

Explanatory Value and Probabilistic Reasoning

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Abstract

The question of how judgments of explanatory value (should) inform probabilistic inference is well studied within psychology and philosophy. Less studied are the questions: How does probabilistic information affect judgments of explanatory value? Does probabilistic information take precedence over causal information in determining explanatory judgments? To answer these questions, we conducted two experimental studies. In Study 1, we found that probabilistic information had a negligible impact on explanatory judgments of event-types with a potentially unlimited number of available, alternative explanations; causal credibility was the main determinant of explanatory value. In Study 2, we found that, for event-token explanations with a definite set of candidate alternatives, probabilistic information strongly affected judgments of explanatory value. In the light of these findings, we reassess under which circumstances explanatory inference is probabilistically sound.

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1 Introduction

Giving explanations and reasoning with them play crucial roles in human cognition. Explanatory considerations are essential for *abduction*, a mode of reasoning where a hypothesis is inferred based on its power to explain a given body of evidence (Peirce 1931-1935; Harman 1965; Josephson and Josephson 1996; Magnani 2001; Thagard 2007; Douven 2011). Good explanations guide scientific reasoning, inform probabilistic inference, and produce a sense of understanding (e.g., Van Fraassen 1980; Keil and Wilson 2000; Lipton 2004; De Regt and Dieks 2005; Keil 2006; Strevens 2008). Explanatory factors can also constrain causal learning and inference (Halpern and Pearl 2001; Woodward 2003; Lombrozo 2011, 2012).

Despite this impressive body of research, little is known about what determines the explanatory value of a given hypothesis. Lipton (2004) associates explanatory value with causality, and suggests that explanatory value *guides* probabilistic inference in both everyday and scientific contexts (see also Okasha 2000; Weisberg 2009; Henderson 2014). Psychological evidence is consistent with Lipton's suggestion, indicating that explanatory considerations, such as simplicity and coherence, can boost an explanation's perceived probability (Thagard 1989; Koehler 1991; Sloman 1994; Lombrozo 2007). Lipton, however, does not clarify whether probabilistic information (should) affect explanatory value; and available psychological evidence does not address this issue either.

Several philosophers have appealed to probabilistic considerations to characterise the nature and quality of an explanation. This is first touched upon in Carl G. Hempel (1965)'s inductive-statistical model of explanation, Peter Railton (1979)'s account of probabilistic explanation, and Wesley Salmon (1971/84)'s statistical-relevance model. In these models of explanation, the hypothesis that does the explaining (the explanans) ought to be statistically relevant for the phenomenon to be explained (the explanandum). More recently, inspired by work of Popper (1934/2002) and Good (1960), McGrew (2003), Schupbach and Sprenger (2011), and Crupi and Tentori (2012) developed probabilistic measures of explanatory power and used them to compare the quality of statistical explanations (e.g., Schupbach 2011a,b). Similar work has been carried out by Halpern and Pearl (2001), who used structural equations to define causal explanation, and probability to define a measure of explanatory power.

Although the impact of probabilistic information on explanatory value is often considered as secondary to the impact of other factors such as causal-mechanistic information (e.g., Lewis 1986), explanatory judgment

plausibly taps into distinct sources of information, including causal and probabilistic information (Lombrozo 2012). Anticipating this idea, Wesley Salmon characterized scientific explanation as “a two-tiered structure consisting of statistical relevance relations on one level and causal processes and interactions on the other” (Salmon 1997, 475–476). From this perspective, explanatory value depends on the joint contribution of statistical relevance and causality, which has also been stressed in the literature on probabilistic causation (for a survey, see Hitchcock 2010).

The present paper tests Salmon’s hypothesis: it investigates whether and under which circumstances judgments of explanatory value are associated with probabilistic and causal characteristics of the potential explanation. A similar methodology has been applied for studying the extent to which confirmation judgments are determined by probabilistic information (Tentori et al. 2007a,b).

We conducted two experimental studies. In both studies, participants read vignettes where we provided statistical and causal information about the relation between an explanandum and a potential explanatory hypothesis. Participants were asked to judge the quality of the putative explanations and to judge along related cognitive dimensions, such as causal relevance, plausibility, and degree of confirmation.

