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# The Soviet Military: *Glasnost'* Against Secrecy

Mikhail Tsyarkin

**T**he Soviet military has cloaked itself in extreme secrecy for decades. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, this secrecy has been challenged by military *glasnost'*—namely, acceptance by the Soviet Union of confidence-building measures and verification of agreements on arms control through on-site inspections, the publication of the Soviet military budget, and an open debate on various aspects of military policy. Soviet military officials themselves are beginning to talk about *glasnost'* and even “transparency” as major instruments of the security policy of their country.<sup>1</sup> The United States and NATO have concluded a number of arms-control agreements with the Soviets.

However, the recent Soviet record of lack of compliance and openness has raised serious concerns. In particular, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's acknowledgment, after the USSR's denials, that the USSR's large phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk was a direct and major violation of the ABM Treaty<sup>2</sup> has acquired symbolic importance for both American proponents and skeptics of arms control. The issue is larger than compliance with arms-control agreements. Secrecy and deception breed international instability in this era of infinitely destructive weapons with a global reach. Nikita Khrushchev's partially successful (thanks to secrecy) missile bluff in the late 1950's led to the crash American ICBM program designed to meet an as yet nonexistent threat. Secrecy was also at the heart of the Cuban missile crisis.

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Military *glasnost'* will significantly enhance international stability if it ensures compliance with arms-control agreements and provides a reasonably accurate picture of future weapons-acquisition efforts. We cannot tell whether military *glasnost'* will be up to these tasks in the future simply by compiling a litany of past Soviet transgressions or by assuming that now even greater openness is inevitable. This is not a useful approach, in view of the pace and scope of political change in the USSR. Instead, we must arrive at an answer from a reading of the broad political context of military *glasnost'*, which has been brought about by recent political changes and is directly affected by the volatile political climate in the Soviet Union.

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## The Political Context

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The political mentality behind secrecy and deception in Soviet politics stems from the Marxist-Leninist belief in the inevitable and all-encompassing conflict between the capitalist and socialist systems and the certain victory of Soviet communism. This ideology long had a firm hold on the minds of many party officials. Some of them are convinced of the eventual world-wide triumph of communism and their need “to be prepared to assume positions of responsibility in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America!”<sup>3</sup> Even Yuriy Andropov is reported to have viewed the situation in Afghanistan in 1979 through a 40-year-old prism of the confrontation be-

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<sup>1</sup>Army General Yazov, “A New Security Model and the Armed Forces,” *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 18, December 1989, p. 68; and Colonel V. A. Chirvin, “Defense Sufficiency and the Problems of the Prevention of War,” *Voyennaya Mysl'* (Moscow), No. 7, 1990, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup>E. A. Shevardnadze, “Foreign Policy and *Perestroika*,” *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Oct. 24, 1989.

<sup>3</sup>Vladimir Bukhonin, first secretary of the Sheksna District Party Committee of the Vologda Province, “Is Chichikov Alive?” *Yunost'* (Moscow), No. 10, 1989, p. 35.

tween communism and fascism in the Spanish Civil War.<sup>4</sup> For those who accepted Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Soviet Union was not part of a larger world, but rather a separate world, not bound to the "other" world by any common interests or values. Therefore, the Soviet elite acted in the belief that deceiving that "other" world contradicted neither Soviet values nor Soviet interests.

This world view has been challenged under Gorbachev. The systemic obsession with secrecy that is endemic to it has also been criticized as an obstacle to progress. The Chernobyl' nuclear disaster in 1986 marked a turning point; the regime's clumsy silence and disinformation damaged Soviet international standing and Gorbachev's personal prestige, and further undermined public confidence in the government. In response, in July 1988, the Politburo adopted a special resolution calling for the creation of an "information society" in the Soviet Union in order to reverse the Soviet Union's growing lag in information technology.<sup>5</sup>

The reformers' views on secrecy can be summed up as follows:

- excessive secrecy increasingly contradicts new political and economic realities and further undermines the public's trust in the government;
- secrecy serves as a prop for a bureaucratic regime unchecked by democratic institutions;
- secrecy has a legitimate role in protecting state interests, but the system of secrecy should be significantly modified;
- lack of information on the Soviet military encourages foreign "opponents" of disarmament to use disinformation as a means to speed up the arms race;
- reduction of secrecy will result in intensified scientific and technological progress and thereby enhance Soviet military capabilities.<sup>6</sup>

An intragovernmental study commission on secrecy and classification regulations was formed in 1988.<sup>7</sup> This commission found that secrets are protected by the KGB, but decisions on classification are made by

<sup>4</sup>Artem Borovik, "The Hidden War," *Ogonek* (Moscow), No. 46, November 1989, p. 19.

<sup>5</sup>Victor Yasman, "Glasnost' versus Freedom of Information: Political and Ideological Aspects," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR* (Munich), July 21, 1989, pp. 2, 4.

<sup>6</sup>V. Rubanov, "From the Cult of Secrecy—Toward the Information Culture," *Kommunist*, No. 13, September 1988, pp. 24–36.

<sup>7</sup>V. Rubanov, "Democracy and the Security of the Country," *ibid.*, No. 11, July 1989, p. 55. Represented on this commission were the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) of the Council of Ministers (the top coordinating body for the defense industry), the Institute of State and Law and other institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Planning Commission (GOSPLAN), the KGB, "and other agencies."

branch ministries usually based on recommendations from lower management levels. There is no single body or person responsible for an all-Union policy on state secrets, and while rules for declassifying information as it becomes dated exist, the branch ministries ignore them most of the time.<sup>8</sup>

The commission had to confront the enormous dimensions of the problem. Up to 70 percent of the so-called "normative acts" (decrees) that regulate most socio-economic activities in the Soviet Union frequently disregard or directly contravene published laws. The research commission's report contains concrete proposals on such diverse subjects as a law on state secrets, the regulation of secrecy in industry, the need to train personnel for enforcing the new secrecy regulations, and the relationship between secrecy and international cooperation and competition in science and technology. The commission has proposed several laudable principles to regulate state secrets: the "presumption of non-secrecy of information," "equal openness and equal secrecy in international relations," the "priority of international law" over domestic laws in matters of state secrets, and declassification of information where the likelihood of keeping it secret is relatively low.

But a law on state secrets has not been passed, making the introduction of a new system for protecting and declassifying secrets impossible.<sup>9</sup> The declarations of sovereignty by most of the union republics, which establish the priority of republican laws over the Union laws, cast doubt on the effectiveness of a future USSR law on state secrets. Thus, *glasnost*' still remains without a firm legal foundation.

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## Secrecy and Soviet Political Culture

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Soviet political culture, expressed in the attitudes, decision-making patterns, and habits of thought of the Soviet elite, plays a significant role in determining the parameters of military *glasnost*'. According to one Soviet scholar, the political culture of the Soviet elite has been shaped by the elite's "usurpation" of political power from the "masses," with the result that the former find it necessary to monopolize all channels of information. Keeping the "masses" uninformed is "a crucial condition for the covert realization of [the elite's] political interests." But not only the elite has been affected. Stalinism made secrecy into a general obsession in So-

<sup>8</sup>V. Zakhar'ko, "The 'Secret' Stamp in the Era of *Glasnost*,'" *Izvestiya*, Apr. 28, 1989.

<sup>9</sup>Petr Nikulin, "The Conversion of Secrecy: An Incomprehensible Insufficiency," *Kommunist*, No. 9, June 1990, pp. 70, 76, 77, 79.

viet society. There is considerable resistance below the elite level to attempts to reduce secrecy.<sup>10</sup>

The Soviet bureaucratic elite does not hold a monopoly on deception. But what makes the Soviet case different is the arrogance of the elite when it comes to handling information, combined with the absence of a tradition of the rule of law and of a government accountable to the public.<sup>11</sup> A Soviet legal correspondent characterized the attitude of average Soviet officials toward the law: "In their consciousness, there is neither the slightest concept of law, nor understanding of it, nor fear of it. . . ."<sup>12</sup>

Having no respect for the rule of law, various bureaucratic interests practice deception both against the public and against the central government, which, in turn, conceals the truth. The handling of the Chernobyl' nuclear accident is instructive. After the reactor explosion, local officials produced rosy assessments for their superiors until the arrival of a high-level investigating commission from Moscow.<sup>13</sup> Although this commission quickly established the facts for the Soviet leadership, the latter attempted to hide the reality from the public, a policy that backfired embarrassingly because of modern space-based and other information-gathering systems—a graphic proof, if the Soviet leaders needed one, of how dated their policy on secrecy was.

