


World War Commemoration and the Politics of the Union in the British Isles, 1994 – 2016



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September 2019

This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Declaration

This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my thesis has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee.

Charlotte Jade Kenealy

Abstract

World War Commemoration and the Politics of the Union in the British Isles, 1994 – 2016

Charlotte Jade Kenealy

The commemoration of the World Wars has frequently attracted controversy and widespread debate, revealing tensions and divergence between politicians, academics and other commentators with regards to the thematic justification, tone and narratives of commemorative events. Within the United Kingdom these debates have been complicated by the multi-national nature of the state. Here, commemoration can simultaneously draw on shared experiences of past conflicts involving all nations within the state as well as highlight divergent sub-state national forms of remembrance.

In the UK, war commemoration has predominantly been based on widespread political and popular subscription to mutually inclusive narratives, rituals and symbols of remembrance involving all the nations of the UK. This, however, obscures the presence of multi-national asymmetries in 'national' forms of history, memory and identity. It also overlooks the existence of distinctive experiences and legacies of war that inform commemoration in England, Scotland, Wales and the island of Ireland.

Additionally, since 1994 the UK has undergone a series of socio-economic, cultural and political changes, which have created different dynamics for the politics of national remembering. The advent of devolution in Scotland and Wales in 1998, the Northern Ireland Peace Process and resultant Good Friday Agreement, the election of the SNP in Scotland and subsequent referendum on Scottish independence, for example, all contributed to the creation of a new political climate in which the representation and commemoration of the World Wars took place.

Through the adoption of a 'Four Nations' framework, then, this thesis seeks to contextualise changing patterns of remembrance. It considers how far this shifting political

climate impacted upon the tone and focus of World War commemoration from 1994 to June 2016, prior to the 'Brexit' vote. In this, it not only highlights the complexities arising from the multi-national nature of the state, but also adds a new dimension to our knowledge of official commemorative practices across the UK and its links to and interactions with the politics of the Union. This thesis is formed of two parts, consisting of five chapters in total. Part One focuses on 'state' approaches to and involvement in commemoration with Chapters One and Two analysing the Westminster Government and institution of the monarchy respectively. Following that, Part Two explores the approaches to commemoration adopted by the Northern Irish, Scottish and Welsh devolved governments in turn. It will also analyse World War commemoration in the Republic of Ireland where it relates to the UK. This is due, in no small part, to the intertwined nature of the history and politics of these two states.

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The final words must go to my mother, Helen, who has always encouraged me to push myself as far as I can go and to follow my ambitions. Without her unconditional love and the strength of her belief in me I never would have felt able to or dreamed that I could undertake and complete such a project.

List of Abbreviations

- AWC – All Wales Convention
- BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
- CMRF – Centenary Memorials Restoration Fund
- CyMAL – Museums, Archives and Libraries Wales
- DUP – Democratic Unionist Party
- EU – European Union
- HM – Her Majesty
- HMSO – Her Majesty’s Stationery Office
- IRA – Irish Republican Army
- IWM – Imperial War Museums
- MLA – Member of the Legislative Assembly
- MOD – Ministry of Defence
- MP – Member of Parliament (UK)
- MSP – Member of Scottish Parliament
- NZ – New Zealand
- PSNI – Police Service of Northern Ireland
- SCC – Scottish Constitutional Convention
- SDLP – Social Democratic and Labour Party
- SNP – Scottish National Party
- SPICe – Scottish Parliament Information Centre
- SQA – Scottish Qualifications Authority
- TD – Teachta Dála (A Member of the Dáil Éireann)
- UK – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- UKIP – United Kingdom Independence Party
- UUP – Ulster Unionist Party
- VE – Victory in Europe

VJ – Victory in Japan

WW1 – World War One

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Introduction: The United Kingdom in an 'Age of Commemoration'¹

Between 2014 and 2018, the United Kingdom experienced an intense flurry of commemorative activity intended to mark the centenary of the First World War. This included: national commemorative events to mark key dates such as the start of the War, the Battles of the Somme, Jutland, Gallipoli and Passchendaele, and Armistice Day; the multi-million pound refurbishment of the First World War Galleries at the Imperial War Museum London; a £5.3 million educational programme enabling one teacher and two pupils from every state secondary school in England to visit the First World War battlefields; and funding for the National Heritage Lottery Fund to support community projects marking the centenary.² Additionally, the Government also provided funding for an official arts programme, *14-18 NOW*. Throughout the centenary, *14-18 NOW* commissioned 107 projects including Danny Boyle's *Pages of the Sea* and Peter Jackson's *They Shall Not Grow Old*.³ It also toured the United Kingdom with *Wave and Weeping Window*, which had originally formed part of *Blood Swept Lands and Seas of Red* [See Figure 0.1].⁴ This evolving art installation, created by Paul Cummins and Tom Piper, was based at the Tower of London between July and November 2014 and saw 888,246 ceramic poppies progressively fill the famous moat, each of which represented a British and Colonial military fatality during the War.⁵

¹ P. Nora, 'L'ère de la Commémoration', *Les Lieux de Memoire*, Vol. 3, (Paris: Gallimard, 1984-1992); P. Nora, 'Reasons for the Current Upsurge in Memory', *Eurozine*, 19 April 2002. Accessed at: <https://www.eurozine.com/reasons-for-the-current-upsurge-in-memory/> [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019].

² Department for Digital, Cultural, Media and Sport Committee (DCMS), *Lessons from the First World War Centenary: Thirteenth Report of Session 2017-2019*, (House of Commons, 16 July 2019); D. Cameron, 'First World War Centenary Plans', Speech at the Imperial War Museum, London, 11 October 2012. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-at-imperial-war-museum-on-first-world-war-centenary-plans> [Date Accessed: 18/01/2016].

³ 'About Us', *14-18 NOW*. Accessed at: <https://www.1418now.org.uk/about/> [Date Accessed: 28/08/2019].

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ 'Tower of London Remembers: WW1 Centenary Commemorations at the Tower of London', *Historic Royal Palaces*. Accessed at: <https://www.hrp.org.uk/tower-of-london/history-and-stories/tower-of-london-remembers/> [Date Accessed: 26/10/2015]. See also: <https://www.paulcumminsceramics.com/blood-swept/> and J. Kidd & J. Sayner, 'Unthinking



Figure 0.1: A photograph showing the *Blood Swept Lands and Seas of Red* installation at the Tower of London.

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<https://www.flickr.com/photos/flashcurd/15138568304/> [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019].

Concurrent with the centenary commemorations, however, was significant controversy about the ways in which the First World War should be remembered and represented. This can be illustrated by the heated and highly polarised debate which took place in the press between then Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove, and Sir Richard Evans, then Regius Professor of History at the University of Cambridge.⁶ In January 2014, Gove sharply criticised an understanding of the First World War that appeared to him to be based on

Remembrance? *Blood Swept Lands and Seas of Red* and the Significance of Centenaries', *Cultural Trends*, 27:2 (2018), pp.68-82 [Date Accessed: 26/10/2015].

⁶ It is notable that Gove and Evans had previously engaged in a public debate about Gove's proposed reform of the English school history curriculum, which had generated major controversy in 2013 and resulted in the modification of the proposals. See, for example: R.J. Evans, 'Michael Gove's History Wars', *The Guardian*, 13 July 2013. Accessed at: <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/jul/13/michael-gove-teaching-history-wars> [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019]; W. Mansell, 'Michael Gove Redrafts New History Curriculum after Outcry', *The Guardian*, 21 June 2013. Accessed at: <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/jun/21/michael-gove-history-curriculum> [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019].

popular television programmes such as *Blackadder*, which characterised the War ‘as a misbegotten shambles – a series of catastrophic mistakes perpetrated by an out of touch elite’.⁷ He continued by suggesting that there were ‘left-wing academics all too happy to feed the myths’ deliberately designed ‘to belittle Britain and its leaders’.⁸ Gove specifically attacked Evans, arguing that he ‘criticised those who fought... and attacked the very idea of honouring their sacrifice as an exercise in “narrow tub-thumping jingoism”’.⁹

This provoked a robust response. Evans argued that Gove’s criticism not only represented an ‘ignorant attack’ on his work, but was also a demonstration of Gove’s own ‘ignorance of history’.¹⁰ Writing in *The Guardian*, he drew attention to the scholarship of a number of ‘right-wing historians’, such as Sir Max Hastings and Professor Niall Ferguson, who were also critical of British military leadership, thus indicating that the discussions that would inevitably be had about the War during the centenary had ‘nothing to do with left or right’.¹¹ Furthermore, Evans concluded by arguing that ‘defaming historians and others who think and write critically about Britain’s role in the First World War... is no way to conduct the debate Gove says he wants to encourage. He should be ashamed of himself’.¹² Similarly, Tristram Hunt, then Shadow Education Secretary and a trained historian, described Gove’s comments as ‘crass’ and argued that the ‘Government is using what should be a moment for national reflection and respectful debate to rewrite the historical record and sow political division’.¹³ Rather, he argued that ‘this year’s anniversary events

⁷ M. Gove, ‘Why Does the Left Insist on Belittling True British Heroes’, *Daily Mail*, 2 January 2014; T. Shipman, ‘Michael Gove Blasts “Blackadder Myths” About the First World War Spread by Television Sit-Coms and Left-Wing Academics’, *Daily Mail*, 2 January 2014. Accessed at: <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2532923/Michael-Gove-blasts-Blackadder-myths-First-World-War-spread-television-sit-coms-left-wing-academics.html> [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019].

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid. Others from the political right, such as UKIP leader Nigel Farage and Conservative London Mayor Boris Johnson, concurred with Gove’s analysis, proclaiming the war as patriotic and just. Johnson, in fact, denounced the ‘intellectual dishonesty of the left’. See B. Johnson, ‘Germany Started the Great War but the Left Can’t Bear to Say So’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 6 January 2014.

¹⁰ Richard Evans quoted in J. Brown, ‘Cambridge History Professor Hits Back at Michael Gove’s “Ignorant Attack”’, *The Independent*, 3 January 2014.

¹¹ R. Evans, ‘Richard J Evans: Michael Gove Shows His Ignorance of History – Again’, *The Guardian*, 6 January 2014.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ T. Hunt, ‘Michael Gove, Using History for Politicking is Tawdry’, *The Guardian*, 4 January 2014.

need to reflect and embrace the multiple histories that the War evinces – from the Royal British Legion to the National Union of Railwaymen to the Indian, Ethiopian and Australian servicemen fighting for the empire'.¹⁴

The commemoration of this anniversary and the extensive discussion that surrounded it raises a number of points that are central to this thesis. In the first instance, it highlights the extent to which the commemoration of the World Wars has attracted significant controversy and caused widespread debate, revealing tensions and divergence between politicians, academics and other commentators with regards to the thematic justification, tone and narrative of commemorative events. As such, it also draws attention to the way in which political ideology can interact with the commemoration of the World Wars and how the legacy and memory of these events often serves in contemporary Britain 'as a proxy for current identity politics'.¹⁵ It also illustrates the fact that although the events are receding into the more distant past, with few people left to remember them directly, memories of the First – and Second – World Wars remain ubiquitous in the British national consciousness. The images, myths and narratives of war are frequently invoked in both political and public discourse as well as featuring prominently in British popular culture.

This commemorative activity, in fact, should be understood as part of a wider phenomenon known as a 'memory boom', or what Pierre Nora has referred to as an 'age of commemoration', which has seen an intensification of commemorative activity over the

¹⁴ Hunt, 'Michael Gove, Using History for Politicking is Tawdry'; Johnson responded to Hunt's comments by demanding his resignation and accusing him of denying that German militarism 'was at the root of the First World War'. See Johnson, 'Germany Started the Great War but the Left Can't Bear to Say So'; G. Graham, 'Boris Johnson: Tristram Hunt Should Resign Over First World War Comments', *The Telegraph*, 6 January 2014. Accessed at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/10552981/Boris-Johnson-Tristram-Hunt-should-resign-over-First-World-War-comments.html> [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019]; M. Chorley, 'Why Won't the Left Blame Germany for the First World War? Boris Johnson Calls for Labour's Education Spokesman to Resign in Row Over How to Mark Great War's Centenary', *Daily Mail*, 6 January 2014. Accessed at: <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2534582/Boris-Johnson-Why-left-say-German-blame-First-World-War.html> [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019].

¹⁵ H. Jones, 'Goodbye to All That? Memory and Meaning in the Commemoration of the First World War', *Juncture*. 20:4 (2014), pp.287-291.

last three decades.¹⁶ Since the 1990s, there has not only been a proliferation of public interest in the World Wars and the various cultural and political dimensions of war memory, but also a distinctive shift in the focus, forms and practices of war commemoration.

This, in part, appears to be a response to Britain's changing demographics and the gradual dying out of the First and, increasingly, Second World War generations.¹⁷ For example, when the last serving British combatants of the First World War, Henry Allingham and Harry Patch, died in 2009, *The Economist* ran a headline which declared that the conflict had shifted 'from memory to history'.¹⁸ Although the extent to which this is true has been debated, the headline revealed not only the perceived inter-relationship between history and memory, but also consternation that not enough people had an understanding of, or cared about, the events. This, in turn, appeared to tap into concerns about the value of remembrance and, consequently, the necessity of commemoration. Furthermore, there has been an increasing number of major anniversaries, marking key military events of the Wars, whose profile has been amplified by the news media.¹⁹ This has both enhanced the public visibility of such commemorative events and created further opportunities for the contestation and analysis of dominant narratives and their contemporary meanings. Additionally, the UK's involvement in a series of conflicts in the last two to three decades has further raised the profile of the military. This, in turn, has led politicians, veteran's associations and the media to encourage greater public recognition of and engagement

¹⁶ Nora, 'L'ère de la Commémoration'; Nora, 'Reasons for the Current Upsurge in Memory'; See also J. Beaumont, 'The Politics of Memory: Commemorating the Centenary of the First World War', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 50:3 (2015), pp.529-530; J. Winter, 'The Generation of Memory: Reflections on "The Memory Boom" in Contemporary Historical Studies', *Raritan*, 21:1 (2001), pp.52-66; J. Winter, *Remembering War: The Great War and Historical Memory in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).

¹⁷ A. Mycock, 'The Politics of the Great War Centenary in the United Kingdom' in S. Sumartojo & B. Wellings (eds), *Nation, Memory and Great War Commemoration: Mobilising the Past in Europe, Australia and New Zealand* (Oxford: Peter Lange, 2014), p.101; T.G. Ashplant, G. Dawson & M. Roper, *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration* (London: Routledge, 2000), p.4.

¹⁸ 'From Memory to History', *The Economist*, 393: 8662 (19 December 2009), pp.51-53.

¹⁹ Mycock, 'The Politics of the Great War Centenary', pp.101-102; Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration*, p.4.

with war commemoration.²⁰ It is striking, however, that this has coincided with a reduction in funding for the Armed Forces and veterans as well as the disbanding of historic regiments.

This speaks to a new stage in the commemoration of the World Wars.²¹ A greater temporal, emotional and political distance has now meant that, as we are increasingly removed from the events themselves, commemoration has become less about direct mourning and grief. Rather, it is increasingly driven by a politics of the present and contemporary political concerns, which have evolved in response to the changing socio-economic, cultural and political circumstances outlined above.

The Politics of War Commemoration and the 'Four Nations'

In the modern era, the 'nation-state' has been the primary agent for the interpretation, articulation and mobilisation of war commemoration and remembrance.²² This is due, in part, to the fact that war has been central to its identity and is seen to establish a symbolic continuity between the past, present and future of the nation-state.²³ As T.G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper have argued the commemoration of war, is a 'key element in the symbolic repertoire available to the nation-state for binding its citizens into a collective national identity'.²⁴

²⁰ Mycock, 'The Politics of the Great War Centenary', p.102.

²¹ It is worth noting that this claim is relevant to the commemoration of the World Wars specifically and notes that a wider chronology and thematic range may lead to more complex conclusions. This thesis also writes in full awareness of the historic inter-relationship between the commemoration of war and contemporary concerns.

²² A. Mycock, S. Sumartojo & B. Wellings, "The Centenary to End all Centenaries": The Great War, Nation and Commemoration' in Sumartojo & Wellings, *Nation, Memory and Great War Commemoration*, p.10; Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration*, p.21.

²³ Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration*, p.21. They suggest that the ongoing political vitality of war memory and commemoration is intimately related to the formation of some nation-states and to the basis of enduring conflicts, identities and traditions of political life in others. See also B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006).

²⁴ Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration*, p.7.

This has meant, however, that the commemoration of war has frequently been founded on ‘dominant or hegemonic state-approved historical narratives’, which recognise and incorporate particular memories of war while simultaneously marginalising or forgetting others.²⁵ The significance of previous wars can also be reworked retrospectively, in accordance with the political requirements of the present.²⁶ State formations and political parties or movements are, therefore, all involved in constructing versions of the national past.²⁷ They rework ‘the repertoire of national stories and symbols to fashion effectively useable public memories for their particular ends and purposes’.²⁸

This is indicative of the way in which commemoration has been and largely remains primarily a ‘political’ project. As Andrew Mycock has identified, the state, and its institutions, ‘mediate and order formal and informal collective memories and histories’ in the promotion of a unitary national identity.²⁹ This process, however, is inherently multi-faceted and highly contentious. The intimate relationship between ‘collective’ national forms of memories or histories and the present, in fact, has meant that they are not only subject to processes of selection but also susceptible to appropriation, manipulation and politicisation.³⁰ It is perhaps for this reason that disputes over the interpretation, framing and commemoration of past conflicts have become a significant component of the emotionally charged debates known as ‘history’ or ‘memory’ wars. These contests, which have emerged as an increasingly persistent facet of public discourse, have also often been linked to wider politicised discussions about political, cultural and socio-economic issues.³¹

²⁵ Mycock, Sumartojo & Wellings, “The Centenary to End all Centenaries” in Sumartojo & Wellings, *Nation, Memory and Great War Commemoration*, p.10.

²⁶ Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration*, p.53.

²⁷ Ibid, p.16.

²⁸ Ibid, p.7.

²⁹ A. Mycock, ‘The First World War Centenary in the UK: “A Truly National Commemoration?”’, *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, 103:2 (2014), p.154.

³⁰ P. Nora, ‘Recent History and the New Dangers of Politicisation’, *Eurozine*, 24 November 2011. Accessed at: <http://www.eurozine.com/recent-history-and-the-new-dangers-of-politicization/> [Date Accessed: 29/08/2019] and P. Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux de Memoire*’, *Representations*, 26 (1989), p.8; See also: ‘Mycock, ‘The First World War Centenary’, p.154; Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration*, p.16, 20, 53; Beaumont, ‘The Politics of Memory: Commemorating the Centenary of the First World War’, p.531.

³¹ Mycock, ‘The First World War Centenary in the UK’, p.154.

This is illustrative of the significant complexities that exist relating to history, memory and the commemoration of war. Within the United Kingdom, this is further complicated by the multi-national nature of the state. World War commemoration can simultaneously draw on 'shared experiences of past conflicts' connecting all the nations of the United Kingdom whilst also highlighting 'distinctive or divergent sub-state national forms of remembrance' based on conflicting or alternative 'constructions of official and unofficial history and memory'.³²

The commemoration of the World Wars in the United Kingdom, however, has overwhelmingly been framed on what are perceived to be shared experiences and memories of past conflicts.³³ This has largely been based on widespread political and popular subscription to 'mutually inclusive narratives, rituals and symbols of remembrance' involving each of the nations of the state.³⁴ Generalisations about the universal nature of 'British' experiences of war and the conflation of 'British' and 'English' narratives, however, often obscure the existence of 'multi-national asymmetries' in 'national' forms of history, memory and identity.³⁵ As a result, it frequently overlooks the distinctive experiences and legacies of war in the home nations that inform the nature of war commemorations, which while interconnected are not necessarily homogeneous.³⁶

³² Mycock, 'The First World War Centenary in the UK', p.158; Mycock, 'The Politics of the Great War Centenary', p.107.

³³ Mycock, 'The First World War Centenary in the UK', p.158; Mycock, 'The Politics of the Great War Centenary', p.107. For a discussion of this see also: A. King, *Memorials of the Great War in Britain: Symbolism and Politics of Remembrance* (London: Berg, 1998); D. Todman, 'Representing the First World War in Britain: The 90th Anniversary of the Somme' in M. Keren & H. Herwig (eds), *War Memory and Popular Culture* (Ottawa: McFarland, 2009); D. Todman, *The Great War, Myth and Memory* (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2005); L. Noakes, *War and the British. Gender, Memory and National Identity* (London: I.B.Tauris, 1998).

³⁴ Mycock, 'The First World War Centenary in the UK', p.158; Mycock, 'The Politics of the Great War Centenary', p.107; See for example: Todman, 'Representing the First World War in Britain'; Todman, *The Great War, Myth and Memory*; Noakes, *War and the British*; King, *Memorials of the Great War in Britain*; M. Connelly, *We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of the Second World War* (Harlow: Pearson/Longman, 2004). A. Calder, *The People's War: Britain 1939-1945* (London: Pimlico, 1992); A. Calder, *The Myth of the Blitz* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1991).

³⁵ Mycock, 'The Politics of the Great War Centenary', p.108.

³⁶ Mycock, 'The First World War Centenary', p.158.

In recent years, however, the United Kingdom has undergone (and continues to experience) a series of socio-economic, cultural and political changes, which have created different dynamics for the politics of national remembering. A key component of this broader shift is the perceived 'decline' of the United Kingdom – an increasing separation between the United Kingdom's constituent parts, in political, popular and academic discourse – and the rediscovery of what Richard Weight has termed 'core' national identities.³⁷ Within this, developments such as the advent of devolution in both Scotland and Wales in 1998, the Northern Ireland Peace Process and resultant Good Friday Agreement, the election victory of the Scottish National Party in Scotland in 2007 and 2011 and, later, the Scottish independence referendum have contributed to the creation of a new political climate in which the representation and commemoration of war now takes place.

This raises the possibility that throughout the United Kingdom commemorative narratives, forms and practices are diverging during the period under consideration in this thesis. This thesis, then, is concerned with the extent to which both the multi-national nature of the United Kingdom and the changing political climate have impacted the tone and focus of World War commemoration. It aims to draw attention to the complexities arising from the politics of the union and add a new dimension to our knowledge of official, state-led commemorative practices by exploring the approaches adopted by the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish devolved governments in addition to that of Westminster. It is also worth noting that, due to complexities relating to the history and politics of the island of Ireland, references to the Republic of Ireland have been included where they pertain to developments in Northern Ireland. It is for this reason that the title of the present thesis refers to the 'British Isles'. It will argue that, on the most fundamental level, there existed a close relationship between the commemoration of the World Wars and the politics of the union. This, however, was frequently determined by the political climate as well as the political agendas present in each individual nation at any given time.

³⁷ R. Weight, *Patriots: National Identity in Britain 1949-2000* (London: Pan Books, 2003), p.1.

Specifically, this thesis seeks to examine this premise by exploring World War commemoration between the years 1994 and 2016. In the United Kingdom, 1994, which constitutes the starting point under consideration, witnessed the coincidence of the eightieth anniversary of the start of the First World War and the fiftieth anniversary of the D-Day landings with the start of the Peace Process in Northern Ireland. It has deliberately chosen the end point as June 2016 in recognition of the complexities and uncertainty that continue to surround what has become known as 'Brexit', following the United Kingdom's vote to 'Leave' the European Union.

Historiography

In order to gain a more nuanced understanding of the issues presented above, this thesis intends to both build upon and bridge two strands of historiography. On one side sits the ever-growing body of scholarship on memory, history and, more specifically, the commemoration of the World Wars. On the other side, is a body of literature, often referred to as 'New British History' or 'Four Nations History'.

i. Memory, History and the Commemoration of the World Wars

Any study of commemoration should first be situated within the context of memory studies. The study of memory, which starts with the conviction that both memory and commemoration have histories of their own, has experienced sustained growth matched by few other fields of historical enquiry, seeing a proliferation of academic research and critical enquiry.³⁸

In this so-called 'memory boom' the 'rediscovery' of Maurice Halbwachs' work and his concept of collective memory in the 1980s was particularly influential, providing a template for early scholars working on memory.³⁹ Halbwachsian collective memory is predicated on

³⁸ B. Rieger, 'Memory and Normality. Review: Germany as a Culture of Memory: Promises and Limits of Writing History by Alon Confino', *History and Theory*, 47:4 (2008), p.560; see also D. Stone, *The Holocaust, Fascism and Memory: Essays in the History of Ideas* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

³⁹ A. Pearce, *Holocaust Consciousness in Contemporary Britain* (London: Routledge, 2014), p.5.

the notion that 'it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognise and localise their memories'.⁴⁰ In this way, Halbwachs argued, individual memory is understood only through a group context; the group constructs the memory and the individuals do the work of remembering.⁴¹ In turn, these social dynamics render collective memory as changeable and so distinct from history. Significantly, Halbwachs claimed that collective memory was informed by the political and social realities of the day.⁴² He also explored the ways in which present concerns determine what and how we remember the past.⁴³

The study of commemoration is equally indebted to Pierre Nora, who expanded on Halbwachs' concept.⁴⁴ He contended that collective memory is used by groups to interpret the past, but that these memories become detached from that past.⁴⁵ Furthermore, Nora argued that groups reconstruct a certain past in order to explain the present.⁴⁶ These groups choose which events are remembered and, therefore, those that are forgotten. Subsequently, events are re-arranged and traditions invented in order to conform to a specific narrative. Benedict Anderson has referred to this forgetting as 'collective amnesia', while Guy Beiner has contended that the deliberate erasing of certain dimensions of the past is an integral component of memory.⁴⁷ Beiner states that this 'social forgetting' is simply a mode of social memory that hinges on 'multi-layered dialectical relationships

⁴⁰ M. Halbwachs, 'The Social Frameworks of Memory' in M. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, trans. L.A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p.38.

⁴¹ P. Novick, *The Holocaust and Collective Memory: The American Experience* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), pp.3-4.

⁴² Novick, *The Holocaust and Collective Memory*, pp.3-4; Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, pp.173-184.

⁴³ Novick, *The Holocaust and Collective Memory*, pp.3-4.

⁴⁴ P. Nora, *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, vol. 1: Conflicts and Divisions*, trans. A. Goldhammer, ed. L. Kritzmann (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); P. Nora, *Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past, vol 2: Traditions*, trans. A. Goldhammer, ed. L. Kritzmann (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); P. Nora, *Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past, vol. 3: Symbols*, trans. A. Goldhammer, ed. L. Kritzman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

⁴⁵ Nora, 'Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux de Memoire*', pp.16-17.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, ch. 11; G. Beiner, 'Disremembering 1798?: An Archaeology of Social Forgetting and Remembrance in Ulster', *History and Memory*, 25:1 (2013), pp.9-50.

between oblivion and remembrance'.⁴⁸ This idea is reminiscent of Ernest Renan's iconic statement in *Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?* that collective forgetting is essential to the formation of national identity.⁴⁹

Nora, however, is perhaps best known for his defining concept '*les lieux de memoire*' or 'sites of memory', which has transformed the way scholars have approached the question of 'memory' by significantly expanding the notion of what constitutes remembering and opening up the field to comparative analysis.⁵⁰ He defined these 'sites of memory' broadly as particular locations, objects or concepts – places, sculptures, museums, images, texts, symbols, rituals, people, events, anniversaries, speeches and more – that come to be associated with particular ideas about the past.⁵¹ In an argument that is now familiar, Nora maintained that the purpose of such a 'site' is to express the will to remember, whether it be on the part of a local community or at the level of a nation-state, and thus, in Nora's own words, 'stop time, to block the work of forgetting, to establish a state of things, to immortalise death [and] to materialise the immaterial'.⁵² In this, Nora not only highlights that memory is a *construct*, but also contends that it is created by a complex interplay between a sense of the past and a sense of the present.⁵³ It is perhaps also worth noting that, in his *Theatres of Memory*, Raphael Samuel made a similar case to that of Halbwachs

⁴⁸ Beiner, 'Disremembering 1798?', p.11.

⁴⁹ E. Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?*, conference faite en Sorbonne, le 11 Mars 1882; English Translation. Accessed at: http://ucparis.fr/files/9313/6549/9943/What_is_a_Nation.pdf [Date Accessed: 27/05/2015].

⁵⁰ Nora, 'Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux de Memoire*', pp.7-8, 11, 13; See also J. Winter, *Remembering War. The Great War Between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century* (Yale University Press, 2006); M. Evans & K. Lunn, 'Preface' in M. Evans & K. Lunn (eds), *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997), p.xvii.

⁵¹ S. Heathorn, 'The Mnemonic Turn in the Cultural Historiography of Britain's Great War', *The Historical Journal*, 48:4 (2006), p.1111; M. Rothberg, 'Introduction: Between Memory and Memory. From Lieux de Memoire to Noeuds de Memoire', *Yale French Studies*, 118/119 (2010), pp.3-12; P. Nora, 'Preface to English Language Edition: From Lieux de Memoire to Realms of Memory', in Nora, *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*, Vol. 1, p.xvii.

⁵² Nora, 'Beyond History and Memory: *Les Lieux de Memoire*', p.19; Also cited in Evans & Lunn, 'Preface' in Evans & Lunn, *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century*, p.xvii.

⁵³ Evans & Lunn, 'Preface' in Evans & Lunn, *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century*, p.xvii.

and Nora. He argued that memory is 'historically conditioned' and changes according to the influences of the present.⁵⁴

The subject of war – in particular the First and Second World Wars - has been at the centre of the emergence and development of 'memory studies' as a field of historical study. Consequently, there now exists an enormous and ever-growing body of scholarship dedicated to an examination of the memory of past conflicts and their commemoration. This proliferation of academic research has accompanied heightened levels of public interest in the phenomena of war memory, as discussed above, and also reflected upon these developments. As such, it has contributed to the further widening of public interest.

The continuing influence of Paul Fussell's pioneering work *The Great War and Modern Memory*, published in 1975, is testament to this growth of interest in memory and war. Focusing on the 'literary means by which [war] has been remembered, conventionalised and mythologised', Fussell opened up the complexities of remembering by analysing the ways in which the imagery of the Great War became inscribed within British culture and society.⁵⁵ He convincingly argued that the Great War generated new images which have since become part of the fibre of our own lives.⁵⁶ Despite the fact Fussell was later criticised for universalising 'modern memory' from the experiences of a socially select range of British writers, Leonard V. Smith writes that Fussell's work remains important for its 'ability to reformulate or re-inscribe pre-existing ways of understanding'.⁵⁷

In addition, as Stephen Heathorn has argued, the importance Fussell placed on memory in the twentieth century has remained a 'suggestive insight'.⁵⁸ A similar approach was taken by Jay Winter in his seminal work *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning. The Great War in*

⁵⁴ R. Samuel, *Theatres of Memory. Volume One: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture* (London: Verso, 1994), p.x.

⁵⁵ P. Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.xi.

⁵⁶ Fussell, *The Great War*, pp.xi; See also M. Evans & K. Lunn, 'Preface', in Evans & Lunn, *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century*, p.xvi – xvii.

⁵⁷ L.V. Smith, 'Paul Fussell's *The Great War and Modern Memory: Twenty-Five Years Later*', *History and Theory*, 40 (2001), p.242.

⁵⁸ Heathorn, 'The Mnemonic Turn in the Cultural Historiography of Britain's Great War', p.1106.

European Cultural History.⁵⁹ As well as drawing on Fussell's work, the use of 'sites of memory' in the title highlights that Winter was also influenced by Nora's 'les lieux de memoire' paradigm outlined above. In this work, which is important for its use of a comparative rather than nationally-focused approach, Winter examines memory as an expression of mourning in both its public and private manifestations.⁶⁰ Through analysis of cultural, social and artistic activity during and after the Great War across Europe (primarily focused on England, France and Germany), he contends that bereavement was the central 'universal' experience of Europeans in the aftermath of war.⁶¹ Significantly, Winter also challenges the conventional view that the First World War represented a cultural watershed definitively ending the long nineteenth century.⁶² Rather, he contends that it resulted in an 'avalanche' of distinctly un-modern commemorative modes because traditional frames of reference, with their familiar and comforting images and values, were necessary to inspire patriotism and mediate grief.⁶³ For Winter, it was the 'cataclysm' of the Second World War that modernised memory and, therefore, brought on the 'culture of trauma and silence'.⁶⁴ Winter's thesis, then, has powerful implications for the significance of commemorative rituals and war memorials as well as highlighting the need to understand how the representation of war has been received as a whole.

Following Fussell and Winter, a number of recent works have also explored war memory.⁶⁵ In 1997, for example, Martin Evans and Kenneth Lunn published a collection of essays entitled *War Memory in the Twentieth Century*. This work, originally presented at an

⁵⁹ J. Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning. The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

⁶⁰ Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning. The Great War in European Cultural History*; See also Heathorn, 'Cultural Historiography', p.1106 for a discussion of Winter.

⁶¹ Winter, *Sites of Memory*, p.1

⁶² S. Farmer, 'Reviewed Work: *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* by Jay Winter', *Journal of Social History*, 32:2 (1998), pp.448-450.

⁶³ Winter, *Sites of Memory*, pp. 5, 178.

⁶⁴ Ibid, p.9. See also R. Bosworth, 'Reviewed Work: *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* by Jay Winter', *The International History Review*, 18:4 (1996), pp.937-939; M. Eksteins, 'Reviewed Work: *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* by Jay Winter', *German Politics & Society*, 14:4 (1996), pp.99-102.

⁶⁵ See, for example: L. Noakes & J. Pattinson (eds), *British Cultural Memory and the Second World War* (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2014).

interdisciplinary conference at the University of Portsmouth in 1994, sought to examine the complexities of war memories in the twentieth century, their function, construction and how they 'relate to concepts of national identity'.⁶⁶ In this, it aimed to raise fundamental questions about different processes of memorialisation.

This is also exemplified by the scholarship of historians such as Alex King, Catherine Moriarty and Adrian Gregory, which is primarily concerned with the ceremonies and memorials established to commemorate the war dead. In his detailed work, for example, King analyses the production and reception of war memorials in inter-war Britain.⁶⁷ He seeks to examine the variety of ways in which people interpreted commemorative symbols and reconstruct the meaning of commemoration for contemporaries by analysing the creative processes involved in remembering the dead.⁶⁸ Ultimately, King concludes that commemoration was concerned with far more than mourning those who died and, in fact, became essentially a political act.⁶⁹

Similarly, Moriarty has analysed the 'processes and currents of influence at work in the building and reception' of First World War memorials and their commemorative ceremonies.⁷⁰ She argues that as 'the most public component of the material culture of war remembrance' war memorials 'occupied a space between the public and the private'.⁷¹ This created a complex relationship between public and private memories that were simultaneously informing and informed by the commemoration of the war dead. It is this which leads Moriarty to conclude that memorials were 'composite sites [of memory]' where it was possible to adopt 'many possible readings' beyond just the commemorative.⁷²

⁶⁶ Evans & Lunn, 'Preface' in Evans & Lunn, *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century*, p.xvi.

⁶⁷ See also J. Mayo, 'War Memorials as Political Memory', *Geographical Review*, 78:1 (1988), pp.62-75. Mayo has written about American war memorials and investigates the relationship between politics and design by demonstrating how war has been expressed symbolically as a political act.

⁶⁸ King, *Memorials of the Great War in Britain*, pp.1,5,13-14.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, pp.5-6, 248-249.

⁷⁰ C. Moriarty, 'Private Grief and Public Remembrance: British First World War Memorials' in Evans & Lunn, *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century*, p.125.

⁷¹ C. Moriarty, 'Review Article: The Material Culture of Great War Remembrance', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 34:4 (1999), pp.654-655.

⁷² Moriarty, 'Private Grief and Public Remembrance', p.125.

In *The Silence of Memory*, Gregory analyses the creation and contestation of meanings surrounding commemorative ceremonies, with a particular emphasis on Armistice Day.⁷³ He argues that Armistice Day and the two minutes' silence were supposed to be transforming experiences, which both unified the nation in a shared remembrance of the dead and re-dedicated the nation to honouring their memory.⁷⁴ Within this study, Gregory also highlights the increasing marginalisation of the role of veterans within these commemorations as the meanings of Armistice Day evolved.⁷⁵

In all of these works it is notable that an analysis of war memorials is often used as a starting point for a wider discussion of commemorative activity. In addition to this literature, a number of scholars such as Dan Todman, Mark Connelly, and Lucy Noakes have sought to examine more broadly the memory and commemoration of the World Wars in Britain.⁷⁶ In *The Great War: Myth and Memory*, Todman wrote about the evolution of public perceptions of the Great War, assessing the extent to which memories of the conflict have been reshaped to suit the changing needs of society. In this, he convincingly argued that in the British popular imagination the First World War has become overwhelmingly associated with iconic images such as mud, barbed wire, the trenches and the Tommy on the Western Front.

In contrast to this, Connelly and Noakes have both written about the memory of the Second, not the First, World War. In *We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of the Second World War*, Connelly analyses 'the British myth of the Second World War'.⁷⁷ Through an examination of popular cultural artefacts, such as films, museum exhibits and book, and the processes involved in creating them he seeks to explain: how and why the myth came about; how it has been reshaped and passed on in the years since 1945; and why the

⁷³ A. Gregory, *The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day, 1919-1946* (Oxford: Berg, 1994).

⁷⁴ L. Noakes, 'Review: Language of Sacrifice. Adrian Gregory. *The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day 1919-1946*', *History Workshop Journal*, 41:1 (1996), pp.294-296.

⁷⁵ Gregory, *The Silence of Memory*, pp.118-48.

⁷⁶ See also: T. Thacker, *British Culture and the First World War: Experience, Representation and Memory* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014); J.S.K. Watson, *Fighting Different Wars: Experience, Memory and the First World War in Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁷⁷ M. Connelly, *We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of the Second World War* (Harlow: Pearson/Longman, 2004), p.1.

British have been so attached to it. Connelly argues that the British people 'carry a peculiar and particular history and memory of World War Two with them'.⁷⁸ This, he contended, effectively amounted to a collective national memory that continues to have 'an ongoing role in our understanding of events and the world around us'.⁷⁹ Noakes has also examined how the Second World War has featured in British national consciousness. More specifically, she analyses the ways in which experiences and memories of the War are shaped by gender and, thus 'how far national identity should be understood as a gendered concept'.⁸⁰ Noakes concludes that 'British women and men occupy different roles within the popular memory of the Second World War', with the male soldier retaining a 'privileged space' in the images and memories of the War.⁸¹

Ultimately, this scholarship provides an important backdrop against which this thesis is set. There can be no doubt that these works have all made important contributions to our knowledge and understanding of war memory and patterns of remembrance. Yet, despite the value of these works to the study of World War commemoration, they fall short in a number of ways. It is apparent that little work has yet been undertaken regarding the commemoration of the World Wars in the United Kingdom since 1994. The United Kingdom however, has changed substantially in this period with a number of political, constitutional, socio-economic, demographic and cultural shifts. In addition to this, much of the scholarship tends to view the United Kingdom as a singular entity, as opposed to a multi-national state. Taken together these developments suggest that it is appropriate to reassess commemoration in this period.

⁷⁸ Connelly, *We Can Take It*, p.14.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p.269.

⁸⁰ Noakes, *War and the British*, p.19

⁸¹ *Ibid*, p.164.

ii. 'Four Nations' History, the United Kingdom, the Politics of the Union and 'Britishness'

The historiography relating to 'Four Nations' History, the politics of the union and 'Britishness' is also instructive for this study.

The first explicit 'Four Nations' agenda was set out by J.G.A. (John) Pocock in his seminal article published in 1975 by the *Journal of Modern History* entitled 'British History: A Plea for a New Subject'.⁸² Fundamentally, Pocock lamented a lack of 'histories of Britain'. In this, he contended that most historical work on the 'North Atlantic Archipelago' was primarily English history, which was rarely a genuine and interactive history of the four different nations and how they interacted and related to each other.⁸³ In his view, 'no true history of Britain' had been written, only histories of England in which the Welsh, Scots and Irish appear as 'peripheral peoples' and, even then, 'only when their doings assume[d] power to disturb the tenor of English politics'.⁸⁴ Furthermore, he argued that this unevenness was compounded by the parallel writing of 'histories of Wales, Scotland and Ireland, which constituted 'separate enterprises' and thereby perpetuated the existence of 'separate historiographical traditions' or 'sub-disciplines'.⁸⁵

Following Pocock, a number of historians have sought to popularise an historical approach that fully takes account of the interactions and interrelationships of the constituent parts of the United Kingdom and thus problematize 'Britain'. It is within these works that the term 'Four Nations' has increasingly come into use. Pocock's mantle was most comprehensively taken up in the 1990s, predominantly by a school of early modernists who, in a series of conference proceedings, emphasised the need to place given points in history into their 'British' context and thus draw attention to hitherto ignored dimensions and establish a new, more complete narrative. The edited collections subsequently

⁸² J.G.A. Pocock, 'British History: A Plea for a New Subject', *The Journal of Modern History*, 47:4 (1975).

⁸³ Pocock, 'British History', p.603.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid, p.604.

generated by these symposia led to the emergence of what David Cannadine has called a 'school of self-consciously "British" historians' or, rather, a 'New British History'.⁸⁶

Other works to adopt this framework have included Hugh Kearney's *The British Isles: A History of Four Nations* and Norman Davies' *The Isles*.⁸⁷ In *The British Isles*, for example, Kearney argued that a single-nation based approach was insufficient. He contended that focusing on any one 'national' interpretation or history, whether English, Irish, Scottish or Welsh, ran 'the risk of being imprisoned within a cage of political assumptions'.⁸⁸ Kearney argued that by neglecting Scottish, Welsh or Irish history, one ignored the extent to which the history of England has repeatedly overlapped and interacted with that of the other nations.⁸⁹

It should be noted, however, that the majority of these works have focused overwhelmingly on the early modern period and little has been done since to further utilise their frameworks. Perhaps the most notable exception to this is Naomi Lloyd-Jones and Maggie Scull's *Four Nations Approaches to Modern 'British' History*.⁹⁰ This volume, which was published in 2017, was the first such collection to appear with an explicit emphasis on the modern period. It emerged out of the 'Four Nations History Network', which was

⁸⁶ D. Cannadine, 'British History as a "New Subject": Politics, Perspective and Prospects', in A. Grant & K.J. Stringer (eds), *Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History* (London: Routledge, 1995), p.13. See also, for example, R.R. Davies (ed.), *The British Isles 1100-1500: Comparisons, Contrasts and Connections* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1988); L. Brockliss & D. Eastwood (eds), *A Union of Multiple Identities: The British Isles, c.1750-1850* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); B. Bradshaw & P. Roberts, *British Consciousness and Identity: The Making of Britain, 1533-1707* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); G. Burgess, *The New British History: Founding a Modern State, 1603-1715* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999); S.J. Connolly, *Kingdoms United? Great Britain and Ireland since 1500: Integration and Diversity* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1999).

⁸⁷ H. Kearney, *The British Isles: A History of Four Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), N. Davies, *The Isles. A History* (Basingstoke: Papermac, 2000).

⁸⁸ Kearney, *The British Isles*, p.1.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ N. Lloyd-Jones & M. M. Scull (eds), *Four Nations Approaches to Modern 'British' History: A (Dis)United Kingdom?* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017/2018).

founded in June 2014 to reignite the debate over how we study 'British' History and to demonstrate the relevance of 'Four Nations' frameworks for a range of fields.⁹¹

Indeed, *Four Nations Approaches* sought to engage with Pocock's ideas in light of further political developments, which provided a backdrop of heightened intra-UK tensions, radically altered patterns of socio-political allegiance and a reorientation of the country's international position.⁹² Significantly, it also aimed to rebalance what Colin Kidd has referred to as the "lop-sidedness" of the New British History of the 1990s, in which Wales had been afforded limited treatment.⁹³

In addition to this, there is now an abundance of literature which seeks to explore not only the history of the United Kingdom (and the political unions that brought it together), but also interrelated issues and questions relating to conceptions of 'Britishness'. Alvin Jackson's *The Two Unions: Ireland, Scotland and the Survival of the United Kingdom, 1707-2007*, for example, is an important work.⁹⁴ In this, through the adoption of a comparative approach, Jackson aims to 'explain the survival of these two constituent unions of the United Kingdom' over the past 300 years.⁹⁵ He contends that it is their survival and longevity, as opposed to decline, which should be the focus of historical study. This work is also important not only for the way in which it successfully captures the complexity of the

⁹¹ The Four Nations History Network was established by Naomi Lloyd-Jones and Margaret M. Scull, based at King's College London. See *Four Nations History Network*. Accessed at: <https://fournationshistory.wordpress.com> [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019].

⁹² N. Lloyd-Jones & M.M. Scull, 'A New Plea for an Old Subject? Four Nations History for the Modern Period' in Lloyd-Jones & Scull, *Four Nations Approaches to Modern 'British' History*, pp.5-6; See also N. Lloyd-Jones & M.M. Scull, 'Four Nations Approaches to Modern "British" History', *Clio@King's History Department Blog*, 17 May 2015. Accessed at: <https://blogs.kcl.ac.uk/kingshistory/2015/05/17/four-nations-approaches-to-modern-british-history/> [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019].

⁹³ C. Kidd, 'Wales, the Enlightenment and the New British History', *The Welsh History Review*, 25:2 (2010), p.209.

⁹⁴ A. Jackson, *The Two Unions: Ireland, Scotland and the Survival of the United Kingdom, 1707 – 2007* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p.8.

United Kingdom, but continues to have considerable resonance and relevance for the ongoing political debates about the state of the union.⁹⁶

In contrast to Jackson, several other commentators have written about the perceived crisis, as opposed to longevity, of the United Kingdom. This was in response to a growing sense of uncertainty from the 1970s about what it means to be 'British', which was being challenged by the end of the Empire, immigration and multi-culturalism, European integration and the growth of political nationalism.⁹⁷ Within this, it has been argued that states which contain more than one nation are inherently unstable.⁹⁸ Tom Nairn, for example, predicted the 'break-up of Britain' as early as 1977 as a consequence of the inevitable unravelling of the multi-national state.⁹⁹ In this view, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (later Northern Ireland) began an 'inevitable process of dissolution' as soon as it was created.¹⁰⁰ This has been accompanied by arguments that 'Britain', and thus 'Britishness', no longer exist(s). In 1999, Nairn declared that we were in a period 'after Britain' while Christopher Harvie argued that 'Britishness' had only been a brief moment in the first place.¹⁰¹ Similarly, Andrew Marr has since referred to *The Day Britain Died*, whilst Peter Hitchens and John Redwood have both written on the 'Abolition' and 'Death' of Britain respectively.¹⁰²

In fact, the fundamental question of what it means to be 'British' has been subject to considerable scrutiny by historians such as David Cannadine, Linda Colley and Hugh Kearney.¹⁰³ Richard Weight and Robert Colls, in *Patriots: National Identity in Britain 1949-*

⁹⁶ J. Mitchell, 'Reviewed Work(s): *The Two Unions: Ireland, Scotland and the Survival of the United Kingdom, 1707-2007* by Alvin Jackson', *Journal of British Studies*, 52:3 (2013), p.804.

⁹⁷ P. Ward, *Britishness Since 1870* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004).

⁹⁸ See T. Nairn, *The Break Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism* (London: New Left Books, 1977);

R. Weight, *Patriots: National Identity in Britain 1949-2000* (London: Pan Books, 2003).

⁹⁹ Nairn, *The Break-Up of Britain*, p.14.

¹⁰⁰ Ward, *Britishness*, p.2; Nairn, *The Break-Up of Britain*.

¹⁰¹ T. Nairn, *After Britain: New Labour and the Return of Scotland* (London: Granta, 1999); C. Harvie, 'The Moment of British Nationalism, 1939-1970', *Political Quarterly*, 71:3 (2000), pp.328-40.

¹⁰² A. Marr, *The Day Britain Died* (London: Profile, 2000); P. Hitchens, *The Abolition of Britain: The British Cultural Revolution from Lady Chatterley to Tony Blair* (London: Quartet, 1999); J. Redwood, *The Death of Britain? The UK's Constitutional Crisis* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999).

¹⁰³ L. Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1992); L. Colley, *Acts of Union and Disunion* (London: Profile Books, 2014); L. Colley, 'Britishness and Otherness: An Argument', *Journal of British Studies*, 31:4 (1992); Cannadine, 'British History as a "New Subject": Politics, Perspective and Prospects'; Kearney, *The British Isles*.

2000 and *Identity of England* respectively, have also recently written on 'Britishness'.¹⁰⁴ In these works, they both argue that 'Britishness' and the British state have been in continual crisis from, at least, the 1940s onwards.

In *Patriots*, Weight seeks to examine 'not only how the British defined themselves but also how the sources of those definitions changed'.¹⁰⁵ In this, it is avowedly a book about 'why the people of Britain stopped thinking of themselves as British and began to see themselves as Scots, Welsh and English'.¹⁰⁶ The focus of *Patriots*, then, is the decline of a sense of 'Britishness' from what he perceives as its 'high-water mark' during the Battle of Britain in 1940 through the 1960s, with the emergence of political nationalism in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, to the 1990s.¹⁰⁷ This emerges from his central argument that the United Kingdom and 'Britishness' were functions of capitalism, imperialism and Protestantism and that, therefore, British national identity was enforced upon the lower classes, colonies (including Scotland, Wales and Ireland) and non-Protestants.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, for Weight, the UK was primarily established to further the quest for empire. As such, when the empire disappeared so too did the 'original raison d'être' of the UK along with many of the ideologies and institutions around which 'Britishness' had been constituted since the eighteenth century.¹⁰⁹

In a similar vein to Weight, in his *Identity of England*, Colls has focused on the question of national identities in modern Britain and the perceived crisis of 'Britishness'. He argues that the existence of multiple identities within the United Kingdom have been so unstable as to be doomed to inevitable destruction.¹¹⁰ Colls, in fact, concludes that all national identities are fundamentally unstable.¹¹¹ Furthermore, he views 'Britishness' as a far weaker force than Weight, contending that there existed a British state but not, in 'any real sense, a

¹⁰⁴ Weight, *Patriots*; R. Colls, *Identity of England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

¹⁰⁵ Weight, *Patriots*, p.16.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p.1.

¹⁰⁷ Weight, *Patriots*, p.727-730.

¹⁰⁸ Weight, *Patriots*, p.12.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p.727.

¹¹⁰ Colls, *Identity of England*, pp.377-381.

¹¹¹ Ibid, p.379.

British collective identity'.¹¹² In this, he suggests that after the Acts of Union what was left 'was a set of British peoples with a sense of their own nationality but not quite sure of how to talk about themselves as nations [...] For over 300 years, the people of these islands have been uncertain'.¹¹³

The literature review, outlined in the paragraphs above, has highlighted areas of historical scholarship which lend themselves to further study and suggested useful avenues of enquiry. It has demonstrated how a study of World War commemoration across the United Kingdom between 1994 and 2016 could contribute further to our understanding of official commemorative practices, the politics of the union and policy-making, and how it has not yet attracted sustained attention from historians.

It should also be noted, however, that this overview is by no means exhaustive. Consequently, each chapter will also provide a more detailed discussion of those works relating specifically to the World Wars and their representation and commemoration in each of the 'Four Nations' under consideration throughout this thesis.

Terminology and Methodology

i. Terminology

At this juncture, it is important to provide clarification with regards to the area under discussion in this thesis. This, however, presents a number of semantic difficulties as terms such as the 'United Kingdom', 'Britain' and the 'British Isles' have historically been, and remain, in a state of flux as well as contested.¹¹⁴ The composition of the United Kingdom has shifted over time. The United Kingdom, as a collective term for England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland, only became the official umbrella designation in 1801.¹¹⁵ This followed Acts of Union first with Scotland in 1707 and, later, Ireland in 1801. Its name was

¹¹² Colls, *Identity of England*, p.377.

¹¹³ Ibid, p.377.

¹¹⁴ J. Vernon, *Modern Britain: 1750 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp.xxi-xxviii.

¹¹⁵ Colley, *Acts of Union and Disunion*, p.6.

changed again in 1922, from what was formerly the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to the official term that exists today: the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This is further complicated by the fact that in contemporary usage, the 'United Kingdom' has often been substituted for 'Britain' or 'Great Britain' while 'England' and 'Britain' have also been used synonymously.¹¹⁶ This has meant that quoted sources may refer to the one term when another is meant. However, this thesis views it as important to reflect the exact language being used. In this thesis, 'Britain' or 'Great Britain' is used to refer to what many consider 'mainland' Britain – England, Scotland and Wales. The British Isles is understood as the geographical entity that comprises England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

In addition, it should be noted that although this thesis inevitably engages with questions and complexities relating to conceptions of national identity and 'Britishness', it is not intended as a direct contribution to an already extensive body of literature which surrounds the question of what it means to be 'British', as outlined above. Indeed, scholars have thus far failed to come up with a definitive answer. In part, this is due to the numerous different factors which are involved in the construction of identity such as gender, religion, language and region. These difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that the terms 'British' and 'English', much like 'Britain' and 'England', have often been used interchangeably. This has meant that many have confused 'Britishness' with 'Englishness', and vice versa.

With regards to 'Britishness', it is perhaps sufficient to adopt Paul Ward's non-theoretical definition, which suggests that 'Britishness is what people mean when they identify themselves individually and collectively as "being British"... this identification relates to the political, economic, social, cultural and personal surroundings they find themselves in at the time they choose to think about their Britishness'.¹¹⁷ For Ward, then, Britishness is a 'flexible' identity.¹¹⁸ This is an important idea, as it allows for different, shifting and

¹¹⁶ Colley suggests that the United Kingdom has never been a particularly compelling identifying name, which may, in part, be responsible for the interchangeable use of these terms. See Colley, *Acts of Union and Disunion*.

¹¹⁷ Ward, *Britishness Since 1870*, p.2.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, p.5.

competing meanings and conceptions of Britishness. It also acknowledges both, as Linda Colley has said, that ‘identities are not like hats, human beings can and do put on several at a time’ and that people are capable of simultaneously accepting and rejecting elements of ‘Britishness’.¹¹⁹

ii. Methodology

To address the questions and omissions that the secondary literature raises, this thesis draws on the methodology of ‘Four Nations History’. It should, of course, be noted that it utilises this framework in full awareness that it is neither uncontroversial nor without its own limitations. Perhaps one of the strongest critiques of the ‘Four Nations’ is that it creates the danger of focusing too much on similarities and not enough on differences.¹²⁰ Colley, for example, has warned that if ‘pushed too hard or too exclusively’, this methodology could conceal not only ‘the fact that the four parts of the United Kingdom have been connected in markedly different ways and with sharply varying degrees of success’.¹²¹

Furthermore, in its historical and historiographical understandings, ‘Four Nations’ is generally taken to refer to England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland.¹²² This nomenclature, however, raises questions about how Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland fit into this framework. From what date should they be included and how should these nations be understood? In this thesis it is Northern Ireland that is incorporated into the ‘Four Nations’ due to its position as a constituent nation of the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the Republic of Ireland cannot be ignored altogether. This is due to the intertwined and complex nature of the island’s history, which has meant that political developments in the

¹¹⁹ Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation*, p.6.

¹²⁰ See also: Cannadine, ‘British History’, pp.25-26; N. Canny, ‘Irish, Scottish and Welsh Responses to Centralisation, c.1530-1640: A Comparative Perspective’ in Grant & Stringer (eds), *Uniting the Kingdom?*, pp.147 – 169.

¹²¹ Colley, ‘Britishness and Otherness: An Argument’, p.314.

¹²² Lloyd Jones & Scull, ‘A New Plea for an Old Subject?’, p.13.

Republic of Ireland have frequently interacted with those taking place in Northern Ireland and vice versa.

Despite its limitations, this thesis argues that 'Four Nations History' provides a nuanced framework through which one can reveal multi-layered patterns and complexities across and within the national boundaries that are part of the United Kingdom.¹²³ It can be employed, as Lloyd-Jones and Scull have argued, not only to study and understand points of convergence and interaction, engagement and development, but also to highlight differences and ask why these exist.¹²⁴ In the words of Raphael Samuel, such an approach 'widens the scope of scholarly enquiry' and, therefore, allows for a better cultural, political and social understanding of variations across the United Kingdom.¹²⁵ Ultimately, when combined with 'collective memory' paradigms discussed above, it offers a distinctive means through which one can explore to what extent the politics of the union, and the multi-national nature of the United Kingdom, has interacted with the commemoration of the World Wars. This, in turn, allows for a more complex understanding of memories of the World Wars throughout the United Kingdom and, therefore, helps to incorporate more readily the 'four nations' into academic discussions about 'British' remembrance and commemoration of the World Wars.

The Sources

This thesis will draw on a wide and varied range of primary sources in order to create a complex and nuanced picture. It combines an analysis of the press, contemporary news and online media and 'sites of memory' with an examination of government sources, political speeches and parliamentary debates amongst others.

It should be recognised, as scholars often have, that there are potential problems when analysing the press. These include, amongst others, factual inaccuracies and incompleteness, inherent biases, and difficulties discerning the extent to which readers

¹²³ Lloyd Jones & Scull, 'A New Plea for an Old Subject?', pp.5-6.

¹²⁴ Ibid, pp.5-6.

¹²⁵ R. Samuel, 'British Dimensions: Four Nations History', *History Workshop Journal*, 40 (1995), p.xviii.

agreed with the claims advanced by editors. This thesis, however, contends that newspapers remain a crucial historical source. Newspapers contain a variety of different source material including news reports which can offer an organised chronicle of events, the text of speeches, press conferences, news briefings and authoritative records of government action and activity. They also publish editorials. This editorial commentary offers not only analysis and criticism of contemporary events, but also can simultaneously shape and reflect public opinion. Additionally, newspapers contain letters to the editor. These are a potentially rich source material, which can provide insight into the public response to both contemporary events and the viewpoints being advanced by editors. They can also act as a means of exploring the issues and events that appeared of the most importance during a particular historic time period.

This study has consulted a range of newspapers, national, regional and local, from across the United Kingdom. In addition to this, it has also drawn on publications circulated exclusively in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In this way, the press can shed light both on commemorative events and the debates surrounding them. It can also provide evidence of variations in national and regional interpretations of events as well as illustrate continuities and changes in historical representations across this period.

Yet, the press is by no means the only source used to elucidate the relationship between the political climate in the United Kingdom and the commemoration of the World Wars. This thesis also draws on so-called 'sites of memory', which can act as indicators of the official and public recognition of, and engagement with, historical events. These include memorials such as the Island of Ireland Peace Tower, the Scottish and Welsh Memorials in Flanders as well as events such as the 1995 VE Day anniversary, the First World War centenary and the Queen's Royal Visit to the Republic of Ireland in 2011. The treatment of these sites as historical sources is, therefore, a crucial component of this study. This, however, poses the problem of how best to interpret and represent this particular type of source material. The past presented at these sites is a highly refined one - a result of combined processes of management, budgeting and interpretation rarely accessible to the public. Consequently, they often convey specific ideas of the past through a variety of lenses that the wider public may not be aware of. It is important, therefore, to analyse both

the content and character of the sites themselves and the processes involved in their development. This thesis also utilises visual evidence, in particular photographs, in order to illustrate some of the commemorative events and 'sites of memory' under discussion.

These sources have been complemented with an analysis of political speeches, biographies, autobiographies, and parliamentary debates drawn from the National Assemblies of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as well as the Houses of Parliament in Westminster. In addition to this, this thesis has consulted election manifestos, research briefings and radio and T.V. broadcasts as well as commemorative programmes and the minutes from meetings of committees such as the First World War Centenary National Advisory, the Cymru'n Cofio - Wales Remembers 1914-1918 and the WW100 Scotland Boards. While the minutes from the Scottish Commemorations Panel were available in the public domain, the records from the other panels were not. As such, several Freedom of Information requests were also submitted. It is striking, however, that while the Welsh Government was forthcoming, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, on behalf of Westminster, rejected the submission. This was justified on the basis that releasing the records may 'prejudice relations between the United Kingdom and any other state', whilst it was also viewed as necessary for members to be able to 'discuss the complex, sensitive and emotive issues at hand' in a 'safe space'.¹²⁶ The Northern Ireland World War One Centenary Committee was contacted directly and failed to reply to any enquiries.

It is also worth highlighting here, that this thesis is deliberately not based on oral history interviews. It was felt that due to the 'four nations' approach of this study it would not be possible to conduct enough interviews in order to obtain a representative sample that covered not only the four nations and different regions but also demographic groups such as age, gender, race and religion. Furthermore, it should be noted that this thesis is written in full awareness that further source material relating to (at least some) of the period covered will soon become available through the National Archives and other repositories across the United Kingdom. It was determined however that, given the overwhelming

¹²⁶ Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, 'Letter to the Author Reference: FOI2019/08064', 20 August 2019.

availability of sources already in the public domain, this should not act as a deterrent to undertaking this research.

Cumulatively, the range of evidence used in this thesis can illuminate the multifarious ways in which the commemoration of the World Wars has interacted with and been affected by the politics of the union in the British Isles. When used in isolation, each source can offer only a limited insight however, when analysed in tandem they can provide a new and more detailed insight into what is a complex subject matter.

Synopsis: The Politics of the Union and World War Commemoration

This thesis comprises two parts, consisting of five chapters in total. The first part is concerned principally with the key institutions of the overarching state of the United Kingdom; the second part analyses approaches to World War commemoration in the component nations of the United Kingdom.

This thesis first investigates the approaches to commemoration adopted by successive governments in power at Westminster. Chapter One outlines the narratives, tone and format of official, state-led commemorative events and analyses the utilisation and appropriation of memories of the World Wars for political purposes. Chapter Two explores the role of the modern 'British' monarchy within commemoration. It considers the involvement of the monarch (and by extension the wider royal family) in their capacity as 'Head of State' and thus a key institution of the United Kingdom. It also examines the relationship between the monarchy and commemoration and considers to what extent their involvement is restricted by the formalities of their constitutional role or whether it can be viewed as far more significant than has previously been assumed.

The following three chapters then offer a nuanced analysis of World War commemoration in the three constituent nations which now have devolved governments, beginning with Northern Ireland, then Scotland and finally Wales. They are considered in no particular order. These chapters will examine to what extent commemorative approaches have been affected by the changing political climate and, in particular, the devolution of power. This is

critical to understanding the relationships between each of these nations and the wider United Kingdom and, in turn, how they have shifted over the course of the period under consideration in this thesis.

Chapter Three considers the extent to which commemoration has been influenced by, and is reflective of, the changing political climate both within Northern Ireland and in the relationship between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom (and thus Northern Ireland). It analyses the impact of the Peace Process and subsequent Good Friday Agreement as well as developments in Inter-Irish and Anglo-Irish relations including the Queen's Royal Visit in 2011. As already noted, this chapter focuses predominantly on Northern Ireland as the complexities of Ireland's past means that a detailed examination of commemoration in the Republic of Ireland would require its own study and as such is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Chapter Four examines the commemoration of the World Wars in Scotland. It explores how successive Scottish Governments, in the post-devolution period, have approached questions of remembrance whilst simultaneously dealing with the issues and debates surrounding Scottish sovereignty, such as devolution and independence. It also draws out how far Scotland's past martial, religious and imperial traditions have interacted with both World War commemoration and identity politics.

In the final chapter Wales is the subject of analysis. This chapter explores how the gradual development of the devolutionary process interacted with the commemoration of the World Wars. It also considers how far Wales' religious and pacifistic traditions as well as regional and linguistic tensions and divisions have resonated within commemorations.

Chapter One: Official State Commemorative Traditions, 1994 – 2016

The World Wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, and the memory of those wars, continue to provoke historical controversy throughout the United Kingdom.¹ In the decades since the Wars there have been numerous public and politicised disputes over how best to commemorate the victims and veterans of these two conflicts. In the lead up to the First World War centenary, for example, debate erupted when Conservative suggestions that the War should be celebrated as a notable British victory and a triumph of democratic values brought forth an intense rebuttal from Labour politicians and their allies in the press. Writing in 2012, *The Guardian's* Seamus Milne rejected David Cameron's suggestion that the Centennial should be a 'focus of national pride', and accused him of trying to 'hijack' the commemoration of the War for narrow partisan ends.² Rather, he argued that 'it does no service to the memory of the victims to prettify the horrific reality', noting that we should 'remember the suffering of the soldiers – rather than the cowards who sent them to die'.³

This debate provides an illustration of how the idea of the 'nation-state' – through the initiatives of the Government and opposition as well as the media responses to these - continued to play a central role in the 'politics of war commemoration'. At the outset, it is worth noting that the concept of a 'nation-state' was never unproblematic and was even less so in 1994, particularly in the case of the United Kingdom, which is multi-national in composition. In using the term 'nation-state', this chapter is referring to those polities which are recognised as independent within the international political and legal order. Internally, such states may be multi-national in composition, or federal in structure. Here, the United Kingdom is one such 'nation-state'.⁴

¹ S. Heathorn, 'The Mnemonic Turn in the Cultural Historiography of Britain's Great War', *The Historical Journal*, 48:4 (2005), p.1103.

² S. Milne, 'The First World War: The Real Lessons of this Savage Imperial Bloodbath', *The Guardian*, 16 October 2012.

³ Ibid.

⁴ See Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, *The Politics of War Memory*, p.15.

It is with the 'nation-state' and the central government of the United Kingdom, therefore, that this chapter is concerned.⁵ The role played by the devolved governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, representing distinct studies in themselves, will form the subject matter of later chapters. Primarily, this chapter will analyse state traditions and government ideologies about World War remembrance and commemoration, how they have evolved in the United Kingdom and the extent to which there is continuity or discontinuity across the various governments.⁶ It is concerned with the regimes of official memory and forgetting instituted by the nation-state – and with the memories and identities constructed via the public commemorations orchestrated by the nation-state. It considers how the memory and heritage of the World Wars have been drawn on by the state and invoked as a means of expressing place and politics.

If we are to understand the complex issues thrown up by the remembrance and commemoration of the World Wars in the United Kingdom, however, it is not enough to treat this memory as fixed. Rather, memory itself must be considered as both historically evolving and contingent. Neither official nor unofficial forms of war commemoration have proven static or universal in their participation and meanings, which are open to renegotiation, reinterpretation and sometimes contestation. Indeed, memories are consciously stimulated and appropriated by political forces, while traditions and myths are constantly renewed in different political and ideological contexts.⁷ As such, there is a need to consider how memories of the Wars are encoded and continually re-inscribed by subsequent events, political commitments and other changes in society and culture. Moreover, since the 1990s, a number of political, social, economic and cultural shifts have required different narratives to bind the state and citizen – from devolution and the 'crisis of the union' to demographic shifts, the growth of 'multi-culturalism' and involvement in a number of military conflicts, and the changing nature of domestic and international

⁵ Similarly, it is worth noting that central government is not necessarily a unitary entity and that in some cases distinctions will exist between varying members of the Government.

⁶ The administrations that this chapter is concerned with are: John Major, 1990-1997 (specifically 1994-1997); Tony Blair, 1997-2007; Gordon Brown, 2007-2010; David Cameron, 2010-2015 (Conservative-Liberal Coalition Government) and 2015-June 2016.

⁷ M. Shaw, 'Past Wars and Present Conflicts: From the Second World War to the Gulf' in M. Evans & K. Lunn (eds), *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Berg, 1997), p.193.

terrorist threats. Remembrance and commemoration play an important role in the renewal of national narratives.

Throughout this chapter, the term 'national' or 'official' memory and memories will be used to refer to what Beaumont has defined as the 'discourse, rituals and practices performed in the public sphere and sponsored by the state' or what Ashplant et al. have referred to as 'those dominant or hegemonic narratives which underpin and help to organise the remembrance and commemoration of war at the level of the nation state'.⁸ Indeed, for Bodnar, 'official' memory is created for the purpose of the stabilisation of the status quo.⁹ This 'official memory' is expressed most explicitly via permanent memorials and through a calendar of ceremonies and rituals (both annual and war anniversaries) which repeatedly recall key wartime events, and mediate on their meaning.¹⁰

This chapter consists of three sections. The first addresses the question of how the decline of the union, and responses to it, have affected commemoration by the state from 1994-2014. As such, it is concerned with how state-sponsored commemoration of the World Wars has affected questions of national belonging and to what extent their memory has been consciously or unconsciously mobilised as a part of a wider politics of legitimising the union. The second section deals with the impact of growing diversity and multi-culturalism on commemoration and whether the historical narratives of the Wars have been adjusted in response to this. This section focuses primarily on the years from 2001 to 2014. Finally, the third section will analyse how far the United Kingdom's engagement in recent military conflicts has affected official commemoration. Overall, in adopting a thematic approach, this chapter will draw on 'snapshots' of evidence, and consequently will not treat each of the different governments equally within each section. This is reflective of the episodic nature of commemoration in this period and the concentration of evidence not only around major commemorative anniversaries but also the changing political environment.

⁸ J. Beaumont, 'The Politics of Memory: Commemorating the Centenary of the First World War', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 50:3 (2015), p.530; Ashplant Dawson & Roper, *The Politics of War Memory*, p.21.

⁹ J. Bodnar, *Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp.13-14.

¹⁰ Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, *The Politics of War Memory*, p.21.

This chapter will argue that the central governments of John Major, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David Cameron all sought to manipulate and appropriate the commemoration of the World Wars as an instrument of policy in an attempt to foster an inclusive and overarching 'British' identity and, therefore, bind the United Kingdom more closely together. While the priorities and political agendas of each varied, it is apparent that there was an increasing emphasis on recognising a more diverse range of experiences and, more importantly, incorporating those into 'British' narratives of the Wars.

The Decline of the Union, Devolution and Responses to 'Crisis'

By the 1990s, although the World Wars themselves were becoming increasingly distant, a string of high-profile war anniversaries appeared to project them to the forefront of consciousness. These included the fiftieth anniversaries of D-Day and Victory in Europe Day in 1994 and 1995 respectively, and the eightieth anniversary of the start of the First World War in 1994. In stark contrast to the somewhat reluctant commemorations undertaken by the Thatcher Government in 1984 and 1985, John Major's Government sponsored a widespread programme of events for the fiftieth anniversaries. Within these commemorations, the centrepiece was a three-day weekend festival of events held in Hyde Park from 6 – 8 May 1995. The 8 May 1995, which marked the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day, was declared a public bank holiday – an illustration of the centrality which the Second World War had acquired by then for the conception of British national identity being promoted by the Government. At the opening of VE Day commemorations, for example, Major noted that the commemorations represented 'an affirmation of the links that bind us together as a nation, across the generations'.¹¹ Similarly, in announcing government plans for the D-Day anniversary, Major said that he hoped that they would 'unite the nation' amid growing calls for devolution in both Scotland and Wales which he believed

¹¹ J. Major quoted in J. Ezard, 'Generations Mix Joyously in Mass VE Day Celebrations', *The Guardian*, 8 May 1995.

would 'ultimately lead to the separation of England and Scotland' and be 'damaging for the whole of the United Kingdom'.¹²

The politicisation of these commemorations, however, and their linking with the promotion of the union of the United Kingdom is perhaps best illustrated by a dialogue between Dame Jill Knight and Major which took place during Prime Ministers Questions on 11 May 1995, following the conclusion of the VE Day commemorations. Here, Dame Jill Knight asked Major:

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the size and scale of public rejoicing on Monday stoutly reaffirmed the love that the British people have for this country? They were waving Union Jacks... Is it not appropriate to remind people that Labour's devolution policy would split this country more irrevocably and fundamentally than all Hitler's armies could possibly have done?¹³

In response to this, Major commented that 'last week's celebrations were a remarkable occasion', which 'struck a perfect balance between commemoration and celebration' before going on to state: 'I believe that they also showed that the sentiments that unite us as a nation are far stronger than those sometimes presented as though to disunite us. That is very healthy for the nation as a whole: it is an enormous strength for this country'.¹⁴

The fiftieth anniversaries of the Second World War also witnessed a significant shift in focus from the military to a civilian experience made accessible to everyone regardless of what they were doing in 1945 or, in fact, whether they were even alive [See Figure 1.1].

¹² J. Major, *John Major: The Autobiography* (London: Harper Collins, 1999) p.415; p.420.

¹³ J. Knight, 'Engagements', *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 259: cols. 880-1, 11 May 1995.

¹⁴ J. Major, 'Engagements', *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 259: cols. 880-1, 11 May 1995.




Figure 1.1: A photograph of the cover of the Official Government Programme to mark the 50th Anniversary of the End of World War II. Taken by the author.

