

EXPECTING PREJUDICE CONFRONTATION TO BACKFIRE:
PREJUDICE NORMS AND MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN FORECASTER EXPECTATIONS
AND EXPERIENCER REALITIES

Kathryn M. Kroeper

Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences
Indiana University

June 2020

Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Doctoral Committee:

Mary Murphy, Ph.D., Chair

Amanda Diekman, Ph.D.

Edward Hirt, Ph.D.

Kurt Hugenberg, Ph.D.

Anne Krendl, Ph.D.

Eliot Smith, Ph.D.

May 22, 2020

Copyright © 2020

Kathryn M. Kroeper

To my grandmother, Evelyn Kroeper.
You did not pursue a higher education of your own, but your deep love of learning, reading, and writing has been instrumental in shaping my own academic dreams.
I love you and miss you, always.

Acknowledgements

The journey to my graduate degree has certainly been an arduous one—with each success comes a failure (or two...or seven). Fortunately, I find myself surrounded by an amazingly supportive community who join me in celebrating the triumphs, but also push me to learn and grow from the inevitable failures. Without such an encouraging bunch, completing the PhD would not have been possible.

First, I would like to extend a special thanks to my graduate advisor, Dr. Mary Murphy. You're simply awesome—warm, brilliant, and single-handedly the most persuasive person that I know. Your clarity of thought and skill at communicating complex ideas in approachable language is something I greatly admire and hope to emulate in my own work. From the moment we met, you welcomed me into your lab with open arms. I've always felt at home. All along the way, you've challenged me and scaffolded my intellectual growth. You've supported my academic explorations, giving me the freedom (and resources) to pursue so, so many research ideas. I am forever grateful for your faith in me, especially in those moments where I most doubted myself. Thank you for being my collaborator. With so many of our projects still in the pipeline, I'm excited that we get to continue working together for a long, long time.

Next, I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to my dissertation committee, Drs. Amanda Diekman, Ed Hirt, Kurt Hugenberg, Anne Krendl, and Eliot Smith. First, thank you for fostering such a supportive community of scholars at IU—it's a community where it is okay to show vulnerability and one where it is assumed that expertise is growable through hard work and engaging with critical feedback. Each one of you have provided me with thoughtful feedback on this dissertation (and also on many other projects over the years). You have pushed me to rethink

my theorizing and methods and continuously improve upon them. It's been a pleasure to pick your collective brain for this project.

I also want to thank the many fabulous graduate students and post docs that I've had the pleasure of getting to know (and commiserate with) over the last six years, especially Elise Agbadu, Julie Eyink, Heidi Williams, Shahana Ansari, Caitlyn Jones, Kathleen Stanko, Dorainne Green, Elizabeth Canning, Katie Muenks, Shannon Brady, and Katie Boucher. You've kept me sane; you've put up with all of my anxieties; and you've helped me find joy. All of those game nights, wine nights, conference trips, "conference trips" (wink, wink), and, more recently, the Zoom hangouts have a very special place in my heart. Thank you for being mentors, collaborators, and my dearest friends. Graduate school may be coming to an end, but I am grateful for the lifelong friendships that I have with you ladies. I would be remiss if I did not give an extra special shout out to Elise Agbadu. We have been in the lab together from (almost) day one. I cannot imagine surviving graduate school without you, truly. Thank you for always being there (tissues in hand) and believing in me.

The present dissertation would not have been possible without the help of four spectacular lab managers who wrangled no less than 32 research assistants and often stepped in themselves to help with dissertation-related lab tasks: Elinam Ladzekpo, Trisha Dehrone, Tiffany Estep, and Rylan Deer. Thank you also to the 'army' of undergraduates, who completed these lab tasks, including coding qualitative data, compiling LIWC dictionaries, spell checking participant responses (so that they could be run through LIWC), and serving as experimenters and confederates in my in-lab studies. Each of you deserve recognition for your contributions: Christina Alex, Diego Arana, Brooke Barker, Kaelyn Billstrand, Holly Bui, Collin Byers, Daphne Castro Lingl, Rylie Cook, Emma Gerrety, Faith Girton, Ellen Hyndman, Fezaan Kazi,

Allison Li, Noah Like, Maria Martinez, Austin Mills, Ella Need, Natalie Neufeld, Gretchen Nihil, Kara Raiteri, Kendall Riley, Alissa Rumsey, Hannah Samuels, Apoorva Sarmal, Luke Smith, Izzy Spriggs, Alexa Sucharetza, Chelsea Theobald, Sydney Whiteford, Kate Wood, Hadeel Yousef, and Lin Zhu.

And finally, my deepest thanks go to my family. Mom and Dad, I love you both tremendously. It has been hard being so far apart these last few years, but our family connection has remained strong and has been a guiding influence in my life. Mom, your compassion for others and your insistence on having conversations with me about bias expression early on in my life have certainly shaped the work that I do today. Dad, your strong work ethic is something that I've always admired, and I try to emulate each and every day. Your support and faith in my ability to succeed means the world to me. Allie, you know you're awesome. I could not have asked for a more perfect, hilarious, supportive, and kind sister. Thank you for being a constant support in my life. And, of course, my husband Bryan deserves the most special thanks. You have been my partner in the truest sense of the word, my best friend. You support me in all the ways one person can support another. I am immensely grateful for the many ways (big and small) that you have helped me as I pursued this degree—from moving halfway across the country (and gearing up to move halfway back), to finding every opportunity to make me smile. I love you and thank you with all of my heart.

Kathryn M. Kroeper

EXPECTING PREJUDICE CONFRONTATION TO BACKFIRE:
PREJUDICE NORMS AND MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN FORECASTER EXPECTATIONS
AND EXPERIENCER REALITIES

Interpersonal confrontation has been heralded in the stereotyping and prejudice literature as a situationally flexible, personally empowering, and highly effective prejudice reduction approach (Czopp & Ashburn-Nardo, 2012; Mallett & Monteith, 2019b). Indeed, a number of experiments consistently show that confrontation (compared to ‘no confrontation’) reduces confrontees’ stereotyping and prejudice endorsement, even among high-prejudice confrontees who reject egalitarian values (e.g., Burns & Monteith, 2018; Chaney & Sanchez, 2018; Czopp et al., 2006). These experiments, however, have uniformly tested confrontation efficacy in social settings where egalitarian norms are strong. This is problematic because norm compliance pressure is theorized to be a key mechanism explaining how confrontation regulates prejudice expression (Czopp et al., 2006). The present research addresses this limitation by comparing confrontation effectiveness across situations where prejudice expression is deemed socially acceptable and unacceptable. In Study 1, college students’ forecast how they would feel, think, and behave in response to being confronted. In Studies 2 and 3, college students’ biased responses were confronted and they reported their feelings, thoughts, and behavioral intentions, while their subsequent stereotyping behaviors were unobtrusively measured. A stark divide between forecaster expectations and experiencer realities emerged. Study 1 analyses revealed that in situations where prejudice acceptability was high (vs. low and moderate), college student forecasters expected prejudice expression to be less offensive and, consequently, anticipated feeling less guilty for expressing prejudice and weaker motivation to self-correct. These same

forecasters also anticipated that confrontation would make them feel angrier and expected to express more dismissiveness and hostility. In Studies 2 and 3, however, self-corrective reactions to confrontation emerged regardless of prejudice acceptability level. College students confronted for expressing prejudice (vs. not confronted) rated their own stereotyping behaviors as more offensive. In turn, they reported feeling more guilt and a stronger desire to self-correct. Additionally, these students reduced their degree of behavioral stereotyping following the confrontation. Taken together, these findings suggest that, despite forecaster intuitions, confrontation can be an effective prejudice reduction tool, even in situations where prejudice expression is widely considered socially acceptable. Theoretical and applied implications of this work are discussed, as well as directions for future research.

Mary Murphy, Ph.D., Chair

Amanda Diekman, Ph.D.

Edward Hirt, Ph.D.

Kurt Hugenberg, Ph.D.

Anne Krendl, Ph.D.

Eliot Smith, Ph.D.

Table of Contents

Title Page	i
Acceptance Page	ii
Copyright Page	iii
Dedication	iv
Acknowledgements	v
Abstract	viii
Table of Contents	X
List of Figures	Xi
List of Tables	xiii
List of Appendices	xiv
I. Introduction	1
a. A (brief) history of interpersonal confrontation as a prejudice reduction approach	5
b. Explorations of confrontation as a prejudice reduction tactic	13
c. Considering social norm perceptions as a critical moderator	18
d. The credible cues model for responding to prejudice confrontations	23
e. Confrontation forecasters vs. confrontation experiencers	26
f. Overview of the present research	29
II. Social Norm Beliefs Pilot Study	30
III. Study 1	31
a. Method	32
b. Results	38
c. Discussion	46
IV. Study 2	49
a. Method	49
b. Results	63
c. Discussion	74
V. Study 3	76
a. Method	76
b. Results	80
c. Discussion	87
VI. General Discussion	88
a. Theoretical implications	92
b. Practical implications	94
c. Limitations & future directions	95
d. Concluding remarks	97
VII. References	99
VIII. Figures	130
IX. Tables	161
X. Appendices	184
XI. Curriculum Vitae	

List of Figures

- Figure 1.** The Credible Cues Model for Responding to Prejudice Confrontations
- Figure 2.** Theoretical model depicting relationships between variables of interest
- Figure 3.** Study 1: Manipulation Check
- Figure 4.** Study 1: Offensiveness
- Figure 5.** Study 1: Negative Self-Directed Affect
- Figure 6.** Study 1: Negative Other-Directed Affect
- Figure 7.** Study 1: Positive Affect
- Figure 8.** Study 1: Self-Corrective Thoughts & Behavior
- Figure 9.** Study 1: Dismissive/Hostile Thoughts & Behavior
- Figure 10.** Study 1: Multilevel Structural Equation Model
- Figure 11.** Study 2: Manipulation Check
- Figure 12.** Study 2: Offensiveness
- Figure 13.** Study 2: Negative Self-Directed Affect
- Figure 14.** Study 2: Negative Other-Directed Affect
- Figure 15.** Study 2: Positive Affect
- Figure 16.** Study 2: Self-Corrective Thoughts & Behavior
- Figure 17.** Study 2: Dismissive / Hostile Thoughts & Behavior
- Figure 18.** Study 2: Moderated Mediation Model
- Figure 19A.** Study 2: Stereotype Usage (Difference Scores)
- Figure 19B.** Study 2: Stereotype Usage (Raw Scores)
- Figure 20A.** Study 2: Emotional Tone (Difference Scores)
- Figure 20B.** Study 2: Emotional Tone (Raw Scores)
- Figure 21.** Study 3: Manipulation Check
- Figure 22.** Study 3: Offensiveness
- Figure 23.** Study 3: Affect
- Figure 24.** Study 3: Thoughts & Behavior
- Figure 25.** Study 3: Moderated Mediation Model

Figure 26A. Study 3: Stereotype Usage (Difference Scores)

Figure 26B. Study 3: Stereotype Usage (Raw Scores)

Figure 27A. Study 3: Emotional Tone (Difference Scores)

Figure 27B. Study 3: Emotional Tone (Raw Scores)

List of Tables

- Table 1.** Aggregated prejudice norm beliefs of Indiana University students
- Table 2.** Study 1: Demographic Characteristics ($N = 1591$ students)
- Table 3.** Study 1: Psychometric Properties of the Major Variables
- Table 4.** Study 1: Zero-order correlations
- Table 5.** Study 1: Multilevel Models for Prejudice Acceptability
- Table 6.** Study 1: Multilevel Confirmatory Factor Analysis (ML-CFA) Factor Loadings
- Table 7.** Study 1: Multilevel Structural Equation Model (ML-SEM) Standardized Factor Loadings
- Table 8.** Study 2: Demographic Characteristics ($N = 393$ students)
- Table 9.** Study 2: Psychometric Properties of the Major Variables
- Table 10.** Study 2: Zero-order correlations
- Table 11.** Study 2: Multilevel Models for Prejudice Acceptability and Confrontation
- Table 12.** Study 2: Moderated Mediation Model Factor Loadings: Direct Paths
- Table 13.** Study 2: Moderated Mediation Model Factor Loadings: Indirect Paths
- Table 14.** Study 3: Demographic Characteristics ($N = 318$ students)
- Table 15.** Study 3: Psychometric Properties of the Major Variables
- Table 16.** Study 3: Zero-order correlations
- Table 17.** Study 3: Moderated Mediation Model Factor Loadings: Direct Paths
- Table 18.** Study 3: Moderated Mediation Model Factor Loadings: Indirect Paths
- Table 19.** High-level summary of statistically significant direct effects across all three experiments

List of Appendices

Appendix 1: Social norm pilot study measures

Appendix 2: Study 1, 2, and 3 measures

Appendix 3: Stigma-related dimensions pilot study materials

Appendix 4: Stereotypes pilot study materials

Appendix 5: Creative writing pilot study materials

Appendix 6: Stereotype map

Appendix 7: Supplemental analyses

Expecting Prejudice Confrontation to Backfire:

Prejudice Norms and Misalignment between Forecaster Expectations and Experiencer Realities

“...many of psychology's strategies for curbing prejudice may only have varying degrees of effectiveness. That is certainly not an indictment against them, as no one technique, model, or approach to such an ambitious goal as improving intergroup relations is likely to be so complete as to not have any limitations.”

- Czopp & Ashburn-Nardo, 2012, p. 176

Among the many bias interventions developed in recent decades, *interpersonal confrontation* stands out as a situationally flexible, personally empowering, and highly effective prejudice reduction approach (Czopp et al., 2006; Czopp & Ashburn-Nardo, 2012).

Confrontations are interactions that can involve as few as two parties: a *confrontee* who expresses some form of prejudice and a *confronter* who witnesses and communicates their disapproval of that prejudice expression directly to the confrontee (Czopp, 2019). Whereas other prejudice reduction approaches are theorized to require large, systemic intervention and to blossom under optimal situational conditions (e.g., intergroup contact; Amichai-Hamburger & McKenna, 2006; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), interpersonal confrontation has been positioned as requiring only a single person willing to speak out against prejudice expression (Czopp & Ashburn-Nardo, 2012). Whereas other prejudice reduction approaches (e.g., invoking a common ingroup identity) have been criticized for their ironic backfiring effects (Dixon et al., 2010; Dovidio et al., 2016; Saguy et al., 2009) interpersonal confrontation has thus far escaped such criticism, appearing to consistently discourage prejudice expression in laboratory contexts, and in a modestly enduring fashion (Burns & Monteith, 2018; Chaney & Sanchez, 2018; Czopp et al., 2006).

The confrontation paradigm derived from research aimed at helping well-intentioned individuals—people with strong, internalized egalitarian values—to self-regulate their prejudiced

responding (Mallett & Monteith, 2019a). When egalitarian individuals ‘slip up’ and say or do something prejudiced (Devine, 1989), there exists a discrepancy between how they *want* to act (in a non-prejudiced way) and how they *actually* acted (in prejudiced way). Recognition of these so-called *prejudice-related discrepancies* can prompt self-directed negative emotions, like guilt and embarrassment (Devine et al., 1991; Higgins, 1987; Monteith & Voils, 1998; Zuwerink et al., 1996), which motivate the actor to make amends and better self-regulate their prejudiced responding in the future (Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002; Rokeach & Cochkane, 1972; Son Hing et al., 2002). Unfortunately, wholesale *self*-regulation (emphasis on the ‘self’) isn’t always possible. This is because individuals aren’t always able or willing to detect their own prejudices (Bell et al., 2018; Monteith & Mark, 2005; Monteith & Voils, 1998; Pronin et al., 2002). Interpersonal confrontation offers one solution to this dilemma. When an observer notices another person express bias, they can confront him or her about it. Assuming the confrontee agrees that prejudice expression occurred and that it was offensive, the confrontation may instigate self-regulation in much the same way as if the confrontee had recognized the prejudice-related discrepancy all on their own (Czopp et al., 2006).

Social interactions, however, are complicated. There is subjectivity involved. When a confronter construes a confrontee’s behavior as prejudiced, it is not guaranteed that the confrontee will agree with that construal. Instead, a confrontee might argue that their behavior was actually unbiased and that the confronter had misconstrued it. Or, a confrontee might concede that the behavior *was* biased, but that such bias is perfectly justifiable and/or inoffensive. Because people do not like feeling misunderstood (Condon, 2008; Gaillard et al., 2009; Shattell et al., 2006), in situations where a confrontee disagrees with a confronter’s construal of their behavior, the confrontation may fail to prompt guilt and self-regulation.

Instead, we might expect the confrontation to incite anger and frustration, possibly even attitudinal and behavioral entrenchment (Miron & Brehm, 2006; Plant & Devine, 2001). That is, we would expect the confrontation to *backfire*.¹

What does the research literature on interpersonal confrontation have to say about the rate at which confrontations backfire or about the social conditions that make backfiring more likely? Surprisingly little. Thus far, published research assessing the effectiveness of interpersonal confrontation has been conducted under seemingly *optimal social conditions*, wherein (a) confrontees have strong *self*-standards for non-prejudiced behavior and/or are in laboratory contexts with strong *social*-standards for non-prejudiced behavior and, therefore, (b) confrontees are predisposed to accept the notion that prejudice expression is offensive and/or causes harm. In fairness, it is quite reasonable that, as a starting point, researchers would rigidly hold contextual features of confrontations constant in their testing. Indeed, these highly controlled laboratory studies consistently show that confrontation (compared to ‘no confrontation’) reduces confrontees’ stereotyping and prejudice endorsement (e.g., Burns & Monteith, 2018; Chaney & Sanchez, 2018; Czopp et al., 2006). Moreover, they show that confrontations in these settings often have surprisingly *positive* interpersonal benefits (e.g., increasing confrontees’ social compensatory behaviors, like apologizing to and smiling at confronters; Mallett & Wagner, 2011). However, by *exclusively* assessing confrontation’s efficacy under these optimal social conditions, it may mean that backfiring effects have been underestimated. These methodological shortcomings mean that we know little about the social conditions that make backfiring effects more likely.

¹ When using the term ‘*backfire*,’ I refer to instances where an interpersonal confrontation fails to suppress prejudice expression and may actually *increase* prejudice expression. This may be related to, but should not be confused with, interpersonal *backlash*—wherein confronters are often perceived as complainers or troublemakers for speaking out against prejudice (Cadieux & Chasteen, 2015; Czopp et al., 2006; Shelton & Stewart, 2004).

Ultimately the reason to study prejudice reduction strategies, like interpersonal confrontation, is to apply effective interventions in real-world settings. Many confronters speak out against prejudice intending to change the confrontee's behavior (Rattan, 2019; Rattan & Dweck, 2010, 2018). However, we currently do not know much about the effectiveness of interpersonal confrontation under non-optimal social conditions, like when norms in the local context are more permissive of prejudice expression—which, truth be told, seems to be an increasingly common social reality (Crandall et al., 2018). Vetting interpersonal confrontation's robustness under non-optimal social conditions—that is, in situations where confrontees endorse (vs. reject) prejudiced beliefs and/or where social norms tolerate prejudice expression—is therefore necessary before we can be confident in confrontation's external validity as a prejudice reduction approach (Paluck & Green, 2009, p. 351). Thus, the present research examines how confrontation fares as a prejudice reduction tool when egalitarian social norms are weak.

Across three experiments, I systematically manipulate perceptions of social norms about prejudice expression, which I refer to as *prejudice acceptability* beliefs. Prejudice acceptability is considered high when most people in a setting agree that expressing prejudice toward a particular social group is common and appropriate; prejudice acceptability is considered low when most people in a setting agree that prejudice toward a particular social group is uncommon and inappropriate. To my knowledge, this work is among the first to consider how contextual factors, like prejudice acceptability, modulate the effectiveness of interpersonal confrontation. In Study 1, I examine students' forecasts about how they would feel and cognitively and behaviorally respond to a confrontation situation, while manipulating prejudice acceptability. In Studies 2 and 3, I place students in an actual confrontation situation (or in a no-confrontation situation), again while experimentally manipulating prejudice acceptability. Then I measure their self-reported

feelings, cognitions, and behavioral intentions as well as their actual rates of stereotyping. In doing this work, I aim to extend *interpersonal confrontation theory* (Czopp et al., 2006; Monteith, 1993) so that it considers the contextual factors that may modulate confrontation's ability to reduce prejudice expression.

A (Brief) History of Interpersonal Confrontation as a Prejudice Reduction Approach

We will begin with a brief historical overview of interpersonal confrontation as a prejudice reduction approach. The aim of this historical overview is to deepen readers understanding of and appreciation for the context that produced interpersonal confrontation.² By contextualizing interpersonal confrontation—its precipitating context, theoretical lens, and proposed mechanism—I hope to convince readers that testing its efficacy under non-optimal social conditions is needed to assess its external validity and, perhaps, to establish its boundaries.

Psychological investigations of intergroup phenomena during the earliest decades of the twentieth century largely operated under the (obviously racist and inaccurate) assumption that some social groups—like Black, Latinx, Asian, and Native populations—were inherently inferior to other social groups—like Whites (R. T. Carter & Goodwin, 1994; Haller, 1995; Samelson, 1978). To psychological researchers of the period, *prejudice expression* was not seen as a problem, but instead an ‘inevitable’ reaction to the supposed ‘natural order’ (Duckitt, 1992). Psychological researchers only began to revise this view in response to high profile social events (e.g., the Black civil rights movement of the 1920s; challenges to European colonial rule) and demographic shifts among practicing psychologists (e.g., a growing number of Jewish

² This historical overview is not meant to be an exhaustive history of prejudice expression and prejudice reduction research. Instead, its purpose is to highlight the theories and social conditions that produced interpersonal confrontation. For more comprehensive historical overviews, interested readers should consult: Dovidio (2001), Duckitt (1992), and Samelson (1978).

psychological researchers who, grounded in their personal experiences with antisemitism, were primed to question the prevailing prejudiced belief systems; Duckitt, 1992; Samelson, 1978).

Informed by these social changes, psychologists began to reverse course, classifying prejudice as an irrational attitude “...based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization...directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group,” (Allport, 1954, p. 9).³ As this new view of prejudice took hold, researchers began centering their theorizing and empirical work on explaining *why* prejudice occurs and *how* to reduce its expression (Dovidio, 2001; Duckitt, 1992). For instance, researchers of the 1930s and 1940s positioned prejudice as a psychological defense mechanism, as a way to rationalize the fundamentally unjust structures and behaviors of the era (e.g., segregation; McLean, 1946; Veltfort & Lee, 1943). To counter prejudice expression then, many psychologists suggested that changes to societal structures were needed to change an unwilling public’s social behaviors (Allport, 1954). This was because such structural changes could influence social norm beliefs, which were increasingly recognized as a powerful way to shape human behavior (e.g., Asch, 1956; Sherif, 1936). This view ushered in an era of psychologist support for legal changes that reduce discrimination (e.g., laws mandating school integration; Benjamin et al., 2002)—a legacy that continues among psychologists today (e.g., laws mandating marriage equality; Kroeper et al., 2019; Tankard & Paluck, 2016, 2017).

Although the predominant attitudes about racial and ethnic bias expression among psychologists had shifted during the early part of the twentieth century, the same period was

³ The definition of prejudice has shifted quite a bit since the early days of psychological science. Most notably for the present research, the idea that prejudice is an “irrational” or “faulty” attitude has been dropped from many definitions, largely because what is considered “irrational” or “faulty” is in the eye of the beholder and is not an objectively measurable criterion (R. Brown, 2011). Further, some psychologists argue that “...the psychological processes that lead to prejudice and its expression are identical for ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ prejudices” (Crandall & Eshleman, 2005, p. 238).

characterized by high levels of prejudice acceptability among the general public. For example, blatant expressions of racial prejudice continued to be quite prevalent (Zinn, 2010) and the public was not shy or embarrassed about expressing these negative attitudes in psychological studies (Katz & Braly, 1935; MacCrone, 1937; Thurstone, 1928). In the wake of WWII and the exposed Nazi atrocities, however, members of the public increasingly began recognizing racial and ethnic prejudice as a serious social problem (Duckitt, 1992). It was around this time that psychologists began documenting steady declines in blatant prejudice expression (Bobo, 2001)—people were less and less willing to report prejudiced attitudes. Although it was clear through the use of unobtrusive audit studies and implicit measures that prejudice lingered (F. Crosby et al., 1980; Greenwald et al., 1998; Payne, 2001), the conventional wisdom of this period was that racial prejudice expressions were reliably shifting from explicit and blatant forms to evermore implicit and subtle ones (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003, 2005; Dixon et al., 2012; Dovidio, 2001; Monteith et al., 2001).

Scholars puzzled over how to reconcile their research showing low explicit endorsement of racially prejudice attitudes (e.g., Bobo, 2001) with persistent racial discrimination in so many sectors of daily life (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; S. Gaertner & Bickman, 1971; S. L. Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977). Among the many theories proposed, some researchers attributed these discrepancies to social compliance pressures (e.g., the *Justification-Suppression Model*, or JSM; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003, 2005), believing that genuine prejudices were not changing so much as the normative contexts were changing. Proponents of the JSM and other normative theories argued that social pressure to appear non-prejudiced caused many people to suppress their genuine prejudices, so as to gain social acceptance. But, if the normative context were to

change (again becoming more permissive of prejudice), we would see a resurgence of prejudice expression.

A second theoretical perspective, the one that would ultimately set the stage for interpersonal confrontation research, argued that inconsistencies between self-reported racial attitudes and actual behavior resulted—at least partially—from the tendency of low-prejudiced and well-intentioned people to slip up and say or do racially prejudiced things on occasion (the *self-regulation of prejudiced responses model*; Monteith, 1993). Scholars endorsing this view reasoned that prejudiced missteps largely occurred because negative racial stereotypes, acquired and reinforced through cultural learning experiences, are highly accessible knowledge structures that take intention and effort to exert cognitive control over (Devine, 1989; Fazio, 1990). As a result, there are often discrepancies between how people *want* to act and how they *actually* act. Low-prejudice people—with internalized egalitarian standards of behavior—*want* to act in non-prejudiced ways and feel guilty and embarrassed when they become aware that their behavior falls short of these personal standards (Devine et al., 1991; Monteith & Voils, 1998; Zuwerink et al., 1996). Guilt is an action-oriented emotion associated with wanting to undo bad actions (Baumeister et al., 1994; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijda et al., 1989). As a result, this negative self-directed affect prompts low-prejudice individuals to engage in self-reflection and correction (Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002). Often, this involves establishing ‘cues for cognitive control’ (Monteith et al., 1993, 2002; Monteith & Mark, 2005). When low-prejudice individuals recognize prejudice-related discrepancies, they are motivated to determine what went wrong. This motivation leads them to slow down and pay close attention to self- and discrepancy-relevant cues in the context. Distinctive cues that are determined to be diagnostic become associated with their negative self-directed affect. Recognition of these diagnostic cues in

subsequent situations induces a careful and controlled posture that helps low-prejudice individuals override their prepotent biased responding.

According to this *self-regulation of prejudiced responses model* (Monteith, 1993), low-prejudice people must first become aware of their own prejudice-related discrepancies in order to successfully self-regulate prejudice expression. Unfortunately, even low-prejudiced people aren't always able or willing to detect their own biases (Bell et al., 2018; Monteith & Mark, 2005; Monteith & Voils, 1998; Pronin et al., 2002). Thus, the primary role of interpersonal confrontation is to raise awareness of prejudice-related discrepancies. Confronters prompt low-prejudice confrontees to recognize when they say or do something biased and, once recognized, confrontees should engage in the same regulatory processes that would otherwise occur if the confrontees had instead detected the prejudiced-related discrepancy on their own (Monteith & Mark, 2005).

Unsurprisingly, the *self-regulation of prejudiced responses model* proposes drastically different predictions for high-prejudice people—those without internalized egalitarian standards for behavior (Monteith, 1993). For high-prejudice individuals, mere awareness of prejudice expression, in and of itself, is unlikely to prompt negative self-directed affect (Devine et al., 1991). This is because prejudice expression is not a violation of high-prejudice individuals' *self*-standards. By definition, for high prejudice people there is no prejudice-related discrepancy between how they *want* to act and how they *actually* acted. Suppressing prejudiced responding then should only occur if there is sufficient *external* pressure to self-regulate (Monteith et al., 2010). That is, there must be a discrepancy between how they acted and how they *should have* acted, according to prevailing social norms. But imposing external pressure is risky (Brehm, 1966; Miron & Brehm, 2006). External pressure to comply with non-prejudiced norms, in the

absence of internal motivation to regulate prejudice, has sometimes been linked to behavioral backlash.

In one set of studies, Plant and Devine (2001) devised scenarios that pressured people to act in pro-Black ways. For example, in one of their studies, people imagined working at a food franchise and (before interviewing anyone) being pressured by their boss to hire a Black cashier because the company was trying to increase its racial diversity. In the scenario, it was suggested that complying with the request would be linked to an upcoming pay raise. In another one of their studies, people were strongly urged by an experimenter to write a counterattitudinal essay supporting affirmative action at their university. Regardless of the experimental procedure, people who were high in external motivation to respond without racial prejudice (and thus felt a high degree of *external* pressure to comply with non-prejudiced norms) but were also low in internal motivation (and thus felt a low degree of *internal* pressure) reported feeling constrained by and resentful of the pro-Black pressure. Further, although these individuals displayed compliant behavior when under social pressure, these individuals responded with behavioral backlash when released from social pressure. In such situations, they were less likely to hire the Black applicant and more likely to fill out anti-affirmative action opinion cards (for similar findings, see Legault et al., 2011). Findings like these suggest that when people are not internally motivated to respond without prejudice, confrontations may induce (*short-lived*) compliance, but once relieved of social pressure, those confrontations may backfire.

Indeed, in the early years of studying interpersonal confrontation, researchers theorized that encouraging high-prejudice people to reflect on so-called ‘prejudice-related discrepancies’ would backfire and “...escalate intolerance of the target group,” (Monteith et al., 1993, p. 209). In their own words, Monteith and Mark (2005, p. 132) explained:

“...low-prejudice individuals are internally motivated to respond without prejudice, and consequently they experience negative self-directed affect when they fail to do so. This affect is critical to the instigation of the self-regulatory mechanisms and outcomes in our model that facilitate the development of the ability to control the potential influence of automatically activated stereotypes. More prejudiced persons lack internal motivation to control prejudice, they do not experience much if any self-dissatisfaction when realising their responses are prejudiced, and self-regulatory efforts are not instigated. We are not arguing that high-prejudice individuals never self-regulate their prejudiced responses. For example, external motivation to control prejudice (e.g., Plant & Devine, 1998) can encourage them to do so. However, our theoretical framework was designed to apply to the experience of low-prejudice people who want to break their habitually biased patterns of responding to members of stereotyped groups.”

Consistent with this view, the preliminary investigations of confrontation provided support for the idea that confrontations would only prompt self-regulation among low-prejudice individuals (and not among high-prejudice individuals). Some studies showed that while low-prejudiced people reported guilt at recognizing prejudice-related discrepancies, high-prejudiced people instead reported anger, frustration, and disgust (Devine et al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1993). Indeed, in one of the first studies assessing interpersonal confrontation, low-prejudice individuals who *imagined* being confronted expected to experience more negative self-directed affect, have more self- and discrepancy-focused thoughts, and engage in more self-corrective behaviors; but this was not the case for high-prejudice individuals (Czopp & Monteith, 2003).⁴ Together, these results suggested to researchers that interpersonal confrontation might be a strategy best reserved for low-prejudice confrontees.

⁴ Here, by “one of the first studies assessing interpersonal confrontation,” I am referring to research testing interpersonal confrontation through the lens of the *self-regulation of prejudiced responses model*. However, there exists prior work in psychological science that is quite similar to contemporary confrontation research and it deserves mention. For example, relevant *values confrontation research* can be traced all the way back to the mid-twentieth century (Citron et al., 1950; Rokeach & Cochkane, 1972; Rokeach & McLellan, 1972). Additionally, some *dissonance-reduction* research is quite similar to contemporary confrontation approaches (e.g., Dutton & Lake, 1973; Sherman & Gorkin, 1980; Steele, 1975).

But then something unexpected happened. Czopp, Monteith, and Mark (2006) invited college students to the laboratory to participate in studies ostensibly about people's attitudes toward computers and computer usage. In actuality, their experiments examined high- and low-prejudice people's reactions to being confronted for expressing prejudice. Each person was paired with a confederate to complete a task that required them to make inferences about people based solely on a photograph and one-sentence description. In most trials, the photograph-sentence pairs were benign, like a picture of a White woman alongside the sentence "This person is often found in a school." But in several trials, the photograph-sentence pairs were designed to make anti-Black stereotypes salient. For example, there would be a photo of a Black man alongside the sentence "This person can be found behind bars," which was intended to elicit the Black criminality stereotype (Donders et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 1997; Oliver & Fonash, 2002). For each trial, participants were asked to make an inference about the person pictured (e.g., "This person is a criminal"). At the end of the task, the confederate confronted participants for using anti-Black stereotypes. Then the researchers examined people's reactions to being confronted. Despite expecting confrontations to result in self-regulation only among the low-prejudice people, this first test of confrontation as a prejudice reduction strategy found that *both* low- and high-prejudice people reported feeling negative self-directed affect and inhibited stereotypic responding after being confronted. In their general discussion, the authors speculated that this unexpected result was due to norm compliance motives. They suggested that, in response to the salience of egalitarian norms in the college campus context, high-prejudiced participants fell in line and suppressed their prejudice expression, likely to avoid the disapproval of others. They suspected these behavioral changes among high-prejudice individuals would be shorter-lived and more situation-specific than the changes among low-prejudice individuals.

Although early confrontation researchers advised caution and called for more empirical work to understand situational moderators of confrontation's effectiveness (e.g., Monteith & Mark, 2005), it was hard to temper the optimism. The promise of confrontation as a prejudice reduction strategy, one that works regardless of a confrontee's prejudice level, was very appealing.

Explorations of Confrontation as a Prejudice Reduction Tactic

Over the last fifteen years, a handful of laboratory studies have replicated the results of Czopp and colleagues (2006), finding confrontation to be an effective method of reducing the expression of race and gender prejudices.⁵ These studies have shown that confronting can lead confrontees to report less prejudiced attitudes and engage in less stereotyping (Burns & Monteith, 2018; Chaney & Sanchez, 2018; Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Mallett & Wagner, 2011; Parker et al., 2018). For example, men who were confronted for using subtly sexist language (i.e., spontaneously using "she" to describe a nurse) detected and corrected more examples of sexist language in a follow-up task compared to men who were not confronted (Mallett & Wagner, 2011). These confrontees also engaged in interpersonal repair strategies after being confronted, like complimenting the confronter, making concessions, and apologizing (Hyers, 2010; Mallett & Wagner, 2011). Other studies have even found the prejudice reducing effects of confrontation to linger beyond the immediate laboratory context, with individuals continuing to reduce their stereotyping up to a week after being confronted (Chaney & Sanchez, 2018).

⁵ To date, all of the published papers on confrontation that show *prejudice reduction effects* among confrontees (i.e., resource-intensive laboratory studies that place people in actual confrontation situations, see Mallett & Monteith, 2019) have only used (typically male) racial minority or (typically White) female targets of bias (Burns & Monteith, 2018; Chaney & Sanchez, 2018; Czopp et al., 2006; Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Mallett & Wagner, 2011; Parker et al., 2018). For this reason, it is unclear whether confrontations will effectively reduce prejudice toward other stigmatized targets.

Moreover, the prejudice reducing effects of confronting are not limited to the confrontee. Simply witnessing a confrontation can lead observers to express less prejudiced attitudes and stereotype less. For instance, Hyers (2010) found that people who witnessed a confrontation of heterosexism subsequently made fewer antigay remarks than before the confrontation occurred. Seeing someone openly condemn prejudice communicates social norm information (Blanchard et al., 1991, 1994; Boysen, 2013; Monteith et al., 1996)⁶ and these social norms of tolerance extend beyond the immediate confrontation situation, spreading throughout social networks (Paluck, 2011; Paluck & Shepherd, 2012). Likewise, seeing someone condone prejudice or remain silent in the face of prejudice *encourages* prejudice expression (Blanchard et al., 1994; Burkley et al., 2016; Jewell et al., 2015), perhaps especially when the would-be confronter is *expected* by others to speak out but ultimately decides not to do so (Czopp, 2013). And to the extent that confrontations increase the visibility of discriminatory incidents, they can help generate consensus that certain groups face real, consistent bias, lending more credibility to claimants of discrimination (E. R. Carter & Murphy, 2017).

Contributing to interpersonal confrontation's image as a flexible prejudice reduction strategy, researchers have found that confrontations can take many forms and still effectively reduce prejudice expression among confrontees (Burns & Monteith, 2018; Martinez et al., 2017; Parker et al., 2018). Confrontations can range in tone from friendly to rude to emotional to matter-of-fact (Citron et al., 1950; Mallett & Melchiori, 2019; Rattan & Dweck, 2018). For example, confronters might highlight moral principles and common humanity; or they might

⁶ To the extent that confrontations *convincingly* signal that tolerance toward a particular group is normative, behavior change should result (Tankard & Paluck, 2016). Confrontations, however, may not always convey convincing social norm information. If the confrontee's pre-existing knowledge suggests that a target group is widely despised, confronter's outrage may seem more like an idiosyncratic belief than an accurate description of social norms. In such a situation, I would expect confrontations to be less effective at prompting self-regulation.

include highly personal emotional disclosures; or they could be framed as educational and knowledge promoting; or they could even be hostile, attacking transgressors as ‘ignorant’ and ‘unintelligent’ (Hubbard et al., 2013). Although hostile confrontations may not win the confronter friends (Becker & Barreto, 2014; Czopp et al., 2006; Lewis & Yoshimura, 2017; Martinez et al., 2017), even hostile confrontations seem to decrease stereotyping behaviors as effectively as nonhostile confrontations (for review, see Monteith et al., 2019).

Beyond reducing prejudice expression, confronting also confers intrapersonal benefits to confronters themselves. As an active-coping strategy, confronting is linked to positive mental and physical health benefits for people who experience discrimination (Chaney et al., 2015; Kaiser & Miller, 2004). Confronters tend to report greater autonomy, competence, and satisfaction compared to people who want to confront, but decide not to do it (C. S. Brown & Salomon, 2019; Dickter, 2012; Gervais et al., 2010; Hyers, 2007; LeMaire, 2017; Sanchez et al., 2016). And failing to confront is linked to greater feelings of guilt, increased rumination on the prejudiced event, and heightened distress (Hyers, 2007; Krieger & Sidney, 1996; Noh & Kaspar, 2003; Shelton et al., 2006). Although assertively confronting a confrontee (e.g., directly calling out their biased treatment as unfair and expressing anger) can cause some emotional distress in the moment of confrontation, over time, assertive confronters report better mood and greater life satisfaction than unassertive confronters (e.g., those who leave the situation, use sarcasm, or simply display negative non-verbal behaviors; Foster, 2013).

So far, we have established that interpersonal confrontation can prompt confrontees to regulate their prejudice expression and it can also confer a number of intrapersonal benefits to confronters (e.g., increased autonomy, competence, and satisfaction; reduced guilt). However, there are also known drawbacks to confrontation—most notably in the form of *interpersonal*

backlash (Czopp, 2019). Even when people interpret an incident as biased and feel compelled to confront it, they tend to worry about the social costs of confronting (C. S. Brown & Salomon, 2019; Herrera et al., 2018; Hill & Kears, 2011; Sechrist et al., 2004) and show less intention to speak out against prejudice as the social stakes increase (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2014; Ayres et al., 2009; Kroeper et al., 2014; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Stangor et al., 2002). Findings like these have prompted researchers to dedicate energy and attention to understanding how to get more people to overcome these social barriers and confront prejudice (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2008; Ashburn-Nardo & Karim, 2019).

As it turns out, these concerns about the social costs of confronting are justifiable. It is well documented that confronters regularly encounter social backlash. People who attribute negative outcomes to discrimination tend to be perceived less favorably than people who attribute the same outcomes to some other external cause (Diebels & Czopp, 2011; Garcia et al., 2005; Kaiser et al., 2006; Kaiser & Miller, 2001, 2003). In fact, simply drawing attention to the existence of inequality can lead people to perceive communicators more negatively (Anisman-Razin et al., 2018). It is perhaps unsurprising then that confronters, who are not only drawing attention to discrimination but are also actively pointing the finger at the particular person or entity responsible, tend to be perceived as complainers and troublemakers (Cadieux & Chasteen, 2015; Czopp et al., 2006; Parker et al., 2018; Schultz & Maddox, 2013; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Simon & O'Brien, 2015; Wang et al., 2015). Indeed, these negative perceptions of confronters occur even when people believe that confronting prejudice is something that *should* be done (Kawakami et al., 2019).

Worse still, confronters who belong to targeted social groups may be especially likely to encounter social backlash. Black confronters of racism and female confronters of sexism are

routinely perceived more negatively than their White or male counterparts, respectively. This holds true even when target and non-target confronters make the exact same arguments (Becker & Barreto, 2019; Dickter et al., 2012; Eliezer & Major, 2012; Gervais & Hillard, 2014; Gulker et al., 2013; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010; Schultz & Maddox, 2013). Even fellow members of the targeted group express more dislike for target confronters, particularly if their confrontation appears too aggressive (Becker & Barreto, 2014) or if they believe the confrontation threatens their group's reputation more than it helps (Garcia et al., 2005).⁷

Even though social backlash is common, it is not inevitable. In certain cases, confronters are perceived more *positively* than non-confronters (Dickter et al., 2012; Dodd et al., 2002). Such perceptions appear related to the perceived offensiveness of the confrontees' prejudiced behavior

⁷ There are a couple of reasons for why target confronters pay an added penalty for speaking out. First, targets' motives for confronting are seen as less pure than non-targets' motives (Gervais & Hillard, 2014; Gulker et al., 2013). In general, people assume that communicators are biased, such that communicators are likely to believe and report information that casts their ingroup in a positive light. As a result, people find information that disconfirms these expectancies more persuasive than information that confirms these expectancies (Eagly et al., 1978). Through this lens, perceivers view target confronters as having a 'vested interest' in the outcome of confrontation, compared to non-target confronters, which presumably compromises targets' perceived integrity. Second, and relatedly, confrontations from non-targets are more surprising than confrontations coming from targets (Gulker et al., 2013). People expect targets to confront prejudice against the targeted group, but they do not expect non-targets to confront. Thus, when non-targets speak up on behalf of outgroup members they are seen as violating their own group interest. Violations of group interest induce surprise and increase cognitive elaboration (or thoughtful processing) of persuasive messages (Petty et al., 2001), which may in part explain why non-target confronters are perceived as more persuasive, even when peddling the exact same message as target confronters (Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). Is all of this to say that target confronters should step aside and let non-target confronters do all the confronting? Of course not. First, it is challenging to get non-targets to confront prejudice (Subašić et al., 2018). Certain perceptual barriers that prevent all people from confronting (e.g., bias detection, classifying bias as an emergency; Ashburn-Nardo & Karim, 2019) may be especially likely to impede non-target confrontations. Second, target confronters are still *effective* confronters. Their confrontations have been shown to reduce prejudice expression, just like non-target confronters (e.g., Czopp et al., 2006), albeit with added social costs. Third, as reviewed above, people may have other incentives to speak out against injustice beyond prejudice reduction (e.g., autonomy promotion, respect goals; Chaney et al., 2015; Mallett & Melchiori, 2019; Shelton et al., 2006). Confrontation is linked to positive psychological and physical health outcomes (Chaney et al., 2015) and promotes broader virtues of justice and equity (Drury, 2013). For many target group members, these other incentives to confront may outweigh the potential social costs (Good et al., 2012; Kaiser & Miller, 2004). Finally, it is also important to remember that target group members do not always view non-target confronters as helping their situation (Martinez et al., 2017). In fact, sometimes the "help" offered by non-target confronters can disempower target group members, especially in situations where non-target confronters are perceived as extrinsically (vs. intrinsically) motivated to confront (Chu, 2017). Non-target confronters must be mindful to wield their influence in ways that support (vs. trample over) the very people they are trying to help.

(Woodzicka et al., 2015; Zou & Dickter, 2013). Here, by *offensiveness* of prejudiced behavior, I refer to the perception that one's biased statements or actions in some way cause *harm*. Many individual and situational factors likely influence the perceived offensiveness of prejudice expression—one such factor being the perceived social norms (or degree of prejudice acceptability) in the local context. To the extent people perceive confrontees' actions to be egregiously inconsistent with social norms of egalitarianism (and thus *more offensive*), people are more apt to praise confronters as crusaders who are standing up for what is right (Garcia et al., 2010). Similarly, *offensiveness construals* may be a crucial mechanism dictating whether confrontations themselves will be successful—prompting confrontees to self-regulate—or will fail—prompting confrontees to react with dismissiveness and hostility.

Considering Social Norm Perceptions as a Critical Moderator

Despite the many lab experiments demonstrating the prejudice reducing effects and intrapersonal benefits of confrontation, this prejudice reduction strategy may not be optimal for all situations. As mentioned above, we currently know very little about how confrontees will react to confrontation when they lack strong *self*-standards for non-prejudiced behavior and are in laboratory contexts that lack strong *social*-standards for non-prejudiced behavior. This gap in knowledge can be traced to at least two methodological shortcomings of the extant confrontation research. First, all of the published, peer-reviewed articles examining the *prejudice-reducing effects* of confrontation have studied confrontees' reactions to confrontations about two target groups: Black Americans and women (Burns & Monteith, 2018; Chaney & Sanchez, 2018; Czopp et al., 2006; Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Mallett & Wagner, 2011; Parker et al., 2018).⁸

⁸ To be clear, this focus on female and Black targets does not pose a problem in and of itself. Given the long histories of stigmatization these two groups have endured (Allport, 1954; Friedan, 2010; Valenti, 2009), it makes sense that psychologists testing the efficacy of a prejudice reduction tool would focus their research on these groups

Second, the vast majority of confrontation studies have recruited confrontees from college samples that are typically steeped in campus cultures well-known for promoting strong egalitarian norms that explicitly support these two target groups (e.g., Crandall et al., 2002). This narrow research scope may mean that the field is overlooking an important contextual moderator of confrontation effectiveness, namely the perceived presence of egalitarian social norms. The research shows that when strong egalitarian norms are in place (or are perceived to be in place), confrontation can be an effective prejudice reduction tool—even when confrontees are high-prejudice (e.g., Czopp et al., 2006). By taking a step back and looking critically at this existing research, however, one is left wondering whether confrontation will remain an effective prejudice reduction tool in more hostile contexts—ones in which the communities’ social norms about prejudice expression toward the target group are not as harsh as a college campuses’ norms regarding Black and female targets of bias.

