

**Deanship of Graduate Studies  
Al-Quds University**



**Translating Political Speeches from English into Arabic:  
The Case of Benjamin Netanyahu's Speech before the UN**

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**Prepared by:**

**Abd al-Rahman Raja Salem Owaida**


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

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Jerusalem-Occupied Palestine

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## **Dedication**

I dedicate my thesis to my family. A special feeling of gratitude goes to my loving parents; this thesis indeed would not be completed without their prayers. I will always appreciate them.

This work is also dedicated to my wife, Nisreen, in whose eyes and smile I see the beauty of this world.

Dedicating this work also goes to those whom I love to the moon and back; my lovely children Lana, Raja and Rama.

Abd al-Rahman Raja Salem Owaida

## **Declaration**

I hereby certify that this thesis, entitled *Translating Political Speeches from English into Arabic: The Case of Benjamin Netanyahu's Speech before the UN*, is submitted for the degree of Master is the result of my own research, except where otherwise acknowledged, and that this study (or any part of the same) has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other university or institution.

Signed: .....

Abd al-Rahman Raja Salem Owaida

Date: 19/12/2018

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Lastly, I would like to express my deep gratitude to Hoeve Zadoks Fonds for funding my studies at Al-Quds University.

Abd al-Rahman Raja Salem Owaida

## **Abstract**

This thesis investigates aspects of ideology and politics in the translation of political speeches during times of ongoing conflict, particularly the Palestinian- Israeli conflict. It examines Benjamin Netanyahu's Speech, which was delivered in the United Nations General Assembly in its 66th session on 23 September 2011, and its three Arabic translations. This thesis, which takes three different Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech as its corpus is situated within the theoretical framework of Descriptive Translation Studies (Lambert and Van Gorp 1985) and the Three-Dimensional Model of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1992). The thesis begins with introducing the historical, sociopolitical and institutional conditions of the production of the original version of the ST and its three different Arabic translations (target texts), focusing on their underlying functions and principles of audience design. It then moves to examine how these different Arabic translations reflect aspects of ideology and politics at the micro-structural level by comparing the target texts to their source text. The final step is to explain these aspects in terms of their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts of these Arabic translations. The overall textual analysis demonstrates that the different translations of political speeches are interpreted differently by different institutions to serve their respective ideologies and political agendas. The analysis also illustrates how these different translations –as products– serve different purposes and functions of the agents involved. These translations, thus, play a major role in circulating narratives and political agendas of the conflict relying on their institutional context and the objectives they meant to serve. These findings emphasize the need to study translations of political speeches in their respective sociopolitical, historical and institutional contexts.

**Keywords:** Political speeches, translation, ideology, politics, Palestinian-Israeli conflict, United Nation.

# ترجمة الخطاب السياسي من اللغة الإنجليزية إلى اللغة العربية: خطاب بنيامين نتنياهو في الأمم المتحدة- أنموذجاً

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## ملخص

تبحث هذه الأطروحة في النواحي الأيديولوجية والسياسية في ترجمة الخطابات السياسية التي تلقى أثناء فترة الصراعات الدائرة، لا سيما الصراع الفلسطيني- الإسرائيلي. إذ تبحث في خطاب بنيامين نتنياهو الذي ألقاه أمام الجمعية العامة في الأمم المتحدة في جلستها السادسة والستين يوم 23 سبتمبر 2011، وترجماته العربية الثلاث. وتبحث الأطروحة الحالية ثلاث ترجمات عربية مختلفة لخطاب بنيامين نتياهو، وتستند في بحثها لهذه الترجمات على منهجية الإطار النظري لدراسات الترجمة الوصفية (Lambert and Van Gorp 1985)، ومنهجية التحليل النقدي للخطاب بمستوياته الثلاث (Fairclough 1992). إذ تبدأ الأطروحة في البحث في السياق التاريخي، والاجتماعي السياسي، والإطار المؤسسي الذي في ظله أُلقيَ النص الأصلي للخطاب مُعْنَةً في ذلك على الجوانب الأيديولوجية والسياسية المتضمنة لهذه الترجمات وطبيعة الجمهور المُخاطب. ومن ثم تنتقل الأطروحة في بحثها فيما تعكسه الاختلافات بين الترجمات الثلاث من مآلات أيديولوجية وأخرى سياسية من خلال مقارنتها مع النص الأصلي للخطاب، وذلك على المستوى الجزئي. ومن ثم تضع تفسيرات لنواحي هذه الاختلافات مرتكزةً في ذلك على دراسة الظروف التاريخية، والاجتماعية السياسية، والمؤسسية التي صاحبت إنتاج الترجمات العربية للخطاب. ويُظهر تحليل النصوص المترجمة أن ترجمات الخطب السياسية يمكن أن تخضع لتفسيرات مختلفة، وذلك باختلاف المؤسسات المترجمة لهذه الخطب سعياً منها لأن تتساقط الترجمة وتتماشى مع أجندتها الأيديولوجية والسياسية. وفي الختام، توضح الأطروحة كيف تخدم هذه الترجمات المختلفة (بوصفها منتجات) أهدافاً مختلفة ووظائف متعددة حيث أن هذه الترجمات تلعب دوراً رئيساً في التأكيد على روايات وأجندة سياسية حول صراع دائر وفقاً للإطار المؤسسي الذي في ظله يُترجم الخطاب، وكذلك وفقاً للأهداف المبتغاة من الخطاب. كما تؤكد نتائج هذه الأطروحة الحاجة الماسة لإجراء مزيداً من الدراسات لترجمات الخطب السياسية بالاستناد إلى دراسة وتحليل السياقات التاريخية، والاجتماعية السياسية، والمؤسسية المواكبة لها.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الخطاب السياسية، الترجمة، الأيديولوجيا، السياسة، الصراع الفلسطيني-الإسرائيلي.



### **List of abbreviations**

<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Stands for</b>
Critical Discourse analysis	CDA
Descriptive Translation Studies	DTS
I Love Israel Website	ILIW
Israeli Prime Minister Office	IPMO
Literal Translation	LIT
Source Language	SL
Source Text	ST
Target Culture	TC
Translation Studies	TS
Target Text	TT
United Nations	UN
United Nation General Assembly	UNGA

## Arabic Transliteration System<sup>1</sup>

Romanization	Arabic Character	Romanization	Arabic Character
'	همزة ء	GH	غ
Ā	ا	F	ف
B	ب	Q	ق
T	ت	K	ك
TH	ث	L	ل
J	ج	M	م
<u>H</u>	ح	N	ن
KH	خ	H	هـ
D	د	W, Ū	والتاء المربوطة في نهاية الكلمة و
DH	ذ	Y, Ī	ي
R	ر	A	Short Opener
Z	ز	Ā	Long Opener
S	س	Ā	Maddah
SH	ش	à	Alif Maqsourah
<u>S</u>	ص	U	Short Closer
<u>D</u>	ض	Ū	Long Closer
<u>T</u>	ط	I	Short Breaker
<u>DH</u>	ظ	Ī	Long Breaker
'	ع	Doubling the letter	شدة

<sup>1</sup>This Arabic transliteration System table is based on the Eleventh United Nations Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names. Retrieved from: [https://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/UNG\\_EGN/docs/11th-unesgn-docs/E\\_Conf.105\\_137\\_CRP.137\\_14\\_Romanization%20System%20from%20Arabic%20%20letters%20to%20Latinized%20%20%20letters%202007%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf](https://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/UNG_EGN/docs/11th-unesgn-docs/E_Conf.105_137_CRP.137_14_Romanization%20System%20from%20Arabic%20%20letters%20to%20Latinized%20%20%20letters%202007%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf) (last accessed, 4/2/2018)

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## **Chapter One**

### **Introduction**

Language can be used to express power and ideology, inflame our patriotic feelings and express our identity (Bazzi 2009: 5). For, Aristotle, there is a "connection between man's political nature and the power of speech" (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 19). Kuhiwczak & Littau (2007: 134) also state that politics and language are closely related. Indeed, the relationship between politics and language is inseparable; simply because "politics cannot be conducted without language" (Chilton & Schäffner 1997: 206). Also, Schäffner (1996: 201) emphasizes that "any political action is prepared, accompanied, controlled and influenced by language".

Politics often requires the use of two or more languages (Mardirosz 2014: 65). To put it in another way, most of politicians' words are rendered in other languages than the one in which they were uttered (Schäffner 1997: 206). Hence, translating becomes a must. However, in Modern Translation Studies, leading theorists such as Godard (1990), Schäffner (1996), Hermans (1997), Baker (2006) and Munday (2008) argue that translation is not a purely neutral activity, and is often meant to serve ideological and political agendas. For instance, Schäffner & Bassnett (2010:8) argue that translation processes are determined by institutional policies and ideologies.

During times of ongoing conflict, each party employs translation to serve its narration, and thus attempts to gain support and market political views. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, for instance, is a case in point. Ayyad (2011: 34) asserts that translation plays a key role in communication in the context of the Palestinian- Israeli conflict. Also, Schäffner (1996: 202) makes the points that political speeches could be seen as "a specific subgenre of political texts", which is "a part of and/or the result of politics, they are historically and culturally determined". Accordingly, translation, in this thesis, is regarded as "a form of regulated transformation, as a sociopolitical practice" (Venuti 1995: as cited in Schäffner & Bassnett 2010: 11).

Accordingly, this thesis argues that translations of political texts are ideologically and politically motivated. The vast bulk of literature review shows that translating political speeches, particularly from English into Arabic, is still largely under-researched area in the discipline of Translation Studies (cf. Chapter Two).

In order to uncover the underlying ideological and political considerations, a text is recommended to be analysed in its historical and sociopolitical context. In this context, Schäffner (1996: 201) argues that "linguistic analysis of political discourse cannot ignore the broader societal and political framework in which such discourse is embedded". Moreover, Van Dijk (2010: 24) asserts that the specifics of political discourse analysis have to be examined in terms of the relations between discourse structures and political context structures. Van Dijk (1993: 279) suggests that CDA represents a promising model to analyse the text as it aims to "provide an account of the role of language, language use, discourse or communicative events in the (re)production of dominance and inequality" (cf. Chapter 3.2.2).

The present thesis aims at investigating aspects of ideology and politics in translations of political speeches. It analyses aspects of ideology and politics in the Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech before the UNGA (cf. Chapter 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). Thus, these translations will be analysed both descriptively and comparatively (cf. Chapter Four). It further examines key characteristic features of the speech, discursive function both in the source and target language, and the textual features in the target culture in terms of their respective historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts. To achieve these goals, the thesis applies the theoretical framework of Descriptive Translation Studies (Lambert and Van Gorp 1985) and the Three-Dimensional Model of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1992) (cf. Chapter 3.2).

Product-Oriented Descriptive Translation Studies approach is interested in examining existing translations (Munday 2008: 10), and CDA enables the analyst to focus on the signifiers that make up the text, and thus it represents a suitable methodology to uncover hidden political and ideological agendas. Yet, investigating the historical determination of these selections is also required to uncover whether the processes of production and reception are socially constrained (Janks 1996: 1).

Applying these two theoretical frameworks enables to unveil the ideological and political aspects underlying in the Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech (cf. Chapter Five). The translations are thus meant to serve different political agendas and narratives. On one hand, the two Israeli translations of the speech prepared by two different Israeli institutions, namely the Israel Prime Minister Office and I Love Israel Website reflect political affiliation and promote ideological and political positions e.g. translating this excerpt of Netanyahu's speech: "*I speak for a hundred generations of Jews who were dispersed throughout the lands*" makes this point (cf. Chapter 4.3.2). On the other hand, the UN's Arabic translation which follows a generally literal translation strategy is, to a large extent, a neutral translation e.g. translating the phrase "*our National life*" (cf. Chapter 4.2.4).

### **1.1 Purpose of the study**

There is an interrelationship between translation and political discourse; they depend on each other (Schäffner 2004: 120). In this context, Ayyad (2011: 35) maintains that "governments, political parties as well as ordinary citizens rely on translation as a source of information which constitutes acts of mediation". Elliott & Boer (2012: 2) also point out that translating sensitive political texts is processed within complex webs of ideology and culture. Consequently, a trend towards producing different translations for the same source text is motivated to fit certain ideological and political views and stances.

The thesis argues that Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech serve ideological and political agendas of the agents' involved. In order to investigate aspects of ideology and politics in the Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech, these translations were investigated in their respective historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts (cf. Chapter Three). In this regard, Schäffner (1996: 204) notes that "the analysis of political speeches in particular and political discourse in general should relate linguistic structures to larger contexts of communicative settings and political functions".

This thesis first examines conditions of text production in their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts (cf. Chapter 3.1). It then describes and

compares the Arabic translations to their ST to unveil the underlying aspects of ideology and politics in these translations and interpret them based on their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts (cf. Chapter 4.1-4.4). To come to these purposes, the corpus of the thesis will be processed within the framework of Product-Oriented DTS of Lambert & Van Gorp (1985) and Fairclough's (1992) Three-Dimensional Model of CDA (cf. Chapter 3.2). Finally, the present thesis aims to contribute to the discipline of Translation Studies by analysing an authentic data.

## **1.2 Significance of the study**

Schäffner (1996: 201) argues that "the study of language has recently become more central to those academic disciplines concerned with politics". For Schäffner & Bassnett, translation is an integral part of political activity (2010: 13). Also, Translation Studies scholars (e.g. Schäffner 1996, Hatim 1997, Baker 2006, Schäffner & Bassnett 2010, Ayyad 2011, Tymoczko 2013) maintain that the study of political texts, is part of both translation and politics because these topics are interrelated and depend on each other. Accordingly, the study of the translations of political speeches is still an under-researched area. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that translations of political texts have to be investigated within their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts since what is regarded as "political" relies on the participants in a communicative context (Schäffner 2004:119).

Translation Studies today is no longer concerned with examining whether a translation has been 'faithful' to a source text. Instead, the focus is on social, cultural, and communicative practices, on the cultural and ideological significance of translating and of translations, on the external politics of translation, on the relationship between translation behavior and socio-cultural factors. (Schäffner & Bassnett 2010: 12)

Schäffner also points out that Translation Studies scholars, interested in political topics, have looked at specific features of political language and at the sociopolitical causes and effects of particular translation solutions (cited in Kuhlczak & Littau 2007: 142). Based on this, the current thesis will examine its corpus in its historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts to provide a vital discussion from the perspective of Translation Studies.

For William & Chesterman (2002: 2), "contribution to the discipline of Translation Studies can be achieved through providing new data, suggesting answers to specific



answers, testing or refining an existing hypothesis, theory or methodology and by proposing a new idea, hypothesis, theory or methodology". This thesis contributes to the discipline of Translation Studies by providing an original data; namely Benjamin Netanyahu's speech. It also provides answers for controversial questions in regard to translation of political speeches in general, and from English into Arabic in particular (cf. Chapter 1.5).

Schäffner (1997: 119) points out that in the analysis of political discourse and political texts, the broader societal and political framework in which such discourse is embedded has to be taken into consideration. Accordingly, the thesis examines three different Arabic translations for Benjamin Netanyahu's speech in their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts. Thus, the thesis attempts to bridge a gap in analysing the translations of political speeches descriptively and comparatively by using more than one translation for one source text. The present thesis also attempts to contribute to the discipline of Translation Studies by uncovering aspects of ideology and politics in the translations of political speeches from English into Arabic (cf. Chapter Five).

### **1.3 Statement of the problem**

In times of ongoing conflicts, the study of the translation of political speeches becomes sensitive. In this respect, Ayyad (2011: 48) makes the point that "it [translation] is of the utmost importance at times of conflict as it directly affects both domestic and foreign policies and consequently, the resolution or aggregation of conflicts". Although the relationship between translation and politics is inseparable, the study of the translations of political texts has not been scrutinized sufficiently (Mahdiyan et al. 2013: 39). Schäffner (2004: 120) indicates that aspects of translation have not so far received sufficient attention by Political Discourse Analysis.

The crux of the thesis rests on examining the translations of political speeches from English into Arabic, at the micro-level, with a particular focus on translating texts loaded with ideological and political contents e.g. 'Benjamin- Binyamin -- the son of Jacob' (cf. Chapter 4.4.4). It examines Benjamin Netanyahu's speech before the UNGA in 2011 as its corpus (cf. Chapter 3.1). It attempts to uncover aspects of

ideology and politics in these translations of political speeches from English into Arabic. It also attempts to unveil the discursive functions of the source text of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech and its three different Arabic translations in light of their textual features (cf. Chapter 1.1). The thesis thus links textual features to their political discursive functions (cf. Chapter 1.5).

This thesis analyses the three Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech in their relevant historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts to uncover aspects of ideology and politics in these Arabic translations. Therefore, it will operate within the theoretical frameworks of Product-Oriented DTS, particularly, Lambert & Van Gorp (1985) and Fairclough's (1992) Three-Dimensional Model of CDA (cf. Chapter 3.2).

#### **1.4 Limitations of the study**

The thesis examines the translation of political speeches from English into Arabic, namely, the case of Benjamin Netanyahu's Speech before the UNGA in its 66<sup>th</sup> session in September, 2011. The analysis is based on describing and comparing three Arabic translations of the speech in their respective historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts. These translations were issued by three different institutions, namely; the United Nations (UN), Israeli Prime Minister Office (IPMO) and the Israeli website *I Love Israel* (ILIW). Thus, the present thesis has two main limitations. First, its corpus is limited to only one of Benjamin Netanyahu's speeches. Second, it would have been more rewarding if the corpus had included a translation produced by an institution with more distant political views e.g. Arab News agencies, and thus the analysis would be more enriched.

#### **1.5 Questions of the study**

The present thesis attempts to provide answers for the following questions:

- 1. What are the key distinctive features of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech as a political text? What are their discursive functions in the source culture?*
- 2. How do the three Arabic translations differ from one another? What are their textual features in the TT? What are their discursive functions in the target culture?*

3. *What political and ideological aspects do these translations reflect? How can the differences in the three Arabic translations be interpreted in terms of their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts?*

To answer these questions, the study is located within the theoretical framework of Product-Oriented DTS of Lambert & Van Gorp (1985) and Fairclough's (1992) Three-Dimensional Model of Critical Discourse Analysis (cf. Chapter Three and Four).

## **1.6 Structure of the study**

The thesis consists of five chapters as follows:

**Chapter One** presents a general overview of the thesis. It then introduces the purpose, significance, statement of the problem, limitations, questions and structure of the study.

**Chapter Two** provides a review of the most relevant studies that investigated translations of political texts with a particular focus on the translation(s) of political speeches. It starts with an overview presenting the aims and main sections of the chapter. The first section reviews literature on translating texts loaded with ideological and political considerations. The second part reviews literature on translating political speeches with a particular focus on translating political speeches from Arabic into English, and vice-versa. Finally, a conclusion summarises the main points of the chapter.

**Chapter Three** introduces the corpus and methodology of the study. This chapter consists of two main sections. The first section introduces the corpus of the study, namely Benjamin Netanyahu's Speech and its three Arabic Translations. It presents the historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts of the production of the ST of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech. It then sheds light on the three Arabic translations of the speech (the target texts) with a particular focus on the three institutions which produced them. The second section presents the methodology of the study; Product-Oriented DTS of Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) and Fairclough's Three-Dimensional Model of CDA. The chapter ends with a conclusion which summarises the main points of Chapter Three.

**Chapter Four** begins with an overview presents the sections and aims of the chapter and justification of the selection of data examples. The chapter then moves to examine and analyse the three different Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech at the micro-structural level to uncover aspects of ideology and politics. Finally, the chapter presents a conclusion to the chapter.

**Chapter Five** represents the conclusion of the study. It consists of three main sections. The first section introduces the major conclusions and findings for the translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech. The second section presents the contribution of the thesis to the discipline of Translation Studies. The last section suggests further research on political texts and speeches from the perspective of Translation Studies and other neighbouring disciplines.

## **Chapter Two**

### **Translating Political Discourse**

#### **Overview**

Schäffner (1997: 119) states that 'political text' is a vague term; an umbrella term covering a variety of text types such as treaties, speeches, editorials and press conferences...etc. The translation of political speeches, as a sub-genre of political texts, constitutes the main focus of the present thesis. To provide a critical view, this chapter reviews literature that examines aspects of ideology and politics in the translation(s) of political texts in general, and political speeches, in particular.

The chapter is divided into two main sections. Section 2.1 critically reviews studies with a particular look on the translations of political texts that are loaded with sensitive ideological and political content. Section 2.2 touches on translating political speeches from Arabic into English and English into Arabic.

#### **2.1 Translation, Ideology and Politics**

Fairclough (1992: 3) states that "discourse is a difficult concept, largely because there are so many conflicting and overlapping definitions formulated from various theoretical and disciplinary standpoints". He defines discourse as "a form of social practice" (Fairclough 1989: 22). For Schiffrin et al. (2001: 398) political discourse is "a discourse which is itself political". Based on this, examining and analysing political discourse in a way or another means studying and analysing politics. On one hand, Van Dijk (1994: 164) indicates that the analysis of political texts has to be based on "genuine social, political or cultural analysis". On the other hand, he states that "discourse plays a fundamental role in the daily expression and reproduction of ideologies" (Van Dijk, 2013: 4). Accordingly, ideology plays a crucial role in shaping political discourse. In this regard, He adds that "ideologies influence our daily texts and talk" (ibid.: 4). To put it simply, sensitive political terms are expected to be

ideologically determined. Thus, the study of 'ideology' and 'politics' should go hand in hand with the study of political speeches as a sub-genre of political texts.

This section reviews major studies that investigate translations of texts loaded with ideological and sensitive political contents with particular focus on the role ideology and politics play in translation.

### **2.1.1 Translation and ideology**

Ideology is a key term in Translation Studies. For Van Dijk ideology is "a composite of the basic beliefs that underlie the social representations of a social group" (2013: 16). Investigating ideological aspects of translations has been a major interest in the discipline of Translation Studies. Lefevere argues that "what determined translation was firstly ideology" (Munday: 2009: 95). Also, Translation Studies scholars (e.g. Newmark 1991, Lefevere 1992, Tymoczko 2002, Munday 2008, Schäffner & Bassnett 2010 and Elliott & Boer 2012) have always maintained that ideology occupies a prominent position in the discipline of Translation Studies as it leaves its fingerprints on the text translated. For Newmark, "the translator's neutrality is a myth" (1991: 161). Tymoczko & Gentzler (2002: xxi) also state that "Translation is not simply an act of faithful reproduction but, rather a deliberate and conscious act of selection, assemblage, structuration and fabrication– and even, in some cases, of falsification, refusal of information, counterfeiting, and the creation of secret codes".

A key argument illustrating the impact of ideology on the text shaped is also made by Lefevere. He maintains that "on every level of the translation process, it can be shown that, if linguistic considerations enter into conflict with considerations of an ideological and/or poetological nature, the latter tend to win out" (Lefevere 1992: 39; as cited in Munday 2008: 127). Also, Van Dijk (2013: 4) points out that "ideologies influence our daily texts and talk". He also illustrates that they constitute the ultimate goal, of group practices, and thus they frame the group power (ibid.: 35). Accordingly, ideology lies at the top-priorities of analysing political speeches.

Schäffner (1996: 203) calls for two perspectives when analysing political speeches as a subgenre of political text: either at the micro-level or the macro-level or both. The present thesis examines the Arabic versions of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech at the micro-level. This subsection of the study reviews literature that investigates the role of ideology in translating political texts loaded with ideological tone.

Al-Mohannadi (2006) conducted a study that aimed at investigating the concept of ideology in political speeches. It "provides a detailed, comparative analysis of a translation of the first, formal speech delivered by bin Laden on 7 October 2001 concerning the events of September 11 and his conflict with the United States" (Al-Mohannadi 2006: 529). The analysis examines interventions that were made in the text produced by translators for ideological motifs and for other technical, linguistic problems. The findings revealed "there is certainly a dilemma facing the translator when his or her ideology contradicts the author's" (Al-Mohannadi 2006: 540). Al-Mohannadi also found that "a dour resolution to adhere to scholarly honesty should be the solution, but even then the translator may unconsciously adopt a technique that varies from the author's and does less-than-credit to the original" (ibid.). She justified this difference as "deviation, changes, or adoption of an ideology that is at variance with what the author intends" (ibid.).

Qaddoumi (2008) investigated the impact of ideology in translating political speeches. The main concern of the study was investigating ideology in translating 'the discourse of commitment' in political speeches. The study was located within the framework of CDA and text linguistics. Corpus of the study consisted of a sample of texts "were selected from the collection of speeches by Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrullah during the 2006 war, whereas the translation material is taken from different Western media sources including MEMRI, The Guardian, Haaretz and The Washington Post" (Qaddoumi 2008: 2). Findings of the study disclosed that translators intentionally or unintentionally let their ideology interfere with the translation produced (ibid.: 53). Findings also revealed that "ideology constitutes the cornerstone in the translation of sacred and sensitive texts such as Nasrullah's political speeches" (ibid.: 54).

Dvořák (2011) examined the translations of metaphors within political discourse. The corpus of the study consisted of official press-releases from top European institutions and a number of selected plenary speeches from the floor of the European parliament (Dvořák 2011: 35-36). The study operated within the empirical, descriptive approach (ibid.: 7). Results of the analysis revealed that metaphors are indeed common in the texts analysed, and political actors in EU used predominantly older, non-original metaphors, although novel metaphors are not uncommon in the parliamentary speeches (ibid.: 67-75). Moreover, translation of tropes in EU is largely functional,

trouble-free, and also non-problematic in terms of intercultural communication, as shifts in meaning or concepts used are truly sporadic (Dvořák 2011: 75).

Other attempts have been made with the purpose of examining the impact of ideologies on translating political speeches. Hussein (2016) conducted a study to explore the intended ideologies and critical linguistic aspects in the political speech delivered by the Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, at the New Suez Canal inauguration ceremony on 6<sup>th</sup> August, 2015. The speech was taken from the internet (Hussein 2016: 85). The study applied CDA as a theoretical framework to analyse the speech (ibid.). Analysing data of the study was based on drawing upon Fairclough's Three-Dimensional Model of CDA, namely, the language text, whether spoken or written, discourse practice and socio-cultural practices (Hussein 2016: 90). Both macro analysis (semantic macrostructures) and micro analysis (local semantics) were conducted in an attempt to link social and linguistic practices (ibid.). Results of the study revealed that this speech had its distinctive features and that language was used tactfully to arrive at the intended political goals of the speaker (ibid.: 86). Also, semantic phenomena such as figures of speech, repetition, synonymy and collocation were widely employed in the speech of the Egyptian president to achieve different political ideologies (Hussein 2016: 86).

Investigating translations of political speeches within their institutional context is also one of the interests of Translation Studies (TS). Baker & Saldanha (2009: 141) state that "although scholarly interest in institutional translation is a relatively recent phenomenon, the practice of institutional translation has a long history". They also add that approaches to the study of all institutional translation share the assumption that translation is a socially situated practice (ibid.: 141).

Power represents one of the main issues in the study of political discourse, institutional dominance upon political speeches is an inescapable fact. Fawcett (1998: 107) asserts this fact by stating that "throughout the centuries, individuals and institutions applied their particular beliefs to the production of a certain effect on translation". When it comes to translation in times of ongoing conflict, the role of translating institutions seems to be more significant. Baker, in her book "Translation and Conflict", points out that "...translation and interpreting are part of the institution



of war and hence play a major role in the management of conflict – by all parties, from warmongers to peace activists" (Baker 2006: 1-2).

Gagnon (2006) also examined the role and influence of the translating institutions' ideology on the Canadian Political Speeches. She examined language plurality from an institutional viewpoint: the influence of the Canadian government on the translation of political speeches (Gagnon 2006: 1). Her corpus consisted of 14 speeches, which "were delivered during national crisis situations by four Canadian prime ministers: William Mackenzie King (1874-1950), Pierre Elliott Trudeau (1919-2000), Brian Mulroney (1939) and Jean Chrétien (1934)" (ibid.: 3). Findings of the study disclosed that "multilingual institutions promote certain ideologies through translation, often leading to the strengthening of society's dominant discourses" (Gagnon 2006: 13).

### **2.1.2 Translation and Politics**

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in examining the relationship between translation and politics in modern Translation Studies. In this respect, El-Dali (2011: 36-37) states that the main focus of the modern Translation Studies rests on "...social, cultural, and communicative practices, on the cultural and ideological significance of translating and of translations, on the external politics of translation". Also, translation is described as "a political act, since translation is culture bound and has to do with the production and ostentation of power and with the strategies used by this power in order to represent the other culture" (Alvarez and Vidal (1996: 2) as cited in Kuhlweck & Littau 2007: 135). Furthermore, Chilton & Schäffner (1997: 206) stress that "politics cannot be conducted without language". Moreover, Schäffner (2004: 119) points out that "political discourse very often relies on translation". As a matter of fact, politics depends on communication and mediation on both levels; regionally and internationally, and thus the importance of translation arises. Accordingly, politics, in this thesis, is defined as "a struggle for power, between those who seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it" (Chilton & Schäffner 2002: 5).

Several attempts have been made to examine the relationship between translation and politics. Schäffner (2004) examined the translation of political texts. She argues that "translations as products, normally involve recontextualization across cultures"

(Schäffner 2004: 143). Schäffner presents examples of authentic translations of political texts examined from the perspective of Translation Studies. "These examples concern political effects caused by specific translation solutions; the processes by which information is transferred via translation to another culture; and the structure and function of equally valid texts in their respective cultures" (ibid.: 117). She found that translators use strategies to fit the text to the genre conventions that suit target culture (Schäffner 2004: 138). Schäffner maintains that "...translations (as target texts) reveal the impact of discursive, social, and ideological conventions, norms and constraints" (2004: 137). In the light of these results, Schäffner (2004: 137) concludes that translators do not make changes spontaneously; they work under some hidden agendas.

Pu (2007) also conducted a study that aims at providing a pragmatic interpretation of President George W. Bush's speech that was delivered at Tsinghua University in 2002. The study was framed within the theory of political discourse analysis (Pu 2007: 206). He found that Bush deliberately used the parallel structure in two forms: persuasive and constructive strategies in order to convince the audience that all bad images of Americans delivered by the mass media were not true and they preach American values of equality and liberty. The study also found that Bush indirectly criticizes the Chinese political and social system in terms of faith, liberty and justice. Based on this, "Bush's administration wants to engage China economically, culturally and politically, but in an American-guided way" (ibid.: 211-214).

Wang (2010) conducted a study exploring the relationships between language, ideology and power on one hand, and examining the role of power of speeches to persuade the public to accept and support certain policies. The study was based on "Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar, in terms of the three meta-functions: ideational function, interpersonal function and textual function, to find out the formal features of Barack Obama's speeches" (Wang 2010: 254). The analysis showed that Obama used more simple words, short sentences instead of difficult ones and easy and colloquial language to shorten the distance between him and the audience easily (Wang 2010: 257). The author also notes that transitivity and modality were used as strategies to serve institutional ideologies (ibid.: 254). Wang also points out that "by using first person pronouns and religious belief, he [Obama] successfully shortened the distance between him and the audience" (Wang 2010: 261). Thus, Obama could

persuade the public to accept and support his policies. Finally, Findings of the study indicated that CDA can be a promising model to explore the relationships between language, ideology and power (Wang 2010: 261).

Ayyad (2011) explored the role of translation and recontextualisation of politically negotiated texts in situations of ongoing conflict. He examined Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives and their different Arabic, English and Hebrew language versions. The study was located within the theoretical framework of Product-Oriented Descriptive Translation Studies (Lambert & Van Gorp 1985) and Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1992). Ayyad (2011: 265) argues that translations of peace initiatives play an important role in "influencing and shaping the Palestinian and Israeli public discourses, attitudes and ideological thinking regarding the conflict and the peace process in the Middle East" (ibid.). The findings also revealed that "the overall textual analysis has demonstrated that these political compromises were interpreted differently by different institutions in their attempts to promote their respective political interests and narratives" (Ayyad 2011: 266). Also, "neither translations nor translators were neutral" (ibid.: 266). Finally, the different language versions produced reflected aspects of ideology and politics (ibid.: 232). This study, to a large degree, goes in line with the main aims of the present theses. They both attempt to unveil the underlying ideological and political consideration of the translations produced.

