

# Title

**Displacement and Adjustment: Ethiopian Environmental**

**Migrants in Durban, South Africa**

By

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## ABSTRACT

Notwithstanding earlier scholarly and scientific disagreements, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century the evidence for climate-induced environmental change is compelling, with little room for doubt, debate or dissent. There are serious negative consequences for water resources, agriculture and food security, human health, terrestrial ecosystems and biodiversity and coastal zones. In addition to the devastating environmental consequences, there is also reasonable consensus about the devastating human impacts, especially in terms of population displacement or environmental refugees. The aim of this study is to investigate the displacement and resettlement of Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban. More specifically, it examines how environmental changes influenced the decision to move and explores the challenges migrants faced while they were crossing borders of different countries. The study also assesses the socio-economic challenges and the survival strategies adopted by environmental refugees in Durban. This study also evaluates the role of refugee agencies in the resettlement and adjustment of migrants.

Ethiopia, as a developing country, more than 80 percent of its economy is based on agriculture. However, the country's vulnerability to environmental events such as drought, land degradation, deforestations, unsustainable agricultural and food security is very high. As a result, almost all surveyed respondents in this study reported that environmentally-induced migration was common in their areas in Ethiopia. Most of the respondents were from rural and semi-urban areas and they were engaged in farming related activities. Legal outmigration of environmental migrants from Ethiopia was very limited. The majority of respondents were forced to leave Ethiopia in a desperate bid to seek alternate survival strategies. Hence, their entire journey from Ethiopia to South Africa was risky and perilous. They were also emotionally intimidated, physically abused and exploited by migrant smugglers. In addition to the participation of non-governmental refugee organisations who provide legal aid and socio-economic assistance to vulnerable foreign migrants, the South African justice system, in theory, promotes the equality of foreign migrants before the law. However, due to the delays and mishandling of the case dockets and appeals, the majority of environmental migrants expressed their discontent and dissatisfaction with government and non-governmental agencies. Police harassment and abuse

of foreign migrants was high. The findings also revealed that some Department of Home Affairs officials were corrupt and unfriendly.

A major concern is the international response, or perhaps, more appropriately, the lack thereof, to the challenges facing environmental refugees. A key contention of this thesis is that 60 years since its initial promulgation, the 1951 Convention should be revised to include environmental refugees.

## **DECLARATION**

I declare that this dissertation is my own work. Publicized data and ideas from other authors and institution have been used. However, their legacies and sources of information ascribed to them have been acknowledged and referenced. Whereas, other authors' words and ideas included directly in this study have been put in quotations, and referenced accordingly.

**Yibrah G. Ghebreyohannes**

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**Date**

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
CoMRSA	Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa
DHA	Department of Home Affairs
EU	European Union
GDP	Forum Gross Domestic Product
GEO	Global Environment Outlook
GHF	Global Humanitarian Forum
HCR	Human Rights Council
HRCR	Human Rights Council Resolution
IAGV	International Action Group for the vulnerable
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICHRP	International Council on Human Right Policy
IFRCRCS	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IDPs	Internationally Displaced Persons
ILO	International Labor Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
KZNRC	KwaZulu Natal Refugee Council
LHR	Lawyers for Human Right
MEA	Millennium ecosystem Assessment
MRF	Munich Renaissance Foundation
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OAU	Organization of African Union
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
RSDO	Refugee Status Determination Officer
RSS	Refugee Social Service
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Program

UNHCR	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNHCR	United Nations high Commission for Refugee
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WEF	World Economic Forum

# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Introduction

The term ‘environmental migration’ is one of the consequences of climate change which appeared for the first time in 1992, in the report of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (IPCC, 1990) argue that the gravest effect of climate change would be on human migration. According to the IPCC (1990: 20) “due to the lack of adaptations and mitigations the poorest people in the developing countries are bearing the burden of the impacts of climate change even though they have contributed little or nothing to the problem.” Human migration is a phenomenon that has persisted throughout history. However, environmental migration is new phenomenon, since the number of people forced to abandon their homes due to environmentally-related and other human related factors is becoming higher and higher (Munich Renaissance Foundation (Munich Re, 2008). Research conducted by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2001) shows that the number of people who are migrating due to environmentally-related disasters exceed those displaced by war. Furthermore, in 1998, there was a prediction that all forms of environmental migrants would exceed political migrants six-fold (Jacobson, 1988). The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 2001) estimate that about 150 million people live outside their countries of origin, either temporarily or permanently.

According to Warner *et al.* (2009: 235), “the greatest single consequence of climate change could be migration and that millions of people could be displaced due to the adverse effects such as shoreline erosions, coastal flooding and severe drought.” Furthermore, the IPCC (2001) projected that, if greenhouse gas emissions, which are the leading cause of climate change, continue to rise, the mean global temperatures will increase between 1.4 to 5.8°C by the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This projection indicates that the number of environmental migrants could increase from 25 million in the 1990’s to 200 million by 2050 (Myers, 1997; IPCC, 2007b). There is compelling evidence that millions of migrants are “forced to flee environmentally-life-

threatening conditions, and are displaced by climate and geophysical events, and the majority of victims are from the developing world” (Myers, 1995: 167-82).

The protection of people displaced within and outside their own borders due to natural or human disasters is a major concern. As the numbers of migrants increase, competition over business opportunities, housing, public services and jobs can create conflict between local and foreign nationals (Adepoju, 2003; UNHCR, 2011). IOM (2000) has criticised countries, politicians and media for failing to communicate the challenges faced by migrants and the ability to integrate multicultural societies in the modern era of globalisation. The lack of such integrated and coherent responses from all concerned bodies exacerbates the current rise of populist anti-immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric, especially in European, Middle East and African politics (IOM, 2000).

## **1.2 Background**

The term ‘environmental migration’ was first introduced by the Worldwatch Institute’s Lester Brown in the 1970s. It became more popular following Essam El-Hinnawi’s 1985 treatise on the topic for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (Kibreab, 1997). Since then, literature on the issue of migration caused by environmental change has flourished (Hugo, 1996; O’Lear, 1997). Renaud (2007) was the pioneer researcher who identified three categories of environmental migrants, namely, environmental refugees, environmentally-forced migrants and environmentally-motivated migrants.

Environmentally displaced persons have been given different definitions by researchers and organisations. Environmental migrants, climate refugees, environmentally-displaced people and environmental refugees are some of the names that have been awarded by the general public, media, and experts to describe people forced to leave their homes when their livelihoods and safety are disrupted due to the sudden and creeping effects of climate change (Renaud, 2007).

Many academics, policy-makers and the media have given attention to the issue of environmental migrants to create a legal framework that embraces all circumstances of cross-border mobility with equal recognition, protection and resettlement programs (Hugo, 1996). However, due to the complexities mix of environmental, social, political and economic factors

that cause migration, there is no such instrument or mechanism which protects the rights of environmental migrants.

South Africa is one of the main migrant destination countries in the world (Department of Home Affairs (DHA, 2008). Despite socio-economic challenges such as unemployment, rampant poverty, inequality, crime and the HIV/AIDS pandemic, democratic South Africa attracts migrants from different corners of the world such as Eastern Europe, the Far East, Africa and other poor regions of the European Union (Cross and Omoluabi, 2006). However, this continuous flow of foreign migrants has been perceived as a potential threat by the local populace (Cross and Omoluabi, 2006). For instance, competition over business opportunities, housing, public services and jobs created conflict between locals and migrants and resulted in violent xenophobic attacks (UNHCR, 2011).

### **1.3 Rationale for the study**

Human livelihoods have frequently been disrupted by natural and human-induced disasters (Myers, 1995). Natural disasters are uncontrollable, and hence, they have the longest history in human displacements and dislocations (Myers, 1995). In addition to the above, it is argued that human-induced involvements in terms of climate change and on the ecosystem are witnessed.

The impacts of global climate and environmental changes in affecting ecosystems and communities, particularly those who depend on them, became one of the most debated issues in the global arena. The most overarching reason is that the threats, events and damages caused by environmental change are becoming huge. According to Odipo (1999: 559) “the increasing numbers of migrants from developing countries was a result of current global environmental chaos as triggered by elements such as eco-stresses, insecurity and poverty.” Therefore, the combined effect of environmental change and social, political and economic stresses in developing countries is expected to create unprecedented numbers of environmental migrants in the future (Warner *et al.*, 2009).

Similarly, the fourth Global Environment Outlook (GEO) of UNEP (2007) concluded that the environmental degradation observed worldwide such as, air pollution, land and water resources degradation, loss of biodiversity hampers development, human well-being and the achievement of some of the Millennium Development Goals, particularly in the developing countries. Furthermore, the UNDP (2007) report noted that one of the many consequences of environmental degradation is human migration, even though establishing direct links is difficult because of the potentially multiple push factors at play.

The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007c) also reported that temporary rural to urban migration is a response to environmental hazards (such as droughts). Furthermore, the report indicated that large numbers of displaced people are likely to be affected by the consequence of extreme events. Particularly, the evidence of environmentally-induced migration in the 21<sup>st</sup> century became undisputable among scholars and scientists. For instance, the concept of environmental migrants, according to Myers (1993: 752) is described by proposing that such environmental migrants are “people who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their erstwhile homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, and other environmental problems.” This definition, used by different researchers and organisations, is useful in providing an understanding of who and what the consequences of migration are. So far, there are no legally binding mechanisms of protection or support for those victims of global environmental change.

According to Harris (1995: 128) “environmental migrants majority from developing countries who seek asylums are defined as economic migrants and are therefore governed by immigration, not refugee law.” More significantly, the Human Rights Watch, an NGO, has recommended to the United Nations Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights that the 1951 Convention be revised in order to make it more relevant so that it meets the current migration challenges.

Just as it is for all migrants, the treks of environmental migration are also very horrendous. Human trafficking is a phenomenon on the rise in Eastern Africa, though the awareness of it is still limited. Like many other forms of criminal activity, acts of human smuggling and trafficking



are increasing globally, particularly in Africa, and are taking advantage of the conflicts, humanitarian disasters and the vulnerability of people in situations of crisis, especially women and children. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2009) argued that many migrants cross borders illegally, hence many of them become trapped in forests and deserts, suffer indefinite detentions and become the victims of migrant smugglers and traffickers. For instance, a number of migrants who set out on the dangerous journey to Europe, Asia and Southern Africa die along the way, due to unsafe journeys across the sea, deserts and also due to the conditions on the transit journey and the brutality of the smugglers. Despite the facts on the ground, many government policies or strategies have not been formulated and put in place properly to tackle these issues effectively and coherently, so as to prevent and combat this phenomenon.

Critics say that the overwhelming number of people residing outside their country of origin has created different kinds of anxieties and resentments among the locals and immigrant-receiving countries over many issues, including competition for resources and jobs. As a result, they are subject to hatred, discriminations and are vulnerable to xenophobic attacks and harassment. Therefore, one of the major concerns is the lack of international response, or perhaps, more appropriately, the lack of mediation in the face of the diverse challenges facing environmental migrants in the new environments, which is one of the focuses of this paper. In order to explore the degree of the aforementioned human crises, this research sets out to study the displacement and resettlement of Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban.

## **1.4 Chapter Outline**

### ***1.4.1 Chapter 1: Introduction***

This chapter introduces the study, the background, the purpose and rationale of the project.

### ***1.4.2 Chapter 2: Literature review***

This chapter presents the theoretical framework for the study. In addition, the chapter discusses relevant literature reviews regarding global environmental migrants in general, and, in particular, previous studies that have been conducted in East Africa, including Ethiopia.

### ***1.4.3 Chapter 3: Methodology***

This chapter explains the study setting and the choice of the case study, research method and data sources, providing information about the study area, including its location and history. It also provides the ethical considerations, challenges in the field work and limitations of the study.

### ***1.4.4 Chapter 4: Result and discussion***

This chapter discusses the key findings pertaining to this study; it discusses how Ethiopian environmental migrants perceive environmental change and its impact in displacing them from their country, and the challenges that face them while trekking. It also explains how refugee agencies handle matters of environmental migrants.

### ***1.4.5 Chapter 5: Evaluation and recommendation***

The final chapter provides the overview and summary of the key findings and presents an evaluation and recommendation based on the findings and literature reviews.

## **1.5 Conclusion.**

The gradual changes that are related to natural and human-induced factors are generating significant increases in temperature around the world (IPCC, 2007a; 2007b). These factors produce increases in the rate at which the sea level rises, more rainfall in specific regions of the world, desertification, more severe droughts in tropical and subtropical zones, incidences of disease, increases in heat waves, more intense hurricane and cyclone activity, arctic and Antarctic ice melting, disasters such as earthquakes and floods, and industrial or some development projects, wars and violent conflict (IPCC, 2007a).

## CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 Introduction

The aim of this literature review is to provide general views of climate change and its impacts on human migration. The chapter also presents the theoretical framework for the study. The environmental push-pull theory argues that migration is more applicable, particularly in poor countries, because of larger environmental impacts. The unsustainable exploitation of the land can result in total impoverishment, and consequently, can enhance displacement. In order to explain the challenges that face migrants with adjustment and resettlement processes in the new environment, xenophobic theory is also very crucial to understanding their day-to-day experiences.

The second section of the chapter reviews the literature on the following sub-topics: definition of environmental migration; lack of recognition of environmental migrants; the future of environmental change and impacts on environmental migrants. The chapter also discusses the current and future environmental-induced migration in Ethiopia; human trafficking and migrant smuggling. Furthermore, it reviews migrant application processes at the Department of Home Affairs and migration challenges in South Africa.

### 2.2 Theories of migration

According to Black *et al.* (2008) the key drivers of human migration are considered to fall into the following categories:

- i. Push-factors related to the origin of a region or country that include political instability and conflict, a lack of economic opportunities, environmental deterioration and a lack of access to resources, and so on;
- ii. Pull-factors related to the region or country of destination, including the availability of employment and higher wages, political stability or access to resources;
- iii. Mediating factors, which are divided into two conflicting factors:
  - (a) Facilitating/encouraging factors that trigger, enable and accelerate departure. For instance, the availability of visas, passports, transport, communications, information,

- recruiters, brokers, traffickers and smugglers, porous borders, and the resources needed for the journey, the distance between the departure and destination countries and the length of transit periods;
- (b) Restraining/constraining factors or intervening obstacles which act against the journey unfolding smoothly. For instance, high migration costs, perceived risks, stricter controls of recruitments, stiffer punishments and penalties for smugglers and traffickers, rogue employment practices in destination countries and
- iv. Social network (pull) factors - such as the existence of relatives, friends and acquaintances in host/destination countries, the availability of opportunities for family unifications in host countries, or the despatch of funds from individuals to enable other family members to join them in the new (host) country which is called a chain migration, that results in migration fields or clustering of people from specific countries in certain neighbourhoods or small towns in the new (host) countries.

### **2.2.1 Environmental push-pull theory**

Most of the explanations of environmental change and migration are dominated by push-pull and Malthusian theories. Passaris (1989) noted that the push-pull model has gained more popularity in numerous migration literatures, and hence has become the dominant migration model. Environmentalists argue that the push-pull theory in terms of environmental migration is more applicable in poor countries (Van der Geest, 2009). This is because population pressure on the resources and unsustainable exploitation of the land, beyond its carrying capacity, results in impoverishment and, consequently, enhances displacement (Lee, 1966; Passaris, 1989; Van der Geest, 2009).

Lee (1966), a prominent migration researcher, argued that the decision to migrate is determined by three factors: first, the area of origin (this could promote socio-political and ecological factors that push migrants); the second factor is the area of destination, (providing geographical barriers, government policies, socio-political and economic wellbeing) and the third factor is personal circumstances. Similarly, Skeldon (1997: 20) identified two main forces that can create the push and pull factors:

*“First, rural population growth causing a Malthusian pressure on natural and agricultural resources, and then enhances environmental stress, and hence, pushing people out of marginal rural areas. And secondly, economic conditions (higher wages) attract people into cities and industrialised countries.”*

Besides wage differences, factors such as population pressure, demographic pressure or environmental degradation have commonly been postulated as ‘root causes’ of migration (King and Schneider, 1991; Schwartz *et al.*, 1994; Zachariah *et al.*, 2001).

Theories on the environment-migration nexus can be categorised as either minimalist or maximalist. According to Suhrke (1994: 474), “maximalist views posit environmental degradation as a direct cause of large-scale displacement of people; in contrast, the minimalist views environmental change as a contextual variable that can contribute to migration.” Van der Geest (2009) was the first researcher who developed a notion of “environmental push and pull theory” to determine to what extent migrants were forced to relocate due to environmental pressure. According to Van der Geest (2009: 28), “environmental push factors are forces that have power to relocate people out of their home region, whereas environmental pull factors suggest that people can opt to relocate to a region with a more benign environment”. Environmental push factors were deforestation, desertification, floods, drought, sea-level rise and nuclear-plant accidents, which have high potential to create environmental migrants on a permanent or semi-permanent basis (Somerville, 2011).

Recent arguments around the push-pull theory suggest that extreme climate variability and change are threatening peoples’ lives and livelihoods in the developing countries, and hence forcing them to migrate to more stable environments (Hampshire, 2002). Environmental conditions at the destination can also be important. According to Hampshire (2002: 32), “people may use migration selectively as part of a range of strategies designed not just to cope with livelihood failure, but to optimise livelihood security in the suitable environment.” Contemporary researchers like Mounkaila (2002), Carr (2005), de Bassett and Turner (2007), Sherbinin and Carr (2007) who have applied the push-pull theory, attest that migration decisions

can be determined by various interrelated factors related to environmental, demographic, and economic phenomena.

Push-pull theory, however, has been criticised for disregarding the complex interactions between migrants and their households, and for not considering cumulative causations, including networks and the cultural, historical, existential and political factors that tend to be part and parcel of migration decisions (Massey, 1990). Henry *et al.* (2004) and Van der Geest (2009) found that migration flows out of Burkina Faso decreased during the severe drought years in the 1970s and 1980s. This was because long distance migration and international migration during drought seasons was usually limited since resources were required to move (Bassett and Turner, 2007).

### **2.2.2 Psychological / Sociological theory**

The explanation of xenophobic theory emanates from psychology, and helps to understand human feelings and is also very important in explaining prejudice and discrimination as a means by which people express hostility arising from frustration. In order to explain the challenges of migrants in terms of adjustment and resettlement processes in the new environment, xenophobic theory is also very crucial theory in detailing migrants' day-to-day dwellings. Xenophobia can be explained by bio-cultural, isolation and scapegoating theories (Osman 2009).

As defined by Horton and Hunt, (2004: 73), “xenophobia is an undue or excessive fear, hatred or dislike of strangers or foreigners, usually new immigrants.” The concept is believed to have originated from the Greek words: *xenos* (meaning foreigner or stranger) and *phobos* (meaning fear) (Horton and Hunt, 2004: 73). Xenophobia is a worldwide phenomenon and occurs among various categories of people, across nationalities, races, ages, gender and socioeconomic groups. It has been noted that poorer people are more likely to be xenophobic because of their socio-economic status, and that education/enlightenment is inversely related to xenophobia (i.e. the more educated people are, the lower the tendency to be xenophobic) (Morris, 1998).

#### ***i. Scapegoating theory***

The scapegoating hypothesis has largely emerged from sociological theory (Osman, 2009). The theory explains xenophobia in terms of broad social and economic factors where black foreigners

are perceived as the main threat to limited resources such as housing, education, health care and employment, coupled with high expectations during transition (Morris, 1998; Tshitereke, 1999). Tshitereke (1999) further suggested that, in post-apartheid South Africa, while people's expectations were heightened, a realisation that delivery would not be immediate resulted in an escalation in discontent. Furthermore, Tshitereke (1999) noted that people were more conscious of their deprivations than ever before and this allowed xenophobia to take root and flourish in the country (Tshitereke, 1999). According to Tshitereke (1999), the psychological interpretation of scapegoating cannot be separated from the socio-economic realities of contemporary South Africa. He further asserts that the scapegoating theory can apply at various levels including jobs, houses, education and even competition for the affection of women.

### *ii) Isolation hypothesis*

The isolation hypothesis emphasises xenophobia as a consequence of apartheid and South Africa's exclusion from the international community. Morris (1998) argued that apartheid insulated South African citizens from nationalities beyond Southern Africa. With the political transition, however, South Africa's borders have opened up and the country has been integrated into the international community. This formed South Africans into direct contact with foreigners from Africa (Morris, 1998). In addition to this, Morris (1998: 1125) quoted, "isolation theory interfaces between previously isolated South Africans and unknown foreigners hence, it creates a space for hostility to develop." Furthermore, Morris (1998) suggested that a group which has no history of incorporating strangers may find it difficult to be welcoming. Xenophobia in South Africa is not applied equally to all foreigners. African foreigners seem to be particularly vulnerable to violence and hostility (Human Rights Watch, 1998; Human Rights Commission, 1999).

### *iii) Bio-cultural hypothesis*

The bio-cultural theory of xenophobia attempts to explain why foreigners become targets of xenophobic attacks by virtue of their physical features and their cultural differences, which are distinct, from that of the hosting nationals (Morris, 1998). Some Africans are treated more harshly than other Africans and this is explained by this theory (Harris, 2002). The bio-cultural

hypothesis locates xenophobia at the level of visible difference, or otherness, that is in terms of the physical biological factors and cultural differences exhibited by African foreigners. For instance, as Morris (1998) suggested, Nigerians and Congolese are easily identifiable as 'other' because of their physical appearance, their bearing, their clothing style and inability to speak one of the indigenous languages. They are, in general, clearly distinct and local residents are easily able to target them. Similarly, Valji (2003) and Crush and Williams (2002b) noted that African migrants are most often targeted by law enforcement officials and the general public. This theory explains the asymmetrical target of African foreigners by South Africans.

### **2.3 Environmental migration**

The fast accelerating rates of migration caused by environmental factors have motivated stockholders such as academics, lawyers, organisations and governments to identify a new category of migrants. The term 'environmental migrants/refugee' was first begun in the 1970's. Since then, different names or phrases have emerged, including: environmental migrants; forced environmental migrant; environmentally motivated migrants; climate refugee; climate change refugee; environmentally displaced person (EDP); disaster refugee; environmental displaced; ecologically displaced person and Environmental-Refugee-To-Be (ERTB) (Stokes *et al.*, 1976; El-Hinnawi's, 1985; Tolba, 1989; Renaud, 2007). For the purpose of this study, the term 'environmental migrants' was adopted.

Jacobson (1988: 37-38), Renaud *et al.* (2008) and IOM (1996) identified three basic categories of environmental migrants and argued that it is possible to distinguish between these three categories.

- i. Environmental emergency migrants: people who migrate temporarily due to a sudden environmental event, especially disasters (for instance, hurricane, tsunami and earthquake);
- ii. Environmentally-induced migrants: people who are forced to leave their area due to deteriorating environmental conditions, for instance, deforestation, drought or coastal deterioration; and



- iii. Environmentally-motivated migrants or environmentally-induced economic migrants: people who choose to migrate to avoid possible future problems such as the decline of crop productivity caused by desertification and land degradation.

Prominent environmentally-induced migration researcher, El-Hannawi (1985: 466) defined environmental migrants as:

*“People who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life.”*

These environmental disruptions, according to El-Hannawi (1985: 4-5) are “any physical, chemical, and/or biological changes in the ecosystem (or resource base) that render it, temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support human life”. Similarly, the IOM (2007: 1-2) defines environmental migrants as:

*“Persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.”*

The number of environmental migrants affected by the global climate change is growing. However, due to the high rate of environmental degradation and competition for scarce natural resources, the impact is more serious in developing countries. Though the threats of global climate change are acknowledged, people who are displaced by the impact of climate change are still lacking recognition from the UNHCR.

#### **2.4 Lack of recognition of environmental migrants**

Notwithstanding the above definitions and arguments given by researchers and other stakeholders, the differences are less important than what they have in common. This is because directly or indirectly, they suggest that there is a determinable relationship between

environmental drivers and human migration which is analytically useful, relevant for policy and possibly provides grounds for the expansion of refugee law (Morris *et al.*, 2008).

The UNHCR (1998: 2) defines a refugee as a “person fleeing from individual persecution, generalised human right violations, or armed conflict in their country of origin.” The 1951 Refugee Convention and the definition of refugee adapted in 1967 do not include environmental factors. Therefore, the office of the UNHCR has no mandate for the protection of environmental migrants (Zlotnik, 1994). However, in 2002, the UNHCR (2002: 12) acknowledged “the common elements between refugee definitions and environmental migrants and their forced nature of their flight, their need for assistance and permission to reside elsewhere.” However, the UNHCR has not recognised environmental migrants as refugees who are afforded protection in times of the Refugee convention.

