

## Parties, cleavages, and issue evolution: The case of the religious-secular cleavage in Chile

Raymond, C., & Felth, B. M. B. (2014). Parties, cleavages, and issue evolution: The case of the religious-secular cleavage in Chile. *Party Politics*, 20(3), 429-443. DOI: 10.1177/1354068811436056

**Published in:**  
Party Politics

**Document Version:**  
Peer reviewed version

**Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:**  
[Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal](#)

**Publisher rights**  
This is the post-print version of an article finally published here: <http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/20/3/429>

**General rights**  
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

**Take down policy**  
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact [openaccess@qub.ac.uk](mailto:openaccess@qub.ac.uk).

# Parties, cleavages, and issue evolution: The case of the religious-secular cleavage in Chile

Forthcoming in *Party Politics*

Christopher Raymond

Address: University of Missouri  
Department of Political Science  
113 Professional Building  
Columbia, MO 65211-6030  
Email: cdrxdd@mail.missouri.edu  
Tel.: (573) 882-2786  
Fax: (573) 884-5131

Brian M. Barros Feltch

University of Missouri  
bmfdnf@mail.missouri.edu

## **Abstract**

Several recent articles have reached different conclusions regarding the impact of the religious-secular cleavage in Chile. The resolution of this debate has important consequences for the understanding of cleavages. Studies subscribing to the view that parties have considerable agency in the maintenance of cleavages have found that religiosity no longer affects vote choice, while studies rooted in a sociological perspective argue that religiosity still matters. We show that the reason for the discrepant results is because a partisan realignment is underway, whereby religious voters are gradually shifting their loyalties from the parties of the left to the parties of the right, matching a division that has taken place at the elite level. These results are consistent with an issue evolution perspective, which provides a clearer articulation of how cleavages form than both the agency or sociological approaches.

## **Acknowledgements**

We would like to thank Leslie Schwindt-Bayer for commenting on a previous draft of the manuscript, as well as the reviewers, one of whom pointed us toward an invaluable database.



Recent scholarship on electoral behavior in Chile has arrived at contradictory findings regarding the effect of religiosity on individuals' political behavior. Conventional wisdom contends that religion has long been the cornerstone of Chilean party politics (Huneus, 2003; Walker, 2003; Scully, 1992; *ibid*, 1995). Torcal and Mainwaring (2003, 68-69), however, claim that after controlling for regime preference, religiosity no longer plays a significant role in structuring the party system. Instead, they contend that the most salient cleavage in Chilean politics today divides those supportive of democracy from those who still hold emotive ties to the Pinochet regime (on this point, see also Tironi and Agüero, 1999; Tironi, 2002). Recent works by Alvarez and Katz (2009) and Bonilla et al. (2011) have reached similar conclusions regarding religiosity. In response, Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma (2007) have shown that the religious-secular cleavage remains a strong predictor of left-right ideology when using a more comprehensive measure of religiosity. While they find that religiosity is not a significant predictor of vote choice for the two major electoral coalitions—*Alianza por Chile* (now *Coalición por el Cambio*, and herein referred to as the Alliance) and *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (herein *Concertación*)—attitudes toward divorce remain significant, with those opposed to divorce supporting the Alliance and those more sympathetic to divorce supporting *Concertación*.

These disagreements have implications beyond this one case. At stake in this debate is the appropriate understanding of the formation of political cleavages and the role of political parties in creating and maintaining them. On the one hand are those like Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma (2007), who defend the traditional understanding of cleavages. This view holds that party systems are primarily determined by the social context in which they operate: the social cleavage makeup of society (see, for example, Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Torcal and

Mainwaring (2003), however, represent the view that the number and types of political cleavages are determined primarily by party elites, and not necessarily by the number of social cleavages. In this view, the agency of political parties explains the sudden demise from the religious-secular cleavage and the emergence of the authoritarian-democratic divide.

In an effort to resolve these controversies, we re-examine the Chilean case. Drawing from the theories of issue evolution (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Carmines and Woods, 2002) and conflict extension (Layman and Carsey, 2002), our analyses show that a partisan realignment is underway in Chile whereby voters have formed partisan identities that match how religious-secular issues have evolved at the elite level. These results provide evidence that parties have considerable agency in creating and maintaining cleavages (in keeping with Torcal and Mainwaring). However, these results also suggest that the issues which perennially animate party politics—those rooted in the social cleavage structure of society—appear to be permanent features of electoral politics, even if the parties which benefit from certain social groups' support changes over time (as Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma contend).

### **Religiosity and the Role of Parties in Chilean Politics**

A long line of literature has examined the role of cleavages in the formation of party systems. This literature can be divided into three strands. The classic formulation maintains that party systems "froze" around the major social cleavages in society shortly after the extension of universal (male) suffrage (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan, 1970; see also LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966; Rose, 1974; Lipset, 1960). This literature is often referred to as a sociological approach because it assumes that parties are extensions of the social group bases they purport to represent. A second line of literature understands cleavages as consisting of three components: the social structure, the values associated with each social category, and the political articulation

of these values (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Bartolini, 2000; Knutsen and Scarbrough, 1995; Kriesi, 1998). This second line of literature sees party systems as being rooted in the social cleavage structure of society, yet acknowledges some autonomy for political parties in the creation and maintenance of these cleavages: without parties to articulate political divisions, social groups and the values associated with them would not be represented. Finally, a third line of literature views parties as possessing even greater agency over the formation of cleavages, emphasizing the agency of parties in creating the cleavages among voters that meet with their electoral and legislative strategies *vis-à-vis* the other parties (Schattschneider, 1960; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986; Sartori, 1969; Chhibber and Torcal, 1997; Enyedi, 2005).

Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) discuss these three strands of literature as we do above. However, their argument fundamentally divides the literature into two. One side (primarily, the sociological approach) emphasizes the importance of the mass electorate in the formation of cleavages, assuming that political parties represent the interests of objective social group identities. This literature also assumes that party systems are shaped primarily by the social structure of society (perhaps a consequence of the mass party model popular at the time during which many of the major works were written). The other side—including the position taken by Torcal and Mainwaring (2003)—de-emphasizes the role of the electorate. Instead, the position taken by Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) is that cleavages do not form without party elite efforts to create them. This latter position is in keeping with previous research on the weak, unstable relationships between social cleavages and parties in many Latin American countries (Dix, 1989; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995).

The case of Chile exemplifies this debate. While Chile is well-known for having stable class and religious cleavages (Scully, 1992; *ibid*, 1995; Huneeus, 2003; Walker, 2003), recent

research contends that these two cleavages have been supplanted. Spearheading this new consensus, Torcal and Mainwaring—building upon the earlier work of Tironi and Agüero (1999) and Tironi (2002)—contend that "religion [has become] irrelevant as a predictor of party preference in contemporary Chile," (2003, 83). They argue that in the wake of the 1988 plebiscite on Pinochet's rule, the political parties of Concertación broke with the party system of 1973 (the last year under democracy prior to Pinochet's coup) and disarticulated religious and class issues in an effort to present a united pro-democracy front against the two major parties that supported Pinochet, UDI (*Unión Demócrata Independiente*) and RN (*Renovación Nacional*). As a result of this disarticulation of religious and class interests, most variables associated with religion and class no longer predict party preferences; in their place, they argue that a *political* cleavage on the issue of regime preference has supplanted these *social* cleavage effects. Key to their argument is the role that the political parties have played in creating and sustaining the regime preference cleavage, while at the same time de-emphasizing the religious and class cleavages.

Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma (2007) stand in sharp contrast to this new consensus. Rooting their argument in the sociological perspective that emphasizes the role of the electorate in the formation of cleavages, they contend that religiosity and religious issues continue to shape party preferences in Chile, noting that unlike religion, regime preferences do not have competing organizations that advocate the position of each respective side. Because of the shallow roots of the regime divide (in comparison to those of the more traditional cleavages of religion and class), the regime cleavage is viewed as "incidental" (Valenzuela, 1997, 51-52), or not having effects that are as long-term as social cleavages. According to this view, religious and other important social cleavages have not been displaced by or subsumed under a regime preference cleavage.

Rather, these cleavages affect partisan attitudes toward Pinochet in the same way that they affect current regime and party preferences. This is in keeping with the view that the social cleavage makeup of society plays a determinative role in the formation of cleavages.

One major shortcoming of previous studies that has impeded resolution of this debate with regard to the Chilean case is that most studies have examined party preferences at one time point. For instance, Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) conclude that religiosity no longer affects party preferences on the basis of data from one point in time. For their part, Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma (2007) use only one point in time as well, much later than the period examined by Torcal and Mainwaring. Because Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma use a different measure of religiosity than Torcal and Mainwaring, the authors cannot address whether their findings showing religiosity effects are due to the fact that they examine a different time period, use a different measure of religiosity, or both. Without a broader time horizon, previous studies have been unable to recognize that the reason for the discrepant findings is that a partisan realignment along religious-secular lines is underway in Chile. In the next section, we articulate why such a realignment has occurred.

### **An Issue Evolution Perspective of the Chilean Case**

The arguments in Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) toward cleavage realignment are akin to the notion of conflict displacement in the American politics literature (Schattschneider, 1960; Sundquist, 1983). Conflict displacement maintains that realignments are characterized by the total replacement of one partisan conflict with another. In the immediate aftermath of the plebiscite on Pinochet's rule, Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) maintain that the previous bases of Chilean politics—religion and class—became irrelevant, being displaced by a cleavage dividing supporters of authoritarian rule (under Pinochet and in general) from supporters of democracy.



Conflict displacement has fallen out of favor and given way to the theories of issue evolution (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Carmines and Woods, 2002) and conflict extension (Layman and Carsey, 2002). The theory of issue evolution holds that rather than producing sharp, abrupt changes in people's partisan preferences, new issues emerge progressively and produce partisan realignments over time. The process begins at a critical moment when party elites start to differentiate themselves from one another on a particular issue, eventually leading them to take clear and consistent stances on similar issues that distinguish them from other parties. Activists both inside and outside the party transmit these stances via cues linking the issue(s) to the parties in such a way that can be perceived by the electorate. The electorate, in turn, perceives these distinctions and begins to polarize in ways that mirror the parties' polarized stances, both in terms of partisanship and issue positions/ideology. The theory of conflict extension maintains that party systems can be characterized by multiple political divisions simultaneously. Rather than supplanting all other cleavages, the regime preference cleavage may instead have evolved into a separate partisan issue, constituting a supplemental issue divide.

Issue evolution in the case of Chile would suggest that if party elites have polarized on religious-secular issues, the public would have polarized in response. Elite polarization can be seen clearly on abortion issues. A search of the Cámara de Diputados website reveals that of the 19 bills introduced between 1990 and 2010 containing the term abortion (*aborto* in Spanish), 15 have been introduced since 2000, suggesting that the debate has intensified over the past decade (Cámara de Diputados, 2011).<sup>1</sup> A glance at the sponsors of the bills demonstrates a clear partisan divide, with members of Concertación—primarily those from *Partido Por la*

---

<sup>1</sup> Similar findings obtain when searching other contentious issues of morality, such as divorce and same-sex marriage.

*Democracia* (PPD) and *Partido Socialista* (PS)—sponsoring bills to decriminalize abortion and/or permit therapeutic abortion in cases when the mother's life is at risk, and members of the Alliance—UDI and RN—sponsoring bills to enact stricter penalties or make decriminalization more difficult. Given their party's stance on abortion, yet their membership in Concertación, it is interesting to note that few members of PDC (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano*) are willing to sponsor bills, be they for or against abortion.

We also see evidence of elite polarization with regard to other religious issues, including the legalization of divorce (Tironi and Agüero, 1999, 157–62), sex education, and emergency contraception (Guzmán, Seibert, and Staab, 2010), all of which passed with the support of Concertación. The parties of the Alliance responded by representing conservative, religious views on each of these issues. Activists on both sides (women's rights groups in favor of Concertación's policies, priests and other religious leaders opposed) spoke out on both sides of the issues (Guzmán, Seibert, and Staab, 2010), playing the role of party activists, linking the laws to the distinct positions each party has adopted (see Carmines and Stimson, 1989, chapter 4). As these and other religious issues have evolved into an axis of partisan competition at the elite and activist levels, an issue evolution perspective predicts that voters have followed the lead of parties, with party identification dividing increasingly along religious-secular lines.

This polarization among elites began during the early-to-mid 1990s, during which the PS and PPD members of Concertación came into greater prominence, both as a result of winning higher offices, but also by promoting an increasingly secular agenda in Congress. This culminated in 'critical moments' like the introduction in 1995 of a divisive bill that would ultimately legalize divorce (but not until 2004), and the election of the Socialist presidents Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet in 2000 and 2006 (respectively)—which would bring the

secular positions of PS and PPD into greater public spotlight and ultimately brand Concertación as a secular coalition. Party elites in the Alliance responded by adopting increasingly religious positions. Whereas Concertación was once the major beneficiary of support from the Catholic Church during the Pinochet years (due to Concertación's promotion of human rights), the Catholic Church increasingly came to support the Alliance for their opposition to divorce, abortion, etc (Shepard, 2000). Polarization in the electorate began shortly afterward (and is likely still continuing), becoming visible in the parliamentary elections of 2001 (demonstrated in the analyses below). This transition from elite-to-mass polarization has occurred over roughly the same amount of time as race issues evolved in the U.S. Congress before polarizing the electorate (see Carmines and Stimson, 1989).

While Carmines and Stimson (1989) demonstrated that racial issues became crystallized among the mass electorate as a result of the development of the racial issue cleavage in American politics at the elite level, Adams (1997)—in looking at the issue evolution of abortion—has shown that issue evolution at the elite level need not *create* issue constraint among the electorate. Instead, issue evolution in such cases occurs solely in terms of party identification: as the parties divide on an issue, attitudes toward the parties, and not ideologies, polarize among the electorate because such ideological polarization already exists. This is important for the case of Chile because religious attitudes, much like abortion attitudes in the United States, may already be clearly defined and constrained, as the religious-secular cleavage has long been present in Chilean politics (Scully, 1992). All that has changed since democratization are the social bases of party identification.

While we concur with Torcal and Mainwaring's basic argument (that cleavages emerge only when parties create partisan identities), we find an explanation based on issue evolution and

conflict extension more capable of providing a cross-national explanation for the development of cleavages for two reasons. First, if we should find evidence that the religious-secular cleavage impacts party identification net of the regime preference cleavage, then the conflict displacement view taken by Torcal and Mainwaring does not hold. Instead, the appearance of both cleavages would provide support to the theory of conflict extension.

