

Department of Government Working Papers

(Pamphlet)

JA

8

B78

no. 10

No. 10

ABLENESS AND ABILITY: MORRISS ON POWER AND COUNTERACTUALS

KEITH M. DOWDING



Department of Government Working Papers

No. 10

ABLENESS AND ABILITY: MORRISS ON POWER
AND COUNTERACTUALS

Keith M. Dowding

ISBN 1-872166-70-9

£2.00


Available from the Editor, Keith Dowding,
Department of Government, Brunel University,
Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB8 3PH, England.

[1990]

Brunel 
THE UNIVERSITY OF WEST LONDON

WORKING PAPERS

1. Keith M. Dowding *Conceptual Analysis & Essential Contestability*
1-872166-20-2
2. Keith M. Dowding *Wants, Needs and Interests*
1-872166-25-3
3. Martin J. Smith *Post-Industrialism, Thatcherism and Policy Networks*
1-872166-30-10
4. Zheng Chuxuan *Gramsci: A Perspective From China*
1-872166-35-0
5. Anthony Glees *Britain and the European Community in 1990: The Reluctant European*
1-872166-45-8
6. Keith M. Dowding *Coercion and Liberty*
1-872166-50-4
7. Barbara Goodwin *Moral Responsibility in Pluralist Society*
1-872166-55-5
8. Sonia Mazey
& Jeremy Richardson *British Interest Groups and the European Community: Changing Lobbying Styles*
1-872166-60-1
9. Martin J. Smith *From Policy Community to Issue Network: Salmonella in Eggs and the New Politics of Food*
1-872166-65-2
10. Keith M. Dowding *Ableness and Ability: Morriss on Power and Counteractuals*
1-872166-70-9



(Pamphlet)
JA
8
B78
no.10

ISBN: 1-872166-70-9

**ABLENESS AND ABILITY: MORRISS ON POWER
AND COUNTERACTUALS**

ABSTRACT

Peter Morriss's logical ability/ableness distinction breaks down under analysis but a similar normative distinction is important for understanding power and liberty. The breakdown is demonstrated under the test case of the power of a pivotal voter in a committee. Brian Barry argues that a pivotal voter has power as ableness not ability, but the paper demonstrates that a pivotal voter has neither. Under standard measures the 'power' of the pivot is due to the chance ordering of all committee members' preference schedules. Rather than power, each has a resource which, when certain conditions obtain, can be powerfully utilized. The power of the pivot depends upon the realization that those conditions obtain thus the power index literature requires modification.

Peter Morriss has recently made a distinction between 'ability' and 'ableness' which is important for our understanding of power, freedom and related concepts.[2] However, Morriss's distinction only holds if we consider all ability-statements as being reducible to statements referring to the physical properties of individuals. Even then, however, his 'power as ableness' is not correctly described as what individuals are able to do. Indeed it does not square with his view that power is a dispositional concept (brilliantly demonstrated against Dahl, Polsby and others). This failure is instructive, especially so since there is an important distinction between ability and ableness which Morriss misses. The distinction rests upon a subtle difference between the Oxford English Dictionary's definitions of 'ability' and 'able':

'Ability:

2. The quality in an agent which makes an action possible; suitable or sufficient power (generally); faculty, capacity (to do or of doing something).

Able:

4. Having the qualification for, and means of, doing anything; having sufficient power (of whatever kind is needed); in such a position that the thing is possible for one; qualified, competent, capable.'[3]

Abilities are those capacities we have which we may use under particular conditions (power in a generic sense). Ablenesses

are those abilities when those particular conditions obtain (power in a particular sense). However, there are, I think, two senses of ableness which are contained in the quotation from the OED. There is ableness where one is in such a position that a thing is possible for one (what Morriss calls the non-conditional sense); and ableness where one has the qualification for doing something. This latter has a normative sense - being qualified to do something may mean that one can claim a legitimacy for doing it and is the difference between 'can' and 'may' - as my primary school teacher used to say, 'yes, you can go to the toilet, but you may not'. The two senses are closely linked, as shown by considering Morriss's example to bring out the ability/ableness distinction:

'The rich are able to feed off caviar and champagne; the poor have to restrict themselves to beer and pickles, and are unable to eat more expensive food. This is not due to any lack of masticatory ability on their part, but because of the social and economic environment they inhabit. They are unable to eat caviar, whilst having the ability to do so.'[4]

The reference to the social and economic environment the poor inhabit which deprives them of ableness gives the normative rather than the logical sense of ableness. The poor do have the ableness to eat caviar if they break the law - steal caviar or stage a revolution after which it is equally rationed. You may reply that the poor cannot steal caviar for

it is too closely guarded, or that the potential costs of stealing or revolting are greater than the potential benefits of succeeding. Therefore they are not able to eat caviar. But if the caviar is too closely guarded then the poor do not have the ability to eat caviar for they do not have the ability to steal it. Thus their lack of ableness to eat caviar is based upon their abilities, though not their masticatory ones. Morriss wants to discount such subjunctive conditionals on the grounds that ablenesses do not support description or manifestation conditionals. I will examine Morriss's views on counterfactuals below. But the poor's inability to stage a revolution is only discounted on normative grounds not pragmatic ones, for their lack of ableness here is justified by reference to the economic and social environment they inhabit. Thus the poor are not able to eat caviar because they are not able to eat it without breaking the law. At primary school I had the ability to go to the toilet but not the ableness; that this too was in the normative sense is proved by the fact that one day I did leave the classroom to visit the toilet when permission had not been granted. I could go, but I could not go legitimately. Similarly the poor can eat caviar, but they may not eat it legitimately.

Caviar may be so scarce that not all may eat it, legitimately or otherwise. Each person then has the masticatory ability to eat caviar but, necessarily due to its scarcity, not all may eat it. Who then gets to eat it depends

upon the rules of the game. If these rules include man-made laws then those who are not able to eat it may be thus restricted in the normative sense of ableness. If the rules of the game do not include man-made laws - the rules which exist in Hobbes's state of nature - then the strong and/or the lucky will eat it. But then it will be their abilities which count and studying their power will require counterfactual analysis. This may be demonstrated by considering Brian Barry's example of ableness in his excellent review of Morriss.[5] Barry's example of ableness does not contain the normative element and is thus a good test of the possibility of a non-conditional sense of ableness. It does not pass the test. Firstly, Barry points out that power as ableness may wax and wane as others' preferences change. He says:

'Surely, however, the more natural way of describing the phenomenon is to say that my power, while remaining unchanged in amount, was insufficient to produce results initially but later became sufficient as a result of a change in the strength of your resistance'.[6]

But Barry does think that power as ableness is useful in some contexts and suggests that in the American Supreme Court each Justice has equal power as ability, but

'suppose that there are two blocs of four Justices which take opposite sides on every question that

comes before the Court. We shall, I suspect, feel little resistance in saying that the remaining Justice, who sometimes votes with one bloc and sometimes with the other, has more power than his brethren...Clearly, this is power as ableness, since it depends upon the preferences among the Justices.'[7]

This example is different from Morriss's poor/rich caviar case, for there the greater ableness of the rich is due to the distribution of resources (i.e. what makes some rich and some poor); in the Justices example the greater ableness is merely due to the distribution of preferences amongst the judges, for their resources - one vote each - are equal. Can we claim that the distribution of preferences amongst the Justices is a resource? I think not, for then every condition in any state of the world may be claimed as a resource for each of us. The fact that it rains 0.5 cm today is hardly my resource if I need to give my plants 1 cm of water, though it does make it easier for me to water them.

