



## UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL

### Challenges and Prospects of Regional Integration in Africa: A Case Study of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

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**Declaration**

I declare that this dissertation is my own. It is being submitted for the degree of Masters of Social Science (International Relations) at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College Campus, and South Africa, 2019.

This dissertation has not been submitted, before for any degree or examination at any university or organisations or person outside the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

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2019

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## **Abstract**

This study explored and assessed the challenges of regional integration in the Horn of Africa's Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD, like all the other Sub-regional and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), is considered as the fundamental pillar for African development and continental economic integration. IGAD's efforts integrate regionally is meant to address economic, social and political challenges by engaging and coordinating efforts of all the regional member states. The aim is to enhance regional development under the umbrella of the African Union. This study thus examined the challenges and opportunities of this initiative, its theoretical underpinnings and in the process explored the specific trajectories of IGAD to determine its role in the regional integration endeavor. By examining the above, this study explored IGAD's institutional structures and arrangements, its programmes of action and implementation.

In the main, two namely, the economic and security dimensions that have dominated IGAD's agenda have remained the focal point of the study. Last part not least, this study probed into two cases of IGAD's interventions that have been noticeable: the cases of Somalia and South Sudan. Thus, this study argues the successes achieved thus far remain rather ambivalent as manifested by the low and uneven positive outcomes. Arguably, this is due to the interplay of complex factors ranging from the political economy of global and regional dynamics, historical formation of the regional states and the geographical challenges in the IGAD region. In light of the above, this study recommends that the institutional capacity of IGAD and its members states needs not only to improve to meet developmental and security challenges but also to provide constructive and permanent solutions in the Horn of Africa.

## List of Abbreviations/Acronyms

ADA	Austrian Development Agency
AEC	African Economic Community
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ALFS	Agriculture, Livestock and Food Security
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ANRE	Agriculture, Natural Resource and Environment
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ARCiSS	Agreement on Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan
ARCSO	Applied Research and Community Service Organization
ARPCT	Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
AU	African Union
CC	Coordination and Collaboration
CEN-SAD	Community Sahel-Saharan States
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and response Mechanism
CEWERU	Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern African states
CPMR	Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution
CVC	Climate Variability and Change
EAC	East African Community
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECISD	Economic Cooperation, Integration and Social Development
EEE-TSTs	Existing, Evolving and Emerging Transnational Security Threats
EIJ	Eritrean Islamic Jihad
EP	Environment Protection
EU	European Union

EUETFA	European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMI	Financial and Macroeconomic Integration
FMP	Free Movement of People
FRUD	Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy
FTA	Free Trade Area
GDP	Growth Domestic Product
GDRL	Governance, Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Viruses
HLRFSS	High-Level Revitalization Forum on South Sudan
HSD	Health and Social Development
ICPAC	IGAD Climate Prediction & Application Centre
ICPAT	IGAD Capacity Building Programme Against Terrorism (ICPAT)
ICU	Islamic Court Unions
ID	Infrastructure Development
IDPs	Internationally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IPF	IGAD Partnership Forum
IPSS	IGAD Peace and Security Study
IRIMP	Regional Infrastructure Master Plan
ISAP	Institutional Strengthening Action Programme
LAPSSET	Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport
LDCs	Least Development Countries
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MSF	Mediation Support Fund
NGOs	Non-Government Organisations
NRC	National Reconciliation Conference

NRM	Natural Resource Management
NSC	National Salvation Council
NUGSS	National Unity Government of South Sudan
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
PCG	Provisional Central Government
PI	Productive Integration
PS	Peace and Security
PSC	Peace and Security Council
REC	Regional Economic Community
RIIs	Regional Integration Institutions
RMCC	Regional Migration Coordination Committees
RMIs	Regional Mechanisms
RPFs	Regional Peace Forces
RST	Research, Science and Technology
SIT	Science, Technology and Innovation
SNA	Somali Nation Alliance
SNPC	Somalia National Peace Conference
SNRC	Somalia National Reconciliation Conference
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition
SPLM-IO	Sudan People Liberation Movement in Opposition
SS	Trans-National Security
SSA	Somali Salvation Alliance
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSP	Security Sector Program
SSYLF	South Sudan Young Leaders Forum
TB	Tuberculosis

TCA	Transitional Central Authority
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TFI	Transitional Federal Institutions
TGNU	Transitional Government of National Unity
TI	Trade Integration
TITD	Trade, Industry and Tourism Development
TNC	Transitional National Charter
TNG	Transitional National Government
UN	United Nation
UNDP	United Nation Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
WNBF	West Nile Bank Front



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# Chapter One

## Researching IGAD and the Region

### 1.1 Introduction: Background to the Study

In recent years, the idea of regional integration in Africa which was largely informed by Pan-Africanist ideology has found pragmatic political and material grounding. Many factors, such as intra and inter-states conflict, concerns over drought and famine, population movements, environmental changes and developmental challenges, have sustained the need for regional integration and cooperation on the continent. The number of regional economic agreements and negotiations both continentally and in the world at large attests to the fact that these issues continue to occupy a critical agenda on matters concerning inter-state cooperation (Geda and Kebret 2008:78; Gebregeorgis 2013:6; Hartzenberg 2011; Moravcsik 2005). As asserted by Hartzenberg (2011:19) “African countries have definitely contributed to the proliferation of regional trade agreements which are defining features of global economic governance in recent decades.”

Notably, aspirations for regional integration have consistently emerged prominently as part of the regional agenda. Appropriating these as their product, many states in the continent have been fostering their regional agenda by engaging with supranational agencies and multilateralism. Thus, regional integration projects and cooperation in Africa have followed a similar trajectory to that of the experiments in other regions albeit having proven to be complex both in terms of the practices and processes. Due to the cultural and technological differences as well as the context and the forms of the state in Africa, regional integration as a project has become a daunting task. It is against this backdrop, therefore, that integrating the highest ethnic diversity and rich cultures, religions and languages under one umbrella is not an easy task.

It is also notable that dealing with the growing concerns and challenges on achieving stability and security and the socio-economic development and sustainability of the continent has become crucial. African states have apparently not severed ties with their former colonial powers and states outside the region instead of forging new relations with their neighbours and immediate regions. For example, Qobo (2007:6) argues, on the one hand, that,

...even though the vestiges of Pan-Africanist ideology – with regard to its aim of creating economic enclaves insulated from the rest of the world – are still hard to dislodge in the

current integration process, there has been a growing crop of elite who is predisposed towards policies that are oriented outward. (Qobo 2007:6)

On the other hand, outlining the historical background to regional integration, Omoro (2008:1) asserts that:

Focusing [on] the case of regional integration in Eastern Africa, the cooperation starts as far back as the beginning of the 20th century. However, the inspiration for the establishment or strengthening of these arrangements, which have come to take the description of Regional Integration Institutions (RIIs) also known as Regional Economic Communities (RECs), was born out of the birth of the Abuja Treaty of the then Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Earlier on, the Abuja Treaty signed in June 3, 1991 set the tone and aspiration for the establishment of economic community, regional industrial and trade zones and relations among African states.<sup>1</sup> The main concern was promotion and establishment of economic, social and cultural development in the continent. It is within the context of the Abuja Treaty (and attendant aspirations) that many of the sub-regional organisations started to mushroom in the continent. Most of these organisations focused on economic integration albeit to a limited degree, with particular focus on sub-regional trade relations. What transpires from the foregoing explication is that economic integration and trade are elements of regional integration, which the continent's elites were eager to institute (Economic Commission for Africa 2016c).

The Abuja Treaty also establishes a roadmap comprising six stages for the establishment of a full-fledged African Economic Community. The first stage entails the establishment of Regional Economic blocks within 5 years from entry in this treaty into full effect (which was by 1999)<sup>2</sup>; the second stage entails the strengthening of the intra-REC (regional economic community) integration that was originally set to be complete in eight years, which by then would have been the year 2007. Stage three entailed the establishment of custom union and free-trade agreements and zones at the level of the regional economic communities which would have been achieved by 2017. This was to be followed by harmonisation of custom, tariff and common market as stage four in the continent which was to be achieved by 2019. Stage five is outlined as the most ambitious plan of all the setting up of the continent's economic and monetary union (including the establishment of single currency and pan-African parliament) which is to be achieved by 2023. The final stage is treated as the transitional period for full continental integration with both economic, monetary and political union, to be achieved by 2028 (see Article 6 of the Abuja Treaty 1991).

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<sup>1</sup> Organisation of African Union (1991) Treaty Establishing African Economic Community. June 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1991, Abuja, Nigeria. The rest of the discussion draws from this document.

<sup>2</sup> This treaty was ratified and entered into force in 1994.

It should be noted that most of the deadlines for this ambitious proposal have come and gone with less than 10 years left from the original proposal of a full union by 2028. What we have as a result of this push, however, are the existing sub-regional economic communities and sub-regional organisations along with the establishment of African Union in its current form. What is evident in this document is the unwavering trust on economic integration and asserting this as fundamental to achieving the objectives of the proposed union.

Although less years from the original ten years are left to its proposed final stage, the trade of African states trade within and among themselves is still weak. For example, “some of the fastest growing countries in the world are African countries, including Angola and Ethiopia” as their import-export trade and investment volumes are by far stronger with the West and China (Economic Commission for Africa 2016c). These countries’ economies have grown exponentially in tandem with their trade with and economic ties with China and the West. Despite being a major priority area of all RECs, trade integration within the boundaries of the continent has seriously lagged behind. A typical example in this regard is the Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN-SAD) in the regional integration index developed by the Economic Commission for Africa (2016). In this regional integration index, out of 29 countries listed as members of CEN-SAD, only 8 countries show a score above 50 points on trade integration and only 7 states on the overall score for integration (Economic Commission for Africa 2016a)<sup>3</sup>. Similarly, Arvis *et al* (2015:463) point out that trade integration is weak while the cost of trade is the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa by comparison to the rest of the world. This is arguably indicative of the fact that the transformation of regional integration still lags behind despite the potential benefits.

The growth and development of trade and economic process in the region should have boosted African economies and thus alleviated poverty. Notably, much has been invested in this regard over the last three decades and this is attested to by the establishment of NEPAD, the eight RECs, ECA, African Development Bank to mention but a few. However, as Akonor (2018:33) puts it, the African economic integration project and the various institutions established to this

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<sup>3</sup> The score is developed using 5 indicators: trade integration, regional infrastructure, productive integration, free movement of people, and financial and macro-economic integration. The member states for CEN-SAD score lower on the average score for trade integration, regional infrastructure, and productive integration are very low. Average score of financial and macro-economic integration shows (0.524), which is certainly skewed by former French colonies, whose monetary and financial policies are still coordinated and influenced by France. All the countries that score high in this dimension are all former French colonies – Niger (1), Burkina Faso (0.982), Senegal (0.981), Chad (0.976), Mali (0.969), Togo (0.968), Cote d’Ivoire (0.964), Benin (0.952), Central African Republic (0.939), and Guinea-Bissau (0.820); it then drastically drops to score of below 0.5 (see Economic Commission for Africa, Integration Index Report 2016a:41).

end “have faced numerous challenges which, despite showing progress, have nevertheless been troubled.” For Akonor (2018) the tension and contradiction are in developing clear collective economic and foreign policy that is responsive and adaptive to the conditions set by the global political economy. In this regard, Akonor (2018) points out to the weakness of the extent of the African states’ economic integration and the institution Africans established in response to the contemporary challenges of the global market and the dynamics of the global political economy.

The troubling scenario is that African trade and investment with the world through the movement of goods, services, capital and people are thriving while the same cannot be said about trade within countries on the continent. Additionally, tensions deriving from political and social problems within and across the states are not addressed without the mediation and direct involvement of Western (former colonial) powers regardless of the fact that the African Union has declared “an African solution to African problems” and has adopted this as its motto. This study, therefore, explored the aspirations, practices, successes and challenges of regional integration as defined by the core values of strategic partnership to strengthen political, cultural, trade and economic interactions and exchange within the African continent. It is noted though that despite its rhetoric and political currency, regional economic integration at the continental level has proven to be a protracted process. Since effective regional integration and co-operation rely on the level of peace and security of the member states which are increasingly understood as essential conditions, there is need to probe into this aspect of integration. Thus, it is against this backdrop, therefore, that this study sought to take stock of the existing experiments and initiatives while closely examining the trajectories, challenges and opportunities they present.

The vast variations in context and contradictions in different regions of the continent make it difficult to engage in an array of regional integration initiatives and projects. For this reason, (and others, which I will point out shortly), this study focuses on the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD as an East African regional initiative presents an interesting case in terms of its aspirations and objective realities, compositions, contradictions and pressing demands. Geographically, it is located in a region wrought with inter-state conflicts, tensions and competitions, intra-state troubles and severe fault lines (in some cases failed states – Somalia and South Sudan, for example). These objectives were to “achieve regional cooperation and economic integration through the promotion of food security, sustainable environmental management, peace and security, intra-regional trade and

development of improved communications and infrastructure” (IGAD 2016b:33). Byiers (2016:iv) writes, stressing the importance of integration at the sub-regional level by arguing:

IGAD is an AU-acknowledged regional economic community (REC) ... targeting the establishment of African Economic Community (AEC) under the AEC Treaty thus involving a commitment to initiate a Free Trade Area (FTA) and forming regional integration to enhance infrastructure and transport development in the region. Economic integration in the region makes an interesting case study given the wide variation in economic policy approaches and challenges among member states, their limited economic complementarity, and the fact that most are also pursuing economic integration through other RECs.

Notably, the Horn of Africa is fraught with both intra/inter-state conflicts and tensions and is ravaged by civil war with two failed states devastated by war. It is also a region enduring multiple border disputes which have become a growing concern because of lack of trust and stability among the states concerned. The most prominent of these conflicts among IGAD member states are the Ethiopia and Eritrea border conflicts of 1998-2000 and the ensuing no-peace-no-war situation/tension, the Djibouti-Eritrea conflicts of 1995 and 2008, and the 2012 border conflicts between Sudan and South Sudan (all of them still unresolved and rather festering) (IGAD 2016a). Somalia and South Sudan are facing serious internal conflicts causing havoc.

*Map 1. The Map of IGAD Nations*



*Source:* <https://www.integrate-africa.org/rankings/regional-economic-communities/igad/> (accessed 20 November, 2019)

Notably, IGAD has multiple advantages, which have the potential of laying a foundation for its regional integration initiatives and these range from informal and indigenous cross border trades, cross border ethnic and cultural ties, cross border environmental problems and shared resources, for example, rivers and lakes. The challenge, however, is how to identify and build



on these and other relations and nodes to promote and develop regional integration. Additionally, it is also crucial to closely consider that the bilateral relations among members in the sub-region are growing significantly towards achieving African regional economic cooperation and integration (Abraham 2008; Economic Commission for Africa 2015; Uzodike, 2009; Verhoeven 2011).

Thus, it is worth underlining the fact that this study sought to explore and assess how under these conditions member states in the IGAD region could/should act collectively not only to bring about sustainable peace and security but also to promote socio-economic development and social progress in the region. So, the pertinent questions raised herein were: What are the potentials, capacities, and limits of IGAD as an organisation while dealing with the above issues and problems? What role can (and should) it play under such conditions? What are the specific advantages and disadvantages of IGAD's regional integration agenda? Who is driving it and towards what ends?

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

IGAD as REC faces multiple and complicated challenges. Thus far, the IGAD region has failed not only to peacefully settle intra-state and inter-state conflicts but also to maintain regional peace and security (Dersso 2014). In fact, many consider IGAD as the weakest of the eight RECs recognised by the AU (Bereketeab 2018). Despite its unique characteristics, IGAD's challenges are symptomatic of the broader challenges of regionalization and regional integration in Africa. By definition, regionalization "refers to the grouping of nations within a common geographical location with the view of strengthening cooperation and sharing as a strategy for achieving socio-economic development" (Danso 1995:36). Thus, initiatives on African's inter-state integration (both sub-regionally and continentally) must be viewed in line with such a regionalization thrust. Notably, regional integration is an identification process in which one state merges with other states forging a regional agreement to achieve economic development based on goals through promoting regional cooperation (Abraham 2008; Hartzenberg 2011; Ketema 2013; Nita 2013; Schoole and de Wit 2014). It is notable, though, that despite the growing economy of African states, inter-regional and inter-state economic exchanges and trades remain very marginal. Thus, the transformation of regional integration remains a challenge to Africa (Vanheukelom 2016).

Sekhu (2011:9-10) points out that "regional integration is a critical step towards ensuring stability and fostering economic development in the African continent". It is notable, however, that Sekhu is referring to the following positive outcomes of regional integration: ensuring stability and security, the expansion of economic space and the liberalisation of trade which in

turn enable production inputs available at prices that are more competitive. These collective outcomes are expected to be mutual benefits for states entering such a configuration. For example, growth is possible by increasing the cost of production to be more efficient and creating effective opportunities for diversification of economies. This is very important for the long-term sustainability of these economies in this increasingly ‘globalising and globalised world’ as this makes these economies more robust to international economic fluctuations and thereby offer them access to market expansion through the reduction of institutional costs and reduction /elimination of tariffs.

Notably, most of the leaders in Africa, have had very few accomplishments in their regional integration and socio economic developmental process for the continent (Qobo 2007). Thus, it can be argued that while African leaders have failed on the domestic front, their efforts to achieve regional integration at the continental level has always been shadowed by such poor performances. This fact notwithstanding, regional integration enables the cutting out of institutional and material costs and fosters economic growth which can propel these countries to engage in a serious development path (Hawdon 1997; Mistry 2000; Nita 2013). It is also notable that regional integration in Africa is conceptualised from the political and geographical perspectives and its process and conditions are determined by these factors. Moreover, the culture of a political decision making process in Africa either targets how to keep the leaders in the office for long or how to get rid of the opponents from any kind of engagement through democratic processes. Despite some of the IGAD’s region states showing economic growth, the democratic transition of power through fair and free elections remains a nightmare.

States in Africa are fragmented and are characterised by multiple contradictions and weaknesses. Much of this is to be attributed to colonially constructed and imposed national borders that have little relationship with the ethnic, cultural and religious configurations of the respective countries. As a consequence of such colonial instrumentation of borders, many countries have been established as small and/or landlocked markets. The dominant explanation for Africa’s poor economic performance focuses on the state-centred approaches to development which are driven by the desire to sustain these locked markets (Acharya 2012; Niekerk 2005)<sup>4</sup>. As part of the colonial legacy and due to demographic shifts, the salience of ethnicity, tribalism and languages still constitute the biggest challenges for postcolonial African states as frustrate intra-national integration. In turn, these concerns have often

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<sup>4</sup> What is even more troubling is that these locked market sought to sustain themselves by sustaining the links – both political and economic ones – created by the colonial powers, skipping their immediate neighbours.

influenced and framed initiatives of building a coherent regional body in the continent. This is to suggest that it is out of such concerns that the states seek integration on the basis of the political ideology and real politics with the impulsive desire to sustain state boundaries rather than the socio-economic imperatives and developmental potentials (Geda and Kebret 2008).

Aside from the above claim, regional integration efforts in Africa are often tools that are meant to deal accordingly with the continent's problems and challenges as a collective process. Some have pointed fingers at Africa's elites claiming that they are obsessed with the weak set of pressing matters with few truthful and sincere efforts towards the dream of Africa's economic development (Hawdon 1997; Øhrgaard 1997; Qobo 2007; Schoole and de Wit 2014). The historical legacy of African countries has become an excuse for the absence of successful regional bodies on the continent. Because of lack of proper, well integrated and sustained development strategies, African countries within the postcolonial trajectories have not succeeded in the nation building, growth and development enterprise. This is certainly an outcome of both internal and external dynamics – failures and mismanagements of postcolonial leaders and their practices while in power as well as the postcolonial powers' sustained and systematic interference, abuse and exploitation.

According to Vanheukelom (2016), the success of regional economic integration in Africa is mixed and it becomes difficult to measure it alongside common goals because of the different processes of economic development and political conditions of each country (see also Economic Commission for Africa 2016c; Hartzenberg 2011; Hawdon 1997). Sub-regional integration initiatives are also to be considered within this frame. When weighing the process of regional integration initiatives in the Horn of Africa, one encounters multiple fragile states, with weak economy and internal political instabilities and dependence on Western powers. Such observations have led some to point out that the fundamental factors that contribute to success for regional integration in Africa are political and economic liberalization and sound macro-economic reforms that are meant to address the above problems. For example, Mshomba (2000) argues that it is not only because of the absence of common political values in the Horn of Africa (such as democratic political culture) that the growing instability emerged. It is also because of a lack of appropriate governance and political liberalization that have been noted as impediments to the possibilities of improved and growing integration (Mshomba 2000).

It is well understood that Africa's regional integration lags behind to bear substantive results of improving the socio-economic conditions and the wellbeing of its people (Mshomba 2000). This situation thus elicits the following important questions: What is the core reason for that?

What remains to be the main challenges? Can integration schemes at sub-region level be realized? What conditions needed to be met in order to achieve this? If not, what factors constitute as obstacle and how could these be overcome?

These questions relate to the regional body IGAD. The establishment of IGAD goes back to the regional challenges of the mid 1980s of drought, environmental crisis and associated challenges of famine and food security which led to the formation of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in 1986 (IGAD 1996; Bereketeab 2012: 173). In the 1990s, this organisation evolved into its current form as IGAD which has “widened its scope and mandate with its transformation to IGAD in 1996” (Byiers, 2016:iv). This organisation is constitutive of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Kenya. IGAD, therefore, aims to widen the regional agenda to deal with all the challenges of the region and member states. It is along with such expansion of IGAD’s mandate that the organisation gained recognition as one of RECs and incorporated into AU’s (the then OAU’s) structures (Bereketeab 2012). IGAD reconfigured with the new mandates to deal with conflict prevention, economic cooperation, and regional integration (IGAD 2010).

As early as the 1990s, the IGAD region has been (and is still) playing a crucial role in the mediation and peace processes in the region and in peacekeeping beyond the region (IGAD 2016b). The varying level of success which focuses on economic policy and other related areas committed to it and a better understanding of key indicators and constraints is illustrative of the challenges besetting IGAD’s region (IGAD 2016a). IGAD has authority to promote the Horn of Africa’s economic cooperation and integration agenda dealing with huge areas characterised by many activities. Some of its target markets involve “cooperation on macroeconomic policies; free movement of goods, services, and people; regional food security; drought resilience; complementary infrastructures, peace and stability in the sub region; programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields which are the challenges facing the relatively young institution in a region characterised by long-running inter and intra-state conflicts, rivalries, alliances and anti-alliances and members with varying political settlements and capacities to govern” (IGAD 2016b:23).

Arguably, major social and environmental challenges still become an influence with wide range of internal and external interests (IGAD 2016a). Thus, this study probed into the main political-economic actors and factors that determine how IGAD sets and implements its agenda in the Horn of Africa (IGAD 2016a). It is this probing that set the tone for much of the inquiry of this study. This, in turn, forced us to focus specifically on peace, security and stability and specifically on socio-economic integration with specific reference to the social, cultural,

historical and institutional factors and outlining all the member states' roles and engagement within the Horn of Africa region (IGAD 2016a).

Against the backdrop of the above identified problems, this study began with the following objectives: to examine the challenges and opportunities of the regional integration initiatives in the Horn of Africa; to assess the political economy of regional integration and associated rhetoric and practices; to interrogate the nature and process of institution-making as driver of regional economic integration and the role of the nation-state in Africa; and to explore the role of IGAD in dealing with socio-economic and political challenges and problems in the Horn of Africa.

### **1.3 Aim of the Study**

This study explored and examined the complexities, challenges and encounters of IGAD as one regional integration initiative and factors that shape its processes and practices. This study interrogated and addressed the question of whether IGAD as a regional integration initiative has a significant role to play in both security matters and development and thus reflect on its challenges, opportunities and their implications for future directions. This study thus sought to assess how this regional initiative set out to achieve these objectives and the mechanisms it put in place to this end.

### **1.4 Research Questions**

Following the above overarching aims and an intent to engage with them, this study set out to explore the following central research questions:

- (a) What is the nature and challenges of integration in the Horn of Africa where IGAD is situated?
- (b) How have such challenges and forms of integrations lend themselves to and for sustainable economic growth and stability on the region?
- (c) What does IGAD's institutional-making processes, challenges and opportunities look like?
- (d) How about its rhetoric and practices? How has IGAD performed in its integration project in the Horn of Africa?
- (e) What are the ways in which this initiative informs and work towards regional peace, stability and good governance in that sub region?

It should be noted that IGAD's region is war torn with multiple interstate and intrastate conflicts. This is exacerbated by the division of multi ethnic and religious groups that tend to shape political loyalties in their societies. These are also demographic features that straddle across states and multiple boundaries thus adding complexity to the regional order (Tekle 1996). These have to be read within the context of multiple border disputes and related wars that have become the main factors for distrust and instability among the member states of the

region. Arguably, the reference is to the Ethiopian-Eritrea, the Djibouti-Eritrea, Ethiopia-Somalia, Sudan-Ethiopia and Sudan–South Sudan are some of conflicts on the IGAD member states (Bereketeab 2018). These problems are compounded by the regional states’ poor human rights records, shoddy governance and fragile democratic institutional processes and culture. Arguably, the IGAD’s region has tremendous potential in terms of both natural and human resources which can propel the region toward self-reliance. This fact notwithstanding, the IGAD region remains one of the world’s poorest regions. According to the World Bank data of 2013, IGAD’s regional “per capita income is much lower than the Sub-Saharan African average of US\$1, 624” (IGAD 2016a:14). According to IGAD 2019 report, the IGAD’s per capita income is \$935. It is arguably for this reason that security and economic development appear to be the major agenda items of this organisation. This study thus assessed how this regional initiative set out to achieve these objectives and the mechanisms it put in place to this end.

### **1.5 Objectives of the Study**

The objectives of this study were as follows:

- (a) To examine the challenges and opportunities of the regional integration initiatives in the Horn of Africa;
- (b) To assess the political economy of regional integration and associated rhetoric and practices;
- (c) To interrogate the nature and process of institution-making as driver of regional economic integration and the role of the nation-state in Africa; and
- (d) To explore the role of IGAD as one REC in dealing with socio-economic and political challenges and problems in the Horn of Africa.

### **1.6 Justification of the Study**

In the Horn of Africa, it has been a monumental task for IGAD to achieve peace, security, economic development and stability. The organisation claims that it has recorded several achievements since its establishment making reference to what it claims “effective and efficient mechanisms, networks, processes, specialized institutions and partnerships among member states for the execution of its regional activities” (IGAD 2016a). Such a claim is also accompanied with rhetoric of success and regional initiatives. It is thus important to weigh these claims and rhetoric and counter them with formidable challenges and multiple festering and debilitating problems the region faces.

This study area is relevant and timely given the fact that Africa is trying to promote its regional integration process in accordance with the Abuja Treaty. As indicated by Madyo (2008:8), “there are still outstanding issues that need to be addressed and recognized by African states,

individually and collectively in order to make this process more progressive and in an achievable way”.

The findings generated from this study were expected to enhance understanding profoundly and deal also with the overall dynamics of how regional integration works with the experience of the East African region integration process as the focal point. This is of great significance to academics in general and academic researchers in particular in that it increases the body of knowledge production. This leads to a larger pool of academic material on regional integration resulting into a better understanding. To this effect, the study aimed for an African specific model of integration. The findings, therefore, do not only draw insight into the working of IGAD, but also help in projecting what specific economic effects this has to the integration states. The study also aimed to share and identify the importance of regional integration and to pinpoint potential state weaknesses that threaten socio-economic stability in the IGAD region. Since much of the literature on the topic tended to concentrate more on the role of IGAD in the Horn of Africa, the study expanded knowledge and literature covering analysis of the regional integration process in IGAD’s region.

### **1.7 Significance of the Study**

This study sought to examine IGAD as one of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) established within the context of Abuja Treaty outlining a road map for full African integration. The results of this study relate to the broader debate and inquiry on this regional/sub-regional economic integration initiatives in the African continent. It also offers critical insight into the role of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) towards sustainable socio-economic development in the Horn of Africa. The main aim of the institutions is to bring effective social, economic and political integration among Africa’s states with the core objective of promoting economic growth and thus strengthen the prosperity of the African peoples (Omoró 2008). In light of this, this study raises interesting and pertinent questions on how the African integration projects have been moving so far towards sustainable and thriving economic and political processes and their challenges and opportunities. While engaged with these broader questions, this study sought to account for their complexities by assessing IGAD’s existing programmes, charters and policy initiatives. The result of this study shows the gaps, understanding and contributions of individuals and institutions for further studies in the area and use it as literature for reference purposes on related studies. The effective regional integration and co-operation on the level of peace and security on the member states is extremely essential. The study assesses how member states in the IGAD region have worked

as a group to maintain peace, security and stability, and towards economic development and social progress of the IGAD region. It should be acknowledged from the outset that security and regional economic development in IGAD have featured as central components of this study for they represent IGAD's prominent agenda.

### **1.8 Research Methodology and Methods**

It is often the preference of any given state to subject its considerations to the economy, politics and the social or geographical considerations as a regional bloc. Therefore, each country, depending on the benefits of integration determines and considers the degree of sovereignty it is willing to surrender (Mwendwa 2014). In order to do this, this study considered the foundation of historical development of IGAD and examined the issues of stability, promotion of economic development, peace and security in the Eastern region. Following this, the qualitative approach was used to explore and examine the above noted issues in relation to IGAD as a regional integration experiment and its associated discourses. This approach was considered appropriate for this study for it generated insight and understanding confronting the region and IGAD as an organization.

The Horn of Africa is culturally and religiously diversified as any other region of Africa (Tekle 1996). However, each state of the region shares common characteristics with other states. Thus, this study explored the diverse social, political and public policy issues in this regional integration initiative and also interrogated and unpacked the challenges of regional integration in the Horn of Africa. Thus, the major preoccupation of this study has been three fold: one, structure and organisation form of IGAD; two, its economic objectives and programmes as REC; and three, its engagement with peace and security. The latter two major initiatives it took since its inception namely the intervention in the Somalia and South Sudan conflicts received particular attention.

This study adopted the qualitative approach since the questions raised in this study could only be dealt with through reviewing multiple documents, policy frameworks, public pronouncements and published material of IGAD. Thus, as a qualitative research, the objectives of this study leans more towards generating insights rather than measuring relationships between variables (Newman 2011). It should also be noted that this study as a case study, focused on IGAD's role in regional integration in the Eastern Africa. Notably, case studies in social science research in particular are quite advantageous as they allow researchers to examine a particular area and use it as a representation of the situation of a greater area. There are four reasons why IGAD was chosen as a case study. Firstly, IGAD was chosen as



one of the eight RECs established in line with the Abuja Treaty road map in order to explore the broad issues of regional integration and regionalism. The second consideration is the fact that IGAD is located in this complex and troubled region which makes it an interesting case study. The third reason was based on the consideration that IGAD has a limited mandate and has often confined itself to specific programmes of actions and interventions (Bereketeab 2018). Last but not least was the obvious one: the familiarity of the researcher with this region as an individual from Ethiopia.

Thus, qualitative data was collected on IGAD from the existing data sources and the focus was on the overall aspects of the integration framework. Additionally, document analysis was used for the main data collection instrument for this study. As a desktop research, purposive sampling, as a strategy of selecting documents and materials to be reviewed, was more appropriate. Purposive sampling is a well-known strategy in a qualitative research. According to Cohen *et al* (2011:156) “researchers hand-pick the cases to be included in the sample on the basis of their judgment of their possession of the particular characteristics being sought”.

In order to produce insight and deeper understanding on IGAD, quantitative data was collected on IGAD from existing data sources focusing on the overall process of the regional integration framework. For the large part, the main data collection instrument used was reviewing and collecting documents and texts. The researcher himself collected the data following multiple sources. Since this research raised questions on issues and particular problems in relation to IGAD as a regional institution, the data came directly from the organisation’s records, including its charters and official records, media statements by its representatives, etcetera.

The IGAD documents included policies, proclamations and publications used to describe policy issues and regional integrations framework in the Horn of Africa. Also, this study made use of other publicly available statements of diplomats, state officials of member states, and media analysis etcetera. Therefore, the study-focused data from public documents were analysed to derive inferences from the findings. The study also made use of secondary data from various sources peer reviewed journals, books, articles, news (both printed and broadcast).

For purposes of clarity, this study categorised the data sources as primary and secondary sources of data that are primarily of a qualitative nature: texts, documents, charters, news bulletins and etcetera. The primary sources of data constituted the documents from the organisation itself, the various speeches made by its representatives, the media briefings, policy documents and charters it published, etcetera. The secondary sources of data represent what other authors/researchers collected, appropriated and used for their own work, which may or

may not have direct relation with this study (Newman 2011). This study thus relied on secondary data and reviewed already published materials, data and the source of information included books, journal articles and other materials published online examining IGAD's regional efforts, policy documents and regional integrations in the region.

Data collected was analysed through content analysis which is a critical examination and a measurement of sifting and interrogation of the publicly or privately collected information related to the issue under investigation. The actual collection process itself was significantly a guide towards content analysis. What this means is that analysis of the data took place even while collecting the data necessary for this research. The rationale for content analysis lies in its role in methodological and data triangulation, the immense value of documents in case study research, and its usefulness as a stand-alone method for specialised forms of qualitative research (Bowen 2009). Understandably, content analysis may be the only necessary data source for studies designed within an interpretive paradigm, as it may simply be the only viable source as in historical and cross-cultural research. In some sense, this study has the element of historical research, not by design but by necessity of doing the actual research, pulling the researcher into collecting and examining over the last three decades. This has often offered this research the opportunity to assess trajectories, through exploring the past and current developments. The study attempted to trace the regional integration challenges and prospects within the framework of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

### **1.9 Structure of the Dissertation**

This study is organised into seven chapters and the demarcation is as follows:

**Chapter One** – This chapter introduces the study in its entirety. It provides the background and problem statement, objectives, significance of the study and methodology in relation to IGAD's challenges and rhetoric in the Horn of Africa region. This chapter deals with the introduction of the dissertation by outlining the research problem and issues/themes investigated. This chapter also offers the historical background to the problem as part of the effort to outline and delineate the research question. This chapter also discussed the methodology and the methods of the data collection process outlined.

**Chapter Two** - This chapter brings together the key theoretical arguments related to regional integration. It reviews the literature that is relevant and theoretical framework in the IGAD's region and probes into the regionalization and cooperation of legitimate structures. The study drew insights from two theories: Regional Cooperation and Inter-governmentalism and explored how these theories fit to the challenge and successes of within Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). This chapter reviews the literature on regional integration,

the process of integrations, regional agreements, regional institution making. This chapter aims to look the IGAD conceptual and theoretical aspects of the topic at international, continental, and regional levels.

**Chapter Three** – This chapter analyses the historical background of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Specific attention paid to the institutional structure and strategic framework, the peace and security strategy and the main four pillars discussed. This chapter examines the ways in which the organisation set its priorities, programme of actions and measures their success.

**Chapter Four** – This chapter deals on the IGADS's economic integration projects and explored initiatives and assessed their performances. This chapter, therefore, focuses only on two programme areas of Pillar 2: trade, investment, industry and tourism development programme and the infrastructural development programme.

**Chapter Five** - This chapter deals with the Somalia and South Sudan conflicts as a case study outlined. In this chapter, IGAD's interventions in, and initiatives, to deal with these crises is explored. IGADS's role for peacekeeping mission in Somalia and South Sudan and role of regional and global actors (including the UN) for mediation and peace and stability in the region are examined and discussed.

