Faculty and Researchers   Faculty and Researchers' Publications

2019

Projecting Stability to the South: NATOs New Mission?

Larsen, Jeffrey A.; Koehler, Kevin

Palgrave

Projecting Resilience Across the Mediterranean

Edited by
Eugenio Cusumano · Stefan Hofmaier

Projecting Resilience Across the Mediterranean

Eugenio Cusumano · Stefan Hofmaier
Editors

Projecting Resilience Across the Mediterranean

Editors
Eugenio Cusumano
Leiden, The Netherlands

Stefan Hofmaier
The Hague, The Netherlands

Contents

Notes on Contributors

Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré is a Postdoctoral Fellow and an Adjunct Professor in Political Science at LUISS University (IT). Before that, she has been an Assistant Professor at Leiden University (NL). She has held visiting positions at the European University Institute (IT); at the University of Washington (USA); and at King's College (UK). She is the author of *The High Representative and EU Foreign Policy Integration: A Comparative Study of Kosovo and Ukraine* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

Rosanne Anholt is lecturer and Ph.D. candidate at the faculty of social sciences of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Her research interests include humanitarian action and development assistance in fragile and conflict-affected states.

Emile Badarin is a Postdoctoral fellow at the European Neighbourhood Policy Chair, College of Europe, Natolin Campus. He holds a Ph.D. in Middle East Politics from the University of Exeter. His research cuts across fields of international politics, foreign policy, with the EU and the Middle East as areas of study, critical theory, and Israel–Palestine conflict. He is the author of *Palestinian Political Discourse: Between Exile and Occupation* (2016).

Edoardo Baldaro is a Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations at the University of Naples "L'Orientale" (Naples, Italy) and holds a Ph.D. from the Institute of Human and Social Sciences of the Scuola Normale Superiore (Florence, Italy). His main areas of interest include security

studies, North–South relations, African politics and security, and the redefinition of statehood in Africa.

Nathan Cooper holds an M.A. degree in international relations from Leiden University and is currently a Policy Advisor at the British Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. He has an interest in migration governance, stabilisation, and democratic institutions, particularly in the European neighbourhood.

Eugenio Cusumano is an Assistant Professor of international relations at the University of Leiden, and Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute. His research on military organisations, private security companies, and NGOs' involvement in international crisis management has been published in leading security studies journals. He also contributed to and edited volumes for Oxford and Stanford University Press, Palgrave, and Routledge.

Hernan del Valle is a lawyer specialised in international law and human rights. For the past 20 years, he led humanitarian aid operations assisting people affected by armed conflict and forced displacement in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. As *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) Head of Advocacy and Communications he was in charge of rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea. He is currently Rita E. Hauser Fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Studies at Harvard University.

Luca Franza is a researcher at the Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP) since 2012. He is also a lecturer at SciencesPo, Paris and a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Groningen. His main areas of research are natural gas and LNG supply and demand, European gas markets, pricing, and the societal, macroeconomic, and geopolitical dimensions of energy.

Andrea Frontini is a Policy Assistant in the European Commission, working on EU defence and security markets and industry. Prior to that, he was a Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre (EPC), a leading European think tank in Brussels, Belgium, and held earlier job positions in the private, public, and not-for-profit sectors, both in Italy and Belgium. He graduated *cum laude* from the University of Trieste, Italy. He writes here in a personal capacity.

Francesco Giumelli is an Assistant Professor in international relations and deputy head of the international department at the University of

Groningen. He has published extensively on sanctions and restrictive measure, and dedicated two books to European Union sanctions specifically.

Stefan Hofmaier is a Lieutenant Colonel in the German Army and the chief of the Concept, Interoperability and Capabilities Branch of the Civil-Military Cooperation Center of Excellence (CCOE). He holds an M.A. degree in Business and previously served as department head of the German Army Centre for Lessons Learnt and Deputy Commander of the Afghan National Army 2nd Brigade NATO operation ISAF mentoring team in Kunduz, Afghanistan.

Professor Christian Kaunert is Chair of Policing and Security, as well as Director of the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales. He published extensively on Policing and International Security, especially in the area of EU counterterrorism. He is the author of several articles on EU counterterrorism, EU asylum and migration, EU Justice and Home Affairs, and wider global security matters.

Rudolf Keijzer retired as Lieutenant Colonel from the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps in 2017 and he is the former Branch Chief Training and Education at the NATO CCOE.

He has master's degrees in economics, marketing, and information management, and he is now an independent stability adviser on Security Force Assistance, Civil-Military Cooperation, and Hybrid Threats. He developed extensive experience on these subjects through deployment to Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Lebanon, and other countries.

Kevin Koehler is an Assistant Professor of Comparative Politics at Leiden University. He previously served as a Research Advisor at the Middle East Faculty of the NATO Defense College and an Assistant Professor of Comparative Methods at the American University in Cairo. He received his Ph.D. from the European University Institute in Florence in 2013.

Jeffrey A. Larsen is a Research Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, and president of Larsen Consulting Group. From 2013 to 2018, he served as Director of the Research Division at the NATO Defense College. He previously completed a 21-year career in the US Air Force, retiring as a

Lt Colonel, followed by 16 years as a senior policy analyst with a major US defense contractor. He is the author or editor of more than 150 books, journal articles, chapters, and monographs.

Sarah Léonard is a professor of Social Sciences at the University of the West of England. She was previously Associate Professor in International Affairs at Vesalius College, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Belgium). Her research lies at the intersection between Security Studies and European Studies. She is particularly interested in the study of securitization processes and the development of the European Union's internal security policies.

Emma Nygren holds a Bachelor's degree from the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University.

Nick Pounds retired from the Royal Marines in 2005, as a Brigadier. He has a master's degree in Post War Recovery Studies from the University of York and he is now an independent consultant on conflict stabilisation and security sector reform—with experience from Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Ukraine. He is also a member of the UK Government Stabilisation Unit's panel of senior advisers and both writes and lectures widely on the subject.

Luca Raineri is a Research Fellow in International Relations and Security Studies at the Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa, Italy. He is also a member of the Research School on Peace and Conflict in Oslo. His areas of expertise include critical security studies, African politics, geopolitics, and peace and conflict studies.

Sebastiaan Rietjens is full professor of Intelligence & Security at the Netherlands Defence Academy. He has done extensive fieldwork in military exercises and operations (Afghanistan, Mali, Greece) and has published in international books and journals including *Disasters, Armed Forces & Society*, *International Journal of Public Administration* and *Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence*.

Chiara Ruffa is Academy Fellow at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and Associate Professor in War Studies at the Swedish Defense University. Chiara's research, published in several international journal, lies at the cross-road between political science, sociology and focuses on the study of peacekeeping operations. Her book, Military Cultures in Peace and Stability Operations, has been published with the University of Pennsylvania Press (in May 2018).

Stefano Ruzza is an Assistant Professor of "Conflict, Security and Statebuilding" at the University of Turin. He lectures regularly in advanced educational programmes of the Italian Army, and is a co-founder of the Torino World Affairs Institute (T.wai), where he leads the "Violence and Security" research programme. His research interests are conflict transformation, non-state armed actors in international relations and private military and security companies.

