


A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ATTITUDES OF URBAN BLACK COMMUNITIES
IN SELECTED AREAS OF DURBAN TOWARDS EVOLUTIONIST
STRATEGIES FOR SOCIAL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA

by



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"Legal reform and revolution are not different methods of historical progress that can be picked out at pleasure from the counter of history ... They are different moments in the development of class society which condition and complement each other, and at the same time exclude each other reciprocally as eg. the North and South poles, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat" (Luxemburg in McLellan, 1979 : 45)

For Stanza

INDEX OF ABBREVIATED NAMES OF ORGANISATIONS

The following organisations have been mentioned in abbreviated form in the dissertation.

AAC	-	All African Convention
ANC	-	African National Congress
AZAPO	-	Azanian People's Organisation
COSATU	-	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CP	-	Conservative Party
CPSA	-	Communist Party of South Africa
FEDSAW	-	Federation of South African Women
FOSATU	-	Federation of South African Trade Unions
HSRC	-	Human Sciences Research Council
IBR	-	Institute for Black Research
IDASA	-	Institute for Democratic Alternatives for South Africa
IP	-	Independent Party
NAFCOC	-	National African Federated Chamber of Commerce
NDM	-	National Democratic Movement
NIC	-	Natal Indian Congress
NOW	-	Natal Organisation of Women
NP	-	National Party
NPP	-	National Peoples Party
PFP	-	Progressive Federal Party
SACC	-	South African Council of Churches
SAIRR	-	South African Institute of Race Relations
SANNC	-	South African Native National Congress
SANTA	-	South African National Tuberculosis Association
TUCSA	-	Trade Union Council of South Africa
UCC	-	United Committee of Concern
UDF	-	United Democratic Front
UWUSA	-	United Workers Union of South Africa
WHO	-	World Health Organisation
WIP	-	Work in Progress
YMCA	-	Young Men's Christian Association

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CHAPTER ONENATURE OF THE STUDY1. INTRODUCTION

It has often been said that the one constant in human life is change. Human beings and their societies - their political, economic, social and religious institutions - are continually changing. The changes in the recent past have been so numerous that they have significantly undermined traditional ways of thinking and behaving, resulting in drastic shifts in attitudes, opinions and values (King and McGinnies, 1972 : 2). Conventional understandings of the realities of social life, including social institutions, are also challenged regularly. The contemporary rapidity of change thus makes the task of influencing change complex and demanding. Organisations and groups have to act in a context that is already changing and must carefully and skilfully utilise particular strategies.

In a plea to Chinese youth in 1915, Ch'en Tu hsiu said: "The progress of the world is like that of a fleet horse, galloping and galloping onward. Whatever cannot skilfully change itself and progress along with the world will find itself eliminated by natural selection" (Lauer, 1982 : 335). Decades later, suggesting that the world was soon to be out of control, Alvin Toffler (1970 : 402), maintained that: "If it were technology alone that had broken loose, our problems would be serious enough. The deadly fact is, however, that many other social processes have also begun to run free, oscillating wildly, resisting our best efforts to guide them". It is Tu hsiu's assertions related to the inevitability of progress as well as Toffler's urge to guide change that serve as the central emphases within this study.

The science of sociology began in philosophical reasoning about social change (Vago, 1980 : 2). The origins of this new science marked the beginning of a long and difficult process towards making "sense" of such change. In early Greek philosophy Heraclitus and Ephesus asserted that everything in the universe was in a state of

flux and that the world came into being by means of upward and downward motion. Opposing this view, the philosopher Parmenides of Elea claimed that the world consisted of indivisible and motionless plenum, which was there, is there, and will always be there. This diversity and polarisation in thought finds its modern versions in the functionalist and conflict schools as well as the numerous adaptations and innovations that have emerged (Edari, 1976 : 1; Denisoff, 1974 : 3).

In spite of the considerable number of efforts at explaining the nature of social change, sociology has not yet satisfactorily indicated how society changes, including how rapidly and in what direction it changes, and why and by whom these changes are caused. Considering the fact that social change has often been conceived of as being the result of conflict, of new modes of thinking, of external forces, of individual motivation to achieve and of popular spontaneity, there is still a great deal to learn about its nature and scope.

From a sociological point of view, the problem of change involves the task of uncovering generalisations, and ultimately, theories on the operation of variables which contribute to the change in social arrangements. Thus, generalisations have had to be established by looking at the variables which contribute to stability and change (Edari, 1976 : 3). Theorists' personal conceptions of change have necessarily affected their interpretations of observed data and occurrences. Social change theory has also served as justification for particular types of social action, both passive and active. Whilst scientific objectivity itself is often attained in the social sciences, neutrality is never or rarely maintained. This particular study will continue the tradition of being objective but not neutral.

Allardt (Ishwaran, 1966 : 2) maintains that it: "is reasonable to assume that the crucial political reactions in a society are related to the legitimacy of the political system and to the solidarity citizens feel towards their society. By legitimacy is

meant that citizens feel that the social and political system of their nation is acceptable. Solidarity with the social and political system of a nation may be defined through the concept of legitimacy. Solidarity prevails as long as people believe that the social and political system is legitimate, or do not act in order to change the system through non-institutionalised means. If solidarity is defined in this fashion, then, of course, legitimacy conflicts are simply the obverse of solidarity".

In South Africa, new levels of conflict have been reached, with new strategies being developed both by extra-parliamentary groups and institutions. It may be asked which particular sectors of the population are considering the political system illegitimate? Mthombathi (Meer, 1985 : 3) maintains that: "Not a single South African has been left unaffected, directly or indirectly by the unrest as the country's African townships explode in a way unprecedented in the country's history". Whilst the unrest has been contained largely within the African townships, do other Black race groups, that is, the Indian and Coloured race groups, subscribe to similar socio-political attitudes? These questions are of extreme importance to the country and the answers are of particular relevance in clarifying the contemporary attitudes that are being formed towards the different social change strategies.

Attitudes themselves are frequently viewed as disposing the individual to feel, think and act in certain ways. They are inferred from these three sources and a number of theories have proposed that attitudes consist of three components: a cognitive (thought) component, an affective (feeling) component and a behavioural (action) component. This component approach to attitudes was developed most systematically in 1959 by Katz and Scotland (Himmelfarb and Eagly, 1974 : 6). They saw an attitude as having both a cognitive and an affective component only if a person is engaged in action vis-á-vis the attitude object. Whilst attitudinal change may reflect or give rise to changes, in some cases the value system itself may possess built-in resistance to any change. As an illustration, economic development will lag unless people

acquire attitudes of co-operation or the desire for advancement. Hence, a major motivator for this particular study has been that attitudes, implicit in the thinking of many individuals, social scientists and laypersons alike, are among the "causes" of social behaviour. Whilst it may not lead to or reflect changes in interpersonal relationships, organisations or institutions - if the attitude change is positive, it does suggest the real potential for instituting change.

A further contention of the research is to examine attitudes of the Black population towards social change strategies initiated by the formal state structure itself. Hence, it must be pointed out that whilst this study is primarily an academic work, it is not conducted solely for academic purposes. It is envisaged that the research will supplement existing knowledge about social change in South Africa. It is hoped that it will add new insights to contemporary research that is being conducted by research institutes and individuals associated with various academic or community based organisations. Perhaps its results could be used by organisations involved in the active processes of initiating change.

Social researchers engaged in the field of social change, particularly with respect to the type of social change preferred, have often been more concerned with supporting vested interests than with building up an empirical and general body of knowledge. Thus, as soon as situations of complex and turbulent proportions are faced, it becomes clear that little is known and little is understood about the nature and responses of our communities. The necessary knowledge can only be achieved by trying to understand the theory of social change and by basing studies upon objective, empirical research, and not upon any particularistic biased approach. A unified system of knowledge about the nature and methods of social change and Black attitudes is possible through a convergent effort to devise more reliable research in this field. The present study aims at contributing to this.

2. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Compared to the abundance of literature available on social change, particularly as pertains to industrialised and industrialising western countries, studies focusing on social change strategies in South Africa are lacking. Specifically, empirical, academic studies, focusing comparatively on the attitudes of the disenfranchised Black population groups are absent.

The necessity for an understanding of socio-political beliefs and attitudes has become urgent, not only in the light of the growing unrest, but also with the increase in international condemnation of South Africa's racial policies. The extent to which the "internal condemnation" exists also needs scientific rather than intuitive analysis.

In Southern Africa as a whole, the contemporary scene was set with the coup in Lisbon in April in 1974. The Portuguese empire subsequently collapsed bringing to an end about five hundred years of colonialism with the independence of Angola and Mozambique. The boundary lines of the supposedly solid "white south" became dramatically reduced. The Angolan civil war in particular had introduced an unexpected degree of internationalisation; South Africa and the west on the side that lost, and Cuba and the USSR on the side that won. The momentum generated by the demise of the Portuguese regime produced a new sense of urgency about the need to solve the outstanding colonial problems of Zimbabwe (then known as Rhodesia), Namibia (then known as South West Africa) and South Africa. In Rhodesia and South West Africa the armed struggle intensified. Independent Black Africa, especially the key "frontline" states, became more militant and supportive. The West, in response to fears of "another Angola" stepped up its efforts to promote negotiations between the contesting parties. South Africa, as a supplier and supporter of Rhodesia and the colonial administrator of South West Africa became involved in shaping the fates of those two countries. However, for the first time since the Sharpeville

shootings of 1960 and the period of political and economic instability that followed, South Africa's own future began to look uncertain (Hare, 1983 : 10).

With Zimbabwean independence in 1980 and the inauguration of Robert Mugabe as Prime Minister, South Africa's isolation increased. The students' revolt which started with the Soweto demonstrations in June 1976, revealed the strength and determination of the Black student movement and the more organised re-emergence of the broader social movements. The current unrest which surfaced during 1984 and which is continuing during 1988, indicate a sustained stirring and a form of organisation of the Black masses unparalleled in South African history. It will undoubtedly have consequences for the future.

Contemporary responses suggest that the township uprisings are a necessary outcome of deep-rooted frustrations which have resulted because of the structure and violence of the apartheid social system. Other responses differ. The recognition that government officials believe that the world is becoming increasingly hostile to South Africa, a world whose attitude towards South Africa has been called a "total onslaught" is central to an understanding of the rise of the security establishment in this country. Total onslaught suggests that the USSR is regarded as the root cause of discontent and instability in the region. They are seen as diabolically using newly independent Black states for their expansionist designs. "The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies," reads the government's White paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1982, "is to overthrow the present body politic in the RSA and to replace it with a Marxist-orientated form of government to further the objectives of the USSR, therefore, all possible methods and means are used to attain this objective. This includes instigating social and labour unrest, civilian resistance, terrorist attacks against the infrastructure of the RSA and the intimidation of Black leaders and members of the Security Forces. This onslaught is supported by a world-wide propaganda campaign and the involvement

of various front organisations, such as trade unions and even certain church organisations and leaders" (Grundy, 1983 : 4).

Thus the following express the rationale for this study:

- 2.1 "We may disagree concerning our long-term goals as such. Fundamentally different kinds of societies or political systems may be proposed as eventual objectives. Which of these are acceptable, and why? Obviously this is of crucial importance to the whole question of "alternatives", but even so it rarely amounts to a straight line choice between different future goals. A prior problem is that we may be uncertain of the very nature and meaning of any given goal, or disagree about its relation to our ethical norms. Our first task must accordingly be to clarify the full implications of the various relevant political strategies, and only then can we sensibly commit ourselves to the pursuit of one or the other of these" (A Spro-Cas Report, 1973 : 63).
- 2.2 "In South Africa, thousands of white people and millions of Black people loathe the apartheid system. Are they the agents or tools of the Kremlin? Not today. But they will be if they are continually harassed by the authorities and accused of complicity in a foreign-based violent revolution. The effect of domestic security policy based on a perception of total onslaught is to alienate still further well-meaning non-violent critics who wish to reform what even some members of the Government recognise as an antiquated system that needs to be changed" (Grundy, 1983 : 4).

The rationale expressed in this form highlights the basic considerations that surround a study of social attitudes toward strategies for social change.

In the first instance, it must be emphasised that intellectual debates as to which strategy for change is most feasible and applicable within the context of the South African situation will persist within academic circles. However, there is a need for an empirical study that encompasses a representative sample of the

socio-political attitudes that exist at grass-roots level, now that the communities have been exposed to years of political oration, strategies and tactics. In the second instance, what needs to be clearly ascertained is the degree of commitment to socio-political beliefs that Black (African, Indian and Coloured) people supposedly have and express - and the extent to which they serve or believe that they serve, as "tools of the Kremlin".

3. FIELD AND PURPOSE

Whilst the study relates to the field of social change, its purpose is not to be either eclectic or definitive. The intention is to contribute towards a systematic theory of social change which helps to clarify the fundamental nature of strategies supported by Blacks within the context of contemporary South African society.

Political sociology is concerned with power in its social context. By "power" is meant the ability of an individual or a social group to pursue a course of action (to make and implement decisions, and more broadly to determine the agenda for decision making) if necessary against the interests, and even against the opposition, of other individuals and groups (Bottomore, 1979 : 7). This statement is not intended as a full and adequate definition of the concept of power, but only as a preliminary delineation of a field of inquiry. Certainly, many sociologists have contributed to this field of political sociology. Many have treated this theme somewhat differently. Constant references to the main writers who have contributed to this field of study will be made. However, many aspects will be treated in a manner considered as original in order to keep the research consistent with the researcher's own mode of thought.

In the field of political sociology, the concept "social change" has been subjected to varying definitions. Edari (1976 : 2) maintains that social change at least involves two things:

- (a) the change in the constitution of social entities over time;
and
- (b) the change in the relations among entities over time.

If this definition appears to cover the whole of social life, it is because the whole of social life is continually changing.

Social change is an inclusive concept that refers to alterations in social phenomena at various levels of human life from the individual to the global. The various levels, some representative areas of analysis within each level, and some representative units of analysis are given in Table 1.

In this particular study, whilst all levels are important, the emphasis will be placed on the societal and individual level of analysis. A final operational definition will be included at the end of this chapter.

4. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The above discussion points to four objectives for the study:

- 4.1 To analyse the dynamics of social change processes and strategies within a South African historical context.
- 4.2 To utilise a particular evolutionary perspective, integrating the concept of social change, as a framework for analysis.
- 4.3 To make a comparative study of attitudes of urban Black communities in selected areas of metropolitan Durban towards evolutionist strategies for social change in South Africa, within the context of working hypotheses.
- 4.4 To make recommendations, after examining the results emanating from theoretical and field research, which may be utilised in attempts to provide constructive solutions to identifiable problems.

TABLE 1UNITS OF ANALYSIS

LEVEL OF ANALYSIS	SOME REPRESENTATIVE AREAS OF STUDY	SOME REPRESENTATIVE UNITS OF STUDY
Global	International organisation; International inequality	GNP; trade data; political alliances
Civilisation	Life cycle of civilisations or other patterns of change eg. evolutionary or dialectical	Artistic; scientific and other innovations; social institutions
Culture	Material culture, non- material culture	Technology, ideology; values
Society	Stratification system; structure; demography; crime	Income; power and prestige; votes; population growth
Institutions	Economy; polity; religion; marriage and family; education	Family income; voting patterns; church attendance; divorce rate
Organisations	Structure; interaction patterns; authority structure; productivity	Roles; friendship cliques; adminis- tration/production ratio; output per worker
Interaction	Types of interaction; communication	Amount of conflict; competition, or consensus
Individual	Attitudes	Beliefs about various matters; aspirations

(Lauer, 1982 : 5)

5. WORKING HYPOTHESES

Three working hypotheses are derived from the objectives of the study:

- 5.1 Black urban communities prefer extra-parliamentary strategies for evolutionary social change.
- 5.2 African urban communities prefer extra-parliamentary revolutionary strategies for social change.
- 5.3 Indian and Coloured urban communities prefer extra-parliamentary evolutionary strategies as compared to revolutionary social change.

6. METHOD

A detailed description of the empirical data gathering methods used, is given in Chapter Four. This is done because a description of the construction of the interview schedule becomes clear only after the analysis of the theoretical sources and the construction of a theoretical frame of reference is completed in Chapter Three. The method used, that is the logical aspects of the study, is outlined here in general terms only:

- 6.1 In Chapter Two an overview of the structure of South African society is undertaken by means of an examination of history, of current literature and of models presented by different theorists as well as the researcher.
- 6.2 In Chapter Three a presentation of the independent indicators of social attitudes is undertaken. A critical presentation of Lenski's evolutionary theory supplemented with other theories is undertaken resulting in the construction of a theoretical framework for the analysis of empirical data.
- 6.3 In Chapter Four a representative selection of nine areas (African, Indian and Coloured) in metropolitan Durban for the purposes of

comparison and analysis is done. The basis for this selection is the accessibility of the areas as well as particular socio-economic indexes.

A representative sample of residents is drawn and serve as the basis of surveys conducted by means of a systematically constructed interview schedule and controlled interview methods.

- 6.4 In Chapter Five a systematic manipulation and analysis of data following the accepted methods of sociological research is done.
- 6.5 In Chapter Six an interpretation of data is undertaken leading to conclusions which may have both theoretical and practical significance and may result in proposals for further research.

7. THE USE OF THE EVOLUTIONIST THEORETICAL MODEL

The evolutionist theoretical model which incorporates structuralist and conflict assumptions is being utilised as this is considered to be the most appropriate model for empirical analysis.

The evolutionist model is appropriate at a theoretical level because:

- 7.1 It depicts clearly diverse forms of social life.
- 7.2 It shows the increasing complexity of structure forms and organisations in time.
- 7.3 It also shows the adaptive capacity of societies and the significant role of factors such as culture and affluence (Hoogvelt, 1978 : 11).

An evolutionary theoretical model as a guiding frame of reference was seen as constructive at the fieldwork stage because it allowed respondents greater freedom to respond to the relevant questions.

* A revolutionary model would have cultivated apprehension on the part of respondents.

Aspects of the conflict model are seen as appropriate at a theoretical level because:

- 7.4 It refers to tension and conflict between groups and individuals.
- 7.5 It suggests that society is an arena in which struggles over scarce commodities take place (Vago, 1980 : 39).

Hence, this synthesis of relevant aspects of contradictory theories is seen as best addressing our complex social structure - one which incorporates elements of conflict and stability. In the final analysis, however, it is essentially reference to cumulative change, the gradual addition of new elements to a continuing base in South Africa that is seen as more appropriate to capture the essence of data extracted in the "snapshot" of society afforded by the empirical research project.

8. DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

8.1 Social change

This comprises modifications in social systems or sub-systems in structure, function or process over some period of time. Thus, by social change is meant any such alterations as occur in social organisation (Davis, 1959 : 22). It may occur as a result of the contradiction between forces and relations of production. It may emerge as the need to reduce tensions between institutions, groups and roles. Non-periodical tensions have a lasting aspect since they result from oscillations which exceed structural limits. The system therefore has no capacity for their absorption because its structure does not react, or reacts poorly, to the stimuli. The lasting dysfunctionality of the system will disorganise it if society does not eliminate or change its obsolete structures. Such changes are often violent because of the accidental tensions (Ferrinho, 1981 : 21).

8.2 Evolutionist/Evolutionary

These terms are used interchangeably. In evolutionist terms, society is portrayed as developing through definite steps on an evolutionary ladder. This evolutionary schema, similar to that in biology, sees social life as progressing from a relatively simple state to one with a higher degree of complexity (Denisoff, 1974 : 181). Earlier, evolutionary theory held that the change from one state to another meant a unilinear cumulative process through which societies changed from "lower" to "higher" stages of development. More recently, evolution has been defined as a multi-linear phenomenon. Many evolutionists maintain that social change has not been unilinear, with all past and present societies capable of being placed on the continuum of development. Rather, human culture has evolved along a number of different lines which suggest that change is multi-linear rather than unilinear (Edari, 1976 : 9). The notion of gradual and progressive development is central to a definition of evolution. Finally, the belief in social evolution or progress implies an inevitable movement in a particular, desirable direction.

8.3 Revolutionary

Revolutions constitute the greatest challenge to the modes of social control (Moore, 1974 : 84). The revolution, which is violent, usually engages a considerable portion of a population, and results in a change in the structure of government, the legal codes relating to other major social functions, and the grounds on which officials base their right to govern. Two other forms of violent (short-term) changes can be distinguished. First, the rebellion may in fact be an abortive revolution. Leach (Moore, 1974 : 86), has argued that most violent political activity in human societies are rebellious rather than revolutionary, because of the general absence of a highly centralised government which can be overthrown. Second, the "coup d' etat" although representing an illegal usurpation of power that may be accompanied by some violence, does not necessarily result in major changes

in the structure of government or in the legal bases of other social institutions.

8.4 Social movement

Social movements are forms of collective behaviour in which members tend to be unified by an ideology in their efforts to bring about or prevent change. Some social movements attempt to change the social structure, either completely (transformative movements) or partially (reformative movements). Others attempt to change the individual either completely (redemptive movements) or partially (alternative movements). With respect to the way social movements originate, adherents of the strain and deprivation theory hold that social movements arise in response to structural strain, which often takes the form of deprivation, either objective or relative. According to the resource - mobilisation theory, many social movements begin not merely when societal strain exists, but when leaders are present to organise adherents and mobilise resources (Goodman and Marx, 1978 : 528-529). A movement is not simply a response to drastic social change, but rather is a mechanism through which that change is shaped and directed (Gerlach and Hine, 1970 : 14).

8.5 Strategy

A strategy refers to a concerted campaign to institute a particular type of social order. It refers to an overall plan of action which may be evolutionist or revolutionary in nature. Thus, strategies may be of a long term or short term duration. An evolutionist strategy would refer to programmes or campaigns to urge change in a gradual, progressive and non-violent manner. A revolutionary strategy would refer to methods that initiate rapid change through violent, non-institutionalised means.

CHAPTER TWOAN OVERVIEW OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURES ANDPROCESSES OF SOUTH AFRICAPART ONESTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE

Polarisations existing within South Africa are not simply between Black and White. There are also those between homeland leaders and urban leaders, for example, between Inkatha and the United Democratic Front (UDF); those between different factions in the Afrikaner group; those between the proponents of black consciousness and the non-racial African National Congress (ANC); as well as many tribal and personal rivalries. These in turn, reflect contradictions at the level of class and sex, for instance, between the organised working class and private (white) capital as well as between patriarchal domination and the trend towards equality between the sexes.

In considering the structure of South African society, Lever (1978 : 33) recalled Gordon Allport's description of South Africa as "an anthropologist's dream and a sociologist's nightmare". This is in line with Allport's and Lever's analyses of the South African society as that of a structure stratified by cross-cutting divisions based on race, ethnic, language, tribal and religious differences. The differences pertaining to class and sex do not play a significant role in Lever's analysis. He maintains further that very often South African society is conceived of in terms of a simple division or polarity between Whites and Blacks. Certain rights and privileges flow from this distinction and there are attendant group interests. However, he contends that the view that there is an undifferentiated mass of Whites opposed to an undifferentiated mass of Blacks is misleading. There are important social differentiations including varying cultural orientations within the two main divisions which have a bearing on the pattern of inter-group relations and group identities in this country (Lever, 1978 : 14).

Whilst Lever suggests that a voluntary alignment of ethnic groups exists, Moodley (1986 : 190) maintains that self-identification is not acceptable. She contends that the imposition of an identity on subordinates by superordinate groups inevitably leads to its rejection, even if equal rights are guaranteed. An imposed identity is not a source of pride, but a stigma. If the formation of the group is itself considered an affront to its alleged members, the principle of their rights becomes meaningless. She contends that there is little evidence that the peoples of South Africa have internalised their official labels, apart from the ruling sector and perhaps some ruling segments of the Black population. In addition, the official policy of collectively denationalising those South African citizens who are deemed to belong to a separate state clearly violates international law.

1. CATEGORISATION

At present South Africa's apartheid (separate development) system divides the country's peoples into so-called population groups. The largest population group is the African or black group followed by the White, Coloured (including Malays) and the Asian (Indian and Chinese) groups.

Within the black group, ethnic categorisation has led to the creation by the system of so-called "homelands" or "national states" which the government claims are the territorial entities to which many Africans belong. The four so-called "independent republics" are Transkei, Ciskei, Boputhatswana and Venda. The "national states" are Kwazulu, Gazankulu, Lebowa, Qwaqwa, Ndebele and KaNgwane. These have been referred to as "bantustans" and this is how they are still often referred to internationally and by many nationally. Therefore, unless there is a need to draw a specific distinction, the 10 areas will be referred to as "bantustans" (MacShane et al, 1984 : 7).

2. COMPOSITION

The Khoi Khoi and the San were the original black inhabitants of South Africa. From the 17th century onwards the Whites arrived in

two waves mainly from the Netherlands and Great Britain. The Coloureds are the descendants of mixed marriages and African-White relationships, whilst the Asian population, largely Indian, are mainly descendants of those brought to South Africa as cheap contract labour by the British in the 19th century.

In the further discussions in this report, the term "Black" shall be used to refer to the people of colour living in South Africa - the Africans, Indians and Coloureds. The common link among all three races is their exclusion from direct political decision making on the basis of colour. Where it is necessary to draw finer distinctions the report uses "African" to refer to the dominant black grouping; "Coloured" in accordance with the definition outlined above and the term "Indian" is used where appropriate.

3. EARLY HISTORY

This overview is not intended to be an exhaustive one, but is a general indication of the complex historical processes which resulted in the complicated social condition existing at present.

The first White (Dutch, French and German) settlers did not found the "new" Cape Colony in an empty land. In 1652, the territories to the north and east had been occupied for centuries by the Khoi Khoi (Hottentots) and for millenia by the San (Bushmen) who were the hunter - gatherers. It was the Khoi Khoi together with the imported slaves that became an available labour force for the colonists whilst the San were the early resisters (De Kock, 1970 : 11).

When Britain came to rule the colony some hundred and fifty years later, they found the most pressing problem to be the Fish River frontier. The clash between White and Xhosa cattle-owners in the area of the Fish River, at the eastern extremity of the European settlement, gave rise to no less than nine "wars" in the course of a century, the first encounter occurring in 1779/80. Frontier

history between 1770 and 1812 has traditionally been seen as a stark conflict between distinct and hostile races. More recently, some liberal historians have moved away from the "conflict-between-races" interpretation. Instead of emphasising conflict, they have had as their central themes co-operation and peaceful interaction between frontier peoples. Revisionist historians while continuing to see conflict as primary, have paid increasing attention to the non-conflictual aspects of the frontier, such as cross-racial alliances or the coalescence of classes across racial lines (De Kock, 1970 : 10-21; Sagay, 1980 : 271).

Relationships were formed in a system embracing various peoples and held together by the goods and services they exchanged with one another. Different groups found it in their interest to establish and maintain a balance of "no-war-no peace" which allowed this system to survive. However, such co-operation and voluntary interaction did not result in the biological, cultural, political or economic integration of separate peoples. Especially on the closing frontier, the prevailing characteristics were withdrawal, exclusion and strife (Giliomee, 1982 : 326-328).

What was also evident was the emergence of new patterns of domination and exploitation. In the case of the Xhosa, they fought bitterly to retain the larger part of their land, but the inequality in arms (most Xhosa fought with spears and all Whites with firearms), the fact that the Whites were mounted, whereas the Xhosa fought mainly on foot, and above all the power of an organised state as opposed to fragmentary chiefdoms, outweighed superiority of numbers (Wilson and Thompson, 1969 : 252). 'Increasingly, dominance was falling to those who could, directly or indirectly, muster the support of the colonial government and to those with firearms - as in the case of the Bambata Rebellion later in 1906 which marked the end of large-scale military confrontation between Blacks organised on tribal lines and Whites, and saw the reduction of blacks to the "status of an internal proletariat" (Roux, 1964 : 87).

Leggasick maintains that whatever the forms of differential distribution of property in African-speaking societies, the impact of the frontier was beginning to sharpen and transform those differences. On the one hand, there were the owners of land, of cattle, of instruments of production; on the other hand there were dependants, servants, even wage labourers (Elphick and Giliomee, 1978 : 274-276).

Though there was considerable acculturation particularly between Europeans and Khoikhoi, it did not lead to the removal of ethnic distinctions. Each group borrowed little from the other. An analysis of class rather than race relations can show important aspects of intergroup contact. In a loose sense one might see the colonists not so much as a race, but as a class clustering around a core of landholders who controlled an immobile, servile class. The colonist's resistance to government interference in their labour relations may be understood as an expression of specific economic interests. Similarly, colonist-Xhosa conflict may be seen as a struggle between rival classes of cattle-owners with different political systems and differential access to European technology. However, even if emphasis is given to these views, the fact remains that Xhosa and colonists distinguished themselves from others mainly by their perception of racial and ethnic differences. They had come to see each other more as racial adversaries than as economic competitors, and conflict occurred mainly along racial lines. This is not to suggest that prejudice and fantasies about race and culture in themselves gave rise to the struggle on the Eastern Frontier. Conflicts arising from the struggle to control land, cattle and labour or put more simply, class cleavages greatly reinforced the racial cleavage and made the conflict more intense. To cope with the continuing problem of labour supply that these conflicts gave rise to, it was further resolved to import African and Malayan slaves: the former mostly from eastern Africa and the latter from Indonesia (Denoon, 1972 : 9).

Although stable relations and various forms of co-operation existed at times between various peoples, conflict was pervasive. Even in

the early 19th century, there was great fear that the Khoikhoi and the Coloured people would ally themselves with the Xhosa in the frontier wars. Between 1798 and 1802 they did so, and the combined force destroyed houses on the Gamtoos River and down the Long Kloof (Wilson and Thompson, 1969 : 247). Since it had both a racial and class dimension, negotiations were less effective in resolving disputes than is often the case in purely economic conflicts. To realise their objectives, the colonists turned increasingly to forceful means, such as labour repressive devices, extraction of ransom, raiding and war (Elphick and Giliomee, 1978 : 326-328). Furthermore, the weakness of White authority on the frontier, which failed to enforce the law prohibiting private trade, itself contributed to the rivalries of Xhosa chiefs who competed with each other for private trade. Trade at this stage was not controlled. Effectively, this led to a situation where stronger chiefs increased their power bases in relation to other chiefs, by increasing their trading of such valuables as ivory and cattle. This competition led to a fair degree of disunity. The disunity that existed at this level prevented the chiefs from combining in an effective military alliance against the authorities (Wilson and Thompson, 1969 : 251).

After 1835, the focal point which since the arrival of the Whites had been the Cape Colony, suddenly shifted to the norther interior when Whites crossed the Orange River and the highveld plateau south and north of the Vaal River, northwards up to the Limpopo River, westwards to the Kalahari semi-desert and eastwards to subtropical Natal where in 1824, a small group of pioneer English traders had settled at the port which is now called Durban. This migration, the Great Trek of 1835-1837, a dramatic break-away by Boer frontier farmers, became a turning point in South African history. The Voortrekkers soon fought against the Matabele, led by Mzilikazi and the Zulu, led by Dingaan. By 1839 the Voortrekkers had subdued both, and proceeded to establish Boer states in the land they had occupied. The events set in motion by the Great Trek led to the formation of two independant Boer Republics, one north and one south of the Vaal River, as well as two British colonies,

the Cape and Natal, part of which was a Voortrekker Republic. After 1850, Natal was converted, through immigration from Britain, into a predominantly English-speaking colony with a limited White and very large African population. Furthermore, Natal introduced indentured Indian labour for its plantations in 1860, without making proper provision for their repatriation and thus adding in this period a fourth element to South Africa's racial pattern of Whites, Africans and Coloureds (De Kock, 1970 : 16). All groups are represented in Natal today. The significance of Natal's early history will be addressed again in this overview.

4. INDUSTRIALISATION AND URBANISATION

Urbanisation, that is, the process of concentration of population in cities, is a world-wide phenomenon, which generally occurs with the development of industrialisation. As industrial development creates the need for a plentiful and increasing supply of labour in the cities, more jobs are created in the cities relative to the countryside. This supply usually comes from two sources. Firstly, from the natural increase in population and, secondly, from changes in agricultural production (such as mechanisation) which forces many people off the land and into the cities (Van der Merwe, 1983 : 1). With the discovery of minerals in South Africa in 1886, two extra-economic methods were used to secure the supply of labour to the mines and the economic and political superiority of the White population over the Blacks. The central laws in this process of forced proletarianisation as described by Webster (1983 : 10), are threefold:

4.1 The Pass Laws

The passport laws for the Khoikhoi (which were later abolished in 1828) were introduced by the British in 1809. Passes for Africans were first introduced in the Cape in 1817, but these were more in the nature of international passports in that they were made available to Africans living on the other side of the frontier who wished to seek work in the colony. Pass laws eventually began to play a more direct role in terms of controlling migrant labour

(Roux, 1964 : 113-114). By means of the pass law an African man could be tracked down, punished and returned to his employer when necessary. Jennings (Webster, 1983 : 10) argued that: "We have a most excellent law, namely the pass law, which should enable us to obtain complete control over the Kaffirs. As at present administered, the pass law gives us no such protection ... we import Africans who sign a contract to serve us for twelve months; many leave after a couple of weeks, and it is impossible to recover them".

4.2 The Glen Grey Act

The Glen Grey Act introduced a labour tax that according to Cecil John Rhodes (Webster, 1983 : 10), was: "... not slavery but a gentle stimulus. I think it will prove an inducement to men to go out and work. Those who do will be better off under the Act than they were before." Rhodes further maintained that the taxation was for the benefit of the blacks and colonists, contributing to their joint prosperity.

Criticising those who appealed to the missionaries for assistance in inducing Africans to take up work in the mines, the newspaper: Standard, declared: "... mission work begins at the wrong end - by clothing, feeding and pampering an already lazy animal, and straight-away removing hunger, that singular incentive which alone successfully compels a man to labour ... it is in the direction of taxation that the ultimate solution of the labour question lies" (Webster, 1983 : 10).

4.3 The Land Act of 1913

The Land Act of 1913 which restricted African land ownership to 13% of the total land area and so forced Africans into overcrowded reserves. This Act had the twin effect of suppressing the emerging African peasantry, which was proving an effective counter-class to the White farmer, and creating a pool of cheap labour in the reserves (Webster, 1983 : 10-12).

5. THE COINCIDENCE OF RACE AND CLASS

Lever maintains that: "the differentiation of individuals into racial categories is not simply an exercise in neat categorisation" (Lever, 1978 : 6). The "race" of the individual affects virtually every aspect of his social life. It dictates where he may live; where he may work; who he may or may not marry; whether he may own freehold property; the amount he will pay in taxation; the probability of his surviving the age of one year; his life expectancy; the probability of his contracting particular diseases; the medical treatment he will receive; the places of entertainment he may visit; the buses he rides on; the public toilets he may use; the amount the state will spend on his education; the universities he may enter; the occupations or trades that may be closed to him; his earnings; his right to elect representatives to a central government; his right of free movement into towns and provinces. Lever contends that the list can be extended considerably. Whilst this is true, it is also true that some aspects of "petty apartheid" have been eroded, eg. the removal of the Immorality Act, the Mixed Marriages Act and recently, the influx control measures. However, without the removal of the Group Areas Act the implications of race continue to extend into almost every component of South African society. Race, more than any other single characteristic, is the most important social differentiating factor in South Africa. "It is woven into the fabric of everyday lives" says Kuper (Lever, 1978 : 6).


Kuper (Bekker, 1974 : 97-98) maintains that priority cannot exclusively be granted to class or material interests. At work and while interacting with Whites, Africans evolve new patterns of behaviour; whilst at home they will interact more in line with their tribal custom. Race and economic position cannot, in general, be causally linked with each other. He maintains further that since ethnic and racial groups (rather than classes) are differentially incorporated into the policy, it follows that race rather than class will be the cleavage along which confrontation over power resources will take place - under the assumption that the two do not coincide exactly. However, the implications of the pass laws, the Glen Grey

Act and the Land Act of 1913, suggest that since Blacks were transformed into the labour force that spearheaded the development of capitalism, race and class do coincide to a large extent in South Africa.

6. MODELS OF STRATIFICATION APPLICABLE TO SOUTH AFRICA

The (slightly adapted) MacCrone model, cited in Lever, is a model depicting crudely the racist nature of the social structure in South Africa (Lever, 1978 : 31):

MODEL 1




The more solid the line, the greater is the impermeability of the boundaries between groups. Most studies on stratification show that highly industrialised, bureaucratic societies tend towards a class structure (Popenoe, 1977 : 29). The significant features of the above illustrated model are:

- (a) that the colour bar separates the White group from the Black (African, Indian and Coloured);
- (b) that mobility takes place with greater ease between classes within the White and Black racial groups (the horizontal broken lines depict the three class structure), ie., within the respective racial groups themselves, rather than among the race groups in general; and
- (c) that no matter how high an African, Indian or Coloured person may rise in the social system, he still retains an inferior position to a White person. In 1949, MacCrone wrote: "There appears to be at present no evidence to support the view that this line (the colour bar), although remaining impermeable has begun to tilt" (Lever, 1978 : 32).

Davenport (1977 : 33), contends, however, that the war years had made the colour bar difficult to retain, particularly at a time when the creation of a variety of semi-skilled jobs involving machine-minding of various kinds rendered the old categories of "skilled" and "unskilled" increasingly obsolete. With increased competition for artisans, the government was compelled to authorise dilution of labour, allowing unqualified workers to do skilled work under supervision, above all in the engineering industry, but also in textiles, furniture, leatherwork and other fields, in all of which the employment of Coloured and African workers greatly increased. Hence, an alternative (slightly adapted) model presented by West (Lever, 1978 : 33) may be seen as more applicable.

Skewed rather than straight lines indicate how, for example, a Black person of high status can attain the status higher than that of a White. The following graphical representation is suggested:

MODEL 2



The oval shaped figure in the White section of the pyramid represents the Protestant and Catholic groups. The oval shaped figure in the Hindu section of the model represents the caste system. The tilting of the colour-bar is significant because it represents the possibility of a change in the status of a Black person and depicts what in contemporary terms may be viewed in line with the development of the "new Black middle class". Whilst


these models bear some relevance to racial/ethnic stratification in South Africa - ethnic distinctions themselves can be seen to have become severely undermined by the implications of class distinctions and the consequent racial-class bars that these project.

Societies can be arranged between two polar extremities according to their vertical mobility. An ideal-typical class structure depicts society as an entirely open stratification system where vertical mobility occurs without any resistance. An ideal-typical caste structure, on the other hand, portrays society as an entirely closed stratification system where vertical mobility is absent. It would be difficult to describe a society at the midpoint of the continuum. Its stratification system could be perceived as either a class or caste structure or it could be termed a class/caste structure.

- 6.1 Caste structures differ from class structures in the following ways:
- 6.1.1 The concept "caste" implies a group of people (born into the group) who are prevented from improving their social status or from marrying outside the group. Regulations govern social intercourse among members of different castes and a person will remain within the caste of this birth throughout his life. Caste implies social distancing between groups in a multi-racial society such as that of South Africa, and no longer applies only to a country like India. A person's position is determined by his birth; neither personal ability nor affluence are sufficient to warrant admission into a higher group; group relationships are governed and fixed by tradition or even by law.
- 6.1.2 In a caste system we deal specifically with ascribed status. A person will possess certain characteristics due to his birth. Society thus forces a status upon him.

- 6.1.3 There is no vertical mobility, but horizontal mobility. This is ideal-typical. Broom and Selznick (1977 : 82) point out: "Such ascriptive societies are often termed caste-like, but there may be no clear case of a true caste system in the sense of absolutely closed social categories with no social mobility between them".
- 6.2 "Social class" generally speaking, indicates the classification of society into groups on the strength of status acquired through wealth, education, occupation or any other such achieved qualities used for evaluating status. In a structural sense, the concept is used to refer to a group of people who are related in a particular way to the means of production and labour power. Broom and Selznick (1977 : 182), maintain that a class structure is characterised by acquired (achieved) status, and a class-structured society is prestige orientated. A high degree of social mobility occurs in a class structure. In societies with an almost pure class structure, class divisions tend to become blurred. There is no clear line of demarcation to indicate where one class begins and the other ends, the differences between them being so slight. Class consciousness among the various classes, too, is not very strong, although the relative positions of the strata are recognised by the classes themselves as well as by the rest of the community.



MODEL 3


A social structure based on class constitutes a hierachic classification of status groups as the above graphic model shows.

6.3 Caste/Class Structure

It can be suggested that in South Africa we have a White caste and a Black caste. Within the respective castes, provision is still made for class structures, each caste having its own class structure. The highest stratum of the entire stratification system contains relatively few positions filled by Blacks. The presence of both principles, caste and class may be noted in the graphic model given below. Kinlock (1974 : 48-50), maintains that: "Looking at South Africa, for instance, the stratification structure consists of a number of racial castes, within which limited class systems

operate ... Also in a society as complex and plural as South Africa, the possibility of a number of stratification systems, racially-defined, arises". He represents the South African system as follows:

MODEL 4




In terms of this model, the caste boundary maintains that Whites only constitute the upper class, whilst the lower and middle class constitute Coloureds and Asians. Africans constitute the lower class with a small proportion recognised as middle class.

Unlike the MacCrone and West models that were stratified in terms of race, and contain an arbitrary barrier that restricted mobility of the races, Kinloch's model provides an explanation for the immobility by drawing more clearly the relationship between race and class.

Thus, the White population approximates if not equals the upper class;
the Coloured/Asian population approximates the middle class; and
the African population approximates the lower and working class.

The relationship between race and class in South Africa is not accidental, it is an evolutionary result of the dispossession of the land of Blacks and the exploitation of their labour power early on as slaves, and later on the gold mines and on the sugar-cane fields.

Various measures of racial discrimination serve to maintain Blacks in a subordinate position. These measures are shown to operate at five levels: political rights, property and residential rights, employment, education and income (Cock, 1980 : 8). However, while racial and class exploitation have been distinguishing characteristics of the society, not much emphasis is placed on gender discrimination that serves to maintain women in a position of dependence. These measures are shown to operate at four critical levels: legal status, employment, education and reproduction. The capitalist system of production and the consequent class structure that has emerged operate to produce a complex pattern of inequality. Whilst all women in South African society are subject to sexual discrimination and domination, the system of racial domination provides White women with important mechanisms of escape from this structure of constraints. The employment of cheap, black domestic labour is one instance and this presents a challenge to conventional feminist analysis.

MODEL 5

EXTENDED KINLOCH MODEL

The Kinloch model could thus be extended and adapted somewhat, as the above graphic illustration shows. In addition to including the sexual component, represented by the longer broken line(s), the caste boundaries have been changed. The boundary for the lower caste White has been raised significantly. This is because the White working class or White lower class has significantly diminished according to Webster (1983 : 16). Some argue that the White worker produces less value than he receives and is, therefore, not exploited. Whether he is to be defined as a separate non-productive class, or whether the White worker is simply to be seen as the privileged stratum of the working class, suffering a rather prolonged bout of "false consciousness" is a matter of considerable debate (Webster, 1983 : 16).

Since 1922 White workers have seen their economic positions improve and because of their access to political power, have defined their position in antagonistic terms to that of the African worker. Whilst Coloured and, in particular, Indian people have moved higher up on the status hierarchy, a large proportion still live in lower socio-economic conditions. According to research conducted by the Built Environment Study Group of the University of Natal (Daily News, 12 November 1986 : 1), 50,00% of people in surrounding Coloured and Indian townships are existing below subsistence level. This gives some indication of the class distinctions that exist within the individual race groups.

PART TWODYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RESISTANCE

Thus far, the structure of the society has been depicted in a relatively static fashion. What follows now is an examination of intra-parliamentary and extra-parliamentary responses to the changing South African situation.

1. INTRA-PARLIAMENTARY RESPONSES

During the years 1910 to 1948 different interest groups within the White community vied with each other for positions within the privileged sector of the society (Denoon, 1972 : 148). The outbreak of World War II in particular saw tremendous activity in White political circles. Smuts took over the government after Hertzog's proposal that South Africa should remain neutral in the war had been rejected by parliament. During the period within which South African soldiers were winning fame in North Africa and Smut's reign was coming to a close, Afrikaners on the whole were divided and confused. However, Malan gradually rebuilt their unity and led Afrikanerdom to the unexpected electoral triumph of 1948. Although it is true to say that the Nationalist Government in South Africa from 1948 onwards has carried previous lines of policy to their logical conclusion, the year 1948 does represent a break in the continuity of White South African politics. For the first time an exclusively Afrikaner cabinet representing exclusively Afrikaner interests had a monopoly of political power in the country (Gordon and Talbot, 1977 : 64; Denoon, 1972 : 174). The National Party went from strength to strength until Dr HF Verwoerd took the initiative in proclaiming a republic and so achieved Afrikanerdom's great ideal from the time of the Anglo-Boer War onwards.

On the basis of historical data, one may extract four underlying factors that determined the path of racial segregation and domination which led to the rise of the "security establishment" (Grundy, 1982 : 1) in South Africa after 1948. Davenport (1977 : 313-343), cites the following:

- 1.1 Cultural diversity is the first factor. White South Africans perceive(d) differences among the cultural heritage, views of life and customs of Whites and Blacks. It was this perception that persuaded the White electorate that the policy of segregation as embodied in apartheid is the only way in which their culture can be preserved, and that in the Bantustans Blacks are given the opportunity to realise their own cultures. Black resistance in this regard reflects the belief that this view is designed to perpetuate a sense of superiority of White culture, since it can flourish unhindered with the resources at its disposal, while Black culture which dates from a pre-industrial era, is being kept alive artificially by the apartheid policy.
- 1.2 Skin colour is a second factor which could underlie people's attitudes. Colour can act as an independent variable in that it highlights manifest physical differences which can then be used as a classificatory principle in a society. It could be said that the "colour uniform" in South Africa has helped to reinforce those cultural differences on which racial relations are based.
- 1.3 It is important to cite the factor of fear. Fear of the Blacks' numerical superiority, fear of losing rights and privileges; or of a repetition of the violence which has occurred in the rest of Africa. The apartheid policy is supposed to exorcise such fears. The May 6, 1987 election saw the Nationalist Party exploiting these fears as well as the belief that South Africa is facing a Communist threat (Paton: Sunday Times, May 15, 1987 : 28). There are, however, those who maintain that the presence of this emotional fear component is precisely what makes apartheid an irrational policy and that apartheid in fact heightens these very fears, since it engenders strong anti-White feelings among the Blacks. Hence, apartheid could well make White fears into self-fulfilling prophecies.
- 1.4 Certain economic-related principles are also important. Since 1922, when White workers went on strike to reinforce privileges, legislation including the Industrial Conciliation Act maintained White worker

superiority over Black workers. Racial segregation is seen as a social attitude propagated by the exploiting class to justify and camouflage the exploitation of other racial groups. The Black becomes primarily and structurally a worker rather than a member of an ethnic group, whereas the White is a member of a dominant capitalist class.

This particular realisation led to the early translation of Black political power which can be reaped through development of the Black trade unions. Although this view allows for the possibility that race may develop a dynamic of its own, on the whole it is regarded as subordinate to the broader issue of capitalism. Over the past ten years this view has gained ground among historians and general academic authors (Hanf, 1982 : 206-209; Davenport, 1977 : 313-343).

By 1948, when the Nationalist Party came into power, the fact that South Africa was recognised as the home of various races could not be altered. In order to maintain the privileged economic position White voters were becoming accustomed to, it was necessary to bridge the differences and to find means of co-existence.

2. CONFLICTING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

Two conflicting schools of thought were emerging in the National Party during BJ Vorster's term as Prime Minister. On the one hand, there was the conservative or right-wing school, which was in favour of a narrow, closed and intolerant Afrikaner nationalism. On the other hand, there was a more liberal wing which favoured a broad, open and tolerant Afrikaner nationalism. It was Prof Willem de Klerk of Potchefstroom that referred to the protagonists of these two schools of thought as, respectively, "verkrampes" and "verligtes". Since then, these terms have been generally used in South African politics.

The verkrampete wing wanted to limit to an absolute minimum the Afrikaner's contact with those who thought otherwise, those who spoke

a different language and those of a different colour. Verligtes favoured large scale immigration, co-operation with English speakers, the forging of diplomatic links with Black states, and the exploration of avenues intended to free South Africa from her isolation and to improve foreign relations (Muller, 1981 : 512-513).

However, both wings wish to maintain White supremacy in the country. Critics and supporters of the South African government have both been impressed by the extent to which the South African government has used a programme of laws to further its aims. Hare (1983 : 3) maintains that the government has been able to avoid the local and international dangers of open and direct domination by enacting and applying a programme of laws which regulate the lives of the Black people (especially the African people) to a degree never surpassed by any other administration in history. The administration of these laws is facilitated by an elaborate bureaucracy which controls all the important aspects of an African's life. This close and intensive system of control, which may be styled legal-bureaucratic domination, makes it possible to keep coercion in the background. He maintains, moreover, that a domination expressed through the laws and applied by an efficient administration, is less obviously oppression since it is concealed behind legal forms and bureaucratic practices.

Crucial to the maintenance of the present South African political system is the necessity to devise a co-ordinated, holistic, counter-revolutionary strategy. It is the mark of the present government, although it by no means stems directly from the time when PW Botha replaced BJ Vorster as Prime Minister, that "A more conscious, concerted and systematic effort is being made to integrate various mechanisms of White control to produce a counter-revolutionary package more rationalised and efficient than at any time before" (Grundy, 1983 : 5). PW Botha and Magnus Malan had sought to fashion such a strategy during Botha's tenure as Minister of Defence in the Vorster Government. However, other political forces and personalities pursued different though not necessarily conflicting agendas.

One vital aspect of the counter-revolutionary strategy is to introduce proposals for modulated change, to blur the lines between formal segregation and integration, to experiment, to disarm critics by revising the trappings of apartheid without tampering with essentials. At the same time, a deep involvement of the defence establishment in civilians' lives can be seen. This process still enables those in charge to control the pace and nature of change or so it would seem. Whether it will unleash unexpected forces moving in surprising directions (as the Conservative Party contends) is another matter altogether (Grundy, 1983 : 5).

Yunus Carrim (Sunday Tribune, 26 April 1987 : 29) pointed out that effective power does not lie in parliament. Rather that it is located in the State Security Council and the elaborate management network that has developed throughout the country.

Carrim contends that at the top is the National Security Management System (NSMS) which co-ordinates regional Joint Management Centres (JMCs). There are at least nine JMCs coinciding with each of the major economic development areas. There are about 60 sub-JMCs which roughly correspond to the areas covered by the newly established Regional Services Councils (RSCs). There are also a further 500 or so mini-JMCs at the local level.

According to Carrim's assertions it is this elaborate structure made up of unknown military personnel, civil servants, politicians and businessmen, that effectively manages and governs the country. This is the hidden core government of the country. Through its formal and informal links with the overt structures of power, it has all-pervasive influence in almost every aspect of the political, economic, social and cultural life of the country.

The most striking feature of this enormous structure is that it is not accountable to even the White community. It is the new tricameral constitution, with its drastic reduction of the power of parliament and its marked elevation of the power of the State President, that has created the space for the development of this

structure. Researchers, Carrim contends, have increasingly referred to the bloodless coup that has taken place in the country. The military, they point out, plays a decisive albeit hidden role in the affairs of the state.

On 5 June, 1987, Helen Suzman (PFP spokesman for Law and Order) said that the National Security Management System was a sinister development by way of which democratic procedures were being circumvented (Daily News, 5 June 1987 : 8). She reiterated Carrim's point that: "the NSMS, being primarily the creation of the police and security forces, is a sort of creeping coup d' etat by consent, in which accountable politicians have abrogated their power to non-accountable members of the security forces. The security forces were accountable only to the State President - and the State President only to himself".

However, Black people are not responding passively to increasing restrictions on their movements implemented by a White government; Black resistance during the period of Nationalist rule needs to be emphasised.

Earlier, the difficulty the government faced in the implementation of the apartheid policy was that it took place amid intensified Black political awareness and growing international hostility to White rule. The emancipation of Asian and African peoples; socialist transformations of post-colonial societies and the struggle between capitalist and communist imperialist states and their rivalry for influence in African states, were all factors that made South Africa the focus of world opinion. The United Nations Organisation (UNO) tackled South African policy under the banner of human rights calling apartheid a crime against humanity. The numerical preponderance of the Afro-Asians in the UNO and the state of world politics suggested that they were destined to play an increasing part in this body. It was under these conditions that the National party had to find its way after 1948.