This image is illustrative of the shift from a military to a civilian focus within commemorations, with the front cover depicting not military figures, but civilian celebrations of VE Day. Yet, while this programme of events represented a dramatic growth in the scale of anniversary celebrations, the commemorations were certainly not unproblematic. In April 1994, for example, Major became embroiled in controversy over his D-Day commemoration plans. This followed announcements that a 'Family Day' party for

up to 300,000 people would be held in Hyde Park to honour ‘the immense effort made by the whole civilian population leading up to D-Day and beyond’ as the key event of the week long fiftieth anniversary commemorations.¹⁵ Major’s focus was described by Labour MP Peter Mandelson as being ‘frivolous and trivialising’. Similarly, a Commons motion, also sponsored by Mandelson, referred to the plans which included street parties, firework displays and even spam fritter contests as ‘inappropriate and in bad taste’ and called upon the Government to scrap its programme and ‘to hold, instead, a single, respectful, dignified national service of thanksgiving’.¹⁶ Significantly, these criticisms focused on the perceived ‘light entertainment tone’ of the ‘celebrations’ and argued that the D-Day Anniversary should be a ‘solemn occasion’ and not an occasion for appropriating the memory of the War in a ‘patriotic jamboree’.¹⁷

These D-Day commemorations also appeared to become mixed up with controversy over the 1994 European elections. Opposition MPs accused Major of using the ‘patriotic good feeling’ that would be generated as a means of not only benefitting the Conservative party’s Euro-election campaign, but also to distract attention from the expected Tory disaster.¹⁸ In fact, the 1994/1995 commemorations became entangled more broadly with the internal Conservative party controversies related to the European Union. In April 1995, for example, Teresa Gorman, one of the eight ‘euro-rebels’ to have the whip withdrawn by Major in November 1994, upon her re-admittance to the parliamentary party made a blunt call for Britain to leave the European Union (EU), commenting that ‘our only hope for the future is to leave the European Union’. She went on to link this explicitly with the Second World War, stating that ‘the approach of VE Day offers us a chance to reflect on what we fought for... above all the freedom from foreign domination’.¹⁹ Similarly, *The Times*

¹⁵ J. Major, ‘Speech on the D-Day Civilian Launch’, 13 April 1994. Accessed at: <http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page2260.html> [Date Accessed: 17/05/2016]; see also J. Ezard, ‘Major to Throw D-Day Party for 300,000 in Hyde Park’, *The Guardian*, 14 April 1994.

¹⁶ Early Day Motion 1032, ‘Marking of the 50th Anniversary of D-Day’, Session 1993-1994, 18 April 1994. Proposed by Peter Mandelson. It is worth noting that of the 54 Signatories all belonged to either Labour/Scottish Labour or the Liberal Democrats.

¹⁷ P. Eastham, ‘It’s Right to Rejoice Over D-Day, Minister Insists’, *Daily Mail*, 19 April 1994.

¹⁸ Ibid; J. Ezard, M. White & P. Wintour, ‘Forced Landings: How the Government Got it Wrong, the Veterans Got it Right and John Major was Pushed into another U-turn’, *The Guardian*, 22 April 1994.

¹⁹ T. Gorman quoted in Anon, ‘Gorman Calls for Break with EU’, *The Independent*, 29 April 1995.

reported on 12 May 1995 that the lessons drawn from VE Day by prominent Euro-sceptic Michael Portillo appeared to be of a 'patriotic, proud and dignified' Britons who had fought to restore to sovereign nations their violated independence'.²⁰ Significantly, the next day *The Times* noted that for the euro-sceptics, the 'new nationalists', VE Day 'stood only for victory'.²¹ This contrasted sharply with Major's official government announcement earlier that year that the theme of the fiftieth VE Day commemorations would be 'reconciliation, a celebration of fifty years peace in Europe and hope for the future'.²² Furthermore, it was within the context of this theme that as early as March 1994 of the previous year Major had stated in a Commons written reply 'we very much hope Germany will play a full part and be represented at a high level in the 1995 commemorations'.²³

While the commemorations became embroiled in internal party controversies, it can also be seen that although the rhetoric behind many of these commemorative ceremonies in 1994 and 1995 concentrated on bringing the nation together, in actuality they appeared to focus on the extension of the pre-existing dominant Anglo-centric narratives of the War to Britain's post-war generations. Writing ahead of the VE Day commemorations in May, Alan Massie of the *Daily Mail*, noted the lack of excitement in Scotland over VE Day celebrations, argued that the difficulty for many lay in the fact they 'no longer feel they belong to the nation that fought the war'.²⁴ Moreover, the official commemorative ceremonies were predominantly located at venues of high national standing concentrated in the English capital, such as Westminster, Buckingham Palace and St Paul's Cathedral.²⁵

It is interesting to compare and contrast the attitudes displayed by the Conservatives while in office with the approach adopted by its successors, the 'New Labour' Government. On 1

²⁰ M. Portillo quoted in N. Wood, 'Hurd Tries to Turn Conservative Euro-Sceptic Tide – Douglas Hurd', *The Times*, 12 May 1995.

²¹ J. Critchley, 'After the Landslide – The Tattered Tories', *The Times*, 13 May 1995.

²² J. Major, 'Press Conference on VE/VJ Commemorations', 11 January 1995. Full Transcript accessed at: <http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page725.html> [Date Accessed: 16/05/2016].

²³ J. Major, 'Second World War Commemorations', *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 240: cols. 135-6W, 22 March 1994.

²⁴ A. Massie, 'It Was Our War Too, You Know: Why is Scotland so Unexcited about VE Day?', *Daily Mail*, 1 May 1995.

²⁵ This is indicated by the *Radio Times Listings* for 8 May 1995. See *Radio Times Listings*, 6 May – 12 May, Issue 3720. Vol. 285. Accessed at: <http://genome.ch.bbc.co.uk> [Date Accessed: 06/03/2016].

May 1997 Tony Blair swept to power in an electoral victory which heralded the start of a period in which there would be a discernible shift in the tone and focus of state-sponsored commemoration.²⁶ Yet, the secondary sources – including biographies of both Blair and his cabinet colleagues – have hitherto neglected New Labour’s approach to commemoration. Upon coming to power, Blair, who was bequeathed a legacy of inflamed tensions within the United Kingdom by the Conservatives, embarked on a programme of national renewal. He believed that these tensions could be stabilised through the adoption of a policy of limited social and political engineering. In Wales and Scotland, for example, this led to the advent of devolution and the introduction of new executives and elected assemblies in Edinburgh and Cardiff, which took responsibility for their devolved powers on 1 July 1999 (cf. Chapter Four and Chapter Five).²⁷ Through devolution, however, Blair was seeking to strengthen the union by renegotiating its terms in order to better accommodate the multi-national nature of the state. The 1997 Labour Party manifesto stated that ‘a sovereign Westminster parliament will devolve power to Scotland and Wales. The Union will be strengthened, and the threat of separatism removed’.²⁸ Increasingly, therefore, Blair was ever-more insistent that the United Kingdom was greater together than the sum of its parts. On 12 November 1998, for example, at the launch of Labour’s campaign for the Scottish Parliament elections to be held in May of 1999, he commented that ‘Scotland, England and the rest of the UK’ were ‘stronger together, weaker apart’. Here, he invoked images of the English and Scots standing together on Remembrance Sunday as a symbol of shared history, going on to say that ‘we are all united in remembering the great sacrifices that the nations of these islands have together made in times of great peril. We stood together to defeat Fascism’.²⁹

²⁶ It is worth noting that these changes have also had a significant impact on commemoration by the devolved governments of Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. This will be explored further within Chapters Three, Four and Five respectively.

²⁷ These were established by the Scotland Act and Government of Wales Act 1998 respectively, coming into existence in 1999.

²⁸ Labour Party, *New Labour Because Britain Deserves Better* (London: Labour Party, 1997).

²⁹ T. Blair quoted in Anon, ‘United We Stand, Divided We Fail, Blair Tells Scots’, *The Times*, 13 November 1998; see also M. Ritchie, ‘Blair Puts Vision of Solidarity to Scots’, *The Herald*, 13 November 1998.

Similarly, this approach to strengthening the union also applied with regards to Northern Ireland. In 1997, Blair's first official trip outside London following the election was to Belfast. He declared it was his aim 'to see a fair political settlement', yet he also stated that it was not his agenda to see the creation of a United Ireland. Rather, he stated that 'Northern Ireland is part of the UK, alongside England, Scotland and Wales. The Union binds the four parts of the United Kingdom together. I believe in the United Kingdom. I value the union'.³⁰ However, the subsequent advances in the Northern Ireland Peace Process, which culminated in the signing of the Good Friday Agreement on 10 April 1998, saw not only the establishment of a devolved government, but also declared that the people of the region would determine whether to join a united Ireland or remain a part of the United Kingdom. It must be borne in mind that this approach continued policies initiated by the Major Government and was fully supported by the Dublin Government (cf. Chapter Three).

Following the passing of devolved powers to Scotland and Wales in 1999, the Blair Governments were characterised by a growth in confidence that there was no crisis in the United Kingdom and that the union was, in fact, strong. This confidence was only strengthened further by the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, which appeared to solve the old, festering issue of Northern Ireland. Consequently, it is perhaps due to this that the Blair Governments made little reference to commemoration in overtly national terms or as a means of highlighting the significance of the union from 1999 onwards. Rather, as will be seen in sections two and three of this chapter, commemoration increasingly became a means of promoting 'multi-culturalism' and affirming support of the armed forces. One might think that these are two incompatible aims, but both, in fact, were closely associated with the Blair agenda in domestic and foreign policy.³¹

It was not until the later years of the Blair administration that a shift in contemporary political discourse marked a return to the use of World War commemoration as an instrument of wider policy concerning concepts of national identity and the union. This was

³⁰ T. Blair, 'Address at the Royal Agricultural Society Belfast', 16 May 1997. Accessed at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/tb16597.htm> [Date Accessed: 17/05/2016].

³¹ For a discussion of foreign policy under Blair see J. Kampfner, *Blair's Wars* (London: Free Press, 2003) and R. Little & M Wickham Jones (eds), *New Labour's Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).

a result of shifts inadvertently caused by devolution which had failed to 'kill the SNP by kindness'. Rather, devolution injected a sense of 'responsibility and mobility' into Scottish politics.³² Scottish independence was now being articulated in economic and fiscal terms, instead of being considered by many as a one-dimensional constitutional issue associated with national identity.³³ Indeed, the limits of the Scottish Parliament had become most apparent in the economic sphere. The economy represented one of Scotland's fundamental problems, yet the parliament had no real economic powers. Furthermore, an opinion poll published in 2005 indicated that just 14% of Scots defined their identity as British, compared with 79% who viewed themselves as Scottish.³⁴ It was Gordon Brown, however, a Scot himself and alert to the weakening of 'Britishness', who wanted to resume the initiative.³⁵ In his role as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Brown delivered an address to the Fabian New Year Conference in London in January 2006, which outlined the endangered state of British national identity and noted that 'we should also think what more we can do to develop the ties that bind us more closely together'. He went on to refer to both Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday as days of national unity and patriotism:

[W]hat is the British equivalent of the US 4th of July, or even the French 14th of July for that matter? [...] What is our equivalent for a national celebration of who we are and what we stand for? [...] Perhaps Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday are the nearest we have come to a British day that is in every corner of our country –commemorative, unifying and an expression of British ideas of standing firm in the world in the name of liberty, responsibility and fairness.³⁶

While Brown's suggestion that either Armistice Day or Remembrance Sunday should be developed into a 'national day of patriotism to celebrate British history, achievements and culture' proved controversial, his speech drew on the way in which these two days of

³² J. Mitchell, 'The Big 'Yes' May End up a 'No', *The Sunday Times*, 16 September 2007.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Figures quoted in L. Ward & J. Carvel, 'Growing Sense of Englishness Explains Why Less than Half of Country Feel British', *The Guardian*, 24 January 2007.

³⁵ See A. MacLeod, 'Scots are Asked to put Britain First', *The Times*, 8 September 2006; A. Browne, 'Brown Issues Rallying Cry to Save the Union', *The Times*, 13 January 2007; J. Allardyce & K. Farquharson, 'Can Brown Really Save the Union?', *The Sunday Times*, 14 January 2007.

³⁶ G. Brown, 'The Future of Britishness Speech to the Fabian New Year Conference, London', 14 January 2006. Accessed at: <http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=316> [Date Accessed: 01/05/2016].

remembrance and, more broadly, the World Wars had become deeply engrained within the concept of British national identity.³⁷ Indeed, as Adrian Gregory highlights, from the 1920s onwards Armistice Day (and later Remembrance Sunday) have functioned in the UK as days of national unity, with the aim of confirming national belonging and expressing patriotic sentiments. In his address, Brown exploited this function for the rhetorical production of citizenship and to stress the values of 'British' identity. This was in turn being used to demonstrate the significance of the wider union of the United Kingdom and to bolster 'Britishness' as a means of extending a more inclusive conception of national identity to all people throughout the United Kingdom, including the English, Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish.

Strengthening the appeal of 'Britishness' was to become a major theme of Brown's own premiership in the expectation that this would bring the United Kingdom back together. This resulted from a sea change in devolution politics in 2007 which had seen the Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru and Sinn Fein all enter government in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland respectively. In Scotland, the SNP emerged as the largest party, winning a total of forty-seven seats, and went on to form a minority government. Although closely followed by the incumbent Scottish Labour Party in second place with forty-six seats, the SNP had gained significantly from the 2003 election results when they had won only twenty-seven seats.³⁸ In Wales, Plaid Cymru made gains at the expense of Labour, winning three more seats in 2007 than 2003, while Labour lost four.³⁹ Although Labour remained the largest party, a coalition government was formed between Labour and Plaid Cymru. The Northern Ireland Assembly elections of 2007 not only resulted in an increased number of seats for Sinn Fein, four more than in 2003, but also saw them enter government, due to a power-sharing deal made with the Democratic Unionist Party, which led to a restoration

³⁷ P. Wintour, 'Brown: Remembrance Sunday should become "British Day"': Chancellor Advocates Annual Celebration to Emulate Fourth of July, *The Guardian*, 14 January 2006; See also R. Money, 'Brown Waves Flag for Britain Day... But Will the Idea Fly?', *Sunday Herald*, 15 January 2006.

³⁸ Figures as given on 'Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly Elections 2007', *UK Political Info*. Accessed at: <http://www.ukpolitical.info/Reg03052007.htm> [Date Accessed: 17/05/2016].

³⁹ Figures as given on 'Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly Elections 2007', *UK Political Info*.

of the Assembly's devolved powers.⁴⁰ When Brown became Prime Minister in 2007, he was faced with renewed fears that the United Kingdom might break up. Consequently, throughout his premiership Brown frequently focused on rhetorical and symbolic attempts to build up a positive 'culture of unionism'. Upon assuming office, for example, he announced his intention to create a new "British Day" aimed at 'bring[ing] together citizens throughout the United Kingdom as well as new immigrants'.⁴¹ Significantly, coming in 2007, this also coincided with the year of the 300th anniversary of the Act of Union between England and Scotland.⁴² To this end, he commissioned a citizenship review, which led to the publication of a pamphlet entitled '*A More United Kingdom*' by think-tank Demos in 2008, about how best to celebrate British national identity. Within this, "27 ways to celebrate a national day" were included, one of which suggested 'decking public spaces with posters of Winston Churchill'.⁴³ The image of Churchill, and therefore the Second World War, was deemed suitably unifying to bring together all the peoples of the United Kingdom.

Under the premiership of Brown, as in the days of Major, the UK Government sought again to use war remembrance, specifically of the World Wars, as a means of highlighting the value of British national identity. Furthermore, state commemoration increasingly sought to recognise the shared experiences of the World Wars and their continuing relevance to all four nations of the United Kingdom. The same approach was continued by Brown's successor, David Cameron, both under the Coalition Government and in the Conservative Government of 2011.

A recognition of the growing need to appeal to all four nations appears to have influenced the Governments' approach to the centenary of the Great War. In October 2012, at the

⁴⁰ Figures as given on 'Northern Ireland Assembly Election 2007', *UK Political Info*. Accessed at: http://www.ukpolitical.info/Northern_Ireland_Assembly_Election_2007.htm [Date Accessed: 17/05/2016]. It is worth noting that the 2003 election had led to a suspension of the Assembly's powers as the DUP, which became the biggest party, opposed the Belfast Agreement.

⁴¹ J. Oliver & R. Brooks, 'Knock it Back – You're Drinking for Britain', *The Sunday Times*, 14 September 2008; See also P. Johnston, 'It's Now Time to Answer the English Question', *The Daily Telegraph*, 17 January 2012, p.21; B. Fatogun, "'Britain Day" Mooted as New Bank Holiday', *Irish News*, 6 June 2007.

⁴² See Anon, 'Leading Article: National Identity: When British Isn't Always Best', *The Guardian*, 24 January 2007.

⁴³ Oliver & Brooks, 'Knock it Back – You're Drinking for Britain'.

Imperial War Museum (IWM) in London, Cameron announced the Government's plans to commemorate the anniversary cycle of the centenary of the First World War, 2014-2018. In this speech, he stated that every part of the United Kingdom should recognise the sacrifices made in the War, while commemorations should mark the impact the War had on the development of Britain today.⁴⁴ Indeed, Cameron claimed that his ambition was to recognise the durable emotional connection of the conflict through the development of:

*A truly national commemoration, worthy of this historic centenary [...] a commemoration that captures our national spirit, in every corner of our country, from our schools and workplaces, to our town halls and local communities. A commemoration that, like the Diamond Jubilee celebrated this year, says something about who we are as a people.*⁴⁵

The reference to the Diamond Jubilee celebrations within this speech is significant. The link drawn by Cameron between the First World War centenary and the Queen's Diamond Jubilee is indicative of the Government's desire to generate a further outpouring of patriotic sentiments similar to those of the summer of 2012. On 9 June 2013, *The Telegraph* noted that 'ministers will hope the commemorations will harness the patriotic spirit which came to the fore last year with the twin celebrations of the Olympic Games and the Queen's Diamond Jubilee, when the country wrapped itself in the Union flag'.⁴⁶ The monarchy and its formal and symbolic roles in commemoration will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two of this thesis.

Cameron's Government sought to renew the significance of the United Kingdom at a time when the union appeared ever weaker, especially with the growing threat of the possibility of Scottish independence. In 1914, the Great War had kindled a new feeling of 'Britishness' in England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales at a time when the United Kingdom had seemed

⁴⁴ K. Devlin, 'UK-Wide Events Planned to Remember 1914 not 1314', *The Herald*, 12 October 2012; P. Wintour, 'National: First World War Centenary Will Be Marked by Events that "Capture Our National Spirit": Prime Minister Sets Aside £50m in Funds for 2014: Loss of Life Across British Empire to be Emphasised', *The Guardian*, 12 October 2012.

⁴⁵ D. Cameron, 'World War Centenary Plans', Speech at the Imperial War Museum, London, 11 October 2012. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-at-imperial-war-museum-on-first-world-war-centenary-plans> [Date Accessed: 18/01/2016]. Emphasis added.

⁴⁶ P. Hennessy, J. Copping & C. Duffin, 'First World War Centenary Plans Revealed', *The Telegraph*, 9 June 2013.

close to disintegration due to campaigns for Home Rule in both Ireland and Scotland and for the disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Wales. Catriona Pennell, for example, has demonstrated that by the end of 1914, the populations of England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland had largely embraced the War. She goes on to note that there were ‘similarities of experience and responses to the start of the First World War’, which, in fact, ‘made the kingdom, at this point, genuinely united’.⁴⁷ It was to this sense of unity, and the patriotic sentiments it inspired, that government commemorations of the Great War appeared to allude. Indeed, in the absence of a ‘unifying’ conflict, the Government instead sought to use the memory of the War as a means of uniting co-nationals around a unifying set of values. Writing in *The Scotsman* in 2013, for example, historian Michael Fry noted that ‘Cameron has already said the centenary of the First World War will be a good time for everybody in Britain to reflect on what has held us together for the past 100 years’.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the UK Government’s decision to mark the start of the First World War in commemorations on 4 August, coming just six weeks before the Scottish independence vote to be held on 18 September, was interpreted by some as ‘a cynical political ploy to wrap Britain once again in the Union flag just weeks before the independence referendum in Scotland.’⁴⁹ *The Telegraph* made this link explicitly when commenting that ‘senior figures in the Government are also crossing their fingers that the First World War programme gives a political boost to the campaign for a “No” vote in next year’s referendum’.⁵⁰ Cameron and the UK Government connected war remembrance to the demonstration of British national identity by explicitly introducing the commemoration of the First World War as a vehicle for forging patriotic feeling, emphasising shared experiences of the War and thus their central importance for national history and identity.

⁴⁷ C. Pennell, *A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.1-3. While Pennell argues that by the end of 1914, British and Irish people had largely embraced the war she also disputes the myth of ‘war enthusiasm’, charting the evolving and complex nature of responses to the war. See also A. Gregory, *The Last Great War. British Society and the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); J. Horne (ed.), *Our War: Ireland and the Great War* (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2008).

⁴⁸ M. Fry, ‘Michael Fry: Battle for Hearts and Minds’, *The Scotsman*, 13 June 2013.

⁴⁹ I. Mann, ‘Let Us Not Name Political Capital Out of the First World War Dead’, *The Herald*, 1 March 2013.

⁵⁰ Hennessy, Copping & Duffin, ‘First World War Centenary Plans Revealed’.

Commemoration of the First World War centenary in Northern Ireland also highlights the Government's appropriation and use of the memory of the conflict to further the union of the United Kingdom. In Northern Ireland, the centenary was part of a wider series of high-profile commemorations between 2012 and 2021 that mark events such as the Home Rule disputes, the Irish Civil War and the Battle of the Somme, all of which could draw attention to the contemporary resonances of historical events surrounding Ireland's partition and the difficult and potentially divisive nature of these commemorations. In response to these commemorations, the UK Government sought to extend the established narratives underpinning the centenary to Northern Ireland in a way that emphasises a shared focus on British participation in the First World War. It is worth noting that this was facilitated by significant changes in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (cf. Chapter Three). For instance, Theresa Villiers, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, stated that 'World War One profoundly affected the whole community across Northern Ireland and involved terrible sacrifice... it is important that a century on, this generation recognises and pays tribute to those who gave so much for *our* country.'⁵¹ Furthermore, the Northern Ireland Office has stated that it aims to 'ensure Her Majesty's Government's programme for the World War One commemorations is implemented in Northern Ireland in a manner that *promotes reconciliation and enhances prospects for a peaceful, shared future*'.⁵² These references to 'reconciliation' and a 'peaceful, shared future' are indicative of the way in which the signing of the Good Friday Agreement and formal end of the 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland have affected commemoration by helping to rehabilitate the memory of the First World War amongst nationalist communities (cf. Chapter Three). Just as this changed political environment has made such commemoration possible, so too has commemoration been used to further the political aspects of the Peace Process. Indeed, state commemoration has come to centre on not only the themes of reconciliation and

⁵¹ A Maguire, 'Northern Ireland Schools Will Play a Part in WW1 Centenary', *Belfast Telegraph*, 15 October 2012. Emphasis added.

⁵² Northern Ireland Office, 'First World War & Decade of Centenaries Commemorations – Update', *GOV.UK*, 4 March 2015. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/first-world-war-commemorations-and-the-decade-of-centenaries> [Date Accessed: 05/05/2016]. Emphasis added.

peace, as seen above, but also on promoting the remembrance of shared history and experiences.

This section has demonstrated that commemoration of the World Wars was used by the Governments of Brown and, in particular, Cameron to stress not only a shared sense of 'Britishness', but also the historic and enduring links between the component nations of the United Kingdom at precisely those moments when the integrity of the union appeared under threat.

Diversity, Multi-Culturalism and State Commemoration

Official World War commemoration by the UK Government, then, has been significantly affected by the numerous questions and issues that have arisen from the multi-national nature of the state in recent years. This 'crisis of the union', indicated by devolution and the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, however, has not been the only significant contextual development to take place since 1994. Indeed, the Government also had to respond to a post-imperial Britain, ever-growing diversity and the rise of 'multi-culturalism' within its borders and the impact of this on the wider state. In the years since the end of the Second World War, British society has witnessed a fundamental alteration in its racial mix. Between 1945 and 2000, large numbers of migrants from throughout the world moved to the United Kingdom on an unprecedented scale. This migration, which took place in a series of waves, had profound consequences for all aspects of British life. Changes became increasingly more apparent in the 1990s, as it became clear that British society at the end of the twentieth century had become far more diverse than that of 1945. Indeed, by the time that Blair and 'New Labour' came to power in 1997, the concept of a 'multi-cultural Britain' had become increasingly accepted in both government and public discourse.

Despite this widespread migration to the United Kingdom in the post-war period, in the years leading up to 1994 national state commemoration of the World Wars failed to pay heed to the diverse memories of its multi-stranded population. This was the case even

though British Imperial and Commonwealth involvement in and contribution to both the First and Second World Wars was crucial. When Britain declared war in 1914, she did so on behalf of the Empire. 1.3 million men volunteered from the so-called 'White Dominions' (Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa); 1.44 million from the Indian Sub-Continent (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka) with 13,000 decorated with medals, including 12 Victoria Crosses; 55,000 from the African colonies; and a further 15,000 from the West Indies.⁵³ Similarly, in the Second World War, the whole British Empire was once again involved from the outset. The 'White Dominions' were free to choose, unlike during the First World War, yet they all joined the conflict within a week. Here, 2.5 million Indians, 1.75 million volunteers from the 'White Dominions' and a further 380,000 from both the African colonies and the West Indies fought alongside Britain.⁵⁴ Moreover, while the Empire's main contribution was arguably its mobilisation of military personnel, its role extended far beyond this. Indeed, the British Empire and Commonwealth also provided financial and military resources for the war effort including supply centres and military bases as well as raw materials and foodstuffs.⁵⁵

Following the general election of 1997, Prime Minister Tony Blair repeatedly called for the establishment of a more inclusive 'New Britain' based on a 'new modern patriotism' which aimed to reshape the nation in order to integrate ethnic minorities more centrally within national identity.⁵⁶ Furthermore, on 2 November 1999 the Culture Secretary, Chris Smith,

⁵³ Department for Communities and Local Government, 'Commonwealth Contribution to First World War to be Commemorated', *GOV.UK*, 8 November 2013. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/commonwealth-contribution-to-first-world-war-to-be-commemorated> [Date Accessed: 06/05/2016].

⁵⁴ See <http://www.memorial-gates-london.org.uk/history/ww2/participants/caribbean/index.html>. Also pages on participants from Africa and the India Sub-Continent [Date Accessed: 11/05/2016]; See also A. Jackson, 'The Empire/Commonwealth and the Second World War', *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, 100:421 (2011), pp.65-78; C. Somerville, *Our War: the British Commonwealth and the Second World War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998); S. Foster, 'The British Empire and Commonwealth in World War II: Selection and Omission in English History Textbooks', *History Education Research Journal*, 5:2 (2005), pp.72-90.

⁵⁵ See also P. Clarke, *The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire* (London: Allen Lane, 2007) for a discussion of the economic contribution of the Empire to the War.

⁵⁶ T. Blair, 'Britain Speech', 28 March 2000. Accessed at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/mar/28/britishidentity.tonyblair> [Date Accessed: 11/05/2016]; T. Blair, 'Our Shared Future – Multiculturalism and Integration – The Duty to Integrate: Shared British Values', 8 December 2006. Accessed at:

opened a debate with the apparent purpose of redefining facets of British identity. He called for 'a more complete version of the truth' regarding British history and spoke of 'the need to look at heritage through more than one pair of eyes'.⁵⁷ This contrasted sharply with the narratives prevalent under Major, which notably excluded those who had fought under imperial flags. During the 1995 commemorations, for example, the emphasis remained overwhelmingly on civilian celebrations of VE Day and not VJ Day. Furthermore, those celebrations of VJ Day that did take place focused almost exclusively on the horrific experiences of former prisoners of war at the hands of the Japanese army. This focus on suffering, rather than the military, however, meant that the memory of Asians fighting and suffering alongside the British was not part of the official UK commemoration. Yet, as many as 65% of the soldiers in Slim's 14th Army were not 'white', and 16 out of 29 Victoria Crosses awarded in the Far East went to Indians, Nepalese and Tibetans. This emphasis on VE Day, combined with the focus on human suffering, ensured that VJ commemorations not only fitted with a traditional narrative of a united (and predominantly white) stoic, British people, but also avoided drawing attention to the end of the Empire and the resultant dramatic loss of status for Britain in the wider world which was viewed as equivalent to 'defeat'.⁵⁸ In fact, it was not simply the war experiences of Imperial and Commonwealth subjects that were marginalised within government narratives of the World Wars, but also those of Jewish minorities. David Cesarani, for example, highlights the manner in which D-Day commemorations frequently failed to recognise the contribution the Allied landings made in saving Jewish lives.⁵⁹

Under Labour, however, this illusion of recognition for soldiers drawn from the Empire was addressed. In the early 2000s, three memorials were established in different corners of

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20040105034004/http://number10.gov.uk/output/Page10563.asp> [Date Accessed: 11/05/2016].

⁵⁷ Quoted in M. Jaggi, 'Casting Off the Shackles of History; Black Britons Have a Right to See Their Heritage Justly Represented', *The Guardian*, 3 November 1999, p.22.

⁵⁸ For a discussion of this refusal to come to terms with the loss of Empire, and the violence which accompanied it see C. Bayly & T. Harper, *Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941-1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2004); see also C. Bayly & T. Harper, *Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain's Asian Empire* (London: Penguin, 2008).

⁵⁹ D. Cesarani, 'Lacking in Conviction: British War Crimes Policy and National Memory of the Second World War' in Evans & Lunn, *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century*, p.37.

Hyde Park Corner which sought to retrospectively commemorate the efforts and experiences of contingents from Africa, the Caribbean and India (unveiled in 2002), Australia (2003), and New Zealand (2006) who fought alongside Britain during the two World Wars. Of these, the establishment of the 'Memorial Gates', also known as the 'Commonwealth Memorial Gates' in 2002, is perhaps the most interesting [See Figure 1.2]. The memorial, which is situated at the Hyde Park Corner end of Constitution Hill in London, is dedicated to the 'five million people from the Indian Sub-Continent, Africa and the Caribbean who served or lost their lives in the World Wars'.⁶⁰ Unveiled by the Queen on 6 November 2002, it consists of four stone gate pillars, two on each side of the road, each topped by a bronze urn and gas flames, which are lit on occasions such as Remembrance Sunday and Armistice Day.⁶¹ The pillars are carved with the country names: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Caribbean, and the Kingdom of Nepal. In addition, on the north side of the road is a domed pavilion (or chattri) on which the names of the 70 Victoria and George Cross recipients are inscribed, while the names of the major campaigns are engraved on two stone benches.⁶²

⁶⁰ 'Memorial Gates', *The Royal Parks*. Accessed at: <https://www.royalparks.org.uk/parks/green-park/things-to-see-and-do/memorials,-fountains-and-statues/memorial-gates> [Date Accessed: 11/05/2016]; 'Memorial Gates London', *Memorial Gates*. Accessed at: <http://www.memorialgates.org> [Date Accessed: 03/05/2016]; 'Memorial Gates: Second World War Participants', *Memorial Gates*. Accessed at: <http://memorialgates.org/history/ww2/participants/caribbean/index.html> [Date Accessed: 11/05/2016].

⁶¹ 'Memorial Gates London', *Memorial Gates*. Accessed at: <http://www.memorialgates.org> [Date Accessed: 03/05/2016]; 'Memorial Gates: Second World War Participants', *Memorial Gates*. Accessed at: <http://memorialgates.org/history/ww2/participants/caribbean/index.html> [Date Accessed: 11/05/2016].

⁶² 'Memorial Gates London', *Memorial Gates*. Accessed at: <http://www.memorialgates.org> [Date Accessed: 03/05/2016]; 'Memorial Gates: Second World War Participants', *Memorial Gates*. Accessed at: <http://memorialgates.org/history/ww2/participants/caribbean/index.html> [Date Accessed: 11/05/2016].

While this project was initiated by Baroness Flather and the Memorial Gates Trust, government attitudes to the memorialisation of Imperial and Commonwealth subjects can be indicated by the inclusion of a letter of support within the planning application materials from Prime Minister Tony Blair. In this letter, dated November 1999, Blair stated: ‘I wholeheartedly support this proposal... to commemorate the contribution made by the hundreds of thousands of men and women from the Indian Sub-Continent, Africa and the Caribbean, who came to the aid of this country during the First and Second World Wars.’⁶³ Moreover, Blair explained that this memorial would serve not only as a permanent recognition of their ‘invaluable help in securing the survival of freedom in this country’, but more significantly of the ‘on-going contribution made by them and their descendants, to the continuing health and richness of our culture and society.’⁶⁴



Figure 1.2: A photograph of the Memorial Gates Monument in London.

Attribution: Leonard Bentley [ShareAlike 2.0 Generic (CC BY-SA 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/>) No Changes Made. [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019].

⁶³ T. Blair, ‘Letter of Support’, *Memorial Gates, Constitution Hill Full Planning Application Westminster City Council*, 00/07223/FULL.

⁶⁴ Blair, ‘Letter of Support’.

The contribution and sacrifices of troops from the Indian subcontinent, Africa and the Caribbean, therefore, proved a growing dimension of war commemoration under Blair's Labour Government. Official recognition of these previously excluded groups continued under subsequent governments. Throughout its First World War centenary announcements, for example, the UK Government sought to recognise not only enduring Commonwealth ties, but also the contribution of ethnic minority communities and the impact of the War on multi-cultural Britain. According to Cameron, the First World War marked 'the beginnings of ethnic minorities getting the recognition, respect and equality they deserve'. Moreover, he also noted that it was vital to recognise the 'extraordinary sacrifice' and 'catastrophic' death toll of 'our friends in the Commonwealth'.⁶⁵ Indeed, as part of the commemorations, the 175 overseas recipients of the Victoria Cross from the First World War were explicitly remembered by engraving their names on bronze memorial plaques to be presented to their home countries.⁶⁶ In launching these plaques, Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, the Senior Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Minister for Faith and Communities, commented that they demonstrated the 'rich diversity of our shared history' and that 'this commemoration is relevant to us all'.⁶⁷

Furthermore, in November 2013 Baroness Warsi announced that in order to commemorate the Commonwealth contribution to the First World War, a series of lectures, exploring 'the role played and sacrifices made by soldiers from Africa, Australia, India, the West Indies and beyond', would be part of the Government's programme.⁶⁸ Earlier in April 2013, on a visit to World War One battlefields in France and Belgium, she paid tribute to the 1.2 million men from the Indian Army who had fought alongside Britain. Here, she noted that

⁶⁵ Cameron, 'World War Centenary Plans'.

⁶⁶ See Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 'First World War Centenary: WW1 Victoria Cross Recipients from Overseas Publication'. Accessed at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/323955/FCO632_WW1_A4_brochure_PRINT_UPDATE.pdf [Date Accessed: 03/05/2016].

⁶⁷ S. Warsi, 'Baroness Warsi Speech Honouring Overseas Heroes from the First World War', 26 June 2014. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/baroness-warsi-speech-honouring-overseas-heroes-from-the-first-world-war> [Date Accessed: 06/03/2016].

⁶⁸ Department for Communities and Local Government, 'Commonwealth Contribution to First World War to be Commemorated'; S. Tudor & R. Anthony, 'Britain and the First World War: Parliament, Empire and Commemoration', *House of Lords Research Paper Library Note LLN-2014-013*, 24 March 2014, p.19.

'our boys weren't just Tommies; they were Tariqs and Tajinders too', arguing that the centenary offered opportunities to acknowledge that 'so many men from so far away came to Europe to fight for the freedoms we enjoy today. Their legacy is our liberty, and every single one of us owes them a debt of gratitude'.⁶⁹

This proposition that subjects from across the Empire sought to defend British domestic liberties is questionable and overlooks the fact that empire was a non-democratic system based on British domination and the related pervasive influence of racial categorisation and discrimination of troops from the British colonies. However, it is demonstrative of the aims of the UK Government to extend the appeal of the centenary commemorations, by addressing the 'neglect' of this chapter of 'our history', and more significantly to provide a contemporary resonance for the First World War in a multi-cultural Britain.⁷⁰ This can be further illustrated by House of Lords debates in June 2013 and in December 2013. On 20 June 2013, Lord Taylor of Warwick commented in a debate about the centenary commemorations that:

Much has been said about Britain's disaffected youth, and in particular black youth. It is my personal view that part of that disaffection is a feeling of not belonging to Britain, and I suspect that the majority of these young men do not know that their ancestors played a full part in the First World War and Second World War. That is why young children need to know about their own heritage.⁷¹

He continued: 'it becomes increasingly important that the Government's initiatives should ensure that the contribution of people from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean to British efforts

⁶⁹ Department for Communities and Local Government, 'Baroness Warsi Kick-Starts Campaign to Remember Commonwealth Servicemen of the First World War', *GOV.UK*, 16 April 2013. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/baroness-warsi-kick-starts-campaign-to-remember-commonwealth-servicemen-of-the-first-world-war> [Date Accessed: 06/05/2013]; S. Warsi, 'The First World War: The Commonwealth Contribution', Speech, 8 November 2013. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-first-world-war-the-commonwealth-contribution> [Date Accessed: 06/03/2016].

⁷⁰ Department for Communities and Local Government, 'Commonwealth Contribution to First World War to be Commemorated'. Emphasis added.

⁷¹ Lord Taylor of Warwick, 'First World War: Commemorations', *Hansard House of Lords Parliamentary Debate, Grand Committee*, 5th series, vol. 746: col. GC179, 20 June 2013.

in the First World War is recognised'.⁷² In response to this, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara added:

It is hoped that [...] in our own country, given the diversity and the challenges that exist in the moment, we should use this commemoration to bring every one of Britain's communities into some form of discussion and knowledge about the event because so many of their forebears were involved in the First World War.⁷³

This use of commemoration by the UK Government, however, is exemplified perhaps most explicitly in House of Lords discussions about the commemoration of the role of armed forces and other personnel from the Indian sub-continent in the First World War. In this, Lord Parekh commented that 'we should commemorate in such a way that the *multi-ethnic character of Britain* is highlighted and our people are able to feel at ease with it'.⁷⁴ This led Lord Bates to respond that 'more countries were involved in the war than not... All should be remembered for the part they played'.⁷⁵ He continued:

[A]s we came together then, so the centenary gives us an opportunity to come together now [...] We should come together to reaffirm our shared values, forged through experiences that will not be forgotten, and that bind us inseparably. Recognition of the important role that those from the Indian sub-continent played is an *integral* part of the Government's plans for an *inclusive* commemoration.⁷⁶

Ultimately, this is indicative of what Tony Kushner has referred to as a shift from a 'liberal assimilationist ideology' to a more pluralistic conception of British society, as the Government increasingly sought to universalise narratives of the World Wars in order to make them relevant to British society as a whole.⁷⁷ Just as official commemoration of the World Wars came to include the war experiences of peoples of the Commonwealth, so too was the Holocaust gradually included in Britain's official memory of the Second World War.

⁷² Lord Taylor of Warwick, 'First World War: Commemorations'.

⁷³ Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, 'First World War: Commemorations', *Hansard House of Lords Parliamentary Debate, Grand Committee*, 5th series, vol. 746: col. GC182, 20 June 2013.

⁷⁴ Lord Parekh, 'First World War: Personnel from the Indian Subcontinent', *Hansard House of Lords Parliamentary Debate, Lords Chamber*, 5th series, vol. 750: col. 1327, 18 December 2013. Emphasis added.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Lord Bates, 'First World War: Personnel from the Indian Subcontinent', *Hansard House of Lords Parliamentary Debate, Lords Chamber*, 5th series, vol. 750: col. 1328, 18 December 2013. Emphasis added.

⁷⁷ T. Kushner, *The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination. A Social and Cultural History* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), p.261.

In January 2000, Holocaust Memorial Day was officially launched, with the first Holocaust 'Remembrance Day' being held on 27 January 2001. Indeed, on 27 January 2015, at the fifteenth annual Holocaust Memorial Day, Cameron urged that it was 'time for Britain as a nation to stand together and say "We Will Remember"', continuing, 'we will not let any form of prejudice destroy the multi-faith, multi-ethnic democracy we are so proud to call *our* home. We will teach every generation the British values of respect and tolerance that we hold dear'.⁷⁸ In many ways, this speech is indicative of the way in which the Government had come to use commemoration as one way to 'unite' an increasingly diverse country, by emphasising the 'British' values of respect and tolerance, and the 'multi-ethnic', 'multi-faith' nature of society and subsequently calling for this Britain to 'stand together'.

The remembrance and commemoration of the World Wars, then, was used as a means of fostering a hegemonic British identity. Yet, as this section has demonstrated, this concept of national identity was extended as the UK Government sought to produce narratives of the World Wars which encompass those groups previously excluded from official commemorations. In this way the history of the World Wars no longer focused solely on the experiences of the Tommy, but also on his fellow soldiers from the Empire. Furthermore, there has been an insistence within mainstream political discourse that the dead of these Wars represent *our* values and *our* shared ideals.

Contemporary Military Conflicts and State Commemoration

Thus far, this chapter has explored the numerous ways in which the narratives of the two World Wars used throughout state-sponsored commemorations have evolved since 1994. Increasingly, the UK Government sought to extend the inclusiveness and relevance of both the First and Second World Wars, universalising war experiences to include everyone,

⁷⁸ D. Cameron, 'National Holocaust Commemoration Event 2015: Prime Minister's Speech', 27 January 2015. Accessed at: <http://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/national-holocaust-commemoration-event-2015-prime-ministers-speech> [Date Accessed: 23/04/2016]. Emphasis added.

especially those in previously overlooked groups. This represented a means of reconfiguring British national identity and extending the relevance of the United Kingdom in light of the so-called 'crisis of the union' and ever-growing diversity within its borders.

In addition to this 'pluralisation of commemoration', the UK Government also appropriated the memory of the World Wars for a further purpose – to mobilise public opinion in support of its armed services and as a legitimisation of the use of war as an instrument of policy. Since 1997, British contingents have been deployed in five military conflicts (Iraq, 1998; Kosovo, 1999; Sierra Leone, 2000; Iraq 2003-2009; Afghanistan, 2001-2014). In November 2001, in fact, troops were engaged in conflict overseas on Remembrance Sunday for the first time in half a century [See Figure 1.3].



Figure 1.3: A photograph of a Remembrance Day in Afghanistan.

Attribution: Cpl. Meredith Brown [Public Domain].

The involvement of the United Kingdom in this series of conflicts since the late 1990s, then, not only raised the profile of military and veterans' associations, but also encouraged greater recognition of and participation in war commemoration.⁷⁹ Perhaps most significantly, however, it contributed to a fundamental reappraisal of the narratives of the World Wars presented within official commemorations, particularly with regards to the First World War.

On 17 July 2014, for example, in a speech at the re-opening of the IWM London following the refurbishment of the Great War exhibition for the centenary, Cameron sought to discuss 'the reasons why we fought'.⁸⁰ He commented that:

In the century since this conflict began, too many have cast it as a pointless war. One fought by young men who didn't know why they were fighting or what the objective was... But we should never forget that those who volunteered and fought believed they did so in a vital cause; to prevent the domination of Europe by one power; to defend the right of a small country – Belgium – to exist. They were right to believe these things, and that is something that I believe should be remembered and paid tribute to.⁸¹

Throughout this speech, Cameron was not only seeking to justify the legitimacy of the First World War, but by extension appeared to be stressing that it was 'proper' both to serve and die for your country.⁸² Thus, by shifting the narrative of the conflict from the slaughter of millions in a 'pointless war' to one of the 'sacrifice' of men who fought and died for their country, state-sponsored commemorations appeared to be seeking to redeem the armed forces and portray them as both competent and professional. Here, the language of sacrifice redeems, while the language of slaughter does not. By highlighting the dedication of the military (and those willing to make the 'ultimate sacrifice') to the protection of the country and the values it holds dear, war appears justified. In this way, contemporary war

⁷⁹ A. Mycock, 'The Politics of the Great War Centenary in the United Kingdom' in S. Sumartojo & B. Wellings, (eds), *Nation, Memory and Great War Commemoration: Mobilising the Past in Europe, Australia and New Zealand* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2014), p.102.

⁸⁰ D. Cameron, 'Reopening of the Imperial War Museum', Speech, 17 July 2014. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/reopening-of-the-imperial-war-museum-david-cameras-speech> [Date Accessed: 06/03/2016].

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² K. Jeffery, 'Commemoration in the United Kingdom: A Multitude of Memories', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 50:3 (2015), p.564.

remembrance and commemoration of the First World War increasingly exhorted us to be proud of the men who died and, by extension, of the nation's role in not only the Great War, but all subsequent military conflicts.⁸³

The continuing lively debate about the legitimacy of British involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan added a further dimension to this re-framing of the World Wars not only in support of armed forces involvement in recent conflicts, but more specifically as a means of justifying UK Government decisions to go to war. In fact, in a House of Lords debate on Afghanistan on 5 November 2001 – just four weeks after the commencement of military operations – the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Ministry of Defence Lord Bach drew upon the two World Wars in his justification of operations:

As we approach Remembrance Sunday, 11th November, I am certain that the millions who sacrificed their lives during the two world wars and the other conflicts of the past century would salute the soldiers, sailors and airmen, men and women alike, who make up our Armed Forces today and who are prepared to put their lives on the line for their country and for civilised values. Our Armed Forces have always fought in defence of civilisation – in the First World War against domination by one country; in the Second World War against fascism and Nazi totalitarianism; and now against the barbarism, for that is what it was, which revealed itself so grotesquely in the attacks of eight weeks ago.⁸⁴

The involvement of British troops in the controversial military operations, for example, appeared to lead to a revival of the idea of heroism in the First World War, which had been confined to oblivion in the interwar period.⁸⁵ This has also been reflected in scholarship on the War. Historiographical reappraisal by historians such as Brian Bond and Gary Sheffield has sought to rehabilitate the image of the military leadership in the First World War, concluding that the leaders were not, in fact, as incompetent as has thus far been contended.⁸⁶ As part of the Department of Communities and Local Government's plans for

⁸³ Heathorn, 'The Mnemonic Turn', p.1222; See also G. Braybon (ed.), *Evidence, History and the Great War. Historians and the Impact of 1914-18* (Berghahn Books, 2003).

⁸⁴ Lord Bach, 'Afghanistan', *Hansard House of Lords Parliamentary Debate*, 5th series, vol. 628: col. 15, 5 November 2001.

⁸⁵ See J. Gillis (ed.), *Commemorations. The Politics of National Identity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

⁸⁶ See B. Bond, *Britain's Two World Wars against Germany: Myth, Memory and the Distortions of Hindsight* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); G. Sheffield, *Forgotten Victory: the First World War: Myths and Realities* (London: Headline, 2001).

the centenary, for example, commemorative paving stones were installed in the home towns of all British Victoria Cross winners (and those with British ties). In announcing this, a Government representative commented that ‘the men who gave their lives in the Great War will remain heroes forever... No hero will be forgotten.’⁸⁷ Furthermore, this notion of individual heroism was subsequently linked with those fighting in contemporary wars. For example, in a House of Commons Debate on First World War commemoration which took place on 7 November 2013, the forces serving in Afghanistan were explicitly compared to those who fought in the First World War. Dan Jarvis argued that:

Today our forces in Afghanistan rightly take pride in the job that they do and the bands of service that they form, and the same applied to those who fought in World War One. During those years, soldiers fought for much. They fought because of a belief that their country was threatened, but ultimately, when it came down to it, they fought for their regiments and for the man standing next to them in the trench. If we want to pay proper tribute to the war dead – as I know that we do – and also to those who came through the war, we should seek to remember that.⁸⁸

Furthermore, on Remembrance Sunday in 2014, service personnel held a ceremony at Camp Bastion in southern Afghanistan to mark the centenary of the First World War, a ceremony which was given added poignancy by the deployment of units with battle honours from the First World War, such as the 5th Battalion the Rifles and the Queen’s Dragoon Guards. During this service, the experiences of troops serving in Afghanistan were once more linked with those of the Great War. Brigadier Thomson, for example, noted that ‘the character demanded by combat has not changed’ and that troops represented ‘first-hand witnesses of another generation of courageous and committed fighting men and women’.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Department for Communities and Local Government, ‘Commemoration of Commonwealth Victoria Cross’, *GOV.UK*, 20 August 2013. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/commemoration-of-commonwealth-victoria-cross> [Date Accessed: 03/05/2016].

⁸⁸ D. Jarvis, ‘First World War Commemoration’, *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 570: col. 489, 7 November 2013.

⁸⁹ Ministry of Defence, ‘First World War Centenary in Afghanistan’, *GOV.UK*, 4 August 2014. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/first-world-war-centenary-in-afghanistan> [Date Accessed: 09/03/2016].

Both the Government and the Armed Forces were eager to underscore the national and civic importance of remembering service in the Armed Forces of the State. Consequently, commemoration of the World Wars, and especially remembrance days such as Remembrance Sunday and Armistice Day, were increasingly used in the contemporary era as a means of subtly popularising support for the Armed Forces. Remembrance days have, in fact, been closely linked with the concept of British national identity and thus functioned as what Danilova has referred to in a telling comparison with Putin's Russia, 'days of national unity'.⁹⁰ Here, the public is reminded about its moral obligation to remember the fallen of the wars, share in national values and support those armed forces currently engaged in military operations. Significantly, such days introduce the values of supporting the armed forces, national mobilisation and military preparedness as key national values or components of national identity.⁹¹

Contemporary versions of Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday, then, have increasingly taken military service as a starting point for commemoration. In this, a shift took place from emphasising the 'war experiences' of those involved in conflict to their 'military service' in the name of the nation. Those killed whilst on military service became the 'glorious dead'.⁹² This conceptual change brought about a decontextualization of the framing of remembrance, thus allowing the incorporation of the fallen from not only the World Wars, but also from current and indeed future conflicts.⁹³

The involvement of members of the armed forces in commemorative events across the United Kingdom designed to mark the centenary of the First World War is indicative of this linking of remembrance of the World Wars, national identity and the military. On 4 August 2014, the hundredth anniversary of the start of the First World War, Defence Secretary Michael Fallon commented:

Today is an opportunity to commemorate the spirit of the British people, our determination to fight for what is just, and our willingness to lay down our lives in

⁹⁰ N. Danilova, *The Politics of War Commemoration in the UK and Russia* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p.86.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p.59.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p.101.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

the name of our country... Our armed forces today, like those of a hundred years ago, embody the best of British, and it is right we honour all that they do for our country.⁹⁴

Here, to be commemorated are neither the 'dead' nor their sacrifice, but the 'spirit of the British people' – something both metaphysical and metahistorical and apparently not bound by existential experiences. In this, it is apparent that Fallon is not only seeking to legitimise British involvement in the First World War by emphasising the positive 'spirit' of the British people in fighting for 'what is just', but also claiming that this same spirit is embodied in those currently serving in the armed forces. This, in turn, appears to extend the concept of fighting for 'what is just' to contemporary military conflicts. Similarly, on 10 June 2013, in announcing that battlefield visits for schoolchildren would form a key component of government plans to mark the First World War centenary, Communities Secretary Eric Pickles commented that 'we have a duty to educate future generations about the First World War to ensure that the role our armed forces played, and continue to play, in defending the liberties we take for granted today are remembered'.⁹⁵

Following this, politicians increasingly sought to relate the World Wars both to contemporary forms of patriotism and citizenship, and to the renewed need for active military service overseas. In his speech, given at IWM London, to launch the First World War centenary plans, Cameron, for example, claimed that those who fought and died were defending 'the values we hold dear'. He went on to suggest that 'we will continue to fight for the values they fought for' – although he defined these only as 'friendship, loyalty, and what the Australians would call "mateship"'.⁹⁶ Moreover, while the World Wars have been

⁹⁴ Department for Culture, Media and Sport & Ministry of Defence, 'We Will Remember Them', *GOV.UK*, 4 August 2014. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/we-will-remember-them--3> [Date Accessed: 06/03/2016].

⁹⁵ Department for Culture, Media & Sport, 'Maria Miller Sets Out How Government Will Mark First World War Centenary in 2014', *GOV.UK*, 10 June 2013. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/maria-miller-sets-out-how-government-will-mark-first-world-war-centenary-in-2014> [Date Accessed: 06/03/2016]; T. Montgomerie, 'We Shall Remember Them', *Conservative Home*, 25 July 2009. Accessed at: <http://conservativehome.blogs.com/thetorydiary/2009/07/we-shall-remember-them.html> [Date Accessed: 05/05/2016].

⁹⁶ Cameron, 'World War Centenary Plans', Speech.

used as templates for the re-framing of modern conflicts, the 'national master narratives' of these wars as told by government have also helped to normalise modern warfare.⁹⁷

Under Blair, and then Cameron, the UK Government demonstrably appropriated the memory of the World Wars and re-inscribed these historical narratives as a means of garnering public support not only for the military, but also for their involvement in recent conflicts and for the justification of government decisions to go to war. In this reading, contemporary political discourse has thus viewed remembrance and commemoration as an instrument for creating a sense of British national identity, popularising support for the armed forces and government foreign policy.

Conclusion

Throughout the announcements regarding the recent First World War commemorations, the UK Government frequently claimed that its role in the centenary was merely to provide leadership and encouragement in organising commemorative acts whilst not dictating the themes of commemoration itself.⁹⁸ Yet, this overlooks the fundamental role played by the Government in determining the wider framework within which the conflict should be remembered and represented, particularly through the narratives of war it chooses to emphasise and in its focus on certain acts of commemoration. As this chapter has demonstrated, various governments appeared keen to put forward certain historical interpretations to suit themselves, therefore appropriating the commemoration of the World Wars for their own purposes.

This chapter has argued that state-sponsored commemoration of the World Wars since 1994, and in particular since the late 1990s, has evolved in response to a number of social, political, constitutional and demographic changes. These changes, which have included

⁹⁷ Danilova, *The Politics of War Commemoration*, p.210.

⁹⁸ See Dr A. Murrison, 'First World War Commemoration', *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 570: col. 482, 7 November 2013: 'The role of Government in the centenary is to lead, encourage and help make it all happen, while avoiding the temptation to prescribe. It is emphatically not the place of Government in our 21st century liberal democracy to be handing down approved versions of history.'

broadly the so-called 'crisis of the union', the rise of multi-culturalism and the involvement of the UK in a series of overseas conflicts, have all required the development of different historical narratives in order to bind the citizen and the state. Significantly, this has involved a degree of both continuity and discontinuity across the Governments of Major, Blair, Brown and Cameron as they have sought to manipulate commemoration as a means of responding to specific issues.

Within this context, however, it is also possible to highlight a gradual shift towards the 'pluralisation of commemorative practices' and the identification of fallen soldiers within state commemorations. Or, put simply, that there was a diversification of the war experiences reflected in official commemoration of the World Wars. This is demonstrated by the growing recognition of Commonwealth involvement in the World Wars and the subsequent impact of the Wars on the development of a 'multi-cultural' Britain, as well as the increasing emphasis on the shared experiences of the four component nations of the United Kingdom in those wars. This pluralisation of war experiences, however, is not incompatible with the idea of a unified nation. Instead, commemoration and the political discourse surrounding it emphasised the manner in which these various sub-groups fought and died for the British cause, for the United Kingdom and the Empire, and for British values and ideals, represented as *our* values and *our* shared ideals, while also linking this with contemporary conflicts. World War commemoration, therefore, remained a powerful tool in the hands of the state, mobilised by the central government as a means of fostering and reshaping allegiances towards a more inclusive yet still hegemonic 'British' identity.

Chapter Two: World War Commemoration and the British Monarchy, 1994

– 2016

Over the past two decades, the commemoration of the First and Second World Wars has proven a powerful tool in the hands of the state. Increasingly, official commemoration has been appropriated and mobilised by the central government of the United Kingdom. On 11 October 2012, for example, in launching the Coalition Government's programme of events for the First World War centenary, David Cameron explicitly linked commemorations with the celebrations for the Queen's Diamond Jubilee. He commented that it was the aim of his government to produce a commemoration that 'like the Diamond Jubilee celebrated this year, says something about who we are as a people'.¹ As Chapter One noted, this reference to the monarchy in the context of World War commemoration was significant for the way in which it indicated the Government's desire to unite the British population around commemoration, as they had united around the Queen throughout the Jubilee.

This is but one example of the multifarious and often complex ways in which the commemoration of the World Wars and the modern British monarchy have been, and continue to be linked. Unlike the Westminster Government, the monarchy dictates neither the events held nor the tone of commemoration. However, Queen Elizabeth II, and the royal family generally, have been ever-present in, and even at the forefront of, many official commemorative events. Indeed, the involvement of the monarchy in remembrance and commemoration includes not only their presence at the annual Remembrance Day service, but also the opening of major First and Second World War memorials such as the Flanders Fields Memorial Garden in 2014 and the Women of World War Two Memorial in 2005. Additionally, members of the royal family have been involved in and represented Britain at numerous other commemorative events such as the commemoration of D-Day at home and abroad, as well as throughout the recent World War centenary commemorations. The iconography of the World Wars has also frequently been utilised

¹ D. Cameron, 'World War Centenary Plans', Speech at the Imperial War Museum, London, 11 October 2012. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-at-imperial-war-museum-on-first-world-war-centenary-plans> [Date Accessed: 18/01/2016].

during royal events, such as the wedding ceremony of Prince William and Catherine Middleton on 29 April 2011, when the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight, which consisted of a Spitfire, Hurricane and Lancaster bomber, made a fly-past over Buckingham Palace.²

It is important for this thesis to extend its focus to the relationship between the modern British monarchy and World War commemoration. This is due to a number of intertwined factors relating not only to this central role in commemorative events, but also to the sovereign's position as 'Head of Nation' and 'Head of the Armed Forces' as well as 'Head of State' which situates it as a central institution in the political life of not only the United Kingdom as a whole but also its nation-states. Indeed, at the most fundamental level, the United Kingdom consisted of four nations (counting Northern Ireland as one) united by the monarchy through parliament.³ The official language of the state, in fact, highlights the significance of the monarchy as a source of union.⁴ This is demonstrated by its very name, 'the United Kingdom', and the fact that the official title of the reigning sovereign is not the Queen of England, nor even of Great Britain, but of the '*United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*'. In both instances the centrality of the Crown to the union between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is clearly established, conveying a sense of permanence. The British monarchy, in fact, has remained important in not just political, but also as part of the national social and cultural life long after the monarchs ceased to govern as well as to reign in the early nineteenth century. Despite only having limited formal powers as 'Head of State', the monarchy continues to exercise what Joseph Nye has referred to as 'soft power', drawn from its ability to wield influence.⁵ Indeed, recognition that the monarchy represents a national symbol is ubiquitous within the historical

² A. Hough, 'Royal Wedding: WWII Aircraft Flypast Highlight of Military Involvement', 1 April 2011. Accessed at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/royal-wedding/8421535/Royal-Wedding-WWII-aircraft-flypast-highlight-of-military-involvement.html> [Date Accessed: 18/09/2019]; 'The Role of the Armed Forces in the Wedding of Prince William and Catherine Middleton', *The Royal Family*, 1 April 2011. Accessed at: <https://www.royal.uk/role-armed-forces-wedding-prince-william-and-catherine-middleton> [Date Accessed: 18/09/2019].

³ P. Ward, *Britishness Since 1870* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), p.22.

⁴ L. Colley, *Acts of Union and Disunion: What has Held the UK Together – and What is Dividing it?* (London: Profile Books, 2014).

⁵ See J. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990) & J. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

literature.⁶ Linda Colley, for example, notes that the monarchy has frequently functioned as a ‘national cement and emblem’, while Michael Billig has identified the existence of a ‘deep equation’ between the monarchy and the nation.⁷ Both Tom Nairn and Andrzej Olechnowicz, however, go one step further in suggesting that the monarchy remains a significant part of the British-identity structure, by acting as a means of binding the state together and representing, amongst other things, continuity, tradition, history and pageantry.⁸ Similarly, Richard Weight views monarchism as a key element of Britishness, referring to it as the ‘last bastion of Britishness’, whilst Paul Ward notes that from at least the late nineteenth to the late twentieth century the monarchy was seen as central to British national identity.⁹

This body of literature raises numerous questions about the nature of the monarchy’s role in the political and public life of the nation. Does the monarchy have a symbolic or a representative function – and, if so, what does it symbolise or represent? Has the gender of the sovereign affected the institutions constitutional character and the role played by the monarchy? Does the monarchy continue to embody national identity, and if so, how does it respond to the tension that exists between ‘Britishness’ and distinctive national and ethnic identities? More specifically, this chapter will analyse the role played by the British monarchy in the commemoration and remembrance of the World Wars. It will consider to what extent the monarchy’s central role in World War commemoration is merely a formality based on the sovereign’s function as ‘Head of State’, or whether this role is, in fact, far more significant than it may appear. It will explore how far the monarchy and the royal family, either on its own behalf or at the behest of politicians, has acted as a symbol in the commemoration of the World Wars that has sought to emphasise a particular ‘British’ interpretation of those wars. Furthermore, it will consider how the monarchy’s

⁶ It is notable though, that the Queen chose to refer to herself as Queen Elizabeth the Second, not Queen Elizabeth the First, which in terms of the history of the United Kingdom would have been the appropriate term.

⁷ Colley, *Acts of Union*, p.45; M. Billig, *Talking of the Royal Family* (London: Routledge, 1992), p.42.

⁸ A. Olechnowicz (ed.), *The Monarchy and the British Nation, 1780 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.1; T. Nairn, *The Enchanted Glass: Britain and its Monarchy* (London: Radius, 1988), p.387.

⁹ R. Weight, *Patriots: National Identity in Britain 1949-2000* (London: Pan Books, 2003), p.684; Ward, *Britishness Since 1870*.

relationship to World War commemoration has affected expressions of place and politics. Primarily, the focus will be on the reigning sovereign, Queen Elizabeth II, however, this chapter will also consider the role played by the wider royal family. Given the continued centrality of the monarchy in British political, social and cultural life, and the importance of the monarchy to the maintenance of the union, the study of the interplay between commemoration and the monarchy provides a further means of analysing the relationship between commemoration, remembrance and the politics of the union.

It is worth highlighting, however, the complexities of analysing the role played by the monarchy in commemoration with the available sources. This is due in no small part to the constitutional monarchy, under which the monarch as ‘Head of State’ is separate from the ‘Head of Government’.¹⁰ In this, the reigning monarch is required to remain strictly neutral with respect to political matters.¹¹ Consequently, the Queen rarely makes political statements. During the Scottish independence referendum, for example, Buckingham Palace commented that ‘the sovereign’s constitutional impartiality is an established principle of our democracy and one which the Queen has demonstrated throughout her reign [...] the monarchy is above politics’. It continued: ‘[a]ny suggestion that the Queen would wish to influence the outcome of the referendum campaign is categorically wrong. Her Majesty is firmly of the view that this is a matter for the people of Scotland’.¹² Bearing in mind such difficulties, this chapter will draw on a systematic analysis of the rhetoric and narratives used in media coverage of royal and commemorative events in which members of the royal family are present. Additionally, royal speeches and addresses, political speeches and parliamentary debates as well as royal and commemorative events, rituals and ceremonies will be examined.

This chapter consists of three sections, each of which will analyse a key feature of the monarchy in relation to World War commemoration. In this way, the thematic structure of

¹⁰ V. Bogdanor, *The Monarchy and the Constitution* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p.14.

¹¹ ‘The Queen and Government’, *The Royal Family*. Accessed at: <https://www.royal.uk/queen-and-government> [Date Accessed: 17/09/2019].

¹² See Anon, ‘Scottish Independence: Monarch “Above Politics”, Buckingham Palace Says’, *BBC News*, 9 September 2014. Accessed at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-29136149> [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019].

the chapter reflects its conceptual nature and seeks to draw out the links between monarchism in modern Britain and the commemoration of the World Wars. The first addresses the issues raised by and the significance of the continuity of the monarchy and the longevity of key royal figures, more specifically, Queen Elizabeth II. The second section will analyse the impact of the monarch's symbolic role as 'Head of Nation'. Finally, section three will discuss questions arising from the Queen as a female monarch and the existence of the 'royal family' and if and how such questions affect commemoration.

The main argument of this chapter is that the monarch's role in, and links to, the commemoration of the World Wars goes beyond the limited nature of the representational duties which comprise the formal role of 'Head of State'. Rather, this chapter contends that the monarchy is of far greater significance than has hitherto been assumed because of the ways in which politicians, and arguably members of the royal family themselves, have sought to utilise World War commemoration as a means of shaping national histories. In part, this chapter reflects a well-established view, first argued by Walter Bagehot in 1867, that stresses the continuity of the institution and longevity of key royal figures, in providing a sense of stability and establishing the monarchy as a direct link between the past and present.¹³ This, in turn, enables traditional narratives, such as that of a united Britain – images that have dominated the popular memory of the Wars - to be reinserted in the present. Furthermore, as the embodiment of the nation, when combined with this sense of permanence, the sovereign acts not only as a focal point in times of remembrance and commemoration, but also transcends national, regional and societal divisions and serves as a 'unifying vehicle'. Similarly, the participation of the wider royal family in World War commemoration further enhances the ability of the monarchy to act as a symbol of unity. Moreover, the gender of the monarch has proved crucial as a female, specifically a mother figure, is arguably not only more relatable, but also easier to conceive of as the embodiment of the nation. This further highlighted the significance of the monarchy's role as a symbol in the years since 1994, particularly from the early 2000s, as Queen Elizabeth II reached reign landmarks in both the Golden and Diamond Jubilees and - in the face of

¹³ W. Bagehot, *Bagehot – The English Constitution*, ed. by P. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.46.

challenges (such as terrorism and wars) and multiculturalism – acquired even more prominence as a symbol of stability and unity in a changing world. These changes have been political, socio-economic and cultural, including, amongst others, the decline of ‘Britishness’, the rise of Celtic nationalism(s) demonstrated by moves for devolution and Scottish independence, and a gradual reassertion of more traditional values.

The Continuity and Longevity of the Monarchy

On 9 September 2015 Queen Elizabeth II became the United Kingdom’s longest-reigning monarch, surpassing the reign of her great-great grandmother, Queen Victoria. This followed the celebration of her Diamond Jubilee three years earlier, in 2012, which recognised her sixty years on the throne. Throughout both occasions, much attention was drawn to the continuity of the monarchy and more specifically, the sovereign’s long reign. Prime Minister David Cameron, for example, commented on the occasion of the jubilee that ‘all my life, and for the lives of most people in this country, she has always been there for us’, and went on to refer to the Queen’s reign as a ‘golden thread’ running through the generations.’¹⁴ Similarly, in a 2015 article in *The Independent*, historian Kate Williams noted that ‘the Queen’s longevity is a great source of her strength and popularity. She has lived through World War Two and throughout the twentieth century. Many people will not have known a different monarch.’¹⁵

This illustrates the extent to which continuity and longevity are key features of the British monarchy today, as in Bagehot’s time. For Robert Hardman, the two most important by-products of constitutional monarchy are stability and continuity, while Alan Hamilton commented in *The Times* that the monarchy’s ‘virtue is its essentially unchanging quality’.¹⁶

¹⁴ D. Cameron, ‘Her Majesty the Queen’, *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 599: col. 387, 9 September 2015.

¹⁵ K. Gander, ‘Queen Elizabeth II to become Britain’s Longest Reigning Monarch, Surpassing Queen Victoria’, *The Independent*, 26 August 2015. Accessed at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/queen-elizabeth-ii-to-become-britains-longest-reigning-monarch-surpassing-queen-victoria-10473729.html> [Date Accessed: 02/03/2017].

¹⁶ R. Hardman, *Our Queen* (London: Arrow, 2012) p.40; A. Hamilton, ‘Above it All: A Salute to the Queen’, *The Times*, 17 October 1994.

In particular, this continuity is seen to be established through the hereditary principle of Britain's constitutional monarchy, which creates a sense of stability and permanence as well as providing a tangible link to the past. Here, as Billig has argued, it is the biological family line and so-called 'royal family' which is significant, acting as a symbol of continuity in the national consciousness and representing 'both the past's continuity into the present, and the continuity of the present into the future'.¹⁷ The perceived permanence of the biological line, therefore, allows for the imagining of the historical continuity and past heritage of royalty and, in turn, conveys a sense of history in the present. The multi-generational nature of the Windsor royal family, then, has enabled four generations of the same family to represent not only the continuities, but, through the younger generation, also the changes in British society. Similarly, it has also meant that many people feel they have grown up with the Windsor family. Indeed, this combined with the 'fame of royalty' and the interest of the media in the royal family has, as Billig argues, meant that 'our own lives seem to run in parallel to theirs'.¹⁸ Moreover, as Robert Tombs notes, the birth of a son, George, to the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge on 22 July 2013 was also taken as projecting the monarchy far into the future.¹⁹ Indeed, the wealth of coverage and attention which followed first the marriage of Prince William to Catherine Middleton, and then the birth of their son was seen as connecting the royal family to a whole new generation.²⁰

Consequently, the royal family was persuasively represented as 'a guarantee of stability, security, continuity, the preservation of traditional values' and thus reflects the dialectic between the past and present.²¹ Moreover, the age of the institution and the link that this

¹⁷ Billig, *Talking of the Royal Family*, p.220.

¹⁸ B. Pimlott, *The Queen: A Biography of Queen Elizabeth II* (London: Harper Collins, 2002), p.693; Billig, *Talking of the Royal Family*, pp. 220-222.

¹⁹ R. Tombs, *The English and Their History* (London: Allen Lane, 2014), p.868.

²⁰ See, for example: S. Bates, 'How the Royal Wedding Boosted the Monarchy', *The Guardian*, 26 December 2011. Accessed at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/dec/26/royal-wedding-monarchy-william-kate> [Date Accessed: 18/09/2019]; S. Bates, 'Royal Wedding: Thousands Gather to Watch the Marriage of Kate and William', *Guardian.com*, 29 April 2011; T. McVeigh, 'Royal Wedding: Firmly Together: Royals Bask in Wedding Success as Honeymoon is Postponed', *Observer*, 1 May 2011; G. Rayner, 'A Day Filled with Romance, Pageantry and Playfulness is Sealed with a Kiss; The Royal Wedding with the World Looking on, Everything Went Without a Hitch', *The Daily Telegraph*, 30 April 2011.

²¹ P. Ziegler, *Crown and the People* (London: Collins, 1978), p.198.

continuity generates and preserves with Britain's history itself is often portrayed as an important part of the association of royalty to national identity, as a 'national emblem' and enduring institution.²² Even Tom Nairn (himself a republican socialist and a Scottish nationalist) has admitted that the monarchy has made a unique contribution to the imagining of the British nation's past.²³

The stability generated by the 'effortless continuity' of Britain's constitutional monarchy, which bridges the discontinuity of party politics in the present while simultaneously generating a link with Britain's past, is a core source of the institution's strength. In recent years, this has been bolstered by the longevity of key royal figures.²⁴ It is the apparent changelessness of British royal figures – especially in times of transformation – which 'appears to offer reassurance that not all is changing beyond recognition'.²⁵ In the UK, therefore, the longevity of and thus public's familiarity with these individuals can conceal the full extent of the changes taking place, creating a semblance of continuity where little exists.²⁶

There are interesting parallels between Queen Victoria's reign and that of the reigning sovereign, Queen Elizabeth II. At the point of her Diamond Jubilee in 2012, for example, the sovereign had reigned through the terms of twelve Prime Ministers, which has since become fourteen [See Figure 2.1]. Furthermore, throughout her reign, which commenced in 1952, Queen Elizabeth II has overseen a period of rapid, and occasionally turbulent, change as Britain's position in the world, the economy and the fundamental structure of society have all been transformed. Her reign, for example, has seen a dramatic growth in population from 50.5 to 63.1 million as well as borne witness to an unprecedented level of decolonisation during which the number of Britain's overseas territories declined from 70

²² Ward, *Britishness since 1870*, p.17; A. Jay, *Elizabeth R. The Role of the Monarchy Today* (London: BBC Books, 1992).

²³ Nairn discussed in Billig, *Talking of the Royal Family*, p.26; Nairn, *The Enchanted Glass*.

²⁴ C. Lee, *Monarchy: Past, Present... and Future?* (London: Bene Factum Publishing Ltd, 2014), p.18; see also Colley, *Acts of Union*, p.50.

²⁵ Billig, *Talking of the Royal Family*, p.220.

²⁶ Colley, *Acts of Union*, p.50; see also Billig, *Talking of the Royal Family*.

in 1952 to just 15 in 2012.²⁷ It is to this ‘loss of empire’ that Colley is referring to when she notes that ‘never in history has a polity given up ruling as many diverse parts of the globe as rapidly as the United Kingdom has been obliged to do since 1952’.²⁸




Figure 2.1: A political cartoon depicting the 12 different Prime Ministers of Queen Elizabeth II's reign up to September 2015.

Attribution: Bob Moran, *Daily Telegraph*, 6 September 2015. British Cartoon Archive, University of Kent: 103013. Accessed at: <https://www.cartoons.ac.uk/>

[Date Accessed: 01/10/2016].