In the **first study**, we examined generic explanations of event-types in vignettes where alternative explanations could easily come to mind. We tested three hypotheses:

- (1A) that judgments of explanatory value were reliably predicted by the prior subjective credibility of the candidate explanation;
- (1B) that judgments of explanatory power were sensitive to the causal priming of the vignettes;
- (1C) that judgments of explanatory value were predicted by the degree of statistical relevance of the putative explanans for the explanandum.

In the **second study**, we examined singular explanations for event-tokens in vignettes where exactly one alternative explanation was provided and no other alternative explanation could easily come to mind. We tested three hypotheses:

- (2A) that judgments of explanatory value could be dissociated from posterior probability or other indicators of the rational acceptability of the putative explanans;

- (2B) that judgments of explanatory value were positively associated with the perceived causal and cognitive salience of the target hypothesis;
- (2C) that judgments of explanatory value were positively affected by statistical relevance.

Results from the first study showed that *for generic explanations of event-types*, prior credibility of the hypothesis and causal priming both raised the explanatory value of the hypothesis. Statistical relevance relations had a negligible impact on explanatory value, yielding to causal credibility as the main determinant of explanatory value. Results from the second study provided evidence that *for explanations of singular events*, judgments of explanatory value were highly sensitive to relations of statistical relevance, and were dissociable from posterior probabilities and other indicators of the rational acceptability of the explanatory hypothesis.

In sum, all above hypotheses, apart from (1C), were confirmed by our results.

Collectively, these findings support the hypothesis that explanation is a complex structure that taps into distinct types of sources of information in different contexts. Specifically, our findings indicate that two different kinds of probabilistic cues—the credibility of the explanation and the statistical relevance for the explanandum—contribute to explanatory value, albeit in different circumstances. The level of generality of the explanation (and the explanandum) makes a crucial difference: For generic (type) explanations, the prior credibility, but not the statistical relevance boosts explanatory value. For singular (token) explanations, explanatory value co-varies with statistical relevance, but not with prior credibility. In the light of these results, attempts to find a probabilistically coherent and descriptively adequate logic of abductive/explanatory reasoning may be doomed, due to the radically different way that people react to probabilistic cues in different contexts.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 and 3 present our two experiments. Section 4 puts the results into a broader perspective and discusses, *inter alia*, the implications for quantitative approaches to explanatory power and broader consequences for theories of explanatory reasoning.

2 Experiment 1: Credibility and Causal Priming

The experiment was preceded by a pre-study in order to optimize stimulus material. 33 students from Tilburg University in The Netherlands (mean

age 28.61 years, SD = 10.74) volunteered to take part in the pre-study and rated individually 14 empirically testable causal hypotheses with respect to their credibility on a 5-point scale. The four lowest and highest rated hypotheses were selected for the incredible/credible report condition of this study.

2.1 Experiment and Methods

Our first experiment was conducted online, using the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk, www.mturk.com). Instructions and material were presented in English language.

Participants

Two hundred thirty-seven participants (mean age 31.86 years; SD = 10.41; 144 male, 161 native speakers of English and 76 speakers of other languages) completed Experiment 1 for a small monetary payment.

Design and Material

Eight short reports about fictitious research studies on different topics were created, using LimeSurvey 1.85 to run the online experiment via MTurk, and to record the data. Presentation order of the short reports was randomized for each participant.

Each report described a fictitious research study, where a “treatment group” (explanans present) and a “control group” (explanans absent) were contrasted. Information about the statistical relevance of the explanans on the explanandum was provided. The reports varied in the use of explicit causal language. Here is an example:

Drinking coffee causes high blood pressure

A recent study by German researchers investigated the link between drinking coffee and high blood pressure. The researchers studied 887 people, aged between 18 and 64. Among the participants who drank several cups of coffee a day, 48% exhibited high blood pressure. Instead, among the participants who did not drink several cups of coffee a day, only 13% exhibited high blood pressure. Factors such as age, daily alcohol consumption, and professional status, which were controlled by the researchers, could not explain these results. The

study therefore supports the hypothesis that drinking several cups of coffee a day causes high blood pressure.