The argument, according to the UNHCR (2002: 13) is that “refugees cannot return to their own governments for protection, because states are often the source of persecution, and they therefore needed international assistance, whereas environmental migrants continued to enjoy national protection whatever the state of the landscape.” Though an environmental change/factor is not recognised as a persecutor, researchers assert that the refugee definition does fit recognition of environmentally-induced migrants (Williams, 2008). For instance, the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration (IASFM, 2007) describes forced migration as a general term which refers to the movements of refugees and internally displaced people, (those displaced by conflicts) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine or development projects. The Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF, 2009) argues that the people who are forced to move due to climate change currently have no adequate recognition in international law.

Environmental migration is a global problem; however, the impacts and damage are the most severe in developing countries (Harris, 1995; IPCC, 2001; Myers, 2005). Odipo (1999: 559) underlined that “the burgeoning of migrants from developing countries are resulting from the current global environmental chaos that are triggered by elements such as eco-stress, insecurity and poverty.” In a similar tone, Harris (1995: 119) also noted that “these impacts that are

immensely affecting the developing world are pushing migrants to flee from their countries of origin; nonetheless, they are treated as economic migrants, and called by hosting countries as asylum seeker migrants.”

The UNHCR is one of the main agencies of the UN that was established to take responsibility and also into look the vulnerabilities of migrants displaced both internally and internationally. However, the 1961 definition adopted by the UNHCR does not recognise migrants who are displaced due to environmental factors (Martin, 2004). The then definition that was adopted by the UNHCR defines refugees as:

*“Person[s] owing to well fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR, 1951:14).*

In reaction to this definition of 1951, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) revised the definition of a refugee. The definition according to the OAU is that (1969: 2):

*“A refugee is a person who is owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in their part of or the whole country, is compelled to seek refuge outside his or her country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his or her place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge elsewhere.”*

After 16 years, the UNHCR also reached an agreement that revised the definition that treats all refugees equally. This agreement is known as ‘The 1967 protocol.’ As stated by the definition, the fear of migrants’ persecution, however, must be in line with the Convention Grounds of the 1967 protocol which include only “being a member of a particular race, religion, nationality and political opinion” (UNHCR, 2002e: 6). The impact of environmental change was not seen as an issue that threatened human mobility, hence, neither the protocol that was reached in 1967, nor the 1969 OAU definition of a refugee included it as fear of persecution. Therefore, these

international refugee frameworks and conventions and national immigration laws of countries don't address climate change-related cross-border migration and internal displacement.

The threat of climate change and its influence on humanity's future, livelihood and mobility is becoming a most contentious issue. In the light of these limitations, stakeholders, including researchers, organisations and human rights activists have been calling for the UNHCR and countries to institute legal reforms, ranging from the revision of the 1951 Refugee Convention 889 to the creation of a multi-disciplinary legal instrument to address all aspects of climate change-related displacement (Human Rights Watch, 1998).

## **2.5 Impacts of environmental change on global migration**


The planet's ecosystem is complexly intertwined and the high-level impacts of climate change, whether in the form of air or water temperature, sea level or erosion patterns. Human livelihood is sensitive to disruption by natural and human-induced disasters (Myers, 1995). Natural disasters have the longest history in promoting human displacement. For instance, forest fires, hurricanes, floods, environmental change, permanent drought, volcanic eruptions and earthquakes have caused human displacement either on a temporary or a permanent basis (Brooks, 2006). Furthermore, the impact of climate changes on the different natural environmental variables has unquestionably jeopardised three fundamental human rights such as the right to life, the right to health and the right to subsistence (Simon, 2010).

The impacts of climate change on natural and human environments have a chain effect. The inter-related chains, according to the UNDP (2005) are climate process, climate characteristics and climate threats/events. According to Brown (2004: 99), "a nomadic way life and agricultural activities [was] adopted 10,000 years ago, and since then human beings have been made vulnerable to another kind of environmental dislocation, that caused by land degradation which is caused by drought, erosion and soil depletion." Some environmentalists also believe that modern agricultural methods, which depend largely on a very few crop types have permanently altered ecosystems and enhanced human vulnerability to crop failure, and that this, in turn, has enhanced human migration (Brown, 2004). As a result, the IPCC (1990) suggested that the greatest single impact of climate change could be on human migration; with millions of people

displaced by severe heat-wave increases, shoreline erosion, coastal flooding and agricultural disruption.

Due to the unprecedented severe heat-wave increases, in 2003 alone, the number of deaths in France was estimated at 14, 800 people within three weeks (Haines, 2006: 41-42). Similarly, due to massive heat-waves that occurred in 2010, the number of deaths in Russia was estimated at 55,000 (Wynne, 2011: 42). The devastating Typhoon-Haiyan in the Philippines resulted in a death toll in 2013 of about 6,000 (Per, 2013: 42). In addition to the shortage of food and water sources, contamination or depletion of food and water sources can also occur concurrently with massive heat-wave events. The contamination of water and food can lead to famine, malnutrition and typhoons (IPCC, 2013).

**Figure 2.1: Climate change: processes, characteristics and threats**



Source: Rekacewicz (2005: 9)

Climate change also has varying degrees of influence upon environmental events and drivers of migration both directly and indirectly (Piguet *et al.*, 2011). It has wide-ranging effects on the environment, and on socio-economic and related sectors, including water resources, agriculture and forestry, food security, human health, terrestrial ecosystems and biodiversity and coastal zones, particularly in rural parts of the developing world (Lubkemann, 2008). Like the impacts caused by climate changes, the human-related factor, including population pressure, malnutrition, landlessness, unemployment, over-rapid urbanisation, pandemic diseases and poor government policies and governance, together with ethnic and cross-boundary conflicts, can also trigger human migration (Ashton and Burke, 2005). However, the impact of environmental change in influencing migration and migration outcomes has become higher and higher, both internally and internationally (Kirisci, 2007). During the last 50 years, for instance, the international migration stocks have grown from 2 percent in 1960 to 3.1 percent in 2010 (Piguet *et al.*, 2011: 153). This figure indicates that, because of the combined effects of human and environmental forces of migration, internal and international migration have grown exponentially. Because of the amplifying effect of climate change, the estimated figures for the potential number of internal and cross-border climate change-related migrants will grow over the coming decades (Pinto-Dobernig, 2008).

Although environmental change and environmental migration is a global problem, the impacts are the severest in developing countries. The IPCC (1990: 21) argued that “whether the impact cause are due to human or natural or due to both factors, the people most affected are typically the poorest and least powerful within developing countries, and they are less capable of waging significant conflicts to address grievances against neighbours or governments.” In this context, the African continent is very vulnerable.

## **2.6 Environmental impact in Africa**

Similar to other developing countries, environmentally-induced migration, combined with other human factors such as civil conflicts, poor governance and adverse economic conditions has forced Africans to move out of their countries (Mohamoud, 2005: 20). According to Lee (1966) the forces which influence human migrations are push (internal) and pull (external) factors. The push factors, according to Lee (1966) are characterised by unsuitable conditions for population

settlement in certain geographical areas, whereas the pull factors includes social, political and economic opportunities in other places, and have a tendency to attract people. Political instability, socio-economic inequalities and environmental challenges in Africa have contributed to the massive migration of both the highly qualified, as well as the poorly-educated populations in Africa (Mohamoud, 2005).

As a result, many people are on the move as asylum-seekers or refugees in a number of countries (Adepoju, 2008: 51). However, the resources in Africa, if well managed, are capable of providing for the continent's population, with the potential to create a more stable environment. Unfortunately, it is well documented that stolen wealth from Africa often ends up with dictators and is invested in banks abroad (Africa Focus Bulletin, 2006). However, factors that have a tremendous impact on livelihoods are human-induced factors (Van Hear, 2000). According to Van Hear (2000: 91) the impacts caused by human-induced activities or involvements are “the main disasters, yet possible to mitigate or adapt the consequences, if all stakeholders galvained positively to the matters, through regulations regarding land use, migration policies, and migrant assistance in receiving areas.” Therefore, in order to reduce the vulnerability and migration flow caused by the joint factors of political, economic, social and climate change, these issues should be addressed by all stakeholders and governments.

## **2.7 East Africa and migration**

During the last 50 years, the socio-economic, political and environmental affairs have been in constant state of change throughout African countries. Like many other parts of Africa which have experienced significant environmental changes, climate change is also expected to be felt in several East African countries (IPCC, 2007). East Africa is one of the regions in Africa where environmental challenges (drought, desertification) and political instabilities have contributed to significant population instabilities (Adepoju, 2008; Mohamoud, 2005). The Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) (2009) reported that the influence of the desertification process in some East African countries is growing. Furthermore, the recent “climate change hit-list” report by the World Bank shows that some south-east African countries are among the places in the world with the highest estimated risk of being adversely affected (de Haas, 2007).

The Sahel is a region characterised by high climate variability, including cycles of increasing and decreasing rainfall, which have been particularly severe since the 1970s and 1980s (IPCC, 2007). For some researchers, the Sahel region has served as an indicator of climate change in Africa, with the prediction of increased water stress and reduced agricultural production (IPCC, 2007). According to the case studies conducted by the European research program, EACH-FOR (Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios) on the environment-migration nexus in 23 countries, there is a positive relationship between water scarcity and desertification on the one hand, and migration on the other (Van der Geest, 2009). The EACH-FOR acknowledges that there are different forms of environmental degradation, as well as natural disasters which can influence environmental migration. Similar to the Sub-Saharan experiences, the causes for internal and international migration flows in East Africa are experienced within the context of harsh and chronic poverty, conflict, successive droughts and the HIV/AIDS pandemic, all of which impact on migration dynamics (Adepoju, 2008).

According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2010) the predominant type of migration in East Africa is forced migration that results from armed conflicts and successive drought-related events. The effects of war, combined with the severe climate changes in the region have placed an increased pressure on the land, and have a very heavy impact on the deforestation, drought and desertification process in the region, while these events and processes, in turn, have a direct impact on the livelihood of the population, especially the rural people (Temesgen, 2010). On top of this, environmental change can have a direct impact on animal and plant lives, as well as on humans dependent on those resources for their survival. In the mid-1990s, out of an estimated total of global migrants of between 80 to 120 million, the Sub-Saharan Africa region accounted for 35 to 40 million (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 4). The UNDP (2011: 37-38) estimated that 10.2 percent of the total global migration (210 million) in 2010, was from Africa.

Migration in the Horn of Africa has been substantial over the past four decades (Gould, 1995). This was influenced by several natural and human factors. Between 1978 and 1995, the flow of refugees in the region was very high (Bariagaber, 2006). For instance, the political overthrow of the Ethiopian Imperial Government in 1974, the independence struggle of Eritrea, the war



between Ethiopia and Somalia between 1977 and 1978, and the civil conflict in Sudan and Somalia in the 1980s, have all served as major catalysts of large, involuntary movements of people in the region (Bariagaber, 1997). Since the 1980s, the Horn of Africa, which consists of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan became the largest refugee-producing area in Africa (Bariagaber, 1999). Exploring the causes of the migration patterns in the Horn of Africa is complex, due to the fact that there are so many agents present at the same time. According to Bariagaber (1999: 599):

*“Untangling the cause of refugee formations in the Horn of Africa requires examination of a host of factors, including ethnic and religious conflict, irredentist and separatist-inspired violence, international war between countries in the region and intervention in domestic conflict by external powers”.*

## **2.8 The future impacts of environmental change and environmental migrants**

### ***2.8.1 The future impacts of environmental change***

According to Myers (1997) the number of environmental migrants in the future could be disrupted due to three major forces. These three major forces, according to Myers, (1993, 1997 and 2002) are a rise in the sea-level, population growth and an increase in extreme weather events. Similarly, Wheeler (2011: 42-43) predicted that the global population who are at risk from Sea Level Rise (SLR) in 2050 would be severe in countries such as India (37.2m), Bangladesh (27.0m), China (22.3m), Indonesia (20.9m), Malaysia (16m), Thailand (20m), Philippines (13.6m), Myanmar (13m), the Republic of Korea (12m), Nigeria (9.7m) Vietnam (9.5m) Japan (9.1m) United States (8.3m) Egypt (6.3m). However, the data attests to the fact that the impacts on climate change are more severe in developing countries. For instance, from 1970 to 2008, over 95 percent of deaths due to natural disasters took place in the developing world (IPCC, 2007: 14). Unlike the rich nations, which are in a better position to store food against the possibility of drought, to move people away from flooded areas, to fight the spread of disease-carrying insects and to build sea-walls to keep out the rising seas, the poor countries do not have such advantages and their populations are vulnerable due to a lack of resources, poverty, marginalisation and exclusion (IPCC, 2007). In addition to this, the differences of emission levels of Greenhouse gases among developed and developing countries are enormous. For instance, the emissions of the whole of sub-Saharan Africa are equivalent to those of New York

City's five boroughs (IPCC, 1997). Now the arguments of mitigation and adaption to climate change as a panacea are leading to confrontation between developing and developed countries (Saleemul and Hannah, 2004). For instance, adaptation of climate change in developing countries is challenging and it can be complicated, serious and costly for these nations combined with limited technological and financial resources. The World Bank (2010) report showed that the estimated cost of adapting to a 2°C increase in world temperature from 2010 to 2050 would cost US\$70bn to US\$100bn per year.

The impact of climate change in the future, according to Myers (1995) and IPCC (2007: 14) indicates that the world is expected to be hotter by an average of 1.8°C to 4°C by 2099 than the current world temperature. And as a result, the IPCC (2007) warned that large areas are becoming drier and drier, hence, the amount of land in constant drought is expected to increase from 2 percent to 10 percent by 2050. Similarly, Burke *et al.* (2006: 1113-1125) indicated that the proportion of land to be exposed to extreme drought is predicted to increase from 1 percent at present to 30 percent by the end of the 21st century.

According to Houghton's (2005) projection, rainfall patterns will also change as the hydrological cycle becomes more intense in some regions. This means that extreme weather events such as droughts, storms and floods are expected to be on the increase, and become more severe. For instance, by 2050, the South Asian Monsoon rain falling on eastern India and Bangladesh is expected to be up to 20 percent heavier (IPCC, 2007, 2001; Houghton, 2005). The change in the hydrological cycle is also expected to trigger an erratic and inadequate amount of rainfall in some regions which could lead to a decrease of 30 percent in crop reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa, central and south Asia by the middle of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (IPCC, 2007a: 102-103). In addition to this, climate change is predicted to worsen a variety of health problems that could increase more widespread malnutrition and diarrhoeal diseases, and alter the distribution of some vectors of disease transmission such as the malarial mosquito, even in high ground areas (Stern, 2006).

Many organisations, institutions and researchers have been studying the impact of environmental change on human livelihoods. For instance, Maplecroft (2010), a risk analysis firm in Asia, noted

that those countries with most climate change vulnerabilities are characterised by high levels of poverty, a dense population, exposure to climate-related events, reliance on food and drought-prone agricultural land. According to the Maplecroft (2010) forecast, developing countries in Asia and Africa are considered to carry extreme risks of environmental disaster in the future. The countries at extreme risk are Bangladesh, Zimbabwe, India, Myanmar, Madagascar, Ethiopia, Nepal, Cambodia, Mozambique, Thailand, Philippines, Malawi, Haiti, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

As consequences of the climate-related-changes, human livelihoods have become vulnerable to different disasters. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MES) (2005a; 2005b) indicated that:

- In 15 of the 24 ecosystems the places reviewed were being degraded or used unsustainably, particularly in poor resource-reliant-countries;
- Ten to twenty percent of drylands have already been degraded, and pressure on the dryland ecosystem is increasing, particularly in those service-providing sectors such as food, water and sanitation; and
- Climate change is also likely to increase water scarcity in regions that accommodate about a third of the world's population. These regions are already under water stress and droughts are becoming more frequent.

The evidence from the above analysis suggests that there are hazards such as droughts, desertification, floods and storms which will be a major source of internal and international displacement of populations, both temporary and permanent, in the future. In relation to the migration and the impacts caused by the environmental changes, the MEA (2005b) noted that those 2 billion people who are living in arid, semi-arid and sub-humid regions could be exacerbated exponentially. Similarly, Black *et al.* (2011) argued that massive displacement has occurred in the majority of the Horn of Africa countries due to productivity failures triggered by had drought and land degradation.

### ***2.8.2 Future environmental migration***

Black *et al.* (2011) introduced a framework that conceptualised linkages between environmental change and migration. This framework identified environmental drivers as one of the categories

of migration drivers, namely economic, political, demographic and social drivers. Myers, one of the most prolific writers on environmental migration, estimates that environmental migrants will be the largest group of involuntary displaced people in the future (Myers, 1995; Myers, 1997). The number of environmentally-induced migrants in very recent years has grown in dramatic ways. For instance, Myers (1995) indicated that the figure in 1995 was 25 million, which increased to 210 million in 2010. As the intensity of global warming increases, the number of environmental migrants is expected to be as many as 200 million by 2050 (Myers, 1997: 167-182).

Although the number of estimated environmental migrants in the future differs among researchers and organisations, the prediction given by Myers in 1995 was acceptable; hence it is cited in different publications. However, some researchers have criticised the figures predicted by Myers. For instance, Gemenne (2009: 159) argued that “the figures predicted by Myers are usually based on the number of people living in regions at risk, and not on the number of people actually expected to migrate.” Furthermore, Gemenne (2009: 159) contended that “Myers’s estimations don not account for adaptation strategies or different levels of vulnerabilities”.

On the bases of the future rates of population growth, the number of people living, either in water scarce or water stressed conditions in 2005 totalled 784 million and by 2025 the estimated number ranges between 2.9 billion and 3.3 billion (Population Action International, 2000: 2-4). One of the impacts of rapid population growth in the future is a contribution to ecosystem degradation and high competition in resource scarcities, which are key factors in facilitating climate-induced migration (Myers, 2005).

Like all developing countries, the catastrophes and threats from environmental, political and economic factors are becoming real in Africa. As a consequence of these combined effects, other challenges, such as, international migration, threats of human security, HIV risks, environmental pressure on rural and urban areas and emigration of large numbers of highly-skilled workers, as well as trafficking in persons are becoming amongst the most concerning issues to all stakeholders and governments in this region (UNDP, 2010). Despite the aforementioned challenges, migration can encompass numerous benefits to countries of this region (UNDP,

2010). These benefits are mainly related to the positive impacts of internal and international remittances, poverty reduction, access to health care and education, skill transfer, know-how, as well as cultural exchanges (UNDP, 2010).

## **2.9 Migration in Ethiopia**

According to the World Bank (2013) Ethiopia is the second most populous landlocked country in Africa. The total population of Ethiopia is estimated to be 91,728, 849 and it is the 14<sup>th</sup> most populous country in the world (World Bank, 2013: 6-7). Ethiopia is also one of the poorest countries in the world, and, in 2005, it had an emigration rate of 0.6 percent (Adepoju, 2008: 50-51).

The impacts of climate change have the potential to disrupt and potentially reverse the progress made in improving the socio-economic wellbeing of East African countries in areas such as infrastructural development, sustainable agriculture and tourism development (Magadza, 2000). As the effects of climate change are becoming a reality, some challenges like hunger, famine, poverty, political unrest and migration are becoming more frequent and more intense in east African countries (Zhou *et al.*, 2004).

Climate in the region is changing, although trends of changes are not clear to researchers. The report released by the IPCC (2007) also reveals that the trends of rainfall in the region are less clear. According to meteorological data, the mean annual temperature has increased between 1960-2006 by 1.0°C in Kenya, and 1.3°C in Ethiopia (UNDP, 2011: 1230-1232). Recent research also suggests that the amount of rainfall from 1980 to 2009 decreased, especially during the rainy seasons (Williams and Funk, 2011). For instance, the analysis of rainfall in pastoral and agricultural areas in Ethiopia and Kenya reveals that rainfall in recent years was below average in all analysed areas, more significantly, the 2010/11 raining season was recorded as the driest or second driest year since 1950/51 in 11 of the 15 analysed pastoral and agricultural zones (Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET, 2011). Climate conditions in the Horn of Africa are also showing an increase in the rate of drought (OXFAM, 2008). For instance, reports from Borana communities in Ethiopia suggested that drought experiences were recorded every six to eight years in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and drought-related shock also occurred every one to two years

(CARE and International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2009). According to the Met Office report (2011), many of the worst affected areas in the region are among the poorest, least developed and most neglected and marginalised people.

Like most East African countries, Ethiopia is also characterised by extreme poverty, a high population growth rate, as well as severe environmental degradation (Getachew, 1995; Ezra 1997; Workneh, 2008). As consequences of these problems, the country faces complex challenges of food insecurity, overpopulation, drought, political instability and ethnic conflicts which influence human mobility (AU 2006; Adepoju; 2008). For the last three decades, migration in Ethiopia has been one of the highest population displacements in Africa (AU, 2006). This is because of the successive drought and famine, political turmoil, economic crisis and security issues.

### ***2.9.1 Human-induced displacement in Ethiopia***

According to Dessalegne (2004), there are three categories of internal displacement in Ethiopia. These are conflict-induced, development-induced and environmental-induced displacements. Conflict induced-displacement in Ethiopia has been forcing large numbers of people out of the country within a short period of time. The second category that occurs rarely is development-induced displacement caused mainly by road and dam construction (Dessalegne, 2004). Furthermore, Dessalegne (2004) contended that environmental-induced displacement threatens a huge part of Ethiopia and is caused mainly by drought and famine-related crises. Generally, the environmentally-induced displacement is characterised as stress migration or temporary displacement. However, in some cases, during times of extreme food deprivation, people also migrate to neighbouring countries to seek assistance (Hammond, 2000, cited in Dessalegne 2004). For decades, drought and famine-induced migrations have been chronic problems in Ethiopia (Dessalegne 2004). Similarly, Bilsborrow (1992) underscored that drought and desertification threaten sources of income and food security, hence many rural agricultural families are forced to migrate. Similarly, Ezra and Kiros (2001) asserted that migration flows in the drought-prone regions of Ethiopia during the period 1984-1994 were very high. They contended that the drought-prone region in Ethiopia enhances vulnerability to food shortages and this, in turn, leads to mass out-migration flows.

### ***2.9.2 Environmentally-induced displacements in Ethiopia***

Migration, as a response to drought and environmental degradation in Ethiopia, is common. For instance, recent reports suggest that lack of access to sufficient farmlands and severe environmental degradation are major factors which force people to abandon their places and encourage people to migrate from Ethiopia (Mberu, 2006). According to Lopez, (2013) the impacts of climate variability and change are also taking their toll on economic development and socio-ecological resilience. For instance, between 1997 and 2007, Ethiopia lost an average \$1.1 billion to drought every year, for instance, farmers and livestock herders have witnessed a 25 percent decrease in rainfall over the past 30 years (Lopez, 2013). Researchers and scientists in eastern African countries noted that the current drought-related migration are caused by diminishing and a lack of rainfall. However, the causes of the disasters are also due to human negligence.

Due to the continuous political instabilities and the successive drought-related famines in the 1970s and 1980s, mass flows of Ethiopians to the United States, Europe, the Middle East and other parts of Africa have intensified (Ezra, 1997). Ethiopia is thus one of the countries with the largest number of diasporas (Giorgis, 2011). The famine of 1970-1974 and 1983-1984 were the most severe and left over 1 million people dead. Many Ethiopians were significantly affected and are still living with the consequences (Ezra and Kiros, 2001).


According to Giorgis, (2011: 22) there were 137,012 Ethiopia immigrants living in the United States, with an additional 30,000 United States born citizens of Ethiopian ancestry. According to Aaron (2007), if the descendants of Ethiopian-born migrants (the second generation and beyond) are included, population estimates, 460,000 in the United States. In addition to this, a large number of Ethiopian communities are found in Israel (130,000, where they make up almost 2 percent of the population); in Saudi Arabia (90,000); Italy (30,000); Lebanon (30,000); United Kingdom (20,000) and large numbers in Canada, Sweden and Australia (Aaron, 2007: 16).