It is not certain that the 'Pivotal Justice' (hereafter PJ) has more power (over the decisions of the Court) than the others in any sense and Barry should not think so, given his previously published views on power.[8] True, as the example is set up, PJ always gets what he wants whereas the others only get what they want, say, 50% of the time. But, as Barry points out in those earlier articles and later in his review, getting

7

what you want all the time is not the same as having power (any more than not having to water my plants at all gives me the power to water them). PJ is just lucky that he is always able to get what he wants. His luck is due to his particular set of preferences and the fact that there are always four other Justices who share his views on each and every issue. He only appears in the example denoted as PJ because the four others who agree with him are not always the same four others. Would we think that he had more power than the others if he always happened to vote with the one bloc? If, that is, his preference structure was the same as four other Justices rather than different from all eight?

His different preference structure does not give him greater power over the results, since the two blocs have their reasons for voting together and he has reasons for voting as he does. The example is only (marginally) persuasive because the preferences of the Justices in the two blocs are taken as given but the preferences of PJ are not. But when PJ is voting with one of the blocs, any of the other four Justices in that bloc has an equal claim to be pivotal. Does this mean that PJ can make a claim to be pivotal 100% of the time but the other eight only 50% of the time? Well, he can, but I still do not see how that is supposed to give him more power than the other Justices, because each time PJ gets his way, one of the other four could scupper his plans. The fact that they never do is just not relevant to whether or not they can do so, and what

they can do is a measure of their power for, as both Barry and Morriss agree, power is a dispositional concept.

The fact that PJ always gets what he wants is not enough to demonstrate that he has power for he does not get whatever he wants, he just gets what he happens to want. PJ does not get whatever he wants because he only has the choice between the two options favoured by the two blocs. Whether he can get what he wants depends upon what happens to be the distribution of preferences amongst the Justices. This is the important, and much misunderstood (and ignored) point about Barry's concept of luck. Barry defines 'luck' as the probability of getting what you want without trying. Now it is true that one may become powerful through luck, but that is not the same as being lucky without power. PJ is not lucky that he is powerful and can thus get what he wants; for his luck over the distribution of preferences does not affect the basis of his power, viz one vote out of nine. Rather he is lucky that he happens to get what he wants despite having no more power than the other Justices, for he, by hypothesis, has no power over the distribution of preferences and if this should happen to change he would no longer get what he wants. PJ may have been lucky to have been made a Justice in the first instance: the basis of his one vote would then be luck, but that is a different matter entirely.

These issues reflect upon what it is to be a pivotal voter and the power that being pivotal brings. Being pivotal,

happening to be pivotal or being lucky that one is pivotal, undoubtedly brings power. But happening to get what one wants and happening to be pivotal is not in itself a form of power; rather it is the realization that one is pivotal which brings power. In other words being pivotal is a resource which may be used by holder to a greater or lesser extent and resources should not be equated with power itself.

When Shapley and Shubik set up their argument they first imagined a voting system where each member votes in temporal turn. Then, admitting that this is an unusual procedure, they defined the pivotal person as the 'last member where support is needed for passage of the bill to be assured'. [9] But a pivot may better be defined as 'the member who makes a minimal [actually minimum KMD] winning coalition in a sequence'. [10] The pivotal member is thus the $[(n + 1)/2]$ th or the $[(n/2) + 1]$ th member. The Shapley-Shubik power index gives the power of the pivot P to any member, i, by:

$$P_i = \text{sequence where } i \text{ pivots} / n!$$

For the 9 justices the P_i of each is $40320/362880$ or $1/9$. But that refers to their ability again, or rather to the formal resources they have to bring to any decision, viz one vote. The Shapley-Shubik index assumes that preferences are randomized, in order to depict power as a pure function of the voting rules. Morriss wants more. He wants to investigate the power of actors 'given the actual (or predicted) voting pattern of all the other voters. The assumption that all

