

Is homonationalism influencing public opinion? Experimental and survey evidence from the UK and Romania

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Is homonationalism influencing public opinion?

Experimental and survey evidence from the UK and Romania

Homonationalism is a proposed value configuration that promotes both accepting gay people and prejudice towards immigrants and ethnic minorities. This value configuration contrasts with the widely supported theory that all prejudices are positively related, and are explained by underlying causes such as authoritarianism. Although homonationalism has received attention in qualitative research on mass-media and political discourse, this is the first quantitative exploration of the concept. We used data from a society likely to be high on homonationalism (UK), and one likely to be low (Romania). None of our results were consistent with homonationalism, either in an experiment conducted with students (Study 1, $N = 110$), or in a secondary analysis of data from the same two countries (Study 2, $N = 2638$). Ethnic prejudice and homophobia were positively related, while homonationalism was negatively related to homophobia and authoritarianism. Homonationalism has little utility as a construct for understanding public opinion at this point in time, and research investigating it at other levels of analysis may be more fruitful.

Keywords: authoritarianism; homonationalism; heteronationalism; homophobia.

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Over the last few years, the media have often probed cross-cultural differences in lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) rights. In October 2014, *The Economist* ran a cover story contrasting Western and non-Western LGB rights policies. The issue's cover mainly relied on contemporary Western visual clichés to represent gay rights: the title, 'The Gay Divide,' was printed in a rainbow-pattern font; and two disembodied, interlocked, male-looking hands formed the central image. The subtitle and the background were split: 'Half the world has leapt forward...' was printed on a white background, and '... but too many countries are going backward' on a black background. The visual message reads easily: a white/bright pro-gay West is defined against a black/dark anti-gay rest of the world.

Sexual mores have been used historically to argue for the cultural superiority or inferiority of certain ethnic groups, countries, or regions. For example, Europeans in the 19th century referred to the perceived promiscuity of other peoples as one of many rhetorical means to justify colonialism (Pryke, 1998). Today, sexuality is once again playing a role in how the West is compared to the rest of the world. In the wake of decolonisation and increased global mobility, many nationalist voices have refocused on restricting immigration to the West from poorer countries (see, e.g., Hekma, 2011). One argument used against immigrants is that they are less tolerant of LGB people than locals. Most typically, Muslim immigrants are seen as bringing in misogyny and homophobia to their (more progressive) host countries in Europe and North America (see Caldwell, 2009, for a book-long example of this discourse). Moreover, Western tolerance towards gay people has also been used as a rhetorical tool to vilify Middle-Eastern countries and to justify 21st century wars against them (Butler, 2009; Puar, 2007). 'There is a transition underway in how queer subjects are relating

to nation-states [...], from being figures of death (i.e., the AIDS epidemic) to becoming tied to ideas of life and productivity (i.e., gay marriage and families).’ (Puar, 2007, p. xii). Now gay rights – rather than Victorian restraint – are the proof of Western superiority, and a reason to keep out the potentially less tolerant immigrants. This new dynamic of nation and sexuality has been called *homonationalism* (Puar, 2007).

Conversely, many political voices in regions such as Eastern Europe see gay rights campaigns as an unwelcome Western interference in their culture: for example, gay pride parades have been construed as foreign by Romanian ultranationalists (Bartoş, Balş, & Berger, 2013). Such a sexuality-nationality dynamic has been called *heteronationalism* (Gosine, 2009). Indeed, research on sexuality and nationalism in Eastern Europe has typically found that gay people were excluded from depictions of national identity, and associated with a West construed as morally corrupt (see, e.g., the first issue of the journal *Sextures*, dedicated to ‘Queering sexual citizenship’). Accordingly, social scientists need to examine the extent to which homo- and heteronationalism might be changing the landscape of pro and anti-gay public opinion in Europe.

Homonationalism and Psychology

Puar (2007) analysed American discourses on the US’s recent defence policies, and identified three thematic strands in homonationalistic talk: (1) the acceptance of gay people makes the US better than other countries; (2) (pro-gay) secularism is construed as normal, while Muslims are rejected; and (3) US superiority (gained via gay rights) legitimises war against other countries. Polar opposites of these assertions can be found in heteronationalistic discourse: homophobia is normalised, and the quest for gay rights is construed as (Western) aggression (Bartos et al., 2013).

For psychology, homonationalism (as well as heteronationalism) is interesting for at least two reasons. First, homonationalism includes sexuality in national (self-) definition, in

addition to the more familiar territorial, linguistic, and religious criteria. Therefore, such binary pairs become possible as *Muslim versus gay* in the homonationalistic West (Butler, 2009), and *Romanian versus gay* in the heteronationalistic East (Bartoş et al., 2013; Nachescu, 2005).