2.1 Collaboration and non-collaboration of extra-parliamentary popular organisations

Three different types of Black responses to the government are evident at present (Connor, 1983 : 7):

2.1.1 Self-interested collaboration,

where people, in order to secure power or profits, openly collaborate with the government. The government is naturally enough trying to increase this particular sector of people by co-opting them into a Black middle class with a stake in the status quo, because they have a share in its privileges.

The success of this governmental programme which holds a certain measure of economic advancement for some, depends upon splitting Black solidarity and encouraging people to have an attitude of possessive individualism towards life. This policy is also implemented by a number of firms seeking to draw academically advanced or promising Africans, even those who have had difficulties with the authorities, into their companies.

2.1.2 Collaborative opposition

where people are using the structures provided by the government itself as means towards combating apartheid. This has been dubbed the "Buthelezi strategy", and works to some extent (Connor, 1983 : 8). Leaders in this position must be enough of an opposition to be seen as representative of that constituency and collaborative enough not to be put out of power by the government. Hence, it is a tight-rope position.. However, the Buthelezi strategy was used by a number of political organisations active during the early twentieth century. The SANNC (South African Native National Congress) which changed its name to the ANC (African National Congress), was the first nationwide umbrella Black South African political organisation. The Black elite of whom this organisation was representative chose to improve their general situation by appealing to the British Administration. A deputation went to Britain to protest against the colour bar built into the 1910 Union Constitution.

The SANNC, with the outbreak of the first world war, pledged its loyalty to Britain and South Africa, hoping that this would increase their bargaining powers once the war was over. However, this did not happen. With the Hertzog legislation in 1936, which removed Africans from the common roll, a new set of segregated political institutions, including white "Native representatives" in parliament and the elected advisory Native Representative Council (NRC) were set up. The AAC (All African Convention) was then set up with the purpose of opposing the Hertzog legislation (Lodge, 1983 : 10).

However, some AAC members, including the ANC served on the Council instead of boycotting it – this undermined the AAC as an independent organisation. The Coloured people, left on the Common role in 1936 participated until 1969 when their representation was then abolished and they were given instead a CRC (Coloured Person's Representative Council). The Indian population was afforded representation in Parliament under the Indian Representation Act of 1946; but this legislation was removed from the Statute Book as soon as the Malan Government took over in 1948. The Indian community had previously decided to reject the concession (Davenport, 1977 : 334). By 1943, the AAC disbanded its organisation and the NRC, frustrated by ineffectual participation, was eventually abolished by the Nationalists.

Although between the twenties and 1939 the ANC had lost much of its influence and was overcome by organisational problems, it survived whereas other Black organisations, such as the ICU disintegrated (Grest, 1982 : 4ff). In the twenty-odd years between the First and Second World Wars the ANC was basically a moderate body seeking to obtain a foothold for Blacks in a White system rather than fighting the system itself. This approach derived from the perspective on life of the Black elite who formed the core of the ANC. They were mainly products of English-medium mission schools, and the British and Christian environment profoundly influenced their political views. Although not completely divorced from their traditional communities, the values and norms of these communities had ceased to have any significance for the elite. Characteristic

of this group's political approach was a liberal optimistic belief in progress - a belief that Whites would accept them as fellow Christians and that they would be assimilated into South African society on those terms. Even their disillusionment over the nature of White legislation from 1910 to 1939 did not destroy their belief as liberals, that justice would eventually be done. As a result, ANC political strategy showed no dramatic change during these years; essentially, the ANC pursued a policy of non-confrontation and tried to fight non-liberal legislation by liberal methods.

Similar liberal methods are currently being used by parliamentarians working within the structures of the tricameral parliament. As in the case of the NRC, which had no legislative powers and viewed in retrospect was merely a buffer between the dominant Whites and the Black masses, the tricameral parliament has, the extraparliamentary forces argue, been ineffectual since its implementation. The NRC was created to permit better control of the Blacks and in this sense was partially successful. The implementation of the tricameral parliament, which excludes Africans from the central decision-making processes has coincided with the worst, sustained unrest South Africa has ever experienced.

2.1.4 Non-collaboration

In this case civil actions are taken such as boycotting of schools, strikes, etc. The more militant form of non-collaboration is armed resistance.

It was within a framework of the socio-economic and political change which accompanied the Second World War (1939-1945) that the ANC experienced a revival. The manufacturing industry had expanded rapidly in the post-war years and by 1943 it had outstripped the mining industry as the single most important source of income. At the same time there was a corresponding increase in the labour force. This was to have three important implications for Black resistance movements. In the first place, the bargaining power of the semi-skilled Black workers was enhanced due to their numerical preponderance

while some White workers were away on active service. In the second place, more and more Black women were entering the labour force, and active attempts were being made to organise them politically. In the third place, the pace of urbanisation created new job opportunities in the cities and developed the potential for contact and organisation among Blacks from different ethnic groups (Van der Merwe, 1983 : 5-6; Cock, 1980 : 11-16).

Whereas previously the ANC had worked for the assimilation of Blacks into a White political system, the accent during the war years was increasingly on eventual Black power and Black majority government. This new trend in Black politics was clearly manifested in the ANC's acceptance in 1943 of a general policy statement in which Black demands were set out. This document, known as "African Claims" included demands for full citizenship; unqualified franchise for all Black men and women; the abolition of the NRC in its existing form because it was based on discrimination; unrestricted land ownership for all Blacks; abolition of the pass laws; free compulsory education; and absolute equality under the law.

From 1943 onwards, the ANC came to the conclusion that the only way in which Blacks could hope to reform the South African societal order was by overt political confrontation. This approach was strongly supported and influenced by a new generation of ANC members who constituted a major pressure group within the ANC itself - the Congress Youth League (CYL)(Lodge, 1983 : 23-25).

The ANC revival continued after the Second World War, and the policies adopted by the Nationalist government in 1948, under Dr DF Malan, provided a further impetus. Under the Smuts government there had been marginal improvement in Black welfare services and a slight increase in the financial allocation to Black education, but even these limited improvements were swept away by the new administration. From the onset, the Africans in particular, were to be drastically affected by further legislation on the part of the Nationalist government. The 38 years, from 1910 to 1948 produced a total of 49 discriminating acts based on colour. Under the

National government, in the twelve year period from 1948 to 1969, an additional 53 such measures were to appear on the statute book. During the the next 10 years (up to 1979) no fewer than 98 additional measures were passed. Thus from 1910 to 1970, a total of 200 laws were passed discriminating against Blacks and regulating their lives (Muller, 1981 : 520-525).

Thus the wave of discriminatory legislation brought on a response from the ANC. In 1952, the ANC requested that the Prime Minister, DF Malan improve the legal position of Blacks. When Malan dismissed this plea, the ANC informed him that they would be launching a programme of passive resistance. Non-violent methods of protest such as passive resistance or civil disobedience became reassessed once the ANC, PAC (Pan Africanist Congress) and 42 leaders had been banned. Furthermore, the protest campaign led initially by the PAC which resulted in the deaths of more than 69 people in Sharpeville in 1960, heralded the end of peaceful protest. The declaring of the ANC and PAC as illegal organisations saw them continuing their activities underground. The military wings of the ANC (Umkonto We Sizwe) and PAC (Poqo) were responsible for a number of sabotage attacks on power stations, railway lines, telecommunication installations and symbols of apartheid such as the Department of Bantu Affairs (Lodge, 1983 : 188).

According to Callinicos (1985 : 5-7) the ANC's policy of violent confrontation since the late seventies has once again been manifest. After the Soweto riots of 1976 many young Blacks left the country to join the ranks of the ANC and undergo military training in such places as Angola and Tanzania. After that they would re-enter South Africa to carry out sabotage attacks. Between January 1977 and October 1982, 150 such attacks were carried out. Although attacks on the civilian population were not officially part of ANC guerilla strategy there was always an inherent danger to human life, as in all forms of violence. Some ANC fighters referred to their strategy as "armed propaganda" a counterweight to government propaganda and structural violence. Lodge (1983 : 340) writes: "With the exception of the assassination of informers and other

people regarded as collaborators (African security policemen, for example), the campaign's strategy had been guided by the principle that civilian casualties should be avoided".

By August 1981 the ANC announced that civilian casualties should be expected. Since 1983 in particular civilians have been deliberate casualties as in the case of the Amanzimtoti bombing and the Magoos Bar bombing which killed five people. The South African Government has responded by destroying suspected ANC bases. Many armed infiltrators and saboteurs have been arrested, sentenced to death and imprisonment (Sunday Tribune, 26 July 1987 : 1).

3. TRADE UNIONS AS EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY RESPONSES

Viewing the development of the trade unions in South Africa, it is necessary to briefly describe the ICU (Industrial and Commercial Workers Union), which was the first Black trade union in South Africa in 1919. Unlike the SANNC, the ICU did not officially petition the authorities but adopted a more militant approach with a view to obtaining better working conditions and higher wages for its members. As a result its membership increased rapidly, mainly because the ICU held out hope for immediate change within the existing socio-economic system, not only for industrial workers but also for those in rural areas. In spite of its large membership, it was beset by poor organisation, financial maladministration and internal dissension which led to its early demise (Webster, 1983 : 116-117).

The collapse of the ICU did not spell out the end for Black unionisation. Its demise was partly due to conflicts over the role of the Communist Party (MacShane, 1984 : 27). For the CPSA (Communist Party of South Africa), racism, nationalism and imperialism were false ideologies symptomatic of a vanishing order. The primary struggle in South Africa they believed would be fought between capital and labour. Although the CPSA's specific interpretation of class in the South African context was not always popular amongst Black workers and led to severe conflicts, the

Party itself did important work (Callinicos, 1985 : 31). In the thirties, the CPSA managed to organise a number of trade unions on the Witwatersrand and this led to the formation in 1942 of the Congress of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU). But, again any hopes of betterment the Black trade unions might have cherished soon faded when the Nationalist government opposed legal recognition of Black trade unions. In the years that followed, it passed legislation which greatly reduced the Black workers' bargaining power. In 1950, parliament passed the suppression of Communism Act which was directed primarily at the trade unions, and by 1960 almost two-thirds of all trade union leaders on the Witwatersrand had been restricted. According to big business and the State, Black workers did not have the judgement necessary to use trade unions in a responsible manner (Webster, 1983 : 9-20). This approach was eventually embodied in the Bantu Labour Act of 1953, which rendered black strike action illegal and the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956, which not only prohibited non-racial trade unions, but also contained a job reservation clause in terms of which certain kinds of work were reserved for Whites.

It was in these circumstances that SACTU was founded in 1955. By 1963, it had acquired a membership of 500 000. But it was difficult to keep aloof from political involvement because, for instance, many members were directly affected by apartheid legislation such as that which regulated resettlement. However, the fact that SACTU engaged openly in political activities instead of confining itself to conventional and more circumscribed trade union action made it an easy target for the authorities. In the wake of Sharpeville and other clashes with the authorities, many trade union leaders suffered imprisonment, banning or restrictions. This was a blow from which SACTU never recovered and by 1965 the organisation lost its presence in the country (though it still exists in exile) (MacShane, 1984 : 33).

With SACTU's disappearance, the late 1960's and early 1970's saw Black trade unionism in the doldrums, but by 1973 the pattern in labour relations was changing drastically. In the preceding period,

the wage gap between White and Black had steadily widened, and any increases given to the Blacks were soon swallowed by inflation. In 1973, 60 000 workers went on strike. The success of this strike acted as a spur on Black trade unionism and between 1973 and 1975 new trade unions were established. In Durban, individual trade unions came together to form the Trade Union Advisory Co-ordinating Council (TUACC), branches of which also spread to the Transvaal, while the Western Province General Workers Union (WPGWU) was formed in the Western Cape. By 1981, the following trade union groups were representing Black workers - FOSATU (Federation of South African Trade Unions), CUSA (Council of Unions of South Africa) and TUCSA (Trade Union Council of South Africa). There were also a significant number of independent unaffiliated unions (Financial Mail, 1983 : 41-42).

The seventies also saw a change in the organisational methods of trade unions, the emphasis now being on greater efficiency. Less time was spent on extensive recruitment of members, which tended to make an organisation unwieldy, and more on educating workers on the factory floor to commit themselves to the objectives of trade unions and to develop union leadership necessary to maintain the unions as ongoing concerns.

In reaction to the 1973 strikes, the government passed the Bantu Labour Relations Act in the same year. A central labour council was set up for Blacks, and a provision was made for the creation of work committees and liaison committees to represent workers' interests. By 1977 there were several such committees but owing to their severely limited powers, the scheme never really gained acceptance among Black workers, who were not prepared to accept these committees as substitutes for independent action by trade unions.

By 1979, Prof N. Wiehahn was appointed chairperson of a commission which was to study and restructure South Africa's labour relations. The Wiehahn commission recommended that Black trade unions be legalised and that certain forms of job reservation be abolished.

However, trade unions would have to be registered, and registration would be subject to various official stipulations. The existing legal definitions regarding strike action, would be maintained, and the final arbiter in industrial disputes would be a labour court. Clearly, the Wiehahn Commission's aim of exercising control over trade unionism by allowing it to function within a fixed framework has not been fully achieved. Still, the commission has introduced a new dispensation in labour relations, one which officially affords scope for the development of trade unionism.

In 1985, COSATU was launched. Ideologically, it is linked to the ANC, but it comprises a broad spectrum of trade unions including the previous unions of FOSATU. In 1986, UWUSA was launched, ideologically linked to Inkatha with a much more conservative bias being introduced into South African trade union politics. In 1986 as well, TUCSA disbanded as a trade union federation leaving its previous affiliates with the choice of joining other federations.

Against this background of resistance and change, the following perceptions can be extracted.

4. NEEDS AND STRATEGIES

4.1 What needs to change

- 4.1.1 Race discrimination needs to end but the free enterprise system must be retained. (PFP, Capital)
- 4.1.2 Racial domination, as exhibited by capitalist class relations must be substituted by a socialist system. (COSATU, AZAPO)
- 4.1.3 Sexual exploitation by racial, class and ideological forces needs to end. (FEDSAW, UDF)
- 4.1.4 Nothing needs to change. (CP, AWB)

4.2 Strategies

4.2.1 Evolutionary and initiated by the formal State structure

- 4.2.1.1 Granting self government to Bantustans to develop the respective groups within the context of their own communities. (CP, NP)
- 4.2.1.2 The devolution of power at central government level by including Indians and Coloureds, whilst Whites remain the majority. (NP)
- 4.2.1.3 The continuation of the processes of consociational democracy by negotiating and consulting with Black personalities who are prepared to negotiate for civil rights in a way that is not seen as radical or violent. (PFP, NDM, IP)
- 4.2.1.4 An acceptance of talks with banned organisations such as the ANC on condition that they denounce violence. (NP)
- 4.2.1.5 The use of repressive state machinery to quell further mobilisation and unrest. (NP, CP)

4.2.2 Evolutionary and initiated by reformist and extraparliamentary forces

- 4.2.2.1 The decentralisation of power/decision-making structures by developing a policy of regionalisation (This will be addressed again with reference to developments in Natal). (Kwa Natal Indaba)
- 4.2.2.2 Civil action involving strikes, boycotts, passive resistance campaigns to destabilise power structures, resulting in gradual qualitative change. (UDF)
- 4.2.2.3 Trade union action involving types of strike action to win higher economic gains/improve working conditions. (COSATU)
- 4.2.2.4 Calling for international pressure, such as disinvestment to overcome apartheid. (SACC)

4.2.2.5 Calling for the liberation and equality of women at a political and legal level. (FEDSAW)

4.2.3 **Revolutionary and initiated by radical/revolutionary forces**

4.2.3.1 Armed struggle aimed at overthrowing the State. (ANC)

4.2.3.2 Political action mobilising the communities to resist apartheid and make the country ungovernable in order to transform it into a socialist society. (ANC, CPSA)

4.2.3.3 Trade union action involving mobilisation of workers to eventually overthrow capitalism. (CPSA, COSATU)

5. **SOUTH AFRICA : THE QUEST FOR REGIONAL SOLUTIONS**

The crisis in South Africa is said to be both structural and conjunctural. At its roots is the struggle by the Black working class against the racial hierarchical state in an unevenly developed economy, unable to create the conditions for stable and social relations of production. The essential weakness of the economy, despite attempts to advance its technological base, lies in social relations of production which have not created a "disciplined" and "responsible" labour force (Moodley, 1986 : 219-220).

Recessions in the 1970's and 1980's have led to further conflicts, both in the places of production and in the urban areas, between the state and the working class. The state's original attempt to lessen this worsening crisis was to adopt a dual-tract approach which combined internal repression with techniques designed to isolate Black workers in order to make them easier to rule. The limited 1979 concessions of Wiehahn and Riekert, the political "independence" of the "homelands", the encouragement of a Black bourgeoisie, the promotion of local government in the townships, and the establishment of a tricameral parliament, were all part of this strategy. Even whilst the reforms announced by the State President in January 1986, 1987 and 1988 are in some part being

implemented, three key features of grand apartheid are explicitly to remain: separate residential areas, separate schools, and political "participation" on a group basis, thereby continuing to deny the Black majority any meaningful role in the management of the State.

Yet even as the State and oppositional groups do battle on a "tactical" field of conjunctural action at the moment, elements within the ruling groups; both inside and outside the State, are attempting to map out a longer term strategic terrain of action within which they hope to confine future battles. These more advanced reformers are looking to solutions that go well beyond those associated with the Wiehahn/Riekert Reports, the "Koornhof Bills", the new constitution and the confederation of ethnic states; that go beyond, in other words, the package of ruling group initiatives commonly referred to as "Total Strategy". (Moodley, 1986 : 220; Cobbett et al, 1985 : 87).

Slabbert (Jacobs, 1986 : 161) maintains that the only process that could lead to a more acceptable constitution is the process of negotiation and the language of this process is compromise. South Africa is not ready for negotiation or else it would be happening. He contends that negotiation is not consultation; it is not the Government making constitutional changes of its own design and co-opting excluded interest groups into it, nor is it all or nothing demands for the immediate transfer of power. It is essentially a process whereby all the main actors accept that they will have to settle for less than they would like in order to be better off than they would be if they did not.

Schlemmer, supporting these contentions (Jacobs, 1986 : 116-117), maintains that even intense pressures on the government resulting from the township unrest, the fall of the rand and threats of economic sanctions, have not shifted it from its basic position, which is a compromise between social differentiation and political co-operation. Clearly, policy stalemate has been reached which has always been latent in South African politics but which in recent

times has come to the fore so forcibly so as to threaten the stability and future prosperity of the entire society. Thus, it seems essential that an approach to socio-political change be evolved which can break the stalemate in policy. He contends that one such possibility has come increasingly to the fore since the publication of the Buthelezi Commission Report in 1982. This is the alternative that major metropolitan regions, sub-provinces or even provinces like Natal and Kwa Zulu, in which the vast majority of non-rural Black people live, acquire a new status as "open areas". One may term this approach that of "regional" options. The principle would be that such regions could choose to become federal "provinces" within South Africa, linked to the central parliamentary system by a "federal" chamber on which representatives from these "provinces" could enjoy an input into national decision-making. Apart from KwaZulu - Natal, other such regions are greater Johannesburg, greater Cape Town and parts of the East London corridor between Ciskei and Transkei.

Within these regions, the entire spectrum of local leadership could be drawn in constitutional negotiations over a form of decentralised government which would best suit the reconciled requirements of the various interest groups in the area.

It is against this background that a consensus is now emerging among the most powerful elements in the state and capital over the importance of the following objectives (Cobbett, et al, 1986 : 86):

- 5.1 The depoliticisation of society through a narrowing of the range of social issues subject to political contestation. This has two aspects:
 - 5.1.1 The reduction of state involvement in the creation and distribution of wealth, employment and welfare. Both the State and capital currently argue that market forces can allocate resources more efficiently than the State.

- 5.1.2 The "deracialisation" of these state interventions and of certain formal institutions of political domination.
- 5.2 The decentralisation of policy formulation and implementation including the devolution of authority over welfare expenditures to regional and local government, and as far as possible the privatisation of such services.
- 5.3 The continued centralisation of powers concerned with the maintenance of order, as well as the retention of the capacity for "pragmatic" economic intervention by the central state to correct market failures.

As part of the research for more developed solutions, sections of the ruling group have begun to explore the possibility of demarcating new spatial units of planning, administration and representation that by-pass existing, highly politicised spatial units - such as the bantustans and group areas. These existing spatial units have been identified as a source both of economic inefficiency and political instability. "The purpose behind identifying new spatial forms would therefore be to disorganise oppositional groups that have challenged existing spatial boundaries and the systems of political representation predicated upon them; and to provide the spatial framework for a renewal of capital accumulation. A new set of "depoliticised" spatial concepts - like development and metropolitan regions - and new approaches to political representation predicted on these spatial forms - like federalism - have gained dominance in the strategic thinking of the ruling groups" (Cobbett et al, 1985 : 87-88).

Cobbett et al (1985 : 89) maintain further that the crisis and questioning of the spatial assumptions of traditional apartheid is occurring across the entire field of state intervention in South Africa whether in the context of political representation, labour control and settlement policy or spatial economic planning. Sections of the political elite have begun to organise opposition to existing policies, and to debate alternatives. The meeting in

July 1987, of 63 Afrikaners with the ANC at Dakar illustrates the extent to which these alternatives are being debated. After 1979 reformers both inside the State and in the wider verligte and liberal communities, began to recognise that the Verwoerdian vision of parcelling South Africa up into independent ethnic states was unrealisable. It had become obvious that the bantustans - the essential pillars of apartheid - were unable to achieve either economic autonomy or political legitimacy. Economically impoverished and reliant on the South African economy, their reintegration into a common economic planning and political framework was increasingly seen as inevitable - notwithstanding the granting of independence to Venda in 1979 and Ciskei in 1981.

Publicly, the government has conceded to no more than the possibility of an ethnically based confederation - in effect an international agreement between supposedly independent ethnic states and South Africa. However, important interests located inside and outside the State system have argued vigorously for a federal type state based on spatially reconstructed political units which would bypass or supercede the provinces and bantustans.

At the time of writing, Regional Services Councils (RSCs) are being implemented. The government maintains that the RSCs will meet the following objectives:

1. "Broaden" democracy to include all races.
2. Eliminate and prevent domination of one group over another.
3. Eliminate discrimination.
4. Provide local government services as efficiently and cost effectively as possible.
5. Generate additional revenue at local level to promote development and provide services in areas with the greatest needs.

RSCs are expected to administer regional services such as electricity, water, sewerage, roads, abattoirs and traffic on a cost effective basis. These objectives and functions must be examined against

the present political and economic climate and what effect they would have on other related statutes (Sunday Tribune, Herald, July 12, 1987 : 4).

However, the RSCs are based on the philosophy of racially segregated communities where representatives will be appointed by constituent units, such as LACs, community councils and local authorities which essentially have an ethnic base. It therefore follows that people will first have to be part of such ethnic local government structures before they can be members of RSCs. Inevitably, the RSCs have been rejected by the extra-parliamentary groupings.

Opposition (Cobbett et al, 1985 : 93) from Black people to the tricameral elections of 1984, and the urban turmoil since then culminating in the November 1984 stay away, has induced big capital to break with tradition and publicly call for African political accommodation within a unitary system. This now seems an essential pre-requisite for long term economic and political stability in South Africa. While it has not publicly backed a specific blueprint, organised capital has privately voiced support for some form of federal solution. Some elements within capital see in the development regions the possible basis for an evolving second tier in a federal-type system, drawing on the United States of America (USA) as a model. Their conceptions differ markedly from the formulations discussed above in that they conceive of these regions as mutually competitive, and not as the objects of costly decentralisation policies designed to ensure a geographically even spread of population, employment and welfare. Hence, the call for federation could become the basis for a wide-ranging consensus amongst those favouring a reformist solution in South Africa.

Whilst Cobbett et al treat the issue of regionalism as the subject of an externally-imposed regionalisation policy, Beall et al (1986 : 5ff), describe regionalism as an ongoing process not least of all involving struggle and of which the current initiatives are a part. Regionalisation is not being imposed upon a passive population.

In the case of the Natal option, this has been possible and applicable as a result of a certain cultural distinctiveness and because of specific class alliances which have emerged, notably the availability of Inkatha for an alternative reform package and the direct continuation of certain authority structures in Natal, deriving from the colonial tradition of indirect rule.

6. THE CASE OF NATAL

6.1 Defining Natal Spatially

Since the empirical data on which this study is based, are obtained in the Natal area, it is necessary to elaborate on the particular Natal circumstances within the broader South African context.

By "Natal" is meant the area roughly within the provincial borders as set out at union (there have been alterations such as the incorporation of Griqualand East, and threats of alterations such as the handing over to Swaziland of Ingwavuma). Within this political entity, there are further sub-divisions, some of greater consequence than others, the most important being the division of authority between the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) and the Natal Provincial Administration (NPA). At the local level, divisions would include magisterial boundaries and areas demarcated for local administration such as municipalities and tribal or regional authorities.

Approximately 20% (or 6 301 000) of the total population of South Africa lives in Natal. Some 5 049 900 are classified as African (with more than 90% being Zulu-speaking or about 75% of all Zulu-speakers in South Africa; 496 560 are classified as White, 664 360 as Indian and 90 180 as Coloured people (Beall et al, 1986 : 6-9). The breakdown of population in Natal is quite different from that in South Africa as a whole. Whereas Whites constitute 15,3% of the South African population, they are only 7,8% of the total in Natal, Indians form 2,8% of the total South African population, but 10,5% of Natal's, while the figures for Coloured people are

8,9% and 1,4% respectively, Africans account for 73,6% of the South African population and 80,1% of Natal's.

KwaZulu is the most fragmented bantustan of all the "national and self-governing states", comprising a number of pieces excluding many of the freehold areas or black spots. As the Surplus People's Project pointed out: "... over half of all the African freehold areas have still not been eradicated, while the African population in what is supposedly the White farming areas still greatly exceeds the White population (Beall et al, 1986 : 14). While the spatial pattern of population distribution was largely set in the nineteenth century, some changes did occur in the twentieth, the most important being the land "scheduling" for the African population in the 1913 and 1936 legislation (Beall et al, 1986 : 14).

Another consequence of population distribution and land allocation in Natal is that the KwaZulu areas are in some cases in close proximity to the major "White" urban areas and to industrial activity in the province. The only other areas in the country where this is the case are the Eastern Cape and around Pretoria. This means that formal and "informal" settlements have arisen very close to potential sources of employment. In consequence Natal has by far the largest number of African commuters as distinct from migrants.

If we look at the pattern of urbanisation in KwaZulu, we find that because of the proximity of KLA - administered areas to industrial employment, massive "informal" settlement has taken place on the outskirts of the Durban-Pinetown area. Haarhoff (1985 : 45) writes that around Durban: "over half the Black population (or between 700 000 and 900 000) were living in informal dwellings of various kinds or roughly one-third of the total city population (of all race groups)". The need for political stability if nothing else, brings home the urgency of some integrated system of administration and provision of services for all the people of the region.

With regard to Indian settlement patterns, when ex-indentured labourers moved off the sugar estates they leased and in a few cases bought small plots of land in areas of low cost around Durban, notably Riverside, Cato Manor, Bayhead, Sea View, Hillary, Bellair, Malvern, Wentworth, Sea Cow Lake and Springfield. Initially, many households were engaged in market gardening but with industrial expansion many were forced off their land by financial pressures whilst others turned to shale farming in response to the increase in urbanisation. Wealthier Indian traders had tended to purchase property in Durban itself both for residential and trading purposes, despite restrictions designed to prevent "Indian penetration" (Beall et al, 1986 : 8).

The Group Areas Act of 1950 affected Coloured and Indian people the most severely since African occupation in urban areas was already largely controlled. In Durban alone by 1967, 6 140 Indian families had been relocated and further 13 000 were still under threat. The net effect of removals under the Group Areas Act was to make the Indian community highly dependent on the municipalities to meet its housing needs, needs which were met on the outskirts of the metropolitan areas. This put the Indian working class at a considerable disadvantage in relation to Whites although they were relatively better off than the African workers who had to commute from even greater distances. The Group Areas Act was also a response to competition from Indian commercial interests which were adversely affected as a result, particularly the smaller traders (Beall et al, 1986 : 10-18).

Hence the question that needs to be asked now is why was Natal/KwaZulu chosen by large sections of South Africa's dominant bloc, and the reformist political community allied to it, as the frontline for constitutional "reform"? The view that Natal is somehow "different" from the rest of the country has a wide popular currency, reflected in cliches about colonial-minded Whites and proud Zulus/(Glaser, 1986 : 10).

6.2

Natal - A Distinctive Political Culture?

In cultural and political terms, English-speaking Natal was reluctantly integrated into the national framework. Having failed to win a federal constitution at the time of Union, regional distinctiveness was manifested in a fear of "Dutch" political domination at the national level and in a fiercely expressed loyalty to the British crown. These sentiments reached fever pitch in the 1920's with accession to power of the Pact government under Hertzog, and the move to create a new "clean" South African flag. The flag question itself became a national political issue and saw extensive mobilisation in Natal to preserve the Union Jack as a symbol of the imperial connection (Glaser, 1986 : 271).

In the 1930's and 1950's Natal's White voters found themselves in opposition to a nationalist-dominated government. In both instances a specifically Natal form of consciousness was invoked by local politicians. It was possible in the 1970's and 1980's to address English-speaking Whites in Natal within a discourse of regional distinctiveness, despite increasing integration into the national polity and the more or less total failure of "Natal politics". In time, English-speaking Natal's opposition to Republic and Afrikaner political hegemony was gradually appeased by the substitution of Afrikaner nationalism with the ideology of free enterprise and notions of total strategy as the new factors of cohesion in the ruling group.

The reinvention of a Natal consciousness in the present conjuncture, and its reworking to include Africans in its ambit, represent a loss of faith in the ability of the national ruling group to forge new alliances capable of stemming the mounting crisis. Whilst there exists this attempt to forge new alliances, the May 6, 1987 election showed a shift towards the right. Hence, in the final analysis, the extent to which a regional solution would be workable, is questionable.

With regard to African politics, there seems to be a regionally distinct political history which has formed the basis of a particular political culture. The Zulu monarchy was never really officially recognised; official recognition might have been held back, but at least for some (capitalist) interests in Natal the position of the King in the African society was less that of a threat than of a political and ideological ally. The first Inkatha movement brought together traditionalism, the aspiring African petty bourgeoisie and commercial agriculture (especially sugar, by far the largest economic sector at the time, producing by 1980, more than double the income from maize in Natal). The African petty bourgeoisie, represented by John Dube, hoped to benefit from the political power that a "Zulu nationalism" under the Zulu monarchy would give them, while sugar interests hoped that Solomon and the Natal chiefs would give them the control over labour that they needed to counter the drain to the Transvaal mines and industries which was a constant threat (Beall et al, 1986 : 12).

Dube, first president of the SANNC, was replaced in 1917. After that date and until his death in 1946, he created a regional base that stood in conflict with the national ANC. His Natal Native Congress left a legacy of tension that was only resolved with the election of Chief Albert Luthuli as president of the regional (1951) and then the National Congress (1952). Welsh (1970 : 228) commented that the Natal Congress: "as Dube's organisation ... remained a band of intellectuals and some enlightened chiefs ...".

As editor and founder of *Ilanga*, Dube was ideally placed to give effect to the other function of the 1920's Inkatha, namely to counter (rather than advance) working class interests. Solomon was being used by sugar interests, to counter the success that the ICU was having in Natal.

What is clear about this period is that it was not only at the administrative level that the position of "traditional" authority was being entrenched. It was also serving capitalist and aspiring capitalist interests to bolster the ideological position

of and ensure an official centrality for the Zulu king and chiefs. The 1927 Native Administration Act was a clear enough continuation of a Natal tradition in the rule over the local population (Beall et al, 1986 : 13ff).

It was really only after 1959 that the policy of ethnic fragmentation, rather than racial separation was pursued with great vigour.

The legacy of indirect rule and the subsequent policy of "retribalisation" after Union as well as the conscious use made of the Zulu monarchy by certain Natal interests go a long way towards explaining why there still is, in the 1980's, a Zulu king who can be used politically and a "tradition" of chieftainship which has served geographic fragmentation and political separation in the past and might well serve some sort of reintegration today.

However, retrospective and centrifugal forces were not the only ones at work. As with parliamentary politics and the economic interests of the capitalist class there were forces at work which were serving to unite the oppressed classes nationally. On the one hand, there was growing non-racial political solidarity which culminated in the Congress Alliance in the 1950's and on the other, the development of an organised labour movement (Webster, 1983 : 221-226).

Significant to Natal's participation in non-racial popular politics was the role played by the Indian population. During the early decades of the century Indians shared with Whites a tendency to look towards the Empire or Commonwealth for articulation or redress of their grievances. In many respects it was this access which enabled them to win for themselves a relatively more privileged status than Africans. However, they shared with the African population a position in the ranks of the racially oppressed. The conservative AI Kajee/Pather Group which dominated the NIC (Natal Indian Congress) was ousted by a new radical grouping in about 1946. Being part of the Congress Alliance, the NIC together with the TIC (Transvaal Indian Congress) conducted campaigns at a national level.

The increasingly militant nature of popular politics during the 1950's was accompanied by the politicisation of African trade unionism, particularly after the formation of the SACTU which formed part of the Congress Alliance. SACTU was particularly successful in organising in Natal despite difficult history for organised labour in the region. There were a number of factors which had militated against the development of a strong trade union movement in Natal. First and foremost was the need amongst Natal capitalists for a controlled labour force, be it indentured contract or "the infamous Durban system" of urban control which created another captive labour force housed in hostels and barracks and isolated from much of the urban dynamics in the region" (Sitas, 1984 : 12). Secondly, Natal employers were skilled at putting one group of workers against another, for example, migrants against urban dwellers or, more precisely, Indian workers against African workers (Marie, 1986).

The 1950's saw a growth in trade unionism which was not only due to organisation but a growth in worker militancy resulting from pressures on living standards in both the rural and urban areas. "Durban and Natal generally was to be the scene of SACTU's most outstanding organisational success. Generated by the upsurge in popular militancy arising from the Cato Manor Riots of June 1959, and encouraged by the enthusiasm for trade unionism of Chief Luthuli, 13 500 Natal workers joined SACTU affiliates that year and new local committees were formed in Pinetown, Ladysmith and Pietermaritzburg" (Lodge, 1983 : 192).

The 1960's saw the repression of all serious opposition to both capital and state which in turn, enabled the latter to forge ahead with its own plans for restructuring society. This involved the development of African administration along ethnic lines and tight control over urbanisation. The economic corollary of this were efforts to encourage industrial decentralisation. Despite incentives this did not have a great deal of appeal to many sections of secondary industry which were meeting the crisis of the collapse

of the reserve-based cheap labour system by becoming increasingly capital intensive in their operations.

There were a number of cases in Natal where this did not apply. For example, in the garment and textile industries which remained relatively labour intensive. The proximity of the reserves to the industrial complex of Durban-Pinetown and that of Pietermaritzburg meant that the latter were able to derive some of the benefits of border industries without the infrastructural expense and inconvenience experienced elsewhere. In this and other ways, patterns of accumulation and class struggle took a specific form in Natal. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1960's Natal had become tightly integrated into the national political economy in both economic and political terms.

The 1973 strikes had a number of implications for the region. Firstly, trade union organisation which was already underway, was given a boost. By the end of August 1975 there existed nationally twenty-five unions with an estimated membership of 66 000. The task of co-ordination and building of unity fell largely upon the Natal-based Trade Union Advisory and Co-ordinating Council (TUACC) which included the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) and the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU). It was the unions under the auspices of TUACC which became a major force behind the formation of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) in 1979. The organisational weight of FOSATU remained in Natal until the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in December 1985, when the balance shifted dramatically away from the region.

Relations between Inkatha and the popular organisations became increasingly strained. In 1979 an ongoing political contact between Inkatha and the ANC was severed. Tensions became overt in 1980 when Buthelezi came out against the activities of community and other popular organisations when he reacted against boycotting school-children. These tensions were confirmed by the ANC's attack on him for this.

The Lombard Plan, arose out of the regional specificity of Natal. With its suggestions of a "regional approach" and the "regionalisation of political and administrative decentralisation" (Beall et al, 1986 : 14) this was a compromise that would allow ethnically-based political representation, while at the same time allowing for recognition of the total interdependence that existed in Natal between the different racial and cultural groups. Of more direct relevance to its sponsors, it would allow the minimum disruption of sugar production, that is, in the nature of nearly all agricultural production, tied to a particular climatic region. The disruption could have arisen from the state's pursuit of a political policy that did not always make economic, and in this case, agricultural sense.

The Buthelezi Commission, announced in April 1980, explored the possibility of finding a way, within the overall framework of the Republic of South Africa, of developing a regional arrangement which might provide an alternative to the programmes to which the White political parties had become committed.

Both the Lombard and Buthelezi Commission Reports operated from the basis that there were sufficient regionally distinct elements in Natal to justify a specific solution which could then be duplicated elsewhere (a contradiction in itself). This distinctiveness, for their purposes, arose mainly from the ethnic/racial composition of the population (ignoring in the main the Indian population). It also took into particular account the economic interdependence of Natal and the spread of the KwaZulu fragments across the whole region, and the consequent necessity to rationalise administration and the provision of services, while minimising the risk of economic and political disruption.

All this at a time when labour was on the offensive, when popular political organisation was re-emerging and the State was making gestures towards reform through commissions of enquiry, and new regional alignment of forces was beginning to make itself felt.

Similarly the KwaNatal Indaba proposals in the late 1980's coincided with a massive upsurge of extra-parliamentary political activity. Calling for national self rule it has placed itself strategically, as opposition to the wider popular call for a unitary society based on one person, one vote. How the balance of forces are shifting remains to be seen. This study will address that question through an examination of the attitudes prevalent within the Durban population.

CHAPTER THREE

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

1. THE INDEPENDENT INDICATORS OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES

An analysis of the independent indicators of social attitudes is presented as part of the theoretical foundation of the interview schedule and the subsequent interpretation of the data.

1.1 Social attitudes and race

"Race refers to biological characteristics such as colour, physical build, body: hair and skull measurements. In contrast, "ethnicity" refers to cultural characteristics of diverse types" (Blalock, 1982 : 4). "Racism refers to discriminatory practices in which a socially constructed notion of "race" is implicated" (Rex and Mason, 1986 : 110).

The Markinor surveys of 1976 and November 1977 provide the first reliable indicators of some of the personal and attitudinal consequences of the unrest which occurred in 1976 and 1977. The Markinor surveys did not ask questions directly on the riots. However, when asked why relations between the races were getting worse, replies were given such as "Whites are killing Blacks" and "Whites deny us human rights" (Lever, 1978 : 205). Whilst a severe level of pessimism was not induced, young Africans in particular, were most resentful of the situation.

Besides Black attitudes in general, attitudes existing among the Black groupings should also be considered. The unity between Indians and Africans has never been particularly strong. As Beall et al (1986 : 19) maintain: "the unity which existed at the level of leadership did not always have resonance on the ground, as acutely evidenced by the 1949 riots". Social inequalities and competition play a significant part in fuelling the hostilities and differences in attitudes between the races.

Coloureds make up 1,4% of Natal's population. Whilst the Coloured population in the Cape Province can be seen as relatively militant, in Natal the Coloured population is much more conservative. In the IBR Special Report (Meer, 1985 : 79) it was indicated that in 1984 almost 70% of the Coloured population did not subscribe to any organisation, whether social or political. After 1985, there was a 14% increase in the support for organisations, paralleling a greater social consciousness.

1.2 Social attitudes and class (Occupation, Income and Education)

"In as much as the groups that demand a highly specific kind of access have evolved broad patterns of goals, identities and attitudes that differ greatly from those of the centre, they want, above all, to change the existing order to conform with their orientations" (Eisenstadt, 1971 : 61). The dimensions of collective identity are based on race and class factors.

Whilst Blacks lack access to central power, certain sectors have experienced some social mobility in the occupational structure giving rise to differences in social attitudes. Income increases among Blacks also indicate considerable upward social mobility. Whilst it does depict less continuing social mobility than does the occupational one, it does indicate upward mobility over time (Van der Merwe and Groenewald, 1976 : 260). To what extent does upward social mobility change or affect class consciousness?

In a study conducted by Goldthorpe and Lockwood (Haralambos, 1980 : 57-59), it was discovered that even though workers were becoming more affluent, they were not developing a middle class consciousness. Earlier, Engels (Haralambos, 1980 : 48-49) had written: "The workers speak other dialects, have other thoughts and ideals, other customs and moral principles, a different religion and other politics than those of the bourgeoisie. Thus, they are two radically dissimilar nations ..."

Contributing towards the definitions of various sub-cultures is the

level of education attained by people within the respective sub-cultures as was noted during a Markinor study (1977). Young and better educated individuals generally retain more radical beliefs than people from less-educated backgrounds. Prejudices also affect classes differently. AM Nzimande (1970 : 178) in: A Study of the Attitudes of Two Groups of the Zulu Tribe Toward the Indian, showed that the lower the educational attainment, the stronger the prejudices towards Indians amongst Africans. There was a steady rise in favourability of attitudes with rise in educational level.

Hence it is necessary to view occupational, income and educational differences as class components having varying effects on social attitude.

1.3 Social attitudes and gender

Since social change was defined as "long-term or short-term disintegrative or reconstructive processes" it includes then the disintegration of patriarchal structures and ideas which can be seen as retrogressive for a developing society. Hence, attitudes of men and women at this level become significant. There is not much available data on differences that might exist between the sexes in terms of their social attitudes. Nzimande (1970 : 134), in his study found that the influence of sex on the attitude of the Zulus towards the Indians was negligible.

In Britain research conducted by T Veness (1962), and Sue Sharpe (1973), indicate that young women of mainly working-class origin saw as their priorities in life: "love, marriage, husbands, children, jobs and careers", more or less in this order. The girls' attitudes towards work reflected their school experience and the general cultural definitions of women's roles. This realisation linked to Bradfield's assertion that: "for a majority of women, family and motherhood are more important than careers" (Chetty, 1983 : 45), and Cohen and Shorts assertion that: "By virtue of their roles, women reflect and adhere to the norms more closely than men" (Lever, 1978 : 253), leads to the belief that the social attitudes of women are more conservative than men.

In a study entitled: Maids and Madams, conducted by Jaclyn Cock in 1978 and 1979 in Albany and Bathurst, South Africa, it was found that almost a quarter (24%) of White women employers (of domestic servants) believed that women were generally inferior to men in their personal qualities. Seventy-five percent thought they were not inferior and one did not know. This contrasted with the views of the Black domestic servants in the sample, where only 16% thought that women were generally inferior to men in personal qualities (1980 : 157).

What these statistics indicate are differences among women of different races and a general conservativeness which may have some bearing on the social attitudes of women towards political processes.

1.4 Social attitudes and age

Fred Cottrell (1976 : 33) in Aging and the Aged maintains that the general view of older persons is that they are conservative. But traditional wisdom also says that as people are denied the opportunity to enjoy the good things about them, they are likely to become radical. Older people certainly have been constantly frustrated by new and more restrictive limitations imposed on what they can do, consume or enjoy. Many of the poorer older people have supported actions that are quite radical, while well to do older people often become reactionary.

A survey conducted by Feit and Stokes (Lever, 1978 : 131) directed at White Afrikaans speaking respondents, discovered that the younger age group with urban rather than rural origins manifested more liberal attitudes towards Black people. In the same way it is assumed that within the Black group older people have more traditionalist ideas towards development and change, whereas younger people exhibit a desire for rapid, more radical change.

Interviews conducted by Fredman et al (1983 : 101) showed that during the Soweto Riots parents became involved in political activity mainly through pressure exerted by their children.

The attitudes of the young are often in sharp contrast to those of many of the older generation, who have an overwhelming feeling that nothing can be done to improve their social condition. More than half (55%) of those interviewed by the A Bergstraesser Institute felt that they were personally powerless to bring about change. At the same time, 42% believed that as a group Blacks had no hope of achieving anything against White superiority (Fredman et al, 1983 : 103). Hence, the significance of age as an indicator of social attitude cannot be underestimated.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

How does one adopt Western theoretical formulations that predict specific types of change when interpreting South African empirical data? A complex social structure that exhibits varying and contradictory components can best be explained through the use of a framework that synthesizes relevant aspects of contradictory theories. Gerhard E Lenski showed that theories as contradictory as those of Marx and Mosca, or of Dahrendorf and Parsons, could be understood within a single, unified framework. Hence, Lenski's synthesis of the conflict and structuralist perspectives, within an evolutionary framework has been adopted.

Since Lenski's partial analysis focuses largely on the distributive and stratification system it will be complemented with further conservative and radical assumptions. The interaction between social structure, social movement and social change with the compounding influences in the development of social attitude will become evident.

Lenski developed a theory that purports to be a synthesis rather than a simple juxtaposition of conflict theory with functionalist analysis. It is evolutionary theory, according to Lenski, that can analyse structure as well as process without being limited to a narrow time span (Poloma, 1979 : 92). By using different approaches, Lenski integrates differing assumptions about the nature of people and the nature of society. Functionalism is based upon a conservative tradition that views stratification as being essential

to meeting the needs of society as a whole. Conflict theory, on the other hand, questions the existence of such "societal needs". It is more concerned with the needs, desires and interests of individuals and their sub-groups rather than of larger societies in their struggle for valued goods and services that are in short supply. Such differences reflect opposing assumptions about the nature of people (Poloma, 1979 : 92-93).

The basic assumptions that Lenski retains are as follows:

1. People are social beings who are required to live in society;
2. Human beings usually place their own or their groups interests before the interests of others;
3. Human beings have an insatiable appetite for the goods and services available in a society; and
4. Individuals are unequally endowed with an ability to engage in the struggle for these scarce goods and services (Lenski, 1966 : 30-32). As early evolutionists, such as Spencer showed, conflicting interests may be incorporated into an evolutionary framework (Lauer, 1982 : 63). For radical theorists, such as Marx, conflicting interests would polarise classes until existing social arrangements are transformed by revolution.

Lenski maintains: "In our discussion of the nature of man, it was postulated that where important decisions are involved, most human action is motivated either by self-interest or by partisan group interests. This suggests that power alone governs the distribution of rewards. This cannot be the case, however, since we also postulated that most of these essentially selfish interests can be satisfied only by the establishment of co-operative relations with others. Co-operation is absolutely essential both for survival and for the efficient attainment of most other goals. In other words, men's selfish interests compel them to remain members of society and to share in the division of labour" (Lenski, 1966 : 44-45).

Lenski hypothesizes that power and need are the two principles that govern stratification systems. The more complex the society, the

more important power becomes in the allocation of available resources. He proceeds to discuss the phenomenon of power in more technologically advanced societies. Although the use of force or coercion is the: "most effective instrument for seizing power in society" and: "remains the foundation of any system of inequity" (Lenski, 1966 : 51), force is not the most effective means of retaining a power position once it has been secured. At this point, the importance of creating and maintaining an institutional or structural base of operation becomes apparent. In order for the new rule to become legitimised, the rule of might must be transformed into a rule of right. This implies that force must be replaced by institutionalised power that is both socially acceptable and much less personal. With similar concerns about rule by force, Spencer (Timasheff and Theodorson, 1976 : 37-41) maintained that individuals submit to legitimate government and resist actively what is perceived as illegitimate forms of government.

Lenski (1966 : 59) maintained that there is a circulation of political power between periods of coercive rule, or "the rule of might" and periods of institutional rule, or "the rule of right". The rule of might is characterised by a forcible seizure of power by a new elite, which involves an initial phase of violence. During this repressive phase, the organised resistance is either destroyed or suppressed.

The second phase is one in which the regime strives to reduce its dependence on naked force and to increase its legitimate authority. The trend at this time is toward constitutionalism, or the rule of right. Unless there is a steady succession of challenges against the reigning power elite, the long-term trend involves a reduction in the active role of force and coercion and an increase in the role of persuasion and incentive. At some time, this constitutional rule of right is again challenged by force and the cycle begins again.

In racial and ethnic terms, power contests can be seen between the dominant and subordinate racial groups. This is true even though these relationships may appear to be smooth running and free of

overt conflict. Whenever power is unevenly distributed among racial groups, as is the case in South Africa, the minorities that are excluded from the socio-political processes, have had to accommodate themselves. It must therefore be recognised that power considerations are not linked in a simple fashion to the issue of whether or not there is overt conflict between two groups. Conflict seems more likely whenever two groups are approximately evenly matched rather than in situations in which one group obviously dominates the other (Blalock, 1982 : 101).

Lenski admits that the duration, the economic situation and the ideological nature of the political cycles vary greatly and cautions that the differences between political cycles should not be minimised.

Social movements at each point are constituted by gradual and pervasive changes in the values of people - changes which can be called cultural drifts. Such cultural drifts stand for a general shifting in the ideas of people, particularly along the line of the conceptions which people have themselves, and of their rights and privileges. Over a period of time many people may develop a new view of what they believe they are entitled to - a view made up of desires and hopes. It could signify the emergence of a new set of values, which influence people in the way in which they look upon their own lives (McLaughlin, 1969 : 9).

Despite substantial movement toward the democratic ideal, political inequality is still a basic fact of life in all advanced industrial societies, and political resources are the basis of one of the more important, but neglected, class systems. Where an individual stands with respect to such resources can have a decisive influence on his chances of obtaining many of the things he desires most: "Though political status is obviously more important for an individual in a totalitarian nation than in a democratic nation it is not without considerable influence in both" (Lenski, 1966 : 327). Lenski does not refer specifically to the changes brought about through modernisation or structural dislocations.

Yet, political organisations are weakened, and broader based and oriented political activities and organisations are enhanced by the major structural aspects and dimensions of modernisation: economic development and differentiation, urbanisation and social mobility, the concomitant development of new occupational groups, and the structural dislocation of old and new groups on the one hand and - above all - their impingement on the centre on the other. The development of new groups and their economic and social dislocations need not change their basic stratification orientations, but it may give rise to new and broader political ideologies and organisations. It may also be connected with keener perception of differentiations within the social order in terms of developed - underdeveloped and the equating of this dichotomy with class conflicts (Paulus, 1980 : 75).

At the same time, however, there is a natural tendency for those who seize power by force to strive to rule by constitutional means, so far as circumstances permit. Yet in the end, every regime is destroyed by force or threat of it. This is the basic theme on which there are a thousand variations (Lenski, 1966 : 61). One of the chief determinants of the social structure for the duration of human history, according to Lenski (1975 : 147) was the environmental barriers to human activity and technological development, specifically environments that impeded the flow of information from other societies.

This bears a close resemblance to Parson's distinction between the processes productive of structural stability and those productive of structural change: "The structure of a system and its environment must be distinguished from processes within the system and in interchange between the system and its environment. But processes which maintain the stability of a system, internally both through structure and process, and in interchange between the system and its environment i.e. states of equilibrium, must be distinguished from processes by which this balance between structure and more elementary processes are altered in such a way as to lead to a new and different state of the system, a state which must be described in terms of an alteration of its previous structure" (Parsons, 1964 : 85).

Within powerless groups, the notion "charismatic authority" is extremely important. For Weber, the term "charisma" applies: "... to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities" (Buckley, 1967 : 58). Such qualities attract disciples who are devoted to the charismatic leader personally and who commit themselves to the normative or moral order that he or she claims to represent. Previous contact as well affects the degree of trust and the extent to which the groups can combine and mobilise themselves effectively (Blalock, 1982 : 110). "The influence of variations in the personal attributes of political leaders also seem to have its greatest impact in the more advanced societies, especially when constitutionalism is at low ebb. In modern industrial societies, political leaders have immense powers available to them, particularly in periods of crisis" (Lenski, 1966 : 107).

In complex industrial societies, a single individual may be a member of any number of classes. Class membership must be seen as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. It is thus important to note that class is a more complex phenomenon in modern industrial society, where individuals are simultaneously members of a number of classes, each with varying power potential. Despite various rankings within as well as among classes, members of a particular class stand in a similar position with regard to interests and in opposition to classes who do not share these interests (Poloma, 1979 : 96). These interests dictate a particular form of consciousness. Durkheim maintained that the collective conscience which dictates consciousness was an outcome of human association and the cultivation of interests (Haralambos, 1980 : 238). It was consciousness rather than political intervention that, for Comte, could bring about fundamental progress (Fletcher, 1971 : 50-52). For Marx, opposing class interests once realised, shatter false consciousness and instil a revolutionary consciousness (Tucker, 1978 : 520).

