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The Avoid Pronoun Principle and the Elsewhere Principle

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Suppose that we assume some form of the Projection principle because of the descriptive and explanatory advantages that it may have (cf. Chomsky (1981)). This principle depends crucially on empty categories. If we make use of empty categories, then if we take the theory seriously and if we want to make the strongest claim possible, we should say the least possible about empty categories: in an ideal grammar, no statement should refer specifically to empty categories, and their properties should follow from principles that apply to NPs in general. So the task of the linguist is to show how independent properties of the grammar interact to yield empty categories with the specific properties that they have. This is a test for the theory and the validity of the Projection principle. The properties of gaps must be determined by components that operate on NPs in general: if this proves possible, then it gives strong support to a model of grammar where empty categories play a role since empty categories come free. But if additional principles are needed to deal specifically with empty categories, then the theory is weakened.

For example, one of the basic ideas behind trace theory was that the theory of movement could be related to the theory of bound anaphors: so the only movements allowed were those where the output is an antecedent-anaphor relation. This contrains the class of possible movements. But trace theory (and more generally the analysis of empty categories) is weakened if for example

additional stipulations are added to the grammar that essentially restate in some other form similar conditions on the relation between an empty category and its antecedent. Some of the statements that weaken the theory by referring specifically to the empty category are things like the ECP, control theory, the Pro Drop condition, the Case Filter, and the Avoid Pronoun principle. If we take such a strong position with respect to empty categories, then for example, the partition of the empty category into different types should depend on the same principles that are used to determine the type of lexical NPs.

I assume the analysis of anaphors and pronouns of Bouchard (1982b), where such a strong position is maintained: anaphors, whether lexical or not, are functionally determined by Binding as in (1).

(1) <u>Binding</u>: In the configuration $(\gamma \dots \beta \dots \alpha \dots \beta \dots), \alpha$ Binds β if and only if: $1^{\circ} \alpha$ governs β $2^{\circ} \alpha$ assigns its R-index to β .

NPs are determined to be pronouns by an Elsewhere procedure that freely indexes NPs at S-structure. An empty category can be either one of these NP types, but never both, contrary to Chomsky's (1981) analysis where PRO is a pronominal anaphor. In my analysis, PRO is either an anaphor governed by its antecedent (local control), or a pronoun freely indexed (long distance control and arbitrary PRO). The distribution of PRO is dependent on Case, not government. This has been proposed in Bouchard (1982b) to solve various conceptual and empirical problems, the details of which I cannot go into here.

Consider now the Avoid Pronoun principle of Chomsky (1981), which states informally that lexical pronouns must be avoided when possible.

(2) <u>Avoid Pronoun Principle</u>: Avoid lexical pronoun when possible.

This principle was proposed by Chomsky to account for the fact that in gerunds like (3), <u>his</u> has a highly preferred reading as being noncoreferential with John.

(3)a) John prefers (his going to the movies) b) John prefers ($\alpha \atop \alpha$ PRO going to the movies)

The Avoid Pronoun principle is in direct contradiction with a strong approach where one tries to minimize the difference between a lexical NP and an empty NP, and where no statement refers specifically to empty categories. Assuming the approach to NP types

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proposed above where anaphors have a more restricted domain than pronouns (i.e. Binding by a governor vs free indexing), I propose to account for the facts in gerunds with a principle that does not make a distinction between lexical NPs and empty categories, but rather between anaphors and pronouns. This is the Elsewhere principle, given in (4).

(4) Elsewhere Principle:

Don't put a pronoun in a position where an anaphor is possible, that is, in a position where the pronoun will be interpreted as coreferential with an NP that can Bind it.

If we assume that the head -ing of a gerund can be nominal or verbal (cf. Lees (1960), Reuland (1980)), then a PRO is possible in (3b) if the gerund is verbal since no Case is assigned to the subject position then: Genitive Case is assigned in the context ($_{NP}$ NP \overline{N}), and if the head -ing is verbal, then α in (3b) is an S, not an NP, so Genitive Case is not assigned here. A verbal gerund being an S, not an S (it has no COMP, presumably because it has no tense.Cf. Stowell (1981)), the PRO is governed across the S node by its antecedent John in (3b), hence it is an anaphor. On the other hand, his gets Case in (3a), the gerund being nominal: so a is an NP and the NP boundary blocks government. So his is a pronoun: it does not get its index by Binding but by free indexing at S-structure. Therefore, by the Elsewhere principle (4), a reading where John is coreferential with the subject of the gerund must be with the anaphor PRO, not with the pronoun his. So we can give an account of the facts in (3) that is in line with our strong position which is that we must minimize the difference between empty categories and lexical NPs. The distinction we make in (3) is not between lexical and nonlexical pronoun, but between pronoun and anaphor.

Another application of the Elsewhere principle is in the case of like-subjects in subjunctives in French like in (5).

