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**MANIFEST DESTINY IN CHINA: A COMPARISON
OF THE UNITED STATES AMERICAN INDIAN
WARS OF THE 1800S WITH CHINAS STRIKE
HARD CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE UYGHUR
MUSLIMS OF XINJIANG PROVINCE**

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Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School

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**NAVAL
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**MANIFEST DESTINY IN CHINA: A COMPARISON OF THE
UNITED STATES AMERICAN INDIAN WARS OF THE 1800S
WITH CHINA'S STRIKE HARD CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE
UYGHUR MUSLIMS OF XINJIANG PROVINCE**

by

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December 2019

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CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE UYGHUR MUSLIMS OF XINJIANG PROVINCE**

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ABSTRACT

Historically, empires have sought to subjugate or destroy target populations by any means necessary, up to and including the use of genocide. However, the proliferation of information technology has provided new ways for state-level entities to influence others without the social and political fallout associated with violent acts of imperialism. In order to address this phenomenon, this thesis examines the role of cultural imperialism in the Information Age by comparing and contrasting two case studies: the American Indian Wars and the present-day plight of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China. It should be noted that this thesis does not purport to illustrate a vast range of similarities between the two. Rather, very few resemblances actually exist. Among them, geographic expansionism, domestic imperialism, and forced assimilation act as the broader themes through which to compare these overt conflicts of influence. Conversely, the differences in cultures, locations, and points in history provide new opportunities to contrast the efficacy of the techniques employed in either case. This thesis finds that, while violence will likely remain a weapon of influence long into the future, cheaper, more effective options have become the preferred tools for furthering vital national interests through the suppression of opposing cultures.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	AN INTRODUCTION TO CULTURAL IMPERIALISM.....	3
	A. TERMINOLOGICAL BACKGROUND	3
	1. What Is Culture?.....	5
	2. What Is Imperialism?	7
	B. WHAT IS (AND IS NOT) CULTURAL IMPERIALISM?.....	10
	C. SUMMARY.....	14
III.	THE AMERICAN INDIAN WARS OF THE 1800s	15
	A. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT.....	15
	B. METHODS	16
	C. DATA COLLECTION AND STRUCTURE	17
	D. DATA ANALYSIS.....	19
	E. INTERVENTION STRATEGIES.....	31
	F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY	32
	G. SUMMARY	33
IV.	CHINA’S DOMESTIC WAR ON ISLAM.....	35
	A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF XINJIANG AND THE UYGHURS (TIME)	35
	B. XINJIANG, TERRORISM, AND NEW CHINESE TACTICS / TECHNIQUES.....	38
	1. The Strike Hard Campaign	39
	2. Becoming Family.....	40
	3. Mass-Surveillance	41
	4. Biometrics and Travel Restriction	42
	5. Socially Engineered Ethnic Dilution	43
	6. Political Re-education.....	44
	C. ANALYSIS / PURPOSE.....	44
	D. SUMMARY	46
V.	POLICY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	47
	A. LITERATURE REVIEW	48
	B. ANALYSIS	53
	C. RECOMMENDATIONS.....	55
	D. SUMMARY	57

VI. CONCLUSION	59
A. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS	59
B. FINAL THOUGHTS	62
 LIST OF REFERENCES	 67
 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	 73

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Native American Population Change, from 1870–1890, in Native American Tribes that Entered Treaties with the U.S. Government	20
Figure 2.	Native American Population Change, from 1870–1890, in Native American Tribes that Did Not Enter Treaties with the U.S. Government	21
Figure 3.	Native American Population Change, from 1870–1890, by Official Reservation Location	22
Figure 4.	Native American Tribe and U.S. Government Relational Ties circa 1890.....	24
Figure 5.	Native American Tribe and U.S. Government Relational Ties at K-Core 6 (All Actors with 6 Ties or Greater) circa 1890	25
Figure 6.	Native American Cumulative Diplomatic Trust Values, circa 1890, by Official Reservation Location.....	31
Figure 7.	The MNIOE’s Hierarchy of Narratives	49

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Historical Events of Significant Tribal Impact, circa 1890, and Their Expected Diplomatic Impacts, as a Cumulative Trust Total, by Tribe.....	26
Table 2.	Native American Population Growth and Cumulative Diplomatic Trust Averages circa 1890	30

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BIA	Bureau of Indian Affairs
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic
GADM	Global Administrative Database Management
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MNIOE	Multinational Information Operations Experiment
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PRC	People's Republic of China
SNA	Social Network Analysis
UN	United Nations
VEO	Violent Extremist Organization
XUAR	Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region

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I. INTRODUCTION

History is rife with examples of larger nations over taking smaller nations, the strong overpowering the weak, and the modern conquering the savage. In many cases, these conflicts engulf entire continents in a fervor of violence and bloodshed, leaving one side paralyzed and enslaved while the other rewrites history in line with its own narratives. The process repeats itself until the would-be victor succumbs to a markedly similar fate: subjugation at the hands of a more technologically advanced civilization. Laws are imposed, behaviors are changed, and religions are replaced. According to Edward Said, “Every empire, however, tells itself and the world that it is unlike all other empires, that its mission is not to plunder and control but to educate and liberate.”¹

This thesis compares and contrasts two examples of Cultural Imperialism in hopes of answering the following questions: How are these cases similar? How are these cases different? And, what can they tell us about the nature of imperialism now and in the future?

It is important to note that this thesis focuses primarily on the aspects of imperialism designed to influence, assimilate, or supplant an opposing culture. The term Cultural Imperialism, as this thesis argues, is a difficult concept to define, but of growing importance to state policymakers. First, it lends itself to scholarly scrutiny, as both components (cultural and imperialism) are difficult to define on their own. For instance, even anthropologists have found it impossible to arrive at a defining consensus of the word “culture,” according to Helen Spencer-Oatey, whose work is heavily referenced in the following chapters.² Aside from the risk of academic scrutiny, the term’s various methods of use since its inception (late 1960s to early 1970s) have been incredibly nuanced. In other words, numerous theorists, as author Livingston White purports, have hijacked the idea of Cultural Imperialism for their own specific uses and “different international scholars who

¹ Edward Said, “Imperialism Quotes,” Goodreads, last modified July 20, 2003, <https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/tag/imperialism>.

² Helen Spencer-Oatey, “What Is Culture?: A Compilation of Quotations,” Global Pad Core Concepts, 2012, <http://www.warwick.ac.uk/globalpadintercultural>.

have written on the subject attribute its beginnings to different sources as well.”³ Finally, Cultural Imperialism, from an analysis perspective, is an exceptionally complicated condition to diagnose, especially in the Information Age. Simply put, information and influence are everywhere in our overly connected world, and proposing a method for sorting through all of the causes and effects remains a herculean task well beyond the scope of this thesis.

Difficult to define, widely abused, and impossible to fix make for a rocky start to any academic pursuit. However, this thesis argues that Cultural Imperialism remains an important issue to acknowledge and understand for any nation attempting to maintain its cultural identity in a globalizing world.

³ Livingston White, “Reconsidering Cultural Imperialism Theory,” Arab Media and Society, last modified August 6, 2019, <https://www.arabmediasociety.com/reconsidering-cultural-imperialism-theory/>.

II. AN INTRODUCTION TO CULTURAL IMPERIALISM

The term “Cultural Imperialism” evokes a strong, emotional response. Instantly, the two words combined seem to multiply the volatility of one another. As if the word “imperialism” were not already pejorative enough on its own, then supplementing it with the word “cultural” somehow makes this hybrid feel intentionally weaponized. Yet, at the heart of the matter, the concept appears to exemplify certain aspects of the globalized world in which we live, indiscriminately unified through the constant exchange of information, money, and political enmity. This chapter devotes itself to discussing the contentious discourse of surrounding Cultural Imperialism and its constituent parts, before proposing an appropriate definition and a way ahead for contending with its consequences in today’s Information Age.

A. TERMINOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

It is important to draw attention to just how young the term Cultural Imperialism actually is and how scholars struggle with it even today. Only by the 1970s had it fully emerged into the academic landscape. While some scholars suggest that the term’s origins reside in the works of Venezuelan author Antonio Pasquali as early as 1963,⁴ the author and sociologist, Herbert Schiller, has since this time become more widely recognized as its proponent.⁵ Schiller, who in 1969 would compose what many academics considered to be the primary Cultural Imperialism source text *Mass Communication and American Empire*⁶ expands on this theory and others like it throughout his career. Primarily concerned with the proliferation of information and the influence of mass media, his works are central to discussions concerning the balance of power in the Information Age.

⁴ White.

⁵ Herbert Schiller, *Communication and Cultural Domination* (Armonk, NY: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1976).

⁶ Rodrigo Gomez Garcia and Ben Birkinbine, “Cultural Imperialism Theories,” Oxford Bibliographies, last modified June 27, 2018, <https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756841/obo-9780199756841-0209.xml>.

During previous decades, academic communities primarily used the term Cultural Imperialism to reference the United States.⁷ With the Vietnam War as a foundation for criticism, analysts at the time feared that larger powers such as the United States would replace smaller ones, though not through necessarily conventional imperial means.⁸ The term “McDonaldization” would arise to describe the effects of large, global corporations on foreign populations.⁹ Not only could global businesses like McDonald’s be seen as invasive, pushing out local businesses, but at scale, the supply demands could arguably have forced ecological changes.¹⁰ The high demand for beef, lettuce, and other ingredients, as well as the logistics needed to distribute these products worldwide, would disrupt far more than just dietary options.¹¹ In the modern era, colonial strategies or mass migrations would no longer be required to influence and enforce the adoption of foreign behaviors. Globalization would tie the world together through the import and export of material goods. As Lane Crothers suggests in his work on the relationship between Cultural Imperialism and globalization, “*cultural products* are carriers of *cultural values*” and, thus “the integration of new cultural artifacts into existing cultures can change those cultures in substantial ways [emphasis added].”¹² By extension, the more effective a culture is in expanding its global market reach, the more likely it is to spread aspects of its culture to others’ shores.

As this chapter highlights, other terms have materialized in response to like-minded geo-political concerns. Marxist author Raymond Williams would agree that the terms neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism attempt to address similar types of phenomena. Another term coined by Western political theorists, Soviet Imperialism, was later referred to as Social Imperialism by the Chinese to describe the Soviet style of influence over various satellite

⁷ Lane Crothers, “Cultural Imperialism,” in *The SAGE Handbook of Globalization*, ed. Paul Battersby, Joseph Siracusa, and Manfred Steger (London: SAGE 2014), 6, <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781473906020>.

⁸ Crothers, 6.

⁹ Crothers, 6.

¹⁰ Crothers, 6.

¹¹ Crothers, 6.

¹² Crothers, 6.

nations.¹³ In contrast, the author Barry Sautman, an expert on Asian affairs, offers that “activists often use the term ‘cultural genocide’ metaphorically to denote any undesired, exogenous change in the culture of a subaltern ethnic group.”¹⁴

In any case, it is not within the scope of this thesis to argue for the universal validity of any single term. Instead, this thesis aims to first recognize that variations do exist and, second, to articulate these differences in the contexts of the case studies that follow. Doing so first requires the dissection of the term’s constituent parts, namely determining practical definitions for both culture and imperial.

1. What Is Culture?

The word “culture” tends to be the most capricious portion of the term Cultural Imperialism. Not only is it ambiguous, but it is difficult to define and tends toward misuse.¹⁵ In order to reveal the term’s many issues, in 2012 Helen Spencer-Oatey assembled a comprehensive collection of definitions ranging throughout the field of study entitled “What is Culture?” She aptly notes the following, as per a quote extracted from the ten-volume 2001 edition of the *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*: “Despite a century of efforts to define culture adequately, there was in the early 1990s no agreement among anthropologists regarding its nature.”¹⁶

Upon acknowledging that even anthropologists cannot seem to agree on a definition of culture, Spencer-Oatey compares multiple contrasting propositions in an attempt to showcase the variance of opinions among scholars:

Culture ... is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.¹⁷

¹³ Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (Cary, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1985), 113, ProQuest

¹⁴ Barry Sautman, *Cultural Genocide and Asian State Peripheries* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 2, ProQuest.

¹⁵ Spencer-Oatey, “What Is Culture? A Compilation of Quotations,” 1.

¹⁶ Spencer-Oatey, 1.

¹⁷ E. B. Tyler, *Primitive Culture* (1871), 6, quoted in Spencer-Oatey, “What Is Culture?” 2.

Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other, as conditional elements of future action.¹⁸

Culture consists of the derivatives of experience, more or less organized, learned or created by the individuals of a population, including those images or encodements and their interpretations (meanings) transmitted from past generations, from contemporaries, or formed by individuals themselves.¹⁹

[Culture] is the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another.²⁰

the set of attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors shared by a group of people, but different for each individual, communicated from one generation to the next.²¹

Spencer-Oatey finally draws upon her own definition, published in 2008:

Culture is a fuzzy set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, beliefs, policies, procedures and behavioural conventions that are shared by a group of people, and that influence (but do not determine) each member's behaviour and his/her interpretations of the 'meaning' of other people's behaviour.²²

This broad range of sentiments, spanning from the somewhat general to incredibly specific, acts as a sort of academic thermometer for predicting the metaphoric temperature of the debate surrounding the meaning of culture. Over time, definitions appear to have become vaguer and, by association, the conflicting discourse erodes any attempt to effectively define and analyze Cultural Imperialism as well.