Second, the theoretical underpinnings of Torcal and Mainwaring's argument are insufficiently grounded to provide a comparative explanation for which sorts of issues parties will use to create cleavages. Torcal and Mainwaring (2003, 59) rightly argue that parties play a fundamental role in the development of cleavages, yet overstate (even if such overstatement is because they do not elucidate explicitly) the degree of agency possessed by parties. Such an approach de-emphasizes the role of the mass electorate in the formation of cleavages. If the mass electorate is largely irrelevant in the creation of cleavages, then one would be left without an explanation for which cleavages party elites choose to create. While parties may try to create any cleavage they wish, they will be unsuccessful (defined in electoral terms) if they try to create cleavages out of issues untied to either voters' preferences or their social group identities. For instance, no matter how well a party may articulate the interests of Catholic voters, if no such voter exists (say, in a predominantly Muslim country), that party will fail to win any votes. While Torcal and Mainwaring argue convincingly that the two major electoral alliances in Chile have created a cleavage regarding regime preference, this argument still requires the assumption that voters care about the issue enough to be grouped (or even have their preferences shaped by the parties) into competing sides.

Issue evolution provides a clearer theoretical explanation for which issue cleavages parties decide to create. Party actors, particularly those in the opposition, are always looking for

the next issue to fracture the majority/government in such a way as to improve their own chances of election. While any number of issues may emerge, only those issues that resonate with voters will 'survive' and produce stable party alignments (see Carmines and Stimson, 1989, chapter 1). This is why social cleavages like religion and class are routine features in electoral politics: people's stable social identities influence their values and issue preferences. These values and preferences lead to the formation of partisan identities, which are used in turn to evaluate parties, policies, and candidates in such a way as to provide durable, contestable issue divides for political parties. This is the causal order of variables affecting vote choice presented in the Michigan model's funnel of causality (see, for instance, Campbell et al., 1960, 24-32; Dalton, 2006, 178; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008, 23). It is because of this long-term stability that Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma (2007) and others refer to religion and other social cleavages as party-generative: these issues are capable of producing long-standing party identification because the social identities which give rise to such issues are equally long-lived. Furthermore, this is in keeping with the most important fact underlying arguments made by those like Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Although realignments appear to contradict the freezing hypothesis, the sorts of issues which fundamentally drive party politics—those rooted in people's lasting social group identities—remain constant features, even if the party beneficiaries of particular groups' support changes.

With the case of regime preference in Chile, the parties that would form Concertación recognized the issue of democracy divided public support for the parties of the Alliance enough that they could win control of government by emphasizing this issue. As a result of their initial success, issue evolution theory suggests that Concertación will continue to use the issue to their advantage until it no longer commands the attention of voters. It is because this issue is only

rooted in the experiences of those who lived during the Pinochet years—and is not rooted in the deeper social identities of voters—that Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma (2007) treat this issue cleavage as incidental and not long-lasting enough to generate and sustain new political parties. In a similar vein, with the case of religious issues, the parties of the Alliance recognized that the religious-secular cleavage divides PDC from PS and PPD within Concertación. Because of their religious affiliations, PDC has been hard-pressed to support the secular stances taken by the rest of the Concertación on such issues as abortion, divorce, sex education, and emergency contraception. This strategy on the part of the Alliance has been particularly effective under the two socialist presidencies of Lagos and Bachelet from 2000-2010, during which Concertación's increasingly secular agenda became increasingly visible, thereby making it easy for Alliance politicians to provide a clear alternative to voters.

Thus, in all of this one can see that issue evolution provides a clearer explanation of the formation of cleavages than the theory offered by Torcal and Mainwaring. This is because issue evolution and its counterpart, conflict extension, incorporate both the role of parties *and* the mass electorate. According to this issue evolution explanation, as Concertación began to promote more secular policies while in government—and the Alliance began to identify themselves more with religious issues—we should find evidence of realignment between the two coalitions, whereby identification with the two coalitions increasingly divides along religious-secular lines.

### **Data Analyses**

In the data analyses to follow, we present four sets of analyses designed to test whether religiosity has re-emerged as a significant political division, as an issue evolution perspective predicts. First, we re-examine the possibility that if the two major coalitions have become increasingly divided along religious-secular lines, this should be apparent in individual

perceptions of the parties' positions on issues of morality. Second, we examine the divide between the two major party coalitions for evidence of realignment, whether identification with each coalition is divided increasingly along religious-secular lines. A third section tests whether an issue of morality (legalization of divorce)—which became a major political issue in the mid 1990s—served as a 'critical moment' (Carmines and Stimson, 1989) that began to polarize party identification. Finally, a fourth analysis examines whether the religious-secular divide has been displaced by the regime preference cleavage—as Tironi (2002) and Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) maintain—or whether both sets of issues impact party identification (as conflict extension and issue evolution perspectives maintain).

#### *Perceptions of the Parties on Issues of Morality*

If there has been realignment along religious-secular lines in Chile, there should be observable evidence of divergence in perceptions of the political parties' positions on issues of morality that divide religious and secular individuals. The literature review above suggests that party rhetoric on issues like divorce, abortion, etc. increasingly divides the parties. While it would be ideal to observe changes in party perceptions over time, temporal data on party perceptions are not readily available. Fortunately, however, one survey conducted jointly by the Centro de Estudios Públicos, Chile (CEP) and the Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) in 2008 asks respondents about their perceptions of the parties' positions (in addition to respondents' own positions) on three issues of morality: abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage, all arranged on a scale from one (most religious—complete disapproval of the behavior) to ten (most secular—complete acceptance). Because this survey is conducted toward the end of the period in which we argue that religious-secular issues have polarized, examining respondents' views of the parties' positions on these three issues tests whether the

parties have indeed polarized along religious-secular lines, as an issue evolution perspective predicts.

These perceptions are presented in Table 1. On each issue, respondents view PS and PPD as being the most secular, while they perceive UDI as being the most religious (with RN and PDC also emerging as more religious than PS and PPD). Comparing the two electoral alliances, Concertación is perceived to be significantly more secular than the Alliance (as determined by difference-of-means tests), and closer to respondents' perceptions of PS and PPD. While perceptions of PDC emerge as closer to perceptions of the Alliance than perceptions of Concertación, this is actually quite indicative of realignment along issue evolution lines. Specifically, this suggests that as Concertación has adopted the policies of its more secular member parties, the electorate has come to identify it as representative of the more secular positions taken by PS and PPD instead of the more religious positions historically taken by PDC. In other words, while the religious realignment has left perceptions of PDC potentially unchanged, the important finding in Table 1 is that contemporary perceptions of Concertación on issues of morality reflect the positions taken by PS and PPD, which is in line with an issue evolution perspective suggesting realignment along religious-secular lines is underway in Chile.

*Table 1 about here*

Comparing the distance between the average respondent and each electoral bloc's position may explain why the Alliance has adopted increasingly religious positions. On both abortion and same-sex marriage (though not euthanasia), the average perception of the Alliance is closer to the average respondent than perceptions of Concertación. This suggests that the parties of the Alliance have adopted such positions because they more closely represent Chileans



than the more secular PS and PPD and thus, these stances may have helped to propel the Alliance to victory in 2010 (particularly on the increasingly prominent issue of same-sex marriage).