A classic study by Tajfel, Billig, Bundy and Flament (1971) found that categorising people into ingroup and outgroup leads to *ingroup favouritism*, i.e., the tendency to allocate more resources to one's own group. Ingroup favouritism is not, however, limited to maximising the resources of one's own group, but it also involves maximising the difference between the ingroup and the outgroup: resources are allocated in such a way that the ingroup shall get more than the outgroup (Tajfel et al., 1971). Difference maximisation will go as far as sacrificing some of the ingroup's gains to ensure that the outgroup obtains comparatively less (Sidanius, Haley, Molina, & Pratto, 2007). Puar's (2007) work suggests that Westerners regard LGB people as ingroup members when they contrast themselves with a Muslim outgroup. Difference maximisation has been found when groups were defined by nationality (Sidanius et al., 2007) and by sexuality (Fasoli, Maass, & Carnaghi, 2015), but it remains an open question whether difference maximisation could also be driven by homonationalism. It is also an open question whether the homo- and heteronationalistic discourses in the media can influence how people allocate resources to groups. In this paper, we will assess whether the resource allocation bias described by Tajfel et al. (1971) can be replicated in relation to the Muslim-versus-gay binary.

Second, homonationalism implies a surprising relationship between homophobia and ethnic prejudice for social psychologists. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950) asserted that all prejudices (racism, sexism, homophobia etc.) were underlain by a personality trait they named authoritarianism. In brief, "authoritarianism is an individual predisposition concerned with the appropriate balance between group authority and

uniformity, on the one hand, and individual autonomy and diversity, on the other.” (Stenner, 2005, p. 14) Extensive research conducted since Adorno et al.’s work has generally confirmed that authoritarianism has widespread implications. Authoritarianism is a strong predictor of all forms of prejudice, such a homophobia, racism and misogyny (Altemeyer, 1998; Goodman & Moradi, 2008; Stenner, 2005; Whitley & Lee, 2000).

Homophobia has often been found to be correlated with racism (Aosved & Long, 2006; Campo-Arias Oviedo, & Herazo, 2014) and other forms of ethnic prejudice (Hadler, 2012; Whitley & Lee, 2000), and authoritarianism explains a significant part of their shared variance (Stenner, 2005). But if groups had homonationalistic beliefs, then we would expect to see individuals with lower levels of homophobia to also show higher levels of ethnic prejudice. Such a pattern of homonationalistic prejudice would be difficult to understand or explain from the standpoint of Adorno et al.’s authoritarianism theory. Such a pattern of beliefs would suggest that a concept of homonationalism is required in social psychology to provide an alternative understanding of prejudice to that offered by the authoritarian personality. The present paper examines the implications of homonationalism for the authoritarian-personality hypothesis, and the social psychology of prejudice more broadly.

But why would homonationalism emerge in the West, while the more traditional heteronationalistic attitudes persist elsewhere? Many traditional religions condemn homosexuality, and many people in Western societies have moved away from these belief systems in the 20th century (Hadler, 2012). Therefore, secularisation may be a driver of new attitudes towards sexuality. Western societies have also experienced a more pervasive value shift that Ronald Inglehart (2008; Inglehart & Baker, 2000) has called *postmodernisation*: equality, diversity, and self-affirmation have become primary goals for these societies and their governments, often eclipsing economic priorities. LGB people, like other oppressed groups, have formed social movements and they have achieved various degrees of acceptance

across the Western world. Eastern Europe has experienced less secularisation and less postmodernisation than the West, which may explain higher levels of homophobia and, possibly, lower levels of homonationalism.

Research on Homonationalism

Some journalists and commentators have quickly adopted the notion of homonationalism. The term itself, technical as it may seem to be, has been taken up to some extent in popular discourse: since the publication of Puar's book in 2007, it appeared at least 120 times in the English-language news outlets indexed by Google News. Two-thirds of these occurrences date from 2017-2016, when they were used to discuss the outreach of prominent nationalist politicians (such as Donald Trump and Marine LePen) to gay voters.

Homonationalism has been the subject of much theoretical and discursive work, but seemingly no psychological research. The available philosophical reflections and qualitative studies suggests that homonationalistic discourses flourish: from Israeli tourist advertisements (Puar, 2014) to Dutch political manifestos (Hekma, 2011) and American war reports (Butler, 2009), pro-gay attitudes are used to contrast a 'civilised' nation to 'backward' ethnic groups. This evidence, however, almost invariably comes from the analysis of news reports, political speeches, and other professionally crafted texts. The social psychological question remains how these messages are reflected in people's thoughts and behaviours. This is not to suggest that discourse lacks reality, only that prejudice can and should be understood at different levels of analysis (Bartos & Hegarty, 2014).

In this paper, we aim to explore homonationalism with the tools of quantitative social psychology. Therefore, we investigate (1) whether homonationalism can be measured and (2) whether the predictions of the prejudice literature summarised above apply to homonationalism. We report two studies. In both studies, we asked whether homonationalism reverses the positive relationship between homophobia and ethnic prejudice, thus posing an

exception to the classic proposition of Adorno et al. (1950) that all prejudices are positively related. First, we designed a questionnaire and an experiment to quantify homonationalism. We tested the homonationalism hypothesis on two similar samples of undergraduate students from Romania and the UK, thus allowing for cross-cultural comparisons (Study 1). Given the small size and low demographic diversity of these samples, we then tested a similar hypothesis on secondary data from the same two countries (Study 2).

