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**REASSURING ONE'S FRIENDS: RICHARD NIXON'S CHINA POLICY
AND ITS IMPACT ON EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 1969-1974**

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**Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

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Abstract

This thesis is a study of how the Richard Nixon administration explained its China policy to its allies and friends in Asia and their reactions towards the major changes in the US-PRC relationship during the early 1970s. These allies and friends are the Republic of China (ROC), the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. When Nixon came to power in 1969, he was desperate to disengage from the Vietnam War and to reduce the United States (US) formal military presence in Asia. He employed the policies of Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine to achieve these objectives, which when combined with the US-PRC rapprochement would serve to reduce tensions in Asia. The Asian states were apprehensive of the future of the US commitment to the region due to the reduction of its military presence in Asia and their worries were compounded when Nixon sought rapprochement with the PRC. Explanations were sought from the US and reassurances were given by the Nixon administration in order to pacify its allies and friends in Asia.

The development of the relationships of the Asian states with the PRC, and also with the US, revealed the extent to which Nixon was able to convince these Asian states that his China policy would not be detrimental to their security. The rapprochement did much to alter the relationships the Asian states shared with both the US and the PRC. Nixon's China policy acted as a catalyst for some of the Asia states to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. These Asian states were either uncertain of the American commitment to Asia or recognised the convergence of interest between the rapprochement and their national interests. They then moved swiftly towards establishing diplomatic ties with the PRC.

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Abbreviations

AAD	Access to Archival Databases
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CONEFO	Conference of New Emerging Forces
DLF	Development Loan Fund
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DNSA	Digital National Security Archives
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
FY	Fiscal Year
HAK	Henry A. Kissinger
HAKOF	Henry A. Kissinger Office Files
IGGI	Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KMT	Kuomintang
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NDP	New Democratic Party
NSC	National Security Council
NSSM	National Security Study Memorandum
PAP	People's Action Party
PHILCAG	Philippine Civic Action Group
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia
PPP	Public Papers of the Presidents
PRC	People's Republic of China

PREM	Prime Minister's Office
PRO	Public Record Office
RNPLM	Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
ROC	Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organisation
TNA	The National Archives of the United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCURK	UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Introduction

When Richard Milhous Nixon became the President of the United States (US) in 1969, the US was embroiled in a war of attrition in Vietnam which it desperately needed to disengage from. Washington was the protector of the free nations of Asia and had a military presence in the region with the stationing of American troops and the existence of military bases in numerous Asian states. The People's Republic of China (PRC) was considered to be the most immediate threat to non-communist Asian states and these nations viewed it with great suspicion, in particular its support for communist subversion overseas. America's allies and other pro-US states depended on the US to assist in the deterrence and containment of the PRC threat.

Meanwhile, within the communist world, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the PRC were involved in a conflict of their own. The advent of the March 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes highlighted the seriousness of the existing split between the PRC and the USSR and most significantly brought new opportunities for Nixon to achieve success in the realm of foreign policy. He realised that a rapprochement with the PRC could assist in speeding up the process of détente with the USSR and in bringing an end to the Vietnam War. The Richard Nixon administration was feeling "Vietnam fatigue" and sought to decrease the US involvement in Vietnam and to find an end to the war. Nixon was hoping to get both the USSR and the PRC to influence the North Vietnamese to come to a compromise regarding the war.¹ By pursuing parallel détente with Beijing and Moscow, the Nixon administration hoped that the communist powers would realise that it would be to their benefit to persuade Hanoi to come to a settlement.² Moreover, by pursuing détente with the USSR and rapprochement with the PRC, the US could isolate North Vietnam by having friendly relations with its two biggest communist allies.

On 15 July 1971, Nixon announced via a live broadcast on American radio and television that National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had just returned from a trip to China where he had held discussions with the PRC Premier Zhou Enlai. Nixon had also accepted a PRC invitation for him to visit China sometime before May 1972. He added the reassurance that rapprochement with

¹ Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 279-294.

² *Ibid.*, 281.

the PRC would not be achieved “at the expense of our [America’s] old friends,” in an apparent attempt to reassure American allies and friends.³ The element of surprise which characterised Nixon’s China initiative provoked concerns among America’s allies and friends. Nixon’s penchant for secrecy in the management of US-PRC relations caused great confusion for these Asian states. This announcement came as a shock to them as they were not briefed beforehand and were given relatively short notice or none at all, before the live broadcast in July 1971. Nixon explained to America’s allies and friends that he had hoped to engage the PRC in conversations ever since he took over the presidency in 1969, so that the PRC could build “a more constructive relationship” with other nations, leading to greater peace in Asia and the world. The China initiative was made in the hope that it would help to reduce tensions in Asia; it was not directed at anyone. He repeated that the US would not forsake its friends and hoped that the world would benefit from the rapprochement.⁴ In February, 1972, Nixon made his historic visit to China. These events signified the end of hostilities between the US and the PRC, the beginning of rapprochement and the normalisation of relations. Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949 after the end of the Chinese Civil War, the Americans refused to recognise the Communist regime and supported the *Kuomintang* (KMT) government in Taiwan instead. Hence, Nixon’s rapprochement with Beijing was a great departure from the policy of containment and non-recognition of the Chinese communist government which had been adopted by his predecessors.

Nixon had pursued the rapprochement with the PRC despite his concern of the impact his move would have on the rest of Asia. He had told French President Charles de Gaulle on 1 March 1969 that “... there could be no changes [in the US China policy] for a number of reasons relating to their impact on Asia.”⁵ However, the opportunities brought forth by the Sino-Soviet split and the possibility that the PRC could be the key to the US finding an end to the war in Vietnam proved too tempting for Nixon to resist and he decided to embark on rapprochement with the PRC despite his concern for his allies and friends in Asia.

³ Remarks by President Nixon to the Nation, July 15, 1971, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1969-1976, I, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d92> accessed 20 April 2010.

⁴ Talking Points: For Various Ambassadors; Undated; China-General, July-October 1971; Box 1036; National Security Council (NSC) Files; For The President’s Files- China/Vietnam Negotiations; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum (RNPLM), National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵ Editorial note of Richard Nixon’s conversation with Charles De Gaulle on 1 March 1969, FRUS 1969-1976, I, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d14> , accessed 20 April 2010.

This thesis is a study of how the Nixon administration tried to explain its China policy to its allies and friends in Asia and their reactions to these explanations regarding the major change in the US-PRC relationship. The East Asian countries included as case studies are the Republic of China (ROC), Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The Southeast Asian countries featured are the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Each chapter deals with one of these East and Southeast Asian states, addressing the major themes of the thesis. The “allies” refers to Asian states that were traditional allies of the US which had their relationships with Washington affirmed by binding security treaties. These states include the ROC, Japan and the ROK, which signed bilateral security treaties with the US. Thailand was an American ally as the US had treaty obligations with it through the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) which was established in 1954. The Philippines was also a SEATO member and had a bilateral security treaty with the US. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were “friends,” not “allies,” of the US. They had no bilateral treaty arrangements with the Americans, but were apparently pro-US and anti-communist despite their claims of neutralism.

There were indeed valid reasons to believe that Nixon’s China initiative would provoke responses from the Asian states. These states did not have diplomatic ties with the PRC and considered it to be a menace and adversary. In East Asia, the ROC was the arch rival of the PRC, while the ROK and Japan were not on friendly terms with the PRC. In Southeast Asia, the PRC was viewed warily due to its support for overseas subversion and also its perceived influence over the local ethnic Chinese population. Hence, any US move towards the PRC would indeed alarm these Asian states.

To fully understand the Asian states’ responses to the US explanations of its motivations behind the rapprochement, it is necessary to look at their responses to the US explanations regarding Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine. When Nixon came to power in 1969, he hoped to achieve the objective of reducing the US military presence in Asia by pursuing Vietnamization and introducing what would become to be known as the Nixon Doctrine. With Vietnamization, the responsibility of the fighting of the war in Vietnam would be shifted to the Vietnamese, thus relieving the burden on American troops. The Nixon Doctrine, meanwhile, called for Asian nations

to take on the responsibility of defence against communist aggression as the US decreased its involvement in the region. These policies, together with the rapprochement with the PRC, would decrease superpower tensions in Asia. The US role in Asia, which was already changing due to the gradual reduction of its presence in the region, was set for further changes with the Nixon administration's pursuit of rapprochement with the PRC. This thesis links the responses of the Asian states to the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization, as were conveyed to the US, with their responses towards the US explanations of the rapprochement. The Asian states, which were already doubtful of the future of the US presence in the region and the US commitment to them, were further confounded when Nixon sought rapprochement with the PRC. The Nixon administration's task of explaining its intentions regarding the change in the US China policy would indeed be a mammoth one.

This thesis makes an original contribution to the existing literature of the US-PRC rapprochement by examining the American impression of the impact of the US shift in China policy on these Asian states through the use of western sources, while linking the responses to the US explanations of these Asian states to their views regarding the ongoing policies of Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine, as were conveyed to the Americans. It should be noted that the US rapprochement with the PRC was a move made in order to decrease tensions in Asia so as to enable the US to gradually reduce its presence in Asia, according to the Nixon Doctrine, and also to provide the US with an exit from Vietnam. The rapprochement was not just a matter of concern for the superpowers; its impact on the Asian nations meant that it was of concern to them as well. Thus, the response of Nixon's China policy in the East and Southeast Asian states should not be neglected.

Historiography

There are numerous studies dealing with the subject of the US-PRC rapprochement of the 1970s. Existing literature tends to focus on the development of bilateral relations between the US and the PRC, highlighting the events leading up to the Nixon visit of 1972 and the subsequent

development of US-PRC relations thereafter.⁶ Margaret Macmillan's *Seize the Hour: When Nixon Met Mao* gives a detailed account of the talks that took place between the US and the PRC in Beijing and also the process which led up to the talks.⁷ Raymond Garthoff's *Détente and Confrontation* talks about the US-PRC rapprochement as part of the great power struggle through the employment of Triangular Diplomacy.⁸ This is useful in contributing to the understanding of the motivations behind the rapprochement, focusing on bilateral ties and great power politics to illustrate an aspect of the history of the rapprochement.

Rosemary Foot's *The Practice of Power* moves away from the great power politics angle of the rapprochement. Instead, it emphasises the reassessment of the PRC based on the changing international and domestic views of Beijing and also the reassessment of the domestic situation of the PRC which contributed to the change in the US China policy, using a thematic approach. Foot reports that US officials were discussing the need to engage the PRC in arms control and nuclear non-proliferation talks due to the PRC's acquisition of a nuclear arsenal in the 1960s. She goes on to argue that if the PRC had not chosen to go into self-isolation in the 1960s, the Lyndon B. Johnson administration could have made more significant changes to the China policy, other than the small steps which were taken towards better ties.⁹ Foot suggests that the change in the US policy towards the PRC during the Nixon administration was brought about by the differing views towards the PRC and also the re-evaluation of the PRC's capabilities in the mid -1960s.¹⁰ Evelyn Goh also emphasises the significance of the 1960s by arguing that there was a "rethinking" within US official circles, as the PRC was viewed as a "Troubled Moderniser" and "Resurgent Power", which in turn favoured the establishment of better ties between the US and the PRC.¹¹ Nixon's own thinking towards friendlier ties with the PRC saw its roots during his pre-presidential years. He was

⁶ Such accounts include Rosemary Foot, *The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), Evelyn Goh, *Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From "Red Menace" to "Tacit Ally"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972* (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1992), James Mann, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China from Nixon to Clinton 1969-1989* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

⁷ Margaret Macmillan, *Seize the Hour: When Nixon Met Mao* (London: John Murray, 2006).

⁸ Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*.

⁹ Foot, *The Practice of Power*.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹¹ Goh, *Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974*, 11-2.

seen conveying his views regarding the importance of opening up to Beijing to various diplomats and national leaders.¹² Goh asserted that Nixon's change of attitude towards a rapprochement with the PRC was not a sudden change in his thinking in the late 1960s. Nixon's thinking was a product of a gradual change in thinking which developed over a decade before his presidency.¹³ Michael Lumbers offers a comprehensive study of US-PRC relations during the Johnson administration which he believed was an area neglected by historians. He argued that the US-PRC relationship during the Johnson presidency was not a period of "stagnation". In fact, there were considerable debates by senior officials arguing for changes to the US China policy.¹⁴ These accounts give another explanation for the rapprochement in the 1970s, with the Johnson administration's policies acting as foundation, paving the way for Nixon's China policy. By focusing on the period before the Nixon presidency, this has proven to be a great departure from the existing literature.

Books focusing on the careers of Nixon and Kissinger are also useful in gaining an understanding of the rapprochement process, as both men were primary architects of this change in the US China policy. Robert Dallek's *Nixon and Kissinger* and Jussi Hahnimaki's *The Flawed Architect* are valuable accounts detailing the careers of both Nixon and Kissinger. *Nixon and Kissinger* is a study of the Nixon-Kissinger partnership in American foreign affairs in which Dallek evaluates the successes and failures of the duo.¹⁵ *The Flawed Architect*, which is a biography of Kissinger, traces his career and evaluates his role in the making of American foreign policy. Hahnimaki argues that Kissinger hoped to restore the glory of the US as a world player, which had been destroyed by its actions in the Vietnam War. His initial successes in diplomacy, such as with détente and the rapprochement, went downhill after 1973 as US relations with the communist powers deteriorated. He claimed that the "architecture" of US foreign policy was collapsing and that Kissinger was the "flawed architect" within this "flawed architecture."¹⁶ As Hahnimaki puts it,

¹² Ibid., 101-23.

¹³ Ibid., 121.

¹⁴ Michael Lumbers, *Piercing the Bamboo Curtain: Tentative Bridge-Building to China during the Johnson Years*, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2008), 3.

¹⁵ Robert Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007).

¹⁶ Jussi Hahnimaki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

“Kissinger’s architecture is inherently flawed. Realpolitik proved a poor match with the realities of the third world.”¹⁷

This thesis contributes to the existing literature of the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy by spotlighting their exercise of diplomacy with the Asian leaders and how the two men practiced their style of diplomacy with these leaders, in particular the use of secrecy and deception. Yukinori Komine’s monograph stresses the secrecy surrounding the foreign policy decision making process of Nixon and Kissinger as the prime feature in the US-PRC rapprochement by delving into the processes and events leading up to the rapprochement and bilateral ties between the two sides.¹⁸ William Bundy’s *A Tangled Web* discusses the element of deception, which he describes as the “hallmark” of Nixon’s management of foreign policy and had invited the responses of the American people and Congress.¹⁹ The understanding of the shroud of secrecy and deception in US diplomacy is further explored in this thesis. Firstly, it examines how secrecy influenced Nixon and Kissinger’s dealings with the Asian allies and friends and sheds light on how the Asian leaders viewed the secrecy in US diplomacy by examining archival materials from the US and the UK. Secondly, it illustrates the use of deception by Nixon and Kissinger by delving into how the duo had tried, at times, to conceal certain information regarding US-PRC relations from the Asian allies and friends and also resorted to deception to placate these Asian leaders and the PRC leaders.

There are many accounts dealing with US bilateral ties with its allies and friends in Asia.²⁰ For example, John Garver’s *The Sino-American Alliance* devotes one chapter to the Chinese

¹⁷ Ibid., xix.

¹⁸ Yukinori Komine, *Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).

¹⁹ William P. Bundy, *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998).

²⁰ These are general works on US ties with the East Asian allies. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992: Uncertain Friendships* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994); John W. Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); Roger Buckley, *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Atsushi Kusano, *Two Nixon Shocks and Japan-U.S. Relations* (New Jersey: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1987); Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). Sung-Joo Han (ed.), *After One Hundred Years: Continuity and Change in Korean-American Relations* (Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, 1982).

These are general works on US relations with the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia respectively. Claude A. Buss, *The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy* (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise for Public Policy Research, 1977); R. Sean Randolph, *The United States and Thailand: Alliance Dynamics, 1950-1985* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1986); Pamela Sodhy, *The US-Malaysian Nexus:*

representation issue in the UN and the US-PRC rapprochement, and the implications for the ROC.²¹ Nancy Bernkopf Tucker's *Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States* provides a general overview of the process of the US-PRC rapprochement and its implications on the ROC.²² Claude Buss discusses Philippine relations with the US and dealt with, briefly, the establishment of diplomatic ties between the Philippines and the PRC.²³ R. Sean Randolph argued that 1969 was a watershed in US-Thailand relations when both sides experienced a strain in the bilateral relationship against the backdrop of the war of attrition in Vietnam."²⁴ While these accounts are valuable in terms of its documentation of the Asian allies' bilateral ties with the US, there is a lack of focus on US diplomatic efforts to appease and reassure its Asian friends and allies regarding the changes in US policies while the rapprochement was set in motion. By delving into the conversations between the US and these Asian leaders, this thesis adds to the analysis of US relations with these Asian states and offers an insight into the diplomatic interactions of the Asian leaders with the US. Although Asian sources are not used in the research, this thesis brings about a greater understanding of the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy by highlighting how the Nixon administration explained its China policy to these Asian allies and friends and what they told the US in response. As such, it aims to contribute to fill up the gap in the literature by focusing on US relations with the Asian states, against the backdrop of the changing US-PRC relationship, with new findings from American and British archival sources in order to illustrate the American impression of the responses of the Asian states towards the rapprochement.

Significance of Research

In *The Global Cold War*, Odd Arne Westad suggests that the Cold War could be easily perceived as "a continuation of European colonial interventions" and also "of European attempts at controlling Third World peoples." Westad believes that historians of the future will regard the Cold

Themes in Superpower-Small State Relations. (Malaysia: Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), 1991).

²¹ Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance*, 248-82.

²² Tucker, *Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States*.

²³ Buss, *The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy*.

²⁴ Randolph, *The United States and Thailand: Alliance Dynamics, 1950-1985*, 129.

War as “one of the final stages of European global control.”²⁵ Part of this thesis traces the development of the relationships of the US friends and allies with the PRC after 1972. This will show the extent to which the US was able to control some of its friends in the Third World—or not—and the extent of US influence over their conduct of foreign policy. In Asia, this varied considerably. Indeed, some states chose their own path, and some even beat the US to establishing diplomatic ties with the PRC, rather than following its pace. However, it must be noted that these states only moved to conduct more significant moves towards friendly ties with the PRC after the US made its own move towards the PRC in 1971. In contrast, some US European allies such as France and West Germany had been conducting independent overtures, such as France’s détente and Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, towards the USSR and Eastern Europe in order to promote better relations.²⁶ This thesis shows the extent to which the Asian allies and friends were induced to move towards friendlier ties with the PRC after the US rapprochement with Beijing, and whether any limited moves were made towards the PRC before the Kissinger visit of July 1971.

The US détente with the Soviet Union raised the concerns of America’s European allies. Kissinger wrote in his memoirs that the European allies were displaying signs of “schizophrenia” when the US finally followed their advice and embarked on détente.²⁷ He went further to explain that the European allies were dissatisfied with the use of the phrase “peaceful co-existence” in the “Basic Principles of US-Soviet Relations” signed by Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev at the Moscow Summit in May 1972. He criticised the Europeans as the French and Germans had made similar declarations in treaties which went even further than what the US had advocated.²⁸ The impact of détente on America’s European allies has attracted the attention of many academics. Catherine Hynes’s *The Year That Never Was* clearly illustrates the apprehensions of the British towards the US pursuit of détente with the Soviets and how it would impact upon their bilateral ties. The secretive Nixon-Kissinger style of diplomacy invited criticisms from the British and was a bone of

²⁵ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 5.

²⁶ Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, 124-7.

²⁷ Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979), 1273.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

contention between the US and Britain.²⁹ Hynes states that Nixon's announcement of his impending Moscow Summit had caused "profound irritation" in London.³⁰ She points out that the possible reduction of US troop levels in Europe was causing tensions in the US relationship with the British.³¹ Mary Elise Sarotte discusses the relationship between the US policy of détente and Federal Republic of Germany Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik. She discusses whether détente and Ostpolitik worked in tandem or worked against each other and if the two policies were actually competing with each other.³² Garthoff notes that the Moscow Summit had generated European concerns and attributed this to the lack of prior consultation and notification before the release of the Basic Principles agreement.³³ European-American frictions arose over some US moves relating to political détente with the Soviet Union. One such incident was the revelation of the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement in June 1973, after its ratification, which caught many nations by surprise.³⁴ The US relationship with its European allies in relation to its pursuit of cordial ties with another superpower, the Soviet Union, which was the principal source of threat to Europe, unsettled many European states. This situation had many parallels with that in Asia. Nixon's rapprochement with the PRC, the biggest threat to the security of non-communist Asia, was of concern to the Asian states and invited responses from the Asian leaders. This issue deserves greater attention and research, as this thesis aims to accomplish.

Background and Scope of Research

Nixon had been thinking about the opening to the PRC and also implementing policies which were the precursors of the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization before his ascent to presidency. His thinking in the 1960s undoubtedly helped shape his Asian strategy. In October 1967, Nixon wrote an article for the journal *Foreign Affairs* titled "Asia after Viet Nam," in which he outlined his "strategy" for ensuring the security of Asia and how best to deal with the PRC

²⁹ Catherine Hynes, *The Year that Never Was: Heath, The Nixon Administration and the Year of Europe* (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2009).

³⁰ Hynes, *The Year that Never Was*, 39.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 14.

³² Mary Elise Sarotte, "The Frailties of Grand Strategies: A Comparison of Détente and Ostpolitik" in *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977*, ed. Federik Logevall and Andrew Preston (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008): 146-163.

³³ Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, 351.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 538.

which was “the world’s most populous nation and Asia’s most immediate threat.”³⁵ The PRC, he argued, with its developing nuclear programme, would unquestionably be more powerful in the future. He further predicted that the PRC’s nuclear programme would be a menace to peace:

China, within three to five years, will have a significant deliverable nuclear capability-and that this same China will be outside any non-proliferation treaty that might be signed free, if it chooses, to scatter its weapons among “liberation” forces anywhere in the world.³⁶

He argued for a two-pronged policy with both short term and long term components. The long term aim would be to bring the PRC back to the international community, using a policy of engagement rather than continued isolation.³⁷ Nixon’s short-term policy was to maintain existing hard line position. However, Nixon felt that it would be impossible for America to contain and restrain the PRC alone. Hence, it would also be necessary to strengthen non-communist Asia. An economically, politically and militarily strong non-communist Asia would be less susceptible to the red menace as Asian countries would cease to be “tempting targets” for communist subversion.³⁸ The PRC would then be persuaded to turn its energies “inward” to deal with its own domestic problems rather than “outward” to satisfy its imperial ambitions.³⁹ Dialogue with Beijing could only happen when it turned “inward.” Hence, in the short run, the US aim would be to assert a “policy of firm restraint, of no reward, of a creative counterpressure designed to persuade Peking [Beijing] that its interests can be served only by accepting the basic rules of international civility.”⁴⁰

By 1968, The US involvement in the Vietnam War had become a strain on the economy and was highly unpopular at home. Nixon emphasised the need for change in US policy towards its friends in Asia. He hinted that the US role as a “world policeman” would most certainly be limited

³⁵ Richard Nixon, “Asia after Viet Nam”, *Foreign Affairs* 46, 1 (1967): 119.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 122.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 121.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 122-3.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 121.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 123.

in the future. This did not mean the US would no longer answer unilateral requests for assistance against communist threats in the “less stable parts of the world,” using military means; but in order for the US to be able to respond to requests for assistance, the countries of Asia should firstly try to fend off any communist threat through a collective effort of the Asian nations and if that did not work, any subsequent request for assistance had to be a collective one.⁴¹ This highlighted the emerging concept of Asian self-reliance, which was something that the Nixon administration emphasised often to US allies and friends. The future American role in Asia would not involve the use of “heavy-handed American pressures”. Instead, the US would support any Asian initiatives towards regional cooperation.⁴² Nixon encouraged regional military cooperation of the Asian states. The SEATO, which was established in 1954, with Thailand and the Philippines as two of the member states, was a Western creation, led by the US. Thus, it would be useful if the Asian states could come up with their own military alliances. An alliance to counter the threat to the region should be established, in light of the “solidifying awareness of China’s threat.”⁴³

While Nixon emphasised the cooperation of Asian nations against external threats in 1967, Kissinger was concerned with the cooperation of nations at the global level. Kissinger wrote in his essay “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy” that there should be greater regional cooperation of nations as the US was unable to “operate programs globally.” The US role in the 1970s had to be one in which it would “contribute to a structure” which would promote other nations to take on their own “initiative.” The US must encourage them to assume the responsibility in regional matters while the US continued to provide aid through defence and positive programs. He added, “Regional groupings supported by the United States will have to take over major responsibility for their immediate areas, with the United States being concerned more with the over-all framework of order than with the management of every regional enterprise.”⁴⁴ Both Nixon and Kissinger believed that the US should limit its role as the protector of other nations but would still assist them but not fight their battles for them.