### **2.10 Future prospects of environmental displacement in Ethiopia**

Since the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there has been a dramatic increase in temperature and change of rainfall patterns in east Africa. As a consequence of these, the future effects of climate change and the

impacts on east African countries, including Ethiopia, are highly anticipated (Myers, 2002; IPCC, 2001; Thornton, 2011). Furthermore, Thornton (2011) projected that temperature will increase by more than 4°C by 2090 in east African countries. The changes in temperature and precipitation in the region could reduce the length of the growing period of crops by up to 20 percent by 2090. Maize and bean production could decline by almost 20 and 50 percent, respectively. These will have significant impacts on the reduction of food production across the major food producers, smallholder farmers and pastoralists (Ole-Neselle, 2009). This, in turn, may influence mass migration (Ezra, 2001).

**Figure 2: Prediction and factors for future movement in developing countries**



Source: Raleigh (2011: 91)

According to Raleigh (2009: 91) “the effects of conflicts, poverty and environmental disasters on human displacement are very huge, and the impact becomes the severest when three of factors existed together.” These impacts, according to Raleigh (2011) are:

***A. Conflict Zone:***

“Developing Countries in Conflict (Zimbabwe, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria). In such countries, development is secondary to security and the accessibilities of public goods are



difficult in areas experienced by conflict. Thus, individual migration takes options based on assets and conflict impacts.” (Raleigh, 2011: 91)

***B. Countries with environmental disasters and conflicts:*** (Russia and Iran). These display a typically low level of mortality due to disasters, but conflicts detract from government's ability to provide for its citizens. Furthermore, such states are effective at limiting opposition, citizens experience a high level of state repression and some migrate in response to environmental disasters (Raleigh, 2011).

***C. Poor countries with high risk of environmental disasters:*** (Bangladesh and Haiti). The combined effects of poverty and environmental instability lead to widespread poverty. According to Raleigh (2011: 91), “migrations in such countries are repeated, circular and temporary.” However, there are extensive coping mechanisms developed by populations who rely on social networks and assets before migration (Raleigh, 2011). The rates of returned migrants are high in this case (Raleigh, 2011).

***D. Interactive relationships between poverty, high conflict and high vulnerability to environmental disasters:*** (Ethiopia, DRC-Congo, Kenya, Chad and Sudan). Poverty becomes entrenched at both national and local levels, which leads to a high risk of repeated conflicts and environmental-induced migration (Raleigh, 2011). Areas which are affected by the three factors are likely to be devastated by political and environmental disasters (Raleigh, 2011). These mixed interactive relationships also enhance widespread poverty, both for the governments and individuals (Raleigh, 2011). Hence, the cycle of poverty, conflict and massive migration becomes an endemic problem, for instance, Pakistan 2010 and the Democratic Republic of Congo 1994–2009 (Raleigh, 2011).

## **2.11 Conflict and environmental change and the impact on migration**

The relationship between climate change and human-induced factors in creating displacement is strong. Like most east African countries, Ethiopia has also been affected by multifactor problems such as social, economic, political and environmental degradation (Myers, 1999). Effects of environmental, economic and political factors are connected to each other, so that one factor may

cause the other or one factor drives the other in a vicious cycle, thereby, triggering the migration process (Baechler, 1999). According to Homer-Dixon (1999) and Goldstone (2001), there is evidence that conflict is most likely to happen in areas where various dimensions of poverty occurs. In addition to this, Homer-Dixon (1994) argued that environmental change can contribute to conflict development through indirect mechanisms. Similarly, Baechler (1999) underscored that environmental change can be a contributory factor that is mediated by a host of social, cultural and economic variables. Furthermore, Homer-Dixon (1999) identified that increased conflict is frequently presented as an indirect consequence of climate change. And in his research on “the relationship between human and natural disasters and the impact on migration”, Homer-Dixon (1994) suggested that migration be considered as an intermediate stage that links environmental degradation and disasters to conflict.

The causes of environmental degradation are also closely linked to other factors such as social and economic exclusion, poverty and the inequitable distribution of resources, land issues, demographic developments, institutional constraints, inter-group tensions and conflict in countries of origin as well as several factors in countries of destination (Pieguet, *et al.*, 2011). In addition to these, different researchers also point out that climate events like drought and desertification could trigger a vicious circle of degradation, conflicts and migrations over territory and borders that threatens social and economic unrest in the future (Funk *et al.*, 2005), political instabilities, (Alexander, 2002a; 200b) and environmental degradations (IPCC, 2007a) in countries and regions, especially in the developing and sea-level or island countries (Funk *et al.*, 2005). For instance, most recent armed conflicts occurred within and between developing countries (Gleditsch *et al.*, 2002); and 90 percent of population growth is expected to occur in developing countries (United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 2011: 132-139), and climate change is expected to have the most detrimental impacts in developing countries where population growth is high (Department for International Development (DfID), 2000). The implication of the cumulative effects of these factors in the future is likely to trigger human migration within and between areas of the developing countries in exponential numbers (IPCC, 2001; 2007a).

If human and natural forces exert their impacts, human livelihood and progress is susceptible to disruption. Due to natural and human factors, mass migration may occur, and that could be a burden for the receiving areas. For instance, Reuveny (2007: 657-659) contended that “mass relocations in response to degradation, and conflicts may occur and this incident may lead to conflicts or violence in receiving areas in response to competition of resources.” The violence could be developed through different contests. According to Reuveny, (2007: 657-659) the contests that may erupt between environmental migrants and receiving areas could be “ethnic tension, fault line, auxiliary condition.” Successive civil wars, secessionist conflicts, tribal and clan warfare, famine, land scarcity and evictions, human trafficking and migrant smuggling and poverty have been the causes of both internal and international displacements in the Horn of Africa countries (Bariagaber, 2006). As result of the above, like all the countries in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia has also been, and continues to be, one of the hotspots of major human displacement in the world.

Human trafficking and migrant smuggling are also on the rise in Eastern Africa (US Department of State, 2010). According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2009), limited allocation of resources to the criminal justice systems, weak governance, socio-economic and political instabilities, the lack of transparency and accountability, successive droughts that led to chronic poverty and inequality and the geographical location of the region contribute to migrant smuggling to be a thriving business in East Africa. Like many East African countries, the government of Ethiopia does not fully comply with the minimum standards of controlling trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so (US Department of State, 2010).

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees in South Africa (UNHCR) reported that between January and October 2011 alone, almost 52,000 Ethiopians migrants made their way mainly to Yemen and South Africa (UNHCR, 2011). South Africa is also one of the important destinations for migrants and refugees from East Africa. Since the Refugee Act of 1998 was approved in 2000, the number of migrants from east Africa, mainly from Somalia and Ethiopia, to South Africa, has continued to grow (UNHCR South African, 2010). For instance, South Africa received 45,673 new applications for refugee status in 2007, of which 14 percent were from Somalia and Ethiopia (UNHCR SA, 2007: 112). Furthermore, the UNHCR-SA (2007)

indicated that the number of Ethiopian migrants in South Africa is growing. For instance, in 2001, Ethiopian new migrant arrivals accounted for 5 percent of arrivals, and in 2006, the number increased to 7.3 percent. However, Amisi and Ballard (2005) stated that refugees in South Africa face many problems: with little livelihood opportunities, inability to access services such as health and education, poor provision of documentation from the Department of Home Affairs and xenophobia experienced daily in institutional and public settings.

## **2.12 Migrants in South Africa**

After the end of apartheid, the new government of South Africa joined the United Nations (UN) and Organisation for Africa Union (OAU). It also agreed to abide by the OAU and the UN Refugee Conventions signed in 1995 and 1996, respectively (McKnight, 2008). In 1993, an agreement was also signed between the government of South Africa and the UNHCR which allows migrants to enter South Africa (McKnight, 2008). The new constitution adopted in 1996 and the international treaties signed by the new government were viewed as a guarantee to protect all migrants equally in South Africa (McKnight, 2008). For instance, those who are granted status have the right to apply for permanent residence after living in the country for five years. They also have a right to apply for a South African refugee ID and travel documents. The permit also allow them to seek employment and have access to basic services such as health and education like all South African citizens (Minnaar, 2000; Haigh and Solomon, 2008; McKnight, 2008). In addition to this, the Bill of Rights of the 1996 Constitution embraces the rights of all people in South Africa and affords them the democratic rights of human dignity, equality and freedom.

Democratic South Africa attracted migrants from Eastern Europe, the Far East, Africa and other poor regions of the European Union in large numbers (Cross and Omoluabi, 2006). In 2010, thousands of migrants mainly from Africa flocked into the country, more so than in any other country in the world (UNHCR, 2011). The majority of African migrants in South Africa come from countries such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Malawi (Khan, 2007). Although some individuals have returned to their countries of origin, a large proportion of individuals prefer to remain in South Africa as a result of the protracted conflicts that have forced them to leave their countries of origin (Khan, 2007).

**Table 2.1: Immigrants in South Africa by country of origin**

Immigrants in SA		Jan 2011		Dec 2011	
Population	Origin	Total in country	Number Assisted by UNHCR	Total in country	Number assisted by UNHCR
Refugee	Somalia	21300	4300	22,700	4,500
	DRC	11,200	2200	12,000	24,00
	Ethiopia	5000	1000	65,00	1,300
	Various	15600	3100	16,900	3,400
Asylum Seekers	Zimbabwe	261,500	45,300	266,500	46,200
	Malawi	33,100	4900	40,100	5000
	Ethiopia	22600	4300	27,600	4,400
	Various	100,500	18600	102,500	18,600
	Total	470,800	83,700	494800	85,800

Source: UNHCR Global Appeal (2011: 112)

South Africa received more than 207 000 individual asylum applications in 2008 and in 2009 the number increased to 222, 300 which indicates a four-fold rise from the number of applicants in 2007 (UNHCR South Africa, 2011). In 2011, the trend of African migrants to South Africa continued, and the number of applicants who were in the asylum system and awaiting a decision reached more than 300, 000 (UNHCR South Africa, 2011). Although some of these asylum-seekers came from China, India, Pakistan and other Asian countries, most of the asylum applicants in South Africa were from Burundi, Ethiopia, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Zimbabwe (UNHCR, South Africa, 2011).

Although South Africa embodies challenges such as unemployment, rampant poverty, inequality, crime and the HIV/AIDS pandemic, it is considered to be a land of hope and economic opportunity. It therefore, continues to attract many migrants from Africa and other parts of the world (Adepoju, 2003; Maharaj, 2004). However, these continuous flows of migrants have been perceived as a potential threat by the local populace (Cross and Omuluabi, 2006). For instance, competition over business opportunities, housing, public services and jobs created conflict between locals and migrants which resulted in violent xenophobic attacks (UNHCR, 2011).

Crush and MacDonald (2000) contended that recent human rights' violations in South Africa are among the prominent examples which signify a dangerous struggle over migrants' claim to land and that citizenship, violence, victimisation and xenophobia reveal the extent of the disregard of migrants' right. Indeed, South Africans perceive foreigners as an economic threat, and as people who have come to take their employment opportunities (Crush, 2008). African migrants also experience verbal, and sometimes physical, abuse in South Africa (Crush and McDonald, 2002).

### **2.13. Conclusion**

The above literature review communicates that the impact of global climate change is real and is being exposed in almost all sectors of the globe. However, due to a lack of resources and managerial skills which could help to mitigate and adapt the effects of climate change, disasters occurred most severely in the poor communities of the developing world. As a consequence, successive drought, considerable reduction of arable lands, shortage of water in some regions, reduction of food and fish stocks, increased flooding and mass migrations are becoming real in many parts of the world (IPCC, 2007b).

Currently, environmentally-induced migration is real in developing countries. Researchers attest that global environmental change will be the main factor resulting in human displacement in the future. Like all developing countries, the livelihoods of more communities in the region of East African countries are disrupted. So far, dramatic droughts, the desertification process and dramatic precipitation changes are occurring, that could cause huge social, economical, political and environmental catastrophes in the future (Myers and Kent, 1995). However, studies concerning Ethiopian environmental migrants and the challenges to their livelihood have not adequately investigated.

As the number of migrants increase, competition for socio-economic resources and other services also increases, resulting in considerable rivalry. As a consequence of this, hatred, hostility, resentment and abuse may develop towards foreign migrants on the part of the hosting locals (Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), 2008). The UN and refugee recipient countries do not accept and recognise climate change as a relevant factor or persecutor to

migrants. Therefore, countries which are extremely vulnerable to climate change, organisations and researchers are calling for international law to fully recognise environmentally-induced migrants.

## **CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY**

### **3.1 Introduction**

This study focuses on the displacement and adjustment of Ethiopian environmental migrants residing in Durban. This section presents the research questions, aims and objectives of the study. The chapter also includes the background of the study area and the issues of migration in Durban. It discusses research methodology utilised in this study, including the importance of the case study, the data collection approaches, the sampling techniques and the data analysis method applied in this study. In addition, the chapter illustrates the challenges encountered and the negotiation of access in the field and the ethical considerations. In order to protect the identity of the respondents pseudonyms have been used. Table 4.3 represents the pseudonyms of respondents and also the real names of participants from refugee agencies.

### **3.2 Aim**

The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of environmental factors in displacing migrants from Ethiopia and to assess their adjustment in Durban, South Africa.

#### **3.2.1 The objectives of the study are to:**

- Explore the perceptions of migrants about the role of environmental factors in their displacement from Ethiopia;
- Understand the trek of migrants from Ethiopia to South Africa;
- Examine how migrants adjust and adapt to the socio-economic challenges in Durban; and
- Assess the nature of assistance provided by government and non-governmental agencies to environmental refugees.

### **3.3 Questions to be asked**

The study focuses on the displacement and adjustment of Ethiopian environmental migrants in the city of Durban and it focuses on the following key questions:

- What are the perceptions of Ethiopian migrants about the impact of environmental changes in their country?
- To what extent have environmental factors influenced migrants to move from Ethiopia?
- How have migrants trekked/travelled from Ethiopia to South Africa?



- How do Ethiopian migrants adjust and adapt to the socio-economic challenges they encounter in Durban?
- What are the roles and responsibilities of the governmental and non-governmental refugee agencies in protecting the rights of the environmental migrants in Durban?

### **3.4 Background of the study area**

Durban is the largest city in the province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). It is also the second most important manufacturing hub in South Africa after Johannesburg. The city of Durban is located in the province of KZN, which is often referred to as the “garden province” of South Africa (SA 2010, 2008). The province stretches from Port Edward in the south to Mozambique ON the north-eastern coastline. The province boasts the magnificent Drakensberg mountain range in the west and an extensive savanna in the east (SA 2010, 2008). KZN’s population of 9.9 million people occupy approximately 92 100km<sup>2</sup> of land (SA 2010, 2008: 36). The majority of the people in KZN speak isiZulu, followed by English and Afrikaans (SA 2010, 2008). Durban and Pietermaritzburg are the biggest cities in the region (SA 2010, 2008).

The longitudinal location of Durban is 29<sup>0</sup> 53’S and latitudinally it is 31<sup>0</sup> 03’ E. Durban is the busiest port and is the third biggest metropolitan city in South Africa (Mukherji, 2011). According to the South Africa Community Survey (2007), the total area of the city is 2292km<sup>2</sup> (884.9sqml) and the total population of the Durban metropolitan region is about 3.5 million. Although Pietermaritzburg is the capital of KZN, the city of Durban is regarded as one of the fastest-growing urban areas in the world. The infrastructural developments in the city, such as famous beaches, nature reserves, holiday resorts, sporting and shipping facilities and the humid subtropical climate with hot, rainy summers. Durban’s short warm winters which are free from frost, make it a popular tourist destination and the busiest container port in African (South Africa’s Transport Network, 2011).

The economy of Durban comprises various sectors such as the tourism, transportation, finance, manufacturing and government sectors. Demographically, Durban is diverse, with a cultural richness of mixed beliefs and traditions from Africa, Europe and Asia. Durban has a warm marine current, a humid subtropical climate and world-class tourism facilities. The Durban

Metropolitan Region is one of the main economic drivers in KwaZulu-Natal and in the country's output, and its economic output accounts for more than 50 percent and 15 percent, respectively (Mukherji, 2011).

### **3.4.1 Durban and migrants**

There is a multiplicity of reasons why South Africa is highly attractive to migrants. These reasons include economic and infrastructural development and democratic policies that are inclusive of migrants' rights (Athiemoolam, 2003; Schaffer, 2008). According to Maharaj and Moodley (2000), a large percentage of migrants choose Durban because job and business prospects are seen as being better in Durban than elsewhere in the country. Furthermore, Maharaj and Moodley (2000: 149-160) noted that 44 percent of traders move to Durban instead of other South African cities because of job potential and business opportunities are known to be better and more prolific in Durban. As Gebre *et al.* (2011) noted, Durban is the most favoured destination of migrants due to its perceived economic opportunities and relatively less violent communities in comparison with other cities in South Africa.

However, migrants in Durban are victims of threats and crime (South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) (2006). The International Refugee Service (IRS) accused the eThekweni Municipality authorities of refusing to build a hostel for the migrants (Maharaj, 2009). Some of the service-providing bodies in the city have also been criticised for playing a role in facilitating crime. For instance, a lack of accessibility to banking services forces migrants to carry money on their selves or keeping cash in their residences (Amisi and Ballard, 2006; HSRC, 2008). This leads them soft targets for crimes of theft. Migrants are also targets of police raids in Durban, and are subjected to drugs and illegal weapon-checking searches (Gema, 2001). Migrants accuse the police for stealing their money and other valuable items during such operations (Gema, 2001). In addition to that, recent research in Durban reveals that female street traders are vulnerable to verbal and sexual abuse (Lee, 2004).

Similarly, continuous patrolling and raiding of migrants' businesses and residences, arrests and harassment by police are common in the city (Mittulah, 2003). Most of migrants who own informal businesses are susceptible to being raided by the police, which can include confiscation

of goods, demand for bribes or a protection fee. As a result of these, migrant traders who operate informal businesses in the city are known to the police as “mobile ATMs” (automated teller machines) (Landau, 2007; Jacobsen, 2004).

Governmental agencies, such as the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) have also been accused of issuing incomplete or erroneous IDs (Motha and Ramadiro, 2002). There are also corrupt officials within the DHA who demand bribes from migrants (Amisi and Ballard, 2006). However, in contrast to the other Home Affairs Reception Offices in South Africa, the DHA in Durban is perceived to be less bureaucratic, especially when compared to other DHA offices (Gebre *et al.*, 2011). Generally, migrants perceive Durban to be a more peaceful and less crime-ridden South Africa (Maharaj and Moodley, 2000; Hunter and Skinner, 2002). As a part-time worker at the Department of Home Affairs Office in Durban, the researcher observed that the number of new arrivals of Ethiopian migrants in the Home Affairs reception office in Durban is the highest compared to other nationals in East Africa. Although this study focuses on the Ethiopian environmental migrants in the city of Durban, it is difficult to estimate the total number of Ethiopian migrants in South Africa and Durban. However, according to the information obtained from the Ethiopian community in Durban, it is estimated that there are about 3000 Ethiopian migrants in Durban.

### ***3.4.2 Xenophobia in Durban***

The xenophobic attacks that erupted in May 2008 in South Africa claimed a total of 62 lives, including those of 21 South Africans. In addition to this, 670 people were wounded, dozens of women were raped, about 100,000 people displaced and millions of rands from foreign-owned businesses were lost through looting (Misago, Landau and Monson, 2009: 7-12). The attacks first started in Alexander Township in Gauteng Province and later spread throughout the country, affecting foreigners, including refugees and migrant women, men and children (Amisi *et al.*, 2010).

Like most foreign migrants who are accused by some local South Africa, foreign migrants in Durban are also accused of being responsible for socio-economic problems in the city such as exacerbating crime and diseases, taking jobs from the locals and overcrowding (Maharaj, 2009; Amisi *et al.*,

2010). For instance, the victims of xenophobic attacks in Chatsworth were mainly those who were living in the Bottlebrush and Unity Avenue informal settlements. These were mostly nationals from Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania Zimbabwe and Pakistani immigrants (Amisi *et al.*, 2010).

The May 2008 xenophobic attack in Durban was unique, because the attacks were supported by some local councillors and police officers (Amisi *et al.*, 2010). For instance, former Councillor Vusi Khoza from eThekweni Municipality is alleged to have led a group of attackers. He was alleged to have claimed that the permission to attack migrants in Albert Park area was granted by the eThekweni Municipality (Schwaree and Mwelase, 2008). Similarly, the government was accused of not providing assistance and for leaving the issue to civil society to fill the void and respond to the crisis (Amisi and Matate, 2009).

#### ***3.4 .3 Organizations and agencies for refugees in Durban***

The researcher has served as a part-time interpreter for Ethiopians and Eritreans in the DHA at the Durban's refugee reception office. However, the DHA has been accused of rendering unprofessional services, inhumane and inhospitable treatment of migrants and outrageous corruption being perpetrated by the majority of workers and officers ((Davids *et al.*, 2005; Landau 2004b; Gebre *et al.*, 2011).

The organisations and agencies for refugees in Durban include the Refugee Social Service (RSS), Law for Human Rights (LHR), KwaZulu-Natal Refugee Council (KZNRC) and International Action Group for the Vulnerable (IAGV). Most of the refugee agencies are located at the Diakonia centre in Diakonia Street (Amisi *et al.*, 2010). The Diakonia centre was selected by the eThekweni Municipality to co-ordinate and facilitates assistances rendered to the victims of xenophobic violence by the civil society organisations (Amisi *et al.*, 2010). As a result, the KZNRC and IAGV are also located in Diakonia Street, in the surrounding of the Diakonia centre. Most of these agencies and organisations depend on UNHCR financial support and other humanitarian donors (Desai, 2010).

**Figure 3.1: Migrants' integration program with locals**





Photo taken by researcher from IAGV

The KZNRC is a voluntary and non-profit organisation founded in response to the 2008 xenophobic violence. This organisation works with refugee communities from 17 refugee-producing countries, as well as several non-profit refugee organisations (Amisi *et al.*, 2010). KZNRC has two main objectives; First, it is dedicated to promoting the basic human rights of refugees and asylum-seekers including access to health care, education, employment, identification documents and travel documents, freedom of speech and movement, and to raising awareness within the refugee community around the responsibility and obligations of refugees toward their host country. Secondl, it aims to promote self-integration of the refugees into South African communities; to support peaceful cohabitation and cultural exchanges between the refugee communities and South Africans and to fight all forms of discrimination and xenophobia (Amisi *et al.*, 2010). Other groups, institutions and organizations, including churches and mosques in Durban, also provide important support network to the refugees and asylum-seekers, especially during the times of xenophobic violence (Amisi *et al.*, 2010; Desai, 2010).

The following section of this chapter comprises of the discussion and the analysis of the research methodology used in this study.

Figure 3.2: Map of Study Area



### 3.5 Research design

#### 3.5.1 Case study

Sarantakos (2005: 10) defined the case study as an “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context when boundaries, phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.”

According to Punch, (2005), the case study approach helps to understand the case in-depth in its natural setting, by recognising its context and complexity, and also aims to preserve and

understand the wholeness and unity of the case. Gilliam (2004) stated that a case study helps in identifying a unit of human activity embedded in real world, which can only be studied and understood in context. Furthermore, Flyvbjerg (2006) stated that case study approaches have the potential to provide in-depth, high quality information which is essential for both practical and theoretical research. A case study method is also appropriate when researchers desire to cover contextual conditions and multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1993). The use of multiple sources of evidence is one of the key characteristics of the research (Yin, 1993). However, a case study has some limitations or drawbacks. Babbie and Mouton (2006: 280) referred to “its limit of generalisability.” The majority of information gathered for this study is qualitative in nature. However, a percentage of quantitative data was also obtained using questionnaires. The data was also presented in the form of tables and figures and that data was critically analysed. The study seeks the understanding of individuals’ experiences and views that stem from their own perspectives. Hence the findings obtained from this study are expected to reveal in-depth information about the topic. The study may not be generalisable to other studies conducted in the study area.

The study adopted a mainly qualitative approach. According to Strauss and Corbin, (1990: 17), a qualitative study is defined as “any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedure or other means of quantification.” In addition to this, Babbie and Mouton (2006: 270) stated that the qualitative approach is “mainly concerned with collecting descriptive data that can be used to study human action from the perspective of the social actors themselves.” Some of the purposes of qualitative research are to produce knowledge of social events and to understand what they mean to people, to explore and document how people interact with each other, and how they interpret and interact with the world around them (Ulin *et al.*, 2002). The qualitative research approach helps a researcher observe, describe and interpret situations as they are, maintaining empathic neutrality (Hoepfl, 1997). This approach focuses on the importance of listening and understanding the world from the perspectives of the participants in this research. This study was not limited to a focus on the impacts of climate change on human migration, but dealt with the broader notions of socio-economic and security issues of environmental migrants in their journeys and in the land of their destination. Therefore, this hope to show that environment change has played roles and it is also more likely to exacerbate

migration processes. Furthermore, it hopes to reveal the challenges, adaptations and adjustments of environmental migrants in their new environment.