Study 1

In Study 1 we sought to operationalise homonationalism and explore its power to explain prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behaviour in one Eastern European and one Western European country. To this end, we designed a homonationalism questionnaire and an experimental task. The questionnaire consisted of 6 items describing Puar's (2007) three facets of homonationalism and contrasting heteronationalistic statements (see Table 1). Homonationalistic discourse occurs in Western Europe, while in Eastern Europe it is made largely impossible by the prevalence of homophobia (Bartos et al., 2013; Kulpa, 2011). We therefore predicted that UK participants would be more homonationalistic than their Romanian peers.

--Table 1 about here --

Second, we performed an experiment to test whether priming participants on tensions between sexual and ethnic minorities influenced their allocation of resources to gay and Muslim groups. Homonationalistic discourse suggests that LGB people are part of the ingroup and constructs Muslims as an outgroup for Western nations. Proponents of the homonationalism concept argue that the mass-media systematically reinforce this binary, exacerbating intergroup tensions (e.g., Butler, 2009; Puar, 2007). We tested the hypothesis that priming homonationalism would shift resource allocation to maximise the relative gains of gay groups over Muslim groups. Increasing the perception that two groups are in conflict

can enhance ingroup favouritism and difference maximisation when allocating resources, especially if participants already hold prejudiced views of the outgroup. Thus, people may be willing to sacrifice the resources of their own group to make sure that the outgroup is not at an advantage; Sidanius et al. (2007) have called this sacrifice during resource allocation, 'Vladimir's choice.'¹ In this study, participants were asked to allocate resources to one Muslim and one gay charity based on an allocation scheme akin to Tajfel matrices (Tajfel et al., 1971). As in Sidanius et al. (2007), participants could opt either to maximise the gains of both groups by giving more money to the Muslim cause than the gay cause; or to give relatively more to the gay cause, at the cost of offering both charities a smaller amount of money (i.e., to make Vladimir's choice). Prior to this resource allocation task, participants read one news flash that presented either Muslim immigrants or local Christians as disrupting a gay pride event. If homonationalism represents a new ingroup/outgroup binary that is anchored in representations of competing interests of gay and Muslim groups, then one would expect more homonationalistic participants to also be more likely to make Vladimir's choice.

Finally, we formulate a prediction independent of the measure of homonationalism developed here, but relevant to the concept of homonationalism. We predicted that the positive relationship between homophobia and ethnic prejudice would be weaker in the UK than in Romania, if the UK were indeed more homonationalistic, and thus had more pro-gay nationalists. Differences between countries in the level of prejudice have been explained by differences in postmaterialism (Inglehart, 1997), authoritarianism (Stenner, 2005) and religiosity (Štulhofer & Rimac, 2009). Therefore, we predicted that the country had no moderating effect on the relationship between ethnic prejudice and homophobia when controlling for authoritarianism, religiosity and postmaterialism.

Method

Participants. Participants were 110 students aged 18-30 from the UK ($n = 55$) and Romania ($n = 55$). As a reward, UK students were entered into a prize draw, while Romanian students received research credit. Initially, 141 students participated. The 10 participants over the age of 30 were excluded to achieve a more homogeneous sample of young adults. A further six Muslim participants were excluded because homonationalism refers only to non-Muslim people's construction of Muslims as an-outgroup. Finally, 15 participants who identified with a sexuality other than *straight* or *heterosexual* were also removed from the sample. Most participants in both countries were women: 75% in the UK and 78% in Romania.

Personal values. Religiosity was assessed on a 7-point Likert scale² on the importance of religion in the participant's life (see, e.g., Inglehart, 1997). Postmaterialism was assessed using Inglehart's (1997) items. Specifically, participants were asked to prioritise goals for their country, choosing between materialistic (e.g., economic growth) and postmaterialistic (e.g., clean environment) goals. Higher scores indicate more postmaterialistic values. Authoritarianism was measured with a short version of Altemeyer's Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (15 items, Zakrisson, 2005). Apart from brevity, this version has the advantage of avoiding direct questions on homosexuality, thus minimising the overlap with other measures. The scale had good internal consistency in the current sample, Cronbach's $\alpha = .780$.

Homophobia. We assessed participants' attitude to LGB issues with Morrison and Morrison's (2002) 12-item Modern Homonegativity Scale (MHS). The instrument was highly reliable (current $\alpha = .875$), and it was strongly correlated with other measures of homophobia (all $r_s > .72$; Rye & Meaney, 2010).

Ethnic prejudice. Most measures of national, racial and ethnic prejudice are developed in specific contexts and with reference to specific groups, which creates difficulties in cross-cultural comparisons. Following Mummendey, Klink and Brown (2001), we selected seven items from a scale developed to measure prejudice against immigrants in the UK (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) that are applicable to both Romania and the UK. We asked participants to answer the questionnaire with reference to the ethnic group in their country from which they feel the most distant. Participants were not asked to name the ethnic group they were referring to, both to reduce the effect of social desirability which is high in racism research, and to allow participants to choose the most appropriate target of their attitudes. The measure showed very good internal consistency, $\alpha = .785$.