¹⁸ Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (1952), 18, quoted in Spencer-Oatey, "What Is Culture?" 2.

¹⁹ T. Schwartz, "Anthropology and Psychology," in *New Directions in Psychological Anthropology* (1992), 324, quoted in Spencer-Oatey, "What Is Culture?" 2.

²⁰ Geert Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind* (1994), 5, quoted in Spencer-Oatey, "What Is Culture?" 2.

²¹ D. Matsumoto, *Culture and Psychology* (1996), 16, quoted in Spencer-Oatey, "What Is Culture?" 2.

²² Spencer-Oatey, "What Is Culture? A Compilation of Quotations," 2.

Indeed, Spencer-Oatey's use of the word "fuzzy" in defining culture sets the stage for the discussion of Cultural Imperialism.²³ She also notes that "culture is learned, not inherited,"²⁴ which alludes to the mutable aspects culture can demonstrate. However, while this study agrees with Spencer-Oatey's implication that no singular definition succeeds in satisfying all scholars, arriving at some definitional commonality remains essential for the deeper discussion of Cultural Imperialism.

2. What Is Imperialism?

As per the objective of this thesis, understanding imperialism becomes equally as important as understanding culture. Welsh Marxist scholar Raymond Williams delineates imperialism into two categories, political systems and economic systems, in his 1985 work, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*.²⁵ His writings have since acted as an anchor for theorists in related fields, during their discussions of the imperialism topic.

First, the political system of imperialism, as Williams notes, involves the governance of colonies "from a political centre."²⁶ This style of control tends to be more representative of nineteenth century empires, such as the British Empire.²⁷ Second, the economic system of imperialism incorporates "external investment [s] and control of markets and sources of raw materials"²⁸ Williams emphasizes that this economic-focused category of imperialism tends to be associated with what other theorists have, in a more recent world historical perspective, deemed American imperialism. Ultimately though, the establishment of the most frequently used term Cultural Imperialism, became common to the lexicon in the 1960s.²⁹ Other terms bare striking similarities worth mentioning as well. The words "imperialism" and

²³ Spencer-Oatey, 2.

²⁴ Spencer-Oatey, 6.

²⁵ Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, 113.

²⁶ Williams, 13.

²⁷ Williams, 113.

²⁸ Williams, 113.

²⁹ Williams, 113.

“colonialism” are rarely discussed apart from one another, and they must both be examined, however briefly.

Colonialism, according to the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, is defined as “a practice of domination, which involves the subjugation of one people to another.”³⁰ Often, colonialism and imperialism are used synonymously to describe the exertion of political and economic powers, very similar to Williams’ analysis of imperialism.

However, an important distinction between the two can be drawn from each word’s etymological roots.

The term colony comes from the Latin word *colonus*, meaning farmer. This root reminds us that the practice of colonialism usually involved the transfer of population to a new territory, where the arrivals lived as permanent settlers while maintaining political allegiance to their country of origin. Imperialism, on the other hand, comes from the Latin term *imperium*, meaning to command. Thus, the term imperialism draws attention to the way that one country exercises power over another, whether through settlement, sovereignty, or indirect mechanisms of control.³¹

As observed from their etymology, colonialism stems from more humble beginnings and has become, somewhat erroneously, synonymous with imperialism. Acknowledging this difference is vital to achieve a foundation for understanding Cultural Imperialism as discussed further in this study. Here, the act of colonization essentially describes the moving and settling of persons irrespective of any governmental agendas to seize territory and exercise sovereignty by extension. Accordingly, while colonization and imperialism have been known to occur in conjunction with one another, this study addresses them as separate phenomena.

Another related term, neo-colonialism, bears mentioning, for the term’s rise in popularity around the same time as the term Cultural Imperialism. In his 2017 article, “Let’s Talk About Neo-Colonialism in Africa,” Professor Mark Langan of Newcastle University addresses the need to examine neo-colonialism as a catalyst for Africa’s continual poverty. Citing “donor governments and foreign corporations’ behavior in Africa,” Langan makes the

³⁰ *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, s.v. “Colonialism,” accessed October 18, 2019, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/colonialism/>.

³¹ *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, “Colonialism.”

argument that such activities have essentially fleeced Africa for its resources without improving the well-being of its people.³² He gives credence to neo-colonialism's definition in Kwame Nkrumah's key text *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, published in 1965, "the concept of neo-colonialism warns us of the potential regressive impact of unregulated forms of aid, trade and foreign direct investment in relation to poverty reduction and wellbeing in African countries."³³

Yet, African nations are not the only susceptible targets of neo-colonialism. Langan notes that, while countries may retain their "flag-independence," their social and cultural sovereignty could become usurped by the economic and political interference of others.³⁴ He also catalogs neo-colonialism as "the last stage of imperialism," which is helpful in providing context to neo-colonialism's relationship to the bigger picture.³⁵ Even if specific acts of colonialism (the settling of peoples) might not occur in conjunction with acts of neo-colonialism, the concept is worth reviewing for its unique origin, context, social importance, and relationship to adjacent conversations.

Through inspection of these previous scholars' comments on the matter, it becomes clear that, as Williams notes, "imperialism, like any word which refers to fundamental social and political conflicts, cannot be reduced, semantically, to a single proper meaning."³⁶ While these terms are similar in scope, and have been ascribed similar meanings by a myriad of authorities on the matter, the "historical and contemporary variations of meaning point to real processes which have to be studied in their own terms."³⁷ Most importantly, Williams' perspective on imperialism is extremely useful because it acknowledges how the definition has

³² Mark Langan, "Let's Talk about Neo-Colonialism in Africa," *Global Policy Journal*, last modified November 16, 2017, <https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/16/11/2017/let%E2%80%99s-talk-about-neo-colonialism-africa>.

³³ Langan.

³⁴ Langan.

³⁵ Langan.

³⁶ Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, 113.

³⁷ Williams, 13.

evolved to suit the changing world. For this same reason, this study assumes that similar dynamics pertain to the usage and evolution of the term Cultural Imperialism.

B. WHAT IS (AND IS NOT) CULTURAL IMPERIALISM?

One of the problems surrounding the topic of Cultural Imperialism is that it can relate to “a range of broadly similar phenomenon.”³⁸ Livingston White, in his paper “Reconsidering Cultural Imperialism Theory,” best summarizes the issue as follows:

Critical theorists have coined various phrases in reference to notions of “cultural imperialism.” An examination of the international communication literature will reveal several different terms such as “media imperialism” (Boyd-Barrett, 1977); “structural imperialism” (Galtung, 1979); “cultural dependency and domination” (Link, 1984; Mohammadi, 1995); “cultural synchronization” (Hamelink, 1983); “electronic colonialism” (McPhail, 1987); “communication imperialism” (Sui-Nam Lee, 1988); “ideological imperialism,” and “economic imperialism”(Mattleart, 1994) - all relating to the same basic notion of cultural imperialism. Different international scholars who have written on the subject attribute its beginnings to different sources as well.³⁹

The overt divergence of opinions exposes a lack of consensus on the context in which the term Cultural Imperialism has been warranted. White furthers this point by noting, “a review of the cultural imperialism literature reveals that cultural imperialism has been used as a framework by scholars of other academic backgrounds and various disciplines to explain phenomena in the areas of international relations, anthropology, education, sciences, history, literature, and sports.”⁴⁰ The various norms and practices of each of these disciplines no doubt had some impact on their representative use of the term Cultural Imperialism. Author John Tomlinson suggests, “to produce a non-controversial definition ... would be extremely difficult,” arguing that “the concept of cultural imperialism is one which must be assembled

³⁸ John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 9.

³⁹ White, “Reconsidering Cultural Imperialism Theory.”

⁴⁰ White.

out of its discourse.”⁴¹ Essentially, even the experts on Cultural Imperialism must define what they mean by the term, before they use it among themselves.

Tomlinson further argues that “the various critiques of cultural imperialism could be thought of as (in some cases inchoate) protests against the spread of (capitalist) modernity.”⁴² The critique is not new, however, and Tomlinson expands his point by offering imagery consistent with most peoples’ idea of what Cultural Imperialism means: “nineteenth century European missionaries washing out the mouths of children for speaking their own language.”⁴³ Scenes like this one “invoke an idea of cultural imposition by coercion.”⁴⁴ This idea of supposedly “advanced” societies physically forcing less developed groups into various forms of compliance is critical to giving meaning behind the term Cultural Imperialism.

But, while Tomlinson’s depiction of cultural imposition by coercion remains generally understood he offers this concept merely as a strawman, in light of the broader injustices that took place. Indeed, such practices (and far worse) were integral components of broader imperial objectives for many rising empires throughout history. Additionally, as time has progressed, so has technology and, thus, the techniques employed to achieve the same compliance results more efficiently. “What dogs the critique of cultural imperialism is the problem of explaining how a cultural practice can be imposed in a context which is no longer actually coercive.”⁴⁵ With new advances come new ways for Cultural Imperialism to move from being coercive to being met with apathy, and sometimes even assent.

On this same point, Joseph S. Nye Jr. might agree that coercion simply is not necessary when more effective means, such as soft power, have become more easily implemented. In his 2004 book, Nye summarizes his concept as follows: “If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to use carrots [inducements] or sticks [threats] to make you do it.”⁴⁶ He

⁴¹ Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction*, 9.

⁴² Tomlinson, 173.

⁴³ Tomlinson, 173.

⁴⁴ Tomlinson, 173.

⁴⁵ Tomlinson, 173.

⁴⁶ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 6.

further mentions that “it is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence.” In line with Tomlinson’s point, attraction, not coercion, transforms the context in which new cultural practices becomes happily accepted instead of needing to be imposed and enforced.

However, Nye’s soft power concept cannot hope to exonerate Cultural Imperialism of its hard power roots. While the voluntary adoption of another culture’s traits might represent a portion of the total effect, Cultural Imperialism can be administered with both soft power and hard power; military pressure, economic strength, intellectual influence, and perhaps aspects of geographic opportunism as well. In fact, much of the existing work on Cultural Imperialism identifies a certain degree of asymmetry to the role of economics in cultural assimilation.⁴⁷

Herbert Schiller, having written the authoritative work on the topic of Cultural Imperialism in 1969, continued to expound on the theory throughout the 1970s. In his 1976 book, *Communication and Cultural Domination*, Schiller redefines the concept as follows:

The concept of cultural imperialism today best describes the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern world system and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even promote, the value and structures of the dominating center of the system.⁴⁸

A few elements of this text deserve special analysis. First, his suggestion that Cultural Imperialism involves bringing a society “into the modern world system” seems to imply an asymmetry in either social or economic advancement. However, it should be noted that his perspective originates in the 1970s, prior to numerous advancements which have since leveled the playing field in terms of information availability. Almost twenty years later, in 1995, Schiller would publish another book addressing this type of asymmetry entitled *Information Inequality*.

Next, Schiller’s use of “attracted, pressured, forced and sometimes bribed” captures a wide range of principles. Soft power comes to mind first. On the opposite side of the spectrum, so does the potential for violence despite what Cultural Imperialism has come to represent. It also leaves room for a number of different scenarios in which larger powers might attempt to

⁴⁷ Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction*, 3.

⁴⁸ Schiller, *Communication and Cultural Domination*, 3.

sink their claws into smaller powers. Economic coercion through trade, tariffs, taxes, and threats have become well-known terms in today's transnational lexicon. Not far behind, incentivization blurs the line dividing economic diplomacy and bribery.

Finally, Schiller's "shaping social institutions" implies a method or process through which change becomes the new normal, maybe tacitly, without the knowledge of those being assimilated. Perhaps this, again, is soft power at work; new ideas injected into a wanting system inspired to change on its own behalf. Or, is it possible that political dynamics have shifted to meet the demands of a new, foreign agenda, slowly morphing the social topography and washing it of its traditions, behaviors, and values? What, then, would it take to not only correspond to, but promote those of, what Schiller calls, the "dominating center of the system?"

Schiller's definition of Cultural Imperialism still resonates today. More importantly, it acts as the foundation for numerous other Cultural Imperialism theories that have emerged since the 1970s. The concerns today might not exclusively isolate smaller cultures or ethnicities supplanted by more powerful entities. However, it can be argued that our rapidly evolving, commercially driven world order has only accelerated the speed at which the shaping of social institutions, as noted in Schiller's definition, can take effect.

Today, simpler definitions might better describe the potential for Cultural Imperialism in the Information Age. The *SAGE Handbook of Globalization*, for instance, offers an amalgam which can be applied to situations in which both sides possess nearly equal influence: "Cultural imperialism ... is the systematic and fundamental replacing of one way of life with another, whether through direct overthrow or gradual displacement."⁴⁹

This definition uses the words "systematic" and "fundamental," suggesting that both intention and methodology aid in the execution of a foreign agenda. It also addresses culture as a "way of life," which is fundamentally replaced with another. Lastly, neither the speed nor the covertness of Cultural Imperialism matters. SAGE's definition allows for "direct overthrow or gradual replacement," implying that a range of techniques might be applied in order to achieve similar effects, though some might take more time than others.