### ***3.6 Sampling method***

The two most common sampling techniques employed in qualitative research with migrants are convenience and snowball samples (Frey *et al.*, 2000). This is because international migrants are not readily visible. According to Boxill (1997) convenience (opportunity) sampling is a type of non-probability method which involves the sample being drawn from that part of the population which is close at hand in other words, readily available and accessible. It is difficult to obtain accurate statistical data of environmental migrants. Thus, the non-probability method, especially convenience sampling, is appropriate to intentionally select the subjects based on their accessibility, convenience and proximity to the researcher (Boxill, 1997).

#### ***3.6.1 Convenience sampling***

According to Frey *et al.* (2000), convenience sampling is important in allowing the researcher to obtain basic data in relation to the study without the complications of using a random sampling method. However, the disadvantage of convenience sampling is that it may not represent the entire population. Sometimes, even if the sample group was chosen from part of the population, there is the possibility of mixed views and opinions from the study group one employed (Frey *et al.*, 2000). Hence, in a qualitative study of this nature, it is not possible to make generalisations and inferences to the whole population. As mentioned earlier, primary data was gathered from Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban and officials from refugee agencies in Durban. In this case, convenience sampling was employed to select respondents from the refugee agencies.

#### ***3.6.2 Snowball sampling***

Snowball sampling is also used by social science researchers. It is important for analysing the hidden aspects of social stigma, sensitive issues such as xenophobia or details of other populations that are socially marginalised (Goodman, 1961). Hughes and Sharrock (2007) described snowball sampling as a technique where an individual is identified and interviewed, and is then asked to identify others in his or her social network, who would, in turn, name others to be part of the study. According to Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2005: 68) snowballing sampling is “like a snowball that continues to roll and grow in size.” However, employing



snowballing sampling can generate relatively similar information (Goodman, 1961). In this case, the snowball sampling method was used to select respondents for the study.

### **3.7 Data collection method and field work**

To identify respondents displaced by environmental change was not an easy task. In order to identify them, the researcher first divided the city centre into three sections based on the Ethiopians' working area. The sections comprise the area around Albert Park, including Smith Street, Park Street, St. Andrew's Street, St George's Street and Broad Street. The second area is near The Wheel Mall currently known as China Malls which comprises West Street and Point Road. The third section is South Beach which encompasses Rutherford Street, Alice and Shepstone Roads. As a part-time interpreter for Ethiopian migrants at the Durban refugee reception office, the researcher had good contact with suitable respondents.

In-depth interviews and questionnaires were the two main data collection methods used on this project. The sample size of the population who participated in the interview sessions comprised eight respondents, including two females and six males. In this group, three respondents were from refugee agencies and five from Ethiopian environmental migrants. According to Opendakker (2006), in-depth interviews are tools characterised by communication between the interviewer and the respondent at a certain time and in a particular place. Interviews and questionnaires are some of the most effective tools in conducting qualitative research (Mason, 2002).

#### **3.7.1 Interviews**

As stated earlier, the total number of respondents who participated in the interview was eight, including three respondents from the RSS, KZNRC and IAGV and five respondents from Ethiopian environmental migrants. In order to elicit in-depth information, the interview questions were prepared in structured and semi-structural designs. These interviews enable us to explore the perspectives, feelings and perceptions of the respondents (Guion, 2006). Furthermore, White *et al.* (2005) argued that in-depth interviews are important to extract information regarding the perceptions and motivations of various individuals, government officials and relevant groups.

However, interviews have limitations. For instance, some respondents may not disclose sensitive information either due to the lack of ability to express their feelings or may be reluctant to talk about their life experiences (Marshall and Rossman, 2011). Furthermore, one's lack of fluency in the respondents' languages may also discourage them from engaging in long narratives (Marshall and Rossman, 2011).

### ***3.7.2. Questionnaires***

The second set of primary data for this study was questionnaires. The utilisation of questionnaires is important because a significant percentage of information can be collected from a number of people in a short period of time. This is relatively cost-effective (Guion, 2006). In addition to the above, the use of questionnaires are usually convenient and the researcher can arrange, analyses and handle the data with the help of a software packages (Foddy, 1993). The extraction of the intended information from respondents, open and closed-ended questions were prepared. According to Foddy (1993) open-ended questions allow the respondents to express their opinion without being influenced by the researcher. However, open-ended questions also have disadvantages in comparison to closed-ended questions.

In order to identify those environmental migrants from among the Ethiopian migrants in Durban, the researcher distributed 100 questionnaires to Ethiopian migrants in the sections using snowballing sampling. Of all the 28 Ethiopian migrants who participated, 8 females and 20 males were environmental migrants and answered all the questions. The questions were prepared in English. The researcher is fluent in Amharic (the home language of the migrants). The researcher works as a part-time interpreter for Ethiopians at the Department of Home Affairs Reception Office in Durban and was thus able to interpret for those who could not speak English.

As a part-time interpreter to Ethiopian migrants at the DHA, the researcher developed a very close relationship with all the key stakeholders and members of Ethiopian community in Durban. Consequently, a bond of trust developed between the researcher and the respondents. Primary data collection took place at the respondents' workplaces, residences and restaurants, during break, from the 10 September to 25 October 2014.

The research adopted the form of a case study on the displacement and resettlement of Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban, South Africa. In order to understand the project, relevant literature reviews including articles, books, websites and legislation such as the South African Constitution and documents from different refugee agencies that could enrich the analyses were utilised. In addition to this, several case studies relating to environmental migration and related issues were reviewed.

### ***3.8 Data analysis***

One of the most common data analysis tools in a case study is interpretive analysis. Interpretive analysis balances phenomenological description with insightful interpretation, and it anchors these interpretations in terms of the participants' accounts (Sherry, 1991; Lewins, Taylor and Gibbs, 2005). However, interpretive analysis focuses primarily on the individual experience or on how groups develop meaning, without considering the broader issues in much depth (Sherry, 1991; Lewins, Taylor and Gibbs, 2005). It is also argued that, because of its high tendency towards narrative, interpretive approaches, it can result in a loss of important aspects of data (Sherry, 1991; Lewins, Taylor and Gibbs, 2005). In order to avoid the loss of data, the analytical method in this study came out with the research question of the study.

Coding is an interpretive technique that helps to organise the data (Creswell, 2008). In addition to this, coding is a very essential tool that helps the researcher to identify the main themes from the data (Creswell, 2008). As noted by Braun and Clark, (2006: 82) “themes indicate relevance of the data in relation to the research questions and they represent meaning within the data set.” One of the main tasks in qualitative research is to identify themes (Mitchell, 2005). Coding is therefore, a method that helps us to organise and group data into categories, because they share some common themes (Grbich, 2007).

However, coding has possibilities in reducing the content and meaning of themes (Creswell, 2008). In an attempt to avoid the reduction of content, themes were designed using a theoretical or deductive approach. The data collected from interviews and questionnaires were recorded and transcribed verbatim. The SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Scientists) was utilised to capture the data collected from questionnaires. Transcribed data was manually coded to identify repeated

patterns or themes which were related to the research questionS. The themes were developed through grouping of words and phrases that appeared to have similar resonance in relation to the research question. The themes were then analysed using interpretive analysis in terms of the trends that emerged from the literature review.

### **3.9 Ethical considerations**

Ethical consideration is a very crucial issue in qualitative research because it considers confidentiality, privacy and sensitivity, especially in the case of refugees or migrants (Neuman, 1994). Migrants are vulnerable to socio-economic difficulties, harassment, sexual abuse, intimidation and discrimination. Therefore, this study had to be guided and influenced by ethical issues. Ethical clearance was obtained from the University of KwaZulu-Natal's Research Ethics Committee. The application for the ethical clearance and the proposal of the project were submitted together, and were approved by the University of KwaZulu-Natal's Ethical Committee.

Respondents in this research study comprised officials and migrants. Therefore, confidentiality and anonymity were assured to all respondents during their participation in this study. All respondents were informed about the nature and purpose of the research and respondents gave their consent to participate in the study. A copy of the consent form which included the university emblem, email addresses and a contact number of the research office and supervisor was also given to each participant before the interview. In addition to confidentiality and anonymity, the written consent also assured participants of their voluntary and unreserved right to withdraw from participation or to stop at any time or to skip any question that made them feel uncomfortable.

### **3.10 Challenges and negotiating access**

In order to complete a successful case study, access to organisations and people is crucial. The case study focused on environmental migrants. However, conducting research on environmental migrants is sensitive and challenging. Firstly, migrants who claim to be displaced by environmental change do not qualify for refugee status according to government and UNHCR's standards. The challenge encountered in the field was the very long working hours and working habits of Ethiopians, even during weekends and holidays. Out of the challenges encountered in the field was the long culture of Ethiopians who spend long hours working even during

weekends and holidays. The other challenge in the field was that some of the refugees were highly mobile. So the interviews had to be re-negotiated with refugees. Second, some of the government officials and non-governmental refugee agencies withdrew from participating in the project. The reason for their withdrawal was that environmental change is not considered a reason for displacement. In addition to this, as stakeholders of refugees, the DHA was requested to be part of this study. Unfortunately, the provincial office of the DHA, in collaboration with the Home Affairs refugee reception office in Durban, rejected the request without disclosing a reason.

### **3.11 Conclusion**

Durban is one of the three major metropolitan cities in South Africa which attracts migrants from different countries. Compared to other cities, there is less violence against foreigners in Durban. A good business environment and less bureaucratic procedures in the Department of Home Affairs office in Durban have been provided the motivation for the high number of foreigners in the city (Gebre *et al.*, 2011).

The methodology utilised to explore the topic ‘displacement and resettlement of Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban’ is also presented in this chapter. The study adopted a mainly qualitative case study approach. In order to elicit in-depth information, the interviews and questionnaires scheduled for officials and migrants were mainly semi-structured. The study conducted eight in-depth interviews, including three with respondents from refugee agencies and five with Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban. In addition to this, 28 Ethiopian environmental migrants were also engaged during the questionnaire sessions.

## CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### 4.1 Introduction

Wars, conflicts and environmental-related disasters are some of the main forces that push people to leave their homelands. Morrissey (2009) attested that the environmental events and processes have major impacts on human livelihoods which can later trigger mass migration. The aim of this study is to investigate the displacement and resettlement of Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban. This chapter is divided into sections. It discusses how environmental change has affected Ethiopians to out-migrate, and then explores what challenges migrants faced while crossing borders. The other section of this chapter relates to how environmental migrants tackle socio-economic challenges and also analyses the survival strategy in their new environment. Furthermore, it evaluates the responsibilities and if there is any assistance of refugee agencies in the resettlement and adjustment of migrants. The following section highlights and discusses the key findings and themes which have emerged from the respondents.

The data relating to these findings was gathered through interviews with refugee agencies and Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban. In addition to interviews, data were also collected through the distribution of questionnaires to Ethiopian environmental migrants residing in Durban. The next section will begin by discussing the demographic background of the respondents.

#### *4.1.1 Demographic background of respondents*

For the purpose of this study, seven demographic variables were measured. Respondents were asked to state their age, gender, marital status, highest educational level, employment status and monthly income. The number of females who participated by responding to the questionnaires comprised 8 (28.7 percent) while the number of males was 20 (71.4 percent). All Ethiopian respondents who participated in this study are also self-employed (Table 4.10). In addition to the above, the majority of Ethiopian respondents who participated in the questionnaires fall within the 21-30 age group (39.3%), followed by the 31-40 age group (25%) and the 41-50 (17.9%) age category (Table 4.1).

**Table 4.1: The demographic characteristics of the respondents (N =28)**

<b>AGE (in years)</b>	
<20	10.7%
21-30	39.3%
31-40	25.0%
41-50	17.9%
51-60	7.1%
<b>SEX</b>	
Female	28.6
Male	71.4
<b>HIGHEST EDUCATION LEVEL ATTAINED</b>	
No Formal Education	3.6%
Partial Primary	32.1%
Primary Completed	25.0%
Secondary Completed	3.6%
Certificate/Diploma	32.1%
Postgraduates	3.6%

#### ***4.1.2 Migrants' socio-economic background***

In terms of the migrants' socio-economic status in Ethiopia, 89.3 percent of the respondents were engaged in farming related activities. The respondents who engaged in trading/business activities and migrants with other professions comprised 7.1 and 3.6 percent, respectively. This indicates that almost all (89.3 percent) of the respondents were migrants from rural areas where farming activities were the main survival strategy (Table 4:2). In terms of educational levels, the majority (60.7 percent) of the respondents had some school education, partial primary and primary completed, 31.5 percent had certificates and diplomas 3.6 percent had completed secondary school, and 3.6 percent had a postgraduate degrees (Table 4.1).

**Table 4.2: Previous socio-economic status and factors affecting respondents (N=28)**

<b>PREVIOUS OCCUPATION (ETHIOPIA)</b>	
Farming-related activities	89.3%
Professionals	3.6%
Traders/running business	7.1%
<b>FACTOR/S PUSHING MIGRANTS FROM THEIR AREA</b>	
Due to the successive drought and food insecurity	61%
Due to successive drought and political unrests	39%


#### **4.2 Respondents' perceptions of climate change in Ethiopia**

Like most developing countries, many households in Ethiopia also depend on natural resources for their livelihoods. These resources include soil, water, plant and animal resources. For instance, forests are the main sources of wood and non-wood products in Ethiopia. However, the country's annual forest loss is estimated to be 141, 000 hectares (Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 2009).

According to the Ethiopian Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), (2009) more than 92 percent of energy is consumed directly from forests, animal dung and agricultural residuals. Rural households depend on forest products for survive. This study revealed that migrants were displaced from rural and semi-urban areas of the central highlands, the Eastern and south-Eastern parts of Ethiopia (Figure 4.3).



**Figure 4.1: Political map of Ethiopia**



Source: <http://www. Mapsofworld.com> (Retr.15 Oct.2014) Moyale.

In order to assess the degree of forest degradation, respondents were asked about their source of energy before they migrated to South Africa. Of all the respondents, 67.9 percent used mixed sources of energy, including biomass and electricity. However, 32.1 percent of them used only biomass as a source of energy, including paraffin.

**Table 4.3: Demographic information about the respondents who participated in the interview**

No	Name	Ag	Sex	Education level	Years in D	Occupation
1	Jilly	27	F	Postgraduate	1	RSS
2	Mukambali	54	M	Degree	10	KZNRC
3	Ahmed	48	M	Degree	8	IGAV
4	Khassa	32	M	Postgraduate	9 months	Self-employed
5	Memo	41	M	Junior (G-7)	2010	Self-employed
6	Tsige	35	F	Junior (G-8)	2009	Self-employed
7	Dejen	45	M	Element. comp.	2009	Self-employed
8	Mesfin	48	M	Elementary comp.	2008	Self-employed

Khassa, a 32-year-old is a graduate in environmental management. He worked as a meteorologist and in agricultural sectors in several parts of Ethiopia. He explained how rural communities used forest and forest products as a source of energy in Ethiopia:

*Rate of deforestation in Ethiopia is very huge. As a strategy to reduce forest losses, the government of Ethiopia has divided forests under private, communal and public ownerships. Unfortunately, rural households collect their fuelwoods and other cultural and economic necessities from all parts of these forests ownerships. Nearly all of the rural population depends on these forests regardless who owns them. Illegal cutting of trees for domestic logging and wood trading, agricultural activities and fuel-wood are common. The federal and regional governments don't take punitive measures against those who violate these illegal cuts (Khassa, 15 Sep 2014).*

Previous studies indicate that different types of biomass and fuel-wood energies account for 78 percent of the total sources of energy (Woody Biomass Inventory and Strategic Planning Project (WBISPP, 2005). Animal dung and agricultural residue also represent 12 percent and 9 percent respectively (WBISPP, 2005: 18-29).

*The population number and the number of animals in Ethiopia are increasing. So, we cut trees for many reasons, such as for agricultural purposes, for building houses, for cooking food and for light in our houses. In addition to these, we also cut trees to feed our animals especially during drought and winter seasons. The government also clears very huge forest cover areas for plantation purposes (Mesfin, 4 Oct 2014).*

Similarly, FAO (2010: 22) indicated that the total consumption of biomass energy in Ethiopia is estimated at about 1000 million tons per year. Although the forests are a source of food and energy for rural and urban societies in Ethiopia, the country's annual forest loss is estimated at 141, 000 hectares in a year (Aklilu, 2005: 23-47).

*People depend on forests for different purposes. Rural households in Ethiopia, for instance, use forests as a source of energy, for cooking and for other energy*

*requirements like heating and lighting. However, the availability of wood and other materials that are obtained from trees is not the same. In order to build your houses, you need to go very far. Sometimes, we steal from the reserved forests because our forests are diminished (Memo, 21 Sep 2014).*

It is argued that forest cover in Ethiopia is decreasing dramatically. For instance, in the 1950's the total forest cover in Ethiopia was 16 percent and the current forest cover decreased to 2.5 percent (Bishaw, 2003: 16-17).

*More than 85 percent of the Ethiopian population lives in rural areas. Even the big towns have shortages of electricity. So, this high rural population and growing demand for fuelwood are the main causes of forest degradation in Ethiopia. In addition to the population pressure, Ethiopian farmers have fragmented farming lands. So, the amount of land to be cleared will be high. Due to the fuelwood demand and primitive farming systems, land degradation and loss of bio-diversity in Ethiopia is high (Khassa, 15 Sep 2014).*

Successive deforestation of trees can lead to the degradation of the environment and substantial reduction of biodiversity (Aklilu, 2005). Furthermore, it is argued that, due to deforestation, the prices of the biomass products in Ethiopia are escalating, particularly in urban areas (FAO, 2009).

#### ***4.2.1 Impact of environmental degradation on migration***

It is argued that environmental degradation, recurrent drought and chronic food insecurity are among the major causes of migration in Ethiopia (Degefa, 2005). For instance, famine and insufficient food in Ethiopia is a long-term phenomenon caused by a combination of both natural and human-generated factors, such as a lack of alternative sources of energy and agriculture, inadequate rainfall pattern and land degradation (Macrae and Zwi 1994; Wisner *et al.*, 2004).

Memo, one of the migrant respondents, claimed that the shortage of food due to the successive drought and later his political affiliation with the Coalition for Unity and Democratic Party (CUD) were the causes of his migration. When he explains it in detail he [Memo] says:

*Before I was displaced to Addis Ababa in 2008, I was one of the active farmers in the district. As a result, I have done a course in farming activities. Later, the Ministry of Agriculture assigned me to train trainees in my village and around its environs. However, the successive drought and shortage of food in my village (around Gijiga) discouraged me. Then I decided to seek a better life for me and my family in Addis Ababa. One year after my stay in the capital, a cadre of the CUD party recruited me to join the party. Later, the party assigned me to my village so that I could recruit more members who would support the party during the national election of 2010. While I was recruiting new members, I was also farming in my village. After the election of 2010, the ruling party Ethiopian people's Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF) began an extensive campaign of arrest and torture against us. Unlike some comrades who perished in prison, I managed to escape from my country to Kenya (Memo, 21 Sep 2014).*

*I was born and grew up in the Amhara region. Drought was common. Due to the erratic amount of rainfall, a shortage of food was common. As a result, rural-urban migration was very high. My husband, who migrated to South Africa, was the bread-winner for the entire family. We were entirely dependent on him and sometimes the government of Ethiopia delivered food aid (Tsige, 17 Sep 2014).*

*As farmers and herders from Oromia region, the impacts of successive drought had devastating consequences on human livelihoods. Other recurring environmental events, such as the degradation of natural resources and often lower soil productivity and increased soil erosion, exacerbated poor harvesting seasons. These events have been contributing to increasing human migration to cities and other countries, and sometimes migration of rural villages with their animals to other regions (Mesfin, 4 Oct 2014).*

Previous studies indicated that households in rural areas were victimised by successive droughts, severe environmental degradation, poor land management practices and reduction of household

income (Bilsborrow, 1992). As a response to drought and environmental degradation, many agricultural families in rural Ethiopia are forced to migrate (Ezra and Kiros, 2001).

**Table 4.4: Respondents’ perceptions of threats of migration in Ethiopia (N=28) (Multiple responses)**

Factors	Percent
Drought-related events are the main reason for migration	98%
Political unrest is the cause of migration	56%
Ethnic conflicts pushes people to migrate	45%
Drought and political events are causes of migration	90%
Drought, political and ethnic unrest increases migration	98%

Those geographical locations which have severe climate events such as limited water and food resources can lead to tension and conflict (CNA Corporation, 2007). This is because climate-induced mass migration can cause competition for the existing resources, which, in turn, can contribute to tensions such as political, ethnical and religious stresses within a country or within migrant-receiving countries (CNA Corporation, 2007).

Environmentally-induced migration in Ethiopia is increasing due to poverty and a long history of environmental, economic and political shocks (Gray and Mueller, 2012). As shown in Table 4.2, the main push factor for migration from Ethiopia occurs as a result of drought-related events and political unrest and the combination of drought, political and ethnic unrest in the country. Table 4.4 illustrates that the impact of drought-related events was perceived as the main push factor of migration in Ethiopia. According to the perceptions of the migrants, drought accounts for 98 percent. Similarly, mixed migration factors such as drought, political and ethnic conflicts were also perceived as main migration factors in Ethiopia. According to the migrants’ perceptions, these collectively comprise 98 percent. Drought and political events represent 90 percent, while political and ethnic conflict accounts for 56 percent and 45 percent, respectively. In this case, the impacts of environmentally-related events like drought were perceived as the main push factors for displacement in Ethiopia. Previous studies indicated that large rural households, particularly from the central highlands and south-eastern parts of Ethiopia, have endured endemic poverty, high population pressure on land resources and long term exposure to successive droughts

(World Bank, 2005). The above fact indicates that these environmental events can exacerbate inadequate rainfall and food insecurity, and they, in turn, can increase the vulnerability of households to multiple problems. The Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF, 2009) and Christian Aid (CA, 2007) concluded that global environmental change hinders development and aggravates risks which can turn into humanitarian catastrophes, forcing people to flee the land.

#### ***4.2.2 Drought and migration in Ethiopia***

The root causes of migration are diverse, however, the impacts of environmental change, both the slow and rapid onset of environmental impacts, enhance rural migration as an option or coping mechanism (Guterres, 2009). Over the last couple of decades, internal and international forced migrations have been intensifying due to the successive deteriorations of political, socio-economic, armed conflict, poverty and environmental degradation (Choularton, 2005). Like most other African countries, Ethiopia has also experienced severe droughts and famine conditions and successive socio-economic and political crises. Similarly, the Ethiopian migration history has been a response to the successive drought and famine, socio-political and economic crisis and need for security (Ezra and Kiros, 2001). However, in recent years, the role of environmental changes in creating migration has become more evident (Mberu, 2006). This is due to environmental degradation that has diminished the fertility of the farms, later forcing people to abandon their land and engage in migration:

*I was a farmer and at the same time I was a herder. Sometimes, the amount of rainfall for farming and animals is too little. Sometimes there are floods that engulf all our crops and grasses. So, seasonal migration of the entire family with animals was common, especially towards the Gambella region, just to seek food and grasses. I personally migrated to Addis Ababa, Yemen and at last to South Africa (Mesfin, 4Oct 2014).*

Similarly, Dejen who was engaged in farming activities said that he migrated due to the successive drought-related events that occurred in the eastern parts of Ethiopia:

*I was a farmer. During low harvesting season, I also used to be involved in trading. I used to bring in grains from other regions which have good harvesting*

*seasons and sell them in my area. However, the successive shortage of food in my area discouraged me from being involved in farming and trading. First, I migrated to Yemen in 2008. After six months, I was deported. Finally, I migrated to South Africa (Dejen, 20 Sep 2014).*

As the level of stress increases, most rural migrants displace further to the surplus-growing areas of the western and southern parts of Ethiopia (Mberu 2006). However, in some cases, during times of extreme deprivation, people also tend to migrate to neighbouring countries to seek assistance there Hammond (2000) cited in Dessalegne (2004). In order to explore the respondents' perceptions on the impacts of environmental changes, the Likert scale was used. The scale ranged from 1 to 5 and represented 'Strongly Agree' (SA), 'Agree' (A), 'No idea' (NI), 'Disagree' (DA) and 'Strongly Disagree' (SDA), respectively. The main perceived findings in relation to the impacts caused by environmental changes in Ethiopia are summarised in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.

