themselves. Given that we are living in a globally competitive environment, the networks and contacts of trading established by the migrants are a resource to be

cultivated, rather than restricted. Furthermore, there are the trade networks that extend into Africa, albeit small by comparison with large multi-national companies, but nevertheless a point of departure for a port city to extend its trade networks into an undertapped market. But a wider vision of developing trade networks through small scale enterprises assumes that foreign migrants would want to be included in some form of representation, particularly as to their economic rights to work either as employees or as self-employed small-scale entrepreneurs. The point is that Malawians generate employment, and spend their wages and salaries locally, but also trade between two or more countries. For the city to acknowledge the growth and development potential that lies locked by discriminatory practices against foreign small-scale entrepreneurs means to confront the question of rights of foreign migrants, and their incorporation in the governance of the city. In part this depends also on how foreign migrants see themselves in the city. The choices that the Malawian migrant makes in relation to economic rights will raise questions about the wider context of rights in relation to governance and development, an aspect that will receive some greater attention in the chapter to follow.

CHAPTER EIGHT

MIGRATION, IDENTITIES AND CITIZENSHIP: MALAWIANS AND THE LOCALITY OF CITIZENSHIP

Immigrants embody a fundamental empirical, normative and conceptual challenge to the exclusive notions of territorially bounded state sovereignty and citizenship
Maxine Reitzes, 1997

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) has recently argued for an expansion of the notion of citizenship in the context of globalisation:

> Elements of citizenship are being created at many levels of society, from the most local through to the most global; and it is increasingly necessary to consider how these different layers of identity and experience are related (1997: 2).

The previous two chapters looked at these experiences and the multiple layers of identity invoked by the migrants in pursuance of multiple livelihood strategies within a locality. Locality here would not be defined as a fixed physical space, or space within defined territorial boundaries but a space filled with a dense set of social and economic relations acknowledged and at times contested by the various participants, including the state, which perforce also fixes boundaries for its own purposes. (Appadurai, A.1995: 205-07). More specifically those chapters considered the Malawian foreign migrants as part of transnational networks as well as part of local host communities in which they live and work, and in which they are more or less active in affairs of the locality. Reflection on the impact that immigration policies have on migrants' accommodative and livelihood practices within a locality was also highlighted. In this chapter consideration is given to what elements of citizenship practices and presence of Malawian migrants raise beyond the convenient overlapping expression of citizenship rights within defined territorial boundaries of the state. In other words what citizenship issues are raised within a locality beyond the formal constitutional definitions of citizenship.

The aims of this chapter are as follows:

1. A theoretical review of the conceptions of globalisation, civil society and migration and of post-national citizenship
2. An overview of citizenship issues in the context of immigration policy in South Africa
3. The elements that the Malawian experience in Durban brings to the issues of citizenship.

This chapter investigates at an empirical level a case study of Malawians in Durban and the implications for a notion of citizenship beyond the coincidence of rights and territorial boundaries. This is not to suggest that formal constitutional definitions are irrelevant, or that the state is a *passé* institution, but rather that the Malawian migrants' experience of the negative and positive aspects of citizenship proceeds on the basis of experiences in entering the country, finding accommodation and the means of survival, and beyond that, in accumulating capital for their entrepreneurial activities in both South Africa and Malawi. In this perspective Malawian migrants in Durban are active agents within locally defined relationships within civil society. While there is an acknowledgement of the global context, or more specifically the regional context of Southern Africa, the focus of this chapter is very much at the level of the local.

8.2 CITIZENSHIP: A BRIEF THEORETICAL REVIEW

8.2.1 Citizenship and the State

The introduction of liberal constitutional democracy into formerly authoritarian regimes has given new impetus to debates around the issues of citizenship and democracy (Urry, 1998, Assies, W. and Salman, T. 2000). One way in which to approach the problem of conceptualising citizenship is to locate it within debates about constitutional rights and safeguards and of people's responsibilities towards state and society (Held, D 1987: pp36-40; 51-55; 97-96). A central issue in this approach would be to define who is or is not a citizen of a territorially defined state through the lens of legally defined rights and procedural criteria, and any responsibilities they might have to discharge. Such a

perspective posits a contractual relationship between state and individuals as members of civil society. Briefly stated the contract between state and individual may be summarised in the following way. Human rights, in its most pristine classical terms transcend state boundaries. They are inalienable. These also called are natural rights, such as the right to life, freedom of movement, freedom of association, *habeas corpus*, freedom of speech, and freedom to own property. In other words these rights exist *a priori* (to the state). They are not granted by the state but are recognised, protected and guaranteed by the state. In theory then, individuals have the right to resist any agent, including the state, if these rights are violated. These human rights also exist along side civil and political liberties such as the right to vote, form political parties, contest elections etc. The state as a social organisation is based on the use of power, and for the most part monopolises the use of legitimate physical force. Hence the relationship between the state and individuals in the implementation, protection and guarantee of these first generation rights, or its violation, is always an unequal one, whose outcome tends to favour the state if there is no countervailing pressure. There are, as noted by Marshall (and outlined in chapter 3: pp57-58), a second generation of social and welfare rights, based on the notion of protecting citizens from the vagaries of unchecked capitalism. These rights are usually entitlements to social services (water, electricity, garbage removal etc), housing, health care and education. These rights, more than the first generation rights, are granted by the state, and can be withdrawn, albeit contested by various groups and classes whose interests might be at stake (for a critique see chapter 3: pp59-61). There is also a debate concerning post-colonial states and the rights of citizens, not only about the theory and application of the unalienable rights and entitlements in contexts very different from Europe and America, but also the right to development (Kabeer, 2002). The right to development, as a right to claim from the state is a highly contested one, and has had very uneven and highly ambiguous outcomes in Africa. Post-apartheid South Africa is one of the most ambitious attempts in Africa to provide both constitutional and legislative guidelines and concrete policies for people's participation in community development.

Much of this debate on citizenship hinges on formal constitutional definitions of who is a citizen, and therefore who is included and excluded from the provisions of many of these rights within national state boundaries. As Urry expresses this idea:

> The concept of citizenship has been based upon the notion of a bounded society. Societies are typically sovereign entities, with a state at their centre that organises the rights and duties of each member... in a set of relations constitut[ing] the social structure in terms of which life-chances of each member of that society are organised and regulated. (1999: 311).

It is this idea that underpins Marshall's idea of social citizenship (1999: 312). But Urry argues this notion is challenged by globalisation, or rather the transformations in economic, social and political relationships on a world scale. The concept of globalisation is the subject of some intense debates (see the reader by Held and McGrew, 2000). However there are two important ideas that need to be emphasised here. Firstly, globalisation as the 'compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole' (Robertson, 1992: 8). The second point, made by Giddens, concerns the contradictory and uneven process of globalisation. While Robertson emphasizes consciousness of the relative smallness of the world as a place, Giddens shifts attention to globalisation as a process which affects people in their everyday lives wherein "larger and larger numbers of people live in circumstances in which disembodied institutions, linking local practices with globalised social relations, organise major aspects of day to day lives" (1990:79). Giddens also emphasizes that it affects ordinary people in their everyday lives, quite often in negative ways, but also provides opportunities for those who are formerly marginalized to take advantage of new possibilities (1990: 76). This poses dilemmas for people everywhere, whether it is a peasant sitting in a village in Malawi, pondering the merits of migration to South Africa to provide a means of livelihood for his family or the capital resources for a small business venture, or a stock broker sitting at a computer in Johannesburg manipulating market shares on the Hong Kong stock exchange. The fact that individuals confront their lives in this way beyond the immediate reach of the state or enclosed society implies relatively unrestricted global flows of information and people. To confront new dilemmas of making livelihoods, rather than rely on the state to provide the means for their social

and economic lives, impacts on the way a state or society can respond. As Urry makes clear, "Global flows across societal borders make it less easy for states to mobilise clearly separate and coherent nations in pursuit of societal goals" (1999:312). The result is, according to Urry, new tendencies that undermine the coherence of the Marshallian project on social citizenship within a state.

Firstly, on a large scale globalisation is characterised by the growing power of international finance capital, and the corresponding lack of power that national governments have to influence the welfare of their citizens. In effect the economies of states are more likely to be subjected to external interventions by both multi-national corporations as well as supra-national institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the United Nations (and its various agencies). Also the growing trend towards concluding international treaties, not just between nation states, but also between blocks of nation states or regional blocks of economies, affects a state's sovereignty. The effect of this can be seen when states regulate, rather than direct national economies (the 'commanding heights of the economy' in its Leninist version), thus playing down the use of national, or nationalised economic institutions to achieve broad societal and welfare goals for their citizens. Conversely, this means that the duties and responsibilities people have towards a state, which now plays a less distributive role, becomes increasingly ambiguous. In the case of many African states that served a narrow set of elite, comprador bourgeoisie and ethnic interests, this not only compromised good governance, but also meant fewer resources were available to engage their citizens for reciprocal and mutually accepted societal goals and projects (Kabeer, 2002: 13; 20-24).

Secondly, globalisation has led to an increase in international migration and movement of people. Large numbers of unskilled and semi skilled workers and peasants leave their developing countries, to live and work in developed economies of the North, and rapidly emerging industrial economies of the South, such as in metropolitan Durban. This movement of people has largely imploded the notion of a unified, more or less homogenous bounded society protected by the state. For the purposes of elucidating the

implications for citizenship for foreign migrants, four consequences may be highlighted below:

1. Often these immigrant and migrant workers, whether legal or undocumented in a host society, live in 'ethnic enclaves', neighbourhoods or areas of urban settlements made up people of their own nationality, ethnic or religious background.
2. The movement of foreign migrants and immigrants into societies that were formerly thought of as unified national cultures, is now subjected to a proliferation of minority cultures and religions. This raises two issues. First it raises questions about the acceptance and tolerance of new cultures and religion, and the emergence of new social phenomena, the hybridisation of cultures. Second, the institutionalisation and assimilation of other cultures into a dominant culture of a society, generating over time a multi-cultural, rather than mono-cultural dispensation.
3. The disassociation of accommodation practices, a dwelling, with a fixed place or permanent residence. This applies not only to movement across state boundaries, but also within a host society.
4. Other phenomenon such as refugees, forced migration, travelling cultures and the growth of commodified culture and tourism, diasporas of various kinds, have also proliferated.

This movement of people has shifted from an older conception of linear immigration and migration as moving from a place of origin to a place of destination to one of a multiplicity of movements across states with greater frequency and intensity. It implies a constant contact between places of origin and places of destination. This has been termed transnational migration. Frequency of travel and various places of migratory settlement have been noted of some Malawians in the previous chapters. More specifically migration that occurs at greater speed and intensity than ever before is also a reflection of the process of globalisation, and in which people sustain, resuscitate and reinvent social relations between places of origin and one of more places of destination. Such is this

international and regional migration, often involving networks and alliances of people in both places of origin and destination, and in between the two ends, creating a virtual circle of transnational networks and alliances. It is out of such a vortex that warrants the UNRISD to raise the issue of citizenship and migration within regional and wider global contexts. This has given rise to reflections on the notion of post-national citizenship.

8.2.2 Notions of Post-National Citizenship, Human Rights and Migration

In this respect sociologists such as Soysal (1994), Reitzes (1997), Hindness (2002) and Urry (1999), among others have argued for a post-national vision of citizenship based on notions of human rights which are not confined to specific territorial boundaries, but as civic rights which migrants have, and can access as the basis on which to take advantage of the economic opportunities presented by the host societies to rebuild their lives. Such a perspective does not, or rather should not, necessarily imply granting formal citizenship as a constitutional right of the host country. Rather it implies the recognition of mobility (Urry 1998), of transnational migration, and the forces that lie behind it, and that within this set of conditions, the practice of civil and human rights within a locality which make it possible for livelihoods to be pursued without undue hindrance.

In Soysal's view post-national citizenship comes about through world-level pressures to adhere to the international protocols sanctioning respect for human rights, refugees, immigrants and migrants. She argues for post-national belonging based on universal human rights (UN protocols, conventions, constitutions etc) as universal entitlements. But these universal entitlements mean nothing if not implemented. There are three problems with such a contention as it might apply to developing countries.