Ayyad (2012) examined the Arabic and Hebrew language versions of the Roadmap Plan. The study aimed at uncovering aspects of political ideology as realized through the language versions of the Roadmap Plan initiatives in their respective sociopolitical and cultural contexts (Ayyad 2012: 250-251). Data of the study was processed within the theoretical framework of DTS drawing on Chesterman's (1997) typology of translation strategies (ibid.: 252). Data Analysis reveals that the language versions of initiatives of the Roadmap Plan are "interpreted differently by different institutions and news media in their attempt to promote their respective political interests and construct narratives that resonate with their constituencies" (Ayyad 2012: 268). The analysis also shows that translating particular lexical terms were deliberately opted when sensitive political texts were translated in order to promote the political narratives of the institutions that produced the texts in hand (Ayyad 2012: 269).

## **2.2 Translating Political Speeches**

This section reviews major studies on translating political speeches and how translations of political speeches reflect aspects of ideology and politics, particularly, from Arabic into English and vice-versa.

### **2.2.1 Translating Political Speeches from Arabic into English**

The following section reviews major studies on the translation of political speeches from Arabic into English.

Al-Hamad & Al-Shunnag (2011) examined the figures of speech used in Arabic political speeches as a tool of communication to gain political advantages. Analysing data of the study relied mainly on four emotive figures of speech: simile, metaphor, personification, and euphemism (Al-Hamad & Al-Shunnag 2011: 155). The analysis demonstrates how emotive expressions are translated from Arabic into English, the emotive content of the source texts (the written manuscript of a speech), was also examined (*ibid.*: 155). The study examined five speeches delivered by the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. They were delivered in Arabic and were published by different sources (*ibid.*). Findings of the study reveal that translating emotive expressions is a complex task (*ibid.*: 167). Al-Hamad & Al-Shunnag (2011: 168) also argue that "it is not enough to know the meaning of each individual word in the text, but one should also understand the higher levels of meaning (connotative meanings), including the purpose of the text" (*ibid.*). Findings of the study also indicate that "the principle of natural-sounding in translating emotive expressions is demonstrated to be more ideal than practical" (*ibid.*: 169).

Al-Harrasi (2001) examined translating metaphors within political discourse. He explored the implications of the conceptual theory of metaphor for translation, and relevance of the idea of conceptual mapping for understanding how metaphors are handled in translation. To fulfill these objectives, Al-Harrasi (2001) analysed data belonging to genuine Arabic political texts and authentic published English translations such as translations produced by the FBIS (Foreign Broadcasting Information Service), a branch of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), of speeches by the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein that were delivered during the Gulf Crisis 1990-1991 (Al-Harrasi 2001: 14). The corpus of the study consisted of Omani governmental translations of some speeches delivered by Sultan Qaboos bin Said, Sultan of Oman (*ibid.*). The study was located within the theoretical framework of

DTS. Findings of the study revealed that "different metaphorical mappings in Arabic are highly influenced by the phenomenon of intertextuality" (Al-Harrasi 2001: 312). Findings of the study also reveal that "concepts derived from cognitive linguistics and the conceptual theory of metaphor have proven to be relevant to translation" (ibid.: 313). Finally, the analysis shows that the translation of metaphor in political speeches is subjected to the translator's ideology, and thus it is not a neutral activity (ibid.).

Lahlali (2012) examined the ideological motives behind the use of repetition in Hassan Nasrallah's speeches. His paper analysed two major speeches delivered by Nasrallah during the 2006 war between Hizbollah and Israel (Lahlali 2012: 3). The two speeches were taken from Hizbollah's official website (ibid.). The study operated within the theoretical framework of Fairclough's (1992). Findings of the study reveal that "repetition has been employed to reinforce and support Nasrallah's ideology and political strategies" (ibid.: 10). Also, repetition is extensively employed not only for stylistic purposes, but also to serve ideological purposes (ibid.: 11). Finally, "the prevalence of lexical repetition has been deliberately employed to promote his ideological and political stance" (Lahlali 2012: 1-2).

Al-Harashseh (2013) focused on "employing CDA method in studying Arabic political discourse in general, and the translatability of figures of speech of Khalid Mashaal's political speeches in particular" (Al-Harashseh 2013: 100). CDA was used as a theoretical framework. Findings of the study show that Mashaal tended to use powerful emotive expressions to attract the audience's attention and gain sympathy with the Palestinian Question. The findings also reveal that translating cultural and ideological inputs included in Mashaal's political speeches represented a problematic challenge for translators (ibid.: 112). Finally, the study recommends researchers to trace back the historical and sociopolitical contexts of the translation(s) of political speeches and link them into the linguistic features of the text to uncover the ideological and political impact on the text translated (ibid.).

Maalej (2013) examined the last three speeches of Husni Mubarak from the perspective of framing and use of person deixis. All the speeches were delivered in Modern Standard Arabic to viewers all over the world through satellite TV (Maalej 2013: 641). The study was situated within cognitive-pragmatics approach (ibid.: 634). Findings of the study reveal that the speeches of the demised president of Egypt: "represent power and reproduction of dominance while the slogans made by the youth

constitute a language of resistance of this power and dominance" (Maalej 2013: 654). Also, the analysis shows that the three speeches witnessed a special manipulation of personal pronouns by the DPE. Finally, analysing the English translations of the speeches uncover relations of power, dominance, and misrepresentation (Maalej 2013:657).

Al-Majali (2015) conducted a study applying Halliday and Hasan's (1976) framework of cohesion. The corpus of the study consisted of seven political speeches delivered by the ousted Arab presidents during the period from December 2010 to December 2012 (Al-Majali 2015: 35). Three speeches were delivered by the Tunisian president, Zain Al-Abdeen Bin Ali; three speeches by the Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak; and one speech by the Libyan president, Muammer Al-Gaddafi (ibid.: 35). Findings of the study show that "the political speeches which were delivered during the Arab Spring Revolution have their distinctive features which are different from those features of the usual speeches of these presidents during the normal circumstances" (Al-Majali 2015: 35). Findings also show that most of the lexical features such as repetition, synonymy, and hyponymy are intensively used to serve ideological and political agendas; threatening the civilian protesters, for instance (ibid.: 47).

### **2.2.2 Translating Political Speeches from English into Arabic**

This section reviews major studies on the translation of political speeches from English into Arabic.

First, Hannouna (2010) investigated the effect of translating emotive terms in the TL and the role the translator plays in order to translate effectively from English into Arabic. Corpus of the study consisted of extracts chosen from some political speeches delivered by the American Presidents G. Bush and B. Obama addressing the Arabs and the Islamic World for the highly emotive expressions expected to be loaded in them. Data of the study was analysed based on the terms of componential analysis as a procedure of translation proposed by Newmark (1981 & 1988) (Hannouna 2010: 71). Findings of the study reveal that "language and politics are inseparable and they go parallel in the sense that one cannot exist apart from the others"(ibid.: 140). They unveil that certain lexical items have different emotive meanings, either positive or negative, that vary from one language to the other constituting a problem in translation (ibid.: 141). Analysing data of the study also reveal that translators are

highly influenced by the political context that the political text shaped is emotively influenced (Hannouna 2010: 142).

Second, Abedel-Hadi (2015) investigated the difficulties which face second year MA students enrolled in Applied Linguistics and Translation Program at An-Najah National University. His thesis also investigated the characteristics of political discourse (Abedel-Hadi 2015: 5). Corpus of the study consists of forty excerpts of two of Obama's political speeches (ibid.: 61). The study applied the analytical research method, however in some parts of the analysis, the descriptive research method was used (ibid.: 7). Findings of the thesis indicate that translating political texts poses real translation problems for second year MA students, and political texts are a mixture of different genres such as religious, law, scientific, advertising...etc. (Abedel-Hadi 2015: 120-1). These difficulties are due to political rhetoric, unfamiliarity with the political language and foreign culture as well as not paying attention to achieve pragmatically an identical target text as the source text (Abedel-Hadi 2015: xii). The findings also indicate that "only 27% of the student's translation is adequate" (ibid.). The translation failure, that the students have, distorts the intended meaning and certainly leads to miscommunication (ibid.: 103). According to the data analysis, "political discourse is characterized with the use of concise snappy messages that are obvious and memorable, and thus, politicians usually raise certain issues to tackle them in a way to place their audience in a particular positions" (Abedel-Hadi 2015: 81).

Third, Al-Dunaibat (2016) examined the function and purpose of the translation of the discussion papers of King Abdullah II Ibn Al Hussein of Jordan. The papers "tackle issues of democracy, debate between people and the government, the political process in Jordan, elections, political parties, democratization, parliamentary governments, and many other issues" (Al-Dunaibat 2016: 10). The thesis examined two major issues. First, it examined the translation of the political messages in these papers. Second, it examined the translation strategies used in translating religious references, metaphors and the term democracy and its collocations throughout the translations of these papers (Al-Dunaibat 2016: 6). By incorporating a critical discourse analysis, the source text and the target text were compared to determine the micro-translation strategies opted for by the translators (ibid.). It was concluded that despite the multiplicity of translation strategies opted for in the translation, the main interest of

translation lied in producing texts that serve the purpose and the function of ST and to produce a TT that fits the linguistic norms of the TT readers' language (Al-Dunaibat 2016: 6). Finally, the unintentional use of ideology appears clearly through opting for strategies such as deletion, addition, toning down, substitution, and borrowing (ibid.: 82)

Finally, Al-Soud et al. (2017) conducted a study investigating the extent to which it is possible to handle the translation of emotive expressions embedded in political speeches delivered by King Abdullah II of Jordan from English into Arabic. The corpus of the study consisted of five political speeches, delivered by King Abdullah II addressing the West and Arab worlds, were chosen for the highly emotive expressions expected to be loaded in them. The study is framed within the theory of CDA following Fairclough (1992 & 1999). Based on the data analysis, Al-Soud, et al. (2017: 78) concludes that "King Abdullah employs highly emotive words to stir the feelings of his audience towards believing in his political agendas". Findings also show that King Abdullah's speeches' emotiveness lies in both the words and ideas (Al-Soud, et al. 2017: 82). They further reveal that CDA efficiently conveys the emotive overtones loaded in the source text into the target text, while taking into account the socio-cultural context they are embedded in (ibid.).

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has critically reviewed the literature on the translation of political texts in general and political speeches, in particular. The review touched on major issues lying at the core of the present thesis (e.g. ideology, politics, translating institutions...etc.). The studies that have been reviewed applied different descriptive, analytical, functional and other methodologies and frameworks. The review shows that no studies exist on the translation of Israeli political speeches from English into Arabic within the discipline of Translation Studies. Thus, the thesis helps to bridge a gap in knowledge by analysing the speech of Benjamin Netanyahu before the UNGA in 2011 and its Arabic translations.

This review has also guided in identifying some of the major distinctive features of political speeches, such as the deliberate and frequent use of intertextuality, repetition, lexical metaphors, political terms...etc. It showed that political speeches are still



largely under-researched subgenre of political texts which share generic features with similar genres. These distinctive features would guide the data analysis at the micro-structural level (cf. Chapter Four). Despite the interest of literature on the translation of political speeches from English into Arabic and vice-versa, none of the studies mentioned in Chapter Two investigated a corpus consisting of three different translations by three different institutions.

The next chapter presents the corpus and methodology of the current thesis. It begins with highlighting the historical, sociopolitical and institutional conditions of the production of the original text of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech (the source text) and its three Arabic translations (the target texts). It then presents the methodology of the thesis.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Corpus and Methodology of the Study**

#### **Overview**

This chapter presents the corpus and methodology of the study. It consists of two main sections. Section (3.1) presents the corpus of the thesis, namely, the Israeli Prime Minister– Benjamin Netanyahu's speech before the UN on 23<sup>rd</sup> September 2011, and its three different Arabic translations. This section also overviews the conditions of production of the speech within their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts. It further presents the three institutions that produced the Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech. Section (3.2) introduces the methodology which is used in analysing the data of the study. To examine the translations of the speech in their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts, the study applies the framework of Product- Oriented DTS of Lambert & Van Gorp (1985) and Fairclough's (1992) Three-Dimensional Model of CDA. The typology of Chesterman's (1997) translation strategies was also used to identify the strategies that were used in the translations of the corpus of the study. Finally, a conclusion summarises the chapter.

#### **3.1 Corpus of the study**

The present section introduces the corpus of the study. It introduces the sociopolitical and institutional contexts in which Benjamin Netanyahu's speech was produced and delivered. It also addresses the main features of the speech from a political and linguistic standpoint as well as the functions which each translation serves within its language setting.

##### **3.1.1 Benjamin Netanyahu's Speech**

Benjamin Netanyahu delivered his speech in English during the 19<sup>th</sup> plenary meeting on 23<sup>rd</sup> September, 2011 before the UNGA in its 66<sup>th</sup> session in New York (UN 2011: 1). According to Katz (2017:505), Benjamin Netanyahu deliberately delivers most of

his international speeches in English as an attempt on his part to take full advantage of the nearly limitless reach of new media platforms and to create political pressure in the United States to support his policies. In this regard, Shanks (1987: 27) indicates that Benjamin Netanyahu described himself as Israel's hero at the UN because of his fluency in speaking English and the long diplomatic experience he holds. Spending his adolescent years in the United States studying architecture and political science helped him to acquire this fluency with a noticeable Philadelphia accent (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2018). Benjamin Netanyahu was also a member of the first delegation to the talks on strategic cooperation between Israel and the United Nations (ibid.). In 1982, he was appointed as Israel's ambassador at the United Nations and held this position for four years. For him, he is proud of his fluency as it plays a crucial role in enhancing Israel's image and improving understanding of its security needs among the American public and political elite (ibid.).

Benjamin Netanyahu's speech was delivered following the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on the same day (Emirson 2011: 2). In this respect, Jaspal & Coyle make the point that Benjamin Netanyahu strove in his speech to contest the legitimacy of the request of the Palestinian President (2014: 5). On the contrary, President Mahmoud Abbas, on his part, made his effort in his speech to get an international recognition of Palestine as a full member state in the UN (Beinin & Hajjar 2014:16). Sabel (2011: 1) makes the point that the Palestinian President called in his speech for a state on the borders of 4<sup>th</sup> June 1967<sup>2</sup> with East Jerusalem as its capital, i.e. only 22% of the overall area of historical Palestine<sup>3</sup> (Pedatzur 2013: 8).

Benjamin Netanyahu's speech depicts the Jewish Israeli victimhood, drawing on both historical and contemporary narratives through portraying Israel primarily as a victim of unfair, biased criticism from the UN, which he referred in this speech as "the theatre of the absurd" (Jaspal & Coyle 2014.: 10). Indeed, this condescending attitude and arrogant way in describing and rebuking the UNGA as "the theatre of the absurd"

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<sup>2</sup> According to (POV 2001: 3) June 5, 1967 witnesses an attack that begins what became known as the "al-Naksah" or "the Setback" for Palestinians, Israel seizes Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian territory. The Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip are captured from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan. Palestinians view this as a violation of international law regarding territory seized during war. In response to the war, the UN Security Council passes Resolution 242, which calls for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.

<sup>3</sup> Historic Palestine is a term refers to the overall area of Palestine including the territories Israel occupied in the 1948 catastrophe.

suggest that Benjamin Netanyahu's speech has power within and behind the speech (cf. Chapter 4.1.2).

Królikowska (2015: 140) points out that Benjamin Netanyahu's speeches on the international stages are often loaded with large implementation of ideology indicated indirectly and implicitly. These ideological contents are meant to serve the Israeli narration in their conflict with the Palestinians and Arabs, and they convey political messages about the Middle East conflict according to the perspective of Israel (ibid.: 151). For Schäffner, politicians behave and speak as representatives for groups, entities, governments, political parties or nations (1996: 203). Baker and Saldana also make the point that Bourdieu asserts that politicians' views of the social foregrounds and social practices are not individual actions; they act in habitual, conventionalized ways that are, to a large degree, the product of the incorporation of social structures, structures that are themselves the product of historical struggles (Baker & Saladanha 2009: 208). In addition, Pym et al. (2008: 235) argue that "power-holders and planners may both acquire, through successful implementation, the domination, or control, of a given entity". Håkansson (2012: 1) also points out that political speeches typify a fertile floor for politicians to persuade others to adopt their opinions and views.

The vast bulk of the previous literature review indicates that addition, intertextuality, metaphors, repetitions and selectivity of political terms occur deliberately in political speeches (cf. Chapter Two). These textual features act as persuasive strategies to serve political agenda. These features appear several times throughout Benjamin Netanyahu's present speech. They also act as persuasive tools to serve the Israeli narration and to contest his opponent's request, President Mahmoud Abbas, represented in getting recognition of the Palestinian State as a full member in the UN Security Council.

Intertextuality, repetitions, metaphors, the deliberate selection of sensitive political terms as well as the use of controversial proper nouns are all key textual features of Benjamin Netanyahu's current speech before the UNGA (cf. Chapter Four). Furthermore, the data analysis reveals that these features are deliberately used in the speech to support ideological and political agendas (cf. Chapter Five). The analysis

also reveals that the different translations of these textual features are ideologically and politically motivated (cf. Chapter Four and Five).

### **3.1.2 The Arabic Translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's Speech**

Schäffner & Bassnett (2010: 12-13) mention that translation plays a very important political role in the international policy, and the speeches, which are available on governmental websites, are meant to serve and pass political messages at both levels; outside and inside home. With this in mind, the translation(s) of political speeches are often made to serve political goals. Schiffrin et al. (2001: 401) also make the point that "similar words and phrases are reproduced to fit different ideological frameworks". Hence, political speeches are often reproduced to address an audience within an ideological framework.

The three Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech were produced by three different institutions, namely, the United Nation<sup>4</sup>, Israeli Prime Minister Office<sup>5</sup> and I Love Israel Website<sup>6</sup>.

The first Arabic translation of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech was produced by the United Nation. The UN's website provides translations for all delegators' and presidents' speeches (UN: 2017). It publishes these translations in the six official languages of the UN, namely, Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish. Having different translations play an important political and practical role in the tasks of the UN organization (Cao & Zhao 2008: 39). UN's official documents are open to access via its website (Xin 2010: 5). It is also worth mentioning that "accuracy is the first priority of its document translation. As a result, literal translation has become the dominant translation strategy adopted by document translators of the UN" (ibid.: 6). Following the literal translation strategy, legal documents and speeches are translated, and thus the UN preserves its accuracy and authoritativeness (ibid.: 9).

The other two Arabic translations were taken from two different Israeli websites. In this respect, it is necessary to point out that Arabic Language is regarded as an official

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<sup>4</sup> The UN Arabic translation retrieved from: [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/PV.19&referer=http://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/symbol.shtml&Lang=A](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/PV.19&referer=http://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/symbol.shtml&Lang=A) (last accessed: 2<sup>nd</sup> November 2018).

<sup>5</sup> The Arabic translation of the Israeli Prime Minister Office, accessed on: [www.pmo.gov.il/MediaCenter/Speeches/Documents/um\\_AR230911.doc](http://www.pmo.gov.il/MediaCenter/Speeches/Documents/um_AR230911.doc) (last accessed: 2<sup>nd</sup> November 2018).

<sup>6</sup> ILIW Arabic translation is accessed on: [http://israel-loving.blogspot.com/2012/06/blog-post\\_163.html](http://israel-loving.blogspot.com/2012/06/blog-post_163.html) (last accessed: 2<sup>nd</sup> November 2018).

language according to the Israeli law side by side with Hebrew (Amara 2013: iv). However, preference, exclusiveness and dominance are given to Hebrew over Arabic in Israel so as to strengthen the foundations of the State of Israel as the homeland of the Jews (ibid.).

The second Arabic translation was produced by the official website of the Israeli Prime Minister's Office. It often provides its visitors translations for all the speeches delivered by the prime ministers in three languages, namely, Arabic, English and Hebrew. The Arabic translation of IPMO was published on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2011, i.e. ten days after the speech was delivered before the UNGA. Since the official website of Israel Prime Minister Office (IPMO) is a branch of the e-government systems, the translation that was taken from the website of IPMO is expected to be "designed to promote implementation of policies" (Wihlborg 2016: 13).

The third Arabic translation was produced by a website labelled as 'I Love Israel' which publishes political, social and economic topics in an attempt to shape positive impression about Israel and Jews among its visitors. It issued the Arabic translation of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2012. It could be unequivocally claimed that most of the topics that are published on this website are loaded with ideological views and reflect political affiliation. Furthermore, these topics are accessed by clicking on icons bearing labels reflecting ideological and political aspects such as *Israel's Friends*, *I Love Israel*, *I love Israel even if I will be labelled as a spy* and other controversial labels. It is also important to indicate that examining all these published materials and topics on this website reveals that they are all published by one person only<sup>7</sup>.

### **3.2 Methodology of the study**

Schäffner (1996: 204) argues that "the analysis of political speeches in particular and political discourse in general should relate linguistic structures to larger contexts of communicative settings and political functions". In other words, for a successful and comprehensive linguistic analysis of political speeches, details of linguistic behavior should be related to political behavior (ibid.: 202). Based on this, to examine the three translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech in their historical, sociopolitical and

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<sup>7</sup> The website can be accessed by clicking this link: <http://israel-loving.blogspot.com/>

institutional contexts, data will be analysed descriptively and comparatively. Accordingly, processing data of the study within the two theoretical frameworks of Product-Oriented DTS of Lambert & Van Gorp (1985) and Fairclough's (1992) Three Dimensional Model of CDA helps to examine aspects of ideology and politics in the three Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech.

Schäffner (2004: 133) defines translation as "...text production, as retextualising a SL-text according to the TL conventions". For Toury, the target text must always be interpreted as a result of the constraints and influences of the target context, or as a cause for the introduction of changes into the target system (Gambier & Doorslaer 2010: 98). On the other hand, Schäffner (2004: 138) argues that CDA mediates between linguistic structures as evident in a text and the social, political, and historical contexts of text production and reception. Hence, these two approaches can fulfill the main purposes of the present thesis, namely, uncovering aspects of ideology and politics in the three Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech, interpret the differences in these different translations in relevant to their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts and provide valid explanations to these differences from the perspective of Translation Studies.

Methodologically, the thesis presents an analysis for the three Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech at the UNGA at the micro-structural level in their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts, focusing on their underlying functions in the target culture (cf. Chapter 3.1). It then moves to examine how the Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech reflect ideological and political positions at the micro-structural levels. Finally, it describes and compares the three Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech to interpret the differences in these translations in their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts. This methodology will be used to provide answers to the following questions of the thesis:

1. *What are the key distinctive features of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech as a political text? What are their discursive functions in the source culture?*
2. *How do the three Arabic translations differ from one another? What are their textual features in the TT? What are their discursive functions in the target culture?*

3. *What political and ideological aspects do these translations reflect? How can the differences in the three Arabic translations be interpreted in terms of their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts?*

The first two questions are answered descriptively and comparatively by applying the Product-Oriented DTS of Lambert & Van Gorp (1985) (cf. Chapter 5.1). The main core of these questions represented in investigating translation as a 'product. This highlights the role which each translation plays in the target language. The last question is answered by operating the analysis of the data within the theoretical framework of Fairclough's (1992) Three-Dimensional Model of CDA. This question sheds light on the text produced descriptively, interpretatively and explanatorily (cf. Chapter 5.1).

### **3.2.1 Product-Oriented Descriptive Translation Studies**

Brownlie (2007: 135) states that "the school of Descriptive Translation Studies was set up in the 1970s, and can be described as a reaction to centuries of prescriptive writing on translation". Indeed, DTS gained momentum in the 1980s and boomed in the 1990s (Gambier & Doorslaer 2010: 94). Toury, who is considered as the father of DTS, defines it as "the study of what translation DOES involve, under various sets of circumstances, along with the REASONS for that involvement" (Toury 1995: 15). According to Kuhlwezak & Littau, DTS focuses on the translator's outcomes and the text produced (2007: 87). Chesterman (1997: 252) also points out that DTS have concentrated on what is produced rather than how it was produced. Also, Munday (2008: 10) asserts that the main concern of this approach is to examine existing translations.

According to Kuhlwezak and Littau "translations, as product, are used as tools for political action; they are politicalized" (2007: 146). The current thesis examines the product in hand; it aims at unveiling the aspects of ideology and politics in the Arabic versions of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech. Thus, it was necessary to operate it within the theoretical framework of Product-Oriented Descriptive Translation Studies as a sub-genre of DTS. Product-Oriented DTS focuses on the description of individual translations, the comparative descriptions of several translations of the same source text and the description of larger corpuses of translation (Gambier & Van Doorslaer 2011: 94).



The crux of this thesis lies in uncovering aspects of ideology and politics in the three Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech before the UNGA. In these versions, aspects of politics and ideology, to a large degree, are reflected on the text in hand (cf. Chapter Four). Thus, examining these aspects entails applying an approach that uncovers what is covered and hidden behind the product "texts produced". Chesterman (1997: 16) points out that "translations, as that Product-Oriented research can reveal interesting things about the people behind the texts". Hence, Van Gorp (1985) Product-Oriented DTS represents a promising approach to situate processing data of the study within it.

For DTS, in particular Product-Oriented, the translation as a product is "the starting point for a researcher with an interest in describing the very shape of the actual target texts, or their function, position, status, within the culture in which they exist" (Gambier & Doorslaer 2010: 236).

This thesis provides data analysis at the micro-structural level (cf. Chapter Four). The analysis is based on comparing the three different Arabic translations to their ST. However, the textual analysis has to be synchronized and combined with a sociological analysis (Schäffner 2008: 23). Thus, the current thesis applies the framework of Product-Oriented DTS Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) side by side with Critical Discourse analysis (Fairclough 1992). With this in mind, the thesis examines the three Arabic translations in their relevant historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts, and then links the textual profiles to conditions of text production.

The model of Lambert & Van Gorp (1985) can be used to examine political texts (Ayyad 2011: 84). At the micro-level, this model delves in textual aspects such as text division, titles and linguistic choices (ibid.). At this level, the analysis uncovers the ideological and political motivations that implicitly lie in the Arabic translations of the corpus of the thesis; i.e. Netanyahu's speech before the UN. It also interprets the selection of information and lexical and textual choices. It further uncovers the power relations in the translations produced. Furthermore, it clarifies the functions of the produced translations in the TC as well as in the SC (cf. Chapter Four and Five).

### 3.2.2 Fairclough's Three-Dimensional Model of CDA


For Johnstone & Eisenhart, "discourse is a form of social practice" (2008: 29). It always involves power and ideologies that are interpreted differently from a translator into another because they have different backgrounds, knowledge, and power positions (Mahdiyan et al. 2013:39). In this respect, McGregor (2010:2) states that discourse analysis stimulates us to see our words as having meaning in a particular historical, social and political conditions rather than abstract language.

CDA is "primarily interested and motivated by pressing social issues, which it hopes to better understand through discourse analysis" (Van Dijk, 1993: 280). Schöffner also asserts that CDA links linguistic forms to social and political activity (1996: 138). Ayyad (2011: 278) makes the points that "CDA attempts to bring the textual analysis and social analysis together". Hence, CDA represents a promising approach for this thesis since it studies discourse and its function in a society (Van Dijk 1995: 24).

To describe, interpret and explain underlying assumptions and considerations of ideology and politics in the Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech, the thesis applies the theoretical framework of Fairclough's (1992) Three-Dimensional Model of CDA. According to Fairclough, CDA "looks to establish connections between properties of texts, features of discourse practice (text production, consumption and distribution), and wider sociocultural practice" (1995: 87). Also, "Fairclough's model is designed for analysis in one language and one culture" (Ayyad 2011: 86). Accordingly, the present study applies this model to interpret the differences in the Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech in their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts of both the ST and the TTs.

Fairclough's (1992) model also suits the current thesis because both share the CDA aims in unveiling the ideological and political aspects of translational choices (Ayyad 2011: 89). For, Fairclough, analysing the text requires linking features of the text(s) to its conditions of production (1992: 73). Fairclough's Three-Dimensional Model of CDA is based on three dimensions; text analysis "*description*", processing analysis "*interpretation*" and social analysis "*explanation*" (Fairclough 1992: 73) (see figure 3.1 below).

**Figure 3.1:** Fairclough's three-dimensional conception of discourse (1992)<sup>8</sup>



For Fairclough, this model represented diagrammatically in figure 3.1 represents:

...an attempt to bring together three analytical traditions; These are the tradition of close textual and linguistic analysis within linguistics, the macro-sociological tradition of analysing social practice in relation to social structures, and the interpretivist or microsociological tradition of seeing social practice as something which people actively produce and make sense of on the basis of shared commonsense procedures. (Fairclough 1992: 72)

Accordingly, Fairclough's Three-Dimensional Model of CDA constitutes a reliable model to provide explanations to the differences in the translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech in light of their historical, political and institutional contexts.

The current thesis also aims at examining the functions of the TTs (cf. Chapter 1.1). Thus, the sociopolitical and background of language users also need to be taken into account when it comes to examining translations (Schäffner 2004: 121). For Fairclough, analysing a text requires an "analysis of how texts work within a sociocultural practice" (1995: 7). Moreover, Wang (2010: 254) states that CDA aims to "explore the relationships among language, ideology and power". Politics, power and ideology all are central issues in the current thesis; these concepts are common shared with CDA. Based on this, this model can be a promising approach to uncover aspects of ideology and politics that are reflected in the Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech.

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<sup>8</sup> Fairclough, N. (1992: 2). *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter introduced the corpus and methodology of the study. It examined the historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts of the production of the original text of Benjamin's Netanyahu's speech (the source text) and its three different translations (the target texts) to uncover their key functions in both; the SL and TL. These functions differ from a translation to another simply since each one was produced by different institutions serving political views.

The Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech were produced in different time shortly after the original text was delivered. Hence, the thesis argues that these translations were framed and contextualized to fit and serve certain ideological and political agendas.

The next chapter introduces the textual analysis of the speech at the micro-structural level. It sets to establish how political and ideological agendas determine translational choices.

## **Chapter Four**

### **Data Analysis**

#### **Overview**

This chapter represents analysis of data of the study. It consists of four main sections. Section (4.1) analyses cases of translations of proper nouns (toponyms and personal names) included in Benjamin Netanyahu's speech. Section (4.2) analyses translations for sensitive political terms. Section (4.3) examines translations of intertextual text. Section (4.4) analyses cases of addition of information in the Arabic translations and interprets these cases. Then, the chapter ends with a conclusion.

Chapter Four is designed on the ground that the Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech are ideologically and politically motivated and largely influenced by power relations. Thus, cases of examples chosen are expected to be ideologically and politically motivated. Based on this, this chapter sets to unveil aspects of ideology and politics. The data examples selected in this thesis appear in bold in the original source text of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech and its three Arabic translations attached in the annexes. Also, the excerpts of these examples that are analysed in this chapter appear underlined within these examples (cf. Annexes 1- 4). Although the Arabic translations of these examples and the entire speech include some grammatical, spelling and punctuation errors, they appear exactly as they were translated by the three institutions, namely the UN, IPMO and ILIW.

Selecting these data examples is based on three criteria. First, presenting a detailed comparison between the ST of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech and its target texts. This was done by comparing the differences between the Arabic translations of the original source text. These comparisons showed that some translation strategies such as addition and omission of information occur constantly in the texts produced. Secondly, the analysis seeks to unveil and examine aspects of ideology and politics in the three different translations in their respective historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts. The third criterion is based on uncovering the key distinctive

textual features of the translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech as a political text. Forthly, the most ideologically and politically motivated translations were chosen to be analysed, and thus the third translation is excluded in some examples.

The thesis adopts the typology of Chesterman's (1997) translation strategies in order to describe the changes that happened on the texts produced. These strategies will be used to classify the differences in the three different translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech. Chesterman's (1997) typology is classified into three categories: syntactic/grammatical, semantic and pragmatic" (Chesterman 1997: 93). It presents "useful conceptual tools for talking about translation" (ibid.). At the syntactical level, the main strategies are literal translation, loan or calque. These strategies indeed have "interesting ideological implications" (ibid.: 95). The syntactical strategies also include transposition unit shift, phrase structure change, clause structure change sentence structure change, cohesion change, level shift and scheme change (ibid.: 95).

Semantic translation strategies deal with meaning manipulation, and thus focus on the changes made on the lexical semantics, but also include aspects of clause meaning such as emphasis (Chesterman 1997: 101). Semantic strategies are synonymy, autonomy, hyponymy, converses, abstraction change, distribution change, emphasis change and paraphrase (ibid.: 101-102).

Pragmatic strategies primarily have to do with "the selection of information in the TT, a selection that is governed by the translator's knowledge of the prospective readership of the translation" (Chesterman 1997: 107). Pragmatic strategies "tend to involve bigger changes from the ST, and typically incorporate syntactic and/or semantic changes as well" (ibid.). Chesterman's set of pragmatic strategies are cultural filtering, explicitness change, information change, interpersonal change, illocutionary change, coherence change, partial translation, visibility change, trans-editing (ibid.: 108).