But it was only after the dimensions of the disaster were supposedly acknowledged that the real deception of the public began. For three years, dangerous ra-

diation levels in Belorussia, Ukraine, and the Bryansk oblast of the Russian republic were concealed. Indeed, the deception was perpetrated primarily by agencies responsible for health care and the environment! Decisions were made to classify information about higher-than-acceptable radiation levels in populated areas, and the health problems of personnel involved in emergency work at Chernobyl'. Only if a patient had suffered an acute case of radiation poisoning were military physicians allowed to enter into a patient's chart the information that he had worked on the Chernobyl' cleanup. Orders classifying radiation data were issued as late as 1989.<sup>14</sup>

Will Soviet officialdom, barely able to distinguish between legality and illegality, comply with complex and not always easily verifiable arms-control agreements? The problem is compounded, moreover, by the fact that in the Soviet Union, general contempt for the rule of law is joined to the treatment of national security as an extralegal matter.

## Secrecy in the Soviet Military

From time to time, and due mainly to pragmatic considerations, periods in Russian history characterized by extreme military secrecy gave way to partial openness. The Bolshevik Revolution did not immediately result in extreme isolation and secrecy in military matters. Until the mid-1930's, Soviet military publications discussed matters of military art and technology in a reasonably forthright manner. Until 1933, Soviet-German military-industrial cooperation exposed numerous German officers and engineers to the USSR's armed forces and defense industry.<sup>15</sup> Military secrecy tightened only in the late 1930's.

The now familiar patterns of secrecy and deception developed during World War II and afterwards. In military operations, the Soviet high command emphasized deception, which was impossible without the strictest secrecy. For instance, the Soviets view the 1945 Manchurian campaign against Japan as the highest achievement of their military art in World War II. In preparation for it, the Soviets "undertook a major transfer of forces from the western to the eastern part of the USSR under the full cover of a strategic deception plan."<sup>16</sup>

Pervasive secrecy grew further as a result of Stalin's decision to conceal from the outside world Soviet postwar weakness and his postwar campaign of xenophobia and spy mania. Military and related scientific and technological activities were particularly affected by this general trend; extraordinary secrecy surrounded work on nuclear weapons and rockets.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>10</sup>Rubanov, "Democracy and the Security of the Country," loc. cit., p. 45; and Rubanov, "The Cult of Secrecy—Toward the Information Culture," loc. cit., p. 26. Rubanov was fired from his job as a department head at the KGB Research Institute after publicly calling for reduction of secrecy—a fine illustration of the importance of secrecy in the political culture of the elite! See Natal'ya Gevorkyan, "Openness is Possible: But Only after the Door Is Closed Behind You," *Moskovskiy Novosti* (Moscow), June 24, 1990.

<sup>11</sup>On the lack of legal tradition in prerevolutionary Russia, see Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime*, New York, Scribner and Sons, 1974, p. 289.

<sup>12</sup>O'l'ga Chaykovskaya, "Resistance," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Nov. 26, 1986. A respected Soviet legal affairs correspondent remarked that in his country there "has not been a state of law even for one day." See Arkadiy Vaksberg in "What Should a State of Law Look Like?" *ibid.*, June 8, 1988.

<sup>13</sup>G. Medvedev, "Incompetence," *Kommunist*, No. 4, March 1989, pp. 98–103.

<sup>14</sup>Yevgeniya Al'bats, "A Big Lie," *Moskovskiy Novosti*, Oct. 15, 1989.

<sup>15</sup>John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command*, London, St. Martin's Press, 1962, pp. 247–282; and Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Origins of the Soviet Military Research and Development System, 1917–1941," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1985, pp. 135–36.

<sup>16</sup>Notra Trulock III, "The Role of Deception in Soviet Military Planning," in Brian D. Dailey and Patrick J. Parker, Eds., *Soviet Strategic Deception*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1987, p. 283.

<sup>17</sup>See Leonard Nikishin, "Those Who Invoked the Genie," *Moskovskiy Novosti*, Oct. 8, 1989; and Andrei Sakharov, *Memoirs*, New York, Alfred Knopf, Inc., 1990, p. 80.

In addition, the memories of the Red Army purge in the late 1930's, when tens of thousands of officers were accused of espionage for foreign powers, caused knee-jerk reactions among successive generations of officers to disclosing any information. Stalin isolated the officer corps from the West—during World War II, there was very little contact between Soviet military officers and their counterparts in the Alliance. Later, there were only minimal contacts between Soviet and NATO officers.

Soviet experiences in 1941 and the advent of nuclear weapons led to a further emphasis on secrecy and strategic deception, two closely related categories in Soviet military art.<sup>18</sup> The Soviets reasoned that if a Germany armed with conventional weapons nearly defeated the Soviet Union in the "initial period of war" partially thanks to surprise, then a surprise attack with nuclear weapons could certainly defeat a superpower! The use of new conventional weapons, if kept secret, could also help decide a war early on.

Cloaking the military in secrecy also served an important political purpose. Soviet military power has helped convey to the populace the idea of the overwhelming might of the Soviet regime.<sup>19</sup> The power mystique was maintained for the military (as well as for the Communist party and KGB) by shrouding it in secrecy, with its might occasionally and ritualistically displayed at giant military parades. Mikhail Gorbachev's insistence on going ahead with the unpopular military parade on the November 7, 1990, anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution was a testimony both to the past importance of this political tool and to the perception that the military was losing its mystique, due to a considerable degree to *glasnost*'.

Finally, secrecy has been prompted by the military's self-interest. Mismanagement has created many problems for the military. There are great and unjustified disparities in the standard of living between the high com-

mand and the majority of officers. There is lack of fairness and favoritism in the promotion system. All of this was conveniently hidden by military secrecy.

### *Glasnost*' in the Military

In order to shake up the bureaucracy and facilitate reform, Gorbachev encouraged political *glasnost*'—public criticism of various institutions and agencies, including the armed forces.<sup>20</sup> The Soviets have also recognized that excessive secrecy is a poor public-relations practice at a time when economic realities are demanding improved relations and arms-control agreements with the West.

Application of *glasnost*' to the Soviet military establishment has followed two tracks which are different but which frequently cross. One track is new policies in arms control, which reflect "new thinking" in foreign affairs. The September 1986 "Final Document" of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe contains numerous provisions for "opening up" various military activities of European countries, East and West. The December 1987 INF Treaty has unprecedented provisions for the on-site inspection of military and military-industrial installations. These steps significantly contributed to a dramatic improvement in East-West relations. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also supported in general terms President George Bush's proposal for "open skies" to increase international trust and stability.<sup>21</sup> In addition, the Soviets have published some data on their military spending and some accurate maps. Numerous Western visitors have been granted selective access to closely guarded military facilities.

The second track of military *glasnost*' is the public airing of problems in the Soviet military, such as poor living conditions, poor technical skills of officers and enlisted men, poor morale, hazing of conscripts, and others. This track is very much a part of the *glasnost*' campaign on the domestic scene.

<sup>18</sup>See Army General S. P. Ivanov, *Nachal'nyy period voyny* (The Initial Period of War), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1974, passim; Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1984, 3rd edition, p. 41; Marshal V. Sokolovskiy, Ed., *Voyennaya strategiya* (Military Strategy), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1968, 3rd edition, p. 247; M. M. Kir'yan, *Problemy voyennoy teorii v sovetskikh nauchno-spravochnykh izdaniyakh* (Problems of Military Theory in Soviet Scientific-Reference Publications), Moscow, Nauka, 1985, p. 124; and Lt. Gen. A. Yevseyev, "On Several Tendencies in the Change of the Contents and Character of the Initial Period of War," *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* (Moscow), November 1985, p. 17. Strategic deception is "carried out following decisions of the Supreme Command and includes a set of measures aimed at protecting the secrecy of strategic operations and campaigns, as well as disorienting the enemy in regard to the true intentions and actions of the armed forces." See *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya* (The Soviet Military Encyclopedia), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1976–1980, Vol. 5, p. 175.

<sup>19</sup>Rebecca V. Strode and Colin S. Gray, "The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military Power," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1981, p. 11.

