

1 Transformation and slippage in co-production ambitions for global 2 technology development: the case of gene drive

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4 Abstract

5 Co-production is an increasingly popular framework for knowledge generation, evaluation
6 and decision making. Despite its potential to open up decisions and practices to the input of
7 others, co-production regularly falls short of its transformative ambitions. Through
8 documentary analysis, we investigate the meaning and dynamics of co-production as it
9 stretches beyond the local into global research and technology spaces. We find that in the
10 case of global gene drive, the meaning of co-production is extended in novel ways and
11 underpinned by new possibilities for meaningful transformation. At the same time, we also
12 identify a simultaneous resurfacing of reductive framings of collaboration. In the paper we
13 present ‘slippage’ as a useful heuristic in helping to understand why co-production fails. We
14 argue that if co-production in these new spaces is to achieve its transformative ambitions,
15 there is a need to engage with new and entrenched knowledge hierarchies that contribute to
16 this slippage.

17 Keywords: Co-production, global research, governance, sustainability, gene drive.

18

19 1. Introduction

20

21 Co-production has become a core idea in the theory and practice of sustainability and a
22 powerful framework for knowledge generation, evaluation and decision making (Miller and
23 Wyborn, 2018). Yet, the term has been described as vague and nebulous, encapsulating a
24 broad array of approaches ranging from thin and instrumental consultation, to more robust
25 forms of shared problem definition (Flinders et al, 2016). It has also been criticised for its
26 focus on local projects and scientific knowledge generation, unconnected to broader
27 processes of social change (Norström et al, 2020). In order to realise the transformative
28 potential of co-production, calls are emanating for attention to be paid to the meanings and
29 formatting of co-production in specific contexts (Wyborn et al, 2019). This paper provides
30 insights into the meaning and dynamics of co-production as it stretches beyond the local into
31 global research and technology spaces which typify an increasing number of collaborative
32 projects in the Anthropocene. We are interested in the extent to which the expansion of co-
33 production into these spaces might provide new opportunities for meaningful transformation.

34

35 A new and specific form of co-production – co-development – is potentially taking shape in
36 the global governance of gene drive technology. Gene drive is an emerging technology with
37 the potential to address diverse health, environmental and conservation challenges such as the

38 flourishing of invasive species and resurgence of infectious diseases vectored by various
39 species of mosquito (NASEM, 2016; Royal Society, 2018). At present, gene drive is being
40 developed in laboratories in the Global North and through Global North/South partnerships
41 but the first release of a gene drive organism into the environment is expected to take place in
42 the Global South (EFSA Panel on GMO, 2020). Gene drive is a global technology because it
43 is designed to spread through a whole population and will not respect political boundaries.
44 The global nature of the technology combined with its potential to eliminate or alter whole
45 species has resulted in a plethora of governance documents prescribing its responsible
46 development and use. These documents place significant emphasis on a new form of
47 governance emerging under the term ‘co-development’ (AU and NEPAD, 2018; Hartley et al,
48 2019; James and Tountas, 2018).

49

50 We employ a nascent theory approach to analyse co-development through performative
51 documents attempting to define the terms of collaborative practice (Edmondson and
52 McManus, 2007). Nascent theory involves inductive learning in cases where there is little
53 explication of the construct or process under study. We document the emergence of a
54 knowledge co-production approach in gene drive research and development and reveal four
55 key ambitions: 1] collaborating with communities, stakeholders and publics; 2] building
56 capacity; 3] engaging with social-cultural contexts, and; 4] embracing environmental
57 complexity. These ambitions present new opportunities for realising co-production’s
58 transformative ideals, but each ambition is accompanied by a resurfacing of top-down
59 hierarchical governance approaches. We argue that slippage is a useful heuristic to
60 understand why co-production fails and demonstrate that, in the case of gene drive, such
61 slippage can be linked, in part, to the persistence of entrenched as well as new knowledge
62 hierarchies. In order to advance the theory of co-production and realise its transformative
63 potential, attention needs to focus more squarely on what van der Hel (2016) describes as the
64 gap between inclusivity and transformation where slippage plays a role.

65

66 2. Meanings of co-production across borders

67

68 Co-production has a rich history spanning multiple disciplines and epistemic traditions
69 (Miller and Wyborn, 2018). It involves opening up decisions and practices to the input of
70 others in order to generate more equitable and innovative sustainability outcomes (Lemos and
71 Morehouse, 2005). It also involves recognising that framings and practices of science, nature
72 and policy are mediated or co-produced by social relations (Jasanoff, 2004; Jasanoff and
73 Kim, 2015). Jasanoff (2005: 3) points to the importance of ‘culture, values, subjectivity,
74 emotions and politics’ in co-producing socio-technical orders. As a call for greater
75 participation in science and technology decision making, co-production is underpinned by
76 normative arguments that shared decision-making is ethically superior as well as by the
77 recognition that collaboration can increase social resilience and empower marginalised voices
78 (Filipe et al, 2017; Glasbergen, 2011). It is also premised upon the recognition that epistemic

79 diversity can contribute to the generation of more robust innovations and policy interventions.
80 Scientific research is currently enjoying a renewed prescription for co-production, with
81 advice on how scientists can take a more co-productive approach to their research appearing
82 in eminent journals such as *Nature* (cf Vera, 2018; Norström et al, 2020).