A recognition of the nature of the changes that have occurred throughout Queen Elizabeth II's years on the throne was an inherent part of the 9 September 2015 debate in the House of Commons regarding "Her Majesty the Queen". During this the Labour Deputy Leader,

²⁷ S. Rogers, 'Diamond Jubilee in Charts: How has Britain Changed since Elizabeth Took the Throne?', *The Guardian*, 30 May 2012. Accessed at: <https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/may/30/diamond-jubilee-1952-2012-compared> [Date Accessed: 27/02/2017].

²⁸ Colley, *Acts of Union*, p.50.

Harriet Harman, commented that ‘her reign spans profound changes in all respects: in work life, family life, our communities and technology’ and emphasised the ‘reassurance of continuity’ that her reign has provided ‘at a time of so much change’.²⁹ In this address, Harman also noted that ‘her life has been a great sweep of British history’, pointing to the Second World War, the Cold War and fall of the Berlin Wall. Today, the Queen stands out as the last Head of State to have worn a uniform during World War Two, while her husband, the Duke of Edinburgh, is now the only remaining major figure on the world stage who saw active service during the Second World War. Cameron similarly stressed that the Queen had been a ‘rock of stability... in an era in which our country has changed so much’ before continuing that she provided ‘an enduring focal point for all her people’.³⁰ Ben Pimlott, in his biography of Elizabeth II, goes further in suggesting that a crucial component of the Queen’s importance is her ability to remain a constant in a changing world.³¹ Pimlott also highlights that Buckingham Palace itself has recognised this, and increasingly ‘focused on what had become the Monarchy’s greatest asset’ – that – ‘through good times and bad, she had always been there’.³² Harman has also stressed that the Queen represents the ‘living incarnation of a set of values and a period of history’, meaning that ‘to millions of people around the planet she represents continuity on a scale bordering on the incomprehensible’.³³

It is not simply the longevity of Queen Elizabeth II that should be seen to establish this sense of continuity and links between the past and present, but also that of Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother. Indeed, throughout the celebration of her hundredth birthday in 2000 it was frequently noted that she represented ‘the continuity and strength of the monarchy, and its central role in the affairs of the nation’ whilst simultaneously highlighting the ‘stability’ that ‘constitutional monarchy brings’.³⁴

²⁹ Colley, *Acts of Union*, p.50.

³⁰ H. Harman, ‘Her Majesty the Queen’, *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 599: col. 389, 9 September 2015.

³¹ Pimlott, *The Queen*.

³² *Ibid*, p.659.

³³ Harman, *Our Queen*, p.1.

³⁴ W. Hague, ‘Hundredth Birthday of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother’, *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 353: cols. 717-727, 11 July 2000.

Moreover, two years later, a number of the tributes which followed the Queen Mother's death emphasised her 'unchanging' nature. In the House of Lords debate of 3 April 2002, for example, it was noted that 'her life spanned a century of enormous change in the world' yet 'she herself never changed. She remained a pillar of stability'.³⁵ Similarly, during the equivalent House of Commons debate it was commented that 'she had become a symbol of continuity in our society, and continuity brings with it a sense of security, which we all [...] need in our lives'.³⁶ This is demonstrative of the emphasis that was placed on the stability and continuity that the Queen Mother's long life had ultimately provided.

Significantly, in all these tributes reference was repeatedly made to the 'remarkable part played by the Queen Mother as Queen and Consort to her much-loved husband, the late King George VI'.³⁷ Indeed, much of the rhetoric surrounding these events focused explicitly on such memories of the Second World War as well as their close relationship as a family. Particular emphasis was placed on the way in which the courage of their Majesties 'inspired and strengthened a nation in a manner which will be remembered always'.³⁸ On the Queen Mother's hundredth birthday, for example, Prime Minister Tony Blair commented that:

Countless people have etched on their minds the wartime pictures of the Queen and her husband engaging with the hazards of the capital during the Blitz. Sustaining the nation's morale and strengthening its resolve in the epic battle for freedom, she was a source of inspiration which sealed her in our nation's heart, just as, during the First World War, the young Lady Elizabeth had provided care and welfare in the hospital at Glamis castle helping others in her direct, straightforward and positive way.³⁹

In referencing such events, Blair was not only highlighting the links between the Queen Mother and the Second World War, but also refocusing attention on a time when 'the

³⁵ Lord Strathclyde, 'Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother', *Hansard House of Lords Parliamentary Debate*, 5th series, vol. 633: cols 385-404, 3 April 2002.

³⁶ M. Trend, 'Death of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth, the Queen Mother', *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 383: cols. 799-828, 3 April 2002.

³⁷ T. Blair, 'Hundredth Birthday of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth, the Queen Mother', *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 353: cols. 717-727, 11 July 2000.

³⁸ Lord Williams of Mostyn, 'Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother', *Hansard House of Lords Parliamentary Debate*, 5th series, vol. 633: cols. 385-404, 3 April 2002.

³⁹ Blair, 'Hundredth Birthday of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth, the Queen Mother'.

nation' (the UK) was perceived to have stood together. In fact, although this has been disputed in academic accounts, the popular memory of the War remains overwhelmingly one of national unity – when internal divisions were overcome in the face of an external threat.⁴⁰ Blair was simply reinforcing this popular memory by focusing on entirely positive depictions of a nation at war, which spoke to the narrative of Britain's 'Finest Hour', and the qualities of strength and resolve during the 'battle for freedom'. Here, the reference to the Blitz is particularly meaningful. As Lucy Noakes has highlighted, the Blitz is especially dominant in the public memory of the war years as a time when the British people pulled together.⁴¹ Throughout the commentary on the Queen Mother's life, in fact, numerous references were made to the decision of the then Queen to remain in London, with her family, to face 'the perils of the Blitz' and share 'without hesitation the grief and danger of the poorest'.⁴²

Fundamentally, the monarchy's continuity with the past and the continuing existence of the royal family, the stability this provides and their ability to encapsulate and embody the nation's history allows for the recollection of times of national self-confidence amidst ongoing change. However, it is not just the monarchy which seeks to do this. Post-war commemoration has often had a nostalgic tone and acted as a way of reinserting older narratives into the public consciousness by linking the present with the past and all that past is taken to represent. It is this, often referred to as 'restorative' or 'backward-looking' nostalgia, which seeks to reconstruct past traditions and values.⁴³ Both Remembrance Sunday and Armistice Day, for example, have traditionally been moments not only to look to and remember the past, but to emphasise the links that exist between then and now,

⁴⁰ See, for example: A. Calder, *The Myth of the Blitz* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1991); M. Connelly, *We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of the Second World War* (Harlow: Pearson/Longman, 2004); L. Noakes, *War and the British. Gender, Memory and National Identity* (I.B. Tauris: London, 1998).

⁴¹ L. Noakes, *War and the British. Gender, Memory and National Identity* (I.B. Tauris: London, 1998), p.27; see also L. Noakes, 'Making Histories: Experiencing the Blitz in London's Museums in the 1990s' in Evans & Lunn, *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century*.

⁴² Lord Strathclyde, 'Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother'.

⁴³ S. Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia* (New York: Basic Books, 2001).

‘between those who serve today and those who served in the past’.⁴⁴ In this, the Queen is often regarded and represented as a ‘living symbol of that continuity’, as someone who was ‘part of a generation born in the shadow of the First World War and raised amid the struggles of the Second’.⁴⁵ The monarchy’s involvement in commemoration, thus represents a further means of reinserting such narratives.

Furthermore, links between the monarchy and the World Wars have not only been made within political debates and discussion of members of the royal family themselves, but have also proven a significant and ever-growing dimension of media coverage of and the monarchy’s involvement in remembrance. Throughout the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day in 1995, for example, the monarchy was placed at the forefront of the commemorations.⁴⁶ For Hardman, the Queen and the royal family ‘represented the perfect focal points for a complex range of national and international emotions’ during these anniversaries which involved millions of people all over the country. As such, they in themselves acted as a ‘phenomenal force for national unity’.⁴⁷ Significantly, the Queen Mother was ever-present during the 3-day weekend as the woman who, rather than evacuate London, remained in Buckingham Palace to face down the Blitz. In what must have been a well-considered government and royal decision, it was the Queen Mother, as opposed to the Queen, who joined the Prime Minister, John Major, in Hyde Park on 6 May to formally open the weekend of events.⁴⁸ Indeed, in reporting on the commemorations, *The Independent* newspaper, for example, noted that she represented the ‘living symbol of a nation’s fortitude in oppression’.⁴⁹ Moreover, in the House of Commons debate regarding the

⁴⁴ Telegraph View, ‘Remembrance Means Looking Forward Too’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 8 November 2015. Accessed at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11981538/Remembrance-means-looking-forward-too.html> [Date Accessed: 01/10/2016].

⁴⁵ Telegraph View, ‘Remembrance Means Looking Forward Too’.

⁴⁶ A. Hamilton, ‘The Queen Takes Lead in VE-Day Commemoration’, *The Times*, 9 March 1995.

⁴⁷ Hardman, *Our Queen*, p. 97

⁴⁸ As indicated in ‘11.10 VE50 The Veteran’s Salute – Hyde Park’, *Radio Times Listings*, 6 May 1995. Accessed at: <http://genome.ch.bbc.co.uk/schedules/bbccone/london/1995-05-06> [Date Accessed: 01/10/2016].

⁴⁹ A. Hamilton & J. Young, ‘Queen Mother Holds Centre Stage on VE-Day of Fun – VE Day Commemoration’, *The Times*, 9 May 1995.

address to be presented to the sovereign on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary, Major noted that:

[I]t is no surprise that Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother continues to hold such a special place in the affection of the British people [given that] when Britain stood alone, the courage and determination of the King and Queen offered strength to the British people and to countless millions beyond our shores.⁵⁰

Major also drew attention to the role of the reigning sovereign in commenting that 'the then Princess [...] played her full part in furthering the war effort' before continuing that since then 'Her Majesty has continued to set an example of duty and service to the nation and to the Commonwealth through the 50 years since then'.⁵¹

This linkage of the past and present remained prominent throughout the entire weekend of commemoration and celebration. An examination of the *Radio Times* for the week commencing 6 May, for example, reveals that a programme entitled *HRH the Princess Margaret: Memories of VE Day* was broadcast on VE Day, 8 May.⁵² In this, the Princess recalled her memories of the War and, in particular, the night of VE Day itself when her and her sister went out to join the celebrations in the streets of London. Similarly, in the Official Commemorative Programme the Message from the Queen also highlighted this link with the past noting: 'As we look back to those wartime years *which so many of us remember so clearly*, let us commemorate with dignity those who contributed to the victory and celebrate with joy what they won'.⁵³ The significance of the continuity between the commemorations of 1995 and events of 1945 embodied by the senior royals, however, is perhaps best highlighted by the recreation of the 1945 VE Day balcony scene at Buckingham Palace. In the original scene, the King, Queen, their two daughters and Winston Churchill appeared on the balcony to acknowledge the cheers and gratitude of a

⁵⁰ J. Major, 'Fiftieth Anniversary of the End of World War II', *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 258: cols. 666-70, 25 April 1995.

⁵¹ Major, 'Fiftieth Anniversary of the End of World War II'.

⁵² '11.05 HRH the Princess Margaret: Memories of VE Day', *Radio Times Listings*, 8 May 1995. Accessed at: <http://genome.ch.bbc.co.uk/schedules/bbccone/london/1995-05-08> [Date Accessed: 01/10/2016].

⁵³ 'Message from Her Majesty the Queen', *The Official Government Programme to Mark the 50th Anniversary of the End of World War II* (London: Whitehall Publications & Marketing, 1995) University of Cambridge West Room Collections. 1997.11.1791, p.5. Emphasis added.

spontaneous gathering of people outside the palace. On 8 May 1995, this was repeated by the three remaining living members. In recognition of the role she played during the War as Queen, the Queen Mother stepped into view on the balcony first to be greeted by a loud cheer from the crowd.⁵⁴ It had been intended that she would remain alone for a few moments; however, she was soon joined by Queen Elizabeth II and Princess Margaret. Ultimately, this balcony appearance, as Pimlott has also argued, was deeply affecting to all those with a sense of the nation's history and achievement and significantly, helped to 'revive the bond between Monarchy and people' following the 'annus horribilis' of 1992.⁵⁵ Significantly, this emphasis on historical continuity throughout the 1995 VE Day commemorations coincided with a resurgence of nostalgia for the British Empire, a time when Britain was perceived to be 'great'. The anniversary, in fact, became a celebration, designed to provide a reassuring picture of Britain as a united, self-contained island nation, the predominant tone was one of patriotic nostalgia. In fact, the whole weekend appeared as a swan-song of war culture, demonstrated by the holding of jitterbug classes and street parties.⁵⁶ The historical continuity of the monarchy and its connection with the former days of Britain's perceived greatness also links closely with this nostalgia for the Empire, making it easier not only to associate those values with the present, but also to believe that history is not entirely lost.

This attention on the association between the monarchy and the World Wars was not only present during the 1995 VE Day commemorations, but has also characterised much of the rhetoric surrounding and coverage of World War commemoration and remembrance in recent decades. This same period also witnessed a resurgence of academic and media

⁵⁴ Hamilton & Young, 'Queen Mother Holds Centre Stage on VE-Day of Fun'.

⁵⁵ Pimlott, *The Queen*, p.574.

⁵⁶ Anon, 'The Government's Official Commemorative Events for the 50th Anniversary of VE and VJ Days', *The Official Government Programme to Mark the 50th Anniversary of the End of World War II*, pp.80-83; J. Keating, 'Party for a Million at VE Day Jubilee', *Evening Standard*, 14 March 1995, p.7; V. Low, 'Come to the Party; With Bands, Bunting and Nostalgia by the Lorry-Load, it is Going to be the Biggest Celebration Since the Coronation. But How Will it Compare With That Incredible Day 50 Years Ago When the War Ended and London Went Wild?', *Evening Standard (London)*, 1 May 1995; T. Leonard, B. McMahon & S. Laville, 'The Pride and Joy of London: (1) Flags and the Biggest Party Ever Seen Mark Glorious VE Day (2) Greatest Tribute of All Time', *Evening Standard (London)*, 9 May 1995, pp.1-2.

nostalgia for the British Empire, a time when Britain was perceived to be 'great', and a growth of the idea of continuing British greatness.⁵⁷ Indeed, the monarchy's ability to link the past with the present and evoke the memory of the World Wars has grown in importance as the World War generations die out and the living memory of that period fades.

Not surprisingly, popular representations of the World Wars came to emphasise this link between the monarchy and the events of the War themselves. Based on true events, the film *A Royal Night Out*, released on 15 May 2015 after special showings around the country on 8 May to coincide with the seventieth anniversary of VE Day, depicted that night in 1945 when the Princesses Elizabeth (played by Sarah Gadon) and Margaret (played by Bel Powley) left Buckingham Palace in order to join the masses in the end of the War celebrations.⁵⁸ In this film, the interweaving of archive news footage within the film, which includes Churchill's Victory in Europe Day announcement and crowds flocking to Buckingham Palace, and the focus on the Princess Elizabeth at its heart was but one way in which a sense of continuity between the past and present was created.

Throughout the film, much emphasis was placed on the role played by members of the royal family during the War. In a telling scene, Jack Hodges (played by Jack Reynor), a fictional airman and staunch republican whom Princess Elizabeth meets during her night out, is visibly angered by the King's official radio broadcast following the end of the War. Jack dismisses the King's use of the word 'fallen' and his reference to 'their sacrifice in the face of a merciless enemy' remarking snidely 'which he'd know all about'. Such a damning indictment of the King, however, draws a strong rebuttal from both the incognito Princess Elizabeth and other British citizens listening to the broadcast.⁵⁹ In the ensuing scene, Elizabeth goes on to state 'well let me tell you... my whole family served in this war', thus highlighting the role played by the royal family.⁶⁰ Throughout the film, in fact, as Kate

⁵⁷ See, for example, M. Asher, *Khartoum: The Ultimate Imperial Adventure* (London: Penguin, 2006); N. Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (London: Allen Lane, 2003).

⁵⁸ Julian Jarrold, Director, Trevor De Silva & Kevin Hood, Writers, '*A Royal Night Out*', Ecosse Films, Filmgate Films, Scope Pictures, Lionsgate, Released 8 May 2015 (United Kingdom).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

Stables notes in her review, ‘the pubs and rammed streets teem with cockney monarchists, making much of how the Windsors shared Blitz dangers with their countrymen in Great Britain’s “finest hour” through the use of phrases such as ‘they [the royal family] got us through this bloody war’.⁶¹ In this, the film both drew attention to and reinforced the link between the past and the politics of the present. *A Royal Night Out*, therefore, is demonstrative of one way in which the memory of the past can be represented. It draws on a number of tropes common to films which approach the subject of the British monarchy. Indeed, it not only links the monarchy with the Second World War, as does *The King’s Speech*, but also much like *The Queen* ‘probes the tension between internal palace politics and external public relations’.⁶² Moreover, throughout the film, as many reviewers noted, director Julian Jarrold created a sense of 1940s nostalgia using crowd scenes that ‘carry an authentic sense of clamour and chaos’ capturing the ‘excitement of a liberated London after the Blitz in full patriotic splendour’. This included ‘the faces of courageous, resilient British people, young and old, celebrating the values they fought the Germans to reclaim for King and Country’.⁶³ It is this which led Stables to argue that the film epitomised a ‘nostalgic wartime fairytale’ which seemed to be a ‘comforting fantasy valorising an era when national identity was less complicated and beer was 8d a pint’.⁶⁴ Moreover, the Britain we see is ‘one happy family, a loyal, monarchy-loving monoculture, where the Royal Family play the role of the nations’ dutiful parents, and their subjects that of cheeky but grateful children’.⁶⁵

⁶¹ K. Stables, ‘A Royal Night Out: Review’, *Sight and Sound*, 25:6 (2015); R. Reed, ‘Beyond Buckingham: Two Princesses Are on the Prowl in ‘A Royal Night Out’, *Observer*, 12 April 2015. Accessed at: <https://observer.com/2015/12/beyond-buckingham-two-princesses-are-on-the-prowl-in-a-royal-night-out/> [Date Accessed: 01/10/2016].

⁶² G. Lodge, ‘Film Review: “A Royal Night Out”’, *Variety Online*, 5 May 2015. Accessed at: <https://variety.com/2015/film/global/a-royal-night-out-review-1201486720/> [Date Accessed: 01/10/2016]; Stephen Frears, Director, Peter Morgan, Writer, *The Queen*, Pathé Pictures, Granada Productions, Released 15 September 2006 (United Kingdom); Tom Hooper, Director, David Seidler, Writer, *The King’s Speech*, U.K Film Council, See-Saw Films, Bedlam Productions, Momentum Pictures, Released 7 January 2011 (United Kingdom).

⁶³ Lodge, ‘Film Review: “A Royal Night Out”’.

⁶⁴ Stables, ‘A Royal Night Out: Review’.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

These links between the past and present were further emphasised by the speeches and addresses given by members of the royal family during such events and anniversaries. During her address on the occasion of the 10 July 2005 Commemorative Event for the sixtieth anniversaries of VE and VJ Days, for example, coming only three days after the 7 July terrorist bombings in London, Queen Elizabeth II noted that ‘sadly, we cannot claim that the world has been free from war – or terror – for the last sixty years’.⁶⁶ She continued, ‘it does not surprise me that, during the present, difficult days for London, people turn to the example set by that generation – of resilience, honour, sustained courage, often under conditions of great deprivation’.⁶⁷ Moreover, the Queen’s 2014 Christmas message, which focused predominantly on the overarching theme of ‘reconciliation’ and ‘forgiveness’, placed images of the Great War at its heart.⁶⁸ Placed on the table behind her at Buckingham Palace, were pictures of her grandparents, George V and Queen Mary while next to these was one of Princess Mary’s Christmas boxes of 1914. The embossed brass boxes, filled with tobacco or chocolate, which were sent to the Armed Forces serving overseas, were paid for by the Sailors and Soldiers Christmas Fund, set up by Princess Mary, George V’s daughter. Significantly, the Queen’s discussion of the First World War was linked not only to the armed services today, but also to Northern Ireland’s Troubles and the Scottish independence referendum. She discussed her visit to the field of ceramic poppies display at the Tower of London and dwelt on the centenary anniversary of the start of the First World War, noting the manner in which ‘countries on both sides... came together to remember in peace’.⁶⁹ Here, the Queen evoked the First World War Christmas Day Truce as an example of reconciliation between two opposing sides and

⁶⁶ HM The Queen, ‘World War II Commemorative Event, Horse Guards Parade’, 10 July 2005. Accessed at: <https://www.royal.uk/world-war-ii-commemorative-event-horse-guards-parade-10-july-2005?page=2> [Date Accessed: 01/10/2016].

⁶⁷ HM The Queen, ‘World War II Commemorative Event, Horse Guards Parade’.

⁶⁸ It is noting that although she is advised by her private secretaries, the Queen writes her Christmas address herself, as opposed to using a script writer. Typically, the speech is used as a chance to reflect on the year and the major events that have occurred throughout it and she takes great care to only write what she believes in. See <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/queens-christmas-message-30-things-didnt-know-majestys-annual/> [Date Accessed: 27/03/2017].

⁶⁹ ‘Queen’s Speech 2014: Christmas Message in Full’. Accessed at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/queens-speech-2014-christmas-message-in-full-9944960.html> [Date Accessed: 01/10/2016].

linked this to the present day. Indeed, from there the Queen's speech went on to acknowledge that 'reconciliation takes different forms', and in reference to the political situation in Scotland, noted that 'after the [independence] referendum many felt great disappointment, while others felt great relief' before recognising that 'bridging these differences will take time'.⁷⁰ This 'call for reconciliation between the people of Scotland in the wake of the divisive independence referendum' was commented on in much of the newspaper coverage, particularly in Scotland.⁷¹ Ultimately, the speech returned to the First World War with the message 'as the Christmas truce a century ago reminds us, peace and goodwill have lasting power in the hearts of men and women'.⁷² The speech, which was watched by 7.8 million people, appeared to have been received in a positive manner with a number of people taking to Twitter to comment under the #QueensSpeech. Moreover, much of the newspaper coverage of the speech highlighted both the Queen's theme of reconciliation and references to the First World War and her linking of it with the present. The *Belfast Telegraph* under the headline 'Reconciliation is Key to Future', for example, commented that:

[C]an anyone who viewed it [the ceramic poppy display] and grasped its significance ever doubt the futility of war and why reconciliation is a much more powerful weapon than even those weapons of mass destruction which are used so routinely throughout the world today? The Queen made that point forcefully in recalling her visit to Crumlin Road Gaol in Belfast, where terrorists were incarcerated during our Troubles but which today is a symbol of the reconciliation between former sworn enemies.⁷³

Similarly, writing in *The Telegraph*, Harry Mount noted that 'she [the Queen] knew whereof she spoke when she said how moved she was by the poppies display at the Tower of

⁷⁰ 'Queen's Speech 2014: Christmas Message in Full'.

⁷¹ L. Heighton, 'Queen Uses Christmas Day Speech to Promote Reconciliation and Forgiveness', *The Telegraph*, 26 December 2014; T. Jones, 'Queen's Christmas Speech Calls for Reconciliation', *The Scotsman*, 26 December 2014; T. Jones, 'Unite My Kingdom: Christmas Speech Message to Two Sides; Queen Calls for Healing After Bitter Divisions of Referendum Campaign Was "Great Disappointment for Some and Great Relief for Others"', *Daily Record and Sunday Mail*, 26 December 2014.

⁷² 'Queen's Speech 2014: Christmas Message in Full'.

⁷³ Anon, 'Reconciliation is Key to Future', *Belfast Telegraph*, 26 December 2014; T. Jones, 'Reconciliation Key Theme in Queen's Christmas Speech', *Belfast Telegraph*, 26 December 2014.

London this year. The only reaction, she said, to walking through the field of ceramic poppies was silence’.

The Monarchy as a ‘Symbol of Unity’

World War commemoration, then, places a great deal of emphasis on both the continuity of the monarchy as an institution and the longevity of key royal figures. The monarchy is identified as a common thread running throughout the generations, providing reassurance, permanence and stability, an idea which is reminiscent of Bagehot’s claim that ‘the traditional strength of the hereditary monarch is at times of incalculable use’.⁷⁴ This common thread, in turn, creates a sense of history in the present. Moreover, in noting the continuity of the monarchy it is frequently the key role played by the monarch and the royal family during the Wars which is emphasised. The linking of Britain’s past with its present through the monarchy is akin to the way in which commemoration of the World Wars, especially Remembrance Day, seeks to establish such connections. Consequently, the involvement of the monarchy in commemoration only serves to reinforce this further.

It is through the monarchy, therefore, that the unifying narratives of the World Wars are often linked to the present day. Yet, this is not the sole way in which the monarchy’s involvement in commemoration draws attention to a shared history and seeks to establish a sense of unity among the different peoples of the United Kingdom. In a statement which remains relevant today, Bagehot noted that part of the function of the monarchy is to act as a ‘visible symbol of unity’.⁷⁵ This ‘unifying role’ is identified in the definition of the monarch’s role not as ‘Head of State’, but as ‘Head of Nation’, or perhaps more accurately as the Head of the various nations which comprise the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. Indeed, the official website of the British monarchy defines this role, which was first outlined by Sir Antony Jay in the 1990s, as follows: ‘as Head of Nation, the Queen’s role is less formal, but no less important for the social and cultural function it

⁷⁴ Bagehot in Smith, *Bagehot – The English Constitution*, p.47.

⁷⁵ W. Bagehot, *The English Constitution: Walter Bagehot*, ed. by. M. Taylor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 45.

fulfils. These include: *providing a focus for national unity and pride*; giving a sense of stability; recognising success, achievement and excellence, and supporting service to others'.⁷⁶ Furthermore, in noting that 'the monarchy is a focus for national unity' the website also identifies the monarchy as 'symbolising the permanence and stability of the nation'.⁷⁷ This is indicative of what Billig has identified as the existence of a 'deep equation' of the monarchy with the nation.⁷⁸ Moreover, it also highlights the existence of a symbiotic relationship between the continuity of the monarchy, discussed in the previous section, and its ability to act as a symbol of unity. Indeed, it is the continuity of the monarchy, and the way it has come to be regarded a synonymous with the nation itself, which enables it to represent and highlight the historic and enduring ties that bind the four nations of the United Kingdom.⁷⁹ Writing during the Queen's Golden Jubilee year, for example, former Prime Minister John Major commented that:

The monarchy remains the most powerful symbol of one unified nation and, as unwise legislation dissolves the country into regional fiefdoms, the Queen may yet be the single most vital element to keep us united. Would the residual demand for independence in Scotland and Wales be containable if the head of state were to be an English president, as opposed to a hereditary monarch with historic affiliations to each part of the kingdom?⁸⁰

Here, Major drew attention not only to the significance of the Queen as a symbol uniting the four nations of the United Kingdom, but also to the fact that part of this ability to do so is strongly linked to the age of the institution and the continuity provided by the hereditary monarchy.

Moreover, as Vernon Bogdanor has argued, it is the monarchy's political neutrality which makes it a powerful symbol and allows the Queen to act as 'Head of Nation'.⁸¹ This political

⁷⁶ Antony Jay is credited with outlining these in a book published alongside the 1990s documentary Elizabeth R, see A. Jay, *Elizabeth R*; Official website of the British monarchy. Accessed at: <https://www.royal.uk/role-monarchy?page=1> [Date Accessed: 02/03/2017] Emphasis added.

⁷⁷ Pimlott, *The Queen*, p.691.

⁷⁸ Billig, *Talking of the Royal Family*, pp.33-34.

⁷⁹ Nairn, *The Enchanted Glass*, p.90.

⁸⁰ J. Major, 'Monarchy Unites Our Nation as a President Never Could', *The Daily Telegraph*, 17 May 2002. Accessed at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3576709/Monarchy-unites-our-nation-as-a-president-never-could.html> [Date Accessed: 01/03/2017].

⁸¹ V. Bogdanor, 'The Guardian Has Got It Wrong', *The Guardian*, 6 December 2000.

neutrality then enables the sovereign, at times of national commemorations such as World War anniversaries, to speak for everyone regardless of political or other allegiances. This is a theme drawn out in popular representations of the monarchy. The popular feature film *The King's Speech* (2010), for example, also highlights this unifying role and the notion that the monarch 'speaks for' and represents the nation.⁸² In this, King George VI (played by Colin Firth) simultaneously recognises his own decorative role and political impotence, yet the importance of this symbolic function. 'If I am to be King... where is my power? May I form a Government, levy a tax or declare a war? No! Yet I am the seat of all authority. Why? *Because the Nation believes when I speak, I speak for them*'.⁸³ Here, *The King's Speech* not only draws on cultural representations of the Second World War as a time of unparalleled national unity, but also highlights that it is through the monarchy that such a sense of unity was established. Whilst a fictional film, *The King's Speech* alludes to something which has been argued in a number of biographical accounts of King George VI: that he did, indeed, help to unify Britain.⁸⁴ Throughout the War, as the representative of all the British people, King George served to counteract the divisions that threatened societal unity, whilst his broadcasts and direct interactions with his subjects were seen to promote a sense that all Britons were in it together.

As this illustrates, the monarchy has sought to act as a force encouraging a sense of 'Britishness', by serving as a national cement and emblem.⁸⁵ For Bogdanor, this unifying role of the monarchy has become ever more important in recent decades with the advent of devolution, which has highlighted the United Kingdom as an explicitly multi-national state.⁸⁶ Indeed, he argues that it is the monarch alone who is 'in a position to interpret the country to itself' and 'who can belong, not to any single one of the nationalities comprising

⁸² N. Rehling, 'When Words Fail: *The King's Speech* as Melodrama' in M. Merck (ed.), *The British Monarchy on Screen* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).

⁸³ Rehling, 'When Words Fail', p.396; Tom Hooper, Director, David Seidler, Writer, *The King's Speech*, U.K Film Council, See-Saw Films, Bedlam Productions, Momentum Pictures, Released 7 January 2011 (United Kingdom). Emphasis added.

⁸⁴ See P. Ziegler, *George VI: The Dutiful King* (London: Allen Lane, 2014); D. Judd, *George VI* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Company Limited, 2012); S. Bradford, *King George VI* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989).

⁸⁵ Colley, *Acts of Union*, p.45; Ward, *Britishness*, p.23.

⁸⁶ Bogdanor, 'The Guardian Has Got It Wrong'.

the United Kingdom, but to all of them'.⁸⁷ The sovereign herself has also recognised this role. This can be exemplified by an analysis of the Diamond Jubilee celebrations of 2012. During her Jubilee address, the Queen dedicated herself 'anew to the nation' and referenced explicitly the 'power of togetherness' which she looked 'forward to seeing in many forms as we travel throughout the United Kingdom and the wider Commonwealth'.⁸⁸ This came in the context of not only the Jubilee, but also against the background of the Scottish National Party's commitment to hold a referendum on Scottish independence (published in the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary Election Manifesto) and the subsequent negotiations between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Scottish Parliament to provide the latter with the powers to hold such a referendum [See Figure 2.2].⁸⁹ Despite this context, throughout the jubilee there was both organised and spontaneous festivity on a large scale throughout the United Kingdom which ranged from street parties to the Thames Diamond Jubilee Boat Pageant. The jubilee celebrations, therefore, appeared to witness a reassertion of a consciously British identity amongst sections of the population articulated around and symbolised by the Crown. Furthermore, the celebrations suggested that the Queen was able to represent 'diversity within unity', something which was extensively commented upon as early as her coronation in 1953.

Indeed, as Ward contends, the monarchy, and events involving the monarchy, provides a way in which unity and diversity can be celebrated through participation, allowing for the validation of different social and national identities while simultaneously stressing unity within the kingdom.⁹⁰ Ward also argues that the celebration of monarchy is not only compatible with a sense of 'Welshness', 'Scottishness' and some forms of 'Irishness', but also has explicitly provided opportunities for establishing this compatibility between these distinctive national identities and a sense of British identity.⁹¹ To this end, through regular

⁸⁷ Bogdanor, 'The Guardian Has Got It Wrong'.

⁸⁸ HM The Queen, 'Queen's Diamond Jubilee Message in Full', 6 February 2012. Accessed at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/the_queens_diamond_jubilee/9063462/Queens-Diamond-Jubilee-message-in-full.html [Date Accessed: 28/02/2017].

⁸⁹ Scottish National Party, *The Next Steps to a Better Scotland* (Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, 2011).

⁹⁰ Ward, *Britishness*, p.11.

⁹¹ Ward, *Britishness Since 1870*, p.23.

royal visits, the reigning sovereign has been able to act as a focus for national unity and in doing so, validate the national distinctiveness of each of these component nations. During Queen Elizabeth II's Golden Jubilee year, for example, it was noted by then Prime Minister Tony Blair that 'the Queen and Duke of Edinburgh will be travelling as widely as possible around the United Kingdom during this year, including visits to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland... Their itinerary will enable them to meet as many people as possible throughout the country'.⁹² This tour of the United Kingdom, in fact, lasted for thirty-five days and incorporated a far more inclusive set of events than in the past. Ultimately, the Jubilee enabled the royal family to reassert the more traditional notions of 'Britishness' which they had sought to represent, at the end of which the Queen thanked her subjects for their loyalty:

I have been profoundly moved by the affection shown and by the warmth of the response to my Golden Jubilee. It has been for Prince Philip and me a summer of great joy and happiness, and a celebration of all that binds us together as a nation: the heritage of our past, the values of our present, and the shared challenges of the future that lies ahead. I thank you all for your loyalty and support.⁹³

⁹² T. Blair, 'Golden Jubilee', *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 379: col. 9W205W, 29 January 2002.

⁹³ HM The Queen, 'End of the Queen's UK Golden Jubilee Tour, Preston', 5 June 2002. Accessed at: <https://www.royal.uk/end-queens-uk-golden-jubilee-tour-preston-5-august-2002?page=16> [Date Accessed: 28/02/2017].




Figure 2.2: A political cartoon which depicts the idea of the Queen as a symbol of unity.

Attribution: Paul Thomas/Daily Express, 16 September 2014. British Cartoon Archive, University of Kent: PTD0167. Accessed at: <https://archive.cartoons.ac.uk/Record.aspx?src=CalmView.Catalog&id=PTD0167&pos=2> [Date Accessed: 01/03/2017].

The concern of the monarchy, therefore, was for the unity and social cohesion of the nations of the United Kingdom. Indeed, the sovereign must be seen to treat the whole 'nation' (used here to refer to all members of the four component nations of the United Kingdom) as a single unit.⁹⁴ Following this, the British monarchy has sought to overcome other divisions within society such as class, ethnic and gender divisions, in order to unite the country. Indeed, throughout her reign the Queen has overseen what Hardman has referred to as the 'greatest demographic change in the country's history' – immigration.⁹⁵ He contends that the importance of the Queen as a force for unity cannot be overstated in this context.

In fact, part of the strength of the monarchy is drawn from the fact that the British Empire, which 'pivoted ideologically and organisationally on the monarchy', was always a multi-

⁹⁴ Jay, *Elizabeth R*, p.186.

⁹⁵ Hardman, *Our Queen*, p.320.

ethnic enterprise, meaning that a familiarity with different races is inbuilt.⁹⁶ Malcolm Rifkind, for example, has commented that ‘the Queen has perhaps found it easier, and at a much earlier date, to contemplate the fact that Britain is a multi-racial society because her family ruled a multi-racial empire, and she is Head of the Commonwealth’.⁹⁷ Consequently, people of all nationalities and ethnicities within the United Kingdom have this common bond of monarchy which enables them to share in the symbols of ‘Britishness’ and, therefore, feel part of British society. The monarchy has, therefore, acted as an integrative factor incorporating the working class as well as the middle class, Scotland, Wales, parts of Ireland and immigrants into the United Kingdom, especially at times of national celebration.⁹⁸ As Nairn has stressed, the ‘single and vital unifying ideology of British royalism’ is a focal point of British culture and a ‘common language spoken in widely different dialects’.⁹⁹

In this, the monarchy appears to have increasingly become a substitute for arguments in favour of the Union, as many of the institutions and factors around which it was built have failed or disappeared altogether. Indeed, as Weight has noted, the Union is no longer bolstered by war and Protestantism, nor by the British Empire, its ‘original *raison d’être*’.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, while historically the Union was associated with economic success, this ended with the downturn in the British economy beginning in 2007. Indeed, throughout the Scottish independence referendum, the ‘Better Together Campaign’ failed to articulate a positive vision for Scotland remaining in the Union or express what its purpose was and why it remained beneficial. Rather, much of David Cameron’s articulation of why he wanted Scotland to remain as part of the Union appeared to be based on a kind of nostalgia for the idea of a United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In this,

⁹⁶ Colley, *Acts of Union*, p.45.

⁹⁷ M. Rifkind quoted in D. H. Strober & G.S. Strober, *The Monarchy. An Oral History of Elizabeth II* (London: Hutchinson, 2002), p.306.

⁹⁸ Ward, *Britishness*, p.25.

⁹⁹ Nairn, *The Enchanted Glass*, p.60.

¹⁰⁰ Weight, *Patriots*, p.327; Linda Colley and Alvin Jackson have also noted the importance of war, Protestantism and Empire for constructions of ‘British’ identities and the longevity of the political union. A. Jackson, *The Two Unions Ireland, Scotland, and the Survival of the United Kingdom, 1707-2007* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); L. Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1992).

the 'Better Together Campaign' appeared reliant on the endurance of any social or emotional sense of commonality, including a sense of shared history and shared institutions. Here, the significance of the monarchy became apparent. Indeed, amidst the almost deafening silence of alternative arguments in favour of 'Britishness' and the Union, the monarchy has retained its currency and credibility over the decades. Ipsos MORI polls conducted in May 2012, for example, showed that 80% of British adults favoured Britain remaining a monarchy (with only 13% saying they wished to see it become a Republic), and 90% (82% in 2002) of British adults stated that they were satisfied with the way the Queen is doing her job. This, in fact, represented the highest level of satisfaction with the Queen that Ipsos MORI had recorded since 1992.¹⁰¹ It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that as was widely reported in the press, the Queen was encouraged to intervene in the independence referendum by the Government. *The Telegraph*, for example, reported that 'David Cameron is under growing pressure to ask the Queen to speak out in support of the Union as 'senior MPs have suggested an intervention from Her Majesty could "make all the difference" as a TNS poll shows the Yes and No campaigns running neck and neck'.¹⁰² Moreover, her comments to a member of the public on 14 September, only four days before the vote, that she hoped people would 'think very carefully about the future' were widely interpreted as a deliberate intervention in favour of a No vote, despite Buckingham Palace's insistence that her remarks were politically neutral.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ 'Support for Monarchy Is At All Time High', *Ipsos MORI*. Accessed at: <https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/2973/Support-for-monarchy-is-at-all-time-high.aspx> [Date Accessed: 29/03/2017].

¹⁰² G. Rayner, C. Hope & P. Dominiczak, 'Scottish Independence: The Queen is Urged to Intervene', *The Telegraph*, 9 September 2014. Accessed at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scottish-independence/11083204/Scottish-independence-The-Queen-is-urged-to-intervene.html> [Date Accessed: 07/04/2017].

¹⁰³ S. Johnson, A. Cramb, C. Hope & G. Rayner, 'Queen Warns Scots to Think 'Very Carefully' About Referendum Vote', *The Telegraph*, 14 September 2014. Accessed at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scottish-independence/11095715/Queen-warns-Scots-to-think-very-carefully-about-referendum-vote.html> [Date Accessed: 07/04/2017]; G. Rayner & C. Hope, 'Queen Decided on Saturday She Would Step into Referendum Debate', *The Telegraph*, 15 September 2014. Accessed at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/queen-elizabeth-II/11098151/Queen-decided-on-Saturday-she-would-step-into-referendum-debate.html> [Date Accessed: 07/04/2017]; N. Watt, P. Wintour & S. Carrell, 'Scottish Independence: Queen Was Asked to Intervene Amid Yes Vote Fears', *The Guardian*, 16 December 2014. Accessed at: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/dec/16/scottish-independence-queen-intervene-yes->

It is this unifying ability which has led Jackson to comment that the monarchy transcends both class and nation, a point that also recurred in media commentaries in the 1990s.¹⁰⁴ In this way, the monarchy bears a striking resemblance to World War remembrance, especially as it has developed over the last three decades. During both World Wars, soldiers were killed on a large scale irrespective of class, nationality, ethnicity and religion. Consequently, World War commemoration, in memorialising those who gave their lives while fighting for the United Kingdom, overcomes these divisions. Moreover, as Chapter One demonstrated, state commemoration of the World Wars has frequently sought to play a comparative unifying role. The involvement of the monarchy in commemoration, therefore, not only reflected commemoration's ability to transcend societal divisions, but also reinforced the sense of unity which it meant to convey, creating a shared affinity that bridges the gulf arising from accidents of birth.¹⁰⁵

The power of the monarchy, therefore, is in overcoming internal divisions and to represent not just a government but an entire nation.¹⁰⁶ This can be illustrated through an analysis of the rhetoric and language used in newspaper coverage of, and parliamentary debates about, commemorative events. In much of the coverage of Remembrance Day over the years, for example, attention has been drawn to and an emphasis placed on the Queen 'leading' the nation. In this, numerous headlines state that 'Queen Leads Cenotaph Ceremony', 'Queen Leads Weekend of Commemoration', 'Remembrance Sunday: Queen Leads Tributes' or even 'Queen Mother Leads War Tributes'.¹⁰⁷ Here, it is apparent that the

vote-fears [Date Accessed: 07/04/2017]; I. Johnston, 'Queen's Remark on Scottish Independence was 'Deliberate Intervention' in Referendum, Book Claims, *The Independent*, 23 September 2015. Accessed at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/queens-remark-on-scottish-independence-was-deliberate-intervention-in-referendum-book-claims-10515000.html> [Date Accessed: 07/04/2017]; S. Carrell, N. Watt & P. Wintour, 'The Real Story of the Scottish Referendum: The Final Days of the Fight for Independence', *The Guardian*, 16 December 2014. Accessed at: <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/16/sp-real-story-scottish-referendum-final-days-fight-for-independence> [Date Accessed: 07/04/2017].

¹⁰⁴ Jackson, *The Two Unions*, p.25; Hamilton, 'Above All a Salute to the Queen'.

¹⁰⁵ T. Graham & P. Burgess, *Jubilee: A Celebration of 50 Years of the Reign of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II* (London: Cassell, 2002).

¹⁰⁶ Tombs, *The English*, p.867.

¹⁰⁷ A. Hamilton, 'The Queen Leads VE Tributes', *The Times*, 6 May 1995; A. Hamilton, 'The Queen Takes Lead in VE-Day Commemoration', *The Times*, 9 March 1995; S. Lister, 'Queen Leads Cenotaph Ceremony', *The Times*, 11 November 2002; 'Queen Leads Weekend of Commemorations', *The*

Queen is leading the nation in mourning in channelling the grief of the nation, something which was also apparent during the funeral of Princess Diana (although it should be noted that the responses of the British public to Diana's death were far more diverse and complex than the media accounts of a nation united in grief suggested).¹⁰⁸

The ability of the monarch to represent the entire nation was perhaps most clearly articulated during the British State Visit to the Republic of Ireland, which took place from 17 to 20 May 2011. This visit built on an earlier, and the first, public meeting between Queen Elizabeth and President Mary McAleese, at the opening of the Island of Ireland Peace Tower in Messines in 1998 (cf. Chapter Three). Significantly, the royal visit to the Republic of Ireland was the first by a British monarch to an independent Ireland. Prior to this, the last visit had come a century earlier in 1911, when King George V travelled to an Ireland still united under British rule within the Empire.¹⁰⁹

The Queen's first substantive public engagement during the visit was the wreath-laying ceremony at the Garden of Remembrance in Dublin's City Centre. Located in Parnell Square, the Garden, which is dedicated to 'all those who gave their lives in the cause of Irish Freedom' between 1798 and 1921, represents, as Nuala Johnson has argued, the 'most significant commemorative space' to the Easter Rising of 1916.¹¹⁰ During the ceremony at the Garden, the Queen stepped forward to lay a laurel wreath at the foot of the memorial, before stepping back and bowing her head. On 18 May, President McAleese and Queen Elizabeth visited the Irish National War Memorial at Islandbridge. There, they

Times, 19 August 1995; A. Hamilton & T. Reid, 'Queen Mother Leads War Tributes', *The Times*, 12 November 1999; J. Meikle, 'Remembrance Sunday: Queen Leads Tributes as Services Held Across UK', *The Guardian*, 8 November 2015.

¹⁰⁸ See J. Thomas, *Diana's Mourning: A People's History* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2002).

¹⁰⁹ The intervening period between the two visits saw the 1916 Proclamation of the Irish Republic during the Easter Rising against British Rule in Ireland. Following this, a military conflict from January 1919 led ultimately to the Partition of Ireland in December 1922, with Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom while the Irish Free State became a self-governing and fully independent Dominion within the British Empire. In April 1949, the Irish State withdrew from the British Commonwealth and abolished its last links to the monarchy in the formal declaration of the Republic of Ireland.

¹¹⁰ N. Johnson, 'A Royal Encounter: Space, Spectacle and the Queen's Visit to Ireland 2011', *The Geographical* p.195; 'Garden of Remembrance', *Heritage Ireland*. Accessed at: <http://www.heritageireland.ie/en/dublin/gardenofremembrance/> [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019].

performed an almost identical act of homage to the Irish soldiers killed in the War, both Nationalist and Unionist. As Edward Madigan has argued, this unprecedented action and the ‘reverential demeanour’ of the Queen at the Garden of Remembrance was ‘truly historic’.¹¹¹ Here, the actions of the Queen demonstrated that she was prepared to bow her head in recognition of the sacrifices made by those who fought for Irish independence from British rule, in much the same way that she bows her head at the Cenotaph each year. This gesture, which the Taoiseach Enda Kenny referred to as ‘symbolism beyond words’, became the dominant image of the visit.¹¹² Perhaps unsurprisingly, the visit received extensive coverage in both the British and Irish press, much of which focused primarily on what it symbolised for contemporary Anglo-Irish relations. As Marina Dekavella and Kevin Rafter have highlighted, there was a tendency to stress its ‘enormous historical and political significance’ as well as both its ‘historic’ and ‘conciliatory’ nature.¹¹³ Hardman, writing in the *Daily Mail*, for example, referred to the Queen’s actions as an ‘unspoken but colossal gesture’. He continued by suggesting that ‘for the large majority of Irish people... the sight of the British Sovereign laying a wreath here, bowing her head and marking a minute’s silence, was a profound and welcome shift in the bilateral narrative’.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ E. Madigan, ‘Commemoration and Conciliation during the Royal Visit to Ireland’, *History Ireland*, Vol 19:4 (2011), pp.10-11.

¹¹² S. Collins, ‘Taoiseach Praises “Symbolism Beyond Words”: Queen Lays Wreath at Garden of Remembrance’, *The Irish Times*, 18 May 2011.

¹¹³ M. Dekavella & K. Rafter, ‘The Construction of a ‘Historical Moment’: Queen Elizabeth’s 2011 Visit to Ireland in British and Irish Newspapers’, *Journalism*, 17:2 (2016), p.234; M. Lord, ‘Queen Honours Those Who Died in the Fight for Irish Freedom’, *Irish Times*, 18 May 2011, p.1; Anon, ‘A Moment of Healing: Queen Bows Her Head to Fallen in Symbolic Act of Historic Reconciliation’, *Irish Independent*, 18 May 2011, p.1.

¹¹⁴ R. Hardman, ‘A Simple Bow of the Head, such a Symbolic Gesture: How the Queen Opened a New Era After a Century of Bloodshed, Distrust and Uneasy Coexistence’, *Daily Mail*, 18 May 2011. Accessed at: <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1387878/Queen-Ireland-visit-opened-new-era-century-bloodshed-distrust.html> [Date Accessed: 17/09/2019]; For other examples see: Anon, ‘The Queen in Ireland: Queen Pays Tribute to Irish War of Independence Dead’, *The Telegraph*, 17 May 2011. Accessed at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/queen-elizabeth-ii/8519684/The-Queen-in-Ireland-Queen-pays-tribute-to-Irish-War-of-Independence-dead.html> [Date Accessed: 17/09/2019]; N. Anderson, ‘How the Queen Brought History to Life During Momentous Irish Visit’, *Irish Independent*, 14 May 2016. Accessed at: <https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/how-the-queen-brought-history-to-life-during-momentous-irish-visit-34714017.html> [Date Accessed: 17/09/2019]; Anon, ‘Queen Pays Tribute to Irish Dead’, *Independent*, 17 May 2011. Accessed at:

Just as the monarchy has served as a unifying device, commemoration of the World Wars in the United Kingdom has also been seen to emphasise unity and national solidarity. This is in contrast to other European countries such as France, where the Second World War was characterised by defeat, occupation, collaboration, resistance and persecution.

Consequently, the collective memory of the Second World War has been defined by competing and contested narratives and has played a role in shaping the sense of the past held by various segments of French society.¹¹⁵ This, in turn, has meant that the official memory and commemoration of the War has been characterised by messiness, politicisation and a 'multi-directional tug and pull'.¹¹⁶

By contrast, in the United Kingdom the willingness of both the Crown and the Government to work together for the sake of unity, and thus create a sense that they shared in the nation's sacrifices, allowed the fabric of the country to survive. Hugh Kearney, for example, notes that the common feeling of 'Britishness' which was created by the First World War in part turned around the monarchy.¹¹⁷ Here, the symbiotic relationship between the monarch the nation was crucial. Furthermore, during the address to the sovereign on the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day, Major stated that '[t]hroughout the War, the royal family symbolised the unity of the nation and of the Commonwealth, and the willingness to make whatever sacrifices were necessary to ensure victory and the preservation of a free way of life'.¹¹⁸ This is an idea which was reinforced by, as Queen Elizabeth II commented, the 'tradition of very long standing that the Sovereign, and members of the Royal Family, are intimately associated with the Armed Forces and have been proud to serve in all three

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/queen-pays-tribute-to-irish-dead-2285163.html> [Date Accessed: 17/09/2019].

¹¹⁵ See O. Wieviorka, *Divided Memory. French Recollections of World War II from the Liberation to the Present* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).

¹¹⁶ J. Ebel, 'Book Review: *Divided Memory: French Recollections of World War II from Liberation to the Present* by O. Wieviorka', *French Forum*, Vol 39:1 (2014), p.163; See also R. Fathi, 'French Commemoration: The Centenary Effect and the (Re)discovery of 14-18', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 50:3 (2015), pp.545-552.

¹¹⁷ H. Kearney, 'The Importance of Being British', *Political Quarterly*, 71:1 (2000), p.21.

¹¹⁸ J. Major, 'Fiftieth Anniversary of the End of World War II', *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 258: cols. 666-70, 25 April 1995.

services'.¹¹⁹ Queen Elizabeth II, for example, is not only 'Head of the Armed Forces' as the reigning sovereign, but she also served as an active member of the Auxiliary Territorial Service during the last year of the Second World War in 1945. Similarly, the Duke of Edinburgh also served in the Royal Navy between 1939 and 1952 and features in several war despatches for his actions in the Battle of Matapan during the Second World War.¹²⁰ Queen Elizabeth's father, King George VI, fought at the Battle of Jutland.¹²¹ More recently, Prince William served as a Regimental Officer in the British Army before undertaking attachments to the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy while Prince Harry served in the British Army for ten years. The monarchy's involvement in commemoration is, therefore, simultaneously a reminder of and draws attention to that willingness to sacrifice for the common good.

Fundamentally, the presence of the monarchy, as the embodiment of the nation, in commemorative events acts both as a focal point for channelling emotions and as a 'unifying vehicle', drawing together the four nations of the United Kingdom, as well as transcending other societal divisions such as class and ethnicity. This ability to act as a symbol of unity is derived from a number of sources. The continuity of the institution and longevity of key royal figures, which in establishing direct links between the World Wars and the present day, both highlights the significant role played by the monarchy during the Wars and enables past narratives of a country 'in it together' to be reinserted into the

¹¹⁹ HM The Queen, 'Queen Elizabeth II Speech at Armed Forces Muster, 2012' in 'The Queen and the Armed Forces', *The Royal Family*. Accessed at: <https://www.royal.uk/queen-and-armed-forces-0> [Date Accessed: 18/09/2019].

¹²⁰ 'How Prince Philip Has Earned The Respect of The British Military', *Forces Network*, 10 June 2019. Accessed at: <https://www.forces.net/news/how-prince-philip-has-earned-respect-british-military> [Date Accessed: 18/09/2019]; G. Rayner, 'Duke of Edinburgh Opens Up About Battle of Matapan', *The Telegraph*, 16 April 2012. Accessed at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/theroyalfamily/9207832/Duke-of-Edinburgh-opens-up-about-Battle-of-Matapan.html> [Date Accessed: 18/09/2019]; D. Smith, 'Prince Philip's War Heroics Come to Light After 60 Years', *Observer*, 28 December 2003. Accessed at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2003/dec/28/monarchy.davidsmith> [Date Accessed: 18/09/2019].

¹²¹ 'King George VI's (then Prince Albert) account of the Battle of Jutland', *The Royal Family*. Accessed at: <https://www.royal.uk/king-george-vis-then-prince-albert-account-battle-jutland> [Date Accessed: 18/09/2019].

present day. Furthermore, the apolitical nature of the monarchy allows the sovereign to act as 'Head of Nation' and unequivocally represent the entire populace.

The 'Royal Family' and the Role of Women in the Monarchy

Thus far, this chapter has demonstrated that the role of the monarch and the monarchy in, and their links to, commemoration of the World Wars is of far greater significance than simply fulfilling representational duties as the 'Head of State'. However, much of the popularity of the monarch, and their ability to act as a unifying figure, is derived not simply from their role as 'Head of Nation', but also from the perception that the sovereign is the 'Head of a National *Family*'. For Ward, it is the representation of the monarch as Head of the National Family that has enabled them, in part, to overcome internal social and geographical divisions.¹²² Throughout the Second World War, and in subsequent representations and popular memory of the War, for example, King George VI and Queen Elizabeth were frequently portrayed as the 'nation's dutiful parents'.¹²³ Perhaps more significantly, as the head of a family, the monarch ultimately becomes a more relatable figure. In *The English Constitution*, Bagehot noted this, commenting that: 'a *family* on the throne is an interesting idea. It brings down the pride of sovereignty to the level of petty life', and this intuition retains an enduring significance.¹²⁴ This has become increasingly the case in the last three decades as younger members of the royal family, such as the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge and the Duke and Duchess of Sussex, have become more prominent in public life. The culmination of this were the Royal weddings of 2011 (Prince William and Catherine Middleton) and 2018 (Prince Harry and Meghan Markle), which had viewing figures on average of twenty-four and eighteen million in the United Kingdom respectively.¹²⁵ This new generations of royals, and events such as these, are seen as

¹²² Ward, *Britishness*, p.22.

¹²³ Stables, 'A Royal Night Out: Review', p.84.

¹²⁴ Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, ed. by M. Taylor, p.41.

¹²⁵ Figures quoted in J. Waterson, 'Royal Wedding Confirmed as Year's Biggest TV Event', *The Guardian*, 20 May 2018. Accessed at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/may/20/royal-wedding-confirmed-as-years-biggest-uk-tv-event> [Date Accessed: 18/09/2019]; Anon, 'Royal Wedding: 24 Million Tune in to Watch Prince William and Kate Middleton Marry', *The Telegraph*, 30

connecting the institution of the monarchy to younger generations and, as a result, extending its appeal.

The sovereign's role as 'Head of the National Family', therefore, is part of the wider charisma of the British monarchy. The concept of a 'royal family' provides a way in which ordinary people can relate their own lives to those who represent the monarchy. As both Nairn and Ward argue, a 'royal family' can create a sense of 'they're just like us'.¹²⁶ It also holds additional appeal with those to whom the notion of 'familyness' and 'family values' appeals. It is worth noting, however, that the royal family appears to be held to a 'higher' standard by the British people than that to which they hold themselves, as if the public expect them to set an example and be a 'perfect' family.¹²⁷ It is apparent, for example, that in contrast to the lives of Queen Elizabeth II and the Duke of Edinburgh, the perceived 'imperfection' of Prince Charles' lifestyle has contributed to the weakening of his personal appeal. Indeed, there has been a persistent public dissatisfaction with Prince Charles, a substantial part of which appears to relate to his divorced status. In the decade before his marriage to Camilla Parker Bowles in April 2005, for example, over 40% did not want a remarried Prince of Wales to become king while between 70 and 76% did not want the new Duchess of Cornwall to be eventually recognised as Queen.¹²⁸ Furthermore, during the 2012 Diamond Jubilee there was widespread discussion in the British media that succession should skip a generation so that the Duke of Cambridge, Prince William, would become king upon the Queen's death.¹²⁹

April 2011. Accessed at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/royal-wedding/8485325/Royal-wedding-24-million-tune-in-to-watch-Prince-William-and-Kate-Middleton-marry.html> [Date Accessed: 18/09/2019].

¹²⁶ T. Nairn, 'Britain's Royal Romance', in R. Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity, III: National Fictions* (London: Routledge, 1989), p.82; Ward, *Britishness*, p.21.

¹²⁷ This is an idea reminiscent of Bagehot who referred to the monarchy as 'head of our morality'. See Bagehot, *Bagehot – The English Constitution*, ed. by P. Smith, p.46.

¹²⁸ Figures cited in A. Olechnowicz, "'A Jealous Hatred": Royal Popularity and Social Inequality' in Olechnowicz, *The British Nation*, pp.296-7.

¹²⁹ Ibid; Billig, *Talking of the Royal Family*, p.219; M. Thornton, 'Why Charles Should Now Stand Aside', *Daily Mail*, 5 December 2012, p.27; R. Ashworth, 'We Want King Wills Next. Prince 'Should Replace Father Charles as Heir'', *Sunday Express*, 6 May 2012; A. Pearson, 'Prince Charles is a Danger to Monarchy', *The Daily Telegraph*, 7 June 2012, p.27; J. Walsh, 'And So the Wait Goes On; The

Significantly, the wider royal family also play an important role in the commemoration of the World Wars. Indeed, it is not just the Queen who represents the monarchy at commemorative events, but also other family members. This can be exemplified by the numerous publications on the official website of the British monarchy which detail the commitments of members of the royal family.¹³⁰ The emphasis on family is significant because it enables the monarchy to appeal to and represent a far broader span of society – across different generations and genders. At a practical level, it also enables the monarchy to attend commemorations across the four nations of the United Kingdom, and even abroad.

It has frequently been the female members of the royal family, however, who have featured the most prominently in World War commemoration and the coverage of such events. Here, it was the Queen Mother prior to her death in 2002, then Queen Elizabeth II and, more recently, the Duchess of Cambridge that have been featured more prominently. This may be due, in part, to the fact the sovereign herself is female, but it is also demonstrative of the importance of gender for the monarchy generally and, as discussed below, their role in commemoration more specifically. Perhaps more significantly, the British monarchy in the twentieth century has predominantly had a feminine face.¹³¹ This is due, in part, to the longevity of the Queens Consort, Mary and Elizabeth, in comparison to their respective husbands, George V and George VI, but also to the fact George VI had two daughters, one of whom, more significantly, has sat on the throne since 1952. The columnist and former editor of *The Daily Telegraph* Charles Moore has even claimed that Britain is the most matriarchal society in the modern world, in that the four most famous

Prince of Wales. As the Nation Celebrates His Mothers' 60-Year Reign, the Heir to the Throne Remains a Man Struggling to Find a Role that Can Keep Him – and the Constitution – Happy', *The Independent*, 2 June 2012, p.46.

¹³⁰ See, for example, 'WW1 Centenary Commemorations', *The Royal Family*, 1 April 2014. Accessed at: <https://www.royal.uk/ww1-centenary-commemorations> [Date Accessed: 01/10/2016]; 'Gallipoli Centenary Commemorations', *The Royal Family*, 6 March 2015. Accessed at <https://www.royal.uk/gallipoli-centenary-commemorations> [Date Accessed: 01/10/2016]; 'Somme Centenary Commemorations', *The Royal Family*, 15 February 2016. Accessed at: <https://www.royal.uk/somme-centenary-commemorations> [Date Accessed: 01/10/2016].

¹³¹ C. Campbell-Orr, 'The Feminisation of the Monarchy 1780-1910; Royal Masculinity and Female Empowerment' in Olechnowicz, *The British Nation*, p.105.

public figures since the Second World War have been women – Princess Diana, Margaret Thatcher, the Queen Mother and Queen Elizabeth II.¹³² Significantly, three of these four figures identified by Moore are (or were) members of the royal family. Indeed, with the succession of these dominant and charismatic women (as well as Queen Victoria), the modern British monarchy itself has often been regarded as a matriarchy. It is this which has led David Cannadine to write that ‘it might...be that the constitutional monarchy is in fact emasculated monarchy, and thus a feminised version of an essentially male institution. For constitutional monarchy is what results when the sovereign is deprived of those historic male functions of god and governor [sic] and general, and this in turn has led – perhaps by default, perhaps by design? – to a greater stress on family, domesticity, maternity and glamour.’¹³³

For Campbell-Orr, the British monarchy is a feminised institution in which royal women appear better accomplished in combining the elements of ‘feminine’ as well as ‘masculine’ role-playing demanded of modern royal persons, as demonstrated by Queen Elizabeth II. This points to a wider view – that the values of the monarchy are, in fact, better embodied in and represented by a female. In fact, historically, there is a strong association of the British Crown and the British national image with female figures.¹³⁴ Considering Boadicea, Queen Elizabeth I, Queen Victoria and the current sovereign, Hardman has noted that the British monarchy has tended to thrive under its queens who have all been particularly symbolic monarchs.¹³⁵

Yet, it is not just the monarchy that has had a strong association with women historically, but the nation more broadly. On the most fundamental level, many nations have been personified or portrayed as female, for example, as a ‘mother country’ such as ‘Mother Russia’. Britain is no exception. Britannia is an ambiguous figure, in that while she is seen carrying weapons for her defence, the centrality of a female figure simultaneously encourages men to protect her. As Ward notes, to love one’s country, one must assign that

¹³² C. Moore quoted in Hardman, *Our Queen*, p.252.

¹³³ D. Cannadine, ‘From Biography to History: Writing the Modern British Monarchy’, *Historical Research*, 77:197 (2004), p.303.

¹³⁴ D. Thompson, *Outsiders. Class, Gender and Nation* (London: Verso, 1993), p.171.

¹³⁵ Hardman, *Our Queen*, p.187.

country features worth defending.¹³⁶ In this, the easiest and least problematic way to do so is to represent and define the embodiment of the nation as something in need of protecting – a woman. Significantly, it is for this reason that her image is particularly potent and common in times of war [See Figures 2.3 and 2.4]. Moreover, she is also seen to represent both British democracy and British liberties and values. Indeed, Madge Dresser has argued Britannia is the incarnation of a common British identity.¹³⁷



Figure 2.3: World War One Recruitment Poster 'National Service Victory N S Industrial Army' depicting Britannia, 1917.

© IWM (Art.IWM PST 13276)

Accessed at:

<http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/24062> [Date Accessed: 28/02/2017].



Figure 2.4: World War One Recruitment Poster 'Remember Scarborough! Enlist Now' depicting a martial Britannia, 1915.

© IWM (Q 33151)

Accessed at:

<http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205132731> [Date Accessed: 28/02/2017].

¹³⁶ Ward, *Britishness*, p.38.

¹³⁷ M. Dresser, 'Britannia', in Samuel, *Patriotism*, pp.26-49.

Furthermore, in most countries while the nation is often personified as female, the figure of a woman also frequently constitutes the actual symbolic figuration of ethnic and national groups.¹³⁸ The nation is represented as a loved woman in danger or as a grieving mother who lost her sons in battle. This, in turn, leads to calls for men to fight 'for the sake of our women and children' or to 'defend their honour'. Moreover, it is women, often mothers, as both biological and cultural reproducers of the nation, who symbolise the spirit of the collectivity. In this, women are associated in the collective imagination with children, and therefore with the collective, as well as the familial future.¹³⁹ Furthermore, as Yuval-Davies notes, this 'burden of representation on women of the collectivity's identity and future destiny has also brought about the construction of women as the bearers of the collectivity's honour'.¹⁴⁰ In this capacity, the important role of mothers in the representation of continuity has meant that women can and are constructed in the role of 'carriers of tradition' and even as 'bearers of memory'. It is not just ordinary women that guard and transmit these reminiscences, but rather, as Campbell-Orr has highlighted, also royal women.¹⁴¹

Consequently, the fact that the current British monarch is female (both a mother and grandmother herself) is significant. Indeed, the association of the nation with a female figure, both in its personification and symbolic figuration, makes it far easier to view Queen Elizabeth II as the embodiment of the collective national organism. It is this, in fact, which has led commentators such as Hardman to argue that following the death of the Queen Mother in 2002, Elizabeth II effectively became 'the mother of the nation'.¹⁴² Here, the idea of the 'mother' and mothering ideals is particularly significant. Writing on Queen Victoria, Thompson has argued that ultimately Victoria's non-white subjects were better able to accept a female head of state, noting that the matriarchal figure she presented in the later years of her reign which facilitated her transformation into the figure of the

¹³⁸ F. Anthias & N. Yuval-Davis, 'Women and the Nation-State' in J. Hutchinson & A.D. Smith, *Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.315.

¹³⁹ N. Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation* (London: Sage Publications, 1997), p.45.

¹⁴⁰ Yuval-Davies, *Gender and Nation*, p.45.

¹⁴¹ Campbell-Orr, 'The Feminisation of the Monarchy', p.106.

¹⁴² Hardman, *Our Queen*, p.40.

'mother of Empire' may actually have been more acceptable to many of the subject peoples within the British Empire.¹⁴³ Moreover, female figures are ultimately icons and symbols to which people can more readily relate. This is partly due to the connection of women with mothers and mothering ideals, but also links to the prominent role played by and the common experience of women as mourners.¹⁴⁴ Campbell-Orr, for example, has argued that the prominence, strength and longevity of the Queens Consort during the First and Second World Wars, was actually representative of many ordinary women's experiences in a century of war, as a result of which single women and war widows soon outnumbered men.¹⁴⁵ Similarly, the devotion of the Queen Mother to both her family and her country during the War, and subsequently, acted as a reminder of the sacrifices made by people's own parents and grandparents. Furthermore, female figures have less association with militaristic values and militarism. This contrasts sharply with men, who are strongly associated with military service.

The gender of the reigning monarch, and the fact she is the head of a wider royal family, has demonstrably affected the symbolic role played by the British monarchy in World War commemoration. The association of women, and mothers more specifically, with the nation and the spirit of the nation not only makes it easier to conceive of the monarch as the embodiment of the nation, but is also connected with the key role women play as both mourners and the carriers of memory. Moreover, both a female monarch and the involvement of the wider royal family in commemoration ultimately make them more relatable and also more universally appealing. This, in turn, enables them to represent and draw together the British population.

¹⁴³ D. Thompson, *Queen Victoria: Gender and Power. A Woman on the Throne* (London: Virago Press, 2001), pp.138-139.

¹⁴⁴ See J. Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

¹⁴⁵ Campbell-Orr, 'The Feminisation of the Monarchy', p.105.

Conclusion

Over the last three decades members of the British royal family have been ever-present in events commemorating and remembering the First and Second World Wars. While the monarchy plays no role in determining the nature of the official state commemorative events to be held – this is the preserve of the national (and devolved) governments of the United Kingdom - much of the sovereign's role involves carrying out the representational duties required of them as the ceremonial 'Head of State'. This includes, amongst other things, the laying of wreaths at the Cenotaph on Remembrance Sunday, the opening of national war memorials and attending commemorative services and other events abroad as Britain's representative.

Yet, while this formal role may be limited, focusing too much attention on this aspect ignores the significance of the monarchy's involvement in the commemoration of the World Wars symbolically. In fact, as this chapter has demonstrated, the continuity of the monarchy and longevity of key royal figures, the function of the monarchy as a 'symbol of unity', and the 'familyness' and female gender of the modern British monarchy have ultimately enabled the Crown to play a significant symbolic role in World War commemoration.

The hereditary nature of the constitutional monarchy, and more specifically the longevity of the Queen Mother and Queen Elizabeth II have ultimately created stability and permanence especially in times of change, as well as conveying a sense of history in the present. In this, the monarchy connected Britain's past with the present day. In particular, the royal family's connections with the Wars drew attention to the critical role the monarchy played in not only the Second, but also the First World War. This, in turn, draws upon memories (both public and private) of the British nation at war. Consequently, the linking of the past and present allows for the reinsertion of traditional narratives into the public consciousness, with positive depictions of the strength, resolve and courage of a nation united in war.

This notion of 'unity' is a crucial one, and is indicative of the way in which the continuity of the monarchy is intimately connected with the monarch's ability to act as the 'Head of

Nation'. The seeming antiquity of the institution allows it to not only embody and represent the nation, but also to draw attention to the shared history and ties that bind all its citizens together. Moreover, the ability of the monarchy to represent the nation and act as a symbol of unity is also derived from its political neutrality. Significantly, it is this same political neutrality which allows the sovereign at times of national commemoration to speak for everyone – to unequivocally represent the entire population. Indeed, the monarchy transcends both national and societal divisions and has therefore acted both as a 'symbol of unity' and an integrative factor in a political context of disintegration, enabling people of all nationalities, ethnicities, classes and religions to share in the symbols of 'Britishness' through the common bond of monarchy. The Crown's involvement in national war commemoration, then, highlights this further (whilst bearing a striking resemblance to the way commemoration itself has often been used) and provides a way in which unity and diversity can be celebrated through participation in commemorative events, much like royal events.

Furthermore, the gender of the monarch has also proved crucial to the symbolism of the monarchy in that it is easier to conceive of a Queen as the embodiment of the collective national organism due to the strong associations of the nation with women, particularly mothers, and their links to bearing and transmitting memories.

Ultimately, these three features of the modern British monarchy have meant that the presence of the Crown at commemorative events both represented and drew attention to symbols and narratives of unity.

Chapter Three: Reconciliation and Commemoration: World War Memory in Northern Ireland, 1994 – 2016

On the 29 June 2016, ahead of the 1 July Somme centenary commemorations, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Theresa Villiers gave a speech entitled 'The Somme and 1916 Centenaries'. In this, she stated that 'the centenary has particular resonance for many in Northern Ireland because [of] the deeds of the 36th Ulster Division'. She continued by acknowledging that 'the history of Ireland and the Great War is not just about the 36th Division. We must also remember the incredible heroism of the 16th Irish Division [...]. Their contribution and their sacrifice was immense and we should never forget it'. Yet, Villiers acknowledged that 'in the decades following partition, the Irish contribution to the Somme and to the First World War more generally often seemed largely hidden'. She posited that 'part of the reason for that lies in the consequences of another seminal event in Irish history [...] the Easter Rising', noting that 'in the post-independence era, two conflicting narratives of the year 1916 began to take shape [...]. [I]f anything, in the period after the Second World War and during the long years of the Troubles, these attitudes hardened. It is one of the many examples of the power history has to sustain long-held divisions and antagonisms on this island.'¹

Villiers' speech is indicative of the complex ways in which memories of the World Wars in Northern Ireland, and also on the island of Ireland, are intertwined with identity politics. Throughout her speech, Villiers repeatedly acknowledged the complexities of Ireland's twentieth century history and, consequently, the difficulties attendant in commemorating it. Indeed, a recognition of these difficulties is pervasive throughout the historical literature on modern Ireland. In his introduction to *History and Memory in Modern Ireland*, Ian McBride stated that 'the interpretation of the past has always been at the heart of national conflict' in Ireland, where nationalist and unionist identities have focused on a series of

¹ T. Villiers, 'The Somme and 1916 Centenaries', 29 June 2016. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-somme-and-1916-centenaries> [Date Accessed: 11/09/2019].

dates that recall inter-Irish conflict.² Similarly, for Nuala Johnson, narratives of war commemoration in Ireland were, and are, consistently in dialogue with the narratives attendant on the national question.³ Guy Beiner has also argued that 'Ireland is deeply troubled by evocative memories of its past'.⁴

Significantly, the island of Ireland has not been immune to the recent upsurge of interest in the World Wars, especially the First World War. In fact, one of the most dynamic areas of current research concerns the impact of the Great War on Ireland. Much attention has focused on the study of the commemoration of, and attitudes towards, the World Wars in the island of Ireland. Few of these studies, however, examine commemoration during and after the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Rather, the majority focus not only on the inter-war and post-war years, but also on the Irish Free State (later the Republic of Ireland). Tom Burke, David Fitzpatrick, Jane Leonard and Ann Rigney, for example, have all surveyed War remembrance in the Irish Free State.⁵ Leonard argues that ex-servicemen continued to publicly commemorate the Great War, noting that it was not until the outbreak of The Troubles that commemoration became more overt. In his article, Burke explores official governmental responses to remembrance in Dublin between 1925 and 1933 arguing that commemoration had become politicised by 1927. Similarly, Fitzpatrick analyses war

² I. McBride, 'Introduction: Memory and National Identity in Modern Ireland', *History and Memory in Modern Ireland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.1.