These findings are consistent with an issue evolution perspective. As the party elites belonging to the parties comprising Concertación have become increasingly vocal in support of secular issues—and elites belonging to the parties of the Alliance increasingly supportive of religious issues—the public has increasingly come to recognize that the parties of each coalition represent increasingly distinct positions with regard to religious and secular issues. These findings apply not only to the individual parties, but to perceptions of Concertación and the Alliance as well. In sum, these findings suggest that as the parties belonging to Concertación (particularly PS) have come to be identified with secular positions, and as parties of the Alliance have come to be identified with religious positions on issues of morality, the support bases of the parties should have similarly divided increasingly along religious-secular lines.

#### *Re-examining The Divide Between the Alliance and Concertación*

In this section, we examine the division in party identification between Concertación (coded one) and the Alliance (coded zero). While the question wording varies slightly from one survey to the next, the question generally reads: 'Now, out of the following political tendencies, with which do you identify or sympathize most?' (the authors' own English translation).<sup>2</sup> The

---

<sup>2</sup> The original Spanish (as quoted from the pre-election survey conducted in October of 2009) reads as follows: 'Ahora, de las siguientes tendencias políticas, ¿con cuál Ud. se identifica o simpatiza más? ¿Con la Alianza, con la Concertación o con el Pacto Juntos Podemos?' Because we are only concerned with the division between Concertación and the Alliance, we ignore respondents identifying with el Pacto Juntos Podemos, 'others', and those stating that they identify with none of the above.

data come from the CEP surveys conducted around four recent presidential and/or parliamentary elections: September-October 1999, December-January 2001-2, October-November 2005, and October 2009. These surveys allow for an update of the findings presented in Mainwaring and Torcal (2003), who use earlier CEP data from 1995.

To measure religiosity, we use frequency of religious service attendance, recoded to range from low to high frequency of attendance. The number of response options varied from one survey to the next; to make this variable comparable across surveys, we transformed the scale into standardized values (z-scores). While we prefer a more comprehensive measure of religiosity (like Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma, 2007), additional measures of religiosity were not surveyed. The bias created by the lack of more comprehensive measures of religiosity, however, only biases our results against finding significant religiosity effects.

Several demographic control variables are included: household income (coded low to high income),<sup>3</sup> those not having completed the Chilean equivalent of high school (*Low Education*, coded 1, 0 otherwise), university and technical school graduates (*High Education*, coded 1 for such graduates, 0 otherwise), gender (*Gender*, coded 1 for females, 0 otherwise), the urban-rural cleavage (rural respondents coded 1, 0 otherwise), whether the respondent is Catholic (coded 1, 0 otherwise), married (coded 1 for those currently married, 0 otherwise), and age (age

---

<sup>3</sup> Because the range of options changes from survey to survey, we standardize this variable. To deal with missing data, we impute the mean for missing values. The results are substantively equivalent when using the mean-imputed or system-missing values.

minus 18, so that values of zero are substantively meaningful).<sup>4</sup> Descriptive statistics for each variable in each survey are presented in the Appendix. Because of the binary nature of the dependent variable, logistic regression is used. To correct for sampling biases, the data are weighted (see the individual CEP codebooks for details of each survey's weighting procedure).

*Table 2 about here*

Table 2 presents the results predicting party identification with Concertación relative to identification with the Alliance. The results show that the sign of each religiosity coefficient is negative, indicating that more religious individuals identify more with Alianza than Concertación. This effect does not reach statistical significance in 1999, but reaches statistical significance in all each of the other three models. Compared to the findings in Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) showing that religiosity is not significantly associated with party identification, these results suggest that a realignment along religious-secular lines is underway in Chile.

The bottom of Table 2 reports the predicted probability changes when moving from half a standard deviation below the mean to half a standard deviation above the mean of religiosity. These were generated using the 'prchange' command developed by Long and Freese (see Long and Freese, 2006), holding all other independent variables at their mean values (modes in the case of dichotomous variables). Over time, the substantive effect of religiosity has increased substantially. In 1999, the effect of religiosity leads to a three percent decrease in identification with Concertación; by 2001, this effect nearly doubles to a 5.8 percent decrease in identification

---

<sup>4</sup> While many studies of Chilean political behavior examine age cohorts—comparing those born prior to the 1973 coup with those whose formative years were spent under Pinochet—such variables do not perform as well as the single age variable used here (see the supplementary file).

with Concertación. While the substantive effect of religiosity is somewhat weakened in 2005 (perhaps as a result of the popularity of then-candidate Bachelet), the effect has its strongest impact in 2009.

These results provide evidence of realignment among religious and secular voters, with religious voters increasingly supportive of the Alliance and seculars increasingly supportive of Concertación. Such realignment provides additional support for the issue evolution perspective: as party elites have begun to divide increasingly along religious-secular lines, the mass public has responded, producing partisan realignment along religious-secular lines. Together with the findings above, this evidence explains why religiosity was not a significant predictor in earlier periods: religiosity did not divide party preferences because religious issues did not yet clearly divide party elites.

#### *A Critical Moment? The Case of the Divorce Legalization Debates*

In this section, we present results suggesting that part of the reason for the realignment documented in Table 2 is due to 'critical moments' like the divorce legalization debates, which brought about a visible religious-secular division among elites. The bill that legalized divorce in 2004 was initially introduced in November 1995, well before religiosity became significantly associated with support for the Alliance. We test whether this issue served as a critical moment that led to elite polarization along religious-secular lines in a manner similar to the effects that early civil rights legislation had on elite polarization on racial issues in the United States (Carmines and Stimson, 1989); we test this by examining whether the impact of attitudes toward divorce on party identification mirrors the evolution of the issue at the elite level. According to an issue evolution perspective, opposition to divorce should become associated with

identification with the Alliance as time progresses and the increasingly polarized positions of the parties become more visible.

We investigate this possibility with data from three time points: May-June 1995 (CEP study 30, prior to the introduction of the bill to legalize divorce and the elite discussion surrounding the issue began to intensify), September-October 1999 (CEP study 38), and December-January 2001-2 (the latter two surveys being the next surveys to ask respondents about their opinions on divorce). The dependent variable is the same as in Table 2. As above, the data are weighted to correct for sampling biases. To measure the impact of divorce attitudes, we code those reporting that they would never support divorce as one, while those reporting that they would support the legalization of divorce in some cases and those reporting that they do not know are coded as zero.

The models for 1999 and 2001-2 include the same set of variables included in Table 2 above. For the model using data from 1995, however, a number of the independent variables have different measurements from those in Table 2. Instead of income, which was not asked in 1995, we employ four dichotomous variables measuring four of the five socioeconomic categories surveyed (the lowest class, E, is used as the base category). Education is measured as years of education, ranging from zero (no education) to seven (18 years or more) in one-unit intervals. Finally, age was measured in five age groups, ranging from 18-24 to 55 and older; we treat those aged 18-24 as the base category and include four dummy variables for each of the other four age groups.

*Table 3 about here*

Table 3 presents the results of logistic regressions predicting identification with Concertación. The results show that prior to the introduction of the divorce bill in 1995, those

opposing divorce were significantly—2.4 percent—more likely to identify with Concertación than the Alliance. Similar to Torcal and Mainwaring (2003), religiosity is also positively, but not significantly, associated with Concertación identification in 1995. In keeping with the findings from Table 2 above, this helps to illustrate the changes in the effect of religiosity over time: still coming out of the authoritarian period during which the Catholic Church supported the parties of Concertación because of their efforts to promote human rights, religiosity and attitudes toward divorce are weakly associated with support for Concertación. What is even more interesting to issue evolution, however, are the results from models 2 and 3, which show that opposition to divorce becomes negatively associated with Concertación identification in 1999. While the effect remains negative in 2001-2, opposition to divorce begins to have less of an impact on Concertación identification; instead, the negative effect of religiosity intensifies and reaches statistical significance. This suggests that by late 2001-early 2002, the issue of divorce had been subsumed under a broader religious-secular divide.