(5)a)*Je veux que j'aille voir ce film. b) Je veux (PRO aller voir ce film)

In the analysis of control facts of Bouchard (1982b), there is no independent theory of control since this would weaken the grammar by referring specifically to empty categories: a PRO is either a pronoun or an anaphor, and this is determined by general principles that apply to pronouns and anaphors, whether lexical or not. So for example, what goes on in local control constructions is that the S is deleted and the PRO is governed by its antecedent: hence it is an anaphor since it is Bound in the sense of (1). So in (5b), α is an S, not an S, and the PRO is an anaphor Bound by its antecedent <u>je</u>. So there is a contrast between (5a) and (5b): there is a pronoun in (5a) but an anaphor in (5b).

If we assume that subjunctives and infinitives are closely related in their temporal interpretation in that both express "unrealized" tenses (cf. Bresnan (1972)), then this means that the interpretation can be maintained in (5) by having an anaphor instead of a pronoun, that is, an infinitive clause instead of a subjunctive clause since PRO is an anaphor in (5b) according to our analysis. And the Elsewhere principle tells us to choose the construction with an anaphor over the one with a pronoun. Hence (5a) is rejected under the reading discussed here.

Consider now the sentences in (6).

- (6)a) (PRO d'être menacé de mort) ne me fera pas changer d'idée.
 - b) Il serait possible (PRO d'être admis à l'académie) si nous en faisions la demande.

In (6), PRO is not governed by its antecedent: so PRO is not an anaphor here, but rather a pronoun coreferential with some NP in the sentence. According to the Avoid Pronoun principle analysis, there should be no difference between the PRO in (5b) and the PRO in (6). On the other hand the Elsewhere principle says nothing about cases where PRO is a pronoun and there is a like-subject that is a pronoun: here it is simply a pronoun for a pronoun, and there should be no contrast as far as the Elsewhere principle is concerned. So subjunctive constructions equivalent to the sentences in (6) with lexical pronouns as subjects should be possible according to the Elsewhere principle, since it predicts a contrast only between anaphor and pronoun, not between lexical and non-lexical pronoun. This is the case, as we see in (7), where we give the subjunctive equivalents to (6).

- (7)a) (Que <u>je</u> sois menacé de mort) ne <u>me</u> fera pas changer d'idée.
 - b) Il serait possible (que <u>nous</u> soyons admis à l'académie) si <u>nous</u> en faisions la demande.

What we see is that the formulation of the principle as an Elsewhere principle has the conceptual advantage that it is stated as differentiating between pronoun and anaphor, not between lexical and non-lexical pronoun. This formulation also has the empirical advantage that it brings together facts that are unrelatable under the Avoid Pronoun principle. Thus besides the like-subjects and gerunds, there are three other sets of facts that I would like to bring to your attention. They all have to do with relative clauses in French.

In French, a relative clause can be formed by moving an overt WH-phrase to COMP as in (8).

(8) L'homme $(\overline{S}(_{COMP} \text{ sur qui})(_{S} \text{ tu te fies } \underline{t}))$

Or it can be formed by moving a \emptyset element to COMP as in (9). (9)a) L'homme $(\frac{1}{S}(COMP \ \emptyset \ que)(S \ tu \ as \ vu \ t))$

b) L'homme $\left(\frac{1}{S}\right)$ (COMP \emptyset que) $\left(\frac{t}{S} \text{ est venu}\right)$

In (9b), I assume along the lines of Kayne (1975), Pesetsky (1979) that a rule changes <u>que</u> to <u>qui</u> when the \emptyset element is nominative.

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Let us assume that this element in COMP is Bound by the head of the restrictive relative clause, the COMP partly heading the \overline{S} and so being accessible for Binding by the head of the relative clause. Then this \emptyset element is an anaphor, bound by its antecedent. Congider now the following facts.

1° In colloquial French, it is possible to form relative clauses by using resumptive pronouns instead of the WH-strategy (cf. Lefebvre and Fournier (1978), Bouchard (1982a-b)). But there is a contrast between relativization of a PP and relativization of a subject or object, as we can see in (10) and (11).

(10) Un gars que je me fierais pas <u>sur lui</u>.

(ll)a)??La fille qu'<u>elle</u> est venue

b)??L'homme que je l'ai vu

What is going on is that the pronouns in (11) contrast with the anaphors in (9), which are also possible in these dialects, so that the sentences fall under the Elsewhere principle. On the other hand, there is no contrast when a PP is relativized as in (8) and (10): this is because the <u>qui</u> in (8) is a pronoun, not an anaphor, since it cannot be bound by the head <u>l'homme</u> because the maximal projection PP blocks government, hence Binding. So the Elsewhere principle accounts for this contrast in the use of resumptive pronouns.

 2° There is a well known contrast between the use of <u>qui</u> and <u>lequel</u> in relative clauses. Consider the following restrictive relative clauses.