<sup>20</sup>*Glasnost*' is part of the Russian military tradition. After Russia's defeat in the Crimean War in 1855, the reformers of the Russian military establishment, led by the War Minister Dmitriy Milyutin, intended to use *glasnost*' to improve the conditions of the Russian military. They understood *glasnost*' as the right to discuss various problems of the military and to volunteer unorthodox opinions, especially by junior officers, to benefit the overburdened high command. This is close to the Soviet high command's view of military *glasnost*'. At the same time, the 19th-century Russian military reformers were worried, just as are their counterparts today, that "incompetent" civilians would "abuse" *glasnost*' by meddling in the affairs of the military. See A. Senin, "On the Use of *Glasnost*,'" *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, April 1989, pp. 63–65.

<sup>21</sup>E. A. Shevardnadze, "The General Plan—Peace, Security, and Harmony of Interests," *Izvestiya*, Sept. 27, 1989.



Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell (right) escorts Soviet General Mikhail Moiseyev at the Pentagon.

—Reuters/Bettmann.

Military *glasnost'* has great public-relations value in the West because it looks so favorable compared to past Soviet practices. But much evidence supports the proposition that obsessive secrecy has by no means been purged from the Soviet military. For example, a handbook on rules of personal conduct for cadets in officer schools suggests that when on liberty they "should not speak with strangers," "should not discuss matters of life and work in the school" with civilians, and if they find themselves in trouble, should "ask for help only from officials."<sup>22</sup> In addition, publishing accurate maps is still a problem. The military opposes declassifying topographic maps of scale 1:100,000 and larger because satellite reconnaissance does not permit determining the exact location of objects photographed without such maps. General Aleksey Losev, the chief of the Military Topography Department of the General Staff, also defended continuing the classification of maps from the 18th century and even earlier on military grounds!<sup>23</sup> In this context, efforts in the realm of military *glasnost'* do seem truly earth-shaking.

One factor hindering *glasnost'* in the military is that the system of military secrecy is still very much in place. Military censorship continues to function as a department of the General Staff. (Not surprisingly, it is located in the same building as the editorial offices of Soviet military journals.) Until the passage of the new Law on the Press on August 1, 1990, the Soviet official press could not publish anything about the military without the prior approval of military censorship. Now, military censors are to review published materials, act through law-enforcement agencies to prosecute the mass media for disclosing military secrets, and "develop a standard document on the protection of secrets in the mass media."<sup>24</sup> In short, they will issue the kind of regulations (unpublicized) that until now have contributed greatly to maintenance of excessive secrecy and the concealment of information.

A list of data "not subject for publication," which was circulated by the newly established Main Administration for Protection of State Secrets, includes various types of military statistics, such as those on disciplinary

<sup>22</sup>S. Taranov, "Wash Your Hands, Cadet!" *ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1989.

<sup>23</sup>V. Zyubin, "We Will Show Our Cards," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), July 22, 1989.

<sup>24</sup>V. Litovkin, "The Military Censor: What Is Possible and What Is Forbidden," *Izvestiya*, Nov. 26, 1989; and Maj. Gen. S. Filimonov, "Will the Censors Become Unemployed?" *Krasnaya Zvezda*, July 12, 1990.

actions, self-inflicted injuries, suicides, desertion, accidental deaths, theft of weapons, and mutinies. Such data have nothing in common with legitimate military secrets (operational plans, weapons capabilities), but they do reveal the quality of conditions in the armed forces. Therefore, Soviet journalists have concluded that the military is simply continuing to use secrecy to protect its corporate interests from public scrutiny. The sentence for divulging state secrets in the press has been set at five to eight years of imprisonment.<sup>25</sup>

Nevertheless, *glasnost*' has apparently disoriented military censorship. For example, in an interview, with *Pravda*, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Fleet Admiral V. N. Chernavin made reference to the new *Tbilisi* "aircraft carrier" now being outfitted in the Black Sea. *Pravda* published this information despite the likelihood of its causing diplomatic and military difficulties, for the Montreux Convention bans passage of aircraft carriers through the Black Sea Straits. Three days later, *Pravda* published a lame "correction," calling the *Tbilisi* "a heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser."<sup>26</sup>

A Soviet journal was able to publish an article suggesting that the mysterious outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk in 1979 resulted from an accident in a biological weapons-research facility—something that was vehemently denied by the Soviets at the time. Chief of the General Staff, General Mikhail Moiseyev, referred to the article as "slanderous and attempted to stop its publication."<sup>27</sup>

Another factor hindering military *glasnost*' is the military's suspicions about the technology used to verify arms-control agreements. The deputy chairman of the USSR State Technical Commission, Lt. Gen. Nikolay Brusnitsin, has expressed concern that US national technical means (NTM) of verification might be used for espionage purposes. On-site inspections and contacts between Soviet citizens and Western visitors cause even greater alarm in military circles. Brusnitsin has accused US personnel present in the USSR to verify Soviet observance of the INF Treaty of espionage; he has also warned that joint ventures employing foreigners, as well as cooperatives linked with the defense industry, have heightened the risk of military secrets being revealed. Brusnitsin has charged that US scientists who participated in a 1989 Black Sea experiment for verification of sea-based nuclear weapons demonstrated

an open desire to obtain data on armaments unrelated to the project.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, an article in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, the Ministry of Defense newspaper, entitled "*Perestroika, Glasnost*' . . . Espionage," expresses concern about an alleged American emphasis on human intelligence, because of the role it plays in assessing such factors as personnel quality and morale, as well as weapons still on the drawing board.<sup>29</sup>

The *Krasnaya Zvezda* article also reflects Soviet concern about "excessive *glasnost*'" in professional contacts between Soviet and American scientists. It discusses the former allegedly disclosing information deemed to be "highly useful for an expert specialist." Thus, the article broadens the definition of what is secret instead of narrowing it down, and reverts to the typical Soviet axiom of "whatever is not expressly permitted is forbidden." Another military author has recently attacked each and every activity that might give the West access to truthful information—from Western visits to Soviet military facilities, to publication of articles on military morale in Soviet newspapers, to frank discussions of the MIKE-class submarine disaster in the mass media, to greater freedom of travel and emigration.<sup>30</sup> The relaxation of military secrecy, especially for "open skies," has also drawn the ire of Colonel Nikolay Petrushenko, one of the "black colonels" in the Supreme Soviet who gained their fame by attacking Shevardnadze (of which the latter complained in his resignation speech) and demanding that Gorbachev conduct a more conservative policy.<sup>31</sup>

It appears that a conservative political agenda of limiting contacts with the West, rather than concerns that *glasnost*' might endanger Soviet security is, at least in part, motivating the military. Many of the military's security concerns appear unjustified. The Soviets have recently given Western officials, specialists, and journalists access to Soviet military facilities without asking for reciprocity from Western countries. For example, in July 1989, a group of US congressmen and "independent scientists" were allowed to visit the Sary Shagan ballistic missile defense (BMD) proving ground. There, they saw a Soviet laser, which was described by the visitors as being incapable of damaging US satellites, outdated, and relatively primitive (contrary to what had been suggested by several previous editions of the US Department of Defense's *Soviet Military Power*). One of

<sup>25</sup>A. Illesh and V. Rudnev, "Censorship Has Been Abolished, the Censors Remain," *Izvestiya*, Oct. 9, 1990.

<sup>26</sup>V. N. Chernavin, "Commentary of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Fleet Admiral V. N. Chernavin," *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 19, 1989; for the "correction," see *ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1989.

<sup>27</sup>"A Chronicle of an Unannounced Death," *Rodina* (Moscow), No. 5, 1990.

<sup>28</sup>Lt. Gen. Nikolay Brusnitsin, *Openness and Espionage*, Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1990, pp. 10–12, 30.

<sup>29</sup>V. Doronin in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 11, 1989.

<sup>30</sup>Colonel V. Nikolayev, "*Glasnost*' and Secrecy," *Morskoy Sbornik* (Moscow), No. 7, 1990, pp. 8–10.

<sup>31</sup>"We Cannot Consider This To Be an Achievement of Our Foreign Policy," *Literaturnaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Nov. 12, 1990.

the visiting scientists said that the same laser had primitive computers and was so crude that "a two-year college in the United States could produce the same in one of its laboratories."<sup>32</sup> But one should be well advised not to draw conclusions about Soviet weapons capabilities solely on the basis of their shoddy looks and somewhat dated components—making capable systems from inferior components has been a trademark of the Soviet military R&D system for decades. Indeed, there is evidence that the laser might not be as primitive as supposed: Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov said that it was of the same type as the one recently used by the US Air Force to track space objects, and was used by the Soviets for that purpose in 1989.<sup>33</sup>

The American visitors did not get answers to any of their specific questions: When exactly was the laser designed and built? And how could the Soviets support their claim that it is to be used only for satellite tracking? Moreover, the Americans were not allowed to visit any other installations in the area and did not obtain answers to their questions about such installations.