⁴¹ Ibid., 114.

⁴² Ibid., 124.

⁴³ Ibid., 116.

⁴⁴ Essay by Henry Kissinger: Central Issues of American Foreign Policy, undated, FRUS 1969-1976, I, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d4> accessed 20 April 2010.

Nixon proposed a “new diplomacy” at a campaign speech in Omaha, Nebraska, on 6 May 1968, which was, in retrospect, the precursor to the Nixon Doctrine. He said that, as the US had exhausted much of its financial resources and manpower due to its involvement in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, it ought to adopt a new strategy in international diplomacy, one which involved contributing to the battles of the free nations against aggression through the provision of weaponry and money, but did not involve taking over the responsibility of armed combat.⁴⁵

Nixon’s new strategy in Asia first came to light during his tour of Asia when he reiterated to reporters in Guam, on 25 July 1969 what would subsequently become known as the “Nixon Doctrine.” The Nixon Doctrine called for Asian nations to take on the responsibility of their own defence as the US decreased its involvement in the region. Nixon clarified that this was not a way for the Americans to get out of Asia. Instead, it was the “only sound basis” which would enable the Americans to continue to play a significant role in the defence of non-communist Asia.⁴⁶ To avoid becoming embroiled in another Vietnam type conflict, the US had to continue to take on a significant role in Asia. The US could not afford to abandon Asia entirely, because throughout history, it had been involved in wars which originated from Asia. Nixon listed the PRC, North Vietnam and North Korea as “aggressive” nations which were adopting “belligerent” foreign policies and thus would be most menacing to peace. Nixon prophesied that, in the long run, Asia would pose “the greatest threat to the peace of the world.”⁴⁷ Thus, the US had to stay in Asia albeit with a reduced military role. Treaty commitments would be honoured, but Asian states must not be overly dependent upon the US for their own defence. The US would only assist countries threatened by a nuclear power, if not, Asian states would have to defend themselves.⁴⁸ In his memoirs, Nixon added that no further commitments would be made except when “they were required by our own [American] vital interests.”⁴⁹

Nixon also pursued Vietnamization as part of his strategy in Asia upon his ascent to the presidency. Unlike the Nixon Doctrine, which was entirely the product of himself, Vietnamization

⁴⁵ Editorial Note, undated, FRUS 1969-1976, I, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d5> accessed 20 April 2010.

⁴⁶ Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (London: Arrow Books, 1979), 395.

⁴⁷ Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen, July 25, 1969, Public Papers of the Presidents (PPP), reproduced at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2140&st=&st1=> accessed 12 September 2010.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, 395.

was not a completely novel idea as the Johnson administration was already implementing a similar plan before 1969. Nixon carried on the process and pursued it with greater vigour than his predecessor. The policy of Vietnamization meant that the US would shift the responsibility of the fighting of the war to the South Vietnamese, thus relieving the need to utilise American troops. Nixon had stated the need to transfer the burden of combat of the Vietnam War to the South Vietnamese in 1968. He said that he would like to carry on the process of the training of the South Vietnamese troops, which was what the present command in Vietnam was undertaking. He added that the troops should be trained to enable them to defend themselves and the US would continue to supply the best weaponry. The American troops could then gradually withdraw from Vietnam with the South Vietnamese taking over the fighting of the war. This would reduce the number of American casualties and also the cost of fighting a war of attrition. This process would also equip the South Vietnamese with the ability to survive the war and also to exist as a viable nation in the future.⁵⁰

The PRC was the key towards greater peace in the region and the US hoped to engage its assistance to achieve that. The US aimed to discuss the issue of disarmament with the PRC, as this was crucial to the reduction of tensions in Asia and beyond.⁵¹ In addition to engaging the PRC in arms control talks, the US wanted to install a hot line to the PRC and also to conclude accidental war agreements between the two sides. This would further ensure that the China initiative would be of great benefit to Asia. The US believed that the China initiative would be to the advantage of the Asian states and would aid the reduction of its own of presence in the region. It was hoped that by communicating with the PRC, the US could help to restrain its support for revolutionary movements and subversions abroad. The US believed that the domestic turmoil of the PRC coupled with the gradual reduction of the US presence in Asia would “mute” the PRC support for overseas communist movements.⁵²

⁵⁰ Editorial Note, undated, FRUS 1969-1976, I, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d7> accessed 20 April 2010.

⁵¹ Discussing Warsaw Meeting with other Governments, 21 January 1970, Digital National Security Archives (DNSA) China and the United States, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/CH/Q0119/all.pdf> accessed 12 October 2009.

⁵² Paper for the President; What We Want and What We Can Get; October 14 1971; China-HAK October 1971 Visit [Part 2]; Box 1035; NSC Files; For the President's Files-China/Vietnam Negotiations; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

Pursuing a rapprochement with the PRC would enable the US to gradually reduce its presence in Asia without causing too many problems to the security of Asia and would serve to relieve tensions in the region.⁵³ The PRC would be more receptive to US advances if the US showed its willingness to decrease its military presence in Asia. Hence, the US rapprochement with the PRC was closely linked to the gradual reduction of the US presence in Asia. Nixon's trio of policies would help him to achieve what he had envisaged in the 1960s: that the PRC's aggressiveness could be curbed with the establishment of friendlier ties through rapprochement. The US could disengage from Asia by employing the policies of Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine and yet continue to strengthen the Asian nations through economic and military aid, without the need to use US forces.

This thesis links Nixon's China policy with his strategy in Asia to decrease the US presence in the region. This strategy, which included the implementation of the policies of Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine, together with the rapprochement with the PRC caused some Asian states to question the level of US commitment to Asia. As most of the Asian states were dependent on the US for military and economic aid, there would definitely be reactions, both positive and negative. It would be detrimental to the security of Asia if other powers such as the USSR and the PRC attempted to gain a greater foothold in the region. Moreover, Asian states were suspicious of the PRC and its support for the local communist insurgents and viewed the US rapprochement with the PRC cautiously.

By examining the conversations the Asian leaders had with the US, this thesis will bring to the forefront the reactions of the Asian leaderships towards Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine, as they were conveyed to the US, while linking these policies to Nixon's China policy. This thesis will also delve into the conversations the individual leaderships of the Asian states had with Washington in order to shed light on their responses towards the announcement of 15 July 1971, as the US tried to explain its motivation to the Asian leaders. Both public and private comments made by the Asian leaders regarding the rapprochement are examined in order to provide a fuller picture of their responses towards this change in US policy. The decision of these

⁵³ Discussing Warsaw Meeting with other Governments, 21 January 1970, DNSA China and the United States, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/CH/00119/all.pdf> accessed 12 October 2009.

leaders to either support or reject the rapprochement would, to a certain degree, be linked to their reactions towards Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine. This was because their perception of the US commitment to them in the light of these two policies would definitely affect their level of support for Nixon's China policy. The reasons given by the US to these states, explaining the rationale behind the pursuit of the rapprochement and also the possible implications on Asia's future, will be linked to their perceptions of how they would be affected by the gradual reduction of the US presence in Asia. Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine could be viewed as a prelude to the rapprochement with the PRC. By showing its willingness to reduce the US presence in Asia, the Nixon administration could be seen as demonstrating to Beijing that it was willing to adopt a less adversarial stance towards the PRC, signalling the beginning of cordial relations. The PRC, which was always against the presence of US troops in Asia, would be more receptive to American advances if the US was to display a willingness to withdraw its troops from Asia.

To understand the responses given by the Asian leaders to the US regarding the rapprochement, it is important to delve into the Nixon-Kissinger style of diplomacy, which made extensive use of backchannel communication and was shrouded in secrecy. At times, Nixon and Kissinger were not being entirely truthful while explaining their intentions to the Asian states. This explains why America's allies and friends were caught by surprise when Nixon made his 15 July announcement regarding the rapprochement. It is also imperative to discuss the Nixon-Kissinger relationship before delving into the discussion of the shroud of secrecy surrounding the Nixon China policy. The relationship was one of mutual disdain but their partnership allowed them to achieve some of the Nixon administration's most dramatic and significant diplomatic triumphs. Kissinger was said to have told one of his regular correspondents that he "detested" Nixon.⁵⁴ Nixon said, "I don't trust Henry, but I can use him."⁵⁵ Iwan Morgan describes Nixon and Kissinger as "Odd couple partners so different yet so similar who did not like each other but were locked together by mutual need."⁵⁶ Nixon indeed needed Kissinger as he possessed great negotiating skills and was a foreign policy intellectual well known in the media. Moreover, Kissinger was happy and

⁵⁴ Jeremi Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 202.

⁵⁵ Iwan Morgan, *Nixon* (London: Arnold, 2002), 126.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

ready to utilise the National Security Council (NSC) Staff as a foreign policy making mechanism, at the expense of the State Department.⁵⁷

Nixon had conducted his China policy from the White House with utmost secrecy even his own State Department was kept in the dark. Originally, Nixon and Kissinger were working with the State Department on China policy. Kissinger needed the experts within the State Department to provide him with studies on issues pertaining to the foreign policy of the PRC and the Sino-Soviet split. He wanted to familiarise himself with the PRC to a point that the White House could assume control of the management of the China policy.⁵⁸ Both Nixon and Kissinger had a dislike for the State Department and increasingly tried to exclude it and to control the management of China policy from the White House.⁵⁹ The NSC Staff became the foreign policy making branch of the Nixon administration, as Nixon centralised the making of foreign policy within the White House. Kissinger, as the National Security Adviser, was said to be holding more power than his predecessors and no other National Security Advisers after him were able to wield the amount of power he had during his time in the White House.⁶⁰ Nixon did not want the State Department to be in charge of diplomatic relations as this would mean that a huge number of officials would be involved and secrecy could be compromised.⁶¹ Nixon also did not want his foreign policy making to be bogged down by the Congress which he thought to be “narrow,” “short-sighted” and “unsophisticated” in its perceptions.⁶²

Nixon preferred to establish backchannel communications with the Communist Chinese rather than to rely on the State Department. This was clearly illustrated in his telephone conversation with Kissinger on 17 December 1970 in which he told Kissinger that the State Department could not be rely upon and everything had to be done in private, using private

⁵⁷ Ibid., 129.

⁵⁸ Seymour Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (New York: Summit Books, 1983), 356-7.

⁵⁹ Asaf Siniver, *Nixon, Kissinger and US Foreign Policy: The Machinery of Crisis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 52.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 52.

⁶¹ Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century*, 224.

⁶² Morgan, *Nixon*, 132.

contacts.⁶³ Nixon was exploring the option of using secret backchannels to communicate with the PRC. He approached the Pakistani President Yahya Khan and they agreed that the PRC should not remain isolated from the world community.⁶⁴ Nixon asked Yahya to pass this message to the PRC leaders.⁶⁵ Nixon also spoke with Romanian President Nicolae Ceaușescu and told him that it would be ideal if the Romanians could be a mediator in US-PRC relations.⁶⁶

In order to re-establish communications with the PRC, Nixon and Kissinger were using all the available channels. As noted previously, although they tried to communicate with the PRC through the Pakistani and Romanian backchannels, they also went back to the Warsaw channel to try to establish contact with Beijing. Walter Stoessel, the American ambassador to Poland, successfully managed to reach the PRC diplomat Lei Yang on 3 December 1969 and an agreement was reached to reconvene the ambassadorial talks. A series of meetings were held between late 1969 to early 1970. However, the Warsaw talks came to an end on 20 June when the PRC told the US that the time was not right for either side to agree on the date of the next meeting due to the situation at that time, apparently referring to the invasion of Cambodia.⁶⁷ However, this did not lead to an end of communications between the two sides. Secret backchannel communications began to take over as the White House gained sole control of the management of US-PRC relations and consequently led to the diminishing role of the State Department.

One result of the US-PRC rapprochement was the entry of the PRC into the United Nations (UN). It was apparent that the issue of the Chinese representation in the UN was complicated by Nixon's revelation of his policy of rapprochement with the PRC. More nations were in favour of the PRC taking up its seat in the UN. Since the US was developing friendly ties with the PRC, American allies and friends saw no problem in supporting the PRC admission into the UN. This thesis documents the change in the voting behaviour of the Asian allies and friends in

⁶³ Nixon-Kissinger telephone conversation on 17 December 1970. Editorial note, FRUS 1969-76, XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 240.

⁶⁴ Editorial Note, FRUS 1969-76, XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 52.

⁶⁵ Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 180-1.

⁶⁶ Editorial note, FRUS 1969-76, XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 52.

⁶⁷ Editorial note, FRUS 1969-76, XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 212.

the Chinese representation issue. It examines whether the Asian states continued to support the ROC in the Chinese representation issue or began to switch their support to the PRC. This will be dealt with in greater detail and on a country by country basis in the subsequent chapters.

A series of meetings were held leading up to the momentous Nixon visit to China in February 1972. These included Kissinger's secret trip in July 1971, his October trip and the January 1972 trip made by his deputy Alexander Haig. These meetings served to more than just merely make the necessary logistical preparations leading up to the presidential visit in February, for example, the drafting of the US-PRC joint statement known as the Shanghai Communiqué had already begun.

Nixon arrived in Beijing on 21 February 1972 and began his one-week visit of China. During the week, Nixon, along with members of his staff, engaged in talks with the PRC leadership and worked towards completing the Shanghai Communiqué. The release of the Shanghai Communiqué caused many Asian allies and friends to further question US intentions and how it would affect the security of Asia. Nixon sent National Security Council member John Holdridge and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green on a tour of Asia to reassure these states of the US commitment to them and also to pacify any fears and apprehensions which had arise due to the Nixon visit to China. This thesis aims to evaluate the explanations given by the Nixon administration to the Asian leaders and their corresponding reactions and also the Nixon visit. The public and private comments of the Asian leaderships will be discussed in order to give a more complete picture of how they perceived Asia's security and the future of US commitment to the region would be affected by the change in the US China policy.

Finally, this thesis looks at the development of the relationships of each Asian state with the US and the PRC after the Nixon visit to China. It evaluates the extent to which Nixon and Kissinger were able to convince the Asian states that the rapprochement posed no threat to their interests. By looking at the course of relations of these states with the US and the PRC after the Nixon visit, this thesis investigates which of these Asian states was affected more by the rapprochement and how they perceived the rapprochement would affect the region. This thesis assesses whether these states gained much from the China policy of the Nixon administration and

whether they were in favour of the rapprochement. The development of the US-PRC relationship initially flourished with more visits by Kissinger to the PRC and the establishment of liaison offices in 1973. However, the development of the relationship became stagnant as the US could not keep the promises made in 1972 and after, which meant that the normalisation of relations seemed to be increasingly unachievable. This thesis will discuss the path taken by the Asian states with regard to their respective relationships with the PRC and determine if they were paving their own course or simply following that of the US. It analyses the reasons behind the actions taken by the Asian states with regards to the PRC.

Sources and Methodology

This thesis does not claim to be a study of US foreign policy or a study of international history. It is essentially a study of the US practice of diplomacy, investigating the American impression of the responses of the Asian allies and friends towards the US-PRC rapprochement. It examines how the US explained its intentions and attempted to reassure its Asian allies and friends, by focusing on what they were told during their meetings with the US. As such, this thesis uses only US and UK sources, which are adequate for the scope of the research. Areas such as Nixon's relationships with Congress and the lobbies, and the inner workings and politics of the US bureaucracy, are outside the scope of the research and, as such, are not considered in any detail.

The memoirs of the personalities involved in the rapprochement are important as they provide valuable accounts of the momentous opening to China. The most important memoirs that are consulted are the memoirs of Nixon and Kissinger.⁶⁸ The main source of primary materials used in this thesis is from the Nixon Library in College Park, Maryland. The US State Department Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) publications⁶⁹ serves as a supplement to the primary materials from the Nixon Library. This thesis also uses materials from The National Archives at Kew in the United Kingdom. These materials prove to be useful as they offer a different perspective on the views of the Asian states regarding the changes in the US China policy. The

⁶⁸ Kissinger, *The White House Years*; Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1982); Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*. (London: Arrow Books, 1979).

⁶⁹ Foreign Relations of the United States, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments> ; accessed 23 April 2010.

Asian states did not reveal all of their views and opinions to the Americans, but often talk more freely and discussed their concerns with the British. Primary documents are available from the National Security Archives website of the George Washington University,⁷⁰ as well as from the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA).⁷¹ The State Department Telegrams available from the National Archives website⁷² provides vital resources from the years 1973 to 1974. Using these sources, this thesis constructs an account of how the US tried to reassure its Asian allies and friends that the US-PRC rapprochement would pose no threat to their interests and highlights the responses of these Asian states with regards to these reassurances. These Asian states are often neglected in the existing literature of the rapprochement. This thesis turns the spotlight on these states to provide a fresh perspective of the rapprochement while making an original contribution to the existing literature

⁷⁰ Electronic Briefing Books, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB> ; accessed 23 January 2007.

⁷¹ Digital National Security Archive <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/marketing/index.jsp> ; accessed 2 October 2009.

⁷² Access to Archival Databases (AAD) [http://aad.archives.gov/aad/series-description.jsp?s=4073&cat=\[T41\]&bc=.sl](http://aad.archives.gov/aad/series-description.jsp?s=4073&cat=[T41]&bc=.sl) ; accessed 25 October 2009

1. The Republic of China

The Chinese Civil War came to a conclusion with the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the KMT and the establishment of the PRC on 1 October 1949. This seriously affected the Truman administration which was blamed for the loss of China to Communism. The Americans refused to recognise the Communist regime as the legitimate government of the whole of China and, instead continued to support the KMT government on Taiwan instead. American commitment to the Nationalist Chinese increased with the advent of the Korean War in 1950, when President Harry Truman approved the deployment of the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait and declared that “the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of the security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.”¹ The alliance of the US and the ROC was affirmed with the signing of the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954, which brought Taiwan and the Pescadores under the US defence perimeter. In January 1955, the security of the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu was guaranteed with the Formosa Resolution which stipulated that the President could defend these islands against attacks should he deem that the security of Taiwan and the Pescadores would be affected. On the global front, in order to preserve the ROC seat in the UN, the Americans employed the strategies of the moratorium procedure and the “important question”² to prevent the PRC from entering the UN throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

US policy towards the PRC, which was the complete opposite of the policy towards the ROC, was one of hostility, containment and, at times, confrontation. The US viewed the PRC as a puppet regime of the Soviet Union especially after the communist allies affirmed their partnership with the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in February 1950. The American criticism of Communist Chinese “subservience” to the Soviets was part of a “wedge” strategy to stir discord in the Sino-Soviet relationship.³ The strategy was

¹ Quoted in Richard Bush, *At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations since 1942* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 88-9.

² An “important question” in the UN would need to obtain two-thirds of the votes in its favour, in order to be implemented.

³ See Warren I. Cohen, “Acheson, His Advisers and China, 1949-1950”, in *Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950*, ed. Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980): 21; John Lewis Gaddis, “The American ‘Wedge’ Strategy, 1949-1955” in *Sino-American*

reflected in Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk's speech in 1951 in which he labelled the PRC as "a colonial Russian Government- a Slavic Manchukuo in a larger scale [*sic.*]."⁴ The PRC's image as an aggressor was affirmed when it intervened in the Korean War and engaged in armed combat with the US. Trade, travel and diplomatic ties with the PRC were virtually non-existent. Tensions peaked when the PRC supported North Vietnam against a US-backed South Vietnam in the Vietnam War.

Changes occurred during the Nixon administration when the President decided to pursue the policy of rapprochement with the PRC. The Nationalist Chinese, who had no prior knowledge of this, were taken by surprise and shockwaves were felt throughout the ranks of the ROC government. There were worries of what this meant for the future of the US-ROC relationship, the international diplomatic position of the ROC and also the security of Taiwan against any attacks from the PRC.

Rapprochement with the PRC was a gradual process which started with a series of early moves made by the US towards the PRC. The chapter will begin with a discussion of how the US attempted to explain its actions to the ROC leadership and the responses of the ROC to these early moves. The Nixon administration was also seeking to reduce its presence in Asia. The opinions of the ROC towards the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization, as was conveyed to the US through meetings between the two sides, will also be discussed. The revelation of Kissinger's secret visit to China in July 1971, the announcement of Nixon's impending visit there in 1972 and the Shanghai Communiqué brought a sense of disbelief to the ROC leadership. Explanations were sought by the ROC and remedial actions were taken by the Nixon administration, but the ROC could not help but feel that their interests were compromised. The chapter will end with a discussion of the development of the US-ROC relationship after 1972. It will delve into how the US tried to reassure the PRC that the plans for normalisation of relations were still alive and forthcoming while

Relations, 1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade, ed. Harry Harding and Yuan Ming (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1989): 166; Jisi Wang, "An Appraisal of US Policy toward China, 1945-1955, and its Aftermath" in *Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade*, ed. Harry Harding and Yuan Ming (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1989): 291-2.

⁴ Quoted in Gaddis, "The American 'Wedge' Strategy 1949-1955": 166.

attempting to convince the ROC that there would be no changes to the US-ROC relationship, regardless of its newfound friendship with the PRC.

Nixon's Pre-Presidential Views Regarding the China Issue

In his memoirs, Nixon described ROC President Chiang Kai Shek as “one of the giants of the twentieth century,”⁵ whom he admired for his “high intelligence and his total dedication to the goal of freeing the Chinese people from communist domination”. Regarding Chiang’s goal to return to the mainland and to liberate the millions of Chinese people from communist rule, Nixon felt that it was impossible and extremely unrealistic. In 1953, he visited Chiang in Taipei and could sense that Chiang still yearned to return to the mainland and assume the leadership of the whole of China, ousting the CCP. He felt that this was impossible, but could not bear to convey his views to Chiang. However, he made it known to Chiang that the US would not support any KMT invasion of Mainland China.⁶ In another trip to Taiwan in 1967, Nixon met again with Chiang who told him that the US should support the KMT’s campaign to return to the mainland in view of the chaos on the mainland due to the Cultural Revolution and the increasing belligerence of the PRC. The PRC had acquired nuclear weapons and was supporting the North Vietnamese in the Vietnam War. Nixon pondered over whether Chiang’s plan was feasible, and felt that his “pragmatic analysis” told him that it was not. The PRC had attained such great power that the KMT simply could not claim victory in any confrontation between the two sides.⁷

During his pre-presidential years, Nixon had been voicing his views regarding building closer ties with the PRC. In the 1960s, he travelled widely, met with foreign leaders and American diplomats and, on many occasions, would reiterate his views on the need for a new China policy. In 1965, during a trip to Taipei, Nixon spoke with American diplomat Arthur W. Hummel Jr., saying that the KMT’s wish to return to the mainland would never be realised and the US ought to build friendly ties with the PRC.⁸ On his trip to Singapore in the same year, Nixon met Roger Sullivan,

⁵ Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, 282.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 126.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 282.

⁸ Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China”, *The Journal of American History* 92, 1(2005): 116.

who was the head of the political section at the American Embassy, and told him how the Americans could build a normal relationship with the PRC and that it was necessary to do that.⁹ In 1967, he spoke with Romanian President Nicolae Ceaușescu and expressed the need for America to communicate with the PRC and even move towards normalisation of relations once the war in Vietnam came to a conclusion.¹⁰ Even more significantly, he met with President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966 and “urged a diplomatic communication with the PRC as soon as possible,” arguing that the time had come to “confront them on the diplomatic front.”¹¹

First Steps towards the US-PRC Rapprochement

On 9 September 1969, in order to reopen communications with the PRC, Nixon instructed Walter Stoessel, the American ambassador to Poland, to approach the PRC Chargé directly, conveying the message that the President was “seriously interested in concrete discussions with the PRC.”¹² Stoessel finally approached the PRC diplomat Lei Yang on 3 December and passed the message to him. The PRC responded favourably, and invited Stoessel to the PRC embassy on 11 December.¹³ Lei and Stoessel met again on 8 January 1970. An agreement was reached and the ambassadorial talks would reconvene on 20 January.¹⁴ Lei said that he would inform the PRC leaders of the American proposal to either send a representative to Beijing or to receive a PRC representative in Washington.¹⁵ A major breakthrough came on 20 February when the PRC stated that they would welcome a high ranking American official to Beijing “for the further exploration of fundamental principles of relations” which concerned both sides. The PRC stated that “the

⁹ Mann, *About Face*, 17.

