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International Regimes Database (IRD): Data Protocol

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M.**

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Working Paper

International Regimes Database (IRD): Data Protocol

*Helmut Breitmeier, Marc A. Levy
Oran R. Young, Michael Zürn*

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Explanation

At the end of each coding form of the computerized data protocol coders can provide uncertainty judgments about their coding and make further comments. The printed version of the data protocol reminds coders that it is possible to make uncertainty judgments in the UNCERTAINTY-field and to provide comments in the COMMENT-field.

Contact

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PRECODING AGREEMENT

The International Regimes Database (IRD) is a computerized information system containing a wide variety of information on a continuously growing set of international regimes. The database is a research tool intended, in the first instance, for use by social scientists seeking to expand knowledge regarding the formation, effectiveness, and dynamics of regimes. The value of this knowledge to practitioners responsible for establishing and operating specific regimes should also be substantial.

Database Architecture

The IRD data protocol contains four principal sections. Each section covers a grouping of variables that address a major area of interest to students of international regimes. The adoption of this structure is intended to facilitate the efforts of both coders and users. But users of the database can draw on variables located in different sections of the database in framing hypotheses to be explored on the basis of information contained in the IRD.

The first section of the data protocol deals with regime formation and places primary emphasis on understanding the forces at work (e.g., power, interests, ideas) in efforts to form new regimes. This emphasis on origins is understandable not only in light of the remarkable growth in the number and variety of regimes operative at the international level during the recent past but also in light of the conflicts and difficulties involved with long negotiation processes and deadlocks or even failures of regime building efforts. Regime formation, a subject that encompasses the reformation of existing institutional arrangements as well as the creation of new institutions where none has previously existed, has emerged as one of the central concerns of the "new institutionalism" in international relations.

The second section focuses on regime attributes and asks for data on principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programs of regimes. This section will yield an inventory of each regime's principal regulative, procedural, and programmatic elements. Regime analysts may use data on regime attributes to assess both the performance and the evolution of regimes. Policy-makers will be able to use quantitative data on regime attributes, such as compliance mechanisms, programmatic activities, decision rules, dispute settlement procedures, or organizational arrangements, to design effective international institutions. Regime analysts will also be able to comprehend changes in the attributes of regimes over time and to understand the evolution of attributes within individual regime components.

The third section on regime consequences contains variables dealing with domestic and international effects of regimes. Coders will be asked to provide data about the "real world" effects of regimes at the international and the national level. This section starts with the outputs of a regime, including activities involved in operationalizing the regime's provisions and decision-making procedures and the first official steps required to translate a regime's provisions from paper to practice. It then moves to data about outcomes at both the international and the domestic level including such variables as: what aims states formulated for problem-solving and goal-attainment in connection with the regime, compliance by member states, activities of major agencies, and actions of those affected by the regime's rules. The section also focuses on the impacts of a regime including both issue specific and broader results produced by the regime's operation. Such results encompass the regime's contribution to solving the problem(s) that motivated the parties to create it, the regime's

contribution to learning about the nature of the problem as well as impacts on the distribution of values arising from the regime's activities.

The fourth section deals with matters of regime dynamics that are not captured in the first and third sections. Because the sections on regime formation and effectiveness allow coders to answer the same questions for the periods before and after fundamental changes (we call them watershed changes) in regimes, data pertaining to some aspects of institutional dynamics are included in these sections. As a result, section four is shorter than the other sections. But it does include data on a number of matters (e.g. shifts in the behavior of regime members toward the regime, resilience of the regime when confronted with new challenges) that are required to answer some important questions about the operations of international regimes.

Precoding Questions

To afford maximum comparability among cases included in the database, we are asking you to complete a precoding agreement in consultation with members of the database management team. Among other things, this procedure will permit us to customize the computerized database protocol to suit the specific features of your case.

The case or unit of analysis for the International Regimes Database is the individual regime. A regime is a social institution consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that govern the interactions of actors in a specific issue area. The scope of an issue area is subjectively defined, mainly on the basis of the perceptions of decision-makers and the organization of governmental structures within participating states. Regimes are social practices that may encompass both a number of explicit agreements and a variety of informal understandings that produce varying degrees of convergence of expectations regarding the behavior of regime members. As such, regimes have temporal boundaries in the sense of starting points and, in some cases, end points.

To reach agreement on the analytic structure of an individual case, it is necessary to identify: (1) the problem(s) to which the regime constitutes a response, (2) the external boundaries of the regime or, in other words, what is part of the regime and what is external to it or what constitutes the environment in which it operates, (3) the internal boundaries of the regime, including discrete components of the regime itself and the temporal structure of the regime, and (4) the most important actors in the regime's issue area.

Although it is not strictly a questionnaire, this precoding agreement is framed as a series of questions. You should treat them as the basis for a dialogue between yourself and members of the database team. Please draft initial responses to the questions and forward them to the database manager by email or fax. If any question is unclear to you, please contact us right away. Once the precoding agreement is finalized, the database manager will customize the electronic version of the database protocol to reflect the terms of this agreement for your case. Note that for purposes of this precoding agreement, the case needs to be outlined, not described in great detail. To keep the task of coding a case manageable, it is desirable to limit the number of regime components as much as possible and to aggregate the important actors as far as possible.

1. THE PROBLEM

International regimes are generally problem driven in the sense that they come into existence to solve or manage problems (e.g. jurisdictional conflicts, transboundary fluxes of pollutants, health hazards) that individual countries are unable to cope with on their own. Yet there is often considerable scope for interpretation in framing these problems; participants do not always agree with each other regarding the nature of the problem, and specific regimes can deal with more than one subproblem at the same time.

1.1. Problem Definition: What problem stimulated participating actors to form the regime? If possible, describe the problem in terms of activities causing the problem or in terms of costs - of any kind - attributable to the problem. If it is hard to answer this question unambiguously, describe two or more problems underlying the regime and specify whether these are subproblems representing distinct elements of the issue area or alternative ways of framing the problem on the part of different actors. Identify only those subproblems or alternative formulations that are consequential for regime formation, design, or effectiveness.

Examples: The regime dealing with trade in chemicals and pesticides illustrates the case of subproblems. It covers two subproblems, one pertaining to public health and the other dealing with the harmonization of international trade. The Baltic Sea regime, by contrast, illustrates the case of differing perceptions of the problem, since some participants framed the problem as one of marine pollution while others saw it as a matter of finding a vehicle for demonstrating the possibility of East-West cooperation.

Notes. Question 1.1 pertains to the period of regime formation. You will be able to deal with subsequent changes in the nature or formulation of the problem at a later stage in the coding of your case. Also, do not finalize your answer to this question before you have considered question 3.1.

2. EXTERNAL REGIME BOUNDARIES

Although regime formation is not an instantaneous process, it is useful for purposes of analysis to specify a temporal starting point for each case included in the database. Many regimes operate on an ongoing basis. But international regimes can go out of existence. When this happens, we want to specify a termination point for the regime. In addition to these temporal boundaries, it is important to specify the substantive boundaries of regimes in the sense of differentiating between elements of the regime itself and features of the surrounding environment. Normally this involves identifying the regime's constitutive elements, whether these are formal agreements or informal understandings.

2.1. Regime Formation: When did regime formation occur in your case? Is there more than one plausible starting date for this case? If so, please provide a short account of the relative merits of each possible starting point and indicate your preference. We normally date the establishment of a regime from the signing of a document (whether legally binding or not) in which the parties agree to the constitutive provisions of an institutional arrangement.

2.2. Regime Termination: Did the regime cease to exist? A regime ceases to exist if (i) there is a temporal discontinuity in the operation of the regime and (ii) there is no

identifiable successor (iia) or (iib) the successor involves a fundamental change in terms of leading actors or the definition of the problem leading to new governing principles/key norms that are at odds with the old ones. Temporal discontinuity occurs when (ia) a complete cessation of regime activities occurs or (ib) actors no longer feel obliged to justify actions that contradict regime obligations or (ic) one or more essential parties abrogate the agreement. Specify the date and describe the nature of the termination process, taking the earliest indicator for regime discontinuity.

Notes. This is a high threshold. To illustrate, the North Pacific fur seal regime came into existence long before World War II, but did not operate during the war years. Because it was revived after the war without significant changes in leading actors or in guiding principles/norms, we analyze it as one regime. Similarly, despite the adoption of governing principles at odds with those articulated in the 1946 convention, we treat the whaling regime as one case because there was no discontinuity in the operation of the regime. If we have asked you to code a regime that strikes you as two distinct cases on the basis of these criteria, please contact us immediately. If your case involves significant changes that fall short of our criteria of regime cessation, you will have an opportunity later on to identify watershed changes within the regime.

2.3. Constitutive Elements: Identify all agreements that you regard as constitutive elements of the regime by name and date (i.e. when they came into existence and dates of major revisions), whether they are (i) legally binding agreements, or (ii) explicit agreements that are not legally binding (i.e. soft law), or (iii) de facto practices that are not formulated in any written agreement (i.e. tacit rules). Where relevant, state whether these agreements are in force.

3. Internal Regime Boundaries

We have found that it is also helpful to make distinctions among analytically differentiable components and temporal watersheds within the same regime. These distinctions are not as fundamental as those described in the preceding section; they pertain to differences within regimes rather than between regimes. Yet it is often necessary to make use of such distinctions to formulate intelligible answers to questions included in the database protocol.

Many regimes encompass two or more distinct institutional arrangements - we call them components - that together make up the regime as a whole. Many questions included in the database protocol apply to individual components rather than to the overall regime. In some but not all cases, it is possible to identify a single component (e.g. a framework convention) as the regime's core with other components (e.g. substantive protocols) occupying positions ancillary to the core.

Note. Because the existence of components adds substantially to the work of coding a case, you will want to be cautious in identifying components in your case. To guide your thinking, we have developed the following criteria:

Regimes have separate components if there are (i) distinct institutional forms (e.g. separate treaties, protocols, annexes) and (ii) one or more of the following conditions obtains: (iia) the distinct forms deal with different subproblems (see above);

(iib) they cover differentiable sources of the problem(s) (e.g. the European acid rain regime includes separate protocols regulating emissions of SOX, NOX, and VOCs in addition to its framework convention);

(iic) these forms are aimed at different regulatory targets (e.g. the global trade regime encompasses different rules for trade in manufactured goods, agricultural goods, and services),

(iic) they aim at different clusters of actors (e.g. the nuclear non-proliferation regime includes different norms and rules aimed at nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states).

(iie) these forms deal with major regime functions (e.g., compliance, funding).

3.1. Regime Components: Does the regime have two or more components? Which of the agreements identified under 2.3. are applicable to each component. List by component.

3.1.1. Component History: When did each component come into existence and become a part of the regime? Provide specific dates.

3.1.2. Regime Core: Does one of these components constitute the core of the regime? If so, identify the core.

A watershed, in contrast to a transition from one regime to another, marks a major change within a regime and divides the regime into distinct time periods. A watershed occurs if there is (i) a temporal discontinuity in the operation of the regime, or (ii) a significant restructuring of principles/key norms (the new principles need not necessarily be at odds with the old ones), or (iii) a significant change in the group of leading actors, or (iv) a significant expansion in functional scope (e.g. a radical deepening of regulative rules). In cases involving watersheds, you will be asked separate questions covering the periods before and after the watershed change.

3.2 Watershed Change: Did the regime experience one or more watersheds? If so, specify the date(s) and the major causes and circumstances. Indicate which of the criteria listed above are relevant to your judgment.

3.2.1. If a watershed change occurred, was it accompanied by a change in the nature of the problem(s) or subproblems or in the framing of the problem(s). Explain how the problem(s) after the watershed differ from the problem(s) mentioned under 1.1.

4. Important Actors

Many parts of the protocol take an actor-oriented perspective. For instance, we often ask about activities instead of structures in seeking to identify the causes of the problem(s). The problem addressed by the GATT regime, for example, is treated at the outset as a problem arising from the protectionist policies of states rather than as a collective-action problem. Similarly, we start by asking about activities leading to overfishing rather than by

characterizing the problem as a tragedy of the commons. Later on, we ask additional questions dealing with structural conditions.

In cases where there are only a few actors, it is possible to supply data on all those participating in the formation and operation of a regime. A growing number of cases, however, involve too many actors to cover exhaustively. In such cases, it is important to identify the most important actors for purposes of answering actor-specific questions.

In some but not all regimes, important actors include not only states and coalitions of states but also non-state actors and even individuals (when their influence reaches beyond their role as agents of corporate actors). Note that an actor can be counted as important whether or not it is a member of the regime (e.g. its actions may be a major cause of the problem even if it does not become a regime member). Disaggregation with regard to actors adds to the complexity of the database protocol and should be resorted to sparingly. If stable coalitions are important in your case, identify them. But also identify one or two leading states for each coalition.

Add a sentence or two indicating why each of these actors is important. Factors to consider in answering this question include: (i) major role in causing the problem(s), (ii) major role (potential or actual) in solving the problem(s), (iii) major role in creating the regime, and (iv) major role in developing strategies to implement the provisions of the regime.

4.1. Important Actors: Which states, coalitions, non-state actors, or individuals do you regard as the most important for purposes of answering questions relating to your case that are actor-specific? Provide separate answers for each of the following subquestions.

4.1.1 If applicable, identify up to five or six important states.

4.1.2. If applicable, identify important state coalitions. Identify one or two leading states for each coalition.

4.1.3. If applicable, identify up to five or six important non-state actors.

4.1.4. If applicable, identify up to five or six important individuals.

PART I

Regime Formation

PART I - TABLE OF CONTENTS

101 THE PROBLEM

101A How many nations were regarded as being important because of their role in causing the problem? How many were regarded as being especially important compared to others because of their role in causing the problem?

101B How many nations were regarded as being important because of the extent to which they were affected by the problem? How was the damage associated with the problem shared among these negatively affected?

101C Which of the important nations identified in the precoding agreement and which other nations were considered to be important because of their roles in causing the problem and/or the negative effects of the problem?

101D Compare the set of nations especially important because of their roles in causing the problem with the set experiencing the bulk of the suffering.

101E What current or future negative effects did or could the problem(s) have on these nations? Specify whether negative effects result in a loss of current welfare or in a failure to achieve gains. Distinguish whether these losses are currently occurring or are expected to occur in the future. Rank up to five of the most important effects.

101F Regarding interests involved in the issue area: Did the negotiations regarding the regime deal with conflicts about the distribution of the costs?

101G Regarding interests involved in the issue area: Was there an incentive to disobey the rules even after the regime was put in place?

101H Regarding interests involved in the issue area: How complex was the issue area?

101I Regarding interests involved in the issue area: How compatible/incompatible were the interests of the parties?

101J Regarding interests involved in the issue area: What was the degree of symmetry/asymmetry in terms of present versus future impacts of the problem?

101K Describe the nature of the proposed solutions to the problem(s). If states had different views about alternative solutions, please explain.

101L Did the proposed solutions appear to be difficult or easy to implement?

101M What were the most important difficulties in implementing the proposed solutions?

101N Does the problem involve supplying a collective good, regulating the use of a common pool resource, managing a shared natural resource, or controlling transboundary externalities?

101O Does the problem involve a conflict over values, a conflict of interest about relatively assessed goods, a conflict over means, or a conflict of interest about absolutely assessed goods?

101P Is the problem addressed by the regime relatively self-contained or closely linked to surrounding issues?

102 THE POLITICAL SETTING

102A What broader currents of tension and hostility or friendship prevailed among the parties participating in regime formation?

102B What power resources are relevant to determining the distribution of issue-specific power resources among the participants in regime formation? List the three most powerful states having these (or most of these) power resources.

102C Were the nations involved in regime formation roughly symmetrical in terms of issue-specific power or did the process involve sharp differences in power resources?

103 THE ECONOMIC SETTING

103A What is the relative importance of the economic sectors that dominated the issue area for the single nations involved? Indicate importance for sectors directly or indirectly responsible for and/or causing the problem(s). Indicate relative importance of economic sectors for each important nation identified in the precoding negotiations.

103B How were costs and benefits of efforts to solve the problem distributed among nations?

104 THE COGNITIVE SETTING

104A Was the nature of the problem well understood?

104B How complete was the information about the options available for dealing with the problem?

104C Did the parties disagree about the completeness or accuracy of information about the options?

104D How well established was knowledge of the probable consequences of different options for solving the problem?

104E Did the parties disagree about the probable consequences of selecting different options?

104F What expert groups were present and active during the process of regime formation?

105 STATES DURING REGIME FORMATION

105A For each of the important states identified in the precoding agreement, indicate whether that state was a pusher, a laggard, or neutral. Include other states if especially noteworthy.

105B For each of the important states identified in the precoding agreement and above, indicate whether that state's efforts were primarily structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial.

105C Were the efforts of individual pushers reinforcing or conflicting? Were the efforts of individual laggards reinforcing or conflicting?

106 NON-STATE ACTORS DURING REGIME FORMATION

106A What types of non-state actors were actively involved?

106B For each of the important non-state actors identified in the precoding agreement, indicate whether that non-state actor was a pusher, a laggard, or neutral. Include other non-state actors if especially noteworthy.

106C For each of the non-state actors identified in the precoding agreement and above, indicate whether its efforts were primarily structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial.

106D Were the efforts of individual non-state pushers reinforcing or conflicting? Were the efforts of individual non-state laggards reinforcing or conflicting?

107 INDIVIDUALS DURING REGIME FORMATION

107A For each of the important individuals identified in the precoding agreement, indicate whether that individual was a pusher, a laggard, or neutral. Include other individuals if especially noteworthy.

107B For each of the individuals identified in the precoding agreement and above, indicate whether her/his efforts were primarily structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial.

107C Were the efforts of individuals who were important pushers reinforcing or conflicting? Were the efforts of individuals who were important laggards reinforcing or conflicting?

108 AGENDA FORMATION

108A When did the problem to be addressed by the regime initially make its way onto the international political agenda? Did the problem stay on the agenda continuously until the negotiations started? When was the last time the problem appeared on the agenda before the negotiations started?

108B Which of the following factors were present during agenda formation? Which of these factors were most influential for agenda formation?

108C Provide a textual explanation of what caused the shift from agenda formation to explicit negotiations.

108D Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by a single state or a small group of potential regime members? Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by potential regime members negotiating among themselves more or less as equals and setting the terms of the agenda deliberately? Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by factors largely outside deliberate efforts of potential regime members?

109 NEGOTIATION STAGE

109A Were there earlier negotiations that failed to create a regime in the issue area? If yes, when did the latest effort that failed start and end?

109B When did the explicit negotiations that led to the regime start? When did they end?

109C Under whose auspices did the negotiations take place?

109D How many actors participated in the negotiations as official participants and observers?

109E Were there states not participating in the negotiation process that other actors believed should have participated?

109F Indicate the negotiation strategies employed by each of the important states and coalitions identified in the precoding agreement. Write a paragraph describing the essential nature of the strategies used during the negotiation phase employing the keywords checked below.

109G Did potential signatories participate in the negotiations but fail to sign the agreement reached?

109H What roles did non-state actors play in the negotiations?

109I In a short paragraph, evaluate how influential these non-state actors were during the negotiations.

109J Were the negotiations dominated by a single state or a small group of states, by an interstate process among relative equals, or by transnational forces?

110 OPERATIONALIZATION STAGE

110A What steps were required for the relevant agreements to become operational? Indicate these steps for each agreement identified in the precoding agreement.

110B How long did it take for the relevant agreements of the regime to become operational? Provide information for each relevant agreement identified in the precoding agreement.

110C Were there serious disagreements among potential regime members concerning whether to make the agreement(s) operational? If so, were these disagreements resolved through actions of a single state or a small group of states, by an interstate process among relative equals, or by transnational forces?

110D Did the parties agree to act as if the agreement were already in force before the regime became operational?

110E How severe were the domestic political battles over the terms of the agreement within member states during the operationalization stage?

111 NARRATIVE

111A Write a short description of the central aspects of regime formation. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include information not coded above. List the most important literature used in coding the regime formation part of the data protocol.

FORM: RF3

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 101C Which of the important nations identified in the precoding agreement and which other nations were considered to be important because of their roles in causing the problem and/or the negative effects of the problem?

Provide codes for each element.

