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Enter the jargon: the intertextual rhetoric of Radical Economic Transformation following the logic of Demosthenes's oratory

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ABSTRACT

This paper considers the timing and entry into public discourse of 'Radical Economic Transformation' as a concept that is open to deliberate misinterpretation in the media. Whilst, as the title suggests, it is necessary to distil the content signified by its rhetorical signposts, the diverse uses to which 'radical economic transformation' is being put by the media, government and researchers requires examination relative to parameters of debate set by the Greek orator Demosthenes's thesis in his *Against Meidias*, during times of political crisis in Athens Macedonian expansion. Similarly, in the wake of oligarchies and deepening economic inequality along racial lines, Jacob Zuma's Radical Economic Transformation (RET) was intended to be a bulwark against further expansion, exploitation and pauperization. In its intention, the rhetoric RET signposted a pro-poor intervention for ownership, management and control of the economy in favour of all South Africans. If the exordium is whether 'Radical Economic Transformation' should be embraced, then the debate takes stock of the observation by Mark Swilling that while *there is a clear need* for 'radical economic transformation,' there are concerns that 'this is being used as an ideological smokescreen to mask the rent-seeking practices of the Zuma-centred power elite' (Bhorat et al., 2017). In the media, Schutte argues that Radical Economic Transformation is part of a 'distorted discourse [which] is the weapon of choice [at a time when] empty rhetoric is served up on Orwellian platters'. Following the logic of Demosthenes, the debate around the rhetoric of Radical Economic Transformation demands and deserves to be tested against legality, justice, expediency, practicability, decency and consequences.

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The intertextual bent of the rhetoric of Radical Economic Transformation

Whereas, broadly speaking, it is necessary to lay bare the reasons for an examination of Radical Economic Transformation by way of Winnie Obike's appropriation of Wright's theoretical method of rhetorical criticism to 'trace the history of ideas [such as Radical Economic Transformation] through speeches and political discourse',¹ the sheer pointedness of its singular definition underscores an interventionist urgency. The term Radical Economic Transformation 'came to prominence after President Jacob Zuma delivered the ANC's January 8 anniversary statement at the Orlando Stadium in Soweto in 2017, and has

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since been widely used in public discourse'.² At policy level Radical Economic Transformation has a basis in the South African Government's Medium Term Strategic Framework for the 2014–2019 electoral term. However, for some observers, the nationalization aspect of Radical Economic Transformation indicates an inclination towards – if not an extension of – the ANC's National Democratic Revolution in an untenable neo-liberal economy that has overshadowed a series of macroeconomic policies since 1994 (Mosala et al., 2017, p. 234). The African National Congress (ANC) as the ruling party in South Africa, is the custodian of RET, meaning as a matter of principle all its members including the Deputy President at the time, Cyril Ramaphosa subscribed to the RET and had to serve as its implementation agents in the public office. Jacob Zuma, by virtue of being the party head as well as the Head of State, automatically became the face and the primary champion of RET. For a number of reasons, the RET remained a rhetoric that did not manifest into pragmatic interventions that change people's lives. Vusi Gumede points out that in President Jacob Zuma's public speeches, President Zuma has described radical economic transformation as 'fundamental change in the structure, systems, institutions and patterns of *ownership, management and control of the economy* in favour of all South Africans, especially the poor, the majority of whom are African and women'.³ This is more direct in comparison to the delineation of what President Zuma prioritizes:

The President of the Republic of South Africa has defined radical socio-economic transformation as 'transforming the structure of the economy through industrialisation, broad-based black economic empowerment, and through strengthening and expanding the role of the state in the economy.' Doing so will jump-start the economy and will ensure that we meet the National Development Plan (NDP) target of 5% growth. (DTI Strategic Plan 2014-2019, p. 10)