configurations count equally has to be replaced by an assessment of which configurations will occur, and how often'. [11] He thus wants to bring the actual preferences of the voters into the equation somehow. This is a fair enough aim. Careful studies of Supreme Court Justices have shown that they tend to vote on ideological issues as might have been predicted from their previous reputation as liberals or conservatives. [12] Thus the entry of a liberal to a Court dominated by conservatives does not bring that Justice great power. We may all be well aware that her entry will not affect decisions on these ideological issues; the Court will continue on its conservative path. But we must not make the mistake of concluding from this undoubted fact that the other (say 7) conservative Justices each have greater power than the new appointee. The individual power that each has is no more than $1/9$ for each cannot get their way (whatever that is) either, except in so far as they happen to agree. The distribution of preferences is such that each member of the conservative bloc happens to get their way. As a bloc or group they have greater power, however, and if the bloc is formed through deliberate action on the President (which it generally has been), then the power of that bloc is not mere chance. But then we are discovering that the basis of that conservative-bloc power is Presidential.

The basis of group power is not always mere agreement in preference ordering - though the Justices example may seem to

suggest so, which is one reason perhaps why the committee power literature is virtually ignored by community power studies. Rather group power is generated by deliberative action which keeps the group together. Coalition theory, which grew out of the committee power literature, assumes this 'party' discipline by the shared preferences within the different groups and it too needs to take account of deliberative action in order to fully specify situations.

PJ in Barry's example is not a 'pivotal' voter in an interesting sense of the term, interesting, that is, to considerations of power rather than luck. If PJ votes as he does purely on his preferences then he has no greater claim to be pivotal than the others, for he is behaving just as they are and any one of the five winning voters has an equal claim to be pivotal (i.e. none is) for they are indistinguishable except by definition. The greater power of pivotal voters, for example small parties in hung Parliaments, comes about not because they happen to vote one way or another on each issue before them, but because their actions change as a result of their realization that they are pivotal. Pivotal voters behave differently from other voters. They use the fact of their pivotal position in order to achieve a greater number of preferable outcomes than they otherwise could. (Not necessarily a greater number of desired outcomes than non-pivotal voters, note, just more than the pivotal voter could if she were non-pivotal with the same amount of luck.)

This greater power is power to bring about outcomes beyond that of the particular issue under vote. Consider the case where the two blocs of four voters are parties with party discipline and the extra voter is an 'independent'. Here the independent does have power to get some of his desires for he can use his position as an independent to bargain with each of the two blocs. He may vote with one bloc on one issue over which he is indifferent (or leads the blocs to believe he is indifferent) in return for their support on issues where he holds stronger preferences than they. He thus has power to get some of the outcomes he wants by agreeing to vote one way or another. But here we have power as ability - the power to bargain - and not ableness (see below). For the independent voter will only choose to support one bloc or the other on each vote dependent upon (a) his preferences with regard to the issue being voted upon, and (b) whether he can persuade either bloc to agree to vote for some other policy which he wants in return for his support on this issue. The measure of his power is how much he can get of what he wants through his ability to bargain with the two blocs. If he can get everything he wants simply by voting with either of the blocs on each issue, then he is just exceptionally lucky; but his power is to put new issues onto the agenda and to get those policies he supports through. In doing so he may vote with one bloc on issues to which he is indifferent or even opposed, as long as the strength of his dislike of those policies is less than the strength of his desire for the issues he is able to get onto

the agenda. Formal coalition theory may thus give important insights into the behaviour of leading actors and the powers they had.[13]

Being pivotal (or rather the recognition that one is pivotal) entails being able to get other things done. It is a resource which brings power. One may become pivotal because one is the last person to be asked to vote a particular way and realizes how important one's own vote is. In some Indian states villages vie with each other to be last to promise their votes for that way they can gain other (usually monetary) rewards.[14] Bargaining strategies such as pre-commitment or keeping one's true preferences hidden are what gives the 'pivotal' voters power and the game which leads some to be pivotal is what makes them pivotal rather than just the fact of some definition. This problem of the 'pivotality' of voters occurs in all of the power indices because they do not denote the pivotal voter by anything other than definition. The pivotal voter is always the one with the floating preferences, but power is the power to get what you want, not getting what you can in order to prove you are powerful.[15] The problem with power indices is one which haunts much of mathematical economics and political science. How does one denote the actors who are the prime cause of the outcomes under discussion?[16] If one does it by definition, how has one causally explained those outcomes? It is a problem for counterfactual analysis, for the causal actor will be the causal

actor in all possible worlds like the actual one in the relevant respects in which she acts like that. The cause in the actual world will include her reasons for acting as she does in this world which may not be the same reason in all worlds. Thus the definitional denotation is not enough, for mathematics holds in all logically possible worlds.[17]