American specialists who in 1989 visited a classified facility for the research and development of gas lasers at the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy concluded that the Soviet laser, which blasted a sheet of metal in their presence, had an impressive power level but little direct military significance. This observation also supports statements made nearly five years ago by the US Department of Defense, which credited the Soviet gas laser with "impressive" output power, but dated possible deployment of laser weapons not earlier than the late 1990's—early 2000's. The implication was that currently available Soviet gas lasers have no direct military significance. Soviet scientists at the facility said that the visit was arranged to reassure the West that the Soviets were interested in the peaceful uses of gas lasers rather than their military applications. However, the gas laser was in fact paid for by the Ministry of Defense. In addition, although the scientists at the Kurchatov Institute were skeptical about the military utility of the gas laser, the military itself did not accept the scientists' judgments.

These claims by Soviet scientists might be true, but they might equally be false. Does a branch of the Kurchatov Institute build lasers only to prove to the military that they are poor weapons? Is that what the military is paying for? Will the laser laboratory continue to accept military contracts despite the scientists' skepticism? What is happening in a lab next door? Indeed, the Soviet scientists "did not discuss in detail their work on chemical or free-electron lasers. . . ."<sup>34</sup>

Since such questions were not answered, the visit to the laser lab at the Kurchatov Institute did not resolve concerns about the Soviet military laser program, al-

though it did confirm conclusions reached by US intelligence. It should also be noted that the American request to visit a very large Soviet laser facility near the city of Dushanbe in Central Asia, which has been suspected of being used for BMD research, was rejected, a curious fact inasmuch as the Soviets have insisted that this facility is designed for peaceful purposes only.<sup>35</sup> Confirming assessments based on NTM data has been undoubtedly useful, but both visits have apparently done little to increase our understanding of the direction of Soviet BMD research and development.

A 1989 visit of a group of Americans to a command center for aging SS-11 missiles, which are being retired, revealed less information than might have been apparent at the time. The Soviets probably believed that the group's main discovery—that the command center was only 20 feet underground—was no longer a secret. After all, it was only a year earlier that the US Department of Defense provided detailed descriptions of Soviet facilities for the command and control of nuclear war, descriptions that included information about the depth of these facilities.<sup>36</sup> After that, could the Soviets really doubt that the depth of their outdated SS-11 command center was a secret?

The 1987 visit by an American congressional delegation to the Krasnoyarsk radar site was similarly unrevealing of new information. Some visitors reportedly concluded that the radar did not look hardened for battle-management and noticed that the workmanship looked shoddy. This, however, was irrelevant to the central question: was the radar a violation of the ABM Treaty? Those American visitors who left believing (correctly, as the Soviets now agree) that the radar was a violation, did so because of the northeastern orientation of the radar and its location deep inside Soviet territory, which made it unsuitable for anything but an ABM mission.<sup>37</sup> Such information, however, had been provided years earlier by American satellite intelligence.

<sup>32</sup>R. Jeffrey Smith, "Soviet Laser Said to Pose No Threat," *The Washington Post*, July 9, 1989.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*


<sup>34</sup>Michael E. Gordon, "US Visitors See Soviet Laser Firing," *The New York Times*, Aug. 17, 1989; and *Soviet Strategic Defense Programs*, US Department of Defense, Washington, DC, October 1985, pp. 13, 14.

<sup>35</sup>Michael E. Gordon, "Congressional Visitors Learn Limits on Glasnost," *The New York Times*, Aug. 28, 1989. On the laser facility near Dushanbe, see William J. Broad, "New Clues on a Soviet Laser Complex," *ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1987.

<sup>36</sup>Gordon, "US Visitors See Soviet Laser Firing," *loc. cit.*; *Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat*, 1988, Washington, DC, US GPO, n.d., pp. 59–62.

<sup>37</sup>William J. Broad, "Inside a Key Russian Radar Site: Tour Raises Questions on Treaty," *The New York Times*, Sept. 7, 1987; William J. Broad, "Soviet Radar on Display," *ibid.*, Sept. 9, 1987; and David K. Shieler, "Americans Who Saw Soviet Radar Unsure If It Violates Pact," *ibid.*, Sept. 9, 1987.





The Krasnoyarsk radar installation.

—V. Medvedev/TASS from Sovfoto.

The Soviets' desire to reap public-relations benefits from military *glasnost*' while minimizing foreigners' access to sensitive information is natural. There is no evidence of strategic deception (that is, a deception program designed to improve significantly Soviet military might while keeping adversaries in the dark) conducted under the guise of *glasnost*'. The strategic deception program of building the ABM radar near Krasnoyarsk was a failure, for it resulted in the mobilization of support in the US for the Strategic Defense Initiative. This failure is likely to discourage, for the time being, new strategic deception programs. Equally important, to conduct strategic deception, one needs a strategy, which the Soviets lack in today's whirlwind of political change. However, in a political culture that places such great stress on secrecy, at least some efforts at military deception will no doubt continue.

### *Glasnost*' and Deception

Given the realities of Soviet political culture, it is not surprising that, *glasnost*' or not, the Soviet military

tends to provide the Soviet public, foreign governments, and international organizations with patently false information. For example, the statement of the Warsaw Pact Committee of Defense Ministers disclosing the strength of Warsaw Pact forces excluded civilian employees on the grounds that they do not undergo military training.<sup>38</sup> Civilian employees of the Western Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, when signing their contracts, are not told that they will have to participate in military training. Upon arrival in East Germany, however, they discover that:

*We must all without exception, in addition to our full-time jobs, participate in military training—even women who are exempt from military service. We have to get up [at night] for combat alerts, we have to wear military uniforms, we have to take part in small-arms drills and other types of military training.*

When a group of civilians complained about this training, a commanding officer told them that "*perestroyka* has not reached here and never will."<sup>39</sup> One does not know what is more disturbing in this case: the contempt for legality and Soviet international obligations or the useless, knee-jerk character of this lie, because the civilians' military training contributes nothing to the Soviet defense capability in Germany.

The Soviet military has recently exhibited a tendency to misinform its own government. According to then Foreign Minister and Politburo member Shevardnadze, high-ranking military officers consistently misled him about the methods they used for crowd control, and especially about their employment of toxic substances during the massacre of peaceful demonstrators in Tbilisi on April 9, 1989.<sup>40</sup> Shevardnadze also accused the military of misleading the political leadership about the nature of the Krasnoyarsk radar. This accusation rings true, given that the military has yet to acknowledge that the siting of this radar violates the ABM treaty.<sup>41</sup>

Before the ink dried on the November 19, 1990, Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the veracity of Soviet data and the Kremlin's willingness to implement the agreement came into doubt. Instead of destroying a substantial number of weapons, as called for by the

<sup>38</sup>"Statement of the Committee of the Ministers of Defense," *Pravda*, Jan. 30, 1989.

<sup>39</sup>"Women on the Military Parade-Ground," *Izvestiya*, Oct. 24, 1989.

<sup>40</sup>Leonid Pleshakov, "To Convince with the Truth," *Ogonek*, No. 11, March 1990.

<sup>41</sup>E. A. Shevardnadze, "Foreign Policy and *Perestroyka*," *Izvestiya*, Oct. 24, 1989. For the Soviet military's attitude, see John W. R. Lepingwell, "Soviet Early-Warning Radars Debated," *Report on the USSR*, Aug. 17, 1990, pp. 14, 15.

treaty, the Soviets allegedly transferred them east of the Urals. They also mislabeled other weapons in order to avoid destroying them. Instead of disbanding three motorized rifle divisions, the Soviets have redesignated them as naval infantry, which is not subject to the CFE Treaty provisions.<sup>42</sup>

In 1989, the troops of the KGB and MVD (the Ministry of Internal Affairs) were officially removed from the composition of the Soviet Armed Forces.<sup>43</sup> Now, allegations are being made in the Soviet Union that this reorganization is being used to put some military forces (a paratroop division based in Vitebsk has been named) under the control of the KGB.<sup>44</sup> In the Soviets' view, this move will likely enable them to claim that these troops are no longer subject to CFE Treaty provisions. This is, however, a deception, especially since the Soviets have traditionally given heavy armaments (tanks and armored fighting vehicles) and combat training to their internal-security troops.<sup>45</sup>