¹⁰ Goh, *Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974*, 107.

¹¹ Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, 273.

¹² Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 9, 1969, 3:15–4:05 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 80.

¹³ Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, December 20, 1969, FRUS 1969-76, XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, footnote no. 2, 152.

¹⁴ Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 12, 1970, FRUS 1969-76, XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, footnote no. 2, 161.

¹⁵ Telegram from the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State, Warsaw, January 20, 1970, FRUS 1969-76, XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 169.

question of fundamental principle in the relations between the two countries should first of all be solved and that was the Taiwan question, which is related to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.” Once, this problem was resolved, bilateral relations could be improved and other problems could be addressed. The Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait would not condone any settlement of the Taiwan issue using the formulae of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” Stoessel replied that the US stand on the issue of Taiwan was compatible with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. He went further to suggest that the US would be willing to discuss with the PRC a joint declaration which would state that the US and the PRC would closely abide by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.¹⁶

When Chiang learnt of what was discussed during the Warsaw talks, he expressed his shock and concern in a personal letter to Nixon, dated 1 March 1970. In the letter Chiang said that if the US was actually willing to accept the “so called Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” and to hold talks with the PRC to find a solution to the “so-called Taiwan problem,” it would be a gross violation of the sovereignty of the ROC.¹⁷ The PRC would continue its aggressive stance and this could hinder the success of Nixon’s policy in Asia, cause the “permanent enslavement” of the 700 million people on the Chinese mainland and put the security of the rest of Asia in jeopardy. Chiang advised Nixon to “carefully consider the consequences and take timely measures to prevent any distortion of your [Nixon’s] well-meaning policy during its implementation.”¹⁸ Kissinger said that Chiang’s letter illuminated ROC anxieties about the impact the Warsaw talks could have on Taiwan.¹⁹ Vice Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo, who was the son of Chiang Kai Shek, warned the Americans on another occasion that the Communist Chinese were simply trying to make use of the Americans by resuming the Warsaw talks. The Communist Chinese were facing threats from the Soviets and hoped that by re-opening communications with the Americans, it would unsettle the

¹⁶ Airgram A-84 From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State, February 21, 1970, FRUS 1969-76, E-13, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve13/d4> accessed 20 April 2010.

¹⁷ Letter: Chiang Kai Shek to Richard Nixon; 1 March 1970; 1969-1974 Republic of China Correspondence President Chiang Kai Shek [Nov 1969- Mar 1973]; Box 751; National Security Council (NSC) Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Memorandum: Henry Kissinger to Nixon; 7 March 1970; 1969-1974 Republic of China Correspondence President Chiang Kai Shek [Nov 1969- Mar 1973]; Box 751; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

Soviets. Resuming talks with the US acted as a form of “psychological warfare device” which served to “alienate” the US and its ROC ally. Consequently, US prestige in Asia would suffer.²⁰

Nixon wrote a reply to Chiang on 27 March in a bid to explain US intentions. He stated that he continued to recognise the threat of the Communist Chinese. However, he wrote,

I would be remiss in my duty to the American people if I did not attempt to discover whether a basis may not exist for reducing the risk of a conflict between the United States and Communist China, and whether certain of the issues which lie between us may not be settled by negotiation. The alternative of maintaining a hostile relationship indefinitely while weapons of mass destruction increase in numbers and power is a terrible one, and demands that every reasonable effort be made to promote understandings which will contribute to peace and stability in Asia.²¹

Nixon said that in making this new move towards Beijing, the US had taken the interests of its allies into consideration. Nixon ended the letter with the assurance that the Warsaw Talks would not change the relationship between the US and the ROC and that the US was still committed to the defence of Taiwan and the Pescadores.²² However, US-ROC relations were in fact changing. Due to Nixon's penchant for secrecy, the ROC was not briefed by the Americans before the Lei-Stoessel Talks, unlike before when the US would always brief the ROC before the talks in Warsaw. The ROC was then given the summaries of the talks but these summaries were deemed as “unsatisfactory.”²³

The ending of regular patrols of the Taiwan Strait was part of Nixon's policy of rapprochement with PRC because it acted as a gesture of “goodwill” to indicate to Beijing that

²⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 21, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 198-9.

²¹ Letter From President Nixon to the President of the Republic of China Chiang Kai-shek, Washington, March 27, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 193.

²² *Ibid.*, 194.

²³ Tucker, “Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China”: 118.

Washington was willing to establish friendlier ties.²⁴ Patrols of the Taiwan Strait would be on an irregular basis, depending on whether the Commander of the Seventh Fleet was able to deploy the forces necessary for patrol. The US justified this decision by linking it to the worldwide reduction of US naval deployment and the cut in its defence budget.²⁵ These gestures of goodwill were complimented by other modifications such as in terms of trade and passport restrictions. According to Kissinger, the termination of the naval patrol was purely “symbolic” with “no real military significance.” He told a Pakistani official that by modifying the Taiwan Strait Patrol the US was in fact removing an “irritant” in Sino-American relations. The US was still committed to the defence of Taiwan with the continuation of the irregular patrols by the US Navy.²⁶

The ROC was informed of the change in the Taiwan Strait Patrol on 7 November 1969. The US stated that it was totally committed to the defence of Taiwan despite the modification of the Taiwan Strait patrol. The Seventh Fleet would, as before, be able to serve its function as stipulated under the US-ROC Mutual Defence Treaty. Moreover, the Seventh Fleet would continue to be present on the Taiwan Strait as elements of it would stop at the ports of Taiwan.²⁷

The ROC was not convinced by the Nixon administration’s explanation that the termination of regular patrols was due to budgetary cuts.²⁸ The ROC viewed the modification of the Taiwan Strait Patrol warily, especially its implications on the defence of Taiwan against PRC offensives. ROC Foreign Minister Wei Tao-Ming told Secretary of State William Rogers this decision could lead to a “possible Chinese Communist reaction” and a surge in Nationalist Chinese

²⁴ Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, “Taiwan’s Policy Towards the United States, 1969-1978”, in *Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: An International History*, ed William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross and Gong Li (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005), 212.

²⁵ Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China and Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, Washington, September 23, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 88-9.

²⁶ Robert Accinelli, “In Pursuit of a Modus Vivendi: The Taiwan Issue and Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969-1972”, in *Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: An International History*, ed William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross and Gong Li (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005), 12-3.

²⁷ Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China and Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, Washington, September 23, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 89.

²⁸ Chang, “Taiwan’s Policy Towards the United States, 1969-1978”, 212.

public opinion. He appealed to the US to amend its decision.²⁹ Chiang sent Nixon a message dated 14 November stating that he was “greatly perturbed” by the US plans to modify the Taiwan Straits Patrol and urged him to postpone its implementation in order to buy time for both sides to “exchange views and work out a mutually satisfactory solution.”³⁰

The modification of the Strait patrol was originally scheduled for implementation on 15 November. Chiang was apprehensive of the impact of the move on the security of Taiwan and also on the mutual interests of the US and the ROC. The US proceeded with a review of the policy after Defense Secretary Melvin Laird ordered the two ships situated at the Strait area with the purpose of continuous patrol to remain on station until 20 November.³¹ On 15 November Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, and Commander in Chief of the Pacific ,Admiral John S. McCain Jr., were sent to Taiwan to explain to Chiang the US stand on the issue. Chiang highlighted again that the patrolling of the Taiwan Strait was important to the security of the ROC and to terminate it would lead to serious consequences. The PRC could launch an offensive against the offshore islands and then move on to attack Taiwan and the Pescadores. He added that the US could subsequently be embroiled in a war of attrition. McCain told Chang that there had been no deviation in policy as there would be about 15 ships, under the control of the Commander of the Taiwan Patrol force, transiting the Taiwan Strait on a monthly basis. He also reassured Chiang that The Seventh Fleet would be able to maintain an “effective patrol” of the Straits with the new arrangements. Packard added that the naval strength would be enhanced with the deactivation of the older US navy ships and the building of modern naval forces.³² Chiang was said to be satisfied

²⁹ Memorandum for the President—Evening Report, Washington, November 12, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 122.

³⁰ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Taipei to SECSTATE WASHDC; 14 November 1969; 1969-1974 Republic of China Correspondence President Chiang Kai Shek [Nov 1969- Mar 1973]; Box 751; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³¹ Memorandum: William P. Rogers to Nixon; 19 November 1969; 1969-1974 Republic of China Correspondence President Chiang Kai Shek [Nov 1969- Mar 1973]; Box 751; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³² Telegram: AMEMBASSY TAIPEI to SECSTATE WASHDC; 16 November 1969; 1969-1974 Republic of China Correspondence President Chiang Kai Shek [Nov 1969- Mar 1973]; Box 751; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

with the modification plan and the ROC was prepared to go along with it. The US proceeded to execute the modification of the Taiwan Strait Patrol on 16 November.³³

As he failed to convince the US to alter its decision, Chiang tried to push for US support to strengthen the military capabilities of the ROC. In another letter, dated 19 November 1969, he expressed his displeasure with the US decision and felt that it would present the PRC forces with a chance to attack the ROC sea line communications to the Pescadores and the offshore islands. In view of the “impending danger” from the mainland, Chiang tried to push for a review of the Rochester plan, which was stated in the US-ROC Mutual Security Treaty as a plan for the defence of Taiwan and the Pescadores.³⁴ Chiang asked for submarines and jets of the latest model so as to eliminate its military disadvantage. The ROC needed to achieve air and naval superiority in the Taiwan Straits, as the PRC Navy was better equipped when compared to the ROC.³⁵

Taipei’s Response towards Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine

When Nixon began to pursue the policies of Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine, they caught the attention of the ROC. Some elements of the Taiwanese media were apparently against Vietnamization. The *Kuomintang China Daily News* reported a bleak view of Vietnamization. It was foreseen that South Vietnam was bound to fall to communism in two years after the withdrawal of the US forces. The *Independence Evening Post* viewed the US policy of Vietnamization as a way to placate the PRC and to play the China card against the Soviets. It predicted that the US policy would “boomerang disastrously.”³⁶

The Nixon Doctrine received much attention in the Taiwanese media as well. The major papers were generally supportive of the Nixon Doctrine in principle. There were thoughts that

³³ Memorandum: William P. Rogers to Nixon; 19 November 1969; 1969-1974 Republic of China Correspondence President Chiang Kai Shek [Nov 1969- Mar 1973]; Box 751; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³⁴ Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, December 9, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 143-4.

³⁵ Letter: Chiang Kai Shek to Nixon; 19 November 1969; 1969-1974 Republic of China Correspondence President Chiang Kai Shek [Nov 1969- Mar 1973]; Box 751; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³⁶ Memorandum: Kissinger to Nixon; 4 August 1969; President’s Trip Reactions-Communications July 22-August 3, 1969; Box 462; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

Asian nations should be strengthened, not weakened by the US withdrawals, and that the US should not withdraw from the region until the Asian nations were strengthened.³⁷ The *Central Daily News*, the KMT official paper, wrote that the Nixon Doctrine was supported wholeheartedly but the US should not withdraw at that particular moment due to the grave situation in Asia and the fear that it might fuel communist ambitions. The Asian nations should be fully supported by the US through military aid. The US should continue to ensure the security of the region and employ means to achieve that within the scope of the Nixon Doctrine. There should also be some kind of regional organisation by the Asian nations to ensure the security of Free Asia. *The China Times* emphasised the need for the Asian nations to be strengthened militarily with the aid of the US in view of Nixon's new Asian policy. Nixon was seen as appeasing the PRC in its actions. One example was that it had no objection to the formation of a coalition government in Vietnam.³⁸

There were also doubts regarding the US commitment in Asia. *Chung Kuo Shih Pao* wrote, "One thing is sure that the Asian countries have not been entirely satisfied with the oral pledges of the United States commitment."³⁹ *United Daily News* expressed doubts over the automaticity of the US commitment to assist an Asian nation against external threats, under the terms of the security treaties. The concern was that the US Congress could refuse to approve the decision to assist the Asian nation, or might not respond promptly to such requests. It also pointed out the contradiction between the US pledge to provide the Asian nations with more military aid and the annual scaling down of the budget for foreign aid by Congress.⁴⁰

Although Chiang was reported to have expressed his support for the Nixon Doctrine, he was apprehensive of its long term effect on Asia. He was fearful that the gradual US withdrawal

³⁷ Telegram: AMEMBASSY TAIPEI to USIA WASHDC; 26 August 1970; Vice President's SEA Trip: President Trip Files August 1970; Box 449; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³⁸ Telegram: AMEMBASSY TAIPEI to USIA WASHDC; 26 August 1970; Vice President's SEA Trip: President Trip Files August 1970; Box 449; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³⁹ Telegram: AMEMBASSY TAIPEI to SECSTATE WASHDC; 2 September 1970; Vice President's SEA Trip: President Trip Files August 1970; Box 449; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁴⁰ Telegram: AMEMBASSY TAIPEI to USIA WASHDC; 26 August 1970; Vice President's SEA Trip: President Trip Files August 1970; Box 449; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

from the region would be interpreted by the PRC as an unwillingness of the US to defend Asia.⁴¹ Chiang continued to declare his support for the Nixon Doctrine to the Americans. On 3 January 1970, Chiang met with Vice President Spiro T. Agnew and told the Vice President his views regarding the Nixon Doctrine. He said that the Nixon Doctrine shared similarities to what had been written in his book *Soviet Russia in China* 16 years before. He had emphasised that Asian nations, with the military aid of the US, should take on greater responsibilities for their own defence.⁴² Chiang wrote in a letter to Nixon dated 1 March 1970 that he “deeply sympathised” with the Nixon Doctrine and was supportive of it and would give the US his “unqualified support” with ROC’s limited resources. He stressed that the policy must be successful. In order for the Nixon Doctrine to succeed, South Vietnam must be well equipped and properly trained to fight against the communist threat. The free nations of Asia had to be provided with enough aid so as to strengthen their defences. These measures would curb the communist threat in the region. Chiang believed that the PRC’s aim was to “harass the US plan of withdrawing her military forces from Vietnam and even more important, to sabotage the US new Asian policy.”⁴³ Chiang supported the Nixon Doctrine’s concept that “threatened” nations should use their own troops to defend themselves and described the idea as “practicable” and “logical.” He stated that the ROC needed US weapons, transportation and moral support, not US manpower.⁴⁴ He also linked Vietnamization with the success of the Nixon Doctrine. Chiang welcomed the US policy of Vietnamization of the war and felt that with proper training and sufficient equipment, the programme would be successful. The US could help other Asian nations against the Chinese Communist threat by using the “Vietnam formula.” This would be most relevant to Taiwan due to its proximity to mainland China and the fact that it was most prone to any Chinese Communist attacks.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Talking Points: Republic of China; 8 December 1969; V.P. Agnew’s Trip December 1969 – January ROC; Box 81; NSC Files; Henry Kissinger Office Files (HAKOF); Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁴² Telegram: AMEMBASSY Canberra to RUEMC/SECSTATE WASHDC; 14 January 1970; VP Trip East Asia: President Trip Files January 1970; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁴³ Letter: Chiang Kai Shek to Nixon; 1 March 1970; 1969-1974 Republic of China Correspondence President Chiang Kai Shek [Nov 1969- Mar 1973]; Box 751; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

Agnew met with Chiang Ching Kuo on 27 August 1970 and Agnew was told that the ROC knew that the US was confronted with “burdensome problems.” President Chiang stated that US military aid to the ROC was more of a gesture of political significance and thus the amount provided was not the crucial factor. The ROC believed that the US should provide the ROC with enough military aid for its mutual security interests and it was the responsibility of the US to do so under the terms of the Mutual Defence Treaty.⁴⁶ The ROC once again emphasised the imminent threat from the PRC, which was perhaps heightened by the modification of the Strait Patrol. Since the PRC had air and naval superiority in the Taiwan Strait area, President Chiang believed that the PRC was capable of defeating Taiwan in 3 days and taking over the territory in 7 days. He appealed to Agnew to convey to the US government that the ROC would require the US to transfer two squadrons of F-4 aircraft to Taiwan and also to loan three submarines to the ROC government. The ROC reminded the US that the prime target of the PRC was the ROC on Taiwan and it would not hesitate to launch a surprise attack when the timing was right.⁴⁷ Chiang Ching Kuo told Agnew that ROC military might was entirely defensive and was closely connected to the US military force and took the opportunity to request for more military aid. The ROC military equipment was becoming obsolete and the ROC military power in the Taiwan Strait had to be on par or even surpass that of the PRC. The air force and navy had to be strengthened and thus the ROC would require US support in the acquisition of F-4 airplanes and submarines.⁴⁸ Agnew told the ROC leadership that the US would try its utmost to make sure that the ROC would not be affected greatly by the reduction in the military assistance programme. He sympathised with the military situation of the ROC but said that the allocation of the budget for military assistance was made by the Congress on a yearly basis. He assured Chiang Ching Kuo that the US would take his opinions into consideration. He added that the US-ROC Mutual Security Treaty would remain the “chief bulwark” against any external threats. Chiang asked Agnew if the planned reduction of US military

⁴⁶ Telegram: CINCPAC to RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC; 30 August 1970; Vice President’s SEA Trip President’s Trip Files August 1970; Box 449; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁴⁷ Telegram: CINCPAC to RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC; 30 August 1970; Vice President’s SEA Trip President’s Trip Files August 1970; Box 449; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

aid to the ROC was made as a conciliatory gesture towards the PRC. Agnew reassured Chiang that these cuts were due to budgetary problems and had nothing to do with US-PRC relations.⁴⁹

In another meeting between Agnew and ROC Vice President Yen Chia-Kan, Yen appealed to the US congress and the Nixon administration to respond favourably to the ROC request for the F-4s. He told Agnew that the capabilities of the PRC's MIG 19s and MIG 21s surpassed that of ROC's F-104s and F-5s. He stated that the PRC possessed better airplanes than the ROC with the MIG 19 and MIG 21. Yen pointed out that although the Nixon Doctrine was a sound policy, the allies would require more American aid in order to fight against any external threats.⁵⁰ The ROC was anxious to obtain more military aid from the US and this conveyed a certain feeling of a lack of confidence of the US commitment to the ROC.⁵¹

ROC and the US-PRC Rapprochement

The biggest blow to the ROC would arrive on 15 July 1971, when Nixon announced that Kissinger had just returned from a trip to China and had held talks with the PRC Premier, Zhou Enlai. Nixon had made the decision that "certain allied governments" would be informed of the presidential announcement "at the very last minute."⁵² The ROC apparently fell into this group of allies as Rogers informed ROC Ambassador to the US James Shen just 20 minutes before the live broadcast. Rogers telephoned Shen at his Washington DC home to inform him that Nixon was due to announce to the world that Kissinger had just returned from a trip to China and Nixon himself would be visiting China in 1972. Rogers explained to Shen that the US move to establish friendlier ties with the PRC was a step towards greater world peace. This would not jeopardise the friendship between the US and ROC and the US would continue to honour the Mutual Security Treaty. Shen

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Telegram: AMEMBassy Canberra to RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC; 14 January 1970; VP Trip East Asia: President Trip Files January 1970; Box 450; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵¹ Scope and Objectives Paper: Republic of China; 8 December 1969; V.P. Agnew's Trip December 1969-January, ROC; Box 81; NSC Files; HAKOF; Country Files-Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵² Backchannel Message SITTO 88/WH 12696 From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), July 11, 1971, FRUS, 1969-76, E 13, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve13/d8> accessed 20 April 2010.

told Rogers that he would pass the message to the ROC government in Taipei. Shen wrote in his memoirs that he was “dumbfounded” by the news and could not believe what he had heard.⁵³

The Nationalist Chinese were surprised by the announcement and there were feelings of betrayal and disappointment. There were apprehensions of what the future held for their relationship with the Americans. In a meeting between Shen and Marshall Green, Shen expressed the sentiment that US actions could “hardly be described as a friendly act.” Green replied that US actions were not unfriendly and went on to repeat Nixon reassurance that rapprochement with the PRC would not be achieved “at the expense of our [America’s] old friends” and the rapprochement was sought in order to reduce the tensions in East Asia. The US relationship with the ROC would remain close with the US adhering to all the security commitments.⁵⁴ Shen also told Green that the reactions back in Taipei were that of “profound surprise and regret.” He said, sarcastically, that by responding favourably to an invitation from the renegade Communist regime, which had swallowed up the mainland territory, to visit China was a peculiar way to express the friendship the US had with the ROC. He went on to say that he was grateful for the assurances given by Green regarding the future of the US-ROC friendship but added that apparently the US would be going ahead with the high-level talks with the PRC, despite these assurances. Shen was also disappointed that the US failed to discuss its new China policy with the ROC.⁵⁵ Shen also hoped to find out more about what was exchanged between Kissinger and Chou during the July talks.⁵⁶

In another meeting between Kissinger and Shen on 27 July 1971, Kissinger expressed his regret that a loyal friend of the US, such as the ROC, had to be subjected to the shock brought about by the 15 July announcement. He said that the secrecy of his trip to China and the announcement of Nixon’s impending trip was the hardest thing that had happened to him throughout his period in the White House. He also explained to Shen that the opening of China was not the beginning of an “era of love” with the PRC. The US would not “betray old friends” or “turn

⁵³ James Shen, *The U.S. & Free China: How the U.S. Sold Out its Ally* (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books Ltd, 1983), 69-70.

⁵⁴ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China, Washington, July 16, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 456-7.

⁵⁵ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China, Washington, July 16, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 457.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 456.

anyone over to communism to ease our [US] problems.”⁵⁷ Kissinger informed Shen that the US told the PRC that it had a security arrangement with the ROC in the form of a Mutual Defense Treaty. It was for the peaceful resolution of the China issue and hoped that the PRC would not resort to using force against the ROC. Shen described the initial shock as “terrific.” Kissinger noted that the official reaction was quite “restrained.” He added that it was hard for Nixon, too, as he liked the ROC more than any of his predecessors had.⁵⁸

Nixon wrote a letter regarding the 15 July announcement to Chiang. In his letter dated 17 July 1971, Nixon expressed his regrets for not being able to inform and brief the ROC prior to the 15 July announcement. He justified the move towards the PRC as necessary in order to demolish the “barriers of hostility and suspicion” which could be detrimental to global peace. He hoped that the nations of Free Asia would be able to benefit from the reduction of tensions between the US and the PRC. He also reaffirmed the US friendship with the ROC and also its commitment to Taiwan’s security under the Mutual Security Treaty.⁵⁹ In another letter to Chiang, dated 1 January 1972, Nixon explained to him that the topics which would be discussed during his China visit would be bilateral issues concerning both sides, subtly hinting that the issue of Taiwan may not be raised. He also told Chiang that the US and PRC would not be discussing the establishment of diplomatic ties during the presidential summit.⁶⁰ These were of course not true, as the issue of Taiwan was discussed extensively in Beijing and also, as early as 1971, both sides had already delved into the possibility of establishing diplomatic ties in the future.

Nixon stepped up his efforts to placate the Nationalist Chinese by sending California Governor Ronald Reagan to Taipei to attend the ROC National Day observances. According to the American diplomat Roger Sullivan, “Taiwan didn’t want to be briefed, didn’t ask to be briefed. So it was a symbolic kind of gesture so they wouldn’t feel they were being abandoned. Maybe a gesture

⁵⁷ Memorandum of Conversation; Dr Kissinger’s Discussions with Ambassador Shen on the President’s Visit to Peking; 27 July 1971; China Trip- July-Nov 1971; Box 500; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Letter: Nixon to Chiang Kai Shek; 17 July 1971; 1969-1974 Republic of China Correspondence President Chiang Kai Shek [November 1969- March 1973]; Box 751; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁶⁰ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China, Washington, January 1, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 635.

to protect Richard Nixon from his own people in the US.”⁶¹ He met with Chiang to explain Nixon’s upcoming trip to China and also reaffirmed the friendship and alliance between the US and ROC. Chiang expressed his view that the presidential trip to China was unnecessary and would only serve to boost the international standing of the PRC.⁶²

Part of the American policy of containment of the PRC was to prevent its entry into the UN. The moratorium procedure was a tactic used in the 1950s, to suspend annually the question of PRC’s admission into the UN. It had been successful in deferring the issue of the PRC entry into the UN for some time. However, this procedure was becoming less effective in view of the global events at that time. For example, in 1960, new members from fifteen African states plus Cyprus gained seats in the UN. It was perceived that these states would not favour the moratorium procedure.⁶³ Moreover, voting in the fifteenth General Assembly had demonstrated a shift favouring the Communist Chinese.⁶⁴ The Kennedy administration noted that this procedure had ceased to be effective in keeping the PRC out of the UN. Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, admitted that the moratorium was no longer effective due to the “very complicated parliamentary situation in the UN.”⁶⁵ The “important question” procedure was thus introduced so as to prevent the PRC from entering the UN. Rusk recommended the entry of the PRC into the UN should be treated as an “important question” which would be “the best tactic to use since it offered us [Americans] a reasonable chance of getting a clear, blocking one third.”⁶⁶

The “important question” procedure proved to be effective in keeping the PRC out of the UN in the 1960s. However, the votes in favour of the ROC began to drop each year with the most

⁶¹Tucker, “Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China”: 126-7.