The vignette was, in a within-subjects design, varied in three dimensions, corresponding to three independent variables. Table 1 provides an overview of the hypotheses used in the experiment and the exact phrasing we used.

IV 1: Credibility The credibility of an hypothesis, with the two levels “incredible” and “credible”.

IV 2: Causal Priming The phrasing of the hypotheses, with the condition “on”, using the wording “X causes Y”, and the condition “off”, with the wording “X is associated with Y”.

IV 3: Statistical Relevance The relative frequency of the explanandum, given absence and presence of the putative explanans. There were two conditions: “big difference” (e.g., 48% vs. 13%) and “small difference” (e.g., 25% vs. 22%).

The experiment was based on a $2 \times 2 \times 2 = 8$ within-subject design, with the factors Credability (credible, incredible), Causal Priming (on, off), and Statistical Relevance (big, small). The allocation of causal and non-causal frames and the allocation of small and big effect size to the individual reports was counter-balanced across the participants.

Procedure

Participants were asked to carefully assess each report along four dimensions (construct names were not revealed to the participants):

Causal Relevance “There is a causal relation between X [the explanans of the respective hypothesis] and Y.”

Plausibility “The hypothesis is plausible, given the results of the study.”

Confirmation “This study provides strong evidence for the hypothesis.”

Explanatory Power “The hypothesis investigated by the researchers is a good explanation of the results of this study.”

The choice of these four items was motivated by the crucial role that these constructs play in abductive reasoning, according to different accounts of explanation (Halpern and Pearl 2001; Woodward 2003; Lipton

2004). Participants' judgments were collected using a 7-point scale with the extremes (1) "I strongly disagree" and (7) "I strongly agree". An "I don't know" option could also be selected.

Hypotheses presented in the vignettes of Experiment 2	
INCREDIBLE	CREDIBLE
Exercising is associated with/causes frequent headache	Consuming anabolic steroids is associated with/causes physical strength
Attending religious services is associated with/causes better health	Smoking cannabis is associated with/causes drowsiness
Eating pizza is associated with/causes immunity to flu	Having breakfast is associated with/causes a healthy body mass index
Sex without condom is associated with/causes female well-being	Drinking coffee is associated with / causes high blood pressure

Table 1: The hypotheses of Experiment 1, ordered according to credibility, for both types of causal framing (off: "X is associated with Y"; on: "X causes Y").

2.2 Results

The participants' ratings were submitted to an ANOVA with the factors Credibility (incredible, credible), Causal Priming (off, on), Statistical Relevance (small, big), and Construct (Causal Relevance, Plausibility, Confirmation, Explanatory Power).

ANOVA revealed main effects of Credibility ($F(1, 236) = 121.728$; $p < .001$; $\eta_{part}^2 = .340$), Causal Priming ($F(1, 236) = 65.184$; $p < .001$; $\eta_{part}^2 = .216$), and Construct ($F(3, 234) = 6.98$; $p < .001$; $\eta_{part}^2 = .029$). We also observed interactions between Credibility \times Causal Priming ($F(1, 236) = 14.265$; $p < .001$; $\eta_{part}^2 = .057$) and Credibility \times Construct ($F(3, 234) = 5.74$; $p = .001$; $\eta_{part}^2 = .024$). The interaction between Credibility and Statistical Relevance was marginally significant ($F(1, 236) = 3.461$; $p = .064$; $\eta_{part}^2 = .014$). There was no main effect of Statistical Relevance ($p > .25$), nor any three- or four-way-interaction (all p 's $> .35$).

Pairwise comparisons showed that incredible reports were rated significantly lower than credible reports, whether causally primed or not (priming off: $t(236) = -8.92$; $p < .001$; priming on: $t(236) = -10.67$; $p < .001$).

	Credibility	
Causal Priming	<i>Incredible</i>	<i>Credible</i>
<i>Off</i>	M = 3.87 (.12)	M = 4.74 (.92)
<i>On</i>	M = 4.14 (.12)	M = 5.32 (.78)
Statistical Relevance		
<i>Small</i>	M = 4.07 (.12)	M = 5.03 (.008)
<i>Big</i>	M = 3.94 (.12)	M = 5.08 (.08)

Table 2: Marginal means and SE of the participants' ratings as a function of Credibility and Causal Priming, and Credibility and Statistical Relevance. Standard Error is given in parentheses.