PROBLEM	Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement.
IMPORTANT_NATION	Important nations/states identified in the precoding agreement. Code each nation for each problem mentioned under PROBLEM (see codes above). For each problem of an element, list up to 10 additional nations.
CAUSER_AFFECTED	Which of the important nations identified in the precoding agreement and which other nations were considered to be important because of their roles in causing the problem and/or the negative effects of the problem? Code each nation mentioned under IMPORTANT_NATION.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Important as causer of the problem

2 = Important because it was negatively affected by the problem

3 = Important as causer and because it was negatively affected by the problem

4 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

- 11 = Decline in military security at a national level (loss or threatened loss of territory; organized physical violence against nation)
- 12 = Decline in security at subnational level (loss of territory, organized physical violence against group or region)
- 13 = Decline in security at individual level (violence, persecution, abuse of political human rights)
- 14 = Failure to achieve gains in military security at a national level (loss or threatened loss of territory; organized physical violence against nation)
- 15 = Failure to achieve gains in security at subnational level (loss of territory, organized physical violence against group or region)
- 16 = Failure to achieve gains in security at individual level (violence, persecution, abuse of political human rights)
- 17 = Decline in population of particular flora species
- 18 = Failure to achieve gains in population of particular flora species
- 19 = Decline in population of particular fauna species
- 20 = Failure to achieve gains in population of particular fauna species
- 21 = Decline in ecosystem health
- 22 = Failure to achieve gains in ecosystem health
- 23 = Decline in aesthetically valued goods (scenic vistas, historic buildings)
- 24 = Failure to achieve gains in aesthetically valued goods (e.g., scenic vistas, historic buildings)
- 25 = Abuse of animal rights (suffering or loss of life in individual non-human organisms)
- 26 = Failure to achieve improvements in animal rights (alleviation of suffering or protection of life of individual nonhuman organisms)
- 27 = Don't know
- 28 = If relevant, mention additional effects

CURRENT_FUTURE For each effect checked under EFFECTS, code whether it was occurring currently and/or expected to occur in the future.

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = Currently
- 2 = In the Future
- 3 = Currently and in the Future
- 4 = Don't know

EFFECTS_RANK For each problem identified in the precoding agreement, rank up to five of the most important effects mentioned under EFFECTS.

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = Rank one (most important rank)
- 2 = Rank two (second important rank)
- 3 = Rank three (third important rank)
- 4 = Rank four (fourth important rank)
- 5 = Rank five (fifth important rank)
- 6 = Not among the top five
- 7 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF9

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 101I Regarding interests involved in the issue area: How compatible/incompatible were the interests of the parties?

Provide codes for each element.

PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement.

INTEREST_
INCOMPATIBILITY How compatible/incompatible were the interests of the parties? Provide codes for each problem mentioned under PROBLEM.

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = Very strong incompatibility of interests
- 2 = Strong incompatibility of interests
- 3 = Minor incompatibility of interests
- 4 = Minor compatibility of interests
- 5 = Strong compatibility of interests
- 6 = Very strong compatibility of interests
- 7 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF10

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 101J Regarding interests involved in the issue area: What was the degree of symmetry/asymmetry in terms of present versus future impacts of the problem?

Provide codes for each element.

PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement.

INTEREST_ASYMMETRY What was the degree of symmetry/asymmetry in terms of present versus future impacts of the problem? Provide codes for each problem mentioned under PROBLEM.

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = Very strong asymmetry in terms of present versus future impacts
- 2 = Strong asymmetry in terms of present versus future impacts
- 3 = Minor asymmetry in terms of present versus future impacts
- 4 = Minor symmetry in terms of present versus future impacts
- 5 = Strong symmetry in terms of present versus future impacts
- 6 = Very strong symmetry in terms of present versus future impacts
- 7 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF11

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 101K Describe the nature of the proposed solutions to the problem(s). If states had different views about alternative solutions, please explain.

If applicable, provide information for each element. Consider that the nature of proposed solution(s) to the problem(s) can change over time. If a problem occurs within more than a single element of a regime, indicate the nature of proposed solution(s) to the problem(s) for each element.

PROBLEM	Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement.
NARRATIVE_SOLUTIONS	Describe the nature of the proposed solutions to the problem(s). If states had different views about alternative solutions, please explain. For each problem mentioned under PROBLEM, provide textual information.
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT	

FORM: RF12

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 101L Did the proposed solutions appear to be difficult or easy to implement?

Provide codes for each element.

PROBLEM	Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement.
SOLUTIONS_IMPLEMENT	Did the proposed solutions appear to be difficult or easy to implement? Provide codes for each problem mentioned under PROBLEM.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Very difficult: Some or all of the following difficulties occurred; 1 = Proposed solutions were cost-intensive; 2 = Financial/technological capabilities were not available; 3 = Solutions involved many different sectors within domestic societies and/or affected a significant portion of domestic populations; 4 = Solutions included new policies not implemented before; 5 = Domestic interest groups had negative views about implementation.

2 = Difficult: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.

3 = Balanced: Some implementation problems were present, but were far less pronounced.

4 = Relatively easy: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.

5 = Easy: No implementation problems occurred.

6 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF13

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 101M What were the most important difficulties in implementing the proposed solutions?

Provide codes for each element.

PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement.

IMPLEMENT_DIFFICULT What were the most important difficulties in implementing the proposed solutions? Provide codes for each problem mentioned under PROBLEM. For each problem, check as many as apply. If applicable, mention additional difficulties.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Great interference in social life

2 = High public sector costs

3 = High private sector costs

4 = Low domestic capacities

5 = Resistance from negatively affected interest-groups

6 = High political costs for single national governments (e.g., loss of electoral support)

7 = High public resistance in the mass media against proposed solutions

8 = Resistance from government agencies and administrations

9 = Proposed solutions contradicted with traditional domestic policies and or regulations

10 = Less or no experience with implementation of proposed solutions

11 = Don't know

12 = If applicable, mention additional difficulties

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF14

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 101N Does the problem involve supplying a collective good, regulating the use of a common pool resource, managing a shared natural resource, or controlling transboundary externalities?

Provide codes for each element.

PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement.

GOOD_TYPE Does the problem involve supplying a collective good, regulating the use of a common pool resource, managing a shared natural resource, or controlling transboundary externalities? Provide codes for each problem mentioned under PROBLEM.

0 = None of the types

1 = Collective (or public) good

2 = Common pool resource

3 = Shared natural resource

4 = Common pool resource and shared natural resource

5 = Transboundary externalities

6 = Don't know

1 = Collective (or public) good: No one can be excluded from the use of the good. Even if some actors try to define rules for the use of the collective good, actors outside such a rule system can behave as free riders without complying with such rules. In contrast to a common pool resource, it is difficult to subtract one actor's use of a collective good from the shares of other users. Collective goods and common pool resources are mutually exclusive categories.

2 = Common pool resource: Similar to a collective good other actors cannot be excluded from the use of a common pool resource and free riding by other actors is possible. A common pool resource makes it possible to subtract the use of one actor from the use of others (e.g., limited number of slots in the geostationary orbit). Therefore, it is necessary to determine the resource unit, such as an acre-foot of water for a ground water basin, tons of fish for fishing grounds, or processing time for computer facilities. Common pool resources can be renewable (like fish stocks) or exhaustible (like nonrenewable resources).

3 = Shared natural resource: Shared natural resources extend into or across jurisdictions of two or more states. They may involve renewable or nonrenewable resources. Shared natural resource may be common pool resources. Therefore, these two types are not mutually exclusive. However, not all common pool resources are shared natural resources.

4 = Common pool resource and shared natural resource (see explanations above)

5 = Transboundary externalities: The control of transboundary externalities refers to problems where one country is the victim of another country's externalization of a certain problem (e.g., pollution: downstream countries as victims of upstream countries; transboundary export of hazardous wastes). Transboundary externalities often give rise to asymmetries between victims and perpetrators.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF15

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 1010 Does the problem involve a conflict over values, a conflict of interest about relatively assessed goods, a conflict over means, or a conflict of interest about absolutely assessed goods?

These four types are based on the distinction between consensual and nonconsensual conflicts. In nonconsensual conflicts actors disagree on what is desirable for all of them collectively. Conflicts about values and conflicts about means are nonconsensual conflicts. In consensual conflicts actors are confronted with a situation of scarcity. Therefore, every actor desires the same valued object but cannot achieve full satisfaction because there is not enough for everybody. Conflicts of interests about relatively assessed goods and conflicts of interests about absolutely assessed goods are consensual conflicts.

Provide codes for each element.

PROBLEM

Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement.

CONFLICT_TYPE

Does the problem involve a conflict over values, a conflict of interest about relatively assessed goods, a conflict over means, or a conflict of interest about absolutely assessed goods? Provide codes for each problem mentioned under PROBLEM.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Conflict about values: A disagreement about values (conflict over values) occurs when the actors disagree fundamentally on the achievement of a certain aim (e.g., conflict about whether protection of human rights is an important issue, conflict about acknowledgement that there is a need for cooperation to protect a certain environmental good).

2 = Conflict about relatively assessed goods: A conflict over relatively assessed goods occurs when actors assess the achievement of values in the issue area in relation to the values achieved by other actors (e.g., with regard to weapons within negotiations on arms reduction; when the relative gains problem is the prevailing feature in economic negotiations).

3 = Conflict about means: A disagreement about means (conflict over means) occurs when the actors disagree on the means for achieving an aim (e.g., conflict about certain policies for achieving the realization of human rights or protection of an environmental good).

4 = Conflict about absolutely assessed goods: Such conflicts refer to objects that cannot be considered in relative terms and can only be assessed absolutely. Goods obtain their value for actors independent of what other actors have (e.g., food or health).

5 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF16

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 101P Is the problem addressed by the regime relatively self-contained or closely linked to surrounding issues?

Provide codes for each element.

PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement.

PROBLEM_LINKED Is the problem addressed by the regime relatively self-contained or closely linked to surrounding issues? Provide codes for each problem mentioned under PROBLEM.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Self-contained

2 = Loosely linked to surrounding issues

3 = Linked to surrounding issues closely

4 = Don't know

NARRATIVE_

PROBLEM_LINKED If PROBLEM_LINKED is coded '2' (=loosely linked to surrounding issues) or '3' (= linked to surrounding issues closely), explain in which ways the issues are linked.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

102 THE POLITICAL SETTING

FORM: RF17

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 102A What broader currents of tension and hostility or friendship prevailed among the parties participating in regime formation?

Provide codes for each element.

POWER_

SETTING_TENSION

What broader currents of tension and hostility or friendship prevailed among the parties participating in regime formation?

1 = Very intense tension/hostility: Violent conflict among major parties can not be excluded and fundamental conflicts determine the overall relationship among states (e.g., USA-Soviet relationship in 1955 to Cold War).

2 = Intense tension/hostility: Although violent conflict among major parties is not likely, fundamental conflicts determine the overall relationship among states (e.g., USA-Soviet relationship 1979 to Afghanistan crisis).

3 = Moderate tension/hostility: Occasional severe conflicts are resolved by non-violent means as a consequence of either state attitudes or the prevailing political framework [membership in military alliances] (e.g., disputes between Turkey and Greece; USA-Russia after dissolution of former Soviet Union).

4 = Friendliness but occasional conflicts: State relationships are generally friendly and established in a context of growing or strong interdependence. Occasional conflicts may be severe but are generally settled by diplomatic/political means (e.g., present relationship between USA-Japan).

5 = General friendliness: State relationships were generally friendly and were established in a context of strong interdependence. Normally states try to avoid severe conflicts (e.g., present relationships between USA-Canada, Germany-France).

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF18

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 102B What power resources are relevant to determining the distribution of issue-specific power resources among the participants in regime formation? List the three most powerful states having these (or most of these) power resources.

Issue-specific power can be thought of as an actor's ability to get others to do something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost for the actor). This question aims at identifying a broad range of power resources, which are not confined to structural power. Thus, negotiation skills can constitute an important power resource.

Provide codes for each element.

POWER_
RESOURCES_LIST What power resources are relevant to determining the distribution of issue-specific power resources among the participants in regime formation? Elaborate, if necessary.

POWER_
RESOURCES_NATIONS For each element, list the three most powerful nations having these (or most of these) power resources.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF19

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 102C Were the nations involved in regime formation roughly symmetrical in terms of issue-specific power or did the process involve sharp differences in power resources?

Provide codes for each element.

POWER_

SETTING_SYMMETRY

Were the nations involved in regime formation roughly symmetrical in terms of issue-specific power or did the process involve sharp differences in power resources?

0 = Not applicable

1 = Completely even distribution: Issue-specific power resources are evenly distributed among nations.

2 = Slightly uneven distribution: Besides slightly uneven distribution, no single nation has a greater ability to get other nations to do something they otherwise would not do.

3 = Considerable unevenness: Uneven distribution of power resources can lead to more powerful actors being able to get other nations to do something they otherwise would not do with regard to a limited number of issues in the issue area.

4 = Highly uneven distribution: Very uneven distribution of power resources can lead to more powerful actors being able to get other nations to do something they otherwise would not do with regard to a significant number of issues in the issue area.

5 = Issue-specific hegemon present: One single actor can get all other actors to do things that they otherwise would not do with regard to nearly all issues at stake in the issue area.

6 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

103 THE ECONOMIC SETTING

FORM: RF20

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 103A What is the relative importance of the economic sectors that dominated the issue area for the single nations involved? Indicate importance for sectors directly or indirectly responsible for and/or causing the problem(s). Indicate relative importance of economic sectors for each important nation identified in the precoding negotiations.

Provide codes for each element.

ECONOMIC_
SECTORS_CAUSERS

What is the relative importance of the economic sectors that dominated the issue area for the single nations involved? Indicate importance for sectors directly or indirectly responsible for and/or causing the problem(s). Indicate relative importance of economic sectors for each important nation listed under IMPORTANT_NATION.

0 = Not applicable

1 = No economic significance: Contribution of these sectors to national GDP or number of employees of the sectors was insignificant (turnover or number of employees in sectors less than 0.1% of GDP or domestic employees).

2 = Low economic significance: Between no and medium economic significance (turnover or number of employees in sectors between 0.1 and 1% of GDP or domestic employees).

3 = Medium economic significance: Contribution of these sectors to national GDP or number of employees of the sectors matter (turnover or number of employees in sectors between 1 and 5 % of GDP or domestic employees).

4 = High economic significance: Between medium and very high economic significance (turnover or number of employees in sectors between 5 and 10% of GDP or domestic employees).

5 = Very high economic significance: Sectors represent key industries or together contribute a major part of national GDP (turnover or number of employees in sectors more than 10% of GDP or domestic employees).

6 = Don't know

IMPORTANT_NATION

Important Nations/states identified in the precoding agreement.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF21

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 103B How were costs and benefits of efforts to solve the problem distributed among nations?

Provide information for each element.

PROBLEM	Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement.
NARRATIVE_COSTS	How were costs of efforts to solve the problem distributed among nations? For each problem, please elaborate. Draw on the following items; add additional information, if applicable: 1 = Were costs concentrated in one or a few nations or were they widely distributed? 2 = Was distribution of costs among nations symmetrical or asymmetrical? 3 = Were there changes in the distribution of costs over the time? 4 = Additional information.
NARRATIVE_BENEFITS	How were benefits of efforts to solve the problem distributed among nations? For each problem, please elaborate. Draw on the following items; add additional information, if applicable. 1 = Were benefits concentrated in one or a few nations or were they widely distributed? 2 = Was distribution of benefits among nations symmetrical or asymmetrical? 3 = Were there changes in the distribution of benefits over the time? 4 = Additional information.
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT	

105 STATES DURING REGIME FORMATION

FORM: RF28

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 105A For each of the important states identified in the precoding agreement, indicate whether that state was a pusher, a laggard, or neutral. Include other states if especially noteworthy.

This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element.

STATE_

PUSHER_LAGGARD

For each state listed under IMPORTANT_NATIONS, indicate whether that state was a pusher, a laggard, or neutral.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Extreme pusher: A leading country that takes the initiative, proposes political measures at the international level to promote regime formation, and plays a very active role in the negotiations. A leader may first introduce domestic measures to lead the way for measures at the international level and may be subject to more domestic political pressure than other countries. Leaders are often the first to be severely affected by a special problem.

2 = Pusher: A country sympathetic to regime formation that displays a more moderate attitude and political behavior in the political process compared with an extreme pusher (less political activity at the international level; proceeds more hesitantly in first introducing domestic measures to lead the way for measures at the international level).

3 = Neutral: A country adopting a wait and see attitude. A neutral country may be severely affected by a special problem and may be confronted with domestic political pressure. The government prefers not to adopt a clear position with regard to supporting or opposing regime formation due to a lack of domestic political pressure, a lack of capacities, etc.

4 = Laggard: A country that opposes regime formation but that displays a more moderate attitude and political behavior in the political process than an extreme laggard (less political activity at the international level).

5 = Extreme laggard: A country that strongly opposes regime formation. An extreme laggard may act as a politically active counterpart to extreme pushers and pushers in the regime formation process.

6 = Don't know

IMPORTANT_NATION

Important nations/states identified in the precoding agreement. Include other states if especially noteworthy. For each element, list up to ten additional states.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF29

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 105B For each of the important states identified in the precoding agreement and above, indicate whether that state's efforts were primarily structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial.

This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element.

IMPORTANT_
NATION_EFFORT

For each state listed under IMPORTANT_NATION, indicate whether that state's efforts were primarily structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial. For each state, check as many as apply.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Structural: States exercise their structural power or try to translate power into bargaining leverage capable of directing processes of regime formation. Such efforts can take the form of trying to promote or to prevent regime formation. The use of structural power can also include strategically deploying material resources to induce others to sign onto the central deals of an agreement.

2 = Ideational: States focus on trying to put forward new systems of thought or worldviews, or to promote cognitive convergence encompassing not only new ideas about the causes of important problems but also prescriptions concerning appropriate solutions. Ideational efforts can take the form of trying to promote or prevent regime formation.

3 = Entrepreneurial: International entrepreneurs are skilled at inventing new institutional arrangements and brokering the overlapping interests of parties concerned with a particular issue area. Entrepreneurs are self-interested in the sense that they seek gains for themselves in the form of material rewards or enhanced reputations, but this in no way detracts from the role they play.

4 = No efforts: State did not display structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial efforts.

5 = Don't know

IMPORTANT_NATION

Important nations/states identified in the precoding agreement and above.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF30

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 105C Were the efforts of individual pushers reinforcing or conflicting? Were the efforts of individual laggards reinforcing or conflicting?

This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element.

PUSHER_STATES_

REINFORCING Were the efforts of individual pushers reinforcing or conflicting?

0 = Not applicable (only one pushing country)

1 = Reinforcing

2 = Conflicting

3 = Neither reinforcing nor conflicting

4 = Don't know

LAGGARD_STATES_

REINFORCING Were the efforts of individual laggards reinforcing or conflicting?

0 = Not applicable (only one laggard country)

1 = Reinforcing

2 = Conflicting

3 = Neither reinforcing nor conflicting

4 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

106 NON-STATE ACTORS DURING REGIME FORMATION

FORM: RF31

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 106A What types of non-state actors were actively involved?

If the European Union (formerly European Community) was involved, include it under "International governmental organizations (IGOs)". National and international activist interest groups include the entire range of involved activist interest groups, if they support regime formation or not.

This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element.

NONSTATE_GROUP What types of non-state actors were actively involved? Check as many as apply.

0 = Not applicable (No non-state actors involved)

1 = International governmental organizations (IGOs)

2 = Sub-national governments

3 = National activist interest groups (nonprofit organizations)

4 = International activist interest groups (nonprofit organizations)

5 = National industrial organizations (e.g., national trade unions, Chamber of Industry and Commerce, national federation of industries)

6 = International industrial organizations (e.g., international federations of trade unions or industrial confederations)

7 = Multinational corporations (e.g., Shell, IBM, Microsoft)

8 = National scientific organizations (e.g., national research centers)

9 = International scientific organizations (e.g., International Council of Scientific Unions)

10 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF32

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 106B For each of the important non-state actors identified in the precoding agreement, indicate whether that non-state actor was a pusher, a laggard, or neutral. Include other non-state actors if especially noteworthy.

This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element.

NONSTATE_

PUSHER_LAGGARD

For each non-state actor listed under NONSTATE, indicate whether that non-state actor was a pusher, a laggard, or neutral.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Extreme pusher: An actor that plays an active role in the political process; generates or promotes new ideas, knowledge, or policies; lobbies for political measures at the international level; and plays an advocacy role for regime formation.

2 = Pusher: An actor that is sympathetic to regime formation but that displays a more moderate attitude and political behavior in the political process compared with an extreme pusher.

3 = Neutral: An actor adopting a wait and see attitude.

4 = Laggard: An actor that opposes regime formation but that displays a more moderate attitude and political behavior in the political process than an extreme laggard.

5 = Extreme laggard: An actor that strongly opposes regime formation and lobbies against it. An extreme laggard may act as a politically active counterpart to extreme pushers and pushers in the regime formation process and may generate new ideas and promote concepts and knowledge to oppose regime formation.

6 = Don't know

NONSTATE

Non-state actors identified in the precoding agreement. Include other non-state actors if especially noteworthy. For each element, list up to ten additional non-state actors.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF33

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 106C For each of the non-state actors identified in the precoding agreement and above, indicate whether its efforts were primarily structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial.

This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element.

NONSTATE_EFFORT For each non-state actor listed under NONSTATE, indicate whether that non-state actor's efforts were primarily structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial. For each non-state actor, check as many as apply.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Structural: Non-state actors assume the roles as agents of states and try to translate the power of a single state into political leverage to influence regime formation. There is a smooth transition from conscious structural guidance as a result of control by the relevant state and a more unconscious structural guidance, where the non-state actor has room to move and make its decisions independent of the state actor. Structural efforts can take the form of trying to promote or prevent regime formation.