⁶² Memorandum from John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 5, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 586-7.

⁶³ Rosemary Foot, “Redefinitions: The Domestic Context of American’s China Policy in the 1960s”, in *Re-Examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973*, ed. Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001), 268.

⁶⁴ ROC Ambassador Dr. George K. C. Yeh observed the following voting trends of the 15th General Assembly on the moratorium which indicated that votes for the moratorium had decreased from 44 to 42. Cuba and Ethiopia being the countries which had switch their votes (from in favour to not in favour) there was an increase in the number of abstentions from 9 to 22, 14 of which came from the African continent. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 17, 1961, 11:30 a.m.-12:10 p.m., FRUS 1961-1963 Volume XXII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v22/d14> accessed 20 April 2010.

⁶⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 3, 1961, 3:10-3:40 p.m., FRUS 1961-1963 Volume XXII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v22/d3> accessed 20 April 2010.

⁶⁶ Foot, “Redefinitions: The Domestic Context of American’s China Policy in the 1960s”, 268-9.

significant change occurring during the 1970 vote. The support ratio in 1970 for the “important question” was 1.2:1, a considerable drop from the ratio of 1.79:1 in 1961.⁶⁷ Meanwhile, support for the rival, Albanian-led, Albanian Resolution, which called for the entry of the PRC into the UN and the expulsion of the ROC, gained a significant majority. A total of fifty-one states voted for the resolution, forty-nine against it with twenty-five abstentions.⁶⁸ This was a warning to the US that the “important question” could no longer work to keep ROC in the UN. Sooner or later, the PRC was going to enter the UN at ROC’s expense. Many countries, including Japan and Australia who were supporters of the ROC were aware that a change in US policy was necessary as it was “at the end of the road with the current policy.” The US could not stick to the current policy anymore, as it would be viewed as “foolish rigidity and excessive deference to one aged man” by the world and would only please Chiang, who would view it as a “firmness of purpose.”⁶⁹ Even the Americans conceded the fact that a new strategy was needed as the present policy was losing the support of the UN member states. To continue using the “important question” would lead to the removal of the ROC from the UN, with the PRC taking over the China seat, possibly within the next two years.⁷⁰ In another memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, the outlook was even more pessimistic as it was predicted that the current policy would only lead to the entry of the PRC into the UN and the expulsion of the ROC, almost certainly by 1972.⁷¹ A new strategy had to be conceived to prevent it from happening.

The issue of Chinese representation in the UN was complicated by Nixon’s revelation of his policy of rapprochement with the PRC. More nations were against the blocking of the PRC entry into the UN. Since the US was developing friendly ties with the PRC, American allies would see no problem in supporting the PRC admission into the UN. The rapprochement policy also meant that the US could no longer oppose this as such an action would be viewed as hostile. Nixon hoped that the PRC would enter the UN, while the ROC retained a seat in the General Assembly.

⁶⁷ Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance*, 249.

⁶⁸ Chang, “Taiwan’s Policy Towards the United States, 1969-1978”, 215.

⁶⁹ Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 3, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 607-8.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 606.

⁷¹ Memorandum: Kissinger to Nixon; undated; Chirep; Box 86; NSC Files; HAKOF; Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

According to Nixon, with dual representation in the UN the US could “retain the geopolitical advantage of keeping the island of Taiwan in friendly hands, while allowing the US to achieve cordial relations and diplomatic leverage over the PRC.”⁷² The Nixon administration had to find a way to support the ROC in the UN or it would be seen as abandoning a long-term ally. A middle ground had to be found and the task of formulating a new strategy for the Chinese Representation issue fell to the State Department, which had been left out of the loop in Nixon’s opening to PRC. The adopted strategy would allow the PRC to enter the UN while the ROC would retain a seat in the UN. The retention of ROC’s UN Security Council seat was an issue of contention between the US and the ROC. The US had conceded that it was impossible for the ROC to keep its seat while the ROC was adamant on retaining it. According to Kissinger, ROC’s Security Council seat would be very hard to preserve. The issue would be decided by the Security Council and the US could not utilise its veto as the issue was procedural. In addition, eight members of the Security Council recognised the PRC and two others felt that the PRC should get the seat.⁷³

The National Security Council had predicted in the document National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 107 that the ROC would be against any US attempt to change the UN policy.⁷⁴ When the ROC learnt that there could be a possible change in the UN policy, it voiced its views through the Permanent Representative of the Republic of China to the UN Liu Chieh, who met with UN Ambassador George Herbert Walker Bush on 11 March 1971. Liu told Bush that he found it hard to believe that the US would be favourable to the prospect of the PRC entering the UN when the PRC’s “fundamental policy” stayed the same. Both Bush and Liu conceded that because of the new circumstances faced by the ROC and the US in the UN, a review of the present policy was needed. The ROC would not tolerate it if it were to lose its Security Council seat, even though it admitted that the old formula was no longer feasible. Liu conveyed to Bush the ROC position that “anything which damaged the ROC position in the UN would have grave repercussions in Taiwan” and the ROC must not be deprived of the Security Council seat as it was

⁷² Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance*, 250.

⁷³ Memorandum: Kissinger to Nixon; undated; Murphy, Ambassador; Box 86; NSC Files; HAKOF; Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁷⁴ Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 3, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 606.

of utmost importance to the ROC. The Security Council seat must not be mentioned in any resolution.⁷⁵ The ROC told the US that it was not its stance that the US should stick to its old policy. Shen told Rogers that Chiang said that if it was the US opinion that the “important question” was doomed, the ROC would not be against any new proposals as long as it kept the elements of the “important question” and the ROC would only be expelled by a two-thirds vote. ROC’s Security Council seat would have to be preserved as it was the ROC stance that its General Assembly seat and the Security Council seat were “inseparable.” Rogers assured Shen that the US would make every effort to keep ROC’s Security Council seat but success could not be guaranteed.⁷⁶

On an earlier occasion, Chiang told Ambassador Robert D. Murphy⁷⁷ that any new strategy should preserve ROC’s Security Council seat so as to safeguard “the ROC’s basic position and the integrity of the Charter.”⁷⁸ Chiang emphasised that after the admission of the PRC, the continual existence of the ROC in the UN would lose its validity if the ROC seat in the General Assembly and its Security Council seat were treated as two separate issues. In view of that, the ROC might find it very hard to remain a member of the UN. The “legal foundation” of the ROC’s existence would be severely damaged if it was to lose its Security Council seat to the PRC. It would be detrimental to the “national honour and tradition” of the ROC and would be intolerable. The Security Council seat was of utmost importance to the ROC and, if it was lost, the ROC would “rather be a jade broken than an earthen tile intact.”⁷⁹

It was becoming increasingly difficult for the US to preserve the ROC’s Security Council seat. The general atmosphere around the UN was that any resolution which advocated a dual

⁷⁵ Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, New York, March 11, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 628-9.

⁷⁶ Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China, Washington, May 29, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 701-2.

⁷⁷ Murphy was a veteran diplomat who served in the US Foreign Service from 1921 until his retirement in 1959. He was honoured as a Career Ambassador.

⁷⁸ Record of Conversation, Taipei, April 23, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 671.

⁷⁹ Letter: Robert Murphy to Kissinger (Summary Record of a Conversation between President Chiang Kai Shek and Mr Robert D. Murphy enclosed); 30 April 1971; Exchanges Leading up to HAK trip to China December 1969-July 1971; Box 1031; NSC Files; For the President’s Files-China/Vietnam Negotiations; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

representation of both ROC and PRC would fail if the Security Council seat was not given to the PRC. According to Bush, "Any effort to obscure the Security Council seat question will be viewed as an effort to keep the PRC out of the UN."⁸⁰ Rogers noted that the only way to keep ROC in the UN was to make sure that the PRC would get the Security Council seat.⁸¹

The Chinese Representation issue in the UN was destined to be further complicated by the Sino-American rapprochement. As the Nixon administration moved towards rapprochement with the PRC, it became clear that it could not vote against its admission to the UN. Nixon told Kissinger and Rogers, "If we on one hand say we're going to Communist China, and on the other hand we're voting against Communist China coming into the UN. I wonder if that doesn't just make us look like a bunch of hypocrites." This shaped the US new strategy in the UN, which was to support the PRC's admission to the UN while opposing the expulsion of ROC which had been a responsible member of the UN.⁸²

In the end, after months of negotiation, the ROC remained steadfast in its view that it would not oppose any change in the US policy in the UN, provided that the ROC would retain its Security Council seat. It accepted the dual representation formula but insisted that the Security Council seat should not be given to the PRC and the ROC would not be expelled unless two-thirds of the UN members voted for it.⁸³ The US formally confirmed that it would go ahead with the dual representation formula of seating the PRC and preventing the expulsion of the ROC. On the issue of the Security Council seat, the US indicated that many nations were concerned about it and would wish to bring up the issue. Thus, the fate of the Security Council seat would depend on the decision

⁸⁰ Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Bush) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), New York, April 17, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 662.

⁸¹ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China, Washington, July 24, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 743.

⁸² Editorial Note of meeting among President Nixon and Henry Kissinger and Secretary of State Rogers on July 22, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 732-3.

⁸³ Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretaries of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) and International Organization Affairs (De Palma) to Acting Secretary of State Irwin, Washington, July 12, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 722; ROC's formal reply to the US regarding their position on the UN issue: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China, Washington, July 27, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, , <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 748-52.

of the UN members.⁸⁴ However, this strategy would not work. Global opinion was shifting towards favouring a Security Council seat for the PRC. This was evident at a meeting of the inner core group of potential co-sponsors, which included Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Philippines, Thailand and Belgium, on 11 August 1971 where the members agreed that the Security Council seat should be given to the PRC to prove the “sincerity” of the sponsor and co-sponsor states and to gain the greatest number of votes possible.⁸⁵

The US chose to amend the draft resolution to award the Security Council seat to the PRC. It was difficult for the US to gain support from its allies for the draft resolution as it did not mention the issue of the Security Council seat and, as a result, the US could not gather enough co-sponsors for the resolution. The Americans approached thirty-five nations to co-sponsor the resolution, but only Costa Rica and Guatemala agreed to be co-sponsors. The US could not even garner the support of stalwarts such as Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines.⁸⁶ The ROC was informed of the American decision to amend the draft resolution on 8 September 1971, when US Ambassador to the ROC McConaughy delivered a message from Rogers to Foreign Minister Chow Shu-Kai.⁸⁷ On 16 September, Nixon openly supported the PRC’s entry into the UN and taking up the Security Council seat. This was further complicated by the announcement that Kissinger would visit the PRC on 21 October 1971, just days before the UNGA debate on the Chinese Representation issue on 18 October 1971. According to Joanne Chang, US actions were seen as “contradictory or counterproductive” and the date of Kissinger’s visit caused confusion to many states that had yet to make a decision on the UN vote.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts, Washington, August 1, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, . <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 765.

⁸⁵ Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, New York, August 11, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 778.

⁸⁶ Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, undated, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 799.

⁸⁷ Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China, Washington, September 8, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 802-5; Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State, Taipei, September 8, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 805-7.

⁸⁸ Chang, “Taiwan’s Policy Towards the United States, 1969-1978”, 230.

On 25 October 1971, the “important question”⁸⁹ was defeated with the final tally of votes being fifty-nine to fifty-five with fifteen abstentions. The defeat was due to last minute defections of the Arab states. Belgium and Cyprus switched their votes from “yes” to “abstain.”⁹⁰ To salvage the situation, Bush called for the removal of the expulsion clause in the Albanian resolution. His recommendation was rejected due to the reason that the voting on the Albanian resolution had already begun.⁹¹ Bush proposed that the issue of the expulsion of the ROC should come under a separate vote. This was defeated fifty-one to sixty-one with sixteen abstaining. Saudi Arabia then put forward a proposal to delay the voting of Albanian resolution, which was also defeated. The Albanian resolution gained a majority of the votes, seventy-six to thirty-five with seventeen abstentions, and was adopted by the UN.⁹² The ROC withdrew from the UN before the voting of the Albanian resolution commenced. Chow said that “in view of frenzy and irrational behaviour in hall del [delegation] of China has decided not to take part in any further proceedings of this Assembly.”⁹³ The dual representation resolution, which was to take place after the voting for the Albanian resolution, did not even come to a vote in the end since the ROC was already voted out of the UN with the victory of the Albanian resolution.

The loss of the UN seat was a major diplomatic defeat for the ROC. However, it invited a rather passive response from the usually out-spoken President Chiang. He thanked the US for its support on the UN vote after McConaughy conveyed an oral message to him after the UN debacle. Nevertheless, he was unusually quiet and did not speak much. The US speculated that Chiang’s

⁸⁹ The “important question” referred to whether or not the question of Chinese representation was an important question. It was agreed that the voting of it would precede the voting for the Albanian resolution. This meant that before the voting of the Albanian resolution began, it had to be decided if majority vote of 2/3 vote would be required before the Albanian resolution could be passed. See Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance*, 255.

⁹⁰ Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, New York, October 26, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 854.

⁹¹ Chang, “Taiwan’s Policy Towards the United States, 1969-1978”, 230-1.

⁹² Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, New York, October 26, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 854-5.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 856.

odd mood was because he was still trying to get over the loss in the UN and chose to remain silent before he would take a stand on the issue.⁹⁴

Foreign Minister Chow indicated that it was necessary for the ROC to “stabilise” its international relations “by hook or by crook.”⁹⁵ As such, the ROC found it necessary to salvage its international standing and any residual diplomatic and trade ties with the world. During a conversation with Rogers, Chow said that the ROC would “fight to the end” to maintain its seat in all specialised agencies.⁹⁶ The ROC would also continue to have trade ties with nations that had recently established diplomatic ties with Beijing.⁹⁷ The ROC also saw the importance of maintaining close relations with its Japanese and American allies. Chow indicated to Kissinger “For the ROC, bilateral relations with the US and Japan were of pre-eminent importance.” He went further to ask if Nixon could announce in a press conference the continual US commitment to the US–ROC Mutual Defence Treaty.⁹⁸ The ROC asked for US reinforcements in terms of supplying military equipment and to help ensure the economic viability of Taiwan. Chow proposed that the US should supply the ROC with tanks, submarines and aircraft. He expressed the wish that the US would help to boost the Taiwanese economy by continuing to encourage trade and investment in Taiwan.⁹⁹

During the July secret meetings and October talks between Zhou and Kissinger, and also the Nixon-Zhou talks in February 1972, the US made several deals with the PRC concerning Taiwan. When Zhou told Kissinger that the US should withdraw its troops from Taiwan and

⁹⁴ Telegram from the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State I Taipei, November 2, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 871-3.

⁹⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 29, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 584.

⁹⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 29, 1971, Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State I Taipei, November 2, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 19 May 2010, 863.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 862.

⁹⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 29, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 582.

⁹⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 29, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 861-2.

destroy all military installations,¹⁰⁰ Kissinger told Zhou that the US had already “ended the Taiwan Strait Patrol, removed a squadron of air tankers from Taiwan, and reduced the size of our [US] military advisory group by twenty percent.” Kissinger then explained that two-thirds of the American forces in Taiwan were “related to activities in other parts of Asia,” and that the remaining one-third was for the security of Taiwan. The US would remove the two-thirds of the American forces when the war in Indochina reached its conclusion. The remaining one-third would be gradually withdrawn as Sino-American relations improved. Kissinger went on to assure Zhou that the US would not support a “two Chinas” solution or a “one China, one Taiwan” solution to the political problem of Taiwan and China.¹⁰¹ When probed by Zhou if the Nixon administration would support the Independence Movement in Taiwan, Kissinger said, “We would not support that.”¹⁰² During the meeting between Zhou and Nixon, Nixon reassured Zhou that he would withdraw two-thirds of the forces in Taiwan once the Vietnam War ended.¹⁰³ He also acknowledged that “there is one China and Taiwan is part of China”. He also repeated the assurance that he would not support the Taiwanese independence movement.¹⁰⁴ With these promises, it appeared to the PRC that the US would be gradually distancing itself from the ROC and moving towards normalisation of relations with the PRC.

Nixon arrived in Beijing on 21 February 1972 and the Shanghai Communiqué was released at the end of the visit. As Kissinger wrote in his memoirs, “the communiqué would be a symbol to the world and our two peoples. It would also guide the two bureaucracies in the new direction of policy. It would thus become a touchstone of the relationship between two countries whose diplomatic ties would remain unconventional as long as Washington continued officially to recognise Taipei as the seat of the government of all of China.”¹⁰⁵ He stressed that the communiqué

¹⁰⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, July 9, 1971, 4:35–11:20 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 367.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 369.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 371.

¹⁰³ Memorandum of Conversation, 22 February 1972, 2:10 p.m. - 6:10 p.m., reproduced at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/NZ-1.pdf>, accessed 20 January 2007, 5-6.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁰⁵ Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 1074.

“put the Taiwan issue in abeyance, with each side maintaining its basic principles.”¹⁰⁶ The communiqué indicated the differences between the two sides instead of trying to resolve them.¹⁰⁷

The issue of the political status of Taiwan was, of course, the most pressing problem dividing the US and the PRC. The PRC had, on many occasions, stated that the Americans were welcome to visit China on the condition that the Taiwan problem would be discussed and a solution was to be sought. The PRC had always maintained that Taiwan was part of China and the PRC was the legitimate government representing the whole of China. Hence, they wanted the US to acknowledge these points in its recognition of the PRC.

In the Shanghai communiqué, the American stance on the status of Taiwan was as follows:

The United States acknowledged that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.¹⁰⁸

The ROC was apprehensive about the future of US-ROC relations due to the content of the Shanghai Communiqué. It was particularly worried about the US commitment to the defence of the ROC and the legitimacy of the ROC as the representative of the whole of China. The latter concern was especially pressing due to the loss of the UN seat. The PRC entry into the UN meant that it became the representative of the whole of China in the UN. During a meeting between Ambassador Shen and Kissinger on 1 March 1972, Shen queried Kissinger regarding these concerns. Kissinger tried to allay ROC fears of decreasing US defence commitment to the ROC by

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 1080.

¹⁰⁷ Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, 576.

¹⁰⁸ The complete text of the Shanghai Communiqué can be found in, Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 1490-2; footnote 3 of XXIV.

reassuring Shen that Nixon had reaffirmed the US commitment to the defence treaty publicly, on many occasions. The military reductions indicated on the communiqué were part of the US policy and the US might reduce US forces by 3000 by FY 73. There were no plans to decrease the figure further.¹⁰⁹ Kissinger continued to promise the ROC that the US would not contemplate the issue regarding the US reduction of forces on Taiwan until the war in Vietnam ended. Even then, only the forces which were supporting South Vietnam would be considered for reduction. Combat forces would not be reduced.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, Kissinger told Zhou in 1973 that the US was trying to reduce its supply of military equipment to the ROC.¹¹¹ The US would be reducing its military forces in Taiwan greatly. It was also becoming less prompt in its supply of new military equipment. The US timetable would be to reduce its forces in Taiwan from 1972 to 1974 and from 1974 onwards it would work towards the normalisation of relations with the PRC which would be completed before the middle of 1976.¹¹² Kissinger told Zhou that the US would remove the two squadrons of phantom planes, U-2 planes and nuclear weapons from Taiwan in 1974.¹¹³

Shen told Kissinger that the ROC main objection to the communiqué was the lack of affirmation of US commitment to the defence of Taiwan.¹¹⁴ Kissinger explained that it was impossible to include this commitment in the communiqué without any PRC opposition. The PRC would never agree to sign the communiqué if the US stated its continual support to ROC defence. On the issue of which China represented the whole of China, Shen wondered why the US did not challenge the PRC position that it was the government of the whole of China. The ROC was apparently annoyed by this claim as it was claiming that it was the legitimate government for the

¹⁰⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 1, 1972, FRUS 1969-76, XVII
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 825-6.

¹¹⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 21, 1973, FRUS 1969-76, XVIII
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/media/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf> accessed 20 March 2010, 199

¹¹¹ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, February 16, 1973, 2:15–6:00 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVIII
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/media/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf> accessed 20 March 2010, 50.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 51.

¹¹³ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, November 11, 1973, 3:15–7:00 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVIII
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/media/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf> accessed 20 March 2010, 335.

¹¹⁴ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 1, 1972, FRUS 1969-76, XVII
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 825-6.

whole of China. To the Nationalist Chinese, the US statement “The United States acknowledged that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China” meant that the US “recognises the PRC’s claim to Taiwan.” Kissinger said the US position was definitely not that. On the sensitive issue of the use of the name “Taiwan” instead of the ROC on the communiqué, Shen questioned whether the use of the term “Taiwan” carried any significance. Kissinger tried to dodge criticism by explaining that the name “Taiwan” referred to the island as a geographical entity and not as a political entity.¹¹⁵ In order to further placate Shen, Kissinger told him that the US-ROC diplomatic ties would not be compromised by the rapprochement. The US had no wish to “liquidate” Taiwan or to “scuttle” the defence treaty.¹¹⁶

In another meeting between Shen and Rogers, the issue of the use of the name “Taiwan” in the Shanghai Communiqué was mentioned again. Shen queried Rogers as to why the ROC was not referred to by its official name in the communiqué. Rogers’ reply was that if the US were to mention the ROC by its official name in the communiqué, it would only “unnecessarily” hinder the completion of the drafting of the communiqué. He emphasised that the content of the communiqué was more important than the actual formulations of it. The US was at liberty to pursue its diplomatic ties with the ROC. Despite reassurances from Kissinger a few days before, Shen still felt that the US use of the term Taiwan was a “little more than a geographic expression.” Rogers said that the US would continue to refer to the ROC by its official name although it would not be able to use that in its interactions with the PRC. As for the statement that “the US acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China,” Rogers clarified that the US would neither challenge nor accept it.¹¹⁷

The official *KMT Central Daily* stated that there was nothing out of the ordinary for the US to recognise Taiwan as part of the territory of China. It reinforced the fact that the Taiwan was the seat of the government of the ROC and the ROC was the only legitimate government of China that was recognised by the US. The privately owned *Chung Kuo Shih Pao* of Taipei felt that

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 826-7.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 828.

¹¹⁷ Telegram: SECSTATE WASHDC to RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY Taipei; 3 March 1972; China-General February 27-March 31, 1972; Box 1036; NSC Files; For the President’s Files- China/Vietnam Negotiations; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

the Nixon administration should not have announced the reduction of US military installations and forces in Taiwan unilaterally and in the joint communiqué with the PRC. The sentiment was that Nixon had “betrayed a pledge and abandoned justice for the sake of appeasing the Maoists.” High level ROC officials were “angry,” “indignant” and “fearful” that the US did not reveal all through the communiqué. On the other hand, the official statement from the ROC regarding the communiqué was relatively mild. Despite US public reassurances of its commitment to the ROC, there was a general sentiment amongst the Chinese, both in the mainland and Taiwan, that their future had been “mortgaged.”¹¹⁸

Shortly after Nixon’s trip to China, Marshall Green and John Holdridge went on a tour of Asia to brief the Asian allies on the rapprochement with the PRC. The afternoon English language paper *The China News* was sceptical of the purpose of the Green visit. It wrote, “If everything but the communiqué is secret, why should he bother to come?” There were doubts as to how much Green actually knew regarding the talks as neither Green nor Rogers were present at Nixon’s talks with Zhou and Mao. It also demanded full transcripts of the memorandum of conversations between Nixon and the PRC leaders and also of any agreements.¹¹⁹

Chiang declined a meeting with Green and Holdridge and the two met with Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai, Vice President Yen, and Vice Premier Chiang Ching Kuo instead. In the meeting, the ROC leaders voiced concerns over US support for Taiwan’s economic development. Holdridge said that US relationship with ROC would not change much as the ROC “had nowhere else to go” and would try to make the best out of their present predicament.¹²⁰ According to Macmillan, Chiang Ching Kuo “listened politely and had only a few questions.” She also wrote that Chiang Ching Kuo probably knew of the contents of the conversations between US and PRC because one of the American interpreters was his close personal friend and they had gone on a

¹¹⁸ Memorandum: Rogers to Nixon; 3 March 1972; China Trip February-March 1972 [2 of 2]; Box 501; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

¹¹⁹ Media Reaction Analysis: Worldwide Treatment of Current Issues: Peking Visit Communiqué No. 28; February 28 1972; China Trip: February- March 1972 Part 1; Box 501; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

¹²⁰ Memorandum for the President’s File by John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff, Washington, March 23, 1972, FRUS 1969-76, XVII
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, footnote 4.

hunting trip shortly before the Green-Holdridge visit.¹²¹ Although this was an interesting piece of information, there was no indication of its source. As such one would have to remain sceptical of it.