**Chapter Six** – This chapter analyses the main challenges of IGAD. Through data collections, analysis of different themes and analytical categories which include political challenges, security challenges, economic and social challenges and structural challenges that how affect the war torn region. Specially, the intra- and interstate conflicts are assessed to examine how peace and security issues have become the biggest challenge in the region.

**Chapter Seven** – The final chapter offers summary and conclusion to the dissertation and recommendations based on the findings obtained.

## Chapter Two

### Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a general overview of the theoretical framework in the context of developing countries. Michel (2012:3) states, “the core driving force behind African integration starts in the 1950s and 1960s was the Pan African movement calling for independence of African states and the end of colonialism”. This means that a transnational elite pushing for regional cooperation supported this ideologically driven movement. The main actors involved in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which is now the African Union (AU) and the African Economic Community, among others, were states officials strategizing their determinations both on Pan African identity and on the expanding of individual states and regional gains (Michel 2012).

Thus, this chapter provides a general overview of the theoretical framework and conceptual choices necessary to explore the context of IGAD’s activities and its overall regional integration projects. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in particular, de Melo and Tsikata (2013) note that “the RECs were to be the ‘building blocs’ of the hoped-for African union in the immediate postcolonial era. Hence, they are now central for implementing the socio-economic and security in the region”. de Melo and Tsika’s (2013) propositional argument outlines how the Horn of Africa needs to identify current economic growth inclusive of socio-economic development. In addition to sustaining and improving business environment, good political and economic governance and management, social development strategies that are consistent with the needs of the industrial and modern sectors are required. Conducive socio-economic conditions, peace and security as well as political will are equally important to ensure that Africa’s structural transformation can effectively take place (Economic Commission for Africa 2015:9).

This chapter argues that the process of African regional integration initiatives are best understood by framing them within multi-level governance theoretical approaches. As the chapter outlines, the premise to this is the assertion that these two theories are better placed to explain the dynamics, processes and conditions of regionalism. The chapter argues that notwithstanding the enormous diversity and wide circulation of theories on model of European

integration, wholesale application of these to account and guide a sub-regional integration project of vast and diverse IGAD's region is problematic.

## **2.2 Conceptual Appropriations: Regionalism, Regional cooperation and Integration**

As an overarching concept and practice, regionalism has become prominent a feature of contemporary world politics and various regions of the world. According to Nye (1968: vii), regionalism refers to “the formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of regions and in the doctrinal sense it entails advocacy of such formations.” Such a conception of regionalism thus entails an ideological form that promotes such grouping within a region which is the basis for the formation of formal structures /institutions to facilitate common objectives. As an ideology, it has spread through the processes of diffusion and the necessity of mechanisms for interdependent decision-making in response to factors in the region and beyond (Börzel 2015). For Cantori and Spiege (1970:6-7) the idea of regionalism is based on “geographical proximity, common bonds (historical, social, cultural, ethnic and linguistic), a sense of identity and international interactions” as defining features for common destiny.

According to Michel (2012), regional cooperation as a project and a concept progressed out of necessity to increase the production of coal and steel resulting in the emergence of the ‘European Coal and Steel Community’ in 1951 and this culminated into the ‘Rome Treaties’ in 1957. Regional cooperation, as a theoretical approach, captures how the nation/state becomes more interconnected regionally to address each state’s internal challenges with specific consideration given to the national interests. Thus, it is useful to assess how states behave and interact cooperatively to deal with the domestic necessity of reducing cost and maximising gains. For example, sustainable economies result from decreased trade costs and multilateral and bilateral mutual agreements which assume that states enter into regional cooperation to limit costs and increase benefits (Obydenkova 2008a; Byiers 2016).

Regional cooperation thus underlines the mutual advantages and benefits that accrue through cooperation. According to Lindberg (1963:121), political integration entails the following pre-conditions:

- (a) Central institutions and central policies must develop.
- (b) The tasks assigned to these institutions must be important enough and specific enough to an active socioeconomic process to which conventional international organizations have no access.

(c) These tasks must be inherently expansive.

(d) The member states must continue to see their interests as consistent with the enterprise.

In such a formulation, the state is treated as central for most part of the appropriation of this concept and analytical tool in the studies of international relations. This is what has been called “old regionalism” which views region-building through the prism of the state and the state as the only role player. Söderbaum (2016) points out that the criticism levelled against “old regionalism” is that it is too state-centrist. This relates to the possible roles of other institutions and actors such as the market and civil society. This is also suggestive of the diffusion of the ideas as foundation for regionalism and region-thinking which is referred to as the social construction of regions along with trusts of globalisation creating the conditions for flows of capital, trade and people (Börzel 2016). It is, arguably, under these conditions that “new varieties of regionalism” are considered where “the state is no longer regionalism’s only gatekeeper” (Fawcett and Serrano 2005:24; see also Söderbaum 2016 and Hettne 2005). Despite the persistence of inter-state region-making and regionalism, recent works consider market and civil society actors organised along formal and informal networks as crucial elements of contemporary forms of regionalism (Söderbaum 2005, 2012; Jessop 2003; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000).

Thus, as we move away from the state-centric form of regionalism, we see the emergence of multiple possibilities for forging ideologies and practice regionalism. This also means the move away from the European model of regionalism that has dominated the world since the Second World War (Söderbaum 2005). Such thrusts have inevitably forced us to reconsider existing conceptions of regional cooperation and integration and their processes and dynamics more broadly. Börzel (2013), however, argues that we should sufficiently differentiate between regional cooperation and regional integration. Though the conceptualisation of these concepts might represent distinct elements of processes and practices of regionalism, it is important to note the fact that they overlap and, are intertwined. Thus, in the following section, regional integration is treated as a dynamic process subsumed within regional cooperation/regionalism. It is also treated as deeper interdependence and interdependent regional institution-building.

Notably, the European Commission (2019) defines the concept of regional integration as “the process of overcoming barriers that divide neighbouring countries, by common accord and of jointly managing shared resources and assets. It is a process by which groups of countries

liberalize trade thus creating a common market for goods, people, capital and services”.<sup>5</sup> To Hartzenberg (2011), regional integration is seen as a rational response to the difficulties faced by a continent with many small national markets and landlocked arrangements with several overlapping membership. Another important definition is by Madyo (2008) who conceives of regional integration as the process in which neighbouring states enter into an arrangement in order to upgrade cooperation through common institutions and rules. It is further added that regional integration is the process by which two or more nations states agree to cooperate and work closely together to achieve peace, stability and wealth. The foregoing review of some of the scholars’ definitions of regional integration reveal that regional integration involves the coming together of more than one state to establish institutions, sign accords for the purpose of promoting economic activity and other related objectives among themselves.

Notably, regional integration can also be initiated to pursue political goals and is said to be playing some other critical roles which, as argued by van Langenhove (2006:49) includes, among other things:

Contribution to peace and security in the region; strengthening of trade integration in the region; the creation of an appropriate enabling environment for private sector environment development; the development of infrastructure programmes in support of economic growth and regional integration; the development of strong public sector institutions and governance; the reduction of social exclusion and the development of an exclusive civil society; the building of environment programmes at the region level and the strengthening of the region’s interaction with other regions of the world.

Regional cooperation theories emphasizes that the regionalisation of different parts of the world is fundamentally driven by countries’ need to engage in strong cooperation with each other in order to access markets, enhance own economies and address other common transnational challenges. In this sense, the driving force is the accruing benefits to be reaped through the specific form of regionalism the regional states enter with each other (Börzel 2016). Here, it is crucial to delineate the questions of integrative or cooperative dimensions that may feature. Regional states can cooperate without being integrated. Regional integration, as conceptualized above, entails a departure from the old version of state bargains on trade liberalization and economic cooperation in the region. Deeper interdependent institution-building and decision-making are defining characteristics of regional integration while regional cooperation features as an overarching feature of regionalism.

The following section outlines and reviews the theoretical underpinning of regionalism and regional integration.

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<sup>5</sup> A definition place on the European Commission official site [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/economic-growth/regional-integration\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/economic-growth/regional-integration_en)

### **2.3 Choosing a Suitable Theoretical Framework**

It bears repeating that the inception of IGAD was necessitated by the desire to respond to a long period of common problems in the region such as drought, famine and conflicts. This was informed by the realisation of the elites of the countries in the greater Horn of the African region that a multi-sectoral approach to socio-economic and political transformation should be pursued as an urgent strategy to address common challenges to sustainable development (in mid 1980s) peace and security (later in the 1990) (Mwendwa 2014). This is suggestive of the desire to cooperate rather than integrate as it has been framed since the inception of IGADD and its offspring IGAD.

Hettne and Söderbaum (2006:181) argue that there are “diverse forms of regional cooperation that have developed due to the new wave of regionalism.” Thus, Börzel (2016) instructively categorises the theories of regional cooperation and integration into two namely, the rationalist and the constructivist approaches respectively. According to Börzel (2016), the old-regionalism is dominated by the rationalist which is a power-based and a state-centred approach, while the new-regionalism is typical of norm-based and constructivist approach. New regionalism criticises old-regionalism for being state-centrist and this emphasizes the role of the market and civil society and the social construction of regions in region-building (Fawcett and Serrano 2005; Hettne and Söderbaum 2006; Söderbaum 2016).

The old regionalism refers to the regionalism theories that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in an attempt to understand and interrogate European integration and its trajectory after the Second World War. This has sustained itself since many of the regional integration initiatives around the world sought to mirror the European experiment (van Klaveren 2017). The 1980s, however, saw new forms of regionalism which are not typically confined to inter-state relations and are characterized by “multidimensionality and complexity” (Hettne and Söderbaum 2006:183). It is also noted that the increasing complexity and multidimensionality of regionalism is attributed to globalisation and associated globalising thrusts (Börzel 2016:8). Börzel (2016:7) makes reference to the emerging “transborder mobility, economic linkages and trade issues” that are necessitating new modalities of dealing with them at the multilateral level. Classical approaches such as neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism whose focus has been state-led forms of regional cooperation are considered the old-regionalism theories while multi-level governance approaches that “focus on a complex, multilevel system of governance, with vertical and horizontal interaction” are considered new-regionalism (Hettne and Söderbaum 2006:183). The focus of the latter is the role of the market, business associations,



trade unions and other civil society region-building initiatives to promote their own economic and political interests (Börzel 2016:3).

This study sought to appropriate both the role of the state and the market as well as other non-state actors in the facilitation of region-building. The proposition here is that while the role of the state is central in region-building in the IGAD region (see Bereketeab 2018), it is also important to consider other variables shaping it particularly the external actors and institutions whose perceived interest is to be promoted through IGAD as a regional organisation. In line with this position, the multi-level governance approaches have been central as theoretical lens to this study. The following sections appraise this approaches and make a case for these by way of appropriating it to this study.

#### **2.4 From Intergovernmentalism to Multilevel Governance: A Political Economy Approach**

Intergovernmentalism as a theoretical framework has informed this review and the analysis of IGAD's activities and the regional integration process. Notably, intergovernmentalism was constructed in the 1960s and the 1970s as a response to neo-functionalism. Put differently, intergovernmentalism is a response to the criticism of neofunctionalism (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Schmitter 1969). Obydenkova (2008a) conceives of "functionality and structure authority" as crucial elements in the neo-functionalist theory's formulation of conditions and political processes of integration. According to Kleinschmidt (2013:4), "[n] eo-functionalism explains processes of state cooperation aimed at solving conflicts between each other and gradually giving up on national sovereignty". Neo-functionalism is perceived to be insufficient in explaining some of the emerging trends in regional integration which are grounded in the realist school of thoughts (Abraha 2013). Neo-functionalists argue that progress and achievement in a certain area increases the force and motivation for successful integration in others (Kleinschmidt 2013).

Neofunctionalists' propositions on the gradual elimination of conflict and national sovereignty are what the intergovernmentalism approach mainly criticizes. One of the main arguments of intergovernmentalism is that "states are the main actors in international cooperation and that they act both as unitary and rational units" (Michel 2012:24). According to Obydenkova (2008b), intergovernmentalism approaches the phenomenon of regional integration from the potential of nation-states and thus treats states, national governments in particular as the prime actors for the integration process. In this sense, states have significant influence and potential control over the process of regional integration initiatives. While building on the neo-

functionalism's view of the state as an actor, intergovernmentalism, however, considers the state as acting and entering into regional integration with all its internal dynamics. In the above conditions, the state as a gatekeeper and as a channel to domestic interests featuring at the regional field is central concept.

The main thrust of intergovernmentalism theory in its account of the European integration process "is that member states are main drivers of European integration process. Member states have interests and it is based on those interests that they decide whether they will pursue a certain policy or not" (Lame 2007:19). For example, as argued by Laursen (2008:9), "Liberal intergovernmentalists see the European Union (EU) Member States as unitary rational actors that are in control of the process of integration". In light of this, one can thus assert that the state's mandate and power are central to integration and there is need to determine how this can be realized in the practical integration process in the African context. In fact, it is important to note that the founder of the theory has made the framework "a general one, which can be applied to any kind of regional integration" (Lame 2007:21).

Considering that African regional integration initiatives mirror the European experiment, the same claim applies to the region-building projects in Africa. It is often argued that in order to overcome their inability to industrialise and strengthen their economies, states in the African continent need to engage in regional cooperation. This is also clearly noted in the Abuja Treaty, which states that region-building is the only way to address economic and social transformation in this continent.

Recent literature and accounts have placed a profound emphasis on local organisational arrangements and mandates to their effectiveness to achieve their economic aspiration and to get to grips with the thrusts of globalisation (see Coe *et al* 2004). This captures the collective choices to be made by national governments as autonomous actors. This notion emanates from a realist view of the world which argues that states are the significant players in regional integration and international relations. However, powerful states dominate the process and influence the nature of integration and within such settings conflicts and competitions are inevitable features of these integration initiatives. Germany's role in EU, Ethiopia's in IGAD, Nigeria's in ECOWAS, and South Africa's in SADC have similar characteristics. These states dominate the regional integration projects and shape their directions while other regional states resist against and compete with these regional powerhouses' role and positions and weaker states simply move along with these projects.

According to Michel (2012), there are three stages in the process of integration: preference formation, substantive bargains and institutional choice. In Michel's (2012) formulation, the


initial stage of preference formation entails strategic and geopolitical consideration of region-building. The second stage determines the negotiation and consultation on how to establish set common objectives and ideals in order to organise the regional block. The third stage is about institutional choices to be made in order to achieve these objectives and organisational aspirations. The powerful states, however, have more political and economic advantages than the poor states which results in unequal influences in the union/relationship. Read from the political economy perspective, intergovernmentalism treats, on the one hand, states and their governments as entering into region-building and regionalism to promote their own political and economic interest, and, on the other hand, powerful states within the region seek to manoeuvre this process of region-building and its projects to serve their transnational interests. One of the most important criticisms that has been levelled against the proponents of intergovernmentalism is that they tend to overlook the process of actual implementation of regional decisions as the implementation is not perceived to be problematic (Abraha 2013). According to Caichiolo (2017), in the process of integration, “disputes that take place at the domestic level also occur at the international level. So, the greater the relative power of a state, the easier it will be for it to show its preference externally” (Caichiolo 2017:5). This type of choice shows that weak states are up against powerful states. While a regional cooperation approach enables us to interrogate the dynamics of cooperation within regional integration, intergovernmentalism helps us to appraise the elements of conflict and competitions in the integration process. In this sense, intergovernmentalism framed within the political economy perspective offers a systematic analysis by considering the dynamics of power-relations in the processes and structure of region-building, structure of domination and strategic moves of states to enhance their own power by cooperating within a certain region.

It bears repeating should be stated again that intergovernmentalism fails to consider the role of non-state actors and institutions and the role of powerful actors away from the region. Söderbaum (2013) argues that the troubles with intergovernmentalism is that Eurocentrism and static understandings of regional space have severely curtailed development of theoretical and conceptual drives, and empirical analysis and practices. The view offered emphasizes the social construction of regions and the various ways in which states, markets and civil society actors relate and come together in different formal and informal patterns of regionalism. This effectively forces us to consider political economy of formal and informal regionalism, and how the state, markets and external actors relate to one another and often come together in hybrid and multi-actor coalitions. Thus, the multi-level governance approach is relevant for it considers the emergences, dynamics and processes of region-building to be influenced by states

as well as non-state actors and institutions. Following this notion, while acknowledging the state’s mandate and power in any regional integration project, we need to questions how this can be reflected in the practical integration process in the African context and insert in other non-state actors and institutions into the analysis. These are important concerns considering the forms of states in Africa and the national politics, African states relations with the outside world, and global power dynamics that would have implications to the process, dynamics and outcomes of regional integration initiatives.

Arguably, this can only be addressed by appropriating the multi-level governance approach. In fact, this approach is developed to engage with, and make sense of, the dynamics of region-building in the African continent (Söderbaum 2016, 2004). For Söderbaum (2016), state forms in Africa, the development and influence of non-state actors and the very nature of globalisation and its impulses force us to consider multiple power circuits in international relations in Africa. It is out of this observation that Söderbaum and others strongly argue for the adoption of the multi-level governance approach in dealing with complex patterns of region-building in the continent. Moving away from the state-centrism or privileging formal processes, the multilevel governance approach offers a “framework that can address the complexity of regional organizations/regionalism and at the same time transcend the case of Europe/EU itself” (Söderbaum and Sbragia 2010: 568).

**Figure 1.** Actors of Intergovernmentalism



Source : Adapted from (Michel, 2012)

While the states, markets, and civil society are central to this approach, there is much less to consider in terms of civil society in the context of IGAD since this sector is weak and fragmented in this region. Ethnicity and ethnic layouts, anticolonial movements and aspirations in the post-colonial moments are crucial elements shaping the discourses of regionalism and region-building in this region. Appropriation of this approach certainly allows us to critically engage and appraise multiple actors (state as well as non-state ones) and discursivities, their role and influence in regionalism and region-building initiatives. So, it is worth considering how regional and global political and economic interests and competitions frame and shape these initiatives and dynamics of integration.

The importance of this approach is both in explaining the success and failure of region-building initiatives and it is useful to appraise the power struggle and conflict of interest such projects host and required to solve. The political economy approach to multilevel governance thus requires close scrutiny of the local, regional and global actors' (including market institutions and civil society) involvement in region-building initiatives. In such scrutiny, we find the competition for influence, the agenda setting, the negotiations and mediations of conflicts and conflicts of interests.

## **2.5 Framing IGAD's Regionalism within Political Economy of Multilevel Governance**

Michel (2012) points out that though similar to the European Union, the historical backdrop of the African economic integration has been described through a typical philosophy and historical impulses. This suggests that the unique historical and material context of the continent has to be appraised to understand both failures and triumphs of the African integration experiment. This experiment, which was built on Pan-Africanist and liberation movements, has seen several setbacks and failed aspirations of Africans more than a few times. Such disappointment with the Organization of African Unity (now African Union) has profound effects on the regional thinking and practices of economic and political elites/circles on the African continent (Michel 2012). They have retreated into the local sphere and moved abroad for their relations and economic ties instead of the neighbourhood. Arguably, regional integration serves to promote national interest and the local agenda and objectives as opposed to the regional one, through dominating and controlling processes at the regional level. Under such conditions, the state as an entity controlled by political and economic elites, emerges as

an actor in the regional realm. Though it is driven by local interest, the domestic base formation and the economic process will influence the state's economic interdependencies.

According to Dersso (2014), the IGAD region is mainly known for the lack of peace and security within and among its member states. These security challenges of the countries and of the region are inextricably intertwined and thus remain for the most part inseparable. What is important to note, therefore, is that these conflicts characterizing the region and the countries constituting the region are ubiquitous as these conflicts are not confined to national borders. On the contrary, such conflicts, more often than not, not only spill over into neighbouring countries but also tend to draw countries in the region into the fray (Dersso 2014).

The review of the literature on the IGAD region concentrates mostly on the various political, security and socioeconomic characteristics that have caught the attention of those who champion peace and security in the context of the politics of regional integration. The ethnic dimension and ethno-national aspirations in the Horn of Africa's region are perennial problems that regionalism sought to whittle out. As argued by Mekonnen (2013), ethnicity as a concept is masked by nationalism which exacerbates internal turmoil and continuing conflicts and this is coupled with the scramble for wealth and power. This, arguably, continues to feature as a major cause of conflicts in the Horn of Africa given the many ethnic groups that inhabit the Horn of Africa. Thus, given the inextricable relationship between nationalism and ethnicity, and the attendant aspirations for self-identification and self-determination, states in the Horn of Africa are under constant threat of fragmentation. Existence of cross-border ethnic identifications and ethno-nationalism in the region is directly or indirectly linked, in many respects, to the multiple intra-state and inter-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa. The typical examples in this regard are socioeconomic deprivation and inequalities, lack of democratic governance and rule of law and the non-inclusive organization and control of state power heavily reliant on force (Dersso 2014).

It is for this reason that conflict in the region "as a social phenomenon is widely perceived to be part of daily life" (Axt *et al* 2006:19). Thus, its manifestations do not only vary but are also contingent on many factors which entail, among other things, contestation (Bereketeab 2013). Notably, the origin of conflicts is attributable to two approaches namely, the subjective and the objective (Axt *et al* 2006). It is also notable that the objective approach, on the one hand, traces the origin of conflict to the socio-political fabric and structure of society whilst the subjective approach, on the other hand, attributes the origin of conflicts to the perceived incompatibility of goals and differences (Deutsch 1991). As argued by Axt *et al* (2006:6), the objective

approach advocates the view that it is incompatible differences that engender conflict. What this means, therefore, is that for conflict to exist, there should be position difference or interest position between groups over certain values (Axt *et al* 2006:6). Region-building and regionalism in the Horn is thus instituted within such context and, partially, in an attempt to deal with such perennial problems.

The economic dimension is also another rationale for entering into the region-building initiative. RECs proposed in Abuja Treaty are instructive of this. Countering globalisation and its negative consequences, on the one hand, and the desire to over-come underdevelopment certainly feature as driving discourses of REC projects in Africa. Thus, establishing intergovernmental institutions is seen as central to gradually achieving these objectives. As a consequence, these projects emerged as both state-focused where the states join such initiatives and operate as fundamental actors promoting and directing regional organisations and region-building projects. It is in light of such observation that many scholars adopt the intergovernmental approach to interrogate and unpack region-building projects and regionalism in Africa.

However, society-based methodologies underline the significance of trans-national markets and common society of shared geographical and cultural characteristics which do not just characterise state inclinations or weight but also influence them to build provincial incorporation processes and also participate in their own building regional institutions with or without the involvement of states (Börzel 2014). Viewed from the intergovernmentalist approach, regional cooperation/integration has the potential of addressing each state's internal problems. Aside from this, it can also be a useful guide to how states behave as regional actors. Major progressive total economic profits come from reducing trade costs and significant losses caused by political instabilities and civil wars. According to Obydenkova (2008a:7),

...for some countries, additional benefits from migrants' remittances can be highly significant and the economic costs of risks such as HIV/AIDS, TB and natural disasters that the region faces are also high' which then justifies the advocacy of the view that "on all issues, regional cooperation can help limit costs and increase benefits.

It is notable that what is often not captured in the above theory is the conflict and competition between states as each state seeks to pursue broad socio-economic, political and security objectives described by the national governments as national interest. Therefore, regional integration has been organised by super-national and institutional structures through a

collective decision-making process. It is well known that African geopolitics has been significantly determined by the continent's colonial powers and current global powers. As some argue, state forms in Africa are significantly shaped by external powers (Hartzenberg 2011). States in Africa are formed along the lines of extractive practice of colonial powers to facilitate the colonial economy (both regional and global). Thus, African geopolitics has little to do with the recent development of nation states. It is within such context that we have to read regional integration initiatives in the continent with specific consideration of regional and global interests and their influence in success and failures of such projects. The assertion here is that IGAD as a region-building initiative cannot be separated from the regional and global powers' interests in the region and geopolitical shifts attendant thereto.

According to Hartzenberg (2011:5), "the geo-political configuration and structure of Africa has been largely determined by the continent's European colonial powers and as such has little to do with the emergence of nation states". This means that almost all the IGAD member states face direct or indirect challenges resulting from their past colonial legacies. For instance, Somalia, well-known as one of the colonies of the European states, is not an exception. The colonial powers (France, Britain and Italy) subdivided Somalia into five different parts and it is still a challenge to national integration and building of sustainable peace and security (Mulugeta 2009).

This study considers how the region integration process post-independence and as modality to the fragmentation colonial project has been instituted. Such regional integration initiative should be distinguished by significant engagement in regional economic development. For large part, however, as Hartzenberg (2011) argues, recent experience "indicates that political motivation for regional integration has also played an important role in African integration" (Hartzenberg 2011:4). Such political motivation often entails concerns over regime stability and security.

Due to this and multiple other factors, the integration of economies and developments have lagged behind. To this day, as it were historically, the European Union is Africa's greatest trade, investment and development partner. It is notable though that China is emerging as rival to this and is increasingly becoming an important trading partner in the continent. There are sustained arguments that regional economic integration among African states need to have strong inward looking projects, economic implementation plans, both at micro and macro levels. Aside from the economic benefits, such initiatives would have a ripple effect in security



and stability of the regional states. This is not meant to give the economic integration a primal place but rather to appraise its critical role in influences the other areas of concern. Notably, most African states are very far behind in sustainable economic growth, stability, peace and security in the region. As a result of this, many are interrelated in many respects.

The Horn of Africa especially has the most complex history of poverty, civil war and economic underdevelopment compared to other African states. IGAD as regional integration initiative is constituted in order to address these problems through coordinated regional efforts. A testament to this is the various mediation efforts and peace operations which this organisation seeks to take pride in. Despite such efforts and emphasis placed on these peace and security initiatives in the region along with the current engagement and regional diplomatic efforts, the IGAD region is still wrought with multiple security problems and instability. This is compounded by the fact that the region has become a theatre for global power players, with imposition of traditional western powers and new global players in the region and further afield. Such domination and imposition of global power players as this study argues, are clearly seen in the funding priorities and programmes implemented that clearly reflect the funders' own security agendas.<sup>6</sup> This has certainly made economic development and social programmes rather secondary in the list of priorities and programmes of actions of IGAD.

In addition to this, the competition for global markets and investment among member states of IGAD has not been helpful. In many respects, rather than cooperation, this condition has created competition and rivalry rather than cooperation. In some sense, this can be attributed to the pervasive colonial legacy of the state formation in Africa that has simply turned these states into suppliers of raw material to the Western market. Competition for dominance, influence and for favours of the global powers are also elements of this problem. Undoubtedly, persistent conflicts, poverty and environmental problems are the prominent enemies in the region which this study considers could best be addressed through cooperation and inward looking policies and programmes.

According to Coe *et al* (2004), regional cooperation and development requires the necessary presence of three inter-related sets of conditions:

(a) The existence of economies of scale and scope within specific regions

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<sup>6</sup> As you will noticed in the chapter five, much of the funding IGAD received has gone into peace and security. This is in spite of the fact that the organization has a list of programme of actions that certainly received marginal attention by the funders.

- (b) The possibility of localised economies within global production networks
- (c) The appropriate configurations of 'regional' institutions to 'hold down' global production networks and unleash regional potential (Coe *et al*, 2004:470).


In the formulation above, regional integration and development depend on multiple processes that evolve over time and are linked to significant progress in economic changes, demands of global production networks and whittling down variation in regional economic development process and specific goals (Coe *et al* 2004). The study strongly argues that to understand and acknowledge why regional institutions take the forms they do, a vast range of independent variables need to be considered. This includes types of integration and cooperation, the number of stakeholders, the ideologies and identities of the actors, strategic and sub-systemic power distributions, domestic politics, extra-regional institutions and non-state actors, cultural and religious aspects and history (Coe *et al* 2004).

When it comes to African integration, the factors affecting the advancement of intra-territorial exchange include getting individuals ready for noteworthy worldwide rivalry and negotiating the terms and conditions of power. Thus, Maruping (2005:135) argues that:

...liberalisation in Africa's regional trade has been limited by, among other factors: costly overlapping memberships, including some bilateral agreements; different time horizons for full liberalisation of trade among member states and sub regions implying that considerable trade barriers – both tariff and nontariff barriers – continue to inhibit intra-regional trade and cross-border trade; delays by some member states in signing trade treaties and protocols, followed by additional delays in implementation.

This means that local actors in some regions and non-local actors in global production processes are differentiated by their level of territoriality being firm which, in turn, will have great challenges for regional sustainable economic development (Coe *et al* 2004).

Figure 2. A framework for examining regional development with the comparison of global production network



Source: Adapted from (Coe *et al* 2004).

To better consider these, as noted above, this study adopted the political economy of multi-level approach to probe into the activities of IGAD and the concomitant regional integration process in its member countries. Framing the research questions within the multi-level governance approach is necessary since the decisions and activities of IGAD are controlled and guided by member states, non-state actors (within and outside) and regional and global powers. This theory remains a suitable framework to be used to analyze IGAD’s activities in relation to the regional integration process in its member countries. The political economy of multi-level governance approach addresses power and influence of and, competition and conflict among, the state actors and the non-state actors as well as regional and global players.

Judging from the foregoing explication above, it can be asserted emphatically that there is recognized potential for enhancing regional economic interdependence by engaging in joint ventures such as the development of transport corridors to sea ports, the management of scarce water resources and improved energy security (Dersso 2014:12). This optimism for the enhancement of regional economic interdependence derives from the realization that IGAD as an organization “has been able to achieve some results including mediation, the establishment

of IGAD Climate Prediction Application Centre (ICPAC) which relays reports on climate change to member states every 10 days. There has also been an establishment of IGD Women's Desk in 1994 to foster gender mainstreaming and promoting Women's participation in IGAD Programmes; establishment of IGAD Sub-regional Action Programme (IGDSRAP) to identify vital areas to facilitate IGAD's intervention efforts; establishment of information and communication service centres for easy flow of information across member states" (Dersso 2014). It is notable, however, that the successes that have been achieved have not been without challenges as attested to by the incessant conflicts or wars among member states. Also, the issues of harsh weather conditions in the form of drought and desertification as well as multiplicity of regional organizations with overlapping memberships and functions have equally affected the process of integration among IGAD's member states (Dersso 2014).

It is notable, however, as argued by Byiers (2016), that the allegiances and alliances with outside actors can undermine the integration process. This fact notwithstanding, the interconnected nature of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa suggests the need for a regional approach to address the diverse underlying causes of conflicts and insecurity in the IGAD region. Thus, there is need for the adoption of a political compromise between national interests as opposed to advocating a linear process of institutional functionality. This should be considered in view of the fact that there has been fluctuation in the regional integration and cooperation in peace and security (Byiers 2016). It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the conclusion is reached that IGAD's success on conflict mediation has been relative with its progress on economic integration as having been described as 'dismal' (IGAD 2012).

As argued by Byiers (2016), it is worth recognizing the fact that the progress or lack of it in economic integration is to be construed as ultimately relating not only to the interests of countries and groups within countries but also to whether there is direct intent to address the stalemate in economic integration through regional processes or not (Byiers 2016). The situation is accounted for by the fact that a diverse range of interests are at play in the IGD economic integration agenda (IGAD 2012).

As argued by Obi (2012), the people of the Horn are called upon to imagine that they are the sovereign actors of the Horn and can through everyday struggles in the future negotiate a new social contract with the states and regional institutions which might open up radical pathways to peace and development in a highly conflicted region. What transpires from the foregoing explication is that the complexity and interconnectedness of intra and inter-state conflicts and

the concomitant pervasive insecurity ravaging the region make the Horn of Africa the most conflict-ridden region in the African continent. At the root of these intra- and inter-state conflicts and insecurity is the crisis of the state. The precarious state-building process has rendered the state crisis-stricken.

Underpinning these bitter conflicts and insecurities are historical, socio-economic, domestic, intra-regional and international factors and underdevelopment. External intervention, driven by competing national, economic, political, security and strategic-linked interests connected to the war on terror and concern about piracy, render the conflicts intractable. In spite of the engagement of many local, national, regional and international actors in the attempt to mitigate the conflicts, so far no significant results have been achieved (Bereketeab 2013).

The methodology of international intervention and the politics of conflict resolution which stress, global strategic, security, political and economic interests, has not only proved lacking, but has also skewed the process of state-, peace and security-building. The peace-meal approach to conflict resolution quite often emanating from geo-strategic expediency is another factor that perpetuates conflict in the Horn of Africa. Interlinked conflicts and insecurities demand holistic, historicized, multidimensional and multidisciplinary analyses, regional approaches and mechanisms (Bereketeab 2013).

The regional security environment accentuates weak governance systems and authoritarian tendencies on the part of those that govern. Conditions for achieving strong and dynamic regional frameworks for economic and political integration are lacking. According to Dersso (2014), the peace and security agenda of IGAD and its broader ambition of regional economic integration cannot succeed unless political governance is also addressed within the regional framework. It is thus arguable that some measure of democratization is a precondition for sustainable regional cooperation and the two processes reinforce each other. As argued by Dersso (2014), the most worrying factor though is that “the political landscape of a significant number of IGAD countries remains dominated by repression of the media, opposition political groups, dissenting voices, the politicization of state agencies and the resort of governments to the use of police and military force as an instrument of settling political disagreements.

It is also notable that what has become commonplace and thus constitutes major sources of instability and contestation of state legitimacy are political and socioeconomic inequalities along ethnic and regional lines (Dersso 2014). There is thus need and demand for greater

integration of the countries of the region. The IGAD region holds strong potential for substantially improving the process of regional economic and socio-political integration. This is attributable to the presence of economic and geographical conditions that tend to catalyse and enhance greater interdependence and cooperation among member states of IGAD (Dersso 2014).

## **2.6 Conclusion**

This chapter explored the broader ideological and theoretical currents influencing IGAD in the context of Africa's region-building initiatives and has placed this within its historical trajectory of regional integration projects in the continent. According to Michel (2012:3), "the core driving force leading to the dawn of African integration in the 1950s and 1960s was the Pan African movement calling for independence of African states and the end of colonialism". This means that a transnational elites pushing for regional cooperation supported this ideologically driven movement. The main actors involved in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) [and now the African Union (AU)] and the African Regional Economic Communities, among others, were political and economic elites strategizing their determinations both on Pan African identification and on the expansion of states and regional gains (Michel 2012).

This chapter explored these initiatives and made a case for why these should be captured through mobilisation of regional cooperation conceptually and in practice. It is also notable that regional cooperation as a concept emphasizes the regionalisation of different parts of the world where countries need to cooperate with each other to access market economies and benefits. Regional cooperation deals with how states attain economic and political objectives through international institutions by implementing rules and regulations. Mutual benefit and cooperative exchange for socio-economic and political advancement are the fundamental challenges for states entering into regional cooperation. In the case of Africa, it is thus argued that for the different countries on the continent, in order to overcome their inability to industrialise and strengthen their economies, they need to engage in regional cooperation.

The argument advanced in this chapter, along with many in the literature, is that the process of African regional integration is best understood through the multilevel governance approach. It is also noted that inter-governmentalism has been the dominant framework informing regionalism and region-building. Intergovernmentalism as a theory of European regional integration identifies how states acquire mandates and the authority to implement and regulate

policies for the purpose of international cooperation among states. Beyond the European experiment, it is argued that intergovernmentalism offers a systematic structure that enhances power by cooperation within a certain area. Intergovernmentalism focuses on economic and geopolitical interests among political and domestic actors. This theory is appropriated to explain African regional initiatives. As Hartzenberg (2011:19) puts it, “African countries have definitely contributed to the proliferation of regional trade agreements which is a defining feature of global economic governance in recent decades”.

