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Early Rebellion and Its Links to Later Success and Conquest:

Why was it that some Norman rulers profited from rebellions early in their reigns, whilst others did not?

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Introduction

The subject of this thesis is the Normans. Its objective is to analyse the development of their civilisation, and to give reasons for their numerous accomplishments, both in Northern Europe and in the Mediterranean. Yet, unlike the many scholars who have studied the Normans before, the main focus here will be on rebellion, and in particular those rebellions which followed the succession of each Norman ruler (either a king or a duke/count), as it will be argued that when dealt with correctly these revolts did not hinder, but instead created the seeds of power and progress; since they gave the new ruler an opportunity to establish a lasting precedent *early on*, that insolence to their authority would not be tolerated; which if accomplished, then led to harmony (internal peace), development and conquest for the rest of the ruler's reign. Indeed, to illustrate this premise further it was once written by the twelfth-century chronicler, Orderic Vitalis: that 'if the Normans are disciplined under a just and firm rule they are men of great valour, who press on invincibly to the fore in arduous undertaking... Without such rule they tear each other to pieces and destroy themselves.'¹ Clearly, he is emphasising here the importance of strong leadership (which, as this thesis will argue, can only truly be obtained via the crushing of rebellion) and in turn, the consequences of weakness. This is particularly important, since it will also be argued here that when a ruler fails to crush rebellious elements early, the reign afterwards is generally chaotic, due to the fact that they did not set a lasting precedent of strength.

Furthermore, in addition to this central theme, each chapter will also examine the role that rebellion played in helping to facilitate a number of major historic events; such as the Norman Conquest of England in 1066, Henry I's conquest of Normandy in 1106,

¹ M. Chibnall (trans.), *The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis*, 6 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969 – 80), Vol. IV, pp.82-3

the conquest of Southern Italy by Robert Guiscard and also how it helped to increase the power and prestige of the kingdom of Southern Italy and Sicily.² Yet, before going into more detail – as chapter structure will be discussed later – it is necessary to give a brief history of the Normans in question and to identify some of the reasons which historians have attributed for their many achievements, so as to ascertain how they fit in with the context of this thesis.

First their history: originating from Scandinavia, the first Normans settled in Northern France after the Viking Rollo was ceded territory around the lower Seine (including Rouen) by the Carolingian king, Charles the Simple in 911.³ Extra land was then acquired through both additional grants (in 924 and in 933) and conquest, giving the Normans, by 933, a precarious hold over almost all the territories that made up future Normandy.⁴ Indeed, as Orderic Vitalis later recorded (writing in the 1130s): their ‘bold roughness’ had proved ‘deadly to their softer neighbours’.⁵

Over the next century however, the Normans swiftly began to acquire the civilisation of Franks, adopting mounted warfare, Christianity and the French dialect – the *langue d'oïl*.⁶ In particular, the reign of Richard II (996 –1026) was one of great reform.⁷ For instance in 1001, he tasked Italian abbot, William of Volpiano to expand the Church throughout the duchy and by 1066 the number of monasteries had increased from five at the turn of the millennium to over thirty.⁸ In Addition to this, Normandy also became famous for its Romanesque architecture and its schools; as during the time of Duke William II (1035 – 87) the Abbey of Bec was controlled by two of the greatest intellects of the age, Lanfranc (1044 – 66) and Anselm (1066 – 93).⁹ All this placed the Normans within the front rank of European civilisations by the second half of the

² R. H. C. Davis, *The Normans and their Myth* (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 1976), pp.71-103

³ D. C. Douglas, ‘Rollo of Normandy’, *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 57, No.228 (October, 1942), p.427

⁴ T. Rowley, *The Normans* (London: Tempus, 2004), p.31

⁵ Chibnall, ‘The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis’, Vol. V, pp. 24-7

⁶ M. Chibnall, *The Normans* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp.14-25

⁷ Rowley, ‘The Normans’, p.45

⁸ *Ibid.*, p.46

⁹ Davis, ‘The Normans and their Myth’, p.8

eleventh-century. And yet, in spite of this, in warfare they were still unsurpassed; with their most famous triumph occurring at the Battle of Hastings in 1066. It was a victory suggested R. Allen Brown, owed to ‘superior military techniques’ and to ‘William’s superior generalship’; a superiority which the Bayeux Tapestry pays tribute to.¹⁰

Still, at much the same time, knights from Normandy also began to acquire territory in Southern Italy and Sicily. On the mainland this was first achieved by grants (Aversa in 1030), and later by the conquest of former Byzantine lands – and also the Lombard provinces of Capua, Salerno and Benevento – the majority of which, were seized by the ‘practiced cunning’¹¹ of Robert Guiscard, who in 1059 was invested as Duke of Apulia and Calabria by Pope Nicholas II.¹² Much of the conquest ended with the fall of Salerno, the last Lombard stronghold, in 1076 (also see chapter three for further details).¹³ As for Sicily however, the island’s capture (1061 – 91) was largely completed by Robert’s younger brother Roger; and ultimately it was through him (and Sicily) that the foundations were laid for the future kingdom.¹⁴ For a century after the Normans’ first initial grant, Roger’s son, Roger II (1105 – 54) was crowned ‘King of Sicily’ and ruler over all of Southern Italy, in 1130, by Pope Anacletus II; giving the Normans their second kingdom.¹⁵

In both England and Sicily, Norman rulers gave out conquered territory to their supporters in the form of *fiefs* – that is land held in return for the payment of knight-service – thus creating a centralised feudal system.¹⁶ In addition, the Normans also (in both kingdoms) retained the pre-existing and highly evolved government institutions of finance and administration; whilst naturally making considerable improvements.

¹⁰ R. A. Brown, ‘The Battle of Hastings’, cited in J. Gillingham, ‘William the Bastard at War’, in M. Strickland (eds.), *Anglo-Norman Warfare* (New York: The Boydell Press, 1993), p.143

¹¹ R. A. B. Mynors, R. M. Thomson & M. Winterbottom (trans.), *William of Malmesbury: Gesta Regum Anglorum* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998), p.483

¹² C. Gravett & D. Nicolle, *The Normans: Warrior Knights and their Castles* (Oxford: Osprey Ltd, 2006), p.48

¹³ Davis, ‘The Normans and their Myth’, p.79

¹⁴ B. H. Rosenwein, *A Short History of the Middle Ages* (Plymouth: Broadview Press, 2005), p.220

¹⁵ Chibnall, ‘The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis’, Vol. VI, p.435

¹⁶ C. H. Haskins, ‘England and Sicily in the Twelfth Century’, *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 26, No.103 (July, 1911), p.433

For example in England, King Henry I (1100 – 35) introduced the exchequer, and also strengthened the country's 'legal and fiscal framework';¹⁷ whilst in Sicily, Roger II implemented a new type of coinage, which included the *ducat* in 1140.¹⁸ And yet, in spite of these similarities, the two kingdoms were in fact remarkably different; for unlike in England, the Normans of Italy and Sicily created a civilisation that, with its strange mixture of Latin, Greek and Arabic, produced some of the most unique multi-cultural cities, artwork and architecture in twelfth-century Europe.¹⁹ Indeed, according to Arab Geographer al-Edrisi (1150s), Palermo was 'the greatest and finest metropolis in the world'.²⁰ To sum up: it is clear that the Normans were great statesmen, as well as great conquerors. In fact, they were once described by F. M. Stenton (1943) as 'the masters of their world'.²¹ But why were the Normans so successful?

To the eleventh- and twelfth-century chroniclers the theme of warfare was particularly dominant, with Norman success often attributed to valour, strong leadership and to the discipline of their mounted knights.²² Indeed, the image created by the chroniclers suggested that the Normans had 'unique military skills'; a premise later discredited by R. H. C. Davis, in *The Normans and their Myth* (1976).²³ Yet, as well as admiration for their military prowess, the chroniclers also highlighted the Normans' brutality. For instance, Roger II was deemed particularly ruthless in 1133 when subduing rebellion in Apulia; as Alexander of Telesse wrote (c.1140): 'he promulgated such mighty and thorough justice that continuous peace was soon to endure'.²⁴ In fact, the use of harsh measures, often to enforce the law, was widely acknowledged as valid by the sources; since they recognised the necessity for a prince to display his authority by punishing those who rebelled sternly; a point which will be examined in further detail during the

¹⁷ Rowley, 'The Normans', p.92

¹⁸ D. Matthew, *The Norman Kingdom of Sicily* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.241

¹⁹ R. Stalley, *Early Medieval Architecture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.221

²⁰ Rowley, 'The Normans', p.199

²¹ F. M. Stenton, *Anglo-Norman England* (London: Clarendon Press, 1943), p.678

²² Chibnall, 'The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis', Vol. IV, p.17 – Orderic is not the only chronicler who comments on the Normans' military skill; others, such as, William of Malmesbury, William of Jumièges and William of Poitiers all made a similar observation.

²³ Davis, 'The Normans and their Myth', pp.62-68

²⁴ G. A. Loud (trans.), *Alexander of Telesse: The Deeds Done by King Roger of Sicily* [Online]. Available: http://www.leeds.ac.uk/downloads/20041/school_of_history, p.16

following chapters.²⁵ However, it is worth mentioning, here, that there were limits, since not all acts of punishment were viewed as justified. For example, Orderic Vitalis considered King William's 'harrying of the North' (1069 – 70), as 'barbarous homicide'.²⁶ He stated: 'for this act which condemned the innocent and guilty alike to die by slow starvation I cannot commend him.'²⁷ Although, Orderic still regarded William's kingship as legitimate based on hereditary right, which he claimed through the marriage, in 1002, of Duke Richard II's sister, Emma to King Æthelred II the Unready.²⁸ Legitimacy was viewed by the chroniclers as a crucial factor behind the Normans' success.

In more recent times however, many historians have been inclined to focus on the Norman impact and how they transformed the societies that they conquered. One area in particular concerns the prickly debate over 'the introduction of knight-service'; a system which, as recognised by J. H. Round (1891), owed its origins in England to King William I.²⁹ Round also argued that this system was completely new, since the knights William demanded from each tenant bore no definite relation to the extent or value of their lands; and as such, 'was in no way derived or developed' during the Anglo-Saxon period.³⁰ His conclusion was acquired by working backwards towards Domesday Book from the 1166 Inquest into service quotas recorded in the *Red Book* and *Black Book* of the Exchequer.³¹ A similar method was also used by the American historian C. H. Haskins, who studied the service returns (1172) from the ecclesiastical tenants of King Henry II, to establish that the Normans had been familiar with knight-service from the time of Duke Robert I (1027 – 35).³² However, the idea that English feudalism was derived solely from its Normandy counterpart has been criticised more

²⁵ Mynors *et al*, 'William of Malmesbury', pp.425-41

²⁶ D. C. Douglas, *William the Conqueror: The Norman Impact upon England* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1964), p.221

²⁷ Chibnall, 'The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis', Vol. II, pp.232-33

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, pp.168-69

²⁹ J. H. Round, 'The Introduction of Knight Service into England', *The England Historical Review*, Vol. 6, No. 23 (July, 1891), pp.440-43

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.442

³¹ M. Chibnall, *The Debate on the Norman Conquest* (Manchester: University Press, 1999), p. 62

³² C. H. Haskins, 'Knight-Service in Normandy in the Eleventh Century', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 22, No. 88 (October, 1907), pp.637-40

recently; since it is argued that the Anglo-Saxon payment of ‘five hides for military service’ was used after 1066.³³ Indeed, as D. C. Douglas suggested (1964): though the Normans gave the elements of feudalism to England, it was the Conquest itself which completed the organisation of feudal society on both sides of the Channel.³⁴ Despite disagreements, what is perhaps most significant, with regards to my work, is that there has yet to be a study which links rebellion to the introduction of English feudalism; thus, one of the aims of this thesis is to argue (in chapter two) that its implementation occurred after the suppression of a major revolt – when royal authority was strong. A strong feudal system was also a factor behind the Normans’ success in warfare.

To continue with the subject of feudal order, there has also been much said in relation to its origin. Indeed, as suggested by Georges Duby (1953): its creation occurred in France, at around the year 1000, when as a result of increasing de-centralisation, the institutions of ‘public order’ gave way to a new feudal system, in which aristocratic lords wielded power over smaller territories through the use of strong-arm tactics and threats of violence.³⁵ In addition, this change also led to the rapid multiplication of new lordships, knights and castles; and was thus, a product – as Duby argued – of ‘a social revolution’ that took place in Europe from about 990 to 1060.³⁶ However, the introduction of new lordships did create problems for established rulers – such as the dukes of Normandy – since their power had to be restrained both by force and by acts, such as the Truce of God (proclaimed by the Church to curb unlicensed warfare).³⁷ Of course, with control came powerful alliances, but to permit troublesome vassals to remain unrestrained often proved disastrous. For example, by failing to deal with his rebellious barons – such as the ‘treacherous count, Robert of Bellême’³⁸ – Robert II lost Normandy to his brother Henry, at the Battle of Tinchebrai (1106), as a result of

³³ Chibnall, ‘The Debate on the Norman Conquest’, p.62

³⁴ Douglas, ‘William the Conqueror’, p.146

³⁵ G. Duby, *La société aux XIe et XIIe siècles dans la région mâconnaise* (Paris, 1953), cited in T. N. Bisson, ‘The “Feudal Revolution”’, *Past & Present*, No. 142 (February, 1994), pp.6-9

³⁶ Bisson, ‘The “Feudal Revolution”’, pp.7-8

³⁷ D. Crouch, *The Normans: The History of a Dynasty* (London: Hambledon & London, 2002), p.66

³⁸ D. Greenway (trans.), *Henry, Archdeacon of Huntingdon: Historia Anglorum* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p.451

his weak position (see chapter two).³⁹ The consequences of failing to crush rebellious lords is a further area that this thesis will explore.