First, as we have seen in South Africa, while there is the symbolic and rhetorical adherence to such protocols, international or world pressures do not necessarily apply in practice. Indeed, recent evidence shows, as with the registration of domestic servants as contributors to the Unemployment Insurance Funds, that those African foreigners working as domestic servants will not be accorded any benefits. In fact it was argued that they should give up their jobs for South Africans or face prosecution for being in the

country illegally, and being employed illegally – a somewhat bizarre interpretation of the right to work and freedom of movement (Cape Times, 2 April 2003). While the International Labour Organisation has hailed the progressive nature of the South African legislation to protect domestic workers, it is not entirely clear whether its xenophobic application meets with its approval.

Secondly, human rights are paid scant attention by authoritarian regimes, especially in Africa. One of the misunderstandings in the South African government's immigration policy is a lack of appreciation of Bayart's characterisation of African civil society's relationship to the state as the 'politics of the belly'. Authoritarian regimes run by elites in Africa are better known for their lack of responsiveness to the social and economic responsibilities and obligations to the majority of their population. While acknowledging that African states have far fewer resources than their European or American counter parts for redistribution on a more or less equitable basis, structural adjustment and inadequate economic management programmes have exacerbated and forced people to fend for themselves relying on their own meagre resources, usually in the first instance that of family, kinship, friendship and ethnic networks. These connections and networks are within the realm of the private, and operate outside state regulatory frameworks. As I have already noted in previous chapters, migration from African countries is a complex phenomenon of push and pull factors, and is often a function of particular social, economic and political relations which often results in people's lack of confidence that the state they live in is able to provide the means by which they can construct a beneficial livelihood and a sense of solidarity and belonging. Indeed, as has been noted by Simone (2001: 46) globalisation and its impact on African societies provided new opportunities to disengage from the formal political and economic spheres of government which have steadily provided the populous with less in the way of reliable services and respected governance. The growth of what Mbembe (2000) calls 'private indirect government', has forced people, with little or no allegiance to the post-colonial state to resort to alternative modes of production ranging from domestic subsistence within families and villages to participation in informal economies, both locally and internationally. Migration is just one expression, not only of the failure of the post-colonial state project to produce a

coherent and accommodative framework for national solidarity since independence from colonial rule, but of simply forcing people to move away to re-start, re-build, restore and restructure their lives. In this view state regulations, albeit in whatever form or content that they exist, are simply there to negotiate around - a hurdle, a useful instrument, and as a means of extraction to cope with rather than any sense of emanating from within a legitimate contractual citizenship-state relationship. Foreign migrants also operate within, between and outside the laws, policies and regulations of governments. It is this 'betwixt and between' approach of migrants that leads to the third problem with Soyal's view. Soysal's perspective pays little attention to the pressures on and from migrant and immigrant groups to carve out the space for the preservation, or indeed the construction (and re-construction) of their livelihoods and to advance their interests within, between and outside of the capillaries of the state's administrative, regulatory and surveillance frameworks.

8.2.3 Civil Society and Migration

Reitzes (1997) adopts a different view in that she argues for the recognition of global civil society in which a set of human rights – freedom of movement, *habeas corpus*, freedom of association, freedom of speech, freedom to own property - and as enshrined in the bill of rights in the South African constitution – provides a relationship to exist, the means of engagement for individuals and voluntary organisation as separate but linked to the state. As she argues:

> All citizens are necessarily part of the state, as they elect representatives to state governments and civil society, in which they engage in a range of claims against the state, but do not claim the state, including economic production and the exchange. (1997: 6).

She suggests that it is here, in the economic transactions of people that the state is 'superseded' (1997: 6). In part the state is already superseded in the way in which international agencies intervene in nation states as the World Trade Organisation imposes trade requirements, in the imposition of structural adjustment programmes, and the way in which global capital flows already operate within and across national economies. For international business corporations and multi-lateral international organisation such as the

World Trade Organisation, the World Bank and IMF operate rules of engagements that are about 'a never-ending series of exchanges in terms of the rules of contract and private property' on a world scale. This is a noted part of the global capitalist economy. But the counterpart to this global capitalist economy is that labour is severely restricted. As has been noted by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development with regard to migrant labour that

> In a world of falling borders, where capital, goods and aspirations for a better life float free of borders, the regimes of nationality and citizenship puts labour at great disadvantage. The structures of solidarity on which national citizenship rests are often neither congruent with temporary or impermanent residence [of foreign migrant labour] or easily adapted to cultural difference. (unrisd.org: Globalisation and Citizenship, document, 1997: 1).

In essence the argument is for the notion of a global citizen with certain rights and duties in the economic sphere, and which is beyond the restrictions and limitations imposed by nation states. As these are universal rights, they precede management of those rights by states, and are thus 'as portable as a suitcase'.

The problem with such an approach is that while it accords a bigger and more active role to individuals and non-governmental organisations within the realm of civil society, ultimately the burden of making sure such rights and entitlements are delivered rests with the state. (The state is dead, long live the state!)

Rather than locating the issue of citizenship exclusively in a state-civil society conjuncture, another approach might to be to analyse citizenship to the degree that it is an active or passive ingredient in people's everyday social relations in the context of wide ranging experiences of social, cultural and economic differentiation and responses of the state. In other words locating citizenship in the practicalities of overcoming the disjunctures in their everyday life. In a society such as South Africa, (or Brazil for example) wide social and economic differentiation and associated asymmetries of power may have fundamental implications for the way people emerge, become, assert and maintain themselves as citizens. Differentiation and power based on a range of factors such as income, place of residence or work, mobility, or identities such as migrant,

immigrant, refugee, race or ethnic group, contrast sharply with constitutional approaches which assume an equality of individuals (i.e. all are equal before the law) and neutrality of the state (or local state) in the administration and defence of their rights (Kabeer, 2002). Social movements or groups of individuals engaged in activities that seek to transcend the limits of their social and economic situations or their potential disenfranchisement as configured by social differentiation and inequalities suggest new notions of active citizenship (Dagnino, 1994: 89; Assies, and Salman, 2000: 294-298). Such active engagement over the issue of citizenship also raises broader issues of what constitutes and defines social or community participation and social integration within society (Turner, 1990: 189; Rose, 1996: 333-4; 337). The passive images of citizenship embedded in the legal framework (the constitution, laws, policies and administrative procedures) and its relationship with the lived experiences of people needs to be explored. It is these lived experiences that Tilly (1996) argues for construing citizenship as a relational, rather than purely a legal or constitutional issue. James Tully (1999) sees citizenship issues arising out of concrete agonistic relationships in their public and hidden forms, rather than open legal contestation about who is or is not a citizen and therefore entitled to enjoy such rights.

Tilly's point about relational view of citizenship rights being conditioned by their participation, their sense of locality and belonging to particular areas in which their daily routines are exercised becomes relevant here. Migrants arrive and they begin their engagement within the city through the networks they encounter and construct. They seek access to resources of various kinds from a variety of sources, and begin a new life (1996, 1-7). This implies, as Tilly argues, 'multiple categories and forms of citizenship', including those which Reitzes identifies as economic transactional forms. Although foreign migrants' presence cannot be wished away, Tilly's relational view still relies on a conception of rights as centred on state practices and state-citizen interactions, and as already argued this has the propensity to exclude, rather than include, and therefore renders what migrants do as, at best, immaterial, or at worst, illegal from the state's perspective. Being illegal is a short step from any foreign migrant's activities being criminalized. From the point of view of being

inclusive, any denial of a right is a denial of the mutual acceptance of these rights that exist prior to a state. At a basic level, this is about how the rules of the game are played out in defining who is, or not entitled to this or that right. But as we have seen with the Malawians, they don't play that game. They simply ignore those rules. However, migrants establishing their presence are not without problems, or indeed contestation. James Tully's (1999, 161-182) conception of agonic citizenship can be invoked in this context. What migrants do, and the context in which they make or create the means of survival, whether this is within the realm of the permissible by the local state, or not (its regulations, procedures, licenses, permits etc) or a challenge to the local state or other stake holder's institutional expression of powers, makes citizenship a contested arena. But for Tully what is important is his conception of agonistic citizenship. Drawing from Hannah Arendt's theory of action and Foucault's concept of governmentality, citizenship is conceived as an 'agonic game'. It is ceaseless 'struggle *of* and *for* more democratic participation in the games in which people are governed'. He defines this as 'a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle, less face to face confrontation which paralyses both sides than a permanent provocation'. The stakeholders (in South African parlance), whether these be the state, local inhabitants, migrants, 'modify rules by what they say and do as they carry on with their lives, modifying their identities as players, that is, the games of freedom within and against the rules of the game of governance' (1999: 168). For Tully what shapes and holds individual and groups together as citizens and peoples is not this or that agreement, but the agonic activities of participation. This participation may be for recognition, to negotiate the prevailing and biased ethos of citizen participation, they may be about struggles against current structures which relegate some people to non-democratic forms of identity (as in criminalizing foreign migrants); they maybe about how informal practices render new forms of incorporation, changing the structure of power, and rules that govern that structure. Citizenship thus becomes not a site of struggle over the possession of rights, duties and obligations, but the very activity that constantly modifies, through dialogue, negotiation and actual practice how power is exercised, and holds out the possibility of the power to act in ways that brings something into existence that did not exist

before. What migrants do in order to survive, and the articulation of this within and against the practice and discourse of governance is a central theme of the thesis.

Both Tilly and Tully do not obscure the lack of visible legal or open contestation, as an absence of rights or indeed the passive enjoyment of civil and human rights. It is this contrast between the passive and active ideas of participation and construction of citizenship that is explored and analysed in this chapter and is explored through the experience of Malawians living and working in Durban. Phrased differently it may be asked, given the context of Durban, what opportunities exist for people to assert their capacity as citizens and migrants, to participate in the determination of the conditions of their own existence, as individuals, in groups, associations or communities. The chapter illustrates the dynamic between passive and active citizenship by drawing on the experiences of Malawian migrants located in the city. The question that is being addressed might be framed thus: to what extent has the passive or active participation of social actors individually, or as groups, associations and communities from the Malawian migrant community engaged and contribute to new conceptions of citizenship?

8.3 DEFINING FORMAL CITIZENSHIP AND PARTICIPATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

In South Africa formal citizenship as defined in the constitution asserts that citizens have 'rights, privileges and the benefits of citizenship'. The possession of rights such as equality, life, dignity and freedom, is further enhanced with reference to social and economic rights (work, shelter [housing, accommodation], health, security, education and culture). Such rights are 'equally subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship'. But the constitution is not precise about who is a citizen, although it proclaims in its preamble that South African 'belongs to all those who live in it'.[1] In short then rights, duties and responsibilities are foregrounded (S.A. Constitution 1996: C1, s3). In other words citizenship involves reciprocity of rights against a community or state, and duties and obligations towards it. The principle of rights or their mere possession has to be

[1] Issues of birth, kin and blood ties are not considered in the constitution.

validated by the obligation on citizens to practice these rights with due regard to their duties and responsibilities. This shifts the emphasis from mere possession of rights to the practice of citizenship, or the participation within a community or state. It is a question of who participates in, against and with the state that defines the context for the exercise of those fundamental rights.

While for South African local migrants these rights endow a large measure of potential rights, and a degree of protection, the imprecision of who is a citizen, or potential citizen, in relation to foreign migrants needs to be elucidated. The following sections will briefly outline the legislative basis of citizenship in the periods 1949 to 1995, and the post-1995 constitutional approach to citizenship. I will summarise Jonathan Klaaren's analysis of citizenship in South Africa from 1949 to 1995 (Klaaren, 1999). Following this section on formal citizenship is a brief outline of the Aliens Control Act, and with its implicit abrogation of human rights and limitations on achieving formal citizenship for foreign migrants.