³ N. Johnson, *Ireland, the Great War and the Geography of Remembrance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.12.; G. Beiner, 'Between Trauma and Triumphalism: The Easter Rising, the Somme, and the Crux of Deep Memory in Modern Ireland', *Journal of British Studies*, 46:2 (2007), p.366. See also: I. Beckett, 'War, Identity and Memory in Ireland', *Irish Economic and Social History*, 36:1 (2009), pp.63-84.

⁴ G. Beiner, 'Between Trauma and Triumphalism: The Easter Rising, the Somme, and the Crux of Deep Memory in Modern Ireland', *Journal of British Studies*, 46:2 (2007), p.366. See also: I. Beckett, 'War, Identity and Memory in Ireland', *Irish Economic and Social History*, 36:1 (2009), pp.63-84.

⁵ J. Leonard, 'Facing the "Finger of Scorn" Veterans' Memories of Ireland After the Great War', in M. Evans & K. Lunn (eds), *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Berg, 1997), pp.59-72; J. Leonard, 'The Twinge of Memory: Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday in Dublin since 1919' in R. English & G. Walker (eds), *Unionism in Modern Ireland: New Perspectives on Politics and Culture* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp.99-114; D. Fitzpatrick, 'Commemoration in the Irish Free State: A Chronicle of Embarrassment', in I. McBride, *History and Memory in Modern Ireland*, pp.184-203; T. Burke, "'Poppy Day" in the Irish Free State', *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review*, 92:368 (2003), pp.349-58; A. Rigney, 'Divided Pasts: A Premature Memorial and the Dynamics of Collective Remembrance', *Memory Studies*, 1:89 (2008), pp.89-97.

remembrance in the interwar period arguing that Sinn Fein's opposition to the war made it impossible to divorce politics from 'issues of personal suffering'. He continues by suggesting that subsequent republican governments perpetuated this. Rigney focuses on commemoration by outlining the history of the Irish National War Memorial, which was built in Dublin in the 1930s but was not formally dedicated until 1988.

On the other hand, commemoration in Northern Ireland has received considerably less attention. Here, Catherine Switzer is the primary scholar. She examines the Protestant-Unionist population, arguing that unionist identity is central to much of the commemoration in, and by, Ulster.⁶ Within the historical literature a few studies have also sought to address commemoration in the contemporary period. Guy Beiner, for example, has analysed the relationship between the memories of the Somme and the Easter Rising in modern Ireland, pinpointing 1916 as the locus of sectarian conflict over the memory of the First World War era.⁷ Helen Robinson, on the other hand, explores commemoration during the Troubles.⁸ She argues that remembrance during that period became increasingly sectarian and divorced from the War itself, instead becoming progressively more concerned with contemporary politics.⁹ Richard Grayson and Keith Jeffery, however, are two scholars who have come closest to an exploration of World War commemoration and remembrance in the contemporary period. In his article on contemporary republicanism and the First World War, for example, Grayson discusses the recent surge of Republican interest in the War. He notes that it was after Enniskillen that there was both a burgeoning public interest in the War and an increase in the number of nationalist gestures towards reconciliation carried out by the Irish Government and nationalist communities within Northern Ireland.¹⁰ Jeffery, writing in John Horne's *Towards Commemoration*, traces the chronology of Irish commemoration from the end of the First World War to the twenty-first

⁶ C. Switzer, *Unionists and Great War Commemoration in the North of Ireland 1914-1918* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007). See also C. Switzer, *Ulster, Ireland and the Somme Memorials and Battlefield Pilgrimages* (Dublin: History Press Ireland, 2013).

⁷ Beiner, 'Between Trauma and Triumphalism'.

⁸ H. Robinson, 'Remembering War in the Midst of Conflict: First World War Commemorations in the Northern Irish Troubles', *Twentieth Century British History*, 21:1 (2010), pp.80-101.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ R.S. Grayson, 'The Place of the First World War in Contemporary Irish Republicanism in Northern Ireland', *Irish Political Studies*, 25:3 (2010), pp.325-345.

century.¹¹ The short nature of Jeffery's chapter, however, has meant that any discussion of the 1990s and twenty-first century is inherently limited. This chapter seeks to go beyond these limits in discussing commemoration in Northern Ireland, and the island of Ireland in general, in the contemporary period.

It is important to focus on World War commemoration in Ireland because it has a highly charged national and political significance not seen elsewhere in the British Isles.¹² The First World War had profound consequences for the development of modern Ireland. For Keith Jeffery the Great War represented 'the single most central experience of twentieth century Ireland', while Boyce has referred to the First World War as a 'turning point in the making of modern Ireland, and of Irish and Ulster identities'.¹³ According to David Fitzpatrick's calculations, for example, it is likely that approximately 210,000 men from both the unionist and nationalist parts of Ireland enlisted. Of these, according to Neil Richardson, who has revised previous estimates by Fitzpatrick, approximately 63,000 were from Ulster and over 145,000 from the South.¹⁴ It has been estimated that between 30,000 and 35,000 died.¹⁵ Of the sixty four UK divisions that served in the major theatres of war during the Great War, two were Irish (the 10th and 16th) and one Ulster (36th). Furthermore, Irishmen also joined the Irish Guards and the London Irish, as well as other English, Scottish and Welsh regiments, the Navy and the Air Corps. The rate of participation in World War One, in fact, was higher than in any other conflict in Irish history.¹⁶ Despite this, in the years following the Armistice, the Great War became politicised on both a national and regional

¹¹ K. Jeffery, 'Irish Varieties of Great War Commemoration', in J. Horne & E. Madigan (eds), *Towards Commemoration: Ireland in War and Revolution, 1912-1923* (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2013), pp.117-25.

¹² R.S. Grayson, 'From Genealogy to Reconciliation: Public Engagement with Remembrance of the First World War in Ireland', *Nordic Irish Studies*, 13:2 (2014), p.99.

¹³ K. Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.2; G. Boyce, 'Ireland and the First World War', *History Ireland*, 2:3 (1994), p.53.

¹⁴ N. Richardson, *According to Their Lights: Stories of Irishmen in the British Army, Easter 1916* (Dublin: The Collins Press, 2015), p.7.

¹⁵ J. Horne (ed.), *Our War: Ireland and the Great War* (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2008), Ch.1; Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War*, pp.33-35,150; D. Fitzpatrick, 'The Logic of Collective Sacrifice: Ireland and the British Army, 1914-18', *The Historic Journal*, 38:4 (1995), p.1018; Timothy Bowman places this figure at 40,000. See T. Bowman, 'Ireland and the First World War', in A. Jackson (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Irish History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p.693.

¹⁶ Horne, *Our War*.

level, as it became a symbol of the battle between the two opposing traditions of Unionism and Nationalism.¹⁷ As James McAuley has identified, the conflict over the partition of Ireland between 1916 and 1923, which institutionalised sectarian, political, social and economic relations, exerted a powerful influence on the way in which the Great War was remembered and forgotten on the island of Ireland, both in the North and in the South.¹⁸ Furthermore, politics continued to cast a long shadow over commemoration in Ireland throughout the twentieth century, reflecting the divided state of the island after 1921. This resulted in the divergence of memories of the Great War on the island of Ireland. In the Irish Free State, later the Republic of Ireland, and amongst nationalist communities in Northern Ireland, remembrance of the War was initially a widespread but politically contentious practice. Over time, however, it became increasingly marginalised to such an extent that, as Pennell notes, it was 'either officially ignored or commemorated in a low-key manner' owing to the 'lapse in official national memory'.¹⁹ Moreover, it was mainly – or exclusively – commemorated within the southern Protestant community. For the majority, instead, it was the Easter Rising of 1916 and War of Independence that came to provide the official narrative of the new state and featured prominently within commemorations. In contrast to this, in Northern Ireland memories of the Great War were 'actively and regularly maintained and reproduced by Unionists. The Battle of the Somme, in particular, became a key reference point in a grand Unionist narrative.

This raises numerous questions about the nature of the relationship between the present and the past in Ireland. This chapter will examine and analyse how the World Wars have been remembered and commemorated on the Island of Ireland, and the roles that such memory and commemoration have played in the reinterpreting and reaffirming of Ireland's

¹⁷ Bowman, 'Ireland and the First World War', p.613.

¹⁸ J. W. McAuley, 'Divergent Memories: Remembering and Forgetting the Great War in Loyalist and Nationalist Ireland', in S. Sumartojo & B. Wellings (eds), *Nation, Memory and Great War Commemoration: Mobilising the Past in Europe, Australia and New Zealand* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2014), pp.120, 124.

¹⁹ For a more in-depth discussion of the commemoration of the First World War (or lack thereof) in the Republic of Ireland and its evolution over time see works by: C. Pennell, 'A Truly Shared Commemoration? Britain, Ireland and the Centenary of the First World War', *The RUSI Journal*, 159:4, pp.92-100; Fitzpatrick, 'Commemoration in the Irish Free State: A Chronicle of Embarrassment', pp.184-203.

changing identity. It will ask: how far has the tone of commemoration and remembrance between 1994 and 2016 changed? To what extent has commemoration been influenced by the changing political relationships between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom (and thus Northern Ireland), as well as within Northern Ireland? How have successive governments (both central and devolved) negotiated the borders and complexities of Irish history, identity and politics when it comes to commemorating the World Wars in Northern Ireland? Furthermore, this chapter will also explore how developments in World War commemoration fit within wider UK trends, examining the extent to which they are unique to Northern Ireland. It will also consider the interaction of World War memory with expressions of identity in Ireland.

Primarily, the focus of this chapter will be on Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, it will also include discussion of World War commemoration within the Republic of Ireland where it relates to Northern Ireland, and by extension to the United Kingdom, due to the inter-related nature of these state's recent histories. Indeed, political movements and changes in the Republic of Ireland have frequently led to further shifts and developments in Northern Ireland and vice versa. This can be illustrated by the fact that the outbreak of political conflict and the militant republican campaign in Northern Ireland during the Troubles led to what has been described as a period of 'revisionism, remembrance and forgetfulness' in the Republic of Ireland.²⁰ Additionally, and in contrast to other chapters, there will be a disproportionate focus on the First World War. Primarily, this is because attitudes towards the First and Second World Wars in Ireland differ significantly, with the First World War being considerably more problematic and controversial.

This chapter consists of three sections, each of which will examine a specific period in World War commemoration in Northern Ireland. Through this chronological structure, this chapter analyses the degree to which political developments and changes in inter-Irish and Anglo-Irish relationships during this period have impacted on the commemoration of the World Wars. The first section will focus on the period from the 1987 Enniskillen

²⁰ M. McCarthy, *Ireland's 1916 Rising: Explorations of History-Making, Commemoration and Heritage in Modern Times* (London: Routledge), p.305.

Remembrance Day bombing to the opening of the Island of Ireland Peace Park at Messines in November 1998. While the Enniskillen bombing technically falls beyond the scope of this thesis, it is illuminating to briefly discuss it because several of the developments with which this chapter will be concerned can trace their origins to the impact of Enniskillen. Section two will then analyse the commemoration of the World Wars from 2001 to 2009. Finally, section three will discuss the period from 2010-2016. It will analyse the years leading up to and including some of the events of the so-called 'Decade of Centenaries', which runs from 2012 – 2021.

Ultimately, this chapter argues that shifts in inter-Irish and Anglo-Irish relationships fostered significant changes in the nature of World War commemoration in Northern Ireland, and on the island of Ireland, between 1994 and 2016. It will be shown that the IRA ceasefires of 1994 and the ongoing Northern Ireland Peace Process, which culminated in the Good Friday Agreement of April 1998, helped to establish a new climate of reconciliation in which it became possible for first nationalists and later republicans to engage in the commemoration of the World Wars. This encouraged a greater recognition and acceptance of a shared Irish history, which, in turn, reinforced the developments taking place as a consequence of the Peace Process. This was apparent in the royal visit of Queen Elizabeth II in 2011, which encouraged a new era of Anglo-Irish relationships reflected in the subsequent 'Decade of Centenaries' commemorative programme.

From Enniskillen to Messines, 1987 – 1998

On the morning of 8 November 1987, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) detonated a bomb at a Remembrance Sunday service in Enniskillen, County Fermanagh. The explosion killed eleven people and injured a further sixty-three.²¹ The victims of the

²¹ G. Dawson, *Making Peace With the Past?: Memory, Trauma and the Irish Troubles* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007); M. Temple, 'Great War Commemoration in Ireland Since the 1987 Enniskillen Remembrance Day Bombing', unpublished MPhil thesis, University of Cambridge (2013); D. McDaniel, *Enniskillen. The Remembrance Sunday Bombing*, (Wolfhound Press Ltd: Ireland, 1997), p.7. This figure later rose to 12 dead, when in December 2000 Ronnie Hill, after spending 13 years in a coma, passed away.

bombing were all members of the Unionist-Protestant community, and nearly all of them were civilians, aged between two months and seventy-five.²² The attack was immediately met with widespread revulsion and almost universal condemnation throughout not only the United Kingdom, but the Republic of Ireland and globally.²³ The day after the bombing the London *Times* reported that ‘the outrage was immediately condemned by leaders in [Britain], the Irish Republic and around the world as the most disgusting ever perpetrated by the IRA’, while Tom King, a Conservative MP and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, referred to it as ‘one of the most callous and heartless acts of butchery in Northern Ireland’s troubled history’.²⁴ In a rare intervention, the Catholic Church joined in the widespread condemnation of the IRA and the bombing of the Remembrance Sunday service. One week after Enniskillen, in a statement referred to by the *Times* as the Church’s ‘strongest mobilisation of its moral authority since the start of the Troubles’, priests and bishops across the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland denounced paramilitary violence.²⁵ Their statement read: ‘there is no room for ambivalence. In the face of the present campaign of republican violence the choice of all Catholics is clear. It is a choice between good and evil [...] It is sinful to join organisations committed to violence or to remain in them. It is sinful to support such organisations.’²⁶ The outrage caused by the bombing, in fact, was so extensive that the attack was even condemned by Sinn Féin in their weekly newspaper, *An Phoblacht*, as a ‘monumental error’ that would strengthen the IRA’s opponents.²⁷

²² Dawson, *Making Peace With the Past?*, p.288.

²³ Condemnation of the bombing, in fact, came from as far as the Soviet Union as well as Libya’s state news agency, *Jamahiriya*. See McDaniel, *Enniskillen*, p.180.

²⁴ J. Cooney, M. McCarthy & R. Young, ‘11 Die in Poppy Day Massacre: Condemnation for IRA Bomb at Ulster War Memorial’, *The Times*, 9 November 1987; Tom King quoted in Cooney, McCarthy & Young, ‘11 Die in Poppy Day Massacre’.

²⁵ J. Cooney, ‘Ireland’s Catholic Bishops Condemn the IRA’, *The Times*, 14 November 1987; D. Hearst & J. Naughtie, ‘Bishops Call on Catholics to Disown IRA’, *The Guardian*, 10 November 1987.

²⁶ Quoted in Cooney, ‘Catholic Bishops Condemn the IRA’; See also Anon, ‘Irish Catholic Bishops Condemn “Sinful” IRA After Enniskillen Bomb’, *The Globe and Mail*, 16 November 1987.

²⁷ Quoted in J. Evershed, *Ghosts of the Somme. Commemoration and Culture War in Northern Ireland* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2018), p.65; H. Raines, ‘The World: Terrorism; With Latest Bomb, I.R.A. Injures Its Own Cause’, *The New York Times*, 15 November 1987, p.3.

This episode provides a clear illustration of the degree to which World War memory and remembrance has acted as a source of inter-Irish tension and conflict. For Murphy Temple and Graham Dawson, in fact, although the ‘poppy day’ bombing, as it became known, was part of the wider ethno-religious civil conflict known as the ‘Troubles’, it also represented the ‘apogee of decades of commemoration-related tensions’ between Unionists and Nationalists.²⁸ Indeed, the reaction to the bombing, discussed above, was due not only to the fact that the victims of the bomb were civilians, but also to the historic and symbolic significance of the commemorative event targeted. On 11 November 1987, for example, Brian Lenihan, the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, denounced the attack, commenting that ‘we all recognise something obscene in the fact that this attack was planned and carried out on a day when many ordinary Irish men and women had gathered to commemorate those who had died in two World Wars. There is a long Irish tradition of respect for those paying tribute to our dead’.²⁹ Similarly, John Hume, leader of the Catholic and nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), commented that ‘the choice of the occasion yesterday, when people were commemorating the dead of two World Wars... was cold and calculated and designed to stir and hit the deepest emotions of the Unionist and British people’. While Kevin McNamara, Chief Opposition Spokesman for Northern Ireland, stated that ‘the whole nation shares the feelings of revulsion caused by this horrible and obscene act... In the past, even the most barbaric have accepted that people should be allowed to honour their dead in peace’.³⁰ Here, the references made to the heartless and brutal nature of the attack, and to the failure to respect the remembrance of the dead that it indicated, were particularly poignant in serving to reinforce the revulsion and outrage being universally felt. Moreover, several commentators contrasted the behaviour of the IRA with those soldiers who had fought and died in the two World Wars. The violence undertaken by the soldiers was viewed as justified and legitimate, in the ‘defence of freedom’, whilst that of the IRA who had committed such acts against civilians

²⁸ Dawson, *Making Peace With the Past?*, p.288; Temple, ‘Great War Commemoration’, p.3, p.20.

²⁹ B. Lenihan, ‘Adjournment Debate – Enniskillen Bombing’, *Dáil Éireann Debate*, vol. 375: col. 2, 11 November 1987.

³⁰ K. McNamara, ‘Terrorist Attack (Enniskillen)’, *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 122: col. 22, 9 November 1987. It is also worth noting that Kevin McNamara was the Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

at little risk to their own lives was not.³¹ In the House of Lords debate held on 9 November, for example, Lord Harris of Greenwich commented that ‘it was the ultimate act of obscenity on a day of remembrance for those who have died to save the freedom of people of Britain and indeed the freedom of the people of Ireland as well’.³²

The Enniskillen attack, therefore, not only represents the most high profile incident in which commemoration intersected with the Troubles, but is demonstrative of the way in which the IRA identified the remembrance of the War dead with the symbolism of Loyalism, Britishness and Imperialism.³³ As Richard Grayson argues, prior to Enniskillen and by the beginning of the Troubles in the late 1960s, the remembrance and commemoration of the World Wars could be characterised by the phrase ‘unionist hegemony, nationalist alienation’.³⁴ Indeed, despite attempts to make it more inclusive, commemoration had become part of the wider commemoration of the British military and therefore not only fed into assertions about British identity, but also was seen to have strong links to the British state. The rituals and symbols of Remembrance Sunday were understood to be intimately associated with Ulster Unionism.³⁵ Consequently, the bombing at Enniskillen was widely interpreted by people of all communities (Nationalist and Unionist, Protestant and Catholic) ‘as an attack on the Unionist community in general, and their British way of life’.³⁶ Seamus Mallon, Justice spokesman for the SDLP, for example, referred to the bombing as ‘obviously sectarian, because those who planted the bomb knew the vast majority of people at the service would be of Protestant faith’. John Hume stated that the attack was ‘probably the deepest act of provocation to have been committed against the Unionist

³¹ Robinson, ‘Remembering War in the Midst of Conflict’, pp. 97-98; See also R. MacLennan, ‘Terrorist Attack (Enniskillen)’, *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 122: cols 26-27, 9 November 1987.

³² Lord Harris of Greenwich, ‘Enniskillen Terrorist Attack’, *Hansard House of Lords Parliamentary Debate*, 5th series, vol. 489: col. 1219, 9 November 1987.

³³ K. Jeffery, ‘Irish Varieties of Great War Commemoration’, in J. Horne, *Towards Commemoration: Ireland in War and Revolution, 1912 – 1923* (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2013); Robinson, ‘Remembering War in the Midst of Conflict’, p.100.

³⁴ Grayson, ‘From Genealogy to Reconciliation’, p.101.

³⁵ Dawson, *Making Peace with the Past?*, p.290.

³⁶ McDaniel, *Enniskillen*, p.116.

people...'.³⁷ In this, Enniskillen was viewed differently from the other terrorist attacks that had been carried out in Northern Ireland. *The Guardian* newspaper, for example, commented that 'yesterday's Enniskillen massacres joins a long list of atrocities which have had an impact that sets them apart from other acts of violence committed in Northern Ireland in recent years'.³⁸

While the Enniskillen bombing technically falls beyond the scope of this thesis, it is illuminating to begin any discussion of World War commemoration in modern Ireland here. The horror caused by the attack in Enniskillen, and the reaction to it, created a situation in which the violence of the Troubles was no longer defensible. This, in turn, generated significant pressures for change on a number of levels and is now commonly regarded as a turning point in the Troubles.³⁹ Indeed, the bombing appeared to motivate, as Dawson has noted, new and increased efforts towards reaching a political resolution to the conflict.⁴⁰ A number of politicians in both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, in fact, used the attack as an opportunity to call for peace and co-operation amongst Republicans, Unionists and the British Government. In the special House of Commons debate on the bombing, for example, Liberal MP David Alton, a Catholic, suggested that 'the most lasting memorial to the innocent victims of the Enniskillen atrocity [would] be redoubled determination and resolve to strengthen co-operation between the British and Irish Governments'.⁴¹

Significantly, the poppy day bombing also prompted a degree of self-reflection in the Republic, and amongst nationalist and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland, thus provoking a wave of interest in the First World War and Irish involvement in that War. Consequently, the World Wars, particularly the First World War, became an integral part of

³⁷ S. Mallon quoted in *Belfast Telegraph*, 9 November 1987, p.4; J. Hume, 'Terrorist Attack (Enniskillen)', *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 122: col. 26, 9 November 1987.

³⁸ P. Murtagh, & J. Joyce, 'Queen's Message to the Bereaved', *The Guardian*, 9 November 1987, p.1; D. Hearst, 'Ulster Terrorist Bomb Kills 11', *The Guardian*, 9 November 1987, p.1; Anon, 'A Time to Mourn, but also to Listen', *The Guardian*, 9 November 1987, p.16.

³⁹ Dawson, *Making Peace with the Past?*, p.288.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p.288.

⁴¹ D. Alton, 'Terrorist Attack (Enniskillen)', *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 122: col. 24, 9 November 1987.

political efforts at reconciliation. This began as early as 11 November 1987. During a meeting of the Seanad Éireann, the Upper House of the Irish Legislature, John Robb, a Northern Irish Protestant senator nominated by the Taoiseach, asked for forgiveness for his role – and the role of all Protestants – in perpetuating the resentment and bitterness that had led to the Troubles. He acknowledged that Remembrance Sunday, despite its historic and symbolic importance in Northern Ireland, had been divisive for the island as a whole, but said that he hoped that the poppy would be ‘seen not as a symbol of imperialism but rather as an emblem of remembrance, repentance, thanksgiving and forgiving’.⁴² Robb concluded, in an early act of cross-border commemoration, by offering a poppy to Charles McDonald, Fine Gael Senator and Deputy Chairman of the Seanad.⁴³

The Enniskillen bombing, then, has frequently been regarded as planting the early seeds of peace and reconciliation by inspiring introspection and expressions of goodwill from members of all communities in its immediate aftermath. Despite this, serious Republican and Nationalist dialogue about and engagement in World War commemoration did not begin until several years later with the cessation of paramilitary hostilities announced by the ceasefire of 1994, in which the IRA publicly renounced their armed campaign. Indeed, it was only with the development of a new climate of reconciliation that an increasing number of nationalist politicians felt able to attend commemoration ceremonies in Northern Ireland. As Catherine Switzer convincingly argues, the SDLP played a crucial role in making a nationalist presence at such events more visible.⁴⁴ Significantly, the first engagement by the Belfast SDLP in commemorative events came in November 1994 when Alex Atwood, an Upper Falls Councillor and party leader on the City Council, attended the first Remembrance Sunday ceremony to follow the signing of the IRA ceasefire in August 1994. Atwood himself drew a direct link between this changed climate and his party’s attendance, commenting that ‘in the environment in the city at the moment, we felt that it

⁴² J. Robb, ‘Enniskillen Bombing: Expressions of Sympathy’, *Seanad Éireann Debate*, 11 November 1987, vol. 117: no.12.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Switzer, *Ulster, Ireland the Somme*, p.195; See also discussion in Grayson, ‘The Place of the First World War in Contemporary Irish Republicanism’.

was important that a further symbolic step be made'.⁴⁵ By 1997, the SDLP position had shifted markedly with the members of the party now playing a full part in remembrance ceremonies, although the party leader did not take part until later in 2002. Indeed, in 1997, Alban Maginness of the SDLP was elected as the first nationalist mayor of Belfast. Maginness adopted a full role in the City's commemorative events, including the laying of a wreath during the annual commemoration of the Battle of the Somme on 1 July. During this ceremony, Maginness stated that 'it is important that we reconcile this city, and the two communities in this city'.⁴⁶ Consequently, he hoped Unionists would interpret his attendance as 'a genuine act of reconciliation', noting that 'there has recently been a discovery of the history of the Great War, in terms of how it affected Ireland and the Irish people and how there should be a recognition of the fact that people from both political traditions died in the Battle of the Somme'.⁴⁷ Moreover, in November of the same year, Maginness became the first nationalist to lead the annual Remembrance Sunday service.⁴⁸ His attendance at both of these events, then, was significant. Indeed, he had previously avoided the ceremonies, claiming that the political climate was not amenable to his being there.⁴⁹

It is also worth highlighting that early shifts within Sinn Fein, and changing attitudes to remembrance within republicanism, can also be traced to this period. In 1995, Tom Hartley, a Sinn Fein councillor for the Lower Falls in Belfast, attended a Second World War commemoration at Islandbridge in Dublin. While this was a Second World War commemoration, and not for the First World War, Hartley's presence indicated a change in attitude taking place by signalling the engagement of Sinn Fein in an arena that they had previously boycotted. Indeed, Hartley subsequently continued to engage with

⁴⁵ A. Attwood quoted *Irish News*, 14 November 1994, p.3; See also Anon, 'Mayhew Keeps Out of Coalition Crisis', *The Irish Times*, 14 November 1994.

⁴⁶ G. Moriarty, 'SDLP Mayor Joins Dublin Counterpart in Commemorating Somme Dead', *Irish Times*, 2 July 1997.

⁴⁷ A. Maginness quoted in *Irish News*, 2 July 1997.

⁴⁸ Maginness has subsequently spoken about the evolution of the SDLP's position, stating that the SDLP in Belfast wanted 'to show respect for a unionist tradition' adding that it was hoped that this would 'create better relations politically within the city hall and between communities in Belfast'. Maginness quoted in *Irish News*, 2 July 1997.

⁴⁹ Moriarty, 'SDLP Mayor Joins Dublin Counterpart in Commemorating Somme Dead'.

remembrance as well as with Protestants and Unionists, through an interest in local history, by organising and conducting tours of West Belfast. Despite these early developments, however, Sinn Fein did not make any further official moves until the early 2000s, as will be discussed later in the chapter.

The paramilitary ceasefires, then, played an important role in creating a new climate of reconciliation in which it was possible to consider the First World War as part of nationalist Irish history. Despite this, it was the historic breakthrough in the Northern Ireland Peace Process signalled by the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (also known as the Belfast Agreement) in April 1998, and the smoothing of sectarian bitterness and tension, that prompted significant shifts in attitudes towards and engagement in World War commemoration. The Good Friday Agreement, which established a devolved government for Northern Ireland and declared that ‘the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland’ would be recognised, marked significant progress towards the building of a credible political settlement between Nationalists and Unionists.⁵⁰ Under the terms of the Belfast Agreement, in fact, both sides committed to working in a cross-community power-sharing political arrangement by agreeing to ‘partnership, equality and mutual respect as the basis of the relationship within Northern Ireland, between North and South, and between these islands’.⁵¹ This is indicative of the way in which the concept of ‘parity of esteem’, which had become a political buzzword in Northern Ireland from the beginning of the 1990s, became not only a cornerstone of the Good Friday Agreement, but also a crucial component of developing approaches to commemoration.⁵² The Agreement aimed to

⁵⁰ The Belfast Agreement, ‘Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland’, p.2. Accessed at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/agreement.pdf [Date Accessed: 05/01/2018].

⁵¹ The Belfast Agreement, ‘Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland’.

⁵² The idea of ‘parity of esteem’ is based upon the assumption that there are two mutually exclusive and hostile political cultures in Northern Ireland, and that both these distinctive cultures should be acknowledged in any further political settlements in the region. This idea first emerged within the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights’, a government advisory body, ‘Religious and

equate the responsibilities of cultural, religious and national identification among the two communities of Northern Ireland by allowing them equal expression. Speaking on the day of the signing of the Agreement, for example, Mary McAleese commented: '[This] is a momentous day which heralds a new phase in developing relationships between the peoples of these islands [...] It offers a new beginning [...], an opportunity to build bridges and partnerships based on mutual respect for all traditions, cultures and creeds on this island'.⁵³

Advances made in the Peace Process, then, helped to rehabilitate the memory of the War amongst nationalist communities in the North and South of the island. This led not only to an increased recognition of and interest in Irish nationalist war service, but also, as Switzer notes, contributed to the 're-imagining of the Great War in terms of the service of both Irish traditions, and the potential of this symbolism in the present day of reconciliation'.⁵⁴ Writing in the *Irish Left Review*, for example, Fergus O'Farrell commented that the 'first stages of the Peace Process allowed for a reinterpretation of recent Irish history, resulting in a new found appreciation of the role played by Irishmen in British uniform during the First World War'.⁵⁵

The Peace Process, therefore, in helping to establish a climate of peace and reconciliation, decisively shaped the politics of commemoration from 1994. As the Peace Process gathered momentum, the commemoration of the First World War - which had frequently been symbolic of the gulf between and within each of the 'two Irelands' - increasingly became a forum for both dialogue and reconciliation. World War remembrance was

Political Discrimination and Equality in Northern Ireland: Second Report' (1990) which used the phrase "equal treatment and esteem of both traditions in Northern Ireland". The concept was later given full governmental use in the 'Frameworks for the Future' document published in February 1995. Here, in a statement of the British Government's approach to a political settlement it was said that: "any new arrangements for the governance of NI must be acceptable to the people and give appropriate expression to the identity of each of the two main parts of the community. They should uphold the principles of equality of opportunity, equity of treatment and parity of esteem already established by the Government".'

⁵³ M. McAleese, 'State on the Good Friday Agreement, 10 April 1998' in M. McAleese, *Building Bridges: Selected Speeches and Statements* (Dublin: History Press Ireland, 2011), pp.253-4.

⁵⁴ Switzer, *Ulster, Ireland and the Somme*, p.195.

⁵⁵ F. O'Farrell, '1916, the Poppy and Ulster Unionism: A More Rounded Memory in the Decade of Centenaries', *Irish Left Review*, 17 November 2014.

identified as an arena in which peace could be further advanced. On the 12 November 1998, for example, members of the Seanad spoke at length about the Great War. Daniel Cassidy, a Fianna Fail politician, asserted that 'Ireland's Great War dead should be cherished alongside all patriots who struggled and suffered'.⁵⁶ He suggested that recovering their stories and adding them to Republican history would help to aid the Northern Irish Process as commemoration of the First World War would act as a reminder of a time when Irishmen fought alongside one another. In this, one principle which became increasingly important within commemoration and the wider Peace Process concerned the identification of the Great War as a shared Irish experience and history with a common narrative of sacrifice for both Nationalists and Unionists.⁵⁷ It was believed that such shared experiences and shared suffering would transcend local Irish political and sectarian differences. Consequently, increased attention was directed towards commemorative initiatives designed to promote 'shared' or 'unified' commemoration.

On 11 November 1998 – just months after the Good Friday Agreement was signed - the Island of Ireland Peace Tower at Messines, in Belgium, was jointly inaugurated by then Irish President Mary McAleese, Queen Elizabeth II and King Albert II of Belgium. Its opening represents perhaps the clearest example of both the drive towards unified commemoration, and the new era in World War remembrance that was emerging as a result of conciliation between Northern Ireland's political parties and Anglo-Irish rapprochement, discussed above. For Keith Jeffery, in fact, the park not only was demonstrative of the conciliatory turn signalled by the Good Friday Agreement, but also suggested an 'apotheosis in the memory of the Great War in Ireland', which represented the 'most outstanding manifestation of this new engagement'.⁵⁸

The project had been initiated by the cross-community 'A Journey of Reconciliation Trust' based in Derry, under the leadership of the former Fine Gael TD from Donegal, Paddy Harte, and Derry Community Leader and former political adviser for the Ulster Defence

⁵⁶ D. Cassidy, 'First World War Anniversary: Statements', *Seanad Éireann Debate*, 12 November 1998, vol. 157: col.2.

⁵⁷ Beiner, 'Between Trauma and Triumphalism', p.388; Switzer, *Ulster, Ireland and the Somme*.

⁵⁸ Jeffrey, 'Irish Varieties of Great War Commemoration', p.122.

Association, Glen Barr. Here, the stated aim was to bring together people from both the 'orange' and 'green' traditions, indicating the extent to which reconciliation lay at the heart of the Peace Park from the outset.⁵⁹ In an interview given to *The Irish Times*, for example, Paddy Harte explained the motivations which lay behind the initiative. He commented that: 'the two communities in Ireland [...] have many things that divide them, but they have one thing that they share, and that is the sadness and grief of what happened in the First World War... I believe that sadness and grief can be a bridge between both communities.'⁶⁰ In this, Harte explicitly outlined his belief that the suffering shared by all Irish soldiers during the War, and sadness it caused, could act as a means of bringing people from different traditions together across the Island of Ireland.

The Peace Tower was built to commemorate all the Irish Great War Dead (approximately 30,000 – 35,000, although *Ireland's Memorial Records* lists 49,000), both North and South, Protestant and Catholic, Unionist and Nationalist [See Figure 3.1].⁶¹ As Jonathan Evershed has highlighted, the Peace Park was laden with symbolism.⁶² The location of the park, for example, reflects the notion of a 'shared experience'. It is situated close to the site of the Battle of Messines, where the 36th (Ulster) and 16th (Irish) Divisions both fought in June 1917, and so draws attention to the fact Irish men from across the Island fought and died side by side. Moreover, the form of the 110ft tall tower, around which the Park is centred, was specifically designed to further this message of reconciliation. The traditional Irish round tower was chosen so the monument's style would predate the Protestant Reformation and the related political divisions in Ireland, thus avoiding some of the more contentious symbols of more recent times. In his memoirs, for example, Harte noted that the design was such that '[n]o religion or political party could claim ownership of it' and that it represented a 'true symbol of ancient Ireland that the people of Ireland had no

⁵⁹ Barr was also one of the leaders of the Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) strike of 1974, which brought down the power-sharing government that stemmed from the Sunningdale Agreement.

⁶⁰ P. Harte in T. Judge, 'Building a Memorial for Peace, in Flanders', *The Irish Times*, 2 July 1998; See also F. Kilfeather, 'Peace Park to Honour Irishmen Who Died in War', *The Irish Times*, 25 November 1997.

⁶¹ Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War*, pp.33-35. The 49,000 listed on *Ireland's Memorial Records* includes all those who served in Irish Regiments.

⁶² Evershed, *Ghosts of the Somme*, p.66.

reason to dispute'.⁶³ Furthermore, the tower was constructed, by young people from across the island of Ireland, using stones taken from every county on the island of Ireland.⁶⁴ For Glen Barr the involvement of young people was particularly important as he 'felt they should be aware of the great sacrifice that was made on their behalf... the bare facts were that they died for us... and regardless of all the political manipulations and distortions of history, tens of thousands were slaughtered and forgotten'.⁶⁵ Taken together, then, the location, construction and symbolism of the Peace Tower was intended to further emphasise that it commemorated 'all those from the Island of Ireland who fought and died irrespective of politics, cultural or creed'.⁶⁶

Significantly, the Park has also been strongly influenced by the Northern Ireland Peace Process. This is demonstrated perhaps most clearly by the 'peace pledge' which appears on a plaque at the Park's centre. The pledge, which begins with a repudiation of violence, goes on to state:

As Protestants and Catholics, we apologise for the terrible deeds we have done to each other and ask forgiveness. For this shared shrine of remembrance, where soldiers of all nationalities, creeds and political allegiances were united in death. *We appeal to all people in Ireland to help build a peaceful and tolerant society.*⁶⁷

⁶³ P. Harte, *Young Tigers and Mongrel Foxes. A Life in Politics* (Dublin: O'Brien Press, 2005), p.328; also quoted in P. Harte, *The Island of Ireland Peace Park and the First World War* (Donegal: Donegal Printing Company, 2001), p.70.

⁶⁴ Harte, *The Island of Ireland Peace Park*, p.82.

⁶⁵ G. Barr quoted in Anon, *A Journey of Reconciliation. Official Opening of Peace Park, 11 November 1998* (Blackrock, Co. Dublin: DBA Publications Ltd). p.10.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p.87.

⁶⁷ 'Peace Pledge' in Anon, *A Journey of Reconciliation*. p.18. Emphasis added.



Figure 3.1: A photograph of the Island of Ireland Peace Tower in Messines.

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 Changes Made.

It then continues:

Let us remember the solidarity and trust that developed between Protestants and Catholic Soldiers when they served together in these trenches. As we jointly mark the armistice of 11 November 1918 – when the guns fell silent along the Western Front – *we affirm that fitting tribute to the principles for which men and women from the Island of Ireland died in both World Wars would be permanent peace.*⁶⁸

The pledge clearly draws a link between remembering the Irish dead of the two World Wars and building upon the newly established Peace Process. Furthermore, the ‘peace pledge’ also illustrates the reciprocal nature of the relationship between the Peace Process and World War commemoration, referenced above. Indeed, while the changed political environment made it possible for such an act of unified commemoration to take place,

⁶⁸ ‘Peace Pledge’ in Anon, *A Journey of Reconciliation*. p.18. Emphasis added.

commemoration and the memory of the Great War has been increasingly mobilised within the Peace Process. This can be further exemplified by reference to several speeches given during the opening of the Park. After the service, President McAleese delivered a speech with a message to this effect:

[F]or much of the past eighty years, [...] the very idea of such a ceremony would probably have been unthinkable [...] Today [...] we are keenly aware that if we are to build the culture of consensus promised by the Good Friday Agreement [,] then we need to create a mutually respectful space for differing traditions [and] differing loyalties [...] which would help [...] to change the landscape of memory [...] None of us has the power to change what is past but we do have the power to use today well to shape a better future. The Peace Park does not invite us to forget the past but to remember it differently.⁶⁹

Similarly, David Trimble, First Minister of Northern Ireland, proclaimed he was 'glad that the Irish Republic [was] recognising those who fought for freedom along with Northern Irish soldiers' and stated that the ceremony was 'part of a new beginning'.⁷⁰ Both Trimble and McAleese, then, appeared to suggest that commemoration formed a crucial part of the Peace Process, representing one area in which a mutually respectful space could be established.

For both Edward Madigan and Catriona Pennell, then, the creation of the Island of Ireland Peace Tower represented a ground-breaking moment in the history of commemoration on the island of Ireland.⁷¹ Here, the presence of the two Heads of State at the opening was particularly notable. As Chapter Two noted, this was the first public appearance between President McAleese and Queen Elizabeth II. Paddy Harte, himself, recognised the significance of this, when speaking before the unveiling, he commented that 'the fact you will have the Queen and Irish President making their first public appearance together is a

⁶⁹ M. McAleese, 'Remarks at The Inauguration of The Messines Peace Tower', in McAleese, *Building Bridges*, pp.255-7.

⁷⁰ D. Trimble quoted in A. Pollak, 'Solemn Ceremony Inaugurates Memorial to Irish Who Died in First World War', *The Irish Times*, 12 November 1998.

⁷¹ E. Madigan, 'Commemoration and Conciliation during the Royal Visit to Ireland', *History Ireland*, Vol 19:4 (2011), pp.10-11; Pennell, 'A Truly Shared Commemoration? Britain, Ireland and the Centenary of the First World War'.

supreme gesture of hope'.⁷² Similarly, he later wrote that their 'attendance... at the opening was a strong message of reconciliation... It helped to change the politics of Ireland', while reflecting in his memoirs that the ceremony 'must rate as one of the most significant moments of true reconciliation between all the peoples of Ireland and Great Britain'.⁷³

Much of the newspaper coverage of the event adopted a similar tone, appearing to recognise both the ceremony and memorial's symbolic significance both for the past and the present. The *Belfast Telegraph*, for example, commented that 'eighty years on, the symbolism of yesterday's Armistice Day ceremony at Messines can have been lost on no one... it was a day laden with memories of the sacrifice made by the soldiers... Protestant and Catholic from North and South found common cause, and death did not discriminate between different denominations'.⁷⁴ It continued, 'while the emphasis was on the past, nobody could ignore the message which was contained for today – and for the future... The Irish Peace Tower should act as a spur to this and future generations to commit themselves to the path of reconciliation'. The article concluded by stating that '[t]oday we must draw inspiration from the example set by those soldiers... we will always have more in common than divides us'.⁷⁵ Similarly, *The Independent* commented that they [Queen Elizabeth and President McAleese] 'stood together in a powerful symbol of armistice and reconciliation' which represented a 'remarkable development in the history of Anglo-Irish relations'.⁷⁶

This section has demonstrated that the Northern Ireland Peace Process significantly affected approaches to World War commemoration. The IRA ceasefires, and subsequent signing of the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998, contributed to the establishment of a new climate of reconciliation. This helped to rehabilitate the memory of the War within nationalist communities, both North and South of the border, by creating a psychological,

⁷² P. Harte quoted in K. Oxley, 'United by Fallen Heroes; Ireland Set to Honour World War One Dead on Historic Royal Visit', *Daily Record*, 11 November 1998, p.12.

⁷³ Harte, *The Island of Ireland Peace Park*, p.88; Harte, *Young Tigers and Mongrel Foxes*, p.335.

⁷⁴ Anon, 'Lessons from the Past; Messines Message: Key Step on Journey of Reconciliation', *Belfast Telegraph*, 12 November 1998.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ K. Butler, 'Queen and President Open Anglo-Irish Peace Tower', *The Independent*, 12 November 1998, p.3.

physical and institutional space within which individual memory could be freed from long-dominant (and violence-related) community-enforced “memories” of the War. This, in turn, allowed for increased engagement with and sustained debate about the Great War. Significantly, the commemoration of the First World War was also increasingly identified as a forum for further dialogue and progress. In this, attention was focused on the identification of the Great War as an example of shared Irish history which would serve to highlight common narratives of sacrifice and suffering for both ‘green’ and ‘orange’ traditions.

2001 – 2009

Between November 1987 and November 1998, then, World War commemoration on the island of Ireland was significantly affected by the Northern Ireland Peace Process and signing of the Good Friday Agreement. Here, the changed political environment and new climate of reconciliation created new spaces in which it became possible to consider the First World War as part of a nationalist Irish history. Consequently, it is in this period that the first nationalist engagement in official commemorative events can be identified. Moreover, there was an increasing recognition of and emphasis on the First World War as a shared Irish history and experience that stressed common narratives of sacrifice for both Nationalists and Unionists. This, in turn, influenced approaches to commemoration which increasingly focused on shared or unified commemoration most demonstrably at the opening of the Island of Ireland Peace Tower in Messines. Furthermore, the commemoration and remembrance of the World Wars was not only influenced by the Peace Process, but was also identified as one arena in which the Peace Process could be further advanced.

Sinn Fein did not take its next official step in its engagement with the commemoration of the World Wars until November 2001 when, as Mayor of Dungannon, Francie Molloy held a reception for the local British Legion on Remembrance Sunday. One year later, in 2002, a month before the annual Battle of the Somme commemoration, Belfast elected its first

Sinn Fein Lord Mayor, Alex Maskey.⁷⁷ The Lord Mayor, as the City's chief representative and ceremonial figure, plays an integral part in the commemoration of the Battle of the Somme in Belfast on 1 July. Upon his election, Maskey had pledged to work 'for all the people of Belfast' stating that 'by the end of my twelve months no citizen will be able to say they were excluded by me'.⁷⁸ He declared that 'I will do my best to represent everyone in this city' and would spend the year in office trying to bring the Nationalist and Unionist traditions together in particular using equality, reconciliation and inclusiveness as guiding principles.⁷⁹ Consequently, Maskey wanted to make a significant gesture of reconciliation at the Battle of the Somme commemoration. However, he faced the same dilemma as the SDLP Lord Mayor, Alban Maginness, had in 1997. Traditionally, Republicans had refused to take part in commemoration of the Battle of the Somme, arguing that they, and other wreath-laying ceremonies, were too closely associated with the British military establishment. A number of Unionists, on the other hand, told Maskey that if he attended the commemoration at the Belfast Cenotaph, people would walk away.⁸⁰

Ultimately, Maskey decided against participating in the main ceremony, which he referred to as a 'military commemoration', concluding that 'the bolder the step I chose to take, the more damaging it could have been for everyone'.⁸¹ He did, however, choose to lay a laurel, not poppy, wreath at the Cenotaph outside the City Hall, at 9am on 1 July, two hours prior to the main ceremony.⁸² The Lord Mayor was accompanied by a number of Sinn Fein

⁷⁷ Alex Maskey had been a leading republican for several decades. He became involved with the Provisional Irish Republican Army when the Troubles broke out in 1969, and was interned twice in the 1970s. See 'Biographies of Prominent People: Alex Maskey', *Conflict Archive on the Internet*. Accessed at: <https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/people/biography/mpeople.htm#maskey> [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019].

⁷⁸ N. McAdam, 'Maskey's Pledge to Serve 'All the People'', *Belfast Telegraph*, 31 May 2002.

⁷⁹ P. Crossey, 'Calls of Shame as Maskey Takes Chain', *Belfast News Letter*, 6 June 2002. See also: A. Maskey, 'A City of Equals. Cathair Na Comhuarraine', 25 June 2002 in Sinn Fein, 'Full Text: A City of Equals. Cathair Na Comhuarraine. Speech by Alex Maskey', *Sinn Fein*. Accessed at: <http://www.sinnfein.org/releases/02/pr022506e.html> [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019].

⁸⁰ See: Anon, 'Maskey "To Make Somme Gesture"', *Belfast News Letter*, 26 June 2002, pp.1-2; Anon, 'What the People Say... Opinions Divided on Maskey Gesture', *Belfast News Letter*, 3 July 2002, p.6.

⁸¹ A. Maskey quoted in B. McCaffrey, *Alex Maskey. Man and Mayor* (Belfast: Brehon, 2003), pp.159-164.

⁸² This was due to the fact that, in Maskey's view, poppies were 'too closely identified with the symbol of British militarism'.

colleagues, including former Sinn Fein Councillor Sean McKnight and Liam Maskey, Alex's brother, but upon reaching the Cenotaph he stepped forward alone, laying the wreath, before retreating a few steps and standing for a minute's silence before departing.⁸³ Some took the view that Maskey had ultimately failed in his duties, by not adopting his primary role in the official commemoration.⁸⁴ However, several commentators have argued that his actions should be recognised as the furthest he could go from an Irish Republican standpoint. For Richard Grayson, for example, Maskey's actions represented both 'the minimum and the maximum that Sinn Fein could do'.⁸⁵ He argues they were the minimum in terms of physically being involved in commemoration, but the maximum in terms of what its own supporters would allow.

Indeed, this action alone made Maskey the first Republican political representative and Sinn Fein politician to lay a wreath to commemorate the Battle of the Somme. Jim Gibney, for example, commented that 'in over eighty years, no one else in Republican Ireland had ever walked the distance [from the City Hall to the Cenotaph in its grounds] or even thought about walking the distance'.⁸⁶ Consequently, both the 'walk and the walkers were resplendent of symbolism' breaking the 'mould of nationalist and republican history'.⁸⁷ Similarly, Maskey's biographer, Barry McCaffrey, commented that 'he had rewritten one of the unspoken tenets of Irish republicanism'.⁸⁸ Indeed, after laying the wreath Maskey stated that 'this is a major step for Republicans and Nationalists on this island... I hope that this initiative will be seen at face value and as a positive gesture'. Moreover, he subsequently told *The Irish Times* that he had viewed the Battle of the Somme commemorations as a 'very important opportunity to say to the Unionist community "here's how I can reach out to you"'. And at the same time commemorate all those people

⁸³ J. Devine, 'Historic Somme Tribute by Sinn Fein Loyd Mayor', *Irish Independent*, 2 July 2002, p.6.

⁸⁴ See Democratic Unionist MLA Sammy Wilson quoted in Anon, 'Sinn Fein Slammed Over "Snub"', *Belfast News Letter*, 2 July 2002; N. McAdam, 'Mixed Reaction Over Maskey Somme Move; City Hall Row Over Memorial Protocol', *Belfast Telegraph*, 27 June 2002; Anon, 'Praise and Criticism for Maskey Gesture', *Belfast News Letter*, 28 June 2002, p.6.

⁸⁵ Grayson, 'The Place of the First World War', p.340; Anon, 'Morning View: Maskey Moves Sinn Fein Forward but Roslea Shows Need for More', *Belfast News Letter*, 2 July 2002, p.8.

⁸⁶ J. Gibney, 'A Difficult Walk into History', *An Phoblacht*, 4 July 2002.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ McCaffrey, *Alex Maskey. Man and Mayor*, pp.159-164.

who lost their lives at the Battle of the Somme'.⁸⁹ Significantly, Maskey also chaired a special meeting of the City Council, which was regarded as a crucial part of the day's events. This meeting required Maskey to read out a tribute to both the British Monarchy and the Commonwealth, as well as to the British soldiers who died at the Battle of the Somme. This was in spite of the fact that, in his view, the motion ignored the Irish nationalists who had died there.⁹⁰

In approaching the remembrance of the Battle of the Somme in this way, Maskey was acutely aware that he was dealing with the role that history plays in forming identities and contemporary politics. Maskey's thoughts on this were apparent in a speech, entitled 'The Memory of the Dead Seeking Common Ground', given at Belfast City Hall on 26 June 2002. Here, he outlined the approach he would adopt with regards to the commemoration on 1 July, noting that 'in respect of the commemoration of the Somme, I am guided by a desire to use this occasion to unite and include rather than divide and exclude'.⁹¹ Within this speech, Maskey situated his actions in 'the issue of memory and the role personal memory has played in the shaping of Ireland's history'.⁹² He argued that 'history helps define us as a people. And it is people by their actions who make history... We inherit history. It is then up to us to make sense out of it for the times that we live in. The history of the people of this island is complex, layered, has many strands and indeed, many versions of those strands.'⁹³ Indeed, he acknowledged that in parallel with the history of Irish rebellion, 'there is another history; the history of those in Ireland who joined the British Army', before recognising that 'for many nationalists those who joined the British Army are dismissed as

⁸⁹ A. Maskey quoted in 'Maskey Marks Somme With Wreath', *BBC News*, 1 July 2002. Accessed at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/2076528.stm [Date Accessed: 05/01/2018]; 'Tom Murphy, Mayor of Pittsburgh Interview with Alex Maskey, Lord Mayor of Belfast, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania', *Pittsburgh Irish*, 22 February 2003. Accessed at: <http://www.pittsburghirish.org/echoesoferin/Maskey.htm> [Date Accessed: 11/09/2019].

⁹⁰ A. Maskey, 'Memory of the Dead: Seeking Common Ground', 26 June 2002 in Sinn Fein, *The Memory of the Dead: Seeking Common Ground. Speech by Alex Maskey, Mayor of Belfast, Sinn Fein*. Accessed at: <http://www.sinnfein.org/releases/02/pr022606.html> [Date Accessed: 02/01/2018].

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ *Ibid.*

not warranting esteem'.⁹⁴ Furthermore, Maskey explicitly linked this historical complexity with the Somme, noting that:

[A]s we approach the 86th anniversary of the Battle of the Somme on July 1st it is worth recalling that the complexity of this island's history was indeed reflected, perhaps encapsulated, in this period...The diversity of Irish political allegiances was reflected on the battlefield. Although divided by political aspirations at home in Ireland they died together side by side at the Somme.⁹⁵

Significantly, with regards to commemoration, and his own role as Lord Mayor, Maskey argued that:

There is a duty and responsibility on all who hold public office to represent all of the electorate. This is what we collectively need to explore. That is, to seek to identify common ground which we can willingly share so that our commemorations, at this level [of democratically elected government], of those who lost their lives can be a unifying source and a calming influence on the course of future political developments; or at least a means of minimising division.⁹⁶

He continued: 'I am laying this wreath in memory of and tribute to all the men who made the supreme sacrifice at the Battle of the Somme and during the First World War', before stating that 'my initiative on this issue is equally in recognition of the sorrow, hurt and suffering left behind for their relatives, friends and comrades'.⁹⁷ Furthermore, Maskey argued that, in the long term, 'my objective... is to seek to identify common ground for all of us in this generation'.⁹⁸

Finally, Maskey concluded the speech by saying:

Historical events properly understood, especially in a divided society, can be a source of inspiration for the living... Let not our children accuse us of distorting history, thereby perpetuating division, when we have the chance of establishing a new beginning. Let us seek to ensure that the history we bequeath to our children enhances all of their lives.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Maskey, 'The Memory of the Dead: Seeking Common Ground'.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

Throughout this speech, Maskey used the language of outreach, generosity and inclusion, which became an increasingly important part of the rhetoric within official commemorations throughout the 2000s. Another strand is also apparent – the identification of World War One as a shared history with a common narrative of sacrifice. In fact, Maskey’s actions and rhetoric reflected a growing awareness amongst policy-makers that the sense of shared history and respectful commemoration of events generated by these strands could be used to build bridges between the two traditions in Northern Ireland. Indeed, Maskey followed this action in November of that year by laying a laurel wreath at the Ulster Tower in Thiepval, Belgium, and, more significantly, holding a small reception for members of the Royal British Legion in Belfast. The latter action was praised by Legion members as a ‘brave and enormous contribution to crossing bridges’, particularly in the context of the ‘extremely sensitive situation’ in which Maskey operated.¹⁰⁰

From the point of view of ‘parity of esteem’, a cornerstone of the Good Friday Agreement, Maskey’s actions in 2002 were arguably more significant than the opening of the Island of Ireland Peace Tower in Messines four years earlier. For David McKitterick, for example, his actions were seen as ‘breaking important new ground not only for his year as Mayor, but in the general disposition of republicanism in recognising and respecting other traditions’. Then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland John Reid welcomed ‘changing nationalist attitudes’ to remembering the dead of the First World War and described it as ‘a sign of encouragement and hope for the future’.¹⁰¹ Similarly, Fern Lane, writing in *An Phoblacht*, highlighted two ways in which Maskey’s actions were important:

Firstly, on behalf of republicanism, he acknowledged the scale of loss and grief experienced by the Protestant community at the Somme... Secondly, he took a vital first step in the process to enable the Nationalist and Republican communities in the Six Counties, and on the island of Ireland to acknowledge those members of

¹⁰⁰ N. Mathers, ‘No Poppy but Maskey Lauds Work of Legion’, *Belfast News Letter*, 5 November 2002.

¹⁰¹ D. McKitterick, ‘Belfast’s Sinn Fein Mayor Lays Wreath to First World War Dead’, *The Independent*, 2 July 2002; J. Reid cited in McCaffrey, *Alex Maskey: Man and Mayor*, p.165; ‘Maskey Marks Somme With Wreath’, *BBC News*, 1 July 2002. Accessed at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/2076528.stm [Date Accessed: 05/01/2018].

their own families who, for very different reasons, fought and died on the British side.¹⁰²

Since Maskey's actions, Republicans have become more closely involved in war commemoration throughout Ireland as Sinn Fein started to take part in local ceremonies in towns outside Belfast. Furthermore, his decision to participate in commemoration, and the implication that official republican attitudes towards commemoration were changing, also opened up new spaces in which Republicans were able to engage with the First World War on their own terms. Significantly, Maskey's actions can also be regarded as having wider implications for the political process in Northern Ireland. Colin Knox, for example, has argued that as a party Sinn Fein aimed to use Maskey's tenure as Mayor to prove to Unionists that Sinn Fein in power provided no threat to them.¹⁰³ Similarly, Gibney stated that: 'We wanted to use Alex [Maskey] as a kind of ambassador... to prove to Unionists that they would be under no threat whenever Sinn Fein was in power, whether that was in Belfast or in a united Ireland'.¹⁰⁴

Despite this progress, Sinn Fein did not have to address the issue of mayoral participation in commemoration again until 2008, when Tom Hartley was elected as Lord Mayor. In 1995, Hartley had been the first person to signify a shift in attitudes to remembrance by Sinn Fein and during his tenure, chose to adopt a similar approach to Maskey, electing to lay a wreath two hours before the main ceremony. Hartley stated that he believed his action would consolidate and build on initiatives taken previously:

It clearly shows that Republicans are committed to engaging with the Unionist and Protestant people and that we are prepared to meet them on common ground no matter how difficult it is for us as republicans to do so. This is what making peace is all about. I am keen to show the continued commitment that Republicans in this city have to building bridges into the Unionist and Protestant community.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² F.Lane, 'Maskey Lays Somme Wreath', *An Phoblacht*, 4 July 2002. Accessed at: <https://www.anphoblacht.com/contents/8939> [Date Accessed: 05/01/2018].

¹⁰³ C. Knox, 'Mayoralty in Northern Ireland: Symbolism or Substance?', in J. Garrard (ed.), *Heads of Local State: International Mayors, Provosts and Burgomasters since 1800* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers, 2007), pp.47-62, p.58.

¹⁰⁴ Gibney quoted in McCaffrey, *Alex Maskey: Man and Mayor*, p.158.

¹⁰⁵ T. Hartley Speech in 'Belfast Mayor Outlines Approach to Somme Commemoration', *Sinn Fein Website*, 19 June 2008. Full Text Accessed at: <http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/13005> [Date Accessed: 05/01/2018].

Significantly, Hartley also renewed calls for a debate on the shape of official commemoration in the City. He argued ‘we should not shy away from the reality that the formal Somme commemoration here in this city will primarily appeal to only that section of the people of our city, who are from a Unionist and Protestant background’. He added: ‘we need to have an open and rational debate about how we commemorate these events in our shared past in an inclusive and non-threatening fashion’.¹⁰⁶

As seen in this section, in the years between 2001 and 2009 commemoration was characterised by increasing, although limited, Republican engagement in official commemorative events. First Alex Maskey, in 2002, and later Tom Hartley, in 2008, of Sinn Fein took part in a number of high profile and arguably ground-breaking acts. As the Lord Mayors of Belfast, both elected to lay laurel wreaths at the Cenotaph prior to the annual Battle of the Somme ceremony, as well as hold receptions for members of the Royal British Legion in November. In this, Maskey and Hartley sought to reach out to the Unionist communities of Belfast, using the same language of shared history and inclusivity throughout, which had emerged in the earlier period as a means to build bridges between the two communities.

The Beginning of the ‘Decade of Centenaries’, 2010 – 2016

Thus far, this chapter has sought to demonstrate that the commemoration of the World Wars in Northern Ireland, and on the island of Ireland, has been significantly affected by changes in both inter-Irish and Anglo-Irish relationships. This was predominantly a result of the Northern Ireland Peace Process, which not only improved relationships between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland as well as with the United Kingdom, but in doing so helped to establish an environment in which it became increasingly possible for nationalist communities to recognise the Great War as part of nationalist Irish history. It has also been shown that it was in this atmosphere of reconciliation that nationalist and

¹⁰⁶ T. Hartley quoted in ‘Sinn Fein Mayor to Lay WW1 Wreath’ *BBC News*, 20 June 2008. Accessed at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/7464795.stm [Date Accessed: 05/01/2018].

later republican, albeit peripheral, engagement in commemorative events began to take place.

It was in this spirit of reconciliation occurring within the Island of Ireland, discussed above, that Queen Elizabeth II was able to undertake the first Royal Visit to the Republic of Ireland since 1911 (cf. Chapter Two). Given the nature of the troubled historic relationship between the two islands the Queen's visit was seen by many commentators as a groundbreaking symbol and landmark transformation of the normalisation of British and Irish relations.¹⁰⁷ Professor Diarmiad Ferriter, of University College Dublin, for example, referred to it as 'the last piece of a jigsaw that has slowly been put together over the course of the Peace Process'.¹⁰⁸ Indeed, the presence of both Foreign Secretary William Hague and Prime Minister David Cameron appeared to indicate the seriousness with which it was regarded by the British Government. During this 'historic' visit, a number of the sovereign's official engagements involved a sensitive but direct and unflinching acknowledgement of the very mixed history of Anglo-Irish relations. In this, both the Queen and President Mary McAleese displayed a willingness to approach the past in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.¹⁰⁹ The Irish memory of the First World War, and the commemoration of these experiences, were at the forefront of attempts at conciliation. This was particularly evident at the wreath-laying ceremonies held at both the Garden of Remembrance in Parnell Square and the National War Memorial at Islandbridge.

During these two wreath-laying ceremonies, the Irish combatants who fought both for and against the British State during the decade of the First World War were honoured with the same solemn reverence (cf. Chapter Two pp.91-92). The ceremonies, therefore, represented a very public and official recognition that whether Irishmen served in the British Army or the IRA, or both, many of them quite sincerely believed that they were

¹⁰⁷ J. Macleod, 'Britishness and Commemoration: National Memorials to the First World War in Britain and Ireland', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 48:4 (2013), p.647; S. Connolly, 'Fáilte Romhat. Queen Elizabeth II's Historic Visit to Ireland Opens a New Chapter', *Irish Examiner*, 18 May 2011, p.1; B. Hutton, 'Significant Gesture to be Remembered by History', *Irish Examiner*, 18 May 2011.

¹⁰⁸ D. Ferriter quoted in D. Gardner & J. Murray Brown., 'The Queen in Ireland: A Sovereign's Debt', *Financial Times*, 20 May 2011.

¹⁰⁹ Madigan, 'Commemoration and Conciliation during the Royal Visit to Ireland', pp.10-11.

fighting for Ireland.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, the implication was that the sacrifices of those who died were equally valid, equally painful for their families and equally worthy of respect and commemoration.¹¹¹ Indeed, as Pennell and Madigan have noted, to Irish communities worldwide, this obvious ‘parity of esteem’ shown to the dead of all traditions throughout the Queen’s visit, served as a reminder that ‘one group of Irish combatants does not have to be remembered at the expense of another’.¹¹² These two acts of remembrance also provided evidence that even the commemoration of divisive events, such as the First World War and the Easter Rising, could have a powerful symbolic and conciliatory impact when approached in the right manner.¹¹³ The Queen’s Visit, in fact, ultimately paved the way and set the tone for the state-led commemorations of the First World War centenary in Ireland, North and South.

In Northern Ireland, the centenary of the First World War was part of a wider series of high-profile and contested commemorations, collectively known as the ‘Decade of Centenaries’, which mark the hundredth anniversaries of the events that gave birth to the two states on the Island of Ireland.¹¹⁴ The descriptive ‘Decade of Centenaries’ was coined by then Taoiseach Brian Cowen during his address to the 2010 Institute for British-Irish Studies Conference at University College Dublin. He stated that ‘the events of the decade between 1912 and 1922 were momentous and defining one for all of the people of this island, and indeed for these islands’.¹¹⁵ Cowen continued ‘[t]his was the decade of the covenant and the gun, of blood sacrifice and bloody politics, a time of division and war, not only on this island but across the world. It was the decade that defined relationships on

¹¹⁰ See also Madigan, ‘Commemoration and Conciliation During the Royal Visit’, pp.10-11.

¹¹¹ Ibid, p.11; S. Connolly, ‘Queen Elizabeth Bows in Respect While Honouring the Fallen Irish’, *Irish Examiner*, 18 May 2011, pp.8-9.

¹¹² Ibid, p.11; C. Pennell, ‘Choreographed by the Angels? Ireland and the Centenary of the First World War’, *War & Society*, 36:4 (2017), p.265.

¹¹³ See F. McGarry, ‘1916 and Irish Republicanism’, in Horne & Madigan, *Towards Commemoration: Ireland in War and Revolution, 1912-1923*, p.53; F. McGarry, ‘Irish President Begins British State Visit’, *The Guardian*, 8 April 2014. Accessed at: <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/apr/08/irish-president-begins-british-state-visit> [Date Accessed: 17/09/2019].

¹¹⁴ M. Coleman, *The Irish Revolution 1916-1923* (London: Routledge, 2014).

¹¹⁵ G. Quigley & B. Cowen, *A Decade of Centenaries: Commemorating Shared History*, IBIS Working Papers No.108 (Dublin: Institute of British-Irish Studies, 2011), p.4.

these islands for most of the last century'.¹¹⁶ Broadly, the Decade of Centenaries covers events such as the Home Rule Crisis (1912-1914), the Easter Rising and Battle of the Somme (1916) as well as the Partition of Ireland (1920), War of Independence (1919-1921) and Irish Civil War (1922-1923).

This context was unique in comparison to the other nations considered in this thesis. As Catriona Pennell has noted, on the Island of Ireland, the First World War centenary had to share the commemorative spotlight with other, more important (at least to a large section of the population) events in Irish History.¹¹⁷ This is indicative of the degree to which the circumstances surrounding the First World War and its aftermath are complex and potentially divisive in Northern Ireland. Consequently, these anniversaries all have the potential to draw attention to the contemporary resonances of historical events surrounding Ireland's partition.

The official 'Decade of Centenaries' programme of commemorations commenced in 2012. Although overseen by the Commemorations Unit of the Department of Culture, Heritage and the Gaeltacht in the Republic of Ireland, it has significantly influenced attempts to provide conceptual frameworks for remembering.¹¹⁸ It has been suggested that the programme could 'reinforce the development of a shared future... and help us [Northern Ireland] become a more mature, inclusive and accepting society'.¹¹⁹ It has also been regarded as being well placed to enhance public understanding of the broader historical context surrounding the events of the First World War, and consequently, the inter-dependent nature of Unionist and Nationalist traditions.

Throughout the state-led commemorations, in both the North and the South, the emphasis was on the War as a moment of shared experience that suggested Irishmen had fought in the War and shared similar experiences regardless of their political persuasion. This is a process that Phillip Orr has described as a 'greening' or 'de-Orangification' of First World

¹¹⁶ Quigley & Cowen, *A Decade of Centenaries: Commemorating Shared History*, p.4.

¹¹⁷ Pennell, "'Choreographed By the Angels?'" , p.257.

¹¹⁸ See *Decade of Centenaries*. Accessed at: <https://www.decadeofcentenaries.com/> [Date Accessed: 11/09/2019].

¹¹⁹ F. Meredith, 'Decade of Centenaries Sees Us Stuck Firmly in the Past', *Belfast Telegraph*, 26 September 2012, p.29.

War history.¹²⁰ Discussions of commemorating the centenaries, as well as state-led approaches to those commemorations, were dominated by an emphasis on a ‘parity of esteem’, ‘inclusiveness’, ‘equality of sacrifice’, ‘mutual respect’ and ‘maturity’. In March 2012, for example, Downing Street issued a joint statement from British Prime Minister David Cameron and Irish Taoiseach Enda Kenny, which outlined a joint vision for better co-operation between the UK and the Republic of Ireland over the coming decade. The statement noted that ‘2012 [...] marks the beginning of a decade of centenary commemorations of events that helped shape our political destinies’, which would offer the people of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom (and thus, by extension, Northern Ireland) ‘an opportunity to explore and reflect on key episodes of [their] past [...] in a spirit of historical accuracy, mutual respect, inclusiveness, and reconciliation’.¹²¹ It continued: ‘we want to ensure that this is a decade not only of remembering but also of looking forward; a decade of renewed and strengthened co-operation between our two countries’. The statement also stressed the role of both governments in promoting and guaranteeing the Peace Process in Northern Ireland and linked this to the commemorations, acknowledging that:

Above all, we stand together with the people of Northern Ireland and its Executive in our determination to make sure that society there is never again blighted by violent conflict [...] [O]ur aim [...] is a society that is not only peaceful, but stable, prosperous, and based on a genuinely shared future for all [...] We will maintain our efforts to promote reconciliation, underpinning the Executive’s objective of creating a cohesive, shared and integrated society in Northern Ireland. We will work together, with the Executive, to encourage the marking of forthcoming centenaries in a spirit of mutual respect, and the promotion of understanding.¹²²

¹²⁰ P. Orr, ‘Interview for the *1916 and Me/2016 and Us Project*’, *History Hub*. Accessed at: <http://historyhub.ie/1916-and-me> [Date Accessed: 19/09/2019].

¹²¹ Prime Minister’s Office, ‘British Irish Relations, the Next Decade. Joint Statement by the Prime Minister David Cameron and the Taoiseach, Enda Kenny’, *GOV.UK*, 12 March 2012. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-irish-relations-the-next-decade> [Date Accessed: 05/01/2018]; Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Prime Minister David Cameron and Taoiseach Enda Kenny: 10 Year Irish-British Joint Statement’, *GOV.UK*, 12 March 2012. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/transcript-prime-minister-david-cameron-and-taoiseach-enda-kenny> [Date Accessed: 05/01/2018].

¹²² *Ibid.*

There are also numerous other examples of this emphasis on reconciliation and shared experiences. On 15 March 2012, for example, the Northern Ireland Executive ‘unanimously agreed that the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Investment and the Minister for Culture, Arts and Leisure will jointly bring forward a programme for a decade’ which would ‘offer a real opportunity for our society to benefit economically and continue its transformation into a vibrant, diverse and enriched place to visit’.¹²³ It continued by outlining that the commemorative programme was to be organised under the principles of ‘educational focus, reflection, inclusivity, tolerance, respect, responsibility and interdependence’.¹²⁴ In 2013, the Executive published its Good Relations Strategy *Together: Building a United Community*, which explicitly reaffirmed the principles of the 2012 Executive Statement in noting the ‘intent to mark significant anniversaries throughout the decade in an inclusive way and in a manner that will... help our society to benefit economically and continue its transformation into a vibrant, diverse and enriching place to visit’.¹²⁵ It continued by stressing that:

Our most recent past is only one aspect of an intricate and complex history that has shaped the identity of many within our community today [...] The decade of commemorations presents an opportunity to celebrate our shared differences in a way which will position Northern Ireland as a powerful example in conflict resolution and transformation on the world stage [...] [W]e believe that exploring our past can be enormously helpful in building a better future.¹²⁶

¹²³ Northern Ireland Executive, ‘Executive Statement on Decade of Centenaries’, *Northern Ireland Executive*, 15 March 2012. (The Public Record Office of Northern Ireland Web Archive, Archived 09 June 2015). Accessed at: <https://wayback.archive-it.org/11112/20150609101824/http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/index/media-centre/executive-statements/executive-statement-on-decade-of-centenaries.htm> [Date Accessed: 11/09/2019].

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, ‘Together: Building a United Community’, *The Executive Office*, 23 May 2013, p.96. Accessed at: www.executiveoffice-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/ofmdfm_dev/together-building-a-united-community-strategy.pdf [Date Accessed: 16/09/2019].

¹²⁶ Ibid, pp.93-94.

Similarly, the Irish Government's Decade of Centenaries website discusses the need to promote a 'constructive dialogue' and 'deeper mutual understanding among people from different traditions on the Island of Ireland'.¹²⁷

As Richard Grayson has argued, the adoption of such language appears to indicate a far more conciliatory approach to commemoration across the board than had previously been implemented. Throughout its centenary announcements, for instance, the UK Government indicated that commemorations offered further opportunities for reconciliation with the Republic of Ireland.¹²⁸ In a Northern Ireland Press Release, one of the stated aims for the 'Decade of Centenaries' was to 'foster ever-closer relations with the Irish Government and work together to promote greater understanding of our shared history'.¹²⁹ Similarly, Dr Andrew Murrison, Special Representative to the UK Government, indicated that the anniversaries would reflect Irish involvement in the First World War, commenting that the 'commemorations will provide an opportunity to explore and reflect on history shared by the UK and Ireland, and by the communities in Northern Ireland'.¹³⁰

Furthermore, the extent of co-ordination which took place between Belfast, Dublin and London with regards to the centenary also represented a significant departure from previous approaches to commemorative events.¹³¹ Expert Advisory Groups and Planning Boards, for example, were established at various levels. This included, amongst others: the National First World War Centenary Advisory Board; the Northern Ireland World War One

¹²⁷ 'About. Decade of Centenaries Programme', *Decade of Centenaries*. Accessed at: <http://www.decadeofcentenaries.com/about/> [Date Accessed: 05/01/2018].

¹²⁸ See, for example, N. Long, 'Centenaries (UK and Ireland), *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 537: col. 101WH-102WH, 7 December 2011; H. Swire, 'Centenaries (UK and Ireland), *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 537: col. 104WH, 7 December 2011.

¹²⁹ Northern Ireland Office, 'First World War Commemorations and the Decade of Centenaries', *GOV.UK*, 9 June 2014. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/first-world-war-commemorations-and-the-decade-of-centenaries> [Date Accessed: 05/01/2018].