While Mark Swilling et al (3) cautiously 'agree with the intentions' of commitment to the necessity of Radical Economic Transformation, so defined, it is not difficult to discern the obvious intertextuality in the foregoing formulaic description of Radical Economic Transformation. The latter's emphasis on 'ownership, management and control' is a conception that readily calls to mind Ngugi wa Thiong'o in his *Moving the Centre*, from as far back as 1993, where he rues: 'It is of course true that imperialism, in whatever form and guise, aims at the complete *ownership, management and control of the entire system of production, exchange and distribution* of the wealth in its home base and those of other nations and territories'.⁴ Similarity here denotes African intertextuality and an anti-imperial, if decolonial, thrust. If Ngugi's idea of the complete *ownership, management and control of the entire system of production, exchange and distribution* of the wealth prompted this specific way in which radical economic transformation is defined, then the intertextuality that is much in evidence lends credence to finding African solutions to African problems. It does not end there. For Davies, as it was for Ngugi, it is important to 'bring about fundamental changes in the productive structure of our economy and also in the patterns of ownership, participation and management in favour of the majority of the population'.⁵

To the extent that, by its intention at any rate, the articulation of anti-imperialism in Radical Economic Transformation finds expression in decrying – and reversing – the exploitative patterns of what has been identified as 'White Monopoly Capital',⁶ it is possible to compare President Jacob Zuma's effort with those of the orator and statesman Demosthenes. Significantly, James Fredal focuses on 'Demosthenes' oration *Against*

Meidias to illustrate the role of 'action' as an independent art of character-presentation and to sketch out its importance in ancient Athenian rhetorical arts.⁷ Despite the occasional public mis-pronunciation or interspersions of Radical Economic Transformation (RET) – often with the levity of mirth in some speeches by President Jacob Zuma – it is important here to note that as global oligarchies expand, exploit and exclude the black majority in South African economic life, the need for him to frame his rhetorical action as an intention to reverse inequality, poverty and unemployment on the plank of 'anti-White Monopoly Capital' policy had become both urgent and spectacular. In the fashion of Demosthenes, the urgency expressed in this rhetoric seems a 'scare tactic rhetoric meant not only to excite public alarm but also give him [President Zuma] the edge over rival leaders'.⁸

More than that, President Zuma posits the thesis of Radical Economic Transformation as an anti-thesis to White Monopoly Capital, thereby gesturing the ruling party – the African National Congress – towards a stance that is diametrically opposed to the exclusive and exploitative logic of global capital. In this scenario, it is important to point at the similar lens with which Demosthenes views Macedonian expansion into (and annexation of) Athens as a threat that requires confrontational rhetorical action. I am thus persuaded by Lois Agnew's identification with Charles Martindale's argument that the complex chain of receptions of, say, Demosthenes 'has the effect that a work can operate across history obliquely in unexpected ways'.⁹

Whilst one reception celebrates Demosthenes as an astute statesman in his anti-Macedonian thesis – much in the same fashion as President Zuma launches his anti-White Monopoly Capital RET rhetoric unexpectedly – Ian Worthington avers that according to the progymnasmata thesis, an examination of a particular subject of dispute (such as Radical Economic Transformation) ought to be opened up to multi-dimensional scrutiny. The issue of dispute may involve politics, theology, morality, or philosophy or, as in the present case, policy. The policy of Radical Economic Transformation was further emphasized by the Trade and Industry Minister at the May launch of the ninth Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), which is aimed at accelerating the implementation of government's policy around the industrialisation of the country's economy.¹⁰ It is here that Rob Davies declared that 'IPAP forms an integral part of radical economic transformation'.¹¹ It is thus necessary to argue both sides of a question in the same essay, in a point-counter point fashion.

Demosthenes may well have been nothing more than a political opportunist, operating at the expense of his country's best interests for his own political advancement. Philip [or, in the present case, White Monopoly Capital], was his stepping-stone to political ascendancy, not some greater ideal of his country's freedom.¹²

In the contemporary media setting, Gillian Schutte¹³ draws from George Monbiot and Manuela Cadelli, further to argue that Radical Economic Transformation is part of a 'distorted discourse [that] is the weapon of choice [at a time when] empty rhetoric is served up on Orwellian platters'.¹⁴ To crystallize this point, she boldly asserts that:

Many ANC politicians are pushing this progressive sounding rhetoric without an iota of self-consciousness about the fact that under a right wing economic model radical transformation is a farce, if not a downright lie. What they rely on to peddle this false hope to their

constituency is that the majority of people in the world do not really understand what neoliberalism is and how it impacts on their lives.¹⁵