The Independence Evening Post encouraged the ROC to believe in its own military strength so that it would not have to worry about any possible abandonment by the US. *Min Tsu Evening News* was sceptical of the purpose of the Nixon trip to China. Although Nixon had asserted that his visit was only a “feeling out” visit, the paper felt that Nixon “entertains many illusions” due to the other members of the administration who went along with the president to Beijing.¹²² The Taiwan Provincial Assembly publicly stated that any agreements concluded by the US and the PRC regarding the legal status of Taiwan would be considered null and void.”¹²³

The ROC tried to reinforce its alliance with the US by seeking reassurance of continual US commitment to its defence and economic development. However, there was evidence that the ROC leadership was considering a rapprochement with the USSR to counter the Sino-American rapprochement. According to Macmillan, the ROC stated that there was a possibility that it would establish friendships with other countries and Chow stated that he would not be averse to seeking out the USSR.¹²⁴ In November 1971, shortly after the UN debacle, Chow announced that the ROC would trade with all Communist countries other than Communist China. It would also look into the possibility of having trade, economic and other relations with “certain communist countries” which were “not sympathetic” to the PRC. The Soviet Union would fit into this category. In March 1972, Chow met with a group of US reporters, led by William Randolph Hearst, Jr., who were on a tour of Asia to gather the responses of Asian leaders to the Nixon trip to China.¹²⁵ While Chow felt that there would not be any formal diplomatic ties between the ROC and USSR, he did not rule out the possibility of having “secret talks” with the USSR, similar to those held in Warsaw between the US and PRC. His tone turned hard-line when he said that should the US make crucial concessions to

¹²¹ Margaret Macmillan, *Nixon and Mao*, 319.

¹²² Telegram: AMEMBASSY Taipei to USIA WASHDC; 25 February 1972; China Trip-Miscellaneous [February 1972]; Box 502; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

¹²³ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Taipei; SECSTATE WASHDC; 25 February 1972; China Trip-Miscellaneous [February 1972]; Box 502; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

¹²⁴ Margaret Macmillan, *Nixon and Mao*, 299.

¹²⁵ Chang, “Taiwan’s Policy Towards the United States, 1969-1978”, 239; Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance*, 278.

the PRC, and choose to disengage from the West Pacific, “the free nations of Asia would begin turning toward the Soviet Union.”¹²⁶ However, it became apparent that Chow’s stand was not well received within the ROC as he had to issue a clarification two days later. It stated that the ROC was “absolutely against communism and communists and ... we shall never depart from the family of free nations which uphold [the] principles of freedom and liberty.”¹²⁷ In fact, there were two differing views on the Soviet connection within the ROC. Chow favoured the use of the Soviet link to caution the PRC that it should not “push too hard.” Another group of leaders felt that the ROC should not link up with the Soviets because by doing so, it could lose the support of the US. They added that the Soviets were unreliable as allies and would abandon the ROC when it was deemed necessary.¹²⁸ Vice Foreign Minister Yang told Chiang Ching Kuo that “any supposed benefit from the Soviet option would prove illusory whereas the harm was very tangible.” On another occasion, he told McConaughy that the ROC was of no use to any communist country and the ROC would be dropped when deemed necessary. Even Chiang Ching Kuo saw the benefit of remaining close with the US and not turning to the Soviets.¹²⁹ Chow lost the battle as he was replaced as foreign minister in June 1972. This signalled the preference of the majority of the ROC leadership to remain in a tight alliance with the US and not turn to the USSR for friendship.

The *Washington Post* reported on 12 July 1972 that the PRC was insisting that the US had to sever all ties with the ROC before normalising its relations with the PRC. However, in Zhou’s pro-forma statement of the PRC claims to Taiwan, he did not include demands for the abrogation of the US-ROC Mutual Security Treaty or that the US should break off diplomatic ties with the ROC. He only mentioned the US withdrawal of its military forces from Taiwan.¹³⁰ It should also be noted that the PRC had been telling foreign diplomats that Taiwan was not really an obstacle to the normalisation of Sino-American relations. On one occasion, Mao conveyed this view to the French

¹²⁶ Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance*, 278.

¹²⁷ Quoted in Chang, “Taiwan’s Policy Towards the United States, 1969-1978”, 240.

¹²⁸ Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance*, 278.

¹²⁹ Chang, “Taiwan’s Policy Towards the United States, 1969-1978”, 240-1.

¹³⁰ *The Washington Post*: China Hits Taiwan-U.S. Ties; 12 July 1972; China Exchanges June 25, 1972-October 17, 1972; Box 850; NSC Files; FOR the President’s File- China Trip; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann.¹³¹ The PRC seemed to be injecting greater flexibility in its approach towards the normalisation of relations and not demanding that the US had to make an immediate break with the ROC, so as not to ruin the efforts made previously.

The US and the PRC had been communicating either through their embassies in Paris or via the Huang Hua¹³² – Kissinger channel in New York. Kissinger made several trips to China to hold talks with the PRC leadership. A breakthrough in relations was forged in February 1973 when an agreement to establish liaison offices in Washington and Beijing was reached. During his visit to Beijing in February 1973, Kissinger proposed to Zhou the establishment of liaison offices in Washington DC and Beijing so as to give US-PRC contacts a greater boost. This would be an interim measure while the US would proceed to adopt the “Japanese solution” to normalise its relations with the PRC in the next two years.¹³³ When Japan established diplomatic ties with the Chinese in 1972, the embassy in Taiwan was shut down but the Japanese maintained trade and cultural ties with the Nationalist Chinese through a private, nongovernmental office.¹³⁴ The liaison offices would be in charge of general public exchanges while other confidential and urgent matters which were not under the purview of the Liaison offices would continue to go through Huang Hua.¹³⁵ The liaison office could take over the issues being discussed in Paris and also a few other political matters. However, Kissinger preferred that more sensitive issues, which should not be leaked to anyone outside of the White House, were discussed directly with Huang Hua. Zhou said that the PRC liaison office in Washington DC had to remain “unofficial” but would enjoy diplomatic immunities. It would not be able to engage in any diplomatic activities. Kissinger raised no objection to Zhou’s proposal.¹³⁶ Kissinger explained, “We are prepared to have a PRC office in

¹³¹ Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 18, 1973, FRUS 1969-76, XVIII <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/media/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf> accessed 20 March 2010, 14.

¹³² Huang Hua was the PRC Ambassador to the United Nations.

¹³³ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, February 16, 1973, 2:15–6:00 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVIII <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/media/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf> accessed 20 March 2010, 51.

¹³⁴ William Burr (ed.), *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow* (New York: The New Press, 1998), 114-5.

¹³⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, February 17–18, 1973, 11:30 p.m.–1:20 a.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVIII <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/media/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf> accessed 20 March 2010, 129.

¹³⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, February 16, 1973, 2:15–6:00 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVIII

the U.S., and you could give it officially a non-official character but it will have diplomatic immunities and will be treated on a diplomatic level, and we will continue whatever business you wish through that office. You could call it a trade office or a new agency, whichever you wish.”¹³⁷

This development was a setback for US-ROC relations as the PRC had in Washington a de-facto embassy while the US and ROC had yet to sever diplomatic ties. Kissinger was pleasantly surprised that the PRC agreed to the liaison office arrangement while the ROC still maintained diplomatic presence in Washington. Zhou was reported to be only interested in setting up liaison offices instead of just trade offices or a consulate.¹³⁸ In his report to Nixon on his February 1973 talks with the Chinese, he wrote that the Chinese had been “farsighted” and “patient” and demonstrated a “willingness to ease our [US] predicament” in their agreement to exchange liaison offices.¹³⁹ The optimism felt by Kissinger led him to hope that the PRC would be willing to allow the US to maintain some sort of official presence on Taiwan and also to remain committed to the defence of the island after the establishment of US-PRC diplomatic relations. If the US could get the Chinese to agree to a normalisation of relations with these terms intact, the Nixon administration would receive greater acceptance for the severance of relations with the ROC.¹⁴⁰

Kissinger told Shen that the US-PRC liaison offices were non-diplomatic. The head of the liaison office would not be an official of the ambassadorial level and would be named the Chief of the Liaison Office. He explained that it was not possible to refer to the offices as “trade offices”. The main function of the liaison office was to deal with exchanges, trade issues and also other non-diplomatic issues. He reassured Shen that the US continued to recognise the ROC despite the liaison offices.¹⁴¹ The Beijing Liaison Office could, in reality, conduct business with the US government agencies. Shen probed further and Kissinger revealed that the Chief of the Liaison

<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/media/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf> accessed 20 March 2010, 52.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Harding, *A Fragile Relationship*, 46.

¹³⁹ Burr, *The Kissinger Transcripts*, 117.

¹⁴⁰ Harding, *A Fragile Relationship*, 46.

¹⁴¹ Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 21, 1973, 6 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVIII
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/media/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf> accessed 20 March 2010, 197.

Office would probably have diplomatic immunities and privileges. Shen commented that the liaison office would be essentially a de-facto embassy. Kissinger begged to differ.¹⁴²

During the Zhou-Kissinger exchanges in 1971, Kissinger mentioned to Zhou that it was not possible for the Nixon administration to formally recognise the PRC within the next one and a half years.¹⁴³ This issue of the official recognition of PRC had to be deferred until after the elections in 1972.¹⁴⁴ The US could not abandon the ROC overnight and wholly embrace the PRC. Nixon had to deal with the supporters of the ROC within his administration, the ROC and also the other American allies and friends before full recognition of the PRC could be accomplished.

In February 1973, Kissinger made another promise to Beijing related to the normalisation of relations. Kissinger told Zhou that the US would like to move swiftly towards normalisation with the PRC.¹⁴⁵ In November 1973, Zhou was told by Kissinger that Nixon would work towards normalising relations with the PRC by mid 1976. The US would not hesitate to strengthen its ties with the PRC at the moment or even to normalise relations. The only problem plaguing the US was its existing ties with the ROC and how to deal with Taipei while it was establishing full diplomatic ties with Beijing.¹⁴⁶ He added the commitment that the US would move towards the normalisation after the 1974 elections using the “Japanese solution.” Kissinger had basically made a promise to the PRC which could not be fulfilled. Shortly after, in November 1973, Kissinger met with Zhou and the question of how the US and the PRC could move forward in their relationship while the US was still holding on to diplomatic ties with the ROC was brought up again. Zhou wanted the relationship to proceed further but Kissinger explained that the US could not adhere to the “Japanese solution” of normalisation of relations, which included the severance of diplomatic and military ties with the ROC. He told Zhou that the US and the PRC would have to adopt measures

¹⁴² Ibid., 198.

¹⁴³ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, July 9, 1971, 4:35–11:20 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 372.

¹⁴⁴ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, July 10, 1971, 12:10–6 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 411.

¹⁴⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, February 15, 1973, 5:57–9:30 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVIII <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/media/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf> accessed 20 March 2010, 28.

¹⁴⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, November 11, 1973, 3:15–7:00 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVIII <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/media/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf> accessed 20 March 2010, 335.

which were more flexible than the Japanese formula so as to ensure that the goal of achieving normalisation before 1976 could be achieved. Kissinger then proposed a plan which would reaffirm the principle of “one China” while the US continued to retain its ties with the ROC. Zhou was reportedly agreeable to Kissinger’s plans.¹⁴⁷ When Kissinger met with Mao on 12 November 1973, Mao told Kissinger bluntly that normalisation would only be possible if the US broke its diplomatic ties with the ROC. Kissinger told Mao that this was not possible as the US could not break with the ROC overnight due to the domestic situation.¹⁴⁸ Mao said that the liaison offices would be enough for the moment as the US still “need[ed]” Taiwan.¹⁴⁹

The Nixon administration was hiding the truth about the possible normalisation of US-PRC relations from the ROC. There was a sentiment in Taipei that the US and the PRC were moving towards normalisation of relations. Kissinger told Shen that the US was not planning on establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC. He added that this would not happen in the “immediate future.”¹⁵⁰ There was also a fear that the US was placing less emphasis on its ties with the ROC as it had been a while since any high-level officials had visited Taiwan. Kissinger denied that the US was trying to “downgrade” the US-ROC relationship and tried to placate Shen by saying that he would check with Nixon to arrange a visit to the US by Chiang Ching Kuo.¹⁵¹ On another occasion Kissinger told Shen that “nothing dramatic is going to happen” to the US-PRC relations and the US was not “compulsively seeking” to normalise diplomatic relations with the PRC. He added that the US and the PRC were in constant contact and thus it would make no difference whether or not diplomatic ties existed.¹⁵²

When asked by Shen if the US would cease its recognition of the ROC once it normalised its relationship with the PRC, Kissinger dodged the question by saying that his trip to Beijing was

¹⁴⁷ Burr, *The Kissinger Transcripts*, 176.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 186.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 187.

¹⁵⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 6, 1973, noon, FRUS 1969-76, XVIII <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/media/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf> accessed 20 March 2010, 309.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 309-10.

¹⁵² Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 19, 1973, 5 p.m, FRUS 1969-76, XVIII <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/media/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf> accessed 20 March 2010, 445.

not made in an attempt to normalise relations with the PRC.¹⁵³ In private, during a conversation with McConaughy on 3 October 1973, Kissinger admitted that full recognition of the PRC was inevitable and would probably be completed, at the latest, by 1980. The US would ensure that the ROC would get its separate status.¹⁵⁴

The bright start to the brand new relationship between the US and the PRC started to fizzle out. The Nixon administration could not keep the promises made in 1972 and after. The normalisation of relations seemed more and more unachievable. The issue of Taiwan and the US-ROC relationship continued to impede progress towards normalisation. The PRC expected the US to gradually distance itself from the ROC. However, this did not occur and the PRC was beginning to feel that the US was reinforcing its close relationship with the ROC. Zhou asked Kissinger about the possibility of the ROC setting up two more consulates, and effectively having two Consulates Generals, in the US. Kissinger said that the purpose of one of the consulates was to ensure that the US and the ROC could maintain some form of contact should the US and the PRC move on to establish diplomatic ties. It should thus be viewed as a contingency plan for the future and not an attempt to increase their presence in the US. He added that it was a “reflection of the reduction of their position in the United States, not an attempt to increase it.”¹⁵⁵

The PRC felt that the US was enhancing the defence capabilities of the ROC, an accusation which Kissinger quickly denied. Zhou queried whether the US was planning to help the ROC to build an airplane assembly factory.¹⁵⁶ Kissinger replied that the US was not helping to manufacture the planes but was only supplying the parts. Once the US ceased to provide the parts, the ROC would have to stop producing the planes. Technically, the US was not “giving” them the airplanes and the ROC had absolutely no means of producing these planes as they could not manufacture the parts themselves. This applied to all the other joint productions between the US

¹⁵³ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 6, 1973, noon, FRUS 1969-76, XVIII <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/media/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf> accessed 20 March 2010, 311.

¹⁵⁴ Editorial Note FRUS 1969-76, XVIII <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/media/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf> accessed 20 March 2010, 323.

¹⁵⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, November 11, 1973, 3:15–7:00 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVIII <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/media/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf> accessed 20 March 2010, 334.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 336.

and the ROC.¹⁵⁷ Kissinger also reassured Zhou that the US would not be providing the ROC with the Phantom fighter plane. The US was not producing the planes for the ROC but merely helping to assemble it using American parts. Furthermore, these shorter range fighter planes were to be used as substitutes for the fighter planes that the US had borrowed for some other purpose.¹⁵⁸ Kissinger also assured Zhou that the US would give the PRC more information on the fighter jets and also a guarantee that the jets would not be used by the ROC to attack the PRC.¹⁵⁹ Lastly, Kissinger's approval of the appointment of Leonard Unger, who was a Senior Foreign Service Officer, to the post of US Ambassador to the ROC in February 1974 made the PRC extremely suspicious of US intentions. The PRC viewed this as a way to keep US-ROC relations at the highest level.¹⁶⁰

By the time of Nixon's resignation in August 1974, the promise to normalise relations using the Japanese formula was still not fulfilled. When Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping told Kissinger during a meeting on 26 November 1974 that the US should use the "Japanese solution" to normalise relations with the PRC, Kissinger told Deng that this was not possible as the US could not accept the idea of following the Japanese as it was usually the Japanese who "imitate" the Americans. He went on to say that that the PRC was "forcing" the US to "imitate" the Japanese.¹⁶¹ Kissinger had previously made the promise to Zhou that the US would move towards normalisation with the PRC using the "Japanese solution." At this juncture, he turned around and told Deng that the PRC was "forcing" the US to adopt the "Japanese solution." Kissinger's Machiavellian ways and duplicity were clearly illuminated in this diplomatic episode.

Conclusion

The initial moves made by the US towards the PRC, namely the resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks and the modification of the Taiwan Strait Patrol, sent tremors throughout the ROC leadership. The ROC became apprehensive about the future of the US-ROC

¹⁵⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, November 12, 1973, 3:00–5:30 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVIII <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/media/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf> accessed 20 March 2010, 360.

¹⁵⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, February 15, 1973, 5:57–9:30 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVIII <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/media/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf> accessed 20 March 2010, 27.

¹⁵⁹ Burr, *The Kissinger Transcripts*, 173–4.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 267.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 288.

relationship and the security of Taiwan. It sought explanation from the US and also tried to extract more military aid in view of the modification of the Taiwan Strait Patrol. The Nixon administration tried to dispel ROC's worries and pledged its continual commitment to the ROC.

However, nothing could prepare the ROC for the shock of the 15 July announcement which cast even more doubt on the US-ROC relationship. The ROC, already questioning the level of US commitment, was shocked by the revelation of Kissinger's visit to Beijing and also the announcement that Nixon would be visiting China in 1972. The ROC made it known to the US that it was not happy with the US move towards the PRC. The rapprochement would no doubt affect the ROC more than any of the other Asian allies and friends because it could wield a substantial impact on the ROC's international status, its viability as the representative of the Chinese people and its bilateral ties with the US. The US would have to sever its ties with the ROC when it normalised its relations with the PRC. This aspect set the ROC apart from the other Asian states as a US-PRC normalisation of relations was unlikely to affect their diplomatic recognition by the US. The ROC questioned the US intentions behind the rapprochement and speculated the impact it would have on Taiwan. The most immediate consequence of the Sino-American rapprochement was that it paved the way towards a radical change in the UN, which was the replacement of the PRC for the ROC as the representative of China in the UN. Global opinion had already been shifting towards favouring the entry of the PRC into the UN. The US rapprochement with the PRC simply accelerated the process and caused the US itself to embark on a change of tactics in the Chinese representation issue. Due to the rapprochement, the US could no longer obstruct the PRC's entry into the UN. It had to support the PRC's entry and could not obstruct it taking up the Security Council seat. The US was in a tight spot as it had to keep the ROC in the UN as well and a dual representation formula was born. Global opinion prevailed, and the ROC was ousted from the UN; the PRC assumed its position in the Security Council and the General Assembly. The ROC thus suffered a serious diplomatic setback, as it was no longer the representative of the Chinese people in the UN. The US statement in the Shanghai Communiqué made the ROC wonder whether the US was still committed in its alliance with the ROC. However, instead of distancing itself from the US, the ROC saw the importance of maintaining a close relationship with Washington. It tried to ask

for US reinforcements in terms of economic and military aid and, also tried to salvage its international standing. The US worked hard to convince the ROC that there would be no changes to the US-ROC relationship despite the rapprochement. On the other hand, the pledges made by the US to the PRC during the high-level talks in Beijing indicated a gradual disengagement of the US from Taiwan and a normalisation of relations between the US and the PRC. The US even promised the PRC that US-PRC relations would be normalised by 1976.

Despite a good start to the US-PRC relations in 1973 with the exchange of liaison offices, normalisation was nowhere in sight. The US even took some actions which appeared to the PRC as further strengthening the US-ROC relationship. The Taiwan issue was destined to impede the progress of the US-PRC relationship. Normalisation of relations would not materialise by 1976. In fact, it would take three more years before the Jimmy Carter administration finally severed US ties with the ROC and fully normalise relations with the PRC.

Another outcome of the US-PRC rapprochement was that many countries began to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC. Japan, an important ally of the ROC in Asia, was one of these countries which swiftly made the decision to normalise relations with the PRC and severed ties with the ROC. As the next chapter will show, Japan had to gradually adjust to the new circumstances brought forth by this alteration in US China policy and began to re-evaluate its own China policy while also maintaining cordial ties with the US, amidst such radically changing circumstances.

2. Japan

The war in the Pacific came to a conclusion when the US dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 August 1945 and 9 August 1945 respectively. Japan duly surrendered and came under American occupation from 1945 to 1952. The American occupation of Japan ended in April 1952 with the signing of the San Francisco peace treaty. However, Japan came under a “virtual occupation” because of the continued presence of American troops all over the country.¹ According to Michael Schaller, Japan became a client state of the US and was not a fully independent country because there were still hundreds of bases occupied by 200,000 American troops and the Americans had control over Okinawa.² The “Yoshida Letter” of 24 December 1951, drafted by John Foster Dulles, which Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru was forced to sign by the US stated that Japan would not conclude any bilateral treaty arrangements with the PRC. This effectively meant that Japan had chosen the ROC and this culminated in the signing of the Japan-ROC Peace Treaty of 1952.³ Despite the lack of diplomatic ties, Japan and the PRC were engaging in trade as the Japanese moved gradually to loosen the trade restrictions it had with the PRC. Bilateral trade was as high as \$2.03 billion between 1963 and 1967.⁴ In this sense, it could be said that Japan was more pragmatic than the US in its relationship with the PRC as the Americans were still holding on to the rigid policy of containment of the PRC and also imposed a strict embargo on trade with the Communist Chinese.

Japan, a major Asian ally of the US, was subjected to the Nixon shocks of 1971. The first shock occurred on 15 July (16 July in Japanese time) when Nixon made his historic announcement that Kissinger had just returned from China and that the President himself would also be visiting China. The Japanese were shocked as they had no idea that Nixon was moving towards rapprochement with the PRC and were only informed three minutes before the official announcement. The first Nixon Shock together with the second Nixon Shock of 15 August, in

¹ The Staff of Asahi Shimbun, *The Pacific Rivals: A Japanese View of Japanese-American Relations* (New York and Tokyo: Weatherhill and Asahi, 1972), 213.

² Schaller, *Altered States*, 62.

³ Soeya Yoshihide, “Taiwan in Japan’s Security Considerations”, *The China Quarterly*, 165 (2001) 135-6.

⁴ Foot, *The Practice of Power*, 69.

which Nixon announced his New Economic Policy, greatly unsettled the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership of Japan. This chapter will begin with a discussion of the US-Japan relationship before the rapprochement and will move on to investigate how Japan's relationship with the US and also China changed after the advent of the Sino-American rapprochement.