⁴⁹ Crothers, "Cultural Imperialism," 4.

The abovementioned SAGE definition is both flexible and general enough to apply to a range of historic and modern-day examples of Cultural Imperialism. For this reason, and with respect to the many scholars which have contributed to the evolution of the term, this thesis will use this definition of Cultural Imperialism as a position from which to further discuss the following case studies.

C. SUMMARY

The varying and nuanced methods by which scholars define and use Cultural Imperialism can seem daunting to the unacquainted. The SAGE definition serves as an approachable and comprehensive definition for analysis of real-world Cultural Imperialism examples. The following case studies will underscore two major episodes of Cultural Imperialism: the American-Indian Wars and the persecution of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China. It should be noted that this thesis does not purport to illustrate a vast range of similarities between the two. Rather, very few resemblances actually exist. Among the similarities, geographic expansion, domestic imperialism, and forced assimilation act as the broader themes through which to compare these overt acts of Cultural Imperialism. Conversely, the differences in cultures, locations, and points in history provide new opportunities to contrast the efficacy of the techniques employed in either case. Finally, a comprehensive analysis of the following two cases (the American Indian Wars of the 1800s and the ongoing Chinese Strike Hard Campaign against Uyghur Muslims) will seek to contribute to the discussion of Cultural Imperialism as a matter of national importance.

III. THE AMERICAN INDIAN WARS OF THE 1800s

Previous comparisons of Native American tribes during their interactions with the U.S. federal government in the 1800s have focused predominately on the deals negotiated between parties, the honoring or dishonoring of those agreements, and the amount of land that changed hands. While these aspects contributed greatly to the overall outcomes associated with Western expansion, additional research can be accomplished in order to better understand the details which impacted the outcomes we know today. Research into the effects of social network building among the tribes themselves and the incorporation of social ties with the U.S. government might also reveal some reasons why certain tribes experienced comparative success compared to others.

This chapter seeks to look at the effects of Cultural Imperialism on Native American tribes, specifically from 1870 to 1890, to determine which tribes were better suited to withstand the actions and policies of the U.S. government and what aspects made these tribes more resilient overall.

A. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

Many definitions for Cultural Imperialism exist, as the effects of governments on indigenous populations have been a topic of pervasive study and interest. As previously stated, this chapter will use the following definition: “Cultural imperialism ... is the systematic and fundamental replacing of one way of life with another, whether through direct overthrow or gradual displacement.”⁵⁰ This definition addresses the what and how of Cultural Imperialism, without adding additional political bias or commentary. Such biases can be a risk when discussing sociological phenomena that carry, at best, a heinous reputation.⁵¹

Regarding the scope and value of this chapter, the authors neither desire to convey support for the previous practice of Cultural Imperialism nor any the related practices described in this case study, which suppressed and subjugated entire populations of people

⁵⁰ Crothers, “Cultural Imperialism,” 6.

⁵¹ Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction*, 173.

without valid rationale or purpose. This chapter is intended only to apply statistical analysis and social network analysis to the research question proposed, without commenting on the legal, moral, or ethical validity of the actions and conditions described. The authors report only how things were, according to sources now available, not how they should have been.

Given the abundance of historical information concerning the diplomatic interactions between Native American tribes and the U.S. government, which is most often analyzed from a qualitative perspective, the topic is ripe for statistical and social network analyses. Quantitative research and analysis, into which attributes, behaviors, and relationships best protected Native American tribes from the effects of Cultural Imperialism, are scarce. Therefore, in an attempt to apply quantitative analysis to the question of how some Native American tribes fared better than others, the following research question is posed: Which attributes, behaviors, and relationships best protected Native American tribes from the effects of Cultural Imperialism? If these indicators can be identified and compared, a profile could be developed to help explain which aspects a successful indigenous population might exhibit, in the face of future threats of Cultural Imperialism.

B. METHODS

This chapter uses three primary families of analysis: Temporal Analysis, Social Network Analysis, and Geospatial Analysis, to outline and discuss the factors influencing the population changes in forty separate Native American tribes, from 1870 to 1890. In this analysis, success is interpreted solely from an increase in total population between these years, since the variety of quality of life surveys which exist today were not available during the late 1800s.

Temporal Analysis shows Native American tribes' population change, between 1870 to 1890, with population growth signaling tribal success in diplomatic decision-making during that time period.

The Social Network Analysis (SNA) section of this chapter presents a comparison of tribal kinship/language ties, cooperative/harmful relationships between tribes and the U.S. government, and the adoption of treaty agreements. SNA metrics utilized include: Degree

Centrality, Betweenness, Closeness, and discussion on Modularity of the most influential Native American tribal groups in the dataset.

Finally, Geospatial Analysis shows where tribal population changes physically occurred, based on Native American Reservation location. It is also used to depict the greatest concentrations of Native American tribes' likely belief and disbelief in future diplomatic measures. This metric of diplomatic trust is based upon the sum of past positive and negative experiences, leading up to 1890, by Native American Reservation location.

C. DATA COLLECTION AND STRUCTURE

Two sources are preeminent in providing the information needed for this chapter. First, Powell's 1896 report "Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution"⁵² outlines the diplomatic agreements the United States government entered into with individual Native American tribes, broken down by the individual agreement's signatory tribes and date of signing. This list of agreements was for land allotment, which offered a set amount of land per Native American tribe member, most often amounting to 160 acres for a head of household, 80 acres for a single adult, or 40 acres for an orphan child, according to the Dawes Act in 1887.⁵³ Further impacting these individual allotments, versus mass land grants to whole Native American tribes, the Indian Appropriations Act of 1871 dictated that the United States cease to recognize the independence of Native American tribes.⁵⁴ The treaties outlined in Powell's report are therefore more akin to agreements for tribes to abide by U.S. governmental land allotment policy without offering resistance, rather than outright legally binding treaties between two sovereign nations.

⁵² J. W. Powell, "Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution" (U.S. House of Representatives, 1899), U.S. Senate Library, <http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llss&fileName=4000/4015/llss4015.db&recNum=0>.

⁵³ *Encyclopedia of North American Indians*, s.v. "Dawes Act," accessed October 18, 2019, https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/hmenai/dawes_act/0?institutionId=901.

⁵⁴ *Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*, s.v. "Indian Appropriations Act (1871)," accessed October 18, 2019, <http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781604265767.n289>.

Second, Russell Thornton, in his 1981 article, “Demographic Antecedents of a Revitalization Movement: Population Change, Population Size, and the 1890 Ghost Dance” in *American Sociological Review*, studies the changes in Native American tribe populations between 1870 and 1890, based upon the tribes’ participation in the Ghost Dance Movement of 1890.⁵⁵ This article consolidates the census data for all tribes examined in this chapter, for both 1870 and 1890. All tribes analyzed in this chapter are represented by census data and any Native American tribes without census data available are excluded.

Additionally, Finkelman and Garrison’s 2009 *Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*⁵⁶ and Houghton Mifflin’s 1996 *Encyclopedia of North American Indians*⁵⁷ are used to identify historical allies and enemies of Native American tribes, and to identify which major named events, such as wars, massacres, and other key historical events, include which specific tribes. For comparison, these key events are ascribed positive values, such as +3 for kinship, +1 for cooperation/association in a single, cooperative endeavor, and +1 for shared language. They are also assigned negative values, such as -1 for each year fought in a named war, -1 per named massacre/atrocity, and -3 for historical enemies.

Finally, this chapter explores Social Network Analysis concepts, as related to Rogers’s 2003 *Diffusion of Innovations* discusses the spread of ideas across connected networks⁵⁸ and Maoz et al.’s 2007 “What is the Enemy of My Enemy? Causes and Consequences of Imbalanced International Relations, 1816–2001” from *The Journal of Politics* describes why some antagonists will ally themselves against a larger perceived threat.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Russell Thornton, “Demographic Antecedents of a Revitalization Movement: Population Change, Population Size, and the 1890 Ghost Dance,” *American Sociological Review* 46, no. 1 (February 1981): 88, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2095028>.

⁵⁶ *Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*, accessed October 18, 2019, <http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781604265767>.

⁵⁷ *Encyclopedia of North American Indians*, accessed October 18, 2019, <https://search.credoreference.com/content/title/hmenai?tab=entries&institutionId=901>.

⁵⁸ Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations*, 5th ed. (New York: Free Press, 2003).

⁵⁹ Zeev Maoz et al., “What Is the Enemy of My Enemy? Causes and Consequences of Imbalanced International Relations, 1816–2001,” *The Journal of Politics* 69, no. 1 (February 2007): 100–115, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00497.x>.

Rogers's concept of "compatibility" with an innovation, in this instance a tribe's agreement to a bilateral agreement with the U.S. government, requires that the tribe can internally reconcile the agreement with its own beliefs and values.⁶⁰ It is possible that tribes who entered into treaties earlier and often, thus signaling compatibility, were more successful than others.

Maoz et al. explain the old adage of enemies of enemies being friends by showing these relationships do statistically produce more opportunistic allies: "Enemies of enemies are three times more likely to become allies than is to be expected by chance alone."⁶¹ Additionally, weak ties among a network can influence partnerships forming as well, though: "both indirect enmity and direct enmity actually *increase the probability of alliance* [emphasis original],"⁶² which could help to explain why Native American tribes' relationships might have changed among themselves, with the additional impact of the U.S. government in their immediate given areas.

D. DATA ANALYSIS

Figure 1 illustrates the population change, between 1870 and 1890, among those tribes which entered into diplomatic agreements with the U.S. government, while Figure 2 depicts population changes in Non-Treaty tribes, during the same time frame. Out of the total 28 tribes which entered into treaties with the U.S. government and the 12 which did not, 8 of 28 and 4 of 12, respectively, showed population growth between 1870 and 1890. While a 28.6% treaty success rate is only slightly better than 25% non-treaty rate, tribes that entered into treaties only lost an average of 11.77 members annually, from a starting population of 94,964, versus the 6.36 average number of members lost by non-treaty tribes, from their starting collective 10,591 members. This seems to greatly support the position of Native American tribes entering treaties, as these tribes only lost an average 0.001% per year, while non-treaty tribes lost far more than this amount, at an average of 0.06% lost per year. The scale of differences

⁶⁰ Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations*, 240.

⁶¹ Maoz et al., "What Is the Enemy of My Enemy?" 108.

⁶² Maoz et al., "What Is the Enemy of My Enemy?" 111.

in total population, among treaty and non-treaty tribes, can be observed at a glance between Figures 1 and 2.




Figure 1. Native American Population Change, from 1870–1890, in Native American Tribes that Entered Treaties with the U.S. Government⁶³

⁶³ Adapted from Thornton, “Demographic Antecedents of a Revitalization Movement,” 94–95; Powell, “Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution.”




Figure 2. Native American Population Change, from 1870–1890, in Native American Tribes that Did Not Enter Treaties with the U.S. Government ⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Adapted from Thornton, 94–95; Powell.

These two graphs alone seem to support the sagacity of tribes who entered into agreements with the U.S. government, and they support Rogers’ general claim that innovators can benefit over those who stay stagnant.⁶⁵ However, population change alone does not address the nuances involved with individual tribe’s decision-making process, based upon each tribe’s unique history and situation. This requires social network analysis to help refine the answers to a historical question of how some Native American tribes fared better than others, when facing Western expansionism.




Figure 3. Native American Population Change, from 1870–1890, by Official Reservation Location⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations*.

⁶⁶ Adapted from Thornton, “Demographic Antecedents of a Revitalization Movement,” 94–95; “American Indian/Alaskan Native/Native Hawaiian Map,” U.S. Census Bureau, accessed October 18, 2019, <https://www.census.gov/geographies/mapping-files/time-series/geo/carto-boundary-file.html>.

In Figure 3, the Navajo Nation and Hopi reservations show that the greatest population increases occurred in Northeast Arizona/Northwest New Mexico, the Kansa decreased, and the Sioux decreased significantly in Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota. This appears to refute the reported impact westward expansion by European settlers was having on Native American tribal concentrations on reservation lands and the impact had by the fiercest resistance to reservations by Navajo and Apache warriors.⁶⁷ While one quarter to one-third of tribes experienced population growth from 1870 to 1890, they were simultaneously also experiencing greater limitations due to their relegation to smaller designated geographic locations.

Social network analysis allows for comparison of, and a further refined explanation for, both successful and unsuccessful growth in Native American tribes during this era. Figure 4 depicts the social ties that were present among Native American tribes and the U.S. government by 1890. The ties between actors in this network have been both colored and weighted, to show which tribes had more ties and which varieties of ties were prevalent. The figure depicts kinship ties in yellow (valued at +3), shared language families in orange (valued +1), and historical enemy relationships in red (valued at -3). Comparison of the tribes who demonstrated population growth does indicate a combination of Kinship and Language ties in these relationships, increasing tribes' degree frequency and significantly improving tribes' chances of success. The greatest correlation between a Social Network measurement and tribal success by 1890 is with degree frequency, at 0.218. This is statistically significant, and it does directly reflect the number of kin and language ties influencing success within the network. All of the tribes with population growth had either kinship ties, shared language families, or both, while there are only three tribes (Arapaho, Apache-Mescalero, and Comanche) who were decreasing in population while also bearing the same two positive social traits.