To underscore this point, consider a thought experiment. Imagine for a moment that you are a college student in a dorm, and you overhear a peer make an anti-Black comment. You decide to speak up and say, “Listen, those kinds of views are prejudiced and inappropriate.” How do you think the confrontee will react? Well, the research suggests that this student is likely to feel badly about themselves (e.g., Czopp & Monteith, 2003) and try to make amends, possibly by apologizing or explaining away their comment as unintentional (e.g., Czopp et al., 2006). The student may not like you (the confronter) very much (e.g., Czopp et al., 2006; Schultz & Maddox, 2013), but the confrontation should at the very least result in compliance, leading the confrontee to think twice before making another anti-Black comment in the dorms. Now imagine the same situation, except you are no longer in a college dorm. Instead you’ve stumbled upon a

(see also Crandall & Warner, 2005). And, even with these limitations, this type of confrontation research has been and continues to be very valuable.

Unite the Right Rally to protest the removal of Confederate monuments (e.g., Hendrix, 2018). As you are passing through, you overhear a protestor make an anti-Black comment. You decide to speak up. How do you think the confrontee will react in this scenario? If you're anything like me, you might feel much less optimistic about the confrontation arousing guilt and halting the prejudiced behavior in this context. But why is that?

It seems obvious, but our intuitions about how confrontees will react to confrontation likely depend on our construals about whether their behavior is *offensive* (harmful) or *inoffensive* (unharmful) in the local context (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2008; Czopp, 2019; Czopp & Ashburn-Nardo, 2012; Mallett & Melchiori, 2019; Woodzicka et al., 2015), and such offensiveness construals are likely tied to our personal values and perceptions of our communities' values. People are highly sensitive to information that signals what most people actually do (*descriptive norms*) and what people should do (*injunctive norms*; Cialdini et al., 1990). We behave in socially normative ways—sometimes willingly, other times begrudgingly—because adherence helps us satisfy our core human motives of mastery, belongingness, and self-esteem (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Conformity and compliance with prejudice norms is no exception (e.g., Crandall et al., 2002; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). The behavior of high-prejudice people, who lack intrinsic motivation to suppress prejudice, depends heavily on their perception of local social norms (e.g., Devine et al., 1991). If their social circle is perceived to deeply value nonprejudiced responding toward a particular group, prejudice expression will mostly be suppressed. If not, then prejudice expression will mostly be expressed and justified (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003, 2005).

As with other types of norms, prejudice norms are localized. That is, norms about the expression of prejudice vary by target group and shift over space and the passage of time

(Crandall et al., 2002; Crandall & Warner, 2005). Crandall and Warner (2005) broadly refer to this idea as the *normative window theory*. Given a particular context and time, all social groups fall somewhere along a continuum of prejudice acceptability. This ranges from complete and unquestioning social acceptance of a particular group (e.g., librarians, blind people, and firemen) to complete and unquestioning social rejection (e.g., child molesters, gang members, and drunk drivers). Pertaining to the thought experiment scenario above, even if the college student confrontee does not have internalized egalitarian values condemning anti-Black bias, this student is most certainly aware of the social norms in the college context—that expressing anti-Black comments is *inappropriate* and, therefore, *offensive* in their campus community. For the Unite the Right confrontee, however, the social pressure to comply with these egalitarian values—at least during the rally—is probably much weaker because this sort of behavior may not be viewed as inappropriate in that context. In consequence, we might expect that he views his expression of prejudice toward Black people as less offensive at the rally and, thus, expect his reaction to confrontation to be more dismissive, if not hostile. Rather than experience guilt, we might expect the Unite the Right confrontee to exhibit anger for being pressured to comply with pro-Black pressure (Plant & Devine, 2001) or perhaps even pride at his ability to withstand such pressures and amusement at ‘triggering the SJWs’ (or the ‘social justice warriors’; R. Cooper, 2018; Sonnad & Squirrell, 2017). Such emotions may feed into impulses to cognitively and behaviorally dismiss the confronter (e.g., refusing to apologize, derogating the confronter as a ‘stupid jerk’, and continuing to express prejudice). And such hostile reactions to confrontation may not be limited to Unite the Right confrontees. We might expect similar responses from college students if, instead of Black or female targets, they’re confronted for expressing

prejudice toward targets that it appears socially acceptable to feel negatively toward on the college campus (e.g., drug users or gang members).

Confrontation gained prominence in the social psychological literature as a prejudice reduction approach during a period where egalitarian social standards for behavior were perhaps at an all-time high in the United States (Bobo, 2001; Case & Greeley, 1990; Dovidio, 2001; Duckitt, 1992). Troublingly, these once restrictive norms for the public expression of prejudice appear to be weakening (Crandall et al., 2018; Giani & Méon, 2019; Valentino et al., 2018). Support for social justice reforms designed to address societal inequalities began to wane during the Obama presidency (Kaiser et al., 2009; Norton & Sommers, 2011; Valentino & Brader, 2011) and these trends have accelerated in the Trump era. Increasingly, explicitly prejudiced rhetoric is socially tolerated—like falsely equating Mexican immigrants with criminals and rapists (Ye He Lee, 2015)—as is outright disdain for anti-prejudice movements (e.g., Black Lives Matter, #MeToo; see Gantt Shafer, 2017). These normative changes have not gone unnoticed by the American public. Compared to before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Americans now perceive greater social tolerance of prejudice expression, particularly toward social groups targeted by the Trump campaign, like Muslims, immigrants, women, and people living with disabilities (Crandall et al., 2018). These normative shifts are particularly alarming to social scientists who recognize the power of social norm perceptions to license prejudiced attitudes and behavior (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003, 2005; Edwards & Rushin, 2018; Georgeac et al., 2018; Giani & Méon, 2019; Huang & Low, 2017; Schaffner, 2018). Indeed, in the years since the Trump election, we have seen a rise in hate crimes—particularly in U.S. counties that have hosted Trump rallies (Feinberg et al., 2019)—and in inhumane conditions for refugees and other immigrants illegally crossing the U.S.-Mexico border (Sacchetti, 2019; Southern Poverty

Law Center, 2019). Thus, at such a tense time in our nation's history, it is especially important to understand whether the perceived presence or absence of egalitarian social norms moderate confrontation effectiveness. If confrontation requires perceived egalitarian social norms in order to be effective, then as social norm perceptions shift, we may find confrontation to be a less and less effective prejudice reduction tool. However, if confrontation does not require perceived egalitarian social norms in order to be effective, then confrontation may be a particularly useful way to combat the rise in prejudice expression at this moment in time.

The Credible Cues Model for Responding to Prejudice Confrontations

The idea that local prejudice norm perceptions moderate the effectiveness of confrontation is not entirely new. As reviewed above, confrontation researchers have long noted that social norms are probably very important in confrontation effectiveness (e.g., Czopp & Monteith, 2003). For instance, in the Czopp, Monteith, and Mark article described earlier (2006, p. 801), the authors remarked:

“Confrontations may be less effective in situations that involve expressions of prejudice that can be easily justified or when there is relatively weak personal or social pressure to suppress such expressions. For example, confronting an individual who openly derogates child molesters (a relatively justifiable prejudice) or confronting a White supremacist at a Ku Klux Klan meeting (where suppression norms are weak) may be particularly ineffective.”

Until now, however, this moderating role of perceived prejudice norms on reactions to confrontation has been understudied and, consequently, undertheorized. To address these empirical and theoretical gaps, in the present work I put forward and test a new model of confrontation, which I am calling the *Credible Cues Model for Responding to Prejudice Confrontations* (see [Fig. 1](#)). This new model highlights the role that confrontees' construals of situational factors play in shaping their downstream emotional, cognitive, and behavioral

responses to confrontation. Extending earlier confrontation models (Monteith & Mark, 2005), the Credible Cues Model does not take for granted that confrontation will inevitably prompt confrontees to acknowledge prejudice-related discrepancies, experience guilt, and engage in self-regulation. It explicitly addresses the possibility that confrontees will reject the confronter's assertion that they acted in a problematic way.

According to the model, after a confrontation occurs, confrontees will experience uncomfortable arousal—regardless of their personal prejudice endorsement. This occurs because people are motivated to view themselves in a positive light and want to see themselves as good and moral beings (Mezulis et al., 2004). People are strongly motivated by interpersonal goals related to being liked and respected by others (Bergsieker et al., 2010; Mallett & Melchiori, 2019). Thus, being confronted for expressing prejudice poses a threat to one's self-integrity (Stone et al., 2011; Wolsiefer & Stone, 2019), and thereby prompts an uncomfortable state of cognitive and physiological arousal (Steele, 1988; Stone & Cooper, 2001).⁹

Motivated to reduce this uncomfortable tension, we expect the confrontee to reflect on the confrontation situation, scanning it for cues to ascertain whether the confrontation is *credible*—that is, the extent to which the confrontee perceives the confrontation as *reasonable*, *warranted*, or *justifiable*. If the confrontation is deemed not credible, the confrontee will evaluate their own behavior as inoffensive and, therefore, they can easily dismiss the confrontation and resolve their cognitive discomfort in ways that bypass self-regulation entirely (e.g., trivialization, shifting blame, justification; Festinger, 1962; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). If the confrontation is deemed credible, however, the confrontee will evaluate their own behavior as offensive (i.e.,

⁹ This model assumes “good faith” actors. It is not designed to predict the confrontation responses of people who express prejudice simply to “get a rise” out of others (e.g., the internet trolls and devil’s advocates of the world). These sorts of bad faith actors *want* to be confronted. As a result, confrontation may not threaten their self-integrity or spur the uncomfortable arousal that good faith actors experience.

seeing their bias expression as harmful), resulting in a cascade of negative self-directed emotions. In such a case, the confrontee must find a non-dismissive way to resolve their cognitive discomfort, perhaps by apologizing to the confronter and/or by better regulating their prejudiced behavior going forward.

I expect that many situational cues may inform these credibility judgments,¹⁰ but the focal cue in the present research is social norm perceptions. In earlier works, confrontation researchers have implied that when social norms condemning prejudice toward a group are perceived to be strong, confrontees will be more likely to construe their actions as offensive and, as a result, be more likely to conform to (or at least comply with) a confronter's prejudice reduction request (e.g., Czopp et al., 2006). When social norms condemning prejudice are perceived to be weak, however, these same researchers theorize that confrontees will construe their actions as inoffensive and be less likely to conform to (or comply with) a prejudice reduction request.

The *Credible Cues Model* extends this previous theorizing by explicitly incorporating a cue construal process into the model. In assessing the credibility of the confronter's claim, confrontees may question whether their actions offended (or harmed) others in ways that violated their self-standards for behavior (e.g., “*Do I think I acted in a way that was offensive, harmful, or undesirable?*”) or the local context's social-standards for behavior (e.g., “*Do others here think I*

¹⁰ For example, cues that indicate whether the confrontee perceives themselves to be *personally responsible* for the biased action may also affect confrontation credibility construals. Without accepting personal responsibility—either because the confrontee deems their prejudice expression as unbiased, out of their control, and/or unintentional—the confrontee will likely resolve the uncomfortable tension spurred by confrontation by shifting blame to a cause outside of the self (Gosling et al., 2006). That is, the confrontee might blame the confronter for misinterpreting their actions or blame the situation for forcing their hand. With the blame shifted, the confrontee preserves their self-integrity without necessarily feeling remorseful and/or changing their behavior. Across all three of the present studies we have devised scenarios that make it relatively challenging for confrontees to reject personal responsibility for prejudice expression (e.g., giving confrontees a great deal of free choice during the experiments). Future studies, however, should experimentally manipulate these (and other) situational constraints to examine how responsibility construals affect responses to confrontation.

acted in a way that was offensive, harmful, or undesirable?”).¹¹ Thus, according to this model, for a confrontation to prompt guilt and behavioral self-regulation, confrontees must first accept that their bias expression is offensive. Without accepting that their behavior was offensive—because the confrontee does not construe their behavior as a violation of self- and social-standards (Stone & Cooper, 2001)—the confrontee will likely resolve the uncomfortable tension spurred by confrontation by trivializing the expression (e.g., “*C’mon that was no big deal*”; “*Relax, this is political correctness run amok!*”) or by justifying the expression as a rational behavior (“*Screw you! I’m being completely reasonable here*”). With the bias trivialized or justified, the confrontee preserves their self-integrity without necessarily feeling remorseful or changing their behavior. Further, confrontees confronted for prejudice expression they deem inoffensive (vs. offensive) may report less negative *self*-directed affect (e.g., guilt and embarrassment) and engage in fewer self-reflective and -corrective thoughts and behaviors (e.g., apology, desire to change) and instead report more negative *other*-directed affect (e.g., anger, disgust), more positive affect (e.g., amusement, pride), and greater dismissive and hostile thoughts and behaviors (e.g., trivialization or justification of prejudice; see [Fig. 2](#)).

Confrontation Forecasters vs. Confrontation Experiencers

Important to consider, intuitions about whether a confrontee will respond to confrontation with self-regulation or with dismissiveness may be misaligned with the reality. It is well-documented that *forecasters* (i.e., people who imagine a scenario and forecast their feelings, thoughts, and behaviors) often misjudge how *experiencers* actually feel, think, and behave (e.g., Vallone et al., 1990; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). For example, forecasters who imagine the sting of a romantic break-up expect to feel much sadder (and for much longer) than experiencers report

¹¹ The purpose of this model is to explain reactions to prejudice confrontation, but this model may be useful for explaining reactions to many sorts of confrontations—prejudice-related and otherwise.

actually feeling (Gilbert et al., 1998). Within the confrontation literature, much of the work on forecaster-experiencer discrepancies has been conducted on prospective confronters, generally finding that people forecast that they will confront prejudice at much higher rates than people actually confront prejudice (Brinkman et al., 2011; J. R. Crosby & Wilson, 2015; Hyers, 2007, 2010; Karmali et al., 2017; Kawakami et al., 2009; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 1999; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001).¹² Much less work, however, has examined forecaster-experiencer discrepancies for confrontees. The exception to this is the work of Czopp and colleagues already discussed above (Czopp et al., 2006; Czopp & Monteith, 2003). They found that although high-prejudice confrontees forecast that they would respond to confrontations with anger and dismissiveness (Czopp & Monteith, 2003), most actually responded with guilt and complied with the confronter's request to stereotype less (Czopp et al., 2006). There is precedence then for the prediction that confrontee forecasters' imagined reactions and confrontee experiencers' actual reactions to confrontation will differ.

Overall, I expect that prejudice acceptability beliefs will inform confrontee forecasters' anticipated reactions to confrontation. As prejudice acceptability increases (that is, as prejudice expression is perceived to be more socially normative), I predict that forecasters who expect to be confronted will view prejudice expression as less offensive. To the extent that prejudice expression is deemed inoffensive, I expect forecasters will anticipate feeling less negative self-directed affect and expect fewer self-corrective/reflective thoughts and behavioral intentions, while anticipating greater negative other-directed affect and expecting more dismissive/hostile thoughts and behavioral intentions. For experiencers, however, I propose competing hypotheses

¹² There are many explanations for why people anticipate confronting prejudice more than they actually confront, but it is beyond the scope of this article to review those explanations in depth. Interested readers should consult Leslie Ashburn-Nardo and colleagues' *Confronting Prejudiced Responses* (2008; 2019) model. Their model systematically outlines a number of perceptual and intergroup-process barriers that discourage confronting behavior.

for how prejudice acceptability will affect confrontees' responses to confrontation: (1) the forecaster-experiencer alignment hypothesis and (2) the forecaster-experiencer misalignment hypothesis.

The Forecaster-Experiencer Alignment Hypothesis. First, it is possible that forecaster expectations will be aligned with what experiencers actually feel, think and do. Like forecasters, experiencers may view prejudice acceptability as a credibility cue. That is, as prejudice acceptability increases, confrontees could view prejudice expression as less offensive which, in turn, would reduce negative self-directed affect and self-corrective/reflective thoughts and behaviors, while increasing negative other-directed affect, positive affect, and dismissive/hostile thoughts and behaviors. Such a finding would suggest that confronters think twice before confronting in situations where prejudice norms are more permissive, for fear of the confrontation backfiring.

The Forecaster-Experiencer Misalignment Hypothesis. Second, and in direct opposition the first possibility, it is also quite plausible that forecaster expectations will be *misaligned* with what experiencers actually feel, think and do, such that, regardless of prejudice acceptability, confrontation will still encourage self-regulation. Offensiveness construals should still be important, but they may be less strongly tied to prejudice acceptability beliefs for experiencers than it is for forecasters. Whereas forecasters may focus on the prejudice acceptability cue to the exclusion of other cues (Wilson et al., 2000), experiencer reactions may be impacted by other sources of normative information that forecasters do not anticipate. For example, experiencers may interpret the confrontation itself as a countervailing social norm manipulation (Blanchard et al., 1991, 1994; Monteith et al., 1996). In a classic experiment, Blanchard and colleagues (1994) had experimenters approach naïve participants and a

confederate who was working with the experimenter. Experimenters asked confederates to complete an opinion survey about racism. The participant witnessed how the confederate answered the survey questions before filling the survey out for themselves. As it turned out, seeing the confederate openly condemn prejudice communicated descriptive social norm information to the participant and, thereby, strongly influenced participants' own self-reported opinions—leading them to *condemn* racism themselves. It is possible then that confrontation will similarly communicate social norm information. Merely being confronted may suggest that prejudice expression is non-normative and, thus, offensive, which could increase negative self-directed affect and self-corrective responding, even in situations where (in the absence of confrontation) prejudice acceptability would otherwise be high. Such a finding would suggest that confrontation may be an effective prejudice reduction strategy, even in contexts where prejudice norms are perceived to be more permissive.

Overview of the Present Research

Until now, researchers have not rigorously and systematically examined the influence of prejudice norm perceptions on confrontation effectiveness. Given the confrontation literature's narrow focus on only a handful of target groups, coupled with its overreliance on data collected in contexts with strong egalitarian norms, it is unclear whether confrontations will reduce prejudice expression in situations where local social norm beliefs allow greater latitude for prejudice. Thus, the central focus of the present research is to examine the effectiveness of confrontation while systematically varying *prejudice acceptability*, or the extent to which it is perceived as socially permissible to feel negatively toward the target group.

Across three experiments, I manipulate prejudice acceptability and examine how confrontees react to interpersonal confrontation—by measuring how offensive they perceive

prejudice expression to be as well as how they feel, what they think, and how they behave. In Study 1, students imagine being confronted for expressing prejudice toward a target group that is either low, moderate, or high in prejudice acceptability (according to pilot tested campus norms) and then forecast their emotional, cognitive, and behavioral reactions to being confronted. In Studies 2 and 3, students are brought into the lab (alongside a confederate) and are actually confronted for stereotyping a target group member that is either low or high in prejudice acceptability. Together, these experiments shed light on the role of prejudice norms in responses to interpersonal confrontation, either increasing faith in confrontation as a prejudice reduction tool or highlighting important situational constraints to when confrontation prompts self-regulation and when it backfires.

Social Norm Beliefs Pilot Study

Prior to Study 1, I conducted a pilot study to assess students' injunctive norm beliefs about prejudice expression on Indiana University's campus ($N = 4,594$ students).¹³ As part of a larger survey administered by the psychology department, students were asked to indicate how socially acceptable it is for Indiana University students to feel negatively toward over 170 social groups (1 = "Definitely not OK to have negative feelings about this group," 2 = "Maybe it's OK to have negative feelings about this group," 3 = "Definitely OK to have negative feelings about this group"; for a similar method, see Crandall et al., 2002).

Based on these data, I selected 30 target groups that roughly fell into three categories: low prejudice acceptability, moderate prejudice acceptability, and high prejudice acceptability (see [Table 1](#)). The **low prejudice acceptability** condition included 10 target groups clustered together because students, on average, believed it is definitely not socially acceptable to express

¹³ See [Appendix 1](#) for Social Norm Beliefs Pilot Study materials and average prejudice norm ratings.

prejudice toward those groups (i.e., blind people, mentally retarded people, elderly people, Black people, Jewish people, people living with depression, gay men, poor people, Muslims, and transgender people); the **moderate prejudice acceptability** condition included 10 target groups clustered together because students were *unsure* about how socially acceptable it is to express prejudice toward them (i.e., fat people, wealthy people, homeless people, Scientologists, hoarders, illegal immigrants, gamblers, cigarette smokers, ex-convicts, and alcoholics); the **high prejudice acceptability** condition included 10 target groups that were clustered together because college students believed it *is* definitely socially acceptable to express prejudice toward them (i.e., men who visit prostitutes, homophobes, gang members, careless drivers, sexists, adulterers, Nazis, KKK members, child abusers, and rapists).¹⁴

Study 1

The purpose of Study 1 is to examine how prejudice acceptability beliefs influence forecasters' offensiveness construals, affect, thoughts, and behavior after imagining being confronted for expressing prejudice.

¹⁴ Readers may have noted similarities among the target groups within each of the three prejudice acceptability clusters—for example, target groups in the “low prejudice acceptability” cluster appear to be groups where people have very little control or choice in their group membership and are often considered vulnerable members of society. By contrast, in the “high prejudice acceptability” cluster, we see target groups that may have more control/choice in their group membership. It seems likely that the college students surveyed use *controllability* to inform which prejudices are acceptable. If we examined another context, the social rules may be very different (e.g., Crandall et al., 2002; Crandall & Warner, 2005). It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore why certain norms are in place in a given setting. While controllability may be conflated with prejudice acceptability, in Study 2 I selected a different set of social groups for the low and high prejudice acceptability conditions that were matched on several stigma-related dimensions—including controllability, concealability, contact likelihood, and entitativity—in order to minimize this potential confound. Further, in Study 3, I manipulated prejudice acceptability while keeping target group constant so that this potential confound cannot explain the results of that study.

Method

Design

This study employed a single factor experimental design. I manipulated *prejudice acceptability* by randomly assigning students to read a vignette that asked them to imagine being confronted for expressing prejudice toward either a *low*, *moderate*, or *high* prejudice acceptability group. Then they forecast their emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses to the imagined confrontation.

The bulk of previous confrontation studies have focused on two target groups of bias—women and Black Americans, groups for whom prejudice expression is largely perceived as non-normative and illegitimate. As some scholars have argued, limiting research to only targets like these may obscure important features of the phenomena under study (Crandall & Warner, 2005; Jetten et al., 2013). That is, we may learn new things about reactions to confrontation by expanding the focal target groups under investigation. Thus, to avoid conflating reactions to confrontation with the idiosyncrasies associated with any one target group, college students imagined being confronted for expressing prejudice toward one target group out of 30 total target groups (10 target groups in each of the three prejudice acceptability levels).¹⁵

Sensitivity Analysis

A priori, I planned to recruit as many students as possible in a single semester for this experiment. Roughly I expected to recruit between 1,500 and 2,000 students to participate (level-one sample size).¹⁶ Each student would be randomly assigned to read a vignette pertaining to one of 30 target groups (level-two sample size), meaning there would be about 500 to 650 students

¹⁵ Some multilevel modeling experts suggest collecting data for at least 30 clusters with at least 30 observations in each cluster (e.g., Hox, 1997).

¹⁶ Prior information about past semesters of data collection indicated that I could reasonably obtain data from 1,500 to 2,000 students in a single semester (via an online experiment).

per prejudice acceptability level (low, moderate, and high) and about 50 to 65 students per target group (e.g., blind people, Muslims, rapists, etc.)

To account for the nested structure of these data, the data were analyzed using multilevel modeling (e.g., Brauer & Curtin, 2018; Judd et al., 2012, 2017), with target group as the level-two random factor. To ensure that I would collect enough data to adequately estimate the proposed multilevel models, I used the PowerUp! tool (Bulus & Dong, 2018; Dong & Maynard, 2013), a program created to calculate the minimum detectable effect size (MDES) for various types of multilevel models.¹⁷ The present design is considered a simple cluster random assignment (CRA) design, because random assignment to condition occurs at the cluster level (vs. the individual level). To calculate the MDES, I used the following inputs: $\alpha = 0.05$, $1 - \beta = 0.80$, two-tailed, ICCs ranging between 0.01 (very little level-two variance) and 0.20 (substantial level-two variance), $P = .33$, no covariates, 30 clusters, and 50 subjects per cluster. The MDES for the present study ranged between 0.20, 95% CI [0.06, 0.33] (when the ICC is small) and 0.52, 95% CI [0.15, 0.89] (when the ICC is large). This indicates that we have sufficient power to detect a small-sized effect in the case of very little level-two variance and sufficient power to detect a medium-sized effect in the case of a great deal of level-two variance—which I predicted, given that the groups varied on prejudice acceptability.

Participants

Introductory psychology students at Indiana University ($N = 1,591$, 70.3% White, 62.2% female, see [Table 2](#) for complete demographic information) were recruited for participation in

¹⁷ To calculate the MDES for this CRA design (Model 3.1), PowerUp! needs to know the desired alpha level (α), desired statistical power ($1 - \beta$), whether the test is one-tailed or two-tailed, Rho (also called the ICC, which refers to the proportion of variance in the outcome that is between clusters), P (the proportion of level-two units randomized to a particular condition), the number of covariates, the number of clusters, and the average number of level-one units per level-two cluster. It was difficult to anticipate the average ICC in advance, so I conducted sensitivity analyses for a range of ICCs from very small (0.01) to much larger (0.20).

this online study.¹⁸ Random assignment to target group was successful, such that each target group had between 51 and 55 respondents, with 532 students randomly assigned to the low prejudice acceptability condition, 526 students to the moderate prejudice acceptability condition, and 533 students to the high prejudice acceptability condition.

Procedure

The materials for the present study appeared within a larger psychology department survey. After consenting and completing demographic measures, students completed a variety of questionnaires. The ordering of my survey within the larger set of surveys was randomized. By completing this larger survey, students earned credit toward a class requirement and became eligible for more psychology studies offered by the department.

For the present study, students first read a short vignette describing a social conflict situation. They were asked to imagine that they were talking with some acquaintances after class. During the imagined conversation they decided to make a joke implying something negative about a particular target group (e.g., blind people, gamblers, Nazis, etc.). Afterward, students were asked to imagine that one of their acquaintances was upset by their joke and ended up calling them prejudiced. Example vignettes are depicted below:

Example Low Prejudice Acceptability condition:

Imagine you are talking with a few acquaintances after class. During the conversation, **you make a joke that implies something negative about blind people.**

An **acquaintance of yours interjects**, saying they were **upset by your joke** and that you seem to be a little **prejudiced**.

Example Moderate Prejudice Acceptability condition:

¹⁸ Sixteen-hundred and thirty-five students originally entered the survey, but 44 of these students (2.7% of the full sample) were excluded for missing 75% (or more) of their data on key outcome variables.

Imagine you are talking with a few acquaintances after class. During the conversation, **you make a joke that implies something negative about homeless people.**

An **acquaintance of yours interjects**, saying they were **upset by your joke** and that you seem to be a little **prejudiced**.

Example High Prejudice Acceptability condition:

Imagine you are talking with a few acquaintances after class. During the conversation, **you make a joke that implies something negative about child abusers.**

An **acquaintance of yours interjects**, saying they were **upset by your joke** and that you seem to be a little **prejudiced**.

After reading the vignette, students were asked to report how they would feel and what they would think and do in this social conflict situation. Of primary interest, I measured whether students believed prejudice expression toward this target group was offensive, their anticipated negative self-directed affect, negative other-directed affect, and positive affect, as well as anticipated self-corrective thoughts and behaviors and hostile-dismissive thoughts and behaviors. Students then reported their injunctive norm beliefs regarding how socially acceptable it is to feel negatively toward *all* of the selected target groups at Indiana University (30-items, 1 “*It is definitely not OK to have negative feelings about this group*” to 3 “*It is definitely OK to have negative feelings about this group*”; Crandall et al., 2002), which would serve as the manipulation check. Finally, students reported their own personal prejudices toward the target group.

At the very end of the survey, students were asked the following memory check question: “Earlier in the survey, you were asked to imagine making a joke that implied something negative about a particular group of people. Which of the following groups did you supposedly make a joke about?” Students could select any of the 30 target groups or say that they did not remember.

Analyses of this question revealed that the majority of students correctly identified their randomly assigned target group (71.3%).

Measures

Outcome measures included participants' offensiveness construals, anticipated affect, thoughts, and behaviors.¹⁹

Offensiveness. The purpose of the offensiveness measure was to assess the extent to which participants believed that prejudice expression toward the target group is harmful. Two items demonstrated strong internal consistency reliability and were averaged together to form a composite score ($\alpha = .89$; 9-point Likert scale, 1 “*Not at all*” to 7 “*Very*”; i.e., “How *offensive* is it to make negative comments disparaging people from this group?” and “How *harmful* is it to make negative comments disparaging people from this group?”). Items were presented in a randomized order. Higher scores indicate that participants view prejudice expression toward the target group to be more offensive.

Anticipated Affect. To measure anticipated affective responses to confrontation, we asked participants to review a list of emotion words and indicate how much they expected each emotion to apply in the imagined social situation, using a 7-point Likert scale (1 “*Does not apply at all*” to 7 “*Applies very much*”; Czopp & Monteith, 2003). First, the ***negative self-directed affect*** subscale assessed negative feelings toward themselves ($\alpha = .93$, 3-items, i.e., “disappointed with myself,” “embarrassed,” and “guilty”). Second, the ***negative other-directed affect*** subscale assessed negative feelings toward the confronter ($\alpha = .87$, 3-items, i.e., “annoyed with the other person,” “angry with the other person,” and “disgusted with the other person”). Third, the ***positive affect*** subscale measured the anticipated presence of smug emotions in

¹⁹ For full Study 1 measures, see [Appendix 2](#).

response to confrontation ($\alpha = .85$, 3-items, i.e., “amused”, “entertained”, “proud”). Items were presented in a randomized order. Higher scores indicate stronger endorsement of the particular emotional response.

Anticipated Thoughts and Behaviors. To measure anticipated thoughts and behaviors in response to confrontation, we asked participants to review a list of cognitions and behaviors and indicate how much they believed they would endorse each one, again using a 7-point Likert scale (1 “*Not at all*” to 7 “*Very much*”; Czopp & Monteith, 2003). The *self-corrective thoughts and behaviors* subscale assessed the extent to which self-regulatory thoughts and behaviors were endorsed ($\alpha = .92$, 9-items, e.g., “I would think I was wrong,” “I would apologize,” and “I would try to avoid such behavior in the future”), while the *dismissive/hostile thoughts and behaviors* subscale assessed the extent to which trivializing and prejudice-justifying thoughts and behaviors were endorsed ($\alpha = .85$, 6-items, e.g., “I would think there’s nothing wrong with what I had said,” “I would think this person is being a jerk,” and “I would tell the person they’re being stupid”). Items were presented in a randomized order. Higher scores indicate stronger endorsement of the particular cognitive/behavioral response style.

Personal Prejudice. As a covariate, we assessed participants’ explicit prejudice endorsement. Participants were asked to think about the target group depicted in the imagined scenario and rate the group along several dimensions ($\alpha = .96$, 3-items; i.e., 1 “Negative” to 9 “Positive”; 1 “Bad” to 9 “Good”; 1 “Unfavorable” to 9 “Favorable”). All items were reverse-scored and then averaged together. Higher scores indicate stronger endorsement of personal prejudice toward the target group.

Results

Data Screening and Preliminary Analyses

Outcome variable composites were created to assess (a) offensiveness beliefs, (b) negative self-directed affect, (c) negative other-directed affect, (d) positive affect, (e) self-corrective thoughts and behaviors, and (f) dismissive/hostile thoughts and behaviors. Scales demonstrated adequate internal consistency reliability ($\alpha \geq .85$). Composite variables satisfied assumptions of normality and linearity required by general linear models. As expected, at the student level (without accounting for clustering), prejudice acceptability condition (-1 = Low, 0 = Moderate, 1 = High) was negatively correlated with offensiveness perceptions ($r = -.49, p < .001$), such that the more socially acceptable it was to express a type of prejudice, the less offensive expressions of that prejudice seemed. Likewise, the more socially acceptable it was to express a given prejudice, the less negative self-directed affect ($r = -.32, p < .001$) and self-corrective thoughts and actions were reported ($r = -.30, p < .001$). Conversely, the more socially acceptable it was to express a given prejudice, the more negative-other directed affect ($r = .27, p < .001$), positive affect ($r = .16, p < .001$), and hostile-dismissive thoughts and actions were reported ($r = .26, p < .001$).

Table 3 provides the psychometric properties of all variables. Table 4 provides zero-order correlations.

Manipulation Check

To confirm that the prejudice acceptability experimental manipulation was perceived by students as intended, I conducted a repeated measures ANOVA. Each student reported how socially acceptable it was to feel negatively toward all 30 target groups. These injunctive norm beliefs were averaged together according to their prejudice acceptability level, resulting in three

injunctive norm composites for each student (one for each prejudice acceptability level: low, moderate, and high).

As predicted, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant and large main effect of prejudice acceptability, $F(2, 3138) = 3504.66, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .69$. Simple effects tests indicated that students rated prejudice toward low prejudice acceptability target groups as less normative ($M = 1.42, SD = 0.45$) than prejudice toward moderate ($M = 1.89, SD = 0.41, p < .001, d_z = 1.20$) and high prejudice acceptability target groups ($M = 2.51, SD = 0.43, p < .001, d_z = 1.63$). Additionally, students rated prejudice toward moderate prejudice acceptability target groups as less normative than prejudice toward high prejudice acceptability target groups ($p < .001, d_z = 1.36$). These findings indicate that students perceived the prejudice acceptability manipulation as intended (see [Fig. 3](#)).

Multilevel Models

Data Analytic Strategy. Multilevel modeling (MLM), with restricted maximum likelihood estimation (ReML), was used to examine the fixed effect of prejudice acceptability on all outcome variables, while accounting for the random intercept for each target group (Level 2).^{20, 21} We required complete data on all key variables, resulting in a final sample size of 1,568 students.

To run the multi-level models, I used the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) for R version 3.6.1 (R Core Team, 2019). Additionally, I used the lmerTest package to obtain t-tests and p-

²⁰ All data across Studies 1-3 were analyzed using a combination of SPSS (v. 26) and R (v.3.6.1), including the lme4, lmerTest, and lavaan packages (Bates et al., 2015; IBM Corp, 2019; Kuznetsova et al., 2017; R Core Team, 2019; Rosseel, 2012).

²¹ All multilevel models were run with and without personal prejudice as a covariate. Personal prejudice was a significant covariate in all analyses (all $ps \leq .003$), negatively predicting offensiveness beliefs ($b = -0.37$), negative self-directed affect ($b = -0.18$), and self-corrective intentions ($b = -0.16$), while positively predicting negative other-directed affect ($b = 0.13$), positive affect ($b = 0.01$), and dismissive/hostile intentions ($b = 0.10$). Any changes to the interpretations of results (dependent on the inclusion of personal prejudice as a covariate) are footnoted alongside the relevant analysis.

values for fixed effects (Kuznetsova et al., 2017). For each outcome variable, I estimated unconditional models at Level 1 and Level 2 to calculate intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC), which estimate the proportion of unexplained variance at the target group level (Level 2) relative to the student level (Level 1).²² To do this, I used the following model equations:

$$\textit{Unconditional Model (Level 1 Only): } Y_i = \beta_0 + \varepsilon_i$$

$$\textit{Unconditional Model (Levels 1 and 2): } Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \alpha_j^T + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

The first model specification equation indicates that for a student (i) the predicted outcome score (Y_i) will be a function of the overall intercept (β_0) and residual random error variation (ε_i). The second model specification equation indicates that the intercept is now permitted to vary by target group. For a student (i) within a target group (j), the predicted outcome score (Y_{ij}) will be a function of the overall intercept (β_0), a random component for the target group (α_j^T), and residual random error variation (ε_{ij}). The ICCs were calculated by dividing the group-level error variance by the total error variance (Hox, 2010), such that higher values indicate greater variance between clusters. As ICCs grow larger, the more strongly the assumption of independent observations is violated and, therefore, the more necessary it is to account for clustering. That said, even small ICCs—e.g., ICC = .01—can dramatically inflate type 1 error rates, particularly in larger samples (Kreft & Leeuw, 1998), so multilevel modeling is recommended whenever data are nested.

The random intercept models follow the same format, except that these models also include the predictor variable to help explain outcome scores:

$$\textit{Primary Model: } Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_{1ij} + \alpha_j^T + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

²² See [Table 5](#) for a complete listing of multilevel model coefficients.

The only additional component to this model is the fixed effect of prejudice acceptability condition (β_1). For a student (i) within a target group (j), the predicted outcome score (Y_{ij}) will be a function of the overall intercept (β_0), the fixed component of condition differences (β_{1ij}), a random component for the target group (α_j^T), and residual random error variation (ε_{ij}). Prejudice acceptability has three levels (low, moderate, and high). As a result, the prejudice acceptability predictor was dummy coded.

Offensiveness. As expected, a large amount of unexplained variance in offensiveness perceptions was accounted for by the target group to which students were randomly assigned (ICC = .29). Consistent with predictions, as prejudice acceptability increased, students perceived expressing prejudice as less offensive. Relative to students in the low prejudice acceptability condition, students in the moderate prejudice acceptability, $t(27.02) = -5.10, b = -1.43, p < .001$, and high prejudice acceptability conditions, $t(26.94) = -10.05, b = -2.81, p < .001$, rated prejudice expression as significantly less offensive. Likewise, students in the high prejudice acceptability condition rated prejudice expression as significantly less offensive than students in the moderate prejudice acceptability condition, $t(27.00) = -4.94, b = -1.38, p < .001$ (see [Fig. 4](#)).

Anticipated Affect. Across all three affective outcomes, a non-negligible amount of the unexplained variance was accounted for by the target group to which students were randomly assigned (Negative Self-Directed Affect ICC = .14; Negative Other-Directed Affect ICC = .10; Positive Affect ICC = .04).

Negative Self-Directed Affect. In line with predictions, as prejudice acceptability increased, students anticipated less negative self-directed affect (e.g., guilt, embarrassment) in response to being confronted. Students in the moderate prejudice acceptability, $t(27.00) = -3.12, b = -0.69, p = .004$, and high prejudice acceptability conditions $t(26.89) = -7.02, b = -1.55, p <$

.001, anticipated significantly less negative self-directed affect than students in the low prejudice acceptability condition. Similarly, students in the high prejudice acceptability condition, $t(26.97) = -3.89$, $b = -0.86$, $p < .001$, anticipated significantly less negative self-directed affect than students in the moderate prejudice acceptability condition (see [Fig. 5](#)).²³

Negative Other-Directed Affect. For the most part, as prejudice acceptability increased, students anticipated greater negative other-directed affect (e.g., anger, frustration) in response to being confronted. Students in the low prejudice acceptability, $t(27.08) = -7.50$, $b = -1.01$, $p < .001$, and moderate prejudice acceptability conditions, $t(27.22) = -5.64$, $b = -0.76$, $p < .001$, anticipated experiencing significantly less negative other-directed affect than students in the high prejudice acceptability group. However, students' anticipated negative other-directed affect did not significantly differ between the low and moderate prejudice acceptability conditions, $t(27.27) = 1.85$, $b = 0.25$, $p = .08$ (see [Fig. 6](#)).

Positive Affect. Consistent with hypotheses, as prejudice acceptability increased, students anticipated greater positive affect (e.g., pride, amusement) in response to being confronted. Students in the moderate prejudice acceptability, $t(27.16) = 2.26$, $b = 0.25$, $p = .03$, and the high prejudice acceptability conditions, $t(26.92) = 4.98$, $b = 0.55$, $p < .001$, anticipated experiencing significantly greater positive affect than students in the low prejudice acceptability condition. Similarly, students in the high prejudice acceptability condition, $t(27.10) = 2.71$, $b = 0.30$, $p = .01$, anticipated experiencing significantly greater positive affect than students in the moderate prejudice acceptability condition (see [Fig. 7](#)).²⁴

²³ For negative self-directed affect, when personal prejudice was added into the model as a covariate, the difference between the low and moderate prejudice acceptability conditions was in the same direction, but no longer statistically significant ($b = -0.39$, $p = .07$). All other comparisons remained significant.

²⁴ For positive affect, when personal prejudice was added into the model as a covariate, only the difference between the low and high prejudice acceptability conditions remained statistically significant ($b = 0.03$, $p = .03$). All other comparisons were reduced to non-significance.

Anticipated Thoughts & Behavior. Across the cognitive and behavioral outcomes, a non-negligible amount of the unexplained variance was accounted for by the target group to which students were randomly assigned (Self-Corrective Thoughts and Behaviors ICC = .12; Dismissive/Hostile Thoughts and Behaviors ICC = .09).

Self-Corrective Thoughts and Behaviors. Consistent with predictions, as prejudice acceptability increased, students expected to engage in fewer self-corrective thoughts and behaviors. Students in the moderate prejudice acceptability, $t(27.08) = -3.82, b = -0.58, p < .001$, and high prejudice acceptability conditions, $t(26.94) = -7.04, b = -1.07, p < .001$, anticipated engaging in significantly fewer self-corrective thoughts and behaviors than students in the low prejudice acceptability condition. Likewise, students in the high prejudice acceptability condition anticipated engaging in significantly fewer self-corrective thoughts and behaviors than students in the moderate prejudice acceptability condition, $t(27.04) = -3.21, b = -0.49, p = .003$ (see [Fig. 8](#)).²⁵

Dismissive/Hostile Thoughts and Behaviors. As predicted, as prejudice acceptability increased, students expected to engage in greater dismissive and hostile thoughts and behaviors. Students in the moderate prejudice acceptability, $t(27.15) = 3.24, b = 0.34, p = .003$, and high prejudice acceptability conditions, $t(26.94) = 7.87, b = 0.83, p < .001$, anticipated engaging in significantly greater dismissive and hostile thoughts and behaviors than students in the low prejudice acceptability condition. Similarly, students in the high prejudice acceptability condition anticipated engaging in significantly greater dismissive and hostile thoughts and behaviors than

²⁵ For self-corrective thoughts and behaviors, when personal prejudice was added into the model as a covariate, the difference between the moderate and high prejudice acceptability conditions was no longer statistically significant ($b = -0.13, p = .39$). All other comparisons remained significant.

students in the moderate prejudice acceptability condition, $t(27.10) = 4.62$, $b = 0.49$, $p < .001$ (see [Fig. 9](#)).²⁶

Multilevel Confirmatory Factor Analysis (ML-CFA) and Structural Equation Modeling (ML-SEM)

The above multilevel analyses provided support for the prediction that prejudice acceptability directly affects all of the proposed outcome variables (i.e., offensiveness, negative self-directed affect, negative other-directed affect, positive affect, self-corrective thoughts and behaviors, and dismissive/hostile thoughts and behaviors), even when accounting for the nested data structure. Beyond examining the direct effects of prejudice acceptability on these outcomes, I also hypothesized indirect effects linking prejudice acceptability to affect through offensiveness (simple mediation); additionally, I predicted indirect effects linking prejudice acceptability to thoughts and behavioral intentions through offensiveness and affect (serial mediation).

To test whether the data support these mediational predictions, I evaluated the fit of a multilevel structural equation model (see [Fig. 10](#)). By combining SEM with MLM, we can simultaneously assess whether the proposed system of regression equations adequately describes the relationships among latent variables at the student-level (Level 1), while accounting for the clustering at the target group-level (Level 2; Bauer, 2003; Krull & MacKinnon, 2001). This analysis involves two main parts: a measurement component and a structural component (Nachtigall et al., 2003). First, I tested whether the relationships between the hypothesized latent factors and observed variables were supported by the data via confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Second, I tested whether the proposed structural relationships between the latent

²⁶ For dismissive/hostile thoughts and behaviors, when personal prejudice was added into the model as a covariate, the difference between the low and moderate prejudice acceptability conditions was no longer significant ($b = 0.17$, $p = .14$). All other comparisons remained significant.

variables were supported by the data.²⁷ Both the measurement model and structural model were conducted, using maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors. Missing data was handled such that only complete cases were included (i.e., listwise deletion).

Measurement Model. The ML-CFA yielded adequate model fit: $\chi^2(594) = 2447.04, p < .001$, Robust CFI = .93, Robust RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.04, 0.05], SRMR (within covariance matrix) = 0.06, SRMR (between covariance matrix) = 0.13.²⁸ Observed indicators loaded onto latent factors as predicted. For unstandardized and standardized factor loadings, see [Table 6](#).

Structural Model. The ML-SEM yielded adequate model fit. Again, the chi square for the model was statistically significant, $\chi^2(627) = 2,429.81, p < .001$, which is usually considered to be an indicator of poor model fit; however, significant chi square tests are common when working with large sample sizes and, in such cases, are generally disregarded (Kline, 2016). According to several alternative indices of model fit, the structure model was supported by the data, Robust CFI = .92, Robust RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.04, .05], SRMR (within covariance matrix) = 0.07, SRMR (between covariance matrix) = 0.24.

Consistent with predictions, this analysis revealed that prejudice acceptability negatively predicted offensiveness perceptions ($b = -0.74, p < .001$), such that the more acceptable a particular type of prejudice was at IU, the less offensive its expression seemed to IU students. As offensiveness perceptions increased, students anticipated experiencing greater negative self-directed emotions (e.g., guilt, embarrassment; $b = 0.64, p < .001$), fewer negative other-directed

²⁷ A priori, sufficient model fit was defined as Comparative Fix Index (CFI) scores $\geq .90$, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) $< .08$, and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) $< .08$ (Schreiber et al., 2006). Chi squares are reported for transparency, but are not evaluated due to the test's sensitivity to large sample sizes (Kline, 2016).