	Credibility	
Construct	<i>Incredible</i>	<i>Credible</i>
<i>Causal Relevance</i>	M = 4.10 (.12)	M = 4.97 (.94)
<i>Confirmation</i>	M = 3.84 (.12)	M = 5.02 (.86)
<i>Plausibility</i>	M = 4.42 (.12)	M = 5.15 (.78)
<i>Explanatory Power</i>	M = 3.95 (.12)	M = 5.08 (.78)

Table 3: Marginal means and SE of the four response variables (Causal Relevance, Confirmation, Plausibility, Explanatory Power) as a function of Credibility (N=236).

Causally primed reports, whether credible or incredible, were rated higher than causally non-primed reports (incredible: $t(236) = -4.047$; $p < .001$; credible: $t(236) = -7.818$; $p < .001$). Pairwise comparisons also showed that incredible reports were rated significantly lower than credible reports, whether statistical relevance was small or big (small relevance: $t(236) = -8.92$; $p < .001$; big relevance: $t(236) = -10.922$; $p < .001$). See Table 2 for the descriptives. Finally, for each construct (Plausibility etc.), incredible reports were rated significantly lower than credible reports (Plausibility: $t(236) = -9.579$; $p < .001$; Confirmation: $t(236) = -10.63$; $p < .001$; Explanatory Power: $t(236) = -10.976$; $p < .001$; and Causal Relevance: $t(236) = -8.19$; $p < .001$). See Table 3 for the descriptives.

These results demonstrate that credibility interacts with the other factors that were manipulated in the experiment. For each of the constructs, credible reports were consistently rated higher than incredible reports, with the ratings further modulated by the other factors. In order to explicitly assess how the credibility of the reports influenced participants'

understanding of the four different constructs, we examined the correlations between the constructs, separately for both levels of Credibility. The results are summarized in table 4.

	Incredible				Credible			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
1. <i>Causal Relevance</i>	—	.71–.82	.69–.79	.72–.74	—	.53–.60	.58–.65	.47–.57
2. <i>Plausibility</i>		—	.77–.82	.70–.76		—	.55–.67	.61–.67
3. <i>Confirmation</i>			—	.76–.84			—	.61–.67
4. <i>Explanatory Power</i>				—				—

Table 4: Zero-order correlations for 4 items in the incredible report condition ($N = 237$, left table) and the credible report condition ($N = 237$, right table). All correlations were significant with $p < .001$.

Correlations between the constructs were very high for incredible reports. They ranged from .69 to .84 while for credible report, the correlations were lower, ranging from .47 to .67. This indicates that the correlations between the constructs, and thus the perceived similarity and dissimilarity of the four constructs, was modulated by the experimental manipulation and especially by the credibility of the reports. Participants treated the four dependent variables (constructs) more similarly for incredible than for credible hypotheses. This shows that participants only distinguished between cognitive virtues of a hypothesis when a basic level of credibility was achieved.

3 Experiment 2: Explanatory Power

3.1 Experiment and Methods

Our second experiment consisted of an online questionnaire, conducted via the LimeSurvey environment. The participants for our study were undergraduate students of Tilburg University from the School of Economics and Management and the School of Social and Behavioral Sciences. They were recruited via emails from a teacher of one of their classes. Incentives were provided in terms of points for the final exam and a prize lottery.

The respondents of the survey were 744 students, of which 671 completed the questionnaire (383 male, $M_{age} = 21.5$ ($SD = 2.3$)). They were randomly assigned to one of the 12 versions of an experimental vignette. Each participant received exactly one vignette.

Design and Material

Participants were presented with an experimental vignette where two possible events were related to two possible explanations for that event:

Vignette 1: *There are two urns on the table. Urn A contains 67% white and 33% black balls, Urn B contains only white balls. One of these urns is selected. You don't know which urn is selected, but you know that the chance that Urn A is selected is 25%, and that the chance that Urn B is selected is 75%. From the selected urn a white ball is taken at random.*

Please now consider the hypothesis that Urn A has been chosen.