The discussion of this chapter focuses on the mediation of the textual elements of the translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech. Key features of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech such as the deliberate choice of sensitive proper nouns (e.g. toponyms and personal names), political terms, intertextuality and cases of addition are discussed in sections (4.2- 4.5). For extensive discussion, full historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts are investigated.

## **4.1 Proper Nouns**

Names are an essential and important part of being a human and it seems a universal practice (Crystal 2003: 140). When it comes to translating proper names, the task is not simple. In this regard, Newmark (1993: 15) states that proper nouns constitute "a translation difficulty in any text". With this in mind, the translations of proper nouns in political speeches, in times of ongoing conflict in particular, cannot be taken for granted as they are not merely physical characters; they are expected to reflect ideological and political beliefs, identity, history and, of course, political affiliation. In this context, Mahadi & Shirinzadeh (2014: 98) point out that having enough knowledge of the figurative language and cultural references along with the referential meaning for proper nouns is an important factor when it comes to translating them.

Proper names is a term that constitutes an umbrella that covers several categories; names of persons, animals, companies or organizations, geographical places and festivals (Jaleniauskiene & Čičelytė 2009: 31). However, the main focus of the present thesis is to examine sensitive place and personal names in the three Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech and interpret them in their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts. The analysis is done on the ground that the Arabic translations of these names have different denotational meanings and reflect ideological and political aspects.

### **4.1.1 Toponyms (Place Names)**

A toponym is a term that deals with place names including names of districts, villages, topographical features, settlements, streets and houses (Anindo 2016: 1). According to Crystal (2003: 140) place names sometimes represent a source of information on a society's history, customs and past events. When it comes to translating place names, the importance of their translations arises due to the fact that they relate to other sections of culture and depict solidarity and identity (Gudeta 2014:254). The following discussion describes the three different Arabic translations of the toponym of "Jerusalem", and then analyses them in their relevant historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts.

## Jerusalem

Jerusalem has always been a controversial issue in the Palestinian- Israeli conflict and lies at its core. Napolitano (2012: 1) asserts that "the question of Jerusalem constitutes one of the most sensitive and complex red lines of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians". Ayyad (2011: 68) also states that Jerusalem constitutes one of the final status issues of the Palestinian- Israeli conflict. Therefore, the conflict over Jerusalem is not restricted to the sovereignty, but it extends to include its history. Thus, when it comes to translating the toponym of 'Jerusalem' into Arabic, it is one of the controversial and sensitive translations as each party in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict translate it differently to support its own historical narration.

(4.1)	(ST)	In two and a half years, we met in <b>Jerusalem</b> only once, even though my door has always been open to you.
	UN's translation	على مدى عامين ونصف، التقيت والرئيس عباس في <b>القدس</b> مرة واحدة فقط، على الرغم من أن أبوابي كانت دائماً مفتوحة أمامه.
	IPMO's translation	كنا قد التقينا على مدى عامين ونصف عام [أي خلال ولاية نتانيا هو الحالية رئيساً للوزراء] مرة واحدة فقط في <b>أورشليم القدس</b> على الرغم من أن أبوابي كانت دائماً مفتوحة أمامك..
	ILIW's translation	خلال عامين ونصف العام هي عمر ولايتي الحالية لم نلتقي الا مرة واحدة في <b>أورشليم (القدس)</b> مع ان بابي ظل دائماً مفتوحا على مصراعيه تدخله متى شئت

In example (4.1) above, the toponym of 'Jerusalem' was translated differently. For instance, it was translated literally in the translation produced by the UN as 'القدس' (āl-Quds, lit. 'Jerusalem'). On the other hand, it was translated by the IPMO and ILIW – following a cultural filtering strategy– as 'أورشليم القدس' (lit. Āūrshalym āl-quds, lit. 'Jerusalem').

The two Israeli translations of the IPMO and ILIW are ideologically and politically significant because 'أورشليم القدس' (Āūrshalym āl-quds, lit. 'Jerusalem') is the Hebrew name of the city (Ayyad, 2011: 261). In this respect, Kristianssen (2015: 2-3) states that due to the ongoing Palestinian- Israeli conflict, the city's history is a main ingredient in the commemorative narratives constituting the foundation of the Israeli political identity of Jerusalem and for legitimizing the Israeli claims on the city. However, Palestinians and Arabs never translate the toponym of 'Jerusalem' as "أورشليم" (lit. Āūrshalym) because 'Yerushalayim' is the Jewish name and 'Al-Quds' is the Islamic and Arabic name of the city of 'Jerusalem' (Segal 1999: 1).



The toponym of 'Jerusalem' appears six times in the source text of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech (cf. Annex 1). The Arabic translations of the toponym of 'Jerusalem' never appear together side by side in the three Arabic translations. In other words, this toponym, was neither translated as 'القدس' (lit. āl-quds) in the two Arabic translations produced by the two Israeli agents (ILIW and IPMO) nor as 'أورشليم القدس' (lit. Āūrshalym āl-quds) in the Arabic translation that was produced by the UN.

### ***Judea***

Names of places are controversial issue in the context of the Palestinian- Israeli conflict especially when it comes to names of holy places e.g. Jerusalem. Each party of the conflict attempts to prove its irreversible right of the places through referring to these places with names that serve its narratives. Conflict over these names left its fingerprints and reflections on the lexical choices opted by each party when translating names of holy places into Arabic. The following example puts it simply.

<b>(4.2)</b>	<b>(ST)</b>	You know why we're called "Jews"? Because we come from <b>Judea</b> . In my office in Jerusalem, there's... etc.
	<b>UN's translation</b>	لماذا ندعى اليهود؟ لأننا من <u>منطقة يهودا</u> . في مكنتي في القدس...
	<b>ILIW's translation</b>	هل تعلمون من اين جائت تسمية (يهود)؟ إنها تعود إلى منطقة <u>يهودا التي كانت أورشليم (القدس) ضمن حدودها وعاصمة لها</u> . وبالمناسبة احتفظ في مكنتي...

The UN translated the toponym of 'Judea' as يهودا (Yahūda, lit. 'Judea') following the literally translation strategy, and thus it does not reflect any ideological or political significance. However, it was translated into Arabic by the ILIW differently by adding additional information that does not appear in the ST. The toponym 'Judea' was translated by ILIW -following the information change strategy- as يهودا التي كانت يهودا التي كانت (Yahūda āllati kānat Āurshālym 'Āl-Quds' demna hudūdiha wa 'āsimatun lahā, lit. 'Judea, which Jerusalem was within its borders and its capital').

For Israel, Judea is an integral part of the 'Promised Land' with Jerusalem as its capital (YESHA Council, 2013: 6). Therefore, whenever Judea appears in the Israeli discourse, Jerusalem appears side-by-side because it represents the heart of Israel, the heart of the conflict and the heart of Judea and Samaria (ibid.: 10). However, what Israel refers to as 'Judea' is referred to as 'the West Bank' by Palestinians and the world (Amidror 2017: 12).

These interpretations indicate that the addition, which appears in the Arabic translation produced by ILIW, is ideologically and politically motivated because it reflects underlying ideological and political assumptions and considerations of the agent involved. It is meant to support the Israeli political and religious claims of Israel's right in the lands of the West Bank including Jerusalem.

#### 4.1.2 Personal Names

##### *President Arafat*

Ennin & Nkansah (2016: 70) argue that personal names are not only markers of identities but also sources of a variety of information. In addition, Shirinzadeh & Mahadi (2014: 8) state that "proper nouns may have particular implications and removing the hidden connotations leads to a translation which is not acceptable". When names operate as markers of identity and a source of a wide variety of information, any deliberate deletion for a sociocultural factor for instance may influence the role they play (Ennin & Nkansah 2016: 69). See the following example.

(4.3)	(ST)	In 2000 Israel made a sweeping peace offer that met virtually all of the Palestinian demands. <b>Arafat</b> rejected it.
	UN's translation	ففي عام 2000، قدمت إسرائيل عرضاً كبيراً من أجل السلام استجاب لجميع المطالب الفلسطينية تقريباً. لكن الرئيس عرفات رفضه.
	IPMO's translation	كانت إسرائيل قد تقدمت بطرح سلمي (كاسح) عام 2000 [يقصد في قمة كامب ديفيد] تجاوب فعلاً مع جميع المطالب الفلسطينية لكن عرفات رفضه.
	ILIW's translation	إسرائيل قدّمت عرض مغري وشامل عام 2000 خلال قمة كامب ديفيد يلبي كافة الطموحات الفلسطينية لكن عرفات ضرب به عرض الحائط.

As it appears in example (4.3), the two Israeli translations which were produced by (IPMO and ILIW) ignore referring to the late national Palestinian President Arafat as a "president"; both refer to him as 'عرفات' (*lit. 'arafat*) only. This suggests a deliberate despise to his nationally and internationally status. On the contrary, the Arabic translation which was produced by the UN referred to Arafat as 'الرئيس عرفات' (*lit. 'Alra'ys arafat*) following explicitness change translation strategy, and thus his political status as being a 'president' was pointed out. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the name of President Arafat is internationally and politically connected to the different periods of the Palestinian cause as both a recognized political representative and national dynamic of the Palestinian struggle (Al Jazeera: 2004). This goes in line with the addition that appears in the translation produced by

the UN. Thus, the UN opts for the strategy of addition to render the product (TT) that reflects its orientations and guidelines.

On the contrary, referring to 'Arafat' without mentioning his status as being a 'president' is a phenomenon in the Israeli and American political discourse (Suleiman & O'Connell 2007: 86). Thus, Arafat is often referred to as either 'Arafat' or 'Mr. Chairman' (ibid.) in the American and Israeli political discourse. From a translational perspective, Khanjan, et al. (2013: 88) point out that the translator is consistently surrounded by various ideologies that affect the lexical choices of the produced text. Accordingly, the IPMO and ILIW can reflect various ideologies such as the source author's ideology, the publisher's ideology, the target readers' ideological preferences and expectations, and his/her own view of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

***Lord Balfour and President Truman***

In November 1917, the British Government, in the so-called "Balfour Declaration", had declared that it favoured the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine (Akasaka: 2008: 3). In what follows is the original source text of this Declaration:

His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country (Baroud: 2017)

Since then, this declaration has been looked at differently by the two main conflicting parties. For many Zionists and Jews, this declaration made up the basis of the establishment of a national home for Jews in Palestine and it represented, momentarily, the now-imminent return of a diasporic people, comparative aliens in gentile societies, to their ancient home in the Levant (Mathew 2011: 26). On the other hand, although 100 years have passed since the Declaration, Arabs and Palestinians still see that the Declaration gave, without any right, authority and consent from anyone, the land of Palestine to Jews, and thus Palestinians still demand an apology from Britain (Joffe 2017: 1).

(4.4)	(ST)	I think it's time that the Palestinian leadership recognizes what every serious international leader has recognized, from <b>Lord Balfour</b> and Lloyd George in 1917, to <b>President Truman</b> in 1948, to President Obama just two days ago right <b>here</b> : Israel is the Jewish state.
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<b>UN's translation</b>	إنني أعتقد أنه حان الوقت للقيادة الفلسطينية أن تعترف بما اعترف به كل قائد دولي جاد من <u>اللورد بلفور وديفيد جورج</u> لويد في عام 1917، إلى <u>الرئيس ترومان</u> في عام 1948، وإلى الرئيس أوباما قبل يومين، <u>في هذا المكان</u> ، وهو إن إسرائيل هي الدولة اليهودية.
<b>IPMO's translation</b>	أعتقد بأنه آن الأوان لكي تعترف القيادة الفلسطينية بما كان أي زعيم دولي جاد قد اعترف به ابتداء من <u>اللورد بلفور</u> [وزير الخارجية البريطاني إبان الحرب العالمية الأولى وصاحب "وعد بلفور" المشهور] ولويد جورج [رئيس الوزراء البريطاني آنذاك] مروراً بالرئيس <u>ترومان</u> [الرئيس الأميركي] عام 1948 وصولاً إلى الرئيس أوباما هنا [في الأمم المتحدة] قبل يومين أي الاعتراف بأن إسرائيل هي الدولة اليهودية.
<b>ILIW's translation</b>	<i>This excerpt of the speech is not translated at all (missing)</i>

The UN translated the personal name "Lord Balfour" as اللورد بلفور (Āllūrd Bilfur, lit. 'Lord Balfour') following the strategy of literal translation, which is to a large degree regarded as a neutral translation strategy. On the other hand, this personal name is translated differently in the Arabic translation that was produced by IPMO. An addition has been made that does not appear in the source text. IPMO translated it as اللورد بلفور [وزير الخارجية البريطاني إبان الحرب العالمية الأولى وصاحب "وعد بلفور" المشهور] (Āllūrd Bilfwūr [wazyr āl-khārijyāh ālbarytāny ābāna ālhārb āl-ālamyāh ālāula wa sāhib wa'id Bilfwur ālmashhūr], lit. 'the British Foreign Secretary during the First World War and the owner of Balfour's famous Promise').

The latter translation provides the audience with the political and historical background of Balfour to remind it with the political power and status Balfour had. It further described his declaration as 'the Famous Promise'. This term is used by Jews and those who support their claims of Palestine as their national home. However, Arabs and Palestinians never refer or describe that declaration as being 'famous', instead they refer to as Balfour's Ominous Declaration' because it represents a historic injustice that has been inflicted on Arabs in general, and Palestinians, in particular (Kuwait Times 2017: 8).

Two more cases of addition were also made in the previous excerpt of IPMO's translation. First, the nationality of President Truman in between two squared brackets [الرئيس الأميركي] (Āl-ra'ys Āl-āmryky, lit. 'the American President') was added so as to remind the international community that America has long ago acknowledged Israel as a 'Jewish State'. The second addition made is stating what the adverb of place 'here' refers to. The Arabic translation produced by IPMO made an addition by adding في [في الأمم المتحدة] (fy āl-Āumam āl-Mutahidah, lit. 'the United Nation') after the adverb of

place 'here'. That is to say that this place 'the UN' that despises Israel today has witnessed recognizing Israel as a 'Jewish State' by presidents and representatives of powerful and influential international entities sixty-three years ago. This addition also goes in line with the official politics of Israel towards the UN organization. It is also warranted to indicate that Benjamin Netanyahu in his speech criticizes the UN sharply and arrogantly for its standpoints and policies towards Israel and expressed his disappointment by branding the UN as "*the theatre of the absurd*" (cf. Annex 1). Also, in his speech, Benjamin Netanyahu stressed his disappointment by repeating the same adverb of place "here" to refer to the UN as it appears in the following excerpt:

...it was **here** in 1975 that the age-old yearning of my people to restore our national life in our ancient biblical homeland -- it was then that this was braided -- branded, rather -- shamefully, as racism. And it was **here** in 1980, right **here**, that the historic peace agreement between Israel and Egypt wasn't praised; it was denounced! And it's **here** year after year that Israel is unjustly singled out for condemnation (cf. Annex 1).

Cheyfitz (1991) argues that "translation is always a form of foreign policy, always an act of violence, and often serves those in power" (Chesterman 1997: 38). The three interventions in the above excerpt indicate that the Arabic translation that was produced by the IPMO is politically and ideologically motivated, and reflect deep concerns of the target audience's expectations. This analysis also proves again that translation is not a neutral activity; instead it is meant to serve ideological and political agendas.

## **4.2 Political Terms**

Sensitive political terms represent great interest for both; translators and politicians. In his analysis of translating political sensitive texts, Ayyad (2011: 180) notes that the choice or avoidance of some political terms is never neutral and it seeks to serve political interests and agendas. Thus, he agrees with Schäffner who asserts that "political discourse depends heavily on translation" (2004: 117). When it comes to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it is well noticeable that the conflict between Palestinians and Israel is not only limited to what is happening on the ground, but extends to a conflict of terminology. That is to say that each party in the conflict strives to employ the terms that best support its narration, claims and agendas.

The analysis of the Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech reveals that the selection of the lexical choices is ideologically and politically motivated. In this regard, the thesis presents and discusses some examples of the translations of some sensitive political terms included in the speech and sheds light on aspects of ideology and politics on the text shaped.

#### 4.2.1 Hezbollah-Controlled Lebanon

Hezbollah defines itself as "an Islamic jihadi (struggle) organization" (Alagha 2011: 61). It considers itself as a resistance movement against the Israeli aggression and occupation (Mulhern 2012: 13). However, Hezbollah is looked at as 'an enemy' and a terrorist organization by Israel although it is a "deeply embedded political party, which is now very much an integral part of the political system" (Norton 2007: 475).

(4.5)	(ST)	It doesn't only cast Israel as the villain; it often casts real villains in leading roles: Gadhafi's Libya chaired the UN Commission on Human Rights; Saddam's Iraq headed the UN Committee on Disarmament. You might say: That's the past. Well, here's what's happening now-- right now, today. <b>Hezbollah<sup>9</sup>-controlled Lebanon</b> now presides over the UN Security Council. This means, in effect, that a terror organization presides over the body entrusted with guaranteeing the world's security. You couldn't make this thing up.
	UN's translation	فهي لا تسلط فحسب الضوء على إسرائيل باعتبارها الشرير، بل إنها كثيراً ما تعطي الأشرار الحقيقيين أدواراً قيادية. فقد ترأست ليبيا القذافي لجنة حقوق الإنسان. وترأست عراق صدام مؤتمر نزع السلاح. يمكن للمرء أن يقول هذا هو الماضي. حسناً، هنا هو ما يحدث الآن الآن، فالיום. <b>فإن حزب الله الذي يسيطر على لبنان</b> يتراأس حالياً مجلس الأمن. وهذا يعني، في الواقع، أن منظمة إرهابية تتراأس الهيئة الموكول إليها ضمان الأمن في العالم. لا يمكن للمرء أن يصطنع هذا الأمر.
	IPMO's translation	لا يكتفي بمنح إسرائيل دور الطرف الخسيس بل كثيراً ما يمنح الأشرار الحقيقيين الأدوار الرئيسية حيث كانت ليبيا القذافي قد ترأست لجنة الأمم المتحدة لحقوق الإنسان فيما ترأس عراق [صدام] حسين لجنة الأمم المتحدة لنزع السلاح. لعلمكم تقولون إن ذلك شيئاً من الماضي لكنه يحدث الآن تماماً في مثل هذا الوقت حيث يرئس <b>لبنان الخاضع لسيطرة حزب الله</b> مجلس الأمن الدولي ما يعني عملياً أن تنظيم إرهابياً بات يرئس الهيئة المكلفة بحماية أمن العالم وهو ما لم يكن من الممكن تخيله.
	ILIW's translation	لا يكتفي بالإشارة إلى إسرائيل سابقاً عليها كل مرة دور الطرف الوضيع، بل يغدق على الأشرار الحقيقيين أدواراً رئيسية، كذلك الذي مُنح لليبيا حين ترأست لجنة الأمم المتحدة لحقوق الإنسان فيما ترأس عراق صدام حسين لجنة الأمم المتحدة لنزع السلاح. ! لعلمكم تقولون بان هذه أحداث ووقائع أصبحت في عداد الماضي. أقول لكم ان شيئاً لم يتغير. <b>فها هو لبنان حزب الله</b> يرئس اليوم مجلس الأمن الدولي، وهو الأمر الذي معناه ان منظمة إرهابية تقف اليوم على رأس الهيئة المكلفة بحماية أمن العالم! وهو امر لم يكن من الممكن تخيله.

<sup>9</sup> Hezbollah is a Shi'a Muslim organization that was formed with the support of Syria and Iran, the world's only Shi'a Islamic state (Mulhern 2012: 6). It "was formed as a response to the 1982 invasion of southern Lebanon by Israel" (ibid.).

The phrase 'Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon' was translated into Arabic in the three translations differently. It was translated by the UN –following the strategy of phrase structure change- as حزب الله الذي يسيطر على لبنان (Hizbullah ālthy yusaytir ‘alā Lubnān, lit. 'Hezbollah which controls Lebanon'). However, it was translated by IPMO- following the Loan strategy- as لبنان الخاضع لسيطرة حزب الله (Lubnān āl-khādi‘ lisaytarat Hizbullah, lit. 'Lebanon which is under the control of Hezbollah').

Using the word الخاضع (āl-khādi‘, lit. 'Subjected to') in Arabic has negative connotations in Arabic. It reinforces a feeling of hatred against Hezbollah because it suggests that Hezbollah controls politics in Lebanon by force as if it were a coup rather than official elections. However, Norton (2007: 479) points out that Lebanese Parliament is not subjected to the control of Hezbollah because 128 Lebanon's parliamentary seats are subdivided among Shias, Sunnis and Maronites, and most districts are confessionally mixed. With this view in mind, Hezbollah is a movement that is represented in the Parliament of Lebanon side by side with the other Lebanese movements. Thus, it cannot control Lebanese' policies as the translation produced by IPMO suggests.

Also, the phrase 'Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon' was translated following the unit shift strategy- as لبنان حزب الله (Lubnān Hizbullah, lit. 'Lebanon of Hezbollah) in the Arabic translation which was provided by ILIW. The ideological and political implications of the use of Lubnān Hizbullah are twofold. Firstly, it suggests that Lebanon, which presided over the UN Security Council in 2011 as indicated in the ST, is a state for a "terrorist organization<sup>10</sup>", which is Hezbollah, rather than being a state for the Lebanese people. Secondly, it suggests that the overall interior and foreign policies of Lebanon are under the full control of Hezbollah. In this context, Neriah & Shapira (2012: 4) point out that from the perspective of Israel, "Hezbollah is not a national Lebanese movement, although it is represented in the Lebanese parliament", and is regarded as virulently anti-Israel (Norton 2007: 475). With this in mind, the deliberate choice of certain lexical items in the translation provided by ILIW is meant to reinforce a feeling of cultural fear and hatred against Hezbollah organization.

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<sup>10</sup> Israel and its US ally along with some Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Bahrain (Neriah & Shapira 2012: 21).

### 4.2.2 Conflict

The conflict between Palestinians and Israelis is a conflict between an occupying power, i.e. Israel and occupied people, i.e. Palestinians as it is referred to in many international laws (Ayyad 2011: 12). It is also regarded as the strongest in the modern history that is seen as the global conflict between the East and West, and thus has been a dominant issue in international politics (Bazzi 2009: 1). As noted before, this conflict between the two parties exceeds the land; it extends to include the terminology not only in politics, but also in everyday life. In this respect, Pia & Diez (2007: 3) maintain that "conflicts, even ethno-political ones, are therefore first and foremost discursive in nature. Thus, some terms bear different connotations. The term "conflict" is a case in point.

(4.6)	(ST)	President Abbas just stood here, and he said that the core of the Israeli-Palestinian <b>conflict</b> is the settlements.
	UN's translation	لقد وقف الرئيس عباس هنا للتو، وقال إن المستوطنات هي جوهر <b>الصراعات</b> الإسرائيلية - الفلسطينية.
	IPMO's translation	كان الرئيس عباس قد وقف هنا للتو وقال إن لبّ <b>النزاع</b> الإسرائيلي الفلسطيني يعود إلى المستوطنات.

The term 'conflict' was translated differently in the three Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech. It was translated, following the literally translation strategy, by the UN as 'صراع' (Sirā', lit. 'conflict'). On the contrary, the term 'conflict', was translated by IPMO- following the cultural filtering strategy as 'نزاع' (Nizā', lit. 'dispute'). The analysis of the speech reveals that the term "conflict" appears six times in the original source text of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech (see Annex 1). However, it was never translated into Arabic as 'نزاع' (Nizā', lit. 'dispute') in the translation produced by the UN since it bears different connotation. The UN always translated it as 'صراع' (Sirā', lit. 'conflict') (see Annex 2).

Although the two words 'نزاع' (Nizā', lit. 'dispute') and 'صراع' (Sirā', lit. 'conflict') in Arabic are both translated into English as "conflict", they have completely different connotations. According to the Arabic dictionary 'لسان العرب' (Lisan Āl-ārab, lit. 'the tongue of Arabs') for Ibn mandhour<sup>11</sup>, the two terms are completely different. He illustrates that the term 'نزاع' (Nizā', lit. 'dispute') is a case in which the two disputing

<sup>11</sup> Ibn mandhour is one of the best linguists in Arabic. He wrote over five-hundred volumes (Al-hakeem 2000: 121). The best of these is Lisan Āl-ārab (lit. "tongue of Arabs"), is regarded as one of the biggest and best dictionaries and encyclopaedias in the Arabic language, and thus it is the most reliable in the Arabic language (ibid.: 122).



parties strive to prove the validity of its pretexts (Ibn mandhour 1997: 351). However, the term 'صراع' (Sirā', lit. 'conflict') is a case of confrontation between two adversaries in which each party strives to murder its enemy (ibid.: 197).

The difference in meaning between the two terms 'نزاع' (Nizā', lit. 'dispute') and 'صراع' (Sirā', lit. 'conflict') is also pointed out by some linguists and intellectuals. For instance, Al-hout (2000) states that the term 'صراع' (Sirā', lit. 'conflict') refers to a case of an argument in which coexistence between conflicting adversaries seems to be impossible, whereas the term 'نزاع' (Nizā', lit. 'dispute') refers to an argument in which the disputing parties strive to find a compromise to solve the argument, and thus coexistence between the two adversaries seems to be possible. Abu Hubla (2017) makes the point that using the term 'نزاع' (Nizā', lit. 'dispute') instead of 'صراع' (Sirā', lit. 'conflict') to refer to the case of conflict between Palestinians and Israel is not valid as the first indicates to a case of misunderstanding of a certain issue between two the disputing parties, whereas the second refers to a set of conflicting issues such as opposing needs, ideas, beliefs, values, or goals (ibid.). Abu Ataya (2014) also emphasises that the case of conflict between Palestinians and Israel must be referred to in Arabic as 'صراع' (Sirā', lit. 'conflict') not 'نزاع' (Nizā', lit. 'dispute') since land constitutes the core of the conflict between Palestinians and Israel.

The difference between the two terms is regarded as important among linguistics and political scientists alike. For example, the senior lecturer in political science at Ben Gurion University, Menachem Klein stresses in his book entitled 'The Shift: Israel-Palestine From Border Struggle to Ethnic Conflict' that what is happening between Palestinian and Israel is 'صراع' (Sirā', lit. 'conflict') not 'نزاع' (Nizā', lit. 'dispute') (Waldman 2011: 73). It is worth mentioning that the Israeli political discourse always refers to the case of the conflict between Israel and Palestinians as 'نزاع' (Nizā', lit. 'dispute') rather than 'صراع' (Sirā', lit. 'conflict'). This creates an impression among the public that the main core of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is represented in borders rather than existence. Also, Kelman (2007: 290) indicates that the lexical choice of the term 'نزاع' (Nizā', lit. 'dispute') to refer to the Palestinian- Israeli conflict is deliberate and appear consistent in the agreements and accords that Israel signed with Palestinians and Arabs, for instance, the Oslo Accord<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>12</sup> Oslo accord was "culminated in the exchange of letters of mutual recognition between the PLO and the State of Israel and the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, adopted in September 1993". (Kelman 2007: 290).

#### 4.2.3 Palestinian State

In a resolution adopted on 22 November 1974, the General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people of national independence and sovereignty (Akasaka 2008: 24). Since then, Palestinians have been struggling to get recognition of Palestine as an independent state based on the United Nation Security Council resolutions 242 and 338<sup>13</sup> on the basis of the borders of 4<sup>th</sup> June, 1967 (Sable 2011: 1). However, according to the perspective of Israel, these two resolutions require Israeli withdrawal from some, but not all, the territories it occupied in 1967 (Beinin & Hajjar 2014: 7). On the contrary, the notion of the Palestinian State according to the Palestinian interpretation has to be based on the two resolutions 242 and 338 was completely rejected by Israel (Zank 2016: 2). This rejection left its fingertips on the lexical choices of the Israeli political discourse and translation as well. The following example sheds the light on aspects of ideology and politics in the Arabic translations for the sensitive term of 'the Palestinian State'.

(4.7)	(ST)	Our major international airport is a few kilometers away from the West Bank. Without peace, will our planes become targets for anti-aircraft missiles placed in the adjacent <b>Palestinian state</b> ?
	UN's translation	ويقع مطارنا الدولي على بعد كيلومترات قليلة من الضفة الغربية. وبدون سلام، هل تصبح طائراتنا أهدافا للصواريخ المضادة للطائرات المثبتة في <b>الدولة الفلسطينية</b> المحاذية؟
	ILIW's translation	ان مطارنا الدولي يقع على بعد كيلومترات قليلة من حدود الضفة الغربية. ما يجعل طائراتنا على مرمى قوس من الصواريخ المضادة للطائرات التي تنتشر <b>حتما في أراضي الضفة الغربية</b> .

As example (4.7) shows, the toponym of 'Palestinian State' was translated literally by the UN as 'الدولة الفلسطينية' (Āl-dawla Āl-filastynyā, lit. 'the Palestinian State'). However, it was translated- following the cultural filtering strategy- by ILIW as 'أراضي الضفة الغربية' (Ārādi Āl-difā Āl-gharbya, lit. 'the lands of the West Bank'). Thus, the toponym of 'الدولة الفلسطينية' (Āl-dawla Āl-filastynyā, lit. 'the Palestinian State') was completely substituted into Ārādi Āl-difā Āl-gharbya (lit. 'the lands of West Bank') to conform to the expectations of the readership. Also, it again asserts the Israeli rejection towards establishing a Palestinian State. Hence, the presence of political

<sup>13</sup> The United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 issued in 1967 and 338 issued in 1973 called upon Israel to withdraw from territories occupied in the recent conflict "1967 War", and thus every state is granted a political independence and has the right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force (Akasaka 2008: 16).

ideology is extensively attended in the Arabic translation of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech.

The analysis of the original source text of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech reveals that the toponym 'Palestinian State' appears ten times (cf. Annex 1). When it appears in a sensitive context, it is either translated following the substitution strategy or omission strategy. The following example makes the point.

(4.8)	(ST)	The truth is that we cannot achieve peace through UN resolutions, but only through direct negotiations between the parties. The truth is that so far the Palestinians have refused to negotiate. <b><u>The truth is that Israel wants peace with a Palestinian state, but the Palestinians want a state without peace.</u></b> And the truth is you shouldn't let that happen.
	UN's translation	والحقيقة هي أن نتمكن من تحقيق السلام ليس من خلال قرارات الأمم المتحدة، ولكن فقط عن طريق المفاوضات المباشرة بين الطرفين. والحقيقة هي أنه حتى الآن يرفض الفلسطينيون التفاوض. <b><u>والحقيقة هي أن إسرائيل تريد السلام مع دولة فلسطينية، لكن الفلسطينيين يريدون دولة من دون سلام.</u></b> والحقيقة هي أنه ينبغي للجمعية العامة ألا تسمح بحدوث ذلك.
	IPMO's translation	والحقيقة هي أنه لا يمكن تحقيق السلام عبر قرارات الأمم المتحدة بل عبر المفاوضات المباشرة بين الأطراف المعنية؛ والحقيقة هي أن الفلسطينيين قد رفضوا حتى الآن التفاوض؛ والحقيقة هي أنه لا يجوز لكم السماح بحصول هذا الأمر.
	ILIW's translation	والحقيقة التي يجب ان نعلمها ان السلام لا يمر عبر قرارات الامم المتحدة بل يتحقق عن طريق مفاوضات مباشرة بين الاطراف المعنية. والحقيقة ان الفلسطينيين يرفضون التفاوض. والحقيقة أنكم لا يجب ان تسكتوا عن هذا.

Example (4.8) above shows that the whole sentence "*The truth is that Israel wants peace with a Palestinian state, but the Palestinians want a state without peace*" was completely omitted in the two Israeli versions of IPMO and ILIW. This elective appropriation of omission reflects the underlying ideological and political considerations of the agents involved which is represented in ignoring to refer to the Palestinian State as being a state. In this regard, Baker (2006: 114) indicates that: "patterns of omission and addition designed to suppress, accentuate, or elaborate particular aspects of a narrative encoded in the source text utterance".

#### 4.2.4 National Life

Religion plays an important role in the Israeli political discourse (Goldberg 2003: 4). Political discourse in Israel has always depended on religion to legitimize Palestine as the national home for Jews, and thus it tends to use names and symbols that best establish an affinity between Jews and Palestine (ibid.: 12). Even those who called for

a strict separation between religion and state are considered as anti-religious (Goldberg 2003: 3).

