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DOUBLE MARGINALIZED LIVES AS WOMAN AND AS REFUGEE: SYRIAN FEMALE REFUGEES IN ANKARA

Tesis Doctoral

**Presentada por:
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29 de mayo de 2020

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CERTIFICA:

Que la presente memoria, titulada “**Double Marginalized Lives as Woman and as Refugee: Syrian Female Refugees in Ankara**”, corresponde al trabajo realizado bajo su dirección por D. **Onur Yamaner**, para su presentación como Tesis Doctoral en el Programa de Doctorado en Ciencias Sociales de la Universitat de València.

Y para que conste firma el presente certificado en Valencia, a 29 de mayo de 2020.

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Double Marginalized Lives as Woman and as Refugee: Syrian Female Refugees in Ankara

Tesis Doctoral

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ABSTRACT

This thesis lays down how Syrian female refugees are socially, economically, culturally, ethnically and sexually marginalized and what they think about the ongoing events, their status and the steps the government and NGO's have taken so far in order to produce solutions for women's invisibilization in the public sphere. Hereby, I have conducted this research in suburbs around Ankara with a group of Syrian female refugees who are socially excluded as "woman" and "refugee" and the local women. The focus will be on the relation between the discourses produced in the host society and the social exclusion of Syrian female refugees. It should be noted that the source of the discourses could be differentiated in terms of a large number of factors such as political opinion, cultural background, socio-economic position, gender, age, poverty, education level, religious affiliation and personal experiences. As for the gender aspects in social exclusion of Syrian female refugees, we see that even local women use patriarchal discourse to discriminate the refugees. The objectification of Syrian women and their bodies by their own culture are criticized by local women who are subordinated by the structure of the patriarchal society they live in. Another scope of the study is to analyze how powerful these discourses are in the host society and how the Syrian female refugees and local women are affected. It is aimed to establish a cause and effect relationship of the social exclusion of Syrian women regarding discourse analysis as social critique. To carry out the research, Foucauldian discourse analysis consists of the main part of the study. It is used to understand the intersectionality of discrimination and invisibilization of Syrian female refugees. The relationship between the discourses are underlined, as there are many contrasting discourses about the objects and events that benefited from the genealogical approach. Apart from the Foucauldian discourse analysis, this paper also examines the discriminatory discourses towards Syrian refugees on Facebook and in Turkish printed mainstream media by following Van Dijk's Critical Discourse Analysis.

Keywords: Social exclusion of Syrian female refugees in Ankara, Discourse Analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis, Facebook, printed mainstream media.

RESUMEN

Este tesis establece cómo las refugiadas sirias son social, económica, cultural, étnica y sexualmente marginadas y lo que piensan acerca de los eventos en curso, su estado y los pasos que el gobierno y las ONGs han tomado hasta ahora para dar soluciones a la invisibilización de las mujeres en la esfera pública. Para ello, he llevado a cabo esta investigación en los suburbios de Ankara con un grupo de refugiadas sirias que están socialmente excluidas como “mujer” y como “refugiada” y con un grupo de mujeres locales. La atención se centrará en la relación entre los discursos producidos en la sociedad de acogida y la exclusión social de las refugiadas sirias. Cabe señalar que la fuente de los discursos podría diferenciarse en términos de un gran número de factores como la opinión política, los antecedentes culturales, la posición socioeconómica, el género, la edad, la pobreza, el nivel educativo, la afiliación religiosa y las experiencias personales. En cuanto a los aspectos de género en la exclusión social de las refugiadas sirias, vemos que incluso las mujeres locales usan el discurso patriarcal para discriminar a las refugiadas. La cosificación de las mujeres sirias y sus cuerpos por su propia cultura es criticada por las mujeres locales que están subordinadas a la estructura de la sociedad patriarcal en la que viven. Otro ámbito del estudio es analizar cuán poderosos son estos discursos en la sociedad de acogida y cómo las refugiadas sirias y las mujeres locales se ven afectadas por ellos. Su objetivo es establecer una relación de causa y efecto de la exclusión social de las mujeres sirias con respecto al análisis del discurso como crítica social. Para llevar a cabo la investigación, la parte principal del estudio consiste en el análisis del discurso foucauldiano. Éste se usa para comprender la interseccionalidad de la discriminación y la invisibilización de las refugiadas sirias. La relación entre los discursos está subrayada, ya que hay muchos discursos que contrastan sobre los objetos y eventos que se beneficiaron del enfoque genealógico. Además del análisis del discurso de foucauldiano, este documento también examina los discursos discriminatorios hacia los refugiados sirios en Facebook y en los principales medios de comunicación impresos turcos siguiendo el análisis crítico del discurso de Van Dijk.

Palabras clave: exclusión social de las refugiadas Sirias en Ankara, análisis del discurso, Análisis Crítico del Discurso, Facebook, medios de comunicación impresos.



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Que la Tesi Doctoral sota el títol "**Double Marginalized Lives as Woman and as Refugee: Syrian Female Refugees in Ankara**", es tracta d'un treball d'investigació original realitzat pel sotasignat durant el període de formació per a obtindre el títol de Doctor en Ciències Socials, assumint amb aquest acte i signatura les responsabilitats legals derivades en cas que es demostre la falsedat de dades ací ressenyades.

I perquè així conste, signe esta declaració.

En València a 29 de mayo de 2020

Signat:

To all marginalized female refugees

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP: The Justice and Development Party

AYM: Anayasa Mahkemesi / Constitutional Court

CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

CHP: The Republican People's Party

DİB: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı / Presidency of Religious Affairs

FRONTEX: European Border and Coast Guard Agency

GAP: Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi / The Southeastern Anatolia Project

GEM: Temporary Education Centers

MEB: Ministry of National Education

MHP: The Nationalist Movement Party

PKK: Terrorist Organization - The Kurdistan Worker's Party

TCK: Türk Ceza Kanunu'nun / Turkish Penal Code

TUİK: The Turkish Statistical Institute

UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

‘I deserve what you deserve’

I had been planning to begin my thesis with the assassinated journalist Samir Kassir’s words “It’s not pleasant being Arab these days” (Kassir, 2013) until one of the respondents in my survey requested me to use her husband’s words “I deserve what you deserve”. Therefore, I have decided to underline both of them as I have witnessed what these two sentences meant countless times. I converted Kassir’s discourse into another discourse specific to my subject of study as “it’s not pleasant being a Syrian woman these days”. This is because Syrian female refugees have to deal with immigration and gender-based difficulties and constraints during and after the forced migration.

Recent migration studies in social sciences with historical and sociological perspectives approach gender as one of the main characteristics of social relations (Schrover & Moloney, 2013) as well as ethnicity and class. Another view is the feminization of migration (Castles, Miller, & Haas, 2014) due to the increasing number of unattached female immigrants and refugees, and altered gender role of women economically (Herzog, 2011, p. 611). Feminization of migration is much like labour migration as it too occurs during forced migration. In this regard, vulnerability of female refugees reaches hazardous levels. Their vulnerability is varied (Schrover & Moloney, 2013) and differentiated as structural and cultural, real and perceived ones. This concept explains that, in addition to changing gender roles, men can also be passive and weak as women are in migration processes. The main reason for this is loss of work and status. To illustrate the issue in the context of Syrians, the nationalist discourse produced by the host society will firstly target the male weakness.

Additionally, Syrian female refugees are exposed to different forms of violence, trafficking, sexual harassment and exploitation. Their vulnerability and gender-based violence against women put them in such a situation that they can even see another social problem, unregistered marriages (Imam Marriage) as a type of solution (CTDC, 2015). Religious marriages can be seen as a possible solution, to some extent, for the

female refugees and their families. However, it is also open to abuse as it is not recognized by law in Turkey. These marriages also give rise to discourses that play a role in increasing the social exclusion of Syrian female refugees. In this respect, the list of justifications and reasons of making discourse based on the real incidents or the rumors inspired and reproduced by the true stories could easily be expanded with the help of growing hate speech. It would be essential to refer to at least some points and explanations of hate speech even though it has a wide range of definitions. Bhikhu Parekh, a political theorist, says “Hate speech expresses, encourages, stirs up, or indicates hatred against a group of individuals, distinguished by a particular feature or set of features such as race, ethnicity, gender, religion, nationality, and sexual orientation” (Parekh, 2012, p. 40). He also suggests three criteria in order to identify hate speech that may help us distinguish any speech from hate speech. He underlines characteristics of hate speech as below:

- Firstly, “*directed against a specified or easily identifiable individual or . . . a group of individuals based on an arbitrary and normatively irrelevant feature*”.
- Secondly, “*hate speech stigmatizes the target group by implicitly or explicitly ascribing to it qualities widely regarded as highly undesirable*”.
- Thirdly, “*because of its negative qualities, the target group is viewed as an undesirable presence and a legitimate object of hostility*” (Ibid, pp. 37-40).

Racist hate speech creates its own forms such as *generalization*, “*us*” and “*them*”, normalization of discriminatory discourses and attitudes, new racism and so forth (Dinar, Mair, Rafael, Rathje, & Schramm, 2016). Hate speech is agonizingly broad and individuals or groups – women, foreigners and migrants, refugees, people with disabilities, members of different beliefs and sects and even people with some particular diseases – can easily be exposed to hate speech. Motivation for hate speech is developed by some factors such as ethnicity, disability, religion and gender. Another significant point is the relationship between hate speech and freedom of speech. Their multifaceted relation problematizes the issue (Weber, 2009).

In this regard, we should also emphasize women’s silenced position due to being subjected to threats even though freedom of speech is a fundamental right for both sexes. Under-represented position of women in all types of media based on political and social oppression makes women more vulnerable to these discriminatory discourses,

attacks and threats in social media platforms. Additionally, severe forms of hate speech in social media suppress and prevent those who attempt to approach refugee issue with an objective perspective, the result being that their significant voices are not heard and they remain silent, too. In addition, hate speech has an ability to derive from each negative event that is relevant or irrelevant to the issue.

This thesis focuses on a group of Syrian female refugees who live in Ankara and are socially excluded as “*woman*” and “*refugee*”. The focus will be on the relation between the discourses produced in the host society and the social exclusion of Syrian female refugees. It should be noted that the source of the discourses could be differentiated in terms of a large number of factors such as political opinion, cultural background, socio-economic position, gender, age, poverty, education level, religious affiliation and personal experiences and so on. As for the gender aspects in social exclusion of Syrian female refugees, we see that even local women use patriarchal discourse to discriminate the refugees. Using the abovementioned patriarchal discourses, local women create a subordinating environment, the one that they have been criticizing and that has objectified themselves for the refugees. Another scope of the study is to analyze how powerful these discourses are in the host society and how the Syrian female refugees and local women are affected. A cause and effect relationship of the social exclusion of Syrian women regarding discourse analysis as social critique is aimed to be established.

1.1. Research Questions

This thesis covers three different sets of data – from Syrian female refugees, from local women and from media discourse – and 24 in-depth interviews and media analysis. Additionally, to enrich the content and to take different approaches, several written interviews have been conducted with academicians, from different Turkish universities, on a particular subject. Criticisms and/or details provided in relevance to the research and the obtained data have been added to the text as footnotes.

The main research questions and the hypotheses developed are as follows:

Research question 1: What factor(s) affect(s) the social exclusion of the Syrian female refugees most?

Hypothesis 1: Syrian female refugees are socially excluded by both public and private patriarchy. They are already subordinated in Syrian society. In addition, the rumors, which are spread by local women, make them more vulnerable and a target to be exploited by men.

Research question 2: How do the social media (Facebook) reproduce information about the Syrian refugee issue and how do the media (Turkish printed mainstream media) build rational and sentimental justifications of discriminatory discourses?

Hypothesis 2: The news related to the refugees and refugee issue takes place on media especially when they are involved in crime so that the media can make use of some expressions for the refugees (Dijk, 1999) such as smuggler, murderer, criminal, burglar and illegal immigrant. Making sweeping statements about refugees and underlying negative examples boost hate speech among the host society. Thus, the media with its language reproduces some negative perception of Syrian refugees. Moreover, the reproduction of the information has been reprocessed in social media repeatedly.

Misleading or exaggerated headlines, news and articles, (particularly on social media platforms like Facebook) make hate discourse against Syrian refugees become widespread in the host society. Social media platforms have become a place in which the racists build a social network and organize their attack plans. These physical and verbal attacks result in negative consequences.

Research question 3: In what ways is the Syrian refugee issue used as a discourse to criticize the ruling party?

Hypothesis 3: When a Syrian refugee gets involved in a crime or the aids received by Syrian refugees are reported in the news, these types of news are generally used for criticism and political gain by the opposition parties. The common sense (common idea or judgement) in society is that criticizing refugee issue means criticizing the governing party so that those who support the governing party tend not to criticize the policy but the presence of refugees although they do not support the policy pursued in the refugee issue. The criticism differs according to the identity and/or ideology of whom voices the criticism. A simple list for grouping people can be formed as those who (only + always) criticize the ruling party, who do not, who want to neither criticize the ruling party nor

support its refugee policy.

Research question 4: How does the identity of the refugees – being Arab trigger the racism in the host society?

Hypothesis 4: The Arab identity and picturing the Arab in every respect are almost always seen synonymous with “undesirable” by especially the intellectuals of Turkish society. There are several reasons for the formation of this thought. As an example, the Arab betrayal in the First World War is still alive in Turkish social memory. However, this historical discourse is only one of the justifications of why Turks prefer to deny the idea of any resemblance to Arabs in spatio-temporal perspective (Bora, 2014). This is because according to Turks, the backwardness and bigotry based on religion are correlated with the reflection of the Arabic cultural elements, which are desired to be erased from Turkish society.

Research question 5: How do Syrian female refugees become a problem or a threat for, and a target or a victim of local women?

Hypothesis 5: At first, Syrian female refugees were *muhacir* and Muslim sisters for some local women (Especially for religious women). Locals began to criticize them with the increase of Syrian population, the number of marriages and fertility rate. Some points such as marriage fraud stories, Syrians' seeking men for marriage, their make-up, allegations about their being dirty (messy) and careless mothers have given rise to increase the sharpest arrows of criticism towards female refugees while some other points such as their being raped and forced to prostitution make them victimized figures in the eyes of the local women.

1.2. Objectives

The general objective of this thesis is to understand how the discriminatory discourses caused the social exclusion of Syrian female refugees are shaped and (re)produced in the host society and what the discriminatory discourses are affected from and what kind of an impact they have. This includes the specific objectives to identify the intersectionality of discrimination and invisibilization of Syrian female refugees. One of the specific objectives of the thesis is to describe how the discriminatory discourses that are instrumentalized in the exclusion of the refugee community as a whole are

constructed and their political, social and economic periphery. I will establish three different set of data, which are fieldwork, social media, and written media analysis. These will give the opportunity to compare, assess and examine the discourses produced on multiple platforms. In the study, the discourses of the social exclusion of Syrian women refugees will be researched using the methods from the toolbox of discourse analysis.

Another specific objective of the thesis is to generate a conceptual framework of how the discriminatory discourses are justified and interrelated with domestic social problems and how the transformation of the discourses on Syrian refugees influences the relations between the host and the refugee societies. This objective is firstly to analyze the circulation of the discourses and the intersectional parts of the discourses between the mainstream media, social media and real life. We can sort the aim of the approach of the three different views in the following ways. Firstly, all the factors that led to the production of the discourses that lead to the social exclusion of refugee women will be taken into consideration. Secondly, the effect of the discourses on the relationship between local and refugee women will be observed. The discourses used by both groups which are in physical contact with each other and the effect of media and social media will be studied. Thirdly, we will discuss how discourses that cause social exclusion are reproduced in the circulation in the media, real life, and on social media. This objective is secondly to comprehend the relationship between Turkey's migration policy, the discourses of the political actors, and the transformation of discourses towards Syrian (female) refugees. I will also focus on how the perception is formed and/or created in the minds of the people in this circulation is affected, and what projections this effect has on the lives of refugees and the responses of the refugees to these discriminatory discourses will be examined.

1.3. Plan of the Dissertation

In this section, the contents of the chapters in the thesis are briefly mentioned. Chapter 1 provides the methodological and theoretical framework of this thesis. The methodology used in this dissertation conducts features of Foucauldian discourse analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis. In this chapter, it gives details on the methodological approach and provides information about the steps as follows: Case selection and research and design,

timing of the research, interviews including two samples – from the point of view of Syrian female refugees and from the point of view of local women – duration of the interviews, and barriers and facilitators to the research, set of ethical rules and the site and participants.

Chapter 2 is titled “*Syrians in Turkey*”. It gives a general background for Turkey’s policy towards Syrian refugees, the experiences and hardships of the refugees in Turkey and how the Syrian refugee issue is perceived by the locals. In this chapter, I will follow two ways. First, the issue will be examined from the perspective of the changing dynamics of Syrian refugee issue in chronological order to summarize the course of the events and to emphasize the milestones and the responses (from both sides). Then, the topic will be processed from general to specific.

Chapter 3 which is titled “*Women Against Women*” is aimed to identify dominant discourses used by/for women. By following these dominant discourses, this paper will underline how the reality has been socially constructed emphasizing the most common discourses as relevant to the social exclusion of Syrian female refugees such as make up, fertility rate, seeking a Turkish man for marriage, accepting to be the second woman and being a careless and dirty mothers. This chapter also examines historical, religious, social and economic reasons and/or justifications for the dominant discourses against the refugees and the reactions of the female refugees to these discourses and the reflections of the discourses on their lives.

Chapter 4 examines what type of power relation is being built on Facebook and how any (actual) incident (could be a photo, a story and/or a comment) is transferred to the social media and how the reprocessed incident on social media influences the relation between the host society and the refugees. The second part of the chapter deals with the representation of Syrian Female Refugees on printed mainstream media and relatively focuses on how the information about the refugees is reproduced and how the refugees are represented by the media.

1.4. Theoretical Framework

If we compare this thesis to a house, discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis form the foundations of the house. The depth and comprehensiveness of the material

constituting this basis have enabled the investigation of the relationships between the matters that are interrelated according to the subject of the study. One of the most important criteria during the construction of the house was to add as many windows as possible to represent the relationship of the subject matters such as power relations and discourse and suffering from intersectional pain of social exclusion.

Discourse analysis is open to criticism and self-criticism due to its reflections. The profound effects of understanding and interpreting findings in discourse analysis come from traditional methods. The object of analysis is oral, written and nonverbal texts. Discourse analysis is not an analysis that uses methods such as experimental and content analysis. Discourse analysis is a multidimensional, multifunctional, historical and critical analysis (Fairclough, 1989). While analyzing any discourse in discourse analysis, an analytical method is not sought. While discourse analysis in interpersonal communication examines the verbal or nonverbal aspect of a relationship, in cultural studies, in the sense Foucault uses it, discourse analysis deals with the meaning of language as well as other codes and focuses on the power relations in these codes; discourse production is controlled, selected, organized and distributed according to a certain number of processes in every society (Bağlı, 2011, p. 292).

Critical discourse analysis takes advantage of Foucault's conceptualization of power and in this context a transitivity between discourse theory and critical discourse analysis appears (Durna & Kubilay, 2010). The relationship between discourse and power relations is also important in examining the relationship between the host community and the refugee community. In other words, where there is power (host society), there is a group (refugee society) that is affected by this power. They are not physically present cases. Power refers to the phenomenon of power that is felt in a certain way of representing a person and group in a broader and symbolic sense of power, through oppression and coercion, rather than merely physical phenomena. Power can be easily recognized in a text, a visual, a speech and/or any other representation. Unlike in the past, the idea that the masses are under control with the information and discourses produced by some institutions is increasingly accepted.

Foucault states that power is now being realized in more modern ways. Rituals, on the other hand, are clearly less repressed and coerced, and less physical, but more mental.

Therefore, power is more discursive in modern societies (Armstrong, 2015).

Discourse defines the production and reproduction of knowledge through language. Discourses, instead of providing information about things, build them, and with this practice they conceal their intentions and thoughts. Discourse establishes reality, and shapes our knowledge of the social world and determines meanings (Foucault, 1987). Discourses build knowledge and make it real. Each subject, specific subjects, objects and information forms and knowledge practices that vary from period to period and do not require continuity between them are produced (Ibid).

Many researchers approach discourse from different perspectives, and the discourse itself can be addressed from many different perspectives. However, in this thesis in which the power relations within the opposition of Syrian-Turkish women and the role of discourse in this relationship are investigated, discourse takes place in the social and ideological context. Since the media dimension of the discriminatory discourse is also included in the study, the teachings of Teun van Dijk, who has an important place especially in CDA, were also used in discourse studies. Like Foucault, Dijk emphasizes the ideological aspect of discourse and argues that in order to understand ideology one must understand discourse. Discourse is social practices affected by ideology. To understand the role of discourse in society, it is necessary to understand social representations and ideologies. One of the most important channels in producing (or sometimes reproducing) discourse is media and alternative media/new media or social media. The effect of the media on public discourse is to construct different definitions of reality, identities and images, and internalize these representations by individuals. Ideological thoughts are learned and internalized through discourses (Dijk, 2003).

1.4.1. Discourse

This thesis is based on Michel Foucault's approach to discourse analysis and Teun Van Dijk's Critical Discourse Analysis. To Foucault, the logic produced by a discourse is related to the broad episteme of the historical period in which it emerged structurally. Using discourse analysis requires answering two fundamental questions. For the solution of the first problem, Foucault recommends accepting a temporary break in the first stage and focusing on an area that can be easily described in a large number of relationships when choosing the starting point (Foucault, 2006). In the other question,

despite the high likelihood of occurrence of statements in contrast to the thought, their appearance is rare and, in this case, makes the researcher's work relatively easy. Foucault uses three basic approaches in the study of discourse structures; archaeology, genealogy and ethics. Currently, the Foucauldian discourse analysis turned into a separate academic field on its own, and examines historical processes focusing on discursive formations shaped by power relationships in society as expressed through language and practices. The archaeology method has emerged as the dominant subject in the center of human design in an effort to place humans where they should be (Foucault, 1980). Basic concepts in archaeological analysis are discontinuity, rupture, threshold, border and succession. Foucault said that archaeological analysis is not about the history of ideas or the history of sciences, but rather a study that seeks to find out how knowledge and theories are possible, which order is established according to the field of knowledge, and what ideas can emerge (Urhan, 2013) and the history of knowledge can only be made in terms that occur in time and in historical a priori terms, not in terms of contemporary and interactional terms (Foucault, 2002). Archaeology does not see the discourse as a starting point; it examines the discourses in itself, emphasizes that the rules of discourse cannot be reduced to anything else and tries to analyze it as it is by staying in the discourse. Archaeology refers to discourses as something that needs to be described, not as conflicts that we have to face and we need to get rid of. In this context, it is important to understand and to address the Syrian refugees and the rhetoric that the double marginalized refugee women are exposed to in this refugee group because of their gender and status. If the group of expressions belonging to a single system of discourse is often used to understand how refugees and in particular refugee women come together, how the discourses come together, what conditions bring them together, what organizes the relationship between these statements, and how other expressions are excluded by other expressions, then they clarify the relationship between discourse and social exclusion. In order to understand the discourses, the formation of the discourse is put into effect, and what can be said at a given time and how these expressions will relate to others is central to Foucault's archaeology (Bernauer, 1990). The archive, which is one of the expressions used by Foucault, is a stock of discourses. In Turkey, the references used in the construction and exclusion of the "other" comes from this stock. In the history of the Republic of

Turkey, the Arab identity and racist rhetoric that these archives are kept in reveals the historical a priori understanding. While emphasizing the struggle against power relations, Foucault often defines struggles against forms of interlocking forms of domination (religious, gender, ethnic and social), struggles against the forms of exploitation that distinguish individuals from the products they produce and defines them as struggles against the situation that connects the individual to the others and in this way subject them to others (Foucault, 2005). These types of struggle cannot be isolated from each other. What is being said should be dealt with exactly as they are said, and what is to be examined is not the speaking subject or the conditions that make up this statement, nor the expression (Foucault, 2006). In the first statement, the construction of discriminatory discourses to which Syrian refugee women were exposed occurred outside the control of the subject using those discourses. The discourse and discursive formations that are effective in the exclusion of refugee women and the reproduction through local women cannot have any meaning other than the fact that it is a discursive formation because it imposes itself on the individuals who are speaking in the discursive area because it is in fact a structure. Refugee women are seen as opponents of local women of the lower classes, and while a threat and should be marginalized, racism is seeping into the struggles of feminist women's groups and women's movements in Turkey.

Turkey's experience with refugees over the years has undergone many changes. The changing conditions influenced the official discourse and the discourse of the people. The analysis of the discursive formation of refugees is undoubtedly ideal depending on these variables, it is not an effort to create an inclusive periodization that gives a continuous and smooth image (Foucault, 2006), which makes the transition between discursive formations and the change of structure of the discursive formation active, contradictions and irregularities possible. As for the sources of texts, the discourses of local women who have spread the discourse of the main power playing and excluding the power game for refugee women constitute the main source of the discourses of the Syrian refugee women who are exposed to discriminatory discourse by both their own society and their counterparts in the host society. In this context, the power relations between local women and refugee women are not directly based on the actions of the refugee women, however what refugee women do or how they act can be used by local

women for the justification of the alienation of the refugees. Modern power and developing forms of power are far less than physical, which means that it has gained a psychological form that is unnoticeable at first sight. The factors that reveal this relationship between the refugee women who applied power on the system and the local women who are the practitioners in the restricted areas of the system, and the basis on which the multiple relations behind power are based and how they are rationalized are examined. Like in many other studies, Teun Van Dijk's Critical Discourse Analysis approach has been used in this thesis to show how social power and power struggle is constructed in written texts. This analysis method examines the legalization, validation, legitimization, transformation, reproduction and/or challenge of the relations of power and domination in society. Discourse analysis focuses on social problems and political problems instead of existing paradigms and styles, defines and explains discourse structures and explains the interaction of discourses with social structure (Dijk, 2003). Another important concept in discourse analysis of Dijk is ideology, and ideologies are important references in the formation and dissemination of discourses. For Dijk, who focused on racism and ethnic prejudice in the 1980s, and studied news in the German and English press, all "ideologies, like languages, are essentially social; there are no 'personal' or 'individual' ideologies – only 'personal' or 'individual' uses of ideologies" (Dijk, 1998, p. 29). In fact, this concept, which is used frequently negatively by newspapers and politicians, is often used as a connection between society and discourse. Also, Dijk explains it as; "*ideologies partly control what people do and say (via attitudes and models), but concrete social practices or discourses are themselves needed to acquire social knowledge, attitudes and ideologies in the first place, viz., via the models people construct of other's social practices*" (Dijk, 1995, p. 21). In social sciences, although it is widely used in daily life, the concept of ideology remains ambiguous. In order to eliminate this ambiguity, Dijk makes some classifications and definitions in defining the ideology. These are; "ideology as a vague and controversial notion", "ideology as a system of beliefs", "ideology as false consciousness or misguided beliefs", "ideology as a general notion", "ideology as the basis of social practices" (Dijk, 2000, pp. 6, 7, 8). If we examine these titles a little, it is emphasized that the misconceptions about ideologies, the polarization between people as a result of a misuse of the concept, deepening as "us" and "them", the concept does

not always have to be negative and sovereign and the ideologies cannot be reduced to ideological practices and the relationship between ideologies and discourse. Discourse is a device that surrounds human beings while playing an active role in the learning and dissemination of ideologies. This is because the series of discourses that begin with childhood years are produced continuously in the private and public spheres to which human beings belong, and every individual is exposed to these discourses. In addition to the traditional media, such as television, newspapers, radio, with the addition of new media and social media, this discourse pool has expanded. Discourse continues to occur or be reproduced outside the media at work, at school, at party rallies, in social settings, and in short, will continue to do so wherever groups of people interact.

The reason why the Critical Discourse Analysis of Dijk is preferred in this dissertation is the effectiveness of this module in revealing the structure and / or ideological presentation of news. In addition to that, Fairclough, (1989, 1992, 1995) Bell, (1991), and Pêcheux (1982) could also be used in this area. However, while Dijk regards the news as a form of public discourse and emphasizes the contextual factors that shape the basic structure of news discourse, Fairclough focuses on the news, Pecheux analyzes the text in terms of constructivism and analyzes the contrasts, and Bell put less emphasis on ideological elements (Özer, 2011, pp. 82, 83).

The discourse analysis of the two levels - macrostructure and microstructure - is formed and divided into two separate headings as a thematic analysis and schematic analysis within the macrostructure, while in the microstructure, syntactic analysis, regional adaptation, word selection and news rhetoric are examined. The news narratives consist of macro propositions, and the thematic structure described within the macrostructure can be hosted in more than one discourse in a discourse, and the themes are structured in the discourse. Another article within the macrostructure is the schematic structure where the main event is presented at the entrance of the news. News feeds come to the fore when the results are considered and Dijk explains this like "...highlights the value of the news in terms of results and the importance of the outcome of the events is effective in making it news" (Özer, 2011, p. 92). In addition to the macrostructure, the second basic element is the examination of the microstructure, which is the evaluation of the text content within the context of word selection, spelling, and implication. In this

structure, in order to emphasize the stability and strength of the subjects' sentences, the active structure is used predominantly in the sentences, while a causal relationship is observed between the sentences. Dijk, when defining macro and microstructures groups them by maintaining “language use, discourse, verbal interaction, and communication belong to the micro level of social order. Power, dominance, and inequality between social groups are typically terms that belong to a macro level analysis” (Dijk, 2015, p. 354). When we go through this distinction, for example, a racist speech about refugees in Turkey’s Grand National Assembly, which can be regarded as micro level in the field of debate in the parliament can in turn become part of a legislative proposal rhetoric making it macrolevel discourse.

The relationship between ideology and discourse or discourse ideology comes into prominence in the construction of the distinction between “us” and “them”, especially in the case of refugees. Discourse is used as a means to convince others of their ideology, to defend their ideology against opposing groups and as a means of propaganda. Indicating that ideologies have a decision-making function in setting the content of discourses, (Dijk, 1998) Dijk also underlines that ideologies and discourses can be reproduced through some institutions such as education (Dijk, 2004). The Arab perception already built in social consciousness, the fact that the refugees are considered as the “other”, as well as the Arab identity has caused the discourse to be utilized more frequently to be excluded by the power (host society).

1.4.2. Racism

“Racism is a current event; only its expression is more disguised and subtle.”

Halford H. Fairchild

It is accepted that the concept of racism was born or invented in the 19th century while it is claimed that racism itself went back to ancient times. However, the idea of race in the 1800s has become the focus of scientists of the Enlightenment that work particularly in areas such as biology and botany. The studies on the classification of people and the placement of Europeans at the top of the scale in these studies and the Africans at the bottom shows the feeling of ethnocentrism and cultural chauvinism (Fairchild, 2004).

Another aspect of this approach is that the institutionalization of slavery and colonialism need an intellectual justification (Ibid). In other words, racism becomes a device used to pave the way for the exploitation of some groups, classes, nations, including both people and their resources. Racial prejudices not being eliminated is expanding this circle of exploitation.

While there is more than one claim about the history of the word, the institutional use of the word is not as vague as its history. Albert Memmi argued that the concept of race entered French in the 15th century and therefore the concept belonged to the near period (See Özbek, 2003). Unlike Albert Memmi, Immanuel Geiss takes the origin of the race concept to the 13th century Roman language, but he claims that the origin of the word comes from Arabic rather than Latin, and to strengthen his argument claims that naturally it is the Spanish and Portuguese who used the concept in Europe for the first time due to their close relations with the Arabs (Ibid). The French traveler and scholar François Bernier is the first to use the term race to define a group of people and to make an analytical classification without having to put any value in the word. (2003). After Bernier, theories on race were developed and the human race was divided into several categories. Swedish naturalist and researcher Carolus Linnaeus divided people into four categories each with their own definitions: *Europaeus albesc [ens]* (whitish), *Americanus rubesc [inc]* (reddish), *Asiaticus fuscus* (tawny), *Africanus nigr [iculus]* (blackish) (See Müller-Wille, 2014). According to Linnaeus, Europeans are described as white, creative, resourceful and law-manageable abiding people to underline their supremacy of Europeans, while the Asians are described as yellowish, property loving, melancholic, the Americans as loving freedom, being angry and managed with customs and lastly the Africans are described as deceitful, lazy, sluglike and manipulated by the master's desires and commands (Özbek, 2003). German naturalist and Doctor Friedrich Blumenbach (1758-1840), the founder of anthropology, also classified people according to the skin color of people and divided them into five races. The Blumenbach race category is as follows; 1- Caucasian or White, 2- Mongol or Yellow, Ethiopian or Black, American or Red, Malay or Brown (Şenel, 1993, p. 7). The study of the classification of races, the environmentalist theories of race (George Louis Buffon 1707-1788 & Jean-Baptiste Lamarck 1774-1829), and the hereditary theories of race (Petrus Camper 1772-1789), led to the emergence of various racial theories such as the theories of race

affected by the theories of evolution.

Today, racism is a culture-centered racism instead of traditional racism based on racial supremacy. Becoming the focal point of or assuming a decisive role, culture has caused the emergence of two kinds of modern racism (Keneş, 2011).

“The first appears as the hierarchical classification of culture rather than race, and it is based on the underestimation of values such as “inferior” and “below” groups' work ethic, self-confidence, self-discipline and individual success as the cause of group inequalities. First of all in the 1960s, especially in the US, labelled as “lack of culture” and adapted to America, the basis of new racism was “to blame the victim” by claiming that the position of minorities always remained the same “to see them inadequate in their efforts”, “laxity of family structures” and “improper values”. This is the first form of contemporary racism. The second racist view that focuses on culture rejects the cultural hierarchy and acts in the sense that it is not possible for groups that are different from each other to live together in peace and harmony. Both the idea that accepts and the idea that rejects there is an absolute difference between the others” based on assimilationism” are the means of sustaining racism based on cultural differences by rejecting the other as the other” (Keneş, 2011, p. 46).

In classical racism, the cultural other has replaced the biological cultural other in the new racism. In other words, the cultural racism and the new racist discourse that used to justify the power relations between people and societies began with the reversal of the population movements with the end of geographical discoveries and the colonial era. Migration, immigration and refugees have become the target of this new racism. The enemy of classical racism was other races that were considered as “inferior” and thought to be “different” from their (European) biological race and group. Thus, it was easier and simpler to differentiate the others. The scientific refutation of the racial classification has undermined this approach. The transformation of racism has occurred because of several reasons such as war, forced migration, capitalist relations, globalization that forced people with different cultures, religions and backgrounds that have to share the same hinterland and have a close relationship with each other. Therefore, the broad features of the new phenomenon of racism today have expanded to include the ethnic groups, religious communities and migrants identified in the context of these traits. It might be said that ethnocentrism and culturalism support new racism within the framework of xenophobia.

It is seen that concepts such as race, ethnicity and nation are intertwined and the concept of race is sometimes used instead of ethnicity. The fact that the concepts of race and ethnicity have quite a lot of common ground can be given as a reason for this situation. At the origin of racial explanations, the impression that it arouses in humans even if it does not have cultural qualities is sometimes in this direction. Ethnicity, defined within the framework of cultural codes, can be confused with the concept of race in this respect. The concept of ethnicity is about social and cultural differences, language and lineage; how it united as a dimension of social action and social organization and how it forms a socially reproduced classification system. In this respect, ethnic identity is formed in a social process of mutual interaction. This interaction takes place in the form of “ours” and those watching us as “theirs” (Fenton, 1999). The concept of race consists of “them”, which is explained by physical/biological differences; but today, racial classification generally means the identification of certain cultural and religious qualities of that group. In this sense, the ethnic group is defined in terms of “race” because it is more inclusive. The relationship between ethnicity and race seems to be intertwined, given neo-racism; because the consciousness of ethnic identity is shaped on the belief of being from a common ancestor, ancestry, race and therefore a common culture and religion.

While there has been an increase in immigration problems in Europe since the 1960s, it was observed that in England, in the mid-1970s, the population of Caribbean and Asian origin originating from post-World War II immigration was twenty years old and there was an increase in their numbers due to births. This has caused a reaction against the immigrants by the local population. In addition, right wing parties have tried to exacerbate this reaction and make the reaction more visible. Martin Barker introduced the new concept of racism in the years when immigration phobia began to embrace the European continent. According to Barker, the British right fights for hatred, plays with irrational fears and reinforces prejudice (Barker, 2002). The daily use of the concept of “race” seems to be closer to the perception of ethnicity as new racism discourses add the element of culture to it.

The discourse of cultural difference of new racism is often used in conjunction with the discourse of ecology, and culture is always linked to a ‘*heritage*’ and a ‘*progeny*’, a

“*root*” (Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991). As a result, culture is gradually being biologically biased and assumed to create natural boundaries such as race. Today’s racism discourse is based on classical racism and defines itself in the cultural sphere. This rhetoric of neo-racism does not mean that people’s attitudes and abilities are related to blood and genes; but to be explained with belonging to historical culture. The articulation of new racism and its reshaping based on cultural differences is the most important feature that distinguishes racism from old racism, which is a reality based on institutional indicators (Keneş, 2014).

The new racism targets immigrants and refugees, thus exposing them to the subsequent and non-indigenous discrimination or discriminating racism. Norma Romm splits new racism into six categories, namely, ‘symbolic racism; modern racism; aversive racism; new racism; institutional racism; and color-blind racism’ (Romm, 2010, p. 33). According to Étienne Balibar, neo racism is a process in which new types of racists or “racism without race” are derived from (Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991). Another characteristic of the new racism is that it occupies the everyday language through idioms, proverbs and even jokes, and that it reproduces itself repetitively and continuously at every moment of life.

When it comes to how racism is perceived in Turkey, the general belief is that because there are no black people in Turkey, there cannot be racism. This perspective reduces racism to morphology and is defined according to skin color. The indifference of the academy on racism and discrimination has delayed the examination of this issue. Racism as a concept has faced the same fate as conservatism, nationalism, fascism and other ideological concepts, and are used indiscriminately (Dellaloğlu, 2017a). Due to this, despite the constant rejection of the existence of racism in the minds, it has reappeared when concerning the Syrian refugees by showing how it had settled in the center of everyday life and discourses, and also shows how strong of a infrastructure there already existed. The fact that Turkey is trying to be a homogenous nation state has inevitably caused the intensification of new racism. Parallel with the national state-building process, many dichotomies such as sub-identity-upper-identity, sovereign nation-minority and domestic-foreign are becoming widespread. Such dichotomies and the need to create their own bourgeoisie, one of the most basic needs of the nation-state,

were chosen from the minorities, which had their own victims of the period, i.e., those left out, and the order came to them throughout the history of the Republic. In this context, racism is made ordinary by the hand of the state, and lynch attempts become a weapon of the state (Bora, 2018) and lynch itself is a threat to minorities. Considering the historical process, the first victims from all the minorities started with the Armenians being subject to exclusion and physical assault exposure. Then stories of the Syriacs gained less exposure and were not well known, it then continued with the trauma suffered by millions of Turks and Greeks during the population exchange. While the events of 1934 in Thrace displaced thousands of Jews, it was the year when the writings of racist, Turanist and Nazi sympathizers peaked (Demirel, 2015). The 1942 Property Tax and the events of 6-7 September 1955 are the continuation of the events in Thrace. Although the methods such as exchange, pogrom, mass murder and forced relocation applied to non-Muslim groups in order to homogenize them in the society were applied by Turkish, Sunni majority, they were also applied to the other groups such as Alevis or Kurds considered to be minorities as, despite their “Muslim” identity, they are minorities due to their ethnic differences or their belonging to other sects of Islam and Alevis and Kurds. The experience of each of the minority groups such as Kurds, Arabs, Alevis, Circassians and Lazs, including the majority however marginalized and / or assimilated, is different from one another. When the Syrian refugees became the focus of the thesis, it was obvious that the Turkish identity would be built on the basis of imagination and assimilation, the Muslim identity lost its significance, and it became obvious the Arabs could not take part in the construction of a unique and secular Turkish identity, and the adventure of othering Arabs gained momentum from the first years of the Republic. The treacherous Arab figure in the textbooks, the Arab image which is compatible with the reaction in the Kemalist ideology is the root of the anti-Arab policies in the early years of the Republic. Despite the improvements in Turkish-Arab relations and the new Ottomanism initiative, the Arab perception by the society has not change significantly in the last period of the AKP government, which came to an end with the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war. Currently, Syrian refugees are exposed to new racism, which has migrated to the center where other refugees, migrants and / or asylum seekers are still exposed to it.

The main problem here is how the classic racism is misunderstood in Turkey; “No

blacks live with us, therefore there is no racism” being the most common discourse. For many locals, racism is reduced to skin color with this proposition. This means accommodating a hidden racism by using black people as the only possible object of racism. In that case, they have difficulty coming up with sufficient justification as to where they stand when regarding “others”, as some do not fully realize what racism is, while some others justify their viewpoint by reproducing this discourse. The new racism in Turkey is not much different from the problematic approach to the classical attitude towards racism. The first stage is ignoring, the second is recognition but not accepting or exclusion by recognition and the last stage is accepting. This is not just a social issue in the case of any type of racism or analyzing the events in question, as, in Turkey, creating long-term solutions to produce proposals and acceptance takes a relatively longer compared to Western societies.

In the thesis, the role of the media in the effort to regulate the social structure in the construction and reproduction of the concept of “other” and the role of social media that has become a new alternative public space have been mentioned. Texts circulated by the media and projections on the audience and readers are found to be important. It is stated that the content that the media creates with verbal, auditory and visual codes augments racism and implicates it into the field of values. It is emphasized that individuals and groups who are the target of racism are defined by the media through stereotypes and are always presented in similar frameworks of gender, race and ethnic identity. However, Dijk emphasizes the position and function of the media to suppress and/or marginalize alternative ideas and thus influence other social groups and social beliefs in the creation, reproduction, and dissemination of racism. Studies that research on ideological representations are presented through media and how individuals in everyday life understand, interpret, re-produce and use them as well as the focus on their dissemination are particularly important in the studies done in this field. From this angle, the way in which the media uses language and how news is reproduced is very important. The discriminatory language used by the media encourages hatred and hostility towards Syrian refugees. The media are targeting refugees by introducing Syrian refugees as the cause of problems under certain headings. We can classify the headlines as follows: Syrians are associated with terrorism, security and crime, and they are marginalized, Syrian refugees are accused of ingratitude, they are presented as a

source of economic problems, they are presented as a threat to health, and Syrian women are discriminated against. Dwelling on the relationship between “discourse” and “racism” is necessary in this thesis because the cultural (new) racism that penetrates into daily life augments the alienation of the refugees.

1.4.3. Intersectionality

The intersectionality used to convey the subjective experiences and reasons for exclusion of Syrian refugee women is growing more in recent years (Bora, 2017) and, is also criticized for mostly handling only the theoretical aspect of inquiry. Inspired by the question “Ain’t I a woman?” by Sojourner Truth, it was developed in order to understand the position of someone exposed to different forms of domination. This question would later take place in the title of the book that criticizes racism in feminism by bell hooks. This concept, introduced by Kimberle Crenshaw in 1989, found its place in feminist debates as a criticism of the homogenizing effects of groups. According to Crenshaw, the experiences of black women are different from the experiences of white women and their situation cannot be understood with the same arguments. Them; black women are different from white women; they have mechanisms of inequality that sometimes conflict and sometimes overlap.

One of the methods of this dissertation is the intersectional nature of social exclusion and discrimination, revealing how class and racial domination intermingle with sexual domination. Intersectionality offers a particular way of theorizing social exclusion of Syrian female refugees and analyzing discourses used by locals. The use of intersectionality in this thesis deals with social, economic, historical and political contexts. Multiple factors such as the identities, denominations and the socio-economic status of refugees are important. In general, intersectionality is built on three main social divisions-race, gender and class. Stewart and McDermott explain the intersectionality of 3 tenets: “(a) No social group is homogenous; (b) people must be located in terms of social structures that capture the power relations implied by those structures; and (c) there are unique, non-additive effects of identifying with more than one social group” (Narvaez, Meyer, Kertzner, Ouellette, & Gordon, 2009, p. 64). According to Crenshaw, the difference between structural and political intersection is that the structural intersection is related to the intersection of unequal social groups, whereas the political

intersection is related to the intersection of political agendas and projects (Walby, Armstrong, & Strid, 2012). On the other hand, McCall identifies the concept of intersectionality in three different approaches. The first one focuses on revealing the difficulties of living within such groups, which ignore the intersectional points of intracategorical specific social groups (Ibid). Secondly, the anti-categorical approach focuses on a methodology, which deconstructs analytical categories, and regards stabilization of categories (Ibid). Lastly, the inter-categorical approach has adopted the existing analytical categories to document the inequality relations between social groups and the changing configurations of inequality between multiple and conflicting dimensions (Ibid). Hancock, who is doing research in intersectional studies and is trying to establish a typology in this field, speaks of three different approaches. These are unitary, multiple and intersectional approaches. In the “unitary” approach, only one category is examined and assumed to be primary and stable. Multiple categories are handled in the “multiple” approach and they are equally important; it is assumed that the categories are stable and have a stable relationship with each other. In the “intersection” approach, more than one category is considered; categories are equally important; the relationship between categories is clear; categories are not liquid; and mutually form one another (Hancock, 2007, pp. 64-67). According to McCall, unidentified studies of the method by which intersectionality can be used can result in understanding of different intersectional methodologies, and therefore, there is a need for further research under the umbrella of intersectionality (McCall, 2005). In addition to these approaches, Walby, Armstrong and Strid (2012) examine the dilemmas of the intersectionality theory in their articles and resolve the 6 basic questions they have identified.

“How to address the relationship between structural and political intersectionality without reducing political projects to social structures. Crenshaw introduces this distinction, but it is rarely addressed in the subsequent literature on intersectionality”.

“How to conceptualize the intersections so that bringing the agency of the disadvantaged into focus does not leave the actions of the powerful out of sight. Crenshaw’s analysis loses sight of the actions of the powerful and the racist structures, while McCall’s (2001) early work deliberately looks at the inequality within ‘categories’; much of the work that uses concepts of ‘category’ and ‘strand’ tends to obscure the powerful within them”.

“How to balance the stability and fluidity of inequalities so they are sufficiently stable as to be available for empirical analysis, while recognizing that they change. The emphasis on fluidity in Hancock poses challenges for practical analysis”.

“How to neither leave class out of focus nor to treat it as of overwhelming importance. Much current literature has addressed the previous neglect of ethnicity, but this is often at the expense of class”.

“How to bring into focus the projects of small minorities, while not making the normative assumption (as Hancock) that all projects are equally important”.

“How to simultaneously identify the intersecting inequalities while recognizing that their intersection changes what they are. The notion of mutual constitution invoked by Hancock is in tension with the demand from Crenshaw that the component inequalities are made visible” (Walby, Armstrong and Strid, 2012, p. 228).

Because this thesis deals with multiple approaches of how refugee women are excluded, intersectionality allows me to witness the experiences of and oppression suffered by the female refugees. The intersection as theory and methodology is structured in such a way as to take over the research identities and examine how to construct the individual as well as to analyze the connections of the state with larger structures. This theory actually expands the social justice heritage of the feminist perspective, as the intersection also questions not only individual confusion, but also political, state-wise and economic structures and group identities. While using intersectionality as a methodological tool in this thesis, it is the third category of McCall that is defined as intracategorical complexity. While this category adopts the categorical and intracategorical of the continuum, it also questions the boundaries of social categories such as the ancient categorical approach. It also accepts the relations represented by social categories at any given time and maintains its critical stance against these categories. Thanks to intersectionality, we can cross-examine individual experiences and structures of power. In that case, the thesis must focus on both structures separately. To be able to do an intersectional analysis, the structures of power such as (national) policy, xenophobia, anti-Arab tendencies in the society based on historical background and the categories of identity such as ethnicity, gender, class and religion need to be reviewed. The fact that social categories are limitless is a factor that makes analysis more difficult and complex. By narrowing the focal point in a single group, it will be possible to manage this complexity. McCall explains the management of complexity as follows; “...complexity derives from the analysis of a social location at the intersection of single dimensions of multiple categories, rather than at the intersection of the full range of dimensions of a full range of categories, and that is how complexity is managed” (McCall, 2005, p. 1781).

While acknowledging women's experience from a feminist perspective allows us to understand what constitutes truth and knowledge, it also reveals that the category of "women" has many variations based on other categories of identity. This thesis provides clues about how multiplicative identities of refugee women are constructed and the social exclusion they are exposed to because they are refugees and women, and how their invisibility increases due to this exclusion.

1.5. Methodology and Research Design

1.5.1. Methodological Approach

In this qualitative study, I aim to examine how Syrian female refugees are socially, economically, culturally, ethnically and sexually marginalized and what they think about the ongoing events, their status and the steps the government and NGO's have taken so far in order to produce solutions for women's invisibilization in the public sphere. To carry out the research, various research approaches such as discourse analysis and media analysis from the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis have been used. As it maintains the subject of gender and the gendered subject, feminist perspectives on sex and gender have been touched upon as well.