The participants were then asked to assess the following seven items (the construct names in italics were not provided to the participants) on a Likert scale ranking from 1 ("do not agree at all") to 7 ("fully agree"):

Logical Implication The hypothesis logically implies that a white ball has been taken out.

Causal Relevance The hypothesis specifies the cause that a white ball has been taken out.

Confirmation The hypothesis is confirmed by a white ball has been taken out.

Posterior Probability The hypothesis is probable given that a white ball has been taken out.

Explanatory Power The hypothesis explains that a white ball has been taken out.

Understanding The hypothesis provides understanding why a white ball has been taken out.

Truth The hypothesis is true.

The choice of these seven items was motivated by the crucial role that concepts such as logical implication, causality and confirmation play in reasoning about candidate explanations, according to different philosophical accounts of explanatory value (Hempel 1965; Salmon 1997; Woodward 2003; Schupbach and Sprenger 2011).

After filling in this questionnaire, the participants could explain the way they made their judgments, and we collected some demographic data.

This vignette was, in a between-subjects design, varied in two dimensions, corresponding to two independent variables:

IV 1: *Statistical Relevance* The degree of statistical relevance between the explanans and the explanandum, with four values ranging from “strong disconfirm” to “strong confirm”.

IV 2: *Prior Probability* The prior probability of the hypothesis under consideration (.25, .5, or .75).

All possible $4 \times 3 = 12$ combinations of the values of these variables were realized in the experiment. Statistical relevance was manipulated by changing the color of the ball drawn from the urn or by changing the explanatory hypothesis (from Urn A to Urn B).

To increase the ecological validity of our experiments, we also set up two other vignettes that are closer to cases of ordinary reasoning, and repeated the experiment for these vignettes. See Appendix.

Procedure

Participants completed the questionnaire on a university PC or their own computer in the digital environment of LimeSurvey installed on a local server. The use of LimeSurvey guaranteed that the data could be protected and provided with a time stamp and information about the IP address of the respondent. The experiment was self-paced and took approximately 10 minutes to complete. In total, the experiment thus contained 36 cells, corresponding to twelve different combinations of the values of the independent variables times three different scenarios.

3.2 Results

Prior to the analysis of the effects of vignette manipulation, we explored the interdependencies of the seven items in the response questionnaire. To recall, the participants were asked to judge several aspects of the hypothesis with respect to the evidence: logical implication, causal relevance, explanatory power, increase in understanding, confirmation, posterior probability and truth. By analyzing the interdependencies with the help of the Pearson zero-order correlation coefficient, we determined whether the participants clearly separated these seven concepts, or whether some of them could be identified with each other.

The correlations are presented in Table 5. The analysis revealed that all of the variables correlated at least with .3 with several other variables, but at most .63. These medium-sized correlations show that the participants distinguish the seven concepts from each other and do not conflate cognate

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. <i>Logical Implication</i>	-	.38	.22	.32	.46	.30	.12
2. <i>Causal Relevance</i>		-	.45	.39	.56	.63	.37
3. <i>Confirmation</i>			-	.56	.35	.47	.63
4. <i>Post Probability</i>				-	.37	.51	.46
5. <i>Explanatory Power</i>					-	.60	.28
6. <i>Understanding</i>						-	.36
7. <i>Truth</i>							-

Table 5: Zero-order correlations for 7 items ($N = 671$), all correlations with $p < .01$.

concepts (e.g., causal relevance, explanatory power) with each other, which would be reflected in correlation coefficients of greater than .7. At the same time, the response variables were sufficiently related to each other to motivate a Principal Component Analysis: that is, a decomposition of the seven response variables into 2-4 constructs that explain together most of the variation in the data.

Principal Component Analysis

The factorability of the 7 items was examined with a Principle Component Analysis (PCA). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .82 and the Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant ($\chi^2(21) = 1790.77, p < .0001$). The initial eigenvalues showed 51% of variance explained by the first factor, 16% explained by the second factor, and 10% explained by the third factor. A visual inspection of the scree plot revealed a 'leveling off' of eigenvalues after the three factors, therefore, a three factor solution using the oblique rotation was conducted, with the three factors explaining 77% of the variance. All items had primary loadings over .7, viz. Table 6, which presents the factor loading matrix (loadings under .30 suppressed). In the remainder, we will restrict our analysis to these three factors.