These recurring traits, in successful groups, intuitively make sense, since those tribes able to communicate with other tribes would be able to pass on vital information

⁶⁷ *Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*, s.v. "Apache Wars (1860–1886)," accessed October 18, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781604265767.n38>.

about successful negotiation tactics, upcoming threats, and other vital pieces of information. By offering mutual support to each other, these tribes ensured a greater likelihood of the success of their tribes and other closely associated partner tribes.




Figure 4. Native American Tribe and U.S. Government Relational Ties circa 1890⁶⁸

Additional inspection of the in-groups represented shows the Algonquian (Plains) language group and the Athabaskan language group occupying a significant portion of the most influential in-group (6 of 8 tribes, excluding the U.S. government). The strong presence of one language group is also a significant support for the importance of communication between tribes predicting their greater success. The two other occupants of

⁶⁸ Adapted from Powell, “Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution.”; Thornton, “Demographic Antecedents of a Revitalization Movement.”; *Encyclopedia of North American Indians*; *Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*.

this in-group were dominant in other ways, with the Sioux being the largest tribe by far (depicted by the relative size of the Sioux node in Figures 4 and 5), and with the Comanche tying themselves to many endeavors embarked upon by the Athabaskan language tribes.




Figure 5. Native American Tribe and U.S. Government Relational Ties at K-Core 6 (All Actors with 6 Ties or Greater) circa 1890⁶⁹

Participation in these treaties, and conflicts with the U.S. federal government, along with the interactions with other tribes, also had an impact on how these tribes could be expected to enter into further negotiations with the U.S. government. Figure 6 outlines the positive and negative historical impacts on individual tribes. Positive experiences, such as those of new treaties with the United States and governmental policies supporting Native

⁶⁹ Adapted from Powell; Thornton; *Encyclopedia of North American Indians*; *Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*.

American self-governance, enhance the ability for these tribes to trust in the truth and efficacy of agreements with the United States. Broken agreements, atrocities carried out by U.S. government representatives, and policies which eroded Native American tribal autonomy likely had the opposite effect.

By using combined data from Tables 1 and 2, Figure 6 depicts which specific tribes, by reservation location, were likely to have more or less trust in diplomatic agreements, by 1890. The Navajo Nation is depicted with the greatest amount of distrust in the U.S. government, due to the long Navajo War (1849-1868), the Navajo “Long Walk” (1864),⁷⁰ and various conflicts which the Navajo engaged upon with their allies.⁷¹

Table 1. Historical Events of Significant Tribal Impact, circa 1890, and Their Expected Diplomatic Impacts, as a Cumulative Trust Total, by Tribe⁷²

Tribe	Treaty Year ¹ (+1 Trust Pt. Ea.)	War/ Massacre Year ² (-1 Trust Pt./Yr.)	Other Policy Pair ² (Either +/-1 Trust Pt. Ea.)	Trust Point Total
Hopi	None		1882 (+1)**	1
Caddo	None			0
Havasupai	None			0
Hidatsa	None			0
Kichai	None			0
Mojave	None			0
Osage	None			0
Washo	None			0
Tule River	None			0
Delaware	1854, 1860, 1866		1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-2
Kickapoo	1854, 1862, 1891		1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-2

⁷⁰ *Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*, s.v. “Navajo War (1849–1868),” accessed October 18, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781604265767.n457>.

⁷¹ *Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*, “Apache Wars (1860–1886).”

⁷² Adapted from *Encyclopedia of North American Indians*; *Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*.

Tribe	Treaty Year¹ (+1 Trust Pt. Ea.)	War/ Massacre Year² (-1 Trust Pt./Yr.)	Other Policy Pair² (Either +/-1 Trust Pt. Ea.)	Trust Point Total
Uta	1868, 1880, 1894, 1895	1879 Ute War	1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-2
Crow	1868, 1882, 1890		1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-2
Sauk & Fox	1830, 1854, 1859	1832 Black Hawk War	1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-3
Sioux	1830, 1854, 1868, 1876, 1886, 1889, 1892	1857 Spirit Lake Uprising, 1865-1868 Bozeman Trail War	1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-3
Oto Missouri	1854 x2		1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-3
Omaha	1854, 1865		1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-3
Iowa	1854, 1890		1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-3
Gros Ventre	1886x2		1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-3
Walapai	None	1866-1868 Snake War		-3
Chippewa-Lake Superior	1854		1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-4
Winnebago	1855, 1859	1832 Black Hawk War	1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-4
Kansa	1859		1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-4
Potawatomi	1861, 1890	1832 Black Hawk War	1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-4
Shoshoni	1868, 1880	1860 Pyramid Lake War	1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-4

Tribe	Treaty Year¹ (+1 Trust Pt. Ea.)	War/ Massacre Year² (-1 Trust Pt./Yr.)	Other Policy Pair² (Either +/-1 Trust Pt. Ea.)	Trust Point Total
Pawnee	1876		1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-4
Arikara	1886		1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-4
Mandan	1886		1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-4
Assiniboin	1886		1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-4
Wichita	1891		1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-4
Bannock	1868, 1880	1860 Pyramid Lake War, 1878 Bannock War	1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-5
Kiowa	1867	1874-1875 Red River War	1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-6
Comanche	1867	1874-1875 Red River War	1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-6
Ponka	1889	1877-1878 Ponka Removal	1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-6
Cheyenne	1867, 1868, 1890	1864- Sand Creek Massacre, 1865-1868 Bozeman Trail War, 1874-1875 Red River War	1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-9
Arapaho	1876, 1890	1865-1868 Bozeman Trail War, 1874-1875 Red River War	1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-9
Nez Perce	1855, 1863, 1868, 1893	1848-1855 Cayuse War, 1877 Nez Perce War	1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*	-10

Tribe	Treaty Year ¹ (+1 Trust Pt. Ea.)	War/ Massacre Year ² (-1 Trust Pt./Yr.)	Other Policy Pair ² (Either +/-1 Trust Pt. Ea.)	Trust Point Total
Navaho	1868	1849-1868, Navaho War, 1864 Navaho “Long Walk”	1823-1832 (-1), 1846 (-1), 1865 (-1), 1866 (+1), 1871 (-1), 1883 (+1), 1885 (-1), 1886 (-1), 1887 (-1)*, 1882 (-1)**	-26
Apache-Mescalero	None	1860-1886 Apache Wars, 1871 Camp Grant Massacre		-28
Apache-Jicarilla	None	1860-1886 Apache Wars, 1871 Camp Grant Massacre		-28

¹ J. W. Powell, “Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution” (U.S. House of Representatives, 1896), <http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llss&fileName=4000/4015/llss4015.db&recNum=0>.

² Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law, CQ Press Political Reference Suite (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009).

* Policy Pairs include: Marshall Trilogy 1823–1832 (-1), *U.S. v. Rogers* 1846 (-1), *U.S. v. Holliday* 1865 (-1), *The Kansas Indians* 1866 (+1), Indian Appropriations Act 1871 (-1), *Ex Parte Crow Dog* 1883 (+1), Major Crimes Act 1885 (-1), *U.S. v. Kagama* 1886 (-1), and Dawes Severalty Act 1887 (-1).

**Includes: Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute 1882

Table 2. Native American Population Growth and Cumulative Diplomatic Trust Averages circa 1890⁷³

Native American Population Change-Trust Value Comparison		
Tribe	Pop. Change (Annual Avg.)	Trust Point Total
Navaho	206.6	-26
Chippewa- Lake Superior	71.85	-4
Uta	11.2	-2
Cheyenne	10.15	-9
Mandan	7.15	-4
Gros Ventre	5.9	-3
Sauk & Fox	5.45	-3
Omaha	4.85	-3
Delaware	-1	-2
Assiniboin	-2.4	-4
Kickapoo	-2.55	-2
Potawatomi	-2.7	-4
Oto Missouri	-4.5	-3
Wichita	-4.65	-4
Comanche	-4.85	-6
Bannock	-8.8	-5
Kiowa	-9.6	-6
Arikara	-11.15	-4
Iowa	-13.1	-3
Kansa	-15.1	-4
Winnebago	-18	-4
Pawnee	-35.85	-4
Nez Perce	-50	-10
Crow	-50.65	-2
Shoshoni	-66.15	-4
Arapaho	-92.2	-9
Sioux	-247.8	-3
Ponka	3.45	-6
Total Average	-11.23035714	-5.107142857
Non-treaty Tribes	Pop. Change (Annual Avg.)	Trust Point Total
Caddo	-6.8	0
Havasupai	-3.9	0
Hidatsa	2.8	0
Apache- Mescalero	-1.85	-28
Apache- Jicarilla	2	-28
Kichai	-1.9	0
Mojave	24.45	0
Osage	-74.55	0
Hopi	31.55	1
Walapai	-32.5	-3
Washo	-5	0
Tule River	-10.65	0
Total Average	-6.3625	-4.833333333

⁷³ Adapted from Thornton, "Demographic Antecedents of a Revitalization Movement"; *Encyclopedia of North American Indians; Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*.




Figure 6. Native American Cumulative Diplomatic Trust Values, circa 1890, by Official Reservation Location⁷⁴

E. INTERVENTION STRATEGIES

While the historical situations faced by the Native American tribes in the late 1800s are long past, some lessons may be learned regarding the likelihood of successful and mutually beneficial diplomatic agreements between indigenous peoples and sovereign nations who claim some authority over those peoples.

First, nations seeking to garner diplomatic cooperation from indigenous populations must synchronize their diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) strategies when engaging indigenous populations diplomatically. Government policy messaging must match military engagement techniques and military presence for

⁷⁴ Adapted from *Encyclopedia of North American Indians; Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*; “United States Administrative Area Map,” GADM, accessed October 18, 2019, <http://www.diva-gis.org/gdata>; U.S. Census Bureau, “American Indian/Alaskan Native/Native Hawaiian Map.”

security should accompany economic incentive programs. If the incentive programs are all-or-nothing, meaning complete compliance with stipulations to receive the offered incentives, these incentives can easily be labeled a bribe, “blood money,” or any other disparaging epithet that a resistance movement can muster. While still difficult to tabulate, stories of the number of historical instances where a tribe did not receive some promised subsistence benefit because of non-compliance with all stipulations on those benefits, are too numerous to have not been detrimental to diplomatic progress.⁷⁵ Indigenous populations, which historically have little say over their autonomy, are more likely to cooperate diplomatically if they are not held hostage by basic subsistence needs.

Second, nations must not back indigenous diplomatic opponents into a physical corner. These groups, facing more military pressure, often become desperate and resist diplomatic efforts more fiercely. This was particularly observed in the Navajo and Apache tribes’ resistance to mandatory relocation to reservations⁷⁶ and to aggressive enforcement by U.S. Army units.⁷⁷ By not restricting or isolating indigenous population to only a very few areas, nations hopeful of gaining some ground in diplomatic discussions can prevent the collective psychological desperation that hinders diplomatic cooperation in a resistant and diplomatically hesitant indigenous population.

F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Two new hypotheses can be derived from the analysis conducted, which would also require further research and quantitative analysis to test. First, nations which have attempted diplomatic proceedings with their indigenous populations have been more successful at minimizing violent resistance than those who do not. Other nations of the world have their own indigenous populations, the Uyghur of China, the Kurds of Turkey

⁷⁵ *Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*, s. v. “U.S. Supreme Court and Indian Policy, 1871–1934,” accessed October 18, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781604265767.n668>; “General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) of 1887,” accessed October 18, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781604265767.n234>; “U.S. Supreme Court and Indian Policy, 1789–1871,” accessed October 18, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781604265767.n667>; “United States–Indian Wars (1848–1891),” accessed October 18, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781604265767.n663>.

⁷⁶ *Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*, “Apache Wars (1860–1886).”

⁷⁷ *Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*, “Navajo War (1849–1868).”

and Iraq, the Basque of France, and the Catalonians of Spain are all examples of dissenting indigenous groups, who have resisted assimilation and cultural imperialist tactics. These groups will likely continue to resist, unless their autonomy is recognized by their respective state governments. Data describing attempts to enter into diplomatic agreements, between groups like those listed and reflecting the impact of historical events, could help identify if diplomatic agreements have aided population growth in indigenous populations elsewhere.

Second, comparison of which indigenous populations were most successful at maintaining autonomy after entering into diplomatic agreements with a state government, would likely show these groups to demonstrate greater relative population growth. Diplomatic and economic decision-making is often difficult for a state to do for its own population, let alone for a population with different sets of customs, values, and goals. Indigenous populations who maintain greater autonomy would therefore be more likely to succeed in these areas. Again, comparison of the groups previously mentioned could reveal which of these groups is better at self-governance, based upon greater relative population growth, when compared with the others indigenous populations.

G. SUMMARY

The examination of relationships between Native American tribes and the U.S. government is complicated and simple statistical analysis alone cannot answer how, in the face of Cultural Imperialism, some tribes appear to have fared better than others. Other analysis forms, like Temporal Analysis, Social Network Analysis, and Geospatial Analysis, offer additional lenses through which insight can be gained. In the instance of Native American tribe relationships in the late 1800s, these analyses offer little in the way of solutions for those historical questions, but analysts witnessing similar situations in other states can glean valuable lessons for today. By using these lessons learned, and applying the myriad analysis tools available today, decision-makers can better interact diplomatically, especially with modern indigenous populations, while avoiding the pitfalls of America's Old West past.