²⁸ The SRMR at the between-level is related to the number of clusters in the dataset—in this case, there are 30 clusters. In cases with fewer than 200 clusters, the traditional 0.08 cutoff for SRMR may be too strict and does not necessarily indicate poor model fit (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2018, p. 13).

emotions (e.g., anger, frustration; $b = -0.16, p < .001$), and fewer positive emotions (e.g., pride, amusement; $b = -0.09, p = .02$). Moreover, these imagined emotional responses to confrontation predicted students' intended cognitive and behavioral responses. Students who anticipated greater negative *self*-directed affect intended to self-reflect and self-correct more (e.g., thinking they're wrong, wanting to apologize; $b = 1.66, p < .001$) and react hostilely and reject responsibility less (e.g., thinking the confronter is a jerk, telling the confronter he/she is stupid; $b = -0.18, p < .001$). By contrast, students who anticipated greater negative *other*-directed affect intended to self-reflect and self-correct less ($b = -0.40, p < .001$) and react hostilely and reject responsibility more ($b = 0.90, p < .001$). Similarly, students who anticipated greater positive affect intended to react hostilely and reject responsibility more ($b = 0.67, p < .001$); contrary to predictions, however, positive affect did not significantly predict intentions to self-reflect and self-correct ($b = 0.10, p = .23$). Indeed, all but one of the indirect paths linking prejudice acceptability to emotional and cognitive-behavioral responses through offensiveness perceptions were statistically significant^{29,30} For the full listing of standardized and unstandardized direct and indirect path coefficients, see [Table 7](#).

Discussion

The goal of Study 1 was to examine how prejudice acceptability beliefs influence forecasted responses to being confronted. To test this, we asked would-be *confrontees* to imagine how they would react to being confronted for expressing prejudice toward either a low, moderate, or high prejudice acceptability target group. I expected that as prejudice was viewed to

²⁹ Contrary to predictions, the indirect path linking prejudice acceptability to self-correction through offensiveness and positive affect was not statistically significant ($b = 0.01, p = .294$). All other hypothesized indirect effects were statistically significant.

³⁰ These direct and indirect pathways remained significant (and in the predicted direction) even when personal prejudice was added into the model as a covariate.

be more acceptable, people would perceive prejudice expression as less offensive, which would in turn decrease anticipated negative self-directed affect (e.g., guilt, embarrassment) while increasing anticipated negative other-directed affect (e.g., anger, frustration) and positive affect (e.g., pride, amusement). Moreover, we expected this increased negative other-directed and positive affect to escalate dismissive and hostile intentions, while decreasing self-corrective and self-reflective intentions. Indeed, this is largely what we found.

Students who imagined being confronted for expressing prejudice toward *high prejudice acceptability* target groups—like gang members, adulterers, and Nazis—rated prejudice expression toward these groups as relatively inoffensive. This construal had downstream consequences for students' forecasted emotional response. These students anticipated low levels of negative self-directed affect and (relative to the other conditions) high levels of negative other-directed affect and positive affect. In consequence, students in the high prejudice acceptability condition expected having fewer self-corrective and reflective thoughts and behaviors and having greater dismissive and hostile thoughts and behaviors.

By contrast, students who imagined being confronted for expressing prejudice toward *low prejudice acceptability* target groups—like blind people, Jewish people, and financially poor people—rated prejudice expression toward these groups as highly offensive. This construal shaped their forecasted emotional responses, such that these students anticipated high levels of negative self-directed affect and low levels of negative other-directed affect and positive affect. Accordingly, students in the low prejudice acceptability condition expected having greater self-corrective and reflective thoughts and behaviors and having fewer dismissive and hostile thoughts and behaviors.

Finally, students who imagined being confronted for expressing prejudice toward *moderate prejudice acceptability* target groups—like fat people, gamblers, and homeless people—forecasted emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses fell in between these two extremes.

Taken together, these results support my model, outlined above. Prejudice acceptability shaped students' forecasted offensiveness construals, which influenced responses to being confronted. When imagining being confronted after expressing prejudice toward low prejudice acceptability groups, forecasters expected to view their prejudice expression as offensive and to conform to (or at least comply with) the confronter's wishes—by apologizing and regulating their responses better in the future. By contrast, when imagining being confronted after expressing prejudice toward high prejudice acceptability groups, forecasters expected to view their prejudice expression as inoffensive and to experience less guilt, more anger, and greater hostility and defensiveness.

Although these findings are consistent with predictions, the implications of Study 1 for understanding real-world responses to confrontation are somewhat limited. These findings suggest that confronting prejudice in situations where the prejudice acceptability beliefs are not on the confronter's side is *expected to be riskier*, but we do not yet know if these situations are *actually riskier*. It is quite possible that how confrontees imagine they would act after being confronted differs from how confrontees will actually act. Indeed, a discrepancy between forecasted and actual responses to confrontation is exactly the surprising result that spurred the explosion of confrontation research nearly two decades ago. When people were asked to imagine how they would respond to being confronted for expressing racism and sexism, Czopp and colleagues found that high prejudice people *expected* to feel less guilt and greater irritation as

well as behave with less compunction and greater antagonism (Czopp & Monteith, 2003); however, in a follow-up study where high-prejudice people were *actually* confronted for expressing racism and sexism, the researchers found that high-prejudice people reported guilt and regulated their stereotyping behavior, just like low-prejudice people (Czopp et al., 2006). For these reasons, it is important to examine how people actually react to confrontation, not just how they imagine they will react. Thus, the purpose of Study 2 is to systematically vary prejudice acceptability and examine how these variations affect people's actual reactions to being confronted.

Study 2

The primary goal of Study 2 was to examine whether people's *forecasted* responses to confrontation accord with their *actual* responses to confrontation. Thus, we brought students into the laboratory and placed them in a confrontation situation. We aimed to see how students would emotionally, cognitively, and behaviorally react to being confronted for expressing prejudice toward either a low or high prejudice acceptability target group, as compared to not being confronted at all.

Method

Design

The present study employed a 2 (Confrontation: Absent, Present) \times 2 (Prejudice Acceptability: Low, High) mixed-model, experimental design.

To increase generalizability beyond one target group, five different target groups were nested under each of the two prejudice acceptability conditions.³¹ That is, students were

³¹ In Study 1, target groups were selected based on a pilot survey assessing over 4,500 IU students' prejudice acceptability beliefs. I selected target groups that ranged across the prejudice acceptability spectrum, from social groups where most IU students agreed prejudice expression definitely was not acceptable (e.g., blind people, the elderly) to social groups where most IU students agreed prejudice expression definitely was acceptable (e.g., rapists,

randomly assigned to consider one of ten possible target groups. For the low prejudice acceptability condition, students considered one of the following target groups: military veterans, Muslim people, financially poor people, domestic violence victims, or people living with anxiety disorders. For the high prejudice acceptability condition, students considered one of these target groups: communists, drug users, alcoholics, gang members, or hoarders. To account for this nested data structure, data was analyzed using multilevel modeling with target group treated as a random factor (Brauer & Curtin, 2018; Judd et al., 2012, 2017).

Power Analysis

A priori, I used G*Power v. 3.1 to compute the minimum acceptable sample size for the present study (Faul et al., 2009). I calculated the sample size I would need to achieve 80% power to detect a medium-sized interaction effect for a 2×2 between-subjects design. This analysis indicated that a minimum sample size of 128 people was needed, using the following parameters: test family = F-test, ANOVA (main effects and interactions); $f = .25$ (medium-sized effect); $\alpha = 0.05$, $1 - \beta = 0.80$; numerator $df = 1$; number of groups = 4. With this minimum in mind, I planned

child abusers). According to theory, I expected that prejudice acceptability beliefs would be positively related to the perceived *threat* the target group poses and, thus, negatively related to *warmth* and *competence* beliefs about the target group (Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 2002). After conducting Study 1, however, I wondered if the selected target groups also varied systematically on other stigma-related dimensions according to their prejudice acceptability level. For example, was membership in one of the high prejudice acceptability target groups, on average, perceived as more *controllable* than membership in one of the low prejudice acceptability target groups? Similarly, was membership in a high prejudice acceptability target group, on average, more *concealable* than membership in a low prejudice acceptability group? To answer these questions, I conducted another pilot study ($N = 361$ students) with a planned missing data design (Graham et al., 2006). All students saw a list of over 170 target groups (from Pilot Study 1, with some additions) and rated their prejudice acceptability beliefs for each target group. Then students were randomly assigned to rate each target group on two of the following seven stigma components: threat, warmth, competence, controllability, concealability, contact, and entitativity. As predicted, in examining ratings for the thirty target groups selected for Study 1, we found that prejudice acceptability beliefs were strongly correlated with threat beliefs ($r = .90, p < .001$), warmth perceptions ($r = -.97, p < .001$), and competence perceptions ($r = -.87, p < .001$); but prejudice acceptability was also moderately to strongly correlated with controllability perceptions ($r = .89, p < .001$), concealability perceptions ($r = .68, p < .001$), and previous contact ($r = -.50, p = .005$). Prejudice acceptability beliefs were not correlated with entitativity perceptions among the Study 1 target groups ($r = -.05, p = .80$). In Study 2, target groups were selected to address these limitations. We specifically chose target groups for the low and high prejudice acceptability conditions that were matched on controllability, concealability, contact, and entitativity. See [Appendix 3](#) for Stigma-related Dimensions Pilot Study materials.

to oversample to account for attrition and exclusions. I aimed to recruit at least 320 participants in total (or approximately 80 participants per cell, 32 participants per target group).³²

Participants

We recruited 393 introductory psychology students at Indiana University ($M_{Age} = 18.94$ years, 79.8% White, 72.3% female, see [Table 8](#) for full demographic information).³³ Random assignment to condition was successful (each cell had between 91 and 105 respondents). In exchange for their participation in a sixty-minute laboratory study ostensibly about creative writing, students earned credit toward a course requirement or were paid \$10.

Procedure

Each participant arrived at the lab individually. An experimenter greeted the participant and ushered them to a testing room where they were asked to wait until the other scheduled participant arrived. In actuality, the “other participant” was a confederate working with the experimenter. When the confederate arrived, he or she took a seat next to the participant and the

³² Late in the research process, I realized that a more appropriate power analysis would be one that factored in the nested structure of these data. Using PANGAEA (v. 0.2) software (see Westfall, 2016), I learned too late that my study design prevented me from achieving 80% power. To explain, there are at least three sources that may explain variance in my outcome measures: target group effects, confrontation condition effects, and prejudice acceptability condition effects. As such, the following parameters were used to calculate power for the current design: prejudice acceptability condition was entered as a fixed factor, with two levels (high, low); target group was entered as random factor, nested within prejudice acceptability (5 groups per Prejudice Acceptability level); confrontation condition was entered as a fixed factor with two levels (absent, present), crossed with both prejudice acceptability and target group. Because each participant was measure only once (i.e., no repeated measures), participants were entered into the design as replicates, rather than as a random factor. This power analysis specification revealed that with only 10 target groups, it would be essentially impossible to detect a medium-sized interaction effect ($d = .45$), whether I had 80 participants per cell (power = 31.2%), 800 participants per cell (power = 33.3%), or even 8000 participants per cell (power = 33.5%). The problem is that I have too few target groups. If I were to redesign the study, based on these new insights, I would use at least 30 target groups (in accordance with recommendations from experts in multilevel modeling, e.g., Hox, 1997). By doing so, I could achieve nearly 80% power (power = 77.5%) to detect a medium-sized interaction effect, with only 150 participants per cell (or 600 participants total).

³³ Four-hundred and thirty-three students originally visited the lab. One student declined to consent (0.2% of the full sample), 5 of students (1.2%) were excluded for missing 75% (or more) of their data on the key outcome variables. Another 7 students (1.6%) were excluded for failing to correctly answer the attention check question (i.e., “This is an Attention Check. Please select ‘Very much’ to show that you are paying attention.”). Another 2 students (0.4%) were excluded for failing to correctly answer the memory check questions. Finally, 25 students (5.8%) were excluded because, in the demographics portion of the study, they identified as a member of the target group they were randomly assigned to write about.

study session began. The experimenter described that the ostensible purpose of the study was to understand factors influencing the writing and evaluation of creative works.

After reading and signing informed consent documents, the experimenter asked the participant and confederate to introduce themselves to each other. Specifically, the experimenter said, “Since you’ll both be working together today, I’d like you to get to know each other a little bit. Introduce yourselves—say your name, major, and since this study is about creative writing, let’s do something fun. Share your favorite author.” The experimenter turned to the participant and asked them to go first.³⁴ After the participant answered, the confederate stated their name, that they were a psychology major, and said, “My favorite author is J.M. Rucker, but it sounds like we have similar tastes because I also really like the author you mentioned,” gesturing to the participant.³⁵ This personal disclosure would be brought up again later to bolster the realism of scripted feedback delivered to the participant.

After introductions, the experimenter explained that one person would be randomly chosen to write creatively (the writer) and the other would evaluate the written products (the evaluator). The experimenter then grabbed a small bucket filled with strips of paper and asked the participant to close their eyes and select one of the paper strips at random. In reality, this selection was rigged because all of the paper strips said “writer” on them—but the participant was told that half of the strips said “writer” and the other half said “evaluator.” The participant

³⁴ In rare instances where participants struggled to name their favorite author, the experimenter said, “It doesn’t need to be your favorite author—just pick any writer whose work you admire.” This usually worked to encourage participants to speak. But in the few cases where the participant could not come up with something, the experimenter asked the participant to name a genre of books that they enjoyed, like biographies or science-fiction stories (rather than naming a specific author).

³⁵ J.M. Rucker is a made-up author name. We chose a made-up author name (vs. a real one) so that all participants were in the identical position of not knowing the author the confederate mentioned, regardless of their literary background knowledge. In the rare cases where participants asked for more information about the author, confederates said, “He’s a newish fiction writer, specializing in short stories.”

then selected a strip of paper and revealed that they selected the writer role. The experimenter reiterated to the confederate that this meant they would take on the evaluator role.

At this point, the experimenter ushered the participant to another testing room and seated him or her at a computer. The experimenter told the participant that they would be presented with three creative writing tasks that would be strictly timed by the computer. After five minutes, the writing sample would automatically be sent to their partner for evaluation. The experimenter explained that at some points during the study session, the participant would have the opportunity to read and reflect upon their task partner's evaluations of their written work. After giving these instructions, the experimenter toggled "some settings" to "sync" the participant's computer with the confederate's computer. In reality, no syncing occurred—these "syncing" and "connection" screens were included merely to bolster the experimental cover story. Then the experimenter left the testing room. From this point forward, the participant worked alone, receiving scripted feedback from the computer.

For the first creative writing task, participants were asked to write a "day in the life" story,³⁶ wherein they composed a one-to-two paragraph story about someone based solely on a

³⁶ Variations of the "day in the life" writing task have been used in previous research to examine stereotyping processes (e.g., Wyer et al., 1998). The purpose of this task in the present study is to give participants an opportunity to stereotype about the target group. An especially appealing feature of this writing task is that it provides the perception of free choice, relative to the "Photograph-Sentence Pairs" task used in previous confronting research (e.g., Burns & Monteith, 2018; Czopp et al., 2006). In the Photograph-Sentence Pairs task, participants often realize the feedback is false and/or reject personal responsibility for using stereotypes, blaming the task for not-so-subtly forcing them to stereotype (e.g., a picture of a black man paired with the sentence "This person uses needles for recreation" is quite obviously intending to elicit the "drug user" stereotype). I also favored the "day in the life" writing task over the Photograph-Sentence Pairs task because it would be difficult to use the Photograph-Sentence Pairs task to elicit stereotypes about target groups that varied on dimensions that cannot be easily identified based on phenotypical differences (e.g., people living with anxiety disorders, alcoholics). To my knowledge, this is the first time that an experimenter is using the "day in the life" task to elicit stereotypes from people with the intention to confront them about it. Using this task (and any stereotyping task) may seem a bit risky because it relies on participants to generate common stereotypes about the target group and employ those stereotypes in their writing. However, previous research suggests that participants very often write stereotypical stories when given the "day in the life" task instructions (at least when it comes to race; see Wyer et al., 1998). To ensure that stereotyping in this task would occur beyond racial minority target groups, I conducted two pilot studies. In the first pilot study, I asked students ($N = 728$) to list the most common stereotypes (positive or negative) about the ten target groups selected for Study 2. Examination of these pilot data revealed that most people could generate positive and negative stereotypes

short “person profile.” Participants received one of ten possible person profiles (at random) that contained a fictional person’s age, gender (matched to the participant’s gender), and target group membership. Half of the participants were tasked with writing a story about a person from a low prejudice acceptability target group (i.e., a military veteran, a Muslim, a financially poor person, a domestic violence victim, or a person living with an anxiety disorder), while the other half were tasked with writing about a person from a high prejudice acceptability target group (i.e., a communist, a drug user, an alcoholic, a gang member, or a hoarder). Aside from target group membership, all other features of the profile were held constant. Example profiles are displayed below:

Example Low Prejudice Acceptability Profile:

Age:	30
Gender:	Male Female [gender-matched to participant]
Fact about this person:	This person is a practicing Muslim.

Example High Prejudice Acceptability Profile:

Age:	30
Gender:	Male Female [gender-matched to participant]
Fact about this person:	This person is a gang member.

Participants were told that these profiles were intentionally minimal in order for the researchers to test how well they could craft a story based on very little information; however, the real reason the profiles were brief was to ensure that target group membership was the most salient piece of information presented. By orienting participants to the target group and putting them under time

about all ten of the target groups. Based on those data, research assistants and I compiled the most common stereotypes for each target group and created Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) dictionaries. In a second pilot study, I asked a separate group of students ($N = 95$) to complete the “day in the life” writing task about one of the ten target groups selected for Study 2. Then I ran their stories through LIWC software. Analyses revealed that 94 of the 95 participants used at least some stereotype-relevant language in their stories. On average, about 5.40% of the words that students used in their stories were stereotype-relevant (ranging from 0.6% to 12.2% of all words used). These findings suggest that the “day in the life” task is an adequate way to elicit stereotyping among students. See [Appendix 4](#) and [Appendix 5](#) for the pilot study materials. See [Appendix 6](#) for a full list of stereotype themes.

pressure,³⁷ we expected them to write stories that drew upon common stereotypes about the target group. Later on, half would be confronted by their task partner for relying on these stereotypes in their stories, whereas the other half would be provided other negative feedback unrelated to confrontation or stereotyping (that is, they were told that their writing was uncreative).³⁸

While their ‘day in the life’ story was ostensibly being evaluated by their task partner, participants completed a second creative writing task. The two main reasons for including this second writing task were (1) to bolster the cover story that the researchers are interested in creative writing broadly and (2) to allow a reasonable amount of time to pass so that the upcoming partner feedback seemed realistic. If the situation *were* real, their task partner would need some time to evaluate the ‘day in the life’ story and write a short response—the feedback would not be immediate. For the second creative writing task, participants were asked to write a two to four-line poem about the positive and negative aspects of being an Indiana University student. They were told explicitly that the poem could be any style and did not need to rhyme (but could!). The purpose of this exercise was to make their IU student identity more salient

³⁷ In a pilot study designed to assess how students felt while writing their ‘day in the life story’ ($N = 84$), participants reported feeling under time pressure. Indeed, 61.9% said that 5 minutes was “too short” to write a story, including comments like, “Because the time was limited, I felt the need to rush through my response and create a very simplistic representation of the character.” Another 32.1% said that 5 minutes for writing the story was “just right.” Only 6.0% said that 5 minutes was “too long.” Even though they felt time pressured, pilot study participants, on average, found the task to be moderately easy ($N = 84$, $M = 2.93$, $SD = 1.60$; scale went from 1 “Extremely Easy” to 7 “Extremely Difficult”), moderately interesting ($N = 84$, $M = 3.13$, $SD = 1.03$; scale went from 1 “Not interesting at all” to 5 “Extremely Interesting”), and reported being moderately likely to recommend that their peers participate in a similar study ($N = 84$, $M = 5.57$, $SD = 1.25$; scale went from 1 “Extremely Unlikely” to 7 “Extremely Likely”). As expected, no one expressed feeling upset or uncomfortable with the writing task.

³⁸ It was important that participants in the confrontation absent condition still be given negatively valenced feedback from their partner. Being called uncreative is in many ways similar to being reprimanded for using common stereotypes—both pieces of feedback are critical of the writer and both suggest they were being ‘overly simplistic’; however, being called uncreative does not have the same negative associations that being called out for stereotyping carries.

before being confronted. If their student identity is salient, then perceptions of campus prejudice norms may also become more salient (Hogg & Reid, 2006).

Once their poem was submitted, participants learned that their computer was “retrieving” their partner’s evaluation of the first writing sample. The feedback was broken into four sections “General Feedback,” “Grammatical Structure,” “Flow/Cohesion,” and “Creative Content.”³⁹ The purpose of the “General Feedback” section was to convince participants that the feedback was indeed from the partner they met in-person earlier. It read:

“I was excited to read your story because we have similar taste in authors. Overall I thought you did a nice job, but I do have some specific feedback for you, which I’ll explain in the other sections.”

The statement called back to their earlier face-to-face interaction and supposed “common taste in authors” in order to bolster the realism of the feedback. For the “Grammatical Structure” and “Flow/Cohesion” sections, each participant received identical, lukewarm feedback. In the “Creative Content” section, each participant received a variant of the following partner feedback statements, depending on the target group they wrote about in the first task and whether they were randomly assigned to the confrontation present or confrontation absent condition:

Example Feedback for the Confrontation Present condition:

Low Prejudice Acceptability condition:

This is the area I thought could use more work. It bothered me used how much you used pretty common stereotypes about [muslims] and, at the end of the day, [muslims] are people too, just like you and me. I felt the story was kind of prejudiced to people from that group..

High Prejudice Acceptability condition:

³⁹ Grammatical and spelling errors were included in the confrontations to make the partner feedback seem more believable. It was supposedly written in only five-minutes, after all.

This is the area I thought could use more work. It bothered me used how much you used pretty common stereotypes about [gang members] and, at the end of the day, [people in gangs] are people too, just like you and me. I felt the story was kind of prejudiced to people from that group..

Example Feedback for the Confrontation Absent condition:

Low & High Prejudice Acceptability:

This is the area I thought could use more work. It bothered me used how much you used pretty common characters and plot lines and, at the end of the day, this project is supposed to be about creative writing, emphasis on the creative part. I felt the story was kind of bland and uncreative..

Immediately after reading their partner's feedback, participants reported how they were feeling, what they were thinking, and what they wanted to do next. Participants were told that their answers to these questions would be strictly confidential and would not be shared with their partner.

Consistent with Study 1, I measured the extent to which students thought their writing sample was offensive, their negative self-directed affect, negative other-directed affect, and positive affect,⁴⁰ as well as task-relevant self-corrective thoughts and behaviors and hostile-dismissive thoughts and behaviors.

After answering these questions, participants were instructed to complete the third creative writing task. For this task, participants were given an opportunity to revise and resubmit their 'day in the life' story from earlier. The survey piped forward their original essay so that participants could revise it directly in the text box (or erase it and start from scratch). They were told that whether or not they decide to incorporate any of their partner's feedback was completely up to them.

⁴⁰ In addition to these three positive affect items, I also asked students to respond to other items typically categorized under the positive affect umbrella (i.e., "excited," "enthusiastic," "creative"). In the present study, these items were not included in the positive affect composite because the specific flavor of positive affect we expect participants to feel in response to being confronted is a more "snarky" and "holier than thou" positive affect—not general positive affect.

Once the third writing task was submitted participants were asked to answer more survey questions. To bolster the cover story, participants were asked filler questions about how much they enjoy creative writing. Then participants were asked to report their prejudice norm beliefs (as a manipulation check) and their personal prejudice toward the target group they wrote their story about.

Toward the end of the survey, participants answered demographic questions, were probed for suspicion, and answered several memory-check questions to ensure that they remembered which group they wrote about and that they recognized whether their partner accused them of prejudice. Lastly, a debriefing message revealing the true purpose of the study appeared on their screen. The experimenter thanked participants for their time and assigned them research credit or gave them their payment.

Measures

To assess whether the prejudice acceptability manipulation was successful, we measured prejudice norm beliefs. Like the previous study, outcome measures included participants' offensiveness construals. In this study, we measured participants' actual (vs. anticipated) affect, thoughts, and behaviors in response to confrontation.^{41, 42} We also measured their subsequent stereotyping behaviors.

Prejudice Norm Beliefs. As a manipulation check, we asked participants to indicate the extent to which they believed prejudice expression toward the target group was descriptively (i.e., "How *common* is it for people in your community to feel negatively toward people from

⁴¹ For full Study 2 and Study 3 measures, see [Appendix 2](#).

⁴² For exploratory purposes, I also measured participants' perceptions of their partner (22-items; Kaiser & Miller, 2001), discrepancies between how participants think they should act toward the target group and how they would actually act toward the target group (16-items adapted from the Should-Would Discrepancies Questionnaire; Monteith & Voils, 1998), internal and external motivations to suppress prejudice toward the target group (10-items adapted from the IMS/EMS Scale; Plant & Devine, 1998), and personal beliefs about political correctness (3-items; Plant & Devine, 2001). Results pertaining to these measures can be found in [Appendix 7](#).

this social group?") and injunctively normative (i.e., "How *socially acceptable* is it for people in your community to feel negatively toward people from this social group?"). These two items were presented in a randomized order and averaged together to form a composite score ($\alpha = .81$). Higher values indicate that participants believe prejudice expression toward the target group is more normative.

Offensiveness. Again, the purpose of the offensiveness measure was to assess the extent to whether participants believed that prejudice expression toward the target group is harmful. Two items demonstrated strong internal consistency reliability and were averaged together to form a composite score ($\alpha = .85$; 9-point Likert scale, 1 "Not at all" to 7 "Very much"; i.e., "I am thinking that my writing was offensive." and "I am thinking that my writing was harmful to others"). Items were presented in a randomized order. Higher scores indicate that participants viewed their own writing about the target group to be more offensive.

Affect. To measure affective responses to confrontation, we asked participants to review a list of emotion words and indicate how much they currently felt each one, using a 7-point Likert scale (1 "Does not apply at all" to 7 "Applies very much"; Czopp & Monteith, 2003). First, the *negative self-directed affect* subscale assessed negative feelings toward themselves ($\alpha = .87$; 5-items, i.e., "disappointed with myself," "embarrassed," "guilty," "self-critical," and "shameful"). Second, the *negative other-directed affect* subscale assessed negative feelings toward the confronter ($\alpha = .79$; 5-items, i.e., "annoyed with my task partner," "angry with my task partner," "disgusted my task partner," "irritated," and "bothered"). Third, the *positive affect* subscale measured the anticipated presence of smug emotions in response to confrontation ($\alpha = .74$; 3-items, i.e., "amused," "entertained," "proud of myself"). Items were presented in a

randomized order. Higher scores indicate stronger endorsement of the particular emotional response.

Thoughts and Behaviors. To measure thoughts and behaviors in response to confrontation, we asked participants to review a list of cognitions and behaviors and indicate how much they currently endorsed each one, again using a 7-point Likert scale (1 “*Not at all*” to 7 “*Very much*”; Czopp & Monteith, 2003). The *self-corrective thoughts and behaviors* subscale assessed the extent to which self-regulatory thoughts and behaviors were endorsed ($\alpha = .92$, 9-items, e.g., $\alpha = .78$; 11-items, e.g., “I think I was wrong to write some of the things that I wrote,” “I want to apologize to my task partner,” “I want to thank my task partner,” and “I want to avoid writing things like this in the future”), while the *dismissive/hostile thoughts and behaviors* subscale assessed the extent to which trivializing and prejudice-justifying thoughts and behaviors were endorsed ($\alpha = .72$; 9-items, e.g., “I am thinking that my task partner is confused and doesn't really know what he/she is doing,” “I want to tell my task partner to lighten up,” and “I want to tell my task partner that they’re being stupid”). Items were presented in a randomized order. Higher scores indicate stronger endorsement of the particular cognitive/behavioral response style.

Personal Prejudice. As a covariate, we assessed participants’ explicit prejudice endorsement. Participants were asked to think about the target group depicted in the imagined scenario and rate the group along several dimensions ($\alpha = .93$, 3-items; i.e., 1 “Negative” to 9 “Positive”; 1 “Bad” to 9 “Good”; 1 “Unfavorable” to 9 “Favorable”). All items were reverse-scored and then averaged together. Higher scores indicate stronger endorsement of personal prejudice toward the target group.

Behavioral Stereotyping. As readers will recall, prior to receiving partner feedback students wrote “day in the life” stories about a target group member. Then, after receiving partner feedback, they had the opportunity to revise their stories. This set-up provided an opportunity to assess how the experimental manipulations influenced subsequent behavioral stereotyping in students’ revised stories written after they have been confronted (or not).

To assess whether the prejudice acceptability and confrontation manipulations affected students’ level of subsequent stereotyping, I used Linguistic Inquiry Word Count software (LIWC; Pennebaker et al., 2015). LIWC reads text data and compares those samples to built-in or user-generated dictionaries associated with psychological constructs of interest. Of interest here, I measured *stereotype usage* (or the proportion of stereotype-relevant words and phrases) and *emotional tone* (or the relative positive to negative affect) across students’ original and revised creative stories.

Stereotype Usage. I generated stereotype dictionaries to assess the change in stereotyping between students’ original creative stories pre-confrontation (or not) and their revised drafts post-confrontation (or not). Preparing these stereotype dictionaries involved several steps. First, I needed to determine the common stereotypes associated with the ten target groups (e.g., military veterans, gang members). In a pilot study, 728 college students were asked to list as many stereotypes as they could (positive or negative) about a subset of the ten possible target groups (e.g., military veterans, gang members). Importantly, students were told that they did not need to personally agree with the stereotypes they listed (see [Appendix 4](#) for these pilot study materials). They were encouraged to display their stereotype knowledge, not necessarily their stereotype endorsement (Devine & Elliot, 1995).

Once these qualitative data were compiled, a team of research assistants helped me code these data for stereotype themes. In total, 67 unique stereotype themes were uncovered (e.g., alone/isolated, rude/vulgar, judgmental, etc.). Each target group was associated with some (but not all) of these stereotype themes. For example, alcoholics, communists, gang members, military veterans, and poor people were associated with rudeness and vulgarity stereotypes, whereas anxious people, domestic violence victims, drug users, hoarders, and Muslim people were not. Each target group mapped onto between 20 to 33 of these stereotype themes. A full stereotype map, linking each target group to their associated stereotypes, can be found in Appendix 6.

After generating these stereotype themes, we created LIWC dictionaries to detect these themes in students' written stories. Research assistants used online thesauruses to find direct synonyms as well as related words and phrases pertaining to each stereotype theme. Finalized stereotype dictionaries ranged from 85 (minimum) to 2,141 (maximum) words and phrases. Some words and phrases appeared in multiple stereotype dictionaries, but we ensured that a particular word/phrase was not associated with any single target group more than once. In total, the master dictionary included 13,723 stereotype-related words and phrases (without duplicates).

We offer a few words of caution as readers interpret the stereotype usage findings. It is important to note that the actual stereotype content differed from one target group to the next, as did the exact number of stereotype words and phrases included in the stereotype dictionaries. For example, there were 8,136 stereotype words and phrases associated with alcoholics, but only 3,664 stereotype words and phrases associated with people living with anxiety disorders.⁴³ For

⁴³ Each target group and its associated number of stereotype-related words and phrases is listed below: military veterans (6,223 words/phrases); Muslim people (4,259 words/phrases); financially poor people (6,822 words/phrases); domestic violence victims (6,728 words/phrases); people living with anxiety disorders (3,664

this reason, the focus of the stereotype usage analyses should be placed on the relative change in stereotype usage between the Time 1 original stories and the Time 2 revised stories (vs. the raw number of stereotype words/phrases used).

Emotional Tone. To compare behavioral stereotyping more easily across the target groups, we also analyzed the change in *emotional tone* between students' Time 1 and Time 2 creative stories. LIWC has a number of built-in dictionaries. One of these dictionaries, *emotional tone*, assesses the relative amount positive to negative affect words. Higher values indicate a more positive (vs. negative) emotional tone (Cohn et al., 2004). This is useful because, unlike the stereotype dictionaries, the emotional tone dictionary is held constant across all target groups. As a result, the cross-group comparisons for this outcome are more straight-forward.

Results

Data Screening and Preliminary Analyses

Outcome variable composites were created to assess (a) offensiveness beliefs, (b) negative self-directed affect, (c) negative other-directed affect, (d) positive affect, (e) self-corrective thoughts and behaviors, and (f) dismissive/hostile thoughts and behaviors. Scales demonstrated adequate internal consistency reliability ($\alpha \geq .72$). Composite variables satisfied assumptions of normality and linearity required by general linear models.

Table 9 provides the psychometric properties of all variables. Table 10 provides zero-order correlations.

Prejudice Acceptability Condition. Unexpectedly (and inconsistent with Study 1), zero order correlational analyses revealed that prejudice acceptability condition (-1 = Low, 1 = High) *positively* predicted offensiveness perceptions ($r = .10, p = .04$), albeit weakly. That is, students

words/phrases); communists (5,577 words/phrases); drug users (7,770 words/phrases); alcoholics (8,136 words/phrases); gang members (6,736 words/phrases); hoarders (6,162 words/phrases).

in the low prejudice acceptability condition perceived their ‘day in the life’ stories as less offensive than students in the high prejudice acceptability condition. By contrast, in Study 1 this same correlational relationship was negative (vs. positive). Perhaps this reflects forecaster-experiencer differences between the two studies. When people imagine making a prejudiced joke about a target group, they may take for granted that the joke will indeed be offensive. In real life, however, experiencers may disagree that their actions were offensive, perhaps especially for low (vs. high) prejudice acceptability target groups. This may be for a couple of reasons: (1) students in the low (vs. high) prejudice acceptability condition may actually be using fewer stereotypes (or, at least, they may be using fewer overtly negative and harsh stereotypes), (2) students in the low (vs. high) prejudice acceptability condition may simply be less willing to admit that their stereotype usage is offensive because such an admission would pose a threat to their egalitarian sense of self, or (3) perhaps it’s some combination of both.

Although I cannot directly assess the hypothesis that people are less willing to admit their writing was offensive with these data, I *can* shed some light on whether *actual* stereotype usage was more negative (and, for that reason, less offensive) in the low (vs. high) prejudice acceptability condition. Using Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) software, I analyzed the emotional tone of students’ stories by their prejudice acceptability condition. When looking exclusively at the original stories students wrote (i.e., the stories written before students received ‘feedback’ from their partner), I find that students assigned to the low prejudice acceptability condition indeed wrote stories that were more positive in emotional tone ($M = 55.14$, $SD = 33.47$) than students assigned to the high prejudice acceptability condition ($M = 46.37$, $SD = 32.84$, $t(391) = 2.62$, $p = .01$, $d = .27$). Such findings suggest that the unexpectedly positive relationship between prejudice acceptability condition and offensiveness perceptions may be, at

least partly, due to the fact that students assigned to the high (vs. low) prejudice acceptability condition wrote stories that were simply more negative in tone.

Regarding the other correlations, prejudice acceptability condition did not significantly predict any of the measured affective, cognitive, or behavioral outcomes, which again differed from the previous study: negative self-directed affect ($r = .03, p = .56$); negative other-directed affect ($r = -.02, p = .65$); positive affect ($r = -.04, p = .43$); self-corrective thoughts and actions ($r = .05, p = .31$); and hostile-dismissive thoughts and actions ($r = -.08, p = .13$). It should also be noted that, as expected, personal prejudice endorsement was strongly positively correlated with prejudice acceptability condition ($r = .63, p < .001$) and that personal prejudice endorsement was also non-significantly related to all affective, cognitive, or behavioral outcomes (all $ps > .05$).

Confrontation Condition. Zero order correlational analyses revealed that confrontation condition (-1 = Absent, 1 = Present) positively predicted offensiveness perceptions ($r = .54, p < .001$). People who were confronted rated their ‘day in the life’ stories as more offensive than people who were not confronted. Confrontation was also significantly positively correlated with negative other-directed affect ($r = .20, p < .001$), self-corrective thoughts and actions ($r = .20, p < .001$), and hostile-dismissive thoughts and actions ($r = .20, p < .001$). Its relationship with negative self-directed affect ($r = .08, p = .12$) and positive affect ($r = -.04, p = .43$) were not statistically significant.

Multi-level Models

Data Analytic Strategy. Multilevel modeling (MLM), with restricted maximum likelihood estimation (ReML), was used to examine the fixed effects of prejudice acceptability condition, confrontation condition, and their interaction on all psychological outcome variables, while accounting for the random effect of target group (Level 2).

The random intercept models follow the same format as the previous study, except that the models also include confrontation condition and the prejudice acceptability × confrontation condition interaction term as predictor variables to help explain outcome scores:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_{1ij} + \beta_{2ij} + \beta_1 * \beta_{2ij} + \alpha_j^T + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

For a student (i) within a target group (j), the predicted outcome score (Y_{ij}) will be a function of the overall intercept (β_0), the fixed component of prejudice acceptability condition differences (β_{1ij}), the fixed component of confrontation condition differences (β_{2ij}), the interaction term ($\beta_1 * \beta_{2ij}$), a random component for the target group (α_j^T), and residual random error variation (ε_{ij}). For the full multilevel modeling results, see [Table 11](#).⁴⁴

Manipulation Check

To confirm that participants perceived the normative manipulation as intended, I ran a multilevel model examining the fixed effects of prejudice acceptability and confrontation on prejudice norm beliefs, with target group included as a random effect. As intended by the prejudice acceptability manipulation, a large amount of unexplained variance in prejudice norm beliefs was accounted for by the target group to which students were randomly assigned (ICC = .51). Consistent with predictions, prejudice acceptability condition significantly predicted prejudice norm beliefs, $t(8.08) = 8.82$, $b = 1.54$, $p < .001$, indicating that people randomly assigned to the low prejudice acceptability group believed prejudice expression to be less

⁴⁴ All multilevel models were run with and without personal prejudice as a covariate. Personal prejudice was not a significant covariate for the following outcomes: offensiveness beliefs ($b = -0.05$, $p = .19$), negative self-directed affect ($b = -0.09$, $p = .07$), positive affect ($b = 0.07$, $p = .12$), and self-corrective intentions ($b = -0.06$, $p = .10$). However, personal prejudice was a significant covariate in the following analyses: negative other-directed affect ($b = 0.08$, $p = .01$) and dismissive/hostile intentions ($b = 0.07$, $p = .004$). Any changes to the interpretations of results (dependent on the inclusion of personal prejudice as a covariate) are footnoted alongside the relevant analysis.

normative than people assigned to the high prejudice acceptability group. This suggests that the experimental manipulation was successful (see [Fig. 11](#)).

Interestingly, this effect was qualified by a significant prejudice acceptability \times confrontation interaction, $t(381.87) = -2.280$, $b = -0.19$, $p = .02$. To decompose this interaction, I analyzed the simple slopes. These analyses revealed that within the high prejudice acceptability condition, students who were confronted rated prejudice as less normative than students who were not confronted, $b = -0.25$, $t(381) = -2.17$, $p = .03$; however, in the low prejudice acceptability condition, people rated prejudice as fairly non-normative regardless of whether they were confronted, $b = 0.13$, $t(381) = 1.08$, $p = .28$. This provides preliminary support for the idea that confrontations may regulate prejudice expression, at least partly, because they shift people's prejudice norm beliefs. In this way, confrontation itself may be construed as a prejudice acceptability manipulation.

The fixed effect of Confrontation condition on prejudice norm beliefs was not statistically significant, $t(381.87) = -0.72$, $b = -0.06$, $p = .47$.

Primary Analyses

Offensiveness. Unlike the previous study, only a small amount of unexplained variance in offensiveness perceptions was accounted for by the target group to which students were randomly assigned ($ICC = .005$). Still, in accordance with recommendations, I proceeded with multilevel analyses to account for the nested data structure (Kreft & Leeuw, 1998). This multilevel analysis revealed a significant effect of confrontation condition, $t(389) = 12.67$, $b = 0.77$, $p < .001$, such that students confronted for expressing prejudice rated their original written stories as more offensive than students who were not confronted (see [Fig. 12](#)).

Additionally, this analysis revealed a significant effect of prejudice acceptability condition, $t(389) = 2.44$, $b = 0.15$, $p = .02$. Students assigned to the high prejudice acceptability condition rated their stories as more offensive, on average, than students assigned to the low prejudice acceptability condition. The interaction between prejudice acceptability condition and confrontation condition was not statistically significant, $t(389) = 0.82$, $b = 0.05$, $p = .41$.

As we stated above, this is inconsistent with Study 1, where students in the low prejudice acceptability condition imagined their jokes as more offensive than students in the high prejudice acceptability condition. Again, this may reflect forecaster-experiencer differences. People who imagine being confronted for making prejudiced comments may take for granted that their imagined comments are offensive, whereas people who are really confronted may disagree about their actual comments' offensiveness, perhaps especially for low (vs. high) prejudice acceptability target groups. And, at least in the present study, these experiencer perceptions may be grounded in some truth. As mentioned above, the original drafts of students' stories were more negative in emotional tone among those assigned to the high (vs. low) prejudice acceptability condition. To explore this possibility, I included the emotional tone scores for students' original stories in the model as a covariate. In doing this, the effect of confrontation on offensiveness remained significant, $t(382.43) = 12.69$, $b = 0.77$, $p < .001$, but the effect of prejudice acceptability was no longer significant, $t(7.89) = 2.16$, $b = 0.13$, $p = .06$. That is, when the emotional tone of students' written stories is held constant, prejudice acceptability had no effect on offensiveness perceptions.

Affect. Across all three affective outcomes, only a small amount of unexplained variance was accounted for by the target group to which students were randomly assigned (Negative Self-Directed Affect ICC < .001; Negative Other-Directed Affect ICC = .01; Positive Affect ICC =

.003). In accordance with recommendations, I used multilevel modeling to analyze these data (Kreft & Leeuw, 1998).

Negative Self-Directed Affect. The effects of confrontation condition, $t(389) = 1.61$, $b = 0.12$, $p = .11$, prejudice acceptability condition, $t(389) = 0.61$, $b = 0.04$, $p = .55$, and their interaction on negative self-directed affect were not statistically significant, $t(389) = -0.64$, $b = -0.05$, $p = .52$ (see [Fig. 13](#)).

Negative Other-Directed Affect. For the negative other-directed affect outcome, a multilevel analysis revealed a significant effect of confrontation condition, $t(382.44) = 4.06$, $b = 0.18$, $p < .001$, such that students who were confronted reported experiencing greater negative other-directed affect than students who were not confronted. Importantly, even though confrontation increased negative other-directed affect relative to no-confrontation, average negative-other directed affect scores remained relatively low across all conditions (all condition $M_s < 2.5$ on a 7-point scale, where 1 indicates the emotion “does not apply at all” and 7 indicates the emotion “applies very much”). Neither the effect of prejudice acceptability, $t(7.46) = -0.28$, $b = -0.02$, $p = .79$, nor the interaction effect were statistically significant, $t(382.44) = -1.99$, $b = 0.09$, $p = .05$ (see [Fig. 14](#)).

Positive Affect. Neither the effect of confrontation condition, $t(383.35) = -0.74$, $b = -0.05$, $p = .46$, nor the effect of prejudice acceptability condition were statistically significant, $t(8.02) = -0.70$, $b = -0.05$, $p = .50$. The confrontation \times prejudice acceptability interaction on positive affect was also not statistically significant, $t(383.35) = -1.44$, $b = -0.10$, $p = .15$ (see [Fig. 15](#)).

Thoughts & Behavior. Across the cognitive and behavioral outcomes, a small amount of the unexplained variance was accounted for by the target group to which participants were randomly assigned (Self-Corrective Thoughts and Behaviors $ICC < .001$; Dismissive/Hostile

Thoughts and Behaviors ICC = .007). Again, I used multilevel modeling to analyze these data (Kreft & Leeuw, 1998).

Self-Corrective Thoughts and Behaviors. This multilevel analysis revealed a significant effect of confrontation condition, $t(383.20) = 4.07$, $b = 0.21$, $p < .001$, such that students who were confronted reported more self-corrective intentions than students who were not confronted. Neither the effect of prejudice acceptability, $t(7.51) = 1.02$, $b = 0.05$, $p = .34$, nor the interaction effect were statistically significant, $t(383.20) = 0.09$, $b = 0.005$, $p = .93$ (see [Fig. 16](#)).

Dismissive/Hostile Thoughts and Behaviors. Again, the multilevel analysis revealed a significant effect of confrontation condition, $t(382.25) = 4.28$, $b = 0.22$, $p < .001$, such that students who were confronted reported more dismissive and hostile intentions than students who were not confronted. However, this effect was qualified by a prejudice acceptability \times confrontation interaction, $t(382.25) = -2.15$, $b = -0.07$, $p = .03$.⁴⁵ Surprisingly, students in the low prejudice acceptability condition who were confronted (vs. not confronted) reported more dismissive and hostile intentions, $b = 0.23$, $t(381) = 4.44$, $p < .001$; however, students in the high prejudice acceptability condition reported similarly low levels of dismissive and hostile intentions, regardless of confrontation condition, $b = 0.08$, $t(381) = 1.54$, $p = .12$ (see [Fig. 17](#)). Again, this may have something to do with the fact that students in the low prejudice acceptability condition wrote stories that were less negative in tone than students in the high prejudice acceptability condition. Students may be rejecting the confrontation more in the low prejudice acceptability simply because they disagree that their comments were offensive.