Professor Tobias Schumacher is Chairholder of the ENP Chair at the College of Europe in Natolin. He is a Senior Associate Researcher at the Center for International Studies at the Lisbon University Institute and was a Kennedy Memorial Fellow at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at Harvard University. He is the lead editor of *The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy* (2018) and co-editor of *The Revised European Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity and Change in EU Foreign Policy* (Palgrave, 2017).

Pier Stapersma is a senior researcher at the Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP) since 2012. He was previously business analyst at Delta NV. His main areas of research are power markets, solar and wind value chains and issues related to decarbonization and the energy transition, particularly in North-Western Europe.

Coby van der Linde is the director of the Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP). She is a professor at the University of Gronigen and a lecturer at Sciences Po, Paris. She is also non-executive director of two energy companies. Her main areas of research are international oil and gas markets and energy transition issues.

Arturo Varvelli, Ph.D. is Head of the MENA Centre at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). He specialises in Libya and writes extensively on the subject. He is author or editor of many books on the country, such as *L'Italia e l'ascesa di Gheddafi*, *Dopo Gheddafi. Democrazia e petrolio nella nuova Libia*, *Libia: Fine o rinascita di una nazione?*, and *Foreign Actors in Libya's Crisis*.

Matteo Villa, Ph.D. is a Research Fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). He specialises in European policies and politics, especially on migration, focusing on quantitative, evidence-based analysis. Over the past years he provided scholarly expertise to the G20, the European Parliament, the Italian Parliament, the Lombardy Region, and the Municipality of Milan.

Wolfgang Wagner is professor of international security at the faculty of social sciences of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. His research interests include the foreign policies of the European Union and its member states.

Ori Wertman is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of South Wales. He previously was a foreign affairs and political adviser to former Israeli Labour Party chairman Isaac Herzog, former deputy chairman of the Israeli Labour Party Youth, and a candidate on the Israeli Labour Parliament (Knesset) list.

Projecting Stability to the South: NATO's "New" Mission?

Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kevin Koehler

In 2014, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was surprised by the sudden emergence of a renewed danger from Russia on its Eastern flank that threatened the sovereignty and security of its member states and their home territories. The Alliance found itself forced to return its attention back to Europe and its previous core missions of collective defence and deterrence, reversing a 20-year trend that was driven by one general assumption: since Europe was free from traditional military threats, the member states were also free to pursue larger ambitions on a global scale. The end of the Cold War contributed to the emergence of crises in the eastern periphery of the Alliance, including in the Balkans, which led to the first wave of NATO out-of-area operations. Nevertheless, the perspective that Europe no longer faced an existential threat was formalised in the 2010 Strategic Concept, which

J. A. Larsen
Department of National Security Affairs, US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA

K. Koehler (✉)
Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands
e-mail: k.koehler@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

emphasised the three pillars of NATO strategy: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. While each was nominally equal in importance, in reality the Alliance and its member states had pursued the latter two pillars at the expense of the former for nearly a generation. The concept of "projecting stability" was highlighted in the 2016 Warsaw Summit Declaration as a way of accommodating both of those two pillars. This document emphasised projecting stability as one of the most important missions for the Alliance, almost on a par with the core missions of collective defence and deterrence.

This chapter argues that projecting stability is not a novel concept for the Alliance—it has in fact been applied to Eastern Europe for nearly 30 years since the end of the Cold War. While we question whether NATO is the international organisation best suited for this mission, we also propose some suggestions which focus on states in the Middle East and North Africa, and the particular challenges they face, for ensuring the success of this mission.

We approach these issues in the following way: the next two sections examine the origins and development of the projecting stability agenda with an emphasis on the particular conception of projecting stability from the military perspective, which has recently been adopted by NATO's Military Committee. The following two sections then examine two waves of projecting stability, one directed eastward after the end of the Cold War, the other aimed at the Alliance's southern neighbourhood and ongoing since the Warsaw Summit in 2016. Based on these considerations, we offer some thoughts on the extent to which the Alliance is fit for the purpose of projecting stability and how current activities could be improved, before closing with recommendations to increase the likelihood of NATO successfully achieving its mission of projecting stability to the South.

BACKGROUND

One would have expected general agreement on the need to reaffirm collective security in Europe as a result of the events of 2014, given that since the end of the Cold War nearly all of NATO's national military forces had become much smaller, and less prepared for collective defence. This trend resulted from two factors: the perceived peace dividend that accompanied the disappearance of the Soviet threat, and the concomitant need to provide more agile and lightweight forces to deal with out-of-area challenges, especially after 9/11. The latter required a

different set of equipment than what the armour-heavy Cold War militaries could provide. The necessary retooling and restructuring for military operations beyond Europe were expensive, took years to complete, and resulted in a new mindset among Western militaries regarding their perceived purpose and role in the post-Cold War world. There was, accordingly, little desire to once again reverse course after 2014. The result was considerable push-back within the Alliance against any return to collective defence. "We don't want a return to the Cold War" was a refrain heard regularly in the halls of NATO for more than two years, until the Warsaw Summit declaration of July 2016 set collective defence once again as the primary responsibility of the Alliance. Instead, there was a push for continued emphasis on out-of-area issues, especially threats emanating from the South of course, there is no reason that the Alliance could not accomplish both missions. Members of the Alliance simply have to make a determined effort to do so, and to pay the necessary price. After all, each member state can, in principle, determine where and in what manner they will contribute to the various security missions.

In fact, NATO has been projecting stability outside its borders for a long time—since the first days of the post-Cold War era—and thus the concept is hardly novel. NATO's expansion to the East in the second half of the 1990s was explicitly referred to as an exercise in "projecting stability" by some analysts at the time, and the notion has reappeared regularly since in statements by NATO officials (Hunter 1995). Indeed, in a 2006 speech, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer referred to projecting stability as "NATO's new approach to security." "[T]o defend our values," de Hoop Scheffer affirmed, "NATO, as a political-military Alliance, requires a range of tools: stronger partnerships and partnerships with key Nations; not a global NATO but a NATO with global partners that share our values" (de Hoop Scheffer 2006). The same idea was reflected more recently by current NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who suggested in a speech at the Graduate Institute in Geneva in March 2017 that "when our neighbors are more stable, we are more secure" (Stoltenberg 2017). In this sense, the agenda of projecting stability can be seen as the Alliance's answer to the increasingly interconnected nature of the security environment at its periphery.

Yet, despite this historic precedence, and notwithstanding the fact that projecting stability experienced a renaissance of sorts following the 2016 Warsaw Summit, important questions remain. To begin with, the Alliance has yet to provide a coherent political definition of stability and

how it can be projected. Currently, the Alliance's military bodies are ahead of their political masters in delineating the concept, a situation which creates tensions and inconsistencies. This gap between political ambition, and strategic thinking and planning severely hampers Alliance efforts. In fact, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations, John Manza, recently suggested that NATO deserved an "F" for projecting stability (Rousselet 2017). On a more general level, there are those who question whether such a broad mission as is implied by the projecting stability agenda is really the best fit for a political-military alliance like NATO. Would this agenda be better served if led by a different organisation, such as the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or the United Nations?