2 = Ideational: Non-state actors focus on putting forward new systems of thought or worldviews or promoting cognitive convergence encompassing not only new ideas about the causes of important problems but also prescriptions concerning appropriate solutions. Ideational efforts can take form of trying to promote or prevent regime formation.

3 = Entrepreneurial: Non-state actors tend to take the ideas of ideational leaders and translate them into concrete policy options, proposals, etc. This includes the use of skills to frame issues and put together deals that would otherwise elude participants endeavoring to form international regimes as well as working as brokers to make deals and line up support for salient options. International entrepreneurs are skilled at inventing new institutional arrangements and brokering the overlapping interests of parties concerned with a particular issue area.

4 = No efforts: Non-state actor does not display structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial efforts.

5 = Don't know

NONSTATE Important non-state actors identified in the precoding agreement and above.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF34

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 106D Were the efforts of individual non-state pushers reinforcing or conflicting? Were the efforts of individual non-state laggards reinforcing or conflicting?

This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element.

PUSHER_NONSTATE_
REINFORCING

Were the efforts of individual non-state pushers reinforcing or conflicting?

0= Not applicable (only one pushing non-state actor)

1 = Reinforcing

2 = Conflicting

3 = Neither reinforcing nor conflicting

4 = Don't know

LAGGARD_STATES_
REINFORCING

Were the efforts of individual non-state laggards reinforcing or conflicting?

0= Not applicable (only one laggard non-state actor)

1 = Reinforcing

2 = Conflicting

3 = Neither reinforcing nor conflicting

4 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

107 INDIVIDUALS DURING REGIME FORMATION

FORM: RF35

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 107A For each of the important individuals identified in the precoding agreement, indicate whether that individual was a pusher, a laggard, or neutral. Include other individuals if especially noteworthy.

This question aims at individuals who may occupy roles in organizations or states. While these individuals may act as agents of their national/international organizations or states, individuals can also act outside their role as agents of organizations and states due to their moral, professional, political reputation.

This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element.

INDIVIDUAL_

PUSHER_LAGGARD

Indicate for each individual listed under INDIVIDUAL whether she/he was a pusher, a laggard, or neutral.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Extreme pusher: An individual who takes the initiative, plays an active role in the political process and in the negotiations (e.g., proposes political measures at the international level, makes compromise proposals, serves as a mediator between opposing actors, or strongly favors single political measures, etc.) to promote regime formation.

2 = Pusher: An individual who is sympathetic to regime formation but who displays a more moderate attitude and political behavior in the political process compared with an extreme pusher.

3 = Neutral: An actor adopting a wait and see attitude.

4 = Laggard: An individual who opposes regime formation but who displays a more moderate attitude and political behavior in the political process than an extreme laggard.

5 = Extreme laggard: An individual who strongly opposes regime formation. An extreme laggard may act as a politically active counterpart to extreme pushers and pushers in the regime formation process.

6 = Don't know

INDIVIDUAL

Important individual identified in the precoding agreement. Include other individuals if especially noteworthy.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF36

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 107B For each of the individuals identified in the precoding agreement and above, indicate whether her/his efforts were primarily structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial.

This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element.

INDIVIDUAL_EFFORT For each individual listed under **INDIVIDUAL**, indicate whether that individual's efforts were primarily structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial. For each individual, check as many as apply.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Structural: Individuals act as agents of states and try to translate the power of a single state into political leverage to influence regime formation. There is a smooth transition from conscious structural guidance as a result of control by the relevant state and a more unconscious structural guidance, where the individual has more room to move and make decisions independent of the state. Structural roles can be played by official negotiators. Structural efforts can take form of trying to promote or prevent regime formation.

2 = Ideational: Individuals focus on putting forward new systems of thought or worldviews or promoting cognitive convergence encompassing not only new ideas about the causes of important problems but also prescriptions concerning appropriate solutions. Ideational efforts can take form of trying to promote or to prevent regime formation.

3 = Entrepreneurial: Entrepreneurial influence tends to take the ideas of ideational leaders and translate these ideas into concrete policy options, proposals, etc. This includes the use of skills to frame issues in ways that foster integrative bargaining and put together deals that would otherwise elude participants endeavoring to form international regimes as well as working as brokers to make deals and line up support for salient options. Entrepreneurs work as agenda setters and popularizers to shape the issues and to draw attention to the relevance of the problem.

4 = No efforts: Individual does not display structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial efforts.

5 = Don't know

INDIVIDUAL Important individuals identified in the precoding agreement and above.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF37

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 107C Were the efforts of individuals who were important pushers reinforcing or conflicting? Where the efforts of individuals who were important laggards reinforcing or conflicting?

This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element.

PUSHER_IND_
REINFORCING

Were the efforts of individuals who were important pushers reinforcing or conflicting?

- 0= Not applicable (only one pusher)
- 1 = Reinforcing
- 2 = Conflicting
- 3 = Neither reinforcing nor conflicting
- 4 = Don't know

LAGGARD_IND_
REINFORCING

Where the efforts of individuals who were important laggards reinforcing or conflicting?

- 0= Not applicable (only one laggard)
- 1 = Reinforcing
- 2 = Conflicting
- 3 = Neither reinforcing nor conflicting
- 4 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

108 AGENDA FORMATION

FORM: RF38

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 108A When did the problem to be addressed by the regime initially make its way onto the international political agenda? Did the problem stay on the agenda continuously until the negotiations started? When was the last time the problem appeared on the agenda before the negotiations started?

Provide date only for such elements, where applicable. If the problem reappeared one or more times, mention when the problem first appeared on the agenda.

A problem is on the international political agenda if a bilateral or multilateral body (e.g., bilateral governmental meeting, multilateral governmental meeting of the G 7, meetings of bodies of international organizations, etc.) formally deals with it.

AGENDA_ENTER When did the problem to be addressed by the regime initially make its way onto the international political agenda? State the time as precisely as possible (year as a four digit number, e.g., 1996). Provide date only for such elements, where applicable.

AGENDA_
CONTINUOUSLY Did the problem stay on the agenda continuously until the negotiations started? Provide codes only for such elements, where applicable.

0 = Not applicable

1 = No

2 = Yes

3 = Don't know

AGENDA_REAPPEAR If AGENDA_CONTINUOUSLY is coded '1' (=no): When was the last time the problem appeared on the agenda before the negotiations started? State the time as precisely as possible (year as a four digit number, e.g., 1996). Provide date only for such elements, where applicable.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF39

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 108B Which of the following factors were present during agenda formation? Which of these factors were most influential for agenda formation?

If the European Union (formerly European Community) was involved, include it under "International governmental organizations (IGOs)".

Provide codes for each element.

AGENDA_FACTORS Which of the following factors were present during agenda formation? Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention additional factors.

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = Leadership of state pushers (no hegemon)
- 2 = Power of hegemon in the issue area
- 3 = Leadership of IGOs
- 4 = Activities of activist nonprofit interest groups
- 5 = Activities of industrial organizations
- 6 = Activities of multinational corporations
- 7 = International ad hoc conference or workshop
- 8 = Activities of scientific organizations
- 8 = Consensual knowledge from epistemic community
- 9 = New scientific knowledge
- 10 = External shocks/crisis (e.g. sudden event)
- 11 = Growing public consciousness about the problem
- 12 = Worsening of a problem
- 13 = Don't know
- 14 = If applicable, mention additional factors

AGENDA_ FACTORS_PRESENT Which of the factors checked or mentioned under AGENDA_ FACTORS were most influential for agenda formation?

- 1 = Factor present
- 2 = Factor present and most influential
- 3 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF40

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 108C Provide a textual explanation of what caused the shift from agenda formation to explicit negotiations.

Provide information for each element. Refer explicitly to items mentioned in the previous form.

FACTORS_SHIFT Provide a textual explanation of what caused the shift from agenda formation to explicit negotiations. Refer explicitly to items mentioned in the previous form.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF41

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 108D Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by a single state or a small group of potential regime members? Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by potential regime members negotiating among themselves more or less as equals and setting the terms of the agenda deliberately? Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by factors largely outside deliberate efforts of potential regime members?

Provide codes for each element.

AGENDA_STATE_DETERMINED Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by a single state or a small group of potential regime members?

0 = Not applicable

1 = Very strongly dominated by a single state or a small group of potential regime members: A single state or a small group of potential regime members dominated agenda formation. The main issues on the agenda were imposed on other actors. One or more dominant powers succeeded in setting the agenda in the issue area.

2 = Strongly dominated by a single state or a small group of potential regime members: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.

3 = Relevance of domination by a single state or a small group of potential regime members: One or more states tried to dominate agenda formation and to impose the main issues on the agenda on other actors, but the dominating states were only partially successful in forcing the others to agree to the main issues on the agenda.

4 = Minor relevance of domination by a single state or small group of potential regime members: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.

5 = Domination by a single state or a small group of potential regime members not at all relevant: Domination by a single state or a small group of potential regime members did not play a role during negotiations.

6 = Don't know

AGENDA_INTERSTATE_
DETERMINED

Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by potential regime members negotiating among themselves more or less as equals and setting the terms of the agenda deliberately?

0 = Not applicable

1= Very strongly an interstate process of potential regime members negotiating among themselves more or less as equals: Agenda formation consisted mainly of a joint and deliberate process of more or less equal actors. The main issues appearing on the agenda were the result of a bargaining process among more or less equal states.

2 = Strongly an interstate process of potential regime members negotiating among themselves more or less as equals: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.

3= Relevance of an interstate process of potential regime members negotiating among themselves more or less as equals: Agenda formation was only partially a process involving more or less equal states making joint and deliberate efforts regarding agenda formation. Only a few of the issues on the agenda were agreed upon through a bargaining process among more or less equal states and deliberately.

4 = Minor relevance of an interstate process of potential regime members negotiating among themselves more or less as equals: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.

5 = Interstate process of potential regime members negotiating among themselves more or less as equals not at all relevant: Interstate process of potential regime members negotiating among themselves as equals did not play a role during agenda formation.

6 = Don't know

AGENDA_OUTSIDE_
DETERMINED

Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by factors largely outside deliberate efforts of potential regime members?

0 = Not applicable

1= Very strongly determined by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential regime members: Agenda formation was determined by factors largely outside deliberate efforts of potential regime members (e.g., external shocks, actions of nongovernmental actors, intergovernmental organizations, individual experts or actions of states considered as not being potential members of the regime).

2= Strongly determined by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential regime members: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.

3= Relevance of determination by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential regime members: Agenda formation was only partially determined by factors largely outside deliberate efforts of potential regime members (e.g., external shocks, actions of nongovernmental actors, intergovernmental organizations, individual experts or actions of states considered as not being potential members of the regime).

4 = Minor relevance of determination by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential regime members: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.

5 = Determination by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential regime members not at all relevant: Agenda formation by factors largely outside deliberate efforts of potential regime members did not play any role.

6 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

109 NEGOTIATION STAGE

FORM: RF42

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109A Were there earlier negotiations that failed to create a regime in the issue area? If yes, when did the latest effort that failed start and end?

An earlier attempt to negotiate failed if it ended without an agreement about the issue or without an agreement about further negotiations.

Provide codes for each element.

NEGOTIATE_EARLIER Were there earlier negotiations that failed to create a regime in the issue area?

0 = Not applicable

1 = There was no earlier attempt that failed

2 = There was one earlier attempt that failed

3 = There were more than one earlier attempts that failed

4 = Don't know

NEGOTIATE_
EARLIER_START

If NEGOTIATE_EARLIER is coded '2' (=there was one earlier attempt that failed) or '3' (=there were more than one earlier attempts that failed): When did the latest effort that failed start? State the time as precisely as possible (year as a four digit number, e.g., 1996).

NEGOTIATE_
EARLIER_END

If NEGOTIATE_EARLIER is coded '2' (=there was one earlier attempt that failed) or '3' (=there were more than one earlier attempts that failed): When did the latest effort that failed end? State the time as precisely as possible (year as a four digit number, e.g., 1996).

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF43

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109B When did the explicit negotiations that led to the regime start? When did they end?

Provide codes for each element.

NEGOTIATE_START When did the explicit negotiations that led to the regime start? Enter month as a full name. Enter year as a four digit number. Example: December 1950.

NEGOTIATE_END When did the explicit negotiations that led to the regime end? Enter month as a full name. Enter year as a four digit number. Example: December 1950.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF44

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109C Under whose auspices did the negotiations take place?

Provide codes for each element.

NEGOTIATE_AUSPICES Under whose auspices did the negotiations take place? Check as many as apply.

0 = Not applicable

1 = None

2 = Global IGOs (e.g., UN system)

3 = Regional IGOs

4 = Nation state(s)

5 = Non-state actor(s)

6 = Don't know

NEGOTIATE_AUSPICES_ACTOR If NEGOTIATE_AUSPICES is coded '2' (=global IGOs), '3' (=regional IGOs), '4' [=nation state(s)] or '5' [=non-state actor(s)], mention these organization(s), nation state(s), or non-state actor(s).

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF45

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109D How many actors participated in the negotiations as official participants and observers?

Indicate number of actors (states, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations) at the beginning/end of the negotiations. Actors can be states or non-state actors. Provide information only for non-state actors that aspired to become formal members of the regime.

Provide codes for each element.

NEGOTIATE_ACTORS What type of actors participated in the negotiations. Check as many as apply.

0 = Not applicable

1 = States as participants

2 = States as observers

3 = Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) as participants

4 = Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) as observers

5 = Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) as participants

6 = Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) as observers

7 = Don't know

NEGOTIATE_ACTORS_START How many actors participated at the beginning of the negotiations as official participants and observers? Provide codes for each type of actors checked under NEGOTIATE_ACTORS.

NEGOTIATE_ACTORS_END How many actors participated at the end of the negotiations as official participants and observers? Provide codes for each type of actors checked under NEGOTIATE_ACTORS.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF46

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109E Were there states not participating in the negotiation process that other actors believed should have participated?

Provide codes for each element.

NEGOTIATE_
NOT_PARTICIPATE

Were there states not participating in the negotiation process that other actors believed should have participated?

0 = Not applicable
1 = No
2 = Yes
3 = Don't know

NEGOTIATE_
NOT_STATE

If NEGOTIATE_NOT_PARTICIPATE is coded '2' (=yes):
Mention states that were either important contributors to the problem or that were important in terms of problem solving.
For each element, list up to ten countries.

NEGOTIATE_
NOT_STATE_TYPE

For each state listed under NEGOTIATE_NOT_STATE,
indicate whether the state was an important contributor to the problem or important in terms of problem solving.

0 = Not applicable
1 = Important contributor to the problem
2 = Important in terms of problem solving
3 = Important contributor to the problem and important in terms of problem solving
4 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF47

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109F Indicate the negotiation strategies employed by each of the important states and coalitions identified in the precoding agreement. Write a paragraph describing the essential nature of the strategies used during the negotiation phase employing the keywords checked below.

Provide codes for each element.

NEGOTIATE_ STRATEGIES

Indicate the negotiation strategies employed by each of the important states and coalitions identified in the precoding agreement. For each actor/bloc mentioned under IMPORTANT_NATION and COALITION indicate, which kind of strategy was employed by that actor/bloc. For each actor/bloc mentioned under IMPORTANT_NATION and COALITION, check as many as apply. If applicable, add other strategies.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Exit option (e.g., withdrawal from negotiations in case of inclusion of certain items in the possible agreement)

2 = Threats (e.g., threat to induce domestic legislation against rising automobile exports from another country in case it does not accede to restrict its exports)

3 = Coercion (e.g., already enacted domestic legislation against rising automobile exports from another country to enforce its agreement to internationally agreed upon rules)

4 = Logrolling (negotiations involving two or more distinct issues: when one party agrees to support another party's preferred outcome on one issue and the other party reciprocates on another issue)

5 = Persuasion (e.g., inducing laggards to give up opposing views with regard to certain subjects in the negotiations)

6 = Issue Linkage (settling conflicts between at least two different blocs/actors having opposing interests with regard to two independent issues; e.g., achieving consensus on arms reduction in combination with settling another economic issue between the actors)

7 = Promises (e.g., promising others to give up a certain behavior in or outside the issue area if they agree to certain regime provisions)

8 = Sidepayments (e.g., rewarding others to reach their agreement to the regime provisions by providing them with financial, technological or other ways of support)

9 = Self-commitment (e.g., a state committing itself to arms reductions before having reached agreement with other states)

10 = Shaming (blaming other states for their practises in the issue area)

11 = Coalition-building (e.g., looking for other partners for the purpose of strengthening the bargaining position)

12 = Search for joint gains (e.g., identifying policies which offer rewards for most of the participants)

13 = Decomposition (separating an issue into its constituent parts or components)

14 = Bring in third parties (entrusting a third party with the function of a mediator/developer of compromise)

15 = Reducing complexity (e.g., reducing the number of single issues to be regulated, reducing the number of states involved, reducing the implications of regulations in a single issue area for other issue areas)

16 = Increasing complexity (e.g., increasing the number of single issues to be regulated, increasing the number of states involved, increasing the implications of regulations in a single issue area for other issue areas)

17 = Delaying tactics to get new adherents for regime formation (e.g., waiting until other states decide to join the position of a key participant or bloc)

18 = Delaying tactics to delay/prevent regime formation (e.g., key participant or bloc insisting on extreme demands or leading long discussions about the rules of procedure to delay or prevent regime formation)

19 = Take over secretarial responsibilities (e.g., key participant or bloc gaining control over services provided [framing of texts from the secretariat, etc.])

20 = Alter institutional setting (e.g., among a variety of institutional forums for regime formation, key participants or blocs identifying the forum displaying the best or worst conditions for regime formation, key participants or blocs changing forum for regime formation after experiences in former forum which were in contrast to their expectations)

21 = Don't know

22 = If applicable, add other strategies

IMPORTANT_NATION Important nations/states identified in the precoding agreement.

COALITION Important coalitions identified in the precoding agreement.

NEGOTIATE_
STRATEGIES_NATURE Write a paragraph describing the essential nature of the strategies used during the negotiation phase employing the keywords checked under NEGOTIATE_STRATEGIES.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF48

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109G Did potential signatories participate in the negotiations but fail to sign the agreement reached?

Provide codes for each element.

NEGOTIATE_
NO_SIGNATURE

Did potential signatories participate in the negotiations but fail to sign the agreement reached?

0 = Not applicable
1 = No
2 = Yes
3 = Don't know

NEGOTIATE_NO_
SIGNATURE_STATE

If NEGOTIATE_NO_SIGNATURE is coded '2' (=yes), please list up to five such nonsignatories. If there are more than five to choose from, select five important participants.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF49

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109H What roles did non-state actors play in the negotiations?

Provide codes for each element.

NEGOTIATE_
NON_STATE_ROLE

What roles did non-state actors play in the negotiations? For each non-state actor listed under NONSTATE indicate what role that actor played in the negotiations. For each non-state actor, check as many as apply.

0 = Not applicable
1 = Observer role
2 = Member of national delegation
3 = Member of negotiation body
4 = Exerted pressure inside the negotiations
5 = Exerted pressure outside the negotiations
6 = Don't know

NONSTATE

Important non-state actors identified in the precoding agreement.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF50

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109I In a short paragraph, evaluate how influential these non-state actors were during the negotiations.

Provide information for each element.

NEGOTIATE_NON_
STATE_NARRATIVE

In a short paragraph, evaluate how influential these non-state actors were during the negotiations.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF51

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109J Were the negotiations dominated by a single state or a small group of states, by an interstate process among relative equals, or by transnational forces?

Provide codes for each element.

STATE_DOMINATION Were the negotiations dominated by a single state or a small group of states?

0 = Not applicable

1 = Very strongly dominated by a single state or a small group of states: A single state or a small group of states dominated the negotiations. Negotiations consisted of a process in which a single state or a small group of states imposed the main regime provisions on other actors. One or more dominant states succeeded in getting others to accept the requirements of the arrangement.

2 = Strongly dominated by a single state or a small group of states: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.

3 = Relevance of domination by a single state or a small group of states: One or more states tried to dominate negotiations and to impose the main regime provisions on other actors, but the dominating states were only partially successful in forcing the others to agree to the main regime provisions.

4 = Minor relevance of domination by a single state or a small group of states: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.

5 = Domination by a single state or a small group of states not at all relevant: Domination by a single or small group of states did not play a role during negotiations.

6 = Don't know

INTERSTATE_
DOMINATION

Were the negotiations dominated by an interstate process among relative equals?

0 = Not applicable

1 = Very strongly a bargaining process among relative equal states: Negotiations mainly consisted of a bargaining process among relative equal states. The main regime provisions were a product of bargaining in which differing interests were reconciled.

2 = Strongly a bargaining process among relative equal states: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.

3 = Relevance of a bargaining process among relative equal states: Negotiations featured only a partial bargaining process among relative equal states. Only parts of the regime provisions were agreed upon through a bargaining process among more or less equal states.

4 = Minor relevance of bargaining process among relative equal states: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.

5 = Bargaining process among more relative equal states not at all relevant: Bargaining among relative equal states did not play a role during negotiations.

6 = Don't know

TRANSNATIONAL_

DOMINATION

Were the negotiations dominated by transnational forces?