However, the complexities and dynamism of the states in the continent necessitates considering non-state regional and global actors as well as global powers that seek to promote their own interest through regionalism as transnational governance mechanism. In assessing the two theories special attention is paid to the complexities and ideological conceptions in relation to when and under what conditions the process of integration is likely to be achieved. Here, specific conditions pertinent to the Horn of Africa region have been explored in order to make a case for appropriating the multilevel governance approach. Notably, the causes which underlie conflicts and insecurity in the region are diverse and these range from external and historical factors to structural ones. After a long period of experiencing common problems in the region such as drought, famine and conflicts, these East African states have come to realise that a multi-sectoral approach to socio-economic and political transformation should be pursued as an urgent strategy to confront common challenges to sustainable development (Mwendwa 2014).

Since region-building and intergovernmental practices are sites of contestation and a power struggle for domination and influence of one state over another it is crucial to frame these within the political economy of region-building. This has highlighted the importance of regional and global non-state actors and global powers which infuse these processes with complexities, competition and contestation. This in turn affirms the need to draw from political economy which is reflective of the manner in which these processes are framed and shaped by economic and political interests of multiple actors. This chapter outlined how the political economy of multilevel governance better explains the complexities, challenges and opportunities of political and economic integration initiatives to achieve socio-economic progress and identifies states’ internal challenges.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Historical, Institutional and Discursive Contexts of IGAD**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This Chapter discusses the historical background that informed the study and the discursive dimension of IGAD as a regional integration initiative. Evidently, IGAD as a region is riddled with and troubled by poverty, economic and environmental crisis, political and security problems. The IGAD region is liable for the recurrent famine and civil war and as such it is one of the powerless regions in the African continent lacking sustainable peace and security. The Eastern part of the region challenges the economic integration so initiated. Thus, this chapter focuses on these aspects and how the structure and operation of IGAD's objectives and aims are discussed. It is in light of this that this chapter considers IGAD's past and present as a regional integration project.

Thus, the first section of this chapter explores the historical foundation of IGAD as a regional organisation. This is followed by an exploration of the objectives and the structure of the organisation. Here, the section explores the relationship among the objectives, priorities set and organisational capacity. The latter sections examine the policy and the strategic framework of IGAD and how these are linked to the organisation's challenges and opportunities. By and large, therefore, the focus is on the outlining of the policy initiatives and programme of actions identified by IGAD and their implementation and measuring their success. Additionally, the challenges and opportunities confronting the organisation in implementation are also explored.

#### **3.2 Context and Historical Background of the IGAD Region**

Demeke and Gebru (2014) point out that Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) that was founded in 1986. The main aim of the establishment of IGADD was to prevent and mitigate drought and famine in the Eastern African countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda (Desmidt 2016:11). IGADD's headquarters were established in Djibouti. Notably, the then six-member state organisation was certainly the first regional multilateral initiative of its kind. Upon attaining its independence, Eritrea joined IGADD in 1993 to become the seventh member state.



IGADD as an organisation was a response to growing concern in the region afflicted by recurring severe drought, famine and other natural disasters. Abnormal low rain fall, ecological degradation and economic privation in the region and locust invasion have been (and continued to be) major contributors to these problems (IGAD 2016b). Thus, the core mandate and target of IGADD was the alleviation of the effects of the recurrent droughts and other human-made disasters. Thus, as its name indicates, two fundamental concerns guided the establishment of IGADD namely, the developmental and environmental control. To this end, the organisation was intended to respond to immediate problems/disasters (such as drought and environmental crisis) and medium and long-term recovery and rehabilitation to overcome developmental challenges.

In line with these concerns as explicated above, the organisation had three crucial activities (focus areas). The first set of activities were the emergency and relief measures in response to immediate humanitarian crisis focusing on the victims of environmental disasters and drought. The activities in this regard included assessing and determining the impact and extent of the disaster, mobilising and coordinating relief measures. The second set of activities focused on short and medium terms measures which dealt with the effects of the crisis at hand through resource and knowledge sharing, skill development and training, and infrastructural development. These had a specific focus which ensured that the resilience of communities of member states against drought ensured that food security was maintained, control desertification, rehabilitation and effective use of natural resources (water, energy and marine etcetera.). The third one focused a long term initiatives and projects which dealt with the sustainability of the environment and development. In this regard, IGADD paid particular attention to rural economy and the agricultural sector.

As revealed in IGADD's initiatives above, reveal, this organisation was driven by the ultimate desire not only to improve food security but also to deal with environmental challenges through regional cooperation. While IGADD was certainly a multilateral response to collective and transnational problems, it was not meant to deal with security and political problems the region was facing (Heally 2011). In the 1990s, few years after the establishment of IGADD, the region was undergoing serious changes which entailed among other things the creation of Eritrea, the collapse of Somalia, the rise of cross-border threats of terrorism and addressing multiple political and security challenges. This is not to say that some of these challenges did not exist

in the mid-1908s. However, the magnitude and nature of these challenges were markedly new and were acutely felt by the region thus necessitating regional response to them.

Driven by these new emerging political and socio-economic challenges in the region, the Assembly of Heads of States and governments met in Addis Ababa in April 1995 and resolved to revitalize IGADD in order to response to the emerging political, economic and security challenges. Following the consensus built in these meetings, the regional states signed a Letter of Instrument to Amend the IGADD Charter / Agreement on 21 March 1996. In line with this, they decided to expand areas of cooperation among the member states under IGAD in three areas of priority namely:

- (a) Food security and environmental protection
- (b) Economic cooperation, regional integration and social development; and
- (c) Peace, security and humanitarian affairs (IGAD 2016).

What is evident in the above is that the newly established IGAD is building on the core issues raised in its predecessor and expands these to include regional integration, economic development and peace and security as an additional objective. Most importantly, this new organisation is following the agreements reached in Abuja Treaty to establish RECs in each sub-region of the continent. In comparison with the other African RECs, “the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is one of Africa’s youngest sub-regional organizations and the region has always been regarded as the conflict zone” (Weldesellassie 2011:1).

This regional bloc is located as the most strategic region of the Horn of Africa and has an area of around 5.3 million km<sup>2</sup> that covers eight regional countries - Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan Kenya and Uganda. It is located in the Red Sea Basin thus linking Africa to the Middle East and the Nile Basin linking it with the south-eastern states of Tanzania, Rwanda and Egypt at the north east. Its coastline extends from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, including the Gulf of Aden and Toudjoura (with 6960 Km of coastline). In land, the IGAD region has 6910 Km of international borders linking it to eight countries (Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Egypt, Libya, Chad and Tanzania).<sup>7</sup>

Although the IGAD region has the third smallest population with 236 million people living in the regional bloc, it is also one of the regions that are experiencing a high population growth rate. The demographic age structure of the regional bloc reveals that the majority of its citizens

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<sup>7</sup> <https://igad.int/about-us/the-igad-region> (accessed September 12, 2019).

are young people sitting at about 50 percent of the population. This is a double edge sword in that it could be an opportunity provided that they receive education and training and participate in the economy of these states or it would be a source of instability if these economies fail to absorb the youth and incorporate it into productive activity. Unfortunately, for the regional bloc, all of the IGAD member states belong to the ‘world’s Least Developed Countries’ (LDCs) with the exception of Kenya. For example, IGAD’s regional per capita income is much lower than the Sub-Saharan African average (2015 – IGAD US\$ 1006 and SSA US\$ 1 635, and in 2018 – IGAD US\$ 918 while SSA registered US\$ 1 634).<sup>8</sup> IGAD member states also share similar economic conditions with serious microstructural problems with negative current account balance (% of the GDP) with severe trade imbalances thus rendering it unable to attract sufficient foreign direct investment with a growing number of labour force. Unless it finds a way of transforming its economy, this certainly poses significant challenges to the regional bloc that has an average median age of around 19.

*Table 1.* List of IGAD member states with Population data and GDP per Capita

<b>Country</b>	<b>Population Size (2018)</b>	<b>% Young(0-25) Population (2018)</b>	<b>Population Growth Rate (2018)</b>	<b>GDP per Capita (2018) US\$</b>
Djibouti	958,923	47.23	1.57 %	2 075
Eritrea	3,452,786	59.71	1.17 %	1 943
Ethiopia	109,224,414	61.42	2.65%	731
Kenya	51,392,565	59.51	2.33 %	1 639
Somalia	15,008,226	67.24	2.87 %	108*
South Sudan	10,975,927	61.55	0.60 %	753
Sudan	41,801,533	60.23	2.42 %	980
Uganda	42,729,036	66.98	3.80 %	687

Source: Adapted from <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/> and <https://unctadstat.unctad.org/>

\*Unreliable data

A huge volume of their economic outputs is dependent on their natural resources (mining and agriculture) and most of the population are dependent on subsistence farming. This is aside

<sup>8</sup> See <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Index.html>. Accessed on February 2019.

from the recent mushrooming of flagship infrastructural projects and industrial parks across the region that are meant to usher in industrialisation and develop the manufacturing sector (see HESPI 2018)<sup>9</sup>. The region's population is for the large part dependent on agriculture (IGAD 2016). The farmlands of the regions account for “7 percent, forests 19 percent and permanent pastures 28 percent of the total land area. The remaining 46 percent is unproductive or marginal land” (IGAD 2016d). As noted in the IGAD's report, the economic pillar of the “region is agriculture comprising both livestock and crop production which provides the basis for food supplies and export earnings as well as contributing as employment for over 80 percent of the population. The contribution of industries to the respective national economies of the IGAD member states is about 15-20 percent.” (IGAD 2016d). This fact notwithstanding, it is notable that land and ecological corruption are the most threatening dangers to the locale as they influence agrarian creation and financial development. Such debasement adds to the uncertainty in nourishment, starvation and the need of resources in the region.

Demeke and Gebru (2014:4) assert that “the IGAD region has been the most conflict and terrorism torn zone in the world”. This is evident in the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sudan and South Sudan and the continuous uncertainty in Somalia in particular. The region is well known for its militarism and as Roux and Kidane (2007:83) put it, “except Kenya, the governments of the IGAD region all have their roots in militarism. Militarisation in the Horn of Africa, as in many developing countries, is partly a product of structural conditions that comprise a crisis for human security and civil war”. The IGAD region is also noted as a region engulfed by struggles over economic and political powers and most of them are driven by ethnic discontent against the state and other forms of ethnic rivalries. The transnational nature of these conflicts are partly attributed to the existence of cross border social ethnic groupings in the region (Byiers 2016). This, on the contrary, should have been a significant point of connection and an opportunity for IGAD to promote regional cooperation, geopolitical and sustainable socio-economic partnership. Thus, such ethnic overlaps and cross-border affinities could have been appropriated in the region that has the potential of mitigating against the region's perennial challenges (Byiers 2016).

In a nutshell, the region is known for the recurring famine and droughts, poverty and starvation, civil conflicts and inter- state wars and political instability and underdevelopment. It is within

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<sup>9</sup> The Horn Economic and Social Policy Institute – Annual report on IGAD 2018.

such context and set of region challenges that IGAD's mandate and authority is instituted as region-building initiative and practice of regional cooperation and integration in the Horn of African. It is out of recognition of the transnational nature of the environmental, socioeconomic, political and security challenges that region that IGAD as regional organisation was instituted. As the upcoming section shows, IGAD's strategic frameworks and regional strategy choices appear to reflect these concerns and aspiration to tackle them. The next section discusses the organisational structure and institutional arrangement of IGAD.

### **3.3 IGAD's Organisational Structure and Operation**

Organisational structure of IGAD is constituted of four segments that allow all the member states to exercise their mandate and levels of power (Byiers 2016). These segments are: The Assembly of Heads of States and Government; The Council of Ministers (Foreign Affairs); The Committee of Ambassadors; and The Secretariat.

IGAD's Assembly of head of states and government is established as the supreme body of the organisation and many of the activities and directions of the organisation come from this organ. The Assembly has the authority to perform the following functions:

- (a) Make policy, direct and control the functioning of the Organisation;
- (b) Determine the main guidelines and programmes of cooperation;
- (c) Give guidelines and monitor political issues especially on conflict prevention, management and resolution;
- (d) Appoint the Executive Secretary upon the recommendation of the Council of Ministers;
- (e) Approve the scale of assessment of contributions of Member States to the budget (Article 9 of IGAD)<sup>10</sup>

Notably, the Assembly of Heads of States and Government is the highest decision making body in the organisation since it sets the principles, programme of actions, follow ups, guide and control the political processes in the region (Byiers 2016:27). According to the organizational rules, the decision making process and any decision to be taken within the organisation should be based on consensus and by general agreement. Considering the complexity of matters in the region and rivalry of states, building consensus is likely to be difficult. The rule also states that

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<sup>10</sup> Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), IGAD/SUM-96/AGRE-Doc, Nairobi, 21 March 1996, <https://www3.nd.edu/~ggoertz/rei/rei475/rei475.01tt.pdf> (accessed February 2018).

the ordinary summit of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government should take place once a year. Alternatively, it takes place upon a request of any member state/s and should be accepted by the majority of the members. However, the Assembly of Heads of States has not occurred for well over a decade.

As a matter of practice, the Assembly is to be chaired by a head of state selected through consensus and it is supposed to be rotational. There is certainty, however, in the Agreement Establishing IGAD for how long a selected head of state chairs the organisation. Presumably, this could be the reason why Ethiopia has been chairing the authority uninterrupted for almost two decades and it has shown absolute reluctance to relinquish this position which has not been well-received among some member states. Ethiopia has been getting away with this by refusing to call for the ordinary summit of Assembly of Heads of States which has not taken place for nearly ten (10) years. Using this, Ethiopia has managed to effectively block Eritrean from re-activating its membership for years (Bereketeab 2018).

IGAD's Council of Ministers is constituted of ministers of foreign affairs of member states and "one other focal Minister who shall be designated by each Member State" (Article 10).<sup>11</sup> The task of the council of ministers is to examine the political and security affairs. This includes conflict prevention, management and resolution, post-conflict building, monitoring and enhancing humanitarian activities, promoting peace and security in the sub region and making recommendations to the assembly (Article 10). In accordance with the rule of IGAD, the Council ordinarily meets twice a year and similar to the Assembly, the decisions to be made in this organ of IGAD is by consensus. Unlike the Assembly, decisions in this organ of the organisation that failed to garner consensus are made based on voting. In this organ of IGAD, as point 5 of Article 10 stipulates, should "the committee fail to reach an agreement by consensus, a decision shall be taken by two-third majority of members present and voting as long as such members constitute a legal quorum". This Council has the authority to establish "ad hoc sectoral Ministerial committees" with defined tasks and mandate established through agreement of the member states in consultation with the Secretariat within the specific terms of references and conditions. Ad hoc committees are meant to be sector specific and they can meet as regularly as they deem necessary in their effort to achieve their objectives.


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<sup>11</sup> Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), IGAD/SUM-96/AGRE-Doc, Nairobi, 21 March 1996, <https://www3.nd.edu/~ggoertz/rei/rei475/rei475.01tt.pdf> (accessed February 2018). N.B. The rest of the section is written based on this document.

The Committee of Ambassadors is another organ of IGAD which consists of assigned ambassadors from IGAD member states. The two main functions and duties of this committee are firstly, to “advise the Executive Secretary on the promotion of his efforts in realizing the work plan approved by the Council of Ministers” and secondly, to “guide the Executive Secretary on the interpretation of policies and guidelines which may require further elaboration” (Article 11, point 2). This committee is thus tasked with engaging, working with and following up on the activities of the Secretariat. This Committee then reports to and advises the respective states (Article 11). Once again, as with the Council of Ministers, this committee is expected to make decisions based on consensus failing which decisions must be based on voting.

As stated in Article 12 of the Agreement Establishing the IGAD, the Secretariat is an executive body of the authority. The main task of this body is to follow-up on the resolution of the assembly and the council dealing with draft proposals and agreements, facilitating the economic and social development policy, arranging necessary resources to administer projects and programmes agreed to by the council and implementing regional projects and policies. In a nutshell, many of the activities of IGAD, including the essential tasks of programme development, coordination, implementation and monitoring, are to be conducted by this organ. Additionally, it deals with many national and regional policies and strategies at the national and regional levels (IGAD 2016b).

**Organogram 1.** IGAD Organisational Structure (Adapted from (Byiers 2016))



To run its day-to-day activities, this organ appoints its own staff, experts and technicians made available to it by the member states and it is to be headed by the Executive Secretary who is to be appointed by the head of states of the IGAD member states with a limited term of 4 years. As things stand, Mahboub Maalim who is a Kenyan diplomat, has been heading the Secretariat since June 2008. This means that the Kenyan diplomat has been running this organization for well over a decade. It is informally reported that Eritrea, Uganda and Djibouti have been unhappy with such state of affairs. In fact, these countries have been complaining that Ethiopia (through the chairmanship of the authority) and Kenya (through the Executive Secretary) have dominated and hijacked IGAD as an extension of their foreign policy thus creating distrust in this organization and raising questions as to whether it is a genuinely regional and multilateral body or not.

In any case, there are four Directors assisting the Executive Secretary, each with specific responsibilities for agriculture and environment; economic cooperation and social development; peace and security; and administration and finance. IGAD also has additional specialized institutions and programmes with their coordinators, such as the IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP), Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), IGAD Centre for Pastoral Area and Livestock Development (ICPALD), IGAD Regional Aids Programme (IRAPP) and IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Center (ICPAC). These institutions and programmes are hosted by the member states.

### **3.4 IGAD's Strategic Framework: Linking Objectives to Programmes of Action**

In broad terms, the strategic aim of IGAD is to promote and implement the advancement of regional cooperation to attain sustainable economic development, peace and security in the Horn of Africa. The fundamental principle is that IGAD should continue to focus on the regional strategy by facilitating regional interventions and develop trans-boundary programmes with regional relevance and monitor their implementation (IGAD 2016a). In line with this, the authority upon its establishment has the following aims and objectives:

- a) Promote joint development strategies and gradually harmonize macro-economic policies and programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields;
- b) Harmonize policies with regard to trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture, and natural resources, and promote free movement of goods, services, and people and the establishment of residence;
- c) Create an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border and domestic trade and investment;



- d) Achieve regional food security and encourage and assist efforts of Member States to collectively combat drought and other natural and man-made disasters and their consequences;
- e) Initiate and promote programmes and projects for sustainable development of natural resources and environment protection;
- f) Develop and improve a coordinated and complementary infrastructure, particularly in the areas of transport and energy;
- g) Promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-State conflicts through dialogue;
- h) Mobilize resources for the implementation of emergency, short-term, medium-term and long-term programmes within the framework of sub-regional cooperation;
- i) Promote and realize the objectives of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the African Economic Community;
- j) Facilitate, promote and strengthen cooperation in research, development and application in the fields of science and technology;
- k) Develop such other activities as the Member States may decide in furtherance of the objectives of this Agreement. (Article 7 of Agreement Establishing IGAD)

Combined together, these aims and objectives speak to the aspiration of establishing an institution that will champion peace and stability, sustainable development and economic integration at the regional and continental level. Some of the core objectives of IGAD noted above speak in many ways to the Abuja road map for the establishment of RECs and regional integration. In many respects, there appears to be sufficient appraisal and understanding that peace and stability are central to the development and economic growth of the region.

What is evident from the above explication is that the main mission of IGAD is to help and engage to achieve through member states “increased economic cooperation, food security and environmental protection, promotion and maintenance of peace and security and economic cooperation and integration” (Mulugeta 2009:23). Aside from these institutional aspirations, one has to consider whether there are institutional mechanisms put in place to materialise these aspiration. This forces us to consider and explore how these are operationalised and how these are turned into specific programme of actions, IGAD’s structure, operational measures and capacities which are issues the following sections explore in some detail.

### **3.5 IGAD’s Regional Strategy and Implementation Plan**

Niekerk (2005:6) suggests that a measure of the regional organisation’s success has to “distinguish the depth of regional integration and cooperation. Forms of cooperation and intergovernmental activity may vary depending on the level of activities and form of projects, programs, policies and institutional structure and the degree of harmonizing and coordination through states, regionally and globally”. It is against this backdrop of regional integration,

therefore, that IGAD engaged in strategic planning, designing specific programmes and projects, linking the authority with members states, and other multilateral bodies. Since its inception, IGAD has developed two regional strategy documents: IGAD Regional Strategy 2011-2015 and IGAD Regional Strategy 2016-2020.

In January 2016, the organisation published the IGAD State of the Region Report, which is an effort in assessing its 2011-2015 regional strategic program. Thus, the IGAD Regional Strategy 2016-2020 is based on this assessment and is split into two documents comprising volume 1- the Framework and volume 2 – Implementation Plan. IGAD Regional Strategy 2011-2015 is, arguably, the first of its kind for the regional body. It certainly set the foundation for strategic direction, planning and implementation by facilitating regional cooperation and integration. Prior to this document, for well over a decade, the regional body had been operating for the large part with programmes set on issues and sectoral basis and with very little strategic direction.

In search for strategic planning, both the 2011-2015 and the 2016-2020 regional strategy documents were developed on a consultative basis with the stakeholders (national and regional) as well as on review of baseline studies and literature. Besides the strategic planning, these documents represent an attempt to reorder and operationalise the aims and objectives of the organisation as well as develop the areas of cooperation into specific programmes of action. For example, the Agreement Establishing IGAD (see Article 13 A) outlines around twenty crucial areas of cooperation to take effect in the sub-region. While these areas of cooperation are extensive and detailed, they feature overlapping issues and themes. The list is also too long to turn into clear a programme of action. In what appears to be an attempt to address these concerns, in IGAD's Regional Strategy of 2011-15, first ever regional strategy document, these are reformulated and regrouped into four overarching pillars as follows: Pillar 1 - Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment; Pillar 2 - Economic Cooperation, Integration and Social Development; Pillar 3 - Peace and Security, and Humanitarian Affairs; and Pillar 4 - Corporate Development Services (IGAD 2016). These pillars are meant to operationalise the objectives which IGAD has set out and turn them into concrete strategies and plan of actions.

Though IGAD had some initiatives and programmes based on the objectives and aims noted in the agreement establishing IGAD, it is through its Regional Strategy that these gained coherence and translated into action plans and programs in a period that spanned for five years. IGAD's regional strategy documents thus reflect the organisations and regional states'

aspiration to define and refine IGAD's development initiatives and chart out practical ways and means of achieving them in a sustainable way. The first one was its Regional Strategy 2011-2015, and the second one, IGAD Regional Strategy Framework and Implementation Plan 2016-2020. Each of these strategic plans were developed envisioning a five (5) years action plan, implementation and monitoring. As part of the effort to concretise the objectives of the Strategy, IGAD has produced a medium-term Implementation Plan for the 2016-2020 planning period (2016c).

The core activities of IGAD, as articulated in both IGAD's Regional Strategy 2011-2015 and IGAD Strategy and Implementation Plan 2016-2020 documents, include promoting compatible policies in the IGAD priority areas, developing policies and enhancing regional relevance and strengthening capacity building. IGAD's strategic plan of 2016-2020 identifies institutional and wide regional capacity building by creating regional, continental and international partnership to facilitate information and knowledge sharing in an early warning system thus providing a legal framework for the implementation of policies and facilitating engagement with key stakeholders. These are formulated with cognisance of the exchange of information and evaluation of the implementation process of the region's programmes using the common institutional strategies which expedite the process of IGAD's regional economic integration and policy implementation.

The main purpose of the IGAD Strategy Implementation Plan 2016-2020 is to promote economic cooperation and social development in the IGAD region through enhanced regional capacity in the following key areas: agriculture and livestock development and food security; natural resources management and environmental protection; regional economic cooperation and integration; social development; maintaining peace and security and IGAD's corporate development.

In the foreword to IGAD's Regional Strategy 2016-2020, Ambassador Mahboub Maalim, as executive secretary, claims that "[t]he Plan is based on realistic assessment of expected outcomes, focusing on the priority areas where IGAD's Secretariat has a comparative advantage as described in the strategy. The Plan 2016-2020 is designed to be the guiding mechanism for the implementation process of the IGAD strategy" (IGAD 2016c:v). Therefore, this eventually forms a comprehensive annual operational plan. The main components of the Implementation Plan 2016-2020 include funding the institutional capacity of the security reform and the implementation of peace and sustainable development programmes,

transitioning from medium-term to annual action plans and monitoring and evaluation framework (IGAD 2016c). The 2016-2020 strategic plan is committed to the provision of the necessary policy, legal and institutional frameworks for the successful implementation of the Plan in close partnership with IGAD's member states and allies to advance the region and the continent at large.

In many respects, both the 2011-2015 and 2016-2020 strategy documents are formulated within the four pillars noted above. These pillars have indeed continued to form a core structure to Regional Strategy 2016-2020 even though they featured first in Regional Strategy 2011-2015. The 2016-2020 document clearly acknowledges this by asserting that "this strategy document affirms the vision, mission, values and goals as laid out in the 2011-2015 document and attempts to update it by taking into account the internal and external environments affecting the region and the Organisation." (IGAD 2016b:25).

The usefulness of these pillars is that they are then translated into programmes of actions and projects with measurable outcomes. In the Regional Strategy 2016-2020, for example, under Pillar 1, there are 16 programs and 55 projects; Pillar 2 has 14 programs and 53 projects; Pillar 3 has 6 programs and 21 projects; and Pillar 4 has 2 programs and 23 projects. Each pillar reflects the specific strategic objectives of the organisation. The first pillar's strategic objectives are to promote attainment of food security and promote sustainable management of the environment and natural resources. The second pillar sets out to deal with the promotion of regional economic cooperation, integration and promotion of social development. For the third pillar, it is promotion of good governance, peace and security. The last pillar's objectives are to enhance the corporate capacity of IGAD to effectively deliver its mandate.

Implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the programmes and projects outlined in the strategic plan are expected to be undertaken by IGAD's Secretariat. Rather strangely, unlike the traditional M&E, the focus of IGAD's monitoring and evaluation is results-oriented as opposed to being a process involving actual activities. The specific focuses of IGAD's M&E include actual results, implementation timelines, resource allocation usage and activities related with budgets and finance.

IGAD's strategic pillars and associated programmes (particularly of those revised in 2016-2020) are designed in such a way that they align with the AU Agenda 2063 and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Following this, the strategic document itemises the

resource required to achieve these objectives and thus implement the programmes. In this regard, IGAD's Regional Strategy 2016-2020 document is a bit more detailed. Both documents have a five years programme with specific set of targets and details of budget required. 2016-2020 strategy, for example, outlines the resource and budgetary requirement of almost US\$402 dollars (IGAD 2016c:102). This amount is for all the programmes, plan of actions and the multiple strategic interventions to be carried out by various organs of the organisation.

The funding for these programmes is to be mobilised from what the document identifies as partner states, development partners and private sector. What is apparent here is that hardly any funding is expected to come from the regional member states. Such heavy reliance on external funding for such wide and expansive programmes and projects raises questions of sustainability of these plan of actions and programs. It is known that grants and foreign aids are often limited and unreliable. Predictably, the regional body is clearly aware of it. Thus, it asserts,

Execution of the Implementation Plan 2016-2020 will pose huge challenges for the IGAD Secretariat and specialised institutions in both human and financial term. In the event that additional financial and human resources will not be available, strategic decisions will be made to review the Plan and carefully prioritise the programmes to focus on. Criteria for prioritization that align with the ultimate outcomes of the Regional Strategy and follow a programmatic approach will be developed. Resource mobilization efforts will be directed to strengthening and building on the close and harmonious relationships that the IGAD has developed over the years with the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF). (IGAD 2016c:15)

Indeed, dependence on external actors for funding has the tendency of prioritising what the funders want rather than the region's own priorities.<sup>12</sup> By ways of unpacking IGAD's regional integration strategy, in the following section, I outline and explore the four pillars and consider some of their programmes, project and measurable outcomes.

### **Pillar 1: Agriculture, Natural Resource and Environment**

This pillar begins with the recognition that agriculture plays a significant role in IGAD's regional economy. It is also cognisant of the region's perennial problem of food insecurity, while agriculture still remains a dominant means of livelihood. Regional Strategy 2016-2020 states that "some 13 million of the region's 230 million population are chronically food insecure. Over 80 percent of the population in the region derive their livelihood from agriculture and, therefore, factors that affect land productivity directly constitute a continuous challenge to the welfare of the population" (IGAD 2016c:4). To this end, IGAD has a strong

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<sup>12</sup> Aspect of this is dealt with in chapter four in some detail.

policy regarding access to sufficient food, thus it encourages effective management of the environment and natural resources.

This is crucial considering the fact that the region suffers from recurring drought and famine which are induced by environmental changes and exacerbated by policy failures. Efficient and effective use of natural resources are the key inputs of regional and continental economic development. Thus, IGAD member states recognize that sustainable use of the environment and appropriations are critical to the region. A piece in the IGAD website states:

The IGAD member States recognize that a clean and healthy environment is a prerequisite for sustainable development and development activities in various productive and social sectors including agriculture and livestock, energy, industry and infrastructure may pose a negative impact leading to the degradation of the environment. (IGAD 2016d).<sup>13</sup>

This is expected in a region where more than 80 percent of its population primarily rely on traditional agriculture (which is susceptible to environmental variables) and the dominance of this sector in the regional states (see Table 3). It is worth noting, therefore, that the regional body’s major concern is the two interlocked problems of food insecurity and environmental degradation ravaging the region (IGAD 2016b). This is succinctly reflected in the organisation’s heavy investment on Pillar 1, which in some ways is also carried over from its predecessor IGADD.

*Table 2. The Contribution of Agriculture to the Economy of the IGAD’s Region*

<b>Country</b>	<b>GDP (%)</b>	<b>Employment (%)</b>	<b>Growth Rate (%)</b>
Djibouti	4.0	10	3.0
Ethiopia	43	83	7.1
Kenya	26	60	2.9
Somalia	40	71	2.6
South Sudan	15	87	3.6
Sudan	34	75	2.8
Uganda	23	72	1.5

*Source:* (IGAD 2016:11, IGAD Baseline Studies, 2014, p 11)

In order to attain food security and sustainable environmental resources management, Pillar 1 focuses on five programme areas: Agriculture, Livestock and Food Security Programme Area (include five programmes with three expected outcomes); Natural Resources Management (two components with two expected outcomes); Environment Protection Programme Area

<sup>13</sup> <https://igad.int/about-us/the-igad-region> (accessed June 9, 2017).

(three components with two expected outcomes); Climate Variability and Change and Disaster Risk Management (four components with two expected outcomes); and Applied Research and CSO Support (with research as its fundamental component (IGAD 2016c:11).

The organisation has outlined measurable indicators of success for these programmes of action which allow IGAD to contribute to the wise use, preservation and governance of natural resources (IGAD 2016c). As noted above, each of the programme areas has their own specific components/projects with determined outcomes/indicators. To demonstrate these, two programme areas of IGAD's major programmes are considered under the rubric of Pillar 1: Agriculture, Livestock and Food Security Programme, and Natural Resources Management Programme areas.

Agriculture, Livestock and Food Security Programme is split into five strategic programmes: agricultural production programme, food security programme, livestock development programme, dryland development programme and the fisheries management programme. Three main expected outcomes of these programmes are noted here: one is to improve and enhance food security through the development of agriculture, fisheries and livestock which the region is well endowed with despite struggling with agriculture which is largely dependent on erratic rainfall; two, improve livelihood and diminish poverty through agriculture development; and three, enhance resilience to natural disasters and economic shocks (IGAD 2016c).

Natural Resources Management Programme areas has two components: natural resources management framework for transboundary water resources management and renewable energy development. The expected outcomes of this programme are “enhanced regional capacity in natural resources management” with two indicators with the first one being the “ability of IGAD to contribute to the wise utilization and preservation of the natural resources base of the region and the second one being I improved transnational governance of the natural resources (IGAD 2016c:6).

The table below demonstrates that the number of projects, investment and resources IGAD put in place on agriculture, livestock and food security are much higher than the other programme areas. This is a succinct sign that agriculture is a predominant sector and it is a priority sector for IGAD. The required budget for the components and specific projects of this programme

area reveals this priority, with agriculture, livestock and food security taking the lion's share of the budget set for programmes in this Pillar (sitting close to 50% of the total budget).

*Table 3. Pillar 1: Agriculture, Natural Resource and Environment (ANRE)*

<b>Programme area</b>	<b>Number of Programmes</b>	<b>Number of Projects</b>	<b>Available \$</b>	<b>To be mobilised</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Percent available</b>
Agriculture, Livestock and Food Security (ALFS)	5	20	2,389,997	66,770,000	69,159,997	3%
Natural Resource Management (NRM)	2	6	4,239,697	22,122,897	26,362,594	16%
Environment Protection (EP)	3	6	2,032,860	11,100,000	13,132,860	15%
Climate Variability & Change and Disaster Risk Management (CVC)	4	15	16,869,090	19,315,512	36,184,602	47%
Applied Research & Community Service Organizations (ARCSO)	2	8	1,830,000	9,340,000	11,170,000	16%
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>27,361,644</b>	<b>128,648 409</b>	<b>1,560,1005</b>	<b>19.4%</b>

*Source:*(IGAD 2016c)

It is notable that considering the values of what is needed and what is already mobilised in these programmes in percentage suggests that there is a gap between aspirations and the real success of pillar 1. Evidently, the issue of environmental changes has become a critical problem in the region which has serious implications for food security and health as this has led to massive food insecurity and displacement of many of IGAD's member states with Ethiopia, South Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia being the cases in point.

## **Pillar 2: Economic Cooperation, Integration and Social Development**

Under this rubric, the aim is to enhance regional economic cooperation and social development for the region and, thus, strategically enhance regional integration. This pillar begins with the assessment of the existing level of trade in the region and in the continent. Thus, it is characterised by an extremely low level of trade of the African countries. The levels of intra-regional trades are stagnant and regional market relation and linkage are extremely small (IGAD 2016c). Notably, addressing these concerns is treated as a central component of the integration objectives and necessary conditions for the development of regional integration.



Regional Strategy 2016-2020 (IGAD 2016c:7) outlines three components under this pillar: Trade, Investment, Industry and Tourism Development Programme; Infrastructural development programme and Health and Social Development Programme. Each one of these includes specific projects and each with its own timeframe and measurable outcomes. The broader key indicators of success for this pillar include: the number of cross-border trade agreements between all the member states, establishment of a functional free trade area of IGAD, modified human development index, migration policy and strategies developed and adopted by member states (IGAD 2016c).

The first programme area of Pillar 2 deals with trade and investment, industry development and tourism to increase cross border trade and to enhance tourism in the region. The second area, the Infrastructure Development Programme, deals with the removal of the ‘physical and non-physical barriers’ to inter-state trade and investment and thus enhances safety on the transport system, mobilizes and identifies potential funding sources to issues related to socio-economic integration. Health and Social Development Programme area deals with education, health employment, migration, culture and sports. Arguably, HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria are serious health and social challenges and this programme area focuses on the protection and eradication of the health related areas for the citizens (IGAD 2016c).

The infrastructural development programme has three key programmes and these are the regional transport development, regional energy connectivity and the regional ICT promotion. Each of these has impressive projects with phased objectives and outcomes. For example, the regional body has proposed a development of what it calls Development of IGAD Regional Infrastructure Master Plan (IRIMP) as one project within the regional infrastructural development. Arguably, the vision of this master plan certainly offers an important regional strategic framework on transport connectivity which in turn would facilitate trade, economic relations and cost-effective and efficient transnational infrastructural development. The plan thus focuses on four sectors that are necessary for regional connectivity: transport, energy, ICT and transboundary water resources.