Admittedly, many modern conflicts between indigenous populations and state governments might be more difficult to research and analyze, given the dearth of

information available. Such a case exists in the ongoing Strike Hard Campaign China is waging against the indigenous Uyghur Muslim population, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). For this reason, and to protect the identities and efforts of the Uyghurs resisting Chinese oppression, the following chapter will focus on qualitative analysis of this contemporary instance of Cultural Imperialism.

IV. CHINA'S DOMESTIC WAR ON ISLAM

This case study examines the events currently ongoing in Xinjiang, China. Recently, international outcry for the treatment of Xinjiang's indigenous populations, primarily referred to as the Uyghurs, has reached a fever pitch, drawing unanticipated attention to the conduct of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This chapter will first provide a brief historical overview of the region and its people. Next, it will provide the geo-political context in which the current situation has worsened, to include the numerous programs employed in the execution of the CCP's agenda. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the issues pertinent to the discussion of Cultural Imperialism.

A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF XINJIANG AND THE UYGHURS (TIME)

On October 1, 1955, Mao Zedong renamed Xinjiang, China, the "Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,"⁷⁸ (XUAR). Mostly, this was a thinly veiled attempt to assuage anti-Chinese sentiments blossoming from China's northwestern most region's indigenous, primarily Turkic Muslim inhabitants.⁷⁹ Xinjiang had already witnessed a few separatist revolts in the 1930s and 1940s which aimed at achieving independence as East Turkestan.⁸⁰ Thus, quelling any prospects for future uprisings would be vital to the success of Mao's fledgling communist administration.

However, much to the chagrin of the CCP, Mao's insincere affectations backfired. From 1955 onward, Xinjiang's residents, despite their numerous ethnic connections to Xinjiang's colorful past, rallied for independence and a right to autonomy.⁸¹ But, there would be other unintended side-effects as well. By officially deeming the region "Uyghur,"

⁷⁸ Dana Carver Boehm, "China's Failed War on Terror: Fanning the Flames of Uighur Separatist Violence," *Berkley Journal of Middle Eastern & Islamic Law* 2, no. 1 (2009): 79, <https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=jmeil>.

⁷⁹ S. Frederick Starr, *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland* (Armonk, NY: Routledge, 2004), 6, ProQuest.

⁸⁰ Starr, 6.

⁸¹ Starr, 13.

Xinjiang's otherwise disparate inhabitants unified under what has become the pan-Uyghur identity, fueling their perception of ownership over the region.⁸²

Ironically, the term Uyghur was inauthentic at best. The previous military governor of Xinjiang, Chinese Warlord Sheng Shicai, who reigned from the mid-1930s through the 1940s, had revived its usage, mimicking the Soviets' categorization of various ethnicities such as the Tajiks or Kyrgyz.⁸³ Prior to this, the word "Uyghur" had "last been used in almost half a millennium previously to describe the largely Buddhist population of the Turpan basin."⁸⁴ While some historic evidence purports a genealogical link to modern-day Uyghurs, the original Uyghurs, primarily nomads of Turko-Mongolian descent, vehemently opposed Muslims.⁸⁵ Not only had Mao inadvertently reinforced the foundation for another revolution in the future, but he had done so in ignorance (or denial) of historic context.⁸⁶ Today, the eroding situation exposes an additional layer of irony; that Mao, China's most infamous insurgent, unwittingly fostered China's present-day nationalist insurrection himself.

Xinjiang (which means "new frontier" or "new territory"⁸⁷) would neither be autonomous nor predominantly Uyghur for very long. Mao's attempt to win over the Turkic speakers came hand-in-hand with a programmed, incentivized barrage of ethnic-Han migrants who would eventually outnumber the indigenous Muslims in this once neglected desert province.⁸⁸ But this was not Beijing's first attempt at managing the future of Xinjiang. It had initially become incorporated in the 1880s under the Qing dynasty and

⁸² Starr, 13.

⁸³ Starr, 13.

⁸⁴ Dru C Gladney, "The Chinese Program of Development and Control, 1978–2001," in *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland* (Armonk: Routledge, 2004), 103, ProQuest.

⁸⁵ James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, "Political and Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region through the Late Nineteenth Century," in *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland* (Armonk: Routledge, 2004), 40–41, ProQuest.

⁸⁶ Gladney, "The Chinese Program of Development and Control, 1978–2001," 103.

⁸⁷ Starr, *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, 6.

⁸⁸ Starr, *Xinjiang* 7.

given its current namesake then.⁸⁹ As early as the mid-19th century, ethnic Hans had begun immigrating in search of opportunity and work.⁹⁰ Various events in Chinese history would, at times, disrupt the flow, but ultimately, Mao's communist victory in 1949 would ignite the fuse of Xinjiang's impending population boom. By the mid-1950s, the Communist party would plan to move 433,000 Han into the borderlands along with a robust support system of reception centers and counselors, while promising new homes to the willing.⁹¹

Prior to contemporary Chinese influences, the remote land of Xinjiang had been a field of conquest, trade, and cultural diffusion as a result of its uniquely central position on the Eurasian continent.⁹² Nomads from the north, the Mongols, the Manchus, various bands of marauders, and the Karakhanid Empire, among others, had all laid claim to the region at various points in history.⁹³ Numerous religions would influence Xinjiang as well, including Nestorianism, Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and Sufism.⁹⁴ Over the course of about two thousand years, conquest, war, trade, new languages, migrations, and innumerable other impacts would form an incredibly diverse pocket of culture and ethnicity, unlike any other in China.⁹⁵

Xinjiang today still resembles a major crossroads for trade and commerce throughout Central Asia, though perhaps for new reasons. Given China's economic rise in recent decades, Xinjiang has become especially relevant to Beijing. Not only is it rich in resources such as oil and natural gas, but China's Silk Road Economic Belt passes directly through it, a Chinese-controlled conduit to Eastern Europe and beyond.⁹⁶ Xinjiang is also

⁸⁹ Gladney, "The Chinese Program of Development and Control, 1978–2001," 103.

⁹⁰ Gladney, 103.

⁹¹ Boehm, "China's Failed War on Terror: Fanning the Flames of Uighur Separatist Violence," 84.

⁹² Starr, *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, 7.

⁹³ Starr, 8–9.

⁹⁴ Starr, 8.

⁹⁵ Millward and Perdue, "Political and Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region through the Late Nineteenth Century," 56.

⁹⁶ Richard Ghiassy and Jiayi Zhou, *The Silk Road Economic Belt: Considering Security Implications and EU–China Cooperation Prospects* (SIPRI, 2017): 2–3, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/13188-20170223.pdf>.

China's largest province, encompassing about one-sixth of China's total landmass, an area roughly 2.3 times the size of Texas.

Over time, the economic value of the seemingly dormant, arid, and inhospitable region would continue to rise, stimulating China's appetite to convert Xinjiang into a major economic hub.⁹⁷ Building a better infrastructure in order to increase the flow of traffic into the region would ultimately result in more influence from mainland China, reducing the footprint of the restive, indigenous Turkic Muslims over time.⁹⁸

B. XINJIANG, TERRORISM, AND NEW CHINESE TACTICS / TECHNIQUES

Recently, China's policies, which have focused on domestic ethnic affairs, have placed the cross-hairs squarely upon Xinjiang's Muslim inhabitants. The events of September 11th, 2001, acted as a catalyst for China's effort to exert control over the Uyghurs. Beijing's report, entitled "'East Turkistan' Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity" was released on January 21st, 2002, only four months following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.⁹⁹ This statement, announced by China's State Council Information Office, linked the worldwide threat of Islamic terror to its crackdown on indigenous Muslims in Xinjiang.¹⁰⁰ Various human rights groups and diplomatic officials responded in criticism.¹⁰¹

According to Mohan Malik of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. "flatly rejected attempts to equate the Uyghurs' independence movement in Xinjiang with the Taliban or al-Qaeda." China, on the other hand, sought to link the Uyghurs and their role during the

⁹⁷ Ghiasy and Zhou, 35.

⁹⁸ Mohan Malik, *Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China's Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses Post-September 11* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2002), 6–7, <https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA409339>.

⁹⁹ Malik, 22.

¹⁰⁰ Malik, 22.

¹⁰¹ Elisabeth Rosenthal, "A Nation Challenged: Asian Terror- Beijing Says Chinese Muslims Were Trained as Terrorists with Money from Bin Laden," *New York Times*, last modified January 22, 2002, <https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/22/world/nation-challenged-asian-terror-beijing-says-chinese-muslims-were-trained.html>.

Soviet occupation of Afghanistan with an updated narrative imbued with homegrown, resurgent terror. In his 2002 report, *Dragon on Terrorism*, Malik articulates this dilemma:

During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, the United States and China had collaborated in financing and arming resistances forces of Afghan mujahideens and Talibans (freedom fighters and Islamic students) through their mutual ally and frontline state, Pakistan, in order to evict the Soviets from that country...China had trained and dispatched Uighurs to fight against the Russians in Afghanistan, fearing that the old silk route along the Karakoram highway built across northern Kashmir could, in time, come under Moscow's domination if the Soviet Union was not dislodged from Kabul...The blowback for Beijing was the return of victorious Uighur jihadis (holy warriors) to Xinjiang, where some of them fueled the simmering insurgency for an independent Muslim Eastern Turkestan.¹⁰²

China's concerns over separatism were not necessarily unwarranted. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Beijing continued to dread that the new formation of the Central Asian states would spell a revitalized demand for Uyghur independence.¹⁰³ Like any Stalinized ethnic group, the Uyghurs felt as though they substantiated their own nation. The Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz had all acquired their own officially recognized states. Why had the Uyghurs, many of whom who had just returned from war, not been afforded the same? Furthermore, one must consider the historic, inter-ethnic nature of Xinjiang's proximity to Soviet territory. In an attempt to defend its ethnic descendants, would Russia ever aspire to covertly reconquer Xinjiang for the sake of those even minutely of Russian descendance? Such tactics employed in Eastern Europe have clearly provided strategic results for Vladimir Putin in the past. How would China enforce its reign?

1. The Strike Hard Campaign

By 2014, China would implement a program designed to "eradicate ideological viruses," according to Human Rights Watch, which has since drawn international attention

¹⁰² Malik, *Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China's Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses Post-September 11*, 5–6.

¹⁰³ Gladney, "The Chinese Program of Development and Control, 1978–2001," 191.

to numerous reports related to Xinjiang.¹⁰⁴ China's campaign, "Strike Hard Against Islamic Terror" ("Strike Hard," henceforth), would act as the foundation upon which new techniques for forced assimilation would be tested in an effort to slowly rid Xinjiang of its Turkic Muslim influences. Slowly, Beijing would exercise its powers over a perceivably foreign culture of nearly eleven-million Uyghurs residing within its own sovereign domain.

While Strike Hard may have emerged in 2014, according to Human Right Watch, "these efforts have been dramatically scaled up since late 2016, when Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo relocated from the Tibet Autonomous Region to assume leadership of Xinjiang."¹⁰⁵ The United Nations, as of 2018, claims that as many as one-million Uyghurs have since been placed in mandatory detention, perhaps as a result.¹⁰⁶ While his appointment in Xinjiang may appear as innocuous as any political transfer, Bloomberg reporting asserts that "more than any of China's top leaders currently in power, Chen has been at the forefront of China's efforts to subdue [Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan]."¹⁰⁷ In other words, this particular appointment by the CCP came with the explicit purpose of reforming Xinjiang and its minorities.

2. Becoming Family

The Strike Hard Campaign acts as an over-arching framework for executing smaller, more surgical initiatives to force-assimilate Uyghurs and other potentially troublesome minorities in Xinjiang. One such sub-program, according to Human Rights Watch, is called "Becoming Family."¹⁰⁸ Since December, 2017, Becoming Family has

¹⁰⁴ Maya Wang, "Eradicating Ideological Viruses: China's Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang's Muslims," Human Rights Watch, last modified September 9, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs>.

¹⁰⁵ Wang.

¹⁰⁶ "The Architect of China's Muslim Camps Is a Rising Star under Xi," Bloomberg News, September 27, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-27/the-architect-of-china-s-muslim-camps-is-a-rising-star-under-xi>.

¹⁰⁷ Bloomberg News.

¹⁰⁸ Wang, "Eradicating Ideological Viruses: China's Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang's Muslims."

been compulsory for residents of Xinjiang.¹⁰⁹ The program acts as a sort of homestay program whereby Chinese officials (cadre) spend five days out of every two months living with families residing mostly in Xinjiang’s countryside.¹¹⁰ The Orwellian implications are staggering. According to secondary reporting by Radio Free Asia, “the cadres teach the families Mandarin Chinese, make them sing the national anthem and other songs praising the ruling Communist Party in Chinese, and ensure families take part in a weekly flag-raising ceremony.”¹¹¹

3. Mass-Surveillance

With Chen’s arrival, numerous surveillance-state policies and tactics have become implemented in Xinjiang as well, many of which were field-tested in Tibet.¹¹² Primarily with the goal of social-engineering in mind, Chen has “not only transformed [Xinjiang] into the world’s most sophisticated police state—complete with networks of facial recognition cameras, ID-linked movement restrictions, and overwhelmingly large quantities of actual police—but also oversaw the construction of a frightening network of indoctrination camps and detention facilities now estimated to hold over a million people,”¹¹³ China has since redoubled its efforts to reach not only Uyghurs, but smaller ethnic, primarily Muslim, minorities as well.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁹ Wang.”

¹¹⁰ Wang.

¹¹¹ Joshua Lipes, “Xinjiang Authorities Regularly Impose ‘Home Stays’ on Muslim Uyghur Families: Rights Group,” Radio Free Asia, last modified May 14, 2018, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/homestays-05142018153305.html>.

¹¹² Gene A. Bunin, “Kyrgyz Students Vanish into Xinjiang’s Maw,” *Foreign Policy*, last modified March 31, 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/31/963451-kyrgyz-xinjiang-students-camps/>.

¹¹³ Bunin.

¹¹⁴ Bunin.

4. Biometrics and Travel Restriction

Xiao Qiang, Director of the Counter-Power Lab at the University of California–Berkeley’s School of Information, expounds further on the degree to which China has come to enable such a degree of “digital unfreedom.”¹¹⁵

As of September 2016, those applying for passports in Xinjiang had to provide a blood sample for DNA testing, along with other forms of biometric data (fingerprints, a voice recording, and a 3-D image of themselves).¹¹⁹ More recently, authorities have begun using obligatory health checks to obtain residents’ DNA and other identifying information.¹¹⁶

Assigning this kind of data allows authorities, not only to scrutinize reasons for foreign travel, but to restrict it all together. In 2016, Human Rights Watch reports denounced China for recalling passport privileges to many Uyghurs, similar to the travel restrictions faced by Tibetans, and presumably for the same reasons.¹¹⁷ However, it is also important to note that, Xinjiang is not the only testbed for this kind of technology. China’s State Council intends on tracking each Chinese citizen through biometrically authenticated data by 2020 in tandem with its nationwide Social Credit System.¹¹⁸

Restricting travel to Xinjiang’s Muslim population represents just one side of China’s goal. Human Rights Watch noted in 2018 that “the Chinese government has stepped up pressure on other governments to forcibly return Uyghurs in their countries to China.”¹¹⁹ Students, political refugees, or family members abroad seem to be subjected to the same scrutiny. “Sensitive Countries,” according to a list corroborated by numerous escaped Uyghurs, include virtually every prominently Muslim country in the world,

¹¹⁵ Xiao Qiang, “The Road to Digital Unfreedom: President Xi’s Surveillance State,” *Journal of Democracy* 30, no. 1 (January 9, 2019): 53–67, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0004>.

¹¹⁶ Qiang.

¹¹⁷ “China: Passports Arbitrarily Recalled in Xinjiang,” Human Rights Watch, November 21, 2016, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/21/china-passports-arbitrarily-recalled-xinjiang>.

¹¹⁸ Qiang, “The Road to Digital Unfreedom: President Xi’s Surveillance State,” 59.

¹¹⁹ Wang, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses: China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims.”

including all of Central Asia and Russia.¹²⁰ Those who have traveled to these countries “have families, or otherwise communicate with people there, have been interrogated, detained, and even tried and imprisoned.”¹²¹

5. Socially Engineered Ethnic Dilution

Controlling a population through technological means has been one of the great anticipations of the Information Age. Not long ago, such a notion would have been considered its own genre of science-fiction. But China has other, older techniques for solving problems that biometric surveillance cannot. For instance, the ethnic cacophony of Xinjiang and its ties to the rest of the Islamic world have fallen prey to China’s unblinking scrutiny. Here, China has opted to employ a long-game strategy.

Ethnic-Han workers have been migrating to Xinjiang for over a century, often through state-orchestrated incentivization.¹²² More recently though, Han migration seems self-initiated, likely due to the increased opportunities in Xinjiang.¹²³ One of these opportunities is inter-ethnic marriages. In 2014, for instance, “the Qiemo county government in Xinjiang reportedly announced it would give mixed couples — one Han, one ethnic minority — annual cash payments of 10,000 yuan (US\$1,450) for the first five years of their marriage,” according to the Hong Kong Free Press.¹²⁴

While aspects of this program might not officially fall within the bounds of the Strike Hard campaign, the implications are clear. By incentivizing ethnic-Han migrants to marry Turkic Muslim women, China guarantees the eventual genetic assimilation of Uyghurs and the likely dissolution of Islam in Xinjiang. Cash stipends are not the only

¹²⁰ Wang.

¹²¹ Wang.

¹²² Anthony Howell and C. Cindy Fan, “Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang: A Survey of Han and Uyghur Migrants in Urumqi,” *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 52, no. 1 (January 2011): 119, <https://doi.org/10.2747/1539-7216.52.1.119>.

¹²³ Howell and Fan, 119.

¹²⁴ Eva Xiao, “China Pushes Inter-Ethnic Marriage in Xinjiang Assimilation Drive,” Hong Kong Free Press HKFP, last modified May 18, 2019, <https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/05/18/china-pushes-inter-ethnic-marriage-xinjiang-assimilation-drive/>.

enticements, however. Recently, the regional government in Xinjiang announced that more “points” would be awarded to children of mixed descent (one Han, one minority parent), greatly affecting the odds of attending university in China.¹²⁵

6. Political Re-education

Perhaps the most pervasive aspect of Strike Hard has been the mass-incarceration of what appears to be roughly ten-percent of the Uyghur population. 2018 estimates indicate that around one million Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang have been held captive in what amount to “open political re-education camps for indoctrination and thought control in Xinjiang.”¹²⁶ This type of extra-judicial treatment applies beyond the confines of these camps as well. Many who have not been confined are allegedly “forced to attend day/evening “education sessions” for “de-radicalization” and indoctrination purposes,”¹²⁷ according to Chinese Human Rights Defenders, a grassroots activist group in China from which Human Rights Watch has drawn various reports. For these reasons, a comprehensive assessment as to the depth and breadth of this program has yet to be ascertained.

C. ANALYSIS / PURPOSE

The perceived threat of terrorism has enabled Beijing to take a hardline, group-punishment stance on the Uyghurs and other Muslim identities in Xinjiang. Coveted for its resources and access to Central Asia and Europe, Xinjiang maintains an essential role in the economic future of China, not only for trade, but for expansion as well. With a population of approximately 1.4 billion people, China recognizes that its populated, coastal regions will eventually be forced to expand into its sparse interior. If global investments in industrial production and commerce continue to grow, the domination of China’s largest province will help to enable the economic eclipse of other competitors and superpowers.

¹²⁵ Xiao.

¹²⁶ “China: Massive Numbers of Uyghurs & Other Ethnic Minorities Forced into Re-Education Programs,” Chinese Human Rights Defenders, August 3, 2018, <https://www.nchrd.org/2018/08/china-massive-numbers-of-uyghurs-other-ethnic-minorities-forced-into-re-education-programs/>.

¹²⁷ Chinese Human Rights Defenders.

At the expense of its marginalized, non-Han ethnicities, China has implemented its Strike Hard campaign as a means of achieving its dream of a homogenous, unified China. Since 2014, the conditions imposed on Muslims in Xinjiang have continually worsened and China's refusal to allow third-parties to inspect conditions in the re-education camps has fomented the growing world-wide concern.¹²⁸ The human-rights implications are limitless. The story of Xinjiang's Muslim population appears to be one of nationalism, not religious or ideological radicalization, as contrived in China's analysis post-9/11. Violent clashes and separatist demonstrations have stained the CCP's track-record in Xinjiang. The continued mass-punishment of Xinjiang's Muslim minorities will likely exacerbate the home-grown nationalist issues for China in the future.

Despite the mounting concern from the international watch-dog community, China's political leadership prefers to see its actions in a more positive and constructive light. Instead of publicizing Han migration as a means of diluting Xinjiang's the cultural character, Beijing likely views it as a journey through which to share the wealth and prosperity of a new Chinese era. Similarly, the \$70-billion investment in Xinjiang's infrastructure made in 2018 might be seen as an olive branch instead of a bundle of arrows.¹²⁹ Furthermore, compared to China's modernized coastal regions, Xinjiang is a sandpit, ripe for development and a blank canvas in terms of industrial capacity. It is also sovereign domain potentially at risk of being over-run with foreign values via the many former-Soviet territories which surround it. Here, the Chinese Communist Party prefers to be perceived as protecting its people from any imported threats, irrespective of Beijing's disproportionate focus on preventing an Islamic-nationalist revolt.

¹²⁸ Peter Stubley, "China Refuses Top Human Rights Official Access to Uighur Muslim 'Re-Education' Camps," *The Independent*, last modified December 5, 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-camps-xinjiang-human-rights-internment-barbel-kofler-germany-a8667886.html>.

¹²⁹ 吴晓波, "Xinjiang to Invest \$70 Billion in Infrastructure in 2018," *China Daily*, last modified January 7, 2018, [//www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201801/07/WS5a51bf96a31008cf16da58c5.html](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201801/07/WS5a51bf96a31008cf16da58c5.html).

D. SUMMARY

In China, inclusivity has become the preferred weapon of choice for shaping domestic policy. Among those affected, the Uyghurs provide Beijing with a population upon whom to test new techniques of influence, perhaps with an eye for future experiments abroad. Not only are the Uyghurs not Han, but their values conflict with those of the Chinese Communist Party. The narratives, programs, and technologies which prove most effective will likely be employed in other, more stubborn parts of China such as Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. For now, Beijing's leadership fully recognizes that the outcome of such programs, in time, will spell for the complete assimilation (and ideological extinction) of Xinjiang's domestic, yet somehow foreign, Muslim population.

Given this overwhelming effort orchestrated and being carried out by the Chinese government, in what is recognized internationally as its sovereign territory, what can Americans and the international community expect in the future? Besides publicly speaking out against the atrocities taking place daily, there are several diplomatic, informational, and military methods available to United States policymakers. In particular, several narratives and counternarratives, concerning the case studies previously discussed, are outlined in the following chapter. These can help provide viable options against China's ongoing endeavor at Cultural Imperialism.

V. POLICY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States has a long and complicated history of explaining the less diplomatic and altruistic actions of its past. This is often because the leaders and representatives of the United States frequently have disparate ideas of how to achieve success or why the United States should even be undertaking some efforts at all. This is to be expected with a representative democracy, but is a confused and ungainly purpose always the outcome of the United States' collective efforts, or can some lessons be learned from previous missteps?

This chapter will analyze the United States' overarching narratives, from the era of westward expansion which led to the most active period of the American Indian Wars from 1823–1890. By outlining the spoken and unspoken narratives and stories espoused by the United States and comparing these ideas with the actions supporting or undermining them, this chapter seeks to determine which narratives and stories were most successful with aiding the sea change for the American indigenous population. By doing so, this study provides a framework for addressing another indigenous population's contemporary challenges, the Uyghur population of the XUAR.

As narratives can be nefariously difficult to develop and implement, let alone control, this chapter is limited to those narratives and stories, either explicit or implicit, which were generated by the United States federal government. Any U.S. federal narratives which were predominately carried out at the sub-federal level and any sub-federal-level narratives will be excluded from this analysis. This is not to say that actions at the sub-federal level did not influence the development and implementation of federal narratives, but only to acknowledge the limitations to any attempts at comprehensive engagement within what the Department of Defense calls the Information Environment.¹³⁰

¹³⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Public Affairs*, JP 3-61, Change 1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016).

A. LITERATURE REVIEW

The definition of terms related to narratives is necessary at the outset of this chapter, because of the many related, but inherently different, disciplines that engage in similar techniques of information dissemination. These disciplines can easily speak past one another, as is often the case when practitioners are discussing the meaning of the military doctrinal term “disrupt” between U.S. Army maneuver officers, information operations planners, and psychological operations personnel, to name but a few.

For the primary definitions of these techniques, Johnson’s *Taliban Narratives* is consulted. As Johnson states “‘narratives’ are a system of cognitive standards within which ‘messages’ are interpreted.”¹³¹ In this regard, narratives are the cohesive picture that is intended for transmission by a collection of individual supporting stories. This can be visualized by picturing a multiple-strand rope where each strand is a story, but together the stories make a narrative, represented as all of the strands of the rope working together. Another term describing a supporting element to a narrative is a theme. A theme is a “Unifying idea or intention that supports the narrative and is designed for broad application to achieve specific objectives.”¹³² Themes, in turn, are supported by messages or “[a] narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience to support a specific theme.”¹³³ The primary differentiators between all of these communication types are their scope of transmission and whether there is a specific audience for which they were tailored. By establishing an order to the communications sent by an organization, general and specific purposes can be supported through a concerted communication effort. Without this order established, many pieces of communication will be misinterpreted, be directed toward the wrong recipient, or they will sometimes even communicate the opposite information entirely.

¹³¹ Thomas H. Johnson, *Taliban Narratives: The Use and Power of Stories in the Afghanistan Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 8.

¹³² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Commander’s Communication Synchronization*, JDN 2–13 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013).

¹³³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Public Affairs*.

In the model provided by the Multinational Information Operations Experiment (MNIOE), a NATO research group, narratives tied to individual missions are subordinated to an overall narrative tied to a grand strategy (Figure 7). Each of these narratives, in turn, are supported by their own subordinate stories.