0 = Not applicable

1 = Very strongly dominated by transnational actors: Negotiations were very strongly dominated by transnational actors which were the most important actors during negotiations. The main regime provisions were products of the activities of transnational actors (e.g., international nongovernmental organizations like multinational corporations, transnational issue-networks, experts, etc.). States played only a minor role and were heavily influenced by and/or relied on transnational actors as advisors, pressure groups, etc.

2 = Strongly dominated by transnational actors: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.

3 = Relevance of domination by transnational actors: Transnational actors tried to dominate negotiations and to determine the main regime provisions, but succeeded only partially, as other actors (especially states) influenced the negotiations and the main regime provisions.

4 = Minor relevance of domination by transnational actors: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.

5 = Domination by transnational by transnational actors not at all relevant: Transnational actors did not play any important role during negotiations.

6 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

110 OPERATIONALIZATION STAGE

FORM: RF52

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 110A What steps were required for the relevant agreements to become operational? Indicate these steps for each agreement identified in the precoding agreement.

Provide codes for each element.

OPERATIONAL_STEPS What steps were required for the relevant agreements to become operational? Indicate these steps for each agreement listed under AGREEMENTS. For each agreement, check as many as apply. If applicable, mention additional steps required for an agreement to become operational.

0= Not applicable (e.g., no steps required)

1 = Ratification by members

2 = Implementing legislation passed by members

3 = Issuance of order or decree from government executive

4 = Formation of regime bodies (committees, secretariats, etc.)

5 = Entry into force of other international legal instruments

6 = Don't know

7 = If applicable, mention additional steps required for an agreement to become operational

OPERATIONAL_RATIFY_NUMBER If OPERATIONAL_STEPS is coded '1' (=ratification by members), indicate how many ratifications were required for the agreement (number).

AGREEMENTS Agreements identified in the precoding agreement that are part of the regime by name.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF53

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 110B How long did it take for the relevant agreements of the regime to become operational? Provide information for each relevant agreement identified in the precoding agreement.

Provide codes for each element.

OPERATIONAL_
SIGNATURE

For each agreement listed under AGREEMENTS, indicate when the agreement was signed. Enter month as a full name. Enter year as a four digit number. Example: December 1950.

OPERATIONAL_
ENTRY_INTO_FORCE

For each agreement listed under AGREEMENTS, indicate when the agreement entered into force. Enter month as a full name. Enter year as a four digit number. Example: December 1950.

AGREEMENTS

Agreements identified in the precoding agreement that are part of the regime by name.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF54

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 110C Were there serious disagreements among potential regime members concerning whether to make the agreement(s) operational? If so, were these disagreements resolved through actions of a single state or a small group of states, by an interstate process among relative equals, or by transnational forces?

Provide codes for each element.

DISPUTE_
OPERATIONAL

Were there serious disagreements among potential regime members concerning whether to make the agreement(s) operational? Provide codes for each agreement listed under AGREEMENTS.

0 = Not applicable
1 = No
2 = Yes
3 = Don't know

DISPUTE_
STATE_RESOLVED

If DISPUTE_OPERATIONAL is coded '2' (=yes) for an agreement listed under AGREEMENTS, indicate whether these disagreements were resolved through actions of a single state or a small group of states.

0 = Not applicable
1 = Very strongly dominated by a single state or small group of states: The dispute was resolved through actions taken by a single state or a small group of states, which imposed operationalization on other actors. One or more dominant powers succeeded in getting others to operationalize the regime.
2 = Strongly dominated by a single state or small group of states: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.
3 = Relevance of domination by a single state or small group of states: One or more states tried to impose operationalization on other actors, but the dominating states were only partially successful in forcing the others to operationalize the agreement.
4 = Minor relevance of domination by a single state or small group of states: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.
5 = Domination by a single state or small group of states not at all relevant: Domination by a single state or small group of states did not play a role in resolving a dispute about operationalization.
6 = Don't know

DISPUTE_
INTERSTATE_RESOLVED

If DISPUTE_OPERATIONAL is coded '2' (=yes) for an agreement listed under AGREEMENTS, indicate whether these disagreements were resolved by an interstate process among relative equals.

0 = Not applicable
1 = Very strongly a bargaining process among relative equal states: Resolution of disputes regarding operationalization consisted mainly of a bargaining process among relative equal states. Resolution of disputes regarding operationalization were a product of bargaining, in which differing interests were reconciled.
2 = Strongly a bargaining process among relative equal states: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.

3 = Relevance of a bargaining process among relative equal states: Resolution of disputes regarding operationalization of an agreement was only partially a bargaining process among relative equal states. Operationalization was only partially achieved through a bargaining process among relative equal states.

4 = Minor relevance of bargaining process among more or less equal states: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.

5 = Bargaining process among relative equal states not at all relevant: Bargaining among relative equal states did not play a role in resolving disputes about operationalization of an agreement.

6 = Don't know

DISPUTE_

FORCES_RESOLVED

If DISPUTE_OPERATIONAL is coded '2' (=yes) for an agreement listed under AGREEMENTS, indicate whether these disagreements were resolved by transnational forces.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Very strongly dominated by transnational actors: Resolution of disputes regarding operationalization was very strongly dominated by transnational actors which were the most important actors forcing others to operationalize the agreement. Resolution of disputes regarding operationalization was a product of the activities of transnational actors (e.g., international nongovernmental organizations like multinational corporations, transnational issue-networks, experts, etc.). States only played a minor role and were heavily influenced by and/or relied on transnational actors as advisors, pressure groups, etc.

2 = Strongly dominated by transnational actors: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.

3 = Relevance of domination by transnational actors: Transnational actors tried to dominate resolution of disputes regarding operationalization, but succeeded only partially, as other actors (especially states) influenced resolution of disputes regarding operationalization.

4 = Minor relevance of domination by transnational actors: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.

5 = Domination by transnational by transnational actors not at all relevant: Transnational actors did not play any important role in solving disputes about operationalization.

6 = Don't know

AGREEMENTS

Agreements identified in the precoding agreement that are part of the regime by name.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF55

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 110D Did the parties agree to act as if the agreement were already in force before the regime became operational?

Provide codes for each element.

OPERATIONAL_ALREADY Did the parties agree to act as if the agreement were already in force before the regime became operational? Provide codes for each agreement listed under AGREEMENTS.

0 = Not applicable

1 = No

2 = Yes, and they explicitly provided for it in the regime

3 = Yes, but they did not explicitly provide for it in the regime

4 = Don't know

OPERATIONAL_
ALREADY_WHEN

If OPERATIONAL_BEFORE is coded '2' (=yes, and they explicitly provided for it in the regime) or '3' (=yes, but they did not explicitly provide for it in the regime), mention when the agreement became informally operational. Enter month as a full name. Enter year as a four digit number. Example: December 1950.

AGREEMENTS

Agreements identified in the precoding agreement that are part of the regime by name.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RF56

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 110E How severe were the domestic political battles over the terms of the agreement within member states during the operationalization stage?

Provide codes for each element.

DOMESTIC_

BATTLES_SEVERE

For each agreement listed under AGREEMENTS, indicate severity of domestic battles within members states over the terms of the agreement during the operationalization stage.

1 = Very strong political battles: Political battles over the terms of the agreement were so severe that it was no longer certain whether a country would remain a member of the regime (e.g., domestic political battles led the U.S. not to join the League of Nations. In the U.S. threatened industries, unions and environmentalists fought hard against ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement, which was ratified in the end).

2 = Strong political battles: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.

3 = Medium political battles: Political battles over the terms of the agreement occurred, but membership was not really called into question. Some political forces accepted the agreement but asked for slight changes or accompanied the "Yes" with a warning that some objections should be considered with the next agreement of this type (e.g., Maastricht ratification debate in Germany, where Bavaria raised objections, leading to a supreme court ruling that warned about additional restrictions to sovereignty).

4 = Few political battles: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.

5 = Political battles not at all relevant: No political battles over the terms of the agreements occurred (e.g., smooth ratification of the U.N. Charter in the U.S.).

6 = Don't know

DOMESTIC_BATTLES

For each agreement listed under AGREEMENTS, indicate how many countries experienced the extent of domestic battles checked under DOMESTIC_BATTLES_SEVERE. For each agreement, code no more than four answers.

1 = Some countries, less than 20 percent

2 = Many countries, between 20 and 50 percent

3 = Most countries, between 50 and 99 percent

4 = All countries, 100 percent

5 = Don't know

AGREEMENTS

Agreements identified in the precoding agreement that are part of the regime by name.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

111 NARRATIVE

FORM: RF57

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 111A Write a short description of the central aspects of regime formation. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include information not coded above. List the most important literature used in coding the regime formation part of the data protocol.

Provide information for each element.

REGIME_FORMATION_
NARRATIVE

Write a short description of the central aspects of regime formation. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include information not coded above.

FORMATION_
LITERATURE

List the most important literature used in coding the regime formation part of the data protocol (If possible, indicate author(s), editor(s), book title, article, and year).

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

PART II

Regime Attributes

PART II - TABLE OF CONTENTS

201 STATED AND UNSTATED GOALS

201A Does the regime have stated goals? If so, what are the most important stated goals of the regime? Identify up to five.

201B Does the regime have unstated goals? If so, what are the most important unstated goals of the regime? Identify up to five.

202 LARGER VISION OR THEORY

202A Does the regime reflect some larger vision or theory regarding the organization and operation of international society?

203 OVERALL CHARACTERISTICS

203A Is the regime an explicit or a tacit regime?

203B To what extent is the regime an internal or an external regime?

203C Do the principles and norms of the regime apply only to members as such, or are members responsible for ensuring that these provisions are complied with by other actors operating within their jurisdiction?

203D Can the regime's principles be characterized in terms of the three fundamental types of property rights/allocation rules?

204 PRINCIPLES AND NORMS

204A Identify the most important regime-specific principles and norms. Mention whether the constitutive agreements make explicit reference to each principle or norm, or whether the commitment is implicit.

205 REGIME RULES

205A What are the substantive rules or prescriptions of the regime? Indicate whether the constitutive agreements make explicit reference to the rules.

205B Is it possible to categorize the regime's substantive rules as requirements, prohibitions, or permissions?

205C Are the regime's substantive rules legally binding on the members, or do they have the character of soft law (e.g., ministerial declarations, codes of conduct)?

205D Are the regime's substantive rules generally precise and easy to interpret in the sense that they call for well-defined actions, or are they ambiguous and indeterminate?

205E Does the regime have substantive rules that differentiate among its members in terms of requirements, prohibitions, or permissions?

205F Is the regime narrow or broad as measured by the functional scope of its rules?

205G Is the regime shallow or deep as measured by the density and specificity of its rules?

206 PROGRAMS

206A Does the regime explicitly call for the conduct of programmatic activities?

206B If the regime explicitly calls for the conduct of programmatic activities, to what extent are those who participate in relevant advisory bodies/programmatic activities recognized as experts in the field?

206C If the regime explicitly calls for the conduct of programmatic activities, who controls participation and the agenda in the bodies carrying out programmatic activities?

206D Does the regime have de facto programs that differ materially from explicitly mandated programs?

207 MEMBERSHIP

207A How many formal members do the relevant agreements have?

207B Are there informal members (states or non-state actors that have not formally signed the regime's constitutive agreements or otherwise acquired membership) but that have rights and obligations under the terms of the regime and have a voice in its decisionmaking processes? If yes, identify these members.

207C Are there state or non-state actors that are important in terms of the problem to be solved but that are not members of the regime?

207D Are there explicit provisions that target activities (e.g., oil tanker operators in MARPOL) of non-state actors or that cover the participation of non-state actors (e.g., provisions governing observer status for non-state actors in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna) in the regime? If so, elaborate on the nature of the rules in a paragraph.

208 MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA AND RULES

208A What criteria govern eligibility for membership?

208B How many states meet these criteria?

208C Do the rules pertaining to the admission of non-founding members differ from the admission rules applied to founding or original members? If yes, please describe.

208D Is there a single category of membership or are there provisions establishing more than one category of membership?

208E Do the regime's provisions allow for role differentiation among the members?

209 SECRETARIAT

209A Did the members of the regime establish a secretariat for the regime as a whole or any of its elements?

209B How independent is the secretariat from the regime's members?

210 DECISIONMAKING

210A What types of formal decisions are made by the regime?

210B What decision rules does the regime provide for and use in arriving at decisions?

210C What decisionmaking bodies are provided for in the regime?

210D How do these bodies participate in decisionmaking? Is participation by these bodies carried out in accordance with the constitutive provisions of the regime?

210E Are there other bodies within the regime that play a role in decisionmaking but are not explicitly provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions? How do these bodies participate in decision-making?

210F Does the regime formally or informally delegate decisionmaking power to any external bodies?

210G How do the external bodies to which the regime informally or formally delegated decisionmaking power participate in decisionmaking?

210H Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting the issues that get on the decisionmaking agenda of bodies explicitly provided for by the regime?

210I Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting the issues that get on the decisionmaking agenda of bodies not explicitly provided for by the regime?

210J Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting the issues that get on the decisionmaking agenda of external bodies to which the regime formally or informally delegates decisionmaking power?

210K In a short paragraph describe the essential features of the regime's decisionmaking bodies as well as their interactions with each other.

211 FUNDING MECHANISMS

211A How are the regime's activities and administrative operations (including the work of the secretariat) funded?

211B How are the programmatic activities of the regime funded?

211C What kinds of financial mechanisms have been created under the regime? Does the regime make use of annual or multiyear budgets?

212 COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

212A Are there reporting procedures requiring the submission of information by individual members pertaining to regime implementation?

212B Are there procedures for reviewing implementation formally or not formally established in the regime's constitutive provisions?

212C What formal compliance mechanisms are provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions to achieve compliance?

212D What compliance mechanisms not provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions are used to achieve compliance?

212E Do these procedures generally reflect an enforcement approach or a management approach to compliance?

213 REGIME'S INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS

213A Identify other regimes with which this regime interacts. Indicate whether the interaction is mutually reinforcing or conflicting.

214 NARRATIVE

214A Write a short description of the central aspects of the regime's attributes. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include information not coded above. List the most important literature used in coding the regime formation part of the data protocol.

201 STATED AND UNSTATED GOALS

FORM: RA1

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 201A Does the regime have stated goals? If so, what are the most important stated goals of the regime? Identify up to five.

Stated goals are explicitly mentioned in the regime's constitutive agreements. Such stated goals may be set forth in the preamble, or in paragraphs which include the regime's principles or major substantive provisions.

Provide codes for each element.

GOALS_EXIST Does the regime have stated goals?

0 = Not applicable

1 = No stated goals exist

2 = Regime has stated goals

3 = Don't know

GOALS If GOALS_EXIST is coded '2' (=Regime has stated goals), what are the most important stated goals of the regime? Identify up to five.

GOALS_REFERENCE Give a reference for the stated goals (e.g., treaty or soft law document) identified under GOALS.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA2

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 201B Does the regime have unstated goals? If so, what are the most important unstated goals of the regime? Identify up to five.

Unstated goals are not explicitly mentioned in the regime's constitutive agreements. But regime members can develop common understandings about such goals. Regime members may (but need not) refer to such unstated goals in public statements about the purposes of the regime (conference statements, press releases, public speeches, governmental/internal documents of regime members).

Provide codes for each element.

UNSTATED_
GOALS_EXIST

Does the regime have unstated goals?

0 = Not applicable

1 = No unstated goals exist

2 = Regime has unstated goals

3 = Don't know

UNSTATED_GOALS

If UNSTATED_GOALS_EXIST is coded '2' (=Regime has unstated goals), what are the most important unstated goals of the regime? Identify up to five.

UNSTATED_
GOALS_REFERENCE

Give a reference for the unstated goals identified under UNSTATED_GOALS (e.g., conference statements, press releases, public speeches, governmental/internal documents of regime members).

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

202 LARGER VISION OR THEORY

FORM: RA3

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 202A Does the regime reflect some larger vision or theory regarding the organization and operation of international society?

Provide codes for each element.

VISION_INTERNATIONAL_
SOCIETY

Does the regime reflect some larger vision or theory regarding the organization and operation of international society? Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention other visions.

0 = There is no larger vision or theory

1 = State-centric: The regime treats states to be the main actors. The regime emphasizes principles like state sovereignty (e.g., sovereignty over natural resources, responsibility not to cause damage to the environment of other states or to areas beyond national jurisdiction) or noninterference as the most important features determining state relationships.

2 = Kantian society of states: The regime reflects the conviction that interstate relationships should be based on an international society governed by law (e.g., principles about good neighbourliness and international cooperation).

3 = Global civil society: The regime considers non-state actors and individuals to be important actors. The regime emphasizes the importance of realizing specific needs and rights of individuals (e.g., preservation of human rights).

4 = Don't know

5 = Mention other visions, if applicable.

VISION_ELABORATE

If one or more visions are checked under VISION_INTERNATIONAL_SOCIETY, elaborate on each of these larger visions and theories in a paragraph.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

203 OVERALL CHARACTERISTICS

FORM: RA4

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 203A Is the regime an explicit or a tacit regime?

Provide codes for each element.

EXPLICIT_TACIT Is the regime an explicit or a tacit regime?

0 = Not applicable

1 = Explicit regime: The term “explicit regime” refers to classic arrangements in which rules are stated formally, actors refer to them regularly, and rule-consistent behavior is widespread. The study of explicit regimes currently constitutes the core of regime analysis. A well-known case in point is the GATT regime.

2 = Tacit regime: The term “tacit regime” refers to those cases in which regular but informal references to informal rules are common and behavior is consistent with some independently inferred rules. The balance of power system in nineteenth-century Europe and the system of spheres of influence among the superpowers after World War II are examples of this type of regime.

3 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA5

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 203B To what extent is the regime an internal or an external regime?

Provide codes for each element.

INTERNAL_EXTERNAL To what extent is the regime an internal or an external regime?

0 = Not applicable

1 = Very strongly an internal regime: The regime serves mainly to increase the utility of regime members in absolute terms (e.g., the GATT regime).

2 = Strongly an internal regime: Although the regime serves mainly to increase the utility of the regime members in absolute terms, it also contains some elements designed to improve the positions of members relative to non-members.

3 = Mixed type (internal and external): The regime contains elements of both types to a nearly equal extent (internal and external).

4 = Strongly an external regime: Although the regime seeks mainly to improve the positions of members relative to non-members, it also contains some elements designed to increase the utility of the regime members in absolute terms.

5 = Very strongly an external regime: The regime seeks mainly to improve the positions of members relative to non-members (e.g., military alliances, COCOM-Regime).

6 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA6

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 203C Do the principles and norms of the regime apply only to members as such, or are members responsible for ensuring that these provisions are complied with by other actors operating within their jurisdiction?

Provide codes for each element.

PRINCIPLES_APPLY Do the principles and norms of the regime apply only to members as such, or are members responsible for ensuring that these provisions are complied with by other actors operating within their jurisdiction?

0 = Not applicable

1 = Principles/norms apply only to the behavior of the members as such (If states are members, components of the public sector, like the army, government agencies, etc. are included)

2 = Members are also responsible for applying these provisions to other actors operating within their jurisdiction (e.g., members are responsible for applying the MARPOL provisions to tanker owners and operators)

3 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA7

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 203D Can the regime's principles be characterized in terms of the three fundamental types of property rights/allocation rules?

Provide codes for each element.

PROPERTY_TYPES Can the regime's principles be characterized in terms of the three fundamental types of property rights/allocation rules?

0 = Not applicable (Impossible to characterize the regime's principles in terms of property rights/allocation rules)

1 = Internationalization: An international authority manages the mode of production and determines allocation of the shares and their allocation among the member states.

2 = Nationalization: The allocation of the resource is managed by states.

3 = Free access and exchange: Only market forces control the allocation of the resource.

4 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

204 PRINCIPLES AND NORMS

FORM: RA8

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 204A Identify the most important regime-specific principles and norms. Mention whether the constitutive agreements make explicit reference to each principle or norm, or whether the commitment is implicit.

Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Regimes can mandate a principled (as opposed to a practical) differentiation of roles among the members (e.g., flag vs. port vs. coastal states). John Ruggie has developed an interpretation of multilateralism that emphasizes the underlying principle of cooperation rather than the number of participants involved. Multilateralism, by this account, describes institutions that build on (a) antidiscrimination as a generalized principle of conduct, (b) the principle of indivisibility, and (c) the principle of diffuse reciprocity, where these elements are treated as an indivisible ensemble.

Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations (e.g., noninterference, compliance, financial and technology transfer, assessment/amendment and adjustment of regime provisions, protection of single species/environmental goods, etc.). To illustrate, it is possible to classify regimes in terms of goal orientation. We can distinguish regimes that serve mainly to increase the utility of regime participants in absolute terms (internal regimes), from those that seek to improve the position of members relative to outsiders (external regimes). A related distinction separates open institutions (e.g., the United Nations), conditionally open institutions (e.g., IMF, GATT), and institutions with restricted membership (e.g., NATO, OPEC, EU).

Provide codes for each element.