¹³⁰ A. Murrison quoted in Northern Ireland Office, 'Events Mark Centenary of Outbreak of First World War', *GOV.UK*, 1 August 2014. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/events-mark-centenary-of-outbreak-of-first-world-war> [Date Accessed: 16/09/2019].

¹³¹ R.S. Grayson & F. McGarry, 'Introduction', in R.S. Grayson & F. McGarry, *Remembering 1916. The Easter Rising, the Somme and the Politics of Memory in Ireland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp.1-10, p.4.

Centenary Committee; the Republic of Ireland Expert Advisory Group on Commemorations. There were also community bodies such as the Unionist Centenary Committee and Belfast Somme 100.¹³² It is also worth noting that the Special Representative for Northern Ireland on the National Centenary Advisory Board, Jeffrey Donaldson, MP for Lagan Valley representing the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), also chaired the Northern Ireland Centenary Committee.

Most obviously, this degree of co-operation has led to an emphasis on the need for a more pluralistic remembrance of historic events, in terms of both ‘what’ is remembered and the tone in which such commemoration is conducted. Speaking at the 99th anniversary of the Battle of the Somme, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Theresa Villiers commented that ‘we have been working together across government in Whitehall and with the Northern Ireland Executive and indeed with the Irish Government to try to ensure that these commemorations are used in a spirit of historical accuracy and objectivity to mark the history we share... There is one thing we can learn from these centenaries – there is a huge amount we have in common across these islands’.¹³³

The language used throughout the First World War centenary and wider ‘Decade of Centenaries’ is familiar and yet striking. Themes of ‘reconciliation’, ‘mutual respect’ and ‘building a shared history’ dominated discussions of and approaches to commemoration, revealing the extent to which the rhetoric being used was that of the Peace Process – indeed, of a ‘parity of esteem’, which formed the cornerstone of the Good Friday Agreement. There was, as Evershed has identified, a clear emphasis on ‘cross-communal’

¹³² See: ‘WW1 Centenary Northern Ireland’, *The Official Website of the Northern Ireland WW1 Centenary Committee*. Accessed at: <http://ww1centenaryni.com/> [Date Accessed: 11/09/2019]; ‘Expert Group’, *Decade of Centenaries*. Accessed at: <http://www.decadeofcentenaries.com/expert-group/> [Date Accessed: 11/09/2019]; Department for Culture, Media and Sport, ‘First Members of WW1 Centenary Advisory Group Appointed’, *GOV.UK*, 11 January 2013. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/first-members-of-ww1-centenary-advisory-group-appointed> [Date Accessed: 05/01/2018]; ‘Unionist Centenary Committee’, *Creative Centenaries*. Accessed at: <https://www.creativecentenaries.org/toolkit/case-study/unionist-centenary-committee> [Date Accessed: 11/09/2019]; ‘Belfast Somme 100’, *Creative Centenaries*. Accessed at: <https://www.creativecentenaries.org/toolkit/case-study/unionist-centenary-committee> [Date Accessed: 11/09/2019].

¹³³ Anon, ‘Dublin to Remember Somme Sacrifice’, *Belfast Telegraph Online*, 1 July 2015.

unity and a 'shared future' over the political divisions of the past.¹³⁴ Consequently, the language of commemoration used during this period is illustrative of how commemoration was used to reinforce messages of continued and improved co-operation, co-ordination and understanding. The remembrance of the World Wars, therefore, was one arena in which the Peace Process could be consolidated and advanced.

It should also be highlighted that this period has seen further developments in Sinn Fein's position. In 2013, Máirtín Ó Muilleoir was elected as the third Sinn Fein Lord Mayor of Belfast. At the annual Battle of the Somme commemoration on 1 July, he elected to continue his party's practice of laying a laurel wreath at the Belfast Cenotaph during a smaller, low-key ceremony held before the official commemoration. On 11 November 2013, however, O'Muilleoir advanced this position by assuming a formal role and attending the Royal British Legion Armistice Day ceremony. This was a step beyond the actions taken by either Alex Maskey, in 2002, or Tom Hartley, in 2008, both of whom had laid wreaths on the day of anniversaries, but ultimately declined to take part in official ceremonies due to the military connotations of such events. In adopting this position, O'Muilleoir set another new precedent, which, in turn, was followed by the next Sinn Fein Lord Mayor, Arder Carson, in 2015. O'Muilleoir stated that he saw his presence as honouring the pledge he made to be a mayor 'for all the people of Belfast'. He argued that 'part of that means reaching out to unionism and today really was about peace-making towards unionism' and to show 'respect to the unionist tradition'.¹³⁵ Although referring to his action as 'the most difficult decision I have made in 30 years in politics' O'Muilleoir commented that 'the peace, and building a better Belfast demands that we have to move ourselves into places where we are uncomfortable'.¹³⁶ He stated that 'we know that remembrance traditionally divides the people of Belfast', but 'I am arguing people to stand on the common ground and part of the common ground is remembering with respect all those who died in the First

¹³⁴ Evershed, *Ghosts of the Somme*, p.71.

¹³⁵ Anon, 'Hard Decision for Sinn Fein Mayor', *Belfast Telegraph*, 11 November 2013.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

World War'.¹³⁷ Similarly, in a video interview with *An Phoblacht* after Armistice Day, O'Muilleoir said:

What I did today was really reaching out to the Unionist, Protestant community of Belfast, for whom Remembrance is a major, major event each year, and in doing so I hope to build the peace. [It was] the right place to be if we want to build the peace, and build a better Belfast. Remember also the fact that many of those who died, many of the Irishmen who died, had joined the British Army to fight for the freedom of Belgium and the freedom of small nations: many for independence and Home Rule as well, and we need to make sure that they are written into the story.¹³⁸

This section has suggested that the commemoration of the World Wars in Northern Ireland between 2010 and 2016 was greatly influenced by the adoption of the so-called 'Decade of Centenaries' commemorative programme. The remembrance of the First World War is located within a wider series of events, which have a complicated significance for the island of Ireland. It has been argued that official approaches to commemoration have been marked by a significant degree of co-ordination between the central UK Government, the Northern Ireland Executive, and the Irish Government. This, in turn, led to an increased emphasis on the need for a more pluralistic approach to remembrance. Furthermore, remembrance has been dominated by discourses which focus on 'reconciliation' and 'mutual respect'. Moreover, further developments in Sinn Fein's approach to remembrance also took place, demonstrated by the formal role played by O'Muilleoir as Lord Mayor in November 2013 in the official Armistice Day commemorative event.

Conclusion

The politics of World War commemoration on the island of Ireland between 1994 and 2016 was decisively affected by shifts in inter-Irish and Anglo-Irish political relationships. Of these, the most significant was the Northern Ireland Peace Process. The IRA ceasefires of

¹³⁷ Anon, 'Hard Decision for Sinn Fein Mayor'. This period also saw the attendance of the first Irish Cabinet Minister at the Battle of the Somme commemorative event in Belfast and presence of the Irish Ambassador at the Cenotaph in 2014.

¹³⁸ D. Kearney, 'Video Interview with Mayor – Armistice Day Participation in Belfast a "Gesture of Respect and Reconciliation"', *An Phoblacht*, 13 November 2013. Accessed at: www.anphoblacht.com/contents/23556 [Date Accessed: 16/09/2019].

1994, and the cessation of paramilitary hostilities, followed by the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998 helped to smooth sectarian tensions and create a new climate of reconciliation. This, in turn, fostered an atmosphere in which it became possible to rehabilitate the memory of the Great War amongst nationalist communities North and South of the border. It was following these developments that a shift in the SDLP position with regards to commemoration took place. This resulted in the first nationalist engagement in such events, as seen in the actions of Alex Atwood and Alban Maginness in 1994 and 1997 respectively.

The Peace Process, in fact, continued to influence approaches to World War commemoration throughout this period. This is apparent in the growing recognition of and emphasis on the existence of a 'shared' Irish history based upon the belief that narratives of common sacrifice and suffering would help to transcend political and sectarian differences. Throughout the construction and unveiling of the Island of Ireland Peace Tower in 1998, for example, a great deal of focus was placed on notions of shared experiences. In addition to this, a dominant discourse of 'reconciliation', 'inclusivity' and 'mutual respect', based on the language of the Peace Process, was increasingly utilised both within commemorations and by policy-makers. Between 2001 and 2009, for example, peripheral Republican engagement in World War commemoration began to take place. As senior members of Sinn Féin, Alex Maskey and later Tom Hartley, elected to participate in the annual commemoration of the Battle of the Somme by laying laurel wreaths before the main ceremonies. These actions alone marked significant departures in Republican attitudes to remembrance. Notably, in adopting these positions both Maskey and Hartley used the rhetoric of both 'shared history' and 'inclusivity' as a means of building bridges between the Unionist and Nationalist communities in Belfast.

This is also illustrative of the extent to which the commemoration of the First World War was increasingly recognised as one forum in which the Peace Process could not only be reinforced, but further advanced. It has been shown, for example, that engagement in commemorative events lay at the heart of the Queen's Royal Visit in 2011, which has since been widely regarded as a diplomatic success and landmark in the transformation of Anglo-Irish relations. Furthermore, the visit also set the tone for the state-led commemorations of

the First World War centenary and wider 'Decade of Centenaries'. Throughout, the commemorative programme involved a significant degree of co-operation between the various governments. This had the most obvious consequence of influencing what was being commemorated, and the tone adopted. Indeed, while the language of 'reconciliation' and 'mutual respect' continued to dominate, there was an increased emphasis on 'historical accuracy'. This was, in part, drawn out through a pluralistic approach to remembrance and an emphasis on the multi-faceted nature of experiences throughout the island of Ireland.

Chapter Four: Devolution, Independence and Remembrance: World War

Commemoration in Scotland, 1994 – 2016

On 7 June 2013, then Education Secretary, Michael Gove addressed the Scottish Conservative party conference on the approaching referendum on Scottish independence. Gove commented that ‘we are going to win the referendum next year on Scotland’s place within the United Kingdom [...] I am optimistic that we shall make an optimistic and generous case for the United Kingdom at every turn’.¹ He continued by suggesting that ‘Alex Salmond thinks next year will be a date of added significance because of the anniversary of Bannockburn’. Significantly, Gove countered this by stating ‘but next year is also the anniversary of the First World War. When English, Scottish, Irish and Welsh soldiers stood together to defend our freedoms. And next year will also, of course, be the anniversary – the 70th anniversary – of D-Day. When this country liberated Europe from totalitarianism it was the stir of the pipes which was heard as the first troops went ashore in Normandy... Scottish, British, Irish united under the United Kingdom flag determined to defeat tyranny, determined to stand for liberty. That is woven into who I am, but Alex Salmond wants to rip it out. Let’s not let him’.²

Indeed, Gove’s comments contrasted sharply with those made by supporters of Scottish independence. Alex Massie, for example, has noted that a number of commentators raised concerns that the centenary of World War One was part of a ‘British Nationalist propaganda exercise’: a ‘minority of Scottish Nationalists...smelt a British plot to put the Scots back in their place. Who “celebrates” the start of a war, they asked? And isn’t the timing of the celebration suspicious or even inappropriate since Scotland’s independence referendum will be held just a few weeks after the centenary of August 1914 is marked?’.³

¹ M. Gove, ‘Address to the Scottish Conservative Conference’, 7 June 2013. Accessed at: <http://www.scottishconservatives.com/2013/06/michael-gove-addresses-scottish-conservative-conference/> [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018].

² Ibid.

³ Ibid. See also, A. Massie, ‘Scotland’s Centenary’ in J. Tanner (ed.), *Do Mention the War. Will 1914 Matter in 2014?* (London: British Future and Imperial War Museums, 2013), pp. 12-13; A. Massie, ‘Commemorating the First World War is Not a Festival of British Nationalism’, *The Spectator Blog*, 8

Similarly, the historian Michael Fry has suggested that the centenary was part of a broader UK Government-orchestrated ‘politicised Britfest’ or ‘Britannia Fetish’ that began with the Diamond Jubilee and Olympics celebrations in 2012.⁴

This is indicative of the extent to which the commemoration of the World Wars in Scotland has frequently interacted with changes in the political climate, raising questions regarding the issues of ‘Britishness’ and ‘Scottishness’. This chapter will analyse how successive Scottish Governments have approached the commemoration of the World Wars while simultaneously addressing questions of identity politics and those related to Scottish sovereignty. What are the main political implications of identity politics as administered through commemoration? How is the idea of ‘Scottishness’ articulated through political narratives associated with commemoration, especially in the post-devolution period? In what ways, if any, did devolution and the subsequent election of Scottish National Party (SNP) Governments in 2007 and again in 2011 affect the ways in which the World Wars have been remembered in Scotland? By focusing on the political narratives associated with World War commemoration, therefore, this chapter advances our understanding of how modern Scotland has redefined its relations with the United Kingdom while also analysing the relationship between World War commemoration, remembrance and the politics of the union.

Like Ireland, Scotland shared in the so-called ‘memory boom’ that has gathered ground since the 1990s. One consequence of this was the generation of new research into Scottish history, with a growth in monographic output and a corresponding increase in the number of historians of Scotland based in Scottish universities (and thus, students taking undergraduate classes in that country’s history).⁵ As *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History*, published in January 2012, comments, ‘over the last few decades, there has been an outpouring of cutting-edge research... [and] major advances in research and

November 2013. Accessed at: <https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2013/11/commemorating-the-first-world-war-is-not-a-festival-of-british-nationalism/> [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018].

⁴ M. Fry, ‘Time to Reflect, Not Celebrate’, *The Scotsman*, 18 October 2012; R. Seymour, ‘The First World War Centenary and the Britannia Fetish’, *The Guardian*, 12 October 2012.

⁵ T. Devine, *The Scottish Nation, 1700 – 2000* (London: Penguin, 2000).

scholarship have transformed understanding of the Scottish past'.⁶ Similarly, The Historiographer Royal in Scotland, writing in 2007, noted that 'Scottish History is pretty vigorous; a structure that was rickety and thinly painted a generation ago is reinforced and much more thickly painted now. It is, as a subject, more deeply understood'.⁷ Amongst others, significant works have included T.C. Smout's *Scotland, 1850-1950* (1990); M. Lynch's *Scotland: A New History* (1991); Caitriona Macdonald's *Unionist Scotland, 1800-1997* (1998); MacKenzie's *Empire and National Identities: The Case of Scotland* (1998) and, Tom Devine's *The Scottish Nation* (1999).⁸

This growth in scholarly interest has resulted in an increased number of historical treatments of both World Wars, which, in focusing on Scottish experiences, diverge from a 'British-state' approach. Perhaps the most notable of these volumes is Caitriona Macdonald and Elaine McFarland's collection of essays, *Scotland and the Great War*. This work explores the impact of the Great War on Scottish civilian life, highlighting the theme of the supposed distinctiveness of the Scottish experience of war while simultaneously reflecting the concern that Scotland's experience of the Great War created a specifically Scottish national identity.⁹ Additionally, Trevor Royle has recently written accounts of Scotland's involvement in and experience of both the World Wars. In *Flowers of the Forest* and *Time of Tyrants*, Royle has sought to bring together military histories of the First and Second World Wars with narratives about Scotland's political, social and economic role in the conflicts.¹⁰ Furthermore, the First and Second World Wars have received treatment in

⁶ T.M. Devine & J. Wormald, 'Introduction: The Study of Modern Scottish History' in T.M. Devine & J. Wormald (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History* (Oxford University Press, 2012), p.1.

⁷ T.C. Smout, 'Scottish History in the Universities since the 1950s', *History Scotland*, vol. 7. September/October 2007, p. 49.

⁸ Ibid. It is also worth noting that Scotland's historical output remains limited especially compared to Ireland. This can be illustrated, for example, by examining the number of Scottish historical journals. Here, can count only two – *The Scottish Historical Review* and the *Journal of Scottish Historical Studies*, compared to five in Ireland – *Irish Historical Studies*, *History Ireland*, *Irish Economic and Social History*, *Irish University Review*, *Journal of Irish Studies*.

⁹ C.M.M. Macdonald & E.W. McFarland (eds), *Scotland and the Great War* (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1999).

¹⁰ T. Royle, *The Flowers of the Forest: Scotland and the First World War* (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2006); T. Royle, *A Time of Tyrants: Scotland and the Second World War* (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2011).

Edward Spiers, Jeremy Crang and Matthew Strickland's substantial edited collection *A Military History of Scotland* as well as the already cited *Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History*.¹¹ There have also been broader examinations of this period in recent histories of twentieth century Scotland, such as those by Richard Finlay, Christopher Harvie and Ewen Cameron, characterised by discussions of Scotland's relationship to the World Wars.¹²

Despite this, the historiography of Scotland's involvement in the First and Second World Wars remains underdeveloped, particularly when compared to the extent of scholarship on Irish experiences (cf. Chapter Three).¹³ Both McFarland and Macdonald have noted that scholarly interest in Scotland during this period has remained located largely within an older social and labour-history framework with a focus on labour relations and 'Red Clydeside'.¹⁴ Similarly, Macdonald has referred to the historiography of Scotland during the Second World War as a "'No Man's Land" in "serious" Scottish History' noting that it is 'fragmented, patchy and episodic'.¹⁵ In fact, the Scottish experience has received little focused attention and is seldom disaggregated in British and international overviews. Rather, it is frequently incorporated within wider British narratives. Additionally, even those accounts which do separate the Scottish from the 'British' experience have tended to limit this engagement to an individual chapter. This lack of dedicated scholarship is particularly striking given the growth of separatist nationalisms and regional identities.

Furthermore, within the historical literature, few studies have sought to explore commemoration in Scotland, much less in contemporary Scotland. James Coleman's

¹¹ E.M. Spiers, J. Crang & M. Strickland (eds), *A Military History of Scotland* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012); Devine & Wormald, *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History*.

¹² R. Finlay, *Modern Scotland 1914 – 2000* (London: Profile Books, 2004); R. Finlay, 'Review Article: New Britain, New Scotland, New History? The Impact of Devolution on the Development of Scottish Historiography', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 36:2 (2001), pp.383-93; E. Cameron, *Impaled Upon a Thistle: Scotland Since 1880* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010); C. Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics 1707 to the Present* (London: Routledge, 1998).

¹³ Royle, *The Flowers of the Forest*.

¹⁴ E.W. McFarland, 'The Great War' in Devine & Wormald, *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History*, pp.553 - 568; Macdonald & McFarland, *Scotland and the Great War*, p.554.

¹⁵ C.M.M. Macdonald, 'Wersh the Wine O' Victorie': Writing Scotland's Second World War', *Journal of Scottish Historical Studies*, 24:2 (2004), pp.105-112.

Remembering the Past in Nineteenth-Century Scotland: Commemoration, Nationality and Memory remains one notable exception.¹⁶ It explores the contested question of Scottish identity through an analysis of commemorative activity relating to William Wallace, John Knox, the Covenanters, and the Stuart dynasty – namely, issues all of which were either associated with anti-English Scottish politics and religion, or were controversial aspects in Anglo-Scottish history.¹⁷ Jenny Macleod has also written about commemoration in Scotland. She analyses the construction of the Scottish National War Memorial in the 1920s, arguing that it not only reflected the multi-faceted nature of Scottish identity, but also indicates the extent to which Scotland’s religious, martial and imperial traditions continued to resonate as a means of commemorating the First World War in Scotland.¹⁸

It is also worth noting that Andrew Mycock, Dan Todman and Keith Jeffery have all, albeit briefly, discussed World War commemoration in Scotland in relation to the First World War centenary.¹⁹ In his article on approaches to the First World War centenary and the ‘politics of war commemoration’ in the United Kingdom, for example, Mycock discusses Scottish responses to the anniversary as well as the impact of both the 2011 SNP election victory and the independence referendum.²⁰ Similarly, Jeffery explores commemoration in Scotland in relation to the problems inherent in the UK Government’s approach to the centenary as well as the issues raised by the multi-national nature of the UK state.²¹ Despite this, in each of these articles such discussion of Scotland’s responses to the

¹⁶ J. Coleman, *Remembering the Past in Nineteenth Century Scotland: Nationality, Memory and Commemoration* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014).

¹⁷ R. Marsden, ‘James. J. Coleman, *Remembering the Past in Nineteenth Century Scotland: Commemoration, Nationality and Memory*’, *The Journal of Scottish Historical Studies*, 35:2 (2015), pp.247-249.

¹⁸ J. Macleod, ‘“By Scottish Hands, with Scottish Money, on Scottish Soil”: The Scottish National War Memorial and National Identity’, *The Journal of British Studies*, 49:1 (2010), pp.73-96.

¹⁹ D. Todman, ‘The Space Afterwards: 2014 and a Century of British Remembrance’, *The Great War: Centenary Perspectives*, Vol. 10 2:14 (2014). Accessed at: http://scalar.usc.edu/works/the-space-between-literature-and-culture-1914-1945/vol10_2014_todman [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018]; A. Mycock, ‘The First World War Centenary in the United Kingdom: A Truly National Commemoration?’, *Roundtable*, 103:2 (2014), pp. 153 – 163; K. Jeffery, ‘Commemoration in the United Kingdom: A Multitude of Memories’, *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 50:3 (2015), pp.562 – 567.

²⁰ Mycock, ‘The First World War Centenary’, p.158.

²¹ Jeffery, ‘Commemoration in the United Kingdom’, p.564.

centenary takes up only one or two paragraphs within a larger article exploring commemoration in the United Kingdom as a whole. Consequently, existing analysis of commemoration in modern Scotland is limited.

This is despite the fact that the World Wars touched Scotland in multifarious and significant ways. In military terms, Scotland made an important contribution to the British war efforts. According to Royle, the precise number of Scottish dead between 1914 and 1918 is difficult to calculate.²² At the end of the First World War, the official figure stood at 74,000, although it should be noted that this figure was arrived at by a calculation on assumptions and estimation, namely by dividing the British total by 10% to reflect the fact Scots represented 10% of the British population.²³ Later in the 1920s, this figure was revised to 100,000, or 13% of the British total.²⁴ Some commentators, such as Jay Winter, Tom Devine and Niall Ferguson, have gone further than this to suggest that the Scottish death rate in the Great War was exceeded only by Serbia and Turkey.²⁵ These claims, however, are based on a statistic which suggests that the total number of Scottish casualties as a percentage of those mobilised was 26.4%, while in Serbia and Turkey it was 37.1% and 26.8% respectively.²⁶ Yet, such a percentage would suggest that, with approximately 690,000 Scots having been mobilised, the number of casualties would be around 182,000 – a figure which has generally been regarded as unrealistic.²⁷ The generally accepted figure is now around 100,000, however, and even that, as Royle suggests this should be considered with

²² T. Royle, 'The First World War' in Spiers, Crang & Strickland, *A Military History of Scotland*, p.529.

²³ Ibid. See also Finlay, *Modern Scotland 1914 – 2000*, p.36; C. Harvie, *No Gods and Precious Few Heroes: Scotland since 1914* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993), pp.3-5.

²⁴ Ibid. See also Royle, *The Flowers of the Forest*, p.285; On the Scottish National War Memorial, see A. Calder, 'The Scottish National War Memorial' in W. Kidd and B. Murdoch (eds), *Memory and Memorials: The Commemorative Century* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp.61-75 and I. Hay, *Their Name Liveth: The Book of the Scottish National War Memorial* (East Kilbride: Edinburgh Trustees of the Scottish National War Memorial, 1985).

²⁵ Devine, *The Scottish Nation*; N. Ferguson, *The Pity of War* (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane, 2006), pp.298-9; J.M. Winter, *The Great War and the British People* (London: MacMillan, 1985), p.75; S. Wood, *The Scottish Soldier* (Manchester, 1987), p.88.

²⁶ Devine, *The Scottish Nation*; N. Ferguson, *The Pity of War*; Winter, *The Great War and the British People*.

²⁷ Royle, 'The First World War', p.529; McFarland, 'The Great War', p.563.

some caution.²⁸ Nationalist propaganda has subsequently been fuelled by these higher figures, allowing the SNP to stress what they view as Scotland's 'disproportionate contribution' to the fighting.²⁹ During the Second World War, Crang estimates that by the end of 1944, 2.8 million soldiers were serving in the British Army, of whom approximately 263,000 were born in Scotland, around 10% of the total strength of the army (English-born soldiers made up 83%, Welsh born 4%, Northern Irish 1% and Eire-born 1%, with the remaining 1% born elsewhere).³⁰ Scottish units served in all major theatres of the War, suffering around 34,000 Scottish-born deaths (approximately 11% of the total British military war dead).³¹ Of these, approximately 6000 were serving with the Royal Navy, 8000 with the Royal Air Force and 20,000 with the Royal British Army.³²

Furthermore, historians such as William Kenefick have argued that the Scottish experiences of the First and Second World Wars and their aftermath were different in many ways from the rest of Britain.³³ While Scotland as a whole was highly 'patriotic' during the Great War, several of its cities were also leading centres of the anti-war movement as well as experiencing significant industrial and civil unrest. Glasgow, in fact, became the focus of political radicalism and effectively found itself under martial law during what became known as the 'Red Clydeside' era. Derek Patrick has also identified another distinctive element of the Scottish experience of the First World War – the sense of a historic martial tradition, which remains a major component of Scottish identity, and the manner in which national, religious, military and imperial traditions intertwined.³⁴ As Brian Glass has argued, the exploits of Scottish regiments of the British Army throughout the Empire as well as in

²⁸ Royle, 'The First World War', p.529; in his *Flowers of the Forest*, Royle, in fact, places this figure higher at 148,000.

²⁹ D. Duff, *Scotland's War Loss*, Glasgow, 1947. Pp.35-46.

³⁰ J. Crang, 'The Second World War', in Spiers, Crang & Strickland, *A Military History of Scotland*, p.584.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ W. Kenefick quoted in 'Poetry, Pukka and Protest': World War One in Scotland. Accessed at: <https://ahrc.ukri.org/research/fundedthemesandprogrammes/worldwaroneanditslegacy/worldwaronearoundtheuk/ww1inscotland/> [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018].

³⁴ D. Patrick quoted in 'Poetry, Pukka and Protest': World War One in Scotland. Accessed at: <https://ahrc.ukri.org/research/fundedthemesandprogrammes/worldwaroneanditslegacy/worldwaronearoundtheuk/ww1inscotland/> [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018].

conflicts such as the Peninsular, Crimean and Boer Wars had cemented the place of the Scottish soldier in Britain's consciousness, and perhaps more significantly in Scotland's consciousness too.³⁵ Consequently, those Scots fighting in the World Wars were seen as entering into and continuing this tradition and, therefore, their experiences were incorporated into centuries of Scottish History. Such military achievements also enabled Scots to identify with the imperial project.³⁶ For Glass Scotland was a 'nation inextricably linked to the British Empire', arguing that such connection proved to be one of the formative experiences of modern-day Scotland. Similarly, there was a close association between Scottish national pride and identity with the Empire, as the image of the Scottish soldier became an imperial icon.³⁷

This chapter consists of three sections, each of which analyses a specific stage in Scotland's political development and its relations with the United Kingdom. The chronological structure of this chapter seeks to analyse and draw out the extent to which political developments in the nature of Scotland's relationship with the political union of the United Kingdom have influenced the ways in which the World Wars have been commemorated there. The first section will focus on the period immediately preceding the introduction of devolution to Scotland, from 1994 to the passage of the Scotland Bill, introducing devolution, in 1998. Section two will analyse the immediate post-devolution period, from the first Scottish Parliamentary elections, leading up to the election of a minority SNP Government in the 2007 Scottish Parliament elections. Finally, section three will discuss the period from 2007 to 2016. It will explore how the Scottish Government, governed by the SNP, has approached the commemoration of the World Wars, in particular the centenary of the First World War.

Ultimately, it will argue that World War commemoration in Scotland between 1994 and 2016 was significantly affected by the changing nature of Scotland's relationship with the political union of the United Kingdom. Prior to devolution, commemoration in Scotland was driven by the UK Government. As such, it reflected the narratives and tone adopted in

³⁵ B. S. Glass, *The Scottish Nation at Empire's End* (Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2014), p.161.

³⁶ *Ibid*, p.1.

³⁷ *Ibid*, p.1.

these wider events and tended towards a much broader focus on 'British' experiences of the Wars. The creation of the devolved Scottish Parliament in 1998 and, more significantly, the victory of the SNP in both the elections of 2007 and 2011 (the latter with an absolute majority) impacted the tone and focus of remembrance. It will be shown that World War commemoration in post-devolution Scotland became one means through which a distinctly 'Scottish' identity could be established as separate from a 'British' one. This is particularly striking throughout the centenary of the First World War: then events, differing from those organised by the Westminster Government, focused on not only the distinctive contributions made by Scotland to the Wars, but also the futility of war and subsequent impact they had on the nation. It will also contend that the commemoration of the World Wars has been increasingly politicised, in particular by the SNP who appear to utilise it as a means of promoting their political agenda, namely the achievement of Scottish independence. In this, it is also apparent that the sectarian tendencies of the SNP as well as the difficulties posed by the legacy of the British Empire had an impact on approaches to the representation and commemoration of the World Wars. It will become apparent, therefore, that the commemoration of the World Wars was increasingly being manipulated for political purposes: Whitehall tried to inspire 'British' patriotic emotions, while the SNP utilised it towards their agendas – the achievement of independence.

The Last Years of Parliamentary Centralism, 1994 – 1998

On 8 May 1995, the United Kingdom celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day. Throughout the UK, a series of commemorative events, driven by John Major's Conservative Government, were held. These included street parties, the lighting of beacons, and a three-day weekend festival held in Hyde Park. Hundreds of thousands of people gathered to take part in picnics and dancing, and to witness march-pasts, fly-pasts and a 'spectacular fireworks display' [See Figure 4.1].³⁸ Iconography such as the Spitfire, V signs, Tommies and Union Flags predominated, appearing on the covers of pamphlets, programmes and leaflets connected with the commemorations. John Major's VE Day

³⁸ R. Samuel, *Theatres of Memory: Island Stories. Unravelling Britain* (London: Verso, 1998), p.42.

commemoration speech at the Hyde Park opening ceremony, however, made no reference to Scotland (or Wales) - only to London and Europe.³⁹



Figure 4.1: A photograph showing the 50th Anniversary of the VE Day Celebrations at Buckingham Palace on 8 May 1995. Attribution: Allan House/MOD. Crown Copyright 1995.

Accessed at: <http://www.defenceimagery.mod.uk/fotoweb/> [Date Accessed: 06/09/2018].

Consequently, there was a distinct sense that, not only were the received narratives too Anglo-centric, but also that more could have been done to mark the event North of the border. Shadow Scottish Secretary George Robertson, for example, commented: 'I think it is a pity so many of the events are based in London. I think a bit more effort should have been made by the Government to have a bigger celebration'.⁴⁰ He continued: 'a lot of people here feel that Scotland was missed out, although the Scottish role in both the victory and fighting was huge'.⁴¹

³⁹ See J. Major, *Speech at VE Day Commemorations*, 6 May 1995. Accessed at: <http://www.johnmajorarchive.org.uk/1990-1997/mr-majors-speech-at-ve-day-commemorations-6-may-1995/> [Date Accessed: 16/01/2019].

⁴⁰ Shadow Scottish Secretary George Robertson quoted in L. Robertson, 'Reunited Scottish Veterans Remember Fallen Comrades', *The Herald*, 9 May 1995.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

Perhaps more significant than this lack of explicit focus on Scotland, however, was the extent to which Scotland's, and Scottish, engagement with the anniversary was limited. On 1 May 1995, one week immediately before the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day, John Ezard noted that 'Scotland appears to have turned its back on next weekend's VE Day commemorations'.⁴² Likewise, Alan Massie commented that 'compared to the VE Day frenzy abroad in England, Scotland's celebrations seem strangely muted' noting that 'although there are various civic commemorations planned, the event has failed to set the public imagination ablaze'.⁴³ He continued, 'the mood seems strangely tepid in Scotland. Our indifference appears to suggest that in some way we suppose this commemoration to be irrelevant'.⁴⁴ Massie went on to suggest that this lack of enthusiasm appeared to be a 'reflection of two (connected) feelings: Scotland's hostility to the Tory Government, and the weakening of the sense of British identity'.⁴⁵ These feelings led some 'to dismiss celebration of VE Day as another Tory ramp' and even 'to dismiss [...] the war itself as, if not England's war...[then] something with which modern-minded nationalist Scots have no cause to concern themselves'.⁴⁶ In this, Massie suggested that the difficulty for many Scots was that they 'no longer feel they belong to the nation that fought the war' and 'would indeed be happy to deny that there is, or ever was, any such thing as a British nation'.⁴⁷

Similarly, writing in *The Scotsman*, Gary Duncan referred to the anniversary as 'plucky Little England Day' suggesting that 'as a national festivity, yesterday was an event imbued with all the patriotic paraphernalia in which Little England loves to revel... It is the kind of supposedly "British" phenomenon which is particularly and peculiarly anglicised in its tone'.⁴⁸ He continued, 'In Scotland, by contrast, the commemoration...was marked by a more muted tone. Yes, flags were flown, beacons lit, and parades duly processed. But the extent to which Scots engaged in all this betrayed limited enthusiasm among some and

⁴² J. Ezard, 'VE Day Fails to Fire Scots', *The Guardian*, 1 May 1995.

⁴³ A. Massie, 'It Was Our War Too; You Know; Why is Scotland So Unexcited About VE Day?', *Daily Mail*, 1 May 1995.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ G. Duncan, 'Crude Effort to Smear the SNP', *The Scotsman*, 9 May 1995.

ennui among others'.⁴⁹ Duncan suggested that, for the English, VE Day represented a 'chance to revel in the sort of nostalgic wartime recollections that are such a powerful strand in the complex flux of feelings and folklore that form its national identity... For a long, self-indulgent day, the English could wrap themselves in the emotional comfort blanket of the Union Flag and snuggle up to reassuring notions of national greatness'.⁵⁰ Consequently, he suggested 'what we witnessed was, in some ways, less Victory in Europe Day than Victory for England Day'.⁵¹ In contrast, he argued that 'for the Scots, the forces which tug at the country's heartstrings, which play on the country's collective psyche, are significantly different. The Union flag is not a symbol especially prized, for example'.⁵² Likewise, a number of other commentators highlighted this sense of ambivalence amongst the Scottish. Ian MacWhirter, for example, commented that 'like many Scots, I looked forward to last weekend's VE Day celebrations with a mixture of boredom and irritation', while Tom Brown noted that 'I'm left with the impression that we're the outsiders. Looking in on what has been taken over as an almost exclusively English event. North of the border, there isn't the same general jollification of VE Day'.⁵³ Brown continued, 'I haven't seen a single Union Jack... fluttering in a single street. There isn't the same misty-eyed nostalgia for World War Two. We've lost that we-were-all-in-it-together feeling'.⁵⁴ Similarly, Tom Nairn referred to VE Day in Scotland as a 'day of forgetting'.⁵⁵

This limited engagement is also revealed by the low number of events held. For Raphael Samuel, despite appeals to regimental loyalties, VE Day celebrations were minimal, while the Lothian Regional Council refused to recognise 8 May as a public holiday.⁵⁶ Indeed, both Marcello Mega and Gillian Harris have highlighted that although events were held across

⁴⁹ Duncan, 'Crude Effort to Smear the SNP'.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ I. MacWhirter, 'Tory Script Misfires in Wartime Barrage', *The Scotsman*, 10 May 1995; I. MacWhirter & T. Brown, 'What Is There to Celebrate in this Divided Nation; VE Day 50th Anniversary', *Daily Record*, 8 May 1995.

⁵⁴ Brown, 'What Is There to Celebrate in this Divided Nation: VE Day 50th Anniversary'; Anon, 'Union Jack Sales Suggest Little Interest in VE Day', *The Herald*, 1 May 1995.

⁵⁵ T. Nairn, *The Scotsman*, 10 May 1995.

⁵⁶ Samuel, *Theatres of Memory. Island Stories*, p.42.

the length and breadth of Britain... [in Scotland] there were fewer events than in many individual regions of England and the atmosphere north of the Border was more commemorative than celebratory'.⁵⁷ Of those events held, most appeared to revolve 'around church services and quiet periods of reflection', contrasting sharply with the 'street parties, flag waving and unofficial beacon lighting that were far more widespread' in England.⁵⁸ Mega and Harris continued: 'in Scotland... the public generally appeared to be going about its business and many expressed ignorance of the two-minutes silence' while in England 'few were unaware of the call to remember the sacrifice of those who did not survive the war'.⁵⁹ Additionally, although the biggest VE Day parade held outside of London took place in Perth, this involved the only public turn-out in Scotland, which was a small one. Here, a crowd of only 5000 assembled to watch more than 1500 veterans from Scottish regiments, including the 51st Highland Division – with the Gordons, Seaforths, Cameronians, Black Watch and Argylls - march through the streets.⁶⁰

For Richard Weight, this is illustrative of the extent to which the fading memory of the Second World War was a key factor in the decline of 'Britishness' in the last decade of the twentieth century.⁶¹ Indeed, a number of surveys had highlighted that 'Britishness' was in serious decline. In 1995, for example, the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust conducted a study in which people were asked to describe their nationality. It was found that 64% of Scots and 41% of the Welsh thought themselves more Scottish and Welsh than British, or not British at all, compared to only 25% of the English who viewed themselves as more English than British.⁶² Yet, the War is widely regarded as having reinvigorated British national identity.⁶³ This suggested that those who lived through the war years were acutely aware

⁵⁷ MacWhirter, 'Tory Script Misfires in Wartime Barrage'; M. Mega and G. Harris, 'Two Minutes Silence, then the Beacons Blaze Out Throughout the Length and Breadth of Britain A Day to Remember', *The Scotsman*, 9 May 1995.

⁵⁸ Mega & Harris, 'Two Minutes Silence, then the Beacons Blaze Out Throughout the Length and Breadth of Britain A Day to Remember'.

⁵⁹ Ibid. Raphael Samuel has also commented that more events were held in Hampshire, than throughout the whole of Scotland, *Theatres of Memory. Island Stories*, p.43.

⁶⁰ J. Rougvié, 'Perth Opens Its Arms to the Highlands' Old Soldiers', *The Scotsman*, 15 May 1995.

⁶¹ R. Weight, *Patriots: National Identity in Britain, 1940 – 2000* (London: Macmillan, 2002), p.669.

⁶² 'State of the Nation: The 1995 Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust/MORI Survey', *Scottish Public Opinion* (September 1995).

⁶³ Weight, *Patriots*, p.669.

that they had united to defend an island which could not afford national divisions. As Weight convincingly argues, it was the wartime generation, whether Scots, Welsh or the English, that felt the greatest attachment to the Union.⁶⁴ However, as this generation passed away so too did their sentimental or emotional loyalty to the Union and collective memory of the geopolitical need for British unity, based on the war years.⁶⁵ Moreover, the predominance of Anglo-centric narratives throughout much of the commemorative programme, and indeed in World War memorialisation generally, impacted younger generations of Scots. They perceived the rhetoric of 'Our Finest Hour' as an exclusively English battle and, consequently, not one which resonated as a source of shared or common identity.

This episode and the decline in 'Britishness' which it implied are indicative of broader issues in the nature of the relationship between England and Scotland, as alluded to by Massie and Brown in their articles discussing the Scottish reactions to VE Day. The VE Day anniversary came during a period when calls for autonomy were growing amongst the Scottish and there was an ever-growing disenchantment with Westminster rule. As Graham Walker argues, the long period of Conservative rule between 1979 and 1997 was notable for the 'reassembling of the devolutionary case in Scotland as a form of popular protest against the Government and its perceived lack of appreciation of Scottish national distinctiveness'.⁶⁶ This is an argument advanced by both Alvin Jackson and Cameron, who contend that Thatcher and the Conservative Party appeared unable to cope with the distinctiveness of not only the political culture, but also the national situation more broadly.⁶⁷ For Jackson, in fact, Thatcher had 'no real understanding of the importance of Scottish national sensitivities and symbols' or, indeed, 'no real knowledge of Scotland'.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Weight, *Patriots*, p.669.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ G. Walker, 'Scotland, Northern Ireland and Devolution: Past and Present', *Contemporary British History*, 24:2 (2010), p.247.

⁶⁷ Cameron, *Impaled Upon a Thistle*, p.348, p.337; A. Jackson, *The Two Unions: Ireland, Scotland and the Survival of the United Kingdom, 1707 – 2007* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.266.

⁶⁸ Jackson, *The Two Unions*, p.266.

Significantly, Scottish opposition to Thatcherism and the Conservatives went deeper than simple hostility to an unpopular government. Indeed, the Governments' values had been wholeheartedly rejected in the 1987 general election where the Conservatives, in their worst result in Scotland since 1910, lost eleven out of twenty-one MPs. Despite this, their policies continued to be imposed in Scotland due to their majority of over 100 in the House of Commons. This, in turn, meant the Conservatives were subject to accusations that they had lost the moral right to govern Scotland. For Tom Devine, Thatcher 'disregarded the tradition of the Union as a partnership in which Scottish interests had been taken into account'.⁶⁹ Instead, Thatcher exerted what she viewed as the 'absolute' sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament to 'rule' Scotland. As a result, the problem of Conservative governance in Scotland was increasingly seen as derived from the nature of the British constitutional system itself, and not just a consequence of Thatcherism. This, in turn, stimulated a wider coalition of interests to engage with constitutional issues.

In the late 1980s, then, pressure for devolution had mounted. This was indicated by the formation of the Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC), which arose out of the publication of a *Claim of Right for Scotland* in July 1988 by the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly.⁷⁰ The SCC, with the involvement of the Labour and Liberal Democrat Parties but excluding the Conservatives and SNP, conducted a wide-ranging policy development exercise. In late 1990, it produced *Towards Scotland's Parliament*, in anticipation of a Conservative defeat at the next general election.⁷¹ When the Conservatives were re-elected in April 1992, however, the SCC resumed its work. This culminated in the publication, on 30 November 1995, of *Scotland's Parliament: Scotland's Right*.⁷² Its proposals advocated for a Scottish Parliament, which should have legislative powers over a range of domestic issues as well as the power to vary income tax by up to three pence in

⁶⁹ Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, p.606.

⁷⁰ O. Gay, 'Scotland and Devolution', *House of Commons Research Paper 97/92* (House of Commons Library, 29 July 1997).

⁷¹ Gay, 'Scotland and Devolution'.

⁷² Ibid. See also 'Scotland's Parliament, Scotland's Right', *Scottish Constitutional Convention*, November 1995; J. McFadden, 'The Scottish Constitutional Convention', *PL*, 215 (1995); J. McFadden, 'Constitutional Law: Framework of Scottish Devolution' in *The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia*, LexisNexis/Butterworths.

the pound. Subsequently, both the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties incorporated support for Scottish devolution, based upon the proposals of the SCC, within their 1997 election manifestos as part of their respective commitments to British constitutional reform.⁷³

The 1995 VE Day anniversary in Scotland, then, took place in a climate in which there was an ever-growing hostility towards the Conservative Westminster Government. Significantly, this had also created a growing sense of disenchantment with the Union more broadly and a decline in the sense of 'Britishness'. Consequently, there was little engagement with the commemorations in Scotland. Indeed, the events were broadly interpreted with scepticism as a flag-waving exercise by the English. Moreover, the Anglo-centric narratives employed by the Tory Government only added to the sense that the events bore little relevance to a Scottish people who no longer felt the same degree of attachment to the British nation that had fought in the Second World War.

The commemorative events which took place prior to 1997, then, did so between two periods of political upset, and on the eve of significant constitutional change. On 1 May 1997, following years of Conservative rule, the Edinburgh-born Tony Blair and his New Labour came to power in a landslide victory. In what was the biggest Labour victory to date, they achieved a majority of 177, while the Conservative Party not only experienced their worst election result since 1832, but also found that for the first time in history not a single Conservative MP was elected in either Scotland or Wales.⁷⁴ Significantly, this was to have wide-ranging implications for the Union, due to the Labour Party's commitment to achieving devolution, as outlined above.

On 24 July 1997, a White Paper on Scottish devolution was presented to the House of Commons. *Scotland's Parliament* provided for a 129-seat Scottish Parliament, with the power to make primary legislation in all areas except those specifically reserved to Westminster, as well as the ability to raise (or lower) revenue by means of an additional

⁷³ Liberal Democrats, *Make the Difference: The Scottish Liberal Democrat Manifesto 1997* (Liberal Democrats, April 1997); Labour Party, *New Labour: Because Scotland Deserves Better* (Edinburgh: Labour Party, April 1997).

⁷⁴ Weight, *Patriots*.

income tax of up to 3p in the pound.⁷⁵ It proposed that elections would take place every four years using the Additional Member System. Within this, seventy-three members would be elected from individual constituencies using First Past the Post, while an additional fifty-six members (seven from each of the eight regions) would be elected from lists of candidates put forward by the parties using Proportional Representation.⁷⁶

A referendum on Scottish devolution was subsequently held on 11 September. It asked whether people in Scotland: 1) Agree/Do Not Agree that there should be a Scottish Parliament and 2) Agree/Do Not Agree that a Scottish Parliament should have tax-varying powers.⁷⁷ Throughout the referendum campaign in Scotland, party lines were more clearly drawn and united around their respective constitutional preferences than had been the case in 1979.⁷⁸ The Conservatives advocated for a 'NO/NO' vote, while the Labour, Liberal Democrat and Scottish National Parties all backed devolution.⁷⁹ The co-operation of Alex Salmond and the SNP with the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties is widely regarded as significant in accounting for the successful outcome. Indeed, during a special National Council Conference held on 2 August 1997, the SNP agreed to support the White Paper's proposals, widely regarding it as a 'door of opportunity for the Scottish people to move towards independence'.⁸⁰ Consequently, the *Scotland Forward* campaign operated as a cross-party lobby for a 'YES/YES' vote.⁸¹

⁷⁵ *Scotland's Parliament* (White Paper) Cm3658, 24 July 1997; Weight, *Patriots*; A. Lyon, *Constitutional History of the United Kingdom* (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2003).

⁷⁶ The additional elected members are elected according to the following system: The seven additional members for each region are identified by calculating the number of constituency seats won by each party in the region and dividing the number of each party's lists votes by the number of constituency seats plus one. The party with the highest number of votes after that calculation gains the first additional member. The calculation is then repeated for the second to the seventh additional member, but by dividing the number of constituency seats plus one and plus additional member seats allocated in previous rounds.

⁷⁷ R. Dewdney, 'Results of Devolution Referendums (1979 & 1997)', *House of Commons Research Paper No 97/113* (Social & General Statistics Section: House of Commons Library, 10 November 1997), p.6.

⁷⁸ D. Denver, 'Voting in the 1997 Scottish and Welsh Devolution Referendums: Information, Interests and Opinions', *European Journal of Political Research*, 41 (2002), pp. 827-843.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ D. Torrance, *Salmond: Against the Odds* (Edinburgh: Birlinn Limited, 2015), p.164.

⁸¹ O. Gay, 'The *Scotland Bill*: Devolution and Scotland's Parliament', *House of Commons Research Paper 98/1*, 7 January 1998.

Moreover, as Christopher Harvie has noted, the Scottish media, with the exception of the *Scottish Daily Mail*, were broadly supportive of devolution, while the No-No campaign suffered from links with the Conservatives.⁸² Throughout the media campaign, in fact, references were frequently made to the negatives of Tory rule. The *Daily Record*, for example, commented on the day of the vote that ‘we’ve had to wait through 18 years of Tory diktat rule. A generation grew up resenting an arrogant government that Scotland didn’t elect and that didn’t even try to understand Scots’. It continued, ‘Labour have delivered what the Tories would not. The Tories have never acknowledged what every Scot knows – that Scotland is special. It isn’t just our own education, our own laws, or own local government. It’s history. It’s kinship. It’s Scottishness’.⁸³ Similarly, *The Scotsman* noted that ‘a devolved parliament has been made more popular, however, by 18 years of Tory Government, which made the status quo unsustainable’.⁸⁴ In each of these, the implication is clear – that Scotland needed to obtain devolutionary powers. It continued, arguing that the Union ‘could not endure four [elections] in a row, especially when the divergence between Tory England and Labour Scotland looked like becoming systematic’.⁸⁵ Significantly, in the context of discussions about the commemoration of the World Wars, both the *Daily Record* and the *Sunday Mail* invoked the Second World War in referring to the day of the vote as the ‘D-Day battle cry of Scots from every walk of life’.⁸⁶

Ultimately, the results were decisive. The Scots voted 3-1 in favour of devolution, with 74.3% of the votes cast on a turnout of 60.4%, representing a swing of 40% compared to

⁸² C. Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism*, p.247; Gay, ‘The Scotland Bill: Devolution and Scotland’s Parliament’.

⁸³ Anon, ‘Record View; Seize the Moment; Record View: Devolution Referendum’, *Daily Record*, 11 September 1997.

⁸⁴ A. Neill, ‘A Tide for Home Rule’, *The Scotsman*, 11 September 1997.

⁸⁵ Ibid. See also D. King & K. Farquharson, ‘Every Vote Counts. Go Out There and Do the Business!’, *Daily Record*, 11 September 1997.

⁸⁶ P. Drury, ‘D-Day for Scotland; The Long Road to Destiny’, *Sunday Mail*, 31 August 1997; Anon, ‘D-Day Over Devo; The Scottish Devolution Referendum Will Be Held on September 11 – the 700th Anniversary of Wallace’s Historic Victory over the English’, *Daily Record*, 18 July 1997.

the results from the 1979 referendum.⁸⁷ Additionally, the vote as to whether they wanted their Parliament to have tax-raising powers, resulted in a 63.5% vote in favour.⁸⁸

The Scotland Bill that was subsequently introduced gave effect to the White Paper's proposals, with no substantial changes.⁸⁹ It provided for a Scottish Parliament, to have legislative power over all devolved matters and a Scottish Executive, headed by a First Minister on whom executive functions would be conferred in respect of devolved and other matters.⁹⁰ Throughout the House of Lords Debate on the Scotland Bill, a number of Peers alluded to the impact of Tory rule in Scotland, discussed above. The Earl of Glasgow, for example, stated that during the Thatcher years 'many of us living north of the Border felt that we had become a colony, governed by a remote foreign power that emanated from somewhere in the home counties'.⁹¹

Perhaps of more significance, however, is the fact that during this and other debates regarding devolution, a number of Peers who opposed the Bill framed their discussions of devolution through reference to the Second World War. Baroness MacLeod of Borve, for example, commented that: 'I fought in the war with the Scottish, the Welsh, the Africans and the Australians. Like other noble Lords who work in this House, I fought for the 'United' Kingdom. Long may she remain so'.⁹² Moreover, during a later debate in the House of Lords on the 'Referendum of Scottish Independence', the Earl of Mar and Kellie, in discussing the complexities of national identity suggested that 'the combined sense of Britishness and Scottishness is strongest among those with life experience of the Second World War. Those born subsequently may have increasingly less strong identification with that sense'.⁹³ A Nuffield Study conducted earlier, at the end of 1997, in fact, indicated that this remained the case and that the prospect of devolution had done little to stabilise the trend regarding

⁸⁷ Weight, *Patriots*, p.697; Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, p.617.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ Gay, 'The Scotland Bill'.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Earl of Glasgow, 'Scotland Bill', *Hansard House of Lords Parliamentary Debate*, 5th series, vol. 590: col. 1710, 18 June 1998.

⁹² Baroness MacLeod of Borve, 'Scotland Bill', *Hansard House of Lords Parliamentary Debate*, 5th series, vol. 590: col. 1741, 18 June 1998.

⁹³ Earl of Mar and Kellie, 'Referendum on Scottish Independence', *Hansard House of Lords Parliamentary Debate*, 5th series, vol. 591: cols. 1303, 8 July 1998.

nationality. Indeed, when asked what best described their nationality regardless of economic considerations, respondents indicated 85% Scots, 63% Welsh, 34% English while simultaneously finding that those whose 'Britishness' was rock solid tended to be over 50 – thus seeming to confirm that the bastion of unionism remained the ever-shrinking wartime generation.⁹⁴

Between 1994 and 1998, World War commemoration in Scotland was driven by Westminster and thus echoed those events held throughout the rest of the United Kingdom, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter One. Until the general election of 1997, however, this meant it was led by an increasingly unpopular Conservative Government, which appropriated commemoration as a means of promoting the unity of the United Kingdom. This created a sense of dislocation and Scottish difference was only exacerbated further by the predominance of Anglo-centric narratives within commemorative events, such as the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day. Consequently, Scottish responses to, and engagement, with remembrance was limited, reflecting the fact that Scots not only no longer felt as connected to the events, but also the significant distance that had emerged between the Scottish people and UK Government following eighteen years of a Conservative Government at Westminster.⁹⁵

Devolution under Labour, 1999 – 2007

By 1997, we have seen that World War commemoration was taking place in a political climate in which the relationship between Scotland and England was becoming strained as calls for Scottish autonomy grew. This, however, began to change following the election of the Labour Party in 1997 and the subsequent referendum on devolution.

⁹⁴ Quoted in Weight, p.696. See also A. Brown, D. McCrone, L. Patterson & P. Surridge, *The Scottish Electorate: The 1997 General Election and Beyond* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999).

⁹⁵ Institute for Government, 'Scottish Devolution (1997 – 1999)'. Accessed at: https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/scottish_devolution_0.pdf [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018].

Following the referendum vote and subsequent debates on devolution, the Scotland Act was passed on 17 November 1998. The results of the referendum gave considerable momentum to implementing the legislation necessary to enact Scottish devolution, making it easy to point to the 'declared will of the Scottish people', while Labour's large majority, and the SNP's support, similarly ensured its safe passage.⁹⁶ The first Scottish Parliamentary elections were subsequently held in May 1999. On 6 May 1999, Labour won 38.8% of the vote (securing fifty-six seats), from a turnout of 58%, and subsequently formed a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, who had won seventeen seats, with Labour's Donald Dewar becoming First Minister.⁹⁷ The SNP became Scotland's second largest party and the official opposition, with 35 seats, although it is worth noting that they achieved only 28.8% of the vote, lower than that achieved in 1974.⁹⁸

On 1 July 1999, Scotland's new Parliament, temporarily housed in the hall of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, was opened. It took up its full powers to make laws on matters such as health, justice, local government, sports, the arts and education.⁹⁹

Amongst other things, this also included responsibility for the maintenance, repair and protection of Scotland's war memorials and war commemoration more broadly.¹⁰⁰ The powers reserved to Westminster, on the other hand, covered areas such as the constitution of the United Kingdom, UK foreign policy, the economy and defence.¹⁰¹

The opening ceremony was a revealing event, in which symbols of Scotland's links with Britain abounded. The Queen's speech, for example, commented that in the 'new era of government in Scotland we can draw strength and direction from such landmarks of *our*

⁹⁶ Gay, 'The Scotland Bill'.

⁹⁷ The definitive election results are published in C. Rallings & M. Thatcher (eds), *Britain Votes. 6, British Parliamentary Election Results 1997* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998); Anon, 'No 68: General Election Results', *House of Commons Research Paper* (House of Commons Library, 1 May 1997).

⁹⁸ Anon, 'No 68: General Election Results'.

⁹⁹ Weight, p.697.

¹⁰⁰ H. McLeish, 'War Memorials', *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 324: col. 126, 26 January 1999.

¹⁰¹ J. Mitchell, D. Denver, C. Pattie & H. Bochel, 'The 1997 Devolution Referendum in Scotland', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 51:2 (1998), pp.166 – 181.

tradition and history'.¹⁰² She continued by defining 'Scottishness', along Blairite lines, as 'entrepreneurial flair'.¹⁰³ She referred to the qualities of the Scottish such as 'grit, determination and humour' as well as 'the forthrightness and... strong sense of identity of the Scottish people' which 'contribute so much to the life of the United Kingdom'.¹⁰⁴ Despite this, there was also a strong emphasis on Scotland's autonomy and a sense of Scottish identity.¹⁰⁵ Throughout his speech, for example, First Minister Donald Dewar stressed that 'this is about more than our politics and our laws. This is about who we are, how we carry ourselves'. He referred to the 'echoes from the past' that could be heard; '[t]he shout of the welder in the din of the great Clyde shipyards... the wild cry of the Great Pipes... back to the distant cries of the battles of Bruce and Wallace. The past is part of us. But today there is... a voice for the future'.¹⁰⁶ Here, Dewar drew on distinctive elements of Scotland's history, especially its military past and martial tradition, in order to emphasise its own identity as separate from that of Britain.

While the broad impact of devolution has been disputed, at the time it was widely regarded an 'extraordinary moment' in Scottish politics, decisively changing the political landscape and signalling the start of contemporary politics in Scotland.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, as Jackson has argued, the creation of the Scottish Parliament provided a new focus for Scottish patriotism and identity that was far removed from the institutions of Westminster and the 'British' state.¹⁰⁸ This had implications for the representation and remembrance of not only the World Wars, but of Scottish history more broadly. For Richard Finlay,

¹⁰² HM The Queen, 'Queen's Speech: Opening of Scottish Parliament', 1 July 1999. Accessed at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1999/06/99/scottish_parliament_opening/382982.stm [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018]. Emphasis added.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Weight, *Patriots*, p.697.

¹⁰⁶ D. Dewar, 'Speech at the Opening of the Scottish Parliament', 1 July 1999. Accessed at: http://www.parliament.scot/EducationandCommunityPartnershipsresources/New_Parliament_Level_A-F.pdf [Date Accessed: 16/01/2018].

¹⁰⁷ P. Cairney, *The Scottish Political System Since Devolution. From New Politics to the New Scottish Government* (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2011), p.1; See also R. Hazell, 'Introduction: The First Year of Devolution' in R. Hazell (ed.), *The State and the Nations: The First Year of Devolution in the United Kingdom* (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2000).

¹⁰⁸ Jackson, *The Two Unions*, p.178.

devolution in Scotland made Scottish history appear more relevant. Consequently, the Scottish nation, in line with its 're-discovery of its political self' and 'flowering of national self-belief', embarked on a process of rediscovering its past.¹⁰⁹ For Alex Salmond, the opening of the new National Museum of Scotland in 1998 typified the new *Zeitgeist* that had emerged since the referendum, characterised by an upsurge in scholarly and public interest in and engagement with the country's history, culture and politics'.¹¹⁰ This can be further illustrated by the growth in numbers of Scottish TV series, newspaper serials, history magazines and even political debates.

On 11 November 1999, for example, the Scottish Parliament debated the issue, raised by the 'Shot at Dawn Campaign', of providing pardons for soldiers executed during the First World War for cowardice and desertion. Throughout the debate, the image of the soldier fighting in the trenches was mobilised to further the campaign, though the predominant focus was on Scotland, as opposed to Britain as a whole. Patricia Godman, Labour MSP for West Renfrewshire, for example, commented that while:

Matters relating to the armed forces are reserved to Westminster. Nevertheless, it is fitting that this Parliament should speak out on behalf of the Scottish soldiers who were executed following courts martial conducted by officers who never gave the accused a fair hearing. Of the soldiers executed for so-called cowardice... 43 were Scots.¹¹¹

A number of other MSPs made specific references to Scotland's involvement in the War. Dorothy-Grace Elder (Glasgow, SNP), for example, highlighted the experiences faced by families in Scotland during the War noting that 'to this day, my family – like so many families in Scotland – are still haunted and shaped by the Great War, more than by the Second World War', while Kay Ullrich (West of Scotland, SNP) discussed the stories of Fusilier Herbert Burden and Private James Archibald, both of whom, despite being young men, had been executed.¹¹² She argued that despite the Westminster Government's

¹⁰⁹ Finlay, 'Review Article: New Britain, New Scotland, New History?', p.383.

¹¹⁰ Torrance, *Salmond. Against The Odds*, p.176.

¹¹¹ P. Godman, 'Pardon for Executed Soldiers', *Scottish Parliamentary Debate Official Report*, 11 November 1999, col.611.

¹¹² D. Elder, 'Pardon for Executed Soldiers', *Scottish Parliamentary Debate Official Report*, 11 November 1999, col. 607; K. Ullrich, 'Pardon for Executed Soldiers', *Scottish Parliamentary Debate Official Report*, 11 November 1999, col. 615.

excuses, 'what is needed is a general amnesty or pardon to mark the new millennium and to remove the burden of shame, guilt and resentment from the families of those who were executed'.¹¹³

Similarly, much of the local and national press in Scotland mobilised the image of the soldier specifically as 'Scottish'. *The Scotsman*, for example, noted that:

The Scottish Parliament will use Armistice Day to call for pardons for *Scottish* soldiers shot for cowardice and desertion during the First World War... The Parliament does not have the power to order Royal Pardons as defence matters are reserved to Westminster. However a motion, which has cross-party support, has been tabled by a Labour MSP Elaine Murray in a bid to lend the Parliament's support to clearing the men's names.¹¹⁴

Throughout this article no reference was made to the total number of 'British' soldiers who were shot for desertion, only of 'Scottish' soldiers. Writing in the *Daily Record*, political editor Carlos Alba adopted a similar note, commenting:

The Scottish Parliament is to pardon 39 Scots soldiers shot for cowardice and desertion during World War One. MSPs are expected to back a motion calling for them to be cleared and their reputations restored. The Scots were among 307 British troops shot by firing squad during the conflict.¹¹⁵

As Ross Wilson argues, this issue became a point at which 'Scottish' identity could be distinguished from notions of 'British' identity or 'Britain'.¹¹⁶ The debate framed contemporary concerns surrounding concepts of nationhood, thus providing a means of expressing and debating contemporary identities in a post-devolution Scotland. It was also used to highlight the limitations placed on the Scottish Parliament.

Despite the emergence of a new political climate, the first eight years of devolution were generally characterised by continuity and stability. In fact, from the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 until the third Scottish Parliamentary elections held in May 2007, the Labour Party remained the lead partner in a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition.

¹¹³ Ullrich, 'Pardon for Executed Soldiers'.

¹¹⁴ A. Hardie & T. Lawson, 'MSPS Bid to Clear Executed Soldiers' Names as Nations Honour the Fallen', *The Scotsman*, 9 November 1999, p.4.

¹¹⁵ C. Alba, 'Pardon at Last for Scots Shot at Dawn', *Daily Record*, 27 October 1999, p.12.

¹¹⁶ R. Wilson, *Cultural Heritage of the Great War in Britain* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013), p.64.

This, in turn, meant that between these years Labour was in power both in Scotland and at Westminster. Consequently, there was significant pressure for convergence with the political rhetoric of the UK Government, resulting in common policy themes.¹¹⁷ This meant that there was minimal divergence in official approaches to commemorative events between Scotland and England.

It is also worth noting that debates about Scotland's place in the political union became less prominent immediately following the establishment of the Scottish Parliament. This, however, proved temporary as debates developed further between the 2003 and 2007 Scottish elections. This was a consequence of the deepening unpopularity of the Labour Government which resulted, at least in part, from its interference in devolved matters and discontent directed at unpopular policies, such as the disbanding of Scottish regiments.

In March 2006, after months of debate, and in the face of strong opposition, the six existing Scottish line infantry regiments were amalgamated to form a single new Royal Regiment of Scotland with a common uniform and badge.¹¹⁸ While this was part of a wider re-organisation of the army, it proved highly controversial in Scotland. Indeed, the plans had generated a political furore both at Westminster and at Holyrood, as well as public outcry and protest in the Scottish media. Within much of the newspaper coverage, for example, the Scottish military tradition was perceived as remaining an 'important and popular part of modern Scottish culture and society, enjoying the general support of most of the population'.¹¹⁹ Writing as early as 2003, for example, Ian Bruce noted in *The Herald* that 'the image of the kilted "jock" in warlike pose is etched deep in the Scottish psyche', and that Scotland's 'regiments are the fiercest guardians of centuries-old traditions'.¹²⁰

A number of commentators situated the Scottish regiments within this tradition by stressing their history. Brian Brady, writing in the *Scotland on Sunday*, highlighted that 'the

¹¹⁷ M.A. Arnott & J. Ozga, 'Education and Nationalism: The Discourse of Education Policy in Scotland', *Discourse*, 31:3 (2010), pp.335 – 350.

¹¹⁸ A. Carswell, 'Scottish Military Dress' in Spiers, Crang & Strickland, *A Military History of Scotland*, p. 627.

¹¹⁹ Anon, 'Let Scotland Be Consulted On Regiments', *The Herald*, 27 July 2005.

¹²⁰ I. Bruce, 'Once Again Into a Battle for Survival' Ian Bruce, Defence Correspondent, Explains Why Scottish Regiments Must Set Aside Old Rivalries', *The Herald*, 15 August 2003.

proud fighters of Scotland's historic regiments have fought and suffered, won and sometimes lost, from Culloden to Tangiers, to Gallipoli and the Somme, Dunkirk, Suez and now Iraq'.¹²¹ Similarly, commenting on the Black Watch specifically, Jennifer Cunningham noted that 'from Highland glens to the Napoleonic Wars, Crimea, the two World Wars, Korea, the partition of India, Kenya, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Iraq the Black Watch has been in the thick of some of the worst fights in history'.¹²² By invoking historic battles and contemporary battles in the same article, the writer placed the Scottish regiments within this martial tradition. Significantly, the First and Second World Wars, and those Scots who fought in them, were viewed as a key component of this tradition. Cunningham, for example, drew attention to the Black Watch's specific contribution to both World Wars, noting 'twenty-five Black Watch battalions served in the First World War and 7993 men were killed... Six battalions... were involved in the Second World War'.¹²³ This highlights the fact that for many Scots, as Carswell argues, the Scottish soldier was viewed as an icon of their country's identity. Consequently, the elimination of so many historic and venerated regimental identities was tantamount to 'vandalism'. It destroyed the perception that devolution under Labour was safeguarding Scottish interests and history. In a letter to the *Sunday Mail*, for example, Rob MacLeod wrote that 'after centuries of distinguished service... our proud Scottish regiments have been stabbed in the back. The decision to downgrade regiments such as the Black Watch and Royal Scots demonstrates breath-taking disregard for our military heritage'.¹²⁴ Similarly, R.F. Ramsay commented that 'I find it disgraceful this Government has amalgamated the Scottish regiments'.¹²⁵

These debates, regarding pardons for executed soldiers and the disbanding of Scottish regiments, demonstrate the extent to which the World Wars were increasingly located within a Scottish framework, even while official commemorative practices remained broadly in line with those of the Westminster Government. The distinct contributions made

¹²¹ B. Brady, 'Scottish Regiments Lose the Battle for Survival', *Scotland on Sunday*, 4 July 2004.

¹²² J. Cunningham, 'The Red Hackle Will Be Raised No More; the Black Watch Bade Farewell to 300 Years of Proud History', *The Herald*, 29 March 2006.

¹²³ Cunningham, 'The Red Hackle Will Be Raised No More'.

¹²⁴ R. MacLeod, 'Letter: Mail Box – White Feather Is An Insult', *Sunday Mail*, 2 April 2006.

¹²⁵ R.F. Ramsay, 'Letter: Your View – Hang Your Head', *Daily Record*, 5 April 2006.

by Scotland's historic regiments were situated within the Scottish martial tradition. Indeed, in removing Scottish experiences from the wider British context, it highlights the way in which this issue became a further means of distinguishing 'Scottish' and 'British' identities. Furthermore, as Jackson has argued, the amalgamation and disbanding of historic Scottish regiments, in representing an affront to Scottish patriotism, effectively alienated Scots and served to undermine the Union.¹²⁶

In the years leading up to the tercentenary of the 1707 Act of Union (16 January 2007), the constitutional debate about Scotland's place in the Union reignited.¹²⁷ During a Scottish Parliamentary debate held on 27 April 2006, for example, Alex Neil of the SNP asked: 'Does the First Minister agree that the best way of commemorating the 300th anniversary of the union of the Parliaments would be to end the union of the Parliaments and to repatriate Scotland's wealth to the Scottish people?'.¹²⁸ Similarly, on 18 January 2007 Iain Smith, of the Liberal Democrats, asked:

Does the First Minister agree that, 300 years on [...] the time is now right for a serious debate about the future of Scotland's Parliament? [...] Does he agree with the words of Donald Dewar, who said that devolution was not an event but a process? The anniversary of the union is the ideal time to move that process on.¹²⁹

The anniversary also triggered comprehensive newspaper coverage. *The Herald*, for example, ran a series entitled '300: The State of the Union'.¹³⁰ Similarly, *The Scotsman* launched 'Scotland 300: The Nationhood Debate'.¹³¹ According to its Editor, Mike Gilson, this eight-debate series was fundamentally about:

¹²⁶ Jackson, *The Two Unions*, p.178.

¹²⁷ Institute for Government, 'Scottish Devolution (1997 – 1999) accessed at: https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/scottish_devolution_0.pdf [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018]

¹²⁸ A. Neil, 'Union of the Parliaments (300th Anniversary), *Scottish Parliamentary Debate Official Report*, 27 April 2006, col. 25061.

¹²⁹ I. Smith, 'Act of Union (300th Anniversary), *Scottish Parliamentary Debate Official Report*, 18 January 2007, col. 31362.

¹³⁰ See, for example, H. MacDonald, 'A Nation with Nothing to Lose but Its Fear... The State of the Union', *The Herald*, 6 February 2007, p.16; Anon, 'The Future of the Union: How You, Our Readers, Have Led The Debate... 300 The State of the Union', *The Herald*, 13 March 2007.

¹³¹ M. Gilson, 'Come and Join Great Debate on Nation's Past, Present and Future', *The Scotsman*, 16 January 2007, p.4.

Trying to understand what happened back then and how history might have been different if that crucial vote had gone the other way. But it is more than that. It is about the present and the future. Especially as, 300 years later, we are entering a fascinating year in which the May elections will ask profound questions both within Scotland and over the Border.¹³²

Significantly, as these debates took place, political and media discourse in Scotland increasingly referred to Scottish experiences in the World Wars to highlight the need for separation from Westminster and affirm a distinctly Scottish identity. This can be evidenced in the Scottish Parliamentary debates about the ninetieth anniversary of the Battle of Passchendaele. This debate focused on the possible construction and funding of a monument in Flanders to commemorate the involvement of all Scottish servicemen on the Great War battlefields [See Figure 4.2].¹³³ Here, the project's initiators perceived the existence of a gap in the landscape of remembrance: 'Strangely enough, at the Western Front, nowhere a monument can be found commemorating the overall Scottish



Figure 4.2: A photograph showing the Celtic Cross Monument in Flanders.

Attribution: MMP1917

Accessed at:

https://www.toerismezonnebeke.be/en/Must_see/First_World_War/Monuments_and_memorials [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019].

¹³² Gilson, 'Come and Join Great Debate on Nation's Past, Present and Future'.

¹³³ Presentation of the Project 'Scottish Monument in Flanders', *Scottish Memorial in Flanders Campaign Brochure*, p.3; See also *Will Ye Come to Flanders* (Brochure Published by the Scottish Memorial in Flanders Campaign, 2007), p.21.

involvement. This is so much more striking as the very Scottish regiments took part in some very heavy fighting, often at crucial moments'.¹³⁴

It should be noted that, while this project was initiated (and driven) by the Scottish Memorial in Flanders Campaign, the Scottish Parliament discussions about the memorial, and the subsequent involvement of the Scottish Executive in providing funds to support its construction, are revealing. They highlight the rhetoric increasingly being used to discuss the World Wars in Scotland.

During the debate, Murdo Fraser, then Deputy Leader of the Scottish Conservative Party, highlighted the purpose of the memorial, commenting:

As part of the commemorations, a monument will be erected as a memorial to all Scottish soldiers who took part in the battle – and indeed, in the Great War... several Scottish regiments played a pivotal role in the battle: they include the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, based in Stirling, and the Black Watch, based in Perth.¹³⁵

Fraser continued by suggesting that the 'Celtic Cross is to commemorate not only Scottish soldiers, but also Commonwealth regiments and units that are linked to Scotland'.¹³⁶ It was intended that this would include Highland regiments and Scottish soldiers from Canada, Australia and South Africa, as well as 'the many Scots who served in English, Irish, Welsh, New Zealand, New Foundland [sic] and other battalions'.¹³⁷

This was indicative of Scotland's traditional identification with the former British Empire and modern Commonwealth. Moreover, it highlighted the manner in which the process(es) of commemoration in Scotland were frequently driven by an acute sense that the Scottish Nation had made a substantial and distinctive contribution to the imperial project through

¹³⁴ E. Ureel & J. Sutherland, 'A Scottish Monument in Flanders' in *Will Ye Come to Flanders* (Brochure Published by the Scottish Memorial in Flanders Campaign, 2007), pp.20-23.

¹³⁵ M. Fraser, 'Battle of Passchendaele (90th Anniversary)', *Scottish Parliamentary Debate Official Report*, 31 January 2007, col. 31728.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ *Will Ye Come to Flanders* (Brochure Published by the Scottish Memorial in Flanders Campaign, 2007).

its military. In the case of the First World War, this reflected the perception that Scotland made a disproportionate ‘blood’ sacrifice.