In light of the above observation by Gillian Schutte, it is worth following the logic of Demosthenes, and the progymnasmata standard on the debate around the rhetoric of Radical Economic Transformation: does it pass the test of legality, justice, expediency, practicability, decency and consequences? Katleho Sekhoto reports that the former Public Protector Advocate Thuli Madonsela spoke on the sidelines of a democracy dialogue at Constitution Hill, indicating there is no legality in implementing RET ... 'a policy that has not been consulted on, written down or made clear cannot be implemented'.¹⁶ For Madonsela it obvious already that 'South Africa has the Equality Act, which is the policy meant to advance economic and social transformation'.¹⁷

In this sense, its legality is in question. It seems clear that Professor Madonsela's point on legality pivots on the manner in which the policy has not been formally promulgated into law, which points prompts her to further argue about the unconstitutionality of such a policy. What is significant, though, is that there is a suggestion from Madonsela that there is no accountability provided for. In not so many words, for Madonsela the Radical Economic Transformation policy represents a Trojan horse for State Capture through the Treasury doorway. However, it is instructive to refer to the structured pattern of rent-seeking that is graphically depicted in Figure 1 below by Ivor Chipkin of the State Capacity Research Group, who made a submission to Parliament's portfolio committee of public enterprises.

Generalised model of a patronage network that extracts and administers rents




Figure 1. Ivor Chipkin's diagram of the architecture of the shadow state behind state capture (<http://47zhcvti0ul2ftip9rxo9fj9.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Screen-Shot-2017-08-01-at-7.51.42-PM-1024x487.png>).

On the sidelines of the JSE-listed Richemont's Annual General Meeting held in Geneva on Wednesday in early September 2017, Johann Rupert – apparently the richest man in South Africa – was blunt in stating that 'Radical economic transformation is just a code word for theft'¹⁸ whilst President Zuma aims to use the policy to reduce poverty, inequality and unemployment. Rupert, the iconic figure and synecdoche of 'White Monopoly Capital' chalks down Radical Economic Transformation to an excuse: 'They're raiding the state's coffers. And it's public knowledge'.¹⁹

This view is not the sole preserve of 'White Monopoly Capital'; for earlier on in April 15 2017, on the occasion of the launch of Dr Khulu Mbatha's scathing book, *Unmasked: Why the ANC failed to Govern* (2017), China Dodovu had expressed his skepticism towards the idea or policy of Radical Economic Transformation. China Dodovu made bold to assert that 'RET policy is nothing but a hollow and radically sounding proposition that lacks underpinnings, ostensibly to defeat the white monopoly capital, used by those who want to deflate our focus from the filthy Gupta family and to loot, plunder and pillage the public resources and to tag anyone who opposes it as an enemy or enemy agent'.²⁰

In Jacques Pauw's discussion of the circumstances surrounding the removal of Pravin Gordhan in *The President's Keepers* (2017), he reveals that, having insisted on taxation on all tax benefits, including fringe benefits, the Minister of Finance was removed on the pretext of accelerating Radical Economic Transformation: 'Zuma reshuffled his cabinet to kickstart a "radical phase of socio-economic transformation"' (139).²¹ This view of a corrupt shadow state resonates strongly with what emerges from the findings of the State Capture Research Group:

It has been argued in [the] report that from about 2012 onwards the Zuma-centred power elite has sought to centralise the control of rents to:

eliminate lower-order, rent-seeking competitors. The ultimate prize was control of the National Treasury to gain control of the Financial Intelligence Centre (which monitors illicit flows of finance), the Chief Procurement Office (which regulates procurement and activates legal action against corrupt practices), the Public Investment Corporation (the second largest shareholder on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange), the boards of key development finance institutions, and the guarantee system (which is not only essential for making the nuclear deal work, but with a guarantee that state entities can borrow from privatelenders/banks without parliamentary oversight). The cabinet reshuffle in March 2017 has made possible this final control of the National Treasury.²² (Bhorat et al., 2017, p. 17)

Notably, the RET was used as a trump card for Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's (NDZ) ANC Presidential campaign, seen by many as an extension of Jacob Zuma's reign. While it is true that NDZ is Zuma's ex-wife and that they have children together, this does not dismiss the fact that she is a distinguished leader in her own right and was a formidable presidential candidate. Her adoption of the Zuma camp's ideological stance through the continuation of the RET, was not so much about her being used as a proxy, more than her being the primary benefactor of Zuma's cadre of loyal supporters. In essence, RET is an ideological stance that would have determined public policy, should NDZ campaign have triumphed over Ramaphosa's CR17.