In keeping with the issue evolution perspective, these results demonstrate that 'critical moments' like the debate over the legalization of divorce appear to have spurred the religious swing toward the Alliance and the secular swing toward Concertación observed in Table 2. Although opposition to divorce is significantly associated with Concertación identification in 1995, as time progresses and religious and secular individuals learn about the positions taken by the two blocs, opposition to divorce becomes negatively associated with Concertación identification. Beginning as the single issue of divorce, the coalitions would divide along similar religious-secular lines when faced with other, comparable moral issues like abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage (according to the results in Table 1). This transformation from a single issue to a broader religious-secular divide can be seen in Table 3: as the effect of opposition to

divorce becomes insignificant and negative, the effect of attendance also becomes negative, reaching statistical significance by 2001-2.

### *Evidence of Conflict Extension*

In this section, we test whether the impact of the religious-secular divide on party identification is robust when examined against the regime preference cleavage, which some have argued has displaced the religious cleavage (Tironi and Agüero, 1999; Tironi, 2002; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003). To do this, we re-estimate the 2009 CEP data used in model 4 of Table 2 above by separately adding three variables measuring the regime preference cleavage. One variable measures how well respondents believe democracy functions. This is measured from zero (very badly) to four (very well). The second variable is a dichotomous variable coded one for those who felt that 'sometimes an authoritarian government may be preferable' (to democracy), and zero for those responding that 'democracy is preferable to other forms of government,' that democracy and authoritarianism are about the same, and those who did not know which of the three statements best described their opinion. A third variable treated the responses used to code the second variable as a scale ranging from zero (those responding with don't know or that democracy is always preferable) to two (those saying that authoritarian government is sometimes preferable), with those saying that the two forms of government are equivalent coded one. Each model uses the same Concertación/Alliance dependent variable used above and is estimated with logistic regression with the appropriate sample weighting procedure.

### *Table 4 about here*

The results show that while support for authoritarianism and negative evaluations of democracy are associated with Alliance identification—as Tironi (2002) and Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) have shown—religiosity continues to impact identification, significantly

reducing the likelihood of identifying with Concertación. When comparing the substantive effects of religiosity relative to the effects of regime preference, the effects of religious issues on identification with Concertación (reported at the bottom of Table 4) are roughly half the size of the effect of regime preference in most instances. A one standard deviation increase in the belief that democracy functions well (model 2) leads to a 12.28 percent decrease in the likelihood of identifying with Concertación. An equivalent change in religiosity yields an 6.05 percent decrease in Concertación identification. Although the effects of religiosity are significantly smaller than the effects of regime preference, this is to be expected according to the Michigan model's funnel of causality (Campbell et al., 1960, 24-32; Dalton, 2006, 178; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008, 23): because regime preferences are more short-term issue divides, unlike the more stable social identities that religiosity produces (Valenzuela, 1997, 51-52; Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma, 2007), regime preferences are more proximate to the development of psychological attachments to the parties (that is, party identification) and should, therefore, have a larger effect on party identification. Based on this, if we were to include variables measuring issues that divide religious and secular individuals alongside regime preferences, the effects of religious-secular issues on party identification would match the effects of regime preferences.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> We are confident in this statement because when we employ variables measuring the three issues of morality taken from the 2008 CEP/PNUD survey used in Table 1 (in analyses not reported here), Concertación identification is lower when the party is perceived as being more secular on the issues of abortion and same-sex marriage. (The same is true of PS and PPD perceptions.) The substantive effects are not only significant, but also equivalent to- or greater than those of regime preference. See the supplementary file for these results.



These findings provide clear evidence supporting a conflict extension perspective. Rather than displacing religious issues as previous authors have argued, issues of regime preference coexist alongside religious issues. Based on these results, the reason why religiosity was not significantly associated with party support in earlier periods, while the regime preference cleavage was, appears to be due to the fact that the effect of religiosity is undergoing a realignment that is only beginning to surface.

### **Conclusion**

During the 2009/2010 elections, then-presidential candidate, Sebastián Piñera acknowledged his support for same-sex civil unions. Despite this development and the fact that Piñera is a member of the rightist party RN, an issue evolution perspective of the Chilean case (and the evidence presented above supporting such a perspective) suggests that religious issues may remain divided along partisan lines. For instance, a bill to legalize same-sex marriage was introduced by two PS senators in early August 2010. The Archbishop of Santiago openly condemned the measure, providing elite cues to religious voters on how to react to the bill, and President Piñera has voiced his own opposition to the bill, citing his support for *civil unions*, but not same-sex *marriage*. Legislative support appears limited as well: the measure is not expected to pass in the Senate, where the Alliance holds the largest number of seats ('Chile's gay marriage bill "unlikely to succeed"', 2010). The partisan division on this and other issues of morality suggests that such issues will remain features of Chilean partisan politics for the foreseeable future.

According to an issue evolution perspective, the reason for the disappearance and re-emergence of religious partisan divisions in Chile is because the Chilean party system is undergoing realignment along religious and secular lines. The analyses presented above

demonstrate that since the late 1990s Concertación has increasingly drawn support from seculars, while the Alliance has increasingly drawn from religious individuals. Since democratization, and particularly under the two socialist presidencies, party elites have polarized along religious-secular lines; in response, party identification has polarized at the mass level as well. This is in keeping with the theory of issue evolution (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Carmines and Woods, 2002). Although an issue cleavage based on regime preferences has also emerged during this period, the religious-secular cleavage is also salient; the existence of both religious and regime cleavages is explained by conflict extension (Layman and Carsey, 2002), which is in keeping with issue evolution theory.

The argument put forth here, based upon the theories of issue evolution and conflict extension, provides an explanation that may resolve the debate between those like Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) and Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma (2007), and therefore may resolve the dispute within social cleavage theory regarding the roles of parties and the electorate. A re-evaluation of the Chilean case from an issue evolution perspective shows that the agency of political parties is essential to understanding which cleavages emerge (as those like Torcal and Mainwaring contend), but that party systems ultimately reflect the social cleavage structure of society (as those like Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma counter), thereby constraining the choices available to parties as to which cleavages—social or political—they may elect to create and represent. Although arguments rooted in the notion of party agency contradict the part of the Lipset and Rokkan freezing hypothesis that predicts sustained patterns of social group support for the same parties over time, what remains truly frozen are the issues rooted in prominent social group identities: whether represented by one party or another, these issues remain permanent features of electoral politics. This shows that by appealing to issue evolution and

conflict extension, social cleavage explanations are able to incorporate the valuable insights regarding party competition provided by those like Torcal and Mainwaring, but in ways that are in keeping with the original understandings of social cleavage theory.

Table 1: Party Perceptions on Three Issues of Morality (2008)

Party/Bloc	Issue		
	Abortion	Euthanasia	Same-Sex Marriage
PS	4.17	4.61	4.16
PPD	3.88	4.37	3.94
PDC	2.90	3.57	3.03
Concertación	3.86	4.35	3.86
Respondent	2.66	4.58	2.98
Alianza	2.90	3.51	2.93
RN	2.98	3.54	2.89
UDI	2.72	3.46	2.76

Entries represent the mean placement of the various parties and electoral blocs (with respondents' self-placements included for the sake of comparison) on a scale ranging from one (least morally permissive) to ten (most morally permissive).