Foucauldian discourse analysis constitutes the main part of the study. It has been used to understand the intersectionality of discrimination of Syrian female refugees. In other words, positioning the locals and the refugees as subject and object is important to identify what subject positions offer and what type of categories, people or activities are on offer. The relationship between discourses is underlined as there are many and contrasting discourses about the objects and events while benefiting from genealogical approach. Stuart Hall makes a brief summary of Foucauldian discourse analysis as: "A group of statements which provides a language for talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about – a particular topic at a particular historical moment... Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. But... since all social practices entail *meaning*, and meanings shape and influence what we do – our conduct – all practices have a discursive aspect" (Hall, 2007). As almost everything including text, act, video, image is a part of discourse and discourse has history as Foucault's definition of genealogy, the discourse analysis contributes more details from different aspects to

this thesis.

In addition to the fieldwork, this thesis examines the discriminatory discourses towards Syrian refugees by following Van Dijk's Critical Discourse Analysis approach to analyze Syrian female refugee issue in Turkish printed mainstream media. There will be two set of data as social media and mainstream media analyses. The first one focuses on merely Facebook posts and comments related to Syrian female refugees and how these discourses used in social media affects the attitudes of the individuals of the host society towards the refugees. I used Facepuger software for fetching public available data from Facebook and BINO Facebook Posts Scraper and Auto Publisher¹ to get the most liked posts on specific dates that provide an opportunity for us to analyze what discourse has become the current issue after the entire post-migration period. The next step was to code the collected data by means of MAXQDA to analyze how Syrian female refugee issue is perceived and how the information is reproduced on social media. These posts have been collected from different Facebook groups and pages² which adopt different

¹ For further information see also: <http://postsscrafer.com/>

² Why I am in Turkey (<https://www.facebook.com/NedenTurkiyedeyim/> accessed 18.05& 12.06 & 08.07 & 26. 08 & 17.09 & 30. 10 & 22.11. 2017 [I have regularly visited this Facebook page in order to follow the updated refugee stories are added to the page as there has been done a new interview.]

Türk press (<https://www.facebook.com/TurkPressMedia/> accessed 04.09.2017)

Teyit.org (https://www.facebook.com/pg/teyitorg/posts/?ref=page_internal accessed 10-11- 20.08.2017)

Kıvık Haber Ajansı

(<https://www.facebook.com/kivikhaberajans/photos/a.1577957819098492.1073741828.1577790792448528/1996309080596695/?type=3&theater> accessed 07.05.2017)

Suriye Vatandaşlık Bürosu (<https://www.facebook.com/suriyedeleti/> accessed

23.09.2017) Düşünen Deli (<https://www.facebook.com/dusunendelim/> accessed 23.09.2017) İnsannews (<https://www.facebook.com/insaninsanca1/> accessed 23-24.09.2017)

Halk Haber (<https://www.facebook.com/halkhaberorg/> accessed

24.09.2017) Ülkücü Hareket

<https://www.facebook.com/ulkucuhareketsayfasi/>

Siyasi Karikatürler (<https://www.facebook.com/Siyasi-Karikat%C3%BCrler-164192426948250/> accessed 27.07 & 01-02.08 & 14.11.2017)

Cahil Filozof (<https://www.facebook.com/ChlFlzff/> accessed 07.11.2017)

Suruç Jet Haber

(<https://www.facebook.com/suruc636363/photos/pcb.855747281255933/855747217922606/?type=3> accessed 07.11.2017)

Çılgın Türkler(https://www.facebook.com/pg/cilginturktimi/photos/?ref=page_internal

accessed 19.08.2017)

İlberOrtaylıHayranları(https://www.facebook.com/pg/ilberortaylihayranlar/photos/?ref=page_internal accessed 08.11.2017)

Rahatsız

(https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=467858313595990&id=361234244258398 accessed 09.11.2017)

political approaches and ideologies in Turkey such as ‘‘Kemalism’’ – a national ideology of modernization, ‘‘Turkish Nationalist Movement’’ and (religious) ‘‘Conservatism’’. I have followed these pages for 8 months starting from July 2018 and during this period examined their older posts since the refugee issue / crisis / problematization came to fore.

Data acquired from Facebook were analyzed in three different groups; *general discourses*, *discourses on Syrian refugee women* and *discourses depending on the agenda*. In the first group, discourses used against the refugees are stereotypical and persistent in characteristics. The codes that have been created for this group depending on the collected data of the discourses can be listed as Syrian (s) and their profile as a guest, an asylum seekers and/or a refugee in Turkey, Turkey’s migration policies, national security, the relationship between hosting the refugees and the economic problems (that Turkey has been going through), scapegoat, othering, threat, normative refugee (or basically the perception of the refugees in the host society) and the aids Syrian refugees receive. Under these main codes, there are also some subcodes such as

Reyhanlı

(<https://www.facebook.com/Reyhanli.Hatay/photos/a.699789556827779.1073741831.688890744584327/1026307320842666/?type=3&theater> accessed 16.11.2017)

Son Heval Bükücü

(<https://www.facebook.com/sonhevalbukucu/photos/a.1759113187432479.1073741829.1533491456661321/1887185404625256/?type=3&theater> accessed 16.11.2017)

Turan Türkiye

(<https://www.facebook.com/1071692912844389/photos/a.1160303507316662.1073741887.1071692912844389/1733169146696759/?type=3&theater> accessed 11.11.2017)

Türkçü Paylaşım

(<https://www.facebook.com/paylasim.turkcu/photos/a.891668787640686.1073741829.848658351941730/970616986412532/?type=3&theater> accessed 03.09.2017)

Üst Akıl

(<https://www.facebook.com/AkliAzam/photos/a.1774033499585239.1073741830.1656000551388535/1913753272279927/?type=3&theater> accessed 03.09.2017)

Deep Web 7. Seviye

(<https://www.facebook.com/DeepWeb7Sw/photos/a.420195708358857.1073741828.420186055026489/476014939443600/?type=3&theater> accessed 04.09.2017)

Bozkurtlar Sokakta

(https://www.facebook.com/pg/BozkurtlarSokakta/photos/?ref=page_internal accessed 19.10.2017)

Takunya (<https://www.facebook.com/TakunyaResmi/posts/1484217138343470> accessed

05.09.2017 Arızalı (<https://www.facebook.com/arizali2016/posts/427839824285764> accessed 21.11.2017)

Ulu Önder Atatürk

(<https://www.facebook.com/Ata1919Turk/photos/a.107499119591240.1073741828.107013159639836>

[/546959258978555/?type=3&theater](https://www.facebook.com/Ata1919Turk/photos/a.107499119591240.1073741828.107013159639836/546959258978555/?type=3&theater) accessed 18.11.2018

personal/group tragedies, brotherhood, and so forth. It might possibly be said that there is an intersectional perspective among all these codes and subcodes. This intersectionality of the codes and the subcodes functions as a bridge, which is built by “ideological discourses”. They are based on two main differentiations, which emphasize and de-emphasize “our good thing” and “their bad things” (Dijk, 2006).

In the second group, discourses that directly target women take place. As the representation of Syrian female refugees and the representation of refugees in the social media are two different subjects of study, the discourses have differed greatly according to gender and gender power relations. During the creation process of my coding scheme in order to organize the data with the help of MAXQDA, two opposite codes, “Threat” and “Victim” became prominent. The “threat” code is associated with other codes like “backwardness” (This code is related to how Arab women are perceived by especially the secular individuals to be symbolizing backwardness in both public and private spheres and how the status of Turkish women in society triggers a comparison between Turks and Arabs.), “moral values”, “fertility rates”, and “homewrecking”. When it comes to “Victim” code, it involves “empathy”, “pity”, “sexual violence” and “human tragedy”. One of the significant points of the discourses that have been collected under the code of “Victim” correlates with the events or the stories of Syrian female refugees whose voices are silenced. In other words, these codes like the most of the codes in this thesis, are the ones that speak up for Syrian female refugees. This situation is a consequence of Syrian women being considered objects rather than subjects.

Discourses in the third group are temporary and the events on agenda are in correlation with the refugee issue. In this part, it is seen that some event-based discourses disseminated periodically have been coded as “Economic reasons”, “Discussions regarding ongoing war”, “Terrorist attacks”, “particular events Syrian refugees were involved in”, “Propagandas for the elections” and “Turkey’s political and military actions such as Turkey’s incursion into Syria (Operation Olive Branch – Zeytin Dalı Harekatı). *Discourses depending on the agenda* are seemingly connected to the first group of the discourses and somehow function as the determinant factors that keep the generalization and alienation of the refugees on the agenda.

The justification of discourse in all three groups, how and when discourse emerges and its relationship with Syrian women refugees were investigated. The intersectional aspects of the discourses of these three groups were also mentioned.

The second survey will examine how Syrian female refugees are presented in the printed mass media. 391 news have been collected from the online platforms of 4 different newspapers; *Yeniakit*, *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, and *Sözcü*. *Yeniakit*, a supporter of AKP, aims to openly support the changing policies of AKP government, be a party to and legitimize these policies through its publications. *Hürriyet* and *Milliyet*, the newspapers whose news were analysed, have a relatively heterogeneous audience compared to other newspapers. Finally, the *Sözcü* newspaper is used as the news source for the main opposition, and its focal point is constructed by an anti-AKP perspective.

To investigate the news relevant to the Syrian refugee issue, I have searched for the following keywords and phrases on Google; Syrian female refugees in Ankara / Önder, Refugees in Önder / Altındağ, the population of Syrian refugees in Ankara, social projects for Syrian female refugees, marrying Syrian refugees, Syrian women, make up, trafficking, sexual harassment of female refugees and social conflicts in Önder / Altındağ. The interval of the news collection is from 2014, when the excessive visibility of the refugees has become more obvious, to 2017, when the Syrian refugee issue has penetrated into every single social, economic and political discourse. Within the scope of the media analysis, I shall underline some main discourses about “Syrian female refugees” and how this news is disseminated by the media and what role media plays in social exclusion of the refugees.

1.5.2. Case Selection and Research and Design of In-Depth Interviews

The focus of this thesis is the social exclusion of Syrian refugee women, the threat of forced immigration, being a refugee and the “other”, being women and the sexual exploitation and prostitution caused by being open to attacks, the lack of recognition as a person, the lack of access to resources, and the intersection of their exclusion and invisibility.

In the last seven years, Turkey has become host to the highest number of refugees in the world. There were 58 thousand refugees in Turkey before she started accepting Syrian

refugees (Erdoğan, 2017b). In a short amount of time, Turkey went from a transit country to a target for migrations and the increasing number of Syrian refugees spread to all of Turkey. Moreover, factors such as Turkey's refugee agreement with the EU, the creation of migration management (ministry of interior directorate general of migration management), Turkey's economic crisis, the approach of politicians, media and local people to the refugee issue, discourses used by them, the perception of threat they create and all other factors need to be observed as Syrians are the subject of the social exclusion, invisibilization and other difficulties they face.

As a principle researcher, for regular observation and in-depth interviews, I visited the district of Altındağ where Syrian refugee women and local women lived from June 2017 to April 2018. Twelve of the 24 in-depth interviews were conducted with local women and 12 with refugee women. All interviews with both local women and refugee women took place in their own homes. The longest of these 24 in-depth interviews was 1 hour 30 minutes 25 seconds on 16 June 2017. However, seven of the interviews conducted alone by the translator and the social worker who assisted me in the field for me for the reason explained below, lasted over 2 hours. An interview with a local woman lasting 18 minutes and 27 seconds was the shortest. The longest interview with local women lasted 48 minutes and 24 seconds. Almost all interviews with refugee women took longer than interviews with local women. The use of interpreters in refugee interviews naturally extends the interview. However, a more important factor than the time spent on translation came from the desire of refugee women to explain themselves and their problems. Another factor causing the variations in the length of the meeting was the food and beverage that I was offered in each interview without any exception. The reason why some of the interviews with local women was relatively short was related to whether local women were in contact with refugee women. To explain, the length of the interviews changed as local women who are in contact with refugee women wanted to relay viewpoints of both local and refugee women and tended to compare the two cultures. In addition, these women tend to empathize with the difficulties faced by refugee women and occasionally conduct self-criticism. For this reason, interviews lasted relatively longer with local women and contained too many examples.

The interviews have been prepared and conducted in two main parts – the one with Syrian female refugees and the other with local women. As for the questions, semi-structured interviews consist of the majority.

I have worked with a translator (from Arabic into Turkish) for the interviews with the refugees and other interviews with the local women have been done in Turkish. After I translated the data into English, a native speaker checked my notes. During the interviews with Syrian female refugees (7 out of 12), a family member attended the interviews which also explains my positioning in the field as a Turkish male researcher coming from the middle class. Every single word of the underlined words positions me in a different context. As for the refugees, the context or the priority of the identities differed from one another. The refugees that I have interviewed should be categorized into two groups as the ones who had known the translator (for a long time) and the ones who had not. For the first group, I had help from a friend of the respondents. This friend did the translations voluntarily for a long time (almost since the beginning) not only for me in the field but also for the refugees in hospitals, schools and anywhere she is needed. Therefore, this voluntary work built a reliable relationship between her and some of the families. In my very first interview, I was told *“anybody who comes to our home through her, is a good person because we only met good people thanks to her and received kindness from her”*. Being male was one of the biggest difficulties in the field for a male researcher due to the gender-based restriction. To observe their surroundings, family relations and ideas of other family members about the current situation, these interviews were vital. On the other hand, the attendance of a family member in the interview may have led to make female refugees feel uncomfortable especially in responding to the questions related to the unspoken agenda such as sexual harassment, forced prostitution, sexual assault and rape. In order to overcome this difficulty, the translator and a social worker who works in the field, voluntarily did seven interviews on my behalf. Two sample interviews will be given as I work with two groups of people, Syrian female refugees and local women. To indicate the diverse aspects, each sample will comprise the answers of different respondents. For some questions, more than one answer will be given (See Appendix E and F).

During this time frame, I had the opportunity to see the activities of some non-

governmental organizations in the region and to gather information regarding their activities. This allowed me to observe and to evaluate different perspectives on the subject of aid given to the refugees. Another important point of the field discussions and observations was to observe the habitats and behaviours of refugee women outside the home. In order to understand the variables and the dynamics in the region, I conducted periodical visits at different times of the day, including during special occasions, holidays and during at least more than one season.

There are differences in the characteristics of the places where Syrian refugee women who are the subjects of my research live. One of the most important differences among the inhabitants of the settlement areas and those living in their periphery is the level of income. Those living in the areas of decline live in financially adverse conditions. These negative conditions are reflected on many areas of life. They are forced to live in slums and unhealthy houses that are living conditions-wise below par. This situation affects not only women but also children in particular. Those who are economically better-off can live in better conditions in apartment buildings. There is a different effect of this situation. While urban settlers have better economic opportunities, those from rural areas live more intensely in areas of decline. The level of education depends on whether the individual is from an urban area or a rural area. While most the refugee women in the areas of urban decline have not attended primary school or other educational institutions, the majority of women in their peripheries are women at secondary or high school or university graduate level. There are also differences in tastes and clothing trends depending on whether the refugees are city or village dwellers. Urban women like black and simple clothes, while village women like colorful clothes. Another area of difference is that women in areas of decline feel compelled to give birth to many children because their spouses want many children as a tradition despite their poor financial conditions. There are several neighboring communities. Although these neighboring areas are of close proximity, residents of each neighborhood can vary greatly in terms of their educational background and/or financial status. However, women in a neighboring community feel less obliged to do so. In this case, the difference in education level is influential. Furthermore, there is a difference in the dialect refugee women speak. Refugee women living in the area of urban decline know the common language ammic (dialect) and cannot speak general Arabic because they

are not educated. This creates a challenge for researchers. The women's knowledge of Arabic is not enough to communicate with them, and it is difficult for female refugees to express themselves. However, the educated women living in their surroundings are able to communicate and express themselves more easily because they know standard Arabic (fusha). Women can live together in areas of decline. This makes it easy for them to meet their socio-cultural and material needs. Educated refugee women who communicate with the local people spend time with their neighbors and friends and feel less alone. Whereas, refugee women who speak neither standard Arabic nor Turkish, despite living in close proximity to other refugees, feel lonely because they are excluded. Nevertheless, they somehow meet their material and socio-cultural needs in the areas of decline in their closed community. Still, it is obvious that overcoming the language barrier is a way of also overcoming exclusion. Another way to reduce exclusion is to isolate oneself from the local society. This is because differences in refugees' clothing, eating and drinking, lifestyle also lead to misunderstandings in the host society. The grooming habits of refugee women in order to please their spouses have a negative impact on the host community and at times turns into a means of exclusion. In case of religious activities, common ceremonies are often held in mosques in areas of decline. Madrasah education is provided in mosques. Once again those who are less educated are not able to participate much in such social activities.

To better the conditions of the refugees, NGOs are at work. There are more NGOs in the areas of decline but there is a limited amount of work on financial assistance in the areas of collapse. The social activities carried out by these NGOs can also benefit the women living in the areas of decline more. Female refugees are able to access some medical treatment needs, even if they are limited in the health centers, which are established only for refugees. Because of the language barrier, refugees in their neighborhoods mostly prefer these places, or they prefer Syrian dentists and doctors who came here working as private doctors. One of the most common complaints of women in the area of decline is that they have to live together with people who have already been involved in more crimes in that area and that their children are threatened. Syrian women are more worried that their children do not want to go to school because of the assault, humiliation, blackmail and physical and verbal harassment they face and that they have to raise their children under these conditions. Those who are better off have the

opportunity to send their children to school, to live in a safer and more organized environment. Although they have to live a more introverted life in the face of exclusion and their children are excluded by their teachers and friends at school, they can find an opportunity to learn a language. Although there is a decrease in social pressure on these refugee women in the areas of decline, it continues due to the collective life they lead. In this case, such refugees are socially more independent than their counterparts in the neighborhood.

Weddings and similar celebrations take place where they live, even in areas of decline. In weddings and celebrations, men and women celebrate in separate places. Weddings and celebrations have a special importance for women. Such activities are primarily a means of being happy for women and such days are when they feel good and special. It also provides the opportunity to sing songs and hymns, and have fun together.

They need to look after themselves regularly and go to the hairdresser because of their fear of not being able to get married and still worried about not being liked. This situation shows that cultural codes and humanitarian needs can persist, even though they are in a more difficult life together due to forced migration.

1.5.3. Timing of the Research

The Syrian refugee issue that arose in 2011 has almost reached its 8th year in Turkey and its incubation period has ended. The timing of this dissertation coincides with the first years of the refugee problem and the period when the number of urban refugees increased and formed their own ghettos in slums. In addition, when this study was being conducted, the ban on researching the topic of refugees in universities by academicians was lifted, and immigration institutes and conferences were established. Due to this situation, the materials used in the thesis are mainly limited to the publications in recent years, which is important in increasing the interest in migration studies in order to investigate the problems and to find solutions.

One other important factor is that the study coincided with the political process after the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016. In this period, a two-year state of emergency was instated, the regime changed to a presidential system, military operations were conducted in northern Syria and the economic crisis emerged. The thesis coincided with

all the aforementioned factors that eventually led to nationalist politics, increased perception of threats to the nation. At the same time, such an atmosphere caused the refugee issue to lose its priority, the spread of racist discourses to the society through media and social media, the replacement of “guest, emigrant and Muslim brother” with the “other”, all being examples of how the attitude towards immigrants has all become more negative during this period. Therefore, the focus of the study is generally a process in which refugees and women in this group deepen the problem of social exclusion and invisibility.

1.5.4. Barriers and Facilitators to the Research

The research has several barriers (limitations) due to some internal and external factors that have influenced the process of collecting data and the respondents who I have interviewed. The first limitation of the study is the established gender relations within the Syrian male dominated culture. Because of the mentioned limitation, I did not have an opportunity to carry out all the interviews in person. Secondly, the Syrian refugees had some particular concerns caused by the uncertainties about Turkey’s migration policy, which is highly connected to its unstable, often changing agenda and affects the discourses towards Syrian refugees. Thirdly, the increasing racism and hate speech against Syrians through the created negative image of the refugees in Turkish mainstream media and social media cause the refugees to be isolated and introverted. Another obstacle is that continuously growing data related to the Syrian refugee issue such as news, academic studies, conferences, new regulations and reproduction of the discourses in social media gave rise to difficulties in identifying and accumulating data efficiently. Lastly, legal restrictions for researchers, the lack of transparency in official numbers and data about Syrian refugees (Memişoğlu & Ilgıt, 2016) are the other limitations pertaining to the study.

When it comes to the facilitators of the research; formal procedures such as obtaining access to the research field has not posed a problem because such a permission is required only when entering refugee camps. As a local resident of Ankara, my personal social network and knowledge of the region also contributed to facilitate coordination in the field.

1.5.5. Network and Observation in the Field

Regarding how to build a network and progress in the field, I have benefited from snowballing technique. However, to avoid oversampling a particular network I attempted to establish a heterogeneous group of people. Firstly, I reached the refugees via the network of my translator and then visited the relatives and the friends of the families interviewed. Secondly, I created another network through a social worker who works in the field. Lastly, my two former students living in the district from The Education Center for Women – Ulubey Hanımlar Lokali³ assisted me with planning the schedule of the interviews with locals. Hereby, I tried to conduct exponential non-discriminative snowball sampling in each neighborhood via new referrals of the four unrelated people. I should state that during my research, there were two various types of observation as programmed and unscheduled. I carried out the programmed one in a specific period of time in the district and some other places where the refugees go to such as hospitals, NGOs and etc. Two religious holidays, Ramadan (June 2017) and Greater Eid (September 2017) (Feast of Sacrifice) were some of the important dates that I had an opportunity to observe how they celebrate holydays, what differences and similarities in their rituals there are between two societies and make contact with the refugees more easily. On both occasions, I did observations with the assistance of the translators. In Ramadan, it was a home visit so I was with my volunteer translator to communicate with female refugees as well. In Greater Eid, it was a field visit and I went to the field to congratulate Syrian shopkeepers' Greater Eid with a male Syrian student who came to Turkey to get a college education before the war, assisted me in translations. I also went to Nazife Hatun Primary School which gives education to Syrian children in the region. Additionally, I went to the hospitals⁴ (3) where the refugees visit most. These visits were so crucial to observing the difficulties (language

³ I have worked a couple of weeks as a part-time teacher at Ulubey Hanımlar Lokali in 2015.

⁴ The visited 3 hospitals: 1. Numune Hastanesi Siteler Semt Polikliniği is 2.3 km away from the district (Önder Mahallesi) (http://anh.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=326:seler-semt-poll&catid=1014:semt-poliklinikleri&Itemid=546).

2. Ankara Hastanesi is 5.5 km away from the district (<http://www.ankarahastanesi.gov.tr/index.php?p=content&id=574&name=cerrah-klnkler&area=1>).

3. Dışkapı Yıldırım Beyazıt Eğitim ve Araştırma Hastanesi is 6.3 km away from the district (<http://www.diskapieah.gov.tr/diskapi1/>).

barrier) and obstacles in receiving healthcare that the refugees deal with. The unscheduled observations were made with no time and space restrictions because of two reasons; the closeness of the living quarters of the refugees to my living space and the distribution of Syrian refugees' population in Ankara. The growing population of the refugees, refugees finding housing in various districts according to their economic condition and their being a part of the local trade circle not only have made Syrian refugees become more visible in many different parts of the city but also somehow have transformed the city itself into a great observation field. Here, the term "visibility of Syrian refugees" is used only to refer to quantity; not with a positive connotation as the word suggests. On the contrary, this type of visibility has opened a door to criticism that could be relevant to almost any social conflict occurred/ occurring/ will occur. As the refugee issue is one of the much-discussed issues in Turkish society, I am already surrounded by these Syrian refugee debates. Briefly, somehow, I have two intertwined circles between where I conduct surveys and where I live in.

1.5.6. Set of Ethical Rules

I have conducted this research in the ghettos around Ankara. During my research, I strictly followed these ethical rules;

- I used a pseudonym for each person involved in this study.
- The questions that were asked during the research did not include anything that made the respondents uncomfortable and feel discriminated and the questionnaire was checked by the relevant professionals.
- All the participants were informed that the data would be used for my PhD thesis.
- Voluntary participation of the respondents was a prerequisite.
- I guarantee that I did not offer money to any participant for an interview. I also confirm that during my work I did not interfere in their daily life routine.
- I agreed to and respected their request for an accompanying family member during the interviews.

1.5.7. Site and Participants

I have conducted this research in the neighborhoods of Ankara – Önder, Hacılar, Ulubey and Karapürçek – the regions most populated with Syrian refugees. The recent statistical information about the refugees is not available, but it is estimated that Syrian refugees make up 90 percent of the inhabitants of Önder neighborhood and the region is called ‘‘Küçük Halep’’, which means ‘‘Little Aleppo’’⁵.



Figure 1 Aleppo – Halep, Altındağ / Ankara

<https://www.amerikaninsesi.com/a/ankara-da-suriyeli-mahallesi-kalici-mi/3662563.html> accessed 15.09.2017.

There is no refugee camp around Ankara so that there are no regions allotted to refugees. This means locals and refugee communities need to live together and especially in areas with cheap housing and low living expenses. However, in the district they live in there is an urban transformation project. This situation has affected the demographic structure of the district drastically as the Turkish inhabitants have moved their houses. The urban transformation project accelerated the process of ghettoization. Altındağ is one of the oldest districts and located in the heartland of Ankara and is well-known with its high crime rates because of illegal housing which made the area a

⁵ It is called as *Little Aleppo* because almost all the refugees in the district came from Aleppo Governorate. This discourse is not only used by the Syrian refugees. I personally witnessed that the minibus (collective taxi) drivers were yelling ‘‘to Aleppo, to Aleppo, Aleppo...’’ (*Halep’e... Halep’e... Halep...*)

shantytown, and the high unemployment rate and high population of uneducated young people (Strateji, 2010).

CHAPTER 2

SYRIANS IN TURKEY

The Civil War in Syria, which has been continuing since 2011, has caused waves of mass migration. A collapsed economy and infrastructure, mass massacres, rape as well as other violent crimes forced millions of Syrians to migrate to the other parts of the world. Syrians mainly took refuge in Turkey, in which their numbers are conservatively estimated at 3.4 million by Turkish officials (Mülteciler Derneği, 2018 & UNHCR, 2018), and to a lesser extent, other countries bordering Syria: Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan. With its refugee population, Turkey has become the country hosting the highest number of refugees (World Economic Forum, 2017 & UNHCR, 2017).

This chapter aims to give a brief summary of Syrian refugee issue in Turkey in terms of political, economic and social environment. The summary will hopefully contribute to gaining a comprehensive perspective to fully grasp the discourses towards refugees such as “unwanted invaders” (Parker, 2015, p. 5) and “different and inferior” (Herzog, 2016, p. 123).

2.1. Early Years of the Syrian Refugee Issue in Turkey

The influx of Syrian refugees to Turkey began with 252 Syrians requesting asylum on 29 April 2011 (Kap, 2014). In time, the number of Syrian refugees increased and reached over 1.6 million in 2014 (Erdoğan, 2014, p. 11). In 2014, Turkey ranked the third as opposed to the 14th in 2011 in the list of top 15 host countries (Recently, Turkey hosts the largest number of refugees in the world) (Asylum Trends-UNHCR, 2014). Some factors like Turkey’s open border policy, the ongoing war and the presence of terrorist groups in Syria and the refugees regarding Turkey as the door to Europe resulted in further influx of Syrian refugees.

**DISTRIBUTION OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN THE SCOPE
OF TEMPORARY PROTECTION BY YEAR**




Figure 2 Distribution of Syrians Refugees in the scope of temporary protection by year, Directorate General of Migration Management http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/temporary-protection_1024_1024_4748 accessed 13.03.2018.

This migration wave has also transformed Turkey’s position in the international migration arena from a transit country to a final destination. Irregular migration to Turkey is also growing in number because of increasing political conflicts and uncertainties in neighboring countries, the geographical position of Turkey, and the strict border security of European countries as seen in the use of Frontex (European Border and Coast Guard Agency – Frontières extérieures) institution.

In Turkey, geographically and procedurally, there are three different types of immigrants (İçduygu, 2004). The first group consist of immigrants who come from Ex-Eastern Bloc Countries (Eastern European Countries) to find work in Turkey. Those are employed in the fields of construction, textile, tourism, childcare and sex industry. There is another of immigrants, whose final destination is Europe. These use “The Eastern Mediterranean Route” and are from a variety of geographical locations including some countries like Iran and Iraq in the Middle East and some Asian and African countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nigeria and Somali. For these types of immigrants – refugees, Turkey acts as a bridge between

where they come from and Europe. They work in Turkey with expired or transit visas and even with no visa at all during their stay and mainly try to migrate to Europe through illegal ways. And the last group constitutes of those who want to apply for asylum and awaiting the application process to be completed (Ibid, pp. 21-27).




Figure 3 Major Refugee Routes to Europe <https://ricochet.com/archives/austria-europes-migrant-crisis-part-ii/> accessed 05.02.2018.

However, although each movement of migration through Turkey has its own peculiar characteristic, none of them is comparable with the Syrian refugee issue as it is considered in the sense of political, economic and social impacts it has on Turkey and its people. In this regard, the Syrian refugee issue has been followed with an intense interest by the public since the start of the conflict. Turkey’s 910-km border with Syria (security issue), historical disputes with Syria because of Turkish Hatay Province which “has never been officially recognized by Syria” (MacGillivray & Solomon, 2017), the water issue⁶ between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, terrorist groups in Syria and the drastic increase in refugee flows to Turkey are the determining factors that hold public’s attention to the crisis. Hatay crisis between the two countries dates back to 1920’s when

⁶ For further information see also: The report of “A Study by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Regional and Transboundary Water” <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/WATER-ISSUES-BETWEEN-TURKEY-SYRIA-AND-IRAQ.pdf> accessed 06.02.2018.

the control of the city was handed over to France. However, when Germany under Hitler's leadership began to arm the Rhine region, France focused its attention on Europe. Although France left Hatay to Syria at first, Turkey's efforts, changing political balance because of pre-war period and a friendship treaty (neutrality agreement) with Turkey during World War II forced France to hand over Hatay Province to Turkey and the region was annexed to Turkey in 1939 (Jörum, 2014). Secondly, the water crisis between these countries, especially between Turkey and Syria, emerged as Turkey had built several dams and barriers on both Tigris and Euphrates rivers to run the sustainable development project – GAP, Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi / The Southeastern Anatolia Project – (Erdağ, 2015). It resulted in a large amount of consumption of water resources and led to some particular concerns in Syria. The water issue, somehow, became more complicated as it turned into a kind of joint policies as water crisis and Syria's support to PKK (Mnory, 2017). This close concern of the public towards the issue and the policies implemented by Turkish government also indicate that the Syrian refugee issue has both a direct and an indirect impact on locals. The refugee issue has indeed become a type of tool to form an estimate of the success of the government. As a result of which, the political environment tends to denote affirmative aspects of the Syrian politics. In addition, the importance of the need to help Syrian refugees is given as a justification to reduce possible further objections. Terminologies such as *Misafir* (guest), *Ensar*⁷, and *Muhacir*⁸, have been used with cultural and religious references. *Misafir*, the most commonly used term, needs to be examined in two aspects: legality form and cultural codes. Turkish officials initially preferred to define Syrian refugees within the concept of “*Misafir*” that grants refugees no legal rights. Although Turkey is a signatory country to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, it retains geographic limitation – accepts asylum applications only from Europe – in order to prevent refugee flows to Turkey from politically unstable regions, especially from African and Asian countries (Lortoğlu, 2017).

Syrian refugee issue revealed that the concept of “refugee” was literally unknown in Turkish society (Dağlıoğlu, 2014) and that there is a need to regulate immigration and

⁷ Muslims of Medina who helped Muslims of Mecca during the migration in the age of the prophet.

⁸ Muslims who migrated from Mecca to Medina for the sake of their religion and beliefs.

refugee law as Turkey's role in migration has changed from migrant-sending to migrant-receiving. When viewed from this aspect, *Misafir* discourse should be read in various ways. A message for the locals that implied that Syrian refugees would not stay for a long time was fully accepted at the onset – also dropped hints about Turkey's refugee policy at least for the first years of the issue. However, the influence of discourse to ease the social tension between the two groups disappeared gradually when the refugees' stay lasted more than expected.

In addition, Turkey's evolving process and the steps that have been taken – “the open border policy”, “law on foreigners and international protection”⁹, “regulation on temporary protection”¹⁰, “regulation on work permit of the refugees under temporary protection”¹¹, “EU-Turkey deal”¹² and “President Erdoğan's announcement on granting citizenship”¹³ – have brought the refugee issue into a different condition and invalidated *Misafir-Ensar-Muhacir* discourses.

2.2. In and Out: Urban Refugees and Those Living in Refugee Camps

The Syrian refugee population in Turkey is divided into two as those who live at camps¹⁴ and the ones living outside the camps. There is a great numerical difference in the distribution of the refugees in these two choices of accommodation. While the recent number of refugees living at camps is 228.918 (Mülteciler Derneği, 2018), the number of refugees remaining outside the camp settings is 3.547.194, (Directorate General of Migration Management, 2018). In this case, the refugees not living at camps make up for more than 90 per cent of entire Syrian refugee population in Turkey.

Both refugees living in camps and urban refugees have been facing various difficulties depending on a great deal of factors. In order to fulfil the need for shelter for the

⁹ http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/eng_minikanun_5_son.pdf accessed 09.02.2018.

¹⁰ http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/_dokuman28.pdf accessed 09.02.2018.

¹¹ http://mhd.org.tr/assets/tp_work_en.pdf accessed 09.02.2018.

¹² <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/the-eu-turkey-deal-europes-year-of-shame/> accessed 10.02.2018.

¹³ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/03/turkey-plans-to-offer-citizenship-to-syrian-refugees/> accessed 10.02.2018.

¹⁴ List of Refugee Camps in Turkey: Şanlıurfa (5), Gaziantep (5), Kilis (2), Hatay (6), Kahramanmaraş (1) 18,382, Adana (1), Osmaniye (1), Adıyaman (1), Mardin (3), Malatya (1) <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/al-jazeera-ozel/26-kamp-81-sehirde-suriyeliler> accessed 14.02.2018.

refugees, 26 refugee camps were built in 10 cities in Southeastern Turkey. Although these camps provide high standards and quality compared to other camps, specifically container camps (Dağlıoğlu, 2014) in other hosting countries, refugees confront difficulties in “applying to live inside and leaving the camps” because of the strict rules (Hadi & Yuruk, 2014). War-torn victims that stay in camps, can have access to basic needs such as healthcare, shelter, food aid and education and are also granted the right to temporary asylum. Yet, most of the Syrian refugees prefer to lead their lives as urban refugees due to some reasons that are the feeling of being trapped, isolated and stigmatized, camps with limited shelter capacity for the human wave and a long period of uncertainty because of the prolonging war. There are also promising aspects of urban living like the opportunity to make money and a hope to build a better future. Yet, some other problems and dangers await refugees in the cities. They may potentially be vulnerable to exploitation and the possibility of being exploited may intensify if they are not officially registered.



Figure 4: The largest tent city built in Turkey with the capacity of 35 thousand <https://www.flickr.com/photos/afadbaskanlik/20545375018> accessed 14.02.2018.

Some main problems that urban refugees have to deal with are difficulty in finding shelter, unemployment, having to or being forced to work illegally while being forced to

compete with the locals for the worst jobs and difficulty in having access to education just to mention a few.

Firstly, working conditions of Syrian refugees have been deeply problematic in both local and refugee communities since migrant workers intensively started to enter the Turkish labor market and employers have been benefiting from refugees as cheap and illegal labor. Syrian refugee workers¹⁵ including child workers mainly work in Turkey's "informal garment sector" (Johannisson, 2016 & Afanasieva, 2016). Besides garment sector, refugees work in several other sectors such as construction, motor vehicle repair and trade, sex work, industrial cleaning, wood industry, waste management and seasonal farm jobs. Types of occupations that refugees are employed vary in each city. As an example, the construction sector (82.4) is where most refugees are employed in Ankara (NRC, 2017).

Secondly, the education of Syrian child refugees is one of Turkey's most problematic issues as the population of school aged Syrians refugee children (5-18) has reached 912,044 (Coşkun & Emin, 2016). If the 0-18 age group is taken into account, the aggregate number of child refugees reaches 1.249.263 (Ibid). Only 311,256 school aged refugees have been enrolled in public schools or "GEMs" – Temporary Education Centers – where 7,000 Syrian volunteer teachers have been trained and (Deane, 2016) instructions are given in Arabic language. Yet, 523,583 school-aged Syrian children are still not going to school (Coşkun & Emin, 2016) because of the obstacles that are economic hardship, social integration issues, language barrier, insufficiency of buildings and classrooms, the ambiguity of legal regulations¹⁶ and lack of information about the

¹⁵ For further information see also Study for the EMPL Committee: "Turkey: Labour Market Integration and Social Inclusion of Refugees" [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/595328/IPOL_STU\(2016\)595328_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/595328/IPOL_STU(2016)595328_EN.pdf) accessed 17.02.2018.

¹⁶ For rules and legal regulations related to education laws see also: BEKAM - "Suriyeli Misafirlere Yönelik Sosyal Uyum ve 2015 Eğitim Müfredatları Çalışması Raporu" <http://bulbulzade.org/indirilebilir/bekam-mufredat-raporu.pdf> accessed 16.02.2018.

SETA - "A Road Map for the Education of Syrians in Turkey: Opportunities and Challenges" http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20160909223717_a-road-map-for-the-education-of-syrians-in-turkey-pdf.pdf accessed 16.02.2018.

MEB - "Education Services for Foreigners" http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/yabyonegiogr_1/yabyonegiogr_1.html accessed 16.02.2018. MEB - "Suriyeli Çocukların Türk Eğitim Sistemine Entegrasyonunun Desteklenmesi Projesi" http://pictes.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2017_03/02171217_ArastYrma_ve_raporlar.pdf accessed 16.02.2018.

policy. It should also be noted that the second phase for child and adolescent refugees after enrolment in public schools for child and adolescent refugees is to deal with discrimination, bullying, peer to peer violence and prejudice.

Turkey has made some arrangements to prevent and to deter undeclared work because the number of Syrian refugees between the age of 15 and 65 has climbed to 1.834.000 (Kaygısız, 2017) and it is stated that there are approximately 600.000 refugees who work without work permit (Ibid) as opposed to 15,022 Syrians with work permits (Boyacıoğlu, 2017). A small number of refugees with work permits may be exposed to the unwillingness of employers to take legal expenses cover, integration problems of Syrians into Turkish labor market, Turkey's current economic situation and increasing negative social interactions towards refugees. As a result of political, social and economic environment in Turkey, many Syrian refugees suffer from exploitation of labour in terms of gender – female refugees' number is higher than male ones – low wages and unhealthy working conditions that maintain risk (İçduygu, 2016b).

2.3. Syrian Female Refugees

During times of conflict when forced displacement occurs, women become more vulnerable compared to men because of sexual, physical and mental abuses (Sami, Williams, Krause, Onyango, Burton, & Tomczyk, 2014). As during these periods of displacement, gaps in security likely to occur, refugee women are exposed to gender-based violence. Such exploitative situations start from their initial journey from their home to destination countries. Except from gender-based violence against female refugees, which might be categorized into during the journey and after the settlement, refugee women encounter some other difficulties such as mental disorders stemming from past experiences (Başterzi, 2017) and transformation in stereotypical gender roles because of migration dynamics (Asaf, 2017). However, some refugee women somehow experience a sort of empowerment or freedom compared to pre-war times while having difficulties as the new breadwinner. Still, many Syrian female refugees are not able to find an opportunity to work. Some other variables can be seen according to the factors that are directly related to features and conditions of who is migrating and to where they are migrating. Within this context, it would be adequate to set a framework of the Syrian

female refugee issue from the perspective of refugees' characteristics and local dynamics like the current situation of gender equality and position of women in Turkey. The main characteristics of refugees to be considered are their level of education, mental and physical health problems if any, economic status, race and ethnicity, cultural diversity, and even their number. However, local dynamics lay emphasis on the extent refugee women have a part on the agenda of the feminist groups, whether male oppression intervenes and how the current situation of gender based relations, from politics to public sphere and from private sphere to access to the basic social services, has an impact on refugee women's position. The first aspect of the second circumstance to address is local women's approach towards female refugees. The aforementioned approach should be dealt with by categorizing local women in two classes as feminist groups and women who are not positioning themselves in any feminist circles or have no relation to any such groups. The question which should primarily be discussed is; where does the women's movement in Turkey stand in female refugee issue?

In Turkey, Women's movement has gained momentum particularly organizational in organizational networks like student organizations for women, campus and community organizations for women, gender, sexuality and women's studies research centers, Women's NGOs, hard copy or online publications, demonstrations as well as high technology in communications and social media use to network and to organize. All branches of feminist groups may make an effort and work together on issues such as femicide (see figure 5), child marriage, sexual harassment, and child abuse. Growing numbers of domestic violence and violence against women and girls in Turkey should be seen as women's resistance against masculine power, male domination of the female body and construction of female identity (Berktaş, 2018). Women's movement has at a certain level created a possibility to shape a public opinion against sexual violence, gender inequalities in the workplace and legitimization of masculinities. Yet, on the other hand, this (affirmative) unity and solidarity does not take joint action for refugee women's position, vulnerability and lack of empowerment except limited and weak support and empathy. If we consider the number of female refugees who married local men as second wives (Duman, 2016), who were forced into prostitution (Doğanay & Keneş, 2016) and who faced multifaceted difficulties, the indifference of feminist groups to Syrian female refugees' problems indicate that the resolution of feminism that

hasn't been adopted yet. The lives of female refugees' lives somehow have become more visible in researches and reports related to migration studies, articles and dissertations as statistics, graphics, charts and data analysis. With the exception of some incidents that damage public conscience as in the case of "pregnant Syrian woman raped and killed with baby", women's groups' response to sexual harassment, violence and assault against female refugees remains non-functional or even worse neglectful. So, why can't the female refugee issue be brought to the agenda of the women's movement in Turkey even though many refugees have confronted multifaceted problems, been sold as second wives and are raped? How influential is refugee women's ethnicity in (not) raising the subject of gender-based violence? Wouldn't women groups be welcoming racism, forgo their primary aims, create a racial hierarchy and contribute to making female refugees "the others of others" if ethnicity played a role in their action plans?

In order to comprehend the indifferent attitude of women's movement towards women refugees, it is necessary to examine the historical background of women's movement in Turkey and to analyze relations of power, the interactive relationship of feminist groups and dynamics of women's movement.



Figure 5 The number of women killed because of sexual violence in Turkey between 2010-2016
<http://kadincinayetlerini-durduracagiz.net/veriler/2786/kadin-cinayetlerini-durduracagiz-platformu-2016-yili-raporu> accessed 26.02.2018.

Feminist movement in Turkey dates back to 19th century. However, *Atatürkçü* or *Kemalist* feminists are inclined to place emphasis on the (early) republican period rather than the historical process. Interiorisation of nationalist and modernist state policies have been adopted by the republican generation who were exposed to the nation building process, but the same process has produced serious consequences that still have some indications on today's polarized political and social environment in Turkey (Mutluer, 2016). The formation of modern Turkey has been settled by the social and political codes of civilized, laic, modern and Turkish factors while creating its antagonist figures as Islamist, traditional and Kurdish (2016). Foundation of *Türk Kadınlar Birliği* – Turkish Women's Association in 1924 could be given as an example of the official policy in the early years of the republic and is criticized for being integrated into state policy and acting as a part of Kemalist modernization which is an effort to copy the model of western societies. After that period, social movements in Turkey with the focus on reconstructing the society with socialist ideals occurred, while struggling against military coups. These military interventions resulted in another problem; the headscarf ban in the public sphere, which was high on the agenda of the state and the society for a long time, remained an obstacle in the path of bridging the gap between Islamic groups and Kemalist groups. Although feminist groups such as *Mor Çatı* and *Uçan Süpürge* work together on social themes such as honor killings, abortion, müftü nikahı¹⁷ – mufti marriage, sexual harassment and household labor, their solidarity and action plan seem to be ineffective in the refugee issue which is the turmoil of today's world. The factors for this ineffectiveness or unwillingness of women's groups may be listed under various reasons for justification. Both internal and external reasoning could be mentioned for this justification. However, it is hard to distinguish one from another as both are mingled and correlated with each other. Thus, embodying all perspectives on reasons rather than classifying them would provide us with a better understanding and chance of evaluation to analyze the determinants that influence society's response to refugee issue as a whole. These points might be outlined as the

¹⁷ The law allows muftis-Islamic jurist qualified to issue a nonbinding opinion (fatwa) on a point of Islamic law (sharia) to conduct civil marriages. For further information see also <https://www.dinihaber.com/m/yonetmelik/resmi-nikh-yetkisi-hakkinde-genelge-h399.html> accessed 02.03.2018.

disunity amongst feminists which is parallel to today's political environment in Turkey. Women's struggle against patriarchal practices and increasing numbers of murdered women and sexual violence against women that gave rise to subordination of problems of 1.621.363 female refugees being regarded of lesser importance (Mülteciler Derneği, 2018), Anti-Erdoğanizm, a large number of refugees, transformation of Turkey's position in migration patterns from a transit country to a final destination without control, limited support and migration policies of Western countries that set off the society's reactions.

Apart from these, two more significant factors that indeed provide a general overview of the crux of the problem should be considered. Firstly, in Turkey, opposing traditions in politics (Bora, 2017), public sphere being weak even in social groups is weak and ghettos of people's minds are being solidified by the polarization in politics. This situation influences not only the public but also intellectuals in Turkey. So, even a respected intellectual has his own mahalle (neighborhood) and although there, in theory, shouldn't be any regional restriction or any barrier for any intellectual, he doesn't interact with other mahalle(s) and intellectuals of other mahalle(s) due to social pressure of his mahalle and reactions of other mahalle(s) (Dellaloğlu, 2017a). The same ghettoization of the mind is valid for the rest of society and social media becomes a new public sphere in which people create their own inner circle in order to defend their notions and most often they attempt to interpret issues in accordance with the perspectives of who they follow on social media platforms. As a natural result, this new public sphere serves as an instrument that deepens ghettos of minds rather than an area to freely discuss societal problems. The second factor is the tendency to regard all refugees "satisfied or dissatisfied with facilities and services provided" and the dissatisfied ones are labelled as ingrates according to the social norms that promote being an abstentious person (Ibid) in Turkish society. How do highly valued abstentious norms in the local society determine the framework of the refugees' living conditions? How do these norms vary from one to another and under what circumstances? Are refugees supposed to be the most abstentious people because they are refugees? To sum up, I will examine all these factors in the following chapters as they are interrelated with each other and frame the topic in terms of social and political polarization, sexism and racism.

CHAPTER 3

WOMEN AGAINST WOMEN

“I believe that one of the meanings of human existence – the source of human freedom – is never to accept anything as definitive, untouchable, obvious, or immobile. No aspect of reality should be allowed to become a definitive and inhuman law for us” (Taylor, 2009, p.1).

Is it too easy to bring an accusation against refugees because they have a different cultural background? Who decides who needs help? What gives a person the right to question someone else’s belief or life style? Does helping somebody make a person have the right to interfere with their way of living or to judge their decisions on their own lives? If so, is it right for a person to do this? Or could it be said that his or her motivation for helping them is not solely the intention to help? Being the citizens of the host country, are our assessments of female refugees realistic ones?

I began this chapter with these questions as during the interviews that I have had, they continuously occupied my mind. For this reason, it may be useful to share them in order to indicate how I approached this topic. This chapter examines how Syrian female refugees are marginalized in the host society and criticized by local women using the very same patriarchal rhetoric that has already made them themselves discriminated.

Not only for this chapter but also for the entire thesis, I prefer to approach and to examine the social conflict between local women and female refugees by explaining the current situation and condition from micro events, discourse and metaphor to macro ones or vice versa. The aim is to identify what factors create a discourse, how it has become widespread and how it influences each group. In addition to this; every single chapter has its own short stories in order to help the subject be understood more clearly and followed more easily.

3.1. Make up: A Reason To Discriminate Or A Reason To Be Marginalized

A large number of negative descriptions, rumors, news and real incidents about Syrian female refugees and the rate of non-official numbers of those married to Syrians all

around Turkey, more intensively the southeast – the border zone, gave rise to the increase of the fear of losing their husbands among local women. Regarding non – official marriages, these reasons which may possibly enhance the fear of Turks can be listed as Syrian female refugees being “young” and “well-groomed”, their being “eager to get married” to Turkish men and having “no demand” for the marriage contract for an official marriage (Mazlumder, 2014). The important issue about the case of the make-up is the discrimination of women by women with a metaphor, which refers to the historical and traditional gender role of a woman (Karakaya, 2017). In other words, local women utilize patriarchal rhetoric as a tool to demonstrate their senses and to harm female refugees, although they, themselves still suffer from these discourses.