**Table 4.5: Respondents' level of agreement in relation to the key impacts of environmental disasters in Ethiopia (N=28)**

IMPACTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE	SA	A	NI	DA	SDA
Due to the environmental change the livelihood of the people is affected badly (i.e. conflict, transmitted diseases, migration...)	35.7%	60.7%	3.6%		
Successive drought and inadequate rainfall resulting in shortages of food for human and animal is common	60.7%	39.3%			
Communities' roles in combating environmental degradation are low	17.9%	64.2%	17.9%		
Biomass source of energy (fuelwood, animal dung) can enhance land degradation	39.3%	46.4%	7.1%	7.1%	
Due to high land degradation, crop and grass production is reduced	28.6%	67.9%	3.6%		
Due to a shortage of food, forced migration is common	17.9%	75%	7.1%		

As indicated in Table 4.4, the majority of the respondents agreed (60.7 percent) and strongly agreed (35.7 percent) with the statement: "environmental change in Ethiopia has affected the livelihood of the people badly". Similarly, respondents' level of agreement to the "impact of

successive drought and inadequate rainfall and their impact upon food security both for human and animals” was strongly agreed with (60.7 percent) and agreed with (39.3 percent). The respondents revealed that their migration was overwhelmingly associated with food insecurity which is exacerbated by land degradation and drought (refer to Table 4.5).

It is argued that the impacts of natural and human-related disasters will continue to be severe with the increase in climate change, and that this will trigger the reduction of agricultural productivity. Due to these inter-related processes, changes and events between natural and human factors, mass migration will also increase. The direct and indirect effects of climate change are on food security and the impacts are already causing migration and displacement in developing countries (UN, 2009). Khassa, who has worked as a meteorologist in Ethiopia says:

*Ethiopia’s variation of climate changes has been recorded for 30 years. The result shows that the country has experienced a warmer climate and an uneven amount of rainfall and these have been accelerating human and animal displacements within Ethiopia and out-migration to neighbouring countries. And these impacts of environmentally-related disasters are more common in the central highlands, the eastern and south-eastern parts of Ethiopia (Khassa, 15 Sep 2014).*

When he [Khassa] argues about “the effect of climate change in triggering conflict and spread of environmental change-related diseases in Ethiopia”, he [Khassa] says:

*The continuous increase of heat-waves that has been recorded for 30 years, shows that climate change has been contributing to food insecurity and water scarcity. For instance, Ethiopian pastoralists have been fighting and sometimes the fights escalated to conflicts between villages and ethnic groups. Similarly, the continuous change in climate could encourage suitable breeding conditions for the mosquitoes and the spread of disease, which may exacerbate mass migration if the government's early malaria prevention measures in villages are not taken.*



Similarly, the US Department of Defence (2010) suggested that global climate change is the main factor for the shortage of food and water, and is also a contributing factor to the spread of diseases which can later act as a migration factor. A “Combination of human-related disasters and climate change can also spur conflicts that can act as an accelerator of instability or conflict, placing a burden to respond on civilian institutions and militaries around the world” (US Department of Defence, 2010).

**Table 4.6 Respondents’ perceptions of the appropriate method/means of environmental protection/ management (N=28)**


	SA	A	NI	DA	SDA
Providing awareness/knowledge to the people about environmental change	42.9%	57.1%	-	-	-
Giving incentives to communities so that they combat land degradation	46.4%	46.4%	-	7.1%	-
Increasing reforestation and forestation programs	53.6%	39.3%	3.6%	3.6%	-
Community-based environmental protection programs	42.9%	35,7%	10,7%	7,1%	-

With regard to the respondents’ perceptions about the appropriate environmental management, Table 4.6 illustrates the four responses given by respondents. All respondents (42.9 percent SA and 57.1 A) believed that providing awareness/knowledge to the people about environmental change may be an appropriate method of environmental management. A further 92.8 percent (46.4 percent SA and 46.4 percent A) perceived that giving incentives to communities could be helpful in combating land degradation. However, 7.1 percent disapproved the use of incentives as a means of environmental management. A total of 92.9 percent (53.6 percent SA and 39.3 percent A) understood that increasing the reforestation and forestation programme might be the appropriate environmental management action. However, there were respondents who disagreed (3.6) and did not have any ideas (3.6) about the reforestation and forestation programme as a form of environmental protection. Furthermore, 78.6 percent (42.9 percent SA and 35.7 percent A) indicated that community-based environmental management was an appropriate environmental protection method. In contrast, 7.1 percent of the respondents disagreed and 10.7 percent did not have any idea that community-based environmental management is a panacea to environmental protection (Table 4.5).

### 4.3 Origin of Ethiopian environmental migrants by region


Most of the respondents (89 percent) are from rural and semi-urban areas and they were primarily engaged in farming-related activities (Table 4.2). The study also assessed the region from which migrants had departed. However, all of the respondents were not willing to divulge the exact village or township they came from.

**Figure 4.2: Respondents' origin by region (N=28)**



As Figure 4.2 indicated, the majority (36 percent) of respondents migrated from Oromiya, and the second highest number of migrants, 21 percent, originated from Ogaden (Somali region) while 21 percent came from the south-eastern parts of Ethiopia which include the Somali region and Oromiya. The remaining respondents (7 percent) migrated from the Amhara region and 7 percent from the north east part of Ethiopia (Figure 4.1 map of Ethiopia). Like all east African countries, Ethiopia is also affected by the continuous climatic variations, extreme weather events, including desertification, droughts and shortages of food and rising global temperatures. Consequently, rural-urban migration is common in Ethiopia (Hunnes, 2012). Previous studies indicated that migration histories in Ethiopia are related more to environmental events (Ezra, 2001).

**Figure 4.3: Origin of migrants in Addis Ababa**



Source: Hunnes (2012: 5).

A previous study on environmentally-related migration revealed that the southern, central and eastern parts of the country are the source of internal migration. Hunnes (2012) found that the majority of environmental migrants into Addis Ababa originated from different parts within the South, Amhara and Oromia villages and townships (Figure 4.4). In this case, the statistical data indicates that 26 (44 percent) of the respondents were from Debub (Southern) region, similarly, 26 (44 percent) were from the Amhara region (northern highlands), and the rest 7 (12 percent) were from the Oromia (central) region.

**Table 4.7: Factors affecting rural urban migration in Ethiopia**

Reasons for migration	Male (N=39)		Female (N=20)		Total (N=59)	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Unable to grow enough food	26	67	17	85	43	73
Want more money/better job opportunity	25	64	13	65	38	64

Source: Hunnes (2012: 4).

In the Hunnes (2012: 4) study, 43 respondents (73%) reported that they migrated to Addis Ababa because they were unable to grow enough food or other products on their land to sustain them for a year, there had been a poor harvest year. The second most common reason for migration to Addis Ababa, reported by 38 (64%) of the respondents, revealed that they wanted more money or job opportunities because they did not have enough food at home. They also did not earn enough from their harvest. It is argued that the choice of migration in response to natural

environmental deteriorations is regarded as a temporary solution, particularly by those rural communities whose livelihood demands depend on natural resources:

*Due to the environmental degradation and the density of the population of the rural people, particularly in the Oromia and Amhara regions, food shortages and diseases are common. So, a considerable number of rural people are forced to go to other countries (Khasa, 15 Sep 2014).*

However, migration from one's own land and country to other areas within one's country or to another country is fraught with many risks. Moreover, while migrants are trekking, they are vulnerable to many abuses and harassments. The circumstances awaiting them on the journey and in the host place or country may also be exploitative and abusive.

#### **4.4 Human trafficking and migrant smuggling in Ethiopia**

According to the United Nations Office for Drug and Crime, (UNODC, 2009) factors like enduring political and economic instability and threats of climate change in the region are the root causes for migration. However, the other problem facing migrants while they are trekking is smuggling, which is considered a thriving business in Eastern Africa (UNOCD, 2009). Furthermore, the UNODC (2009:12) concluded that:

*East African countries have experienced considerable progress towards sustainable development over the last years, but at the same time, the economic crisis, ongoing extreme poverty and inequality, climate change and a continuous threat of escalating violence and conflict in the region have continued to threaten Eastern Africa's progress, and provide a fertile ground for the twin threats of organised crime and trafficking to flourish.*

In this regard, the researcher has observed the prevalence of organised crime committed by Ethiopians and others nationals to reap the benefits of smuggling and human trafficking at the expense of the vulnerable migrants. The respondents who participated in this study indicated that false and deceptive information was given by the brokers. In addition to the above, the houses built and other assets owned in their villages by some countrymen who had previously migrated to South Africa were some of the reasons that motivated migrants to move to South Africa.

However, as long as illegal migration continues, the entire journey may be irregular and perilous, hence the migrants' journeys are very risky and they are subject to emotional intimidation, physical abuse and entrapment by migrant smugglers.

**Table 4.8: Number of countries crossed and time taken from departure (Ethiopia) to destination (South Africa). Data retrieved from open ended questionnaire (N=28)**

Number of respondents crossed countries	Number of countries crossed from Ethiopia-SA	Time taken (spent) from Ethiopia-SA	Percentage
1	Directly Ethiopia-South Afri	2 days	3.6
2	2	3 days	7.1
1	2	7 days	3.6
3	3	1 month	10.7
1	3	1 year	3.6
2	3	2 months	7.1
1	3	8 months	3.6
3	3	20 days	10.7
2	4	1 years	7.1
1	4	2 months	3.6
1	4	6 months	3.6
1	4	8 months	3.6
1	5	1 months	3.6
1	5	2 months	3.6
1	5	3 months	3.6
1	5	4 months	3.6
1	5	5 months	3.6
3	5	6 months	10.7
1	5	8 months	3.6

Table 4.8 indicates that the total amount of time taken by travel from the land of departure (Ethiopia) to the destination (South Africa), did not correlate with the number of counties the migrants crossed. The above report (Table 4.8) indicates that migrants who crossed the same number of countries and used the same routes arrived at their final destinations at different times.

The majority of respondents said that they first reached Moyale, a town at the border between Ethiopia and Kenya, so that they could find brokers who would connect them with smugglers (Figure 3.1). Some of them also organised brokers while they were still in their villages.

Respondents who crossed the border through Moyale to Kenya accounted for 93 percent of the total number. According to these respondents, the entire journey from Moyale to their destination (South Africa) was unsafe and unpleasant as the brokers had promised them. Once they crossed the border into Kenya, the respondents revealed that they were exposed to robbery, abuse, ransoms, abandonment and betrayal.

Most of the respondents' routes to South Africa started from Kenya and Tanzania. The routes then diverted from Tanzania in two directions. The first busiest and longest route crossed Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The entire journey along this route used land transport (smuggling people in shipping containers, with groceries or on foot). The second journey encompassed travelling from Tanzania to Mozambique via water and land transport. According to the migrant respondents, they were smuggled by old boats, by hiding them in shipping containers. Some of them travelled long distances on foot. However, the respondents indicated that, whether migrants took the longest or the shortest routes, the time taken to arrive at the last destination (South Africa) was not regular.

#### ***4.4.1 Brokers and human traffickers and migrant smugglers***

According to the UNHCR (2009), Kenya was the destination country of most Ethiopian migrants in Africa. The report also indicated that, in 2009 the number of Ethiopians who were recognised as refugees in Kenya was estimated at 25,500 (UNHCR, 2009: 3-6). The journey from Kenya to South Africa is well organised and employs several people from several countries. Sometimes this route stretches from Ethiopia up to South Africa. Adepoju (2005) and the United States' Department of State (2006) contend that Kenya and Tanzania serve as the main transit routes for Ethiopians trafficked to Europe, the Middle East and South Africa.

Tsige, a 35-year-old female respondent departed from the Amhara region. She and her daughter wanted to rejoin her husband who was in Durban, South Africa. Her husband had told her [Tsige] that he had a plan to bring them to South Africa. However, Tsige said they (she and her daughter) could not rejoin her husband without the help of a broker. When telling the story of the entire process, Tsige recalls:

*I and my daughter accomplished the legal process with the help of brokers. First, my husband told me he had a plan to bring us to South Africa., so he asked me if I could arrange the journey from Addis Ababa to South Africa via plane. Then I asked some relatives if they could help. They found someone who could do everything. It was an unimaginable dream to get a legal permit from Ethiopia, unlike my husband who had fled illegally. Then some days later, the broker told me to give him passport photos of myself and my daughter. He also recommended that I be secretive about my journey and cautious about being spied on by federal police or security officials in Addis Ababa. After finishing all these processes, the broker handed over our passports. After a three day journey, we joined my husband in Johannesburg (Tsige, 17 Sep 2014).*

When she was asked about the illegal processes and crimes of brokers and traffickers, she denied knowledge about traffickers. All that she knows was the broker and the money she gave him to do his job. According to Tsige, the amount of money she paid the broker was about \$ 2200 each.

*I admire the brokers as they help for those unprivileged citizens who can't fight for their right (Tsige, 17 Sep 2014).*

According to some respondents, migrants are completely vulnerable. Sometimes, smugglers abandon migrants far from their homes where food and water is scarce. Due to the fact that the migrants are unable to speak the local language and lack information about their journey, they are exposed to different challenges including robbery, harassment and even physical attacks by police, bandits and local people. Furthermore, he [Mesfin] says:

*During the night we saw a big glimmer of light from far and they told us it was Nairobi. And they [smugglers] told us that it's not safe to drive at night. Instead, it was safe to walk. They told us it's a matter of 30 minutes. They told us that we would stay one night, and the next morning we would arrive in Nairobi. Then they asked us for money so that they could buy dinner from a nearby shop. After they took the money we didn't see them again. We knew we had been abandoned (Mesfin, 4 Oct 2014).*

The fate of migrants who choose illegal migration organised by smugglers and traffickers is always risky. According to Mesfin, a respondent from the Ethiopian community leaders, migrants' susceptibilities to crime and violation are very high:

*When we began our journey, we were stopped everywhere by almost everyone including civilians and some who claimed to be security officials. We walked for three hours to reach to the outskirts of Nairobi. A local man who was driving a lorry saw us from far and he came and said 'Ethiopian' and we replied yes, using sign language. Then he signalled to us to climb into his car. We were very delighted and we felt that there were still some people who belong to God. He took us into Nairobi where most Ethiopians reside. After we exchanged greetings, one Ethiopian guy gave some money to the local driver. Then immediately things in Nairobi became worse. Our own brother asked us for money, because he said he had paid money, \$50 each, for transport to that local man. Everyone was fooling us (Mesfin, 4 Oct 2014).*

Memo arrived in South Africa early in 2010. He first migrated to Moyale, a town bordering both Ethiopia and Kenya. He finally arrived in South Africa through Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique by land and water. He crossed three countries and travelled for one month. His journey was arranged by brokers in Moyale-Ethiopia corridor. When he described how the brokers arranged the process of smuggling from Ethiopia to South Africa, he [Memo] said:

*There are mediators between us and smugglers and they are called brokers. The benefits of these brokers depend on the number of people they collect who wish to migrate. These brokers can be business people or they can be from the middle-class who have the trust of the community. Sometimes, they lend money to migrants with double interest to be paid by the migrants or by their families. And they also act as guarantors between the migrants and the smugglers and traffickers, by keeping the money of the migrants until their arrival. Then they give the money back to the smugglers once the migrants' arrival is confirmed. Most of them have good connections with the police and border guards. In case of failure, while the migrants are crossing borders they promise you that you*



*wouldn't get into trouble, because, it is believed that they will bribe the police and border guards so that the migrants will not face arrest (Memo, 21 Sep 2014).*

As most of the respondents reported, ransoms and migrant abuses are common. For instance, Dejen who came to South Africa in 2009, was first informed by his friends who were already in South Africa, that they live better in South Africa even than those in Europe. His friends also told him about the humiliation, harassment and abusive acts of the migrant smugglers, the drivers and police. Unlike his friends, he chose to take the risk by himself:

*During the night around 8 p.m. my friend and I crossed the border and we travelled the whole night. After two days we met a truck full of cows. We agreed to pay the driver \$150 each to travel to Nairobi. They loaded us into a very dirty truck with many cows, however, the driver stopped many times and they asked for money to get through the check-point (Dejen, 20 Sep 2014).*

According to migrant respondents, the journeys of migrants are very harsh and scary. There is no certainty in the intended destination once one undertakes the illegal journey. Furthermore, Dejen recalls the brutal acts of criminals:

*There were two occasions on which the driver betrayed us to the police and bandits. During our second day journey, some bandits stopped us and they asked us to hand over all our belongings, including our IDs. We gave them what we had in our pockets, however they demanded more. They took some Birr (Ethiopian currency) from me and \$50 from my friend.*

*For most of my journey, I used trucks which transport cows, however, on one occasion, Malawian police caught us while we were crossing a river along the Malawi-Zambia border and immediately they ordered us to put our hands up. They searched us several times but they could find anything because I had already hidden \$450 inside a cow's foot. Then they ordered us to remove our clothes and shoes. Then they tore our clothes to shreds. They found some money on the others. They let the others go, however they held me. I knew that they*

*would beat me and I intended to tell them the truth that the money was in the truck inside the cow's foot, but, how could I tell them. Finally, they beat me up (Dejen, 20 Sep 2014).*


The journey from Kenya to South Africa was also similar to the journey from Ethiopia to Kenya. According to the respondents' reports, the network and journey of smuggling involves several networks from various countries, however, the journey is still risky and migrants are always at the mercy of the smugglers.

*After we had stayed for four days in Nairobi, six Somalis, including two women, joined us. At the Kenyan-Tanzanian border, the Kenyan smugglers transferred us to two Somali guys. These Somali guys then took us to Tanzania mostly by cars and sometimes on foot. In Malawi, one Somali and two local guys from Malawi accompanied us until we arrived in Zambia. Things in Zambia were the worse and left me with an unforgettable bad memory. We didn't have IDs. Until some family and friends from South Africa raised money for my release, the police arrested me and detained me for six months. After we had paid \$400, they released us. After one week in Zambia, I found another Somali who could smuggle me to Zimbabwe. Things in Zimbabwe were very smooth till we crossed the border to South Africa. However, when we arrived in Messina, the South African police rounded us up and arrested all of us, including the two Ethiopians who had come to take us from Messina to Johannesburg (Dejen, 20 Sep 2014).*

#### **4.4.2 How migrants reached South Africa**

Figure 4.4 depicts the modes of transport used by the majority of respondents, who travelled by land (54 percent), followed by those who used a mixed means of transport (land and air, 32 percent) and respondents who used land and water and only air comprised 7 percent in each case.

**Figure 4.4: Respondents' modes of transportation to South Africa (n=28)**



The study reveals that, 96 percent of the respondents passed through Kenya or used the country as a transit to their destination (Table 4:8). However, of all the migrant respondents, none of them applied for asylum in Kenya. This indicates that the dream of respondents was to reach South Africa. South Africa is Africa's number two powerhouse after Nigeria, and it is also ranked as an upper-middle class income economy by the World Bank (World Economic Forum (WEF) 2013). It's total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is estimated at US\$159.9 billion, which is approximately 25 percent of the total continent's GDP and is four times greater than its southern African neighbours (WEF, 2013).

Armed conflicts and associated dislocation, political and economic upheaval, food insecurity, lack of education and employment opportunities and the blight of the AIDS epidemic makes South Africa a magnet which attracts migrants from across the continent and beyond (Rossi, 2003). In addition to its economic and political stability, the hub of transportation facilities that offers direct flights and shipments to and from Europe and Asia, attracts human trafficking more greatly than other neighbouring countries (Rossi, 2003). Despite continuous government participation, South Africa remains one of the central markets for the services of trafficked persons from regional and extra-regional locations (Rossi, 2003). In addition to these, traditional migration patterns of labour to South Africa from surrounding states and the casual border procedures have contributed to the illegal cross-border movement (Rossi, 2003).

The number of Ethiopian migrants in South Africa constitutes one of the highest migrant populations from African countries. Unfortunately, the actual number of Ethiopians in South Africa could not be obtained from the DHA. The researcher has been working as an Ethiopian interpreter at the Durban's DHA reception office. According to observations made at the reception office, the numbers of new arrivals from Ethiopia comprise the highest numbers of migrants from East African countries. The average number of newcomers who apply at the Durban reception office ranges from 30-50 per week. Furthermore, Mesfin, a respondent and one of the members of the Ethiopian community representatives said that the number of new migrant arrivals from Ethiopia is growing from year to year in Durban:

*According to the information we have, the majority of Ethiopians apply at Pretoria, Messina and then Durban refugee reception offices. As you know, every Tuesday, the number of newcomers in Durban is huge; sometimes 50 per week. However, the number of newcomers who apply as refugees at Pretoria and Messina reception offices are more than here in Durban (Mesfin, 4 Oct 2014).*

According to the migrant respondents', their choice of migration to South Africa was intensified by the deceptive and persuasive characters of the brokers. They played a tremendous role in convincing migrants to choose South Africa. As mentioned above, the route from Kenya to South Africa has two options. The busiest and long route includes Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe or from Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi to Zambia and Zimbabwe. This route encounters many geographical barriers like rivers, thick forests and lakes. The entire journey of this route is accomplished by trucks and on foot. The second route starts from Kenya. One then takes boats from Tanzania to Mozambique. This route is shorter but riskier. Respondents travel through land and water, however, as long as illegal border crossing is involved, the numbers of countries crossed by migrants do not determine the time taken to reach South Africa. Even if the migrants follow the same route, there could be differences of as much as months in their arrival times.

Table 4.8 indicates migrant respondents' total time and space travelled. It also shows the number of countries crossed by migrants does not correlate with the total amount of time the migrants travelled. The above means that the safety and length of their journey merely depends

on the experiences and determinations of the traffickers and smugglers. For instance, those respondents who crossed two countries (17.5 percent) reached South Africa between two days and any time less than a month. Similarly, those who crossed three countries (32 percent) also travelled for as long as one month to one year. The respondents who crossed five countries (32.3 percent) experienced huge gaps that ranged from one month to eight months (Table 4.8). This indicates that the time taken does not correspond with the number of countries crossed by the migrants. The potential reasons for these discrepancies in time can be attributed to what they refer to as “financial constraints while migrants are on their journey, arrest for months without appearance in court by the authorities of those countries, and the irresponsible and inhumane actions committed by migrant smugglers and traffickers.” On the other hand, 25 percent of the respondents who crossed one or two countries reached South Africa between two and twenty days. The respondents who flow into South Africa by airplane (3.6 percent) are included in this category (Figure 4.8).

**Table 4.9: Total amount of money paid to traffickers/smugglers to reach South Africa (N=28)**

Money paid in Dollars	Frequency	Percent
None	1	3.6
<\$1000	2	7.1
\$1100-\$2000	4	14.3
\$2100-\$3000	7	25.0
\$3100-\$4000	9	32.14
\$4100-\$5000	3	10.7
>\$5100	2	7.1

As Table 4.9 attested, 7.1 percent of the respondents paid more than \$5100, 10.7 percent of them also paid between \$4100 and \$5000, while the majority of respondents (32.14 percent) paid from \$3100 to \$4000. Twenty-five percent of them also paid between \$2100 and \$3000. While 14.3 percent of the respondents spent from \$1000-\$2000 and the remaining respondents (7.1 percent) paid <\$1000. According to the respondents, those who paid smaller sums of money to the smugglers are those migrants who had financial problems and sourced funding from relatives or family members. Hence, when the decision to migrate was made they undertook the journey risking their lives on the way.

*When I decided to come here, I first had to collect some money for the journey. I did not have any one who could fund me and my families were dependent on me, so I migrated to Addis Ababa and I worked in the cement and coffee industries. Then I collected about \$ 500” (Dejen, 20 Sep 2014).*

*“I heard that life in South Africa was better even than in Europe and Arab countries. I didn’t have money to pay for brokers and smugglers. I worked in Addis Ababa for six months and I sold one cow. I only had about \$1100. Then I managed to reach South Africa by myself. However, the Zambian police arrested me for five months. All in all, I spent about a year trying to reach South Africa” (Memo, 21 Sep 2014).*

However, the detentions of Ethiopian migrants for alleged unlawful entry into the countries are common. For instance, the Zambian government issued reports that a total of 141 Ethiopian migrants were intercepted by the immigration department while travelling in two Zambian registered vehicles. The reports also indicated that migrants paid undisclosed amounts of money to unnamed agents in order to be smuggled into South Africa (Teddy, 2014). Similarly, the Ethiopian Embassy in Kenya stated that Ethiopian citizens were detained by Kenyan police after being caught in a human smuggling scheme. Furthermore, the embassy reported that migrants were forced to pay \$2,715 to be smuggled from Ethiopia to South Africa ([www.Sodere.com](http://www.Sodere.com)). Similarly, Mesfin indicated the journey he encountered was very risky and with unforgettable memories. Furthermore he [Mesfin] attested that migrants were transferred from one to another smuggler of different countries.