Table 2: Logistic Regression Estimates of Identification with Concertación (1) versus the Alliance (0)

Variables	1999	2001	2005	2009
Religiosity	-.149 (.087)†	-.235 (.074)**	-.162 (.081)*	-.255 (.091)**
Catholic	-.247 (.218)	-.218 (.173)	-.042 (.169)	-.346 (.198)†
Household Income	-.026 (.097)	-.014 (.091)	-.159 (.098)	-.327 (.116)**
Low Education	.255 (.212)	-.074 (.170)	.775 (.242)**	.165 (.233)
High Education	-.427 (.236)†	.148 (.244)	.358 (.260)	-.148 (.250)
Rural	-.460 (.246)†	.090 (.221)	-.034 (.240)	-.377 (.266)
Gender	-.094 (.164)	-.107 (.145)	.084 (.154)	.479 (.181)**
Married	-.271 (.165)	.153 (.145)	-.193 (.166)	.013 (.187)
Age	-.002 (.005)	.008 (.004)†	-.004 (.005)	.010 (.006)†
Constant	1.200 (.293)**	.102 (.232)	.235 (.300)	.154 (.265)
LR $\chi^2$ (df)	16.09†	16.29†	30.99**	37.81**
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.019	.015	.031	.054
n	758	882	809	611
Predicted Probability Changes Due to the Effect of Religiosity				
Pr(Concertación)	-.030 (.018)†	-.058 (.018)**	-.040 (.020)*	-.064 (.023)**

† .10 \* .05 \*\* .01 (two-tailed). Entries in the top section of the table are log odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. Entries in the bottom section of the table reflect the change in probability of supporting each respective party in a given year when moving from one half a standard deviation below to one half a standard deviation above the mean of religiosity, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values (standard deviations of the predicted probabilities are in parentheses).

Table 3: The Effect of Attitudes toward Divorce on Identification between Concertación (1) and the Alliance (0)

Variables	1995	1999	2001
Opposition to Divorce	.602 (.234)**	-.321 (.204)	-.076 (.186)
Religiosity	.055 (.095)	-.125 (.089)	-.232 (.076)**
Catholic	-.029 (.234)	-.258 (.216)	-.219 (.173)
Income	-	-.040 (.097)	-.022 (.091)
Highest Classes	-1.890 (.657)**	-	-
C2	-.500 (.522)	-	-
C3	-.092 (.398)	-	-
D	-.260 (.366)	-	-
Education	-.106 (.072)	-	-
Low Education	-	.284 (.215)	-.083 (.170)
High Education	-	-.426 (.236)†	.153 (.244)
Rural	.825 (.303)**	-.463 (.248)†	.090 (.222)
Gender	-.009 (.182)	-.098 (.164)	-.106 (.146)
Married	-.633 (.234)**	-.268 (.165)	.165 (.145)
25-34 Year-Olds	.441 (.297)	-	-
35-44 Year-Olds	.419 (.317)	-	-
45-54 Year-Olds	.734 (.363)*	-	-
55 Years and Older	.418 (.345)	-	-
Age	-	-.001 (.005)	.008 (.004)†
Constant	1.744 (.474)**	1.242 (.291)**	.111 (.233)
LR X <sup>2</sup>	57.40**	19.23*	16.31†
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.079	.021	.015
n	820	758	880
Predicted Probability Changes			
Opposition to Divorce	.024 (.012)*	-.027 (.018)	-.008 (.1924)
Religiosity	.005 (.010)	-.025 (.018)	-.057 (.019)**

† .10 \* .05 \*\* .01 (two-tailed). Entries in the top section of the table are log odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. Entries in the bottom section of the table reflect the change in probability of supporting each respective party in a given year when moving from one half a standard deviation below to one half a standard deviation above the mean of religiosity, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values.

Table 4: The Effect Religiosity on Identification with Concertación (1) Versus the Alliance (0), Controlling for Regime Preferences (2009)

Variables	Models			
	1	2	3	4
Functioning of Democracy	-	.629** (.132)	-	-
Authoritarianism Preference	-	-	-1.366** (.244)	-
Regime Scale	-	-	-	-.824** (.125)
Religiosity	-.255** (.091)	-.243** (.094)	-.231* (.095)	-.233* (.098)
Catholic	-.346† (.198)	-.327 (.205)	-.351 (.215)	-.358 (.219)
Household Income	-.327** (.116)	-.328** (.115)	-.303* (.120)	-.316** (.120)
Low Education	.165 (.233)	.279 (.243)	.243 (.250)	.310 (.257)
High Education	-.148 (.250)	-.090 (.261)	-.180 (.255)	-.231 (.259)
Rural	-.377 (.266)	-.263 (.279)	-.277 (.297)	-.204 (.302)
Gender	.479** (.181)	.481* (.190)	.488** (.189)	.484* (.193)
Married	.013 (.187)	-.078 (.196)	.018 (.193)	-.009 (.196)
Age	.010† (.006)	.011† (.006)	.007 (.006)	.004 (.006)
Constant	.154 (.265)	-1.241** (.393)	.462 (.291)	.683* (.309)
LR $X^2$ (df)	37.81**	58.99**	67.87**	77.06**
Pseudo $R^2$	.054	.093	.103	.122
n	611	596	605	605
<b>Predicted Probability Changes</b>				
Variables	Predicted Probability Changes			
Functioning of Democracy	-	.123** (.025)	-	-
Authoritarianism Preference	-	-	-.131** (.023)	-
Regime Scale	-	-	-	-.203** (.024)
Religiosity	-.064** (.023)	-.061** (.023)	-.058* (.024)	-.058* (.024)

† .10 \* .05 \*\* .01 (two-tailed). Entries in the top section of the table are log odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. Entries in the bottom section of the table reflect the change in probability of supporting Concertación (with standard errors of the probabilities in parentheses) when moving from one half a standard deviation below to one half a standard deviation above the mean of religiosity, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values.

Appendix: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	CEP Survey Year				
	1995	1999	2001	2005	2009
Opposition to Divorce	.27 (.45)	.21 (.41)	.19 (.39)	-	-
Religiosity	.00 (.98)	.08 (.97)	.05 (.99)	.02 (.97)	.05 (1.00)
Catholic	.81 (.40)	.82 (.39)	.78 (.42)	.72 (.45)	.70 (.46)
Household Income	-	.11 (1.04)	.09 (.96)	.15 (.92)	.04 (.96)
Highest Classes	.03 (.17)	-	-	-	-
C2	.07 (.26)	-	-	-	-
C3	.34 (.47)	-	-	-	-
D	.44 (.50)	-	-	-	-
Low Education	-	.26 (.44)	.54 (.50)	.55 (.50)	.50 (.50)
High Education	-	.14 (.35)	.12 (.32)	.33 (.47)	.22 (.40)
Education Scale	3.66 (1.83)	-	-	-	-
Rural	.22 (.41)	.16 (.37)	.15 (.35)	.14 (.34)	.15 (.36)
Gender	.50 (.50)	.55 (.50)	.60 (.49)	.54 (.50)	.56 (.50)
Married	.66 (.47)	.59 (.49)	.51 (.50)	.55 (.50)	.48 (.50)
Age	-	26.3 (15.9)	25.8 (16.9)	25.7 (16.1)	28.5 (17.5)
25-34 Year-Olds	.24 (.43)	-	-	-	-
35-44 Year-Olds	.23 (.42)	-	-	-	-
45-54 Year-Olds	.16 (.37)	-	-	-	-
55 Years and Older	.22 (.41)	-	-	-	-
Functioning of Democracy	-	-	-	-	2.18 (.79)
Authoritarianism Preference	-	-	-	-	.18 (.38)
Regime Scale	-	-	-	-	.48 (.78)

Entries are means with standard deviations in parentheses.