⁴⁵ When personal prejudice is added into the model as a covariate, $t(374.59) = 2.84$, $b = 0.07$, $p = .01$, only the main effect of confrontation on dismissive and hostile thoughts and behaviors remains significant $t(382.68) = 4.78$, $b = 0.17$, $p < .001$.

The main effect of prejudice acceptability on dismissive/hostile thoughts and behavioral intentions was not significant, $t(7.60) = -0.99$, $b = -0.05$, $p = .35$.

Moderated Mediation Model

As with the previous study, I hypothesized indirect effects linking prejudice acceptability and confrontation to affective responses through offensiveness (simple mediation). Additionally, I predicted indirect effects linking prejudice acceptability and confrontation to thoughts and behavior through offensiveness and affect (serial mediation). To test whether the data support these mediational predictions, I evaluated the fit of a moderated mediation model (see [Fig. 18](#)).⁴⁶ Missing data was handled using listwise deletion.

As expected, confrontation positively predicted offensiveness perceptions ($b = 0.77$, $p < .001$), such that people who were confronted rated their stories as more offensive than people who were not confronted. Unexpectedly, prejudice acceptability also positively predicted offensiveness perceptions ($b = 0.15$, $p = .01$), such that the more acceptable a particular type of prejudice was at IU, the more offensive students rated their stories to be. Again, this may be because the original story drafts were more positive in tone among those assigned to the low (vs. high) prejudice acceptability condition. When the emotional tone of students' original stories is held constant, the relationship between prejudice acceptability and offensiveness is reduced to non-significance.

As offensiveness perceptions increased, students reported experiencing greater negative self-directed emotions (e.g., guilt, embarrassment; $b = 0.52$, $p < .001$). Inconsistent with the previous study, students also reported experiencing greater (vs. fewer) negative other-directed

⁴⁶ Unlike the previous study, there was not enough variability at Level 2 for a multilevel structural equation model to reliably converge. Instead, I evaluated indirect effects using a single-level mediation model.

emotions (e.g., anger, frustration; $b = 0.12, p = .001$). Offensiveness perceptions did not significantly predict positive emotions (e.g., pride, amusement; $b = -0.06, p = .32$).

Emotional responses indeed predicted students' cognitions and behavioral intentions. Students who experienced greater negative *self*-directed affect reported self-correcting more (e.g., thinking they're wrong, wanting to apologize; $b = 0.32, p < .001$) and reacting less hostilely and dismissively (e.g., thinking the confronter is a jerk, telling the confronter he/she is stupid; $b = -0.10, p < .001$). By contrast, students who experienced greater negative *other*-directed affect reported self-correcting less ($b = -0.20, p < .001$) and reacting more hostilely and dismissively ($b = 0.55, p < .001$). Oddly, students who experienced greater positive affect reported significant increases in self-correction ($b = 0.11, p < .001$) and hostile and dismissive reactions ($b = 0.12, p < .001$).

Although there is no evidence of moderated mediation—because the interaction between prejudice acceptability and confrontation did not influence downstream responding—there is evidence of mediation and serial mediation linking confrontation to the downstream affective, cognitive, and behavioral outcomes through offensiveness. For the full listing of standardized direct and indirect path coefficients, see [Table 12](#) and [Table 13](#).

Behavioral Stereotyping

Data Analytic Strategy. Multilevel modeling (MLM), with restricted maximum likelihood estimation (ReML), was used to examine the fixed effects of prejudice acceptability condition, confrontation condition, and their interaction on the change between Time 1 and Time 2 stereotyping behaviors, while accounting for the random effects of target group and within-person factors.

The random intercept models are specified as follows:

$$Y_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_{1ijk} + \beta_{2ijk} + \beta_1 * \beta_{2ijk} + \alpha_j^T + \alpha_k^P + \varepsilon_{ijk}$$

For an observation (i) within a target group (j) and within a particular student (k), the predicted outcome score (Y_{ijk}) will be a function of the overall intercept (β_0), the fixed component of prejudice acceptability condition differences (β_{1ijk}), the fixed component of confrontation condition differences (β_{2ijk}), the interaction term ($\beta_1 * \beta_{2ijk}$), a random component for the target group (α_j^T), a random component for the participant (α_k^P), and residual random error variation (ε_{ijk}).

Stereotype Usage. Large amounts of the unexplained variance in stereotype usage were accounted for by target group (ICC = .13) and within-person factors (ICC = .54). The multilevel analysis revealed significant effects of time point, $t(388.96) = -5.71, b = -0.64, p < .001$, and confrontation, $t(637.57) = 4.49, b = 0.89, p < .001$. These effects, however, were qualified by the predicted time \times confrontation interaction, $t(388.96) = -4.94, b = -0.56, p < .001$. Simple slopes analyses were used to decompose this interaction. As predicted, among students who were not confronted, stereotype usage did not change between their original stories (Time 1) and their revised stories (Time 2), $t(391) = -0.55, b = -0.09, p = .58$. By contrast, students who were confronted revised their essays to include significantly fewer stereotypes, $t(391) = -7.70, b = -1.20, p < .001$ (see [Fig. 19A](#) and [Fig. 19B](#)). All other effects and interactions were non-significant (all $ps \geq .14$).

Emotional Tone. To compare behavioral stereotyping more easily across the target groups, we also analyzed the change in *emotional tone* between students' Time 1 and Time 2 creative stories. Again, large amounts of the unexplained variance in stereotype usage were accounted for by target group (ICC = .07) and within-person factors (ICC = .54). This multilevel analysis revealed a significant effect of confrontation, $t(631.28) = -2.69, b = -7.30, p = .007$,

which was qualified by a significant time \times confrontation interaction, $t(389.00) = 4.54, b = 7.06, p < .001$. Simple slopes analyses revealed that among students who were not confronted, the emotional tone of their stories did not change between their original (Time 1) and revised drafts (Time 2), $t(391) = -1.89, b = -4.21, p = .06$. Students who were confronted, however, revised their stories to be significantly more positive in emotional tone, $t(391) = 4.50, b = 9.76, p < .001$ (see [Fig. 20A](#) and [Fig. 20B](#)).

All other effects and interactions were non-significant (all $ps \geq .06$). However, as noted above, exploratory simple effects tests revealed that the emotional tone of student stories was more negative at Time 1 among students assigned to the high (vs. low) prejudice acceptability condition, $t(391) = -2.67, b = -4.38, p = .01$. This same pattern persisted into Time 2, $t(391) = -2.68, b = -4.41, p = .01$, where the emotional tone remained more negative for students assigned to the high (vs. low) prejudice acceptability condition.

Discussion

Building on the findings of Study 1, the goal of Study 2 was to examine how prejudice acceptability beliefs influence actual (vs. forecasted) responses to being confronted. I had competing hypotheses going into the present study. On the one hand, it was possible that when prejudice was perceived to be more (vs. less) acceptable, confrontations would backfire. Indeed, this is what forecasters expected. In Study 1, when prejudice was perceived to be more acceptable, student forecasters viewed prejudice expression as less offensive and, thus, anticipated less negative self-directed affect and self-correction after being confronted, while also anticipating greater negative other-directed affect, positive affect, and hostility. On the other hand, it was possible that confrontation would prove to be an effective prejudice reduction tactic, regardless of prejudice acceptability level. That is, if confrontation is itself a cue to prejudice

acceptability, people who are confronted (vs. not confronted) may rate their behavior as more offensive, which would increase negative self-directed affect and self-correction, perhaps even in situations where prejudice acceptability is high.

Methodologically, I found that the “day in the life” story writing paradigm that I used resulted in extensive stereotyping. Indeed, most students used common stereotype words in their initial draft of their stories, across all target groups. In fact, only 1.5% of the entire sample used no stereotype-related words and phrases at all.

Regarding my results, I found that confrontation encouraged self-regulatory responding, even when prejudice acceptability was high. Confronted students rated their original stories as more offensive than non-confronted students. As expected, offensiveness perceptions predicted greater negative self-directed affect, which predicted more self-corrective thoughts and behavioral intentions. Further, confronted students revised their creative stories using fewer stereotypes and a more positive emotional tone as compared to non-confronted students, regardless of prejudice acceptability condition.

Additionally, students who were confronted (vs. not) rated prejudice expression toward the target group as less normative, regardless of prejudice acceptability level. This supports the hypothesis that confrontation acts as a social norm manipulation by shifting prejudice acceptability beliefs downward. To the extent that prejudice expression is viewed to be offensive, students show greater negative self-directed affect and self-corrective intentions. It should be noted that even though confrontation positively predicted greater negative other-directed affect and dismissive and hostile responding as well, confronted students reported greater negative self-directed affect and self-corrective responding overall. Taken together, these findings show great promise for confrontation as a prejudice reduction strategy. Confrontation,

even in situations where prejudice acceptability is high, appears to encourage self-regulatory responding.

With regard to prejudice acceptability, however, the takeaways are less straightforward. We see clear discrepancies between how forecasters *believe* prejudice acceptability will affect their responses to confrontation (Study 1) and how it *actually* affects experiencers responses to confrontation (Study 2). Whereas forecasters expected increases in prejudice acceptability to lower the perceived offensiveness of bias, we found the opposite pattern among experiencers. Experiencers rated their creative stories as more offensive when writing about high (vs. low) prejudice acceptability groups. Though this was not expected, this pattern may reflect the fact that original story drafts of those assigned to the high (vs. low) prejudice acceptability condition were more negative in tone. As a result of this potential confound, we cannot confidently conclude much regarding prejudice acceptability from this study. To address this confound, in Study 3 I decided to hold target group constant and manipulate prejudice acceptability by varying the local social norm information presented to students, which is a common approach in many social norm studies (e.g., Goldstein et al., 2007).

Study 3

In the previous studies, we manipulated prejudice acceptability perceptions by randomly assigning participants to imagine expressing prejudice (Study 1) or actually express prejudice (Study 2) toward target groups that varied in prejudice acceptability within the college context. However, without holding target group constant and directly manipulating local social norm information, the argument positing causal links between prejudice norms, offensiveness beliefs, and reactions to confrontation is relatively weak. To remedy this, the purpose of Study 3 was to hold the target group (i.e., cigarette smokers) constant and experimentally manipulate local

prejudice norm information. From there, I tested whether these manipulations influenced offensiveness perceptions and, in turn, how people emotionally, cognitively, and behaviorally reacted to being confronted.

Method

Design

I employed a 2 (Prejudice Acceptability: Low and High) \times 2 (Confrontation: Absent, Present) between-subjects, experimental design.

Power Analysis

I used G*Power v. 3.1 software to compute the a priori minimum acceptable sample size for this study (Faul et al., 2007). I sought to detect a medium-sized effect for a two factor, between-subjects experimental design at the standard .05 alpha error probability, with 80% power. This power analysis revealed a minimum sample size of 128 people was needed, using the following parameters: test family = F-test, ANOVA (main effects and interactions); $f = .25$ (medium-sized effect); $\alpha = 0.05$, $1 - \beta = 0.80$; numerator $df = 1$; number of groups = 4. With this minimum in mind, I planned to oversample to account for attrition and exclusions. I aimed to recruit 320 participants in total (or approximately 80 participants per cell).

Participants

I recruited 318 non-smoking, introductory psychology students at Indiana University ($M_{Age} = 20.0$ years, 68.6% White, 65.4% female, see [Table 14](#) for complete demographic information).⁴⁷ Random assignment to condition was successful (each cell had between 76 and

⁴⁷ Three-hundred and sixty-eight students originally entered the survey, but 9 of these students (2.4% of the full sample) were excluded for missing 75% (or more) of their data on the key outcome variables. Another 12 students (3.2%) were excluded for failing to correctly answer the attention check question (i.e., “This is an Attention Check. Please select ‘Very much’ to show that you are paying attention.”). Another 22 students (6.0%) were excluded for failing to correctly answer one ($n = 20$) or both ($n = 2$) of the memory check questions assessing students’ memory of the experimental manipulations. Finally, 7 students (1.9%) were excluded because they identified as cigarette smokers in the demographics portion of the study.

82 respondents). In exchange for their participation, students earned credit toward a course requirement or were paid \$10.

Procedure

The procedure for Study 3 was almost identical to the procedure for Study 2, with two notable differences. The first difference is that I held target group constant. In the present study, all students wrote “day in the life” stories about *cigarette smokers*. Cigarette smokers were selected as the focal target group because pilot data revealed that Indiana University students’ ($N = 4,586$) expressed uncertainty about prejudice norms toward smokers—that is, there was little *social norm clarity*. On a 3-point scale where “1” meant it definitely was *not* okay to feel negatively toward smokers and “3” meant it definitely *was* okay to feel negatively, the average rating was 1.87 with a standard deviation of 0.67. Examining the frequencies, 52.8% of students selected “2” on the scale, and the remainder of students were pretty split (30.2% selected “1” and 17.0% selected “3” on the scale). Consistent with previous research suggesting that people’s normative beliefs about target groups may be more suggestible when social norm clarity is low (Zitek & Hebl, 2007), I reasoned that it would be easier to shift students’ social norm beliefs about cigarette smokers compared to other target groups, for whom social norm clarity may be higher.⁴⁸

The second difference between this study and the previous one is that in this study participants were randomly assigned to receive descriptive norm information about campus attitudes toward cigarette smokers. Before writing their original “day in the life” story, half of the students learned that it was descriptively normal on campus to have negative feelings toward smokers (high prejudice acceptability), while the other half learned that it was descriptively

⁴⁸ Presently, tobacco use is banned on Indiana University property.

normal to have neutral feelings toward smokers (low prejudice acceptability).⁴⁹ These norm manipulations are printed below:

High Prejudice Acceptability

You have been randomly assigned to write a story about a day in the life of a **cigarette smoker**.

Before writing your story, you may be interested to know that Indiana University administrators recently conducted a high-profile survey to understand students' attitudes toward smoking on campus. They hope that the results of this survey will inform campus policy decisions.

Results of this survey revealed that Indiana University students have overwhelmingly negative opinions of smoking on campus. Almost 75% of IU students reported having negative feelings toward smokers. In fact, when asked whether the university should continue to ban cigarette smoking on all parts of campus, most students supported the ban.

Low Prejudice Acceptability

You have been randomly assigned to write a story about a day in the life of a **cigarette smoker**.

Before writing your story, you may be interested to know that Indiana University administrators recently conducted a high-profile survey to understand students' attitudes toward smoking on campus. They hope that the results of this survey will inform campus policy decisions.

Results of this survey revealed that Indiana University students lack strong opinions about smoking on campus. Almost 75% of IU students reported having neutral feelings toward smokers. In fact, when asked whether the university should continue to ban cigarette smoking on all parts of campus, most students opposed the ban.

Then the remainder of Study 3 proceeded in the exact same fashion as Study 2.

Measures

The measures used in Study 3 were identical to the measures used in Study 2. As a manipulation check, participants were asked to report their prejudice norm beliefs about cigarette smokers ($\alpha = .74$; 2-items). For outcomes, I again measured negative self-directed affect ($\alpha = .84$; 5-items, i.e., “disappointed with myself,” “embarrassed,” “guilty,” “self-critical,” and “shameful”), negative other-directed affect ($\alpha = .83$; 5-items, i.e., “annoyed with my task partner,” “angry with my task partner,” “disgusted my task partner,” “irritated,” and “bothered”), and positive affect ($\alpha = .75$; 3-items, i.e., “amused,” “entertained,” “proud of myself”), as well as

⁴⁹ I chose to contrast “negative feelings” toward smokers with “neutral feelings” because it seemed odd and unbelievable that the majority of Indiana University students would have “positive feelings” toward smokers, given the widely known negative health consequences of smoking and second-hand smoking (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2014).

task-relevant self-corrective thoughts and behaviors ($\alpha = .79$; 11-items, e.g., “I think I was wrong to write some of the things that I wrote,” “I want to apologize to my task partner,” “I want to thank my task partner,” and “I want to avoid writing things like this in the future”) and hostile-dismissive thoughts and behaviors ($\alpha = .73$; 9-items, e.g., “I think there’s nothing wrong with what I wrote”, “I am thinking that my task partner is confused and doesn't really know what he/she is doing,” “I want to tell my task partner to lighten up,” and “I want to tell my task partner that they’re being stupid”). I also measured the extent to which they thought their writing sample was offensive ($\alpha = .87$; 2-items, i.e., “I am thinking that my writing was offensive” and “I am thinking that my writing was harmful to others”). Then participants were asked to report their personal prejudice toward cigarette smokers ($\alpha = .82$; 3-items).

Results

Data Screening and Preliminary Analyses

As with the previous studies, outcome variable composites were created to assess (a) offensiveness beliefs, (b) negative self-directed affect, (c) negative other-directed affect, (d) positive affect, (e) self-corrective thoughts and behaviors, and (f) dismissive/hostile thoughts and behaviors. Scales demonstrated adequate internal consistency reliability ($\alpha \geq .73$). Composite variables satisfied assumptions of normality and linearity required by general linear models.

Table 15 provides the psychometric properties of all variables. Table 16 provides zero-order correlations.

Prejudice Acceptability Condition. Inconsistent with Study 1 (where prejudice acceptability condition significantly negatively predicted offensiveness perceptions) and Study 2 (where it significantly positively predicted offensiveness perceptions), zero order correlational

analyses revealed that prejudice acceptability condition (-1 = Low, 1 = High) did not significantly predict offensiveness perceptions ($r = .01, p = .83$). In fact, of the measured affective, cognitive, or behavioral outcomes, prejudice acceptability condition only significantly predicted negative other-directed affect ($r = -.12, p = .03$), such that as prejudice acceptability increased, negative other-directed affect decreased.

Confrontation Condition. Consistent with Study 2, zero order correlational analyses revealed that confrontation condition (-1 = Absent, 1 = Present) positively predicted offensiveness perceptions ($r = .53, p < .001$). People who were confronted rated their ‘day in the life’ stories as more offensive than people who were not confronted. Also like the previous study, confrontation positively predicted self-corrective thoughts and actions ($r = .18, p = .001$) and hostile-dismissive thoughts and actions ($r = .14, p = .01$). Its direct correlational relationship with negative self-directed affect ($r = .04, p = .44$), negative other-directed affect ($r = -.02, p = .76$), and positive affect ($r = -.04, p = .52$) were not statistically significant.

Manipulation Check

To confirm that students perceived the normative manipulation as intended, we conducted a 2 (prejudice acceptability) \times 2 (confrontation) ANOVA that revealed a significant main effect of prejudice acceptability, $F(1, 314) = 169.20, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .35$. As expected, students assigned to the high prejudice acceptability condition perceived prejudice toward cigarette smokers to be significantly more normative ($M = 7.26, SD = 1.33$) than students assigned to the low prejudice acceptability condition ($M = 4.97, SD = 1.79, p < .001, d = 1.45$). Moreover, consistent with the view that interpersonal confrontations communicate social norm information (specifically, that prejudice expression is *not* socially acceptable), there was a significant main effect of confrontation condition, $F(1, 314) = 6.79, p = .01, \eta_p^2 = .02$. Students

who were confronted for expressing prejudice about smokers perceived prejudice toward cigarette smokers to be less socially normative ($M = 5.89, SD = 1.99$) than students who were not confronted ($M = 6.33, SD = 1.89, p = .01, d = 0.23$; see [Fig. 21](#)). The interaction effect was not statistically significant, $F(1, 314) = 0.26, p = .61, \eta_p^2 = .001$.⁵⁰

Offensiveness

An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of confrontation, $F(1, 314) = 119.64, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .28$, such that students who were confronted for expressing prejudice rated their own creative stories about smokers as more offensive ($M = 2.79, SD = 1.66$) than students who were not confronted ($M = 1.22, SD = 0.66, p < .001, d = 1.23$). It is important to note that the average offensiveness ratings were below the midpoint of the scale, even when students *were* confronted. This suggests that students may largely rate prejudice expression toward smokers as inoffensive (see [Fig. 22](#)). Unlike Study 2 (where target groups varied), when target group was held constant the main effect of prejudice acceptability on offensiveness was not statistically significant, $F(1, 314) = 0.12, p = .73, \eta_p^2 < .001$. People assigned to the high and low prejudice acceptability conditions rated prejudice expression toward smokers to be similarly inoffensive. The interaction effect was not statistically significant, $F(1, 314) = 0.18, p = .67, \eta_p^2 = .001$

Affect

Negative self-directed affect. There were no significant main effects of confrontation, $F(1, 314) = 0.61, p = .44, \eta_p^2 = .002$, or prejudice acceptability condition on negative self-

⁵⁰ All two-way ANOVAs were run with and without personal prejudice as a covariate. Personal prejudice was not a significant covariate for the following outcomes: offensiveness beliefs ($b = 0.01, p = .86$), negative self-directed affect ($b = 0.02, p = .79$), and dismissive/hostile intentions ($b = 0.02, p = .60$). However, personal prejudice was a significant covariate in the following analyses: negative other-directed affect ($b = 0.11, p = .03$), positive affect ($b = -0.24, p < .001$), self-corrective intentions ($b = -0.13, p = .01$). There were no changes to the interpretations of results dependent on the inclusion of personal prejudice as a covariate.

directed affect, $F(1, 314) < 0.001, p = .99, \eta_p^2 < .001$. The interaction was also not significant, $F(1, 314) = 0.38, p = .54, \eta_p^2 = .001$ (see [Fig. 23](#), Panel A).

Negative other-directed affect. An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of prejudice acceptability, $F(1, 314) = 4.73, p = .03, \eta_p^2 = .02$, such that students assigned to the low prejudice acceptability condition reported greater negative-other directed affect ($M = 2.04, SD = 1.11$) than students assigned to the high prejudice acceptability condition ($M = 1.78, SD = 0.97, p = .03, d = 0.24$; see [Fig. 23](#), Panel B). Neither the main effect of confrontation, $F(1, 314) = 0.08, p = .78, \eta_p^2 = .001$, nor the interaction effect were statistically significant, $F(1, 314) = 0.94, p = .33, \eta_p^2 = .003$.

Positive affect. There were no significant main effects of confrontation, $F(1, 314) = 0.40, p = .53, \eta_p^2 = .001$, or prejudice acceptability condition on positive affect, $F(1, 314) = 0.01, p = .94, \eta_p^2 = .001$. The interaction was also not significant, $F(1, 314) = 2.22, p = .14, \eta_p^2 = .01$ (see [Fig. 23](#), Panel C).

Thoughts & Behavior

Self-corrective. An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of confrontation, $F(1, 314) = 10.67, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .03$, such that students who were confronted for expressing prejudice about smokers expressed more self-corrective thoughts and behavioral intentions ($M = 3.41, SD = 1.19$) than students who were not confronted ($M = 3.03, SD = 0.82, p = .001, d = 0.37$; see [Fig. 24](#), Panel A). Neither the main effect of prejudice acceptability, $F(1, 314) = 0.04, p = .84, \eta_p^2 < .001$, nor the interaction effect were statistically significant, $F(1, 314) = 0.004, p = .95, \eta_p^2 < .001$.

Dismissive and hostile. An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of confrontation, $F(1, 314) = 6.75, p = .01, \eta_p^2 = .02$, such that students who were confronted for expressing

prejudice about smokers expressed more hostile and dismissive thoughts and behavioral intentions ($M = 2.42$, $SD = 0.73$) than students who were not confronted ($M = 2.20$, $SD = 0.76$, $p = .01$, $d = 0.30$; see [Fig. 24](#), Panel B). Neither the main effect of prejudice acceptability, $F(1, 314) = 1.30$, $p = .26$, $\eta_p^2 = .004$, nor the interaction effect were statistically significant, $F(1, 314) = 3.58$, $p = .06$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$.

Moderated Mediation

Consistent with the previous studies, I hypothesized indirect effects linking prejudice acceptability and confrontation to affective responses through offensiveness (simple mediation) and indirect effects linking prejudice acceptability and confrontation to thoughts and behavior through offensiveness and affect (serial mediation). To test whether the data support these mediational predictions, I evaluated the fit of a moderated mediation model (see [Fig. 25](#)). Missing data was handled such that only complete cases were included (i.e., listwise deletion).

As with the previous study, confrontation positively predicted offensiveness perceptions ($b = 0.79$, $p < .001$), such that people who were confronted rated their stories about a cigarette smoker as more offensive than people who were not confronted. In this study, prejudice acceptability did not significantly predict offensiveness perceptions ($b = -0.03$, $p = .72$), nor did the interaction between prejudice acceptability and confrontation ($b = 0.03$, $p = .66$).

As offensiveness perceptions increased, students reported experiencing greater negative self-directed emotions (e.g., guilt, embarrassment; $b = 0.50$, $p < .001$). However, offensiveness perceptions did not predict negative other-directed emotions (e.g., anger, frustration; $b = 0.06$, $p = .15$) or positive emotions (e.g., pride, amusement; $b = -0.01$, $p = .89$).

Emotional responses again predicted students' cognitions and behavioral intentions. Students who experienced greater negative *self*-directed affect reported self-correcting more

(e.g., thinking they're wrong, wanting to apologize; $b = 0.37, p < .001$) and reacting less hostilely and dismissively (e.g., thinking the confronter is a jerk, telling the confronter he/she is stupid; $b = -0.11, p = .001$). By contrast, students who experienced greater negative *other*-directed affect reported self-reflecting and self-correcting less ($b = -0.22, p < .001$) and reacting more hostilely and dismissively ($b = 0.47, p < .001$). Students who experienced greater positive affect reported significant increases in self-reflecting and self-correcting ($b = 0.11, p < .001$) and reacting more hostilely and dismissively ($b = 0.09, p < .001$), like in Study 2.

Like the previous study, there is no evidence of moderated mediation. The interaction between prejudice acceptability and confrontation did not influence downstream responding. Confrontation predicted offensiveness perceptions, which had downstream implications for affective reactions, cognitions, and behavioral intentions. For the full listing of standardized direct and indirect path coefficients, see [Table 17](#) and [Table 18](#).

Behavioral Stereotyping

As with the previous study, we examined whether our predictors *influenced stereotype usage* (i.e., the proportion of stereotype-relevant words/phrases used) and *emotional tone* (i.e., the relative proportion of positive to negative words, with higher scores indicating a more positive tone) within participants' original and revised creative stories, as assessed by LIWC software (Pennebaker et al., 2015).

Data Analytic Strategy. To examine whether prejudice acceptability and confrontation influenced behavioral stereotyping, I conducted two repeated measures ANOVAs, with prejudice acceptability and confrontation entered as between-subjects predictors and time point as a within-subjects predictor.

Stereotype Usage. In this study, target group was held constant and, therefore, so were the stereotype dictionaries. In total, 26 stereotype themes related to cigarette smokers were detected, including “addicted,” “angry,” and “anxious” (see [Appendix 6](#) for the full list of stereotype themes).⁵¹ This analysis revealed a significant main effect of confrontation, $F(1, 314) = 4.63, p = .03, \eta_p^2 = .02$, and a significant main effect of time point, $F(1, 314) = 24.67, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .07$, which were both qualified by the predicted confrontation \times time point interaction, $F(1, 314) = 9.66, p = .002, \eta_p^2 = .03$. As expected, before receiving partner feedback (Time Point 1), stereotype usage in students’ original creative story drafts did not differ by confrontation condition ($M_{Absent} = 5.34, SD_{Absent} = 2.11; M_{Present} = 5.21, SD_{Present} = 2.56; p = .64, d = 0.05$). However, after receiving partner feedback (Time Point 2), students who were confronted used significantly fewer stereotype-relevant words in their revised stories ($M_{Present} = 4.31, SD_{Present} = 2.15$) than students who were merely given critical feedback but were not confronted ($M_{Absent} = 5.13, SD_{Absent} = 1.88, p < .001, d = 0.41$; see [Fig. 26A](#) and [Fig. 26B](#)). Neither the main effect of prejudice acceptability, nor the remaining two-way and three-way interactions were statistically significant (all $ps \geq .14$).

Emotional Tone. When evaluating the emotional tone of students’ creative stories, no significant main effects emerged (all $ps \geq .05$); however, the confrontation \times time point interaction, $F(1, 314) = 28.92, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .08$, and prejudice acceptability \times time point interaction emerged as significant, $F(1, 314) = 9.07, p = .003, \eta_p^2 = .03$. The three-way interaction was not statistically significant, $F(1, 314) = 0.004, p = .95, \eta_p^2 < .001$.

Starting with the confrontation \times time point interaction, simple effects tests revealed that before receiving partner feedback (Time Point 1), the emotional tone of students’ original

⁵¹ The master LIWC stereotype dictionary linked cigarette smokers with 5,306 stereotype-related words and phrases.

creative stories did not differ by confrontation condition ($M_{Absent} = 46.05$, $SD_{Absent} = 30.46$; $M_{Present} = 43.29$, $SD_{Present} = 29.17$; $p = .41$, $d = 0.09$). After receiving partner feedback (Time Point 2), however, confronted students' revised stories had a significantly more positive emotional tone ($M_{Present} = 54.08$, $SD_{Present} = 27.85$) than non-confronted students' revised stories ($M_{Absent} = 40.15$, $SD_{Absent} = 29.79$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.49$). Interestingly, as students who were confronted revised their stories to be significantly more positive in tone ($M_{Difference} = 10.78$, $SE = 2.17$, $p < .001$, $d_z = 0.38$), students who were not confronted revised their stories to be significantly more negative in tone, perhaps in an effort to make their story more “creative” ($M_{Difference} = -5.96$, $SE = 2.24$, $p = .01$, $d_z = 0.21$; [Fig. 27A](#) and [Fig. 27B](#)).

Turning next to the prejudice acceptability \times time point interaction, simple effects tests revealed that positive emotional tone did not differ between students assigned to the low and high prejudice acceptability conditions at Time 1 ($M_{Low} = 44.34$, $SD_{Low} = 30.36$; $M_{High} = 44.92$, $SD_{High} = 29.29$; $p = .84$, $d = 0.02$). At Time 2, however, students assigned to the low prejudice acceptability condition wrote stories that were significantly more positive in emotional tone ($M_{Low} = 51.64$, $SD_{Low} = 28.98$) than students assigned to the high prejudice acceptability condition ($M_{High} = 42.96$, $SD_{High} = 29.65$; $p = .01$, $d_z = 0.30$).

Discussion

Much like Study 2, the goal of Study 3 was to examine whether *forecasted* responses to confrontation accorded with *actual* responses to confrontation. However, in this study we held target group constant and manipulated prejudice acceptability by presenting students with ostensible local norm information. Overall, we again found evidence that confrontation led to self-regulation, regardless of prejudice acceptability condition. Consistent with Study 2, students who were confronted (vs. not) rated their original creative stories as more offensive. These

offensiveness perceptions positively predicted negative self-directed affect, which, in turn, positively predicted self-corrective thoughts and behaviors. Although confrontation (vs. no confrontation) again predicted greater dismissive and hostile thoughts and behavioral intentions, overall, greater self-corrective responses to confrontation were reported. Additionally, students who were confronted for expressing prejudice toward smokers (vs. not confronted) revised their stories to use fewer stereotypes and to have a more positive emotional tone. This behavioral self-correction was somewhat stronger for students in the low (vs. high) prejudice acceptability condition.

Further, this study provides further evidence that forecasters expect prejudice acceptability to elicit different emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses to confrontation than experiencers actually exhibit. When prejudice acceptability is high (vs. low), Forecasters expect that they will perceive prejudice expression as less offensive and, consequently, respond with less self-regulation after being confronted. However, experiencers appear to perceive prejudice expression as similarly offensive and engage in largely the same amount of self-regulation, regardless of whether prejudice acceptability is high or low. That is, confrontation reduced prejudiced responding, even in situations where prejudice expression was depicted as normative. Simply put, confrontations appear robust to a fair degree of perceived social norm variability.

General Discussion

Interpersonal confrontation has been heralded as a successful prejudice reduction strategy, one that is flexible, personally empowering, and surprisingly effective (Czopp & Ashburn-Nardo, 2012). At its core, the process of confronting is simple. A confronter witnesses prejudice expression and then makes their disapproval of such expression directly known to the

confrontee, through some sort of verbal or non-verbal behavior (Czopp, 2019; Shelton et al., 2006). According to earlier models, confrontations were theorized to curb prejudice expression along two pathways (Czopp et al., 2006), one self-regulatory path and another norm compliance path. Along the former path, confrontations are thought to induce a self-regulatory cycle, whereby confrontation makes confrontees aware of prejudice-related discrepancies (or discrepancies between their own behavior and their non-prejudiced *self*-standards for behavior). This recognition prompts guilt and self-corrective action, ultimately reducing prejudice expression going forward. Along the norm compliance path, by contrast, confrontation is thought to make salient local non-prejudiced norms. Upon being confronted then, confrontees are forced to recognize a discrepancy between their own behavior and the non-prejudiced *social*-standards for behavior that are prevalent in their local context, inducing behavioral compliance with those non-prejudiced norms.

Although confrontation researchers have long speculated that perceiving egalitarian norms in the local context is critical for inducing compliance with confrontation, particularly when confrontees lack strong self-standards for non-prejudiced behavior (e.g., Czopp et al., 2006), until now this assumption has not been empirically tested. Prior to the present studies, the published research assessing the prejudice-reducing effects of interpersonal confrontation had been conducted under seemingly *optimal social conditions*, like contexts with strong *social*-standards for non-prejudiced behavior and where prejudice acceptability is uniformly low. Due to these situational constraints, confrontees may have been predisposed to accept the notion that their prejudice expression is *offensive* (Burns & Monteith, 2018; Chaney & Sanchez, 2018; Czopp et al., 2006; Mallett & Wagner, 2011; Parker et al., 2018), which has been theorized as a critical situational construal for prompting prejudice suppression (Czopp & Ashburn-Nardo,

2012). A central question left unanswered by the current literature concerned whether confrontation would continue to be an effective prejudice reduction strategy in the perceived absence of egalitarian social norms. The present research program is among the first to test confrontation effectiveness in situations where local prejudice norms are more permissive of bias expression. In doing so, I investigated two major research questions. First, I assessed whether the effectiveness of confrontation varied depending on prejudice acceptability. Second, I examined whether the intuitions of forecasters aligned (or, as we'll see in this case, misaligned) with the realities of experiencers.

So, does prejudice acceptability influence confrontation effectiveness? Well, it depends who you ask. For forecasters, increases in prejudice acceptability predicted decreases in offensiveness perceptions, which ultimately meant lowered negative self-directed affect and fewer self-corrective intentions. It also meant increases in negative other-directed affect, positive affect, and dismissive/hostile intentions. Put simply, forecasters expected confrontations to be at increased risk of backfiring when prejudice acceptability was high (vs. low or moderate). These forecaster findings are quite consistent with the intuitions of scholars who warned that confrontations might be less effective when social pressure to suppress prejudice expression is weak (Czopp et al., 2006).

Among experiencers, however, prejudice acceptability did not exhibit consistent effects on reactions to being confronted. In Study 2, increases in prejudice acceptability unexpectedly predicted *increases* in offensiveness perceptions (though, as described above, this may have been due to a methodological confound)⁵² and in Study 3, prejudice acceptability did not predict

⁵² Unexpectedly, Study 2 participants in the high prejudice acceptability condition rated their own behavior as significantly more offensive than participants in the low prejudice acceptability condition. As discussed earlier, this is likely due to the fact that their stories, on average, were more negative in tone. This main effect of prejudice acceptability was not found in Study 3, where target group was held constant.

offensiveness perceptions at all. There were almost no direct effects of prejudice acceptability on emotional, cognitive, or behavioral outcomes among experiencers (see [Table 19](#) for a high-level summary of these results).

Even though prejudice acceptability did not consistently impact offensiveness construals, I found across all three studies that offensiveness construals were a key predictor of self-regulation. Perceiving one's own actions as more offensive (vs. less) prompted increased negative self-directed affect (e.g., guilt, embarrassment), which, in turn, promoted self-corrective and reflective responding (e.g., apologizing, wanting to avoid bias expression in the future). Such a finding is an important proof of concept for the *Credible Cues Model for Responding to Prejudice Confrontations*, which posits that offensiveness construals (along with other construals that signal confronter credibility) are important in determining whether confrontations will be deemed credible (and, in turn, foster self-regulation) or deemed not credible (and backfire).

Taken together, these findings suggest that although prejudice acceptability may be an important cue that forecasters use to determine their *anticipated* affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses to confrontation, prejudice acceptability is a less important cue for experiencers. Instead, among experiencers it appears that *confrontation itself* signals to confrontees that their behavior is offensive, and, in turn, it encourages self-regulatory responding and stereotype suppression. This occurred even when the confrontation was on behalf of a high prejudice acceptability group (e.g., gang members, hoarders, and alcoholics) and when students were explicitly told that prejudice toward a group was common at their university (i.e., telling students that 75% of other students feel negatively towards cigarette smokers and smoking). Why might confrontation positively predict offensiveness beliefs, above and beyond prejudice acceptability? Well, I provide some evidence that confrontation itself may be acting as a social

norm manipulation, influencing students' beliefs about whether prejudice expression is socially permissible in the campus context. Merely being confronted for prejudice expression (vs. not) suggests that such behavior is non-normative. Much research shows that prejudice norms are quite malleable (Crandall & Warner, 2005). Indeed, prejudice expressions that at one point in time were considered socially acceptable (e.g., women in the workplace, transgender people, interracial couples), nowadays seems unreasonable and obviously offensive. Confrontation may be one method of communicating these prejudice norms. And perhaps this feature of confrontation is underappreciated, as evidenced by the fact that forecasters do not seem to anticipate this norm-signaling function.

Theoretical Implications

Expanding upon earlier confrontation models, in this dissertation I proposed and began testing components of the *Credible Cues Model for Responding to Prejudice Confrontations*. This model serves as a framework for understanding how situational cues can influence confrontees' affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses to confrontation. In short, the model assumes that being confronted prompts a state of uncomfortable psychological arousal within the confrontee, because it poses a threat to their self-integrity (Stone & Cooper, 2001). Motivated to reduce the uncomfortable tension brought about by confrontation, the model proposes that confrontees scan the local environment for cues signaling whether the confrontation is credible, that is, whether it is justified, warranted, and reasonable. During this scanning phase, confrontees will assess the offensiveness of their so-called 'prejudice expression' by questioning whether their behavior violated their self-standards (e.g., "*Do I think I acted in a way that was offensive, harmful, or undesirable?*") or the local context's social-standards (e.g., "*Do reasonable others here think I acted in a way that was offensive, harmful, or undesirable?*"). As I mentioned above,

the present studies support the notion that offensiveness construals shape downstream affective, cognitive, and behavioral responding to confrontation. Indeed, when students anticipated perceiving or actually perceived their prejudice expression to be offensive, they tended to report increased negative self-directed emotions, self-corrective intentions, and engage in more stereotype suppression. One of the theoretical innovations of this work is it recognizes the role of credibility construals, operationalized through the perceived offensiveness of one's own behavior, which moderates whether an individual recognizes that a prejudice-related discrepancy indeed occurred (fostering self-regulation processes) or not (instigating confrontation backfiring effects).

Importantly, the situational cues that shaped these offensiveness construals differed for forecasters and experiencers. Forecasters were sensitive to the cue of prejudice acceptability and this influenced their offensiveness perceptions; however, this was not the case for experiencers. This finding fits within a broader social psychological literature showing that there are often wide gaps between how forecasters believe they will respond to events and how experiencers actually respond (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1998). Pertaining to confrontation, such work has mostly focused on forecaster-experiencer discrepancies among confronters. Generally, researchers find that experiencers are much less likely to confront prejudice than forecasters expect (Brinkman et al., 2011; J. R. Crosby & Wilson, 2015; Hyers, 2007, 2010; Karmali et al., 2017; Kawakami et al., 2009; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 1999; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001). Research investigating forecaster-experiencer discrepancies among confrontees has been much sparser. Prior to the present research, only two studies addressing this topic have been published. In that work, although high-prejudice confrontees forecast that they would respond to confrontations with anger and dismissiveness (Czopp & Monteith, 2003), most actually

responded with guilt and complied with the confronter's request to stereotype less (Czopp et al., 2006). Thus, the present research adds to this growing literature and also serves as a cautionary tale for those who may believe that cues that influence forecasters responses to confrontation (e.g., prejudice acceptability) are the same cues that impact experiencers' reactions.

Overall, the results of these studies are quite promising for the Credible Cues Model. Still, many components of the model remain to be tested. For instance, the model hinges on the idea that confrontees are ultimately interested in assessing the credibility of a confrontation—that is, they intend to determine whether the confrontation is warranted. The present studies infer credibility beliefs based on the offensiveness outcome, and do not measure credibility directly. Thus, measuring credibility beliefs directly seems to be an obvious direction for future research.

Additionally, although the present research highlighted offensiveness construals as one key factor that confrontees use to assess a confrontation's credibility, many other factors may shape confrontees' credibility assessments. For example, confrontees may scan for cues that signal whether they are indeed responsible for the bad behavior for which they were accused (i.e., responsibility construals). For instance, they might question whether they had any control over their own behavior or whether it was forced. Rejecting responsibility for one's actions is one of the easiest ways to alleviate the uncomfortable psychological tension brought about by cognitive dissonance (Gosling et al., 2006). If confrontees do not assume responsibility for engaging in biased behavior—and instead assign blame elsewhere—they may feel little motivation to self-regulate (J. Cooper & Fazio, 1984). In the present studies, I provided students with a great deal of free choice in their written responses. This was by design, because I wanted to make it difficult for students to reject responsibility for their bias expression. Future research, however, should examine the role of responsibility construals in their own right, determining

whether accepting responsibility is a necessary condition for confrontation to effectively suppress prejudice expression.

Practical Implications

The present work offers some practical takeaways for people interested in confronting prejudice. First, these findings suggest that people's intuitions about whether a confrontation will succeed or backfire, at least in some instances, may be more pessimistic than the reality. Forecasters anticipated that being confronted when prejudice acceptability was high would result in backfiring effects, but this was not the case for experiencers. Although experiencers who were confronted (vs. not) did report greater negative other-directed affect and dismissive/hostile behavioral intentions, confrontation also led to greater negative self-directed affect, self-corrective thoughts and behavioral intentions, and reduced stereotyping. To the extent that people use their own forecasted feelings, thoughts, and behavior as a gauge for how they expect others to feel, think, and behave (e.g., Ramnani & Miall, 2004), then potential confronters may be more fearful of their own confrontations backfiring when prejudice acceptability is high (and, therefore, be more hesitant to confront prejudice) than is warranted. My data shows that even in these cases, confronting can effectively instigate self-regulation and self-corrective behaviors.

Second, if offensiveness construals are indeed an important factor in determining whether confrontations will succeed or backfire (as the present data suggest), then practitioners may want to consider how they can construct confrontations to maximize offensiveness construals. Perhaps appeals to the offensiveness of biased behavior can be incorporated into the confrontation message itself, explicitly or implicitly. The present research cannot say one way or the other whether this tactic will prove effective, but it certainly seems a promising direction for future research.

Limitations and Future Directions

All studies have limitations, but such limitations often provide exciting avenues for future research. For example, one limitation of the present research involves the extremity (or lack thereof) of the confrontation situation. Earlier I asked readers to imagine an extreme prejudice confrontation scenario occurring at the epicenter of a Unite the Right rally, where prejudice expression toward racial and religious minoritized groups is prevalent. In light of the present findings, should we expect confrontation to effectively reduce prejudice expression in the Unite the Right setting? Even in my more optimistic moments, I have doubts. My data suggest that confrontation effectively reduces prejudice expression, regardless of prejudice acceptability. However, there may be extreme normative circumstances beyond the purview of the present research that render confrontation ineffective (e.g., at a Unite the Right rally where confrontees are surrounded by and prodded on by likeminded others). For these reasons, it will be important to conduct similar research in the field where there are extreme normative circumstances that test the boundaries of confrontation effectiveness.

In future work it will also be important to rule out plausible alternative explanations for the present findings. For example, another possible explanation for the observed forecaster-experiencer discrepancies is more methodological than theoretical. In Study 1, forecasters imagined being confronted for expressing prejudice toward one of thirty target groups that ranged in prejudice acceptability. Blind and elderly people were at the low end of this prejudice acceptability continuum and Nazis and child abusers were at the high end. These groups varied in terms of their prejudice acceptability among college students, but also in terms of other stigma-related dimensions, like their concealability and controllability. To address this issue, I used a different set of low and high prejudice acceptability target groups in Study 2—

specifically, groups that were matched for controllability, concealability, likelihood of contact, and entitativity. Then, in Study 3, target group was held constant while descriptive norm information was explicitly manipulated, completely removing this potential confound. Although changing the focal target groups between Study 1 and Studies 2 and 3 was useful for isolating the role of prejudice acceptability, this methodological choice leaves open the possibility that the observed forecaster-experiencer discrepancies were stimulus-driven. If the proposed stigma dimensions (i.e., controllability, concealability, likelihood of contact, and entitativity) explain the findings of Study 1 and not prejudice acceptability, it is possible that the described forecaster-experiencer discrepancy is merely a methodological artifact. To address this issue, I have begun collecting data for two follow-up forecaster studies. In one of these upcoming studies, students are exposed to the same imaginary social conflict scenario shown to participants in Study 1, except now I am using the same target groups selected for Study 2, which eliminate this confound because the groups are matched along stigma-related dimensions (Study 1B).⁵³ In another forecaster study, I am employing the same method but holding target group constant while explicitly manipulating local norm information, again removing this confound from the study design (Study 1C). Additionally, these upcoming studies have a no-confrontation control condition, improving upon the design of the original forecaster study. Data collection is ongoing, but preliminary findings suggest that, even when target groups are matched on the above-mentioned stigma-related dimensions, forecasters still expect prejudice acceptability to shape their reactions to confrontation in much the same way as I described in Study 1.

⁵³ This new study was designed with statistical power limitations of Study 2 in mind. I plan to employ a 3 (Confrontation: No Confrontation, 'You're Stupid' Confrontation, 'You're Prejudiced' Confrontation) x 2 (Prejudice Acceptability: Low, High) mixed design, with prejudice acceptability condition as a within-subjects factor, confrontation condition as a between-subjects factor, and participant as a random factor. There will still only be 10 target groups, but because the design is partially within-subjects I am able to achieve high power with a relatively small sample size. My power analyses (PANGAEA v. 0.2) indicate that to detect a small interaction effect, I need at least 258 participants (resulting in 2,580 observations).