Figure 7. The MNIOE's Hierarchy of Narratives¹³⁴

With this framework established, one might ask which overarching strategic-level narratives were communicated during the Western expansion of the United States? These can largely be gathered from presidential statements, Supreme Court rulings, and congressional proceedings from this era.

The idea of Manifest Destiny was first referenced in 1845 by John L. O'Sullivan,¹³⁵ and it meant that European settlers of the United States were given the blessing of God to expand their control of the North American continent from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, regardless of what or who they might find in between. This was, of course,

¹³⁴ Source: Christian Bell and Dirk Schweickhardt, *Narrative Development in Coalition Operations* (Multinational Information Operations Experiment, 2014): 14, https://www.lymec.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Narrative-Tool-v1-0_20141113_Final_Final.pdf.

¹³⁵ John Wilsey, "'Our Country Is Destined to Be the Great Nation of Futurity': John L. O'Sullivan's Manifest Destiny and Christian Nationalism, 1837–1846," *Religions* 8, no. 4 (April 17, 2017): 68, <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel8040068>.

problematic for the Native Americans living in various states of organization and complexity across the New World. While Manifest Destiny was not an official narrative of the U.S. federal government, the means by which the federal government developed and implemented Native American-related policies certainly appeared to view Manifest Destiny as a logical extension of their diplomacy toward the indigenous peoples of North America.

In a bid to reconcile the idea of Manifest Destiny with the humanity he personally experienced while fighting and dealing with the Native Americans during his service in the Army, President Andrew Jackson issued a State of the Union Address to Congress, which addressed the Native Americans in the southeast. The prepared statement was read by a clerk and stated Jackson had “informed the Indians inhabiting parts of Georgia and Alabama that their attempt to establish an independent government would not be countenanced by the Executive of the United States, and advised them to emigrate beyond the Mississippi or submit to the laws of those States,” and then confusingly added, “The emigration should be voluntary, for it would be as cruel as unjust to compel the aborigines to abandon the graves of their fathers and seek a home in a distant land.”¹³⁶ This inadvertently initiated a hasty and opportunistic state-level campaign against Native Americans in Georgia and developed into a poor interpretation of how to continue to develop Native American-focused policies thereafter.

Andrew Jackson’s statement supported the removal of Native Americans from the Southeast, but seemingly as an afterthought, he added that it should only occur with their permission. Shortly after this statement, Georgians would begin forcefully removing Native Americans from their land, including Cherokees who were considered for years to be included in the Five Civilized Tribes, for their willingness to assimilate to western European ways.

Another widespread narrative was that the United States was a benevolent benefactor, with the best interests of Native Americans in its heart. The Marshall Trilogy

¹³⁶ A. J. Langguth, *Driven West: Andrew Jackson and the Trail of Tears to the Civil War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 140.

of Supreme Court cases, which include *Johnson v. M'Intosh* 1823, *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* 1831, and *Worcester v. Georgia* 1832,¹³⁷ served to establish all Native American tribes as under the control and benediction of the U.S. federal government, while offering the small assurance of still maintaining their own sovereignty from the control of the individual states in which they resided. In this kind of political limbo status, the Native American tribes began to see a slow erosion of their legal standing as separate nations with sovereignty and individual rights of their own.

Other Supreme Court rulings, which were pertinent to how American lawmakers negotiated with Native American tribes, and which influenced how European settlers viewed Native Americans as equals or not, were the cases of *United States v. Rogers* 1846, *United States v. Holliday* 1865,¹³⁸ *United States v. Kagama* 1886, and *Ex Parte Crow Dog* 1883.¹³⁹ These cases had sweeping effects on the sovereignty and individual rights of all Native Americans, whether they had entered into a diplomatic treaty with the United States federal government or not. These cases are analyzed later in this chapter for the messages they conveyed.

Congressional proceedings, which have communicated the most salient meaning as to how Native American tribes were viewed by the United States, include the Indian Removal Act of 1830, the Major Crimes Act of 1885, the Indian Appropriations Act of 1871, and General Allotment Act (also called the Dawes Severalty Act) of 1887. The Legislative Branch of government participated in the diplomatic discussions, through various representatives, and thus owed an arguably better matching word-deed record, in that regard. The Indian Removal Act, however, went contrary to this ideal and forced the southeastern tribes to move from their land to the newly apportioned Indian Territory, in what is today the State of Oklahoma.

¹³⁷ *Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*, "U.S. Supreme Court and Indian Policy, 1789–1871."

¹³⁸ *Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*.

¹³⁹ *Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*, "U.S. Supreme Court and Indian Policy, 1871–1934."

A few other texts exist which help provide a functional framework for the development and analysis of narratives, from the academic and military areas of expertise. In addition to Johnson's *Taliban Narratives*, Krebs' *Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security* highlights the difficulty policymakers face with creating and supporting their own narratives, while not becoming victims of those narratives which were contrary to their own interests: "Policies at odds with underlying narratives strike audiences as illegitimate: they have few public advocates, and their few advocates are ignored or treated as beyond the pale."¹⁴⁰ While the mass media and social media platforms of today were not present in the 1800s, those Native Americans on the receiving end of word-deed mismatches from the United States assuredly responded accordingly when faced with these missteps.

Ajit Maan's *Narrative Warfare* also speaks of the contemporary War on Terrorism and the ongoing conflict with ISIS in the Middle East, but it does so in the context of how narratives influence movement among insurgent groups who are unhappy with that status quo. As Maan emphasizes, "Ideas are almost always true or false. Narratives are successful or not, interesting or not, influential or not, but narratives do not rely upon truth-value for their success."¹⁴¹ This ability to influence others to act, regardless of the factual or non-factual basis for action, is still relevant today, just as it was true during American westward expansion into the lands of indigenous American tribes.

Military texts have addressed the need for a framework in developing and implementing narratives and the information environment, in which narratives and stories are employed, has also gotten more focus over the past decade. The foremost military texts, which address narratives, are Joint Publication 3-13 *Information Operations*, Joint Publication 3-61 *Public Affairs*, and Joint Doctrine Note 2-13 *Commander's Communication Synchronization*. These are Joint publications, meaning they are applicable to all branches of the U.S. military when working together, and these

¹⁴⁰ Ronald R. Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 15.

¹⁴¹ Ajit K. Maan, *Narrative Warfare* (San Bernardino, CA: Narrative Strategies Ink., 2018), 16.

publications allow for commanders, staff planners, and information-related capability practitioners to “speak the same language” and avoid miscommunication across multiple planning efforts occurring simultaneously across multiple echelons of command.

Finally, the *Narrative Development in Coalition Operations* white paper is an offering of the MNIOE, which outlines what narratives are, how they can be developed, employed, and how they can be evaluated for effectiveness. The MNIOE outlines three things to develop an effective narrative: “Situational context; Narrative landscape; Narrative script,”¹⁴² and this three-element outline can serve as a useful tool to evaluate the narratives at play, in any level of development and employment.

B. ANALYSIS

To best understand the narratives at work during the American Indian War period from 1823–1890, the categorization of the narratives and themes at work is required. These narratives must be separated into two primary narratives: Manifest Destiny and the Need to Civilize the Savage. As with all narratives, the truthfulness of a narrative’s premise is irrelevant; what matters most is how the narrative, either purposefully or accidentally, resonates with a target audience to essentially make the narrative true. Even during the 1800s, the truism Perception is Reality held sway just as much as it does in today’s oversaturated information environment.

From these two narratives of Manifest Destiny and the Need to Civilize the Savage, supporting themes can be observed. These supporting themes, which were communicated via word and/or deed, by the transmission of federal policies and the carrying out of those policies by federal representatives, including the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), BIA agents, and, most often, the United States Army. These supporting themes are interpreted through explicit statements, from official documents and speeches, and through implicit meanings of these statements and/or official actions by federal representatives.

With Manifest Destiny, actions were taken, which promoted industrialization and commercial progress at the sacrifice of Native American claims to land, supported the

¹⁴² Bell and Schweickhardt, *Narrative Development in Coalition Operations*, 16.

notion of Manifest Destiny. The expectation that traditions of hunter-gathering and nomadic ways of life must give way to agriculture and small land right ownership (or relegation to small reservation areas only) belies the superiority Manifest Destiny adherents felt. Progress was on its way and progress would not be stopped. Many land rights cases and legislation fall into this category, by making it easier for white settlers and investors to acquire land from Native American tribes and individuals who were not utilizing the land to its fullest potential. The Indian Removal Act of 1830 and the General Allotment Act of 1887 were the most egregious of these land-related legislative missteps, with one forcibly removing the Five Civilized Tribes and causing the Trail of Tears and the other giving individual Native Americans small tracts of land, regardless of their agricultural aspirations or experience.

The Need to Civilize the Savage narrative was stated, both explicitly and implicitly, through similar means. Andrew Jackson's characterization of Native Americans was diminutive, for as much as he viewed himself as an advocate for Native American concerns. "Surrounded by the whites with their arts of civilization, which by destroying the resources of the savage doom him to weakness and decay."¹⁴³ In *United States v. Holliday*, the Supreme Court ruled that Kansas tribes were not permitted to purchase alcohol, even outside of their reservations, effectively limiting the tribe's ability to conduct commerce with others outside of this dependent nation within a nation.¹⁴⁴ If the tribes were incapable of conducting the various duties of a sovereign nation, was this based upon some previous real-world experiences of the United States? The answer is decidedly "no," in the case of the Cherokee.

In the *Cherokee Phoenix*, a newspaper in circulation in the Cherokee Nation and printed before the Trail of Tears, a copy of the Cherokee Nation Constitution, which "echoes its U.S. counterpart, but with a more overtly religious tone"¹⁴⁵ and includes the ideals of justice, tranquility, common welfare, liberty, humility and gratitude toward God.

¹⁴³ Langguth, *Driven West: Andrew Jackson and the Trail of Tears to the Civil War*, 140.

¹⁴⁴ *Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law*, "U.S. Supreme Court and Indian Policy, 1789–1871."

¹⁴⁵ Langguth, *Driven West: Andrew Jackson and the Trail of Tears to the Civil War*, 77–78.

This is not a document the people of 1829 could argue was produced by “savages.” These same “savages” utilized the legal recourse methods available to them, through appeals to the Supreme Court, discussions with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and entreaty of the population at large, often to no avail.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States might not have developed narratives that are today palatable, with relation to how the Native American tribes were treated, but that does not mean valuable lessons cannot be learned from that dark period of our history. Even today, China is struggling with its indigenous Uyghur population in Xinjiang Province, which is situated at its extreme northwestern region. These Uyghur are different ethnically than the Han Chinese citizens, they are a majority Muslim, and they have voiced a desire to remain autonomous of excessive control from Beijing. Wary of this autonomy, granted back in October 1955 by Mao Zedong,¹⁴⁶ Xi Jinping has required the placing of Uyghurs into education camps, refused them permission to practice Islam, and has required they submit to biometric monitoring, all in the name of combating terrorism.¹⁴⁷ Those keeping an eye on the developments suspect that a motive behind this over policing of the Uyghurs is China’s desire to fulfill the Silk Road Economic Belt Initiative, which would be served well to traverse through the XUAR.¹⁴⁸

One narrative, a way to address the problem but certainly not the only way, that could be developed to highlight the targeting of Uyghurs by Chinese officials is China’s Ethnic Purge. This narrative works through two supporting narratives: China’s Ruthless Ethnocentrism and the Moral Bankruptcy of Beijing.

¹⁴⁶ Preeti Bhattacharji, “Uighurs and China’s Xinjiang Region,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified May 29, 2012, <https://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/uighurs-and-chinas-xinjiang-region>.

¹⁴⁷ Nicholas Bequelin, “The Dark Side of the China Dream: Erasing Ethnic Identity,” *The Diplomat*, last modified August 17, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/the-dark-side-of-the-china-dream-erasing-ethnic-identity/>.

¹⁴⁸ Ghiasy and Zhou, *The Silk Road Economic Belt: Considering Security Implications and EU–China Cooperation Prospects*.

China's Ruthless Ethnocentrism speaks, not only to the re-education camps, excessive policing and cultural subjugation of the Uyghurs, but it also pulls in other regional states that have been maligned for being considered the "other" by the People's Republic of China. Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan have all previously fought physically and ideologically with China, and these animosities can be stirred up today, in support of the suffering Uyghur population. Highlighting diplomatic failings across academic and international news outlets serves information consumers who are already aware of China's duplicitous behavior, but sensationalizing the injustices of the Uyghur among broader international audiences adds additional bottom-up political pressure to representatives. The fact that a China that cannot view other nations as equals cannot be trusted to engage globally in good faith must become widespread common knowledge to affect change.

China's Moral Bankruptcy speaks to the various sordid lengths China will go to in order to get what it desires. Whether pointing to dubiously authentic documents to justify creating islands out of unusable rock outcroppings,¹⁴⁹ or blaming terror threats for the systemic cultural targeting of the Uyghur,¹⁵⁰ China has proven itself willing to violate international norms in the interest of uninhibited, economic control and power. China has not just violated the sovereignty of the Philippines, by building up the significant naval port and air landing strip facilities in the Spratly Islands, it has also rejected the Hague tribunal ruling, which declared China in violation of international sovereignty norms.¹⁵¹ In the case of violating Uyghur's individual rights, the *United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* starts its list of enumerated articles with "Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the *Charter of the United Nations*, the

¹⁴⁹ Derek Watkins, "What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea," *New York Times*, last modified October 27, 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south-china-sea.html>.