Whilst consciousness plays a crucial role, it is the distributive system and the consequent inequality of the prevailing economic

system that is central to Lenski's analysis. Lenski (1966 : 85) maintains that the degree of inequality in distributive systems will vary directly with the size of a society's surplus. Some modification of this general pattern could emerge, however, when conditions permit persons who individually lack power to combine and organise, and thus to develop a collective counterbalance to those with greater individual power. Such developments seem most probable in democratic nations with an egalitarian or socialist ideology.

A second important property of distributive systems is their rate of vertical mobility. Here, too, the same methodological problems arise. However, the possibility of rough but meaningful comparisons seem possible, especially if appropriate qualifications are made for significant variations between class systems and between inter- and-intra generational mobility.

On an ad-hoc basis, one might predict that they will tend to vary directly with the rate of technological and social change. Such change should lead to changes in the bases of power and, in a period of flux, traditional means of transmitting and retaining power should prove somewhat less effective than in periods of relative stability.

The degree of class hostility is a third variable feature of distributive systems. Lenski (1966 : 74-75) defines class as: "an aggregation of persons in a society who stand in a similar position with respect to force or some specific form of institutionalised power, privilege or prestige". Class, for Lenski, is power class. On the degree of class hostility, the same methodological problems and possibilities that apply to the first two variables apply here as well.

Here, too, there is no basis for predicting systematic variations, but again an ad hoc hypothesis suggests itself. If, as suggested earlier, the lack of opportunities for upward mobility is one of the sources of class hostility, one would predict that the degree

of class hostility will tend to vary inversely with the rate of upward mobility. Since the rate of upward mobility is assumed to be only one among several factors contributing to class hostility, we should not expect a strong relationship (Lenski, 1966 : 85-86).

There are other properties of distributive systems which might also be used as bases for comparison, as for example, the degree of their complexity, institutionalisation and so forth.

Lenski found that because hunting and gathering societies have little surplus of goods and resources, the stratification system is not contingent on such a surplus. The survival of the group requires co-operation in allocating what is available, meeting minimal survival needs for individuals in the society. There is still a stratification system in operation - one that is based on prestige and honour. Simple horticultural societies are much like hunting and gathering societies in their absence of a surplus that would enable the development of more defined social classes. With improvement in gardening techniques come surplus in advanced horticultural societies and the development of a separate political system. Here we see the beginnings of a class system based upon birth rather than primarily upon achieved contributions to the group.

Agrarian societies mark another important stage in human history, made possible through the intervention of the plow and the harnessing of animal energy. Lenski points out that the advances in productive technology: "were matched by advances in military technology" (Lenski, 1966 : 193). In these situations techniques of waging war become more and more efficient. Here we see the emergence of a military class that takes its position alongside the political class. Other classes are also added to the hierarchy in agrarian societies, including foreign ethnics (from wars waged) merchants (because of the improvement in transportation of goods), and urban dwellers, including the governing class, who are able to live off the surplus produced by the agrarian peasants. This social type is characterised by a rigidly stratified society with much reliance upon heredity as a basis for class.

Industrial societies represent the next stage in the evolutionary development of the stratification system. Lenski (1966 : 321) notes that here: "The raw materials used are far more diversified, the sources of energy quite different, and the tools far more complex and efficient". There is both a great increase in consumption of goods and a great increase in their production. Lenski proposes that partly because of the great ability to produce, making desired goods less scarce, inequities in advanced industrial societies may be showing signs of abating. He observes (1966 : 308): "The appearance of mature industrial societies marks the first significant reversal of the age-old evolutionary trend towards ever increasing inequality". The relationship of inequality to the social structure appears to be a curvilinear one that increases in advanced horticultural and agrarian societies and shows some decrease in highly developed industrial societies. At the same time, however, Lenski leans towards the conservative position that given the nature of man, inequalities will always exist in societies.

Lenski (Poloma, 1979 : 100-101) maintains that: "The most basic characteristics of distributive systems appear to be shaped by the interaction of those constant elements in the human situation". One might add that technology, social structure and social movements influence social organisational factors whose variation is greatly influenced by prior variations in technology. Collective action within this context becomes a complex phenomenon.

Lenski (1966 : 417) maintains that when opportunities for individual mobility are insufficient, people often resort to collective action as a means of obtaining the rewards they seek, thus generating class struggles. These are much more common in industrial societies than in agrarian and probably for the reason that Marx suggested more than a century ago: these new societies provide unparalleled opportunities for communication among the less powerful, and less privileged segments of society.

Lenski's propositions are directly dependent on his assumptions about people and society. These assumed traits are constants that

have not changed during human history. Lenski depends upon the degree of technology. The theory tends in the conservative direction in analysing societies with little or no economic surplus. In societies in which the surplus is more substantial, the radical position of coercions' role in maintaining the stratification system is emphasised (Lenski, 1966 : 441). Thus Lenski asserts that his theory can be said to be neither conservative nor radical, functionalist nor conflict-orientated, but an integration of two opposing theoretical perspectives, relying on an evolutionary framework in tracing the development of society.

Sahlins and Service (Hoogvelt, 1978 : 13) suggest that evolutionary advanced societies:

1. have embodied more varied and more effective means of exploiting the energy resources of a greater variety of environments. Such effective means of exploiting the greater energy resources of more variegated environments means that
2. these societies are relatively more free from environmental control, that is they can adapt to a greater environmental variety than less advanced types. As a consequence, they
3. tend to dominate and replace less advanced types.

Sahlins (Appelbaum, 1970 : 57) maintained that adaptation to specific conditions, including the previous cultural heritage of a society, results in tremendous cultural diversity among societies. "New cultural traits arising through adaptation can be considered adapted advantages" (Appelbaum, 1970 : 57). Unlike specific biological evolution, specific cultural evolution allows for the possibility of transmitting variation through diffusion. "Separate cultural traditions unlike separate biological lineages, may converge by coalescence" (Appelbaum, 1970 : 57). Furthermore, cultures may borrow wholesale the achievements of other cultures without recapitulating all the stages of development. Thus, specific evolution provides a link to understanding seemingly

discontinuous progress in the general evolution to higher forms. Specific evolution: "is the phylogenic ramifying, historic passage of a culture along its many lines, the adaptive modification of particular cultures" (Appelbaum, 1970 : 58). Similarly, Lenski maintains that technologies slowly fashioned to enhance human heritage is a chief determinant of the social structure for the duration of human history.

Sahlins and Service (Hoogvelt, 1978 : 18) maintain as well that diffusion occurs mostly under the wings of dominance. The law of cultural dominance merely states that each successive higher culture type because of its greater adaptability tends, at the expense of lower types, to spread further and faster than previous types. Western culture is spreading its dominance - the trend is towards greater convergence and consequent homogeneity of culture types accompanied by a decrease in the diversity of cultures.

Under the wings of dominance as well, competition for scarce resources takes place - not only between individuals and classes but also among class systems (Poloma, 1979 : 97ff). Lenski cites the illustration of efforts to equalize educational opportunities, which would increase the importance of the educational class system while decreasing the importance of the racial and sexual class system. Employers then, are forced to use educational qualifications in hiring more than racial or sexual class system membership.

Lenski maintains that many, though not all, of the more advanced industrial nations of the world contain serious racial, ethnic or religious cleavages. So long as such groupings are irrelevant to the distributive process, they cannot be considered classes or status groups. When, however, membership in them begins to have an appreciable influence on access to important rewards, then it becomes impossible to treat them otherwise. To call such groups classes does not mean that they are only classes, or even that they are identical with other kinds of classes. It does mean, however, that they are groups of people who stand in a common position with respect to some attribute which functions as a resource in the productive and

distributive process - in this instance, race. Significantly, Lenski notes that the struggle to reduce inequality has often had the effect of increasing racial identity (Lenski, 1966 : 389-395).

In agrarian societies, power, privilege and prestige of almost every woman was determined by the status of the man on whom she was dependent and her relation to him. With industrialisation, the situation of women has changed rapidly, and it is no longer feasible to view them as merely dependents of some male. With industrialisation the number of opportunities outside the traditional roles of wife, daughter, or dependent kinswomen have been greatly increased. In short, the traditional barriers which long separated the female stratification from the male, and kept the former dependent on the latter, are clearly crumbling. Hence, in analysis of advanced industrial societies it is impossible to ignore, or treat as obvious, the role of sex in the distributive process. Furthermore, Lenski maintains that some of the most dramatic indicators of change is the extent to which women occupy positions in areas previously the private domain of men (Lenski, 1966 : 402-404).

Another illustration of the struggle between class systems may be seen in totalitarian countries, where political class-system membership is increased at the expense of other systems, particularly the property class system. Privilege and prestige are given to high status party members rather than, as in capitalist systems, to those who own the most property. The shifting of the elite thus, results in individuals continuing to experience deprivation due to the usurpation of power and the competitive nature of the distributive system.

For the deprived in particular, organisations take on a significant role. The broad perceptions of the organisations indicate the extent of political awareness of elements facilitating the transformation of the stratification system. Ward (Bierstedt, 1981 : 52) in this regard believed that people are moved by the power of sentiment, not intellect, and that the religious sentiment is the most powerful of all. Political sentiment is also crucial. The

extent and potential of active mobilisation is discussed to a limited extent by Lenski. Not accepting the spontaneity of worker uprising as fundamental, Lenin (McLellan, 1979 : 89) emphasised the role of the party in directing social behaviour.

It has already been maintained that Lenski accepts a view of people as self-seeking. This assumption is consistent with that advanced by functionalism. It may be demonstrated by the theory of stratification presented by Davis and Moore in which egoistic, self-seeking natures are controlled by the institutional structure of society. Lenski (1966 : 26) supports this assertion by pointing out that research reveals the human infant as an extremely self-centred creature who is motivated entirely by a desire to satisfy his/her own needs and desires. As children become socialised into the world of other people, they learn the norms of the group. The inculcation of the norms of the group, leads to a commitment towards the distributive and institutional structure.

On the political commitment of the population, Lenski (1966 : 54) maintains: "Though the majority may become politically active in a significant way for a brief time in a revolutionary era, the necessity of securing a livelihood quickly drives most from the political arena. The affairs of state in any civilised society, and in many that are not, are directed by a small minority. The majority are apolitical. Even in popular democracies the vast majority do no more than cast a ballot at infrequent intervals. The formulation of public policy and the various other tasks required by the system are left in the hands of a tiny minority. This greatly facilitates the task of a new regime as it seeks to make the transition from the rule of might into the rule of right".

Lenski acknowledges that altruistic action is possible but believes that it is extremely infrequent at the level of major social decisions. We could infer that Lenski's human being is rarely free and voluntary but rather is usually determined by his/her innately self-seeking nature, which is somewhat curbed by the norms of the

social structure. The curbing of the individual can lead to the estrangement or alienation of the self. The nature of the distributive system also creates barriers between different interest groups.

Furthermore, society as a social system translates beliefs and cognitions about ultimate reality into cultural values underpinning its social order and orientating peoples' behaviour in the physical world. This has implications for the theory of evolution. It means that we must focus on the cultural system in order to detect fundamental sources of general societal evolution. Since evolutionary advance is associated with the development of technology and the nature of the distributive system we can expect the progressive differentiation of the cultural system to be a significant indicator of evolutionary social change.

2.1 Influences on the formation of attitude

The following is a summary of the influences on the formation of attitude, derived from the theoretical discussion:

2.1.1 Conflicting social interests

Lenski's synthesis attempts to explain the operation of social classes. Competitive group and individual interests are curbed by the institutional structure. Are individualistic group interests being curbed by institutions?

2.1.2 Perceived legitimacy

In order to be perceived as legitimate the existing rule must be seen as the rule of right. To what extent is force being replaced by institutionalised power that is socially acceptable?

2.1.3 Experienced repression

The rule of might is characterised by a number of phases. During particular repressive phases organised resistance is either destroyed or suppressed. How widespread is repression experienced?



2.1.4 Exclusion from socio-political processes

When power is unevenly distributed among racial groups the minorities that are excluded from the socio-political processes will have to accommodate themselves. To what extent have people accommodated themselves to exclusion?

2.1.5 Interchanges with the environment

The structure of a system and its environment must be distinguished from processes within the system and in interchange between the system and its environment. To what extent do environmental interchanges affect social attitudes?

2.1.6 Consciousness

Members of a particular class stand in a similar position with regard to interests and in opposition to classes who do not share these interests. Consciousness is an outcome of human association. To what extent is consciousness fundamentally determined by race, class and sex?

2.1.7 Collective action

When opportunities for individual mobility are insufficient, people often resort to collective action as a means of obtaining the rewards they seek, thus generating class struggles. Do people believe that collective action facilitates changes?

2.1.8 Gradual adaptation

Adaptation to specific conditions, results in tremendous cultural diversity among societies. To what extent have people adapted to their segregated existences?

2.1.9 Diffusion under dominance

Each successive higher culture type because of its greater adaptability, tends, at the expense of lower types to spread further and faster than previous types. To what extent is western culture extending its dominance and influencing attitudes of minorities? To what extent has there been a diffusion of ruling class ideas?

2.1.10 Deprivation

Groups of individuals experience deprivation of privilege and prestige due to their position in the distributive system. The extent to which deprivation is experienced by particular classes and class systems will need to be addressed.

2.1.11 Political exposure

The perceptions of the organisations and structures indicate political awareness of elements facilitating transformation of the stratification system. What is the extent of political exposure at this particular moment?

2.1.12 Commitment

The inculcation of the norms of the group leads to a commitment to the institutional structure. Are people committed to the existing social structures or does socio-political apathy exist?

2.1.13 Alienation

The self-seeking nature of people and curbing by the norms of the social structure can lead to alienation. To what extent do people experience alienation?

2.1.14 Influential contact

In modern industrial societies, political leaders have immense powers available to them, particularly in periods of crisis. Is leadership visible? What of political organisations?

2.1.15 Culture

The cultural system will allow detection of the major sources of general societal evolution. Though not synonymous, the different races exhibit different cultural orientations. To what extent does culture affect attitude?

2.2 The theoretical analytical framework

An analytical scheme is presented which takes into account the points and questions summarised from previous discussions of theories.

The indicators of social attitudes will be used extensively; however, age will not exert as strong an influence as the remaining three indicators. Age would affect the favourability towards particular methods of change but would not rate as a fundamental indicator of social attitude. Furthermore, of the remaining three indicators, the significance of gender, whilst it is brought into play, is not emphasised as often as the relationship between race and class. This is not to undermine gender as an instrumental indicator but to take cognisance of the fact that theory on the inextricable relationship between race, class and sex has not advanced far enough within the field of social change.


2.3 The resource mobilisation theory

The role of organisations located within a broad mass social movement will be emphasized. The resource mobilisation theory explains the emergence and development of social movements in terms of the resources available to the discontented groups. The assumption here is that whilst there is possibly always enough discontent on the grassroots level of a society for the formation of a social movement, the deciding factor is whether there are leaders present to organise effectively and whether these leaders have power and resources to mobilise followers (Goodman and Marx, 1978 : 276).

The final interpretation of the data will be done with reference to Model 6.

MODEL 6

THE THEORETICAL ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK



CHAPTER FOUR

METHODS USED FOR GATHERING EMPIRICAL DATA

1. A REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE

An extensive literature survey was conducted at the initial stage of the study. Information was collated from sources at different universities and research institutes. Reviewing attitudes discovered in past studies was a necessary procedure for the researcher since it provided guidelines for the construction of the theoretical framework and for the interview schedule. The literature survey as the first stage of the research process was essential as a link between the theory and the empirical research facets of the study.

2. CONSULTATION WITH AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Since South Africa's political environment is so dynamic, it is small wonder that many individuals and organisations are now studying attitudes and social change. The problem is that many of the research findings contradict and negate each other. This is probably because of:

1. the origins of the institutes through which they are conducted eg. CASS (Centre for Applied Social Sciences) and IBR (Institute for Black Research); and
2. the position from which they are articulated, eg., whether they are state-supportive or anti-system in nature.

Thus, discussions with researchers, academics, community workers and activists, were imperative in order to gain clearer insights into how the schedule should be constructed and what the contemporary socio-political issues within the communities are. Further discussions were held with political, civic, church and youth groups. Some discussions were held with members of the community in a relatively, unstructured manner. This type of consultation contributed directly to the structuring of the questionnaire.

3. THE METHOD OF EMPIRICAL DATA COLLECTION

The intention of the study is to compare the attitudes of different Black communities towards strategies for social change. The social survey was regarded as the most appropriate method to collect empirical data because it lends itself to large scale applications, it is reasonably controllable and it is compatible with representative sampling. The question of "equivalence of meaning" as it pertains to cross-societal or cross-community research is raised by Marsh (1967 : 271). Marsh points out that using identical formal procedures to compare different societies may produce functionally non-equivalent meanings and results. Since the survey was conducted in the English and Zulu languages, the question of whether equivalence in meaning would result had to be contended with. The author attempted to resolve possible misunderstandings by:

1. having the Zulu translations checked by individuals in the Department of Zulu, University of Durban-Westville, who pointed out contradictions and ambiguities in meaning;
2. by determining the questions of the survey from an understanding of observable characteristics of all three communities and by counter-checking with all available material at hand the relevance of the particular questions to the required data; and
3. by examining the results of the pilot study to see whether differences observed would be as a result of ambiguities in meaning.

There are three types of surveys available, namely, the:

1. objective survey;
2. descriptive survey; and
3. projective survey (Davis, 1971 : 80).

Since descriptive surveys are not intended to discover causal relationships but rather aim to describe phenomena in detail, they present questions allowing respondents to answer freely in their own words (Simon, 1978 : 192; Davis, 1971 : 80). Projective

surveys present abstract situations requiring the respondent to analyse and comment on them. The objective survey was preferred since it presents a question and a choice of answers in such a way that respondents merely mark the answer that is their choice. A survey structured in this manner facilitates comparison of the different communities as well as the interpretation of the data.

The survey used the interview schedule as a data gathering technique. Although the cost in terms of money and time is high, this was seen as the most useful technique since the questions in the schedule required substantial explanation and constant probing which would have been difficult with the use of any other technique. Furthermore, within face-to-face situations the researcher and other fieldworkers were able to cross-check information about social class, income, age and other specific information that may have been prone to exaggeration. The other techniques that were not seen as suitable were:

1. the mailed questionnaire; and
2. telephonic interviewing.

The mailed questionnaire, whilst cheaper, always poses the difficulty of obtaining a reasonable random sample size. It was envisaged that because of the socio-political nature of the interview schedule, the "silent majority" would then not respond but only individuals with strong beliefs, thus providing a biased result. The telephone interview was seen as unsuitable specifically because many Black people, towards whom the survey was directed, do not have telephones (Simon, 1978 : 193; Bailey, 1982 : 15).

The interview schedule was divided into four parts:

- Part 1 : This comprised questions 1 to 8 and gathered biographical data on the respondents.
- Part 2 : This comprised questions 9 to 11 and gathered data on organisational awareness and support.

- Part 3 : This comprised statements 12 to 17 and gathered data on socio-political consciousness.
- Part 4 : This comprised statements 18 to 67 and gathered data on attitudes towards strategies and beliefs about the contemporary situation in South Africa.

4. DETERMINANTS OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES

The way in which the determinants of social attitudes towards strategies for social change are related to the items in the questionnaire can be briefly indicated.

4.1 Culture

The entire study itself presupposes the existence of different cultural groupings by comparing Africans, Indians and Coloureds. Thus, all questions in the schedule serve as reflections of these categories. However, more specific consideration has been given to this determinant. Statement 31 was included to test how complex the South African social situation is perceived to be. Statement 29 was included to test community consciousness and to view peoples' understanding of broad community responses. Statement 55 was designed to question whether people thought it necessary to develop their own culture within their own communities. Question 2, by delineating area, suggested the cultural background of the groups involved.

4.2 Influential contact

In Chapters Two and Three it is maintained that the initial contact between the colonizers and the indigenous people was one of dominance and subjugation. The social-psychological effects of this domination have affected Black perceptions of themselves and their relationships to one another. Statement 13 examines the extent to which people identify themselves as having suffered under apartheid. Statement 14 examines the extent to which Blacks perceive themselves as inferior. Statement 9 tests organisational awareness and, most importantly, organisational support. Statements 9 and 10 test organisational support and the belief in the progressiveness of certain organisations

capable of affecting change in the country. Statement 11 tests charismatic leadership.

4.3 Political exposure

Statements 9, 10, 11 and 12 would reflect the extent to which people are politically and socially aware. Statements 26 and 27 are useful indicators of people's faith in information received via the mass media. In line with the materialist framework upon which the theoretical formulations rest, the extent to which people perceive their interests as antagonistic to that of the ruling class is examined. Statements 18 to 66, all examine socio-political attitudes, thus reflecting this perception. Statement 67, in particular, looks at the extent to which communication between different groups take place.

4.4 Conflicting social interests

Questions 6, 7 and 8 are important indicators of the social status of Black people. The occupation, income and educational level of a person is a clear indicator of that person's social position/status within the community, and in society at large. Statements 32, 33 and 56 refer to "power-sharing" that has occurred and aims to test responses to this situation. Statements 50, 51 and 52 are aimed at testing whether peoples' allegiances are closer to the trade unions or to political organisations.

4.5 Exclusion from socio-political processes

Statement 12 examines whether people who are frustrated and alienated because of the social situation in this country and who can afford it are considering leaving the country.

Statements 15, 16 and 17 examine the extent to which people resent being disenfranchised and discriminated against. Responses in the previous section on conflicting social interests would provide some insight into whether partial inclusion of two race groups into the socio-political processes was perceived as unifying or destructive to unity. Statement 24 questions whether united action or collective

behaviour can be viewed as a means to overcome exclusion. Statement 41 addresses the question of one person-one vote and through the responses here, an indication of whether or not people view the present structure as perpetuating exclusion becomes evident.

4.6 Experienced repression

The repression that people may experience both psychologically and physically will inevitably shape their responses and beliefs. Since this study is being conducted under the state of emergency, precautions are taken to ensure that the responses are true reflections of peoples attitudes. This will be elaborated on at a later stage. Here it is noted that three questions refer specifically to this situation, namely, Statements 20, 21 and 30. Statement 20 questions whether people believe that they would invite difficulties merely by talking about their positions. Statement 21 defines a broader position on detentions. Statement 30 questions whether people feel that the socio-political situation has been aggravated to such an extent that it could lead to violent revolution.

4.7 Collective action

4.7.1 Resistance

Three types of resistance are broadly defined: Collaborative opposition, evolutionary resistance and revolutionary resistance. Statements 34, 46 and 57 refer to the first. Statements 48, 49 and 61 refer to the second, whilst 53 and 65 refer to the third. These are historical responses that shape perceptions and provide guidelines for what action is possible and desirable in the future.

4.7.2 Mass pressure

Here, biological and physical factors, dictate, in part, the pace of change. Statement 22 addresses this issue. Statement 24 addresses the utility of collective action.

4.8 Perceived legitimacy

Statement 18 questions whether the present government can create acceptable reforms. Statement 25 assesses the peoples' perceptions of governmental reform, whilst Statement 19 probes whether Black people perceive fundamental changes coming about with a change in White government. Statements 35, 57 and 58 question whether government position on the issue of the SADF cross border raids, the present structure of the tricameral parliament and the question of conditions of negotiations, are viewed as legitimate.

4.9 Commitment

Statement 23 questions apathetic responses to change. The extent to which certain race groups are more content with the existing social situation has been assessed through comparative analysis. The commitment to change possessed by individuals and groups shapes the socio-political thinking and behaviour alike. Historically, people have viewed political organisations and in more industrialised nations, trade unions, as being vehicles for change. The extent to which people view these as effective organisations will be the extent to which they will commit themselves to supporting these organisations. Statements 51 and 52 measure peoples perceptions of the organisations' effectiveness.

4.10 Interchanges with the environment

To avoid pressure existing within the country, some people are considering leaving the country. Statement 12 examines the extent to which Black people are considering leaving the country. Statement 37 exposes an internal formation of attitude in response to an external, international belief. Statements 39 and 40 examine the effects and understanding of the effects of disinvestment.

Statement 47 looks at Natal's relationship with the rest of the country. The extent to which people within Natal view Natal as being in a position to resolve its problems by itself is questioned. Hence, the notion of the "cultural distinctiveness" of Natal is examined.

4.11 Consciousness

The extent to which people can offer views that they believe are similar to those of their communities, would indicate the community consciousness that exists. Statement 29 examines the extent to which people believe the tricameral parliament is supported/not supported by the broader community. Statements 36, 38 and 43 further test this consciousness - the extent to which people can offer positive or negative responses will be the extent to which they believe that they understand the community. Statement 64 tests more directly the political consciousness of the individuals concerned; if they have clarified a political position then they will be able to respond positively or negatively.

4.12 Diffusion under dominance

Statements 31, 33 and 41 question whether individuals have inculcated dominant thinking on political behaviour, ie., whether they support the dominant groups' evolved institutions or whether they subscribe to more universalistic demands. Statement 66 examines whether despite rejection of many of the institutional structures, people still have faith in government commissions of inquiry. The extent to which Black people view outlawed organisations or advocates of rapid change, in the same way that the White electorate does, will be established by Statements 42 and 44.

4.13 Alienation

Statement 67 examines the extent to which Black people communicate and interact with each other. Living segregated lives created alienation and misperceptions of different experiences of the various communities. Linked to this are the different community responses to Statement 54. What attitudes do African peoples have towards Bantustan independence? Do Indian and Coloured people subscribe to similar attitudes? If not, are those differences a result of racial alienation? In a Marxian sense, once alienation is accentuated, the hardships posed by capitalism as an economic system becomes increasingly evident. Statement 62 tests this consciousness with Statement 63 questioning whether socialism would be perceived as an alternative.

4.14 Gradual adaptation

The extent to which people have adapted to constraints within the South African environment will be measured by Statements 20 and 21. Statement 28 tests whether, despite the violence and unrest, Black people still believe that we may gradually evolve into an acceptable, democratic system through peaceful means. For those individuals who have adapted to the South African situation, criticisms of the government arise through lack of understanding of a concrete, complex reality. Statement 31 tests this attitude whilst Statement 45 examines the extent to which all existing organisations within the country are viewed as being legitimate and representative enough to constitute a National Convention.

4.15 Deprivation

Deprivation shapes, subdues and nourishes attitudes, particularly those of a socio-political nature. Whilst Black people have historically endured constraints entrenched within a racially stratified society, to what extent do Black people perceive the system as being unjust? Statement 13 thus, questions at a basic level, the extent of deprivation perceived. The leadership of prominent Black political organisations have emanated from the universities and local schools. Boycotts of Black tertiary institutions by students in response to broader socio-political situations have become regular occurrences in South Africa. To what extent are these protest actions the consequences of deprivation, and is this particular tactic understood by the community. Statement 59 addresses this issue. Statement 60 questions more directly the issue of frustration at the denial of political rights.

5. SOCIO-POLITICAL STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE

The schedule also distinguishes between intra-parliamentary and extra-parliamentary responses as means toward social change.

This is related to items in the schedule as follows:

5.1 Intra-Parliamentary evolutionary responses

- (i) Existing parliamentary structures accepted:
17.3; 32; 33; 29; 56
- (ii) Existing social structures accepted:
17.2; 62; 63
- (iii) Legislation accepted:
17.1; 21; 44
- (iv) Military defence of existing structures:
35; 36
- (v) Commissions of inquiry as means to change:
66

5.2 Extra-Parliamentary evolutionary responses

- (i) Self-interested collaboration:
18; 31; 54
- (ii) Collaborative opposition:
34; 46; 57
- (iii) Non-collaboration:
12; 24; 64
- (iv) Trade union action:
49; 50; 52
- (v) Economic measures:
39; 40
- (vi) Independent political structures:
45; 47

(vii) Negotiated change:

42; 43; 58

5.3 Extra-parliamentary revolutionary response

(i) Conflict based change:

38; 53; 65

6. SCORING OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The statements on all the indicators were listed in schedule items 13 to 66 and respondents were asked to choose among five response categories for each item. The scale used in these items is the Likert scale. The essence of the Likert technique is to increase the variation in the possible scores, by coding from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" (Bailey, 1982 : 365). A scale is computed for each respondent. If person A makes a very high score and person B a very low score, then the age, sex, race and class of the person can be considered to explain the differences. Further, their answers to all questions can be compared to see if there is any single question that the persons with the two very evident scores answered identically.

Within the context of extra-parliamentary evolutionary change, positive statements indicating a high level of agreement to such a strategy for change can be illustrated as follows:

Passive resistance by the communities
gives rise to significant change

Strongly Agree.....	5
Agree	4
Undecided	3
Disagree	2
Strongly Disagree	1

Within the context of extra-parliamentary revolutionary change, negative statements indicating a high level of disagreement to such a strategy for change can be illustrated as follows:

Armed struggle should not be used to bring about change

- Strongly Agree..... 1
- Agree 2
- Undecided 3
- Disagree 4
- Strongly Disagree 5

Within the context of intra-parliamentary evolutionary change, positive statements indicating a high level of agreement to such a strategy of change can be illustrated as follows:

The reform programme initiated by the government should be supported since it is moving us in the right direction

- Strongly Agree..... 5
- Agree 4
- Undecided 3
- Disagree 2
- Strongly Disagree 1

The scoring of each question can be observed by referring to the schedule which is attached as addendum A of this study.

This procedure is in line with Bailey's advice (1982 : 365-366), that in a Likert scale, researchers should code all responses so that a higher score on a particular item indicates a strong agreement with the attitude being scaled. This means that the researcher must code 5 for strong agreement with a positive statement or strong agreement with a negative one, and code 1 for strong disagreement with a positive statement or strong disagreement with

a negative one. A scale is then computed for each respondent by summing his or her score on all questions. Items 1 to 12 and item 67, comprised some fixed alternative, three scale and open-ended questions and statements which were individually analysed.

7. PROBLEMS POSED BY THE SURVEY

7.1 Response rate

A survey deals with a large representative sample from a population and thus permits inference from the sampled data to the population. It is thus imperative that the sample maintains its representativeness which may be affected severely when a substantial portion of the respondents fail to participate in the study (Lin, 1976 : 241). The interview schedule which is administered personally by fieldworkers, was used to minimise the possibility of a poor response rate. However, the political overtone of the interview schedule could have resulted in reluctance on the part of respondents to answer freely and honestly. Interviewers therefore constantly reiterated the confidential and academic nature of the survey to encourage a greater willingness on the part of the respondents to provide complete and honest answers.

7.2 Lack of dynamics

Lin (1976 : 243) points out that the survey presents a "frozen" slice of reality; that is, data are collected at one point in time. Whilst it is true that the data may be collected from geographic cross-sections and from different strata composed of different groups of persons defined according to race, sex, class and age, such a comparison makes sense only in terms of one point in time and does not provide a view of how things became what they are and how things will be in the future.

In this particular study, Chapters One, Two and Three locate historically the defined problem, and attempt to link up and provide insight into the processes that gave rise to the present development of social and political attitudes and the consequent socio-political behaviour.

The present study was completed on the eve of the effective banning in early 1988 of the UDF, COSATU and fifteen other legal-democratic extra-parliamentary organisations. The research shows that the organisations affected are amongst the most widely supported in Natal, seen as attempting to advance the quality of life of Black people in South Africa.

The silencing of these particular organisations will, in addition to drastically reducing the potential for negotiation, increase the polarisation between contending forces.

It seems unlikely that the present study could have been completed if the restrictions had been implemented before the fieldwork was finished. The importance of the intervening period within which this study was completed must be emphasised, that is, the time before the restrictions on organisations, before the escalation of township violence and before the devastating floods which would have made access to people in the areas extremely difficult.

The researcher contends that even should there be continuing violence, further detentions and bannings, socio-political attitudes will not be significantly affected. The fear and reluctance to express social attitudes and political sympathies will certainly increase, but the fundamental demands, beliefs and aspirations will not change.

With proper training and execution, the survey remains the most powerful method of data collection available to the social researcher to infer results from a sample to a population.

8. TRAINING THE INTERVIEWER/FIELDWORKER

Just as there is no standard survey or interview, so there can be no standard training programme. The type and intensity of training will depend on the goals of the study, the number of interviewers, their previous experience, the availability of time and the difficulty of the questionnaire (Warwick et al, 1975 : 224). In this study, the interviewers chosen were students from various tertiary

institutions and community workers, all of whom lived in the delineated areas and all with previous experience in doing field work in the community. They were thoroughly trained for the field-work especially with reference to the directions of Warwick et al (1975), Backstrom and Hirsch (1963), Chadwick et al (1984), and Johnson (1978).

9. **THE PILOT STUDY**

A pilot study was conducted in which the entire survey procedure was tested. Since the researcher at the early stage had not fully trained the interviewers involved, she undertook to do the fieldwork herself. A random sample of 21 respondents revealed minor problems of design which were rectified at the early stages. It was at this point that the researcher formulated further explanations and definitions that the fieldworkers were to refer to during their field visits for the purposes of clarification and confirmation.

10. **CHOICE OF LOCALE AND SELECTION OF THE SAMPLE**

The quantitative method used in this study involved, as already indicated, largely the objective survey as a method of research. The population was chosen in terms of nine broad areas. The areas defined were within the Durban Functional Region (DFR) and represented homogenous groupings comprising Africans, Indians and Coloureds.

The extent of a city is often defined by municipal boundaries. In practice, however, there are usually a considerable number of communities living relatively far away from the Central Business District and beyond the municipal boundaries. The term DFR which is used by a number of research institutes including the Urban Foundation and Built Environment Research Group, is defined as including people and communities who:

1. work and shop in the city or surrounding areas; and
2. identify themselves as living "in Durban".

The map shows the approximate boundaries of the DFR and, in diagrammatic form, the major residential areas (City Engineers' Dept., 1987).

MAP 1


(See page 105)

Since the Durban population is perceived as fairly heterogenous as a whole, the simple random sampling method on its own was seen as inappropriate. A stratified random sample recognises the composition of strata which represent different types of individual groups. This implied that the three sub-populations would have to be equalised to facilitate comparisons.

Since the intention of the researcher was not only to compare the three areas, but to ascertain socio-political attitudes of Blacks in Durban towards social change in South Africa, the proportional stratified sampling procedure was seen as the most appropriate. Durban contains significantly more Africans than Indians and Coloureds, thus this group's attitudes would have to weigh more heavily in terms of defining Durban's attitudes. To equalise the population in terms of these three groups would culminate in a biased result.

The proportional stratified design combined with cluster sampling was seen to be the answer to the problem. The first step here was to effect a separation of the several elements in the total population and then to select from each of the individual groups, three clusters that proportionately represent different class interests existent in that racial group.

Clusters within each stratum were decided upon after it was discovered that the three areas, ie., African, Indian and Coloured were difficult to compare because of the differences in social indexes that existed when comparing single areas. Since most areas are distinguished as being upper class, middle-class or working class it was seen as necessary to extract clusters that appear to comprise these particular



———— DURBAN FUNCTIONAL AREA

- - - - - DURBAN METROPOLITAN AREA

MAP 1 : THE DURBAN FUNCTIONAL REGION

(Research Section: City Engineer's Department)

class interests. The cluster would represent the class sectors of the community proportionately, eg., since African people comprise largely of a working class/lower stratum component, the cluster comprising this group would be far larger than the cluster comprising an upper-middle class sector. Hence, each racial stratum would then be a true reflection of the particular population group. The process of combining two or more sampling techniques is known as multi-stage sampling (Lin, 1976 : 154).

10.1 Selection of areas

Three African, Indian and Coloured areas each were chosen allowing for representation of

1. upper middle class;
2. middle class; and
3. working class elements.

However, these classifications were more evident in the Indian and Coloured areas than the African areas.

Thus the population was stratified proportionately because of the existing differences in terms of population figures. It was further stratified in terms of race. Finally, within each racial category, cluster sampling was necessary to accentuate class and social mobility differences. The areas were not chosen randomly. They were purposively selected on two grounds. First, taking into account the present accessibility of the areas (due to the volatile nature of unrest in the townships) and second, taking into account class factors, ie. which of the accessible areas represent different class interests. Hence, at this stage, a non-probability sampling technique was utilised. According to Selltiz et al (1959 : 535-536) if sampling is carried out in a series of stages, it is possible to combine probability and non-probability sampling in one design and still retain a representative sample with a valid generalisation of inferences from sample to population, within limits of error. The present sampling plan complies with Selltiz et al's description.

The nine areas chosen were as follows:

African Areas

1. Umlazi (Upper Middle Class)
2. Lamontville (Middle Class)
3. Clermont (Working Class)

Indian Areas

1. Reservoir Hills (Upper Middle Class)
2. Overport (Middle Class)
3. Chatsworth (Working Class)

Coloured Areas

1. Greenwood Park (Upper Middle Class)
2. Newlands East (Middle Class)
3. Wentworth (Working Class)

The rest of the stages were conducted according to probability sampling principles. Within each area a socially defined cluster was drawn in which the simple random technique was used.

The researcher acquired the following statistics from the publication of the City Engineer's Department, "Durban Focus" (May, 1987):

Durban Functional Region

Total	3 514 186
Whites	316 591
Coloureds	63 929
Indians	552 819
Africans (Formal Areas)	849 285
Africans (Informal Areas)	1 731 562

Previous figures such as those reflected in the Population Census (Central Statistical Agency, 1985 : 37), appear to seriously underenumerate the African sector:

Durban Metropolitan (Including Pinetown and Inanda)

Total	634 301
Whites	173 863
Coloureds	54 465
Indians	372 000
Africans	33 973

Beall et al (1986 : 6), in defining Natal spatially, maintain that because of the excessive under-enumeration of the 1980 census especially with regard to the African population of South Africa, it is not possible to give more than an indication of the population of the region. In this study the Durban City Engineers' Department figures for the DFR are accepted as the most valid available. Bodies such as the Urban Foundation and Built Environment Study Group also use these statistics.

With a population of 3 514 186 people in the Durban Functional Region and 3 197 595 Black people, the ratio of African, Indian and Coloured people is 40,5 : 8,5 : 1.

Developing a proportional but manageable sample based on the above ratio's would result in the construction of a sample with too few Indians and Coloureds to ascertain reliable characteristics. Thus, in keeping with a proportional stratified design, the ratio 3 : 2 : 1 was utilised. On selecting a number of cases from different strata it became necessary to adjust the findings in accordance with the ratio 40,5 : 8,5 : 1 before final inference to the population could be made.

According to a table developed by Backstrom and Hirsch (1963 : 33), and confirmed by Arkin and Colton (1964), a sample size of 267 respondents is needed to attain a 95% confidence limit, and a 5% margin of error. Thus, to ensure that 95 elements out of 100 would contain the population value in an interval within 6% in either direction of the estimate, it was decided to multiply the employed ratio's by 60 in order to make up the total sample number

of 267. This number was exceeded, thus making allowance for possible wastage of sample elements. The larger sample size allowed for incorporation of a greater number of elements within the clusters, thus facilitating the representation of different class interests. The eventual sample size was as follows:

Africans	(3 x 60)	=	180
Indians	(2 x 60)	=	120
Coloureds	(1 x 60)	=	60

A tolerated error of 6% is claimed, although the sample size comes close to 384 elements which Backstrom and Hirsch (1963 : 40) indicate as necessary for a 5% tolerated error.

10.2 Sample elements from each area

The number of elements chosen from each area were based on an approximation of the class strata within the Black areas. In practice, there is insufficient data to specifically quantify the exact ratios in this respect, but their existence can be empirically observed by referring to styles of life in different residential areas:

1. Within the African areas it is clear that the majority of the people belong to the labouring class, with a small but significant middle class and an established upper middle class. Each "class group" has tended to congregate within a certain residential area, and these areas were used as indicators of class membership.
2. Within the Indian areas, the majority of the people are still working class. However, there is an expanding upper middle and lower middle class representing the entrepreneurial and professional sectors. Again residential areas are used to define class membership.

3. The comparatively small Coloured population in Durban also has a relatively large working class population. With constant social mobility, however, middle and upper middle class populations have appeared, and these are also identified with reference to residential area.

Hence the number of elements chosen per area were as follows:

TABLE 2
SAMPLE ELEMENTS

Africans:

Umlazi (upper middle class sector)	30
Lamontville (middle class sector)	50
Clermont (working class sector)	100
	180

Indians:

Reservoir Hills (upper middle class sector)	20
Overport (middle class sector)	40
Chatsworth (working class sector)	60
	120

Coloureds:


Greenwood Park (upper middle class sector)	15
Newlands East (middle class sector)	20
Wentworth (working class sector)	25
	60

It must be emphasised that the areas were not differentiated for the purposes of comparison within themselves but were viewed as segments of a composite whole, eg., in the case of the Coloured population, the purpose is not to compare Greenwood Park with Newlands East or

Wentworth (since the number of elements is too small). Rather, they are viewed as a composite whole, but one in which the various class/income strata are all represented in an approximation of their actual ratio. Bailey (1982 : 100) maintains that 30 elements are sufficient for the purposes of inference.

EXTENDED SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF SAMPLE DESIGN

MODEL 7



10.3 Area profiles

10.3.1 African areas

This study was conducted against a background of instability and social turbulence. A series of sporadic conflicts in the townships are surfacing and receding.

The fieldwork for this study was conducted during June–August 1987, a period which included June 16 (Soweto Day) and June 26 (Freedom Day). This together with the overriding implications of the state of emergency, led to the survey being undertaken under extremely trying conditions.

The three African areas chosen: Clermont, Umlazi and Lamontville, represent three urban areas with some degree of social mobility. Clermont is one of half a dozen urban areas in the country offering freehold land rights to Africans. In Clermont one observes rows of single room homes, some well built but most constructed of second hand material, cardboard and beer cartons. There are well built blocks of flats, small cottages and large houses all grouped together alongside shabby underdeveloped roads. It was housing that was the visible criterion for class categorisation. The majority of the houses were shack settlements, with the larger well-built houses rented and occupied by a number of families. This area was seen as useful for examining working class attitudes.

Clermont's spatial distribution caused some problems for the researcher. Since the houses were so badly spaced and many had no house numbers, it was difficult to construct a random table of house numbers. With the assistance of the postmaster in Clermont, house numbers were provided with inconsistencies, discrepancies and omissions made clear to the researcher. Thus, the researcher was able to randomly select numbers from the simple random table. Houses and shack settlements without numbers were retained within a table and afforded a number, eg., 2nd from 3351 or 5th from 7210's left.

In Umlazi, Section D has a large number of self-built houses occupied by professional and business people. In Section A, white collar employees live in well built houses subsidised by their employers. This implies that Umlazi is appropriate to study the most affluent group of African people.

At the fieldwork stage, the administration of the township of Umlazi fell under the Department of the Interior of the KwaZulu Government. The Township Manager, appointed by Pretoria, and seconded to the KwaZulu Government, was effectively in control. It was through the township manager's office that information on the structure of the area was obtained. A cluster of houses were called a section. The sections were ordered and given codes such as AA, A, BB, B, C, D, etc. There were no street names nor house numbers. The researcher had to randomly select streets with the aid of a map (and number the randomly chosen streets independently). All houses were given numbers as in the case of the few omitted numbers in Clermont.

In Lamontville, according to a study made by Padayachee (1985 : 60), there exists an average of 1,36 earners and almost one unemployed person per household. Households were crowded; 6,36 persons on average and dependency burdens high. However, there were less shack settlements and more brick houses than in Clermont, so this area was appropriately selected to draw a middle-range group of individuals.

Here, few technical problems were experienced. House numbers were obtained with the aid of the post office and the researcher went into the area to check the authenticity of the numbers given. However, it was here that one of the field workers was almost assaulted, being accused of being a police spy.

10.3.2 Indian areas

The Indian areas resemble to some extent social conditions existing in those of the Coloured areas. These areas have been unaffected

by sustained unrest as evident in the African townships, except during the Inanda/Phoenix unrest in 1985.

In 1976, 83% of the Indians in South Africa were concentrated in Natal. As a consequence, Indians comprise 12,2% of Natal's population compared with only 2,9% of the South African population. A large concentration of this minority group is in the Durban Functional Region.

Reservoir Hills, seen as one of the more elitist Indian areas in Durban, has a large proportion of Indian doctors, lawyers, business persons and other professional people. Hence, it was envisaged that this area would depict upper middle class attitudes.

The researcher had no difficulty in constructing a sampling framework, since the household numbers were indicated on valuation rolls. After the numbers within clusters were randomly selected the researcher went into the area to check whether the numbers chosen existed in the field. Thus omissions and discrepancies were further rectified.

Overport, distinguishes itself from other areas in its vicinity by containing mainly flats. Whilst Overport does contain many self-built houses with laid out gardens, the majority of the people live as tenants in flats.

A large number of people are seen as well-educated, with a significant proportion having had tertiary education. However, there appears to be also a considerable number of unemployed persons residing in the area. By and large, though, it could be regarded as an area that would reflect middle class attitudes.

The valuation rolls gave an account of the number and names of flats in Overport. However, the flat numbers per building had to be ascertained through direct observation in the field on the part of the researcher, once the cluster was randomly chosen.

The Indian people have been affected more than any other group in South Africa by the Group Areas Act. By 1970, about 37 653 Indian families had been required to move which represented over 300 000 of the total Indian population of about 624 000 at that time. The artificial pattern of mobility was the highest in Chatsworth, where over 70% of heads of households had been required to move (Sugden, 1978 : 37). Chatsworth has since developed into the largest Indian area outside India.

The typical Chatsworth home is a small but double storeyed brick house alongside the road, shared by at least two families. This area offers an adequate representation of the lower working class sector of the Indian population. With the assistance of valuation rolls and direct observation in Chatsworth, the sampling frame was constructed.

10.3.3 Coloured areas

Unlike the instability experienced in the African areas, the Coloured areas exhibit relative calm.

In Natal, the Coloured community is a numerical and sociological minority. As such, the political cohesiveness or assertiveness of the group has never been clearly defined. As pointed out in Chapter Three, by 1984 almost 70% of this population in Durban did not belong to any organisation.

The Coloured communities of Greenwood Park, Newlands East and Wentworth represent three urban areas with less social mobility than segments of the African areas, but with a slightly higher degree of occupational mobility. The upper middle class area of Greenwood Park has well constructed buildings with a brick and tile dwelling on a plot large enough to accommodate a garden for the average house.

Whilst Greenwood Park itself was identified as an upper middle class Coloured area there is also a strong middle class and to a lesser extent working class component. A larger proportion of its

population comprises professional people - doctors, lawyers, teachers and business persons. The 1985 census indicates that Greenwood Park has a significantly large "educated population".

The researcher structured the sample frame with the aid of valuation rolls, maps and by visiting the area to observe whether any contradictions exist between the household numbers contained in the rolls and those that were apparent.

Newlands East, on the other hand, was identified as a middle class to lower middle class area. There are a significantly large number of people working in the retail industry that live in that area. Most however, work in white-collar professions or do clerical work. Some are factory workers.

A small percentage of Newlands East's income is earned in the area through self-employment, shop and shebeen-keeping and through vendoring.

Whilst there are a fair amount of self-built houses, there are parts of the area that exhibit duplexes, semi-detached housing and the housing scheme homes. The household numbers did not pose any problems in the construction of the sampling frame.

Austerville or Wentworth, as its inhabitants prefer it to be called, is a Coloured housing area about 11km south-east of Durban. It was proclaimed a Group Area in 1963 and rehoused Coloured people moved from areas such as Clairwood, Sea Cow Lake and Clare Estate. It is home to 40% of Durban's Coloured people.

Meer (Daily News, April 15, 1987 : 15), described Wentworth as: "one of Durban's most depressed communities, a compound of both material and spiritual deprivation. Unemployment is high, educational achievements low. Almost one-fifth of the families live on less than R400 a month. Over one-third of the babies in the community are born out of wedlock. Alcoholism and gangsterism are rampant".

A fair amount of the population are unemployed. An indication of household income is given in the following table:

TABLE 3**HOUSEHOLD INCOME**

<u>INCOME</u>	<u>CHATSWORTH</u>	<u>WENTWORTH</u>
R0	8 (10%)	3 (6%)
R1 - R200	8 (10%)	3 (6%)
R201 - R400	12 (15%)	12 (23%)
R401 - R600	17 (22%)	5 (10%)
R601 - R1 000	18 (23%)	22 (42%)
More than R1 000	16 (20%)	7 (13%)
AVERAGE	<u>R748,39</u>	<u>R775,11</u>

(CRU, 1986 : 16).

The average household incomes for Wentworth and Chatsworth are very similar (CRU, 1986 : 16). From the above discussion it is clear that Wentworth qualifies without doubt as a low income, working class area.

The researcher noted that many houses were not properly numbered and this was taken into consideration during the construction of the sampling frame.

11. DATA PROCESSING AND STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES

11.1 Coding

After editing, the data were reduced to a suitable form for analysis. The main task of data reduction is coding. Coding for computer analysis generally consists of assigning a code number to each answer category so that the answers may be stored in the computer. All of the questions were precoded, except question 9 which was post-coded. Then the relatively simple, but laborious task of transferring codes from interview schedules on to data sheets was set about.

Open ended data resulting from open-ended questions, were not statistically or quantitatively analysed by the computer, but subjectively and qualitatively analysed by the researcher. With regard to all other data, codes were transferred from the interviewer schedules onto data sheets.

The data sheets were then given to a computer programmer who identified and functionally analysed the requirements. System software was used to:

- (a) define data elements;
- (b) build a file on disk (file size: 360 records; record length: 126 characters); and
- (c) set up a data file utility (DFU) programme to capture data directly on to the disk file.

The data were then keyed from the data sheets directly onto the visual display unit. The captured data from the data sheets were inserted into the file. A computer printout was obtained. The printout was manually checked against the data sheets for possible errors incurred during the keypunching process. Hence, the data were edited, ensuring that the file was free of errors.

The programme was written in RPGII and the system hardware was the IBM system 36. The programme was run against the disk file to produce the information required for statistical analysis.

11.2 Statistical techniques utilised to address the hypotheses

Bailey (1982 : 401-407) asserts that truth or falsity of a hypothesis are called inferential statistics, in contrast to descriptive statistics, which do not seek to make an inference but merely to provide a description of the sample data.

A further distinction is made between parametric and non-parametric statistics. Non-parametric statistics are those used when the variables being analysed can be classified on an ordinal scale. Interval measurement may not be assumed. Non-parametric statistics were used to address the hypotheses.

The statistics used in the present study are as follows:

11.2.1 **Chi square:**

With the chi square test of statistical significance we learn the probability that the observed joint distribution of cases would have happened by chance when no association exists between the two variables in the population. Actually, the chi square statistic itself is not a probability, but it can be converted into a probability figure which is called the significance level (Klecka et al, 1975 : 74). Hence, with chi square we measure the association between variables such as race, occupation, income, education, sex and age on the one hand and favourability towards types of change on the other hand. The null hypothesis would suggest that no association exists between these variables.

11.2.2 **Spearman Rho:**

This is also called Spearman's coefficient of rank order (r_s) and it is an ordinal level of association and measures the relationship or degree of correlation between variables. It has been used here to examine the relationship between the socio-political attitudes of the different race groups.

11.2.3 **Further measures of association:**

The median and frequency and percentage distributions are also used.

11.2.4 **Weighted mean:**

The number of responses in each category were multiplied by the appropriate numerical weighting; the products were added and the sum divided by the total number who replied to the item. The result of this calculation is a measure of the overall direction and intensity of the degree of obligation felt. The weighted mean (\bar{X}_w) ranges between 1 and 5. The closer \bar{X}_w is to 5, the more obligatory the activity mentioned in the statement is felt to be.

11.2.5 **Variance**

The variance (V) indicates the amount of agreement among respondents on the extent of the obligation. The smaller the variance the greater the consensus.

Further inferences have been made through the examination of cross tabulated responses and the qualitative examination of open ended questions.