It becomes all the more clear how control of the key levers of the economy was concretised through corrupt lines of patronage that are epitomized by the 'Premier League of Premiers' and latterly beleaguered Gupta family, in the guise of Radical Economic Transformation. Despite these unhealthy developments, Rob Davies, the Minister of Trade and Industry, sees differently and much suggests that the rot in the system of both capture and inequality can be redeemed through Radical Economic Transformation:

We've got to bring about a radical change in production structures and inclusion. We've got to bring this about to place us on a higher growth path ... We cannot any longer afford to be an economy whose position is determined by the fact that we are producers and exporters of primary mineral resources. That is what colonialism defined our role as. We need to move away from that.²³

The many faces of radical economic transformation

As evidenced above, there is a hardly any doubt today that Radical Economic Transformation now exhibits the properties of a Derridian *pharmakon*²⁴: it is both poison and cure for the socio-economic inequality generated by unipolar white economic privilege that arises out of the Sunset Clauses of the South African political settlement and the State Capture scandal. The extent of the latter capture was also exposed by Magda Wierzycka, CEO of Sygnia Asset Management, who elucidated the role that established business such as KPMG played. To take the idea of Radical Economic Transformation-as-pharmakon further, especially as it brings the economy to the centre, it is worth looking at it from the lens of Marian Hobson (1998) who illuminates the point that 'As a pharmakon, logos is at once good and bad; it is not at the outset governed exclusively by goodness or truth'.²⁵ This article does not intend to equate President Jacob Zuma's advocacy for Radical Economic Transformation with the political oratory of Demosthenes, even where there are parallels between the anti-Macedonian stance and the anti-White Monopoly Capital rhetoric. Rather, it observes that both leaders have demonstrated a distinct ability to respond to political threats by switching policy during a political crisis, especially where there is an exploitation of what Ian Worthington calls 'scare tactic rhetoric meant not only to excite public alarm but also give him [Demosthenes] the edge over rival leaders'.²⁶

As the December 2017 elective Conference of the ruling African National Congress drew near, the boldness with which Radical Economic Transformation has been articulated as a trump card now depends on the version of RET punted. The more refined – and notably different from the last – the better it is for the ANC leader in the leadership succession battle. Or is it?

For Vusi Gumede, the ANC – as outlined in its 2017 Strategy and Tactics discussion document – makes a point that 'the campaign for radical economic transformation should encompass efforts to change the structure of the economy to advance manufacturing and beneficiation, investment of more resources in productive activities, and comprehensive broad-based economic empowerment'.²⁷ More than participation, argues Gumede, the development of a capable developmental state is a RET goal that is linked to creating and strengthening a capable developmental state in a way that is linked to the 2014 to 2019



Figure 2. SaveSA eyewitness account.

Medium Term Strategic Framework. The shift from discussing Radical Economic Transformation as a variegated political discourse via the ANC rather than the exclusive articulation by the President is deliberate: the fissures within the party are subtly contesting ownership of the Radical Economic Transformation policy and providing more and more refined versions to supplement that propounded by the President. For instance, the Secretary-General of the ANC, Gwede Mantashe says Radical Economic Transformation is an effort to ensure that ‘the majority of South Africans must have access to ownership and control of the South African economy, and the state must facilitate that.’²⁸ Since this Radical Economic Transformation delineation involves ownership and control, a la Ngugi, it goes further to emphasize the role of the State. With ever-rising inequality, poverty and unemployment, the facilitation of such a transfer of ownership is necessary.

Yet it is also as over-simplistic as it is over-enthusiastic in its interventionist assumptions. In *The Financial Mail*, Claire Bissek insists that ‘Poverty, unemployment and inequality in SA, though deep-seated, can be resolved without resort to radical populist policies which are based on untruths about the economy that should be rejected.’²⁹ Certainly, this cautionary stance reflects the prevalent mood much earlier in 2017 when President Jacob Zuma was taken to task by opposition parties over the overarching theme of his address – radical socio-economic transformation – during the State of the Nation debate in Parliament. Yet, ironically, it also seems clear that the SAVE SA marches and their campaign in April 2017 also pointed to the corruption of accounting firms such as KPMG in enabling state capture (see Figure 2). One example is the anti-trust collusion since April 2015 by 17 Banks, local and international, as they were involved in price-fixing and market allocation in the trading of foreign currency pairs – contrary to the Competition Act. Another is the case of a listed company such as Markus Jooste’s Steinhoff that show the darker side of ‘White Monopoly Capital’ in the deliberate theft and loss of billions of