Before the Nixon Administration

As the Vice President of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration, Nixon visited Japan during his 1953 trip around Asia. He was impressed by the "tremendous spirit of enterprise and discipline" of the Japanese people and was certain that Japan would make a rapid recovery from the war in a much shorter time than was anticipated by the US. He claimed to have evolved into a staunch advocate of close American-Japanese ties after this trip.⁵ Nixon visited Asia in April 1967 as a private citizen in the hope of finding out more about the views of the Asian leaders regarding the PRC and also its future relationship with the rest of Asia and the world. In his memoirs, Nixon wrote that he viewed Japan as an emerging industrial power and the PRC as possibly the greatest threat to peace in the future. On this trip, he visited Japan and spoke with Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke. Japan expressed the view that the US should remain in Asia and regional cooperation would be needed to counter the communist challenge.⁶

In his 1967 foreign affairs article "Asia after Viet Nam," Nixon discussed Japan's role in the security of Asia. Nixon's views, which were in line with that of the US government throughout the 1950s, were that Japan should take on a bigger role in Asian security. Nixon wrote that as "a nation moving into the first rank of major powers" Japan should not be expected to depend on any of its closest allies for its security. He added that Japan had to be trusted to manage its own armed forces and defence in order to gain a status compatible with the role that Japan should be playing in Asia which was to assist the non-communist Asian states to maintain their security.⁷ Japan would take on a much larger role than before in Asia, one which was compatible with its strength as a global economic power, while the US played a decreased role in the region. The Asian nations

⁵ Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, 136-7.

⁶ *Ibid*, 282.

⁷ Nixon, "Asia after Viet Nam": 121.

would cooperate with one another in defence matters and their economies would be strengthened, so as to act as an effective “counterforce” to the PRC.⁸

The US-Japan Partnership and the Prelude to the “Nixon Shocks”

When Nixon came to power in 1969, the US began to reduce its troops and bases in Japan. Due to the tremendous economic wealth of Japan, its defence spending constituted only less than one percent of GNP.⁹ Some commentators in Japan applauded Nixon's shift from military aid to economic aid. An editorial in *The Japan Times* wrote, “We believe this makes sense. It marks in a way, a return to the traditional American policy of the pre-Korea and pre-Vietnam period.”¹⁰ The *Asahi* hoped that the Nixon administration would be sensitive towards the lessons learnt from the Vietnam War and also the wishes of the neutral Asian states and would work towards a more peaceful policy towards the PRC and Asia.¹¹

As the US sought to decrease its military commitments in Asia, through the policy of Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine, it looked to Japan, its closest Asian ally, to play a greater regional role in Asia. Due to its economic prosperity, Japan was the prime candidate to assume a greater military role to support the other Asian states. As such, its concerns regarding the reduction of the US presence in Asia was different from that of the other Asian allies and friends. Nixon and Sato discussed this issue in detail during the Sato visit to Washington from 19 to 21 November 1969. The US encouraged Japan to expand its global role from just the economic sphere to security and defence areas as well. At the same time, Nixon understood the budgetary constraints faced by Sato and also the issue of the “political problem created by those who wished to make Japan defenceless to the USSR and the PRC.” The US could not afford to continue to play a predominant role in Asia. According to Nixon, in the “New Asia”, Japan would be the only country powerful

⁸ Ibid., 124.

⁹ Background: The Security Treaty and Japan's Defense; undated; Japan Visit of Prime Minister Vol 1 Sato November 19-21, 1969, Box 925; NSC Files; VIP Visits; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum (RNPLM), National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

¹⁰ Memorandum: Foreign Radio and Press Reaction to President Nixon's Trip to Asia and Romania 23 July- 3 August 1969; August 6 1969, II; East Asia Trip 1969; Box 464; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

¹¹ Memorandum: Henry A Kissinger to Richard Nixon; August 4 1969; President's Trip Reactions- Communications Jul 22-Aug 3, 1969; Box 462; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

enough to play a substantial role in the region. In response, Sato told Nixon that a US presence in the region was still necessary.¹²

Nixon encouraged the Japanese to build up their military capability, which would exclude the development of nuclear weapons. Nixon knew that the Japanese government was constrained by constitutional and political problems, and could not move freely to develop Japan's military capability. However, he believed that Japan would not be content to remain solely an economic force in Asia and that the time had come for the Sato government to consider building up Japan's military might and defence capabilities. This would be to the benefit of the world in general. Nixon added that Japan should join the league of military powers of the world which included the US, Western Europe (including West Germany), the Soviet Union and China and become the "fifth finger on a hand". A stronger Japan, taking on a greater role, could act as a counterbalance to the other forces in Asia and also the world.¹³

Sato disagreed with Nixon. He told Nixon that the constraints of the Japanese constitution meant that it would be difficult to develop Japan's military might and suggested an alternative which involved the use of Japan's immense economic strength. Japan could use its economic power to contribute to the region. He asked Nixon if economic potential could be considered as an aspect of military power and Japan could be the "fifth finger" with its role being economic and not necessarily military.¹⁴ Sato highlighted the fact that Japan could not possess nuclear weapons. Hence, an expanded military role would not be enough to counter any threats due to the lack of nuclear weapons. Nixon said that even without nuclear weapons, Japan could "indirectly" help the Asian nations with conventional forces and its immense economic strength. The aid would be in terms of building up the defences of these nations so as to protect themselves against any subversive attacks.¹⁵

¹² Memorandum: Conversation between Sato Eisaku and Nixon; undated; Visit of Prime Minister Sato, Vol [1 of 3] November 19-21 1969; Box 924; NSC Files; VIP visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

¹³ Memorandum: Conversation between Nixon and Sato; 19 November 1969; Visit of Prime Minister Sato, Vol [1 of 3] November 19-21 1969; Box 924; NSC Files; VIP visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Nixon said that the most important factor which determined the peace and prosperity in the Pacific was the US-Japan relationship. He believed that it was important for the two countries to remain close or else the peace in the Pacific could be jeopardised.¹⁶ This meant that the two sides should continue to maintain a close security relationship. The LDP and the Japanese government believed that it was important that the Mutual Security Treaty be extended for a “considerably long period.” Nixon said that the US presence in Okinawa served to safeguard both the security of the US, Japan and also the other free nations of Asia.¹⁷ Furthermore, in the Nixon-Sato Communiqué of 21 November 1969, Nixon told Prime Minister Sato that the two nations should work together to ensure the security of Asia. Sato affirmed that Japan would play an active role in Asia.¹⁸ In a speech to the National Press Club, Sato guaranteed that he would not turn down the Americans should they require the use of the Okinawa bases to counter any threats to Taiwan and South Korea in times of crisis.¹⁹

In an address to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Editors and Broadcasters in the Department of State by Secretary Rogers on 15 January 1970, it was again emphasised that a greater regional role in Asia for Japan was necessary. Rogers commented that post-war Japan had developed into a strong industrial power. The time had come for Japan to play a regional role in Asia and the Pacific. The US and Japan would enter a new era of cooperation as the Americans prepared for the return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty.²⁰ The US could be perceived as encouraging the Japanese to engage in a greater role in the region, in view of Japan’s prosperity. Moreover, Nixon believed that Japan, not the US, should act as the main “counter-force” to the PRC. He pointed out that the PRC and the USSR understood this and was in fact very interested in the cables regarding the Okinawa reversion. Nixon stated that it was “absolutely indispensable for

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ The Nixon-Sato Communiqué was the result of discussions held between Sato and Nixon from 19-21 November 1969 in Washington.

Joint Statement following Discussions with Prime Minister Sato of Japan, November 21, 1969, PPP reproduced at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2334&st=&st1=> accessed 12 September 2010.

¹⁹ Schaller, “Détente and the Strategic Triangle”, 365-6.

²⁰ Address by Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, January 15, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976, I, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d51> accessed 20 April 2010.

political reasons” that the US should train the troops in Japan and that a number of US forces remained on Japanese soil.²¹

American control over Okinawa was the last remnant of the American occupation of Japan. Although American occupation ended in April 1952, the Americans held on to Okinawa because it was one of the most important military bases in Asia. Okinawa was vital for the defence of South Korea and Taiwan and it contained an arsenal of nuclear weapons.²² The return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty became a pressing problem for successive Japanese leaderships as domestic opinion called for the eradication of this last vestige of the American occupation.

Negotiations over the Okinawa reversion were handled by emissaries. Agreements were reached prior to the November 1969 Nixon-Sato meetings. These meetings which produced the “final agreement” were actually “stage-managed” to confirm the agreement that was previously reached by the emissaries. The most troublesome issue was under what conditions the Americans could manage the US military forces in Okinawa afterwards.²³ In his report to Nixon, Kissinger said that it was imperative that the leaders of both sides negotiate an accommodation on the Okinawa reversion or risk losing the bases altogether. He wrote, “In short, military and political risks of seeking to maintain the status quo outweighed the military cost of having somewhat less flexibility in operating the Okinawa bases under Japanese sovereignty.”²⁴ The next pressing issue of the Okinawa reversion was the storage of nuclear weapons in Okinawa after the reversion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were eager to get an agreement from the Japanese which would allow the US continual access to the bases and also the right to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa. The JCS considered the Okinawa bases as being of high importance because of their geographical position. After the reversion, the US had to retain its right to use the bases freely and also for nuclear weapons must be stored in Okinawa.²⁵ Japan should take the necessary measures to ensure that the US bases were protected and that the US would have free access to them after the

²¹ Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Buchanan) to President Nixon, Washington, February 18, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976, I, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d59> accessed 20 April 2010.

²² Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 325.

²³ Roger Buckley, *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990*, 121.

²⁴ Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 327.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 326.

reversion.²⁶ This was crucial as the US was in the midst of decreasing its military presence in Asia. Hence, the US had to hold on to the bases in Okinawa, as these bases could help in ensuring the security of the region due to its proximity to the potential flashpoints of Asia, namely Taiwan and South Korea.

Negotiations with the Sato government commenced at the US embassy in Tokyo. The American diplomats chose to wait and see if they could get the Japanese to agree to be involved more deeply in Asian affairs and also to build up their defence capabilities before they made any significant concessions.²⁷ As the negotiations were in progress, the textile issue began to unravel and threaten to drive a wedge between the Pacific allies. Kissinger described the textile problem as “unconnected with Okinawa but destined to be intimately linked to it... Where the Okinawa negotiations exemplified high policy, the textile problem proved a case of low comedy and near fiasco.”²⁸

The textile issue had its roots in 1968 during Nixon’s presidential campaign. The Southern textile industry was facing competition from the Japanese textile imports. In a bid to undermine his rival for the Republican nomination, California Governor Ronald Reagan, Nixon approached Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. Nixon, through Thurmond, met the textile producers. He made a promise to the American Textile Manufacturers Institute that he, if elected, would restrict textile imports in order to help the Southern textile industry to overcome the competition from the Japanese textile imports. In return, the institute would contribute to Nixon’s election fund and make further donations once Nixon fulfilled his promise.²⁹ The truth was that Japanese imports hardly posed a huge challenge to the Southern textile industry. Imported textile and apparel from Japan were a mere one percent of American textile production which constitutes only four percent of Japan’s textile production.³⁰

²⁶ Memorandum: Richard L. Sneider to Kissinger; 1 May 1969; Country Files Far East: Trust Territories Vol 1- 1969-1970; Box 567; NSC Files; Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

²⁷ Buckley, *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990*, 122.

²⁸ Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 329.

²⁹ Schaller, *Altered States*, 215-6.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 215; Even the Japanese seemed to agree that, contrary to American claims, Japan’s textile exports to the US constitute too small a percentage to pose any serious challenge to the Southern textile industry. Buckley, *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990*, 124.

In November 1969, Nixon thought that he had secured a deal on the textile issue when Sato vowed that he would place a limit on Japanese exports. Nixon was to be increasingly frustrated and irritated with the Sato cabinet for failing to keep its promise. Nixon had resolved to return Okinawa to Japan, albeit with the military bases remaining but without the presence of nuclear weapons. As Nixon had made a huge concession on Okinawa, he expected Sato, in return, to accede to the US on the issue of reducing textile exports to America.³¹ Nixon wrote to Sato on 25 June 1970 stating his frustration with the progress of the textile negotiations. He wrote, "needless to say, I am deeply disappointed that it has not been possible to arrive at an agreement."³² The US was facing urgent domestic problems and would need to settle the textile issue "at least in principle" before the Japanese elections.³³

The US handling of the textile issue was causing a rise of nationalistic sentiments in Japan. Sato could not convince the Japanese public and the Japanese textile industry to accept the restraint agreement. The Okinawa reversion was linked to the textile issue and this fizzled out the good feeling brought about by the Okinawa pledge.³⁴ The US acknowledged the link between trade issues, like that over textiles, and the agreement regarding Okinawa. The "favourable resolution" of these trade issues would lead to better public and congressional sentiments regarding the conclusion of the Okinawa issue.³⁵ The Thurmond import quota bill made the problem worse by implying that the US should not return Okinawa to the Japanese unless Japan compromised on the textile issue.³⁶ Sato was apprehensive of the possible public backlash if it seemed that Japan

³¹ Schaller, "Détente and the Strategic Triangle", 365.

³² Letter: Nixon to Sato; 25 June 1970; Japan (Sato Correspondence) 1969- 8 July 1972; Box 757; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³³ Memorandum: Rogers to Nixon; 4 November 1969; Japan Visit of Prime Minister Vol I November 19-21 1969 Sato 1 of 2; Box 925; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³⁴ Memorandum: C. Fred Bergsten to Kissinger; 30 March 1970; Sato Visit- Vol II (Textiles) [2 of 3] March 1970; Box 924; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland; The Washington Post; Textile Battle Arouses Japan Against U.S.; 28 March 1970; Sato Visit- Vol II (Textiles) [2 of 3] March 1970; Box 924; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³⁵ Memorandum: Rogers to Nixon; 4 November 1969; Japan Visit of Prime Minister Vol I Nov 19-21 1969 Sato 1 of 2; Box 925; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³⁶ Memorandum: C. Fred Bergsten to Kissinger; 30 March 1970; Sato Visit- Vol II (Textiles) [2 of 3] March 1970; Box 924; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland; The Washington Post; Textile Battle Arouses Japan Against U.S.; 28 March 1970; Sato Visit- Vol II (Textiles) [2 of 3] March 1970; Box 924; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

accepted the US position on the textile issues so as to gain the desired result on the reversion of Okinawa.³⁷ This further complicated the resolution of the textile issue.

Nixon wrote another letter to Sato dated March 1971, again expressing his disappointment at the progress of the textile negotiations. Nixon was surprised by the statements of the Japanese Textile Federation and the Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary. Nixon emphasised the domestic pressures and disagreement with the position of the Japanese textile industry. He told Sato that the American textile industry and its supporters, which included members of the US Congress, were “violently and unanimously” against the position of its Japanese counterpart.³⁸ The tensions generated by the textile issue heightened in 1971, when Nixon decided not to inform the Japanese of the opening to China due to his frustration with Sato, who failed to deliver on the textile issue. Schaller noted that Nixon and Kissinger never officially admitted that the refusal to give enough notice to Japan regarding the China opening was due to their frustration with the Japanese over the textile issue. However, they gave their endorsement when journalist Henry Brandon attributed this as the reason for giving Japan a mere three minute notice. The research of Brandon’s book *The Retreat of American Power* consisted of interviews with Nixon and Kissinger, which increased the credibility of the claim.³⁹ Kissinger had a low opinion of Japanese diplomats as he viewed them as not being conceptual, not far-sighted and would only make decisions through consensus. He even nicknamed them “little Sony salesman [salesmen].” He deemed the Japanese officials as “prosaic, obtuse, unworthy of his sustained attention.”⁴⁰ His low opinion of the Japanese perhaps contributed to why the Japanese were not given sufficient notice.

However, Nixon’s penchant for secrecy also played a role in his decision not to inform the Japanese prior to 15 July 1971. In his memoirs he explained why he did not give the Japanese ample notice before the 15 July announcement.

³⁷ Background: Textile Restraints; 15 November 1969; Japan Visit of Prime Minister Vol 1 Nov 19-21 1969 Sato (1 of 2); Box 925; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³⁸ Letter: Nixon to Sato; 11 March 1971; Japanese Textile Imports (Duplicate Copies); Box 101; NSC Files; HAKOF; Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³⁹ Henry Brandon, *The Retreat of American Power* (London: Bodley Head, 1973); Schaller, *Altered States*, 228.

⁴⁰ Schaller, *Altered States*, 211-2

They [the Japanese] resented the fact that they had not been informed in advance, but we had no other choice. We could not have informed them without informing others, thus risking a leak that might have aborted the entire initiative.⁴¹

The “Nixon Shocks”

When Nixon made his 15 July 1971 announcement regarding the Kissinger secret trip to Beijing, the Japanese were totally surprised by the revelation. Nixon had called off the arrangement for Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson to go to Japan a day before the announcement to brief the Japanese. Johnson made a phone call to the Japanese Ambassador to the US Ushiba Nobuhiko, to inform him of the upcoming presidential announcement to the nation, just minutes before Nixon was due to go on air. Sato was informed by his secretary Kusuda Minoru just three minutes before Nixon’s speech. Sato was totally caught off guard as Defense Secretary Melvin Laird had informed Sato that the US had no plans to alter its China policy during his visit to Tokyo the week before.⁴² The ROC Ambassador Shen was informed twenty minutes before the announcement. When compared to the ROC, which was another close Asian ally of the US, Japan’s notice from the US regarding the Nixon announcement was indeed insufficient. US actions meant that it was frustrated by the Japanese and decided to inform them only at the last moment.

Writing in retrospect, Kissinger lamented that Nixon could have shown more sensitivity towards Japan’s feelings. He felt that it was “particularly painful” to put Sato through such embarrassment, as Sato had been a loyal ally of the US and had contributed a great deal to “cement” the US-Japan friendship.⁴³ He said that it would have been more “courteous” and “thoughtful” if one of his associates, who had been on the China trip, was sent to Japan to inform Sato a few hours before the announcement. He noted that “this would have combined secrecy with a demonstration of special consideration for a good and decent friend.”⁴⁴

In his letter to Sato dated 3 August 1971, Nixon explained the reasons behind the US opening to the PRC. Nixon said that he had already planned to open up communications with the

⁴¹ Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, 395.

⁴² Schaller, “Détente and the Strategic Triangle”, 375.

⁴³ Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 761.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 762.

PRC during the early days of his presidency. As early as December 1970, he had determined that his administration would work towards the normalisation of US-PRC relations. He reminded Sato of his public statement indicating his wish to visit China at some point, either as the President or as a private citizen. He justified that his China initiative did not represent a sudden change of US policy, despite the shock of the 15 July announcement which caught the world by surprise. It was rather a “continuation of an existing policy.”⁴⁵ He went on to justify the timing of his rapprochement with the PRC. He said that the changes in the circumstances meant that he could carry out his China initiative much earlier than he had anticipated. Nixon hoped that his China initiative and the subsequent easing of tensions would result in greater peace and thus would benefit Asia and the world. He was not under the illusion that all the differences between the US and the PRC had been resolved and would work towards eliminating the differences that remained.⁴⁶ Nixon tried to reassure Sato of the continual US commitment to Japan by telling Sato that his China initiative was not made as an attempt to unsettle any third party. He reassured Sato that the interest of the US allies would not be compromised in his quest towards better relations with the PRC and added that the US would continue the “preservation” and “strengthening” of the US-Japan relationship.⁴⁷

Sato thanked Nixon for the letter and said that he hoped that the rapprochement would benefit both the US and Japan. However, he pointed out that Nixon’s China policy had raised the concerns of the Asian nations and also Australia, and attracted some speculation. He told Nixon that his reassurances that his China visit was not made “at the expense of old friends” and that the US would continue to adhere to its commitments to its allies, including the ROC, was “heartening.” The Japanese government was reported to be receptive to the impending Nixon trip to China as the easing of tensions between the US and the PRC would lead to a reduction of global tensions.⁴⁸ Sato seemed to be displaying a degree of support for the US China policy, at least in his letter to Nixon. He added that it was his hope that the US would take “appropriate steps” so as not to affect the

⁴⁵ Letter: Nixon to Sato; 3 August 1971; Japan (Sato Corr) 1969-8 Jul 1972; Box 757; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Memorandum: Rogers to Nixon; 22 July 1971; Japan (Sato Corr) 1969-8 Jul 1972; Box 757; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

solidarity and cooperation of the free Asian nations. Sato agreed with Nixon that the US and Japan had to maintain close ties and would do his utmost to ensure that even if the two sides were to deviate from each other in their respective Asian policy.⁴⁹ Japan was concerned about the subsequent development of the US-PRC relationship, which would no doubt have an impact on Asia. It was hoped that in order to preserve the mutual trust between the US and Japan that the US would consult the Japanese in advance on matters, such as those related to the PRC, which would have an impact on Japan.⁵⁰

Although Sato seemed to be supportive of the rapprochement, as shown in his letter to Nixon, he conveyed his feelings of disappointment privately to Australian Labour Leader, Gough Whitlam. A teary Sato said to Whitlam, "I have done everything they [the Americans] have asked. They let me down."⁵¹ Sato's feeling of disappointment was understandable. He felt disillusioned as Japan was not given sufficient notice before the announcement, and was not consulted beforehand on the policy change, when in 1970 Nixon and Sato had come to the understanding that both sides would consult with each other on policy issues towards China.⁵²

The views of other figures in the Japanese government displayed greater apprehensions towards the rapprochement, with the lack of prior notice being the biggest bone of contention. Japanese Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo's response was mixed. It was not the content of the announcement which shocked the Japanese, as Fukuda believed that the US should establish a more cordial relationship with the PRC. It was the "abrupt and dramatic" way in which the news was announced to the world, which had "shaken" Japan and other Asian nations. He described the

⁴⁹ Letter: Sato to Nixon; 14 August 1971; Japan (Sato Corr) 1969-8 Jul 1972; Box 757; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵⁰ Memorandum: Rogers to Nixon; 22 July 1971; Japan (Sato Corr) 1969-8 Jul 1972; Box 757; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵¹ Sato's words to Whitlam were quoted in John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System* (London and Atlantic Highlands: The Athlone Press, 1988), 295.

⁵² Atsushi Kusano, *Two Nixon Shocks and Japan-U.S. Relations* (New Jersey: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1987), 1-2.

announcement of 15 July as “most shocking” to the Sato government⁵³ as it was “excessively abrupt and dramatic.”⁵⁴

Ushiba, whose view represented his own and that of most Japanese officials, said that the US move towards the PRC was applauded and that it would be impossible for any Japanese Prime Minister to pursue such a move. This was because the discussions with the party and the cabinet would lead to information leaks. However, this caused some problems for the Sato leadership which had followed the Yoshida tradition of close collaboration with the US on the China issue. The US had gone ahead and mended ties with the PRC without consulting or informing its Japanese ally in advance.⁵⁵ Ushiba was upset by the lack of prior notification. He felt that Japan deserved more than a three minute notice and the Americans should have explained their policy move to Japan first. He also criticised Nixon for “bowing down” to Mao Zedong.⁵⁶

Nixon’s actions invited criticisms and it was evident that a lot of discontent was brewing behind the scenes in Japan. There was also a considerable media backlash. Ambassador Ushiba was blamed by the Sato Cabinet for not knowing anything about Nixon’s China policy before the official announcement.⁵⁷ *Asahi Shimbun* reported that a leading member of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reproached the Americans for being “truly heartless and lacked the feeling requisite for placing a high value on its moral obligations.”⁵⁸ The Japanese media criticised the Sato government for its “stumbling inaction” with regards to its China policy and praised the US for bringing about a change in its policy towards the PRC. More criticism came from the opposition parties which berated the Sato government for being submissive to the Americans who then went ahead to mend ties with the Communist Chinese without any prior consultation with the

⁵³ Memorandum: Conversation between Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo and Vice President Spiro Agnew; 16 May 1972; Vice President’s Visit to Asia 15 May 1972 [1 of 2]; Box 951; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵⁴ Memorandum: Kissinger to Nixon; 18 May 1972; Vice President’s Visit to Asia 15 May 1972 [1 of 2]; Box 951; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵⁵ Conversation with Japan Ambassador Ushiba; 20 July 1971; DNSA; Japan and the United States, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/JU/01407/all.pdf> accessed 12 October 2009.

⁵⁶ Kusano, *Two Nixon Shocks and Japan-U.S. Relations*, 7.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁵⁸ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 7.