(12)a) L'homme	qui <u>t</u> est venu	(SUBJ)
b) L'homme	que tu as vu t	(OBJ)
c) L'homme	pour qui tu as voté t	(P-OBJ)
(l3)a)*L'homme	lequel <u>t</u> est venu	(SUBJ)
	lequel tu as vu <u>t</u>	(OBJ)
c) L'homme	pour lequel tu as voté t	<u>t</u> (P-OBJ)

In restrictive relative clauses, <u>lequel</u> cannot appear alone in COMP as when a subject or object position is relativized: it can only appear in COMP if a PP has been relativized. If we assume that <u>lequel</u> is a pronoun, then we expect this contrast between the pronoun <u>lequel</u> and the \emptyset anaphor in an Elsewhere principle analysis. If <u>lequel</u> is a pronoun, then by the Elsewhere principle it cannot appear bare in the COMP of a restrictive relative clause since it would then be Bound by the head of the relative clause: so it can only appear in the COMP if it is not Bindable, that is, if a PP node blocks government by the head.

Note that one could always say that, in this case, the Avoid Pronoun principle makes the right prediction: there is a contrast between a lexical form <u>lequel</u> and a non-lexical form \emptyset . But then the Avoid Pronoun principle analysis cannot explain why the contrast does not also hold in the case of non-restrictive relative clauses, as in (14) and (15).

(14)a) Cet homme, <u>lequel t</u> n'a jamais fait quoi que ce soit pour son pays, nous dégoûte. (SUBJ)

- b) Cet homme, <u>lequel</u> Marie n'a jamais vu <u>t</u> sobre, la dégoûte. (OBJ)
- (15)a) Cet homme, <u>qui</u> t n'a jamais fait quoi que ce soit pour son pays, nous dégoûte. (SUBJ)
 - b) Cet homme, <u>que</u> Marie n'a jamais vu <u>t</u> sobre, la dégoûte. (OBJ)

If there is a \emptyset element in (15), as is probably the case if one assumes so for (12), then there should be a contrast between (14) and (15) according to the Avoid Pronoun principle. But the head of a non-restrictive relative clause presumably does not govern the COMP of the relative clause since this clause is more like a parenthetical, and so the element in COMP cannot be Bound as an anaphor and it is a pronoun. So the Elsewhere principle predicts that <u>lequel</u> forms should be allowed in such cases since there is no contrast between pronoun and anaphor here: both the <u>lequel</u> and the \emptyset element are pronouns in non-restrictive relative clauses. So these facts show that the contrast must be between pronoun and anaphor, not lexical and non-lexical pronoun.

 3° The third set of facts has to do with the doubly filled COMP constructions that are possible in colloquial French, as in (16).

(16)a) Le gars à qui que je pense

b) Le gars <u>de qui que</u> je te parle

c) Un gars sur qui que je me fierais pas

d) Le gars pour qui que je vais voter

Note that the examples in (16) all involve WH-phrases in PPs. If the relativized position is the subject or the object however, these doubly filled COMP constructions are ungrammatical. (17)a)*Le gars <u>qui qui qui t</u>est venu.


b)*Le gars qui que/que que j'ai vu t

This is not due to some filter which blocks doubly filled COMPs only if the WH-phrase is nominative or accusative, since the construction is possible in questions as in (18).

(18)a) Qui qui est venu?

b) Qui que tu as vu ?

But \emptyset operators are not possible in questions, whereas they are in relative clauses. Consider now the structure which this additional <u>qui</u> appears in. This additional <u>qui</u> is adjoined in such a way to COMP that it does not head the S', so that it is not accessible for government from outside the S'. Thus the structure is as in (19).



So this additional <u>qui</u> is a pronoun, not an anaphor since it cannot be Bound by its antecedent. Now since these dialects of French have a free option between relative clauses with

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(19)

doubly filled COMPs and relative clauses without doubly filled COMPs, this means that they have an option between a pronoun and an anaphor in the cases where an element can be Bound in COMP, that is, in the cases where the element in COMP is not prevented from being Bound by a PP node blocking government: this is precisely the contrast between subject and object relativization on the one hand, and PP relativization on the other hand. So the reason why the constructions in (17) are ungrammatical is because they involve pronouns that contrast with anaphors in cases like (20).

(20)a) Le gars qui est venu.

b) Le gars que j'ai vu.

On the other hand, no such contrast exists between (16) and (21), or (18) and (22), since these constructions involve pronouns only in all cases.

- (21)a) Le gars à qui je pense
 - b) Le gars de qui je te parle
 - c) Le gars sur qui je me fierais pas
 - d) Le gars pour qui je vais voter
- (22)a) Qui est venu?
 - b) Qui as-tu vu?

In conclusion, we see that adopting the Elsewhere principle instead of the Avoid Pronoun principle has the conceptual advantage that it is stated as differentiating between pronoun and anaphor, not between lexical and non-lexical pronoun; and we are assuming that this latter type of statement should not have a place in an ideal grammar. This analysis also has the empirical advantage that it brings together facts that are unrelatable under the Avoid Pronoun principle analysis: the facts about gerunds, like-subjects in subjunctives, the peculiarities of relativization with respect to resumptive pronouns, <u>que</u> doubling, and the <u>qui/lequel</u> contrast when the subject and object positions are relativized in French.

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