Origins and Development of the Concept

Shortly after the end of the Cold War, the Alliance decided to go out of area in an attempt to stabilise its neighbourhood. It hoped that by doing so it would reduce conflict, improve the living standards of the recipients of such stability, and thereby increase Europe and NATO's own security by damping down dangerous tendencies along its periphery (Moore 2007).

NATO's strategic concepts after the end of the Cold War never made explicit reference to projecting stability. In the document published in 2010, the substantive idea of securing Alliance territory by stabilising the security environment in the periphery is visible in the fact that the classical core task of collective defence was complemented by an emphasis on crisis management and cooperative security. However, projecting stability had not reached the level of a strategic concept (NATO 2010). In brief, even though the concept is two-decades old, its function still does not extend far beyond the fundamental hypothesis that "when our neighbors are more stable, we are more secure." In short, the Alliance lacks a focused political reflection on the actual meaning of projecting stability.

In lieu of such reflection, NATO has developed a military concept for projecting stability that has been approved by the Military Committee and, at the time of writing, awaits approval by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). While the latest draft of this document, MC 0655/4, remains classified, previous versions suggest a "means-focused" approach to projecting stability with a little effective reflection on the desired political end-state. The latest, unclassified draft document, MC 0655/3,

contains working definition of both stability and projecting stability.[1] According to this document, stability refers to:

> A situation where capable, credible, legitimate and well-functioning institutions and a resilient state/society create the conditions in which the risk for outbreak, escalation, recurrence of conflict is reduced to acceptable levels, leading to a more secure and less threatening environment.[2]

Building on this definition, as well as on prior guidance contained in MC 0400/3, projecting stability is therefore defined as:

> a range of military and non-military activities that influence and shape the strategic environment in order to make neighbouring regions more stable and secure in support of both NATO's strategic interests and those of its neighbours.[3]

Two observations regarding these definitional efforts should be made. First, in terms of the military function of the document, the definitions appropriately refrain from specifying a concrete political end-state. In fact, MC 0655/3 clearly states that projecting stability "includes both political and military efforts, recognizing that all efforts should serve a clear political aim."[4] Reflecting NATO's character as a political-military alliance, this political guidance should come from the political level.

Second, the definition of stability is rather ambitious. Its formulation not only implies activities far beyond NATO's traditional area of functioning, but also suggests that the Alliance take an active interest in the domestic political configurations of non-allied countries. While this does not necessarily suggest that the Alliance is in the business of democratisation, it does imply that, as a recently commissioned report from Allied Command Transformation describes, "local political institutions… need to be sufficiently resilient and representative of local societies as to avoid and resist further crises in the near future" (Costalli 2017: 25; on

---

[1] MC 0655/3 is an unclassified draft document. The fourth version, MC 0655/4, which has been adopted by the MC remains classified. The definitions quoted here might have changed in the final document.

[2] MC 0655/3, para. 5a.

[3] MC 0655/3, para. 5b.

[4] MC 0655/3, para. 4.

NATO's role in the political transition of Tunisia and Egypt, see Amadio Viceré and Frontini in this volume).

In the larger scheme of things, the Alliance has thus put the cart before the horse in its approach towards its periphery, explicating means without having first discussed the ends. Indeed, in the absence of a coherent policy and appropriate direction and guidance at the political level, NATO's military authorities are left with the task of translating an overly vague concept into a concrete set of activities.

While such attempts to develop definitions of central concepts *in abstracto* are welcome, the political implications of Alliance efforts to project stability are best understood in reference to concrete historical settings. In the following section, we trace two waves of projecting stability, which have taken place in two major compass directions and some 20 years apart: to the East in the 1990s and to the South in the 2010s.

The First Wave of Projecting Stability: Partnership with and Enlargement to the East

In the early post-Cold War years of the 1990s, a belief arose that even though Europe was now peaceful, facing no imminent threats, it could not achieve genuine security if instability reigned along its periphery. With the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the end of the dangerous long peace, many analysts thought that NATO had accomplished its mission and outlived its usefulness.

Others, however, felt that instead of fading away, the Alliance should now take on a new role: helping erase the divisions of the Cold War, and creating a Europe that was whole, free, and at peace. This was an opportunity for the United States to push its longstanding desire to expand NATO's focus beyond Europe. This new world order would be based on NATO's core values and shared beliefs: democracy, personal freedom, the rule of law, and a just international order. As an American publication opined, it was "time to transform NATO from an alliance based on collective defence against a specific threat into an alliance committed to projecting democracy, stability, and crisis management in a broader strategic sense" (Asmus et al. 1993).

The idea of projecting stability was born from this context immediately after the end of the Cold War and was based on the idea that, as US Senator Richard Lugar expressed in 1993, NATO had to go "out of area

or out of business" (quoted in Rosenfeld 1993). At NATO's London Summit in July 1990, Alliance members thus made a pledge to construct a new security environment in Europe. They declared that the Soviet Union was no longer an enemy. Such revisions were a way to maintain Alliance cohesion in an uncertain time by providing a new mission for NATO. Years after, it would also provide a new home for the nations of the former Warsaw Pact by telling them that they were all part of greater Europe, and would not be left out in the cold. For all of this to work, however, the Alliance would have to project stability and democracy to its former enemies in the East. As Vaclav Havel put it, "If the West does not stabilize the East, the East will destabilize the West" (Havel 1997).

At the Rome Summit in 1991, the Alliance took the next step and declared that it would pursue dialogue and cooperation as well as security. One tangible result of this decision was the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council). In 1994, the Alliance created the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which grew to include 21 member states, including all the independent republics that came out of the former USSR, and all the neutral states of Europe. In 1997, the Alliance signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which put relations between the two on a more equal footing.

These initiatives towards NATO's eastern neighbourhood constituted concrete efforts to project stability (Hunter 1995; also see Yost 1998). An article by US permanent representative Robert Hunter, published in *NATO Review* in 1995, for example, declared NATO's enlargement as "part of a strategy for Projecting Stability into Central Europe" (Hunter 1995). The idea was to fundamentally transform the security environment in Central Europe: to "move Eastward one of the most thrilling human achievements of the past half century: the abolition of war itself among the states of Western Europe" (Hunter 1995: 3). NATO would offer its erstwhile adversaries to the East various levels of cooperation ranging from potential membership, to close consultation through the framework of the PfP, or through specialised procedures such as the NATO-Russia Founding Act (Hunter 1995: 3). Hunter outlined the Alliance's three-pronged approach: engaging countries from the former Warsaw Pact through consultations in the framework of the PfP initiative; offering a long-term prospective to these countries either through membership, or through sustained partnership; and putting the NATO–Russia relationship on a new footing by winning "Russia's confidence in

NATO's intentions by developing a rich and productive relationship with Moscow" (Hunter 1995: 7).