For just a moment of reflection, linking Jews around the world with the land of Palestine via the deliberate use of quoted religious texts, intertextuality and the deliberate choice of lexical sensitive terms maintains that the source text of the speech is loaded with a religious tone. Thus, religion is meant to serve ideological and political stances. The lexical choices opted by IPMO and ILIW in the translation of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech makes the point.

(4.9)	(ST)	After all, it was here [The UNGA] in 1975 that the age-old yearning of <b>my people</b> to restore <b>our national life</b> in our ancient biblical homeland -- it was then that this was braided -- branded, rather -- shamefully, as racism.
	UN's translation	ومع ذلك، جرى هنا في عام 1975، وعلى نحو مخز وضم شعبي بالعنصرية، ذلك الشعب الذي ظل يتوق لعصور إلى استعادة <b>حياتنا الوطنية</b> في وطننا الذي ورد في العهد القديم.
	IPMO's translation	إذ كان قد تم عام 1975 - وبصورة مخزية - وسُم توك <b>شعبي القديم</b> لاستعادة <b>حياتنا القومية</b> في أرض أجدادنا من الكتاب المقدس بأنه عنصرية [بالإشارة إلى قرار الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة في ذلك العام اعتبار الصهيونية حركة عنصرية].
	ILIW's translation	وإنني اعبر عن أسفي بأن هذه القاعة شهدت عام 1975 اعلانا مؤسفا قرن ما بين الصهيونية التي تجسد حنين <b>شعبنا العريق</b> منذ نشأته الأولى الى تحقيق <b>أمانيه القومية</b> والتوراتية في ارض الاجداد، وبين العنصرية. وأعني قرار الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة الذي اعتبر الصهيونية حركة عنصرية.

As it appears in example (4.9), the phrase 'my people' was translated into Arabic by the UN as 'شعبي' (Sha'by, lit. 'my people') following the literally translation strategy. This translation does not reflect that Jews have any origins in Palestine. On the contrary, it was translated into Arabic by IPMO following the addition translation strategy as **شعبي القديم** (Sha'by Āl-qadym, lit. 'my old-age people'). Thus, the adjective 'القديم' (Āl-qadym, lit. old-age) that does not appear in the source text was added. In the same way, ILIW translated it adding the adjective 'العريق' (Āl-'aryq, lit. the old). The addition of this lexical choice is meant to signify that the existence of Jews in Palestine is not recent but goes back in history, i.e. Jews have roots in the land of historic Palestine. Moreover, it reflects that Jews' presence precedes the declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. In this regard, Hajjar & Beinun (2014: 1) state that "Jewish claims to this land [Palestine] are based on the biblical promise to Abraham and his descendants, on the fact that this was the historical site of the Jewish Kingdom of Israel (which was destroyed by the Roman Empire)".

The above excerpt of the Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech also reflects ideological and political stances in translating the phrase 'our national life' as 'حياتنا القومية' (Hayātuna āl-qawmiya, lit. 'our national life') by the IPMO or translating it by ILIW 'آمانيه القومية' (Āmanyhi āl-qawmiya, lit. 'its national hopes'). Both agents (IPMO and ILIW) followed the cultural filtering translation strategy in translating this phrase. Thus, the lexical item shaped triggers warm feelings in the audience of the target culture.

For deeper discussion, it is worth indicating that the word 'national' has two equivalents in Arabic; وطني (Watany) and قومي (lit. Qawmi). However, both have different connotations. The first term refers to an entity within known geographical borders, whereas the second term refers to a group of people who share one trait and exceeds the geographical borders to include ethnic groups, religion, values...etc. Based on this, the people who are meant in the speech are only Jewish people not the Israeli people because Jews comprise roughly 75% of Israel's population; whereas the rest are Muslims, Christian's and Druze (Kaddari & Yadgar 2010: 7).

With this in mind, the two Arabic translations for the phrase 'our national life', that are produced by IPMO and ILIW, are meant to support the Israeli narration regarded the alleged Promised Land, and thus this translation represent a warm appeal to Jewish people around the world to immigrate to Palestine as if it were their national home. In addition, the two terms using the terms حياتنا القومية (Hayātuna āl-qawmiya) by the IPMO or آمانيه القومية (Āmanyhi āl-qawmiya,) by ILIW play a role in the formation of Jewish identity.

### **4.3 Intertextuality**

It is argued that translation "is often seen as a particular case of intertextuality" (Garcia 2002: 27). Thus, intertextuality is one of the most common linguistic phenomena in translating political texts since politicians tend to express their identity in their speeches consulting intertextualities. In addition, "translations, as products, normally involve recontextualisation across cultures" (Schäffner 2010: 143). Also, Intertextuality has been described as an "all pervasive textual phenomenon" (Hatim 1997: 29). Accordingly, intertextuality is not made casually or to fill a space, but it is

often used deliberately to convey meaning and serve the context it appears within. In this respect, Stritzel (2012: 553) asserts that the core of intertextuality is to situate texts within and against other texts. Based on this, it should be borne in mind that the common use of religious references included in the ST of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech is deliberately employed as a strategy to serve the speaker's political aims (cf. Chapter 3.1.1).

In the majority of cases, intertextual references appear in the original ST of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech act as a persuasive tool to support his ideological and political standpoints. They also convey political messages both nationally and internationally. The translations of these cases of intertextualities reflect deep concerns of the TT audience. In this context, the thesis presents data analysis for cases of the translations of intertextual excerpts of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech.

#### ***4.3.1 Palestinian Territory***

Allusions are very common in English. They are more or less closely related to terms such as reference, quotation or citation, borrowing... and the more complex intertextuality (Leppihalme 1994: 6). For Ruokonen, "allusion is an implicit reference resembling an external referent that belongs to assumed shared knowledge" (2010: 33).

In the following example, Netanyahu refers to an event that took place in 1967 when the UNGA adopted a resolution<sup>14</sup> which considers the Palestinian territories, including East Jerusalem, an occupied Palestinian land by Israel. Israel on its part rejected the resolution, and issued a law known as 'The Jerusalem Basic Law' in 1980 which declared "Jerusalem complete and united, as the capital of Israel" (ibid.). The Palestinians, on the other hand, have been striving to establish their state based on the Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 (for more comprehension discussion cf. Chapter 4.2.3). Thus, Israel continues refuting the Palestinian rights regarding Jerusalem. The translations of the following excerpt of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech make the point.

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<sup>14</sup> Security Council resolution 242, unanimously adopted on 22 November 1967, is considered a basic instrument in all subsequent discussions of a Middle East peace settlement (Akasaka 2008: 21). The resolution is based on two principles: Firstly, the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 (ibid.: 16). Secondly: the termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State within recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force (ibid.).

(4.10)	(ST)	So, here in the UN, automatic majorities can decide anything. They can decide that the sun sets in the west or rises in the west. I think the first has already been pre-ordained. But they can also decide -- they have decided that the <u>Western Wall</u> in Jerusalem, Judaism's holiest place, is <u>occupied Palestinian territory</u> .
	UN's translation	هنا في الأمم المتحدة، يمكن للأغلبية التلقائية أن تقرر أي شيء. يمكنها أن تقرر أن الشمس تشرق من الغرب. يمكن أن تقرر أيضا -بل قررت -بأن <u>حائط المبكى</u> في القدس، وهو أقدس مكان لدى اليهود، <u>أرض فلسطينية محتلة</u> .
	IPMO's translation	توجد هنا في الأمم المتحدة أغلبية تلقائية تستطيع اعتماد أي قرار. إنها قادرة على اعتماد قرار يقضي بأن الشمس تغيب في الغرب أو تشرق في الغرب (رغم أنني أعتقد بأن الخيار الأول مقضي فيه من البداية. .)، كما يمكنها اتخاذ قرار - وسبق لها أن اتخذته - بأن <u>الحائط الغربي</u> <u>إحاطت المبكى</u> في <u>البلدة القديمة من أورشليم القدس</u> وهو أقدس مكان لدى اليهود ما هو إلا <u>منطقة فلسطينية محتلة</u> .
	ILIW's translation	والحاصل ان الأمم المتحدة تملك أغلبية تلقائية لاعتماد أي قرار حتى لو كان منافيا للواقع، فهي يمكنها مثلا ان تقرر بان الشمس تغيب غربا لكنها تستطيع ان تقرر ايضا بان الشمس تشرق من جهة الغرب رغم ان هذا الامر محسوم منذ البداية ولا يمكن التشكيك في صحته. كما يمكنها ان تقرر - وقد فعلت - بان <u>إحاطت الغربي المتبقى من آثار بيت المقدس اليهودي</u> او <u>ما نسيميه حائط المبكى الواقع في البلدة القديمة</u> في أورشليم (القدس) وهو أقدس بقعة في العالم للشعب اليهودي، يمكنها اعتباره <u>بقعة فلسطينية واقعة تحت الاحتلال</u> .

As it appears in the UN's translation in example (4.10) above, the phrase 'occupied Palestinian territory' was translated, following the literal translation strategy, as أرض فلسطينية محتلة (ard filastiniya muhtala, lit. 'occupied Palestinian land'). However, IPMO and ILIW translated it- following the synonymy strategy, differently. IPMO translated it as منطقة فلسطينية محتلة (mantiqa filastynya muhtala, lit. 'An occupied Palestinian area'), and the ILIW translated it- following the same strategy, as بقعة فلسطينية واقعة تحت الاحتلال (buq'a filastynya waqi'a tahta aħtilāl, lit. 'a Palestinian spot under occupation').

Although أرض (ārd), منطقة (mantiqa) and بقعة (buq'a) are, to some extent, regarded as synonyms, the political connotations of these in Benjamin Netanyahu's speech are, to a large degree, different on one hand, and they differ in their sympathetic effect on the target audience on the other hand. An interesting analysis for the two terms in their historical and sociopolitical contexts was made by Ayyad (2011). He sheds light on the differences between the two terms stating that the word أرض (Ārd) "reflects the high value attached to land in the Arab political discourse" (Ayyad 2011: 183), whereas the use of the term منطقة (mantiqa, lit. 'area') refers to the Palestinian lands occupied by Israel in 1967 (ibid.), and thus the term is purely political and does not trigger any sympathy on the target audience. The difference between these three

terms was also outpointed by the Palestinian Ministry of Information by asking the Arabic mass media to refer to the Occupied Palestinian Territory as أراضي (ārādi, lit. 'lands'), but not مناطق (manatiq, lit. 'areas'). (Khalaf 2017: 6).

Translating names of holy places in the Old City of Jerusalem in the two Israeli translations -IPMO and ILIW- is also controversial. In example (4.10) above, the toponym of 'Western Wall' was translated by the UN, following literal translation strategy, as الحائط الغربي (āl-hā' t āl-gharby, lit. 'the Western wall'). However, IPMO translated it- following information change strategy, as الحائط الغربي [حائط المبكى في البلدة القديمة من أورشليم القدس] [āl-hā' t āl-gharby [hā' t āl-mabkà fi āl-baldh āl-qadyma min āürshalym āl-quds], lit. 'the Western Wall in the Old City of Jerusalem'). Using the same translation strategy, ILIW translated it as الحائط الغربي المتبقي من آثار بيت المقدس القديمة اليهودي او ما نسميه حائط المبكى الواقع في البلدة القديمة bayt āl-maqdis āl-yahwdi aw ma nusamyhi hā' t āl-mabkà āl-wāq' fi āl-baldh āl-qadyma, lit. 'the Western Wall that remained from the remains of the Holy Jewish House or what we call the "Wailing Wall" that is located in the Old City').

As it is shown in example (4.10) above, the two Israeli translations add additional information which does not appear in the ST, but seems to be relevant to the TT readership. The ST in the above original textual excerpt of the speech also illustrates how "Political discourse originates from the historical and cultural development of a particular community and involves power and ideological struggle that is expressed through linguistic means" (Lande 2010: 4).

'Al-Buraq Wall', the Arabic name, or 'the Western Wall' "represents the southwestern section of Al-Aqsa Mosque's wall, some 50 meters in length and approximately 20 meters in height. It is part of Al-Aqsa Mosque and considered an Islamic property" (Abdul Hadi 2013: 66). Al-Buraq Wall constitutes one of the main religious symbols for Muslims and Jews. For Muslims, it is the place where Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) tied his steed, al-Buraq, on the night journey to Jerusalem before being ascended to paradise, and it constitutes the Western border of al-Haram al-Sharif (Winder 2012: 11). For them, its name is al-Buraq Wall and it is classified as Islamic Waqf, and thus, "it is forbidden by religious law to make any use of the name "Wailing Wall" (Berkovitz 2001: 21-22). On the other hand, "The Jews now call it "The Wailing Wall" claiming it is the remaining part of their destroyed Temple. At



least until the 15th Century Jews used to pray at the Mount of Olives which is separated from the Old City by the Kidron Valley" (Abdul Hadi 2013: 66).

#### 4.3.2 Jews who were dispersed

Religion noticeably constitutes a key discursive tool of the Israeli political discourse (cf. Chapter 4.2.4 and 4.4.4). In this regard, Kaddari & Yadgar (2010: 3) maintain that "there has never been formal separation between religion and state in Israel's legal and political structure and religion is intertwined in all levels of governance, political society, and civil society". In Benjamin Netanyahu's speech, the analysis reveals that there are several religious references in the speech. For instance, there are quotations from religious texts quoted from the Bible, sayings of known religious men (e.g. the great rabbi of Lubavich) as well as the speech itself is extensively loaded with religious tones. This feature is meant to support and serve ideological and political agendas. The translations of the following excerpt reflect the ideological and political interest of the agents of these three Arabic translations.

(4.11)	(ST)	As the prime minister of Israel, I speak for a hundred generations of <b>Jews who were dispersed</b> throughout the lands.
	UN's translation	بصفتي رئيس وزراء إسرائيل، أتكلم باسم مئات الأجيال من <b>اليهود الذين تم تفريقهم في أنحاء الأرض.</b>
	IPMO's translation	إنني أتحدث بصفتي رئيساً لحكومة إسرائيل باسم مئات الأجيال المتعاقبة من <b>اليهود الذين تم تفريقهم أيدي سبأ.</b>
	ILIW's translation	انني بصفتي رئيس حكومة اسرائيل اتحدث باسم اجيال واجيال من <b>اليهود الذين لم يفقدوا الامل في حلم العودة بعد ان تفرقت أيدي يهود.</b>

As it is shown in the above example, the subordinate clause '*Jews who were dispersed*' was translated differently in the three Arabic versions produced. It was translated literally by the UN as 'اليهود الذين تم تفريقهم' (Āl-Yahūd Ālladhyna tama tafryqahumm lit. 'Jews who were dispersed'). However, the texts which were produced by the two Israeli versions are clearly carried out with a religious tone. For instance, the IPMO translated it, following the addition translation strategy, as 'اليهود الذين تم تفريقهم أيدي سبأ' (Āl-Yahūd ālladhyna tamma tafryqahum Āydy Saba', lit. 'Jews who were dispersed as the hands of Saba'). Thus, the phrase 'أيدي سبأ' (Āydy Saba', lit. hands of Saba') was added. This addition triggers warm feelings in the audience since it brings to their mind a well-known old story stated in Arab's poetry, proverbs, the holy Qur'an and Torah alike. It is a story in which Allah Almighty warns those people

who denied believing in Islam that they will face the fate of diaspora throughout the land exactly like that fate faced Saba's horde (Belhaf 2016: 18).

The phrase of '*Jews who were dispersed*' was translated by ILIW as 'اليهود الذين لم يفقدوا' (Āl-Yahūd ālladhyna lam yafqidu āl-āmal fy Hulm āl-awda ba' da ān tafaraqat āyādi Yahūd, lit. 'Jews who did not lose the hope in the dream of return after the hands of Jews were dispersed'). Although this phrase was translated differently by ILIW, the translation implicitly reminds the audience with the same story stating 'بعد ان تفرقت أيادي يهود' (ba' da ān tafaraqat āyādi āl-Yahūd , lit. 'after the hands of Jews were dispersed'). It further suggests that Palestine is the Promised Land which God granted to Jews. This is indicated in the translation by adding 'لم يفقدوا الأمل في حلم العودة' (lam yafqidu āl-āmal fy Hulm āl-awda, lit. 'who did not lose the hope in the dream of return').

These cases of addition occur in the TTs that were produced by IPMO and ILIW act as a persuasive tool to support ideological agenda as well as justifying political views. On one hand, they play a role in portraying every opposition towards Israel's willing of being recognized as a Jewish state as if it were an opposition to God's promise granted to Jews. On the other hand, they stress the Israeli claims over the land of occupied Palestine as if it were its own property.

#### **4.4 Addition of Information**

Translators tend to add information to the TT that is not existent in the ST in several cases. Newmark (1988: 91) points out that a translator may have to add additional information to his version for cultural, technical linguistic reasons and when the original text is at an odd with his readership. Furthermore, adding information in the TT may appear in several forms: within the text, notes at bottom of page, notes at end of chapter or notes or glossary at end of book (ibid.: 92). Moreover, a translator can add information to a text to expand it with explicatory details (Bielsa & Bassnett 2009: 9). However, when it comes to translating sensitive political texts, it seems that cases of addition reflect ideological and political considerations. In this context, Al-Quinal (2005: 489) states that deliberate interventions, as a form of addition, "have often been made in rewritten texts in the name of some ideology".

The deep analysis of the three Arabic versions of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech reveals that there are 49 cases of addition. These are one case of addition in the UN's version, 40 cases in IPMO's and 8 cases of addition in ILIW's. Moreover, the vast bulk of them are ideologically and politically motivated rather than being technical. The following is a sample of these ideologically and politically motivated cases of addition.

#### 4.4.1 Praising Rabbi of Lubavich

Afolabi (2015: 42) state makes the point that politics depends on religion to come to its aims. In the case of the Israeli political discourse, religion serves as a political tool for politicians especially the notion of establishing Israel in 1948 is based on religious claims (Goldberg 2003: 4-6). Thus, religion lies always at the core of the Israeli political discourse. For instance, politicians tend to quote sacred texts or quote from religious men not only when addressing Jews around the world, but also when addressing the international community.

Noticeably, Benjamin Netanyahu's speech is saturated with intertextual texts that are loaded with religious tones. The analysis of the Source Text (ST) reveals that there are quoted biblical texts and other religious texts quoted from well-known Jewish religious men to conform to the desired political messages of the speech. The translations of the following excerpt also reflect ideological and political views. Examining the historical and sociopolitical contexts of these translations makes the point.

(4.12)	(ST)	In 1984 when I was appointed Israel's ambassador to the United Nations, I visited <b>the great rabbi of Lubavich</b> . He said to me, [...] you'll be serving in a house of many lies.
	UN's translation	ففي عام 1984، عندما عُيِّنت سفيراً لإسرائيل لدى الأمم المتحدة، زرت <b>الحاخام الأكبر لوبافيتش</b> ، قال لي [...] "سوف تعمل في مكان يعج بالأكاذيب..."
	IPMO's translation	ففي العام 1984 حين تم تعييني سفيراً لإسرائيل في الامم المتحدة، زرت <b>الحاخام الكبير ذائع الصيت الراحل لوبافيتش حاخام جماعة (حباد) اليهودية الذي كان يقيم على مقربة من نيويورك</b> ، قال لي آنذاك [...] "إنك ستخدم في مقرّ حافل بالأكاذيب".
	ILIW's translation	وكننت قد زرت عام 1984، عندما عُيِّنت سفيراً لإسرائيل لدى الأمم المتحدة، <b>الحاخام العظيم "لوبافيتش" إباحام راحل قاد جماعة "حباد" اليهودية وذاع صيته بين اليهود أجمعين علماً بأنه كان إقامة كان قرب نيويورك</b> قال يومها [...] إنك ذاهب لتعمل في مؤسسة مليئة بالاكاذيب.

As shown in example (4.12) above, the UN translated the proper nouns 'the great rabbi of Lubavich' literally, and thus no additional information on the translation was made. However, the two Israeli translations added information that the ST does not include. The two translations of IPMO and ILIW praised the rabbi adding that he was ذائع الصيت (Thā'ī āl-syt, lit. well-known "in the positive sense'). Also, they drew the audience's attention to his political and religious status by adding information suggesting that he was the rabbi of the Chabad organization<sup>15</sup>, and also added his residence place 'New York' which is the city where Netanyahu delivered the speech. They further referred to him as الراحل (Āl-rahīl, lit. 'late').

These two cases of addition convey several political messages. First, they convey a social and political message to Jews living in New York that Israel respects this organization and everyone who belongs to it. Second, they convey a political message to the General Assembly itself reminding it with its location, New York, which is regarded as the centre of the Chabad which supports Israel infinitely (Qudsi: 2010). Furthermore, quoting texts from a religious man acts as a persuasive tool to gain the public support and steer the lay people's attitude. Accordingly, these cases of addition rendered on the text in hand serve ideological and political agendas.

#### 4.4.2 Collective Memories

As mentioned in earlier sub-sections in the current chapter, one of the key features of the Israeli political discourse is the extensive use of religious and historic narratives (cf. Chapter 4.2.4). Gillis et al. (1993) points out that one of the main features of the Israeli political discourse is that it is based on memories and so called commemorations (cited in Kristianssen 2015:4). This trend of employing collective memories in the political discourse in Israel also occurs in the translations of the following excerpt produced by the two Israeli institutions, namely, IPMO and ILIW.

<b>(4.13)</b>	<b>(ST)</b>	And for those Jews who were exiled from our land, they never stopped dreaming of coming back: Jews in Spain, on the eve of their expulsion; Jews in the Ukraine, fleeing the pogroms; Jews fighting the Warsaw Ghetto, as the Nazis were circling around it. They never stopped praying, they never stopped yearning. They whispered: Next year in Jerusalem. Next year in the promised land.
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<sup>15</sup> Chabad is one of the richest Jewish organizations in the world founded in 1800. It works actively especially inside Israel and the USA. It is based in New York. Its founder is Zalman from Russia and he called it after his village in Russia 'Allubavitcher'. It is one of the most aggressive organizations against Palestinians (Al-Qudsi: 2010).

UN's translation	هؤلاء اليهود الذين تم نفيهم من أرضنا لم يتوقفوا فقط عن الحلم بالعودة -اليهود في إسبانيا عشية طردهم؛ اليهود في أوكرانيا، الفارين من المذابح؛ اليهود الذين قاتلوا في غيتو وارسو، عندما طوقهم النازيون -لم يتوقفوا مطلقاً عن دعوة ربهم، لم يتوقفوا عن التوق للعودة. يتهامسون: "في العام القادم في القدس. في العام المقبل في أرض الميعاد".
IPMO's translation	أما بخصوص أولئك اليهود الذين تم نفيهم من بلادنا فإنهم لم يتوقفوا عن الحلم بالعودة سواء أكان الحديث يدور عن يهود إسبانيا قبل طردهم <u>أواخر القرن الـ15</u> أو يهود أوكرانيا الفارين من المجازر بحقهم <u>القرن الـ18</u> أو اليهود الذين قاتلوا في غيتو وارسو عندما طوقه النازيون <u>إبان المحرقة النازية وتحديداً عام 1943</u> . إنهم ما فتئوا يدعون ربهم أو يشتاقون <u>العودة إلى أرض إسرائيل</u> ؛ إنهم كانوا يتهامسون: "[لنكن إن شاء الله] في العام القادم في أورشليم القدس، لنكن في العام القادم في أرض الميعاد".
ILIW's translation	وظل اليهود الذين اقتلعوا من ارضهم يراودهم حلم العودة ولم يتنازلوا يوماً عن حق العودة، سواء يهود إسبانيا قبل طردهم <u>أواخر القرن الـ15</u> ، أو يهود أوكرانيا الفارين من المجازر <u>في القرن الـ18</u> ، أو اليهود الذين قاوموا النازية في غيتو وارسو <u>العام 1943</u> . كل هؤلاء ظلوا يتضرعون إلى الله ويتطلعون <u>إلى أرض إسرائيل</u> ويلهجون بالدعاء ويخفنون القول "سنلتقي العام القادم في اورشليم". "العام القادم في أرض الميعاد".

The underlined cases of addition that appear in example (4.13) above in the two translations produced by IPMO and ILIW do not appear in the ST or in the translation produced by the UN. Initially, several interventions have been made in these two translations that are produced by IPMO and ILIW. First, they both added the period when Jews were expelled out of Spain as the speaker of the ST states أواخر القرن الـ15 (Āwākhir ālqarn āl-15, lit. 'in the late of 15<sup>th</sup> century'). Second, they added the period when Jews in the Ukraine fled due to pogroms as the ST indicated القرن الـ18 (ālqarn āl-18, lit. 'in the 18<sup>th</sup> century'). Third, they added the period when Jews were fighting the Warsaw Ghetto, and as a result they were circled around by the Nazis عام 1943 (ām 1943, lit. in the year 1943'). Also, the translation produced by IPMO added information the year إبان المحرقة النازية وتحديداً عام 1943 (Ibbāna āl-mahraqa āl-nāzyah wa taḥdydī ām 1943, lit. 'during the Nazi holocaust exactly in 1943'). Fourth, both translations of IPMO and ILIW added the phrase إلى أرض إسرائيل (ilil awda ālā ārdi āsrāyl, lit. 'back to the land of Israel'). All these cases of addition that were made in the Arabic translations produced by IPMO and ILIW do not appear in the original source text of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech.

Noticeably, the focus of the two translations produced by IPMO and ILIW lies on collective memories, ethnic persecution and commemorative narratives in the Israeli translations for the excerpt provided in the translations appear in example (4.13) above. In this context, Kristianssen (2015: 4-5) points out that more attention is given to the collective memories and commemorative narratives in the Israeli political and

literary discourse because they play a role in shaping the social construction of the Jewish identity. Daghigh & Awang (2014: 10) also state that identifying temporal and spatial framing selectively through embedding texts in translation, which originally belongs to different time and place, helps the reader to make links between the embedded and the new narrative. Thus, the two translations of IPMO and ILIW tend to reposition participants in relation to each other. From the perspective of Translation Studies, Baker (2006:132) makes the point that translators "actively reframe the immediate narrative as well as the larger narratives in which it is embedded by careful re-alignment of participants in time and social/political space". Accordingly, selecting historical events to be added is very accurate and a deliberate action to serve ideological and political agendas.

To sum up, analysing the translations of the previous excerpt of the speech reveals that five cases of addition were made in the translation produced by IPMO and four ones in the translation of ILIW. None of them were made for technical linguistic reasons; they all are meant to serve ideological and political agendas. Thus, such cases of addition perform discursive functions that serve ideological and political stances.

#### ***4.4.3 The Hand of Israel***

Afolabi (2015: 42) points out "there is an incontrovertible connection between religion and politics" (cf. Chapter 4.4.1). When it comes to the case of the history of Israel, "the political system and the religious establishment have thus far existed together in Israel" (Goldberg 2003: 6). Thus, politicians in Israel attempt to employ religion to serve their political agenda (cf. Chapter 4.4.4).

The current thesis argues that Benjamin Netanyahu's speech as a political text is "historically and culturally determined" (Schäffner 1996: 202). To put it simply, Benjamin Netanyahu relied, to a large extent, on religious claims to justify pure political positions. The analysis of the source text of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech reveals that religion is interjected over twenty-four times in his speech (cf. Annex 1). Moreover, religion was not only interjected in the ST of the speech, but also in the TTs. Thus, the translations produced are ideologically and politically motivated. The following example represents a model of this interjection.

(4.14)	(ST)	President Abbas, I extend <b>my hand -- the hand of Israel</b> - - in peace.
	UN's translation	الرئيس عباس، أنا أمد إليك <u>يدي يد إسرائيل</u> في سلام.
	ILIW's translation	ها انا ذا أمد يدي اليك نيابة عن دولة اسرائيل ناشدا السلام، <u>يد اسرائيل</u> (يعقوب) ممدودة للسلام.

As it is shown in example (4.14) above, the phrase '*my hand-the hand of Israel*' is translated literally in the Arabic version produced by the UN as *يدي يد إسرائيل* (Yady- yad Isr'yl, lit. 'my hand-the hand of Israel'). However, it was translated by ILIW as '*يدي يد (يعقوب) إسرائيل*' (Yady- yad Isr'yl "Ya'qūb", lit. 'my hand-the hand of Israel- Jacobs'). Thus, stating the name of prophet Jacobs (peace be upon him) was added.

In the Israeli political discourse, Israel is often referred to as the State of Jacob. Israel is another name for Prophet Jacob (peace be upon him), and thus the state of Israel is the state of Prophet Jacob and his descendants (Hanukoglu 1998: 53). Based on this, Israel is assumed to be the land of Jacob's descendants and God's chosen people-Jews (ibid.: 54-55). Therefore, it is often indicated in the Israeli political discourse that the state of Israel is the state of Prophet Jacob and his descendants. On the contrary, from an Islamic perspective, "Abraham's worthiest descendants, the ones who follow in his path, are Muslims and not Jews or Christians" (Hudson Institute: 2016).

Framing the existence of the state of Israel by labeling it as being the state of Jacob's serves political views as the establishment of the state of Israel is indeed based on religious claims (Hajjar & Beinin 2014: 1). Also, from the perspective of Translation Studies, Baker (2006: 122) illustrates that framing by labeling, refers to "any discursive process that involves using a lexical item, term or phrase to identify a person, place, group, event or any other key element in the narrative". With this in mind, framing and labeling represent main textual and discursive features of the Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech.

#### **4.4.4 Our Grandfather Benjamin**

Underlying ideological and political considerations and assumptions in the Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech are, to a large degree, clearly noticed via the cases of addition, omission and selectivity of political terms. These cases reflect political interest and promote ideological and political stances of the agents involved. The translations of the following excerpt of the speech assert that.

(4.15)	(ST)	My first name, Benjamin, dates back a thousand years earlier to <b>Benjamin</b> -- Binyamin -- the son of Jacob, who was also known as Israel.
	UN's translation	ويرجع اسمي الأول، <b>بنجامين</b> ، إلى حقبة سبقت ذلك بألف عام -إلى بنيامين -ابن يعقوب، الذي عرف أيضا باسم إسرائيل.
	ILIW's 's translation	اما اسمي الاول "بنيامين" فتيمننا <b>جدنا بنيامين</b> ابن يعقوب او بنيامين ابن اسرائيل فيعقوب هو اسرائيل.

As it is shown in example (4.15) above, the proper noun of 'Benjamin' was translated literally in the translation produced by the UN as بنجامين (Binjāmyṅ). However, an addition was made in the translation produced by ILIW; the word جدنا (Jaduna, lit. 'Our grandfather') was added.

This addition touches on two ideologically and politically two sensitive issues. First, it triggers warm feelings in the audience to say that what happens in 1948 was not an occupation but a return to the 'promised land', and thus Israel is not an occupying force. Bein & Hajjar (2014: 1) state that "Israeli claims over Palestine are based on the biblical promise to Abraham and his descendants". Second, this addition conveys a political message to all Jews around the world appealing to them to come to live in Israel since they are the descendants of their great grandfather Benjamin- the son of Jacob (peace be upon him) in their capacity as "the rightful heirs to the Abrahamic promise" (Cezula 2017: 3). Based on this, the word جدنا (Jaduna, lit. 'Our grandfather') is a deliberate addition was made to support the aforementioned ideological claim.

## Conclusion

The study of the translation of political speeches deals with two main domains, namely, language and politics. Analysing data of the study reveals that translating political speeches is a target-oriented process since translators and translational institutions do not adhere to the original texts. Several issues interrelate and leave their fingertips on the text produced.

The analysis of the different translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech suggests that these translations are target-oriented. They excite ideological and political concerns of the target audience. Also, they are meant to serve certain ideological and political views. Moreover, each of these translations is meant to fit the ideology of the translational institution that produced the text. Therefore, several translational strategies were used by IPMO and ILIW to produce translations that best go in line with their ideologies such as addition, omission, cultural change, filtering...etc. On



the other side, the UN followed the literal translation strategy to preserve the meaning of the original source text of the speech, and thus, sticking to its guidelines in translation (cf. Chapter 3.1.2).

Situating the differences in the three different Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech in their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts maintain again that translation is not a neutral activity; it meant to serve and support ideological and political agendas.

Translating proper nouns, sensitive political terms, intertextualities and cases of addition in the three translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech suggest political and ideological significance. Thus, these translations affirm again that translation shares politics in its aims especially when it is issued within a governmental and institutional context. Finally, translation represents a field of intellectual war between the conflicting parties by which each party strives to acquire support in favour of its political agendas and at both local and international levels.

The next chapter presents a conclusion of the thesis. It summarizes the main findings, the major contribution of the study to the discipline of Translation Studies and future research.