CHAPTER FIVEPRESENTATION OF ANALYSIS

The analysis within this Chapter is divided into three broad parts:

1. Profile of the sample;
2. Addressing the hypotheses; and
3. Addressing theoretical issues discussed in Chapter Three.

1. PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE

The sample consisting of 360 elements contained:

- 1.1 Race

<u>Africans</u>	:	<u>180</u>	
From Umlazi	:	30	(Upper Middle Class)
Lamontville	:	50	(Middle Class)
Clermont	:	100	(Working Class)
<u>Indians</u>	:	<u>120</u>	
From Reservoir Hills:		20	(Upper Middle Class)
Overport	:	40	(Middle Class)
Chatsworth	:	60	(Working Class)
<u>Coloureds</u>	:	<u>60</u>	
From Greenwood Park :		15	(Upper Middle Class)
Newlands East :		20	(Middle Class)
Wentworth :		25	(Working Class)
		<hr/>	
		360	
		<hr/>	

1.2 **Occupation**

Clerical	:	42
Professional	:	54
Sales	:	19
Self-employed	:	28
Skilled worker	:	83
Unskilled worker	:	29
Student	:	66
Other (Unemployed, housewife, pensioner)	:	39
		<hr/>
		360
		<hr/>

1.3 **Family income per annum**

Less than R3 000	:	65
Between R3 000 - R6 000	:	89
Between R6 000 - R10 000	:	81
Between R10 000 - R15 000	:	57
Between R15 000 - R25 000	:	42
More than R25 000	:	26
		<hr/>
		360
		<hr/>

It is from this particular subset of the population that the researcher is to generalise the results obtained to statements about the population.

1.4 **Educational qualifications**

None (and non-literate)	:	3
None (and literate)	:	8
Primary school education	:	25
Junior secondary	:	77
Senior secondary	:	189
Higher than Std 10	:	58
		<hr/>
		360
		<hr/>

1.5 **Gender**

Females	:	180
Males	:	180
		<hr/>
		360
		<hr/>

1.6 **Age**

Older than 60 years	:	6
46 - 60	:	64
36 - 45	:	61
26 - 35	:	84
16 - 25	:	145
		<hr/>
		360
		<hr/>

1.7 **Marital status**

Single	:	145
Married	:	177
Separated	:	9
Divorced	:	6
Widowed	:	13
Living together	:	10
		<hr/>
		360
		<hr/>

2. **ADDRESSING THE HYPOTHESES**

In this section broad scores are given which will serve to test the validity of the working hypotheses formulated in Chapter One.

The broad scores indicating favourability towards intra-parliamentary and extra-parliamentary strategies are as follows:

TABLE 4Distribution of Responses in terms of Support for
Intraparliamentary Evolutionary Strategies and
Assumptions

SCORE	SUPPORTIVE		UNDECIDED	UNSUPPORTIVE	
	95 - 76	75 - 58	57	56 - 38	37 - 19
Frequency	-	51	15	204	90
Frequency %		14,17	4,17	56,67	25,00
Freq. Totals		51	15		294
Freq. Totals %		14,20	4,20		81,60
Median		61			44
Mean of Total		61,65			45,20

TABLE 5Distribution of Responses in terms of Support for
Extraparliamentary Evolutionary Strategies and
Assumptions

SCORE	SUPPORTIVE		UNDECIDED	UNSUPPORTIVE	
	95 - 76	75 - 58	57	56 - 38	37 - 19
Frequency	43	265	10	42	-
Frequency %	11,19	73,61	2,78	11,67	-
Freq. Totals		308	10		42
Freq. Totals %		85,55	2,78		11,67
Median		70			54
Mean of Total		72,82			36,68

Tables 4 and 5 show that a far greater number of respondents supported extraparliamentary evolutionary strategies and assumptions than intraparliamentary strategies and assumptions. The median in both instances compares quite favourably with the mean indicating further that a significant number of those supportive of intraparliamentary strategies are close to undecided whilst a number of those supportive of extraparliamentary strategies are close to strongly supportive. The median of those unsupportive of extraparliamentary strategies and assumptions differs significantly from the mean of the total score. This indicates the combination of two extreme groupings - those unsupportive but close to undecided and those very strongly unsupportive.

Hence the first working hypothesis is tentatively proved since Black (African, Indian and Coloured) urban communities do show preference for strategies for evolutionary change outside of those provided for by the formal state structure.

The broad scores indicating favourability towards extraparliamentary revolutionary change are as follows:

TABLE 6

Distribution of Responses in terms of Support for Revolutionary Strategies and Assumptions

SCORE	SUPPORTIVE		UNDECIDED	UNSUPPORTIVE	
	40 - 33	32 - 25	24	23 - 17	16 - 8
Frequency	32	212	40	74	2
Frequency %	8,89	58,89	11,11	20,56	0,56
Freq. Totals	244		40	76	
Freq. Totals %	67,78		11,11	21,11	
Median	27			23	
Mean of Total	31,62			20,36	

When the broad scores indicating favourability towards revolutionary assumptions and strategies were reviewed, it was found that support for extraparliamentary evolutionary change was greater than support for revolutionary change (85,55% as opposed to 67,78%) (See: Table 5 and Table 6).

When race was taken into consideration in comparing evolutionary and revolutionary change, the following were the results:

TABLE 7

AFRICANS: TYPE OF CHANGE FAVOURED

Total: 180	
<u>No. of Favourable Respondents</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
: Evolutionary Change	157
: Revolutionary Change	134

Hence, the second working hypothesis is tentatively disproved since the indications are that a greater number of African respondents support evolutionary rather than revolutionary change.

Similarly, the Indian and Coloured scores can be displayed in Tables 8 and 9 as follows:

TABLE 8

INDIANS: TYPE OF CHANGE FAVOURED

Total: 120	
<u>No. of Favourable Respondents</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
: Evolutionary Change	104
: Revolutionary Change	75

TABLE 9COLOURED: TYPE OF CHANGE FAVOURED

	Total:	60
<u>No. of Favourable Respondents</u>		<u>Frequency</u>
: Evolutionary Change		47
: Revolutionary Change		35

Hence the third working hypothesis is tentatively proved. Indians and Coloureds prefer evolutionary as compared to revolutionary social change.

Spearman Rho was used to test the degree of correlation between African and non-African attitudes and the results are shown in Tables 10, 11 and 12:

TABLE 10Attitudes towards Intraparliamentary Change

	African	R_1	Non-African	R_2	(d)	(d^2)
					$R_1 - R_2$	
0 - 37	61	2	29	3	-1	1
38 - 56	101	1	103	1	0	
57	3	4	12	4	0	
58 - 75	15	3	36	2	1	1
76 - 95	0	5	0	5	0	

$r_s = 0,95$ (strong agreement)

(d) = 0; $d^2 = 2$

TABLE 11Attitudes towards Extraparliamentary Change

	African	R_1	Non-African	R_2	(d) $R_1 - R_2$	(d ²)
0 - 37	0	5	0	5	0	0
38 - 56	19	3	23	2	1	1
57	4	4	6	4	0	0
58 - 75	133	1	102	1	0	0
76 - 95	24	2	19	3	-1	1

$(d) = 0; d^2 = 2$

 $r_s = 0,95$ (strong agreement)TABLE 12Attitudes towards Revolutionary Change

	African	R_1	Non-African	R_2	(d) $R_1 - R_2$	(d ²)
0 - 16	0	5	2	5	0	0
17 - 23	29	2	45	2	0	0
24	17	4	23	3	1	1
25 - 32	115	1	97	1	0	0
33 - 40	19	3	13	4	-1	1

$(d) = 0; d^2 = 2$

 $r_s = 0,95$ (strong agreement)

The ranking of the broad scores indicate correlation and not the qualitative differences that exist in terms of social attitude. Here, one can infer that the social attitudes of the different race groups are very similar.

3. ORGANISATIONS WORKING TO IMPROVE THE LIVES OF BLACK PEOPLE

In this section comparative attitudes towards social organizations are discussed.

Tables 13, 14 and 15 reflect the frequency of responses to statement 10 which required an indication of the organisations which respondents considered to be working to improve the lives of the Black people.

The 5 most popular organisations amongst the Africans are :

1. COSATU
2. UDF
3. Inkatha
4. UWUSA
5. AZAPO

Three of the five organisations can be seen as extraparliamentary organisations functioning until recently within South Africa at a legal-democratic level viz. COSATU, UDF and AZAPO. The fact that COSATU and the UDF are the two most popular fronts, shows further that there is a tendency amongst the African population in the region to support organisations working outside of the state structures.

TABLE 13AFRICANS: ORGANISATIONS WORKING TO IMPROVE LIVES

STATEMENT 10	F	£
Religious	33	18,33
Inkatha	64	35,55
Sporting and Recreational	24	13,33
Student / Youth	35	19,44
NPP	12	6,66
Labour Party	20	1,11
UWUSA	63	35,00
Welfare	27	15,00
Womens	19	10,05
COSATU	96	53,33
Solidarity	3	1,66
Cultural	7	3,88
NIC	21	11,66
UDF	93	51,66
Garment Workers' Union	1	0,55
Red Cross	7	3,88
Health Care	2	1,11
Legal Aid	1	0,55
St. Johns Ambulance	3	1,66
S.A.N.T.A.	1	0,55
YMCA	1	0,55
Urban Foundation	1	0,55
Small Business Corporation	1	0,55
W.H.O.	1	0,55
Operation Hunger	3	1,66
KwaZulu Development Corporation	1	0,55
Natal Association for the Blind	1	0,55
Medical Association of S.A.	1	0,55
TUCSA	11	6,11
AZAPO	38	21,11
ANC	15	8,33
National Forum	1	0,55
UCC	3	1,66
SACC	4	2,22
SAIRR	1	0,55
Civic	2	1,11
Unaffiliated Unions	1	0,55
NAFCOC	1	0,55

TABLE 14

INDIANS: ORGANISATIONS WORKING TO IMPROVE LIVES

STATEMENT 10	F	£
UDF	42	35,00
NIC	34	28,33
NPP	9	7,50
Solidarity	8	6,66
PFP	3	2,50
HSRC	1	0,83
KwaZulu Natal Indaba	2	1,66
COSATU	30	25,00
TUCSA	5	4,16
AZAPO	8	6,66
TIC	2	1,66
ANC	10	8,33
IBR	1	0,83
Religious	12	10,00
Cultural	6	5,00
Unaffiliated Unions	3	2,50
UWUSA	5	4,16
Womens	2	1,66
Student / Youth	4	3,33
Inkatha	6	5,00
Labour Party	3	2,50
UCC	3	2,50
Cheshire Homes	2	1,66
Welfare	60	50,00

Here, the 5 most popular organisations are:

1. Welfare Organisations
2. UDF
3. NIC
4. COSATU
5. Religious Organisations

Three of the five organisations are formidable extraparliamentary organisations viz. UDF, NIC and COSATU. Welfare, although still partially subsidised and administered by the state (whilst being privatised) cannot be seen as voluntarily state supportive. Neither can respondents supporting welfare organisations be seen/as

necessarily state supportive. Religious organisations cannot also be seen as state supportive. Islamic and Christian organisations to which Black people belong have a long-standing tradition of rejecting state initiatives. However, major Hindu religious bodies which represent the majority of Indians in Natal, have been more collaborative with state initiatives than the other two.

TABLE 15

COLOUREDS: ORGANISATIONS WORKING TO IMPROVE LIVES

STATEMENT 10	F	£
UDF	22	36,67
UCC	9	7,50
Womens	14	23,33
Youth	6	10,00
Labour Party	3	5,00
Religious	8	13,33
Political	1	1,67
Sporting	2	3,33
KwaNatal Indaba	1	1,67
Welfare	7	11,67
Operation Hunger	1	1,67
PFP	3	5,00
Diakonia	1	1,67
IDASA	1	1,67
COSATU	10	16,67
NIC	3	5,00
ANC	7	11,67
SACC	3	5,00
AZAPO	3	5,00
Inkatha	5	8,33
NPP	1	1,67
Cultural	1	1,67
WIP	3	5,00
UWUSA	1	1,67

Here, the 5 most popular organisations are:

1. UDF
2. Women's Organisations
3. UCC
4. COSATU
5. Religious Organisations.

Here again, three of the five organisations are sister organisations working outside of parliament. Whilst many women's organisations are not attached to political structures, most are aligning themselves to fronts, such as the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW), which are supportive of the UDF. Religious organisations here would be mainly church and some Islamic organisations, most of whom would probably not support state structures.

Overall the five organisations perceived by Black (African, Indian and Coloured) respondents as working to improve the lives of Black people in South Africa are:

1. UDF
2. COSATU
3. Welfare Organisations
4. Inkatha
5. UWUSA

The greater support for the UDF rather than COSATU amongst Indians and Coloureds led to the UDF being seen as the most popular, with COSATU following. Increased amount of support for welfare organisations amongst the Indians led to it replacing Inkatha as the third most significant. Inkatha was followed closely by UWUSA.

4. ORGANISATIONAL AWARENESS

When organisational awareness was examined (Statement 9) the following were the results (Table 16):

TABLE 16

ORGANISATIONAL AWARENESS

	UDF	NIC	AZAPO	NATIONAL FORUM	INKATHA	NPP	SOLIDARITY	LABOUR PARTY	UCC	UWUSA	COSATU	TUCSA	UNAFFILIATED UNIONS	WELFARE	CULTURAL	WOMENS	RELIGIOUS	CIVIC	SPORTING & R	YOUTH/STUDENT	OTHER
ORGS. HEARD OF:	ORG: 1	ORG: 2	ORG: 3	ORG: 4	ORG: 5	ORG: 6	ORG: 7	ORG: 8	ORG: 9	ORG: 10	ORG: 11	ORG: 12	ORG: 13	ORG: 14	ORG: 15	ORG: 16	ORG: 17	ORG: 18	ORG: 19	ORG: 20	ORG: 21
IN TOTAL	349	270	276	107	323	247	220	281	122	273	307	168	96	266	199	233	269	158	248	215	
FREQ. %	96	75	76	29	89	68	61	78	33	75	85	46	26	73	55	64	74	43	68	59	
BY R																					
AFRICAN	177	111	158	52	171	82	54	112	47	167	171	77	38	108	77	106	102	50	100	98	
FREQ. %	98	61	87	28	95	45	30	62	26	92	95	42	21	60	42	58	56	27	55	54	
COLOURED	59	49	41	20	53	53	50	56	33	38	48	32	15	48	32	42	53	30	44	34	
FREQ. %	98	81	68	33	88	88	83	93	55	63	80	53	25	80	53	70	88	50	73	56	
INDIAN	113	110	77	35	99	112	116	113	42	68	98	59	43	110	90	85	112	78	104	83	
FREQ. %	94	91	64	29	82	93	96	94	35	56	73	49	35	91	75	70	95	65	86	69	
BY CLASS																					
R6000	145	91	108	37	128	77	63	92	34	117	123	56	26	91	61	83	94	51	81	76	
FREQ. %	94	59	70	24	83	50	40	59	22	75	79	36	16	59	39	53	61	33	52	49	
6-15000	136	112	104	41	127	104	91	121	49	109	119	68	36	109	81	96	110	58	103	84	
FREQ. %	98	81	75	29	92	75	65	87	35	78	86	49	26	78	58	69	79	42	74	60	
15-25000	68	67	64	29	68	66	66	68	39	47	65	44	34	66	57	54	65	49	64	55	
FREQ. %	100	98	94	42	100	97	97	100	57	69	95	64	50	97	83	79	95	72	94	80	
BY SEX																					
FEMALE	173	128	120	43	154	121	109	139	48	124	141	71	38	137	98	133	134	75	124	110	
FREQ. %	48	35	33	11	42	33	30	38	13	34	39	19	10	38	27	36	37	20	34	30	
MALE	176	142	156	64	169	126	111	142	74	149	166	97	58	129	101	100	135	83	124	105	
FREQ. %	48	39	43	17	46	35	30	39	20	43	46	26	16	35	28	27	37	23	34	29	

Again, the UDF was the best known followed by Inkatha, COSATU, the Labour Party, AZAPO and both the NIC and UWUSA equally known. Religious organisations followed, with welfare organisations closely behind. The least known were trade unions not affiliated to any federation and the National Forum Committee.

A racial breakdown indicates that amongst the Africans the organisations heard of most frequently were:

1. UDF (98,00%)
2. COSATU (95,00%) and Inkatha (95,00%)
3. UWUSA (92,00%)
4. AZAPO (87,00%)
5. NIC (61,00%)

Least known were trade unions not affiliated to any organisation (21,00%).

Amongst Indians,

1. Solidarity (96,00%)
2. Religious Organisations (95,00%)
3. UDF (94,00%) and Labour Party (94,00%)
4. NPP (93,00%)
5. NIC (91,00%) and Welfare Organisations (91,00%).

The least known was the NF Committee (29,00%). A larger number of Indians had heard of unions not affiliated to federations because many Indian workers belong to unions that disaffiliated from TUCSA and which have not affiliated to any other federation.

Amongst Coloureds,

1. UDF (98,00%)
2. Labour Party (93,00%)
3. Inkatha (88,00%), NPP (88,00%) and Religious Organisations (88,00%)
4. Solidarity (83,00%)
5. NIC (81,00%)

Here again, unaffiliated unions were not heard of (25,00%).

It is interesting to note that COSATU has not been popularised and thus, not heard of as frequently as the other organisations. In Indian areas, 73,00% and in Coloured areas, 80,00% had heard of COSATU.

When class or specifically income levels, were used to differentiate organisational awareness, it was found that the UDF and Inkatha were still the most heard of amongst all income groups. Awareness of the existence of the various organisations increases substantially as income increases. The one exception was UWUSA; where organisational awareness was lowest amongst the highest income group.

The researcher, whilst aware of the difficulties of ascertaining membership to organisations in the region, continued to question affiliation.

Table 17 lists the highest scores recorded for the Africans:

TABLE 17

AFRICANS: AFFILIATION TO ORGANISATIONS

STATEMENT 9	F	%
1. Religious organisations	57	31,66
2. UDF	54	30,00
3. Inkatha	36	20,00
4. Sporting & Recreational org.	35	19,44
5. COSATU	28	15,50
6. Welfare organisations	27	15,00
7. Youth/Student organisations	22	12,20
7. Cultural organisations	22	12,20
9. UWUSA	10	5,55
9. Other organisations	10	5,55

A relatively significant amount of support was expressed for religious organisations, the UDF and Inkatha. The political interests again show divided support for contrasting political groups.

Table 18 lists the highest scores recorded for the Indians:

TABLE 18

INDIANS: AFFILIATION TO ORGANISATIONS

STATEMENT 9	F	g
1. Sporting & Recreational org.	26	21,66
1. Religious organisations	26	21,66
3. Student/Youth organisations	14	11,66
4. Welfare organisations	10	8,33
5. NIC	9	7,50
5. Cultural organisations	9	7,50
5. Civic organisations	22	12,20
8. Womens organisations	8	6,66
9. UDF	7	5,83
10. COSATU	5	4,16

There was significant affiliation to sporting, recreational and religious organisations. There was also some support for civic organisations which can take on a politicising role. Support for political organisations was insignificant.

Table 19 lists the highest scores recorded for the Coloureds:

TABLE 19COLOUREDS: AFFILIATION TO ORGANISATIONS

STATEMENT 9	F	8
1. Religious organisations	9	15,00
2. Student/Youth organisations	3	5,00
3. Other organisations	2	3,33
4. Sporting & Recreational org.	1	1,66
5. UDF	1	1,66

It is worth noting that membership to organisations in the Coloured community was very low. Membership to religious organisations was most prominent.

5. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

When political leadership was questioned, it was found that the following were preferred as political leaders by the different race groups. (Tables 20 and 21)

The summary of results in Table 21, whilst suggestive of stronger support for the UDF/ANC alliance in general, conceals the particular differences between the races. Support for Mandela in the African areas was as strong as support for PW Botha in the Indian areas. Van Zyl Slabbert was supported most in the Coloured areas.

TABLE 20LEADERSHIP PREFERENCE PER GROUP (STATEMENT 11)

<u>AFRICAN AREAS</u>	<u>RESPONDENTS</u>	
	<u>F</u>	<u>%</u>
Mandela	51	(28,33)
Buthelezi	37	(20,55)
Tutu	8	(4,44)
Tambo	6	(3,33)
Gumede	4	(2,22)
Dhlomo	3	(1,67)
Sisulu (Walter)	2	(1,11)
Slabbert	2	(1,11)
No response	67	(37,22)
	180	(100%)

<u>INDIAN AREAS</u>	<u>RESPONDENTS</u>	
	<u>F</u>	<u>%</u>
P W Botha	34	(28,33)
Mandela	6	(5,00)
Slabbert	4	(3,33)
J N Reddy	4	(3,33)
Gumede	1	(0,83)
Tutu	1	(0,83)
Tambo	1	(0,83)
Boesak	1	(0,83)
Buthelezi	1	(0,83)
Eglin	1	(0,83)
No response	66	(55,00)
	120	(100%)

<u>COLOURED AREAS</u>	<u>RESPONDENTS</u>	
	<u>F</u>	<u>%</u>
Slabbert	6	(10,00)
Mandela	4	(6,67)
Botha	2	(3,33)
Archbishop Hurley	1	(1,67)
Worral	1	(1,67)
Tutu	1	(1,67)
No response	45	(75,00)
	60	(100%)

TABLE 21LEADERSHIP PREFERENCE IN TOTAL (STATEMENT 11)TOTAL BLACK SUPPORT

	<u>F</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>%</u>
No response			178	(49,44)
<u>ANC/UDF</u>			86	(23,89)
Mandela	61	(16,94)		
Tambo	7	(1,94)		
Sisulu	2	(0,55)		
Gumede	5	(1,38)		
Boesak	1	(0,27)		
Tutu	10	(2,77)		
<u>INKATHA</u>			41	(11,38)
Buthelezi	38	(10,55)		
Dhlomo	3	(0,83)		
<u>PARLIAMENT</u>			42	(11,66)
Botha	36	(10,00)		
Eglin	1	(0,27)		
Reddy	4	(1,11)		
Worrall	1	(0,27)		
<u>INDEPENDENT</u>			13	(3,61)
Slabbert	12	(3,33)		
Hurley	1	(0,27)		
	360	(100)	360	(100)

6. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES6.1 Intraparliamentary strategies for change

TABLE 22

Statement 18: The reform programme initiated by the government should be supported since it is moving us in the right direction.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	16 (8,00%)	6 (5,00%)	1 (1,66%)	23	3,06
Agree	40 (22,22%)	37 (30,83%)	12 (20,00%)	89	14,44
Undecided	68 (37,77%)	18 (15,00%)	16 (26,66%)	102	20,83
Disagree	28 (15,55%)	43 (35,83%)	15 (25,00%)	86	30,00
Strongly Disagree	28 (15,55%)	16 (13,33%)	16 (26,66%)	60	31,67
Median	3 (Undecided)				

$\bar{X}_w = 2,81$

$V = 1,37$

TABLE 23

STATEMENT 18

RACE	OCCUPATION	INCOME	EDUCATION	AGE	GENDER
Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V
AFRICAN 2,93 1,37	CLERK 2,52 1,10	LESS THAN R3 000 3,16 1,46	NONE (AND ILLITERATE) 3,33 0,88	BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS 2,70 1,45	MALE 2,70 1,49
INDIAN 2,78 1,38	PROFESSIONAL 2,37 1,10	BETWEEN R3 - R6 000 2,96 1,33	NONE (AND LITERATE) 2,87 1,10	26 - 35 2,76 1,37	FEMALE 2,90 1,22
COLOURED 2,45 1,28	SALES 2,9 1,10	BETWEEN R6 - R10 000 2,98 1,12	PRIMARY SCHOOL 3,0 1,04	36 - 45 2,90 1,30	$\chi^2 = 9,358$ with 4° freedom $P = 0,052$ $\geq 0,05$
$\chi^2 = 37,245$ with 8° freedom $P = 0,0001$ $< 0,05$	SELF-EMPLOYED 2,6 1,09	BETWEEN R10 - R15 000 2,49 1,16	JUNIOR SECONDARY 2,97 1,03	46 - 60 2,96 1,18	
	SKILLED WORKER 3,01 1,18	BETWEEN R15 - R25 000 2,45 1,24	SENIOR SECONDARY 2,75 0,89	OVER 60 3,00 1,66	
$\chi^2 = 67,973$ with 28° freedom $P = 0,0001$ $< 0,05$	UNSKILLED WORKER 3,24 1,10	MORE THAN R25 000 2,00 1,07	POST-MATRIC 2,60 1,51	$\chi^2 = 7,286$ with 16° freedom $P = 0,967$ $> 0,05$	
	STUDENT 2,57 1,70	$\chi^2 = 51,875$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,0001$ $< 0,05$	$\chi^2 = 29,321$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,081$ $> 0,05$		
$\chi^2 = 0,385$	OTHER 3,38 0,70				

- Strongly Agree (5)
- Agree (4)
- Undecided (3)
- Disagree (2)
- Strongly Disagree (1)

In Tables 22 and 23, the lack of consensus and general indecisiveness of respondents on this question shows the degree of apprehension towards addressing socio-political issues prevalent amongst the Black population. Apprehension appears to be a greater factor amongst the African population with a larger proportion of Indians and Coloureds rejecting state initiatives. There was disagreement within the rankings of the attitudes of the different race groups since a low positive correlation co-efficient was discerned.

Disagreement here, could be related to the fact that Indians and Coloureds have had an opportunity to decide whether or not to participate in parliamentary structures, irrespective of the power allocated to the individual chambers. The stronger rejection of state initiatives on the part of Indians and Coloureds probably arises from the fact that the tradition of some long-standing political organisations within these communities has been to campaign against voting for parliamentary organisations. The further association between occupation, income and attitudes towards this statement will strengthen the suggestion that the most vociferous anti-election campaigners and anti-system activists have been from the more affluent class.

The strongest disagreement to the statement from a single occupational group, came from the professionals, whilst the greatest indecision came from the sales personnel and the skilled workers. As income increased, it was shown that rejection of state initiatives increased. Furthermore, stronger disagreement came largely from the better educated respondents. As educational qualifications increase, the lesser the indecision with regard to state strategies.

More men than women were unsupportive of state strategies. No significant association exists between attitude towards statement 18 and gender.

TABLE 24

Statement 19: No matter which white government comes into power nothing will change.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	37 (20,55%)	8 (6,66%)	5 (8,33%)	50	13,89
Agree	44 (24,44%)	58 (48,33%)	18 (30,00%)	120	33,33
Undecided	35 (19,44%)	20 (16,66%)	15 (25,00%)	70	19,44
Disagree	25 (13,88%)	31 (25,83%)	18 (30,00%)	74	20,56
Strongly Disagree	39 (21,66%)	3 (2,50%)	4 (6,66%)	46	12,78
Median	3 (Undecided)				

$\bar{X}_w = 2,85$

$V = 1,59$

The median 3 and the weighted mean equivalent to 2,85 show the general indecisiveness of the population (Tables 24 and 25). Whilst the average agree with the statement, the weighted mean is closer to 3 (undecided) than 2 (agree). The relatively high variance at 1,59 show the lack of consensus on this particular question.

TABLE 25

STATEMENT 19

RACE	OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		AGE		GENDER			
	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V		
AFRICAN	2,91	2,10	CLERK		LESS THAN R3 000		NONE (AND ILLITERATE)		BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS		MALE	
			2,76	1,27	2,92	1,85	2,00	0,66	2,83	1,18	2,78	1,82
INDIAN	2,69	1,02	PROFESSIONAL		BETWEEN R3 - R6 000		NONE (AND LITERATE)		26 - 35		FEMALE	
			2,83	1,32	2,69	1,76	2,76	1,32	2,97	1,61	2,91	2,39
COLOURED	2,96	1,23	SALES		BETWEEN R6 - R10 000		PRIMARY SCHOOL		36 - 45		$x^2 = 13,027$ with 4° freedom $P = 0,011$ $> 0,05$	
			2,94	1,26	2,86	1,50	3,00	1,84	2,96	1,40		
$x^2 = 56,521$ with 8° freedom $P = 0,0001$ $< 0,05$	SELF-EMPLOYED		BETWEEN R10 - R15 000		JUNIOR SECONDARY		46 - 60					
	3,03	1,46	2,71	1,21	2,58	1,54	2,75	1,46				
$\bar{x} = 0,60$	SKILLED WORKER		BETWEEN R15 - R25 000		SENIOR SECONDARY		OVER 60		$x^2 = 20,064$ with 16° freedom $P = 0,217$ $< 0,05$			
	2,83	1,58	3,26	1,28	2,87	1,42	1,33	0,23				
$x^2 = 45,263$ with 28° freedom $P = 0,020$ $< 0,05$	UNSKILLED WORKER		MORE THAN R25 000		POST-MATRIC				$x^2 = 19,427$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,492$ $> 0,05$			
	3,10	1,71	3,45	1,40	3,12	1,73						
$x^2 = 40,120$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,004$ $< 0,05$	STUDENT											
	2,77	1,75										
$x^2 = 40,120$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,004$ $< 0,05$	OTHER											
	2,76	0,79										

- Strongly Agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Undecided (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly Disagree (5)

For Indians, the difference between White parties were minimal; and a change in White government would not mean anything different. The fact that Coloureds have closer cultural links with the White population, however, may account for the fact that more Coloureds believe that a change in White government would bring about broader changes. Given conflicting political interests within Natal, those of the UDF/COSATU alliance and those linked to Inkatha, political attitudes towards change emanating through state initiatives, vary. The high percentage suggesting support for change in White government amongst the Africans may be reflective of those sympathetic towards Inkatha's views rather than any other more radical grouping. A moderate correlation coefficient indicated the average degree of agreement amongst the attitudes of the different race groups.

Again, an association existed between attitude, occupation and income. A significantly greater number of unskilled workers disagreed with the statement than students and professionals. However, when income was reviewed it was found that the upper income group within the Black community believed that change could be negotiated through a change in the White parliamentary structure. For the poorer class their lot would not change irrespective of change in government.

Disagreement to statement 19 tended to increase as educational level increased. Furthermore, a greater number of men than women agreed with statement 19. Those between 46 years and older agreed more strongly with statement 19. The most indecisive were those between 26 and 45 years. Those between 16 and 25 years were slightly more agreeable to statement 19. It would seem that the median age group was largely indecisive and hence, most reluctant to consider the social consequences that may follow a change in White government.

In Tables 26 and 27, the median at 2 suggested a high level of agreement and the variance at 0,80 confirmed a very high degree of consensus. The high amount of agreement amongst all race groups indicates their resentment of their existing lack of freedom. The slightly lower percentage of agreement amongst Coloureds shows the isolation of the broader Coloured community in Natal from the harsher effects of state legislation. An association exists between attitude towards statement 20 and race. A strong correlation coefficient showed significant agreement amongst the rankings of the different races.

The notably high agreement amongst the professionals, workers and students suggests the resentment of the most politicised and affected occupational categories. Agreement with statement 20 was relatively constant amongst income groups.

Stronger agreement to statement 20 came from higher educated people showing resentment of the socio-political situation from this sector.

Attitudes towards statement 20 and sex differences were independent of each other.

TABLE 28

Statement 21: Detentions only worsen the country's problems.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	108 (60,00%)	26 (21,66%)	21 (35,00%)	155	43,06
Agree	48 (26,66%)	78 (65,00%)	28 (46,66%)	154	42,78
Undecided	9 (5,00%)	8 (6,66%)	7 (11,66%)	24	6,67
Disagree	11 (6,11%)	6 (5,00%)	2 (3,33%)	19	5,28
Strongly Disagree	4 (2,22%)	2 (1,66%)	2 (3,33%)	8	2,22
Median	2 (Agree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 1,81$$

$$V = 0,87$$

TABLE 29

STATEMENT 21

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		AGE		GENDER	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
1,63	0,99	1,78	0,903	1,80	1,05	2,00	1,00	1,84	0,98	1,76	0,13
2,00	0,63	1,703	0,581	1,80	0,94	1,75	0,93	1,78	0,93	1,85	0,81
1,93	0,91	1,578	0,457	1,80	0,94	1,75	0,93	1,78	0,93		
$\chi^2 = 54,829$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 < 0,05		1,26	1,41	1,71	0,62	1,72	0,68	1,63	0,52		
		1,78	0,806	1,87	0,87	1,81	0,46	1,93	0,87		
		1,862	1,15	1,87	0,87	1,81	0,46	1,50	0,25		
$r_s = 0,80$		1,69	0,96	1,85	0,93	1,62	0,78				
		2,17	0,752	1,88	0,81	1,62	0,78				
		$\chi^2 = 54,829$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0001 < 0,05		$\chi^2 = 17,526$ with 20° freedom P = 0,618 > 0,05		$\chi^2 = 17,028$ with 20° freedom P = 0,651 > 0,05		$\chi^2 = 10,226$ with 16° freedom P = 0,854 > 0,05			

Strongly Agree (1)
Agree (2)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (4)
Strongly Disagree (5)

With reference to Tables 28 and 29, as many as 85,84% of the respondents agreed, with 7,50% disagreeing, 6,67% being undecided. The median at 2 compared with the weighted mean of 1,81 and indicated a high level of agreement with the statement. The variance at 0,87 reinforces this suggestion.

An equal number of Africans and Indians (86,66%) agreed whilst 81,66% of the Coloureds agreed with statement 21. A high positive correlation was thus discerned. Furthermore, attitude towards statement 21 was independent of occupation, income, education, sex and age differences.

Before and particularly during the declaration of the state of emergency, a number of anti-apartheid campaigners have been detained without trial - these included children as young as eleven years old (Amnesty International, 1987 : 421). Furthermore, detention has been regardless of the nature of political opposition (ie. violent or non-violent) afforded by individuals.

All occupational categories agreed with statement 21. Some conflict of opinion was exhibited by the unskilled workers indicated by a high variance. On average, however, both skilled and unskilled workers agreed with the statement.

TABLE 30

Statement 25: The government is entrenching rather than dismantling apartheid.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	79 (43,88%)	22 (18,33%)	20 (33,33%)	121	33,61
Agree	57 (31,66%)	67 (55,83%)	25 (41,66%)	149	41,39
Undecided	33 (18,33%)	13 (10,83%)	9 (15,00%)	55	15,28
Disagree	8 (4,44%)	17 (14,16%)	6 (10,00%)	31	8,61
Strongly Disagree	3 (1,66%)	1 (0,83%)	0 (0,00%)	4	1,11
Median	2 (Agree)				

$\bar{X}_w = 2,02$
 $V = 0,94$

TABLE 31
STATEMENT 25

RACE	OCCUPATION	INCOME	EDUCATION	AGE	GENDER
Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V
AFRICAN 1,88 0,95	CLERK 1,904 0,66	LESS THAN R3 000 2,00 0,92	NONE (AND ILLITERATE) 1,66 0,24	BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS 1,90 0,80	MALE 1,88 0,84
INDIAN 2,20 1,02	PROFESSIONAL 1,85 0,65	BETWEEN R3 - R6 000 2,05 0,90	NONE (AND LITERATE) 1,75 0,68	26 - 35 2,03 0,93	FEMALE 2,15 0,98
COLOURED 2,00 0,95	SALES 1,73 0,21	BETWEEN R6 - R10 000 2,04 0,87	PRIMARY SCHOOL 2,00 0,80	36 - 45 2,18 1,13	$x^2 = 7,803$ with 4° freedom $P = 0,099$ $> 0,05$
$x^2 = 36,122$ with 8° freedom $P = 0,0001$ $< 0,05$	SELF-EMPLOYED 1,92 0,81	BETWEEN R10 - R15 000 2,01 0,91	JUNIOR SECONDARY 2,11 1,03	46 - 60 2,09 0,95	
	SKILLED WORKER 2,15 1,94	BETWEEN R15 - R25 000 2,16 0,61	SENIOR SECONDARY 1,97 0,80	OVER 60 2,33 0,88	
$\xi = 0,80$	UNSKILLED WORKER 2,06 0,96	MORE THAN R25 000 1,80 0,84	POST-MATRIC 2,12 1,27	$x^2 = 11,531$ with 16° freedom $P = 0,775$ $> 0,05$	
	STUDENT 1,78 0,80	$x^2 = 24,581$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,217$ $> 0,05$	$x^2 = 18,538$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,217$ $> 0,05$		
	OTHER 2,66 1,07				

Strongly Agree (1)
 Agree (2)
 Undecided (3)
 Disagree (4)

The following conclusions can be drawn from Tables 30 and 31. The median at 2 was compatible with the weighted mean at 2,02 indicating a high degree of agreement. The variance at 0,94 indicates a comparatively high degree of consensus.

As many as 75,55% of the Africans, with 74,16% of the Indians and 75,00% of the Coloureds agreed with Statement 25. Again, a high positive correlation coefficient showed agreement within the rankings.

The strong belief that the state is not dismantling apartheid but rather strengthening it, almost four years after the tricameral parliament has come into effect can only reveal the tricameral parliament as a structure without support from the two communities it is supposed to represent as well as the large community that it constitutionally excludes. The imminent further government created structures, legislation and policies do not seem to be able to effect any changes. It also suggests above all that changes thus far are not seen as far-reaching, but perhaps as another means to protect White hegemony.

The results contrast strongly with those of statement 18. It would follow that if people felt that the state is entrenching apartheid they would not view its so-called reform initiatives positively. Yet, there was general indecisiveness on that question - which as already maintained was probably due to apprehension, rather than political ambiguity.

As many as 6,11% of the Africans disagreed with statement 25, whilst 15,00% of the Indians and 10,00% of the Coloureds believed that the state was dismantling apartheid. Hence, a larger proportion of Indians were supportive of state initiatives.

An association exists between attitude towards statement 25 and occupation.

Income and educational qualifications were independent of attitude towards statement 25.

Men were a bit stronger in their belief, than women, that the government was entrenching rather than dismantling apartheid.

TABLE 32

Statement 27: At the moment the mass media covers news events adequately.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	3 (1,66%)	2 (1,66%)	5 (8,33%)	10	2,78
Agree	12 (6,64%)	18 (15,00%)	5 (8,33%)	35	9,72
Undecided	21 (11,66%)	4 (3,33%)	4 (6,66%)	29	8,06
Disagree	57 (31,66%)	72 (60,00%)	28 (46,66%)	157	43,61
Strongly Disagree	87 (48,33%)	24 (20,00%)	18 (30,00%)	129	35,83
Median	2 (Disagree)				

$\bar{X}_w = 2,00$
 $V = 1,08$

TABLE 33

STATEMENT 27

RACE	OCCUPATION	INCOME	EDUCATION	AGE	GENDER
Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V
AFRICAN 2,04 0,12	CLERK 1,97 0,88	LESS THAN R3 000 2,15 1,26	NONE (AND ILLITERATE) 1,66 0,22	BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS 1,92 1,09	MALE 1,94 1,09
INDIAN 2,18 0,96	PROFESSIONAL 1,93 0,87	BETWEEN R3 - R6 000 2,05 1,10	NONE (AND LITERATE) 2,25 0,93	26 - 35 1,95 1,09	FEMALE 2,05 1,49
COLOURED 2,18 1,43	SALES 2,05 0,99	BETWEEN R6 - R10 000 1,93 0,79	PRIMARY SCHOOL 2,24 1,38	36 - 45 2,04 0,96	$x^2 = 4,291$ with 4° freedom $P = 0,368$ $> 0,05$
$x^2 = 49,887$ with 8° freedom $P = 0,0001$ $< 0,05$	SELF-EMPLOYED 2,10 1,23	BETWEEN R10 - R15 000 2,00 1,19	JUNIOR SECONDARY 2,11 0,93	46 - 60 2,21 1,32	
	SKILLED WORKER 2,16 1,28	BETWEEN R15 - R25 000 2,11 1,14	SENIOR SECONDARY 2,04 1,20	OVER 60 1,66 0,55	
$r^2 = 0,80$	UNSKILLED WORKER 1,68 0,76	MORE THAN R25 000 1,42 0,24	POST-MATRIC 1,58 0,55	$x^2 = 14,644$ with 16° freedom $P = 0,550$ $> 0,05$	
	STUDENT 1,74 0,79	$x^2 = 40,993$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,0009$ $< 0,05$	$x^2 = 42,407$ with 4° freedom $P = 0,002$ $< 0,05$		
OTHER 2,46 1,12	$x^2 = 49,887$ with 28° freedom $P = 0,0001$ $< 0,05$				

- Strongly Agree (5)
- Agree (4)
- Undecided (3)
- Disagree (2)
- Strongly Disagree (1)

With reference to Tables 32 and 33, the median at 2 indicates agreement but the variance at 1,08 does not show consensus. However, a high positive correlation showed significant agreement amongst the ranking of attitudes of the different races.

Whilst there was no clear association between occupation and attitudes towards statement 27 the highest amount of disagreement came from the students, unskilled workers and professionals. It is mainly this sector of the population that is seriously affected by the curbing of the press. Inadequate media coverage of political events and unrest is due to the muzzling of the press under emergency regulations. Whilst the state is maintaining that the muzzling is to encourage objective reporting, all race and occupational groups were unanimous in their resentment of present media coverage.

An association existed between income and attitude towards the statement. Agreement to statement 27 tended to decrease as income increased, and then to increase as income further increased.

An association existed between education and attitude towards statement 27. Disagreement tends to decrease as educational qualifications increase. No significant differences between the different age groups or the different sexes were perceived.

TABLE 34

Statement 29: The tricameral parliament is not supported by people in my community.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	89 (49,44%)	16 (13,33%)	12 (20,00%)	117	32,50
Agree	61 (33,88%)	51 (42,50%)	21 (35,00%)	133	36,94
Undecided	16 (8,88%)	21 (17,50%)	16 (26,66%)	53	14,72
Disagree	9 (5,00%)	26 (21,66%)	10 (16,66%)	45	12,50
Strongly Disagree	5 (2,77%)	6 (5,00%)	1 (1,66%)	12	3,33
Median	2 (Agree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 2,17$$

$$V = 1,25$$

TABLE 35
STATEMENT 29

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		AGE		GENDER	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
1,77	1,01	2,26	1,09	2,06	1,19	2,33	0,23	2,23	1,29	1,94	1,09
2,64	1,16	2,09	1,12	2,03	1,24	2,50	2,00	2,13	1,28	2,05	1,49
2,45	1,08	1,57	0,66	2,16	1,24	2,12	1,06	1,96	1,01	$\chi^2 = 6,909$ with 4° freedom P = 0,140 >0,05	
$\chi^2 = 63,147$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 63,140$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 24,705$ with 20° freedom P = 0,213 >0,05		$\chi^2 = 19,785$ with 20° freedom P = 0,003 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 19,592$ with 16° freedom P = 0,239 >0,05			
										2,3	1,3
$\chi^2 = 63,147$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 63,140$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 24,705$ with 20° freedom P = 0,213 >0,05		$\chi^2 = 19,785$ with 20° freedom P = 0,003 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 19,592$ with 16° freedom P = 0,239 >0,05		$\chi^2 = 6,909$ with 4° freedom P = 0,140 >0,05	
$\chi^2 = 63,147$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 63,140$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 24,705$ with 20° freedom P = 0,213 >0,05		$\chi^2 = 19,785$ with 20° freedom P = 0,003 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 19,592$ with 16° freedom P = 0,239 >0,05		$\chi^2 = 6,909$ with 4° freedom P = 0,140 >0,05	
$\chi^2 = 63,147$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 63,140$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 24,705$ with 20° freedom P = 0,213 >0,05		$\chi^2 = 19,785$ with 20° freedom P = 0,003 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 19,592$ with 16° freedom P = 0,239 >0,05		$\chi^2 = 6,909$ with 4° freedom P = 0,140 >0,05	
$\chi^2 = 63,147$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 63,140$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 24,705$ with 20° freedom P = 0,213 >0,05		$\chi^2 = 19,785$ with 20° freedom P = 0,003 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 19,592$ with 16° freedom P = 0,239 >0,05		$\chi^2 = 6,909$ with 4° freedom P = 0,140 >0,05	
$\chi^2 = 63,147$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 63,140$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 24,705$ with 20° freedom P = 0,213 >0,05		$\chi^2 = 19,785$ with 20° freedom P = 0,003 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 19,592$ with 16° freedom P = 0,239 >0,05		$\chi^2 = 6,909$ with 4° freedom P = 0,140 >0,05	
$\chi^2 = 63,147$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 63,140$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 24,705$ with 20° freedom P = 0,213 >0,05		$\chi^2 = 19,785$ with 20° freedom P = 0,003 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 19,592$ with 16° freedom P = 0,239 >0,05		$\chi^2 = 6,909$ with 4° freedom P = 0,140 >0,05	

Strongly Agree (1)
Agree (2)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (4)
Strongly Disagree (5)

As many as 69,44% agreed with statement 29 whilst 15,83% disagreed and 14,72% were undecided. Of the Africans, 93,75% agreed whilst 55,83% of the Indians and 55,00% of the Coloureds agreed, while 26,66% of the Indians and 18,33% of the Coloureds disagreed, believing that people within their communities supported the tricameral parliament (Table 34). Whilst the median indicates that a large sector of the population is agreeable to statement 29's contention, the variance indicates the overall indecisiveness or lack of consensus on this issue. A low, but positive correlation coefficient reinforced this indication (Table 35).

The stronger resentment towards the tricameral parliament by the Africans than the Indians and Coloureds is clearly due to the fact that Africans were not offered representation in an acceptable parliament. The tricameral parliament is probably being viewed as inadequate in addressing the demands of the majority of the population. Given the low percentage polls at the 1984 Indian and Coloured elections, one would have expected resentment towards the tricameral

parliament to be significant. However, the degree of resentment was significantly less than that of the Africans. It would seem that although not supported by the majority of Indians and Coloureds, the tricameral parliament was becoming more acceptable to a sector of the population.

Whilst less Indians than Coloureds voted for the tricameral parliament in 1984, it seems now that a larger amount of Indians support the tricameral system. This could be a result of the lack of acceptable alternatives offered by opposition Indian extra-parliamentary forces since the election campaign.

The greatest amount of support for the tricameral parliament came from the "other" sector (unemployed, housewives and pensioners) whilst the greatest opposition came from the sales and unskilled workers. An association existed between attitude towards statement 29 and differences in income level. Disagreement tended to increase as income increased.

However the best educated sector was least supportive.

More men than women believed that the tricameral parliament was not supported by the communities. Again, there was a tendency for women to appear more sympathetic towards the State.

TABLE 36

Statement 31: People who criticise the government don't understand the complexities of the South African situation.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	10 (5,55%)	3 (2,50%)	3 (5,00%)	16	4,44
Agree	27 (15,00%)	55 (45,83%)	17 (28,33%)	99	27,50
Undecided	49 (27,22%)	7 (5,83%)	12 (20,00%)	68	18,89
Disagree	51 (28,33%)	38 (31,66%)	13 (21,66%)	102	28,33
Strongly Disagree	43 (23,88%)	17 (14,16%)	15 (25,00%)	75	20,83
Median	3 (Undecided)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 2,67$$

$$V = 1,46$$

TABLE 37
STATEMENT 31

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		AGE		GENDER			
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V		
AFRICAN		CLERK	LESS THAN	NONF (AND	BETWEEN	MALE							
2,50	1,36	2,50	1,39	R3 000	ILLITERATE)	16 - 25 YEARS	1,94	1,09					
INDIAN		PROFESSIONAL	BETWEEN	NONE (AND	26 - 35	FEMALE							
2,90	1,48	2,48	1,43	R3 - R6 000	LITERATE)	2,63	1,49	2,05	1,49				
COLOURED		SALES	BETWEEN	PRIMARY SCHOOL	36 - 45	$\chi^2 = 32,586$ with 4° freedom P = 0,0374 >0,05							
2,67	1,77	2,89	1,04	2,75	1,93							2,60	1,68
$\chi^2 = 49,235$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		SELF-EMPLOYED	BETWEEN	JUNIOR	46 - 60							2,87	1,17
		2,53	1,03	R6 - R10 000	2,72							1,64	
$\chi^2 = 0,30$		SKILLED WORKER	BETWEEN	SECONDARY	OVER 60							3,00	1,33
		2,72	1,50	R10 - R15 000	2,81	0,90							
		UNSKILLED WORKER	BETWEEN	SENIOR SECONDARY	$\chi^2 = 16,260$		with 16°		freedom		P = 0,435		
		2,34	1,53	R15 - R25 000	2,65	1,56	>0,05						
		STUDENT	BETWEEN	POST-MATRIC									
		2,06	0,87	2,45	1,48								
		OTHER	MORE THAN	2,37	0,61								
		3,48	0,91	R25 000									
		$\chi^2 = 63,358$		2,73	1,65								
		with 28°		$\chi^2 = 26,440$									
		freedom		with 20°									
		P = 0,0001		freedom									
		<0,05		P = 0,151									
				>0,05									

Strongly Agree (5)
Agree (4)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (2)
Strongly Disagree (1)

With reference to Tables 36 and 37, as many as 49,16% disagreed whilst 31,94% agreed, while 18,88% were undecided. Of the Africans, 20,56% agreed whilst 52,22% disagreed and 27,22% were undecided. Of the Indians, 48,33% agreed whilst 45,84% disagreed and 5,83% agreed whilst 46,67% disagreed and 20,00% were undecided. The median 3 as well as the high variance indicate the indecisiveness of or lack of consensus on this issue. A very low positive correlation coefficient showed little agreement within the rankings of attitude of the different races.

Whilst there was stronger belief that government critics do understand the complexity of the South African situation, a significant proportion were of a contrary belief suggesting some measure of dissension with existing leadership.

In particular there was stronger agreement amongst the Indians showing this group to be most dissatisfied with government critics. The least amount of dissatisfaction was existent amongst the Africans -

where a larger amount of people agreed that critics do understand the issues pertinent to South Africa.

It was mainly the self-employed, unskilled workers and "other" sectors that were agreeable to statement 31. There were no significant differences between the attitudes of the various income groups. However, the significantly high variance for each category showed the lack of consensus of respondents belonging to the various income groups.

An association existed between attitude towards statement 31 and educational level. Those with higher education disagreed more strongly with statement 31, than those with lower education.

Except for the unskilled workers as a group, the majority of those supporting critics of the government were largely (though not entirely) from more affluent backgrounds. An almost equal number of men and women disagreed and there were no significant differences in attitudes amongst the different age groups.

TABLE 38

Statement 32: The tricameral parliament has increased the unity of Indians and Coloureds.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	16 (8,88%)	1 (0,83%)	1 (1,66%)	18	5,00
Agree	35 (19,44%)	26 (21,66%)	10 (16,66%)	71	19,72
Undecided	56 (31,11%)	14 (11,66%)	9 (15,00%)	79	21,94
Disagree	39 (21,66%)	58 (48,33%)	19 (31,66%)	116	32,22
Strongly Disagree	34 (18,88%)	21 (17,50%)	25 (41,66%)	76	21,11
Median	2 (Disagree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 2,55$$

$$V = 1,37$$

The strongest disagreement to statement 32 came from the professionals and the students. The most indecisive were the unskilled workers.

A further association exists between attitude towards statement 32 and differences in income earned. Disagreement tended to increase as income increased.

No relationship existed between attitude and sex differences. Both men and women disagreed that the tricameral parliament has increased the unity of Indians and Coloureds.

TABLE 40

Statement 35: SADF raids on ANC bases should be conducted to enable the state to continue with its reform programme.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	5 (3,89%)	4 (3,33%)	0 (0,00%)	11	3,06
Agree	10 (5,56%)	37 (30,83%)	5 (8,33%)	52	14,44
Undecided	30 (16,67%)	21 (17,50%)	24 (40,00%)	75	20,83
Disagree	49 (27,22%)	45 (37,50%)	14 (23,33%)	108	30,00
Strongly Disagree	84 (46,67%)	13 (10,83%)	17 (28,33%)	114	31,67
Median	2 (Disagree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 2,27$$

$$V = 1,31$$

Of the total respondents, 61,67% disagreed whilst 17,50% agreed. Of the Africans 73,88% disagreed whilst 48,33% of the Indians and 51,66% of the Coloureds disagreed (Table 40). A low positive correlation coefficient was discerned when the scores of the different race groups were ranked (Table 41)..

Most disagreed with the SADF's raids on the ANC not only because it was a violent form of opposition but probably also because the ANC is actually comprised of mainly Black people from South Africa, and African people in particular. This accounts for the fact that a larger number of Africans opposed the raids than Indians and Coloureds.