In addition to the effects of NATO's eastward expansion, members of the Alliance also conducted a series of out-of-area kinetic and non-kinetic operations to the East. At the time, these operations generated considerable debate on both sides of the Atlantic, as experts and politicians considered the future role of the Alliance, whether it should be conducting operations outside its traditional area, whether it should be conducting offensive military operations at all or remain a defensive alliance, and whether an alliance decision obligated all members to comply. But these existential considerations did not prevent the Alliance from acting when it saw a pressing need for some organisation—any organisation—to take prompt action in a crisis. NATO discovered that it was the only organisation available and capable of taking action in most cases of crisis during this period. Some of its actions included:

- Allied Goodwill I and II, humanitarian aid and medical expertise provided to Russia and former Soviet states, 1992
- US arms embargo in the Adriatic, supported by NATO, 1992–1993
- Operations Deadeye and Deliberate Force, countering Bosnian Serb actions, 1995
- International Force (IFOR), Bosnia, 1995–1996
- Security Force (SFOR), Bosnia, 1996–2004
- Operation Allied Freedom, air campaign over Serbia to protect Kosovo, 1999
- Kosovo Force (KFOR), 1999–present
- Operations Essential Harvest, Amber Fox, and Allied Harmony, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), 2001–2003
- NATO Headquarters in Skopje, FYROM, 2002–present.

Each of these missions included air, sea, and land military forces of multiple NATO member states, which greatly inflated the Alliance's view of itself, its purpose in the new world order, and its ability to conduct relatively small-scale military operations in the pursuit of stability for Europe and its immediate neighbourhood.

The ultimate step in projecting stability, for many Partner nations, was an invitation to join NATO as a full member. For some nations, this was also the best indicator of success of the entire projecting stability effort. This logic guided much of the enlargement debate of the 1990s.

The original thinking was based on valid liberal principles: the belief that NATO's enlargement would be a beneficial contribution to the democratisation, and hence pacification, of Eastern Europe. Increased membership was required for more nations to abide by the norms espoused by NATO and the OSCE. This assertion had a political purpose as much as one of military expediency. The lure of membership would create a positive link between the development of a state's foreign and defence policies and its prospects for membership. The Membership Action Plan became the bible for states wishing to become members and served as a tool for outreach and a way of projecting the values of the Alliance. The importance of this assertion for the Alliance is present in today's continued support of NATO's "Open Door" policy for all European states, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.

The success of projecting stability to the East can be explained in part by the fact that European Partner states were motivated by the possibility of eventual NATO membership. In addition, parallel and simultaneous efforts by the European Union to enlarge its zone of peace through shared economic, social, and cultural relationships also supported NATO's efforts in the region. As we shall see, the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partnership programmes were hamstrung to some extent since they did not carry the same incentivising aspects of future membership to either organisation. This made cooperation with NATO in the MENA region more pragmatic, and seen primarily through the prism of military-to-military programmes.

The Second Wave of Projecting Stability: NATO Looks South

Having shaped NATO's approach to its Eastern neigbourhood in the immediate post-Cold War era, the notion of projecting stability has undergone a renaissance of sorts since the 2016 Warsaw Summit—this time with an emphasis on the South (Díaz-Plaja 2018). The development of the military concept for projecting stability, moreover, constitutes an attempt to give concrete meaning to this abstract notion. This renewed emphasis on projecting stability, somewhat paradoxically, must be seen against the backdrop of increased Alliance efforts in collective

defence and deterrence since 2014. Given the Alliance's renewed focus on its classical core task after Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea (Kroenig 2015), including the return of the nuclear issue (Kamp 2018), the simultaneous resurgence of projecting stability reflects NATO's attempt to balance different risk perceptions by its Eastern and Southern members (Vito 2015).

The second wave of projecting stability is directed towards the South, more specifically towards North Africa and, to a lesser extent, the Eastern Mediterranean. To the extent that the projecting stability agenda as applied to the South is perceived as paralleling earlier efforts in the East, it is important to identify a number of core differences in the regional and global context which might impact the effectiveness of such an agenda.

First, even though the Alliance maintains its "open door policy," there is no prospect for membership when it comes to Partners in the South. While fiercely criticised at the time (Perlmutter and Carpenter 1998) and controversial due to its effects on NATO–Russia relations (Dannreuther 1999), NATO's eastward enlargement must be considered successful from a technical point of view. With four waves of enlargement between 1999 and 2017, NATO has integrated a total of 13 new member states in Central and Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War. This certainly transformed the security environment in the region and had significant effects on domestic security sectors as well. In the absence of a membership prospective—and the corollary prospect of being allowed under the security umbrella of Article 5—comparable transformations are unlikely in the MENA. In other words, incentives for Southern Partners to adapt their policies and open up their security sectors are limited when compared to former and present candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Second, NATO does not have the best of reputations in the Southern neighbourhood. Despite lacking systematic public opinion data, public attitudes towards NATO in most MENA countries range from ignorance to opposition. Even at the level of security professionals and military officers, NATO is considered with some scepticism, and Alliance intentions in the south are generally perceived as unclear.[5] The Libya intervention—or rather its aftermath—certainly did not help to present

---

[5] Based on the authors' regular interaction with officers and officials from MENA countries at the NATO Defense College in Rome, 2013–2018.

NATO in a better light in the MENA region. NATO thus starts from a difficult position in the south, underlining the importance of outreach and confidence building activities.

Third, NATO's enlargement to the East occurred in parallel to the EU's eastern enlargement, and it is therefore difficult to disentangle the causal effects of these two processes. It must be understood, however, that similar incentives for, and pressures towards, larger political reforms do not exist in the MENA region. Quite to the contrary, given strategic interests, major Western powers have traditionally supported authoritarian regimes with dubious security practices in the region (Brownlee 2012). For example, Egypt is probably one of the countries furthest removed from the standards of security sector governance encouraged by NATO, even though the country is one of the largest recipient of Western military aid, and has long cooperated with Western powers on a bilateral level and with NATO as part of the MD.

Finally, Western attempts to project stability (or influence) to the MENA do not occur in a vacuum. Russia's September 2015 intervention in the Syrian crisis has proven beyond doubt that Russia is, and will remain, a crucial player in the Middle East (Trenin 2013, 2018). This not only has the potential to transpose some of the re-emerging East–West confrontation into the MENA region, but also means that the West and NATO are not the only game in town. Research has shown that ties with non-democratic patrons can help stabilise authoritarian regimes (Tansey et al. 2017). From the perspective of regional countries, cooperating with Russia might thus appear more attractive, given the fact that Russian support does not come with strings attached regarding domestic political processes. While the first wave of projecting stability to the East occurred during a period of reduced geopolitical competition, NATO's attempts to project stability to the South occurs in the context of resurgent NATO–Russia tensions—not least in the MENA region itself given Russia's role in Syria, but also its increased engagement in Egypt and Libya (Cook 2018).

Given this less-than-optimistic starting point, what can NATO hope to achieve with regard to regional security? We argue that NATO should focus its efforts around the vision of a cooperative (and in the long term, integrated) regional security order. Such a regional security order is currently a long way off, but it is not an entirely unrealistic prospect for the long terms. Indeed, NATO's existing partnership frameworks, the MD and the ICI, can both be seen as efforts in the right direction.