Many in the Soviet Union distrust the figures in the "real" Soviet defense budget first released in 1989.<sup>46</sup> Academician V. Avduyevskiy, a top space scientist, said the sum is unrealistically low. Major V. Lopatin, a radical USSR Supreme Soviet deputy, has quoted an unnamed Ministry of Defense official as saying the real defense budget was 120 billion rubles. Captain 3rd Rank A. Antoshkin, a student at the Lenin Military-Political Academy, has compared contradictory statements of Soviet military officials on the subject and concluded that the announced defense budget numbers are meaningless.<sup>47</sup> Indeed, it follows from a statement by a department head in the Directorate of Administrative Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers, S. Guchmazov, that the announced defense budget did not include all direct and indirect expenditures a state makes in order to provide for the possibility of its stable functioning in emergency situations, including war.<sup>48</sup> Among

such expenditures Guchmazov lists the ineffective but omnipresent pre-draft military training, partially financed through involuntary membership dues; reserve officer training of students, which is carried out in most Soviet higher educational institutions, with each having a military department staffed with officers up to the rank of general; and the accumulation of state and mobilizational reserves.<sup>49</sup>

There is also the Soviet military's propensity to stage *pokazukha* (Potemkin villages) in response to inspections. Military bases are routinely prepared for important visitors by painting grass (in lieu of real lawns), removing soldiers to different quarters (so that they do not soil the cleaned barracks), and turning the mess halls into something akin to real restaurants. In 1988, the Ministry of Defense began mass construction of "show military settlements" (*pokaznyye voyennyye gorodki*) specially designed to impress visiting Soviet officials. Considerable effort and resources were devoted to building expensively furnished barracks, gyms, and other facilities, while the real needs of the servicemen were ignored.<sup>50</sup> Although this is a case of deception directed against the Soviet authorities themselves, it is a good illustration of an institutional culture prone to cheating in general. If inspectors from the Ministry of Defense can be deceived, why not the arms-control inspectors from NATO?

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## How Much Should the Public Know

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We can be assured of Soviet military intentions and capabilities only if the Soviet people are granted the right to know about their country's military affairs. Defense Minister Yazov has recently proclaimed that openness about military activities will become "a virtual guarantee" of international security, because it allows the "popular masses," who are interested in the preservation of peace, to participate actively in military affairs.<sup>51</sup> But the Soviet military has been very uneasy over the principle of public accountability.

The furious domestic debate about the condition of the Soviet Armed Forces is more threatening to the military establishment than the most intrusive arms-control verification measures. *Glasnost'* has opened up for dis-

<sup>42</sup>R. Jeffrey Smith, "US, Soviets Dispute Arms-Cut Provisions," *The Herald* (Monterey), Dec. 17, 1990.

<sup>43</sup>"On the Confirmation of Decrees of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Introduction of Changes and Additions to Legislative Acts of the USSR," *Izvestiya*, Aug. 5, 1989.

<sup>44</sup>A. Krainiy, "Unpeeled Potatoes?" *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 15, 1990.

<sup>45</sup>*Military Balance 1989-1990*, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989, p. 42; and William C. Fuller, Jr., "The Internal Troops of the MVD SSSR," College Station, TX, Texas A&M University System, Center for Strategic Technologies, College Station Papers 6, 1983, pp. 35, 36.

<sup>46</sup>N. I. Ryzhkov, "On the Program of Future Activities of the USSR Government," *Izvestiya*, June 8, 1989.

<sup>47</sup>B. Kononov, "The Defeat of the Militarized Economy," *Izvestiya*, Feb. 7, 1990; S. Aleksandrov, "Military Reform," *Nedelya* (Moscow), No. 22, 1990; and A. Antoshkin, "A Volunteer Army: More Costly or Less Costly?" *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 9, 1990, p. 39.

<sup>48</sup>A. Lopukhin, "The Dividends of Peace and Conversion," *Pravda*, July 30, 1990.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.* For details on the Soviet system of reserve officer training, see Mikhail Tsyarkin, *The Soviet Reserve Officer Training System: An Assessment*, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 1988, NPS-56-88-017.

<sup>50</sup>Danuta Junavičienė, "The Soviet Army—A Theater of the Absurd," *Kauno Aidas* (Kaunas), Sept. 21, 1989; and letter from political officer G. Grozmani, in *Ogonek*, No. 50, December 1989.

<sup>51</sup>Yazov, loc. cit., p. 68.

discussion the abysmal condition of conscripts, the necessity of conscription itself, the size of the military budget, and the military's role in internal-security operations, among other issues. These discussions continue even though the CPSU Central Committee issued two memoranda in 1989 demanding that the mass media limit their negative coverage of the military.<sup>52</sup>

Many high-ranking officers have been incensed by civilian specialists' criticisms of various aspects of the Soviet force posture, from "tankomania" to the blue-water navy. The civilian specialists are also clamoring for declassification of information in order to facilitate their analyses, which have been mainly critical. The military responded by accusing these specialists of incompetence and irresponsibility, and labeling the debates conducted by non-military analysts as "harmful" for the "unprepared" public.<sup>53</sup>

Hopes for greater public accountability are primarily placed on the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security—the KOGB. However, it has done little to increase public participation in setting military policy, and appears incapable of lifting the veil of military secrecy. The KOGB is dominated by high-ranking military officers (including Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev and the chief of armaments, Army General Vitaliy Shabanov), defense-industry executives (including the leaders of the *Sukhoi* and *Ilyushin* aircraft design bureaus), and officials of the Communist party.<sup>54</sup> Its first chairman was Vladimir Lapygin, a specialist in missile guidance and general designer for the onboard control system of the Soviet space shuttle *Buran*. Lapygin's views were generally close to those of the military high command. He opposed "unilateral disarmament" and excessive zeal in the conversion of defense industry to civilian needs and was suspicious of the Baltic popular fronts. He regarded the professional competence (in the areas of defense industry, the military, or state security) of deputies in the KOGB as essential—thus drawing an implicit comparison between the "competence" of officials from these spheres and the "incompetence" of their civilian critics. Lapygin criti-

cized abuses of secrecy prompted by "primitive spy mania" (such as making secret "the location of large defense enterprises and military bases") and the desire to hide arms-control violations. Nevertheless, he strongly defended secrecy in his own field of activity—research and development of new weapons. Criticized for his cozy relationship with the military and for attention to his professional activities at the expense of work in the KOGB, Lapygin recently resigned from his post. He was replaced by another trusted insider, Leonid Shárin, a party official. Not surprisingly, Dr. Georgiy Arbatov has criticized the KOGB for "having a strange membership and working in a strange fashion," and doing nothing to reduce military secrecy.<sup>55</sup>

The KOGB has been meeting in secret, without even maintaining a classified stenographic record. An item that would be routinely made public in the West, such as General Yazov's report to the KOGB on the global military-political situation, was not disclosed. Only a meeting on defense-industry conversion (a topic with obvious propaganda appeal) was conducted in the presence of representatives from the media. The KOGB's criticisms of the government's defense programs for fiscal year 1990 have been released through a newspaper in a most guarded form.<sup>56</sup>

The Ministry of Defense tried to keep the KOGB members in the dark on crucial matters. According to KOGB member Nikolay Tutov, the defense budget was initially disclosed to committee members in a generalized form (under such categories as operations and maintenance, weapons acquisition, R&D, construction, pensions, and miscellaneous), while details concerning concrete programs were withheld.

When the Soviets did disclose more details, it was in a standard form submitted to the United Nations in October 1990. Despite many significant omissions and evasions, this document provides more detailed information than was furnished to the Soviet legislature. For example, it includes data on budget shares of the services in general and in various categories (R&D, weapons acquisition, construction, and others).<sup>57</sup> The data, however, were published in the Soviet Union only after the UN obtained them. The submission of the document to the UN is encouraging, for it seems to indicate that the Soviets have come to understand the importance of military *glasnost*' for international security. It is

<sup>52</sup>"On the Central Press's Interpretation of the Life and Activities of the Soviet Armed Forces," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, July 6, 1989; and "On the Course of the Implementation of the Resolutions of the CC CPSU of April 29, 1989.

"On the Central Press's Interpretation of the Life and Activities of the Soviet Armed Forces," *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* (Moscow), No. 1, 1990, pp. 14, 15.

<sup>53</sup>Lt. Gen. Ye. Volkov, "Don't Explain, but Obfuscate," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Sept. 28, 1989. See also Alexei Arbatov, "How Much Defense Is Sufficient?" *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1989, pp. 31–44; and Maj. Gen. Yu. Lyubimov, "On Defense Sufficiency and the Shortage of Competency," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 16, 1989, pp. 21–26.

<sup>54</sup>For details, see Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Committee for Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet," *Report on the USSR*, May 11, 1990, pp. 8–11.