IRIMP is thus considered to have far-reaching effects on regional integration as it has the potential of increasing trade, movements of goods, services and people. These are also expected to translate into sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. Under this programme, regional strategy 2016-2020, has proposed the four outputs as part of the infrastructural development project: IGAD Regional Transport Master Plan 2014-2040; IGAD Regional

Energy Master Plan 2014-2040; IGAD Regional ICT Master Plan 2014-2040; and IGAD Regional Transboundary Water Resources Master Plan 2014-2040.<sup>14</sup> These are major projects that require serious funding which in some ways is difficult to be met by member states. This would undoubtedly lead the organisation and regional states to look elsewhere for sources of funding.

*Table 4. Pillar 2: Economic Cooperation, Integration and Social Development (ECISD)*

<b>Programme area</b>	<b>Number of Programmes</b>	<b>Number of Projects</b>	<b>Available \$</b>	<b>To be Mobilised</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Percent available</b>
Trade, Industry and Tourism Development (TITD)	3	8	100,000	2,510,000	2,610,000	4%
Infrastructure Development (ID)	3	14	4,912 500	48,839,000	53,751,500	9%
Health and Social Development (HSD)	8	31	4,400,000	35,670,000	40,070,000	11%
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>9,412,500</b>	<b>87,019,000</b>	<b>96,431,500</b>	<b>8%</b>

*Source:*(IAGD 2016c)

The above table reveals that this organisation has made slightly higher investment on health and social development than the rest. Though it is hard to consider this as suggestive of where the organisation's priority is with regards to this sector, it reflects, arguably, that this sector's developmental challenge has drawn the attention of IGAD. The above table shows that the process of intra-regional trade with member states is still very low and thus needs to mobilise aggressively to promote economic growth and health competitive trades among the member states.<sup>15</sup>

### **Pillar 3: Peace, Security, and Humanitarian Affairs**

The main aim of this pillar is to promote effective and efficient leadership, peace and stability and to address the challenges the region is facing concerning humanitarian security. Sustainable peace and the safety of all the citizens are the fundamental aspects of this pillar which are unquestionably necessary conditions for the sustainable and effective development in the region. This pillar begins with the recognition that the IGAD region experiences serious

<sup>14</sup> This next chapter considers the following in some detail as part of the regional economic integration.

<sup>15</sup> This is also a theme explored in much more detail in the upcoming chapter.

challenges because of human induced as well as natural disasters and that in addition to this, the region hosts and suffers from intra and inter-state conflicts. Conflicts and other disasters thus feature as serious concerns of IGAD member states. The programmes under this pillar entail a desire to address and respond to these issues and thus bring all opportunities for permanent peace and stability in the IGAD region (IGAD 2016b).

The Peace and Security Pillar has three programme areas with 6 programmes and 21 specific projects. The three programme areas are: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution; Trans-national Security Threats; and Governance, Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights. The conflict prevention management and resolution programme area has three components and these are Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN), Enhancing IGAD's capacity for preventive diplomacy and mediation, and Post-conflict reconstruction and development. The trans-national security threats area has three sub-programmes (namely, Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Coordination against existing, evolving and emerging Transnational Security Threats (EEE-TSTs); Enhancing Member States' and IGAD's Institutional and Human Capacities to Address EEE-TSTs; and Promoting and supporting regional and international normative, institutional/policy and programmatic frameworks to address EEE-TSTs). The governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights area has two components: one, strengthening the role of IGAD NGOs/CSOs on peace and security and other stakeholders; and two, assisting MSs in the area of democracy, good governance, elections, rule of law and HR (IGAD 2016c).

The overall indicators of success for these programmes and sub-programmes under this pillar IGAD has outlined are two; these are: one, increased utilization of IGAD regional policies and mechanisms for peace and security issues and, two, effective cooperation among member states on addressing humanitarian issues (IGAD 2016c). Under this pillar, the region trans-nation security challenged appears to have received serious consideration by the authority. The region's security and conflict affected the institution's cost immensely. Programmes in this pillar have the second highest estimated cost, amounting to US\$108,800,000 (the first one is Pillar 1 with estimated amount of US\$156,010,000). Adding thrust to the claim of priority to peace and security, the authority had already raised substantial amount of the fund needed for this while it was designing the 2016-2020 implementation plan. Indeed, as Gebru (2016:16) puts it, since its inception, "[a]xiomatically, much of IGAD's most visible work has been in the areas of peace and security." When this is combined with the fact that much of the funds

for this are allocated for development of systems and structures and coordination and collaboration in tandem with the trans-national security, one gets a clear sense of what IGAD's priority area is. Arguably, this is understandable when the number of state malaise, instability and insecurity besieging the region, particularly Somalia and South Sudan are taken into account.<sup>16</sup> What is revealing is the authority's inability to raise any fund for running Governance, Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights (GDRL), an area which the region has lagged behind in comparison to other regions in the continent.

#### **Pillar 4: Corporate Development Service**

Pillar 4 aims to promote the overall corporate capacity of IGAD to efficiently address its mandate and ensure that all the member states follow the process collectively (IGAD 2016c). Under this pillar, the authority has two programme areas and 5 programmes with a total of 23 projects. These are for the large part based on the 2015 IGAD's internal and external self-assessment. The assessments addressed all the aspects of IGAD including its historical evolution, mandate, management structure, human and financial resources, policy issues, programmes and activities, relationships and responsibilities, achievements, challenges and opportunities (IGAD 2016b). These particular assessments generated valuable recommendations which have the potential of contributing immensely to the Secretariat's drive for self-improvement. To translate these recommendations proactively into concrete actions that would engender the required transformation, the Secretariat is expected to focus on two key programme areas under Pillar 4: institutional strengthening and capacity building, research, science and technology (IGAD 2016c).

*Table 5. Pillar 4: Corporate Development Services*

<b>Programme area</b>	<b>Number of Programmes</b>	<b>Number of Projects</b>	<b>Available \$</b>	<b>To be Mobilised</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Percent available</b>
Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building Programme Area (ISAP)	4	20	38,983,000	-	38,983,000	100%
Research, Science and Technology Programme Area (RST)	1	3	-	1,700,000	1,700,000	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>38,983,000</b>	<b>1,700,000</b>	<b>40,683,000</b>	<b>50%</b>

*Source:*(IGAD 2016b)

<sup>16</sup>The chapter on peace and security deals with these initiatives and interventions.

These strategic objectives of this pillar are meant to “enhance the corporate capacity of IGAD to effectively and efficiently deliver its mandate”(IGAD 2016d). Indicators of success outlined for this include: a vibrant and more effective IGAD able to provide sustainable service delivery capacity benefits to the region and level of donor interest in ‘basket funding’ IGAD’s programmes and activities (IGAD 2016d). As the table below shows, institutional strengthening and capacity building have a considerable amount of costs, although there is a potential input for efficient and effective economic growth and the science and technology sector really need attention.

### **3.6 Financing IGAD’s Regional Strategy 2016-2020**

As we have noted above, over all, one can clearly see the comprehensive and the detailed nature of these regional strategic plans and the pillars that the authority has set out to guide its strategic 5 years plans and regional initiatives. In the end, however, there are few factors that determine its success. One can raise efficient organisational structure, political will etcetera as important factors. Nonetheless, funding and resources sit at the heart of the success or failure of these projects. For these programmes and projects to take off and deepen in the region, the availability of funds is central. There are two components to financial requirements of IGAD; one is to its institutional operations and activities and the second one is related to programmes and projects.

Despite the assertion that funding these operations is the responsibility of the member states, the authority has had to consistently look for external funders to meet the funding requirements of these projects. It is rather troubling to note that such a regional organisation considers looking elsewhere for funding and assistance as an indicator for effective delivery on its objectives of capacity building and corporate development. As the table below shows, the shortfall for funding requirement for the projects the authority has set under its strategic plan 2016-2020 is substantial. It has referred to this shortfall as “funds to be mobilised”, which is over 70% of the total fund requirement (this amounts to US\$286,170,000 out of the US\$401,930,000) (IGAD 2016c:16).

Table 6. IGAD’s Pillars and their funding requirements, RS 2016-2020

	Available funds	Funds to be mobilized	Total funds (mill.USD)	Percent available
<b>Pillar 1</b>	27.36	128.65	156.01	18%
<b>Pillar 2</b>	9.41	87.02	96.43	10%
<b>Pillar 3</b>	40.00	68.80	108.80	37%
<b>Pillar 4</b>	38.98	1.70	40.68	96%
<b>Total</b>	<b>115.76</b>	<b>286.17</b>	<b>401.93</b>	<b>29%</b>

Source: (IGAD 2016c)

These projects and programmes outlined in RS of 2016-2020 invariably have two dimensions, on the one hand, there is what the authority has to undertake as a facilitator, and on the other hand, there is what the member states need to undertake. In this sense, the funding requirements of IGAD relate to the facilitation of these projects while the actual projects would need to be funded by the member states or in cooperation with other funders. A good example is IGAD’s infrastructural development programme, such as Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSSET). As it is, IGAD will engage in the feasibility and detailing design of the studies of the LAPSSSET Railway project while the states involved would have to find the actual fund to build these on the ground. It should thus be clear that the authority’s financial requirements are limited to its already outlined intervention areas. IGAD indicates that the regional strategy 2016-2020 of its medium to long- term plans seeks to realise the desired objectives and it has delineated four intervention areas: policy development, knowledge management, research and technology and capacity building including gender issues in the respective priority areas within IGAD’s pillars (IGAD 2016c).

To deal with its project, the organisation in its RS 2016-2020 document indicates that it would seek to improve its funding schemes and mobilisation of resource, through working with member states, bilateral and multilateral donors engage with non-traditional donors and create an IGAD endowment fund (IGAD 2016c:15). The first presumption is that operational funding contributions should come from all the member states. One of the main responsibility of the member states is the cost of running the organization towards the objectives, and cost of funding projects and programmers of the authority. Considering that it has only been Kenya and Ethiopia who have been paying for the membership fee and contribute to these programmes, there cannot be any doubt that the organisation has simply been looking into external funders to meet these financial requirements. It is also not clear how the IGAD

endowment fund is going to be established while these member states are not even sufficiently contributing to these programmes.

Therefore, it is clear that meeting the organisation's financial requirements is heavily dependent on external funding sources. In fact, most of IGAD's financial means come from donors, grants, savings, subsidies and taxes from the European Union and other international financial organisations. One of the recent funds/support comes from the European Union (EU) and the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) agreement, which signed a 42 million euros grant to assist and capacitate IGAD with resources to carry out peace and security agendas in the Horn of the African region. The agreement was signed on March 23, 2018 (Ashenafi 2018; IGAD 2016b). Notably, the grants made available from external funders have been focused on Pillar 3: peace and security. For example, the grant agreement with Australian government, which covers a four-year period from 2018 to 2022, is geared towards improving its conflict early warning systems and thus become more skilled in mediation and countering transnational security threats in the region. Another funding agreement IGAD entered with the governments of Austria and Sweden focuses on, once again, Pillar 3.

This agreement is one of many initiatives being funded by the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUETFA), which was established to promote stability and address the fundamental causes of migration and displaced persons in the region. The main objective of this agreement which will be implemented for the coming four years is to advance the IGAD conflict early warning and response mechanism. These are meant to enable cooperation between member states and at large the continent on countering transnational security threats. Additionally, the skills of IGAD and national governments in the region is sought to be enhanced for preventive diplomacy and mediation and thus provide capacity building and core staffing for IGAD's peace and security division (Ashenafi 2018).

It is notable, therefore, that dependence on external donors has the tendency of being skewed by the geopolitical interests of the donors and may not reflect the region's priority. As a result, the pillars and projects meant to deal with the region's most pressing problems still lack sufficient funding. IGAD is still struggling to find funding for Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 for which the authority had only managed to raise 18% and 10% respectively in 2016 and not much has been collected since then. What these perhaps reveal is that both external funders and IGAD's priority is towards peace and security. Arguably, peace and security are major concerns in the Horn of Africa region where IGAD's member states are located. The broader objectives for

these countries is the authority engages in the region and work cooperatively with the regional states to deal with peace and security. These activities are meant to improve the collection and distribution of early warning data so that IGAD and its member state governments can take action in time to prevent conflicts. These funding include financing the cost of sending mediation teams into conflicts ridden areas and thus offer training in mediation and preventive diplomacy to improve the skills of the mediators. These external funders' agreements are also geared towards trans-national security threats such as violent extremism and terrorism and work together towards finding lasting solutions.

The ultimate goal of regional integration entails cooperation and coordination among the neighbouring states. IGAD has the strategic framework of enhancing the poor economic condition in the region. In 1997, IGAD member states identified that the integration should be a mutual collaboration and guidance rather than the practice of donor-recipient relationship with the dependency syndrome (Weldesellassie 2011). As a result, the IGAD Partnership Forum (IPF) was established for development to assist member states “with funds for sub-regional development programmes, focussing on infrastructure projects. The IPF worked with IGAD at three levels: technical expert level, operational/ambassadorial level and policy or ministerial level” (Weldesellassie 2011:4). Therefore, both member states shared a common vision and objectives. According to Hartmann (2016), currently, IPF comprises the “United Nation Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank, International Organisation for Migration, European Union, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy Japan, Netherland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA” (Hartmann, 2016).

### **3.7 Conclusion**

The chapter outlined IGAD's strategic framework, the structure and operational strategy with four major pillars identifying cooperation as a critical factor among the member states. The core objective of IGAD is thus to pursue economic cooperation and regional integration by averting and eliminating security threats in the region as they negatively affect the economic cooperation and development in the region. IGAD's successive regional strategic plans and the pillars within which these are conceptualised are evidently comprehensive and expansive. However, the lack of funding and its skewed nature as it focuses on peace and security reveals the challenges this organisation faces in its effort to implement these strategic plans. There is need for IGAD member states to mobilize and allocate proper funding mechanisms that should strengthen and sustain IGAD.



The regional body needs to look into internal funding mechanisms. Such meaningful strategy regarding funding can reduce being dependent on external donors which comes with strings attached that have the potential of hampering its activities in all priority areas (Wafula 2015). There is thus need for the region to develop a funding strategy to be independent and self-supporting to mobilize sufficient amount of financial and technical resources in order to successfully implement the plan earmarked to span from 2016 to 2020. Security is a great concern for the IGAD's region. The continuous unstable security and peace in the region made it difficult for the institution to exercise its institutional mandates and financial resources as planned. The institution spends much time and efforts on conflicts and the sustainability of peace and security rather than the economic development of the region, wellbeing of the citizen's extreme poverty, famine and unemployment in the region. Member states have to work closely for socio-economic and political integration to materialise. Thus, the peacebuilding approaches need a strong collaboration of all the member states for sustainable, permanent and long-term peace building in each member state at the regional level.

IGAD's strategic plan spanning from 2016 to 2020 is designed "on a realistic and actual assessment of expected outcomes, focusing on the priority areas where IGAD Secretariat has a comparative advantage as described in the strategy"(IGAD 2016b:5). Both phases of the strategic plan of the authority were based on key pillars, with key objectives, programmes of actions and specific outcomes and indicators. This study posed the following questions: How much has been achieved through translating this pillar in real practices of IGAD specifically as it relates to good governance, rule of law conducive and supportive business environment? Do all IGADs strategies achieve the desired aim and objectives accordingly? So, the final outcomes of this pillar are expected to be real practices at the regional and national level that entail law and institutions making, establishment of efficient bureaucracy, conducive business environment, and sustained business support. Thus, the next two chapters closely examine the two pillars namely, peace and security, and Economic Cooperation and Integration and Social Development.

## Chapter Four

### Reflection on IGAD's Regional Economic Integration Project

#### 4.1 Introduction

The exploration of the context of IGAD's economic integration initiative begins with considering its mandate as part of the RECs and the direction given to them in the Abuja Treaty. de Melo and Tsikata (2013) note that "the RECs were to be the 'building blocs' of the hoped-for African union in the immediate postcolonial era. Now, they are central for implementing the socio-economic and security plan in the region" (de Melo and Tsikata 2013:4). IGAD, as one REC in the Horn of Africa's region, was formed in line with the direction specified by the Abuja Treaty for the formation of RECs. The purpose of these RECs include promoting economic growth, inclusive socio-economic development and industrialisation in the continent. These are meant to materialise through measured and step-by-step regional economic integration of the continent constituting the sub-regional blocks – such as IGAD.

Formulating short and long-term strategic plans requires honest assessment of the existing conditions within which the RECs are operating. As explored in Chapter Three explores, IGAD as one of the RECs of this region has developed two five years strategic plans (from 2011-2015 and 2016-2020) which are also in many respects linked to three important targets: the Abuja Treaty for Continental Integration, AU's Agenda 2063, and the UN's SDG. These strategic plans of IGAD consider the developmental, political and economic dimensions and thus link to these continental and global agendas. Most importantly, these plans are also aware of the linkages and intertwined nature of the problems the region is facing and the solution therefor. This has been established in Chapter Three while exploring the four pillars the regional body outlined as part of IGAD's strategic plan.

While acknowledging these linkages, this chapter, however, confines itself to the economic integration dimension of the regional integration project. This chapter, therefore, focuses only on two programme areas of Pillar 2: trade, investment, industry and tourism development programme and the infrastructural development programme. This chapter also, assesses the performance of IGAD member states drawing assessment data mainly from the data made available by the Economic Commission for Africa and IGAD's state of the region report.

As succinctly stated in the Abuja Treaty, regional integration is viewed as a route to addressing economic and developmental challenges of the region. In this sense, economic integration and cooperation, within the context of RCs, are crucial in transforming the region's economy and socioeconomic conditions. In line with this, IGAD has placed these within its regional strategic framework with the impulse of prioritising regional networks of infrastructure (ICT, transportation and energy) and trade. This chapter thus explores these initiatives in the IGAD region by assessing their progress and trajectory. This chapter discusses how the various projects are conceptualised under the rubric of intra-regional economic integration and trade in the greater Horn of Africa region. In line with this, this chapter also explores what the regional body has put in place and proposed in order to achieve economic and technological integration among its member states. Following these, the chapter engages with the conditions and factors influencing these aspirations.

#### **4.2 Context for Economic Integration in the IGAD Region**

The IGAD region is undoubtedly a region that, in as much it is struggling politically, is suffering economic challenges. Of these, the most formidable ones are poverty, unemployment, and failing agriculture as a result of land and environmental degradation. It is for this reason that IGAD's (IGAD 2016b) strategic document links sufficiently the food security and drought and disaster reduction with its economic and market integration approaches. This is a recognition that the greater Horn of Africa region's profound threats of land and environmental degradation pose serious threats to its economic growth and agricultural production. Such conceptualisation considers economic integration as having ripple effects in the material and social wellbeing of the population in the region.

In recognition of this, IGAD has set out to deal with economic integration in its regional strategic plan. These aspirations and objectives are reflected succinctly in two of its Pillars: Pillar 1 - Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment and Pillar 2 - Economic Cooperation, Integration, and Social Development. The obvious is that elements of these pillars feed into and overlap with each other despite their presentation as being under two separate pillars. The regional body also envisioned the programmes under these pillars to be strategically linked to the UN's SDG set for 2030 and the AU's Agenda 2063. As already noted, Pillar 1 focuses fundamentally on environmental related challenges the region is facing while Pillar 2 is geared to engage with social and economic challenges. Both Regional Strategic plans (2011-2015 and 2016-2020) IGAD has developed consider Pillar 2 as a measure of addressing

the economic challenges of the region by focusing on trade, investment, industry and tourism, along with the necessary infrastructural development to make this happen (what is slightly different on 2016-2020 is the inclusion of health and social development).

IGAD's own self-assessment also reveals that insufficient infrastructure, lack of market linkages, poor intra-regional and national trade characterise the region's economic space (IGAD 2016b, 2016a). This is a huge disadvantage in the global competitive market. The regional body thus claims that its "over-arching objective of regional integration is to create an open, unified, regional economic space for private operators which is a single market open to competitive entry and well integrated into the global economy" (IGAD 2016b:9). The authority also indicates that the region in addition to the above needs to reconfigure its connectivity in terms of infrastructure, ICT and energy as priority areas (IGAD 2016c).

Beyond this, as the Economic Commission for Africa (2018) points out, sustained and improved business environment, good political and economic governance and management, social development strategies that are consistent with the needs of the industrial and modern sectors are required. Getting this done requires embracing regionalism and genuine cooperation of the member states and openness to the coordination of their economic and trade policies. Arguably, indeed, buttressing regionalism is seen in many respects as a fundamental solution to many of the challenges the region is facing.

To encourage mutual benefits, states, civil societies, political and economic elites in the region must develop transnational thinking, relations and bonds to transcend the interest of states and aligning partnerships with national, regional and international cooperation at large. For these to be effect it is necessary to work with and through the four core strategies towards creating economic cooperation within the sub-region (ECA 2018). These are based on encouraging agricultural production; promoting free trade and enlarging regional market; enhancing the development of regional investment and rationalization of industrialization; attracting tourism, developing infrastructure and communication among the member states (ECA 2018).

In addition to this, necessary institutions, policies and programmes need to be put in place in order to ensure structural transformation and industrialisation of the member states. Arguably, conducive socio-economic conditions, peace and security as well as political will are equally important to ensure that these outcomes are realised (ECA 2015:9). Notwithstanding the declared allegiances for regionalism among the member states, it is very hard not to see the

rivalry and competition among them. In many instances it has been established that a gain for one country is treated as a loss for the other. A typical example in this regard relates to ports which are already servicing (Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia) and those with the potential of servicing Ethiopia (Eritrea, Kenya) which exhibit subtle rivalry.

Regrettably, the regional member states' engagement in economic and trade relations are often characterised by competition rather than cooperation and agreed upon regional strategy on these. This is understandable since these are defined and influenced significantly by the political economy of the state rather than regionalism through cooperating on and complementing each other. True to the political economy of intergovernmentalism, the regional states entered the block with the intention of promoting the national interests thus opening up the block for multi-pronged competition and rivalry for dominance and control. The argument is that without strategic regional trade, exchange and cooperation, agroindustry, technology and environment, it is unclear when and how social, economic and political modernisation will be realised.

Thus, the more pressing concern is whether IGAD as a regional body has the necessary political and material space as well as the requisite institutional capacity to develop its own policy and thus carry out its mandate. In other words, there is need to weigh its administrative authority with defined power over its spheres of influence with the view of exercising its will and thus accomplish its aims autonomously (Weldesellassie 2011). Thus, there is need to evaluate the organisation beyond the declarations and reports on what it actually set out as programmes and projects and its capacities as critical components towards achieving its core objectives and thus turn regional agreements into effective practice.

What is apparent is that the region has huge potential as its combined GDP sits at about US\$313 Billion and the population size over 268 million which mostly is a young population (see the table below). These are suggestive of the region's collective potentials in terms of shared markets, trade and size of the economy. Also, the region has a large area covering "mineral resources that have not yet been fully utilized as a result of the main challenges in maximizing the agricultural potential of the IGAD's region stemming from the high degree of lack of consistency in the rainfall patterns as they occur both in space and in time" (IGAD 2016b:25).

**Table 7:** Regional Indicators for IGAD

<b>Selected regional indicators for IGAD (2017)<sup>17</sup></b>	
<b>GDP</b>	\$313.4 billion
<b>GDP per capita</b>	\$1167
<b>Area (sq. km)</b>	5.5 million sq. km
<b>Total population</b>	268.458 million
<b>Total imports</b>	\$61.8 billion
<b>Total exports</b>	\$32.1 billion

The region's economies are also the least developed and less diverse. Despite the fact that the IGAD region has been experiencing a steady growth over the decade, it still has a combined balance of payment negative US\$29.7 Billion (2017). The region's strong economies are Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia. Thus the bulk of the GDP of the region comes from these countries. Thus far, the region's economy depends for the large part on agriculture and export of basic commodities (from agriculture and mining). Developing the intra-regional trade and having the economies and market linked will offer the region the much needed boost to transform these economies.

Expanding linkages and relations of the region's economies would benefit tremendously the much needed development and transformation of the region. Unfortunately, institutional costs of trade and the business environment of the member states are rather prohibitive for this to materialise. This combined with the corruption and uncertainties have made cross-boundary ventures unappealing. Consequently, there is a region of states with small local markets and the disintegration of regional businesses whose linkages are dominated by ties with outside economies outside the region. These conditions in turn translate into lack of proper economies in the production of goods and services (Hartzenberg 2011). For example, while the oil produced in South Sudan is exported outside of the region, the regional states continue to purchase oil from the Middle East. Arvis *et al* (2016:463) point out "that trade costs are generally higher in the developing world than in the developed world but the problem is particularly severe for the poorest developing countries."

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<sup>17</sup> <https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx> (accessed August 2019)

It is also particularly notable that the process of regional integration has been hampered by unconstrained expenditure and misappropriation of public funds after the independence of the African states (Qobo 2007). To add to this, most of the IGAD member states have quite low governance indicators (Thonke and Spliid 2012). These are combined effects on the regional economic integration. On the one hand, misuse and abuse of public resource takes resources away from the most pressing areas of infrastructural development and other public investments. On the other hand, these behaviours often have the tendency of negatively shaping policy spaces which in such situations subject the trans-boundary economic and trade policies to possibilities of being hijacked by economic and political elites. In other words, regional projects and programmes would be more than likely to be evaluated within the narrow interests of these corrupt political and economic elites. In recognition of this problem, the regional body states that “[c]urrently all protracted and complicated problems in the IGAD region relate to an absence of legitimacy either due to unpopular governance and intolerance to diversity or the lack of capacity and political will to deliver public goods” (IGAD 2016a:44-45).

The IGAD region has been receiving the lowest share of FDI per capita, comparing to the other RECs of the continent for more than ten years (2005-2017) and these are attributable to the issues and challenges noted above. Also, accounting for this state of affairs are the civil wars and conflicts (both intra and inter-states ones) that have been ravaging the region for a while. These are the underlying factors framing the region’s economies, its potentials and challenges. Thus, the regional economic integration initiatives would have to be considered within the context of these underlying conditions in the region. The strategic plans of IGAD for the last two five (5) years cycle have pointed out these challenges and opportunities and formulated the specific programmes/projects as the regional level as a response to them. The following section thus assesses the regional economic integration initiatives of IGAD over this period mainly drawing from ECA’s regional integration reports and IGAD’s own self-assessment.

#### **4.3 Assessing Regional Economic Integration of IGAD Member States**

As already noted, economic integration in Africa is seen as a route to transforming the continent to ensure development and wellbeing of its people. Economic integration is also one of the most important pointers for regionalism and regional integration. Economic integration thus features as one of the crucial indicators for the African region’s Index which is an index that measures the stages, success and progress of the integration process in Africa. ECA developed for the African economic integration index is the most widely used one. The main aim of the

Index is to comprehensively assess the regional economic integration processes and dynamics by focusing on the mechanisms, strategy and policy directions. This index uses five indicators to measure integration. These are regional infrastructure, trade integration, productive integration, free movement of people and financial and macroeconomic integration (ECA 2016a). Each of these has its own specific indicators which are outlined in the following (taken from ECA 2016a:11).

**Regional infrastructure:** the main target in this is that each state has to facilitate trade and investment opportunity by providing transportation, financial intuitions and arrange communication networks for the purpose of mutual sustainable economic development in the region. This is measured by using the following indicators: Infrastructure Development Index: transport; electricity; ICT; water and sanitation; and Proportion of intra-regional fights; Total regional electricity trade (net) per capita; Average cost of roaming.

**Trade integration:** this focuses on economic integration which deals with the collective coordination of trade policies among the member states and the region as a whole, weighed against the extent of tariff and non-tariff restrictions on trade and investment. It has the following indicators: Level of customs duties on imports; Share of intra-regional goods exports (% GDP); Share of intra-regional goods imports (% GDP); and Share of total intra-regional goods trade (% total intra-REC trade).

**Productive integration:** this entails the fair division of intra-regional intermediate exports within the member states (African Union 2016). According to the Index, the productive integration works on the percentage of intra-regional goods exports and it has the following specific indicators: Share of intra-regional intermediate goods exports (% intra-regional exports); Share of intra-regional intermediate goods imports (% intra-regional imports); and Merchandise Trade Complementarity Index.

**Free movement of people:** it is directly measured by considering legislations governing the movement of people and the ratification of the free movement of people from one member state to other states without requiring a visa for entry. The following are its indicators: Proportion of REC member countries whose nationals do not require a visa for entry; Ratification (or not) of REC protocol on free movement of persons; and Proportion of REC member countries whose nationals are issued with a visa on arrival.



**Financial and macroeconomic integration:** this measures the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies at the regional level and intergovernmental policy development on these. Its indicators are Regional convertibility of national currencies and Inflation rate differential (based on HPCI).


These indicators and value measures in many instances relate to what IGAD has developed as programmes, projects and indicators of success. For example, the infrastructural development programme area has three important sub-programme areas (Regional ICT Promotion; Regional Transport Development; and Regional energy interconnectivity). These have direct relations within items listed under the regional infrastructural indicator developed by ECA (transport, electricity, ICT, water and sanitation).

There are two ways in which the data is presented by ECA for regional economic integration in the continent. One set of data explores the integration index of each member state and the other data set is presented as regional performance. A specific score is presented on each member state considering their performance in each of the indicators of regional integration. As the data below shows, Kenya and Uganda have the highest scores in the regional integration index, weighed against the overall integration scores with various indicators of the IGAD member states (ECA 2018). Except for Uganda and Kenya (scoring 0.67 and 0.76 respectively), the rest of IGAD members states integration index score is, once again, below average which is the average score considered [0.5].

Based on the overall dimension scores, Uganda and Kenya score high on “Trade integration (TI); Productive integration (PI); Free movement of people (FMP) and the Financial and macroeconomic integration (FMI)” (ECA 2018). Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea scores average while South Sudan and Somalia are the lowest performers. It is not surprising that South Sudan and Somalia scores are extremely low considering their political context. However, below is the average score of Sudan which is something that requires explanation. All IGAD member states, except Somalia, are simultaneously members of COMESA. As members of COMESA, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan have the lowest integration index and are sitting at the bottom four out of 20 states (ECA 2016a:14). It should be noted that almost all the member states of IGAD have overlapping membership with COMESA (Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea, Sudan, Djibouti), EAC (Kenya and Uganda), and CEN-SAD (Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea,

Sudan, Somalia). These overlapping memberships entail differential economic relations and structural linkages and thus shape the differential scores in the indexes.

Figure 3. Summary of each country’s ranking for IGAD



Source: <https://www.integrate-africa.org/rankings/regional-economic-communities/igad/>

Uganda and Kenya are also countries that are in East African Community (EAC) and COMESA. Two factors account for their better than average performance in the integration index. Firstly, both of them are in EAC, and EAC has pushed the integration project a bit more than the rest. Indeed, EAC is the better performing region in all the indicators with the exception of Financial and macroeconomic integration [with the score of 0.156]. Secondly, this is accounted for by their colonial legacy since as British colonies their economic, trade and social infrastructures are connected. Kenya is the performer in the IGAD region, scoring highly on the four indicators of regional economic integration (on trade integration; productive integration; free movement of people; and financial and macroeconomic integration).

Uganda has the highest score on free movement of people, trade integration and productive integration. This is accounted by Uganda’s unique position deriving from its historical structural linkages to Kenya and Tanzania and as a land locked state (thus dependent on regional states for export and trade) and a member of EAC and IGAD. Similarly, Djibouti has scored high on three areas: productive integration, regional infrastructure and financial and macroeconomic integration. Undeniably, these are directly linked to Djibouti’s structural linkage to the Ethiopian economy as Djibouti depends on Ethiopia for water, electricity and other commodities, and it is also the major outlet for Ethiopian import and export. Somalia’s and South Sudan’s poor performance certainly have to do with the political instability and crisis

that these countries have had to endure. Somalia's crisis, for example, has lasted for almost three decades.

The ECA report shows that IGAD has the following scores in the specific indicators of integration: trade Integration (0.5), regional infrastructure (0.63), productive integration (0.43), free movement of people (0.45), and financial and macroeconomic integration (0.22). The IGAD region scores the highest [0.63] in the regional infrastructure when compared to the other continental RCs and extremely low in financial and macroeconomic integration [0.22].

The intra-IGAD member states trade (both for import and export) constitute 14% of the total trade of the regional block. Although this appears to be positive, it is still significantly lower than the region's trade with the rest of the world (for example, China 21% and the EU 16%).<sup>18</sup> All of the IGAD member states' import from Africa is less than 20%, while their export is also far too low. These are indicative of the extent to which trade and market integration in IGAD has been slower than the aspirations and declaration. IGAD (2011; 2016b), in its regional strategic documents has indicated to work towards regional economic cooperation and integration and open a single regional economic space with a single market. These are meant to focus on the development of integrated regional infrastructure and a gradual harmonisation of policies. Despite these declarations of intent, there are hardly any noticeable signs signifying actual progress. There is no regional trade agreements at the IGAD level for example. It should be noted also that IGAD has approved a Minimum Integration Plan in January 2012 whose objective was economic cooperation, integration of trade as well as harmonisation of trade policies and standards. Contrary to this set objective, there is nothing substantive in these regard after ten (10) years.

IGAD member states' slow progress in these stems from the multiple overlapping memberships and unequal development in the integration process of these REC. These uneven developments create an environment for states in the IGAD region to take extreme precaution, with the other REC member states showing a significant progressive level of market integration. For example, three of the IGAD member states (Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan) are members of EAC with far more advanced market integration which is splitting the IGAD member states. Another one is the progress in COMESA (to which most of IGAD member states belong) is pushing for

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<sup>18</sup>The data for these is compiled from UNCTAD database, and data for 2017.

market integration and aligning itself with other RECs. Thus, alignments and coordination of policies among the RECs are the only outlets out of such concerns.

Nevertheless, IGAD's performance in trade integration cannot be discounted. It sits as the third best performing REC (with EAC 1<sup>st</sup>, and UMA 2<sup>nd</sup> and a tie with COMESA). IGAD's performance in this is for the large part aided by its members in EAC and COMESA. This is reflected in the fact that it has scored the highest in the level of customs duties on imports which are by far determined as part of both EAC (which has level of customs duties on imports score [1]) and COMESA), while performing poorly in the intra-regional trade (% of total intra-REC), import [% of GDP] and export [% of GDP] (0.46, 0.18 and 0.42 respectively).<sup>19</sup> Once again, the region block is also performing better than the other continental RECs on productive integration. Arguably, IGAD's performances on these are primarily supported by Kenya and Uganda whose performance scores are aligned with EAC and COMESA.

The regional block has scored low on another crucial regional economic integration indicators which are financial and macro-economic integration. The IGAD region has zero score on regional convertibility of national currencies and it has no plan or proposal on these either. This is certainly a disincentive for intra-regional trade and investment. Djibouti is the better performing country in the block with financial and macro-economic integration which in many respects is suggestive of its deeper integration with the Ethiopian economy rather than its performance towards integration with the regional block as a whole.

The regional block is one of the poorly performing RECs in terms of the free movement of people. In fact, IGAD does not have any discernible protocol governing the movement of people within the region. Neither have the regional states ratified the AU's REC protocol on the free movement of persons. While Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea have expanded their list of countries whose nationals do not require a visa, visa on arrival appears to be the dominant rule in the IGAD region. These are indeed functions of the bilateral agreement states in the region have entered into with each other rather than a collective IGAD-based dispensation.