rand in accounting for Public Investment Company (PIC) investment. Mark Swilling et al describe the PIC as 'the second largest shareholder on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange' (2017, p. 17). Billions in pension funds investment were lost and not even accounted for by Steinhoff as any corporate citizen would have. Like the Gupta family, **Steinhoff** had their auditing fudged by accounting firms that colluded with Steinhoff in a multi-billion rand corporate failure scandal. However, the staggering figures and cost to the South African economy seem to suggest that 'corporate failure' is as much invidious as 'State capture'. Both are contributing to corporate meltdown in comparable proportion to state capture.

In light of the above-mentioned corporate failure and even meltdown caused by private sector companies, former President Zuma's rhetoric against 'White Monopoly Capital' becomes justified as it was when Demosthenes decried the annexure of Athens. In the event that State Capture prompts prosecution, as is the case now, corporate meltdown deserves it equally.

In sum: contesting the rhetoric of RET in context

Whilst the rhetoric of radical economic transformation (RET) echoes in many intertextual ways Ngugi wa Thiongo's clamour for the 'ownership, management and control of the economy', Vusi Gumedede (2017) avers that it also shows how former President Jacob Zuma had a clear agenda that sought to address the poverty, unemployment and inequality couched in rhetorical gestures. This was not much unlike the rhetorical bent of Demosthenes as he addressed the burning issues of Athens. The latter, deemed the greatest orator of all time, proceeded in a logic that simultaneously posited a thesis and anti-thesis in what James Fredal (252) describes as Demosthenes' oration *Against Meidias*, which ostensibly served to illustrate the role of 'action' as an independent art of character-presentation.

In much the same way that Demosthenes saw fit to confront the Macedonian expansion into (and annexation of) Athens as a threat that requires confrontational rhetorical action, President Zuma sought to address the pressing challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment through Radical Socio-Economic Transformation. To the extent that the programme is backed by the Medium Term Strategic Framework (2014–2019), RET emphasizes growth and inclusiveness, not just increased involvement by the State in the economy. In a country with such stark inequality, entrenched poverty and high unemployment, the moral argument for RET is strong and the RET programme expresses the political will of the ruling party to address these issues. At face value, this makes RET pass the test of legality, justice, expediency, practicability and decency for the majority of poor South Africans.

However, Gillian Schutte (2017) will have us throw caution to the wind: RET is at best a 'distorted discourse' and at worst empty rhetoric 'served up on Orwellian platters' because it is impossible to rollout this economic intervention on the back of an economy that pursues neo-liberal imperatives. Priorities of the market and trade tariffs that do not promote equality in trade make it impossible to roll this RET programme out since, in a crude sense, the growth in the economy – however sluggish or pegged at 5% according to the NDP target – will not have a corresponding growth in the economic well-being of the poor majority. In this scenario, JSE-listed companies will benefit in increased profits

and the inequality will increase further still. On the obverse side, such growth will legitimize the ill-gotten gains of listed companies through anti-trust behavior and corporate failure and/or meltdown on the scale of State Capture. If, as Johann Rupert and Mark Swilling et al point out in different places, RET is a means of raiding the Treasury, then the corollary is the raiding of the JSE that arises from economic growth that is not people-focused but profit-based in favour of private companies. Of the latter, Steinhoff is the most notorious example in respect of the PIC – a company that manages funds in the order of almost R2 trillion in government employees' pensions, amongst others. Beyond Steinhoff the PIC – for all it is worth – is also a target of State Capture head honchos, in the name of Radical Economic Transformation. As both sides (the 'White Monopoly Capital' legion, on the one hand, and the RET rentier pack, on the other) of the economic assault go for the jugular, the RET jargon cannot save the day.