<sup>55</sup>"The Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies: Stenographic Report," *Izvestiya*, Dec. 19, 1989.

<sup>56</sup>V. Kosarev, "Searches for the Optimal Solution," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Oct. 13, 1989.

<sup>57</sup>"The Military Budget in the Light of *Glasnost*," *Pravitel'stvenny Vestnik* (Moscow), No. 45, November 1990.



US Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney addresses members of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security.

—Reuters/Bettmann.

discouraging, however, that the government releases important information as a foreign policy gesture, rather than as something due the Soviet parliament or public. What is worse, this document contains no information about future plans. Even when the KOGB began to debate the military budget for 1991, there was no one to testify on future defense plans.<sup>58</sup> Indeed, Dr. Arbatov has alleged that most KOGB members had no knowledge of the Soviet program for modernization of strategic forces or the volume of Soviet weapons production until a speech to their committee by US Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney.<sup>59</sup>

To counteract the Ministry of Defense's stonewalling, the minority of more reform-minded KOGB members are coming to rely on individuals they euphemistically refer to as "consultants"—disgruntled defense-industry specialists, and military and KGB officers. Despite threats of retribution, these individuals have provided KOGB members with information that their agencies have tried to conceal.<sup>60</sup> There is no indication, however, that such disclosures have resulted in any action.

Intrusions into the national security field by people's deputies who are members of the parliamentary opposition or who are not beholden to the military-industrial

complex are discouraged. According to Radio Liberty analyst Alexander Rahr, a subcommission under the chairmanship of Yuriy Ryzhov, a member of the Interregional Group of Deputies, which had been assigned the task of working out alternative concepts for national security, existed for only 40 days before being dissolved by Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Luk'yanov.<sup>61</sup>

### Scenarios of Future Behavior

The future balance between *glasnost'* and secrecy in the military will be directly affected by the course of political developments in the Soviet Union. Traditional sources of authority are crumbling, but new ones have

<sup>58</sup>V. Urban, "The Military Budget: Preliminary Discussion," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Nov. 13, 1990.

<sup>59</sup>A. Podvez'ko, "In the Secret Committee," *Sovetskaya Estoniya* (Tallinn), Jan. 28, 1990; Georgiy Arbatov, "Thank You Mister Cheney," *Izvestiya*, Oct. 10, 1990.

<sup>60</sup>Podvez'ko, loc. cit.

<sup>61</sup>Alexander Rahr, "Inside the Interregional Group," *Report on the USSR*, Oct. 26, 1990, p. 3.

not yet been established. Soviet society has become a seething ocean of volatile, unstructured political and popular national movements that clash with each other and the government. Some of these conflicts have already resulted in substantial casualties. In the language of political science, this is a classic situation of high social mobilization with low political institutionalization, a recipe for instability and violence.<sup>62</sup> Several scenarios of political development are possible in this uncertain situation.

**Scenario one: modernization muddles through.** If Gorbachev's regime survives, it will mean further efforts to modernize the Soviet Union and integrate it into the world community. This approach generally favors military *glasnost*'. But this also means years of political instability. While the policies of democratization, even though partially reversed in the last several months, are pointing toward some "demilitarization" of Soviet state and society, "the future development of these processes," as David Holloway has observed, "remains uncertain, and the danger exists that the military might be a willing instrument in bringing them to an end."<sup>63</sup>

Such an "end" could easily come if (some might say, when) Gorbachev is compelled to use the military to impose martial law to suppress independence movements or labor strikes. Actually, the military (usually the paratroopers) have already supplemented the internal-security troops' "law and order" operations in Transcaucasia, Central Asia, Moldavia, and Lithuania. The military now openly recognizes its role as the ultimate guarantor of the stability of the Soviet empire. Lt. Gen. O. Zinchenko, commander of the Political Directorate of the Baltic Military District, has described the Soviet military as "the main obstacle to a restoration of bourgeois [political] structures. . . ." General V. Achalov, a former commander of the paratroops, has referred to the military as the most "internationalist" body in the Soviet Union.<sup>64</sup> Indeed, in late 1990, 11 cities or regions of the Soviet Union were under what amounts to martial law.<sup>65</sup>

Greater reliance on the military for maintaining regime stability will have a negative impact on military *glasnost*'. The more Soviet territory under martial law (or its equivalent), the greater the reluctance of the military and politicians to lift the veil of secrecy from military operations. The fear of embarrassment and concern for operations security both act as constraints. The initial reaction of the Kremlin to the proclamation of Lithuanian independence was the use of the military to intimidate the independence movement and the closure of Lithuania to foreigners.

The negative impact on *glasnost*' of the militarization of politics was demonstrated on September 9–13,

1990, when several regiments of paratroopers were sent in great secrecy on unscheduled exercises around Moscow. Several people's deputies, disturbed by rumors of a coup, were refused access to the areas where the paratroopers were deployed. When pressed for an explanation, the Ministry of Defense provided sketchy and contradictory information, which only increased suspicions about the military's intentions.<sup>66</sup>

The attempted military crackdown in Lithuania on January 11–13, 1991, is a perfect case study of the relationship between the military's role in political repression, secrecy, deception, and suppression of *glasnost*'. As additional detachments of paratroopers were moving into Lithuania, a General Staff spokesman denied that they were to be used for a crackdown rather than for the announced goal of enforcing the military draft. The first target of the attempted coup was an embodiment of *glasnost*'—the television studio in Vilnius. Indeed, Gorbachev tried to justify the attack by invoking, among other factors, the independent nature of Lithuanian television broadcasts. Apparently, it was planned to transfer power in Lithuania to an illegal Committee of National Salvation, whose membership was a secret. The responsibility for the failed coup has been laid on a relatively low-ranking commander of the Vilnius garrison, while the actions of his superior chain of command, from Gorbachev on down, have been kept secret. The coverage of the situation in Lithuania by Moscow television has been largely a throwback to the pre-*glasnost*' era—the news broadcasts have been obviously slanted to support the Kremlin's policy and whitewash the military.<sup>67</sup>

There are plans for the military's involvement in internal-security operations on an even broader scale. A de-

<sup>62</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 8–47.

<sup>63</sup>David Holloway, "State, Society, and the Military under Gorbachev," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1989–90, p. 24.

<sup>64</sup>V. Zyubin, "On Democracy and Order," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Aug. 8, 1990; and Lt. Gen. O. Zinchenko, "We Serve in the Baltic," *ibid.*, Dec. 20, 1989.

<sup>65</sup>*Radio Liberty Daily Report* (Munich), Nov. 29, 1990; they include four areas of Azerbaijan (including Baku, Nakhichevan, and Nagorno-Karabakh); three areas of Armenia (including Yerevan); Georgia (Abkhazia); Uzbekistan (Fergana); Kirgizia (Osh oblast); and Moldavia (five areas inhabited by the Gagauz).

<sup>66</sup>N. Krivonozov, "How the Paratroopers Came to Moscow," *Pravda*, Sept. 19, 1990; A. Pankratov, "And Somebody Thought—Exercises Are Going On," *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, Sept. 26, 1990; V. Urban, "The Lie about the 'Military Coup'," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Sept. 27, 1990; N. Velan, "For the Sake of Noise . . .," *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Sept. 29, 1990; and Major M. Pustobayev, "What They Write to Us from the Army," *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, Oct. 12, 1990.

<sup>67</sup>Riina Kionka, "The Baltic Notebook," *Report on the USSR*, Jan. 18, 1991, p. 24; Dzintra Bungis, "Baltic Notebook," *ibid.*, Jan. 25, 1991, pp. 8, 9; Saulius Girnius, "Lithuania's National Salvation Committee," *ibid.*, pp. 6–8; and Vera Tolz, "Recent Attempts to Curb *Glasnost*," *ibid.*, Mar. 1, 1991, p. 3.

cree signed by Minister of Defense Yazov and Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo on December 29, 1990, but kept secret for a month afterwards, authorized joint military-police patrols throughout the USSR.<sup>68</sup> The greater the armed forces' internal-security responsibilities are at the time of extraordinary political tensions, the greater will be the obstacles to military *glasnost*: (1) because *glasnost* is inimical to extra-legal security operations; and (2) because of the power of the senior military officers to resist *glasnost*, which they view as something imposed upon them, associated with the loss of war in Afghanistan, the decline in the military's prestige and budget, the unceremonious discharge of tens of thousands of officers into an uncertain future, vigorous public criticism of the military, doubts about the need for military force in a new international environment, etc. Although quite a few junior officers have become politically radicalized and do not share anti-*glasnost* sentiments, there is little doubt that the senior officer corps would use the first opportunity presented by an improvement of the military's political fortunes in the course of a military crackdown to curtail *glasnost*. The damage to *glasnost* from imposition of martial law in the destabilized Soviet empire would be severe.