Integration in terms of regional infrastructure is where IGAD has done better than the other RECs. IGAD has the highest score on regional infrastructure (0.63) when compared to the other RECs. Its specific scores of each indicator for regional infrastructure integration is as follows:

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<sup>19</sup><https://www.integrate-africa.org/rankings/dimensions/trade-integration/>.

Infrastructure Development Index (0.53); Proportion of intra-regional flights (0.39); Total regional electricity trade (net) per capita (0.82); Average cost of roaming (0.40). Clearly, electricity trade among the regional states is the highest and this is essentially a significant contribution of Ethiopia with its massive hydro electricity output and trade with its neighbours (Kenya, Sudan, Djibouti, and potentially South Sudan and extending to Tanzania). South Sudan and Djibouti have the highest score in the regional infrastructural development.

In its two strategic documents IGAD has expressed the desire to expand regional infrastructural development with multiple programmes and projects outlined in this regard. These include development of regional physical infrastructure (road, rail, port, and air transportation) and integration in energy (oil, gas, hydropower, wind and geothermal energy). The specific projects outlined under the rubric of Pillar 2 of IGAD's regional strategic documents are very clear in this regard.

IGAD has proposed multiple projects which range from constructing new transnational highways, electricity grids and ICT projects to upgrading existing ones (IGAD 2016c). These include IGAD Regional Transport Master Plan 2014-2040; IGAD Regional Energy Master Plan 2014-2040; IGAD Regional ICT Master Plan 2014-2040; and IGAD Regional Transboundary Water Resources Master Plan 2014-2040. These are outlined along with their proposed timeframes to fit with the African Union agenda 2063 of building the necessary infrastructure and ICT to support Africa's integration and development (ECA 2015).

As part of such initiatives, IGAD has designed what it calls the Horn of Africa Initiative (HOAI) to enhance the regional connectivity, with an eye on promoting IGAD's economic competitiveness. A typical example in this regard is the LAPSET Corridor programme which is by far the most complex and advanced projects the IGAD region has ever embarked upon. The ambitious project intends to connect Kenya, Ethiopia and South Sudan with an oil pipe line, inter-regional highway and gauged railway lines. This project is conceptualised to connect the Lamu Port of Kenya with these three countries both for logistic and tourism purposes. However, the fact that such a huge project would only be connecting three countries has not gone down well with the other regional states, particularly, Sudan and Uganda. In reaction to this, Uganda has been in talks with Tanzania on a similar project, with the exclusion of Kenya and Ethiopia. Ethiopia has also pursued separately the South Sudan-Ethiopia-Djibouti pipeline. These are suggestive of the incoherent bilateral and trilateral strategies, and often built with

rivalry and competition. Besides these, many of the projects under this rubric are embattled by lack of internal funding and sustained political commitment to see them through.

Thus, developing a coherent regional economic integration strategy, with elaborate and inclusive agreement and policies and the necessary institutions to sustain them is crucial to materialising these aspirations. The IGAD member states thus need to reach consensus on how to configure the regional trade, market, infrastructure, and macroeconomic policies in order to make substantive progress in regional integration (RI) and ensure a better life for the citizens in the respective member states. Member states should see the opportunities in these regional economic integration initiatives and thus engage in complementing instead of competing with each other. In other words, they need to stop assuming one's gain would be the other one's loss. Avoiding such perception also requires developing an inclusive regional project and programmes that would boost the economies of the region. Thus, for the regional economic integration to succeed and meaningfully impact positively on all the member states, efficient regional institutions, inclusive projects, and evenly distributed capacities and infrastructures are critical.

#### **4.4 Linking the Economic Integration, Agriculture, Social Development and Environment**

The IGAD region's regional strategic plan considers social development such as health, labour, gender issues as crucial elements of its regional integration plan. Health and social development (with social protection, education, migration, gender as central concerns) are treated as central to the region's development and there must be regional measures and coordination at the regional level. The youth and sports programs are the most ambitious ones in this category. These are clear indications that the regional body considers economic integration as going hand in hand with sociocultural integration. Besides this, most of these issues have regional dimensions and as such do require regional responses.

In addition to the above, the regional block is also cognisant of the challenges environmental changes and the degradations pose to the population and countries in the region. These changes do not only contribute to extreme poverty, lack of sufficient food and famine but also have implications for socio-economic and political burdens whose outcomes are conflicts which exacerbate poverty and unemployment. Therefore, managing natural resources is conceptualised as a fundamental platform for all IGAD member states towards the eradication

of extreme poverty, effective and efficient economic progress and sustainable peace in the Horn of the African region.

In recognition of this, the regional body has outlined these in its regional strategic plan by dedicating it as one of its leading pillars with multiple programmes and projects. In these projects, agriculture, livestock, fishery, water resources and their development and management are outlined. Transboundary energy development, environmental protection, and resource management are integral parts of Pillar 2.

Arguably, IGAD emphasises the linkages between economic integration and market access and its aspiration to ensure food security and drought/disaster reduction. Thus, the pursuit of economic integration as part of the authority's vision of regionalism is deemed to have direct and direct implications to growth in the agricultural sector and its strategies of ensuring food security and drought resilience.

In its regional strategic plan for 2016-2020, IGAD has proposed that there be development of a regional policy framework on fertiliser and seed industry and the inter-regional development of these must boost agricultural production in the region. Beside this, cross border training and knowledge and skill sharing are developed as part of such strategy. Particular attention is paid to the Climate Smart Agriculture which is one that is sensitive to climate variability from which the region suffers and on which commodity value chains are to be configured within the region. The authority also proposed to boost the regional agricultural production with the use of environmentally friendly, sustainable technological inputs (such as fertilisers and improved seed varieties).

Livestock development is another important project the regional body has identified. This is a critical step considering the fact that a significant portion of the population in this region depends on animal husbandry and as such they are often severely affected by climate changes and drought. The trans-boundary nations of these pastoralist communities are known for taking their livestock across borders for pasture and water and this necessitates trans-boundary environmental management and agricultural goods and livestock monitoring and regulating programmes.

The activities cited above do certainly have forward and backward linkages with other sectors in the economies of the region. Besides their immediate benefits to food security, building resilience to environmental changes and poverty reduction provided that they are sufficiently

developed, their potential impact to regional economic growth and transformation is tremendous. Arguably, these are interconnected and intertwined in many respects.

As impressive as these well elaborate projects and programmes that IGAD region has put in its regional strategic plan are their implementation is a critical factor to be considered. So far, however, the authority has not received sufficient support to make most of these projects take off. As already indicated, these probably do not feature in the list of priorities of the funders which is suggestive of the need for the regional body to find internal (intra-regional) funding mechanisms which would enable it to pursue its own priorities.

#### **4.5 Conclusion**

This chapter explored IGAD's regional economic integration initiatives and assessed their performances and thus offered tentative remarks on the progress and shortcomings in these. The context and dynamics for the IGAD regional economic integration were also explored. These are characterised by competition and rivalry, conflict and tension. Notably, the IGAD region is known for the various intra-state and inter-state conflicts which make regional economic integration very frail and slow moving, if not completely difficult. Far more pressing are the challenges to consensus building, coordination of programmes and projects and policies under these conditions.

This chapter also assessed the region's performance on economic integration by drawing data from the ECA and the UNCTAD. The IGAD region and the member states have mixed performances in the regional economic integration index. Compared to the rest of African RECs, IGAD has low overall performance on the regional economic integration. While the IGAD region still has significant room for improvement, it has done well in terms of regional infrastructure. Nevertheless, it is clearly lagging in all the other indexes of regional economic integration.

Kenya and Uganda are the better performers within the region while South Sudan and Somalia lag behind. While Kenya's score on the regional integration index is the highest Somalia and South Sudan score the lowest. Integration in the region, for large part, is driven by the regional power houses namely, Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya which are also the major contributors to the regional economy with Ethiopia at 29%, Sudan at 28.5% and Kenya at 27.7% and these countries contribute to the regional GDP.



## Chapter Five

### IGAD's Peace and Security Strategy/Architecture

#### 5.1 Introduction

The Horn of Africa has gained the reputation of being a site not only of civil wars but also of intra-state and interstate conflicts. The IGAD member states are marked by lack of credibly elected national leaders and pervasive civil strife, wars and border conflict which are issues that have sustained a decade of fighting in the region (Weldeslassie 2011). Another dimension to these conflicts has been the state collapse in Somalia in the 1990s which gave rise to piracy and terrorism in the region to increasingly become transnational. It is against this backdrop, therefore, that from its constitution, IGAD has given particular attention to peace and security in the region. The emphasis here has been on peaceful settlement of these conflicts with specific focus on how to deal with intra- and inter-state conflicts through dialogue. Regional security in the IGAD region is, however, defined by geopolitical interdependence of the member states on security issues.

It is known now that the security challenges in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti and Kenya cannot be untangled as the tension in the respective countries has ramifications for the other countries irrespective of whether the conflicts are inter-state or intra-state. Although Ethiopia has waged wars with Somalia, it is now operating as a peacekeeping force (this is along with the presence of non-peacekeeping military force and undue political influence, which adds contradiction to its role). As a result, Somalia is still struggling to emerge as a functioning state. It is ironic that the regional states' (Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya)<sup>20</sup> security is completely reliant on a stable Somalia. Eritrea has had protracted conflict with Ethiopia with a longstanding border conflict and rivalry and this conflict has drained the resources of both countries thus pushing them to the verge of instability. Sudan's multiple intrastate conflicts and the civil war tearing apart South Sudan have regional dimensions. The superpowers' naval and military base in Djibouti shape the dynamics in the region. Somalia's instability too has become a breeding ground for terrorists and other non-state actors operating in multiple states in the region.

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<sup>20</sup>What are considered here are the presence of ethnic Somalis in these countries – potentially dragging the Somalia clan conflict and tension into these states, the cross-border presence of Al Shabab, and the various terrorist attacks in Kenya and Ethiopia.

In this chapter, therefore, the focus of the discussion is on IGAS's peace and security architecture and its strategy that are designed to address these problems. This chapter also explores IGAD's interventions in the Somalia and the South Sudan conflicts by probing into how IGAD member states act collectively to address peace and security challenges of the region. Two I important concerns are central to this aspect of the inquiry. On the one hand, regional actions and interventions in the context of the complexities of conflicts and tension in the region is of particular interest in this chapter. On the other hand, the focus is on how the organisation mediates and manages competing interests, rivalries and tensions in line with inclusive participation and consensus based decision-making principles of IGAD. This is meant to enhance cooperation and decisive commitment. It is thus notable that the furthering IGAD's aims of sustainable peace and security in conflict resolution and the forging of co-operation and friendly relations among the member states are of the utmost importance.

Before going into the details of these cases, it is worth considering the regional and global dynamics that frame and shape IGAD's involvement in these conflicts. Following this, the chapter closely examines the most important Pillar of IGAD and the success of its regional strategy in securing Peace and Security. Additionally, IGAD's most important initiative of Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) is also examined. The chapter also explores how the Peace and Security Strategy of the authority is sought to be integrated into the AU's peace and security Architecture. Thus, this chapter offers a critical discussion of Somalia and South Sudan by examining how the policies and strategies are put into action and thus probes also into the possible causes and implications of their antagonistic conflicts. The conflicts in the two countries are construed not only as an eastern region security dilemma but also of continental and even global concern.

## **5.2 The Regional Peace and Security Challenges and the Global Dynamics**

Many conflicts have catastrophically affected the region both at the intrastate and interstate levels which operate as the backdrop to IGAD's intervention in Somalia and South Sudan. By all measures, this is the worst area since it is widely known for its protracted conflicts which claimed thousands of lives during and in the post-Cold War era. The list since 1990 include: the border conflicts between Djibouti and Eritrea; Eritrea and Ethiopia devastating border war namely, the Darfur crisis in Sudan; the Sudan – South Sudan war, and the now pending border conflict between Sudan and South Sudan; the civil war in South Sudan; the multiple conflicts in Somalia. Al-Shabaab in Somalia and its spill-over effects in the region and incidents of

cross-border terror and attacks, for example, along the borders of Ethiopia and South Sudan.<sup>21</sup> Notably, these are cases of trans-boundary security challenges. IGAD, in its 2016 State of the Region report, states that “since 1993, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda have faced terrorist attacks by Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidden (Al Shabaab) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) operating in Central and East Africa” (IGAD 2016a:65). The following table shows major inter-state conflicts in the region.

**Table 8.** Selected Inter-States Conflicts among IGAD Member States

<b>Year</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Type of Intra-State Conflict</b>	<b>Involved IGAD Member States</b>
Since 1991	Somalia	Civil War among Clans and Militia Group	Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda and Kenya
Since 1990	Djibouti	Ethnic Tension between Afar and Issa	Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea
2006-2008	Ethiopia-Somalia	Full-Scale war/Ethiopia Intervened Military	Ethiopia and Somalia
1998-2015	Brief Armed Confrontation	Territorial Dispute	Eritrea and Djibouti; Ethiopian and Eritrea; Sudan and South Sudan

*Source:* Adapted by the Author from Various Sources

Evidently, the Horn of African Region is plagued by protracted violent conflicts and thus faces several security challenges. These are certainly compounded by severe poverty, perennial drought induced famine, high unemployment and the migration of people adding complexities to these regional problems (Girma 2016; Fikade 2017). As they feed into each other, these challenges are exacerbated by environmental factors, famine and civil wars. Thus, these security challenges feed into socio-economic challenges and vice versa. The assertion here is that despite their sources, the IGAD region’s peace and development challenges are certainly intertwined. Since there are intersecting political and socio-economic dynamics, this has led to

<sup>21</sup> The brutal act of armed South Sudanese Murle tribes that severely affected Ethiopia’s Nuer tribes (Gambella Regional State) on April 15, 2016 is typical example of this.

the realisation that these are transnational threats and thus necessitate a collective and regional response through a common forum such as IGAD.

Militarisation in Africa, as in various developing countries, is partly a product of structural conditions.<sup>22</sup> It is notable, however, that the militarisation in East African Region is highly influenced by the state's forms, neo-colonial conditions, competition for control of state power, rise and persistence of protagonist groups (Luckham 1994). For example, groups such as Al-Shaabab, Al-Ithad and the multiple warlords in Somalia are formed within the context of, not only state collapse - filling the power vacuum created, but also as a result of the desire of outside powers to influence the political trajectory in the country. The conditions include a history of civil wars, authoritarian rule, the exclusion of minorities from government, socio-economic inequity and deprivation and weak governments that are unable to manage normal societal conflict and exercise a legitimate political decision in a sustainable and effective manner (Roux and Kidane 2007). The IGAD region has hardly known peace, democracy, a blameless human rights record and free and fair elections. As Roux and Kidane (2007) argue, most of the states in the region do not represent the good interests and character of their populations and that is, arguably, the root cause of the conflict. These conflicts invariably constitute a perpetual crisis of human security, humanitarian crisis and state instability.

These conditions as explicated above have for long been enduring features of the greater Horn of Africa. What is also significant to note here is how these are interlocked as they often transform into a regional crisis. As it has already been noted, the inter-state conflicts in this region often feature as trans-boundary nature involving the regional states. Notably, the inter-state conflicts have a tendency to devolve into intra-state conflict as one state tries to weaken the other. Many of the conflicts in the IGAD region thus challenge the basis of statehood and its bounded nature. For example, the conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, North and South Sudan, and Somalia and Somaliland have both inter-state and intra-state dimension as each actively works to destabilise the other. The greater Horn of Africa region as a consequence saw the formation of new states. In relation to these, Healy asserts that "possibilities of new states emerging from conflict meant that essentially domestic conflicts had foreign policy implications and fragile peace and security" (Healy 2011:4).

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<sup>22</sup> It should be noted that there are multiple ways of defining militarisation in African context. For the purpose of this discussion, the term militarization is used to capture a loosely tied/linked situations in Africa: the process through which military personnel control state power, usually through coup; the important of armed conflict to controlling state power, and the attendance disproportional investment in arms and military expenditure (Wiley 2012; Cervenka 1987).

As noted, the consequences of these conflicts is that they negatively impact on the states' relations at the regional level. Conflicts in the IGAD region thus need to be understood as regional problem and as such can only be addressed at the regional level by involving regional states. There is a general agreement that regions are the most unstable and conflict-prone areas in the world and the security sector reform is a critical agenda to alleviate this (Gebru 2016; Roux and Kidane 2007).

These regional dynamics are also shaped and framed by global powers which seek to promote their strategic interests and competition for hegemony in the region. This began in earnest with the cold war conditions and proxy-wars of the then global powers (Wiley 2012; Luckham 1994). The recent global powers' relentless effort to militarise and securitise the continent, which have been taking place for the three decades is a continuation of the above (see Brown 2019). For example, Somalia's complex and protracted conflict cannot be fully understood without considering the USA's entrenched involvement in the conflict and local politics (Møller 2009).

Since 2001, the USA has viewed Somalia and its engagement in the region through the prism of its much taunted policy of "global war against terrorism" (Møller 2009). Arguably, the USA and to some extent the EU have channelled IGAD to play this role in the Somalia and the region in general. What appeared to be the rivalry between the USA and China in South Sudan and Sudan has also shaped the conflict as well as the mediation process in these countries. Unfortunately, these conditions were also exacerbated by rivalry and competition of IGAD members as well. The competition between Uganda and Ethiopia in South Sudan and Kenya and Uganda in Somalia are clear cases in point.

Despite the complexity of these dynamics, IGAD has become, arguably, active in facilitating and arranging conflict mediations. The authority and member states have come to realise that dealing with these persistent conflicts in the region is very hard and cannot be left to the states alone even if these appear to be intra-state issues. In line with such paradigm shifts, it has been noticed that the authority involved resolving decades long Sudan and South Sudan conflicts through extensive diplomatic means and South Sudan's internal problems and Somalia's long-standing statelessness and lawlessness. Despite these initiatives, these tensions/conflicts have been some of the most formidable challenges in the region in recent years. IGAD and AU/UN interventions and mediations to deal with these problems have been instructive with regional

actors operating as peacekeepers, stakeholder, brokers and “peace-enforcers” (Weldesellassie 2011). It should be noted, therefore, that these actions and diplomatic manoeuvres are usually inherently contradictory as “the national interest” overshadows “the regional interest”. Thus, regional states’ interventions are guided by their own narrow perceived ‘national interest’ and the interest of their global power sponsors and as a consequence they seek to impose their own will in these processes. In the end, these states appeared to be part of these conflicts as opposed to being mediators and neutral peace-keeping forces.

This is despite the fact that these interventions are coordinated with other continental and global peace actors (Weldesellassie 2011). Many countries such as the United States of America, China, EU and all the IGAD members (with the exception of Eritrea) are, among others, involved in dealing with the South Sudan and Somali conflicts. Ethiopia is chosen as a strategic anchor state for the region by the USA to serve its ‘architecture’ of security and domination. In this systematic arrangement, the USA uses Ethiopia as its police state in the IGAD region where it (the USA) is engaged in counter-terrorism. Most of the USA’s projects, diplomatic and military involvements in the Horn of Africa is dealt with and through Ethiopia. In this sense, IGAD’s operations in the region and Ethiopians dominant role in this organisation is, for a large part, a function of US-Ethiopia relations as against the US’s interest in the region.

It is against this backdrop, therefore, that most of Ethiopia’s interventions in the region have been launched at the behest of the EU and the USA. Ethiopia’s intervention, with specific reference to Somalia, was eagerly sought and recognised by the West. The USA, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, has effectively turned to Ethiopia (including other regional state, with Ethiopia as the anchor) as its regional police and the hub of its counter-terrorism initiative in Somalia and the region (Wiley 2012). It is thus no surprise that Ethiopia receives roughly \$1.9 billion under the rubric of peace and security assistance each year (Weldesellassie 2011). This shows that global actors have enrolled the organisation and Ethiopia to promote their objectives in the region.

Any appraisal of IGAD’s intervention efforts has to be viewed against overlapping interests, conflicts and rivalry and these are reflected in complexities of the missteps and the confrontations in IGAD’s initiatives in resolving conflicts in the region. It is also worth paying attention to the competition and cooperation among regional and global actors. These invariably constitute the regional and global dynamics and processes that shape and frame IGAD as an organisation and its initiatives. In this sense, successes and failures of IGAD’s

intervention efforts are located within the global and regional political economy of intergovernmentalism. In the following section, therefore, IGAD's peace and security strategy is explored in some detail by interrogating both the successes and failures of IGAD.

### **5.3 IGAD Peace and Security (PS) Strategy**

Arguably, sustainable peace and security are critical agendas for IGAD since the region experiences many conflicts. Besides addressing the Horn Africa, regional conflicts, wars and instabilities, peace and security are viewed as critical elements to regional integration and development. According to the African Index Report, the architect of peace and security in "regional integration also considers creating a safe environment for the free movement of goods, services and people across the region and the whole of Africa. Peace, stability and safety of the citizens are key preconditions for the effective and sustainable economic development. Therefore, this means getting goods to move more easily across borders, transport, energy and telecommunications to connect more people across more boundaries. This also entails having people move more freely across the frontiers and capital and production to move and grow beyond national limits" (African Union 2016:1). This is what necessitates the devising of a regional peace and security strategy. Development of peace and security strategy has to be grounded within frank assessments of these threats and sources of instability in the region.

When the challenges and threats in the region are tallied, the trials and intractable challenges IGAD has to deal with can be appreciated. Peace and security are the two core challenges which come from both intra- and inter-state conflicts and tensions. The threats in the region also include piracy (particularly in the coast of Somalia), human and drug trafficking, terrorism, money laundering and illegal dealing in arms. In the face of militarised responses, the cold war and international interference, these internal conflicts transform into civil wars and struggles for secession including Sudan and South Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Somalia (Somaliland) with disastrous humanitarian and socio-economic consequences. In Sudan, the civil war started in the southern region of Sudan (now South Sudan) but later spread to Darfur, Kordofan, Blue Nile and the Eastern parts of Sudan (Mulugeta 2009).

In addition to these intra- and inter-state conflicts, the states in this region have also seen serious problems of legitimacy and political instability. The region has seen regular rigged elections and the pre-election post-election process has become very challenging. For instance, Ethiopia (2005), Kenya (2007), Uganda (2010), Djibouti (2013), among others, are the cases in point

which have caused post-election conflicts and tensions. This is evidence of the region's need to have effective institutions for permanent solutions to maintain peace and security in the IGAD region (Byiers 2016). In the list of fragile state index compiled by the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine, all the IGAD member states consistently featured as the most fragile states from 2005-2018.<sup>23</sup>

All the regional states are weak and at different moments, each of these regional states shows varying degree of political, economic and social uncertainty. Beside the internal challenges, as part of the colonial legacy most states in this region have border disputes with their neighbouring countries which have become the main factor for the lack of trust and certainty. It is against this context that IGAD's regional border disputes that have "escalated into border wars and led to military confrontations are assessed. This region has hosted brutal border related wars between the Ethiopia-Somalia in 1977, the Ethio-Eritrea in 1998-2000, the Djibouti-Eritrea in 1995 and 2008, and the Sudan-South Sudan in 2012 (IGAD 2016b:44). In the final analysis, IGAD as a region is troubled by unrelenting and protracted civil wars, with the regional state exhibiting fragility both internally and internationally.

In response to these, in the first few years of its inception, IGAD has been involved in developing a peace and security policy. After two decades of IGAD's experiment as a regional organisation, the organisation appears to take pride in its historic efforts in mediation and peace support operations it has undertaken. It is notable though that despite these efforts, which include the region's past and current engagement and regional diplomacy, the outcomes of such efforts are rather dismal.

The fundamental regional peace and security policy is set out to control and manage possible conflicts in the region and thus facilitate peace making and building activities (Mulugeta 2009). Such policy featured more as a declaration, and less as a coherent strategy. Notably, IGAD's efforts concentrated on facilitating regional cooperation and coordination to ensure stability of all the member states. Apart from such declaration, this initiative has not been able to articulate well what its peace and security strategies are. Instead, in these few years, IGAD appeared to have developed a piece meal approach towards managing peace and stability in the region. This is attested to by the number of firefighting as instantiated in Somalia and South Sudan and manifested in other cases by having burning security issues in the region ignored. The absence

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<sup>23</sup> See the following site: <https://foreignpolicy.com/?s=failed+states+index> and <https://fragilestatesindex.org/>.



of a coherent security strategy is very much evident in IGAD's biggest and longest running intervention in Somalia.

In seriously attempting to address this shortfall, the authority sought to develop a well-thought-out regional peace and security strategy in the 2011-2015 strategic plan. This strategic plan appropriated peace and security as one of its pillars and considered in detail how the challenges and proposed specific actions were to be dealt with. IGAD's regional strategy with its implementation plan of 2016-2020 strengthens this proposal and plan of action. While the 2011-2015 regional strategic plan considers merely peace and security whereas the 2016-2020 document adds humanitarian affairs as part of this pillar. Both documents feature peace and security as well as the promotion of good governance as essential elements of the regional strategic plan as outlined under the rubric of Pillar 3 (IGAD 2016c; IGAD 2011).


In its 2016-2020 strategic plan, the authority proposed that it would need US\$108,800,000 to put the programmes and projects set under this pillar into place with thirty-seven percent (37%) of the money having already been raised (IGAD 2016c:103). The expected outcomes of this strategic objective are the following: one, "increased utilization of IGAD regional policies and mechanisms for peace and security issues" and, two, "effective cooperation among member states on addressing humanitarian issues" (IGAD 2016c:9). As noted in the chapter three, this pillar has three programme area: Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR); Trans-national Security Threats (TST); Governance, Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights (GDRL) (IGAD 2016c). Each of these programme areas have multiple programmes and projects.

Under the programme area of CPMR, IGAD has set out three important sub-programmes: Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN); enhancing IGAD's capacity for preventive diplomacy and mediation; and post-conflict reconstruction and development. A large portion of the estimated budget for Pillar 3 goes into these sub-programmes - around US\$73 million out of US\$108 million. The overall intent of these programmes is to design and develop mechanisms for appropriate interventions and build capacity of the member states and the organisation in their efforts to prevent conflict and pursue management and resolution of the challenges. What is gleaned from the explication above is that the authority is keen to work towards setting up mechanisms for member states to develop own capacity to engage in peaceful resolution of conflicts/disputes and peace-building. Resolving their own differences

locally and on their own is what IGAD proposes through this programme area and this serves as a measure of success of the organisation in addressing the challenges it faces.

Judging by the number of tensions and conflicts still burning in the region, IGAD is nowhere near to achieving its objective. It is thus arguable that aside from some peace-building, conflict resolution and management and other security related workshops, nothing substantive and noteworthy has been achieved.<sup>24</sup> This is not, however, to dismiss the importance of the initiatives, but rather to measure their success and contribution. For example, the authority established a Mediation Support Unit (MSU) in December 2012 in line with the Resolution of the Committee of Ambassadors (COA). The rationale behind MSU is to enhance the mediation capacity of IGAD and thus develop, promote and capacitate local institutions of member states on conflict prevention and management as well as peace-making and peace-building.

Figure 4. IGAD’s Peace building approaches



Source: Adapted from (IGAD 2016)

Under CEWARN, IGAD has multiple projects whose main tasks involve gathering, processing, analysing and disseminating data and thus enhance capabilities of regional states on how to respond to and manage conflicts. Here, operational capabilities of the units in these projects, their response systems and structures as well as their join coordination at the regional level are given particular attention. There are what the organisation has called Conflict Early Warning

<sup>24</sup> See the last five years media briefings and online inserts of the organisation in the section of Peace and Security Division. Indeed, the organization has held multiple issues based and, at times country specific, conferences and workshops with the support of Western donors.

and Response Units (CEWERU) in six regional members states: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda. Each CEWERU. These units are tasked with working with government and civil society in the respective states to facilitate conflict management initiatives. Despite being underfunded and working under difficult conditions, in many instances the CEWERU are well organised with their own situation room staff that regularly monitor situations in the regional states with the support of members states. They are equipped with GIS products and supporting its activities and monitoring local as well as regional issues of concern with GIS located in each of the Member States where the units are located.

The second programme has to do with TST which is much more focused on the interdependence of security challenges in the IGAD region. Based on such assessment, the organisation proposed what it called regional “comprehensive approach to security” challenges. Under this umbrella, IGAD has outlined three sub-programmes:

- (a) Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Coordination against existing, evolving and emerging Transnational Security Threats (EEE-TSTs)
- (b) Enhancing Member States’ and IGAD’s Institutional and Human Capacities to Address EEE-TSTs
- (c) Promoting and supporting regional and international normative, institutional/policy and programmatic frameworks to address EEE-TSTs

The main concerns of this aspect of the Peace and Security strategic plan is to counter cross-border security threats such as terrorist activities, violent extremism, illegal movements of arms, goods and people. Such initiatives broadly involve regional “cooperation and coordination against, Existing, Evolving and Emerging Transnational Security Threats (EEE-TSTs) (IGAD 2016c:9) and the mechanism established and effectively contributed to the prevention and countering of cross-border security threats in the IGAD region. These also include land and maritime border controls which include engaging with piracy as one aspect of the peace and security concern in the region. The above programmes are meant to strengthen cross border control as preventive measures and law enforcement in such areas of concern. There is also recognition that this would have to be accompanied by the necessary judicial reform on criminal justice along with coordination and cooperation on these at the regional level. In line with this, IGAD has established a mechanism of strengthening cross border law enforcement by preventing conflict and employing management strategies among member states (IGAD 2016b; IGAD 2016a).

The third programme area of the organisation under Pillar 3 is GDRL focusing on democracy, good governance, human rights and the rule of law. What is apparent in these is that the member states have come to recognise that these are fundamental to the sustainability of peace and security. This thinking features mainly in the organisation's assessment of the state of the region and is attested to in the assertion that:

The internal and external political, economic and social determinants of Peace and Security (PS) in the IGAD region will focus on: extreme poverty, income inequality, lack of governance, mismatches between performance legitimacy and popular legitimacy, corruption, election-related disputes and violence, radicalization and violent extremism, transnational threats and organized criminal activities, as well as migration, smuggling and human trafficking. The nature of state, social and political forces at national and sub-national level, and the nature of international and regional interventions may significantly affect the peace and security of the IGAD region (IGAD 2016a:44).

Thus, governance, democratisation and the rule of law, along with other issues, are deemed important factors causing instability within the region. In pursuit of addressing this, IGAD proposed to engage with and assist member states in their efforts to succeed in good governance towards improving the human rights of their citizens. Along with these, the organisation proposed to ensure active and constructive participation of the civil societies in the member states. The authority also insists upon maintaining permanent peace and security in the region which requires the active and constructive involvement of local institutions and authorities.

The broader objective of these programmes and projects is to transform the political affairs of the regional states in the areas of democratisation, rule of law and good governance. This can be gleaned from the two specific programmes proposed in this segment. The first programme focuses on strengthening the role and capacities of NGOs/CSOs and other stakeholders in their participation in promoting peace and security in the region. The second one focuses on assisting the regional states and promoting rule of law, democracy, good governance, and human rights. Gender is also another important dimension added under this programme. Here, IGAD has set up a project under this sub-programme with a title of Gender and Equality of Women's Empowerment for Peace. This project is essentially focused on advocacy to influence member states' policies and practices on gender and empowerment of women.

Any assessment of this GDRL aspect of IGAD's peace and security strategy would certainly tilt towards the negative, if not downright condemnation of the reality. The region fares badly in these measures. Much more troubling is that very little substantive work has been done by the organisation in this regard aside from acting as election observer in the shoddy elections the regional states have conducted. Aside from the infrequent workshops organised under this

rubric, substantive initiatives are hardly noticed by way of engaging, supporting and promoting the civil society organisations in the region.

Considered more broadly, the peace and security strategy of the region works with conflict prevention, control and management. Its effectiveness hinges on how cooperative and involved the member states are. Effectiveness of the proposals in the PS strategy of the authority are rendered weak by the fact that the member states of IGAD are in conflict with each other with apparent rivalry and shifting alliances within the members states. Healy (2011:13) cites another dimension characterising the region and notes that the “phenomenon of militarized peace and security processes are part of the regional culture in which states regularly project military power beyond their own borders. This creates a particularly difficult environment in which to build regional structures for peace and security”. As a result, IGAD’s institutional security constraints remain a serious challenge.

Although IGAD appeared to have prioritised peace and security for well over a decade, there has been very little significant decreases in the level of conflict in the IGAD’s region or any signs of activities towards communal peace and security process (Healy 2011). A decade later after implementing the regional PS strategy, the member states in the IGAD region still face prolonged conflicts, security challenges and political instability. The region has, however, made some promising progress in other sectors like cooperation in TST and information sharing. Recognizing the “critical role that science, technology and innovation (STI)” play, the organisation has sought to appropriate them to effect regional members’ role in peace and security (ECA 2016a). These have already started to serve for M&E and information sharing within the IGAD region and institutions to address the peace and security problems of the region.

The regional PS strategy of the region would have to be framed within and integrated into other continental PS strategies. What is to be considered here is the region’s PS strategy’s relation with AU’s peace and security architecture. The UN and AU committed all member states to abide by a constitutive Act to participate in promoting regional security collectively (IGAD 2016a). IGAD’s regional PS strategy is formulated within these continental and global multilateral frameworks. For example, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is formed to connect and link the formation of the five African regions as ‘building blocks’ of the continent’s APSA policy. These are North Africa, Central Africa, West Africa, South Africa and East Africa. It is important to note that these are different from the RECs. Thus, IGAD’s

peace and security strategy is a different mechanism albeit drawing substantially from the APSA.

Much of this featured after the historical post-election violence events in Kenya (2007/08) which significantly impacted the whole region. This shook the EAC and forced it to decide to initiate a peace and security programme by largely copying the institutions under the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (Thonke and Spliid 2012). However, as the 2010 APSA guidelines noted, IGAD did not have the same Peace and Security Council (PSC). Notably then, IGAD initiated its peace and security strategy in 2011 and still does not have a PSC as a distinct organ and neither has it intended to establish one any time soon. Byiers (2016:32) argues that “IGAD’s peace and security architecture indeed looks considerably different from the AU” and the organisation questions whether such institutions building on its own address the regions pervasive and complex security challenges. Thus, as argued by Byiers (2016), a disaggregated evaluation was expected to survey advancement of peace and to improve continuous commitment of the IGAD states to the operationalization of the APSA as supported by the 2013 Assessment of the African Standby Forces. However, IGAD has endeavoured to build up comparable structures among a Council of Elders as an ‘East African Panel of the Wise’ (Byiers 2016).

#### **5.4 Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)**

As noted in the previous section, the core aim of the CEWARN is to work closely with all member states to attain sustainable regionally coordinated conflict prevention and management initiatives to build and ensure peace and security in the region. The milestones are achieved through the regional strategic framework. CEWARN was first formed in 2002 and then developed to be reformulated as part of the pillars of regional strategic plan. CEWARN was established to coordinate and ensure regional cooperation for conflict prevention and mitigation through collective information collection, analysis and sharing. As the name entails, it was designed to be an early warning and response. The idea was very much similar to IGAD’s predecessor IGADD (that had early warning system for drought and environmental changes) but now with a focus on peace and security.