TABLE 41
STATEMENT 35

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE			
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V		
AFRICAN		CLERK		LESS THAN R3 000		NONE (AND ILLITERATE)		MALE		BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS			
1,92	1,23	2,35	1,32	2,29	1,46	2,33	0,22	2,13	0,48	2,22	1,26		
INDIAN		PROFESSIONAL		BETWEEN R3 - R6 000		NONE (AND LITERATE)		FEMALE		26 - 35			
2,78	1,23	2,96	0,59	2,41	1,56	1,62	0,73	2,40	1,19	2,29	1,47		
COLOURED		SALES		BETWEEN R6 - R10 000		PRIMARY SCHOOL		$x^2 = 13,132$ with 4° freedom P = 0,010 < 0,05		36 - 45			
2,28	0,96	2,15	1,18	2,18	1,30	2,44	1,84			2,29	0,58	2,57	0,74
$x^2 = 81,753$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 < 0,05		SELF-EMPLOYED		BETWEEN R10 - R15 000		JUNIOR SECONDARY		$x^2 = 13,302$ with 16° freedom P = 0,656 > 0,05		46 - 60			
		SKILLED WORKER		2,39		1,54				2,41		0,80	
$t_3 = 0,4$		UNSKILLED WORKER		BETWEEN R15 - R25 000		SENIOR SECONDARY		$x^2 = 28,146$ with 20° freedom P = 0,106 > 0,05		OVER 60			
		2,06		1,23		2,19				0,91		2,16	
$x^2 = 51,333$ with 28° freedom P = 0,004 < 0,05		STUDENT		MORE THAN R25 000		POST-MATRIC		$x^2 = 14,138$ with 20° freedom P = 0,823 > 0,05		2,03		1,36	
		2,97		1,7		2,15				0,89		2,15	

Strongly Agree (5)
Agree (4)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (2)
Strongly Disagree (1)

The weighted mean reinforced the median, indicating disagreement; however, the variance did not suggest a high degree of consensus.

An association existed between attitude and occupation. Some support for SADF raids was found amongst the unemployed, housewives and pensioners whilst the strongest opposition was exhibited by the professionals and unskilled workers.

Whilst disagreement towards SADF raids tended to increase as income level increased, this was not significant. Strongest disagreement came from the best educated and least educated categories.

There seemed to be some differences between male and female responses. Men disagreed more strongly, showing that men on average were more critical of SADF raids on ANC bases than women.

TABLE 42

Statement 36: SADF raids in neighbouring states are increasing the regions instability.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	106 (58,89%)	16 (13,33%)	19 (31,67%)	141	39,17
Agree	56 (31,11%)	65 (54,17%)	22 (36,67%)	143	39,72
Undecided	9 (5,00%)	20 (16,67%)	12 (20,00%)	41	11,39
Disagree	4 (2,22%)	17 (14,17%)	6 (10,00%)	27	7,50
Strongly Disagree	5 (2,78%)	2 (1,67%)	1 (1,67%)	8	2,22
Median	2 (Agree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 1,94$$

$$V = 1,01$$

TABLE 43

STATEMENT 36

RACE	OCCUPATION	INCOME	EDUCATION	GENDER	AGE
Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V
AFRICAN 1,58 0,837	CLERK 2,00 1,00	LESS THAN R3 000 1,84 0,96	NONE (AND ILLITERATE) 1,66 0,22	MALE 1,87 0,62	BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS 1,87 0,95
INDIAN 2,36 0,92	PROFESSIONAL 1,81 0,85	BETWEEN R3 - R6 000 1,96 1,04	NONE (AND LITERATE) 1,12 0,10	FEMALE 2,00 0,90	26 - 35 2,03 1,10
COLOURED 2,13 1,06	SALES 1,68 0,53	BETWEEN R6 - R10 000 1,93 1,02	PRIMARY SCHOOL 1,88 0,50	$x^2 = 9,265$ with 4° freedom P = 0,054 >0,05	36 - 45 1,96 0,81
$x^2 = 77,078$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 0,05	SELF-EMPLOYED 1,89 0,73	BETWEEN R10 - R15 000 2,03 1,12	JUNIOR SECONDARY 2,01 0,99		46 - 60 1,98 0,85
	SKILLED WORKER 2,12 1,33	BETWEEN R15 - R25 000 1,95 0,85	SENIOR SECONDARY 1,99 1,06	OVER 60 1,33 0,22	
$t_5 = 0,60$	UNSKILLED WORKER 1,62 1,06	MORE THAN R25 000 1,84 0,84	POST-MATRIC 1,81 1,05	$x^2 = 10,170$ with 16° freedom P = 0,857 >0,05	
	STUDENT 1,74 0,79	$x^2 = 48,791$ with 28° freedom P = 0,088 >0,05	$x^2 = 8,187$ with 20° freedom P = 0,972 >0,05		$x^2 = 25,652$ with 20° freedom P = 0,177 >0,05
OTHER 2,38 1,74					

Strongly Agree (1)
Agree (2)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (4)
Strongly Disagree (5)

As many as 78,88% of the sample agreed whilst 9,72% disagreed and 11,90% were undecided (Table 42). The median at 2 showed a strong tendency towards agreement whilst the mean at 1,94 showed responses ranging between strongly agree and agree, but tending towards agree (Tables 42 and 43).

Of the Africans, 90,00% agreed whilst 67,50% of the Indians and 68,33% of the Coloureds agreed. As in the results of the previous statement, the African population appeared more resentful of the destabilising effects of the SADF raids. A moderate correlation coefficient showed agreement within the rankings.

Attitudes towards statement 36 and differences in income earned were independent of each other. Similarly, no significant difference was noted amongst the frequencies of respondents with different educational qualifications.

A greater number of men and older people agreed with statement 36 than women and younger people.

TABLE 44

Statement 44: The government needs to ban/outlaw organisations calling for rapid change.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	4 (2,22%)	4 (3,33%)	2 (3,33%)	10	2,78
Agree	12 (6,67%)	25 (20,83%)	6 (10,00%)	43	11,94
Undecided	26 (14,44%)	10 (8,33%)	9 (15,00%)	45	12,50
Disagree	67 (37,22%)	61 (50,83%)	27 (45,00%)	155	43,06
Strongly Disagree	71 (39,44%)	20 (16,67%)	16 (26,67%)	107	29,72
Median	2 (Disagree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 2,15$$

$$V = 1,13$$

However disagreement was not as strong amongst the other occupational categories. It was mainly the professionals/student grouping and the unskilled worker grouping that were represented in popular political and trade union structures, respectively.

Attitude was relatively constant when income groups were reviewed. However, there was a tendency for disagreement to increase slightly as income increased.

When educational qualifications were taken into consideration, it was found that the most disagreeable to statement 44 were the best and the least educated.

There was no clear association between the attitudes of men and women. Less women than men disagreed with statement 44. It would appear that the greater concentration of women in the domestic sphere has left them more sceptical or conservative in socio-political matters.

TABLE 46

Statement 54: Granting independence to all the Bantustans would result in the development of the people in those areas.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	12 (6,67%)	3 (2,50%)	1 (1,67%)	16	4,44
Agree	29 (16,11%)	55 (45,83%)	12 (20,00%)	96	26,67
Undecided	23 (12,78%)	18 (15,00%)	14 (23,33%)	55	15,28
Disagree	50 (27,78%)	31 (25,83%)	18 (30,00%)	99	27,50
Strongly Disagree	66 (36,67%)	13 (10,83%)	15 (25,00%)	94	26,11
Median	2 (Disagree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 2,56$$

$$V = 1,57$$

TABLE 47
STATEMENT 54

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE			
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V		
2,27	1,69	2,57	1,43	2,66	1,60	3,00	1,80	2,40	0,47	2,64	1,62		
3,03	1,12	2,93	0,99	2,77	1,65	2,62	1,60	2,71	1,45	2,39	1,59		
2,43	1,25	2,36	1,23	2,77	1,65	2,62	1,60	x ² = 11,147 with 4° freedom P = 0,025 < 0,05	2,63	1,64	2,48	1,28	
x ² = 51,104 with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 < 0,05	2,46	1,67	2,51	1,89	2,72	1,64	2,66						1,55
r _s = 0,30	2,66	1,59	2,58	1,91	2,62	1,09	2,57	1,51	x ² = 12,181 with 16° freedom P = 0,731 > 0,05	2,66	1,55	2,66	1,55
	2,65	2,08	2,71	1,68	2,32	1,08	2,32	1,08					
	3,12	1,08	2,60	1,77	2,60	1,77	2,32	1,08	x ² = 24,778 with 20° freedom P = 0,210 > 0,05				
	x ² = 42,706 with 28° freedom P = 0,0372 < 0,05			x ² = 15,954 with 20° freedom P = 0,719 > 0,05									

Strongly Agree (5)
Agree (4)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (2)
Strongly Disagree (1)

With reference to Tables 46 and 47, 53,61% of the respondents disagreed whilst 31,11% agreed. On the one hand, 22,77% of the Africans agreed whilst 48,33% of the Indians and 21,66% of the Coloureds agreed. On the other hand, 64,45% of the Africans disagreed whilst 36,66% of the Indians and 55,00% of the Coloureds disagreed. A low positive correlation coefficient was discerned.

Stronger disagreement from the Africans as compared to the other two groups, in particular the Indians, shows the minority groups' lack of understanding of the other groups' needs - but at the same time projects some of its fears. The large amount of Indians supporting Bantustan independence, shows the fear that may prevail over the question of majority rule or greater non-racial participation. The stronger opposition to Bantustan independence reflects, amongst Africans a unity between opposition ideologies because both the UDF and Inkatha oppose Bantustan independence.

The median at 2, indicates a high degree of disagreement. However, contrasted with the weighted mean at 2,56 indications are that the average is closer to 3 (undecided) than 2 (disagree). The variance at 1,57 shows a lack of consensus.

Again, an association exists between occupational status and attitude towards statement 54. More professionals disagreed whilst a significant proportion of sales staff, students, clerks and unskilled workers also disagreed. Lesser disagreement was exhibited by the self-employed, the skilled workers and the unemployed.

No association exists between income and educational differences and attitudes towards statement 54.

Less women disagreed than men. As in previous statements, women exhibited more conservative beliefs in this case showing less disagreement towards independence of Bantustans.

No association existed between age and attitude towards statement 54. But, 30,53% of those over 35 years agreed with this statement, whilst 31,44% of those under 35 years agreed.

TABLE 48

Statement 55: The Group Areas Act serves the important function of allowing people to develop their own culture within their own communities.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	14 (7,78%)	3 (2,50%)	1 (1,67%)	18	5,00
Agree	22 (12,22%)	50 (41,67%)	13 (21,67%)	85	23,61
Undecided	28 (15,56%)	8 (6,67%)	10 (16,67%)	46	12,78
Disagree	53 (29,44%)	38 (31,67%)	19 (31,67%)	110	30,56
Strongly Disagree	63 (35,00%)	21 (17,50%)	17 (28,33%)	101	28,06
Median	2 (Disagree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 2,47$$

$$V = 1,59$$

significant support, probably because of the importance this community places on cultural preservation.

There were significant differences or associations amongst the race, occupational, income, educational groups and the different sexes. Attitude, however was independent of age differences.

The most prestigious occupational categories were less agreeable. These include professionals, the self-employed, the students, the clerks and the skilled workers. Less disagreeable were the unskilled workers and the unemployed.

The tendency for disagreement to increase as income increased was again confirmed. The higher income groups disagreed more strongly than the lower income groups.

Those with higher educational qualifications disagreed more strongly that the Group Areas Act facilitated cultural preservation, than those with lower educational qualifications.

A significant difference between gender responses was discerned. Women generally were closer to "undecided" than to "disagree" as compared to the strong disagreement exhibited by the men. Women, again exhibit more conservative views than men.

TABLE 50

Statement 56: Constant consultation between Bantustan leaders and the government would resolve problems existent in these areas.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	26 (14,44%)	3 (2,50%)	6 (10,00%)	35	9,72
Agree	50 (27,78%)	69 (57,50%)	24 (40,00%)	143	39,72
Undecided	34 (18,89%)	9 (7,50%)	11 (18,33%)	54	15,00
Disagree	39 (21,67%)	25 (20,83%)	13 (21,67%)	77	21,39
Strongly Disagree	31 (17,22%)	14 (11,67%)	6 (10,00%)	51	14,17
Median	3 (Undecided)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 3,09$$

$$V = 1,56$$

TABLE 51
STATEMENT 56

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE				
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V			
3,00	1,79	3,07	1,44	3,23	1,90	3,33	0,88	2,84	0,59	3,13	0,98			
3,18	1,33	2,72	1,38	BETWEEN R3 - R6 000		NONE (AND ILLITERATE)		FEMALE		BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS				
3,18	1,39	2,94	1,94	3,24	1,44	2,62	1,13	3,11	0,04	3,07	1,80			
$\chi^2 = 35,822$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 0,05	SELF-EMPLOYED		BETWEEN R6 - R10 000		PRIMARY SCHOOL		$\chi^2 = 17,406$ with 4° freedom P = 0,0016 <0,05		26 - 35		36 - 45			
	3,21		3,17		3,24				3,03		46 - 60		3,09	
	1,81		1,22		1,62				1,53		OVER 60		3,16	
$r_s = 0,30$	SKILLED WORKER		BETWEEN R10 - R15 000		JUNIOR SECONDARY		$\chi^2 = 16,014$ with 20° freedom P = 0,715 >0,05		3,18		3,16			
	3,18		3,01		3,18				1,13		$\chi^2 = 7,0344$ with 16° freedom P = 0,972 >0,05			
	1,73		1,35		1,57				1,13					
UNSKILLED WORKER		BETWEEN R15 - R25 000		SENIOR SECONDARY		3,13		1,45						
3,06		2,73		2,73		2,84		1,71						
1,33		1,57		1,57		1,71								
STUDENT		OTHER		MORE THAN R25 000										
3,07		3,48		2,73										
1,31		0,86		1,89										
		$\chi^2 = 46,190$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0167 <0,05		$\chi^2 = 47,163$ with 20° freedom P = 0,0006 <0,05										

Strongly Agree (5)
Agree (4)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (2)
Strongly Disagree (1)

With reference to Tables 50 and 51, 49,44% agreed whilst 35,55% disagreed and 15,00% were undecided. The median at 3 compared with the weighted mean at 3,09 indicates a very low degree of obligation. Variance at 1,56 indicates a lack of consensus. A relatively low positive correlation coefficient was discerned.

Whilst Africans were divided on this issue (shown by the significant lack of consensus) a greater number of Indian and Coloured respondents agreed.

An association exists between attitude towards statement 56 and differences in occupational and income level. A greater number of the unemployed agreed as well as a significant proportion of the skilled workers and the self-employed. Less agreement was exhibited by the clerks, the sales staff, the students and the professionals. The professionals were least supportive of consultations with

Bantustan leaders. Similarly, as income increased disagreement to the statement increased.

Stronger agreement than disagreement showed the urgency with which Black people, particularly less affluent people, viewed the necessity for resolving problems in the region through the use of even collaborative strategies. Whilst the support for Bantustan leader - government consultation was more definite amongst the Indians and Coloureds, there was less confidence expressed by the African sector. However, the greater overall confidence towards consultation could also be discerned from the fact that some respondents recognise that Buthelezi, who has a presence in the area, is in a position to consult with governmental authorities.

The tendency towards agreement within the sample is a result of far greater support amongst women than men towards consultation.

TABLE 52

Statement 58: The Government should hold talks only with organisations that reject violence.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	8 (4,44%)	5 (4,17%)	4 (6,67%)	17	4,72
Agree	14 (7,78%)	35 (29,17%)	13 (21,67%)	62	17,22
Undecided	37 (20,56%)	13 (10,83%)	11 (18,34%)	61	16,94
Disagree	52 (28,89%)	54 (45,00%)	23 (38,34%)	129	35,83
Strongly Disagree	69 (38,33%)	13 (10,83%)	9 (15,00%)	91	25,28
Median	2 (Disagree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 2,40$$

$$V = 1,38$$

TABLE 53
STATEMENT 58

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
AFRICAN		CLERK		LESS THAN R3 000		NONE (AND ILLITERATE)		MALE		BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS	
2,11	1,29	2,45	1,00	2,40	1,5	2,66	0,22	2,18	1,19	2,46	1,39
INDIAN		PROFESSIONAL		BETWEEN R3 - R6 000		NONE (AND LITERATE)		FEMALE		26 - 35	
2,70	1,28	2,03	1,07	2,47	1,37	2,37	1,48	2,62	0,10	2,38	1,37
COLOURED		SALES		BETWEEN R6 - R10 000		PRIMARY SCHOOL		$x^2 = 12,647$ with 4° freedom P = 0,0013 < 0,05		36 - 45	
2,66	1,37	2,63	1,81	2,44	1,33	2,28	0,39			2,47	1,52
$x^2 = 54,529$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 < 0,05		SELF-EMPLOYED		BETWEEN R10 - R15 000		JUNIOR SECONDARY		$x^2 = 6,089$ with 16° freedom P = 0,987 > 0,05		46 - 60	
		SKILLED WORKER		2,50		1,33				2,46	
$\chi^2 = 0,30$		UNSKILLED WORKER		BETWEEN R15 - R25 000		SENIOR SECONDARY		$x^2 = 22,146$ with 20° freedom P = 0,332 > 0,05		OVER 60	
		2,37		1,98		2,46				1,53	
$\chi^2 = 57,803$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0008 < 0,05		STUDENT		MORE THAN R25 000		POST-MATRIC		$x^2 = 40,415$ with 20° freedom P = 0,004 < 0,05			
		2,15		1,24		2,19					
$\chi^2 = 40,415$ with 20° freedom P = 0,004 < 0,05		OTHER									
		2,94		1,12							

Strongly Agree (5)
Agree (4)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (2)
Strongly Disagree (1)

The median indicated disagreement (Table 52). The variance at 1,38 showed a lack of consensus. A low positive correlation, however, showed limited agreement.

Of the Africans, 67,22% disagreed whilst 55,83% of the Indians and 53,33% of the Coloureds disagreed. Hence, the government position on outlawed organisations renouncing violence rather than merely suspending it, was not supported by the majority of Black people.

Stronger disagreement came from the more affluent sectors. However, the middle income group tended not to disagree as much as the lowest income group.

This was further confirmed by comparisons within the occupational sector. Whilst the professionals and students were most disagreeable, so too were the unskilled workers as compared with the skilled workers and the self-employed.

There was no clear association between attitude towards statement 58 and educational qualifications. Strongest disagreement, however, came from the most educated group.

A greater number of men were of the opinion that the government should hold talks with organisations that do not reject violence, than women. This is consistent with the trend exhibited thus far.

TABLE 54

Statement 60: I feel frustrated because I don't have political rights.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	122 (67,78%)	25 (20,83%)	18 (30,00%)	165	45,83
Agree	23 (12,78%)	58 (48,33%)	25 (40,00%)	105	29,17
Undecided	4 (2,22%)	16 (13,33%)	8 (13,33%)	28	7,78
Disagree	29 (16,11%)	18 (15,00%)	10 (16,67%)	57	15,83
Strongly Disagree	2 (1,11%)	3 (2,50%)	0 (0,00%)	5	1,39
Median	2 (Agree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 1,98$$

$$V = 1,30$$

The following conclusions can be drawn from Tables 54 and 55: 75,00% of the respondents agreed whilst 17,22% disagreed; 7,78% were uncertain. The weighted mean at 1,98 varied between strongly agree and agree, but remained closer to agree; this was reinforced by the median at 2. The variance at 1,30 however, did not reflect a significantly high degree of consensus. However, a relatively strong positive correlation coefficient was discerned.

Within the African sector, 80,55% agreed (67,78% had strongly agreed). Within the Indian sector, 69,16% agreed (20,83% had strongly agreed). Within the Coloured sector, 70,00% agreed (30,00% had strongly agreed).

The stronger agreement expressed by the Africans illustrates the severe frustration experienced by this community. The frustration is evident but not to the same degree by the other communities

TABLE 55
STATEMENT 60

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE		
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	
AFRICAN		CLERK		LESS THAN R3 000		NONE (AND ILLITERATE)		MALE		BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS		
1,70	0,99	2,11	1,15	2,30	1,38	2,00	1,89	1,81	1,18	2,00	1,27	
INDIAN		PROFESSIONAL		BETWEEN R3 - R6 000		NONE (AND LITERATE)		FEMALE		26 - 35		
2,30	1,07	1,77	0,42	2,05	1,49	1,12	0,18	2,13	1,35	2,08	1,27	
COLOURED		SALES		BETWEEN R6 - R10 000		PRIMARY SCHOOL		$x^2 = 10,61$ with 4° freedom P = 0,031 < 0,05		36 - 45		
2,16	1,07	1,84	1,18	1,90	1,17	1,68	0,85			2,00	1,27	
$x^2 = 89,036$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 < 0,05		SELF-EMPLOYED		BETWEEN R10 - R15 000		JUNIOR SECONDARY		$x^2 = 10,11$ with 16° freedom P = 0,764 > 0,05		46 - 60		
		SKILLED WORKER		BETWEEN R15 - R25 000		SENIOR SECONDARY				OVER 60		
$\bar{r}_5 = 0,70$		UNSKILLED WORKER		BETWEEN MORE THAN R25 000		POST-MATRIC		$x^2 = 29,709$ with 20° freedom P = 0,074 > 0,05		1,79		1,25
		STUDENT		OTHER		OTHER				1,50		0,25
		1,75		1,76	1,96		2,2					
		1,87		1,19	1,97		1,07					
		2,71		1,07	1,92		0,76					
		$x^2 = 50,149$ with 28° freedom P = 0,006 < 0,05		$x^2 = 12,527$ with 20° freedom P = 0,896 > 0,05								

Strongly Agree (1)
Agree (2)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (4)
Strongly Disagree (5)

that have been to some extent differentially incorporated into the political and economic infrastructure.

An association between attitude towards statement 60 and occupational level was evident. Whilst agreement was relatively constant amongst all categories, the unemployed (including the housewives and pensioners) tended not to agree. The weighted mean here was close to "undecided". The unemployed, thus far, have appeared as an apathetic and alienated group whose responses have contradicted those of the majority of respondents.

There was no significant difference amongst the responses of the different income groups as well as among those with different educational qualifications. It is significant to note that frustration at being excluded from the political processes was stronger amongst the older group, i.e., those over 35 years as opposed to the younger group, i.e., under 35 years old. Whilst

it is being maintained in political circles that the political initiative is lying increasingly in the hands of the youth; on average, there appears to be somewhat greater frustration on the part of the older sector.

The fact that fewer women agreed with statement 56, than men, shows the greater political apathy of women in general.

TABLE 56

Statement 64: Political organisations working outside of parliament should be supported.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	43 (23,89%)	13 (10,83%)	12 (20,00%)	68	18,89
Agree	47 (26,11%)	57 (47,50%)	21 (35,00%)	125	34,72
Undecided	53 (29,44%)	18 (15,00%)	15 (25,00%)	86	23,89
Disagree	28 (15,56%)	30 (25,00%)	12 (20,00%)	70	19,44
Strongly Disagree	9 (5,00%)	2 (1,67%)	0 (0,00%)	11	3,06
Median	2 (Disagree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 2,53$$

$$V = 1,20$$

Out of the total, 53,61% agreed whilst 23,89% were undecided and 22,50% disagreed (Table 56). The mean at 2,53 showed that respondents were between undecided and agree whilst the median at 2, shows that respondents were tending towards agree. The variance at 1,2 indicates the lack of consensus. A moderate correlation coefficient was discerned (Tables 56 and 57).

On the whole, 50,00% of the Africans, 58,00% of the Indians and 55,00% of the Coloureds agreed. But, 20,56% of the Africans, 26,67% of the Indians and 20,00% of the Coloureds disagreed. Furthermore, 29,44% of the Africans chose to remain undecided.

All race groups supported extraparliamentary organisations, in particular the Indians. This could be a result of the long history of support for anti-state organisations by the Indian community.

TABLE 57

STATEMENT 64

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE		
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	
AFRICAN		CLERK		LESS THAN		NONE (AND		MALE		BETWEEN		
2,51	1,36	2,54	1,15	R3 000		ILLITERATE)		2,25	1,13	16 - 25 YEARS		
INDIAN		PROFESSIONAL		2,56	1,19	3,00	0,66	FEMALE		2,37	1,10	
2,59	1,06	2,64	1,07	BETWEEN		NONE (AND		1,80	1,36	26 - 35		
COLOURED		SALES		R3 - R6 000		LITERATE)		$\chi^2 = 14,02$ with 4° freedom P = 0,007 < 0,05		2,61	1,78	
2,45	1,04	2,68	1,98	2,48	1,80	2,25	0,68		36 - 45		2,75	1,16
$\chi^2 = 30,49$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0002 < 0,05		SELF-EMPLOYED		BETWEEN		PRIMARY SCHOOL			46 - 60		2,64	0,67
		2,50	1,17	R6 - R10 000		2,76	1,30		OVER 60		3,00	1,33
		SKILLED WORKER		2,64	1,11	BETWEEN			JUNIOR		$\chi^2 = 19,42$ with 16° freedom P = 0,247 > 0,05	
	2,44	1,13	R10 - R15 000		SECONDARY		2,63	0,42				
	UNSKILLED WORKER		2,29	1,64	SENIOR		2,51	1,23				
$\chi^2 = 33,036$ with 28° freedom P = 0,158 > 0,05		STUDENT		BETWEEN		SECONDARY		2,41	1,13			
		2,19	1,18	R15 - R25 000		2,64	1,43	POST-MATRIC				
		OTHER		2,74	0,85	MORE THAN		R25 000				
$\chi^2 = 0,70$				2,26	1,04	2,26	1,04	$\chi^2 = 13,87$ with 20° freedom P = 0,837 > 0,05				
				$\chi^2 = 18,859$ with 20° freedom P = 0,531 > 0,05								

Strongly Agree (1)
Agree (2)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (4)
Strongly Disagree (5)

However, the largest number of disagreeing respondents were also Indians - showing that the pro-parliamentary forces were also beginning to counter the traditional support for opposition to state initiatives. The large amount of Africans and Coloureds that were undecided exemplified the reluctance of those population groupings to express a positive or negative answer, as well as considerable apathy prevalent. Moreover, the difference within Coloured responses also show the tensions between pro- and anti-parliamentary forces. Within the African sector, the differences in strategy between Inkatha and other extraparliamentary forces may also be highlighted.

No association existed between attitude towards statement 64 and income, occupation, education and age. The greatest amount of support for organisations not working with the government came from the students and the skilled workers. Support from the various

income groups was relatively constant. Agreement was stronger amongst those with higher rather than lower education. At the same time there was very little consensus amongst the more educated categories.

TABLE 58

Statement 66: Commissions of inquiry that establish causes of problems, can be used as a means for bringing about changes.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	38 (21,11%)	9 (7,50%)	6 (10,00%)	53	14,72
Agree	88 (48,89%)	75 (62,50%)	37 (61,67%)	200	55,56
Undecided	23 (12,78%)	14 (11,67%)	11 (18,33%)	48	13,33
Disagree	16 (8,89%)	11 (9,17%)	3 (5,00%)	30	8,33
Strongly Disagree	15 (8,33%)	11 (9,17%)	3 (5,00%)	29	8,09
Median	4 Agree				

$\bar{X}_w = 3,61$
 $V = 1,19$

TABLE 59

STATEMENT 66

RACE	OCCUPATION	INCOME	EDUCATION	GENDER	AGE
Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V
AFRICAN 3,65 1,34	CLERK 3,42 1,19	LESS THAN R3 000 3,53 1,32	NONE (AND ILLITERATE) 4,00 0	MALE 3,56 1,53	BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS 2,42 1,22
INDIAN 3,50 1,13	PROFESSIONAL 3,35 1,37	BETWEEN R3 - R6 000 3,55 1,26	NONE (AND LITERATE) 2,87 0,35	FEMALE 3,82 0,80	26 - 35 2,53 0,36
COLOURED 3,66 0,84	SALES 3,57 1,82	BETWEEN R6 - R10 000 3,81 0,81	PRIMARY SCHOOL 3,76 1,14	$x^2 = 14,23$ with 4° freedom $P = 0,006$ $< 0,05$	36 - 45 2,26 0,85
$x^2 = 16,316$ with 8° freedom $P = 0,038$ $< 0,05$	SELF-EMPLOYED 3,78 1,17	BETWEEN R10 - R15 000 3,82 0,67	JUNIOR SECONDARY 3,59 1,27		46 - 60 2,31 0,74
	SKILLED WORKER 3,61 1,18	BETWEEN R15 - R25 000 3,26 0,93	SENIOR SECONDARY 3,66 1,4		OVER 60 1,83 0,13
$r_s = 0,90$	JNSKILLED WORKER 3,79 0,99	MORE THAN R25 000 3,38 1,69	POST-MATRIC 3,72 1,88		$x^2 = 22,54$ with 16 freedom $P = 0,126$ 0,05
	STUDENT 3,72 1,11	$x^2 = 16,316$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,0381$ $< 0,05$	$x^2 = 49,06$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,0003$ $< 0,05$		
	OTHER 3,66 0,68				

Strongly Agree (5)
 Agree (4)
 Undecided (3)
 Disagree (2)

With reference to Tables 58 and 59: the mean at 3,61 is closer to 4 (agree) than 3 (undecided) whilst the median at 4 indicates a significant degree of agreement. However, the variance does not indicate significant consensus. The very high positive correlation coefficient however, indicates very significant agreement within the rankings of the different race groups.

It appears that 70,00% of the African and Indian respondents as well as 71,66% of the Coloured respondents agreed. Irrespective of inevitable governmental influences over commissions of inquiry, most Black people would see these as a step towards constructive change. There were similar degrees of agreement from all race groups involved.

Some differences were exhibited by the different occupational groups.

The professionals and clerks were closer to "undecided" whilst the remaining occupational categories were closer to "disagree".

No association existed between statement 66 and income. As far as educational background was concerned, there was a tendency for agreement to increase as qualifications increased.

An association existed between statement 66 and gender differences. More women than men supported commissions of inquiry.

6.1.1 of Summary conclusions on intraparliamentary strategies for change

Examination of responses to specific statements in the schedule suggest that people do not support and are very uncertain about the authenticity of reform initiatives, believing strongly that the state is entrenching rather than dismantling apartheid. Uncertainty was evident over whether change could be elicited through a change in the white government. A very high consensus was evident on people's perceptions on the lack of freedom of speech. A significantly high number of people believe that detentions are only worsening the situation in the country.

A high degree of dissatisfaction was expressed over media coverage of unrest events as a result of press curbing by the state. However, there was indecisiveness over the question of support for the tricameral parliament. Whilst most people agreed that the communities did not support the tricameral parliament, only 55,00% of the Indians and Coloureds agreed. More Africans than Indians and Coloureds believed that the tricameral parliament has increased the unity of Indians and Coloureds.

Whilst most believed that government critics understand the complexities of the South African situation, there was still uncertainty on this question.

Respondents did not support SADF raids on ANC bases with strong agreement that the SADF is destabilising the region. None of the groups supported the banning of organisations calling for rapid change.

Mainly Africans and Coloureds rejected the belief that Bantustan independence was a prerequisite to development in those areas. On the question of whether the Group Areas allows people to develop their own culture within their own community, there was a considerable lack of consensus. Whilst the majority disagreed, differences did exist.

Most people were frustrated because they did not have political rights and most believed that the government should hold talks with "violent organisations". Most believed as well that organisations working outside of parliament should be supported.

Contradicting rejection of intraparlimentary strategies, was the belief by most people that problems could be resolved through consultation between the government and Bantustan leaders, as well as the belief that commissions of inquiry can be used as a means towards change.

More men than women tended to be unsupportive of state ideology and

TABLE 60

INFERENCE FROM PROPORTIONAL STRATIFIED SAMPLES TO THE POPULATION

<u>Population</u>	<u>African</u>	<u>Indian</u>	<u>Coloured</u>	<u>Total</u>
(a) Absolute size	2 580 847	552 819	63 929	3 197 595
(b) Relative size	80,7	17,3	2	100
<u>Proportional/Cluster Sample</u>				
(c) Absolute size	180	120	60	360
(d) Percent supportive of intraparliamentary change	8,33	20,83	18,33	(14,16) $\frac{51}{360}$
(1) Absolute size (d x a)	214 985	115 152	11 718	341 855
(2) Relative size (d x b)	6,72%	3,6%	1,56%	(11,88%)

Hence, 11,88% (almost 12,00%) of the Black population support intraparliamentary strategies as opposed to 14,16% when the ratio 3 : 2 : 1 is used.

However, the two figures are relatively close, thus showing the reliability of the proportional method.

initiatives. Stronger disagreement as well tended to emerge from the higher income and higher educated respondents as well as from the professional and sales personnel.

There were no significant differences in attitudes reflected by the different age groups.

In the final analysis it can be stated that Black people do not support intraparlimentary assumptions and strategies largely because of a tendency to view the State as illegitimate and due to its seeming refusal to move towards genuine negotiation. The support for consultation, no matter how limited, emphasises this point.

6.2 Extraparliamentary evolutionary strategies for change

TABLE 61

Statement 22: The fact that the Black population is increasing at a faster rate than the White population only means that White minority rule will soon be over.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	28 (15,56%)	7 (5,83%)	4 (6,67%)	39	10,83
Agree	37 (20,56%)	37 (30,83%)	18 (30,00%)	92	25,56
Undecided	61 (33,89%)	27 (22,50%)	18 (30,00%)	106	29,44
Disagree	41 (22,78%)	46 (38,33%)	18 (30,00%)	105	29,17
Strongly Disagree	13 (7,22%)	3 (2,50%)	2 (3,33%)	18	5,00
Median	3 (Undecided)				

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{x}_w &= 3,08 \\ &= 1,18\end{aligned}$$

With reference to Tables 61 and 62: the mean at 3,08 indicates the general indecisiveness of the population whilst the median at 3 indicates that a large proportion of the population were undecided on this question. The variance at 1,18 shows a lack of consensus. However a relatively high correlation coefficient shows agreement within the rankings.

TABLE 62
STATEMENT 22

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
3,14	0,44	3,12	1,32	3,20	1,44	3,66	1,55	3,20	1,19	3,08	1,19
2,99	1,02	2,59	0,92	3,22	1,13	3,50	1,50	2,96	1,12	3,00	1,28
3,06	0,99	3,09	1,35	3,22	1,13	3,50	1,50			3,22	0,68
$\chi^2 = 23,749$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0025 < 0,05		3,42	0,94	3,14	1,29	3,40	1,12			3,14	0,96
		3,16	0,59	2,87	0,90	3,32	0,34	$\chi^2 = 5,686$ with 4° freedom P = 0,2239 > 0,05		2,83	0,80
		3,37	0,92	2,95	1,24	3,04	0,14				
$r_s = 0,70$		3,12	1,43	2,95	1,24	2,81	1,18				
		2,92	1,25	2,57	1,26						
		$\chi^2 = 44,24$ with 28° freedom P = 0,026 < 0,05		$\chi^2 = 31,363$ with 20° freedom P = 0,0506 ≥ 0,05		$\chi^2 = 22,38$ with 20° freedom P = 0,3203 > 0,05				$\chi^2 = 9,523$ with 16° freedom P = 0,8903 > 0,05	

Strongly Agree (5)
Agree (4)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (2)
Strongly Disagree (1)

Within the African sector 36,11% agreed, 30,00% disagreed whilst 33,89% were undecided.

Within the Indian sector, 36,66% agreed, 40,83% disagreed and 22,50% were undecided.

Within the Coloured sector, 36,66% agreed whilst 33,33% disagreed and 30,00% were undecided.

The results from the different groupings are somewhat similar. No definite statement can be made due to the high degree of indecision. However, it is apparent that inevitable evolutionary change as a result of natural causes was not confidently viewed as a possibility.

An association, however, exists between attitude towards statement 22 and occupational and income differences. Agreement was strongest amongst the unskilled workers, the self-employed and the students whilst it was lowest among the professionals, the unemployed and

the sales staff. No clear pattern was established as both affluent and non-affluent occupational groups agreed and disagreed. The students, as opposed to the professionals, believed to a greater extent in the inevitability of change.

There was however, a slight tendency for disagreement to increase as income increased. There was also stronger agreement amongst those with lower education than those with higher education. Agreement decreased as educational qualifications increased.

Also, there was stronger agreement amongst the men on the inevitability of evolutionary change, who were less pessimistic than the women.

TABLE 63

Statement 23: I think we could have changed our situation a long time ago if people were less apathetic.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	87 (48,33%)	15 (12,50%)	13 (21,67%)	115	31,94
Agree	62 (34,44%)	85 (70,83%)	35 (58,33%)	182	50,56
Undecided	11 (6,11%)	5 (4,17%)	7 (11,67%)	23	6,39
Disagree	14 (7,78%)	13 (10,83%)	5 (8,33%)	32	8,89
Strongly Disagree	6 (3,33%)	2 (1,67%)	0 (0,00%)	8	2,22
Median	4 ((Agree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 4,01$$

$$V = 0,94$$

The following conclusions can be drawn from Tables 63 and 64: the mean equalled the median at 4, both indicating agreement. The variance at 0,94 indicates a high degree of consensus. This was matched by a significantly high degree of correlation between the rankings of the different races.

The scores of the different responses correlated positively with 82,77% of the Africans, 83,33% of the Indians and 80,00% of the

TABLE 65

Statement 24: If people with the same problems were to come together as a group they would be able to change their situation.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	97 (53,89%)	22 (18,33%)	18 (30,00%)	137	38,0
Agree	51 (28,33%)	90 (75,00%)	32 (53,33%)	173	48,0
Undecided	12 (6,67%)	2 (1,67%)	4 (6,67%)	18	5,0
Disagree	14 (7,78%)	6 (5,00%)	6 (10,00%)	26	7,2
Strongly Disagree	6 (3,33%)	0 (0,00%)	0 (0,00%)	6	1,6
Median	4 (Agree)				

$\bar{X}_w = 4,14$
 $V = 0,85$

TABLE 66

STATEMENT 24

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
4,21	1,16	4,02	0,83	4,20	1,03	4,15	0,66	4,15	0,89	4,11	0,88
4,06	0,39	4,03	0,73	4,13	1,04	4,00	1,68	4,11	0,80	4,07	0,97
4,03	0,76	4,36	0,65	4,13	1,04	4,75	0,18	4,11	0,80	4,07	0,97
$x^2 = 69,731$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		4,53	0,24	4,16	0,73	4,10	0,95	$x^2 = 5,320$ with 4° freedom P = 0,2560 >0,05		4,21	0,69
		4,06	1,02	3,92	1,05	4,10	0,72			4,18	0,80
		4,27	1,21	4,14	0,51	4,20	0,78			4,33	0,22
$r_s = 0,9$		4,18	0,93	4,30	0,48	4,10	0,72			$x^2 = 14,833$ with 16° freedom P = 0,5369 >0,05	
		3,97	0,58	4,30	0,48	4,20	0,78				
		$x^2 = 39,025$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0805 >0,05		$x^2 = 22,954$ with 20° freedom P = 0,2911 >0,05		$x^2 = 45,741$ with 20° freedom P = 0,0009 <0,05					

Strongly Agree (5)
 Agree (4)
 Undecided (3)
 Disagree (2)
 Strongly Disagree (1)

The results in Tables 65 and 66 show that: 86,11% agreed with statement 24 whilst 8,88% disagreed. Only 5,00% were undecided. The mean at 4,14 was between agree and strongly agree but tended towards agree. The median was 4 and the quantile at 25,00% was also 4. Hence, the variance at 0,85 indicated a very high degree of consensus and a significantly high correlation coefficient was discerned.

It appears that 82,22% of the Africans, 93,33% of the Indians and 83,33% of the Coloureds agreed with the statement. The belief that collective rather than individual action would necessitate changes in individual lives was strongest amongst the Indians. It is probably stronger within this group because group rather than individual effort is more strongly emphasised.

There was high agreement amongst all occupational groups, notably amongst the self-employed where 100,00% of the respondents agreed.

Strongest agreement came from those within the highest and lowest income groups.

Agreement was relatively constant, except amongst the illiterate group who disagreed with statement 24. This shows that collective action of some sort would be supported by a broad section of the population. Furthermore, more women than men favoured collective action.

TABLE 67

Statement 26: The mass media should furnish us with all the information concerning unrest in the country.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	
Strongly Agree	100 (55,56%)	33 (27,5 %)	26 (43,33%)	159	44,
Agree	66 (36,67%)	74 (61,67%)	27 (45,00%)	167	46,
Undecided	4 (2,22%)	4 (3,33%)	3 (5,00%)	11	3,
Disagree	5 (2,78%)	8 (6,67%)	3 (5,00%)	16	4,
Strongly Disagree	5 (2,78%)	1 (0,83%)	1 (1,67%)	7	1,
Median	4 (Agree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 4,26$$

$$V = 0,76$$

TABLE 68
STATEMENT 26

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
4,39	0,78	4,35	0,65	4,20	1,33	4,66	0,22	4,33	0,67	4,31	0,68
4,08	0,64	4,37	0,79					4,18	0,81	4,32	0,61
4,23	0,77	4,26	1,03	4,20	1,01	4,25	1,68			4,32	0,61
$x^2 = 27,684$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0005 < 0,05		4,21	0,32	4,32	0,50	4,12	0,74	$x^2 = 5,964$ with 4° freedom P = 0,2018 > 0,05		4,06	1,61
		4,19	0,63	4,32	0,50	4,15	0,75			4,18	0,65
		4,37	0,85	4,22	0,73	4,29	0,68			4,33	0,22
$r_s = 0,90$		4,34	0,83	4,30	0,45	4,34	0,84				
		3,94	0,99	4,15	1,30						
		$x^2 = 26,548$ with 28° freedom P = 0,5429 > 0,05		$x^2 = 25,532$ with 20° freedom P = 0,1818 > 0,05		$x^2 = 19,947$ with 20° freedom P = 0,4613 > 0,05				$x^2 = 11,363$ with 16° freedom P = 0,7868 > 0,05	

Strongly Agree (5)
Agree (4)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (2)
Strongly Disagree (1)

With regard to this statement, Tables 67 and 68 indicate that: 90,55% of the population agreed whilst 6,38% disagreed and 3,06% were undecided. The median is at 4 whilst the variance at 0,76 indicates a very high consensus. A high percentage, 92,22% of the Africans, 89,16% of the Indians and 88,33% of the Coloureds agreed, with significant correlation existing within the rankings. It is clear that media coverage was viewed as inadequate. There seems to be a high degree of consensus with the extraparliamentary demand that press censorship be lifted and that the public be furnished with all the information concerning unrest in the country.

An association exists between statement 26 and differences in occupation. Strongest agreement was amongst the professionals, clerks, students and the unskilled workers.

There was a tendency for agreement to decrease and then increase as qualifications increased. Strong agreement came from the most and least educated groups.

A greater number of men (93,33%) agreed than women (87,77%) showing men to be more critical of the present state of the media.

TABLE 69

Statement 39: Disinvestment by international companies is an important way through which racial discrimination can be overcome.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	41 (22,78%)	10 (8,33%)	10 (16,67%)	61	16,94
Agree	45 (25,00%)	42 (35,00%)	16 (26,67%)	103	28,61
Undecided	30 (16,67%)	10 (8,33%)	9 (15,00%)	49	13,61
Disagree	39 (21,67%)	52 (43,33%)	23 (38,33%)	114	31,67
Strongly Disagree	25 (13,89%)	6 (5,00%)	2 (3,33%)	33	9,17
Median	3 (Undecided)				

$\bar{X}_w = 3,13$
 $V = 1,64$

TABLE 70
STATEMENT 39

RACE	OCCUPATION	INCOME	EDUCATION	GENDER	AGE
Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V
AFRICAN 3,21 1,88	CLERK 3,19 1,34	LESS THAN R3 000 3,20 1,79	NONE (AND ILLITERATE) 3,33 2,88	MALE 3,11 1,72	BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS 3,24 1,01
INDIAN 2,98 1,31	PROFESSIONAL 2,79 1,45	BETWEEN R3 - R6 000 3,28 1,73	NONE (AND LITERATE) 2,75 2,18	FEMALE 3,18 1,28	26 - 35 3,00 1,69
COLOURED 3,15 2,42	SALES 3,10 1,91	BETWEEN R6 - R10 000 3,11 1,66	PRIMARY SCHOOL 3,11 1,75	$x^2 = 2,486$ with 4° freedom $P = 0,6471$ $> 0,05$	36 - 45 3,04 1,71
$x^2 = 35,819$ with 8° freedom $P = 0,0001$ $< 0,05$	SELF-EMPLOYED 3,32 1,57	BETWEEN R10 - R15 000 2,90 1,62	JUNIOR SECONDARY 3,28 1,71		46 - 60 3,00 1,43
	SKILLED WORKER 2,97 1,61	BETWEEN R15 - R25 000 2,90 1,38	SENIOR SECONDARY 3,08 1,52	OVER 60 4,00 0,66	
$r_s = 0,70$	UNSKILLED WORKER 3,62 1,40	BETWEEN R25 000 2,95 1,62	POST-MATRIC 3,08 1,60	$x^2 = 12,171$ with 16° freedom $P = 0,7321$ $> 0,05$	
	STUDENT 3,31 1,82	MORE THAN R25 000 2,95 1,62	$x^2 = 23,984$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,2431$ $> 0,05$		
	OTHER 3,00 1,33				
	$x^2 = 37,226$ with 28° freedom $P = 0,114$ $> 0,05$	$x^2 = 20,683$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,416$ $> 0,05$			

- Strongly Agree (5)
- Agree (4)
- Undecided (3)
- Disagree (2)
- Strongly Disagree (1)

From Tables 69 and 70 it is clear that out of the total, 45,55% agreed whilst 40,83% disagreed and 13,61% were undecided. The mean at 3,13 tended between undecided and agree, but was closer to undecided. The high degree of indecision was matched by the variance at 1,64 which showed a lack of consensus. A relatively high correlation coefficient was discerned.

Of the Africans, 47,77% agreed whilst 35,55% disagreed and 16,67% were undecided. While 43,33% of the Indians agreed, 48,33% disagreed and 8,33% were undecided. Furthermore, 43,34% of the Coloureds agreed whilst 41,66% disagreed. A small percentage (15,00%) were undecided. There was stronger agreement than disagreement on the question of disinvestment, with a greater number of Africans agreeing and Indians disagreeing.

No association existed between attitudes towards statement 39 and occupational differences when the categories were viewed independently. Strongest agreement came from the unskilled workers and strongest disagreement from the professionals.

When these categories were reorganised in terms of percentages and condensed, tendencies were more clearly discerned (Table 71):

TABLE 71.

ATTITUDES TO DISINVESTMENT IN PERCENTAGES

	<u>AGREE</u> %	<u>DISAGREE</u> %
Professionals	31,48	57,41
Clerical, self-employed, sales	48,10	37,84
Unemployed	41,03	46,16
Students	54,55	33,33
Workers (skilled & unskilled)	51,00	31,51

Only the professional and unemployed were unresponsive of disinvestment whilst other sectors including the workers supported disinvestment. There was a slight tendency for support for disinvestment to increase as income decreased.

When the results here were compared to those of the Schlemmer (December 1984) and CASE/IBR (September 1985) studies, a hardening of attitudes over time was noted (Table 72):

TABLE 72
RESULTS OF OTHER STUDIES

	Schlemmer (Dec. 1984)	CASE/IBR (Sept. 1985)	Present Study (Nov. 1988)
	(n = 1 000)	(n = 796)	(n = 360)
% in favour of total disinvestment	9,00	24,00	45,55

(Orkin, 1986 :24)

The figures show that it is probable that a greater number of people are becoming more inclined to support unconditional disinvestment in an attempt to end apartheid, as time goes on. It would be likely that supporters of disinvestment would be from the lower income and less prestigious occupational groups.

It may also be probable that they would come from a lower educated background. In the present study, slightly greater support for disinvestment came from the less educated groups.

The difference between male and female responses was minimal and hence, not significant.

TABLE 73

Statement 40: The effects of disinvestment in the long-run would be positive.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	25 (13,89%)	10 (8,33%)	7 (11,67%)	42	11,67
Agree	36 (20,00%)	35 (29,17%)	20 (33,33%)	91	25,28
Undecided	48 (26,67%)	18 (15,00%)	11 (18,33%)	77	21,39
Disagree	41 (22,78%)	51 (42,50%)	18 (30,00%)	110	30,56
Strongly Disagree	30 (16,67%)	6 (5,00%)	4 (6,67%)	40	11,11
Median	3 (Undecided)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 2,96$$

$$V = 1,47$$

TABLE 74

STATEMENT 40

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
2,89	1,68	3,04	1,42	3,09	1,41	4,00	0,66	2,91	1,64	BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS	
2,93	1,26	2,72	1,34	BETWEEN R3 - R6 000		NONE (AND ILLITERATE)		FEMALE		3,11 1,37	
3,13	1,34	2,89	1,67	3,08	1,29	2,62	2,48	2,83	1,28	26 - 35	
$x^2 = 30,315$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0002 < 0,05	SELF-EMPLOYED		BETWEEN R6 - R10 000		PRIMARY SCHOOL		$x^2 = 6,927$ with 4° freedom P = 0,1398 > 0,05		2,92 1,47		
	2,89 1,45		2,88 1,53		3,00 0,64				36 - 45		
	2,68 1,39		BETWEEN R10 - R15 000		JUNIOR SECONDARY				2,81 1,81		
3,51 1,21		UNSKILLED WORKER		2,82 1,46		3,00 1,24		46 - 60			
3,33 1,49		STUDENT		BETWEEN R15 - R25 000		2,90 1,43		2,68 1,21			
2,79 1,13		OTHER		MORE THAN R25 000		3,05 1,73		3,83 0,47			
$x^2 = 39,206$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0777 > 0,05		$x^2 = 26,495$ with 20° freedom P = 0,1501 > 0,05		$x^2 = 19,694$ with 20° freedom P = 0,4774 > 0,05				$x^2 = 22,314$ with 16° freedom P = 0,1333 > 0,05			
$r_s = 0,6$											

Strongly Agree (5)
Agree (4)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (2)
Strongly Disagree (1)

According to Tables 73 and 74, 36,95% agreed whilst 41,66% disagreed and 21,39% were undecided. The mean at 2,96 was closer to undecided than disagree. The median was at 3 whilst the variance at 1,47 showed a lack of consensus. A higher moderate correlation coefficient was evident.

While, 33,88% of the Africans agreed and 39,44% disagreed, 37,50% of the Indians agreed whilst 47,50% disagreed. But, 45,00% of the Coloureds agreed whilst 36,66% disagreed. Whilst more supported disinvestment, most people believed that the long term effects would be negative. The exception here were the Coloureds where a greater proportion seemed optimistic about the after effects of disinvestment.

There was greater disagreement than agreement to statement 40 amongst all occupational categories except the unskilled workers and students where there was a tendency towards agreement.

The differences amongst the different income groups are depicted below (Table 75):

TABLE 75

DIFFERENCES AMONG INCOME GROUPS ON LONG TERM EFFECTS OF DISINVESTMENT

Income Earned Per Annum	% of Respondents that Agreed	% of Respondents that Disagreed
Less than R3 000	36,93	30,77
R 3 - 6 000	39,32	32,59
R 6 - 10 000	35,80	45,68
R10 - 15 000	36,84	52,64
R15 - 25 000	33,34	47,62
Over R25 000	38,46	53,85

Whilst agreement seems relatively constant, disagreement tends to increase as income increases with the exception of one income group (R15 - R25 000 per annum) which also exhibited the largest number of undecided respondents.

Those with post-matric education tend to be more supportive of the view that the effects of disinvestment would be positive than those with only matric education or lower. However, those with primary school education tend to be more supportive than those with junior secondary education (Table 76):

TABLE 76
EFFECT OF EDUCATIONAL LEVEL ON ATTITUDES TOWARDS
DISINVESTMENT

	Agree	Disagree
	%	%
Higher education (Post-Matric)	44,83	41,38
Senior Certificate	33,86	43,39
Junior Secondary	37,66	40,26
Primary Education	40,00	36,00
No Education	36,36	36,36

A greater number of men than women believed that the effects of disinvestment in the long run would be negative.