A woman, who attaches importance to her self-care, is more than enough to be targeted as someone unwanted and a threat for the society in the dominant social cultural understanding and perspective of sub-cultures of ghettos in Ankara. Cultural diversity between the locals and the refugees and adverse circumstances occurred because of forced migration, which led to an increase in the social exclusion of Syrian female refugees who live in Ankara.

To exemplify how it is seen from the point of view of both sides, I will quote some of the statements, comments and discourses, which have been recorded during the fieldwork. The first interviewee *Dilek*,¹⁸ is a local woman who attempts to understand and to empathize with the current social problem, and confrontations in her daily life. The information she hands in is crucial because she knows Arabic, helps female refugees individually, has witnessed the entire process from the very beginning and lives in the region. Her motivation for helping female refugees (not to discriminate or being neutral might be regarded as a kind of help for them nowadays) is mainly due to two reasons; firstly seeing it as a duty of how her belief (Islam) preaches her to do so and secondly because she tries to put herself in their place. She stated the reason she is helping me voluntarily as: *‘Their (Syrian female refugees’) stories must be written and*

¹⁸ Dilek like Belgin works as a volunteer for the refugees. It should be stated here that volunteer or voluntary works doesn’t mean people work with a supervisor and with a fixed timetable via a specific Ngo. What I mean here is self-volunteering. The common features of the volunteers I have observed are that they know basic level of Arabic or they are interested in learning it, want to make even a little difference at least among their surroundings, practice Islamic rules and live nearby the refugees.

known. I would be very happy if I could help you in your research because I can't write it but you can.'¹⁹

It has been easily noticed that her strong and emotional ties with the refugees makes her statements quite protective. Still her participation and comments are extremely significant for me to grasp the subject in detail. As soon as we started to have a conversation, I figured out how profoundly she could compare Syrian culture with her own. She explained her ideas about what putting on make-up symbolizes in both cultures with these remarks:

“We as Turkish women, do not give that much importance to what we wear when we are at home and generally wear quite casual things, and do not put on make-up. Unlike us, Syrian women love to put on makeup and dress up nicely at their homes. This situation is being perceived as a threat. They (Turkish Women) thought that Syrian women put on make-up in order to steal their husbands. Although ‘they will steal our husbands’, is one of the most common discourses used by local women, I have not come across any type of such an incident. I think, the bush telegraph makes everything worse for the refugees and build a great prejudice against them” (Dilek, married, in communication with the refugees, over 30, Local).

One of the main reasons, at least for some local women is fear of losing their husbands, which is often cited to criticize the refugees. The increasing numbers of marriages²⁰ to

¹⁹ Unless it is stated otherwise, all translations from Turkish to English of the received data from the fieldwork belong to me.

²⁰ From the interview with Fatma Çakır, Teaching Assistant in Turkish Studies, Sabancı University, Istanbul: *“Most specifically one of the other issues which requires attention is that some of Syrian women are forlorn, defenseless and poor in Turkish society. To illustrate with actual examples, I would like to share my own observations and memories in reference to this social issue. As I heard through my relatives who live in Ankara, these women have been perceived as “slaves for men”, “and a way of having cheap sex and housework”. Many of these men, who are aware of Syrian women’s desperation, want to get married to Syrian women, because; it is way cheaper, easier and more comfortable in their minds. Men may easily dominate these women since most of them lost their husband or family members. And these women may not have other options. These women are merely trying to survive in any place where they can reach basic needs such as shelter, food, water and so on. Due to all of these conditions, they are vulnerable and in danger.*

Another point that I would like to mention is that some of these men who get married to Syrian women, also have their wives and children. And, some of these second or third marriages are often unheard because they discreetly take place via religious marriage ceremonies. That’s why; most of people do not hear about these marriages or when they do, they choose to keep silent. That’s why; those are also part of this social crime.

While women in these families are mainly unheard about how they feel and consider this situation, also men sometimes enthusiastically make fun of these remarriages. It is something like a joke and very easy for them. Furthermore, they choose a woman among many women. What kind of a trauma is this for these Syrian women, the first wife and children? And is it that easy for men to get married to a Syrian woman? These women have been seen as objects or a commodity due to these uncontrolled and arbitrary

Syrian female refugees in the cities near the border gave rise to many broken homes (Haber Türk, 28/10/ 2014). Indeed, local women had experienced the same fear before the Syrian issue erupted. With the official fall of the Soviet Union, a great number of Russian women came to Turkey and took up or had to take up a generally undesirable and despised profession like prostitution. The same rhetoric “*they will steal our husbands*” repeated itself continuously and the hate discourse created a metaphor of *Nataşa – Natasha*. Although *Nataşa* itself is only a common Russian female name, its meaning to Turks is a Russian woman who comes from Russia and works as a sex worker²¹ (Bianet, 23/05/ 2002). In other words, to label every Russian woman as *Nataşa* or the other way around has become a widely used discourse not only figuratively but also literally. Moreover, their dignity was questioned mostly by local women. Seeing all Russian women as *Nataşa* has become a pattern of Turks which takes effect on women with different professions. For example, the incident²² where a Russian woman, an investment specialist, was insulted by a local woman as *Nataşa* in front of her 7 year old son ending up in a lawsuit (Hürriyet, 28/11/ 2008), demonstrates the public perception of Russian woman. Being *Nataşa*, having a relationship with *Nataşa*, forcing *Nataşa* to work as a sex worker, pointing *Nataşa* as a threat to the moral values of the traditional Turkish family and so on have been the subject of Turkish Cinema, TV series, books and innumerable news. Regarding the marriage issue, that over 105 thousand Russian women married to Turks (Karakuş, 2017) is a valid reason for local women to be concerned and is also more than a valid reason for a male-dominated society to invent a new discourse – *Russian Brides*. In fact, it is this discourse that turns *Nataşa* into a *Russian Bride*. It is supposed to be a new, proper and a discourse connected to the

marriages and their outcomes. What will happen next? What are the precautions taken by the Turkish state? Do we know women’s own stories by their own voices in relation to these marriages?’

²¹ It is claimed that 50 thousand Russian women work as sex workers in Turkey (Türk erkeklerin Nataşa faturası 600 milyon doları buluyormuş, 2008). See also: İçduygu A. And Toktas S., ‘How do Smuggling and Trafficking Operate via Irregular Border Crossings in the Middle East? Evidence from Fieldwork in Turkey’ [2002] 40(6) International Migration 25. IKGV, “Seks İşçileri ve Yasalar: Türkiye’de Yasaların Seks İşçilerine Etkileri ve Öneriler,” Ed. Muhtar Çokar and Habibe Yılmaz Kayar, (Istanbul, 2011).

²² According to the incident, a Russian woman parked her car to buy flowers. In the meantime, a Turkish woman asked her not to park there as she herself could not get out of the parking lot. When the Russian woman’s answer was “wait a little bit, I’ll buy flowers and come back”, the Turkish woman called her Nataşa and a Russian... She sued the Turkish woman and won the case.

Turkish family structure that would be accepted by Turkish society. The perception of a Russian woman and a woman from Ex-Eastern Bloc Countries needs to be reformed in regard to the expected role of woman in the reproduction of patriarchal values of masculinity. Briefly, two discourses have been separated from each other and the one which is directly related to sex trafficking in Turkey brings about another question. Have Syrians female refugees become the new Nataşa? The current influx of migrants undoubtedly heightens this fear. Yet, I think, one of the disturbing key points for locals in the Syrian female refugees case is the refugees – who are supposed to be piteous and be coming from a country and culture many Turks look down on – do what local women have been told not to do by the social norms. The reaction would not be the same if someone from Western Europe came to Turkey as a refugee. She would most probably be criticized as well for having different attitudes, habits and so on. In her case, the first criticism would definitely be associated to her religion, a defiled one according to Muslims if she is not a Muslim. Thus, she is already a *gavur* (infidel) (Hrant Dink Vakfi, 2012), a label, which is not only used to identify Non-Muslims but is also used as an insult when she is criticized, this factor is taken into consideration. On the other hand, in theory, according to the *Qur'an (Koran)*, a Muslim criticizing another Muslim is one of the most dangerous things if the smutted one hasn't committed anything deserving to be criticized (Kur'an-ı Kerim, Muslim 1/319).

The women I have interviewed so far wear a turban or headscarf that is usually the attire of a religious woman in Turkish society apart from those who wear it by parental or social pressure. If so, why are these presumably religious women questioning someone else's belief although it is clearly forbidden according to their religion? The reason behind their discourse against female refugees must come from the learned cultural doctrines. The interesting point here is that these women have never taken part in the decision-making process of social norms and possibly never questioned what they have been told even if they did not do it or not. But this time the situation is different. Paternalistic learned doctrines or social norms are being utilized by women against women without any consideration.

“Their belief is criticized because of the way they wear make-up. Are these women Muslims or what? What kind of Muslims are they? This make-up case has become a great problem among Turkish women. A Turkish woman wearing a head scarf recorded them during their wedding ceremonies and showed the

videos to everyone to discredit them. Indeed, Syrian women wear low-cut dresses but men and women don't stay at the same place or there are no men in their weddings. Nevertheless, the way they dress up and wear makeup, lead to serious reactions. Local women, who show these reactions, consider themselves more religious because they do not wear makeup. Being a dressy woman means a disturbing type of woman in the subculture. And those who meet these criticisms come from this culture. A woman who wears makeup can't be a good woman'' (Nevin, married, in communication with the refugees, over 30, Local).

''In Syrian culture, there is a negative moral connotation of a woman who wears make up (It depends on who wears make up – divorced women.) If a divorced woman wears make up, it means she is seeking a man. I think Turkish women do wear more make up. They go a little heavy on eye makeup but I haven't seen any Syrian woman who applies lipstick. It is something only for the husband'' (Ebru, married, under 30, Syrian).

This point of view has historical and religious roots that show why Turks feel superior. The common feeling in the conservative wing in Turkey (partially in The Middle East too) is that Turks have always been the leaders of the Islamic World (Manaz, 2005) because of the successful battles against Crusaders in the period of Seljuk and Ottoman Empires, where they expanded the borders of Islam and claimed the caliphate. While Turks, on the one hand, see themselves as the leader and those responsible for Muslims, the Arabs are still seen as traitors because of the events where the Arabs colluded with England and France and betrayed the Ottoman Empire during the First World War (Erdem, 2012), a story that has been continuously retold to every single schoolchild. This betrayal has still been perceived as the ungratefulness of the Arabs against the "saviour" of Islam and Muslims, a title which has always been used for the Turks. This discourse has automatically produced another discourse among conservatives that what the Arabs live now under the Western Powers, is because of their betrayal to Ottomans. The situation and the engagement between Turks and Arabs throughout history might be explained by what Roy Boyne has mentioned about superior and inferior relations in his book, *Foucault and Derrida: The Other Side of Reason*.

''In each case a judgement is made by a self-appointed superior over a presumed inferior, and the judgement is always that the qualities of the inferior are in every respect inadequate and derivative copies of the superior instance'' (Boyne, 1990, p. 135).

Almost in all occasions, applying culturally and historically deep-rooted discourses of

the nationalists for the Arabs distorts the conflict which has already become a double blind for both sides. Practically speaking, pinned down, as we are between what to do and how to deal with this enormous migrant issue, out of the blue, the discourse of the other(s) has been risen again dramatically.

3.1.1. Social Pressure Got the Result: ‘I don’t put on makeup anymore’

How/when can norms become so powerful? Or how are they established? How do they influence those who they are imposed on? More questions related to normative basis, discursive practices, social critiques or effects of social norms can be added. However, it can be said that using norms as techniques of subordination (Herzog, 2016) is a good example for the make-up case in that it has parallelism with various issues with particular aspects such as religious, sexual, social and cultural meanings of and for putting on makeup references in Turkish society.

Fatma, one of the Syrian female refugees I interviewed, grew up with the social doctrines that have told her to be good looking, to put on make-up and dress well at home. Now that she lives in Turkey, another Muslim country, she has been continuously told not to do so. Therefore, the process of normalization in her case has two different periods, previously, in Syria and now in Turkey. In the first period, the norms she was exposed to in her own culture were more easily acceptable but in the second period, she is now exposed to different ones which are not easily acceptable.

“Syrian mothers teach their daughters how to apply make-up because of the possibility of our husbands marrying a second woman or more, up to four according to Islamic rules. This can be thought as a kind of rivalry between the women married to the same man. It is because no woman wants to be the second one, that’s why she should take good care of herself to protect her position in the eye of her husband” (Tansu, married, over 30, Syrian).

Another crucial point is the altered circumstances between two processes of normalization or sexual subordination (Feder, 2007). In the first one, in the ongoing vicious circle, patriarchy works in its regular path (historical gender role that has been underlined for women). In the second one, almost everything is getting worse for her as she is being discriminated as a woman, a refugee and a Syrian.

“I used to put on make-up when I came to Turkey. It is a kind of respect for the guests. It means nothing more than that. I gave up doing it. I don’t wear makeup anymore because I am fed up with all this social

pressure. I really don't need more problems in my life. I am out of my country. Especially when my family's future is uncertain, I really don't care. I went to university in Syria and I can distinguish what is good what is not for me. It shouldn't be so difficult to accept me just the way I am. I can't say all people approach me like this. It wouldn't be fair. I met really nice people who never care about the clothes I wear or cosmetic products I use. No one (any Syrian Woman) could have guessed that putting on make-up would be the reason for such an enormous conflict between two Muslim nations. But it occurred'' (Fatma, over 30, Syrian).

Foucault explained how modern states moved away from enforcing the authority physically to enforcing it psychologically (Foucault, 1995). His example of prison structure related self-governs might be associated with many modern items used in current modern life. Indeed, it has close links to Fatma's (of many other Syrian female refugees) case as well. Every single local woman who visits her in her home, might potentially be a prison guard. Similarly, the home itself, which is supposed to be the freest and safest zone for the owner might become the prison. The question that must be asked here in this situation is who/what makes local women become 'prison guards'? It appears rather inadequate to attribute this eminently complicated, variable and ongoing process to a particular reason or element as it has been consisting of a great deal of components.

3.1.2. The Order of the Needs

As expected, by the settling of the refugees in where migrated, new problems will definitely emerge. These problems are triggered depending on personal experiences, how culturally home country close to the migrated one. Migration itself means losing in almost every possible way. Immigrants / refugees can lose a part or their entire family physically or symbolically, their hometown and even after a while their own mother tongue and of course these losses have a negative effect on the refugees (Arévalo, Tucker, & Falcón, 2015). To adjust to a new culture is a compelling process, which includes alterations in old habits and adopted social values, behaviors and attitudes. When the circumstances of the female refugees are considered, it gets more traumatic because of sexual harassment and violence against women and desubjectifying (Taylor, 2013) of women before/during/after the migration process. If the make-up case is a sign that there is lack of empathy for Syrian female refugees, only a few local people consider these factors and social exclusion and hate speech causes to make refugees

voiceless in the host society. These three different quoted passages of the interviewees below may be handy tips in order to set a framework of how we, Turks, perceive the make-up case and how we create a gender metaphor from it.

Be miserable to get help:

“They came. Poor. Turks helped when Syrians came at first. However humane sentiment was over when the Syrians did not look miserable. Turks need to pity somebody to help. Perhaps not all of them but most of them. They say our government gives them bread but they throw it out. They wear make up. They go to weddings. Only if they have barely enough to survive, Turks will keep feeling sorry for them. Indeed, it is what is expected from them. But putting on make-up, dressing up nicely, solemnizing and trying to keep on with their lives of Syrian female refugees turn humane sentiment of locals into hostility” (Burçak, single, in communication with the refugees, over 30, Local).

With the constant migration waves from Syria, a wide range of non-governmental organizations have been founded in Turkey. Apart from these organizations, individual aids are of significance for the refugees. Getting helped by an NGO or any government agency like Municipality of Ankara is to be more formal at least in regard to paper work and application process although there might sometimes be exceptions. On one hand, self-help (Imece) – quite a common in practice in Turkish society – is based on different variables that may hinder receiving help of some refugees in need, while on the other hand, may provide more help for some of the refugees inasmuch as there in general is no regular or irregular record of whom or to what extent this help is given. When the fact that over 150,000 refugees²³ (Hasene International, 2017) live in Ankara is taken into consideration, it gets far more difficult to help them. As to the amount of money which has been spent, Öznur Çalık, the Vice President of AKP (the Justice and Development Party), stated: “By now, 25 billion dollars for 3 million Syrians has been spent but we as the government have spent 12 billion out of this sum of 25 and the rest has been provided by the private enterprises, benefactors and Non- governmental organizations” (Finans Gündem, 23/03/2017). This extent of financial help indicates how vital these individual aids are for the refugees. However, any type of discourse that targets the refugees not only causes a direct or indirect influence on charity works but

²³ Before 2011, Turkey only hosted fewer than 100 thousand refugees in total (Erdoğan, “Kopuş”tan “Uyuma”a Kent Mültecileri, 2017).

also is the reason, at least in some cases, for not receiving help.

Another noteworthy point is that Syrian female refugees experience a dilemma as while they are socially excluded because of wearing make-up, they are also provided with some vocational courses on professions such as hairdressing and beauty care²⁴. This approach to refugees confirms two things: firstly, the refutation of make-up discourses by providing make-up courses and secondly, still trying to find solutions in gender-based customs. In that case, I shall address these two questions. What type of relation is there according to the traditional gender role in a Muslim society between the working sphere of women (women in public service) in theory and in practice? How can the make-up discourse be validated while on the other hand it is encouraged by government-supported social projects? As a response to the first question, today's religious segment of the population in Turkey expects devout women to fulfil an obedient role, and if they demand to build a career, they can build a career of motherhood and homemaking for as long as they wish (Sönmez, 2017). Behind the curtain, there is an extremely tight relationship between demanding equality being seen as defying Islam and only making the utmost effort to stay away from feminism – only the principle of *sisterhood* of the first feminist movement seems to be accepted (Ibid) – so that they will be able to object

²⁴One hundred female refugees from the district of Altındağ – where I conduct my research – have attended to these vocational trainings and courses under the project of “I am teaching a profession to my sister” carried out by the Syrian Friendship Association which was founded in 2009. Besides, the Ministry of Education runs similar free of charge projects in the district all year around, too. The duration of the courses varies according to the content of each course. To give an example of comments on these courses by the participants would fall in place in order to analyze the functionality and utility of the vocational courses for the refugees. Pınar, who is a young Syrian mother with four children, has participated in tailoring training of 192 hours and had a certificate. She claimed (She also showed her certificate to me although I did not make a request), “I went there for 4 months (from 8th of February to 31st of May 2017) but what did I learn? Nothing, but I have a certificate. I had thought that I could develop myself. I just did what I had already known. The only difference was it was dead slow this time. When I asked the trainer if I could find anything (a job) she said “you have a certificate, you can look for a job” (Interview, 31.07.2017). It should firstly be discussed for what purpose are those trainings done? Then what are the expectations of the refugees from the trainings? Or most correctly, what objectives do the trainings fulfill? Have the participants (the refugees) been informed about these objectives, if there are any? For the Ministry of Education, these courses and trainings such as Grundtvig Lifelong Learning Programme are type of routine activities to socialize especially elder people (Education and Training: Supporting education and training in Europe and beyond, 2017). They should have been aimed at the socialization of the refugees. As it is understood from the Pınar's question, the objectives have not been told. However, the vocational trainings with a job guarantee are run by İşkur – Turkish employment organisation. To sum up, except for Turkish lessons, the rest of the courses do not serve a useful purpose because the use of theoretical knowledge given by the trainings and the needs of the refugees do not match up. The socialization of the refugees was considered with a good intentions but the way of doing it simply caused disappointment as the refugees do prefer permanent solutions for their basic needs such as education, health and housing rather than attending to a course which has no other meaning than being a waste of time.

to masculine domination. In regard to the second question, it is self-explanatory by the reply to the first question.

University teachers handle the problem:

“There have been conferences about the refugees at two different universities in Ankara. My teacher from the university went to these conferences too. The topic came to Syrian women’s expenses on make-up. University teachers over there said that they should not be given money because they spend these financial aids (600 Turkish Lira) on cosmetics” (Belgin, married, in communication with the refugees, over 30, Local).

Professors who are believed and supposed to be the most intellectual persons in the society, and again are supposed to raise the awareness of public in practice, do not often proceed in this way. It should not be that easy to generalize all refugees and claim that Syrian female refugees who spend their aid money on cosmetic products should not be helped. Each female refugee who wears make up gets help, and each who gets help spends the money on make-up so that the money would be spent in vain one way or another. Just like Descartes rejected the criticism of similarity, it is like saying that every A is a B and every B is a C so that every C is an A (Foucault, 1994). Hence, the other possibilities such as getting help personally from a friend, using the money of a working husband... should be known to be able to reach the accurate information about how they can purchase the cosmetics. If it is the real concern, this tends to be tacitly neglected.

Make-up: Mothers to Mothers

“For them (Syrian female refugees), make-up is a necessity. For example, we (Turkish mothers) spend the money (it traditionally refers to pocket money that is daily given to the housewives by their husbands or working elder sons) on basic needs of our children and houses. And feeding our children comes first. But for them non-essential personal care such as make-up comes first. We also do wear makeup when we go out but they constantly put on makeup” (Dilek, married, in communication with the refugees, over 30, Local).

As expected, neither in the streets nor at homes I have had any possibility to see any Syrian women with make-up. Yet, they were wearing *abaya*²⁵ (Some cover their faces

²⁵ An outer garment is also known as chador and worn by Muslim women.

too with *purdah* – to prevent women from being seen by men.) outside and as for the interviews I conducted indoors, there of course was no way to witness the claims about make-up because of the fact that they were positioning me as a “*male*” researcher coming to their homes to interview them. In the Middle East, all the social relations are considered, separated and practiced primarily by gender, more often than they are by other factors (there might be some exceptions), therefore my identity, age, personality and profession come after my gender. The reference guide for shaping these relations between people in the society is based on religion because “*religion is not a part of life in the Middle East but life itself*” (Baysan, personal communication, August 6, 2017). In short, regarding the make-up case, I was not able to cross-check the relationship between what is used as a discourse and what is done in practice. So, how did the discourse grow itself? When the way these events are narrated by the interviewers is considered, the reckless orators – could be a friend, a relative, a neighbor or even a stranger – have had an impact on them and played one of the most important roles for spreading the rumors or real incidents that occurred in the district. The language and the phrases they (some of the participants) use for instance “*they had wanted to get married to a Turkish man*”, “*it had happened*” and “*we had always heard of disagreeable events*” indicate that the credibility of the source is not in the first place as the social exclusion increases and makes its borders insurmountable by the help of these message carriers.

3.1.3. What Does Make-up tell us?

The relation of social exclusion to make-up is of significance and is firmly attached to the make-up discourse acutely as it is seen in *tables 1 and 2* These most frequently repeated discourses and the examples in the tables below demonstrate the role of social exclusion in cause and effect relationship with the discourses. The key difference between table 1 and 2 is in which column social exclusion has been mentioned. Social exclusion is situated in the result part of the table 1 (local women) in four out of five discourses and in the reason part of the table 2 (Syrian Female Refugees) in five out of five discourses.

<i>Discourse</i>	<i>Reason</i>	<i>Result</i>
<i>They</i> constantly put on <i>make-up</i> .	Cultural Diversity / Reason for discrimination	Social exclusion
<i>They</i> put on <i>make-up</i> to tempt <i>our</i> husbands with <i>their</i> beauty.	Threat / the fear of losing husband	Social exclusion
Which is more important for <i>them</i> the needs of a child or <i>make-up</i> ? For <i>us</i> it is of course <i>our</i> children.	Lack of Information and Empathy / Reason for discrimination / The Order of the Needs	Creating negative perception / Social exclusion / Condemning
If <i>they</i> spend <i>our</i> money on cosmetic products, <i>they</i> should not be helped.	Economic situation of Turkey / Wasting of financial aids / Poverty	Negative influence on the benefactors / Forming public opinion in a negative way / Social exclusion
<i>They</i> are Muslims as <i>we</i> are. But <i>They</i> dress inappropriately and put on <i>make-up</i> . What kind of Muslims are <i>they</i> ?	Threat / Cultural diversity / Conflict with the learned doctrines	have a right to question someone else' belief

Table 1 Discourse, Reason and Result from the point of Local Women

<i>Discourse</i>	<i>Reason</i>	<i>Result</i>
<i>I</i> do not wear make-up anymore.	Social exclusion / Social Pressure	Normalization / Social Adaptation
Although there are many <i>Turkish women</i> who do not even wear hijab and do <i>make-up</i> too, dress inappropriately (means wearing clothes like miniskirt and etc.), <i>we</i> are the ones criticized.	Negative discourse / Social exclusion / Social pressure / Criticisms on belief	Becoming a target
<i>Turks</i> act like a nitpicker about anything related to <i>us</i> . <i>They</i> see even a very tiny black point in white milk.	Racism / Reason for discrimination / Economic situations / Social exclusion	Generalization / Becoming a target / Victimization
<i>I</i> can't say all the <i>Syrian women</i> are good. The good and the bad are separated from each other by the clothes and make-up, not by the character. However, are all the <i>Turkish women</i> good?	discourse / Social exclusion	Questioning / Comparison
<i>We</i> , most of the <i>Syrian women</i> , are veiled women but still <i>we</i> are women and put on <i>make-up</i> . Is it a reason to criticize my belief?	clusion / Criticisms on belief	Objection

Table 2 Discourse, Reason and Result from the point of Syrian Female Refugees

Suffice it to say that poverty, deprivation, hardships and marginalization are related to the term ‘‘social exclusion’’. Although more features can be added as reasons or justifications for social exclusion; physical appearance, language (Turkish from the point of refugees who live in Turkey), skin color²⁶, religion, poverty, nationality and

²⁶ I was discriminated because of my skin color when I went a state hospital to have a statement of health. A security guard who knows my brother wanted to help me for the registration and we went to registration desk together. He asked the price and the process to the person in charge. The officer only had a look at me for a second and explained what steps should be taken for Syrian refugees. He thought that I

gender are the predominant ones. Social exclusion can be seen in almost all immigration incidents and leads to various transformations in the cultural and socio-economic structure of the migrated cities. This transformation process is painful in general and only a small spark is enough to increase the tension between locals and refugees. Social exclusion turns into direct violence, lynch attempts against the refugees is a tool making the refugees the target of the locals so that the fear of suffering violence turns into conversion and hiding identity. Syrian female refugees altering the way of wearing hijab not to be distinguished (Ekinci, 2015) at least at first sight is a good example of the normalization process of the female refugees. Briefly, the discourses utilized by the locals cause an immense gap in relationships between Turks and Syrians. The socially excluded Syrian female refugees become voiceless and invisible although they unsuccessfully try to object to the discourses by their own discourses. In other words, when a local woman can criticize the morality, identity, culture and even maternal behavior of a female refugee explicitly, a Syrian female refugee simply can't.

3.2. Giving Birth: Women between Social Exclusion and Social Acceptance

Syrian female refugees are torn between social exclusion and social acceptance because of the giving birth issue. Discriminatory discourses of the host community about the fertility rates of Syrian female refugees has become more common in direct proportion to increasing the number of newborn Syrian infants – over 230 thousand (Erdoğan, 2017) – in Turkey. The criticisms are mainly the result of the ethnocentric point of view against the others in the form of hate rhetoric. Economic reasons, the perception management of media and discriminatory language especially in social media, an excuse to criticize the ruling party and many other reasons and the reflections caused by these reasons make the majority of the locals criticize the refugees without reliable information which, in fact, should not be the case. Because of this approach towards the refugees, judging, charging them of crimes and targeting them are the initial reactions of the society leading to whatever reasons for having children the refugees have such as religious factors, praise (reputation, esteem or even prestige) of a man, the need for

was Syrian. I certainly did not feel to be discriminated due to having resemblance to any Syrian refugee but the way he treated me as if I was not there offended me. When I spoke to him in Turkish, he changed his attitudes and apologized for the misunderstanding. He also said that the security staff of the hospital helps the refugees because most of them do not know Turkish.

agricultural labour and keeping the property in the family (for male child) and so on, (Karakaya, Margirit Çoşkun, Özerdoğan, & Yakıt, 2017) do not matter.

3.2.1. Religious Practices or Husband's Will: Female Body, Sexuality and Sin

“Marry those who are loving and fertile, for I will be proud of your great numbers before the other nations.”

Prophet Muhammad

Although the host society and the refugees share the same religious belief, the way they follow their belief is different from each other mostly in terms of cultural, political and legal practices. For this reason, examining in detail the Islamic approach to marriage, role of men and women and the interpretation of Islam about giving birth in detail not only demonstrates the diversity in understanding and/or practicing of Islam in both societies, but also lets us see the problem from a critical point of view as well.

Firstly, I shall underline the framework of how the marriage and the relationship between husband and wife are arranged according to Islamic teachings. Then, to what extent these teachings are implemented will be analyzed. To begin with, the ascribed role of Muslim women would give us the cornerstones of the social norms in Muslim societies. The Qur'an and the hadiths²⁷ are the main sources for this framework.

Some of the main responsibilities and duties of a Muslim woman in the context of marriage are playing her role as a mother of the next generation and learning how to respond and please her husband's needs (Lemu, 1992). When it comes to sexual needs, it is emphasized that the pleasure of both husband and wife is important. On the other hand, a wife should not refuse constantly her husband's demand to have sexual intercourse constantly without having any valid reason (Ibid). This very point of view can be connected to practicing or misinterpretation of polygyny (a practice of having two or more wives) in Islam and thus in Syrian culture. Polygyny is condoned by Surah 4:3 in the Qur'an: *“...Marry of the women that please you; two, three or four; but if you fear that you will not be able to deal justly, then only one...”* (Philips & Jones, 2005).

²⁷ Hadiths are the sayings, traditions or teachings of the Prophet Muhammad that are received as a major source of religious law and moral guidance.

Muslims have their own justifications to defend the practice such as females outnumbering males, wars and the need for women's protection (Johnson, 2005). From a sociological point of view, it is preferable not to concentrate not on the fiqh – Islamic jurisprudence – discussions about the practice of the polygyny but its effects on Syrian women.

The practice of polygyny²⁸ decreases in urbanized areas whereas it still maintains its continuity legally (Filizkan, 2010). With the help of religious references, the patriarchal Syrian society has forced women to be more obedient to their husbands. Giving permission to a man to marry more than one woman causes some major problems such as physical and psychological exploitation of women and one-sided balance of the marriage priorities.

“She (the neighbor of the respondent) has five children and is pregnant with her sixth child. Her husband wants ten because his family has ten children too. She has varicose veins everywhere and her body does not look good. But she said ‘I will have ten children’” (Cansu, married, in communication with the refugees, over 30, Local).

“Women want abortion because they do not want to have too many children. A young woman punched herself to abort her child. She has nothing. She doesn't love her husband or is afraid not to be able to take care of her own child. If she works and makes money, it is ok. But she has no place to sleep. Her place comes after her husband's first wife. She doesn't even have a room and in the living room, she is sleeps on the floor” (Melis, married, under 30, Syrian).

In this case, the questions worth asking are what is the motivation or condition of the refugees, as *Cansu* mentioned above, to give birth to as many babies as her husband wants even though her body is not healthy enough? To what degree is she supposed to please her husband? How is the female body perceived? Except for the reasons or justifications for polygyny mentioned above, this practice turns into a type of pretext for men (Öztürk, 2014) and a threat for women. In the first stage, the power, the patriarchal system itself, has utilized Islamic law²⁹ to continue its absolute dominance over women

²⁸ A large number of Syrian women have become widowed by the social and political upheaval in Syria; hence the economic conditions and responsibilities of getting married to more than one woman – having separate houses for the second woman – are to be disregarded for the protection of widows (Suriye'de kadın olmak, 2016).

²⁹ One of the main problems regarding to the interpretation of Islamic law is that Islam is treated as if it were a state (Johnson, 2005).

and the customs for the benefit of man. Then, the social pressure which is supported religiously and practiced traditionally has spread out the feeling of learned helplessness among women. Finally, the learned helplessness results in mainly two different practices (Some common practices can be listed as well). First, women remain in between some difficult conditions such as having psychological disorders due to being put in a latter position and being ill-treated. Second, there is no any other choice or option but to accept what is offered as the gender role³⁰. One of the interviews with a Syrian female refugee done by under the project of “*why am I in Turkey?*”³¹ adequately explains women’s position in Syria:

“Actually, I never felt that I am a human being in Syria. As a human being and as a woman there. I am not protected legally as a woman in Syria. I have no value in Syrian society as a woman. Even the law is against us. I do not feel my existence in Syria at all” (Moazzen, 2017).

What I am also trying to analyze is what local women think about religious factors over Syrian women in terms of the reproduction issue and in what ways locals and Syrian women are / are not differentiated from each other. In the first phase, feminist movements in both countries among women and men and the women’s response to the question of woman in issues such as subordination, marginalization and objectification of woman have to be understood as Simone de Beauvoir claimed, “Woman is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute – she is the Other” (Beauvoir, 2010, p. 26). It might be (to a certain extent) understood local women criticize Syrian female refugees from their own perspectives. However, the comparison of cultural, historical, social and economic differences between two groups has also resulted in problematic outcomes. This underrating approach is particularly similar to how the Western feminist state theory ignores both the postcolonial states and the experiences of women who are citizens of these states. It should be noted that the perspective of colonialism in the Middle East, the historical change in the region during the twentieth century, and huge differences within the

³⁰ From the interviews with Syrian female refugees.

³¹ “*Why am I in Turkey?*” (W.A.I.T) aims to publish the life stories of the Syrian refugees from various cities in Turkey. For further information visit <https://whyamiinturkey.com/about-b0bf051a103c>

region itself are quite important in the reality of the Middle East (Bora, 2008). When we refer to the results of the survey, we will see two main factors in the answers of the women living outside the district. The first is dependent on age, education level, residential area and other variables. Secondly, it is possible that women would remain in between reality and what is supposed to be (ideally).

The second consideration is somehow shaped under the influence of the first one. To give an example, it seems like there is a Western perspective view of “*Muslim woman*” and from this point of view “*Muslim woman*” refers to all women (Güç, 2008), whether they are secular or religious. When it is considered from this respect, the image³² of “*Syrian Woman*” faces a same sort of generalization. The very image of Syrian woman, identified with “Arab” and “Muslim” identity, takes precedence over the experiences and differences of women. Lastly, we should lay emphasis on religion which produces mechanisms aimed at controlling female sexuality and fertility, and is still the most powerful factor the existence of the male dominated system in most societies. Connecting Islam with the manners and customs that are not related to Islam (İlkkaracan, 2003) becomes a for a man shelter running for cover.

Woman that is discursively constructed as inferior (King, 2004, p. 30) must be disciplined, controlled and protected by the social practices of masculine domination. Manipulating and controlling the fear of sinning, and peccatophobia, by the power is one of the most influential instruments for threatening woman. Sinning can be correlated with male authority at all points. This control mechanism, reinforced with the fear of sinning, social pressure and being cursed, has an impact on many aspects of life from sexual intercourse to social behavior. To state it, the fear of sinning and sin itself become a watchman of the male domination that is utilized to regulate gender roles and responsibilities to ensure that women are obedient to the male – that could be a father, a brother, a husband and an adult son – around her.

³² For the subjects of Muslim Women, Women in the Middle East, Islamic Feminism, Gender and Social Change see also Badran Margot, “Between Secular and Islamic Feminisms/Reflections on the Middle East and Beyond”, *Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies*, Winter 2005, Vol. 1, No 1. Badran Margot, *Feminists, Islam and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995. S. Arebi, “Gender Anthropology in the Middle East: The Politics of Muslim Women’s Misrepresentation”, *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, Vol. 8, 1991. A. Wadud, *Quran and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. K. Jayawardena, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*, London: Zed Books, 1994.

“The Messenger of Allaah (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) said: ‘When a man calls his wife to his bed and she refuses, and he goes to sleep angry with her, the angels will curse her until morning’” – Narrated by al-Bukhaari, 3065; Muslim, 1436 – (Fiqh of the family - Rights of spouses, 2001).

Women feel obliged to compete for giving birth to a male child because of cultural sayings such as “Men beget men” (Salman, 1987). Because a wife can hold the whip hand over the second wife / wives if she has male child / children. For the mothers who have son/s, the perception of having a male child is a sort of insurance to be socially accepted, to win the competition against other wives and to be praised as the one who provides her husband with the opportunity to keep the family name alive. But this situation causes social exclusion and criticisms towards the refugees in the local society leading to the condition that the female refugees seesaw between social acceptance and social exclusion.

“We can’t handle (the situation) because we aren’t talking about thousands. Now millions... A Syrian mother and daughter gave a birth on the same day. I saw it on television³³. I don’t think we have that much money for their reproduction because every day someone gives birth” (Burcu, married, over 30, Local).

Syrian female refugees mainly explain the reasons of fertility rate in four items. The first item is early marriage, which can also be attributed to being immature, lack of education, gender bias and religious barriers, is (biologically) related to fertility. Secondly, it is stated that they are trying to reproduce as much as possible for the need of a new generation when the Civil War is over. Thirdly, Islamic teachings and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad are another reason. Last but not least, marriage and a large family have been promoted, praised and institutionalized for a long time. There are also some other issues like sexual desire left unsaid because sex is a function of reproduction (Foucault, 1978). Local women criticize female refugees through sexuality that is unspoken agenda for themselves as well and use descriptive adjectives and phrases like “hysterical”, “sex addict”, “reproducing like a dog”, “we will become refugees in our own country” and “their population will exceed ours”. These types of

³³ The link to access the news mentioned: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/anne-kiz-ayni-anda-dogum-yaptilar-40594373> accessed 14.12.2017.

discriminatory discourses do not belong to the women. They are the words the power is putting in women's mouth. More or less the same power guidance worked for creating hate speech against fertility rates of Kurdish women before. So, women would not be a direct target of discourses in both cases although it appears to be so. Because women – local, refugee or from minority groups – have never been considered as a key player but the role of women as producers has been at the center of the fear tactics against refugees, minorities and shortly all people the powers that be identify as others.

Additionally, feminist movement in Turkey had difficulties in bringing up its own political agenda to the state's political agenda particularly on the issues that need to be institutionalized in the field of women's politics (Sancar, 2009). It may also be stated that when local women criticize female refugees because of having too many children during the wartime, they usually skip over or leave aside two more factors, pregnancy from rape and men's refusal to use a condom.

“We do not want to give birth as many times as men want. We are the ones who suffer. I never hear any Syrian man uses condom. My husband also rejects because he says he does not take pleasure and it is a sin too (ejaculate outside)” (Adel, married, under 30, Syrian).

3.3. Burqa, Turban and Headscarf: Between Invisibilization and Protection, Between Freedom of Religious Belief and Expression and Intersectionality

“Excluded or marginalized social groups frequently face problems of representation in the public sphere. Moreover, the very notion of exclusion typically refers to communicatively or discursively produced mechanisms of not being considered relevant in public processes of communication. Exclusion and marginalization might therefore be understood as process of silencing or invisibilizing important social groups” (Herzog, 2017, p. 1).

We shall argue how wearing *burqa* or *headscarf*³⁴ becomes an instrument for social

³⁴ From the interview with Dr. Ayşe Duygu Yavuz, Research Assistant in the department of Turkish language and literature, Doğuş University, İstanbul: *“I think burqa is not the essential point in this case. Men or women, the Syrian refugees in Turkey are both invisible. Turkish people try to ignore the problems of Syrian refugees because they think the government is not capable of looking after the majority of the Turkish society. According to the major part of the population of the country, the Syrian people don't have to pay taxes and this is unfair. And some Turkish people are concerned about the Syrian's patriotic feelings because they didn't defend their own country in war and they choose to ran away. These excuses turn into the hate speech, even murder. If a person becomes invisible in one's eye it means this person is anonymous. And to harm someone who is anonymous is much easier than the one you are familiar with. And it does not really matter where the woman in burqa is from, she be a Syrian or Turkish. If a man wants to give harm to a woman the nationality or clothes don't change the result. But again, it is much easier to kill or rape*

exclusion of Syrian female refugees. The turban³⁵ – hijab – question/matter including the ban on headscarves in the civil service and educational and political institutions in Turkey should be examined first to analyze social exclusion of Syrian female refugees and their invisibilization in burqa.

As the subject is associated with numerous fields from politics to social codes and also it has already become a burning question in modern Turkish history, a historical assessment, therefore, would be useful to gain a different point of view. In this regard, the question that should be first asked would be *what does headscarf mean in the Turkish society?* after then proceed with the question *how is conservatism interpreted and progressed?* However, both questions, somehow, are connected to each other inasmuch as there is a cause and effect relation. Unlike the progress of conservatism in the West that is more related to (social economic) class, in Turkey, it has developed in response to the modernization movement of Turkey and the reaction maintained the western complex (Dellaloğlu, 2017a) which caused us to perceive or to understand conservatism as something dominantly religious or with an extended definition something relevant to culture (Ibid). To give an example of the conflict which has even become a power struggle between two groups – those who adopt secularism and those who adopt conservatism – the headscarf ban in Turkey would provide a basis for understanding the relation between burqa, turban or headscarf and invisibilization and discrimination of Syrian female refugees.

a woman if you define her as an anonymous figure. The burqa doesn't have power to protect a woman from a rapist. Also, women are not visible when they are seen as a sexual object. The decisive thing is hidden in the men's eye not in clothes of the women. But it is always easy to hurt someone who is powerless."

³⁵ In the thesis, I prefer to use "turban" instead of "hijab" because of two reasons: 1) there is an etymological proximity between the two terms turban and türban 2) it refers to political and religious issues in Turkey. However, regarding to the discourses of the Syrian female refugees on turban, I use "hijab" instead of "turban".



Figure 6 “Women protest headscarf ban” <https://www.timeturk.com/28-subat-surecinin-unutulmaz-fotograflari/fotogaleri-133874/11> accessed 11.12.2017.

Wearing a headscarf³⁶ in the public sector is an issue under discussion that has a history of half a century (Saka & Altınöz, 2011) and has been considered as an attack on thesecular regime (Cindoğlu, 2011). On the contrary, any restriction, barrier or any discrimination aimed at a woman wearing headscarf has been found as a violation of freedom of religious belief and expression. The headscarved women, whether they were students in a higher education institution or civil servants in a governmental agency had to hover between religion-state-society relations and their own choices, i.e. being socially excluded and exposed to social suffering by the headscarf ban itself and its effects. Although there could be a lot of answers for the headscarf issue, I attempt to establish a connection between the discriminatory discourses related to wearing burqa or headscarf by giving examples and two main reasons for the past and current discussions on burqa and headscarf, in addition to what the notion of public sphere in Turkish society is and what is meant by restricted socialization. To begin with the notion

³⁶ From the interview with Associate Professor Nadide Karkiner, an independent researcher (sociologist). “In Turkey there is a significant difference between “kara çarşaf” and scarf. Kara çarşaf is seen as a sign of underdevelopment and reactionary views. May be in Urfa and Gaziantep one can see many women who wear “kara çarşaf” or in Bağcılar neighborhood of İstanbul. In Bağcılar I thought that I was in a different country like Iran. In 2000’s not only women but also men who define themselves as secular hate “kara çarşaf” and called those women cockroaches (kara fatma) and bugaboo (öcü). Nowadays, those secular people have no idea about Syrian refugees who have clothes traditional or modern. It is difficult to differentiate a Syrian woman from a Turkish woman if both wear “kara çarşaf”. So, social opposition of secular people in public is not widespread now.”

of understanding the public sphere, we see that the established public sphere³⁷ in Turkey was simply not a domain of where social problems were discussed among individuals (Ersöz, 2015). It, indeed, has become a domain where modernist practices and lifestyles are practiced (Ibid). Because of that, the notion of public sphere in Turkish society refers to using merely constructed facilities and physical substructure (Saray & Üzer, 2013) such as halls, parks, government offices, streets and so forth. This very understanding has given rise to missing the first meaning of public sphere which Habermas defines as “a domain of our social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed” (Habermas, 1989, p. 231).

Another point is how restrictive socialization or limits in socializing in Turkish society affects the public opinion and the discourses people use for one another. What is roughly referred to as “people” in this context is two (incompatible) groups of people with similar characteristics, including secular and conservative members. In other words, it has become a them and us situation and both secularism and conservatism have been widely supported and have clashed with each other. The misinterpretation of political terminologies³⁸ and the limitations of socialization among these groups led to the intensification of not only the lack of communication but also intellectual and political polarization within the society. It means that the surroundings of each individual, group, and intellectual have been defined by the particular social codes.

The social and political environment that is mainly a one-sided ideological dimension, accounts for the replies of the 12 local respondents to the question *how does the critics’ political view influence his or her criticism of Syrian (female) refugees?* Without

³⁷ In some cases, public sphere and public space have been intertwined.

³⁸ a) Secular and/or laic (for the majority of Turkish people and intellectuals, secularism and laicism, secular and laic are synonyms) is an adjective describing a feature of a state’s political and social institutions, yet the definition is also used for individuals in Turkey.

b) Conservatism that is mainly separated as Islamic and Nationalist Conservatism, has always been taken into consideration as a terminology related to inherently local (Dellaloğlu, 2017a) and confused with traditionalism. Although it, too, is an urban and western ideology (Beneton, 2016), it is not considered in this way. To exemplify the perception of conservatism in Turkey through sharing the received criticism of the Turkish historical television series “*Muhteşem Yüzyıl*” may present us a better perspective to comprehend the basis of differentiation between two groups. One group has criticized the Tv series owing to showing the Sultan while he is drinking. The other group has reacted to the series on the account of underlying the military tactics and technical superiority of the Ottoman Empire rather than the power of Turks and Turkishness in order to win a war (Türkiye’de Muhafazakar Olmak, 2012).

c) Another problematic public perception is that “fascism is a form of excessive nationalism” (Dellaloğlu, 2017b, p. 119).

exception, every single local respondent agrees and confirms that the critic's political view has an impact on his or her criticism. Another significant finding is that although Turkish society have begun to discuss social and political issues intensively – that have been papered over the cracks – through social media, the social codes of the society formed by the past experiences are still highly influential, i.e. constructed intellectual ghettos (Albrecht & Dearth, 2016) in social media do not allow for establishing a domain of discussion platforms to be established but serve as a medium for hate crime and hate speech. Local respondents' dwell on several distinctive factors, particularly economic ones, in answering the question but in general, conclude with the same distinction that is between having faith in Allah and lack of conviction. Such an assessment could be read from various aspects. Firstly, matching or identifying people's political preferences by inferring from their beliefs and vice versa is an example of ghettoization of our minds (for both sides). Secondly, the dispute between two groups because of the historical unresolved issues seems to be partially dealt with but is still alive.

“People who recognize and accept the sunnah and the Qur'an, have welcomed and accepted Syrians very quickly. They saw them as their Muslim brothers and sisters. They also considered themselves as Ensar and Syrians as Muhacir. But people especially leftists who have nothing to do with religion, do not care” (Berna, married, in communication with the refugees, over 30, Local).

What follows is local women emphasizing that there is a strong relation between burqa and invisibilization of female Syrian refugees. Although 9 out of 12 local women wear headscarves, they state that burqa is a bit excessive. Such external criticism has been expressed against headscarved women and by men about headscarved women in Turkey. Using the same discourse to criticize disadvantaged groups of female refugees by those discriminated in the same way before, indicates that how the criticism is interiorized or justified by the society. Besides, a considerable number of the replies point out that burqa is not associated with the invisibilization of female Syrian refugees. The respondents who find it as unrelated, center on three governing ideas. The first idea is that the districts in which the refugees live, conservative people (conservative people refer to religious people) constitute the majority of the population which means they are not discriminated because of their belief. Secondly, with the AKP government, the

headscarf ban has been lifted and religious conservatives have gained strength. Lastly, wearing burqa does not make the refugees invisible – on the contrary, it leads to excessive visibility because of burqa.

“The perception of burqa in Turkish society is twofold; first and foremost, the burqa has been a powerful symbol of everything that the majority of Turkish people stand against since the foundation of the Turkish Republic: Poverty, bigotry, oppression of women and illiteracy. The religious rigidity and accompanying cultural elements that require women to wear a burqa is alien to vast majority of Turkish people who, despite claiming to be Muslims, uphold a Deistic-Western lifestyle in practice. Therefore, any woman who wears a burqa is automatically perceived as a byproduct of social backwardness, not as a part of a dignified society, and certainly not as a “real” person. She is merely a sex slave, an incubator whose main function is to produce more of herself. Even to those who try to empathize with her, she is a victim at best; a victim who is at the receiving end of a cruel “Men’s World”, a concubine who needs to be saved. Secondly, the burqa is generally perceived as a perfect camouflage for immoral, obscene and criminal acts such as prostitution, kidnapping, theft, armed robbery, terrorism, pedophilia, imposture etc. committed by both men and women over the years. Since the value of such a perfect disguise is apparent, an average Turkish citizen does not rule out the possibility of a potential criminal in a burqa. Therefore, the apparent lack of attention to many Syrian women in Turkish society is deeply rooted in a phenomenon called “association by appearance”. According to this, anyone who wears a burqa or a similar garment is a person who is either a “half-person”, whose personal will and life had been hijacked long ago (and therefore unrecoverable), or a person who is after a sinister act against the society. The effects of these phenomena can easily be observed through Turkish main stream media: Syrian women who are allowed to express themselves on papers or on TV are dressed predominantly in western style. That is mainly because the media is fully aware of the apathy and indifference towards people who are dressed otherwise. Symbols still rule over minds” (Özerinç, personal communication, January 21, 2018).