8.3.1 Immigration policy and citizenship in South Africa

In South Africa the debate around immigration policy illustrates aspects of the debate around citizenship, rights, obligations, responsibilities and the social and economic entitlements of citizens. Indeed, immigration, and more specifically the influx of foreigners from other parts of Africa has become a highly controversial issue in South Africa. It is alleged, among other things, that foreign migrants and immigrants are entering the country illegally, swamping the cities and towns, taking away jobs, and have become a drain on the country's resources and social services. Employment and social services, which are increasingly limited, it is implied, are the preserve of South African citizens, not foreigners. Not being able to blame an authoritarian unrepresentative regime any longer for the shortcomings of the government and economy, the poor and dispossessed have turned their anger towards foreigners blaming them for the ills they suffer. Accompanying this anger and combined with the perception of massive influx of African migrants is the rise in xenophobia, often expressed in attacks on those assumed to be non-citizens of the country. The response

of government to African continental migration and the rise of xenophobia have been inconsistent and at odds with its commitment to human rights. Indeed some may argue the legislative regime devoted to immigration is discordant with its own constitution and bill of rights (Reitzes, and others). A seemingly majority view from government, or at least represented by the Department of Home Affairs, is to adopt the position of keeping foreigners out. It would have been expected that a more progressive stand, or at least a more moderate immigration policy would have resulted in keeping with the broad vision of freedom enshrined in the constitution and bill of rights. Rather the response by the Department of Home Affairs has been to amend the apartheid era Aliens Control Act of 1991, and a much debated and delayed Immigration Bill which imposes severe constraints on immigration into South Africa. The legislative regime, as shown in chapter 4, does not take into account foreign migrant workers, as indeed many of the Malawians, Zimbabweans, and Mozambicans are, nor their past (as super-exploited migrant workers on the mines, contributing to the economic growth of the country), nor their present contribution. They are a particular category of migrants, as undocumented migrants seeking temporary work and for whom there is no official category (see Reitzes, 1998: 22; Crush, 1997: 2). The net result, as far as the law is concerned, is that they are criminalized, and when apprehended are subjected to harassment, imprisonment without trail, confiscation of their material goods, corrupt practices, and eventual deportation by state officials and police under the Aliens Control Act. The regime of criminalizing and deportation does not stop the foreign migrants from coming back, or new migrants to making the journey to South Africa, perceived as the land of opportunities, second or third to Europe or America.

Although the debate focuses on managing immigration and migration, much of the underlying theoretical concepts have, as shown by Reitzes, developed out of notions of state sovereignty, and associated legal and political conceptions of territoriality, boundaries, citizenship and rights within a perspective of *real politik* (1997: 3). All these conceptions impose various ways of including and excluding people on the basis of normative prescriptions, and implemented by the state through its legislative

and judicial mechanisms and procedures. Thus for South Africa legally defined notions of citizenship as embedded in the constitution become the immediate basis around which rights enjoyed by citizens such as the freedoms of movement, expression and the right to vote etc are conveyed by the state and can be accessed within the boundaries of the country. (The constitutionally defined concept of citizenship in South Africa is analysed below.) Regardless of how useful such legal definitions might be in officially categorizing people within a defined territory, the problem with such an approach is that it presumes a passivity of citizens to accept the roles so defined for them by the state, and removes the activity of members of a society from challenging state defined notions and the assertion of their own notions of citizenship. It especially dis-empowers undocumented foreign migrants for whom no category exists for their official or legal representation. In Chapter 4 I have illustrated how the immigration legislative regime does not cater for the category for temporary foreign undocumented migrant seeking only to work for limited periods before returning home. Such a legislative and policy regime serves not only to exploit them, but also to silence and of necessity force them to act in pursuance of their temporary livelihoods in South Africa in less visible ways. For Malawian migrants this of necessity forces a hidden form of migration.

The debate about the legislative regime, without the active voice of undocumented migrants, is in fact one sided. It is a situation where the state determines the terms of debate, and by doing so excludes the very people it determines policy for, that is, undocumented foreign workers. The terms of the debate within South Africa, in so far as it a public debate that affects foreign migrants, suggest that the government lacks an understanding of the problem or reasons for African continental migration to South Africa, or does not have adequate information about the problems of Africa that prompt migration. Alternatively, or in conjunction with its lack of understanding of the problems of migration on the African continent, there is the new government's continued adherence to outmoded concepts of territorial integrity in the face of globalisation. The narrowness of debate within and between state agencies and its limited exposure in the public domain seem to be fundamentally based on the

proposition of keeping foreigners out. It therefore reinforces the perceptions of xenophobia that prevail. This is not to suggest that the state agencies actually support xenophobia. In fact the state does not support xenophobia, but inadvertently encourages it by default. But as we have already seen throughout the thesis, migration, or in this case its specific type, transnational migration, is a significant phenomenon in many societies both for the advanced countries, as well as more developed societies of the third world. Indeed the new waves of migration signify part of the process of globalisation (see US Global Trends Report, 2015: 8).

This debate has reached a stalemate in terms of appropriate government responses to African continental migration to South Africa. This has occurred despite the best intentions of the green paper on international migration that adopted a developmentalist perspective on migration for the whole Southern African region. Such a position would imply the recognition of migration, at least within the SADC countries, and with it certain rights that migrants would have in the host countries. However, the Department of Home Affairs, as the state agency responsible for migration, has not appeared to shift its fundamental position of attempting to keep foreigners out. Thus the question of migration, migrants and citizenship cannot be addressed adequately as part of the engagement with the states of Southern Africa. The alternative is to engender further debate through a critique in the best traditions of universal normative expectations and respect for human rights and through the elaboration of empirically verifiable theoretical models of what constitutes civil society, the state and sovereignty in a post-colonial globalised world. In this perspective greater weight is accorded human rights as recorded in various international protocols, sanctioned and built into the constitutions of countries.

8.3.2 Historical Outline of Formal (Legal) Citizenship

Prior to 1949 there was no legislation that defined a South African citizen. There were only British subjects and Union nationals. Aliens were those not defined as British subjects. In 1949 the passing of the South African Citizenship Act made all Union nationals South African citizens. A British subject could be a South African citizen, or a

citizen of another country or the Commonwealth. This provision was abolished when South Africa became a Republic in 1961. The 1949 Citizenship Act was also one of the first pieces of apartheid legislation where being a South African citizen was a condition for the franchise, though not the only condition. In other words the franchise was race based. Citizenship was common, but not all citizens were equal. This position lasted until 1970.

In 1970 the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act was passed which ensured that every black person was made a citizen of a homeland, without his or her consent. They became a citizen of a particular homeland on the basis of language, culture, or race. At first this did not diminish their South African citizenship. Thus a black person from Ciskei could retain his South African citizenship, even though he was a citizen of Ciskei. However when Ciskei became an independent homeland he lost his South African citizenship to the extent that he should have been treated as if he was a foreigner. The logical conclusion of such a policy was, as C.P.Mulder pointed out, 'there will be not one black man with South African citizenship...every black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated in some independent new state in this honourable way and will no longer be a moral obligation on this Parliament to accommodate these people politically' .At the same time the demands on white South Africa citizens increased, with the extended role they had to play in the defence force and police to defend the apartheid state.

The third phase of formal citizenship (1986-1995) saw the passage of three pieces of significant legislation: the passing of the Restoration of South African Citizenship Act of 1986, the Restoration and Extension of South African Citizenship Act of 1993 and the 1993 Interim Constitution.

The Restoration of South African Citizenship Act (1986) did not restore citizenship to all those who lost their citizenship as a result of the homelands policy of the apartheid state. Indeed it restored citizenship only to those who were nominally citizens of independent homelands, but permanently resident in South Africa. The Restoration and Extension of South African Citizenship Act of 1993, as part of the interim arrangements in drafting the

interim constitution, restored citizenship to those who lost their South African national citizenship as a result of apartheid policies. All those who had independent homelands (TBVC) citizenship automatically had their South African citizenship restored, and which then enabled them to vote in the 1994 elections. One could argue that a common South African citizenship with a common franchise existed from 1 January 1994. However the legislative regimes on citizenship of the TBVC states remained, until the passing of the 1995 South African Citizenship Act.

8.3.3 The 1995 South African Citizenship Act.

The 1995 South African Citizenship Act made five main changes to citizenship law. These were:

- The repeal of old citizenship laws, including the homelands citizenships acts, and application of the law nationally.
- A policy of tolerance towards dual citizenship.
- Adjustments to the naturalization policy.
- The declaration of allegiance was amended.
- Citizenship by birth for stateless children was introduced.

All apartheid legislation pertaining to citizenship was abolished, including the automatic citizenship to whites who resided in the Republic for five years. Other features of the new legislation was the adoption of citizenship for stateless children born in South Africa, affirmation of judicial review of ministerial decision, and continued toleration of dual citizenship (not least because many in the liberation movement had acquired citizenship of other countries during exile).

8.3.4 The Current Legal Position on Citizenship and Permanent Residence

There are three ways in which citizenship and permanent residence can be granted: birth, descent and by naturalisation.

The acquiring of South African citizenship is a mixture of *jus soli* (birth) and *jus sanguinis* (by descent). In terms of *jus soli* citizenship can only be granted if a parent is a citizen or both parents are permanent residents. This rule is relaxed if at least one parent is a permanent resident. Children born of temporary residents are not usually granted citizenship. Descent can apply to children born to South African citizens living abroad. Most South African citizens acquire their status under the principle of *jus soli.*

However for the purposes of investigating the rights of migrants to formal citizenship, the question of permanent residence and naturalisation is of some importance. The legislative bar against a large number of people acquiring citizenship means that naturalisation is the only legal option, and therefore of some importance to consider (although for many it was not the formal citizenship, but acquiring an identity document that will make their lives easier). There are eight conditions that have to be met to become a naturalised citizen. These are:

- A person must be over 21 years
- Must be admitted for permanent residence
- Must have lived continuously for at least one year in the Republic before applying for permanent residence
- Must ordinarily have lived for four of the last eight years as a resident preceding the application
- Must be of good character
- Be able to communicate in one of the official languages
- Must have knowledge of the responsibilities and duties of a citizen

In short, naturalization depends on permanent residence. The Aliens Control Act guides permanent residence. A permit for permanent residence is available to a person who is of good character, who will be a desirable resident of the Republic, who will not harm the welfare of the Republic and who does not and is not likely to pursue an occupation where there are already sufficient numbers of people available. Immediate permanent residence may be granted to the destitute, aged, infirm or for spouses and dependent children of permanent residents and citizens. Applicants usually have to apply for permanent residence from outside the country, although those with temporary residence, a work permit, the aged, the infirm and destitute can apply from within the country. Persons who are married to citizens or permanent residents can also apply from within the country.

The question that might be asked is whether the citizenship status would make any difference to ordinary people living in the republic. Two issues might be noted here. Firstly, the legal and bureaucratic procedural requirements for citizenship and permanent residence. Attempts at acquiring either citizenship or permanent residence may be less than encouraging because of the following factors:

- The administrative challenge faced by the Department of Home Affairs given the previous lack of clarity over citizenship, and its ambiguous extension to people within homelands during the many years of apartheid.

- The growth in corruption in the application of the rules and procedures over citizenship, the issuing of identity documents, permanent and temporary residence and refugee and political asylum seekers.

Secondly, formal citizenship is probably less important than the acquisition of an identity document. For practical purposes an identity document is far more important in that it is the requirement for employment applications, opening bank accounts, access to trading permits and a range of other services. Acquisition of an identity document is a primary requisite in South Africa, one that foreign migrants quickly realise. And it is a document that is highly sought after by them. To have an identity document does not necessarily imply acquisition of citizenship.

8.3.5 Rights, Citizenship and the Aliens Control Act

The Bill of Rights, as contained in the South African Constitution, provides that almost all rights are to benefit everyone, including 'aliens'. Except for the rights to trade, occupation, profession, citizenship and certain restrictions on movement and residence, everyone who lives in the republic has rights under the new constitution. These are rights for 'everyone' not just for citizens. While formal legal changes to the *jus soli* and naturalization rules were made to accommodate the changed constitutional status of the Republic, the general effect of the new Act was non-racial and inclusive in so far as the South Africans are concerned. The Citizenship Act and Constitution sought to be inclusive of all South Africans, in contrast to the fragmentation and divisive regime of the past. While the constitution upholds the rights of everyone, (but draws the distinction between the all encompassing rights of 'citizens' and 'the people'), there are various acts which restrict the rights of foreign migrants. The principal law that covers foreign migrants is the Aliens Control Act of 1991, as amended in 1995 (Aliens Control Amendment Act).