## References

- Adams, Greg D. (1997) 'Abortion: Evidence of Issue Evolution', *American Journal of Political Science* 41: 718-737.
- Alvarez, R. Michael and Gabriel Katz (2009) 'A Bayesian Multinomial Probit Analysis of Voter Choice in Chile's 2005 Presidential Election', *Electoral Studies* 28: 177-189
- Bartolini, Stefano and Peter Mair (1990) *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates, 1885-1985*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bartolini, Stefano (2000) *The political mobilization of the European left, 1860-1980*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bonilla, Claudio A., Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love, and Ernesto Silva Méndez (2011) 'Social or political cleavages? A spatial analysis of the party system in post-authoritarian Chile', *Public Choice* 146: 9-21.
- Camara de Diputados de Chile (2011) 'Proyectos de Ley', Santiago. Accessed at <[http://www.camara.cl/pley/pley\\_buscador.aspx?prmBuscar=aborto](http://www.camara.cl/pley/pley_buscador.aspx?prmBuscar=aborto)> 1 June 2011.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes (1960) *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley.
- Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson (1989) *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Carmines, Edward G. and Michael W. Wagner (2006) 'Political Issues and Party Alignments: Assessing the Issue Evolution Perspective', *Annual Review of Political Science* 9: 67-81.
- Carmines, Edward G. and James Woods (2002) 'The Role of Party Activists in the Evolution of the Abortion Issue', *Political Behavior* 24: 361-377.
- Centro de Estudios Públicos. 2011. "Estudio de Nacional de Opinión Pública, mes y año del estudio". Website: [www.cepchile.cl/bannerscep/bdatos\\_encuestas\\_cep/base\\_datos.php](http://www.cepchile.cl/bannerscep/bdatos_encuestas_cep/base_datos.php).
- Chhibber, Pradeep and Mariano Torcal (1997) 'Elite Strategy, Social Cleavages, and Party Systems in a New Democracy', *Comparative Political Studies* 30: 27-54.
- 'Chile's gay marriage bill 'unlikely to succeed', *Pink News*. 5 August 2010. Accessed at: <<http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2010/08/05/chiles-gay-marriage-bill-unlikely-to-succeed/>>.
- Dalton, Russell J. (2006) *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

- Dix, Robert H. (1989) 'Cleavage Structures and Party Systems in Latin America', *Comparative Politics* 22: 23-37.
- Enyedi, Zsolt (2005) 'The role of agency in cleavage formation', *European Journal of Political Research* 44: 697-720.
- Guzmán, Victoria, Ute Seibert, and Silke Staab (2010) 'Democracy in the Country but not in the Home? Religion, politics, and women's rights in Chile', *Third World Quarterly* 31: 971-988.
- Huneus, Carlos (2003) 'A Highly Institutionalized Political Party: Christian Democracy in Chile', in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (eds.) *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts*, pp. 121-161. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Knutsen, Oddbjørn and Elinor Scarbrough (1995) 'Cleavage Politics', in Jan van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough (eds) *The Impact of Values*, pp. 492–523. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter (1998) 'The Transformation of Cleavage Politics: The 1997 Stein Rokkan Lecture', *European Journal of Political Research* 33: 165-185.
- LaPalombara, Joseph and Myron Weiner (1966) 'The origin and development of political parties', in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.) *Political Parties and Political Development*, pp. 3-42. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Layman, Geoffrey C. and Thomas M. Carsey (2002) 'Party Polarization and 'Conflict Extension' in the American Electorate', *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 786-802.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael, William G. Jacoby, Helmut Norpoth, and Herbert F. Weisberg (2008) *The American Voter Revisited*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin (1960) *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan (1967) 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.) *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, pp. 1-64. New York: Free Press.
- Long, J. Scott and Jeremy Freese (2006) *Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata*. College Station: Stata Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy R. Scully (1995) *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

- Przeworski, Adam and John Sprague (1986) *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rokkan, Stein. (1970) *Citizens, Elections, and Parties*. New York: Universitetsforlaget-McKay.
- Rose, Richard, ed. (1974) *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook*. New York: Free Press.
- Sartori, Giovanni (1969) 'From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology', in Seymour Martin Lipset (ed.) *Politics and the Social Sciences*, pp. 65-100. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schattschneider, E.E. (1960) *The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden.
- Scully, Timothy R. (1992) *Rethinking the Center: Party Politics in the Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Chile*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Scully, Timothy, R. (1995) 'Reconstituting Party Politics in Chile', in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (eds.) *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, pp. 100-137. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Shepard, Bonnie (2000) 'The "Double Discourse" on Sexual and Reproductive Rights in Latin America: The Chasm between Public Policy and Private Actions', *Health and Human Rights* 4: 110-143.
- Sundquist, James L. (1983) *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute.
- Tironi, Eugenio and Felipe Agüero (1999) '¿Sobrevivirá el Nuevo Paisaje Político Chileno?' *Estudios Públicos* 74: 151-168.
- Tironi, Eugenio (2002) *El Cambio está Aquí*. Santiago: Random House Mondadori.
- Torcal, Mariano and Scott Mainwaring (2003) 'The Political Recrafting of Social Bases of Party Competition: Chile, 1973-95', *British Journal of Political Science* 33: 55-84.
- Valenzuela, J. Samuel (1997) 'The Origins and Transformations of the Chilean Party System', in Fernando J. Devoto and Torcuato S. Di Tella (eds.) *Political Culture, Social Movements and Democratic Transitions in South America in the XXth Century*, pp. 47-100 Milano: Feltrinelli Editore.
- Valenzuela, J. Samuel, Timothy R. Scully, and Nicolás Somma (2007) 'The Enduring Presence of Religion in Chilean Ideological Positionings and Voter Options', *Comparative Politics* 40: 1-20.

Walker, Carlos (2003) 'The Future of Chilean Christian Democracy', in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (eds.) *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts*, pp. 162-195. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

## Supplementary Material

We address two issues in this supplementary file. One issue is concerned with the robustness of the findings in the main text showing that the religious-secular cleavage has re-emerged as an important issue cleavage in Chilean politics. A second issue regards the use of alternative measures of age-related effects. We deal with each sequentially below.

Because some have argued that the regime preference cleavage has displaced the religious cleavage (Tironi and Agüero, 1999; Tironi, 2002; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003), we demonstrate that the impact of religious issues on party identification appears robust when examined against the regime preference cleavage (as we claim in footnote 5 in the main text). To do this, we use the 2008 CEP/PNUD survey used in Table 2 in the main text, which included measures of party placements on three issues of morality: abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage. For each issue, we create an issue-distance measure by taking the absolute distance between respondents and their perceptions of the party's position. In Table S.1, we use perceptions of Concertación in order to test whether it is the increasingly secular positions taking by Concertación on such issues that have driven the polarization in party perceptions and party identification among the mass public. In Table S.5, we compare the results using Concertación perceptions with the results using other party perceptions.