When these three ideas are examined closely, there arise some problematic propositions about the invisibilization of female Syrian refugees including the refugees’ habitus. It seems that certain boundaries have already been set for the refugees. For example, the notion that “they live where religious people live” means “they are not invisible in burqa; at least not for the majority”. Or as in the second argument, it is claimed that the existence of headscarved women in the public sphere minimizes their invisibilization in the society. In other words, the religious section in Turkey began to express themselves more confidently owing to the political developments of the AKP government such as

lifting of the headscarf ban in 2013. And the most recent researches on religion and morals, religion and society and politics address some contradictions between discourse and practice. On the one hand the percentage of those who identify themselves as devout has increased between 1990 and 2011 (Esmer, 2012) but on the other hand there is a decrease in practicing religious rituals (Virtua Araştırma & Alice BBDO, 2012). There are also some similar conflicting ideas and attitudes towards the refugees. This type of inconsistent manners of the host society influence the reactions of the refugees and the relationship between two groups as well. While 95 % of the local respondents stated that “they are free to practice their religion”, 81 % found burqa a bit excessive (Ibid).




Chart 1 The relationship between burqa and invisibilization / burqa and women's protection (This graph has been created according to the respondents' answers and the numbers used in the graph are the indicators of the respondents' number. Twelve is the maximum number of persons for each group.)

Additionally, the understanding of women's invisibilization specific to wearing burqa differs from person to person and time to time. Spatial level of social exclusion of Syrian refugees (Hülür, Deniz, & Ekinçi, 2016) that is intensified in the outskirts of Ankara by the racist discourses based upon economic reasons, stimulates other types of social exclusions, the first and foremost one being discursive exclusion. Due to this

reason, those who support freedom of religious belief and expression and have been against the headscarf ban in public sphere, emphasize that “the burqa enhances not invisibilization but excessive visibility of female Syrian refugees”. In this case, two more questions should be added to analyze what the meaning of invisibilization and social suffering is for the respondents.

As a first step, does wearing burqa make Syrian female refugees more noticeable or visible? Then, what is relationship between the increase in the number of refugees and the discourse of invisibilization or visibility of the refugees with burqa? Before analyzing the burqa question, these terminologies should also be briefly mentioned; these terminologies; turban (16.2%) perceived as a political standpoint (urban) (Karabatak, 2008), headscarf (51.9%) as conventional (rural) and burqa (1.3%) as bigotry (Konda, 2007). Turban and headscarf are semantically intertwined with each other. Turban, has significant meanings like awareness, being a political symbol, symbolizing cultural transmission and being seen in urban areas while headscarf does not refer to any of these significations (Hakan, 2007). Furthermore, between 2007 and 2014 the total percentage of headscarved women including all types of covering of the heads and body increased from 69.4 (Ibid) to 71.6 (DİB, 2014). The number of women with burqa does not increase noticeably and constitutes only a small fraction of the total number of headscarved women (Şen, 2016) although there is an increase in the number of women with headscarf (Aydınpost, 16/07/2014) – that is already the greatest majority of the total female population. So, by inference from both the recent researches and the replies of the respondents, the reasonable deduction that there is a clear distinction between the used metaphors³⁹ for and the reactions to burqa and other types of covering can be reached. Another significant distinction is that women with burqa are at the bottom of the pyramid of social exclusion and invisibilization among headscarved women. However, due to the racist discourses, another classification – “Syrian women with burqa” or “refugees with burqa” – is added to the hierarchical structure of headscarved women as the lowest level of the hierarchical layers. Social exclusion of this classified group of women is based firstly on racism – justified with economic,

³⁹ The respondents also claim that people do not use negative metaphors – cockroach, ninja, veil of ignorance, bugaboo and Muslim reactionaries – as much as they used to do but still there are significant differences between the perception of burqa and others.

religious and historical references – then religion.

As in chart 1, (the relationship between women's protection thanks to burqa and sexual harassment) it is seen that a great majority of female Syrian refugees do not believe the burqa has any limiting factor in and power to protect them from sexual abuse. Almost all of them stated that “*women feel obliged to wear it because of their husbands*”. According to the cultural perception, which has been formed and shaped by masculine discourse, there are some factors such as pregnancy and headscarf (burqa, hijab etc.) that are thought to be preventing women from sexual abuse in Muslim societies. The fact remains that sexual abuse of women in Turkey has increased (Karabağlı, 2013 & Taşkale, 2017 & Ekal, 2016 & Demirel, 2014) and women from all strata including full covering, face showing and with no headscarf have been exposed to verbal and physical sexual harassment.

For the female refugees, two main periods might be listed as being sexually abused during and after the migration process. While the female refugees are sexually abused by human traffickers in the first process, their vulnerability to being abused has become prevalent, problematized and differentiated according to internal and external problems and psychological and physical effects of the first period. In addition, it should be considered that the increasing number of sexual harassments – 93 % in total, verbal and physical (Dalaman, 2017b) – child abuse rate in Turkey is also systematically increasing and constitutes 46 % of total sexual harassment (Balkız, 2016). Despite the fact that almost every two out of three women wear headscarf, 93 % of women have been exposed to sexual harassment and if we exclude the child abuse percentage from the total, the statistics in relation of women with headscarf and sexual harassment against women in Turkey support female Syrian refugees' claims that external factors are at play.

Sexual abuse with all types and aspects are issues that are a part of the unspoken agenda. The cultural codes of Muslim societies shape “the attributes of true womanhood” and “the ideals of purity”, i.e., such societies consider a woman as someone that can be soiled (Dalaman, 2017a). To give an example of one of these shared cultural codes, on the one hand the society expects the girls not to have sexual intercourse before marriage but on the other, it encourages the boys to prove their

“masculinity” (sexual performance) (Dalaman, 2017a). As 48.5 % of the sexually abused (Muslim + Local) women cannot even talk about their personal experiences (Tok, 2017) due to these types of approaches to the gender and sexuality, male dominated politics and social pressure on women, it is not easy to estimate how often the female refugees under unfavorable conditions (factors) such as language barrier, ethnic, cultural and economic discrimination and other issues related to migration and gender are exposed to sexual abuse. The statement of a local woman, “burqa makes me look like a Syrian woman these days”, demonstrates that burqa itself does not protect Syrian women but is, instead, the cause of distinction between local women and themselves. On the other hand, the difference in the dress codes of headscarved women in both groups makes the recognition of Syrian women easier.

“When I was waiting at the bus stop, a car came nearby (it was day time) and started saying some offensive expressions. As soon as I replied them in Turkish, they understood that I am not a Syrian woman and went away. I have been wearing burqa “kara çarşaf” for a long time and have been insulted before but it was the first time I was sexually harassed” (Ilgın, married, over 30, Local).

More cases might be added to this example, e.g. forced prostitution, child marriage and human trafficking. It may also be inferred that neither burqa or headscarf nor moral values such as motherhood – that is highly valued (Topbaş, Ünsal, Çan, Bacak, & Özgün, 2008) – is able to protect Syrian female refugees from harassment.

“While I was shopping, two men started to follow me. I was sure that they did not see my face as I wore purdah. I was so afraid... Just left the market and took a dolmuş (collective taxi – dolmuş). I thought it was over. However, they came after me in their car. I got off the dolmuş, looked back and saw them again. All I did not want them to learn where I live. Therefore, I went around the back. A few hours later, I heard that they came to the building and asked if there is any Syrian living here. One of my neighbors said that they were municipal police officers... With their radio... And car. Everyone says I should make a complaint about. But I am not going to... Because if I do it, it does not solve any problems except making me be disclosed. I did not talk to them... They did not know... They stalked me. I will not go to officials to complain about them. I do not want this. No... No... We have no one to help us” (Ebru, married, under 30, Syrian).

Furthermore, three main characters who are the local man, the male refugee and the

female refugee should be mentioned. I will attempt to delve into each relation between the characters and the cases and initially deal with how the relationship of husband and wife in a Syrian (refugee) family structure is constructed according to the social norms. In this context, wearing burqa has two aspects, protection and power. Both of them complete and encompass each other and have numerous correlations between gender (social) roles and responsibilities in the community. The need for protection of women, which is in the circle of the power is supposed to strengthen the power itself while the power itself is the one needing protection. Once social norms firmly established, the responsibility of the power is to keep firstly the inner circle (his own family including relatives too) and then the outer circle (the community where he belongs to) safe and secure from external threats. The level of threat perception can also vary in relation to post-migration living difficulties (Aragona, Pucci, Mazzetti, & Geraci, 2012). For example, the female refugees' statements such as “(In Syria) *we could not even go to the bazaar alone but now we are thinking of working*” (Berra, married, under 30, Syrian) and “*Turkish women can move freely and our husbands are very afraid that we are badly influenced*” (Adel, married, in communication with locals, under 30, Syrian) indicate that the authority of male refugees has been shattered under the circumstances of the post-migration process.

In reply to the alteration of family relations, Syrian male refugees have implemented several methods in order to secure male dominance. Their first attempt is therefore reproducing some discourses; “*Since we came (to Turkey), my husband has become more obsessive and oppressive about burqa. I am constantly warned to be careful and not to do something inappropriate for our culture and religion*” (Rana, married, in communication with locals, under 30, Syrian) and “*When I said I wanted to work, my husband said you would count money like a man. If I really want to, I had to do it somewhere else not in the same city where I lived*” (Miray, married, in communication with locals, over 30, Syrian). However, the influence of the discourses could not have lasted for a long time, therefore male refugees explored different ways such as *beating, threatening* (The most common types of threats are threatening with divorce, taking a second wife and slandering), *cutting off women's communication with the outside and manipulating the source of the problem* to maintain male-dominant power relations.

According to Islamic teachings, beating a woman which is bound by rules to what circumstances call for it, when and how it can be given, is the last method and the third stage of disciplining women (Narrated by Muslim, 1218). As social contracts in Muslim societies especially in Arab Countries are based upon Qur'an and hadith, this issue, too, is based on a surah from the Qur'an: "*As to those women on whose part you see ill conduct, admonish them (first), (next), refuse to share their beds, (and last) beat them (lightly, if it is useful), but if they return to obedience, seek not against them means (of annoyance). Surely, Allah is Ever The Highest, The Greatest*" (Surah An-Nisa, 4:34). I shall underline the circumstances of how and when the Islamic teachings are partly used and generally ignored in accordance with a relationship based on self-interest. Though I have not directly asked any question about family violence, some of the respondents stated that they are exposed to violence. They also emphasize their husbands have been negatively affected by post-migration stress because of external factors such as working conditions.

"My husband said he (Employer) did not pay him. Then, I became so worried and just talking about our needs. I was not complaining. He misunderstood me and beat me. But I did not say anything because he was so stressed. I stand for my family as all Syrian women do" (Feriha, married, over 30, Syrian).

Normalization of the beating up of Syrian female refugees not only by men but also by women themselves indicates how the social codes penetrate into "the society where gender never mix" (Salman, 1987) and clarify the status of women in domestic relations. The secondary (gender) role of a Muslim woman within the family is encouraged and a self-sacrifice for the whole family, that is already accepted as the given role and duty of a woman is imposed on women while the male dominated society can skip some specific parts of Islamic teachings because of their conflicting with male benefits and can practice the other favorable parts for men (Ibid). The man realizes himself outside the home in the public sphere that is his social service for the society. His home, a private sphere, is a place where the man should rest and the woman should prepare it for his rest. Beating is also thought as a way of female endurance (At some points, beating may not be considered as suffering.) that the constructed social order demands for asserting herself. Thus, a beating woman may be justified by and attributed to a great deal of reasons.

As for threatening, we may encounter commonly used discourses: "I will divorce you" and "I will marry another woman." That another woman generally refers to a Syrian

woman but, in some cases, could as well be a local woman to subject women to extreme repression as for a male refugee, marrying a local woman means having more rights and feeling secure. The point here is that the threatening husband wants to state that he would have options if a wife did not obey her husband in every aspect. Apart from divorce and marriage discourses, a different and more sophisticated way of threatening emerged in the region. One of the working male refugees who were uncomfortable because of their wives' manners brought their local workmates home as if they were undercover police officers. The intention was clearly to convince women to obey as they used to before. This peculiar incident indicates that the stereotyped methods for disciplining women loses their function and the fear of losing control over women make men collaborate with locals on the fake police plan.

“One day my husband came home with a police officer. He said this policeman wanted to talk to me. I was so afraid. Why did a policeman come and want to talk to me? He showed me his police ID. And then started talking and advising about family relations and a wife's responsibilities. He also said “I heard you do not behave well towards your husband. If you keep behaving like this if I will put you in jail”” (Sevgi, married, in communication with locals, under 30, Syrian).

Briefly, using religious teachings or doctrines to legitimize the suppression of women's rights and sexuality is interrupted by the post-migration conditions. So, as the balance of power has been changing, male refugees take precautions to maintain control of the male dominance over women. Changing the balance of power does not mean a radical change in women's status and position but on the other hand we can make an inference that this is a significant change for two reasons. Firstly, male refugees' effort to prevent their wives from working, attending to integration programs including meetings related to women's sexual health and any socio-economic activities indicates that yet the female refugees have not changed to the degree men imagine yet but it was enough for men to take action. Secondly, this important alteration, whether it is a small or a big one, of the female refugees has become a cornerstone.

The call for Syrian men to protest the participation of refugee women in activities, informative and awareness centered trainings and meetings at the women's health center in the Ulubey neighborhood and targeting the health center are also efforts to prevent a new crisis in masculinity that might occur in the future, caused by their immigration-shaken power. The Syrian men who organized the protest through WhatsApp apparently

took a step beyond the silent protest as mentioned in the voice recording, since the health center had to suspend services for approximately a week for precaution. The approach, selection of words and usage of discourses of the person sending the voice recording plays an important role in the reaction of the protesters. Discourse, since it is directly related to the target audience and how it is addressed, is very important in how it is constructed. The discourse in the message highlights how deep the problem is and it concerns everyone in order to draw the attention, reaction of the listeners and most importantly to gather supporters. Emphasis is put on the virtue sought in on women body and men who are obligated to protect women. The process of becoming a man starts after right after birth by language acquisition and passes through stages such as circumcision, military service, sexual experience towards earning money, being the head of the family (Bozok, 2011) and continues with basic social norms like always being a man. This message where social norms are reproduced and the support given to the message shows how the female identity is coded by Syrian men living in Ankara. In the same text, with sentences such as *“I hope God will give you the dignity, to save your woman”*, call of being a man is highlighted over “dignity” and the path of achieving “dignity” is also shown. Another concept seen in text is the explanation, to gather the anger of men, describing in detail the values of “us” that are under threat and as a result makes women’s health center the only target. There are several reasons behind the health center being the only target. First of all, by suggesting *“Or maybe your wife is going there and getting involved without knowing the reason”*, it is underlined that women are perhaps participating in these activities in an uninformed manner. In this case, there are “our” innocent women and sisters to be protected and the text has placed emphasis on the universal value of a man’s “dignity” and “honor” in this protection and continuously repeats this notion. The fact that the call, although it is consisted of simple discourses and more importantly does not contain any information about the health center activities, has resulted in such reaction also points out the crisis of manhood of the refugee men feel. For this reason, it is the health center that threatens to change the cultural codes and the male-female power relationship against the men. As a result, the text of the person who introduced himself as Abu Hothaifa (it is highly possible that the name may not be real) is in the form of an open letter written to attract the attention of the male reader that emphasizes the service provided to Syrian refugees within the

health center should be stood against. In the context of the text, as a summary it is mentioned that the wives of Syrian men are brainwashed at the health center in question and as a result of this activity the marriages result in divorce and this situation should be fought against. It is interesting that what is being fought against in this call is not clear. In other words, it is not explicitly mentioned what ideas are encouraged at the health centre that enable women to decide on divorce. In contrast, what should the recurring theme of “loss of male dignity” as mentioned throughout the text suggest to us? It is obvious that there is a concern towards loss of manhood, and as an extension of male dignity the objectification of female body is the issue. Instead of sitting at home after men have left for work women get educated in the health center and as a result they pass from gendered space to public space. It is suggested in the text that this is to be prevented since it is a sign of virtue loss of women. The concern for male honor being harmed by female public experience at the health center is in relation to male mind seeing female as an extension of itself both physically and ontologically. The source of this thought has become a rooted reference based on the verses and hadiths in the sacred text that suggest the myth of woman being created from the man’s rib.

“O mankind, fear your Lord, who created you from one soul and created from it its mate and dispersed from both of them many men and women. And fear Allah, through whom you ask one another, and the wombs. Indeed, Allah is ever, over you, an Observer” (Surah An-Nisa, 4:1).

“...And I advise you to take care of the women, for they are created from a rib and the most crooked portion of the rib is its upper part; if you try to straighten it, it will break, and if you leave it, it will remain crooked, so I urge you to take care of the women” (Al-Bukhari, 7.114).

“Selamun Aleykum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuhu. Good evening for you. I wish I did not have to talk, but I could not stay silent. Because I have to talk and it is my duty to warn you. If I don’t warn and alert you, I won’t be comfortable and I will disappoint your trust in me. Look at this picture and a lot of similar pictures (A picture from a training conference for Syrian female refugees). In the attendees there may be your wife, your sister, my wife or my sister. This is an institute that is giving lecture for women. This is a result. In the beginning what are they saying: “Do you want an aid kit? Okay we will give you, but you have to attend to these trainings”, they were inviting them to attend here in Ulubey. Now they are taking them to another place because the number has increased too much and the women who want to attend are increasing. The reason for this increase can be any reason or the aid kit that they will get. I hope Allah will keep you safe. You are going to your work and you don’t know whether your wife is attending or not. Or maybe your wife is going and involving without knowing the reason. She is going to those centers that are corrupting for the brain of attendee’s women. Guys!!! I hope Allah will give you the dignity, save your women. What we have of trouble is enough for us. We are exposed to a great deal of negative conditions because of forced migration, after all this they don’t leave us alone and they are trying to manipulate with our ideas. Now they are inciting the wife against her husband. All the divorcement that is happening here is because of this. If you see what I get on WhatsApp private message you will cry. All the divorcement situations are happening because of this. They say (pointing to wives): “I have those rights on my husband”, “I have freedom”, “I can tell the complaint to the police”. Why this is happening to us? Guys!!! Allah gives you dignity, save your wives. You don’t need the help of these centers. Who wants the aid should keep in mind that there is divorce behind this. I swear to God that there is divorce behind this aid. Please, please, take care of your families, your wives, your children, and your homes. I swear to God this is corruption for our society, our religion, it is brain washing. This is a brain washing for the women and for the sisters. This is wrong brothers. Do you know where your woman is going? You should know where your woman is going, where is she registering and why is she doing this. I wish that I did not need to say this. But this situation is getting out of control. The situation has passed its limits long ago.

Anyway, Guys I invite all the people that have honor and this is my voice let it reach all the world. I am, Abu Hothaifa, inviting every person that has honor to stand against this and protest in front of this center. I don’t know to whom this center belongs. I am inviting to protest this center that is washing our wives’ brains. This doesn’t represent our religion and transitions. Our society is already great. This is corruption for the society and woman. All of this is for what? For an aid kit!!! We sold our country and we followed the aid kit. We sold our honor and dignity and we ran after the aid kit. Anyway, I am inviting you in front of this center to protest. Either on Tuesday or Wednesday. Anyway, I will tell you when and we will meet. We need to organize a silent protest. Everybody wants to attend is welcome. Just follow us and we will announce when we will meet. Either on Tuesday or Wednesday. I wish Allah give you dignity and save you. Alsalamu Alaykum.”

This WhatsApp voice message was translated from Arabic to English by Muhammed Ballan.

Table 3 The Protest against the Women Center in Ulubey - Ankara



Figure 7 The mentioned photo in the WhatsApp voice message
https://www.facebook.com/pg/TOG.KSDM/photos/?ref=page_internal accessed 22.01.2018.

Another relationship we try to analyze is the one between local men and female refugees. We first dwell on the relationship from the point of view of local men. The blackmailing case demonstrates that as both the blackmailer (local man) and the discipliner (Syrian male refugee) have the same prevalent perceptions of honor (Abadeer, 2015), the locals take advantage of cultural and social norms that support violence and make women become more vulnerable to sexual violence. The notion that the female refugees cannot share what they have been facing with their families owing to the fear of punishment and also cannot claim their rights because of the language barrier, the attitude of officials towards the refugees (It differs from person to person but the general overview is not positive according to the refugees I have interviewed with), lack of information about their rights, for example where to file a complaint against and the rumours about female refugees – “*Syrian women are easy meat*” (Leyla, single, in communication with the female refugees, under 30, Local) – give rise to sexual exploitation and make them an easy target. The key point about the increasing sexual assault incidences against refugees is that many of the sexual harassment cases are

swept under the rug and the sentences given are not deterrent. In addition, some discriminatory precautions, particularly in public transport vehicles such as *pink bus* (Hürriyet, 1/3/2018), *trambus (trambüs) for women* (NTV, 9/18/2017) and *priority use subway car for women* (Bursadabugün, 09/06/2017) taken to protect women from any type of sexual abuse, exacerbates the problem itself. In other words, putting women in a fish glass because of the consideration that they have the possibility to be exposed to sexual harassment means social exclusion rather than protection. Separating women in public transport strengthens the sexist mentality that triggers sexual harassment and these sorts of precautions demonstrate how men interpret women's access to public sphere and expansion of women's spaces, which have led to an identity crisis among men (Monqid, 2012). The recommended solutions make women socially excluded rather than ensuring the protection of women, cause women's presence in the public sphere to be perceived as a threat, restrict women's freedom of travel and force them to make a decision whether to use these buses or not. It is also related to men's perception of women, in which women are not full partners but considered their private sphere. Thus, the statistical data collected by Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu (We Will Stop Femicide Platform) indicates that such proposed solutions and promoting social norms from the point of masculine power, that are supposed to protect family values, do not help ensuring women's protection from violence. For instance, only in 2018, 332 women were exposed to sexual violence, 409 (local) women were killed while 387 children were sexually abused (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu, 2018). Unrecorded sexual abuse or incest relationship within the family must also be added to these numbers. However, how many of the murders remained on the agenda? It can be said that putting murders of women on agenda has parallels with the forms of killings in the way that it has paved the way for normalizing sexual and physical violence against women including murders.

3.4. Conclusions

The subheadings of chapter 3, namely, sections 3.2 and 3.3, may seem mixed up for some of the readers. This is especially possible when you consider the discussion on headscarf with respect to religion, patriarchy, oppression, and sexual harassment in section 3.3 as a repetition of the main points of discussion in section 3.2, including the issues related to birth, fertility, sex, body, religion, sin, patriarchy and again, oppression.

Even though I could organize these issues of discussion separately, I preferred the current structure as I believe the topics of discussion in question are vital parts of a whole bound together by both closer and more distant links which cannot be readily divisible into individual discourses. For this reason, working through each topic in itself required me to refer back to the relationships I just indicated. The main point of discourse, or the relationship that binds the multitude of discussion topics together, can be summarized as this: the tyranny constructed over women first stemmed from the elements of culture, which is patriarchal, and which uses religion as its most powerful discourse of masculine dominance. Religion is not only the main reference point that is used in the construction of gender roles and norms, but is also seen as the vigilant force in ensuring the continuity of masculine dominance and submissive feminine roles when women cross hypothetical lines, and in the initiation of relevant punishment to protect masculine tyranny. Patriarchy dominates the culture infused with religion, while uses discourses on body to ensure reliance of women on men and the continuity of male tyranny, by transforming the female body into a possession. This is precisely how issues related to women ranging from putting on a headscarf to fertility are inter-related.

To conclude, when the discourses used by local women and Syrian refugees are analyzed, the striking feature seems to be the fact that local women are more prone to the repeating the discourses rather than actually constructing them. Local women frequently use expressions like “Rumor has it...” or “Syrians are said to do...” when describing things happening in their neighborhoods. The major factors triggering the use of such discriminatory language seem to be the lack of communication between the two groups in addition to the “us versus them” situation. Yet, it is worth mentioning that local women can be divided into two groups as the ones in communication with refugee women and those who are not. The language used and the discourse constructed by the local women who are in contact with the refugees reflect a viewpoint dominated by cultural relativity. This group pretends as if they are repeating facts rather than retelling stories. The clearest example of this situation was the comment “For them (Syrian Female Refugees) make-up is a necessity” made by a local respondent (Dilek, married, in communication with the refugees over 30, Local). Talking about the allowance given to Syrian females on Fridays and telling that this allowance is spent on personal care by Syrian women demonstrate the extent Dilek’s relationship with the refugees has

reached. Precisely because of this fact, Dilek preferred to use the word “necessity” at a time when female refugees are exposed to social exclusion due to socio- cultural as well as economic reasons and religious doctrine. Moreover, Dilek’s using the expression “for them” rather than saying “Syrians” or “others” is also a result of her being in a dialogue with the refugees. It is this relationship that results in using the language in a more egalitarian manner when compared to the “superior – inferior, giver– taker or us–them” discourse common in the other groups of locals. The ever-changing and inconsistent attitude of the governing party in its refugee politics and rhetoric has led discourses like the one of Dilek to gradually lose effect and become rare. One reason behind the transformation of the discourse used for the refugees from “Muslim brothers” to “traitors” or from “guest” to “enemy” is the incomplete, flawed, well-intentioned but insufficient or the poorly-prepared workings and politics of the governing party when establishing their policies on the refugee issue. The initial reactions of the government, though intended to be long-term solutions, ending up being temporary solutions as well as religious and cultural discourses that were meant to be welcoming and sincere, in fact, deprived the refugees of their identity as refugees. Ever-increasing use of discriminatory discourses, in time, spread to women, too. Both groups in the field state that the relationships between the refugees and the local public have deteriorated and that discourses used have changed the perceptions about the other group since before 2014. The discourse given in table 1 support this claim made. When the statements made in relation to the social alienation of the female Syrian refugees due to their make-up habits are analyzed, it is obvious that putting on make-up is linked to various issues like the responsibilities of motherhood, how the aid money is spent (wasted), whether Syrians are in an attempt to tempt the husbands of local women and even whether Syrians are devoutly religious Muslims. As a result of the attempts of local women to exclude Syrian female refugees with the discourse they opt to use, the relationship between these two groups started to undergo changes. That the Syrian female refugees are still trying to be cautious despite the discourses they are exposed to is clearly seen in the expressions they choose to use. For example, in response to the oppression and exclusion created by the discourses used by the locals, by saying “I can’t say all the Syrian women are good” Melis, a Syrian woman, is trying to use a discourse that is diplomatic and inoffensive enough not to cause reactions from the local

people. However, when they talk about incidences that bothered them or things and/or people that hurt them, they can no longer keep on being cautious of what they say, or are simply too tired to do so, and start to express themselves -whether intentionally or not- in a more straightforward manner, occasionally expressing how they feel through asking rhetorical questions or via their body language (hugging their child, taking their time before replying a question, swallowing, not making eye-contact or eyes filling with tears). When refugee women talk about how “Turkish women” -and every citizen in the host country is called “Turkish” by them- treat them, they make not so subtle comments like “Turks act like a nitpicker” about anything related to us”. Similarly, when referring to the social alienation they have been subjected to, they let go of the diplomacy and subtlety by saying “I hate the way they stare at us”. Another factor that affects the discourses used for each other is what information the parties have about one another and how they come to gather such information. What they “know” about one another and how they communicate are immensely influential in the relationships built, their perception of each other and the discourse they use. When positioning refugee women, local women retell stories or judgments about refugees rather than relying on their own experiences, refugee women, on the other hand, act defensively to protect themselves. A woman’s resorting to repeating patriarchal discourses in order to single out or to point a finger at another woman, in turn leads women to circulate male-dominant discourses. Both groups of women making use of rhetorical questions to express themselves is an indicator that both are nearly as influenced by stories produced by male-dominant social order as their own personal experiences when positioning each other.

CHAPTER 4

WHAT WE ARE TOLD AND WHAT WE ARE THINKING: The Reflections of Syrian Refugees Issue on Facebook and the Representation of Syrian Female Refugees on Printed Mainstream Media

In this chapter, firstly, the data collected from Facebook will be examined under three main titles. While working on the data, some examples regarding social media use and the impact of social media on social events will be given. Secondly, the relationship between the data collected on social media and the five basic codes that are valid for the entire thesis will be examined. Thirdly, the responses of the locals on social media regarding the discourses of the “guest”, “Ensar-Muhacir” and “Muslim brother”, which the government has preferred to use intensively especially in the first years of the refugee issue it will be dealt with. Next, I will discuss in what aspects the discourses against Syrian refugees on Facebook will embody Syrian female refugees. Finally, I will focus on the representation of Syrian female refugees in Turkish mainstream media.

This chapter deals with the role of Facebook and mainstream media in the dissemination of discourses (mainly discriminatory ones) and reproduction of the discourses against Syrian female refugees in Turkey. The chapter has two parts. Firstly, I will examine Facebook posts and comments. In this part, I will initially set the framework of the codes collected under three groups, *general discourses*, *discourses on Syrian refugee women* and *discourses depending on the agenda*. These three groups were formed in order to categorize the Facebook posts and comments mainly aiming to externalize Syrian refugees while analyzing how, when and with what motivation they were created. Within these categorized groups, there are also subtopics listed below.

General Discourses:

T1: Criticism about foreign affairs and migration policies of Turkey through Syrian refugees.

T2: Being of the opinion that the refugee crisis is the main source of economic problems.

T3: Labelling refugees as traitors, cowards and a threat risk for Turkey.

T4: Misleading information about Syrian refugees in the host society resulting in negative attitudes such as displacing the inhabitants from their jobs or questioning the amount of aid support given to them.

T5: Canalizing the political discourses shaped by ideologies towards the refugees.

T6: Cultural discrimination against Syrian identity (Labeling them as lazy, dirty, trickster, vulgar and noisy).

Discourses on Syrian refugee women:

T1: The use of the Turkish-Syrian women opposition to show the backwardness of the Arabs (from the perspective of Turkish secular wing).

T2: Holding Syrian women accountable for the degeneration of moral values and scapegoating them.

T3: When Syrian women are perceived as “victims”, their being shown more empathy, which is misconstrued as pity in Turkish society.

T4: Fertility rates (Among Syrians)

T5: Their accepting to be the “second wife”, they’re not insisting on being officially married their being perceived as a threat to the marriages of local women. In this context, an attempt to create an image of the Syrian women in pursuit of man-hunting and homewrecking.

T6: Fake marriages making the headlines

Discourses depending on the agenda:

T1: Whenever there is faltering in economy, say an increase in the price of consumables.

T2: When there is a terrorist attack.

T3: During times of elections.

T4: When Turkish soldiers die in battles at the Syrian border.

T5: When Syrians get involved in crime, including incidences where they do not.

T6: Any social, economic or political occurrence that can somehow be linked to the Syrian refugees.

Then, I will attempt to analyze the connections between these discourses. Secondly, I will analyze the discriminatory discourses related to the refugee issue in Turkish mainstream media.

Recently, there has been a massive increase in the number of social media users. Facebook has outreached 2.2 billion active users and Turkey is in the ninth place on the list of “*Leading countries based on number of Facebook users as of January 2018*” (Statista, 2018). Facebook as a new form of public sphere has affirmative and negative effects. However, this thesis focuses on what role social media plays in disseminating hate speech against Syrian refugees.

Compared to mainstream media, social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter can distribute news to a large number of people fast and relatively for free (Broersma & Graham, 2013) and Facebook as source of news dominates social media usage in Turkey (Fletcher & Radcliffe, 2015). The reasons for the high rate of Facebook usage can be explained. It can also be claimed that Facebook and the other social networks have become Turkey’s new online libraries, e-books and newspapers. Through social media, people can follow trends, have information about current agenda and share their thoughts at any moment and without any charges. The speed of adjustment to Facebook of the local society gives us some feedback about the society’s characteristics and helps us understand the basic set of tendencies of the society in order to reach knowledge. Turkish people spend only one minute per day reading books (Hızlan, 2017) while watching TV (6 hours per day) which, at the rate of 94.6 %, is the most popular social activity, (Gürbüz, 2015) the length of average time spent on social media in Turkey is 3 hours and 1 minute per day (We are social, 2017). By spending so much time on social

media, people narrow their understanding and have difficulty interpreting their surroundings and events due to not having the habit of reading books. For many people, the only reading done is the one on social media, which does not really qualify as reading as reading social media posts does not usually provide the reader with the chance to broaden horizons, the ability to analyze causal relationships or the ability to maintain objectivity. This tunnel vision leads to a high level of dissemination of propaganda, urban legends and (disinformation) misinformation in social media (Şencen & Kalkan, 2019). This can serve as another tool to analyze how these discourses towards Syrian refugees are spread on Facebook and how the reproduced Facebook posts that contain sensationalism, misinformation and polarisation are interpreted by those who spend one minute per day reading. When lack of knowledge, lack of the ability of interpretation and lack of questioning are combined with laziness, Facebook posts are generally considered as trustworthy or untrustworthy under primarily one condition that is basically who has shared the post on Facebook. In other words, those who remain in between news A and news B take the easy way out which is taking sides according to their partisan polarization (Ibid).

The critical point here is, today, in Turkey where the mainstream media are almost all under the control of the government and polarization of press has risen, social media has become an alternative type of media where everyone is broadcasting their own news. The most important example of this is the functionality of social media in Gezi Park protests. The collective movements of these activists, who will later be conceptualized as, “Gezi Park Youth”, against the power was seen as a civil democracy act that was “above class, above generations, above gender, above superiority, above emotions, above parties, above attitudes and above teams” (Özkök, 2013). In Gezi Park protests, the impact of social media was massive. In the massification of something, the characteristics of social media such as the possibility of one person to address many, the distribution and sharing of information in a single-handedly controlled way, delivery to everyone at the same time through a network and the formation of discussion platforms where everyone can actively have a participatory role in discussion on a certain subject, being an interactive communication tool and having an organizing quality are important (Topbaş & Işık, 2014). To spark people’s emotions through social media or to massify the act and movement, it is necessary for other people to also be disturbed by the

phenomenon, occurrence or situation. Otherwise, the impact of the shared posts will remain confined to small circles. As was in Gezi Park protests, social media that activates the masses and removes notions of boundary, space and time, that are called barriers of communication, is a medium open to information pollution and manipulations, and has a threatening aspect (Ibid). In both cases it is related to perception management and is reshaped according to the circumstances. The Gezi Park protestors that the government and the mainstream media targeted and alienated, and refugees alienated by society are different in their positions and projections in social media. These two situations can seem to have paradoxes in them and can be perceived as invalidating the claim that social media is an alternative media against the government and mainstream media controlled by the government. Even though in both cases social media users' social media usage patterns and reactions (Gezi Park / Movement - Syrian Refugee / Information Pollution and Manipulation) vary, it is seen that there is a parallelism in terms of perception formation of social media users' interests or disturbances or in terms of bringing the majority together by a common denominator.




Chart 2 Social media usage as news source in Turkey

http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/research/files/Supplementary%2520Digital%2520News%2520Report%25202015.pdf?utm_source=digitalnewsreport.org&utm_medium=referral accessed 16.03.2018.

One other point worth mentioning is how Facebook influences society and social life by giving a perceptual power, which allows people to position themselves as experts. However, we contribute to the problematization of the Syrian refugee issue by focusing

only on problematizing assumptions through social media channels. These assumptions, indeed, indicate how the social codes behind people's act shape their discourses. It would be better to approach the issue from the perspective of the historical background of modern social psychology in Turkey. In this context, our main reference would be the process of Turkish westernization (modernization), the effects of Turkish westernization on Turkish society and Turkish response to westernization that a radical change of in the society forms the background of the current conflicts (Zurcher, 2004). The history of Turkish westernization dates back to the late Ottoman period. Through two centuries, the Western civilization and values have become the *Kaaba* of the Turkish sultans, leaders and rulers (Cem, 2017) but the vast majority of Turkish society has never adopted this ideology. The social reforms have not occurred due to radical social changes based on the cultural and historical process.

“The introduction of Western elements to an Eastern society strangely strengthens the backwardness in that society” (Ibid, p. 265).

*François Léger (Les influences occidentales
dans la Révolution d'Orient)*

Thus, these social changes do not refer to the cultural roots of Turkish society. The implementation of social changes and the philosophy did not mesh together so that the attempts did not penetrate into the whole society. On the other hand, the inadequate and incomplete understanding of western civilization and ethical values penetrates into Turkish society. This understanding influences a great variety of factors such as public perceptions, culture of consumption, social media usage and even academic environment. It also creates a confusion and unbalanced situation on how to respond to the refugee issue. Turks remain in-between the traditional way of act and western standards. This dilemma causes social inhibition when dealing with the refugee issue and somehow increases discriminatory discourses against Syrian refugees, particularly in social media. When it comes to social media, Facebook has power to build perception that fosters insecure individuals to feel superior to others, which spreads narcissism especially among teenagers (Turgeon, 2011). The perceptual power leads to make these individuals feel like the judge. So called perception that we all have the right to speak,

all materials of propaganda for spreading perception management and the capacity of using these materials easily while increasing judgmental hate speech in the host society have been instrumental in turning Facebook users into judges. Actually, the criticism in the visual below emphasizes how accuracy of information can change in accordance with for what and for whom it serves, also showing the changeability of reality in line with the borders of perceptions.




Figure 8 Facebook Hayatımızı Nasıl Etkiliyor? (How does Facebook influence our lives?), <http://www.bubitekno.com/sosyal-medya/facebook-hayatimizi-nasil-etkiliyor.html> accessed 16.11.2017.

Facebook usage patterns should be considered according to social values and norms of Turkish society as forms of social actions should be evaluated within the society, which is examined (Coleman, 1986). In regard to the perspective, democracy practices, suppression of media, political and socio-economic instability due to internal and external conflicts such as military coups and terrorism, education policy and other factors, influence the interpretation of social and political conflicts within the Turkish political and cultural realms.

To summarize, there exist a large number of factors that influence (in)directly Facebook usage patterns in Turkey on the discourse towards Syrian refugees. To remind a few critical points:

A) “Turkey’s Migration Policy” Code stands out the most among other codes of this

research, and it is the most interrelated one as well. Due to lack of comprehensive “migration regulations” (which politicians attempted to justify later on: “We were caught unprepared and are doing our best”), in addition to the government’s migration policy, which lead to confusion and obscurity on immigrants’ legal status, this code incorporates, affects or justifies many other codes. The unwillingness of government officials to distribute relevant data is the primary reason of widespread incorrect and negative information about immigrants on Social Media. The Syrian War was perceived by politicians and the public as a short-term conflict at first; therefore, the term “Guest” to describe the immigrants pronounced by the Government, as time passed, proved to be wrong. This alone triggered a massive discontent among the public. Any argument, and any perception created by that argument within “Turkey’s Migration Policy” Code serves to deepen the host nation’s negative attitude about the problem. The primary reason pitting the public against the immigrants is the Government’s policies, or the lack thereof; and the officials’ unwillingness to produce efficient solutions to the problem. There are also difficulties to obtain reliable information because of (un)intentional news organization of the media and limitations on data-sharing between government agencies and non- governmental organizations and other sectors.

B) Economic reasons, which foster racism is one of the main bases. While Facebook threads often emphasize economic aspects of the problem in the mainframe of the “Burden” Code, the negative discourse regenerates and justifies itself from a nationalist perspective through a “threat perception” and alienation.

Another code is creating an “Arab identity” that is synonymous with religious bigotry and fanaticism. The focal point of this code is the social media threads that concentrate on social gender roles, which target to create a sharp contrast between Syrian and Turkish women; thereby positioning a progressive and civilized “Us” (the host nation) against a primitive and narrow-minded “Them” (Syrians) in the public eye.

C) “Seeing the issue as an opportunity to criticize Erdoğan and the ruling party” is another code of this survey. The discourse of this code is that the problem is

related to “homeland security issues”, “economic data”, “selective double-alienation according to immigrants’ ethnic origins” and an emphasis that the problem is a “Foreign Policy” issue.

D) “Intersectionality in the discourses towards Syrian refugees” is a compilation of multiple negative discourses on Syrian refugees under various codes. If we look at the social media as the primary source of discourse, that would help us examine the intersection of discourses as a whole.

The contextual frameworks of the locals’ discourses on Facebook will provide us with a better understanding of Facebook discourses related to the refugees analyzed under the three main titles below.

4.1. Types of Discourses on Facebook

4.1.1. General Discourses or the Generalization and the Problematization of the Refugee Issue

Three groups of discourses, namely, *discourses on Syrian refugee women*, *general discourses* and *discourses depending on the agenda* have been formed from the collected Facebook posts (258) and comments (423). Each group has been established according to some certain conceptual frameworks such as gender-based approach, closeness to identity of Syrian refugees, religious and race-based discourses and intersectionality. Under the title of the general discourses towards Syrian refugees on social media, the discourses such as criticisms on Turkish foreign policy, economic hardships, Turks’ objection to the aids given to Syrians, racism towards and hate speech about Syrians can be listed. Apart from these, it should be noted that such negativity curb common sense and positive approach towards Syrian refugees.

Discourse plays a significant role in the reproduction of ideologies (Dijk, 2003) and determines or changes our ideologies (Ibid). As social media is one of the most influential communication instruments to spread notions, discourses and ideologies, the discourses about the Syrian refugee issue in Turkey have initially taken part, discussed and reproduced on social media platforms.




Figure 9 Types of Discourses on Facebook

The figure 9 could be seen as a visualizing framework of the interrelations of the discourses towards Syrian refugees in Turkey on Facebook. It also indicates where and in which cases the intersectional relations are built by the discriminatory discourses. Another function of the figure is to uncover the ignored impacts of social exclusion on female refugees caused by General Discourses and Discourses depending on the agenda. We aim to correlate with the reasons or justifications for the discourses and the effects of the discourses on Syrian female refugees. At first glance, the discourses against refugees do not seem to target the female refugees, and discourse rates and

utterance rates of *discourses on Syrian refugee women* are lower when compared to *general discourses* and *discourses depending on the agenda*. However, each negative discourse increases the social exclusion of Syrian refugees as a whole and the vulnerability of female refugees. It is because posttraumatic stress disorder, discrimination, working under poor conditions and worries of male refugees to maintain patriarchal social order end up in domestic violence against women. Most of the female refugees I interviewed were inclined to justify domestic violence by pointing out traditional gender roles, which are not practicable in modern day. Furthermore, male refugees who have already become a security threat, have a better sense of the level of social exclusion as they have to work and spend more time out than women do.

General discourses creating and using stereotyped terms⁴⁰; traitor, coward, rapist, dirty and useless for (mainly male) refugees “constitute one of the most powerful labels”. The adjectives, definitions and discourses with negative connotations are likely to be reproduced by other discourses depending on the agenda. Such discourses, “*we have become refugees in our own country*” and “*we should settle in Syria because there are fewer Syrians over there*” are very common examples of sarcasm. Dissemination of fake news about the aids that Syrian refugees receive through social media is in the center of almost all discourses related to the refugees. Misinforming news amplifies the effect of the discourses with the help of racist discourses. Neither the results of the Syrian Civil War nor the growing digital hate speech in Turkey was forecasted by Turkish authorities. Thus, a common Turkish understanding of *kervan yolda düzülür* – *make it up as you go along*, has been adopted instead of taking precautions in time. Although Turkey built refugee camps with high standards and organized successful aid campaigns for the refugees, it failed to integrate Syrians into the labor market, education system (partially successful) and social life due to the large number of refugees and being caught off balance. This excuse has become another discourse to cover up all the conflicts, problems and difficulties and to blame western countries for not taking responsibility. Turkey, indeed, was not late to respond to the influx of Syrian refugees and followed a policy of appeasement by producing cultural and religious antidotes

⁴⁰ Although stereotypical terms show similarity in general, these terms can differ from region to region or country to country depending on socio-economic and political dynamics of the region or the country.

(*Misafir – Guest – Suriyeli Müslüman Kardeşim – Syrian Muslim Brother /Sister – Ensar and Muhacir*) in order to prevent hate speech against the refugees. It is good at giving fast reactions and interfering in crises as in the case of Atatürk Airport reopening within 5 hours after the bomb attack in 2016 (Hürriyet, 29/06/2016). Nevertheless, the refugee issue requires a sustainable action plan for Syrian refugees in the long run. The significant point is what factors have deactivated the discourses produced by the ruling party. Expectations from the discourses should not have been too high but still that the discourses would remain as instances of ineffectiveness was not to be expected. Firstly, it is difficult to persuade those, who have criticized Turkey's foreign policy towards Syria since the beginning of the conflict, to adopt these discourses. Secondly, the discourses did not give locals an insight into what steps the government and non-governmental organizations would take in order to manage the refugee influx.

Brotherhood stemming from religious fellowship is one of the most referenced guides or political movements used as a policy of appeasement. This policy is apparently considered as an affirmative way of approaching the refugees but on the other hand, it is also a method used not to allow the refugee crisis to be officially born. Therefore, the discourses were not helpful except for increasing uncertainty and confusion about the status of Syrian refugees. *Misafir* discourse that was used towards refugees in the early years has formed a “perception of the situation being temporary” in the minds of the local society and was in time replaced with the idea that refugees are permanent. However, in the construction of new discourses *misafir* discourse has always maintained its place. This discourse that reproduces itself continuously has been efficient in the formation of the image of a “normative refugee” in the eyes of the host society. Naming Syrians sometimes as guests, sometimes as asylum seekers, sometimes as refugees raised the problem of definition. *Misafir* discourse, that gave both the host society and the refugee community the message that refugees will be returning back after a certain amount of time, and the desire expressed by the host society can be cited as victim (disadvantaged) overriding victim (disadvantaged) in a country where welfare levels were already low. In other words, the status of the Syrians is carried to a new platform as the term *misafir* transforms to *refugee*. In this new platform, refugees that status quo wants to see as guests but are on their way to becoming permanent, are exposed to stigmatization and exclusion by being labelled, certain characteristics being attributed to

them, named differently from us and excluded. Another purpose of these discourses is to try to have a coherent unity among groups of people in relation with cultural and religious norms. The process of non-recognition, recognition and social exclusion of Kurds as an ethnic minority or Alevis as a religious minority or any other recognition issue related to minorities and immigrants or refugees give basis for schemata – the argumentative structures (Dijk, 1984) of the discourses used for the Syrian refugees. Apart from the unitary discursive approach under the umbrella of Islam towards minorities that have Islamic beliefs, Turkish identity has become the superordinate identity and another unifying instrument through Turkification policy since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. This is because minority issues have been perceived as a threat to nation state, which must be protected (Akgönül, 2015). National security problems and pains of transition process of Turkey from an empire to a nation state shaped Turkish identity and its relation with other identities. For example, Turkish nationalism as the major and the founder ethnic group of Turkish Republic tended not to recognize Kurds at first, but eventually they reached recognition, which brought about exclusion. It attempted to state the ideological base of Turkish nationalism with an inclusive and extended definition. This is a modern, inclusive and integrative understanding of nationalism that is not ethnicity based (Bora, 2015).

Efforts for the protection of the rights of minorities during European Union negotiations, the Nationalitarian environment has produced a new discourse that is “*Kurds are no longer unattended. Now Turks are unattended*” (Ibid). This discourse reminds the discourse for Syrian refugees on Facebook, which is “*we have become refugees in our own country*”. The underlying reason for the discourse is mainly based on economic factors and dissemination of misinformation. All news about refugees from running illegal businesses to receiving free treatment support the effect of misinformation that causes not considering the lack of legal framework for Syrian refugees to start businesses and the rights of asylum seekers. In other words, locals are inclined to be interested in pointing the results of the problems rather than considering the source of such problems. This approach also shows that nationalist determinants dominate political and public sphere. The capitulations, endowed commercial privileges to foreigners during Ottoman Empire, (Acartürk & Kılıç, 2011) holds *gayrimüslim* (non-Muslims) responsible for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (one of the leading

factors). Another social memory of Turkish society is that under the influence of the racist movement of the period, Turkey enacted the law of the wealth tax of 1942⁴¹, that led to the disappearance of enterprises run by non-Muslims. In the case of capitulations, the focus of the public was not on the reasons but the results. Therefore, from the point of view of the Turkish society, the political benefits of capitulations for the Ottomans were not significant as the Empire was powerful (2011). In the case of the wealth tax of 1942, the background of the enactment depended on a desire of creating a national economy which was also politically inspired by the ideological emphasis of the “ethno-religious make-up of Anatolia” (Ağır & Artunç, 2017). Discourses about non-Muslim minorities caused by religious, economic and ethnic reasons have transformed into ethnic based discourses towards Syrian refugees. To sum up, discourse forms and (re)produces itself depending on the fulfilment of needs of the ones in power.