Concluding Remarks

The results of the present research are quite optimistic for confrontation. These findings suggest that, despite forecaster intuitions, confrontation can be an effective prejudice reduction tool, even in situations where prejudice expression is widely considered socially acceptable. There are of course many possible future directions and lingering questions about the endurance of these effects and the normative boundary conditions, but such findings may mean that the optimal social conditions for confrontation to remain effective are less rigid than previously theorized (Czopp et al., 2006). Ultimately the goal of studying prejudice reduction strategies, like interpersonal confrontation, is to apply effective interventions in the real-world. *The Credible Cues Model for Responding to Prejudice Confrontations* extends theorizing in the confrontation domain by providing a framework for when we can expect confrontation to result in self-regulation and when we can expect it to backfire. By using this model, we have identified offensiveness perceptions as a key situational construal that prompts self-regulation and stereotype suppression. However, the present work only scratches the surface of what is possible using this model. My hope is that the present work will encourage other researchers to more thoughtfully consider the range of possible reactions to confrontation and to creatively study the psychological processes underlying confrontation effectiveness. This may involve additional laboratory studies, but it must also involve research in field settings where normative conditions meaningfully differ. By doing so, we will increase our understanding of the situational complexities involved in the social cognition of confrontation and move closer to applying confrontation effectively in day-to-day life.

References

- Allport, G. W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.
- Amichai-Hamburger, Y., & McKenna, K. Y. A. (2006). The Contact Hypothesis Reconsidered: Interacting via the Internet. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, *11*(3), 825–843. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2006.00037.x>
- Anisman-Razin, M., Kark, R., & Saguy, T. (2018). “Putting gender on the table”: Understanding reactions to women who discuss gender inequality. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *21*(5), 690–706. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430217744648>
- Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of one against a unanimous majority. *Psychological Monographs: General and Applied*, *70*(9), 1–70. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0093718>
- Ashburn-Nardo, L., Blanchar, J. C., Petersson, J., Morris, K. A., & Goodwin, S. A. (2014). Do You Say Something When It’s Your Boss? The Role of Perpetrator Power in Prejudice Confrontation: Perpetrator Power and Prejudice Confrontation. *Journal of Social Issues*, *70*(4), 615–636. <https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12082>
- Ashburn-Nardo, L., & Karim, M. F. A. (2019). The CPR model: Decisions involved in confronting prejudiced responses. In R. K. Mallett & M. J. Monteith (Eds.), *Confronting prejudice and discrimination: The science of changing minds and behaviors* (pp. 29–47). Academic Press. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-814715-3.00002-3>
- Ashburn-Nardo, L., Morris, K. A., & Goodwin, S. A. (2008). The Confronting Prejudiced Responses (CPR) Model: Applying CPR in Organizations. *Academy of Management Learning & Education*, *7*(3), 332–342.

- Asparouhov, T., & Muthén, B. (2018). *SRMR in Mplus*.
<http://www.statmodel.com/download/SRMR2.pdf>
- Ayres, M. M., Friedman, C. K., & Leaper, C. (2009). Individual and Situational Factors Related to Young Women's Likelihood of Confronting Sexism in Their Everyday Lives. *Sex Roles, 61*(7–8), 449–460. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-009-9635-3>
- Bates, D., Mächler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting Linear Mixed-Effects Models Using lme4. *Journal of Statistical Software, 67*(1). <https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v067.i01>
- Bauer, D. J. (2003). Estimating Multilevel Linear Models as Structural Equation Models. *Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 28*(2), 135–167.
<https://doi.org/10.3102/10769986028002135>
- Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. (1994). Guilt: An interpersonal approach. *Psychological Bulletin, 115*(2), 243–267. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.115.2.243>
- Becker, J. C., & Barreto, M. (2014). Ways to Go: Men's and Women's Support for Aggressive and Nonaggressive Confrontation of Sexism as a Function of Gender Identification: Ways to Go. *Journal of Social Issues, 70*(4), 668–686. <https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12085>
- Becker, J. C., & Barreto, M. (2019). Personal, collective, and group-distancing motives underlying confrontation of prejudice. In R. K. Mallett & M. J. Monteith (Eds.), *Confronting prejudice and discrimination: The science of changing minds and behaviors* (pp. 141–158). Academic Press. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-814715-3.00014-X>
- Bell, A. C., Burkley, M., & Bock, J. (2018). Examining the asymmetry in judgments of racism in self and others. *The Journal of Social Psychology, 1–16*.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2018.1538930>

- Benjamin, L. T., Crouse, E. M., & American Psychological Association. (2002). The American Psychological Association's response to Brown v. Board of Education. The case of Kenneth B. Clark. *The American Psychologist*, *57*(1), 38–50.
- Bergsieker, H. B., Shelton, J. N., & Richeson, J. A. (2010). To be liked versus respected: Divergent goals in interracial interactions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *99*(2), 248–264. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018474>
- Blanchard, F. A., Crandall, C. S., Brigham, J. C., & Vaughn, L. A. (1994). Condemning and condoning racism: A social context approach to interracial settings. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *79*(6), 993–997. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.79.6.993>
- Blanchard, F. A., Lilly, T., & Vaughn, L. A. (1991). Reducing the Expression of Racial Prejudice. *Psychological Science*, *2*(2), 101–105. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1991.tb00108.x>
- Bobo, L. D. (2001). Racial attitudes and relations at the close of the twentieth century. In *America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences* (Vol. 1, pp. 264–301). National Academy Press.
- Boysen, G. A. (2013). Confronting Math Stereotypes in the Classroom: Its Effect on Female College Students' Sexism and Perceptions of Confronters. *Sex Roles*, *69*(5–6), 297–307. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-013-0287-y>
- Brauer, M., & Curtin, J. J. (2018). Linear mixed-effects models and the analysis of nonindependent data: A unified framework to analyze categorical and continuous independent variables that vary within-subjects and/or within-items. *Psychological Methods*, *23*(3), 389–411. <https://doi.org/10.1037/met0000159>
- Brehm, J. W. (1966). *A theory of psychological reactance* (pp. x, 135). Academic Press.

- Brinkman, B. G., Garcia, K., & Rickard, K. M. (2011). “What I wanted to do was...” discrepancies between college women’s desired and reported responses to gender prejudice. *Sex Roles: A Journal of Research*, 65(5–6), 344–355.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-011-0020-7>
- Brown, C. S., & Salomon, I. (2019). Adolescents’ responses to gendered harassment and discrimination. In R. K. Mallett & M. J. Monteith (Eds.), *Confronting prejudice and discrimination: The science of changing minds and behaviors* (pp. 159–177). Academic Press. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-814715-3.00007-2>
- Brown, R. (2011). *Prejudice: Its Social Psychology*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Bulus, M., & Dong, N. (2018). *PowerUpR: R version of PowerUp!. R package version 0.2.3*.
- Burkley, M., Andrade, A., & Burkley, E. (2016). When Using a Negative Gender Stereotype as an Excuse Increases Gender Stereotyping in Others. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 156(2), 202–210. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2015.1090945>
- Burns, M. D., & Monteith, M. J. (2018). Confronting stereotypic biases: Does internal versus external motivational framing matter? *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 136843021879804. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430218798041>
- Cadieux, J., & Chasteen, A. L. (2015). You gay, bro? Social costs faced by male confronters of antigay prejudice. *Psychology of Sexual Orientation and Gender Diversity*, 2(4), 436–446. <https://doi.org/10.1037/sgd0000134>
- Carter, E. R., & Murphy, M. C. (2017). Consensus and consistency: Exposure to multiple discrimination claims shapes Whites’ intergroup attitudes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 73, 24–33. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.06.001>

- Carter, R. T., & Goodwin, A. L. (1994). Racial Identity and Education. *Review of Research in Education, 20*, 291–336. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1167387>
- Case, C. E., & Greeley, A. M. (1990). Attitudes toward racial equality. *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations, 16*(1), 67–94. JSTOR.
- Chaney, K. E., & Sanchez, D. T. (2018). The Endurance of Interpersonal Confrontations as a Prejudice Reduction Strategy. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 44*(3), 418–429. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167217741344>
- Chaney, K. E., Young, D. M., & Sanchez, D. T. (2015). Confrontation’s health outcomes and promotion of egalitarianism (C-HOPE) framework. *Translational Issues in Psychological Science, 1*(4), 363–371. <https://doi.org/10.1037/tps0000042>
- Chu, C. (2017). *Target perceptions of prejudice confrontations: The effect of confronter group membership on perceptions of confrontation motive and target empowerment* [Masters Thesis].
- Cialdini, R. B., & Goldstein, N. J. (2004). Social Influence: Compliance and Conformity. *Annual Review of Psychology, 55*(1), 591–621. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142015>
- Cialdini, R. B., Reno, R. R., & Kallgren, C. A. (1990). A focus theory of normative conduct: Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58*(6), 1015–1026. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.58.6.1015>
- Cialdini, R. B., & Trost, M. R. (1998). Social Influence: Social norms, conformity, and compliance. In *The handbook of social psychology* (pp. 151–192). McGraw-Hill.

- Citron, A. F., Chein, I., & Harding, J. (1950). Anti-minority remarks: A problem for action research. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 45(1), 99–126.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/h0061855>
- Cohn, M. A., Mehl, M. R., & Pennebaker, J. W. (2004). Linguistic Markers of Psychological Change Surrounding September 11, 2001. *Psychological Science*, 15(10), 687–693.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00741.x>
- Condon, B. A. (2008). Concept Inventing: A Humanbecoming Perspective on Feeling Misunderstood. *Nursing Science Quarterly*, 21(3), 212–216.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0894318408320147>
- Cooper, J., & Fazio, R. H. (1984). A New Look at Dissonance Theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 17, pp. 229–266). Academic Press.
[https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601\(08\)60121-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60121-5)
- Cooper, R. (2018, April 6). A Political Movement, Defining Itself by What It Hates. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/06/books/review/mike-wendling-alt-right.html>
- Crandall, C. S., & Eshleman, A. (2003). A justification-suppression model of the expression and experience of prejudice. *Psychological Bulletin*, 129(3), 414–446.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.414>
- Crandall, C. S., & Eshleman, A. (2005). The justification-suppression model of prejudice: An approach to the history of prejudice research. In C. S. Crandall & M. Schaller (Eds.), *Social Psychology of Prejudice: Historical and Contemporary Issues* (p. 35). Lewinian Press.

- Crandall, C. S., Eshleman, A., & O'Brien, L. (2002). Social norms and the expression and suppression of prejudice: The struggle for internalization. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82(3), 359–378. <https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.82.3.359>
- Crandall, C. S., Miller, J. M., & White, M. H. (2018). Changing Norms Following the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election: The Trump Effect on Prejudice. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 9(2), 186–192. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617750735>
- Crandall, C. S., & Warner, R. H. (2005). How a Prejudice Is Recognized. *Psychological Inquiry*, 16(2/3), 137–141.
- Crosby, F., Bromley, S., & Saxe, L. (1980). Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White Discrimination and Prejudice: A Literature Review. *Psychological Bulletin*, 87(3), 546–563. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.87.3.546>
- Crosby, J. R., & Wilson, J. (2015). Let's Not, and Say We Would: Imagined and Actual Responses to Witnessing Homophobia. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 62(7), 957–970. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2015.1008284>
- Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2008). Warmth and Competence as Universal Dimensions of Social Perception: The Stereotype Content Model and the BIAS Map. In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 40, pp. 61–149). Elsevier. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601\(07\)00002-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(07)00002-0)
- Czopp, A. M. (2013). The Passive Activist: Negative Consequences of Failing to Confront Antienvironmental Statements. *Ecopsychology*, 5(1), 17–23. <https://doi.org/10.1089/eco.2012.0066>
- Czopp, A. M. (2019). The consequences of confronting prejudice. In R. K. Mallett & M. J. Monteith (Eds.), *Confronting prejudice and discrimination: The science of changing*

- minds and behaviors* (pp. 201–221). Academic Press. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-814715-3.00005-9>
- Czopp, A. M., & Ashburn-Nardo, L. (2012). Interpersonal confrontations of prejudice. In D. W. Russell & C. A. Russell (Eds.), *The psychology of prejudice: Interdisciplinary perspectives on contemporary issues*. Nova Science Publishers.
- Czopp, A. M., & Monteith, M. J. (2003). Confronting Prejudice (Literally): Reactions to Confrontations of Racial and Gender Bias. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 29(4), 532–544. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167202250923>
- Czopp, A. M., Monteith, M. J., & Mark, A. Y. (2006). Standing up for a change: Reducing bias through interpersonal confrontation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90(5), 784–803. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.90.5.784>
- Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 56(1), 5–18. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.56.1.5>
- Devine, P. G., & Elliot, A. J. (1995). Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading? The Princeton Trilogy Revisited. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 21(11), 1139–1150. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672952111002>
- Devine, P. G., Monteith, M. J., Zuwerink, J. R., & Elliot, A. J. (1991). Prejudice with and without compunction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 60(6), 817–830. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.60.6.817>
- Dickter, C. L. (2012). Confronting Hate: Heterosexuals' Responses to Anti-Gay Comments. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 59(8), 1113–1130. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2012.712817>

- Dickter, C. L., Kittel, J. A., & Gyurovski, I. I. (2012). Perceptions of non-target confronters in response to racist and heterosexist remarks: Perceptions of confronters. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 42*(1), 112–119. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.855>
- Diebels, K. J., & Czopp, A. M. (2011). Complaining about a compliment: Evaluating attributions of positive outcomes to discrimination: Attributing success to discrimination. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, no-no*. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-839X.2011.01343.x>
- Dixon, J., Levine, M., Reicher, S., & Durrheim, K. (2012). Beyond prejudice: Are negative evaluations the problem and is getting us to like one another more the solution? *Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 35*(6), 411–425.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X11002214>
- Dixon, J., Tropp, L. R., Durrheim, K., & Tredoux, C. (2010). “Let Them Eat Harmony”: Prejudice-Reduction Strategies and Attitudes of Historically Disadvantaged Groups. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 19*(2), 76–80.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721410363366>
- Dodd, E. H., Giuliano, T. A., Boutell, J. M., & Moran, B. E. (2002). Respected or Rejected: Perceptions of Women Who Confront Sexist Remarks. *Sex Roles, 11*.
- Donders, N. C., Correll, J., & Wittenbrink, B. (2008). Danger stereotypes predict racially biased attentional allocation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44*(5), 1328–1333.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2008.04.002>
- Dong, N., & Maynard, R. (2013). PowerUp!: A Tool for Calculating Minimum Detectable Effect Sizes and Minimum Required Sample Sizes for Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Design Studies. *Journal of Research on Educational Effectiveness, 6*(1), 24–67.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/19345747.2012.673143>

- Dovidio, J. F. (2001). On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Third Wave. *Journal of Social Issues*, 57(4), 829–849. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00244>
- Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2000). Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999. *Psychological Science*, 11(4), 315–319. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00262>
- Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., Ufkes, E. G., Saguy, T., & Pearson, A. R. (2016). Included but Invisible? Subtle Bias, Common Identity, and the Darker Side of “We.” *Social Issues and Policy Review*, 10(1), 6–46. <https://doi.org/10.1111/sipr.12017>
- Drury, B. J. (2013). *Confronting for the Greater Good: Are Confrontations that Address the Broad Benefits of Prejudice Reduction Taken Seriously?* [Thesis]. <https://digital.lib.washington.edu:443/researchworks/handle/1773/22767>
- Duckitt, J. H. (1992). Psychology and prejudice: A historical analysis and integrative framework. *American Psychologist*, 47(10), 1182–1193. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.47.10.1182>
- Dutton, D. G., & Lake, R. A. (1973). Threat of own prejudice and reverse discrimination in interracial situations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 28(1), 94–100. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0035582>
- Eagly, A. H., Wood, W., & Chaiken, S. (1978). Causal inferences about communicators and their effect on opinion change. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 36(4), 424–435. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.36.4.424>
- Edwards, G. S., & Rushin, S. (2018). *The Effect of President Trump’s Election on Hate Crimes* (SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3102652). Social Science Research Network. <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3102652>

- Eliezer, D., & Major, B. (2012). It's not your fault: The social costs of claiming discrimination on behalf of someone else. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *15*(4), 487–502.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430211432894>
- Ellsworth, P. C., & Smith, C. A. (1988). From appraisal to emotion: Differences among unpleasant feelings. *Motivation and Emotion*, *12*(3), 271–302.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00993115>
- Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A.-G. (2009). Statistical power analyses using G*Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. *Behavior Research Methods*, *41*(4), 1149–1160. <https://doi.org/10.3758/BRM.41.4.1149>
- Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. *Behavior Research Methods*, *39*(2), 175–191. <https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03193146>
- Fazio, R. H. (1990). Multiple Processes by which Attitudes Guide Behavior: The Mode Model as an Integrative Framework. In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 23, pp. 75–109). Elsevier. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601\(08\)60318-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60318-4)
- Feinberg, A., Branton, R., & Martinez-Ebers, V. (2019, March 22). Counties that hosted a 2016 Trump rally saw a 226 percent increase in hate crimes. *Washington Post*.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/22/trumps-rhetoric-does-inspire-more-hate-crimes/>
- Festinger, L. (1962). Cognitive Dissonance. *Scientific American*, *207*(4), 93–106.
- Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, *58*(2), 203–210.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/h0041593>

- Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *82*(6), 878–902.
<https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.82.6.878>
- Foster, M. D. (2013). Everyday Confrontation of Discrimination: The Well-Being Costs and Benefits to Women over Time. *International Journal of Psychological Studies*, *5*(3).
<https://doi.org/10.5539/ijps.v5n3p135>
- Friedan, B. (2010). *The Feminine Mystique*. W. W. Norton & Company.
- Frijda, N. H., Kuipers, P., & ter Schure, E. (1989). Relations Among Emotion, Appraisal, and Emotional Action Readiness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *57*(2), 212–228.
- Gaertner, S., & Bickman, L. (1971). Effects of race on the elicitation of helping behavior: The wrong number technique. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *20*(2), 218–222.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/h0031681>
- Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (1977). The subtlety of White racism, arousal, and helping behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *35*(10), 691–707.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.35.10.691>
- Gaillard, L. M., Shattell, M. M., & Thomas, S. P. (2009). Mental Health Patients' Experiences of Being Misunderstood. *Journal of the American Psychiatric Nurses Association*, *15*(3), 191–199. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1078390309336932>
- Gantt Shafer, J. (2017). Donald Trump's "Political Incorrectness": Neoliberalism as Frontstage Racism on Social Media. *Social Media + Society*, *3*(3), 2056305117733226.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305117733226>

- Garcia, D. M., Reser, A. H., Amo, R. B., Redersdorff, S., & Branscombe, N. R. (2005). Perceivers' Responses to In-Group and Out-Group Members Who Blame a Negative Outcome on Discrimination. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *31*(6), 769–780. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167204271584>
- Garcia, D. M., Schmitt, M. T., Branscombe, N. R., & Ellemers, N. (2010). Women's reactions to ingroup members who protest discriminatory treatment: The importance of beliefs about inequality and response appropriateness. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *40*, 733–745. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.644>
- Georgeac, O. A. M., Rattan, A., & Effron, D. A. (2018). An Exploratory Investigation of Americans' Expression of Gender Bias Before and After the 2016 Presidential Election. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 194855061877662. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550618776624>
- Gervais, S. J., & Hillard, A. L. (2014). Confronting Sexism as Persuasion: Effects of a Confrontation's Recipient, Source, Message, and Context: Persuasion and Confronting Sexism. *Journal of Social Issues*, *70*(4), 653–667. <https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12084>
- Gervais, S. J., Hillard, A. L., & Vescio, T. K. (2010). Confronting Sexism: The Role of Relationship Orientation and Gender. *Sex Roles*, *63*(7–8), 463–474. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-010-9838-7>
- Giani, M., & Méon, P.-G. (2019). Global Racist Contagion Following Donald Trump's Election. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1–8. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000449>
- Gilbert, D. T., Pinel, E. C., Wilson, T. D., Blumberg, S. J., & Wheatley, T. P. (1998). Immune neglect: A source of durability bias in affective forecasting. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *75*(3), 617–638. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.3.617>

- Goldstein, N. J., Griskevicius, V., & Cialdini, R. B. (2007). Invoking Social Norms: A Social Psychology Perspective on Improving Hotels' Linen-Reuse Programs. *Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly*, 48(2), 145–150.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0010880407299542>
- Good, J. J., Moss-Racusin, C. A., & Sanchez, D. T. (2012). When Do We Confront? Perceptions of Costs and Benefits Predict Confronting Discrimination on Behalf of the Self and Others. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 36(2), 210–226.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0361684312440958>
- Gosling, P., Denizeau, M., & Oberlé, D. (2006). Denial of responsibility: A new mode of dissonance reduction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90(5), 722–733.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.90.5.722>
- Graham, J. W., Taylor, B. J., Olchowski, A. E., & Cumsille, P. E. (2006). Planned missing data designs in psychological research. *Psychological Methods*, 11(4), 323–343.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/1082-989X.11.4.323>
- Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74(6), 1464–1480. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1464>
- Gulker, J. E., Mark, A. Y., & Monteith, M. J. (2013). Confronting prejudice: The “who”, “what”, and “why” of confrontation effectiveness. *Social Influence*, 8(4), 280–293.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/15534510.2012.736879>
- Haller, J. S. (1995). *Outcasts from Evolution: Scientific Attitudes of Racial Inferiority, 1859-1900*. SIU Press.

- Hendrix, S. (2018, August 10). 'It's still hard to look at': The story behind the searing photo of Charlottesville's worst day. *The Washington Post*.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/local/charlottesville-photographer-pulitzer-prize-photo/>
- Herrera, M. del C., Herrera, A., & Expósito, F. (2018). To Confront Versus not to Confront: Women's Perception of Sexual Harassment. *The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context*, *10*(1), 1–7. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpal.2017.04.002>
- Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. *Psychological Review*, *94*(3), 319–340. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.94.3.319>
- Hill, C., & Kearl, H. (2011). *Crossing the line: Sexual harassment at school*. AAUW.
- Hogg, M. A., & Reid, S. A. (2006). Social Identity, Self-Categorization, and the Communication of Group Norms. *Communication Theory*, *16*(1), 7–30. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2006.00003.x>
- Hox, J. J. (1997). Multilevel modeling: When and why. In I. Balderjahn, R. Mathar, & M. Schader (Eds.), *Classification, data analysis, and data highways* (pp. 147–154). Springer Verlag.
- Hox, J. J. (2010). *Multilevel analysis: Techniques and applications, 2nd ed.* Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
- Huang, J., & Low, C. (2017). Trumping Norms: Lab Evidence on Aggressive Communication before and after the 2016 US Presidential Election. *American Economic Review*, *107*(5), 120–124. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171016>
- Hubbard, R. R., Snipes, D. J., Perrin, P. B., Morgan, M. R., DeJesus, A., & Bhattacharyya, S. (2013). Themes in Heterosexuals' Responses When Challenging LGBT Prejudice.

- Sexuality Research and Social Policy*, 10(4), 269–278. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13178-013-0127-4>
- Hyers, L. L. (2007). Resisting Prejudice Every Day: Exploring Women’s Assertive Responses to Anti-Black Racism, Anti-Semitism, Heterosexism, and Sexism. *Sex Roles*, 56(1–2), 1–12. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-006-9142-8>
- Hyers, L. L. (2010). Alternatives to Silence in Face-to-Face Encounters with Everyday Heterosexism: Activism on the Interpersonal Front. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 57(4), 539–565. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00918361003608749>
- IBM Corp. (2019). *IBM SPSS Statistics for Macintosh, Version 26.0*. IBM Corp. <https://www.ibm.com/analytics/spss-statistics-software>
- Jetten, J., Iyer, A., Branscombe, N. R., & Zhang, A. (2013). How the disadvantaged appraise group-based exclusion: The path from legitimacy to illegitimacy. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 24(1), 194–224. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2013.840977>
- Jewell, J., Spears Brown, C., & Perry, B. (2015). All My Friends Are Doing It: Potentially Offensive Sexual Behavior Perpetration Within Adolescent Social Networks. *Journal of Research on Adolescence*, 25(3), 592–604. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jora.12150>
- Johnson, J. D., Adams, M. S., Hall, W., & Ashburn, L. (1997). Race, Media, and Violence: Differential Racial Effects of Exposure to Violent News Stories. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 19(1), 81–90. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15324834baspp1901_6
- Judd, C. M., Westfall, J., & Kenny, D. A. (2012). Treating stimuli as a random factor in social psychology: A new and comprehensive solution to a pervasive but largely ignored problem. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 103(1), 54–69. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028347>

- Judd, C. M., Westfall, J., & Kenny, D. A. (2017). Experiments with More Than One Random Factor: Designs, Analytic Models, and Statistical Power. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 68(1), 601–625. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-122414-033702>
- Kaiser, C. R., Drury, B. J., Spalding, K. E., Cheryan, S., & O'Brien, L. T. (2009). The ironic consequences of Obama's election: Decreased support for social justice. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 45(3), 556–559. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.01.006>
- Kaiser, C. R., Dyrenforth, P. S., & Hagiwara, N. (2006). Why Are Attributions to Discrimination Interpersonally Costly? A Test of System- and Group-Justifying Motivations. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 32(11), 1423–1536. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167206291475>
- Kaiser, C. R., & Miller, C. T. (2001). Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of Making Attributions to Discrimination. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 27(2), 254–263. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167201272010>
- Kaiser, C. R., & Miller, C. T. (2003). Derogating the Victim: The Interpersonal Consequences of Blaming Events on Discrimination. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 6(3), 227–237. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13684302030063001>
- Kaiser, C. R., & Miller, C. T. (2004). A Stress and Coping Perspective on Confronting Sexism. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 28(2), 168–178. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.2004.00133.x>
- Karmali, F., Kawakami, K., & Page-Gould, E. (2017). He said what? Physiological and cognitive responses to imagining and witnessing outgroup racism. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 146(8), 1073–1085. <https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000304>

- Katz, D., & Braly, K. W. (1935). Racial prejudice and racial stereotypes. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 30(2), 175–193. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0059800>
- Kawakami, K., Dunn, E., Karmali, F., & Dovidio, J. F. (2009). Mispredicting Affective and Behavioral Responses to Racism. *Science*, 323(5911), 276–278. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1164951>
- Kawakami, K., Karmali, F., & Vaccarino, E. (2019). Confronting intergroup bias: Predicted and actual responses to racism and sexism. In R. K. Mallett & M. J. Monteith (Eds.), *Confronting prejudice and discrimination: The science of changing minds and behaviors* (pp. 3–28). Academic Press. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-814715-3.00001-1>
- Kline, R. B. (2016). *Principles and practice of structural equation modeling, 4th ed.* Guilford Press.
- Kreft, I. G. G., & Leeuw, J. de. (1998). *Introducing Multilevel Modeling.* SAGE.
- Krieger, N., & Sidney, S. (1996). Racial discrimination and blood pressure: The CARDIA Study of young black and white adults. *American Journal of Public Health*, 86(10), 1370–1378. <https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.86.10.1370>
- Kroeper, K. M., Muenks, K., & Murphy, M. C. (2019). Marriage Equality: On the Books and on the Ground? An Experimental Audit Study of Beliefs and Behavior towards Same-Sex and Interracial Couples in the Wedding Industry. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 19(1), 50–77. <https://doi.org/10.1111/asap.12172>
- Kroeper, K. M., Sanchez, D. T., & Himmelstein, M. S. (2014). Heterosexual Men's Confrontation of Sexual Prejudice: The Role of Precarious Manhood. *Sex Roles*, 70(1–2), 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-013-0306-z>

- Krull, J. L., & MacKinnon, D. P. (2001). Multilevel Modeling of Individual and Group Level Mediated Effects. *Multivariate Behavioral Research, 36*(2), 249–277.
https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327906MBR3602_06
- Kuznetsova, A., Brockhoff, P. B., & Christensen, R. H. B. (2017). lmerTest Package: Tests in Linear Mixed Effects Models. *Journal of Statistical Software, 82*(13), 1–26.
<https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v082.i13>
- Legault, L., Gutsell, J. N., & Inzlicht, M. (2011). Ironic Effects of Antiprejudice Messages: How Motivational Interventions Can Reduce (but Also Increase) Prejudice. *Psychological Science, 22*(12), 1472–1477. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611427918>
- LeMaire, K. L. (2017). *Heterosexual allies' confrontation of sexual prejudice: The effect of gender, attitudes, and past allied behavior* [Ph.D., Marquette University].
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1854891207/abstract/F148FA9C7D894CA8PQ/1>
- Lewis, T., & Yoshimura, S. M. (2017). Politeness Strategies in Confrontations of Prejudice. *Atlantic Journal of Communication, 25*(1), 1–16.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/15456870.2017.1251198>
- MacCrone, M. A. (1937). A quantitative study of race stereotypes. *South African Journal of Science, 33*(03), 1104–1111.
- Mallett, R. K., & Melchiori, K. J. (2019). Goals drive responses to perceived discrimination. In R. K. Mallett & M. J. Monteith (Eds.), *Confronting prejudice and discrimination: The science of changing minds and behaviors* (pp. 95–119). Academic Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-814715-3.00009-6>
- Mallett, R. K., & Monteith, M. J. (2019a). Confronting prejudice and discrimination: Historical influences and contemporary approaches. In R. K. Mallett & M. J. Monteith (Eds.),

- Confronting prejudice and discrimination: The science of changing minds and behaviors* (pp. xiii–xxv). Academic Press. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-814715-3.00025-4>
- Mallett, R. K., & Monteith, M. J. (Eds.). (2019b). *Confronting prejudice and discrimination: The science of changing minds and behaviors* (1st edition). Elsevier.
- Mallett, R. K., & Wagner, D. E. (2011). The unexpectedly positive consequences of confronting sexism. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47*(1), 215–220. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2010.10.001>
- Martinez, L. R., Hebl, M. R., Smith, N. A., & Sabat, I. E. (2017). Standing up and speaking out against prejudice toward gay men in the workplace. *Journal of Vocational Behavior, 103*, 71–85. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jvb.2017.08.001>
- McLean, H. V. (1946). Psychodynamic factors in racial relations. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 244*, 159–166.
- Mezulis, A. H., Abramson, L. Y., Hyde, J. S., & Hankin, B. L. (2004). Is There a Universal Positivity Bias in Attributions? A Meta-Analytic Review of Individual, Developmental, and Cultural Differences in the Self-Serving Attributional Bias. *Psychological Bulletin, 130*(5), 711–747. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.130.5.711>
- Miron, A. M., & Brehm, J. W. (2006). Reactance Theory—40 Years Later. *Zeitschrift Für Sozialpsychologie, 37*(1), 9–18. <https://doi.org/10.1024/0044-3514.37.1.9>
- Monteith, M. J. (1993). Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses: Implications for Progress in Prejudice-Reduction Efforts. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65*(3), 469–485. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.65.3.469>

- Monteith, M. J., Ashburn-Nardo, L., Voils, C. I., & Czopp, A. M. (2002). Putting the brakes on prejudice: On the development and operation of cues for control. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *83*(5), 1029–1050. <https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.83.5.1029>
- Monteith, M. J., Burns, M. D., & Hildebrand, L. K. (2019). Navigating successful confrontations. In R. K. Mallett & M. J. Monteith (Eds.), *Confronting prejudice and discrimination: The science of changing minds and behaviors* (pp. 225–248). Academic Press. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-814715-3.00006-0>
- Monteith, M. J., Deneen, N. E., & Tooman, G. D. (1996). The Effect of Social Norm Activation on the Expression of Opinions Concerning Gay Men and Blacks. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, *18*(3), 267–288. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15324834basps1803_2
- Monteith, M. J., Devine, P. G., & Zuwerink, J. R. (1993). Self-Directed Versus Other-Directed Affect as a Consequence of Prejudice-Related Discrepancies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *64*(2), 198–210. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.64.2.198>
- Monteith, M. J., & Mark, A. Y. (2005). Changing one’s prejudiced ways: Awareness, affect, and self-regulation. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *16*(1), 113–154. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280500229882>
- Monteith, M. J., Mark, A. Y., & Ashburn-Nardo, L. (2010). The self-regulation of prejudice: Toward understanding its lived character. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *13*(2), 183–200. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430209353633>
- Monteith, M. J., & Voils, C. I. (1998). Proneness to prejudiced responses: Toward understanding the authenticity of self-reported discrepancies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *75*(4), 901–916. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.4.901>

- Monteith, M. J., Voils, C. I., & Ashburn-Nardo, L. (2001). Taking a Look Underground: Detecting, Interpreting, and Reacting to Implicit Racial Biases. *Social Cognition, 19*(4), 395–417. <https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.19.4.395.20759>
- Nachtigall, C., Kroehne, U., Funke, F., & Steyer, R. (2003). *(Why) Should We Use SEM? Pros and Cons of Structural Equation Modeling. 8*(2), 22.
- Noh, S., & Kaspar, V. (2003). Perceived Discrimination and Depression: Moderating Effects of Coping, Acculturation, and Ethnic Support. *American Journal of Public Health, 93*(2), 232–238. <https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.93.2.232>
- Norton, M. I., & Sommers, S. R. (2011). Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game That They Are Now Losing. *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6*(3), 215–218. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691611406922>
- Oliver, M. B., & Fonash, D. (2002). Race and Crime in the News: Whites' Identification and Misidentification of Violent and Nonviolent Criminal Suspects. *Media Psychology, 4*(2), 137–156. https://doi.org/10.1207/S1532785XMEP0402_02
- Paluck, E. L. (2011). Peer pressure against prejudice: A high school field experiment examining social network change. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47*(2), 350–358. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2010.11.017>
- Paluck, E. L., & Green, D. P. (2009). Prejudice Reduction: What Works? A Review and Assessment of Research and Practice. *Annual Review of Psychology, 60*(1), 339–367. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163607>
- Paluck, E. L., & Shepherd, H. (2012). The salience of social referents: A field experiment on collective norms and harassment behavior in a school social network. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103*(6), 899–915. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030015>

- Parker, L. R., Monteith, M. J., Moss-Racusin, C. A., & Van Camp, A. R. (2018). Promoting concern about gender bias with evidence-based confrontation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 74*, 8–23. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.07.009>
- Payne, B. K. (2001). Prejudice and perception: The role of automatic and controlled processes in misperceiving a weapon. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81*(2), 181–192. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.81.2.181>
- Pennebaker, J. W., Boyd, R. L., Jordan, K., & Blackburn, K. (2015). *The Development and Psychometric Properties of LIWC2015*. https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/31333/LIWC2015_LanguageManual.pdf
- Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90*(5), 751–783. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.90.5.751>
- Petty, R. E., Fleming, M. A., Priester, J. R., & Feinstein, A. H. (2001). Individual Versus Group Interest Violation: Surprise as a Determinant of Argument Scrutiny and Persuasion. *Social Cognition, 19*(4), 418–442. <https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.19.4.418.20758>
- Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (1998). Internal and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75*(3), 811–832. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.3.811>
- Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (2001). Responses to Other-Imposed Pro-Black Pressure: Acceptance or Backlash? *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37*(6), 486–501. <https://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.2001.1478>

- Pronin, E., Lin, D. Y., & Ross, L. (2002). The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28(3), 369–381.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167202286008>
- R Core Team. (2019). *R: A language and environment for statistical computing*. R Foundation for Statistical Computing. <http://www.R-project.org/>
- Ramnani, N., & Miall, R. C. (2004). A system in the human brain for predicting the actions of others. *Nature Neuroscience*, 7(1), 85–90. <https://doi.org/10.1038/nn1168>
- Rasinski, H. M., & Czopp, A. M. (2010). The Effect of Target Status on Witnesses' Reactions to Confrontations of Bias. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 32(1), 8–16.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01973530903539754>
- Rattan, A. (2019). How lay theories (or mindsets) shape the confrontation of prejudice. In R. K. Mallett & M. J. Monteith (Eds.), *Confronting prejudice and discrimination: The science of changing minds and behaviors* (pp. 121–140). Academic Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-814715-3.00008-4>
- Rattan, A., & Dweck, C. S. (2010). Who Confronts Prejudice? The Role of Implicit Theories in the Motivation to Confront Prejudice. *Psychological Science*, 21(7), 952–959.
- Rattan, A., & Dweck, C. S. (2018). What happens after prejudice is confronted in the workplace? How mindsets affect minorities' and women's outlook on future social relations. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 103(6), 676–687. <https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0000287>
- Rokeach, M., & Cochkane, R. (1972). Self-Confrontation and Confrontation With Another as Determinants of Long-Term Value Change. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 2(4), 283–292. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1972.tb01280.x>

- Rokeach, M., & McLellan, D. D. (1972). Feedback of Information About the Values and Attitudes of Self and Others as Determinants of Long-Term Cognitive and Behavioral Change. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 2(3), 236–251.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1972.tb01275.x>
- Rosseel, Y. (2012). lavaan: An R Package for Structural Equation Modeling. *Journal of Statistical Software*, 48(2), 1–36.
- Sacchetti, M. (2019, July 10). ‘Kids in cages’: House hearing examines immigration detention as Democrats push for more information. *Washington Post*.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/kids-in-cages-house-hearing-to-examine-immigration-detention-as-democrats-push-for-more-information/2019/07/10/3cc53006-a28f-11e9-b732-41a79c2551bf_story.html
- Saguy, T., Tausch, N., Dovidio, J. F., & Pratto, F. (2009). The Irony of Harmony: Intergroup Contact Can Produce False Expectations for Equality. *Psychological Science*, 20(1), 114–121. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02261.x>
- Samelson, F. (1978). From “race psychology” to “studies in prejudice”: Some observations on the thematic reversal in social psychology. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 14(3), 265–278. [https://doi.org/10.1002/1520-6696\(197807\)14:3<265::AID-JHBS2300140313>3.0.CO;2-P](https://doi.org/10.1002/1520-6696(197807)14:3<265::AID-JHBS2300140313>3.0.CO;2-P)
- Sanchez, D. T., Himmelstein, M. S., Young, D. M., Albuja, A. F., & Garcia, J. A. (2016). Confronting as autonomy promotion: Speaking up against discrimination and psychological well-being in racial minorities. *Journal of Health Psychology*, 21(9), 1999–2007. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1359105315569619>

- Schaffner, B. F. (2018). *Follow the Racist? The Consequences of Trump 's Expressions of Prejudice for Mass Rhetoric* [Unpublished Manuscript].
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3ff2/9822155973661029da17a4c0610088e15340.pdf>
- Schreiber, J. B., Nora, A., Stage, F. K., Barlow, E. A., & King, J. (2006). Reporting Structural Equation Modeling and Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results: A Review. *The Journal of Educational Research*, 99(6), 323–338. <https://doi.org/10.3200/JOER.99.6.323-338>
- Schultz, J. R., & Maddox, K. B. (2013). Shooting the Messenger to Spite the Message? Exploring Reactions to Claims of Racial Bias. *Personality Ad Social Psychology Bulletin*, 39(3), 346–358. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167212475223>
- Sechrist, G. B., Swim, J. K., & Stangor, C. (2004). When Do the Stigmatized Make Attributions to Discrimination Occurring to the Self and Others? The Roles of Self-Presentation and Need for Control. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 87(1), 111–122.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.87.1.111>
- Shattell, M. M., McAllister, S., Hogan, B., & Thomas, S. P. (2006). “She Took the Time to Make Sure She Understood”: Mental Health Patients’ Experiences of Being Understood. *Archives of Psychiatric Nursing*, 20(5), 234–241.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apnu.2006.02.002>
- Shelton, J. N., Richeson, J. A., Salvatore, J., & Hill, D. M. (2006). Silence is Not Golden: The Intrapersonal Consequences of Not Confronting Prejudice. In S. Levin & C. Van Laar (Eds.), *Stigma and Group Inequality: Social Psychological Perspectives* (pp. 65–82). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

- Shelton, J. N., & Stewart, R. E. (2004). Confronting Perpetrators of Prejudice: The Inhibitory Effects of Social Costs. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 28(3), 215–223.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.2004.00138.x>
- Sherif, M. (1936). *The psychology of social norms* (pp. xii, 210). Harper.
- Sherman, S. J., & Gorkin, L. (1980). Attitude bolstering when behavior is inconsistent with central attitudes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 16(4), 388–403.
[https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031\(80\)90030-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(80)90030-X)
- Simon, S., & O'Brien, L. T. (2015). Confronting Sexism: Exploring the Effect of Nonsexist Credentials on the Costs of Target Confrontations. *Sex Roles*, 73(5–6), 245–257.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-015-0513-x>
- Son Hing, L. S., Li, W., & Zanna, M. P. (2002). Inducing Hypocrisy to Reduce Prejudicial Responses among Aversive Racists. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 38(1), 71–78. <https://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.2001.1484>
- Sonnad, N., & Squirrell, T. (2017, October 30). *The alt-right is creating its own dialect. Here's the dictionary*. Quartz. <https://qz.com/1092037/the-alt-right-is-creating-its-own-dialect-heres-a-complete-guide/>
- Southern Poverty Law Center. (2019, September 24). *Family separation under the Trump administration – a timeline*. Southern Poverty Law Center.
<https://www.splcenter.org/news/2019/09/24/family-separation-under-trump-administration-timeline>
- Stangor, C., Swim, J. K., Van Allen, K. L., & Sechrist, G. B. (2002). Reporting discrimination in public and private contexts. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82(1), 69–74.
<https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.82.1.69>

- Steele, C. M. (1975). Name-calling and compliance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 31(2), 361–369. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0076291>
- Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 21(2), 261–302.
- Stone, J., & Cooper, J. (2001). A Self-Standards Model of Cognitive Dissonance. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 37(3), 228–243. <https://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.2000.1446>
- Stone, J., Whitehead, J., Schmader, T., & Focella, E. (2011). Thanks for asking: Self-affirming questions reduce backlash when stigmatized targets confront prejudice. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 47(3), 589–598.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2010.12.016>
- Subašić, E., Hardacre, S., Elton, B., Branscombe, N. R., Ryan, M. K., & Reynolds, K. J. (2018). “We for She”: Mobilising men and women to act in solidarity for gender equality. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 21(5), 707–724.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430218763272>
- Swim, J. K., & Hyers, L. L. (1999). Excuse Me—What Did You Just Say?!: Women’s Public and Private Responses to Sexist Remarks. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 35(1), 68–88. <https://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.1998.1370>
- Tankard, M. E., & Paluck, E. L. (2016). Norm Perception as a Vehicle for Social Change: Vehicle for Social Change. *Social Issues and Policy Review*, 10(1), 181–211.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/sipr.12022>
- Tankard, M. E., & Paluck, E. L. (2017). The Effect of a Supreme Court Decision Regarding Gay Marriage on Social Norms and Personal Attitudes. *Psychological Science*, 28(9), 1334–1344. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617709594>

- Thurstone, L. L. (1928). An Experimental Study of Nationality Preferences. *The Journal of General Psychology*, 1(3–4), 405–425. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00221309.1928.9918018>
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2014). *The Health Consequences of Smoking—50 Years of Progress: A Report of the Surgeon General*.
- Valenti, J. (2009). *He's a Stud, She's a Slut, and 49 Other Double Standards Every Woman Should Know*. Basic Books.
- Valentino, N. A., & Brader, T. (2011). The Sword's Other Edge: Perceptions of Discrimination and Racial Policy Opinion after Obama. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 75(2), 201–226. <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfr010>
- Valentino, N. A., Neuner, F. G., & Vandebroek, L. M. (2018). The Changing Norms of Racial Political Rhetoric and the End of Racial Priming. *The Journal of Politics*, 80(3), 757–771. <https://doi.org/10.1086/694845>
- Vallone, R. P., Griffin, D. W., Lin, S., & Ross, L. (1990). Overconfident prediction of future actions and outcomes by self and others. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 58(4), 582–592. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.58.4.582>
- Veltfort, H. R., & Lee, G. E. (1943). The Cocoanut Grove fire: A study in scapegoating. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 38(2, Suppl), 138–154. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0063188>
- Wang, K., Silverman, A., Gwinn, J. D., & Dovidio, J. F. (2015). Independent or ungrateful? Consequences of confronting patronizing help for people with disabilities. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 18(4), 489–503. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430214550345>

- Westfall, J. (2016). *PANGEA: Power ANalysis for GEneral Anova designs*.
<http://jakewestfall.org/publications/pangea.pdf>
- Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2005). Affective Forecasting: Knowing What to Want. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *14*(3), 131–134. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2005.00355.x>
- Wilson, T. D., Wheatley, T., Meyers, J. M., Gilbert, D. T., & Axson, D. (2000). Focalism: A source of durability bias in affective forecasting. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *78*(5), 821–836. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.78.5.821>
- Wolsiefer, K., & Stone, J. (2019). Addressing bias in healthcare. In R. K. Mallett & M. J. Monteith (Eds.), *Confronting prejudice and discrimination: The science of changing minds and behaviors* (pp. 275–297). Academic Press. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-814715-3.00013-8>
- Woodzicka, J. A., & LaFrance, M. (2001). Real Versus Imagined Gender Harassment. *Journal of Social Issues*, *57*(1), 15–30. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00199>
- Woodzicka, J. A., Mallett, R. K., Hendricks, S., & Pruitt, A. V. (2015). It's just a (sexist) joke: Comparing reactions to sexist versus racist communications. *Humor*, *28*(2).
<https://doi.org/10.1515/humor-2015-0025>
- Wyer, N. A., Sherman, J. W., & Stroessner, S. J. (1998). The Spontaneous Suppression of Racial Stereotypes. *Social Cognition*, *16*(3), 340–352.
<https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.1998.16.3.340>
- Ye He Lee, M. (2015, July 8). Donald Trump's false comments connecting Mexican immigrants and crime. *Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact->

checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/

Zinn, H. (2010). *A People's History of the United States*. Harper Collins.