The fundamental assumption underlying the Aliens Control Act is that foreigners pose an economic and social threat to South Africa. This assumption has its historical precedents in the 1913 Immigration Act and the 1937 Aliens Act, both pieces of legislation which are racist and anti-Semitic (Perberdy and Crush, 1998). These acts were seemingly non-racial because they did not mention the actual race or religious group to which they were directed. The 1913 Immigration Act was directed against Indian immigration and the 1937 Aliens Act against Jews, in particular those fleeing from Nazi Germany. Both Acts, as Crush points out, "shunned transparency, administrative justice and accountability and gave wide discretionary powers to administrators, and allowed politically powerful employers such as the mines to devise their own 'immigration policy' " (1998, 2). It might be argued that the racial assumptions and administrative procedures of these Acts are carried over into the 1991 consolidation of Aliens legislation, and then further into the 1995 amendments.

There are three important issues that arise out of the Constitution and the Aliens Control Act which are of concern in relation to the subject of migrants as discussed later in the thesis. The first is that there is an assumption of a necessary conflict between the interests of migrants/immigrants and South Africans (Reitzes, 1999). There is, in Reitzes' view, no concrete evidence of this conflict of interest in South Africa. There is, of course xenophobia. But the xenophobia is about South African perceptions of migrants and immigrants as a threat, rather than the reality. The existence of xenophobia does not deny or justify differential and discriminatory treatment, including attacks on migrants or immigrants or indeed on anyone, including South Africans, who are alleged to be foreign because they are too dark in complexion, have the wrong vaccination mark, shape of nose, or hair texture, or cannot say the word 'elbow' in one of the main official languages. It is suggested that the symbolic use of foreign migrants, albeit questionable, is one means of uniting South African citizens around a national identity. Although not suggestive of a national state strategy, opposition to foreigners to emphasis a South African identity may be what lies behind images of foreign migrants as disease-ridden, job-grabbing, criminals intent on swamping South Africa in large numbers, rendering life as it is known today 'alien'.

The second issue that can be considered here is the impact of the discourse of human rights, as infused in the making of the South African constitution, on the understanding of citizenship. Klaaren has argued that large parts of the current Aliens Control Act would not stand the test of the constitutional court (1999). According to the Human Rights Watch (1998), there are many human rights issues raised by the Aliens Control Act, and which may be in violation of the various international and African protocols signed by the government. An analysis of the abuse of human rights of undocumented migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in South Africa may be found in Manby, (1997) and Human Rights Watch (1998). An exploration of these abuses is not directly relevant here, suffice to record its existence. However a few important points may be raised as these impact directly on subsequent themes in the thesis.

One of the points raised by the Human Rights Watch is that there is no enabling legislation in South Africa providing for public and parliamentary scrutiny of the

Department of Home Affairs whose jurisdiction covers foreign migrants, refugees, and political asylum seekers. The system by which migrants and immigrants, refugees, and political asylum seekers are incorporated into South African society does not exist in any systematic or institutional form. Those administrative procedures that do exist are internally prescribed and often inconsistently and informally applied by officials in the Department of Home Affairs with no consistent oversight by parliament and therefore hidden from the public's gaze. Indeed corruption, as mentioned above, is a major problem in the Department. However, there are guidelines which the government and its agencies are morally obliged to follow by virtue of membership of the United Nations, International Labour Organisation and the Organisation of African Unity, and the agreements signed with the United Nation's High Commission for Refugees. The Act and its various incarnations as a white paper on international migration violate a wide range of human rights (Reitzes, 1998, 1999). In Reitzes' view the Act hardly acknowledges human rights guarantees in the constitution, and has a highly questionable approach to the issue of domicile. We shall return to the issue of human rights and domicile below.

Reitzes makes the further point that the Aliens Control Act does not seek to assimilate people, but rather to contain or expel foreigners, especially illegal or undocumented ones. In fact, the Act and the subsequent white paper depart radically from the earlier Green Paper that treated migration and immigration as an economic development issue. Flowing from the assumption that migrants are a social and economic problem, Reitzes argues that there is an emerging position from within the Department of Home Affairs which suggests that if people enter the country illegally, or persist in staying after the expiry of their visa permits and without any further legal documentation, then they forfeit their "rights". At an empirical level there is no formal category for temporary foreign migrant workers in the Act, and hence no rights, in particular economic rights; in essence no formal rights to forfeit. At a conceptual level this is problematic. The contrast or juxtaposition of formal citizenship rights against the rights of non-citizens seems contrived, as if these actors bear "rights" that are mutually exclusive. This seems to suggest that in South Africa you can have human rights or citizenship rights, but not necessarily both. Or at least you can have full human rights only if you are citizen. Such a perspective is extremely limited to a position where the state decides what rights people

might have, which reinforces a passive acceptance of citizenship status. The state as custodian of the rights of citizens becomes opaque, and opens up the space for the abuse of state power. In Mann's terms such a state in its approach to citizenship issues might be considered, at least, authoritarian. Such a characterisation stands at odds with the fact that nine years into its transition South Africa has developed an enviable reputation as having re-invented democracy. There exist all the trappings of parliamentary democracy: a constitution with a bill of rights, a constitutional court, and a human rights commission, and several substantially free national and local government elections and a robust parliamentary debate between political parties.

The third issue is whether rights can be enjoyed only where people are domiciled. It should be acknowledged that immigration policy by its very definition (placing limitations of where and when people may move) violates the idea of universalist assumptions about human rights such as the freedom of movement and association. The issue of making rights specific to a geographic place ignores the fact that human rights are inalienable (they are portable). Human rights cannot be circumscribed by boundaries, so that one can practice human rights in one place, but not in another (see Reitzes, for an analysis of the inherent tension between human rights, sovereign rights and citizenship rights: 1997: 4-7). As Urry (1998) points out, while formal constitutionally defined citizenship is commonly conceived of as a bundle of rights within a territorially defined national state, with globalisation human rights issues have become entangled with citizenship issues. However the practice of the rights within a prescribed area, or place of domicile, is a contentious one in legal theory. It is not the intention here to engage with that debate directly, although it carries with it shades of apartheid ideology as it is applied in South Africa (Mail and Guardian, 24-30/08/01). What is of concern is the limitation it implies in terms of mobility and economic opportunity. In the case of migrants who are the subject of this thesis, it is precisely their mobility to exploit economic and employment opportunities within the Durban Metropolitan region that is crucial to their survival. Foreign migrants' success in their enterprises or employment opportunities hinges on their mobility. Indeed in some cases success can be measured by their ability to extend their economic operations and enterprises by providing further employment opportunities to others. The 1999 White Paper on International Migration seeks to

liberalise entry conditions while making it difficult for foreigners to obtain employment, and seeks to shift the responsibility for policing the employment of foreign migrants to actors such as trade unions, employers, local and provincial governments, and service providers. But foreign migrants are not found in large or even moderate numbers in the formal sector of the economy, but rather in the informal sector. Not having easy legal access to formal jobs, and restricted in various activities due to their lack of an identity document, most foreign migrants and workers are found in the informal sector, mostly self-employed, and constantly under scrutiny from the agencies of the state. There are some who find work in the formal sectors of the economy such as in the agricultural and construction sectors. Examples are Mozambicans working on commercial farms in Mphumalanga province, or those working in the construction industry (Reitzes, 1999). In both formal and informal working environments, these foreign migrants work under very exploitative conditions.

But there is another dimension to the issue of domicile and territorial boundaries that will be raised in the context of the citizenship rights in urban centres such as Durban. Metropolitan centres are where municipal government takes on a greater role in the provision of employment opportunities, economic and housing infrastructure and services in a dense, highly stratified and heterogeneous population. Because migrants, both foreign and local, are attracted to such centres, the issue of mobility is of great importance in finding work, or the means of subsistence, and accommodation that will suit their apparent indigent circumstances. The question is what rights (human and citizenship) can such migrants articulate in their dire need to find the means of survival, and in which their freedom of movement is not impeded so as to compromise their survival strategies. Clearly, constitutional and legislative devices may not cover these issues as a package of bureaucratic procedures and institutional rules. Here we return to the theoretical positions outlined above to make sense of these everyday challenges - sometimes hidden, sometimes overt - that are faced by migrants.

8.4 MIGRANTS AND CITIZENSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA

Given the discussion above, the following points are the most salient for purposes of discussing the Malawian case study. These points will be incorporated into the discussion. The points are:

1. The fundamental assumption underlining the Aliens Control Act is that foreigners pose an economic and social threat to South Africa, and therefore should be kept out.
2. There is a necessary conflict between the interests of migrants/immigrants and South Africans
3. To prevent this conflict requires a muscular response in the form of systematic police raids, deportations, and border patrols, and a system of surveillance of foreigners in the form of bureaucratic controls such as the payments for issuing of permits, identity documents, reporting to home affairs officials etc.
4. The immigration legislative regime does not cater for the category for temporary foreign undocumented migrant seeking to work only for limited periods before returning home. This criminalizes foreign migrants.
5. The regime of criminalizing and deportation does not stop the foreign migrants from coming back, or new migrants making the journey to South Africa.
6. The Aliens Control Act does not seek to assimilate people, but rather to contain or expel foreigners, especially illegal or undocumented ones.
7. The constitution is infused with the aura of human rights (follows various models and international protocols), yet the legislation on immigration and migrants contradicts the spirit and letter of the law.
8. Formal citizenship is probably less important than the acquisition of an identity document.
9. The issue of domicile and territorial boundaries plays it itself out in contradictory ways – while trying to restrict foreign migrants, it also does not

place limits on securing employment once granted permission to stay in the country. Refugees, in particular are not confined or restricted to refugee camps.

10. Citizenship rights are conditioned by their participation, their sense of locality and belonging to particular areas in which the practice their daily routines:
    a. participation in economy – development of informal sector - micro enterprises and entrepreneurship
    b. debating their role as entrepreneurs
    c. participating in a metropolitan economy – challenge of services provided and consumed.
    d. belonging to a locality.

8.4.1 Places of Origin and Entering the country

Many of foreign migrants in Durban come from the countries that comprise the Southern African Development Community (SADC), namely, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. There are also a large number that now coming from outside of the SADC countries, particularly from West Africa (Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire), Central Africa (Congo, Burundi, Rwanda) and parts of East Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya). This new and constant in-flow of new migrants, as work seekers, refugees and political asylum seekers, is a feature of the new reality and composition of South African society. In chapter 4 the reasons for the presence of foreign migrants, immigrants and refugees was covered, and discounted the debate on the numbers of foreigners as a threat to the economy as of little importance. What was of importance was what they actually do in terms of inserting and assimilating themselves into the country and making a living (survival). Later in this chapter I shall return to this point of insertion and assimilation when discussing the participation of Malawians in the local economy.

The state's response to African continental migration to South Africa has been, to quote Klaaren, 'muscular'. Repatriations and deportations, as well as regular raids in areas known to be densely populated with foreign migrants, has been the order of the day.

Surveillance through the issuing of permits and migrants having to report and renew permits at regular intervals are also mechanisms to reduce the length of stay and willingness to either come to the country, and/or settle permanently. Xenophobia, while not encouraged by the state, is on the rise, as witnessed in a number of incidents. Yet not all foreign migrants and immigrants have the same problems.

Malawians rely on their national identity to enter the country, the difference being that they are treated with less suspicion than other African nationals. Yet they are aware that a declaration to immigration official that they are seeking work in South Africa would be a tactical mistake. Thus obtaining a tourist visa is the least problematic means of entry because they are members of an SADC country, and they can easily satisfy the test of a name and an address of a relative or friend in South Africa given the long-term contact between the two countries. Although Malawians have easier entry into South Africa, their visa does not entitle them to work. Yet that is precisely what many do, search and find work once inside the country[2]. But unlike the Senegalese who rely heavily on their own internal network of Senegalese, the *Dahira*, for an institutional form support (Bouillon, 2000, 50-54; Vawda, 2000: 113-115), the Malawians rely on a variety of strategies to survive once inside the country: religious affiliation, work skills, length of stay and marriage to locals are important considerations in their survivalist strategies.