Regional Security Integration

In terms of regional security integration, the Middle East and North Africa lag behind other regions (Aarts 1999). This is because, to begin with, the League of Arab States (LAS) does not have a security component and is largely ineffective as a political organisation (Pinfari 2009). Similarly, while the Gulf Coordination Council (GCC) had shown some signs of increasing cooperation in military and security matters, the current crisis between Qatar on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the other has largely blocked what progress had been achieved up to that point (Samaan 2017). In brief, the MENA region remains one of the least integrated regions of the world—economically, politically, and in terms of security. Instead of forming a regional security order, the regional security complex (Buzan and Wæver 2003) in the Middle East is shaped by a high degree of international penetration on the one hand (Hinnebusch 2003), and by a Saudi-Emirati hegemonic projection based on strategic competition with Iran on the other (Lynch 2016).

These systemic processes are punctuated by sub-regional security cooperation, largely based on necessity. Examples include the G5 Sahel (G5S) formed by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger and supported by the EU. Founded in 2014, the G5S has set up a joint military force (FC-G5S) in an effort to contribute more efficiently to security provision in the region (International Crisis Group 2017). Further examples include the Peninsula Shield Force of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and steps towards establishing a framework for joint command and missile defence coordination—largely driven by increased demands on Gulf militaries resulting from their countries' more militarily assertive posture since 2011 (Samaan 2017; also see Young 2013). However, as the current GCC crisis illustrates, GCC integration was not strong enough to prevent political differences between the UAE and Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Qatar on the other to escalate into a full-blown diplomatic crisis since June 2017 (Lenderking et al. 2017).

NATO's partnership formats, the MD and the ICI, have played no significant role in these developments. Cooperation between NATO and the G5S, for example, has been limited to the participation of G5S representatives—along with officials from the European Union delegation

in Mauritania and representatives from the African Union (AU)—in the fifth Mediterranean Dialogue Policy Advisory Group Meeting in Nouakchott, Mauritania, in October 2017 (NATO 2017a). Moreover, while both the UAE and Qatar (but not Saudi Arabia) are members of NATO's ICI, and while all parties to the dispute—including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt—have continued to participate in NATO partnership activities alongside Qatari participants, the fact that most parties to the GCC crisis share membership in NATO partnership initiatives did not play a role. In other words, despite their relatively long history, NATO partnership initiatives in the MENA region have not developed into effective drivers of cooperative (much less collective) security, nor did they live up to their potential as fora for Track 2 or Track 1.5 political dialogue on security issues.

Part of the reason for this somewhat sobering state of affairs can be seen in the context in which these initiatives emerged. In the case of the MD, initiated in 1994, this background crucially included the Oslo Peace Process between Israel and the Palestinians, and the associated prospects of a resolution to this longstanding conflict (Kaim 2017). Given this backdrop, it made political sense to include countries as diverse as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan in the same dialogue initiative. After the failure of the Oslo process, however, and given the current political setting—including the blockage of the Middle East peace process, but also significant shifts in the regional distribution of power in the wake of 2011, as well as the crises in Syria and Libya—it is unclear whether the format of the MD still makes political sense. Similar assessments apply to the ICI.

Set up in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, and in the context of the global war on terror, the ICI was initially envisaged mainly as a tool to help NATO increase its cooperation with Gulf countries, not least in terms of counterterrorism (Kaim 2017). The fact that two important players, Oman and Saudi Arabia, never joined the ICI, however, signalled the limitations of this approach from the beginning. Moreover, Iraq remained outside NATO's regional partnership programme as a NATO Partner across the Globe together with countries such as Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Japan, and Pakistan, among others (NATO 2017b). A structured form of interaction with Iran was never envisaged, even though Iran is arguably one of the main

powers in the region. In brief, the ICI did not and does not incentivise regional cooperation, and political developments since its inception in 2004 again suggest that its current format should be revised.

Moreover, in contrast to the PfP initiative in post-Cold War Eastern Europe, the MD and ICI were never conceived of as pathways to full membership, nor do they include the same access to consultations under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty enshrined in the PfP. As a result, incentives for Partners to adapt their security practices to NATO standards have been markedly reduced. In effect, the NATO-Partner relationship in the MD and ICI is subject to some of the same principal-agent problems which beset security force assistance programmes more generally (Biddle et al. 2018).

Taken together, and somewhat resulting from these limitations, NATO Partners in both the MD and the ICI have generally preferred bilateral cooperation with the Alliance over cooperation through their respective partnership frameworks. Political disagreements among different members of both partnership formats are part of the explanation for these limitations. Moreover, the partnership frameworks themselves do not reflect contemporary security dynamics in the region, but are instead based on the political status quo at the time of their foundation. All of this means that NATO is failing to capitalise on one of its greatest strengths—its experience in organising collective security on a regional basis.

NATO should work towards increased cooperation with regional organisations—the LAS, GCC, G5S, AU, and others—to incentivise and promote stronger regional security cooperation. While this is admittedly a long-term process, there is much to gain and very little to lose from reorienting NATO partnerships with MENA countries in this direction. This would involve reorganising existing partnerships into a new framework which better reflects the current security environment, and reinvigorating these frameworks through a stronger emphasis on multilateral cooperation. Current efforts by the US administration to revive the idea of an "Arab NATO" based on cooperation between Gulf countries and Egypt and Jordan—mainly as a tool to counter Iran—could go in such a direction (Smith 2018). There are some encouraging signs that current divisions can be overcome—at least at the level of practical security cooperation. On 12 September 2018, the GCC Chiefs of Defence—significantly including Qatar—met with their Egyptian and Jordanian counterparts as well as with representatives from US Central Command

(CENTCOM) in Kuwait to discuss a deepening of defence cooperation (Al Bawaba 2018). While such initiatives do not preclude bilateral cooperation between the Alliance and specific Partner countries, multilateral cooperation should be a strategic priority for NATO.

The Domestic Picture

All of NATO's partnership programmes—PfP, MD, ICI, Partners across the Globe, as well as the close relations with the EU, the UN, and the OSCE—have served the Alliance in many ways. The 41 official Partner nations serve as essential force multipliers in NATO operations.[6] In fact, these Partners have been critical to the success of some missions. For example, at one point, there were 51 nations represented in ISAF, including all then 28 NATO members and 23 others—most of them NATO Partners. Each nation provided expertise, military forces, funding, and/or other contributions in efforts to modernise Afghanistan and coordinate military operations there. The Alliance also has created several Enhanced Partnership Interoperability Programs with these nations, which primarily train, exercise, and deploy military capabilities with NATO. In addition, at the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO announced a Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative with Georgia, Moldova, and Jordan (NATO 2015).