83

84 However, despite the great gusto for co-production, two dominant challenges exist in the
85 literature. First, co-production is subject to considerable interpretive flexibility and degrees of
86 influence. Co-production is imagined and practiced in highly variable ways (Norström et al,
87 2020). Flinders et al (2016) suggest co-production is subject to conceptual stretching, arguing
88 that it has different ‘shades’ that run from thin, instrumental shades, to deeper shades where
89 co-production becomes embedded and meaningful. van der Hel (2016) notes a similar
90 distinction. This heterogeneity in meanings is confusing in both theory and practice. Wyborn
91 et al (2019) call for a robust discussion about what co-production practices and processes are
92 appropriate and effective and in what contexts. To achieve this kind of discussion, more
93 attention must be paid the meanings of co-production and how these meanings matter for co-
94 production’s transformative potential.

95

96 The second challenge is concerned with co-production in different contexts. Too often,
97 studies of co-production are focused on a specific local or regional context and on the
98 generation of scientific knowledge (Miller and Wyborn, 2018). However, global research
99 partnerships and cross-border collaborations are increasingly prevalent ways of addressing
100 global sustainability challenges (Chu et al, 2014; Larkan et al, 2016). Further, research
101 institutions, funders and non-governmental organisations increasingly operate at a global
102 scale (Norström et al, 2020). Turnhout et al (2020) suggest that in these global contexts, co-
103 production may need to address pronounced inequalities and power imbalances. For example,
104 Chu et al (2014) have argued that capacity building in the Global South may help to
105 maximise the benefits of co-production when these power imbalances exist. This paper
106 addresses these challenges through an examination of the meaning of co-production in the
107 development of an emerging global technology that crosses international borders. We are
108 interested in what happens to co-production when it stretches into these global spaces which
109 entangle multiple countries, relations and actors in new ways.

110

111 3. Methodology

112 3.1 *The case study*

113

114 Gene drive is a prominent case through which to conceptually develop our thinking on co-
115 production in global spaces (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Gene drive is a natural process identified by
116 Austin Burt in 2003. Burt identified selfish genetic elements which increase the propensity of
117 a particular gene to be preferentially passed on to an offspring organism (Burt, 2003). The
118 power of selfish genetics lay dormant until the development of genome editing tools such as
119 CRISPR Cas9 which enable scientists to direct this process for human ends. By 2014,

120 scientists were able to ‘drive’ desired traits through offspring populations by altering the
121 genome of an organism (such as a rat or mosquito) so that it expresses a particular trait (e.g.
122 refractoriness to disease or altered reproductive capacity). This ‘synthetic’ drive allows
123 scientists to bypass Mendelian rules of inheritance and force edited genomic changes through
124 a whole species (Gantz and Bier, 2015). Unlike genetically modified organisms developed
125 under conditions of contained use, gene drives are intended to propagate within ecological
126 systems.

127

128 Gene drive developers claim the technology has huge potential to address a diverse array of
129 contemporary health and environmental challenges (Hammond and Galizi, 2017; Webber et
130 al, 2015). The technology is currently being developed by a small number of scientists
131 supported by public, private and philanthropic funders including the Bill and Melinda Gates
132 Foundation and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, a US agency responsible
133 for emerging technologies for military use. As the technology develops, new applications are
134 emerging including the control of invasive species flourishing under changing climatic
135 conditions, such as rodents and flies (NASEM, 2016). The gene drive application which
136 scientists expect to be deployed first is Target Malaria’s gene drive mosquito (EFSA Panel on
137 GMO, 2020). These mosquitoes are modified through a ‘suppression’ drive system involving
138 genes that reduce female fertility and bias the sex ratio to reduce or ‘supress’ the population
139 of biting female mosquitoes (Target Malaria, 2019).

140

141 International tensions surrounding the development of gene drive were apparent at the recent
142 2018 Convention on Biological Diversity in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt where civil society
143 groups made calls for a moratorium on the future use and development of the technology
144 (Callaway, 2018). These calls expose normative questions about the procedures that will be
145 used to make decisions about gene drive deployment and are one of the drivers of a co-
146 production approach.

147

148 *3.2 Data collection and analysis*

149

150 The theoretical basis of this paper interweaves co-production and nascent theory, allowing us
151 to be ‘guided by and open to emergent themes and issues’ related to the emergence of the new
152 term, co-development (Edmondson and McManus, 2007, p.1164). This means that while the
153 analysis process is alert to argumentation already established in co-production literature,
154 particularly surrounding the meanings and interpretations of co-production, it will also be
155 attentive to the specificities of the data. There has been little delineation of the dynamics and
156 meaning of co-production as it stretches into increasingly global research and technology
157 spaces, making nascent theory a key departure point for the paper. Co-development emerged
158 in high-level governance documents prescribing a co-production approach to the development
159 and deployment of gene drive. Using qualitative documentary analysis we took a broad
160 understanding of what co-development means, mapping over time the solidification of a

161 model that was taking shape as early as 2014. Data sources were collected and analysed
162 between 2017 and 2019 (Table 1).