The names for these factors are derived from the clustering that Table 6 indicates. Factor 1, **Cognitive Salience**, clusters explanatory power together with cognitive values that are often seen as related, such as causal coherence and enhancement of understanding (De Regt and Dieks 2005; Strevens 2008). Factor 2, **Rational Acceptability**, captures those cognitive values that hang together with the acceptability of a hypothesis: probability, confirmation by the evidence, and finally, truth. The strong correla-

	Cognitive Saliency	Rational Acceptability	Entailment	Communality
<i>Logical Implication</i>			.94	.94
<i>Causal Relevance</i>	.86			.74
<i>Confirmation</i>		-.84		.77
<i>Post Probability</i>		-.72		.67
<i>Explanatory Power</i>	.81			.73
<i>Understanding</i>	.87			.78
<i>Truth</i>		-.88		.75

Table 6: Factor loadings and communalities based on a principle component analysis with oblimin rotation for 7 items ($N = 671$).

tions between these values are not surprising: confirmation raises posterior probability, which is in turn an indicator of the truth of a theory (e.g., Howson and Urbach 2006). Finally, Factor 3 captures the strength of the logical relation between hypothesis and evidence. Since no other response variable is loaded on this factor, it figures as **Entailment**, showing the link to the response variable Logical Implication.¹

Tests of Experimental Manipulation

We conducted two analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to test the effects of the independent variables, Statistical Relevance and Prior Probability, on Cognitive Saliency, Rational Acceptability and Entailment, respectively.²

First, we tested the effects of the experimental manipulation on *Cognitive Saliency*. There was a significant main effect of *Statistical Relevance*, $F(3, 659) = 118.53, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .35$, but no effect of *Prior Probability*, $F(2, 659) = 0.20, p = .822$. There was no interaction effect between *Statistical Relevance* and *Prior Probability*, $F(6, 659) = 0.12, p = .994$ – see Table

¹The internal consistency for two of the three scales (the third scale only consisted of one item) was examined using Cronbach's alpha, resulting in alpha .82 for Factor 1 and .79 for Factor 2. Composite scores were calculated for each of the three factors using the mean of the items with primary loadings on each factor. The descriptive values for the newly constructed scales were $M = 3.65, SD = 1.91$ for Explanatory Value, $M = 3.63, SD = 1.87$ for Rational Acceptability, and $M = 3.75, SD = 2.40$ for Logical Implication.

²A prior analysis of the effect of the vignette on the three dependent variables revealed that Cognitive Saliency (but not Rational Acceptability and Entailment) was also affected by the vignette manipulation. For clarity of exposition, the statistics is not included here because the size and direction of the significant main effects and the interaction effect remained the same when vignette was included as a factor.

Cognitive Salience	Statistical Relevance			
Prior Probability	<i>Strong Disconfirm</i>	<i>Weak Disconfirm</i>	<i>Weak Confirm</i>	<i>Strong Confirm</i>
<i>Low</i>	2.02 (.22)	3.02 (.21)	4.72 (.20)	4.81 (.19)
<i>Medium</i>	1.95 (.21)	3.05 (.20)	4.66 (.21)	4.58 (.20)
<i>High</i>	1.88 (.24)	3.12 (.21)	4.63 (.22)	4.64 (.20)

Table 7: Estimated Marginal Means and SE of Cognitive Salience by Statistical Relevance and Prior Probability ($N = 671$).

7 for the descriptives. A pair-wise comparison with Bonferroni correction of the levels of *Statistical Relevance* showed a significant difference between all levels ($p < .001$), with the exception of Weak and Strong Confirm.

Second, we examined the effects of the experimental manipulation on *Rational Acceptability*. There was again a significant main effect of *Statistical Relevance*, $F(3, 659) = 223.76$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .51$, but no effect of *Prior Probability*, $F(2, 659) = 1.68$, $p = .188$. There was no interaction effect between *Statistical Relevance* and *Prior Probability*, $F(6, 659) = 0.81$, $p = .463$ – see Table 8 for the descriptives. A pair-wise comparison with Bonferroni correction of the levels of *Statistical Relevance* showed a significant difference between all levels ($p < .001$), with the exception of Weak Disconfirmation and Weak Confirmation ($p = .005$).