And finally, before moving to look at chapter structure, it seems necessary to examine briefly the nature of medieval warfare, as the subject of conflict will feature heavily in the following chapters. As John Gillingham explains: throughout the Middle Ages the most common form of encounter was the siege; indeed battle itself was often avoided due to risk, since its outcome could be decisive both for the loser as well as the victor.⁴⁰ A prime example of this was William's victory over the Norman rebels led by Guy of Burgundy at Val-ès-Dunes (1047); for in a single act he both, crushed a potential claimant to the ducal crown and also re-asserted his authority as duke.⁴¹ However, not all battles proved decisive. In South-Italy for instance, Rainulf, count of Alife defeated Roger II on the field at Scafati, in July 1132, only for the king to return a month later and ravage much of the rebels' lands.⁴² For a medieval prince battle also brought a terrible fear of serious injury, shame, capture or even death; and as such, when attacking most generals preferred to force an enemy's submission by ravaging their lands.⁴³ In fact, it was even written by the tactician Vegetius (author of a late Roman handbook on war, widely used in medieval Europe): that 'the main and principal point in war is to secure plenty of provisions for oneself and to destroy the enemy by famine.'⁴⁴ This method was used by William; with one example being the recovery of Maine (1073); for as stated by the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*: he 'completely devastated the countryside, and brought' the province under his 'subjection'.⁴⁵

In terms of structure, the thesis itself will be separated into three chapters, followed by a conclusion. The first two chapters will concentrate on the Normans in Northern

³⁹ J. A. Green, 'Robert Curthose Reassessed', in C. Harper-Bill (eds.), *Anglo-Norman studies XXII: Proceedings of the Battle Conference 1999* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2000), pp.97-100

⁴⁰ Gillingham, 'William the Bastard at War', in Strickland, 'Anglo-Norman Warfare', p.147

⁴¹ Douglas, 'William the Conqueror', p.49

⁴² Matthew, 'The Norman Kingdom of Sicily', p.43

⁴³ Gillingham, 'William the Bastard at War', in Strickland, 'Anglo-Norman Warfare', p.150

⁴⁴ W. Goffart, 'The Date and Purpose of Vegetius' *De Re Militari*, *Traditio*, Vol. 33 (1977), pp.70-75

⁴⁵ G. N. Garmonsway (trans.), *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1953), p.209

Europe, both before and after 1066; whilst the third chapter will look at the Normans in Southern Italy and Sicily. The first chapter will focus primarily on ducal authority, from the reigns of Duke Richard II to William the Conqueror (although, there will be some references made to earlier tenth-century rulers). This is in order to determine the extent of Richard II's authority, as well as that of his sons; and also to illustrate how internal anarchy within Normandy during the 1030s and 1040s helped to facilitate, both a rise in ducal authority and the conquest of major territory during the 1060s – notably that of Maine and England.⁴⁶

The second chapter will be divided into three sections. The first will focus primarily on how internal chaos – after William's initial conquest of England – helped the Normans to tighten their grip over the English landscape; whilst highlighting also, the domestic status of both England and Normandy prior to the death of King William in September 1087, so as to illustrate the evenness of his power (royal and ducal) in both territories.⁴⁷ The next two sections will investigate: firstly, the rule of Robert Curthose in Normandy, and how his failure to deal with troublesome lords led to a rapid decline in ducal authority. And secondly, his rule will then be compared to the rules of both William Rufus and Henry I in England, in order to illustrate that a major factor behind their success was their ability to deal with troublesome elements *early*. This was also one of the reasons why Robert lost control of Normandy in 1106 to his brother, Henry – as this chapter will show.⁴⁸

And finally, much like the second chapter, the third will also be divided into (two this time) sections. The first will focus on the career of Robert Guiscard. This is in order to show what effects revolts in Apulia had on ducal authority, and how they helped to dictate the flow of conquest (plus the rule of Robert's son will also be analysed). After this, the second section will then examine Norman Sicily, and the rule of Roger II, so as to identify how early revolts against his leadership (in Southern Italy) helped to

⁴⁶ Chibnall, 'The Normans', pp.29-45

⁴⁷ D. Bates, *William the Conqueror* (Stroud: Tempus, 2001), p.204

⁴⁸ Chibnall, 'The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis', Vol. VI, p.285

strengthen the bonds that held the newly formed Norman kingdom together. Also, this chapter will look at the long-term benefits of punishing rebels severely.

Sources

Each chapter will be supported by primary evidence. This will consist of information extracted mainly from chronicles or histories written during the eleventh- and twelfth-century; in some cases written shortly after the events they describe. In addition to this, there will also be further evidence taken, to support the argument of this thesis, from treaties, charters and other contemporary documents; which will be acquired primarily from books, such as, *Recueil des actes des ducs de Normandie de 911 à 1066*, by Marie Fauroux (1961),⁴⁹ and from the *English Historical Documents* series, which was edited by D. C. Douglas.⁵⁰⁵¹

In terms of chronicle sources which will be used in the first chapter, those from the eleventh-century will consist, primarily, of the *Deeds of the Dukes of the Normans* written by the Norman monk, William of Jumièges (the date it was written is between the late 1050s to c.1070); a particularly useful source, since it contains information on every revolt that occurred within the history of early Normandy;⁵² and also *The Five Books of the Histories* written by the Cluniac monk, Ralph Glaber (before 1047); a non-Norman, who – unlike William of Jumièges – acquired much of his information on the Normans from sources close to the Italian reformer, William of Volpiano (who reformed the Norman Church at the request of Richard II: as mentioned before); and was therefore subject to less pro-Norman bias.⁵³ As well as these sources, the first chapter will also feature evidence from histories produced in the twelfth-century, such

⁴⁹ M. Fauroux (eds.), *Recueil des actes des ducs de Normandie de 911 à 1066* (Caen: Caron, 1961)

⁵⁰ D. Whitelock & D. C. Douglas (eds.), *English Historical Documents I: 500-1042* (Eyre Methuen: Oxford University Press, 1979)

⁵¹ D. C. Douglas & G. W. Greenway (eds.), *English Historical Documents II 1042-1189* (Oxford: Eyre Methuen, 1981)

⁵² E. M. C. Van Houts (trans.), *The Gesta Normannorum Ducum of William of Jumièges, Orderic Vitalis, and Robert of Torigni*, 2 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), Vol. I, pp.i-xv

⁵³ J. France (trans.), *Rodulfus Glaber: The Five Books of the Histories* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p.xxi

as, the *Ecclesiastical History* written by the Anglo-Norman monk of Saint-Evroult, Orderic Vitalis (writing between 1110 and c.1142); a man who, despite often praising the Normans for their achievement, did not shy away from highlighting the negatives to their warlike nature;⁵⁴ for indeed, to Orderic, the Normans were a race who seemed to enjoy war a little too much and as such, his text often criticised their use of cruelty when it went too far.⁵⁵ His work is, therefore, considered to be ‘an honest and truthful guide to the history of his times’, by historian C. Warren Hollister.⁵⁶ A further history from the twelfth-century which will also be used is *Deeds of the Kings of the English* by the English scholar William of Malmesbury (completed in 1125);⁵⁷ who, according to Hollister, was ‘well versed in the literature of classical, patristic and early medieval times’.⁵⁸ And indeed, was perhaps ‘the most learned man in twelfth-century Western Europe’.⁵⁹ His text will, therefore, provide useful evidence to support the argument of this thesis. And finally, the last source which will feature, predominantly, in the first chapter is the *Roman de Rou*; a twelfth-century poem which was commissioned by King Henry II (1154 – 89) and written by Wace.⁶⁰ The poem itself documents many of the events (such as revolts) which occurred in early Normandy, especially during the reign of William II; and is therefore a highly useful source.

For the most part, the sources which will be used in the second chapter will be much the same as those used in the first (although both the texts of Ralph Glaber and Wace will not be used). However, in addition to these, there will also be evidence – which will be extracted to support the chapter’s argument – from three further histories. The first is the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* – which is a collection of annals that document the history of the Anglo-Saxon and British peoples from around 60 BC to 1154.⁶¹ The text also gives a much needed English perspective – as most of the sources mentioned

⁵⁴ Chibnall, ‘The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis’, Vol. I, pp.vii-xxv

⁵⁵ E. M. C. Van Houts, *The Normans in Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p.77

⁵⁶ C. W. Hollister, *Henry I* (London: Yale University Press, 2003), p.6

⁵⁷ Mynors *et al*, ‘William of Malmesbury’, pp.v-xxx

⁵⁸ Hollister, ‘Henry I’, p.3

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.3

⁶⁰ G. S. Burgess & E. M. C. Van Houts (trans.), *The History of the Norman People: Wace’s “Roman de Rou”* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2004), p.xi

⁶¹ Van Houts, ‘The Normans in Europe’, pp.134-142

above contain a slight pro-Norman bias – on the Norman activities in England after 1066. Also the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* was utilised as a source by the final two twelfth-century histories which will be used in the second chapter. These are the *History of the English People* by Henry the archdeacon of Huntingdon (completed in 1135),⁶² and the *Chronicle of John of Worcester* written before 1140.⁶³ Naturally, both sources will provide useful information concerning the deeds of King William I, and his sons.

For the third chapter however, the sources will be mostly different. This is due to the fact that the events, which will be analysed, occurred in a different part of Europe – in Southern Italy and Sicily. Similar to the first chapter the sources will be derived both from the eleventh- and twelfth-century. Those from the eleventh will comprise of: *The History of the Normans* written by Amatus of Montecassino (in c.1080),⁶⁴ *Deeds of Robert Guiscard* by William of Apulia (which is a poem written in Latin hexameters, in c.1096 – 99, that was dedicated to Robert’s son, Roger Borsa),⁶⁵ and *The Deeds of Count Roger and his brother Duke Robert* written by the Benedictine monk, Geoffrey Malaterra (in c.1098 – 1101).⁶⁶ Note: that each author is believed to have been of an Italo-Norman origin (and maybe even pure Norman in the case of Geoffrey Malaterra, who frequently refers to ‘our men’ in his text);⁶⁷ and as such, they often portray the Normans in a favourable light – ‘as being just and merciful’, for example.⁶⁸ However, the chroniclers do provide useful information on the career of Robert Guiscard.

In addition to these, there is useful information on Robert contained in the *Alexiad*; a twelfth-century text written by the Byzantine princess, Anna Comnena (somewhere

⁶² Greenway, ‘Henry, Archdeacon of Huntingdon’, p.3

⁶³ P. McGurk (trans.), *The Chronicle of John of Worcester*, 3 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), Vol. III, p.xxxii

⁶⁴ P. N. Dunbar (trans.), *The History of the Normans by Amatus of Montecassino* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2004), p.1

⁶⁵ G. A. Loud (trans.), *William of Apulia: The Deeds of Robert Guiscard* [Online]. Available: http://www.leeds.ac.uk/downloads/20041/school_of_history, book I, pp.1-2

⁶⁶ G. A. Loud (trans.), *Geoffrey Malaterra: The Deeds of Count Roger and his Brother Duke Robert* [Online]. Available: http://www.leeds.ac.uk/downloads/20041/school_of_history

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ Dunbar, ‘The History of the Normans by Amatus of Montecassino’, p.26

between c.1138 and the mid-1150s);⁶⁹ who incidentally was the daughter of Emperor Alexius Comnenus (1081 – 1118), one of Guiscard's enemies.⁷⁰ Although much of the text is biased against the Normans as they attacked the empire, it does provide useful information on their activities in the Balkans, as well as a very detailed portrait of Robert's personal traits.⁷¹ And finally, the last two sources which will be used, predominantly, in this chapter will be *The Deeds Done by King Roger of Sicily* by the abbot of S. Salvatore, Alexander of Telesse (written before 1136)⁷² and *Chronicon* by Falco of Benevento (written after 1154).⁷³ Each text contains information on the reign of Roger II; information which is not biased towards him.⁷⁴ In fact, they even display a tendency to highlight the king's cruelty; especially when it came to how he dealt with lords that questioned his authority (note that other sources will also be used in each chapter, but to a lesser extent).⁷⁵

⁶⁹ E. A. Dawes (trans.), *Anna Comnena: The Alexiad* (London: Routledge, 1928) [Online]. Available: <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/AnnaComnena-Alexiad01.html>

⁷⁰ Van Houts, 'The Normans in Europe', p.250

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.250

⁷² G. A. Loud (trans.), *Alexander of Telesse: The Deeds Done by King Roger of Sicily* [Online]. Available: http://www.leeds.ac.uk/downloads/20041/school_of_history, pp.1-3

⁷³ Davis, 'The Normans and their Myth', p.88

⁷⁴ J. J. Norwich, *The Normans in the South: 1016 – 1130* (London: Longmans, 1968), pp.340-41

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.340-41

Chapter One

Ducal Authority in Eleventh Century Normandy – Before 1066

In 996 Richard I was succeeded as the ruler of Normandy by his son, Richard II (996 – 1026).¹ Like his father, the younger Richard was considered by many eleventh- and twelfth-century chroniclers to be an ‘extremely powerful’ duke; both admired for his military skill and for his ability to maintain internal order during a period dominated by much instability (within France).² Indeed, it was written by Cluniac monk, Ralph Glaber (writing in Burgundy before 1047) that ‘the duke surpassed all men in military might, in his desire for a general peace, and in his liberality.’³ However, despite these claims, unlike his contemporaries – such as, the buccaneering counts of Anjou and of Blois-Chartres – Richard II made little, if any, territorial gains; and as such, perhaps he was not as powerful as the chroniclers imply.⁴ Of course, conquest did occur much later, but this was during the reign of Duke William II (1035 – 87). The following paragraphs will therefore examine the true extent of eleventh-century ducal authority, firstly prior to the reign of William. This will be followed by an examination into the anarchy that occurred at the beginning of William’s reign, in order to illustrate how this helped to strengthen ducal authority and helped to facilitate conquest.

In the history of Normandy prior to 1066, it has been argued by John Le Patourel that there were two distinct phases in the evolution of the region.⁵ The first is known as the ‘Viking phase’.⁶ This was where Rollo, and his direct successors, firstly formed a robber state and lived largely off plunder. The second or ‘feudal phase’ on the other

¹ T. Rowley, *The Normans* (London: Tempus, 2004), p.32

² D. Greenway (trans.), *Henry, Archdeacon of Huntingdon: Historia Anglorum* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p.339

³ J. France (trans.), *Rodulfus Glaber: The Five Books of the Histories* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p.37

⁴ D. Bates, *Normandy Before 1066* (London: Longman, 1982), p.67

⁵ J. Le Patourel, *The Norman Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p.14

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.14

hand began towards the end of the tenth-century, and it was here, where the Normans transformed Normandy into a contemporary Frankish-principality.⁷ This was achieved by adopting the French language, Christianity and by developing a feudal order; one where the close relatives of the duke were granted the title of count; initially by Richard II after 1010.⁸ Furthermore, each count was given possession of a castle and was also responsible for the defence of a sensitive border region (also see appendix one).⁹ By empowering his relatives Richard II was able to extend his authority beyond the reaches of Rouen, thereby obtaining a far greater control over the landscape than previously achieved during the ‘Viking phase’. Additionally, the counts also formed a military-élite, which assisted the duke by helping him to maintain both internal and external peace. For example, it was Richard’s uncle Rodulf (later count of Ivry) who crushed the peasants’ revolt in 996.¹⁰ As Wace noted, he captured the leaders and ‘had their feet... and hands cut off’.¹¹ And similarly, after a dispute between Robert I and Alan III, count of Brittany, in 1033, it was Archbishop Robert of Rouen (also count of Évreux) who ‘reconciled his two nephews making them both promise peace’.¹²

Nevertheless once established, these new lords soon became dissatisfied with the land they had been granted, and as a result, they began to acquire more by conducting in private warfare. For instance, as indicated by Orderic Vitalis: during the time of Duke Robert I (1027 –35), Count Gilbert of Brionne – ‘chafing to enlarge his estates’ – tried to seize the ‘canton of Le Vimeu’ but was beaten back ‘in a pitched battle’ by Count Enguerrand of Ponthieu; whilst more successfully, Humphrey, lord of Pont-Audemer, extended his lands by seizing the estates of Beaumont, Beaumontel and Vieilles from the Abbey of Bernay.¹³ For the majority of his reign, Robert’s rule suffered as a

⁷ Le Patourel, ‘The Norman Empire’, p.14

⁸ R. A. Brown, *The Normans* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1984), p.24

⁹ D. C. Douglas, ‘The Earliest Norman Counts’, *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 61, No.240 (May, 1946), pp.129-130

¹⁰ R. H. C. Davis, *The Normans and their Myth* (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 1976), p.23