Homonationalism. We constructed a 6-item Homonationalism Scale (HN) to measure homonationalism based on Puar's (2006) work (see Table 1). Higher scores indicate greater homonationalism. The psychometric qualities of this measure are described below.

Experimental Task. We designed a task in which participants allocated resources to gay and Muslim charities. As with the ethnic prejudice measure, we aimed to construct a task that was decontextualised enough to suit both countries. Christian locals in an unnamed Belgian³ town were the intended ingroup, while Muslim immigrants in the same town were the outgroup. The seven resource allocation options were those used in the 'Vladimir's choice' matrix (Sidanius et al., 2007). The first three options allocated more money to the Muslim charity, the fourth option allocated equal amounts to both charities, and the last three option allocated more to the gay charity. Thus, allocating £19,000 to the gay charity and £25,000 to the Muslim charity was scored '1'; allocating £13,000 to each charity was scored '4'; and allocating £7,000 to the gay charity and £1,000 to the Muslim charity was scored '7'. Accordingly, participants could only disfavour the Muslim charity by also cutting funds from the gay one, i.e., by making 'Vladimir's choice'. The full options are presented in Table 2.

--Table 2 about here--

Procedure. The experimental task was presented before the other measures to a randomly-selected half of the participants, and after the other measures to the rest of the participants. Romanian translations were performed by the first author; back-translations were obtained via Google Translate (<http://translate.google.co.uk>) and with the assistance of a Romanian native speaker.

Results

The Homonationalism Scale. To explore the properties of the newly constructed homonationalism scale, a principal components analysis was conducted. A one-factor solution proved to be adequate, but only after one item was eliminated; see Table 1. The Keiser-Meyer-Olkin test suggested the sampling was acceptable but modest, $KMO = .628$. The single factor had an eigenvalue of 2.176, and it explained 43.529 % of the variance. The absolute values of the loadings of individual items ranged from .519 to .707. The scale thus constructed had an acceptable internal consistency, Cronbach $\alpha = .674$.

In order to further examine the properties of our homonationalism scale, its correlations with the other variables were computed. (See Table 3.) As expected, homonationalism was strongly and negatively related to homophobia, $r(109) = -.626, p < .001$. Given that homophobia explained more than one third of the variance of homonationalism, partial correlations controlling for homophobia were also computed. Surprisingly, homonationalism was negatively correlated with ethnic prejudice, $r(109) = -.411, p < .001$. However, this was no longer the case when controlling for homophobia, partial $r(107) = -.072, p = .459$. It is also noteworthy that the homonationalism scale showed medium-to-strong negative correlations with authoritarianism and religiosity both when raw scores were considered and when controlling for homophobia. In other words, there was no

evidence that homonationalism was associated with greater levels of ethnic prejudice, even after the relationship between homonationalism and pro-gay attitudes was partialled out.

--Table 3 about here--

We also examined the correlations between individual homonationalism items and the other variables (Table 3). These results were consistent overall with the conclusions drawn from analysing the homonationalism scale: participants who agreed more with homonationalistic items tended to be less homophobic, less prejudiced towards ethnic minorities, less authoritarian and less religious. Those who agreed more with heteronationalistic statements also had higher scores for homophobia, ethnic prejudice, authoritarianism and more religiosity. Postmaterialism and resource allocation showed weak associations with these items. The item we excluded from the homonationalism scale (Item 6) did not significantly correlate with any other variable.

As predicted, homonationalism scores were higher in UK ($M = 4.88$, $SD = 0.89$) than in Romanian ($M = 4.48$, $SD = 1.02$) participants, $t(108) = 2.17$, $p = .032$, $d = 0.42$. Given the strong correlation between homonationalism and homophobia, we performed an ANCOVA to assess the difference in homonationalism between Romania and the UK when controlling for homophobia. The effect of homophobia was large and significant, $F(1, 107) = 61.833$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .366$. The effect of the country was small and nonsignificant, $F(1, 107) = 0.230$, $p = .633$, $\eta^2 = .002$. Country differences in homonationalism were entirely explained by country differences in homophobia, suggesting no need to posit an additional factor other than homophobic attitudes to explain ideological differences between the West and the East.

Next, we tested the hypothesis that homonationalism moderated the link between homophobia and ethnic prejudice. We performed a linear regression analysis using mean centred predictors. The model was significant, $F(3, 106) = 38.267$, $p < .001$; and it explained a large proportion of the variance of homophobia, adjusted $R^2 = .506$. Both ethnic prejudice

($b = 0.387$, $SE = 0.073$, $\beta = .393$, $p < .001$) and homonationalism ($b = - 0.475$, $SE = 0.076$, $\beta = - .465$, $p < .001$) had a significant effect on homophobia. The effect of the product of the predictors, however, was nonsignificant, $b = 0.009$, $SE = 0.070$, $\beta = .009$, $p = .892$.