The radical edge of the RET rhetoric – however much desirable in some quarters and perplexing in **others** – is devoid of a systematic rollout plan that will guarantee the much-needed ownership, management and control of the economy by the poor South African majority rather than what Chipkin and Swilling (2018) have aptly described as the Shadow State. As was the case with Demosthenes and Meidias, the intensity of enmity in the RET rhetoric is not between former President Jacob Zuma and 'White Monopoly Capital': it marks the blue-print of economic freedom being torn up by elements of the Shadow State whose patronage and rent extraction networks aggrandize themselves. RET thus becomes a poisoned chalice to the poor majority in need of economic emancipation; yet it is also an elixir to the rentier class embedded within the infrastructure of the Shadow State.

Notes

1. See Obike (2016) 'Nelson Mandela's Address to the U.S. Congress: A Universal Appeal to Dignity,' *African Journal of Rhetoric* 8: 128. Such an approach as Wrage's (1947, pp. 451–457) has allowed Obike incredible analytical purchase in demonstrating how Nelson Mandela's appeal for human dignity was transformed into 'demands for economic rights through the rhetoric of economic moralism'.
2. Bendile (2017) for *Mail & Guardian* 'Let's embrace radical economic transformation', available on <https://mg.co.za/article/2017-07-02-00-lets-embrace-radical-economic-transformation>, accessed on 11 August 2017.
3. Gumede (2017) for *Mail & Guardian* 'The state does have ways to radically transform SA', available on <https://mg.co.za/article/2017-06-01-00-the-state-does-have-ways-to-transform-sa>, accessed on 25 July 2017.
4. Wa Thiong'o (1993, p. 50).
5. Bendile, Op Cit.
6. When taken to task, after an email expose, the Public Relations firm Bell Pottinger capitulated to the position that they created a political frenzy with the term White Monopoly Capital, on behalf of the Gupta family at the heart of State Capture claims.
7. Fredal (2001, p. 252).
8. Worthington (2002, p. 4)
9. Agnew (2016, p. 3).
10. Tabane (2017) for *SABC News* 'Radical economic transformation is needed for inclusive growth: Davies Monday 8 May 2017' <http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/f9015f804110c2549549f510d2cccae0/Radical-economic-transformation-is-needed-for-inclusive-growth-20170805>, accessed on 22 May 2018.

11. Ibid.
12. Worthington (2002) *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator*. London & New York: Routledge: 3.
13. Schutte (2017) 'The Radical Economic Transformation Lie', Media for Justice, online <https://www.mediaforjustice.net/the-radical-economic-transformation-lie/>, accessed on 22 May 2018.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Eye Witness News (2017) for *Eye Witness News*, 'Thuli Madonsela gives her take on Radical Economic Transformation', available on <http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/17/thuli-madonsela-gives-her-take-on-radical-economic-transformation>, accessed on 16 May 2018.
17. Ibid.
18. Gretler and Griffiths (2017) for *Bloomberg News* 'Johann Rupert: Radical economic transformation just a code word for theft', available online on <http://www.fin24.com/Economy/johann-rupert-radical-economic-transformation-just-a-code-word-for-theft-20170913>, accessed on 22 May 2018.
19. Ibid.
20. Dodovu (2017) available on <http://www.unmaskedkm.co.za/a-critique-by-china-dodovu/>, accessed on 16 June 2018.
21. Pauw (2017) *The President's Keepers: Those Keeping Zuma in Power and Out of Prison* outlines the significance of the rhetorical action of Radical Socio-Economic Transformation in dealing with foes who were questioning 'State Capture', conflating them with 'White Monopoly Capital'.
22. Bhorat et al (2017) *Betrayal of the Promise: How the Nation is being stolen*, PARI: Stellenbosch, 2.
23. Bendile (2017) op cit.
24. Elucidating the loss of oppositional structures outlined by Jacques Derrida in his defocalization strategy of reversal and displacement of the whole system of dependence in his reading of Plato's *Pharmacy*, in Zeyneb Direk (2002) *Jacques Derrida: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers*. London & New York: Routledge: 72.
25. Hobson (1998) *Jacques Derrida: Opening Lines*. London & New York: Routledge.
26. Worthington (2002, p. 4).
27. Gumede (2017) op cit.
28. Ibid.
29. Bisseke (2017) for *Business Live* 'DEBUNKING THE MYTHS: Nine myths about SA's economy', available online on <https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/cover-story/2017-09-21-nine-myths-about-sas-economy/>, accessed on 21 September 2017.

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