¹¹ G. S. Burgess & E. M. C. Van Houts (trans.), *The History of the Norman People: Wace’s “Roman de Rou”* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2004), p.102

¹² *Ibid.*, p.122

¹³ M. Chibnall (trans.), *The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis*, 6 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969 – 80), Vol. II, p.13

consequence of internal disorder; although as sources from the abbeys of Jumièges and St-Wandrille suggest: it was the duke's own reluctance to restrain his 'perverse' aristocracy, which led to a decline in ducal authority;¹⁴ a decline that continued after his death in July 1035 (to be discussed in more detail later).¹⁵ However, Robert I was not the only duke prior to William II whose authority was weakened by troublesome lords; for – as argued by David Bates – even though William I of Bellême rebelled against Robert in 1028, in order 'to cast off the yoke of service'¹⁶, the earliness and ferocity of the revolt suggests that William was perhaps causing problems during the final years of Richard II.¹⁷

The problem (for Richard), here, as noted by Orderic Vitalis, was that unlike other Norman lords, the family of Bellême held most of their land outside of Normandy as much of their estates resided within the counties of Perche and Maine.¹⁸ Avesgaud of Bellême for example, held the bishopric of Le Mans 'until his death' in c.1035.¹⁹ By owning estates within multiple regions, the Bellêmes' were, thus, able to establish (in the eleventh-century) a quasi-independent territory that was located partly within the south-western perimeter of Normandy in an area where William I of Bellême 'held Alençon as a *fief*' of Richard II from 1025 (William's son Ivo, also 'became bishop of Séez in 1035').²⁰ In addition, this rise in power was also accomplished by taking advantage of a lack of ducal authority in Lower (south-west) Normandy; for although Richard II had extended his influence by empowering his relatives, the bulk of ducal power still remained, at this point, in Upper (north-east) Normandy (a point illustrated by the distribution of Richard's vassals).²¹ In fact, it was only after William II crushed the western rebels in 1047 – led by the traitors Guy of Burgundy, Nigel, *vicomte* of

¹⁴ M. Fauroux (eds.), *Recueil des actes des ducs de Normandie de 911 à 1066* (Caen: Caron, 1961), pp.219-20

¹⁵ E. A. Freeman, *The History of the Norman Conquest of England: Its Causes and its Results*, 6 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1870), Vol. II, p.187

¹⁶ E. M. C. Van Houts (trans.), *The Gesta Normannorum Ducum of William of Jumièges, Orderic Vitalis, and Robert of Torigni*, 2 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), Vol. II, p.51

¹⁷ Bates, 'Normandy Before 1066', pp.69-70

¹⁸ Chibnall, 'The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis', Vol. II, p.363

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p.363

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p.363

²¹ Bates, 'Normandy Before 1066', p.69

the Cotentin, and Rannulf, *vicomte* of the Bessin – that ducal power became firmly established within the lower region; since William himself deliberately fostered the expansion of Caen in order to provide a power-base for ducal authority, so as to prevent further rebellion.²² This development, along with the construction of two new abbeys (Sainte-Trinité erected in c.1059 and Saint-Étienne in c.1063)²³ and a stone castle (in 1060) at Caen, also helped to integrate upper and lower Normandy into a single political unit; something which William's predecessors had failed to achieve.²⁴ Although in Richard's case, this was probably due to a lack of necessity, since unlike William, he did not have to deal with constant challenges to his authority; hence the requirement to tighten ducal control within certain areas was non-existent.

In fact, the only major domestic dispute that Richard suffered was the peasants' revolt at the beginning of his reign (996).²⁵ After this, his rule was remarkably peaceful; so much so that in May 1023 he declined to introduce the Peace of God (a Church policy to limit private warfare) within Normandy due to a lack of necessity.²⁶ However, as a medieval prince, Richard was involved in a number of military campaigns. These included, according to William of Jumièges: two in support of his ally, King Robert II the Pious (996 – 1031); the first of which was in Burgundy (1003 – 05) following 'a rebellion' to royal authority 'in the city of Auxerre'; whilst the second was in Flanders against Count Baldwin IV.²⁷ In addition to this, the duke also engaged in a border-war against Odo II, count of Blois-Chartres in 1013 – 14, after a dispute concerning 'the guardianship of the castle of Dreux'.²⁸ In the first of these campaigns however, the true extent of Richard's involvement is rather questionable; for whereas Norman sources – such as William of Jumièges – suggest that he sent 'a large army'²⁹, certain French sources – like Ralph Glaber – on the other hand, tend to imply that his troops

²² R. A. B. Mynors, R. M. Thomson & M. Winterbottom (trans.), *William of Malmesbury: Gesta Regum Anglorum* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998), p.429

²³ Van Houts, 'The Gesta Normannorum Ducum', Vol. II, pp.148-149

²⁴ Rowley, 'The Normans', pp.50-52

²⁵ Burgess & Van Houts, 'Wace's "Roman de Rou"', p.102

²⁶ Bates, 'Normandy Before 1066', p.66

²⁷ Van Houts, 'The Gesta Normannorum Ducum', Vol. II, p.35

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p.23

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p.35 – In reference to Richard's campaign with Robert II in Burgundy.

behaved more like mercenaries under the command of the French king, and as such they were fewer in number.³⁰ Indeed, in military terms, it is even doubtful whether Richard actually possessed the resources necessary to deploy a large army; as when engaged against the powerful Count Odo (his only major war), he decided ‘to ask for help from... overseas’³¹ by hiring a huge number of Viking mercenaries; an indication perhaps, of Norman military weakness during this period.³²

Indeed, the limits of Richard’s military capabilities become clearer when compared to the achievements of other territorial princes. For instance during this period, Fulk III Nerra, count of Anjou (987 – 1040) was able – unlike Richard – to expand his domain by acquiring authority over the counties of Maine and Touraine; which was achieved via a combination of military skill and steady consolidation (also similar to Fulk, in 1019, Odo II expanded his lands by annexing the county of Champagne).³³ In addition to this, Fulk was also engaged – again unlike Richard – in a number of large pitched-battles; the most significant of which was against his main rival Count Odo II in July 1016; where according to one Angevin monk (in c.1100): ‘Odo’s knights could not withstand the ferocious blows of the men of... Anjou, and were put to flight... and slaughtered’.³⁴ The victory was a clear display of his military strength. As suggested Richard’s lack of involvement in major military activities during this period is somewhat peculiar; and indeed, when compared to the actions of his predecessors – William Longsword’s (928 – 42) ‘unremitting’ expansion ‘of the duchy on all sides’, for example³⁵ – it would appear that the Normans had lost the very ruthlessness and fighting strength on which the duchy had been founded; possibly as a consequence of the almost continuous peace which existed within Normandy from the second half of Richard I’s reign to until Richard II’s death in August 1026.³⁶ And finally, this point

³⁰ France, ‘Rodulfus Glaber’, pp.79-81

³¹ R. Onslow, *The Dukes of Normandy and Their Origin* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1945), p.106

³² Van Houts, ‘The Gesta Normannorum Ducum’, Vol. II, p.25

³³ Bates, ‘Normandy Before 1066’, p.47

³⁴ L. Halphen and R. Poupardin (trans.), *Chroniques des Comtes d'Anjou et des Seigneurs d'Amboise* (Paris: Picard, 1913) [Online]. Available: <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/anjou.html>

³⁵ Van Houts, ‘The Gesta Normannorum Ducum’, Vol. I, p.77

³⁶ D. Crouch, *The Normans: The History of a Dynasty* (London: Hambledon & London, 2002), p.32

is also further supported by Ralph Glaber, who suggests that Richard's troops whilst in Flanders (as mentioned above) were notably 'undisciplined'; thus indicating that they lacked regular practice in the martial arts.³⁷

However, this is not to say that Richard II was a particularly weak ruler; since what he lacked in military strength, he more than made up for with political skill – as in order to defend his borders, the duke decided to ally himself to a number of powerful rulers; namely, King Robert II (which continued his father's alliance) and Geoffrey, count of Brittany.³⁸ Incidentally the latter was formed, as William of Jumièges explains, by the marriage of Richard's sister, Havise to Geoffrey in c.997.³⁹ After this, Richard then married Geoffrey's sister, Judith in c.1003, so as to create a strong bond of 'friendship and assistance'; thereby securing Normandy's western border.⁴⁰ This relationship also allowed Richard to obtain Breton auxiliaries, which he used in his war against Odo II in 1013 – 14 (prior to this conflict Odo had been allied to the duke, via his marriage to Matilda, Richard's sister – she died before the war).⁴¹ Yet these alliances were not the only source of Richard's power; as significantly, it was his ability to summon military aid from Scandinavia, which prevented other rulers from attacking him; for as Ralph Glaber wrote: 'far from the other nations terrorising them, the fear they inspired (the Normans and their Viking allies) terrified foreign peoples'.⁴² Thus to sum up: it was *clearly* not Richard's own military strength which made him powerful. Instead, it was his ability to call upon support from a number of allies.

By maintaining links with Scandinavia, Normandy's wealth increased during the late tenth- and early eleventh-century, as a result of Viking plunder being sold at Norman ports, such as Rouen. In fact, it was even recorded in 1003 that Richard II signed a treaty with the Danish king, Sven Forkbeard, which allowed the Danes to use Norman

³⁷ France, 'Rodulfus Glaber', pp.96-99

³⁸ D. C. Douglas, *William the Conqueror: The Norman Impact upon England* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1964), pp.28-29 – Richard I was allied to Hugh Capet, king of France.

³⁹ Van Houts, 'The Gesta Normannorum Ducum', Vol. II, p.15

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p.15

⁴¹ Le Patourel, 'The Norman Empire', p.15

⁴² France, 'Rodulfus Glaber', p.57

ports – when attacking the English shoreline – in return for a share of the loot.⁴³ This act did however, violate a previous treaty of non-alignment (sponsored by Pope John XV) signed between Richard I and King Æthelred the Unready (978 – 1016), whereby both rulers agreed, in March 991, not to aid their respective ‘enemies’.⁴⁴ In short, this continued connection with Scandinavia made Richard II a tremendously wealthy ruler; a wealth which was used, by the duke, to construct a large number of churches, monasteries and castles (as mentioned in the introduction).⁴⁵ However, not all of this ‘legendary wealth’ was generated by external means, since a significant part of it came from a particularly sophisticated system of internal taxation; a system which, according to the American historian C. H. Haskins (1909), ‘was in advance of neighbouring lands such as the county of Anjou or the royal domain’.⁴⁶ This financial prosperity was further helped by Richard’s maintenance of internal peace.

After the death of Richard II in August 1026, the control of Normandy passed briefly into the hands of the duke’s eldest son, Richard III (1026 – 27).⁴⁷ Like his father, the younger Richard continued to protect Normandy’s borders by maintaining links with a number of powerful allies, one of whom was the French monarch Robert II, whose daughter Adela was betrothed to the young duke (although by this point Norman ties with Scandinavia had been broken).⁴⁸ Furthermore, Richard III was also considered to be a relatively skilled general, as he was involved in a number of successful military campaigns. These included, according to William of Jumièges: one in Burgundy, in 1020, against Hugh, count of Chalon; where Richard laid ‘waste the countryside’ after Hugh ‘had refused to hand over’ his brother-in-law, Reginald.⁴⁹ And another against his brother, Robert (1026); who – dissatisfied with his inheritance (he was made count

⁴³ Fauroux, ‘Recueil des actes des ducs de Normandie’, p.23

⁴⁴ ‘A letter from Pope John XV to all the faithful, concerning the reconciliation of Æthelred, king of England, and Richard, Count of Normandy (991)’, in D. Whitelock & D. C. Douglas (eds.), *English Historical Documents I: 500-1042* (Eyre Methuen: Oxford University Press, 1979) pp.894-95

⁴⁵ Davis, ‘The Normans and their Myth’, pp.42-3

⁴⁶ C. H. Haskins, ‘Normandy under William the Conqueror’, *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (April, 1909), pp.467-68

⁴⁷ D. C. Douglas, ‘Some Problems of Early Norman Chronology’, *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 65, No. 256 (July, 1950), pp.294-96

⁴⁸ Douglas, ‘William the Conqueror’, p.27

⁴⁹ Van Houts, ‘The Gesta Normannorum Ducum’, Vol. II, pp.37-9 – Reginald I later ruled Burgundy.

of Hièmois)⁵⁰ – chose to rebel against the duke by seizing control of ‘the stronghold of Falaise’; only for Richard to then lay ‘siege to him’, and reduce the fortress ‘using battering-rams and siege-engines’.⁵¹ Even though brief, the rule of Richard III was similar in many ways to Richard II’s, since it was a rule of internal peace (Robert’s revolt was the only major domestic dispute), economic prosperity and still limited military power. However, Richard III died less than a year into his reign, possibly from ‘poison’ or possibly, as several sources suggest, at the hands of Robert, his brother and successor.⁵² For instance, William of Malmesbury names ‘Ralph Mowin’ as Robert’s agent in his brother’s murder.⁵³

The rule of the next duke, Robert I – as previously mentioned – suffered due to his inability to restrain the ‘debauched’ actions of many troublesome barons.⁵⁴ Instead, Robert seemed to be more anxious to focus his efforts on revenge since he decided, in 1028, to attack his distinguished uncle, Archbishop Robert of Rouen and his cousin, Hugh, bishop of Bayeux; both of whom had supported Richard III during the siege of Falaise in 1026 (as noted above).⁵⁵ Thus, as a result of such actions and in-actions (his unwillingness to control private warfare), Robert I is generally considered to be a much weaker ruler than both his father and brother. However, this is not to say that everything about his rule was disastrous – as by crushing two revolts in particular, he did successfully increase ducal authority in two areas of Lower Normandy where it had previously been weak. The first was along the Norman-Breton border, where to tighten his grip over the landscape, he built a castle at Cherruix (1033), after Count Alan III tried to break his oath of fealty by raiding Avranchin (the Normans were the dominant party in the Norman-Breton alliance).⁵⁶ Wace also noted that Robert ‘lay

⁵⁰ J. Le Patourel, ‘The Norman Succession 996 – 1135’, *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 86, No. 339 (April, 1971), p.238

⁵¹ Van Houts, ‘The Gesta Normannorum Ducum’, Vol. II, p.45

⁵² *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p.47

⁵³ Mynors *et al.*, ‘William of Malmesbury’, p.309

⁵⁴ Hugh of Flavigny, *Chronicon Viridunense seu Flaviniacense*, cited in Bates, ‘Normandy Before 1066’, p.100

⁵⁵ Crouch, ‘The Normans’, pp.48-9 – After being attacked by Duke Robert, both Robert and Hugh were expelled from Normandy, and did not return from exile until 1033 and 1032 respectively.

⁵⁶ Bates, ‘Normandy Before 1066’, p.71

waste' to Dol in retaliation.⁵⁷ As for the second, this was on the south-western border of Normandy, where treacherously – as noted before – William I of Bellême chose to rebel against the duke in 1028 by fortifying himself in 'the fortress of Alençon'.⁵⁸ His eventual surrender, thus, helped to strengthen ducal authority within the region.