163

164 To meet criteria for inclusion they needed to be written by four or more gene drive funders,
165 supporters and developers and with an aim to establish a benchmark to shape practice. Our
166 inclusion criteria resulted in documents such as the 2018 ‘A Constitutional Moment – Gene
167 Drive and International Governance’ report by the Sustainability Council of New Zealand
168 being excluded from our analysis. We also excluded documents with a narrow focus on risk
169 assessment or the development of principles for community consent. Our data set reflects the
170 advanced development of gene drive applications in global health, particularly the gene drive
171 mosquito for malaria control, over other applications such as the gene drive mouse for
172 conservation (e.g. Farooque et al, 2019). Our selection resulted in the following documents
173 intending to set benchmarks for collaborative practice (Table 1).

174

175

176 **Table 1: Data set of gene drive governance documents***

177

178

179 D1 Year: 2019 Title: **Sustainable innovation in vector control requires strong**
180 **partnerships with communities**

181 Author/s: Bartumeus et al

182

183 D2 Year: 2019 Title: **Guidance on stakeholder engagement practices to inform the**
184 **development of area-wide vector control methods**

185 Author/s: Thizy et al

186

187 D3 Year: 2018 Title: **Gene drives for malaria control and elimination in Africa**

188 Author/s: AU and NEPAD

189

190 D4 Year: 2018 Title: **Pathway to the deployment of gene drive mosquitoes as a potential**
191 **biocontrol tool for elimination of malaria in sub-Saharan Africa: recommendations of a**
192 **scientific working group**

193 Author/s: James et al

194

195 D5 Year: 2017 Title: **Results from workshop ‘problem formulation for the use of gene**
196 **drive in mosquitoes’**

197 Author/s: Roberts et al

198

199 D6 Year: 2017 Title: **Principles for gene drive research**

200 Author/s: Emerson et al

201

202 D7 Year: 2016 Title: **Gene Drives on the Horizon: Advancing Science, Navigating**
203 **Uncertainty and Aligning Research with Public Values**

204 Author/s: NASEM

205

206 D8 Year: 2016 Title: **Policy and regulatory issues for gene drive insects**
207 Authors: Carter and Friedman
208
209 D9 Year: 2014 Title: **Guidance framework for testing of genetically modified mosquitoes**
210 Authors: WHO
211

212 **Full citations in end reference list*

216 Using a discourse analysis approach we investigate the meaning of co-development and how
217 it is conceptualised as a driver of more effective and equitable approaches to the development
218 of a technology with global reach. Analysis proceeded through a three-step process. An
219 iterative re-reading of the governance documents led to the identification of first order
220 information-based codes. First order codes reflect key topics and themes within the
221 documents (Pansera and Owen, 2018). These codes were then assembled into second order,
222 theory centric codes denoting broader thematic categories. Finally, we developed aggregate
223 codes encapsulating the second order theory centric headings. The coding and analysis
224 process required us to be ‘guided by and open to emergent themes and issues’ (Edmondson
225 and McManus 2007: 164). Our methodological approach recognises the value of a case study
226 contribution, yet speaks back to theory development through its investigation of the
227 formatting of co-production in a new problem space (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Sovacool et al, 2018).
228

229 4. Results

230 4.1 Co-development as a new form of co-production

231 A new sub category of co-production - co-development - emerged within key governance
232 documents responding to the science of gene drive between 2014 and 2019. As early as 2014,
233 the scientific community and international governance institutions were alert to the need to
234 ensure gene drive development and governance was conducted in an open, transparent and
235 collaborative fashion. The WHO (2014) *Guidance Framework for the Testing of Genetically*
236 *Modified Mosquitoes* was the first to emphasise the importance of a ‘democratic’ approach.
237 Recognising a ‘new era of science’ typified by heightened public awareness and scrutiny of
238 science, the framework stressed that gene drive research must be conducted in an engaged
239 manner (WHO, 2014: 71).
240

241 By 2015, scientific capabilities began to develop rapidly and proof of concept drives were
242 developed in yeast, fruit flies and mosquitos (NASEM, 2016). Later that year, the J. Craig
243 Venter Institute, a world-leading genomics research centre, published ‘*Policy and Regulatory*
244 *Issues for Gene Drives in Insects.*’ The report argued gene drive developers have a greater
245 responsibility to pursue social acceptance of the technology beyond regulatory approval due
246 to the propensity of gene drives to interact with and persist in the environment.