Sato government.⁵⁹ There was also criticism from U. Alexis Johnson, who complained that Nixon and Kissinger “embarked on a period of rapturous enchantment with China” and had pushed Japan, the principal American ally in Asia, into the “back burner.”⁶⁰

The US move towards China caused confusion within the Japanese leadership. There were questions as to how Japan should react to Nixon’s move towards China and also how to handle its relationship with the ROC. Sato was left in an awkward predicament. In view of the prevailing political climate, there were expectations that Japan ought to engage in diplomatic relations with China. However, Sato had been a defender of the ROC, speaking up for the Nationalist Chinese on several occasions. China would not want to deal with Sato because of this.⁶¹

More woes were to follow for Sato. There was an attempt by Sato’s intra-party rivals to remove him from his position after he cooperated with the US and became a co-sponsor of the US resolutions in the Chinese representation issue in the UN. The attempt proved to be unsuccessful. However, Sato’s rivals had acquired a new form of ammunition to attack him with Nixon’s unveiling of the Kissinger visit to China. The general view was that the US had gone to China before Japan did, which seemed to be a huge problem as it was thought that Japan should be the one to mend ties with the PRC first in view of the geographic proximity, culture, history and race.⁶²

The first Nixon Shock certainly cast some doubts over the future of US-Japan relations. While Japan was still recovering from the first shock, Nixon announced his “New Economic Policy” on 15 August 1971. This was known as the second Nixon Shock and was described by Nixon as an attempt to “stick it to the Japanese.”⁶³ This created more problems for the US-Japan relationship, which was already soured by the first Nixon Shock. Japan was informed of it ten minutes before the official announcement, a mere seven minutes more than the three minute notice of 15 July. The result of the New Economic Policy was that the yen would have to be re-valued,

⁵⁹ Memorandum: Conversation between Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo and Vice President Spiro Agnew; 16 May 1972; Vice President’s Visit to Asia 15 May 1972 [1 of 2]; Box 951; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁶⁰ Schaller, “Détente and the Strategic Triangle”, 376.

⁶¹ Buckley, *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990*, 131.

⁶² Background Paper: Political Impact on Japan of the President’s Trip to China; 6-7 January 1972; Japan January 1972 Sato (San Clemente (1 of 3)); Box 925; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁶³ Schaller, *Altered States*, 211.

taxes would be imposed on imports, textiles imports would be subjected to quotas and the US dollar would no longer be convertible to gold. As Schaller described it, the Japanese leadership was “stunned.”⁶⁴ The dual shocks hit Sato hard. He went on to convey the following views during a 1972 policy speech to the Diet,

The drastic change in world conditions in 1971 put Japan in a difficult situation.

Under these new conditions, it is reasonable to say that uneasiness and irritation have been pervasive among the Japanese people.⁶⁵

Japan and the Issue of the Chinese Representation in the United Nations

Japan was one of the co-sponsors of the “important question” resolution when it was first introduced in 1961.⁶⁶ The “important question” procedure proved to be effective in keeping the PRC out of the UN in the 1960s. However, the votes in favour of the ROC began to drop each year. Many countries, including Japan, which was a supporter of the ROC, were aware that a change in US policy was necessary as it was “at the end of the road with the current policy.”⁶⁷ The Japanese reiterated at a meeting with US policy planners at Lake Kawaguchi that the PRC entry into the UN was inevitable, but the ROC should be allowed to retain its seat in the UN.⁶⁸

It was apparent that some elements of the Japanese press and Diet members were critical of the role played by Japan in the Chinese representation issue in 1969. Hence, it was taking a more cautious approach and would only co-sponsor but not introduce the resolution.⁶⁹ Japan was actively supporting the ROC in the UN. It was reported to have contacted one hundred and five countries

⁶⁴ Schaller, “Détente and the Strategic Triangle”, 379.

⁶⁵ Quoted in Kusano, *Two Nixon Shocks and Japan-U.S. Relations*, 1.

⁶⁶ Editorial Note, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 487.

⁶⁷ Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 3, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 607-8.

⁶⁸ Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan, Washington, May 22, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 685.

⁶⁹ Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, June 12, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 504.

regarding their views on the dual representation resolution.⁷⁰ It would support the dual representation formula, but felt that the Security Council seat should not be mentioned. However, it conceded that it might be necessary to include it as its exclusion could mean that the dual representation might not be passed eventually.⁷¹ The expulsion of the ROC from the UN would be an “important question” and two-third of the votes would be required. Dual representation would only require a simple majority. The Japanese Director-General of UN Affairs Nishibori conceded that the issue of the Security Council would no doubt be brought up, and the ROC would not be able to retain it.⁷²

Global opinion was shifting towards the PRC taking up the Security Council seat. This was evident at a meeting of the inner core group of potential co-sponsors, including Japan on 11 August 1971, where the members agreed that the Security Council seat should be given to the PRC to prove the “sincerity” of the sponsor and co-sponsor states and to gain the greatest number of votes possible.⁷³

Sato announced that Japan would be cosponsoring the reverse “important question” and the dual representation resolutions.⁷⁴ He said that the decision was made in light of the increasing international recognition the PRC was receiving at the moment. The PRC was recognised by sixty UN members, which was three more than the fifty-seven members which recognised the ROC. He added that times had changed and the Japanese were ready to welcome the PRC into the UN and to take up its seat in the Security Council. The expulsion of the ROC would remain an “important question.” It should be noted that this decision was made against the backdrop of strong opposition from within the LDP and the cabinet.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, July 3, 1971. FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 719.

⁷¹ Ibid., 718.

⁷² Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State Tokyo, July 6, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 721.

⁷³ Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, New York, August 11, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 778.

⁷⁴ Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, Tokyo, September 22, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 816.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 817.

Japan and the Beijing Summit

The Nixon administration was making the effort to brief the Japanese before the Beijing Summit. Nixon told Kishi on 22 October 1971 that he viewed the Beijing Summit as serving the purpose of exploring the exchanges of persons and trade between the US and the PRC. The talks would be more of a “feeling out process.” Japan would be informed regarding any issues that would affect their interests.⁷⁶ Nixon stated that the result of the summit would be an opening of a communication channel with the PRC but not the normalisation of relations, as the US recognised the ROC and was committed to Taiwan’s defence. Nixon told Sato that his upcoming visit to Beijing was not made at the expense of US commitments to its allies in the Pacific.⁷⁷ Regarding the Beijing and Moscow Summits, Sato stated that he had “full confidence” in Nixon that the assurances he had received from Secretary of Treasury John Connally and the others would be adhered to. US-Japan relations would remain close.⁷⁸

Rogers briefed Fukuda and Sato before the Beijing Summit. The US would not be abandoning their interests in Southeast Asia, although it was reducing its troops in Vietnam. The Japanese were assured that the US did not make any deals with the PRC and there were no conditions attached to the summit. Existing friendships with allies and friends would not be abandoned for the sake of a new friendship with the PRC. Nixon informed Japan that it should not be assumed that the Beijing Summit would induce any major changes and there should not be too much expectation on what the US could accomplished from the summit.⁷⁹

The Americans felt that Sato should not worry that the US was abandoning the Japanese because of the rapprochement with the PRC as the Communist Chinese remained the main

⁷⁶ Memorandum: Alexander M. Haig to Nixon; 1 November 1971; Memcon- The President and Former PM Nobusuke Kishi October 22, 1971; Box 1025; NSC Files; Presidential/HAK MemCons; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁷⁷ Memorandum: Meeting with Eisaku Sato; 6 January 1972; Henry A. Kissinger’s Visit to Japan- Talking Points June 1972; Box 22; NSC Files; HAKOF; HAK Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁷⁸ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Tokyo to SECSTATE Washdc; 24 November 1971; Presidential Trip- Miscellaneous; Box 499; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁷⁹ Memorandum of Conversation; 11 November 1971; DNSA Japan and the United States, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/JU/01464/all.pdf> accessed 12 October 2009.

adversary in Asia, while the Japanese was the key Asian ally of the US.⁸⁰ The US view was that the Japanese would be most apprehensive if the US made deals with the PRC in secret and their subsequent revelation would greatly change the circumstances in Asia, much to the disadvantage of Japan and furthermore would embarrass the Japanese.⁸¹ There was also the fear that the US might abandon the ROC, in light of improving relations with the PRC, leaving Japan alone to support the ROC.⁸²

Nixon sent a message to Sato immediately after his trip to China and reaffirmed the US relationship with Japan in the Shanghai communiqué stating that “the United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan” and would “continue to develop the existing close bonds.” Nixon assured Sato that he had kept in mind the US relationship with Japan throughout the Beijing Summit.⁸³

The Sato government was relieved that no US-PRC agreements were included in the Communiqué. Sato said that Japan was trying to open up communications with the PRC which might lead to the eventual normalisation of relations.⁸⁴ Fukuda said that the Nixon trip to China was a significant development in global affairs as it would contribute to the reduction of tensions in Asia. He viewed the section on Taiwan which indicated the gradual withdrawal of the US from the island as “the heart of the Nixon Doctrine.”⁸⁵ The Sato government was glad, after viewing the Shanghai communiqué, to see that there were no immediate concessions made to the PRC. However, it still had some apprehensions regarding the section on Taiwan.⁸⁶

Before leaving for China, Nixon promised that he would not make any secret deals and there would be no negotiations with the PRC without the knowledge of the allies and friends of the

⁸⁰ Briefing Book: Japan: Recommended Talking Points; undated; Japan: January 1972 Sato (San Clemente (1 of 3)); Box 925; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁸¹ Memorandum: U Alexis Johnson to Nixon; 29 December 1971; Japan: January 1972 Sato (San Clemente (1 of 3)); Box 925; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁸² Issues and Talking Points; Japan; undated; Japan: January 1972 Sato (San Clemente (1 of 3)); Box 925; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁸³ Letter: Nixon to Sato; 28 February 1972; Japan (Sato Correspondence) 1969- 8 July 1972; Box 757; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁸⁴ Memorandum: Haig to Nixon; 24 March 1972; China Trip February-March 1972; Box 501; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁸⁵ Telegram: Secstate Washdc to Ruehex/White House Communications Center; 27 February 1972; China Trip- Misc Feb 72; Box 502; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁸⁶ Memorandum: Rogers to Nixon; 3 March 1972; China Trip February-March 1972; Box 501; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

US. Marshall Green told Fukuda that Nixon had kept his word and made no such negotiations or deals with the PRC. Fukuda was apparently grateful for the visit and briefing by Green and Holdridge and also the significance placed on US-Japan relations by the US as reflected on the Shanghai Communiqué.⁸⁷ There were attempts to explain the Taiwan reference in the Shanghai Communiqué by linking it to the Nixon Doctrine. Green informed Fukuda that the indication of the US withdrawal from Taiwan, as stated in the Shanghai Communiqué, was effectively an example of the Nixon Doctrine in action. The US stood firm on its position regarding Taiwan and nothing had changed. Although the US treaty commitment to the ROC was missing from the communiqué, it was a non-issue as no other treaty commitments with other US allies were mentioned either. Fukuda remained unconvinced and remarked that the US would withdraw from Taiwan as it seemed to have accepted the Five Principles and the non-use of force with regards to the Taiwan issue. Fukuda said that it was possible that the US had agreed to the withdrawal from Taiwan in exchange for the non-use of force from the PRC.⁸⁸ To quash Fukuda's apprehensions, Green and Holdridge countered Fukuda's point by stating that the US withdrawal would depend on the situation in Vietnam, "as the tension in the area diminishes." Green told Fukuda that the US and the PRC only discussed bilateral matters and issues pertaining to Japan were brought up only briefly in the joint communiqué. It was not revealed to Fukuda the discussions the US and the PRC had about Japan and the PRC contention that Japan could embark on a more militaristic policy. Fukuda was told that the US and the PRC did not talk about the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.⁸⁹

The US thought that Japan's apprehensions were lessened by the explanations given by Green during his visit to Japan. However, there were still doubts over the US China policy and how the US perceived the Taiwan issue.⁹⁰ Ushiba said that the Sato government was surprised to note the point on the US withdrawal from Taiwan on the Shanghai Communiqué, during a 6 March 1972 meeting with Kissinger. Kissinger explained that the point was made in an attempt to channel a matter of fact in the policy of the US. The withdrawal would also be contingent on the easing of

⁸⁷ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Tokyo to SECSTATE Washdc; 29 February 1972; China- General February 21-March 31, 1972; Box 1036; NSC Files; For the President's Files- China/Vietnam Negotiations; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Scope Paper: Your Japan Visit; undated; Henry A. Kissinger's Trip to Japan June 1972; Box 22; NSC Files; HAKOF; HAK Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

tensions in the region and also the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. The US claimed that the point in the communiqué meant that the US did not promise anything at all to the PRC on the Taiwan issue.⁹¹

The *Kyodo News Agency* reported that Japanese officials were “unsatisfied with the briefings given by Green regarding the Beijing summit” and thus hoped to find out more from Kissinger what was transpired in Beijing regarding the Taiwan issue.⁹² The US was losing credibility in the eyes of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. In a report by *Yomiuri Sunday* on the meeting of the Foreign Ministry leaders on 26 February, it was said that they believed that the US would disregard the Taiwan obstacle and proceed to normalise relations with the PRC after Nixon’s re-election. The San Clemente talks with Sato and Nixon were viewed as misleading and Japan would be subjected to a third shock.⁹³ Another argument for the US-PRC rapprochement was reiterated by the Foreign Office. It speculated that once the US and the PRC established diplomatic ties, the PRC would be seemingly accepting the concept of two Chinas and this would work to Japan’s advantage as it would alleviate its problem with the PRC with regards to its treaty with the ROC.⁹⁴

In order to further placate the Japanese, Nixon sent a letter to Sato dated 6 June 1972 and explained that the US would continue to preserve its ties with its allies, a goal which was accorded the greatest priority of the US.⁹⁵ In his reply, Sato continued to display his support for his American ally, and told Nixon that by opening up communications with the PRC and USSR, he had “succeeded in conversations crucial to the establishment of world peace.”⁹⁶

⁹¹ Memorandum: Conversation between Ushiba Nobuhiko and Kissinger; 6 March 1972; Japan March 6-June 8 1972 [2of 2]; Box 102; NSC Files; HAKOF; Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁹² Memorandum: Les Janka to Kissinger; 1 April 1972; HAK’s Japan Visit June 1972; [3 of 3]; Box 21; NSC Files; HAKOF; HAK Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁹³ Telegram: Secstate Washdc to Ruehex/White House Communications Center; 27 February 1972; China Trip- Misc Feb 72; Box 502; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁹⁴ Telegram: Secstate Washdc to Ruehex/White House Communications Center; 26 February 1972; China Trip- Misc Feb 1972; Box 502; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁹⁵ Letter: Nixon to Sato; 6 June 1972; Japan (Sato Correspondence) 1969- 8 July 1972; Box 757; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁹⁶ Letter: Sato to Nixon; 12 June 1972; Japan (Sato Correspondence) 1969- 8 July 1972; Box 757; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

Japan-PRC Normalisation of Relations

The Minister of International Trade and Industry, Tanaka Kakuei, defeated his main rival Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo and became the Prime Minister of Japan in July 1972. Fukuda was thought to be the prime candidate to succeed Sato after his retirement. However, Tanaka was able to garner much support within the party and managed to outflank Fukuda.⁹⁷

Tanaka was set to embark on the road towards a Sino-Japanese normalisation of relations. Any unilateral Japanese move towards better relations with the PRC would have been frowned upon by the Americans if Nixon had not sought rapprochement with the PRC himself. The US could not possibly criticise Japan's opening to the PRC when it had done the same thing in 1971. Indeed, the US seemed to have no major objection to the reconciliation between the PRC and Japan. Kissinger, when probed by Zhou as to whether the US had any objection to the PRC commencing talks with Japan on Sino-Japanese normalisation, replied, "I favour it."⁹⁸ He reassured the PRC side on 14 August 1972 that the Americans would neither oppose the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations nor pose any delays or obstacles to it.⁹⁹ The American objective for supporting Sino-Japanese normalisation seemed to be revealed in the conversation between Kissinger and PRC Ambassador to the United Nations Huang Hua on 21 August 1972. Kissinger said that the US had no objection to the timing of a Japanese visit to the PRC, even if it was to be held during the American election period. He commented that it was good that Japan was talking with the PRC or else Japan might start discussions with the Soviet Union regarding the peace treaty.¹⁰⁰ This meant that the US preferred its old Asian ally, Japan, to lean towards the PRC rather than the Soviet Union. The Americans were beginning to view the Soviets as the bigger threat and were leaning towards the Communist Chinese themselves. This could be inferred from the fact that the US was sharing with the PRC information on US-USSR relations such as the content of Soviet-American discussions and agreements and also intelligence information on Soviet military activities and high

⁹⁷ For more information on the intra LDP factional conflict which led to the victory of Tanaka over Fukuda, see Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p. 311-4.

⁹⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, June 19, 1972, 10:25-11:20, p.m. FRUS, 1969-76, E 13, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve13/d139> accessed 20 April 2010.

⁹⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, New York, August 14, 1972, 3:30-4:10 p.m. FRUS, 1969-76, E 13, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve13/d151> accessed 20 April 2010.

¹⁰⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, New York, August 21, 1972, 6:05-6:50 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVII <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 1045.

resolution satellite photographs.¹⁰¹ On the other hand, according to William Burr, Kissinger did not share with the Soviets the “substance of US-China relations, much less the details of his talks with PRC officials.”¹⁰²

However, Kissinger, in his typical Machiavellian style, was showing duplicity in his views regarding the Sino-Japanese normalisation. In a conversation with the ROC Ambassador Shen, in September 1972, Kissinger criticised the Japanese move towards normalisation and said that Japanese actions were “immoral” and that the Communist Chinese despised them and were just making use of them.¹⁰³ Perhaps Kissinger was trying to placate the Nationalist Chinese as both of their allies, the Americans and the Japanese were moving towards normalisation of relations with the PRC, their biggest enemy. Kissinger was just telling the ROC leaders what they wanted to hear.

As noted above, the circumstances presented Japan with a chance to ease tensions with its communist neighbour without upsetting the Americans. Tanaka stated that Japan was not trying to beat the US in the race towards diplomatic ties with the PRC. The rapprochement aided Japan-PRC normalisation of relations and accelerated the process. In fact, it was the US which had “shown us [Japan] the route to Peking.” Tanaka commented that the conditions in Japan were made perfect by the Nixon visit, which created a general agreement that the time had come to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC.¹⁰⁴ As Buckley puts it, “Japan simply went in to China through the door left ajar by the United States.”¹⁰⁵ Due to the events of 1971, US-Japan relations went through a rough patch and Tanaka did not want the relationship to deteriorate further.¹⁰⁶ In order to set Nixon at ease, Tanaka promised that Japan’s normalisation of relations with the PRC would be within the framework of the US-Japan Security Treaty.¹⁰⁷ Tanaka’s prospects of success improved when Zhou told Takekiri Ichiro, chairman of the second-largest opposition party, the Komei Party, that the US-

¹⁰¹ Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, 262.

¹⁰² Burr, *The Kissinger Transcripts*, 47.

¹⁰³ Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 8, 1972, FRUS 1969-76, XVII <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 1060.

¹⁰⁴ Memorandum of Conversation between Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Kissinger; 19 August 1972; Memcon- Kissinger and PM Kakuei Tanaka August 19 1972; Box 1026; NSC Files; Presidential/HAK Memcons; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

¹⁰⁵ Buckley, *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990*, 132.

¹⁰⁶ Kusano, *Two Nixon Shocks and Japan-U.S. Relations*, 40.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 41.

Japan Security Treaty would not impede the move towards a Sino-Japanese rapprochement.¹⁰⁸ Tanaka said that Japan's ties with the US would not be overlooked as Japan moved towards diplomatic ties with the PRC.¹⁰⁹ The global situation, coupled with a Japanese Prime Minister who was willing and able to approach the Chinese, rendered the Sino-Japanese normalisation of relations possible.

Tanaka's move towards normalisation of relations with the PRC, which was driven by the Sino-American rapprochement, raised concerns amongst America's Asian allies, with the ROC being most particularly worried. Shen said that the ROC was worried that the Japan-PRC normalisation of relations would lead to the abrogation of the 1952 Japan-ROC peace treaty. The ROC was also anxious about the prospect of this development leading to a "chain reaction in Asia" which would prove to be detrimental to the diplomatic position of the ROC.¹¹⁰ Shen criticised Japan for being ungrateful towards the ROC, which had been particularly helpful towards Japan after its devastating defeat in World War II. The Japanese were displaying a behaviour which could be described as "gross ingratitude."¹¹¹ The ROC feared for the security of Taiwan in the future. Shen asked Kissinger if Taiwan could be defended using the bases in Japan in times of emergency, in view of the recent developments of Japan-PRC relations. Kissinger reassured Shen that Taiwan would be protected even without those bases. Other Asian allies such as Thailand and the Philippines wrote letters voicing their concerns regarding Japanese actions, which Kissinger had subsequently conveyed to the Japanese.¹¹²

The US was informed by intelligence reports that the purpose of Tanaka's trip to China was to speak to the PRC leaders and also to lay the path towards normalisation of relations. The two sides would then continue to hold talks over a period of time, leading to the eventual

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 40.

¹⁰⁹ Memorandum of Conversation between Tanaka and Nixon; 31 August 1972; Tanaka Visit (Hawaii) 31 August- 15 September (1972) (1 of 4) [July- September 1972]; Box 926; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

¹¹⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 25, 1972, noon., FRUS 1969-76, XVII <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 1024.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 1026.

¹¹² Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 8, 1972, FRUS 1969-76, XVII <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 1061.

normalisation of relations. However, the US did not rule out the possibility of Tanaka, in a bid to display “public signs of progress,” speeding up the process towards normalisation.¹¹³

Tanaka visited China on 25 September 1972, beginning the process of normalisation of relations and proceeded swiftly to normalise relations with the PRC. On his trip, Tanaka engaged in conversations with Mao and Zhou and a joint communiqué was issued five days later. The communiqué stipulated that the former enemies would put to an end the state of war and relations would be normalised with the establishment of full diplomatic ties. Japan recognised that the PRC was the “sole legal government of China” and that it held the PRC’s view that Taiwan was part of China.¹¹⁴ Both sides pledged that the move towards normalisation was not “directed against third countries.” Both countries would not seek hegemony in the Asia–Pacific region and believed that the normalisation of relations would contribute to the “relaxation of tension in Asia” and the “safeguarding of world peace.” Japan would end all diplomatic links with the ROC and indicated that it would not support the Taiwan Independence Movement and that it had no ambitions towards Taiwan. Japan hoped to continue its trade links with the ROC. The PRC would not write off this possibility and responded that more discussions should be held before a decision could be made.¹¹⁵ With Japan-PRC relations normalised, the Nationalist Chinese were helpless and could do nothing but demonstrate at the PRC Mission to the UN in New York by throwing eggs and breaking windows.¹¹⁶

The US-Japan Alliance in the Age of the US-PRC Rapprochement

Japan and the PRC had no diplomatic ties before 1972 and the PRC could not forget the horrors of the Japanese occupation during World War II. The two sides were engaging in trade without any official recognition. The PRC was highly suspicious of the US-Japan relationship and also perceived Japan as having ambitions in Asia. The Nixon Shocks of 1971 created tensions in

¹¹³ Memorandum: Holdridge to Kissinger; 10 August 1972; Tanaka Visit (Hawaii) 31 August- 1 September 1972 (3 of 4); Box 926; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

¹¹⁴ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, 319.

¹¹⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, New York, October 3, 1972, 8:30–9:20 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVII <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 1082.

¹¹⁶ Memorandum for the Record, New York, October 8, 1972, 1:45-2:15 p.m., FRUS, 1969-76, E-13, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve13/d162> accessed 20 April 2010.

the relationship between Japan and the US. However, the two sides remained close allies. During its talks with the PRC, the US argued its case on the importance of the US-Japan security treaty as a form of deterrence against the remilitarisation of Japan. Despite the rapprochement with the PRC, Japan's role in the security of Asia remained as important as before. The US could not afford to abandon its Japanese ally. Japan should remain firmly allied to the US. The change in the threat perception of the Soviets played a part in ensuring that it was important for both the US and the PRC to have close relationships with Japan. The outbreak of the Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969 triggered the Americans and the PRC to reassess the Soviet threat. During a National Security Council meeting on 14 August 1969, Nixon commented that the Soviet Union was the more aggressive party and it would be detrimental to American interests if the PRC was destroyed in a war between the two former communist allies.¹¹⁷ The border conflict with the Soviets led to the final breakdown of the relationship between the former communist comrades. As the PRC moved closer towards the US, in a bid to play one "barbarian" off another, friendlier ties began to exist between the once bitter enemies. Both sides agreed with each other that Japan should never be made to feel isolated, in light of a closer US-PRC relationship, or else there could be a possibility that Japan might be pushed towards the USSR. As Kissinger put it, "I think that Japan has to be kept in some sort of emotional balance, and anyone who is trying to push it too far in one direction may easily bring about the opposite of what he wants."¹¹⁸

The PRC was concerned about the relationship between the US and Japan and was apprehensive that the Japanese were on the verge of a remilitarisation and would rise as a hegemonic power in Asia. The PRC was uneasy with the security and military arrangements between Japan and the US. Zhou expressed his concerns that an economically strong Japan would seek to expand militarily.¹¹⁹ He went further to comment that if the US were to withdraw from the Far East, Japan would have to be "strengthened" and would become the "vanguard" of the US in

¹¹⁷ Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 182.