Gorbachev's inclination to listen to more conservative critics, which began in the fall of 1990, has been accompanied by attempts to stifle *glasnost* in general. These attempts were quite successful at Central Television, where the main news program *Vremya* again became a mouthpiece of the regime and most of the radical shows were banned. The anti-*glasnost* campaign has been obviously spurred on by loud complaints from senior military officers about the hostility of the mass media to the armed forces. But muzzling the printed media has been much more difficult, as the multitude of newspapers and journals are less subject to centralized controls.<sup>69</sup> The criticism of the military in the printed media has generally continued unabated. Nothing short of an outright crackdown will completely stifle *glasnost*.

**Scenario two: a counterreformist takeover.** The search for an ideology and the building of a political movement supporting counterreform are already taking place, and the Soviet military is taking an active part in these efforts. The ideology is broadly characterized by hostility toward the nationalists in the union republics, an extreme anxiety about the stability of the Soviet empire, an emphasis on Russia's unique place among nations and its glorious past and national pride, strong opposition to Western influences and democratic ideas, and strong support for the military as the foundation of Russian statehood.



Col. Gen. Al'bert Makashov, commander of the Volga-Urals Military District, being interviewed by newsmen at the 28th Congress of the CPSU in July 1990.

—S. Maisterman/TASS from Sovfoto.

The military establishment has been openly sympathetic to the counterreform movement, and has opened the pages of its press to some of its more prominent figures, notably Nina Andreyeva (whose "letter," promoted by anti-Gorbachev elements in the Communist party in 1988, became the manifesto of conservative resistance); Aleksandr Prokhanov, a pro-military writer and now one of the leaders of the "United Council of Russia," a Russian conservative nationalist organization; and Karem Rash, a previously unknown school teacher, whose writings glorify the past, present, and future of the Soviet Armed Forces.<sup>70</sup>

Some military officers have been making public statements reflecting this nascent ideology. An unprecedentedly vicious attack on *perestroyka* and "new thinking" in foreign policy was made by General Al'bert Ma-

<sup>68</sup>Alexander Rahr, "Gorbachev and El'tsin in a Deadlock," *ibid.*, Feb. 15, 1991, p. 4.

<sup>69</sup>Tolz, *loc. cit.*, pp. 1–6.

<sup>70</sup>N. A. Andreyeva, "Historical Fantasies," *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, June 1990, pp. 10–16; S. Pashayev, "Aleksandr Prokhanov: Our Association Calls for Agreement," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Oct. 24, 1989; Colonel Yu. Vashkevich, "Honor," *ibid.*, Nov. 10, 1989; and Karem Rash, "The Army and Culture," *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, February 1989, pp. 3–15; March 1989, pp. 3–10; April 1989, pp. 3–13; May 1989, pp. 3–11; July 1989, pp. 3–13; August 1989, pp. 3–13; and September 1989, pp. 3–14. On Karem Rash, see also Holloway, *loc. cit.*, pp. 22, 23; and Mikhail Tsyplin, "Karem Rash: An Ideologue of Military Power," *Report on the USSR*, Aug. 3, 1991, pp. 8–11.

kashov, the commander of the Volga-Urals Military District, at the first congress of the Communist Party of Russia in June 1990. To the applause of this predominantly conservative gathering, Makashov described as "learned turkeys" the "new thinkers" who deny the existence of an immediate threat of attack on the Soviet Union, and made thinly veiled threats of a military coup. According to former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin, who has joined the democratic opposition, in his speech, Makashov revealed "the position of many high-ranking military and KGB officers." Similar statements have been made by General Igor' Rodionov, the commandant of the General Staff Academy.<sup>71</sup>

Two colonels, Viktor Alksnis and Nikolay Petrushenko, have assumed leading roles in the *Soyuz*, a bloc of conservative members of the USSR Supreme Soviet. They sharply criticized Gorbachev's reformist domestic and foreign policies, and on November 16, 1990, Alksnis demanded that Gorbachev reestablish "order," or resign within 30 days. According to Stanislav Shatalin, the former economic adviser to the President, Gorbachev "capitulated" to this attack and turned to more conservative politics. Although there is no direct evidence that Alksnis and Petrushenko acted on orders of their superiors, the contrast between the Ministry of Defense's treatment of officers such as Major Lopatin, who is active in democratic politics and was forced out of the armed forces, and Alksnis and Petrushenko, who continue on active duty, is quite telling. According to Alksnis, after his ultimatum to Gorbachev, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Armed Forces, General Yazov, simply advised him to be more "flexible."<sup>72</sup>

It is difficult to assess the popularity of conservative views among the officer corps. An analysis of the voting patterns of military officer-members of the Russian republic's Congress of People's Deputies shows that only 16 percent of the votes of top military officers were cast for proposals sponsored by the democratic bloc, compared with 82 percent against, whereas among the middle-level army officers the figure was 63 percent for (37 percent against), and among junior officers—73 percent for (22 percent against). At the same time, according to Major V. Lopatin, a reform-minded people's

<sup>71</sup>Col. Gen. A. Makashov, "We Are Not Going to Surrender," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 21, 1990; and Col. Gen. I. Rodionov, "When Will They Stop Mocking the Army and the State?" *Molodaya Gvardiya* (Moscow), No. 9, 1990, pp. 3-10.

<sup>72</sup>*Radio Liberty Daily Report*, Nov. 23, 1990; V. Litvin, "To Return from a Knockdown," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Nov. 21, 1990; S. Shatalin, "It Is Impermissible to Resist Evil with the Help of Evil," *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, Jan. 22, 1991; *Argumenty i Fakty* (Moscow), No. 52, December 1990; and Elizabeth Shogan, "Kremlin's Rightist Tilt Can Be Linked to *Soyuz*," *The Los Angeles Times*, Feb. 26, 1991.

deputy, the failure of new representative bodies to concern themselves with the rapidly deteriorating social conditions of the officer corps is making junior officers increasingly subject to manipulation by their conservative superiors.<sup>73</sup>

The election platform of the conservative "Bloc of Social-Patriotic Movements of Russia" for the 1990 elections in the Russian republic describes "reasonable defense sufficiency" as "naïve." During a "working meeting" in December 1989, the group of conservative Russian nationalist people's deputies criticized "euphoria" from "growing foreign policy contacts," which allegedly "conceal" the continuing hostility of the West.<sup>74</sup>

The conservative Russian nationalists have sharply criticized "new thinking" in foreign policy. Beginning with Prokhanov's early 1990 attack against the Kremlin for "losing" Eastern Europe, such criticisms have spread to cover the whole range of Soviet national security, from the terms of military withdrawal from Eastern Europe, to the terms of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, to the cooperation with the US during the Persian Gulf crisis, and to the view of the free-market democracies as potential partners of the Soviet Union.<sup>75</sup>

Conservative Russian nationalism emphasizes Russian "uniqueness," and thus opposes the current trend to integrate the Soviet Union with the rest of the world.<sup>76</sup> The less the Soviet Union is integrated into the world community, the greater the likelihood of political tensions in the future, and consequently the greater the justification for military secrecy. Conservative Russian nationalists fervently believe that Russia has always been victimized by foreigners and has been too accommodating to them. They maintain that Russia was destroyed by Marxism, which was imported from the West, and that it is being threatened anew by the mind-

<sup>73</sup>Julia Wishnevsky, "The Two Sides of the Barricades in Russian Politics Today," *Report on the USSR*, Aug. 24, 1990, p. 17; and Sergey Leskov, "The Red Army Is the Strongest in the World," *Nachalo* (Moscow), July 1990.

<sup>74</sup>For a Policy of National Agreement and Russian Rebirth," *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Dec. 29, 1989; and "It Was Endured by Life Itself," *ibid.*, Dec. 14, 1989.

<sup>75</sup>Aleksandr Prokhanov, "The Tragedy of Centralism Is the Tragedy of Spilled Blood," *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Jan. 5, 1990; Suzanne Crow, "Germany: The 'Second Crisis' of Soviet Foreign Policy," *Report on the USSR*, Mar. 15, 1991, pp. 9-12; Yuriy Katasonov, "The Army and the Demagogues," *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Apr. 27, 1990; Aleksandr Prokhanov, "The Army: Thoughts of a Civilian," *Syn Otechestva* (Moscow), Aug. 17, 1990; "We Cannot Ascribe It to the Achievements of Our Foreign Policy," *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Nov. 12, 1990; and Eduard Volodin, "For What?" *ibid.*, Dec. 7, 1990.