<i>The references of the discourses</i>	<i>Reactions and responses on Facebook (from the collected data)</i>
Misafir: It has a religious and cultural background. It is also a message for the locals and the refugees that Syrians will return to Syria.	Misafir stays for three or five days. They are going to stay forever. I suppose, Turkey is the first country in the world history that has been conquered without fighting (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 1, Entry 26, <i>General Discourses</i>).
Ensar – Muhacir: It is a reference to the history of Islam, duty of Muslim (duty of humanity).	We are not the only Muslim country. How many Syrians are there in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab states? We have become refugees in our own country (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 1, Entry 1, <i>General Discourses</i>).
Muslim Brother: Efforts to prevent racism against the refugees.	When did Arabs help us when we needed it? Wasn't it Syria that hid Öcalan (PKK leader) and supported PKK? (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 1, Entry 44, <i>General Discourses</i>).

Table 4 Misafir, Ensar – Muhacir and Muslim Brother

⁴¹ For the full text of the wealth tax of 1942: <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/5255.pdf>

The discourses of *Ensar and Muhacir*, *Misafir* and *Syrian Brother* among religious conservative groups (See chapter 3 and footnote 38 for a full understanding of how the terms conservative and conservatism apply in Turkey) is another question. There would be several answers but most importantly, even though secularization of the religious segment during AKP period is not accepted discursively, religious groups have changed their consumption habits. (Batur, 2015). Old-fashioned discourses fail to correspond to the new life style of the religious conservatives who have been experiencing a wave of secularization. In addition to this, these discourses have strict religious references. However, atheism and deism are increasing among devoutly religious families (radicalized Muslim families) (Kulat, 2017 & Sucu, 2017 & Girit, 2018). Under the rule of AKP, Islam or religious people in Turkey did not have to defend itself / themselves for the first time in the history of the Republic of Turkey but, on the other hand, there was a noticeable increase in the rate of atheism and deism. Growing number of deist, atheist and agnostic young people, when freedom of religion has reached its peak level, indicates the collapse of political Islam and Islam itself in Turkey. As a result, the discourses of the ruling party can be thought as efforts to postpone the birth of the refugee crisis by using religious discourses rather than accepting the presence of the problem and that their efforts are inconclusive.

Furthermore, the vast majority of the general discourses about Syrian refugees on social media contain negative discourses and Syrian refugees are perceived as a threat. Discourses against refugees on social media concentrate on perceived negative characteristics of refugees, criticism of the government in relation to its refugee policy, prognostication of risks and threats in near future and positive attitude towards Syrian refugees. The most prominent discourses used in Facebook are “traitor” (189), “terrorist” (176), “coward” (152) and “rebel”(129). Moral superiority (Dijk, 1993), which can be considered as moral exclusion, is a leading factor to establish and legitimate these discourses. Within this context, the discourse of “we” as good and “they” as bad creates by itself the justification that emphasizes the negative effects of Syrian refugees on social and economic structure of Turkey. Some Facebook comments will be given to illustrate the established relationship between “we - good” and “they – bad”.

Example 1: “If you stay silent, one day they will invade your homes” (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 1, Entry 8, General Discourses).

Example 2: “They found a country to take shelter in but if we were in the same situation, we would never have left our country. Even if we wished to seek refuge, who would accept us?” (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 1, Entry 3, General Discourses).

Example 3: “When we cannot care for our own poor people, we take care of these terrorists.” (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 3, Entry 38, Discourses Depending on the Agenda).

These comments have multiple subtexts. In the first example, The Facebook user attracts attention to the risks of sheltering large numbers of Syrian refugees. The user attempts to indicate the seriousness of the crisis by using “home” as metaphor. This, on the other hand, implies the metaphor of homeless, which could be considered the worst-case scenario for the locals.



Figure 10 Objection to Aid that Syrian Refugees Receive⁴²

The second example states that Turkish people glorify themselves by underlining the

⁴² On the left side of the image, locals are illustrated while they are rummaging through garbage containers to find food. On the right side, there is photo of the pre-paid debit card given to Syrian refugees. The text reads as: “The Syrian receives help from the Kızılay, is given the PTT card while our people earn their own living from garbage. This is what being expat and experiencing injustice in your own country is”.

benevolence, compassion, courage and patriotism of the Turkish nation. In the last example, there is objection to the financial aid granted to the refugees. The discourse is created with two justifications. Firstly, the text points out Turkey's current economic troubles. Secondly and most importantly, it emphasizes it is the Syrians who receive this aid. It indeed criticizes Turkish refugee policies due to certain reasons; the Turkish army fighting in the north Syrian region of Afrin, illegal border crossing, lack of criminal records of Syrian refugees and existence of terrorist groups in Syria. The worries of the locals about the near future result in some other points emphasized in their discourses. These can be listed as:

- Syrian refugees cannot be controlled.
- The general thought / belief and judgment about Syrian refugees that they will cause serious problems in the future.
- Syrians working illegally.
- Adaptation problems of Syrian refugees, which is considered as a threat to social harmony and peace in the society.
- Untold damages to workplaces of the locals.

All these main worries and concerns of the locals compound the criticism of the government's asylum policy including alternative control policies. The common ground of Facebook posts and comments is economic reasons and national security concerns, which have been fostered by racism, fear of terrorism and threat to Turkey's territorial integrity (The Kurdish issue). For Turkish society, the expression "terrorist" is one of the most important factors that strengthens the discourses on concerns. The ongoing clash with PKK (Terrorist organization) since 1980's and recent terror attacks in İstanbul and Ankara are the main cause, reasoning or justification to generalize others as "possible terrorists". Turkey's experience with terrorism has various prominent characteristics and interpretations depending on the ideological and social background of people and/or even the personal history of each individual. Thus, while it is a war against Islam⁴³ for religious groups, it is not only a threat to Turkey's national security

⁴³ I quoted only a small part of the news, which described PKK, published in a newspaper known as progovernment and religious. *'The main goal of the PKK, which has Marxist-Leninist ideology, is to harm Islam. Despite the fact that the bloody organization accepts no ideology related to any religion, it plans to bring the religion of Zoroastrianism instead of Islam because the organization cannot find any response*

but also an attack to “Turkishness” according to Turkish nationalists.

In conclusion, the terrorist discourse gains strength by combining its argument with economic reasons. Furthermore, the discourse is interpreted in terms of religion and nationalism to reach a large group of people, covers a wide range of refugee phenomenon, which marginalizes them as “dangerous foreigners”, “invaders” and “unwanted individuals”. It also represses the weak voice of others who attempt to support refugee rights and make positive approaches on Facebook. Social exclusion, hate speech and discriminatory discourses negatively affect life conditions and integration process of refugees that lead to psychological and emotional problems such as loss of self-esteem (Alba, 2005) and even if *general discourses* do not point female refugees as the target, they are already exposed to social exclusion as it is “a form of prejudice based on group membership” (Cooley, Elenbaas, & Killen, 2016).

4.1.2. Discourses on Syrian Women Refugees

In this section, I shall examine two Facebook discourses against Syrian female refugees. The first one is “*we accept women and children but not young male refugees*”. While analyzing this and the other discourse, I will focus on some particular subjects and perspectives such as women’s social position in Turkish society, women’s sexuality, sexual and gender based violence, vulnerabilities of female refugees in order to delve into the discourse itself and the relationship of the discourse with Turkey’s current realities in terms of gender based issues. To begin with, I will briefly describe the social structure of the local society. Then, I will follow other items i.e., the hidden message of the discourse, perception of honor built on female sexuality and body, male dominance, social morality and current problems based on gender in Turkey.

It is necessary to deal with gender discrimination and perception of femininity in Turkish society together with the general structure of social and cultural texture, which has accumulated for centuries. One of the most remarkable factors in relevance with Turkish society is that it maintains dichotomies: Eastern and Western elements, multiculturalism, secularism and Islamic conservatism, a huge socio-economic gap between the regions and so forth. The discourse of “Turkey has Eastern and Western

to their unreligious ideology from the public” (Yeni Akit, 01.26.2018).

elements” is a common way to describe Turkey’s cultural mosaic, diversity and background. One of the main reasons for this description is the geographical location of Turkey, which is perhaps the best way to explain it by the metaphor “a bridge that transfers historical richness”. However, Turkey’s multiculturalism has failed or “*Turkey has yet to complete its cultural integration*” (Akyol, 2018) by virtue of the Turkification process of modern Turkey, removal of the Non-Muslim elements, population exchange between Greece and conflict with minorities, even with Alevi, a Muslim minority. Eastern or more particularly Muslim (Sunni) + Turk / Turk + Muslim (Sunni) elements ensued as the hegemonic culture and contrary to what has been stated – the mixture of different cultures –, there has been cultural assimilation thanks to the policy of Turkishness. To give an example of the political usage of Islamic and nationalistic figures, discourses and gestures in Turkey, Turkish and Ümmet (Muslim Community) identity can separately come to the fore according to political needs of the period while both can become prominent for the purpose of political interest. Adopting the “*Rabia*” salute (The hand gesture symbolizes Muslim Brotherhood) by AKP and “the national will” discourse of Erdoğan or his salute with the wolf’s-head sign (the symbol of the Nationalist Movement Party – MHP) in his party’s congress in Mersin before the 24 June general elections are some examples of the political use of nationalism and religion. This brief information on the background of Turkey’s political and cultural structure arises from two various needs. Firstly, even if “local(s)” is used to involve all the members from different nations, religions and sects who live in Turkey, it mostly refers to Muslim (Sunni) and Turks because two dominant factors, Turkish culture and Islamic doctrines, have formed women’s position and influenced women’s history in Turkey. The general understanding of the historical concept of women divides women’s history into three periods, Pre-Islamic, Ottoman Empire and The Republic of Turkey, and defines women’s history as Turkish women’s history. Secondly, it is important to approach the Syrian female issue from the perspectives of Turkey’s dichotomies, hegemonic cultural norms, regional differences between eastern and western Turkey and Islamic rules.

The first discourse – “*we accept women and children but not young male refugees*” – clearly implies the criteria and the restriction for who is acceptable as a refugee according to gender and age factors. The first part of the discourse recalls a traditional

discourse of “to commend martyrs’ wives to whole nation”. It can also be inferred that the majority of Turkish society sees the intake of Syrian female refugees and children as humanistic duty. There are some contradictions between discourses and practices. Although the notion of martyrdom and being mothers and wives of martyrs are unduly attached to nationalism and Islam (Gedik, 2009), the discourse loses one of its constituent parts in response to the refugee issue. This is because the image of martyrdom is a conceptual tool for the nationalist ideology, which has accelerated in late 1980’s and 1990’s parallel to the nationalistic wave rising throughout the world and internal conflicts such as PKK terrorism. Another reason is that the perceived threats from the surrounding countries during the Cold War and after the war with the collapse of bipolarization incite Turkish nationalism (Koçer, 2002). These circumstances sanctify martyrdom in the context of nationalism and patriotic duty and provide Turkish women a new (respected) status, the wife of a martyr. Such an expectation would be unrealistic for Syrian refugees as they are the martyrs’ wives of “others”. Thus, we shall need to interpret the discourse from another perspective. For instance, some discourses like *bacı (sister)*, *teyze (aunt)*, *anne (mother)* are utilized to emphasize sexlessness or unavailable and inaccessible sexual relationship with women who are not part of family (Kandiyoti, 2015, p. 84). However, the incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse indicate that Syrian female refugees are not treated within the perspective of these discourses neither. In spite of the fact that it is difficult to find out a social norm/discourse/perspective, which suits female refugees’ situation perfectly, the understanding of local constructions of widowhood can be considered as the closest matching case. The collective oppression of female sexuality (Ibid) (relatives – uncles from mother and father sides, brothers and each male member of family), in Turkish society starts at adolescence period. This pressure is closely related to virginity, which has to be protected until getting married. On the other hand, widowhood makes widows marginalized and causes them to be perceived as a threat in the society. The solidarity among married women arising from the sense of empowerment of learned social norms leads to maintaining men’s traditional privileges. If we elaborate more on the situation of women being the carrier of the male dominance, the first thing we notice is that male dominance hasn’t spent an extra effort in order to maintain its existence. One of the most significant factors that underlie the success of patriarchy is its ability to get people

to feel as if the values the patriarchy established have always existed (Chambers, 2005). When we consider how the subordinated groups away from male dominance and administrating groups who are situated at the center relate to each other, it is hard to deny that male dominance involves almost all the individuals as more or less a cultural carrier at some point in their lives or throughout their lives. While trying to respond to the position of women in patriarchy and why they are cooperation with patriarchy, Kandiyoti conveys the notion of the concept “Bargaining with Patriarchy” (1988) which she herself puts forward.

“The ways women adopt in order to defend their rights can be explained, to some extent, with the logic of the system that they are in. As in all dominance systems, male dominance also has both protective and oppressive elements. And in every system women also have their own power and autonomous sources. That’s why, as much as men, women can also be loyal to the systems which seem to oppress them. However, Patriarchal bargaining is based on the assumption that some mutual expectations will be met and the quality of these expectations can vary from society to society.” (Kandiyoti, 2015, p. 15).

The social pressure on young girls’ virginity is replaced with vulnerability if they become widows. While widowhood rules out the issue of virginity, it also makes women’s sexuality more available in the eyes of men. This notion, sometimes, would go a step further and having sexual intercourse with a widow would be interpreted as a favor to fulfil women’s sexual desire. As the society finds this type of relationship an indiscreet affair, it establishes its own norms. To give an example, while widows, especially young and beautiful ones, are “*baci*” in the daytime, they might turn into possible sexual partners at nights. As for Syrian female refugees, the situation might increase their vulnerabilities due to being “other”, language barrier, social exclusion and invisibilization, lack of access to their rights, and the perception of locals about female refugees as a second wife or mistress. The claim of 70 percent of female refugees, *we do not feel safe*, (Barbaros, 2015) Muta(h) marriages to female refugees (temporary marriage)⁴⁴, sexual abuse and rape indicate the hardships based on sexuality.

Another point of the first Facebook discourse is categorizing the refugees in terms of sex and age. The unwanted groups of people are young men because they are the ones who

⁴⁴ For further information see the article of The Four Pillars of Muta <https://www.al-islam.org/muta-temporary-marriage-in-islamic-law-sachiko-murata/four-pillars-muta> accessed 23.07.2018.

are supposed to defend their homeland. Military service has symbolized one of the most significant duties for the nation in Turkish society. This understanding has penetrated into even social life and led to some kind of discourses such as “every Turk is born a soldier” (Arjomand, 2017) or “askere gitmeyene kız verilmez” (A man is refused marriage if he has not served his time in the military) (Gökçe, 2013, p. 219).

The first discourse separates men from women and children, thus creating a perception that a man, especially a young man should not be perceived as a refugee; underlining a normative refuge (essentially a “guest nation”) by excluding the young male from the refugee population. This normative model accepts women and children as refugees to a certain degree while constructing a Turkish-Syrian conflict by reducing young males to cowards who have escaped the war.

“What do you know about (the concepts of) the motherland, fighting for your country; what do you know about dying for the motherland? You are shameless people having fun here, while your friends you have dined together are dying in Syria” (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 1, Entry 11, General Discourses).

This is only relevant for males however, since women and children are perceived as innocent victims, and nothing more:

“...we welcome the elderly, the children and the women who took refuge in our land! But man, I can't stand those sons of bitches; men between 20 and 50, have betrayed their country but strolling here like everything's fine. They ruin morals and (our) tolerance. I live by the sea in Darica; yet it's been 5 years since I could swim (because of the Syrians)” (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 2, Entry 9, Discourses on Syrian Refugee Women).

To sum up, the first discourse seeks for a “desirable refugee”, an acceptable “guest” if possible; thus, it is inclined towards putting the young male out of the picture as a threat.

The second discourse is “*when they come here, they become dissolute*”. The social media comments about refugee women include moral judgement and casting out, mostly by local women, thus implying a certain level of threat perception. Interestingly, wearing purdah is seen as a symbol of Arab bigotry while not wearing it gets comments about Arab women’s moral decay simultaneously. The moral decay part is stemmed

mainly from an ever-increasing number of news on intermarriages. (That type of news are often presented in a fashion that the refugee women are “the predators”, while men are merely preys) stigmatization of the refugee women is in play:

“Wake up oh Turkish girls; Syrian women got all your men, so stop your capricious behaviour” (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 2, Entry 5, *Discourses on Syrian Refugee Women*).

“Our virtuous girls become old virgins while those foreigners flood in our country and make themselves comfortable. They know how to spot rich guys; how to get them too. Don’t ruin your families over those women. Never leave your peaceful home, for there is no turning back, ever. We lost harmony and this is all their fault. This type of women knows where they would fair well and they know how to get there. They don’t care about ruined families; all they care is themselves” (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 2, Entry 14, *Discourses on Syrian Refugee Women*).

It is also possible to approach the discourse from the point of the conflict between secularism and traditionalism /conservatism/ Islamism, which has emerged from the secularist movement in Turkey. Indeed, it is not the first time the discourse has been used and it is not used exclusively for Syrian veiled women. The exactly same or similar discourses have repeated themselves for female tourists from the Middle East and even the local women who used to wear hijab before. It points out two things; firstly, Turkey provides women with freedom to wear what they want to, secondly, veiled women’s behaviours indicate the pressure of patriarchy through Islamic doctrines.

To dig into the details of the discourse, we should deal with the pattern of the altered social norms during the Turkish nation state building process. Religious authorities were one of the main internal rivals of Turkey’s secularist movement. The political changeover from the multi-ethnic structure of the Ottoman Empire to nation state based on Turkish cultural nationalism is the turning point of the distinction and the differentiation between (cultural) nationalism and Islam in Turkey. The strong adaption of laicism has created two solidified opposition groups in the society as Kemalist and Islamist. When the new political system faced some religious, ethnic and cultural resistance, the power became more authoritarian (Tokluoğlu, 2000). The impacts of the authoritarian practices of the early republican period lay the foundations of Turkey’s

current controversial topics. The forms of head covering are one of the most problematic issues. Wearing chador/purdah/headscarf was/is interpreted as bigotry and an obstacle that stands against one of the chief principles of Kemalist secularist movement; reaching the level of modern civilizations. The principle (motto) penetrated so deeply into every single field in the society that it caused the state itself to regulate women's legal rights (Kandiyoti, 2015). In this respect, it could be said that the secularist movement in Turkey with its official policy accelerated the process of suffrage and other legal rights for women. The situation raised several questions as to the reforms. The reforms related to women's social status in the society are regarded as top down reforms. Kemalist women's reaction and adaptation to these principles bore traces of the foundations of the republican policy (cultural nationalism). This period and women's rights being granted (not gained) constitute the main source of historical reference and criticism that manifests itself on social media posts of the people. Social media becomes a digital public sphere to make comparison between affirmative impacts of Turkey's secular and progressive modernization on Turkish women and negative impacts of the backwardness and bigotry of the Arab world on Arab women's life. It is also possible to see these types of discussions as a struggle between progressives and conservatives.

Muslims and the Western world have a misconception about head covering. Although women's head covering is linked to Islam, its practice and history originated in monotheistic religions and other civilizations as a symbol of woman's dignity (Berkday, 1996). As for Muslims, the historical roots of theological perspectives are negligible. The underlying reason springs from the notion that Islam itself is a perfect synthesis, which corrects all the deficiencies of the previous religions. The sacredness of Islamic doctrines covers up the traditional aspects of patriarchy. And wearing *türban* has become an issue of discussion for both sides. While not wearing hijab is defended as woman's freedom by the secular nationalists, it can be proclaimed as irreligious by the radical Islamists (Kandiyoti, 2015).

When we look at the posts and comments on social media, it is apparent that the host public tends to enlarge and diffuse the usage of this discourse by some examples. Most of the alienation of refugee women takes place in marriage department. Criticism about intermarriages can be summed up in three arguments. The first is that refugee women

“con Turkish men using gratuitous marriage plans”. This argument, compared to the other two, is the one that puts the Turkish men under spotlights the most. (This argument is only relevant regarding social media posts and comments; the press on the other hand, takes a narrative that Turkish men are the conned, victimized part of the deal) The main reason for this is that middle-aged and elderly men want to marry young women; thus get condemned by (some) local women as womanizers and sexual predators.

“An article was published on this subject, by the Istanbul Bar I think; Syrian women, of whom most are young, are married (religious ceremony, not officially) to old men. When they get pregnant, they are thrown out in the street. Sex hungry, pervert men replace their wives every three months. Figures. It wasn’t that they were gonna be good husbands, right? EXPLOITATIOOOON” (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 2, Entry 25, *Discourses on Syrian Refugee Women*).

“I’m watching the Müge Anlı Show. All “uncles” aged between 50-60 are on screen saying “we’ve been conned”. They find Syrian women to get married; sell everything they have; buy gold jewelry as a gift to those women. It’s such a joke, I’m losing it” (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 2, Entry 29, *Discourses on Syrian Refugee Women*).

Secondly, the focal point of the criticism from the perspective of the discourse of becoming dissolute is that Syrian women “accept polygamy and becoming the second wife of a man”. Their cultural backgrounds, social positions, identities, world views, life choices and conditions they had been forced under become reasons for alienating, excluding and humiliating them.

“Isn’t it clear where all this Syrian loving comes from? Syrian women allow their husbands to get married other women, they even encourage it. All (Syrian women) I talked to have asked me: “How many wives do you have?” (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 2, Entry 4, *Discourses on Syrian Refugee Women*).

Last of all, the main argument regarding being a threat to the family is that Syrian women pursue a life of “man-hunting” and “homewrecking”.

“In Hatay, 3 out of 10 marriages end in divorce because of Syrian women. Some ‘Muslim sisters’ escaped the war and came here to ruin homes” (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 2, Entry 1, *Discourses on Syrian Refugee Women*).

The discourse of becoming dissolute have two separate responses from the refugees. The first one is that refugees face anti-refugee sentiments in every aspect of life, thus feel being forced to explain themselves to the host nation. In this regard, the argument “Not all of us are good; not all of us are bad either” (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 2, Entry 2, *Discourses on Syrian Refugee Women*) is a construction they came up with to decrease the ever increasing discriminatory discourses and approaches they have to deal with. This argument encompasses all Syrians regardless of gender, and creates a compartment of “Us” and “them” within the refugee community. The same “Us” voluntarily cast out and alienates each Syrian individual who is believed to cause problems with the host nation. In other words, increasing pressure on refugees have led them to assume an “acceptable refugee” role. The second response is related to the Syrian women’s perception of the discourse of becoming dissolute and who they put in that discourse. Contrary to local women’s belief, refugee women think of polygamy and religious marriage as “necessities”.

“For some women, marriage is not a matter of choice but a necessity. They (local women) don’t get that” (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 2, Entry 51, *Discourses on Syrian Refugee Women*).

The reasons that lead to refugee women casting each other out are not related to events such as a religious marriage between a Syrian woman and a Turkish man, and/or having a second wife. To them, the real threat is a single Syrian woman who had to migrate all by herself, (without the company of a man), who is not under a man’s control, and what she wears and how she behaves.

“Many Syrian women changed when we arrived (Turkey). They say “we are free”. What they call freedom is trampling on our moral values, culture and customs” (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 2, Entry 7, *Discourses on Syrian Refugee Women*).

Also, refugee women, in parallel to the argument “*not all of us are good; not all of us are bad either*”, label con artists using marriages as “*rotten apples in (our) basket*” (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 2, Entry 14, *Discourses on Syrian Refugee Women*). As a conclusion, the discourse of “becoming dissolute” results in social exclusion of Syrian female refugees in both groups.

4.1.3. Discourses Depending on the Agenda

It is possible to approach the discourses depending on the agenda from three different aspects. The first two of three perspectives are economic justification and criticism of the Turkish government's refugee policy. Lastly, these discourses may be correlated with the lynching practices. Under the title of discourses depending on the agenda, I will concentrate on the third aspect because it embodies the first two aspects and also underlines the connectedness between the discriminatory discourses towards Syrian refugees and the lynching attempts targeting the refugees.

Tanıl Bora, author of the book, "Turkey's Lynching Regime" (2018) explains the features of lynching as "*the fantasies of homogeneous society are convenient to lynching initiatives*" (Bora, 2018, p. 27). These fantasies can easily govern and manipulate public perception by means of perceived national threats, which (re)produce several elements such as national reaction, national will and national anger to legitimize lynching attempts. In other words, normalization and justification of each lynching event that harms the benefits of the society, causes public indignation. In consideration of the history of modern Turkey and its domestic politics, lynching incidents have become a common practice (Ibid). This political approach utilizes lynching itself as a disincentive tool to oppress marginalized groups. Erdoğan's response to Gezi Park protests, "*There is another 50 percent [that voted for the AKP] that we are having difficulty keeping at home*" (Hürriyet Daily News, 05.06.2013) is an example of political *know-how*.

Another effect of the legitimization process is to create clichéd discourses used in almost each relevant or irrelevant case. In this regard, the characteristics of *discourses depending on the agenda* show similarities with the discourses towards *communists, leftists, Kurds and Alevis*. The discriminatory discourses on Syrian refugees have been invigorated by any social economic and political problem encountered and the refugee issue has become the centerpiece especially of economic problems. The reproduction of the hate speech against the refugees by means of national anger transforms into lynching attempts.

In this process, social media functions as a tool to disseminate information that forms a

basis for hate speech. The context-transitivity (Beji, 2016) of discourse differs greatly according to the agenda and indicates discourse's relation to power (Dijk, 2000). As Syrian refugees are also matter of opinion, the fixed ideas of the society related to national security and perceived threat pave the way for the discriminatory discourses of the established frame of minds, Turkey's agenda can be easily misguided to paint them as a target. It can also be said that the misleading beliefs about the outgroup, Syrians, create the legitimization of dominance, which has caused the social exclusion of the refugees. The ideological basis of the speaker plays a fundamental role in much of the locals' discourse when they address the refugees. When considered from this point of view, the wide variety of the discourses towards Syrian refugees can be interpreted as an attempt to reshape discursive practices to draw a nationalistic response to the refugee issue.

The exclusion of refugees by establishing a Turkish-Syrian polarity is the most common method of producing event-based discourses. For example, when we look at figure 11, the polarity of the Syrian teacher who was appointed and the Turkish teacher who wasn't established. In the text used in the visual, the phrases "Unassigned Turkish teacher committed suicide" and "Syrian teacher appointments were made" are seen. "She committed suicide" phrase was chosen to be made in a different colour from the general colour used in the text to strengthen the emphasis. Moreover, the part of the Syrian teacher appointments is shown in a larger font size. This is an attempt to create a relation between these two situations; Syrian refugees' employment in an environment where "Turkish" teacher committed suicide due to unemployment. For the same purpose, for the young "Turkish teacher" who committed suicide a smiling photograph was used, while for the middle-aged "Syrian teacher" a serious photograph while giving a lecture is used in order to show that she is working.



Figure 11 Turkish and Syrian Teachers. Unassigned Turkish teacher commits suicide (Left). Syrian teachers have been appointed (Right).

The story and photograph of the teacher who was in depression and committed suicide by the reason of unemployment (Newspapers, 17/04/2018) was used for creating anti-refugee ideas. This share, in a way shows the limits reached by increasing anti-refugeeism in social media. Even if we assume that the woman portrayed as a Syrian and an appointed teacher is in fact a Syrian, the places where the Syrian teachers employed are the GEM's (Temporary Education Centres) where Syrian students receive Arabic education. It was announced as "GEM's will complete their mission in three year" (MEB, 2016), and closed down (MEB, 2018). If GEM's remain open and while they do not intersect with the business domain of local educators, perception management in social media is creating and increasing a business competition that never occurred between these two groups. The aim of this discourse is not only the exclusion of refugees or xenophobia but also the profile AKP represents and policies of AKP. Although there were other teachers who committed suicide at that time, usage of 25-year-old Merve Çavdar to marginalize refugees had two different reasons. The first reason is, Merve's Aegean homeland (west Anatolia coastal region) and her being an

educated young woman are idealizable qualities for Turkey's secularist segment. In addition, this example also allows the emphasis/ differentiation of modernity to be made through the clothing of women. Secondly, Merve's suicide has been ideologically politicized. A person with username Şeyma Korkmaz, a member of the Board of Directors of AK Party Esenyurt Youth Branches, had a social media share stating "There are 500 thousand teachers who cannot be assigned. Nobody, those that have belief and fear of Allah, is not committing suicide. So, this lady is an atheist-deist, she of course went to hell. Allah knows, this is obvious. In addition, one more vote of cehape (Chp) is reduced." (T24, 2018). This share gives information about the massive increase in polarization in Turkey. After the reactions to this share, AKP has made an announcement stating "This person has no connection to AK Party Esenler Youth Branches Board of Directors member honorable Şeyma Korkmaz. Account was later determined to have changed the username-name and used an IP from abroad. Legal actions were initiated for the account." (Manifesto, 2018). The discourse used by the other woman who commented on the suicide of the teacher (Şeyma) is more important than whether she is working for AKP. This person defines the group she represents as the opposite party as "without religion" and she does this with her "religious" identity. Another noteworthy point is that even though the woman in question is not employed in AKP, the way she defines the opposition party is the same manner used by Erdoğan and AKP. The consciously written and pronounced Chp as cehape is somewhat similar to the expression of AKP (by the opposition) and Ak Party (by the party's supporters). Cehape is the discourse produced by Akp, against the AKP expression, that is used to humiliate and marginalize the opposition. In short, Merve's suicide is an example of polarization of the inner group (local people) and reflection of this to the outside group (refugees) by enlargement of the circle of polarization (without the necessity of being rational). In other words, for both segments the term 'to take on new responsibilities and duties according to the situation' can be used. Subject can be approached as, from the standpoint of Şeyma as 42 teachers committed suicide in last 2 years (Yeniçağ, 18/04/2018), turning Merve's suicide into a political material for defending AKP against the criticism against AKP; on the other hand from the standpoint of opposition as adding a new layer to the continuing debates and including the refugees in the subject.

In *discourses depending on the agenda*, the most popular reaction is the visit of Syrians to Syria repeated twice a year for bairam (religious holiday). The fact that the discourses about bairam have been repeating themselves for years and that they always follow the same fiction, suggests the idea that these discourses can be examined within the general discourses. However, they are examined under this title since they are in the agenda periodically. Such discourses are used repeatedly every holiday with wording and visual changes:

“People cannot go to their village because of poverty, while the Syrians who fled war are going to vacation to their country” (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 3, Entry 1, *Discourses Depending on the Agenda*) *“Have you ever seen a refugee going to the country where he fled for bairam holiday?”* (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 3, Entry 2, *Discourses Depending on the Agenda*) or *“Refugees are going to Syria for the bairam holiday...!! You live your homeland to others and escape because there is war and then go to Syria for the bairam holiday. A person should have some shame!”* (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 3, Entry 12, *Discourses Depending on the Agenda*).

The main characteristics of bairam discourses apart from the fact that they are produced in yearly periods is the intersectionality in the discourses towards Syrian refugee. From the critique of power to economic reasons, many codes can be seen in a coherent or intersecting position within the same circle. If it is tried to be explained in more detail, “Syrians returning home for bairam” profile contradicts with the initial normative refugee perception of the local people. At the start of the borders this perception draws is the necessity of Syrian refugees to be without means. Moreover, the fact that they can go to Syria indicates that there is no longer a life security problem and the main purpose of establishing the relationship between ‘ability to go’ and ‘life safety’ on a regular basis is to underline the necessity of ending the hospitality. The most important feature of the discourses gathered under the normative refugee code is that it plays an active role in the formation or guiding of other discourses. Furthermore, in the formation of the code there is both “Turkey’s migration policy” and the discourses of political actors that can be expressed as extensions of that policy. If a bracket is opened, it is not known how accurate it is to define this perception created or formed as normative refugee in an atmosphere where political actors, media (Cantek & Soykan, 2018) and the people do not accept or ignore individuals’ asylum rights. Instead, normative guest statement may

appear to be a more realistic definition in an environment where refugees are not legally refugees (they are only temporary asylum seekers, but it should be stated that this terminology is not widely used). As a result, when the bracket is closed and returned to the codes and discourses under these codes, a relationship like this is seen. Internal and external groups are confronted with the discourses gathered under the “Turkey’s migration policy” code, which is a kind of powerhouse for all codes. The discourses covered by this code in the general discourses group have in an integrated manner formed the perception of refugees with Syrian and guest statements. On the other hand, “Turkey’s migration policy” code can be identified as the powerhouse of also the other discourses since it expands with many issues such as; government not following a transparent policy, the status of the Syrians, refugee issue becoming an opportunity to criticize Erdoğan and the AKP, economic burden, refugees being made political material, lack or nonexistence of integration work and many more issues that can be counted further. Discourses in the other two groups are produced by the reasons behind the discourses in the first group. However, the main point where the discourses in the two groups differ from the discourses in the first group is that one of them tries to relate the current issues to the refugee issue according to gender norms, while the other is based on events.

<i>Fragments of Discourse</i>	<i>Interval and intensity in discourse</i>
Have you ever seen refugees that return home for bayram holidays? (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 3, Entry 4, <i>Discourses Depending on the Agenda</i>)	Repeated itself periodically (religious holidays)
My citizen works for one month to get his/her 1400 TL payment but in the end this person cannot get repayment of his/her effort. When we look at the Syrian people they are not even satisfied with the financial aid (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 3, Entry 18, <i>Discourses Depending on the Agenda</i>).	From generalization and targeting to case-based reasoning For an indefinite period of time
Unassigned Turkish teacher commits suicide. On the other hand, the appointments of Syrian teachers have been made (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 3, Entry 19, <i>Discourses Depending on the Agenda</i>).	From case-based reasoning to generalization and targeting Particular period of time
Instead of spending money on Syrians, if we spent our money on stockbreeding, we would not need to import meat from Serbia. (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 3, Entry 20, <i>Discourses Depending on the Agenda</i>).	From case-based reasoning to generalization and targeting Particular period of time
“Syrians supported Erdoğan’s call to convert foreign currency savings to Turkish lira by exchanging their dollars.” That must be a joke (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 3, Entry 41, <i>Discourses Depending on the Agenda</i>).	From case-based reasoning to generalization and targeting Particular period of time
Since we are in such a bad position that we can’t pay bonus salaries to pensioners, why did no one ask us anything when they took in 4 million refugees? (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 3, Entry 22, <i>Discourses Depending on the Agenda</i>).	A targeted criticism Specific period of time (bonus salaries before the bayram holiday)
The soldiers of my country die in Syria everyday while the Syrians have fun and get money for free (Facebook Posts and Comments, Group 3, Entry 7, <i>Discourses Depending on the Agenda</i>).	Every martyr news

Table 5 Discourse in Time

4.2. Syrian Female Refugees on Turkish Mainstream Media

When refugees and migrants are mentioned in Turkey, Syrian refugees come to the mind. The role of the media in this created perception cannot be denied. The foreign policy followed by the AKP government, the change of the refugee topic into one of internal politics and the discourses produced by both the government and the opposition have become the sources of the media. The approach of Turkish press towards Syrian refugees varies according to the periods and the agenda. Research related to the media perception towards Syrian refugees living in Turkey by Özgürlük Araştırmaları Derneği (Freedom Research Association) highlights how the approach of the press changed annually as follows:

- Humanitarian Plight - It is time to support (2011-12),
- The Future of Assad Regime (2013-14),
- Great Escape to Europe (2014-15),
- Baby Aylan (2015),
- Turkey-EU Negotiations (2015),
- Citizenship (2016), (Erdogan, Kavukçuer, & Çetinkaya, 2017).

In the following years (2017-18), it is also possible to add some more headlines such as ‘‘Syrians return home’’, ‘‘Syrians increase unemployment’’ and ‘‘they will vote’’. I will deal with the reasons for the dramatic change in discursive practices in the media that reconstruct the identity of Syrian refugee, from guest to enemy, and the impact of the media on the locals’ attitudes towards the refugees. While framing the topic from various aspects, I will focus on underrepresentation, minimization and invisibilization of Syrian refugee women’s diverse stories, experiences and roles, which are re-subordinated by social norms and gender-differentiated approaches of the media.

Before returning to the subject from the gender perspective, how the media approaches the refugee issue in general should be examined. Firstly, needless to say, the media is not independent from power relations that influence the role of the media as an information provider. Secondly, the event-based approach of Syrian refugee news in Turkish media

(Erdoğan, Kavukçuer, & Çetinkaya, 2017) caused the deprivation of in- depth analysis of the refugee problems in media. Thirdly, although the representation of Syrian refugees in Turkish media might be seen as the natural process of Stanley Cohen's theory of moral panics (1972) and the model of media logic by Altheide & Snow (1979), it should be underlined that another critical factor that plays a part in the approach of the media is an attitude of indifference. Indeed, the second approach (event-based news) could be easily counted as an indicator and a result of the indifferent approach of the media. Furthermore, the passivity of the media in providing reliable information and analyzing the social problems has a multiplier effect. Due to lack of transparency about the issues related to the refugees (Yıldız, 2018), information dissemination by the printed media becomes limited and insufficient. This means that the media loses its function, legitimacy and power to inform the public, which is the main role and responsibility of media. The invisibilization of Syrian refugees in Turkish media encourages social media users to play a role in creating, leading and promoting hate speech through digital public sphere, which motivates the masses to act (Al-Rawi & Fahmy, 2018), and which might result in attacks against the refugees. The flow of information through social media is open to confirmation bias. Although verification of information to find out whether it is misleading (false) or incomplete is a significant element in order to inhibit the spread of fake news related to the refugees on social media, this approach has not been the focus of the authorities. It is therefore important to identify what reasons caused the media to act unconcerned about the Syrian refugee issue. The first reason is that the government tends not to share the data related to the refugees with researchers and academics (Danış, 2017), hence it sees the refugee crisis as a threat to national security. The government took the notion of national security a step further by trying to restrict academic researches on the refugee issue (Karakaş, 2015). This condition has a negative impact on building sustainable integration programs for the refugees and reaching trusted sources of information that shifts the approach of the media from in-depth analysis to event-based journalism.

While conducting the media survey, I came across some terms such as *guest*, *refugee*, *immigrant* or *asylum seeker* used for each other and one another in the same meaning. This is because the uncertainties about the status of refugees due to lack of legal

framework for migration policy and the discourses that the politicians use, lead to confusion over defining the refugees. In addition, it has been noticed that the mainstream and local media do not avoid using statements such as flood, wave, illegal refugee, burden, influx and raid, which stir nationalist emotions and show the refugees as a security risk. The tendency to label Syrian refugees by singular events like rape, sexual harassment, robbery and murder is also another significant finding of the survey. The media represents Syrian refugees as a 'threat' to security by linking them to individual events. The news about refugees in the media shows a security indexed perspective. This security approach does not reflect a conventional security approach, and this conventional form of security can even reduce the basic economic and social rights of Syrian refugees to work and housing rights and to a police or military security problem.

The inclination of the media towards the refugees, with emphasis on “*we are the ones who open our homes but they respond to our hospitality with vandalism*”, increases the otherization of Syrian refugees. When it comes to the issue of economy, the anger of *us* becomes more powerful. This anger rises from the fear of losing jobs that is the dominant notion in lower class as the types of employment that the refugees can work is seen like a cake sharing problem. Although economic problems are one of the main reasons for conflicts in ghettos between two groups, newspapers, almost in each attack, place moral problems to justify locals' actions (Danış, 2017). Locals' claims like *they harassed a girl or a woman, they beat our children* are reported unquestioningly. For instance, a conflict that occurred in Ankara has been reported by a large number of online platforms under the titles of *Tension in Ankara, Syrian fight in Demetevler Ankara* even though the fighting was between Iraqi refugees and the locals (2017). The approach of the media presents two different points: firstly, the media does not follow the basic principles of reporting and secondly, it paints all Arabic speaking refugees as Syrians. The second factor is also a common reflection of public opinion that caused to augment influential type of discriminatory practices against Syrian refugees.

“This displacement strategy places the refugees as the target of discriminatory discourses and on one hand, class differences and conflicts are not seen due to the war economy, while on the other hand, Syrians are held responsible for the shrinking of their economy, leading to avoiding responsibilities mediating the diversion from the original goal that critiques should address.

Therefore, those that exploit refugees by paying them low wages, landlords that demand higher rent and Syrians not being given working permits so that business owners don't have to pay insurance are all political actors that should be the target of anger; instead, the refugees are the target'' (Keneş, 2016, p. 269).

Recent economic recession in Turkey, the constant disappointments and failures of the opposition against AKP and even the political deadlock of both the government and the opposition about Turkey's current problems (Çakır, 2018) made the refugees a political tool. Yet, in another sense, the opposition plays the refugee card with the government while the government follows the same politics with the EU.

The politicization of the refugee issue and the fact that in some periods political parties have made refugees the focus of criticism of government policies are effective in spreading discriminatory discourses towards refugees in the society and thus deepening polarization. Newspapers criticize the government's policies with an anti-refugee viewpoint and trigger a risky classification by comparing the Syrian refugees and citizens of Turkey. People who have the power to influence public opinion in Turkey claiming that Syrian refugees are more privileged than Turkish citizens through discriminatory and even racist discourses comes into circulation through the media and reproduction of these are ratified; it is spreading discriminatory practices towards Syrians. The discourses that instrumentalize Syrians as a 'tool of criticism' against the ruling party are sometimes based on unsubstantiated claims, rumors, detached information and prejudiced views. When the allegations and rumors that need to be questioned for accuracy are presented as truth by public figures and the media, the negative judgments of news sources become widespread and accepted.

In this regard, the role, approach and focus of the media towards the refugees have been represented as a reflection of the political and the social atmosphere. The media put forward the positive sides of the EU- Turkey refugee agreement such as financial support and visa free travel for Turkish citizens. On the other hand, the opposition media keeps underlying the danger of granting Turkish citizenship to Syrians due to socio-economic and political reasons. Briefly, the refugees are being used as political campaign strategies to gain strength and both the partisan and the opposition media deal with the issue in accordance with their ideological interest. As the choice and textual function of headlines serve the ideology and the interest of the power (Dijk, 1991), both sides of the media interpret the refugee crisis from their own perspective. The

connection between Turkish media and Turkey's domestic and foreign politics is the main determinant factor that influences the discourses related to Syrian refugees. At this point, it can be stated that the political media become influential in the ghettoization in Turkish society and the language that the mainstream media uses in pro-government newspapers (almost 9 out of 10 newspapers) and opposition newspapers differentiate from each other visibly when we examine some examples of news reporting. We would also consider the attitude of local media towards the refugee crisis as a part of the same discursive struggle. To begin with, it seems to me that we should analyze the approach of the pro-government newspapers, as they are the dominant set of mainstream media and their response to the issue indicates the major change in Turkish refugee policy, Turkey's current political tendencies and maneuvers. This helps us to understand the ideological transformation of the dominant discourses from *guest, innocent civilians, Muslim brothers, muhacir and humanitarian duty* to "*Syrians will return to Afrin after the end of the operation*", (Alyanak, 2018), to *illegal Syrians were caught, illegal workers and the birth rate among Syrian refugees is dangerously high*. As it is seen in Erdoğan's discourses (see table 6) about Syrian refugees over the years, Turkey's refugee policy has been anything but coherent and has become fragile enough to be affected negatively by both foreign and domestic politics. The radical transformation of these discourses in a short period is, however, a sort of testament to Turkey's unstable refugee regime, which should be scrutinized for moral responsibility and pragmatism. The perspective of moral responsibility in the discourses is based on a framework of humanitarian assistance, which stays within the scope of several emphases such as historical responsibility with the reference to Turkey's imperial past (Korkut, 2016). Besides that, using the terminology of *misafir* (guest) is to underline the discursive context of portraying Syrians as temporary. It is possible to state that the focal points of Erdoğan' discourses regarding Syrian refugees in table 6 are mainly based on the criticism of European migration policy, especially in terms of the economic violation of the EU-Turkey deal by the EU, while on the other hand, they can be easily rendered as Turkey's migration policy, which produces a pragmatic approach but avoids dealing with the refugee issue itself. The change in the discourses can be politically explained by several factors but AKP-MHP alliance known as *Cumhur İttifakı – People's Alliance*, the government's policies on security and Turkey's foreign policy towards Syrian case

are the leading ones. Even if this is an electoral alliance, the established alliance can be interpreted as the government's changing political landscape that concentrates on the national security and security policy. Erdoğan emphasizes the failed coup attempt (2016) in order to explain Turkey's security policies. It also argues that the mainstream media shows more interest in Assad's regime itself than in the refugee problems (Erdoğan, Kavukçuer, & Çetinkaya, 2017) because of Turkey's concerns related to the national security issues. Turkey's political failures about the Syrian case (Ünlü, 2018), ambiguous immigration and asylum policies and the high number of vilified and imprisoned journalists and the media's limited access to the refugee data might be seen as the reasons for the indifferent attitudes of mainstream media to the refugees' problems. As a natural consequence of the silenced opposition media, the mainstream media is free to affirm Turkish government's discourse change in the refugee issue. To sum up, in this 7-year period, the media has failed in its functionality and has set the foundation for the increasing discrimination concerning the refugee crisis, as the pro-ruling party media and the opposition media alike have taken on the agenda of the party they are closest to, according to their ideologies and policies.

<p><i>“We do not stay silent against the events in Syria. We have historical ties. Everyone says ‘you [Turkey] are right’, but the main opposition party stands against us. It is out of the question that Turkey stays silent to the fire just beside”</i> (NTV, 9 October, 2012).</p>
<p><i>“We, too, have become Ensar to you”</i> (Hürriyet, 7 October, 2014).</p>
<p><i>“We will continue to teach them (Western Countries) humanity”</i>.</p>
<p><i>... “You (Syrians) are not a burden for us”</i>. (Habertürk, 7 October, 2014).</p>
<p><i>“We have spent \$8 billion until now. How much support did the world give us? \$417 million”</i> (Reuters, 16 October, 2015).</p>
<p><i>“We do not have the word ‘idiot’ written on our foreheads. Don’t think that the planes and the buses are there for nothing. We will do what is necessary”</i> (Euroactiv, 11 February, 2016).</p>
<p><i>“Border gates will be opened if you go too far”</i> (Anadolu Ajans, 25 November, 2016).</p>
<p><i>“They promised to give us €3bn, four months have passed since then. The prime minister is in Brussels right now. I hope he returns with that money”</i> (The Guardian, 7 March, 2016).</p>
<p><i>“Syrians will not stay here forever”</i> (Hurriyet Daily News, 8 February, 2018).</p>
<p><i>“If European countries are living in peace today, it is thanks to Turkey for hosting four million refugees”</i> (Ahval, 4 May, 2019).</p>

Table 6 Erdoğan’s Discourses (The discourses in this table have been reported in a large number of newspapers including at least one of the four newspapers I selected to conduct my media survey. However, I preferred to use some other newspapers for the quotations in the table as they have the English version of the same news regarding Erdoğan’s discourses.)

4.2.1 The Stories of the Invisibles: Gendered Discourses in Media

The invisibilization of “woman” in Turkish mainstream media, in general, is only a reflection or more correctly put, a mirror of the society, which constantly reproduces unequal power relations between genders. Gendered discourses in the media might vary widely from traffic accident to murder. On the one hand, newspapers utilize headlines on the matter of women’s representation such as “*Morning traffic was tied up because of the crash caused by a female driver*”, “*Terrifying event! A woman murdered her husband in cold blood*” and “*Kara Dul Cinayeti – The Black Widow Murder*”. Another practice of mainstream media is to provide an ideal reference for public sphere where even matters concerning women are discussed and formulated by men. In other words, media, under the control of male dominance in terms of quality and quantity, determines how to build women’s representation in media regarding all social, economic and political factors that serve to buttress patriarchy.

The analysis of the pieces of news shows that the representations of Syrian women in written media contain certain elements of discourse. Under the title of *The Stories of the Invisibles: Gendered Discourses in Media*, we will examine how the media has approached the refugee issue and represented Syrian female refugees. Some subheadings like “Contagion carrier”, “Criminalizing by being the perpetrator”, “Marriage fraud stories”, “Turkish women versus Syrian women: A threat to family unity”, “Child mothers reduced to numbers” and “Victim of rape, violence and death” when reporting on Syrian female refugees.