The Labour Deputy Minister for Communities Des McNulty, for example, noted:

In raising a magnificent Celtic Cross on the Frezenberg in Flanders... the organisers are commemorating the bravery of Scottish troops not only in Flanders or at the Battle of Passchendaele, but throughout the entire First World War. As Tom Devine pointed out, Scottish soldiers suffering proportionately the heaviest battlefield casualties... Our soldiers fought alongside from other parts of the UK, the Commonwealth, France and the USA to defend our traditions, values and way of life.¹³⁸

The sacrifice of Scottish soldiers on the battlefield was recognised as significant for Scottish values and character. Moreover, by highlighting the disproportionate Scottish sacrifice, McNulty appears to assert that the weight of Scotland’s contribution to the war effort provides a means of validating its own, distinctive, Scottish nationhood.

Similarly, in commenting on the reasons for the Scottish Government’s financial contribution to the memorial, Linda Fabiani, then Minister for Europe, External Affairs and Culture, noted:

The Scottish Government strongly agreed that the horror of Passchendaele must be remembered and appropriately commemorated, in particular for Scots the sacrifice of the ten Scottish regiments that participated in the offensive. In raising a magnificent Celtic Cross made from Scottish granite at Frezenberg, we are commemorating the bravery of Scottish troops not just in Flanders or at the Battle of Passchendaele, but throughout the entire First World War... It is with humility and compassion and quiet pride that we remember with gratitude *those Scots who fought and died for our nation* on the fields of Flanders during 1917.¹³⁹

The use of such language as ‘[they] fought and died for our nation’ is overtly political in appearing to suggest that those Scots who fought in 1917 had consciously given their lives for the ideal of Scottish nationhood.

¹³⁸ D. McNulty, ‘Battle of Passchendaele (90th Anniversary), *Scottish Parliamentary Debate Official Report*, 31 January 2007, cols. 31738 – 31739.

¹³⁹ L. Fabiani quoted in *Will Ye Come to Flanders*, p.4. Emphasis added.

The monument was constructed on the Frezenberg ridge, near the village of Passendale in Zonnebeke, West Flanders close to the site where the 15th Scottish Division stormed and captured ground held by the German Army during the Battle of Passchendaele. It took the form of a 'High Cross' or 'Celtic Cross' made from Scottish granite (Corrennie Pink) and produced by the Scottish firm Fyfe Glenrock (based near Aberdeen) situated on a plinth of original Great War bunker stones [See Figure 4.3].



Figure 4.3: A photograph showing the detail on the Scottish Celtic Cross.

Attribution: MMP1917

Accessed at: <https://www.visitflanders.com/en/things-to-do/attractions/top/scottish-memorial-frezenberg.jspArtist> [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018].

It was this which led both Erwin Ureel and John Sutherland, the Coordinator of the Scottish Memorial in Flanders Campaign and UK Coordinator respectively, to write that the Cross

would ‘constitute a symbolic link with the homeland both in shape and material’.¹⁴⁰

Moreover, the unveiling of the Cross itself, which appeared draped in the Scottish national flag, reiterated that the image of Scottish troops in battle remained a significant component of Scottish identity [See Figure 4.4].

Furthermore, its inauguration was linked to what was referred to as a ‘Scottish Memorial Weekend’, presented under the title ‘Will Ye Come to Flanders’, held on 25 and 26 August 2007 to commemorate the ninetieth anniversary of the Battle of Passchendaele.¹⁴¹ This consisted of a number of commemorative activities, which sought to combine ‘the aspects of remembrance with traditional Scottish culture’. These included a Highland Games,



Figure 4.4: Photographs showing the unveiling of the Celtic Cross.

Attributions: Photograph www.greatwar.be (Filip Debergh) and Photograph www.greatwar.be (Harmony St Cecilia Beselare)

Accessed at: <http://archieff.w01.be/jwe/2007/Augustus/Zonnebeke-Schots-Gasten%203/body1.htm> <http://archieff.w01.be/jwe/2007/Augustus/Zonnebeke2508/body1.htm>
[Date Accessed: 30/03/2018].

¹⁴⁰ *Will Ye Come to Flanders*, p.21; See also: T. Green, ‘Planning Begins for the Scots Commemoration of Passchendaele’, *Glasgow University’s Great War Project*, accessed at: <https://glasgowunigreatwar.wordpress.com/2016/08/04/planning-begins-for-the-scots-commemoration-of-passchendaele/#more-1215> [Date Accessed: 16/01/2018].

¹⁴¹ This festival formed part of *Remembrance*, a wider series of commemorative events which marked the 90th anniversary of the Battles of Passchendaele and Messines, co-ordinated by the *Passchendaele 1917 Memorial Museum* in Zonnebeke.

Military Tattoo, battlefield visits and dawn service, which were designed to specifically commemorate Scottish soldiers, and involved delegates from the Scottish Executive, Flemish Government, Scottish Military and Scottish Civilian population.¹⁴² The commemorative weekend took place following the election of the SNP minority government in May 2007, whose avowed aim was to achieve independence for Scotland. As such, it was their decision as to whether to attend the event. The impact of this election will be discussed further in the final section of this chapter.

As David Hesse has argued, throughout this commemorative weekend the reframing of Scottish history for political purposes became evident.¹⁴³ Indeed, in addition to its framing as a means of validating Scottish nationhood, discussed above, the event was also used to highlight the historic connections between Scotland and Europe and, more specifically, Scotland and Flanders. There was discussion of the fact that the memorial provided an opportunity to emphasise the bond between ‘two rising federal states within Europe visually and permanently’.¹⁴⁴ Geert Bourgeois, Flemish Minister of Tourism, External Affairs and Media – and a member of the secessionist *Nieuw Vlaamse Alliance* party – stressed that the Scottish monument furthered ‘bonding through commemoration’.¹⁴⁵ He continued, placing the Flemish-Scottish co-operation in a contemporary political context: ‘the commemoration of what should never be repeated thus immediately becomes an active step towards increased and intensified co-operation between the federated states in Europe’.¹⁴⁶ In this reading, the joint commemoration of the Scottish war dead became an act of solidarity between two aspiring European regions. Indeed, while both Scotland and Flanders had acquired greater political self-determination in the 1990s, they continue to have strong separatist movements. It is, however, perhaps worth noting that the SNP appeared less keen to invoke the European dynamics of Scotland’s past or Scottish identity.

¹⁴² *Will Ye Come to Flanders*, p.16.

¹⁴³ D. Hesse, *Warrior Dreams. Playing Scotsmen in Mainland Europe, 1945-2010*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh (2010), p.115.

¹⁴⁴ Hesse, *Warrior Dreams; Will Ye Come to Flanders*, p.23.

¹⁴⁵ G. Bourgeois quoted in *Will Ye Come to Flanders*, p.7.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

Rather, throughout this event they tended to emphasise ‘the massive effect that the First World had and the sacrifices that Scotland made’.¹⁴⁷

Ultimately, between 1999 and 2007 there was little divergence in official approaches to World War commemoration in Scotland. This was due, in part, to the dominance of the Labour Party both in Holyrood and Westminster which ensured that devolution between these years remained predominantly an internal affair characterised by continuity. Consequently, there was considerable pressure for convergence with UK Government political rhetoric and policy which was frequently reflected in the commemoration of the World Wars.

Between the 2003 and 2007 Scottish Parliamentary elections, however, the constitutional debate about the nature of Scotland’s relationship with the United Kingdom reignited. This can be demonstrated by examining debates regarding the Scottish Regiments and anniversary of the 1707 Union. Significantly, during these years both political and media rhetoric increasingly referred to the Scottish war experience as a means of asserting a ‘Scottish’ identity as distinct from a ‘British’, as seen in debates surrounding the building of a Celtic Cross in Flanders. Indeed, devolution had ultimately created a political climate in which the commemoration of the World Wars – which had started as Unionist ‘propaganda’ – was increasingly being appropriated/utilised for political purposes.

The SNP in Power, 2007 – 2016

Between the advent of the new Scottish Parliament in 1999 and the elections of May 2007, the Scottish Government was dominated by a Labour-led coalition, which coincided with thirteen years of Labour rule at Westminster (1997 – 2010). In the May 2007 Scottish Parliamentary elections, however, the SNP became the largest party in Scottish political history for the first time, achieving one more seat than the Labour Party (forty-seven and

¹⁴⁷ L. Fabiani quoted in J. Vallely, ‘Scots Who Fell at Flanders Honoured 90 Years On’, *Scotland on Sunday*, 26 August 2007.

forty-six respectively).¹⁴⁸ The SNP subsequently formed a minority government, while Alex Salmond was elected as First Minister.

As John Curtice has argued, it was the system of political devolution that proved ‘crucial to the party’s ability to secure power’.¹⁴⁹ Indeed, for Colin Mackay the creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 provided the SNP with a ‘political platform and status it could never have otherwise achieved’, thus ‘breathing new life into the SNP’.¹⁵⁰ Similarly, for Hassan this demonstrated the extent to which in the post-devolution landscape the reality of both the SNP and Scottish politics more broadly had changed – providing nationalism with both a platform and the ‘trappings, prestige and resources of office’.¹⁵¹

Significantly, this meant that, for the first time in its seventy-three-year history, the SNP had power at a national (Scottish) level as well as significantly enhancing its electoral position at a local government level.¹⁵² As Fiona Mackay and Meryl Kenny both highlight, the 2007 Scottish Parliament election results were historic. The SNP had not only ended over 50 years of Labour dominance in Scottish politics, but this was also the first time a nationalist-led administration had been elected in one of the devolved parliaments.¹⁵³ It is this which has led Margaret Arnott and Jenny Ozga to comment that 2007 signalled a ‘significant change to the electoral and political landscape of Scottish politics’.¹⁵⁴ Salmond himself recognised this when, with a play of words on Macmillan’s 1960 Cape Town speech

¹⁴⁸ In percentage terms this equated to 1% more in the constituency vote and 2% more in the party list vote. See S. Herbert et al, ‘Election 2007’, *SPICe Briefing*, (Scottish Parliament, 8 May 2007).

¹⁴⁹ J. Curtice, ‘Devolution, the SNP and the Electorate’, in G. Hassan (ed.), *The Modern SNP: From Protest to Power* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p.60

¹⁵⁰ C. Mackay, ‘The SNP and the Scottish Parliament: The Start of a New Sang?’ In Hassan, *The Modern SNP*, p.79.

¹⁵¹ G. Hassan, ‘The Making of the Modern SNP: From Protest to Power’, in Hassan, *The Modern SNP*, p.10.

¹⁵² For D. Kenealy, the SNP’s success can be largely attributed to positive evaluations of the party on issue competence, leadership and party image. See D. Kenealy, ‘The Economy and the Constitution Under the SNP, 2007 – 2016’, *Scottish Affairs* 25.1 (2016).

¹⁵³ F. Mackay & M. Kenny, ‘Women’s Political Representation and the SNP: Gendered Paradoxes and Puzzles’, in Hassan, *The Making of the Modern SNP*, p.42.

¹⁵⁴ Arnott & Ozga, ‘Education and Nationalism’, p.336.

– which heralded the end of the British Empire in Africa – he commented that ‘there is a wind of change blowing through Scottish politics’.¹⁵⁵

From the outset, the tone, style and content of Salmond’s minority administration was one of ‘Scotland’s Government’, with the SNP aspiring to be perceived as the national voice of Scotland.¹⁵⁶ This was in stark contrast to the Labour-Liberal Democrat Executives which had preceded it, and was part of an attempt to convince a majority of Scots of the merits of the drive to achieve national self-determination. In government, then, the SNP sought to promote a distinct Scottish national identity that was not only ‘inclusive, diverse and exciting’ but also ‘steeped in rich culture and history’.¹⁵⁷

To this end, the SNP sought ‘to embed Scottish history, culture and heritage’ in a range of policy areas.¹⁵⁸ Predominant amongst these was the introduction of wide-ranging reforms to the school curriculum in Scottish schools – the so-called *Curriculum for Excellence*.¹⁵⁹ Within this, a great deal of emphasis was placed on the teaching of history. The former Education Secretary, Fiona Hyslop, argued for more emphasis on Scottish history in the education of Scottish pupils, noting that ‘Scotland is one of the few countries in Europe which does not have teaching of its own culture and heritage as a core element of the curriculum’.¹⁶⁰ Underlying this was the perception that Scotland had been “denied” its own history. Moreover, for the SNP, the absence of references to Scottish History accounted for a greater focus on the English aspect of ‘Britishness’ in the identity building of young Scots.

¹⁵⁵ Torrance, *Salmond. Against The Odds*, p.4.

¹⁵⁶ Hassan, *The Making of the Modern SNP: From Protest to Power*, p.11.

¹⁵⁷ A. Salmond, Scottish National Party Conference Speech, 13 October 2006. Accessed at: <https://alanindyfed.blogspot.com/2010/10/aleax-salmond-keynote-speech-to-html> [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018]. See also: A. Salmond, ‘Ambitions for a Celtic Lion Economy. Speech to the Council of Foreign Relations, New York, NY, 12 October 2007. Accessed at: <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/This-Week/Speeches/council-foreign-relation> [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018].

¹⁵⁸ Quoted in A. Mycock, ‘SNP, Identity and Citizenship: Re-Imagining State and Nation’, *National Identities*, 14:1 (2012), pp.53-69. See also: M.S. Leith, ‘Scottish National Party Representations of Scottishness and Scotland’, *Politics*, 28:2 (2008), pp.83-92; M.S. Leith, ‘Governance and Identity in a Devolved Scotland’, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 63:2 (2010), pp/286-301.

¹⁵⁹ It is worth noting that the *Curriculum for Excellence* was originally developed by a unionist Labour/Liberal Democrat coalition and later adopted by the SNP in government.

¹⁶⁰ F. Hyslop, ‘Learning About Scotland’s Past Will Help Shape Our Future’, *The Scotsman*, 21 January 2008.

Adam Ingram, then Minister for Children and Early Years, went further suggesting that the Scots lacked confidence due to the fact ‘they have little knowledge of the glories of their past achievements... or the contribution that the Scots have made to the modern world’.¹⁶¹ The SNP argued that ‘Scotland’s young people must reclaim the past and understand this nation’s history’.¹⁶²

Consequently, the SNP Government strongly encouraged the teaching of a version of Scottish History which emphasised the pre-Union period or focused on specifically Scottish post Union history. As Peter Hillis has highlighted, a compulsory Scottish element was introduced to the ‘Special Topic’ at Higher level.¹⁶³ Significantly, one of these possible topics was the ‘Impact of the Great War, 1914-1928’, which taught the First World War exclusively through the prism of Scottish participation. This course focused on both Scottish experiences of the Great War and its significance in the development of Scottish identity.¹⁶⁴ The course specification listed the four key issues within the module as: Scots on the Western Front; the Domestic Impact of War: Society and Culture; Industry and Economy; and Politics.¹⁶⁵ The description of the content to be covered included, for example, ‘the experience of Scots on the Western Front, with reference to the battles of Loos and the Somme’, ‘the kilted regiments’, ‘the role of Scottish military personnel in terms of commitment, casualties, leadership and overall contribution to the military effort’, ‘Red Clydeside’, ‘continuing support for political unionism’ and ‘the crisis of Scottish identity’. The narratives deployed by the SNP, then, tended to overlook the wider context of events, focusing on Scottish experiences only whilst frequently glorifying certain aspects of the Scottish past, such as its proud martial tradition, in an attempt to emphasise a distinct

¹⁶¹ A. Ingram, ‘Scottish History’, *Scottish Parliamentary Debate Official Report*, 30 January 2008, col. 5591.

¹⁶² F. Hyslop, ‘Pledge to Reclaim Scottish History for Our Children’, *The Scotsman*, 21 January 2008.

¹⁶³ P. Hillis, ‘The Position of History Education in Scottish Schools’, *Curriculum Journal*, 21:2 (2010), pp.141-159.

¹⁶⁴ Scottish Qualifications Authority (SQA), ‘SQA Higher History Course Specification’, *Scottish Qualifications Authority*, 2019. Accessed at: https://www.sqa.org.uk/files_ccc/HigherCourseSpecHistory.pdf [Date Accessed: 10/02/2019].

¹⁶⁵ SQA, ‘SQA Higher History Curriculum Course Specification’.

‘Scottish’ identity. In many ways, this somewhat ironically appeared to mirror Gove’s use of history from which this chapter started.

Discussions of the place of history in schools, however, attracted a significant amount of political debate, press coverage and public comment – more than any other subject. These debates raised a number of concerns about the ‘Bruceification’ or ‘Tartanisation’ of history teaching within Scottish schools.¹⁶⁶ During a Scottish Parliamentary debate held on 30 January 2008, for example, Conservative Education Spokesman Murdo Fraser commented that ‘we don’t want to see any Nationalist tinge to Scottish History’ and criticised attempts by the SNP to present a ‘Braveheart version of our country’s past’.¹⁶⁷ Similarly Ken Macintosh, Labour Shadow Schools Minister, questioned whether the debate about history had been ‘generated’ to focus on the importance of ‘Scottishness’, rather than history.¹⁶⁸ He continued: ‘this is actually about a more limited perspective – about trying to get young people to see the world from a particularly narrow and nationalistic viewpoint’.¹⁶⁹ In a similar debate held a year later, Ken Macintosh commented that it was ‘difficult not to worry about implicit politicisation’ and ‘nationalism creeping into the curriculum’, while Murdo Fraser raised a suspicion that the SNP were ‘pursuing a narrow nationalist agenda’.¹⁷⁰

The controversy regarding the History Curriculum continued for several years. As late as 2012, Neil McLennan, President of the Scottish Association of Teachers of History, commented ‘the British History units pale into dry, boring insignificance against this populist history... many units portray Britain as the consistent arch-imperialist villain of the piece’.¹⁷¹ The British History paper, for example, reduced the Empire to a module on the Atlantic Slave Trade as well as included a module on Britain and Ireland, 1900 – 1985. In

¹⁶⁶ Hillis, ‘The Position of History Education in Scottish Schools’, pp.141-159.

¹⁶⁷ M. Fraser, ‘Scottish History’, *Scottish Parliamentary Debate Official Report*, 30 January 2008, col. 5595.

¹⁶⁸ K. Macintosh, ‘Scottish History’, *Scottish Parliamentary Debate Official Report*, 30 January 2008, col. 5590.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ K. Macintosh, ‘Education (Scottish History)’, *Scottish Parliamentary Debate Official Report*, 25 November 2009, col. 21484; M. Fraser, ‘Education (Scottish History)’, *Scottish Parliamentary Debate Official Report*, 25 November 2009, col. 21490.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

contrast to this, the module in the Scottish History paper on Scotland and Empire, 'Migration and Empire, 1830-1939', focused on the significance of migration and Empire in the development of Scottish identity. Here, the key issues were listed as: The Migration of Scots; The Experience of Immigrants in Scotland; The Impact of Scots Emigrants on the Empire (with reference to Canada, Australia, NZ and India); and The Effect of Migration and Empire on Scotland, to 1939.¹⁷² Similarly, in the guidance provided for the Great War module, no reference was made to the fact Scotland fought for Britain and, indeed, the British Empire.

This highlights the existence of enduring anti-imperialist themes within SNP narratives of Scottish nationalism and independence. Furthermore, it draws attention to the fact that Scotland's involvement in the former Empire and Commonwealth has proven largely absent from the SNP's constructions of an independent Scottish nation-state, with limited acknowledgement of its potential contribution to the shaping of contemporary Scottish national values or identity.¹⁷³ This reflected a propensity for nationalists to focus excessively on Scotland's own perceived 'colonisation' by England, whilst simultaneously overlooking the extent to which modern Scotland was not only a 'product of empire', but that even its economic success was linked to exploitation and slavery.¹⁷⁴ Instead, the SNP insisted that many senior figures within the UK Government had regarded 'Scotland as a colonial property to be divided and ruled by Westminster'.¹⁷⁵ Yet, while criticising Westminster and the British Empire, the SNP was also unwilling to engage with Scotland's own imperialist past. Instead, the implications of any post-independence constitutional ties with the former Empire were not only overlooked but disregarded altogether. Salmond, for

¹⁷² SQA, 'SQA Higher History Course Specification'.

¹⁷³ Mycock, 'SNP, Identity and Citizenship', pp.53-69.

¹⁷⁴ T.M. Devine with N. Patrick (Producer). 'Scotland and Slavery', *Making History* (London: BBC Radio Four, 21 September 2010); T. Gallagher, 'Scotland's Nationalist-Muslim Embrace', *Open Democracy*, 9 August 2007. Accessed at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflicts/democracy_terror/scotland_islam [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018]; Mycock, 'SNP, Identity and Citizenship', pp.53-69.

¹⁷⁵ 'SNP Seizes on North Sea Memo', *BBC News*, 29 December 2005. Accessed at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/4567138.stm> [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018].

example, argued that with independence Scotland 'would carry none of the baggage of the imperial past'.¹⁷⁶

This reluctance to adopt a self-critical position when considering the legacy of Empire and the Scottish nation was linked to a desire by the SNP Government to build diasporic ties. The perceived economic, social and cultural benefits are set alongside the ability to emphasise the distinctiveness of Scottish nationhood and nationality. For example, the 2009 'Homecoming' event aimed to encourage Scottish self-identifying diasporic communities in countries such as the USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia to 'come home'.¹⁷⁷ Yet, there was limited engagement with those diasporic communities which might draw attention to the negative legacy of Scotland's involvement in the imperial project, such as in the Caribbean.¹⁷⁸ Significantly, the Scottish-born diaspora in England were also largely overlooked, due to their potential to highlight links with the Union and a shared 'Britishness'.

It must be kept in mind that between 2007 and 2011 the SNP Government remained a minority administration. This meant that as the SNP was required to govern on the basis of co-operation and consensus, substantial restrictions were often placed on the policies it was able to implement. The reform of Scotland's education system, with a particular focus on the teaching of history, however, remained a crucial component of the SNP's political agenda. It is within discussions about these reforms that we can see increasing reference made to an explicitly 'Scottish' experience of the First World War. This emphasis on 'Scottish' experiences would continue following the re-election of the SNP in 2011.

¹⁷⁶ Scottish National Party, 'It's Time for a Unique Contribution to International Development', 18 January 2007.

¹⁷⁷ M. Wade, 'Homecoming: SNP Hype or Tourism Bonanza?', *The Times*, 28 November 2008. Accessed at: <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article5254353.ece> [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018]; M. Wade, 'Token Asian Face Angers Homecoming Critics', *The Times*, 19 December 2008. Accessed at: <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article5372681.ece> [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018].

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

In May 2011, the SNP secured an absolute majority of seats in the Scottish Parliament. The party won 69 of the parliament's 129 seats, equating to 53.49% of parliamentary seats.¹⁷⁹ This signalled a dramatic shift from the 2007 elections, with an increase of twenty two seats and a 13% rise in the percentage of the vote achieved.¹⁸⁰ The SNP took Labour seats in every city in Scotland, while, Orkney and Shetland aside, they wiped out the Liberal Democrats.¹⁸¹ Consequently, this victory was widely regarded at the time as historic, particularly given the electoral system used in Holyrood elections was designed to prevent any single party from gaining overall control. In fact, devolution, as George Robertson once commented, 'was meant to kill nationalism stone dead'.¹⁸² The scale of the SNP victory, then, changed the political map of Scotland and marked a new period for both the devolved UK and Scottish politics.¹⁸³ After the victory, Salmond commented that 'for the first time we're living up to the idea that we're a national party of Scotland, all classes, all communities, all parts of Scotland; we will do our absolute best to redeem the people's trust.'¹⁸⁴

The election of the SNP, in turn, had significant implications for the commemoration of the World Wars. This is particularly evident in the case of the First World War centenary, where it is apparent that the SNP encouraged a distinctive approach to the commemorations in Scotland. In March 2013, for example, the Scottish Government announced the formation of a Scottish Advisory Commemorations Panel to 'recommend and oversee a programme of events to commemorate the centenary of World War One'.¹⁸⁵ Under the leadership of former Army Chaplain Professor Norman Drummond, the panel were tasked with

¹⁷⁹ Of these, the SNP won 53 seats in the constituencies with 45.4% of the vote and 16 seats in the regions with 44.7%. The Labour Party, in contrast, won only 37 seats.

¹⁸⁰ S. Herbert et al, 'Election 2011', *SPICe Briefing*, (Scottish Parliament, 10 May 2011).

¹⁸¹ S. Carrell, 'Stunning SNP Election Victory Throws Spotlight on Scottish Independence', *The Guardian*, 6 May 2011. Accessed at: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/may/06/snp-election-victory-scottish-independence> [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018].

¹⁸² G. Robertson quoted in G. Hassan, 'The "Forward March" of Scottish Nationalism', *Renewal. A Journal of Social Democracy*, 19:2 (2011).

¹⁸³ Hassan, 'The "Forward March" of Scottish Nationalism'.

¹⁸⁴ A. Salmond quoted in Carrell, 'Stunning SNP Election Victory Throws Spotlight on Scottish Independence'.

¹⁸⁵ See also 'First World War (Centenary), *Scottish Parliamentary Debate Official Report*, 27 June 2013, cols. 21763 – 21774.

identifying key dates to be commemorated for Scotland, in addition to ensuring commemorations achieved a range of objectives.¹⁸⁶ According to both the WW100 Scotland and the Scottish Government websites, these objectives were as follows: to ‘remember the role and sacrifice of Scottish servicemen and women’; ‘reflect on the global impact of World War One’; ‘reflect on the domestic impact of World War One in Scotland both during 1914-1918 and the lasting social and civic legacy of the war’ while achieving a ‘balance of tone between remembrance and celebration’ as well as ‘encouraging a spirit of research and inquiry in educational and genealogical terms’.¹⁸⁷ Similarly, the minutes from the first meeting of the panel indicate that in ‘Setting the Scene’, the historian Trevor Royle explained why, despite having been a British effort, the War had a ‘significant and distinct political, social and economic impact and implications for Scotland and her people’.¹⁸⁸ Here, it is apparent that a desire to raise awareness about Scotland’s experiences of the War was central to the panel’s objectives.¹⁸⁹

The Scottish Commemorations Panel subsequently recommended a series of eight key dates to be commemorated, alongside local and community initiatives, which would span a five-year commemorative programme running from 2014 – 2019.¹⁹⁰ This differed from the UK Government programme, which spanned only four years from 2014 to 2018. In addition to national centenaries including both the outbreak of the War and the Armistice, the dates recommended by the Scottish panel focused on a series of anniversaries of particularly

¹⁸⁶ ‘The Panel. About the Scottish Commemorations Panel’, *WW100 Scotland*. Accessed at: <http://ww100scotland.com/panel/> [Date Accessed: 16/01/2018]. See E. Fergus, ‘Scotland Ready to Commemorate First World War’, *Sunday Herald*, 10 March 2013.

¹⁸⁷ Scottish Commemorations Panel, ‘Scottish Commemorations Panel: Objectives’, *The Scottish Government*. Accessed at: <https://beta.gov.scot/publications/scottish-commemorations-panel-objectives/> [Date Accessed: 16/01/2018]; See also <http://ww100scotland.com/> [Date Accessed: 06/06/2018].

¹⁸⁸ Scottish Commemorations Panel, ‘Minutes from the First Meeting of the Scottish Commemorations Panel’, 14 March 2013. See also Royle quoted in Anon, ‘Panel to Oversee Commemorations of First World War’.

¹⁸⁹ Official Commemorations Panel Tag Line for the Commemorations was ‘what do we learn from all this’.

¹⁹⁰ N. Drummond, ‘Blog: Norman Drummond, Chair of the Scottish Commemorations Panel, on the Drumhead Service and Memorial Events Taking Place on August 10’, *WW100 Scotland*, 15 May 2014. Accessed at: <http://ww100scotland.com/blog/> [Date Accessed: 16/01/2018].

Scottish significance.¹⁹¹ Sir Hew Strachan, Chichele Professor of War at Oxford University and member of both the UK and Scottish Commemorations Panels, commented that the panel wished to mark those events that had a ‘much bigger impact on Scotland than perhaps they did elsewhere’.¹⁹² These included the Quintinshill rail disaster, near Gretna, which killed 214 Scottish Territorial soldiers on 22 May 2015; the Battles of Loos and Arras, which are seen to have particular resonance given the involvement of Scottish Battalions; the Battle of Jutland; and the sinking of the HMV *Iolaire* in January 1919, off the coast of Stornaway, during which 204 servicemen drowned.¹⁹³ In this, Drummond noted that ‘as well as aligning with the United Kingdom commemorative programme, these dates would enable Scotland to remember the specific and significant contributions made by our servicemen and women and our local communities in very challenging times throughout the First World War and beyond’ while also reflecting ‘the impact the First World War had on Scotland’.¹⁹⁴ Yet, it is striking that these commemorations focused overwhelmingly on military events.

The Scottish Government also announced the creation of two £1 million funds to assist secondary schools to undertake battlefield visits and support the renovation of war memorials. The first of these, the Centenary Memorials Restoration Fund (CMRF), was launched in January 2013 by First Minister Alex Salmond ‘to support the repair and conservation of war memorials in Scotland’ as one way to mark the First World War centenary.¹⁹⁵ Speaking during a visit to the war memorial in Fyvie, Aberdeenshire, Salmond

¹⁹¹ Anon, ‘The Centenary The Dates; The Dates, Recommended by the Scottish Commemorations Panel, That Will Be Marked During the Centenary of the World War One’, *Daily Record & Sunday Mail*, 18 May 2014.

¹⁹² Hew Strachan quoted in J. Morrison, ‘This Is A Commemoration Not A Celebration... Leading Historian on Shaping How Our Nation Should Remember The Fallen’, *Daily Record & Sunday Mail*, 18 May 2014, pp.48 – 49.

¹⁹³ Todman, ‘The Space Afterwards’.

¹⁹⁴ Drummond quoted in S. MacNab, ‘First World War Centenary Plans Announced by FM’, *The Scotsman*, 24 May 2013; ‘WW1 Commemorations in Scotland’, *Scottish Government News Publication*, 23 May 2013.

¹⁹⁵ The scheme ran from April 2013 to March 2018. For more information see <http://www.warmemorials.org/grants-scotland/> [Date Accessed: 16/01/2018]. See also: <http://www.warmemorials.org/uploads/publications/400.pdf> and <http://www.warmemorials.org/uploads/publications/399.pdf> [Date Accessed: 16/01/2018].

stated that ‘the events in 2014 to mark the anniversary of the outbreak of the Great War will not be a celebration in Scotland, but a commemoration of the servicemen and women who paid the ultimate price in defence of our country.’¹⁹⁶ He argued that ‘Scotland’s war memorials... pay tribute to those fallen and will be an important part of the commemorations in communities the length and breadth of Scotland during 2014’ before remarking that ‘the launch of the CMRF... will offer grants to those who care for these important monuments for works to be carried out’.¹⁹⁷ Salmond commented that ‘each memorial in Scotland reminds us of the sacrifice made by those who died during the Great War, Second World War and other conflicts. They remind us of the *futility of war and the necessity that we never forget the sacrifice* made by those who fell in conflict.’¹⁹⁸ Similarly, a Government Spokesman noted that ‘the creation of this new fund... will allow communities across Scotland to carry out maintenance of memorials as part of the hundredth anniversary of the First World War’.¹⁹⁹

This initiative appeared to be generally well-received. Members of the public wrote to newspapers about it and intervened on radio talk shows. For example, in a ‘Letter to the Editor’ of *The Herald*, one Donald MacLeod wrote that ‘as one who lost many relatives in the two world wars I am grateful to the SNP Government for establishing a fund to restore Scottish War memorials... In the two world wars Scotland made a military contribution greatly above her due and fair share having regard to the Scottish proportion of the British population’.²⁰⁰

Later that year, in May 2013, the Government announced that ‘every secondary school in Scotland’ would be offered financial help in order to carry out educational visits to

¹⁹⁶ A. Salmond quoted in F. Urquhart, ‘£1m Fund to Restore War Memorials Ahead of Centenary’, *The Scotsman*, 15 January 2013. Accessed at: <https://www.scotsman.com/lifestyle/1m-fund-to-restore-war-memorials-ahead-of-centenary-1-2736128> [Date Accessed: 16/01/2018].

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid; See also Anon, ‘Alex Salmond Announces Scottish War Memorials Restoration Fund’, *BBC News Online*, 14 January 2013. Accessed at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-21013594> [Date Accessed: 16/01/2018]. Emphasis added.

¹⁹⁹ Government Spokesman quoted in Urquhart, ‘£1m Fund to Restore War Memorials Ahead of Centenary’; See also Anon, ‘Alex Salmond Announces Scottish War Memorials Restoration Fund’.

²⁰⁰ D. MacLeod, ‘Letters: War Memorial Restoration Fund is Both Welcome and Overdue’, *The Herald*, 17 January 2013.

European battlefields as part of the Governments' plans to mark the centenary.²⁰¹ The scheme would provide a £2000 grant to every senior school throughout Scotland to help them meet the costs of trips to Western Front battlefields and war graves.²⁰² In announcing the £1 million fund, to be administered by Historic Scotland, the First Minister commented: 'it is absolutely crucial that we take the opportunity presented by the centenary to help young people develop a deeper understanding of the causes, consequences and horrors of the war and the devastation wrought by the conflict on communities in all corners of the country'.²⁰³ Moreover, he noted that by taking 'pupils and teachers to Europe during the centenary' the fund would not only broaden pupils' knowledge of the conflict but ensure 'that a new generation of Scots never forgets the unimaginable price paid by their forbears a century ago'.²⁰⁴ In response to this announcement, Drummond commented that 'it is vital that we create an educational legacy as part of Scotland's commemorative programme'.²⁰⁵ He continued, 'these visits will enable our pupils and teachers to experience at first-hand the significant service and sacrifice given by so many Scottish servicemen and women throughout World War One'.²⁰⁶ Similarly, Denise Dunlop, President of the Scottish Association of Teachers of History, said: 'battlefield visits are a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for school pupils to learn first-hand about war and its horrible consequences... many of these conflicts are glamourised in today's society, and these trips offer a chance for young people to learn the truth about what happened to so many thousands of soldiers'.²⁰⁷

The developments of these years illustrated the existence of significant differences in the patterns of official commemoration either side of the border, which can be seen both in

²⁰¹ Anon, 'WW1 Battlefield Schools' Visit Funding', *Scottish Government News Release*, 20 May 2013.

²⁰² Ibid; F. Urquhart, 'Schools To Get Cash for WW1 Battlefield Trips', *The Scotsman*, 20 May 2013. Accessed at: <https://www.scotsman.com/news/education/schools-to-get-cash-for-wwi-battlefield-trips-1-2937206> [Date Accessed: 16/01/2018].

²⁰³ A. Salmond quoted in Urquhart, 'Schools to Get Cash for WW1 Battlefield Trips'. See also: Anon, 'WW1 Battlefield Schools' Visit Funding'.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Norman Drummond quoted in 'Urquhart, 'Schools to Get Cash for WW1 Battlefield Trips''. See also: Anon, 'WW1 Battlefield Schools' Visit Funding'.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Urquhart, 'Schools to Get Cash for WW1 Battlefield Trips'.

the length of the Scottish commemorative programme and events chosen. These differences were also reflected in the different ways in which the British Prime Minister and Scottish First Minister announced their respective countries' centenary plans and the rhetoric adopted more broadly throughout the commemorations. The Prime Minister, David Cameron, justified the need to mark the centenary on the basis of three reasons: the need to remember the scale of the losses from every community in the country; the War's place in the development of modern Britain, not least in the demonstration of 'resilience [...] courage [and] the values we hold dear'; and the emotional pull of the conflict, which was still 'a fundamental part of our national [British] consciousness' and mattered 'not just in our heads, but in our hearts'.²⁰⁸ It was for these reasons, therefore, that Cameron called for a 'truly national commemoration'.²⁰⁹

Conversely, Salmond, speaking at the annual Royal British Legion Scotland conference in Perth in May 2013, adopted a more downbeat tone. He stated that communities across Scotland were to gather together and remember the 'exceptional sacrifice made by their sons during the brutal conflicts of the war'.²¹⁰ Continuing, Salmond noted:

*[T]he Great War commemorations are in no sense a celebration of the centenary of this devastating conflict. They are a commemoration, which will give the whole of the country the opportunity to reflect on the impact that the First World War had on Scotland... By reflecting on these devastating events, and the consequences they had for communities the length and breadth of Scotland, we will help people of all ages in this country understand more about the *futility of war* and strengthen our resolve to never let a tragedy like the Great War happen again.*²¹¹

In this address, Salmond struck a distinctive note. By emphasising the futility of the conflict and framing the Scottish Government's programme of events in terms that depicted the War as a tragedy never to be repeated, he sought to distinguish the commemorations in Scotland from those of the UK Government.

²⁰⁸ D. Cameron, 'World War Centenary Plans', Speech at the Imperial War Museum London, 11 October 2012. Accessed at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-at-imperial-war-museum-on-first-world-war-centenary-plans> [Date Accessed: 18/01/2016].

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Salmond quoted in MacNab, 'First World War Centenary Plans Announced by FM'; 'WW1 Commemorations in Scotland'. Emphasis added.

²¹¹ Ibid.

The divergence in these announcements, in fact, reflected differences in not only the politics of the Great War's meaning, but also the politics of nationhood in the UK and Scotland more broadly. As we have already seen (cf. Chapter One), Cameron's announcement, which compared the centenary to events such as the Diamond Jubilee and Olympic Games, was interpreted by some as too celebratory.²¹² Indeed, it appeared motivated by a desire to appropriate the memory of the First World War in order to generate an outpouring of patriotic sentiment that would bind the Union together. At the heart of Salmond's announcement, however, was a contrasting political agenda focused on the achievement of Scottish independence.

Yet, while these announcements diverged in discussions of the historic events themselves it is also evident that there were some similarities with regards to attitudes to the present. In each of these speeches, neither Salmond nor Cameron refer to reconciliation with former enemies such as Germany or, indeed, joint commemorations with allies including France and Belgium. Instead, each focuses on specific national contexts. This contrasts sharply with approaches elsewhere. In France, for example, the State framed the commemoration of the centenary in terms of 'peace and reconciliation', emphasising not only international dimensions but European ideals more specifically.²¹³ This was particularly evident in the joint commemoration, with German President Joachim Gauck, of the declaration of war by Germany on France on 3 August 1914. In Germany, on the other hand, there was no central commemorative event in 2014.²¹⁴ Instead, both Gauck and Angela Merkel took part in commemorative events in Belgium and France. Despite this, it is also worth noting that Germany criticised Cameron's 'celebratory' approach to the centenary. Andreas Meitzner, the Federal Foreign Office's Special Envoy to the commemoration of the outbreak of the First World War, for example, flew to London and observed that a victory celebration might lead to a cooling of German-British relations while noting that the focus should be on

²¹² M. Fry, 'Michael Fry: Battle for Hearts and Minds', *The Scotsman*, 13 June 2013.

²¹³ See R. Fathi, 'French Commemoration: The Centenary Effect and the (Re)discovery of 14-18', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 50:3 (2015), pp.545-552 for a more detailed discussion of the French approach to first years of the centenary.

²¹⁴ See M. Bayer, 'Commemoration in Germany: Rediscovering History', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 50:3 (2015), pp.553-561 for a more detailed discussion of the German approach to the first years of the centenary.

victims and especially on the European Union as the institution that ‘helped us overcome the situation where a war like this could start, where European countries could go to war with one another’.²¹⁵

Throughout the course of the centenary commemorations, it is apparent that the rhetoric used frequently sought to balance an emphasis on the futility of war with drawing attention to Scotland’s ‘unique’ contribution to the war effort and its ‘lasting social and civic legacy’ for the Scottish nation.²¹⁶ This is indicative of a politicised commemorative narrative which sought to combine pride in Scotland’s military achievements with a sense of inconsolable loss and sorrow, reflecting the significance that the First World War has come to bear, located within the martial tradition, in Scottish history and, indeed, for Scottish identity. Within this, the perception of a ‘disproportionately Scottish contribution’ to the war effort was predominant. Stephen McGinty, writing in *The Scotsman*, suggested that the ‘ties that bind Scotland to World War One are blood red... as a nation we lost 149,000 men during the conflict... Proportionally more than twice the number of other parts of Britain’.²¹⁷ Similarly, ahead of the Glasgow Cathedral World War One Commonwealth Service, Salmond commented that:

No home, no school, no community in Scotland was left untouched by the devastating impact of the Great War, which remains one of the most brutal conflicts the world has ever seen. Scotland’s losses were, per capita, among the highest of any combatant nation, and the war’s effects on our nation were profound and long-lasting.²¹⁸

²¹⁵ A. Meitzner quoted in J. Copping, ‘Germany Intervenes in WW1 Commemoration Debate’, *The Telegraph*, 18 August 2013.

²¹⁶ F. Hyslop, quoted in S. Macnab, ‘Scots Rail Disaster at Heart of WW1 Commemorations’, *The Scotsman*, 9 January 2015.

²¹⁷ S. McGinty, ‘Stephen McGinty: First World War History in Making’, *The Scotsman*, 18 October 2013.

²¹⁸ Scottish Government, ‘FM: Journey of Commemoration Starts Today’, *The Scottish Government*, 4 August 2014. Accessed at: <https://news.gov.scot/news/fm-journey-of-commemoration-starts-today> [Date Accessed: 06/03/2016].

He continued: 'between 1914 and 1918, the First World War claimed the lives of around 145,000 Scots'.²¹⁹ In each of these instances, reference was made to an inflated figure of Scottish deaths in order to draw attention to the significance of Scotland's contribution.

Throughout this speech, and the commemorations more broadly, it is striking that Salmond does not refer to the 'British' state or even the 'British Empire' in framing the cause that Scots fought and died for. Instead, the commemorations, and its transnational connections, were being firmly located within a distinctly Scottish context and experience of war. This is indicative of a broader omission of Scotland's involvement in the British Empire, as already noted in the discussion of education policy, from the rhetoric and policies as well as the political and cultural constructions of 'Scottishness' being promoted by the SNP. This is due, in no small part, to the complicated and problematic legacy of the British Empire for those seeking post-UK independence/statehood.²²⁰ The involvement of large numbers of Scots, Welsh, Irish and English in the British Empire has the potential to draw attention to a common imperial experience. Consequently, acknowledging Scottish involvement in the 'British' imperial project could highlight narratives that emphasise a shared 'British' past and a 'British', as opposed to 'Scottish', identity thus reinforcing links with the wider Union.

It is apparent, therefore, that the language utilised throughout the commemorations focused on the wider framing of the War and the casualties of war as exclusively 'Scottish'.²²¹ There was not only no mention of the British Empire, but also, linked to this, little to no differentiation or acknowledgement of the experiences of the different ethnic or religious groups, such as the Irish Catholics or Italian immigrants, within Scotland. Instead, their experiences appeared to have been integrated into, if not even lost within, a broader 'Scottish' narrative of the War which focused on Scotland's martial tradition.²²² The

²¹⁹ Scottish Government, 'FM: Journey of Commemoration Starts Today'.

²²⁰ See. A Mycock, 'British Citizenship and the Legacy of Empires', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 63:2 (2010) for a further discussion of this.

²²¹ See S. MacNab, 'Scottish WW1 Tribute Accused of Whitewash', *The Scotsman*, 27 May 2013; F. Hyslop quoted in Scottish Government, 'WW1 Commemorations Go Nationwide', *The Scottish Government*, 9 January 2015. Accessed at: <http://news.scotland.gov.uk/News/WW1-commemorations-go-nationwide> [Date Accessed: 06/03/2016].

²²² See E. McFarland, 'How the Irish Paid Their Debt: Irish Catholics in Scotland and Voluntary Enlistment, August 1914-July 1915', *Scottish Historical Review*, 82 (2003), pp.261-284 and D. Tierney, 'Catholics and Great War Memorialisation in Scotland', *Journal of Scottish Historical Studies*, 37:1

absence of any references to race, and indeed religion, in this self-analysis of the Scottish nation, then, is striking. It contrasts sharply with the commemorations undertaken by both Ireland and the Westminster Government (cf. Chapter One), which explicitly sought to recognise the contributions of ethnic minority communities and the impact of the War on a multi-cultural Britain. In Scotland, however, this lack of engagement with diversity was not only linked to the problems created by recognising and representing a multi-ethnic past, but also to the underlying sectarian traditions of the SNP.

The SNP, in fact, have been broadly criticised by the Labour Party for their approach to the sectarian question since 2007, which Tom Gallagher has argued has largely been an ‘invisible issue’.²²³ This is despite the fact that sectarianism continues to maintain a visible presence in Scotland.²²⁴ It is particularly apparent in Glasgow where it continues to be played out symbolically in both street parades and football matches between Celtic and Rangers. Indeed, commenting ahead of the centenary commemorations, Sir Hew Strachan observed that in Glasgow it was still possible to view the Great War in sectarian terms.²²⁵

Taken together, the absence of both race and religion throughout the centenary commemorations suggests that the SNP was attempting to overlook – instead of reconciling - schisms within Scottish society that have the potential to compromise national unity or the perceived unity of Scottish nationhood.

(2017), pp.19-51 for a more detailed discussion of the contribution of Irish Catholics in Scotland to the war effort and their memorialisation. See also: T. Clayton, ‘Diasporic Otherness’: Racism, Sectarianism and “National Exteriority” in Modern Scotland’, *Social and Cultural Geography*, 6:1 (2005), pp.99-116.

²²³ T. Gallagher, ‘Holding a Mirror to Scotia’s Face: Religious Anxieties and Their Capacity to Shake a Post-Unionist Scotland’, in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Scotland’s Shame? Bigotry and Sectarianism in Modern Scotland* (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publications, 2000), pp.41-52, p.44; T. Gallagher, *Divided Scotland. Ethnic Friction and Christian Crisis* (Glendareul: Argyll Publishing, 2013), p.9. See also Mycock, ‘SNP, Identity and Citizenship’.

²²⁴ See for example blogs by the Reverend David Chillingworth, Bishop of St Andrews, Dunkeld and Dunblane between 2004 and 2017, and Primus of the Scottish Episcopal Church between 2009 and 2016. Chillingworth has discussed the continuing prevalence of sectarianism in Scotland. See: D. Chillingworth, ‘Faith in Teaching’, *Time to Think. David Chillingworth’s Blog*, 18 August 2009. Accessed at: <http://www.bishopdavid.net/2009/08/faith-in-teaching/> [Date Accessed: 16/01/2019].

²²⁵ Discussed in Jeffery, ‘Commemoration in the United Kingdom’, p.564.

The 2011 election not only generated a distinctive approach to commemoration but also signalled a marked change in debates about Scotland's future constitutional arrangements within the United Kingdom. The SNP's 2011 election manifesto, for example, contained a commitment to holding a referendum on Scottish independence, stating: '[w]e think the people of Scotland should decide our nation's future in a democratic referendum and opinion polls suggest that most Scots agree. We will, therefore, bring forward our Referendum Bill in this next Parliament'.²²⁶

Between 2007 and 2011, however, the SNP had been unable to hold a referendum on secession from the United Kingdom as the opposition parties (together accounting for a majority of the MSP) opposed it.²²⁷ Consequently, the SNP's landslide victory in May 2011 was seen as removing this barrier, and providing the 'moral authority' to deliver a referendum, thus making the fulfilment of its manifesto commitment unavoidable.²²⁸

The political dynamics of this referendum, held on 18 September 2014, and its juxtaposition with the anniversary of the start of Britain's involvement in the First World War (six weeks earlier on 4 August 2014), as well as that of the Battle of Bannockburn, provided a further dimension to debates about the centenary. Although this was coincidental, the way it was handled was indicative of the cultural and political cross-currents associated with the centenary commemorations and the potential mobilisation of history as a powerful cultural resource for purposes of British national integration and disintegration.²²⁹ However, it is worth noting that both the pro- and anti-independence campaigns formally signalled a 'political armistice' in agreeing that the commemorations of

²²⁶ Scottish National Party, *The Next Steps to a Better Scotland* (Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, 2011).

²²⁷ R. Johns, J. Mitchell & C. Carman, 'The Scottish National Party's Success in Winning an Outright Majority at Holyrood in May 2011 was an Extraordinary Result in an 'Ordinary' Election. Research Shows that Scots Voters Did Not Move Further Towards Secession and Independence', *British Politics and Policy*, London School of Economics and Political Science, 27 July 2011. Accessed at: <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/snp-scotland-victory/> [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018].

²²⁸ Cairney, *The Scottish Political System Since Devolution*; Salmond quoted in Carrell, 'Stunning SNP Election Victory'.

²²⁹ P. O'Leary, 'Mobilising the Past for Today's Politics', *IWA Wales*, 25 April 2014. Accessed at: <https://www.iwa.wales/click/2014/04/mobilising-the-past-for-todays-politics/> [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018].

the First World War should not be utilised for political purposes. Scottish Secretary Alistair Carmichael, for example, noted that while ‘2014 is obviously a very important year for Scotland for other reasons... it should go without saying that an experience with such profound and lasting consequences as the First World War deserves the utmost respect from politicians and commentators’.²³⁰ Similarly, a spokesman for ‘Yes Scotland’ noted that ‘the horrific sacrifice and bloodshed of the First World War is something for everyone in Scotland to remember and honour and people of all political views and none will come together on that respectful basis.’²³¹ Here, the marking of a ‘national anniversary’ at a point when the shape of the United Kingdom was about to potentially alter highlights the degree to which the multi-national nature of the UK state presented further political challenges in approaches to World War commemoration.

Significantly, *Do Mention the War*, a report published on 4 August 2013 by the Imperial War Museums and British Future, an independent think tank, which surveyed attitudes towards the War revealed national differences. In this report it was the Scottish response, centred on Glasgow, which was arguably the ‘most striking’.²³² According to Sunder Katwala, director of British Future, in Scotland responses reflected a wider gender gulf than elsewhere, which in turn took on a stronger political dimension. The survey results suggested that ‘for Scottish men, there was strong suspicion of political agendas given the timing of the centenary’, within which suspicion was frequently directed at ‘the Westminster Government [...] but also at how Alex Salmond might exploit the occasion for those opposed to independence’.²³³ The results also indicated that ‘Glasgow men saw the centenary as British, rather than Scottish, and therefore as less relevant to them’.²³⁴ Interestingly, it has also been suggested that sectarianism may have been an important determining factor in explaining the results of this survey. Helen McArdle, writing in the *Sunday Herald*, drew on a report which stated that for Glaswegian men ‘the starting point

²³⁰ B. Ferguson, ‘1st World War Parade at Heart of Edinburgh Fringe’, *The Scotsman*, 16 May 2014.

²³¹ D. Maddox, ‘Political Armistice Promised as Britain Marks WW1 Centenary’, *The Scotsman*, 11 October 2012.

²³² Tanner, *Do Mention the War. Will 1914 Matter in 2014?*

²³³ S. Katwala, ‘“Was That One or Was That Two?”’, in Tanner, *Do Mention the War*, pp.8-9.

²³⁴ Katwala, ‘“Was That One or Was That Two?”’.

was scepticism about the political uses of this event so close to the referendum and distance from a “British” event. Moreover, it noted that the context of sectarianism (and football) in Glasgow in particular framed the male discussion of British identity, the military and Remembrance’.²³⁵

Moreover, as briefly discussed in the introduction to this chapter, during the referendum campaign supporters of Scottish independence raised concerns about the United Kingdom’s ‘jingoistic celebrations’ of the Great War.²³⁶ For Stephen McGinty, there were those who were ‘concerned that the commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the First World War could be used to tighten the bind of Britishness’.²³⁷ In a letter to *The Herald*, for example, Ian Grant commented that the ‘nature and tenor’ of David Cameron’s national centenary announcements made him ‘extremely anxious’. He noted that ‘for Scotland the First World War was a defining event in history, not based on the national spirit, but on the sheer destruction of a generation of the country’s young men and the desolation of communities across the land [...] proportionately, more than twice as many Scots died in the First World War as in other parts of the UK’.²³⁸ Grant continued, ‘if this were to be a genuine commemoration of the war, with due regard being given to its futility and the destruction it wrought, as well as to the bravery and loss, that would be acceptable. If it becomes a celebration of British imperial history it will be a disgrace.’²³⁹

This was a sentiment echoed in a number of other letters to newspapers. Mary Thomas, for example, regarded the UK Government’s plans to commemorate the start of the First World War as an ‘attempt to bolster Britishness in 2014’ and ‘cynical attempt to influence the referendum result’ while for Iain Mann they represented a ‘cynical political ploy to wrap Britain once again in the Union Flag just a few weeks before the independence

²³⁵ H. McArdle, ‘Why Glasgow Men Do Not Want to Celebrate WW1’, *Sunday Herald*, 4 August 2013.

²³⁶ J. McAlpine, ‘Joan McAlpine: Slaughter of Great War Cast a Shadow Over Scotland That Took Decades to Lift... There’s Nothing to Celebrate’, *Daily Record*, 5 November 2013.

²³⁷ McGinty, ‘First World War History in Making’.

²³⁸ I. Grant, ‘Letters: A Genuine Commemoration of the War to End All Wars?’, *The Herald*, 13 October 2012.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*

referendum'.²⁴⁰ He continued, 'if that is indeed so, I can only regard such behaviour as despicable and an insult to the sacrifice of all those Scots who lost their lives in the conflict'.²⁴¹ Similarly, Donald Kerr wrote that 'David Cameron wants to have that special day in August 2014, the anniversary of the start of the war, what I believe to be, a cynical attempt to make political capital just before the referendum on independence. That, to me, is abhorrent'.²⁴² Hugh McLean, also made this link to the referendum, commenting that:

It would be extremely distasteful if David Cameron has in mind to promote and to stimulate the NO vote in this year of the independence referendum on the backs of the victims of this dreadful war in which the Scots and more particularly the Highland regiments had a disproportionate share.²⁴³

Similarly, in an article in the *Daily Record*, the SNP MSP Joan McAlpine referred to the 'Great Slaughter' of Scotland's young who died as a result of 'misplaced loyalty'.²⁴⁴ One observer went as far as to suggest that 'British military commanders have always viewed Scottish forces as expendable'.²⁴⁵ He continued by arguing that a vote for independence would ensure that future generations of Scots could not be 'sent like lambs to the slaughter for a monarch or a crusading Western zealot'.²⁴⁶

In contrast to this, supporters of the Union argued that the century would provide 'ample opportunity to remind the Scottish people how they stood together with the English, Welsh and Northern Irish'.²⁴⁷ Perhaps the most controversial of these statements came from Lord

²⁴⁰ M. Thomas, 'Letter to the Editor: A Genuine Commemoration of the War to End All Wars?', *The Herald*, 13 October 2012; I. Mann, 'Letter to the Editor: Let Us Not Make Political Capital Out of the First World War Dead', *The Herald*, 1 March 2013.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² D. Kerr, 'Letter to the Editor: A Genuine Commemoration of the War to End All Wars?', *The Herald*, 13 October 2012.

²⁴³ H. McLean, 'Letter to the Editor: A Genuine Commemoration of the War to End All Wars?', *The Herald*, 13 October 2012.

²⁴⁴ McAlpine, 'Slaughter of Great War'.

²⁴⁵ M. MacLachlan, 'Why Ypres Matters More Than Bannockburn for the Independence', *Caledonian Mercury*, 16 April 2012. Accessed at: <https://archive.is/LtIINL> (<http://caledonianmercury.com/2012/04/16/opinion-why-ypres-matters-more-than-bannockburn-for-the-independence-vote/0032258>) [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018].

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ S. Johnson, 'Why War Anniversaries Will Influence the Battle Over Scottish Independence', *The Daily Telegraph*, 8 November 2011.

Lang of Monkton, a former Scottish Secretary, during a debate in the House of Lords about the implications of an independent Scotland. Lang noted that ‘for generations, Scots and English have lived alongside each other, sharing a British heritage. They fought shoulder to shoulder in the battles of the past three centuries and still serve together today’.²⁴⁸ He continued, ‘must they now, both Scotland and England’ disavow that shared history? *Would that not dishonour the sacrifices, made in common cause, of those who died for the United Kingdom, a nation now to be cut in two if the present generation of Scottish nationalists have their way?*²⁴⁹ The Scottish Conservatives, however, quickly distanced themselves from these remarks. Ruth Davidson, the leader, ‘[d]eplore[d] all intemperate language in this hugely important constitutional debate... I believe everybody in Scotland, no matter their views on the referendum, will come together throughout the year to commemorate those who fought for their country in the First World War’.²⁵⁰

Moreover, a number of commentators also portrayed the commemorations as a chance to counter the nationalist rhetoric associated with the 700th anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn, which is widely regarded by nationalists as a key episode in Scotland’s history of self-determination, to be commemorated on the 23 and 24 June 2014.²⁵¹ Significantly, a number of Unionist politicians, in both the Scottish and UK parliaments, accused the Scottish Government of investing more funding in the Bannockburn anniversary while deliberately sidelining the First World War commemorations. In 2010, for example, the Scottish Government announced that a new £5 million visitor centre would be built at the site of the Battle of Bannockburn, to be opened in 2014 for the anniversary.²⁵² In addition to this, a further £250,000 was allocated to the staging of a major re-enactment event, which was to be held on 28-30 June 2014. As a result of this, the Government was interpreted as dedicating considerable resources to the celebration of

²⁴⁸ Anon, ‘Why Must the Long Dead Be Called Up to Fight for Union?’, *The Herald*, 1 February 2014; D. Maddox, ‘Scottish Independence: Lang Comments Ridiculous’, *The Scotsman*, 30 January 2014.

²⁴⁹ Anon, ‘Why Must the Long Dead Be Called Up to Fight for Union?’; Maddox, ‘Scottish Independence: Lang Comments Ridiculous’.

²⁵⁰ R. Davidson quoted in Maddox, ‘Scottish Independence: Lang Comments Ridiculous’.

²⁵¹ Todman, ‘The Space Afterwards’; Gove, ‘Address to the Scottish Conservative Conference’.

²⁵² Anon, ‘Bannockburn Centre to Offer ‘Flavour’ of Battle’, *BBC News Online*, 11 October 2010. Accessed at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-tayside-central-11515074> [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018].

the defeat the Scots inflicted on the English. This approach led one commentator to suggest that it was an attempt by the Scottish Government to appeal to the 'inner nationalist' of Scots rather than their 'outer Brit'.²⁵³ For Ditchburn and Macdonald, in fact, the public profile of Bannockburn increased enormously as both the anniversary and the referendum approached while Simon Johnson has emphasised that history is central to Salmond's political thinking.²⁵⁴

Furthermore, in April 2013 a cross-party group of Scottish MPs and Peers raised these concerns, suggesting that the SNP Government was lagging behind the rest of the UK in meeting grassroots demands for events to mark the centenary of the start of the conflict. Instead, they called upon the Scotland Office, and Scottish Secretary Michael Moore, to 'fill the gap' left by the Scottish Government and take a leading role in facilitating events north of the border.²⁵⁵ Labour Peer Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, for example, commented that 'the First World War was very much about the Union and different parts of the UK standing together whereas Bannockburn was, of course, about fighting the English... Quite a number of Peers and MPs were worried that the Scottish Government wanted to play down the First World War commemorations because of this'.²⁵⁶ Here, the concern was that, with 2014 being the year in which the independence referendum was held, SNP ministers were more concerning with marking the Bannockburn anniversary.²⁵⁷ In response to Donald Kerr's letter to *The Herald*, for example, Ronald J Sandford wrote: 'I do not agree[...] that David Cameron's wish to commemorate the centenary... is in any way a cynical attempt to have an impact on the forthcoming independence referendum'. Rather, he suggested 'the cynicism lies with our First Minister who has chosen to wrap himself in the Saltire in 2014 in

²⁵³ A. Cochrane, 'What We Should Unite Behind in 2014 Inner Nat or Not', *The Daily Telegraph*, 11 October 2012.

²⁵⁴ Johnson, 'Why War Anniversaries'; D. Ditchburn & C.M.M. Macdonald, 'Bannockburn, World War I and the Referendum', *The Scottish Historical Review*, 93:2 (2014), p.162.

²⁵⁵ D. Maddox, 'Clash Between WW1 and Bannockburn Memorials Feared', *The Scotsman*, 28 April 2013.

²⁵⁶ G. Foulkes quoted in Maddox, 'Clash Between WW1 and Bannockburn Memorials Feared'.

²⁵⁷ Notably, the Scottish Government denied the accusations that the centenary was not being taken as seriously as Bannockburn. See Maddox, 'Clash Between WW1 and Bannockburn Memorials Feared'.

a blatant attempt to hijack public opinion by embracing... the 700th anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn to underpin the final weeks of his independence campaign'.²⁵⁸

The commemoration of the World Wars in Scotland between 2007 and 2010, especially from 2011 onwards, was influenced by the electoral fortunes of the SNP. When they came to dominate the Scottish Government, the latter adopted a distinctive approach to commemoration, in particular the First World War centenary. Through the Scottish Commemorations Panel, a series of events was scheduled which emphasised the specific contributions made by Scotland's soldiers and thus the Scottish nation. Moreover, the 2011 election also signalled a marked change in debates about the political union between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom. Here, the SNP's manifesto commitment made the holding of an independence referendum inevitable. This, in turn, influenced debates about the centenary as the War was invoked in support of both sides of the debate.

Conclusion

The politics of World War commemoration in Scotland between 1994 and 2016 was decisively affected by shifts in the nature of its relationship with the rest of the United Kingdom. Prior to the introduction of devolution in 1998, commemoration was driven by the Conservative Government in Westminster. This, however, meant that it was dominated by Anglo-centric narratives and overwhelmingly 'British' iconography. Such narratives, however, reinforced and exacerbated a growing sense of difference between Scotland and the United Kingdom as well as an increasing notion of Scottish distinctiveness. It is not surprising, therefore, that the evidence illustrates a lack of Scottish engagement with World War commemoration, which was increasingly viewed as a Conservative 'tool'. This is evidenced, in particular, by the limited response to the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day, which as Chapter Five will show was also a feature of the Welsh response.

The establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, however, decisively changed the political landscape. It created a new environment in which both further constitutional

²⁵⁸ R. J. Sandford, 'Letter to the Editor: We Should Remember and Honour the Sacrifice of the First World War', *The Herald*, 16 October 2012.

debate took place and the nature of discussions about and approaches to World War commemoration began to shift. Increasingly, the World Wars were used as a means of highlighting the need for increased devolutionary powers and/or Scottish independence as well as establishing a more explicit 'Scottish' identity. This was apparent both in the Scottish Parliamentary debates about granting pardons for soldiers shot for cowardice and in the construction and unveiling of the Celtic Cross Monument to Scottish troops in Flanders in 2007.

It was, however, the election of the SNP first in 2007, and again in 2011, that had the most significant impact on both debates about the state of the Union and the commemoration of the World Wars. This, largely, was a consequence of the SNP's stated aim of achieving Scottish independence. Under the SNP, then, the tone and focus of commemoration shifted. This is most clearly evidenced by the official approach to the First World War centenary. Here, the emphasis was placed on those anniversaries/events that were of specific relevance to Scotland, such as the Battles of Loos and Arras, thus distinguishing it from the commemorations led by the Westminster Government. In the same vein, much of the rhetoric surrounding the Scottish commemorations adopted a more downbeat, and less celebratory, tone stressing both the futility of war and disproportionate sacrifice made by Scotland during it. It is apparent, therefore, that World War commemoration had become increasingly politicised, utilised by the SNP as a means of highlighting a distinct 'Scottish', and not 'British', identity and history. The coincidence of the referendum on Scottish independence with the anniversary of the start of the First World War added another dimension to such debates about and approaches to the centenary.

Chapter Five: 'A Process, Not an Event'¹: Devolution and World War

Commemoration in Wales, 1994 – 2016

On 28 October 2013, at the launch of the Cymru'n Cofio – Wales Remembers 1914-1918 Commemorative Programme, then First Minister Carwyn Jones stated that 'the centenary of the start of the war in 1914 marks an important opportunity for us to remember all those who took part in the First World War'.² He continued by noting the 'transformational impact of the conflict in shaping modern Wales' and suggested that 'there will be very few people in Wales whose lives have not been affected by the First World War's enduring legacy, whether they are aware of it or not'.³ Jones not only appears to highlight the enduring place of the War in Welsh national consciousness, but also alludes to a sense of collective suffering and the perception that Wales suffered disproportionately in the aftermath of the War. It is perhaps for this reason that Jones goes on to note the 'central role' that 'education and community events' would play in the commemorations, which were intended to 'reach out to people of all ages'.⁴

This is indicative of one way in which the commemoration of the World Wars in Wales has been approached at a governmental level in the post-devolution period. Indeed, it speaks to the Welsh approach to the First World War centenary, which was largely non-political but also focused on the distinctive experiences and legacy of the War for modern Wales. Although general statements, they also reveal a shift in World War commemoration as it increasingly interacted with the shifting political climate, identity politics and conceptions of the Welsh nation.

This chapter analyses how successive Welsh Governments have approached the commemoration of the World Wars. It deals with questions regarding the nature of Wales' relationship to the wider United Kingdom. How is the idea of 'Welshness' articulated through political narratives associated with commemoration? How does this relate to

¹ R. Davies, *Devolution: A Process Not an Event* (Cardiff: Institute for Welsh Affairs, 1999).

² Ibid.

³ Anon, 'Carwyn Jones Launches First World War Commemorations', *South Wales Argus*, 29 October 2013.

⁴ Ibid.

conceptions of 'Britishness'? How far has the tone and focus of commemoration changed between 1994 and 2016 and to what extent has it reflected and been influenced by shifts in the political climate, such as devolution? To what extent has commemoration become one means through which to assert a sense of the Welsh nation's own culture, history and identity? Has commemoration continued to follow wider British trends or highlight Wales' links with the United Kingdom? Consequently, exploring and analysing World War commemoration adds a new dimension to our knowledge of how contemporary Wales has redefined its relations with the United Kingdom and dealt with associated questions of identity politics whilst simultaneously contributing to wider historiographical debates on war, remembrance and the politics of the union.

First, however, it is worth briefly commenting on the current state of Welsh historiography. As Martin Johnes has noted, 'little Welsh history... [has been] written by people from outside Wales'. Moreover, he has argued that Welsh history 'has made little impact beyond Wales, too often going unread, ignored or unappreciated'.⁵ Philip Jenkins has also claimed that surveys of the UK often pay 'extremely perfunctory and sometimes derisory attention to Wales'.⁶

Since the 1990s, however, there has been a noticeable, albeit slow, growth in research into Welsh history. Angela Gaffney, for example, wrote in 1998 that Welsh history was beginning to attract 'considerable scholarly attention' as increasing numbers of historians successfully applied traditional and new historical approaches to the study of Wales.⁷ The Welsh language and its revival, for example, now has a rich historiography of its own.⁸ Another theme to emerge within this growing body of literature was religious change and

⁵ M. Johnes, 'For Class and Nation: Dominant Trends in the Historiography of Twentieth-Century Wales', *History Compass*, 8:11 (2010), pp.1257 – 1274, 1257, 1264.

⁶ G.H. Jenkins, 'Clio and Wales: Remembrancers and Historical Writing, 1751 – 2001', *Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion*, 8 (2001), pp.119 – 135.

⁷ A. Gaffney, *Aftermath: Remembering the Great War in Wales* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1998), p.v.

⁸ J. Aitchison & H. Carter, *A Geography of the Welsh Language, 1961-91* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1994); J. Aitchison & H. Carter, *Language, Economy and Society: The Changing Fortunes of the Welsh Language in the Twentieth Century* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000); G.H. Jenkins, 'Terminal Decline? The Welsh Language in the Twentieth Century', *North American Journal of Welsh Studies*, 1:1/2 (2001), pp.59-67.

the legacy of Nonconformism in Wales.⁹ A number of studies have also focused on histories of Liberalism and Labour as well as key political figures such as David Lloyd George and Neil Kinnock.¹⁰ The ‘Yes’ vote in the 1997 referendum on devolution also triggered a number of projects exploring both the short-term and long-term history of devolution in Wales.¹¹ In addition to this, several broader examinations of Welsh history have been published, such as those by John Davies, Gareth Evans, John Gower and Philip Jenkins.¹²

Even with this emerging body of scholarship, it is striking that few full-length treatments of Wales’ experience of the First and Second World Wars exist.¹³ This stands in stark contrast to both Scotland and Ireland, which, as we have seen in previous chapters (cf. Chapters Three and Four), have been the subject of numerous academic volumes as well as receiving their own ‘military histories’.¹⁴ Writing in 2014, for example, Robin Barlow commented that

⁹ See, for example: P. Chambers, *Religion, Secularisation and Social Change in Wales: Congregational Studies in a Post-Christian Society* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2005); D.D. Morgan, *The Span of the Cross: Christian Religion and Society in Wales, 1914-2000* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999); R. Pope (ed.), *Religion and National Identity: Wales and Scotland c.1700 – 2000* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2001); R. Pope, *Building Jerusalem: Nonconformity, Labour and the Social Question in Wales, 1906-1939*, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2014); R.J.W. Evans, ‘Nonconformity and Nation: The Welsh Case’, *Welsh History Review*, 25:2 (2010), pp.231-238; D. Hopkin, ‘The Rise of Labour’, *Llafur*, 6:3 (1994), pp.120-142.

¹⁰ See, for example: J.G. Jones, *David Lloyd Jones and Welsh Liberalism* (Aberystwyth: National Library of Wales, 2010); E. Price, *David Lloyd George* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2006); D. Tanner, C. Williams & D. Hopkin (eds), *The Labour Party in Wales, 1900 – 2000* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000); J. England., *The Wales TUC, 1974-2004: Devolution and Industrial Politics* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2004).

¹¹ See, for example: J.G. Evans, *Devolution in Wales: Claims and Responses, 1937-1979* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2006); A. Edwards & D. Tanner, ‘Defining or Dividing the Nation? Opinion Polls, Welsh Identity and Devolution, 1966-1979’, *Contemporary Wales*, 18 (2006), pp.54-71; R. Scully, *Wales Says Yes: Devolution and the 2011 Welsh Referendum* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2012).

¹² J. Davies, *A History of Wales* (London: Penguin Books, 2007); D.G. Evans, *A History of Wales, 1906 – 2000* (Cardiff: University of Wales, 2000); J. Gower, *The Story of Wales* (London: BBC Books, 2012); G.H. Jenkins, *A Concise History of Wales* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

¹³ Even David Williams in his *A History of Modern Wales* (London: John Murray, 1950) widely regarded as the first synthesis of modern Welsh history, although taking his history up to 1939, and claiming that ‘life in Wales in the quarter of the century after 1914 was entirely dominated by the First World War and by its consequences’, has nothing to say about the war itself.

¹⁴ K. Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); C.M.M. MacDonald and E. McFarland, *Scotland and the Great War* (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1999); T. Bartlett and K. Jeffery (eds), *A Military History of Ireland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); E.M. Spiers, J. Crang & M. Strickland (eds), *A Military History of Scotland* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012).

‘of the thousands of works published on the First World War with “Britain” in the title’ one could ‘search in vain through the index of nearly all of them for references to “Wales” [...] unfortunately, the old cliché still applies, “For Wales, See England”’.¹⁵ Alun Eirug has also argued that the history of the Great War as it affected Wales has often been written in the context of other subject areas.¹⁶ Consequently, the historiography is, not just ‘fractured and incomplete’, but barely existent.¹⁷ Similarly, Stuart Broomfield suggested with regards to the Second World War that ‘as far as Wales is concerned a significant overview [...] has not yet been created’. Matthew Cragoe and Chris Williams have also argued that ‘the Second World War remains something of a paradox in the history of Wales. Though quite evidently a conflict of enormous significance, it has yet to draw substantial attention from professional historians’.¹⁸ The Welsh experience of the two World Wars, then, has received little focused attention and is seldom disaggregated in British and international overviews. Rather, it is frequently subsumed into overarching narratives of Britain and the British Empire.

Accordingly, Barlow’s *Wales and World War One* and Broomfield’s *Wales at War. The Experience of the Second World War in Wales* remain amongst the only English-language monographs dedicated to this subject.¹⁹ Barlow sought to provide a narrative of the Welsh

¹⁵ R. Barlow, *Wales and World War One* (Llandysul, Ceredigion: Gomer Press, 2014), pp.xiii – xiv.

¹⁶ A. Eirug, ‘Opposition to the First World War in Wales’, unpublished PhD thesis, Cardiff University (2017), p.43.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p.43. While there are very few monographs, the Welsh experience of the First World War has received some treatment in historical journals. In December 2017, for example, the *Welsh History Review* published a special issue about Wales and the First World War. See also: G. Phillips, ‘Dai Bach Y Soldiwr: Welsh Soldiers in the British Army, 1914-1918’, *Llafur: Journal of Welsh Labour History*, 6:2 (1993).

¹⁸ S. Broomfield, *Wales at War. The Experience of the Second World War in Wales* (Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2011), p.12; M. Cragoe & C. Williams, ‘Introduction’ in M. Cragoe & C. Williams (eds), *Wales and War. Society, Politics and Religion in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2007), p.5.