¹⁵⁰ Wang, "Eradicating Ideological Viruses: China's Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang's Muslims."

¹⁵¹ Tom Phillips, Oliver Holmes, and Owen Bowcott, "Beijing Rejects Tribunal's Ruling in South China Sea Case," *The Guardian*, last modified July 12, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china>.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights law.”¹⁵²The disconnect, between a country knowingly jailing and punishing a minority of its population based only on ethnicity and religion against the same country touting its technological advancement of 5G network capability (via Chinese communications company Huawei), should be highlighted and repeated at every opportunity.

D. SUMMARY

Narratives are an effective means of communicating ideas that have longevity and staying power with a target audience. Development of narratives must be done deliberately, though, with a thought about the information conveyed by both words and deeds of an organization, and sometimes the lack of these can speak just as effectively.

During the American Indian Wars of the 1800s, the United States developed and implemented many policies that spoke to its explicit and implicit ideas. These became the pervasive narratives upon which a nation was built and by which other nations were greatly diminished. Policymakers must recognize the power of narratives to affect change in diplomatic and military endeavors and commit themselves to using narratives to reach desired end states. By planning for, and using, the power of narratives, and avoiding deliberate and accidental deed-word mismatches, the United States can improve the mistakes of the past and improve the global storytelling future.

¹⁵² United Nations, *United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* (United Nations, 2007), https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2018/11/UNDRIP_E_web.pdf.

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VI. CONCLUSION

This thesis compares and contrasts two examples of Cultural Imperialism in hopes of answering the following questions: How are these cases similar? How are these cases different? What can they tell us about Cultural Imperialism in the future?

The developing case of the Uyghurs highlights the emerging capabilities available to influence communities resistant to change. Although similar objectives have been shared by imperialist regimes throughout history, recent technological advancements have enabled China to accelerate the process of assimilation while also increasing the efficacy. Much of Beijing's success can be attributed to such operations being conducted within China's sovereign borders. Here, domestic policies can be enforced with little to no reprisal. Tibet, arguably, acted as a testing ground for operations in Xinjiang. Lessons learned in Xinjiang will likely resonate elsewhere within China's sphere of influence.

A. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Looking to the near future, China's Social Credit system aspires to become the next revolution in behavioral control. By 2020, Beijing plans to be able to rate the loyalty and trustworthiness of every Chinese citizen.¹⁵³ Here, Orwellian concepts meet big-data, making dystopian fiction a reality for approximately 1.4 billion people. However, the social credit system would not apply only to citizens. Chinese companies will also be rated for their behaviors and business practices. According to journalist Evelyn Cheng, "while Beijing insists the system is meant to create a 'fair, transparent and predictable' business environment, there are concerns about how the government might use the data, especially in light of escalating trade tensions with the U.S."¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³ Rachel Botsman, "Big Data Meets Big Brother as China Moves to Rate Its Citizens," *Wired*, last modified October 21, 2017, <https://www.wired.co.uk/article/chinese-government-social-credit-score-privacy-invasion>.

¹⁵⁴ Evelyn Cheng, "China Is Building a 'Comprehensive System' for Tracking Companies' Activities, Report Says," *CNBC*, last modified September 4, 2019, <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/04/china-plans-for-corporate-social-credit-system-eu-sinolytics-report.html>.

It begs the question as to how similar information technologies can be employed against oppressive regimes which seek to accomplish the same. The 2019 Hong Kong protests surrounding the announcement of a new extradition bill might serve as such an example. As of August, activists took to the streets armed with a new critical capability. A crowdsourced program known as “HKMap.live,” generally referred to as a dynamic map, enabled users to track and report protest activities within Hong Kong with the same functionality as Google Maps.¹⁵⁵ However, instead of reporting speed traps, protesters were able to publicize the locations of water cannons, tear gas, and violent acts reported against civilians, all while communicating where the next major display of resistance would occur. While not at the same scale as the Uyghurs or Native Americans, scenarios like Hong Kong exemplify the power of information today.

The two cases represented in this thesis bare similarities worth restating. First, both cases occur within the sovereign boundaries of their respective countries. The United States and Chinese governments would ultimately impose cultural changes upon indigenous people as a result of expansionist objectives. A certain degree of natural assimilation could be assumed as well, both for the Native Americans as well as the Uyghurs, a factor which defies most empirical analysis. In both cases, changes in (or commitment to) domestic policies act as the only indicators of whether or not national objectives are being met.

Second, both the United States and China sought to expand westward for resources, land, and trade potential. While the cardinal direction does not necessarily matter, imperial objectives apply in both cases. Both empires would accomplish their objectives in similar ways as well, by incentivizing their own citizens into the frontier with the promise of work and a new start. Eventually, crucial infrastructure such as roads and rails would be installed in order to speed the transit for more migrants and materials, accelerating the effects and enveloping the indigenous population.

Third, both cases also involve a life-changing degree of modernization brought to the aforementioned indigenous populations. This thesis’ preferred definition of Cultural

¹⁵⁵ Mary Hui, “Real-Time Maps Warn Hong Kong Protesters of Water Cannons and Riot Police,” Quartz, last modified September 3, 2019, <https://qz.com/1700205/real-time-maps-warn-hong-kong-protesters-of-police/>.

Imperialism does not necessitate modernization as an essential factor and the impact of modernization in both cases helps to make apparent this comparison. And, while the Uyghurs were by no means devoid of certain modern technologies prior to the Strike Hard campaign, the life-changing degree of modernization is most obvious in the degree to which they have become subjected to Beijing's suite of population control measures. Today, checkpoints, biometric authentication, geo-tracking restrictions, and other forms of big-data analysis dominate this indigenous culture in a way which was not chosen, but imposed upon them.

Finally, it is interesting, though likely not correlated, that these cases happen to tell the stories of two emergent super powers. This point, though, is subjective for the obvious reason that China has not yet fully proven itself in this role, in the current era. However, warranting the concerns of political analysts today, if China ever eclipses the United States as a world economic and political power, this thesis might become even more relevant to the discussion of Cultural Imperialism as a means of achieving global influence.

A great many dissimilarities between these cases must be addressed as well. To begin, the differences in the types of data available is a function of historical perspective. Over one hundred years have passed since the twilight of the Native American's plight against unwanted change and colonial encroachment. Since this time, researchers have sought to untangle America's sordid past with its indigenous residents, in many cases through the rigorous analysis of census data. Modern analysis techniques have proven invaluable in determining factors such as population increases and decreases as well as the likely effectiveness in the preservation of indigenous traditions and languages. However, despite the ubiquity of information today, less is known about similar metrics regarding present-day Xinjiang and the Uyghurs. We assess that this lack of knowledge has largely to do with Beijing's initiative to protect such information from the public eye. Still, occasional leaks, interviews, investigations and second-hand reports have met the media with significant effects. Most recently, a report surfaced condemning China for forcibly

harvesting human organs from the Uyghurs.¹⁵⁶ China denies the allegations, though the growing international concern indicates that matters for the Uyghurs and other indigenous minorities have gotten worse, not better, since the inception of the Strike Hard campaign.

The level of technological sophistication of the U.S. government efforts to remove Native Americans contrasts sharply with the techniques being employed in Xinjiang. Surveillance-state technologies executed in tandem with China's push towards a big-data-enabled social credit system has begun transforming science-fiction into a present-day reality for the majority of Chinese. Xinjiang has acted as a testing ground for its more extreme programs.

Furthermore, while the cultural differences between the two cases studies abound, little can be said of any similarities regarding the anti-religious agenda, such as the one promoted so readily by the PRC following the attacks of 9/11. The War on Terror then acted as an excuse to extinguish the Uyghur's perennial nationalist agenda through the implementation of harsher domestic policies. The creation of an internationally recognized East Turkestan would heavily impact Beijing's economic interests along the One Belt Road Initiative and neighboring states. Religious unrest alone has rarely been identified as a primary source of tension between the American colonists and Native Americans over the course of the American Indian Wars.

B. FINAL THOUGHTS

Despite the effort taken in refining this thesis' definition of Cultural Imperialism, the term remains deeply subjective. Numerous other terms have been employed to describe the same or similar phenomenon since the early 1970s, but the common denominator of the strong influencing the weak seems immovable within the conversation. While the two cases presented in this thesis barely scratch the surface regarding the implications of Cultural Imperialism in the future, the differences between them highlight today's concerns

¹⁵⁶ Will Martin, "China Harvesting Organs of Uighur Muslims, China Tribunal Tells UN," *Business Insider*, last modified September 25, 2019, <https://www.businessinsider.com/china-harvesting-organs-of-uighur-muslims-china-tribunal-tells-un-2019-9>.

regarding great power competition, globalization, emerging superpowers, and specifically China as an adversary.

If nothing else, this thesis finds that the term Cultural Imperialism, like many of its pejorative cousins, tends to be wielded in an accusatorial fashion rather than one of objective criticism. It is used to rate the behaviors of empires on a subjective scale of evil to benevolent (usually evil) based on the historical fallout decades or even centuries after the fact. Rating current examples, such as in the case of Xinjiang, China, is especially difficult without an end result to act as a foundation for evaluation.

In order to more effectively recognize and analyze Cultural Imperialism in the future, we have identified six lenses through which to illustrate its complexities:

Intentionality: Here, we ask whether or not the more powerful entity is asserting itself with the objective of some kind of dominance? What about soft power, hegemony, or natural assimilation? It can be difficult to separate the effects of Cultural Imperialism from the effects of modernization, globalization, or the malaise of day-to-day cultural assimilation in an arguably over-connected world. “Evidence,” according to Barry Sautman, “may be lacking that the state intends to destroy a culture.”¹⁵⁷

Responsibility: The issue of responsibility has to do with attribution over time. Cultural Imperialism represents a long-term effort whereby numerous political administrations may have executed different agendas over the course of decades, if not centuries.¹⁵⁸ Perhaps Cultural Imperialism had not been an objective at the beginning as in the case with early trade expeditions by seafaring Greeks and Romans. Especially in today’s global environment, policies within governments constantly adjust, conforming to new leadership, new social movements, emerging national interests, and the ever-changing moods of the constituency. The same policy might last for multiple iterations of leadership. Or, small policy changes might have been made several times within the same administration. In any case, each consecutive leader has inherited the results of those who

¹⁵⁷ Sautman, *Cultural Genocide and Asian State Peripheries*.

¹⁵⁸ Sautman.

have ruled before and been forced to either adjust or adopt as required. Simply put, it would be illogical for a single administration to shoulder the blame of all which came before.

Fluidity: If Responsibility reveals the subjectivity of a political decisions made over long periods of time, then Fluidity addresses the rate at which social changes have occurred irrespective of those policies. In other words, short of a perfectly Orwellian construct, even totalitarian regimes have a hard time controlling the natural evolution of a civilization over time. In any society, there are certain changes that simply cannot be accounted for.

Plurality: It cannot be assumed that just one entity is acting against another, unless in a specific, likely geographically isolated situation. Here, the competing influences of perhaps multiple civilizations might converge, disrupting each other's effects.

Directionality: Cultural Assimilation does not exclusively happen from point A to B. If anything, the information age has taught us that influence is a two-way street. It would be brash to assume that the cultural influences of any indigenous population would not, in some way, influence the cultures of would-be colonists.

Scalability: The discussion of Imperialism tends to be addressed at the national level for obvious reasons. However, we cannot deny the emergence of smaller entities such as international businesses, violent extremist organizations (VEO), and other non-state actors as arbiters of influence. Other models at varying levels ought to be considered. This thesis, for instance, covers two cases which represent domestic applications of Cultural Imperialism. For this reason, it is important to consider that the tenets of Cultural Imperialism can be applied to other models.

These lenses can help identify other case studies, where an indigenous population faced the expansion and political devices of an overwhelming state government, which could provide additional insight into these phenomena. Historical cases, which bear many of these lens criteria and which might have records of interactions between an indigenous population and a state, would add a wealth of insight into the results offered by this chapter. While cases with available documentation are more likely to originate from democratic and

republican models of governance, multiple examples across the globe exist, including Australia,¹⁵⁹ Canada, Brazil, Colombia, Siberia, and even Japan,¹⁶⁰ to name only a few.

The continued study of Cultural Imperialism across these lenses is daunting and complex, but ultimately worth the effort. In the current era of great uncertainty between nations, any edge of learning how diplomatic efforts can succeed, particularly between two groups with vastly different cultures, norms and goals, By committing to the effort, of learning from the past and actively pursuing equitable solutions for the future, responsible policy makers will be best equipped to respond in the diplomatic arena. And, this preparation can mean all the difference between diplomatic success and failure.

¹⁵⁹ Jessie Mitchell, *In Good Faith? -Governing Indigenous Australia through God, Charity and Empire, 1825–1855* (ANU E Press, 2011), JSTOR.

¹⁶⁰ Siegfried Wiessner, “Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis,” *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 12 (April 1999): 57–128, Lexis-Nexis.

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