Furthermore, this increase in military activity also seems to have had a positive effect on the Normans' martial strength. Indeed, as argued by David Crouch: in terms of 'foreign adventures' the campaigns of Robert I 'were far more aggressive' than 'his father's'.⁵⁹ This point is best illustrated by Robert's actions in Flanders – in aid of Count Baldwin IV against his son, Baldwin V – since here, the Norman forces are described by William of Jumièges as being 'like a fearsome whirlwind', which 'upon arrival at the stronghold of Choques... seized it and burnt it'.⁶⁰ The act was sufficient to shock Baldwin V into making peace with his father at Oudenarde in 1030.⁶¹ Also in addition to this, Robert was able to gain control (in part) over the French Vexin⁶² (the first territorial gain of the eleventh-century); a reward for helping King Henry I (1031 – 60) to recover his crown after he was ousted by his stepmother Queen Constance in 1033.⁶³ His exile incidentally is recorded at the Abbey of St-Wandrille, since a charter noted: 'at this time' (1033) the king 'was a fugitive maintained in this land'.⁶⁴ In military terms, therefore, the rule of Robert I was partly prosperous; with his troops seemingly far stronger than the 'undisciplined' ones (as noted before) that were deployed previously by his father Richard II; an improvement which must have developed from the dramatic increase in internal warfare during this period; and indeed, it may even be fair to say, that had Robert been able to control his aristocracy, by re-asserting his

⁵⁷ Burgess & Van Houts, 'Wace's "Roman de Rou"', p.122

⁵⁸ Van Houts, 'The Gesta Normannorum Ducum', Vol. II, p.45

⁵⁹ Crouch, 'The Normans', p.48

⁶⁰ Van Houts, 'The Gesta Normannorum Ducum', Vol. II, p.53

⁶¹ Crouch, 'The Normans', p.50

⁶² Chibnall, 'The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis', Vol. IV, p.76 – According to Orderic, Robert was granted control over the whole of the French Vexin by Henry; an act which later created a fertile source for dispute between the Normans and Capetians. However, as David Bates argues: the inclusion of this grant, by Orderic, was simply to justify William's invasion of the Vexin in 1087, and as such, perhaps, only a partial grant, if any, was given. Yet, in spite of this, Robert's forces were still invaluable in re-establishing Henry I as king.

⁶³ Crouch, 'The Normans', p.50

⁶⁴ Fauroux, 'Recueil des actes des ducs de Normandie', pp.205-6

authority, then potentially, he could have been a much stronger duke overall than both his father and brother.

However, by failing to resolve this issue, the problem of internal disorder passed into the reign of William II and thrive throughout the 1040s; This accumulated in a major revolt to the duke's authority in 1047; a revolt which – as noted before – was quelled in a pitched-battle at Val-ès-Dunes.⁶⁵ From this point, William II quickly began to take a more pro-active approach than his father against troublesome lords by, firstly, introducing the Truce of God in 1047 to limit private warfare, and by attacking castles that had been erected in 'seditious zeal'.⁶⁶ In addition to this, the duke was also forced to suppress two further revolts: one in Lower Normandy, where the count of Anjou, Geoffrey Martel (1040 – 60) had taken 'possession of the fortress of Domfront (and Alençon) with support of its rebellious garrison' in 1051;⁶⁷ and a second in 1053, against his uncle, William, count of Arques; who had also acquired additional support from King Henry I.⁶⁸ However, in the end the king was no match for the Napoleonic resourcefulness of the duke and was beaten back at St-Aubin-sur-Scie; leaving Count William – 'stricken with famine' – to submit.⁶⁹ With each victory, William's power simply kept on growing, until by the mid-1050s his authority was absolute. In short, he had become, as described by a monk at Marmoutier (1055), the 'ruler of his whole land', since every major family had been forced, as a result of his violent approach, to accept his authority; even those on the very fringes of Normandy.⁷⁰ This was an accomplishment never before achieved by a Norman ruler.

On the back of this success, William also began to further increase ducal authority by tightening his grip over the Norman aristocracy, via the enforcement of several strict

⁶⁵ D. Bates, *William the Conqueror* (Stroud: Tempus, 2001), p.38

⁶⁶ R. H. C. Davis & M. Chibnall (trans.), *The Gesta Gvillelmi of William of Poitiers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p.13

⁶⁷ Van Houts, 'The Gesta Normannorum Ducum', Vol. II, pp.123-25 – Although Domfront resided outside of Normandy's border, it was still within the sphere of ducal authority.

⁶⁸ J. Bradbury, *The Battle of Hastings* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2001), p.61 – Although Henry aided William in 1047, by the early 1050s they were enemies; thus breaking the Norman-Capetian alliance.

⁶⁹ Mynors *et al*, 'William of Malmesbury', p.433 – William of Arques was exiled after his surrender.

⁷⁰ Fauroux, 'Recueil des actes des ducs de Normandie', pp.313-14

policies. These included: his right to forbid the unlicensed construction of castles, to enforce the payment of knight-service and to garrison any noble's castle for his own personal use; as well as the right to exile any lord for defiance.⁷¹ Indeed, it is said: William was 'stern beyond measure to those who opposed his will.'⁷² This point is illustrated by the disinheritance of William Werlenc, count of Mortain in c.1055 for acts of treason;⁷³ and by the 'service of one hundred knights' imposed on Count Guy of Ponthieu, in 1056, as a punishment for assisting King Henry I and Geoffrey Martel in their unsuccessful invasion of Normandy in 1054.⁷⁴ However, not all of William's policies incidentally were designed to restrict and punish, as similar to his grandfather Richard I, he *too* advanced the status of certain loyal, new lords – men whose power had increased during the anarchy of the 1030s and 1040s (men such as, William fitz Osbern, Roger of Montgomery, Roger of Beaumont and William of Warenne) – so as to reinforce ducal authority; although unlike Richard, the distribution of their lands was far more diverse and not mostly concentrated in Upper Normandy (as mentioned before); hence the control that William had over the whole of the duchy was much tighter.⁷⁵ These men would also play a vital role in the duke's military endeavours by supporting him, for instance, in both the conquests of Maine and England.

Indeed, the society that William created – a society based on the principle of a feudal order with the duke at its head – was by far 'one of the most fully developed feudal societies in Europe'⁷⁶ by 1066; an achievement which could only have occurred as a result of the power William held by the mid-1050s (after the victory at Mortemer); a power which was used, by the duke, to enforce military demands upon both his

⁷¹ Bates, 'William the Conqueror', pp.59-60

⁷² G. N. Garmonsway (trans.), *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1953), p.219

⁷³ Douglas, 'William the Conqueror', p.138 – As argued by Douglas, the disinheritance of William Werlenc was simply a way to empower his own half-brother, Robert (he became count of Mortain after William), since the charges against him were rather flimsy. However, it is unlikely that the duke would re-move a lord, whose loyalty was still intact, simply to empower another; especially when other lands were available. For example, the county of Arques remained vacant.

⁷⁴ C. H. Haskins, 'Knight-Service in Normandy in the Eleventh Century', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 22, No. 88 (October, 1907), p.646 – Although, Ponthieu was outside of Normandy, it fell, firmly, into the sphere of ducal authority after the French army was defeated at Mortemer in 1054.

⁷⁵ Bradbury, 'The Battle of Hastings', p.61

⁷⁶ C. H. Haskins, *Norman Institutions* (Cambridge, U.S.A.: Harvard University Press, 1918), p.5

secular and ecclesiastical aristocracy; thereby massively increasing his own military potential.⁷⁷ He was more powerful than either Richard II or Robert I. This is particularly important since it was both the swiftness with which internal discontent was quelled and the new extent of ducal authority (after the anarchy), which allowed William to be in a position of great strength by the 1060s; a position whereby, for the first time in the eleventh-century, major conquest was possible. Although it is worth noting that, as recorded in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, both of the duke's main rivals King Henry I and Geoffrey Martel died in 1060, which further strengthened William's position, since it removed the threat of external invasion.⁷⁸

This was not the only time, however, in the history of Normandy prior to 1066, where early internal disorder, followed by the re-assertion of authority led to later prosperity. As much like William's, the rule of Richard I (942 – 96) suffered initially – from an uprising in Bayeux led by a Viking named Harold (942)⁷⁹ and at the hands of King Louis IV who invaded in 'an effort to get rid of the Norman nuisance' in 945 – before ducal power was re-established.⁸⁰ Afterwards, Richard I used his newly acquired authority to consolidate the Normans' position, by implementing a number of political reforms (the feudal phase: as mentioned before); acts that would secure Normandy's survival. Furthermore, Richard was also responsible, as sources suggest, for beginning a monastic revival within the region, as he restored the major abbeys of St-Wandrille, Mont-St-Michel (966) and Fécamp.⁸¹ Thus in short: it seems clear that initial internal disorder could be beneficial, as two of the most successful rulers of early Normandy began their reigns' in this manner, before internal peace was restored.

And finally: it seems that the initial anarchy at the start of William's reign also had a positive effect, as it did during Robert's rule, on the Normans' martial strength; which in turn, helped to facilitate conquest. Indeed, as observed by Marjorie Chibnall:

⁷⁷ Douglas, 'William the Conqueror', p.103

⁷⁸ Garmonsway, 'The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle', p.189

⁷⁹ Burgess & Van Houts, 'Wace's "Roman de Rou"', pp.61-64

⁸⁰ Freeman, 'The History of the Norman Conquest of England', Vol.I, pp.209-10

⁸¹ Van Houts, 'The Gesta Normannorum Ducum', Vol. I, pp.130-33

victory was achieved at Hastings (1066) partly because ‘the core of the Norman army was a force of fighting men seasoned in the many wars the duke had fought’.⁸² But, it was not only troops that benefited, since William himself also gained valuable experience of generalship during this period of chaos. This experience was used later to help facilitate the conquests of Maine (1063) and England. For example, the use of ‘fear’ to force an enemy’s submission was first used, by the duke, during the siege of Alençon in 1051; where according to Wace: after taking an outlying fort, he brutalised those he captured by having the ‘hands and feet’ of ‘thirty-two’⁸³ men cut off.⁸⁴ His cruelty, thus, persuaded the people of Alençon to surrender.⁸⁵ This tactic was later repeated during the conquest of Maine, as here William ‘destroyed vineyards, fields and estates’, in order to terrify the local populace into accepting his authority.⁸⁶ And likewise, the Bayeux Tapestry also depicts the duke’s men torching houses in Wessex, most likely, so as to goad Harold into a speedy confrontation, thus giving William the advantage of being more prepared.⁸⁷ Good preparation and sufficient supplies were regarded as further factors behind the duke’s success at Hastings – as shown on the Bayeux Tapestry.⁸⁸ Again, their value was probably recognised by William II during his early reign, in the period of initial disorder, since he was involved in numerous sieges.

In conclusion, it seems reasonably clear that although Richard II was a very rich and powerful duke (due to his allies), the continuous peace that existed from the second half of Richard I’s rule right through until the end of Richard II’s did, however, have a negative effect on the Normans’ military strength, and as such Richard is considered

⁸² M. Chibnall, *Anglo-Norman England 1066 – 1166* (Oxford, 1986), cited in J. Gillingham, ‘William the Bastard at War’, in M. Strickland (eds.), *Anglo-Norman Warfare* (New York: The Boydell Press, 1993), p.144

⁸³ Van Houts, ‘The Gesta Normannorum Ducum’, Vol. II, p.96

⁸⁴ Burgess & Van Houts, ‘Wace’s “Roman de Rou”’, p.139

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p.139

⁸⁶ Davis & Chibnall, ‘The Gesta Gvillelmi of William of Poitiers’, p.63

⁸⁷ M. K. Foys, *The Bayeux Tapestry Digital Edition* (Leicester: Scholarly Digital Editions, 2003) [CD-ROM], scene 31 – Note: that because of his haste, King Harold left most of his archers and auxiliaries in York, where he had been based after the English victory at Stamford Bridge. This meant that the Saxon king did not possess many archers at the Battle of Hastings; thus giving William a tactical advantage.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, scene 25

to be *militarily* a much weaker ruler than many of his contemporaries. In fact, it was only after the anarchy of the 1030s and the 1040s that the Normans, and particularly William (although militarily Robert I is also considered to be a lot more powerful than Richard II), emerged to be militarily powerful; thereby illustrating that disorder, and especially early disorder in William's case, can be advantageous; as unlike Richard II, William was able to conquer large amounts of territory. Furthermore, the disorder (and rebellions) suffered by William at the start of his rule, also helped to strengthen and extend (particularly into Lower Normandy) ducal authority; with William *again* emerging by the mid-1050s, as one of the most powerful rulers of Normandy, since he possessed a much tighter hold over the landscape than had ever been achieved before. In addition to tightening his authority, this disorder also provided the perfect training ground for William to sharpen his skills as a duke, so that by the 1060s, the years of conquest, he had become as stated by R. Allen Brown: 'a prince of proven worth... a master of politics, war and the management of men'.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ R. A. Brown, *The Normans and the Norman Conquest* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1969), p.178

Chapter Two

Power in Post-Conquest England & Normandy – Up until 1106

Having defeated the last Anglo-Saxon king, Harold, in a decisive victory, on the field of Hastings, William II, duke of Normandy, ‘was crowned on Christmas Day’ 1066 as the king of England.¹ Yet, almost from the very outset, it soon became apparent that the rule of this foreign monarch was not to everyone’s pleasing, and as such, much of his early reign suffered as a consequence of internal disorder. Undeterred by their impertinence, William’s character meant that he was more than able to overcome his opponents. Indeed, it was written by a monk at Caen (in the late 1080s), that ‘he never allowed himself to be deterred from prosecuting any enterprise because of the labour it entailed and he was even undaunted by danger’.² His powerful rule, thus, lasted for nearly twenty-two years until his death in 1087.³ After this however, William’s cross-Channel realm was separated, briefly, into two parts (Normandy and England), before being reunited in 1106.⁴ The following paragraphs therefore will be divided into three sections. The first will examine how revolts in England helped William to strengthen royal authority, while commenting also on his rule in Normandy; whilst the second section will analyse the rule of Robert Curthose (in Normandy); and the third will compare his rule with the rules of William Rufus and Henry I (in England), so as to explain why Robert lost control of Normandy in 1106.