Thus, in 2002, IGAD launched what it called Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERU’s) with a base in each of the regional member states at the time. The main structures of cooperation in CEWARN are highlighted in its Protocol for the member states including its

duties and functions that are established through the creation of “integration, contact and harmonization between CEWARN and the nationally established Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERUs)” (Weldesellassie 2011:27). According to IGAD (2016), some of the functions of CEWARN include the following:

- (a) Promoting the exchange of information and collaboration among member states on early warning and response on the basis of timeliness, transparency, cooperation and free flow of information
- (b) Gathering, verifying, processing and analysing information about conflicts
- (c) Communicating all such information and analysis to the decision makers of IGAD policy organs and the national governments of member states

Arguably, since the region faces multiple threats, conflicts and wars that have transnational characters, such kind of early collection, analysis and swift sharing of data on security related development is critical. The importance of coordinating this at the regional level cannot be taken lightly. Having such mechanism at the regional level has the potential of developing timely responses to regional security threats. CEWARN as one of IGAD’s peace and security initiatives is constituted as an effort “to establish effective collective measures to eliminate threats to sub-regional cooperation, peace and stability” (Mulugeta 2009:23). CEWARN is, in many respects a flagship of the IGAD mandate and its geographic jurisdiction to identify and report on potential conflicts and threats (including security, environmental, social, economic and governance) (IGAD 2016b).

In its pilot phase, between 2002 and 2006, CEWARN’s focus has been on the potential pervasive conflicts among the pastoralists in the region. Such initiative is an important step, especially considering the trans-boundary movements of pastoralists and the recurring conflicts among them over claims for grazing land and water for pasture. Here, the most notable cases were monitoring and gathering information on pastoralist clusters: the Karamoja cluster (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan border) and the Somali cluster (Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya) (IGAD 2016b). Since 2006-2011, CEWAR as a regional mechanism expanded to include other security issues (such as terrorism and extremism, piracy, trafficking etcetera) in all the regional member states. IGAD’s early initiative on CEWARN focused, as Abraha (2013:41) puts in relation to “livestock rustling, conflicts over grazing and water points, nomadic movements, smuggling and illegal trade, refugees, land mines and banditry”.

In 2011-2016 regional strategic plan (and again in 2016-2020 RS plan), CEWARN was reconstituted as one element within the broader Peace and Security Pillar. This was accompanied with serious strategic shift in the conceptualisation and reconstitution of CEWARN. These strategic shifts are reflected in the number of national, regional and global issues the organisation sought to pay attention to. It should be noted that there is a fundamental thinking to CEWARN which has been consistent throughout. The fundamental mission of CEWARN is to assess and report on situations that can potentially lead to tensions or conflicts and monitoring prevention mechanisms (IGAD 2016a). One of the key responsibilities of CEWARN is to collect appropriate information regarding the possibility of violence and conflicts before the outbreak and its spreading in the region and thus share this with the regional member states.

To maintain regional peace and security, IGAD developed interventions targeting the power and rights of all the member states as well as the region as a whole for successful conflict prevention, management and resolution. Through CEWARN, IGAD strives to create and implement processes and mechanisms to promote peaceful means to resolve disputes by empowering countries of the IGAD region to resolve their differences locally and on their own by collaborating with other regional and global players (IGAD 2016b). IGAD has taken steps to accelerate the vision of CEWARN to strengthen partnerships as an effective and efficient early conflict warning system. Additionally, it aims to establish a conducive environment for peace and stability to ensure that disputes in the region are resolved and are of collective and mutual benefit.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-government organisations (NGOs) also play a major role in determining CEWARN's duties and functions. The finding of this study reveals that for CEWARN to achieve its expanding geographic and thematic scope in the region, it must first resolve its political and institutional obstacles. Although there is some progress in certain smaller groups conflicts, CEWARN has been 'found wanting' in deadly prolonged conflicts including the most recent conflict in South Sudan (Byiers 2016).

Arguably, Indeed, CEWARN constitute an important part of the PS strategy of the authority. Beside its importance, it is an integrative thrust that draws the member states to work closely on security matters, share information and actively respond to these. It is also notable that the authority has expanded what it considered to be security threat to include other areas that were not considered to as such (environmental, governance, social and others). Despite such



expansion, it is doubtful whether the organisation or CEWARN has acted in any meaningful way on these or not. An inference is drawn on these based on the persistent issue of non-interference as a general principle which member states harbour as compounded by the rivalry, suspicion and mistrust that characterised their relations over the last two decades. In the following sections, the chapter explores IGAD's two foremost and important interventions in the Somalia and South Sudan conflicts.

### **5.5 The Somalia Conflict, Regional Actors and IGAD's Intervention**

In many respects, the roots of Somalia's conflict can be traced back to its colonial formation in 1897 and later in 1948 when Somalia was divided by three colonial powers namely Britain, Italy and France. The Republic of Somalia became independent in 1960 from Italy and Britain (Abdi 2012). Somalia has withstood the worst post-independence civil strife because of competing global, regional and local interests that have made Somalia's conflict intractable and resulted in continuous conflicts. For the last three decades, Somalia has been "suffering from lawlessness due to the non-existence of state institutions, highly factionalized political groups, terrorist attack and repeated external intervention" (Mulugeta 2009:11). Between 1991 and 1997, 13 attempts and during the 1980s and the 1990s several more attempts were made to establish a functioning government for Somalia and to re-establish the state (Gebregeorgis 2013; Kodhek 2015). However, the history of Somalia's conflicts show the world a non-ending and complicated war in the Horn of Africa region.

Thus, IGAD, the AU and the international community have been challenged on how to address peace, security and stability in Somalia. Clan based conflicts, entrenched tribalism and interminable civil war have led to state and economic collapse which in turn destroyed many Somali lives and led to displacement of many (Wafula 2015). Many point to the "colonial legacy, clan system, and economic factors" as the root causes of the Somali conflict and the subsequent state collapse (Mulugeta 2009:9). Such assessments are still one-sided views (heavily focuses on the local dynamics) that ignore all the other players that have fuelled and perpetually enflamed Somalia's conflict (contemporary external factors and interferences). Following is a brief exploration of these multiple and seemingly intractable conflicts in Somalia and the challenges and complexities of intervening in the labyrinth of these conflicts. This paves the way, then for the framing of IGAD's intervention in the Somalia's case and the role the member states in the region played.

In 1960 Somalia gained independence under the leadership of president Aden Abdullah Osamn and thus joining the then British and Italian controlled Somalia. Arguably, this independence was granted to a very fragile country whose grasp of economic and political structure was lacking. Since then, the inabilities can be traced back to the fact that there were huge differences between how Italy and Britain administered their respective colonies. Britain was largely accused of neglecting its territory whereas Italy had developed an economic and political plan (Kodhek 2015). Somalia was divided into five parts as colonies of the European colonial powers (Italy, Britain and France) and Ethiopia. British Somaliland and the northern territory of Kenya were ruled by the British and Italy controlled what was called the Italian Somaliland and France seized Djibouti at the northern coast and the Ogaden region was annexed by Ethiopia. These historical events shaped and continue to shape all attempts to restore Somalia's territorial integrity (Mulugeta 2009). The last three decades of Somalia's political reality was thus framed by these contexts as some of the different Somali-occupied parts came to be controlled by a single state in the 1960s (with the exception of Djibouti and Ogaden).

Subsequent to this, much of Somalia's history has been marred by internal strives and competing claims. Somalia's conflicts and tensions are characterised by shifting alliances and competing and conflicting interests of the various players in Somalia. Today, Somalia is one of the few territories in the world without a fully functioning government structure in place. After gaining its independence from colonial Italy in 1960 under the leadership of a civilian administration, the stability of the Somalia states has remained fragile. Under the leadership of Adan Abdulle Osman and Abdilrashid Ali Shama'arke the first and the second presidents respectively, who were not without shortcomings, it was the reign of Mohammed Siad Barre (Gen.) which planted the seeds for the current unending conflict and instability.

Barre's administration was characterised by inequality, violence and a full-blown dictatorship. Hence, the emergence of rebel-armed groups which have since the 1980s challenged his rule inside and outside of Somalia. When Barre was ousted in 1991, there was a high degree of fragmentation among the armed forces of Somalia with no dominant group emerging to claim leadership and exercise power over the whole of Somalia. However, in the last three decades, chaos, instability, famine and different types of humanitarian crises have reigned in Somalia without a central authority to tackle these issues (Ashenafi 2017).

Though some critics still argue that colonialism should be considered as the most critical factor to the Somalia crisis, others point to the clan system with all its tension and rivalry as the most

fundamental reason for Somalia's ongoing crisis (see review of this by Besteman 1996). All Somalis speak one language, have the same religion, and are from the same ethnic group, which is uncommon in Africa. Such homogeneity should have been a significant contributory factor in creating a nation-state. Under any conditions, indeed, such ethnic homogeneity would have been considered essential in conjuring up a solid nation-state.<sup>25</sup> However, a deep clan system and division have long disrupted internal cohesion.

There are five major clans in Somalia: Darood, Hawiye, Rahanweyn, Isaaq, and Dir, and each clan has its sub-clans. Clans and sub-clans play a very important role in defining the political, economic and social landscape (Gundel 2006:5-6). Over 80 percent of the Somali people are pastoralists without a political culture of dominance and/or control by a centralised organisational structure as much of the organisation is around kinship which promotes loyalty to their kin and clans (Gundel 2006; Lewis 1961/1999). In fact, in his seminal work, I.M. Lewis (1961/1999) shows us how the clan and its segmented formation constitute a decentralised political structure. These segmented political formations have certainly featured as the source of fragmentation of Somalia's polity and perennial civil war.

Multiple factors are often attributed for the rise of the clan and traditional authority and ensuing entrenched divisions. From the traditional clan rivalry and conflict, the very nature of the clan structure in Somalia to Siad Barre's misrule are identified as contributory factors to this protracted problem in Somalia. During his two decades of rule (1969–1991), Barre is blamed for exploiting existing clan based divisions as a tactic of divide and rule policy and the patrimonial relations he established with his own clan group to ensure loyal political groups (Mulugeta 2009; Besteman 1996). This has another repercussion: the struggle against Barre's rule emerged as clan based (Besteman 1996). By 1991, Siad Barre's regime had collapsed as a result of a coup forcing him into exile and the result was that the Somali political and economic forces became extreme clan-based forces. The 1991 coup was different from the 1969 one because not a single person or party was agreed upon to take leadership. This led to the fragmentation of the state and clan-based grouping in the country (Kodhek 2015).

Gundel (2006) points out that the fall of Barre's rule and the resultant collapse of the state collapse had pushed Somalis to depend increasingly on traditional structures/authority to substitute for the vacuum and thus maintain some level of order. For Gundel (2006), this

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<sup>25</sup> Following the European experiment on nation-state, many consider homogeneity are crucial conditions for its rise and development (see Kramer (2011) and Smith (1986))

unquestionably became the source of Somalis' paradox: traditional authority/structure based on the clan that emerged as the foundation for relative peace and stability in Somalia has also pushed it towards fragmentation of the country. Gundel (2006) also suggests that endless stitching and unstitching of clans, sub-clans and sub-sub-clans as a basis for shifting loyalties, factions and political allegiances has often featured as the source of fragility of Somalia. According to Mulugeta (2009:10), these divisions and shifting allegiances have deepened and widened as consequence of "competition over resources".

Others have pointed out that the competition and fighting for economic resources are some of the main causes of Somalia's conflict (see review of these works in Besteman 1996). Fighting over the natural resources including land, water and livestock has continuously been a source of dispute in Somalia. At the very least, this might have been compounded and complicated by Somalia's longest warlords run civil wars and instability.

In a nutshell, much of the analysis on this perplexing and complex chaos in Somalia focused on the broad structural factors within the country that are driving the crisis in the country. These include factors such as traditional authority, postcolonial conditions, environmental degradation, the clan political structure and emergence of warlords. Others have paid attention to the undue external interventions and interferences which to impose / promote their own external agendas (Besteman 1996). Additional explanation to these refers to the crisis as related to "the missed opportunities and miscalculations of leaders" and under such consideration the crisis is taken "not as a fate, but as a tragedy" (Menkhaus 2007:358-9).

As Menkhaus (2007:359) argues, although each of these explain Somalia's long standing troubles, they are, arguably, a confluence of factors and "of internal and external interests and pressures working against the revival of a central government". As a result of the absence of a central government and the vacuum created by this, "Somalia has been the epicentre of terrorism and source of international terrorism in the IGAD region" (Demeke and Gebru 2014:10). This is a direct function of state collapse in Somalia which has weakened and rendered the local actors powerless to control local security and Somalia's territories. This instability is long known for having implications not only on economic, social and political certainty in the country but also the entire Horn of Africa region. This instability has undeniably affected not only the region but also the continent and the international peace and security at large (for example, piracy in the coast of Somalia, transnational terrorism and migration etcetera). It is thus understandable that there has been a sustained desire and initiatives over

the last three decades to stabilise Somalia. Many of the interventions, regional as well as global, have to be partially framed within such considerations.

### **5.5.1 Intervention of IGAD and Regional Actors in Somalia Conflict**

Many of the regional interventions in Somalia begin with the recognition of the prolonged conflict that has had serious implications for the IGAD region and that these were manifested in the economic, social and political landscape (Mulugeta 2009). Notably, multiple collective efforts to restore peace, build alliances and broker peace and stability in Somalia, by regional member states and others from further afield have been made (Healy 2011). In the last thirty (30) years, over twenty failed reconciliation conferences and initiatives to restore the Somalia state and bring together the various factions and actors in this conflict have been held. The involvement of external actors both from the region and elsewhere have also contributed to exacerbating the multiple Somalia conflicts. Following is an explication of the interventions of regional actors (particularly Ethiopia and Kenya), the regional multilateral initiatives (as the ones mediated by IGAD) and the dynamics caused by both.

In the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia has pushed itself as a significant external role player in the Somali conflict. Notably, Ethiopia's obstinate desire to dominate and control IGAD as a regional mechanism and be the driver of, particularly, matters related to Somalia's case is related to this aspiration.<sup>26</sup> For the large part, Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia's conflicts is driven by its desire to drive and control the course of political change in Somalia. Few factors, arguably, frame and inform Ethiopia's desire. Firstly, Ethiopia has a long border not demarcated with Somalia in the eastern part of the region. This is also compounded by the Greater Somalia aspiration of some Somali elites which is a claim directed at Ogaden. Secondly, there is, the historical hostility between Somalia and Ethiopia over contestation of the Ogaden region inhabited by the Somalis which is a "region of eastern Ethiopia which has resulted in interstate wars between the two countries" (Wafula 2015:47). Thirdly, Ethiopia has also often cited a security threat coming from AL-Itihad which is a popular terrorist group that declared war against Ethiopia (Mulugeta 2009; Wafula 2015). To add to these, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Movement (ONLM), Ethiopia's two secessionist movements, used Somalia as their base and for decades these organisations

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<sup>26</sup> As noted in the previous chapter, Ethiopia has not relinquished its chairmanship of the organization for years, and selectively calls for meeting on issues that it prioritized.

had been supported by Somalia. Ethiopia has also exhibited fear that Eritrea might want to use Somalia to open another front to weaken and thin down by dividing Ethiopia's defence capability. This fear of Ethiopia gained particular credence with Eritrea's support of UIC in the early 2000s.

Notably, civil war broke out in Somalia followed by a complete state collapse before past enmities and aggression between the two countries could be settled legitimately and appropriately (Wafula 2015). Thus, to prevent state failure, civil war and uncertainty, Ethiopia has been involved, on the one hand, with peace negotiation and mediation efforts and, on the other hand, promoting and propping up selected factions in the Somali elites and clans.

Kenya too has followed similar interventions in Somalia's protracted conflict as it has a long border with Somalia and has a significant number of Somalis as its citizens. It also hosts the largest Somali refugees. On the surface, these are crucial factors informing Kenya's desire to actively engage in Somalia's political crisis. It is worth noting that it has hosted multiple conferences in its capital and for a long time, it hosted the Somalia government and parliament established in exile. Djibouti and Eritrea have also sought to play a role at some level.

The early interventions were in the first half of the 1990s focusing on getting the various political players and actors in the conflict in Somalia to come to a round table discussion. These were the preludes to IGAD acting as a regional mechanism to deal with such problems. Since the formal establishment of IGAD, the organisation has been working on conflict prevention and negotiation working on establishing peace and security in Somalia using its formal structures. With the inception of IGAD, it has been (as it currently is) actively playing a role in mediation and peace processes in Somalia's intractable conflicts as well as in peacekeeping operations (IGAD 2016b).

IGAD's almost two decades old expensive and extensive intervention in Somalia's conflicts have often been claimed as regional initiatives in promoting peace and security. The organisation as well as observers points to the relative changes in security in Somalia to such regional mechanism. Demeke and Gebru (2014) argue that IGAD has played a comprehensive and continuing role in the reestablishment of an independent and legitimate state in Somalia. As the following section demonstrates, this is far from the truth. In fact, the fact that self-interest guides many of the external actors' involvement in Somalia is an attestation of the fact that these actors have contributed to the pain of Somalia and Somalis. Arguably, IGAD member

states' conflicting desires to exploit IGAD for this purpose and impose their will on the Somalia conflict have also led to the protracted nature of this problem.

The very first regional initiative to mediate and bring together the then warring parties was taken by Djibouti in June 1991 with the funding from Saudi Arabia. This was soon after Siad Barre was toppled down and Hassan Gulaid Abtidon, the then President of Djibouti, brought together leaders of six armed factions to a round table. In this Djibouti conference, Somalia's prominent political leaders were present and coordinating the meeting. The conference was, for example, chaired by Aden Abdulle Osman (first President of Somali Republic), with two former civilian prime ministers Abdirizak Haji Hussein and Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal assisting. Djibouti hosted another conference as a continuation of this in July 1991. These became known as 'Djibouti I' and 'Djibouti II' conferences. What this conference achieved was merely to appoint Ali Mahdi Mohamed as the interim president of the Republic of Somalia for two years. This was then challenged by General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Somali National Alliance (SNA) (the group he was running), completely rejecting the Djibouti conference and its outcome (Menkhaus 2010).

The violence in the country continued unabated. This occurred despite multiple local (Somalis run peace efforts)<sup>27</sup>, regional and international initiatives to address the Somalia crisis. In 1994, Kenya hosted another initiative under the auspices of the UN to establish a new power-sharing agreement. This conference was attended by 16 factions and militia leaders (including General Aideed, who was seen as spoiler), and it sought to establish an agreement on a coalition government. This initiative too did not materialise into anything. On the contrary, the violence in Somalia persisted and the country was deeply entrenched into fragmented areas controlled by warlords and factions. This is with the exception of Somali-Land that self-declared a republic despite lack of recognition from the international community. Notably, except Somali-Land that was led by Mohammud Ibrahim Egal, there was hardly any properly functioning region of Somalia.

In the rest of the country, multiple warring and faction groups were running the different regions of Somalia with varying degrees of success. Various regions were run by the formation of alliances such as the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), headed by Ali Mahdi Muhammad;

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<sup>27</sup> This is a reference to the various inter-group and inter-faction accords and meetings to address the prevailing crisis in their respective regions and between/among factions. These took place with varying degree of success and failure.

the Somali National Alliance (SNA), first formed by General Muhammad Aidede who died in 1996 and then in 1997 led by his son Hussein Aidede; and a third alliance led by the Aidede's former financier, Osman Hassan Ali. Both SSA and SNA alliances claimed to head governments and their leaders used the title of 'president' (Kodhek 2015).

In October 1996, 26 Somali leaders affiliated with SSA factions met in Nairobi, Kenya, with the aim of establishing a government to rule over the entire state of Somalia and a commitment to continue dialogue towards lasting peace. This initiative was for the large part steered by Kenya and Western countries (particularly the USA and the EU). The Kenya's stint was overshadowed by Ethiopia's initiative at Sodere which took place from November 1996 to January 1997. Reflective of the competing regional interests in Somalia, the conference organised by Ethiopia was rivalling the Kenyan and Egyptian organised talks. These were actually taking place separately but concurrently (at least in the Sodere and Cairo processes), and these featured rather as separate rival efforts between the mid-1996 and early 1997.

The Ethiopian organised conference in Sodere was attended by the leaders affiliated with SSA with those affiliated with SNA and the Republic of Somaliland having boycotted the meeting. Predictably, this meeting was in many respects dominated by Ethiopia and for large part it was an Ethiopian initiative even though Ethiopia was given a mandate from both the OAU and the newly established Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). This conference organised by Ethiopia under the auspices of IGAD brought together 27 leaders representing 26 political factions. The October 1996 meeting ended with the parties signing a declaration of national pledges and commitments to engage in peace. However, the major political actors of that time such as Mr. Hussein Aidede and Mr. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal did not participate in the meeting. Following this conference in 1997, the National Salvation Council (NSC) was established thus buttressing the commitments set out in the meeting held in October 1996. The broader objective of this was to establish a single functional government for the Somalia state.

Even though it was not accepted by some political actors in the Somalia conflict, and despite its failures, the establishment of NSC certainly paved the way for renewed hope for Somalia. The outcome of the Sodere conference was thus rather symbolic. In line with the Sodere conference, all efforts were channelled towards the establishment of a Transitional Central Authority (TCA) or Provisional Central Government (PCG) of Somalia. The declaration provided that an NSC total of 41 members were selected from 26 political movements with an eleven-member national executive committee led by five co-chairmen. The declaration called



for the pursuit of the following five points: “work towards the restoration of peace, stability, law and order; help reconcile the difference among the clan in conflict areas; Draft a Transitional National Charter (TNC) for the TCA; cooperate and facilitate the provision of emergency relief and rehabilitation programmes and other social services; and act as the counterpart to the international community in efforts to assist the reconciliation and rehabilitation process for the peace and stability in the region.” (Kodhek 2015:44)

Despite the pledges and commitments made, the above five points were not implemented as expected. The main reason was the non-inclusion of the factions allied to SNA and the Republic of Somaliland. According to observers and mediators, both Hussein Aideed (from SNA) and Mohammud Egal (from the Republic of Somaliland) claimed to have been elected by their respective people and both rejected the formation of NSC laying claim to the leadership of the entire state of Somalia (Kodhek 2015). It should also be noted that Aideed had a troubled relation with Ethiopia which would make it hard for his faction to take part in an Ethiopian organised conference. As Menkhaus (2010) puts it, Ethiopia and Aideed’s SNA had become adversaries with Ethiopia accusing these factions for collaborating with Islamic groups that Ethiopia considered a threat to its security. It was also clear, and for all to see, that any peace initiative that would not include SNA and Hussein Aideed would be troubled, if not a complete failure.

Arab states were also trying to mediate the various factions in the Somalia conflict, notably, the most prominent ones. In November 1997, Egypt organised a peace conference in Cairo to mediate Hussein Aideed’s SNA and the NSC that emerged from Sodere to form a national government. This was dashed as few faction leaders that were in NSC pulled out of these talks. Yemen too had similar efforts in May of 1997 along the same line. These competing and rivalling peace talks featured as a proxy war between Arab states and Ethiopia thus derailing any possibility for a peaceful solution to the Somalia crisis. Out of fear for its own security, Ethiopia was seen as developing alliances with selected Somalia factions in order to influence the political process in Somalia and at times playing them against each other (Menkhaus 2010). Despite a call from the United Nation Security Council (UNSC), none of the faction leaders agreed to disarmament and so fighting in several areas continued. Another factor that led to the stagnation of the peace efforts was the rise of the Islamist militia groups such as the Sudan-backed Al Ittihad. The groups carried out several attacks in Ethiopia leading to repeated cross-border attacks by Ethiopian troops where the militias were cleared from their bases. These

developments were very much indicative of the fact that Ethiopia had long been party to the conflict which conflicted with its role as host and organiser of peace conferences.

Over the years, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya and Egypt hosted several meetings to mediate between the various Somalia factions. Each of these mediation efforts took place sadly by limiting the participation of important Somalia actors and factions. The tension and mistrust among these hosting states and the conflicting interest they had in the Somalia political process, certainly hampered any progress. In the end, all the outcomes of these efforts turned out to be short lived and conspicuously failed to achieve peaceful resolutions to the Somalia crisis and bringing the groups together to rebuild the war-torn country. In what appeared to be a major breakthrough, the Djibouti government hosted Somalia National Peace Conference in the small town of Arta in August 2000 led to the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG). The Transitional National Government (TNG) was the 14<sup>th</sup> attempt to build a cohesive and stable government in Somalia. What is important about this peace conference was that it gained for the first time the endorsement of many regional and international actors (including the UN and Egypt).

Nonetheless, TNG too “failed to win the backing of all the neighbouring states and the confidence of donor governments” and certain factions showed hostility towards it mainly “the ‘blocks’ which were all aligned with Ethiopia” (Menkhaus 2010). This was predictable considering the fact that Ethiopia was suspicious of the TNG rule and its relation to Hassan Dahir Aweys (formerly head of Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya) and personalities linked to Al-Itihad. Out of these concern and calculation, Ethiopia “actively supported the establishment of an opposing alliance of military factions called the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC)” (Menkhaus 2010:16). This is clear indication that regional states rivalry and undue intrusion in the Somalia crisis has led to difficult alleyway.

Known as an outcome of the ‘Arta process’, the establishment of TNG with its own Transitional Charter for government was important. Despite its legitimacy and wide acceptance, due to poor infrastructures, lack of strong territorial control, inability to collect taxes and an inability to provide proper social services, the TNG government was unable to function in Somalia (Kodhek 2015). Ethiopia’s established SRRC that openly opposed TNG also seriously challenged the legitimacy of TNG. TNG’s acceptance slowly waned locally, internationally and regionally. Two years after its establishment, by 2002, TNG was already deemed irrelevant.

This opened up for renewed diplomatic efforts through IGAD to bring together TNG and SRRC for a national reconciliation conference. This IGAD-led Somalia National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC), hosted by Kenya and supported by the UN and Western donors, was the longest peace conference that lasted two years (Blok and Tijmen 2010). After two years of back and forth, the Transitional Federal Charter was developed thus paving the way for the establishment of the Transitional Federal Parliament (Kodhek 2015). In line with these, the newly established parliament elected its first president Abdullahi Yusuf in October 2004, for a five-year transitional period to establish the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). TFG started work in 2004 under president Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, making it the first internationally and regionally recognized government and leader in Somalia since 1991 (Kodhek 2015).

More effective than its precursor, the TFG tried to restore legitimate government and judicial institutions and, while doing this, it gained popular support from the population. Its tasks of restoring order and bringing about lasting peace and security to this war-torn country is yet to be realised. The establishment of TFG is not without its own controversy. The entire process was marred by corruption to influence votes and allegiances, and Ethiopia's undue influence of the process and clans aligned to it. As result, despite its international recognition, various Somalia factions view TFG as an institution controlled and steered by Ethiopia. Through time, "TFG proved to be a very fragile alliance as it was prone to internal strife and clan interests. Arguably, TFG enjoys international support from the United Nations, the African Union (AU), IGAD and many Western nations politically" (Blok and Tijmen 2010:3). It is thus notable that TFG also struggled to gain national acceptance and ensure physical control over Somali territories.

Consequently, alliances inside Somalia, particularly those in Mogadishu (including Islamists, leaders of the previous TNG, and warlords), became a block rivalling TFG and refused to recognise it and much less host it in Mogadishu. It was out of this that the Islamic Court Unions (ICU) which brought a wide range of figures and factions into its fold, including Islamist forces ensued. In March 2005, the parliament of the TFG split and the militia group 'Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism' (ARPCT) seeing weakness in the government, decided to confront the Islamic Court Unions (ICU) in an attempt to control Mogadishu but were defeated.

Following this, Ethiopia hankering to support TFG (which was already dubbed as its client), had its troops going into Mogadishu to depose the ICU in 2006 and recapture the city (Kodhek

2015). This was an open Ethiopian invasion of Somalia with all its tanks and troops under the auspices of the US and to a lesser extent the EU. Later, though, Ethiopia managed to install TFG and found itself stuck in the Somalia's intractable conflict unable to find any way out of it. This turned out to work contrary to the interest of TFG and in the process lost any semblance of legitimacy for it was seen as a stooge for Ethiopia as it became effectively weak and unable to impose its authority over the significant portion of the country.

Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia also divided IGAD. Eritrea wanted IGAD to chastise Ethiopia for invading Somalia and Uganda was not happy about it either. However, all the efforts failed to resolve the differences between Eritrea and Ethiopia as well as Uganda and Ethiopia (Abdi 2012). In the end, Ethiopia managed to isolate Eritrea with the help of the regional states and western powers involved in the Somalia crisis (notably the USA), and kept a moderate deal with Uganda to get out of this.

Ethiopia's salvation for being stuck in Somalia came from international actors, the USA and the UN which helped negotiate an exit strategy for Ethiopia and brought in a peacekeeping force which was a component of them from IGAD. These facts are crucial in better understanding what IGAD and the regional actors did and did not do, should and should not have done. Following the spectacular failure of TFG and Ethiopia's intervention to create new stable conditions in Somalia, new initiatives in 2008 were seen. This was a mediation effort initiated by the UN to bring an end to the fighting between TFG and the various armed groups fighting TFG and Ethiopian forces.

The efforts of the international community seem to have delivered some tangible results in Somalia in recent years as evidenced in the formation of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in 2012. The FGS was mandated to take office and replace the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) established in 2004 in exile, in Kenya. Notably, in August 2012 Somalia elected its first formal parliament that elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in September 2012 (Kodhek 2015). After the transition from the TFG to FGS took place, many considered this transition as a pivotal shift towards bringing peace and stability to the war-torn country. However, the FGS is still a weak structure confronted by many challenges such as the Al-Qaeda affiliated to Al-Shabaab, clan leaders and the differences between the national and regional governments.

Like Ethiopia, Kenya too got involved in the Somalia conflict rather directly. Since 2009, Somalia's main adversaries have been the Al-Shabaab militia prolonging the fighting and

plaguing the same region with terrorist attacks across the border. This became an intervention known as Operation ‘Linda Inchi’ launched in October 2011 with the Kenyan government having entered Somalia to secure its border. After intervening, Kenya pushed diplomatically to get its troops rebranded as peacekeeping forces a similar to the process which had been followed by Ethiopia.<sup>28</sup>

After October 2008, IGAD was established as an implementer and cooperation office in Addis Ababa. The office was mandated to do the following: “facilitate reconciliation, assist institutional and capacity building efforts, assist the mobilization of financial and technical resources for the TFG II and assist the TFG II to fulfil its mandate as per the TFG and the Djibouti agreement” (Mulugeta 2009:34). The office also works with the African Union and the United Nations. To bring peace and to exercise its mandates to address the problems in Somalia, the office formed a strategic plan named “Re-establishing Effective Institutions in Somalia.” The two-year strategy plan (2009–2011) was designed to re-establish institutions that can create a system of basic administration and thus provide security. IGAD also established a liaison office in Mogadishu to follow-up and provide information on a daily basis to the facilitator’s office. Furthermore, the office has been supported financially by the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), especially Denmark and Finland. According to Mulugeta (2009), “the Facilitator’s Office has been gathering information and updating the member states on developments in Somalia and its activities have also been coordinated with the UN and AU” (Mulugeta 2009:35).

IGAD has thus far been active in the security matters of Somalia. According to the IGAD’s Security Sector Program (SSP), “Al-Shabaab has become a regional security threat in the East Africa region” (Nagish 2016). In a new report titled “Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat”, IGAD labelled Al-Shabaab as a threat to the wider Horn and East African region. Al-Shabaab, the Islamic militant group, has long been perceived as merely a Somali-organisation. According to the report, “Al-Shabaab is clearly no longer an exclusively Somali problem, and requires a concerted international response”. In the opening remark, Commander Abebe, Muluneh, director of IGAD Security Sector Program (SSP), urged the IGAD member States to establish a transnational security initiative to promote cooperation and coordination within the sub-region. The report claims that Al-Shabaab aspires to become a truly regional organisation with membership and horizons that transcend national borders. Accordingly, Al-Shabaab as an

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<sup>28</sup> This is explored in some detail in the upcoming section.

Al-Qaeda's affiliate in the Horn of Africa has a presence in five countries: Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Tanzania and Uganda. It also stated that the group is working hard to extend its tentacles across the region. This is the first time that IGAD has officially placed Tanzania together with other countries of the region that are facing a serious threat from Al-Shabaab. It expressed its concern that the group is already recruiting young people in the member states (Nagish 2016).<sup>29</sup> The report further specifies that progressive expansion is mainly the result of the strategic direction adopted by its former leader and Ahmed Abdi Godane and his successor, Ahmed Diiriye who presently heads the movement. As Nagish puts it: "In late 2013, Godane re-organized Al-Shabaab's military wing to include two transnational units: one, the Jaysh Ayman, directed against Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and another dedicated to operations against Ethiopia" (Nagish 2016). IGAD stated that while the group has failed in effective operation in Ethiopia, the report accused the Jaysh Ayman for launching continuous cross-border attacks to Kenya in 2014. Notably, "an attack in Kenya's Garissa University College occurred a little over a year ago and resulted in the loss of 148 lives including 142 students. The attack was the second bloodiest in Kenya since Al-Qaeda bombed the US embassy in Nairobi in 1998, killing 213 people" (Nagish 2016). Just after a year, there was another attempt in the same city. The initial target was at a busy shopping mall but the plot was identified and lives were saved.

IGAD's Security Sector Program (SSP) in collaboration with the Sahan Foundation officially launched and released the study and report on Al-Shabaab. The report provides a series of recommendations to be taken by IGAD member states and other stakeholders in order to mitigate the threat posed by Al-Shabaab. Subsequent to the submission of the report, on May 2016, IGAD commissioned a study on 'Mapping Jihadist Organizations and Influences in the IGAD Region' which is still to be reported to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Committee on Eritrea and Somalia (Nagish 2016). The Islamic militant group has continued to fight with Somali security forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

AMISOM is facing different resistance from Al Shabaab who continues to operate mostly in rural areas. Wafula (2015) argues that "continued collaboration between AMISOM and the United Nations is critical in turning Somalia around. AMISOM must also understand the

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<sup>29</sup> <https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/content/al-shabaab-no-longer-exclusively-somali-problem>, Al- Shabaab no longer an exclusively Somalia problem: The Reporter, 20 August 2016, By Yemane Nagish (accessed June 2 2018).

perceptions of the Somali people towards their presence in Somalia so that they can respond appropriately” (Wafula 2015:54). The UN Security Council Resolution 2093 aims to increasingly put the United Nations in charge of peace and security in Somalia by specifically building capacity in the security sector and thus establish the rule of law institutions (Wafula 2015). The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) began work in 2013 to identify the process to achieve the goals of the organisation but these strategies respond to technical rather than political problems.

The US government established a military official with a small contingent cell in Mogadishu ostensibly at the request of AMISOM and the Somali government (Martinez 2014). This unit includes advisers, planners and communicators assisting the AMISOM and the Somalia government forces. Until 2001, the US also funded the Somalia peace process but its involvement, along with Western powers, was minimal. This was the case until September 2001, which dramatically changed the US’s and Western powers interest in Somalia. It was during this period that the funding from the US and other Western powers came in force; and this development managed to ensure that IGAD was able to function without the involvement of Egypt, Libya and Yemen who had direct interests in Somalia and the Horn of Africa at large (Abdi 2012).

All the external actors in the Somali case must tread carefully because of the complexity and nature of the conflicts. As argued by Sharamo and Mesfin (2011), there are many other national, regional and international actors that play a significant part in promoting peace and security in Somalia. These actors include regional states (Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Djibouti, and Eritrea) and states from further afield (the EU, Egypt, Turkey, Libya, Qatar, Syria, UAE and Iran). Other internal actors include the warlords, AhluSunnaWal-Jama and the business community. It is very important that the UN, the AU and IGAD, among others, strategize effectively and make diplomatic efforts to eradicate the support received from those actors that play a negative role. To this end, Sabala (2011:115) suggests, “they should rethink the basis of their cooperation with the other actors especially those seen as strategic partners. Somalia’s priorities and interests should be placed ahead of these actors ‘roles in Somalia irrespective of their impact.’”