Malawians have, as we have shown in the previous chapters, longstanding migrant labour ties, as well as diplomatic and economic relationships. In concrete terms Malawians in Marainnhill and to an extent in the Overport and city centre come from a number of villages in southern Malawi, principally the district of Mangochi, but also from other towns, villages and cities. Many have come from villages, their primary first migratory step is to the towns and cities of Malawi, mainly Lilongwe and Blantyre. While the geographic place of origin might give clues as to the reasons for leaving, the intention to stay in the cities of Malawi and later Durban, for whatever length of time is decided

[2] Given the long-term migratory history between the two countries, some Malawians do eventually obtain residential permits. Only one Malawian showed me his passport in which it was stamped 'Malawian citizen, resident in South Africa'. Others may obtain residential permits because of marriage to local people.

upon, and the reasons for this length of time is of importance in understanding any continued relationship that might exist with the place of origin, and the degree of commitment such a migrant might have to belonging in the city. Initial indices of belonging, or elements towards constructing a livelihood in the city are the places of accommodation, the construction of a household, and the type of work that is sought and engaged, and the period of time and if a transient oscillating transnational migrant (or rather the option of being one), the number of regular return trips made. The sense of belonging in Durban, rather than anywhere else, is, it might be argued, a critical component towards any conception of citizenship.

8.4.2 Survival Strategies: Rights and Work

The Aliens Control Act, as Reitzes has pointed out, is based on the assumption of a conflict of interests between South African and foreign workers. At first glance this might appear to be true, and employment for foreign workers needs to be restricted to South Africans because of the high unemployment rates in the country. It might be further argued that the influx of African continental migrants and refugees occurs at a time of transition in the country when the economy is being re-structured, with consequent job losses. Here a distinction must be drawn between refugees and asylum seekers, and continental African migrant workers. One of the positive features for refugees and asylum seekers is that once registered with the Department of Home Affairs they have a legitimate right to seek employment or pursue self-sustaining employment options. This in turn implies that they should not be denied legitimate access to job opportunities and/or resources to pursue various employment prospects. However, this right to engage in economic activities is not absolute. It does not mean that the South African state undertakes to assist them in securing jobs or access to social services such as shelter, health or education. It also does not mean they can register as work seekers with the Department of Labour. Furthermore even if an employer wants to employ a foreigner he would have to prove that the skills required for the job couldn't be found among the local population, particularly amongst blacks. In effect, regardless of the skills of refugees and asylum seekers, the Act effectively denies legitimate African foreign immigrants access to work opportunities. In effect this means those foreigners who are here for reasons of

political asylum or as refugees have to rely on themselves to construct a livelihood in order to survive.

This right to seek economic opportunities does not apply to undocumented foreign migrants who seek work, that is, economic refugees. Although they give their reasons for entering South Africa as visiting friends, relatives or as tourists, many African migrants, such as the Malawians, are here as economic refugees because of the dire economic circumstances in their respective countries, often exacerbated by political instability. In other words their situation is a complex intertwining of political, economic and sometimes personal reasons for leaving their countries of origin and travelling thousands of kilometres to the southern tip of Africa. Some might even argue that South Africa has a moral obligation to assist Malawian migrant workers as they contributed to the development of the mining industry, when very few South Africans were prepared to work underground. The Malawians are forthright in their reasons for coming to South Africa: they come to seek work. Except for a few their options are limited to being workers or self-employed entrepreneurs. But the choice of livelihood depends, at least in the initial stages of their stay, on the country of origin, and what networks of friends and relatives that they connect with in South Africa. Malawians, because of the longer ties that they have with South Africa, tend to be able to connect with a well-established network of their own nationals. These networks provide them with advice on employment opportunities, or access to South African employers mainly in various retailing, tailoring, dressmaking and clothing manufacturing sectors. Some Malawians have subsequently branched out to work on their own, and create employment.

While political refugees are able to access a number of non-governmental organisations for their initial support, mainly religious based ones and UNHCR sponsored organisations, such as the Refugee Forum, the Malawians, rely almost entirely on their own resources and networks to find accommodation and work. In the case of Muslim migrants and immigrants, such as the Malawians from the Mangochi district (where the Yao Muslims predominate), connecting and seeking assistance from Islamic charitable organizations or mosques has also been a consideration in starting to develop a new life.

Virtually from the moment they arrive, they rely on their own networks and entrepreneurial experience to fend for themselves, making no overt demands on the state.

While there might be competition among foreign migrants and local people to find jobs, it is difficult to construe such a situation as a case of inimical interests. In an era where the state has withdrawn from guaranteeing full employment, or any kind of employment, as the Minister of Finance so recently put it in no ambiguous terms, it would be difficult to construe finding and securing employment by your own means as a conflict of interests. All foreign migrants, whether political or economic refugees, rely on themselves and their networks, without any assistance from the state, to find employment. Indeed as has been shown in the previous chapter some have created their own employment opportunities, started small scale businesses and now provide employment for local South Africans. Yet the foreign migrant workers, as employees competing with other unemployed South African, as self-employed entrepreneurs and providers of employment and tax revenue for the state, do not have the formal right to act as if they were citizens. They do however, challenge, by their very economic transactional practices, the denial of a right to fend for themselves.

8.4.3 Spaces to Survive, Places to Assimilate

While the literature shows that many foreign immigrants/migrants have opted to live and work in city centres, the high cost of living in the centre of the city meant that many Malawians exercised the option of moving their residence (and in some cases their enterprises) out of the city centre to the margins of the Durban Metropolitan region in Mariannhill. Malawians also live in densely populated residential areas such as Overport in high-rise apartments, and in the city centre, where they benefit from close access to their places of employment, access to services and facilities, and share the expenses of rental tenancy and other living expenses. Overport also is a predominant Indian residential area with a substantial Muslim Indian population with whom Malawians seem comfortable to live among, particularly for Malawians from the Yao and Chewa ethnic groups who tend to be predominately Muslims.

The choice of place to live and work, an essential ingredient of citizenship rights, is in this case also exercised because of security concerns. To live in the city centre also makes a foreign migrant prone to police raids. As with all undocumented migrants the world over, a series of stratagems have been evolved by foreign migrants to circumvent falling into the clutches of the police. But choice of residence is significant as it is the base from which one makes forays into evolving livelihood strategies. Those Malawians living on the periphery argue that not only is it cheaper, but also provides a measure of protection from the surveillance of the police and home affairs officials. It is not unusual for foreign migrants, particularly those who trade on the street and live in the city centre to experience regular police raids and as a consequence to have their property confiscated, be taken into custody, and eventually deported at the slightest provocation. Bribes to police often assist in making the nightmare disappear. But such police raids raise crucial questions about civil society's, local government and parliamentary oversight on the actions of state agencies, and the apparent unbridled power such agencies have in upholding the protection of life, property, and the principles of *habeas corpus*.

It is the possibility of living in the urban periphery, with lower accommodation and subsistence costs and with a community support system, which enables them to survive at lower costs per individual or household. But for them it is not just another poverty trap. Surviving in the semi-urban area of Mariannhill enables them to accumulate some surplus funds. The accumulated funds are then used either to start or expand their entrepreneurial activities in Durban, or remit surplus funds to Malawi to support their families or set up new enterprises. Despite the problems of xenophobia and harassment, Malawians, by playing a lower profile, have been able to carve out niches for themselves, and create the spaces for themselves to pursue with determination their chosen objectives in migrating to Durban. In addition local traders have participated with them in the fast-growing informal sector. This issue of small and micro enterprises, as it relates to the issue of citizenship is analysed in a separate section below.

8.4.4 Continental African Migrants in Durban and Small-Micro Enterprises

In the section above the question was posed as to whether Malawian and South Africa interests are inimical. I have tried to provide one answer to this question. Here I develop another answer by making an assessment of what they do with their accumulated or surplus funds.

In the previous chapter it was shown that a key informant, Banda, set up his own tailoring business in Mariannhill, after many years of working in a clothing factory and various tailoring establishments. Working from home he was able to accept contract work from some of the Indian owned clothing factories and retailers, as well as casual everyday business from both his own ethnic and national compatriots, as well as local people in the neighbourhood. His business was not confined or dependent on an ethnic group. Others, such as Aslaam Kadalie and Said Muhammad, sew pinafores, shirts and trousers for sale on the streets of the city centre. The street sellers, often women South Africans, are involved in contractual obligations to retail the manufactured goods of the Malawians. Other Malawian migrants, it seems, buy various goods that are scarce in Malawi: clothes, electronic equipment, household equipment, cosmetics, trinkets, etc. for re-sale in Malawi. A few remit surplus cash to support family and business enterprises in Malawi. Others, such as the recent migrant, Jamie Mdala, are here as target workers. They have in their minds what they want to pursue as their main subsistence or livelihood activities in Malawi, but need to obtain the necessary start up capital or commodities by working in South Africa, and then returning. Thus for some the whole process of migration, work, accumulation and return could be repeated as need arises leading to a pattern of oscillating international migration between their countries of origin and South Africa. In short the Malawians present a picture of industrious petty entrepreneurs and workers engaged in diverse set of occupations, but removed from the everyday contestation of physical space in the city centre. These would seem to be the ideal citizens: unassuming, law abiding people who provide for themselves, and not reliant on the state for welfare or unemployment benefits. They fit in with the rules of the free market game.

Nevertheless the free-market game is at odds with the expectations that a post-liberation government would provide a variety of service and welfare entitlements, including employment. This has in part led to the debate about the implications foreign immigration and migration has for the South African labour market and a new immigration policy. I have already shown that a strategy built on keeping foreigners out, and the need to control entry does not address what these new international migrants do in the country, particularly for a livelihood, and whether these practices, or participation in the local economy, precipitate issues of rights and citizenship. Here I am not referring to specifically undocumented migrants but to all those who have entered the country and have had to find the ways and means of survival. One major means of survival is as small petty traders, or micro-enterprises, usually as part of the informal sector. Officially this is referred to as part of the small, medium and micro-enterprise economy (SMME), that is, enterprises employing less than 40 people. In terms of official views on SMME, three categories are distinguished: (a) survival enterprises in the informal economy, (b) growing micro-enterprises, and (c) formal small or medium sized enterprises. This shifts the debate from control of immigrants to questions of growth and development as suggested in the *Green Paper on International Migration.* Recent studies have shown that in Durban it is street traders and hawkers or 'survival enterprises' that are the most visible growth points in the regional economy, particularly in the centres of cities and towns, selling basic commodities, food and trinkets. The North and South Central Councils Integrated Development Plan points out that there are some 20 000 street traders in the Durban Metropolitan area.' Although this figure is not broken down by type of commodities sold, income earned or by nationality or ethnic group it does argue that *'the most buoyant and rapidly expanding component of Durban's industrial sector are firms of less than 40 employees. These are more likely to be owned or operated by Indian or African entrepreneurs'* (1998: 24). Although the further development of SMME's is seen as an essential part of the growth and development of the regional economy, the question is what implications does this have for foreign informal traders and entrepreneurs in relation to urban governance and development in the city of Durban: in short the citizenship rights within a locality of trading.

But it has also prompted among themselves a debate about their economic activities in SMME sector of the economy, principally around the accusations that they are deviant, criminals, take away jobs from locals, and do not integrate with locals. Of course they reject these accusations, citing their religion as prohibiting them from engaging in criminals activities, that they are in fact self-employed, and employ locals, and that integration is also matter of locals overcoming their ignorance of the world, and in particular the circumstances of their respective countries. In this their several other identities as Muslims, traders, employers, residents begin to emerge, which are beginning to play profoundly different roles as they begin to contest their all-consuming subjected identity.

It is precisely in these transnational contacts that potential benefits to the city may occur if a more constructive approach is taken to street trading by foreign nationals. Firstly, given that Durban as a regional economic centre exists within in a globally competitive environment, the networks and contacts of trading established by the migrants (and immigrants) are a resource to be cultivated, rather than restricted. Secondly there are the trade networks that extend into Africa, albeit small by comparison with large multi-national companies, but nevertheless a point of departure for a port city willing to extend its trade network to an untapped market. Naturally this requires it to shed its vision of trade as primarily connected with Europe and America, and that small or micro enterprises are a matter of only an internal and tourist market. A third aspect is the revenue generated and revival of the city centre. By not recognizing the potential revenue generated by granting migrants the required trading permits, they reduce the revenue generated from immigrant street traders who are willing to pay these costs in order to secure a stand to support their business enterprises. A fourth aspect is that it is apparent that many foreign street traders, including the Malawians, generate employment. For the city to acknowledge the growth and development potential that lies locked by discriminatory practices against foreign street traders, means to confront the question of rights of foreign migrants, and their incorporation in the governance of the city. In part this depends on how foreign migrants see themselves in the city.