Zitek, E. M., & Hebl, M. R. (2007). The role of social norm clarity in the influenced expression of prejudice over time. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 43(6), 867–876.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2006.10.010>

Zou, L. X., & Dickter, C. L. (2013). Perceptions of racial confrontation: The role of color blindness and comment ambiguity. *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology*, 19(1), 92–96. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0031115>

Zuwerink, J. Z., Devine, P. G., Monteith, M. J., & Cook, D. A. (1996). Prejudice Toward Blacks: With and Without Compunction? *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 18(2), 131–150.
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15324834basp1802_2

Figures

Figure 1. The Credible Cues Model for Responding to Prejudice Confrontations




Figure 2. Theoretical model depicting relationships between variables of interest.




Figure 3. Study 1: Manipulation Check




Figure 4. Study 1: Offensiveness




Figure 5. Study 1: Negative Self-Directed Affect




Figure 6. Study 1: Negative Other-Directed Affect




Figure 7. Study 1: Positive Affect




Figure 8. Study 1: Self-Corrective Thoughts & Behavior




Figure 9. Study 1: Dismissive/Hostile Thoughts & Behavior





Figure 10. Study 1: Multilevel Structural Equation Model



Note. Maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors, $N = 1568$, 30 clusters: $\chi^2(627) = 2429.81, p < .001$; Robust CFI = .92; Robust RMSEA = .05; SRMR (within) = .07, SRMR (between) = .25; Standardized regression coefficients depicted (see Tables 6 and 7 for the full listing of standardized direct and indirect path coefficients).

Figure 11. Study 2: Manipulation Check




Figure 12. Study 2: Offensiveness




Figure 13. Study 2: Negative Self-Directed Affect




Figure 14. Study 2: Negative Other-Directed Affect




Figure 15. Study 2: Positive Affect




Figure 16. Study 2: Self-Corrective Thoughts & Behavior




Figure 17. Study 2: Dismissive / Hostile Thoughts & Behavior




Figure 18. Study 2: Moderated Mediation Model






Figure 19A. Study 2: Stereotype Usage (Difference Scores)




Note. Difference scores in stereotype usage across the two time points are depicted on the y-axis. Higher scores indicate more stereotype usage at Time 2, relative to Time 1.

Figure 19B. Study 2: Stereotype Usage (Raw Scores)




Note. Raw stereotype usage scores are depicted on the y-axis. Dotted lines represent Time 1 stereotype usage counts. Solid lines represent Time 2 stereotype usage counts. Black lines (dotted and solid) represent the High Prejudice Acceptability Condition. Gray lines (dotted and solid) represent the Low Prejudice Acceptability Condition. Confrontation Condition is depicted on the x-axis. Higher scores indicate more stereotype usage.

Figure 20A. Study 2: Emotional Tone (Difference Scores)



Note. Difference scores in emotional tone across the two time points are depicted on the y-axis. Higher scores indicate a more positive tone at Time 2, relative to Time 1.

Figure 20B. Study 2: Emotional Tone (Raw Scores)



Note. Raw emotional tone scores are depicted on the y-axis. Dotted lines represent Time 1 emotional tone. Solid lines represent Time 2 stereotype emotional tone. Black lines (dotted and solid) represent the High Prejudice Acceptability Condition. Gray lines (dotted and solid) represent the Low Prejudice Acceptability Condition. Confrontation Condition is depicted on the x-axis. Higher scores indicate a more positive emotional tone.

Figure 21. Study 3: Manipulation Check




Figure 22. Study 3: Offensiveness




Figure 23. Study 3: Affect




Figure 24. Study 3: Thoughts & Behavior




Figure 25. Study 3: Moderated Mediation Model






Figure 26A. Study 3: Stereotype Usage (Difference Scores)




Note. Difference scores in stereotype usage across the two time points are depicted on the y-axis. Higher scores indicate more stereotype usage at Time 2, relative to Time 1.

Figure 26B. Study 3: Stereotype Usage (Raw Scores)




Note. Raw stereotype usage scores are depicted on the y-axis. Dotted lines represent Time 1 stereotype usage counts. Solid lines represent Time 2 stereotype usage counts. Black lines (dotted and solid) represent the High Prejudice Acceptability Condition. Gray lines (dotted and solid) represent the Low Prejudice Acceptability Condition. Confrontation Condition is depicted on the x-axis. Higher scores indicate more stereotype usage.

Figure 27A. Study 3: Emotional Tone (Difference Scores)



Note. Difference scores in emotional tone across the two time points are depicted on the y-axis. Higher scores indicate a more positive tone at Time 2, relative to Time 1.

Figure 27B. Study 3: Emotional Tone (Raw Scores)



Note. Raw emotional tone scores are depicted on the y-axis. Dotted lines represent Time 1 emotional tone. Solid lines represent Time 2 stereotype emotional tone. Black lines (dotted and solid) represent the High Prejudice Acceptability Condition. Gray lines (dotted and solid) represent the Low Prejudice Acceptability Condition. Confrontation Condition is depicted on the x-axis. Higher scores indicate a more positive emotional tone.

Tables

Table 1. Aggregated prejudice norm beliefs of Indiana University students

Target Group	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i> (<i>SE</i>)	Variance
1. Firemen	613	1.17 (0.017)	0.187
2. Blind people	4581	1.18 (0.007)	0.203
3. Deaf people	4591	1.19 (0.007)	0.211
4. Mentally retarded people	4588	1.21 (0.007)	0.236
5. People with learning disabilities	4589	1.22 (0.007)	0.235
6. People who give to charity	4589	1.23 (0.007)	0.236
7. Babies	613	1.23 (0.019)	0.215
8. Women in STEM careers	4584	1.23 (0.007)	0.241
9. Olympians	613	1.23 (0.018)	0.208
10. Women	2652	1.24 (0.010)	0.243
11. Female soldiers	4579	1.24 (0.008)	0.258
12. Native Americans	4586	1.25 (0.007)	0.242
13. Single fathers	4590	1.25 (0.007)	0.250
14. People with physical disabilities	614	1.25 (0.021)	0.264
15. Interracial couples	4583	1.25 (0.007)	0.255
16. Single mothers	4583	1.25 (0.007)	0.257
17. Dog owners	4586	1.26 (0.007)	0.257
18. Business women	4583	1.26 (0.008)	0.258
19. Family men	4585	1.26 (0.008)	0.259
20. Elderly people	4581	1.27 (0.008)	0.262
21. Male nurses	4591	1.27 (0.008)	0.264
22. Black Americans	4587	1.27 (0.008)	0.279
23. People with mental illnesses	4586	1.27 (0.008)	0.273
24. Jews	4578	1.27 (0.008)	0.274
25. Women who stay home to raise kids	4589	1.28 (0.008)	0.264
26. Domestic violence victims	3150	1.28 (0.010)	0.328
27. Scientists	611	1.29 (0.020)	0.244
28. Doctors	4579	1.29 (0.008)	0.273
29. Hispanics	4589	1.29 (0.008)	0.290
30. Young Adults	614	1.30 (0.021)	0.268
31. Librarians	4581	1.30 (0.008)	0.284
32. Spelling bee champions	4592	1.30 (0.008)	0.292
33. Stay at home dads	4589	1.30 (0.008)	0.290
34. Heterosexual couples	613	1.31 (0.022)	0.301
35. Asian Americans	4589	1.31 (0.008)	0.307
36. Canadians	4578	1.31 (0.008)	0.295
37. Muslim women who wear hijabs	4585	1.31 (0.008)	0.316
38. Farmers	4586	1.31 (0.008)	0.294
39. Anxious people	612	1.32 (0.020)	0.256
40. Gay soldiers	4591	1.32 (0.008)	0.312
41. Auto mechanics	4582	1.32 (0.008)	0.295

Target Group	<i>N</i>	<i>M (SE)</i>	Variance
42. Manual laborers	4579	1.32 (0.008)	0.305
43. Gay people who raise children	4583	1.33 (0.008)	0.328
44. Women who frequently play videogames	4589	1.33 (0.008)	0.295
45. People living with depression	614	1.33 (0.021)	0.276
46. Members of a bowling league	4581	1.33 (0.008)	0.299
47. People who put their kids in daycare	4591	1.33 (0.008)	0.286
48. Accountants	4577	1.33 (0.008)	0.297
49. Lesbians	4586	1.34 (0.008)	0.331
50. Middle aged people	613	1.34 (0.021)	0.282
51. Gay Men	4585	1.35 (0.009)	0.344
52. Trash collectors	4586	1.35 (0.008)	0.318
53. People from big cities	4590	1.35 (0.008)	0.302
54. Same-sex couples	4024	1.35 (0.009)	0.342
55. Poor people	4583	1.35 (0.008)	0.328
56. Bisexual People	4588	1.35 (0.009)	0.332
57. Students who attend community college	4584	1.36 (0.008)	0.330
58. Cat owners	4591	1.37 (0.009)	0.336
59. Muslims	4584	1.37 (0.009)	0.358
60. Environmentalists	4588	1.37 (0.008)	0.320
61. Rap music fans	4587	1.37 (0.008)	0.323
62. People on Medicare	4582	1.38 (0.008)	0.330
63. Ugly people	4584	1.40 (0.009)	0.377
64. Whites	4581	1.40 (0.009)	0.371
65. Catholics	4587	1.40 (0.009)	0.351
66. Local residents of Bloomington	3972	1.41 (0.010)	0.368
67. Christians	3261	1.41 (0.010)	0.354
68. High school cheerleaders	4589	1.41 (0.009)	0.341
69. Transgender People	4581	1.42 (0.009)	0.397
70. Men	2655	1.42 (0.012)	0.378
71. FBI agents	4576	1.43 (0.009)	0.348
72. Lawyers	4579	1.43 (0.009)	0.343
73. Syrian refugees	4585	1.44 (0.009)	0.369
74. People who never went to college	4580	1.44 (0.009)	0.367
75. Mentally unstable people	4584	1.44 (0.009)	0.355
76. Entertainers	613	1.44 (0.024)	0.339
77. People with AIDS	4584	1.45 (0.009)	0.393
78. Traveling salesmen	4581	1.45 (0.009)	0.361
79. Beauty contestants	4577	1.47 (0.009)	0.369
80. Fat people	4583	1.48 (0.009)	0.409
81. People who are illiterate	4585	1.48 (0.009)	0.389
82. Welfare recipients	4581	1.49 (0.009)	0.381
83. Hipsters	4578	1.50 (0.009)	0.385
84. People accepted into MENSA	4565	1.50 (0.008)	0.330

Target Group	<i>N</i>	<i>M (SE)</i>	Variance
85. Women who breastfeed in public	4584	1.50 (0.009)	0.390
86. People who call the Psychic Hotline	4583	1.51 (0.009)	0.377
87. People who got a job due to Affirmative Action	4575	1.52 (0.009)	0.387
88. Women who wear revealing clothing	4586	1.52 (0.009)	0.381
89. People who drive fancy cars	4584	1.52 (0.009)	0.395
90. Country music fans	4582	1.52 (0.010)	0.448
91. Waif fashion models	1320	1.52 (0.017)	0.383
92. Drag Queens	4586	1.54 (0.010)	0.439
93. Wealthy people	4584	1.54 (0.009)	0.406
94. Homeless people	4584	1.54 (0.009)	0.399
95. Democrats	4588	1.55 (0.009)	0.408
96. Hare Krishnas	4558	1.55 (0.009)	0.360
97. White Southerners	4583	1.55 (0.010)	0.428
98. Black Lives Matter protesters	4584	1.56 (0.010)	0.438
99. Feminists	4585	1.56 (0.010)	0.442
100. Members of the Green Party	4571	1.57 (0.009)	0.374
101. Bernie Sanders supporters	4578	1.58 (0.009)	0.406
102. Teen moms	4585	1.58 (0.009)	0.405
103. Iraqi soldiers	4577	1.58 (0.010)	0.428
104. Political activists	4584	1.58 (0.009)	0.398
105. Police officers	4580	1.60 (0.010)	0.446
106. IRS agents	4583	1.63 (0.010)	0.430
107. People with open sores	4584	1.63 (0.010)	0.425
108. Jehovah's Witnesses	4578	1.64 (0.010)	0.457
109. Scientologists	4577	1.65 (0.010)	0.504
110. Hillary Clinton supporters	4587	1.66 (0.010)	0.455
111. Republicans	4578	1.67 (0.010)	0.481
112. All Lives Matter protesters	4580	1.67 (0.010)	0.497
113. Liberal media pundits	4570	1.69 (0.010)	0.426
114. Debt collectors	4582	1.69 (0.010)	0.449
115. Blue Lives Matter protesters	4585	1.69 (0.010)	0.459
116. Rednecks	4576	1.70 (0.010)	0.478
117. Tele-evangelists	4567	1.73 (0.010)	0.444
118. People who go to the University of Kentucky	4587	1.73 (0.011)	0.583
119. Members of the National Rifle Association	4588	1.73 (0.010)	0.474
120. Students who rarely study	4587	1.75 (0.010)	0.425
121. College teachers with poor English skills	4582	1.78 (0.011)	0.519
122. Conservative media pundits	4577	1.79 (0.010)	0.466
123. Hoarders	4587	1.79 (0.010)	0.431
124. Illegal immigrants	4586	1.81 (0.010)	0.479
125. People who don't vote	4585	1.82 (0.010)	0.460
126. Politicians	4578	1.84 (0.011)	0.528

Target Group	<i>N</i>	<i>M (SE)</i>	Variance
127. Gamblers	4588	1.85 (0.009)	0.404
128. People who smoke	4586	1.87 (0.010)	0.455
129. Contagious people	612	1.88 (0.028)	0.464
130. People who sell marijuana	4586	1.89 (0.010)	0.434
131. Lazy people	4588	1.89 (0.010)	0.451
132. Porn stars	4583	1.89 (0.010)	0.487
133. People who smell bad	4586	1.90 (0.010)	0.494
134. People who don't hold the door for others	4589	1.92 (0.010)	0.433
135. People who are anti-vaccine	4580	1.94 (0.011)	0.540
136. Members of the Alt Right	4569	1.95 (0.011)	0.574
137. Male prostitutes	4589	1.95 (0.011)	0.517
138. Female prostitutes	4586	1.95 (0.010)	0.504
139. Ex-convicts	4583	1.98 (0.009)	0.396
140. Donald Trump supporters	4587	1.98 (0.011)	0.571
141. People who eat with their mouths open	4587	2.00 (0.011)	0.510
142. Juvenile delinquents	4583	2.01 (0.009)	0.400
143. People who go to Purdue University	4584	2.03 (0.012)	0.704
144. Members of religious cults	4584	2.05 (0.010)	0.492
145. Alcoholics	4584	2.06 (0.010)	0.450
146. Drug users	4582	2.07 (0.010)	0.434
147. Internet trolls	4580	2.11 (0.011)	0.513
148. Men who go to prostitutes	4589	2.14 (0.010)	0.480
149. Women who leave their families	4585	2.20 (0.010)	0.492
150. People who cut in line	4589	2.22 (0.010)	0.451
151. People who litter	4585	2.22 (0.010)	0.468
152. People who cheat on exams	4586	2.27 (0.010)	0.433
153. Homophobes	4590	2.28 (0.011)	0.583
154. Men who leave their families	4582	2.32 (0.010)	0.490
155. People who text and drive	4584	2.32 (0.010)	0.453
156. Gang Members	4586	2.33 (0.010)	0.449
157. Careless drivers	4587	2.35 (0.010)	0.475
158. Liars	4588	2.38 (0.010)	0.452
159. Kids who steal other kids lunch money	4589	2.41 (0.010)	0.450
160. Men who refuse to pay child support	4586	2.45 (0.010)	0.441
161. Sexists	4594	2.46 (0.010)	0.480
162. Negligent parents	4585	2.49 (0.010)	0.469
163. People who cheat on their spouses	4586	2.55 (0.009)	0.409
164. Pregnant women who drink alcohol	4583	2.56 (0.009)	0.410
165. Members of the American Nazi Party	4587	2.62 (0.010)	0.421
166. Racists	4591	2.63 (0.010)	0.419
167. Drunk Drivers	4593	2.68 (0.009)	0.356
168. Wife Beaters	4585	2.68 (0.009)	0.383

Target Group	<i>N</i>	<i>M (SE)</i>	Variance
169. Members of the Ku Klux Klan	4585	2.70 (0.009)	0.355
170. Terrorists	4581	2.72 (0.009)	0.353
171. Child Abusers	4588	2.74 (0.009)	0.335
172. Child Molesters	4576	2.76 (0.008)	0.317
173. Rapists	4587	2.76 (0.008)	0.309

Note. A sample of 4,594 Indiana University students were asked to rate how socially acceptable it is to have negative feelings toward these target groups (1 = “Definitely not OK,” 2 = “Maybe OK,” 3 = “Definitely OK”). These scales were borrowed from previous research on the same topic (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002). These data were collected over three semesters (Spring 2017, Fall 2017, and Spring 2018). The target groups with lower *N*s were either added or removed from the list in the second semester of data collection. Full results are reported above—there were no participant exclusions. Bolded groups were selected as target groups for Study 1.

Table 2. Study 1: Demographic Characteristics ($N = 1591$ students)

Characteristic	N	%
<i>Race</i>		
White	1119	70.3%
Black	89	5.6%
Hispanic/Latino	49	3.1%
Asian	184	11.6%
Other	150	9.4%
<i>Gender</i>		
Man	591	37.1%
Woman	989	62.2%
Other	11	0.7%
<i>Political Orientation</i>		
Liberal Leaning	636	40.0%
Conservative Leaning	415	26.1%
Neither	313	19.7%
Choose not to answer / Don't know	227	14.3%
<i>Sexuality</i>		
Heterosexual	1456	91.5%
Homosexual	40	2.5%
Other (e.g., Bi, Pansexual)	84	5.3%
Choose not to answer / Don't know	11	0.7%
<i>Disability</i>		
Physical / Sensory Disability	7	0.5%
Mental Illness	147	9.2%
Learning Disability	18	1.1%
Other Disability	164	10.3%
No Disability	1194	75.0%
Choose not to answer / Don't know	61	3.8%
<i>Religion</i>		
Atheist/Agnostic	247	15.5%
Buddhist	22	1.4%
Christian	846	53.2%
Hindu	35	2.2%
Jewish	113	7.1%
Muslim	15	0.9%
Other	187	11.8%
Choose not to answer / Don't know	126	7.9%
<i>Country of Birth</i>		
United States	1416	89.0%
Other	175	11.0%

Table 3. Study 1: Psychometric Properties of the Major Variables

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	α	Range		Skew
				Potential	Actual	
Offensiveness	5.62	2.35	.89	1.0 - 9.0	1.0 - 9.0	-0.22
Negative Self-Directed Affect	4.48	2.00	.93	1.0 - 7.0	1.0 - 7.0	-0.30
Negative Other-Directed Affect	2.72	1.54	.87	1.0 - 7.0	1.0 - 7.0	0.73
Positive Affect	2.25	1.40	.85	1.0 - 7.0	1.0 - 7.0	0.95
Self-Corrective Thoughts & Actions	4.60	1.48	.92	1.0 - 7.0	1.0 - 7.0	-0.31
Dismissive/Hostile Thoughts & Actions	2.58	1.26	.85	1.0 - 7.0	1.0 - 7.0	0.60
Personal Prejudice	5.32	2.42	.96	1.0 - 9.0	1.0 - 9.0	-0.12

Table 4. Study 1: Zero-order correlations

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
1. Prejudice Acceptability Level	--							
2. Offensiveness	-.49***	--						
3. Negative Self-Directed Affect	-.32***	.57***	--					
4. Negative Other-Directed Affect	.27***	-.34***	-.29***	--				
5. Positive Affect	.16***	-.28***	-.39***	.58***	--			
6. Self-Corrective Thoughts & Actions	-.30***	.58***	.81***	-.38***	-.39***	--		
7. Dismissive/Hostile Thoughts & Actions	.26***	-.43***	-.47***	.69***	.67***	-.48***	--	
8. Personal Prejudice	.67***	-.54***	-.34***	.30***	.15***	-.35***	.28***	--
	<i>M</i>	5.62	4.48	2.72	2.25	4.60	2.85	5.32
	<i>SD</i>	2.35	2.00	1.54	1.40	1.48	1.11	2.42

Note. Pearson correlations. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5. Study 1: Multilevel Models for Prejudice Acceptability

	<i>Offensiveness</i>	<i>Negative Self-Directed Affect</i>	<i>Negative Other-Directed Affect</i>	<i>Positive Affect</i>	<i>Self-Correction</i>	<i>Dismissive/Hostile</i>
Fixed Effects						
Intercept	7.03 (0.20)	5.22 (0.16)	2.29 (0.10)	1.98 (0.08)	5.16 (0.11)	2.19 (0.07)
Prej. Accept Moderate	-1.43 (0.28)	-0.69 (0.22)	0.25 (0.14)	0.25 (0.11)	-0.58 (0.15)	0.34 (0.11)
Prej. Accept High	-2.81 (0.28)	-1.55 (0.22)	1.01 (0.14)	0.55 (0.11)	-1.07 (0.15)	0.83 (0.11)
Random Effects						
Residual Variance	3.95 (1.99)	3.45 (1.86)	2.13 (1.46)	1.90 (1.38)	1.92 (1.39)	1.47 (1.21)
Intercept	0.32 (0.56)	0.18 (0.42)	0.05 (0.23)	0.02 (0.16)	0.08 (0.28)	0.03 (0.17)
Random Intercept Model						
Deviance	6651	6428	5658	5468	5505	5069
AIC	6665	6444	5676	5488	5523	5089
BIC	6692	6470	5703	5515	5549	5115
Unconditional Model (Levels 1 and 2)						
ICC	0.29	0.14	0.10	0.04	0.12	0.09
Deviance	6698	6459	5693	5487	5536	5104
AIC	6705	6467	5702	5497	5545	5114
BIC	6721	6483	5718	5513	5561	5130

Note. Standard errors are included in parentheses beside Fixed Effects coefficients. Standard deviations are included in parentheses beside Random Effects coefficients.

Table 6. Study 1: Multilevel Confirmatory Factor Analysis (ML-CFA) Factor Loadings

Parameter Estimate	Unstandardized	Standardized	ICC	R ²	p
<i>Measurement Model</i>					
Offensiveness → X ₁	1.00 (---)	1.84 (0.06)	0.28	0.74	<.001
Offensiveness → X ₂	0.97 (0.03)	1.83 (0.04)	0.24	0.72	<.001
Negative Self-Directed affect → X ₃	1.00 (---)	1.82 (0.03)	0.13	0.83	<.001
Negative Self-Directed affect → X ₄	0.94 (0.02)	1.71 (0.03)	0.11	0.75	<.001
Negative Self-Directed affect → X ₅	0.99 (0.02)	1.80 (0.03)	0.14	0.82	<.001
Negative Other-Directed affect → X ₆	1.00 (---)	1.35 (0.03)	0.07	0.59	<.001
Negative Other -Directed affect → X ₇	0.99 (0.03)	1.34 (0.05)	0.11	0.71	<.001
Negative Other -Directed affect → X ₈	0.99 (0.03)	1.35 (0.04)	0.07	0.73	<.001
Positive affect → X ₉	1.00 (---)	1.36 (0.03)	0.03	0.72	<.001
Positive affect → X ₁₀	1.03 (0.03)	1.40 (0.04)	0.04	0.79	<.001
Positive affect → X ₁₁	0.75 (0.04)	1.03 (0.04)	0.03	0.46	<.001
Self-Correct → X ₁₂	1.00 (---)	1.61 (0.04)	0.14	0.74	<.001
Self-Correct → X ₁₃	0.78 (0.03)	1.26 (0.04)	0.05	0.54	<.001
Self-Correct → X ₁₄	0.43 (0.03)	0.70 (0.04)	0.02	0.16	<.001
Self-Correct → X ₁₅	0.95 (0.02)	1.53 (0.03)	0.09	0.65	<.001
Self-Correct → X ₁₆	0.89 (0.02)	1.44 (0.02)	0.09	0.59	<.001
Self-Correct → X ₁₇	0.95 (0.03)	1.52 (0.05)	0.11	0.67	<.001
Self-Correct → X ₁₈	0.94 (0.02)	1.51 (0.03)	0.09	0.68	<.001
Self-Correct → X ₁₉	0.57 (0.04)	0.92 (0.06)	0.02	0.27	<.001
Self-Correct → X ₂₀	0.78 (0.03)	1.25 (0.05)	0.11	0.46	<.001
Dismiss → X ₂₁	1.00 (---)	1.10 (0.04)	0.11	0.39	<.001
Dismiss → X ₂₂	1.06 (0.04)	1.17 (0.04)	0.06	0.53	<.001
Dismiss → X ₂₃	0.84 (0.07)	0.93 (0.06)	0.02	0.26	<.001
Dismiss → X ₂₄	1.11 (0.05)	1.22 (0.05)	0.08	0.61	<.001
Dismiss → X ₂₅	0.99 (0.05)	1.09 (0.04)	0.04	0.58	<.001
Dismiss → X ₂₆	1.07 (0.05)	1.18 (0.04)	0.07	0.65	<.001

Note. Maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors, $N = 1568$, 30 clusters: $\chi^2 (594) = 2447.04$, $p < .001$, Robust CFI = .93, Robust RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.04, 0.05], SRMR (within covariance matrix) = 0.06, SRMR (between covariance matrix) = 0.13; Standard errors in parentheses. ICC indicates the total variance at Level 2 for that particular item.

Table 7. Study 1: Multilevel Structural Equation Model (ML-SEM) Standardized Factor Loadings

Parameter Estimate	Standardized	<i>p</i>
<i>Structural Model</i>		
<i>Direct Paths</i>		
Prejudice Acceptability → Offensiveness	-0.74 (0.09)	< .001
Prejudice Acceptability → Negative Self-Directed affect	-0.06 (0.05)	= .247
Prejudice Acceptability → Negative Other-Directed affect	0.27 (0.05)	< .001
Prejudice Acceptability → Positive affect	0.14 (0.05)	= .005
Prejudice Acceptability → Self-Correct	-0.002 (0.06)	= .968
Prejudice Acceptability → Dismiss	-0.06 (0.05)	= .196
Offensiveness → Negative Self-Directed affect	0.64 (0.06)	< .001
Offensiveness → Negative Other-Directed affect	-0.16 (0.03)	< .001
Offensiveness → Positive affect	-0.09 (0.04)	= .017
Offensiveness → Self-Correct	-0.09 (0.04)	= .017
Offensiveness → Dismiss	-0.16 (0.03)	< .001
Negative Self-Directed affect → Self-Correct	1.66 (0.08)	< .001
Negative Self-Directed affect → Dismiss	-0.18 (0.04)	< .001
Negative Other-Directed affect → Self-Correct	-0.40 (0.09)	< .001
Negative Other-Directed affect → Dismiss	0.90 (0.07)	< .001
Positive affect → Self-Correct	0.10 (0.09)	= .230
Positive affect → Dismiss	0.67 (0.09)	< .001
<i>Indirect Paths</i>		
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegSelf	-0.47 (0.07)	< .001
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegOther	0.12 (0.03)	< .001
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → Positive	0.07 (0.03)	= .026
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegSelf → Self-Correct	-0.79 (0.13)	< .001
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegSelf → Dismiss	0.08 (0.02)	< .001
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegOther → Self-Correct	-0.05 (0.01)	= .001
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegOther → Dismiss	0.11 (0.03)	< .001
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → Positive → Self-Correct	0.01 (0.01)	= .294
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → Positive → Dismiss	0.05 (0.02)	= .041

Note. Maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors, $N = 1568$, 30 clusters: $\chi^2(627) = 2429.81, p < .001$; Robust CFI = .92; Robust RMSEA = .05; SRMR (within) = .07, SRMR (between) = .25; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 8. Study 2: Demographic Characteristics ($N = 393$ students)

Characteristic	N	%
<i>Race</i>		
White	288	73.3%
Black	13	3.3%
Hispanic/Latino	11	2.8%
Asian	47	11.9%
Other	34	8.7%
<i>Gender</i>		
Man	108	27.5%
Woman	284	72.3%
Other	1	0.3%
<i>Political Orientation</i>		
Liberal Leaning	179	45.5%
Conservative Leaning	75	19.1%
Neither	84	21.4%
Choose not to answer / Don't know	55	14.0%
<i>Sexuality</i>		
Heterosexual	349	88.8%
Homosexual	7	1.8%
Other (e.g., Bi, Pansexual)	27	6.9%
Choose not to answer / Don't know	10	2.5%
<i>Disability</i>		
Physical / Sensory Disability	5	1.3%
Mental Illness	59	15.0%
Learning Disability	3	0.8%
Other Disability	37	9.4%
No Disability	281	71.5%
Choose not to answer / Don't know	8	2.0%
<i>Religion</i>		
Atheist/Agnostic	87	22.1%
Buddhist	6	1.5%
Christian	200	50.8%
Hindu	13	3.3%
Jewish	27	6.9%
Muslim	3	0.8%
Other	30	7.6%
Choose not to answer / Don't know	27	6.8%
<i>Country of Birth</i>		
United States	362	92.1%
Other	31	7.9%

Table 9. Study 2: Psychometric Properties of the Major Variables

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>α</i>	Range		Skew
				Potential	Actual	
Offensiveness	2.05	1.44	.85	1.0 - 7.0	1.0 - 7.0	1.24
Negative Self-Directed Affect	2.88	1.42	.87	1.0 - 7.0	1.0 - 6.8	0.60
Negative Other-Directed Affect	1.89	0.91	.79	1.0 - 7.0	1.0 - 5.8	1.29
Positive Affect	2.90	1.33	.74	1.0 - 7.0	1.0 - 7.0	0.61
Self-Corrective Thoughts & Actions	3.31	1.04	.78	1.0 - 7.0	1.0 - 7.0	0.35
Dismissive/Hostile Thoughts & Actions	1.95	0.74	.72	1.0 - 7.0	1.0 - 7.0	1.46
Stereotype Usage (T2 - T1, Diff. Score)	-0.66	2.30	--	--	-8.9 - 8.9	-0.15
Emotional Tone (T2 - T1, Diff. Score)	2.97	31.55	--	--	-95.2 - 96.1	0.18
Personal Prejudice	4.12	1.94	.93	1.0 - 9.0	1.0 - 9.0	-0.06

Table 10. Study 2: Zero-order correlations

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.
1. Prejudice Acceptability Condition	--										
2. Confrontation Condition	-.004	--									
3. Offensiveness	.10*	.54***	--								
4. Negative Self-Directed Affect	.03	.08	.41***	--							
5. Negative Other-Directed Affect	-.02	.20***	.23***	.39***	--						
6. Positive Affect	-.04	-.04	-.07	-.06	.01	--					
7. Self-Corrective Thoughts & Actions	.05	.20***	.60***	.56***	.10*	.08	--				
8. Dismissive/Hostile Thoughts & Actions	-.08	.20***	.07	.04	.62***	.24***	-.02	--			
9. Personal Prejudice	.63***	-.14**	-.06	-.06	.06	.05	-.06	.03	--		
10. Stereotype Usage (T2 - T1, Diff. Score)	-.05	-.24***	-.20***	-.01	-.02	-.04	-.06	-.04	.04	--	
11. Emotional Tone (T2 - T1, Diff. Score)	-.001	.22***	.22***	.03	.04	-.11*	.08	.05	.01	-.25***	--
	<i>M</i>	2.05	2.05	2.88	1.89	2.90	3.31	1.95	4.12	-0.66	2.97
	<i>SD</i>	1.44	1.44	1.42	0.91	1.33	1.04	0.74	1.94	2.30	31.55

Note. Pearson correlations. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 11. Study 2: Multilevel Models for Prejudice Acceptability and Confrontation

	<i>Offensiveness</i>	<i>Negative Self-Directed Affect</i>	<i>Negative Other-Directed Affect</i>	<i>Positive Affect</i>	<i>Self-Correction</i>	<i>Dismissive/Hostile</i>
Fixed Effects						
Intercept	2.02 (0.06)	2.87 (0.07)	1.88 (0.06)	2.91 (0.07)	3.31 (0.05)	1.95 (0.05)
Prej. Acceptability	0.15 (0.06)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
Confrontation	0.77 (0.06)	0.12 (0.07)	0.18 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.21 (0.05)	0.15 (0.04)
Interaction	0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.07)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.04)
Random Effects						
Residual Variance	1.46 (1.21)	2.01 (1.42)	0.79 (0.89)	1.76 (1.33)	1.04 (1.02)	0.51 (0.71)
Intercept	< .001 (< .001)	< .001 (< .001)	0.01 (0.11)	0.01 (0.10)	0.001 (0.04)	0.01 (0.11)
Random Intercept Model						
Deviance	1259	1386	1023	1336	1126	853
AIC	1286	1411	1051	1362	1155	882
BIC	1310	1435	1075	1386	1179	906
Unconditional Model (Levels 1 and 2)						
ICC	0.005	< 0.001	0.009	0.003	< 0.001	0.02
Deviance	1400	1389	1042	1339	1144	875
AIC	1410	1398	1052	1349	1154	885
BIC	1422	1410	1064	1361	1166	897

Note. Standard errors are included in parentheses beside Fixed Effects coefficients. Standard deviations are included in parentheses beside Random Effects coefficients. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 12. Study 2: Moderated Mediation Model Factor Loadings: Direct Paths

Parameter Estimate	Standardized	<i>p</i>
<i>Direct Paths</i>		
Prejudice Acceptability → Offensiveness	0.15 (0.06)	.01
Confrontation → Offensiveness	0.77 (0.06)	< .001
Interaction Term → Offensiveness	0.05 (0.06)	.40
Prejudice Acceptability → Negative Self-Directed affect	-0.03 (0.07)	.60
Confrontation → Negative Self-Directed affect	-0.29 (0.08)	< .001
Interaction Term → Negative Self-Directed affect	-0.07 (0.06)	.27
Prejudice Acceptability → Negative Other-Directed affect	-0.04 (0.04)	.41
Confrontation → Negative Other-Directed affect	0.09 (0.05)	.11
Interaction Term → Negative Other-Directed affect	-0.10 (0.04)	.03
Prejudice Acceptability → Positive affect	-0.04 (0.07)	.53
Confrontation → Positive affect	-0.01 (0.09)	.93
Interaction Term → Positive affect	-0.09 (0.07)	.16
Prejudice Acceptability → Self-Correct	-0.01 (0.04)	.75
Confrontation → Self-Correct	-0.06 (0.05)	.15
Interaction Term → Self-Correct	-0.01 (0.04)	.88
Prejudice Acceptability → Dismiss	-0.03 (0.03)	.28
Confrontation → Dismiss	0.09 (0.03)	.005
Interaction Term → Dismiss	-0.02 (0.03)	.46
Offensiveness → Negative Self-Directed affect	0.52 (0.05)	< .001
Offensiveness → Negative Other-Directed affect	0.12 (0.04)	.001
Offensiveness → Positive affect	-0.06 (0.06)	.32
Offensiveness → Self-Correct	0.36 (0.03)	< .001
Offensiveness → Dismiss	-0.03 (0.03)	.29
Negative Self-Directed affect → Self-Correct	0.32 (0.03)	< .001
Negative Self-Directed affect → Dismiss	-0.10 (0.02)	< .001
Negative Other-Directed affect → Self-Correct	-0.20 (0.05)	< .001
Negative Other-Directed affect → Dismiss	0.55 (0.04)	< .001
Positive affect → Self-Correct	0.11 (0.03)	< .001
Positive affect → Dismiss	0.12 (0.02)	< .001

Note. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 13. Study 2: Moderated Mediation Model Factor Loadings: Indirect Paths

Parameter Estimate	Standardized	<i>p</i>
<i>Indirect Paths</i>		
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegSelf	0.08 (0.03)	.01
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegOther	0.02 (0.01)	.04
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → Positive	-0.01 (0.01)	.34
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegSelf → Self-Correct	0.03 (0.01)	.02
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegSelf → Dismiss	-0.01 (0.004)	.03
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegOther → Self-Correct	-0.004 (0.002)	.08
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegOther → Dismiss	0.01 (0.005)	.05
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → Positive → Self-Correct	-0.001 (0.001)	.35
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → Positive → Dismiss	-0.001 (0.001)	.36
Confrontation → Offen. → NegSelf	0.40 (0.05)	< .001
Confrontation → Offen. → NegOther	0.10 (0.03)	.001
Confrontation → Offen. → Positive	-0.04 (0.04)	.32
Confrontation → Offen. → NegSelf → Self-Correct	0.13 (0.02)	< .001
Confrontation → Offen. → NegSelf → Dismiss	-0.04 (0.01)	< .001
Confrontation → Offen. → NegOther → Self-Correct	-0.02 (0.01)	.02
Confrontation → Offen. → NegOther → Dismiss	0.05 (0.02)	.002
Confrontation → Offen. → Positive → Self-Correct	-0.01 (0.01)	.33
Confrontation → Offen. → Positive → Dismiss	-0.005 (0.005)	.35
Interaction → Offen. → NegSelf	0.03 (0.03)	.40
Interaction → Offen. → NegOther	0.01 (0.01)	.42
Interaction → Offen. → Positive	-0.003 (0.004)	.51
Interaction → Offen. → NegSelf → Self-Correct	0.01 (0.01)	.40
Interaction → Offen. → NegSelf → Dismiss	-0.003 (0.003)	.41
Interaction → Offen. → NegOther → Self-Correct	-0.001 (0.002)	.43
Interaction → Offen. → NegOther → Dismiss	0.003 (0.004)	.42
Interaction → Offen. → Positive → Self-Correct	< 0.001 (0.001)	.52
Interaction → Offen. → Positive → Dismiss	< 0.001 (0.001)	.52

Note. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 14. Study 3: Demographic Characteristics ($N = 318$ students)

Characteristic	N	%
<i>Race</i>		
White	218	68.6%
Black	18	5.6%
Hispanic/Latino	13	4.1%
Asian	42	13.2%
Other	27	8.5%
<i>Gender</i>		
Man	101	31.8%
Woman	208	65.4%
Other	9	2.8%
<i>Political Orientation</i>		
Liberal Leaning	160	50.3%
Conservative Leaning	65	20.4%
Neither	60	18.9%
Choose not to answer / Don't know	33	10.4%
<i>Sexuality</i>		
Heterosexual	270	84.9%
Homosexual	11	3.5%
Other (e.g., Bi, Pansexual)	31	9.7%
Choose not to answer / Don't know	6	1.9%
<i>Disability</i>		
Physical / Sensory Disability	5	1.5%
Mental Illness	40	12.6%
Learning Disability	4	1.3%
Other Disability	42	13.2%
No Disability	218	68.6%
Choose not to answer / Don't know	9	2.8%
<i>Religion</i>		
Atheist/Agnostic	71	22.3%
Buddhist	6	1.9%
Christian	165	51.9%
Hindu	2	0.6%
Jewish	14	4.4%
Muslim	7	2.2%
Other	36	11.3%
Choose not to answer / Don't know	17	5.3%
<i>Country of Birth</i>		
United States	277	87.1%
Other	41	12.9%

Table 15. Study 3: Psychometric Properties of the Major Variables

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	α	Range		Skew
				Potential	Actual	
Offensiveness	2.03	1.50	.87	1.0 - 7.0	1.0 - 7.0	1.35
Negative Self-Directed Affect	2.83	1.41	.84	1.0 - 7.0	1.0 - 7.0	0.71
Negative Other-Directed Affect	1.91	1.05	.83	1.0 - 7.0	1.0 - 7.0	1.37
Positive Affect	3.29	1.39	.75	1.0 - 7.0	1.0 - 7.0	0.22
Self-Corrective Thoughts & Actions	3.23	1.05	.79	1.0 - 7.0	1.0 - 7.0	0.56
Dismissive/Hostile Thoughts & Actions	2.31	0.75	.73	1.0 - 7.0	1.0 - 7.0	0.98
Stereotype Usage (T2 - T1, Diff. Score)	-0.57	2.02	--	--	-10.3 - 6.6	-0.02
Emotional Tone (T2 - T1, Diff. Score)	2.70	29.23	--	--	-96.1 - 95.0	0.10
Personal Prejudice	5.84	1.15	.82	1.0 - 9.0	1.0 - 9.0	-0.31

Table 16. Study 3: Zero-order correlations

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11
1. Prejudice Acceptability Condition	--										
2. Confrontation Condition	.01	--									
3. Offensiveness	-.01	.53***	--								
4. Negative Self-Directed Affect	.001	.04	.41***	--							
5. Negative Other-Directed Affect	-.12*	-.02	.06	.45***	--						
6. Positive Affect	.01	-.04	-.02	-.06	-.01	--					
7. Self-Corrective Thoughts & Actions	.01	.18**	.58***	.56***	.03	.11	--				
8. Dismissive/Hostile Thoughts & Actions	-.06	.14*	.07	.11*	.57***	.16**	-.02	--			
9. Personal Prejudice	.05	-.02	-.001	.02	.12*	-.20***	-.14*	.03	--		
10. Stereotype Usage (T2 - T1, Diff. Score)	.07	-.17***	-.16*	-.07	.04	-.06	-.09	-.01	.04	--	
11. Emotional Tone (T2 - T1, Diff. Score)	-.16*	.29***	.25***	.05	-.02	-.05	.16**	-.05	-.01	-.34***	--
		<i>M</i>	2.03	2.83	1.91	3.29	3.23	2.31	5.84	-0.57	2.70
		<i>SD</i>	1.50	1.41	1.05	1.39	1.05	0.75	1.15	2.02	29.23

Note. Pearson correlations. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 17. Study 3: Moderated Mediation Model Factor Loadings: Direct Paths

Parameter Estimate	Standardized	<i>p</i>
<i>Direct Paths</i>		
Prejudice Acceptability → Offensiveness	-0.03 (0.07)	.72
Confrontation → Offensiveness	0.79 (0.07)	< .001
Interaction Term → Offensiveness	0.03 (0.07)	.66
Prejudice Acceptability → Negative Self-Directed affect	0.01 (0.07)	.88
Confrontation → Negative Self-Directed affect	-0.33 (0.08)	< .001
Interaction Term → Negative Self-Directed affect	0.03 (0.07)	.64
Prejudice Acceptability → Negative Other-Directed affect	-0.13 (0.06)	.03
Confrontation → Negative Other-Directed affect	-0.07 (0.07)	.33
Interaction Term → Negative Other-Directed affect	0.06 (0.06)	.35
Prejudice Acceptability → Positive affect	0.01 (0.08)	.95
Confrontation → Positive affect	-0.04 (0.09)	.65
Interaction Term → Positive affect	0.12 (0.08)	.13
Prejudice Acceptability → Self-Correct	-0.01 (0.04)	.84
Confrontation → Self-Correct	-0.07 (0.05)	.14
Interaction Term → Self-Correct	-0.03 (0.04)	.44
Prejudice Acceptability → Dismiss	0.01 (0.03)	.70
Confrontation → Dismiss	0.11 (0.04)	.01
Interaction Term → Dismiss	0.05 (0.03)	.15
Offensiveness → Negative Self-Directed affect	0.50 (0.06)	< .001
Offensiveness → Negative Other-Directed affect	0.06 (0.04)	.15
Offensiveness → Positive affect	-0.01 (0.06)	.89
Offensiveness → Self-Correct	0.30 (0.04)	< .001
Offensiveness → Dismiss	0.02 (0.03)	.62
Negative Self-Directed affect → Self-Correct	0.37 (0.04)	< .001
Negative Self-Directed affect → Dismiss	-0.11 (0.03)	.001
Negative Other-Directed affect → Self-Correct	-0.22 (0.05)	< .001
Negative Other-Directed affect → Dismiss	0.47 (0.04)	< .001
Positive affect → Self-Correct	0.11 (0.03)	< .001
Positive affect → Dismiss	0.09 (0.02)	< .001

Note. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 18. Study 3: Moderated Mediation Model Factor Loadings: Indirect Paths

Parameter Estimate	Standardized	<i>p</i>
<i>Indirect Paths</i>		
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegSelf	-0.01 (0.03)	.72
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegOther	-0.002 (0.01)	.74
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → Positive	< 0.001 (0.004)	.90
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegSelf → Self-Correct	-0.004 (0.01)	.72
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegSelf → Dismiss	0.001 (0.004)	.73
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegOther → Self-Correct	< 0.001 (0.001)	.74
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → NegOther → Dismiss	-0.001 (0.002)	.74
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → Positive → Self-Correct	< 0.001 (0.001)	.90
Prej. Accept. → Offen. → Positive → Dismiss	< 0.001 (0.001)	.90
Confrontation → Offen. → NegSelf	0.39 (0.06)	< .001
Confrontation → Offen. → NegOther	0.05 (0.03)	.15
Confrontation → Offen. → Positive	-0.01 (0.05)	.89
Confrontation → Offen. → NegSelf → Self-Correct	0.14 (0.03)	< .001
Confrontation → Offen. → NegSelf → Dismiss	-0.04 (0.01)	.001
Confrontation → Offen. → NegOther → Self-Correct	-0.01 (0.01)	.19
Confrontation → Offen. → NegOther → Dismiss	0.02 (0.01)	.15
Confrontation → Offen. → Positive → Self-Correct	-0.001 (0.01)	.89
Confrontation → Offen. → Positive → Dismiss	-0.001 (0.01)	.89
Interaction → Offen. → NegSelf	0.02 (0.03)	.66
Interaction → Offen. → NegOther	0.002 (0.004)	.66
Interaction → Offen. → Positive	< 0.001 (0.002)	.90
Interaction → Offen. → NegSelf → Self-Correct	0.01 (0.01)	.66
Interaction → Offen. → NegSelf → Dismiss	-0.002 (0.004)	.66
Interaction → Offen. → NegOther → Self-Correct	< 0.001 (0.001)	.66
Interaction → Offen. → NegOther → Dismiss	0.001 (0.002)	.66
Interaction → Offen. → Positive → Self-Correct	< 0.001 (0.001)	.90
Interaction → Offen. → Positive → Dismiss	< 0.001 (0.001)	.90

Note. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 19. High-level summary of statistically significant direct effects across all three experiments.