<sup>76</sup>This view characterizes the extremists of *Pamyat'* as well as such intellectual Russian nationalists as Dr. Igor' Shafarevich. See, for instance, I. Shafarevich, "Two Paths to the Same Precipice," *Novyy Mir* (Moscow), July 1989.

less importation of Western ideas and culture. The emphasis on the state as the guarantor of stability; the distrust of society, which is implicit in conservative ideology; and the special role this ideology accords to the military as an institution of nearly mystical importance for the development of the national character are not conducive to military *glasnost*'.

Some prominent counterreformers, such as Nina Andreyeva and General Rodionov, have objected to military *glasnost*'. Hostility against military *glasnost*' has also been voiced by USSR People's Deputy Yevgeniy Kogan. (He operates within the loose alliance of party conservatives, Russian nationalists, and anti-reformist workers' fronts.) Kogan accused one unnamed people's deputy of participating in flights of "foreign agents" over Soviet "military facilities"—obviously a reference to one of the recent gestures to military *glasnost*'.<sup>77</sup>

A political leadership inspired by such an ideology would be more likely than a modernizing regime to use force against ethnic and labor unrest. Such a policy would also spell the end of military *glasnost*'.

**Scenario three: radical democratic reform.** The radical democrats<sup>78</sup> clearly favor further integration of the Soviet Union into the world community, are committed to openness in government, and regard the Soviet military as a burden on the country's economy rather than a pillar of the state. They have clashed repeatedly with the military over budget, secrecy, conscription, and other issues. They would be inclined to broaden the limits of military *glasnost*' far enough to reassure the West about Soviet intentions.

But will democratic reformers ever be in a position to implement their policies vis-à-vis the military? A government of democratic reformers could ill afford to antagonize the military. In this difficult and hazardous transition, micro-managing military *glasnost*' (which is necessary given the military's lukewarm feelings about it) might be impossible. If the military feels itself challenged by the civilian authority of Gorbachev, its resistance to intrusion by a government of democrats unsure of its own power (and loathed by top Soviet military officers) is likely to be much stronger. And no change in regime will immediately expunge the negative characteristics of the Russian/Soviet bureaucratic political culture.

<sup>77</sup>Nina Andreyeva, "Glasnost' Obligates," *Molodaya Gvardiya*, No. 7, 1989, p. 274; Rodionov, loc. cit., p. 8; and statement by People's Deputy Ye. Kogan in "The Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies," loc. cit.

<sup>78</sup>I use this umbrella term to describe a loose coalition of politicians, who include Boris Yel'tsin, Gavriil Papov, Anatolii Sobchak, Nikolay Travkin, and others. This group is not bound together in any formal party, but they are close ideologically.

Furthermore, will the policies on arms control and military *glasnost*' pursued by a democratic government in Moscow be at all relevant? Such a government will likely preside over the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a national security entity. Much of the arms-control baggage of the present and immediate future will be irrelevant if the Soviet Union is replaced by several successor-states. This is especially true of any agreements reducing conventional forces. Many of the union republics are already demanding military formations of their own. If they become completely independent or independent within a loose confederation, they will likely acquire their own conventional forces, and will not be bound by previous agreements concluded by the Kremlin.

Even though the advocates of the union republics' right to independence generally agree that the best way for handling the Soviet nuclear arsenal will be to leave it under the control of some type of a federal military command in Moscow (some union republics, like Ukraine, have already declared their intention to be non-nuclear),<sup>79</sup> the reality might turn out to be different. If the Soviet strategic arsenal is split among several successor-states, they might refuse to carry out some or all of the provisions of arms-control agreements signed earlier by Moscow. Such agreements and their verification provisions might have to be renegotiated with the Soviet successor-states. The more hostile the future relations among the successor-states (or between successor-states and today's neighbors of the USSR), the lower the likelihood of their observing and successfully renegotiating existing arms-control and confidence-building agreements.

Still, the fact that a government of radical reformers would be seeking a long-term accommodation with the West on the basis of common political values would by itself reduce the justification for military secrecy. A government of this type in Moscow would at least have some chance of managing a reasonably amicable dissolution of the Soviet monolith, unlike either the muddling-through Gorbachevian modernizers or the outright counterreformers.

**Scenario four: disintegration of the Soviet Union.** Disintegration of the Soviet Union could result from any of the three scenarios described above. The muddling modernization (scenario one) may fail and result in chaos. Gorbachev's muddling modernizers could be replaced by the counterreformers (scenario two), who are likely to increase hostility in the union republics because they lack the ability or the desire to understand

<sup>79</sup>Viktor Altayev, "The Armed Forces of the USSR: At the End of the Road," *Vek XX i Mir* (Moscow), No. 6, 1990, p. 30.



the problems of minority nations in the Soviet Union, or are outright hostile to them and ready to use force to save the Russian/Soviet empire. The result could be an outbreak of anti-Russian resistance in the union republics, and ultimately civil war. The radical democrats (scenario three) might be unable to prevent disintegration or thwart a coup by the counterreformers, and the country would again confront chaos.

In this case, *glasnost*' will suffer because the military will be involved in internal operations. This would be particularly true of conventional forces attempting to restore order, to put down independence movements, and so on. Verification of compliance with arms-control agreements would be impeded.

The fate of *glasnost*' concerning Soviet strategic forces would be of immense concern in this case. We can only hope that even under this scenario the Soviet military would comply with at least the most important provisions of nuclear arms-control agreements and maintain a degree of openness about their nuclear forces and operations necessary for reassuring the United States about Soviet compliance, capabilities, and intentions in the realm of strategic weapons.

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### Conclusions

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The steps undertaken by the Soviets to implement military *glasnost*' are beneficial to Western security interests. Unfortunately, such benefits have been limited so far, and might remain so in the future. These limitations stem from the transitional character of military *glasnost*': born, together with other Gorbachev's other innovations out of a profound crisis of the Soviet system, it leads an uneasy existence as it confronts the Russian/Soviet tradition of secrecy, the bureaucratic self-interest of the military, and an increasing uncertainty about the future of reform. It has not become entrenched in Soviet political and military institutions, and can be reduced or overturned by a new course of political events.

As stated in the beginning of this article, military *glasnost*' should contribute to international security by ensuring verification of arms-control and confidence-building agreements, and by reassuring other nations regarding future weapons R&D and acquisition pro-

grams. Soviet performance here is likely to be uneven at best. Verification of and compliance with agreements involving conventional forces will be complicated by their probable use in massive internal-security operations. The breakup of the Soviet Union might make verification impossible. Western security would be affected, and the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe would feel less secure. Stability and security would also suffer in regions contiguous to Soviet Central Asia and the Far East.

The problems of *glasnost*' as they relate to strategic nuclear systems are likely to be different. Since strategic weapons cannot be used for internal-security operations, and since the international consequences of violating strategic arms-control agreements would have a direct impact on Western security and thus be likely to call forth a strong response, even an anti-Western, pro-military regime would probably attempt to maintain the minimum level of *glasnost*' needed for verification. The situation would deteriorate if the strategic arsenal were to be broken up as a result of the dissolution of the USSR, unless new arms-control instruments could be quickly devised.<sup>80</sup>

The military-industrial complex uses secrecy in the battle for the biggest slice of state budget. *Glasnost*' concerning future weapons (another significant factor for international security) would be advanced if the influence of the military-industrial complex were reduced. Two factors would facilitate such a reduction: relative domestic stability and transition to a free-market economy.

Any regime in Moscow (Gorbachev's, counterreformer, or democratic) will find it difficult to maintain and further military *glasnost*'. Ethnic and economic conflicts, the residual strength of the old power structures welded to imperial thinking and the command economy, the weakness of nascent democratic political parties—all of these factors conspire against stability and therefore against military *glasnost*'.

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<sup>80</sup>The Soviets understand Western concerns on this account, and might use them to justify harsh actions against the independence movements; Minister of Defense Yazov has threatened restive union republics with reprisals for their anti-military stance. Although no popular front now in power in the union republics has asked for a share of the Soviet nuclear "inheritance," Yazov chose to accuse them of nuclear ambitions. See Bill Keller, "Soviet Army Told to Use Force to Defend Itself in the Republics," *The New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1990.