Due to the regional security dilemma, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, have had a historical security presence in Somalia’s conflict. All four countries have supported or fought with armed groups inside Somalia. Neighbouring countries also have small groups that have

fought against various rulers in Mogadishu. At times, external interventions in Somalia have been carried out due to the need to fight domestic groups. At other times, external interventions have been used to steer dynamics inside Somalia in a neighbour-friendly direction. Thus, Somalia has been used as a proxy theatre (Wafula 2015). There have been persistent internal peace spoilers. Typical examples in this instance are the Al Shabaab and other militia groups who are against the government. This did not rule out the effort being made by all the internal and external actors to help Somalia achieve its vision of having a federal government by 2016 (Abdi 2012).

Even though there are differential efforts and commitments of all the IGAD member states and that there are at times conflicting and competing interests in their engagement, IGAD sought to play an important task in strengthening the TFG II. Djibouti too played a pivotal role while Kenya and Ethiopia systematically pursued interventionist policies with the tangential 'wait and see' approaches (Mulugeta 2009). Thus, the most arguable and debatable question is: Why is Ethiopia viewed as a significant external actor in the Somali conflict? As noted above, geographically, Ethiopia has a long border that is not demarcated with Somalia in the Eastern part and Ethiopia considers its security vulnerability coming from Somalia. For this reason, since the start of the decade-long Somali conflict, Ethiopia intervened in various ways by assisting in significant interim peace negotiations and mediations to outright military intervention with the claim of stabilising the country. Ethiopia was already embroiled in the Somalia conflict before it even formally invaded Somalia. Therefore, it was selectively training and arming the factions in the Somalia clan based war theatre thus creating resentment and anger among those who were not receiving such support.

America and Kenya have been doing the same. It is notable though that with Ethiopia, considering the historical animosity, it was a bit more pronounced. Somali's Islamic militant factions had a military base in the Gedo region of South Somali (Wafula 2015). It is often claimed that subsequent to the failure of the central government, the country became a hotbed for different extremist groups. Thus far, the international community has exerted efforts to bring sustainable peace and security to the country but has not managed to bring any long lasting peace and stability to Somalia. The group also has strong support throughout the country and aims to establish an Islamic state in Somalia with the view of extending Islamic radicalism in the Horn of Africa. Al- Shabaab (meaning 'the youth' in Arabic) are the other main actors in the Somali conflicts. After the Ethiopian intervention, this group increased in size and strength especially in southern Somalia (Wafula 2015).



### **5.5.2 The AU, AMISOM and United Nations Mediation Process in Somalia**

During the entire period of conflicts, many interventions were made through the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), and the Arab League and IGAD (Roba Sharamo 2011). The main mediation processes implemented by external actors were: the 1997 Cairo peace conference; the 2000 Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC) in Arta Djibouti; the 2002 Somali Reconciliation Conference (SRC) in Eldoret, Kenya; the 2003 National Reconciliation Conference (NRC) in Nairobi, Kenya; and the 2007 National Reconciliation Conference in Mogadishu (Kodhek 2015).

According to Wakengela (2011:384), “the presence of the AU in Somalia occurs through the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is a peacekeeping mission operated by the AU with the approval of the United Nations under Resolution 1744. In September 2006, the AU decided to send a peacekeeping mission to Somalia”. AMISOM was officially deployed in Somalia in 2007 for six months only to provide peace and security support to the TFIs (Transitional Federal Institutions). Their efforts were geared towards not only the stabilisation of Somalia to ensure safety and security and the “furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation but also to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and [to] create conducive conditions for long term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia” (Wafula 2015:53).

When AMISOM entered Somalia in 2007, it initially deployed troops from Uganda and Burundi, with Uganda being the only IGAD member state. At the time, there was a great amount of suspicion over neighbouring states’ conflicting interest and stake and a broad consensus on not seeking troops from them for this mission. Thus, the AU was looking for troops to be contributed from countries elsewhere. By 2010 there was a combined force of 5 250 in Mogadishu (2 700 from Uganda and 2 550 Burundians), which is 3 000 fewer troops than the minimum required number stated at the time. Even this number reached where it was in 2010 after a slow increment on the troop numbers. Other countries that offered troops were Nigeria, Ghana, Malawi, Djibouti and Guinea (Wakengela 2011). However, lack of resources, the need for equipment, uncertainty facing troops in Somalia and internal politics in these countries, led these states to withdraw their offer. This had certainly hindered the AU’s plans. This is not surprising considering the Somalia crisis and the multiple war fronts the country was (still is) hosting. In fact, the question many were asking was: How was this going to be a

peacekeeping mission in the absence of peace to keep? This has pushed many to consider and debate on possibilities of peace-enforcing mission instead of peacekeeping one.

In any case, at the time, countries such Sudan, France, Kenya, Djibouti, Brazil, Uganda and Turkey were not willing to train troops (Wafula 2015; Ashenafi 2017), but were willing to end own troops for the mission. Notably, Kenya and Djibouti later sent its troop as part of AMISOM. Kenyan troops first moved into Somalia as an invading force but through diplomatic efforts, it was rebranded as part of AMISOM. Ethiopia too followed the same root. However, Ethiopia has since been in Somalia both as peacekeeping force and invading force. Besides getting a segment of its troop wear blue, Ethiopia maintains an unknown number of its invading force as a contingent in the name of fighting terrorism. As a result, Ethiopia has continued to be labelled among Somalis as invading force (even with the blue beret) which is an image the country battled to shirk off among Somalis. Kenya too got its invading force rebranded as peacekeeping force by wearing completely blue. However, its image as an invading force persisted. This is despite the fact that Kenya and Somalia did not have any historical enmity while Ethiopia had. The only obvious conclusion for this is that its first entry has not helped it. Notably, there have been multiple al Shabaab terror attacks in the Kenyan heartland as backlash of this intervention.

By 2015, more than half of the IGAD member states were embroiled in the Somalia conflict. Except Burundi, all the troop-contributing countries to the AMISOM mission are from IGAD: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda with a total of 22,000 troops. Eritrea and Sudan were also seen as supporting one or the other faction in Somalia. Eritrea was often in cross-hair with Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti for supporting factions which the others did not like or approve (considering them to be spoilers). These countries dubbed Eritrea as a spoiler and in the end ganged up against it to be sanctioned by the UNSC. It should also be noted that external powers such the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, USA and EU, etcetera have in one way or another sought to influence the political process in Somalia using their local and regional alliances. Typical examples in this regard are the US and Turkey which have boots in the ground. While the division among regional states was clear right from the beginning the African Union has in many respects shown interest and determination in peacekeeping and peace-building in Somalia. While the USA is eager for the large part to quell Islamic terrorism, the Arab League states (particularly Turkey and the Gulf states) may have their own Islamic agenda.

These multiple conflicting involvements and interests that Somalia was expected to accommodate have not helped the AMISOM mission in any way. What was even troubling is that the troop-contributing countries were not in agreement with each other (Barnett 2016) as they often engaged in activities that were contradictory to the states' mission. It was already known that, despite the UNSC sanctions, much of the arms circulating in Somalia were coming from the neighbouring states that had contributed troops to the mission (see Wezeman 2010; Allison 2015; Koigi 2018). There are also reports blaming countries involved in the AMISOM mission for being there for financial reasons rather than genuine concern for peace and the reconstruction of Somalia (TRT 2019; Williams 2019). In fact, with 10 years of the AMISOM mission, there is very little to show for it (Maruf 2017).

In spite of the stated failures / shortcomings, considering the complexity of the Somalia crisis and the mission itself, AMISOM has at least achieved few objectives. In the early years, the mission had been successful in offering protection to the Abdullahi Yusuf administration and that of Sheikh Sharif. The subsequent security of Somalia and Mogadishu was made possible through this effort. However, these accomplishments have not been without massive human and financial losses. All peacekeeping forces continue to be threatened by the opposition armed groups and these huge logistical and financial challenges make the mission more complicated. As noted earlier, the AMISOM task is certainly more on the lines of peace-enforcing than peacekeeping which entail engaging in combat with armed forces seeking to destabilise the country.

Besides these challenges, there is sustained consensus that Somalia would descend into anarchy if it were not for the efforts of AMISOM. Thus, the presence of the AMISOM troops, despite the heavy cost (particularly human, financial and political), has continued to be indispensable for the relative security and stability of Somalia. Pointing to this reality, Sabala (2011:100) states:

In terms of sustaining a peacekeeping mission in Somalia, the hope lies in the request to the UN Secretary General to explore the option of replacing AMISOM with a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia. Until AMISOM is replaced by an UN-operated peace mission it seems the mandate of AMISOM will continue to be a subject of renewal for some time. The likelihood of other African countries contributing troops to join AMISOM continues to diminish, as the AU has not been able to marshal sufficient resources and equipment to support them.

It is thus arguable that against all odds, AMISOM has done incredible work to maintain peace in Somalia since its entry in 2007. For the first time, Somalia has an internationally recognised

legitimate government which was formed inside the country. AMISOM has been supportive of reopening embassies to support the new government. AMISOM is also reputed for fighting al Shabaab effectively and slashing the power and grip of this organisation in much of Somalia.

## **5.6 IGAD and the Peace Process in South Sudan**

The current South Sudan and Sudan were under colonial Egyptian rule until they gained independence in 1956 and inherited its boundaries from Anglo–Egyptian Sudan (Kodhek 2015). Geopolitics and history show that Sudan is located in one of the most conflict-torn regions of the world. Its neighbouring countries are Chad and the Central African Republic in the west, Egypt and Libya in the north, Ethiopia and Eritrea in the east and Kenya, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the south. Sudan is very much diverse in terms of ethnicity, language and religion. As Mugo (2016:2) contends, this diversity is not reflected in the leadership of the country as Sudan is characterized by a continuous domination of the centre over the marginalized peripheries”.

This drove Sudan down through the long running civil war and down in the middle creating a slip of South Sudan. As a consequence of this political failure, Sudan hosted the longest running civil war that lasted from 1962-2004. For the first time, Kenya-led mediation efforts in 2002 made a breakthrough in ending the civil war and getting South Sudanese rebels and Sudanese governments. This is what then became known as the Machakos Protocol which enabled the south to conduct a referendum for self-determination after six years. With the help of the AU-led mediation in January 2005, North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed as an accord thus effectively ending the longest running civil war in the continent. This includes details of ceasefire, autonomy for the south, a power-sharing arrangement between government and rebels and a condition for the proposed south Sudanese referendum.

The AU, IGAD and the regional states were instrumental in ending the Sudanese conflict and midwifing the birth of South Sudan. Following the 2011 referendum, South Sudan became an independent state. In 2003, barely two years after its declaration of independence, this newly established state of South Sudan descended into another round of civil war and conflict thus dashing all hopes of the newly born state. In responding to the South Sudanese crisis, the IGAD regional states took the frontline. So, in trying to resolve the South Sudan conflict, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya have sought to play their parts both as individual states and as members of IGAD. Early at the onset of the South Sudanese crisis, “the regional leaders particularly that of Kenya, Sudan and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, immediately sent their foreign

ministers to Juba on 19 December 2013 for consultation with the political leadership after the unfolding of deadly violence” (Mugo 2016:32).

A full-blown civil war broke out in South Sudan in December 2013 following President Salva Kiir accusation of his former vice-president, Riek Machar for plotting to overthrow him. It devolved to this because President Kiir fired the entire cabinet including Vice-President Riek Machar in July 2013 thus sparking off a civil war. The infighting within SPLM turned into an armed confrontation between the South Sudan government (Kiir’s forces) and the opposition forces (Mchar’s forces) (Kodhek 2015). It is reported that the conflict erupted in 2013 when the personal guards of president Kiir and Machar entered into armed confrontation.

Besides this, what appeared to be a dispute over power sharing soon devolved into civil conflict along ethnic lines largely between the Dinka and the Nuer communities. As the war raged the country, Machar formed a rebel force out of the South Sudanese army loyal to him and waged armed insurgency in many parts of the country. Thus, what started as a power struggle within the governing Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) turned into a devastating war – edging the state towards collapse. Since the war began it has so far claimed more than 300,000 lives and more than three million people have been displaced in a country of 13 million with millions internally displaced and one million left to neighbouring countries namely, Sudan, Kenya and Uganda (Fikade 2017).

On 27 December of 2013, IGAD’s Heads of States and governments met in Nairobi, as part of IGAD’s 23<sup>rd</sup> extraordinary session of Assembly of Heads of States. The South Sudan crisis was the major agenda and the Assembly thus elected the Ethiopian leader as the chair of IGAD to mediate between the conflicting parties in South Sudan. It also elected the one-time Ethiopian foreign minister, Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin, as head of IGAD’s Special Envoy for South Sudan, whose team consisted of General Lazarus Sumbeyo of Kenya and General Mohamed Ahmed El Dabi of Sudan (Abiye 2017). Notably, no person from Uganda is chosen here, despite the fact that Uganda is already embroiled in this conflict – with the intent of protecting Salva Kiir’s government. The Ugandan army was crucial to shoring up the advance of opposition forces and their attack on the capital in January 2014. Indeed, from the beginning, the engagement of IGAD’s frontline states (namely, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and Sudan) were significant and these countries too assumed a major role in the negotiations. IGAD’s role as lead mediator in the South Sudan conflict was supported by the African Union and the

international partners (notably the US and EU) because of IGAD's significant investment and its involvement in peace-making in Sudan-South Sudan.

A protracted peace talks under the auspices of IGAD occurred in Addis Ababa. These peace talks took place while the fighting continued in multiple parts of the country. As a culmination of IGAD's two (2) years efforts, Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) was finally signed in 17 August 2015. ARCSS was seen as a major breakthrough which led to the end of the civil war in South Sudan that had broken out in December 2013. It was on the bases of this accord that the National Unity Government of South Sudan (NUGSS) was established thus enabling the power sharing arrangement. As part of this deal, in April 2016, Machar returned to Juba and was re-instituted into his former position and in 2016 April - Riek Machar finally returned to Juba and was sworn in as first vice-president in a new unity government but was sacked in July after further conflict and went back into exile.

This calm made possible through ARCSS turned out to be a short-lived one. Unstable as it was, the deal collapsed in July 2016 after new fighting in the capital Juba broke out which forced the first vice president Machar into exile. This clash between the two rival parties left more than 300 civilians dead and over 150,000 displaced. The situation was unpredictable and forced the citizens to live in fear while causing foreign governments to evacuate their nationals from Juba. Among these, Italy and Germany managed to airlift European citizens out of Juba, and Japan, India and Uganda also evacuated their nationals (Anberbir 2016).

Subsequently, the country noticed a split of the opposition with Taban Deng taking over as first vice-president and Machar's faction took up arms against the government (Abiye 2017). Machar left Juba when the conflict started and having failed to return on the deadline set by Salva Kiir,<sup>30</sup> Kiir replaced Machar with Taban Deng Gai (Gen.) (Nagish 2016). Subsequently, Machar's faction took up arms against the government and brought more complexities to the South Sudan problem. Besides Kiir's government army and Machar's SPLM/A-IO, half a dozen armed opposition groups have sprung up since July 2016 (Nagish 2017).

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<sup>30</sup> Riek Machar left Juba with deteriorating security in the capital and citing personal threat he claimed to face. There were reports at the time that his residence was attacked by government forces (purportedly loyal to Salva Kiir); Machar left Juba after have been on the run and hiding for a couple of weeks in Juba (Fortin and Kron 2016; BBC news, 9 July 2016 ).

Following this outbreak, in August 2016, IGAD held a closed session meeting in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia with the warring parties with the intention of getting Reik Machar back to the unity government. The discussion of this meeting sought to get Salva Kiir's camp agree that Riek Machar reassumes his previous position of First Vice President of the NUGSS. In the first place, IGAD did not approve Taban's appointment and it did not see this as a prudent choice on the part of president Kiir. In particular, Ethiopia was not happy with this decision and it was already hosting Machar at its capital at the time. This in turn became a sore point between Juba and Addis Ababa and thus dragged Uganda into the fray. Nagish (2016) points out that "amid the closed meeting of IGAD, the representatives, who were not part to the negotiation, called upon the regional block members to decide for the deployment of intervention forces immediately to protect civilians and halt the collapse of the South Sudanese state".

Arguably, this was an Ethiopian position which did not go down well with Juba and Kampala. When this statement was released by SPLM-IO officials, the government refused to accept the appointment of the new Vice President claiming that it completely violates the agreement signed between the two contending parties. It is notable that the divergent interests of and division between the Ethiopians and the Ugandans hurt the South Sudanese peace process. Ethiopia has not liked the Ugandan continued military presence in Juba to support Kiir's government while informal officials from Kiir government have been accusing Ethiopia of taking sides with Machar's group. In multiple occasions in the course of the mediation process, Uganda has overtly shown strong determination to retain Kiir in his position. Evidently, the rivalry and competing interests among all the regional states involved in mediating this crisis are expressed in multiple instances and in various forms. These reflect the fact that they have divergent economic and security investments in controlling and managing the South Sudanese crisis which has serious ramifications for the mediation process.

The assembly of heads of state and government and the African Union specially appointed a committee to discuss the political developments and peace negotiations in South Sudan. This summit held in Addis Abeba was a consensus building meeting organised and directed by IGAD. The gathering was led by the Ethiopian PM of Hailemariam Dessalegn (at the time) then Chairperson of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government with the participation of Heads of State from the district and agents from the UN and the African Union (Nagish 2016).

On July 11, 2016, Ethiopia revealed its readiness for a hard-hitting measure to enforce peace in South Sudan days after an IGAD's communiqué demanded revisions on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to establish an intervention and mediation process. Former Ethiopian Communication Affairs Minister, Getachew Reda remarked in a press conference that troops from contributing countries should take strong actions to ensure peace in South Sudan and to realise the peace agreement. Thus, it was asserted to this effect that "Ethiopia believes that peace could not be sustainable the way it has been handled in Juba unless a forceful measure is taken by the peacekeeping mission there" (Anberbir 2016).

This latest position came days after a communiqué was issued by IGAD demanding an urgent revision of the UNMISS. IGAD's council of ministers met on July 11 2016 in the capital of Kenya where they discussed the recent situation in South Sudan. The meeting, which was presided by Ethiopian Foreign Minister Tedros Adhanom and attended by the members of council as well as representatives from the Troika (United States, United Kingdom, and Norway), condemned the latest fighting between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the SPLA in Opposition (SPLA-IO) in Juba. They also condemned the fact that many people lost their lives and suffered casualties and the destruction of properties that continued unabated. IGAD demanded an immediate ceasefire and a revision of the UNMISS mandate to initiate an intervention process and to increase the number of troops from different regions to secure Juba.

According to Minister Getachew Reda, IGAD and the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) have selected Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda to be prepared for an extra contribution of troops. According to Getachew, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn had met officials of both the rival factions and urged for a ceasefire. However, the situation escalated even to the extent of launching a military attack on the UN compound which is clearly a war crime. An Ethiopian soldier was among the wounded while a Chinese peacekeeper was declared dead. Political analysts and observers criticised the peacekeeping mission in Juba for failing to protect the civilians (Anberbir 2016). The Christian Science Monitor reported on Reda's suggestion to put in place an international intervention team willing to be more hostile to re-establish peace in the country. According to him, the brigade could be placed in the wider UN mission and would need to be constituted of African Union troops.

IGAD has returned the warring parties once again into the negotiating table and prioritised cease-fire. These renewed efforts, following the July 2016 fallout, were peace initiatives both at the national and regional levels. IGAD came up with what it called High Level Revitalization



Forum (HLRF) which was a decision taken at its Extra-Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government on South Sudan on 12 June 2017. This was a decision to bring parties in South Sudan conflict to the negotiating table and thus revive ARCSS. In these talks, IGAD sought to bring back the Chairman of the Sudan People Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) to his previous post in the government so that the ARCSS could be fully respected (IGAD 2015).

The HLRF was officially launched in December 2017 and since then it facilitated numerous negotiations between the South Sudanese warring parties (SPLM/A-IG and SPLM/A-IO), including other oppositions groups over a period of a year and a half. These IGAD-led negotiations came to be known as Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) which is to be construed as a culmination of this South Sudanese warring factions and the government signed at least six important peace agreement.

The first agreement was the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access signed on 21 December 2017 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This deal to cease all hostilities followed the high-level meeting at the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian minister of Foreign Affairs Workneh Gebeyehu noted that this peace deal had to be regarded only as the first step towards further negotiations towards finding a better way to secure humanitarian aid in the country (Nagish 2017). This was certainly indicative of the direction IGAD and its mediating team wanted to take in the negotiation. True to this direction, the HLRF initiative managed to get the parties in South Sudanese conflict to sign on the Addendum to the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access, signed on 22 May 2018 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This particular agreement focused on elaborating details to ensure permanent ceasefire and access and corridors for humanitarian aid/activities. However, the parties rejected power sharing, transitional period, governance system and broader security arrangements proposed by IGAD and left the meetings without any formal agreements on these issues.

Following intense pressure from IGAD and the international community, President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar met in Khartoum for the first time in two years (The Star 2018). At this meeting, the parties inked the Khartoum Declaration of Agreement between the Parties to the Conflict in South Sudan on 27 June 2018. This agreement includes a cease-fire and power sharing arrangements. Once the signing ceremony ended with much fanfare, the cease-fire only lasted just few hours, with skirmish in the Northern part of the country and both parties blaming

each other for this violation. Subsequent to these, a week later, in a meeting held to discuss the violation of the previous agreement and way forward, on 6 July 2018, the Agreement on Outstanding Issues of Security Agreements was signed in Khartoum, Sudan. The Agreement on Outstanding Issues on Governance was signed on 5 August 2018 in Khartoum, Sudan. The latest peace-making efforts also saw the signing of a peace agreement on 12 September 2018 in Addis Ababa. Despite President Kiir and Riek Machar signing peace agreements 12 times, the South Sudan conflict has continued unabated with varying levels of intensity.

Arguably, regional states and IGAD have played a leading role in these conflicts. Ethiopia particularly dominated this process and in the last few years Uganda and Sudan have taken the lead. Early at the start of this conflict, Ethiopia and Uganda were pushing difficult terms and disagreeing on how to handle the negotiation and peaceful settlement of South Sudan's crisis. Lack of consensus (and the apparent rivalry) between Addis Ababa and Kampala as mediators on the South Sudan crisis has hampered the peace process. As Vertin (2018:1) puts it, "the potential value brought to the South Sudanese mediation effort by IGAD's frontline states—Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda—was ultimately outweighed by their competing national interests and stakes in the outcome." In the end, IGAD-led mediation process was tainted by unsubtle imposition of interests of the member states in the process and apparent bias of mediators. The opposing interests and involvement of global powers (particularly, the USA and China) have also complicated this crisis. As discussed in the next section, these global powers often sought to influence the political and security process through the regional states and organisation as well as the AU/UN.

### **5.6.1 The Role of Global Actors in South Sudan's Conflict**

On the surface, there appears to be broader consensus in the urgent need to stabilise South Sudan. Notably, IGAD has been mandated by the international community (AU and UN) and Ethiopia is leading the mediation process. However, there are apparent divisions on how to take this forward and the end outcome external actors expect out of this process. Like all diplomatic manoeuvres, the peace mediation processes were framed and guided by geopolitical interests of each state. In many respects, this is what has caused the wider division between Ethiopia and Uganda in the South Sudan crisis and between China and USA. For example, the USA proposed UNSC sanctions on South Sudan were consistently blocked by China and Russia.

Evidently, local actors are aligned to regional actors and global actors. Despite having been the mediator, Addis Abeba has apparently been aligned with Machar, while Kampala has sided with Kiir. Since the start of the conflict, the US has sided with Kiir's camp. The Obama administration indeed supported Salva Kiir by enabling him access to arms through Uganda at the behest of the US. It is notable that the US has winked on Ugandan People's Defence Force's (UPDF) intervention and move to Juba following the escalation of the crisis in South Sudan in 2013-2014. The US has also been blocking the arms embargo and this was meant to enable weapons flow to president Kiir controlled government (Temin 2018). In many occasions, US officials formally and informally acknowledged their desire to retain Kiir as president and thus discouraged Machar from joining the unity government. For example, Special Envoy Donald Booth told the US Congress, "We do not believe it would be wise for Machar to return to his previous position" (Hunt 2018). This is despite the fact that US has shifted its position, partly due to frustration on the lack of progress. Early in 2018, the US sought to sanction 6 South Sudanese officials, accusing them for obstructing the peace process to which President Kiir vehemently objected.

When Machar fled from Juba, it was Ethiopia that hosted him and there are also reports that he trains an army which launches his attacks from Ethiopia. This is arguably related to the fact that Ethiopia is in a difficult position as a home for ethnic Nuer, and Ethiopian's Nuer are seen to be supporting Machar and his group inside Ethiopia. What makes matters worse is that at the start of the conflict in 2014, Kiir government has been accusing the UN strong 8,500 peacekeeping forces in the country for siding with Machar's rebels. The Ethiopian army is the largest contingent of this peacekeeping force deployed in South Sudan. Besides this, Ethiopia has an economic interest in South Sudan. This is not unique to Ethiopia, for it is known that Uganda and Kenya have similar ambitions in South Sudan.

China is a major country with interests in both South Sudan and the Sudan with actual investments in multiple sectors. It is well known that China is the closest ally to the Sudanese government and its major exporter of weapons and ammunition albeit maintaining good relations with major businesses in South Sudan including the imports of about 6% of its needs of oil from South Sudan. China's foreign policy is built upon the principle of 'non-interference in the internal affairs' of its allies, friendly countries or business partners. So, it was certainly disturbed by the development in post secession relations between South Sudan and its neighbour Sudan (Mugo 2016).

China has been investing heavily in infrastructure, the petroleum sector and telecommunication in South Sudan which constitutes a real presence on the ground and support through various sectors in the country. South Sudan inherited China's oil companies working with other south Asians as *de facto* investors upon its concession. Energy-hungry China advances its presence in South Sudan through supporting the developmental activities of the government by providing loans and being a major market for its defence needs. China's role in the advancement of peaceful resolution of conflict commenced with IGAD's early mediation processes where it contributed financial support urging the parties to reach a quick solution. Its interests in South Sudan coupled with its strategic relations and influence in the region (Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and South Sudan) encouraged China to play a vital role in engaging the parties bilaterally or collectively towards a nationally owned agreement (Mugo 2016).

China views the conflict in South Sudan as something that goes beyond the local politics of power struggle within the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM), to an international conflict over resources where its rival the US tries to unseat it through proxy and support to favourable individuals in power. In light of this, China consequently took a robust stance by supporting the mediation process and thus engaged the parties while deploying its first combat force in South Sudan as part of the United Nation's peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in a clear mark of Chinese vested interest.

IGAD received one million dollars support for the mediation process from China at the beginning of 2014 (Mugo 2016) and it (China) continues to engage high-level representation of its Special Envoy to South Sudan (SESS) and Sudan. Both parties to the conflict view China's role as important and they were vocal in rejecting the United Nation Security Council's (UNSC) proposed sanction's threats. Both parties appeared to view China as the more credible party. China focuses on encouraging the parties to expedite the process and it viewed the proposed sanctions as less productive and constructive. China's UN ambassador Liu Jieyi dismissed the proposed sanctions and their modalities as illogical (Mugo 2016). In fact, none of the IGAD member states thought sanctions would be constructive. Instead, IGAD proposed the deployment of armed forces under blue which the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) upheld (Nagish 2016).

Arguably, the regional block has to manage some balance in the military presence in Juba. More precisely, with Kirr sitting at the helm of the government, how many of his forces Machar could bring to Juba was an issue that needed consensus. Additionally, Kiir has to order some

of its troops out of Juba. The whole ordeal took weeks of back and forth with Machar arriving at the Gambella Airport ready to leave and cancelling a couple of times. According to observers, when the deadline for the August agreement was put in place by IGAD Plus, one of the conditions was for IGAD to fully refer the South Sudan issue to the AU or the UN, should the recent round of negotiations not get implemented. Needless to say, the process was stalled. With the recent arms' sanctions failing to pass the floor at the UNSC due to the opposition of a handful of countries like Japan, Russia and the like ( to serve their own political interests), the role of the UN seems to be undermined in the South Sudanese conflict as well.

In December 2016, Ambassador Okamura Yoshifumi, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's special envoy to South Sudan denounced atrocities and human rights violations committed by the warring factions in South Sudan but remarked that his country would, however, reject the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) peaceful draft resolution to enforce an arms embargo on South Sudan. This was confirmed by Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn, (Former Ethiopian prime minister) who was at the time chairman of IGAD. Ambassador Yoshifumi stated that Japan did not support the move the UNSC was considering to take with regards to South Sudan which was a reference to the proposed sanctions. Refuting these measures which the UNSC was about to vote on Japan supported regional peace initiatives and proposed the deployment of Regional Peace Forces (RPFs) to stop atrocities, killings and the violation of human rights in that country. The Japan Ambassador also noted that the protection of aid workers would have to be part of the mission of this peacekeeping force which Japan supported wholeheartedly (Fikade 2017).

In addition to urging for inclusive peaceful dialogues, the ambassador conveyed Prime Minister Abe's request that those involved in the killings of civilians be held accountable. According to the ambassador, Abe's administration has approved and deployed 350 contingency military personnel to South Sudan. Nevertheless, the ambassador denied involvement of the troops in any combat missions so far and vouched that they are not mandated to do so. Rather, the Japanese contingent is involved in the rebuilding of South Sudan's war-torn infrastructure. Spending three days in Juba, ambassador Yoshifumi met President Salva Kiir and his ministers before he left for Addis Ababa. The former vice president-turned-rebel chief of South Sudan, ambassador Yoshufimi stated that the ousted leader should be part of the newly-launched national dialogue which President Kiir announced. According to media reports, Machar is believed to be under house arrest in South Africa (Fikade 2017; Abiye 2017; Nagish 2017).

So far, a peace accord, negotiation or mediation attempts by IGAD member states have not been achieved. Back in 2015, IGAD came up with a roadmap suggesting a power sharing arrangement in an inclusive transitional government. The proposal of the regional block was swiftly scuppered by both Kiir and Machar. However, ambassador Yoshifumi argues that it is a hasty generalisation to claim that the peace processes are failures altogether. He also denounced the UNSC remarks that “it’s too early to impose sanctions”. According to the ambassador, the effectiveness of the arms embargo is dubious and might further escalate the already worsened crisis in South Sudan. In contrast to the Japanese, the government of the United States through its ambassador to the UN, Samantha Powers, urged the international community to impose sanctions on South Sudan as the situation is getting dire. Despite international pressures, however, the plight of civilians in South Sudan is still dire. Currently, reports are suggesting that South Sudan is on the brink of genocide.

As established earlier on in the discussion, competing interests, mistrust and enmities within IGAD members have contributed to much of the failures and protracted nature of the South Sudan crisis. Global powers’ differences on how to deal with this and their desire to dictate the outcome have compounded this problem. In the final analysis, these developments and experiments in mediation and intervention raise questions on whether IGAD is up to the challenges the region is facing or not. The main argument advanced in these is that power dynamics and material interests of the regional and global actors involved in the peace process have serious ramifications in dealing with and handling the South Sudan and Somalia crises.

## **5.7 Conclusion**

This chapter discussed the various policies and programmes that IGAD outlined for itself focusing on the two consecutive periods of five (5) years regional strategic plans. It has also been seen how the authority categorised its strategies into specific pillars with each outlining its own multiple programmes, sub-programmes and projects and budgetary requirements. This chapter also explored briefly the programmes and projects by probing in their application and implementation. The main argument is that IGAD has a long way to go in terms of its capacity and resource to implement its strategic objectives and plans. When considering that the various projects already implemented and are to be implemented, the available budget and what is still required, IGAD is still dependent on the good will of external funders. This makes it pliable towards the donor’s interest rather than its own priorities.

This chapter also explored IGAD's peace and security strategy by focusing on its intervention in two most devastating regional crises. Here, IGAD's role in mediating and intervening on Somalia and South Sudan was explored including how the military, economic and political diplomacy of all the actors are deployed to handle the crisis of the two countries. Notably, their efforts are shaped and influenced by political and economic interests of the regional and global actors which are reflected in the process and initiatives. The political economy of IGAD member states and global power interest interactively form and frame regional initiatives. The necessity and desire to intervene in the protracted conflicts are, thus, guided by the self-interests of the states involved.

It can thus be assumed that the political economy of inter-governmentality guides IGAD's regional integration and the regional strategic plan. South Sudan and Somalia have borne the strain of post-independence civil wars and destructive conflicts because of failure in leadership which led to continuous conflict. To this day, the power vacuum has been exploited by the rise of military groups such as Al-shabaab in Somalia and the escalation of ethnic leaders in the case of South Sudan which once again leads to stagnation of the country (Kodhek 2015; Demeke and Gebru 2014). IGAD's interventions in these two cases are, in some respects, meant to deal with these vacuums as an initiative of transnational governance.

IGAD has been subjected to hard power and external support in its fight against terrorism and must direct resources to fight terrorist groups in its member states. In part, in both Somalia and South Sudan cases, the 'dependency syndrome' has implicated and complicated the situations of these states and opened them up for manipulation and the imposition of external agendas. Though a central role player, IGAD too has suffered from the above problem thus leaving it exposed to external influence and pressures as is the case in the Somali's states, stakeholders and institutions. IGAD should focus on the burning issues of political settlements, social and economic inequality, extreme poverty, corruption, bad governance, lack of tolerance and extremist ideologies towards progressive peace and sustainable economic development in Somalia (Demeke and Gebru 2014). In the case of South Sudan, challenges range from inter-clan conflicts over natural resources to highly politically driven power struggles among the military and political ruling class (Kodhek 2015).

## **Chapter Six**

### **Considering Challenges and Opportunities of IGAD's Regional Integration Project**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter deals mainly with the challenges that IGAD faces which include political, security, economic, social and structural challenges. Notably, regional integration is a multidimensional process since besides economic considerations, it involves cultural, social and political aspects. Similarly, the success of regional integration depends on a combination of social, cultural, economic and political factors. This chapter, therefore, outlines how the conflict in the region implicated IGAD's peace and security agenda to improve the socio-economic lives of citizens in the region.

The first section explores and assesses the challenges facing IGAD by way of considering both intra and inter-state conflicts which have become pervasive in the region. The second section examines the challenges emerging from multiple membership and the nature of the state in the region. Notably, states in this region are weak when considering the criteria for determining the weakness-strength of a state. Hence, this section addresses the challenges of regional integration of weak states and their implications. Section three engages with IGAD's multiple challenges which combine conflicts, terrorism and piracy associated with increasingly troubling developments in the refugee crisis. Following this, this chapter explores the challenges posed to regional integration by the lack of sufficient and well-developed infrastructures in member states. Finally, the chapter pays attention to the lack of good governance which is a neglected dimension in regionalism.

#### **6.2 Assessment of Challenges facing IGAD: Intra and Inter-state conflicts**

Thonke and Spliid (2012:15) argue, "it is evident that there is a quite large gap between ambitions and reality in regional integration in Africa". The ideology of countries differs from one another which might be a colonial legacy as argued by some writers. IGAD has been trying to bring about peace and security, on the one hand, and socio-economic collaboration, on the other hand. When it comes to peace and security, the importance of state building and capacity have not been viewed as imperative to the above major concerns of the region. The assumption has been that once peace and security are brought the other prerogatives will follow. However, collaboration in this area is a question of state interest and strong political will. Even though



IGAD adopted many protocols and declarations regarding peace and security, their implementation has not been effective (Gebregeorgis 2013).