## **Chapter Five**

### **Conclusion**

#### **Overview**

This chapter of the thesis includes three main sections. Section (5.1) introduces the main findings of the thesis. Section (5.2) includes the main contribution of the thesis to the discipline of Translation Studies. Then, the chapter moves to section (5.3) which suggests future research in light of the main findings of the thesis.

#### **5.1 Major Findings**

This thesis examined the English ST of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech before the UNGA and its three different translations into Arabic in their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts. The analysis of the three different translations of the corpus of the thesis suggests implicit ideological and political aspects. Analysing the differences in the three different translations also demonstrates that aspects of ideology and politics are, to a large degree, reflected on the text shaped (cf. Chapter Four). Also, situating the translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech within their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts reveals that the translations reflect deep concerns of the TT audience through the deliberate selections of lexical choices bearing connotations that conform to their expectations.

Based on the literature review, this thesis illustrated that the study of the translation of political speeches from English into Arabic in general, and those delivered in times of ongoing conflicts in particular, has not been embraced by largely under-researched area from the perspective of Translation Studies (cf. Chapter Two). Therefore, one of the limitations of the study of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech is the lack of research on translating political speeches descriptively and comparatively by describing and comparing several TTs to their ST by operating the analysis within the theoretical framework of DTS Van Gorp (1985) with the aid of Fairclough's (1992) Three

Dimensional-Model (cf. Chapter 3.2). However, this dilemma was processed through reviewing on research that investigated the translations of political texts in which several TTs were compared to their ST in their respective historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts (e.g. Ayyad 2011).

The questions that ask about the key distinctive features of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech as a political text and its discursive function in both the SL and TLs are answered in the light of the historical and sociopolitical background of the speech (cf. Chapter 3.1). A detailed account of the conditions of text productions indicated that the two translations produced by IPOM and ILIW are meant to serve ideological and political views and narratives (cf. Chapter 3.1.2).

In this thesis, Benjamin Netanyahu's speech is regarded as a political text (Schäffner 1997: 119). For a comprehensive analysis for the speech, "textual features need to be linked to the social and ideological contexts of text production and reception" (Schäffner 2004: 131). On the other hand, "CDA mediates between linguistic structures as evident in a text and the social, political, and historical contexts of text production and reception" (ibid.: 138). Therefore, data of the corpus of the thesis were processed within the theoretical framework of DTS Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) with the aid of Fairclough's (1992) Three Dimensional-Model (cf. Chapter 3.2.1 and 3.2.2).

Data analysis also disclosed that the two Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech that were produced by IPMO and ILIW are ideologically and politically motivated (cf. Chapter Four and Five). For instance, they opted for particular lexical items when translating sensitive political terms (e.g. National life) that best conforms to the audience's expectation (cf. Chapter 4.2.4).

Analysis of the different translations provided for Benjamin Netanyahu's speech also revealed that the Arabic translations produced by IPMO and ILIW reflect underlying political and ideological stances (cf. Chapter Four). For example, their translation products included deliberate cases of addition, omission, opting for particular lexical choices when it comes to translating sensitive political terms (e.g. Niza', lit. 'dispute'), translating some toponyms (e.g. Jerusalem) and some personal names (e.g. Arafat). Analysing these cases suggests that these two translations reflect aspects of ideology and politics as they both are meant to serve ideological and political agendas.

Furthermore, the translations that were produced by IPMO and ILIW reinforce a cultural fear and hatred against those who are at an odd with Israel (cf. Chapter 4.2.1). The analysis further shows that both translations express the concerns of the target audience (cf. Chapter 4.1.1). In other cases, the two translations produced by IPMO and ILIW aimed to trigger warm feelings in the audience (e.g. pointing out collective memories cf. Chapter 4.4.2). These cases also unveil aspects of ideology and politics in the two Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech produced by IPMO and ILIW.

Analysing the ST and TTs of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech reveals that religion, to a large degree, was devoted to serve ideological and political agendas, and thus it served as 'a political weapon'. The ST of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech as well as the TTs included biblical verses, quoting from religious figures (e.g. Rabbi of Lubavich, cf. Chapter 4.4.1), using exclusive terms of the Jewish religion (e.g. Jews who were dispersed, cf. Chapter 4.3.2). Thus, Benjamin Netanyahu's speech was loaded with religious tone to serve a political agenda (cf. Chapter Four). This result again supports Goldberg's (2003: 4) argumentation mentioning that political discourse in Israel and religion cannot be separated. He also pointed out that religion lies at the core of the Israeli political discourse so as to establish an affinity between Jews and Palestine as Jew's Promised Land (ibid.: 12). Indeed, the lexical choices that were selected by IPMO and ILIW in translating proper nouns (toponyms or personal names alike), intertextuality, sensitive political terms and cases of addition were mostly based on religious and historical claims. With this in mind, religion, politics and translation are intertwined in the translations provided by IPMO and ILIW (cf. Chapter 4.4.3). Thus, the findings of the current thesis go in line with Qaddoumi's (2008) findings which disclosed that "ideology constitutes the cornerstone in the translation of sacred and sensitive texts such as Nasrullah's political speeches" (Qaddoumi 2008: 54).

Processing data of the thesis within the theoretical framework of DTS Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) with the aid of Fairclough's (1992) Three-Dimensional Model of CDA contributed to answer main questions of the study (cf. Chapter 1.5). Applying the theoretical framework of DTS Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) contributed to provide an answer for the first question:

1. *What are the key distinctive features of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech as a political text? What are their discursive functions in the source culture?*

Analysing the corpus of the study reveals that Benjamin Netanyahu's speech has underlying power within and behind the text (cf. Chapter 3.1.1 and 4.1.2). Also, framing and labelling represent distinctive discursive features of Netanyahu's speech and its Arabic translations particularly those produced by IPMO and ILIW (cf. Chapter 4.4.4).

The analysis also reveals that the deliberate use of repetitions and intertextuality (e.g. allusion or religious references) are main textual distinctive features of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech (cf. Chapter 4.3 and 4.4.1). Indeed, the deliberate use of these two strategies is twofold. Firstly, they play political purposes (cf. Chapter 4.4.1). Secondly, they serve as a persuasive political tool through triggering warm feelings in the audience, and thus supporting ideological and political agendas (cf. Chapter 4.4.4). Hence, the findings of this thesis go in line with the findings Harrasi's (2001) study which revealed that the translations of political speeches is not a neutral activity (Harrasi's 2001: 312).

These findings go in line with conclusions of scholars and researchers in the discipline of Translation Studies (e.g. Newmark 1991, Lefevere 1992, Tymoczko 2002, Munday 2008, Schäffner 1996 and 2004, Ayyad 2011 and Elliott & Boer 2012). They all indicated that the texts produced, in particular the political texts, are ideologically determined on one hand, and the translations of political texts is politically motivated (cf. Chapter Two).

Moreover, describing the three different translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech by applying DTS Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) and situating them, based on Fairclough's (1992) Three-Dimensional Model of CDA, within their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts contributed in providing answers for the other two main questions:

2. *How do the three Arabic translations differ from one another? What are their textual features in the TT? What are their discursive functions in the target culture?*

3. *What political and ideological aspects do these translations reflect? How can the differences in the three Arabic translations be interpreted in terms of their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts?*

For providing comprehensive answers, data of the study on one hand were described, interpreted and explained, and on the other hand, Chesterman's (1997) classification of translation strategies was used. Thus, features of the texts produced were linked to conditions of production. Accordingly, the analysis clearly disclosed that- through following the literal translation strategy, the UN's translation was almost neutral; it does not take side in favour of any of the two conflicting parties. On the contrary, opting for translation strategies such as addition, omission, loan translation, explicitness, cultural filtering and information change suggests that the two translations that were produced by IPMO and ILIW were meant to serve ideological and political purposes (cf. Chapter Four). For instance, the two translations strike a sympatric chord of the target audience, support ideological and political narration of the speaker-Benjamin Netanyahu's and reflect deep concerns of the target audience. This conclusion agrees with what Hussein (2016) came to in his study that political speeches have distinctive features and the language is used tactfully to arrive at the intended political goals of the speaker (Hussein 2016: 86).

The analysis also revealed that the two translations that are produced by IPMO and ILIW reflect the agents' ideology and political affiliation that fully go in line with the speaker's (cf. Chapter Four). Accordingly, these findings agree with the findings of Ayyad's (2012) which disclosed that the translations of sensitive political texts in the translations of the Roadmap Plan initiatives were set to reinforce the political narratives of the institutions that produced the texts in hand (Ayyad 2012: 269).

A part from the textual analysis, names of the two agents involved (e.g. IPMO and ILIW) reflect their political affiliation that support the Israeli narration regarding their conflict with Palestinians. One of the agents is *Israel Prime Minister Office* (IPMO), and the second is *I Love Israel Website* (ILIW). Thus, conforming to the speaker's ideological and political views is inescapable.

## **5.2 The Contribution to Translation Studies**

This thesis examined Benjamin Netanyahu's speech before the UNGA in September 2011. Benjamin Netanyahu's speech, as a political text, is situated within the umbrella of political texts (Schäffner 1997: 119). Having this in mind, the thesis examined a "sub-genre of political texts" (Schäffner 1996: 202). Based on this debate, the thesis contributed to research on translating political speeches from English into Arabic. Thus, it fills a gap in knowledge from the perspective of Translation Studies.

In addition, the thesis contributed to the discipline of Translation Studies through examining an authentic and original data represented in Benjamin Netanyahu's speech before the UNGA which has not been investigated before in any research within the researcher's best knowledge. Furthermore, processing data of the thesis within mixed methodologies may encourage researchers to apply mixed approaches, and thus presenting comprehensive answers and discussions for controversial questions from the standpoint of Translation Studies. Moreover, the thesis presented practical cases of translations for proper nouns, political terms, intertextuality and addition to be analysed, and thus extracting aspects of ideology and politics in the text produced.

Moreover, this thesis contributed to the discipline of Translation Studies by analysing and comparing three different TTs of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech to their ST. Thus, it presents practical examples that may help in situating the textual and discursive characteristics of the Israeli political discourse within a mixed scope of practice and theory together. In addition, the thesis disclosed how translations of political speech play a crucial role in steering the lay people's discourse, attitudes and views in times of ongoing conflict. With this view in mind, this thesis contributes to research on the role translations play in times of ongoing conflict.

This thesis also stresses the idea that religion and politics in the Israeli political discourse are not only intertwined, but also fused. Accordingly, this finding bridges the gap in knowledge in research on how religion is purposively devoted in the translation of political texts, in general, and political speeches, in particular.

Finally, findings and results of the thesis provide answers for questions that may arise in regard to translation as a product in times of ongoing conflicts.

### 5.3 Future research

Political speeches, as a sub-genre of political texts, constitute a very rich, extensive and complex area of research. The thesis examined three different translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech before the UNGA from English into Arabic with a particular focus on aspects of ideology and politics. However, the study of the aspects of ideology and politics in the translations of political speeches is still largely under-researched area. In other words, the more ideology is researched, the more consideration it holds within the discipline of Translation Studies. This thesis may pave the way to more research on interesting topics from the perspective of Translation Studies in several ways:

Firstly, the original text of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech is in English (cf. Chapter 3.1.1). The speech was also translated into Hebrew<sup>16</sup>. In addition to its translation in Arabic, access to its other UN's translations in the other four official languages, Chinese<sup>17</sup>, French<sup>18</sup>, Russian<sup>19</sup> and Spanish<sup>20</sup>, is open to everyone. Thus, a broader interesting corpus, from the perspective of Translation Studies, is available to be investigated. Thus, findings of such studies can be compared with the findings of the current thesis in terms of its main interests.

Secondly, as long as access to the UN's official political speeches-as official documents- is available, all of Benjamin's Netanyahu's speeches are translated into the UN's six official languages. Thus, they constitute interesting corpus, from the perspective from Translation Studies, to research on the aspects of ideology and politics in translations of political speeches. Thus, the discipline of Translation

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<sup>16</sup> The UN's translation of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech in Hebrew can be accessed on: <https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/israel/Article-b1b45c503979231017.htm> (Last accessed: 26 March 2018).

<sup>17</sup> The UN's translation of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech in Chinese can be accessed on: [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/PV.19&referer=http://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/symbol.shtml&Lang=C](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/PV.19&referer=http://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/symbol.shtml&Lang=C) (Last accessed: 26 March 2018).

<sup>18</sup> The UN's translation of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech in French can be accessed on: [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/PV.19&referer=http://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/symbol.shtml&Lang=F](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/PV.19&referer=http://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/symbol.shtml&Lang=F) (Last accessed: 26 March 2018).

<sup>19</sup> The UN's translation of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech in Russian can be accessed on: [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/PV.19&referer=http://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/symbol.shtml&Lang=R](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/PV.19&referer=http://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/symbol.shtml&Lang=R) (Last accessed: 26 March 2018).

<sup>20</sup> The UN's translation of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech in Spanish can be accessed on: [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/PV.19&referer=http://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/symbol.shtml&Lang=S](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/PV.19&referer=http://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/symbol.shtml&Lang=S) (Last accessed: 26 March 2018).



Studies will be enriched with comprehensive findings and discussions for topics lie at its core such as politics, ideology, power, culture...etc.

Thirdly, the three Arabic translations of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech before the UNGA in September 2011 were examined in terms of translating sensitive proper nouns, political terms, intertextuality and cases of addition (cf. Chapter Four). Framing and labelling, as a discursive feature of Benjamin Netanyahu's speeches and its Arabic translations produced by IPMO and ILIW (cf. Chapter 4.4.3), may constitute a new start for research on the translations of repetitions in Benjamin Netanyahu's speeches.

Translation, particularly in times of ongoing conflicts, is a complex activity. Several interesting major translational issues still need more investigation. For instance, examining the translation(s) of repetitions, intertextualities, sensitive political terms, proper nouns and other textual features of political texts are all interesting topics to be investigated from the perspective of Translation Studies. Also, situating these translations produced within their historical, sociopolitical and institutional contexts help to understand the relationship between the discipline of translation and the other disciplines such as politics, religion, business...etc. This also may pave the way to more modern issues to be investigated and researched in the discipline of Translation Studies, and thus having better comprehensive understanding about the complex nature of translation in general, and in times of ongoing conflict, in particular.

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## Annexes

### Annex 1: The Original Source Text of Benjamin Netanyahu's Speech

Ladies and gentlemen, Israel has extended its hand in peace from the moment it was established 63 years ago. On behalf of Israel and the Jewish people, I extend that hand again today. I extend it to the people of Egypt and Jordan, with renewed friendship for neighbors with whom we have made peace. I extend it to the people of Turkey, with respect and good will. I extend it to the people of Libya and Tunisia, with admiration for those trying to build a democratic future. I extend it to the other peoples of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, with whom we want to forge a new beginning. I extend it to the people of Syria, Lebanon and Iran, with awe at the courage of those fighting brutal repression. But most especially, I extend my hand to the Palestinian people, with whom we seek a just and lasting peace.

Ladies and gentlemen, in Israel our hope for peace never wanes. Our scientists, doctors, innovators, apply their genius to improve the world of tomorrow. Our artists, our writers, enrich the heritage of humanity. Now, I know that this is not exactly the image of Israel that is often portrayed in this hall. **After all, it was here in 1975 that the age-old yearning of my people to restore our national life in our ancient biblical homeland -- it was then that this was braided -- branded, rather -- shamefully, as racism.** And it was here in 1980, right here, that the historic peace agreement between Israel and Egypt wasn't praised; it was denounced! And it's here year after year that Israel is unjustly singled out for condemnation. It's singled out for condemnation more often than all the nations of the world combined. Twenty-one out of the 27 General Assembly resolutions condemn Israel -- the one true democracy in the Middle East.

Well, this is an unfortunate part of the UN institution. It's the -- the theater of the absurd. **It doesn't only cast Israel as the villain; it often casts real villains in leading roles: Gadhafi's Libya chaired the UN Commission on Human Rights; Saddam's Iraq headed the UN Committee on Disarmament. You might say: That's the past. Well, here's what's happening now -- right now, today. Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon now presides over the UN Security Council. This means, in effect, that a terror organization presides over the body entrusted with guaranteeing the world's security. You couldn't make this thing up.**

**So here in the UN, automatic majorities can decide anything. They can decide that the sun sets in the west or rises in the west. I think the first has already been pre-ordained. But they can also decide -- they have decided that the Western Wall in Jerusalem, Judaism's holiest place, is occupied Palestinian territory.**

And yet even here in the General Assembly, the truth can sometimes break through. **In 1984 when I was appointed Israel's ambassador to the United Nations, I visited the great rabbi of Lubavich. He said to me -- and ladies and gentlemen, I don't want any of you to be offended because from personal experience of serving here, I know there are many honorable men and women, many capable and decent people serving their nations here. But here's what the rebbe said to me. He said to me, **you'll be serving in a house of many lies.** And then he said, remember that even in the darkest place, the light of a single candle can be seen far and wide.**

Today I hope that the light of truth will shine, if only for a few minutes, in a hall that for too long has been a place of darkness for my country. So as Israel's prime minister, I didn't come here to win applause. I came here to speak the truth. (Cheers, applause.) The truth is -- the truth is that Israel wants peace. The truth is that I want peace. The truth is that in the Middle East at all times, but especially during these turbulent days, peace must be anchored in security. **The truth is that we cannot achieve peace through UN resolutions, but only through direct negotiations between the parties. The truth is that so far the Palestinians have refused to negotiate. The truth is that Israel wants peace with a Palestinian state, but the Palestinians want a state without peace. And the truth is you shouldn't let that happen.**

Ladies and gentlemen, when I first came here 27 years ago, the world was divided between East and West. Since then the Cold War ended, great civilizations have risen from centuries of slumber, hundreds of millions have been lifted out of poverty, countless more are poised to follow, and the remarkable thing is that so far this monumental historic shift has largely occurred peacefully. Yet a

malignancy is now growing between East and West that threatens the peace of all. It seeks not to liberate, but to enslave, not to build, but to destroy.

That malignancy is militant Islam. It cloaks itself in the mantle of a great faith, yet it murders Jews, Christians and Muslims alike with unforgiving impartiality. On September 11th it killed thousands of Americans, and it left the twin towers in smoldering ruins. Last night I laid a wreath on the 9/11 memorial. It was deeply moving. But as I was going there, one thing echoed in my mind: the outrageous words of the president of Iran on this podium yesterday. He implied that 9/11 was an American conspiracy. Some of you left this hall. All of you should have. (Applause.)

Since 9/11, militant Islamists slaughtered countless other innocents -- in London and Madrid, in Baghdad and Mumbai, in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, in every part of Israel. I believe that the greatest danger facing our world is that this fanaticism will arm itself with nuclear weapons. And this is precisely what Iran is trying to do.

Can you imagine that man who ranted here yesterday -- can you imagine him armed with nuclear weapons? The international community must stop Iran before it's too late. If Iran is not stopped, we will all face the specter of nuclear terrorism, and the Arab Spring could soon become an Iranian winter. That would be a tragedy. Millions of Arabs have taken to the streets to replace tyranny with liberty, and no one would benefit more than Israel if those committed to freedom and peace would prevail.

This is my fervent hope. But as the prime minister of Israel, I cannot risk the future of the Jewish state on wishful thinking. Leaders must see reality as it is, not as it ought to be. We must do our best to shape the future, but we cannot wish away the dangers of the present.

And the world around Israel is definitely becoming more dangerous. Militant Islam has already taken over Lebanon and Gaza. It's determined to tear apart the peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and Jordan. It's poisoned many Arab minds against Jews and Israel, against America and the West. It opposes not the policies of Israel but the existence of Israel.

Now, some argue that the spread of militant Islam, especially in these turbulent times -- if you want to slow it down, they argue, Israel must hurry to make concessions, to make territorial compromises. And this theory sounds simple. Basically it goes like this: Leave the territory, and peace will be advanced. The moderates will be strengthened, the radicals will be kept at bay. And don't worry about the pesky details of how Israel will actually defend itself; international troops will do the job.

These people say to me constantly: Just make a sweeping offer, and everything will work out. You know, there's only one problem with that theory. We've tried it and it hasn't worked. **In 2000 Israel made a sweeping peace offer that met virtually all of the Palestinian demands. Arafat rejected it.** The Palestinians then launched a terror attack that claimed a thousand Israeli lives.

Prime Minister Olmert afterwards made an even more sweeping offer, in 2008. President Abbas didn't even respond to it.

But Israel did more than just make sweeping offers. We actually left territory. We withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 and from every square inch of Gaza in 2005. That didn't calm the Islamic storm, the militant Islamic storm that threatens us. It only brought the storm closer and make it stronger.

Hezbollah and Hamas fired thousands of rockets against our cities from the very territories we vacated. See, when Israel left Lebanon and Gaza, the moderates didn't defeat the radicals, the moderates were devoured by the radicals. And I regret to say that international troops like UNIFIL in Lebanon and UBAM (ph) in Gaza didn't stop the radicals from attacking Israel.

We left Gaza hoping for peace.

We didn't freeze the settlements in Gaza, we uprooted them. We did exactly what the theory says: Get out, go back to the 1967 borders, dismantle the settlements.

And I don't think people remember how far we went to achieve this. We uprooted thousands of people from their homes. We pulled children out of -- out of their schools and their kindergartens. We bulldozed synagogues. We even -- we even moved loved ones from their graves. And then, having done all that, we gave the keys of Gaza to President Abbas.

Now the theory says it should all work out, and President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority now could build a peaceful state in Gaza. You can remember that the entire world applauded. They applauded our withdrawal as an act of great statesmanship. It was a bold act of peace.

But ladies and gentlemen, we didn't get peace. We got war. We got Iran, which through its proxy Hamas promptly kicked out the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority collapsed in a day -- in one day.

President Abbas just said on this podium that the Palestinians are armed only with their hopes and dreams. Yeah, hopes, dreams and 10,000 missiles and Grad rockets supplied by Iran, not to mention the river of lethal weapons now flowing into Gaza from the Sinai, from Libya, and from elsewhere.

Thousands of missiles have already rained down on our cities. So you might understand that, given all this, Israelis rightly ask: What's to prevent this from happening again in the West Bank? See, most of

our major cities in the south of the country are within a few dozen kilometers from Gaza. But in the center of the country, opposite the West Bank, our cities are a few hundred meters or at most a few kilometers away from the edge of the West Bank.

So I want to ask you. Would any of you -- would any of you bring danger so close to your cities, to your families? Would you act so recklessly with the lives of your citizens? Israel is prepared to have a Palestinian state in the West Bank, but we're not prepared to have another Gaza there. And that's why we need to have real security arrangements, which the Palestinians simply refuse to negotiate with us.

Israelis remember the bitter lessons of Gaza. Many of Israel's critics ignore them. They irresponsibly advise Israel to go down this same perilous path again. You read what these people say and it's as if nothing happened -- just repeating the same advice, the same formulas as though none of this happened.

And these critics continue to press Israel to make far-reaching concessions without first assuring Israel's security. They praise those who unwittingly feed the insatiable crocodile of militant Islam as bold statesmen. They cast as enemies of peace those of us who insist that we must first erect a sturdy barrier to keep the crocodile out, or at the very least jam an iron bar between its gaping jaws.

So in the face of the labels and the libels, Israel must heed better advice. Better a bad press than a good eulogy, and better still would be a fair press whose sense of history extends beyond breakfast, and which recognizes Israel's legitimate security concerns.

I believe that in serious peace negotiations, these needs and concerns can be properly addressed, but they will not be addressed without negotiations. And the needs are many, because Israel is such a tiny country. Without Judea and Samaria, the West Bank, Israel is all of 9 miles wide.

I want to put it for you in perspective, because you're all in the city. That's about two-thirds the length of Manhattan. It's the distance between Battery Park and Columbia University. And don't forget that the people who live in Brooklyn and New Jersey are considerably nicer than some of Israel's neighbors. So how do you -- how do you protect such a tiny country, surrounded by people sworn to its destruction and armed to the teeth by Iran? Obviously you can't defend it from within that narrow space alone. Israel needs greater strategic depth, and that's exactly why Security Council Resolution 242 didn't require Israel to leave all the territories it captured in the Six-Day War. It talked about withdrawal from territories, to secure and defensible boundaries. And to defend itself, Israel must therefore maintain a long-term Israeli military presence in critical strategic areas in the West Bank.

I explained this to President Abbas. He answered that if a Palestinian state was to be a sovereign country, it could never accept such arrangements. Why not? America has had troops in Japan, Germany and South Korea for more than a half a century. Britain has had an airspace in Cyprus or rather an air base in Cyprus. France has forces in three independent African nations. None of these states claim that they're not sovereign countries.

And there are many other vital security issues that also must be addressed. Take the issue of airspace. Again, Israel's small dimensions create huge security problems. America can be crossed by jet airplane in six hours. To fly across Israel, it takes three minutes. So is Israel's tiny airspace to be chopped in half and given to a Palestinian state not at peace with Israel?

**Our major international airport is a few kilometers away from the West Bank. Without peace, will our planes become targets for anti-aircraft missiles placed in the adjacent Palestinian state?**

And how will we stop the smuggling into the West Bank? It's not merely the West Bank, it's the West Bank mountains. It just dominates the coastal plain where most of Israel's population sits below. How could we prevent the smuggling into these mountains of those missiles that could be fired on our cities?

I bring up these problems because they're not theoretical problems. They're very real. And for Israelis, they're life-and-death matters. All these potential cracks in Israel's security have to be sealed in a peace agreement before a Palestinian state is declared, not afterwards, because if you leave it afterwards, they won't be sealed. And these problems will explode in our face and explode the peace.

The Palestinians should first make peace with Israel and then get their state. But I also want to tell you this. After such a peace agreement is signed, Israel will not be the last country to welcome a Palestinian state as a new member of the United Nations. We will be the first. (Applause.)

And there's one more thing. Hamas has been violating international law by holding our soldier Gilad Shalit captive for five years.

They haven't given even one Red Cross visit. He's held in a dungeon, in darkness, against all international norms. Gilad Shalit is the son of Aviva and Noam Shalit. He is the grandson of Zvi Shalit, who escaped the Holocaust by coming to the -- in the 1930s as a boy to the land of Israel. Gilad Shalit is the son of every Israeli family. Every nation represented here should demand his immediate release. (Applause.) If you want to -- if you want to pass a resolution about the Middle East today, that's the resolution you should pass. (Applause.)

Ladies and gentlemen, last year in Israel in Bar-Ilan University, this year in the Knesset and in the U.S. Congress, I laid out my vision for peace in which a demilitarized Palestinian state recognizes the Jewish state. Yes, the Jewish state. After all, this is the body that recognized the Jewish state 64 years ago. Now, don't you think it's about time that Palestinians did the same?

The Jewish state of Israel will always protect the rights of all its minorities, including the more than 1 million Arab citizens of Israel. I wish I could say the same thing about a future Palestinian state, for as Palestinian officials made clear the other day -- in fact, I think they made it right here in New York -- they said the Palestinian state won't allow any Jews in it. They'll be Jew-free -- Judenrein. That's ethnic cleansing. There are laws today in Ramallah that make the selling of land to Jews punishable by death. That's racism. And you know which laws this evokes.

Israel has no intention whatsoever to change the democratic character of our state. We just don't want the Palestinians to try to change the Jewish character of our state. (Applause.) We want to give up -- we want them to give up the fantasy of flooding Israel with millions of Palestinians.

**President Abbas just stood here, and he said that the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the settlements.** Well, that's odd. Our conflict has been raging for -- was raging for nearly half a century before there was a single Israeli settlement in the West Bank. So if what President Abbas is saying was true, then the -- I guess that the settlements he's talking about are Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jaffa, Be'er Sheva. Maybe that's what he meant the other day when he said that Israel has been occupying Palestinian land for 63 years. He didn't say from 1967; he said from 1948. I hope somebody will bother to ask him this question because it illustrates a simple truth: The core of the conflict is not the settlements. The settlements are a result of the conflict. (Applause.)

The settlements have to be -- it's an issue that has to be addressed and resolved in the course of negotiations. But the core of the conflict has always been and unfortunately remains the refusal of the Palestinians to recognize a Jewish state in any border.

**I think it's time that the Palestinian leadership recognizes what every serious international leader has recognized, from Lord Balfour and Lloyd George in 1917, to President Truman in 1948, to President Obama just two days ago right here: Israel is the Jewish state.** (Applause.)

President Abbas, stop walking around this issue. Recognize the Jewish state, and make peace with us. In such a genuine peace, Israel is prepared to make painful compromises. We believe that the Palestinians should be neither the citizens of Israel nor its subjects. They should live in a free state of their own. But they should be ready, like us, for compromise. And we will know that they're ready for compromise and for peace when they start taking Israel's security requirements seriously and when they stop denying our historical connection to our ancient homeland.

I often hear them accuse Israel of Judaizing Jerusalem. That's like accusing America of Americanizing Washington, or the British of Anglicizing London. **You know why we're called "Jews"? Because we come from Judea. In my office in Jerusalem, there's a -- there's an ancient seal. It's a signet ring of a Jewish official from the time of the Bible. The seal was found right next to the Western Wall, and it dates back 2,700 years, to the time of King Hezekiah. Now, there's a name of the Jewish official inscribed on the ring in Hebrew. His name was Netanyahu. That's my last name. **My first name, Benjamin, dates back a thousand years earlier to Benjamin -- Binyamin -- the son of Jacob, who was also known as Israel.** Jacob and his 12 sons roamed these same hills of Judea and Sumeria 4,000 years ago, and there's been a continuous Jewish presence in the land ever since.**

**And for those Jews who were exiled from our land, they never stopped dreaming of coming back: Jews in Spain, on the eve of their expulsion; Jews in the Ukraine, fleeing the pogroms; Jews fighting the Warsaw Ghetto, as the Nazis were circling around it. They never stopped praying, they never stopped yearning. They whispered: Next year in Jerusalem. Next year in the promised land.**

**As the prime minister of Israel, I speak for a hundred generations of Jews who were dispersed throughout the lands, who suffered every evil under the Sun, but who never gave up hope of restoring their national life in the one and only Jewish state.**

Ladies and gentlemen, I continue to hope that President Abbas will be my partner in peace. I've worked hard to advance that peace. The day I came into office, I called for direct negotiations without preconditions. President Abbas didn't respond. I outlined a vision of peace of two states for two peoples. He still didn't respond. I removed hundreds of roadblocks and checkpoints, to ease freedom of movement in the Palestinian areas; this facilitated a fantastic growth in the Palestinian economy. But again -- no response. I took the unprecedented step of freezing new buildings in the settlements for 10 months. No prime minister did that before, ever. (Scattered applause.) Once again -- you applaud, but there was no response. No response.



In the last few weeks, American officials have put forward ideas to restart peace talks. There were things in those ideas about borders that I didn't like. There were things there about the Jewish state that I'm sure the Palestinians didn't like.

But with all my reservations, I was willing to move forward on these American ideas.

President Abbas, why don't you join me? We have to stop negotiating about the negotiations. Let's just get on with it. Let's negotiate peace.

I spent years defending Israel on the battlefield. I spent decades defending Israel in the court of public opinion. President Abbas, you've dedicated your life to advancing the Palestinian cause. Must this conflict continue for generations, or will we enable our children and our grandchildren to speak in years ahead of how we found a way to end it? That's what we should aim for, and that's what I believe we can achieve.

**In two and a half years, we met in Jerusalem only once, even though my door has always been open to you.** If you wish, I'll come to Ramallah. Actually, I have a better suggestion. We've both just flown thousands of miles to New York. Now we're in the same city. We're in the same building. So let's meet here today in the United Nations. Who's there to stop us? What is there to stop us? If we genuinely want peace, what is there to stop us from meeting today and beginning peace negotiations?

And I suggest we talk openly and honestly. Let's listen to one another. Let's do as we say in the Middle East: Let's talk "doogri". That means straightforward. I'll tell you my needs and concerns. You'll tell me yours. And with God's help, we'll find the common ground of peace.

There's an old Arab saying that you cannot applaud with one hand. Well, the same is true of peace. I cannot make peace alone. I cannot make peace without you. **President Abbas, I extend my hand -- the hand of Israel -- in peace.** I hope that you will grasp that hand. We are both the sons of Abraham. My people call him Avraham. Your people call him Ibrahim. We share the same patriarch. We dwell in the same land. Our destinies are intertwined. Let us realize the vision of Isaiah -- (speaks in Hebrew) -- "The people who walk in darkness will see a great light." Let that light be the light of peace.