*Until my cousin from South Africa arranged the money for the journey, I stayed in Nairobi for two weeks. On the 16 September 2009, my cousin phoned me to tell me to get ready. Then one Somali and a Kenyan driver took us to Tanzania. The road was very rough and long, and they asked us money for check-points and to bribe the border guards. While we were crossing the lake, we were caught by Malawian police. The police threatened to deport us if we didn’t pay \$250 each. After negotiations, they reduced this to \$150. The Kenyan and Somalian*

*smugglers didn't get caught. After two weeks, almost all of us paid the amount. Again, in Zambia, we were caught by the police. All our documents, including our IDs were taken by bandits while we were crossing the Ethiopian-Kenyan border. Then the police in Zambia couldn't deport us. After one week, two Somalis paid bail for all of us, about 17 migrants including Somalis and Ethiopians. Then these Somalis took us to Zimbabwe safely. Once we reached Zimbabwe, things became smooth and bright, however, the price we paid was quite a lot. All in all, I paid about \$3500 dollars to reach South Africa (Mesfin, 4 Oct 2014).*

#### **4.4.3 Concerns of smuggling and migrant abuses**

Despite the significant and positive efforts made by a few governments, institutions and some environmental researchers, the lack of recognition of environmentally-induced migration by the majority of countries, international agencies and some NGOs allow human rights in the destination countries to be violated. The finding of this study attests to the fact that Ethiopian environmental migrants are exposed to different crimes and abuses from their departure to their destination. Furthermore, the study reveals that migrant' deceptions and kidnapping by local and foreign brokers, and that they have been forced to pay thousands of dollars to traffickers and smugglers. In addition to the above, the respondents in this study indicated that they were detained due to the violation of immigration laws in countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In relation to the inhumane and barbaric crimes and acts committed by the brokers, migrant traffickers and smugglers, the respondents have concerns:

*This route is illegal, risky and lives are at the mercy of smugglers. In order to illuminate this illegal business, the awareness of all governments and all concerned bodies must be obtained to work together (Khasa, 15 Sep 2014).*

However, the opinion of Tsige who travelled by plane is different. When she [Tsige] comments about human traffickers and smugglers, and the difficulties faced migrants while they are crossing borders, she says:

*Of course, if human traffickers and smugglers don't get their money according to the agreement they reached with the migrants or with their families, they may react inhumanly and in an abusive way. If your government does not allow you to fly legally, it's not bad to pay someone who fulfils your dream. (Tsigie, 17 Sep 2014).*

When she [Tsigie] asked about the measures that need to be taken in order to reduce illegal ways of human trafficking:


*It is very difficult to control, as many hands from governments and civilians are involved in this. The corruption by officials and police at the immigration and border-posts and the lack of awareness by migrants is not a mystery. Migrants who come through this routes, they bring their brothers by the same routes. So the problem is not easy to solve. It is a profitable business for those who participate in it and, at the same time, options like these are good for someone who can't get legal permission (Tsigie, 17 Sep 2014).*

#### **4. 5 Social networks**

Some of the factors that attract migrants to Durban include its socio-economic stabilities and its relatively sustainable security for migrants. The presence of a good network between former and new migrants is also one of the motivating factors for Ethiopians to reside in Durban. The social network plays a very crucial role in the success of new migrants. According to El-Abed (2003: 5), “social networks refer to ties and kinship relationship and provide social, financial and political support in order to facilitate social development of their members.”



**Figure 4.5: Respondents' network (kinship) in Durban (N=28)**



Almost all respondents who participated in this study admitted that they came to South Africa and Durban in particular, because they knew someone who was living in better conditions and working, receiving a better income. As shown in Figure 4.5, 96.4 percent of the respondents indicated that they had networks that helped them to acquire information about Durban. They also revealed that the networks played a crucial role in adapting the new environment in Durban. According to Amisi and Ballard, (2004: 12-19), a social network “constitute[s] a social net against random events such as illness, police arrest and death.”

#### **4.6 Challenges to the survival strategies in Durban**

Unlike other migrants, the researcher learned that Ethiopians do not take on any kind of employment as a means of survival. In addition to the above, they also revealed that whenever they engaged in any activities that could generate incomes, they do not operate being shares with non-Ethiopians. Table 4.10 reveals that 92.9 percent of the respondents are self-employed, while the remaining 7.1 percent of the respondents are engaged in formal business activities.

**Table 4.10: Respondents' economic status in Durban (N=28)**

<b>Table 4.2: EMPLOYMENT STATUS</b>	
Self-employed	92.9%
Businessman/woman	7.1%
<b>MONTHLY INCOME (in Rand)</b>	
<1000	3.6%
1100-3000	60.7%
3100-6000	10.7%
6100-9000	7.1%
9100-12000	7.1%
12100-15000	3.6%
15100-18000	3.6%
>21000	3.6%

Despite the challenges caused mainly by the lack of proper documents, Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban are very successful. Although most of the respondents (89.3 percent) had previous experience of farming-related activities in Ethiopia, (Table, 4:2) the ethics of hard work, cooperation among themselves and a culture of self-reliance helped them to be economically independent and successful. This statement is confirmed by the fact that 54 percent of the respondents earn between R3100 and R9000 a month, whereas 21 percent of the respondents earn between R9100 and R2100 per month. The remaining respondents (25 percent) earn between R1100 and R3000 per month (Table 4.10). Similarly, a study conducted on Ethiopian migrants in Durban indicates that the culture of hard work of the Ethiopians has helped them to live in better economic conditions than other migrants (Ghebre *et al.*, 2011). As a result of the above, the study conducted by Ghebre *et al.* (2011) shows that some respondents were able to save about R15, 000 per month.

According to the respondents who participated in this study, almost all of them came to Durban without resources that could help them to start informal businesses. However, as the researcher observed, the network in Durban plays a tremendous role in achieving the aforementioned successes. Dejen and his cousin own a thriving tuck-shop and he says that their business is growing. When he explains how he started the business and the success he has achieved so far, he [Dejen] says:

*When I came here I did not have any money in my pocket. I worked in locations (in Mpumalanga) for two years. I used to sell blankets, bags, bed-sheets, dishes and much more in the location. Two years later I came to Durban to open a decent business. Things were not as easy as I thought. As you know... .the rent is escalating and to get into the right places is also difficult and expensive. Then I phoned my cousin to see if he could join me. We found this place. And, as you can see, thank God, we are doing well. We paid back the credit we owed. Now we have money to eat, money to pay our rent and money to put petrol in our car. We don't depend on anybody (Dejen, 20 Sep 2014).*

Similarly, Mesfin, from the Ethiopian community representatives said he had a clothing shop in Johannesburg. He then opened a similar shop in Durban. However, the challenges he encountered are described as follows:

*As you know, almost all of us arrived in Johannesburg first. I worked in Johannesburg for two years. I did not like the living and working conditions there, but I had also good business conversations with friends who used to come from Durban to Johannesburg to buy their stock. In Durban, the xenophobia, crime and other threats are low and the economic opportunities and benefits are also high. Unlike nowadays, seven to eight years ago, Durban was virgin. These were some of the motives that attracted me to come here. Here I opened this shop (clothing shop). Businesswise, I am okay (Mesfin, 4 Oct 2014).*

Almost all the respondents who participated in the study indicated that they do not ask for any humanitarian aid, either from government or from non-governmental agencies. However, the majority of them have concerns about crime, robbery and the potential threat of xenophobia that only targets Africans. When he [Mesfin] illustrates his concerns and threats, he says:

*Unlike other foreigners we don't depend on any NGO and are not at the mercy of the government. However, there are many obstacles here. You know, in Johannesburg, foreigners' main threats are criminals and sometimes xenophobic attacks. Here it is different; yes, we are scared of xenophobia, but our main*

*threats are the police not the criminals. My residence was in West Street and the Victoria embankment. The police used to come and search our residences, especially West Street. Finally I changed my residence to Morningside which is more expensive, but safer. And, as you know, at Home Affairs we are sick and tired of applying to get a maroon ID which is the only accepted document to open a bank account. I don't have a bank account. I have applied for a maroon ID three times, but I have not yet obtained one (Mesfin, 04 Oct 2014).*

The above statements confirm that respondents' means of survival have enabled them to be independent in their new environment. Jacobsen (2004) argued that migrant traders are dependent upon their businesses alone for their livelihood. However, the respondents' successes do not come without challenges. For instance, Harris (2001) attested that foreign nationals' lack of access to open bank accounts in South Africa exposed them to violence and theft, since they are known to keep money in their houses or shops. In addition to this, Landau (2007) argued that the lack of access to banking services might well discourage African migrants from investing more assets in cities, including Durban.

**Table 4.11: Respondents' residence and choices in Durban (N=28)**

<b>RESPONDENTS' RESIDENTIAL LOCATIONS</b>	<b>FREQUEN. %</b>	
Albert Park	1	3.6
Morningside	3	10.3
North Beach	4	13.8
Point Road	2	6.9
Russell Street	6	20.7
South Beach	4	13.8
West Street	8	28.6
<b>WHY DID YOU CHOOSE DURBAN?</b>	<b>YES</b>	<b>NO</b>
Suitable for business	85.7	14.3
Low crime compared to other cities in SA	78.6	21.4
Low bureaucratic measures in Durban compared to others DH	67.9	32.1
Family ties in Durban	89.3	10.7

The other challenges facing respondents in Durban are the issues of residence and crime. The researcher observed that the Central Business District (CBD) of Durban is the location where most Ethiopians migrants congregate. Respondents also reveal that different kinds of crimes and xenophobic attacks on foreigners are more common in the CBD of Durban. In order to avoid crime and xenophobic threats in the CBD, 10.3 percent and 13.8 percent of the respondents live outside the CBD; in the suburb of Morningside and North Beach occupying flats respectively (Table 4.10).

Migrant respondents were also asked the reasons that motivated them to come to Durban. In this case, 85.7 percent of the migrant respondents came to Durban because of its suitability for business. However, 14.3 percent of the migrant respondents were not attracted by Durban's business suitability. In a similar manner, the majority (78.6 percent) of the migrant respondents came to Durban because they perceived Durban to have a low crime rate as compared to other cities in the country. However, 21.4 percent of the respondents did not admit that the choice of Durban was due to its relatively low crime. In relation to the permits, 67.9 percent of the migrant respondents indicated that the less bureaucratic procedures of the DHA in the Durban refugee reception centre was one of the factors that motivated them to reside in Durban. Almost all (89.3 percent) of the respondents indicated that they had come to Durban because of their ties with families who had previously resided in Durban. However, 10.7 percent of the respondents did not associate their choices with family ties in Durban (Table 4.11).

Similarly, Mesfin complains about the challenges he faces in Durban:

*My friend and I were sharing a flat on the Victoria embankment for three years. The lease was in my friend's name because he had a maroon ID. However, when my friend went to the USA, I asked the supervisor to renew the lease, however, they refused my refugee permit. Now I am paying huge money in Morningside, sharing with a friend who has a maroon ID (Mesfin, 4 Oct 2014).*

**Table4.12: Respondents’ perceptions of crimes and xenophobia (percentage) (N=28)**

<b>Respondents' level of agreement</b>	<b>SA</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>NI</b>	<b>DA</b>	<b>SDA</b>
Crime by police towards foreigners is higher than others	17.9	32.1	25	21.4	3.6
Police response to foreigners at times of robbery and at crime scenes is too slow	10.7	67.8	10.7	7.1	3.6
Refugee agencies in Durban don't treat all foreigners equally	3.6	7.1	75	10.7	3.6
Asylum-seekers have problems accessing residences in Durban	42.9	50	3.6	-	3.6
Xenophobia towards foreigners is high in Durban	17.9	39.2	10.7	25	7.1

Table 4.12 summarises the main findings in relation to the primary concerns perceived by migrant respondents. The respondents strongly agreed (SA) (17.9 percent) and agreed (A) (32.1 percent) (total of 50 percent) with the statement that “crime by police towards foreigners is higher than others,” indicating that 50 percent of migrant respondents do not feel comfortable or safer when the police are around. This statement in turn is strongly supported by the statement that “police response to robbery and crimes where the foreign nationals are ineffective and sometimes it is too slow.” In this case, 10.7 percent of the migrant respondents were agreed (A) and 67.8 percent of them strongly agreed (SA). Of all the migrant respondents, only 10.7 percent disagreed (DA) and strongly disagreed (SDA) with the above statement. Whereas the respondents’ level of agreement regarding asylum-seekers’ challenges in accessing residences in Durban was among the issues which were of greatest concern. In this case, 92.9 percent of the migrant respondents perceived strongly agreed (SA) (42.9 percent) and agreed (A) (50 percent). Regarding the issue of xenophobia, the respondents’ perceptions were that they strongly agreed (SA) (17.9 percent) and agreed (A) (32.9 percent), whereas respondents who disagreed (DA) and strongly disagreed (SDA) to xenophobia towards foreigners accounted for 25 percent and 7.1 percent, respectively.

#### ***4.6.1 Xenophobia in Durban***

When the alarm of xenophobia is heard, the first word or country which comes to mind is South Africa. However, xenophobic attacks and violence have occurred, even in European countries like Germany, Finland, Russia and Switzerland (Haigh and Solomon, 2008). The responses and measures taken by these governments against the violence were quick and punitive.

Maharaj, Desai and Bond, (2010) and Amisi *et al.* (2010) argued that xenophobia can take place, in the long-range, where economic and social processes are distributed in extremely uneven patterns (favouring a few metropolitan areas, but only in concentrated sites, such as Central Business Districts, edge cities and low-density suburbs) and a combination of modern and pre-modern (or racist, ethnicist, patriarchal or otherwise super-exploitative) social relations. For instance, migration researchers Misago, Landau and Monson (2009: 7–12) contended that:

*“Violence against [black] immigrants to South Africa has been a permanent attribute across the apartheid and post-apartheid divide, where otherness/outsiderness, stereotypes, and structural exclusion prevent immigrants from exercising ‘political rights and rights to residence in the cities.’”*

In May 2008, violence erupted at Umbilo Road, in a tavern where frequently Nigerian migrants buy alcohols. Similar incidents spread to other parts of Durban, including the CBD and Albert Park (Amisi *et al.*, 2010). A year later, a mob led by a Durban city councillor deliberately pushed two migrants from Zimbabwe and Tanzania to death from a six-floor building (Amisi *et al.*, 2010).

Like all major South African cities, Durban has also witnessed the incidents of xenophobia. Due to socio-economic imbalances, high competition for existing resources and services between locals and migrants on the one hand, and fierce competition for space and retail outlets among migrant traders and between migrants and local traders on the other, could lead to conflict in the city (Bond, 2005 and Amisi *et al.*, 2010). Furthermore, Amisi *et al.* (2010) found that a form of business competition-related hatred seemed to exist between Ethiopian and Congolese traders, and between migrants and local traders in Durban. The allegation is that Ethiopian and Somali traders in Durban who own wholesaler shops accused of supplying good and groceries at wholesale prices to migrant and local traders. However, they also sell at the same shop at retail prices which are similar to the wholesale prices. These findings indicate that Ethiopian and Somali traders in Durban are accused of attracting customers from and destroying other traders’ niche-markets (Amisi *et al.*, 2010).

Table 4: 12 shows that 51 percent of migrant respondents have concerns about the issue of xenophobia in Durban. Several respondents observed that business competition among themselves and between them and other national traders is high in Durban. Dejen, who runs a tuck-shop at South Beach says that fighting or xenophobia due to business competition among traders may erupt:

*So far, fighting and blackmailing among us (Ethiopians) due to business competition is common. For instance, if you rent your shop at R7000 per month, someone who knows you very well could offer the landlord R10000 or R11000 per month. The landlord has no option but to chase me out. In other incidences, some migrants offer huge amounts of money to local shop-owners or locals who run businesses or to migrants from other countries. This thing is not good. Rent is escalating, and it is also creating resentment among us, and possibly among others and the locals. Sometimes, the local customers themselves are not happy for many similar shops to be opened around them. Sometimes, if they see specials in our shops, they don't trust the stuff, though the stuff is genuine and still fresh. These things stem from hate and jealousy (Dejen, 20 Sep 2014).*

Adopting a similar attitude, Memo expressed concern about the threat of xenophobia which might erupt any day in Durban.

*Of course it may happen one day... when the space of the city and its capacity to accommodate all migrants and locals reaches its limit, a catastrophic event may happen. As you know, the police's rescue mission for foreigners is very limited and, if it exists at all, it is too slow. Robbery and violence targeting us is rampant. The UN and other humanitarian bodies who are involved with migrants also don't have the power to quell the violence. Even if the government was willing, I don't think the government soldiers could calm the waves of South African mobs (Memo, 21 Sep 2014).*

According to the AU (2009) convention, all displaced persons at their place of destination should receive humanitarian assistance. Article 5 of the AU 2009 convention specifically explains the



obligations of states' parties regarding the protection and assistance of IDPs. However, according to the information obtained from the returning migrants, there is evidence that the roles and responsibilities of member states in protecting migrants at their place of destination is not enough.

#### **4.7 Perceptions of respondents to the services rendered by the Department of Home Affairs Reception Office in Durban**

Like most refugee laws in African countries, South Africa's refugee laws also stem from the 1957 UN Convention and the 1969 Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) Refugee Convention governing refugee affairs in Africa (McKnight, 2008). Contrary to and conventions signed between South Africa and the two international organisations, foreign migrants, particularly black Africans in South Africa, are the most vulnerable and are deprived of access to basic services. In relation to the above, Valji (2003) argued that the government of South Africa, through the Refugee Service Determination Office, (RSDO), often rejects asylum applications if the country of the asylum-seeker is not at war. This implies that the government of South Africa does not recognise migrants displaced by climate change. Furthermore, Harris (1995: 119-128) contended that "migrants are viewed as people in flight from poverty, and those seeking asylum are all too often regarded as economic migrants and therefore they governed by immigration, not refugee law."

**Table 4.13 Respondents with refugee and asylum permits and bank accounts (N=28)**

Migrants	Frequency	Percent
Asylum-seekers	24	85.7
Refugee status	4	14.3
Total	28	100.0
<b>Bank Account</b>		
Bank account	5	17.9
No bank account	23	82.1
Total	28	100.0

As Table 4.13 reveals, all respondents (100 percent) migrated due to environmentally-related events. As a result, the majority (85.7 percent) hold asylum-seeker permits, whereas 14.3 percent

of the respondents have refugee status. In addition to the above, the newcomers' lacks to financial resources prevent them from applying at the Refugee Reception Office on specific days. Due to these circumstances, the entry permits given at the border-post expire. Migrants, therefore, encounter different forms of abuse and violation by police, sometimes, the security guards and officers at the DHA.

**Table 4.14: Respondents' perceptions of the outcome of their permits given by the DHA in Durban (N=28)**

Cause	Frequency	Percent
No response	1	3.6
I didn't pay money	2	7.1
I didn't have money to get refugee status	3	10.7
I paid money	3	10.7
My husband has refugee status	1	3.6
They told me that I came because of hunger	1	3.6
It is because of the interpreter's performance	1	3.6
I don't have any idea	3	10.7
I don't know the reason	7	25
They told me I am not a political migrant	4	14.3
I was told to leave SA within 30 days	2	7.1
Total	28	100.0

The 1996 constitution of South Africa refers the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers in the republic. The South African Refugee Act No. 130 of 1998 also states that it is a refugee's right to enjoy full recognition and full legal protection which includes the right to access to education, health care, justice, the right to work and all the basic human rights that are outlined in Chapter Two of the constitution, except the right to vote (Refugee Act, 1998: Section 27:10). Similarly, Landau (2004) contended that the permits issued by the DHA are intended to promote social integration, safety and security and a sense of belonging. They enable the foreigners to exercise their rights. Table 4.14 reveals that 28.6 percent of the respondents claimed that the decisions issued by the DHA with regard to their permits were linked by the ability to make the required payments. The implication of this fact is that, regardless of the push factor affecting migrants, money was the most important factor in determining the status of migrants. Respondents who

claim they didn't have any idea and who didn't know the reason for their asylum permits comprise 42.3 percent. However, 14.28 percent of them responded that they were rejected as refugees because they were told that they were not political migrants. Similarly, 3.6 percent were told by the Home Affairs officers that they did not qualify to be refugees because they had fled hunger in their country. However, 10.7 percent of the respondents secured refugee permits because they paid money (Table 4.14).

*I came here in 2006 to change my life. Before I went to apply to the Home Affairs I heard that interpreters ask money from us if we want refugee status... [laughing]. I didn't apply immediately, instead I went to Bizana to work, just to get... you know... Then I worked for six months there without a permit. Then I came back to Durban to apply for a refugee permit. First, I discussed with the interpreter that I was looking for a refugee status permit. He told me that this thing would cost me more money to pay to those who dealt with it. When we reached agreement about the amount of money, he advised me not to talk about hunger and the lack of jobs in Ethiopia. In addition to this, he told me that he would fill out the form accordingly, and he would convince the official about my case. Then I secured refugee status (Mesfin, 4 Oct 2014).*

Similarly, Dejen preferred to pay money to someone at the DHA so that he would avoid the long hours spent attempting to renew his asylum-seeker permit. When he [Dejen] clarifies how he renews his permit, he postulates his story by saying:

*Unlike migrants from other countries, we Ethiopians are the most targeted in terms of bribes. We know that everything is for free, but the long queues and sometimes the bureaucratic processes to renew your permit specifically target us (Ethiopians). They call it 'make a plan'. And some of them they ask us, through the mediators (interpreters). On my part, I don't see a problem with bribing them and getting your permit quickly. I am here now and have closed my shop since 7 a.m. So I like it, because my matters will be finished quickly so that I can get back to my shops (Dejen 20 Sep 2014).*

As in all parts of South Africa, the number of migrants in Durban is also growing. For instance, Adepoju (2006b) argued that the number of migrants from non-SADC countries has increased in recent years. As a part-time worker interpreting at the DHA for the past two years, the researcher has also observed that the numbers of newcomers from African countries, particularly from Ethiopia, is growing in Durban. The average new arrival of Ethiopian migrants at the Durban reception centre alone is estimated at around 30 to 50 per week.

The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) that survey conducted on the quality of refugee service delivery in South Africa showed that the Refugee Reception Office (RRO) officials were unfamiliar with the Refugee Act (Davids *et al.*, 2005). Furthermore, Landau (2004) argued that the DHA was characterised by incompetence and maladministration in decision-making. This caused difficulties for refugees and asylum-seekers in obtaining identity documents according to the Constitution. Similarly, bribery and corruption are also some of the challenges facing the DHA. According to the interviewed respondents, almost all refugees and asylum-seekers accuse officers, including interpreters working at the DHA reception office in Durban, of intimidation and demanding money (Table 4.14). Furthermore, Table 4.14 indicates that the respondents' perceptions towards the services offered by officers and interpreters at the DHA reception office in Durban are negative.

**Table 4.15 Respondents' perceptions of bribery at the DHA (N=28)**

	Frequency	Percent
No response	1	3.6
All officials who dealt with my case asked for money	9	32.1
All interpreters who deal with my case asked for money	4	14.3
Some officers and interpreters ask, some don't	11	39.3
All of them	2	7.1
None of them asked for money	1	3.6
Total	28	100.0

According to the respondents who hold refugee permits, they are unable to open bank accounts. Sometimes, the bar codes of the refugee permit holders are not recognised by the bank scanners. The bank officials then prohibit them from accessing banking services or/ and opening bank

accounts. Of all migrant respondents, 82.1 percent do not have bank accounts, whereas 17.9 percent do (Table 4.13). Memo, a successful self-employed migrant, from South Beach, Durban says:

*Brother, to be frank with you, as you can see, I am here the whole day from 5.30 a.m. to 11 p.m. working with my brother. Look there are many people from many countries with different cultures Most of them don't have jobs. And they know we are working here and that our business is going well. Whatever we have is here inside the shop. No proper documents, no bank accounts and it is very difficult to get a residence that suits us We are scared because we are here in South Africa temporarily. One day is one day. We are just waiting for that day (Memo, 21 Oct 2014).*

*As you can see my shop is very small and it's not busy like the shops next to me. You know us very well. In West Street, we have been harassed by police. I don't have any problem with South Africans. What we possess and own they consider or call illegal. Our money and our stuff has been confiscated by the police. Whatever the amount, everyone prefers to get out of here and rent outside this area, where the police don't patrol. If you ask anyone, even the police, you won't find anyone saying Ethiopians are in possession of drugs or guns, though the police raid us to prevent these illegal things (Tsige, 17 Sep 2014).*

#### **4.8 Non-Governmental refugee organisations and assistance to migrants**

According to the Geneva Refugee Convention (GRC) of 1967, the well-founded fear of persecution (serious harm) should be linked to one of the five protected grounds, including racialism, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (The UN Human Rights Council (UNHCR), 2006). Furthermore, the UNHRC (2008) reaffirmed that impacts of climate change have direct and indirect implications for the effective enjoyment of human rights, for instance, the right to life, the right to adequate food, the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the right to adequate housing, the right to self-determination and human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation. However, at the moment, the UN itself, does not want to revise the primitive refugee definition adopted in 1967.