As a result of the Norman Conquest, by the time of William’s death (1087) much of English society had been massively transformed, as England had received virtually a new Church, new architecture, a new type of art, as well as a new aristocracy and a

¹ R. A. B. Mynors, R. M. Thomson & M. Winterbottom (trans.), *William of Malmesbury: Gesta Regum Anglorum* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998), p.463

² ‘The death and character of William the Conqueror, by a monk of Caen’, in D. C. Douglas & G. W. Greenway (eds.), *English Historical Documents II 1042-1189* (Oxford: Eyre Methuen, 1981), p.280

³ *Ibid.*, p.279

⁴ T. Rowley, *The Normans* (London: Tempus, 2004), p.89

new language (French).⁵ Indeed, as recorded in Domesday Book, by 1086, less than half a dozen of the king's 180 great tenants-in-chief (controlling around eight per cent of all land)⁶ were English; and by 1090, only one of England's sixteen bishoprics was held by an Englishman.⁷ This also meant that French became the dialect of polite society, whilst 'English was relegated to the language of the unprivileged.'⁸ However, this transformation did not take place straight away; instead it occurred after the suppression (which strengthened royal authority, thereby helping to push forward this transformation) of two large-scale revolts to William's rule. The first occurred in 1067 – 68, with revolts in cities – as indicated in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* – such as Exeter, Lincoln, Cambridge, Huntingdon, Nottingham and York;⁹ although because of their widespread nature the English rebels lacked both co-ordination and leadership and as a result, the king 'easily subdued' them.¹⁰ Afterwards, William utilised this opportunity to tighten his grip over the landscape by constructing castles within these cities and by assigning many of his loyal lieutenants to administer them – his chosen method of control. For example, it was recorded by Orderic Vitalis that in Exeter he constructed a castle 'within the walls' and left 'Baldwin of Meules' to command it¹¹; and similarly in York, it was noted by John of Worcester that he built 'two castles and garrisoned them with 500 knights'.¹²

The second wave of revolts, on the other hand, was far more severe, as this time the English rebels (concentrated mostly in the north) were supported, in 1069 – 70, by the army ('240 ships') of the Danish king, Sweyn Estrithson (and by Malcolm III, king of Scotland); which, as noted by John of Worcester, 'landed at the mouth of the Humber

⁵ R. H. C. Davis, *The Normans and their Myth* (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 1976), p.103

⁶ D. C. Douglas, *William the Conqueror: The Norman Impact upon England* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1964), p.266

⁷ 'The Domesday Survey', in Douglas & Greenway, 'English Historical Documents II', pp.847-879

⁸ Davis, 'The Normans and their Myth', p.103

⁹ G. N. Garmonsway (trans.), *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1953), pp.202-3

¹⁰ Mynors *et al*, 'William of Malmesbury', p.463 – With Harold dead, the English rebels lacked a strong leader to co-ordinate their aggression against William.

¹¹ M. Chibnall (trans.), *The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis*, 6 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969 – 80), Vol. II, p.215

¹² P. McGurk (trans.), *The Chronicle of John of Worcester*, 3 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), Vol. III, p.7

in September 1069', before then going on to sack the city of York.¹³ But once again, William proved himself to be more than capable of crushing this uprising, as by utilising a combination of speed and brutality, he moved systematically against individual pockets of resistance; crushed them, and then devastated the surrounding landscape so as to prevent any recurrence. In short it was, as argued by D. C. Douglas, 'one of the outstanding military achievements of the age', as 'it was to prove decisive in ensuring that the Norman domination of England would endure'.¹⁴ And, it was not just the campaign, itself, which proved significant; as in order both to prevent any further revolts and to strengthen his authority, William decided to inflict two types of punishment. The first, and perhaps most severe, was where Norman troops 'harried' (devastated) much of Northern England in an effort to remove the region's ability to rebel; though this did result, as Orderic Vitalis wrote (in condemnation), in 'so terrible a famine... that more than 100,000 Christian folk... perished from hunger'.¹⁵ As for the second: this involved the mass disinheritance of many troublesome English lords (William was more lenient during the previous revolt), which *significantly* included the removal of the last great-earls (two of the key rebel leaders), Morcar, earl of Northumbria and Edwin, earl of Mercia; an act which meant that for the remainder of William's reign, no English earl possessed the power that, for example, Earl Godwin did during the reign of King Edward the Confessor (1042 – 66).¹⁶

The manner in which William distributed land was also different to Edward; as in order to prevent the build-up of large power-blocks, the new king parcelled out estates to his supporters, especially after 1070, over wide areas.¹⁷ For example, Robert, count of Mortain was given land in some twenty counties, whilst the earl of Chester, Hugh

¹³ McGurk, 'The Chronicle of John of Worcester', Vol. III, p.9 – There were additional revolts along the Welsh border, led by Edric the Wild; and others in Dorset and Somerset. Also, the Danes invaded England, as like Harold Hardrada in 1066, Sweyn possessed a claim to the English throne, and so came to challenge William's kingship. Yet, after the defeat of the English rebels, he accepted a substantial bribe and left.

¹⁴ Douglas, 'William the Conqueror', p.220

¹⁵ Chibnall, 'The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis', Vol. II, pp.231-33 – Orderic's opinion concerning the 'harrying of the North' was also mentioned in the introduction.

¹⁶ J. Bradbury, *The Battle of Hastings* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2001), pp.27-35

¹⁷ R. A. Brown, *The Normans and the Norman Conquest* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1969), p.185

d'Avranches held estates in nineteen;¹⁸ and overall around twenty of William's great tenants-in-chief held lands within ten or more counties.¹⁹ The only exception where power-blocks did exist was along the Welsh border as the king created, in c.1071, the earldoms of Chester and Shrewsbury, and built-up the earldom of Hereford to protect against invasion (the earldom of Kent also remained powerful whilst Bishop Odo was earl to defend England from continental attack).²⁰ However, it was not just the manner in which land was distributed that William reformed, but also the way in which it was held, as under Norman rule all land now belonged to the king (as conqueror, William claimed the whole of England as his); land which was then granted to his tenants to be held in return for the payment of knight-service; thus creating a powerful and highly centralised feudal system (as noted in the introduction).²¹ As suggested, the way in which territory was both held and distributed under Norman rule *clearly* helped to strengthen royal authority, since the English crown was much stronger under William than it had ever been under Anglo-Saxon rule. Although, it is important to note: that most of William's land reforms were implemented after 1070 – after he had defeated the English rebels.²²

In addition to strengthening royal authority, by introducing the system of knight-service into English society, William was able to place himself – much like he did in Normandy before 1066 (noted in chapter one) – at the head of a very powerful force of knights.²³ Indeed, it was estimated by R. Allen Brown that as king, William could obtain 'some five thousand knights' from his English tenants (much more than could be obtained from Normandy); men which would both help him to defend his newly conquered kingdom and support him in his military endeavours.²⁴ For instance, it was documented in a writ that in 1072 William ordered Æthelwig, abbot of Evesham, 'to summon all those (knights) who are subject to your... jurisdiction' and to bring 'fully

¹⁸ Brown, 'The Normans and the Norman Conquest', p.185

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.185

²⁰ M. Chibnall, *The Normans* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp.66-7

²¹ J. H. Round, *Feudal England* (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1895), pp.225-317

²² *Ibid.*, pp.225-317

²³ *Ibid.*, pp.225-317

²⁴ Brown, 'The Normans and the Norman Conquest', p.190 – 5,000 was a large number of knights.

equipped those 5 knights which you owe... in respect of your abbacy', for support in a (successful) campaign against Malcolm III, king of Scotland – who had previously aided the English rebels.²⁵ However, what perhaps is most significant here is not the system of knight-service itself, but the date that it was introduced into English society, since according to the thirteenth-century chronicler, Matthew Paris (a view accepted by historians, such as Douglas), it was in 1070 when William ordered the 'bishoprics and abbasies... to come under military servitude'.²⁶ Once again, the date was after the king had suppressed the English rebels, at a time when his authority was strong.

Also, it was not only knights that William could demand (after 1070) from his English tenants, since he could obtain financial aid, inheritance tax and scutage (a fee for the non-payment of knights); which combined with 'the Old English taxes' that 'made the Anglo-Saxon kingdom about the richest in Europe', and England's lucrative wool trade; meant that as king, he was extremely wealthy.²⁷ And of course, it was not just the king who was affluent, but his new lords as well; since their English estates were worth considerably more than those in Normandy; an issue which would later cause problems after William's death (to be discussed in more detail below).²⁸ To sum up: after suffering a period of, and dealing with, initial disorder – as noted before – by the 1070s William had emerged for the remainder of his reign as an extremely rich and powerful king, whose authority within England was very strong. In fact, it was even recorded in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* that when Ralph of Gael, earl of East Anglia rebelled in 1075, because they feared the king's wrath, 'the inhabitants of the country opposed him; with the result that he accomplished nothing'.²⁹

Back in Normandy, however, the situation was much different, since the domestic peace that existed from the mid-1050s (as noted in chapter one) continued after 1066

²⁵ 'Summons to the feudal host', in Douglas & Greenway, 'English Historical Documents II', p.895

²⁶ Matthew Paris, *Historia Anglorum* (Rolls Series, 1866), in *Ibid.*, pp.894-95 – Although, Paris does not indicate, when knight-service was imposed on *all* secular lords, it is unlikely, as Douglas suggests, that it was before 1070, as prior to this date William's authority within England was relatively weak.

²⁷ Davis, 'The Normans and their Myth', p.114

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.114

²⁹ Garmonsway, 'The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle', p.211

and lasted up until William's death in 1087.³⁰ In fact, as suggested by Douglas: this peace was also a factor behind the king's success against the English rebels, since it gave him the freedom to concentrate his military efforts in England.³¹ This is not to say, however, that throughout this period (1066 – 87) William's rule on the French side of the Channel went without incident, since there was a large revolt in Maine in 1069 that was finally subdued in 1073 and also a number of external attacks.³² These came from both the count of Anjou, Fulk le Réchin (1068 – 1109), who, according to Orderic Vitalis, assaulted the stronghold of John of La Flèche, one of William's main supporters in Maine in both 1077 and 1081 (Fulk wanted control over Maine);³³ and from the French king, Philip I (1060 – 1108), who gave the castles of Montreuil in 1075 and Gerberoy in 1078 (situated on the Norman-Capetian border) to William's enemies – Edgar Ætheling and Robert Curthose (who had briefly fallen out with his father) respectively – to be used as bases from which to harass Normandy.³⁴ Similar to Count Fulk's, Philip I's strategy aimed to curb – although with little success – William's growing power; although according to William of Malmesbury (who often praised William): his actions were due more to jealousy, since 'so much glory' had been 'achieved by someone who was known to have been his father's man'.³⁵ In short by the time of William's death, much like in England, the situation in Normandy was fairly stable; especially since most of the external attacks were directed against William and not necessarily against the Normans themselves.

As suggested in the above paragraphs (and in the first chapter), William was, as sources indicate, a remarkably powerful ruler of 'the highest reputation'; a man who *significantly* was both 'inexorable when dealing with rebellion'³⁶ and 'stern beyond measure to those who opposed his will'.³⁷ Yet, unfortunately, the same cannot be said

³⁰ D. Bates, *William the Conqueror* (Stroud: Tempus, 2001), pp.109-112

³¹ Douglas, 'William the Conqueror', p.223

³² McGurk, 'The Chronicle of John of Worcester', Vol. III, p.23

³³ Chibnall, 'The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis', Vol. II, pp.307-11

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp.357-61

³⁵ Mynors *et al.*, 'William of Malmesbury', p.477

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.493

³⁷ Garmonsway, 'The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle', p.219

about his son and successor in Normandy, Robert Curthose; for although he was often praised for his chivalry, kind-heartedness, skill in battle and for his bravery whilst on the First Crusade in 1096 – 99 ('under heaven there was no better lord'³⁸), as the duke of Normandy he is described by numerous twelfth-century chroniclers as weak; with many character faults.³⁹ These included, according to Orderic Vitalis: his inability 'to pass judgement on wrongdoers', his reliance on the opinions 'of corrupt and foolish men' – as besides Bishop Odo inept advisers were considered to be a factor behind his weak rule –⁴⁰ as well as being rather swift, according to Robert of Torigni, to abandon military enterprises before an actual conclusion was reached.⁴¹ And similarly, Eadmer also noted that Robert's 'piety and... absence of any desire for worldly wealth' meant that numerous Norman nobles too readily transferred their allegiance to his wealthier brothers.⁴² In short, it seems fair to say that most of the chroniclers were fairly critical of Robert's rule, thus giving the somewhat correct impression – as it will be argued – that it was 'one long record of weakness and of failure'.⁴³

What, perhaps, began this record of weakness was Robert's significant and initial failure to subdue completely the troublesome lord, Robert of Bellême. As Orderic Vitalis explains: after making peace with King William Rufus (1087 – 1100) in 1088, Robert and the Bellême family decided instead to rebel against the duke by fortifying their castles of 'Bellême, Lurson, Essay, Alençon, Domfront, Saint-Céneri, La Roche, and Mabille' against him; thus forcing the duke to take military action.⁴⁴ Robert's campaign initially began with great success, since 'he succeeded in bringing Alençon and Bellême to the brink of surrender' and arrested Robert of Bellême himself.⁴⁵ But

³⁸ Gaimar, *Lestoire des Engleis*, in A. Bell, *Anglo-Norman Text Society* (1960), cited in J. A. Green, 'Robert Curthose Reassessed', in C. Harper-Bill (eds.), *Anglo-Norman studies XXII: Proceedings of the Battle Conference 1999* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2000), p.99

³⁹ D. C. Douglas, *The Norman Achievement 1050 – 1100* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1069), p.52

⁴⁰ Chibnall, 'The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis', Vol. IV, p.115

⁴¹ E. M. C. Van Houts (trans.), *The Gesta Normannorum Ducum of William of Jumièges, Orderic Vitalis, and Robert of Torigni*, 2 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), Vol. II, pp.203-5

⁴² G. Bosanquet (trans.), *Eadmer's History of Recent Events in England* (London: The Cresset Press, 1964), p.176

⁴³ C. W. David, *Robert Curthose: Duke of Normandy* (Cambridge: Mass, 1920), p.75

⁴⁴ Chibnall, 'The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis', Vol. IV, p.153

⁴⁵ D. Crouch, *The Normans: The History of a Dynasty* (London: Hambledon & London, 2002), p.214

unfortunately, just when it seemed as though he was about to bring the rebels to heel, the duke decided instead to abandon ‘his show of energy’ and ‘unexpectedly agreed to a precarious peace’; one which ‘freed Robert of Bellême from his fetters.’⁴⁶ This was a mistake. Indeed, as Orderic Vitalis once again explains: not only did this mean that the ‘dangerously powerful’ Robert of Bellême was again free to wreak havoc in Lower Normandy, which he did; but notably it also displayed to his nobles that – unlike his father, who mercilessly punished the English rebels, for example, by devastating the North of England (as noted before) – Robert was ‘weak’ when it came to ‘enforcing justice’;⁴⁷ and as such, much of his rule suffered (in much the same way that Robert I’s did: noted in chapter one) as a consequence of internal disorder, since incessant fighting occurred between the great-lords of Bellême, Breteuil, Conches and Grentemaisnil, due to Robert’s inability to both enforce and maintain a strong ducal authority.⁴⁸

Furthermore, Robert’s lack of authority (combined with the disorder that emerged as a result) also seems to have had a negative effect on Normandy’s economy. Indeed, as suggested by Judith Green: if the sources ‘are to be believed’, then ‘duc al finances were in a woeful state’ by 1106.⁴⁹ However, it was not just internal chaos that caused this problem, since the duke was accused of squandering Normandy’s vast wealth on fruitless military enterprises – such as, his two failed and ill-prepared attempts at trying to obtain the English crown in 1088 and 1101⁵⁰ – by mortgaging the county of the Cotentin to his brother Henry for 3,000 marks, thereby denying himself of one-third of the ducal revenue (for a period of time) and also on uncalculated acts of

⁴⁶ Chibnall, ‘The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis’, Vol. IV, pp.157-59

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, pp.157-59

⁴⁸ C. H. Haskins, *The Normans in European History* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1915), p.154

⁴⁹ J. A. Green, *Henry I: King of England and Duke of Normandy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.103

⁵⁰ Crouch, ‘The Normans’, p.214 – Note: that in 1088 a formidable coalition of English lords, headed by Bishop Odo of Bayeux, rebelled against the kingship of William Rufus in support of Robert’s claim to the English throne. Yet, one of the reasons behind the failure of this enterprise was that Robert delayed in his crossing from Normandy with re-enforcements (the rebellion of 1088 will also be looked at in more detail later on). In 1101, Robert did however, invade England. But, again the campaign failed; with the duke criticised, this time, for stalling at Winchester. On both occasions Robert’s poor generalship was considered to be a factor behind his lack of success.

generosity.⁵¹ Although with the latter, it was argued by Orderic Vitalis that many Norman lords also took advantage of Robert's kind-heartedness, since he wrote: 'the jesters and harlots' (with reference to his counsellors) constantly 'boast that they have robbed the duke.'⁵² In short, Robert's mismanagement of Normandy's finances, along with his inability to maintain internal law and order is, thus, particularly important; as not only did it mean that ducal authority was rather weak throughout the principality, but also it meant that Normandy itself was more susceptible to attack.