247

248 Also in 2015, the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (NASEM)
249 convened an expert group to develop a coherent response from the scientific community. The
250 expert group, composed of 16 members with interdisciplinary expertise across the natural and
251 social sciences, developed a ‘consensus overview’ of the state of the science and expectations
252 for responsible research. Its report *‘Gene Drives on the Horizon: Advancing Science,
253 Navigating Uncertainty, and Aligning Research with Public Values’*, recognised the capacity
254 of gene drive to ‘genetically alter a wild population, and potentially an entire species,’
255 represented a unique governance challenge (NASEM, 2016: 70). It emphasised engagement,
256 stipulating that the participation of stakeholders, publics and communities will be as
257 important as the science if gene drive is to progress beyond the laboratory and fulfil its
258 potential.

259

260 By 2017, it became apparent that the first application of gene drive technology was likely to
261 be gene drive mosquitoes to reduce malaria in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2019, Target Malaria
262 released genetically modified sterile male mosquitoes in Burkina Faso in order to develop
263 knowledge and capacity for the proposed release of gene drive mosquitoes. This advance led
264 gene drive funders and supporters to establish a funder forum, providing an avenue for
265 funders and stakeholders to review developments in the field and to coordinate work streams
266 to ‘move the field forward in a positive manner’ (FNIH, 2017: para.1). As part of this
267 reflexive practice, representatives from the Wellcome Trust, the Foundation for the National
268 Institutes of Health and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation published *‘Principles for gene
269 drive research’* in the journal *Science*, calling for a culture of responsible innovation in gene
270 drive development and deployment (Emerson et al, 2017).

271

272 Later in 2018, the publication of *‘Pathway to Deployment of Gene Drive Mosquitoes as a
273 Potential Biocontrol Tool for Elimination of Malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa:
274 Recommendations of a Scientific Working Group’* constituted a high profile attempt to
275 develop a practicable plan of action. A strong commitment to collaboration had at this stage
276 begun to solidify under the auspices of the term ‘co-development’. The Pathway document
277 stipulated that ‘Scientists and research institutions in the countries where the product
278 ultimately will be used must play a central role in the development process from its early
279 stages’ (James et al., 2018, p.20) and that development and deployment of gene drive must
280 involve ‘interaction with a diverse spectrum of groups’ (Ibid., 2018: 9).

281

282 There was now resounding recognition that gene drive posed notable scientific, ethical and
283 governance challenges and calls for collaboration began to be heard from experts in Global
284 South countries who would be expected to host the first field trials of gene drive organisms.
285 In 2018, Dr Jonathon Kayondo of Uganda Virus Research Institute stated:

286

287 ‘Africa must not wait for advances in malaria innovation – we must pioneer them - to
288 position ourselves at the forefront and spur development of this new field, we need

289 African and Africa-based scientists to add their voices to the debate on genetic
 290 technologies, which have so far taken place largely in Europe and North America.’
 291 (Kayondo, 2018: para.12)
 292

293 The 2018 African Union and New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development report
 294 ‘*Gene Drives for Malaria Control and Elimination in Africa,*’ also emphasised the
 295 importance of the term co-development which it described as being based on ‘collaboration
 296 between the partners in the teams, from research design to the creation of standard operating
 297 procedures’ (AU and NEPAD, 2018, p.13). Later in 2019, the ‘*Guidance on Stakeholder
 298 Engagement Practices To Inform the Development of Area-Wide Vector Control Methods*’
 299 defined co-development as ‘A collaborative process of jointly designing a research pathway
 300 and its resultant intervention to reach a common goal’ (Thizy et al, 2019: 4). This document
 301 stressed that an effective co-development approach will require ‘dialogue and compromise,’
 302 acknowledging that redefinition of project goals may also be required (Ibid). In the analysis
 303 and discussion that follows, we unpack the meaning co-development and investigate its
 304 ambitions.
 305

306 *4.2 An anatomy of co-development’s transformative ambitions*
 307

308 Our inductive approach to data analysis reveals four transformative ambitions for co-
 309 development: (1) collaborating with communities, stakeholders and publics; (2) building
 310 capacity; (3) engaging with social-cultural contexts and (4) embracing environmental
 311 complexity. We explore these ambitions, how they embody the open and transformative
 312 aspects of co-production, and show where these ambitions ‘slip’ back towards what van der
 313 Hel (2016) describes as linear, mono-disciplinary research models and the traditional
 314 hierarchal structures and assumptions that accompany them. Table 2 summarises these
 315 ambitions and their slippage.
 316

317
 318 **Table 2: An anatomy of co-development**
 319
 320

Collaborating with communities, stakeholders and publics	Building capacity	Foregrounding social-cultural contexts	Embracing environmental complexity
Ambition			
Communities, stakeholders and publics to contribute substantive knowledge to the technology’s development through engagement	Host country partners empowered to develop and scrutinise the technology	Social-cultural values and practices to shape technology pathways and risk assessment	Environmental complexity necessitates experimental methods and diverse knowledge

Slippage			
Community, stakeholder and public engagement to secure acceptability and delimit criticism	Capacity building to ensure the scientific and technical capabilities exist to facilitate pre-defined developmental pathways for gene drive	Social-cultural context is a barrier to be overcome to develop and deploy gene drive in the Global South	Environmental complexity to be managed through expert-led risk assessment and quantifiable parameters