Predictor	Forecasters (Study 1)	Experiencers (Study 2)	Experiencers (Study 3)
Prejudice Acceptability Condition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↓ Offensiveness ↓ Negative Self-Directed Affect ↑ Negative Other-Directed Affect ↑ Positive Affect ↓ Self-Corrective Intentions ↑ Dismissive/Hostile Intentions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↑ Offensiveness 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↓ Negative Other-Directed Affect ↓ Positive Emotional Tone
Confrontation Condition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↑ Offensiveness ↑ Negative Other-Directed Affect ↑ Self-Corrective Intentions ↑ Dismissive/Hostile Intentions ↓ Stereotype Usage ↑ Positive Emotional Tone 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↑ Offensiveness ↑ Self-Corrective Intentions ↑ Dismissive/Hostile Intentions ↓ Stereotype Usage ↑ Positive Emotional Tone
Offensiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↑ Negative Self-Directed Affect ↓ Negative Other-Directed Affect ↓ Positive Affect ↑ Self-Corrective Intentions ↓ Dismissive/Hostile Intentions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↑ Negative Self-Directed Affect ↑ Negative Other-Directed Affect ↑ Self-Corrective Intentions ↓ Stereotype Usage ↑ Positive Emotional Tone 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↑ Negative Self-Directed Affect ↑ Self-Corrective Intentions ↓ Stereotype Usage ↑ Positive Emotional Tone
Negative Self-Directed Affect	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↑ Self-Corrective Intentions ↓ Dismissive/Hostile Intentions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↑ Self-Corrective Intentions ↓ Dismissive/Hostile Intentions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↑ Self-Corrective Intentions ↓ Dismissive/Hostile Intentions
Negative Other-Directed Affect	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↓ Self-Corrective Intentions ↑ Dismissive/Hostile Intentions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↓ Self-Corrective Intentions ↑ Dismissive/Hostile Intentions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↓ Self-Corrective Intentions ↑ Dismissive/Hostile Intentions
Positive Affect	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↑ Dismissive/Hostile Intentions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↑ Self-Corrective Intentions ↑ Dismissive/Hostile Intentions ↓ Positive Emotional Tone 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↑ Self-Corrective Intentions ↑ Dismissive/Hostile Intentions

Appendix 1: Social Norm Beliefs Pilot Study Measures

To what extent do you think that it is socially acceptable for **IU students** to have **negative feelings** toward the following groups?

We are NOT asking about your personal feelings toward these groups. We are asking you to describe what is **socially acceptable on campus.*

Most IU students think it
is **definitely not OK to
have negative feelings
about this group.**

1

Most IU students think it
is **maybe OK to have
negative feelings** about
this group.

2

Most IU students think it
is **definitely OK to have
negative feelings** about
this group.

3

- | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|--|
| 1. Firemen | 39. Anxious people | |
| 2. Blind people | 40. Gay soldiers | |
| 3. Deaf people | 41. Auto mechanics | |
| 4. Mentally retarded people | 42. Manual laborers | |
| 5. People with learning disabilities | 43. Gay people who raise children | |
| 6. People who give to charity | 44. Women who frequently play videogames | |
| 7. Babies | 45. People living with depression | |
| 8. Women in STEM careers | 46. Members of a bowling league | |
| 9. Olympians | 47. People who put their kids in daycare | |
| 10. Women | 48. Accountants | |
| 11. Female soldiers | 49. Lesbians | |
| 12. Native Americans | 50. Middle aged people | |
| 13. Single fathers | 51. Gay Men | |
| 14. People with physical disabilities | 52. Trash collectors | |
| 15. Interracial couples | 53. People from big cities | |
| 16. Single mothers | 54. Same-sex couples | |
| 17. Dog owners | 55. Poor people | |
| 18. Business women | 56. Bisexual People | |
| 19. Family men | 57. Students who attend community college | |
| 20. Elderly people | 58. Cat owners | |
| 21. Male nurses | 59. Muslims | |
| 22. Black Americans | 60. Environmentalists | |
| 23. People with mental illnesses | 61. Rap music fans | |
| 24. Jews | 62. People on Medicare | |
| 25. Women who stay home to raise kids | 63. Ugly people | |
| 26. Domestic violence victims | 64. Whites | |
| 27. Scientists | 65. Catholics | |
| 28. Doctors | 66. Local residents of Bloomington | |
| 29. Hispanics | 67. Christians | |
| 30. Young Adults | 68. High school cheerleaders | |
| 31. Librarians | 69. Transgender People | |
| 32. Spelling bee champions | 70. Men | |
| 33. Stay at home dads | 71. FBI agents | |
| 34. Heterosexual couples | 72. Lawyers | |
| 35. Asian Americans | 73. Syrian refugees | |
| 36. Canadians | 74. People who never went to college | |
| 37. Muslim women who wear hijabs | 75. Mentally unstable people | |
| 38. Farmers | | |

76. Entertainers
77. People with AIDS
78. Traveling salesmen
79. Beauty contestants
80. Fat people
81. People who are illiterate
82. Welfare recipients
83. Hipsters
84. People accepted into MENSA
85. Women who breastfeed in public
86. People who call the Psychic Hotline
87. People who got a job due to Affirmative Action
88. Women who wear revealing clothing
89. People who drive fancy cars
90. Country music fans
91. Waif fashion models
92. Drag Queens
93. Wealthy people
94. Homeless people
95. Democrats
96. Hare Krishnas
97. White Southerners
98. Black Lives Matter protesters
99. Feminists
100. Members of the Green Party
101. Bernie Sanders supporters
102. Teen moms
103. Iraqi soldiers
104. Political activists
105. Police officers
106. IRS agents
107. People with open sores
108. Jehovah's Witnesses
109. Scientologists
110. Hillary Clinton supporters
111. Republicans
112. All Lives Matter protesters
113. Liberal media pundits
114. Debt collectors
115. Blue Lives Matter protesters
116. Rednecks
117. Tele-evangelists
118. People who go to the University of Kentucky
119. Members of the National Rifle Association
120. Students who rarely study
121. College teachers with poor English skills
122. Conservative media pundits
123. Hoarders
124. Illegal immigrants
125. People who don't vote
126. Politicians
127. Gamblers
128. People who smoke
129. Contagious people
130. People who sell marijuana
131. Lazy people
132. Porn stars
133. People who smell bad
134. People who don't hold the door for others
135. People who are anti-vaccine
136. Members of the Alt Right
137. Male prostitutes
138. Female prostitutes
139. Ex-convicts
140. Donald Trump supporters
141. People who eat with their mouths open
142. Juvenile delinquents
143. People who go to Purdue University
144. Members of religious cults
145. Alcoholics
146. Drug users
147. Internet trolls
148. Men who go to prostitutes
149. Women who leave their families
150. People who cut in line
151. People who litter
152. People who cheat on exams
153. Homophobes
154. Men who leave their families
155. People who text and drive
156. Gang Members
157. Careless drivers
158. Liars
159. Kids who steal other kids lunch money
160. Men who refuse to pay child support
161. Sexists
162. Negligent parents
163. People who cheat on their spouses
164. Pregnant women who drink alcohol
165. Members of the American Nazi Party
166. Racists
167. Drunk Drivers
168. Wife Beaters
169. Members of the Ku Klux Klan
170. Terrorists
171. Child Abusers
172. Child Molesters
173. Rapists

Appendix 2: Study Measures

Study 1 Measures

Imagine you are talking with a few acquaintances after class. During the conversation, you **make a joke** that **implies something negative** about **[target group]**. An **acquaintance of yours interjects**, saying they were **upset by your joke** and that you seem to be a little **prejudiced**.

[Affect]

How would you **feel** in this social situation?

Does not apply at all	1	2	3	4	5	6	Applies very much	7
_____	1.	Disappointed with myself	_____	7.	Annoyed with the other person			
_____	2.	Embarrassed	_____	8.	Disgusted with the other person			
_____	3.	Guilty	_____	9.	Angry with the other person			
_____	4.	Tense	_____	10.	Amused			
_____	5.	Threatened	_____	11.	Entertained			
_____	6.	Uncomfortable	_____	12.	Proud			

Note. The following composites will be made by averaging items together: Negative self-directed affect (items 1-3), Negative other-directed affect (items 7-9), Discomfort (items 4-6), and Positivity (items 10-12).

[Thoughts & Behaviors]

What would you **think** in this social situation?

Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	6	Very much	7
_____	1.	I would think I was wrong						
_____	2.	I would think about what I had said and why						
_____	3.	I would think about the other person's reaction without getting upset						
_____	4.	I would think I really didn't mean anything by what I said ⁵⁴						
_____	5.	I would think there's nothing wrong with what I said						
_____	6.	I would think this person is being a jerk						
_____	7.	I would think about how my statements violated my personal values						
_____	8.	I would think about how my statements violated the social values of my community						

⁵⁴ A priori, this item was meant to be an indicator for the dismissiveness/hostility outcome; however, in internal consistency reliability analyses and confirmatory factor analyses, this item did not load well with the others. As a result, it was removed from the overall scale.

What would you **do** in this social situation?

- | | Not at all | | | | | | Very much |
|-------|------------|--|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| _____ | 1. | I would apologize | | | | | |
| _____ | 2. | I would try to avoid such behavior in the future | | | | | |
| _____ | 3. | I would talk it over with the person and try to work it out | | | | | |
| _____ | 4. | I would tell the person they're right and drop the subject | | | | | |
| _____ | 5. | I would tell the person to lighten up because it was just a joke | | | | | |
| _____ | 6. | I would tell the other person that my position is right | | | | | |
| _____ | 7. | I would tell the person they're being stupid | | | | | |
| _____ | 8. | I would tell the other person that they're actually the biased one, not me | | | | | |

Note. The following composites will be made by averaging items together: Self-correction/Self-reflection (“Think” items 1-3, 7-8 and “Do” items 1-4); Hostility/Dismissiveness (“Think” items 4-6 and “Do” items 5-8)

In the space below, feel free to say anything else you would like about how you would **feel**, **think**, or **act** in this social situation.

[Offen. Beliefs]

Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group]

How **offensive** is it to make negative comments disparaging people from this group?

Not at all offensive									Very offensive
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

How **harmful** is it to make negative comments disparaging people from this group?

Not at all harmful									Very harmful
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

[Prejudice Beliefs]

Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group]

People belonging to this group are...

Negative									Positive
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

People belonging to this group are...

Bad									Good
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

People belonging to this group are...

Unfavorable									Favorable
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

[Discrimination Intentions]

Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group]

Earlier, you were asked to imagine making a joke implying something negative about this group.

How **likely** would you be to make a joke **implying something negative** about people from this group **in real life**?

Not at all likely									Very likely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

[Prejudice Norm Beliefs: Descriptive Norm]

Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group]

Is **prejudice** against this group a **pervasive problem** at Indiana University?

Not at all a pervasive problem									Very much a pervasive problem
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

[Prejudice Norm Beliefs: Injunctive Norm]

To what extent do you think that it is socially acceptable for **IU students** to have **negative feelings** toward the following groups?

Most IU students think it is **definitely not OK to have negative feelings** about this group.
1

Most IU students think it is **maybe OK to have negative feelings** about this group.
2

Most IU students think it is **definitely OK to have negative feelings** about this group.
3

Study 2 & Study 3 Measures

[Creative Writing Task 1: "Day in the Life" Stories]

The timer has already started! Work quickly. You have 6 minutes total:

- **1 minute** to read the instructions
- **5 minutes** to write your story in the text box.

Reminder: Key Instructions

- Write a story describing **an ordinary day** in this person's life.
- Write your story in the **third person**, as a third party observer or an omniscient narrator.
- **Focus primarily on the one person in the profile. Do NOT write a dialogue between more than one person.**
- Use **ALL** of the profile information in your story.

Below is your "Person Profile." You'll notice that the profile is **pretty minimal--that's intentional**. We want you to craft a story about this person based on very little information.

[Countdown Clock]

[Person Profile]

Give your character a name. What is this person's **name**?

List some of your character's defining traits. What is this person's **personality** like?

Write your "**day in the life**" story in the text box below.

Do you have writer's block? Try answering these questions: What sorts of things does this person like or dislike doing? What is this person's biggest character flaw? How much money or status does this person have? Are they satisfied with their lifestyle? What is most important to this person?

[Creative Writing Task 2: “A Bit of Poetry”]

For this writing task, we would like you to write a **two to four line poem** about the **positive and negative aspects of being an Indiana University student**.

You may use any style of poetry. Your poem can rhyme or not. It’s completely up to you. Afterward, your story will be sent to your partner. He or she will read it and send you feedback. [Countdown Clock]

Write your **poem** in the text box below.

[For Studies 2 & 3, it is at this point the participant is confronted by confederate]

Before moving on to Creative Writing Task #3, we would like to ask you a few multiple choice questions about your experience so far.

[Affect]

How do you **feel** right now?

Does not apply at all							Applies very much
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
<input type="checkbox"/> 1. Disappointed with myself							<input type="checkbox"/> 11. Entertained
<input type="checkbox"/> 2. Embarrassed							<input type="checkbox"/> 12. Proud of myself
<input type="checkbox"/> 3. Guilty							<input type="checkbox"/> 13. Motivated
<input type="checkbox"/> 4. Tense							<input type="checkbox"/> 14. Excited
<input type="checkbox"/> 5. Threatened							<input type="checkbox"/> 15. Enthusiastic
<input type="checkbox"/> 6. Uncomfortable							<input type="checkbox"/> 16. Shameful
<input type="checkbox"/> 7. Annoyed with the other person							<input type="checkbox"/> 17. Self-Critical
<input type="checkbox"/> 8. Disgusted with the other person							<input type="checkbox"/> 18. Irritated
<input type="checkbox"/> 9. Angry with the other person							<input type="checkbox"/> 19. Bothered
<input type="checkbox"/> 10. Amused							<input type="checkbox"/> 20. Creative

Note. The following composites will be made by averaging items together: Negative self-directed affect (items 1-3 & 16-17), Negative other-directed affect (items 7-9 & 18-19), Discomfort (items 4-6), and Positivity (items 10-12 & 13-15 & 20).

[Thoughts & Behaviors]

To what extent are you **thinking the following thoughts** right now?

- | | | | | | | | |
|------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| Not at all | | | | | | | Very much |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
- ___ 1. I am thinking I was wrong to write some of the things that I wrote.
 - ___ 2. I am thinking a lot about what I chose to write and why.
 - ___ 3. I am thinking a lot about my task partner's evaluation of my writing.
 - ___ 4. I am thinking that I didn't really mean anything by what I wrote earlier.
 - ___ 5. I am thinking there's nothing wrong with what I wrote.
 - ___ 6. I am thinking that my task partner is being a jerk.
 - ___ 7. I am thinking some of the things I wrote violated my personal values.
 - ___ 8. I am thinking some of the things I wrote violated social values of my community.
 - ___ 9. I am thinking about how my task partner is doing a good job evaluating my writing.
 - ___ 10. I am thinking that my task partner is confused and doesn't really know what he/she is doing.
 - ___ 11. I am thinking about how I stand behind what I've written so far.

To what extent do you want to **do the following actions** right now?

- | | | | | | | | |
|------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| Not at all | | | | | | | Very much |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
- ___ 1. I want to apologize to my task partner.
 - ___ 2. I want to avoid writing things like what I wrote in the future.
 - ___ 3. I want to talk things over with my task partner.
 - ___ 4. I want to tell my task partner that their evaluation of my work is accurate.
 - ___ 5. I want to tell my task partner to lighten up.
 - ___ 6. I want to tell my task partner that their evaluation of my work is flawed or inaccurate.
 - ___ 7. I want to tell my task partner that they're being stupid.
 - ___ 8. I want to thank my task partner.
 - ___ 9. I want to give my task partner harsh feedback.
 - ___ 10. I am thinking that my writing was offensive.
 - ___ 11. I am thinking that my writing was harmful to others.

Note. The following composites will be made by averaging items together: Self-correction/Self-reflection (“Think” items 1-3, 7-9 and “Do” items 1-4, 8); Hostility/Dismissiveness (“Think” items 4-6, 10-11 and “Do” items 5-7, 9); Offen. (“Do” items 10-11).

In the space below, feel free to say anything else you would like about how you are **feeling**, what you are **thinking**, or what you want to **do**.

[Creative Writing Task 3: “Another Day in the Life”]

For this writing task, you will get a chance to rewrite your day-in-the-life story from earlier.

For your convenience, we will reprint your original story. You can erase it and start from scratch or you can edit and add to it directly in the text box.

Whether or not you choose to incorporate your partner’s feedback is completely up to you.

Afterward, your story will be sent to your partner. He or she will read it and send you feedback.

[Same Person Profile from Earlier]

[Countdown Clock]

Give your character a name. What is this person's **name**?

[Participant’s original character name]

List some of your character’s defining traits. What is this person’s **personality** like?

[Participant’s original character traits]

Revise your original "**day in the life**" story in the text box below.

[Participant’s original essay]

Thank you for participating in all three creative writing tasks!
Before we share your partner's evaluations of Creative Writing Task #2 and Creative Writing Task #3, we have a short survey for you to complete.
To begin the survey, click the "Next" button.

[Filler items to bolster cover story]

- | Not at all | | | | | | | Very much |
|------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| _____ | | | | | | | |
| _____ | | | | | | | |
| _____ | | | | | | | |
| _____ | | | | | | | |
| _____ | | | | | | | |
| _____ | | | | | | | |
| _____ | | | | | | | |
1. I enjoy creative writing.
 2. I think I am good at creative writing tasks.
 3. I care deeply about creative writing.
 4. I think I am better at writing stories than writing poems.
 5. Writing poetry just comes naturally to me.
 6. It is difficult for me to do creative writing tasks well.
 7. I often feel a sense of writer's block.

[Impressions of Partner]

Please indicate your **impression** of your **task partner** is/has....

- | | Not at all | | | | | | Very much |
|-----|------------|---|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| ___ | 1. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 2. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 3. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 4. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 5. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 6. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 7. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 8. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 9. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 10. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 11. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 12. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 13. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 14. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 15. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 16. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 17. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 18. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 19. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 20. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 21. | | | | | | |
| ___ | 22. | | | | | | |

Note. The following composites will be made by averaging items together: Complainer (items 1-6); Favorability (items 7-22)

For the second Creative Writing Task, "A Bit of Poetry," we asked you to write a poem about your favorite things about being an Indiana University student.

Below, we have a few follow up questions about your attitudes toward Indiana University.

[Filler items to bolster cover story]

When you think about IU, how often, if ever, do you wonder: "Maybe I don't belong here"?

Never	Hardly ever	Sometimes	Frequently	Always
1	2	3	4	5

Please rate each of the following items on the scale below regarding your **identity** as an **IU student**.

Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

- ___ 1. Overall, my identity as an IU student has very little to do with how I feel about myself.
- ___ 2. In general, my identity as an IU student is an important part of my self-image.
- ___ 3. Being an IU student is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.
- ___ 4. Being an IU student is an important reflection of who I am.

For the first and third Creative Writing Tasks, "Day in the Life," we asked you to write a short story based on a person profile that was randomly assigned to you.

The person you wrote about was [Target Group].

On the following pages, we have a few follow up questions about your attitudes toward [Target Group].

[Prejudice Norm Beliefs]

Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group]

Injunctive

How **socially acceptable** is it for people in your community to **feel negatively** toward people from this social group?

Not at all socially acceptable									Very socially acceptable
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

Descriptive

How **common** is it for people in your community to **feel negatively** toward people from this social group?

Not at all common									Very common
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

[Personal Prejudice]

Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group]

People belonging to this group are...

Negative									Positive
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

People belonging to this group are...

Bad									Good
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

People belonging to this group are...

Unfavorable									Favorable
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

[Should/Would Discrepancies]

[Should]

Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group]

The following items concern **your beliefs about people from this social group**.

We would like you to respond to the following items based on the beliefs that you hold, regardless of whether the way you actually act is always consistent with those beliefs.

Please select the answer that best reflects how much you **agree** or **disagree** with each statement.

- | Strongly
Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | Strongly
Agree |
|----------------------|----|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------|
| _____ | 1. | I believe that I should not think of people from this social group in stereotypical ways. | | | | | |
| _____ | 2. | I should not feel uncomfortable in the company of people from this social group. | | | | | |
| _____ | 3. | I do not believe that my neighborhood should be open to people from this social group. | | | | | |
| _____ | 4. | I believe that I should never avoid interacting with someone just because he/she is a member of this social group. | | | | | |
| _____ | 5. | I think that people from this social group should have as equal an opportunity as anyone else to be hired by an employer. | | | | | |
| _____ | 6. | I should not feel uncomfortable shaking the hand of a person from this social group. | | | | | |
| _____ | 7. | I believe that laughing at jokes that play on the stereotypes of people from this social group is wrong. | | | | | |
| _____ | 8. | I support people from this social group in their struggle against discrimination. | | | | | |

[Would]

Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group]

Sometimes the way we actually respond in a situation is **consistent** with our beliefs, and other times we find ourselves acting in a way that is **inconsistent** with our beliefs.

For each item below, we are interested in your **initial, gut-level reactions**, which may or may not be consistent with how you believe you should react.

Please select the answer that best reflects how much you **agree** or **disagree** with each statement.

- | Strongly
Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | Strongly
Agree |
|----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------|
|----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------|
- ___ 1. I sometimes have stereotypical thoughts about people from this social group.
 - ___ 2. I would feel uncomfortable if I were in a place with lots of people from this social group.
 - ___ 3. I would not be troubled if people from this social group moved into my neighborhood.
 - ___ 4. On occasion, I have avoided interactions with people because they were members of this social group.
 - ___ 5. If I were an employer, I would initially hesitate to hire someone who was a member of this social group.
 - ___ 6. I would feel uncomfortable shaking the hand of a person from this social group.
 - ___ 7. I sometimes laugh at jokes that play on the stereotypes of people from this social group.
 - ___ 8. I feel irritated when people from this social group claim they've been discriminated against.

[IMS/EMS]

Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group]

The following questions concern various **reasons or motivations people might have for responding in various ways** towards people from the above listed social group.

Some of the reasons reflect **internal – personal motivations** whereas others reflect more **external – social motivations**. Of course, people may be motivated for both internal and external reasons; we want to emphasize that neither type of motivations is by definition better than the other.

Please indicate the degree to which you **agree** or **disagree** with each of the following statements using the scale below.

- | Strongly
Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | Strongly
Agree |
|----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------|
|----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------|
- ___ 1. Because of today's PC (politically correct) standards I try to appear nonprejudiced towards people from this social group
 - ___ 2. I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward people from this social group because it is personally important to me.
 - ___ 3. According to my personal values, using stereotypes about people from this social group is OK.
 - ___ 4. I try to hide any negative thoughts about people from this social group in order to avoid negative reactions from others.
 - ___ 5. I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward people from this social group.
 - ___ 6. If I acted prejudiced toward people from this social group, I would be concerned that others would be angry with me.
 - ___ 7. Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about people from this social group is wrong.
 - ___ 8. I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward people from this social group in order to avoid disapproval from others.
 - ___ 9. Being nonprejudiced toward people from this social group is important to my self concept.
 - ___ 10. I try to act nonprejudiced toward people from this social group because of pressure from others.

[Political Correctness Beliefs]

Please answer the following questions.

- | | Not at all | | | | | | Very much |
|-------|------------|--|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | so
7 |
| _____ | 1. | Do you ever feel as if you have to make an effort to act politically correct? | | | | | |
| _____ | 2. | Do you feel that there are times when you have to refrain from expressing your opinion because it's not socially acceptable? | | | | | |
| _____ | 3. | The politically correct (PC) standards in the U.S. bother me because I have to be careful of what I say all the time. | | | | | |

Appendix 3: Stigma-Related Dimensions Pilot Study Materials

On the following pages, you will be asked a series of questions about different groups of people.

Please read carefully and respond to each question to the best of your ability. Before beginning the survey, we ask that you read through the Study Information Sheet.

Thank you for participating today!

[All participants completed the prejudice norm beliefs questions and then were randomly assigned to rate each target group along two of the remaining scales: threat, warmth, competence, controllability, concealability, likelihood of contact, and entitativity.]

--

[Prejudice Norm Beliefs]

We are interested in how you think **most Indiana University students** feel about the following groups.

Below, we have listed different types of people IU students could encounter. To what extent do you think **most other IU students** (not you personally) think it is okay to feel **negatively** about these groups?

Most IU students think it is definitely OK to have negative feelings about this group.	... probably OK to have negative feelings...	...maybe OK to have negative feelings...	...probably <u>not</u> OK to have negative feelings...	Most IU students think it is definitely not OK to have negative feelings about this group.
5	4	3	2	1

[This scale is used to rate each of the over 170 target groups]

--

[Threat]

We are interested in what you think **most Indiana University students** believe about the following groups.

Below, we have listed different types of people IU students could encounter.

As viewed by **most other IU students** (not you personally), to what extent are individuals in these groups **threatening or dangerous?**

Individuals in this group are extremely threatening or dangerous.	...very threatening or dangerous.	...somewhat threatening or dangerous.	...a little threatening or dangerous.	Individuals in this group are not at all threatening or dangerous.
5	4	3	2	1

[This scale is used to rate each of the over 170 target groups]

--

[Warmth]

We are interested in what you think **most Indiana University students** believe about the following groups.

Below, we have listed different types of people IU students could encounter.

As viewed by **most other IU students** (not you personally), to what extent are individuals in these groups **friendly, trustworthy, or good-natured?**

Individuals in this group are extremely friendly, trustworthy, or good-natured.	...very friendly, trustworthy, or good-natured.	...somewhat friendly, trustworthy, or good-natured.	...a little friendly, trustworthy, or good-natured.	Individuals in this group are not at all friendly, trustworthy, or good-natured.
5	4	3	2	1

[This scale is used to rate each of the over 170 target groups]

--

[Competence]

We are interested in what you think **most Indiana University students** believe about the following groups.

Below, we have listed different types of people IU students could encounter.

As viewed by **most other IU students** (not you personally), to what extent are individuals in these groups **competent, capable, or intelligent?**

Individuals in this group are extremely competent, capable, or intelligent.	...very competent, capable, or intelligent.	...somewhat competent, capable, or intelligent.	...a little competent, capable, or intelligent.	Individuals in this group are not at all competent, capable, or intelligent.
5	4	3	2	1

[This scale is used to rate each of the over 170 target groups]

--

[Controllability]

We are interested in what you think **most Indiana University students** believe about the following groups.

Below, we have listed different types of people IU students could encounter.

As viewed by **most other IU students** (not you personally), to what extent do individuals in these groups have **control** over whether they belong to the group?

Individuals in this group have complete control over whether they belong to this group	...quite a lot of control...	...some control...	...very little control...	Individuals in this group have no control at all over whether they belong to this group
5	4	3	2	1

[This scale is used to rate each of the over 170 target groups]

--

[Concealability]

We are interested in what you think **most Indiana University students** believe about the following groups.

Below, we have listed different types of people IU students could encounter.

To what extent do people **know** whether an individual belongs to each of these groups **just by looking at them?**

People always know whether an individual belongs to this group just by looking at the person.	People usually know...just by looking at the person.	People sometimes know...just by looking at the person.	People rarely know...just by looking at the person.	People never know whether an individual belongs to this group just by looking at the person.
1	2	3	4	5

[This scale is used to rate each of the over 170 target groups]

--

[Likelihood of Contact]

We are interested in what you think **most Indiana University students** believe about the following groups.

Below, we have listed different types of people IU students could encounter. How likely is the average IU student to **encounter** individuals belonging to these groups in their daily life?

It is extremely likely that an IU student will encounter an individual from this group in daily life.	...very likely...	...somewhat likely...	...a little likely...	It is not at all likely that an IU student will encounter an individual from this group in daily life.
5	4	3	2	1

[This scale is used to rate each of the over 170 target groups]

--

[Entitativity]

In this study, we are interested in your perceptions of various groups.

One thing that all groups have in common is that each one is a collection of people. However, **not all collections of people are considered to be a "group."**

For example, most people would consider the members of a planning committee to be a group but would not consider a bunch of people who happen to be on an elevator together to be a group.

Next, we'll ask you to provide your opinion about the extent to which the following collections of people are considered "groups."

This collection of
people is very much a
"group."

This collection of
people is somewhat
a "group."

This
collection of
people is not
at all a
"group."

5

4

3

2

1

[This scale is used to rate each of the over 170 target groups]

Appendix 4: Stereotypes Pilot Study Materials

Before getting started with **the Stereotype Knowledge task**, it is necessary to **review some important definitions**.

On the following pages, we will share the definitions of **stereotypes** and **social groups** as defined by the researchers.

--

Important Definitions

Social Groups are categories that describe people on the basis of traits, attributes, or actions. Each of us belongs to many different social groups. Some of our social group memberships are based on our stage in life (e.g., child, adult, elder) or our gender or race. Other group memberships are based on our beliefs or actions (e.g., political affiliations, religious identification). Still others are based on our abilities or traits (e.g., brainiacs, extroverts).

Some examples of social groups:

- Women [based on gender identification]
- Christians [based on religious identification]
- Conservatives [based on political identification]
- Deaf people [based on sensory ability]
- Performers [based on action/activity]

The list goes on and on.

--

Important Definitions

Not every social group is evaluated equally by others. Some social groups are more often viewed positively and others are more often viewed negatively.

Stereotypes are widely shared beliefs about a particular social group.

Some examples of stereotypes:

- Women are kind and caring [stereotype based on gender identification]
- Christians are forgiving [stereotype based on religious identification]
- Conservatives are mostly old people [stereotype based on political identification]
- Deaf people are good at lip reading [stereotype based on sensory ability]
- Performers are extroverted [stereotype based on action/activity]

Again, the list goes on and on.

--

Important Definitions

By growing up in the U.S., we are aware of many positive and negative stereotypes about a wide variety of social groups.

However, just because we are aware of a particular stereotype does not necessarily mean that we believe it is true. There is a difference between **stereotype awareness** (i.e., knowing that a particular stereotype exists) and **stereotype endorsement** (i.e., believing that a particular stereotype is true).

Today, the researchers are interested in your awareness of stereotypes--regardless of whether or not you personally believe that the stereotypes are true.

--

Instructions

Today, you will work on **Stereotype Knowledge task**.

The researchers are trying to compile lists of the most common stereotypes for different social groups.

Your task will be to **generate as many stereotypes about a social group as you can think of** in 3 minutes. You will do this 3 separate times, for 3 different social groups.

Remember, you do not need to personally agree that these stereotypes are true to list them. We are interested in your knowledge of stereotypes, not your personal endorsement of stereotypes.

--

[Countdown Timer]

You have exactly **3 minutes** to list as many stereotypes as you can about **[Target Group]**.

Please list as many **stereotypes** (positive or negative) as you can in the text boxes below:

Stereotype 1	
Stereotype 2	
Stereotype 3	
Stereotype 4	
Stereotype 5	
Stereotype 6	
Stereotype 7	
Stereotype 8	
Stereotype 9	
Stereotype 10	
Stereotype 11	
Stereotype 12	
Stereotype 13	
Stereotype 14	
Stereotype 15	
Stereotype 16	
Stereotype 17	
Stereotype 18	
Stereotype 19	
Stereotype 20	

[This is done 3 separate times for 3 different target groups]

Appendix 5: Creative Writing Pilot Study Materials
Creative Writing Task:
"A Day in the Life"

For this writing task, we would like you to write a day-in-the-life story about another person.

We have a database of possible person profiles. The computer program will show you one of these person profiles at random.

You will then write a one to two paragraph story about what a day in that person's life is like.

--

Creative Writing Task:
"A Day in the Life"

Key Instructions:

- Write a story describing **an ordinary day** in this person's life.
- Write your story in the **third person**, as a third party observer or an omniscient narrator.
- **Focus primarily on the one person in the profile. Do NOT write a dialogue between more than one person.**
- Use **ALL** of the profile information in your story.

--

Creative Writing Task:
"A Day in the Life"

You will have exactly **6 minutes** on the next page. We recommend spending your time in the following way:

- Spend **1 minute reading** the person profile
- Spend **5 minutes writing** your day-in-the-life story.

The countdown timer will start once you click the "Next" button.

--

**Creative Writing Task #1:
"A Day in the Life"**

The timer has already started! Work quickly. You have **6 minutes** total:

- **1 minute** to read the instructions
- **5 minutes** to write your story in the text box.

Reminder: Key Instructions

- Write a story describing an ordinary day in this person's life.
- Write your story in the third person, as a third party observer or an omniscient narrator.
- **Focus primarily on the one person in the profile. Do NOT write a dialogue between more than one person.**
- Use ALL of the profile information in your story.

Below is your "**Person Profile**." You'll notice that the profile is **pretty minimal--that's intentional**. We want you to craft a story about this person based on very little information.

[Countdown Timer]

[Person Profile]

Give your character a name. What is this person's **name**?

List some of your character's positive traits.

List some of your character's negative traits.

Write your "**a day in the life**" story in the text box below.

Do you have writer's block? Try answering these questions: What sorts of things does this person like or dislike doing? What is this person's biggest character flaw? How much money or status does this person have? Are they satisfied with their lifestyle? What is most important to this person?

Appendix 6: Stereotype Map

Stereotype Content	Domestic Violence										
	Alcoholics	Anxious People	Cigarette Smokers	Communists	Violence Victims	Drug Users	Gang Members	Hoarders	Military Veterans	Muslim People	Poor People
Abused / Damaged / Broken					X			X	X		X
Addictive / Attached / Medicated	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Afraid / Panicked / Timid		X			X				X		
Alone / Isolated	X	X	X		X			X	X		X
Angry / Mean	X		X	X		X	X		X	X	
Annoying / Burdensome	X	X	X								X
Anxious / Stressed		X	X		X				X		
Arrogant / Snobby				X			X		X		
Attention Seeking / Dramatic / Overreacting		X									
Beggar / Needy				X	X	X		X	X		X
Bigoted / Prejudiced									X	X	X
Boring										X	
Cautious		X			X						
Closed-minded / Stubborn	X		X			X		X		X	
Controlling / Manipulative	X			X							
Crazy / Mentally ill	X	X		X		X		X	X		X

Stereotype Content	Domestic Violence										
	Alcoholics	Anxious People	Cigarette Smokers	Communists	Violence Victims	Drug Users	Gang Members	Hoarders	Military Veterans	Muslim People	Poor People
Criminality / Corruption / Immoral / Unethical	X		X	X	X	X	X				X
Dependent on others / Trapped					X	X		X			X
Depressed	X	X	X	X	X	X		X			X
Destructive	X			X		X				X	
Dirty / Unclean	X		X		X	X		X		X	X
Disciplined / Strict / Stern				X				X		X	
Disgusting	X		X			X					X
Dumb / Naive / Unrealistic	X		X	X	X	X	X	X			X
Dysfunctional Family Life	X				X	X	X				
Fatigued		X									
Foreign / Ethnic				X		X				X	X
Greedy				X		X					X
Impressionable / Conformist				X	X	X					
Impulsive / Reckless / Negligent	X		X			X	X				
Insecure / Self-loathing / Ashamed		X			X				X		
Introverted		X			X				X		
Judgmental									X		
Lazy	X		X	X		X	X	X			X
Lustful / Horny					X				X		
Obsessive		X					X				
Old	X		X					X			

Stereotype Content	Domestic Violence Victims									
	Alcoholics	Anxious People	Cigarette Smokers	Communists	Drug Users	Gang Members	Hoarders	Military Veterans	Muslim People	Poor People
Organized / Tidy		X		X				X		
Outspoken / Activist				X						
Pious / Religious									X	X
Political				X				X	X	X
Poor / Unwealthy	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Radical / Extreme				X					X	
Rebellious / Anti-establishment			X	X	X	X			X	
Prudish / Self-righteous / Sanctimonious					X			X	X	
Rowdy / Loud	X					X		X		X
Rude / Vulgar / Disrespectful	X		X	X		X		X		X
Selfish / Uncaring	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Serious / Stoic				X				X	X	
Sneaky / Secretive				X	X				X	
Tough / Hardened						X		X		X
Traditional / Conservative								X	X	X
Trashy / Low Class	X		X		X	X				X
Traumatized	X	X			X		X	X		
Ugly	X		X		X		X		X	X
Undisciplined	X		X		X					X

Stereotype Content	Domestic												
	Alcoholics	Anxious People	Cigarette Smokers	Communists	Domestic Violence Victims	Drug Users	Gang Members	Hoarders	Military Veterans	Muslim People	Poor People		
Unhealthy (physically)	X		X			X		X				X	
Unlucky / Misfortunate												X	
Unorganized / Disheveled	X	X			X			X				X	
Unreliable / Irresponsible	X	X			X							X	
Unsuccessful	X		X		X		X	X				X	
Untrustworthy / Deceptive / Lying	X			X	X		X			X		X	
Useless / Incapable	X				X	X						X	
Violent	X		X	X		X	X		X	X			
Wasteful			X										
Weird / Odd		X						X					
Wimpy / Weak (physically)		X			X								
TOTAL STEREOTYPES	32	20	26	27	23	30	22	22	32	20	20	33	

Note. These stereotypes were based on pilot data from college students. Each stereotype was defined (see pp. 214-217).

Stereotype Content	Definition
1. Abused / Damaged / Broken	...subjected to harmful or improper treatment; loss or harm resulting from injury to person, property, or reputation; altered by or as if by breaking
2. Addictive / Attached / Medicated	...causing or characterized by addiction; reliant on a substance; attached to things; to be on a medication or substance; using illicit or harmful substances
3. Afraid / Panicked / Timid	...filled with fear or apprehension; of, relating to, or arising from a panic; a sudden overpowering fright; lacking in courage
4. Alone / Isolated	...separated from others
5. Angry / Mean	...feeling or showing anger; spiteful
6. Annoying / Burdensome	...causing vexation or irritation; imposing or constituting a burden
7. Anxious / Stressed	...characterized by extreme uneasiness of mind; a state of mental tension resulting from stress
8. Arrogant/Snobby	...exaggerating or disposed to exaggerate one's own worth or importance often by an overbearing manner; being, characteristic of, or befitting a snob; one who tends to rebuff, avoid, or ignore those regarded as inferior; one who has an offensive air of superiority in matters of knowledge or taste
9. Attention Seeking / Dramatic / Overreacting	...something that attracts or demands notice; acting in a way that is likely to elicit attention and/or validation from others; to react to something too strongly; to respond to something with too strong an emotion or with unnecessary or excessive action
10. Beggar / Needy	...one that begs or is in need of help; marked by want or need; wants handouts
11. Bigoted / Prejudiced	...having or showing an attitude of hatred or intolerance toward the members of a particular group
12. Boring	...causing weariness and restlessness through lack of interest
13. Cautious	...careful about avoiding danger or risk
14. Closed-minded / Stubborn	...not willing to consider different ideas or opinions; unreasonably or perversely unyielding; difficult to handle, manage, or treat
15. Controlling / Manipulative	...inclined to control others' behavior; serving or intended to control or influence others in an artful and often unfair or selfish way
16. Crazy / Mentally ill	...not mentally sound; marked by thought or action that lacks reason; marked distress or disability typically associated with a disruption in normal thinking, feeling, mood, behavior, interpersonal interactions, or daily functioning
17. Criminality / Corruption / Immoral / Unethical	...the quality or state of being criminal or corrupt; not conforming to a high moral standard; morally wrong
18. Dependent on others / Trapped	...reliant on another for support; placed in a restricted position
19. Depressed	...low in spirits; sad
20. Destructive	...causing destruction; designed or tending to hurt or destroy
21. Dirty / Unclean	...not clean or pure

Stereotype Content	Definition
22. Disciplined / Strict	...marked by or possessing discipline; stringent in requirement or control; having a definite hardness or severity of nature or manner; demanding that rules concerning behavior are obeyed and observed
23. Disgusting	...causing a strong feeling of dislike or disinclination; causing disgust
24. Dumb / Naïve / Unrealistic	...lacking intelligence; stupid; marked by unaffected simplicity; deficient in worldly wisdom or informed judgment; inappropriate to reality or fact
25. Dysfunctional Family Life	...a family in which conflict, misbehavior, and often child neglect or abuse on the part of individual parents occur continuously and regularly
26. Fatigued	...drained of strength and energy; tired
27. Foreign / Ethnic	...situated outside a place or country; of or relating to large groups of people classed according to common racial, national, tribal, religious, linguistic, or cultural origin or background
28. Greedy	...having or showing a selfish desire for wealth and possessions
29. Impressionable / Conformist / Submissive	...capable of being easily impressed; one who conforms; a person who behaves in accordance with prevailing standards or customs and typically dislikes or avoids unconventional behavior; submitting to others; act in an excessively subservient manner
30. Impulsive / Reckless / Negligent	...prone to act on impulse; acting momentarily; marked by lack of proper caution; careless of consequences; failing to exercise the care expected of a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances
31. Insecure / Self-loathing / Ashamed	...not confident or sure of oneself; loathing of oneself; self-hatred; feeling shame, guilt, or disgrace
32. Introverted	...possessing a reserved or shy nature typically with an inclination to solitude
33. Judgmental	...characterized by a tendency to judge harshly
34. Lazy	...disinclined to activity or exertion
35. Lustful / Horny	...excited by lust; desiring sexual gratification
36. Obsessive in thought	...excessive thoughts about something, often to an unreasonable degree
37. Old	...advanced in years or age; showing the characteristics of age
38. Organized / Tidy	...arranged in a systematic way; having one's affairs in order so as to deal with them efficiently; neat and orderly in appearance or habits
39. Outspoken	...spoken or expressed without reserve; direct and open in speech or expression
40. Pious / Religious	...marked by or showing reverence for deity and devotion to divine worship
41. Political	...of, relating to, involving, or involved in politics; interested in or active in politics
42. Poor / Unwealthy	...lacking material possessions; not wealthy
43. Radical / Extreme / Activist	...the quality or state of being extreme; advocacy of extreme measures or views; one who is open-minded or not strict in the observance of orthodox, traditional, or established forms or ways; a person who uses or supports strong actions (such as public protests) in support of or opposition to one side of a controversial issue

Stereotype Content	Definition
44. Rebellious / Anti-establishment	...given to or engaged in rebellion; resisting treatment or management; opposed or hostile to the social, economic, and political principles of a ruling class
45. Rowdy / Loud	...boisterous in behavior; marked by intensity or volume of sound
46. Rude / Vulgar / Disrespectful	...being in a rough or unfinished state; lacking refinement or delicacy; morally crude, undeveloped, or unregenerate; offensive in language; lewdly or profanely indecent; to show or express disrespect or contempt for; low regard or esteem for someone or something
47. Self-righteous / Sanctimonious / Prudish	...convinced of one's own righteousness especially in contrast with the actions and beliefs of others; narrow-mindedly moralistic; hypocritically pious or devout; marked by prudery; having or revealing a tendency to be easily shocked by matters relating to sex or nudity; excessively concerned with sexual propriety
48. Selfish / Uncaring	...concerned excessively or exclusively with oneself; seeking or concentrating on one's own advantage, pleasure, or well-being without regard for others; lacking proper sympathy, concern, or interest in others
49. Serious / Stoic	...thoughtful or subdued in appearance or manner; not joking or trifling; not affected by or showing passion or feeling
50. Sneaky / Secretive	...marked by stealth, furtiveness, or shiftiness; disposed to secrecy
51. Tough / Hardened	...capable of enduring strain, hardship, or severe labor; to assume an appearance of harshness or severity
52. Traditional / Conservative	...following or conforming to tradition; adhering to past practices or established conventions; tending or disposed to maintain existing views, conditions, or institutions
53. Trashy / Low Class	...being, resembling, or containing trash; of inferior quality or social status
54. Traumatized	...affected by physical or emotional trauma
55. Ugly	...offensive to the sight; offensive or unpleasant to any sense
56. Undisciplined	...lacking in discipline or self-control
57. Unhealthy (physically)	...not conducive to health; not in good health
58. Unlucky / Misfortunate	...having or meeting with misfortune; likely to bring misfortune
59. Unorganized / Disheveled	...not organized; marked by disorder or disarray
60. Unreliable / Irresponsible	...not reliable; lacking a sense of responsibility
61. Unsuccessful	...not successful; not meeting with or producing success
62. Untrustworthy / Deceptive / Lying	...not worthy of confidence; tending or having power to cause someone to accept as true or valid what is false or invalid; tending or having power to deceive; a person who tells lies; marked by or containing untrue statements
63. Useless / Incapable	...having or being of no use; lacking capacity, ability, or qualification for the purpose or end in view

Stereotype Content	Definition
64. Violent	...using harmful physical force; prone to commit acts of violence
65. Wasteful	...given to or marked by waste; using or expending something of value carelessly, extravagantly, or to no purpose
66. Weird / Odd	...of strange or extraordinary character
67. Wimpy / Weak (physically)	...lacking strength; deficient in physical vigor

Appendix 7: Supplemental Analyses

In Studies 2 and 3, I included some exploratory measures at the very end to investigate how prejudice norms influence reactions to confrontation beyond the affective, cognitive, and behavioral reactions described in the main text. The aim of including these measures was to inspire future (more confirmatory) research.

Partner Perceptions

First, I examined whether confrontation influenced students' perceptions of their task partner who either confronted them (confrontation present condition) or gave them generic negative feedback (confrontation absent condition). Previous research suggests that people tend to evaluate confronters negatively, as complainers and unfavorable (Cadieux & Chasteen, 2015; Czopp et al., 2006; Parker et al., 2018; Schultz & Maddox, 2013; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Simon & O'Brien, 2015; Wang et al., 2015). I expected to replicate these effects. Further, I tested whether prejudice acceptability moderated the relationship between confronting and partner perceptions. Perhaps, when prejudice acceptability is high, people evaluate confronters even more negatively—possibly because the confrontation seems less justified. However, it is also possible that people will evaluate confronters more negatively when prejudice acceptability is low—perhaps because the confrontation poses a greater threat to one's self-integrity and denigrating the confronter is one way to alleviate some of that self-threat.