A further factor behind Robert's downfall was the aggressive actions of his younger brothers, who took advantage of his weakness by attacking Normandy in quite similar ways on two separate occasions (prior to the conquest of the duchy by Henry in 1106).⁵³ The first was in 1090, where according to William of Malmesbury: William Rufus invaded and successfully took control over many castles in Northern Normandy, both by gaining the support of local lords – men such as Odo of Aumâle, Count Robert of Eu, Walter Giffard and Ralph of Mortimer; all of whom held larger estates in England and so were more inclined to unite with the king – and by utilising his riches to bribe 'the men in charge'.⁵⁴ As for the second: this occurred in 1104 and once again, it involved, firstly, many Norman lords in Western Normandy transferring their loyalties, this time to King Henry I (1100 – 35); before the king then went on to take, as stated by the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, the cities of 'Caen and Bayeux'.⁵⁵ But, it was not just the actual invasions themselves and the land lost as a result, which was damaging to Robert's rule, since what was perhaps more harmful was the concessions that he had to make in order to restore peace on each occasion. These included, for the peace of 1091: the surrender to William of 'the county of Eu and Cherbourg'⁵⁶ (land that the king had already taken), the 'abbey of Mont-St-Michel' and also 'the palace

⁵¹ H. W. C. Davis, *England Under the Normans and Angevins: 1066 – 1272* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1922), p.80

⁵² Chibnall, 'The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis', Vol. VI, p.63

⁵³ M. Chibnall, 'England and Normandy: 1042 – 1137', in D. Luscombe & J. Riley-Smith (eds.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History IV: c.1024 – c.1198* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.205-7

⁵⁴ Mynors *et al*, 'William of Malmesbury', p.549 – William's wealth will be examined further below.

⁵⁵ Garmonsway, 'The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle', p.239

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.225

of Fécamp', which *humiliatingly* was a key symbol of ducal power.⁵⁷ And similarly, in 1104, Robert also had to surrender to Henry the homage – as recorded by Orderic Vitalis – of 'William, count of Évreux, with his county and all his dependences'; an act which ultimately cost the duke the allegiance of a key and powerful *vassal*.⁵⁸ Also, Count William would later ally with the king at the Battle of Tinchebrai (1106), as a result of this concession.⁵⁹ As suggested, the actions of Robert's brothers *clearly* helped to further undermine the duke's authority, since not only did their invasions highlight his weakness to an already troublesome aristocracy (which made the internal situation more chaotic), but also they showed that he could not sufficiently protect Normandy's borders. The latter proved to be advantageous to Henry in 1106.

In comparison to Robert's rule, the reigns of his brothers (in England), William and Henry were – as it will be argued – considerably more successful; with many sources portraying their rules in a much more positive light.⁶⁰ For example, William Rufus is described, by William of Malmesbury, as being an incredibly powerful king; hugely ambitious, boastful and self-confident; a man whose talents were comparable to those of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar.⁶¹ And equally, Orderic Vitalis also stated, that William was 'a masterful, bold and warlike man'; a king who 'terrorised thieves and robbers and successfully enforced internal peace throughout his realm'; a peacefulness which Robert, on the other hand (as mentioned before), failed to achieve in Normandy.⁶² In fact, the theme of internal peace when talking about the reigns of William and Henry is particularly dominant within the sources; since both Henry of Huntingdon (writing before c.1154)⁶³ and the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* saw the reign of Henry I, much like William's, as a time of peace, law and order: 'in his days no man

⁵⁷ McGurk, 'The Chronicle of John of Worcester', Vol. III, p.59 – Note, that in the 1091 treaty (signed by William and Robert), Robert was supposed to acquire territory in England, equal to the land which William had gained in Normandy. Yet, there is no real evidence to suggest that William kept his side of the bargain. Thus, the peace agreement was clearly weighted in the king's favour.

⁵⁸ Chibnall, 'The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis', Vol. VI, p.59

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, p.285

⁶⁰ M. T. Clanchy, *England and its Rulers: 1066 – 1272* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1998), pp.10-11

⁶¹ Mynors *et al.*, 'William of Malmesbury', p.567

⁶² Chibnall, 'The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis', Vol. IV, p.179

⁶³ D. Greenway (trans.), *Henry, Archdeacon of Huntingdon: Historia Anglorum* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp.448-93

dared to wrong another.’⁶⁴ Although they did suggest, negatively: that at times Henry could be overly cruel when it came to enforcing justice and was often ruthless when it came to removing disloyal magnates.⁶⁵ In short, it would seem that on the surface the rules of both William and Henry were internally somewhat peaceful, as it would appear (as the sources clearly suggest) that the seeds of domestic chaos did not blossom in England during their reigns, and as such, their rules were in many ways more similar to their father’s than to Duke Robert’s.

This is not to imply, however, that the reigns of William and Henry occurred without incident, as similar to Robert, both kings had to deal with internal disorder at the start of their reigns. In William’s case, this took the form of a major revolt in 1088.⁶⁶ It was here, where, according to the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, many (including six out of the ten greatest baronial landowners as recorded in Domesday Book⁶⁷) of ‘the most powerful Frenchmen’ in England, led by Bishop Odo, rose up against William in aid of Robert’s claim to the English throne by attacking ‘the lands of all those men who owed allegiance to the king’.⁶⁸ However, like his father, William proved himself to be more than capable of crushing this revolt. As Orderic Vitalis explains: after he successfully persuaded the powerful earl of Shrewsbury, Roger II of Montgomery to switch sides, so as to divide the opposition, the king then went on – by utilising the military obligations which his father had put in place (as noted before) – to personally attack and capture, ‘with the utmost ferocity’, the strongholds of Tonbridge, Pevensey and Rochester, where Odo and the rebel leaders were situated.⁶⁹ His attack displayed to the English barons that militarily ‘young William’ was ‘no less powerful than old William.’⁷⁰ However, what was perhaps most *significant* here, was not just the victory itself, but the punishments that the king inflicted, as unlike Robert who was lenient for

⁶⁴ Garmonsway, ‘The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle’, p.263

⁶⁵ Greenway, ‘Henry, Archdeacon of Huntingdon’, pp.448-93

⁶⁶ F. Barlow, *William Rufus* (London: Methuen, 1983), p.77-8

⁶⁷ R. Bartlett, *England Under the Norman and Angevin Kings: 1075 – 1225* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), p.52

⁶⁸ Garmonsway, ‘The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle’, p.223

⁶⁹ Chibnall, ‘The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis’, Vol. IV, p.125 – William only dealt with the rebels in Kent personally. Other rebels were dealt with by, loyal, local lords.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p.131

example to the ‘treacherous count, Robert of Bellême’⁷¹ (as noted before), William on the other hand, took a more authoritarian stance; since he confiscated the lands of all those who rebelled and banished Bishop Odo ‘from England’.⁷² Afterwards, ‘the king gave their lands to men who were more faithful’.⁷³ By punishing his magnates in this manner, William was thus able to set, early on in his reign, a precedent that insolence to his rule would not be tolerated and that loyalty would be rewarded; which in turn, ensured that internal peace, law and order, and not anarchy (at the same time disorder thrived in Normandy, because Robert failed to punish rebels harshly), would flourish for the majority of his reign.⁷⁴

As indicated above, the rule of Henry I began in a similar manner to that of William’s as like his predecessor he too had to deal with early disorder, when in 1102 the great house of Bellême-Montgomery (also see appendix four) chose to rebel⁷⁵ by fortifying ‘the city of Shrewsbury and... the castles of Arundel and Tickhill’ against him.⁷⁶ But again, like his father and his brother William, Henry proved himself to be more than capable of dealing with this rebellion. As John of Worcester explains: by quickly and aggressively attacking the three brothers – Robert of Bellême, Arnulf and Roger of Poitou – ‘within thirty days the city and all the castles had surrendered’.⁷⁷ Also after this, Henry then went on to punish the rebels severely, as he expelled the entire family from England and took their ‘whole honor’, along with ‘the estates of the vassals who had stood by’ them; an act which in turn, set a significant precedent that – much like in his predecessor’s time – treachery, even from the most powerful of families would not go unpunished; and as such, internal peace blossomed after 1102.⁷⁸ In fact, it was even written by the chronicler Orderic Vitalis that because of his firm stance, ‘Henry

⁷¹ Greenway, ‘Henry, Archdeacon of Huntingdon’, p.451

⁷² Chibnall, ‘The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis’, Vol. IV, p.135

⁷³ Garmonsway, ‘The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle’, p.225

⁷⁴ E. Mason, *King Rufus: The Life & Murder of William II of England* (Stroud: The History Press Ltd, 2008), pp.63-70 – Note: that the only other revolt to William’s rule occurred in 1095, but this was of a smaller scale, and subdued quickly by the king. Also, once again, harsh punishments were handed out to rebels. For example, Count William of Eu was brutally mutilated.

⁷⁵ Davis, ‘England Under the Normans and Angevins’, p.124

⁷⁶ McGurk, ‘The Chronicle of John of Worcester’, Vol. III, p.101

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p.101

⁷⁸ Chibnall, ‘The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis’, Vol. VI, p.31

reigned prosperously for thirty-three years' (from 1102 onwards), as 'no one... dared to rebel against him in England'.⁷⁹

By expelling the troublesome lord, Robert of Bellême, however, Henry seems to have *unintentionally* had a further hand in Duke Robert's misfortune, since when the lord returned to Normandy in 1102, he was able once again to wreak havoc in the south-western part of the principality, by exploiting the duke's weak authority and weak stance, when it came to enforcing law and order (as mentioned before).⁸⁰ In fact, it was even recorded by Orderic Vitalis that cruelly Robert of Bellême destroyed 'the nunnery of Almenèches' in 1103 and that *significantly*, in the same year, he defeated a ducal army, led by the duke, in a pitched battle near to the castle of Exmes.⁸¹ This defeat further humiliated Duke Robert, since it showed once again that he was unable to enforce internal law and order. It also meant that 'the harsh tyranny of the warlike count' would continue in the south-western region.⁸² In short, Robert's inability to extinguish (on a number of occasions) the power of the Bellêmes' meant that he had failed, where his brother Henry had succeeded (since he had defeated and banished the family) and as such, he was never able to possess the same level of authority in Normandy, as his powerful brother possessed in England.

Indeed, by crushing rebellion early, unlike his brother Robert, Henry found himself to be in a position of great strength – much like his father was after 1070 (as mentioned before) – and as such, he was able to utilise his newly acquired power in order to vastly increase his wealth.⁸³ This was achieved, firstly, by raising the level of taxation across England in order to fund his campaigns against Robert in Normandy;⁸⁴ and later, via the implementation (from c.1107 onwards) of numerous governmental and administrative reforms; including the introduction of the 'Exchequer', which greatly

⁷⁹ Chibnall, 'The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis', Vol. VI, p.31

⁸⁰ Green, 'Robert Curthose Reassessed', in Harper-Bill, 'Anglo-Norman studies XXII: Proceedings of the Battle Conference 1999', p.113

⁸¹ Chibnall, 'The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis', Vol. VI, pp.35-37

⁸² *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, p.35

⁸³ Green, 'Henry I', pp.248-53

⁸⁴ Garmonsway, 'The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle', p.239

improved how the collection of revenue was managed.⁸⁵ And it was not just Henry, who was able to benefit from the power that was gained by crushing rebellious elements early, as like his younger brother, William Rufus was also able to utilise his strong authority – the power that he gained after crushing the revolt of 1088 (as noted before) – to boost his wealth. This was achieved again: by the imposition of ‘severe and unjust taxes’, according to the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*;⁸⁶ and also by demanding the payment of large reliefs when a tenant died and was succeeded.⁸⁷ For example, after the death of Earl Hugh of Shrewsbury in 1098, his brother Robert of Bellême had to pay the enormous relief of £3,000 for the privilege of succeeding him.⁸⁸ In addition to this, William also made more money (which was used to fund his military campaigns in Normandy) by abusing the Church, ‘since when the head of a bishopric or an abbacy died, he either sold’ the vacant seat and attached estates ‘for money or kept them within his grasp and let them for rent’.⁸⁹ As suggested, the true extent of a ruler’s wealth was clearly linked to the strength of their authority, and as such, it is easy to see why kings, William I, William Rufus and Henry I were rich and why Duke Robert was nearly bankrupt.

In conclusion, it seems fairly clear that although initially chaotic, from 1070 onwards the reign of King William I was extremely prosperous; an accomplishment which he achieved by crushing the English rebels swiftly and by punishing harshly those involved. By doing this, the new king was able to strengthen his (royal) authority by setting the precedent that insolence to Norman rule would not be tolerated. This also insured that internal peace flourished for the remainder of his reign; which in turn, helped to facilitate the implementation of reform (such as, land reform and the introduction of knight-service) and the acquisition of great wealth. Furthermore, this new found prosperity, in England, did not simply die with King William. Indeed, by dealing with revolts early and in a similar manner (each uprising was crushed quickly

⁸⁵ Clanchy, ‘England and its Rulers’, pp.49-53

⁸⁶ Garmonsway, ‘The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle’, p.235

⁸⁷ Davis, ‘England Under the Normans and Angevins’, p.79

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p.79

⁸⁹ Garmonsway, ‘The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle’, p.235

and the rebels were justly punished), both kings, William Rufus and Henry I proved themselves to be more than capable of sustaining their father's legacy, as both rulers were remarkably rich and powerful. However, *unfortunately* the same cannot be said about their elder brother Robert, the duke of Normandy; who at the same time, proved himself to be incapable of dealing with rebellious elements and as such, his rule was very weak; thus proving that, in short, it was *how* revolts were dealt with (particularly early revolts) which determined a ruler's fate; especially since Robert lost control of Normandy in 1106 to Henry as a consequence of his continual weakness.