Accordingly, the moderation hypothesis was not supported: homonationalism does not moderate the link between homophobia and ethnic prejudice.

Resource Allocation. Resource allocation did not differ between the two countries: UK participants ($M = 4.42$, $SD = 1.27$) had a nonsignificantly stronger tendency to make Vladimir's choice than their Romanian peers ($M = 4.24$, $SD = 1.27$), $t(108) = 0.720$, $p = .473$, $d = 0.139$. The experimental manipulation⁴ also had no main effect on resource allocation. Rather, a nonsignificant trend was observed in the direction contrary to the one expected: those in the control group had a nonsignificantly stronger tendency towards Vladimir's choice ($M = 4.45$, $SD = 1.25$) than those exposed to homonationalistic messages ($M = 4.20$, $SD = 1.39$), $t(108) = - 1.011$, $p = .314$, $d = - 0.183$. Resource allocation was not correlated with homonationalism, $r(109) = - .060$, $p = .533$. To test if the effect of experimental manipulation on resource allocation was moderated by homonationalism, we performed a linear regression analysis using mean centred predictors. The model was not significant, $F(3, 106) = 0.716$, $p = .545$, adjusted $R^2 = .008$. Neither the experimental condition ($b = - 0.146$, $SE = 0.128$, $\beta = - .111$, $p = .256$), nor homonationalism ($b = - 0.120$, $SE = 0.134$, $\beta = - .089$, $p = .371$) had a significant effect on resource allocation. The interaction was also nonsignificant, $b = - 0.094$, $SE = 0.134$, $\beta = - .068$, $p = .484$. Thus, the moderation hypothesis was not supported.

Tests of Other *A Priori* Hypotheses. Finally, we assessed the hypothesis that the relationship between homophobia and ethnic prejudice is weaker in the UK due to an influence of homonationalism. A hierarchical linear regression analysis were performed with homophobia as the criterion variable. See Table 4. In Step 1, we entered ethnic prejudice and

participants' country. Ethnic prejudice was a significant and strong predictor of homophobia, but participants' nationality was not. The model was significant, adjusted $R^2 = .341$, $F(2, 107) = 27.695$, $p < .001$. In Step 2, we entered the interaction between country and ethnic prejudice. This was nonsignificant, and it did not improve the model, adjusted $R^2 = .001$, $F(1, 106) = 0.191$, $p = .663$. In Step 3, we added authoritarianism, postmaterialism, and religiosity. None of these predictors was significant individually, but they collectively improved the model, $\Delta R^2 = .082$, $F(3, 103) = 4.914$, $p < .01$. The effect of ethnic prejudice on homophobia remained large and significant after controlling for all other variables, $b = 0.498$, $SE = 0.089$, $p < .001$, $\beta = .506$. See Table 4 for details. In sum we found no evidence that homonationalism had weakened the relationship between homophobia and ethnic prejudice in the UK.

--Table 4 about here--

Discussion

The results enabled by the homonationalism scale and by the resource allocation task did not support the homonationalism hypothesis for several reasons. First, contrary to expectations, the positive relationship between homophobia and ethnic prejudice was not weaker in participants high on homonationalism. Second, a media message that showed gay and Muslim people in conflict did not prompt participants to disfavour Muslims to a greater extent in resource allocation, even among participants who were comparatively high on homonationalism. Third, UK participants were indeed more homonationalistic than their Romanian peers, but this difference was entirely explained by UK participants being less homophobic.

Whilst this first quantitative investigation of homonationalism casts doubt on the importance of the concept and its explanatory power. In Study 1, student participants were employed as an efficient way to obtain comparable samples in different countries. Students

are the ideal participants for cognitively demanding tasks that require complex thinking about social and political issues (Dasgupta & Hunsinger, 2008). However, Henry (2008) found that American students are less prejudiced than non-students, and their prejudice toward specific groups has a weaker relationship with their general belief in equality. Study 1 also had a small sample. Sensitivity analyses suggested this study could detect medium-sized effects for mean differences ($d = 0.54$), correlations ($r = .26$), and linear regression with two predictors ($R^2 = .09$), with $\alpha = .05$ and $1 - \beta = .80$. However, the study may have been underpowered for detecting interactions, which requires sample sizes several times larger than a comparable main effect (Aiken and West, 1991) . Study 2 employed a much larger, non-student sample.

Study 2

Mindful of the limitations of student samples, we designed a second test of the homonationalism hypothesis. Specifically, we reanalyse data from the World Values Survey (World Values Survey Association, 2015) and its sister project, the European Values Study (European Values Study, 2015; henceforth WVS/EVS), in order to study homophobia in a larger, cross-cultural sample. The WVS/EVS systematically collects data on people's attitudes on dozens of issues, regularly surveying about one thousand participants from most of countries around the world.