The IGAD region experiences many challenges as a result of man-made and natural disasters and has had more than its share of intra and inter-state conflicts some of which have lasted for more than four decades (IGAD 2016b). Almost all the IGAD member states have experienced civil/conflicts with neighbouring states. The thirty years of long civil war in Northern Ethiopia ended in 1991 but the region has barely recovered from this war. For example, the government is fighting against the OLF, ONLF and other opposition groups and the state must deal with over nine broad conflicts (Molla 2002). In Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) have been engaged in armed opposition to the regime in power. The Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and other opposition forces have been operating against the Eritrean government. Somalia is still a conflict zone divided by different clans and warlords tearing it apart. In Djibouti, the Afar-based Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) battles against the government. The Islamic party of Kenya has been engaged in subversive activities against the Kenyan government. The situations in Sudan and South Sudan are even more troubling with multiple instances of civil strifes and wars. It is arguable, therefore, that these domestic conflicts negatively impact on the inter-state relations in the IGAD sub-region (Molla 2002).

Mulugeta (2009:37) notes that "the religious culture is under pressure from the tiny to highly violent Islamist extremists who aim to establish a Taliban-like regime in the Horn of Africa by uniting all Somalis living in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti". The extreme Islamist groups who always declare allegiance to the global jihad movement are becoming a clear threat to peace in Somalia even further complicating regional peace and security strategies (Mulugeta 2009). The IGAD regional states have a long history of engaging in each other's internal conflicts by supporting oppositional groups. However, it is hardly possible to think of a genuine security policy and organised mutual benefit peace strategy. There is an air of uncertainty and non-cooperation rather than of peaceful and strengthening partnerships among the states. IGAD is, therefore, powerless to develop a common position to effectively deal with the Somali peace and security process.

Intra- and interstate conflicts have also made it very difficult for IGAD to focus on addressing the issue of radical Islamism in the region. For example, IGAD has devoted considerable energy, time and money dealing with the crisis in Sudan from 1994 to 2005 and from 2011

until now (Mulugeta 2009). The direct and indirect involvement of some Arab states also undermines IGAD's ability to deal with ongoing intra- interstate conflicts in the region. According to Mulugeta (2009:39), "Al-Shabaab is said to be receiving financial support and weapons from supporters from Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Egypt and Libya also face similar accusations. Egypt has been repeatedly accused of spoiling the peace initiatives taken or endorsed by IGAD". These states are well-known for providing financial support to radical Muslim groups in the name of voluntary 'non-profit organizations' which remains problematic for the establishment of peace and security in the IGAD region (Mulugeta 2009).

Relations between Sudan and Uganda remain fragile largely because of Uganda's support of the SPLA and Sudan's links to Ugandan rebel groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF). Sudan's relations with Eritrea have also been marred by repeated border incidents since 1993. The Sudan government has supported Eritrea's opposition groups like the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ). In turn, Eritrea has provided assistance to SPLA groups. Sudan has been in conflict with Kenya particularly over the sovereignty of territory on the Kenyan side of the Kenyan-Sudan border known as the 'Elemi-triangle' which is believed to contain substantial deposits of petroleum. Sudan's relations with its neighbour Ethiopia is also characterised by conflict. Ethiopia accuses Sudan for exporting Islamic ideology to the region and Sudan's suspicion of Ethiopia's support to SPLA can be cited as examples of conflicts between the two IGAD member countries (Molla, 2002).

Ethio - Eritrea relations have been marred by conflict and tension, and both states support each other's oppositions, which may exacerbate the already tense security situation in the Horn of Africa.<sup>31</sup> Despite this, the African Union has "always proved eager to play a profound role in resolving inter-state disputes and has been unwilling to involve itself in civil conflicts within states even on occasions when it is within the purview of the African Union policy of conflict prevention, management and resolution strategy" (Tekle 1996:11). Most of the conflicts in the region end either after a loss of thousands of lives a result peace and security among the member states remain fragile.

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<sup>31</sup> There appears to be a shift over the last few months in the region in this regard, with thawing relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. They have also come to an agreement on security, economic and regional cooperation.


### **6.3 Weak States, Multiple Membership and Lack of Super National Authority**

The implementation of preferential trade between member states requires advanced and fair practices such as the harmonisation of production, marketing and import-export needs to be free of bureaucratic procedures plus fair practice of rules and regulations. According to Healy (2011), capacity is unevenly distributed in the IGAD region and is almost non-existent in the most fragile countries like Somalia and South Sudan (Healy 2011). Arguably, without a strong sense of collective integration, a single state or the involvement of only two states cannot bring IGAD's nations together. Overlapping memberships also become another serious challenges in the different regional trade blocks and regional organisations in Africa one way or the other.

Overlapping membership is a problem for two reasons: firstly, when it becomes a serious challenge and constraint in economic and political resources and, secondly, when it leads to unnecessary conflicting commitments of member countries. All the IGAD member states excluding Somalia are members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African states (COMESA). Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan are members of the Arab League, and also, five IGAD members Eritrea, Somalia Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti, are additionally members of the Community of Sahl-Sahelian states (CEN-SAD) (Gebreglorgis 2013; Healy 2011).The implications and consequences of the involvement of IGAD member states into multiple regional groupings ranges from low level participation in the meeting to challenges in making payments on budgetary contributions (Molla 2002). It also creates heavy constraints on the integration process, which leads to conflicts over mandates and divided loyalty between member states. Such challenges cause financial and administrative burdens for the states.

Moreover, the core reasons for the weak institutionalisation and the weak progress of IGAD are poor interstate relations, violent intrastate conflicts, major military conflicts and recurring massive humanitarian crises. Additionally, the policy approach for cooperation is very poor and the financial and regulatory policy framework for the comprehensive economic integration in the IGAD region is weak. It also causes conflicting political commitments and courses of action as well as pressurizing states to oppose the objectives of various sub-regional organisations on the continent at large.

Figure 5. Summary of multiple memberships



Source: Adapted from (Union, 2009)

Global international activity has increased significantly. The regional institutional actors have become more interactive and cooperative on the continent. Although regional institutions might have similar objectives, regional integration groups choose contradictory routes to achieve them. COMESA, for example, has a schedule for tax and tariff reductions, which may not be similar to that which the East African Community (EAC) member states will have to fix. Deciding on the rules of origin and the list of exceptions has also raised difficulties in COMESA and different criteria may be arrived at in the EAC region (Goldstein and Ndung'u 2001).

Like other economic integration arrangements in Africa, IGAD is an intergovernmental organisation devoid of power to enforce decisions over its constituencies. IGAD has a high organ that comprises Heads of State and Government, a Council of Ministries, a Committee of Ambassadors and a Secretariat and the Secretariat that are appointed by the Heads of State and Government. This structure could lead to (or create the appearance of) domination of the organisation by single heads of states which may result in increased levels of politicisation of its programmes and, even worse, create a pattern of a single state-led organisation (Mwendwa, 2014). In this regard, the follow-up of decisions taken at sub-regional meetings is left to the Heads of States or a few ministers and to civil servants in the ministries dealing with cooperation matters without the involvement of the rest of the population.

In other words, IGAD's integration in the sub region lacks a strong supranational authority. The supreme policy and important decision maker of IGAD is the Assembly which consists of Heads of States and Government and decisions are reached by consensus. This allows governments to avoid loss of sovereignty through unilateral decisions in the application of regional agreements. Most of the IGAD officials are more loyal to their governments than to the institution. This has become one of the challenges to effective integration in the sub-region. As Mwendwa (2014:95) puts it, "[t]he lack of political will on the parts of the participating governments is also reflected on their reluctance to give executive independence to the Secretariat in the running and management of the institution".

#### **6.4 IGAD's Multiple Challenges: Conflicts, Refugee Crisis, Terrorism and Piracy**

IGAD's goal is to "achieve regional cooperation and economic integration through promotion of food security, sustainable environmental management, peace and security, intraregional trade and development of improved communications infrastructure in the Horn of Africa" (IGAD 2016b:3). Almost all the IGAD members are engaged in inter-state conflicts. Above all, without peace and security the success of IGAD ultimately relies on peaceful and smooth relations among member states. Continuous conflict and tension among the states instead of full engagement in the economic development sector, means that the region has been struggling to maintain peace and stability.

Implementing democratic government and state building from the national to the regional level becomes a growing concern for the region. There are many small groupings and clans, which are not yet accepted and are referred to as tribes and ethnic groups in South Sudan and Somalia associated with land are common. In this regards, conflicts occur where communities claim ancestral land from the persons displaced because of civil wars (Kodhek 2015). According to UNHCR, the "South Sudan situation is the third largest refugee emergency in the world after the Syrian crisis and Afghanistan situation and the largest and most complex emergency in Africa" (UNHCR 2017:27). Peace and security remains unstable in Somalia as well. Armed conflict continues the killing of the civilians, abductions, rape and a general state of lawlessness.

Many of the problems in the IGAD region are caused by the nature of the states and external interferences. Currently, all long-lasting and complicated problems in the IGAD region relate to an absence of legitimacy either due to dictator governance and intolerance to diversity, or

lack of capacity and political will to govern peacefully (IGAD 2016). Ketema (2013) argues that state policies regarding regional institutions are very poor:

[D]espite the obvious need for a better regional security framework in the Horn of Africa, the scope and the effort of the IGAD secretariat to develop an autonomous conflict resolution capability will remain limited, and member states will try to use IGAD's authority to legitimize their own regional policies. (Ketema 2013:99)

Somalia and Sudan remain a security challenge for cooperation and integration in the region. Notably, domestic conflicts have negative impacts on inter-state relations. We have seen countless conflicts and wars between the states. Such conflicts challenge IGAD member countries to work together in pursuance of common development goals. Evidently, IGAD region, refugees, terrorism and piracy create a large gap between ambitions and realities. The region has been the centre of continental instability and humanitarian disaster for more than three decades. According to Demeke and Gebru (2014) "states of the region experienced authoritarian regimes, which massacred thousands of people. They have also undergone through conflicts over ethnic identity, resources and boundary questions in the region" (Demeke and Gebru 2014:5). The region has seen much known poor governance and weak economic development. Furthermore, the IGAD region is also besieged by drought, massive famine and influx of refugees. Among other things, terrorism and extremist groups have posed some of the greatest security challenges in the region.

Particularly, the dominant form of trans-national terrorism in the IGAD region has been committed by organisations operating within the region. Al Shabaab has been the major terrorist organisation operating and organised within the region. It declared itself as an al-Qaeda affiliated organisation with the primary objective of establishing an Islamic republic state in Somalia (Demeke and Gebru 2014). IGAD acknowledged that land access and peaceful economic development have become a serious and continuous concern causing ethnic and religious tension. Terrorism is also a major obstacle to establishing peace and enabling development. Since the mid-1990s Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Somalia have faced terrorist attacks emanating from radical organisations based in Somalia (IGAD 2016a).

As primary targets of terrorist attacks by Al Shabaab, IGAD member States are at the forefront of fighting Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Al Shabaab based in Somalia and its operatives in Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia, the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda and South Sudan have victimised nationals of IGAD member states and other countries (IGAD 2016b). It is also unfortunate that almost all the IGAD region's election results have been disputed and have

often led to violence and civil unrest. Political force has become a way of obtaining power and has deteriorated the legitimacy of elections and the outcome of results in the region, for example, Ethiopia (2005), Kenya (2007), Uganda (2010), and Djibouti (2013) (IGAD, 2016).

Migration has emerged in the last few years as a critical political and policy challenge for many African states as it includes dimensions such as integration, social cohesion, the attraction and retention of skills and labour as well as border management. The IGAD region has suffered much as a result of border disputes that escalated into wars between countries. Migration is thus a cause or consequence of conflicts. Due to the impacts of localised conflicts, there are and will continue to be more internally displaced people and refugees in the IGAD region (IGAD 2016b). This requires a shift of focus to internal displacement and the influx of refugees from the IGAD region to the Middle Eastern countries is expected to drastically increase with the increasing demand for low and highly skilled migrants which leads to ‘brain drain’ which burdens the region. Migration challenges IGAD’s sustainable socio-economic development objectives. According to IGAD’s assessment of civil conflicts and cross-border wars, the region currently hosts 4.6 million internationally displaced persons (IDPs) and 1.8 million refugees while also producing 1.9 million refugees. In July 2012, IGAD ministers adopted a regional migration policy framework focusing on labour migrants, refugees, IDPs and returnees. IGAD (2016a) has established a ‘Regional Migration Coordination Committees’ (RMCC) where Directors of Immigration from the IGAD member states hold regular meetings to address migration issues among member states.

South Sudan and Somalia repeatedly feature as a major concern with widespread violations of international humanitarian law and a massive humanitarian crisis that civilians face in the Horn of Africa. Civilians are at high risk of being killed and injured in indiscriminate attacks by all parties to internal armed conflicts and because of generalised violence and collapse of the rule of law. For example, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report (2010), over 200,000 civilians were estimated to have fled their homes in Somalia between January and early September 2010, some 1.4 million are currently displaced within the country and 68,000 have been registered as newly arrived refugees in neighbouring countries in 2010 (UNHCR 2017)<sup>32</sup>.

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<sup>32</sup> 10 November 2010, Index Number: AFR 01/007/2010

According to this UNHCR report, in South Sudan, one in four people are forced to leave and the outflows of refugees have become a concern for all international institutions. Notably, “the South Sudan situation is the third largest refugee emergency in the world after the Syrian crisis and Afghanistan situation and the largest and most complex emergency in Africa” (UNHCR 2017:34). The institution further outlined that there are more than two million refugees in the sub-region in addition to two million South Sudanese who are displaced. Out of the 12 million South Sudanese population, a third has been displaced and more than half of the entire population has been affected by the conflict (UNHCR 2017).

Hosting refugees always has security, political, economic and social implications in the IGAD region. Refugees can cause direct or indirect security challenges to the host country. For example, Somali refugees who moved in their thousands into Ethiopia and Kenya Al-Itihad undertook a series of terrorist attacks in the mid-1990s. According to Mulugeta (2009), “currently, the Al-Shabaab is said to be recruiting troops from refugee camps in Kenya and there is a growing fear in Nairobi that it could launch terrorist attacks. The threat is also eminent in other states, since Al-Shabaab established networks within the Somali Diaspora” (Mulugeta 2009:13). The presence of Somali refugees in the front-line states – Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti—is said to have created ethnic militants in the Somali inhabited areas of these states. The economic implication of hosting refugees is also high and creates a massive security burden in these states (Mulugeta 2009).

IGAD and the international community are highly concerned about the occurrences of piracy off the coast of Somalia. In 2009, 217 ships were attacked by Somali pirates of which forty-seven were hijacked and 867 crew members were held hostage. This is a dramatic increase as compared with 2008, when over 134 incidences had been recorded (Mulugeta 2009:15). This shows that in 2009 Somalia was regarded as the country with the highest piracy incidents in world records. Somalia accounted for more than half of the 406 piracy incidents that happened in 2009 alone. It experienced a marked increase in the number of reported attacks along the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden, which caused significant damage to regional and international trade. The piracy attacks in the region also had serious economic implications on shipping companies, insurance companies and the stakes were excessively high. However, when sailing through the Gulf of Aden, which the insurance companies consider to be a typically high-risk zone, the premiums on the ships increase and this has a ripple effect on import-export trade and the cost of goods transported through these waterways. A recent study



estimates an increase in insurance and transport costs from US\$500 to US\$20,000 for a voyage through the Gulf of Aden. Though the actual use of force by the Somali pirates is modest, the human cost of piracy incidents is still a concern for the international community. For example, out of the 889 crew members taken hostage in 2008, 815 were taken in Somalia (Mulugeta 2009:16).

Piracy can also increase the possibility of environmental degradation and has financial implications for the IGAD nations. Pirates indiscriminately fire rocket-propelled grenades to capture potential targets. Such violent acts against chemical and oil tankers can result in major oil spills and cause environmental damage in the region. The international community responded in collaboration with some IGAD member states to the rising threat by deploying naval forces along the lengthy coast of Somalia, which is a costly exercise. The presence of naval forces temporally subdued piracy activities. Nonetheless, effective maritime security has made it difficult to conduct normal operations due to continued instability in Somalia and elsewhere (Mulugeta 2009).

### **6.5 Poor Communication Infrastructures within Member States**

Due to lack of proper and organised communication and infrastructures the region has been struggling with rapid growth and the expansion of market competitiveness among all the member states. Transport and communication are implicated because of poor infrastructure, roads, railways and airways, which make the effort of integration inefficient and difficult. Like most of the developing countries, the IGAD region remains weak and small (Gebreglorgis, 2013). Lack of technological advancement and poor infrastructures are the primary challenges in Africa especially in the Horn of Africa. Interconnectedness and economic interaction through modern technologies is vital for regional integration. Economic advancement in a single state thorough communication, railways, IT, roads, plus advanced infrastructures will not bring sustainable and healthy economic integration for the rest of IGAD member states (Ketema 2013). However, the Horn of Africa was and still is a troubled region with weak states suffering from economic malaise and with environmental, social and political practices that are unsustainable. Under such conditions, economic relations and integrating them among all member states, have become a continuous challenge. The challenge to effective and progressive integration is also reflected in the poor records of intra-trade in the sub-region of IGAD.

## **6.6 The Neglected Dimension of Regionalism: Lack of Good Governance**

The region has been experiencing lack of good governance for more than four decades. Consolidating democracy and reinforcing good governance remains a challenge on the African continent. Political leaders manipulate power for their own interests rather than that of the states and this creates ongoing threats to the future of African socio-political dynamics (Geda and Kebret 2008). Corruption, favouritism, nepotism, maladministration and incompetent governance are the main problems in the IGADs region. The following are continuous challenges:

- (a) Lack of infrastructure, financial and technical resources;
- (b) Poor economic and political governance;
- (c) Lack of institutional capacity to address problems at the grassroots levels;
- (d) High population growth and slow economic growth;
- (e) Poor record of basic human rights.

Some member states have unclear projects when it comes to policy and institutional strengthening processes and regional institutions need to do much to accommodate all member states equally and fairly. Some member states have a very poor record of maintaining basic constitutional and democratic rights like the right to choose leaders freely and fairly. Rigged elections have become a norm and following that anger and civil unrest follow. The outcome of election results leads to massive clashes and this is also a potential threat to the states and the region at large.

The implication of the lack of good governance in the region also results in massive migration and further security challenges. In order to work with member states, selective engagement to the exclusion of some cannot bring about a sustainable and progressive regional agenda in the region. We have seen that most of the IGAD's member states suffer from rifts between them; efforts to act under the umbrella of IGAD are affected by this, as well as the organisation's ability to deal with the wide range of socio-political challenges across member states. For instance, Sudan and Eritrea are widely considered to be authoritarian and repressive while Uganda is described as a semi-authoritarian regime (Byiers, 2016). Any country which has a record of human rights abuse and manipulating the rule of law will not have healthy relations with its neighbouring states.

## **6.7 Conclusion**

As discussed in this chapter, IGAD can play a significant role on the continent as well as in regional development, cooperation and integration. Its major responsibilities are enhancing economic cooperation, promoting environmental protection and food security, promoting regional capacity building, promoting infrastructure development and physical integration in the region, reducing global challenges and enhancing opportunities to partner with the AU and other continental and international institutions. In the past couple of decades, IGAD has made some progress in different fields such as infrastructure development, food security and poverty reduction, investment attraction, trade exchanges, natural resources management and disaster control, capacity building, social development and political stability.

These practices can strengthen the assumption that RECs can bring about achievements in their regions or on the continent. The study identified that intra- and inter-state conflicts, weak states and multiple membership, conflicts, refugee crises, terrorism and piracy, low stakeholder participation, lack of good governance and poor communication among member states are major challenges. All member states must be part of the solution and show practical action for permanent change. Transparent and credible elections not only bring peace and progressive socio-economic advancement to one state but for the IGAD region at large. Millions of people are displaced across the region and beyond. It is argued that unrest and civil war between South Sudan and Sudan, the unstable Somalia, the boarder tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the Islamic radicalism in the Horn of Africa remain ongoing challenges to IGAD.

## Chapter Seven

### Conclusions and Recommendations

#### 7.1 Conclusion

The study established that IGAD, as one of the RCs and regional integration initiative, crucial regional mechanism to ensure regional development, peace and stability. These aspirations are reflected in its strategic objectives and activities it has planned to undertake and already is undertaking in the region. Its fundamental objectives involve promotion of sustainable socioeconomic development, and peace and stability in the sub-region. The driving reason for the transformed itself from Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) into IGAD in 1996 was to establish a properly constituted RC in this sub-region. In its initial years, IGAD had continued to focus on drought and related natural and man-made challenges in the region. It started to move into areas that proper RCs are meant to engage in, with all the necessary institutional and organisational forms.

This study has also explored IGAD's strategic framework and its structure, how it operates, and its aims and objectives. IGAD's four major pillars (namely, Agriculture, Natural Resource and Environment; Economic Cooperation, Peace, Security, and Humanitarian Affairs; and Integration and Social Development; and Corporate Development Service) outlined with indicators of success on the improvement of economic development and peace and security in the region.

Despite the institutional arrangements/structures developed and resources mobilised to meet these objectives, IGAD as RC of this sub-region still lags behind its peers. As we have seen, complex regional dynamics, conflicts and tensions have dragged this organisation down. The inter-state and intra-state conflicts, competition for dominance and influence have often crept into the organisation's agendas and influencing its activities. This was very much apparent in the manner in which the authority sought to intervene in the political crisis of South Sudan and Somalia.

This study also showed that IGAD lacks in its economic integration, which was considered very important stepping stone to scaled full integration of region. The political tension and competing material interests of states in the region have blinded them from seeing their complementarities. The current conditions in the IGAD region are also still framed within geo-

political and social recognition of Africa, whose conditions are influenced by three factors. One, the region's configurations (e.g. ethnic composition, state formation, border and economy) are primarily determined by the legacy and, continued influence, of European colonial powers. Two, the emerging powers desire to influence and enhance their footprint in the region's political outcomes and economy is also palpable. Three, state forms in the sub-region and, their contemporary interactions, are characterised by unrelenting competition and confrontation. Combined effects of these directly contributed to continued existence of fragmented, small and/or weak states (both politically and materially) in the sub-region. These have not much to do with the progressive emergence of nation states.

Besides this, like the rest of Africa, the Horn of Africa region is constituted of states with weak and fragmented market, both locally and regionally. Altering us to the negative consequence of this, Hartzenberg (2011:5) points out that, "small domestic markets and continental fragmentation translates into lack of scale economies in the production and distribution of goods and services". Despite some promising economic changes in the IGAD region, the integration of their economies are still lagging (of course, with some of the members states are doing a bit better than others).

This study, therefore, has demonstrated that the effective regional integration attempt in the IGAD sub-region remains far from being successful. This, is manifested mostly by the fact that the deep economic dependency of most of IGAD countries, intra- and -inter-state conflicts, poor performance of infrastructure and communications development, lack of political commitment on the part of participating good governments, the refugee crisis, terrorism, suspicion, and lack of confidence among the member states are still major challenges. Maruping (2005) argues that most of "African regional integration history shows that it initially starts from political rather than economic or developmental agendas, but has more recently, become strategically re-launched with an economic focus" (Maruping 2005:4).

As the dissertation outlined, critical appraisal of IGAD's success and failures, opportunities and challenges would have to be framed within the political economy of inter-governmentalism. On one hand, we have looked at how IGAD regional states engagements with each other and at the regional level are reflective of the political economic dynamics and interests of their respective states. On the other, how these regional inter-governmentalism are influenced by global powers – through direct pressure, donation and agenda setting. Thus, outcomes of the regional integration initiatives are interconnecting the national, regional and

global power dynamics as well as political and economic interests. We have also seen regional grouping at the structural levels reflects how states interact at the domestic levels and the international levels and thus becomes a site of struggle for the political and economic elites. In this sense, IGAD's geopolitics is an expression of the behaviour of states in the international system.

This dissertation has assessed not only the historical background of IGAD member states but also the overall structure and strategies. The strategic implementation plan of 2016 to 2020 is organised along with the four fundamental pillars of IGAD whose aim is to actively enhance socio-economic integration in the IGAD region. The various conflicts and security challenges in the region are explored by ways of assessing peace and security strategy of the authority. Here, in order to serve as a concrete example, this study focused on the IGAD's, regional and global actors' intervention in the South Sudan and Somalia conflicts. IGAD, the AU, the UN and the EU are among the regional, international and global players who have been trying hard to bring peace to the region. Thus, the role IGAD assumed in these crisis were coalesced with global powers and regional actor's that sought to determine the outcomes of these process to serve their interests. Indeed, thus, IGAD's main challenges and factors determining the success and failures of its initiatives are emanated from dynamism of overlapping the intra-and inter-state conflicts, and competition and rivalry among states in the Horn of Africa.

The study concludes that considering that states in the region are weak states with limited size of national economy and market, they have no alternative but to work towards pulling their resources to build these at a regional level and as sub-regional economy and market. Their low level of development are likely to negatively impact the much needed market expansion through regionalism. Thus, the potential dynamics of emerging from regional groupings in an enlarged market and economies of scale are unlikely to occur if the countries involved are very poor and unproductive. Even though IGAD adopted many protocols and declarations regarding peace and security, these have not materialised.

As we have seen, using the regional economic integration index, economic integration of the IGAD region still have a long way to go. Despite the weak overall performance in this, we also notice that some member states in IGAD have managed to achieve significant progress in coordinating their trade, investment and infrastructural development. However, since these are early stages and not fully developed, they are yet to translate into effective integration, which

manifests in the free movement of people, goods and capital, plus financial and macroeconomic integration in the region.

This study has established that economic integration in the greater Horn of Africa needs to be approached from a variety of angles: cultural, social, economic and political. In this sense, to move forward, effective and hegemonic regionalisation is a necessary condition, not only a function of political will. Thus, it is not an exercise by political actors and their decisions, but rather a broad-based collective understanding and collaboration towards sustainability and eradicating socio-economic challenges. Thus, the success of economic integration requires a strong combination of cultural, social and political aspects to address a broad and committed policy. It is against this backdrop, therefore, that the economic objectives of the integration scheme must amicably target all member states in relation to their integrities and common interests. In other words, IGAD's member states need to recognise their complementarities and collective strength, and buttress these for common vision of development and prosperity of the region.

Another formidable regional challenge of IGAD has been peace and security. The most immediate challenges that may hinder the successful implementation of the IGAD Peace and Security Study (IPSS) are the politics of the region (Gebregeorgis 2013). The Horn of Africa, an area engulfed by struggles over economic and political power is also marked by ethnic conflict and unstable peace and security. Thus, armed conflicts, climate change and famines, among other things, have threatened the region in many ways, necessitating practical and actionable strategies. IGAD has been acknowledged as one of the most important mechanism to tackling such regional challenges. It is in line with these that IGAD developed its regional peace and security strategy, with its own policy and programmes of action. Having weighed on the various regional security challenges and threats, within this strategy, IGAD has introduced CEWARN, IGAD Climate Prediction & Application Centre (ICPAC), and IGAD Capacity Building Programme Against Terrorism (ICPAT). This dissertation has explored and examined CEWARN more closely, for it sits at the heart of peace and security strategy of the authority.

IGAD's core peace and security strategy tools are the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). Both peace and security indicators assist regional cooperation and integration through conflict prevention and mitigation and early warning responses among member states. It is notable, though, that

all the efforts and plans towards achieving peace and stability are hampered by conflicts in South Sudan and instability in Somalia, unresolved border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, to mention but a few challenges in the region. Thus, this study argued that the nature of international and regional interventions and the roles played by internal and external institutions may significantly affect the peace and security process. What is troubling in this region is the widespread practice of one member state supporting and hosting militant groups and opposition parties of another member state to use as leverage for their own agenda rather than for the stability of the region at large.

This study strongly questions the realisation of the Implementation Plan 2016-2020 as expected given the fact that only two years are left before its final date. There are hardly signs of visible success in the regional cooperation benchmarks set for this plan of action in the areas of agriculture and livestock development and food security, regional economic cooperation and integration, social development; natural resources management and environment protection, maintaining peace and security and IGAD's corporate development. More broadly, this study argues that the funding mechanisms currently operational, sources of funding and the funds allocated to IGAD's programmes reflect the prerogative of funders. Notably, the bulk of IGAD's funding comes from western powers that seek to promote their own interests in the region.

South Sudan and Somali are major challenges to the region and IGAD's continued efforts towards achieving mediation and peace have proved to be a protracted process, straining resources and commitments. This directly or indirectly impacts on the entire strategy of resolving unemployment, poor infrastructure and lack of transparency among member states, and improving the standard of living and sustainable economic growth. This study assessed the IGAD-led peace process in South Sudan and has found it unsuccessful so far. The political and social implications of the South Sudanese conflict are felt by ordinary South Sudanese through displacement, pervasive poverty and famine, and the impacts of war. These factors have to be influential and prominent drivers to search for a solution and to reach consensus and lasting peace in the country. Despite the fact that the peace process is still ongoing, the region has shown that permanent peace and stability is a long process.

The principal conclusion of this study is that the implementation of regional integration in the Horn of Africa has been mixed with internal politics in each state. However, strategic partnerships of African regional integration will strengthen African trade with the rest of the



world. Integration at the political level for the IGAD region, however, remains challenging. Regionalisation in Africa has become the will of political and economic elites rather than collective and grassroots understanding and collaboration towards addressing the complex socio-economic challenge of the African people. In the Horn of Africa, as in many other developing countries, regional integration is a politically charged subject. IGAD region has a dire need for cooperation among all the member states by shifting the focus towards economic fronts and matters of trade, investment, joint infrastructural development and tourism.

The IGAD region often deemed to present excellent trade and investment opportunities for the Middle Eastern countries due to the size of its population and natural resources (Maru 2017). At the same time, the IGAD region can benefit immensely from development, investment partnership in Middle Eastern countries and eventually trade with them, particularly in agriculture, skilled labour mobility, livestock and related products, resources, as well as in the other areas of cooperation. Yet, regional integration in the greater Horn of Africa is often mocked by observers as ‘castles in the air’ that do not result in tangible and progressive results. This is especially the perception about economic integration in Africa where regional belligerence, civil war, extremism, terrorism, poverty, migration and corruption are constantly observed (Thonke and Spliid 2012; Girma 2016). Though, it is hard to dismiss these, the story from IGAD is not one of a complete despair, and indeed, the regional integration initiatives on themselves are a learning process.

Another fact tainting the image of the region is that the current leaderships of Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea and Somalia came to power by winning civil wars respectively, and thus strongly believe in the importance of force and good strategies (Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2003). The stronger political leadership is realised through peaceful means and free and fair elections and when this materialises it makes possible the attaining of success of economic and political cooperation. Political will plays a pivotal role in the strong and devoted IGAD socio-economic strategies. The region spends time and money in search of sustainable peace and security and this may indeed eventually bring about peace and security. However, in the short and medium term national budgets and economic resources are exhausted without being focused on sustainable socio-economic commitments and the eradication of poverty. The study strongly argues that fighting unemployment, poverty and inequality remains a continuous challenge in the IGAD region. Moreover, establishing a globally competitive industrial sector to sustain the region’s economy and allowing a conducive environment for investors is another critical challenge.

## **7.2 Recommendations**

Regional integration has become increasingly interdisciplinary and multi-vocal. The lack of commitment around the world collectively or individually speak to burning issues like conflict, peace and inequality. While global challenges require unified partnerships, the intimidating task is to find ways of interacting and dialoguing effectively across theoretical and practical boundaries. Weldesellassie (2011:29) is of the view that IGAD tends “to extend itself as an instrument of super-power and donor countries: a risk that questions its true ownership”. Therefore, a collective political commitment is necessary to enhance IGAD’s institutional commitment. Lack of proper commitment of all the member states is a growing concern and presents challenges for the IGAD region. Political leaders in particular need a strong stand and strategy for the building up of Eastern Africa and the African continent at large.

Africa needs strong macro-economic reforms and governance mechanisms, strong commitment to improve transport, telecommunications, infrastructure and domestic regulatory environments to create a more predictable investment climate (Qobo 2007). Promoting capital inflow and higher investment, improved technology and expanding export markets are key ingredients for successful economic regional integration in the Horn of Africa. IGAD needs ardent leadership, accountable and responsive institutions to speed up regional integration, prosperity and peace in the Eastern Africa region. Political unity and driving the diversity of Africa will be the culmination of the integration process resulting not only in the free movement of people and the establishment of strong continental institutions but also in full economic integration (ECA 2015).

According to the African Union Agenda 2063, the role of regional economic communities as building blocks for continental integrity and accountable states at all levels and in all spheres, plus financing Africa’s development is fundamental for sustainable growth and socio-economic development in the Horn of Africa and in the continent at large. Arguably, the following areas in IGAD’s policy framework still need to be addressed: policies and institutional capacities, financial resources and budgetary allocations, technical innovation capacity, climate change, low investment, information and reliable scientific data, education and training and marketing (IGAD 2016a).

Poor internal political security is regarded as both a driving force and a threat for regional integration and cooperation in the Horn of Africa. On the regional level, the mandates of IGAD’s peace and security initiatives fall far behind the expected outcome. However,

Kritzinger-van Niekerk (2005) suggests that “it is over the past few years, that intra-interregional political security has been assuming increasing importance in the regional cooperation agendas of RIAs and they are actively institutionalizing their mandates in some form or another” (Kritzinger-van Niekerk 2005:10). It is notable that one of the greatest opportunities Africa has is its young and growing population which presents the continent with a fundamental development opportunity. According to the World Economic Forum on Africa Durban, 3-5 May 2017, successful implementation depends on Africa’s shared values and identities.

Therefore, true regional integration is a bottom-up cultural process and not a top-down political or technical process (Kanza 2017). The study strongly argues and poses the following two questions: does a history of economically and socially deprived Africa has the potential bottom-up culture of integration and progress? How can one bring about significant integration in Africa in the absence of political will and without integrational transitions strategies? Africa desperately needs to push forward structural reforms that boost productivity and thus create more opportunities. The African Union Commission ‘Agenda 2063’ asserts that an integrated continent with rule of law, democracy, human rights, good governance, and justice will further the dream of an Africa that is integrated, peaceful and prosperous.

Here, IGAD needs to take seriously Maruping's (2005:150) suggestion “[r]egional integration treaties, protocols, leadership and priorities should be unambiguous in providing binding rules-based frameworks and results-oriented milestones to guide national, sub-regional and regional actions required for envisaged eventual continental integration.” He also points out that these have to be accompanied with “[e]ffective monitoring, follow-up and corrective mechanisms [...] be put in place and enforced,” and to this end, the regional organisation “should be adequately staffed and resourced, with authority to act as necessary” (Maruping 2005:150).

Recent studies suggest that foreign direct investment, economic integration can support modern technological transfer, innovation and knowledge among African countries, supporting advances in productivity and enabling entrepreneurs to achieve sustainable economic development on the continent “Agenda 2063”. For instance, it is noted that all the African Union member states aim for an Africa in 2063 with “free movement of capital, significant increases in investments amongst African countries” (ECA 2016a). The integration process in IGAD’s region needs to go beyond ‘regional grouping’. Multi-lateral trade has to be

strengthened at continental levels while international trade and the investment sector must play a pivotal role for sustainable socio-economic growth in Africa.

Therefore, meaningful legislative power in the organisation is important in driving integration and improved participation of the citizens in the regional integration process. Thus, the AU has to step in aggressively to bring about significant progress. IGAD must plan strategic implementation of the regional integration agenda in the country and at sectorial levels to roll out programmes and also monitor and evaluate the success of its economic integration on the continent.

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