Chapter Three

The Conquest of Southern Italy & Sicily – The Birth of a Second Norman Kingdom

Established in 1130 with the coronation of Roger II, the twelfth-century kingdom of Southern Italy and Sicily is perhaps one of the most fascinating creations of the medieval period.¹ For indeed, in its uniqueness the civilisation fostered by the Norman rulers was able to combine elements from a variety of different cultures (principally Arabic, Greek and Latin), so as to create a society of religious tolerance, intellectual diversity and artistic beauty that *significantly* was unlike anywhere else in Western Europe.² In fact, the brilliance of what was created can easily be seen in the cathedrals of Cefalù and Monreale, and in the Cappella Palatina at Palermo; all of which contain Byzantine mosaics, honeycomb ceilings, pointed arches and occasional inscriptions in Greek or Arabic.³ However, it was not just the kingdom itself which was remarkable, but also how it was formed; and as such, this chapter will focus on some of the Norman rulers which made its existence and survival a possibility. To do this, the following paragraphs will be divided into two sections. The first will focus on the career of Robert Guiscard and the effects that rebellion had on ducal authority in Apulia; whilst the second section will look at Sicily and the Norman kingdom, so as to display the long-term benefits of punishing rebels severely.

The Normans arrived in Southern Italy throughout the course of the eleventh-century – where they quickly proved themselves, to the local populous, to be highly skilled warriors.⁴ In short, it was through the utilisation of their skill, discipline, ‘boldness and strength’, that allowed them to start wresting large amounts of land – beginning

¹ A. Marongiu, ‘A Model State in the Middle Ages: The Norman and Swabian Kingdom of Sicily’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 6, No.3 (April, 1964), pp.308-9

² C. E. Nicklies, ‘Builders, Patrons and Identity: The Domed Basilicas of Sicily and Calabria’, *Gesta*, Vol. 43, No.2 (2004), pp.106-10

³ *Ibid.*, pp.106-10

⁴ J. J. Norwich, *The Normans in the South: 1016 – 1130* (London: Longmans, 1968), pp.18-31

with Aversa in 1030 and Melfi in 1041 – from the weaker native Greeks, Italians and later Muslims.⁵ Also, what helped to facilitate this conquest in the early stages was their triumph at the Battle of Civitate in 1053, since here, as recorded by Amatus, the Normans, ‘led by Count Humphrey’ (d.1057), were able to vanquish the numerically superior army of Pope Leo IX; who had taken to the field in an attempt to expel the foreigners from Southern Italy.⁶ His defeat dashed any long-term hopes of removing the Norman presence from the peninsula.

However, despite these early achievements, much of the conquest of Southern Italy took place slightly later during the reign of Robert Guiscard, who became the Count of Apulia in 1057.⁷ According to the Byzantine princess, Anna Comnena, Robert was a man of huge physical stature; ‘in mind most cunning, brave in action, very clever in attacking the wealth of magnates’, and ‘most obstinate in achievement, for he did not allow any obstacle to prevent’ him from ‘executing his desire’.⁸ It was through his military leadership that the Normans were able to conquer nearly all of Southern Italy and parts of Sicily; including the cities of Troia in 1059, Reggio in 1060, Messina in 1061, Bari the former Greek capital of Italy in 1071, Palermo the capital of Sicily in 1072 and Salerno the capital of the last Lombard principality in 1076.⁹ Indeed, in terms of military achievement, the career of Robert Guiscard was one of great triumph and seeming endless conquest. He was, as regarded by J. J. Norwich, ‘perhaps the most gifted... soldier of his age’ – equal somewhat in his accomplishments to his contemporary William the Conqueror.¹⁰ And finally, it must be said that because of the level of his military triumph, Robert was often depicted by

⁵ P. N. Dunbar (trans.), *The History of the Normans by Amatus of Montecassino* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2004), p.24

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.99-101

⁷ G. A. Loud, *The Age of Robert Guiscard: Southern Italy and the Norman Conquest* (London: Pearson, 2000), p.123

⁸ E. A. Dawes (trans.), *Anna Comnena: The Alexiad* (London: Routledge, 1928), book I [Online]. Available: <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/AnnaComnena-Alexiad01.html>

⁹ D. Matthew, *The Norman Kingdom of Sicily* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.11-19 – Although Robert was not the only Norman leader to conquer parts of Southern Italy (for example, it was the Norman counts of Aversa who captured the principality of Capua); it is not the purpose of this chapter to look at these conquests. Also, Robert received help during many of his campaigns from his younger brother Roger; who was responsible for much of the conquest of Sicily.

¹⁰ Norwich, ‘The Normans in the South’, p.69

the sources in a superhuman manner.¹¹ For instance, it was stated by Anna: that because most enemies feared him, his ‘battle cry’ was ‘said to have put thousands to flight’; for ‘he was’ – as the princess continues – ‘naturally indomitable and’ was thus ‘subordinate to nobody in the world’; not the popes nor the emperors from east or west, who allegedly ‘trembled before him’¹² – because, in truth, on the battlefield he had defeated them all.¹³

Nevertheless, regardless of his military achievements, Robert’s rule in Southern Italy was not an easy one, as there were a number of major revolts against his rule. These occurred in 1067 – 68, in 1072 – 73, in 1079 – 80 and in 1082 – 83; all of which were due, in part, because many of Robert’s fellow Norman counts – who were sometimes backed with Greek money (for example, it was written that in 1067 Amicus, count of Molfetta was ‘lent... 100 hundredweight of gold’ to cause chaos)¹⁴ – often disliked his ever rising demands for them to provide him with military service, and because they resented his increasing authority which he excised over them (as duke of Apulia from 1059, the lords were officially his vassals).¹⁵ Although slightly differently, William of Apulia does suggest: that many of the counts ‘envied’ Robert’s ‘virtues’, and as such, ‘they... conspired to murder him when they could find a suitable opportunity’.¹⁶ Yet, it is not necessarily the revolts themselves which are important here, but instead the amount of them and the manner in which they were subdued, since although Robert was able to utilise his military skill to ‘quickly’ crush – as stressed by Amatus – every uprising¹⁷, his failure to severely punish the rebels on each occasion meant that much like the rule of Robert Curthose (1087 – 1106) in Normandy (as mentioned in chapter two), he too, suffered terribly at the hands of internal disorder, due to his inability to

¹¹ E. M. C. Van Houts, *The Normans in Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp.250-52

¹² G. A. Loud (trans.), *Geoffrey Malaterra: The Deeds of Count Roger and his Brother Duke Robert* [Online]. Available: http://www.leeds.ac.uk/downloads/20041/school_of_history, p.130

¹³ Dawes, ‘Anna Comnena’, book I

¹⁴ Dunbar, ‘The History of the Normans by Amatus of Montecassino’, p.134

¹⁵ Loud, ‘The Age of Robert Guiscard’, p.235 – Because of Robert’s seemingly endless career of conquest, he was always in need of fresh troops to assist him.

¹⁶ G. A. Loud (trans.), *William of Apulia: The Deeds of Robert Guiscard* [Online]. Available: http://www.leeds.ac.uk/downloads/20041/school_of_history, book II, p.25

¹⁷ Dunbar, ‘The History of the Normans by Amatus of Montecassino’, p.134

show a firm hand. Indeed, it was often the case that several of those who rebelled against the duke were repeat offenders.¹⁸ For instance, Count Peter II of Andria took up arms against Robert in both 1067 and 1072.¹⁹ On each occasion he was captured, ‘but after being bound by an oath of fealty Peter was eventually set free and recovered all that he had lost’.²⁰ His punishment was rather lenient.

However, it is perhaps a little harsh to suggest here that Robert was simply a great conqueror, but a weak ruler; since the use of severe punishment had to be balanced, by the duke, against the constant need for both knights and capable lords to govern (and for his army) his ever expanding empire; due to fact that the Normans, in Italy, were forever outnumbered.²¹ Hence, the imposition of strong penalties on the rebels – such as, permanent banishment, long-term imprisonment or even execution – would have been counterproductive; a problem which Robert Curthose, on the other hand, did not have in Normandy, since there were few limitations on his ability to discipline those who rebelled severely. He just failed to do so (as noted in chapter two). Also, it must be noted here: that to sustain an air of legitimacy amongst the indigenous Greek and Italian populace, Robert could not afford to be seen as a harsh ruler, again due to the lack of a strong Norman presence;²² and as such, it was recorded by William of Apulia: that Robert ‘*never* sought to oppress his people under a cruel tranny’.²³ His legitimacy was also further helped by his marriage to Sichelgaita, the eldest daughter of Prince Guaimar IV of Salerno (1027 – 52) in 1058, since after this date – as noted again by William of Apulia – ‘the people who formerly served under compulsion now gave the obedience due to ancestral right’.²⁴

As suggested, the rule of Robert Guiscard was *evidently* one that featured many internal uprisings – occurrences which were made possible due to the duke’s inability

¹⁸ Loud, ‘The Age of Robert Guiscard’, p.235

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.235

²⁰ Loud, ‘William of Apulia’, book III, p.38

²¹ Norwich, ‘The Normans in the South’, p.168

²² *Ibid.*, p.235

²³ Loud, ‘William of Apulia’, book II, p.29

²⁴ *Ibid.*, book II, p.26

to discipline (for the reasons stated above) many of his troublesome magnates. Indeed, these men were, as suggested by F. Marion Crawford (1905), a ‘persistent thorn in the great conqueror’s side’.²⁵ However, despite these setbacks, it would seem that Robert was never deterred from chasing ‘his desire for territorial expansion’, and it was often the case that internal disorder even helped to dictate the flow of conquest.²⁶ For example, it can be said that the acquisition of Bari (the last Greek city) in 1071 came as an aftereffect of the revolt which transpired in Apulia in 1067 – 68; since according to Amatus, the uprising, led by the Normans Joscelin, lord of Molfetta and Geoffrey of Conversano, was stirred up by the Greeks, who assisted the rebels by sending them money (as indicated before) and Varangians from Constantinople.²⁷ Thus, the city of Bari was targeted afterwards, by the duke, so as to vanquish the Greek menace from Apulia. Also it is important to note: that prior to the 1067 – 68 revolt, Robert was in fact campaigning in Sicily with Count Roger and so had the revolt not occurred then presumably he would have stayed with his younger brother; thus leaving Bari, at least for the time being, in the hands of the Byzantines.²⁸ Also, it was not just Bari which was targeted by Robert as a consequence of rebellion, since it can also be said that the duke’s invasion of the Balkans during the 1080s, in which the island of Corfu was taken in 1081, along with the port of Durazzo in 1082 – transpired due to the fact that the Greeks frequently aided the Norman rebels.²⁹ Robert also justified this campaign by indicating that it was to help Emperor Micheal VII (his then ally), whose removal from power in 1078 was, according to a letter written by Pope Gregory VII, ‘neither just nor rational, but... malicious’.³⁰

Robert’s campaign in the Balkans would be one of his last. In July 1085 the great duke ‘rendered up his own spirit’, as he died whilst trying to capture the island of

²⁵ F. M. Crawford, *Southern Italy And Sicily* (London: MacMillan, 1905), p.209

²⁶ Dawes, ‘Anna Comnena’, book I

²⁷ Dunbar, ‘The History of the Normans by Amatus of Montecassino’, pp.133-34

²⁸ Loud, ‘Geoffrey Malaterra’, p.70

²⁹ Norwich, ‘The Normans in the South’, pp.224-33 – Note, that because Robert was in the Balkans, he was not aiding his brother in Sicily, which he might have done, had the Greeks not assisted the duke’s enemies; and as such, Count Roger was forced to conquer Sicily alone.

³⁰ ‘A letter written by Pope Gregory VII to the bishops of Sothern Italy’, in *Registrum Neapolitani Archivii Monumenta*, 6 Vols. (Naples: 1854 – 61), cited in Loud, ‘The Age of Robert Guiscard’, p.212

Cephalonia.³¹ His death also brought a swift end to the Norman assaults against the Greek mainland and an end to the seemingly endless conquest which occurred in Italy under Robert's leadership – as unlike his predecessor, the new duke of Apulia, Roger Borsa (1085 – 1111) was by no means a great military commander.³² In fact, the only trait that Roger seemed to inherit from his father was an inherent inability to punish severely all those who questioned his authority. Indeed, it was noted by Romuald of Salerno, that Roger was 'a lover of peace, merciful to sinners, kind to his own men' and 'peaceful to foreigners'; it was said that he 'tried to win the love rather than the fear' of his people.³³ This opinion of Roger was also reflected in the text of Geoffrey Malaterra, who wrote: 'the influence of his piety made him a little remiss in the rigour of his justice'.³⁴ Unfortunately for Roger these personal characteristics were not necessarily the traits which were required by a medieval prince. Instead, it is argued by this thesis that sternness and a desire to punish those who rebelled firmly were a must in order to uphold a strong rule. Thus, this is one of the reasons *why* the reign of Roger Borsa can be viewed (as it will be below) as weak.

As Apulia was already quite a volatile region, the lack of an authoritative duke meant that outbreaks of internal fighting soon became commonplace during the late 1080s and 1090s; as rival families chose to utilise this opportunity – much like many families did in Normandy during the unstable years of Robert I (1028 – 35) and William's minority (as stated in chapter one) – 'to gain more (territory) through force of arms'.³⁵ In fact, the situation even became so desperate that the Church tried to help Roger by proclaiming the Truce of God in 1093, to try and restore internal peace – though its effectiveness was probably limited.³⁶ However, it was not just private warfare which was detrimental to Roger's authority, since the most damaging actions came from the duke's half-brother Bohemond; who – 'led by ambition for the ducal

³¹ Loud, 'William of Apulia', book V, p.64

³² Norwich, 'The Normans in the South', pp.268-69

³³ C. A. Garufi (eds.), *Romualdo Guarna: Chronicon sive Annales* (Citta di Castello, 1935), cited in Loud, 'The Age of Robert Guiscard', p.255

³⁴ Loud, 'Geoffrey Malaterra', p.135

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 141

³⁶ Loud, 'The Age of Robert Guiscard', p.227

honour³⁷ – rebelled against him in 1087 by seizing the city of Oria, which remained in his possession due to the duke's inability (as stated before, Roger did not possess his father's military genius) to oust him.³⁸ Also, in order to appease his half-brother's desire for territory, Roger was also forced to sacrifice, in 1088, large amounts of his own land to Bohemond; land that included – as indicated by Geoffrey Malaterra – the major cities of Taranto, Otranto, Gallipoli and later Bari in 1090, along with the title: prince of Taranto.³⁹ But even this did not fully settle his unruly half-brother, since Malaterra also indicates that he remained a persistence menace until he left Apulia in 1096 to join the First Crusade.⁴⁰

Bohemond was not the only member of the Hauteville family, however (see appendix three for the family-tree), that shrewdly abused Roger's weakness, as *significantly* his uncle Count Roger took advantage of him by giving him military support to deal with internal chaos, but at a high price. The cost was that Roger had to yield, to his uncle, control over all the Calabrian castles which were held jointly between the duke (from the time of his father Robert Guiscard) and the count, along with all of his possessions in Sicily.⁴¹ As suggested, the rule of Roger Borsa can be seen as incredibly weak due to his reluctance to deal with troublesome lords. It was for this reason *why* during this period the authority of the duke of Apulia declined, as it was broken-down; with both land and power going to Bohemond (and his newly created semi-independent principality of Taranto) and, perhaps, more importantly to the count of Sicily.⁴² Indeed, it was during these years, the reigns of Roger and his son William (1111 – 27) – who was also characterised as weak by the chroniclers (for example, Romuald of Salerno wrote: he was held 'in contempt by' his barons 'for his kindness and patience') – that the status and power of Norman Sicily grew (at least in part) at the expense of Apulia's, whose own prestige had been in decline ever since the loss of its

³⁷ Loud, 'Geoffrey Malaterra', p.135

³⁸ Loud, 'The Age of Robert Guiscard', p.256-57

³⁹ Loud, 'Geoffrey Malaterra', p.136

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p.136-72

⁴¹ Norwich, 'The Normans in the South', p.259 – To avoid confusion with Roger Borsa, Roger of Sicily (Robert Guiscard's brother) will be referred to as Count Roger throughout this chapter.