On the domestic level, NATO has been involved in a number of regional states—mainly in providing educational opportunities and specialised training. These activities, as a rule, are demand-driven—meaning that the content of individual cooperation programmes is determined by Partners. We argue that NATO should revise its "free for all" approach to cooperation with Partners, and should instead utilise the instruments available to the Alliance with strategic oversight. This highlights an inherent tension between the Alliance's emphasis on a demand-driven approach and strategic interests in "capable, credible, legitimate and well-functioning" (security) institutions. Activities related to reforming the security sector—such as NATO's Building Integrity programme— can be perceived as invasive by Partners due to the implications of these activities for domestic balances of power. Given this situation, NATO needs to consider ways to incentivise Partners to make the investment

---

[6]NATO's 41 Partners still include Russia, which is currently not a Partner in good standing. NATO has had no practical cooperation with Russia since April 2014.

necessary to advance in this realm. An important aspect of such an incentive structure would be to increase coherence between Alliance activities and bilateral initiatives by Allies.

From a strategic vantage point, the aim of supporting Partners to become effective security providers implies different things for different Partners, depending primarily on which obstacles a particular Partner Country faces. Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, face different issues than Algeria and Egypt—even though all four countries profit from cooperation with NATO. NATO's current approach to partnership relies to a large extent on Partners themselves choosing which types and areas of cooperation they prefer and on formalising these preferences in a biannual Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP). In this area, NATO's political leaders should take a stronger lead, capitalising on existing bilateral cooperation schemes, and the development of new ones to help guide Partner countries towards the desired end-state. In other words, based on a political vision of security in the MENA, NATO should use its partnership instruments to incentivise Partners to move in the right direction.

A precondition for such an approach is a clearer picture of what effective security provision implies for the structure and capacity of the security sector Partner nations. To put it simply, effective security provision in the MENA is hampered by two different problems: a lack of capacity which prevents the effective provision of security despite best efforts, and deficiencies in security sector governance, which prevents capacities from being deployed efficiently. If states lack capacity, they might be unable to confront domestic or regional security challenges simply because they do not command the human or material resources necessary to do so. On the other hand, if security sectors are governed poorly, while states may well have considerable resources at their disposal, such resources may still be deployed in ways which do not effectively contribute to security provision. The first would constitute a capacity shortfall and to the second would constitute a lack of strategic leadership. In reality, these problems do not exist independently of each other, but are likely to occur simultaneously in different combinations and configurations. On an analytical level, it nevertheless makes sense to examine the two dimensions separately.

Examples which come close to the exemplary type of a capacity shortfall are Afghanistan and Iraq after their recent wars, respectively. In both countries, security institutions had to be built up almost from scratch to

enable national security sectors to eventually take over responsibility for security provision. This led to the establishment of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) after the dissolution of the country's Baathist military upon orders from coalition authorities (Gaub 2016). Given this context, the NTM-I's main mission was to "assist in the development of Iraqi security forces training structures and institutions so that Iraq can build an effective and sustainable capability that addresses the needs of the nation" (SHAPE, n.d.). NATO assistance to Iraq was renewed recently (Emmott and Ali 2018). In Afghanistan, NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) was set up in 2009 to complement existing capacity-building efforts under US auspices (NATO 2009). Similar NATO-led programmes might be expected to take place in Libya once the situation on the ground allows. The EU-led training of the Libyan coast guard under the auspices of EUNAVFOR Med (Operation Sophia),[7] as well as bilateral efforts with Italy already follow such a pattern (Emmott and Stewart 2017). Moreover, the 2018 Brussels Summit has seen the formal announcement of a new training mission in Iraq (Koehler 2018). All of these activities proceed from the assumption that the Partner countries involved in cooperation with NATO lack specific technical capacities which can be addressed by capacity building and training. The hope underlying such activities is that the strengthening of such capacities will then contribute to domestic stability which will, in turn, increase Alliance security.

On the other side of the spectrum, the effective provision of security can also be hampered by political factors, notably by bad governance of the security sector. The Alliance's Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB), which was launched at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, departs from the assertion that "[e]ffective and efficient state defense institutions under civilian and democratic control are fundamental to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and for international security cooperation" (NATO 2018). This concern with security sector governance is well-founded. Research in civil–military relations and military sociology has long suggested that military effectiveness depends crucially on good governance of the security sector. It has been shown, for example, that the military effectiveness of authoritarian regimes

[7]Operation Sophia was originally called European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EU NAVFOR Med). It is a military operation of the European Union established in April 2015 to neutralise refugee smuggling routes in the Mediterranean.

depends on specific organisational features adopted by armed forces such as merit-based promotion regimes, specific training systems, and information-sharing procedures (Talmadge 2015; Brooks 2006). On a general level, democracies have been found to be more effective militarily because they implement a strict separation of political leadership and military decision-making (Biddle and Long 2004; Reiter and Stam 1998). In short, political meddling in military affairs—through politicised rather than merit-based recruitment and promotion, politicised funding and investment decisions—decreases military effectiveness. The political control of the armed forces by a civilian, rather than military elite, is therefore not just a normative concern, but an important aspect of an effective provision of security.

Moreover, the Alliance does not currently differentiate between different Partner needs. Rather, the 1400 activities contained in the Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM) are, in principle, open to all Partner countries, even though Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programs are agreed upon with Partner countries. If these partnership activities are to be effective components of a projecting stability agenda, NATO needs to make better use of opportunities to direct cooperation, and to proactively offer bespoke content to specific Partners. In particular, generating capacity without paying attention to governance issues will lead neither to an effective provision of security, nor to security sector reform in the absence of capacity.

A more strategic use of NATO's partnership programmes is predicated upon a detailed needs assessment, framed by an overall understanding of where the Alliance would like Partner countries in the region to move. It is wishful thinking, however, to assume that disparate cooperation activities will somehow automatically lead to an outcome only vaguely defined as "stability." It would be outright foolish to rely on cooperation in the absence of strategy to increase the security of the Alliance.

Counter Arguments: Should NATO Be Doing This?

Of course, in an international alliance that has grown to 29 nations, one cannot expect to achieve consensus easily on matters of grave importance, such as the concepts of projecting stability, enlargement, and out-of-area military operations. As a result, one hears counterarguments to the official line that NATO can pursue both defence and dialogue with

equal vigour, or that the two goals of European security and projecting stability are manageable, affordable, and desirable by this political-military alliance of nearly one billion people.

For one thing, the ability to project stability outside NATO's borders must be based on the initial predication of the existence of a Kantian peace in Europe. If the Alliance has to worry about its own borders and the security of its own populations, how can it continue to pursue out-of-area operations and other efforts to project stability abroad? This question has been reinforced by the seeming end of the short peaceful period from 1991 to the resumption of Russian assertiveness starting in 2014.[8] Yet the Alliance has renewed its call for projecting stability, as we have seen in the 2016 Warsaw Summit communiqué, and in documents, speeches, and meetings since. Some members of the Alliance may believe that with the strong response to Russian challenges in Northeastern Europe—including an Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), forward deployed multinational forces in the Balkans, increased air policing, the creation of new command structures for reinforcements and for the North Atlantic, the enhanced NATO Response Force, and so on—the problem of the Eastern frontier is "fixed." With this challenged sufficiently addressed, some argue, the Alliance can now turn its attention to the South, and projecting stability seems to be the best way to deal with the serious problems arising in the MENA region.