I adapted a person perception measure developed by Kaiser and Miller (2001). Participants were asked to indicate their impression of their task partner by indicating the extent to which trait words/phrases applied to their partner (7-point Likert scale, 1 “*Not at all*” to 7 “*Very Much*”). The *favorability* subscale included traits like “likable,” “intelligent,” and “easy to get along with (16-items, $\alpha_{\text{Study 2}} = .95$; $\alpha_{\text{Study 3}} = .95$), while the *complainer* subscale included

traits like “complainer,” “hypersensitive,” and “argumentative” (6-items, $\alpha_{\text{Study 2}} = .77$; $\alpha_{\text{Study 3}} = .80$).

Study 2. Multilevel modeling (MLM), with restricted maximum likelihood estimation (ReML), was used to examine the fixed effects of prejudice acceptability, confrontation, and their interaction on partner perceptions, while accounting for the random intercept for each target group ($\text{ICC}_{\text{Favorability}} = .02$; $\text{ICC}_{\text{Complainer}} < .001$).

Favorability Perceptions. A multilevel analysis revealed no significant main effects or interactions. The main effect of confrontation on favorability perceptions was not statistically significant, $t(381) = -1.58$, $b = -0.07$, $p = .11$, nor the main effect of prejudice acceptability, $t(8) = -0.60$, $b = -0.04$, $p = .56$, nor their interaction, $t(381) = 1.37$, $b = 0.06$, $p = .17$.

Complainer Perceptions. A multilevel analysis revealed a main effect of confrontation, $t(381) = 4.71$, $b = 0.22$, $p < .001$, such that students who were confronted evaluated their partner as more of a complainer than students who were not confronted. However, this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction effect, $t(381) = -2.25$, $b = -0.11$, $p = .02$. Simple slopes analyses revealed that prejudice acceptability did not affect students’ partner evaluations in the confrontation absent condition, $t(8) = 0.54$, $b = 0.03$, $p = .60$. For these students, perceptions that their partner was a complainer were consistently low. In the confrontation present condition, however, prejudice acceptability mattered, $t(8) = -2.68$, $b = -0.17$, $p = .03$. Specifically, students in the low prejudice acceptability condition rated their partner as more of a complainer than students in the high prejudice acceptability condition. The main effect of prejudice acceptability on partner perceptions was not statistically significant, $t(8) = -1.48$, $b = -0.07$, $p = .17$.

Study 3. Two-way univariate ANOVAs were conducted to examine the effects of prejudice acceptability, confrontation, and their interaction on partner perceptions.

Favorability Perceptions. Inconsistent with the findings of Study 2, the two-way univariate ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of confrontation, $F(1, 314) = 3.98, p = .047, \eta_p^2 = .01$, such that people who were confronted reported perceiving their partner more favorably ($M = 5.53, SD = 0.98$) than people who were not confronted ($M = 5.33, SD = 0.85$). Neither the main effect of prejudice acceptability $F(1, 314) = 0.03, p = .87, \eta_p^2 < .001$, nor the interaction were statistically significant, $F(1, 314) = 0.40, p = .53, \eta_p^2 = .001$.

Complainer Perceptions. Consistent with Study 2, this analysis revealed a significant main effect of confrontation, $F(1, 314) = 6.28, p = .01, \eta_p^2 = .02$. Students who were confronted perceived their partner as more of a complainer ($M = 2.45, SD = 1.00$) than students who were not confronted ($M = 2.17, SD = 0.94$). This time, however, neither the main effect of prejudice acceptability, $F(1, 314) = 1.79, p = .18, \eta_p^2 = .01$, nor the interaction effect were statistically significant, $F(1, 314) = 0.12, p = .73, \eta_p^2 < .001$.

Should-Would Discrepancies

Second, I assessed whether confrontation influenced the degree of prejudice-related discrepancies that students reported and whether prejudice acceptability moderated this relationship. I adapted a measure created by Monteith and Voils (1998). Whereas the original measure was used to assess prejudice-related discrepancies pertaining to race, the adapted measure was designed to be more general, so that it could pertain to a wide variety of target groups (for the full measure, see [Appendix 2](#)). The new measure included 8 items phrased as “should” behaviors (e.g., “I believe that I should not think of people from this social group in stereotypical ways.”) and 8 corresponding items phrased as “would” behaviors (e.g., “I sometimes have stereotypical thoughts about people from this social group.”). Students rated their agreement with the “should” behaviors first, then turned their attention to the “would”

behaviors. All items used a 7-point scale (1 “*Strongly Disagree*” to 7 “*Strongly Agree*”). A difference score was calculated for each pair of items (Would item – Should item), then these difference scores were averaged together ($\alpha_{\text{Study 2}} = .73$; $\alpha_{\text{Study 3}} = .67$). Negative composite scores indicate that students believe they *should* act more egalitarian than they actually *would*, while positive composite scores indicate that students believe they *would* act more egalitarian than they actually *should*.

Grounded in the previous literature, I expected that students who were confronted (vs. not confronted) would report greater differences between what they should do and what they would do. However, I suspected that the direction of difference would depend on the prejudice acceptability level. In the low prejudice acceptability condition, I expected that confronted students (vs. non-confronted students) would report that they *should* act more egalitarian than they actually *do*. By contrast, in the high prejudice acceptability condition, I expected that confronted students (vs. non-confronted students) would report that they *do* act more egalitarian than they actually *should*.

Study 2. Multilevel modeling (MLM), with restricted maximum likelihood estimation (ReML), was used to examine the fixed effects of prejudice acceptability, confrontation, and their interaction on should-would discrepancies, while accounting for the random intercept for each target group ($ICC = .40$). This multilevel analysis revealed a main effect of prejudice acceptability, $t(8.08) = 4.64$, $b = 0.91$, $p = .002$, such that students in the high prejudice acceptability group reported fewer prejudice-related discrepancies than students in the low prejudice acceptability group. On average, students in both prejudice acceptability groups reported that they *should* act more egalitarian toward the focal target group than they actually *do*.

Neither the main effect of confrontation, $t(381.52) = -1.01, b = -0.07, p = .31$, nor the interaction were statistically significant, $t(381.52) = -1.36, b = -0.09, p = .17$.

Study 3. A two-way univariate ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of prejudice acceptability, confrontation, and their interaction on should-would discrepancies. Inconsistent with the findings of Study 2, the two-way univariate ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of confrontation, $F(1, 314) = 4.20, p = .04, \eta_p^2 = .01$, such that people who were confronted reported greater prejudice-related discrepancies ($M = -1.21, SD = 1.57$) than people who were not confronted ($M = -0.86, SD = 1.49$). More specifically, students reported that they *should* act more egalitarian toward cigarette smokers than they actually *do*. Neither the main effect of prejudice acceptability $F(1, 314) = 0.47, p = .49, \eta_p^2 = .001$, nor the interaction were statistically significant, $F(1, 314) = 1.10, p = .30, \eta_p^2 = .003$. However, exploratory simple effects tests somewhat corroborate Study 2, indicating that this main effect of confrontation was driven by differences within the high prejudice acceptability condition ($M_{Difference} = .53, SE = .24, p = .03$) and not in the low prejudice acceptability condition ($M_{Difference} = .17, SE = .24, p = .48$).

Internal and External Motivation to Suppress Prejudice

Third, I assessed whether confrontation influenced the internal and external motivations that students reported and whether prejudice acceptability moderated this relationship. I adapted a measure created by Plant and Devine (1998). The original measure assessed internal and external motivations to suppress racial prejudice. Again, the adapted measure was designed to be more general, so that it would pertain to a wide variety of target groups (for the full measure, see [Appendix 2](#)). Like the original measure, 5 items assessed internal motivation to suppress prejudice (e.g., “I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward people from this social group because it is personally important to me”) and 5 items assessed external motivation to suppress prejudice (e.g., “I try to hide any negative thoughts about people from this social group in order

to avoid negative reactions from others”). All items were presented on a 7-point scale (1 “*Strongly Disagree*” to 7 “*Strongly Agree*”). Internal motivation items were averaged together to create a composite score, as were external motivation items. For both studies, the internal motivation items ($\alpha_{\text{Study 2}} = .83$; $\alpha_{\text{Study 3}} = .85$) and external motivation items had satisfactory internal consistency reliability ($\alpha_{\text{Study 2}} = .80$; $\alpha_{\text{Study 3}} = .83$).

A priori, I expected that people who were confronted (vs. not confronted) would report greater motivation to suppress prejudice. However, I predicted that the type of motivation would depend on the prejudice acceptability level. In the low prejudice acceptability condition, I expected that confronted students (vs. non-confronted students) would report higher internal motivation to suppress prejudice than external motivation. By contrast, in the high prejudice acceptability condition, I expected that confronted students (vs. non-confronted students) would report higher external motivation to suppress prejudice than internal motivation.

Study 2. Multilevel modeling (MLM), with restricted maximum likelihood estimation (ReML), was used to examine the fixed effects of prejudice acceptability (between-subjects), confrontation (between-subjects), motivation type (within-subjects), and their interactions on motivation to suppress prejudice, while accounting for the random intercepts for each target group and each respondent. This analysis revealed a main effect of prejudice acceptability, $t(389) = -5.78$, $b = -0.25$, $p < .001$, and a main effect of motivation type, $t(388) = 20.83$, $b = 0.83$, $p < .001$. These main effects, however, were qualified by a significant prejudice acceptability \times motivation type interaction, $t(388) = -3.97$, $b = -0.16$, $p < .001$. Overall, students reported more internal motivation to suppress prejudice than external motivation. Simple slopes analyses indicate that, while external motivation did not differ by prejudice acceptability condition, $t(391) = -1.55$, $b = -0.09$, $p = .12$, internal motivation did differ by prejudice acceptability condition.

Students in the low prejudice acceptability condition expressed greater internal motivation to suppress prejudice than students in the high prejudice acceptability condition, $t(391) = -6.92$, $b = -0.41$, $p < .001$. The remaining main effects, two-way interactions, and three-way interaction were also not significant (all $ps \geq .07$).

Study 3. Inconsistent with Study 2, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed only a main effect of motivation type, $F(1, 314) = 265.17$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .46$, such that students reported significantly more internal motivation to suppress prejudice toward smokers ($M = 4.82$, $SD = 1.29$) than external motivation ($M = 3.35$, $SD = 1.33$). The remaining main effects, two-way interactions, and three-way interaction were also not significant (all $ps \geq .20$).

Political Correctness Beliefs

Fourth, I measured self-reported political correctness beliefs (Plant & Devine, 2001). This was measured with 3 items ($\alpha_{\text{Study 2}} = .77$; $\alpha_{\text{Study 3}} = .77$; e.g., “Do you ever feel as if you have to make an effort to act politically correct?”) on a 7-point scale (1 “*Not at all*” to 7 “*Very much so*”). I expected that students who were confronted would report stronger political correctness beliefs than students who were not confronted. Moreover, I expected that this relationship would be stronger among students in the high (vs. low) prejudice acceptability condition.

Study 2. Multilevel modeling (MLM), with restricted maximum likelihood estimation (ReML), was used to examine the fixed effects of prejudice acceptability, confrontation, and their interaction on political correctness beliefs, while accounting for the random intercept for each target group ($ICC = .001$). This multilevel analysis revealed no significant main effects, nor interactions (all $ps \geq .41$).

Study 3. A two-way univariate ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interactions (all $ps \geq .09$). However, exploratory simple effects tests revealed that within the high prejudice acceptability condition, students who were confronted felt greater pressure to act in politically correct way ($M = 4.35, SD = 1.74$) than students who were not confronted ($M = 3.80, SD = 1.54, p = .04$). This difference was not significant within the low prejudice acceptability condition ($M_{\text{Confronted}} = 3.87, SD_{\text{Confronted}} = 1.69; M_{\text{Not Confronted}} = 3.96, SD_{\text{Not Confronted}} = 1.68; p = .75$).

Kathryn M. Kroeper
Curriculum Vitae

ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS

2020 - present **The Ohio State University**
Postdoctoral Fellow
President's Postdoctoral Scholars Program
Advisor: Dr. Steven Spencer

EDUCATION

Ph.D., June 2020 **Indiana University, Bloomington**
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences
Sixth-Year Graduate Student
Psychology (Minor: Individualized)
Overall GPA: 4.00

Dissertation: *Expecting prejudice confrontation to backfire: Prejudice norms and misalignment between forecaster expectations and experiencer realities.*
(Advisor: Dr. Mary C. Murphy).

B.A., May 2012 **Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey**
School of the Arts and Sciences Honors Program
Major: Psychology (Departmental Honors)
Minor: Women & Gender Studies
Overall GPA: 3.98; Psychology GPA: 4.00

Honors Thesis: *Heterosexual men's confrontation of sexual prejudice: The role of precarious manhood* (Advisor: Dr. Diana T. Sanchez).

PUBLICATIONS

* Indicates shared first authorship

+ Indicates undergraduate or post-baccalaureate student mentee

∴ Indicates an Award-Winning Publication or Presentation

***Kroeper, K. M.**, *Quintanilla, V. D., Frisby, M., Yel, N., Applegate, A. G., Sherman, S. J., & Murphy, M. C. (2020). Underestimating the unrepresented: Cognitive biases that disadvantage Pro Se litigants in family law cases. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*, 26(2), 198-212.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/law0000229>

Canning, E. A., LaCosse, J., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2019). Feeling like an imposter: The effect of competition on the daily classroom experiences of first-generation college students. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*. Online First.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550619882032>

Kroeper, K. M., Muenks, K., & Murphy, M. C. (2019). Marriage equality: On the books and on the ground? An experimental audit study of beliefs and behavior towards same-sex and interracial couples in the wedding industry. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 19*(1), 50–77. <https://doi.org/10.1111/asap.12172>

Murphy, M. C., **Kroeper, K. M.,** & Ozier, E. O. (2018). Prejudiced places: How contexts shape inequality and how we can change them. *Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 5*(1), 66-74. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2372732217748671>

Kroeper, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2017). Supporting college and career readiness through social psychological interventions. In K. L. McClarty, K. D. Mattern, & M. N. Gaertner (Eds). *Preparing students for college and careers: Theory, measurement, and educational practice.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Kroeper, K. M., Sanchez, D. T., & Himmelstein, M. (2014). Heterosexual men's confrontation of sexual prejudice: The role of precarious manhood. *Sex Roles, 70*, 1-13, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-013-0306-z>

MANUSCRIPTS UNDER REVIEW

Kroeper, K. M., Williams, H. E., & Murphy, M. C. (invited revision at *JPSP*). Counterfeit diversity: How strategically misrepresenting gender diversity dampens organizations' perceived sincerity and elevates women's identity threat concerns.

Muenks, K., **Kroeper, K. M.,** Canning, E. A., & Murphy, M. C. (submitted). What cues do students use to discern their professors' mindset beliefs? An exploratory study of the beliefs and behaviors that communicate faculty mindset in college stem classrooms.

WORKING MANUSCRIPTS

Kroeper, K. M. (unpublished manuscript). Expecting prejudice confrontation to backfire: Prejudice norms and misalignment between forecaster expectations and experiencer realities. [Dissertation Research].

Kroeper, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (in prep). Toward increasing equity and inclusion in mathematics classrooms: exploring the potential of proactive confrontation in teacher-education.

*+ Fried, A. C., ***Kroeper, K. M.,** & Murphy, M. C. (in prep). Toward developing practical recommendations for fostering growth-mindset classrooms.

Green, D. J, **Kroeper, K. M.,** & Murphy, M. C. (in prep). Barriers to bridging the political divide: How moral convictions shape anticipated inter-ideological interaction experiences.

*Rattan, A., ***Kroeper, K. M.,** Arnett, R., Brown, X., & Murphy, M.C. (in prep). Not such a complainer anymore: Confrontation that signals a growth mindset can undercut backlash.

*Boucher, K. L., *Kroeper, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (in prep). Perceptions of social psychological intervention outcomes.

GRANTS & FELLOWSHIPS

- 2020 **President's Postdoctoral Scholars Program**, (\$100,000), *The Ohio State University*
- 2019 **Inclusive Mathematics Environments (IME) Early Career Fellowship** (\$10,000), *the Mindset Scholars Network & Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation*
- 2019 **Hedwig Hass Turkenkopf Fellowship** (\$1,500), *Associate Alumnae of Douglass College*
- 2018 **Gordon Kato Summer Fellowship** (\$2,234), *Indiana University*
- 2015 **Research Fellow**, *College Transition Collaborative*
- 2015 **Graduate Research Fellowship**, *National Science Foundation* (\$102,000)
- 2012 **Aresty Undergraduate Research Fellowship**, *Rutgers University*

RESEARCH RECOGNITION

- 2020 **Women's Research Poster Competition (1st Place in the Social Sciences Category)**, for "Counterfeit diversity: How strategically misrepresenting gender diversity dampens organizations' perceived sincerity and elevates women's identity threat concerns," *Center of Excellence for Women & Technology*
- 2020 **Graduate Student Research Award**, for "Counterfeit diversity: How strategically misrepresenting gender diversity dampens organizations' perceived sincerity and elevates women's identity threat concerns," *Midwestern Psychological Association*
- 2019 **Self & Identity Preconference Poster Award**, for "Counterfeit diversity: How strategically misrepresenting gender diversity dampens organizations' perceived sincerity and elevates women's identity threat concerns" *Society for Personality and Social Psychology*
- 2017 **Graduate Student Paper Award**, for "Marriage equality: On the books and on the ground? An experimental audit study of beliefs and behavior towards same-sex and interracial couples in the wedding industry," *Midwestern Psychological Association*
- 2015 **Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences Poster Award**, for "Creating better confrontations: The role of context-focused confrontations in addressing racial bias," *Indiana University*
- 2012 **Henry Rutgers Scholar Award** for an Outstanding Honors Thesis, *Rutgers University*
- 2012 **John R.Z. Abela Award** for Excellence in Research in Clinical Psychology, *Psychology Department, Rutgers University*

LEADERSHIP, SPEAKING, & TEACHING AWARDS

- 2015 **Outstanding Graduate Teaching Assistant Award**, *Indiana University*
- 2012 **Edele Neilsen Prize in Speech**, *Douglass Residential College*
- 2012 **Shelia Kelly Hampton Student Leadership Prize**, *Douglass Residential College*
- 2011 **Psi Chi Honor Society**
- 2011 **Cap and Skull Senior Honor Society**, *Rutgers University*
- 2011 **Paul Robeson Scholar**, *Rutgers University*

ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE AWARDS

- 2011 **Rosalind S. Myers Scholarship** for academic promise, *Douglass Residential College*
- 2011 **Ruth Kennedy Scholarship** for academic success, *the American Association of University Women*
- 2010 – 2011 **Jessie Munger Scholarship** for deserving Douglass College students, *Douglass Residential College*
- 2010 **Academic Excellence Award** for maintaining the highest standards of academic excellence, *Rutgers University*
- 2009 – 2012 **School of the Arts and Sciences Honors Program**, *Rutgers University*
- 2008 – 2012 **Dean's List**, *Rutgers University*

TRAVEL AWARDS

- 2016 **Travel Award**, *Society for Personality and Social Psychology*
- 2015 - 2020 **Provost's Travel Awards for Women in Science**, *Indiana University* (6× recipient)
- 2017 **Graduate and Professional Student Government Travel Award**, *Indiana University*
- 2015 **Graduate Student Travel Award**, *The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues*

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

CHAired SYMPOSIA

- Kroeper, K. M. & Hughes, C. S. (2019).** *Stigma-related beliefs among perceivers and targets living with mental illness.* Symposium at the Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.

SYMPOSIA

- Kroeper, K. M.,** Muenks, K., Canning, E. A., Fried, A. C., & Murphy, M. C. (2020, May). How do students know their professors' mindset beliefs? Examining the behaviors that communicate faculty mindset beliefs in college. In C. Griffiths (Chair) *Advancing Equity by Changing Teachers' Psychological Frameworks*. Symposium conducted at the Association for Psychological Science Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL. (Conference Cancelled).
- Kroeper, K. M.,** & Murphy, M. C. (2019, April). The consequences of speaking out against mental health stigma. In K.M. Kroeper & Hughes, C.S. (Chairs) *Stigma-related Beliefs among Perceivers and Targets Living with Mental Illness*. Symposium conducted at the Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.
- Kroeper, K. M.,** Green, D. J., Ozier, E. M., Dehrone, T. A., Quintanilla, V. D., Nelson, A. A., & Murphy, M. C. (2019, April). Boosting academic performance by increasing the value of teacher-student relationships. In L. Wallace (Chair) *Psychology of Social Change*. Symposium conducted at the Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.
- Kroeper, K. M.,** & Murphy, M. C. (2019, April). Supporting college and career readiness through social psychological interventions. In K.L. McClarty & Mattern, K.D. (Chairs) *Preparing Students for College and Careers: Theory, Measurement, and Educational Practice*. Symposium conducted at the National Council on Measurement in Education Annual Meeting, Toronto, ON.
- Brady, S. T., **Kroeper, K. M.,** Henderson, A. G., Li, X. A., Ozier, E., Blodorn, A., Krol, N., Mathias, K., & Walton, G. M. (November, 2017). Message intended is not message received: Shame, stigma, and disengagement in the academic probation notification process. Symposium talk presented to the 2017 Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management Fall Research Conference, Chicago, IL.
- Kroeper, K. M.,** Sanchez, D. T., & Himmelstein, M. S. (2015, May). Confronters as crusaders: Perpetrator status moderates perceptions of non-target confronters. In C.A. Zimmerman (Chair) *Responding to Mistreatment: When Does It Occur, and When Is It Beneficial?* Symposium conducted at the Western Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Las Vegas, NV.

CONFERENCE TALKS

- Kroeper, K. M.,** Williams, H. E., & Murphy, M. C. (2020, April). Counterfeiting diversity dampens perceived sincerity and elevates identity threat concerns. Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL. (Conference Cancelled).
- Jones, C. S., **Kroeper, K. M.,** Ozier, E. O., & Murphy, M. C. (2020, April). Prejudiced people and prejudiced places. Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL. (Conference Cancelled).
- Kroeper, K. M.,** Williams, H. E., & Murphy, M. C. (2019, June). Counterfeit diversity: When the diversity advertised is not the diversity encountered. Paper presented at the Weary Symposium on Diversity Social Identity, Columbus, OH.

- Boucher, K. L., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2019, June). Reactions to the content and results of social psychological interventions. Paper presented at the Weary Symposium on Diversity Social Identity, Columbus, OH.
- Muenks, K., Canning, E. A., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2019, April). Achievement goals and growth mindset. Roundtable session conducted at the American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, Toronto, ON.
- Canning, E. A., LaCrosse, J., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2019, April). Feeling like an imposter: Competition and the classroom experiences and performance of first-generation college students. Symposium conducted at the American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, Toronto, ON.
- Kroeper, K. M.**, Muenks, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2018, July). Marriage equality: On the books and on the ground? Paper presented at the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues Conference, Pittsburgh, PA.
- Boucher, K. L., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (April, 2018). Perceptions of success and support for social psychological interventions. Paper presented at the Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.
- Kroeper, K. M.**, Muenks, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2017, April). “I do’s” to “you don’ts”: Discrimination in the wedding industry. Paper presented at the Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.
- Levy, D. J., Muenks, K., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2017, April). Faculty mindsets in STEM vs. non-STEM fields. Paper presented at the Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.
- Kroeper, K. M.** & Murphy, M. C. (June 2016). Creating better confrontations: How context-focused confrontations address racial bias. Paper presented at the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues Conference, Minneapolis, MN.
- Kroeper, K. M.** & Murphy, M. C. (May 2016). Creating better confrontations: How context-focused confrontations address racial bias. Paper presented at the Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.
- ⁺Johnson, S., **Kroeper, K. M.**, Ozier, E., Murphy, M. C. (2015, July). The role of friendship networks and motivational goals in interracial interactions. Paper presented at the IGERT Undergraduate Research Symposium, Bloomington, IN.
- Kroeper, K. M.**, Sanchez, D. T., & Himmelstein, M. S. (2015, April). Confronters as crusaders: Perpetrator status moderates perceptions of non-target confronters. Paper presented at the Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.
- Kroeper, K. M.**, Sanchez, D. T., & Himmelstein, M. S. (2015, April). Confronters as crusaders: Perpetrator status moderates perceptions of non-target confronters. Paper presented at the Social Psychologists of Indiana Biennial Meeting, West Lafayette, IN.

Kroeper, K. M., Sanchez, D. T., & Himmelstein, M. S. (2012, April). Heterosexual men's confrontation of sexual prejudice: The role of precarious manhood. Paper presented at the Aresty Undergraduate Research Symposium, New Brunswick, NJ.

OUTREACH TALKS

Kroeper, K. M., & ⁺Gordon, B. (2019, October). New directions in social identity threat research. *Faculty and Staff for Student Excellence (FASE)*, Office of Diversity, Equity, and Multicultural Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.

Kroeper, K. M., Green, D. J., & Murphy, M. C. (2018, November). Creating classroom cultures that support student success. *The Advance College Project*, Office of the Vice Provost for Undergraduate Education, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.

Kroeper, K. M., Muenks, K., & Murphy, M. C. (2018, January). Marriage equality: On the books and on the ground? *The Center for Law, Society, & Culture Spring Speaker Series*, Maurer School of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.

*Quintanilla, V. D., ***Kroeper, K. M.,** & Applegate, A. G. (2017, September). Judicial and attorney perspective-taking and the preference for mediation in family law cases with pro se parties. *The Indiana State Bar Association Annual Meeting*, Indianapolis, IN.

*Quintanilla, V. D., ***Kroeper, K. M.,** & Applegate, A. G. (2017, September). Judicial and attorney perspective-taking and the preference for mediation in family law cases with pro se parties. *The Indiana Association of Mediators Annual Meeting*, Indianapolis, IN.

Kroeper, K.M., & Murphy, M.C. (2015, November). Stereotype threat and new directions in social identity threat research. *First Year Graduate Student Seminar*, Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.

CONFERENCE POSTERS

Kroeper, K. M., Williams, H. E., & Murphy, M. C. (2020, April). Counterfeit diversity: How strategically misrepresenting gender diversity dampens organizations' perceived sincerity and elevates women's identity threat concerns. The Women's Research Poster Competition at the Center of Excellence for Women & Technology, Bloomington, IN. (Conference Online).

⁺Nihill, G., **Kroeper, K. M.,** Tai, C., & Murphy, M. C. (2020, April). Preserving group harmony: Does Confronting prejudice serve or impede collectivist goals? Poster presented at the Midwest Undergraduate Cognitive Science Conference. (Conference Online).

⁺Carter, J. L., **Kroeper, K. M.,** & Murphy, M. C. (2020, April). College students' perceptions of military veterans. Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL. (Conference Cancelled).

Kroeper, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2020, February). When confronting prejudice backfires: How social norms influence the effectiveness of confrontations. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, New Orleans, LA.

- Jones, C. S., **Kroeper, K. M.**, Ozier, E. O., & Murphy, M. C. (2020, February). Prejudiced people and prejudiced places. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, New Orleans, LA.
- [†]Mills, A., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2020, February). An exploration of identity contingencies for sexual minorities across social contexts. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, New Orleans, LA.
- [†]Castro Lingl, D., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2020, February). Confronting prejudice in extreme political samples: Comparing/contrasting Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders supporters. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, New Orleans, LA.
- [†]Nihill, G., **Kroeper, K. M.**, Tai, C., & Murphy, M. C. (2020, February). Preserving group harmony: Does Confronting prejudice serve or impede collectivist goals? Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, New Orleans, LA.
- [†]Fried, A. C., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2019, April). Counterfeit diversity: Exaggerating workplace gender diversity increases threat and undermines organizational trust. Poster presented at the Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.
- [†]Dehrone, T. A., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2019, April). Men are strong, women are weak: Do beliefs about physical strength enable discrimination against women? Poster presented at the Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.
- [†]Smith, L. G., [†]Samuels, H. C., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2019, April). Not all Republicans: Socially acceptable negative feelings toward Trump Supporters. Poster presented at the Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.
- [†]Samuels, H. C., [†]Smith, L. G., [†]Ladzekpo, E. M. A., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2019, March). To friend or not to friend? How online personality cues affect person perception. Poster presented at the International Convention of Psychological Science, Paris, France.
- [†]Gordon, B., **Kroeper, K. M.**, Ansari, S. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2019, March). Accused of Favoring the Ingroup (vs. hating the outgroup): The Influence of Framing on Responses to Prejudice Confrontations. Poster presented at the International Convention of Psychological Science, Paris, France.
- [·]**Kroeper, K. M.**, Williams, H. E., & Murphy, M. C. (2019, February). Counterfeit diversity: Exaggerating workplace gender diversity increases threat and undermines organizational trust. Poster presented at the Self & Identity Preconference at the SPSP Annual Convention, Portland, OR. <https://osf.io/t3gp2/>
- Kroeper, K. M.**, Ozier, E. M., Green, D. J., Dehrone, T. A., Quintanilla, V. D., Nelson, A. A., & Murphy, M. C. (2019, February). Reducing school discipline: Toward building stronger interracial teacher-student bonds. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, Portland, OR.
- [†]Smith, L. G., [†]Samuels, H. C., [†]Ladzekpo, E. M. A., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2019, February). To friend or not to friend? How online personality cues affect person perception. Poster presented at SPSP Annual Convention, Portland, OR.

- [†]Suh, G., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2019, February). When prejudice is political: Understanding prejudices toward political foes. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, Portland, OR.
- [†]Fried, A. C., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2019, February). Toward developing practical recommendations for fostering growth-mindset classrooms. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, Portland, OR.
- [†]Dehrone, T. A., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C., (2019, February). Men are strong, women are weak: Do beliefs about physical ability enable hiring discrimination against women to persist? Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, Portland, OR.
- [†]Ladzekpo, E. M. A., **Kroeper, K. M.**, Ozier, E. M., [†]Smith, L. G., [†]Samuels, H. C., & Murphy, M. C. (2019, February). Are they stuck-up or just shy? Misattributing the behaviors of black introverts. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, Portland, OR.
- [†]Carter, J. L., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2019, February). “Relax, it’s only subtle bias”: The effect of bias type on perceptions of confronters. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, Portland, OR.
- [†]Gonzalez Tigre, A., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2018, July). Approaches to confronting racial bias. Poster presented at the Group STEM Summer Symposium, Bloomington, IN.
- [†]Smith, L. G., [†]Samuels, H. C., [†]Ladzekpo, E. M. A., **Kroeper, K. M.**, Ozier, E. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2018, April). Black = Extrovert? An examination of personality stereotype spillover. Poster presented at Indiana University, Bloomington Undergraduate Research & Creative Activity Week, Bloomington, IN.
- ^{††}Williams, C., **Kroeper, K.M.**, & Murphy, M.C. (2018, April) Confrontation fatigue: The intrapersonal effects of confronting racial prejudice. Poster presented at the Indiana University Center of Excellence for Women in Technology (CEWiT) Women’s Research Poster Competition, Bloomington, IN.
- [†]Carter, J. L., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2018, April). Foolish or heroic? The influence of perpetrator status on perceptions of those who confront prejudice. Poster presented at the National Conference on Undergraduate Research (NCUR), Edmond, OK.
- [†]Aslinia, C., [†]Oistad, B., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2018, April). Social norms of prejudice: Investigating perceptions of stigmatized groups. Poster presented at the National Conference on Undergraduate Research (NCUR), Edmond, OK.
- [†]Williams, C., **Kroeper, K. M.**, Ozier, E. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2018, April). The psychological immune system in action: Coping with negative feedback after confronting racial prejudice. Poster presented at the Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.
- [†]Lisnek, J., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2018, April). Overlooking excessive force perpetrated against communities of color: The effect of implicit bias, outcome bias, and cue ambiguity on culpability decisions. Poster presented at the Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.

- Kroeper, K. M.,** Muenks, K., & Murphy, M. C. (2018, March). Marriage equality: On the books and on the ground? Beliefs and behavior towards same-sex and interracial couples in the wedding industry. Poster presented at the Illinois Summit on Diversity in Psychological Science, Champaign, Illinois.
- Kroeper, K. M.,** ⁺Fisher, P. H., & Murphy, M. C. (2018, March). The academic and psychological health consequences of non-belonging among LGB college students. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, Atlanta, GA. <https://osf.io/x7e62/>
- Kroeper, K. M.,** Boucher, K. L., & Murphy, M. C. (2018, March). Perceptions of success and support for social psychological interventions. Poster presented at the Intervention Science Preconference, SPSP Annual Convention, Atlanta, GA. <https://osf.io/7mhwj/>
- ⁺Williams, C., **Kroeper, K. M.,** Ozier, E. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2018, March). The psychological immune system in action: Coping with negative feedback after confronting racial prejudice. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, Atlanta, GA.
- ⁺Lisnek, J., **Kroeper, K. M.,** & Murphy, M. C. (2018, March). Overlooking excessive force perpetrated against communities of color: The effect of implicit bias, outcome bias, and cue ambiguity on culpability decisions. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, Atlanta, GA.
- ⁺Carter, J. L., **Kroeper, K. M.,** & Murphy, M. C. (2018, March). Foolish or heroic? The influence of perpetrator status on perceptions of those who confront prejudice. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, Atlanta, GA.
- ⁺Aslinia, C., ⁺Oistad, B., **Kroeper, K. M.,** & Murphy, M. C. (2017, December). Social norms of prejudice: investigating perceptions of stigmatized groups. Poster presented at the IUURC Conference, Indianapolis, IN.
- ⁺Carter, J. L., **Kroeper, K. M.,** & Murphy, M. C. (2017, December). Foolish or heroic? The influence of perpetrator status on perceptions of those who confront prejudice. Poster presented at the IUURC Conference, Indianapolis, IN.
- ⁺Hernandez, Y. E., **Kroeper, K. M.,** & Murphy, M. C. (2017, July). “Most Americans hate the BLM movement, but not me”: Social norm beliefs and personal attitudes toward “Lives Matter” groups. Poster presented at the Louis Stokes Alliances for Minority Participation (LSAMP) Annual Poster Session, Bloomington, IN.
- ⁺Abdirisak, M. Z., **Kroeper, K. M.,** & Murphy, M. C. (2017, July). Political orientation and perceived social norms regarding religious groups. Poster presented at the Louis Stokes Alliances for Minority Participation (LSAMP) Annual Poster Session, Bloomington, IN.
- ⁺Dozier, S., **Kroeper, K. M.,** & Murphy, M. C. (2017, July). Social norms, conformity, and the expression of anti-LGBT prejudice. Poster presented at the Group STEM Summer Symposium, Bloomington, IN.
- ⁺Ansari, S. M, Chen, S., **Kroeper, K. M.,** Canning, E., & Murphy, M. C. (2017, April). Being multiracial in a monoracial world: Academic and psychological effects of identifying with component identities. Poster presented at the Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.

- ⁺Karim, M. F. A., ⁺Jettinghoff, W. M., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2017, April). Overlooking police brutality: How race and ambiguity affect culpability judgments. Poster presented at the Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.
- Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2017, January). “I do’s” to “you don’ts”: Discrimination in the wedding industry. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, San Antonio, TX.
- ⁺Jettinghoff, W. M., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2017, January). Overlooking police brutality: How race and ambiguity affect culpability judgments. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, San Antonio, TX.
- ⁺Ansari, S. M, Chen, S., **Kroeper, K. M.**, Canning, E., & Murphy, M. C. (2017, January). Being multiracial in a monoracial world: Academic and psychological effects of identifying with component identities. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, San Antonio, TX.
- ⁺Mettert, K. D., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2016, June). Encouraging anti-gay bias confrontation through threat reduction: Reaffirming masculinity to combat bias in others. Poster presented at the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues Conference, Minneapolis, MN.
- Kroeper, K. M.**, ⁺Ansari, S. M., Murphy, M. C. (2016, April). Creating better confrontations: The role of context-focused confrontations in addressing racial bias. Poster presented at the Center of Excellence for Women in Technology Annual Poster Session, Bloomington, IN.
- Kroeper, K. M.**, ⁺Ansari, S. M., Murphy, M. C. (2016, January). Creating better confrontations: The role of context-focused confrontations in addressing racial bias. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, San Diego, CA.
- ⁺Mettert, K. D., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2016, January). Encouraging anti-gay bias confrontation through threat reduction: Reaffirming masculinity to combat bias in others. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, San Diego, CA.
- ∴Kroeper, K. M.**, ⁺Ansari, S. M., Murphy, M. C. (2015, October). Creating better confrontations: The role of context-focused confrontations in addressing racial bias. Poster presented at the Indiana University Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences’ Graduate Student Poster Session, Bloomington, IN.
- ⁺Navarro, K. A., **Kroeper, K. M.**, Ozier, E., & Murphy, M. C. (2015, July). The role of friendship networks and motivational goals in interracial interactions. Poster presented at IU-HBCU STEM Summer Scholars Institute, Bloomington, IN.
- ⁺Greiner, C. V., Ozier, E., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Murphy, M. C. (2015, July). The role of friendship networks and motivational goals in interracial interactions. Poster presented at Project SEED Research Symposium, Bloomington, IN.
- ⁺Harnish, A. K., **Kroeper, K. M.**, & Young, J. F. (2015, March). Perceived discrimination and elevated depressive symptoms among children and adolescents. Poster presented at the SRCD Biennial Meeting, Philadelphia, PA.
- ∴Kroeper, K. M.**, Sanchez, D. T., & Himmelstein, M. S., (2015, February). Confronters as crusaders: Perpetrator status moderates perceptions of non-target confronters of sexual minority prejudice. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, Long Beach, CA.

Kroeper, K. M., Sanchez, D. T., & Himmelstein, M. S., (2014, June). Meta-perceptions of confronters: "Won't confronting prejudice make me look bad?" Poster presented at the SPSSI Biennial Conference, Portland, OR.

[†]DiMaio, S. N., **Kroeper, K. M.,** Young, J. F., (2014, April). The predictive efficacy of discordance in reports of parent-child attachment and its effect on youth depressive symptoms. Poster presented at the Aresty Undergraduate Research Symposium, Piscataway, NJ.

Cohen, J. R., **Kroeper, K. M.,** Young, J. F., Hankin, B. L., Abela, J. R. Z. (2014, March). Why are anxiety and depressive symptoms comorbid in youth?: A multi-wave, longitudinal examination of competing etiological models. Poster presented at the SRA Biennial Meeting, Austin TX.

Kroeper, K. M., Sanchez, D. T., & Himmelstein, M. S. (2013, May). He'll think I'm gay! Masculinity-related barriers preventing confrontations of sexual prejudice. Poster presented at the APS 25th Annual Convention, Washington, D.C.

Kroeper, K. M., Cohen, J. R., Young, J. F., Abela, J. R. Z., & Daryanani, I. (2012, May). Cognitive vulnerability in children. Poster presented at the APS 24th Annual Convention, Chicago, IL.

Kroeper, K. M., Sanchez, D. T., & Himmelstein, M. S. (2012, June). The role of precarious manhood in confrontations of sexual prejudice. Poster presented at the SPSSI Biennial Conference, Charlotte, NC.

ISSUE BRIEFS

Brady, S. T., **Kroeper, K. M.,** Ozier, E. M., Henderson, A. G., Walton, G. M. & the College Transition Collaborative (2018). *Academic probation and the role of notification letters* [Research Brief]. Retrieved from http://collegetransitioncollaborative.org/content/sass_toolkit_researchbrief_final.pdf

INFOGRAPHICS

Brady, S. T., Li, X. A., Walton, G. M., **Kroeper, K. M.,** Ozier, E. M., & the College Transition Collaborative. (2017). *Administrator & student perspectives on academic standing* [Infographic]. Retrieved from http://collegetransitioncollaborative.org/content/2017_CTC_AcademicStandingInfographic.pdf

STUDY MATERIALS

Kroeper, K. M., Williams, H. E., & Murphy, M. C. (2019). *Counterfeiting gender diversity in technology organizations: Cueing identity safety or identity threat?* [Study Materials]. Available from <https://osf.io/yzvmp/>

ADDITIONAL TRAINING

July 2019 *Summer Institute in Social and Personality Psychology (SISPP)*
Conducted at New York University (NYU) New York, NY, USA.

- June 2019 *Multilevel SEM with xxM (Todd Little's Stats Camp)*
Conducted in Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA.
- February 2019 *Improving your Statistical Inferences* (auditor)
Online Course taught by Dr. Daniel Lakens of Eindhoven University of Technology
- July 2018 *R Programming* (auditor)
Online Course taught by Dr. Roger Peng, Dr. Jeff Leek, & Dr. Brian Caffo of Johns Hopkins University
- August 2018 *Getting and Cleaning Data in R* (auditor)
Online Course taught by Dr. Roger Peng, Dr. Jeff Leek, & Dr. Brian Caffo of Johns Hopkins University
- July 2017 *Summer School on Social Cognition and Neuroscience (SCONE)*
Conducted at Julius-Maximilians-University (JMU) Würzburg, in Würzburg, Germany.

TEACHING

Statistics/Methods Courses

- Social Psychology Lab (Instructor of Record, Spring 2020)
Statistical Techniques (Associate Instructor, Fall 2019, Summer 2020)
Social Psychology Lab (Teaching Assistant, Spring 2019)
Methods of Experimental Psychology (Associate Instructor, Spring 2017)
Advanced Research in Psychology (Teaching Assistant, Fall 2014, Spring 2015)

Psychology Content Courses

- The Role of Psychology in Legal Doctrine (Teaching Assistant, Spring 2015)
Cognitive Psychology (Teaching Assistant, Fall 2014, Summer, 2015)

Special Topics Courses

- Psychology of College Life (Teaching Assistant, Summer 2019)
Careers for Psychology Majors (Teaching Assistant, Fall 2018)
Knowledge & Power: Issues in Women's Leadership (Teaching Assistant, Fall 2009)

MENTORING

- 2014 – present **Murphy Lab Undergraduate Research Group (MLURG)**
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN
Founder and Graduate Student Mentor

2014 – 2016 **Group STEM Initiative**
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN
Graduate Student Mentor

2013 – 2014 **First-Year Interest Group Seminars**
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ
Staff Mentor

Research advisor for Honors and Capstone students:

2020 – 2021 Natalie Neufeld
B.A. Psychology, Indiana University, May 2021 [Honors Student]

2019 – 2020 Daphne Castro Lingl
B.A. Psychology, Indiana University, May 2020 [Honors Student]
Confronting Trumpsters, Bernie Bros, & Clintonites: How social norms shape reactions to prejudice confrontation
**Recipient of the Hutton Honors College Research Grant (\$1500) in pursuit of her thesis*
**Recipient of the Sharon Stephens Brehm Excellence in Research Award*

Gretchen Nihill
B.A. Psychology, Indiana University, May 2020 [Capstone Student]
**Recipient of the Hutton Honors College Research Grant (\$750) in pursuit of her project*

2018 – 2019 Audrey Fried
Toward developing practical recommendations for fostering growth-mindset classrooms
B.A. Psychology, Indiana University, May 2019 [Honors Student]

2017 – 2018 Cierra Williams
Confrontation fatigue: The intrapersonal effects of confronting racial prejudice
B.A. Psychology, Indiana University, May 2018 [Honors Student]

Jaelyn Lisnek
Overlooking excessive force perpetrated against communities of color: The effect of ambiguity and race cues on perceptions of police
B.A. Psychology, Indiana University, May 2018 [Honors Student]

2015 – 2016 Kayne Mettert
The effects of masculinity threat on confrontation of anti-gay bias
B.A. Psychology, Indiana University, May 2016 [Honors Student]
**Recipient of the College Undergraduate Research Grant (\$2,000) in pursuit of his thesis*

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

Editor

2020 – Present Co-Editor for special issue in *Translational Issues in Psychological Science*,
“Perspectives on the Impact of Race on Psychological Processes”

Peer Reviewer

2017 – Present Ad Hoc Reviewer for *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*

2017 – Present Ad Hoc Reviewer for *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*

Indiana University Departmental Service:

Co-Coordinator for Indiana University’s Social Seminar, 2017-2019

IU Graduate and Professional Student Government Travel Awards Reviewer, 2015

Getting You Into IU (GU2IU) Graduate Student Volunteer, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019

POST-BACCALAUREATE RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

2012 – 2014 **The Institute for Research on Youth Depression and Prevention**
Supervised by Dr. Jami F. Young
Project Coordinator / Lab Manager

Responsible for the day-to-day functioning of an NIMH funded, longitudinal, multi-wave, multi-method research project titled, “Genetic, Cognitive, and Interpersonal Vulnerabilities to Depression in Youth” (n = 316 parent-child pairs)

UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

2011 – 2014 **Stigma, Health, and Close Relationships Lab**
Supervised by Dr. Diana T. Sanchez
Honors Thesis Researcher

2010 – 2012 **The Institute for Research on Youth Depression and Prevention**
Supervised by Dr. Jami F. Young
Senior Research Assistant

2011 – 2012 **Social Cognition Lab**
Supervised by Dr. Laurie Rudman
Research Assistant

IN THE NEWS

The Benefits of Student-to-Student Mentoring:

<http://spsp.org/news-center/member-newsletters/9-27-18/student-to-student-mentoring>

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

The Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP)

The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI)

The Society for the Improvement of Psychological Science (SIPS)

Society for the Psychology of Women (SPW)

Association for Psychological Science (APS)

Midwestern Psychological Association (MPA)

The American Association of University Women (AAUW)

SKILLS

Research: A/B testing; experimental design; interviews and focus groups; survey design; protocol and research material development; manuscript preparation; scientific writing; grant writing

Data Analysis: Multivariate linear and non-linear regression; Analysis of variance (ANOVA); Basic and sequential process mediation; Multilevel modeling; Structural equation modeling; Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis; Data visualization

Computer: R, SPSS, STATA, Qualtrics, Survey Monkey, Google Forms, Audacity Digital Audio Editor, Microsoft Office Suite (i.e., Word, Excel, PowerPoint), iWorks Suite (i.e., Pages, Numbers, Keynote), iMovie