## Annex 2: The UN's Arabic Translation

ظلت إسرائيل تمدّ بها بالسلام منذ لحظة تأسيسها قبل 63 عامًا. بالنيابة عن إسرائيل والشعب اليهودي، أمدت تلك اليد مرة أخرى اليوم. أمدتها إلى شعب مصر والأردن، مع تجديد الصداقة للدول المجاورة التي حققنا السلام معها. أمدتها إلى الشعب التركي، مع الاحترام وحسن النية. أمدتها إلى شعبي ليبيا وتونس، مع الإعجاب بالذين يسعون إلى بناء مستقبل ديمقراطي. أمدتها إلى الشعوب الأخرى في شمال أفريقيا وشبه الجزيرة العربية، وهي شعوب نريد تشكيل بداية جديدة معها.

أمدتها إلى شعوب سوريا ولبنان وإيران، لروح الشجاعة التي يكافحون بها القمع الوحشي. أمد يدي بشكل خاص جدا إلى الشعب الفلسطيني الذي نسعى إلى التوصل معه إلى سلام عادل ودائم. إننا في إسرائيل لن نحسر أملنا في السلام. والعلماء والأطباء والمبدعين لدينا يسخرون عبقريتهم لتحسين عالم الغد. ويعمل الفنانون والكتاب لدينا على إثراء تراث الإنسانية. وأعرف الآن أن هذه ليست بالضبط هي صورة إسرائيل التي غالبا ما تُرسم في هذه القاعة.

ومع ذلك، جرى هنا في عام 1975، وعلى نحو مخز ووصم شعبي بالعنصرية، ذلك الشعب الذي ظل يتوق لعصور إلى استعادة حياته، الوطنية في وطننا الذي ورد في العهد القديم. وفي 1980 وهنا بالذات فإن إبرام اتفاق السلام التاريخي بين مصر وإسرائيل لم ينل الثناء والاستحسان، لكن تم التنديد به.

ويجرى هنا عاما إثر عام استفراد إسرائيل بالإدانة ظلما. يتم استفرادها بالإدانة أكثر بكثير من كل دول العالم مجتمعة. لقد صدر 21 من أصل 27 قرارا من قرارات الجمعية ذات الصلة تدين إسرائيل التي تمثل الديمقراطية الحقيقية في الشرق الأوسط. هذا هو الجزء المؤسف في مؤسسة الأمم المتحدة. هذا هو مسرح اللامعقول فهي لا تسلط فحسب الضوء على إسرائيل باعتبارها الشرير، بل إنها كثيرا ما تعطي الأشرار الحقيقيين أدوارا قيادية. فقد ترأست ليبيا القذافي لجنة حقوق الإنسان. وترأست عراق صدام مؤتمر نزع السلاح. يمكن للمرء أن يقول هذا هو الماضي. حسنا، هنا هو ما يحدث الآن الآن، فاليوم. فإن حزب الله الذي يسيطر على لبنان يتراأس حاليا مجلس الأمن. وهذا يعني، في الواقع، أن منظمة إرهابية ترأست الهيئة الموكول إليها ضمان الأمن في العالم. لا يمكن للمرء أن يصطنع هذا الأمر.

هنا في الأمم المتحدة، يمكن للأغلبية التلقائية أن تقرر أي شيء. يمكنها أن تقرر أن الشمس تشرق من الغرب. يمكن أن تقرر أيضا - بل قررت - بأن حائط الميكي في القدس، وهو أقدس مكان لدى اليهود، أرض فلسطينية محتلة.

مع ذلك، وحتى هنا في الجمعية العامة، يمكن في بعض الأحيان أن تظهر الحقيقة. ففي عام 1984، عندما غينت سفيرا إسرائيل لدى الأمم المتحدة، زرت الحاخام الأكبر لويافيتش. قال لي - وأنا لا أريد بأن يشعر أي شخص هنا بالإهانة، لأنه من تجربتي الشخصية في الخدمة هنا أعرف أنه يوجد الكثير من الشرفاء من الرجال والنساء، يوجد هنا الكثير من الناس المقدرين والترهيبيين الذين يخدمون دولهم - ولكن إليكم ما قاله لي الحاخام: " سوف تعمل في مكان يعج بالأكاذيب." ثم قال لي: "تذكر أنه حتى في أكثر الأماكن ظلمة، يمكن أن ترى النور فيه من بعد وعلى نطاق واسع من خلال ضوء شمعة واحدة فيه." ولدي أمل في أن يتألق ضوء الحقيقة، ولو لبضع دقائق، في قاعة ما برحت لفترة طويلة جدا مكانا مظلمًا بالنسبة لبليدي.

بصفتي رئيس وزراء إسرائيل، لم أحضر إلى هنا للفوز بالتصفيق. جئت إلى هنا لكي أقول الحقيقة. والحقيقة هي إن إسرائيل تريد السلام. والحقيقة هي أنني أريد السلام. والحقيقة هي أنه في الشرق الأوسط، وفي جميع الأوقات، ولكن خصوصا في هذه الأيام التي يسودها الاضطراب، لا بد من توطيد السلام بدعائم الأمن. والحقيقة هي أن تتمكن من تحقيق السلام ليس من خلال قرارات الأمم المتحدة، ولكن فقط عن طريق المفاوضات المباشرة بين الطرفين. والحقيقة هي أنه حتى الآن يرفض الفلسطينيون التفاوض.

**والحقيقة هي أن إسرائيل تريد السلام مع دولة فلسطينية، لكن الفلسطينيين يريدون دولة من دون سلام. والحقيقة هي أنه ينبغي للجمعية العامة ألا تسمح بحدوث ذلك.**

عندما جئت إلى هنا لأول مرة منذ 27 عاماً، كان العالم مقسماً بين الشرق والغرب. ومنذئذ، انتهت الحرب الباردة، ونهضت حضارات عظيمة من سبات دام لقرون، وتم انتشار مئات الملايين من البشر من برائن الفقر، وهناك أعداد كبيرة في طريقها إلى أن تحذو نفس الحذو، والشئ الرائع هو أنه حتى الآن، يحدث هذا التحول التاريخي الهائل بصورة سلمية إلى حد كبير. مع ذلك لا يزال هناك ورم خبيث ينمو الآن بين الشرق والغرب ويهدد السلام للجميع. أنه لا يسعى إلى التحرير، بل الاستعباد، ولا يسعى من أجل البناء، بل من أجل التدمير. ذلك الورم الخبيث هو الإسلام المتشدد. لقد غلّف نفسه بعباءة دين عظيم، ومع ذلك يقوم بقتل اليهود والمسيحيين والمسلمين على حد سواء ومن دون تحيز قاس.

في 11 أيلول/ سبتمبر 2001، قتل المسلمون المتطرفون آلاف الأمريكيين وتركوا البرجين التوأمن أنقاضاً يلفها دخان الحريق المشتعل. في الليلة الماضية، وضعت إكليلاً من الزهور على النصب التذكاري لحادث 11 أيلول/ سبتمبر 2001. كان ذلك مؤثراً جداً. ولكن عندما كنت في طريقي إلى هناك، ثمة شيء واحد كان يجول في خاطري ألا وهو الكلمات الشائنة التي صدرت بالأمس عن الرئيس الإيراني ومن على هذه المنصة. فقد ألمح إلى أن حادث 11 أيلول/ سبتمبر 2001 كان مؤامرة أمريكية. لقد ترك البعض هذه القاعة، وكان ينبغي للجميع تركها.

منذ 11 أيلول/ سبتمبر، ذبح الإسلاميون المتشددون أعداداً أخرى كبيرة من الناس الأبرياء في لندن، ومدريد، وبغداد، ومومباي، وتل أبيب والقدس، وفي كل جزء من إسرائيل. أعتقد أن أكبر خطر يواجهه عالمنا هو أن هذا التعصب سوف يسيل نفسه بأسلحة نووية، وهذا هو بالضبط ما تحاول إيران القيام به.

فهل بوسعنا أن نتصور أن الرجل الذي تحدثت به عاطفة باردة هنا أمس مسلح بأسلحة نووية؟ يجب على المجتمع الدولي وقف إيران قبل فوات الأوان. وإذا لم يتم التصدي لإيران فإننا جميعاً سنواجه شبح الإرهاب النووي وقد يتحول الربيع العربي سريعاً إلى شتاء إيراني. إن هذا الأمر قد يصبح مأساة. لقد خرج الملايين من العرب إلى الشوارع لاستبدال الطغيان بالحرية وستكون إسرائيل المستفيد الأول من انتصار أولئك الملتمزين بالحرية والسلام.

ذلك هو الأمل المتوهج الذي براودني، لكن بصفتي رئيس وزراء إسرائيل، لا يسعني المخاطرة بمستقبل الدولة اليهودية لأجل مجرد تمنيات. يجب على القادة النظر في واقع الحال كما هو وليس كما يجب عليه أن يكون. يجب علينا بذل كل ما في وسعنا لتشكيل المستقبل لكن لا يسعنا تجاهل الأخطار المحدقة في الوقت الحاضر. إن العالم المحيط بإسرائيل يزداد خطورة بالتأكد. لقد سيطر التشدد الإسلامي بالفعل على لبنان و غزة، وأنه مصمم على تمزيق معاهدتي السلام المبرمتين بين إسرائيل ومصر وإسرائيل والأردن. إنه سمّ الكثير من العقول العربية لتتجه ضد اليهود وإسرائيل وأميركا والغرب. إنه لا يعارض سياسات إسرائيل بل وجودها.

والآن هناك من يدعي بأنه إذا كنا نريد إبطاء وتيرة انتشار التشدد الإسلامي، خاصة في هذه الأوقات المضطربة، يجب على إسرائيل أن تسارع إلى تقديم التنازلات، بما في ذلك التوصل إلى تسويات تقوم على التخلي عن أراض. وتبدو هذه النظرية بسيطة لأنها تقيّد أساساً بما يلي: "أتركوا الأراضي وعندها سيجري التقدم صوب السلام. وسيعزز المعتدلون فيما يتم احتواء المتطرفين، ولا داعي للقلق بشأن التفاصيل المزجة حول الكيفية التي ستدافع بها إسرائيل عن نفسها فعلاً، إذ ستقوم قوات دولية بهذا العمل". إن هؤلاء الناس يقولون لي دوماً: "كل ما عليكم هو تقديم عرض كاسح، وعندها سيصبح كل شيء على ما يُرام." لكن هناك مشكلة واحدة فقط في تلك النظرية، ألا وهي أننا كنا قد جربناها لكنها لم تحقق النتيجة المرجوة. ففي عام 2000، قدمت إسرائيل عرضاً كبيراً من أجل السلام استجاب لجميع المطالب الفلسطينية تقريباً. لكن الرئيس عرفات رفضه، وعندها أطلق الفلسطينيون حملة إرهابية أزهدت أرواح ألف مواطن إسرائيلي. ثم تقدم رئيس الوزراء أولمرت بعرض كاسح أكثر من سابقه عام 2008. لكن الرئيس عباس لم يردّ عليه مطلقاً.

غير أن إسرائيل قامت بأكثر من مجرد تقديم العروض الكاسحة. لقد خرجنا عملياً من بعض الأراضي، إذ انسحبنا من لبنان عام 2000 ثم انسحبنا من كل شبر من غزة عام 2005. ولم يجعل ذلك العاصفة الإسلامية التي تهددنا تهدأ، بل أدى الأمر إلى جعل هذه العاصفة أقرب منا وأشد قوة. لقد أطلقت عناصر حزب الله وحماس آلاف الصواريخ على مدننا انطلاقاً من ذات الأراضي التي أخليناها. وعندما خرجت إسرائيل من لبنان و غزة، لم يهزم المعتدلون المتطرفين بل اتهم المتطرفون المعتدلين. ويوسفني القول إن القوات الدولية بما في ذلك قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان وبعثة الاتحاد الأوروبي لتقديم المساعدة الحدودية في غزة، لم تتمكن من وقف هجمات العناصر المتشددة على إسرائيل.

لقد خرجنا من غزة أملاً في تحقيق السلام. ولم نجمد المستوطنات في غزة، بل اقتلعناها، بمعنى أننا قمنا بتحديدًا بما نقوله النظرية: خرجنا وعدنا إلى حدود 1967 وفككتنا المستوطنات. ولا أظن أن الناس يذكرون مدى ما ذهبنا إليه لتحقيق ذلك. لقد اجتثنا الآلاف من الناس من ديارهم. وسحبنا الأطفال من المدارس ورياض الأطفال. وجرفنا الكس، بل إننا نقلنا أحبتهم من مدافعهم. وعندما أنجزنا كل ذلك سلمنا مفاتيح غزة للرئيس عباس. وكان من الواجب أن تحقق النظرية مبتغاه وأن تمكن الرئيس عباس والسلطة الفلسطينية في هذا الظرف من إقامة دولة مسالمة في غزة. ونذكر جميعاً كيف صَفَق العالم بأسره حينها مهلاً لانسحابنا باعتباره خطوة جريئة نحو السلام ينم عن الحنكة السياسية العظيمة. لكننا لم نحقق السلام بل ووجهنا بالحرب. لقد جاءتنا إيران - التي قامت، عبر وكيلتها حماس بطرد السلطة الفلسطينية بسرعة. وانهارت السلطة الفلسطينية خلال يوم ليس إلا. وكان الرئيس عباس قد قال للتو من على هذا المنبر إن الفلسطينيين مسلحون فقط بالأمال والأحلام. نعم، إنهم مسلحون بالأمال والأحلام وكذلك بـ 10 آلاف من القذائف وصواريخ "غراد" زودتهم بها إيران، ناهيك عن سيل الأسلحة الفتاكة التي تندفق الآن على غزة من سيناء وليبيا وأماكن أخرى. وقد تم فعلاً إطلاق وإبل من الآلاف القذائف على مدننا، وبالتالي قد يكون من المفهوم - بالنظر إلى كل ما تقدم - أن يطرح الإسرائيليون السؤال الآتي: ماذا يحول دون تكرار هذا في الضفة الغربية مرة أخرى؟

معظم المدن الرئيسية في جنوب بلدنا تقع على مسافة عشرات الكيلومترات من غزة، لكن في وسط البلد قبالة الضفة الغربية، لا تبعد مدننا إلا مئات الأمتار أو عدة كيلومترات لا أكثر عن أطراف الضفة الغربية.

ولذا أود أن أطرح هذا السؤال: هل يمكن لأي من الحاضرين هنا أن يجلب الخطر ليصبح قريباً إلى هذا الحد من مدنها وعائلاتهم؟ هل كانوا سيتصرفون تصرفاً طائشاً إلى هذا الحد إزاء حياة مواطنيهم؟ إن إسرائيل مستعدة لقيام دولة فلسطينية في الضفة الغربية لكننا غير مستعدين لاستنساخ تجربة غزة هناك. وبناء عليه فإننا نحتاج إلى ترتيبات أمنية حقيقية، وهو ما يرفض الفلسطينيون بكل بساطة التفاوض معنا بشأنه.

إن الإسرائيليين يذكرون الدروس المستفادة مما جرى في غزة. أما العديد ممن ينتقدون إسرائيل فإنهم يتغاضون عن ذلك وينصحون إسرائيل بشكل غير مسؤول بالسير على نفس الدرب الخطير مرة أخرى. عندما تطالع ما يقوله هؤلاء الناس يساورن الشعور وكان شيئاً لم يحدث حيث إنهم يرددون النصح والصيغ ذاتها وكان شيئاً لم يحدث فعلاً. ويواصل هؤلاء المنتقدون ممارسة الضغط على إسرائيل لتقديم التنازلات الشاملة دون أن يقدموا أولاً أي ضمانات على حماية أمن إسرائيل. إنهم يشيدون بأولئك الذين

يغذون عن غير عمد تمساح التشدد الإسلامي النهم ويصفونهم برجال الدولة الشجعان. إنهم ينعنون بأعداء السلام من منا يصرون على أنه يجب أولاً نصب حاجز ثابت لإبقاء التمساح في الخارج، أو على الأقل وضع قضيب حديدي بين أنيابه الفاغرة.

إن إسرائيل تحتاج إلى نصيحة أفضل إزاء كل هذه التسميات وكلمات الكذب والتشهير. إذ يُفضّل أن يتخذ الإعلام موقفاً سلبياً منها بدلاً من أن تتال الكلمات التأيينية المنمّقة؛ لا بل سيكون من الأفضل أن تحظى إسرائيل بتغطية صحفية منصفة من جانب أولئك الذين يتجاوز حسهم التاريخي ما يتناولونه على مادة الإفطار والذين يقرّون بوجود شواغل أمنية مشروعة لدى إسرائيل. إنني أعتقد بأن المفاوضات السلمية الجدية تسمح بالمعالجة المناسبة لهذه الاحتياجات والشواغل، لكن لن تتم معالجتها بدون مفاوضات. والاحتياجات كثيرة لأن إسرائيل بلد صغير. فيدون يهودا والسامرة - الضفة الغربية - لا يتعدى عرضها 9 أميال.

أود وضع المسألة في سياقها أمامنا جميعاً في هذه المدينة، إذ تعادل هذه المسافة ثلثي طول مساحة جزيرة مانهاتن. إنها تساوي المسافة بين منتزه باتري بارك وجامعة كولومبيا. وينبغي ألا ننسى أن الناس الذين يعيشون في بروكلين وفي نيوجيرسي اللطيف إلى حد كبير من بعض جيران إسرائيل. فكيف يمكن حماية بلد صغير إلى هذا الحد، ومحاط بأبناس تعهدوا بتدميره ومدججين بالأسلحة المزود من إيران؟ وجلي أنه لا يمكن الدفاع عنه من ذلك الحيز الضيق وحده. فإسرائيل بحاجة إلى عمق استراتيجي، ولهذا السبب بعينه 1967 (من إسرائيل أن) لم يطلب قرار مجلس الأمن 242 تنسحب من جميع الأراضي التي حازتها في حرب الأيام الستة. فقد نص على انسحاب من أراض إلى حدود يمكن الدفاع عنها. ولكي تدافع إسرائيل عن نفسها، عليها أن تحافظ في الأجل الطويل على وجود عسكري إسرائيلي في مناطق استراتيجية حاسمة في الضفة الغربية.

لقد شرحت ذلك للرئيس عباس. وكان جوابه أنه إذا كان للدولة الفلسطينية أن تكون بلداً ذا سيادة فإنه لا يمكن أن يقبل إطلاقاً بتلك الترتيبات. ولم لا؟ الولايات المتحدة لديها جنود في اليابان، وألمانيا، وكوريا الجنوبية لما يزيد على نصف قرن. وبريطانيا لها قاعدة عسكرية في قبرص. وفرنسا لها قوات في ثلاث دول أفريقية مستقلة. ولا تزعم أي دولة من تلك الدول أنها بلدان لا تتمتع بالسيادة. وهناك مسائل أمنية عديدة أخرى يجب معالجتها أيضاً. خذ مثلاً مسألة المجال الجوي. ومرة أخرى، مساحة إسرائيل الصغيرة تشكل مصدراً لمشاكل أمنية كبيرة. فأجواء الولايات المتحدة يستغرق عبورها بالطائرة ست ساعات.

أما الطيران عبر أجواء إسرائيل فيستغرق ثلاث دقائق. فهل يقطع نصف المجال الجوي لإسرائيل ليعطى لدولة فلسطينية ليست في سلام مع إسرائيل؟ ويقع مطارنا الدولي على بعد كيلومترات قليلة من الضفة الغربية. وبدون سلام، هل تصبح طائراتنا أهدافاً للصواريخ المضادة للطائرات المثبتة في الدولة الفلسطينية المحاذية؟ ولا يتعلق الأمر بالضفة الغربية بعينها، بل إنها جبال الضفة الغربية، التي تتحكم بالسهل الساحلي إلى أسفل، حيث تتركز أغلبية المراكز السكانية لإسرائيل. وكيف يمكن أن نمنع تهريب الصواريخ إلى تلك الجبال حيث يمكن إطلاقها على مدننا؟ إنني أطرح هذه المشاكل لأنها ليست مشاكل نظرية. إنها حقيقية تماماً. وجميع تلك الثغرات الأمنية الممكنة يجب سدّها في اتفاق سلام قبل إعلان الدولة الفلسطينية، وليس بعد ذلك، لأنها إذا تركت لما بعده فلن تتم إزالتها. وستتفجر تلك المشاكل في وجودها مما سيؤدي إلى تفجير السلام.

على الفلسطينيين أن يتوصلوا إلى سلام مع إسرائيل وأن يحصلوا على دولتهم بعد ذلك. ولكن أريد أن أقول هذا أيضاً. بعد توقيع اتفاق سلام، لن تكون إسرائيل آخر بلد يرحب بالدولة الفلسطينية بوصفها عضواً جديداً في الأمم المتحدة. بل سنكون أول من يفعل ذلك. وهناك أمر آخر. حماس ظلت تحرق القانون الدولي من خلال احتجاج جندينا جلعاد شاليط لخمس سنوات. ولم يسمحوا حتى بزيارة واحدة للصليب الأحمر. إنه محتجز في زنزانه، في الظلام، بما يخالف جميع القواعد الدولية.

وجلعاد شاليط هو ابن أفيفا ونوعام شاليط. إنه حفيد تسفي شاليط الذي نجا من المحرقة من خلال قدومه إلى أرض إسرائيل صبياً في الثلاثينيات. وجلعاد شاليط هو ابن كل أسرة إسرائيلية. وينبغي لكل دولة ممثلة هنا أن تطالب بإطلاق سراحه فوراً. وإذا كنا نريد اتخاذ قرار بشأن الشرق الأوسط اليوم، هذا هو القرار الذي ينبغي اعتماده.

في العام الماضي، عرضت رؤيتي للسلام في جامعة بار أيلان، وهذا العام في كونغرس الولايات المتحدة، وتوجد في تلك الرؤية دولة فلسطينية متروعة السلاح تعترف بالدولة اليهودية. نعم، الدولة اليهودية. ففي نهاية المطاف هذه هي الهيئة التي اعترفت بالدولة اليهودية قبل 64 عاماً. والآن ألا ترى الجمعية العامة أنه حان الوقت للفلسطينيين أن يحذوا حذوها؟

إن دولة إسرائيل اليهودية ستحمي دائماً حقوق جميع الأقليات، بما في ذلك أكثر من مليون من العرب المواطنين في إسرائيل. وأود لو استطعت أن أقول الشيء نفسه عن الدولة الفلسطينية في المستقبل، حيث كما أوضح مسؤولون فلسطينيون بالأمس - أعتقد أنهم قالوا ذلك هنا، في نيويورك - لن تسمح الدولة الفلسطينية بوجود أي مواطنين يهود. سيكونون خالين من اليهود - جودينراين. هذا تطهير عرقي. وهناك قوانين في رام الله تجعل بيع الأرض لليهود جريمة عقوبتها الموت. هذه عنصرية. وتعلم الجمعية العامة بأي قوانين يذكرنا ذلك. إن إسرائيل ليست لديها أي نوايا بتغيير الطابع الديمغرافي لدولتنا. إننا نريد فقط ألا يحاول الفلسطينيون تغيير الطابع اليهودي لدولتنا. ونريدهم أن يتخلوا عن طيف خيالهم أنهم سيعمرون إسرائيل بملايين الفلسطينيين.

**لقد وقف الرئيس عباس هنا للتو، وقال إن المستوطنات هي جوهر الصراعات الإسرائيلية - الفلسطينية.** حسناً، هذا غريب. فصراعاتنا كانت على أشدها قبل نصف قرن من وجود مستوطنة إسرائيلية واحدة في الضفة الغربية. فلو كان ما يقوله الرئيس عباس صحيحاً، هذا يعني على ما أظن أنه تكلم عن تل أبيب وحيفا ويافا وبئر السبع. وربما هذا ما قصده عندما قال بالأمس أن إسرائيل تحتل الأراضي الفلسطينية منذ 63 عاماً. إنه لم يقل منذ عام 1967؛ بل منذ عام 1948 إنني أأمل أن أحداً سيكلف نفسه عناء توجيه هذا السؤال إليه، لأنه يبين حقيقة بسيطة. جوهر الصراع ليس المستوطنات؛ المستوطنات هي نتيجة للصراع. المستوطنات مسألة ينبغي معالجتها وحلها خلال المفاوضات. ولكن جوهر الصراع كان، وما زال هو رفض الفلسطينيين الاعتراف بدولة يهودية ضمن أي حدود.

**إنني أعتقد أنه حان الوقت للقيادة الفلسطينية أن تعترف بما اعترف به كل قائد دولي جاد من اللورد بلفور وديفيد جورج لويد في عام 1917، إلى الرئيس ترومان في عام 1948، وإلى الرئيس أوباما قبل يومين، في هذا المكان، وهو إن إسرائيل هي الدولة اليهودية.** وأود أن أطلب من الرئيس عباس أن يتوقف عن الدوران حول هذه المسألة، اعترف بالدولة اليهودية واعقد سلاماً معنا. ففي سلام حقيقي كهذا، ستكون إسرائيل مستعدة لتقديم حلول توفيقية مؤلمة. إننا نؤمن بأن الفلسطينيين لا ينبغي أن يكونوا مواطني إسرائيل ولا أتباعها. بل ينبغي أن يعيشوا في دولتهم الخاصة بهم. ولكن ينبغي لهم أن يكونوا مستعدين، كما نحن، لقبول حل توافقي. وسوف نعلم بأنهم باتوا مهياين للتسوية وللسلام عندما يشرعون في أخذ الاحتياجات الأمنية لإسرائيل مأخذ الجد، وعندما يتوقفون عن إنكار صلتنا التاريخية القديمة بأرض أجدادنا.

كثيراً ما سمعتم يتهمون إسرائيل بتهوديد القدس. الأمر لا يعدو كونه اتهام أميركا بأمركة واشنطن، أو البريطانيين بإضفاء الصبغة الإنكليزية على لندن. لماذا ندعى اليهود؟ لأننا من منطقة يهودا. في مكتبي في القدس، ختم قديم. إنه عبارة عن خاتم للتوقيع لمسؤول يهودي من عصر الكتاب المقدس. تم العثور على الختم بمحاذاة الحائط الغربي، ويعود تاريخه إلى 2700 عام، أي عهد الملك حزقيا. نقش اسم المسؤول اليهودي على الخاتم باللغة العبرية. كان اسمه "نتنباو". هذا هو اسم عائلتي. ويرجع اسمي الأول، بنجامين، إلى حقبة سبقت ذلك بألف عام - إلى بنيامين - ابن يعقوب، الذي عرف أيضاً باسم إسرائيل. جاب يعقوب وأبناؤه الإثنا عشر تلال يهودا

والسامرة قبل نحو أربعة آلاف عام، وكان هناك وجود يهودي متواصل على هذه الأرض منذ ذلك الحين. هؤلاء اليهود الذين تم نفيهم من أرضنا لم يتوقفوا فقط عن الحلم بالعودة - اليهود في إسبانيا عشية طردهم؛ اليهود في أوكرانيا، الفارين من المذابح؛ اليهود الذين قاتلوا في غيتو وارسو، عندما طوقهم النازيون - لم يتوقفوا مطلقاً عن دعوة ربهم، لم يتوقفوا عن التوق للعودة. يتهايمسون: "في العام القادم في القدس. في العام المقبل في أرض الميعاد".

بصفتي رئيس وزراء إسرائيل، أتكلم باسم منات الأجيال من اليهود الذين تم نفيهم في أنحاء الأرض وعانوا كافة أشكال الشور على وجه الأرض، ولكنها لم يتخلوا قط عن الأمل في استعادة حياتهم القومية في دولة يهودية واحدة دون غيرها. لا أزال أمل أن يصبح الرئيس عباس شريكاً في السلام. لقد عملت جاهداً للدفع بهذا السلام قدماً. يوم توليت منصبى، دعوت إلى إجراء مفاوضات مباشرة دون شروط مسبقة. غير أن الرئيس عباس لم يستجب. ووضعت رؤية للسلام قائمة على الحل القائم على وجود دولتين لشعبيين. لكن الرئيس عباس ظل يرفض الاستجابة.

قمت بإزالة مئات من حواجز الطرق و نقاط التفتيش لتسهيل حرية التنقل في المناطق الفلسطينية. وسهل هذا تحقيق نمو هائل للاقتصاد الفلسطيني. لكن ذلك لم يحظ بالاستجابة مرة أخرى، اتخذت خطوة غير مسبوقه بتجميد مشاريع البناء الجديدة في المستوطنات لمدة 10 أشهر. علماً بأنه لم يقدم أي رئيس وزراء على فعل ذلك من قبل. وأسمع تصفيقا لهذه الخطوة، ولكن، مرة أخرى، لم تكن هناك أي استجابة.

في الأسابيع القليلة الماضية، طرح المسؤولون الأمريكيون أفكاراً لاستئناف محادثات السلام. كانت ضمن هذه الأفكار مسائل تتعلق بالحدود لم تعجبني. وكانت تنطوي أيضاً على أشياء خاصة بالدولة اليهودية التي يقينا لم تعجب الفلسطينيين. ولكن رغم كل تحفظاتي، كنت على استعداد للمضي قدماً على أساس تلك الأفكار الأميركية. لماذا لم ينضم إلي الرئيس عباس؟ علينا أن نتوقف عن التفاوض حول المفاوضات. فلنخض غمارها فحسب. للتفاوض بشأن السلام.

لقد أمضيت سنوات دفاعاً عن إسرائيل في ساحة المعركة. ثم قضيت عقوداً دفاعاً عن إسرائيل في ساحة الرأي العام. لقد كرس الرئيس عباس حياته للدفع بالقضية الفلسطينية. هل من المحتوم استمرار هذا التراجع لعدة أجيال، أم أننا سنتمكن أطفالنا وأحفادنا من الحديث في السنوات المقبلة عن السبيل لوضع حد له؟ هذا هو ما ينبغي علينا أن نطمح إليه، وهذا ما أرى إمكانية إنجازه.

**على مدى عامين ونصف، التقيت والرئيس عباس في القدس مرة واحدة فقط، على الرغم من أن أبوابى كانت دائماً مفتوحة أمامه.** وإذا رغب في ذلك، سأتي إلى رام الله. في الواقع، لدي اقتراح أفضل. لقد قطع كلانا آلاف الأميال وصولاً إلى نيويورك. الآن نحن في نفس المدينة، بل نفس المبنى. فنجتمع هنا اليوم، في الأمم المتحدة. من سيمنعنا؟ ماذا يمنعنا؟ إذا رغبنا في السلام حقاً، فما الذي يقف حائلاً أما عقد لقاء بيننا اليوم والشروع في مفاوضات السلام؟

أقترح أن نتحدث بصراحة وصدق. لنصغ إلى بعضنا البعض. وكما نقول في الشرق الأوسط، لننحدث "دغري"، أي "بوضوح". سأبلغك باحتياجاتي وشواغلي، فيما تبلغني أنت بما لديك. وبعون الله، سنجد أرضية مشتركة للسلام. هناك مقولة عربية قديمة تقول إن يداً واحدة لا تصفق، حسناً، ينطبق الأمر نفسه على السلام. لا يسعني صنع السلام لوحدي. لا أستطيع صنع السلام دون محاور. الرئيس عباس، أنا أمد إليك يدي - يد إسرائيل - في سلام. وأمل أن تمد إلي يديك لتمسك بهذه اليد. كلانا أبناء إبراهيم. شعبي يدعوهم إبراهيم؛ شعبه يدعوهم إبراهيم. نحن نتشارك النبي نفسه. نحن نعيش على الأرض ذاتها. نتلازم مصانرتنا. فلنحقق رؤية النبي إشعيا: "الشعب السالك في الظلام رأى، نورا ساطعاً" [الكتاب المقدس، النبي إشعيا، الفصل 9 الآية 2]. فلنجعل هذا النور نور السلام.

### Annex 3: The IPMO's Arabic Translation

النص الكامل خطاب رئيس الوزراء بنيامين نتانياهو أمام الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة

أيها السيدات والسادة، إن إسرائيل كانت تمدّ يدها للسلام منذ لحظة نشأتها قبل 63 عاماً. إنني أعيّد اليوم مدّ هذه اليد نيابة عن إسرائيل والشعب اليهودي. إنني أمدّها إلى الشعبين المصري والأردني بطلب تجديد الصداقة مع هذين الجارين اللذين كنا قد صنعنا السلام معهما؛ إنني أمد يدي للشعب التركي من منطلق الاحترام والنية الحسنة؛ إنني أمد يدي للشعبين الليبي والتونسي إعجاباً بأولئك الذين يسعون لبناء مستقبل ديمقراطي، مثلما أمدّها لباقي شعوب شمال إفريقيا والجزيرة العربية التي نريد صياغة بداية جديدة معهما؛ كما أنني أمد يدي لشعوب سوريا ولبنان وإيران احتراماً لشجاعة أولئك الذين يحاربون القمع العنيف.