PRINCIPLE_NORM Identify the most important regime-specific principles and norms. Check as many as apply. If relevant, list up to ten additional principles and norms.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Precautionary principle: Provides a basis for the early development of new international law to address environmental risks even if scientific knowledge about the causes of the problem is still incomplete (e.g., the precautionary principle is explicitly mentioned in the 1987 Montreal Protocol of the ozone regime).

2 = Polluter pays: The principle that costs arising from pollution and from measures to prevent pollution should be borne by the actor(s) responsible for causing the pollution and the costs.

3 = Sovereignty: A general principle that states act as independent and equal actors.

4 = Sovereignty over natural resources: States have (within certain limits) the right to conduct or authorize such activities as they choose within their territories, including activities that may have adverse effects on their own environment.

5 = Responsibility not to cause damage to environment: Responsibility not to cause damage to the environment of other states or to areas beyond national jurisdiction.

6 = Principle of preventive action: There is an obligation to prevent damage to the environment, or to reduce, limit, or control activities that might cause such damage.

7 = Good neighborliness and international cooperation: A general obligation to cooperate in the issue area, with regard to specific problems of the regime (e.g., implementation of the regime's provisions), or with regard to specific commitments.

8 = Common concern: The principle emphasizing the common concern about the consequences of an environmental problem (e.g., the biodiversity convention states that "biodiversity is a common concern of humankind").

9 = Common heritage of mankind: The principle that certain “international commons” are the common heritage of mankind.

10 = Intergenerational equity: The principle emphasizing the responsibility of members of present generations for future generations.

11 = Equitable use of natural resources: A general principle calling for equity between states that are at different economic levels, that have different environmental and developmental needs, and that contribute in different degrees to particular problems.

12 = Sustainable use of natural resources: The principle focusing on the adoption of standards governing the rate of use or exploitation of specific natural resources. The principle was developed originally to govern the exploitation of marine species (e.g., to limit catches to “maximum sustainable levels” for species such as whales, tuna, North Pacific fish).

13 = Integration of environment and development: The commitment to integrate environmental aspects into economic development and to consider economic and social needs in determining and implementing rules for environmental protection.

14 = Don’t know

15 = If relevant, list up to 10 additional principles and norms.

PRINCIPLE_

NORM_EXPLICIT

For each principle/norm checked and listed under PRINCIPLE_NORM, state whether the constitutive agreements make explicit reference to the principle/norm or whether the commitment is implicit.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Constitutive agreements make explicit reference to principle/norm

2 = Commitment to principle/norm is implicit

3 = Don’t know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA10

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 205B Is it possible to categorize the regime's substantive rules as requirements, prohibitions, or permissions?

Provide codes for each element.

RULE_CATEGORY For each rule listed under RULES, code whether it is a requirement rule, prohibition rule, or permission rule.

0 = Not applicable: Not possible to categorize the rule as requirement, prohibition, or permission.

1 = Requirement rule: Spells out an action or outcome (or its negation) that is obligatory.

2 = Prohibition rule: Spells out an action or outcome (or its negation) that is forbidden.

3 = Permission rule: Grants permission but neither forbids nor requires an action. Permission rules need not be laid down as written formulations.

4 = Don't know

RULES Substantive rules or prescriptions of the regime listed above.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA11

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 205C Are the regime's substantive rules legally binding on the members, or do they have the character of soft law (e.g., ministerial declarations, codes of conduct)?

Provide codes for each element.

RULE_BINDING For each rule listed under **RULES**, code whether it is legally binding on the members, or whether it has the character of soft law (e.g. ministerial declarations, guidelines, codes of conduct).

0 = Not applicable

1 = Rule is legally binding.

2 = Rule is soft law/not legally binding.

3 = Don't know

RULES Substantive rules or prescriptions of the regime listed above.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA12

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 205D Are the regime's substantive rules generally precise and easy to interpret in the sense that they call for well-defined actions, or are they ambiguous and indeterminate?

Provide codes for each element.

RULE_PRECISE For each rule listed under RULES, code whether the rule is generally precise and easy to interpret in the sense that they call for well-defined actions, or whether it is ambiguous and indeterminate.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Precise and easy to interpret (e.g., precise rules for emission reductions to achieve a percent reduction goal within a certain time frame and calculated from a base year; rules that require the fulfillment of certain economic indicators to achieve membership in the European Monetary System by the end of the decade).

2 = Between 1 and 3 on the scale.

3 = Medium (e.g., general exemption clauses specifying certain circumstances under which states will not have to fulfill specific obligations. Article XIX in GATT allows a country to suspend obligations under conditions causing "serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products." The contracting country is free, with respect to such a product "and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part").

4 = Between 3 and 5 on the scale.

5 = Ambiguous and indeterminate (e.g., rules to guarantee "access to appropriate means" for the work of journalists).

6 = Don't know

RULES Substantive rules or prescriptions of the regime listed above.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA13

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 205E Does the regime have substantive rules that differentiate among its members in terms of requirements, prohibitions, or permissions?

Provide codes for each element.

RULE_DIFFERENTIATE For each rule listed under **RULES**, code whether it differentiates among its members in terms of requirements, prohibitions, or permissions.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Rule does not differentiate among members

2 = Rule differentiates among members

3 = Don't know

DISCUSS_RULE If **RULE_DIFFERENTIATE** is coded '2' (=rule differentiates among members) for a rule listed under **RULES**, discuss the kind of differentiation among members in terms of requirements, prohibitions, or permissions for that rule.

RULES Substantive rules or prescriptions of the regime listed above.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA14

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 205F Is the regime narrow or broad as measured by the functional scope of its rules?

Provide codes for each element.

RULES_NARROW Is the regime narrow or broad as measured by the functional scope of its rules?

0 = Not applicable

1 = Very narrow: The regime has a very limited functional scope compared to the specific issues considered necessary for inclusion in the regime and covers only a limited number of important issues. For instance, only a very small number of issues are regulated compared to a large number considered necessary for inclusion in the regime (e.g., regime includes regulations about a single substance contributing to pollution of a transboundary river, but regulations about a large number of other substances of similar or even greater importance are lacking; regime for conventional arms reductions includes only regulations about a single type or a small number of weapons, but other major types of weapons of similar or even greater importance are not included).

2 = Narrow: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.

3 = Medium: The regime covers some important issues compared to the range of issues considered necessary for inclusion in the regime. For instance, several issues considered necessary for inclusion in the regime are regulated (e.g., regime includes regulations about several substances contributing to pollution of a transboundary river, but still other important pollutants are not regulated; regime for conventional arms reductions includes regulations about several types of weapons, but other major weapons are not included).

4 = Broad: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.

5 = Very broad: The regime has a very comprehensive functional scope and covers all important issues considered necessary for inclusion in the regime (e.g., regime includes regulations about all important pollutants contributing to pollution of a transboundary river; regime for conventional arms reductions includes regulations about all major types of weapons considered necessary for inclusion).

6 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA15

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 205G Is the regime shallow or deep as measured by the density and specificity of its rules?

Provide codes for each element.

REGIME_SHALLOW Is the regime shallow or deep as measured by the density and specificity of its rules?

1 = Very shallow: Compared to the density of rules considered necessary for managing the problems in the issue area, the regime comprises only a very limited number of rules, and/or established rules are rather weak compared to the specificity of the rules considered necessary for managing the problems in the issue area (e.g. the 1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals is a very shallow regime with a very limited number of weak rules).

2 = Shallow: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.

3 = Medium: Compared to the density of rules considered necessary for managing the problems in the issue area, the regime comprises a sizable number of rules to manage the problem and/or established rules have developed some strength compared to the specificity of the rules considered necessary for managing the problems in the issue area.

4 = Deep: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.

5 = Very deep: Compared to the density of rules considered necessary for managing the problems in the issue area, the regime comprises a very comprehensive set of rules and/or established rules are rather strong compared to the specificity of the rules considered necessary for managing the problems in the issue area [e.g., the adjustments and amendments to the Montreal Protocol (1987) adopted in London (1990) and Copenhagen (1992) led to a rather deep regime with comprehensive and strong rules].

6 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

206 PROGRAMS

FORM: RA16

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 206A Does the regime explicitly call for the conduct of programmatic activities?

Programmatic activities are substantive activities intended to support the regime's operation and to promote the implementation of the regime's provisions (e.g., scientific analysis, compliance monitoring, verification of compliance, financial and technology transfer, etc.).

Provide codes for each element.

PROGRAM_ACTIVITIES Does the regime explicitly call for the conduct of programmatic activities? Check as many as apply. Mention additional activities, if applicable.

0 = No programmatic activities

1 = Scientific monitoring of causes and effects of the problem

2 = Research about causes and effects of the problem

3 = Expert advice

4 = Compliance monitoring

5 = Review of implementation

6 = Verification of compliance

7 = Financial and technology transfer

8 = Reviewing adequacy of commitments

9 = Information management

10 = If applicable, mention additional activities,

11 = Don't know

PROGRAM_BUDGET Provide data about the size of the budget (including currency and year) for those programmatic activities checked or mentioned under **PROGRAM_ACTIVITIES**.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA17

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 206B If the regime explicitly calls for the conduct of programmatic activities, to what extent are those who participate in relevant advisory bodies/programmatic activities recognized as experts in the field?

Provide codes for each element.

PROGRAM_EXPERTS If the regime explicitly calls for the conduct of programmatic activities, to what extent are those who participate in relevant advisory bodies/programmatic activities checked under PROGRAM_ACTIVITIES recognized as experts in the field?

0 = Not applicable

1 = No member of the body is among the top 50 leading experts in the field

2 = Members of the body include less than 10% of the 50 leading experts in the field

3 = Members of the body include between 10 and 20% of the top 50 leading experts in the field

4 = Members of the body include between 20 and 50% of the top 50 leading experts in the field

5 = Members of the body include more than 50% of the top 50 leading scientists in the field

6 = Don't know

PROGRAM_ACTIVITIES Programmatic activities checked or mentioned above.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA18

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 206C If the regime explicitly calls for the conduct of programmatic activities, who controls participation and the agenda in the bodies carrying out programmatic activities?

Provide codes for each element.

PROGRAM_
EXPERTS_CONTROL If the regime explicitly calls for the conduct of programmatic activities, who controls participation in the bodies carrying out programmatic activities checked under PROGRAM_ACTIVITIES? For each programmatic activity, Check as many as apply.

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = No membership control exists
- 2 = Political bodies appoint members
- 3 = Individuals (like an executive secretary, chairman) appoint members
- 4 = Experts appoint members
- 5 = Membership is open to experts, without appointment
- 6 = Don't know

PROGRAM_
EXPERTS_AGENDA If the regime explicitly calls for the conduct of programmatic activities, who controls the agenda in the bodies carrying out programmatic activities checked under PROGRAM_ACTIVITIES?

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = Political bodies or government officials
- 2 = The experts themselves
- 3 = Don't know

PROGRAM_ACTIVITIES Programmatic activities checked or mentioned above.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA19

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 206D Does the regime have de facto programs that differ materially from explicitly mandated programs?

This question aims at de facto programs (in contrast to programs explicitly called for by the regime).

Provide codes for each element.

PROGRAM_
DE_FACTO

Does the regime have de facto programs that differ materially from explicitly mandated programs?

0 = Not applicable

1 = No

2 = Yes

3 = Don't know

NARRATIVE_
PROGRAM_DE_FACTO

If PROGRAM_DE_FACTO is coded '2' (=yes), elaborate in a paragraph.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

207 MEMBERSHIP

FORM: RA20

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 207A How many formal members do the relevant agreements have?

Formal membership is limited to actors that have formally signed the regime's constitutive agreement.

Provide codes for each element.

MEMBERSHIP_SOURCE	Indicate where the database team can obtain information about the number of formal members of the regime. Indicate, whether information provided for a single element fits for other elements as well. If so, provide information only once.
MEMBERSHIP_NUMBER	How many formal members do the relevant agreements listed under AGREEMENTS have? Indicate the number of formal members (including states, international governmental and nongovernmental organizations).
MEMBERSHIP_YEAR	Indicate the year for which MEMBERSHIP_NUMBER is valid.
MEMBERSHIP_ACTOR	Identify the members for each agreement listed under AGREEMENTS.
MEMBERSHIP_ACTOR_YEAR	For each member listed under MEMBERSHIP_ACTOR, indicate year of membership.
AGREEMENTS	Agreements identified in the precoding agreement that are part of the regime by name.
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT	

FORM: RA21

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 207B Are there informal members (states or non-state actors that have not formally signed the regime's constitutive agreements or otherwise acquired membership) but that have rights and obligations under the terms of the regime and have a voice in its decisionmaking processes? If yes, identify these members.

This question applies only to explicit regimes.

Example: Taiwan cannot become a member of regimes to which China belongs, but it plays a role as an informal member of some of these regimes.

Provide codes for each element.

INFORMAL_MEMBER Are there informal members (states or non-state actors that have not formally signed the regime's constitutive agreements or otherwise acquired membership) but that have rights and obligations under the terms of the regime and have a voice in its decisionmaking processes?

0 = Not applicable (Not an explicit regime)

1 = No

2 = Yes

3 = Don't know

INFORMAL_MEMBER_
STATE

If INFORMAL_MEMBER is coded '2' (=yes), are there states that have not formally signed the regime's constitutive agreements or otherwise acquired membership but that have rights and obligations under the terms of the regime and have a voice in its decisionmaking processes? If yes, identify these states.

INFORMAL_MEMBER_
NON_STATE

If INFORMAL_MEMBER is coded '2' (=yes), are there non-state actors that have not formally signed the regime's constitutive agreements or otherwise acquired membership but that have rights and obligations under the terms of the regime and have a voice in its decisionmaking processes? If yes, identify these non-state actors.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA22

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 207C Are there state or non-state actors that are important in terms of the problem to be solved but that are not members of the regime?

Include non-state actors only if the regime allows membership of non-state actors.

Provide codes for each element.

NON_MEMBER Are there state or non-state actors that are important in terms of the problem to be solved but that are not members of the regime?

0 = Not applicable

1 = No

2 = Yes

3 = Don't know

NON_MEMBER_STATE IF NON_MEMBER is coded '2' (=yes), are there states that are important in terms of the problem to be solved but that are not members of the regime? If yes, identify these states.

NON_MEMBER_NON_STATE IF NON_MEMBER is coded '2' (=yes), are there non-state actors that are important in terms of the problem to be solved but that are not members of the regime? If yes, identify these non-state actors.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA23

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 207D Are there explicit provisions that target activities (e.g., oil tanker operators in MARPOL) of non-state actors or that cover the participation of non-state actors (e.g., provisions governing observer status for non-state actors in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna) in the regime? If so, elaborate on the nature of the rules in a paragraph.

Provide codes for each element.

PROVISIONS_NONSTATE Are there explicit provisions that target activities (e.g., oil tanker operators in MARPOL) of non-state actors or that cover the participation of non-state actors (e.g., provisions governing observer status for non-state actors in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna) in the regime? If applicable, check more than one answer.

0 = Not applicable

1 = No

2 = Explicit provisions targeting activities of non-state actors

3 = Explicit provisions targeting participation of non-state actors

4 = Don't know

RULES_ACTIVITIES If PROVISIONS_NONSTATE is coded '2' (=explicit provisions targeting activities of non-state actors), identify these rules targeting activities of non-state actors in a paragraph.

RULES_PARTICIPATE If PROVISIONS_NONSTATE is coded '3' (=explicit provisions targeting participation of non-state actors), identify these rules targeting participation of non-state actors in a paragraph.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

208 MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA AND RULES

FORM: RA24

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 208A What criteria govern eligibility for membership?

Provide codes for each element.

MEMBER_

CRITERIA_STATE

What criteria govern eligibility for membership of states? Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention additional membership criteria.

0 = Not applicable

1 = The regime has no membership criteria

2 = Belonging to a certain continent

3 = Belonging to a certain region

4 = Status as a neighbor/user of a security/economic/environmental good

5 = Membership in other international organizations

6 = Membership in other international regimes

7 = Polity (e.g., liberal democracy, socialist/communist state)

8 = Realization of human rights in countries applying for membership

9 = Evidence of peaceableness

10 = Economic indicators (like GNP, GDP, etc.)

11 = Type of domestic economic system (e.g., market economy, centrally planned economy)

12 = Specific domestic economic and budgetary policies

13 = Expertise and work carried out in the issue area

14 = Potential to help with problem solving in the issue area

15 = Role as a source of the problem

16 = If applicable, mention additional membership criteria.

17 = Don't know

MEMBER_

CRITERIA_NONSTATE

What criteria govern eligibility for membership of non-state actors? Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention additional membership criteria (see codes above).

MEMBER_

CRITERIA_IGOS

What criteria govern eligibility for membership of international governmental organizations? Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention additional membership criteria (see codes above).

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA25

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 208B How many states meet these criteria?

Provide information for each element.

NARRATIVE_

MEMBER_CRITERIA

Elaborate on how many states meet these criteria governing eligibility for membership (mentioned under MEMBER_CRITERIA_STATE). Indicate the year for which your statement is valid.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA26

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 208C Do the rules pertaining to the admission of non-founding members differ from the admission rules applied to founding or original members? If yes, please describe.

In some regimes, parties wishing to become members after the regime is formed are subject to requirements that differ from those applied to the founding members. This may involve meeting specified membership tests (e.g., showing that they are peace loving) or living up to specific performance standards (e.g., level of effort requirements).

Provide codes for each element.

MEMBER_

CRITERIA_DIFFER

Do the rules pertaining to the admission of non-founding members differ from the admission rules applied to founding or original members?

0 = Not applicable

1 = No

2 = Yes

3 = Don't know

NARRATIVE_

MEMBER_CRITERIA

If MEMBER_CRITERIA_DIFFER is coded '2' (=yes), elaborate in a short paragraph how the rules pertaining to the admission of non-founding members differ from the admission rules applied to founding original members.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA27

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 208D Is there a single category of membership or are there provisions establishing more than one category of membership?

Some regimes provide for categories of membership. The Antarctic Treaty System distinguishes between consultative parties and ordinary parties. Only consultative parties, confined to original signatories and states undertaking substantial scientific research in Antarctica, have decisionmaking authority. Non-consultative parties are states that accede to the Antarctic Treaty but do not undertake substantial scientific research. Non-consultative parties do not have any formal decisionmaking authority.

Provide codes for each element.

MEMBER_
CATEGORY

Is there a single category of membership or are there provisions establishing more than one category of membership?

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = Single category of membership
- 2 = More than one category of membership
- 3 = Don't know

NARRATIVE_
MEMBER_CATEGORY

If MEMBERSHIP_CATEGORY is coded '2' (=more than one category of membership), elaborate in a paragraph.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA28

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 208E Do the regime's provisions allow for role differentiation among the members?

The provisions of MARPOL differentiate among flag states, port states, and coastal states. The hazardous waste regime distinguishes between exporting and importing states.

Provide codes for each element.

MEMBER_
ROLE_DIFFERENTIATE Do the regime's provisions allow for role differentiation among the members?

0 = Not applicable

1 = No

2 = Yes

3 = Don't Know

NARRATIVE_
MEMBER_ROLE If MEMBERSHIP_ROLE_DIFFERENTIATE is coded '2' (=yes), elaborate in a paragraph.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

209 SECRETARIAT

FORM: RA29

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 209A Did the members of the regime establish a secretariat for the regime as a whole or any of its elements?

Provide codes only once for the overall issue area, as a secretariat normally performs tasks for all regime elements.

SECRETARIAT Did the members of the regime establish a secretariat for the regime as a whole or any of its elements?

0 = Not applicable

1 = No secretariat established

2 = Regime has a secretariat of its own operating independently of other organizations (e.g., secretariat of the Framework Convention on Climate Change)

3 = An intergovernmental organization performs the secretariat's functions (e.g., ozone secretariat operating under UNEP)

4 = A nongovernmental organization performs the secretariat's functions [e.g., Article 8 of the Ramsar Convention specifies, that "the International Union for Conservation of Nature shall perform the continuing bureau duties under this Convention." IUCN is a nongovernmental organization with a membership of 526 nongovernmental organizations, 99 government agencies, and 62 states (in 1993)]

5 = A nation state performs the secretariat's functions

6 = Don't know

**SECRETARIAT_
IN_OPERATION**

If SECRETARIAT is coded '2' (=regime has a secretariat of its own operating independently of other organizations), '3' (=an intergovernmental organization performs the secretariat's functions), '4' (=a nongovernmental organization performs the secretariat's functions), or '5' (=a nation state performs the secretariat's functions), indicate year(s) when the secretariat was in operation. Indicate, if there was a break of the secretariat's operation.

**SECRETARIAT_
ESTABLISHED**

If SECRETARIAT is coded '2' (=regime has a secretariat of its own operating independently of other organizations), '3' (=an intergovernmental organization performs the secretariat's functions), '4' (=a nongovernmental organization performs the secretariat's functions), or '5' (=a nation state performs the secretariat's functions), indicate year when the secretariat was established.