As a result, the majority of states and UNHCR are against the amendment and modification of the 1967 convention. The argument is that the renegotiation of the Geneva Convention, on the issue of environment may result in a lowering of protective standards and may undermine the international refugee protection regime altogether (UNHCR, 2008). Regardless of the UN/HCR's reluctance to recognise environmental migrants, the Geneva Refugee Convention has mandates and responsibilities to carry out in respect of all migrants by acting as the main human rights instrument and a bridge between the vulnerable migrants and governments.

As in all parts of South Africa, the humanitarian NGOs in Durban also work with refugees and migrants. These NGOs play a positive role in assisting vulnerable migrants to establish sustainable livelihoods. The NGOs that work with refugee matters in Durban were contacted by the researcher. They include the Lawyers for Human Right (LHR), Refugee Social Service (RSS), KwaZulu Natal Refugee Council (KZNRC) and International Action Group for the Vulnerable (IAGV).

The LHR was established in 1966 to strengthen, enforce and advocate for the rights of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers in South Africa (LHR, 2013). According to Amisi and Ballard (2004) the LHR's main agendas are to implement repatriation programs for voluntary refugees, integration programs with locals and assist with resettlement and court appeals if migrants have problems with permits. Like all agencies, the LHR can also be contacted if the Ethiopian environmental migrants consulted their office seeking any humanitarian assistance, be this residential, permit or crime-related issues. Unlike most African migrants in Durban, most Ethiopian migrants are not generally familiar with the DHR office. Respondents reported that they experience socio-security challenges with the police and DHA (Table 4. 12). The LHR is serves all the migrants, regardless of their nationalities. However, at the time the researcher contacted them, the LHR office was working on the case of one Ethiopian migrant regarding his asylum-seeker permit.

The RSS was one of the refugee agencies visited by the researcher. Previously, the RSS was known as the Mennonite Centre Committee (MCC) (Amisi and Ballard, 2004). Since its registration as an NGO in 2008, the RSS's main mission is to provide social assistance to

refugees and asylum-seekers (Amisi and Ballard, 2004). Similarly, Chesang (2002) contended that the RSS is the social implementing partner of the UNHCR in South Africa. According to Jilly, a 31-year-old refugee worker at the RSS office reveals:

*Provision of social emergency assistance, including accommodation, temporary material support, including food, money for rent, and assisting kids with uniforms and linking people at different organisations is the agenda of this office. This program focuses mainly on vulnerable women and child migrants. We also engage in self-reliance programs for the refugees and asylum-seekers. In the self-reliance program, we encourage those skilled migrants to use their gifts and to teach women the skill of the English language so that migrants can become economically independent in their new environment. Security-wise, we try to protect and take care of their lives in times of violence, despite the office's limited resources to reach them on time and limited places to accommodate them all. In the case of documentation, we deal with refugees and asylum-seekers who have problems with their permits. In these cases, we handle the matter carefully and deal with the issues with the relevant stakeholders (Jilly, RSS 2014).*

According to the respondents, the office is open to all vulnerable migrants from any country. However, like the LRS, the RSS was also consulted by an Ethiopian migrant who had a problem with his asylum permit. When she asked about the fate of environmental migrants who had been given 30 days to leave the country (South Africa) the RSS official recommended that they get legal assistance.

*Any foreigner, whether a political, economic, socially segregated or sexually harassed or migrants forced by environmental inconvenience has the full right to contact us. We can arrange lawyers for them and they can get temporary permits despite the DHA decisions. During negotiations with our stakeholders there is also a possibility of transferring them to a third country (Jilly, RSS 2014).*

It is estimated that the number of Ethiopian migrants in Durban is about 1500. The findings of this study also assert that 85.7 percent of these respondents hold asylum-seekers' permits and 14.

3 percent hold refugee permits. Despite the crime and robberies, problems in relation to residences and other concerns of these migrants, generally, Ethiopians do not ask for any kind of assistance provided by the RSS.

In a similar manner, Mohamed, from the IAGV argues:

*This organisation, like all NGOs, tries to assist displaced migrants in Durban. Whatever the factors, be environmental change, war, religious or security issues, we try to assist vulnerable migrants according to our capacity. Assistance could take the form of psychological and/or financial aid (Ahmed, IAGV 2014).*

Unlike the other NGOs in Durban, the IAGV deals with vulnerable migrants regarding their religious (Islamic) and their documentation (permit) issues. When Mohamed comments about those migrants who come to seek assistance from the IAGV, he [Mohamed] says that the majority are from the DRC, Burundi, and Rwanda and rarely from Somalia. According to him, Somali migrants visit the office only for the Islamic programme. Since the inception of the organisation in 2012, the office has never been approached by Ethiopian migrants:

*Regardless of the reasons behind Ethiopian migration, whether they are political or environmental migrants, whether they are newcomers or not, it is unusual to see them seeking any assistance from NGOs, maybe due to the fact that they are economically and socially better equipped than other migrants and the tradition of high socio-economic coherence and cooperation may help them to help each other (Ahmed, IAGV 2014).*

The information from the RSS and IAGV reveals that the Ethiopian migrants in Durban do not have contact with the NGOs. The respondents in this study also asserted that they made requests to the government through the DHA. Unlike migrants from other countries such as Malawi, Tanzania, DRC, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, those who speak local languages integrate easier with the locals. Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban do not speak local languages like IsiZulu. On top of this, they do not perceive the inability to speak the local languages as a factor contributing to social clashes or negative perceptions.



*When I was in Bizana working in the location, I used to speak little Xhosa. I cannot lie to you, now I can't recall the language. As you know, the number of Ethiopian migrants in Durban is becoming higher and higher. It is better to work with your people than working with others, risking your life and your assets. My business is also shifting from local-oriented service to serving Ethiopians only. At the moment, almost all of my daily customers are Ethiopians. I have been here in this shop for more than four years, and I can say frankly, that even my English skills are lacking. I can tell you confidently that, despite this the area [West Street] is better respected, and the locals treat us better than the other migrants. They know that we don't have any bad reputation and that we just work hard (Mesfin, 4 Oct 2014).*

The theme of self-reliance and cooperation within one's community is important. Under such conditions, the issue of integration with the locals could, however be hampered, and, in the long run, people may be prevented from coping with the socio-cultural and protection issues in the hosting countries. Moreover, Catanzarite (2000: 45) contended that "the integration of migrants into the host nation is important as it prevents occupational segregation, and thereby prevents labour market inequality and low earnings".

Like all humanitarian agencies in Durban, the KZNRC also serves all vulnerable migrants, both in Durban, and in other parts of KZN. The mission of this NGO is to create an integration programme with locals, providing legal services, material and food assistance and organising workshops with communities and stakeholders such as the police, banking institutions and the DHA.

*Although the service rendered by the KZNRC is open to any vulnerable migrant, so far, the majority of beneficiaries of our services are nationals from DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and very rarely migrants from Ethiopia, regarding security (Mukambila, KZNRC 2014).*

According to Mukambila, a respondent from the KZNRC, the office is well known for its compassion and dedication to serve vulnerable migrants whenever they need assistance.

*Our legal services are open to serve any migrant be they local or foreigners in this province. When the service of the office is needed by anyone, anywhere, we are very glad to be there on time. For instance, in 2010, there was a xenophobic threat by the Tongaat residents against Ethiopians. The local people distributed a warning letters saying they should leave the area within ten days. Then, when our office was informed about the issue, we conducted meetings that included the locals and the Ethiopians. We found that the problem stemmed from business competition between the locals and the Ethiopian migrants. Finally, we managed to resolve the matter (Mukambila, KZNRC 2014).*

However, a community representative who was appointed to settle the matter responded in different manner:

*I can say the incident was very silly. We were made to be scapegoats by the locals. They accused us of not visiting them when someone has died or is sick. We were there just to collect their money. And they labelled us as sellers of expired and fake stuff in the township (Mesfin, 4 Oct 2014).*

**Table 4.16: Respondents’ length of residence in Durban (N=28)**

Length of residence in Durban	Frequency	Percent
<6 months	2	7.1
6 months to 1 year	4	14.3
1 to 2 years	2	7.1
2 to 3 years	2	7.1
3 to 4 years	6	21.4
5 to 6 years	3	10.7
6 to 7 years	9	32.1
Total	28	100.0

In order to examine respondents’ perceptions towards the services provided by NGOs in Durban, the respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement to the question, ‘whether refugee agencies like human rights, RSS and other refugee agents that serve migrants in Durban’. The majority of the respondents (75 percent) do not have any idea about the services that are

provided by NGOs in Durban. However, of the total 10.7 percent (3.6 percent agreed (A) and 7.1 percent strongly agreed (SA) that NGOs in Durban assist foreign migrants. Similarly, those respondents who disagreed (DA) and strongly disagreed (SDA) account for 10.7 percent and 3.6 percent, respectively (Table 4:17). Furthermore, Gebre *et al.* (2011) attested that Ethiopian migrants in Durban do not ask for any humanitarian assistance from NGOs. Similarly, the respondents who participated in this study indicated that they do not ask for any socio-economic assistance from the NGOs in Durban (Table 4.16).

Furthermore, Table 4.17 indicates that there is a negative perception held by migrants with regard to the services rendered by the NGOs, the police and DHA employees. The respondents' perceptions of the services delivered by the justice system and the police were negative. The respondents were asked how they perceive the justice institutions in Durban. In this case, 14.2 percent of them (7.1 percent strongly agreed and 7.1 percent agreed) perceived justice institutions in Durban as treating all the people as equals before the law. However, 39.4 percent of the respondents (21.4 percent disagreed and 18 percent strongly disagreed) felt that the justice institutions do not treat all the people equally before the law. The rest of the respondents (46.4 percent) do not have any idea about the justice system (Table 4.17). Similarly, the majority (60.7 percent) of the respondents (21.4 strongly agreed and 39.3 agreed) perceived perpetration by the police to be the greatest threat to them. Similarly, 10.7 percent and 3.6 percent of the respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed, respectively. However, 25 percent of the respondents do not have any idea about crimes committed by the police in Durban (Table 4.17). The question on the perception of respondents on the attitudes of the Durban people also investigated. The perception of the majority (75.1 percent) (32.1 strongly agreed and 43 percent agreed) of the respondents indicate that the people of Durban are friendly (Table 4.17).

*Manipulation and dropping of migrants' cases by the justice institutions and by the police, more crimes committed by the police and by DHA workers in Durban are common. We have challenges with these issues. Sometimes, the Ethiopian community representatives are also involved in helping with migrant matters. Sometimes, we prepare interpreters and lawyers, because the majority of*

*migrants don't have contact with the LHR and others like the UNHCR (Mesfin, 4 Oct 2014).*

Similarly, Gebre *et al.* (2011: 30) indicated that, “Ethiopian migrants in Durban have very limited contact with the local South Africa community and non-governmental organisations including the UN.” However, the lack and limited knowledge of English and other local languages were obstacles to almost all respondents (97.4 percent), restricting their accesses to services that were rendered by refugee agencies in Durban (Table 4.17).

**Table 4.17: Respondents’ level of agreement with regard to key services and protection issues in Durban (N=28)**

	SA	A	NI	D	SDA
Lack of knowledge English and other local languages are obstacles preventing me from accessing services and doing better business	64.3	32	3.6	-	-
I don't think humanitarian agencies like human rights, RSS and other refugee agents serve migrants in Durban equally	7.1	39.3	46.4	7.1	-
The justice institutions in Durban treat all people equally before the law	7.1	7.1	46.4	21.4	18
Service providers owned by the government welcome and serve migrants as equals to citizens	7.1	39.3	14.3	25	14.3
Police crime towards foreigners is the greatest threat to us	21.4	39.3	25	10.7	3.6
The people of Durban (South Africans) are friendly	32.1	43	7.1	10.7	7.1

In addition to the socio-economic challenges and losses, (Table 4.18), the findings also indicate that the Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban do not report their problems to the governmental and non-governmental refugee representatives. For instance, the majority (67.9 percent) of the respondents who faced security problems did not report their cases. Of all the respondents, only 10.7 and 21.4 percent of the respondents reported to the Ethiopian community and the police station in Durban, respectively (Table 4.18). And of those who opened the cases, those cases which were resolved and partially solved by the requested bodies account for 7.1 percent each. However, the respondents’ cases which remain unsolved by the requested bodies represent 46.4 percent and pending cases comprise 39.3 percent.

*It is very strange being an Ethiopian and asking for money or assistance from the UN or other co-agencies. These NGOs don't have the power and money to help migrants. I have not seen or heard anyone saying thank you to them. Our only accessible body is the HA, though we are not happy (Khasah, 5 Sep 2014).*

**Table 4.18: Respondents' socio-economic and security challenges in Durban**

<b>PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED IN DURBAN</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
Housebreaking and robbery at residences	53.5	46.4
Robbery at my business	50%	50%
Harassment, confiscation of goods and demanding of money by police	75%	25%
Attacks and xenophobic threats, especially by criminals	50%	50%
<b>LOSSES AS A RESULT OF ROBBERIES</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>%</b>
No problem	17	58.6
R5100-R7000	4	13.8
R7100-R9000	1	3.4
R9100-R11000	2	7.1
R13100-R15000	1	3.4
>R15000	3	10.3
<b>OTHER RELATED PROBLEMS</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>%</b>
Disabled (beaten by criminals)	1	3.4
Hijacked (robbed of R5000 and my car recovered)	1	3.4
Hijacked with a fully-loaded bakkie (R90,000)	1	3.4
Lost brother (brother shot dead by criminals)	1	3.4

Table 4.18 summarises the respondents' socio-economic challenges and their impacts on migrant respondents in Durban. In order to assess and measure the challenges and problems, the respondents were asked questions related to their socio-economic issues (Table 4.18). Seventy-five percent of the respondents reported that there are continuous harassments, confiscation of goods and demanding of money from the migrants by police in Durban. It is noted that 50 percent of the respondents declared that they had experienced robberies at their businesses and 53.5 percent reported that they had suffered housebreakings and robberies at places of residences. Similarly, 50 percent of the respondents had experienced threats of xenophobic attacks in Durban, especially by the criminals (Table 4.18).

Recent research on the issue of crime perpetrated on African migrants indicated that small business operators, particularly foreign migrants, are vulnerable to different kinds of crimes. For instance, recent research conducted on foreign migrants in Durban indicated that female street traders are vulnerable to sexual abuse (Lee, 2004). In addition to the harassment, the police are also blamed for taking away their money and other valuable items during such operations (Gema, 2001).

*Since I opened my business here (South Beach) I have faced many major problems. On the first day, I went to the police station to open a case. Unfortunately, the officer on duty asked me how much money I had lost. When I told him the amount, he again asked me of what type of currency I was robbed. Then I told him it was Rands. He laughed... and advised me not to open a case. He and his colleague were laughing. When I asked why this was so amusing, he said, "No, no my friend, remember the money is not dollars, they took Rands, the money of South Africans". I was so angry. His friend confessed that they were joking. Since then, whatever the problem, I hate to open cases at police stations (Dejen, 20 Sep 2014).*

Most of the respondents (75 percent) indicated that the police are usually the ones who they considered as the main threat to their survival in Durban (Table 4.18).

*It was my first day in Durban. My friend and I booked into a lodge around Shoprite-South Beach area. We were out to dinner with friends until 9 p.m.. They drop us at the Value lodge. After a few minutes, there was a knock at our room door and we heard "Open up, we are police". When we opened the door, four policemen and women came inside. They searched and came up with some plastic object with which they accused us of being druggies or drug-dealers. They demanded R500 from each of us otherwise they would take us to the police station. We didn't have R1000, but we managed to pay R700. This is how we live with the Police (Memo, 21 Sep 2014).*

Organised crime that targets or perpetrates against migrant business owners is common in Durban. For instance, criminals pretending to be the police and SARS officials are becoming uncontrollable in Durban. Similarly, a study conducted by Hayangah and Ofosu-Kwakye (2009) showed that the crucial challenges confronting Durban today are, among other things, crime, poverty and the inefficiencies of the local government.

*I have a small shop and I sometimes sell clothes and soccer jerseys, including South African and English soccer jerseys. I know it is not legal to sell brands. However, some criminals pretending to be customs' officers, or from SARS or wearing police uniforms come and confiscate branded and non-branded clothing. Sometimes, I also pay money to the real customs officer who checks shop to shop, so that he will phone me so that I can hide all the unauthorised clothing ahead of the official checking (Tsige, 17 Sep 2014).*

*I have a restaurant in West Street and I serve food for Ethiopians. In January 2013, I was stopped at a robot in Smith Street around the City campus, just by the rear of my business. Two private cars stopped in front of me and to my right. Two men came out and pointed a gun at me. They grabbed me and chased me out of my car. The total value I lost in that incident is estimated at more than R80 000 to R90 000, including stock estimated at R25 000, around R8000 cash in my pocket and my car estimated at R45 000. There were metro police at the junction. They were watching the incident. One of the hijacker's cars was already stopped in front of me, almost in the middle of the road. I received neither response nor sympathy from them (Mesfin, 4 Oct 2014).*

*I can't open cases against polices or criminals who are always in and out of police custody. Even if you give the police a tip-off, they ask you for proof and if you give them proof they will carry out an investigation. We can't open cases. We are scare for our lives (Tsige, 17 Sep 2014).*

#### 4.9 Concerns about the government organisations and NGOs in Durban

One of the important aspects of the OAU convention of 1989 is that it urges all member countries to accept migrants ‘temporarily.’ Thus, it contributes to the development of the right to temporary protection for humanitarian reasons. Lopez (2007: 389-390) on the other hand, argued that “the 1989, OAU Convention explicitly includes victims of environmental crises, since such events seriously disturb the public order.”

**Table 4.19: Respondents’ perceptions of the justice system in Durban (N=28)**

<b>Respondents and bodies which received cases</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>%</b>
Community organisation of my country	3	10.7
Police	6	21.4
Human rights/refugee agency	-	-
No report	19	67.9
<b>Did your request receive attention from the requested body</b>		
Yes	2	7.1
Partially	2	7.1
Not at all	13	46.4
Pending	11	39.3

The government of South Africa, refugee agencies and the NGOs in South Africa have been participating in ensuring the protection of and upholding the rights of asylum-seekers and refugees (CoRMSA, 2009). Moreover, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996: Chapter 2:1247-1259) outlines the “legal protection and provision for Universal Human Rights (UHR) in South Africa, such as ensuring equality and human dignity, freedom and security, no subjection to servitude, slavery and forced labour, freedom of belief and freedom of expression and opinion”. However, foreign migrants’ permits and protections are among the most worrying issues in South Africa. For instance, Palmary (2002) identified three systematic migrants’ violations by the DHA. A deliberate scaling down of the asylum process so that; firstly, the DHA is able to prevent migrants from settling permanently in South Africa. The second systematic migrant violation was the Department’s desire to provide a cheap source of human labour for the country. The third reason, according to Palmary (2002), was also the deliberate delays to determine the migrants’ status which are aimed at benefitting the corrupt department officials.



Table 4.18 indicates that respondents of this study have socio-security challenges such as crime, a lack of access to residences and fear of the xenophobic threat in Durban.

*I don't care what some people call us or how they insult us. As a foreigner, the issue of xenophobia always worries me. We don't ask for grants for our children, we pay school and medication fees. We work hard to feed ourselves. But, as a father of two, I always regret raising a family here. No matter where they were born, because of their mother and I, they will be treated like us. I don't see a future for my kids here (Mesfin, 4 Oct 2014).*

However, as the majority of respondents reported, more crimes are committed by the police and staff members at Home Affairs (Table 4.17). Similarly, Maharaj (2009) contended that police repeatedly link migrants to criminal activities without supplying proof of their assertions. The study also asserted that the majority of asylum-seekers and refugee respondents have problems regarding access to residential accommodation and bank accounts (Table 4.17). Some respondents have reported that certain banking institutions allowed them to open bank accounts. However, there is a problem getting proof of residence. Most of the respondents are dependent on those who have maroon IDs. In addition to the above, the respondents who report cases to justice institutions like the police, are unable to gain a final resolution to their cases. As a result, respondents' perceptions of the services rendered by NGOs and the police force are negative. Although they appeal to them, they do not trust them.

#### **4.10 Conclusion**

This chapter has explored and analysed the information harvested from the respondents using the questionnaires, interviews and analysis of relevant documents. Based on these, a number of concerns emerged from among the Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban. The key points that emerged from the study are, first, environmentally-related events which forced productive rural farmers from the central, eastern, north-eastern and south-eastern parts of Ethiopia to opt for international migration. In this regard, the findings reveal that the perceptions of all Ethiopian environmental migrants towards the impacts of environmental change in Ethiopia were almost similar. As the results reveal, almost all the respondents crossed borders illegally. Consequently,

almost all of the journeys of respondents to South Africa were not as smooth as they wished, and as pledged by the brokers and migrant traffickers and smugglers. Therefore, while they were travelling, they were exposed to different abuses such as beatings, betrayal, ransoms and abandonment in forests, rivers and lakes.

Foreign migrants in South Africa were involved in micro-economic activities such as petty trading, flea-markets and street vending (Adepoju 2006a). Similarly, the study asserts that, Ethiopian environmental migrants who participated in this study are also involved in formal and informal trading activities. Despite their historical and socio-economic differences in Ethiopia, all of the respondents were self-employed and are economically successful and independent. However, regarding security issues, documents and access to housing and banking services, they have challenges and problems.

All member states of the UN and AU, including South Africa, have obligations and responsibilities to secure social security and the human rights of foreign migrants by taking punitive action against those individuals and government officials who violate the migrants' rights. The government of South Africa allows asylum seekers and refugees to work and study in the country. Similarly, there are also several NGOs in Durban which work against abuses of violations to and crimes against migrants. However, the perceptions of the Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban towards the services offered by the government and NGOs were perceived to be negative.

## **CHAPTER 5: EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **5.1 Introduction**

Different researchers have asserted that the global environmental change has directly and/or indirectly contributed to and facilitated exposure of human beings to different vulnerabilities through many events such as ecological disasters, economic hardship, migration, conflict and impacts on human rights (Care International, 2011; Gemenne, 2011b). The migration of Africans and migrants from around the world to South Africa has been forced by different push and pull factors. Valiji (2003) suggested that the migration of foreign nationals into South Africa is due to many factors, including, famine, environmental degradation, drought, economic instability, political conflict, violation of human rights and persecution in their respective countries.

The impact of environmental change in Ethiopia has affected the socio-economic aspects of the country, hence, the argument that the history of migration in Ethiopia is associated with successive drought, land degradation and poverty. Regional and international conventions and definitions regarding environmental migrants are, however, hindering the victims of the global environmental change from being recognised by migrant-receiving countries. Limited access to basic services and issues of security, foreign abuse and harassment by authorities like the police and the DHA are rampant in South Africa. However, African migrants are mostly vulnerable to xenophobia and discrimination. The aim of this chapter is to summarise the key findings in relation to the objectives of the study. Furthermore, the limitations and recommendations of the study will be presented.

### **5.2. Discussion of the key findings**

This study attempted to address the key findings based on the following research objectives as stated in Chapter Two, which are to:

- Explore the perceptions of migrants about the role of environmental factors in their displacement from Ethiopia.
- Understand the treks of migrants from Ethiopia to South Africa.
- Examine how migrants adjust and adapt to the socio-economic challenges in Durban.

- Assess the nature of assistance provided by the government and non-governmental agencies to refugees.