4.2.1.1. Syrian Women Responsible for Contagious Diseases

Portraying refugees as potential contagion carriers and constantly making use of negative discourses against refugees is a common practice of the media. Under the heading, the news piece “*Syrians brought AIDS*” is examined. The news contains a statement about Syrians made by Fikri Sağlar, a member of the parliament from the opposition party. Although the news article includes some other contagious diseases too, the news headline only refers to AIDS. Another detail worth mentioning about the headline is that right above the headline, there is the statement “Fikri Sağlar makes an alarming explanation”, written in red in a smaller font. The headline not only depicts

Syrians as offenders but also has a worrying content. The article mentions seven diseases other than AIDS and using the metaphor “haunting the public”, claims that these diseases, previously with a very low rate of incidence in Turkey, is now, with the arrival of refugees, on the rise again. The article holds Syrian women prostituting themselves responsible for the alleged rise of incidences of these diseases. It is possible to analyze Sağlar’s statements in the article in three ways: a) His criticism of the government’s refugee policies and implementation of them, b) The representation of “them” who disturb “our” existence and peace, c) Pointing a finger at Syrians. The MP criticizes the government and its policies on the lack of inspection during and after the admission of refugees to Turkey. He never uses the word “government” or the name of any other political figure directly. He solely brings the issue on the agenda by showing the cause and effect relationship.

“...However, Sağlar claimed that along with the Syrians, 7 illnesses resurged and AIDS was added to them and made the following remarkable statement: “Some women among the refugees who were admitted into the country without adequate control and who entered illegally, work in the nightclubs and pavilions without supervision. It is claimed that refugee women falling into the hands of prostitution gangs caused the increase in AIDS cases in Mersin. This situation makes our citizens uneasy. Refugees not only disrupt the socio-economic internal dynamics of society, they also deeply shake the health of society” (Sözcü, 04/07/2017).

To back up the claims, the journalist refers to the latest incidences in Mersin, yet without providing any numerical data or a report on the incidences. While concluding the article, the statement “...in the region (Mersin) there is an increase in the rate of offenses such as extortion, theft and prostitution” (Ibid) is made to highlight some social problems other than 'health', which was the main topic of the article. In addition, to emphasize that the Syrians cause certain problems, the number of Syrians (350 thousand) is also specified in the article. To sum up, in the news article, Syrians are depicted to be entities who disrupt “our” peace and public order who also bring along health problems. The word “contagious” is used both literally and metaphorically, representing refugees as the source of filthiness and disorder.

4.2.1.2. Criminalizing by Being the Perpetrator

Another noteworthy point is the representation of Syrian refugee women in the media as offenders or victims. Most frequently, they are portrayed as offenders in the news on fake marriages. This type of news depicts Syrian refugee women as swindlers who trap Turkish men, the victims whose good intentions are exploited. In the news with the headline ‘‘Second Syrian bride blow to the groom!’’, the story is of the victimization of a Turkish man who ‘‘wanted to build a family’’. The relationship between the victim (us) and the swindlers (them) is explicitly given in the headline. The word ‘‘blow’’ is used to underline how badly the groom was victimized. Telling the readers that this was the second time such a thing happened serves to highlight the fact that such occurrences are rather frequent. Statements made attract attention to differences frequently contain such exaggerated expressions (Barthes, 1977). The news article makes generalizations about refugee women when talking about the marriage trap some Syrian women set. The news also provides details on how much money the groom spent, the amount of jewellery he bought for the bride and that the bride ran away right after the wedding ceremony. The groom is represented as a responsible citizen due to the fact that he ran to the prosecutor’s office after the fact. Yet, that he used middlemen for both marriages and that the Syrian women were sold like commodities are not mentioned at all throughout the article. The article ends with the groom’s message; ‘‘Turkish citizens should be cautious when it comes to Syrian women’’, which is a warning against Syrian women who want to get married. Such a message not only reproduces us versus them opposition but also portrays all Syrian women as potential criminals.

‘‘...The bride who puts Türkal to sleep the next morning with drugs, left his house after taking 20 thousand liras worth of jewellery with two people he introduced as her brother and cousin. Realizing that his wife had escaped when he came to, Türkal understood that he had been cheated and ran to Serinhisar Prosecutor’s Office and filed a criminal complaint. After the first event of fraud, Rıza Türkal was introduced to a Syrian woman named Riçat again this week through a middleman. Türkal allegedly paid the middleman 1500 lira, and paid 6 thousand 500 liras of dowry to the man who introduced himself as her father. However, this time he married her through an imam marriage. He gifted the bride 3 bracelets, gold earrings and rings. The bride was this time caught by Türkal while trying to escape, like the first bride did, in the morning. Rıza Türkal who was cheated for the second time when he wanted to get married

said “Those that cheated me before were caught, but my jewellery never came back. I got back the jewellery in my second marriage, but I lost 8 thousand liras. Let our citizens be vigilant against those who come from Syria and want to marry” (Milliyet, 24/02/2016).

Another piece of news where Syrian women are depicted as criminals was the one reporting on “They wanted to sell their 3-month-old baby”, published in 2014 in Cumhuriyet. (Cumhuriyet, 11/05/2014). As is the case with nearly all pieces of news on the crimes committed by the refugees, the very first thing the news piece underlines is that the perpetrator is Syrian, that the mother willing to sell her baby is Syrian. In the summary section of the news, it is reported that to sell her baby, the Syrian mother contacted two women, one from Syria and the other Turkmenistan. Unlike many other pieces of news on refugees, in this news article, the rights of the refugees are not infringed by disclosing their identity. Yet, in order to draw greater attention and dramatize the situation, the photo of a baby sleeping in an incubator is used.

4.2.1.3. Marriage Fraud News

Some news on marriages point to marriage as the only remedy for Syrian women. Such news articles are examples of news representing refugee women as victims. News such as these regularly appear in pro-government newspapers. The news article published by Yeniakit with the headline “*The drama of Syrian women... Their only remedy is marriage*” is rather striking, not because of the content of the news, but because of the timing of its publication. This is so because the news piece in fact retells a well-known situation that Syrian women have been faced with since the breakout of the war, seven years prior to the publication of this article in September 2018. Among the four newspapers analyzed, although Yeniakit is the one that mostly fails to report on refugees’ being forced to prostitute, the harassment and sexual abuse women suffer at refugee camps, minor girls being forced to religious marriages for monetary gain and ending up getting pregnant, with this news article, it emphasizes how desperate refugee women are. The news piece tells that the women who lost their husbands in the civil war and who are oppressed try to recover from their trauma through marriage. Despite the fact that such marriages take place out of desperation, the language used in the news has a tone of affirmation. Yet, the article does not mention any of the circumstances that

force women into marriages or propose any solutions. At first sight, the news piece seems to be a report by a pro-government newspaper on the victimization suffered by refugee women. However, the news does not include any of the solutions proposed in the report “*Needs Assessment of Syrian Women and Girls Under Temporary Protection Status in Turkey*”, published both in English and Turkish by UN Women (UN Women, 2018). On the contrary, it actually gives important messages to the readers belonging to the “us” group. Conveying these messages to the readers is what convinced Yeniakit to make such a piece of news when the life stories of refugee women no longer arise interest among the public. Firstly, just like many other news pieces gathered to be analyzed in the thesis, the identity of the woman, presented as a victim to be heard with the help of the news, is revealed, which is an infringement of her civil rights. In that case, the alleged sensitivity shown to the victim is rather questionable. Secondly, the news calls for empathy and pity via children and women. This is because pity cannot be aroused for Syrian male refugees who are labelled to be traitors, cowards and abusers by the local society. While constructing an image of victimization, the news addresses “us”, telling that “they” would also like to go back and that their main aim is to go to Europe. The emphasis on the refugees' transitory status and victimization is more of a story-telling than news reporting. The article is completely lacking in in-depth analysis and criticism.

“... Women who lost their husbands in the humanitarian drama in Syria are trying to get rid of the pressure they experienced through marriage. The deepest longing of the women, who stated that they faced the 'return to your country' reactions at every opportunity, is a house where they can live with their children. Mürüvvet Ayşat (32), says they are always seen as the “other”, and came to Turkey from Syria 3 years ago because of the war. Their target is Germany. But, her husband drowned while trying to enter Germany through illegal means.” (Yeniakit, 17/09/2018).

The issue of refugees serves as a tool in politics and is made use of by both the governing party and the opposition as frequently as possible. While the government dwells on both the negative and positive aspects of the issue, the opposition focuses on the negative aspects. The government includes the issue in both national and international politics whereas for the opposition, it is a tool for domestic politics. The

refugee issue and economic problems are the main arguments used by the opposing party in the criticism of the government. The two issues can be represented as interrelated and claimed to be also related to the mistakes made in regard to Syria. This is the underlying reason why pro-government Yeniakit made a piece of news emphasizing that refugees are transitory at a time when U.S. dollar exchange rate exceeded 7 Turkish liras (Newspapers, 12/08/2018).

News stories such as this one show that media outlets which are controlled by the governing party have acted as the mouthpiece of the government refugee politics since 2011 rather than fulfilling their journalistic duties, thus giving rise to even more misconceptions about the refugee issue in Turkey.

Some other pieces of news, naturally made by newspapers sympathizing with the opposition party, are about the victimization of Syrian refugee women by showing how these women are drawn to prostitution. In one of these pieces of news, the word *terrible* is used in the headline of the article in order to emphasize what a dangerous level this issue has reached. One part of the news is an interview done with a Syrian female refugee where the interviewee lists various incidents she had had to go through. The journalist classifies the incidents under different headings to draw attention to multiple crimes and misdemeanours committed against the said individual. The said piece of news is quite unique in that the actual words of the interviewee are reported. The news opens with the most striking quotes from the interviewee in order to highlight what refugee women are exposed to. The word “honor” is given in quotation marks to further emphasize the victimization suffered by these women. This is because women have always been defined with the concepts of honor and virtue in the society, accompanying men in social life as their “other half” (Ersoy, 2009). The local society perceives “virtue” as a quality that women have but men protect. In case of widowed women or the women who had to leave their husbands back in Syria, there is no man around them to guard the virtue of these women.

“Her name is Yıldız, and while drinking she gets stuck on “şerefe”. Because she has lived in Turkey for 2 years, she speaks Turkish well. She says with a bitter smile “I am sorry what is honour?” And then she laughs” (Sözcü, 18/11/2015).

Upon the introduction of the news, the journalist lists the various hardships suffered by

female refugees. The news, comprising of nine items, tells how refugee women are made to resort to prostitution. The said nine items are: 1 Our demands are not fulfilled, 2 We live in conditions that do not suit human beings, 3 Women are sold through intermediaries, 4 Girls aged 15 are marketed, 5 They asked me for women, 6 Why did someone with AFAD enter the tent in the middle of the night?, 7 There is a prostitution house in Nizip, 8 They sold a married woman, 9 I witnessed women taken out daily – (Ibid). Before the list is dealt with, the interviewee, a female refugee, under the alias “Yıldız”, reports the process in which refugees are entrapped in prostitution. She says that one of the major ways of entrapment is making women indebted. She explains how this is done as follows:

“Once you borrow money, you’re in trouble. You are made to pay in instalments. You’re sure to get stuck somewhere. When you can’t pay, you start to work. Nobody gives you half the drink on the table until you pay your debt. You owe more. This time, you not only work in the night club, but you are drawn to prostitution” (Ibid).

In order to draw attention, the allegation that women are in fact “sold” to men in pretense religious marriages is written in bold. The reason behind drawing attention to religious marriages is that such marriages is a matter of controversy and debate between religiously rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) which is a firm supporter of political Islam and the opponents of these political practices. The ruling of the Constitutional Court (AYM, E. 2014/36, K. 2015/51, k.t. 27.5.2015) seen as an approval of religious marriages is an example of the aforementioned situation. The said ruling invalidated articles 230/5-6 of Turkish penal code:

5- *“Those who forego civil marriages and go through with a religious marriage ceremony are sentenced to imprisonment of two to six months. Yet, in case the couple receive their civil marriage certificate, the civil lawsuit and the given sentence will be revoked.”*

6- *“Those who conduct a religious wedding ceremony without seeing the civil marriage certificate of the couple are sentenced to two to six months sentence in prison.⁴⁵” (Turkish Penal Code, 2004).*

The annulment of the abovementioned articles created some unrest as with such a

⁴⁵ The translation of the article has been taken from the website of Türk Hukuk Sitesi <http://www.turkhukuk sitesi.com/serh.php?did=12415> accessed 02.10.18.

change in penal code, women are put in even a less secure position and there is no legal basis to prevent child marriages. (Tahaoglu, 2015). Such rulings also create disturbances among people as these verdicts are not compatible with the secular regime and are likely to cause even more serious issues in the future. In other words, this situation is directly related to how the balance of power has shifted with Erdoğan and how the polarized society positions the relationship between the state and religion. Regarding this matter, sociologist Mucachit Bilici's comments on the relationship between religion and the state in Muslim societies can be explanatory.

“... in Orthodox Islam, the Church is the state. In Christianity, the Church owns the state. In Islam, however, the state is the owner of religion. Therefore, in Islam, the state is the Church. It is the state that shapes, focuses on and governs religion. There is no need for the one that produces religion to believe in the religion as it is the one creating it... the state cannot leave sunni Islam on its own. When it does, there is chaos. That is what I mean by using the analogy of the Church when talking about the relationship between the state and religion in Islam. Even the most secular Muslim countries cannot set religion free because they feel the need to control it” (Bilici, 2018).

As religion is indispensable for both political wings, the real issue is how to shape it. The political Islam policies dominating Turkey currently and Erdoğan's ideal to raise devout generations are both criticized heavily in matters related to gender. The reason why issues like child marriages, religious marriages, relationship between sexes arouse controversy and provoke criticism against the governing party is that the “judgments made about women are based on outdated beliefs belonging to times when women were not considered equals” (Ibid) and thus cannot cater the needs of the modern society. This is reflected in the news articles drawing attention to religious marriages when the news is on Syrian women. This is because such pieces of news make criticizing both the government and its ideology possible.

4.2.1.4. Turkish Women Versus Syrian Women: A Threat to Turkish Family Unity

Another factor leading to Syrian female refugees being made a target is the contrasting image of Syrian women to the one of Turkish women created by the media. Female refugees are portrayed as temptresses seducing Turkish family men and breaking homes. The first news of Syrian female refugees marrying local men are reported from

cities near the border. The piece of news analyzed is titled “Divorces are increasing rapidly in Kilis! Reason.” and focuses on the problems caused by marriages to Syrian refugee women. Even in the first sentence of the news, Syrian women are identified as perpetrators. When Syrian women- one of them- and Turkish women –one of us- are compared, the news dwells on the issue of “divorce”. This is because, divorce is a traumatic situation for the family. This being the case, there are various reasons to protect the one who belongs with “us” rather than the one belonging to “others”. To illustrate, when Syrian and Turkish women are compared, it is acceptable to consider Turkish women victims due to the discrimination, negative attitudes and labelling they have to suffer. The reason why news on divorces are dealt with so frequently by the media is the need for justifying making the comparison between Turkish and Syrian women. In developing countries, the male-dominated governments and political actors regard the socio-economic hardships women have to go through after divorce as of secondary importance. (Owen, 1996). This lesser importance attributed to conditions women are in is reflected in numbers surveys reveal. In the survey “Across the World Many See Discrimination Against Widows and Divorced Women” (2008) conducted by World Public Opinion, 52% of divorced women tell that they faced “a great deal of” discrimination after divorce (WPO, 2008). Another study conducted with 1220 divorced or widowed women showed that “three fourths of women have difficulty affording basic necessities like food, heating, clothing, furniture or children’s education while at the same time owing debts to the landlord and storeowners” (Vardar, 2011). When the approach of AKP affiliated politicians to women issues and the discourses they use are considered, the reason why the issue of divorce is so dwelt upon like it never was is that the “perpetrators” are Syrian women. Going back to the news article, to increase the credibility of the news, The Bar Chairman of Kilis, the head of Women and Children Rights Commission of the Bar of Kilis, even a cosmetics storeowner saying Syrian women put on too much make-up are quoted in addition to some numerical data given. The most striking phrases in the news piece are “Syrians marry via religious marriages” and “(The women in Kilis share) the same fate with women of the Black Sea region”, both written in capital letters in an attempt to attract the readers’ attention.

The news article points to Syrian women as the sole responsible party in the case of unregistered marriages while presenting the issue as “The crisis by Syrian women”.

The article portrays Turkish women as proud and aggrieved as opposed to Syrian women who settle for religious marriages and cause crises.

“SYRIANS LIVE WITH IMAM MARRIAGE. According to the records of Kilis Marriage Registry Office, 78 Syrians got married this year. However, according to the representatives of non-governmental organizations, the Syrians live mostly by imam marriage. Although the Syrian women’s crisis is reflected in the petitions of divorce, most women are too proud to state the real reason, therefore the stated reason for divorce is ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’. It is stated divorces increased by 60 percent with 20 percent of them due to these reasons” (Haber Türk, 28/10/2014).

The head of Women and Children Rights Commission of the Bar of Kilis, Şeyma Gürses Kepekçi, claims that the family unity is under threat. While assessing the events in Kilis, she says she believes that what happens in Kilis bears resemblance to what the women in the Black Sea region went through in the past, reinforcing the victim image. Kepekçi reminds the examples witnessed in the past, uses analogies like “a disaster of flood” or “a bomb on our laps” to describe the current situation and calls for immediate action. Far from being objective, Kepekçi even talks about the cheap fee Syrian women charge for house cleaning digressing from the topic of divorce. By doing so, Kepekçi, the head of Women and Children Rights Commission, portrays Syrian women not only as a threat to family unity but also competitors in the job market.

“The problem of the women in the Black Sea in the past is now experienced by women in Kilis. Because they thought Syrians would leave some day, they chose to stay silent. Now the women of Kilis are silent. This event is like a bomb on our lap. Social events are like floods. Urgent measures should be taken.” Statistics do not show the reality “Women cannot tell their child that her husband lives with a Syrian woman. They’re depressed. She can’t get a divorce because she has nowhere to go... If a local woman charges 60 liras for housecleaning, the Syrian woman charges 20 liras for a day’s work” (Ibid).

Following the statements of Kepekçi, the journalist adds a transition sentence in the article. Throughout the entire article, that single sentence is the only statement in which Syrian women are not marginalized, targeted or portrayed as offenders. The comment “The issue of the Syrian women in Kilis is a little bit of gossip” (Ibid) is one of the

most striking accounts in the article. The article also contains the phrase, claimed to be spread by the word of mouth “Turkish men are like delights but women don't look after themselves” (Ibid). The news article finally deals with the issue of make-up (which is extensively analyzed in the chapter “Women Against Women”) which is one of the most widespread criticisms against Syrian women. This make-up issue is perceived as a threat on its own by Turkish women. This perception is also widely-held by devout Muslims in the male-dominated communities. This is because in a society where women are regarded as properties of men and expected to wear make-up only for/in the presence of their husbands, the amount of make-up Syrians wear is considered to be extravagant and creates the fear that Turkish women could aspire to do so. The risk of women becoming more easily noticed and attracting attention in public sphere creates the need among the pious members of the society to be more vigilant when it comes to the “borders” drawn around women. When reporting on the risks created by Syrian women with their make-up habits, a local woman, Meral Yılmaz, who runs a cosmetics store with her brother-in-law, is quoted as “...*There is no limit to the cosmetics products they buy. They buy from anything to everything like powders, perfumes, make-up products, shimmering body lotions, whatever they need*” (Ibid). The phrase “there is no limit” used by Yılmaz can either be the limit Syrians set for themselves, or the boundaries local women see fit for the refugees. However, judging by the unrest felt by local women, it is the limit set by local women that is transgressed. (The boundaries are not a set of written rules but more like norms which are subject to change in different parts of Turkey due to socio-economic or socio-cultural differences. The boundaries in the said article are the ones shaped by the cultural norms in south eastern Turkey).

4.2.1.5. Child Mothers Reduced to Numbers

The news about child pregnancies reported by Hürriyet Daily News with the title of “The case of 115 underage pregnant girls treated in Istanbul hospital not notified to Turkish authorities” (Gökçe, 2018) and the second news is about femicide, “Pregnant Syrian woman raped, killed with baby in Turkey’s northwest” (Newspapers, 07/07/2017).

Child pregnancies case was first recorded with the title of “*Türkiye’yi Sarsacak Utanç Listesi – A List of Shame That Will Shatter Turkey*”. However, the same piece of news

was written in English with less detail and a different title (The news is provided in Turkish and English in newspaper addons). Although the Turkish title above is much more striking than the English one, it is news itself that would cause uproar. This protective attitude is reflected in the English text and a direct translation of the news is not used. While analyzing this news, I will proceed with the content of Turkish news. When we look at the content of the news, numbers and references are used regularly to draw attention to both the credibility of the news and the seriousness of the situation. The media that has been monopolized and has felt the pressure of the power was determined to focus on the basis of reactions to the source of the news. According to the news, the hospital workers did not notify the authorities about 115 underage pregnant girls. The expression in the introduction part of the text “These records were changed twice, which was a purposeful intrusion” (Gökçe, 2018). At first, the perception created was that of a mistake of who revealed the child abuse at the same time showing the protection reflex of the institution (hospital). The news resonated with the society and remained on the agenda for a long time even though Turkey’s political agenda was fully occupied with the war in Afrin. It would be useful to analyze the situation by separately examine it in various parts such as politics as a reflection of society, mainstream media’s approach, public perception and response to the issue.

We, therefore, need to find some answers to these questions: What role does Turkish politics play in preventing child marriage? How did the media perform its role during the period? And why did people from all segments of the society show a strong reaction to this matter and have a lot of discussions on the topic although the practice of underage marriages is not a rare occurrence? These three questions have a type of interpenetrate cause and effect relationship but I prefer to begin with the last one that might be interpreted as the most contradictory approach. Although child marriage is illegal, one third of all marriages are underage marriages (Karabağlı, 2012) and the rate of adolescent pregnancies in Turkey is 5,2 % (Çelik, Kırmısoy, & Antakyalıoğlu, 2018). People responded to the event as if they heard these types of news for the first time (Ibid). This reaction might be also viewed from two different perspectives. Firstly, it could be thought as a result of accumulated anger caused by some incidents like the ministry of education allowing secondary school students to get engaged (Bianet, 05/08/

2009), 45 male students having been sexually abused at a government-linked foundation (Ensar) (Ashdown, 2016) and the increasing number of women murders in the last eight years (1964) (Ulukaya, 2018).

Secondly, the real target of the society's reaction is the government itself. At this point, every single question penetrates into each other's circle. Judicial process and local governance approach to the issue provide us with a better understanding of Turkish political attitudes towards gender-based problems. To illustrate this point, the examples below would be convenient to better understand the problematic and conceptual structure of the gender discrimination in Turkey.

- *The office of chief public prosecutor declared that "all the victims have been called to testify" (Cumhuriyet, 18/01/ 2018).*
- *"The Küçükçekmece Prosecutor's Office had demanded an investigation into a doctor and hospital employee implicated in the incident, but the Istanbul Governor's Office, in a letter dated Dec. 4, 2017, refused permission. The governor's office said the hospital records showed that the two hospital personnel had not neglected their duty" (Gökçe, 2018).*

The given declarations of the authorities indicate that there is violation of child protection law in practice and the common tendency of dealing with the issue is not to bring the institution under suspicion. Put differently, the protection of the institution instead of the victims is the main focus of the incident. The governor of Istanbul stated that *"Pregnancies under the age of 15 have to be reported. All of them have been reported"* (Evrensel, 17/01/ 2018). In the news there is an emphasis on sentences like "15 years old" ... "two children born in 2003 are on the list according to the register" and "11 of the children in the list were found to be born in 2002". There is an emphasis that the figures need to be trusted by referring to "115 pregnant children in 5 months", "77 of the 115 children over the age of 15" also being used to support this figure. The governor further argues that if there is any exceptional circumstance, such as violence or pressure in the occurrence of these pregnancies of girls between the age of 15 and 18, these should be reported (Ibid). Criminal sanctions between the age of six and above have been based on the acceptability of the age of 15 in the society as the age of religious maturity and the discourse of the penalty reduction increases the

vulnerabilities of girls. Another emphasis on the extraordinary circumstances is whether pregnant children are married or not. The importance of being married is related to how Turkish society and especially its conservative majority interpret the female body and how they perceive honor. In another news report written in response to those who opposed early marriage, such marriages were defended by saying “*If you think that a nation that has adopted the “motherland, flag and honor” triumvirate will get a “hysterical crisis report”, you are mistaken!*” (Say, 2016). In order to criticize the CHP’s method, the writer used the reference “hysteria crisis report”, and the term “honor” was used to support the reproduction of social norms about the female body. The governor’s explanations about the child pregnancies could be considered a political legitimacy. Indeed, the rulings of family courts related to the underage marriages are reflections of patriarchal attitudes towards girls and corroborate the practice Judges, without exception, have given permission to girls aged 16 to marry based on the Turkish Civil Code allowing underage marriages in “extraordinary cases” (Çelik, Kırımsoy, & Antakyalıoğlu, 2018).

“Male or female may not get married unless s/he has completed the full age of seventeen. However, judge may give permission for marriage of a male or a female who has completed the age of sixteen in extraordinary (exceptional) circumstances and for a very important reason. Father and mother or guardian are heard before decisions whenever possible” (Ibid).

It is apparent that child marriage is not acceptable by the law, while it is by the society. Though such marriages are illegal, some local people consider the issue of minor age marriages from a financial and cultural viewpoint and find them acceptable. That is why they are still practiced. Turkey shows a similar dichotomy for international conventions such as CRC or UNCRC⁴⁶ – *The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child* (New York, 1989), CEDAW⁴⁷ – *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women* (New York, 1979) Istanbul Convention⁴⁸ – *Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence Action Against Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence* (Istanbul, 2011). Although Turkey has signed these conventions and become the first signatory state of Istanbul Convention, it has failed to stick to the agreements. This political approach towards

⁴⁶ CRC or UNCRC, <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/crc.pdf> accessed 06.10.2018.

⁴⁷ CEDAW, <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cedaw.pdf> accessed 06.10.2018.

⁴⁸ Istanbul Convention, <https://rm.coe.int/168046031c> accessed 06.10.2018.

child marriage has also influenced the statistical data regarding child brides of TÜİK - The Turkish Statistical Institute (UNFPA, 2014). Patriarchal discourses and practices reproduce a Janus-faced approach to gender-based problems. They indeed determine the being of women from the aspects of social, economic, political and physical factors (Kandiyoti, 2015). Such a patriarchal political structure encouraged by historical, cultural and most importantly religious references positions itself as the absolute power. Understatement of the statistical data regarding child brides of TÜİK - The Turkish Statistical Institute (UNFPA, 2014), or not to allow women take part in decision making process concerning women's lives like the "*Mufti Marriage Law*"⁴⁹ are the products of the unbalanced power relations and sociocultural attitudes towards gender equality.

Media's role and approach to address the issue is as problematic as is the political one. It prefers to focus on the results rather than the reasons. Thus, what has been discussed in the media is not the invisibilization of these children before they get pregnant but the reasons why they cannot be protected although they admitted to hospitals after being pregnant. The media attempts to present the issue as a crisis to the society. The efforts of the society, the state and the media to find the perpetrators have been presented as solving the problems (Çelik, Kırımsoy, & Antakyalıoğlu, 2018).

In summary, the conflict between the rise of the AKP and Turkish secularism may shed light to one of the main reasons for the gender-based problems in the society. Apart from being the first Islam based ruling party (Çınar, 2011), the AKP's political movements have caused to unveil some dichotomies since it came to power. Turkey as a country torn between secularism and Islamism, now experiences dilemmas of institutionalization the other way around. Gender inequality has become one of the problematic fields where these uncertainties and dilemmas are most felt because of the political attitude change in Turkey. In addition to these social and political conflicts from the point of gender perspective, Syrian female refugees are forced to struggle against some extra difficulties due to being the disadvantaged group that encounter the intersectionality of race and gender in refugee situations heavily. According to how the mainstream media reports the news, these 39 underage pregnant refugee children are

⁴⁹ The Article of Mufti Marriage , <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2017/12/20171202-10.pdf> accessed 06.10.18.

only statistical data. While the news article mentions 115 children at the onset of news, as only 39 of the children revealed their ethnic identity and stated that they were Syrian, a more direct reflection of another kind of abuse is focusing on the Syrian, “other”, identity of the victim.

When referring to pregnant children, the emphasis on the Syrian identity contributes to the spread of the discourse that they “give birth to too many children” as it contributes to the circulation of its discourse in its closed reproduction. News on 115 pregnant children, Turkey’s political power and other elements of power the society, such as men in a male-dominant society, women and women’s groups in the minority and refugee women being exposed to conditions in national newspapers, shows to what extent, the Syrian identity is effective in the production of news on the subject. The media’s tendency, which has become political by the government’s pressure (Ince, 2015), leads to invisibilizing the diverse experiences and stories of Syrian female refugees.

4.2.1.6. Victim of Rape, Violence and Death

The news, which has been reported in the light of social norms has involved several rape myths. It may be said that rape myths are formed by social norms that are the main factors to determine what real rape is and what is not. In other words, society establishes the set of fixed ideas as normal and acceptable or abnormal and heresy (Bozkurt, 2011), which means rape perceptions or myths are not a type of mental product of a rapist but learned social norms (Okray, 2018). The rape myths become a cover for male-dominated power dynamics, which encourage violence against women and create a perception that rape phenomenon is associated with heresy or considered an individual crime (Doğanay & Kara, 2011). From the point of sexual violence myths, in the case of the pregnant Syrian woman, this woman might be regarded as the victim of a “real” rape because male dominance could not justify the incident by the patriarchal norms of Turkish society. On the contrary, the victim’s features and the way the incident happened make her a “proper” example for the society. Female victims’ identity, profession, marital status, age, clothes and, when and where sexual assaults occur, expand “the traditional conceptualization of situational-level analyses” (Sampson & Lauritsen, 1994, p. 2). Some discourses such as, “Erasmus student”, “female tourist”,

“female university student”, “widowed woman” and “sex worker” are utilized in order to attempt to legitimize sexual violence (Okray, 2018) by creating stereotyped ideas while power uses some discourses to determine women’s moral values and ethics. In recent years, the public patriarchy in Turkey, which has been massively reinforced by various factors, the most important one being the neoliberal and conservative policies of Akp (Yıldız & Erol, 2018) with the intention of controlling female sexuality, classifies women simply as “being acceptable” and “being not acceptable”. This expected behaviour on the basis of gender establishes the framework of the role of social norms. Although most of the rape myths are non-realistic, it is also difficult to refute some of them because the stereotyped roles of gender directly affecting rape myths are attributed to homogeneity, which does not actually exist in social life (Eker & Erdener, 2011). The relationship between the female victim and the male perpetrator or more simply the abused and the abuser has several dynamics and scenarios that are used to determine who to blame or whose actions are to be justified. The discourses mentioned above are some of the examples which allow for better understanding of how the abused ones are stigmatized by their identities through discourse. The stigmatizing discourses against foreign women (especially coming from the western countries) arise from stereotypes and rumors regarding race and life style of the victims. One of the most fixed ideas about women who are coming from Western countries is that having a sexual intercourse is more normal for them (not a kind of taboo as it is in Turkey) and rape cases would be less traumatic for them or they are simply not from us (Okray, 2018, p. 210). It is also stated that the common point between racism and sexism is the explicit expression of prejudices that are accepted by social norms (Scully, 1990). The internalized racism may cause women to be seen more *rapable* as a result of the devaluation of women belonging to some particular race, and paves the way for the denial of rape by the rapist (Ibid). As for a female university student, the media reproduces the idea that they are already in public sphere and live by a structure other than the traditional family structure in Turkey (Okray, 2018). Therefore, the discourse (female university student) itself would not be compatible with the socially acceptable behavioural patterns in such societies. When it comes to “widowed woman” and “sex worker”, we see a hypocritical understanding based on women’s identity, marital status and job. Such a hypocritical attitude is even visible in the court of law, when rape cases

are dealt with. The length of the sentence the perpetrator will be facing is determined according to the identity of the victim. In that case the longest sentence is passed when the victim is a married woman, a shorter one if the victim was a virgin, even a shorter one in case a widow was raped and the most lenient sentence when the victim is a prostitute. (Eker & Erdener, 2011 & See also Article 429 of the Turkish Penal Code). Aforementioned difference between the sentences given is a natural consequence of media reproducing rape myths about almost every rape case, women being regarded as a property of men or classifying women as “being acceptable” and “being not acceptable” in the patriarchal society. Media plays its role to reflect and to shape public opinion on gender-based issues. Regarding the pregnant Syrian woman case, we may explain details of the news from the point of rape myths and Turkish social norms.

In Kaynarca district of Sakarya, a 9-month pregnant woman of Syrian nationality was raped and killed, their heads crushed by stones in the woods together with her 10 month old son on 08 July 8, 2017. The incident was reported as “*she had a name; Emani Arrahman*”, “*after, Emani Arrahman*”, “*Pregnant Syrian woman was raped and killed with her child*”, “*Syrian raped and murdered with her children*”, “*Dead Syrian*”, “*Emani Arrahman*”, “*We lost the entrusted: Emani !*”, “*Emani and hope*” in the Turkish mainstream media. Almost all of the headlines in the news state the nationality of the dead woman; in some parts only the name of the deceased woman is given which is in Arabic and enough to hint her nationality. The fact that the newspapers that report on a conservative line emphasize the “entrusted” is in fact a reference to the Ensar - Muhacir relationship in the migration process. Victim and victimization mean that we cannot protect the woman who needs the protection of “us”. Media, which creates an image of victimization and tries to increase the sense of pity, often speaks to our manhood which is identified only with his body and hence his sexuality. A story that it was probably an act of revenge was created about the cause of the event. The media story was that the murder was caused by an argument the woman’s husband had at his workplace. The news about the woman was given to the media together with rape myths as a woman or mother or partner either as a sexual object or as an object of violence. Firstly, she was a mother and expecting another child while she was raped and killed. Therefore, the rapists attacked motherhood, which is one of the most important institutions (Maätita, 2010). Secondly, she could not resist rape because of the number

of the rapists (2) and she and her baby were killed. This also increases the incidence of sexual violence. Thirdly, she was kidnapped from her home when her husband was at work. It invalidates some justifications like being outside at night. Lastly, she was a headscarved woman so that her dress would not be seductive according to moral appropriateness and structural approach (Dawson, 1995). However, the media still covers the rape as an individual and an exceptional event and this is because the media uses discourses where it declares perpetrator(s) monsters (evils) and states that humanity is dead when it has difficulties legitimizing events. The fact that these events are conveyed as individual acts shows that there is no questioning of the patriarchal order.

When we examine the newspapers in terms of the event, *Hürriyet* gave the event a place on the main page and allotted a whole page to this news in the newspaper. To begin with the macro levels of the news, headlines are full of ideological meanings according to Van Dijk (Dijk, 2003). It can be seen that the newspapers initially focused on the nationality of the murdered woman which was an ideological act. There are no other rape or homicide case news like ‘the women from İzmir got killed’. It is common knowledge that there are many Syrian refugees in Turkey and with the lack governmental regulations on adaptation and integration, the levels of prejudice against Syrian refugees keep increasing. By stressing the hidden idea of ‘woman is from Syria’, a negative ideation of the case can be established through the headline. The *Milliyet* newspaper reported the news as a half-page in the “News from home” section. The other newspapers spared a small space for the news. It was observed that the *Cumhuriyet* reported the event in a single column without photographs. Furthermore, the information that this is a rape case was not mentioned in the headline as well. In subheadings, it is stated that ‘2 persons have been captured and put in to a detention after they raped and killed a woman and her kid’. It can be seen that the effort and habit of generalization host a prejudice-based ideation that ‘Syrians and crime’ are interrelated topics.

In micro level, the news writers strive to adjust the structure of sentences to build a causal relationship (Dijk, 2003). To evaluate it with a critical point of view, I focused on the details of the news. Many news web sites wrote that, the convicts and the husband of a poor woman had an argument in workplace and the convicts also claimed that, the conflict occurred because the Syrian husband worked too much. We can observe the

casual relationship here. Subliminally, media acts as an agent of the heteronormative system, pointing out that the cause of the rape and murder is that conflict that they had before, thus softening a horrible event. Moreover, from many possible statements of convicts, they picked the part that ‘the Syrian husband was working too much’, which was another example of creating and spreading race-based prejudice and reinforcing false beliefs such as ‘Syrians are trying to steal our jobs’ that are endorsed by Turkish community.

The news is based on the theme of “the rape of the Syrian refugee woman living in difficulty and the killing of their children” and the photos used in the news support the thematic structure. Although the statements of witnesses are included in the text and the victim identity is highlighted, what the Syrian woman and her children went through (neck squeezed, hit on the head with a rock) are being constructed as violent pornography. The fact that the Syrians cannot defend themselves and their rights because of the language barrier has allowed the news writer to provide detailed criminal information.

As a result, when both news articles are taken into account, when Syrian women are portrayed in traditional gender roles, in most cases the public conscience is hurt as victims are innocent. In other words, in cases where the media cannot remain indifferent, women are included in the news when they are victims of murders or sexual abuse. Syrian refugees that immigrate to Turkey as a consequence of the ongoing war in Syria, are forced to cope with many problems such as food, shelter and integration-based problems. However, female refugees in same conditions have had to deal with such problems in a whole different level than men. They are facing the problems arising from the differences between gender norms between the two countries and prejudice-based ideation (Açer & Güçlüer, 2018). Another issue is that Syrian refugee women are being muted in discourse in the mainstream media by being disregarded. When the Syrian women, who have been denied their right to speak for themselves and who are ignored in the discourse, are seen as a threat when they are the subject of the news, in which case the woman is generally photographed in public space, not at home. In addition to all this, it seems to be difficult to address and classify Syrian women’s representations in mainstream media from a single dimension, but if we make a general

classification, they dwell on the sexuality of women and how much they fall within the roles attributed to them, or how much of those roles, in other words, pass the borders.

4.3. Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter touches on the pattern of the discourses in social media and written media. Turkey's migration policy is seen as the first and most important code created by the discourses. The Misafir discourse is derived and discussed and effects the most the general perception among this code. The worsening economic situation is blamed upon the refugees and therefore has caused the Misafir discourse to turn to the Suriyeli (Syrian) discourse. However, this transformation still intersects with Turkey's migration policy. The government needs to adapt a transparent and long-term strategy regarding the integration policies once again comes to the forefront. This situation has caused the basis of the creation of the Turkish-Syrian opposition and has increased the circulation of discriminatory discourses through economic reasons. To be a Syrian in Turkey is shown as one without economic problems, and the current migrant policy not being transparent enough have been used by political actors as domestic and foreign political material. The money spent on refugees is been brought to the agenda (see table 6) at regular intervals through conflicts "the state is taking care of Syrians", "The freeloaders", "Should have been a Syrian in Turkey" has spread and has strengthened the perception of the refugees as a hunch growing on the back of Turkey. Syrians with capital opening stores in Turkey has caused an increase in tension between the two groups (Örer, 2018). Syrians and their families working a lot (they have to work) has mean that they have minimum expenditure. Refugees opening their own stores has become a material for discriminatory discourses such as "what really matters is us" (Turks).

The elections that took place between 2011-2018 are also an important factor to the circulation of these discriminatory discourses. In this time period in Turkey, there were 9 elections; a constitutional referendum (2017), presidential elections (2014 & 2018), general elections (2011, 2015x2, 2018), local elections (2014-2019) and along with the cancelled Istanbul local elections, 10 in total. The opposition have used the refugees as propaganda because of the Arab identity, cultural differences, number of refugees and their cost on Turkey as they were again brought to the agenda.

Another factor in the rise of discriminatory discourses against Syrian refugees in real life, social media and media is the hierarchy of acceptance and acceptable immigration/migration (Danış & Parla, 2009). Syrian refugees are also subject to this hierarchy. This case is seen more in the comparison method between recent Turkish descendent Bulgarian migrants and Syrian refugees. However, such an approach is one sided in terms of both the characteristics of the two groups compared and the hierarchy of acceptability, but does not go beyond trying to portray one group as good and the other group as bad. Although this hierarchy of acceptance varies according to period and conjecture, generally, Turks that live outside of Anatolia in Turkey are also evaluated and there has been a process of inclusion and exclusion against Turks from abroad. The fact that the majority of the immigrants who were granted citizenship in the early periods of the Turkish descendants coming from the Balkans was considered to be favoritism to the Muslim conservative wing (Ibid). Behind this idea of the Balkans lies “conquered but not made into a homeland” is mentioned (Ibid, p.135). Another example of this situation is the discourse of “Cypriot Turks need to prove that they are Turks” and now (under the AKP government), “that they are Muslims” used for the citizens of the Northern Turkish Republic of Cyprus (Bayraktar, personal communication, June 7, 2019). Compared to the policy of the Turkification and Muslimization of Anatolia during the early Republican period, after turning into a homogenous society, Turkey has followed a more reserved migration policy (Danış & Parla, 2009). Geography of origin of the foreign immigration to Turkey in the Turkish immigrants by period of internal and external political stability is sometimes seen as instrumentalisation and Turkish identity-Muslim identity in ethnicity and religion sometimes comes forward. In fact, Erdoğan spoke of immigrants from Bulgaria in 1989 “they were expelled from there (Bulgaria) not because they are Turks but because they are Muslims...” (Erdoğan, 2018) shows the point of view of the conservative Muslim wing. The subjection of Turks from abroad to the hierarchy of acceptable migration also causes the separation into groups of those that come from abroad. Syrian refugees, on the other hand, are independent of all groups, but it is possible to say that this group is a new and large group under all other groups. Because of these new group identities, they could not be included in the aforementioned hierarchy, and had to struggle with racism as a natural consequence of immigration policies or lack of policies, which was intended to be built

within the framework of guest discourse, which then had to change but far from inclusion. Refugees are perceived as undesirable, threatening elements in society and the fact that they are at the bottom of social stratification increases their vulnerability. Refugees are becoming a group in which the discriminatory rhetoric is directed at the bottom of society in the mechanism of racism that constantly produces an “other” at the intersection of perception management, xenophobia and a policy of immigration that is far from transparent. While Syrian refugees are excluded as a whole in the media and social media, male refugees become hostile and female refugees become victimized when they become the object. However, the victimization and visibility of the refugee women in media often occurs after being subjected to violence or sexual abuse, resulting in death. On the other hand, addressing the emphasis on Arab backwardness through social gender is also one of the factors that increase the exclusion of refugee women. Racist propaganda builds the image of a refugee woman in adjectives such as ignorant, lazy, giving birth to many children and a man hunter. In addition, the media ignores discrimination and paves the way for the spread of discrimination. In this case, the tension between the two communities increases and as a result of this tension refugees retreat to their own shells. While the focus of the news on refugees in the national media is around the problems experienced or caused by refugees, a perspective regarding the solution to these problems is not developed by the representatives of the media. As a result, the female refugees' living space is getting smaller and their disadvantage is already increasing in the excluded refugee community. While the gender-based disadvantage of refugee women sometimes increases from invisibility and sometimes from excessive visibility when they share the same public sphere with the local population, the refugee community that is pushed to live within itself due to social pressure increases the pressure on women. The perception that male refugees are the main element of the discourses used to portray refugees as enemies is brought to the fore. However, psychological and physical pressure on refugee women increases when social polarization escalates where discriminatory discourse plays an active role.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The central aim of the thesis was to investigate how the discriminatory discourses on Syrian refugee women are reproduced in the host society and how this reflects on the lives of refugee women. Parallel to this focus, social, political and economic factors in the increase of discriminatory discourses were taken into consideration. For the central aim of this dissertation, it is significant to identify how discourses are shaped, and who or what is effective in this process.

One of the most important findings of this thesis is that the masculine discourse is also internalized and decisive among women as seen in power relations among men and women. This situation can be seen as a discourse to show the social power relations of the representations of Syrian women, and how cultural norms adorned with nationalist and religious motifs are used by local women to discriminate against refugee women. As discussed in Chapter 3, local women do not target refugee women regarding subjects that go beyond the axis of societal gender norms set by the masculine domination. In other words, local women's perceptions are affected as they are besieged by the socially increasing racist discourses. When the issue is approached from this angle, the factors that give rise to social inclusion include cultural diversity, lack of communication, inadequate and biased information regarding the living conditions of refugees, the non-validation of news by authorities regarding the aid received by refugees, economic problems and uncertainties created by a migration policy that is not carried out in a transparent and orderly manner. In this kind of relationship, where they are the opposite of one another, one side is generally dominant (Derrida, 1984). The refugees exposed to social exclusion and repression tend to normalize, accept and adapt to the situation. On the other hand, the questioning and rejection of their invisibility and the exclusion they have lived through being overseen and their unheard reactions are psychological problems caused due to being continuously singled out as the target and the victim. The second objective is to investigate how discriminatory discourses are justified and used in the social exclusion of refugee women. In this context, the way in which nationalist and religious discourses are used in the marginalization of refugees is of great

importance and it is a sub-objective to examine the intersectional dimension of exclusion and the exclusion that refugee women are exposed to. As this thesis focuses on the social exclusion of refugee women living in Ankara because of their refugee status and their gender, the study of intersectionality from sectarian (Kurdish-Arab, Alevi-Arab and Turkmen-Arab) differences is of great importance for further research, especially considering religion based social exclusion.

The nationalist discourse of “us” and “them” affects all discourses. As all things might be used to become involved and to become distinguished, this discourse focuses on the identity formation and the differences of the two communities that create the concept of othering. Therefore, the essential need to reproduce the negative effects of the long-established historical and the religious discourses on the Arab identity explains *how does the identity of the refugees – being Arab trigger the racism in the host society?* The discourse also gives us an opportunity to render one of the specific objectives of this thesis, which is *to generate the conceptual framework of how the discriminatory discourses are justified and interrelated with domestic social problems.* For example, in “our” culture, raising a generation is sanctified and childbearing is encouraged, but when it is the “others”, they are defined as sex addicts and insulted by saying “their women” give birth like rabbits. In this respect, hypocritical (Janus-faced) nationalist projects draw the borders (Akkaya & Kam, 2017). This is because mothers, who are considered to be the ones responsible for biological reproduction and carriers of cultural differences position themselves right on the border between “us” and “them” in nationalist discourse and the border is reshaped with every step they take. The relationship between nationalist and religious discourses, and the variables that the two cover, support and differentiate are one of the important factors affecting the situation of Syrian refugees. The intersectionality between the two discourses is reflected in the reactions of the locals. The factor which an individual feels more is in correlation to the identity s/he defines and what kind of direction which s/he is faced with. The perception of the socio-economic based threat elements within the framework of “us” and “them” is that the discourse of nationalism encompasses the discourse of the religious discourse, and in established power relations, “us” is the right practitioners of religion, and the “them” are divided those that interpret religion incorrectly. Although Turkish-Arab religious nationalism intensified after interacting with Syrian refugees, the basis of

this is much older. While Turkish religious nationalism has justified the superiority of its own discourse, it uses historical references such as the fact that Turks have been the leaders of Islam throughout history. When I consider the issue in terms of the effect of the religious discourse on refugee women, cultural variables in the interpretation of religious teachings mean social exclusion by the society in which they live, which in turn means that there is a necessity of acceptance in their own society.

Along with religious references, one of the main reasons for men to establish a domination of the female body is that religious teachings are deterrent. Refugee women suffer from more contradictions because they are caught in between two societies where both groups are in search of the “ideal” women and due to this there is a desire to control the female body. The ideal female figure of their society is subservient and their body is presented to men for them to control, even when it is against the will of women. Without considering the effect of nationalistic discourses and the social norms imposed on refugee women, the society in which they live define “them” as those that need to adapt to “us”. The issue of the high birth rates of refugee women is one of the most discussed subjects. Bearing many children, especially sons, is a cause for mothers to be sanctified, to be accepted and honored as they satisfy men’s egos in their culture while it also causes the same mother to be exposed to social exclusion in the culture which they live in. Another example of the trending discourse of the masculine domination of women’s bodies in the thesis is the role and effect of the burqa in protecting women from sexual assault and making them less visible. Although the majority of the interviewed refugee women believe that the burqa does not protect them from sexual harassment, they are wearing the burqa due to the pressure of their husbands. On the other hand, the majority of local women that wear headscarves perceive the burqa as exclusionary rather than a tool for invisibilization because they think that the burqa is very visible and extreme. In the first case, what deepens the problem, rather than submitting to the oppression of power, is that the norms of the patriarchal structure harm another patriarchal structure diminished due to migration. Hence, beneath this, lies the justification of the authority or power to define sexual assault as rape myths. Parallel to the question of *how do Syrian female refugees become a problem or a threat for, and a target or a victim of local women?* we see that the most discussed issues from the point of view of religious teachings, nationalistic discourses and social norms establish a basis

for positioning Syrian female refugees.

The ways in which women interpret the relationship between burqa and sexual harassment are more realistic than of men's, who are responsible for their protection. Indeed, the burqa they wear for protection reflects their identities at first glance and makes them more vulnerable to attack. Aside from factors such as economic conditions, social networking and social assistance, refugees have been forced to live together in order to take certain measures against social pressure, exclusion and sexual assault. While this situation significantly affected the integration of the refugees, interestingly, Syrian women stated that the language barrier was an advantage for them when it came to sexual assault.