We include four controls measuring the regime preference cleavage. One variable measures how well respondents believe democracy functions. This is measured from zero (very well) to four (very badly). The next two variables measure preferences for authoritarianism. The first is a dichotomous variable coded one for those who felt that 'sometimes an authoritarian government may be preferable' (to democracy), and zero for those responding that 'democracy is preferable to other forms of government', that democracy and authoritarianism are about the

same, and those who did not know which of the three statements best described their opinion. A third variable treated these responses as a scale ranging from zero (those responding with 'don't know' or that democracy is always preferable) to two (those saying that authoritarian government is sometimes preferable), with those saying that the two forms of government are equivalent coded one. Finally, a fourth variable asks respondents about their perceptions of the current quality of democracy using a scale ranging from zero (very democratic) to nine (not democratic). In Table S.1, each regime preference variable is added separately to the three morality perception variables. All four models use the Concertación/Alliance dependent variable and are estimated with logistic regression with the appropriate sample weighting procedure.

*Table S.1 about here*

The results show that while support for authoritarianism and negative evaluations of democracy are associated with party identification, issues of morality also impact identification. Increased distance between respondents and Concertación on the issues of abortion and same-sex marriage is negatively and significantly associated with party identification with Concertación. In fact, when comparing the substantive effects of religious issues relative to the effects of regime preference, the effects of religious issues on identification with Concertación are at least comparable, and in some cases larger, than the effect of regime preference. A one standard deviation increase in regime preference (model 1) leads to a 9.74 percent decrease in the likelihood of identifying with Concertación. A two-unit change in each of the religious issue distance measures, collectively (which amounts to less than a one standard deviation increase in each) yields an 11.06 percent decrease in Concertación identification.

To what extent are these results dependent upon the use of Concertación perceptions and/or robust to using alternative party perceptions? Table S.2 compares the results using

perceptions of Concertación from model 1 in Table S.1 with the perceptions of other parties by employing difference of deviances tests (insignificant differences indicate statistically equivalent model fit): the Alliance, PS, PPD, and PDC. The results show that perceptions of Concertación are equivalent to perceptions of PS and PPD in terms of model fit, while perceptions of the Alliance and PDC provide significantly weaker fit. The fact that party identification is determined more by perceptions of PS and PPD than PDC suggests that the increasingly polarized views of Concertación on issues of morality are being driven by the increasingly secular positions taken by the two socialist parties (documented in Table 1 in the main text), which we argue above have become the primary forces spurring changes in party perceptions. The fact that perceptions of the Alliance matter less than perceptions of Concertación (as well as perceptions of PS and PPD) in shaping party identification provides further evidence of this point.

*Table S.2 about here*

To summarize the findings, this supplementary section provides clear evidence in favor of conflict extension (in addition to the evidence presented in Table 4 in the main text). Rather than displacing religious issues, issues of regime preference coexist alongside religious issues. Instead of being displaced, the reason why religiosity was not significantly associated with party support in earlier periods appears to be due to the fact that the effect of religiosity is undergoing a realignment that is only beginning to surface. This realignment is being driven by the increasingly secular positions taken by Concertación, a supposition that is supported by the fact that perceptions of Concertación as a secular coalition are closely associated with perceptions of PS and PPD (the parties which have led the legislative efforts in Congress to promote a secular agenda).

On the second issue, we show that the age-related measures used in the main text are robust. Because age cohorts may differ in their responses to the Pinochet regime, we substituted the single age variable used in Table 3 with two variables measuring two distinct age cohorts. One measures those reaching voting age in 1990 (*Post-Pinochet era*, the first year following the end of the Pinochet dictatorship) while another measures those reaching voting age prior to the 1973 coup (*Pre-Pinochet era*). The results of these re-estimated models are presented in Table S.3. Whereas the single age variable reached significance in 2001 and 2009, neither of the two cohort-based measures reaches significance in Table S.3. Compared with the results in Table 3, the use of either the single age variable or the two cohort measures does not appear to affect the results: Table S.3 shows that religiosity remains significant in each model. Thus, the results in Table 3 appear robust to alternative controls dealing with age-related effects.



Table S.1 The Effects of Issue Positions on Identification with Concertación Versus the Alliance

Variables	Model			
	1	2	3	4
Abortion	-.092† (.053)	-.109* (.054)	-.111* (.055)	-.105* (.053)
Euthanasia	-.018 (.047)	-.013 (.049)	-.007 (.050)	-.019 (.048)
Same-Sex Marriage	-.117* (.047)	-.101* (.047)	-.104* (.047)	-.110* (.049)
Functioning of Democracy	-.556** (.156)			
Authoritarianism Preference		-.807** (.273)		
Regime Scale			-.545** (.141)	
How Democratic				-.095† (.050)
Constant	2.129** (.372)	1.158** (.196)	1.360** (.215)	1.453** (.302)
LR $\chi^2$	30.13**	25.24**	29.65**	21.43**
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.067	.059	.072	.047
n	386	383	383	382

† .10 \* .05 \*\* .01 (two-tailed). Entries are log odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses.

Table S.2 Comparisons of Deviance Statistics from Models using Different Party Perceptions

Test Results	Comparing Model 1 in Table 6, Replacing Perceptions of Concertación with:			
	The Alliance	PS	PPD	PDC
Difference in Deviances	-22.299**	.283	1.884	-31.676**
Residual df	2	2	3	12
Decision	Prefer Model 1	Both Equal	Both Equal	Prefer Model 1

† .10 \* .05 \*\* .01 (two-tailed).

Table S.3 Logistic Regression Estimates of Identification with Concertación (1) versus the Alliance (0)

Variables	1999	2001	2005	2009
Religiosity	-.154 (.087)†	-.243 (.075)**	-.164 (.081)*	-.253 (.092)**
Catholic	-.245 (.219)	-.228 (.174)	-.034 (.169)	-.353 (.200)†
Household Income	-.025 (.097)	-.005 (.091)	-.152 (.099)	-.321 (.116)**
Low Education	.253 (.212)	-.059 (.170)	.797 (.240)**	.181 (.233)
High Education	-.419 (.236)†	.148 (.246)	.374 (.257)	-.142 (.250)
Rural	-.459 (.246)†	.084 (.222)	-.036 (.241)	-.363 (.267)
Gender	-.091 (.164)	-.101 (.145)	.086 (.155)	.479 (.181)**
Married	-.283 (.172)†	.099 (.149)	-.160 (.168)	.013 (.187)
Pre-Pinochet era	-.085 (.174)	.195 (.164)	.068 (.186)	.095 (.227)
Post-Pinochet era	-.056 (.256)	-.294 (.194)	.245 (.196)	-.284 (.224)
Constant	1.189 (.282)**	.329 (.233)	.001 (.297)	.503 (.304)
LR $\chi^2$ (df)	16.19†	18.88*	31.90**	36.96**
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.019	.017	.032	.053
n	758	882	809	611
Predicted Probability Changes Due to the Effect of Religiosity				
Pr(Concertación)	-.031 (.018)†	-.057 (.018)**	-.040 (.020)*	-.064 (.023)**

† .10 \* .05 \*\* .01 (two-tailed). Entries in the top section of the table are log odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. Entries in the bottom section of the table reflect the change in probability of supporting each respective party in a given year when moving from one half a standard deviation below to one half a standard deviation above the mean of religiosity, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values (with standard errors of the predicted probabilities in parentheses).