I believe that power as ableness will always be found to be wanting once the examples of its use are examined carefully. Either it collapses into power as ability or it turns out not to be an example of power at all. Morriss does not agree because of his rejection of possible worlds theory for his version of the suppositionist approach to counterfactual analysis allows him to isolate a belief and imagine its contradiction without worrying about how it affects our other beliefs.[18] I cannot produce a full account of why this is an error here (or perhaps anywhere) but offer in its place the key reason. Morriss's suppositionist approach assumes, in advance, that any chosen belief is privileged in the sense that it cannot be challenged even if it contradicts other beliefs which we hold. It thus assumes that the assumptions of its suppositions make sense. That is, it assumes that there are not good reasons which entail their rejection. For example, it precludes our asking 'why do the Justices vote the way they do?' as a query which may affect our analysis of our concept of power. A possible worlds approach gives us worlds in which we may ask all of the questions we can ask in the real world. In

this case we ask, 'why do the Justices vote the way they do?' If it is due to some sort of party discipline then PJ has power because he is able to exploit the fact that he is (relatively) indifferent to what each bloc cares about and is able to bargain to vote with one bloc or the other if they help to provide him with that to which he is not indifferent. If the blocs are not parties (the Justices example proper), then PJ is not really pivotal, it is just that sometimes he agrees with one group and sometimes with another. He is no more decisive than any of the others he votes with: he is just luckier than they are. Barry defines luck as the probability of getting what you want without trying, yet PJ has to vote to get what he wants. Whilst in a sense, then, he is trying, he does not have to try very hard. On each issue he votes and gets what he wants 100% of the time, due merely to his luck over the nature of the preference schedules of all the Justices. And that is pretty damn lucky.

Playing fast and loose with examples is of course an unhappy habit that possible worlds theorists are just as likely to commit as anyone else, but at least the theory allows us to examine and re-examine counterfactual statements to see which variants are the ones we are interested in (the ones in the nearest possible world to the actual one to use their technical language). The beliefs which may be held to be steadiest are those governing natural laws, but even those beliefs may be

challenged by imagining what evidence would make us re-examine them.

The breakdown of Morriss's distinction between ability and ableness is important, for he holds that power as ableness is power in the important sense. He claims that an 'ability-sentence contains (explicitly or implicitly) counterfactual descriptive and manifestation conditionals' whereas an 'ableness-sentence cannot contain counterfactual descriptive or manifestation conditionals.' [19] The former is descriptive of the conditions under which the conditional holds (for example the conditions under which sugar will dissolve in water) and the latter denotes the conditionals which hold when those conditions obtain (when the water and sugar actually do come together). [20] He goes on)

'For this reason, social and political power is usually a sort of ableness and not an ability, in social philosophy we are not usually interested in what people could do if they had resources that in fact they do not have.' [21]

But it is simply false that ableness-sentences cannot contain counterfactual descriptive or manifestation conditionals and Morriss thinks so because he only considers such sentences with reference to past and future tenses, rather than with other possible worlds. [22] Thus the sentence 'I cannot read it today (my glasses are broken)' implicitly contains the descriptive

conditional 'if my glasses were not broken I could read it today'. The importance of counterfactual conditions is that they specify the resources that I require in order to be able to read. In this sense ableness is what we are interested in, for it is the resources of those who have power to do x that give them that power to do x. Importantly then, we need the counterfactual analysis to understand power in society. In order to map the power structure of a given society we need to map out which naturally possible world it appears in, where the set of naturally possible worlds are those logically possible ones in which the natural laws of the actual world hold. Or as Popper writes:

'A statement may be said to be naturally or physically necessary if, and only if, it is deducible from a statement function which is satisfied in all worlds that differ from our own world, if at all, only with respect to initial conditions.'[23]

When we understand the naturally necessary conditions of power ascription, i.e. the resources needed in the actual world in order to get things done, we can look and see who holds those resources. Morriss believes that ableness-statements do not contain manifestation and descriptive conditionals but merely imply them.[24] They do not contain descriptive conditionals, I think, because we do not need to know all the descriptive conditionals in order to understand the meaning of the statement 'I cannot read it today for my glasses are broken';

but then nor do all the descriptive conditionals need to be known in order to understand ability-statements: for example, 'I can read' implies that 'I can read if I do not have a blinding migraine'. If the latter is not an example of a descriptive conditional of an ability rather than an ableness-statement I have lost the sense of what ability-statements are, unless they are statements about individuals which are reducible to physical features about those individuals and contain no reference to what they may do. This latter view may be the case, for Morriss does not think that we need to study individual resources to understand individual power, because he believes that such analyses commit the 'vehicle fallacy'. The vehicle fallacy is confusing the dispositional property of an object with its vehicle. He quotes Benn, 'the power to extinguish a flame is possessed alike by a bucket of water, a cold wind, or a quantity of pyrene foam, each possessing the same power by quite different properties'. [25] This is quite true, but examining those properties is surely the way in which to understand why each is able to extinguish the flame. Examining the different ways in which groups of people may bring about desired outcomes is surely the way to understand power in society. Morriss misses this point because he denigrates the vehicle of power to 'subvisible structures' when he writes 'It is either false or empty to claim that someone who can speak french has a different subvisible structure from someone who cannot'. [26] But who would claim that the resources which allow someone to influence government are due

to their subvisible structures? It is the equating of individual (genetic) potentialities with 'ability' and resources with 'ableness' that leads Morriss to the latter as the better analysis of power, but surely in doing so is not Morriss committing the vehicle fallacy with regard to abilities rather than power? Is it not simply false or empty to claim that someone who has the ability to speak French has different subvisible structure than someone who cannot?

The logical distinction between the ability and ableness breaks down under closer analysis, which means that we cannot merely dismiss realist accounts of power[27] on the grounds that they attempt to analyse the powers that we see in terms of a causal mechanism that we do not see (though it is true that they will have problems in identifying a mechanism which does this).

The normative distinction noted in the quotes from the OED should not be denigrated, however, particularly when we are considering the question of human liberty rather than human powers. It is sometimes held that individual power is a subset of freedom, for what one is able to do one is free to do, but one is also free to do some things that one, as it happens, does not have the power to do. But this cannot be right, for then the conscientious objector cannot say that he is not free to refuse military service when he is in gaol for so refusing. Here he does have the power to refuse and was prepared to, given the State's incentives against his refusing, but he was

2

not free to do so. He can refuse but he may not and with regard to liberty the normative distinction between ability and ableness is important. What matters for political freedom in society are the state backed incentives for or against action; what matters for power are the resources one has to overcome negative incentives and make use of the positive ones. Much more can be said on this topic but I will leave it aside.

. How are we to go about studying the resources of groups to bring about desired outcomes? Brian Barry writes:

'It would be highly convenient if 'power' could be made to work in the same way as 'income' does in economics, and much analysis has proceeded as if this was feasible...But when we study power we do not have any similar way of rendering commensurable all the outcomes that people could get by overcoming resistance.' [28]