But how can NATO do it all? The Alliance is once again expected to provide significant conventional defence, and nuclear deterrence forces in Europe and the North Atlantic; to perform cooperative security and collective defence missions; and now to project stability to the South. There is little appetite within allied nations for increased defence spending, larger force sizes, or new forays of operational missions in far-away places. The long war in Afghanistan took its toll on popular support for such military operations. At the same time, much of Europe's military force structure and capabilities, as well as America's role in European security, were on a steady decline between 1991 and 2014. The political leadership and the populace both liked the new world, where they did not have to worry about sudden conflict breaking out in their region. But the West also has to respond to a real-world context, which

[8] Or perhaps even earlier, such as Putin's speech to the Munich Security Conference, 10 February 2007, or the Russian incursions into Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both in Georgia, in 2008.

sometimes has malevolent actors who *do* want to return to a cold war, or perhaps even a hot conflict.

This philosophical difference between knowing the Alliance needs to provide the forces required to stand up to an adversary, and wishing this was not the case, has created divisions within the Alliance itself. In particular, there is a divide between those who believe the existential threat facing the West comes from a recidivist, nuclear-armed Russia, and those who believe that the more serious and proximate threats are emanating from the South, including terrorism, unchecked migration, and political instability. Without the resources to deal with both, it is disingenuous to proclaim that both are equally important.

There are also divisions within the Alliance over the scope and nature of post-Cold War activities by the Alliance. Indeed, it is true that all nations formally agreed to maintain NATO after the Berlin Wall fell. It is also true that the allure of the Alliance remains strong, as shown by the continuing interest in membership or partnership status by many other countries. But is the alliance overextended? Is it risking its internal integrity in partnering with nations that do not share its Western values? What are NATO's real vital interests? Is the provision of stability one of them? These are questions which have not yet been fully addressed by the member states.

Finally, is NATO really the best organisation for handling such out-of-area missions? Even if the answer is yes, does this imply some sort of moral obligation to act accordingly? Why cannot larger organisations such as the EU, UN or the OSCE be held responsible for projecting stability? Why must a military organisation be in charge?

This last question is the most challenging. Why NATO? If the Alliance genuinely sees NATO as the right organisation to project stability, it still begs an additional question: for what purpose? NATO is a regional security organisation created to ensure the security of its member states in Europe and North America. If Europe is "whole, free, and at peace," does this not suffice? Has not NATO met its charter obligations?

Apparently not. At the time of writing, member states have some 18,000 military personnel in NATO missions around the world: Afghanistan, Kosovo, afloat on the Mediterranean, supporting the African Union, assisting the European Union with the refugee and migration crises, deployed with Patriot missile batteries on the Turkish–Syrian border, forward deployed in the Baltic States and Poland, flying AWACS missions. As Secretary General Stoltenberg noted in 2017:

"NATO is adapting partly by strengthening our collective defense in Europe and partly by stepping up our efforts to project stability to our neighbors" (Stoltenberg 2017). The Alliance, and its national members, want to do both.

The Warsaw Summit declaration amplified this point: "NATO must retain its ability to respond to crises beyond its borders, and remains actively engaged in projecting stability and enhancing international security through working with partners and other international organizations" (NATO 2016). The following questions however for the Alliance remain. How "global" should NATO become? Should it retain its original core functions as a regional organisation created for the collective defence of its homelands? Or should it focus more on out-of-areas missions that fall under the headings of crisis management and collective security? Can it do it all? Should it continue to try? To do both, NATO will need to explicate a number of solid starting points that it seems to be lacking with regard to the concept of projecting stability: a strategy, a clear understanding of its ultimate goals, adequate funding, and the political support of all member states. Without agreement on these starting points, the Alliance will continue to provide grandiose visions without the wherewithal to turn them into reality.

Conclusion: (How) Can We Get There?

In this chapter we have advanced three principal and interrelated points. First, despite the hype surrounding NATO's "new" projecting stability agenda since the 2016 Warsaw Summit, neither the underlying idea nor the phrase itself are new within the Alliance's political discourse. NATO has a 25-year history of projecting stability to the East. Nevertheless, the notion remains ill-defined and needs to be better understood if it is to be useful in guiding Alliance activities in the MENA region and elsewhere. Second, we have outlined how NATO has attempted to project stability to the East and the South, and have questioned the extent to which this overextends Alliance ambitions. Third, we have raised questions about the ability and willingness of the Alliance for taking on this mission. Is NATO really fit for purpose when it comes to projecting stability outside Europe?

These concerns notwithstanding, NATO is currently committed to projecting stability—in addition to collective defence and deterrence. We

argue that for this ambition to be successful, a number of preconditions need to be met.

1. *Agree on a clear policy for the Strategic Direction South.* This step is crucial from three interrelated perspectives. Firstly, a policy agreed upon by all 29 Allies will increase the chances that coordination between Alliance activities and initiatives by individual Allies is strengthened. Given different threat assessments and national strategic priorities, full coordination is probably difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, any progress towards coordination would be positive to avoid duplication, and because it would strengthen NATO's credibility in the region. Secondly, a clear policy is an important part of a new public relations strategy for the region. NATO's regional Partners face frequent difficulties in understanding the Alliance's strategic aims—a problem which, combined with a generally sceptical attitude, feeds distrust and misinterpretations about the "real" intentions of the Alliance. A clear strategic approach coupled with an open dialogue process could help address these issues. Third, a coherent policy would give direction to the various activities suggested under the military concept, many of which are already being conducted. In the absence of such guidance, it is difficult to prioritise and to efficiently allocate resources.

2. *Use partnerships strategically.* NATO has long insisted that its partnership programmes be demand-driven. The current military concept mimics this idea.[9] There are two different ways of resolving the inherent tension between a demand-driven approach, and the requirements of a regional strategy. The most radical solution would be to shift from a demand-driven to a conditionality-based approach. This would allow NATO to incentivise what it sees as positive reforms and to target resources where they are most likely to produce favourable outcomes. On the flipside, it might be difficult for Partners to accept such an approach, given the concern that conditionality would encroach upon their sovereignty. A less radical solution would therefore be to cooperate selectively. Here NATO would reinforce cooperation with some Partners and scale back cooperation with others, based on the extent to

[9] MC 6055/3, para. 20b.

which individual Partners are willing and able to contribute to the NATO's overall strategic aims. To some extent, this approach is already applied in practical terms, but it would be useful to make it explicit to ensure a proper incentive structure.

References

Aarts, P. (1999). The Middle East: A Region Without Regionalism or the End of Exceptionalism? *Third World Quarterly, 20*(5), 911–925.

Al Bawaba. (2018, September 13). *Egypt, GCC and Jordan Discuss Military Alliance in Kuwait.* https://www.albawaba.com/news/egypt-gcc-and-jordan-discuss-military-alliance-kuwait-1185410. Accessed 23 January 2019.

Asmus, R., Kugler, R., & Larrabee, F. (1993). Building a New NATO. *Foreign Affairs, 72*(4), 28.