The WVS/EVS contains data from thousands of participants of all ages and all backgrounds using measures that have been extensively studied over time (see below). Of course, WVS/EVS contains no *direct* measure of homonationalism. However, it can be used to test a thesis similar to the last hypothesis of Study 1. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that the relationship between homophobia and ethnic prejudice is moderated by participants' nationality, and that the role of nationality is explained by country-level differences in religiosity, authoritarianism and postmaterialism.

Data

Participants. Individual-level data from Romania and the UK were used from data collection Wave 6 (2006-2010). Participants were 2683 respondents to the survey (1372 in the UK and 1311 in Romania) who had complete data on all variables of interest. Overall, 12.43 % of the cases were discarded due to missing values. Participants were aged 16 to 94 ($M = 50.33$, $SD = 18.09$). British participants ($M = 52.08$, $SD = 18.82$) were slightly older than their Romanian peers ($M = 48.51$, $SD = 17.12$), $t(2671) = 5.122$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.190$. As for gender, 56.4 % of the participants were women.

Personal values. Religiosity was assessed through a question (F034) allowing people to categorise themselves as either religious (1), non-religious (2) or atheists (3). To make the results easier to interpret, we reversed the coding of this variable so that religious people scored the highest and atheists the lowest. Postmaterialism was assessed with the same method as in Study1. The resulting variable (Y002) approximated a normal distribution (skewness and kurtosis values in all three countries < 2). Following Stenner (2005), a measure of authoritarianism was computed based on the WVS items on childrearing values (A027 – A034; see Stenner, 2005). The respective questions assess the importance placed by participants on such authority-focused values as obedience, and such independence-focused values as creativity. As anticipated (Stenner, 2005), the measure of authoritarianism computed from childrearing values had low internal consistency, particularly in Eastern European samples (Cronbach's $\alpha = .256$ in the UK, $.142$ in Romania). However, the scale seems to have very good convergent validity, being the strongest predictor of homophobia across cultures (see also Stenner, 2005, for other cultures and other forms of prejudice).

Ethnic prejudice. Ethnic prejudice was operationalised as the rejection of immigrant neighbours. Specifically, participants were asked to pick from a list the types of people they

would not like as neighbours, “immigrants” being one option (A124_06). This measure was therefore dichotomous: immigrants were either selected (1) or not selected (0) from the list.

Homophobia. Two measures of homophobia were used. A dichotomous survey item (A124_09) indicated whether participants chose ‘homosexuals’ from a list of potentially undesirable neighbours. We will call this measure *social distance*. Participants also assessed the morality of homosexuality (F118) on a scale ranging from ‘never justifiable’ (1) to ‘always justifiable’ (10). In many countries (including Romania), (1) is the most frequent answer. Therefore, this variable has often been dichotomised (e.g., Inglehart, 1997) to contrast those for whom homosexuality was never justifiable (1) with all other respondents (0). We dichotomized the measure in this study also, and called this measure *moral rejection*.

Analysis

Separate hierarchical binary logistic regression analyses were performed for the two measures of homophobia. The models were otherwise identical. In Step 1, we entered immigrant rejection and participants’ country as predictors. In Step 2, we added the interaction between country and immigrant rejection. In Step 3, we added authoritarianism, postmaterialism, and religiosity. Both measures of homophobia were higher in those who also rejected immigrants, and in Romanian participants. The interaction terms added in Step 2 rendered results that contradicted the focal homonationalism hypothesis. For the social distance item about homosexuals, the interaction between country and ethnic prejudice was significant, but in the direction opposite to the one expected based on homonationalism: the association between homophobia and ethnic prejudice was stronger in the UK ($OR = 7.695$) than in Romania ($OR = 2.810$). For the item on the moral rejection of homosexuality, the interaction between country and ethnic prejudice was nonsignificant. In the case of both outcome measures, authoritarianism, postmaterialism and religiosity improved the model

without meaningfully affecting the effects of the other predictors. The predictions generated by the homonationalism hypothesis were entirely unsupported. See Table 5 for details.

--Table 5 about here--

Discussion

The relationship between homophobia and ethnic prejudice was not stronger in Romania than in the UK, nor was it related to other predictors of prejudice such as authoritarianism, postmaterialism and religiosity. Unlike Study 1, however, Study 2 had a large representative sample, and enough statistical power to detect even small effects. The conclusions of both studies engendered doubt about the social psychological importance of homonationalism.

As with any secondary analysis, the datasets we used did not always contain the best type of data to answer our questions. Quantifying authoritarianism within the WVS is manageable but complex, as explained in the section on *Data*. The measurement of homophobia in the WVS might be problematic for current purposes. The two questions asked in the WVS explore blatant prejudice, ignoring the emergence of more subtle modern homophobia (Morrison & Morrison, 2002). However, Rye and Meaney's (2010) comparison of homophobia scales found very high correlations among all measures, regardless of the type of prejudice they addressed.