There are many factors that make Syrian women vulnerable to sexual harassment. However, two of these can be considered as the main factors. The first one is the variability and uncertainty of the refugee discourse and policy, affecting the whole scenario. It is the transformation of the process that begins with the "guest" discourse and turns into hate speech. Internal problems such as the growing racism triggered by the economic crisis, Turkey being adversely affected by the variables of the Syrian issue and the failed coup attempt have hindered any measures and caused the refugee issue to lose its priority. Syrian refugee women are more vulnerable to silencing and other attacks due to the uncertainty of the social status of Syrian refugees becoming apparent, the existence of refugees not on record, refugees not being sufficiently informed on their rights and the bias of the authorities in incidents where refugees are involved. Another factor are the myths created by local women about Syrian refugees. Putting on a lot of makeup, being well groomed, being busy with their own beauty and making their husbands happy their priority rather than focusing on their children and wearing open and flashy dresses on their special days (these dresses are considered as inviting) are some of these myths. While local women use the myths, they created against refugee women they consider as threats to socially exclude and target them, they also share photos and videos with their spouses taken with and without permission in order to legitimize themselves. However, this approach has led to the reproduction of these myths by men and has left refugee women considered a threat by local women, more open to threats and has played a role in spreading this threat.

Another specific objective of the study is to reach the answer(s) of *how do the social media (Facebook) reproduce information about the Syrian refugee issue and how do the media (Turkish printed mainstream media) build rational and sentimental justifications of discriminatory discourses?* In the fourth chapter, which started with social media, the discourses on Facebook were gathered in three groups. The first, *general discourses* uses negative stereotyped discourses and approaches which covers all Syrian refugees and tries to justify the generalist and discriminatory discourses that have entered the process of normalization. The second group of discourses on *discourses on Syrian refugee women* is at first glance a more protective discourse against women. But the problem here is that the locals have demanded that there be a restriction of acceptance of refugee women as “us”. This demand differentiates the acceptable and non-acceptable refugee by age and gender. The norms developed by the host country to emphasize the importance, legitimacy and sanctity of family are not valid when it comes to refugees. This hypocritical approach is reflected in other discourses. Discriminatory discourses from the women in their surroundings triggers the hypocritical approach in social media. The most obvious example of this is that the image of women refugees, alone, aggrieved, vulnerable and in need of protection is closer to being acceptable by the host country over time becomes the image of dirty, immoral husband hunters who are also swindlers. The first factor strengthening this contradiction is the problem of refugee identification. The status of the *guest* is both a giver-taker hierarchy and the duality of this hierarchy with “otherness”. In other words, the guest discourse is used outside, to show the value given to refugees while on the other hand, it is a discourse against refugees, which contains contradictions in how refugees should be treated, how much they will be helped and leaves the amount of help to be given at the discretion of the host. In fact, while defining refugees, the social perceptions caused by discourses such as *misafir, ensar and muhacir* that remind the job of the host are directly related to the problems identified by not only this thesis but also this study. When considered from this point of view, the identification problem of the discourses in the last group; *discourses depending on the agenda* appears to be clearer. All the problems, such as news of soldiers being made martyr coming from the border, the increase in meat imports from abroad, news of Turkish citizens that commit suicide because of economic problems, the increase in service costs for basic requirements such as health, electricity,

water, gas, related or not, tend to be associated with the existence of the refugees and investments made for them by the community. The dissemination and conversion of this association into hate speech is attributed to the use of Facebook as a source of news in Turkey (Fletcher & Radcliffe, 2015).

In the second part of this chapter, how the mainstream media handles the subject of Syrian refugees, and how they reflect this on the society in the context of power relations of Critical Discourse Analysis is examined. The press is classifying and “othering” groups that do not stick to norms (Foucault, 1987) by transferring, processing the duality of Syrian and Turkish women and information produced by power. However, before addressing the issue of representation of women refugees in the media, addressing refugee representation in media from a general perspective may provide a useful background. It is particularly important to understand how the media positions itself in the subject of forced migration - migrants that affect both domestic and foreign politics. The projections of the refugee issue on Turkey vary greatly. It is possible to divide this positioning into periodic and ideological segments. Media’s analysis of the subject according to periodic variables can also be divided into two phases. Accordingly, in the first phase, it is possible to come across examples that victimize refugees by emphasizing the necessity of “our” protection towards “guests” and siblings in faith, migrants who lost their lives in the accidents in the Aegean Sea, or human beings victimized by human trafficking. This period traversed into the second phase with refugees moving out of the camps and settling in the areas where local people live. In this new phase, the idea of the temporariness of refugees is replaced by the disruption of the peace of the local people together with their welfare in all areas of employment, health and daily life, all caused by the refugees (Cantek & Soykan, 2018). In the first stage of the migration process, while the common aspects such as religion, culture and historical ties were underlined, differences started to be emphasized with the change in the process. In media’s ideological approach to the refugee issue, it is possible to mention two groups as the opposition group and the pro-government group. The main difference between these two groups is the language they use. The Syrian refugee profile represented by the newspapers close to opposition group is a group of people who transmit contagious diseases, are used by the ruling party to strengthen its own power, are prone to crime and are likely to disrupt public order. On the other hand,

perhaps the greatest emphasis given in pro-government newspapers is the protectionism of Turkey and the bargaining power (EU-Turkey deal). The two main issues that both groups have skipped are that they do not produce news with in-depth analysis and that asylum does not appear to be a human right (Ibid).

When it comes to the gender perspective, female refugees are mostly portrayed as helpless victims in written press, and as long as women remain this way or do not become a threat, they are not a target of the media that guide the public. Although the Syrian refugee women's representations in the media vary widely, and do not go beyond one-dimensional, univocal representations, the fact that Syrian women refugees are ignored in the media is irrefutable. Are the perpetrators the most important factor that increases the degree of the invisibilization of refugee women? Or is it the victim herself? Female refugees are represented this way in the media. For example, in the news of 115 underage pregnant girls examined in the fourth chapter, and in the news that were a continuation of the mainstream news, no information was found other than the race and number of refugee pregnant children. The invisibilization and silencing of Syrian refugee women is reinforced in the media by the production of news with an ideological and social viewpoint.

There are several interdependent factors that affect the social exclusion of Syrian refugee women both as women and as refugees. These give us a full conceptual grasp of one of the specific objectives, which is *to describe how the discriminatory discourses that are instrumentalized in the exclusion of the refugee community as a whole are constructed and their political, social and economic periphery*. Religious and national discourses seem to dominate the social, economic and political coexistence of these patterns in the highest level. The main reason for this is that the two elements that most favor the discriminatory discourses and stereotyping of refugees, highlighting the idea “us” versus “them”, is religion and nationalism. The struggle for power of the Islamist and secularist circles, the separations during the foundation of the nation-state and the pains of the transition from the empire to the nation-state in addition to religious, ethnic, political and intellectual ghettoization have been effective in spreading discriminatory discourses throughout the whole society. This divergence and mental ghettoization in society diminishes in rare cases. This happens either when some events that undermine

the public conscience of the whole society occur, playing an integrative role or, some events emerge as a threat to accepted material and moral values of the vast majority of the entire society. The issue of Syrian refugees is conceived as a threat that brings all segments of the society together. The spread of increasing racist discourses has silenced the minority trying to empathize and adversely affected the aids to refugees. The way in which the aid was made was both the cause and the result of racist discourse. The fact that the local population in the area I work in is economically disadvantaged and that the beneficiaries of the existing aid campaigns (it almost ended due to economic crisis and increasing racism) of civil society organizations and the related institutions of the state were Syrians has caused the increase of discriminatory discourses. Another problem with this issue is the lack of a common online pool for civil society organizations, foundations and related institutions of the state to use for local, national and / or national registration, follow-up, needs assessment and planning. One of the most fundamental problems posed by this system is the unequal distribution of aids to the refugees because it is not possible to see where they got the aid from. Another problem is that the benefits are not based on need assessment, but according to the resources in the hands of the charity institution; no organization other than the women's health center in the region prepares an aid package for the specific needs of women. In addition, unregistered assistance not being monitored can leave unaccompanied widows and single refugee women vulnerable to sexual abuse in return for humanitarian assistance. Another reason for the problems of refugee women not appearing on agendas is that feminist women's groups and activists in Turkey do not put this problem on their own agendas or only do so superficially and symbolically. When all these factors are considered, refugee women become the subordinate group of both local- refugee and male-female opposites. Refugee women have to play the role of invisibility within the outer circle, drawn by the cultural norms reshaped by the conditions of their home society and the ghetto which they live in, where the host community creates a hostile circle through social discourses and social pressure, and the transition areas between the circles become the intersectional area of their social exclusion. Although for a certain amount of time, academicians were not allowed to conduct research concerning the refugee problem, later on, due to the opening of migration institutions and post-graduate programs in universities there have been a considerable increase in academic studies.

However, the continuation of the process makes it impossible for me to say the last word while explaining why there is a need for new studies on refugees.

Recently there has been a significant rise in the academic works/studies on the Syrian refugees in Turkey. When we look at the current studies, we can observe that the migration phenomenon is studied by many different disciplines in various aspects such as politics, law, media, gender, healthcare, labor migration, education and integration. When we come back to academic works related to the main concern of this thesis, which is migration experiences of female refugees, the studies in which forced migration is scrutinized at the gender level vary and they contribute to the field to a great extent. There have been several studies dealing with issues in which female refugees are involved such as legal violence, refugees' exclusion at work, post-migration period, health needs, mixed marriages, integration problems, schooling, representation of Syrian female refugees in Turkish media and so on (see also Kıvılcım, 2016, Altunkaynak, 2016, Akkaya & Kam, 2017, Ozturk, Serin, & Altinoz, 2019, Asaf, 2017, Doğanay & Çoban Keneş, 2016, Karakaya, Çoşkun, Özerdoğan, & Yakıt, 2017, Rohwerder, 2018, Başterzi, 2017). However, the ones apart from media and social media surveys cover only the refugees living in one particular city. Therefore, it will be better for the future studies to focus on the experiences of the female refugees who are staying at the camps, the ethnical differences among female refugees, refugees in the COVID-19 crisis, the current situation of the female refugees during the repatriation process, which was intensified during the 2019 summer, the agenda of the feminist groups in Turkey concerning the refugees, the importance of gender in the aid efforts of the NGOs, the effects of the foundations and societal groups formed by female refugees on the post-migration period. However, among other topics we need to pay extra heed to the female refugees staying in the camps. The first reason why researchers examine refugees living in the cities is that it requires a lot of bureaucracy for the researchers to enter the camps, and it is good to note that it is almost impossible to get the permission to do so. Moreover, most of the Syrian refugees are urban and they usually live in the outskirts of the cities. The third reason is that almost all-around Turkey there is sufficient number of refugees to interview with, and because most of the universities in Turkey do not spare budget for the fieldwork, many researchers lean to/tend to do research in the cities where they work. (This last reason, in fact, is an explanation to why

most of the studies cover only one city.)

The thesis shows that the official discourse used regarding refugees is a false embrace and that the government is not following a transparent policy on the issue of refugees. This ambiguous and non-transparent immigration policy is shaped by the government's policies regarding when and how to use refugees, who are already political tool in both domestic politics and foreign politics, for their political advantages. The lack of legal integration prevents social integration (Castro, 2007). This situation is influential in the construction of the marginalization of refugees in domestic politics and becomes a trump in foreign policy. Despite the government's ever-changing rhetoric and the racist language used by government-led media, the government's efforts to show increased anti-refugee and hate speech to be independent from its own are related to balancing religious and nationalist votes in domestic politics. In addition, the rapid escalation of racism in ghettoization in the society will create a chaos in favor of the government. Yet, in fact, such a chaos is work in progress for a gradual withdrawal of the refugees involved in crimes being sent back to their country, despite the fact that such an issue arose from Turkey's already unsuccessful Syrian foreign policies. When I regard the issue from this viewpoint, the number of integration attempts and the fact that the number of works to be done or opted to be not done shows that the policy pursued contains hypocritical sincerity⁵⁰. The women in the marginalized refugee group, who are the subject of the study, are excluded because of their refugee identity, while at the

⁵⁰ I have stated that Turkey's migration policy code is the powerhouse of the other codes in the data and codes that are collected for use in this thesis. Since I am in the final stage of writing the thesis, I will not be able to examine the repatriation process in this thesis. However, a new Turkification or homogenization process that I envisioned when I was in the field and coding media data broke out while making the final corrections. Therefore, I wanted to give brief information about this period in which temporary asylum rights were violated. This topic has already attracted the attention of all immigration researchers and I hope that many researchers will conduct detailed studies in the future. If I go back to the repatriation process, it is a matter that nobody knows, including immigration experts, how the state envisages an integration policy, what mechanisms it has developed and/or developed to implement this policy. But what is known, seen and evident is the fact that refugees have been deprived of refugee rights for years due to the problematic status of temporary protection given to refugees, as well decisions that breach their right of non-refoulement in the summer of 2019. Intensifying checks in July 2019, deportations to Syria, as they only lived outside the province where they were registered, showed that this status and rights were defined by transience and arbitrariness and were unreliable. On refugees in Turkey, the social dialogue and consensus-based migration policies or visibilization of the problems are caused by the lack of policies and refugee hostility based on racism or led racism-based refugee hostility to take the stage of the fascist rhetoric that has become a situation in the country. In an atmosphere where the ruling party (AKP-MHP) normalizes racism and in a country where there is a historical root of anti-Arabism, the excitement of the anti-Syrian opposition in the masses will lead to even more devastating consequences.

same time they are double marginalized because they are women first, then helpless, unclaimed for and vulnerable, and due to myths about Arab women. The perceived threat in the refugee society due to the mental and physical ghettoization and increasing tension created by discriminatory discourses in addition to the desire to protect the family and the girls and women who are the honor of their family have increased social pressure on refugee women and reinforced their invisibility in the public sphere.

In short, when I consider all the factors that contribute to the social exclusion of refugee women, it becomes apparent that the transformation of discourses on refugees plays a major role. This transformation process caused by Turkey's migration policy is one of the most satisfying aspects of *what factor(s) affect(s) the social exclusion of the Syrian female refugees most?* Because the stages of transformation hosted terms such as "misafir", "muhacir", "temporary refugee", "unwanted guest", "burden", "a threat stationed on European borders", "a threat to Turkey's economic growth, social order and security," but never the term "refugee" per se. Turkey's steady inconsistencies regarding migration policy helped this transformation gain acceleration. During the first years of migration, political actors created a framework with historical and religious discourses. Reminding the host country, the responsibilities of being an "ensar", they also expressed refugees they identified as "muhacir" the idea that they were honoured to be in a position of being an "ensar".

In fact, AKP's bi-directional approach regarding Syrian refugees was not reserved only for local – refugee communities, but also for internal and foreign politics. Speaking of foreign politics, the terms "Muslim brother", "muhacir" and "misafir", used in internal affairs, were transforming into "refugee" and these people were increasingly instrumentalized as a matter of negotiation for their foreign politics with Europe. AKP highlights the language of security regarding internal affairs towards refugees; however, remains loyal to a political agenda relying on security framework in its operations. Securitization within the context of a national threat was helping AKP cover up its structural and political problems directed towards the refugee issue.

Turkey's migration policy resulted in numerous frameworks to emerge. As the refugee issue became the most discussed topic in media, social media and everyday lives of masses, discourses regarding refugees got diversified into political, social and financial

categories. Sub-categories within these three categories can be further named as historical, religious, cultural and pragmatic discourses. The main context of these divisions was formed to aid in the construction of superior-inferior and giver-taker dynamics between the locals and refugee societies. We can also see that these categories, forming social dynamics between the aforementioned social groups, became dominant periodically either as isolated or as a group, even altogether at times. Their common point, though, was always the aim to serve the political benefits of the host society, or 'us'. These created frameworks have two-sides of the political benefits: on the one hand a tool of criticism against the ruling party for the opposition parties – on the other a tool of political manoeuvre for the ruling party. The first side, with a special focus on national threat and burden discourses, is the main body of the answer to the question: *in what ways is the Syrian refugee issue used as a discourse to criticize the ruling party?* The guest framework was used to rip legal refugee rights off from refugees; the refugee framework itself was used to cite refugees as the source behind worsening financial strength, resulting in social exclusion; refugee women framework was used to hint at threats to the social unity of family; and, finally, the national threat framework, the most extensive amongst hitherto mentioned, was pragmatically used to marginalize refugees. All these created frameworks with the help of the discriminatory discourses provide a better understanding of the general objective of this thesis, *to understand how the discriminatory discourses caused the social exclusion of Syrian female refugees are shaped and (re)produced in the host society and what the discriminatory discourses are affected from and what kind of an impact they have.*

As a final word, in the same manner I started with the thesis, I would like to conclude by quoting what one of the silenced women refugees who have the biggest share in this work said and give the last word to them.

“We had problems in Syria. Because we were women, we had a heavy weight on our shoulders. But we were not refugees... we were not excluded like this every day... we did not feel this worthless. Now I just want to forget the bad memories in Syria and not be excluded here. But every problem I have here reminds me of those days that I try to forget because the cause of all these problems is the war that left me without a home” (Sevgi, married, in communication with locals, under 30, Syrian).

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR SYRIAN FEMALE REFUGEES (English)

Introduction by Facilitator

Selamun Aleykum – Hello, my name is Onur Yamaner. Thank you for your time and contribution to my research. This interview is a part of my doctoral thesis which will be submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the department of Sociology at University of Valencia.

During this interview, I will ask some questions about social exclusion (if there is), discourses used by the locals` discourses (affirmative and negative) and integration programs that have been carried out.

If accepted, this interview will be recorded in order to capture all your ideas in detail. If there is an objection, I will be taking notes. In both ways your name and comments will remain confidential.

Introductory questions

- 1- How/when did you decide to come to Turkey?
- 2- Before immigrating to Turkey, how did you imagine Turkey and your life in Turkey?
- 3- How did local people behave when you first came to Turkey?
- 4- Have you migrated to Turkey alone or with your family?
- 5- How many of your family members are there in Turkey?
- 6- Is there any change in locals' behaviors towards you? If yes, what are the possible reasons for that change?
- 7- Has religion been a factor in your decision to come to Turkey?

Questions about social exclusion and discourses

- 1- How are you influenced by the news in mainstream media and social media?
- 2- What do you think about Facebook posts related to Syrian female refugees?
- 3- Have you ever felt yourself excluded from the society or disengaged from daily life? If so, can you give some examples from your daily life?
- 4- How aware are you of the discourses about the refugees in newspapers and social media platforms such as Facebook?
- 5- What is the most powerful discourse used by local women?
- 6- There are some criticisms related to the fertility rates of Syrian female refugees. How do you regard these criticisms?
- 7- What are your comments on these discourses related to make up, fertility rates and motherhood?

- 8- Syrian refugees are called as our guests / Syrian Muslim Brothers and so on. What is the purpose of using these words (terms) instead of calling you directly refugee?
- 9- How much pressure do these discourses put on you?
- 10- Did you (have to) give up any of your habits because of the discourses (or critics) that you are exposed to?
- 11- Does your Muslim and Arab identity have any negative or positive impact on the discourses made by the locals?

Questions about the marriages

- 1- What do you think about a Syrian woman marrying a local man?
- 2- How do religious marriages affect the relation between spouses?
- 3- Can it be thought that these marriages are seen as a sort of protection and salvation?
- 4- Especially in the cities near the Turkish border, marrying a Syrian woman becomes a common practice. This high demand for Syrian female refugees encourages the human traffickers in the region. Under these circumstances, how have religious marriages been perceived from the point of view of Syrian families and women?

Questions about the integration programs and process

- 1- What type of social (integration) programs have been done so far?
- 2- Have you participated in any of these integration programs?
- 3- What type of projects and charity works do non-governmental organizations carry out?
- 4- How do you get in touch with the non-governmental organizations which work for the refugees? Or how do they reach you?
- 5- Do you want to add any comment?

*Thank you very much for your participation. The results of the research will not reveal your identity or any information related to you and your replies will only be used for academic research purposes.

** Katılımınız için çok teşekkür ederim. Araştırmanın sonuçları adınızı ve / veya sizinle ilgili herhangi bir bilgiyi açığa çıkartmayacaktır ve yanıtlarınız yalnızca akademik araştırma amaçlı kullanılacaktır.

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR SYRIAN FEMALE REFUGEES (Arabic)

اسئلة المقدمة:

- ١- متى و كيف قررت ان تأتي الى تركيا؟
- ٢- قبل الهجرة الى تركيا, كيف كنت تتخيل تركيا و الحياة بتركيا؟
- ٣- كيف عاملك المحليين عند وصولك الى تركيا ؟
- ٤- هل هاجرت الى تركيا وحدك ام مع عائلتك ؟
- ٥- كم فرد من عائلتك متواجد في تركيا؟
- ٦- هل هناك اي تغيير بتعامل الاثراك معك ؟ اذا كان جوابك نعم, ما هي اسباب هذا التغيير؟
- ٧- هل لعب العامل الديني دورا بقرارك بالقدوم الى تركيا ؟

الاسئلة حول الاقصاء الاجتماعي و الانتقادات:

- ١- كيف تتأثر بالاخبار في التلفاز او شبكات التواصل الاجتماعي ؟
- ٢- ما رأيك بالمنشورات التي يتم نشرها على شبكة التواصل الاجتماعي الفيس بوك المتعلقة باللاجئات السوريات ؟
- ٣- هل شعرت بالاقصاء الاجتماعي او عدم الانخراط بالمجتمع في حياتك اليومية ؟ اذا كان جوابك نعم, هل يمكنك اعطائنا بعض الامثلة ؟
- ٤- هل انت على علم بالخطابات التي يتم نشرها على الاعلام كشبكة التواصل الاجتماعي الفيس بوك ؟
- ٥- ما هو اقوى انتقاد مستخدم من قبل المرأة المحلية لكم ؟
- ٦- هناك بعض الانتقادات عن معدلات الخصوبة عند اللاجئات السورية. كيف تنظر الى ذلك الانتقاص ؟
- ٧- كيف تعلق على الانتقادات المتعلقة بموضوع الماكياج و معدلات الخصوبة و الامومة ؟
- ٨- يدعى الاجئين السوريين بالضيوف و الاخوي المسلمين الى اخره.... ما هو الهدف من استخدام هذه المصطلحات بدلا من ان يدعوهم بالاجئين السوريين ؟
- ٩- ما هي كمية الضغط الذي تضعه على عاتقك مثل هذه الانتقادات ؟
- ١٠- هل توقفت او اضرت لان تتوقف عن القيام باي من عاداتك بسبب هذا النقد الذي تتعرض له؟
- ١١- هل هويتك كمسلم عربي لها اي تأثير سلبي او ايجابي على النقد الذي تتعرض اليه من قبل السكان المحليين ؟

اسئلة عن الزواج:

- ١- ما رأيك بزواج المرأة السورية من الشباب المحليين ؟
- ٢- ما هي تأثيرات الزواج الديني هلى العلاقة بين الزوجين ؟
- ٣- هل يمكننا ان نعتبر هذا النوع من الزواج هو حماية او استعباد ؟
- ٤- الزواج بامرأة سورية هو امر شائع و خصوصا على الحدود التركية السورية بسبب العادات المشتركة. الطلب المرتفع على المرأة السورية يشجع علالتجارة الغير قانونية بالناس في المنطقة. تحت مثل هذه الظروف, كيف يتم النظر الى الزواج الديني من وجهة نظر المرأة السورية و المرأة بشكل عام ؟

اسئلة عن برامج و عملية الاندماج:

- ١- ما هي البرامج الاجتماعية (الاندماجية) التي اتممت الى الان ؟
- ٢- هل شاركت في مثل هذه البرامج ؟
- ٣- ما هي المشاريع و الاعمال الخيرية التي اقيمت من قبل مؤسسات غير حكومية ؟
- ٤- كيف يتم الوصول الى المؤسسات الغير حكومية التي تعمل لمساعدة الاجئين ؟ و كيف يصلون اليك

APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR LOCALS (English)

Introductory questions

- 1- Is there any Syrian female refugee who you are friends with or in communication with?
- 2- How do you see the migration process?

Questions about social exclusion and discourses

- 1- What was the Arab image in your mind before and what is it now?
- 2- Do you think that Syrian female refugees are socially excluded? If yes, in what ways are they excluded?
- 3- What kind of Syrian refugee images do you see on TV, social media (Facebook) and newspapers?
- 4- How does the language used in the media influence your perception of the refugees?
- 5- Does putting on burqa make Syrian female refugees invisible in the society? If so, How?

Questions about the marriages

- 1- Have you ever heard of a Turkish man marrying a Syrian woman officially? If yes, what is the motivation for the marriage?
- 2- How do you see Imam Marriages between Turkish men and Syrian female refugees?
- 3- What factor (economic, social rights, safety) is more important in Imam Marriages? (For both sides)

Questions related to politics

- 1- The politicians of the governing party often use particular references such as *Ensar* and *Muhacir* from the history of Islam. How do you see this situation? / What is your comment on this situation?
- 2- How is the refugee issue criticized by the opposition parties?
- 3- How does political view of a person influence his or her criticism of Syrian (female) refugees?
- 4- What role does the refugee issue play in politics?

APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR LOCALS (Turkish)

Girizgah soruları

- 1- Suriyeli kadın mülteci arkadaşınız veya iletişim kurduğunuz birisi var mı?
- 2- Göç sürecini nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

Sosyal dışlanma ve söylemlerle ilgili sorular

- 1- Zihninizdeki Arap imajı önceden nasıldı? Şimdi nasıl?
- 2- Sizce Suriyeli kadın mülteciler dışlanıyor mu? Eğer evet ise, ne şekilde dışlanıyorlar?
- 3- Televizyonda, sosyal medyada ve gazetelerde ne tür bir Suriyeli mülteci imajı görüyorsunuz?
- 4- Medyada kullanılan dil mülteci algınızı nasıl etkiliyor?
- 5- Suriyeli mülteci kadınların türban takmaları onları görünmez hale getirir mi? Eğer öyleyse nasıl?

Evlilikle ilgili sorular

- 1- Suriyeli bir kadınla Türk erkeğin resmi nikâh ile evlendiğini hiç duydunuz mu? Eğer evet ise, bunun evlilikteki motivasyonu nedir?
- 2- Suriyeli kadın mültecilerle Türk erkekleri arasında kıyılan imam nikâhları hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
- 3- İmam nikâhlarında en önemli etken/sebebe nedir? (Her iki taraf açısından da)

Politika ile ilgili sorular

- 1- İktidar partisindeki siyasilerin sık sık *Ensar* ve *Muhacir* gibi İslam tarihinde yaşanan göç olayına belirli göndermeler yapmaktadırlar. Bu konuyu nasıl görüyorsunuz/ yorumluyorsunuz?
- 2- Mülteci sorunu muhalefet partilerince nasıl eleştirilmektedir?
- 3- Bir kişinin politik görüşünün Suriyeli (kadın) mültecileri eleştirmesindeki etkisi nedir?
- 4- Mülteci krizinin politikadaki rolü nedir?

APPENDIX E: SAMPLE INTERVIEW 1 (Syrian Female Refugees)

How did Turkish people treat you when you first came to Turkey? Is there any change in Turks' behaviors towards you? If yes, what are the possible reasons for?

Answer

They (Turkish people) helped us a lot when we came first. We really appreciate everything they did for us. We did not have anything. My husband's brother was here. We stayed 5 days in his house and then we found this house. We rented the house but it was empty. There was nothing at all. People gave some furniture, goods. The teacher of the Quran course where I work moved out. And she left all her things for me. However, I was embarrassed to have all for myself. I gave the new refrigerator to another Syrian and the seating group to my sister.

Yes, Turks changed their attitudes. At first, I felt this change in 2014. Indeed, most of Syrians would say the same thing to you. When the number of Syrians increased, their behaviours changed. I can understand. This is their country. I also know that we are guests here and Turks were very friendly hosts in the beginning. I understand it all. Turks should know that we are not trying to take hold of their lands. We only want to survive. We always hear some things like that. How can we manage that even if we really aim at that? Why do we want this? I am really afraid of this dramatic change of attitude towards us (Syrian female refugee, from Aleppo, married, in communication with the locals, over 30, 16.07.2017).

There are some criticisms related to the fertility rates of Syrian female refugees. How do you regard these criticisms?

Answer A

Men would tell you many reasons for having too many children. All of them are religious reasons. But it is not true. If everything were according to religious rule, they would not get married without the permission of their first wives. I do not think they need this permission now. Most of Syrian men want to marry once again when they get bored (sexually). Their wives have already had 6 – 7 – 8 or more children. And they think that their women are not desirable anymore. Here in this neighborhood, a man has two wives, the first wife is 50 and the second is 30, and he now wants to marry a 20 or 25 year-old girl (Syrian female refugee, married, over 30, 03.11.2017).

Have you ever felt yourself excluded from the society or disengaged from daily life? If so, can you give some examples from your daily life?

I had only bread. My neighbor (Turkish) needed bread too. It was the evening. At nights, it was dangerous to be out. Even though I knew that I was going to be hungry next morning, I cut my bread into two and gave her. But she said ‘No, I don’t want’. Why are they treating us like that? We are not dirty. Only our home is in a bad condition (Syrian female refugee, married, in communication with the locals, over 30, 21.10. 2017).

Does your Muslim and Arab identity have any negative or positive impact on the discourses made by Turks?

They (Turks) don’t want us here. It is very clear for me. I can give you too many examples. They see us as gypsies. I hate the way they stare at us. They always say ‘you are very comfortable and our government takes good care of you’. I wouldn’t claim

that all Turks do the same but I definitely say that even the ones who have utmost sympathy for us, have at least once thought when we would return to our country (Syrian female refugee, married, no communication with the locals, over 30, 10.12.2017).

What do you think about a Syrian woman marrying a Turkish man? Can it be thought that these marriages are seen as a sort of protection and solution?

Answer A

There is nothing wrong with marrying a Turkish man. My husband is Turkish too. But marrying someone who has a different culture causes some problems. Expectations of the Syrians and the Turkish from their wives are totally different. For example, in Syria husbands give some pocket money to their wives for personal needs on Fridays. Because of these types of differences, I don't know how to behave.

We prefer to marry Turks not to be harmed and to live a safe live. On the other hand, Imam Nikah (Religious Marriage – Imam Marriage) makes me feel insecure. Men are abusing this situation. Mostly, Turkish men marry Syrian women and after a while when they get bored, they leave them (Syrian female refugee, married, in communication with the locals, under 30, 21.12.2017).

Answer B

I think, marrying a Turkish man is something positive. Even I want my little girl to marry a Turk. I think thanks to these marriages, two sides will know each other better. Those who have lost their husbands are somehow obliged to marry due to protection and security reasons, there is no better solution for them (Syrian female refugee, married, in communication with the locals over 30, 24.12.2017).

APPENDIX F: SAMPLE INTERVIEW 2 (Locals)

The politicians of the ruling party often use particular references such as Ensar and Muhacir from the history of Islam. How do you see this situation? / What is your comment on this situation?

Answer A

Ensar and Muhacir discourse is a very political discourse though it seems a religious one. Because if you recognize a person as a refugee, you have to give her/his rights. They are afraid of giving their rights. Temporary asylum seeker sounds to me like Ensar and Muhacir. In this relation, (Ensar – Muhacir) there is conscience. It is limited or up to what your conscience gives away. It maintains a culture of helping and religious hegemony. So, people have tried to act according to what Islam dictates and what the doctrine is. Actually, what they are telling us here is that they do not produce a permanent solution for them (the refugees). We left this to the people's conscience. We are not working on this topic. They really know that their policy is wrong. Something is missing. The discourse which is used is built on not to give their rights. Shelter must be provided for everyone. But when Ensar – Muhacir relation comes into play, this discourse relieves the politicians of their obligations. Making them our guests seems really positive but it is in fact not so because in our culture, a guest can not have what s/he expects but has to make do with what s/he finds. This means they will not introduce policies, produce realistic solutions. You... public... as long as you can, do whatever you can do.. Help each other. Instead of offering equal health care to everyone, it is easier to give the refugees coal, apple, oranges, blankets... Building a culture of helping each other and empathizing... Pretending to be doing something or producing solutions. We opened our doors to the refugees. Nobody accepts them but us. But if we were really a

good Ensar for them, why would we use refugees to threaten Europe and play the refugee card against Europe anytime we need it? I also do not disagree with the policy Europe (giving money Turkey to keep them in Turkey) follows. Ensar – muhacir equals temporary asylum seeker so, as I said your guest cannot demand more than you give them. Religious references are just a cover up not to produce real solutions (Local, single, in communication with the female refugees, under 30, 24.10.2017).

Answer B

They are used to escape criticisms on Syrian refugees. Yes, it is a political discourse. They say this or that... I don't mind. I only care about this question; could we manage to be Ensar for Syrian refugees. No. We couldn't be Ensar. I always say this to my students (she is teaching Quran) if we had been Ensar at the time of the prophet and he came to Medina, we wouldn't have chased him up with our slippers. This is our current manner. They say they would not. I say you would, just like you do it today (Local, married, in communication with the female refugees, over 30, 27.08. 2017).

Does putting on burqa make Syrian female refugees invisible in the society?

We simply like to label people. Now burqa helps us. If someone is wearing burqa she is Syrian. Indeed, there are Turkish women who wear it, and they are disadvantaged. For many years, they have been called as foggy and cockroach. But now it is very clear and used for Syrians. Syrians... They do not understand anything... Dirty... Bad. Burqa creates an image of Syrian Woman which is something to keep the distance with. Totally something negative, something nasty. Normally Syrian women are not that conservative and wear burqa in Aleppo, and Damascus. But in Turkey, they wear it. They feel like they have to because their husbands think that their wives will be exposed to more rape or sexual harassment by Turks when they do not wear burqa. When they do not wear it, their husbands get angry at them. Women who do not wear burqa in their own country wear burqa here. Because of this pressure, they do. They do not think that it is protecting them, but their husbands think that way and persuade or force those women (Local, single, in communication with the female refugees, under 30, 24.10. 2017).

What factor is more important in Imam Marriages? (For both sides) + How do you see Imam Marriages between Turkish men and Syrian female refugees?

Answer A

A few couples who really love each other got married officially. I want to keep these cases out. For women, they know that they will get an official paper to stay here if they marry a Turkish man. They can be more open (here the point is burqa). Better conditions. Feel more sheltered. Because she would be married to someone who knows the language, culture and everything and can protect her.

For men, I heard so many incidents. But two cases I witnessed myself. A man officially married to Turkish woman marries a Syrian woman by Imam Nikahı but the Syrian woman does not know that he is already married. Generally, after a Syrian woman gives birth, the truth is revealed because the baby must be registered. They act as if they had a home birth and showed the baby as the child of husband's official partner. As for the other case I witnessed; they do not have children.

Men prefer Syrian women because they find them deceivable. They do not have too many demands before they marry. Briefly, they are easy meat. Let's take advantage of her...(Here She meant sexual harassment) They already agree to be the second wife. When a man has a child from her, he can take his child from her very easily (Local, single, in communication with the refugees, under 30, 25.10. 2017).

Answer B

*They accept to be the second wife. Why does not a Syrian woman accept Imam Nikahı? It is too normal for me because a man can marry to 4 women in their country. We have İmam Nikahı in Turkey as well. But here we first marry officially and then have İmam Nikahı if we want to. And many women do not do this. We **never** accept to be the second wife. I find these type marriages illegal. If they want to help them, they can just help them. No need to marry her. My neighbor is a Syrian. She is married. Her husband is at the same age as her father and he is married to a Turkish woman. Almost every day he comes and stays for a couple hours and then leaves. I do not think that his first wife knows anything about that thing. I cannot blame my neighbor.*

My Turkish neighbors come and ask to me whether I know any Syrian woman or not as I know Arabic and visit them. Some people really want their sons to marry Syrians. Economy is so important. They do not have enough money to spend on a well-organized wedding. They think Syrians are religious, we share the same belief and our culture is not too different. I support these. But others are only a cover up for sexual desire and exploitation of women (Local, married, in communication with the refugees, over 30, 28.06. 2017).

Do you think that Syrian female refugees are socially excluded? If yes, in what ways are they excluded? + How does political view of a person influence his or her criticism of Syrian (female) refugees?

Answer A

Yes, nearly always. Make them (Syrian Women) sterilized!!! Mentioned so many times. I am really surprised how easily they talk about people. Even the most merciful one I have ever met said “I feel very sorry about these children selling tissues outside. If there is a woman who wants her fallopian tubes “tied”, I can do it without her husband’s permission.” It was a Professor. Nothing can make me surprised if a Professor can say such a thing.

It definitely affects. Let me give you an example from hospitals. I went to a hospital with a Syrian woman who was 41 weeks pregnant. Despite her emergency, they had us wait in a line. I talked to the doctor and told her I was working in women’s health center. I showed my ID. The first sentence of her before asking me what happened to this woman was “we spend millions of dollars for them and I think we should not give health service and they should return to their own country.”

In another hospital, a teacher told me that they should be sterilized. I said ‘you are a fascist then, if you think like this. And he said yes, he was a fascist when the subject is Syrian refugees. I repeated he is a fascist. He said they should not demand much from the country where they come as guests (Local, single, in communication with the refugees under 30, 24.10. 2017).

Answer B

I suppose yes. Social media is an example. In Önder I do not think they are socially excluded because they are the majority here. They have everything they need. Market, restaurant, shops and everything. They even have their pirate taxi (unlicensed taxi).

One hundred percent. People criticize them according to their ideology. There is nothing wrong with it (Local, married, over 30, 14.12. 2017).

APPENDIX G: FIGURE 7 – THE PROTEST OF THE WOMEN CENTER IN ULUBEY – ANKARA (WhatsApp Voice Message in Arabic)

لام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته أسعد الله مسانكم بكل خير . شباب يعني كنت بتمنى ما احكي بس والله ما غضرت يعدي لازم احكي. هاد واجب علي انو احكيواجب علي انو نيهكن لانو ازا ما نبعنكن و ازا ما حذرتكن بكون عم خون ضميري و بكون عم خون تفتكن الي حطتوها فيي. شوفو هالصورة هي و مثلا كتير صور. قد تكون زوجتك بين اد دا الحاضرات قد تكون زوجتي اختي هاد مركز عم يعطي دورات تثقيفية للمرأة. طبعا هي النتيجة. بالبداية شو بيقل ك بدكرتونة ؟ تمام بنعطيك كرتونة بس بتروحي بتحضري دورة تثقيفية. كان يحضروهن هوني بالاولو بيبي صا رو ياخودهن على غير مكان لانو العدد صاركتير. صار الاقبال كبير بسبب قد يكون الكرتونة و قد يكون الكرتونة ا لي عم يطمعوهن فيها. يا شباب الله يكرمك و يحفظك و يخليك و يستر اعراضك. يجوز انت عم تروح عشلك و ما عم تعرف زوجتك انو راحت او ما راحت. او يجوز احدا الحالات تروح مرتك تتورط و تروح و ما تعرف شو الموضوعشو الترتيب. عم تروح عهي المراكز هي مراكز افساد للمجتمع. افساد لمخ هالمرة الي عم تروح تاخذ محا ضرة. الله يكرمك يا شباب حافظو على نسوانك. يعني الي فينا مكفينا. يعني تشريد و دمار و خراب و لجوء و اخر شي ما تركونا في حالنا. لحقونا على افكارنا. راحو صارو يحرضو الزوجة عالزوج. حالاتالطلاق الي عم تصير ه ون بهالمجتمع. لك يا جماعة والله ما سمعك شو عم يجيني عالخاص لتبكو. حالات الطلاق الي عم تصير من ورا ه المواضيع هي. انابحلي عند زوجي كزا و هي حرية و انا بروح بشتكي عزوجي و انا... يا الله دخيلك ليش هيك صار فينا ليش هيك عم يصير فينا؟ يا جماعة الله يكرمك حافظو على نسوانك. خيو الي بدو ياخود معوني يحط في ب الو انو والله في خراب بيت من ورا هالمعونة في خراب بيون من ورا هالكرتونة. رجاء ثم رجاء ثم رجاءتنتبهو لعيلا تكن تنتبهو لبيوتكن تنتبهو لولادكن. يا اخواني والله افساد للمجتمع هي. افساد للدين افساد للمجتمع. غسيل دماغ عم يد صير. غسيل دماغ للنساء الاخوات. ما بيجوز هالامر هاد. عم تعرف و بين مرتك عم تروح اعريف و بين مرتك عم تر وح. و اعريف و بين رايحة. و اعريف و بين عم تسجل و ليش عم تاخذكرتونة. انا والله كنت باتمنى ما احكي بس المو ضوع بلغ السيل الذبي. الموضوع زاد عن حدو كتير كتير كثير. انا عكل حال يا اخواني بادعو كل انسان شريف. و هاد صوتي يوصل لكل الدنيا. انا ابو حذيفة بادعو كل انسان شريف الي مقفة احتجاجية شريفة اما م هالمركز هادا. هاد المركز لمينتابع ما بعرف. وقفة احتجاجية الشيء الي عم يساوي هالمركز هادا غسيل لدماغ ن سوانا. نحنا ديننا مو هيك عادتنا مو هيك تقاليدنا مو هيك. نحنا مجتمع قائمبحد ذاتو. الي عم يصير افساد للمجتمع. ا فساد للمرأة مشان شو مشان كرتونة. لك بعنا وطننا و لحقنا الكرتونة؟ لك بعنا شرفنا و عرضنا و الحقنا الكرتونة؟ ه ليجوز هادا يا اخواني ؟ عكل حال انا بادعو لوقفه احتجاجية اما يوم الثلاثاء او يوم الاربعاء ان شاء الله امام المركز هاد. عكل حال انا بحدلكن ايمتى. ايمتموعد الاحتجاج اما هالمركز. بدنا اعتصام صامت. الي بيحب يشارك يباتعد ي رح نعلن عن هاد الموضوع اما الثلاثاء او الاربعاء. الله يبارك فيكن و يحفظك ويسلمك و السلام عليكم.

***This voice message was transcribed by Muhammed Ballan (17.01.2018).

APPENDIX H: THE NEWS RELATED TO “CHILD PREGNANCIES”
(Original Language – Turkish)

“Türkiye'yi sarsacak utanç listesi” Dinçer Gökçe - İstanbul

Date	Clinic Name	Birth Date
27.01.2017	GEBE POLİKLİNİĞİ 2	16 08.04.2000
27.01.2017	GEBE POLİKLİNİĞİ 2	16 05.08.2000
07.02.2017	JINEKOLOJİ POLİKLİNİĞİ 6	17 11.07.1999
07.02.2017	GEBE POLİKLİNİĞİ 5	16 01.01.2000
07.02.2017	JINEKOLOJİ POLİKLİNİĞİ 1	15 01.01.2000
08.02.2017	ACIL KADIN DOĞUM 1	16 01.01.2000
08.02.2017	ACIL KADIN DOĞUM 2	13 01.12.2002
08.02.2017	GEBE POLİKLİNİĞİ 1	16 01.11.1999
09.02.2017	ACIL KADIN DOĞUM 2	16 13.08.2000
10.02.2017	ACIL KADIN DOĞUM 2	16 18.04.2000
10.02.2017	ACIL KADIN DOĞUM 2	16 22.01.2000
10.02.2017	ACIL KADIN DOĞUM 2	16 01.11.1999
10.02.2017	ACIL KADIN DOĞUM 2	16 25.10.1999
10.02.2017	JINEKOLOJİ POLİKLİNİĞİ 2	17 21.06.1999
12.02.2017	ACIL KADIN DOĞUM 2	16 05.08.2000
13.02.2017	ACIL KADIN DOĞUM 2	15 19.05.2001
13.02.2017	GEBE POLİKLİNİĞİ 2	16 01.06.2000
15.02.2017	ACIL KADIN DOĞUM 2	16 01.02.2000
15.02.2017	GEBE POLİKLİNİĞİ 3	14 01.01.2002
16.02.2017	GEBE POLİKLİNİĞİ 1	16 05.12.1999
17.02.2017	ACIL KADIN DOĞUM 2	16 02.09.1999
17.02.2017	JINEKOLOJİ POLİKLİNİĞİ 3	14 01.01.2002
19.02.2017	ACIL KADIN DOĞUM 2	17 20.10.1999
19.02.2017	ACIL KADIN DOĞUM 2	15 17.03.2002
20.02.2017	ACIL KADIN DOĞUM 2	17 06.06.1999
20.02.2017	GEBE POLİKLİNİĞİ 2	13 05.01.2003
20.02.2017	GEBE POLİKLİNİĞİ 3	
04.05.2017	ACIL KADIN DOĞUM 2	
05.05.2017	ACIL KADIN DOĞUM 2	
08.05.2017	GEBE POLİKLİNİĞİ 3	

İSTANBUL Küçükçekmece'deki Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Eğitim ve Araştırma Hastanesi'ne 5 aylık süreçte gelen, yaşları 18'in altında 39'u Suriyeli 115 çocuğun hamile olduğu saptandı. Bu kayıtların 'zorunlu' olmasına karşın polise bildirilmediğini saptayıp hazırladığı tutanakla durumu savcılığa bildiren hastane görevlisi hakkında inceleme başlatıldı ve görev yeri iki kez değiştirildi. Hastanenin üst düzey bir yetkilisi, hurriyet.com.tr'nin sorusu üzerine, konu ile ilgili bir ihmal olmadığını bilgisini aldığını, ancak raporunu görmediğini söyledi.

5 AY İÇİNDE 115 HAMİLE ÇOCUK

Ş.İ.N., daha sonra hastaneye 1 Ocak 2017- 9 Mayıs 2017 tarihleri arasında gelen 115 çocuğa ilişkin kayıtlar tek-tek inceledi. Kayıtlara göre, hamile oldukları tespit edilen 115 çocuktan 77'sinin 15 yaşın üstünde, 38 çocuğun 15 yaşından önce hamile kaldıkları anlaşıldı. 15 yaşın altındaki hamileliklerde rıza aranmaksızın çocuğun cinsel istismarı kapsamında olduğu belirtilen 12 Haziran 2017 tarihli tutanak Sosyal Hizmet Uzmanı Ş.İ.N. ve Psikolog I.Ö. tarafından imza altına alındı.

CUMHURİYET SAVCILILIĞINA BİLDİRDİ

Tutanakta, yasal sorumluluğun bildirimini yapmayan Sosyal Hizmet Uzmanı N.D.'ye ait olduğu öne sürüldü. Durumu hastane yönetimine ileten Ş.İ.N, bir işlem yapılmaması üzerine Küçükçekmece Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığı'na ihbarda bulundu ve 1 yıla kadar hapsi gerektiren, 15 yaşından küçük olması halinde cezanın yarı oranında artırıldığı 'kamu görevlisinin suçu bildirmemesi' suçunun işlendiğini öne sürdü.

VALİLİK SORUŞTURMA İZİNİ VERMEDİ

Savcılığın talebiyle, sorumlu başhekim yardımcısı Dr. A. A. ve Sosyal Hizmet Uzmanı N.D. için soruşturma izni istendi. İstanbul Valiliği, 4 Aralık 2017 tarihli yazısıyla iki görevli hakkında soruşturma izni vermedi. Valilik yazısında, adli görevin ihmal edilmediği, görevi kötüye kullanma suçunun oluşmadığı kaydedildi..

İHMALİ SAVCILAR ARAŞTIRIR

Valiliğin kararının iptali için İstanbul Bölge İdare Mahkemesi'ne itiraz başvurusu yapıldı. Avukat Erkan Akça'nın imzasını taşıyan 2 Ocak tarihli başvuruda, çocuk istismarına yönelik vakaların mutlaka adli makamlara bildirilmesinin zorunlu olduğu kaydedildi. Başvuruda "Bu ihmalin varlığını araştırması gereken kurum cumhuriyet başsavcılıkları iken, valilik makamınca soruşturma izni verilmemesi hukuka aykırılık teşkil etmekte. Asıl sorumluların araştırılmasına engel teşkil etmektedir" denildi.

2003 DOĞUMLU ÇOCUK BİLE VAR

115 hamile çocuğa ilişkin kayıt listesine göre 2003 doğumlu iki çocuk da listede bulunuyor. Listede yer alan çocuklardan 11'inin 2002 doğumlu oldukları anlaşıldı. Listede, doğum tarihinden hastaneye geliş tarihine dek bir dizi bilginin yer aldığı listede yer alan çocuklardan 39'u, Suriye'deki savaş nedeniyle Türkiye'ye göç eden ailelerin çocukları. Konuyu savcılığa bildiren Ş.İ.N. hakkında inceleme başlatıldı ve görev yeri iki kez değiştirildi.