321

322

323

324 *Collaborating with communities, stakeholders and publics*

325

326 Engagement with communities, stakeholders and publics is positioned as an essential
 327 component of gene drive development. Strong calls are made for funders to allocate a
 328 percentage of technical grants to engagement activities. There is a clear and expressed
 329 commitment to ‘meaningful’ engagement that embodies ‘respectful listening, creative
 330 compromise, and flexible practice’ (D7: 134). WHO emphasises that engagement activities
 331 should not be conceptualized in terms of an education or deficit model, insisting that well-
 332 developed engagement can help direct technical goals, improve the performance of research
 333 in social contexts and generate new learning opportunities. As WHO explains, scientists
 334 ‘have become cognizant of new ways that involving non-scientists in their work can be
 335 beneficial. Exceedingly complex problems may require planned activities that engage non-
 336 scientists in collaborative or problem-solving roles, rather than considering them solely as
 337 subjects’ (D9: 71).

338

339 NASEM similarly builds upon the substantive type of engagement articulated by WHO,
 340 emphasising that engagement with communities, stakeholders and publics is ‘critical for
 341 successful decision making regarding the research, development and potential release of gene
 342 drive mosquitoes’ (D7: 131). NASEM contains one of the most comprehensive discussion of
 343 engagement in gene drive to date, calling for a ‘meaningful’ and ‘robust’ approach. It
 344 differentiates itself from customary mechanisms of engagement existing under the provisions
 345 of the US National Protection Act which stipulates that the public must be notified prior to
 346 the release of a GMO. NASEM states public notice is an ‘inadequate platform for the more
 347 robust forms of engagement’ needed (D7: 171).

348

349 Risk and hazard assessment is a key area where engagement is identified as being able to
 350 substantively contribute to gene drive decision making. NASEM notes community
 351 engagement may help to provide ‘critical insights about potential harms’ (D7: 78). AU and
 352 NEPAD similarly note ‘researchers and risk assessors should integrate engagement into the
 353 construction of risk assessment models’ (D3: 21). Both WHO and NASEM highlight the
 354 innovative approach to engagement surrounding the risk assessment and release of

355 mosquitoes infected with the Wolbachia bacterium in Cairns, Australia. Populations living at
356 the release site were engaged in ways which generated new research questions including
357 whether or not Wolbachia could be passed on to humans through the salivary glands of
358 mosquitoes. Engagement here provided a means of reconfiguring the research programme.

359

360 Engagement has an important role to play in cultivating new relationships and socialities - it
361 can contribute more broadly to innovation in the opening up of reflexive deliberation
362 surrounding societal futures, values and modes of organisation (including funding priorities)
363 (Buchthal et al, 2019; Delbourne et al, 2017; Farooque et al, 2019; Lemos and Morehouse,
364 2005). Yet, beyond identifying harms it is not clear from the documents how knowledge
365 gathered through engagement might shape the technology trajectory in other ways. Aside
366 from the identification of environmental hazards, discussions slip back regularly to
367 information dissemination models foregrounding the need to ‘convey intelligible information
368 about gene drive’ (D7: 136). While the documents recognise there are different types of
369 publics and that engagement is multifaceted (D2, D4, D7), there is a lack of clarity
370 surrounding the role and potential contributions of these groups. Non-expert publics are
371 regularly described as having ‘perspectives’ rather than knowledge (D9: p.vii; D7: 136; D4:
372 28) and slippage is further evidenced by the temporality of accounts of engagement which
373 describe engagement as enabling communities to participate in decision making about the *use*
374 (rather than the design and development) of gene drive organisms (D7: 80).

375

376 *Building capacity*

377

378 Capacity building is regarded as a transformative component of co-development, empowering
379 Global South actors to draw on their own ‘values rather than relying on values imported from
380 elsewhere’ (D7: 77). James et al call for emphasis to be placed ‘not only on technology
381 transfer to partner institutions, but on building knowledge about gene drive technology
382 among African scientists and the public more broadly’ (D4:41). NASEM espouses similar
383 sentiment, emphasising the ‘ability of people in low-income countries to participate
384 meaningfully in decision making would be supported best not by merely engaging them in
385 decision making but by building the capacity in those countries to conduct research that is
386 locally valuable’ (D7: 76-77).

387

388 Here, the focus is on ensuring Global South research partners are able to become developers
389 and scrutinise technology trajectories. As WHO emphasises, Global South decision-making
390 bodies should have ‘the capacity to formulate the risk problem, to define appropriate
391 endpoints for risk, [and] to interpret the character of the component sources of risks’ (D9:
392 62). Capacity building is envisaged through a number of practices and protocols. The
393 documents stipulate scientists from Global South institutions should be able to participate in
394 research and safety work conducted in the Global North (D7, D2). WHO regards these
395 opportunities as laying a foundation for ‘future strength and independence for national
396 research activities’ (D9: 34).