8.4.5 Representation and Local Authority Governance Issues

Foreign migrant identities are shaped from the moment they arrive at border entry points. From the perspectives of a migrant, state power is most visibly apparent in the whole apparatus of border and passport controls, issuing of visas, residency and work permits, and the rights and obligations attached to it, which officially stamps a migrant with an exclusionary subjected identity.

Local authorities such as Durban have largely followed the lead established by the Department of Home Affairs and reacted to foreign migrants negatively, usually in hostile ways, often on the assumption that foreigners are to blame for a range of inner city problems. Thus, by extension, foreign migrants are an irritant to be ignored and excluded from developmental plans of the local state, and therefore marginalized. But in fact migrants such as the Malawians, have as shown above participated intimately in the economic activities of the metropolitan area. Those who have chosen to put down roots, and particularly those who have married locally can claim strong residential rights, and sense of belonging, and are not necessarily marginalized as foreigners. In some cases they have benefited from development initiatives. They have also benefited from their close associations with other powerful segments of the local population such as Indian merchants and industrialists. However inappropriate the local state authorities responses might be presently, it cannot be assumed that in the future such authorities would want to exclude migrants in some kind of formal enfranchisement process. But this assumes that foreign migrants would want to be included in some form of representation. Given that their legal status does not encourage them to be openly challenging to the local and national state, it is not surprising that their voices are not heard. But it does not mean that for example, they prefer the status quo, especially when it comes to issues such as trading permits and municipal services. The choices that the Malawian migrants make in the future, possibly in association with Muslim or Islamic organisations, as well as residential based civic organisations in relation to economic transactional relationships will raise questions about the wider context of their participation in relation to governance and development. Assuming wider participation by foreign migrants over the direct issues that affect them means an incipient change in a relationship of power over them to one in

which participation leads to a dispersal of centralised power in a shared, negotiated and contested way to more democratic forms of recognition of their identities and contributions.

8.4.6 Assimilation and Insertion into Local Communities

As noted above in the critique of the Aliens Control Act, there is a view expressed that the Act does not provide for any institutionalised mechanisms for assimilating or incorporating immigrants into the host society. But this does not mean that assimilation does not take place. As noted previously, Islam plays a large role in assimilating Malawian Muslims. Other Malawians of different religious persuasion are also incorporated into the community of Malawian Muslims if they come from the same district in Malawi. While local South African Indian Muslims have accepted Malawian Muslims without prejudice, assisting in providing initial poverty relief for the individuals and families of migrants, and crucially, employment, there is some criticism of the low wages paid. As Sheikh Banda stated: 'As Muslims they give us work, but they also don't pay well. We must thank Allah they give us the chance to get some money, but it is too little.' On the other hand local Muslims have supplied the public symbols of religious identification: mosques and Quranic schools. In other words one sector of South African society has fully accepted these migrants, even though it is a religious minority.

South Africans being predominantly Christian in their religious outlook, have often identified Islam and Muslim with Indians – a completely false notion. As the constitution accepts religious diversity as acceptable and each religion and its practices as separate and equal, the presence of continental Africans as Muslims has engendered a sharp learning curve for South Africans. This applies particularly to black South Africans who often associate Islam with Indians. Rather than merely genuflect to the notion of freedom of religion the practice of Islam by Africans, albeit 'other' Africans, this is a practical demonstration of constitutional imperatives. Malawians, living as they do, among other racial and ethnic groups in a densely populated neighbourhood and declaring their religion openly, without serious objection, clearly inaugurates a tolerance and respect beyond the mere words that people have a right to practice whatever religion they wish. It

is precisely because this is a religious minority that it touches at one of the crucial aspects of citizenship – that of accepting religious diversity and cultural differences.

But the practice of the religion with the help and assistance of the Muslim bourgeoisie comes at a possible cost. Whatever the misconceptions or interpretations by other South Africans, clearly the Malawians have used their religious activism and contacts among the local Muslim trading population to access employment opportunities, and as benefactors for mosques built in Marainnhill. The price to be paid for this may be dependency on patronage of Muslim welfare and charity organisations controlled and administered by Indian Muslims. Indeed this researcher has been accused of being part and parcel of the exploitative domineering Indian merchant class. This in itself is welcome as it prompts a debate that touches on questions of structural inequality beyond religious and ethnic solidarity in a society dominated by wide expanses of social and economic differentiation.

While religion provides one basis for assimilation and insertion into a sub-sector of local society, the long history of contact, and evident networks that have been built up over decades, and strengthened in recent times, clearly influences the ways in which Malawians insert and assimilate to South African society. Another basis of assimilation is that Malawians are not afraid to learn to speak Zulu. Unlike French speakers whose language makes them stand out as different, Yao and Chewa speakers from Malawi quickly learn to integrate themselves through language. Speaking English, as most Malawians do, rather than French, also helps, and probably assisted in augmenting the religious ties to a largely English speaking South African Indian Muslim population. But those who have thoroughly assimilated into South African society, and have little or no intention of returning to Malawi (even though they may maintain contact), have taken on South African spouses. Such an action entitles them to at least permanent residence, and their children are South African citizens by birth.

8.5 CONCLUSION

Foreign migrants engage with the city as a locality to reconstruct their lives and pursue a set of fragile livelihood strands in constant tension with changing policy and administrative directions. In the spaces created by the constant definition and redefinition of what constitutes council policy and administrative procedures, Malawian migrants and immigrants push the boundaries of their claims not through overt challenges, but by their everyday practices which have an cumulative effect, for example to create an ethnic enclave in Mariannhill in the midst of a multi-racial community. Such a change to the character of the area is dramatic even by the standards of post-apartheid South Africa (where black townships have remained essentially poverty stricken black working class townships).

Some practices accept the rules of the game, but demand that these rules are tested against laws and legally constituted procedures. They act as citizens, participating, wittingly or unwittingly, by staking their claim to the city. Although Malawians have not used or relied on perspicacious lawyers and the moral weight of international protocols to defend their rights, their participation in the local economy precipitates issues of rights and citizenship. Thus while the state, and local state, intentionally or not, attempts to intimidate (police harassment, denial of justice and denial of permits) or alternatively to criminalize refugees, or simply tries to ignore them, their presence and practices have to be acknowledged. It seems contradictory for the state to accept the notion of an informal sector as "the most buoyant and rapidly expanding component of Durban's industrial sector" and then deny a platform for a category of people from that sector of society.

Immigrants and continental African migrants live and work in the city. Their presence, both physically and otherwise is unmistakable, and their use and contribution to the resources of the city makes it a concern for the city authorities. This could be interpreted to mean that access to the city should be cut off or restricted for African foreign migrants. That would be myopic as such migrants are unlikely to

disappear, given the conditions, both political and economic that exist in other parts of Africa, and that South Africa continues to appear as a successful economy and society. If indeed the local state deems it fit to cut off access by constant harassment of those street traders who seek to engage in legitimate and open informal business, it can have the adverse effect of either facing a barrage of law suits, and/alternatively driving such businesses underground. This would probably add to the burden of crime rather than preventing it. A corollary would be that to deny immigrants the right to make a living is tantamount to declaring that local government is willing to take on the task of providing shelter, welfare services and some level of gainful employment. Thus far the city authorities have largely been reactive, and have left the provision of any services and assistance for refugees and political asylum seekers to non-governmental, religious organisations and private initiatives.

Foreign migrants' engagement with the local state has not been direct, but rather by occupying some of the capillaries of the local economy. It does not entail acknowledgement of universal or internationally accepted protocols, rights, laws and moral codes of conduct. Such a small step does not mean that the state will meet its obligations. Rather, for many refugees and migrants the minimum that they seek is for the state, both local and national, to remove undue obstacles in their path to making a living. Ideally foreign migrants would like to be treated as if they were normal citizens, having the same freedom of movement enjoyed by locals. In short the outsiders would like to be considered as insiders.

However, from the perspective of the local state, more specifically politicians entrusted with development of the marginalized and formerly disadvantaged sectors of the population, the intrusion of foreigners, albeit African refugees, asylum seekers and migrants, with demands and claims based on moral and humanitarian grounds, was not a welcome additional political obligation. Indeed to divert resources to people other than their natural constituencies would be to court political suicide. Thus, for example, while the local state politicians made plans to regulate and absorb the informal economy as part of the economic activities of the city, this was not to be

extended to foreign migrants. However, absolving themselves of responsibility for a section of the city's inhabitants, whose primary means of survival is the informal economy cannot be a long-term solution.

In the case of foreign African migrants, their citizenship status presupposes a framework of state and society. This framework provides the context for their political engagement, not always directly with political decision makers, but with the regulating mechanisms of the city and the state at the level that affects them directly: finding accommodation in the city and making a living on the street. Their daily existence is a constant battle with the Department of Home Affairs, the police, and city inspectorate. They are at a distance from the centre of political power both within the local state and the national state. Yet their status and economic circumstances requires both an acknowledgement and acceptance of a minimal recognition, a platform from which to participate and argue for an extension of rights against the state already ensured by the protocols recognising universal human rights and the moral approbation of the post-apartheid state. What few formal rights refugees and political asylum seekers and migrants enjoy are easily ignored, save for when it is activated in defence. Yet they are the model citizens whom the neo-liberal state wishes to foster, the self-reliant, hardworking, entrepreneurial citizens whose dependence on the state is minimal.

Is it possible that the new forms of negotiations and co-operative governance turn out to be old forms of passive citizenship because (a) the 'legitimate' authority of local government produced self-regulation among subjects as to their responsibilities, that is, Malawian migrants self-regulate themselves to be invisible and hidden, as in the bad old days of apartheid when black people were not to be seen on the streets of white South Africa; (b) the processes of social learning about democratic rights are incomplete; and (c) the resource base of the society has not changed significantly to allow for political development?

CHAPTER NINE

ASSESSMENTS

9.1 INTRODUCTION

In this final chapter of the thesis I summarise in a paragraph what the thesis was about, followed by a discussion of the main elements of the hypotheses put forward in chapter one and conclude with an assessment of the main findings in the light of the changing nature of migration, and the implication this has for citizenship and current migration and immigration policies.

The essence of this thesis was an investigation into what kinds of livelihood itineraries Malawian migrants in Durban are obliged or decide to elaborate and act upon within transforming system of governance that affects them as individuals or groups or networks when they begin to:

a. Insert themselves in the city (locating themselves in the city and including finding accommodation).
b. Seek, find or create work (finding employment, being employed, creating self-employment).
c. Change, stabilise their work or work related activities and the structure of their residential living.
d. Become part of the city social landscape, i.e. becoming and developing a sense of belonging to, and being part of the city. They begin to institutionalise their presence.

These livelihood itineraries are now discussed below in relation to the various hypothesis set out in chapter one.

9.2 DISCUSSION OF HYPOTHESES

The discussion of the hypotheses will deal only with the salient points of each hypothesis.

1. The presence of undocumented Malawian migrants in Durban displays the characteristics of transnational migratory patterns.

In assessing the findings as presented in chapters five, six and seven, I observe, in terms of the first hypothesis that Malawian migrant livelihood itineraries have become, or at the very least are becoming an institutionalised expression of transnational migratory patterns. While these migrants and their livelihood strategies remain opaque to the panoptic gaze of the state, they do exist. In their persistence they play and challenge the rules of the governance game. I discuss the implications of these new or changing patterns of migration in relation to citizenship in greater detail below.

2. The main push-pull factors in continental African migration to South Africa are not only economic, but are a complicated ensemble of economic and political circumstances.