⁴² M. Chibnall, *The Normans* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp.75-93

greatest duke, Robert Guiscard.⁴³ This also explains *partly* why the later Norman crown was Sicilian and not Apulian; as it was Sicily which had become the dominant South-Norman territory by 1130.

When compared to the situation in Apulia, it is easy to see why Sicily became so dominant; as its rise in power can largely be attributed to two differences. The first is to do with how each territory was acquired; as unlike the island of Sicily which was captured chiefly by Count Roger (though help was also obtained from Robert) over some thirty years between 1061 and 1091,⁴⁴ the conquest of Apulia on the other hand began initially, in the 1040s, when many different groups of Norman knights started to take large amounts of territory for themselves in a manner which *significantly* was independent of any true central-leadership.⁴⁵ Indeed, even though William ‘Iron Arm’ was the first Norman to be elected as the count of Apulia in September 1042, in reality, his position was – as indicated by Amatus – still simply one amongst twelve Norman territorial chiefs.⁴⁶ Also at this time, the Normans were still technically subordinate to the over-lordship of Prince Guaimar.⁴⁷ Although satisfactory at the time, it was this territorial arrangement which was the cause of many later revolts; for as mentioned before, the spark of discontent often emerged amongst the lords when the duke of Apulia (especially in Robert’s case) tried to extend his authority over land which he himself had not taken, by demanding military service for it.⁴⁸ Due to the differences in conquest, this problem did not arise in Sicily. And lastly, as for the second difference: this was to do with how each territory was managed; as one of the reasons why Sicily stayed so peaceful throughout the eleventh- and twelfth-century was that unlike in Apulia, Count Roger continued to use the Arab custom of keeping all major towns and cities within the demesne of central government, since he did not hand them out as parts of fiefs to feudal lords; as was often the case on the Italian

⁴³ Garufi, ‘Romualdo Guarna’, cited in Loud, ‘The Age of Robert Guiscard’, p.255

⁴⁴ D. Mack-Smith, *A History of Sicily: Medieval Sicily 800 – 1713* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1968), pp.13-23

⁴⁵ Norwich, ‘The Normans in the South’, pp.57-67

⁴⁶ Dunbar, ‘The History of the Normans by Amatus of Montecassino’, pp.175-77

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.175-77

⁴⁸ Loud, ‘The Age of Robert Guiscard’, p.235

mainland.⁴⁹ This prevented the build-up of potentially hostile power-blocks; which was a common problem in Apulia.

Having established why Norman Italy was so prone to rebellion (compared to Sicily) it is easy to see why the later kingship of Roger II was initially met with hatred by many of the Apulian lords.⁵⁰ Having enjoyed the fruits of ducal weakness for a considerable number of years (during the reigns of Roger Borsa and William), so that, as indicated by Alexander of Telesse, no longer did lords 'fear bloody punishment' for typically lawless acts, such as engaging in private warfare – it was for this reason why the Apulians were not prepared to recognise the newly acquired rule of King Roger; especially as he was willing to enforce it.⁵¹ In short, they chose instead (after 1131) to rebel.⁵² However, this time they were not alone; as by becoming a king, Roger II also gained authority over the previously sovereign Norman 'principally of Capua';⁵³ much to the disgust of the Capuain people and its prince, Robert II who, according to the twelfth-century historian Falco of Benevento, did 'not want to be bound by oaths of fealty to the king'; and so he too chose to rebel in 1132.⁵⁴ And lastly, in addition to these internal challenges, the kingship of Roger II was also attacked by the armies of the German king, Lothair III (1125 – 37) who invaded Apulia in 1137, and by Pope Innocent II who despised Roger's kingship, largely because he acquired his crown by supporting the rival pope, Anacletus II.⁵⁵

Despite the enormity of the challenge which faced him, in the end it was Roger and not the rebels which would emerge triumphant; an achievement which was due *largely* to the strength of his character; for despite the fact that much of the rebellion

⁴⁹ Mack-Smith, 'A History of Sicily', p.20

⁵⁰ Matthew, 'The Norman Kingdom of Sicily', p.38

⁵¹ G. A. Loud (trans.), *Alexander of Telesse: The Deeds Done by King Roger of Sicily* [Online]. Available: http://www.leeds.ac.uk/downloads/20041/school_of_history, p.6

⁵² Matthew, 'The Norman Kingdom of Sicily', p.38

⁵³ G. A. Loud (trans.), *John Berard: The Chronicle of St. Clement, Casauria* [Online]. Available: http://www.leeds.ac.uk/downloads/20041/school_of_history, p.29

⁵⁴ E. d'Angelo (eds.), *Falco of Benevento: Chronicon* (Florence, 1998), cited in Matthew, 'The Norman Kingdom of Sicily', pp.42-43

⁵⁵ Norwich, 'The Normans in the South', p.327 – Both popes, Anacletus II and Innocent II were elected in 1130.

lasted for the better part of a decade (1131 – 39), as indicated by the historian Donald Matthew, the king never showed any ‘signs of being discouraged or deterred even by spectacular defeats (for example, he was beaten on the field at Scafati in July 1132, and at Rignano in October 1137, each time by the powerful Capuan noble, Rainulf, count of Alife); he was ‘determined to prevail and have his revenge on his enemies’.⁵⁶ And revenge he did have; as unlike his predecessors – Roger Borsa and even Robert Guiscard, who, as mentioned before, was often rather lenient towards rebels – Roger did not hesitate when it came to giving out harsh punishment.⁵⁷ Indeed, as written by Orderic Vitalis: he ‘cruelly suppressed’ all rebels ‘with great forces; he spared no man but struck down kinsmen and strangers alike and stripped them of their wealth, crushed and humbled them’.⁵⁸ However, it was not just Orderic that considered Roger’s treatment of the rebels as harsh, since both the texts of Alexander of Teleso and Falco of Benevento also give examples of his cruelty. For instance, it was recorded by Teleso that in 1132 Roger’s army ‘furiously’ sacked the rebel city of Montepeloso, by ‘putting anybody they met to the sword’.⁵⁹ He also stated that one of the leaders, Roger of Plenco was ‘put to death’, whilst another, Tancred of Conversano was ‘sent to Sicily in chains’.⁶⁰ Similarly, it was also documented by Falco, that after a revolt at Bari, in 1139, Roger chose to hand out particularly brutal punishments, since ‘he secured the judicial murder of Jaquintus (the city’s ruler), his counsellors and ten others.’⁶¹ In short, by punishing those who rebelled severely, Roger was able to strengthen royal authority throughout the kingdom and achieve a lasting peace (as there were no revolts against the king after 1139); a peace which his mainland predecessors had failed to achieve.

After the final defeat of the rebels in 1139, Roger chose to turn his attention, since he was *now* free to do so, to more productive endeavours which aimed at improving the

⁵⁶ Matthew, ‘The Norman Kingdom of Sicily’, pp.38-39

⁵⁷ Mack-Smith, ‘A History of Sicily’, p.25

⁵⁸ M. Chibnall (trans.), *The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis*, 6 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969 – 80), Vol. VI, p.435

⁵⁹ Loud, ‘Alexander of Teleso’, p.36

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p.36

⁶¹ d’Angelo, ‘Falco of Benevento’, cited in Matthew, ‘The Norman Kingdom of Sicily’, p.53

power and prestige of the Norman Kingdom. In addition to continuing building work on Sicily's many famous cathedrals, in 1140 he also introduced a series of new laws, known as the royal *assizes*.⁶² These touched upon all possible aspects of contemporary legal concern, such as civil law, private property, public property, the Church, royal finances and military service.⁶³ The *assizes* helped to centralise and strengthen royal authority, as *significantly* they established laws which would be applicable in every region.⁶⁴ However, it was not just administrative reform and construction which Roger focused on after 1139, since he also desired to enlarge his territory; and so he did, in a number of different ways. Firstly, he began by expanding his northern Italian frontier in March 1140, as he sent an army (note: that his soldiers had been toughened over the last decade of warfare, much like the Conqueror's had during the violent 1040s and 1050s, as stated in chapter one), led by his sons Roger and Alfonso, to capture the imperial owned region, known as the Abruzzo; which they did.⁶⁵ After this, he targeted North Africa (1146 – 48), firstly to protect his trade routes from the Arab pirates (who constantly attacked them) and secondly to conquer territory; that in the end – as recorded by the Muslim chronicler Ibn al-Athir – 'extended from Tripoli to the borders of Tunis, and from the western Maghrib to Qayrawan'.⁶⁶ In addition to the above, for a brief period (1147 – 49) Roger also held the island of Corfu, which he acquired along with a number of Greek silk weavers (who were taken to Palermo, to form the basis for the Sicilian silk industry), when the royal admiral, George of Antioch raided Greece under the veil of the Second Crusade (1145 – 48).⁶⁷

To conclude: having explored the reigns of many different rulers in Norman Southern Italy and Sicily, it is easy to see the downsides, for a prince, of not punishing rebels severely; as despite the fact that Robert Guiscard was one of the greatest conquerors

⁶² Matthew, 'The Norman Kingdom of Sicily', pp.173-76

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp.173-76

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.173-76

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p.53

⁶⁶ D. S. Richards (trans.), *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir for the Crusading Period from al-Kamil to fi'l-Ta'rikh*, 3 Vols. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2007), Vol. II, p.20 – The African lands were lost by 1160.

⁶⁷ Mack-Smith, 'A History of Sicily', p.29

of the eleventh-century, his authority in Apulia was regularly challenged, throughout his reign, largely, because of his willingness to show leniency (although as indicated above, he did have reasons for not treating the rebels harshly and also rebellion did help to dictate the direction of his conquests) to those who defied him. The same can be said about his son and successor, Roger Borsa, whose rule in Apulia was extremely weak due to his inability to show a firm hand. This also meant that his half-brother, Bohemond and uncle, Count Roger were free to take advantage of his weakness, with the result that ducal authority was in a constant state of decline until Apulia was absorbed into the dominion of Roger II. And finally, with the downsides in mind, it is also easy to see the benefits, since it was by punishing those who rebelled severely that enabled King Roger to achieve a lasting peace (for the rest of his reign) after 1139; a peace which gave him the freedom to develop his newly formed kingdom and to conquer territory.

Conclusion

Having discussed the reigns of many different eleventh- and twelfth-century Norman rulers, situated both in Northern Europe and in the Mediterranean, it is clear that the central premise of this thesis (as outlined in the introduction) stands. As identified throughout the course of chapters one, two and three the successfulness of a medieval prince (either a king or a duke/count) is clearly linked to *how* they dealt with rebellion at the start of their reign; as it was often the case that when a prince defeated and then punished those who had rebelled sternly (even if, the use of harsh punishment was at times condemned by the sources for going too far) that afterwards their authority was much stronger, for the simple reason that a lasting precedent had been established early on – that insolence to their rule would not be tolerated.¹ This also acted as a *catalyst* for later wealth (as each prince became very rich), internal development and conquest; a point which was indicated in each chapter, by several examples of princes whose reigns fit within this premise.

These were: Duke William II since after he had crushed all of the rebellious elements at the start of his reign, he then went on to extend and increase ducal power throughout Normandy and perhaps more *significantly* he also went on to conquer England in 1066 (indicated in chapter one). Additionally, once he had become king, although his rule suffered terribly at the beginning, by punishing those who chose to rebel quite sternly (as indicated in chapter two), his reign after 1070 was incredibly prosperous, since he used his newly acquired authority – the power that he had gained by crushing the rebels – to boost his wealth and to transform, modernise and feudalise

¹ M. Chibnall (trans.), *The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis*, 6 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969 – 80), Vol. II, pp.232-33 – One example, where the use of brutality was condemned is in the text of Orderic Vitalis, since he criticises King William I for destroying much of Northern England during the years 1069 and 1070 (also mentioned in the introduction and in the second chapter).

English society. Furthermore, in addition to William's the same can also be said about the reigns of William Rufus, Henry I (in England) and Roger II (in Southern Italy and Sicily), since each king had to deal with and crush, many rebellious elements during the early part of their reign (as stated in chapters two and three), before internal peace, prosperity and conquest were achieved.²

Having established many of the benefits which early rebellion can bring when dealt with correctly, it is necessary to sum up the negatives; since it was often the case that when a prince failed to vanquish all rebellious elements *early* that internal disorder tended to flourish throughout the majority of their reign, for the simple reason that the authority of the prince was never truly established; and as such, the lords were free to challenge (without fear of reprisal) the prince's rule – which they did – whenever they pleased. Also, without the rule of law – since it was also the responsibility of the prince to prevent outbreaks of private warfare (a task which was hard to do when their authority was weak) – life within that particular state (either a kingdom or a duchy) tended to break down, since greedy lords took advantage of the prince's weakness by attacking their rivals; which in turn, resulted in the destruction of villages, farmland and churches; as well as having a negative effect on the prince's wealth, as weak rulers also tended to be rather poor.³ Examples of those who fit within this part of the premise were: Robert I (as indicated in chapter one), Robert Curthose, who also lost Normandy because of his weakness in 1106 (as indicated in chapter two) and Roger Borsa (as indicated in chapter three); all of whom were, as suggested by the sources, incredibly weak rulers.

In a sense the same can also be said about the reign of Robert Guiscard, since although powerful (as he was more than capable of defeating in battle any lord who challenged his authority), his rule does display, yet again, the necessity for a prince to hand out just, and sometimes severe, punishment to those who chose to rebel; as when


² Note, that William Rufus also conquered territory, since he acquired land in Normandy, from his brother Robert Curthose (as indicated in chapter two).

³ C. W. David, *Robert Curthose: Duke of Normandy* (Cambridge: Mass, 1920), p.142

he did not (for example, Robert was very lenient towards rebels), the fact that he was considered to be great in other respects, made no difference, since the authority of the prince was never truly established.⁴ Leniency was not the key to a lasting peace.


And finally, in terms of what happened when no major uprising occurred during the reign of a Norman prince, it would seem, as indicated by the reign of Richard II, that no major conquest occurred either. Indeed, despite the fact that Richard II (indicated in chapter one) was a wealthy ruler (internal peace was necessary for a prince to acquire great wealth), militarily he was weak. This was because early rebellion also provided the perfect training ground for both the prince and his soldiers to sharpen their military skills; skills which were necessary to facilitate conquest.

⁴ G. A. Loud, *The Age of Robert Guiscard: Southern Italy and the Norman Conquest* (London: Pearson, 2000), p.235 – Also indicated in chapter three.

Appendix Two – the great house of Bellême-Montgomery.²

² The information has been compiled using many of the books that are listed in the bibliography.

Appendix Three – the family of Hauteville.³



³ The information has been compiled using many of the books that are listed in the bibliography.

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