غير أنني أمد يدي بشكل خاص إلى الشعب الفلسطيني الذي نسعى للتوصل إلى سلام عادل ودائم معه. أيها السيدات والسادة، إن أملنا في تحقيق السلام لا يتلاشى أبداً في إسرائيل. إن علماءنا وأطبائنا ومبتكرينا يوظفون عبقريتهم لتحسين عالم الغد فيما يثري فنانونا وكتابنا التراث الإنساني. وأعلم بأن هذه ليست تماماً صورة إسرائيل كما يتم رسمها كثيراً ما في هذه القاعة. إذ كان قد تم عام 1975 - وبصورة مخزية - وسُمّ توفّق شعبي القديم لاستعادة حياتنا القومية في أرض أجدادنا من الكتاب المقدس بأنه عنصرية [بالإشارة إلى قرار الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة في ذلك العام اعتبار الصهيونية حركة عنصرية]، ثم تم في هذا المكان تحديداً عام 1980 التنديد - وليس المدح - باتفاقية السلام التاريخية بين إسرائيل ومصر، كما أن إسرائيل تتعرض دون غيرها هنا [في الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة] عاماً تلو الآخر للاستتكار، لا بل تتم إدانتها أكثر من كل دول العالم مجتمعة، حيث هنالك 21 قراراً من مجموع قرارات الجمعية العامة الـ 27 يدين إسرائيل وهي الدولة الديمقراطية الوحيدة في الشرق الأوسط.

إن هذا الأمر يمثل فضلاً لا يليق بمؤسسة الأمم المتحدة. إنه ليس إلا مسرحةً عيبياً لا يكتفي بمنح إسرائيل دور الطرف الخسيس بل كثيراً ما يمنح الأشرار الحقيقيين الأدوار الرئيسية حيث كانت ليبيا القذافي قد ترأست لجنة الأمم المتحدة لحقوق الإنسان فيما ترأس عراق [صدام] حسين لجنة الأمم المتحدة لنزع السلاح. لعلمكم تقولون إن ذلك شيئاً من الماضي لكنه يحدث الآن تماماً في مثل هذا الوقت حيث يرأس لبنان الخاضع لسيطرة حزب الله مجلس الأمن الدولي ما يعني عملياً أن تنظيم إرهابياً بات يرأس الهيئة المكلفة بحماية أمن العالم وهو ما لم يكن من الممكن تخيله.

وبالتالي توجد هنا في الأمم المتحدة أغلبية تلقائية تستطيع اعتماد أي قرار. إنها قادرة على اعتماد قرار يقضي بأن الشمس تغيب في الغرب أو تشرق في الغرب (رغم أنني أعتقد بأن الخيار الأول مقضي فيه من البداية.)، كما يمكنها اتخاذ قرار - وسبق لها أن اتخذته - بأن الحائط الغربي [حائط المبكى في البلدة القديمة من أورشليم القدس] وهو أقدس مكان لدى اليهود ما هو إلا منطقة فلسطينية محتلة.

لكن الحقيقة قد تشق طريقها أحياناً حتى هنا في الجمعية العامة. وكنت قد زرت عام 1984، عندما عُينت سفيراً لإسرائيل لدى الأمم المتحدة، الحاخام العظيم "لوفافيتش" [حاخام راحل قاد جماعة "حباد" اليهودية وذاع صيته بين اليهود أجمعين علماً بأنه مكان إقامته كان قرب نيويورك] حيث قال لي آنذاك (أيها السيدات والسادة، لا أريد أن يشعر أي منكم بالمهانة [لهذا الكلام] بالنظر إلى

تجربتم الشخصية في الخدمة هنا كوني أعلم بوجود الكثير من الرجال والنساء الشرفاء والأكفاء والكرام الذين يخدمون دولهم هنا.)  
الكلام الاتي "إنك ستخدم في مقر حافل بالأكاذيب" ثم استطرد قائلاً "تذكر أن ضوء شمعة واحدة يمكن رؤيته بعيداً حتى في أظلم مكان."

إنني أرجو اليوم أن يسقط نور الحقيقة ولو لعدة لحظات في قاعة كانت لفترة أطول مما يجوز مكاناً مُظلماً بالنسبة لبلادي. وعليه لم أحضر إلى هذا المكان لنيل التصفيق بل جئت لقول الحقيقة. فالحقيقة هي أن إسرائيل تريد السلام؛ والحقيقة هي أنني شخصياً أريد السلام؛ والحقيقة هي أنه يجب دائماً – ولكن في هذه الفترة المضطربة بصفة خاصة – جعل السلام في الشرق الأوسط يرتكز على الأمن؛ والحقيقة هي أنه لا يمكن تحقيق السلام عبر قرارات الأمم المتحدة بل عبر المفاوضات المباشرة بين الأطراف المعنية؛ والحقيقة هي أن الفلسطينيين قد رفضوا حتى الآن التفاوض؛ والحقيقة هي أنه لا يجوز لكم السماح بحصول هذا الأمر.

أيها السيدات والسادة، عندما جئت إلى هذا المكان لأول مرة قبل 27 عاماً كان العالم منقسماً بين الشرق والغرب. وقد انتهت الحرب الباردة منذ ذلك الحين فيما نهضت حضارات عظيمة من سبات دام قروناً وتم انتشار مئات الملايين من دائرة الفقر ويوشك عدد آخر لا يُحصى من الناس على سلوك هذا الدرب أيضاً، علماً بأن الشيء اللافت هو إنجاز هذا التحول التاريخي بمعظمه حتى الآن بصورة سلمية. غير أن الحقد أصبح يتنامى حالياً بين الشرق والغرب بشكل يهدد سلام الجميع. ولا يسعى هذا الاتجاه الخبيث إلى التحرير بل إلى الاستبعاد ولا إلى البناء بل إلى الدمار.

إن هذا الخبث هو التشدد الإسلامي الذي يتخفى بعباءة الإيمان الشديد لكنه يقتل اليهود والمسيحيين والمسلمين على حد سواء بشكل لا يُعترف. لقد قتلت العناصر الإسلامية المتشددة في الحادي عشر من سبتمبر أيلول [2001] الآلاف من الأميركيين وجعلت البرجين التوأمين [لمركز التجارة العالمي في نيويورك] أنقاضاً يتصاعد منها الدخان. وقد وضعت اللبلة الماضية إكليلاً من الزهور في النصب التذكاري المقام لإحياء ذكرى ضحايا الحادي عشر من سبتمبر، وكان الأمر مثيراً للعواطف العميقة. لكن عندما توجهت إلى ذلك المكان ترددت في خاطري فكرة واحدة وهي الكلام الشنيع الذي ألقاه الرئيس الإيراني من على هذا المنبر أمس حيث لمح ضمناً إلى أن ما جرى في الحادي عشر من سبتمبر لم يكن إلا مؤامرة أميركية. وعندما انسحب بعضكم [مخاطباً أعضاء البعثات الدبلوماسية لمختلف الدول الأعضاء في الأمم المتحدة] من القاعة لكن كان يجدر بجميعكم مغادرتها.

وقد ذبح الإسلاميون المتشددون منذ الحادي عشر من سبتمبر عدداً لا يُحصى من الأبرياء في لندن ومدريد وبغداد ومومباي وتل أبيب وأورشليم القدس وجميع أنحاء إسرائيل. أعتقد بأن أكبر خطر يواجهه العالم هو حصول هذا التيار المتشدد على الأسلحة النووية، وهذا تحدياً ما تحاول إيران القيام به. هل تستطيعون تصور الرجل الذي تبجح بالكلام العنيف هنا أمس [الرئيس الإيراني] وهو مسلح بالأسلحة النووية؟ يجب على المجتمع الدولي وقف إيران قبل فوات الأوان. وإذا لم يتم التصدي لإيران فإننا جميعاً سنواجه شبح الإرهاب النووي وقد يتحول الربيع العربي سريعاً إلى شتاء إيراني.

إن هذا الأمر قد يصبح مأساة. لقد خرج الملايين من العرب إلى الشوارع لاستبدال الطغيان بالحرية وستكون إسرائيل المستفيد الأول من انتصار أولئك الملتزمين بالحرية والسلام. إن هذا الأمل المتوهج يراودني، لكن بصفتي رئيساً لوزراء إسرائيل لا يسعني المخاطرة بمستقبل الدولة اليهودية لأجل التفكير الرغبي [التمني]. يجب على القادة النظر في واقع الحال كما هو وليس كما يجب عليه أن يكون. يجب علينا بذل كل ما في وسعنا لصياغة ملامح المستقبل لكن لا يسعنا تجاهل الأخطار المحدقة في الوقت الحاضر.

إن العالم المحيط بإسرائيل يصبح بكل وضوح أكثر خطورة. لقد سيطر التشدد الإسلامي على لبنان وغزة وأنه مصمم على تمزيق معاهدتي السلام المبرمتين بين إسرائيل ومصر وإسرائيل والأردن. إنه سمّ الكثير من العقول العربية لتنتج ضد اليهود وإسرائيل وأميركا والغرب. إنه لا يعارض سياسات إسرائيل فحسب بل مجرد وجودها.

وهناك من يدعي بأن انتشار التشدد الإسلامي أو بالأحرى السعي لإبطاء وتيرة انتشاره – خاصة في هذه الأوقات المضطربة – إنما يستوجب استعجال إسرائيل في تقديم التنازلات والتوصل إلى تسويات تقوم على التخلي عن أراض. وتبدو هذه النظرية بسيطة لتفيد أساساً بما يلي: "أتركوا هذه الأراضي وعندها يمضي السلام قدماً، وسيطول أمد المعتدلين فيما يتم احتواء المتطرفين، ولا داعي للقلق بالنسبة للتفاصيل المزعجة حول كيفية دفاع إسرائيل عن نفسها إذ تقوم قوات دولية بهذا العمل". إن أولئك الناس يقولون لي دوماً: "كل ما عليكم هو تقديم عرض (كاسح) وعندها سيصبح كل شيء على ما يُرام". لكن إعلموا أن هناك مشكلة واحدة فقط في هذه النظرية ألا وهي أننا كنا قد جربناها لكنها لم تحقق النتيجة المرجوة. إذ كانت إسرائيل قد تقدمت بطرح سلمي (كاسح) عام 2000 [يقصد في قمة كامب ديفيد] تجاوب فعلاً مع جميع المطالب الفلسطينية لكن عرفات رفضه، وعندها أطلق الفلسطينيون حملة إرهابية طالت حياة ألف مواطن إسرائيلي [يقصد الانتفاضة الفلسطينية الثانية]؛ ثم تقدم رئيس الوزراء أولمرت بعرض (كاسح) أكثر من سابقه عام 2008 لكن الرئيس عباس لم يرد عليه على الإطلاق.

غير أن إسرائيل قامت بأكثر من طرح "العروض الكاسحة". لقد خرجنا عملياً من بعض الأراضي إذ انسحبنا من لبنان عام 2000 ثم انسحبنا من أي شبر من غزة عام 2005. ولم يجعل ذلك العاصفة الإسلامية – تلك العاصفة التي تهددنا – تهدأ، بل أدى الأمر إلى جعل هذه العاصفة أقرب منا وأشد قوة.

لقد أطلقت عناصر حزب الله وحماس آلاف الصواريخ على مدننا انطلاقاً من ذات الأراضي التي أخليناها. لاحظوا، عندما خرجت إسرائيل من لبنان وغزة لم يهزم المعتدلون المتطرفين بل التهم المتطرفون المعتدلين. ويؤسفني القول إن قوات دولية مثل اليونيفيل [قوات الطوارئ الدولية لحفظ السلام] في لبنان و [EUBAM قوة المراقبين الأوروبية في معابر غزة] لم تتمكن من وقف هجمات العناصر المتشددة على إسرائيل.

لقد خرجنا من غزة أمليين في تحقيق السلام. ولم نجمد المستوطنات في غزة بل اقتلعناها بمعنى أننا قمنا تحديداً بما تقوله النظرية المنوّه بها: "أخرجوا، عودوا إلى حدود 1967، فككوا المستوطنات". ولا أظن أن الناس يذكرون مدى ما ذهبنا إليه لتحقيق ذلك: لقد اجتئتنا الآلاف من الناس [يقصد المستوطنين في قطاع غزة] من ديارهم وسحبنا الأولاد من المدارس ورياض الأطفال وجرّنا الكنس إلى درجة أننا قلنا أحببهم من مدافعهم. وعندما أنجزنا كل ذلك سلمنا مفاتيح غزة للرئيس عباس.

وكان من الواجب أن تحقق النظرية مبتغها وأن يتمكن الرئيس عباس والسلطة الفلسطينية في هذا الطرف من إقامة دولة مسالمة في غزة. لعلكم تذكرون كيف صفق العالم بأسره حينها، إن الجميع هلل لانسحابنا باعتباره عملاً يتم عن الحنكة السياسية العظيمة. وكان الأمر بمثابة خطوة جريئة نحو السلام.

لكننا، أيها السيدات والسادة، لم نحقق السلام بل ووجهنا بالحرب. لقد جاءتنا إيران – عبر بوابة حماس التي طردت فوراً السلطة الفلسطينية. لقد انهارت السلطة الفلسطينية [في قطاع غزة] خلال يوم ليس إلا. وكان الرئيس عباس قد قال للتو من على هذا المنبر إن الفلسطينيين مسلحون بالآمال والأحلام. نعم، لديهم الآمال والأحلام وكذلك 10 آلاف قذيفة صاروخية وصاروخ "غراد" زودتهم بها إيران، ناهيك عن تدفق أسلحة فتاكة على غزة في الوقت الحالي من سيناء وليبيا وأماكن أخرى. وقد تم حتى الآن إطلاق وإبل من آلاف الصواريخ على مدننا، وبالتالي قد تتفهمون – بالنظر إلى كل ما تقدم – أن الإسرائيليين لربما يطرحون السؤال الاتي: ماذا يحول دون

تكرار ما جرى [في غزة] في الضفة الغربية أيضاً؟ لاحظوا أن معظم مدننا الرئيسية في جنوب البلاد تقع على مسافة عشرات الكيلومترات من غزة لكن في أواسط البلاد - قبالة الضفة الغربية - لا تبعد مدننا إلا مئات الأمتار أو عدة كيلومترات لا أكثر عن أطراف الضفة الغربية. ولذا أود سؤالكم: هل كان أي منكم يجلب الخطر ليصبح قريباً إلى هذا الحد من مدنكم وعائلاتكم؟ هل كنتم ستمارسون سلوكاً طائشاً إلى هذا الحد إزاء حياة مواطنيكم؟ إن إسرائيل مستعدة لقيام دولة فلسطينية في الضفة الغربية لكننا غير مستعدين لاستنساخ تجربة غزة هناك. وبناء عليه فإننا نحتاج إلى تدابير أمنية حقيقية فيما يرفض الفلسطينيون بكل بساطة التفاوض معنا حولها.

إن الإسرائيليين يذكرون الدروس المرّة المستفادة مما جرى في غزة. أما العديد ممن ينتقدون إسرائيل فإنهم يتغاضون عن ذلك وينصحون إسرائيل بشكل غير مسؤول بالسير على نفس الدرب مرة أخرى. عندما تطالع ما يقوله هؤلاء الناس [يساورك الشعور] وكان لم يحدث شيء مما تقدّم حيث إنهم يرددون النصائح والصيغ ذاتها وكان شيء لم يحدث فعلاً. ويواصل هؤلاء المنتقدون ممارسة الضغط على إسرائيل لتقديم التنازلات البعيدة دون أن يقدموا أولاً أي ضمانات على حماية أمن إسرائيل. إنهم يشيدون بأولئك الذين يغذون عن غير عمد تسمح التشدد الإسلامي النهم ويصفونهم برجال الدولة الشجعان، فيما أنهم ينعوتون بأعداء السلام أولئك منا الذين يصرون على أنه يجب أولاً نصب حاجز ثابت لإبقاء التماسح خارج الحدود أو على الأقل وضع قضيب حديدي بين أنيابه الفاعرة.

إن إسرائيل تحتاج إلى نصيحة أفضل إزاء كل هذه التسميات وكلمات القذف والتشهير. إذ يُفضّل [بالنسبة لإسرائيل] أن يتخذ الإعلام موقفاً سلبياً منها بدلاً من أن تنال الكلمات التأيينية المنمقة؛ لا بل سيكون من الأفضل أن تحظى إسرائيل بتغطية صحفية منصفة من جانب أولئك الذين يتجاوز حسهم التاريخي ما يتناولونه على مائدة الإفطار والذين يقرّون بوجود هومو أمنية شرعية لدى إسرائيل.

إنني أعتقد بأن المفاوضات السلمية الجدية تسمح بالتعامل اللائق مع هذه الاحتياجات والهموم لكن سيتم التعامل معها بدون المفاوضات أيضاً. وهناك الكثير من الاحتياجات لأن إسرائيل هي دولة صغيرة للغاية لدرجة أن مساحتها العرضية بدون يهودا والسامرة أو الضفة الغربية لا تتعدى 9 أميال [تقريباً 15 كيلومتراً]. أرجو طرح الموضوع عليكم بمنظوره الصحيح كونكم متواجدين حالياً في هذه المدينة [نيويورك]، إذ تعادل هذه المسافة ثلثي طول مساحة جزيرة مانهاتن أو بالأحرى المسافة بين باتيري بارك وحرم جامعة كولومبيا. ولا تتسوا أيضاً أن الناس القاطنين في بروكلين ونيو جيرزي ألطف بكثير من بعض جيران إسرائيل..

كيف إذاً يمكن حماية دولة بالغة الصغر كهذه محاطة بناس أفسوساً بإبادتها وأصبحوا مدججين بالسلاح بفضل إيران؟ بالطبع يستحيل حمايتها من ذلك الشريط الضيق وحده. إن إسرائيل تحتاج إلى عمق إستراتيجي أكبر ولهذا السبب بالذات تجنب قرار مجلس الأمن 242 مطالبة إسرائيل بالانسحاب من كافة المناطق التي استولت عليها في حرب الأيام الستة [1967] وتحدث عن "انسحاب من مناطق" إلى حدود أمنة وقابلة للحماية. وبالتالي تحتاج إسرائيل لغرض الدفاع عن نفسها إلى الإبقاء على حضور عسكري إسرائيلي بعيد المدى في مناطق إستراتيجية حيوية في الضفة الغربية. سبق وشرحت ذلك للرئيس عباس لكنه أجاب بأن الدولة الفلسطينية لن تستطيع أبداً القبول بترتيبات كهذه إذا أريد لها أن تكون دولة سيادية. لكن لماذا لا يا ترى؟ إن أميركا لديها قوات في اليابان وألمانيا وكوريا الجنوبية منذ أكثر من نصف قرن، وتوجد قاعدة جوية بريطانية في قبرص فيما ترابط قوات فرنسية في ثلاث دول إفريقية مستقلة، ولم تدع أي من هذه الدول بأنها غير سيادية.

كما أن هناك قضايا أمنية حيوية أخرى عديدة يجب التعامل معها. أنظروا مثلاً إلى مسألة المجال الجوي: إن مساحة إسرائيل الصغيرة تخلق مشاكل أمنية ضخمة. إذ تستطيع طائرة نفاثة اجتياز الأراضي الأمريكية [الولايات المتحدة] خلال ست ساعات بينما لا يستغرق عبور إسرائيل جواً إلا ثلاث دقائق. هل يصح بالتالي اقتطاع المجال الجوي الصغير للغاية لإسرائيل إلى جزئين ومنح أحدهما إلى دولة فلسطينية لا تقيم السلام مع إسرائيل؟ كما أن مطارنا الدولي الرئيسي لا يقع إلا على بُعد عدة كيلومترات عن الضفة الغربية. هل ستصبح إذاً - بغياب السلام - طائرتنا مستهدفة بصواريخ مضادة للطائرات سيتم نشرها في أراضي الدولة الفلسطينية المتاخمة؟ وكيف يمكننا وقف عمليات التهريب إلى داخل الضفة الغربية؟ ولا يقتصر الأمر على الضفة الغربية [بشكل عام] بل يتعلّق تحديداً بالمناطق الجبلية فيها. إنها تسيطر على السهل الساحلي حيث تقيم غالبية سكان إسرائيل. كيف إذاً نستطيع منع تهريب الصواريخ التي يمكن إطلاقها على مدننا إلى المناطق الجبلية هذه؟

إنني أطرح هذه المشاكل كونها غير نظرية بل حقيقية. إنها مسائل تتعلق بالحياة أم الموت بالنسبة للإسرائيليين. لذا يجب سد كافة الشروخ الأمنية المحتملة ضمن أي تسوية سلمية تسبق - ولا تتبع - الإعلان عن قيام دولة فلسطينية حيث يستحيل سد هذه الشروخ إذا ما تركت على حالها فيما بعد. وستفجر هذه المشاكل في وجوهنا وتنسف السلام.

يجب على الفلسطينيين أولاً صنع السلام مع إسرائيل ثم الحصول على دولتهم. لكنني أريد إبلاغكم بالرسالة الآتية: إن إسرائيل لن تكون - بعد توقيع مثل هذا الاتفاق السلمي - آخر دولة ترحب بالدولة الفلسطينية بصفتها عضواً جديداً لدى الأمم المتحدة بل إنها ستكون السبابة إلى ذلك.

ثمة موضوع آخر يجب التطرق إليه: إن حماس تنتهك القانون الدولي باحتجازها الجندي غلعاد شاليط على مدى 5 سنوات. إنها لم تسمح للصليب الأحمر بزيارته ولو مرة واحدة. إنه محتجز في قيود مظلّم بما يناقض كافة الأعراف الدولية. إن غلعاد شاليط لهو ابن الزوجين أفيفا ونوعام شاليط وحفيد تسفي شاليط الذي كان قد هرب من المحرقة (الهولوكوست) عند قدومه في ثلاثينات القرن الماضي في فترة صباه إلى أرض إسرائيل. إن غلعاد شاليط هو ابن أي عائلة إسرائيلية. ويجب على أي دولة ممثلة هنا المطالبة بالإفراج عنه فوراً. إذا ما أردتم اعتماد قرار حول الشرق الأوسط اليوم فإنه القرار الذي يجب عليكم اعتماده.

أبها السيدات والسادة، كنت قد طرحت العام الماضي في جامعة بار إيلان ثم العام الحالي في الكنيست وفي الكونغرس الأميركي رؤيتي الخاصة بالسلام القائم على اعتراف دولة فلسطينية منزوعة السلاح بالدولة اليهودية، نعم بالدولة اليهودية. إذ إن هذه الهيئة [الأمم المتحدة] هي التي اعترفت بالمجمل بالدولة اليهودية قبل 64 عاماً. ألا تعتقدوا بأن الوقت قد حان لأن يقوم الفلسطينيون بالمثل؟

إن دولة إسرائيل اليهودية ستحمي إلى الأبد حقوق جميع الأقليات القاطنة فيها بما فيها أكثر من مليون مواطن عربي. كنت أتمنى أن يسعني قول الكلام نفسه عن دولة فلسطينية مستقبلية غير أن مسؤولين فلسطينيين كانوا قد أوضحوا قبل أيام هنا في نيويورك أن الدولة الفلسطينية لن تسمح بوجود أي يهودي فيها بل إنها ستكون خالية من اليهود. ويمثل هذا الموقف التطهير العرقي بعينه. كما توجد حالياً قوانين في رام الله تعتبر مجرد بيع الأراضي لليهود أمراً يستدعي فرض عقوبة الإعدام مما يُعدّ نهجاً عنصرياً (إنكم تعرفون ما هي القوانين التي تستحضر [في الأذهان لسماح ذلك]). على كلٍ فلا نية لدى إسرائيل لتغيير الطابع الديمقراطي لدولتها، بل إن ما نريده هو عدم السماح للفلسطينيين بمحاولة تغيير الطابع اليهودي لدولتنا. إننا نريدهم يتخلون عن فتنازيا إغراق إسرائيل بالملايين من الفلسطينيين [يقصد إحقاق حق عودة اللاجئين الفلسطينيين إلى داخل إسرائيل].

كان الرئيس عباس قد وقف هنا للتو وقال إن لبّ النزاع الإسرائيلي الفلسطيني يعود إلى المستوطنات لكن الأمر غريب نوعاً ما، إذ كان النزاع مشتعل منذ قرابة نصف قرن قبل وجود ولو مستوطنة إسرائيلية واحدة في الضفة الغربية. وبالتالي - إذا ما كان الرئيس عباس يقوله صحيحاً - أفترض أن المستوطنات التي تحدث عنها هي تل أبيب وحيفا ويافا وبئر السبع. لعله كان يقصد هذا الأمر في ذلك اليوم عندما قال إن إسرائيل تحتل الأرض الفلسطينية منذ 63 عاماً. إنه لم يقل [إن الاحتلال يدوم] منذ 1967 بل منذ 1948. وأتمنى أن

يكون هناك من يكف نفسه عناء طرح هذا السؤال عليه لأنه يجسد حقيقة بسيطة مفادها أن لب النزاع ليس المستوطنات بل إن المستوطنات هي نتيجة للنزاع. ويجب أن يتم التعامل مع قضية المستوطنات وحلها في إطار المفاوضات إلا أن لب النزاع كان دوماً ولا يزال لسوء الحظ رفض الفلسطينيين الاعتراف بوجود دولة يهودية ضمن أي حدود.

**اعتقد بأنه أن الأوان لكي تعترف القيادة الفلسطينية بما كان أي زعيم دولي جاد قد اعترف به ابتداء من اللورد بلفور وزير الخارجية البريطاني إبان الحرب العالمية الأولى وصاحب "وعد بلفور" المشهور ولويد جورج رئيس الوزراء البريطاني آنذاك] مروراً بالرئيس ترومان [الرئيس الأمريكي] عام 1948 وصولاً إلى الرئيس أوباما هنا [في الأمم المتحدة] قبل يومين أي الاعتراف بأن إسرائيل هي الدولة اليهودية. أيها الرئيس عباس، يجب أن تكف عن المراوغة إزاء هذه المسألة وأن تعترف بالدولة اليهودية وتصنع السلام معنا. إن إسرائيل مستعدة ضمن اتفاق سلام حقيقي لتقديم تنازلات مؤلمة حيث نعتقد بأنه لا يجوز أن يكون الفلسطينيون مواطنين أو رعايا إسرائيليين بل يجب أن يعيشوا في دولة حرة خاصة بهم. لكن يجب عليهم أيضاً – مثلهم مثلنا – تقديم التنازلات. وسوف نعلم بأنهم باتوا مهذّبين للحل الوسط وللسلام عندما سيشرعون في أخذ الاحتياطات الأمنية الإسرائيلية مأخذ الجد ويتوقفون عن إنكار صلتنا التاريخية بأرض أجدادنا.**

كثيراً ما سمعتم [الفلسطينيين] يتهمون إسرائيل بتهويد أورشليم القدس لكن الأمر لا يعدو كونه اتهام أميركا [الولايات المتحدة] بأمركة واشنطن أو اتهام البريطانيين بأنجلزة لندن. هل تعلمون من أين جاءت تسمية اليهود؟ إنها تعود إلى منطقة يهودا. ويوجد حالياً في مكتبي ختم قديم عبارة عن خاتم للتوقيع لمسؤول يهودي من عصر الكتاب المقدس. وقد تم العثور على هذا الختم بمحاذاة الحائط الغربي ويعود تاريخه إلى حوالي 2700 عام أي إلى عهد الملك حزقيا. وتم نقش اسم المسؤول اليهودي على الختم باللغة العبرية، وكان اسمه "نتانياهو" الذي يوافق شهرتي. أما اسمي الأول "بنيامين" فإنه يعود إلى حقبة سبقت ذلك بألف عام أي إلى بنيامين ابن يعقوب الذي عُرف أيضاً باسم إسرائيل. وكان يعقوب وأبناؤه الاثنا عشر بجيوبون تلال يهودا والسامرة قبل نحو 4 آلاف عام وكان هناك حضور يهودي متواصل على هذه الأرض منذ ذلك الحين. أما بخصوص أولئك اليهود الذين تم نفيهم من بلادنا فإبهم لم يتوقفوا عن الحلم بالعودة سواء أكان الحديث يدور عن يهود إسبانيا قبل طردهم [أواخر القرن الـ15] أو يهود أوكرانيا الفارين من المجازر بحقهم [القرن الـ18] أو اليهود الذين قاتلوا في غيتو وارسو عندما طوَّقه النازيون [إبان المحرقة النازية وتحديدًا عام 1943]. إنهم ما فتئوا يدعون ربهم أو يشتاقون [العودة إلى أرض إسرائيل]؛ إنهم كانوا يتهايمسون: "لنكن إن شاء الله] في العام القادم في أورشليم القدس، لنكن في العام القادم في أرض الميعاد."

إنني أتحدث بصفتي رئيساً لحكومة إسرائيل باسم منات الأجيال المتعاقبة من اليهود الذين تم تفريقهم أيدي سبا والذين عانوا كافة أشكال الشرور تحت الشمس لكنهم لم يتخلوا قط عن الأمل في استعادة حياتهم القومية في إطار الدولة اليهودية الوحيدة الممكنة دون غيرها.

أيها السيدات والسادة، لا أزال أمل في أن يكون الرئيس عباس شريكي في السلام. لقد عملت جاهداً لدفع هذا السلام. إذ كنت قد دعوت منذ تسلمي منصبى إلى إجراء مفاوضات مباشرة دون شروط مسبقة، غير أن الرئيس عباس لم يستجب. ووضعت رؤية السلام القائم على حل الدولتين للشعبين إلا أن الرئيس عباس ظل يرفض التجاوب. ثم قمت بإزالة المئات من الحواجز والنقاط التفقيشية [في الضفة الغربية] لتسهيل حرية التنقل في الأراضي الفلسطينية مما يسرّ الطريق نحو تحقيق نمو هائل للاقتصاد الفلسطيني، إلا أن أي تجاوب [من جانب الرئيس عباس] لم يأت. واتخذت فيما بعد ذلك خطوة غير مسبوقة من خلال تجميد مشاريع البناء الجديدة في المستوطنات لمدة 10 أشهر – علماً بأن أي رئيس وزراء سابق لم يقدم على ذلك – غير أن هذه الخطوة (وإنكم كنتم تصفون لها) لم تُقابل بأي تجاوب. وشهدت الأسابيع الأخيرة قيام مسؤولين أميركيين بالسعي لدفع بعض الأفكار لأجل إعادة إطلاق محادثات السلام، وكانت ضمن هذه الأفكار مسائل تتعلق بالحدود لم تُعجبني فيما أنها كانت تنطوي على طروحات خاصة بالدولة اليهودية أرى يقيناً أنها لم تُعجب الفلسطينيين. لكن رغم كل التحفظات فإنني أهديت استعدادي للمضي قدماً على أساس الأفكار الأميركية هذه.

أيها الرئيس عباس، لماذا لا تنضم إليّ؟ يجب علينا التوقف عن التفاوض حول المفاوضات. دَعْنَا نخوض غمار الموضوع ونتفاوض حول السلام. سبق وأضيت سنوات دفاعاً عن إسرائيل في ميدان القتال ثم أمضيت عقوداً دفاعاً عن إسرائيل في ساحة الرأي العام. أيها الرئيس عباس، إنك أفنيت عمرك في دفع القضية الفلسطينية. هل من المحتوم استمرار هذا النزاع مدة أجيال أم أننا سنمكّن أولادنا وأحفادنا من الحديث في السنوات القادمة عن كيفية إيجادنا الطريق لإنهاء النزاع؟ هذا ما يجب أن نطمح إليه وهذا ما أرى إمكان إنجازه.