Biddle, S., & Long, S. (2004). Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48*(4), 525–546.

Biddle, S., Macdonald, J., & Baker, R. (2018). Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance. *Journal of Strategic Studies, 41*(1–2), 89–142.

Brooks, R. (2006). An Autocracy at War: Explaining Egypt's Military Effectiveness, 1967 and 1973. *Security Studies, 15*(3), 396–430.

Brownlee, J. (2012). *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buzan, B., & Wæver, O. (2003). *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cook, S. A. (2018, August 31). Putin Is Sneaking up on Europe from the South. *Foreign Policy.* https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/31/putin-is-sneaking-up-on-europe-from-the-south/. Accessed 23 January 2019.

Costalli, S. (2017). What Is 'Stability' and How to Achieve It? In S. Lucarelli, A. Marrone, & F. N. Moro (Eds.), *Projecting Stability in an Unstable World* (pp. 25–29). Bologna: Allied Command Transformation, Università di Bologna, Istituto Affari Internazionali.

Dannreuther, R. (1999). Escaping the Enlargement Trap in NATO–Russian Relations. *Survival, 41*(4), 145–164.

de Hoop Scheffer, J. (2006, July 10). *Projecting Stability.* Speech at FRIDE in Madrid. https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/opinions_22477.htm?selectedLocale=en.

Díaz-Plaja, R. (2018, March 13). Projecting Stability: An Agenda for Action. *NATO Review.* https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/also-in-2018/projecting-stability-an-agenda-for-action-nato-partners/en/index.htm. Accessed 23 January 2019.

Emmott, R., & Ali, I. (2018, February 15). At U.S. Urging, NATO Agrees Training Mission in Iraq. *Reuters World News*. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-nato/at-u-s-urging-nato-agrees-training-mission-in-iraq-idUSKCN1FZ1E5. Accessed 23 January 2019.

Emmott, R., & Stewart, P. (2017, February 16). Libya Sends New Request for Military Training to NATO. *Reuters World News*. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-nato/libya-sends-new-request-for-military-training-to-nato-idUSKBN15V23B?il=0. Accessed 23 January 2019.

Gaub, F. (2016). *An Unhappy Marriage: Civil–Military Relations in Post-Saddam Iraq*. Regional Insight. Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center.

Havel, V. (1997, May 13). NATO's Quality of Life. *New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/13/opinion/nato-s-quality-of-life.html. Accessed 23 January 2019.

Hinnebusch, R. A. (2003). *The International Politics of the Middle East*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hunter, R. E. (1995). Enlargement: Part of a Strategy for Projecting Stability into Central Europe. *NATO Review, 43*(3), 3–8.

International Crisis Group. (2017). *Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force*. Africa Report No. 258. Brussels: International Crisis Group.

Kaim, M. (2017). *Reforming NATO's Partnerships* (SWP Research Paper RP 1). Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

Kamp, K. H. (2018). *Nuclear Reorientation of NATO*. NDC Commentary 01/18. Rome: NATO Defense College.

Koehler, K. (2018). *Projecting Stability in Practice? NATO's New Training Mission in Iraq* (NDC Policy Brief No. 2). Rome: NATO Defense College.

Kroenig, M. (2015). Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War. *Survival, 57*(1), 49–70.

Lenderking, T., Cammack, P., Shihabi, A., & Des Roches, D. (2017). The GCC Rift: Regional and Global Implications. *Middle East Policy, 24*(4), 5–28.

Lynch, M. (2016). *The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East*. New York: Public Affairs.

Moore, R. R. (2007). *NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*. Westport: Praeger Security International.

NATO. (2009, April 4). *NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan*. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52802.htm. Accessed 23 January 2019.

NATO. (2010, November 19). *Active Engagement, Modern Defense*. https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm. Accessed 23 January 2019.

NATO. (2015, September 5). *Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales*. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm. Accessed 23 January 2019.

NATO. (2016, July 9). *Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8–9 July 2016.* https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm. Accessed 23 January 2019.

NATO. (2017a, October 2). *NATO and MD Partners Meet in Mauritania for the Fifth Mediterranean Dialogue Policy Advisory Group (MD PAG).* https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_147563.htm?selectedLocale=en. Accessed 23 January 2019.

NATO. (2017b, May 19). *Relations with Partners Across the Globe.* https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49188.htm. Accessed 23 January 2019.

NATO. (2018, May 9). *Defence Institution Building.* https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_50083.htm. Accessed 23 January 2019.

Perlmutter, A., & Carpenter, T. G. (1998). NATO's Expensive Trip East: The Folly of Enlargement. *Foreign Affairs, 77*(1), 2–6.

Pinfari, M. (2009). *Nothing but Failure: The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council as Mediators in Middle Eastern Conflicts* (Crisis Sates Working Paper Series 2). London: London School of Economics and Political Science.

Reiter, D., & Stam, A. C. (1998). Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42*(3), 259–277.

Rosenfeld, S. S. (1993, July 2). NATO's Last Chance. *Washington Post.* https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1993/07/02/natos-last-chance/22054ea7-5958-44b0-9e6a-212ee1da51de/?utm_term=.34d6d349cf09. Accessed 23 January 2019.

Rousselet, L. (2017, December 13). *John Manza Gives NATO an 'F' in Projecting Stability.* The German Marshall Fund of the United States (Blog). http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2017/12/13/john-manza-gives-nato-f-projecting-stability. Accessed 23 January 2019.

Samaan, J. L. (2017). *Toward a NATO of the Gulf? The Challenges of Collective Defense Within the GCC.* Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute.

SHAPE. (n.d.). *NATO Training Mission—Iraq (NTM-I).* Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. https://shape.nato.int/page136952. Accessed 23 January 2019.

Smith, H. L. (2018, July 30). Donald Trump in Push to Build an Arab NATO. *The Times.* https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/donald-trump-in-push-to-build-an-arab-nato-sf7qr05gz. Accessed 23 January 2019.

Stoltenberg, J. (2017, March 2). *Projecting Stability Beyond Our Borders.* Speech at the Graduate Institute in Geneva. https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/opinions_141898.htm.

Talmadge, C. (2015). *The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Tansey, O., Koehler, K., & Schmotz, A. (2017). Ties to the Rest: Autocratic Linkages and Regime Survival. *Comparative Political Studies, 50*(9), 1221–1254.

Trenin, D. (2013). *The Mythical Alliance: Russia's Syria Policy* (Carnegie Paper). Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center.

Trenin, D. (2018). *What Is Russia up to in the Middle East?* Cambridge: Polity.

Vito, C. (2015, November 17). *A False Dichotomy: The Choice Between Protecting NATO's Eastern and Southern Flanks.* NATO Association of Canada (Blog). http://natoassociation.ca/a-false-dichotomy-the-choice-between-protecting-natos-eastern-and-southern-flanks/. Accessed 23 January 2019.

Yost, D. S. (1998). The New NATO and Collective Security. *Survival, 40*(2), 135–160.

Young, K. E. (2013). *The Emerging Interventionists of the GCC* (LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series 2). London: London School of Economics and Political Science.