This research project did not undertake to provide a rigorous analysis of the push-pull factors in a global context, but rather modestly, through a review of the literature, and with reference to the reasons offered by the migrants themselves, point to those economic and political factors affecting the decision to migrate. In reviewing the literature on international trends in migration, a distinction was made between macro processes that provide the global context in which migration takes places, and the meso-level processes and micro-level contexts in which decisions are made to migrate. This was in part an attempt to separate the structural factors – the vicissitudes of post-colonial economies trying to cope with effects of flexible production and globalisation - and human agency in the migration process, and identify the different reasons and streams of migration. Apart from the very visible ways in which refugees become migrants as a result of overt political manoeuvrings and conflict on the continent, there are also the implementation of failed economic policies and political patronage of elites which have contributed to the demise of many national economies, and hence provide fertile grounds for the movement

of people to where they think there might be better opportunities to make a living. With reference to the Malawian migrants, their main reason for migrating has been to find alternative employment and business opportunities (87%, see table 5.6, chapter five). There were some who migrated for business reasons, or a combination of visiting friends, business reasons and learning new skills. Others were followers of their spouses or parents who had already migrated and settled in their new place of destination. Underlining all these decisions to migrate to Durban is that the economy in Malawi is currently less than fully able to deliver the possibilities of employment and economic opportunities. However, as was suggested by a number of the Malawian migrant entrepreneurs, a return to Malawi with their accumulated savings and investments implies that not all economic opportunities have evaporated. Indeed it was suggested that there is more likely to be a continuing link, either to accumulate more savings, or to engage in cross-border trade between the stronger economy of South Africa and that of Malawi as a result of their respective investments.

This review does suggest South Africa has become a metropole, or if viewed on global scale, a sub-metropole to the developing countries of the north. It is a reflection of the already entrenched migratory patterns between developing countries of the south with the developed countries of the north. For the Malawians it must be noted that this is within the hidden migratory process, and at an informal level. Such a mode of migrancy suggests that a poor marginal post-colonial economy such as Malawi has difficulties in providing the infrastructure, and appropriate training and skills to their citizens to compete in the formal economy on a world scale to overcome the debilitating effects of the poverty. Malawians arrive with skills only marginally better than most black South Africans, except that they have better English language skills, and having experienced the consequences of structural adjustments earlier than South Africans, are in a better position to appreciate the rigours of finding all manner of idiosyncratic livelihoods. Migration is no more than part of the larger embroidery of livelihood itineraries that they are obliged or decide to act upon.

3. The decision to migrate is often made at an individual and household level with the general aim to improve their general welfare (primarily income), accumulate savings and return.

There are two interrelated issues in this hypothesis. Firstly, the decision to migrate, and secondly, the decision to return to Malawi. It was difficult to obtain information on the actual decision-making process to migrate. But as has already been shown the decision to migrate was made because: a) they could not find employment or sufficient opportunities within their own country to be self employed, b) even if they were self-employed the desired income to provide for a family or household was insufficient, and c) in order to be self-employed, perhaps as a result of being retrenched, migrating to South Africa to accumulate sufficient capital to start an enterprise in Malawi. Usually an individual made the journey by himself leaving behind a family, or with friends and relatives, suggesting that the decision was not entirely an individual calculating the costs and returns on investing in migration. However, as to the second part of the hypothesis as to whether by accumulating enough capital, they either remit their surplus, or return with their accumulated savings and goods, the results of the survey, and as indicated in some of the in-depth interviews show a mixed outcome. Slightly less than half of the respondents (49%) indicated that returning to Malawi was still a goal, while 41% indicated that they have no desire to return. (10% were uncommitted to either option). This is confirmed by the figures on remittances where approximately 49% remit, 39% do not, and 11% did not answer the question. Rather than interpret this result as partial confirmation of the myth of return, or that Malawians are really out here only of temporary necessity, it rather indicates the changing patterns of migration, and a shift to a transnational model within the Southern Africa, in which decisions to return are made as the circumstances either within South Africa or Malawi change, and to the extent that their livelihoods are evolving, secure, or under threat. Such a perspective fits in with the reasons for either returning or staying in South Africa: 33% said they would return once they had achieved the goals or wanted to return as soon as they had accumulated their capital. A further 39% said they would return to Malawi to visit family and friends, but would return to their work in Durban (see table 5.4, chapter five). What is required is further research to

probe exactly what this 'return' to Malawi means in concrete terms. For example, what exactly does visiting mean – are gifts, or commodities taken with for family and friends part of the ritual of visiting? What does investments in Malawi mean? Are these in rural or urban areas, and what kinds of investments are they? And in the long term how successful are they? Are these to be investigated only at a household level?

4. Foreign migrants, such as Malawians, despite the obstacles they face, find ways to create livelihood strategies.

Very few Malawians find themselves unemployed for very long. Despite the fact that current legislation and immigration and migrant policies do not favour the employment of foreigners, or the provision of trading permits by the municipality, continental African migrants do engage, through proxies or contacts with street sellers, in informal trading on the streets and home based industries. Others have found employment, albeit often under exploitative conditions. Malawians have found the means to exploit the opportunities that they perceive. No one stands still, and by a combination of their own perspicacity and the assistance from their networks of friends, relatives and contacts with the Muslim community of Durban have carved out the niches in which they operate to create a multiple set of livelihood strategies to survive and in some cases prosper. However, the social capital mobilised though their networks of friends and relatives and connection with various others is not premised on bottomless generosity: migrants have to find ways of surviving at the very least, or the means to return home if all else fails.

5. Although migrants see themselves as temporary sojourners, they build up a stake in the city.

I have argued that the migration patterns have changed not only from one which was based on formal contract labour, but that the idea of temporary sojourn is also likely to change to one in which transnational migration becomes the norm, where migrants either travel or remain in constant contact between Durban and their villages and towns in Malawi, and involve the investment of time and resources across national boundaries between places of origin and destination. This implies a greater stake in the city, rather than merely a place to rest one's head, accumulate capital and return home permanently.

Clearly a number of migrants had this latter option in mind when making the journey. However, their itineraries evolved to building a greater stake in the city, and can be seen in the indices of accommodation practices and the types of work, length of employment and learning to speak the local language, Zulu. Close to 60% are sharing accommodation, mainly with family and kin. As long as they are contributing to the household, it is less likely that they will be asked to leave and will remain until their goals are achieved or change. While a majority, nearly 60% are involved in formal types of employment, the length of employment ranges from a few months, for those who have recently arrived, to nine years for those who have been here for most of the decade. It might be suggested that because they are paid exploitative wages they cannot accumulate enough capital to leave. That may be so, but the percentage that reported this as a reason for not returning to Malawi is less than 1% (see table 5.54). Others, although a minority, have built up a stake through their entrepreneurial activity and as this provides an income of no small insignificance to accumulating capital and making further investments either in Durban or in Malawi. Such entrepreneurial activity provides employment opportunities for other people, both local street traders and Malawians. Such a stake in the city cannot simply be dismissed. The investment and income derived from these economic activities is not likely to be aborted until there is an equivalent or better opportunity in Malawi or elsewhere.

Another way in which a stake can be claimed is through marriage and acquiring a house. While the majority of the migrants come as single male persons, clearly reflected in the statistics in chapter five, marrying a local person, either out of convenience or for other more appropriate reasons is an active consideration. Marriage to South Africans entitles access to rights of residence and eventually formal citizenship, but does not invalidate citizenship of Malawi as dual citizenship is permitted under South African immigration law.

Furthermore, the long history of contact between long-settled Malawians in Durban and their friends and relatives in the towns and villages of Malawi suggest that over the last decade 'porous' borders and relaxed entry for SADC residents, set in place a positive

feedback mechanism whereby the initial links become the bridgehead for promoting greater levels of migration from the same area, in this case Mangochi (and more generally southern Malawi). Thus over time settled migrants are able to sustain greater levels of new incoming migrants. This not only expands the enclaves in which they live and work, but also entrenches the presence of Malawian migrants.

It is against the formal rules of the game, and in the regular iterative social practices of the migrants, reproduced daily, that their stake in the city is built up, and expressed institutionally. They build the social institutions that work for them.

6. Participation in the social and economic life of the city entitles them to claim human and citizenship rights.

There are two aspects of this hypothesis that needs to be assessed. The first is what is their participation and, secondly, what rights are embedded in those practices. This assessment is based around the following: the use of state resources, either in finding employment or in social services; their economic status or participation in the economy; and the relative freedom to pursue such activities. There is also a moral dimension to this argument of entitlements. As Malawian migrants in the past have contributed to the economic, political and social development of the country, it might be argued that South Africa owes a debt of gratitude, and an concrete demonstration of this would be at the very least to afford migrants the same rights to work opportunities and social services as any other citizen as guaranteed in the constitution. However, none of the migrants interviewed raised this as an issue, perhaps because most are relatively young and the experience of formal contracts of labour for the mines is not part of their experiences.

In chapters four, five and six I demonstrated that migrants do not, as a rule, depend on any kind of handout from the state whether in the form of employment opportunities, or social and welfare services. Those living in apartments in Overport and the city centre pay rent and for the services that already exist. However, Mariannhill, a peri-urban zone, has benefited from infrastructural development, such as water, electricity, and roads. Some have been able to access housing because of their status as permanent residents or

through their marriage to local people. However, this must be placed in context, in that the neighbourhood in which most of the Malawians live in Mariannhill, such development was triggered by the sale of the land from a Muslim landowner to the municipality. Whether as tenants or as landowners, they now pay for the services and are subject to all the regulations regarding the use and payments for such services, and those who own property are subject to rates. As hidden migrants their role in these developments was not very obvious, or public, but is singularly important from the point of view of many settled migrants. Their participation in influencing the transfer of land not only gave them a stake in the area, but a sense of belonging and identity as they participated unobtrusively in that process. While participation takes place, albeit unobtrusively, their right to vote in local elections is severely limited.

Although Malawian migrants, as investigated in this project, are mostly not educated beyond secondary school education, what skills they have, they have used productively without making claims on the state to provide jobs or skills training. Where skills had to be acquired, such in tailoring or sewing, they did this. They have demonstrated their industrious nature in that almost all find some form of work, either in the formal sector, or as self-employed entrepreneurs in the informal sector. It is possible that those in formal employment are paid exploitative wages and this undermines the wage levels for local South Africans. However, the counter argument is that by pursuing a policy of discrimination against migrants, such undocumented workers will remained hidden and will continue to offer themselves at lower wages, which will further depress wages levels. Yet in being employed they pay taxes and contribute to the economic output of the region. Furthermore, those who are self-employed entrepreneurs also provide employment for both local people as well as their own nationals from Malawi.

From the perspective of the Malawian migrants, the central issue here is the right to work. It is not entitlements to social services provided by the state to its citizens. Paradoxically it is about the power of delivery by the state, but not in the sense of the state doling out patronage, but about the right to work. Clearly, Malawian migrants do not depend on the state to provide the means to employment or accommodation. Rather

they depend on their networks, and social capital to access accommodation and information to obtain employment, training and self-employment. In pursuing their livelihood strategies they are the 'ideal' citizens, that is, they are the classic liberal 'free agents' who are self-driven and self-reliant. They fit in as the model citizen and pose no drain on the state, except in the provision of conventional infrastructure and services by local government. Allied to this is the right to participate openly in the governance of their lives, and in particular the denial of trading permits or any representation to change this iniquitous practice. The larger issue here is that of the state conferring and guaranteeing those fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of movement, association, expression and the right to own property, that enable citizens to provide for themselves. I shall return to this issue shortly in the discussion below on new forms of citizenship.

7. Current policies of the state are exclusionary and offer little or no protection to the defence of their interests.

When discussing this hypothesis a distinction needs to be drawn between the local state, such as the eThekwini Municipality, and national state. This distinction illustrates a disjuncture between local conditions and national state imperatives. In terms of the local state the denial of trading permits to foreign migrants for informal trading is not only illegal, but also effectively excludes foreign migrants from open participation to defend their interests. In a strict following of the legislation regarding immigration, all undocumented migrants would be illegal, and by definition excluded from the protection of the state. In effect, undocumented Malawian migrants have very little protection against the security forces of the state at local or national level. This insecurity is compounded by high levels of xenophobia, which have demonstrated that no foreigner, or even a local who looks like a foreigner, is safe from xenophobic attacks from the public as well as police. This makes the constitutional provisions for personal freedom and *habeas corpus* extremely ambiguous. Consequently continental African migrants go to great lengths to avoid being caught, to the extent of accommodating themselves in enclaves in apartment buildings in the inner city, and on the periphery of the city, in a bid to attract as little attention as possible to themselves, keeping themselves hidden and unobtrusive.