**كنا قد التقينا على مدى عامين ونصف عام [أي خلال ولاية نتانياهو الحالية رئيساً للوزراء] مرة واحدة فقط في أورشليم القدس على الرغم من أن أبوابي كانت دائماً مفتوحة أمامك. وإذا أردت ذلك فإنني سأصل إلى رام الله. لكن بالفعل لديّ اقتراح أفضل من ذلك: لقد قطع كلانا الآن آلاف الأميال وصولاً إلى نيويورك وها نحن حاضران في نفس المدينة لا بل في نفس العمارة، فدَعْنَا بالتالي نتقابل هنا اليوم في مقر الأمم المتحدة. هل يوجد ما يعيقنا يا ترى؟ إذا ما رغبنا حقاً في السلام فما الذي يقف حائلاً أمام عقد لقاء بيننا اليوم والشروع في مفاوضات السلام؟ إنني أقترح أن نتحدث بصدق وصراحة. دَعْنَا نصغي إلى بعضنا البعض؛ دَعْنَا نعمل ما يقال في الشرق الأوسط أي أن نتحدث "دعري" أي بشكل صريح ومباشر. إنني سأبلغك باحتياجاتي وهمومي فيما تبلغني أنت بما لديك، لنتمكّن بعون الله من إيجاد الأرضية المشتركة للسلام. هناك مقولة عربية قديمة تقول إنه "لا يمكن التصفيق بيد واحدة" حيث ينطلي الأمر نفسه على السلام. لا يسعني صنع السلام وحدي؛ لا يمكنني صنع السلام بدونك. أيها الرئيس عباس، إنني أمد يدي – يد إسرائيل – طالباً السلام. أتمنى أن تمسك بهذه اليد. إن كلنا أبناء إبراهيم – الذي يسميه أبناء شعبي "أفراهم" ما يعني أننا نتقاسم نفس الجذ ونسكن في ذات الأرض. إن مصائرنا متلازمة. دَعْنَا نحقق رؤية النبي إشعيا (الفصل 9 الآية 1): "الشعبُ السَّالِكُ في الظُّلام رأى نوراً ساطِعاً". دَعْنَا نجعل هذا النور نور السلام.**

## Annex 4: ILIW's Arabic Translation

السيدات والسادة الكرام، ظلت اسرائيل تمد يدها للسلام منذ نشأتها قبل 63 عاما وحتى هذه اللحظة. وها انا ذا أقف اليوم أمامكم باسمي وباسم الشعب الاسرائيلي باسطة يدي للسلام. أبسط يدي للسلام الى الشعبين المصري والاردني أملا بتجديد الصداقة مع جارين سادت بيننا يوما أو أواخر سلام. أمد يدي للشعب التركي منطلقا من الاحترام والنية الحسنة. أبسط يدي للشعبين الليبي والتونسي معبرا عن اعجابي بسعيهم الى تحقيق مستقبل ديمقراطي. كما أمد يدي الى شعوب شمال افريقيا والجزيرة العربية متمنيا ان نفتح معكم صفحة جديدة. وأمد يدي الى الشعب السوري والشعب اللبناني والشعب الايراني معبرا عن مشاعر الاحترام والاعجاب لوقوفهم في وجه القمع والطغيان. وبالتأكيد يدي ممدودة بشكل خاص الى الشعب الفلسطيني مفعما بالامل بان نتوصل الى سلام عادل ودائم بيننا .

سادتي وسيدات الاعزاء، ان أمل الشعب الاسرائيلي بتحقيق السلام لم يخبو يوما. وان علماءنا وأطبائنا ومخترعينا يوظفون جلّ عقبريتهم لبلوغ وضمان غد أفضل لنا وللعالم أجمع، في الوقت الذي يعكف ايضا فنانونا وكتابنا ليل نهار على اثر التراث الانساني. واني على علم بان صورة اسرائيل هذه التي أصفها أمامكم ليست هي تلك الصورة المرسومة في اذهانكم. واني اعبر عن أسفي بان هذه القاعة شهدت عام 1975 اعلانا مؤسفا قرن ما بين الصهيونية التي تجسد حنين شعبنا العربي منذ نشأته الاولى الى تحقيق أمانيه القومي والتوراتية في ارض الاجداد، وبين العنصرية. وأعني قرار الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة الذي اعتبر الصهيونية حركة عنصرية. وفي العام 1980 وفي هذا المكان تحديدا، وبدلا من الاشادة بمعاهدة السلام التاريخية التي أبرمت بين مصر واسرائيل، تمت يومها ادانة هذه المعاهدة! وما زالت اسرائيل حتى اليوم تتعرض دون غيرها للمرة تلو المرة للادانة في هذه القاعة من قبل الجمعية العامة. ليس هذا وحسب بل ان اسرائيل تتم ادانتها اكثر من دول العالم مجتمعة!! فهناك 21 قرار من مجموع قرارات الجمعية العامة ال 27 يدين اسرائيل، ولا يشغف لها كونها الدولة الوحيدة في الشرق الاوسط التي تمارس نظاما ديمقراطيا .

ان مثل هذا السلوك يعيب على مؤسسة كالأأم المتحدة. ويمكن وصفه بأنه مسرعا عتيا لا يكتفي بالإشارة الى اسرائيل سابقا عليها كل مرة دور الطرف الوضع، بل يغدق على الاشرار الحقيقيين ادوارا رئيسية، كذاك الذي مُنح لليبيا حين ترأست لجنة الأمم المتحدة لحقوق الإنسان فيما ترأس عراق صدام حسين لجنة الأمم المتحدة لنزع السلاح! ..

لعلكم تقولون بان هذه أحداث ووقائع أصبحت في عداد الماضي. أقول لكم ان شينا لم يتغير. فها هو لبنان حزب الله يرنس اليوم مجلس الامن الدولي، وهو الامر الذي معناه ان منظمة اهابية تقف اليوم على رأس الهيئة المكلفة بحماية أمن العالم! وهو امر لم يكن من الممكن تخيله. والحاصل ان الأمم المتحدة تملك أغلبية تلقائية لاعتماد أي قرار حتى لو كان منافيا للواقع، فهي يمكنها مثلا ان تقرر بان الشمس تغيب غربا لكنها تستطيع ان تقرر ايضا بان الشمس تشرق من جهة الغرب رغم ان هذا الامر محسوم منذ البداية ولا يمكن التشكيك في صحته. كما يمكنها ان تقرر - وقد فعلت - بان الحائط الغربي المتبقي من آثار بيت المقدس اليهودي او ما تسميه حائط المبكى الواقع في البلدة القديمة في اورشليم (القدس) وهو أقدس بقعة في العالم للشعب اليهودي، يمكنها اعتباره بقعة فلسطينية واقعة تحت الاحتلال .

من ناحية أخرى، قد تجد الحقيقة طريقها احيانا الى الجمعية العامة. ففي العام 1984 حين تم تعييني سفيرا لاسرائيل في الامم المتحدة، زرت الحاخام الكبير ذائع الصيت الراحل لوبافيتش حاخام جماعة (حabad) اليهودية الذي كان يقيم على مقربة من نيويورك، قال يوما (ولا أقصد هنا توجيه اهانة شخصية لأي منكم او التقليل من شأن احدكم وقد علمت ان بينكم الشرفاء والأكفاء، وما اكثرهم في هذا المحفل، رجالا ونساء، الذين يداؤبون على خدمة بلدانهم) قال لي إنك ذاهب لتعمل في مؤسسة مليئة بالاكاذيب، واستطرد قائلا : عليك ان تتذكر بان شمعة واحدة لا بد ان نرى ضوءها حتى لو أوقدت في مكان يلفه ظلام داسم" ..

ان ما أرجوه اليوم هو ان يسطع نور الحقيقة ولو للحظات عابرة في هذه القاعة التي ظلت لأمد بعيد تعتبر مكانا حالكا بالظلام بالنسبة لبلدنا. لم أحضر ان هنا اليوم لتمطروني بهتافاتكم بل لاقول الحقيقة. والحقيقة ان اسرائيل تنشد السلام. والحقيقة أنني شخصيا أتوق الى السلام. والحقيقة ان السلام في الشرق الاوسط، وفي هذه الفترة بالذات التي تشهد حالة من عدم الاستقرار، يجب ان يكون عماده الامن. والحقيقة التي يجب ان نعلمها ان السلام لا يمر عبر قرارات الامم المتحدة بل يتحقق عن طريق مفاوضات مباشرة بين الاطراف المعنية. والحقيقة ان الفلسطينيين يرفضون التفاوض. والحقيقة أنكم لا يجب ان تسكتوا عن هذا .

أيها السيدات . والسادة الكرام، عندما كنت هنا للمرة الاولى قبل 27 عاما كان العالم مقسوما الى فسطاطين: شرق وغرب. وقد انتهت الحرب الباردة وقامت حضارات عظيمة من الانقراض بعد سبات دام قرون وتم انتشال مئات ملايين البشر من دائرة الفقر، والحيل على الجرار. علما بان كل ذلك حصل بطرق سلمية. غير ان الحد المدفون بين عناصر من الشرق والغرب عاد ليطل برأسه من جديد مهددا السلم العالمي. ولا يسعى هذا التيار الخبيث ايدا الى التحرر بل الى الاستعباد والاقصاء، وسعيه الذؤوب ليس الى البناء بل الى الدمار. والمقصود هنا هو التيار الاسلامي المتشدد الذي يُسرف في التلغف بعباءة الدين فيما لا يتورع عن قتل اليهود والمسيحيين والمسلمين دون ان يفرق بين احد منهم. وقد فعلها يوم 11 سبتمبر 2001 حين قتل الالاف في مركز التجارة العالمي وحول البرجين الكبريين الى ركام يتصاعد منه الدخان. وقمت الليلة الماضية بوضع اكليل من الزهور عند النصب التذكاري الذي أقيم لتخليد ذكرى الضحايا تعتريني مشاعر جياشة وقلبي ينزف ألما. تتردد في خاطري كلمات الرئيس الايراني من على هذه المنصة حين ألمح بان هجوم الحادي عشر من سبتمبر لم يكن سوى مؤامرة امريكية. وقد غادر القاعة يومها فريق منكم من أعضاء البعثات الدبلوماسية من شتى دول العالم حيال سماع هذه الاوصاف المعيبة لكن ذلك لم يكن كافيا فكان على الجميع مغادرة القاعة على الفور .

ولم ينتهي الامر عند ضحايا الحادي عشر من سبتمبر فقد أمعن الاسلاميون المتشددون في غيهم وامتدت مجازرهم الى لندن ومدريد وبغداد ومومباي وتل ابيب وأورشليم وكافة اراضي اسرائيل. من هنا اعتقد جازما بان الخطر الحقيقي الذي يحدق اليوم بالعالم هو حصول جماعات التيار الاسلامي المتشدد على اسلحة نووية. وهو الهدف الذي تسعى ايران الى بلوغه. وتخيّلوا الرئيس الايراني الذي نطق بتلك العبارات المربعة بالامس على هذه المنصة تخيلوه واقفا أمامكم شاهرا اسلحته النووية؟! ان هذا الامر لا يجب ان يحصل، وعلى العالم ان يمنع ذلك قبل فوات الاوان. فان لم يفعل حين ذاك سواجه جميعا شبح الارهاب النووي فيما قد يحول الربيع العربي الى شتاء ايراني. وهو أمر أساسوي بالفعل. لقد شاهدنا كيف نزل ملايين العرب الى الشوارع والميادين ليصرخوا في وجه الطغيان مطالبين بالحرية والانتعاق. اما اسرائيل فترى بانها اكبر المستفيدين من انتصار الشعوب المؤمنة بقيم الحرية والسلام. ما أجمل هذا الحلم حين يتحقق. لكن طبعاً بصفتي رئيسا لوزراء دولة اسرائيل لا يمكنني ان أقامر بمستقبل دولتنا العبرية عوضا عن أماني يمكن ان تتحقق او لا تتحقق. فالقيادة يتعاملون مع واقع الحال لا مع الواقع المأمول. علينا ان لا نألو جهدا في سبيل تحديد ملامح المستقبل دون ان نقفز فوق مخاطر الحاضر. فالمنطقة برمتها باتت على كف عفريت، فها هو التيار الاسلامي الراديكالي قد أحكم قبضته على لبنان وجزء، وهو ماضٍ في امعانه في تمزيق معاهدات السلام الموقعة مع مصر والاردن، وهو ماضٍ قدما في سعيه لتلويث العقول وتأليب القلوب في الشارع العربي ضد اسرائيل وامريكا والغرب قاطبة. هذا التيار لا يعارض سياسات اسرائيل فحسب بل يرفض وجودها اصلا .



ثمة من يزعم بوجود علاقة طردية بين انتشار التيارات الإسلامية المتطرفة وبين سلوك اسرائيل واستعدادها او عدم استعدادها لتقديم تنازلات. بمعنى ان الطريقة الوحيدة للحد من تنامي الحركات الإسلامية المتطرفة على حد قولهم، خصوصا في هذه الفترة العصبية، يستوجب تقديم تنازلات عاجلة من الطرف الاسرائيلي والتوصل بسرعة الى تسوية سياسية تتأسس على الانسحاب من اراضي متنازع عليها. يقول لنا دعاة هذه النظرية انسحبوا من الاراضي وسيحل السلام ويعلو شأن التيارات المعتدلة فيما تنحسر التيارات المتشددة ويتم احتواءها. ولا داعي ان تقلقوا أيها الاسرائيليون على أمن اسرائيل فسيكتفل المجتمع الدولي والقوات الدولية بهذه المهمة. هؤلاء المتفانين يقولون لي دوما إن كل ما علينا فعله هو تقديم عرض مغري وسخي حينئذ سيكون كل شيء على ما يرام. أقول لهؤلاء لقد جربنا كل ما تقولون. كنا في هذه التجربة اكثر من مرة. ولم يتحقق شيء. اسرائيل قدمت عرض مغري وشامل عام 2000 خلال قمة كامب ديفيد يلبى كافة الطموحات الفلسطينية لكن عرفات ضرب به عرض الحائط. وقد تلى ذلك انتفاضة دموية حصدت ارواح الالاف من المواطنين الاسرائيليين. ثم جاء دور رئيس الوزراء الاسرائيلي أولمرت حيث تقدم هو الآخر بمبادرة سخية وغير مسبوقه، غير ان هذه المبادرة كان مصيرها كسابقتها فيقيت على الرف ولم تحظى حتى برد من الرئيس الفلسطيني محمود عباس .

علما ان اسرائيل قامت فعلا واكثر من مرة بخطوات جريئة رافقتها انسحاب من اراضي. فلقد انسحبنا من لبنان عام 2000. وانسحبنا كاملا من غزة عام 2005. لكن كل هذا لم يرضي الجهات الإسلامية ولم يهدأ من روعها وما ينفك هذا التيار الشرس شاهرا سيفه ووعيده في وجوهنا كما كان. بل ان الامر جعله يزداد بأسا وصلفا. فما هي الا مسألة وقت حتى انطلقت صواريخ حزب الله وحماس بالأفها تصف القرى والمدن الاسرائيلية منطلة من ذات الاراضي التي انسحبنا منها. لاحظوا ايضا ان ما يسمى بالتيارات المعتدلة لم تقو شوكتها بعد انسحابنا كما قيل لنا ولم يتم احتواء العناصر المتشددة بل على العكس ذابت التيارات المعتدلة وتم ابتلاعها داخل الجهات المتطرفة. ويوسفني ان أقول بانه لا قوات حفظ السلام الدولية على حدود لبنان (اليونيفيل) ولا البعثة الأوروبية لمراقبة معبر رفح الحدودي (EUBAM) تمكنت من وقف الهجمات ضد اسرائيل .

خرجنا من غزة املا بتحقيق السلام. ما فعلناه في غزة ليس تجميد استيطان بل اخلاء المستوطنات الاسرائيلية في غزة عن بكرة ابيها. قالوا لنا اخرجوا من غزة فخرجنا. قالوا لنا عودوا الى حدود 67 ففعلنا. طالبونا بازالة المستوطنات فقمنا بذلك. الالف من المستوطنين اليهود في غزة اقتلعوا من بيوتهم ومدارسهم وروضاتهم وتم تجريف بيوت العبادة اليهودية بل حتى افراغ القبور من الموتى، وتم تسليم مفاتيح غزة الى الرئيس عباس. فماذا حصل؟ ماذا كان مصير الوعود العربية والدولية التي ستصبح غزة بمقتضاها كيانا مسالما يسعى الى جوار حسن مع جيرانه؟ هل تذكرون كيف صفق العالم يومها بحرارة وكبر وهلل لهذا الانسحاب الذي وُصف بالمبارك واعتبر فعلا سياسيا حادقا من الدرجة الاولى وخطة جريئة باتجاه تحقيق السلام؟

سادتي الاعزاء . ان ما حصلنا عليه لم يكن سلاما بل وبالا ونكالا. لقد فرنا بأيدنا معقلا أمنا لايران في غزة وباتت ايران تطل علينا مكشرة أنيابها عبر بوابة غزة بعد ان طرد عباس وفتح شر طردة من غزة على يد حماس. لم تحتاج حماس الى اكثر من يوم لتقويض سلطة عباس. عن أي أحلام يتحدث الرئيس عباس وأي آمال قصد حين قال قبل قليل لقد جننا الى هنا مسلحين بالأمال والأحلام!! هل يقصد العشرة الاف قذيفة صاروخية وصواريخ غراد التي تزودت بها حماس من ايران؟! هذا طبعاً عدا استمرار تدفق الاسلحة الفتاكة الى غزة عبر سيناء من ليبيا ومناطق اخرى. ألم يتم اطلاق الالاف من هذه الصواريخ باتجاه مدننا؟؟ هل تملكون جوابا للسؤال ما هي ضماناتكم هذه المرة حتى لا يتكرر سيناريو غزة في الضفة الغربية؟؟ مع الأخذ بالحسبان ان المسافة التي تفصل مدننا الرئيسية عن الضفة الغربية أقل بكثير من المسافة التي تفصلها عن غزة، ما يجعل الاراضي الاسرائيلية كلها تحت طائلة الصواريخ لو وصلت الى الضفة الغربية. كم منكم يوافق ان يستقدم بنفسه صواريخاً تهدد مدنه وبيته وعائلته؟ هل منكم من يقامر الى هذه الدرجة وبهذا الشكل الارعن بارواح شعبه؟

نعم اسرائيل مستعدة لقيام دولة فلسطينية على اراضي الضفة الغربية لكننا غير مستعدين لاستنساخ تجربة غزة. أجل نحتاج الى تدابير أمنية فعليه وصارمة وهو الامر الذي يرفض الجانب الفلسطيني التفاوض حوله. ما زال الاسرائيليون يتذكرون الدروس المرة المستقاة من تجربة غزة. وما زال دعاة التسوية والانسحاب يوجهون سهام نقدهم الى اسرائيل في الوقت الذي يتغاضون تماما عن الحقائق السابق ذكرها ولا يكلمون من دعوة اسرائيل بشكل غي مسئول الى تكرار تجربة غزة باعتبارها الحل الوحيد المطروح. وعندما تطالع مقالاتهم يتتابك شعور بان شيئا مما ذكرنا لم يحدث بنظرهم، هم يكررون ذات الاسطوانة وذات الصيغة وكان شيئا لم يكن. ويمعنون في الضغط على اسرائيل لتقديم تنازلات بعيدة الامد دون ان يقدموا اي ضمانات او يقترحوا أي حلول ترقى الى حجم الاحتياجات الامنية الاسرائيلية. ويصفون كل من يعمل ولو بحسن نية على تعاضم قوة الغول الاسلامي المتطرف، بالرجل الشجاع. فيما يصفون كل من يقف في وجه هذا الغول المنفلت من عقاله ويحاول كبح جماحه، بعدو السلام .

أن لاسرائيل ان تنال استحقاتها ايضا وان يهمسوا في أنها نصائح صادقة وان تكون وقفة جادة معها في وجه من ينال من شرفها وكرامتها. فاسرائيل والحال هذا تفضل صحافة معادية على عبارات تعزية جميلة تعلن وفاتها!! أن لاسرائيل ان تحظى بتغطية صحفية منصفة من أناس جادين يقرؤون بشرعية المخاوف الامنية الاسرائيلية وليس من أولئك الذين لا تتجاوز ثقافتهم التاريخية مادة افطارهم . إنني على يقين بان المفاوضات السلمية الجادة تكون وحدها القادرة على تذليل كل العقبات وتمكننا من التعاطي بشكل لائق مع الاحتياجات والهجوم المتبادلة، علما ان اسرائيل ستحتفظ بحقها في توفير الحماية لشعبها في حال غياب المفاوضات المباشرة. ومثل هذه الاحتياجات تصبح ملحة اكثر كون اسرائيل دولة صغيرة جدا لا يتعدى عرضها في بعض المناطق 15 كيلومترا بدون اراضي الضفة الغربية. وحتى نوضح الامر وطالما نحن موجودون هنا في مدينة نيويورك نقول إن هذه المسافة تعادل ثلثي طول جزيرة مانهاتن او بالاحرى المسافة بين باتيري بارك وحرم جامعة كولومبيا. مع الأخذ بالاعتبار ان سكان بروكلين ونيو جيرزي اكثر لطفا من بعض جيران اسرائيل .

طيب كيف يمكن اذن ان توفر حماية لدولة صغيرة بحجم اسرائيل محاطة بأناس يحلفون أغلظ الايمان بأنهم لن يهدأ لهم بال ولن يهدأ لهم عيش الا بعد زوال اسرائيل، ونحن نعلم انهم مدججين بأسلحة إيرانية؟؟ بالطبع يستحيل ان تتحقق هذه الحماية عبر الشريط الضيق الذي يشكل طول اسرائيل وعرضها بل نحتاج الى عمق استراتيجي اكبر ولهذا السبب تحديدا تجنب قرار مجلس الامن 242 مطالبية اسرائيل بالانسحاب من كافة المناطق التي احتلتها عام 67 واكتفى بالحديث عن "انسحاب من مناطق" الى حدود آمنة وقابلة للحماية .

وبالتالي نحتاج إسرائيل لغرض الدفاع عن نفسها إلى الإبقاء على حضور عسكري إسرائيلي بعيد المدى في مناطق إستراتيجية حيوية في الضفة الغربية. سبق وشرحت ذلك للرئيس عباس لكنه أجاب بأن الدولة الفلسطينية لن تستطيع أبداً القبول بترتيبات كهذه تمس بسيادتها. طيب دعونا نعيد النظر في هذا الامر من خلال استحضار بعض النماذج، سنجد ان الولايات المتحدة لديها قوات في كل من اليابان والمانيا وكوريا الجنوبية منذ اكثر من نصف قرن. بريطانيا تمتلك قاعدة جوية في قبرص. فرنسا ترابط قواتها في ثلاث دول افريقية مستقلة ولم تشتكي هذه الدول بان الامر يمس بسيادتها .

وهناك عديد القضايا الامنية الحيوية التي تتطلب منا توفير حلول جادة. لاحظوا مثلا قضية المجال الجوي مع الأخذ بالاعتبار مساحة اسرائيل الصغيرة سترون بانها مصدر قلق أمني حقيقي. ففي الوقت الذي تحتاج طائرة نفاثة الى ست ساعات لاجتياز الاراضي

الامريكية، فانها لن تحتاج الى اكثر من ثلاث دقائق لاجتياز المجال الجوي الاسرائيلي! ان المشكل هنا هو تقاسم هذا المجال الجوي الضيق اصلا مع دولة فلسطينية معادية او في احسن الحالات لا تقيم علاقات سلام مع اسرائيل. مع ملاحظة ان مطارنا الدولي يقع على بعد كيلومترات قليلة من حدود الضفة الغربية. ما يجعل طائراتنا على مرمى قوس من الصواريخ المضادة للطائرات التي ستنتشر حتما في اراضي الضفة الغربية. ولو ركزنا البصر اكثر فاننا نقصد تحديدا المناطق الجبلية في الضفة الغربية التي تشرف على الشريط الساحلي في اسرائيل حيث التجمعات السكنية الرئيسية التي تاوي غالبية سكان اسرائيل. هل من سبيل لمنع تسرب الصواريخ الى هذه المناطق او الحيلولة دون اطلاقها باتجاه المدن الاسرائيلية؟

ليست هذه مسائل نظرية او كلاما مرسلا ولا أطلق الكلام جزافا او ألقبه على عواهنه. هذه مشكلات حقيقية ومصيرية تحتاج الى حل. ما يستدعي منا سد جميع الثغرات قبل الاعلان عن الدولة الفلسطينية وليس بعد اعلانها حيث سيغدو الامر مستحيلا. حين ذلك ستطفو كل هذه المشكلات على السطح وتنسف عملية السلام. من هنا يتوجب علينا اسرائيليين وفلسطينيين ان نصل الى صيغة توافقية تسبق الاعلان عن الدولة الفلسطينية. وقت ذلك لن تكون اسرائيل آخر من يرحب بقيام دولة فلسطينية واعتمادها عضوا جديدا في الامم المتحدة بل ستكون اول المرحبين والموقعين والمباركين .

السادة الحضور الكرام . سبق واستعرضت العام الماضي رؤيتي لعملية السلام ضمن خطاب جامعة بار ايلان وكررت هذا العام في خطابي اما الكنيست الاسرائيلي وامام الكونغرس الامريكي، موضعا مسألة الدولة الفلسطينية منزوعة السلاح وحتمية الاعتراف بدولة اسرائيل بصفتها دولة يهودية من قبل الجانب الفلسطيني. ان هذه الهيئة أي الامم المتحدة هي ذاتها التي اعترفت بالمحصلة النهائية بقيام دولة يهودية قبل 64 عاما، فما الذي يمنع ان يفعل الفلسطينيون الامر ذاته اليوم؟

علما ان صيغة دولة يهودية معناها انها ستضمن بشكل دائم حماية حقوق كافة مكونات المجتمع الاسرائيلي بما في ذلك اكثر من مليون مواطن عربي. وكنت اتمنى في هذه المناسبة ان اؤكد الامر ذاته بالنسبة للدولة الفلسطينية العتيدة الا ان الامر بات محسوما حيث اوضح مسؤولون فلسطينيون هنا قبل ايام بان الدولة الفلسطينية ستكون خالية من اليهود تماما. وبالمناسبة هم لا يسمون ذلك تطهيرا عرقيا . هذا فضلا عن سن قوانين في رام الله تسمح بفرص عقوبة الاعدام في حق كل فلسطيني يبيع اراضي لليهود. وهو ما نعتبره نهجا عنصريا بامتياز. على كل حال لا مانع لدينا ان تكون فلسطين ذات غالبية فلسطينية واسرائيل ذات غالبية يهودية .

عندما وقف الرئيس عباس هنا قبل قليل ذكر ان المستوطنات تشكل محور الصراع الاسرائيلي الفلسطيني. واسمحوا لي اني لا ارى هذا الامر على هذا النحو، إذ لم تكن مستوطنة اسرائيلية واحدة في الضفة الغربية قبل نصف قرن في الوقت الذي احتدم فيه الصراع على أشده. فهل يجوز لي ان اقول بان الرئيس عباس ربما كان يقصد مستوطنات اخرى مثل تل ابيب وحيفا ويافا وبئر السبع؟! وهل كان يقصد ذات الامر حينما قال ان اسرائيل تحتل الاراضي الفلسطينية منذ 63 عاما؟! لقد قالها صراحة ان احتلال فلسطين قائم منذ عام 48 وليس 67 . واتمنى ان يجيب بصراحة عن هذا السؤال لانني اعتقد بان المستوطنات ليست جوهر الصراع بل نتيجة له. نعم يتوجب علينا ايجاد حل مرضي لمسألة المستوطنات ايضا، في اطار المفاوضات، لكن يظل جوهر الصراع من وجهة نظرنا مرتبطا برفض الجانب الفلسطيني الاعتراف المبدئي بوجود دولة يهودية ضمن حدود معترف بها، مثلما هو انكارهم للرابطة الوثقى بين شعب اسرائيل وارض اسرائيل. والامر ذاته ينسحب على مسألة (تهويد القدس) كما يسميها الجانب الفلسطيني. وانا هنا اريد ان أقول لكم شيئا.

**هل تعلمون من اين جاءت تسمية (يهود)؟ انها تعود الى منطقة يهودا التي كانت اورشليم (القدس) ضمن حدودها وعاصمتها لها .**  
وبالمناسبة احتفظ في مكتبي بختم قديم يعود الى شخصية يهودية معروفة من العصور الاسرائيلية القديمة او ما نسميه حقبة التوراة. عثر على هذا الختم خلال أحافير أثرية بمحاذاة السور الغربي في البلدة القديمة ويعود تاريخه الى حوالي 2700 عام مضت أي الى عصر الملك حزقيا. وقد نقش عليه اسم "نتانياهو" باللغة العبرية وهو اسمي ايضا كما تعلمون. اما اسمي الاول "بنيامين" فتمننا جدنا بنيامين ابن يعقوب او بنيامين ابن اسرائيل فيعقوب هو اسرائيل وقد عاش قبل يحزقيا بالف عام. كان يعقوب واسباطه الاثني عشر يجوبون تلال يهودا قبل نحو اربعة الاف عام، ولم ينقطع الوجود اليهودي في البلاد منذ ذلك الزمان. وظل اليهود الذين اقتلعوا من ارضهم يراودهم حلم العودة ولم يتنازلوا يوما عن حق العودة، سواء يهود اسبانيا قبل طردهم أواخر القرن ال 15، او يهود اوكرانيا الفارين من المجازر في القرن ال 18، او اليهود الذين قاوموا النازية في غيتو وارسو العام 1943. كل هؤلاء ظلوا يتضرعون الى الله ويتطلعون الى ارض اسرائيل ويلهجون بالدعاء ويخفنون القول "سنلتقي العام القادم في اورشليم". . "العام القادم في ارض الميعاد . ."

**انني بصفتي رئيس حكومة اسرائيل اتحدث باسم اجيال واجيال من اليهود الذين لم يفقدوا الامل في حلم العودة بعد ان تفرقت أيادي يهود ودخلنا في عصور من المعاناة والقهر والظلم، وظل الامل يداعبنا باستعادة لحممتنا القومية ولم شملنا في ارضنا التي لا ارض لنا سواها . .**

السيدات والسادة الكرام . ما زال الامل بحدوني بان يكون الرئيس عباس شريك في عملية السلام. لقد عملت جاهدا للمضي بهذا السلام قدما. فمئذ تسلمت منصبى بادرت الى مفاوضات مباشرة دون شروط مسبقة. ولاثبات حسن نيتي بادرت الى ازالة العديد من الحواجز ونقاط التفتيش في الضفة الغربية لتسهيل حرية التنقل في انحاء الضفة الغربية وهو الامر الذي مهد الطريق للنهوض بالاقتصاد الفلسطيني بشكل غير مسبوق. وقمت بتجميد البناء في المستوطنات لمدة عشرة اشهر كبادرة حسن نية ايضا ولمنح الجانب الفلسطيني فرصة للتجاوب والتفاعل والاستجابة غير ان ذلك لم يحدث حتى الان .

وأتوجه من هذه المنصة الى الرئيس عباس : هيا لنعمل سويا. لتتوقف عن التفاوض لمجرد التفاوض. هيا بنا نتناول الموضوع من كل جوانبه ونخوض في جوهر السلام. كلانا أنفق سنين عمره في سبيل الدفاع عن قضيته، في ميادين الحرب كما في ميادين الاعلام. هل هو قدر محتوم ان يستمر هذا الصراع الى اجل غير معلوم ام ترى ثمة بارقة امل ان يأتي يوم يذكرنا ابناءنا واحفادنا بالخير باعتبارنا اشخاصا تمكنوا من ارساء ركائز السلام . ما زال الامر ممكنا طالما توافرت النوايا الصادقة . .

**خلال عامين ونصف العام هي عمر ولايتي الحالية لم تلتقي الا مرة واحدة في اورشليم (القدس) مع ان بابي ظل دائما مفتوحا على مصراعيه تدخله متى شئت. انا مستعد ان ازور رام الله اذا كان هذا سيحل المشكلة. وبما اننا هنا في نيويورك ادعوك بان نغتزم الفرصة لبدء الحوار هنا. ما الذي يمنعنا من ذلك . اذا توافرت النية والرغبة سنشرع في مفاوضات على الفور. سيكون حديثا صادقا وصرحيا. سيصغي كل منا الى صاحبه. سنحاز الى الطريق (الذغري)! سنتكلم (ذغري) أي مباشرة وبصراحة وبدون مواربة. سنتحدث عن كل شيء، عن همومنا وعن ضروراتنا وسنصل بعون الله الى ارضية مشتركة للسلام. وكما يقال في المثل العربي القديم يد واحدة لا تصفق. يد واحدة لا تصنع السلام. جانب واحد لا يصنع السلام. السيد الرئيس عباس! ها انا ذا امد يدي اليك نيابة عن دولة اسرائيل ناشدا السلام. يد اسرائيل (يعقوب) ممدودة للسلام. كلانا ابناء ابراهيم. ابراهيم هو ابراهيم عندنا. سنتجاوز في ارض ابراهيم جدنا وجدكم. ان مصيرنا واحد. ولنحقق رؤية نبينا اشعيا (فصل 9 آية 1) : (الشعب السالك في الظلام رأى نورا ساطعا). هيا لنجعل هذا النور نور السلام. . .**