397

398 Yet, it is not clear in practice how capacity building might be extended in a way that benefits
399 a wider constituency of publics beyond natural scientists and field entomologists. The focus
400 is on ensuring Global South partners have the infrastructure and regulatory mechanisms in
401 place to ‘support trials, including an experienced team of entomologists and epidemiologists,
402 and the capacity for transport, sample collection, and laboratory work’ (D4: 21). Minimal
403 mention is made of capacity building in areas such as the social sciences or humanities.
404 There is recognition of the need for ‘independent’ social inquiry into the conditions for
405 effective community participation (D1: 3). Yet, there is no attempt to build capacity in
406 understandings surrounding how the reconfiguration or ‘cessation’ of a project (D2) could
407 generate beneficial outcomes for all including for technology developers. Where capacity is
408 mentioned it is often linked to the capacity of developers to engage in dialogue with
409 stakeholders, rather than the capacity of multiple publics to open up the technology trajectory
410 through deliberation (D2).

411

412 The emphasis on building capacity to support field trials and regulatory infrastructures
413 reveals a prevalent instrumental rationale driving capacity building that resembles business-
414 as-usual and conflicts with the described transformative ambitions. The technology is
415 ultimately being developed in the Global North with deployment capacities enhanced and
416 developed in the Global South. However, global health and development literatures suggest
417 capacity building can be conceived in substantive rather than instrumental ways (Fransman et
418 al, 2019; Kok et al, 2017; Madsen and Adriansen, 2020).

419

420 *Foregrounding social-cultural contexts*

421

422 All governance documents recognise that engaging with social-cultural contexts is
423 fundamental to co-development of the technology. There is an acknowledgement that terms
424 such as ‘species diversity’ and ‘ecosystem health’ are contingent descriptions imbued with
425 social values and judgements (D7: 116). NASEM notes that while *Palmer amaranth* is
426 regarded as a weed and target for gene drive in the United States, related species of *amaranth*
427 are cultivated for food in Mexico, South America, India and China where they hold social-
428 cultural significance (D7: 68). Roberts et al similarly emphasise that any definition of
429 biodiversity risk ‘is dependent on identification of what aspects of biodiversity are considered
430 valuable’ (D5: 532). The documents call for social-cultural values to be built into
431 environmental protection goals (D4-D5, D7).

432

433 As well as acknowledging diversity in social-cultural values, there is an alertness to prior
434 experiences in global health where social-cultural contexts were not fully appreciated or
435 engaged. NASEM makes reference to the poor uptake of functionally efficient and effective
436 bed nets for malaria control in Kenya where the white nets ‘mimicked the burial shrouds used
437 by the local population, who thus did not adopt them’ (D7: 133). The WHO recounts a prior
438 historical incident in India where a WHO van bearing a snake logo released cases of sterile

439 male mosquitoes into a local community. The villagers who had a fear of snakes regarded the
440 van suspiciously and reacted angrily to the release (D9: 86). These instances contribute to the
441 call by James et al for technology development programmes to investigate ‘local social and
442 cultural perspectives on biotechnology research, malaria eradication, and large-scale public
443 health efforts’ (D4: 21).

444

445 The literature suggests that the social-cultural context of science and technology cannot be
446 separated from facts and objectivity in co-production (Jasanoff, 2004). Further, this social-
447 cultural context allows for the production of new types of knowledge which may suggest
448 meaningful ways to solve societal challenges (Filipe et al, 2017; Leach and Scoones, 2006).
449 Yet, while the documents evidence learning, it is notable that the overarching rationale for
450 engaging with social-cultural contexts is to determine potential barriers to the deployment of
451 gene drive technology. NASEM describes how engaging with publics is ‘complicated’ (D7:
452 79) by variations in risk perceptions and that cultural distrust of GM crops may encourage
453 similar distrust in gene drives. This requires being ‘wary about any one way of framing gene
454 drive technology (D7: 80). While WHO is wary of assuming one decision maker is
455 representative of whole community, there is no delineation of how a broader remit of publics
456 might be engaged (D9). There is also little clarity on the methods required to effectively
457 develop an appreciation of social-cultural values and knowledges. Incorporating social-
458 cultural values into environmental protection goals in a meaningful way will require public
459 deliberations. There is little discussion of what this might look like and the resources this
460 might require in the documents.

461

462 *Embracing environmental complexity*

463

464 The documents show a strong ambition to respect the natural world as a collaborator in the
465 technology development process. This marks a departure from prior technocentric
466 approaches, which regard the natural environment a passive subject without its own agency.
467 NASEM is cognisant of limits in the capacities of scientific knowledge to predict the
468 unfolding of gene drive in ecological systems, acknowledging that laboratory settings cannot
469 fully replicate environmental conditions and that proof of concept studies conducted in the
470 laboratory are insufficient to ‘support the release of gene-drive modified organisms into the
471 environment’ (D7: 177). James et al similarly stipulate that some questions about safety ‘may
472 not be answerable by laboratory studies and modelling’ (D4: 15). The documents
473 acknowledge the importance of not shying away from ‘uncertainty of outcomes and risks’
474 (D2: 8) and that research must be conducted with ‘respect and humility for the broader
475 ecosystem in which humans live’ (D6: 1136).