SECRETARIAT_STAFF

If SECRETARIAT is coded '2' (=regime has a secretariat of its own operating independently of other organizations), '3' (=an intergovernmental organization performs the secretariat's functions), '4' (=a nongovernmental organization performs the secretariat's functions), or '5' (=a nation state performs the secretariat's functions), what is the size of the secretariat's staff?

SECRETARIAT_
STAFF_YEAR

Indicate year for which SECRETARIAT_ STAFF is valid.

SECRETARIAT_
BUDGET

If SECRETARIAT is coded '2' (=regime has a secretariat of its own operating independently of other organizations), '3' (=an intergovernmental organization performs the secretariat's functions), '4' (=a nongovernmental organization performs the secretariat's functions), or '5' (=a nation state performs the secretariat's functions), what is the size of the secretariat's budget? Indicate number and currency.

SECRETARIAT_
BUDGET_YEAR

Indicate year for which SECRETARIAT_ BUDGET is valid.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA30

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 209B How independent is the secretariat from the regime's members?

Determine the independence of the secretariat according to the latitude the secretariat has when performing its core tasks (e.g., arranging and servicing meetings of the Conference of the Parties and subsidiary bodies; performing the functions assigned by legal documents; preparing and transmitting reports based on information received from the Conference of the Parties and subsidiary bodies; preparing reports on secretariat implementation activities for the Conference of the Parties; ensuring coordination with relevant international bodies and NGOs; liaising/communicating with relevant authorities, non-parties, and international organizations; compiling and analyzing data/information; monitoring adherence to treaty obligations; giving guidance and advice to the parties; and consulting/assisting) as well as when performing additional tasks or roles (e.g., its political role as pusher or laggard for regime evolution/ratification/compliance, its promotion of treaty to non-parties, public relations, its influence on the agenda of the regime, etc.).

Provide codes only once for the overall issue area, as a secretariat normally performs tasks for all regime elements.

SECRETARIAT_
INDEPENDENCE

How independent is the secretariat from the regime's members?

0 = Not applicable (no secretariat exists)

1 = Highly independent: The secretariat has broad latitude to take action independent of member approval. Most of the important actions do not need state approval.

2 = Strong independence: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.

3 = Some independence: The secretariat has some latitude to take action with regard to some, but not all, important issues.

4 = Less independent: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.

5 = No independence: The secretariat has no latitude to take independent action. All action taken by the secretariat must have state approval.

6 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

210 DECISIONMAKING

FORM: RA31

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210A What types of formal decisions are made by the regime?

Distinguish between decisions called for in the formal provisions of the regime and decisions made but not formally called for by the regime's constitutive provisions.

Provide codes for each element.

DECISIONS_PROVIDED What types of formal decisions are called for by the constitutive provisions of the regime? Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention additional decisions.

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = Establish and revise substantive rules
- 2 = Apply rules
- 3 = Amend or extend core constitutive document
- 4 = Admit new members
- 5 = Expel members
- 6 = Accept withdrawal of members
- 7 = Terminate the regime
- 8 = Resolve disputes
- 9 = If applicable, mention additional decisions.
- 10 = Don't know

DECISIONS_CARRIED_OUT What types of formal decisions are made as called for by the constitutive provisions and mentioned under **DECISIONS_PROVIDED**. Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention additional decisions (see codes above).

DECISIONS_OTHER_MEANS What types of decisions are made but not formally called for by the regime's constitutive provisions? Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention additional decisions (see codes above).

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA32

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210B What decision rules does the regime provide for and use in arriving at decisions?

There is a difference between having written decision rules which are part of the regime's provisions and using decision rules for arriving at these decisions (e.g., the regime's provisions can provide for a qualified majority, whereas in practice states try to arrive at these decisions by consensus).

Provide codes for each element.

DECISION_RULES_ PROVIDED

What decision rules does the regime provide for in arriving at decisions? Code each decision listed under DECISIONS_PROVIDED. For each decision, check as many as apply.

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = No decision rules
- 2 = Unanimity
- 3 = Consensus
- 4 = Weighted/unweighted voting
- 5 = Qualified majority
- 6 = Simple majority
- 7 = Right to opt-out, file objection
- 8 = Don't know

DECISION_RULES_ IN_PRACTICE

What decision rules does the regime use in practice in arriving at decisions? Code each decision listed under DECISIONS_PROVIDED (see codes above).

DECISIONS_PROVIDED

Formal decisions called for by the constitutive provisions of the regime listed above.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA33

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210C What decisionmaking bodies are provided for in the regime?

There is a difference between bodies that participate in decisionmaking and bodies that make final decisions. Identify both types of decisionmaking bodies, if they are explicitly provided for in the regime. Note, that this question does not include external decisionmaking bodies.

Provide codes for each element.

BODIES_PROVIDED What decisionmaking bodies are provided for in the regime?
Identify as many as apply. Mention name of each body.

BODY_TYPE Indicate the body type for each decisionmaking body listed
under BODIES_PROVIDED.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Regular meeting of conference of parties

2 = Ad hoc meetings of conference of parties

3 = Standing subsidiary body

4 = Ad hoc subsidiary body

5 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA34

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210D How do these bodies participate in decisionmaking? Is participation by these bodies carried out in accordance with the constitutive provisions of the regime?

There is a difference between how the regime provides for participation of the bodies in decisionmaking and whether their participation is carried out in accordance with the regime provisions.

Provide codes for each element.

PARTICIPATION_ PROVIDED

How do these bodies listed under BODIES_PROVIDED participate in decisionmaking?

0 = Not applicable

1 = Regime provides for participation in decisionmaking

2 = Regime provides for participation in decisionmaking and to make final decisions

3 = Don't know

PARTICIPATION_ ACCORDANCE

Is participation by these bodies listed under BODIES_PROVIDED carried out in accordance with the provisions of the regime?

0 = Not applicable

1 = Body participates in accordance with the provisions of the regime

2 = Body does not participate in accordance with the provisions of the regime

3 = Don't know

BODIES_PROVIDED

Decisionmaking bodies provided for in the regime listed above.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA35

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210E Are there other bodies within the regime that play a role in decisionmaking but are not explicitly provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions? How do these bodies participate in decisionmaking?

This question does not include external decisionmaking bodies.

Provide codes for each element.

BODIES_OTHER Are there other bodies within the regime that play a role in decisionmaking but are not explicitly provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions? If so, mention name of each body.

BODY_TYPE Indicate the body type for each decisionmaking body listed under BODIES_OTHER.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Regular meeting of conference of parties

2 = Ad hoc meetings of conference of parties

3 = Standing subsidiary body

4 = Ad hoc subsidiary body

5 = Don't know

PARTICIPATION_OTHER How do these bodies listed under BODIES_OTHER participate in decisionmaking?

0 = Not applicable

1 = Body participates in decisionmaking

2 = Body participates in decisionmaking and makes final decisions

3 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA36

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210F Does the regime formally or informally delegate decisionmaking power to any external bodies?

Provide codes for each element.

DELEGATE_DECISIONS Does the regime formally or informally delegate decisionmaking power to any external bodies?

0 = Not applicable

1 = No

2 = Yes

3 = Don't know

EXTERNAL_BODIES If DELEGATE_DECISIONS is coded '2' (=yes), list the external bodies that have decisionmaking power for the regime.

EXTERNAL_LOCATION Indicate if the bodies mentioned under EXTERNAL_BODIES are part of an international governmental organization (IGO), international nongovernmental organization (INGO), or another regime.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Not part of any IGO, INGO or another regime

2 = Body is part of an IGO

3 = Body is part of an INGO

4 = Body is part of another regime

5 = Body is part of an IGO and another regime

6 = Body is part of an INGO and another regime

7 = Body is part of an IGO and an INGO

8 = Body is part of an IGO, INGO and another regime

9 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA37

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210G How do the external bodies to which the regime informally or formally delegated decisionmaking power participate in decisionmaking?

Provide codes for each element.

PARTICIPATION_OTHER How do these bodies listed under EXTERNAL_BODIES participate in decisionmaking?

0 = Not applicable

1 = Body participates in decisionmaking

2 = Body participates in decisionmaking and makes final decisions

3 = Don't know

EXTERNAL_BODIES External bodies with decisionmaking power for the regime listed above.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA38

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210H Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting the issues that get on the decisionmaking agenda of bodies explicitly provided for by the regime?

Provide codes for each element.

SUBSTANTIVE_
RESTRICTIONS Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting the issues that get on the decisionmaking agenda of bodies explicitly provided for by the regime listed under BODIES_PROVIDED? For each body, check as many as apply.

0 = Not applicable

1 = No restrictions

2 = Issues are restricted according to explicit criteria

3 = Any member can put item on agenda

4 = There is a voting procedure for adding items to the agenda

5 = There is a decisionmaking procedure for adding items to the agenda (e.g., approval of several other bodies)

6 = The agenda is controlled by another regime body

7 = Don't know

BODIES_PROVIDED Decisionmaking bodies provided for in the regime listed above.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA39

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210I Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting the issues that get on the decisionmaking agenda of bodies not explicitly provided for by the regime?

Provide codes for each element.

SUBSTANTIVE_ RESTRICTIONS

Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting the issues that get on the decisionmaking agenda of bodies not explicitly provided for by the regime listed under BODIES_OTHER? For each body, check as many as apply.

0 = Not applicable

1 = No restrictions

2 = Issues are restricted according to explicit criteria

3 = Any member can put item on agenda

4 = There is a voting procedure for adding items to the agenda

5 = There is a decisionmaking procedure for adding items to the agenda (e.g., approval of several other bodies)

6 = The agenda is controlled by another regime body

7 = Don't know

BODIES_OTHER

Other bodies within the regime that play a role in decisionmaking but are not explicitly provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA40

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210J Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting the issues that get on the decisionmaking agenda of external bodies to which the regime formally or informally delegates decisionmaking power?

Provide codes for each element.

SUBSTANTIVE_
RESTRICTIONS

Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting the issues that get on the decisionmaking agenda of bodies not explicitly provided for by the regime listed under EXTERNAL_BODIES? For each body, check as many as apply.

0 = Not applicable

1 = No restrictions

2 = Issues are restricted according to explicit criteria

3 = Any member can put item on agenda

4 = There is a voting procedure for adding items to the agenda

5 = There is a decisionmaking procedure for adding items to the agenda (e.g., approval of several other bodies)

6 = The agenda is controlled by another regime body

7 = Don't know

EXTERNAL_BODIES

External bodies with decisionmaking power for the regime listed above.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA41

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210K In a short paragraph describe the essential features of the regime's decisionmaking bodies as well as their interactions with each other.

Provide information for each element.

NARRATIVE_BODIES

In a short paragraph describe the essential features of the regime's decisionmaking bodies as well as their interactions with each other.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

211 FUNDING MECHANISMS

FORM: RA42

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 211A How are the regime's activities and administrative operations (including the work of the secretariat) funded?

Answer this question only, where applicable. For example, if there is no difference between the funding of activities and administration of the regime as a whole and its different components, provide information only for the regime as a whole (e.g. for the core constitutive agreement).

FUNDING_ACTIVITIES How are the regime's activities and administrative operations (including the work of the secretariat) funded?
Check as many as apply.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Regime does not rely on contributions, assessments, or a distinct source of revenues

2 = Regime has its own distinct source of revenues

3 = Regime relies on assessments on members

4 = Regime relies on voluntary contributions

5 = Regime relies on mixed financing through assessments as well as voluntary contributions

6 = Regime relies on national contributions through use of national facilities

7 = Regime relies on in kind contributions

8 = National activities financed nationally contribute to international activities of the regime

9 = Don't know

FUNDING_NARRATIVE In a short paragraph explain the answer given under FUNDING_ACTIVITIES.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA43

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 211B How are the programmatic activities of the regime funded?

Provide codes for each element.

FUNDING_PROGRAM How are the programmatic activities of the regime listed under **PROGRAM_ACTIVITIES** funded? For each programmatic activity, check as many as apply.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Regime does not rely on contributions, assessments, or distinct source of revenues

2 = Regime has its own distinct source of revenues

3 = Regime relies on assessments on members

4 = Regime relies on voluntary contributions

5 = Regime relies on mixed financing through assessments as well as voluntary contributions

6 = Regime relies on national contributions through use of national facilities

7 = Regime relies on in kind contributions

8 = National activities financed nationally contribute to international activities of the regime

9 = Don't know

PROGRAM_ACTIVITIES Programmatic activities checked or mentioned above.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA44

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 211C What kinds of financial mechanisms have been created under the regime? Does the regime make use of annual or multiyear budgets?

Answer this question only, where applicable. For example, if there is no difference between the funding of activities and administration of the regime as a whole and its different components, provide information only for the regime as a whole (e.g. for the core constitutive agreement). If there is a single budget for the regime as a whole including the regime's components, provide information only for the regime as a whole (e.g. for the core constitutive agreement). However, if there are differences between the components of the regime with regard to annual or multiyear budgets, provide codes for each element.

FINANCIAL_ MECHANISMS

What kinds of financial mechanisms have been created under the regime? Check as many as apply.

0 = Not applicable

1 = There are no formal or informal financial mechanisms

2 = Trust fund or similar mechanism to support the regime's administration

3 = Trust fund or similar mechanism to support the regime's administration and national participation of developing countries

4 = Trust fund or similar financial mechanism to compensate states for certain activities in the international/global interest (e.g., protection of UNESCO World Heritage sites within their territory)

5 = Trust fund or similar financial mechanism to subsidize national compliance (e.g., to finance 'incremental costs' for developing countries to meet their obligations under the Montreal Protocol, the Climate Change Convention and the Biodiversity Convention)

6 = Trust fund or similar mechanism to protect resources that remain under national sovereignty (e.g., Rain Forest Trust Fund for the Amazon)

7 = Don't know

BUDGET_ANNUAL

Does the regime make use of annual or multiyear budgets?

0 = Not applicable (e.g., no budget is necessary for the regime)

1 = Annual budgets

2 = Multiyear budgets

3 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

212 COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

FORM: RA45

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 212A Are there reporting procedures requiring the submission of information by individual members pertaining to regime implementation?

Provide codes for each element.

COMPLIANCE_
REPORTING

Are there reporting procedures requiring the submission of information by individual members pertaining to regime implementation?

0 = Not applicable

1 = No

2 = Yes

3 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA46

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 212B Are there procedures for reviewing implementation formally or not formally established in the regime's constitutive provisions?

Distinguish between formal procedures provided for by the regime and procedures carried out but not formally established in the regime's constitutive provisions. If applicable, mention additional formal procedures for reviewing implementation.

Provide codes for each element.

REVIEWS Are there procedures for reviewing implementation formally or not formally established in the regime's constitutive provisions? Check as many as apply. Identify additional review procedures, if applicable.

0 = Not applicable

1 = There are no explicit review procedures

2 = Information gathering for broad assessment without evaluating performance/compliance of individual parties

3 = Information from third parties on implementation by other parties

4 = Information gathering for assessment of performance and compliance of individual parties

5 = Review and broad assessment of the regime by the supreme decisionmaking body

6 = Review and broad assessment of the regime by bodies delegated by parties to make decisions or recommendations

7 = Review of member performance/compliance by the supreme decisionmaking body

8 = Review of member performance/compliance by bodies delegated by parties to make decisions or recommendations

9 = Recommendation/implementation of responses to inadequate performance by the supreme decisionmaking body

10 = Recommendation/implementation of responses to inadequate performance by bodies delegated by parties

11 = On-site inspections to verify compliance

12 = Identify additional review procedures, if applicable

13 = Don't know

**PROVIDED_
CARRIED_OUT**

For each review procedure listed under REVIEWS, indicate whether the review procedure is carried out as formally provided for by the regime, the review procedure is not carried out although formally provided for by the regime, or the review procedure is carried out although not formally provided for by the regime.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Review procedure is carried out as formally provided for by the regime

2 = Review procedure is not carried out although formally provided for by the regime

3 = Review procedure is carried out although not formally provided for by the regime

4 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA47

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 212C What formal compliance mechanisms are provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions to achieve compliance?

Answer this question only for formal compliance mechanisms provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions.

Provide codes for each element.

COMPLIANCE What formal compliance mechanisms are provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions to achieve compliance? Check as many as apply. Identify additional formal compliance mechanisms, if applicable.

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = No compliance mechanisms
- 2 = Issuance of notices of violations
- 3 = Suspension of membership rights
- 4 = Exclusion from membership
- 5 = Imposition of military punishments
- 6 = Imposition of financial/economic punishments
- 7 = Support for capacity building to enhance compliance
- 8 = Granting of a transition period to achieve compliance
- 9 = Dissolution of linkages
- 10 = Identify additional compliance mechanisms, if applicable
- 11 = Don't know

**PROVIDED_
CARRIED_OUT** For each compliance mechanism listed under **COMPLIANCE**, indicate whether the compliance mechanism is carried out as formally provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions or the compliance mechanism is not carried out although formally provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions.

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = Compliance mechanism is carried out as formally provided for by the regime
- 2 = Compliance mechanism is not carried out although formally provided for by the regime
- 3 = Don't know

**NARRATIVE_
COMPLIANCE** If applicable, elaborate on these compliance mechanisms provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions in a paragraph.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA48

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 212D What compliance mechanisms not provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions are used to achieve compliance?

Answer this question only for compliance mechanisms carried out but not provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions.

Provide codes for each element.

COMPLIANCE_
OTHER_MEANS

What compliance mechanisms not provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions are used to achieve compliance? Check as many as apply. Identify additional compliance mechanisms, if applicable.

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = No compliance mechanisms
- 2 = Threat of issuance of notices of violations
- 3 = Issuance of notices of violations
- 4 = Threat of suspension of membership rights
- 5 = Suspension of membership rights
- 6 = Threat of exclusion from membership
- 7 = Exclusion from membership
- 8 = Threat of military punishments
- 9 = Imposition of military punishments
- 10 = Threat of financial/economic punishments
- 11 = Imposition of financial/economic punishments
- 12 = Support for capacity building to enhance compliance
- 13 = Granting of a transition period to achieve compliance
- 14 = Dissolution of linkages
- 15 = Shaming
- 16 = Identify additional compliance mechanisms, if applicable
- 17 = Don't know

NARRATIVE_
COMPLIANCE_OTHER

If applicable, elaborate on these compliance mechanisms carried out but not provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RA49

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 212E Do these procedures generally reflect an enforcement approach or a management approach to compliance?

An enforcement approach focuses on measures to pressure violators to comply (e.g., punishments, sanctions). A management approach shifts attention to sources of noncompliance that can be managed by routine international political processes. In such cases, the regime's provisions will contain noncompliance procedures to cope with ambiguous behavior and dispute settlement procedures to cope with ambiguous rules. The capacity problem will be managed by offering technical and financial assistance. Parties will make serious efforts to persuade violators to comply, rather than using coercive measures.

Provide codes for each element.

COMPLIANCE_APPROACH Do these procedures generally reflect an enforcement approach or a management approach to compliance?

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = Enforcement approach
- 2 = Management approach
- 3 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

213 REGIME'S INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS

FORM: RA50

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 213A Identify other regimes with which this regime interacts. Indicate whether the interaction is mutually reinforcing or conflicting.

Provide information for each element.

REGIME_INTERACTION Identify other regimes with which this regime interacts.

INTERACTION_TYPE For each regime listed under REGIME_INTERACTION, indicate whether the interaction is mutually reinforcing or conflicting.

1 = Interaction is reinforcing

2 = Interaction is conflicting

3 = Interaction is reinforcing and conflicting

4 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

214 NARRATIVE

FORM: RA51

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 214A Write a short description of the central aspects of the regime's attributes. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include information not coded above. List the most important literature used in coding the regime formation part of the data protocol.

Provide information for each element.

**NARRATIVE_
ATTRIBUTES**

Write a short description of the central aspects of the regime's attributes. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include information not coded above.

**ATTRIBUTES_
LITERATURE**

List the most important literature used for coding the regime attributes part of the data protocol (If possible, indicate author(s), editor(s), book title, article, and year).

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT



PART III

Regime Consequences

PART III - TABLE OF CONTENTS

301 OUTPUTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

301A Are the regime-wide bodies that are called for by the regime's constitutive agreements in operation? If so, do these regime-wide organizational arrangements produce authoritative decisions on a regular or as-needed basis?

301B What kinds of authoritative decisions about principles, norms, rules and programmatic activities are made by the regime?

302 MEMBER-LEVEL OUTPUTS

302A Have the important members taken steps to translate the international commitments of the agreements into domestic obligations?

302B In a paragraph, elaborate on the political dynamics involved in these outputs.

303 ACTOR-LEVEL OUTCOMES

303A Does the behavior of important actors generally conform with the provisions of the regime? Did the regime exert a causal influence on these developments?

303B What types of events and actions were significant elements of the processes through which the regime affected outcomes? Which of these processes played significant roles in the regime's causal impact?

303C Did the regime have behavioral effects that were not explicitly called for in its constitutive provisions? If so, please describe these effects and the mechanisms that caused them.

303D Has the operation of the regime directly or indirectly affected the behavior of various social groups of important actors (e.g., car drivers, power plant operators, builders of pollution abatement facilities, private firms, ethnic groups, arms producers)?