General Discussion

Our findings across both studies were overwhelmingly inconsistent with the hypothesis that homonationalism has exerted a distinct influence on the ideology of the West creating a pro-gay rationalization of ethnic prejudice in general and Islamophobia in particular. Contrary to this hypothesis, homonationalism was not associated with ethnic prejudice, and cross-national differences in homonationalism were explained by differences in existing measures of homophobia. Resource allocation to ethnic and sexual minorities was

not sensitive to homonationalistic messages, and it was not related to participants' homonationalism scores either. Moreover, the degree to which homophobia and ethnic prejudice were associated either did not differ between Romania and the UK or was *stronger* in the UK than in Romania. The data thus failed to support the conjecture that Western countries now have more specifically *pro-gay* racists.

As opposed to homonationalism, our results are largely consistent with the classical understanding of prejudice proposed by Adorno et al. (1950). The correlation between homophobia and ethnic persisted across different measures, samples and countries. Religiosity and postmaterialism were related to homophobia only in Study 2, but not in the smaller student sample of Study 1. Authoritarianism was significantly related to the moral rejection of homosexuality (Study 2), but only marginally to modern homonegativity (Study 1) and not at all to social distance (Study 2). This, the classical understanding of prejudice fits the data better than the homonationalism hypothesis, but its explanatory power was not consistent across all measures and methodologies.

The correlations between the homonationalism scale and other instruments suggest that this new scale measures a facet of homophobia, but not the concept of homonationalism proposed in other literatures. Homonationalism scores were correlated strongly with homophobia. They also correlated with religiosity and authoritarianism, even when controlling for homophobia. Most importantly, the homonationalism scale was not independently related to ethnic prejudice, and the item that made the most explicit reference to ethnic minorities ("Some ethnic groups in our country present a threat to LGB people's full equality.") needed to be excluded for the homonationalism scale to achieve internal consistency. The questionnaire therefore seems to capture a form of opposition to authoritarian, religiously conservative attitudes towards LGB people that is not entirely covered by the MHS (Morrison & Morrison, 2002). However, we have discovered no

empirical basis for caution that this opposition leads to new, particular or worrying forms of outgroup hatred or ostracism of immigrants or ethnoreligious minorities.

One should not, however, immediately or categorically conclude that such a thing as homonationalism does not exist in any sense. The juxtaposition of current quantitative findings and previous qualitative research suggests that homonationalism as defined by Puar (2007) could be a rhetorical tool rather than a construct reflecting public opinion or private attitudes. The use of such statements to create ethnic tensions is likely to be limited to public discourse, without much reflection in people's attitudes. It seems that *homonationalism is a discursive repertoire that exploits new developments in sexual politics, but it is not the essence of these developments*. Puar (2007) was probably right in claiming 'no organic unity or cohesion' (p. 10) for homonationalism. Further qualitative research in psychology may identify aspects of homonationalism that are more relevant to the discipline than further quantitative research.

In conclusion, the present study has found limited use for the concept of homonationalism in explaining the psychology of prejudice. The relationships between homophobia, ethnic prejudice, and related constructs were consistent with the established model: the two types of prejudice were positively related, and linked to authoritarianism. We did not find a homonationalistic attitudinal configuration either in participants from the West or postmaterialistic participants. However, a questionnaire containing items on LGB issues framed in a geopolitical terms was negatively related to religiosity, authoritarianism, ethnic prejudice, and homophobia. Given that the items refer to current geopolitical issues, we think it possible that the homonationalism scale captures a stage in the evolution of homophobia that is past the 'modern homonegativity' measured by the MHS, but does not indicate that homonationalism is a salient part of that landscape. Homonationalism may exist, and may

have a reality in public opinion, but the current investigations show no empirical support for this view.

Footnotes

¹ The name originates in a Russian folk tale in which the protagonist (Vladimir) sacrificed his own gains for an opportunity to punish his foe.

² Unless otherwise specified, all variables in this study represent the means of 7-point Likert scale items.

³ Belgium was chosen as a country with comparatively few associations relevant to this study in either the UK or Romania. Note that the experiment was conducted before Brussels was the scene of extensive anti-terror investigations in November 2015.

⁴ The order of presentation had no effect on any variable of interest. All t tests were nonsignificant.

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Table 1. Summary of principal components analysis for the homonationalism scale ($N = 110$). The full scale comprises all the proposed items, while the revised scale contains only the five items retained for the final version of the instrument. IRI = item reliability index (corrected item-total correlation).

Puar's label	Item	Item content	Full scale		Revised scale	
			Loading	IRI	Loading	IRI
<i>Queer as regulatory</i>	1	Gay rights threaten the traditional way of life in some cultures.*	.694	.323	.700	.473
<i>Sexual exceptionalism</i>	2	Countries that support gay rights are better than countries that don't.	-.656	.484	-.649	.411
<i>Queer as regulatory</i>	3	Some ethnic groups in our country present a threat to LGB people's full equality.	-.030	.010	-	-
<i>The ascendancy of whiteness</i>	4	Developed countries should influence less developed countries to be more accepting of LGB people.	-.711	.515	-.707	.476
<i>Sexual exceptionalism</i>	5	Traditional heterosexual families are a defining aspect of our culture.*	.704	.474	.703	.471
<i>The ascendancy of whiteness</i>	6	Rich countries often force poorer countries to accept gay rights.*	.513	.219	.519	.309
Eigenvalue			2.177		2.176	
Variance explained (%)			36.281		43.529	
Cronbach α			.593		.674	

*Reverse coded (heteronationalistic) item.