TABLE 77

Statement 41: One person, one vote would transform this country into a democratic society.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	115 (63,89%)	18 (15,00%)	15 (25,00%)	148	41,11
Agree	45 (25,00%)	48 (40,00%)	16 (26,67%)	109	30,28
Undecided	14 (7,78%)	21 (17,50%)	18 (30,00%)	53	14,72
Disagree	5 (2,78%)	30 (25,00%)	8 (13,33%)	43	11,94
Strongly Disagree	1 (0,56%)	3 (2,50%)	3 (5,00%)	7	1,94
Median	4 (Agree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 3,97$$

$$V = 1,21$$

TABLE 78
STATEMENT 41

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
AFRICAN		CLERK		LESS THAN R3 000		NONE (AND ILLITERATE)		MALE		BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS	
4,48	0,68	3,97	0,78	4,30	0,71	3,66	0,88	4,05	1,25	4,02	0,89
INDIAN		PROFESSIONAL		BETWEEN R3 - R6 000		NONE (AND LITERATE)		FEMALE		26 - 35	
3,40	1,19	3,87	1,40	4,12	0,85	4,75	0,18	3,87	1,50	3,80	1,15
COLOURED		SALES		BETWEEN R6 - R10 000		PRIMARY SCHOOL		$x^2 = 14,065$ with 4° freedom P = 0,0071 <0,05		36 - 45	
3,53	1,31	3,68	1,90	3,90	1,24	4,20	1,04			3,90	1,40
$x^2 = 102,845$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		SELF-EMPLOYED		BETWEEN R10 - R15 000		JUNIOR SECONDARY		$x^2 = 19,209$ with 16° freedom P = 0,2580 >0,05		46 - 60	
		SKILLED WORKER		3,80 1,46		3,98 1,33				4,50 0,25	
$r_s = 0,40$		UNSKILLED WORKER		BETWEEN R15 - R25 000		SENIOR SECONDARY		$x^2 = 23,218$ with 20° freedom P = 0,2782 >0,05		OVER 60	
		4,44 0,73		3,50 1,68		3,86 1,22				4,83 0,47	
$x^2 = 56,459$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0011 <0,05		STUDENT		MORE THAN R25 000		POST-MATRIC		$x^2 = 23,675$ with 20° freedom P = 0,2569 >0,05			
		4,13 1,08		3,80 1,57		4,06 1,06					
$x^2 = 23,675$ with 20° freedom P = 0,2569 >0,05		OTHER						$x^2 = 23,675$ with 20° freedom P = 0,2569 >0,05			
		3,69 0,87									

- Strongly Agree (5)
- Agree (4)
- Undecided (3)
- Disagree (2)
- Strongly Disagree (1)

With reference to statement 41 (Tables 77 and 78), 71,38% agreed whilst 13,88% disagreed and 14,72% were undecided. But, 88,89% of the Africans agreed whilst 55,00% of the Indians and 51,67% of the Coloureds agreed. A greater amount of Coloureds were undecided (30,00%) as opposed to the percentage of Indians (17,50%) and the lower percentage of Africans (7,78%) that were also undecided. A very low positive correlation coefficient shows disagreement within the rankings of attitude of the different races.

The weighted mean at 3,97 is closer to the median at 4 implying agreement. However, the variance at 1,21 does not indicate consensus amongst the respondents. When consensus amongst the different race groups was reviewed it was found that the Africans exhibited a significantly high degree of consensus. However, Indians and Coloureds showed a considerable lack of consensus amongst themselves on this issue. It is probable that a significant sector

amongst the Indians and Coloureds who perceive themselves as minorities are afraid of the consequences of majority rule which is implicit in the principles of one-person-one-vote.

An association existed between attitude towards statement 41 and occupational level. Ranking in terms of agreement was as follows:

1. Unskilled workers (89,66%)
2. Self-employed (75,00%)
3. Clerks (71,43%)
4. Students (71,22%)
5. Skilled workers (69,88%)
6. Unemployed (69,23%)
7. Professionals (68,52%)
8. Sales staff (57,9%)

It is interesting to note that the professionals and sales staff that appeared most critical of the present situation earlier on, were most disagreeable to one-person-one-vote.

It would seem that as income increases favourability towards one-person-one-vote decreases (Table 79):

TABLE 79
RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS ONE-PERSON-ONE-VOTE

Income	Agreed	Disagreed	Agreed (Group Averages)
	%	%	
R3 000	83,08	3,08	} 77,92%
R3 - 6 000	74,16	10,11	
R6 - 20 000	71,61	16,04	} 68,11%
R10 - 15 000	63,16	17,54	
R15 - 25 000	59,52	23,81	} 63,23%
R25 000	69,23	23,08	

However, the highest income group is more favourable towards one-person-one-vote, than the second highest group. When the income groups are combined into 3 (as opposed to 6), the indications are that agreement decreases as income increases. Within the lower income groups there was consensus on support for one-person-one-vote. The higher income groups exhibited a lack of consensus as well as lesser support.

No association between statement 41 and educational qualifications was evident. However, those with post-matric education were more favourable towards one-person, one-vote than those with less education. Again, those within the median range were least favourable towards a unitary system.

Men were more supportive of one-person-one-vote than women.

When age was reviewed it was found that the older people were most supportive (Table 80):

TABLE 80

RELATION BETWEEN AGE AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS ONE-PERSON-ONE-VOTE

Age	Agree	Disagree
	%	%
16 - 25 years	71,73	10,35
26 - 45	68,96	17,24
46 - 60	75,71	15,63

The percentages here support the weighted means.

TABLE 81

Statement 42: The country now needs the unbanning of outlawed organisations, people in exile to return, the release of those in detention and the calling of a National Convention.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	104 (57,78%)	23 (19,17%)	23 (38,33%)	150	41,67
Agree	46 (25,56%)	70 (58,33%)	24 (40,00%)	140	38,89
Undecided	25 (13,89%)	14 (11,67%)	10 (16,67%)	49	13,61
Disagree	3 (1,67%)	12 (10,00%)	2 (3,33%)	17	4,72
Strongly Disagree	2 (1,11%)	1 (0,83%)	1 (1,67%)	4	1,11
Median	4 (Agree)				

$\bar{X}_w = 4,15$
 $V = 0,82$

TABLE 82
STATEMENT 42

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
4,37	0,74	4,02	0,68	4,15	0,99	4,33	0,22	4,30	0,65	4,16	0,74
3,85	0,56	4,27	0,45	4,03	1,15	4,75	0,43	4,00	0,93	4,10	0,97
4,10	0,82	4,21	1,53	4,16	0,51	4,16	0,77	4,07	1,006	4,04	0,89
$x^2 = 57,755$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		4,35	0,72	4,12	0,70	4,07	1,006	$x^2 = 2,15$ with 4° freedom P = 0,0204 <0,05		4,29	0,67
		4,08	0,89	4,33	0,41	4,08	0,85			4,00	0,66
		4,31	0,83	4,30	0,36	4,36	0,43				
$r_s = 0,90$		4,28	0,96	$x^2 = 34,897$ with 20° freedom P = 0,0207 <0,05		$x^2 = 18,848$ with 20° freedom P = 0,5317 >0,05				$x^2 = 14,152$ with 16° freedom P = 0,5874 >0,05	
		3,74	0,54								
		$x^2 = 72,821$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05									

- Strongly Agree (5)
- Agree (4)
- Undecided (3)
- Disagree (2)
- Strongly Disagree (1)

According to Tables 81 and 82 the median at 4 indicates a high level of agreement whilst the mean at 4,15 compares favourably. The variance at 0,82 indicates a high level of consensus and a very high positive correlation exists amongst the rankings.

It appears that 83,34% of the African respondents agreed whilst 77,50% of the Indians and 78,33% of the Coloureds agreed. Tremendous support from all groupings show that no solution to the country's problems could be resolved without the participation of excluded forces.

A high degree of agreement was existent amongst all occupational groups, in particular the professionals, the self-employed and the unskilled workers.

An association existed between attitude towards statement 42 and income earned (Table 83):

TABLE 83
RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS EXCLUSION
OF OPPOSITION

Income	Agree	Disagree
	%	%
R3 000	70,77	4,62
R3 - 6 000	75,28	12,36
R6 - 20 000	81,49	4,94
R10 - 15 000	85,96	5,26
R15 - 25 000	90,48	0,00
R25 000	92,31	0,00

Agreement increased as income increased. This supported the weighted means which showed agreement tending to increase as income increased.

Less women than men agreed with statement 42.

The following differences in terms of age were discerned (Table 84):

TABLE 84

RELATION BETWEEN AGE AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS EXCLUSION OF
OPPOSITION

Age	Agree	Disagree
	%	%
16 - 25 years	78,62	3,45
26 - 45	79,77	8,33
46 - 60	87,14	6,25

Strongest agreement came from the older grouping. It is this sector of the population that lived through the period during which time the Congress Alliance and other organisations were emerging and mobilising the population. These were eventually deactivated through bannings, imprisonments and detentions amongst other factors.

TABLE 85

Statement 43: A National Convention will not solve the countries problems.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	22 (12,22%)	3 (2,50%)	2 (3,33%)	27	7,50
Agree	19 (10,56%)	22 (18,33%)	13 (21,67%)	54	15,00
Undecided	28 (15,56%)	17 (14,17%)	14 (23,33%)	59	16,39
Disagree	34 (18,89%)	68 (56,67%)	20 (33,33%)	122	33,89
Strongly Disagree	77 (42,78%)	10 (8,33%)	11 (18,33%)	98	27,22
Median	4 (Disagree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 3,58$$

$$V = 1,54$$

TABLE 86
STATEMENT 43

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
AFRICAN		CLERK		LESS THAN R3 000		NONE (AND ILLITERATE)		MALE		BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS	
3,69	2,01	3,04	1,37	3,40	1,96	3,66	1,55	3,60	1,72	3,53	1,26
INDIAN		PROFESSIONAL		BETWEEN R3 - R6 000		NONE (AND LITERATE)		FEMALE		26 - 35	
3,50	0,93	3,68	1,25	3,78	1,35	4,12	1,85	3,56	1,34	3,44	1,48
COLOURED		SALES		BETWEEN R6 - R10 000		PRIMARY SCHOOL		$\chi^2 = 7,564$ with 4° freedom P = 0,1089 > 0,05		36 - 45	
3,41	1,24	4,36	0,96	3,66	1,49	3,76	1,14			3,55	1,59
$\chi^2 = 81,778$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 < 0,05		SELF-EMPLOYED		BETWEEN R10 - R15 000		JUNIOR SECONDARY		$\chi^2 = 16,006$ with 16° freedom P = 0,4526 > 0,05		46 - 60	
		SKILLED WORKER		3,14 1,69		3,58 1,72				3,92 1,25	
$r_s^2 = 0,20$		UNSKILLED WORKER		BETWEEN R15 - R25 000		SENIOR SECONDARY		$\chi^2 = 18,078$ with 20° freedom P = 0,5822 > 0,05		OVER 60	
		3,89 1,81		3,80 0,82		3,55 1,40				3,50 1,58	
$r_s^2 = 0,20$		STUDENT		MORE THAN R25 000		POST-MATRIC		$\chi^2 = 74,546$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0001 < 0,05		$\chi^2 = 38,288$ with 20° freedom P = 0,0082 < 0,05	
		3,50 1,91		3,88 1,17		3,51 1,80					
$r_s^2 = 0,20$		OTHER						$\chi^2 = 74,546$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0001 < 0,05		$\chi^2 = 38,288$ with 20° freedom P = 0,0082 < 0,05	
		3,74 0,39									

Strongly Agree (1)
Agree (2)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (4)
Strongly Disagree (5)

Tables 85 and 86 show that whilst 61,11% disagreed and 22,50% agreed. 16,39% were undecided. The median at 4 indicates that over 50,00% disagreed, whilst the mean at 3,58 indicated an average response between undecided and disagree but closer to disagree. The variance at 1,54 shows the lack of consensus. An extremely low correlation coefficient showed insignificant agreement among the rankings.

Out of the total, 65,50% of the Indians, 61,67% of the Africans and 51,66% of the Coloureds were most optimistic about the outcome of a National Convention. At the same time, a significantly high number of Coloureds (25,00%) believed that a National Convention would not solve the country's problems. The fact that a National Convention, or a forum through which all political forces come together to develop consensus on a future constitution, is not to be seen as an end product, was recognised by a proportion of the population that agreed that this forum would not solve the country's problems.

However, the majority of respondents in each group had faith in a National Convention as a means towards resolving the country's problems. The scepticism shown by the Coloured community could be associated with minority fears coming to the surface.

An association existed between attitudes towards statement 43 and occupational groups. Very strong disagreement was exhibited by the sales staff. The professionals, self-employed and unskilled workers also disagreed with the statement. Low disagreement showed pessimism amongst the clerks and students.

When income groups were reviewed it was found that the lower income groups were not as supportive as the higher income group.

Educational qualifications did not play too significant a role in the formulation of attitude towards a National Convention. However, from the post-junior secondary level average responses were favourable and constant.

There was very little difference between male and female responses.

TABLE 87

Statement 45: A National Convention should be called only with all existing legal organisations taking part.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	57 (31,67%)	7 (5,83%)	7 (11,67%)	71	19,7
Agree	68 (37,78%)	68 (56,67%)	24 (40,00%)	160	44,4
Undecided	16 (8,89%)	11 (9,17%)	7 (11,67%)	34	9,4
Disagree	22 (12,22%)	25 (20,83%)	12 (20,00%)	59	16,3
Strongly Disagree	17 (9,44%)	9 (7,50%)	10 (16,67%)	36	10,0
Median	2 (Agree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 2,53$$

$$V = 1,58$$

TABLE 88

STATEMENT 45

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE		
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	
2,30	1,65	2,92	1,68	2,33	1,63	3,00	0,66	2,52	1,69	2,64	1,63	
2,67	1,21	2,48	1,40	2,37	1,42	1,5	0,50	2,52	0,46	2,47	1,63	
2,90	1,72	2,21	1,42	2,50	1,48	2,2	0,88	$x^2 = 4,660$ with 4° freedom P = 0,323 > 0,05	2,22	1,22	2,60	1,61
$x^2 = 40,517$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 < 0,05	$r_s = 0,40$	2,85	1,97	2,49	1,26	2,59	1,56		2,60	1,61	2,33	0,88
		2,26	1,37	2,95	1,85	2,58	1,61		2,48	1,62	2,33	0,88
$x^2 = 49,978$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0065 < 0,05	$x^2 = 35,521$ with 20° freedom P = 0,0175 < 0,05	1,93	0,89	2,96	1,72	2,48	1,62		$x^2 = 23,528$ with 20° freedom P = 0,264 > 0,05	2,60	1,61	2,33
		2,93	1,93	2,96	1,72	2,48	1,62	2,48		1,62	2,33	0,88
		2,35	0,69	2,96	1,72	2,48	1,62	$x^2 = 14,996$ with 16° freedom P = 0,5249 > 0,05	2,33	0,88	2,33	0,88
				2,96	1,72	2,48	1,62		2,33	0,88	2,33	0,88

Strongly Agree (1)
Agree (2)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (4)
Strongly Disagree (5)

Statement 45 shows that 64,16% agreed whilst 26,36% disagreed. The weighted mean at 2,53 was closer to undecided than agree whilst the median at 2 indicated agreement. The variance at 1,58 showed a lack of consensus. This was matched by a low positive correlation coefficient (Table 88).

So strong was the belief in negotiation and consultation that there was agreement from all race groups that even without the exiled and banned organisations participating, consultations between existing organisations should take place. Out of the total, 69,45% of the Africans, 62,50% of the Indians and 51,67% of the Coloureds agreed with statement 45. Agreement here was not as significant as with statement 42 which included banned organisations and imprisoned and exiled persons. There was also a lack of consensus here as compared with statement 42.

An association existed between attitude towards statement 45 and income earned per annum (Table 89):

TABLE 89

RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS A NATIONAL CONVENTION AND ONLY LEGAL ORGANISATIONS PARTAKING

Income	Agree %	Disagree %
R3 000	64,62%	18,46%
R3 - 6 000	73,03%	21,35%
R6 - 20 000	62,97%	28,39%
R10 - 15 000	68,43%	26,31%
R15 - 25 000	47,62%	38,1%
R25 000	53,84%	38,46%

Disagreement increases as income increases (with the exception of the R10 - R15 000 income group).

Agreement was stronger amongst those with lower education as opposed to those with higher education showing the less educated to be most inclined to support all forms of pressure.

It would appear that in line with the women's more conservative stance depicted through this study, a greater number of women were more inclined to support negotiations under any circumstances. Yet, the weighted means indicating male and female responses were identical showing similarity on this statement.

TABLE 90

Statement 46: The state should attempt to solve problems at a provincial or regional level eg. develop a political structure for Natal to resolve its problems by itself.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	8 (4,44%)	4 (3,33%)	4 (6,67%)	16	4,44
Agree	34 (18,89%)	35 (29,17%)	20 (33,33%)	89	24,72
Undecided	30 (16,67%)	16 (13,33%)	12 (20,00%)	58	16,11
Disagree	49 (27,22%)	56 (46,67%)	17 (28,33%)	122	33,89
Strongly Disagree	59 (32,78%)	9 (7,50%)	7 (11,67%)	75	20,83
Median	4 (Disagree)				

$\bar{X}_w = 3,42$
 $V = 1,43$

TABLE 91

STATEMENT 46

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
X _w	V	X _w	V	X _w	V	X _w	V	X _w	V	X _w	V
2,65	1,52	3,45	1,26	3,40	1,65	3,33	0,88	3,46	1,54	3,42	1,51
3,25	1,12	3,38	1,38	3,59	1,60	4,00	2,00	3,37	1,28	3,66	1,19
3,05	1,34	3,42	1,19	3,25	1,30	3,32	1,65	$x^2 = 10,62$ with 4° freedom $P = 0,312$ $> 0,05$	16 - 25 YEARS	3,39	1,48
$x^2 = 41,084$ with 8° freedom $P = 0,0001$ $< 0,05$	3,43	1,52	3,17	1,26	3,40	1,38	36 - 45		3,18	0,75	
	3,37	1,68	3,17	1,26	3,40	1,38	46 - 60		2,66	1,88	
$r_s = 0,40$	3,5	1,52	3,57	1,29	3,93	0,96	OVER 60		2,66	1,88	
	3,33	1,04	3,65	1,30	3,65	1,30	$x^2 = 18,162$ with 16° freedom $P = 0,3145$ $> 0,05$				
		$x^2 = 33,613$ with 28° freedom $P = 0,2139$ $> 0,05$		$x^2 = 32,368$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,0395$ $< 0,05$		$x^2 = 39,279$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,0062$ $< 0,05$					

Strongly Agree (1)
 Agree (2)
 Undecided (3)
 Disagree (4)
 Strongly Disagree (5)

According to Table 90, 54,72% disagreed whilst 29,16% agreed, and 16,11% were undecided. The median at 4 indicates disagreement whilst the mean at 3,42 is closer to undecided than disagree. The variance at 1,43 shows a general lack of consensus. The low positive correlation showed some disagreement within the rankings (Table 91).

Table 90 also shows that 23,33% of the Africans agreed whilst 60,00% disagreed and 16,67% were undecided. But, 32,50% of the Indians agreed whilst 54,17% disagreed and 13,33% were undecided. It appears that 40,00% of the Coloureds agreed whilst 40,00% were undecided. The majority disagreed with a regional solution to the country's problems. Significantly, strongest disagreement came from the Africans, thus undermining Buthelezi's initiative on the KwaZulu Indaba.

No association existed between attitude towards statement 46 and occupational differences. Strongest disagreement was exhibited by the students and the clerks.

An interesting association was depicted by the different income groups (Table 92):

TABLE 92

RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOLVING PROBLEMS AT A REGIONAL LEVEL

Income (p.a.)	Agree	Disagree
	%	%
R3 000	29,23	50,77
R3 - 6 000	24,71	61,80
R6 - 10 000	34,56	43,21
R10 - 15 000	35,09	54,38
R15 - 25 000	23,81	59,52
R25 000	23,08	69,23

} Most favourable group

The median income group tended to be most supportive of regional alternatives for social change, whilst the lowest and highest income groups tend to be least supportive.

When educational categories were reviewed it was found that those with higher education tended to disagree with statement 46 more strongly than the other educational categories.

Some differences between the sexes were noted, with men disagreeing to a larger extent than women, i.e. 50,56% disagreed whilst 31,11% of the men agreed and 58,89% disagreed.

Only 37,25% of those who supported intraparlimentary change, also supported statement 46. This represented 5,27% of the sample. But, 57,14% of those that supported extra parliamentary evolutionary change disagreed with statement 46.

TABLE 93

Statement 47: Natal cannot separate itself politically from the rest of the country.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	72 (40,00%)	18 (15,00%)	18 (30,00%)	108	30,00
Agree	58 (32,22%)	66 (55,00%)	26 (43,33%)	150	41,67
Undecided	23 (12,78%)	5 (4,17%)	5 (8,33%)	33	9,17
Disagree	20 (11,11%)	30 (25,00%)	11 (18,33%)	61	16,94
Strongly Disagree	7 (3,89%)	0 (0,00%)	1 (0,83%)	8	2,22
Median	4 (Agree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 3,80$$

$$V = 1,23$$

According to Table 93, 71,66% agreed whilst 19,16% disagreed and 9,17% were undecided. With the median at 4 indicating agreement and the mean at 3,8 ranging between undecided and agree but closer to agree, the variance at 1,23 shows a lack of consensus. A moderate positive correlation coefficient was discerned (Table 94).

When income levels were reviewed the following pattern was established (Table 95):

TABLE 95

RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS NATAL'S
POLITICAL SEPARATION FROM REST OF COUNTRY

Income	Agree %	Disagree %
R3 000	63,08	20,00
R3 - 6 000	70,78	19,10
R6 - 10 000	69,13	20,98
R10 - 15 000	77,19	17,54
R15 - 25 000	78,57	16,67
R25 000	80,77	19,23

Whilst disagreement remains fairly constant, agreement tends to increase slightly as income increases.

When educational qualifications were reviewed it was found that agreement was strongest amongst the highest income group and lowest amongst those with junior secondary education.

Agreement was also stronger amongst men than women.

TABLE 96

Statement 48: Civic actions such as refusing to pay high rents are important ways of changing our immediate situation.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	37 (20,56%)	13 (10,83%)	12 (20,00%)	62	17,22
Agree	40 (22,22%)	61 (50,83%)	20 (33,33%)	121	33,61
Undecided	57 (31,67%)	9 (7,50%)	6 (10,00%)	72	20,00
Disagree	38 (21,11%)	32 (26,67%)	17 (28,33%)	87	24,17
Strongly Disagree	8 (4,44%)	5 (4,17%)	5 (8,33%)	18	5,00
Median	4 (Agree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 3,33$$

$$v = 1,45$$

TABLE 97
STATEMENT 48

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
AFRICAN		CLERK		LESS THAN R3 000		NONE (AND ILLITERATE)		MALE		BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS	
3,32	1,39	3,33	1,26	3,38	1,46	3,33	0,22	3,32	1,46	3,45	1,44
INDIAN		PROFESSIONAL		BETWEEN R3 - R6 000		NONE (AND LITERATE)		FEMALE		26 - 35	
3,37	1,23	3,16	1,51	3,50	1,10	3,87	0,60	3,35	1,24	3,44	1,22
COLOURED		SALES		BETWEEN R6 - R10 000		PRIMARY SCHOOL		$x^2 = 2,478$ with 4° freedom P = 0,6486 >0,05		36 - 45	
3,28	1,66	3,57	1,50	3,35	1,06	3,28	1,32			3,09	1,40
$x^2 = 49,484$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		SELF-EMPLOYED		BETWEEN R10 - R15 000		JUNIOR SECONDARY		$x^2 = 15,095$ with 16° freedom P = 0,5177 >0,05		46 - 60	
		SKILLED WORKER		3,17		3,17				3,36	
$\chi^2 = 0,40$		UNSKILLED WORKER		BETWEEN R15 - R25 000		SENIOR SECONDARY		$x^2 = 18,327$ with 20° freedom P = 0,5659 >0,05		OVER 60	
		3,17		3,17		3,34				3,33	
$\chi^2 = 36,143$ with 28° freedom P = 0,1390 >0,05		STUDENT		MORE THAN R25 000		POST-MATRIC		$x^2 = 28,493$ with 20° freedom P = 0,0982 >0,05			
		3,54		3,16		3,24				3,24	
$\chi^2 = 28,493$ with 20° freedom P = 0,0982 >0,05		OTHER						$x^2 = 28,493$ with 20° freedom P = 0,0982 >0,05			
		3,28		0,97		3,23				1,79	

Strongly Agree (5)
Agree (4)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (2)
Strongly Disagree (1)

Tables 96 and 97 show the following results. The median at 4 indicates agreement whilst the weighted mean at 3,33 shows indecisiveness. The low agreement and variance at 1,45 shows a lack of consensus. By group, 42,78% of the Africans agreed whilst 25,55% disagreed; 61,66% of the Indians agreed whilst 30,84% disagreed; 53,33% of the Coloureds agreed whilst 36,66% disagreed. A low positive correlation shows some disagreement within the rankings.

There was no consensus on this issue. Stronger support came from Indian respondents followed by Coloured and then African respondents. At the same time strongest disagreement came from the Coloureds, then the Indians and then the Africans. Ambiguous responses from the race groups could probably be a result of the experiences people have had with civic issues. Where support is stronger, community victories have been won in the past, where support is minimal serious losses have been encountered in the past.

Strongest agreement came from the students, self-employed, the unemployed and the sales staff. Lowest agreement was exhibited by the professionals, the skilled workers, the clerks and the unskilled workers.

The differences in income levels were as follows (Table 98):

TABLE 98

RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS CIVIC ACTIONS

Income p.a.	Agree	Disagree	
	%	%	
R3 000	52,31	26,15	} 53,12% (Agree)
R3 - 6 000	53,94	17,98	
R6 - 10 000	48,14	27,16	} 47,75% (Agree)
R10 - 15 000	47,37	40,35	
R15 - 25 000	50,00	40,47	} 51,97% (Agree)
R25 000	53,94	38,46	

Strongest agreement came from the lowest income group. Close behind was the highest income group with the middle income group being the most resistant to this sort of strategy.

There was very little difference regarding support for this sort of strategy between the different educational groups.

Women agreed more strongly than men with statement 47. This could probably be because women have been traditionally more active in civic rather than political matters.

TABLE 99

Statement 49: The trade unions should be supported by workers since these are the most important organisations through which workers can change their economic situation.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	107 (59,44%)	28 (23,33%)	19 (31,67%)	154	42,78
Agree	62 (34,44%)	81 (67,50%)	34 (56,67%)	177	49,17
Undecided	7 (3,89%)	5 (4,17%)	2 (3,33%)	14	3,89
Disagree	4 (2,22%)	5 (4,17%)	5 (8,33%)	14	3,89
Strongly Disagree	0 (0,00%)	1 (0,83%)	0 (0,00%)	1	0,28
Median	4 (Agree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 4,30$$

$$V = 0,56$$

TABLE 100

STATEMENT 49

RACE	OCCUPATION	INCOME	EDUCATION	GENDER	AGE
Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V
AFRICAN 4,51 0,46	CLERK 4,28 0,34	LESS THAN R3 000 4,43 0,58	NONE (AND ILLITERATE) 4,33 0,22	MALE 4,36 0,62	BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS 4,30 0,48
INDIAN 4,08 0,50	PROFESSIONAL 4,37 0,34	BETWEEN R3 - R6 000 4,38 0,39	NONE (AND LITERATE) 4,87 0,10	FEMALE 4,23 0,48	26 - 35 4,27 0,69
COLOURED 4,11 0,66	SALES 4,26 1,77	BETWEEN R6 - R10 000 4,22 0,64	PRIMARY SCHOOL 4,32 0,45	$x^2 = 10,349$ with 4° freedom P = 0,0349 < 0,05	36 - 45 4,18 0,73
$x^2 = 47,279$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 < 0,05	SELF-EMPLOYED 4,25 0,90	BETWEEN R10 - R15 000 4,21 0,44	JUNIOR SECONDARY 4,25 0,63		46 - 60 4,42 0,33
	SKILLED WORKER 4,26 0,67	BETWEEN R15 - R25 000 4,21 0,54	SENIOR SECONDARY 4,29 0,50	OVER 60 4,66 0,22	
$r_s = 0,80$	UNSKILLED WORKER 4,55 0,52	MORE THAN R25 000 4,36 0,90	POST-MATRIC 4,29 0,66	$x^2 = 13,735$ with 16° freedom P = 0,6185 > 0,05	
	STUDENT 4,31 0,58	$x^2 = 26,842$ with 20° freedom P = 0,1398 > 0,05	$x^2 = 16,742$ with 20° freedom P = 0,6697 > 0,05		
	OTHER 4,10 0,29				
	$x^2 = 39,015$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0807 > 0,05				

Strongly Agree (5)
Agree (4)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (2)
Strongly Disagree (1)

With reference to Table 99, 91,94% agreed whilst 4,17% disagreed and 3,89% were undecided. The mean at 4,3 and median at 4 indicate agreement whilst the variance at 0,56 indicates a very high degree of consensus. This was matched by a strong positive correlation coefficient (Table 100).

Table 99 also shows that 93,88% of the Africans agreed whilst 90,83% of the Indians and 88,34% of the Coloureds agreed. The very high consensus here can only point to the potential trade unions have in terms of mobilising Black (African, Indian and Coloured) support for social change strategies. It also emphasises the increasingly significant role of the trade unions.

There was general unanimity amongst the different occupational categories with the unskilled workers, the professionals, the students and the clerks showing the strongest support.

When the different income groups were reviewed, it was found that the highest agreement was found amongst the lowest income groupings, followed by the highest income grouping, but without much difference among the highest and lowest groupings.

Agreement amongst the different educational groups was comparable. However, it would seem that stronger agreement was exhibited by the lower income groups.

Strong consensus and agreement was exhibited by both women and men, showing significant support from both sexes for trade unions.

TABLE 101

Statement 51: Political organisations are not effective.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	4 (2,22%)	2 (1,67%)	10 (16,67%)	16	4,44
Agree	26 (14,44%)	25 (20,83%)	14 (23,33%)	65	18,06
Undecided	29 (16,11%)	21 (17,50%)	10 (16,67%)	60	16,67
Disagree	74 (41,11%)	64 (53,33%)	22 (36,67%)	160	44,44
Strongly Disagree	47 (26,11%)	8 (6,67%)	4 (6,67%)	59	16,39
Median	4 (Disagree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 3,50$$

$$V = 1,21$$

TABLE 102

STATEMENT 51

RACE	OCCUPATION	INCOME	EDUCATION	GENDER	AGE
X _w V	X _w V	X _w V	X _w V	X _w V	X _w V
AFRICAN 3,74 1,13	CLERK 3,50 1,34	LESS THAN R3 000 3,56 1,53	NONE (AND ILLITERATE) 4,33 0,22	MALE 3,53 1,31	BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS 3,67 1,06
INDIAN 3,42 0,89	PROFESSIONAL 3,50 1,21	BETWEEN R3 - R6 000 3,61 1,02	NONE (AND LITERATE) 3,00 1,25	FEMALE 3,46 1,09	26 - 35 3,47 1,22
COLOURED 2,93 1,52	SALES 3,52 1,19	BETWEEN R6 - R10 000 3,51 1,02	PRIMARY SCHOOL 3,64 1,51	$x^2 = 16,326$ with 4° freedom P = 0,0026 < 0,05	36 - 45 3,47 1,13
$x^2 = 51,235$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 < 0,05	SELF-EMPLOYED 3,64 1,08	BETWEEN R10 - R15 000 3,28 1,21	JUNIOR SECONDARY 3,40 0,98		46 - 60 3,25 1,40
	SKILLED WORKER 3,46 1,95	BETWEEN R15 - R25 000 3,26 1,43	SENIOR SECONDARY 3,50 1,20		OVER 60 2,66 0,88
$r_s = 0,362$	UNSKILLED WORKER 3,41 1,001	MORE THAN R25 000 3,76 1,02	POST-MATRIC 3,60 1,17		$x^2 = 29,747$ with 16° freedom P = 0,0194 < 0,05
	STUDENT 3,72 1,16	$x^2 = 26,842$ with 20° freedom P = 0,1398 > 0,05	$x^2 = 19,778$ with 20° freedom P = 0,4719 > 0,05		
	OTHER 3,15 0,89				
	$x^2 = 25,48$ with 28° freedom P = 0,6016 > 0,05				

Strongly Agree (1)
 Agree (2)
 Undecided (3)
 Disagree (4)
 Strongly Disagree (5)

In Tables 101 and 102, the median of 4 shows disagreement whilst the mean at 3,5 suggests that the strength of the responses lie between undecided and disagree. The variance at 1,21 indicates a lack of consensus. A low positive correlation coefficient was discerned.

According to Table 101, 67,22% of the Africans disagreed and 16,67% agreed. But, 60,00% of the Indians disagreed whilst 22,50% agreed and 43,34% of the Coloureds disagreed whilst 40,00% agreed. Significantly more Africans believed that political organisations were effective than Coloureds, where a low percentage were of the same opinion.

The responses of people within the different occupations were as follows (Table 103):

TABLE 103

RELATION BETWEEN OCCUPATION AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS

Occupation	Agree %	Disagree %
Clerks	21,42	66,67
Unemployed	30,77	46,15
Professionals	24,07	61,11
Sales Staff	26,32	57,89
Self-employed	14,28	60,72
Skilled Workers	24,09	60,24
Students	16,67	71,21
Unskilled Workers	24,14	51,72

The strongest support for political organisations came from the students whilst the lowest support came from the unemployed.

Disagreement or support for political organisations, was strongest amongst the highest earning group (Table 104):

TABLE 104RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS

Income Earned	Agree %	Disagree %
R3 000	23,07%	61,53%
R3 - 6 000	19,1%	67,42%
R6 - 10 000	18,52%	53,08%
R10 - 15 000	28,07%	54,38%
R15 - 25 000	33,33%	59,52%
R25 000	15,39%	76,92%

Stronger support for political organisations came from the lowest rather than middle income group. This compares favourably with the weighted means of those income groups.

Support for political organisations amongst respondents with different educational qualifications was similar.

When gender was considered, men tended to be more supportive of political organisations than women.

There were some differences exhibited by the different age groups.

As age increases agreement increases i.e. older people believe more strongly that political organisations are ineffective.

Tables 105 and 106 show that 73,33% disagreed whilst 8,61% agreed and 18,06% were undecided, whilst the weighted mean at 3,83 was close to the median at 4 indicating disagreement. The variance at 0,79 indicates a significant degree of consensus. An exceptionally strong positive correlation coefficient was discerned.

TABLE 105

Statement 52: Trade unions are not effective.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	5 (2,78%)	2 (1,67%)	0 (0,00%)	7	1,94
Agree	5 (2,78%)	12 (10,00%)	7 (11,67%)	24	6,67
Undecided	45 (25,00%)	14 (11,67%)	6 (10,00%)	65	18,06
Disagree	75 (41,67%)	79 (65,83%)	38 (63,33%)	192	53,33
Strongly Disagree	50 (27,78%)	13 (10,83%)	9 (15,00%)	72	20,00
Median	4 (Disagree)				

$\bar{X}_w = 3,83$
 $V = 0,79$

TABLE 106

STATEMENT 52

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
3,88	0,87	3,90	0,56	3,76	0,85	3,33	0,22	3,93	0,81	3,82	0,79
3,84	0,70	3,88	0,65	3,74	1,01	4,12	0,35	3,72	0,77	3,86	0,87
3,81	0,68	3,84	0,86	3,79	0,70	3,92	0,79	$x^2 = 7,43$ with 4° freedom $P = 0,1148$ $> 0,05$	3,86	0,87	
$x^2 = 40,338$ with 8° freedom $P = 0,0001$ $< 0,05$	3,82	0,86	3,79	0,70	3,77	0,66	3,77		0,86		
	3,80	0,90	3,84	0,69	3,77	0,66	3,84		0,91		
	3,58	0,76	3,84	0,69	3,77	0,66	3,66		0,55		
$t_s = 0,975$	3,87	1,04	4,04	0,37	3,76	0,94	$x^2 = 14,548$ with 16° freedom $P = 0,558$ $> 0,05$	3,84	0,91		
	3,79	0,47	4,00	0,92	4,03	0,65		3,66	0,55		
		$x^2 = 61,652$ with 28° freedom $P = 0,0002$ $< 0,05$		$x^2 = 29,297$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,0821$ $> 0,05$		$x^2 = 16,977$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,6545$ $> 0,05$					

- Strongly Agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Undecided (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly Disagree (5)

Table 105 also shows that 69,45% of the Africans disagreed whilst 5,56% agreed and 25,00% remained undecided. But, 76,67% of the Indians disagreed whilst 11,67% agreed and 11,67% remained undecided. The number of Africans disagreeing with the statement i.e. believing that trade unions were effective was slightly higher than the number supporting political organisations (2,00% higher). The differences evident within the Indian and Coloured sectors were significant. Approximately 17,00% more Indians and 35,00% more Coloureds supported trade unions, than political organisations.

Strongest belief in the effectiveness of trade unions was exhibited by the students, the clerks and the professionals. There was significant support from the workers as well.

The following were the results when respondents from different income groups were reviewed (Table 107):

TABLE 107

RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS TRADE UNIONS BEING INEFFECTIVE

Income Earned	Agree %	Disagree %
R3 000	7,70%	67,69%
R3 - 6 000	11,23%	69,66%
R6 - 10 000	7,41%	66,66%
R10 - 15 000	12,28%	80,70%
R15 - 25 000	2,38%	88,10%
R25 000	7,70%	80,77%

Those with higher incomes were more confident about the effectiveness of trade unions.

Furthermore, 73,27% of those with higher education disagreed whilst 73,52% of those with lower education disagreed with statement 52.

There was stronger support for trade unions amongst men than women. Both men and women were more supportive of trade unions than political organisations.

TABLE 108

Statement 57: A fourth chamber for Africans should be added to the tricameral parliament.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	71 (39,44%)	9 (7,50%)	6 (10,00%)	86	23,89
Agree	55 (30,56%)	27 (45,00%)	67 (55,83%)	149	41,39
Undecided	13 (7,22%)	13 (10,83%)	4 (6,67%)	30	8,33
Disagree	24 (13,33%)	21 (17,50%)	12 (20,00%)	57	15,83
Strongly Disagree	17 (9,44%)	10 (8,33%)	11 (18,33%)	38	10,56
Median	2 (Agree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 2,48$$

$$V = 1,68$$

According to Table 108, 65,27% agreed whilst 26,38% disagreed and 8,33% were undecided. In Table 108 the median at 2 indicates agreement whilst the mean at 2,48 is closer to agree than undecided. However, the variance at 1,68 shows the lack of consensus existent amongst the population. The lowest positive correlation coefficient (0) showed no agreement within the rankings.

Table 108 also indicates that 70,00% of the Africans agreed and 22,77% disagreed, whilst 63,33% of the Indians agreed and 25,83% disagreed. But, 55,00% of the Coloureds agreed and 38,33% disagreed. Strongest support for the fourth chamber came from the African sector - contradicting the rejection of the proposal for the fourth chamber by extraparliamentary evolutionary forces.

An association existed between attitude towards statement 57 and occupation. Agreement was not strong among higher prestige occupations, but was amongst the workers, sales staff and the clerks.

TABLE 109

STATEMENT 57

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
2,22	1,79	2,33	1,12	1,96	1,29	2,33	1,55	2,63	1,85	2,49	1,69
2,63	1,23	3,00	1,38	2,26	0,44	2,08	1,03	2,32	0,59	2,42	1,57
2,91	1,77	1,78	0,90	2,30	1,39	2,37	1,40			2,34	1,60
$x^2 = 55,068$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 < 0,05		2,24	1,50	2,89	1,67	2,62	1,71			2,62	1,79
$r_s = 0$		1,96	1,55	2,85	1,59	2,46	2,07			2,50	1,58
		2,72	1,22	3,46	2,24						
		2,41	0,95								
		$x^2 = 69,296$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0001 < 0,05		$x^2 = 59,291$ with 20° freedom P = 0,0001 < 0,05		$x^2 = 24,046$ with 20° freedom P = 0,2404 > 0,05		$x^2 = 8,803$ with 4° freedom P = 0,0662 > 0,05		$x^2 = 5,646$ with 16° freedom P = 0,9915 > 0,05	

Strongly Agree (1)
 Agree (2)
 Undecided (3)
 Disagree (4)
 Strongly Disagree (5)

The differences in income exhibited the following differences in terms of attitude (Table 110):

TABLE 110

RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS A FOURTH PARLIAMENTARY CHAMBER FOR AFRICANS

Income Earned	Agree	Disagree
	%	%
R3 000	78,46	13,85
R3 - 6 000	71,91	16,86
R6 - 10 000	70,37	20,98
R10 - 15 000	54,39	40,36
R15 - 25 000	52,38	38,09
R25 000	38,46	57,69

This indicates clearly that agreement to the formation of a fourth chamber decreases as income increases. An examination of the weighted means also shows an identical relationship.

Agreement tends to increase as educational qualifications decrease. There was lesser agreement from the higher educated groups. This is to be expected since the leadership of the anti-apartheid forces, which have rejected the idea of the fourth chamber, have always tended to arise from better educated backgrounds.

A greater number of women than men were supportive of the fourth chamber.

Differences in strength of attitude were discerned amongst the various age groups.

Strongest disagreement came from the oldest group, showing them to be most opposed to reformist strategies.

TABLE 111

Statement 59: The nation wide boycotts at schools and universities show student's rejection of the South African educational and political system.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	64 (35,56%)	24 (20,00%)	18 (30,00%)	106	29,44
Agree	68 (37,78%)	61 (50,83%)	31 (51,67%)	160	44,44
Undecided	21 (11,67%)	14 (11,67%)	7 (11,67%)	42	11,67
Disagree	20 (11,11%)	20 (16,67%)	4 (6,67%)	44	12,22
Strongly Disagree	7 (3,89%)	1 (0,83%)	0 (0,00%)	8	2,22
Median	4 (Agree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 3,87$$

$$V = 1,09$$

According to Table 111, 73,88% agreed (29,44% strongly agreed), 14,44% disagreed whilst 11,67% were undecided. The variance at 1,09 did not show significant consensus whilst the mean at 3,87 was closer to agree than undecided and thus compared favourably with the median at 4. A very strong positive correlation coefficient was evident (Table 112).

TABLE 112
STATEMENT 59

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
AFRICAN		CLERK		LESS THAN R3 000		NONE (AND ILLITERATE)		MALE		BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS	
3,90	1,64	3,66	1,12	3,84	1,31	3,33	0,22	3,95	1,05	3,93	1,07
INDIAN		PROFESSIONAL		BETWEEN R3 - R6 000		NONE (AND LITERATE)		FEMALE		26 - 35	
3,72	1,48	3,79	1,38	3,96	0,84	3,37	0,98	3,77	1,09	3,89	1,04
COLOURED		SALES		BETWEEN R6 - R10 000		PRIMARY SCHOOL		$x^2 = 5,251$ with 4° freedom P = 0,2625 >0,05		36 - 45	
4,05	0,68	4,10	0,62	3,80	0,96	3,80	1,44			3,77	1,09
$x^2 = 17,792$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0228 <0,05		SELF-EMPLOYED		BETWEEN R10 - R15 000		JUNIOR SECONDARY		$x^2 = 18,754$ with 16° freedom P = 0,2816 >0,05		OVER 60	
		SKILLED WORKER		3,71		1,28				3,76	
$r_s = 0,90$		UNSKILLED WORKER		BETWEEN R15 - R25 000		SENIOR SECONDARY		$x^2 = 28,312$ with 20° freedom P = 0,1022 >0,05		$x^2 = 28,818$ with 20° freedom P = 0,0914 >0,05	
		3,96		1,41		3,86					
$r_s = 0,90$		STUDENT		MORE THAN R25 000		POST-MATRIC		$x^2 = 28,312$ with 20° freedom P = 0,1022 >0,05		$x^2 = 28,818$ with 20° freedom P = 0,0914 >0,05	
		4,16		1,22		3,94					
$r_s = 0,90$		OTHER		4,11		1,30		$x^2 = 28,312$ with 20° freedom P = 0,1022 >0,05		$x^2 = 28,818$ with 20° freedom P = 0,0914 >0,05	
		3,41		0,95		3,96					

Strongly Agree (5)
Agree (4)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (2)
Strongly Disagree (1)

Table 111 also shows that 73,34% of the Africans, 70,83% of the Indians and 81,67% of the Coloureds agreed. It is interesting to note that strongest agreement came from the Coloured community. African students in Natal have been less radical than their Cape or Transvaal counterparts, whilst Indian students have been the least in favour of boycotts as a means of symbolic protest or resistance.

As could be predicted when occupation was reviewed, students were most in favour of statement 59. Also strongly supportive were the sales staff and the self-employed.

Agreement was strongest amongst the highest income group, showing this strategy to be most supported by the affluent classes.

Similarly, agreement was strongest amongst the higher educated and disagreement was strongest amongst those with the lowest educational qualifications.

Greater support for nationwide boycotts was exhibited by the men rather than the women.

TABLE 113

Statement 61: Passive resistance by the communities gives rise to significant change.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	12 (6,67%)	10 (8,33%)	7 (11,67%)	29	8,06
Agree	37 (20,56%)	66 (55,00%)	12 (20,00%)	115	31,94
Undecided	51 (28,33%)	13 (10,83%)	16 (26,67%)	80	22,22
Disagree	43 (23,89%)	24 (20,00%)	19 (31,67%)	86	23,89
Strongly Disagree	37 (20,56%)	7 (5,83%)	6 (10,00%)	50	13,89
Median	3 (Undecided)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 2,96$$

$$V = 1,44$$

According to Table 113, 40,00% agreed whilst 37,78% disagreed and 22,22% were undecided.

The median at 3, matched by the weighted mean at 2,96 which is closer to undecided than agree show indecision within the Black community on this question. The variance at 1,44 indicates a lack of consensus and a very low positive correlation coefficient was evident (Table 114).

TABLE 114

STATEMENT 61

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE		
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	
2,68	1,43	3,30	1,35	2,69	1,67	4,00	2,00	2,82	1,54	3,45	1,07	
3,4	1,15	2,53	1,24	2,93	0,30	2,50	2,00	3,10	1,23	3,32	0,62	
2,91	1,90	2,68	0,95	2,93	0,30	2,88	1,62	$x^2 = 8,075$ with 4° freedom $P = 0,0889$ $>0,05$	3,49	0,31	3,56	0,96
$x^2 = 56,232$ with 8° freedom $P = 0,0001$ $<0,05$	3,07	1,49	2,93	1,31	3,05	1,34	4,50		0,25	$x^2 = 13,355$ with 16° freedom $P = 0,6466$ $>0,05$		
	3,15	1,48	3,22	1,24	3,01	1,11	2,75		1,32			
$x^2 = 51,268$ with 28° freedom $P = 0,0046$ $<0,05$	3,58	1,41	3,04	1,66	2,75	1,32	$x^2 = 31,531$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,0486$ $<0,05$		$x^2 = 21,799$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,3515$ $>0,05$			
	2,68	1,30	3,11	0,56	3,11	0,56						
$x^2 = 0,375$	3,58	0,95	3,11	0,56	3,11	0,56						
	3,58	0,95	3,11	0,56	3,11	0,56						

Strongly Agree (5)
Agree (4)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (2)
Strongly Disagree (1)

According to Table 113, 27,23% of the Africans, 63,33% of the Indians and 31,67% of the Coloureds agreed, and 44,45% of the Africans, 25,83% of the Indians and 41,67% of the Coloureds disagreed. Hence, there was no strong support for passive resistance except within the Indian community. Historically, passive resistance has been an important component of Indian resistance.

An association existed between attitude towards statement 61 and occupational levels. Strongest agreement was exhibited by the unemployed, the clerks and the skilled workers. Agreement was not significant amongst the students, sales staff and the unskilled workers.

Attitudes by respondents whose income varied were as follows (Table 115):

TABLE 115RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS PASSIVE RESISTANCE

Income Earned	Agree	Disagree
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
R3 000	30,77	47,70
R3 - 6 000	40,45	39,32
R6 - 10 000	37,04	34,57
R10 - 15 000	47,37	29,82
R15 - 25 000	40,48	35,72
R25 000	53,85	38,46

Agreement tends to drop and then rise again. Lowest agreement to statement 61 came from the lowest income group whilst strongest agreement to passive resistance as a strategy came from the highest income group.

Disagreement to passive resistance tends to increase as educational qualifications increase. The more educated sector sees little hope in attaining change through passive resistance.

Women, however, were more supportive of passive resistance than men.

Agreement to statement 61 increases as age increases.

The most supportive were the older sector of people. It was this group that had lived through the passive resistance era of the 1940s and 1950s.

TABLE 116

INFERENCE FROM PROPORTIONAL STRATIFIED SAMPLES TO THE POPULATION

<u>Population</u>	<u>African</u>	<u>Indian</u>	<u>Coloured</u>	<u>Total</u>
(a) Absolute size	2 580 847	552 819	63 929	3 197 595
(b) Relative size	80,7	17,3	2	100
 <u>Proportional/Cluster Sample</u>				
(c) Absolute size	180	120	60	360
(d) Percent supportive of extraparliamentary evolutionary change	87,22	86,67	78,33	(85,55) $\frac{308}{360}$
(1) Absolute size (d x a)	2 251 015	479 128	50 076	2 780 219
(2) Relative size (d x b)	70,38%	14,99%	1,56%	(86,93%)

Hence, 86,93% of the Black population support extraparliamentary evolutionary strategies as opposed to 85,55% when the ratio 3 : 2 : 1 is used.

However, the two figures are relatively close, thus showing the reliability of the proportional method.

6.2.1 Summary of conclusions on extraparliamentary evolutionary strategies for change

The single accumulative score for extraparliamentary evolutionary change indicated that 85,55% of the respondents were supportive of this type of change whilst 11,67% were unsupportive.

Early evolutionary theories suggest a progressive, inevitable outcome of change due to endogenous changes including population size. However, the respondents did not view a population size increase of Black people as being an important factor for change. Whilst a slightly higher percentage agreed rather than disagreed, most remained indecisive.

A high degree of consensus was exhibited on the question of community apathy and the ability to change situations collectively. There was higher consensus on the question of information; most believed that the mass media should furnish us with all the information concerning unrest in the country.

A higher percentage supported disinvestment than did not, with Africans and Coloureds being more favourable towards disinvestment and the Indians least agreeable. When occupational groups were reviewed, the professionals were seen as the least agreeable (followed by the unemployed) whilst strongest agreement came from the workers. Interestingly, however, the professionals' support for passive resistance was also minimal.

A significantly higher amount of Africans than Indians and Coloureds supported one-person-one-vote, but 30,00% of the Coloureds were undecided on this issue. It is probable that this reflects the fear of the "minority groups" in Durban of majority dominance within a unitary society.

The majority supported the call for the unbanning of outlawed organisations, people in exile to return, the release of all those in detention and the calling of a National Convention. Strongest

agreement came from the professionals and self-employed. Agreement tended to increase as income increased. Strongest agreement came from those over 46 years old - it is probable that agreement is significant amongst this group because older respondents lived through the period in which the Congress Alliance was activated. The call for a National Convention was particularly strong during this phase. The majority believed as well that a National Convention will solve the country's problems.

So strong was the belief in negotiation, that a smaller majority agreed to a National Convention with just existing legal organisations taking part. A larger number of Coloureds disagreed. Disagreement with this sort of "limited National Convention" was also seen to increase as income increased.

The majority disagreed with the formation of regional and provincial structures as an attempt at a political solution. This shows little potential for the KwaNatal Indaba. Level of education did not affect the degree of disagreement. A larger percentage also agreed that Natal could not separate itself politically from the rest of the country.

Whilst the majority agreed that civic actions are important tactics for change, the level of agreement was not significantly strong nor the degree of consensus high. There was stronger agreement amongst the Indians and the students and the lowest income group.

There was an extremely high degree of consensus on the question of support for the trade unions. Agreement was high when all race groups were compared. Agreement was highest amongst the lowest and highest income groups. Most agreed as well that trade unions are effective. Some agreed that political organisations are effective. Fewer Indians and Coloureds agreed that political organisations are effective.