İHMAL YOK BİLGİSİNİ ALDIM

Hastanenin üst düzey bir yetkilisi, soruşturma sonunda, 'ihmal' iddiasının olmadığına ilişkin rapor çıktığını söyledi. Raporun kendisine sunulmadığını ancak sözlü olarak bilgi aldığını aktaran yetkili, "İhbarın yalan olduğu konusunda belgeler de var kanıtlar da var. İdari soruşturmayı yapan da gördü, bunlar (bildirimler) yapılmış. Raporun sonucu bize gelmedi, görmedim" diye konuştu.

BAKANLIK: DERHAL BİLDİRİN

Sağlık Bakanlığı'nın 2012'de tüm illere gönderilen "Kadına Yönelik Şiddet, Adolesan Gebeliği ve Doğum Vakaları" konulu yazısında şu ifadeler yer alıyor: "Adolesan gebeliği (çocuk gebeliği), doğum vakaları ve çocuk ihmali, istismar vakalarının tamamının olayın geçtiği yerde bulunan İl/İlçe Emniyet Müdürlüğü Çocuk Büro Amirliği'ne bildirilmesi, çocuğun örselenmesini önlemek amacıyla adli sürecin sağlık kuruluşunda bulunduğu zaman zarfı içinde izlenmesi..."

BİLDİRİLMEMESİ AĞIR BİR SUÇ

İstanbul Barosu'na üye avukat Tuba Torun yaptığı değerlendirmede şunları söyledi: "Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu'nun verilerine göre, 2017 yılında 387 çocuk istismara uğradı. Bu rakam, acı vakaların yalnızca haberleşen kısmı... Bu hastanede olduğu iddia edilen olay da bunun kanıtıdır. Bir hastanede 115 çocuğun gebeliği hukuka aykırı ve suç teşkil eder şekilde gizli tutulmuş ve gerekli mercilere bildirilmemişse, diğer hastanelerle birlikte düşünüldüğünde ülkedeki çocuk hak ihlallerinin dehşet verici bir boyuta ulaşmış olduğu şüphesizdir.

Çocuk gebeliğinin bir yasal zorunluluk olarak ilgili kurumlara bildirilmemesi, açıkça çocuk istismarının üzerini örtmek ve suça ortak olmak anlamına gelir. Sorumluların en ağır şekilde cezalandırılması gerekirken, suçu bildiren kişi hakkında inceleme başlatılması ve görev yerinin değiştirilmesi dikkat çekici."

<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/turkiyeyi-sarsacak-utanc-listesi-40712654>

**APPENDIX I: THE NEWS RELATED TO “CHILD PREGNANCIES”
(English Translation)**

“115 underage pregnant girls treated in Istanbul hospital not notified to authorities” Dinçer Gökçe – ISTANBUL

“An Istanbul hospital that treated 115 pregnant underage girls, including 39 Syrian nationals, between Jan. 1 and May 9 last year, failed to notify the authorities, which is a legal requirement for treating pregnant girls younger than 18 years-old.

The situation came to light when a hospital social worker and psychologist notified the Küçükçekmece Prosecutor’s Office.

According to records at the Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Training and Research Hospital in the Küçükçekmece district of Istanbul, of the 115 girls, 77 became pregnant between the ages of 15 and 18, while the remaining 38 got pregnant before the age of 15.

According to previous regulations enforced by the Health Ministry, the police should be notified in cases where the pregnant girl is younger than 18, while cases involving children below 15 automatically qualify as “sexual abuse.”

The Küçükçekmece Prosecutor’s Office had demanded an investigation into a doctor and hospital employee implicated in the incident, but the Istanbul Governor’s Office, in a letter dated Dec. 4, 2017, refused permission. The governor’s office said the hospital records showed that the two hospital personnel had not “neglected their duty.”

The lawyer Erkan Akça has made an appeal to the Istanbul Regional Administrative Hospital to nullify the decision made by the Governor’s Office. “The institution that should investigate the neglect of duty is the prosecutor’s office. The refusal of the governor’s office to allow an investigation is against the law,” Akça said in his appeal dated Jan. 2.

Meanwhile, an investigation has been launched into the anonymous hospital social worker who notified the incident to the authorities and who has subsequently been re-assigned to other places of work twice.”

<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/115-underage-pregnant-girls-treated-in-istanbul-hospital-not-notified-to-authorities-125903>

APPENDIX J: MARGINALIZADOS DOS VECES, COMO MUJER Y COMO REFUGIADA: MUJERES REFUGIADAS SIRIAS EN ANKARA

Introducción

Estudios recientes sobre migración en ciencias sociales con perspectivas históricas y sociológicas abordan el género como una de las principales características de las relaciones sociales (Schrover y Moloney, 2013), así como el origen étnico y la clase. Otro punto de vista es la feminización de la migración (Castles, Miller y Haas, 2014) debido al creciente número de mujeres inmigrantes y refugiadas sin vínculos, y el papel económico alterado de las mujeres por el género (Herzog, 2011, p. 611). La feminización de la migración es muy parecida a la migración laboral, ya que también ocurre durante la migración forzada. En este sentido, la vulnerabilidad de las refugiadas alcanza niveles peligrosos. Su vulnerabilidad es variada (Schrover y Moloney, 2013) y diferenciada como estructural y cultural, real y percibida. Este concepto explica que, además de cambiar los roles de género, los hombres también pueden ser pasivos y débiles ya que las mujeres están en procesos de migración. La razón principal de esto es la pérdida de trabajo y estatus. Para ilustrar el problema en el contexto de los sirios, el discurso nacionalista producido por la sociedad de acogida se centrará primero en la debilidad masculina.

Este estudio se centra en un grupo de mujeres refugiadas sirias que viven en Ankara y están socialmente excluidas como “*mujer*” y “*refugiada*”. La atención se centrará en la relación entre los discursos producidos en la sociedad de acogida y la exclusión social de las refugiadas sirias. Cabe señalar que la fuente de los discursos podría diferenciarse en términos de una gran cantidad de factores, como la opinión política, el acervo cultural, la posición socioeconómica, el género, la edad, la pobreza, el nivel educativo, la afiliación religiosa y las experiencias personales, etc. En cuanto a los aspectos de género en la exclusión social de las refugiadas sirias, vemos que incluso las mujeres locales usan el discurso patriarcal para discriminar a las refugiadas. Utilizando los discursos patriarcales mencionados anteriormente, las mujeres locales crean un ambiente de subordinación, el que han estado criticando y que se ha objetivado para los refugiados. Otro alcance del estudio es analizar cuán poderosos son estos discursos en la sociedad de acogida y cómo se ven afectadas las refugiadas sirias y las mujeres locales.

Se pretende establecer una relación de causa y efecto de la exclusión social de las mujeres sirias con respecto al análisis del discurso como crítica social.

Preguntas de investigación

Esta tesis cubre tres conjuntos diferentes de datos, de mujeres refugiadas sirias, de mujeres locales y del discurso de los medios, y 24 entrevistas en profundidad y análisis de los medios. Además, para enriquecer el contenido y adoptar diferentes enfoques, se han realizado varias entrevistas escritas con académicos de diferentes universidades turcas. Las críticas y/o detalles proporcionados en relación con la investigación y los datos obtenidos se han agregado al texto como notas al pie.

Las principales preguntas de investigación y las hipótesis desarrolladas son las siguientes:

Pregunta de investigación 1: ¿Qué factor afecta más a la exclusión social de las refugiadas sirias?

Hipótesis 1: Las refugiadas sirias están socialmente excluidas por el patriarcado público y privado. Ya están subordinadas en la sociedad siria. Además, los rumores, difundidos por las mujeres locales, las hacen más vulnerables y un objetivo para ser explotadas por los hombres.

Pregunta de investigación 2: ¿Cómo reproducen las redes sociales (Facebook) información sobre el tema de los refugiados sirios y cómo construyen los medios de comunicación (los principales medios impresos turcos) justificaciones racionales y sentimentales de discursos discriminatorios?

Hipótesis 2: Las noticias en los medios de comunicación aluden a los refugiados y al tema de los refugiados especialmente cuando están involucrados en el crimen de manera que los medios puedan utilizar algunas expresiones para los refugiados (Dijk, 1999) como contrabandista, asesino, criminal, ladrón e inmigrante ilegal. Hacer declaraciones radicales sobre los refugiados y subyacentes ejemplos negativos impulsan el discurso de odio en la sociedad de acogida. Por lo tanto, los medios con su lenguaje reproducen una percepción negativa de los refugiados sirios. Además, la reproducción de la información

ha sido reprocesada en las redes sociales repetidamente. Los titulares, noticias y artículos engañosos o exagerados (particularmente en plataformas de redes sociales como Facebook) hacen que el discurso de odio contra los refugiados sirios se generalice en la sociedad de acogida. Las plataformas de redes sociales se han convertido en un lugar en el que los racistas construyen una red de interacciones y organizan sus planes de ataque. Estos ataques físicos y verbales tienen consecuencias negativas.

Pregunta de investigación 3: ¿De qué maneras se usa el tema de los refugiados sirios como un discurso para criticar al partido gobernante?

Hipótesis 3: Cuando un refugiado sirio se involucra en un crimen o las ayudas recibidas por los refugiados sirios se informan en las noticias, este tipo de noticias generalmente se utilizan para las críticas y el beneficio político de los partidos de la oposición. El sentido común (idea o juicio común) en la sociedad es que criticar el tema de los refugiados significa criticar al partido gobernante para que aquellos que apoyan al partido gobernante no tiendan a criticar la política sino la presencia de refugiados aunque no apoyen la política aplicada en la cuestión de los refugiados. La crítica difiere según la identidad y/o ideología de quien expresa la crítica. Se puede formar una lista simple para agrupar a las personas que critican (solo y siempre) al partido gobernante, que no lo hacen, que no quieren criticar al partido gobernante ni apoyar su política de refugiados.

Pregunta de investigación 4: ¿Cómo la identidad de los refugiados, ser árabe, desencadena el racismo en la sociedad de acogida?

Hipótesis 4: La identidad árabe y la representación del árabe en todos los aspectos son casi siempre sinónimo de "indeseable", especialmente por parte de los intelectuales de la sociedad turca. Hay varias razones para la formación de este pensamiento. Como ejemplo, la traición árabe en la Primera Guerra Mundial sigue viva en la memoria social turca. Sin embargo, este discurso histórico es solo una de las justificaciones de por qué los turcos prefieren negar la idea de cualquier parecido con los árabes en la perspectiva espacio-temporal (Bora, 2014). Esto se debe a que, según los turcos, el atraso y la intolerancia basada en la religión están correlacionados con el reflejo de los elementos culturales árabes, que se desean borrar de la sociedad turca.

Pregunta de investigación 5: ¿Cómo se convierten las mujeres refugiadas sirias en un problema o una amenaza para las mujeres locales, así como una diana o víctima?

*Hipótesis 5: Al principio, las refugiadas sirias eran *muhacir* y hermanas musulmanas para algunas mujeres locales (especialmente para mujeres religiosas). Los lugareños comenzaron a criticarlas con el aumento de la población siria, el número de matrimonios y la tasa de fertilidad. Algunos argumentos como las historias de fraude matrimonial, las sirias que buscan hombres para casarse, su maquillaje, las acusaciones de ser sucias (desordenadas) y madres descuidadas han dado lugar a un aumento de las críticas más agudas hacia las refugiadas, mientras que otros argumentos como ser violadas y obligadas a prostituirse las convierte en figuras victimizadas a los ojos de las mujeres locales.*

Objetivos

El objetivo general de esta tesis es comprender cómo se forman y (re)producen los discursos discriminatorios que causan la exclusión social de las refugiadas sirias en la sociedad de acogida y por qué se ven afectados los discursos discriminatorios y qué tipo de impacto tienen. Esto incluye los objetivos específicos de identificar la interseccionalidad de la discriminación y la invisibilización de las refugiadas sirias. Uno de los objetivos específicos de la tesis es describir cómo se construyen los discursos discriminatorios que se instrumentalizan en la exclusión de los refugiados en su conjunto y su periferia política, social y económica. Estableceré tres conjuntos diferentes de datos, que son trabajo de campo, redes sociales y análisis de medios escritos. Estos datos permitirán comparar, evaluar y examinar los discursos producidos en múltiples plataformas. En el estudio, se investigarán los discursos de exclusión social de las mujeres refugiadas sirias utilizando métodos del análisis del discurso.

Otro objetivo específico de la tesis es generar un marco conceptual de cómo los discursos discriminatorios están justificados e interrelacionados con los problemas sociales internos y cómo la transformación de los discursos sobre los refugiados sirios influye en las relaciones entre la sociedad de acogida y la de los refugiados. Este objetivo tiene una primera parte en la que se analizará la diseminación de los discursos

y las partes interseccionales de los discursos entre los principales medios de comunicación, las redes sociales y la vida real. Podemos ordenar este estudio del enfoque de las tres vistas diferentes de la siguiente manera. En primer lugar, se tendrán en cuenta todos los factores que llevaron a la producción de los discursos que conducen a la exclusión social de las mujeres refugiadas. En segundo lugar, se observará el efecto de los discursos en la relación entre las mujeres locales y las refugiadas. Se estudiarán los discursos utilizados por ambos grupos que están en contacto físico entre sí y el efecto de los medios y las redes sociales. En tercer lugar, discutiremos cómo los discursos que causan la exclusión social se reproducen en los medios, la vida real y las redes sociales. El objetivo tiene una segunda parte que es comprender la relación entre la política de migración de Turquía, los discursos de los actores políticos y la transformación de los discursos hacia los refugiados sirios (mujeres). También me enfocaré en cómo se altera y/o crea la percepción en las mentes de las personas en esta diseminación, y qué proyecciones tiene este efecto en la vida de los refugiados y se examinarán las respuestas de los refugiados a estos discursos discriminatorios.

Marco teórico

Si comparamos esta tesis con una casa, el análisis del discurso y el análisis crítico del discurso forman los cimientos de la casa. La profundidad y exhaustividad del material que constituye esta base ha permitido la investigación de las relaciones entre los asuntos que están interconectados en el tema del estudio. Uno de los criterios más importantes durante la construcción de la casa fue agregar la mayor cantidad de ventanas posible para representar la relación de los temas, como las relaciones de poder y el discurso y el padecimiento de dolor interseccional de la exclusión social.

El análisis del discurso está abierto a la crítica y la autocrítica debido a sus reflexiones. Los profundos efectos de comprender e interpretar los hallazgos en el análisis del discurso provienen de los métodos tradicionales. El objeto de análisis son los textos orales, escritos y no verbales. El análisis del discurso no es un análisis que utiliza métodos como el análisis experimental y de contenido. El análisis del discurso es un análisis multidimensional, multifuncional, histórico y crítico (Fairclough, 1989). Al analizar cualquier discurso en el análisis del discurso, no se busca un método analítico. Mientras que el análisis del discurso en la comunicación interpersonal examina el

aspecto verbal o no verbal de una relación, en los estudios culturales, en el sentido en que Foucault lo usa, el análisis del discurso trata del significado del lenguaje y de otros códigos y se enfoca en las relaciones de poder en estos códigos; la producción del discurso se controla, selecciona, organiza y distribuye de acuerdo con un cierto número de procesos en cada sociedad (Bağlı, 2011, p. 292).

El análisis crítico del discurso aprovecha la conceptualización del poder de Foucault y, en este contexto, aparece una transitividad entre la teoría del discurso y el análisis crítico del discurso (Durna y Kubilay, 2010). La relación entre el discurso y las relaciones de poder también es importante para examinar la relación entre la comunidad de acogida y la de refugiados. En otras palabras, donde hay poder (sociedad de acogida), hay un grupo (sociedad de refugiados) que se ve afectado por este poder. No son casos físicamente presentes. El poder se refiere al fenómeno del poder que se siente de cierta manera al representar a una persona y a un grupo en un sentido de poder más amplio y simbólico, a través de la opresión y la coerción, en lugar de simplemente fenómenos físicos. El poder se puede reconocer fácilmente en un texto, una representación visual, un discurso y/o cualquier otra representación. A diferencia de en el pasado, a día de hoy la idea de que las masas están bajo control con la información y los discursos producidos por algunas instituciones está cada vez más aceptada.

El discurso define la producción y reproducción del conocimiento a través del lenguaje. Los discursos, en lugar de proporcionar información sobre cosas, los construyen, y con esta práctica ocultan sus intenciones y pensamientos. El discurso establece la realidad, da forma a nuestro conocimiento del mundo social y determina los significados (Foucault, 1987). Los discursos construyen conocimiento y lo hacen real. Cada tema, temas específicos, objetos y formas de información y prácticas de conocimiento que varían de un período a otro y que no requieren continuidad entre ellos son producidos por ellos (Ibid).

Sin embargo, en este estudio en el que se investigan las relaciones de poder dentro de la oposición de las mujeres sirio-turcas y el papel del discurso en esta relación, el discurso tiene lugar en el contexto social e ideológico. Dado que la dimensión mediática del discurso discriminatorio también se incluye en el estudio, las enseñanzas de Teun van Dijk, que tiene un lugar importante especialmente en el análisis crítico del discurso,

también se utilizaron en los estudios del discurso. Al igual que Foucault, Dijk enfatiza el aspecto ideológico del discurso y argumenta que para comprender la ideología uno debe entender el discurso. El discurso es prácticas sociales afectadas por la ideología. Para comprender el papel del discurso en la sociedad, es necesario comprender las representaciones sociales y las ideologías. Uno de los canales más importantes para producir (o a veces reproducir) el discurso son los medios de comunicación y los medios alternativos/nuevos medios o redes sociales. El efecto de los medios en el discurso público construye diferentes definiciones de realidad, identidades e imágenes, e internaliza estas representaciones por parte de los individuos. Los pensamientos ideológicos se aprenden e internalizan a través de discursos (Dijk, 2003).

Enfoque metodológico

En este estudio cualitativo, mi objetivo es examinar cómo las refugiadas sirias son marginadas social, económica, cultural, étnica y sexualmente y qué piensan sobre los eventos en curso, su estado y los pasos que el gobierno y las ONGs han tomado hasta ahora para dar soluciones a la invisibilización de las mujeres en la esfera pública. Para llevar a cabo la investigación, se han utilizado varios enfoques de investigación como el análisis del discurso y el análisis de los medios desde la perspectiva del Análisis Crítico del Discurso. Como considera el tema de género y el sujeto con género, las perspectivas feministas sobre el sexo y el género también han sido abordadas.

El análisis del discurso de Foucault constituye la parte principal del estudio. Se utiliza para comprender la interseccionalidad de la discriminación de las refugiadas sirias. En otras palabras, posicionar a los lugareños y a los refugiados como sujetos y objetos es importante para identificar qué posiciones de sujetos ofrecen y qué tipo de categorías, personas o actividades ofrecen. La relación entre discursos está subrayada, ya que hay muchos discursos contrastantes sobre los objetos y eventos mientras se benefician del enfoque genealógico.

Además del trabajo de campo, este documento examina los discursos discriminatorios hacia los refugiados sirios siguiendo el enfoque del Análisis crítico del discurso de Van Dijk para analizar el tema de las refugiadas sirias en los principales medios impresos turcos. Habrá dos conjuntos de datos adicionales como redes sociales y análisis de

medios convencionales. El primero se centra únicamente en las publicaciones y comentarios de Facebook relacionados con las refugiadas sirias y cómo estos discursos utilizados en las redes sociales afectan las actitudes de los individuos de la sociedad de acogida hacia los refugiados. Utilicé el software Facepager para obtener datos públicos disponibles de Facebook y BINO Facebook Posts Scraper y Auto Publisher para obtener las publicaciones que más me gustaron en fechas específicas que nos brindan la oportunidad de analizar qué discurso se ha convertido en el tema actual en el período posterior a la migración. El siguiente paso fue codificar los datos recopilados mediante MAXQDA para analizar cómo se percibe el problema de las mujeres refugiadas sirias y cómo se reproduce la información en las redes sociales.

Los datos adquiridos de Facebook se analizaron en tres grupos diferentes: discursos generales, discursos sobre las mujeres refugiadas sirias y discursos según la actualidad. En el primer grupo, los discursos utilizados contra los refugiados son estereotipados y de características persistentes. Los códigos que se han creado para este grupo en función de los datos recopilados de los discursos se pueden enumerar como sirios y su perfil como acogido, solicitantes de asilo y/o refugiados en Turquía, las políticas de migración de Turquía, seguridad nacional, la relación entre acoger a los refugiados y los problemas económicos que Turquía ha estado atravesando, chivos expiatorios, otros, amenazas, refugiados normativos (o básicamente la percepción de los refugiados en la sociedad de acogida) y las ayudas que reciben los refugiados sirios. Bajo estos códigos principales, también hay algunos subcódigos como tragedias personales/grupales, hermandad, etc. Posiblemente podría decirse que existe una perspectiva interseccional entre todos estos códigos y subcódigos. Esta interseccionalidad de los códigos y los subcódigos funciona como un puente, que se construye mediante “discursos ideológicos” y se basan en dos diferenciaciones principales, que enfatizan y desestiman “lo bueno” y “lo malo” (Dijk, 2006).

En el segundo grupo, tienen lugar discursos que se dirigen directamente a las mujeres. Como la representación de las refugiadas sirias y las refugiadas en las redes sociales son dos temas de estudio diferentes, los discursos se han diferenciado mucho según el género y las relaciones de poder de género. Si bien nuestro esquema de codificación se creó para organizar los datos con la ayuda de MAXQDA, dos códigos opuestos,

“Amenaza” y “Víctima” se hicieron prominentes. El código de “amenaza” está asociado con otros códigos como “atraso” (este código está relacionado con la forma en que las mujeres árabes son percibidas especialmente por las personas seculares para simbolizar el atraso en las esferas públicas y privadas y cómo el estatus social de las mujeres en Turquía desencadena una comparación entre turcos y árabes), “valores morales”, “tasas de fertilidad” y “naufragio”. Cuando se trata del código de “Víctima”, implica “empatía”, “lástima”, “violencia sexual” y “tragedia humana”. Uno de los puntos importantes de los discursos que se han recopilado bajo el código de “Víctima” se correlaciona con los eventos o las historias de refugiadas sirias cuyas voces son silenciadas. En otras palabras, estos códigos, como la mayoría de los códigos en esta tesis, son los que hablan por las refugiadas sirias. Esta situación es consecuencia de que las mujeres sirias son consideradas objetos en lugar de sujetos.

Los discursos en el tercer grupo son temporales y los eventos en la actualidad están en correlación con el tema de los refugiados. En esta parte, se ve que algunos discursos basados en eventos difundidos periódicamente se han codificado como “razones económicas”, “discusiones sobre la guerra en curso”, “ataques terroristas”, “eventos particulares en los que se vieron involucrados los refugiados sirios”, “Propagandas para las elecciones” y “acciones políticas y militares de Turquía”, como la incursión de Turquía en Siria (Operación Rama de Olivo - Zeytin Dalı Harekatı). Los discursos que dependen de la agenda aparentemente están conectados con el primer grupo de discursos y de alguna manera funcionan como los factores determinantes que mantienen la generalización y la alienación de los refugiados en la agenda.

Se investigó la justificación del discurso en los tres grupos, cómo y cuándo surge el discurso y su relación con las mujeres refugiadas sirias. También se mencionaron los aspectos interseccionales de los discursos de estos tres grupos.

La segunda encuesta examinará cómo se presentan las refugiadas sirias en los medios de comunicación impresos. Se han recopilado 391 noticias de las plataformas en línea de 4 periódicos diferentes; Yeniakit, Hürriyet, Milliyet y Sözcü. Yeniakit, partidario de AKP, tiene como objetivo apoyar abiertamente las políticas cambiantes del gobierno de AKP, ser parte y legitimar estas políticas a través de sus publicaciones. Hürriyet y Milliyet, los periódicos cuyas noticias fueron analizadas, tienen una audiencia relativamente

heterogénea en comparación con otros periódicos. Finalmente, el periódico Sözcü se utiliza como fuente de noticias para la oposición principal y su punto focal se construye desde una perspectiva anti-AKP.

Sirios en Turquía

El Capítulo 2 se titula "*Sirios en Turquía*". Da un trasfondo general de la política de Turquía hacia los refugiados sirios, las experiencias y las dificultades de los refugiados en Turquía y cómo los lugareños perciben el problema de los refugiados sirios. En este capítulo, abordaré el tema de dos formas. Primero, el tema será examinado desde la perspectiva de la dinámica cambiante del tema de los refugiados sirios en orden cronológico para resumir el curso de los eventos y enfatizar los hitos y las respuestas (de ambos lados). Luego, el tema se procesará de general a específico.

Mujeres Contra Las Mujeres

El Capítulo 3, titulado "*Mujeres contra las mujeres*", tiene como objetivo identificar los discursos dominantes utilizados por y para las mujeres. Al seguir estos discursos dominantes, este documento subrayará cómo se ha construido socialmente la realidad, enfatizando los discursos más comunes que son relevantes para la exclusión social de las refugiadas sirias, como el maquillaje, la tasa de fertilidad, la búsqueda de un hombre turco para el matrimonio, la aceptación de ser la segunda mujer y ser una madre descuidada y sucia. Este capítulo también examina las razones y/o justificaciones históricas, religiosas, sociales y económicas de los discursos dominantes contra los refugiados y las reacciones de las refugiadas a estos discursos y las reflexiones de los discursos sobre sus vidas.

Lo Que Nos Cuentan y Lo Que Pensamos: La imagen de la cuestión de los Refugiados Sirios en Facebook y la Representación de las Mujeres Refugiadas Sirias en los Medios de Prensa Dominantes

El Capítulo 4 examina qué tipo de relación de poder se está construyendo en Facebook y cómo cualquier incidente real (ya sea una foto, una historia y/o un comentario) se transfiere a las redes sociales y cómo el incidente reprocesado en las redes sociales

influye en relación entre la sociedad de acogida y los refugiados. La segunda parte del capítulo trata de la representación de las mujeres refugiadas sirias en los principales medios impresos y se centra parcialmente en cómo se reproduce la información sobre los refugiados y cómo los refugiados están representados por los medios.

Conclusiones

El principal objetivo de este estudio fue el de investigar cómo los discursos discriminatorios hacia las mujeres refugiadas Sirias son reproducidos por la sociedad huésped y cómo esto se refleja en sus vidas. Para ello se tomó en consideración el efecto de factores sociales, políticos y económicos en el aumento de estos discursos. Dentro de este contexto es importante identificar cómo discursos son formados, y quién o qué participa en esta formación.

Uno de los hallazgos más importantes de este estudio es que el discurso masculino también es interiorizado y decisivo entre mujeres, tal y como se puede observar en las relaciones de poder en hombres y mujeres. Esta situación puede ser vista como un discurso que intenta mostrar las relaciones de poder social de las formas como son representadas las mujeres sirias por los medios de comunicación. Al mismo tiempo, ella también muestra cómo normas culturales adornadas con connotaciones nacionalistas y religiosas son usadas por mujeres locales para discriminar a mujeres refugiadas. En el Capítulo 3 discutimos cómo las mujeres locales tan solo señalan a mujeres refugiadas dentro del contexto de las normas sociales de género establecidas por la dominación masculina. En otras palabras, las percepciones de las mujeres locales son afectadas al ser éstas asediadas por los discursos racistas crecientes. Cuando la cuestión es abordada desde este ángulo, los factores que participan en el fomento de una mayor inclusión social incluyen la diversidad cultural, la falta de comunicación, informaciones inadecuadas y sesgadas sobre las condiciones de vida de los refugiados, la falta de validación por parte de las autoridades de noticias que hablan sobre la ayuda recibida por parte de los refugiados, y problemas económicos e incertidumbres creados por una política de inmigración que no es llevada a cabo de una manera transparente y ordenada. Los refugiados expuestos a una exclusión social y una represión tienden a normalizar, aceptar y adaptarse a la situación. Por otro lado, el cuestionamiento o rechazo de su

invisibilidad y de la exclusión que han vivido a través de haber captado la atención y de que sus reacciones no hayan sido escuchadas, son problemas psicológicos causados por haber sido continuamente destacadas como blanco de críticas y como víctima. El segundo objetivo es investigar cómo discursos discriminatorios son justificados y usados en la exclusión social de mujeres refugiadas. En este contexto, la forma como discursos nacionalistas y religiosos son usados para la marginalización de refugiados es de gran importancia, y es un subobjetivo que ayuda a examinar la dimensión interseccional de la exclusión y a la propia exclusión a la que son expuestas las refugiadas.

El discurso nacionalista de "nosotros" y "ellos" afecta a todos los demás. Como todas las cosas podrían ser usadas para involucrarse y verse distinguidas, este discurso se centra en la formación de identidades y en las diferencias de las dos comunidades que crean el concepto de "otro" como un grupo separado y diferenciado del propio. Por tanto, la necesidad esencial de reproducir los efectos negativos de los discursos históricos y religiosos establecidos desde hace mucho tiempo en la identidad Árabe explica "cómo afecta la identidad de los refugiados, siendo Árabes, a la hora de disparar el racismo en la sociedad huésped?". El discurso también nos da la oportunidad de retratar uno de los objetivos específicos de esta tesis, que es el de "generar el contexto conceptual de cómo los discursos discriminatorios son justificados e interrelacionados con problemas domésticos sociales". Por ejemplo, en "nuestra" cultura, criar a una generación es santificado y la maternidad es fomentada, pero cuando son los "otros", ellos son definidos como adictos sexuales e insultados, diciendo que "sus mujeres" dan a luz como conejos. En este sentido, los límites son dibujados por proyectos nacionalistas hipócritas de dos caras (Janus-faced; Akkaya & Kam, 2017). Esto es porque las madres, las cuales son consideradas como las responsables de la reproducción biológica, y que acarrean las diferencias culturales, se posicionan precisamente en la frontera entre el "nosotros" y "ellos" del discurso nacionalista y esta frontera toma una nueva forma con cada nuevo paso que dan. La relación entre discursos nacionalistas y religiosos, y las variables que ellos cubren, apoyan y diferencian son uno de los factores importantes que afectan a la situación de los refugiados sirios. La interseccionalidad entre los dos discursos se refleja en las reacciones de locales. El factor que un individuo más siente está correlacionado con la

identidad que él/ella define y con qué tipo de dirección se ve enfrentado. La percepción de los elementos de amenaza con base socio-económica en el contexto de "nosotros" y "ellos" es que el discurso de nacionalismo abarca el discurso religioso y, en relaciones de poder establecidas, el "nosotros" acaba consistiendo en los practicantes correctos de la religión, y el "ellos" en aquellos que interpretan la religión incorrectamente. A pesar de que el nacionalismo religioso Turco-Árabe se ha intensificado después de interaccionar con refugiados sirios, su base es mucho más antigua. Mientras el nacionalismo religioso Turco ha justificado la superioridad de su propio discurso, él utiliza referencias históricas como el hecho de que los Turcos han sido los líderes del Islam a lo largo de la historia. Cuando yo considero la cuestión en términos del efecto del discurso religioso en las mujeres refugiadas, variables culturales en la interpretación de enseñanzas religiosas acaban significando una exclusión social por parte de la sociedad en la que viven. Esto, a su vez, provoca una mayor necesidad de aceptación por su propia sociedad.

Junto con referencias religiosas, una de las razones principales que hacen que los hombres establezcan una dominación del cuerpo de la mujer es que las enseñanzas religiosas son disuasorias. Las mujeres refugiadas sufren más contradicciones porque ellas se encuentran atrapadas entre dos sociedades donde ambos grupos buscan a la mujer "ideal" y, debido a esto, hay un deseo de control sobre su cuerpo. La figura femenina ideal de su sociedad es subordinada y su cuerpo les es presentado a los hombres para que ellos lo controlen, incluso cuando esto va en contra de la voluntad de las mujeres. Aún sin considerar el efecto de discursos nacionalistas en las normas sociales impuestas en mujeres refugiadas, la sociedad en la que viven define "ellos" como aquellos que necesitan adaptarse a "nosotros". La cuestión de las altas tasas de natalidad en mujeres refugiadas es uno de los temas más discutidos. El hecho de tener muchos hijos, especialmente varones, es motivo de santificación para las mujeres, que son aceptadas y honradas, ya que satisfacen los egos de los hombres en su cultura, pero al mismo tiempo esto también provoca que la misma madre sea expuesta a una mayor exclusión social por parte de la cultura en la que viven. Otro ejemplo de discurso en auge de la dominación masculina sobre los cuerpos de las mujeres analizado en este trabajo es el papel y el efecto del burka a la hora de proteger a las mujeres de asaltos sexuales, y el de hacerlas menos visibles. A pesar de que la mayoría de las mujeres

refugiadas entrevistadas creen que el burka no las protege del acoso sexual. Ellas lo llevan debido a la presión de sus maridos. Además, la mayoría de mujeres locales que llevan pañuelo en la cabeza perciben el burka como exclusivista más que como herramienta de invisibilización porque ellas creen que éste es muy visible y extremo. En el primer caso, lo que agrava el problema, más que someterse a la opresión del poder, es que las normas de la estructura patriarcal del país huésped dañan otra estructura patriarcal disminuida debido a la migración. Portanto, por debajo de esto se encuentra la justificación de la autoridad o poder para definir asaltos sexuales como mitos de violación. Así, una de las preguntas que abordamos es: "como las refugiadas Sirias se convierten en un problema o amenaza para, y un alvo o una víctima de las mujeres locales?". En paralelo a ella vemos que las cuestiones más discutidas desde el punto de vista de las enseñanzas religiosas, discursos nacionalistas y normas sociales establecen una base para posicionar a las refugiadas Sirias.

Hay muchos factores que tornan a las mujeres Sirias vulnerables al acoso sexual. Sin embargo, de entre ellos hay dos que pueden ser considerados como los principales. El primero es la variabilidad y la incertidumbre de los discursos y políticas dirigidos a refugiados, y que afecta a toda su situación. Ésta es la transformación del proceso que empieza con el discurso del "invitado" y se acaba convirtiendo en un discurso de odio. Problemas internos como el creciente racismo provocado por la crisis económica, el hecho de que Turquía se haya visto afectada de manera adversa por las variables de la cuestión Siria y el golpe fallido, han dificultado la aplicación de cualquier medida y hicieron que la cuestión de los refugiados perdiera prioridad. La refugiadas Sirias son más vulnerables al silenciamiento y a otros ataques debido a varios factores como la incertidumbre de que el estatus social de refugiados sirios se vuelva evidente, la existencia de refugiados no registrados, que los refugiados no sean suficientemente informados de sus derechos, y los sesgos de las autoridades en incidentes en que hay refugiados involucrados. Otro factor son los mitos creados por las mujeres locales sobre los refugiados sirios. Algunos de estos mitos son el de ponerse mucho maquillaje, ir bien acicaladas, estar ocupadas con su propia belleza y con hacer a sus maridos felices en lugar de centrarse en sus hijos, y llevar vestidos abiertos y vistosos en sus días especiales (esos vestidos son considerados como provocativos). Mientras que mujeres locales utilizan los mitos que ellas mismas crearon contra mujeres refugiadas a las que

ven como una amenaza para excluirlas y convertirlas en alvo, ellas también comparten con sus esposos fotos y vídeos tomados con y sin permiso con el fin de legitimarse a sí mismas. Sin embargo este abordaje ha llevado a la reproducción de estos mitos por parte de los hombres y ha hecho que las refugiadas sean consideradas como una amenaza por mujeres locales. Eso las ha dejado más abiertas a posibles amenazas y además ha participado en la propagación de estos mitos.

Otro objetivo específico de este estudio es el de intentar responder a la pregunta de "cómo las redes sociales (como Facebook) reproducen informaciones sobre la cuestión de los refugiados sirios y cómo los medios (sobretudo los medios impresos turcos dominantes) construyen justificaciones racionales y sentimentales para los discursos discriminatorios". En el cuarto capítulo, el cual empieza tratando la cuestión de las redes sociales, se recogió en tres grupos los discursos encontrados en Facebook. El primero, Discursos Generales o de Generalización de la Cuestión de los Refugiados, usa discursos estereotípicos negativos y abordajes que cubren a todos los refugiados sirios e intenta justificar los discursos generalistas y discriminatorios que han entrado en el proceso de normalización. El segundo grupo de discursos, "discursos en mujeres refugiadas sirias", es a primera vista un discurso más protector hacia las mujeres. Pero el problema en este caso es que los locales han pedido que se haga una restricción a la hora de aceptar a las mujeres refugiadas como "nosotras". Esta petición hace una diferenciación entre los refugiados aceptables y los no-aceptables, basándose en motivos de edad y género. Las normas desarrolladas por el país huésped para enfatizar la importancia, legitimidad y santidad de la familia no son válidas cuando se trata de los refugiados. El abordaje hipócrita se refleja también en otros discursos. Discursos discriminatorios por parte de las mujeres a su alrededor disparan el abordaje hipócrita en las redes sociales. El ejemplo más obvio de esto es que la imagen de las mujeres refugiadas, inicialmente vistas como solas, ofendidas, vulnerables y en necesidad de una protección, se torna otra muy diferente, la de cazadoras sucias e inmorales de maridos, que a la vez son estafadoras. El primer factor que refuerza esta contradicción es el problema de la identificación como refugiado. El estatus de "invitado" es a la vez una jerarquía de donante-receptor y la dualidad de esta jerarquía con la de una categorización como "el otro". En otras palabras, el discurso de invitado es usado afuera, para mostrar de este modo el valor dado a los refugiados. Al mismo tiempo, este

discurso va contra los refugiados, ya que contiene contradicciones sobre cómo deben ser tratados, y hasta qué punto serán ayudados y deja la decisión de qué cantidad de ayuda debe ser dada en manos del huésped. De hecho, a la vez que definen a los refugiados, las percepciones sociales causadas por discursos como "misafir", "ensar" y "muhacir", que recuerdan al trabajo del huésped, están directamente relacionadas con los problemas identificados, no tan solo en esta tesis, como también en el estudio que se hizo en su realización. Al considerarlo desde este punto de vista, el problema identificación de los discursos en el último grupo, "discursos que dependen del orden del día", parece ser más clara. Todos los problemas, como por ejemplo las noticias de soldados hechos mártir que llegan de la frontera, el aumento de importaciones de carne de fuera, noticias de ciudadanos Turcos que cometen suicidio debido a problemas económicos, o el aumento en el coste de los servicios para necesidades básicas como las de sanidad, electricidad, agua o gas, tienden a ser asociadas con la presencia de los refugiados y las inversiones que se derivan de ella, independientemente de que estén relacionadas con ellas. La diseminación y la conversión de esta asociación en discurso de odio se atribuye al uso de Facebook como fuente de noticias en Turquía (Fletcher and Radcliffe, 2015).

En la segunda parte de este capítulo se examina cómo los medios de comunicación dominantes tratan el tema de los refugiados sirios y cómo esto se refleja en la sociedad en el contexto de las relaciones de poder del Análisis de Discurso Crítico. La prensa está clasificando y categorizando como "otros" a grupos que no se atienen a normas (Foucault, 1987) a través de transferir y procesar la dualidad de mujeres sirias y turcas, así como la información producida por el poder. A pesar de ello, antes de abordar la cuestión de la representación de mujeres refugiadas en los medios, tal vez resultaría útil abordar la representación por parte de los medios de los refugiados desde una perspectiva más amplia. Es particularmente importante entender cómo los medios se posicionan en relación al tema de las migraciones forzadas - migrantes que afectan tanto a la política interior como exterior. En Turquía, las proyecciones de la cuestión de los refugiados varían ampliamente. Este posicionamiento puede dividirse en segmentos periódicos e ideológicos. El análisis de este tema hecho por parte de los medios de acuerdo con variables periódicas también se puede dividir en dos fases. Por consiguiente, en la primera fase, es posible encontrar ejemplos que victimizan a los refugiados a través de enfatizar la necesidad de "nuestra" protección hacia nuestros

"invitados" y hermanos de fe, migrantes que perdieron sus vidas en accidentes en el Mar Egeo, o seres humanos victimizados debido a la cuestión del tráfico humano. Este período evolucionó hacia una segunda fase donde muchos refugiados salieron de los campos y se establecieron en áreas donde vive la gente local. En esta nueva fase, la idea de temporalidad de los refugiados es reemplazada por la idea de que los refugiados provocan una ruptura de la paz de la gente local, así como de su bienestar en todas las áreas de empleo, sanidad y vida cotidiana (Cantek & Soykan, 2018). En la primera etapa del proceso de migración, los aspectos comunes como la religión, cultura y lazos históricos fueron subrayados, pero más tarde las diferencias empezaron a ser enfatizadas. Dos discursos ideológicos principales pueden ser identificados en la manera como los medios abordan la cuestión de los refugiados: uno pro-gobierno y otro de oposición al mismo. La diferencia principal entre esos dos grupos es el lenguaje usado. El perfil del refugiado sirio representado por los periódicos más cercanos al grupo de oposición es el de un grupo de personas que transmiten enfermedades contagiosas, que son utilizadas por el partido en el poder para fortalecer su propio poder, que son propensas a cometer crímenes y que probablemente van a perturbar el orden público. Por otro lado, los periódicos pro-gobierno tal vez han puesto un mayor énfasis en el proteccionismo Turco y las negociaciones de poder (el acuerdo EU-Turquía). Las dos cuestiones principales que ambos grupos han evitado son la de que ellos no producen noticias con análisis en profundidad y que el asilo no es tratado como un derecho humano (Ibid).

Existen varios factores interdependientes que afectan la exclusión social de las mujeres refugiadas sirias tanto como mujeres como refugiadas. Estos nos dan una comprensión conceptual completa de uno de los objetivos específicos, que es describir cómo se construyen los discursos discriminatorios que son instrumentalizados en la exclusión de la comunidad de refugiados en su conjunto y su periferia política, social y económica. Los discursos religiosos y nacionales parecen dominar la coexistencia social, económica y política de estos patrones al más alto nivel. La razón principal de esto es que los dos elementos que más favorecen los discursos discriminatorios y los estereotipos de los refugiados, destacando la idea de "nosotros" versus "ellos", es la religión y el nacionalismo. La lucha por el poder de los círculos islamistas y seculares, las separaciones durante la fundación del estado-nación y los dolores de la transición del

imperio al estado-nación además de la guetización religiosa, étnica, política e intelectual han sido efectivos en difundir discursos discriminatorios en toda la sociedad. Esta divergencia y guetización mental en la sociedad disminuye en casos raros. Esto sucede cuando ocurren algunos eventos que socavan la conciencia pública de toda la sociedad, desempeñando un papel integrador, o cuando algunos eventos surgen como una amenaza para los valores materiales y morales aceptados por la gran mayoría de la sociedad. La cuestión de los refugiados sirios se concibe como una amenaza que une a todos los segmentos de la sociedad. La difusión de los crecientes discursos racistas ha silenciado a la minoría que intenta empatizar y ha afectado negativamente a las ayudas a los refugiados. La forma en que se hizo la ayuda fue tanto la causa como el resultado del discurso racista. El hecho de que la población local en el área en la que trabajo esté económicamente en desventaja y que los beneficiarios de las campañas de ayuda existentes (que casi terminaron debido a la crisis económica y al creciente racismo) de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil e instituciones relacionadas del estado fueran sirios provocó el aumento de discursos discriminatorios. Otro problema es la falta de un proyecto común de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil, las fundaciones y las instituciones relacionadas del estado para el registro, seguimiento, evaluación de necesidades y planificación locales y/o nacionales. Uno de los problemas más fundamentales planteados por este sistema es la distribución desigual de las ayudas a los refugiados porque no es posible ver de dónde obtuvieron la ayuda. Otro problema es que las ayudas no se basan en la evaluación de las necesidades, sino de acuerdo con los recursos en manos de la institución benéfica; ninguna organización que no sea el centro de salud de la mujer en la región prepara un paquete de ayuda para las necesidades específicas de las mujeres. Además, la falta de supervisión de la asistencia no registrada puede dejar a las viudas no acompañadas y a las mujeres refugiadas solteras vulnerables al abuso sexual a cambio de asistencia humanitaria. Otra razón por la cual los problemas de las mujeres refugiadas no aparecen en las agendas políticas es que los grupos de mujeres feministas y activistas en Turquía no colocan este problema en sus propias prioridades o sólo lo hacen de una forma superficial y simbólica. Cuando se consideran todos estos factores, las mujeres refugiadas se convierten en el grupo subordinado de los opuestos locales-refugiados y hombres-mujeres. Las mujeres refugiadas tienen que desempeñar el papel de la invisibilidad dentro del círculo exterior, atraídas por las

normas culturales remodeladas por las condiciones de su sociedad de origen y el gueto en el que viven, donde la comunidad de acogida crea un círculo hostil a través de los discursos sociales y la presión social y las áreas de transición entre los círculos se convierten en el área interseccional de su exclusión social.

A pesar de la retórica cambiante del gobierno y el lenguaje racista utilizado por los medios de comunicación dirigidos por el gobierno, los esfuerzos del gobierno para mostrar un mayor discurso contra los refugiados y un discurso del odio independientes están relacionados con el equilibrio de los votos religiosos y nacionalistas en la política interna. Además, la rápida escalada del racismo en la guetización de la sociedad creará un caos a favor del gobierno. Sin embargo y de hecho, tal caos es un trabajo en progreso para una retirada gradual de los refugiados involucrados en crímenes enviados de regreso a su país, a pesar de que el problema surgió de las infructuosas políticas de Turquía sobre los refugiados sirios. Cuando considero el tema desde este punto de vista, el número de intentos de integración y el número de trabajos por hacer o los que se optaron por no hacer muestra que la política aplicada es de una sinceridad hipócrita. Las mujeres en el grupo de refugiados marginados, que son el tema del estudio, están excluidas debido a su identidad de refugiado, mientras que al mismo tiempo están doblemente marginadas porque primero son mujeres, luego indefensas, no reclamadas y vulnerables, y debido a ciertos mitos sobre las mujeres árabes. La amenaza percibida en la sociedad de refugiados debido a la guetización mental y física y a la creciente tensión creada por discursos discriminatorios, además del deseo de proteger a la familia y a las niñas y mujeres que son el honor de su familia, han aumentado la presión social sobre las mujeres refugiadas y ha reforzado su invisibilidad en la esfera pública.

En resumen, cuando considero todos los factores que contribuyen a la exclusión social de las mujeres refugiadas, se hace evidente que la transformación de los discursos sobre los refugiados juega un papel importante. Este proceso de transformación causado por la política de migración de Turquía es para responder qué factor afecta más a la exclusión social de las refugiadas sirias? Debido a que las etapas de transformación albergaron términos como “misafir”, “muhacir”, “refugiado temporal”, “invitado no deseado”, “carga”, “una amenaza estacionada en las fronteras europeas”, “una amenaza para el crecimiento económico de Turquía, el orden social y seguridad”, pero nunca el término

“refugiado” per se. Las constantes inconsistencias de Turquía con respecto a la política de migración ayudaron a que esta transformación se acelerara.

La política de migración de Turquía dio lugar a la aparición de numerosos marcos. A medida que el tema de los refugiados se convirtió en el tema más discutido en los medios, en las redes sociales y en la vida cotidiana de las masas, los discursos sobre los refugiados se diversificaron en categorías políticas, sociales y financieras. Las subcategorías dentro de estas tres categorías pueden denominarse además como discursos históricos, religiosos, culturales y pragmáticos. El contexto principal de estas divisiones se formó para ayudar en la construcción de dinámicas superior-inferior y donante-tomador entre los locales y las sociedades de refugiados. También podemos ver que estas categorías, que forman dinámicas sociales entre los grupos sociales mencionados anteriormente, se hicieron dominantes periódicamente, ya sea de forma aislada o grupal, incluso a veces por completo. Sin embargo, su punto común siempre fue el objetivo de servir los beneficios políticos de la sociedad de acogida o “nosotros”. Estos marcos creados tienen beneficios políticos dobles: por un lado, son una herramienta de crítica contra el partido gobernante para los partidos de oposición; por el otro, son una herramienta de maniobra política para el partido gobernante. El primer lado, con un enfoque especial en los discursos de amenazas y cargas nacionales, es la principal respuesta a la pregunta: ¿de qué manera se usa el tema de los refugiados sirios como un discurso para criticar al partido gobernante? El marco de invitados se utilizó para despojar a los refugiados de los derechos legales de los refugiados; el marco de refugiados en sí se utilizó para citar a los refugiados como la fuente detrás del empeoramiento de la fortaleza financiera, lo que resulta en la exclusión social; el marco de las mujeres refugiadas se utilizó para insinuar las amenazas a la unidad social de la familia; y, finalmente, el marco de amenaza nacional, el más extenso entre los mencionados hasta ahora, se utilizó pragmáticamente para marginar a los refugiados. Todos estos marcos creados con la ayuda de los discursos discriminatorios proporcionan una mejor comprensión del objetivo general de esta tesis, comprender cómo los discursos discriminatorios que causaron la exclusión social de las refugiadas sirias se configuran y (re)producen en la sociedad de acogida y por qué se ven afectados los discursos discriminatorios y qué tipo de impact.