### ***5.2.1 Perceptions of migrants about the role of environmental change in displacing them from Ethiopia***

The results reveal that the perceptions of all of the migrant participants towards environmental change and its impact on human livelihoods were similar to that discovered by previous studies conducted in Ethiopia. Furthermore, migrant respondents expressed opinions as to the degree of environmental impact which affected the livelihood of the rural people. The majority of the migrant respondents were farmers who migrated from the rural areas of the central highlands, the east, north-eastern and south-eastern regions of Ethiopia. Previous studies conducted in Ethiopia show that environmentally-induced migration in Ethiopia is more severe in the rural areas of the central and north-eastern regions (Choularton, 2005; Hunnes, 2012). Like most developing countries, the impact of environmental change in Ethiopia has affected the socio-economic sectors of the country. Thus, the history of migration in Ethiopia has been associated with successive droughts, land degradation and poverty (Ezra 1997; Getachew 1995; Ezra, 2001; Choularton, 2005; Workneh, 2008).

The key finding of this study is that migrant respondents perceive the frequent droughts, severe environmental and forest degradation and extreme poverty in Ethiopia to be the main factors causing displacement. As a result, the findings of the study show that environmentally-induced displacements, both internally and externally, are common, particularly in the rural areas of Ethiopia. Similarly, Hammond (2000) cited in Dessalegne (2004) and Ezra and Kiros (2001) showed that in response to successive droughts and other environmental shocks, rural communities in Ethiopia migrate to neighbouring countries seeking assistance.

It has been argued that Ethiopia's environmentally-induced migration will be worse due to poverty and a long history of environmental, economic and political shocks in the country (Dray and Mueller, 2012a). Hence, migrants' responses to drought, political and ethnic unrests have been identified as causes for their migration. The findings of this study regarding the perceptions of the migrant respondents towards environmental change were similar with Choularton (2005)

and Hunnes (2012) findings that the variation of climate changes shows that the country has experienced warmer climate and erratic rainfall in last thirty years. These environmental impacts have been accelerating mass human and animal migrations within Ethiopia and beyond its borders. According to the migrant respondents, the impacts of environmentally-induced migration were more common in the central highlands, eastern and south eastern part of Ethiopia.

### ***5.2.2 Understanding the trek of migrants from Ethiopia to South Africa***

This study indicates that the desire to migrate from Ethiopia to South Africa is motivated by the relatively stable economic and free business opportunities in South Africa. This statement can be supported by the fact that none of the migrant respondents applied for asylum in the first country they land up in. In addition to South Africa's economic upper hand, the findings of this research reveal that environmental migrants' choice to migrate to South Africa was inspired by false information and the deceptive tactics of brokers, human traffickers and migrant smugglers. In relation to this, Dejen, an environmental migrant, responded that the houses built and other assets bought in the country by Ethiopians who had previously migrated to South Africa also convinced people to choose South Africa rather than European and Arab countries. However, trekking from Ethiopia to South Africa was perilous and was a life-threatening journey.

Once the decision to migrate had been reached, migrants undertook their journey without evaluating the positions, circumstances and possibilities awaiting them on the journey and in the host country. The findings illustrate that 93 percent of the respondents travelled by crossing borders illegally. As a result of this, many migrants were tortured by immigration authorities and were also exposed to different crimes such as intimidation, physical and emotional attack, ransom, abandonment, betrayal by migrant traffickers and smugglers to police, border-guards and bandits. Above all, the findings show that migrant brokers, migrant traffickers and smugglers are not accountable if migrants are arrested by authorities. They are also not held to account by the families of migrants in the event of any human injuries and fatalities.

The findings of the research reveal that the migrants' journeys from Kenya to South Africa were well-organised and employ several people from various countries. Kenya was the first country

crossed by the majority of respondents and it was used as a gateway or transit post to Tanzania. According to the UNHCR (2009) Kenya was the most commonly chosen destination country in Africa by Ethiopians.

The route to South Africa begins from Kenya and it diverts into two different directions from Tanzania. However, respondents indicated that sometimes, the net and routes of smuggling can stretch from Ethiopia up to South Africa. The Tanzanian, Malawian, Zambian and Zimbabwean route is the longest and involves land transport, while the Tanzanian and Mozambique route is shorter and involves both land and water transport. Similar studies conducted by Adepoju (2008), UNODC (2006) and the United States Department of State (2006) contended that Kenya and Tanzania serve as the main transit routes for Ethiopians to be trafficked through and smuggled to Europe, the Middle East and South Africa. However, migrants' safety, security and speedy arrival in South Africa is neither determined by the distance of the route nor the number of countries crossed. The amount of money paid by migrants to those who facilitate the journey is extensive. Similarly, the amount of money they pay also does not guarantee their safety and security. Alternatively, the total time taken, the safety and security of migrants merely depends on the credibility and experience of those participating in their migration.

### ***5.2.3. Environmental migrants' adjustment and adaptation in Durban***

New Zealand, Australia, Argentina and Sweden are pioneer countries who accept climate change refugees as part of their humanitarian immigration programme by ensuring that appropriate recognition is awarded to climate change refugees through the establishment of a new convention on climate change refugees (Australian Labour Party, 2006). In the case of South Africa, Valiji (2003) argued that the flocks of foreign migrants into South Africa are due to many reasons, including, famine, environmental degradation, drought, economic instability, political conflict, violation of human rights and persecution in their own countries. However, the finding of this study indicates that the majority of Ethiopian environmental migrants applying for asylum at the DHA were not recognised as refugees in so far as environmental change-related events are concerned. In relation to the above, Harris (1995:119-128) contended that "migrants are viewed as people in flight from poverty, and those seeking asylum are all too often regarded as economic migrants and therefore they governed by immigration, not refugee law". Furthermore, Valiji

(2003) argued that the Refugee Status Determination Officer (RSDO) often rejects the asylum application if the country of the asylum seeker is not at war. The above implies that the government of South Africa doesn't recognise migrants displaced by climate change-related events.

The findings of this research also reveal that Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban have faced many challenges, mainly, from polices and Home Affairs workers. The researcher has observed that new arrivals are exposed to different foreign abuses and violations, mainly by police, security, criminals and sometimes by the security guards at the DHA. Due to the migrants' financial and information constraints during the initial days of their arrival, they are delayed for many days on the border, and the entry permits given to them (valid for only 14 days) at the border posts expire before they reach Durban. In addition to the arrests and crimes, when migrants approach the DHA with their expired entry permits, they face harassment and sometimes workers at the DHA ask them for money in return for safe custody.

The general perceptions of migrants in this study indicate that the decisions made by the DHA regarding the permits they hold are associated with money. This means that, regardless of which factors pushed the migrants from home, money is the key in determining the status of the migrants. According to the respondents, almost all of them are self-employed and the majority of them own shops. The findings of this research confirm that the majority of migrant participants have been involved in bribery while they were applying for or renewing their permits. However, a very strange opinion has emerged from some respondents of this study which shows that they prefer to be part of this bribery system than waiting in the long queues and suffering the bureaucratic processes at the DHA.

In relation to documents, migrant respondents insisted that the asylum permits they hold are the main obstacles for them, preventing them from obtaining a suitable residence and accessing bank accounts. The majority of the migrant respondents in this study also do not have bank accounts. Dejen, one of the migrant respondents expressed the fear that the potential threat of xenophobic attack, robbery and violence against him and his assets might erupt in Durban one day. Whatever they own is inside their shops, either in stock or cash, so they feel that one day, these assets

might be taken from them, as they are known to be people without bank accounts. In such conditions, exposure to continuous attacks, crimes and thefts is rife (Harris, 2001). In addition to this, Landau (2007) contended that migrants' failure to access bank accounts might discourage African migrants from investing more assets in cities, including Durban. However, the finding of this research illustrates that 14.3 percent of the migrant respondents managed to get refugee permits. And of all the participants, 17.9 percent of them (both from asylum and refugee permit holders) also have bank accounts.

Harassment, intimidation and blackmail of migrants by the police, as well as exploitation on the basis of where the migrants come from are some of the overarching concerns and challenges facing migrant respondents in Durban. The findings indicate that the majority of migrant respondents do not feel comfortable or safe, particularly when the police are around them. In addition to this, the results illustrate that police involvement and support towards foreigners' matters in the form of their emergency units does not exist, and if it does, is it is extremely slow.

The socio-economic imbalances and high competition for the resources and services between locals and migrants on one hand, and the fierce competition for space and the retail industry among migrant traders and between migrants and local traders on the other, could lead to conflict in the city (Bond, 2005 and Amasi *et al.*, 2010). Similarly, the findings of a study based on Ethiopian environmental migrants reveals that business competition, business expansion and domination by Ethiopians in Durban could lead to antagonism and xenophobic attacks. It is said that the numbers of Ethiopian new arrivals in Durban are growing daily. Therefore, the findings show that, due to business competition, fighting among Ethiopian migrants has begun to occur. Dejen, one of the migrant respondents, referred to common fighting and blackmailing among them, (Ethiopians) due to business competition. This fear is that, in the long run, the time-bomb triggered by business competition among them might erupt soon. Similarly, a study conducted by Amasi *et al.* (2010) revealed that the competition between Ethiopian and Congolese traders, and between migrants and local traders in Durban could lead to the development of xenophobia.

Despite the challenges mainly generated by the lack of appropriate documentation and permits, Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban are very successful. The findings of this research



illustrate that almost all respondents (96.4 percent) came to Durban because of the strong networks that exist between Ethiopian migrants who already resided in Durban and new arrivals to South Africa. These networks were the main motives for respondents to come to South Africa in general, and Durban in particular. All the migrants came to South Africa without resources that could help them start businesses. However, the existing networks in Durban and the Ethiopian's culture of supporting, funding and borrowing money for the new arrivals, and for anyone of their community who is in a difficult position were some of the factors encouraging migrants to reside and operate their own businesses. El-Abed (2003: 16) contended that "social networks refer to ties and kinship which provide social, financial and political support in order to facilitate social development of their members." In addition to this, Durban's socio-economic attractions, such as its suitability to operate businesses and low crime rate compared to other cities were also amongst the motives for migrants to choose Durban.

Although the majority of respondents were engaged in farming-related activities, the findings of this research attempts that the survival strategy of Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban lies in operating formal and informal trading activities by adopting a self-employment strategy. Unlike the majority of black Africans who approach government and non-governmental agencies for financial and material assistance, Ethiopian environmental migrants confirmed that they are capable of being self-sufficient and that they are economically successful. Previous studies conducted on Ethiopian migrants in Durban also reveal that the culture of hard work of the Ethiopians has helped them to live in better economic conditions than other migrants (Ghebre *et al.*, 2011).

#### ***5.2.4. Nature of assistance provided by governmental and non-governmental refugee agencies to migrants***

Many NGOs and humanitarian refugee agencies work under the principles of the UN and AU refugee conventions. LHR, RSS, KZNRC and IAGV are among the agencies who work to assist refugees and asylum-seekers in Durban. The main agendas of these agencies are to facilitate integration and resettlement programs with locals, to assist with court appeals if migrants have problems with permits and the distribution of food parcels. In addition to this, refugee agencies in Durban also offer financial and residential support to most vulnerable migrants. The

researcher assessed whether any Ethiopian environmental migrants have consulted the offices of these agencies seeking humanitarian assistance, be it residential, permit- or crime-related. Despite their vulnerability to crime and xenophobic attacks, generally no Ethiopian migrants are familiar with these offices. Regarding social services and security issues, the findings reveal that migrants face challenges, particularly regarding access to residences and bank accounts. However, these offices confirm that they were not approached by any Ethiopian migrants. In addition to this, when they have social and security issues, Ethiopian migrants do not appeal and take their cases to the police or other justice officials. The findings in relation to why Ethiopian environmental migrants do not ask for legal assistance from these agencies and polices can be illustrated as follows:

First, the majority of respondents do not perceive migrants as having equal rights before the law. As most of the cases are opened for robbery, crime and harassment by locals and the police, the migrants' general perception is that the police and justice officials only favour local citizens and they do not expect the police to betray one another, therefore, opening cases and referring matters to justice would be a waste of time and money for them.

Second, they face harassment and underestimation when they open cases. When migrants approach police stations, they fear unexpected reaction by the police officers. The finding in this regard indicates that police harassment and unlawful reaction to claimants is common.

Third, migrants have developed a sense of dissatisfaction and mistrust towards the police. This dissatisfaction stems from the fact that, when criminals are caught with an exhibit, or when police are tipped off about the accused, the police do not arrest them. In this case, the findings illustrate that repeated mishandling of cases and unlawful measures taken by justice officials are the reasons why migrants tend to avoid reporting cases.

The study also reveals that there are NGOs in Durban who participate in providing socio-economic assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers in Durban. The results obtained from the officials of these NGOs reveal that they operate their services under the South African refugee constitution, the international and AU refugee charters and conventions. Financially, they depend

on the UN, humanitarian and religious donors. Despite the limited resources they have, the passion and compassion of helping vulnerable migrants motivates them to carry out their professional responsibilities. However, the findings obtained from NGOs and Ethiopian participants reveal that, generally, Ethiopian migrants in Durban do not come forward to request socio-economic assistance. A similar study conducted by Gebre *et al.* (2011: 30) indicated that “Ethiopian migrants in Durban have limited contact both with the local South Africa community and non-governmental organizations including the UN.” Furthermore, the findings reveal that matters handled by refugee agencies are inefficient and fruitless.

The outcome of the study in relation to the NGOs’ equal treatment, credibility and good services towards foreign migrants, shows that the majority of these migrants don’t have any idea about these NGOs and their services. However, the findings illustrate that 10.7 percent of the migrant respondents agreed that these NGOs don’t treat and deliver good services to all migrants equally (Table 4.16). Furthermore, the results obtained from the migrant respondents reveal that the NGOs in Durban are inadequate in terms of resources and power, and that they are known to be slow and to follow bureaucratic processes. In addition to the above, respondents in this study branded them as incapable of solving the problems of foreigners.

### **5.3 Climate change and the lack of recognition of environmental migrants**

As the problem of climate change continues to escalate, the effects experienced by both humanity and the natural environment are becoming increasingly prevalent. A recent report indicated that the impact of climate change on human lives is already responsible for 300,000 deaths each year, and recently, it affected 300 million people worldwide (GHF, 2009: 1). Furthermore, the report argued that the global economic losses due to climate change are estimated at more than \$125 billion annually (GHF, 2009: 1-2). Despite these catastrophes, there is still no international law for people who flee the impacts of environmental change (McAdam, 2007). Thus, environmentally-induced migrants are facing serious threats and challenges to their lives or livelihoods and violations of civil and political rights (Lafontaine, 2007).

Today, nine out of every ten natural disasters are caused by climate-related problems (UNHCR, 2008). Furthermore, the report indicated that, over the last two decades, the number of recorded

natural disasters has doubled (from 200 to over 400 per year) (UNHCR, 2008). In response to this, the AU (2009: 8) convention indicated that “all state parties shall provide sufficient protection and assistance to IDPs, and where available resources are inadequate to enable them to do so; they shall cooperate in seeking the assistance of international organizations and humanitarian agencies, civil society organizations and other relevant actors.” Despite these multiple disasters, the UN is showing reluctance to amend and revise the Refugee Protocol of 1967.

Mirroring the reluctance by the UN and the majority countries, including South Africa, very few countries are taking concrete steps towards assisting environmentally-induced migrants. For instance, on the basis of an immigration agreement in Pacific countries, New Zealand has already accepted ‘climate refugees’ by taking an annual quota of migrants from certain island states, for instance, 75 environmental migrants from Tuvalu and Kiribati and 350 from Tonga. The Swedish aliens’ law and Finland’s are only a few of the migration laws of EU Member States, which contain a category of persons who cannot return to their countries of origin due to environmental disasters (Vikram and Finn, 2009: 313-326). In Australia, the Labor Party recommended, in 2007, that the Australian government should accept climate change refugees as part of its humanitarian immigration program, and should ensure appropriate recognition of climate change refugees in existing Conventions, or through the establishment of a new convention on climate change refugees (Australian Labor Party, 2006). Similarly, the Argentinean government has taken steps to accept migrants vulnerable to environmental change (Vikram and Finn, 2009). And this glimmer of hope offered by these exemplary countries and the broad realities of global climate change are expected to amend the primitive UN refugee definition.

So far, the South African Refugee Act of 1998 binds the state to certain obligations with respect to the treatment and protection of refugees in accordance with internationally accepted guidelines (Republic of South Africa, 1998). According to the Refugee Act 130 of 1998, a refugee is entitled to full legal protection, formal written recognition of refugee status, to seek employment or study and to receive the same basic health services and primary education as South African citizens. In accordance with this, South Africa’s Refugee Act of 1998 was also rectified to align

with the internationally accepted guidelines and the law is obliged to respect, treat, and protect refugees. In this case, all refugees and asylum-seekers in South Africa are entitled to legal protection, given formal written recognition with a refugee status, access to basic health services and to seek employment and to study in the Republic.

#### **5.4 Recommendations**

Literature reviews and results obtained from this study reveal that climate change has direct and indirect impacts on humans' health, food and environmental securities. In addition to this, climate change events have been affecting human assets in different forms of natural ecosystems such as deserts and rainforests, depleting soil of grasslands and savannahs (UNEP, 2010). As a result, huge losses of forest and biodiversity and disruptions to human habitats have occurred (IPCC, 2014). As a result of the cumulative effect of the climate change, forced human migration and displacement have occurred (UNHCR, 2009). The IOM, the UNHCR and the United Nations University (2009) reported that the gradual and sudden environmental changes have already resulted in substantial human migration and displacement. Though environmental change is a global problem, the majority victims of the global environmental change are the poor communities who are marginalised by social, economical and political powers (UNHCR, 2009).

Climate-related displacement can affect the socio-economic affairs of both the sending and receiving countries. As a solution, the UNHCR (2009) suggested that it is important to assess environmental impacts on human lives; to make environmental information public; to facilitate and promote public participation in environmental decision-making and to provide individuals with remedies (Knox, 2013). On top of this, applying collaborative approaches and partnerships, based on principles of international cooperation and conventions between sending and receiving countries, developed countries and international organisations can forestall the dire situations of those most vulnerable migrants of environmental change. For instance, developed countries should provide quotas in their immigration policies for environmentally-induced migrants so that migrants' vulnerabilities and risks to tortures and deportation by immigration officials, and the ransoms and abuses perpetrated by migrant smugglers while they travel could be reduced. In addition to the above, transfer of knowledge and skills and sharing of experiences among countries especially from developed to developing countries, can also help to mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change.

The international community, including scientists, organisations and human rights activists has been calling for the recognition of climate change-induced migrants and respect for their human rights. For instance, Knox (2013) suggested that individuals, communities, and governments have the legal right to enjoy a very safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment. Furthermore, Knox (2013) recommended that states implement appropriate means and measures within their national legislative and judicial systems, and launch education, awareness and enlightenment programs about environmental change and the impacts caused by environmental mismanagement. Applying such mechanisms and measures, at national and international levels, could have a positive effect on mitigating and adapting the impacts caused by climate change.

At grass root level, it is imperative to increase the awareness environmental protection and its management at community and village level. This programme could yield positive understanding about environmental change and its consequences. Implementing this program could be an effective method if proper campaigns and training is provided. On top of these, having community-based legislation and budgetary resources that could be used for nursery and forestation programs and allocating money for those exemplary villagers or villages so that they would be motivated and encouraged to protect their own areas.

#### ***5.4.1 Human trafficking and migrant smuggling***

East Africa, including Ethiopia, is known as a region where peace and human security are fragile and volatile. Human trafficking and smuggling have also had a played complex socio-economic impact on the region (UNODC, 2006; UNODC, 2009). Without sustainable peace and security, sustainable economic development and environmental management will not be achieved. So, promoting the rule of law and human security and good governance by all states in the region could reduce the socio-economic catastrophes, human trafficking and migrant smuggling in the region.

The US Department of State (2010) reported that the government of Ethiopia did not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. The report, however, indicated that the government has made progress over the past year in addressing transnational

trafficking through significantly increased law enforcement efforts. So far, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda and Tanzania have enacted specific anti-trafficking clauses in people's legislation, while Burundi, Kenya, Mauritius and Uganda are in the process of adopting anti-trafficking legislation (UNDO, 2009).

Due to the political and socio-economic insecurities and geographical location, most East African countries are a source of human, drug and firearm trafficking, counterfeiting of goods, currency and medicines, money laundering and terrorism (UNDO, 2009). Therefore, in order to strengthen the combating capacity and capabilities against crime and violations, the implementation of specific legislation addressing these issues is very important. The exchange of information between the sending and receiving countries is also important in tracking and bringing these criminals to justice.

#### ***5.4.1 The roles of governmental and NGOs towards environmental migrants***

The IASC (2008) Working Paper noted that the assistance and protection of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol for those migrants who are directly affected by the effects of climate change was very small. Due to the ongoing drought and deterioration of food supplies in Somalia, as well as in East Africa, the number of refugees is currently increasing with around 1,400 people arriving every day (UNHCR, 2011: 112; OCHA, 2011). As stated by the IPCC (2007) the four dimensions of food security, namely food availability (production and trade), stability of food supplies, access to food and food utilisation will likely be affected by climate change (Olivier, 2012). However, the current and potential environmental impacts on human migration, and the lack of policies and conventions that protect civil rights are the biggest challenges and concerns.

The other drawback of the majority international community according to the Human Rights Council Resolution (HRCR) (2011) is that actions towards climate change-related objectives and general frameworks on corporate responsibilities with regard to human rights are not yet documented in all UN member countries. For instance, South Africa, like many African and Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt and Israel, recognises similar common law principles of

negligence and nuisance regarding climate change and climate change-induced migrants (Hansen, 2013). The government has, however, introduced legislation regulating Greenhouse Gases. However, legal action in response to such legislation is in its infancy. South Africa, as a member and signatory to UN and AU conventions, should implement new laws and guiding frameworks covering climate change and environmental migrants. In addition to this, all migrants' stakeholders such as NGOs, human rights institutions, human rights defenders, academic institutions, researchers, regional organisations and other individuals should participate in providing legal assistance to the vulnerable environmentally-induced migrants. New regional and international frameworks, guiding principles and conventions endorsed by the UN, AU, EU and others on corporate responsibilities to protect and respect human rights in the context of climate change should be implemented (HRCR, 2011).

## **5.5 Conclusion**

Different researchers (Myers, 2002; IPCC, 2007; Hunnes, 2012) emphasised the linkages between the changes of natural environment and the impact on internal or international migration. These linkages, according to the researchers, are land use, including forest cover and its resources; energy use by rural populations; use of common property resources; intrusions into protected areas; soil erosion and soil degradation; flooding, drought and precipitation (excesses and deficits). Furthermore, these linkages indicate that the deteriorations and changes to the natural environments can stimulate the out-migration of people who see the productive capacity of their land, forests and water resources declining. However, the intensity and impacts of environmental change are more severe in developing countries. Ethiopia, like most developing countries, is affected by deteriorations of natural environments and successive droughts (Hunnes, 2012). Migration history in this country is thus more related to the changes regarding natural environmental assets.

Rural communities affected by the deterioration of the natural environment can be encouraged to attempt internal or international migration, particularly where it is easy to cross neighbouring countries (Ezra and Kiros, 2001). Similarly, the findings of the case study reveal that international migration was most important for rural communities in Ethiopia. Furthermore, the findings of the study reveal that Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban originated from Oromia, Southern, Eastern, and central parts of the country. However, Ethiopian environmental



migrants in Durban indicated that the journey from Ethiopia to South Africa was not safe. The involvement of brokers, human traffickers and migrant smugglers from different countries has facilitated the journey from Ethiopia to South Africa. In relation to the socio-economic attractions in Durban, the social network and the culture of cooperation of Ethiopians already living in South Africa were also motives for migrants to flock to Durban.

All participants in this study can be said to be economically independent. All migrants who participated in this study either engage in selling clothes, running tuck-shops or restaurants serving Ethiopian food. However, due to the lack of proper permits, Ethiopian environmental migrants in Durban are vulnerable to different kinds of crime, abuse and harassment both by individual criminals and the police and HA workers. The threat of xenophobia is another concern of these migrants in Durban, and this threat is an obstacle which prevents them from investing more. Different government and NGOs provide legal, limited financial and material assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers, however, the perceptions of Ethiopian environmental migrants towards these agents is that of suspicion, mistrust and, if they seek their assistance, it is very limited.

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