303E Specify the important nations in which the behavior of these groups was especially affected. Indicate the extent to which the behavior of these groups was affected by the operation of the regime.

303F Taken together, did the behavioral changes lead to the fulfillment of the stated and/or unstated goals of the regime? What causal impact did the regime have in producing these changes?

304 IMPACTS OF THE REGIME IN THE TARGETED ISSUE AREA

304A How did the state of the world change during this period with respect to the problems addressed by the regime? Did the regime exert a causal influence on these developments?

304B Did the understanding of the nature of the problem change within important nations? How much of this change is attributable to the operation of the regime?

304C Did the information about the options available for tackling the problem change within important states? How much of this change is attributable to the operation of the regime?

304D Did the operation of the regime lead to increases in the capacities of member states to participate effectively in social practices at the international level? If so, elaborate in a paragraph.

304E How are the benefits arising from the operation of the regime distributed among members? In a paragraph, describe the nature of the distribution and identify a few illustrative states that received different benefits.

304F How are the costs associated with the operation of the regime distributed among members? In a paragraph, describe the nature of the distribution and identify a few illustrative states that incurred different costs.

304G Describe the relationship between the distribution of costs and benefits.

305 BROADER CONSEQUENCES OF THE REGIME

305A Did the regime influence relations between members and non-members? If so, please describe.

305B Did the operation of the regime produce demonstration effects leading to the creation of new international regimes or influencing the evolution of existing international regimes in other issue areas? If so, please describe.

305C Has the regime changed the contents of the international political agenda or the priority of issues included on this agenda?

305D Has the regime affected overall relations among the participating states?

305E Has the regime affected the character of international society?

306 NARRATIVE

306A Write a short description of the central aspects of the regime consequences. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include information not coded above. List the most important literature used in coding the regime consequences part of the data protocol.

Introduction - Part III

This section covers issues often discussed under a number of separate headings, including implementation, compliance, and effectiveness. For ease of exposition, it makes use of the distinction among *outputs*, *outcomes*, *impacts*, and *broader consequences*. As the time frame for considering regime consequences is open-ended, it is expected that answers to many questions in this category will change over time. It is therefore important to focus on questions about change. Two additional features of this section should be kept in mind. First, questions about consequences are not confined to purely descriptive matters. To some extent, we are interested in recording coders' causal judgments. Second, given that regime analysis has only recently moved into the area of regime consequences, the categories used here are still debated and are less clearly defined than those in the formation section. As a result, the questions are more open ended and keywords or proposed answers are less established.

Output: At the international level, the output dimension refers to the activities involved in activating a regime's provisions and decisionmaking procedures (regimes bodies). After the negotiation and the signing of an agreement, states must take steps to put the regime's provisions into practice internationally. At the state level, the output dimension includes the steps required to translate a regime from paper to practice. Such governmental actions involve steps like ratification and implementation measures.

Outcome: The outcome dimension refers to the behavior of actors at both the international and the domestic level. Outcomes at the international level include compliance by important members. At the state level, outcomes cover activities of major agencies and actions of those affected by the regime's rules.

Impact: The impact dimension includes results of the regime's operation within its own issue area. Such results can encompass the regime's contribution to solving the problem(s) that motivated the parties to create it, the regime's contribution to learning about the nature of the problem, or the regime's impacts on the distribution of values.

Broader consequences: These are effects of the regime that go beyond the problem or specific issues it addresses. For example, such consequences encompass demonstration effects leading to the creation of new international regimes in other issue areas or changes in the contents or the priorities of the international political agenda produced by the regime.

301 OUTPUTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

Output: At the international level, the output dimension refers to the activities involved in activating a regime's provisions and decisionmaking procedures (regimes bodies). After the negotiation and the signing of an agreement, states must take steps to put the regime's provisions into practice internationally. At the state level, the output dimension includes the steps required to translate a regime from paper to practice. Such governmental actions involve steps like ratification and implementation measures.

FORM: RC1

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 301A Are the regime-wide bodies that are called for by the regime's constitutive agreements in operation? If so, do these regime-wide organizational arrangements produce authoritative decisions on a regular or as-needed basis?

Authoritative decisions on a regular or as-needed basis are made when participants accept them as legitimate in the sense that they are made in conformance with the rules and procedures of the regime. These decisions may take the form of regulatory rules, programmatic activities, etc. Within CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora), there are biennial decisions about species listed in Appendices I or II that restrict export and import of the respective species. Several bodies and working groups within LRTAP (Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution) are responsible for overseeing the management of collaborative research projects under the convention.

Provide codes for each element.

BODIES_IN_OPERATION For each body listed under PROGRAM_ACTIVITIES, BODIES_PROVIDED, and EXTERNAL_BODIES, indicate whether the regime body is in operation.

0 = Not applicable
1 = No
2 = Yes
3 = Don't know

PRODUCE_DECISIONS For each body listed under PROGRAM_ACTIVITIES, BODIES_PROVIDED, and EXTERNAL_BODIES, indicate whether the regime body produces authoritative decisions on a regular or as-needed basis?

0 = Not applicable (Regime body is not in operation)
1 = No
2 = Yes
3 = Don't know

PROGRAM_ACTIVITIES Programmatic activities checked or mentioned above (see codes above).

BODIES_PROVIDED Decisionmaking bodies provided for in the regime listed above (see codes above).

EXTERNAL_BODIES External bodies with decisionmaking power for the regime listed above (see codes above).

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RC2

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 301B What kinds of authoritative decisions about principles, norms, rules, and programmatic activities are made by the regime?

Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. The International Whaling Commission's new management procedures involve an authoritative decision about principles.

Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations (e.g., noninterference, compliance, financial and technology transfer, assessment/amendment and adjustment of regime provisions, etc.). The relaxation of participation restrictions in Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings is an example of authoritative decisions about norms.

Rules are well-defined guides for action or standards setting forth actions that members are expected to perform (or to refrain from performing) under appropriate circumstances. They include prohibitions, requirements, and permissions. Any given rule includes an indication of the relevant subject group, a behavioral prescription, and a specification of the circumstances under which the rule is operative. Under many treaty regimes regular conferences of the parties make authoritative decisions about rules by a) revising existing rules and developing new rules in the issue area, and b) making decisions about how to apply existing or newly developed rules in the issue area.

Programmatic activities are substantive activities intended to support the regime's operation and to promote the implementation of the regime's provisions (e.g., scientific analysis, compliance monitoring, verification of compliance, financial and technology transfer, etc.). Under many treaty regimes regular conferences of the parties or other regime bodies make authoritative decisions about the content of programs for scientific analysis, and about measures to improve compliance of the parties, and on financial mechanisms or projects to support domestic implementation.

Provide codes for each element.

REGIME_
DECISIONS

What kinds of authoritative decisions are made by the regime? Check as many as apply.

- 0 = Regime makes no authoritative decisions at all
- 1 = Regime makes authoritative decisions about principles/norms
- 2 = Regime makes authoritative decisions about rules
- 3 = Regime makes authoritative decisions about programmatic activities
- 4 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

302 MEMBER-LEVEL OUTPUTS

FORM: RC3

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 302A Have the important members taken steps to translate the international commitments of the agreements into domestic obligations?

This question applies to both legally binding and non-binding agreements. For non-binding agreements, members can demonstrate their commitment to the regime through formal statements indicating acceptance of the terms of the regime. Ratification as a formal requirement in the sense of international law applies only to states. For states, implementing legislation refers to the enactment of statutes. For non-state actors, it refers to actions like corporate plans, directives (e.g., EU directives), or other regulations intended to translate an agreement into a domestic obligation. Some states do not require implementing legislation for a treaty to acquire domestic legal status. It is possible to make an international obligation a domestic obligation through means other than formal implementing legislation (for example, states and non-state actors can translate international obligations through executive orders or voluntary agreements into domestic obligations).

Provide codes for each element.

AGREEMENTS Agreements identified in the precoding agreement that are part of the regime by name.

IMPORTANT_
FORMAL_MEMBERS Important formal members identified above (including states, international governmental and nongovernmental organizations).

TRANSLATION_
STEPS Have the important members listed under **IMPORTANT_ FORMAL_MEMBERS** taken steps to translate the international commitments of the agreements listed under **AGREEMENTS** into domestic obligations? For each important formal member, check as many as apply.

0= Not applicable

1 = Member (only if state) ratified the agreement

2 = Member has taken steps other than ratification to acknowledge an obligation to the regime within its own jurisdiction

3 = Member passed implementing legislation (state passed law, non-state actor passed internally binding regulations)

4 = Member took steps other than implementing legislation to make agreement a domestic obligation

5 = Member designated administrative or non-governmental unit to be responsible for implementing the agreement

6 = Agencies given responsibility in the legislation devised and promulgated more detailed regulations

7 = Responsible agencies of important member initiated programs needed to give effect to the agreement's provisions

8 = Member negotiated agreements with firms or other actors to implement the agreement

9 = Member allocated funds to implement agreement domestically

10 = Member had already passed some or all necessary implementing legislation before agreement was concluded

11 = Member had already designated non-governmental unit before agreement was concluded

12 = Agencies had already devised/promulgated detailed regulations before agreement was concluded

13 = Member had already negotiated agreements with firms or other actors before agreement was concluded

14 = Member had already allocated funds to implementation measures before agreement was concluded

15 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RC4

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 302B In a paragraph, elaborate on the political dynamics involved in these outputs.

Provide information for each element.

PERSPECTIVES_

NARRATIVE

What were the members' perspectives on the implementation process and what were their motivations? Refer to the motivations of the members of the agreements and to the motivations and actions of those domestic actors involved with implementation.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

303 ACTOR-LEVEL OUTCOMES

Outcome: The outcome dimension refers to the behavior of actors at both the international and the domestic level. Outcomes at the international level include compliance by important members. At the state level, outcomes cover activities of major agencies and actions of those affected by the regime's rules.

FORM: RC5

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 303A Does the behavior of important actors generally conform with the provisions of the regime? Did the regime exert a causal influence on these developments?

Provide codes for each element.

Distinguish between regime factors and non-regime factors in assessing the regime's causal influence in this area. Indicate the basis for your judgment (documents, articles or books, interview notes, etc.).

Actor behavior conforms with regime rules when it produces outcomes that fulfill requirements, whether or not it was intentional, whether or not the actor has a legal obligation to do so, and whether or not the regime had a causal impact on the behavior.

If behavior would have been the same without the regime, the regime had no causal impact. If the behavior of actors conformed occasionally or even frequently failed to conform with the regime's rules but conformity with the regime's rules would have been even worse in the absence of the regime, we consider the regime to have had a positive causal influence. If the behavior of actors conformed occasionally or frequently failed to conform with the regime's rules but conformity would have been even better in the absence of the regime, we consider the regime to have had a negative causal influence.

Regime factors are those that stem from the regime's existence. Such factors may include weak or strong rules, mechanisms for technology or financial transfer, etc. that may have positive or negative influences on the achievement of the regime's stated goals. Non-regime factors are those operating outside the regime's environment but not attributable to the regime's existence (e.g., economic recession) that either promote or weaken the achievement of the regime's stated goals.

IMPORTANT_NATION Important nations/states identified in the precoding agreement.

ALL_MEMBERS Provide a general judgement about all members of the regime.

NONSTATE Non-state actors identified in the precoding agreement.

CONFORMITY For each important actor listed under IMPORTANT_NATION, ALL_MEMBERS, or NONSTATE, indicate whether that actor generally conformed with the provisions of the regime rules.

0 = Not applicable (e.g., actor does not need to conform with regime rules)

1 = Behavior exceeds regime requirements: The actor conforms with the regime's rules almost all the time and even exceeds them to a degree that is considered significant or important by regime members (e.g., the behavior of a number of industrialized countries exceeds the rules established under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1987 and its revisions in 1990 and 1992).

2 = Behavior meets regime requirements: The actor conforms with the regime's rules almost all the time but does not significantly exceed the regime requirements (e.g., the U.S. and the former Soviet Union conformed with the provisions of several bilateral agreements to reduce nuclear weapons but did not significantly exceed the regime requirements).

3 = Behavior conforms with some requirements but not all: The actor only conforms with some of the regime rules.

4 = Behavior conforms some (but not all) of the time and/or to some degree but not completely: The actor conforms with the regime's rules most of the time but deviates occasionally in such a way that is considered significant or important by regime members (e.g., North Korea's behavior occasionally deviated from the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty) and/or conforms only to some degree in a way that is considered significant or important by regime members.

5 = Behavior does not conform at all: The actor does not conform with the regime's rules to any significant or important degree.

6 = Don't know

CONFORMITY_CAUSAL For each important actor listed under IMPORTANT_NATION, ALL_MEMBERS, or NONSTATE, indicate whether the regime had a causal influence on the degree of conformance of the actor(s).

0 = Not applicable (e.g., actor does not need to conform with regime rules)

1 = Little or no causal impact: Non-regime factors mainly account for state of the world and regime factors do not play a role.

2 = Modest causal influence: The regime matters with regard to the state of the world but non-regime factors are more important.

3 = Large causal influence: The regime accounts equally with non-regime factors for the state of the world or has proven to be more important with regard to the state of the world than non-regime factors.

4 = Negative causal influence: The regime exerted a negative influence toward conformance with requirements.

5 = Don't know

CONFORMITY_CAUSAL_REFERENCE Indicate the basis for your judgment (documents, articles or books, interview notes, etc.) for each important actor.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RC6

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 303B What types of events and actions were significant elements of the processes through which the regime affected outcomes? Which of these processes played significant roles in the regime's causal impact?

Provide codes for each element.

ACTIONS_OUTCOMES What types of events and actions were significant elements of the processes through which the regime affected outcomes? Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention additional events/actions.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Government policy applying to government action alone

2 = Government policy applying to the population as a whole

3 = Government policy applying to specific industrial/economic sectors

4 = Government subsidies to industry

5 = Government policies aimed at individuals

6 = Change in industrial goals or methods not required by government policy

7 = Campaigns to change consumer behavior

8 = Watchdog groups pushing for regime compliance (e.g., non-state actors like Amnesty International or Greenpeace pushing for compliance with human-rights or environmental regimes)

9 = Don't know

10 = If applicable, mention additional events/actions

ACTIONS_OUTCOMES_CAUSAL Which of these processes played significant roles in the regime's causal impact (see codes above)? Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention additional events/actions.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RC7

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 303C Did the regime have behavioral effects that were not explicitly called for in its constitutive provisions? If so, please describe these effects and the mechanisms that caused them.

Provide information for each element.

NARRATIVE_

BEHAVIORAL_EFFECTS

Did the regime have behavioral effects that were not explicitly called for in its constitutive provisions? If so, please describe these effects and the mechanisms that caused them. For each element, elaborate. Draw on the following items; add additional information, if applicable. 1 = Did domestic political alignments in the nations change and what causal impact did the regime have on this change? 2 = Did the regime strengthen or weaken the position of actors on the international level (e.g., the Antarctic Treaty System had the effect of strengthening the position of the scientific community vis-à-vis other interests within most member states with regard to development of government policies toward Antarctica)? 3 = Did the regime strengthen or weaken the position of other actors (e.g., the GATT strengthened the positions of exporting and consumer interests). 4 = Additional information.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RC8

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 303D Has the operation of the regime directly or indirectly affected the behavior of various social groups of important actors (e.g., car drivers, power plant operators, builders of pollution abatement facilities, private firms, ethnic groups, arms producers)?

Distinguish between groups that are affected negatively or positively by the operation of the regime.

Positive effects can result from economic payoffs (e.g., higher turnover from higher sales of pollution abatement facilities, increased exports as a consequence of lower tariffs), from improvement of the environment (e.g., better air quality in regions with severe air pollution, better water quality in highly polluted rivers), from improvement of the domestic status of a group (e.g., protection of ethnic groups), from newly established processes of decision-making due to moving decisionmaking from the domestic to the international level (domestic groups can gain influence), etc.

Negative effects can result from new economic strains (higher production costs, costs arising from investments in pollution abatement measures, decreased arms exports as a consequence of disarmament), from newly established processes of decisionmaking due to moving decisionmaking from the domestic to the international level (domestic groups can lose influence), etc.

Provide codes for each element.

SOCIAL_

POSITIVELY_AFFECTED Mention those social groups within each of the important nations whose behavior is affected positively by the operation of the regime.

0 = No groups affected (operation of the regime has not positively affected behavior of social groups within important nations - neither directly nor indirectly)

1 = Don't know

2 = If yes, mention those groups affected by the operation of the regime

SOCIAL_

NEGATIVELY_AFFECTED Mention those social groups within each of the important nations whose behavior is affected negatively by the operation of the regime.

0 = No groups affected (operation of the regime has not negatively affected behavior of social groups within important nations - neither directly nor indirectly)

1 = Don't know

2 = If yes, mention those groups affected negatively by the operation of the regime

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RC9

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 303E Specify the important nations in which the behavior of these groups was especially affected. Indicate the extent to which the behavior of these groups was affected by the operation of the regime.

Provide codes for each element.

IMPORTANT_NATION Important nations/states identified in the precoding agreement. Give a judgment for all states in the issue area as well.

SOCIAL_
POSITIVELY_AFFECTED Social groups within important nations whose behavior was positively affected by the operation of the regime. Indicate for each important nation listed under IMPORTANT_NATION, if these groups were positively affected.

SOCIAL_
POSITIVE_DEGREE For each group listed under SOCIAL_POSITIVELY_AFFECTED, indicate the extent to which the behavior of these groups was affected by the operation of the regime. Provide information separately for each important nation listed under IMPORTANT_NATION.

1= Little or no positive effect: The benefits a group receives as a consequence of the regime's operation are only marginal. For example, economic actors experience low or no increase in economic turnover due to investments necessary as a consequence of the regime's operation (e.g., producers of pollution abatement technologies). Such a slight increase in economic turnover does not exceed 5 percent and does not lead to a perceptible increase in employment in a single industrial sector. People affected by a problem experience no or only a little improvement of the situation.

2= Moderate positive effect: Compared to the situation before the regime, the regime's operation positively affects a group's behavior or the group benefits to some extent. For example, economic actors experience an increase in economic turnover due to investments as a consequence of the operation of the regime, and such an increase falls between 5 and 20 percent. Such an increase in economic turnover can lead to a perceptible increase in employment, not exceeding 5 percent for a single affected group. People affected by a problem experience some improvement of the situation, although the main problem still exists.

3= Major positive effect: The positive effects resulting from the operation of the regime are dramatic. Economic actors benefit from a strong increase in economic turnover that exceeds 20 percent. Such an increase in economic turnover can lead to a significant increase in employment, exceeding 5 percent for a single affected group. People affected by a problem experience significant improvement of the situation.

4 = Don't know

SOCIAL_
NEGATIVELY_AFFECTED Social groups within important nations whose behavior was negatively affected by the operation of the regime. Indicate for each important nation listed under IMPORTANT_NATION, if these groups were negatively affected.

GROUPS_
NEGATIVE_DEGREE For each group listed under SOCIAL_NEGATIVELY_AFFECTED, indicate the extent to which the behavior of these groups was affected by the operation of the regime. Provide information separately for each important nation listed under IMPORTANT_NATION.

1= Little or no negative effect: The adjustments to be made by a group as a consequence of the regime's operation are only marginal. For example, compared to its former behavior, the group has to make only minor investments in new technologies or consumer behavior is (nearly) stable. Compared to its former economic turnover in the relevant sector, it experienced only a minor decrease not higher than 5 per cent. For instance, car drivers or other interest groups experience little or no significant increase in prices, not exceeding 5 percent (e.g., gasoline prices, taxes, investments in new technologies, etc.). New investments necessary as a consequence of the regime's operation do not cause additional costs higher than 5 percent considering long-term amortization of these investments. Such additional costs do not lead to a perceptible reduction in employment. People affected by the problem experience little or no worsening of the situation.

2 = Moderate negative effect: Compared to former practices, the regime's operation affects a group's behavior to some extent. For example, investments in new technologies produce additional costs, and costs are higher for such technologies even if long-term amortization is taken into account. However, such short- or long-term costs do not exceed 20 percent compared with pre-regime costs. Compared to the former economic turnover in the relevant sector, it experienced a decrease between 5 and 20 per cent. For instance, car drivers or other interest groups could experience a perceptible, but still moderate, increase in costs of not more than 20 percent or could be required to make perceptible but not drastic behavioral changes (e.g., speed reduction from 130 to 110 km/h). Additional costs could lead to a perceptible reduction in employment, not exceeding 5 percent within a single affected group. People affected by the problem experience some worsening of the situation.

3 = Major negative effect: The increase of costs or other behavioral changes resulting from the operation of the regime are dramatic. For example, investments in new technologies produce significant additional costs that exceed 20 percent including long-term amortization. Compared to former economic turnover in the relevant sector, it experienced a major decrease of more than 20 per cent. Car drivers experience a significant increase in the price of gasoline or significant changes in speed limits. Such an increase in prices exceeds 20 percent. A speed reduction from 130 to 90 km/h represents a significant behavioral change as a direct or indirect consequence of the regime's operation. Additional costs lead to significant reduction in employment, exceeding 5 percent for a single affected group. People affected by the problem experience significant worsening of the problem.