9.3 CHANGING NATURE OF MIGRATION

Since the decline of formal recruitment of labourers for the mining industry, new forms of migration from other African countries, including Malawi, have emerged. I have identified this as transnational migration. Key elements of transnational migration are the crossing of two or more national boundaries, in which migrants have a continuing multi-stranded relationships with their places of origin in terms of contact with family and friends, investments and resources that are remitted and exchanged between the places of origin and destination, and the influences this has on their migratory itineraries, the stake they have in their respective places of settlement, and the sense of belonging through their participation in the social and economic environment.

I have intimated that the restructuring of employment practices in the mining industry in South Africa, and the implementation of structural adjustment programmes in Malawi during the 1980s, provided the broad macro-structural context for new kinds of migration. Malawians began to experience difficulties in maintaining their livelihoods prompting a migration that begins to resemble transnational migration, rather than the highly controlled contract migration of the past. The results of this research show this new migration emanating from southern Malawi, mainly the Mangochi district, with its destination point being Durban. A large number of people, mainly males with no more than a high school education, between the ages of 15 and 35 years, began seeking better economic opportunities through a step migration process from the villages and towns of Malawi, southwards towards Durban. This step migration process also begins to coincide with an expanding migratory web of links between Durban and Mangochi district in Malawi. This web or chain of migratory links creating a field of social relationships across national and international boundaries, built through multiple identities – family, kinship, friendship, religion, ethnicity, and nationality. It is these multi-stranded social relationships, which in the case of Durban, provides the basis for receiving, providing accommodation and means for finding and securing work in either the formal or informal sectors of the economy. The web of connections, held together by family, kinship and friendship ties, as well a sense of identity and belonging, is also the main means by which

information, remittances, financial transactions, and commodities are passed between Durban and Malawi.

Two kinds of migration patterns have emerged out of the examination of the Malawian migrants in Durban. The first is one where they migrate to Durban and as a result of their interaction begin to see their place of destination more as a permanent settlement, rather than temporary. Some migrants in this category break all ties with Malawi, while others continue to retain contact with family and friends in the villages and towns of Malawi. These migrants build a greater stake in Durban and form the basis of a positive feedback loop that encourages further migration because of the social capital and networks that are built up. These do not necessarily give up their Malawian identity, or that of their ethnic or religious status, and indeed use, as all migrants do, such identities as a resource in gaining and creating livelihood strategies. A second stream of migrants are those who use their social capital and networks to accumulate saving, capital and other resources to invest in Malawi. Two subtypes may be identified here. One subtype is made up of those migrants who begin to see that their stake in the economy here in association with their investments in Malawi, effectively building long-term material and social links that will endure over time, for example bringing family or friends to work for them in Durban, and sending or personally taking back financial and material resources for further investment in Malawi. These may be termed circular migrants. The second subtype includes those migrants who see the migratory process in purely instrumental terms. Migrants come to work in South Africa to enable the accumulation of savings, and return. They do not necessarily envisage a return to Durban or South Africa, but it might be a possibility. These are the target migrants. They have very specific goals for migrating, and once achieved return home. There is a third stream, but this has not received sustained investigation in this thesis. These are those who are the mobile itinerant traders and peddlers involved in a constant travel between the two countries transporting goods they buy in South Africa to sell in Malawi as well as people between the two countries. This third stream are not migrants per se, as they do not settle in Durban, but are an important link in the chain of migration.

All of these of streams of migrants underline the primarily economic nature of the migratory process however it is elaborated and embedded in their everyday social and economic practices, within and among the community they live with, and the working environment, including dealing with the regulations imposed on them by state. While in the past the Malawian migrants contributed most significantly to the mining industry, these new migratory streams contribute to the burgeoning informal and services sectors of the local economy. They also contribute to their places of origin by making investments or supporting their families. While contract migration of the past ensured employment in the mining industry (at least for a year), the new migration leaves them open to the vagaries of economic instability and business cycles, as well as xenophobic attacks. Although many find work, either in the formal or informal sectors, there are those who report being unemployed. However, most Malawian migrants find some form of work or employment within six months of their arrival in a range of areas in the city, including the city centre. As a hidden underclass of workers they are prone to labour under exploitative conditions, or as informal traders having to work long hours to achieve their income goals. Yet, as suggested in earlier chapters, they are the 'ideal' citizens who eschew state assistance, act responsibly to provide for themselves, and are motivated by an unflagging work ethic, and the knowledge of there being little or no alternative livelihoods, except to migrate elsewhere, or return home. The image projected here is that of migrants quietly interested in going about their ingenious methods of material and financial acquisition, and disengaged in civic and political matters. Yet the hidden nature of their migration, unobtrusive presence and limited integration into the wider social life of their communities in which they live (that is, beyond the boundaries of religious minority) underlines the very real civic and political problems that weigh upon them.

9.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP

What is clear from the perspectives of the Malawian migrants, as well as from the other literature reviewed in chapter 4, is that continental African migrants would like to have the same work or economic rights that South Africans enjoy. As suggested by the analysis on the flow of migrants into South Africa, they would prefer to enjoy greater freedom of movement between the two countries, rather than illegality to which they

have become accustomed, or the insularity of a fixed location, or limitations on movement. They have no need for permanent residence or formal citizenship status, but rather the freedom to move.

In chapter seven I outlined three models of citizenship and its allied concept of rights. The first model suggests that a state enjoys sovereignty over a territory in which citizens enjoy such rights as are granted or mediated by the state. The South African Constitution grants the right to earning a living (not to work), and various other social rights and welfare rights to citizens. Since migrants are not citizens, they enjoy no rights. Therefore immigration control protects the rights of citizens, including unfair competition for jobs, and avoids the drain on social and welfare services that foreigners pose. This is a widely held perspective; both by the public and political leaders, suggesting that there are only citizenship rights, not human rights. This would invalidate the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution that takes its legitimacy from universal notions of rights, not territorial ones. But I outlined other models that challenged this view.

One such model, the post-colonial citizenship model, argues that there is no intrinsic link between a territory and human rights. Its basic argument is that in a world of globalising pressures, tendencies and processes, people have human rights and dignity regardless of territory, or state boundaries, and should not be limited as such. Such state boundaries in Africa are in any case the arbitrary creation of colonial powers.[1] In this view then migrants or immigrants have a right to move across state boundaries in pursuit of their livelihoods, and therefore should be entitled to whatever rights are available or on offer to its citizens. There is a less iconoclastic version which suggests that there be freedom of movement to allow people to pursue their livelihoods, or economic activities, but that access to social and political rights, such as health care or the right to vote, be limited or restricted to citizens only. I have argued that these models of citizenship are based on notions of human rights which are formal, legal and constitutional, in which the state is the ultimate arbiter of which rights it dispenses, and that ultimately such a position

[1] In an Africanist perspective all those born in Africa would enjoy human rights regardless of where they were born.

encourages a passivity in citizens to question the limits of state action in the abrogation of those rights. (Alternatively it encourages authoritarian tendencies within governance structures of the state.) In consequence, the abrogation and violation of human rights in terms of the Aliens Control Act is not a public debate. And a state's genuflection to international protocols to protect human rights and treat people with dignity is more often practiced in the breach.

I have pointed to a third model of citizenship which places the emphasis on the practices of individuals and groups of individuals as agonic participatory actors in their respective social and economic spaces and in relation to the practices of the state. In this perspective I have tried to show that the iterative and accumulative economic actions of Malawian migrants as they pursue their itineraries build up a position that both challenges state actions and policies and accepts certain ideological positions. For example, the Department of Home Affairs maintains that undocumented migrants are illegal, and the local state tries to limit their economic activities by refusing to give them trading licences. Yet Malawian migrants' livelihood strategies, by their very presence, their iterative existence, their ingenious ways of survival through a combination of tapping into social capital and internal networks of support, and external connections through religious, ethnic and national identities, create the conditions which allow for their continued existence without state patronage. Their existence challenges the denial of their right to exist. Yet their very presence stands as testimony to the very ideals of an entrepreneurial spirit that is actively promoted by the state. The ensemble of migrant activities, whether as employees or self-employed entrepreneurs fulfils a central policy of the state committed to creating job opportunities by encouraging self-activating individuals to participate in the market economy. Such a perspective is usually labelled as espousing neo-liberal values. But what is important here is not the sterility of such polemical discourse on neo-liberalism, but that such enterprising migrants fit into a organising concept that gives life to government policy in the way it shapes, influences and constructs a social category in such a way that people consciously or unconsciously take on the model of the government's way of doing things. Undocumented migrants become the model of rational calculating competitive individuals, who in pursuit of

surplus profits create jobs; or for those who are employees, productive workers who are prepared to work longer and harder for less. Hidden migration, ironically, produces the free self-activating agent, the model citizen of the state without its panoptic gaze.

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APPENDIX A:

Map of Malawi

Maps Copyright by Hammond World Atlas Corp. #12576

Map of Malawi offered by World Press Review.

Appendix B

University of Durban-Westville
Department of Anthropology and Institute of Social and Economic Research:
Research on Urban Dynamics and Development: Migrants in the City

Social Survey Among Migrants in Durban: Malawians

A. Interview Details

1.Place of interview________________________________ 2.Time ______________

3. Date______________

B. Biographical Details

1. Name:______________________________
2. Village/Town of Origin______________________________
3. Age______________

C. Migration and Residence Details

1. When did you arrive in Durban?______________________________
2. With who are you staying now?______________________________
____
3. How did you come to Durban?______________________________
4. Why did you come to Durban?______________________________
5. Did you come alone or with others?______________________________

6. Table: Household Information

	1. Head	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
Relationship to H.H. head								
Sex								
Age								
Marital Status								
Economic Status								
Level of Educ. Completed								
Other Training								

Codes for Economic Status:

1. **Worker - Employed**
2. **Worker - Unemployed**
3. **Self-employed**
4. **Housewife**
5. **Scholar / student**
6. **Retired/Pensioner**
7. **young child**
8. **No occupation eg. diabled/ill-health**

7. Are you sharing a residence/house/? Yes___.No____.How many of you in house?________
8. Are you family/kin members? Yes___No_____
9. If yes, who are they?____

____

10. Previous Places

Previous places at which household members lived							
	Interviewee	1	2	3	4	5	6
Place/s [number the places and number the rest of the responses correspondingly]	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____
Period of stay	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____
Work/Employ ment while there	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____
With whom did they stay	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____
Reasons for leaving	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____	1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____

D. Formal employment/ Unemployment

1. Are you currently employed? Yes____No_____.
2. If yes, where are you employed?______________________________
3. What work do you do?______________________________________
4. If not employed, how long have you been unemployed?________________
5. If you worked before being unemployed, where were you employed?____
6. What work did you do?______________________________
7. How long were you employed?____
8. Any other previous employment____

____

E. *Return migration*

Return to home/village/town			
Name	Place	Y/N	Reason
1		Y……N…..	
2		Y……N…..	
3		Y……N…..	
4		Y……N…..	
5		Y……N…..	
6		Y……N…..	
7		Y……N…..	
8		Y……N…..	
9		Y……N…..	
10		Y……N…..	

F. ***Informal Trading***

1. When did you start to selling?_______________
2. Where did you first start trading? Which street/place?_______________
3. Any other places/streets that you traded?_______________
____
4. What are you selling?_______________
5. How is the trading business?_______________
6. Do you employ any one?_______________
7. Where do you get your goods from?_______________
____
8. Problems (eg. police; city officials; local traders; customers; home affairs; accommodation)
____
____
____
____
____

G. Income:

1. How much income did the household earn last month?

R100 - 300	
R300 - 500	
R500 - 1000	
R1000 - 1500	
R1500 - 2000	
R2000 - 2500	
R2500 - 3000	
More than R3000	

2. Do you send money back to Malawi? Yes____No_____. If yes, how much?______________________