¹⁹ Barlow, *Wales and World War One*; Broomfield, *Wales at War*. It should also be noted that a few publications, although oral histories, were produced following the sixtieth anniversary of World War Two including J. O’Sullivan, *When Wales Went to War 1939-45* (Stroud: Sutton, 2004) and P. Carradice’s, *Wales at War* (Llandysul: Gomer Press, 2003). A number of studies examining the impact of war on villages and towns in Wales have also been produced. See, for example: W. Troughton, *Aberystwyth and the Great War* (Stroud: Amberley, 2015); J.P. Hicks, *Barry and the Great War* (Barry: Fielding, 2007); B. Lewis, *Swansea in the Great War* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2014) and P. Carradice, *Cardiff and the Vale in the First World War* (Stroud: Amberley, 2014).

experience of the First World War both on the home front and abroad whilst Broomfield attempts to 'knit together the individual experiences of people from across Wales against a background of the narrative of the war at home and abroad'.²⁰ Another important addition to the scholarship, although not a monograph, is Mari A. Williams' contribution to the BBC *Millennium History of Wales*, which examines Wales in the period between 1914 and 1945.²¹

Furthermore, few studies have sought to explore the nature of World War commemoration in Wales. Gaffney's *Aftermath. Remembering the Great War in Wales* remains one of the only examples.²² Gaffney analyses the various ways in which communities in Wales engaged with processes of commemoration to remember the War dead. She also explores how the experience and memory of the First World War pervaded society in the inter-war years. Furthermore, by situating this study within the wider context of Welsh history in the decade after the War, Gaffney examines how remembrance was influenced by language, cultural diversity and economic decline, as well as how far the commemoration process can help to provide insights into the complex topic of national and local identity.²³ Additionally, Andrew Mycock, Dan Todman and Keith Jeffery have all, albeit briefly, analysed World War commemoration in Wales in relation to the First World War centenary.²⁴ In each of these articles, however, discussion of Wales's involvement in and responses to the centenary takes the form of only one paragraph, or in the case of Jeffery one line, situated within a

²⁰ Broomfield, *Wales at War*, p.12.

²¹ M.A. Williams, 'In the Wars: Wales 1914-1945', in G.E. Jones & D. Smith (eds), *The People of Wales* (Llandysul: Gomer, 1999). Gwyn Jenkins & Gareth Williams Jones have also recently published *Cymru A'r Rhyfel Byd Cyntaf* (Tal-y-bont: Y Lolfa, 2014) in Welsh, which predominantly focuses on the military aspect of the First World War.

²² Gaffney, *Aftermath*, p.7.

²³ *Ibid*, p.7.

²⁴ D. Todman, 'The Space Afterwards: 2014 and a Century of British Remembrance', *The Great War: Centenary Perspectives*, Vol. 10 2:14 (2014). Accessed at: http://scalar.usc.edu/works/the-space-between-literature-and-culture-1914-1945/vol10_2014_todman [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018]; A. Mycock, 'The First World War Centenary in the United Kingdom: A Truly National Commemoration?', *Roundtable*, 103:2 (2014), pp. 153 – 163; K. Jeffery, 'Commemoration in the United Kingdom: A Multitude of Memories', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 50:3 (2015), pp.562 – 567.

larger article exploring issues inherent in the commemoration of the First World War in the United Kingdom as a whole.

Yet, both the First and Second World Wars had a significant impact on Wales. Gaffney, for example, has referred to the First World War as ‘the deepest cleft in the history of the Welsh nation’.²⁵ Indeed, according to figures cited by Williams, Gower and Barlow, approximately 270,000 men from Wales (including Monmouthshire) served in the British Army during the Great War.²⁶ This equated to 21.52% of the male population (compared to 24.02% in England; 23.71% in Scotland and 6.14% in Ireland).²⁷ Of this, it is calculated that between 35,000 and 40,000 Welshmen died in the conflict.²⁸ The latter figure, however, is based on rough approximations stretched widely to include those born in Wales, those living in Wales who served with any unit, and those who died whilst serving with a Welsh Regiment.²⁹ It should also be noted that although these figures highlight that Wales contributed proportionately fewer recruits to the British Army than either England or Scotland, Welshmen played a major role in the War. Kenneth Morgan, in fact, has previously argued the people of Wales ‘threw themselves into the war with gusto’, displaying ‘heights of hysteria rarely matched in other parts of the United Kingdom’. In this, he argues that the ‘wholehearted support that Welshmen of all parties and creeds gave to the war itself’ was in ‘striking contrast to the divisions of the recent past’.³⁰

²⁵ Gaffney, *Aftermath*, p.9.

²⁶ HMSO, *Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War, 1914-1920* (London 1922), p.363; C. Williams, ‘Taffs in the Trenches: Welsh National Identity and Military Service, 1914 – 1918’, in Cragoe & Williams, p.126; Gower, *The Story of Wales*, p.250; Barlow, *Wales and World War One*, p.xiii.

²⁷ HMSO, *Statistics of the Military Effort*, p.363; Williams, ‘Taffs in the Trenches’, p.126; Jenkins, *A Concise History*, p.248.

²⁸ Williams, ‘Taffs in the Trenches’, p.126; It is worth noting that there is some dispute over these figures. Barlow (*Wales and World War One*, p.xiii) for example has cited a lower number of 31,000 compared to the between 35,000 and 40,000 mentioned above.

²⁹ Gaffney, *Aftermath*, p.151; Williams, ‘Taffs in the Trenches’, p.126.

³⁰ K.O. Morgan, *Rebirth of a Nation: Wales, 1880 – 1980* (Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 1981), p.159; K.O. Morgan, *Wales in British Politics, 1868-1922* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1980), p.275. The figures Morgan uses to support his argument, however, were based on an erroneous interpretation of the statistics, first used in a work published by Ivor Nicholson (*Wales; Its Part in the War*) and Trevor Lloyd-Williams, and, in turn, derived from a speech by Sir Auckland Geddes, the Director of Recruiting, to the House of Commons on 14 January 1919. For Alun Eirug, the mistaken interpretation of these figures, creating a myth that Wales was more enthusiastic than other parts of

The contribution of Welshmen to the war effort, however, is perhaps best exemplified by the fact that David Lloyd George, who became known as ‘the man who won the war’ after 1918, was a quintessential Welsh-speaking Welshman. Lloyd George, who had become Prime Minister in December 1916, was also celebrated (or ridiculed) as the ‘Welsh Wizard’ and had played a critical role in the formation of a Welsh Army Corps (WAC).³¹ The aim had initially been to raise two divisions; however, due to the numbers of recruits in the event, the ‘Welsh Army Corps’ was confined to a single division only. The 1st Division of the WAC became the 43rd (Welsh) Division on 10 December 1914 and was later renumbered as the 38th (Welsh) Division on 29 April 1915. The Welsh Guards had also been formed on 26 February 1915, to add a regiment representing Wales to the Foot Guards. One might, therefore, expect the Welsh war effort to have both attracted considerable scholarly attention and inspired commemoration.³²

The Second World War also involved a sizeable number of Welshmen. Johnes, for example, has estimated that of the around 5 million British men and women in uniform at the end of the war, around 300,000 were Welsh.³³ He suggests that there were approximately 15,000 Welsh-born deaths.³⁴ Significantly, both the threat and reality of bombing also put Wales on the frontline.³⁵ Pembroke Dock, Cardiff and Swansea, in particular, were badly hit during the Blitz. Of these, Swansea suffered the most intense attack over the course of three nights in February 1941. 30,000 bombs were dropped on the city, destroying 282 and

Britain, influenced other historians’ approaches to the Great War to such an extent that it has skewed and over-simplified the interpretation of the response to War by other historians such as Gareth Elwyn Jones, J. Graham Jones and Philip Jenkins.

³¹ ‘Lloyd George, David (17 Jan. 1863)’ entry in D. Kavanagh & C. Riches (eds), *A Dictionary of Political Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 2nd Edition.

³² Barlow, *Wales and World War One*, p.22.

³³ M. Johnes, ‘The Impact of the Second World War on the People of Wales and England up to 1951’, accessed at: <https://martinjohnes.com/2019/02/28/debate-the-impact-that-the-second-world-war-had-on-the-people-of-wales-and-england-up-to-1951/> [Date Accessed: 12/05/2019]; M. Johnes, ‘Wales and the Second World War’ draft chapter from *Wales since 1939*. Accessed at: https://www.academia.edu/217439/Wales_and_the_Second_World_War [Date Accessed: 01/08/2019]; M. Johnes, *Wales Since 1939* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), Ch.1.

³⁴ Gower, *The Story of Wales*, p.268; Johnes, ‘The Impact of the Second World War’; Jenkins, *Concise History of Wales*, p.258; Johnes, *Wales since 1939*, Ch.1.

³⁵ A. Gaffney, ‘The Second Armageddon’: Remembering the Second World War in Wales’ in M. Cragoe & C. Williams, *Wales and War*, pp.193-194; Johnes, *Wales since 1939*, Ch.1.

damaging 11,084 houses as well as killing at least 227 people. In Cardiff, 33,000 houses were damaged and 335 people were killed during the War. In total, 984 people were killed and 1,221 seriously injured in bombing raids targeting Wales.³⁶

Furthermore, for historians such as Morgan and Johnes the Welsh experiences of the World Wars and their aftermath were distinctive from the rest of Britain. Morgan, for example, refers to Wales' 'distinctive national experience' of the Great War, describing its impact on Wales in terms of the 'distinctive transformation wrought upon Welsh culture and the sense of nationhood'.³⁷ He argues that 'in no part of the British Isles was the contrast between pre and post-war conditions more pronounced' nor did any 'part of the United Kingdom [show] more dramatically than Wales the revolutionary impact of the events of 1914-1918'.³⁸ Morgan continued, noting that 'Liberal Wales, the basis of later Victorian society in our nation, its status and its values, was a casualty of total war' before concluding that 'the Wales that emerged after the Armistice was a far more troubled, tormented a nation [...] On a series of levels, there was evidence of an endemic decline – the war left a bitter legacy'.³⁹ As Paul O'Leary has identified, this is indicative of the 'view of the war as one of discontinuity between two periods', which has become an established feature of accounts of twentieth century Wales.⁴⁰ Indeed, O'Leary suggests that such narratives of the War as a decisive moment in the twentieth century have made it central to contemporary historians' understandings of modern Wales.⁴¹

Additionally, Lester Mason has argued that there is a perception of a more distinct pacifism within Wales, which interacts with and complicates Wales' relationship to war.⁴² Barlow,

³⁶ Johnes, 'The Impact of the Second World War'; Johnes, *Wales Since 1939*.

³⁷ K.O. Morgan, 'Wales and the First World War' in K.O. Morgan., *Revolution to Devolution. Reflections on Welsh Democracy* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2014), p.170.

³⁸ Morgan, *Revolution to Devolution*, pp.145-146; see also Morgan., *Rebirth of a Nation: Wales*, p.177.

³⁹ Morgan, *Revolution to Devolution*, p.145-146.

⁴⁰ P. O'Leary, 'Wales and the First World War: Themes and Debates', *Welsh History Review*, 28:4 (2017), p.592; Other examples of this view include Davies, *A History of Wales*, pp.494-510 and Gaffney, *Aftermath* amongst others.

⁴¹ O'Leary, 'Wales and the First World War', p.592.

⁴² L. Mason -

<https://ahrc.ukri.org/research/fundedthemesandprogrammes/worldwaroneanditslegacy/worldwaro>

for example, notes Wales's reputation as a predominantly peace-loving and pacifist nation, influenced by the Welsh tradition of non-conformism, whilst Denis Morgan argues that 'on the eve of the First World War non-conformity was the most single significant institution which Wales possessed'.⁴³ Similarly, Cragoe and Williams comment that 'though it flickered in the face of huge moral challenges posed by the two World Wars, the flame of pacifism did not die out' but rather 'lingered at the margins of Welsh life'.⁴⁴ Indeed, they note that 'conscientious objection remained a distinctively Welsh option during the Second World War' – embraced, in particular, by many members of Plaid Cymru.⁴⁵ This, however, is not uncontroversial. As Cragoe and Williams highlight, subsequent research has suggested that pacifism was always a minority belief in the Principality.⁴⁶ The existence of a tradition of pacifism within Wales, therefore, does not counteract the above claims of a substantial Welsh contribution to the War but rather complicates the picture. As John Ellis has argued, Wales' relationship with war is more complex.⁴⁷ He argues that Welsh national identity is 'Janus-faced', contested by 'two competing images' alternatively defining the Welsh as a pacific people and as a martial race.⁴⁸ Ellis suggests that Wales has suffered from a process of 'selective national amnesia' regarding its military and imperial pasts, noting that there are 'competing traditions of militarism and pacifism within Modern Wales'. He concludes by suggesting 'Welshness and its relationship to war is not a static concept [...] but a fluid construction, constantly contested, negotiated and revised in relation to changing historical circumstances'.⁴⁹

This chapter consists of three sections, each of which analyses a specific stage of Wales' political development and its relations with the United Kingdom. This chronological

nearroundtheuk/ww1inwales/pulpitsmutinieskhakifever/ [Date Accessed: 08/05/2019]; J. Black, *A New History of Wales* (Stroud: Sutton, 2000), p.188.

⁴³ Morgan, *The Span of the Cross*, p.23, also p.281, n.24; Barlow, *Wales and World War One*, p.118.

⁴⁴ Cragoe & Williams, *Wales and War*, p.1.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Cragoe & Williams, *Wales and War*, p.1; See Barlow, *Wales and the World War One*, p.118; Eirug, 'Opposition to the First World War in Wales'.

⁴⁷ J. Ellis, 'A Pacific People – A Martial Race: Pacifism, Militarism and Welsh National Identity' in Cragoe & Williams, *Wales and War*, pp.15-37.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ellis, 'A Pacific People – A Martial Race'; Cragoe & Williams, *Wales and War*, p.2.

structure reveals the extent to which the changing nature of Wales' relationship with the United Kingdom has impacted on the manner in which the World Wars have been commemorated. The first section focuses on the period immediately preceding the introduction of devolution to Wales, from 1994 to the passage of the Government of Wales Bill in 1998. Section two will analyse the immediate post-devolution period, from the first Welsh Assembly elections leading up to and including the introduction of the second Government of Wales Act in 2006. Finally, section three discusses the period from the implementation of this Act in 2007 up to June 2016, focused predominantly on how the Welsh Government has approached the commemoration of the First World War centenary.

Ultimately, it will be argued that, as in Scotland, the commemoration of the World Wars in Wales has interacted with the changing political dynamic in the United Kingdom. The creation of the devolved Welsh Assembly in 1998 and, more significantly, the evolution of this process, which culminated in the successful outcome of a referendum on primary law-making powers in 2011, had a significant impact on the tone and focus of commemorative events. This is most clearly demonstrated by the Welsh Government's approach to the First World War centenary, which shows the way in which World War commemoration in post-devolution Wales had increasingly come to emphasise the distinctive legacy of the World Wars for Wales. Yet, it is also notable that the changes to commemorative approaches not only proceeded at a slower pace – reflecting the way in which devolution progressed differently in Wales – but also proved to be significantly less politicised than in Scotland.

The Last Years of Parliamentary Centralism, 1994 – 1998

The 8 May 1995 marked the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day. As both Chapters One and Four have demonstrated, the official commemorative events led by Westminster were dominated by Anglo-centric narratives and iconography. As was the case with Scotland,

these state-led commemorations failed to refer to Welsh experiences of and contributions to the war effort.⁵⁰

Despite this lack of explicit focus on the home nations, there is evidence to suggest that Wales engaged far more widely in the commemorative events and celebrations than Scotland did. On 1 May 1995, for example, John Ezard, writing in *The Guardian*, noted that Wales was holding 101 local commemorative events (compared to 23 in Scotland and 44 in Northern Ireland).⁵¹ Of these, the largest was arguably a free concert held (by the BBC National Orchestra of Wales) at Cardiff's Cooper's Field, which attracted around 20,000 people.⁵²

This is corroborated by the coverage of the fiftieth anniversary in Welsh newspapers, which was not only considerably more extensive than that featured in Scottish newspapers, but also indicates the extent and nature of the Welsh response. On 25 April 1995, for example, Jenny Waldorf, writing in the *Western Mail*, reported that 'VE Day is set to be the biggest street celebration in Wales since the Royal Wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana'.⁵³ She noted that 'sales of bunting, flags and plastic hats have hit heights not seen since the halcyon days of 1981 [and the Royal Wedding]'.⁵⁴ Four days later, the *Western Mail* wrote that 'all over Wales this week, people are preparing for one of the biggest celebrations of recent times, the 50th anniversary of the end of World War Two' whilst the *South Wales Evening Post* noted that a '1940s style extravaganza celebrating VE Day in Port Talbot had sold out for the second time after moving to a bigger [2600 seat] venue'.⁵⁵ On 9 May, the day after the anniversary, the *Daily Post* commented that 'people throughout North Wales turned the clock back half a century yesterday and threw themselves into the spirit of the nationwide VE Day celebrations. Street parties and parades got into full swing under yards

⁵⁰ See J. Major, *Speech at VE Day Commemorations*, 6 May 1995. Accessed at: <http://www.johnmajorarchive.org.uk/1990-1997/mr-majors-speech-at-ve-day-commemorations-6-may-1995/> [Date Accessed: 16/01/2019].

⁵¹ J. Ezard, 'VE Day Fails to Fire Scots', *The Guardian*, 1 May 1995, p.2.

⁵² P. McLean, 'Big Open-Air Concert to Mark VE Day Anniversary', *Western Mail*, 5 April 1995, p.2.

⁵³ J. Walford, 'Victory Day Fever Hitting the Streets', *Western Mail*, 25 April 1995, p.9.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ P. Lewis, 'VE Event Sold Out for Second Time', *South Wales Evening Post*, 1 May 1995, p.7; Anon, 'Beacon to Light Up the Day', *Western Mail*, 29 April 1995, p.4.

of bunting and flags'. The *South Wales Evening Post* also reported that 'it was the biggest and best party for 50 years. S. West Wales' streets were a blaze of red, white and blue.⁵⁶ Additionally, the *Daily Post*, *South Wales Echo* and *South Wales Evening Post* all ran special issues across several days providing coverage of VE Day.⁵⁷

Throughout the anniversary, it is apparent that a number of the commemorative events were intended to echo both the tone and format of those organised by the Westminster Government. Areas such as Llanelli organised 'Weekends of Celebration' in conjunction with the 'National Weekend of Celebration' held at Hyde Park (cf. Chapter One) while beacons were also lit across Wales to coincide with the one lit by the Queen during the commemorations on 8 May. British imagery and symbolism also dominated events: Union Jacks were waved, street parties were held, military uniforms worn and Vera Lynn songs, such as 'White Cliffs of Dover' and 'We'll Meet Again', were sung. The *South Wales Echo*, for example, wrote that 'across the capital, hundreds sat down to wartime fare of spam sandwiches, ideal milk, jelly and ice cream, to celebrate VE Day and the end of the war in Europe'.⁵⁸ Similarly, the *Daily Post* noted that 'it was a weekend of celebration, a weekend of commemoration [...] Towns and villages across North and Mid Wales were swathed in red, white and blue yesterday as thousands marked the end of the war in Europe'.⁵⁹

Yet, it is notable that although the commemorations emphasised well-established British iconography, Welsh symbolism was simultaneously present. Sarah Roberts, for example, reported in the *South Wales Echo* that 'mile upon mile of patriotic bunting framed the blue skies, and hundreds of Union Jack and Welsh Dragon flags fluttered in the brilliant May

⁵⁶ E. Williams, 'Wartime Spirit is Rekindled in Wales', *Daily Post*, 9 May 1995; Anon, 'It's Party Time' *South Wales Evening Post*, 9 May 1995, p.6. Anon, 'It's Party Time in the Valleys', *South Wales Echo*, 4 May 1995, p.25; S. Roberts, 'Partying for Peace', *South Wales Echo*, 9 May 1995, p.6; Anon, 'Rush to Get Dressed Up for VE Day', *South Wales Evening Post*, 3 May 1945, p.5; Anon, 'It's Party Time'.

⁵⁷ 'VE Day Special', *Western Mail Weekender*, 6 May 1995; 'Victory in Europe', *South Wales Evening Post*, 3 May 1995; *South Wales Evening Post*, 8 May 1995; *South Wales Evening Post*, 9 May 1995; *South Wales Evening Post*, 11 May 1995; *South Wales Evening Post*, 13 May 1995; *South Wales Echo*, 8 May 1995; 'Victory Day', *Daily Post*, 8 May 1995; 'Victory in Europe', *South Wales Evening Post*, 3 May 1995; Anon, 'VE Day Parties Galore', *South Wales Evening Post*, 8 May 1995.

⁵⁸ Roberts, 'Partying for Peace'.

⁵⁹ 'Victory Day', *Daily Post*, 8 May 1995.

sunshine'.⁶⁰ Likewise, visual and photographic evidence appears to reinforce this with a number of photographs depicting the presence of both flags.⁶¹ Another shows a street drawing comprised of a Welsh Dragon, Union Jack and a dove.⁶² Additionally, the *South Wales Evening Post* utilised the image of a Welsh Dragon on the front cover of its VE Day special edition.



Figure 5.1: A photograph of the Air Defence Monument in Swansea.

Attribution: ©Mark Newton (WMR-17706).



Figure 5.2: A photograph of the Air Defence Monument Memorial Plaque.

Attribution: © Mark Newton (WMR-17706).

There is also evidence that, alongside the dominant 'British' narratives of the Second World War, there was an emphasis on specifically Welsh narratives as both commemorative events and coverage of the anniversary drew attention to wartime experiences in Wales and the Principality's contribution to the wider war effort. In Swansea, for example, the 'Air Defence Monument' was officially unveiled on VE Day by the Lord Mayor of Swansea to simultaneously 'commemorate the 50th anniversary of the cessation of hostilities in Europe' and act 'in memory of the 387 civilian and military personnel who died in air raids on

⁶⁰ Roberts, 'Partying for Peace'.

⁶¹ C. Tasker, 'Tears of Joy and Sorrow', *South Wales Evening Post*, 10 May 1995; 'VE Day Special', *Daily Post*, 9 May 1995, p.15.

⁶² Anon, 'Victory in Europe; Music Gets Street in the Mood', *South Wales Evening Post*, 13 May 1995, p.2. Special Supplement.

Swansea' [See Figures 5.1 and 5.2].⁶³ The memorial, in fact, was broadly interpreted as a 'symbol of Swansea's proud air defence stand against the Second World War bombers'.⁶⁴

A number of newspapers also included articles referring to the experiences of the Blitz in Wales with a particular focus on cities that suffered the most damage, such as Swansea and Cardiff. On 8 May 1995 Don Thompson of Winch Wen, Swansea, writing in the *South Wales Evening Post*, discussed his experiences of the impact of the bombing in Swansea and linked this to the end of the War by concluding that 'this is why the VE celebrations in Swansea were so memorable – now Swansea could sleep at night'.⁶⁵ Furthermore, other coverage explored the involvement of Welsh soldiers. The *South Wales Evening Post*, for example, included articles under the title 'Welsh Feared by Nazis'. One such piece, entitled 'The Warrior Celts', outlined the 53rd Welsh Division's participation in the Second World War.⁶⁶ The newspaper coverage of the anniversary also frequently included photos and stories sent in by readers which detailed their personal experiences of the War and the VE Day celebrations.⁶⁷

The combination of British and Welsh symbolism throughout the commemorations reflected the nature of Wales' relationship with England, which has generally been less problematic than that between Scotland and England. For Richard Weight, this is due in part to the length and depth of Wales' union with England. This has not only meant that discontent has rarely become a mass dislike of the English, but also that, as Bradbury and Andrews have argued, English/British and Welsh national identities 'have co-existed for centuries'.⁶⁸ Furthermore, the union also meant that the formation of 'modern' Wales was strongly influenced by wider 'British' developments such as industrialisation and the British

⁶³ Anon, 'Memorial in Place, *South Wales Evening Post*, 1 May 1995, p.1.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ D. Thompson, 'The Time to Celebrate', *South Wales Evening Post*, 8 May 1995, p.13.

⁶⁶ V. Thompson, 'Welsh Feared by Nazi Forces: The Warrior Celts', *South Wales Evening Post*, 3 May 1995, Special Supplement, p.12.

⁶⁷ See for example articles in 'Victory in Europe', *South Wales Evening Post*, 3 May 1995; 'VE Day Special', *Western Mail Weekender*, 6 May 1995.

⁶⁸ R. Weight, *Patriots. National Identity in Britain, 1940-2000* (London: MacMillan, 2002), p.702; J. Bradbury and R. Andrews, 'State Devolution and National Identity: Continuity and Change in the Politics of Welshness and Britishness in Wales', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 63:2 (2010), p.231.

Empire.⁶⁹ These 'shared experiences' created socio-economic linkages as Wales was integrated into the wider 'British' and Imperial economies.⁷⁰

In addition, any sense of a separate and distinct Welsh identity was weakened by a number of other factors. This includes the prevalence of migration between England and Wales which, as Taylor and Thomson have noted, was a consequence of the long border shared between the two. Indeed, historically there have been large numbers of English immigrants in Wales as well as many Welsh immigrants in England.⁷¹ The distinctiveness of a Welsh identity had also predominantly depended on religion, specifically nonconformism, which in turn had made Liberalism an obvious political choice.⁷² Liberalism, however, declined after 1929. Similarly, as Robert Pope has noted, religion as a whole in Wales declined during the twentieth century particularly from the 1960s onwards.⁷³

There is, however, also evidence to suggest that the VE Day anniversary was not unanimously embraced throughout Wales to the extent that a number of prominent commemorative events failed to engage significant numbers. In Llanelli (Carmarthenshire) for example, a three day VE Day celebration 'billed as among the top four in Britain outside London' and the 'biggest VE Day event in Wales' proved to be a 'complete flop'.⁷⁴ The event, which spanned three days, had been expected to attract over 15,000 people yet it was estimated that less than 1000 actually participated.⁷⁵ In response, organisers suggested that apathy was to blame, noting that the 'people are apathetic in Llanelli and many of the young are ignorant about VE Day', which was broadly interpreted as a

⁶⁹ L. Colley, *Acts of Union and Disunion. What has Held the UK Together and What is Dividing It?* (London: Profile Books Ltd, 2014); P. Ward, *Britishness Since 1870* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), p.143.

⁷⁰ Ward, *Britishness Since 1870*, p.143.

⁷¹ B. Taylor & K. Thomson, 'Introduction and Conclusions' in B. Taylor & K. Thomson (eds), *Scotland and Wales: Nations Again?* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999), p.xxxix; see also Bradbury and Andrews, 'State Devolution and National Identity', p.233.

⁷² Ward, *Britishness Since 1870*, pp.144-145.

⁷³ R. Pope, 'Introduction' in Pope, *Religion and National Identity*, p.3.

⁷⁴ W. Murgatroyd, 'What a Flop, Say Traders', *South Wales Evening Post (Llanelli and West Edition)*, 9 May 1995, Front Page; Anon, 'VE Day Show is Big Flop', *South Wales Evening Post*, 9 May 1995, p.3; Anon, 'Soldiers and Civilians Together Remember the End of Fighting', *Western Mail*, 5 May 1995, p.11.

⁷⁵ Anon, 'VE Day Show is Big Flop'; Murgatroyd, 'What a Flop, Say Traders'.

consequence of a lack of understanding about the relevance of the Second World War to the Welsh.⁷⁶ Rather, it was felt that the events were being used as an opportunity for the English and, more specifically, the Tories to wrap themselves in the Union Jack and bolster unionist sentiment. The predominance of Anglo-centric narratives further reinforced this sense of indifference and feeling amongst some that the anniversary was no longer significant for them.

A number of 'Letters to the Editor' drew attention to this sense of disappointment with and disengagement from the commemorations. J.D. Roberts, writing from Roath in Cardiff, condemned the 'content of the VE Day concert which was held in Cardiff on May 7' for its Anglo-centric nature and the fact that 'at no point during the day was the Welsh National Anthem played'. They commented: 'I consider this to be an outright insult to the thousands of Welsh people who contributed to the war effort... If it is appropriate to play the English anthem, then why was the Welsh National Anthem left unplayed?'⁷⁷ Similarly, Ann Richards, also from Cardiff, found the concert held at Coopers' Field 'inspiring' yet criticised it for the same reason. She wrote that 'it was of great disappointment that not one song was sung in Welsh, and the absence of the Welsh National Anthem was deplorable'. She continued 'surely the Welsh soldiers who fought and died in the war deserved to be commemorated with due respect in their own language'.⁷⁸

Others criticised the commemorations for their Anglo-centric nature while also linking this to wider concerns. In letters to both the *Daily Post* and *Western Mail*, for example, Cith Up Henri from Cardiff wrote that 'sadly, some little Englanders are trying to wrap themselves up in the Union Jack and turn VE Day into anti-Europe Day. These people are dangerous fools'.⁷⁹ The writer continued: 'fifty years on, we in Wales do not have a democratically elected government nor do we have full national representation in Brussels. We desperately need both... Our economy is now totally dependent on the EU. We need to bypass the Tory little Englanders in London if we are to prosper and return to full

⁷⁶ Murgatroyd, 'What a Flop, Say Traders'.

⁷⁷ J.D. Roberts, 'Letters to the Editor – 'Land of Hope and an Insult'', *Western Mail*, 11 May 1995.

⁷⁸ A. Richards, 'Letters to the Editor – Deplorable Absence', *Western Mail*, 11 May 1995.

⁷⁹ C.A. Henry, 'Letters to the Editor: Flag of Oppression', *Daily Post*, 3 May 1995, p.6.

employment'.⁸⁰ Henri concluded that 'today in Wales the Union Jack and low-flying RAF jets are not symbols of freedom but of oppression. Let the Red Dragon fly over Wales and our skies be free and empty. Free Wales'.⁸¹ It is apparent that Henri was interpreting the commemorations as a flag-waving exercise by the English – a tool utilised by a Conservative Government that had refused to grant Wales the ability to govern its own affairs.

Moreover, this letter contrasted the marginalisation of Welsh interests by the Conservative Government with the perceived benefits that the evolving European Union (EU) could offer Wales. As Andrew Thompson has argued, the EU was increasingly viewed, in particular by Plaid Cymru, as providing a forum for a separate voice in Wales and an opportunity for Wales to achieve 'an appropriate level of self-determination' and, thus, to 'step out of the shadow cast by the central government in London'.⁸² From the late 1980s onwards organisations began to look to the EU more, partly due to the improved availability of funding from EU Programmes.⁸³ The impact of the EU, in fact, would later become an important component in the revived devolution debate, acting as a catalyst for the 'political metamorphosis' in Wales.⁸⁴

This was indicative of the gradual emergence of wider issues in the nature of the relationship between England and Wales. The fiftieth anniversary of VE Day, in fact, fell during a period when public demand for a more advanced and effective democratic process in Wales began to increase. For Rebecca Davies, as in Scotland, this could be

⁸⁰ Henry, 'Letters to the Editor: Flag of Oppression'.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Evans, *A History of Wales*, p.238; A. Thompson, 'Wales in Europe', in D. Dunkerley & A. Thompson (eds), *Wales Today* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999), p.310.

⁸³ Thompson, 'Wales in Europe', p.310; A report by the Institute of Welsh Affairs noted that the impact of EU funding in Wales, especially the EU Structural Funds, had been extremely valuable. See: K. Morgan & A. Price, *The Other Wales. The Case for Objective 1 Funding Post 1999* (Cardiff: Institute of Welsh Affairs, 1998).

⁸⁴ B. Jones, 'Welsh Politics and Changing British and European Contexts' in J. Bradbury & J. Mawson (eds), *British Regionalism and Devolution* (London: Jessica Kingsley, 1997); J. Osmond, *The European Union and the Governance of Wales: A Background Paper* (Cardiff: Institute of Welsh Affairs, 1997). See also Thompson, 'Wales in Europe'. For a further discussion of the impact of EU regional policy on discussions about the political relations between the EU, Wales and Central Government see J. Bradbury and J. Mawson, 'Conclusions: The Changing Politics and Governance of British Regionalism' in Bradbury & Mawson, *British Regionalism and Devolution*.

'attributed to eighteen years of Conservative Government in the United Kingdom, and particularly the impact of Thatcherism'.⁸⁵ Although Wales had initially supported Margaret Thatcher, her policies soon became unpopular.⁸⁶ This growing hatred was predominantly a response to her Government's economic policies and, in particular, the impact they had on manufacturing and industry as well as unemployment rates.⁸⁷ The issue which dominated Welsh politics under Thatcher, however, was the Miners' Strike 1984-1985.⁸⁸ The strike was a deeply traumatic experience, which led to large numbers of pit closures and the subsequent collapse of the coal industry having a devastating impact on mining communities.⁸⁹

Similarly, James Mitchell has contended that devolution was also given impetus by the growing perception that the Conservatives lacked legitimacy in Wales.⁹⁰ He has convincingly argued that the shift in opinion on political devolution began in earnest after the Conservatives' third election victory in 1987.⁹¹ During the 1987 election, the Welsh Conservative share of the vote had fallen to 29.6% returning only 8 Welsh MPs compared to 14 in 1983 (31.0%) and 11 in 1979 (32.2%).⁹² By 1992, this had fallen again to 28.6% and 6 MPs.⁹³ Yet, electoral success elsewhere meant that despite securing a small proportion of

⁸⁵ R. Davies, 'Banal Britishness and Reconstituted Welshness: The Politics of National Identities in Wales', *Contemporary Wales*, 18:1 (2006), pp.106-121, p.116; A. Thomas, 'Wales and Devolution: A Constitutional Footnote?', *Public Money and Management*, 16:4 (1996), pp.21-28.

⁸⁶ Gower, *The Story of Wales*, pp.312-313. This is suggested by the 1979 election results. See: R. Awan-Scully, 'The History of One Party Dominance in Wales. Part 2: Labour Hegemony', *Elections in Wales*, Cardiff University, 9 October 2013. Accessed at: <https://blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/electionsinwales/2013/10/09/the-history-of-one-party-dominance-in-wales-part-2-labour-hegemony/> [Date Accessed: 08/05/2019].

⁸⁷ For more details on the impact of Thatcher's policies see M. Johnes, 'What Did Thatcher Ever Do For Wales?', in H.V. Bowen (ed.), *A New History of Wales. Myths and Realities in Welsh History* (Llandysul, Ceredigion: Gomer Press, 2011), p.187.

⁸⁸ J. Mitchell, *Devolution in the UK* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009) p.157.

⁸⁹ Jenkins, *A Concise History of Wales*, p.244; Gower., *The Story of Wales*, pp.316-317; Johnes, 'What Did Thatcher Ever Do For Wales?', pp.189-190.

⁹⁰ R. Davies, 'Banal Britishness and Reconstituted Welshness: The Politics of National Identities in Wales', *Contemporary Wales*, 18:1 (2006), pp.106-121, p.116; Thomas, 'Wales and Devolution', pp.21-28.

⁹¹ Mitchell, *Devolution in the UK*, p.157; O. Gay, 'Wales and Devolution', *House of Commons Research Paper 97/60* (House of Commons Library, 19 May 1997), p.18.

⁹² Awan-Scully, 'The History of One Party Dominance in Wales'.

⁹³ Black, *A New History of Wales*, pp.220 – 221; Mitchell, *Devolution in the UK*, p.157.

the Welsh vote, the Conservative Party ruled Wales continuously from 1979 to 1997.⁹⁴ It is this which led Ron Davies, for example, to later write that:

I vividly recall the anguish expressed by an eloquent graffiti artist who painted on a prominent bridge in my constituency overnight after the 1987 defeat the slogan “We voted Labour, we got Thatcher! I felt the future was bleak [...] For me, this represented a crisis of representation. Wales was being denied a voice.”⁹⁵

Ultimately, as support for the Conservatives declined in polls both at Westminster (down from 32.2% in 1979 to 28.6% in 1992) and at local government level (12.5% in 1993 to 8.1% in 1995), the perception of a democratic deficit in Wales grew.⁹⁶

Additionally, the existence of a Welsh Office run by a succession of English-born, English-speaking Secretaries of State, predominantly representing constituencies in England, fuelled this notion of a ‘democratic deficit’ or ‘crisis of representation’ as it was felt they were not accurately representing Welsh interests.⁹⁷ For J. Graham Jones, this led to a growth in hostility, ‘to such an extent that they [the Secretaries of State] began to be viewed as alien governor-generals or viceroys’.⁹⁸ This echoes Gwynfor Evans, who claimed that they wielded ‘the enormous powers of a colonialist governor-general’.⁹⁹ In particular, the appointment of John Redwood in 1993, MP for Wokingham in Surrey, led to a dramatic

⁹⁴ J. Graham Jones, ‘The Parliament for Wales Campaign, 1987-2011’, *Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion*, 21 (2015), p.104; Black, *A New History of Wales*, p.219.

⁹⁵ Davies, *Devolution: A Process, Not an Event*.

⁹⁶ See Table 7.1 in J. Bradbury, ‘Wales: Still a Labour Stronghold but Under Threat?’, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 68:1 (2015), pp.101-116; M. Thrasher & C. Rallings, *British Electoral Factors 1832-2006* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); M. Thrasher & C. Rallings, *Local Elections Handbook 1993* (Local Government Chronicle Elections Centre: University of Plymouth, 2004); The Local Government Act of 1994 reorganised local government in Wales on the basis of twenty-two unitary authorities, which came into operation from April 1996. ‘Shadow’ local elections were held in May 1995 in preparation for the new unitary councils, in which the Conservatives lost heavily almost everywhere in Wales, especially in Cardiff. The Labour Party won outright control in fourteen of the twenty-two Councils. See Evans, *History of Wales*, p.240; Jones, ‘The Parliament for Wales Campaign’, p.116.

⁹⁷ Constitution Unit, *An Assembly for Wales* (London: The Constitution Unit, 1996); Mitchell, *Devolution in the UK*, p.157; Jones, ‘The Parliament for Wales Campaign’, p.116; R. Mair Jones, ‘From Referendum to Referendum: National Identity and Devolution in Wales, 1979 – 1997’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Wales (2003), pp.105-6. With the exception of Nicholas Edwards, who represented Pembrokeshire, Secretary of State from 1979 to 1987, the 4 other Secretaries of State did not represent a Welsh constituency and only David Hunt was born in Wales.

⁹⁸ Jones, ‘The Parliament for Wales Campaign, 1987-2011’, p.104; See also Jones, ‘From Referendum to Referendum: National Identity and Devolution in Wales, 1979-1997’, p.86; pp.105-6.

⁹⁹ G. Evans, *The Fight for Welsh Freedom* (Tayllybont: Y Lolfa, 2000), p.165.

change in style. Indeed, as both Mitchell and Johnes have identified, Redwood was a staunch Thatcherite with little knowledge of or feeling for Wales or its people.¹⁰⁰ It was also under Redwood that the 'abuses of the Welsh quangocracy came to light'.¹⁰¹

The role and nature of the ever-increasing number of quangos, which were not democratically accountable, and were perceived to reflect party political considerations as opposed to merit, became particularly contentious throughout Wales.¹⁰² Between 1979 and 1991 the number of bodies officially recognised as quangos in Wales doubled to 80.¹⁰³ It is perhaps this which in 1996 led Kevin Morgan to coin the term 'Quangoland' as a description of Wales.¹⁰⁴ By 1996, for example, there were 1273 councillors in Wales, but approximately 1400 quango appointees.¹⁰⁵ It is not surprising, then, that the historian Richard Vinen has claimed that the Tories 'began to look like a foreign army of occupation'.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, David Hanson, Labour MP for Delyn, following a survey of appointments conducted at the end of 1993, concluded that the Welsh Quangos were 'overstuffed with white, male businessmen, lawyers and accountants, with a sprinkling of

¹⁰⁰ Mitchell, *Devolution in the UK*, p.62; Johnes, *Wales Since 1939*, Ch.11.

¹⁰¹ J. Bradbury, 'Conservative Governments, Scotland and Wales: a Perspective on Territorial Management', in J. Bradbury & J. Mawson (eds), *British Regionalism and Devolution* (London: Kingsley Publishers, 1997), p.92; Mitchell, *Devolution in the UK*, pp.62-63.

¹⁰² This is examined in general terms in: J. Macleavy & O. Gay, 'The Quango Debate', *House of Commons Research Paper 05/30* (Parliament and Constitution Centre: House of Commons Library, 11 April 2005); O. Gay, 'The Quango Debate', *House of Commons Research Paper 96/72* (Home Affairs Section: House of Commons Library, 14 June 1996); Jones, 'The Parliament for Wales Campaign', p.116.

¹⁰³ Council of Welsh Districts, 'Quangos in Wales – A Discussion Document', January 1995; Johnes, *Wales Since 1939*, Ch.11. Furthermore, if appointed local bodies and advisory committees are included in this figure, there were up to 350 Quangos by the beginning of 1995.

¹⁰⁴ K. Morgan & E. Roberts, *The Democratic Deficit: A Guide to Quangoland* (Cardiff: Department of City and Regional Planning, University of Wales College of Cardiff, 1993), no.144.

¹⁰⁵ Figure cited in Johnes, *Wales Since 1939*, Ch.11; See also J. Osmond, 'Living in Quangoland', *PL*, 110 (1995), pp.27-36; J. Bradbury, 'The Devolution Debate in Wales During the Major Governments: The Politics of a Developing State?', in H. Elock and M. Keating (eds), *Remaking the Union. Devolution and British Politics in the 1990s* (Abingdon: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), p. 126; K. Morgan and G. Mungham, *Redesigning Democracy: the Making of the Welsh Assembly* (Bridgend: Seren, 2007), p.56; Morgan & Roberts, *The Democratic Deficit*; K. Morgan and J. Osmond, 'The Welsh Quango State', (1995?); J. Osmond, 'The Contradictions of Welsh Politics', *Scottish Affairs*, 11 (1995), p.47.

¹⁰⁶ R. Vinen, *Thatcher's Britain: The Politics and Social Upheaval of the Thatcher Era* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009), p.211.

establishment figures for good measure. The pattern of appointments represents the face of the Conservative Party and their sympathisers, not the people of Wales'.¹⁰⁷

In criticising Quangos for their overwhelmingly 'white', 'male', middle-class nature, and by extension English, composition Hanson appeared to argue that both Quangos and the Conservative Party, from which appointments were frequently drawn, were not capable of representing Welsh interests because they did not reflect Wales' demographics, which were more diverse in terms of gender, class and ethnicity. The 'Quango State' in Wales, then, was broadly perceived to be a vehicle for Conservatives to increase the extent of their power.¹⁰⁸ Despite this, it is worth noting that anti-English and anti-Conservative sentiment was less extreme in Wales than in Scotland.¹⁰⁹

The fiftieth anniversary of VE Day, then, took place amidst a growing sense of dissatisfaction with the nature of governance in Wales. This was predominantly a consequence of the perceived 'democratic deficit', fuelled by the so-called 'Quango State' and the appointment of English Secretaries of State. Significantly, this also contributed to a growth in devolutionist sentiment and the re-emergence of devolution onto the political agenda.

On 1 May 1997, Tony Blair's New Labour came to power, the first time the Labour Party returned to office since 1979. Heralded as a landslide victory, Labour achieved a majority of 179 in the House of Commons (winning 34 out of the 40 Welsh seats on the basis of 54.7% of the vote).¹¹⁰ Conversely, the Conservative Party failed to secure the election of a single Conservative MP in Wales (and Scotland) for the first time in history, achieving only 19.6%

¹⁰⁷ D. Hanson, *Unelected, Unaccountable and Untenable: A Survey of Appointments to Public Bodies in Wales*, (Cardiff: Institute of Welsh Affairs, 1993), p.29.

¹⁰⁸ K. Morgan & S. Upton, 'Culling the Quangos' in J. Osmond (ed.), 'Welsh Politics Comes of Age: Responses to the Richard Commission', p.80; Jones, *Wales Since 1939*, Ch.11; B. Barry Jones, 'Welsh Politics Comes of Age: The Transformation of Wales Since 1979' in J. Osmond, *A Parliament for Wales* (Llandysul: Gomer, 1994), pp.39-47.

¹⁰⁹ Black, *A New History of Wales*, p.221.

¹¹⁰ B. Morgan, 'General Election Results, 1 May 1997', *House of Commons Research Paper 01/38* (Social & General Statistics Section: House of Commons Library, 29 March 2001); <https://www.assembly.wales/en/abthome/role-of-assembly-how-it-works/Pages/history-welsh-devolution.aspx> [Date Accessed: 08/05/2019]; R. Wyn Jones & B. Lewis, 'The Welsh Devolution Referendum', *Politics* 19:1 (1999), p.42.

of the vote.¹¹¹ Significantly, this had wide-ranging and profound implications for Wales, due not only to the Labour Party's commitment to achieving devolution, but also to the traditional identification of Wales with Labour.

As early as 1992, the Labour Party (re)confirmed their commitment to pursue devolution by pledging in their election manifesto to establish a 'Welsh Assembly of 76 members (2 for each constituency) with executive, but not legislative, powers'.¹¹² It should be noted, however, that in Wales there was no equivalent to the Scottish Constitution Convention (cf. Chapter Four), which had been founded in 1989. Rather, the Welsh Labour Party – the branch of the Labour Party that operates in Wales - established its own Policy Commission to undertake a 'consultation process' intended 'to produce a blueprint for the type of Assembly that will command the broadest range of support in Wales at the next general election'.¹¹³ The Commission's Final Report, *Shaping the Vision*, was approved by the Welsh Labour Party Conference in May 1995.¹¹⁴ This was supplemented in 1996 by a further document, *Preparing for a New Wales*.¹¹⁵ In stark contrast to Scotland, it is apparent that the policy documents were the products of internal, largely closed, party discussions and not wider cross-party or civil-society based consensus.¹¹⁶ By June 1996, the Labour Party had also announced that a pre-legislative referendum would be held.¹¹⁷ This was subsequently confirmed by the Labour Party's 1997 Election Manifesto, which stated:

¹¹¹ Weight, *Patriots*, p.671; L. Audickas, R. Cracknell, & P. Loft, 'UK Election Statistics: 1918-2019: A Century of Elections', *House of Commons Briefing Paper CBP7529* (House of Commons Library, 18 July 2019), pp.18-19; Audickas, Cracknell & Loft., 'UK Election Statistics: 1918-2019', pp.18-19; Black, *A New History of Wales*, p.232.

¹¹² Gay, 'Wales and Devolution', p.20; See also D. Balsom & B. Jones, *The Road to the National Assembly for Wales* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000), p.34; Labour Party, *It's Time to Get Britain Working Again* (London: Labour Party, 1992). This is, of course, an incomplete history of devolution in Wales. For further information see: Gay, 'Wales and Devolution'; Mitchell, *Devolution in the UK*; D. Torrance, "'A Process, Not an Event": Devolution in Wales, 1998 – 2018', *House of Commons Briefing Paper Number 08318* (House of Commons Library, 11 July 2018).

¹¹³ Gay, 'Wales and Devolution', p.20.

¹¹⁴ Wales Labour Party, *Shaping the Vision: A Report on the Powers and Structures of the Welsh Assembly* (Cardiff: Labour Party, 1995); Gay, 'Wales and Devolution', p.20.

¹¹⁵ Wales Labour Party, *Preparing for a New Wales: A Report on the Structure and Workings of the Welsh Assembly* (Cardiff: Labour Party, 1997); Gay, 'Wales and Devolution', p.20.

¹¹⁶ Wyn Jones & Lewis, 'The Welsh Devolution Referendum', p.41.

¹¹⁷ Gay, 'Wales and Devolution', p.23.

Labour will bring a fresh start for Wales. We will, with the consent of the people of Wales, legislate for a Welsh Assembly [...] As soon as possible after the election we will enact legislation to allow the people of Wales to vote in a referendum on our proposals, which will be set out in a White Paper. This referendum will take place not later than the autumn of 1997.¹¹⁸

On 22 July 1997 the White Paper on Welsh Devolution was published.¹¹⁹ *A Voice for Wales* set out Labour's proposals for an elected 'Assembly for Wales', consisting of 60 members to be elected every four years under the Additional Member System. 40 members would be elected from individual constituencies using First Past the Post, while an additional 20 members (4 from each of the 5 regions) would be elected from lists of candidates put forward by the parties using Proportional Representation.¹²⁰ In addition, the Assembly would assume many of the functions and powers of the Secretary of State for Wales. The powers proposed for the Welsh Assembly, however, were nowhere near as extensive as those to be granted to the Scottish Parliament (cf. Chapter Four). For Taylor and Thomson, the proposals only matched those for Scotland in one regard – the electoral system to be used.

A referendum on Welsh devolution was subsequently held on 18 September - one week after a separate vote was held in Scotland.¹²¹ As Wyn Jones and Lewis note, the hope was that a positive result in Scotland would create a 'bandwagon' effect in favour of establishing the Welsh Assembly.¹²² The potential significance of the Scottish vote was recognised within much of the media coverage of the referendum. The *Daily Post*, for

¹¹⁸ Labour Party, *New Labour: Because Britain Deserves Better*, (London: Labour Party, 1997); Labour Party, *New Labour: Because Wales Deserves Better* (Cardiff: Labour Party, 1997); see also J. Osmond, *Accelerating History – the 1979, 1997 and 2011 referendums in Wales* (Cardiff: Institute of Welsh Affairs, 2011); Gay, 'Wales and Devolution', p.25.

¹¹⁹ Welsh Office, *A Voice for Wales: The Government's Proposals for a Welsh Assembly*, Cm 3718 (London: the Stationery Office, 1997).

¹²⁰ The additional elected members are elected according to the following system: The four additional members for each region are identified by calculating the number of constituency seats won by each party in the region and dividing the number of each party's lists votes by the number of constituency seats plus one. The party with the highest number of votes after that calculation gains the first additional member. The calculation is then repeated for the second to the seventh additional member, but by dividing the number of constituency seats plus one and plus additional member seats allocated in previous rounds.

¹²¹ Weight, p.697; Torrance, "'A Process, Not an Event": Devolution in Wales, 1998 – 2018'.

¹²² Wyn Jones & Lewis, 'The Welsh Devolution Referendum', pp.37-46.

example, included headlines such as ‘Prescott Hopes Scots Will Boost Wales Vote’, ‘Your Turn Now, Tony Blair Tells Wales’ and ‘Follow the Scots’ Plea in Referendum’, whilst the *South Wales Evening Post* ran articles entitled ‘Scots Say Yes to Own Parliament’ and ‘Welsh Yes Boost at Scots’ Double’.¹²³

The situation in Wales, however, was different.¹²⁴ There had been little public discussion of the devolution plans, whilst the parties that came to form the ‘Yes for Wales’ campaign, launched in February 1997, had not previously worked together. Ultimately, the Welsh Labour Party, Welsh Liberal Democrats and, from July, Plaid Cymru took part in the cross-party campaign.¹²⁵ On the other hand, the Conservative Party formed the organisational backbone of the ‘Just Say No’ campaign, which was not launched until 21 July 1997. Significantly, the Yes Campaign had a much higher profile. As Johnes has noted, both the *Western Mail* and *Daily Post* were broadly supportive of devolution. Yet, the collective readership of these newspapers only amounted to approximately 12% of households whilst the local and regional press was largely disengaged. In Wales, due to the limited nature of the Welsh ‘national’ press, the majority of the public read British newspapers which were less likely to cover Welsh events extensively.¹²⁶ Consequently, there was little awareness of arguments for or against devolution, especially when compared to the level of engagement

¹²³ T. Boden, ‘Prescott Hopes Scots Will Boost Wales Vote’, *Daily Post*, 12 September 1997, pp.4-5; T. Boden ‘Your Turn Now, Tony Blair Tells Wales’, *Daily Post*, 13 September 1997, pp.4-5; D. Jones, ‘Follow the Scots’ Plea in Referendum’, *Daily Post*, 15 September 1997, p.10; Anon, ‘Scots Say Yes to Own Parliament’, *South Wales Evening Post*, 12 September 1997, p.2; B. Walters, ‘Welsh Yes Boost at Scots’ Double’, *South Wales Evening Post* (Swansea Edition, 12 September 1997), p.1.

¹²⁴ N. Duclos, ‘The 1997 Devolution Referendums in Scotland and Wales’, *French Journal of British Studies*, 14:1 (2006), pp.151-164.

¹²⁵ Notably, this unity was largely a consequence of Ron Davies’ efforts as he had previously secured the backing of Plaid Cymru and the Welsh Lib Dems by adding an element of proportional representation to the original devolutionary plans.

¹²⁶ See Welsh Assembly Government, Communities and Culture Committee: Broadcasting Sub-Committee, *Communication and Content: The Media Challenge for Wales* (Cardiff: Welsh Assembly Government, 10 November 2008), p.15. See also: ‘Low Welsh Media Consumption Creates “Democratic Deficit”’, 7 April 2016. Accessed at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-35984859> [Date Accessed: 12/05/2019]; National Assembly for Wales: Culture, Welsh Language and Communications Committee, *Read All About It: Inquiry into News Journalism in Wales* (Cardiff: National Assembly for Wales Commission, May 2018), p.13; National Assembly for Wales, Communities and Culture Committee: Broadcasting Sub-Committee, *The Welsh Newspaper Industry Inquiry Report* (Cardiff: National Assembly for Wales, June 2009), p.9.

with the issue in Scotland. As in Scotland, the No Campaign also suffered from its links with the Conservatives.

Throughout discussions of devolution and the referendum campaign itself reference was frequently made to the impact of Conservative rule. In a letter to the *South Wales Evening Post*, for example, Robert Smith argued that:

The referendum tomorrow presents the people of Wales with a unique opportunity [...] Then, as now, the people of Wales recognised the damaging influence of 18 years of a Conservative government that systematically set out to centralise political power and under local autonomy in a manner alien to any democratic tradition [...] A Welsh Assembly is a crucial step towards addressing the problems created by those years.¹²⁷

This was a sentiment echoed in a number of parliamentary debates. In a House of Commons Debate held on 4 June 1997, for example, a number of MPs highlighted the consequences of Tory rule in Wales. Ted Rowlands, MP for Merthyr, Tydfil and Rhymney, for example, argued that ‘two things have changed public opinion [on devolution] in the past 18 years’.¹²⁸ He noted that ‘people have seen [...] an unrepresentative Government determining Welsh affairs [and] Secretaries of State who did not understand, feel, or appreciate Wales’.¹²⁹ He continued, ‘the second contributory factor... is the growing revulsion for the quango state [...] That state offends the instinctive democratic instincts of the Welsh people. I believe that [...] has been a major factor in increasing the mood in favour of devolution. I sense that that feeling has grown in the past 18 years’.¹³⁰ Similarly, Donald Anderson, MP for Swansea East, commented that in campaigning for devolution: ‘We must get through to the people of Wales [and Scotland] the fact that the Tories have shamelessly bypassed local government and democratic structures for 18 years by creating

¹²⁷ R. Smith, ‘Letter to the Editor: Go Ahead with Great Confidence’, *South Wales Evening Post*, 17 September 1997, p.27.

¹²⁸ T. Rowlands in ‘Referendum in Wales’, *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 295: col. 456, 4 June 1997.

¹²⁹ Rowlands in ‘Referendum in Wales’, vol. 295: cols. 456-457.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

quangos from which they largely excluded representatives of the majority [...] by putting in their own people, who often had no credible claim to be Welsh or to represent Wales.¹³¹

Perhaps of more significance, however, is the fact that throughout the referendum campaign and subsequent debates on the Government of Wales Bill, discussions of devolution were sometimes framed through reference to the World Wars. In a letter to the *South Wales Evening Post*, for example, Chris Lewis wrote that ‘the yes vote will inevitably bring about the break-up of the UK as we proudly know it... Wars have been fought, lives have been lost and past victories won all under the Union Jack flag of which we as BRITISH people should be proud as a combined nation’.¹³² Here, the fact that it was ‘Britain’ and not Wales, that declared and fought in conflicts, such as the First and Second World War, was raised in opposition to the notion of devolution. Similarly, in a House of Commons Debate of 21 May 1997 Michael Howard highlighted this notion of ‘a community of interests, a shared history, and an essential friendship between its constituent peoples’ in support of the union. He continued by invoking the words ‘of the highlander at Dunkirk, who told his comrades that, if the English surrendered too, it could be a long war’ before concluding that ‘Labour has jeopardised that relationship. A Union that has held fast for centuries could begin to fray in a matter of months’.¹³³

Ultimately, the Welsh voted narrowly in favour of establishing a National Assembly of Wales. The ‘Yes’ vote obtained 50.3% or 559,419 votes compared to the 552,698 votes cast against, in a turnout of only 50.1%. The margin of victory, then, was small, with a majority of only 6,721 votes, which represented only 0.6% of those cast during the referendum or 0.3% of the total eligible electorate.¹³⁴

¹³¹ D. Anderson in ‘Referendum in Wales’, *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 259: col. 482, 4 June 1997.

¹³² C. Lewis, ‘Letter to the Editor: No is the Only Answer for Welsh Pride’, *South Wales Evening Post*, 17 September 1997, p.27.

¹³³ M. Howard in ‘Referendums (Scotland and Wales) Bill’, *Hansard House of Commons Parliamentary Debate*, 6th series, vol. 294: col. 737, 21 May 1997.

¹³⁴ R. Wyn Jones & D. Trystan, ‘The 1997 Welsh Referendum Vote’ in Taylor & Thomson, *Scotland and Wales Again?*, p.65. In the absence of a 40% threshold, a stipulation stating that 40% of those voting had to vote ‘Yes which that had been added in the Scotland and Wales Act of 1979, this result was sufficient for the Government to proceed.

This outcome was not only significantly different to that in Scotland, which had voted decisively in favour of devolution, but appeared to expose a fault line at the heart of Welsh society.¹³⁵ As Taylor and Thomson have argued ‘Welsh’ Wales backed devolution, whilst ‘British’ Wales still appeared to want to retain its links with Westminster.¹³⁶ Despite the narrow majority, however, the result represented a significant swing, 30%, towards approving the notion of an assembly compared to the results from the 1979 referendum when the ‘Yes’ vote had achieved only 20.3%.¹³⁷ For Richard Wyn Jones and Bethan Lewis, despite the closeness of the result and low turnout, this signalled a substantial transformation in Welsh attitudes towards devolution.¹³⁸

It is also particularly striking that, when analysing the results, age appeared to be an important factor in determining voting decisions. For John Osmond, writing for the Institute of Welsh Affairs, ‘arguably the single most important explanation’ for this marked change was a ‘fundamental, in many ways psychological shift between generations that took place during the period [between the two referendums]’.¹³⁹ He notes that ‘in 1979 society was still governed by a generation whose formative experience had been the Second World War, the fight against fascism, the creation of the Welfare State after 1945, and the consciousness and then loss of Empire.’¹⁴⁰ Yet, by 1997 ‘this generation had largely passed on. In its place was 600,000 people who in 1979 had been too young to vote. For them the

¹³⁵ J. Curtice, ‘Is Scotland a Nation and Wales Not? Why the Two Referendum Results Were So Different in Taylor & Thomson, *Scotland and Wales. Nations Again?*, p.119; Taylor & Thomson, ‘Introductions and Conclusions’, p..xxviii.

¹³⁶ Taylor & Thomson, ‘Introductions and Conclusions’, p..xxviii. This use of ‘Welsh Wales’ and ‘British Wales’ draws on Denis Balsom’s famous Three-Wales Model, which identifies an industrial heartland in the south (Welsh Wales), a linguistic heartland in the west and north (Y Fro Gymraeg) and an eastern, more anglicised border (British Wales). ‘No’ votes outnumbered ‘Yes’ votes all along the border with England. See D. Balsom, ‘The Three Wales Model’ in J. Osmond (ed.), *The National Question Again: Welsh Political Identity in the 1980s* (Llandysul: Gomer Press, 1985). See R. Dewdney. ‘Results of Devolution Referendums (1979 & 1997), *House of Commons Research Paper 97/113* (Social & General Statistics Section: House of Commons Library, 10 November 1997) for a breakdown of the results.

¹³⁷ Wyn Jones & Lewis, ‘The Welsh Devolution Referendum’, pp.38-39. The turnout in 1979 was 58.8%.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Osmond, *Accelerating History*, p.11.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

Second World War was as much history as the Napoleonic Wars'.¹⁴¹ Consequently, 'this new generation... regarded their Welshness in a different light... Giving Wales a political vote seemed a natural thing to do'.¹⁴² In 1997, the Welsh Referendum Survey, conducted by the University of Wales in Aberystwyth, suggested that those under 45 were likely to vote 'Yes' by a margin of 3:2, whilst those over 45 were likely to vote 'No' by a similar margin.¹⁴³ This evidence would seem to offer significant support to Richard Weight's contention that it was the wartime generation which continued to feel the strongest attachment to the United Kingdom and the fading memory of the Second World War was a key factor in the decline of 'Britishness' in the last decade of the twentieth century.¹⁴⁴

This section has argued that between 1994 and 1998 the public commemoration of the World Wars in Wales remained the preserve of Whitehall. The official commemorative event organised for the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day, a 'National' Weekend of Celebrations held in London, not only failed to disaggregate the Welsh experiences of the War within an overarching 'British' narrative, but also was dominated by Anglo-centric iconography and narratives such as the Union Jack, Churchill and the songs of Vera Lynn. This, in part, reflected the priorities of the Conservative Government that drove the official commemorations between 1979 and 1997, as discussed further in Chapter One. Although Westminster did not directly organise any official events in Wales for the anniversary, which in of itself is striking, the commemorations held in conjunction with the national celebration tended to adopt a similar tone, format and style to those in London and England. There was a preponderance of street parties and 1940s style celebrations while beacons were lit across Wales and commemorations were frequently framed as a weekend of events. This, in turn, suggests that the level of engagement with the commemorations in Wales was significantly higher than that in Scotland (cf. Chapter Four), reflecting the less problematic nature of Wales' relationship with both England and the wider United Kingdom.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴¹ Osmond, *Accelerating History*, p.11.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Cited in Osmond, *Accelerating History*, p.11.

¹⁴⁴ Weight, *Patriots*, p.669.

¹⁴⁵ Gower, *The Story of Wales*, p.330.

Throughout the VE Day commemorations, however, there is also evidence that Welsh symbolism and narratives were increasingly being placed alongside the dominant narratives of the Second World War as Welsh experiences of and contributions to the wider war effort were highlighted. Furthermore, the analysis has also revealed that in some instances the commemorative events were not as well received in Wales compared to England as the predominance of Anglo-centric narratives was criticised, creating apathy and a lack of understanding as well as a sense of difference regarding the relevance of the events to the Welsh.

The Early Years of Devolution, 1999 – 2006

In the years leading up to (and including) 1998 the commemoration and remembrance of the World Wars, which was driven by Westminster, was taking place in a shifting political climate – one in which the nature of the relationship between England and Wales was beginning to alter amidst calls for a more democratic political process in Wales. This culminated in the landslide victory of the Labour Party in the 1997 General Election and subsequent holding of a referendum vote on the devolution of political powers to Wales. The narrow ‘Yes’ vote, however, was only the start of a process of devolution which continued to evolve over the course of the next decade (and beyond) following the opening of the Welsh Assembly in May 1999. This, in turn, would have significant implications for the commemoration of the World Wars. Throughout this period, Wales came to be viewed not as a Principality, but as a distinct nation. Consequently, it was increasingly felt that there was a need for Welsh experiences of the World Wars to be explicitly recognised and the Welsh war dead commemorated as such.

The first Welsh Assembly elections were held on 6 May 1999.¹⁴⁶ The Labour Party won a total of 28 seats, from a low turnout of 46.3%, which was nearly 12% lower than those held

¹⁴⁶ For a detailed analysis of the election see D. Balsom, ‘The First Welsh General Election’ in B. Jones & D. Balsom, *The Road to the National Assembly for Wales* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000), pp.212-228.

in Scotland.¹⁴⁷ However, they achieved 18% less of the vote than in the 1997 General Election and failed to win an overall majority, despite this being widely anticipated ahead of the vote. In contrast to this, Plaid Cymru became the second largest party, winning a total of 17 seats.¹⁴⁸ For Plaid Cymru, this represented more than double its previous best performance of 11.5% in 1970 and, significantly, placed it on an electoral par with the Scottish National Party for the first time in its history.¹⁴⁹ In winning traditionally Labour seats in the Rhondda, Islwyn (Neil Kinnock's former seat) and Llanelli, Plaid Cymru also succeeded in breaking out of its traditional strongholds in the Welsh-speaking areas.¹⁵⁰ This represented, as Thomas has argued, 'possibly the biggest shake-up the Labour Party in Wales had ever seen', as its vote collapsed in their traditional heartlands of South Wales.¹⁵¹

This 'disastrous' electoral performance has widely been interpreted as a consequence of Alun Michael's leadership of the Welsh Labour Party between October 1998 and February 2000.¹⁵² It had been expected that Ron Davies, who has often been regarded as the 'architect of devolution' in Wales and was selected as Labour's candidate for First Secretary in September 1998, would become First Minister of Wales. Davies, however, was forced to resign following a self-declared 'moment of madness', during which he was mugged at knifepoint by a man he had met on Clapham Common, then a well-known gay meeting

¹⁴⁷ B. Morgan, 'Welsh Assembly Elections: 6 May 1999', *House of Commons Research Paper* (House of Commons Library, 12 May 1999), p.5; It is worth noting that the turnout in Wales, 46.5%, was nearly 12% lower than in Scotland. This was later attributed to a range of factors including a lack of both belief in and understanding of the National Assembly as well as a lacklustre election campaign. This broke down into 37.6% of the constituency vote and 35.5% of the regional vote.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid; J. Bradbury & R. Andrews, 'State Devolution and National Identity: Continuity and Change in the Politics of Welshness and Britishness in Wales', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 63:2 (2010), p239. Plaid Cymru achieved 28.4% of the constituency vote and 30.5% of the regional vote.

¹⁴⁹ Weight, *Patriots*, p.704.

¹⁵⁰ D.G. Evans, *A History of Wales, 1906 – 2000* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000), p.242; R. Wyn Jones & D. Trystan, 'Turnout, Participation and Legitimacy in the Politics of Post-Devolution Wales', in P. Chaney, T. Hall & A. Pithouse (eds), *New Governance – New Democracy? Post-Devolution Wales* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2001), p.18; Gower, *Story of Wales*, pp.324-325.

¹⁵¹ A. Thomas, 'Politics in Wales: A New Era?', pp.287-304 in D. Dunkerley & A. Thompson (eds), *Wales Today* (Cardiff: University of Wales, 1999), p.297.

¹⁵² Bradbury & Andrews, 'State Devolution and National Identity', p.243; P. Flynn, *Dragons Led by Poodles, The Inside Story of a New Labour Stitch-Up* (Politics, 1999).

place.¹⁵³ Alun Michael was instead put forward by Blair as a ‘decent but nondescript placeman’ and a ‘safe pair of hands’.¹⁵⁴

Michael was portrayed as ‘Blair’s poodle’, the candidate ‘parachuted’ into Wales against the grassroots favourite, ‘maverick’ and ‘off-message’ Rhodri Morgan.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, Blair proceeded to engineer Michael’s victory by using the trade union bloc vote to outweigh the preference of individual party members. Morgan won the Members Ballot by 64.35% to 35.65% but lost overall due to Michael’s victories in the affiliates and MPs/candidates sections (by 63.96% to 36.04% and 58.43% to 41.57%) giving Michaels a 52.68% to 47.32% victory.¹⁵⁶ This revealed a degree of central control which contrasted with the logic of devolution, which was about reducing the influence of Westminster. This flouting of national wishes, Bradbury and Andrews have argued, led to the perception that the Labour Party in Wales was both ‘anti-Welsh’ and ‘too overly British-centric’.¹⁵⁷ Martin Shipton, for example, wrote at the time that ‘Labour’s failure to gain an overall majority largely reflects the general feeling that something undemocratic and profoundly distasteful had occurred [...] The Labour Party must realise that it cannot run Wales like a rotten borough any longer.’¹⁵⁸ Later, in February 2000, Michael resigned ahead of a ‘no confidence’ vote; yielding the job to Morgan. A month later, he quit as an Assembly Member altogether.

The devolutionary process culminated in May 1999 with the opening of the Welsh Assembly, which has since been hailed as an institution of ‘unique historic significance’ and the ‘political expression of nationhood’ in Wales.¹⁵⁹ Upon its opening on 27 May, the Assembly took up the executive powers formerly held by the Welsh Secretary of State and

¹⁵³ Ron Davies quoted in C. Brown, ‘No Sex, No Drugs’. Davies Tells of His Moment of Madness’, *The Independent*, 31 October 1998. Accessed at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/no-sex-no-drugs-davies-tells-of-his-moment-of-madness-1181604.html> [Date Accessed: 09/09/2019]; Anon, ‘UK Politics: My “Moment of Madness”’, *BBC News* 31 October 1998. Accessed at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/204691.stm [Date Accessed: 09/09/2019].

¹⁵⁴ Weight, *Patriots*, p.704; M. Shipton, *Poor Man’s Parliament: Ten Years of the Welsh Assembly*, (Bridgend: Seren, 2011), p.9; Bradbury & Andrews, ‘State Devolution and National Identity’, p.243.

¹⁵⁵ Thomas, ‘Politics in Wales: A New Era?’, p.296; Flynn, *Dragons Led by Poodles*.

¹⁵⁶ Figures quoted in Shipton, *Poor Man’s Parliament*, p.15.

¹⁵⁷ Bradbury & Andrews, ‘State Devolution and National Identity’, p.243.

¹⁵⁸ Shipton, *Poor Man’s Parliament*, p.24.

¹⁵⁹ M. Ford, *For Wales, See England: Language, Nationhood and Identity* (Stroud: Amberley Publishing, 2016), p.53.

the Welsh Office.¹⁶⁰ The new devolved body, however, was not granted full law-making powers or the ability to initiate primary legislation.¹⁶¹ Rather, the National Assembly exercises its powers through secondary legislation or law-making powers – the passing of subordinate legislation under existing Acts of Parliament.¹⁶²

The opening ceremony itself was a low-key affair, in contrast to the equivalent event held in Scotland two months later. The event lasted only 23 minutes whilst formalities akin to those of Westminster were also kept to a minimum, with little or no acknowledgement of the old anachronistic symbols of sovereignty, such as flag raising.¹⁶³ The *South Wales Evening Post*, for example, referred to it as a ‘dignified’ but ‘modern and more relaxed occasion’.¹⁶⁴ During the ceremony, speeches which were made in both English and Welsh emphasised not only Wales’ links with the United Kingdom, but also acknowledged the Principality’s distinctive identity and the need to accommodate this within the wider political union. The Queen, for example, described the Assembly as both a ‘notable moment in our nations’ long history’ and ‘[a] bridge into the future’.¹⁶⁵ In a reference to the whole devolutionary project, she suggested that the Assembly derived from the recognition ‘of the need for devolved, democratic bodies [...] to reflect and articulate our rich national diversity’.¹⁶⁶ The Queen also noted that the Assembly would provide Wales with ‘a more resonant democratic voice and a clearer expression of Welsh society and

¹⁶⁰ M. Leeke, C. Sear & O. Gay, ‘An Introduction to Devolution in the United Kingdom’, *House of Commons /Parliament and Constitution Centre, Research Paper 03/84* (House of Commons Library, 17 November 2003), p.24; *Government of Wales Act 1998* - For details of the Act see: <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/38/contents> [Date Accessed: 10/09/2019]; See also K. Patchett, ‘The New Welsh Constitution: The Government of Wales Act 1998’ in B. Jones & D. Balsom, *The Road to the National Assembly for Wales* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000), pp.229-264.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid*, p.24; *Government of Wales Act 1998* - For details of the Act see:

<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/38/contents> [Date Accessed: 10/09/2019].

¹⁶² *Ibid*; Torrance, ‘“A Process, Not an Event”’, p.11; See also O. Gay, ‘The Government of Wales Bill: Devolution and the National Assembly’, *House of Commons Library Research Paper 97/129* (House of Commons Library, 4 December 1997).

¹⁶³ P. Lewis, ‘Nation Unites for Great Day. Her Majesty Opens First Welsh Parliament in 600 Years’, *South Wales Evening Post*, 26 May 1999, p.1.

¹⁶⁴ B. Walters, ‘Queen Opens Up Bridge to Future. National Assembly Wins Royal Seal of Approval’, *South Wales Evening Post*, 27 May 1999, p.4.

¹⁶⁵ P. Waugh & T. Heath, ‘No Pomp as Welsh Assembly Opens’, *The Independent*, 27 May 1999, p.4.