Table 2. Response options for the “Vladimir’s choice” task (adapted from Sidanius et al., 2007).

Option	LGBT Equality Group	Muslim Charitable Fund	Participant score
A	€19,000	€25,000	1
B	€17,000	€21,000	2
C	€15,000	€17,000	3
D	€13,000	€13,000	4
E	€11,000	€9,000	5
F	€9,000	€5,000	6
G	€7,000	€1,000	7

Table 3. Zero-order and partial (controlling for homophobia) correlations between the homonationalism scale and related variables ($N = 110$).

	Homonationalism	Item 1	Item 2	Item 3	Item 4	Item 5	Item 6
	Total	Partial					
Ethnic prejudice	-.411*	.261*	-.315*	-.0	-.343*	.313*	
Authoritarianism	-.584*	-.072*	.368*	-.411*	-.1	-.357*	.511*
Homophobia	-.626*	-.425*	.344*	-.498*	-.1	-.518*	.401*
Postmaterialism	.249**	-.203	.330**	-.0			-.07
		.154*		.44		.151	-.054

		<i>-.577*</i>	<i>-.461*</i>	<i>.344*</i>	<i>-.448*</i>	<i>-.0</i>	<i>-.436*</i>	<i>.467*</i>	
Religiosity	**	**	**	**	**	88	**	**	.168
Resource							.00		
allocation		<i>-.060</i>	<i>.053</i>	<i>-.014</i>	<i>.011</i>	3	<i>-.213*</i>	<i>-.063</i>	.119
* <i>p</i> < .05 ** <i>p</i> < .01 *** <i>p</i> < .001									

Table 4. Hierarchical linear model predicting homophobia ($N = 110$).

Step					p
		B	SE	β	
1	Intercept	3.22	0.07		< .00
		9	7	1	
	Country (UK)	-	0.09	-.02	.758
		0.028	0	8	
	Ethnic prejudice	0.58	0.08	.59	< .00
	9	9	8	1	
	Adjusted R^2			.34	< .00
			I	I	
2	Intercept	3.24	0.09		< .00
		9	0	1	
	Country (UK)	-	0.09	-.03	.733
		0.031	0	1	
	Ethnic prejudice	0.59	0.09	.60	< .00
		5	1	4	1
	Country x Ethnic prejudice	-	0.09	-.03	.663
	0.040	1	5		
	Adjusted ΔR^2			.00	.663
			I		
3	Intercept	1.98	0.58		.001
		2	3		
	Country (UK)	-	0.08	-.07	.397
		0.076	9	7	
	Ethnic prejudice	0.49	0.09	.50	< .00
		8	0	6	1
	Country x Ethnic prejudice	-	0.08	-.03	.660
		0.038	7	4	
Authoritarianism	0.27	0.14	.19	.068	
	5	9	6		
m					

	Postmaterialis		0.01	0.06	.01	.863
m		2	9	4		
	Religiosity		0.07	0.04	.15	.099
		6	6	7		
	Adjusted ΔR^2				.08	.003
				2		

Table 5. Hierarchical binary logistic models predicting social distance and moral rejection ($N = 2,683$).

Step	Predictors	Social distance				Moral rejection			
		<i>E</i>		<i>R</i>		<i>E</i>		<i>R</i>	
(1)	Intercept	0.343	.049	.001	.709	.146	.051	.004	.157
	Ethnic prejudice	.302	.097	.001	.677	.762	.101	.001	.143
	χ^2	<i>181.419</i>				<i>58.332</i>			
(2)	Intercept	0.570	.057	.001	.566	.131	.058	.025	.140
	Ethnic prejudice	.537	.113	.001	.650	.704	.117	.001	.021
	Country(UK)	2.143	.113	.001	.117	2.121	.117	.001	.120
	Country x Ethnic prejudice	.007	.226	.001	.738	0.295	.234	.207	.745
	$\Delta\chi^2$	<i>713.847</i>				<i>597.358</i>			
	Intercept	0.157	.193	.416	.855	.482	.183	.008	.619
	Ethnic prejudice	.537	.118	.001	.649	.630	.120	.001	.877
	Country(UK)	1.948	.125	.001	.143	1.943	.125	.001	.143

	Cou							
Country x	.117	.236	.001	.055	0.329	.239	.169	.720
Ethnic								
prejudice								
	Aut							
Authoritarianism	.070	.050	.162	.073	.294	.048	.001	.342
	Post							
Materialism	0.334	.080	.001	.716	0.514	.076	.001	.598
	Reli							
Religiosity	.374	.117	.001	.454	.477	.101	.001	.612
	$\Delta\chi^2$							
		32.576				118.060		
(3)								

For all χ^2 values, $p < .001$.