Most agreed that a fourth chamber should be added to the tricameral parliament. A larger percentage of Africans than any other group

agreed. Agreement to the formation of a chamber decreased as income increased.

The majority agreed that the nationwide boycotts reflect rejection of the South African system. Strongest agreement came from the students, the sales staff and the self-employed. Agreement was also strongest amongst the highest income group and the lowest amongst the lowest income group.

There was little support amongst Coloureds and Africans for passive resistance.

In the final analysis, Black (African, Indian and Coloured) support for extraparliamentary evolutionary change can be seen as significant. A comparison with more radical perceptions of change will be made later on to address the second and third working hypotheses simultaneously.

6.3 Extraparliamentary revolutionary strategies for change

TABLE 117

Statement 30: A violent revolution will never take place.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	9 (5,00%)	8 (6,67%)	1 (1,67%)	18	5,00
Agree	16 (8,89%)	17 (14,17%)	5 (8,33%)	38	10,56
Undecided	67 (37,22%)	30 (25,00%)	20 (33,33%)	117	32,50
Disagree	56 (31,11%)	56 (46,67%)	19 (31,67%)	131	36,39
Strongly Disagree	32 (17,78%)	9 (7,50%)	15 (25,00%)	56	15,56
Median	4 (Disagree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 3,64$$

$$V = 1,07$$

With reference to Table 117, only 15,56% agreed whilst 51,95% disagreed and 32,50% were undecided.

The majority disagreed, believing that a violent revolution was inevitable. The mean at 3,64 was between undecided and disagree whilst the median at 4 indicated disagreement. The variance at 1,07 does not indicate a significant degree of consensus. Yet, an extremely high correlation coefficient showed agreement in terms of the ranking of attitudes of the different races (Table 118).

TABLE 118

STATEMENT 30

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
AFRICAN		CLERK		LESS THAN R3 000		NONE (AND ILLITERATE)		MALE		BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS	
3,47	1,13	3,59	1,38	3,35	1,21	3,33	0,88	3,57	1,15	3,57	1,04
INDIAN		PROFESSIONAL		BETWEEN R3 - R6 000		NONE (AND LITERATE)		FEMALE		26 - 35	
3,34	1,10	3,98	0,62	3,33	1,25	3,25	1,43	3,36	0,96	3,52	1,12
COLOURED		SALES		BETWEEN R6 - R10 000		PRIMARY SCHOOL		$x^2 = 10,518$ with 4° freedom $P = 0,032$ $< 0,05$		36 - 45	
3,70	0,97	2,94	0,99	3,35	0,84	3,68	0,69			3,34	1,20
$x^2 = 21,808$ with 8° freedom $P = 0,0005$ $< 0,05$		SELF-EMPLOYED		BETWEEN R10 - R15 000		JUNIOR SECONDARY		$x^2 = 14,846$ with 16° freedom $P = 0,535$ $> 0,05$		46 - 60	
		SKILLED WORKER		3,66		3,29				3,50	
$r_s = 0,90$		UNSKILLED WORKER		BETWEEN R15 - R25 000		SENIOR SECONDARY		$x^2 = 13,136$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,871$ $> 0,05$		OVER 60	
		3,37		3,59		3,45				3,83	
		STUDENT		MORE THAN R25 000		POST-MATRIC					
		3,68		3,92		3,51					
		OTHER									
		3,00									
		$x^2 = 52,618$ with 28° freedom $P = 0,003$ $< 0,05$		$x^1 = 20,035$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,4558$ $> 0,05$							

Strongly Agree (1)
Agree (2)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (4)
Strongly Disagree (5)

Table 117 shows that 48,89% of the Africans disagreed whilst 13,89% agreed and 37,22% were undecided. Of the other two groups, 20,84% of the Indians agreed whilst 54,17% disagreed and 56,67% of the Coloureds disagreed whilst 10,00% agreed. A greater number of Indians and Coloureds believed that a violent revolution would take place. This anticipation of inevitable revolution was not strongly

shared by the Africans who exhibited a large degree of doubt and uncertainty.

When occupational categories were reviewed, it was found that strongest belief in revolution was exhibited by the professionals, the clerks and the students. The unemployed, the unskilled workers and the skilled workers were less inclined to believe in the inevitability of revolution.

Hence, a distinction was evident between affluent and non-affluent categories.

A similar pattern is evident when income groups are reviewed (Table 119):

TABLE 119

RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS NON-OCCURRENCE OF VIOLENT REVOLUTION

Income Earned	Agree %	Disagree %
R3 000	20,00%	44,61%
R3 - 6 000	20,23%	46,07%
R6 - 10 000	14,81%	45,68%
R10 - 15 000	10,53%	63,15%
R15 - 25 000	11,90%	57,15%
R25 000	7,69%	76,93%

Stronger disagreement to statement 30 or belief that revolution would take place was evident amongst the higher income groups, whilst belief that revolution would never take place increased as income decreased.

Disagreement to statement 30 tended to increase as well, as educational qualifications increased.

A greater number of men believed that revolution would take place than women.

TABLE 120

Statement 37: The international world believes that the situation in South Africa is explosive, but this is not the situation.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	12 (6,67%)	5 (4,17%)	3 (5,00%)	20	5,56
Agree	39 (21,67%)	45 (37,50%)	16 (26,67%)	100	27,78
Undecided	47 (26,11%)	9 (7,50%)	10 (16,67%)	66	18,33
Disagree	61 (33,89%)	50 (41,67%)	18 (30,00%)	129	35,83
Strongly Disagree	21 (11,67%)	13 (10,83%)	13 (21,67%)	45	12,50
Median	3 (Undecided)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 3,22$$

$$V = 1,31$$

TABLE 121

STATEMENT 37

RACE	OCCUPATION	INCOME	EDUCATION	GENDER	AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	
AFRICAN	CLERK	LESS THAN R3 000	NONE (AND ILLITERATE)	MALE	BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS	
3,22	1,26	2,97	1,48	3,41	1,33	
INDIAN	PROFESSIONAL	BETWEEN R3 - R6 000	NONE (AND LITERATE)	FEMALE	36 - 45	
3,14	1,32	2,93	1,41	3,02	1,21	
COLOURED	SALES	BETWEEN R6 - R10 000	PRIMARY SCHOOL	$x^2 = 16,676$ with 4° freedom P = 0,002 < 0,05	36 - 45	
3,36	1,49	3,21	1,90		3,13	1,37
$x^2 = 28,191$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0004 < 0,05	SELF-EMPLOYED	BETWEEN R10 - R15 000	JUNIOR SECONDARY	36 - 45	36 - 45	
	3,64	0,93	3,16	1,04	3,31	1,02
$t_s = 0,65$	SKILLED WORKER	BETWEEN R15 - R25 000	SENIOR SECONDARY	46 - 60	46 - 60	
	3,09	1,13	3,26	1,38	3,33	1,22
	UNSKILLED WORKER	MORE THAN R25 000	POST-MATRIC	OVER 60	OVER 60	
	2,86	1,303	3,41	1,27	3,83	0,13
	STUDENT	$x^2 = 53,768$ with 28° freedom P = 0,002 < 0,05	$x^2 = 37,353$ with 20° freedom P = 0,0106 < 0,05	$x^2 = 12,599$ with 20° freedom P = 0,893 > 0,05	$x^2 = 14,464$ with 16° freedom P = 0,564 > 0,05	
	OTHER					
	2,89	1,16				

Strongly Agree (1)
Agree (2)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (4)
Strongly Disagree (5)

Table 120 shows that 33,33% agreed with statement 37 whilst 48,33% disagreed and 18,33% were undecided. The number of respondents (48,33%) that believed that the situation in South Africa is explosive is comparable with the number (51,95%) that believe that a violent revolution will take place. Hence, it is probable that respondents see the current sustained and sporadic unrest as a prelude to a more revolutionary situation. A stronger moderate correlation coefficient was evident (Table 121).

Whilst a greater number of people disagreed, hence believing that the situation is explosive, the median at 3, matched by the weighted mean at 3,22 indicates indecision. The variance at 1,31 shows a lack of consensus.

Table 120 also indicates that 28,34% of the Africans agreed whilst 45,56% disagreed and 41,67% of the Indians agreed whilst 52,50% disagreed. In comparison, 31,67% of the Coloureds agreed whilst 51,67% disagreed. Again Indian and Coloured responses were stronger on the question of whether or not the situation was explosive.

An association existed between attitudes towards statement 37 and occupation. Stronger belief that the situation in South Africa was explosive was exhibited by the self-employed, the professionals and the students whilst lowest support for this view was exhibited by the sales staff, the unskilled workers and the unemployed.

Similarly, when different income groups were reviewed it was found that disagreement to statement 37 increases as income increases.

Disagreement to statement 37 increases as educational level increases. Some differences between the sexes exist. Significantly more men than women disagreed.

TABLE 122

Statement 38: Unrest in the country is going to spread to other areas, such as our own.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	30 (16,67%)	11 (9,17%)	14 (23,33%)	55	15,28
Agree	54 (30,00%)	67 (55,83%)	24 (40,00%)	145	40,28
Undecided	58 (32,22%)	11 (9,17%)	6 (10,00%)	75	20,83
Disagree	28 (15,56%)	28 (23,33%)	15 (25,00%)	71	19,72
Strongly Disagree	10 (5,56%)	3 (2,50%)	1 (1,67%)	14	3,89
Median	4 (Agree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 3,43$$

$$V = 1,18$$

TABLE 123

STATEMENT 38

RACE	OCCUPATION	INCOME	EDUCATION	GENDER	AGE
Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V	Xw V
AFRICAN 3,36 1,21	CLERK 3,47 1,24	LESS THAN R3 000 3,52 1,26	NONE (AND ILLITERATE) 3,00 0,66	MALE 3,41 1,22	BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS 3,53 1,18
INDIAN 3,45 1,04	PROFESSIONAL 3,57 1,01	BETWEEN R3 - R6 000 3,30 1,11	NONE (AND LITERATE) 3,75 0,68	FEMALE 3,43 1,13	26 - 35 3,41 1,24
COLOURED 3,58 1,309	SALES 3,10 1,17	BETWEEN R6 - R10 000 3,30 1,10	PRIMARY SCHOOL 3,16 0,93	$x^2 = 4,694$ with 4° freedom $P = 0,320$ > 0,05	36 - 45 3,42 1,29
$x^2 = 45,935$ with 8° freedom $P = 0,0001$ < 0,05	SELF-EMPLOYED 3,28 1,39	BETWEEN R10 - R15 000 3,54 1,009	JUNIOR SECONDARY 3,31 0,91		46 - 60 3,21 0,95
	SKILLED WORKER 3,49 1,36	BETWEEN R15 - R25 000 3,61 1,23	SENIOR SECONDARY 3,49 1,26		OVER 60 3,66 0,55
$r_s = 0,30$	UNSKILLED WORKER 3,27 1,13	MORE THAN R25 000 3,61 1,23	POST-MATRIC 3,48 1,35	$x^2 = 14,528$ with 16° freedom $P = 0,559$ > 0,05	
	STUDENT 3,66 1,12	$x^2 = 30,049$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,069$ > 0,05	$x^2 = 31,708$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,320$ > 0,05		
OTHER 3,05 0,87					
	$x^2 = 40,613$ with 28° freedom $P = 0,058$ $\geq 0,05$				

Strongly Agree (5)
Agree (4)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (2)
Strongly Disagree (1)

According to Table 122, 55,55% of the respondents agreed whilst 23,61% disagreed and 20,83% were undecided. The median at 4 indicated agreement whilst the mean at 3,43 was closer to undecided. The variance at 1,18 shows a lack of consensus. Similarly, a very low positive correlation coefficient was evident (Table 123).

Table 122 shows that 46,67% of the Africans agreed whilst 21,12% disagreed and 32,22% were undecided. Indecision here may be due to the fact that African areas are already experiencing instability largely due not only to active resistance against the State but to fighting between the UDF and Inkatha. Agreement to statement 38 here shows that respondents anticipate an acceleration of unrest. Furthermore, 65,00% of the Indians and 63,33% of the Coloureds agreed with statement 38 whilst 25,83% and 26,67% disagreed respectively. Indian and Coloured views were again stronger suggesting that unrest was going to spread to their own areas which have been virtually untouched by civil unrest.

No association existed between attitude towards statement 38 and occupation, suggesting a similarity between responses.

However, agreement to statement 38 tended to increase as income increased (Table 124):

TABLE 124

RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS SPREADING OF UNREST

Income Earned	Agree %	Disagree %
R3 000	56,92	18,46
R3 - 6 000	46,07	23,59
R6 - 10 000	47,45	27,16
R10 - 15 000	63,16	28,07
R15 - 25 000	66,67	21,43
R25 000	73,07	19,23

A strong association existed between attitude towards statement 38 and differences in terms of educational qualifications attained. Agreement tended to increase as educational qualifications increased (with the exception of those with senior certificate qualifications).

More women than men agreed that unrest was going to spread (there was greater consensus amongst women). The greater positive response from women here could be seen as contradicting a trend that has been exhibited thus far, showing women to be more conservative. However, it could also be seen as in line with earlier responses if women's greater belief in the spreading of unrest were as a result of fear and paranoia.

TABLE 125

Statement 50: Political organisations are more important than trade unions.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	28 (15,56%)	2 (1,67%)	2 (3,33%)	32	8,89
Agree	21 (11,67%)	24 (20,00%)	9 (15,00%)	54	15,00
Undecided	59 (32,78%)	33 (27,50%)	18 (30,00%)	110	30,56
Disagree	56 (31,11%)	59 (49,17%)	25 (41,67%)	140	38,89
Strongly Disagree	16 (8,89%)	2 (1,67%)	6 (10,00%)	24	6,67
Median	3 (Undecided)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 3,19$$

$$V = 1,13$$

According to Table 125, 23,88% agreed whilst 45,55% disagreed and 30,56% were undecided. The median at 3 and mean at 3,19 indicates indecision. The variance at 1,13 does not show consensus. A stronger moderate correlation coefficient was discerned (Table 126).

Table 125 shows that 27,23% of the Africans, 21,67% of the Indians and 18,33% of the Coloureds agreed. At the same time 40,00% of the

TABLE 126

STATEMENT 50											
RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
AFRICAN		CLERK		LESS THAN		NONE (AND		MALE		BETWEEN	
3,05	1,40	3,14	1,05	R3 000		ILLITERATE)		3,26	1,02	16 - 25 YEARS	
INDIAN		PROFESSIONAL		3,04	1,18	2,33	0,88	FEMALE		3,02	1,23
3,29	0,73	3,29	1,21	BETWEEN		NONE (AND		3,12	1,20	26 - 35	
COLOURED		SALES		R3 - R6 000		LITERATE)		$x^2 = 3,024$ with 4° freedom $P = 0,553$ $>0,05$		3,32	1,21
3,40	0,94	2,94	1,25	3,04	1,23	3,25	2,18			36 - 45	
$x^2 = 35,134$ with 8° freedom $P = 0,0001$ $<0,05$		SELF-EMPLOYED		BETWEEN		PRIMARY SCHOOL		3,27	0,85	46 - 60	
		3,07	0,93	R6 - R10 000		3,16	1,09	3,29	0,95	OVER 60	
		SKILLED WORKER		BETWEEN		JUNIOR		$x^2 = 15,082$ with 16° freedom $P = 0,518$ $>0,05$		3,66	0,22
	3,27	1,16	R10 - R15 000		3,12	0,94					
$r_s = 0,60$		UNSKILLED WORKER		BETWEEN		SENIOR					
		2,86	1,44	R15 - R25 000		3,23	1,09				
		STUDENT		MORE THAN		POST-MATRIC					
		3,21	1,27	R25 000		3,20	1,19				
		OTHER		3,53	0,86	$x^2 = 19,021$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,520$ $>0,05$					
		3,35	0,70	BETWEEN							
		$x^2 = 26,437$ with 28° freedom $P = 0,549$ $>0,05$		$x^2 = 22,737$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,301$ $>0,05$							

Strongly Agree (1)
 Agree (2)
 Undecided (3)
 Disagree (4)
 Strongly Disagree (5)

Africans disagreed as well as 50,84% of the Indians and 51,67% of the Coloureds. Indecision was also relatively high - 32,78% of the Africans, 27,50% of the Indians and 30,00% of the Coloureds were undecided. A positive correlation showed agreement within the rankings. A larger number of Africans believed that political organisations were more important than trade unions. Fewer Africans than Indians and Coloureds disagreed with the statement. This is probably because of the long history of resistance led by political organisations and of the increasing political role trade unions themselves have always had to play.

Disagreement to statement 50 suggests that respondents are recognising, consciously or not, the increasing importance of trade unions as forces for change. No longer can political organisations be seen as the only forces within a political terrain, but rather as organisations whose interests if coupled with those of the trade unions can provide a revolutionary impetus.

Strongest disagreement to statement 50 came from the unemployed, the professionals, the skilled workers and the students.

The fact that disagreement to statement 50 increased as income increased is significant. The wealthiest group was most supportive of the view that trade unions were more important than political organisations. It would seem that the lowest income group had the greatest sensitivity to the complex interplay between the political and trade union forces by remaining largely indecisive.

No association existed between attitude towards statement 50 and educational qualifications. Responses from the different groups were similar.

More men than women disagreed with statement 50.

Regarding the different age groups, as age increases agreement decreased and disagreement increased.

TABLE 127

Statement 53: Armed struggle should not be used to bring about change.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	22 (12,22%)	13 (10,83%)	7 (11,67%)	42	11,67
Agree	49 (27,22%)	74 (61,67%)	25 (41,67%)	148	41,11
Undecided	50 (27,78%)	11 (9,17%)	7 (11,67%)	68	18,89
Disagree	36 (20,00%)	15 (12,50%)	13 (21,67%)	64	17,78
Strongly Disagree	16 (12,78%)	7 (5,83%)	8 (13,33%)	38	10,56
Median	2 (Agree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 2,74$$

$$V = 1,41$$

TABLE 128
STATEMENT 53

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
AFRICAN		CLERK		LESS THAN R3 000		NONE (AND ILLITERATE)		MALE		BETWEEN 16 - 25 YEARS	
2,93	1,46	2,80	1,49	2,64	1,70	4,00	0	2,85	1,50	2,86	1,40
INDIAN		PROFESSIONAL		BETWEEN R3 - R6 000		NONE (AND LITERATE)		FEMALE		26 - 35	
2,40	1,09	2,57	1,41	2,89	1,21	2,37	1,23	2,63	1,29	2,67	1,36
COLOURED		SALES		BETWEEN R6 - R10 000		PRIMARY SCHOOL		$x^2 = 3,125$ with 4° freedom P = 0,444 >0,05		36 - 45	
2,83	1,505	2,78	1,79	2,82	1,42	3,00	1,04			2,60	1,51
$x^2 = 42,800$ with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		SELF-EMPLOYED		BETWEEN R10 - R15 000		JUNIOR SECONDARY		$x^2 = 17,017$ with 16° freedom P = 0,3845 >0,05		46 - 60	
		SKILLED WORKER		R15 - R25 000		SENIOR SECONDARY				OVER 60	
$r_s = 0,20$		UNSKILLED WORKER		BETWEEN R25 000		POST-MATRIC					
		STUDENT		MORE THAN R25 000							
		OTHER									
		2,33		0,955		2,38		1,54			
		$x^2 = 47,364$ with 28° freedom P = 0,0125 <0,05		$x^2 = 21,597$ with 20° freedom P = 0,362 >0,05		$x^2 = 24,869$ with 20° freedom P = 0,206 >0,05					

Strongly Agree (1)
Agree (2)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (4)
Strongly Disagree (5)

According to Table 127, 52,78% agreed whilst 28,33% disagreed and 18,89% were undecided. Whilst the median at 2 suggests agreement, the weighted mean is closer to undecided than agree at 2,74. The variance at 1,41 shows a lack of consensus. Whilst a majority agreed with the statement a sizeable proportion disagreed. A small percentage, 28,33%, in terms of population size would indicate that 905 879 people were potentially supporters of armed struggle. A very low positive correlation showed limited agreement within the rankings of the different race groups.

Of the Africans, 39,44% agreed whilst 32,78% disagreed, with 27,78% remaining undecided, showing Africans to be divided on this issue. Of the Indians 72,50% agreed whilst 18,33% disagreed and 9,17% remained undecided. Of the Coloureds, 53,34% agreed with 35,00% disagreeing. A small percentage, 11,67%, of the Coloureds were undecided.

An association existed between attitude towards statement 50 and occupational categories.

Strongest rejection of armed struggle was exhibited by the unemployed whilst strongest support for armed struggle was exhibited by the sales staff, students and skilled workers.

Agreement was also strongest amongst the highest income group and disagreement was strongest amongst the second and third lowest groups.

No significant differences amongst the higher, senior and junior secondary groups are evident. However, agreement towards statement 53 was lowest amongst the primary school groups with disagreement highest.

More men than women agreed showing men to be more supportive of armed struggle.

Agreement to statement 53 tended to increase as age increased. Disagreement was strongest within the youngest sector. African male youth from lower income groups are more likely in terms of the above to be supportive of armed struggle.

TABLE 129

Statement 62: Capitalism is at the root of the countries problems.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	8
Strongly Agree	36 (20,00%)	15 (12,50%)	10 (16,67%)	61	16,94
Agree	51 (28,33%)	63 (52,50%)	15 (25,00%)	129	35,83
Undecided	65 (36,11%)	22 (18,33%)	15 (25,00%)	102	28,33
Disagree	19 (10,56%)	19 (15,83%)	15 (25,00%)	53	14,72
Strongly Disagree	9 (5,00%)	1 (0,83%)	5 (8,33%)	15	4,17
Median	4 (Agree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 3,46$$

$$V = 1,13$$

TABLE 130

STATEMENT 62

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
3,45	1,31	3,38	1,14	3,53	1,17	3,33	1,55	3,45	1,28	3,45	1,07
3,60	0,85	3,62	1,34	3,48	1,01	3,75	0,93	3,47	0,98	3,32	1,21
3,16	1,47	3,05	1,43	3,29	1,02	3,52	1,04	$x^2 = 5,446$ with 4° freedom $P = 0,244$ $> 0,05$	3,32	1,21	
$x^2 = 37,328$ with 8° freedom $P = 0,0001$ $< 0,05$	3,21	1,33	3,29	1,02	3,59	1,04	3,49		1,13		
	3,377	1,02	3,59	1,18	3,46	1,16	3,56		1,08		
	3,72	1,42	3,28	1,25	3,25	1,08	4,50		0,25		
	3,65	1,21	3,76	1,17	$x^2 = 25,042$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,199$ $> 0,05$	$x^2 = 11,242$ with 16° freedom $P = 0,794$ $> 0,05$					
3,40	0,67	3,76	1,17	$x^2 = 45,994$ with 28° freedom $P = 0,0175$ $< 0,05$			$x^2 = 27,188$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,130$ $> 0,05$				
$r_s = 0,80$											

Strongly Agree (5)
Agree (4)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (2)
Strongly Disagree (1)

According to Table 129, 52,77% of the respondents agreed whilst 18,89% disagreed. The median at 4 indicates agreement whilst the mean at 3,46 is closer to undecided than agree. The variance at 1,13 shows a lack of consensus. A strong positive correlation coefficient showed significant agreement within the rankings.

Of the Africans, 48,33% agreed whilst 15,56% disagreed and 36,11% were undecided. Of the Indians, 65,00% agreed whilst 16,67% disagreed. A smaller percentage of the Coloureds, 41,67% agreed whilst 33,33% disagreed. A significant number of Indians as opposed to Africans and Coloureds believed that the economic system of production was at the root of the country's problems.

When occupation groups were reviewed it was found that strongest agreement was exhibited by the students, the unemployed, the unskilled workers and the professionals.

The differences in terms of income can be depicted as follows:

TABLE 131

RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS CAPITALISM
AS ROOT PROBLEM

Income Earned	Agree %	Disagree %
R3 000	49,23	13,85
R3 - 6 000	55,05	15,73
R6 - 10 000	49,38	29,63
R10 - 15 000	59,65	15,79
R15 - 25 000	45,24	30,95
R25 000	61,54	11,54

The Table shows that the highest income group was most strongly in agreement whilst the preceding income group was most strongly in disagreement.

Agreement is much higher amongst the lower educated individuals. As education increases, agreement drops.

A slightly higher number of women than men supported statement 62. This does not imply a tendency of radicalism but pessimism on the part of the women.

TABLE 132

Statement 63: Socialism would transform this country into a free society.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	98 (54,44%)	16 (13,33%)	8 (13,33%)	122	33,89
Agree	54 (30,00%)	53 (44,17%)	18 (30,00%)	125	34,72
Undecided	18 (10,00%)	28 (23,33%)	15 (25,00%)	61	16,94
Disagree	3 (1,67%)	22 (18,33%)	15 (25,00%)	40	11,11
Strongly Disagree	7 (3,89%)	1 (0,83%)	4 (6,67%)	12	3,33
Median	4 (Agree)				

$$\bar{X}_w = 3,84$$

$$V = 1,23$$

TABLE 133

STATEMENT 63

RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
4,29	0,97	3,78	1,02	3,86	1,50	3,00	2,00	3,93	1,20	3,80	1,25
3,50	0,93	3,51	1,27	4,01	1,08	4,87	0,10	3,75	1,24	3,79	1,01
3,18	1,31	3,84	1,82	4,08	0,86	4,04	1,07	x ² = 3,318 with 4° freedom P = 0,506 >0,05		3,86	1,58
x ² = 94,737 with 8° freedom P = 0,0001 <0,05		4,00	1,50	3,63	1,18	4,02	0,88			3,96	1,18
r _s = 0,20		3,96	1,88	3,26	1,19	3,70	1,33			4,00	0
		3,87	1,5	3,92	1,37	3,32	1,56	x ² = 36,977 with 20° freedom P = 0,011 <0,05		x ² = 23,564 with 16° freedom P = 0,099 >0,05	
		3,48	0,79	x ² = 46,731 with 20° freedom P = 0,0006 <0,05							
		x ² = 60,379 with 28° freedom P = 0,0004 <0,05									

Strongly Agree (5)
Agree (4)
Undecided (3)
Disagree (2)
Strongly Disagree (1)

According to Table 132, 68,61% agreed whilst 14,44% disagreed and 16,94% remained undecided. The median at 4 indicates agreement whilst the mean at 3,84 is closer to agreement than undecided. The variance at 1,23 does not show consensus. This is matched by a very low positive correlation coefficient.

Of the Africans, 84,44% agreed whilst 57,50% of the Indians and 43,33% of the Coloureds agreed. Within the African sector, the variance was 0,97 showing significant consensus. Consensus at 0,93 was also significant within the Indian sector. However, socialism was not a simple matter for the Coloureds.

Whilst a significant number of Indians agreed that capitalism was at the root of the country's problems a lesser percentage saw socialism as an alternative. A low percentage of Coloureds supported socialism whilst a significantly high proportion of Africans supported socialism - a number higher than those positively recognising capitalism as the root of all the problems.

An association existed between attitude towards statement 63 and differences in terms of occupation. Strongest agreement came from the skilled workers, the self-employed and the unskilled workers. The unemployed and the professionals were least favourable towards statement 63.

Whilst the highest income group agreed that capitalism was at the root of the country's problems, the more prestigious, professional class was least in agreement to socialism as an alternative. The workers were most strongly in favour of socialism.

A similar relationship emerges when income groups are reviewed.

TABLE 134RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS DESIRABILITY OF SOCIALISM

Income Earned	Agree %	Disagree %
R3 000	67,69	13,84
R3 - 6 000	76,40	10,11
R6 - 10 000	76,55	6,17
R10 - 15 000	64,91	19,30
R15 - 25 000	42,86	33,33
R25 000	69,23	15,39

As income increases favourability towards socialism tends to decrease.

When educational qualifications were reviewed, it was found that there was greater support from the less qualified. A positive correlation indicates that the rankings are not conflicting.

Greater support for socialism was exhibited by the men than the women.

TABLE 135

Statement 65: Organisations must work towards making the country ungovernable so that it can be rapidly changed.

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	COLOURED	TOTAL	%
Strongly Agree	47 (26,11%)	10 (8,33%)	12 (20,00%)	69	19,17
Agree	42 (23,33%)	31 (25,83%)	9 (15,00%)	82	22,78
Undecided	43 (23,89%)	20 (16,67%)	16 (26,67%)	79	21,94
Disagree	34 (18,89%)	55 (45,83%)	17 (28,33%)	106	29,44
Strongly Disagree	14 (7,78%)	4 (3,33%)	6 (10,00%)	24	6,67
Median	3 (Undecided)				

TABLE 136

STATEMENT 65											
RACE		OCCUPATION		INCOME		EDUCATION		GENDER		AGE	
Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
3,41	1,608	3,07	1,6	3,18	1,68	3,00	0,66	3,25	1,69	3,26	1,56
2,90	1,17	3,11	1,58	3,35	1,51	3,00	2,75	3,11	0,79	3,22	1,41
3,06	1,62	3,31	1,39	3,25	1,32	3,00	1,68	$x^2 = 6,778$ with 4° freedom $P = 0,148$ >0,05		3,21	1,57
$x^2 = 37,568$ with 8° freedom $P = 0,0001$ <0,05		3,03	1,41	2,92	1,39	3,25	1,34			2,92	1,41
		3,32	1,44	3,13	2,10	3,11	1,50	3,00	1,66		
$\bar{r}_s = 0$		3,45	1,61	3,11	1,53	3,41	1,58	$x^2 = 39,178$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,006$ <0,05		$x^2 = 12,060$ with 16° freedom $P = 0,747$ >0,05	
		2,71	0,84	3,00	1,69	$x^2 = 16,291$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,698$ >0,05					
		$x^2 = 51,888$ with 28° freedom $P = 0,003$ <0,05		$x^2 = 16,291$ with 20° freedom $P = 0,698$ >0,05							

Strongly Agree (5)
 Agree (4)
 Undecided (3)
 Disagree (2)
 Strongly Disagree (1)

According to Tables 135 and 136, 41,95% agreed whilst 36,11% disagreed. Whilst a larger percentage agreed than disagreed the degree of consensus was not evident as indicated by the variance at 1,53. The median at 3 and weighted mean at 3,18 show the indecisiveness of the population on this question. The lowest positive correlation coefficient (0) shows no agreement amongst the rankings.

Of the Africans, 49,44% agreed whilst 34,16% of the Indians and 35,00% of the Coloureds also agreed. A smaller percentage, 26,67% of the Africans, 49,16% of the Indians and 38,33% of the Coloureds disagreed. Whilst a greater proportion of people agreed with ungovernability than disagreed, this was mainly as a result of greater support amongst the African population.

An association exists between statement 65 and differences in terms of occupation. Strongest support came from the student, unemployed

and sales sectors. The self-employed and clerks were most apprehensive.

The differences in terms of income levels are as follows:

TABLE 137

RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS ORGANISATIONS
MAKING COUNTRY UNGOVERNABLE

<u>Income Earned</u>	<u>Agree</u>
	<u>%</u>
R3 000	43,08
R3 - 6 000	49,44
R6 - 10 000	43,21
R10 - 15 000	31,58
R15 - 25 000	38,10
R25 000	38,40

Support for ungovernability is strongest amongst the lowest income groups.

When educational qualifications were reviewed, the following differences were noted:

Strongest agreement towards ungovernability has come from the respondents with junior secondary and post-matric education.

A larger number of men agreed as opposed to women.

6.3.1. Summary of conclusions on extraparliamentary revolutionary strategies for change

More Coloureds and Indians believed that a revolution was going to take place than Africans. Furthermore, a larger number of professionals and students compared to any other occupational group believed that a revolution would take place. More men than women were of the view that a revolution would occur.

TABLE 138

INFERENCE FROM PROPORTIONAL STRATIFIED SAMPLES TO THE POPULATION

<u>Population</u>	<u>African</u>	<u>Indian</u>	<u>Coloured</u>	<u>Total</u>
(a) Absolute size	2 580 847	552 819	63 929	3 197 595
(b) Relative size	80,7	17,3	2	100
<u>Proportional/Cluster Sample</u>				
(c) Absolute size	180	120	60	360
(d) Percent supportive of extraparliamentary revolutionary change	74,44	62,5	58,33	67,78 $\frac{(244)}{(360)}$
(1) Absolute size (d x a)	1 921 183	345 512	37 290	2 303 985
(2) Relative size (d x b)	60,07%	10,81%	1,16%	72,04%

Hence, 72,04% of the Black population support extraparliamentary revolutionary strategies as opposed to 67,78% when the ratio 3 : 2 : 1 is used. However, the two figures are relatively close, thus showing the reliability of the proportional method.

The international perception that the situation in South Africa is explosive was supported. Belief that a crisis is being experienced at the moment increased as income and educational qualifications increased. Most agreed as well that unrest was going to spread further, affecting the areas within which they lived.

Whilst twice as many people disagreed than agreed with the statement suggesting that political organisations were more important than trade unions, the average score suggested general indecisiveness because of the large amount (30,56%) who chose to remain undecided. Greater support for political organisations was exhibited by the lower income grouping. Also, older people have less faith in political organisations.

Whilst most agreed that armed struggle should not be used to bring about change, a sizeable proportion supported armed struggle. Opposition to armed struggle was strongest amongst the Indians and Coloureds and the highest income group.

Most agreed that capitalism was at the root of the country's problems - and an even larger number of respondents agreed that socialism would transform this country into a free society. A significantly higher number of Indians and a higher number of students did not support capitalism. The highest income group also agreed strongly that capitalism was at the root of the country's problems.

However, a substantially higher number of Africans, as compared to Indians and Coloureds saw socialism as an alternative. The majority of those supporting socialism supported evolutionary as well as revolutionary strategies, showing the possibility of socialism being struggled for through non-violent means.

Ungovernability was also supported by evolutionary and revolutionary strategic adherents. Again, whilst a greater number maintained that organisations must work towards making the country ungovernable, there was also strong disagreement and indecision.

It should be noted that the responses to statements 15 and 16, which relate to gender discrimination were not individually analysed since they do not have a significant bearing on the hypotheses of the research. However, the results here were integrated in 7.5.

Responses to these statements as well as the following were not discussed in the preceding pages. Attention will be given to these in general terms within the context of the following theoretical discussion: Statements 12, 13, 14, 17, 28, 33, 34 and 67. In the interest of completeness, tables relating to these statements are appended as Addendum B.

7. Indicators of social attitude derived from the theoretical framework related to the findings

The following influences on the formulation of attitude, extracted from the theories will be supplemented by the findings of the survey. All statements tested in the survey will be regrouped to address these influences. Class factors (differences exhibited by the different occupational, income and educational groups) that arise as a result of differential access to the distributive system will play a fundamental analytical role.

7.1 Culture

A statistical analysis of responses towards all statements shows that Black attitudes whilst similar in important respects, exhibit some finer cultural differences that coincide with race. Composite attitudes of the different groups reflect a shared social reality. The more a person's attitudes are shared by comparable others within the racially defined areas, the more he/she will regard the attitude as having internal validity.

Within the dominated races, a privileged affluent group emerges and inevitably plays a more assertive role in political emancipation. The culture of this class necessitates that this group will not accept structural inability to attain power and fulfil needs. Racial domination and the need for capitalist advancement are contradictory, resulting in the affluent disenfranchised group playing a radical

yet ambiguous role. The cultural drift or shifting of ideas of this class show an extension of radical attitudes. Yet, in practice, their greater support of government created institutions show them to be in opposition to other classes. The lower classes are less favourable towards government institutions like the tricameral system. The fact that the Black upper class concentrates Indian and Coloured elements, introduces a source of strain to general social evolution.

Hence, the cultural composition of the groups, showing those composing the affluent class to possess among other things consciousness whilst those of the lower class possessing a greater adherence to tradition, manifests itself now in terms of differences in social attitude. The need for political power and the rejection of the need for cultural preservation is matched by the collaborative tendency of the upper class. Whilst race and cultural group are not necessarily synonymous, the different races within Natal appear to exhibit behavioural patterns and lifestyles that are peculiar to themselves. The difference in intensity of African and non-African responses show that we must focus on the cultural system to discern sources of general societal evolution.

7.2 Influential contact

Culture is in a state of constant change; sub-systems are inter-related in a state of dynamic equilibrium and are continually readjusting to the changed states of the other sub-systems. Parts of cultural systems were brought into contact when European explorers and indigenous tribes traded with various objects. With colonialism and the domination of cultures, extreme socio-psychological pressure was placed on the subjected people (Hagen, 1962 : 411-414). The colonizing class indicated in countless ways contempt for the traditional culture of the subjugated people. They regarded the individuals of the subordinated class as inferior simply because they were indigenous people. Alongside popular resistance against colonialism and in the South African situation internal colonialism, was an incorporation of negative self-images on the part of the people.

Although retreatism was the most common reaction of colonial subjects to tensions, the behaviour of individuals who came most directly under the pressure of almost complete absence of status respect plus almost complete helplessness led to still more extreme ones. A significant proportion of the Black working class believed Whites to be superior, showing the overwhelming psychological effects of apartheid irrespective of the recognition of all classes of the material suffering of people under this system.

Under these circumstances, charismatic leadership or authority is a major factor that could cause people to change their attitudes, beliefs and perceptions of the existing social environment. If political leaders have immense powers in modern industrialised societies, then South Africa's developing society is an exception. In this social vacuum where no credible political leadership is entirely visible in South Africa, where petty bourgeois leadership recedes and surfaces, tensions within a social framework have resulted in the directing of conflicts within the disenfranchised group itself. Rivalries and factional elitisms are thriving under repression, and the absence of leadership is increasing political confusion.

7.3 Political exposure

The administrators of the colonial age thought a press of any kind was dangerous in the hands of the indigenous people and a nationalist press was particularly dangerous. Consequently, colonial governors used their power to punish alternative newspapers that adopted a critical position in relation to the government.

The colonial press kept reinforcing the subordinate role of the African, confirming in his mind the hopelessness of his political future. Tomaselli (1986 : 5) maintains, however, that myths change. The stories by which a culture explains or makes sense of some aspect of reality are dynamic. The ruling classes, the hegemonic bloc, propagate myths about the other classes and groups precisely because they have political control: they are the myth-makers. They create and modify various myths to suit the political exigencies of

the moment. Similarly, Lenski's contention that all constitutional methods will be implemented to transform the rule of might to the rule of right is appropriate here.

Widespread reluctance to indicate political support was prevalent amongst all classes, particularly the working class. The apathy or low social consciousness discerned is in keeping with Lenski's assertion that the majority are politically apathetic. Yet resistance or dissatisfaction with the mass media was significant. Language and views expressed in the media and contemporary Black political thinking is polarising, reinforcing the views of conflicting political camps. The most ardent participants here, are those of the affluent groups who expressed definite positions and were rarely indecisive.

Exposure to political and economic truths may increase the particular role of the working class and further activate organisations facilitating working class struggles. The warring classes of society are always the products of the economic conditions of their time, but at this point in time the relatively radical political position of the affluent Black sectors are still containing the antagonisms as between different races and to a lesser extent between classes.

7.4 Conflicting social interests

When the sample elements were examined it was found that the vast majority (65,00%) of the population received wages below the living wage level (as defined by the unions) whilst a minority (18,06%) were seen as receiving wages below the minimum survival wage (as defined by the capitalist class). The MLL (Minimum Living Level) was calculated at R396,33 per month and the HSL (Household Subsistence Level) was calculated at R340,34 per month for 1987. It is this calculation that has found supporters largely amongst the capitalist class. The alternative to those measurements calculated by C R I C (Community, Resource and Information Centre) was a living wage of R850 per month for 1987 (Cosatu News, 1987 : 15). A conflict of interest and a potential basis for future antagonisms are made evident.

Whilst differences in position are emerging and will possibly deepen over time, contradictions are now being contained as all classes recognise the significance of political organisations and trade unions and above all bear a similar relationship and attitude towards existing political structures. Competitive and group interests are curbed by similarity of sentiment towards institutional structures. There is no evidence to suggest that antagonisms would invert themselves within the Black community and give rise to differences in terms of class, race and sex although minor differences in terms of attitude persist. The fundamental conflict of social interests would exist between the composite attitudes of Blacks irrespective of class and the opposing white hegemony.

7.5 Exclusion from the socio-political processes

Partial accommodation is prevalent with the vast majority not considering emigration but a significant minority, particularly amongst the affluent grouping, considering leaving.

The role of sex is crucial in the distributive process. A greater proportion of women hold the belief that gender discrimination is evident. The significantly smaller proportion of men than women believing in equality between the sexes shows that the belief in the full participation of both sexes cannot be treated as obvious.

Traditional barriers still exist in a developing industrialising country. A greater proportion of those unfavourable towards equality between the sexes were African men. Hence, radicalisation in a political sphere, does not necessarily alter conservatism about the position of women in society. At this point the women's movement has subordinated itself to the broader political movements that encompass all strata of the excluded populations.

Exclusions from the socio-political processes has drawn a stronger recognition that race laws and a lesser recognition that capitalism represents the fundamental contradiction within society. In addition, the recognition that all classes see united, collective action as a

means of overcoming exclusion, indicates that a degree of uniformity exists in the values of people - the potential for consensus on strategy to overcome exclusion is strong.

The ambiguous position of the affluent group and the accompanying self-interest exhibited can be seen by referring to the call for one-person-one-vote. Reluctance to accept one-person-one-vote suggests perhaps, a fear of the organisation of the workers as a class and the consequences of their political power.

7.6 Experienced repression

The anticipation or preparedness for revolution is matched by the increasing repression experienced. In this particular repressive phase when classes recognise detention and the inability to freely voice political opinions as aggravating the political situation, organised resistance has been severely suppressed.

Yet the repression experienced in contemporary South Africa, similar though not identical to conditions existent in pre-independent African states, exhibits a pattern in terms of the responses of the different classes of the disenfranchised group. Experienced repression encourages active resistance. The industrial proletariat develops and is conditioned by the development of the industrial bourgeoisie. Only under its rule does the proletariat raise its resistance to a national one. It is only then that it can create the modern means of production which become potentially the means of revolutionary emancipation (Tucker, 1978 : 588). Yet, the more radical the bourgeoisie the more the compromise between the different classes whose interests are, in the long term, antagonistic. Given Lenski's specific definition of class, that is, "... persons ... who stand in a similar position with respect to force ..." (1966 : 74), one broad class can be said to exist. This will diversify itself when the power relations and the distributive system changes.

7.7 Collective action

7.7.1 Collaborative opposition

If people are to combine successfully to achieve any social objective, whether this be participation in rejected parliamentary structures or regionally structured alternatives, one thing is certain, some form of collective action has to be adopted. Social objectives cannot be implemented or agreed to without the support of broader social movements. Faced with the alternatives of social inaction under repressive conditions and collaborative action by the social movement, the latter for most seems to be the lesser of the two evils. When opportunities for individual mobility are insufficient, people resort to any form of collective action that may further the attaining of rewards.

The increasing radical resistance of sectors of the Black population has led to the strengthening of the state machinery to an impressive extent. Opposing this, considerable favourability towards participation notwithstanding rejection of the tricameral structure, exists and therefore must be considered.

7.7.2 Evolutionary resistance

Reformist agitations and pressure group campaigns do not involve the total rejection of societal values and norms. They are essentially concerned with minor or partial adjustments within an existing framework. Reformists may hold that specific policies or laws conflict with other more important values and may attempt to persuade the political elite to initiate changes. There exists a certain degree of tolerance of peaceful disagreement. The exponential rise of extraparliamentary groupings suggest but do not clearly indicate the diverse array of interconnected commitments to change.

It is the affluent group that adheres strongly to both radical

and passive resistance. Lower support for passive resistance among the working classes indicates disillusionment with this form of strategy. Hence the potential for the generation of a class struggle amongst the disenfranchised Black sector exists.

The economic struggles located in the community manifest themselves largely as civic issues, whilst economic struggles at the factory floor are taken up by the trade unions. It is these struggles of an economic nature that are supported most by the lower income groups. The stratification system in existence implies that different immediate interests are perceived as urgent by the different strata.

7.7.3 Revolutionary resistance

It would be incorrect to assume that there is any simple cause and effect relationship between severe social distress and alignment to radical politics. Whilst stronger support for armed struggle and ungovernability was evident among the lower income sector, neither the indications nor the internal validity was significant.

Marx made more than a grudging admission of the potential efficacy of long-term reformist and parliamentary strategies in special circumstances. Marx, however could not bring himself to regard parliamentary reformism as an end in itself, only as an occasionally justified means to revolutionary ends (Wilkinson, 1971 : 129). If the capitalist system could not as Marx maintained be "humanised and reformed on a piecemeal basis" (Wilkinson, 1971 : 129), then the greater support for radical change would be shown by the working class. The potential for the development of a genuine revolutionary consciousness would be cultivated.

7.7.4 Mass pressure

Human beings distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their means

of subsistence people are directly producing their actual material life.

Production only makes its appearance with the increase of population. With the ever increasing population, pressure on the system of production ensues just as much as the capitalist class exploits the expanding labour force. Black people do not view infrastructural pressure as a means towards changing the polity; when class is taken into consideration it would seem that workers are more conscious of an inevitable change. Marx (Tucker, 1978 : 135) maintains that "its goal and its historical action are prefigured in the most clear and ineluctable way in its own life situation as well as in the whole organisation of contemporary bourgeois society". Increase in population was not the answer but increased collective mobilisation.

7.8 Perceived legitimacy

The fundamental pressures upon which the South African state rests was considered illegitimate, by the majority of all the races and all classes. Whilst this perception was not deep rooted it was significant. In contrasting the composite Black attitudes with those of the ruling class, it indicates the extent to which the ideological forms of apartheid have sunk more definitively into the minds of the sections of the white community that support the system (Cohen, 1986 : 11).

7.9 Commitment

The belief by all groups and classes that the political situation would have changed if they had asserted themselves rather than remaining apathetic, shows the increasing commitment of the population. The ambiguity of commitment, ideology and behaviour of individuals arises not simply out of personal psychology but also from their structurally dependent position within the political economy and the colonial type state, and the contradictory nature of the existing order itself (Marks, 1986 : 1).

There are no fundamental differences when support by the different classes for political organisations and trade unions are assessed. Stronger support however was evident among the more affluent groupings. Whilst a sense of commitment exists, it is not necessarily self-interested given the support for collective group action.

Marx (Tucker, 1978 : 130-131) draws an important relationship which has a bearing on the South African situation: Social distress does not produce political understanding, social well being does. Thus it can be further maintained that the greater commitment cultivated by the affluent class will see them seeking the overthrow of a particular form of state. The greater understanding of the bourgeois, Marx maintains, will lend to the incorporation of this radical thinking into the aims and objectives of the workers. By pursuing only political aims, their insight into their real aims would be falsified, thus their political understanding will deceive their social instinct.

The nature of the South African state, with the coincidence of race and class, however, has developed spontaneous and conscious resistance on economic and political fronts.

7.10 Interchange with the environment

Whilst there was stronger belief amongst the affluent groupings that the situation in South Africa was explosive it was from this sector that a proportion was considering leaving the country. The call for outside pressure to attempt to resolve an internal problem was stronger amongst the lower classes and the regional option was seen as more feasible by the higher income groups.

The fact that processes take place over space, the facts of distance or closeness, of geographical variation between areas, of the individual character and meaning of specific places and regions - all these are essential to the operation of social processes themselves. Ideologies and social processes are being played out in Natal; the conflict between Inkatha and the UDF has stalled the highlighting of

the KwaZulu Natal Indaba and has increased doubts over its historical validity.

The Black population, furthermore, has tremendous potential power. They constitute the overwhelming majority of the proletariat of Africa's richest and most developed country, a majority without whose labour-power the economy would collapse, with all the disastrous consequences such a collapse would have for world imperialism (South Africa is the leading producer of gold and diamonds in the capitalist world, and one of the major producers of uranium). This tremendous potential power is being tested through the disinvestment campaign.

7.11 Consciousness

A fundamental form of social control undertaken by the apartheid state comprises the non-violent and non-coercive, but nonetheless powerful, attempts to influence the Black population in the legitimacy of white rule. The obvious ideological necessity for this exercise revolves around the gross incongruity between the small number of whites who rule or elect those that do and the large number of Blacks excluded from these possibilities. In this ideological form, apartheid supporters act to displace the major contradiction between white rulers and Black ruled, by seeking to persuade the disenfranchised population of the legitimacy of institutional structures. A lack of support amongst all classes for the tricameral system of government as well as greater support amongst the lower income grouping for extraparliamentary organisations show that this attempt has been unsuccessful. It also suggests a contradictory tendency where members of different classes stand in similar position in some instances and in opposition to others. The argument that Blacks are not so entitled to rule is reinforced by customs, norms, expectations and social practices that are informally conveyed in white attitudes and behaviour patterns, generationally transmitted by the family, the media and other social institutions. The notion that Blacks are unfit to govern also rests on strong caricatures and stereotypes of the Black population. Hence, the National Convention supported

by most Blacks and which has been the persistent call of the national democratic movement within which the ANC has been the dominant force, has not been conceded to by the State since it would inevitably imply majority rule. Instead the rule of might has facilitated SADF raids which despite media and institutional justification, are perceived as incorrect by all classes of Black people.

People are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. - real, active people as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of people is their actual life-process.

7.12 Diffusion under dominance

Whilst the majority of Black people have not internalised state ideology and are not supporting state initiatives, significant sectors have in some respects, and this perhaps, is increasing ambiguity in political thinking and organisation.

The fact that a large percentage were disillusioned about critics and sceptical about majority rule inevitably created through the principle of one-person-one-vote, has fundamental implications for the development of united positions. Indians and to a lesser extent Coloureds were most supportive of and hence diffused into, the existing political structure. The greatest support for banning of organisations and the least for the calling of a National Convention came from the Indians. The Africans showed little evidence of having diffused ruling class ideas under dominance indicating that whilst differences in terms of political affiliation were exhibited, political understanding and position appeared more cohesive than the other races in Natal.

The question of diffusion can be explained, but in a limited way by Marxists. The division of labour simplifies social relationships.

Similar relationships to the means of production produces similarity of consciousness, as evident amongst the Africans.

Race and kinship ties may provide a broader explanation for the diffuseness of certain groups and their alignment with state ideology. Social differentiation and distancing among the races leads to ignorance of each other's peculiar socio-political situation. Furthermore, no society can successfully dominate a sector of its population without the diffusion of its cultural patterns and social institutions, nor can any society successfully diffuse all or most of its cultural patterns and social institutions without some degree of domination. A degree of inculcation of the White South African cultural patterns and acceptance of existing institution has led to a co-option of a sector of the Black population. However the universalistic values accompanying increasing westernisation is challenging those particularistically inculcated values and norms.

7.13 Alienation

In a real sense alienation at the industrial level seems to be taking place. Most agree that capitalism is at the root of the countries problems, whilst more agree that socialism would transform this state into a democratic society. An overwhelming number of workers, by comparison subscribed to socialism.

Since social distancing is strong and racial contact limited, African workers would appear most favourable towards socialism. Other races (Indians and Coloureds) would probably respond to alienation through retreating and minimising alignment with the African working class. Social alienation ensures that the contact between different races is minimal, thereby facilitating barriers at the ground. For Marx (Tucker, 1978 : 133) as already maintained the affluent class and the proletarian class represent one and the same human self-alienation. But the former feels satisfied and affirmed in this self-alienation, whilst the latter, however feels destroyed in this alienation, seeing it as its own impotence and the reality

of an inhuman existence. This process seems to be rapidly taking place with the self-seeking nature of people emphasised.

Social movements spearheaded by the self-seeking nature of groups and individuals will signify the emergence of new influences.

7.14 Gradual adaptation

A developing economy tends to meet the people's needs to some extent; so, while remaining assertive in their everyday demands, they do not see the necessity of a violent overthrow of the system. An adaptation to the specific conditions has taken place and most Black people of all race groups would accept an internal agreement and steps towards negotiation being arranged within the country even though it may exclude outlawed organisations.

It would seem that alongside the present attempt to reconcile huge disparities of power, wealth, opportunity, health and education between whites and Blacks is not the subordination of independent Black forms of consciousness, but its cultivation. Breakdowns of orthodox racial separation increases expectations and facilitates demands. Cohen (1986 : 81) maintains that what can be said definitively is that with the exception of Bantustan leaders, Black demands have not followed the lines of apartheid orthodoxy. The subordinate population has largely resisted the ruling class ideology.