¹⁶⁶ Quoted in M. Wells, ‘The Queen Opens Wales’s ‘Voice for the Future’, *The Scotsman*, 27 May 1999, p.4.

culture'.¹⁶⁷ Similarly, Prince Charles, speaking in Welsh, referred to the Assembly as 'a modern expression of the spirit of Wales' and suggested that 'in ways not possible before, Welsh minds will be directed to Welsh matters'.¹⁶⁸

There was also a strong emphasis placed on the opportunities presented by devolution for Wales to create its own political identity and focus on issues specific to Wales. Throughout his speech, for example, First Minister Alun Michael noted the 'profound sense of history' he felt. He continued, 'it is our responsibility to start a new era. This is a time of change and it is a time of hope [...] [We must] devise Welsh solutions to Welsh problems'. Similarly, Dafydd Wigley commented that the Assembly would bring 'confidence and new dignity' to Wales.¹⁶⁹ Jan Morris, writing in *The Independent* after the opening, echoed this sentiment when noting that 'the Welsh sense of national identity has marvellously revived. Pride in Welshness is far stronger now, the Welsh language flourishes'. Morris continued: 'anybody who has lived in this country since the devolution referendum two years ago must have observed the immense change in the national spirit'.¹⁷⁰

The National Assembly in its early years, however, was beset by numerous difficulties. This was predominantly a consequence of the limited nature of the powers granted to Wales by the 1998 Act, compounded by the poor electoral turnouts in both the 1997 Devolution Referendum and 1998 Welsh Assembly elections. It was also coloured by the issues regarding Alun Michael's leadership. Indeed, the Assembly's capacity for initiative was severely constricted by its reliance on Westminster to provide the legislative framework within which it could advance a distinctive Welsh dimension.¹⁷¹ The Scottish Parliament,

¹⁶⁷ Wells, 'The Queen Opens Wales's 'Voice for the Future'; Walters, 'Queen Opens Up Bridge to Future'.

¹⁶⁸ G. Gibbs, 'Welsh Crown Day with a Song', *The Guardian*, 27 May 1999; Wells, 'The Queen Opens Wales's 'Voice for the Future'; Walters, 'Queen Opens Up Bridge to Future'.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ J. Morris, 'Welcome to Wales, Ma'am; Nationalists Who Would Not Have Been Seen Dead on the Honours List Will Soon Accept Royal Favours', *The Independent*, 27 May 1999.

¹⁷¹ K. Patchett, 'The New Constitutional Architecture' in J. Osmond & J. Barry Jones, *Birth of Welsh Democracy. The First Term of the National Assembly for Wales* (Institute of Welsh Affairs, 2003), pp.3-17; R. Hazell, 'Multi-Level Governance' in Osmond & Barry Jones, *Birth of Welsh Democracy*, pp. 19 – 31.

for example, was able to pass forty-four Acts during the first three years of devolution, whereas Wales managed to obtain only one Wales-only statute from Westminster.

This combination of issues, especially the limitations on its powers, appeared to have a wider effect on the National Assembly, in terms of the areas which dominated political debates during its early years. Consequently, some subjects, regardless of how they might affect or be relevant to Wales, were marginalised. This can be illustrated by the Assembly's response to the issues raised by the 'Shot at Dawn' Campaign which contrasted sharply with that of the Scotland Parliament (cf. Chapter Four). On 30 November 1999, for example, John Griffiths (MP for Newport East) tabled a written question, asking: 'What part may the Assembly play in the debate as to whether there should be a "millennium pardon"?' In his reply, the First Minister, at this time still Alun Michael, commented that: 'the subjects of pardons for soldiers executed during the First World War is a defence issue and, therefore, a wholly reserved matter'.¹⁷² He discussed the review carried out by the former Minister of State for Armed Forces and highlighted that 'those responsible for the country's war memorials and books of remembrance have been asked to add these men's names so that they can be remembered alongside their comrades'. Despite this, and the fact that 15 Welshmen were executed during the First World War, Michael was ultimately unwilling to involve the Assembly and concluded: 'I suggest that it is sensible for the Assembly to approach with care those matters over which we have no jurisdiction, on which we have limited information, and on which Members of Parliament are better placed to comment'.¹⁷³

This represented a stark contrast with the debates that took place in Scotland. Indeed, as we have seen, despite the question of pardons also being a reserved matter there, it became an issue around which not only a sense of 'Scottish' identity could be established, but the Parliament's limited powers could both be highlighted and criticised. In Wales, however, no such links between commemoration, identity, nationalism and further devolution were made. The issue of commemoration, and especially the pardons, was not

¹⁷² J. Griffiths, 'Answers to Questions Not Reached in Plenary: Questions to the First Secretary' (Welsh Assembly, 30 November 1999).

¹⁷³ Griffiths, 'Answers to Questions Not Reached in Plenary: Questions to the First Secretary'.

subject to wider parliamentary debate. Rather, it appears that the focus of attention during the first years of the National Assembly was overwhelmingly directed towards issues relating to the operation of the new devolutionary settlement as well as the delivery of public services such as health and education.

Despite such limitations, it is now generally agreed that devolution represented an ‘historic achievement’ and a ‘pivotal moment in the history of Wales’ which ‘constituted the most significant milestone in the history of democratic government in Wales’.¹⁷⁴ Dennis Balsom has also referred to the establishment of the National Assembly in 1999 as the ‘birth of the political nation’.¹⁷⁵ Significantly, in creating an explicitly Welsh political arena, devolution decisively changed the political landscape of Wales. This allowed, as Morgan has argued, ‘the application of an all-Wales viewpoint at the point of decision-making for the first time in modern history’.¹⁷⁶ The National Assembly, in fact, although limited in power, has been crucial for the renewal of a distinctive Welsh identity. Graham Day, David Dunkerley and Andrew Thompson, for example, wrote in 2000 that ‘the devolution of decision-making powers to the National Assembly for Wales signifies political recognition of the distinctiveness of Wales as a place that merits independent representation, which has its own ‘voice’, and its own problems and concerns’. They continued by suggesting that it constituted an acceptance that Wales formed ‘a distinct, although not wholly separate, society with its own history, identity and institutional structure’.¹⁷⁷ Furthermore, as Bradbury and Andrews argue, debate about revitalising and reconfiguring conceptions of ‘Welshness’ appeared to acquire an unparalleled degree of prominence within the public and political life of the country.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁴ Jenkins, *A Concise History of Wales*, p.298; P. Chaney, T. Hall & A. Pithouse, ‘New Governance – New Democracy?’, in P. Chaney, T. Hall & A. Pithouse (eds), *New Governance – New Democracy? Post-Devolution Wales* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2001), p.4.

¹⁷⁵ D. Balsom, ‘No Going Back’ in Osmond, *Birth of Welsh Democracy*, p.305.

¹⁷⁶ Bradbury & Andrews, ‘State Devolution and National Identity’, p.236; K.O. Morgan, ‘Welsh Devolution: The Past and the Future’, in Morgan, *Revolution to Devolution*, p.261. This article was originally written in 1998 and reproduced in *Revolution to Devolution*.

¹⁷⁷ G. Day, D. Dunkerley & A. Thompson, ‘Evaluating the ‘New Politics’: Civil Society and the National Assembly for Wales’, *Public Policy and Administration*, 15:2 (2000), p.25.

¹⁷⁸ Bradbury & Andrews, ‘State Devolution and National Identity’, p.236.

During this period, there was also growing debate about commemorative events and a shift in perceptions, which increasingly highlighted the need for Wales to be represented during such events. In 2002 and 2003, for example, discussions emerged regarding the nature of the annual Remembrance Day commemorations in Wales. The lack of a 'central focus' for remembrance or 'single national event' in Wales was frequently highlighted and increasingly criticised.¹⁷⁹ Rather, it was noted that senior politicians in Wales 'attended separate services to honour the country's war dead'.¹⁸⁰ The Welsh National Assembly had marked the occasion by attending a service at Llandaff Cathedral in Cardiff, whilst the Cardiff County Council traditionally held a service at the National War Memorial in Cathays Park.¹⁸¹

In November 2002, then, a Westminster Government spokesman stated: 'the present situation doesn't unify Wales enough at a time when the whole of Wales mourns its war dead'.¹⁸² They noted that Peter Hain, Secretary of State for Wales, wanted to address this issue and would 'try to get agreement for a service which will be relevant to the whole of Wales in the Welsh capital'.¹⁸³ Similarly, Hain himself later commented that shortly following his appointment as Secretary of State he 'became aware that there was no Remembrance Sunday service to honour all the Welshmen and women who died in the two World Wars and subsequent conflicts... I thought there must be such a focus for national remembrance'.¹⁸⁴

This culminated in the introduction, in 2003, of an 'all-Wales' or 'combined' Welsh 'National' Service of Remembrance intended to act as a 'focal point for the country's mourning'.¹⁸⁵ Although this initiative was driven by the Secretary of State and not the National Assembly, it is significant that throughout the commentary in the media, a

¹⁷⁹ P. Hain, 'Wales Unites to Honour Those Who Died for Us; Welsh National Service of Remembrance', *Western Mail*, 8 November 2003; Anon, 'Comment: Thought for the Day', *Western Mail*, 11 November 2002.

¹⁸⁰ Anon, 'Leaders to Unite at War Memorial', *Western Mail*, 7 October 2003.

¹⁸¹ Hain, 'Wales Unites to Honour Those Who Died for Us'.

¹⁸² Anon, 'Hain Plans Wales Service of Remembrance in Capital', *Western Mail*, 11 November 2002.

¹⁸³ Anon, 'Hain Plans Wales Service of Remembrance in Capital'.

¹⁸⁴ Anon, 'United in Tribute to Wales' Fallen; One Service Will Salute War Dead', *South Wales Echo*, 6 October 2003.

¹⁸⁵ J. Atkinson, 'The Nation Unites in Remembrance', *Western Mail*, 11 November 2002.

number of figures specifically linked this issue to the emergence of a new political climate in Wales. The Lord Mayor of Cardiff, Russell Goodway, for example, commented that: 'I am really pleased that [we] have been able to find a way forward [...] Change is always difficult to bring about and there is nothing more sensitive than events such as this. I have been aware for some time that we needed to reflect the new arrangements, post-devolution'.¹⁸⁶ In addition to this, Goodway noted that these changes to the Remembrance Service would 'enable an enhanced level of national representation'.¹⁸⁷ Similarly, First Minister Rhodri Morgan in supporting the call for a Welsh National Remembrance Service in the previous year had commented that: 'It would be desirable... Obviously the Cenotaph service is held in London, and I believe they hold an equivalent service in Scotland, but there has never been one in Wales... It is something we have been edging towards in recent years, since devolution'.¹⁸⁸

These discussions, then, highlight changes that were taking place in the nature of Wales' relationship with the commemoration of the World Wars as the wider political climate shifted. Indeed, this issue appears to have become one around which the 'Welsh Nation', in establishing its own 'national' event was able to further distinguish itself as separate from 'Britain' in the post-devolution period.

In 2004 a controversy emerged over First Minister Rhodri Morgan's decision not to attend the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day commemorations. Instead, he went to a meeting at the Celtic Manor Resort near Newport to discuss Wales' hosting of the Ryder Cup in 2010. In his place, Social Justice Minister Edwina Hart, whose family had served in World War Two, was chosen to attend the anniversary on behalf of Wales.¹⁸⁹

This decision not only received extensive newspaper coverage, but was heavily criticised by politicians in the Welsh Assembly and Westminster, veterans and the wider public alike. On 8 June 2004, for example, this incident was raised as an 'Urgent Question' in the National

¹⁸⁶ Anon, 'Leaders to Unite at War Memorial'.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Anon, 'Hain Plans Wales Service of Remembrance in Capital'.

¹⁸⁹ M. Shipton, 'First Minister Attacked for D-Day Snub', *Western Mail*, 5 June 2004; K. Jackson, 'You Plonker, Rhodri!', *Wales on Sunday*, 6 June 2004; A. Denholm, 'D-Day: The 60th Anniversary Welsh First Minister Forced to Say Sorry', *The Scotsman*, 7 June 2004.

Assembly. Throughout the debate, the criticism levelled at Morgan was predominantly framed in terms of the First Minister's responsibility to represent the Welsh nation. Nick Bourne, Welsh Conservative Assembly Leader, for example, commented that: '[t]he opportunity to represent our nation at Arromanches should be viewed as a privilege and not a chore. I believe that it was essential that the First Minister represented our nation in France last weekend. We should have been represented at the highest level.'¹⁹⁰

A number of other Assembly Members, in their contributions, adopted similar rhetoric. Ieuan Wyn Jones, the Plaid Cymru Assembly Leader, for example, stated:

The Welsh veterans who attended the events in Arromanches last weekend expected to see the First Minister at their side representing Wales. This is not about rank or the pecking order in your Cabinet; it is about who should have represented Wales at this event, which should unquestionably have been the First Minister.¹⁹¹

Likewise, Michael German, Liberal Democrat Assembly Leader, noted that 'the issue here is that you represent me, the Assembly and the people of Wales. Therefore, your presence at Arromanches would also have been that of the people of Wales, which is why I regret your absence. Will you reflect on the fact that you are the most senior person in Wales, and that this was the most senior of occasions?'¹⁹² Rhodri Glyn Thomas (AM for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr), also argued that 'the big political mistake... was to even consider that you should not go. Everybody expected you, as the First Minister of Wales, to do so, and everybody is still incredulous that you did not do that to represent the people of Wales... As First Minister, it was your responsibility to be there.'¹⁹³

Criticism was not only levelled at Morgan by Assembly Members, but also by other politicians. Nicholas Soames, Shadow Defence Secretary, for example, said:

¹⁹⁰ N. Bourne, 'Urgent Question: D-Day Celebrations' *National Assembly of Wales Record of Proceedings*, 8 June 2004.

¹⁹¹ I. Wyn Jones, 'Urgent Question: D-Day Celebrations' *National Assembly of Wales Record of Proceedings*, 8 June 2004.

¹⁹² M. German, 'Urgent Question: D-Day Celebrations' *National Assembly of Wales Record of Proceedings*, 8 June 2004.

¹⁹³ R. Glyn Thomas, 'Urgent Question: D-Day Celebrations' *National Assembly of Wales Record of Proceedings*, 8 June 2004.

It is inexcusably casual and deeply disrespectful to the memory of the tens of thousands of Welshmen who gave their lives on active service during the Second World War. Those Welsh servicemen still surviving and the families of those who gave their lives will no doubt find it extraordinary that Wales' military contribution to the allied operations is not being recognised by Wales' First Minister on this momentous occasion.¹⁹⁴

In addition to this, the former Welsh Secretary Ron Davies commented that: 'Rhodri can't get his bags packed fast enough if he wants to jump on a plane to watch a rugby match or a soccer match [...] but he can't seem to put aside a golf event to represent our nation. It's an appalling lack of judgement on his part'.¹⁹⁵

This sentiment was echoed in numerous 'Letters to the Editor' from across Wales. R. Sheppard from Coed Hirwaun in Port Talbot, for example, wrote of Rhodri Morgan that 'you had a duty to represent Wales in remembrance of all those Welshmen and others who died or suffered injury before the hell of the beaches' while H. Thomas from Neath Abbey, who was 9 on D-Day, wrote that 'as the public face of Wales he [Morgan] should have been present to commemorate the sacrifices of so many of his fellow countrymen'.¹⁹⁶ Similarly, Alun John Richards writing from Swansea described Rhodri Morgan's absence from the commemorations as 'contemptible'. He noted that it 'not only insults the Welsh servicemen who played a disproportionately large part and suffered disproportionately large casualties 60 years ago, but also brings shame on the whole Welsh nation'.¹⁹⁷ C.F. Williams, writing from Rumney in Cardiff, also drew this link to the nation, commenting: 'you disgrace us as a nation with your total lack of thought and feeling for these men and the suffering they endured for us all today'.¹⁹⁸

This is further indicative of the extent to which the commemoration of the World Wars was increasingly becoming one arena in which it was felt that Wales should be represented as a

¹⁹⁴ Shipton, 'First Minister Attacked for D-Day Snub'.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ R. Sheppard, 'Letters to the Editor – Rhodri, You Must Resign', *South Wales Evening Post*, 10 June 2004, p.14; H. Thomas, 'Letters to the Editor – Sadness, Pride and Shame', *South Wales Evening Post*, 10 June 2004, p.14.

¹⁹⁷ A.J. Richards, 'Letters to the Editor – 'First Minister's Absence Brings Shame On Nation'', *Western Mail*, 7 June 2004, p.12.

¹⁹⁸ C.F. Williams, 'Letters to the Editor - Viewpoints: You Brought Disgrace to Our Nation', *South Wales Echo*, 11 June 2004, p.41.

distinct entity, separate from Britain. This incident, then, demonstrates a shift in perceptions of Welsh nationhood and Welsh identity in the post-devolution period. It is apparent that many strongly believed that the First Minister should have been present at the commemorations to represent Welsh soldiers and thus the Welsh 'nation'. It was felt that despite Prime Minister Tony Blair's presence on behalf of the United Kingdom to represent 'British' soldiers, Morgan's absence was inexcusable. For some, in fact, it was felt that Morgan's failure to attend the ceremony not only discredited the new political institution, but also appeared to invalidate a sense of Welsh nationhood. Brian Jones from Mamhilad in Monmouthshire, for example, wrote that in choosing to attend 'a golf dinner instead of attending the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day... he has devalued his position and the National Assembly'.¹⁹⁹ Similarly, D. Milner, from Ael y Bryn, Llanedeyrn in Cardiff, asked:

How can he [Morgan] profess to be the leader of Wales when he was not got the courtesy to go to the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day? He is our so-called representative but it seems only when it suits him. How can Wales be a true political force with this kind of behaviour? The Richards report says Wales needs more powers but after Mr Morgan's insult to D-Day veterans, powers need taking away until our politicians show they deserve them.²⁰⁰

Significantly, this was taking place amidst continuing debates over the nature of devolution in Wales. On 31 March 2004, for example, the Richard Commission published its final report.²⁰¹ The Commission, chaired by Lord Richard, a former Leader of the House of Lords, had been established on 18 April 2002. It formed part of the coalition agreement signed in October 2000 between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, in which the Welsh Assembly Government had agreed to appoint a body to review the powers and electoral arrangements of the Assembly.²⁰² Its recommendations, although considered radical, were broadly welcomed by Members of the National Assembly. Of these, those relating to

¹⁹⁹ B. Jones, 'Letters to the Editor - Assembly Devalued', *Western Mail*, 16 June 2004, p.10.

²⁰⁰ D. Milner, 'Letters to the Editor - Our 'Leader' Is Just a Disgrace', *South Wales Echo*, 15 June 2004, p.24.

²⁰¹ Lord Ivor Richard (Chair), *Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales* (Report of the Richard Commission, Cardiff: National Assembly for Wales, 2004).

²⁰² J. Bradbury & J. Mitchell, 'Devolution: Between Governance and Territorial Politics', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 58:2 (2005), pp.287-302; Torrance, "'A Process, Not an Event": Devolution in Wales, 1998 - 2018', p.13.

legislative powers were the most significant. The Commission argued convincingly for the introduction of a 'Wales Bill', intended to amend the Government of Wales Act 1998, to grant the Assembly primary law-making powers.²⁰³ It also suggested that the secondary legislative powers of the devolved Assembly should be enhanced as an interim measure. In addition to this, the report suggested changes to both the size of the Assembly and electoral system used, as well as recommending the separation of the Executive and Assembly.²⁰⁴

In response to this report, Secretary of State Peter Hain, in conjunction with First Minister Morgan, developed the White Paper, *Better Governance for Wales*, published on 15 June 2005. Although falling short of the Richard Commission Report, it proposed to: give legislature effect to a formal separation between the National Assembly and the Welsh Assembly Government; grant the Assembly primary law-making powers - although as that would constitute a 'fundamental change to the Welsh [devolution] settlement', it would require the support of the Welsh public through a referendum; and, it noted that it would "gradually over a number of years" grant the Assembly enhanced powers in defined policy areas.²⁰⁵ The Government of Wales Bill was subsequently introduced to the House of Commons on 8 December 2005 and received Royal Assent on 25 July 2006, signalling the further development of the devolutionary process in Wales.

This section has argued that, between 1999 and 2006, there was initially little divergence in official approaches to war commemoration. This reflected not only the dominance of the Labour Party both at Westminster and in Cardiff, but also the limited nature of the powers initially granted to the National Assembly. Throughout this period, however, discussions regarding the nature of the devolutionary arrangement continued to feature prominently. This is shown by the establishment of the Richard Commission in 2002 and the subsequent publication of its report, which called for the introduction of further powers to the National

²⁰³ Richard, *Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales*.

²⁰⁴ Richard, *Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales*; The Richard Commission recommended the introduction of an 80-member Assembly elected by the Single Transferable Vote method, to replace the 60-member system elected by AMS.

²⁰⁵ Torrance, "A Process, Not an Event": Devolution in Wales, 1998 – 2018', p.47.

Assembly. Significantly, the evidence suggests that a shift was beginning to take place. There was an increasing emphasis on the need for the Welsh nation to be represented at the highest level, as distinct from 'Britain'. This can be seen in the debates about and reception of the introduction of a national event for Remembrance Day in Wales in 2002, and the criticism levelled at Rhodri Morgan for his failure to attend the commemorations for the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day held in Normandy.

The Evolution of Devolution, 2007 – 2016

Thus far, this chapter has sought to demonstrate that approaches to and discussions surrounding the commemoration of the World Wars in Wales were closely linked to debates regarding the constitutional relationship between Wales and the wider United Kingdom. It has argued that the introduction of devolution in Wales, while characterised by both numerous limitations and continuity with Westminster, ultimately created an explicitly Welsh political arena. This, in turn, led to the growth of a 'Welsh consciousness' and strengthening of conceptions of Welsh nationhood. It is within this political climate, then, that it was increasingly felt that the commemoration of the World Wars should reflect the new post-devolution settlement.

In the May 2007 Welsh Assembly elections, the Labour Party again failed to achieve an overall majority. It won twenty-six seats in total, which equated to 43.3% of National Assembly seats.²⁰⁶ Meanwhile, Plaid Cymru won fifteen seats.²⁰⁷ In the wake of these elections, an historic coalition agreement was negotiated between Labour and Plaid Cymru – *One Wales*.²⁰⁸ This meant that, for the first time, Plaid Cymru was able to exercise power

²⁰⁶ Of these 26 seats, 24 were won in the constituencies with 32.2% of the vote and 2 in the regions with 29.6% of the vote. The Labour Party was also the only one of the four major parties to register a decrease in its percentage of the vote. See '2007 Assembly Election Results', *Finance and Statistics Team, Paper Number 07/069* (Cardiff: National Assembly for Wales, July 2007). The Labour Party's vote decreased by 7.8% in the constituency section and 6.9% in the regional vote.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.* Of these, Plaid Cymru won seven seats in the constituencies with 22.4% of the vote and eight in the regions with 21%.

²⁰⁸ Welsh Assembly Government, *One Wales. A Progressive Agenda for the Government of Wales. An Agreement Between the Labour and Plaid Cymru Groups in the National Assembly* (Labour Party & Plaid Cymru, 27 June 2007).

at a national level. As Craig McAngus has argued, Plaid Cymru's involvement in government was significant not only due to their commitment to achieving independence, but also their intention to utilise governmental status to gain further powers for the National Assembly of Wales.²⁰⁹ Plaid Cymru's 2007 election manifesto, for example, outlined a clear pledge to hold a referendum in order to 'establish a Proper Parliament for Wales'.²¹⁰

It is significant, then, that the *One Wales* agreement included commitments to a post-legislative referendum on primary law-making powers for the National Assembly. It bound both parties 'to proceed to a successful outcome of a referendum for full law-making powers under Part IV as soon as practicable, at or before the end of the Assembly Term'.²¹¹ As Wyn Jones has noted, this represented a major concession to Plaid Cymru both in terms of the outlined timetable and the Labour Party's stated commitment to campaigning for a 'yes' vote.²¹² Additionally, the 'All Wales Convention' (AWC), chaired by former diplomat Sir Emyr Jones Parry, was established to gauge the public appetite for a vote.²¹³ The AWC reported in November 2009 that the majority of voters in Wales did not understand the Assembly's current law-making arrangements and argued convincingly that a move towards primary-law making powers via a referendum was desirable. On 9 February 2010, the National Assembly achieved the 'super majority' required by the Government of Wales Act 2006 in favour of holding a referendum on further devolution. The UK Government subsequently introduced legislation enabling such a referendum to be held on 3 March 2011.

²⁰⁹ C. McAngus, 'What Does it Mean to be 'Normal'? Plaid Cymru and the SNP in Government', unpublished Paper, University of Strathclyde, (2013), p.1. See also Plaid Cymru's constitution which states that their primary goal is to '[s]ecure independence for Wales in Europe'. See: Plaid Cymru – The Party of Wales, 'Constitution'. Accessed at: <https://www.join.partyof.wales/constitution.pdf> [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019].

²¹⁰ Plaid Cymru, *Make a Difference: National Assembly Election Manifesto 2007* (Plaid Cymru, 2007), p.36.

²¹¹ *One Wales. A Progressive Agenda for the Government of Wales. An Agreement Between the Labour and Plaid Cymru Groups in the National Assembly.*

²¹² R. Wyn Jones & R. Scully, *Wales Says Yes. Devolution and the 2011 Welsh Referendum* (Cardiff: University of Wales, 2012), p.78.

²¹³ Torrance, "'A Process, Not an Event": Devolution in Wales, 1998 – 2018', p.17.

On 3 March 2011, a referendum was held on the question: 'Do you want the Assembly now to be able to make laws on all matters in the 20 subject areas it has powers for?'²¹⁴ The Welsh voted overwhelmingly in favour. A total of 517,132 people (63.49%) voted 'yes', whilst 297,380 (36.51%) responded 'no'. It is, however, worth noting that turnout was extremely low, at only 35.6%.²¹⁵ It is also notable that, unlike the narrow result in the 1997 referendum, every local authority area apart from Monmouthshire returned a majority supporting law-making powers.²¹⁶ For Wyn Jones, this appeared to show that devolution looked increasingly like reflecting 'the settled will of the Welsh'.²¹⁷

The Assembly assumed its new powers on 5 May 2011, and thus finally acquired powers to pass primary legislation without recourse to Westminster in the twenty areas that had previously been devolved to Wales. It was this which led First Minister Carwyn Jones to comment that 'today an old nation came of age'.²¹⁸ Similarly, Deputy First Minister and Plaid Cymru leader Ieuan Wyn Jones said that it marked: '[t]he beginning of a new era of Welsh devolution [Wales] has demonstrated pride in who we are, and what we all stand for'.²¹⁹ It is apparent, then, that obtaining law-making powers was viewed as crucial to a sense of Welsh nationhood. Consequently, the result appeared to signal that Wales was 'now clearly a constituent national unit in its own right, rather than an addendum to an "England and Wales" unit'.²²⁰

Significantly, it was in this new political climate that the Welsh Government began to make its own plans to mark the centenary of the First World War. As Mycock has argued, commemoration plans increasingly appeared to focus on Welsh national as well as British

²¹⁴ M. Jennings, 'Results of the National Assembly for Wales Referendum 2011', *National Assembly for Wales. Paper Number: 11/017* (Cardiff: National Assembly for Wales, March 2011); Wyn Jones & Scully, *Wales Says Yes*.

²¹⁵ Jennings, 'Results of the National Assembly for Wales Referendum 2011'.

²¹⁶ Wyn Jones & Scully, *Wales Says Yes*, p.110.

²¹⁷ *Ibid*, p.166.

²¹⁸ T. Bodden, 'A Nation "Comes of Age" as Wales Votes Yes in Referendum', *Daily Post*, 5 March 2011; Anon, 'Welsh Referendum: Voters Give Emphatic Yes on Powers', *BBC News*, 4 March 2011; Anon, 'First Minister Hails Day Wales "Came of Age"', *Wales Online*, 5 March 2011.

²¹⁹ Bodden, 'A Nation "Comes of Age" as Wales Votes Yes in Referendum'; Anon, 'Welsh Referendum: Voters Give Emphatic Yes on Powers'; Anon, 'First Minister Hails Day Wales "Came of Age"'.
²²⁰ Wyn Jones & Scully, *Wales Says Yes*, p.176.

experiences, although it should be noted that these proved less politicised than in Scotland.²²¹

On 3 March 2012, for example, then First Minister Carwyn Jones announced the appointment of Professor Sir Deian Hopkin, President of the National Library of Wales, as his expert advisor on the centenary of the First World War. Speaking at his monthly news conference, Jones noted that ‘the First World War is widely seen as one of the most deadly conflicts in human history... it is extremely important that we remember those who died and reflect on how it changed Wales [and the world forever]’.²²² He continued: ‘we will see events and ceremonies within Wales and beyond and Sir Deian will advise us on how best we can remember the conflict and engage with the Welsh public... [we] will make sure we strike the right tone and give the centenary the attention it deserves’.²²³

In addition to this, Hopkin was to act as Chair of the Cymru’n Cofio - Wales Remembers 1914-1918 Programme Board, established in October 2012. This cross-portfolio board included representation from a wide range of bodies including the Welsh Government, National Museum, National Library of Wales, National Eisteddfod, Arts Council Wales, BBC Wales, S4C, the Heritage Lottery Fund (Wales Office), the IWM and the Army in Wales.²²⁴ The Board, under Hopkin, were tasked with ensuring ‘that Wales’ distinctive experiences and contribution will be accurately reflected in commemorative activities’, whilst simultaneously enabling commemorations to achieve a range of aims and objectives.²²⁵

²²¹ Mycock, ‘A Truly National Commemoration’, p.159.

²²² C. Jones quoted in ‘Expert Advisor Appointed to Help Wales Remember the First World War’, (Welsh Government, 1 March 2012) in *Welsh Government* (National Web Archive, Archived 24 April 2016). Accessed at: <https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160424235436/http://gov.wales/newsroom/firstminister/2012/120301firstworldwar/?lang=en> [Date Accessed: 04/05/2019]; ‘Sir Deian Hopkin to Advise on Welsh WW1 Remembrance’, *BBC News*, 2 March 2012. Accessed at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-17229705> [Date Accessed: 04/05/2019].

²²³ ‘Expert Advisor Appointed to Help Wales Remember the First World War’; ‘Sir Deian Hopkin to Advise on Welsh WW1 Remembrance’.

²²⁴ ‘First World War Commemorations in Wales: Planning for 2014-2018’, *CyMAL: Museums, Archives and Libraries Wales* (Aberystwyth: Welsh Government, July 2013).

²²⁵ ‘Planning of the First World War Commemorations’, *Paper Submitted to Welsh Government Cabinet by Carwyn Jones* (Welsh Government, 23 October 2012) in *Welsh Government* (National Web Archive, Archived 12 December 2012). Accessed at:

According to the 'Framework Programme for the Commemoration in Wales 2014-2018' the overarching aim was 'to deliver a successful and memorable commemoration in Wales that enables everyone to participate at a time and in a way that best suits their interests and aspirations'.²²⁶ Furthermore, it noted that the wider objectives were as follows: 'to identify and mark significant anniversaries, working with Welsh organisations and services, other UK Home Nations and international partners'; 'to support an educational programme that encourages schools and young people's organisations to fully participate in commemorative activities'; 'to develop and support productive partnerships to deliver activities and events throughout the commemorative period to diverse audiences'; 'to support vibrant cultural and historical interpretation events and activities by our cultural and heritage bodies reflecting different perspectives on the period'; 'to work with the Heritage Lottery Fund (HLF) and other funders to support community projects telling the story of Wales and the First World War'; 'to ensure that information about the commemoration in Wales is easily available to everyone with Wales and beyond'; and 'to leave a rich digital legacy of the commemoration for future generations'.²²⁷

Similarly, in a paper entitled 'Commemoration of the First World War' submitted to the Welsh Cabinet on 9 July 2013, Carwyn Jones noted that the centenary would be 'an extremely high-profile opportunity to engage with people in Wales and beyond to better understand the transformational impact of the War on Welsh life and society'. He continued 'it will be important that Wales delivers a programme which is appropriate and reflective in tone and which leaves a lasting digital legacy'.²²⁸ Moreover, the paper highlighted in relation to the draft commemorative programme that 'building connections

<https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20180413014522/http://gov.wales/about/cabinet/meetings/previous-administration/23oct12/?lang=en> [Date Accessed: 11/09/2019].

²²⁶ 'Framework Programme for the Commemorations in Wales 2014-2018', *Cymru'n Cofio. Wales Remembers 1914-1918* (Welsh Government, October 2013), p.11.

²²⁷ 'Framework Programme for the Commemorations 2014-2018', p.11.

²²⁸ 'Commemoration of the First World War', *Paper Submitted to Welsh Government Cabinet by Carwyn Jones* (Welsh Government, 9 July 2013) in *Welsh Government* (National Web Archive, Archived 13 April 2018). Accessed at:

<https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20180413013317/http://gov.wales/about/cabinet/meetings/previous-administration/9jul13/?lang=en> [Date Accessed: 11/09/2019].

with Welsh life underpins our approach'.²²⁹ It is apparent that a desire to increase knowledge about Wales's involvement in and experiences of the First World War was a central part of the Welsh Government's approach to the centenary. A great deal of emphasis was placed on discussing the long-term impact and wider legacy of the War. The minutes from the May 2012 meeting of the First World War Centenary Board, for example, note that 'the First Minister was very clear that the thrust of the celebrations should be in terms of the legacy of the War and that it focussed [sic] on the effects it had on the lives of young people'.²³⁰ It is also notable that these events were viewed as an opportunity to engage communities widely.

The Framework Programme, published in October 2013, outlined a series of key dates to be commemorated in Wales, alongside local and community initiatives.²³¹ In addition to national centenaries, which included the outbreak of War and Armistice Day, the dates recommended focused on a series of anniversaries of particularly Welsh significance.²³² These included the Battle of Ghuvelvt (October 2014); the landing of the 53rd Welsh Division at Gallipoli (August 2015); the involvement of Welsh sailors in Jutland (31 May 2016); the first Battle of the Somme, in particular the engagement of the 38th Welsh Division at Mametz Wood (1 – 14 July 2016); and the engagement of the 38th Welsh Division at Pilckem Ridge during the Battle of Passchendale where the Welsh war poet Ellis Humphrey Evans, better known by his bardic name Hedd Wyn, was killed (31 July 2017).²³³ In launching the programme on 28 October 2013, Jones noted that 'the period from 1914-1918, and the immediate aftermath, shaped the Wales we live in now and we need to understand not only why nations went to war, but also the lingering impact of that war on our daily lives'.²³⁴ He continued, 'I look forward to a commemoration in Wales which will

²²⁹ 'Commemoration of the First World War'.

²³⁰ 'First World War Centenary Meeting, Wales Minutes', *Cymru'n Cofio. Wales Remembers 1914-1918 Programme Board*, 29 May 2012.

²³¹ 'Framework Programme for the Commemorations', p.13.

²³² 'Framework Programme for the Commemorations 2014-2018'.

²³³ 'Framework Programme for the Commemorations 2014-2018'.

²³⁴ L. Day, 'We Need to Understand Why Nations Went to War'; Programme to Commemorate WW1 Launched by First Minister', *Western Mail*, 29 October 2013.

bring people together to pay tribute to those Welsh people whose hard work and sacrifice is justly remembered by us all'.²³⁵

The Framework Programme also outlined that a key part of the commemorative programme would involve the unveiling of a new National Memorial to Welsh Casualties of the First World War in Langemark, Flanders, on 16 August 2014. The Welsh Memorial in Flanders Campaign was founded in 2011 by Peter Carter Jones (in Wales) and Erwin Ureel (in Flanders).²³⁶ The project initiators were responding to a perceived gap in the landscape of remembrance. Mr Jones commented:

I was taken aback to find there was no memorial for Welsh soldiers in Belgium [...] the Welsh per capita lost more sons than any other nation – and most of the casualties occurred in Flanders[...] while New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Ireland and Scotland all have large monuments in Flanders to remember their war dead, we have no such thing [...] It is going to be a very special place for generations to come and children can understand the sacrifices made by soldiers in the war.²³⁷

Similarly, earlier in 2013, he stated that 'all other nations in 2014 will be having pilgrimages to their various monuments where there will be services and commemorations and we the Welsh have nowhere to go, so this needs to be rectified'.²³⁸

It should be noted that, while this project was initiated (and driven) by the Welsh Memorial in Flanders Campaign, the Welsh Government was subsequently involved in both publicising and supporting the campaign as well as providing up to £25,000 to underwrite the appeal.²³⁹ This highlights the extent to which both the Welsh public and Government had a desire for the wider Welsh contribution to the War to be commemorated in Belgium by the establishment of a 'national' memorial. The only other memorial to Welsh soldiers there, for example, is dedicated specifically to the soldiers of the 38th Welsh Division who

²³⁵ Day, 'We Need to Understand Why Nations Went to War'.

²³⁶ L. Connor, 'WW1 Memorial Design Unveiled', *Western Mail*, 12 February 2014.

²³⁷ Connor, 'WW1 Memorial Design Unveiled'; Anon, 'Welsh Government £25k Backing for WW1 Memorial in Flanders', *South Wales Argus*, 19 September 2013.

²³⁸ 'World War I Centenary: Wales Flanders Memorial Campaign', 12 February 2013. Accessed at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-21393665> [Date Accessed: 05/05/2019].

²³⁹ 'First Minister Announces Support for New Welsh First World War Memorial, *Cymru'n Cofio Wales Remembers 1914-1918*, 18 September 2013. Accessed at: <https://cymruncofio.org/blog/2013/09/18/first-minister-announces-support-for-new-welsh-first-world-war-memorial/> [Date Accessed: 11/09/2019].

died during the Battle of the Somme. Moreover, as mentioned above, this was viewed as even more important given the presence of monuments to the dead of other nations – including Scotland and Ireland. Significantly, a Cabinet Paper on the ‘Planning of the First World War Commemorations’ indicates that as early as October 2012 the establishment of ‘a memorial to all Welsh casualties at Langemark, Belgium where Hedd Wyn died’ had already been identified as a commemorative initiative for the approaching centenary.²⁴⁰ Moreover, in commenting on the reasons for the Welsh Governments’ support, Carwyn Jones noted:

The public appeal to build this memorial is a partnership between the people of Wales and Flanders. They are people who felt moved by the sacrifice of Welsh service personnel during the First World War and wanted to make sure that they were remembered. This memorial honours not just the Welsh men who fell in battle in Flanders during the conflict, but all Welsh men and women who served during the War. I am pleased that the Welsh Government has been able to support this appeal.²⁴¹

The memorial was constructed on the Pilkem Ridge, near the villages of Langemark and Ypres, West Flanders, on a piece of land donated by the Mayor of Langemark. This was close to the site where the 38th Welsh Division and Welsh Guards fought during the Battle of Passchendaele, tasked with driving the Germans off the ridge so the main assault could proceed. Moreover, it is also a short distance from where the renowned Welsh poet Hedd Wyn was killed on 31 July 1917.

Significantly, the memorial took the form of an 8ft-tall red bronze Welsh Dragon, cast at Castle Foundry Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant near Powys, situated on a ‘Cromlech’ formed with Welsh Blue Pennant stones from the Craig Yr Hesg quarry near Pontypridd, Wales [See Figure 5.3].

²⁴⁰ ‘Planning of the First World War Commemorations’.

²⁴¹ ‘First Minister Announces Support for New Welsh First World War Memorial’; Anon, ‘Welsh Government £25k Backing for WW1 Memorial in Flanders’.



Figure 5.3: A photograph showing the Welsh Dragon Memorial located in Langemark, Belgium.

Attribution: Llywelyn2000 [CC BY-SA 4.0 (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>)] No Changes Made. [Date Accessed: 04/09/2019].

The sculptor Lee Odishow commented that his design celebrated ‘the symbol of Wales’.²⁴² Similarly, Carwyn Jones commented that: ‘I’m pleased to unveil the winning design [...] for this memorial, which will be a lasting tribute to Welsh people who lost their lives in the First World War. As this will be the first national memorial outside Wales, it is fitting that the memorial will feature Welsh stones and be topped by a proud, red dragon’.²⁴³ The decision to utilise the Welsh Dragon on the memorial, a non-human symbol frequently associated with tourism rather than commemoration, is particularly striking. It appears to

²⁴² G. Henry, ‘Memorial to Be Unveiled in Honour of Welsh Fallen’, *Western Mail*, 13 August 2014; Connor, ‘WW1 Memorial Design Unveiled’.

²⁴³ ‘First Minister of Wales Unveils Design for First World War Memorial in Belgium’, Posted on *Centenary News*, 12 February 2014. <https://centenarynews.com/article?id=1452> [Date Accessed: 06/05/2019].

reflect a desire to create strong links with the Welsh nation through the use of symbols that were, as Odishow commented when discussing his design, ‘instantly recognisable’.²⁴⁴

In front of the memorial is a plaque which bears a red Welsh dragon and an inscription in Welsh, English and Flemish, which reads: ‘In remembrance of all those of Welsh descent who took part in the First World War’ [See Figure 5.4].



Figure 5.4: A photograph of the Memorial Plaque on the Welsh Dragon Memorial.

Attribution: Llywelyn2000 [CC BY-SA 4.0 (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>)] No Changes Made. [Date Accessed: 04/09/2019].

It is also located within a wider ‘Welsh National Garden of Remembrance’, which includes a special memorial stone inscribed with the words of the first verse of the Welsh National Anthem, *Hen Wlad Fy Nhadau* (Land of My Fathers):

Mae hen wlad fy nhadau yn annwyl I mi, Gwlad beirdd a chantorion, enwogion o fri; Ei gwrol ryfelwyr, gwladgarwyr tra mad, tros ryddid gollasant eu gwaed.

This land of my fathers dear to me, land of poets and singers, and people of stature. Her brave warriors, fine patriots, shed their blood for freedom.²⁴⁵ [See Figure 5.5].

²⁴⁴ Connor, ‘WW1 Memorial Design Unveiled’.

²⁴⁵ Lyrics cited on ‘Poets, Singers and Stars: Wales’ National Anthem, *Wales.com*. Accessed at: <https://www.wales.com/about/language/poets-singers-and-stars> [Date Accessed: 11/09/2019].



Figure 5.5: A photograph of the memorial stone bearing an inscription of the Welsh National Anthem.

Attribution: ViennaUK [CC BY-SA 4.0 (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>)] No Changes Made. [Date Accessed: 31/07/2019].

The use of the Welsh Dragon and Welsh National Anthem as well as materials brought from Wales to construct the memorial is indicative of the extent to which symbolic and physical links to the Welsh nation were emphasised across the memorial site. This is reinforced by the fact that alternative symbols, such as the Black Chair (see below), which were both symbolic in Wales and more commonly associated with solemn commemoration were not chosen. Furthermore, the unveiling of the Welsh Dragon itself, which appeared draped in

the Welsh National Flag, reiterated the notion that the First World War remained significant in conceptions of Welsh history and identity [See Figure 5.6].



Figure 5.6: A photograph showing the unveiling of the Welsh Dragon, draped in the Welsh flag.

Attribution: Photograph www.greatwar.be Accessed at: <http://www.wo1.be/en/youwerethere/6186/service-of-dedication-of-the-welsh-memorial-in-flanders> [Date Accessed: 31/07/2019].

Throughout the service of dedication, in fact, physical as well as symbolic links with Wales abounded. It included, for example, accounts of two Welsh soldiers who lost their lives during the War told by two Welsh schoolboys. As part of this, the boys placed photographs of the soldiers of the memorial. They also ceremonially deposited soil gathered from the summits of Snowden, Pen Y Fon and Yr Ysgwrn, the home of Hedd Wyn, at the base of the

‘Cromlech’.²⁴⁶ In addition to this, the Hedd Wyn poem ‘Rhyfel’ (War) was read by Isgoed Williams and the Welsh hymn ‘Gwahoddiad’ was sung by the Welsh choir, Cor Rygbi Gogledd Cymru.²⁴⁷ Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the inauguration of the memorial formed part of the wider Cymru’n Cofio – Wales Remembers 2014-2018 Programme for the First World War centenary, which emphasised the specifically Welsh context of the War.

In addition to the programme of events described above, the Welsh Government supported a number of other commemorative initiatives. In October 2013, for example, then First Minister Carwyn Jones announced that the Welsh Government had ‘earmarked £850,000 for an educational programme to accompany commemorations’.²⁴⁸ It was intended that the money would be used to develop and produce bilingual, cross-curriculum, learning resources ‘tailor-made’ for Welsh schools.²⁴⁹ The Welsh Government committed £76,500 of this to the ‘Wales at War’ project.²⁵⁰ This ‘inclusive educational project’ was to take the form of a digital app designed ‘enable reflection on the transformational impact of the First World War on life and communities in Wales’.²⁵¹ It would ‘tell the story of Wales’ role in the conflict’ through the use of maps, statistics, diaries, newspapers, photographs, audio and moving image materials, all of which would have ‘a particular Welsh resonance’.²⁵² In announcing the project, for example, Carwyn Jones noted that it would ‘put schoolchildren at the heart of efforts to put faces and life

²⁴⁶ ‘Service of Dedication to the New Welsh Memorial in Flanders to All Men and Women Who Served in the First World War’, *Cymru’n Cofio. Wales Remembers 1914-1918*. Accessed at: https://cymruncofio.org/blog/events_lists/service-of-dedication-to-the-new-welsh-memorial-in-flanders-to-all-men-and-women-who-served-in-the-first-world-war/ [Date Accessed: 03/08/2019]; M. Williams, ‘First Minister Carwyn Jones Unveils First World War Memorial in Flanders’, *South Wales Argus*, 16 August 2014.

²⁴⁷ ‘Service of Dedication to the New Welsh Memorial’.

²⁴⁸ ‘Wales’ First Minister Outlines Centenary Plans Including £850,000 for “Educational Legacy”, Posted on *Centenary News*, 29 October 2013. Accessed at: <https://centenarynews.com/article?id=1194> [Date Accessed: 06/05/2019].

²⁴⁹ ‘Framework Programme for the Commemorations 2014-2018’, p.14; A. Wightwick, ‘Project Ensure Wales’ Fallen Will Always Be Remembered’, *Western Mail*, 30 June 2014; ‘Wales’ First Minister Outlines Centenary Plans Including £850,000 for “Educational Legacy”.

²⁵⁰ Wightwick, ‘Project Ensure Wales’ Fallen Will Always Be Remembered’.

²⁵¹ ‘Annex A: Wales at War Brief’ in ‘First World War Centenary Programme Board Meeting Minutes’, *Cymru’n Cofio. Wales Remembers 1914-1918*, 21 March 2014.

²⁵² Wightwick, ‘Project Ensure Wales’ Fallen Will Always Be Remembered’.

stories to the names of those who fell during the War [...]. Wales at War will use local memorials to make clear to children the impact the First World War had on their community and engage pupils in local history they can see and visit with their class and family, ensuring the learning experience is wider than the classroom'.²⁵³ He continued, 'the result will be a lasting digital record that will act as a legacy and remind future generations of how we in Wales remembered the sacrifice of our people during the war 100 years on'.²⁵⁴

Furthermore, it was announced that 'every secondary school in Wales' would be given the opportunity to apply for grants of £1000 to 'develop creative and innovative projects to commemorate the War and to encourage debate and discussion'.²⁵⁵ Within this, it was noted that the Welsh Government would provide schools with only 'basic criteria along with a list of possible ideas to explore'.²⁵⁶ Rather, schools would be 'given the freedom to interpret the project as they wish' and could, therefore, 'develop their own approaches to commemorating the First World War and [...] utilise the imagination of teachers and pupils [...] to stimulate exploration of the issues that are generated by the study of the many and varied aspects of the First World War'.²⁵⁷ Here, the intention was that schools would have 'a leading role in developing commemoratives activities which will lead to a wider and more varied range of activity in Wales over the next five academic years'.²⁵⁸ It was also argued that the programme would, support projects important to the schools' individual communities and thereby 'act as a catalyst to generate local interest in history and ensure that pupils across Wales are able to understand the impact the war had on their own

²⁵³ Wightwick, 'Project Ensure Wales' Fallen Will Always Be Remembered'.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ 'Secondary School Grant Funding for First World War Commemorations', 15 May 2015 in *Welsh Government* (National Web Archive, Archived 26 April 2016). Accessed at: <https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160426040657/http://gov.wales/topics/educationandskills/schoolshome/fundingschools/schoolfunding/secondary-school-grant-funding-for-first-world-war-commemorations/?lang=en> [Date Accessed: 05/05/2019]; 'First World War: Secondary School Grant Scheme' in 'Programme 2016', *Cymru'n Cofio. Wales Remembers 1914-1918* (Wales: Welsh Government, 2016), pp.3-4.

²⁵⁶ 'Young Voices' in 'Framework Programme for the Commemorations 2014-2018', p.14.

²⁵⁷ Referenced in 'Young Voices' in 'Framework Programme for the Commemorations 2014-2018', p.14, and the 'First World War: Secondary School Grant Scheme' in 'Programme 2016', pp.3-4.

²⁵⁸ 'Young Voices' in 'Framework Programme for the Commemorations 2014-2018', p.14.

community, on Wales, on the United Kingdom, and on the world'.²⁵⁹ Significantly, this contrasted with the educational initiatives introduced elsewhere in Britain. In both England and Scotland, for example, funding was provided to schools to enable children to visit the World War One battlefields. The minutes from the First World War Centenary Programme Board meeting held on 28 June 2013 reveal that 'it was not felt that a similar programme for Wales would be appropriate'.²⁶⁰ In contrast to this, the focus in Wales was placed on encouraging children to explore the stories of men who joined up and the impact the War had on their local communities. As Gethin Matthews has convincingly argued, this represented 'quite a different emphasis', highlighting a different culture of remembrance which was 'more a matter of community in Wales than elsewhere'.²⁶¹ For Matthews, in fact, this was a consequence of a 'long-standing narrative of Wales suffering more than the rest of Britain... or being treated worse' both during and as a result of the War.²⁶²

Throughout the centenary, then, the Welsh commemorations sought to emphasise a number of distinctive elements of 'the Welsh Experience' of the War. In the foreword to the 2014 Commemorative Programme, for example, Hopkin noted that 'from the outset, the Welsh programme is designed to encompass the widest spectrum of commemoration, from the military and political, to the cultural and religious, with a strong emphasis on the international dimension'.²⁶³ Similarly, in 2013 he highlighted that 'we will be reflecting on many aspects of the war and considering what it meant to the people of Wales... we will also be reflecting on the challenges faced by those who resisted the War or declined to

²⁵⁹ Also noted in 'Item 4: First World War Commemorations. Minutes and Papers of a Meeting of the Cabinet', *Welsh Government Cabinet* (Welsh Government, 18 November 2013) in *Welsh Government* (National Web Archive, Archived 12 April 2018) Accessed at: <https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20180413014038/http://gov.wales/about/cabinet/meetings/previous-administration/18nov13/?lang=en> [Date Accessed: 11/09/2019].

²⁶⁰ 'First World War Centenary Programme Board Meeting Minutes' *Cymru'n Cofio. Wales Remembers 1914-1918*, 28 June 2013.

²⁶¹ G. Matthews, quoted in M. Shinn, 'Pulpits, Mutinies and "Khaki Fever": World War One in Wales'. Accessed at: <https://ahrc.ukri.org/research/fundedthemesandprogrammes/worldwaroneanditslegacy/worldwaronearoundtheuk/ww1inwales/pulpitsmutinieskhakifever/> [Date Accessed: 08/05/2019].

²⁶² Matthews quoted in Shinn, 'Pulpits, Mutinies and "Khaki Fever" World War One in Wales'.

²⁶³ D. Hopkin, 'Foreword' in 'Programme 2014', *Cymru'n Cofio. Wales Remembers 1914-1918* (Wales: Welsh Government, 2014), p.2.

participate for religious or political reasons'.²⁶⁴ This can also be seen in the centrality of particular Welsh historical figures, specifically David Lloyd George and Ellis Humphrey Evans, within the commemorative programme. It is striking that it is the renowned Welsh-language poet, Hedd Wyn, who garnered the most attention. Hedd Wyn was killed on 31 July 1917, during the first day of the Battle of Pilckem Ridge. Five weeks later he was declared the winner of Wales' greatest poetry prize – the National Eisteddfod chair.²⁶⁵ The empty chair was draped in black cloth and has since come to be known as 'the Black Chair'. This vacant chair, and Hedd Wyn himself, subsequently became symbols of sacrifice, an example of the cost of war, representing all the other empty chairs throughout Wales and the loss of an entire generation of men. It is this, which is regarded as 'part of the legend of modern Wales'.²⁶⁶ Speaking in November 2012, for example, Carwyn Jones stated that 'Hedd Wyn has a special place in our country's history and securing his legacy is essential if we are to keep his story and experiences alive for future generations, especially as we approach the 100th anniversary of the start of the First World War'.²⁶⁷ The October 2012 Cabinet Paper on the centenary, in fact, highlights that from an early stage in the planning process, Hedd Wyn was identified for inclusion in the programme. It notes that one commemorative project would be the development of 'a major £3 million interpretative centre at Hedd Wyn's home, Yr Ysgwrn, Transfynydd, through a Heritage Lottery Fund grant, to be opened by the centenary of his death in 2017'.²⁶⁸ The July 2013 Cabinet Paper later notes the 'purchase of Hedd Wyn's family farm for the nation' and reiterates the intention to 'establish an interpretative centre on the First World War to open in time for the centenary of Hedd Wyn's death on 31 July 2017'.²⁶⁹ Similarly, it is notable that he is the only individual to be named in the 2013 Framework Programme under 'The Scope of Programme Activities' list of 'initial events identified for commemoration'.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁴ Hopkin, 'Foreword' in 'Framework Programme for the Commemorations', p.3.

²⁶⁵ Jenkins, *A Concise History of Wales*, pp.248 – 249.

²⁶⁶ 'Keeping the Door Open: Developing Yr Ysgwrn' in 'Programme 2017', *Cymru'n Cofio. Wales Remembers 1914-1918* (Wales: Welsh Government, 2017), pp.4-5.

²⁶⁷ C. Jones quoted in W. Jones, 'Hedd Wyn's Legacy Lives On; Poet's Home Plays Part in Wales' War Anniversary', *Daily Post*, 17 November 2012, p.14.

²⁶⁸ 'Planning of the First World War Commemorations'.

²⁶⁹ 'Commemoration of the First World War'.

²⁷⁰ 'Framework Programme for the Commemorations 2014-2018', p.13.

Taken together, it is apparent that there were demonstrable differences in the patterns of official commemoration adopted by the Westminster and Welsh Governments during the course of the First World War centenary. This can be seen not only in the events and individuals selected as a focus for the commemorations, but also in the emphasis on the War's wider legacy and links to 'community'. Significantly, these differences were also reflected by rhetoric which was dominated by the themes of 'remembrance and reconciliation', with key figures keen to emphasise that the commemorations would in no way be a 'celebration'. It is striking that many also referenced notions of peace and contemporary conflict. In the foreword to the 2013 Framework Programme, for example, Carwyn Jones wrote: 'Wars are sadly still a part of our world and young people can take a great deal from understanding the causes and impact of the "Great War" into how we should resolve conflict in our own time'.²⁷¹ Similarly, in 2012 he commented: 'reflecting on the First World War will not only help us understand the past, but also help us to try and understand conflicts across the world today'. This sentiment was echoed in 2014, when he noted that 'the commemorative period will be a time to reflect on how we can develop our understanding of our place in the world and work even harder to play our part towards conflict resolution and tolerance'.²⁷² This is indicative of the extent to which Welsh commemorations drew on the perception of a distinctly Welsh tradition of pacifism.

This section has demonstrated that the commemoration of the World Wars in Wales between 2007 and 2016 was significantly affected by shifts in the nature of Wales' relationship with England and the wider United Kingdom. The 2007 Welsh Assembly elections proved significant as Plaid Cymru entered into a coalition government with the Labour Party. Plaid Cymru secured significant concessions and played a critical role in securing first a referendum on the devolution of further powers, and then a 'yes' vote. Although Plaid Cymru later lost ground at the 2011 Assembly elections, the outcome of the referendum proved historic in securing for Wales primary law-making powers for the first time. It also signalled a marked change in the politics of the union. It is striking then, that the Welsh Government subsequently adopted a distinctive approach to the

²⁷¹ C. Jones, 'Foreword' in 'Framework Programme for the Commemorations 2014-2018', p.2.

²⁷² Jones, 'Foreword' in 'Programme 2014', p.2.

commemoration of the First World War centenary, developing a series of commemorative initiatives to represent the distinct experiences and legacy of the War in Wales, in addition to reflecting Welsh priorities such as a focus on community.

Conclusion

The politics of World War commemoration in Wales between 1994 and 2016 was influenced by the gradual development of the devolutionary process and resulting shifts in its relationships both with England and the wider United Kingdom. It has been shown that changes in commemoration often reflected not only the slower progression of devolution in Wales, compared to Scotland, but also the specific nature of Wales' links to the Union, which was notably less problematic.

This is illustrated by the Welsh engagement with the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day. As in Scotland, prior to the introduction of devolution in 1998, commemoration was driven by the Conservative Government in Westminster. Consequently, as we have already seen, it was dominated by Anglo-centric narratives. It is not surprising, therefore, that there were notable instances whereby commemorative events failed to attract significant attention or were broadly interpreted as the product of Tory 'Little Englanders' and, in turn, criticised for a lack of focus on 'Wales'. The evidence, however, has also shown that there was a substantial amount of media coverage of and engagement with the commemorative events, which frequently utilised a combination of Welsh and British symbolism.

Although the establishment of the National Assembly for Wales did not initially have an impact on approaches to World War commemoration, this chapter has argued that it was still significant for its creation of an explicitly Welsh political arena. Throughout the initial years of devolution, debates about the Union and the need to obtain increased powers remained prominent. In 2002, for example, the Richard Commission was established to investigate the question of further devolution. Later, in 2004, it reported in favour. It is at this time that discernible shifts in discussions about and approaches to the commemoration of the World Wars become apparent. This is illustrated by both the

introduction of a 'national' Welsh event for Remembrance Day and the controversy which arose as a consequence of First Minister Rhodri Morgan's decision not to attend the sixtieth anniversary of the D-Day landings. In each of these cases, links were made to the need to reflect the post-devolution political climate and, therefore, represent Wales as distinct from Britain.

Of more significance for both debates about constitutional matters and the commemoration of the World Wars, however, was the electoral success of Plaid Cymru in 2007. Plaid Cymru entered into a coalition with the Labour Party as a minority partner. The party gained significant policy concessions and played a key role in not only obtaining a referendum on the devolution of primary law-making powers to the Welsh Assembly, but also securing a 'yes' vote in March 2011. This represented a significant shift in Wales' relationship with the Union and signalled, for some, the first time Wales constituted a national unit in its own right. It was against this background that the Welsh Government began to develop its plans to commemorate the First World War centenary. The evidence has shown that a great deal of emphasis was placed on those anniversaries/events that would highlight Wales' specific contribution to the War and its legacy for the development of modern Wales, such as the Battles of Mametz Wood and Pilckem Ridge (during the Battle of Passchendaele). The rhetoric adopted and tone of events also often reflected a perceived Welsh tradition of pacifism and emphasis on community. Yet, it should also be noted that commemoration was not politicised to the same degree as in Scotland. It was not utilised either to promote Welsh independence or defend the Union, but rather to assert a distinctive history and identity in a Wales that was increasingly understood not as a province but a separate nation within a wider United Kingdom.

Conclusion

Between 1994 and 2016 the United Kingdom, like many other countries globally, experienced an intensification of commemorative activity focused around the events of the First and Second World Wars. Certainly Europe, Australasia, and Canada shared a similar focus, while the USA and the Far East had their own war experiences to commemorate. This commemorative activity coincided with a series of political and constitutional as well as socio-economic, demographic and cultural shifts, which radically altered the nature of the political relationships between the United Kingdom and Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. These included, amongst others, the introduction and subsequent development of devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Peace Process and the Scottish independence referendum. A significant increase in immigration as well as generational shifts and the passing away of the World War generations were also perceived as influences on the events of this time.

Taken together, such developments raise questions about how far the emergence of this new political climate affected both debates about and approaches to the representation and commemoration of the World Wars. Thus, a central argument of this thesis has been that these recent political developments and consequent shifts in how we perceive and understand both the United Kingdom and the wider British Isles have necessitated the adoption of new and more nuanced approaches to the study of World War memory and commemoration, which account for the multi-national nature of the state. This, in turn, has revealed a degree of complexity about the changing nature of World War commemoration, which has so far been overlooked in accounts of 'British' remembrance. Therefore, it has been argued that the commemoration of the World Wars and the political climate in each of the four nations of the United Kingdom has, in fact, been closely linked.

It has also become apparent when considering the state-led approaches to World War commemoration that the Westminster Governments of John Major, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David Cameron appropriated and manipulated the commemoration of the World Wars as a means of both maintaining and promoting the unity of the Kingdom. As Chapter One sought to demonstrate, the commemoration and memories of the World

Wars were frequently utilised as an instrument of policy in the attempt to renew the significance, and indeed relevance, of the United Kingdom in a time of increasing social and political fragmentation.

The evidence has shown that the fiftieth anniversaries of D-Day and VE Day in 1994 and 1995 respectively were broadly interpreted by John Major as an opportunity to unite the nation amidst growing calls for devolution in both Scotland and Wales. Similarly, the Cameron Government's approach to the First World War centenary, which called for a 'truly national commemoration', revealed a desire to not only appeal to all four nations of the United Kingdom, but also draw attention to shared experiences and memories amid the ongoing threat of Scottish independence.

Alongside this, Chapter One showed that both the Blair and Cameron Governments recognised the importance of acknowledging and emphasising diversity for the maintenance of the union and promotion of an overarching hegemonic 'British' identity. Wider policy objectives, then, were reflected in the commemoration of the World Wars, which increasingly highlighted the contributions of ethnic minority communities and the impact of the World Wars on a multi-cultural Britain.

However, this thesis has also revealed that, despite a growing recognition of the breadth of World War experiences, commemoration continued to draw on pre-existing 'British' and overwhelmingly Anglo-centric narratives of the World Wars focused on 'British' values and ideals. Consequently, debates about and the remembrance of previously overlooked groups tended to integrate their experiences within the dominant narratives, stressing the extent to which they fought and died for 'Britain' and the 'British Empire'.

The relationship between the modern British monarchy and the commemoration of the World Wars as of yet has not received any sustained attention by historians. In consideration of the significance of the monarchy as a source of union as well as its importance as ceremonial Head of State, this thesis has considered it important to include an analysis of that relationship. The monarchy and the British royal family have been ever-present in commemorative events whilst iconography traditionally associated with the World Wars, in particular the Second World War, has often featured in royal events such as

the wedding of Prince William and Kate Middleton in 2011. While much of this involvement was a direct consequence of the constitutional duties incumbent in the sovereign's position as 'Head of State', this thesis has argued that the monarchy has also played a significant 'symbolic' role in commemoration for three interlinked reasons.

First, the continuity of the monarchy created by its hereditary nature as well as the longevity of key royal figures, including Queen Elizabeth II and the Queen Mother, helped to establish a sense of stability and permanence, providing familiarity and reassurance, particularly in times of significant change. This was due to their ability to connect the past with the present, by providing a common thread spanned the decades. As we have seen in Chapter Two this was reinforced within commemorative events, such as the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day, which frequently drew attention to the role the monarchy played during the World Wars. Significantly, this both provided a direct link to the historical events themselves, but in doing so highlighted narratives that have become associated with the World Wars in the public consciousness, such as the strength and resilience of a nation which came together, united in war.

Second, this continuity, in part, allows the sovereign to act as the 'Head of Nation', a term first coined by Antony Jay. This refers to the monarchy's ability to embody and represent the nation in its entirety, regardless of politics, religion, nationality, class, gender, age or any other defining factors. The responsibility of the monarchy is to act as a 'symbol of unity' by not only transcending national and societal divisions, but also highlighting shared histories, experiences and common bonds. Through their involvement in World War commemoration, therefore, members of the royal family draw attention to these bonds allowing the nation to come together in shared remembrance.

Third, the ability of the British monarchy to act as a 'symbol of unity' has been enhanced in the period under discussion by the increased involvement of other members of the royal family in the public sphere. Following the argument of Walter Bagehot, it has been shown that the concept of a Royal 'family' not only makes the monarchy more relatable, but also allows them to bridge generational divides. The Duke and Duchess of Cambridge as well as

the Duke and Duchess of Sussex, for example, are commonly regarded as connecting younger generations with the institution of the monarchy and, therefore, the Union.

It is clear when analysing the commemoration of the World Wars in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland that throughout all of them the changes to the politics of the Union had a significant impact on the tone, focus and narratives of official commemorative events as well as the debates and discussions surrounding them. The evidence shows that in each of these nations devolution, and (in Northern Ireland) the Peace Process, decisively changed the political landscape through the (re)establishment of the Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales and Northern Ireland Assembly. These representative bodies were able to address specific national concerns and issues. It is apparent that in the years following this, approaches to World War commemoration began to shift, frequently diverging from the overarching 'British' and Anglo-centric narratives that had previously dominated and continued to be employed by the Westminster Government. While there were demonstrable similarities in the development of World War commemoration, the analysis also revealed that in each of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland changes approaches to commemoration predominantly reflected the specific national circumstances surrounding the introduction of devolution and subsequent political developments.

It was in Northern Ireland, that the politics of World War commemoration were most decisively affected by shifts in inter-Irish and Anglo-Irish political relationships. As we have seen in Chapter Three, the most significant of these was the emergence and development of the Northern Ireland Peace Process, which resulted in the signing of the Good Friday, or Belfast, Agreement on 10 April 1998. In building on the work of historians such as Richard Grayson and Keith Jeffery, this thesis has sought to demonstrate that through the easing of political, religious and sectarian tensions the Peace Process ultimately helped to create an environment in which divergent and divisive memories of the First World War could be rehabilitated amongst nationalist communities. This enabled politicians belonging first to the SDLP and, later, Sinn Fein, to take significant steps towards engaging with commemorative ceremonies. Perhaps the most significant intervention was made by Alex Maskey, the first Sinn Fein Lord Mayor of Belfast, in 2002 when he laid a laurel wreath in an informal ceremony to commemorate the Battle of the Somme.

This thesis has also highlighted that while this new atmosphere of reconciliation allowed such acts of commemoration to take place, the commemoration of the World Wars simultaneously became a forum in which the Peace Process could be both reinforced and further advanced. This was apparent throughout the opening of the Island of Ireland Peace Tower in 1998 and especially, as also discussed in Chapter Two, in the 2011 Royal Visit to the Republic of Ireland. In Northern Ireland, therefore, the narratives employed within the commemoration of the World Wars increasingly emphasised all-Ireland commonalities and shared experiences in an attempt not only to draw communities together, but also to establish closer political relationships with both the wider United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. In the years following 1998, the language employed throughout the commemoration of the World Wars, focused on a 'parity of esteem', 'inclusivity' 'reconciliation' and 'togetherness', was that of the Peace Process.

In many ways, the changes taking place in the nature of World War commemoration in Northern Ireland appeared to represent the inverse of those occurring in Scotland and Wales. As Chapters Four and Five have sought to demonstrate, in both Scotland and Wales official approaches to commemoration increasingly emphasised the uniqueness of their experiences, differentiating them from the overarching 'British' and predominantly 'Anglo-centric' narratives employed by the Westminster Government. In Northern Ireland, however, the commemoration of the World Wars was utilised to try and established stronger bonds with both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland.

Prior to the introduction of devolution the commemoration of the World Wars in Scotland was driven by Westminster and a Conservative Government. Consequently, it was dominated by Anglo-centric narratives, which largely overlooked the individual experiences of the individual nations within the UK. This exacerbated a growing sense of divergence between Scotland, England and the wider United Kingdom, as political relationships were placed under strain by the policies of an increasingly unpopular Conservative Government. The evidence has suggested that it was for this reason that the Scottish engagement with the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day, frequently regarded as 'Little England Day', in 1995 was limited.

The introduction of devolution in 1998 and opening of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, however, created a new political climate in which not only further constitutional debate took place, but the commemoration of the World Wars was increasingly used as a means of highlighting the need for further autonomy and establishing a distinct Scottish identity. This was apparent in the Scottish Parliamentary debate about granting pardons to soldiers shot for cowardice and desertion during the First World War, which focused explicitly on the Scottish soldiers who were executed.

This thesis has also argued that in Scotland, it was the election of the Scottish National Party (SNP) first in 2007, as a minority government, and then again in 2011, with a majority, which had perhaps the most significant impact on not only constitutional debates, but also the commemoration of the World Wars. This was largely a consequence of the SNP's commitment to achieving Scottish independence. It has been shown that the SNP Government adopted a distinctive approach to the First World War centenary, focusing on events of specific relevance for Scotland including the Battles of Loos and Arras. Furthermore, the analysis also revealed that much of the rhetoric surrounding the commemorations adopted a more downbeat tone than those of the Westminster Government, focusing overwhelmingly on the consequences of the War for Scotland. Throughout the campaign for Scottish independence, which coincided with the hundredth anniversary of the start of World War One, commemoration became politicised in Scotland as Scottish Nationalists tended to emphasise the perceived disproportionate sacrifice of Scotland, drawing on the War not only to highlight a specifically 'Scottish' history and identity, but in some instances as an example of why Scotland needed independence.

In the years leading up to (and including) 1998 the commemoration and remembrance of the World Wars in Wales, which was also driven by Westminster, was taking place in a political climate in which the nature of the relationship between England and Wales was beginning to change. This was apparent in the growth of calls for a more democratic political process, which were in response to Conservative governance in Wales. In contrast to Scotland, however, while this did result in notable instances of apathy towards and criticism of the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day, Chapter Five argued that the level of engagement with the commemorations in Wales was still substantial. This is shown by the

number of street parties and other celebrations held as well as the newspaper coverage the events received.

Following the landslide victory of the Labour Party in the 1997 General Election, a referendum on the devolution of political powers to Wales was held which achieved a narrow 'Yes' vote. While the establishment of the National Assembly for Wales in 1999 was significant for its creation of an explicitly Welsh political arena, Chapter Five demonstrated that it did not initially have a substantial impact on the tone and focus of World War commemoration. This was due to the combination of both the limited nature of devolution and the domination of Labour-led Governments in London and Cardiff as well as the long and intertwined history of Wales' association with England and the United Kingdom.

In the years immediately following devolution, however, debates regarding the nature of the devolutionary arrangement and the extension of the Assembly's powers continued. It was during this period that discernible shifts in discussions about World War commemoration become apparent, first in 2002 and later 2004. In 2002, for example, a 'national' event for Remembrance Day in Wales was introduced. Although this initiative was driven by the Welsh Office in Westminster, debates revealed that it was broadly interpreted by political figures in Wales as an appropriate step to reflect the new post-devolution political climate. Similarly, in 2004 First Minister Rhodri Morgan was heavily criticised by politicians and the public alike for his decision not to attend the commemorations in Normandy for the sixtieth anniversary of the D-Day landings. This was on the basis that in his capacity as 'First Minister', it was felt he should have been there to represent the Welsh war dead and veterans as well as the Welsh 'nation'.

It is also evident that in Wales the election of Plaid Cymru in 2007, as the election of the SNP in Scotland, was significant for the advancement of debates about devolution and Wales's relationship with the United Kingdom. The involvement of Plaid Cymru as the minority partner in a coalition with the Labour Party between 2007 and 2011 was crucial in securing first a referendum and then a 'yes' vote in (2011 in) favour of further devolution and the introduction of primary legislative powers. This signalled a marked change in the constitutional relationship between Wales, England and the United Kingdom and, as the

evidence suggests, for some commentators was the first time Wales represented a distinct national unit as opposed to a 'province'. Notably, it was in the years following this, that the Welsh Government developed and subsequently implemented Cymru'n Cofio – Wales Remembers 1914-1918, the official programme of events for the First World War centenary. This thesis has argued that the Welsh Government adopted a distinctive approach to the commemorations, emphasising anniversaries that highlighted Wales' specific and distinctive contributions to the war effort as well as the transformational impact it had on the development of modern Wales.

This thesis has analysed the relationship between the commemoration of the World Wars and the politics of the Union as a means to explore the wider issues relating to policy making, national identity and the use of official memory to retain a sense of unity. It has also sought to highlight complexities arising from the politics of the Union and add a new dimension to our knowledge of official, state-led commemorative practices. The examination of the role of the monarchy as both a source of union and as having a ceremonial role in commemorative events has attempted to somewhat redress the balance of a lack of any sustained historical attention.

It has sought to interrogate and problematise a framework commonly used by historians which tends to view the United Kingdom as a singular entity, meaning that commemoration has frequently been analysed in terms of an overarching 'British' remembrance of the World Wars. The single most significant contribution made by this thesis, then, has been to show how 'commemoration' was the means to advance distinct – ultimately contrasting and incompatible – political projects. The examination of the relationship between World War commemoration and the politics of the Union has illustrated the extent to which, in the post-devolution period, the narratives, tone and focus of commemoration in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland increasingly diverged from the 'British' narratives employed by the Westminster Governments and the monarchy itself to reflect the specific political climates in each member nation.

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