However, the problem is not so much that power is not like income, but rather that the number of goods that people are trying to buy is so much smaller in the political market and the goods they exchange are not numeraire. [29] If we study the resources of everyone and how these resources may be used to get the desired outcomes we have an analogy with the market for goods. The number of goods is more limited in the power case and not only are individuals trying to buy the same goods but they are also trying to persuade the manufacturers to produce

goods of a different nature. In the same way that the rich in money may price the poor out of some goods in the economic marketplace, so those rich in resources may price the poor in resources out of goods in the political marketplace. True, there is no one medium of exchange, but rather several goods to be exchanged in a never-ending barter system. But when studying power in society we should be studying which resources are being bartered for which outcomes. The models of the economic and political marketplaces are not so dissimilar; it is just that, as always, the political scientist has the harder job.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 I would like to thank Brian Barry, Anne Gelling and Peter Morriss for their paper-improving comments. I use the term 'counteractual' rather than the more normal 'counterfactual' as shorthand for subjunctive conditionals on the grounds that it is confusing to call something which is a fact a counterfact. If I kick you hard in the groin it will hurt. And that's a fact.
- 2 Peter Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analysis, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987).
- 3 Cited in Morriss, Power, p. 81, Morriss's emphasis.
- 4 Morris, Power, p. 81.
- 5 Brian Barry, 'Review Article: The Uses of 'Power'', Government and Opposition, 23, (1988), 340-353.
- 6 Barry, 'Review Article: The Uses', p. 344.
- 7 Barry, 'Review Article: The Uses', p. 345.

- 8 Brian Barry, 'Power: An Economic Analysis', in Brian Barry, ed., Power and Political Theory (London: John Wiley); 'Is it Better to be Powerful or Lucky?' Parts 1 and 2, Political Studies, 28, (1980), 183-194 and 338-352.
- 9 L.S. Shapley and M. Shubik, 'A Method for Distributing Power in a Committee System', in R. Bell, D.V. Edwards and R.H. Wagner, eds., Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1969), p. 210.
- 10 W.H. Riker 'A Test of the Adequacy of the Power Index', in Bell et al Political Power, p. 214.
- 11 Morriss, Power, p. 169.
- 12 Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert D. Cover, 'Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices', American Political Science Review, 83, (1989), 557-565.
- 13 See I. McLean, Public Choice: An Introduction, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 107-120 for an example.
- 14 See Robert Wade, Village Politics: The Management of Common Property Resources in South India, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
- 15 Barry, 'Is it Better to be Powerful or Lucky?'.
- 16 See M. Taylor and H. Ward, 'Chickens, Whales and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Collective Goods Provision', Political Studies, 30, (1982) 350-370 for a recognition of this problem.

17 Keith M. Dowding, 'Individualism and Rational Choice',
Paper Presented to the the ECPR Joint Sessions of
Workshops, Amsterdam (1987).

18 This is unfair to Morriss for two reasons (a) he does
give strict rules for using counterfactuals but
essentially I think the problem I am identifying results
from his isolationist approach. (b) The example I am
using to illustrate it is Barry's not Morriss's, so
Morriss might claim he does not, at least, commit this
error.

19 Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analysis, p. 83.

20 I find the latter puzzling as any non-manifestation
conditional is not a conditional at all.

21 Morriss, Power, p. 83.

22 Morriss, Power, pp. 82-83.

23 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, fifth
edition, (London: Hutchinson, 1972) p. 433.

24 In a personal communication to the author.

25 Stanley I. Benn, 'Hobbes on Power', in M. Cranston and
R.S. Peters, eds. Hobbes and Rousseau, (New York:
Anchor, 1972) pp. 191-192.

26 Morriss, Power, p. 18.

27 For example, J.C. Isaac, Power and Marxist Theory: A
Realist View, (New York, Cornell University Press,
1987).

28 Barry, 'Review Article: The Uses', p. 343. The most
famous users of this sort of analogy are C.E.G. Catlin,

The Science and Method of Politics, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927); K.W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, (New York: Free Press, 1963) and The Analysis of International Relations, 3rd edition, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1988); Talcott Parsons, 'On the Concept of Political Power' Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 107 (1963) 232-262.

29 D.A. Baldwin The Paradoxes of Power, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989) chapter 2 contains a good account of some of the limits of this power/money analogy.