Finally, we analyzed the effects of the experimental manipulation on *Entailment*. Similarly to the previous two dependent variables, there was again a significant main effect of *Statistical Relevance*, $F(3, 659) = 105.40$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .32$, but no effect of *Prior Probability*, $F(2, 659) = 1.23$, $p = .292$. There was no interaction effect between *Statistical Relevance* and *Prior Probability*, $F(6, 659) = 0.76$, $p = .598$ – see Table 9 for the descriptives. A pair-wise comparison with Bonferroni correction of the levels of *Statistical Relevance* showed a significant difference between all degrees ($p < .001$) with the exception of Weak Confirm and Weak Disconfirm ($p = .007$). Since Entailment measures the impact of the hypothesis on the explanandum rather than vice versa, it is logical that the order deviates from the previous two tables, with Weak Confirm obtaining the highest score.

Rational Acceptability	Statistical Relevance			
Prior Probability	<i>Strong Disconfirm</i>	<i>Weak Disconfirm</i>	<i>Weak Confirm</i>	<i>Strong Confirm</i>
<i>Low</i>	1.93 (.18)	2.93 (.18)	3.45 (.17)	5.39 (.16)
<i>Medium</i>	2.05 (.18)	3.10 (.17)	3.74 (.18)	5.62 (.17)
<i>High</i>	1.95 (.20)	3.20 (.18)	3.48 (.18)	5.82 (.17)

Table 8: Estimated Marginal Means and SE of Rational Acceptability by Statistical Relevance and Prior Probability ($N = 671$).

Logical Entailment	Statistical Relevance			
Prior Probability	<i>Strong Disconfirm</i>	<i>Weak Disconfirm</i>	<i>Weak Confirm</i>	<i>Strong Confirm</i>
<i>Low</i>	2.37 (.27)	2.98 (.26)	5.92 (.26)	4.14 (.25)
<i>Medium</i>	2.33 (.26)	3.00 (.26)	5.93 (.26)	3.69 (.26)
<i>High</i>	1.88 (.30)	3.09 (.27)	5.92 (.27)	3.32 (.26)

Table 9: Estimated Marginal Means and SE of Entailment by Statistical Relevance and Prior Probability ($N = 671$).

4 Discussion

To investigate the impact of causal and probabilistic information on explanatory judgment, we conducted two experiments where participants were presented with fictitious vignettes and asked to rate a given hypothesis along various dimensions, e.g., its explanatory value, its plausibility, its causal saliency, the sense of understanding it confers, etc.

In the first experiment, participants were presented with hypotheses that could causally explain familiar types of phenomena (e.g., “eating pizza causes/is associated with immunity to flu” vs. “consuming anabolic steroids is causes/associated with physical strength”). Explanations differed in their degree of subjective prior credibility, and were presented in the form of research reports. The reports also differed in the explicit use of causal language as well as in the degree of statistical relevance between explanans and explanandum.

We found that manipulations of statistical relevance did not affect participants’ judgments, but the plausibility of the causal mechanism did have a strong effect on their judgments. This result indicates that the plausibility of a candidate explanation matters for generic, event-type explanations. In such contexts, the plausibility of the causal mechanism overrides considerations of statistical relevance. We also observed an interaction effect between causal priming and prior plausibility: causal priming was the more effective the more credible the candidate explanation was. For a

credible causal hypothesis, the explicit use of causal language led to a much more coherent (and explanatorily valuable) picture than for an implausible causal hypothesis. Both main effects and the interaction effect underline the importance of causal information for generic explanatory judgments.

In the second experiment, participants were asked to judge token-explanations of singular events. We observed a clear distinction between judgments of explanatory value and (objective) posterior probabilities. More generally, participants' judgments on the seven response variables were aligned along three dimensions: *Cognitive Salience* (primarily loaded with the response variables Causality, Explanatory Value and Understanding), *Rational Acceptability* (Posterior Probability, Confirmation and Truth) and *Entailment* (Logical Implication). On the one hand, this finding substantiates the conjecture from previous literature about the existence of a tight connection between explanatory value, causality and a sense of understanding (Lipton 2004; Keil 2006; Lombrozo 2007; Trout 2007). On the other hand, it indicates that folk reasoning about potential explanations can neatly distinguish between the concepts of Rational Acceptability and Cognitive Salience of a hypothesis, as we hypothesized.