4 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RC10

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 303F Taken together, did the behavioral changes lead to the fulfillment of the stated and/or unstated goals of the regime? What causal impact did the regime have in producing these changes?

Distinguish between regime factors and non-regime factors in assessing the causes of these developments.

If the behavioral changes would have occurred without the regime, the regime had no causal impact. If the regime led to some or significant behavioral changes but behavioral changes would have been less likely or occurred to a more limited extent in the absence of the regime, we consider the regime to have had a positive causal influence. If behavioral changes would have been even more far-reaching in the absence of the regime, we consider the regime to have had a negative causal influence.

Regime factors are factors that stem from the regime's existence. Such factors may include weak or strong rules, mechanisms for technology or financial transfer, etc. that may have positive or negative influences on the achievement of the regime's stated goals. Non-regime factors are those operating outside the regime's environment and may include developments that are not attributable to the regime's existence (e.g., economic recession) and that either promote or weaken the achievement of the regime's stated goals.

Provide codes for each element.

GOALS Stated goals of the regime mentioned above.

GOALS_FULFILL If the regime has stated goals, indicate whether the behavioral changes led to the fulfillment of the stated goals of the regime. Provide codes for each stated goal mentioned under STATED_GOALS.

0 = Not applicable (No goals)
1 = No (Goal not fulfilled)
2 = Yes (Goal fulfilled)
3 = Don't know

GOALS_FULFILL_CAUSAL For each stated goal coded under GOALS_FULFILL, indicate what causal impact the regime had on this development.

0 = Not applicable
1 = Little or no causal impact: Non-regime factors mainly account for all behavioral changes and regime factors do not play a role.
2 = Modest causal influence: The regime matters with regard to behavioral changes but non-regime factors are more important
3 = Large causal influence: The regime accounts equally with non-regime factors for the behavioral changes or has proven to be more important with regard to the behavioral changes than non-regime factors.
4 = Negative causal influence: The regime exerted a negative influence on behavioral changes affecting the fulfillment of the stated and/or unstated goals.
5 = Don't know

UNSTATED_GOALS

Unstated goals of the regime mentioned above.

UNSTATED_
GOALS_FULFILL

If the regime has unstated goals, indicate whether the behavioral changes that occurred led to the fulfillment of the unstated goals of the regime. Provide codes for each unstated goal mentioned under UNSTATED_GOALS.

- 0 = Not applicable (No goals)
- 1 = No (Goal not fulfilled)
- 2 = Yes (Goal fulfilled)
- 3 = Don't know

UNSTATED_GOALS_
FULFILL_CAUSAL

For each unstated goal coded under GOALS_FULFILL, indicate what causal impact the regime had on this development?

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = Little or no causal impact: Non-regime factors mainly account for all behavioral changes and regime factors do not play a role.
- 2 = Modest causal influence: The regime matters with regard to behavioral changes but non-regime factors are more important.
- 3 = Large causal influence: The regime accounts equally with non-regime factors for the behavioral changes or has proven to be more important with regard to the behavioral changes than non-regime factors.
- 4 = Negative causal influence: The regime exerted a negative influence on behavioral changes affecting the fulfillment of the stated and/or unstated goals.
- 5 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

In the first half of the 1990s, peace talks among Israel, the Arab states, and the PLO produced some progress with regard to the relationships among the parties).

5 = The problem improved considerably: During this stage, a considerable change occurred with regard to (further) improvement of the problem (e.g., human rights problems between East and West: As a consequence of the dissolution of the former Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe, basic human rights like freedom of speech or association are no longer conflictual issues between East and West).

6 = Don't know

PROBLEM_

CHANGE_CAUSAL

For each problem coded under PROBLEM_CHANGE, indicate whether the regime exerted a causal influence on the change of the world with regard to the problem.

0 = Not applicable

1 = Little or no causal impact: Non-regime factors mainly account for state of the world and regime factors do not play a role.

2 = Modest causal influence: The regime matters with regard to the state of the world but non-regime factors are more important.

3 = Balanced causal influence: On balance, regime and non-regime factors account equally for the state of the world.

4 = Significant causal influence: The regime has proven to be more important with regard to the state of the world than are non-regime factors.

5 = Very strong causal influence: Regime factors account for virtually all these developments.

6 = Don't know

PROBLEM_

CAUSAL_REFERENCE

For each element, indicate a basis for your judgment (documents, articles or books, interview notes, etc.).

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RC13

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 304C Did the information about the options available for tackling the problem change within important states? How much of this change is attributable to the operation of the regime?

Options for dealing with a problem may focus on measures taken within different sectors that contribute to a solution of the overall problem. Options for tackling an international problem are based on information about the variables most important for solving the problem.

Regime factors are those that stem from the regime's existence. Such factors may include new knowledge gathered through scientific collaboration promoted by the regime (e.g., the creation of ad hoc working groups of experts to develop options for tackling the problem), etc.. Non-regime factors operate outside the regime's environment and are not attributable to the regime's existence (e.g., availability of new technologies developed outside the regime).

Provide codes for each element.

PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement.

IMPORTANT_NATION Important nations/states identified in the precoding agreement. Provide codes for each problem listed under **PROBLEM**. Give a judgment for all states in the issue area as well.

OPTIONS_
PROBLEM_CHANGE Did the information about the options available for tackling the problem change within important states? For each problem, provide codes for each important nation listed under **IMPORTANT_NATION**.

0 = Not applicable
1 = Little or no change
2 = Significant change
3 = Don't know

OPTIONS_PROBLEM_
CHANGE_CAUSAL How much of this change is attributable to the operation of the regime? For each problem, provide codes for each important nation listed under **IMPORTANT_NATION**.

0 = Not applicable (no change).
1 = Little or no causal impact: Non-regime factors account for virtually all changes and regime factors do not play a role.
2 = Modest causal influence: The regime matters with regard to changes in the understanding of the problem and in the understanding of opportunities for problem solving, but non-regime factors are more important.
3 = Significant causal influence: The regime is more important with regard to changes in understanding of the problem and in the understanding of opportunities for problem solving than are non-regime factors.
4 = Don't know

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RC14

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 304D Did the operation of the regime lead to increases in the capacities of member states to participate effectively in social practices at the international level? If so, elaborate in a paragraph.

A regime can increase the capacity of members to participate effectively in social practices by providing an institutional framework of principles, norms, rules, programs and decisionmaking procedures to promote cooperation in a world of anarchic states; by providing incentives for states to participate in international negotiations (e.g., a trust fund for developing countries' participation in the climate negotiations); by providing knowledge, technological assistance, and financial and technological transfers for those countries unable to comply with the regime's rules, etc.

Provide codes for each element.

SOCIAL_PRACTISES Did the regime lead to increases in the capacity of member states to participate effectively in social practices at the international level?

0 = Not applicable

1 = No

2 = Yes

3 = Don't know

SOCIAL_PRACTISES_NARRATIVE If SOCIAL_PRACTISES is coded '2' (=yes), elaborate in a paragraph.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RC15

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 304E How are the benefits arising from the operation of the regime distributed among members? In a paragraph, describe the nature of the distribution and identify a few illustrative states that received different benefits.

This question refers to benefits associated with problem-solving and not to benefits arising from side payments, etc.. For instance, is a decrease in cases of cancer resulting from the operation of the regime evenly or unevenly distributed among members? Do members benefit evenly or unevenly from the improvement of the environment achieved as a consequence of the regime (e.g., thicker ozone layer, cleaner regional seas, etc.)? Do members benefit evenly or unevenly from disarmament? Does liberalization of trade produce the same benefits for all members, or do exporting countries benefit more than others?

Provide codes for each element.

BENEFITS_DISTRIBUTE How are the benefits arising from the operation of the regime distributed among members?

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = More or less evenly distributed
- 2 = Unevenly distributed
- 3 = Don't know

BENEFIT_
DISTRIBUTE_NARRATIVE Describe in a paragraph the nature of the distribution and identify a few illustrative members that received different levels of benefits.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RC16

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 304F How are the costs associated with the operation of the regime distributed among members? In a paragraph, describe the nature of the distribution and identify a few illustrative states that incurred different costs.

Costs can be material or non-material. For example, one cost to countries donating to the Montreal Protocol Interim Fund was the precedent set by the fund for future global environmental agreements. Liberalization of trade can put countries with economic sectors not adapted to global competition at a disadvantage.

Provide codes for each element.

COSTS_DISTRIBUTE How are the costs associated with the operation of the regime distributed among members?

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = More or less evenly distributed
- 2 = Unevenly distributed
- 3 = Don't know

COSTS_DISTRIBUTE_
NARRATIVE Describe in a paragraph the nature of the distribution and identify a few illustrative members that incurred different levels of costs.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RC17

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 304G Describe the relationship between the distribution of costs and benefits.

Provide information for each element.

COST_BENEFIT_
RELATION Describe in a paragraph the relationship between the distribution of costs and benefits. Discuss the relationship between costs and benefits for a few illustrative states. Draw on the following items; add additional information, if applicable. 1 = Did members who paid the highest costs get the most benefit? 2 = Where members paying little costs given an advantage over other members paying higher costs in terms of benefits received from the operation of the regime? 3 = Additional information.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

305 BROADER CONSEQUENCES OF THE REGIME

Broader consequences: These are effects of the regime that go beyond the problem or specific issues it addresses. For example, such consequences encompass demonstration effects leading to the creation of new international regimes in other issue areas, or changes in the contents or the priorities of the international political agenda produced by the regime.

FORM: RC18

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 305A Did the regime influence relations between members and non-members? If so, please describe.

Sometimes regimes alter relations between members and non-members. For example, some fishery agreements help members to restrict non-member access to a resource previously open to access by all. The Barents Sea fishery agreement helped the USSR and Norway to restrict foreign access to parts of the Barents Sea. The GATT deepened the separation between market economies and command economies. The European Common Market/Single European Act led to increased US direct investment in Europe.

Provide codes for each element.

RELATIONS

Did the regime influence relations between members and non-members?

0 = Not applicable

1 = No

2 = Yes

3 = Don't know

RELATIONS_
NARRATIVE

If RELATIONS is coded '2' (=yes), elaborate in a paragraph.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RC19

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 305B Did the operation of the regime produce demonstration effects leading to the creation of new international regimes or influencing the evolution of existing international regimes in other issue areas? If so, please describe.

A typical demonstration effect involves the stimulation of a new regime-building process in another issue area (e.g., the ozone regime stimulating the creation of a climate regime). Individual elements of a regime can stimulate the creation of a regime in another issue area or encourage the use of similar legal formulations or political mechanisms in new regimes (the ozone fund as an example for future funds, the framework convention/protocol approach of LRTAP as an example for other conventions).

Provide codes for each element.

DEMONSTRATION_
EFFECTS

Did the operation of the regime produce demonstration effects leading to the creation of new international regimes in other issue areas?

0 = Not applicable
1 = No
2 = Yes
3 = Don't know

DEMO_EFFECTS_
NARRATIVE

If DEMONSTRATION_EFFECTS is coded '2' (=yes), elaborate in a paragraph.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RC20

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 305C Has the regime changed the contents of the international political agenda or the priority of issues included on this agenda?

Newly established regimes or regime-related developments can cause growing attention to other issues on the international political agenda. The Maastricht Treaty among the EU member states led to a debate about democratic participation of the European Parliament and about the declining influence of subnational governments and authorities. The Framework Convention on Climate Change raised the salience of the North-South international economic order.

Provide codes for each element.

AGENDA_CHANGE Has the regime changed the contents of the international political agenda or the priority of issues included on this agenda?

0 = Not applicable

1 = No

2 = Yes

3 = Don't know

AGENDA_CHANGE_
NARRATIVE

If AGENDA_CHANGE is coded '2' (=yes), elaborate in a paragraph. Discuss the following items. Add additional information, if applicable: 1 = Did the regime lead to inclusion of new issues related to the regime and/or to neighboring issue areas on the international political agenda? 2 = Did the regime lead to increased importance of issues associated with the regime or neighboring issue areas on the international political agenda? 3 = Did the regime lead to the elimination of old issues or to decreased importance of matters related to neighboring issue areas on the international political agenda? 4 = Additional information.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RC21

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 305D Has the regime affected overall relations among the participating states?

Example: The partial test ban treaty was one factor among others that played a role in facilitating East-West détente.

Provide codes for each element.

OVERALL_RELATIONS Has the regime affected overall relations among the participating states?

0 = Not applicable

1 = No

2 = Yes

3 = Don't know

OVERALL_RELATIONS_
NARRATIVE

If OVERALL_RELATIONS is coded '2' (=yes), elaborate in a paragraph. Discuss the following items. Add additional information, if applicable: 1 = Did the regime affect overall power relations? 2 = Did the regime affect the possibility of a security community? 3 = Did the regime affect incentives to cooperate in other issue areas? 4 = Additional information.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RC22

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 305E Has the regime affected the character of international society?

The UN human rights policy and other legal documents adopted after the end of the second world war set global standards for human relations and contributed to the erosion of any strict notions of sovereignty (e.g., 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1987 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment). The creation of GATT had the consequence of generally increasing interdependencies in global society.

Provide information only once for the regime as a whole.

BROADER_EFFECTS Has the regime affected the character of international society?

0 = Not applicable

1 = No

2 = Yes

3 = Don't know

BROADER_EFFECTS_NARRATIVE

If BROADER_EFFECTS is coded '2' (=yes), elaborate in a paragraph. Discuss the following items. Add additional information, if applicable: 1= What was the regime's contribution to the overall growth of international governance systems? 2 = What was the regime's contribution to increased levels of interdependence in international society? 3 = What was the regime's contribution to guidance of cooperative efforts in other issue areas? 4 = Additional information.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

306 NARRATIVE

FORM: RC23

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 306A Write a short description of the central aspects of the regime consequences. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include information not coded above. List the most important literature used in coding the regime consequences part of the data protocol.

Provide information for each element.

CONSEQUENCES_
NARRATIVE

Write a short description of the central aspects of the regime consequences. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include information not coded above.

CONSEQUENCES_
LITERATURE

List the most important literature used in coding the regime consequences part of the data protocol (If possible, indicate author(s), editors(s), book title, article, and year).

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

PART IV

Regime Dynamics

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403 NARRATIVE

403A Write a short description of the central aspects of the regime dynamics. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include information not coded above. List the most important literature used in coding the regime dynamics part of the data protocol.

Introduction - Part IV

This section covers changes associated with watersheds identified in the precoding agreement. A watershed, in contrast to a transition from one regime to another, marks a major change within a regime and divides the regime into distinct time periods. A watershed occurs if there is (i) a temporal discontinuity in the operation of the regime, or (ii) a significant restructuring of principles/key norms (the new principles need not necessarily be at odds with the old ones), or (iii) a significant change in the composition of the group of leading actors, or (iv) a significant expansion in functional scope (e.g. a radical deepening of regulative rules).

401 CHANGES IN CONNECTION WITH WATERSHEDS

FORM: RD1

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 401A If a watershed occurred, what kinds of changes did it involve? Indicate what caused the change to occur.

Provide codes for each watershed identified in the precoding agreement.

WATERSHED Watershed(s) identified in the precoding agreement.

WATERSHED_CHANGE Which of the following institutional or behavioral phenomena changed in connection with a watershed? Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention additional institutional or behavioral phenomena that changed in connection with a watershed. Provide codes for each watershed mentioned under WATERSHED.

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = No change occurred
- 2 = Functional scope of the regime rules
- 3 = Density or specificity of the regime rules
- 4 = Programmatic activities of the regime
- 5 = Compliance mechanisms of the regime
- 6 = Mechanisms for funding the regime's programmatic activities
- 7 = Decision-rules of the regime
- 8 = Decisionmaking bodies of the regime
- 9 = Composition of membership of formal regime members
- 10 = Composition of membership of informal regime members
- 11 = Formal members taking requirements seriously
- 12 = Informal members taking requirements seriously
- 13 = Formal members incorporating regime provisions into standard operating procedures
- 14 = Informal members incorporating regime provisions into standard operating procedures
- 15 = If applicable, mention additional institutional or behavioral phenomena
- 16 = Don't know

CHANGE_INCREASE_DECREASE Indicate for each answer listed under WATERSHED_CHANGE what kind of change occurred within a watershed.

- 1 = There was an increase
- 2 = There was a decrease
- 3 = Don't know

WATERSHED_CHANGE_CAUSAL For each answer provided under WATERSHED_CHANGE, describe what caused the change to occur. Draw on the following items; add additional information, if applicable. 1 = Change in the nature of the problem, 2 = Cognitive change (e.g., change in availability of knowledge about causes and consequences of the problem, change in availability of ideas about managing the problem), 3 = Shifts in interests of leading actors, 4 = Change in distribution of power among

important actors, 5 = Economic change (e.g., economic crisis, improving economic environment, economic growth), 6 = Technological change (e.g., development/availability of new technologies), 7 = Changed incentives arising from success at initial regime operation, 8 = If applicable, mention additional causes.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

402 DYNAMIC PATTERNS AT THE OVERALL LEVEL

FORM: RD2

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 402A Did any challenges to the survival of the regime occur?

This question asks for a judgment about the regime as a whole.

Major challenges to the survival of the regime can arise from developments in the issue area of the regime (e.g., noncompliance of parties, new technologies, redefinition of state interests, new knowledge, military conflict between members of a security regime, etc.) or from developments outside the issue area (e.g., economic recession, military conflict among members of economic, environmental, or human-rights regimes).

THREAT Did any challenges to the survival of the regime occur?
Check as many as apply.

0 = Not applicable

1 = There were no challenges that threatened the regime

2 = There were challenges in the issue area that threatened the regime, which the regime coped with effectively

3 = There were challenges in the issue area that threatened the regime, which the regime was unable to cope with effectively

4 = There were challenges outside the issue area that threatened the regime

5 = Don't know

THREAT_NARRATIVE If THREATS is coded '2' (= There were challenges in the issue area that threatened the regime, which the regime coped with effectively), '3' (= There were challenges in the issue area that threatened the regime, which the regime was unable to cope with effectively), or '4' (= There were challenges outside the issue area that threatened the regime), indicate the nature of the challenges threatening the regime. Elaborate in a paragraph.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RD3

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 402B Describe the dynamic patterns at the overall level of the regime. What causes of these dynamic patterns at the overall level are identifiable?

This question asks for a judgment about the regime as a whole.

OVERALL_CHANGE Which of the following institutional or behavioral phenomena changed at the overall level of the regime? Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention additional institutional or behavioral phenomena that changed at the overall level of the regime.

- 0 = Not applicable
- 1 = No change occurred
- 2 = Functional scope of the regime rules
- 3 = Density or specificity of the regime rules
- 4 = Programmatic activities of the regime
- 5 = Compliance mechanisms of the regime
- 6 = Mechanisms for funding the regime's programmatic activities
- 7 = Decision-rules of the regime
- 8 = Decisionmaking bodies of the regime
- 9 = Composition of membership of formal regime members
- 10 = Composition of membership of informal regime members
- 11 = Formal members taking requirements seriously
- 12 = Informal members taking requirements seriously
- 13 = Formal members incorporating regime provisions into standard operating procedures
- 14 = Informal members incorporating regime provisions into standard operating procedures
- 15 = If applicable, mention additional institutional or behavioral phenomena
- 16 = Don't know

OVERALL_INCREASE_DECREASE Indicate for each answer provided under **OVERALL_CHANGE** what kind of change occurred at the overall level of the regime.

- 1 = There was an increase
- 2 = There was a decrease
- 3 = Don't know

OVERALL_CHANGE_CAUSES For each answer provided under **OVERALL_CHANGE**, describe what caused the change to occur. Draw on the following items; add additional information, if applicable. 1 = Change in the nature of the problem, 2 = Cognitive change (e.g., change in availability of knowledge about causes and consequences of the problem, change in availability of ideas about managing the problem), 3 = Shifts in interests of leading actors, 4 = Change in distribution of power among important actors, 5 = Economic change (e.g., economic crisis, improving economic environment, economic growth), 6 = Technological change (e.g., development/availability of

new technologies), 7 = Changed incentives arising from success at initial regime operation, 8 = If applicable, mention additional causes.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

FORM: RD4

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 402C Did the ability of the regime to cope with the problem(s) it addresses increase or decrease over time?

This question asks for a judgment about the regime as a whole.

OVERALL_

PROBLEM_NARRATIVE

Did the ability of the regime to cope with the problem(s) it addresses increase or decrease over time? Elaborate in a paragraph.

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT

403 NARRATIVE

FORM: RD5

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 403A Write a short description of the central aspects of the regime dynamics. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include information not coded above. List the most important literature used in coding the regime dynamics part of the data protocol.

DYNAMICS_NARRATIVE Write a short description of the central aspects of the regime dynamics. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include information not coded above.

DYNAMICS_LITERATURE List the most important literature used in coding the regime dynamics part of the protocol (If applicable, indicate author(s), editor(s), book title, article, and year).

UNCERTAIN + COMMENT