476

477 Proposed responses to the off-target effects and potential unintended consequences include
478 the regular sampling of gene drive organisms and wild strains to detect the emergence of
479 resistance. In NASEM, ‘reversal’ and ‘immunisation’ drives intended to destroy the original
480 drive are recommended. Yet, NASEM recognises the limits of applying engineering logics to

481 living materials, emphasising that it is hard to predict the effects which might arise ‘the
482 creation of breaks in DNA’ (D7: 98). NASEM also recognises that the use of assays
483 (biological monitoring used to monitor resistance) can contain inbuilt assumptions which can
484 lead to ‘observational bias’ (D7: 98). Ecological risk assessment is also proposed as a
485 response to environmental complexity (D4-D7) and positioned as a more robust alternative to
486 environmental assessments (D7). Ecological risk assessment is defined as being alert to
487 multiple interacting stressors. This described as necessitating ‘convergence of multiple fields
488 of study including molecular biology, genome editing, population genetics, evolutionary
489 biology, and ecology’ (D7: 7) as well as public engagement.

490

491 Yet while ecological risk attempts to grapple with the complexity of processual systems, it
492 regularly falls back on reductive models more akin to conventional risk assessment methods.
493 For example, NASEM suggests it will be important for ecological risk assessment to identify
494 cause-effect pathways in a probabilistic manner (D7: 204). Complex process cannot always
495 be identified in this way (Stirling, 2010). Across the documents (D1-D9) there is also little
496 delineation of the types and kinds of long term experimental sampling methods needed to
497 identify unanticipated unintended effects. Taking seriously the systems complexity of gene
498 drive will require experimental methods over long time periods of time. Enrolling the
499 environment as a collaborator requires not only recognising that environmental systems are
500 understood differently by different epistemic traditions (as evidenced in section 4.2.3) but
501 also taking seriously the propensity of non-human systems and organisms to exceed human
502 models and frames of reference (Bennett, 2009; Dürbeck et al, 2015).

503

504 5. Discussion

505

506 Norström et al (2020) argue that the stretching of co-production into new spaces may provide
507 opportunities for co-production to realise its transformative ambitions. We found this to be
508 true in our case. The global nature of our case, as well as the transformational nature of the
509 technology, has stretched co-production in ways which enhance its potential for meaningful
510 change. It is not simply stakeholders and communities that are recognised as collaborators in
511 the technology development process. Non-human actors (including genes and ecologies) are
512 also recognised for their role in shaping technological outcomes. This is a key addition to the
513 theory and practice of co-production. As environmental philosophers have long argued,
514 plants, genes and ecologies do not simply conform to scripts that we give them (Bennett,
515 2010). Recognising non-human agencies with humility is key to developing robust
516 environmental sustainability outcomes. Co-production has also been broadened in our case
517 through its emphasis on capacity building. Capacity building has potential to rebalance power
518 inequalities and may help to connect co-production to border processes of social change.

519

520 Yet, perhaps the key finding to emerge from our analysis is the identification of an uneasy co-
521 existence between an ambitious commitment to meaningful change and a simultaneous
522 resurfacing of linear, mono-disciplinary models of collaboration (van der Hel, 2016). While

523 the governance documents articulate a concerted effort to developing more equitable forms of
524 science and technology this commitment is regularly muddled along the way. We propose
525 that ‘slippage’ is a useful heuristic in helping to make sense of the simultaneous co-existence
526 of competing framings in this context. As theoretical attention increasingly begins turns
527 towards the reasons why co-production fails (Turnohut et al, 2020), slippage encourages us to
528 focus on why co-production might fall short. It contributes to theory building efforts by
529 drawing attention to the discourses, process and contexts that contribute to the gap between
530 inclusivity and transformation.

531

532 Slippage appeared across each of the four ambitions of co-development. Indeed, despite the
533 ambitious commitment to inclusivity and collaboration broadly defined, there is an
534 overarching emphasis on engagement with communities in order to obtain consent for future
535 field trials. The dominant strategy is a conventional model of establishing community trust,
536 understanding perceptions and securing acceptance for the technology. This provides only
537 minimal opportunities for the technology to be opened up to alternative trajectories and
538 knowledges.

539

540 Similar challenges are also evident in capacity building which is imagined in narrow
541 scientific spaces designed to enhance deployment capabilities in support of pre-determined
542 trajectories. If capacity building is to contribute to a transformative form of co-production, it
543 must empower a much broader range of disciplinary and professional capacities including
544 social science and engagement capacities within the Global South to facilitate the opening up
545 of technology futures to multiple visions and publics. Otherwise this approach to capacity
546 building more closely resembles neo-colonial research models as well as the privileging of
547 science over other forms of knowledge (Beran et al, 2017). Slippage also appeared in the
548 third and fourth ambitions of co-development, where social-cultural contexts were regarded
549 as barriers to the deployment of the technology and a commitment to embracing
550 environmental complexity fell back on a reductive risk assessment approach.