As well as physical resistance, the core of Black demands has remained after forty years of apartheid, the institutionalisation of equal opportunities for all population groups in a unitary state.

Marx (Tucker, 1978 : 158) maintains that the satisfaction of the first need leads to new needs; and this production of new needs is the first historical act.

With consciousness becoming radicalised in certain sectors and the state instead modifying and adapting its structures it would seem that the State is being pressurised to change. However, unlike the

Marxian contention a revolutionary situation is not inevitable. Gradual deracialisation and economic concessions may result in the sustained control of the South African white elite despite internal contradictions. At the same time, cultural diversity is not intense when viewed from a political perspective and adaptation to conditions is minimal.

7.15 Deprivation

The impossibility of equal education in a class society is further affected by a race differentiated educational system. The majority, particularly the affluent class believe strongly that boycotts register protest against the educational and political system.

The strong recognition by all classes of injustices suffered under apartheid is not matched by the same degree of frustration at being denied political rights. Frustration at being deprived due to position in the distributive system is stronger amongst the lower classes.

"Poverty has many dimensions, each of which must be studied separately, but which in reality constitute an interrelated network of deprivations" (Haralambos, 1980 : 152). In theory, the vicious cycle in which poverty breeds poverty, occurs through time, and transmits its effects from one generation to another. It can be argued that poverty survives in part because it is useful to a number of groups in society.

If deprivation is supposed to be accompanied by a lack of awareness, the impoverished class in South Africa is at this point contradicting that assumption. Awareness of the extent of deprivation is increasing, working alongside increasing class consciousness.

The relationship to the distributive system has been drawn to emphasise the extent to which the contemporary contradictory nature of attitudes and our society can be described in conflict-structuralist terms. Whilst there is an overriding favourability towards

evolutionary formulae, changing conditions may not necessarily follow; the transition or expectations of the transition to a more egalitarian socio-economic system may indeed follow more strongly than at present.

8. CONTRAST AND BLENDING OF SUPPORT FOR EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY
POLITICAL POPULAR ORGANISATIONS AND PROGRESSIVE TRADE UNIONS

Irrespective of a movement towards the formation of a united front bringing political and trade union organisations closer together, the way in which both are viewed by the broader population differ to some extent. Trade unions are perceived as more effective structures and to some extent then, more important than political organisations.

There was extremely strong consensus on the role of trade unions. The vast majority agreed that they should be afforded support since they were the most important organisations through which workers can change their economic situation.

The researcher has already maintained that a very powerful tradition of popular or populist politics has emerged in South Africa. The role of the great political movements such as the Congress Alliance has been to mobilise the population against the minority government. In such a situation, mass mobilisation has been essential in order to challenge the legitimacy of the State, both internationally and internally. Where a major sector of the population is voteless and subjugated by a racial minority, then a great alliance of all classes arises as a necessary and clear political strategy. Building such an alliance has always been a great task. Foster (Fosatu publication, 1982) maintains that "politically, most unions and their leadership lack confidence as a worker leadership, they see their role as part of a wider struggle but are unclear on what is required for the worker struggle. Generally, the question of building an effective worker organisation is not dealt with and political energy is spent in establishing unity across a wide front".

Such a position has led to strategic errors in the past, that may now weaken, if not destroy worker organisation in the future. All the great and successful popular movements have had as their aim the overthrow of, most often, colonial regimes. However, these movements cannot and have not in themselves been able to deal with the particular and fundamental problem of workers. Their task is to remove regimes that are regarded as illegitimate and unacceptable by the majority (MacShane et al, 1984 : 128).

Given the above realisation as well as the fact that the leading role of the workers has been continuously emphasised as well as the fact that respondents view the role of workers as much more potentially significant, it is essential that workers strive to build their own effective organisations even whilst they are part of the wider alliance. This organisation is necessary to protect and further worker interests and to ensure that the popular movement is not hijacked by elements who may in the end have no option but to turn against their worker supporters.

In response to the two questions posed in Chapter Three, the following are the generalised results:

- 8.1 Whilst the trade union movement has been seen as the most potent force for change by all classes, particularly the affluent classes, workers themselves experience a considerable amount of ambivalence here. It would seem that the merging of economic and political issues has developed a stronger association between union and community struggles, for workers. Hence, attempts to develop artificial distances between the two will negate the grassroots experiences of workers.
- 8.2 Whilst the existing progressive political organisations are not being viewed as the most significant organisations for change, their role is still crucial. There is a closer overt alliance between the Black bourgeoisie and the Black workers. However, the fact that Black workers subscribed in the final analysis to

socialism to a much greater extent shows that a fundamental conflict of interest may emerge within this context. The fact that the Black trade unions espouse socialism to a greater extent than the popular political organisations shows that these particular conflicting interests are being collectively organised.

9. FINAL VERIFICATION OF WORKING HYPOTHESES

When the data analysed in the preceding sections are related as a whole to the sample, and the sample is inferred to the total population, the following results are obtained:

It can be concluded that the second working hypothesis is disproved. Africans do not prefer revolutionary strategies rather than extraparliamentary evolutionary strategies. Whilst there is strong support for revolutionary strategies, support for evolutionary strategies is stronger. Both the qualitative examination of individual statements and the quantitative inferences verify this.

It can also be concluded that the third working hypothesis is proved. Indians and Coloureds do prefer extraparliamentary evolutionary rather than revolutionary strategies for change. Both the qualitative examination of individual statements and the quantitative inferences verify this.

It can therefore, be concluded that the first hypothesis is proved. It seems from the research that Black Urban communities prefer extraparliamentary strategies for evolutionary social change.

DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF CONCLUSION

INTRAPARLIAMENTARY CHANGE

- Existing parliamentary structures not accepted
- Social structures undermined
- Legislation concerning race, detentions and organisations not accepted
- SADF initiatives not supported
- Support for Commissions of Inquiry

EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY CHANGE

- Collaborative views supporting state initiatives and ethnic fragmentation not evident
- Anticipation of participation in future modified national structure evident
- Stronger tendency towards non-collaboration whilst remaining within the country
- Trade union action most significant
- Economic measures increasingly important
- Limited national, not regional political structures accepted

REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE

- Belief that unrest was spreading evident
- Armed struggle not accepted
- Some agreement towards ungovernability

Specific attitudes are affected by the race/class position of the individual. The strength of attitude is further affected by gender.

RACE/
CLASS

SEX

DISTRIBUTIVE
SYSTEM

TRADE
UNIONS

POLITICAL
ORGANISATIONS

The changing consciousness of groups and individuals are affected by the transcending material conditions and the balance of forces brought into play by the increasingly significant role of the extraparliamentary organisations.

CHAPTER SIX
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS AND SUMMARY

1. **Major results of the research**

1.1 **Responses to intraparlimentary strategies for change**

1.1.1 **Existing parliamentary structures accepted**

Most disagreed with the statement that no changes need to be made.

Most believed that the tricameral parliament has not increased the unity of Indians and Coloureds.

Most believed that the tricameral parliament has not increased the unity of Blacks.

Most did not accept the tricameral parliament.

Most believed that consultations with Bantustan leaders will resolve problems.

1.1.2 **Existing social structures accepted**

Most people believed that capitalism did not have to be overcome.

Most believed that capitalism was at the root of the country's problems.

Most agreed that socialism would transform this country into a democratic society.

1.1.3 **Legislation accepted**

Most agreed that race laws need to change.

Most agreed that detentions only worsen the country's problems.

Most disagreed that the government needs to ban/outlaw radical organisations.

1.1.4 **Military defence of existing structures**

Most rejected SADF raids on ANC bases.

Most agreed that SADF raids are increasing the regions instability.

1.1.5 Commissions of inquiry

Most believed that commissions of inquiry can bring about changes.

1.2 Responses to extraparliamentary evolutionary strategies for change

1.2.1 Self-interested collaboration

Most did not support state initiatives.

Most believed that critics of the government understand the complexities of the South African situation.

Most did not believe that independence would result in the socio-economic development of the Bantustans.

1.2.2 Collaborative opposition

Most agreed that Blacks should enter parliament to change things from within.

Most did not support the resolving of socio-political issues at a regional level.

Most agreed that a fourth chamber should be added to the tricameral parliament.

1.2.3 Non-collaboration

Most had no intention to leave the country.

Most agreed to collective action to change their situation.

Most agreed that organisations working outside of parliament should be supported.

1.2.4 **Trade union action**

Most believed that trade unions are the most important organisations for workers.

Most believed that trade unions are more important than political organisations.

Most believed in the effectiveness of trade unions.

1.2.5 **Economic measures**

Most believed that disinvestment is an important instrument for the dismantling of apartheid.

Most believed that the long-term effects of disinvestment would be negative.

1.2.6 **Limited political structures**

Most agreed that a limited National Convention should be held.

Most agreed that Natal could not separate itself politically from the rest of the country.

1.3 **Responses to extraparliamentary revolutionary strategies for change**

1.3.1 **Conflict based change**

Most agreed that unrest was going to spread to other areas.

Most did not support armed struggle to bring about change.

Most agreed that organisations must work towards making the country ungovernable so that it can be rapidly changed.

2. **Conclusions**

The preceding results and discussion in Chapter 5, show the extent to which strong ambiguities, uncertainty and apathy exist amongst the people of different races, classes, sex

and age groups. Whilst all groups oppose the nature of the existing South African system, race and to some extent sex plays a fundamental role in the defining of the methods that should be adopted in attempting to initiate change. African people show a greater tendency towards revolutionary strategies than other groups. This shows the difficulty that necessarily emerges in attempting to draw broad non-racial strategic alliances. Whilst class and age do not play a fundamental role in the defining of socio-political attitudes, some crucial differences do surface - the affluent groupings tend to exhibit a greater resentment towards political exclusion whilst the working classes show greater difficulties in accepting the contemporary economic order. This in itself has been creating tensions within the Black extraparliamentary organisations and will have consequences for a future society.

The fact that women are more conservative and apathetic than men whilst recognising that they are discriminated against, exemplifies the extent to which women's issues have been subordinated to political issues in this country. Age, does not play a significant role in affecting political attitudes, though it does affect the extent of political participation.

Evolutionist strategies are preferred to more radical as well as state supportive strategies. This in itself is not absolute. Changing conditions may necessitate changes in consciousness. However, the consciousness of certain sectors will remain relatively stable. Indians and Coloureds, women and middle class individuals that show the greatest apathy and consistency will remain relatively unchanged in attitude. The African, male, upper class and working class sectors will show the greatest variation in attitude. Whilst these sectors are becoming increasingly radicalised, they would possibly show a willingness towards participation in parliamentary structures if basic demands such as those related to the calling of a National Convention, with the

participation of all excluded forces, are met.

At a methodological level it was found that an integrated theoretical and statistical approach was indeed the only way in which reliable attitudinal research could in fact be attained. Finally, it was only through the usage of comparative statistics that the contradictions and ambiguities were discernable.

3. Recommendations

Making socio-political recommendations for change in South Africa often becomes a passionate issue tending towards the support of the proposals of particular political fronts. The three recommendations offered, thus, will be brief and deliberately open to varying definitions.

3.1 Internal resistance and extraparliamentary consolidation : Towards negotiation

In April 1987, Obery and Van Niekerk (Work In Progress, No. 47, 1987 : 8-14) maintained that if the far right had established party unity at the same time as the moderates regrouped and consolidated, the 1987 election could have been a disaster for the NP. If the combined right had won 35-40 seats with the moderates winning the same number, an overall National Party majority could have been prevented. Further, moderate coalition to the left could have been instrumental in pressurising the government, towards negotiations with credible Black leadership, including the ANC.

At the same time it should be noted that there is a growing division between "conservative reformers" and "radical reformers" in the NP. Swilling (Work In Progress, No. 50, 1987 ; 17) maintained that the radical reformers pioneered key-policy shifts : the inclusion of Africans in the

Regional Services Councils (RSC's), scrapping of pass laws, dropping of the law against mixed marriages, as well as some political interference laws. Dr Wimpie de Klerk (Daily News, January 13 1988 : 15) maintained that the radical reformers have a greater sense of urgency, and talk guardedly of a massive "leap of reform" to enable a move towards real negotiations with Black leaders.

Hence, notwithstanding the predominance of the conservative reformers and militarists in parliament at present there are pressure groupings that would support the transition towards negotiation. Whilst it is significant that alliances cutting across parties and races are occurring to the left of the government, without the allied support of the extraparliamentary organisations the long term significance of such pressure would be minimal. Both the ANC and the internal extraparliamentary organisations such as the UDF maintain that a "climate for negotiation" can only be created if all political prisoners and detainees are released, exiles allowed to return to South Africa unconditionally, repressive laws dismantled, organisations unbanned and the right to free association guaranteed. Like most earlier anti-colonial struggles, this one is almost certain to end through talks. Hence, the recommendation of the researcher is that extraparliamentary organisations explore the extent to which coalitions with intraparliamentary organisations and pressure groups could take place to pressurise existing government to move towards the creation of the "climate for negotiation". The fact that there is a high degree of consensus exhibited by the mass of the Black people on this issue, reiterates its urgency.

Because of the existing repression, extraparliamentary organisations, which have the greatest mass appeal and mass base, have become virtually ineffective and recently effectively banned. The extent to which it can consolidate

and develop its mass base will dictate the strategies it could and should adopt to increase resistance and facilitate social change. Tom Lodge (Work In Progress, No. 50, 1987 : 6) maintains that : "Once predominantly Black democratic organisations begin co-operating across the lines which strategically divide parliamentary from extraparliamentary forces, then sooner or later a fundamental question must be asked about the boycottist question ... the strategic issues which confront the progress of democratic opposition to apartheid are complex. The categories which are required to discuss them are analytical and dispassionate, not moral and emotive".

The unprecedented restrictions on the extraparliamentary organisations believed to have been implemented in order to appease the far right White groupings will seriously affect the future of Black democratic organisations. The organisations effectively banned will not be able to function at any level except the administrative. This does not prevent alternative structures from being created to continue with the building of alliances and mass work.

3.2 Maintaining organisational clarity : The independence of trade unions and women's organisations

In all nationalist struggles, the tendency for oppressed sectors such as the workers and women to be further subordinated by the democratic political organisations has been very strong. Whilst there is the need for the development of strong alliances, there is also a need for the interests of workers and women to be furthered outside of these alliances. The independence of the trade union movement and the women's movement will necessitate the taking up of the particular and real struggles of workers and women after a transition to democracy. A class-blind and sex-blind approach has contributed to the subordination of these sectors after

independence and liberation in most African countries. Hence, the recommendation here is not just that the organisations maintain relative autonomy but that they constantly define clearly their specific role within the changing political dynamics.

3.3 Role of academics : Social involvement and relevant research

Almost all early and later evolutionary theorists have urged a greater development of knowledge to guide change. The recommendation that academics play a greater role in facilitating change is thus being made. Not only is there an urgency for social scientists to cultivate greater insight into the nature of communities and the forces advocating inevitable change in South Africa, but to play a guiding and integral role in democratic, mass-based organisations.

In a society where the scientific, the social, the personal and political constantly merge into each other, the call for neutrality may alienate the researcher's work from concrete application and humanitarian relevance. Until such time when scientific neutrality cannot be interpreted as latent support for the status quo, academics should develop political positions which direct the chosen fields of study, maintaining in the course of their work, scientific objective methodology. The creation of educational programmes, communication projects and social awareness seminars generating critical thinking within educational institutions would speed the process towards the qualitative building of non-racialism.

4. Future research possibilities

4.1 The present research has not negated previous results, but shows shifts in attitudes amongst certain sectors and within

certain areas. Indecision in certain areas, indicating either apathy or fear needs to be further investigated. Hence, there will always be room for further empirical studies based in the Natal region, testing particularly organisational affiliation and perceptions of the future society. Research conducted once the conflict between Inkatha and the UDF has subsided, to test perceptions of that struggle, may be of long-term socio-political significance.

- 4.2 Stratifying the Black population and developing a particular research design to adequately test the needs of all interest categories (e.g., professionals or the 16-25 year age group) would lead to the addressing of the particular fears, desires and needs of the various categories and show the extent to which groups would play a role in accommodation and change.
- 4.3 The devising of alternative and comparative research methodology in order to continuously investigate the changing perceptions and attitudes of people (Black and White) towards strategies for change under state of emergency conditions.
- 4.4 Investigation of the relationship between race and class position and the support for militarist strategies with the use of varied research techniques.
- 4.5 Historical documentation or empirical study focusing on the struggle between the moderate and militarist forces within the white political field, and its effects upon the white population.
- 4.6 The strategies and tactics of the NSMS (National Security Management System) and the scope for Black parliamentary participation.

- 4.7 The African working class and the possibility of socialism in a post-apartheid society.
- 4.8 The social position of women in post-independent African states, the existing position of the women's issue in democratic organisations and the consequences for a post-apartheid society.

5. Summary

The present study was conducted in order to establish the extent to which Blacks in general are favourable towards state strategies, extraparliamentary evolutionary and revolutionary strategies, and the socio-political significance thereof.

An interview schedule was constructed after the examination of various models, historical data and theories. The pilot study, which preceded the actual study, exposed ambiguities and misunderstandings which necessitated the adjusting of the questionnaire.

A proportional stratified sample accommodating a multistage plan was used to allow for the testing of race, class, sex and age groups. A sample of 360 respondents was used. This was greater than the required number but was necessary to test the population stratified in terms of the ratio 3:2:1. Area profiles were integrated into the fieldwork stage.

The raw data was processed by an IBM computer. Frequencies, percentages, the qualitative examination of open ended questions, weighted scores and extrapolated generalisations, weighted means, median, variance as well as chi-square and Spearman Rho were used, in some instances comparatively.

Overall, it became evident that the existing parliamentary

structures, legislation and SADF initiatives were not accepted. Social structures were seriously undermined but there was considerable support for commissions of inquiry. Generally, there was negligible support for intraparliamentary change.

Collaborative views supporting state initiatives and ethnic fragmentation was not evident but there was anticipation of participation in future modified parliamentary structures. There was a stronger tendency for people to want to remain in the country whilst utilising all available democratic national structures. Trade union action was seen as most significant and economic measures were seen to be becoming increasingly important. Extraparliamentary evolutionary strategies were seen as most favourable by Africans, Indians and Coloureds.

Armed struggle was not accepted by the majority but there was some support for ungovernability. There was also the belief that unrest was going to spread to encompass a wider area. Whilst there was greater support for revolutionary strategies than state initiatives, these were less than the support for extraparliamentary evolutionary strategies.

Race, class and sex as well as age affected the above perceptions in varying degrees. African people, men, the upper and lowest income groups were often the most politicized categories.

The following recommendations were made:

1. That extraparliamentary organisations should explore the extent to which coalitions with intraparliamentary organisations and pressure groups could take place to pressurise the government to move towards negotiation.

2. That trade unions and women's organisations should retain their autonomy even whilst allying themselves with broader political movements.
3. That academics involve themselves with mass based organisations, create the structures at educational institutions to facilitate non-racialism and to link their research to socially relevant issues.

ADDENDUM A

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ADDENDUM A

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DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

DEPARTEMENT SOSIOLOGIE

Dear Sir/Madam,

**STUDY OF ATTITUDES OF URBAN BLACK (AFRICAN, INDIAN AND COLOURED)
COMMUNITIES IN SELECTED AREAS OF DURBAN TOWARDS STRATEGIES FOR
SOCIAL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA**

This study is being undertaken for postgraduate research purposes at the University of Durban-Westville. Since the study is being conducted for academic, scientific purposes your answers in this interview schedule will remain confidential.

All that you need to do is to state exactly what you feel about people of other communities as well as the different strategies for social change in South Africa. There are no right or wrong answers.

As the study involves eight (8) areas besides your own, an attempt will be made to use the findings towards the resolving of existent problems.

Your cooperation will be highly appreciated.

Yours sincerely

K. Naidoo
.....
K. NAIDOO

CANDIDATE FOR M.A. DEGREE

G.F. Schoombee
.....
PROF. G.F. SCHOOMBEE
STUDY SUPERVISOR

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. Number

--	--	--

Identification

2. Residential Area

CLERMONT	UMLAZI	LAMONTVILLE	RESERVOIR HILLS	OVERPORT	CHATSWORTH
01	02	03	04	05	06
GREENWOOD PARK		NEWLANDS EAST	WENTWORTH		
07		08	09		

3. Age

16 - 25	26 - 35	36 - 45	46 - 60	OVER 60
01	02	03	04	05

4. Sex

MALE	FEMALE
01	02

5. Marital Status

MARRIED	SINGLE	DIVORCED	SEPARATED	COHABITATION	WIDOWED
01	02	03	04	05	06

6. Educational Qualifications

NONE (AND NONE-LITERATE)	NONE (AND LITERATE)	PRIMARY SCHOOL	JUNIOR SECONDARY	SENIOR SECONDARY
01	02	03	04	05

HIGHER THAN STANDARD 10 06

SPECIFY _____

OTHER _____ 07

7. Occupation

PROFESSIONAL	CLERICAL	SALES & RELATED	SKILLED WORKER
01	02	03	04
UNSKILLED WORKER	SELF-EMPLOYED	STUDENT	OTHER:
05	06	07	08

8. Family Income per Annum

LESS THAN R3000	BETWEEN R3-6000	BETWEEN R6-10000	BETWEEN R10-15000	BETWEEN R15-25000	OVER R25000
01	02	03	04	05	06

9. Which of the following organisations or types of organisations have you heard of and to which do you belong?

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>HEARD OF</u>	<u>BELONG TO</u>
UDF (UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT)		
NIC (NATAL INDIAN CONGRESS)		
AZAPO (AZANIAN PEOPLES' ORGANISATION)		
NATIONAL FORUM		
INKATHA		
NPP (NATIONAL PEOPLES' PARTY)		
SOLIDARITY		
LABOUR PARTY		
UCC (UNITED COMMITTEE OF CONCERN)		
UWUSA (UNITED WORKERS UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA)		
COSATU (CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS)		
TUCSA (TRADE UNION COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA)		
UNAFFILIATED UNIONS		
WELFARE ORGANISATIONS		
WOMENS ORGANISATIONS		
RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS		
CIVIC ORGANISATIONS		
SPORTING AND RECREATIONAL ORGANISATIONS		
YOUTH/STUDENT ORGANISATIONS		
OTHER:		

10. Name 5 organisations that you believe are working to improve the lives of Black (Indian, African, Coloured) people in South Africa?

- 1. _____
- 2. _____
- 3. _____
- 4. _____
- 5. _____

11. Is there any person that you consider to be most capable of leading this country?

YES	NO
01	02

SPECIFY: _____

12. I am considering leaving the country because of the social situation

YES	NO
01	02

GIVE REASON: _____

13. Blacks have suffered injustices under apartheid

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

14. Whites in South Africa are biologically superior to Blacks

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

15. Gender discrimination does not exist in this country

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

16. Which statement would you agree with:

1. Women need to be controlled
2. When women are liberated, nobody respects them
3. Women and men should be equal

01

02

03

17. Which statement would you agree with:

1. Race laws in this country need to be changed
2. Capitalism needs to be overcome
3. No changes here need to be made

01

02

03

18. The reform programme initiated by the government should be supported since it is moving us in the right direction

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

19. No matter which white government comes into power nothing will change

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

20. People cannot talk freely about their problems as they may get into trouble

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

21. Detentions only worsen the country's problems

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

22. The fact that the Black population is increasing at a faster rate than the White population only means that white minority rule will soon be over

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

23. I think we could have changed our situation a long time ago if people were less apathetic

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

24. If people with the same problems were to come together as a group, they would be able to change their situation

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

25. The government is entrenching rather than dismantling apartheid

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

26. The mass media should furnish us with all the information concerning unrest in the country

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

27. At the moment the mass media covers news events adequately

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

28. I believe that important changes in South Africa will take place gradually and peacefully

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

29. The tricameral parliament is not supported by people in my community

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

30. A violent revolution will never take place

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

31. People who criticise the government don't understand the complexities of the South African situation

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

32. The tricameral parliament has increased the unity of Indians and Coloureds

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

33. The tricameral parliament has increased the unity of Indians, Coloureds as well as Africans

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

34. Black (Indian, Coloured and African) people must enter parliament to change things from within

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

35. SADF raids on ANC bases should be conducted to enable the state to continue with its reform programme

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

36. SADF raids in neighbouring states are increasing the regions instability

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

37. The international world believes that the situation in South Africa is explosive, but this is not the situation

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

38. Unrest in the country is going to spread to other areas, such as our own

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

39. Disinvestment by international companies is an important way through which racial discrimination can be overcome

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

40. The effects of disinvestment in the long-run would be positive

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

41. One person, one vote would transform this country into a democratic society

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

42. The country now needs the unbanning of outlawed organisations, people in exile to return, the release of those in detention and the calling of a National Convention

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

43. A National Convention will not solve the country's problems

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

44. The government needs to ban/outlaw organisations that are calling for rapid change

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

45. A National Convention should be called only with existing, legal organisations taking part

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

46. The State should attempt to solve problems at a provincial or regional level eg. develop a political structure for Natal to solve its problems by itself

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

47. Natal cannot separate itself politically from the rest of the country

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

48. Civic actions, such as refusing to pay high rents, are important ways of changing our immediate situation

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

49. The trade unions should be supported by workers since these are the most important organisations through which workers can change their economic situation

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

50. Political organisations are more important than trade unions

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

51. Political organisations are not effective

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

52. Trade unions are not effective

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

53. Armed struggle should not be used to bring about change

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

54. Granting independence to all the Bantustans would result in the development of the people in those areas

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

55. The Group Areas Act serves the important function of allowing people to develop their own culture within their own communities

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

56. Constant consultations between Bantustan leaders and the government would resolve problems existent in these areas

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

57. A fourth chamber for Africans should be added to the tricameral parliament

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

58. The government should hold talks only with organisations that reject violence

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

59. The nation-wide boycotts at schools and universities show students' rejection of the SA educational and political system

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

60. I feel frustrated because I don't have political rights

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

61. Passive resistance by the communities gives rise to significant change

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

62. Capitalism is at the root of the country's problems

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

63. Socialism would transform this country into a free society

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

64. Political organisations working outside of parliament should be supported

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
01	02	03	04	05

65. Organisations must work towards making the country ungovernable so that it can be rapidly changed

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

66. Commissions of inquiry that establish causes of problems, can be used as a means for bringing about changes

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
05	04	03	02	01

67. I communicate with members of other Black race groups

OFTEN	SELDOM	NOT AT ALL
01	02	03

THANK YOU FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION



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DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

DEPARTEMENT SOSIOLOGIE

Mnumzane/Nkosikazi/Nkosazane,

**LONA NGUMSEBENZI WOKUCWANINGA NGEMIZWA NANGEMIBONO YABANTU
ABAMNYAMA (AMA-AFRICA, AMANDIYA NAMAKHALADI) BEMIPHAKATHI
ESEMADOLOBHENI ASETHEKWINI NGENJONGO YOKULETHA USHINTSHO
E-NINGIZIMU AFRICA**

Lomsebenzi wenziwa ngenhloso yocwaningo lukasomaghuzu (postgraduate) eYunivesithi yase Durban-Westville. Njengoba lomsebenzi wenzelwe ubuchwepheshe kwisayensi kwezemfundo, izimpendulo zakho kulemibuzo zohlala ziyimfihlo.

Konke okufanele ukwenze ukuba nje usho ukuthi uzwa noma ubona kanjani mayelana nabanye abantu kanye neminye imiphakathi ngezindlela ezahlukene zokuletha ushintsho e-ningizimu Africa. Kakukho zimpendulo eziyizo nokungesiyizo.

Njengoba lomsebenzi ughutshwa nakwezinye izindawo ngaphandle kwalena yakho, imiphumela iyosentshenziselwa ekuxazululeni lezizinkinga ezikhona.

Ubambiswano lwakho luyobongeka kakhulu.

Yimina Ozithobayo

K. Naidoo
.....
K. NAIDOO

UMFUNDI EGHUZWINI LEZOBUCHWEPHESHE (M.A. DEGREE).

G.F. Schoombee
.....
PROF. G.F. SCHOOMBEE
UMHLOLI KULOMSEBENZI

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. Inamba

--	--	--

Imininingwane

2. Indawo ohlala kuyo

CLERMONT	UMLAZI	LAMONTVILLE	RESERVOIR HILLS	OVERPORT	CHATSWORTH
01	02	03	04	05	06
GREENWOOD PARK		NEWLANDS EAST	WENTWORTH		
07		08	09		

3. Iminyaka

16 - 25	26 - 35	36 - 45	46 - 60	OVER 60
01	02	03	04	05

4. Ubulili

INDODA	OWESIFAZANE
01	02

5. Okuganwa/Ukugana (Marital Status)

USHADILE	AWUSHADILE	UBUYE EMSHADWENI	NIHLUKENE	NIKIPITILE	UMFELWA
01	02	03	04	05	06

6. Izinga Lemfundo

AWUYANGA ESIKOLENI	AKAFUNDILE KODWAUYAKWAZI UKUBHALA NOKUFUNDA	ISIKOLE ESINCANE	ESIPHAKATHI NENDAWO	ESIKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

UDLULILE EBANGENI LESHUMI 06

UFUNDELE INI _____

OKUNYE _____ 07

7. Umsebenzi

UMSEBENZI UWUFUNDELE	UWUMA BHALANE	UWUMDAYI SI	UQEQUESHELWE UMSEBENZI	AKAQEQESHIWE
01	02	03	04	05
UZIQAASHILE UMFUNDI OKUNYE				
06	07	08		

8. Imali Oyiholayo Ngonyaka

NGAPHANSI KUKA R3000	PHAKATHI KUKA R3-6000	PHAKATHI KUKA R6-10000	PHAKATHI KUKA R10-15000	PHAKATHI KUKA R15-25000	NGAPHEZU KUKA R25000
01	02	03	04	05	06

9. Iziphi Izinhlangotho Kwezilandelayo Ozaziyo Noyijoyinile?

<u>INHLANGANO</u>	<u>OZAZIYO</u>	<u>OKUYO</u>
UDF (UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT)		
NIC (NATAL INDIAN CONGRESS)		
AZAPO (AZANIAN PEOPLES ORGANISATION)		
NATIONAL FORUM		
INKATHA		
NPP (NATIONAL PEOPLES' PARTY)		
SOLIDARITY		
LABOUR PARTY		
UCC (UNITED COMMITTEE OF CONCERN)		
UWUSA (UNITED WORKERS UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA)		
COSATU (CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS)		
TUCSA (TRADE UNION COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA)		
UNAFFILIATED UNIONS		
WELFARE ORGANISATIONS		
CULTURAL ORGANISATIONS		
WOMENS ORGANISATIONS		
RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS		
CIVIC ORGANISATIONS		
SPORTING AND RECREATIONAL ORGANISATIONS		
YOUTH/STUDENT ORGANISATIONS		
OTHER:		

10. Yisho izinhlango ezinhlano okholelwa ukuthi zisebenza ukuthuthukisa izinga lempilo (abamnyama beshe amaNdiya amakhaladi namaAfrica)

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____

11. Ukhona umuntu omthatha ngokuthi uyena ongahola lelizwe

YES	NO
01	02

IMUPHI : _____

12. Kuyakufikela ukushiya lelizwe ngenxa yesimo senhlalo

YES	NO
01	02

YISHO ISIZATHU : _____

13. Abamnyama bayahlupheka ngaphansi kwesimo sobandlululo

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

14. Abamhlophe eS.A. badalwa babangaphezulu kwabamnyama ngokwemvelo

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KHALE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

15. Ubandlululo ngobulili kulelizwe kalukho

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

16. Ikuphi ovumelana nakho kulokhu:

1. Abesifazane badinga ukuphathwa
2. Uma abesifazane bekhululekile abahlonishwamuntu
3. Abesifazane nabesilisa kufanele balingane

01

02

03

17. Yikuphi ovumelana nakho lapha:

1. Imithetho ebandlulula ngezinhlangakuleli kufanele ishintshwe
2. Ubungxiwankulu kumele kuqedwe (Capitalism)
3. Alukho ushintsho oludingekile

01

02

03

18. Uhlelo loshintsho olulethwa nguhulumeni kumelwe luxhaswe ngoba lusisa empumelelweni

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

19. Akukho shintsho oloba khona noma kungathatha muphi uhulumeni omhlope

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

20. Abantu bayesaba ukukhuluma bakhululeke ngezinkinga zabo ngoba bangase bangene ezinkingeni

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

21. Ukuboshwa kwabantu emajele kwenza isimo sibe sibi kakhulu

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

22. Ukwanda kwabamnyama ngokushesha uma kuqhathaniswa nokungandi kwabamhlophe kusho ukuthi umbuso wedlanzana labamhlophe ungase uphele

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

23. Ngicabanga ukuthi ukuba abantu bayazisukumela izinkinga zabo ngabe isimo kade sashintsha.

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

24. Uma abantu abanezinkinga ezifanayo bengahlangana babe ndawonye bengasishintsha isimo sezinkinga zabo.

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

25. Uhulumeni kaluyeki ubandlululo kunalokho uyaluqinisa

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

26. Amaphephandaba, ama T.V. nama Radio kufanele kusinike konke okwenzenkayo ngezibhelu

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

27. Okwamanje ama T.V., Radio namaphephandaba kusasika konke okwenzeka layo

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

28. Ngikholwa ukuthi uguquko eNingizimu Afrika luzoza kahle nango kuthula

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

29. Unxantathu wePhalamende alusekelwa abantu bomphakathi wami (Phalamende yamaNdiya Amakhaladi Nabamhlophe)

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

30. Udlame alunakwenzeka

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

31. Abantu ababeka izici uhulumeni waseS.A. abazi izinkinga ezibheke iS.A.

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

32. Unxantathu wephalamende ubukhuphulile ubunye bamaNdiya namakhaladi

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

33. Unxantathu wephalamende ubukhuphulile ubunye phakathi kwamandiya amakhaladi namaAfrica

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

34. Abamnyama (Ndiya, Kaladi, Africa) kufanele bangene ePhalamende ukuze balethe ushintsho ngaphakathi

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

35. Ukuhlasela kwamabutho ezokuphepha aseNingizimu Africa ehlasela ezizindeni ze ANC kufanele kuqhubeke ukuze uhulumeni aqhubeke nohlelo Iwakhe

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

36. Ukuhlasela kwamabutho ezokuphepha aseningizimu Africa emazweni angomakhelwane kwandisa ukungabikho kokuthula

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

37. Umhlaba wonke ukholelwa ukuthi isimo eningizimu Africa sesingaphezu kwamandla kodwa lokhu akulona iginiso

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

38. Isimo senxushunxushu emhlabeni wonke sizokwandela nasemazweni amanye njengalo leli lethu

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

39. Ukungaxhaswa ngezimali kwalelizwe yizinkampani zamazwe angophandle kubalulekile ukuze kuqedwe ubandlululo ngezinhlanga kuleli

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

40. Imiphumela yokungaxhaswa ngezimali kwaleli amanye amazwe iyogcina imihle

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

41. Ukuvota komuntu ngamunye evotela umuntu ngamunye kungenza ukuba lelizwe libuseke ngentando yeningi

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

42. Okudingwa yilelizwe manje ukukhululwa kweziboshwa zepolitiki, uku buyiswa kwabantu abasekudingisweni Nokuvulwa kwezinhlangano ezivaliwe ukuze kube nokhukhulela Ngoqo woboniswano

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

43. Ukhukhulela Ngoqo woboniswano ungeke uzixazulule izinkinga Zaleli

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

44. Uhulumeni udinga ukuzivala izinhlango ezifuna inguquko ngokushesha

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

45. Ukhukhulela ngoqo kufanele ubizwe besekuthi zonke izinhlango ezikhona ngokusemthethweni zibambe iqhaza

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

46. Uhulumeni kufanele axazulule izinkinga ngokwehlukana kwezindawo njengokuthi iNatal ixazulu le ezayo yodwa

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

47. INatal ngeke izehlukanise nomhlaba wonke kwezepolitiki

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

48. Izenzo zomuphakathi Njengokungakhokhi irenti ephezulu zibalulekile ekushintsheni isimo samanje

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

49. Izinyunyana zimelwe ukuxhaswa abasebenzi njengobakuyizona ezibaluleke kakhulu ukuze isimo sabasebenzi kwezomnotho sishintshe

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

50. Izinhlango zezepolitiki zibaluleke kakhulu kunezinyunyana

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

51. Izinhlango zezepolitiki kazenzi umsebenzi obonakalayo

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

52. Izinyunyana kazenzi umsebenzi obonakalayo

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

53. Umzabalazo wezikhali ungeze wasetshenziselwa ukuletha uguquo

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

54. Ukunika omazimele geqe kuzonazonke izabelo kuletha ukuthuthuka kwabantu balezozabelo

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

55. Umthetho wokuhlukaniswa kwezinhlanga kwenza ukuba abantu bakhule kumasiko abo kumiphakathi yabo

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

56. Ukuxoxisana phakathi kukahulumeni nabaholi bezabelo kungaxazulula izinkinga ezikhona kulezizindawo

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

57. Ingosi yesine efaka amaAfrica kumelwe ifakwe kunxantathu wephalamende

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

58. Uhulumeni kufanele abe nezingxoxo nezinhlango ezingahambisani nodlame

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

59. Ukudutshwa kwezikhole namaNyuvesi kuzwe lonke kukhombisa ukwaliwa kwalemfundo nesimo salelizwe kweze politiki

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

60. Ngizizwa ngisenkingeni eyinqaba ngoba anginawo amalungelo kwezepolitiki

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

61. Ukuzabalaza ngokuthula kwemiphakathi kuletha uguquko

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

62. Ubungxiwankulu kusezimpendeni zezinkinga zezwe

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

63. Inkambiso engaphansi kukahulumeni okhethwe iningi ungaleta umphakathi okhululekile

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

64. Izinhlango zezepolitiki ezingabambisani nohulumeni kumelwe zisekelwe

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
01	02	03	04	05

65. Izinhlangotho kufanele zenze isimo esingabuseki ukuze kube noshintsho olusheshayo

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

66. Amakhomishane acwaninga ngezizathu ezidala izinkinga angasetshenziselwa uguquko

NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU	UYAVUMA	AWUBONI KAHLE	AWUVUMI	ANGIVUMI KAKHULU
05	04	03	02	01

67. Ngiyaxhumana namalunga eminye imiphakathi emnyama

KANINGI	KAMBALWA	ANGIXHUMANI NHLOBO
01	02	03

LUYABONGEKA UBAMBISWANO LWAKHO

ADDENDUM B
FURTHER SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES

TABLE 139

Statement 12

Africans	Y	18,52%
	N	81,48%
Indians	Y	34,22%
	N	65,78%
Coloureds	Y	27,01%
	N	72,99%

Various reasons for wanting to leave the country were offered by the broader population. The most common were the following:-

- (1) Economic reasons: greater job opportunities were seen to exist in some other countries.
- (2) Political reasons: violence in the country was seen to potentially accelerate. People were looking for a more stable environment.
- (3) Educational reasons: the need to study further was seen as another reason. Families were also considering leaving to find alternative educational institutions in other countries in which their children could study.

TABLE 140

RACE AND FURTHER SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES

RACE	RESPONDENTS		S13		S14		S15		S16		S17		S28		S33		S34		S67	
	N	%	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
AFRICAN	180	50,00	1,32	0,51	4,23	1,12	3,72	1,55	2,30	0,76	1,46	0,31	3,18	1,06	3,86	1,16	1,58	0,82	1,59	0,48
INDIAN	120	33,33	1,66	0,70	3,30	1,18	3,46	1,42	2,81	0,30	1,35	0,42	3,02	1,29	3,75	1,07	2,27	0,96	1,64	0,41
COLOURED	120	16,67	1,63	0,94	4,06	1,42	3,33	1,74	2,83	0,30	1,30	0,21	3,21	1,93	4,03	1,01	2,01	1,20	1,46	0,36
			Xw=4,50		Xw=3,897		Xw=3,57		Xw=2,56		Xw=1,405		Xw=2,86		Xw=2,14		Xw=4,11		Xw=1,588	
			V=0,66		V=1,641		V=1,543		V=0,619		V=0,347		V=1,12		V=1,111		V=1,018		V=0,437	
			x ² = 27,248 with 8° freedom P=0,006 <0,05		x ² = 76,398 with 8° freedom P=0,0001 <0,05		x ² = 54,334 with 8° freedom P=0,0001 <0,05		x ² = 50,715 with 4° freedom P=0,0001 <0,05		x ² = 28,6 with 4° freedom P=0,0001 <0,05		x ² = 48,39 with 8° freedom P=0,0001 <0,05		x ² = 34,37 with 8° freedom P=0,0001 <0,05		x ² = 64,12 with 8° freedom P=0,0001 <0,05		x ² = 5,516 with 4° freedom P=0,0001 <0,05	
			r _c = 0,7625		r _s = 0,60		r _s = 0,30		r _s = 1,00		r _s = 1,00		r _s = 0,70		r _s = 0,90		r _s = 0,90		r _s = 1,00	

TABLE 141

OCCUPATION AND FURTHER SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES

OCCU- PATION	RESPONDENTS		S13		S14		S15		S16		S17		S28		S33		S34		S67	
	N	%	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
CLERK	42	11,67	1,50	0,82	3,85	1,77	3,19	1,59	2,71	0,41	1,21	0,28	3,16	1,05	3,97	1,10	2,07	1,26	1,57	0,39
PROFESS- IONAL	54	15,00	1,29	0,25	4,35	1,16	3,77	1,5	2,67	0,38	1,44	0,28	3,59	1,14	4,14	0,97	2,01	1,42	1,53	0,41
SALES	19	5,28	1,26	0,51	3,78	1,68	3,5	1,27	2,42	0,78	1,31	0,15	2,73	0,95	3,94	1,76	1,57	0,58	1,52	0,48
SELF- EMPLOYED	28	7,78	1,39	0,46	3,96	1,34	3,53	1,48	2,20	0,98	1,32	0,22	3,25	0,97	4,07	0,71	1,78	0,97	1,78	0,68
SKILLED WORKER	83	23,06	1,51	0,86	3,71	1,73	3,46	1,73	2,38	0,78	1,43	0,26	2,97	1,03	3,69	1,11	1,85	0,88	1,51	0,48
UNSKILLED WORKER	29	8,06	1,48	0,67	3,79	1,76	3,65	1,28	2,27	0,88	1,51	0,39	2,80	1,01	3,86	0,68	1,51	0,74	1,65	0,51
STUDENT	66	18,33	1,36	0,48	4,06	1,76	4,01	1,10	2,77	0,74	1,42	0,28	3,37	1,18	3,9	1,18	1,90	1,13	1,57	0,31
OTHER UN- EMPLOYED	39	10,83	2,10	0,71	3,17	1,12	3,17	1,36	2,84	0,42	1,46	0,30	2,71	1,05	3,3	1,21	2,05	0,61	1,69	1,43
			Xw=4,50		Xw=3,897		Xw=3,57		Xw=2,56		Xw=1,405		Xw=2,86		Xw=2,14		Xw=4,11		Xw=1,588	
			V=0,66		V=1,641		V=1,543		V=0,619		V=0,347		V=1,12		V=1,111		V=1,018		V=0,437	
			x ² =65,83 with 28 ^o freedom P=0,0001 < 0,05		x ² =51,94 with 28 ^o freedom P=0,003 < 0,05		x ² =48,266 with 28 ^o freedom P=0,010 < 0,05		x ² =46,685 with 14 ^o freedom P=0,001 < 0,05		x ² =28,487 with 14 ^o freedom P=0,0126 < 0,05		x ² =55,06 with 28 ^o freedom P=0,0017 < 0,05		x ² =54,06 with 28 ^o freedom P=0,002 < 0,05		x ² =43,39 with 28 ^o freedom P=0,031 < 0,05		x ² =20,009 with 14 ^o freedom P=0,1299 > 0,05	

TABLE 142

INCOME AND FURTHER SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES

INCOME	RESPONDENTS		S13		S14		S15		S16		S17		S28		S33		S34		S67	
	N	%	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
LESS THAN R3 000	65	18,06	1,41	0,47	3,76	1,69	3,13	1,71	2,40	0,79	1,27	0,24	3,00	1,17	3,80	1,17	1,67	1,06	1,66	0,54
BETWEEN R3- 6 000	89	24,72	1,57	0,88	3,69	1,87	3,69	1,24	2,34	0,76	1,50	0,42	3,04	1,09	3,65	1,11	1,80	1,05	1,73	0,47
BETWEEN R6-10 000	81	22,5	1,55	0,70	3,80	1,72	3,71	1,30	2,50	0,63	1,40	0,37	3,08	0,96	3,71	1,19	1,79	0,63	1,53	0,35
BETWEEN R10-15000	57	15,83	1,43	0,80	4,00	1,16	3,60	1,84	2,82	0,46	1,42	0,38	3,33	0,75	4,01	0,96	2,00	1,08	1,42	0,32
BETWEEN R15-25000	42	11,67	1,45	0,54	4,19	1,26	3,30	1,67	2,83	0,52	1,40	0,30	3,02	1,32	4,02	1,13	2,11	0,88	1,61	0,54
OVER R25 000	26	7,22	1,38	0,24	4,39	1,20	4,00	1,73	2,69	0,45	1,30	0,23	3,69	1,07	4,46	0,49	2,30	1,82	1,42	0,34
			Xw=4,5		Xw=3,897		Xw=3,57		Xw=2,56		Xw=1,405		Xw=2,86		Xw=2,14		Xw=4,11		Xw=1,588	
			V=0,66		V=1,641		V=1,543		V=0,619		V=0,347		V=1,12		V=1,111		V=1,018		V=0,437	
			x ² =14,66 with 20° freedom P=0,7955 >0,05		x ² =37,59 with 20° freedom P=0,0099 <0,05		x ² =46,17 with 20° freedom P=0,0008 <0,05		x ² =29,368 with 10° freedom P=0,0144 <0,05		x ² =2,236 with 10° freedom P=0,6611 >0,05		x ² =48,64 with 20° freedom P=0,0003 <0,05		x ² =35,82 with 20° freedom P=0,0161 <0,05		x ² =34,47 with 20° freedom P=0,0231 <0,05		x ² =15,606 with 10° freedom P=0,1115 >0,05	

TABLE 143

EDUCATION AND FURTHER SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES

EDUCATION	RESPONDENTS		S13		S14		S15		S16		S17		S28		S33		S34		S67	
	N	%	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
NONE (& ILLITERATE)	3	0,83	1,33	0,23	3,33	0,24	3,33	0,24	1,67	1,00	1,33	0,25	3,00	0,67	4,00	0,67	1,00	0,00	2,00	0,67
NONE (& LITERATE)	8	2,22	1,00	0,00	4,25	0,19	3,87	1,38	1,37	0,49	1,12	0,52	3,13	1,11	3,87	1,51	1,33	0,23	1,75	0,69
PRIMARY SCHOOL	25	6,94	1,36	0,32	3,20	0,85	3,48	1,45	2,08	0,96	1,72	0,67	3,16	0,68	3,48	1,29	1,80	0,88	1,92	0,56
JUNIOR SECONDARY	77	21,39	1,72	0,78	3,67	1,45	3,33	1,37	2,42	0,68	1,44	0,37	2,97	1,11	3,7	1,12	1,88	1,01	1,80	0,51
SENIOR SECONDARY	189	52,5	1,47	0,76	3,94	1,28	3,50	1,59	2,71	0,46	1,34	0,53	3,15	1,23	3,93	1,30	1,93	1,06	1,51	0,37
POST-MATRIC	58	16,11	1,36	0,37	4,30	1,12	4,08	1,63	2,63	0,57	1,44	0,33	3,29	1,14	3,94	1,12	1,93	1,24	1,34	0,27
			Xw=4,5		Xw=3,897		Xw=3,57		Xw=2,56		Xw=1,405		Xw=2,86		Xw=2,14		Xw=4,11		Xw=1,588	
			V=0,66		V=1,641		V=1,543		V=0,619		V=0,347		V=1,12		V=1,111		V=1,018		V=0,437	
			x ² =24,43 with 20° freedom P=0,2241 > 0,05		x ² =54,46 with 20° freedom P=0,0001 < 0,05		x ² =40,468 with 20° freedom P=0,0044 < 0,05		x ² =56,238 with 10° freedom P=0,0001 < 0,05		x ² =22,68 with 10° freedom P=0,0911 > 0,05		x ² =16,964 with 20° freedom P=0,6553 > 0,05		x ² =28,335 with 20° freedom P=0,1017 > 0,05		x ² =21,89 with 20° freedom P=0,3461 > 0,05		x ² =33,314 with 10° freedom P=0,0002 < 0,05	

TABLE 144.

GENDER AND FURTHER SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES

GENDER	RESPONDENTS		S13		S14		S15		S16		S17		S28		S33		S34		S67	
	N	%	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
MALE	180	50	1,46	0,78	4,08	1,39	3,55	1,43	2,36	0,77	1,45	0,34	3,19	1,52	3,95	1,07	1,95	1,28	1,61	0,45
FEMALE	180	50	1,52	0,54	3,7	1,86	3,59	1,62	2,75	0,39	1,35	0,34	3,07	1,04	3,75	1,15	1,82	0,75	1,56	0,44
			Xw=4,50		Xw=3,897		Xw=3,57		Xw=2,56		Xw=1,405		Xw=2,86		Xw=2,14		Xw=4,11		Xw=1,588	
			V=0,66		V=1,641		V=1,543		V=0,619		V=0,347		V=1,12		V=1,111		V=1,018		V=0,437	
			x ² =10,372 with 4° freedom P=0,0346 < 0,05		x ² =14,15 with 4° freedom P=0,006 < 0,05		x ² =3,647 with 4° freedom P=0,4558 > 0,05		x ² =24,13 with 2° freedom P=0,0001 < 0,05		x ² =5,899 with 2° freedom P=0,1166 > 0,05		x ² =4,571 with 4° freedom P=0,3342 > 0,05		x ² =4,345 with 4° freedom P=0,3614 > 0,05		x ² =9,559 with 4° freedom P=0,048 < 0,05		x ² =0,922 with 2° freedom P=0,6307 > 0,05	

TABLE 145
AGE AND FURTHER SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES

AGE	RESPONDENTS		S13		S14		S15		S16		S17		S28		S33		S34		S67	
	N	%	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V	Xw	V
BETWEEN 16 - 25	145	40,28	1,53	0,76	3,97	1,18	3,64	1,45	2,71	0,41	1,37	0,31	3,25	1,19	3,84	1,03	1,95	1,12	1,57	0,40
26 - 35	84	23,33	1,34	0,46	3,90	1,21	3,42	1,38	2,50	0,70	1,33	0,27	3,02	1,20	3,80	1,23	1,98	1,40	1,57	0,45
36 - 45	61	16,94	1,59	0,87	3,89	1,22	3,45	1,82	2,55	0,69	1,50	0,46	3,19	1,03	3,85	1,35	1,83	0,97	1,39	0,35
46 - 60	64	17,78	1,5	0,56	3,91	1,38	3,71	1,11	2,06	0,89	1,43	0,35	2,9	1,03	3,92	1,02	1,68	0,67	1,78	0,58
OVER 60	6	1,67	1,5	0,25	3,33	1,24	3,50	1,25	2,83	0,17	1,67	0,57	3,00	0,67	3,83	0,82	1,67	0,24	2,16	0,16
			Xw=4,50		Xw=3,897		Xw=3,57		Xw=2,56		Xw=1,405		Xw=2,86		Xw=2,14		Xw=4,11		Xw=1,588	
			V=0,66		V=1,641		V=1,543		V=0,619		V=0,347		V=1,12		V=1,111		V=1,018		V=0,437	
			x ² =10,399 with 16° freedom P=0,845 > 0,05		x ² =22,35 with 16° freedom P=0,132 > 0,05		x ² =18,14 with 16° freedom P=0,3156 > 0,05		x ² =41,473 with 8° freedom P=0,0001 < 0,05		x ² =10,596 with 8° freedom P=0,563 > 0,05		x ² =13,106 with 16° freedom P=0,665 > 0,05		x ² =12,017 with 16° freedom P=0,7428 > 0,05		x ² =9,825 with 16° freedom P=0,8756 > 0,05		x ² =22,147 with 8° freedom P=0,0047 < 0,05	

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