Participants' judgments on the three main factors we identified—Cognitive Salience, Rational Acceptability, and Logical Implication—were strongly affected by changes in statistical relevance, specifically by manipulations of the likelihood of the target hypothesis. Instead, the prior probabilities of the candidate explanatory hypothesis, presented as objective base rates, affected participants' judgments in none of those three factors. These results demonstrate that in situations where causal detail is kept sparse and the explanandum corresponds to a singular token-event, explanatory judgment is heavily affected by information about probabilistic relations between hypothesis and evidence.

Overall, the results of our two study indicate that explanatory judgment is, as Lombrozo (2012, 270) reports, a complex psychological phenomenon intertwined with probabilistic and causal reasoning. Specifically, our results demonstrate that two different kinds of probabilistic information—the prior credibility of the explanation and the statistical relevance for the explanandum—contribute to explanatory value, albeit in different circumstances. The level of generality of the explanation (and the explanandum) make a crucial difference: for generic (type) explanations, the prior credibility of the explanatory hypothesis, but not its statistical relevance on the explanandum boosts explanatory value, whereas for singular (token) explanations, explanatory value co-varies with statistical

relevance, but not with the prior credibility of the explanatory hypothesis.

While these findings confirm and refine conjectures made in the theoretical literature on explanation (Salmon 1984), they call for a reassessment of the rationality of abduction (e.g., Okasha 2000; Lipton 2004): when explanatory value is insensitive to the prior credibility of the explanans, abductive inference will not track posterior probabilities and may lead to probabilistically incoherent judgments. Logics of abductive/explanatory inference that have ambitions to be descriptively adequate need to take into account the **context-sensitivity of people's explanatory reasoning**. Pluralism about the nature of explanatory reasoning may become more attractive as a result.

The result also demonstrate the fruitfulness of recent theoretical work that explicates explanatory power in probabilistic terms (Schupbach and Sprenger 2011; Crupi and Tentori 2012). Finally, discovering the hitherto unknown difference between singular and generic explanatory reasoning opens the way for further work on matching explanatory with causal and probabilistic reasoning (e.g., regarding the analogous difference between generic and singular causation).

We hope that our contribution will stimulate further research on the nature of explanation. In particular, we hope that our results will help to promote “the prospects for a naturalized philosophy of explanation” (Lombrozo 2011, 549), where philosophical theorizing about the nature of explanation is constrained and informed by empirical evidence about the psychology of explanatory value.

Experimental Material for Experiment 2

Apart from Vignette 1 (the urn scenario), we used the following vignettes and varied them in the dimensions of Statistical Relevance and Prior Probability:

Vignette 2: *Again and again, Ruud has knee problems when playing football. The doctors give him two options: knee surgery or a conservative treatment. If Ruud chooses to go into surgery, he cannot play football for half a year; if he chooses the conservative treatment, there is a 33% chance that he can play again after one month; otherwise (with a chance of 67%) he has to rest longer. You don't know which option Ruud chooses, but you believe that the chance that he chooses surgery is 75%—and that the chance that he chooses the conservative treatment is 25%. A month later a joint friend tells you that Ruud is*

still unable to play football.

Please now consider the hypothesis that Ruud has chosen for the conservative treatment.

Vignette 3: Louise arrives by train in Twin City. Twin city has two districts: West Bank and East Bank. In West Bank, there is only one taxi company, namely Green Taxi Ltd., and all their cabs are green. Green Taxi Ltd. also owns 67% of all cabs in East Bank. The other cabs in East Bank are owned by The Red Taxi Inc., all their cabs are red. Louise does not know which part of the city the train is entering, but judging from her knowledge of Twin City she assumes that there is a 75% chance that she is in West Bank (and a chance of 25% that she is in East Bank). At some point, Louise sees a green cab from the train.

Please now consider the hypothesis that Louise is in East Bank.

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