551

552 Slippage can be linked to the persistence of new and emergent knowledge hierarchies. These
553 are expert-lay hierarchies and expert-expert hierarchies. The privileging of expert over lay
554 knowledge is well-documented in the literature (Seethaler et al, 2019) and remains
555 entrenched in our case. The gene drive governance documents largely presume knowledge is
556 to flow from experts to publics and make no substantive attempt to outline how knowledge
557 might flow the other way. Other than attempting to elicit concerns or risks associated with a
558 pre-determined technology trajectory, there is little imagination surrounding how other
559 knowledges might flow back into the technology problem space in substantive ways. This is
560 despite long-standing developments in fields such as science and technology studies (STS)
561 which demonstrate that expertise is distributed and that ‘non-expert’ publics can provide
562 substantive insights into scientific problems (Callon et al, 2011). While recent calls to enrol
563 local publics into entomological surveillance attempts in novel ways may generate new
564 socialities and learning opportunities (Thizy et al, 2019), the emphasis is nevertheless still

565 largely on educating communities rather than opening up fundamental questions surrounding
566 the kinds of technology futures and the kinds and qualities of relationships between
567 technology developers, organisations and publics that we might want to bring into the world.
568

569 The second knowledge hierarchy, an expert-expert hierarchy in which certain types of science
570 and expertise are privileged over others, is less explored in the existing co-production
571 literature. In particular, we observe the privileging of natural scientific knowledge over both
572 social science knowledge and practitioner knowledge. African scientists have called attention
573 to the expert-expert knowledge hierarchy, pointing to the privileging of Northern expert
574 knowledge and calling for African involvement in gene drive development (Mshinda et al,
575 2004; Kayondo, 2018). The former Minister of Health in the Republic of Namibia, Richard
576 Kamwi, has argued that the knowledge and perspectives of representatives from malaria-
577 afflicted countries are missing from conversations about gene drive development (Kamwi,
578 2016). Hassan Mshinda (Mshinda et al, 2004: 264), director general of the Tanzania
579 Commission for Science and Technology suggests that ecological studies and field research
580 constitute ‘an immediate opportunity for malaria-afflicted nations to regain their roles as
581 stakeholders, decision makers, and eventual owners of this technology.’
582

583 Realising the transformative potential of co-production will require redressing these
584 imbalances in knowledge. It will also require the development of processes, practical tools
585 and theoretical insights that can help to prevent slippage towards traditional hierarchical
586 models. Elsewhere we have argued that thinking in terms of ‘knowledge engagement’ rather
587 than ‘public engagement’ can help to focus attention on the direction of knowledge flows,
588 thereby preventing slippage towards one way information dissemination, or knowledge
589 deficit models (Hartley et al, 2019). A knowledge engagement lens can help to provoke
590 reflexivity, making visible engagement practices where it is presumed, for example, that
591 scientists hold a monopoly on expert knowledge. Knowledge engagement can also contribute
592 to the development a clear articulation of the diverse contributions that can be made by
593 multiple epistemic traditions. This will be key in moving beyond expert hierarchies which are
594 based upon presumptions which regard the role of the social sciences as existing to
595 communicate to publics or identify public perceptions which might disrupt technology
596 trajectories (Balmer et al, 2015).
597

598 As well as addressing new and emerging knowledge hierarchies, it will also be critical to
599 think about which actors are shaping the terms of the debate. The shift from government to
600 distributed governance, which has been drive in part by the complexity of global challenge
601 issues, has been accompanied by a reduction in the role of state actors (Ansell and Torfing,
602 2016). In our case, the retrenchment of state actors resulted in a relatively narrow group of
603 funders, technology developers and high profile organisations with an interest in the
604 deployment of the technology shaping the terms and framing of collaboration. There is a
605 danger that unless mechanisms are put in place to address slippage in co-development, it may

606 be perceived as an instrumental tool designed to push through a technology under the illusion
607 of participation, particularly where elite groups are involved.

608

609 6. Conclusion

610

611 The case of the co-development of gene drive raises important lessons for the theory and
612 practice of co-production as it stretches into new global spaces. The global nature of our case
613 as well and the transformational nature of the technology stretched co-production in ways that
614 enhance its potential for meaningful change. Co-development is attentive towards the
615 agencies of the natural environment and alert to the need to engage in capacity building to
616 shift collaboration from discourse to praxis. Yet, at the same time, we have also identified an
617 uneasy co-existence of transformational and reductive framings of collaboration in co-
618 development. Slippage is a useful heuristic to help researchers make sense of tensions
619 between inclusivity and transformation, particularly as collaborative governance moves into
620 new spaces extending beyond local scientific knowledge generation projects. Slippage in co-
621 development of gene drive can be linked to the persistence of established knowledge
622 hierarchies between expert and lay publics as well as new hierarchies between expert
623 traditions. Redressing shortcomings in co-production will require sustained theoretical
624 delineation into these kinds of reasons why co-production fails. Our case sheds light on the
625 new and entrenched hierarchies that will need to be addressed if co-production is to achieve
626 its transformative ambitions.

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