¹¹⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, June 19, 1972, 10:25-11:20 p.m., FRUS, 1969-76, E-13, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve13/d139> accessed 20 April 2010.

¹¹⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, July 9, 1971, 4:35-11:20 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> , accessed 20 April 2010, 383.

the Far East to “control” the Asian countries in the absence of the Americans.¹²⁰ Zhou was particularly apprehensive about the possibility of Japanese forces entering Taiwan should the Americans withdraw from the island.¹²¹

Kissinger agreed with Zhou that “a strong Japan has the economic and social infrastructure which permits it to create a strong military machine and use this for expansionist purposes if it so desires.” He tried to dispel Zhou’s apprehensions by stating that the American troops stationed in Japan “played no role compared to the potential power Japan represents.” He assured Zhou that the US-Japan defence relationship actually served to prevent the Japanese from pursuing “aggressive policies.” If this relationship ceased to exist, Japan could actually seek to remilitarise and even develop its own nuclear arsenal in order to build up its defence capabilities. Hence, the US-Japan defence relationship would serve PRC interests better.¹²²

Nixon explained to Zhou the reason the Americans should continue their defence relationship with the Japanese was to prevent other forces from allying with Japan, should the Americans “get out of Japanese waters.” Another possible development was the one which was also articulated by Kissinger in July 1971: namely that Japan could turn to develop its own weapon systems to defend itself. Nixon tapped in on the PRC fear of Japan moving in on Taiwan or Korea by saying that the Americans could not ensure that the Japanese would not pursue such a course if Washington backed away from both countries. The Americans could only assert an influence on Japan if a defence arrangement existed.¹²³ In another meeting he added that “unless we have forces in Japan, they won’t pay any attention to us.”¹²⁴ Nixon’s view was that maintaining a defence arrangement with the Japanese was actually of benefit to the PRC as it acted as a restraint over the Japanese from remilitarising or becoming a hegemonic power in Asia. Nixon was keeping a firm position with regards to Japan and was unwilling to concede to the PRC.

¹²⁰ Ibid, 390.

¹²¹ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, July 11, 1971, 10:35–11:55 a.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf>, accessed 20 April 2010, 446.

¹²² Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, July 9, 1971, 4:35–11:20 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf>, accessed 20 April 2010, 394.

¹²³ Memorandum of Conversation, 22 February 1972, 2:10 p.m. - 6:10 p.m., reproduced at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/NZ-1.pdf>, accessed 20 January 2007, 12.

¹²⁴ Memorandum of Conversation, 24 February 1972, 5:15 p.m. - 8:05 p.m., reproduced at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/NZ-3.pdf>, accessed 20 January 2007, 13.

However, it was ironic that Japan was not particularly interested in developing its military capability and would rather use its economic power to assist the other nations in Asia. It was the US that continued to encourage Japan to build up its military capability. Japan was also averse towards acquiring a nuclear arsenal. Hence, it could be said that the possibility of Japan remilitarising was quite low, and there was no cause for alarm. It could be said that Nixon and Kissinger were playing on PRC fears in order to quell any opposition against the US-Japan security relationship, as they had no wish to make any changes to it. It could be concluded that keeping Japan close to the US was indeed very important to Nixon and this could not be jeopardised despite the blossoming US-PRC relationship.

One reason why Nixon could not afford to abandon Japan was that it was an important base for ensuring the security of Asia. Hence, it was vital that Japan continued to be aligned with the US. With the US gradually decreasing its military presence in Asia, and also the possibility that it might need to back away from Taiwan due to its rapprochement with the PRC, Japan became more important than ever to the security of Asia. The Defense Department understood this and Laird explained to Kissinger the importance of having Japan as a close ally:

I remain convinced that maintenance of a relationship of trust and cooperation between our country and Japan is of the utmost importance, requiring full, frank, and timely discussions on a continuing basis. The possible removal of the US military presence from Taiwan makes our Japanese bases, especially on Okinawa, almost indispensable.¹²⁵

Nixon understood the importance in keeping Japan close to the US and told Sato and Ushiba on 6 January 1972 in San Clemente that the US and also its European allies had to maintain close cooperation with Japan. Such cooperation was important because he regarded Japan as an important part of the free world. The following quote explained Nixon's position:

¹²⁵ Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 13, 1971., FRUS 1969-76, XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> , accessed 20 April 2010, 474.

The reason he [Nixon] believes this [is] important is that in viewing the Free World, the great economic powers, the United States, Japan, Germany, Britain, France, and possibly Canada must consult closely if we are to build a stable and productive Free World economy with trade and monetary stability... England, France, and Germany no longer maintain a significant military presence in Asia, where Japan is the major Free World nation. Therefore, he believed that the development of a 5-power consultative process... would not only serve the economic needs of the entire Free World, but would also contribute to the development of cohesion in policy for handling all the difficult political and security problems that arise.¹²⁶

Initially, the PRC was uneasy with the security and military arrangements between Japan and the US. As the Japan-PRC relationship improved and the US and the PRC were on friendly terms and having regular conversations, the PRC started to see the value of the US-Japan defence partnership. They had come to the understanding that the defence partnership was the way to keep Japan from remilitarising or to embark on expansionistic foreign policies. Japan could help the PRC to fend off any Soviet or Indian threats by acting as an “incipient ally.”¹²⁷ Zhou told Kissinger that Japan must be kept under the American nuclear umbrella. The two sides must work together to ensure that Japan would not seek the Soviet Union for protection. He added that Japan must stay allied with the West.¹²⁸ This could be viewed as a testimony of the PRC approval of the US-Japan relationship and saw how it would be beneficial to the interests of the PRC.

The change in the threat perception of the Soviets played a part in ensuring that it was important for the US and the PRC to maintain close relationships with Japan. Both sides agreed that Japan should not form any close ties with the Soviets and would try to prevent that from

¹²⁶ Editorial Note of Memorandum of Conversation between President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and Ambassador Ushiba Nobuhiko in San Clemente, California, January 6, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976, I, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d103> accessed 20 April 2010.

¹²⁷ Burr, *The Kissinger Transcripts*, 83-4.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 205.

happening. Both Kissinger and Mao, during a 17 February 1973 conversation, agreed that they would prefer Japan to have closer ties with the PRC than with the Soviet Union. Kissinger said that closer ties between the Soviets and the Japanese would be extremely detrimental to peace.¹²⁹ Kissinger conveyed to Mao, on another meeting on 12 November 1973, that it was important that Japan should not feel “isolated and left alone” and the US should not “give them too many temptations to manoeuvre.” Mao said that Japan should not be pushed towards the Soviets. Kissinger added that the US did not want the Soviets and Japanese to form closer ties.¹³⁰

After Japan and the PRC normalised relations in September 1972, there was pressure from the PRC side that the US should follow Japan’s lead and normalise relations with the PRC. During a meeting between Kissinger and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping on 14 April 1974, Deng urged the US to normalise relations with the PRC using the “Japanese way.” Kissinger replied that the US could not accept the idea of following the Japanese as it was usually the Japanese who “imitate” the Americans.¹³¹

The US began the process of rapprochement with the PRC much earlier than the Japanese, but could not deliver on the promise to cut off ties with the ROC and normalise relations with the PRC during Nixon’s second term in office. This showed that the US could not abandon the ROC overnight and embrace the PRC wholly. Moreover, during the later part of his term in office, Nixon was bogged down by the Watergate scandal and US-PRC relations came to a standstill. This Deng-Kissinger conversation illuminated the fact that the Japanese were indeed very much ahead of the Americans in terms of China policy. The tables were turned as the US was pressurised to follow the lead of its client state, Japan.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 92.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 190.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 288.

Conclusion

The US and Japan became close allies after the conclusion to the Second World War. The relationship was not smooth, as various frictions threatened to drive a wedge between the allies. The dispute over the textile issue was a major bone of contention. Sato's inability to settle on the textile issue while the US had made a huge concession on Okinawa, led Nixon to "stick it to Japan"¹³² as he failed to give Japan ample notice before his 15 July 1971 announcement. Nixon's dissatisfaction over the textile issue could have caused him to make the decision to not inform Japan in advance. However, his penchant for secrecy in the management of US-PRC relations meant that he was determined that no one outside of his White House circle knew about the opening to the PRC. The US-PRC rapprochement was a tremendous breakthrough in foreign policy for the Nixon administration. However, it threatened to unsettle the relationship the US had with its Asian allies and friends. The Sato government was upset that it was not informed in advance and was subsequently subjected to the shock of the announcement. The Nixon administration's poor handling of the task of informing Japan greatly hurt its sensitivities. The rapprochement brought woes to the Sato Government which was under increased pressure domestically to re-evaluate its China policy and to possibly move towards normalisation of relations with the PRC. However, Sato was unable to bring the normalisation of Japan-PRC relations into fruition as the PRC would not deal with him. This was not the case for Tanaka who commented that the US-PRC rapprochement cleared the way for his government to seek the normalisation of relations with the PRC. He successfully normalised relations with the PRC in September 1972. The US-PRC rapprochement facilitated Tanaka to normalise relations with the PRC. This development greatly alarmed the Nationalist Chinese who perceived it as a Japanese betrayal of the ROC. Relations with the US remained tight as the US-Japan security treaty was still in force. Strategic concerns meant that Japan became more important than ever to the security of Asia especially since the US was decreasing its military presence in Asia. It needed Japanese military bases to ensure the security of the region. Hence, the US wanted to hold on to Japan to prevent it from seeking the friendship and protection from the Soviet Union.

¹³² Phrase quoted from Schaller, "Détente and the Strategic Triangle", 367.

The next chapter deals with the last of the East Asian allies of the US, the ROK. The ROK, a fellow US ally and Japan's next door neighbour, did not take the news of the US-PRC rapprochement too well. Like Japan, it had to take on measures to re-adjust to the changing situation in Asia brought forth by Nixon's policies. However, its measures were adverse at the time and served to unsettle both the domestic situation and also the US-ROK relationship.

3. The Republic of Korea

Nixon's move towards rapprochement with the PRC was preceded by the policies of Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine which represented the brand new US strategy in Asia. The ROK was no doubt affected because of the importance of the American military presence in South Korea as a deterrent against North Korean aggression. Thus, any troop cuts would be viewed as detrimental to its security. Nixon's rapprochement with the PRC, which was an ally of the North Koreans, sent shockwaves throughout the ROK leadership. The rapprochement added to the ROK's worries of the diminishing US support, and made the ROK leadership question the US commitment to the ROK.

This chapter looks at how ROK President Park Chung Hee tried to bargain with the US to secure a timely modernisation of the ROK forces and to obtain other forms of aid from the US, as the US tried to reduce its presence in South Korea in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine. It will then discuss the American impression of the ROK reactions to the US rapprochement with the PRC and Nixon's 1972 China visit, as it tried to explain its intentions to the ROK. It will discuss the ROK's relationships with the US and the PRC from 1972 onwards.

The Evolution of the US Commitment to the ROK

Korea was annexed by Japan on 22 August 1910. During the 5 years prior to the annexation, Korea was already under Japanese subjugation with the signing of the Treaty of Protection in 1905. The treaty subjected Korea to Japanese protection and its foreign affairs were under Japanese "supervision."¹ For the next thirty five years, Korea was under Japanese rule. Korea's fate took another turn as Japan surrendered unconditionally on 15 August 1945, marking the end of the World War II in the Pacific. Korea was divided temporarily along the 38th parallel to facilitate the acceptance of the Japanese surrender. This was because the US could not send enough forces to Korea to receive the surrender of Japan any where north of the 38th parallel. The US would accept the Japanese surrender south of the 38th parallel while the USSR was in charge of the

¹ Andrew C. Nahm, "U.S. Policy and the Annexation of Korea", in *U.S.- Korean Relations 1882-1982* (ed) Kwak, Tae-Hwan in collaborations with John Chay, Soon Sung Cho and Shannon McCune (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1982), 48.

surrender north of the 38th parallel. The division of Korea was proposed by the US, worried that the Soviet forces, which had already entered Korea in August 1945, would occupy the entire Korean peninsula. The division would limit the Soviet occupation to half of the Peninsula.² The prospects for peaceful reunification seemed bleak as two separate nations were set up in 1948. The ROK was established in August 1948 as a result of the UN led general elections of May 1948. This was shortly followed by the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in September 1948 under the sponsorship of the USSR.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson made a speech in January 1950 which stated that the US did not perceive the possibility of an attack on the South from the North and if the South was facing any external threat, it would be capable of "adequately" defending itself.³ In his speech, Acheson categorised South Korea as one of the areas outside of the US defence perimeter and added that "no person can guarantee these areas against military attacks."⁴ Contrary to US expectations, the DPRK launched a military offensive against the South on 25 June 1950. The ROK was caught off guard and could not sustain a battle against the well-prepared DPRK. Acheson was viewed as having given the DPRK an open invitation to start the Korean War, a sentiment shared by Nixon.⁵

Sensing that the South could be defeated and subsequently fall to communism, the US made an about-turn on its policy towards the ROK and intervened in the Korean War. A communist Korea would be detrimental to America's security interests in Japan and the Western Pacific.⁶ UN and US forces, under the command of General Douglas MacArthur fought alongside ROK forces against the communists. The newly established PRC came into direct armed combat with the US when it sent large numbers of "Chinese People's Volunteers" across the Yalu to fight

² Soon Sung Cho, "American Policy toward Korean Unification, 1945-1980", in *U.S.- Korean Relations 1882-1982* (ed) Kwak, Tae-Hwan in collaborations with John Chay, Soon Sung Cho and Shannon McCune (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1982), 66-7.

³ Michael L. Baron, "The United States, the United Nations, and Korean Unification", in *After One Hundred Years: Continuity and Change in Korean-American Relations* (ed) Han, Sung-Joo (Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, 1982), 331.

⁴ Cho, "American Policy toward Korean Unification, 1945-1980", 70.

⁵ Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, 110.

⁶ Tae-Hwan Kwak, "U.S.-Korea Security Relations", in *U.S.- Korean Relations 1882-1982* (ed) Kwak, Tae-Hwan in collaborations with John Chay, Soon Sung Cho and Shannon McCune (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1982), 226.

alongside the DPRK. After 3 years of battle, the war was stalemated and finally came to an end on 27 July 1953 with the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement signed at *Panmunjom*.

After the Korean War, US security commitment to the ROK was affirmed with the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. However, the ROK was not satisfied with the treaty due to Article 3 which stipulated that,

each party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories under their control would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with the constitutional processes.⁷

This meant that US commitment to the ROK lacked an element of automaticity as it did not include a “NATO-type guarantee” of absolute commitment to the ROK. In the advent of another war in Korea, the US would have to consult the Congress to determine the appropriate measures to be employed.⁸ The ROK had insisted for many years that the US should inject an element of automaticity into the treaty by omitting the reference to constitutional processes.⁹

During the Lyndon Johnson administration there was an increasing US commitment to the ROK and a military partnership existed between the two sides. The US tried to reassure the ROK of the firm US commitment to its security through a number of communiqués. In the 1965 Johnson-Park Communiqué, the US told the ROK that it would continue to provide the South Koreans with military aid, make local currency funds generated by US assistance available to the defence of the ROK, and to conduct annual reviews of the MAP Transfer Program.¹⁰ In the 1968 Johnson-Park Communiqué, Johnson promised that the US would provide “prompt and effective assistance” that

⁷ Background Paper; U.S. Commitments to the Republic of Korea; undated; (Visit of Park Chung Hee - Pres. of Korea Briefing Book) August 21-22, 1969; Box 930; NSC Files: VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁸ Tae-Hwan Kwak and Wayne Patterson, “The Security Relationship between Korea and the United States, 1960-1982”, in *Korean-American Relations 1866-1997*, ed. Lee, Yur-Bok and Wayne Patterson (Albany: State University of New York, 1999), 83.

⁹ Background Paper; U.S. Commitments to the Republic of Korea; undated; (Visit of Park Chung Hee - Pres. of Korea Briefing Book) August 21-22, 1969; Box 930; NSC Files: VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

was “in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty” to counter any armed attacks against South Korea.¹¹ There was also military cooperation between the ROK and the US. The ROK was sending troops to Vietnam as military support to the South Vietnamese. The ROK would pay the base salary of ROK troops in Vietnam while the US would bear the all other costs.¹²

In April 1969, an EC-121 aircraft of the US Navy on a reconnaissance mission off the North Korean coast, with 31 crew members, was shot down by two North Korean MIG aircraft. The EC-121 incident was seen as a test of the Nixon administration’s willingness to defend the ROK in times of danger. Nixon stated in his memoirs that he was torn between either trying to solve the problem using diplomatic means or countering DPRK aggression with force. He wrote, “I reacted in the same way and with the same instincts that I had felt when the North Vietnamese offensive began: we were being tested, and therefore force must be met with force.” He was advised by Secretary of State William Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird not to resort to military means to solve the problem. The US Ambassador to the ROK, William Porter, warned that any military reprisals would end up “playing into the hands” of the Kim Il Sung regime.¹³ Yet, Nixon and Kissinger still favoured using military means. Kissinger argued that the US needed to react forcefully in order to prove to the world that it was sure of itself for the first time in years. Kissinger did not foresee that the conflict would end up becoming another Korean War but told Nixon that if it did, the US would have to use all means necessary to defeat the DPRK.¹⁴ However, the burden of the Vietnam War made Nixon decide against retaliation as the US could not afford to become embroiled in another war in Asia. He was also persuaded against employing military means because of the possible effect it would have on Congress. Kissinger agreed and said that a Cabinet insurrection occurring during the first year of Nixon’s term could be disastrous.¹⁵ This mirrored the Johnson administration’s handling of the *Pueblo* incident¹⁶ where restraint had been

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, 383.

¹⁴ Ibid., 384.

¹⁵ Ibid., 385.

¹⁶ The *Pueblo* incident refers to the 1968 capture of the USS *Pueblo* by North Korea.

shown. The US continued with the EC-121 reconnaissance flights which were accompanied by combat escorts as a precaution against any future incidents.¹⁷

The South Koreans were reportedly worried that Washington's moderate handling of the *Pueblo* and EC-121 incidents would lead to the North Koreans becoming even more aggressive.¹⁸ However, in Park's April 1969 letter to Nixon, he commented that US actions in response to the EC-121 incident were "wise" but added a warning of possible DPRK belligerency. He stated that the North Koreans were ready and could launch an offensive against South Korea to force a reunification. In Park's opinion, the North Koreans might have thought that any provocations would not necessarily invite reprisals, as the US was bogged down by the Vietnam War and the ROK forces were relatively much weaker. Park tried to push for the US to strengthen its forces, especially the air forces in South Korea, so as to send a message to the North that the South had the means to retaliate even before the Seventh Fleet was to be moved into the Korea Area.¹⁹ In his 10 June 1969 reply to Park, Nixon said that the US would continue to work on strengthening the US-ROK relationship. In response to Park's request for the reinforcement of the US forces in South Korea, Nixon did not promise to accede to Park's request but emphasised that the US air forces had already been strengthened after the *Pueblo* incident and the attempted North Korean raid of the ROK President's residence and office, known as *Cheong Wa Dae* or the Blue House to order to assassinate Park.²⁰

Vietnamization, the Nixon Doctrine and the US Commitment to the ROK

US security commitments were set to be changed with Nixon's twin policies of Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine. Nixon met with Park on 21 August 1969 and told Park that the US would adhere to the Mutual Defense Treaty and that the US had to reconsider the best way

¹⁷ Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, 383 & 385.

¹⁸ Lee, Chae-Jin and Sato Hideo. *U.S. Policy toward Japan and Korea: A Changing Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1982), 45.

¹⁹ Memorandum; Henry Kissinger to President Nixon; 30 April 1969; Korea President Park corr. 1969; Box 757; NSC Files: Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

²⁰ Letter; President Nixon to President Park Chung Hee; 10 June 1969; Korea President Park corr. 1969; Box 757; NSC Files: Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland

to stay committed to its allies.²¹ Nixon was in favour of the ROK's self-reliance efforts in the military and economic realms and hoped that more countries in Asia would do the same. The US still had to play an important role in Asia and would continue to provide aid to countries like the ROK which was embarking on the road towards self reliance. The US would keep to its commitments to its allies and would maintain its presence in the Pacific area. However, the US had to come up with new ways to achieve that: one of which was to continue to provide economic and military aid to self-reliant countries.²² Nixon said that "all the aid in the world will not help people who are unable or unwilling to help themselves."²³ The most apparent worry for Park was the possibility of a DPRK strike on the ROK if the DPRK believed that the US was set to reduce its presence in South Korea. According to Park, the US commitment to the ROK and its military presence in South Korea had acted as a deterrent against the DPRK attacking the ROK. Nevertheless, he told Nixon that he was grateful for the explanation given regarding the "so-called Nixon Doctrine" and agreed with the point that Asian nations should be self-reliant.²⁴

The US and the ROK disagreed on the likelihood of a DKRP attack on the South. The US felt that the possibility was low and urged the South to open up negotiations with the North and try to resolve the conflict using diplomatic means. On the other hand, the ROK had been trying to stop the US from withdrawing its presence from the South by stating that a North Korean attack on the South was inevitable. The ROK would require the US to speed up the modernisation programme and also to add the element of automaticity into the US-ROK Security Treaty.²⁵

Nixon implemented the Nixon Doctrine in South Korea by announcing that the US would be withdrawing 20,000 of the 63,000 US forces stationed in South Korea by the end of June 1971. By 31 December 1973, 24,000 troops were withdrawn.²⁶ This was contrary to the policy of the

²¹ Memorandum of Conversation, San Francisco, California, August 21, 1969, 4:15–6:15 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XIX <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/media/pdf/frus1969-76v19p1.pdf> accessed 10 May 2010, 97.

²² Ibid., 97-8.

²³ Kwak and Patterson, "The Security Relationship between Korea and the United States, 1960-1982", 85; Kwak, "U.S.-Korea Security Relations", 227-8.

²⁴ Memorandum of Conversation, San Francisco, California, August 21, 1969, 4:15–6:15 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XIX <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/media/pdf/frus1969-76v19p1.pdf> accessed 10 May 2010, 99.

²⁵ TNA: PRO FCO 21/938, 30 July 1971, A.B. Taggart to Ministry of Defence.

²⁶ Kwak, "U.S.-Korea Security Relations", 228.

Johnson administration, which had pledged that the US had no intention to reduce the level of forces in South Korea.²⁷

In response to the partial withdrawal of US forces from South Korea, Park wrote in a letter to Nixon that certain conditions had to be fulfilled before he would be willing to modify his position of total opposition to troop cuts before 1975. The US must be willing to modernise the ROK forces before making a total withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula. There had to be a substantial amount of US forces stationed in South Korea and the US had to be ready to strengthen ROK units if South Korea was subjected to an attack.²⁸ Nixon reassured Park that the US would adhere to the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty. He promised that the remaining US forces would be strong enough to deter any threats to ROK security and furthermore would be a symbol of the US commitment to ROK's defence and security.²⁹

According to Country Director for Korea at the State Department, Don Ranard, the ROK argued that Article IV of the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty stipulated that both sides had to come to an accord regarding the stationing of US forces as well as its withdrawal. The US did not agree on this point but accepted that both sides needed to discuss with each other the timing of the withdrawals and the positioning of the remaining US troops. The US would do its utmost to modernise the ROK military. The development of the modernisation programme would have no bearing on the withdrawal of US troops by the end of June 1971, which would be conducted without delay regardless of the progress of the modernisation programme.³⁰

The Nixon administration was concerned with the effects the troop withdrawal would have on the ROK. Park was reported to have been "shaken" by the US decision and the South Koreans were deeply disturbed by it. Vice President Spiro Agnew was due to visit Seoul in August 1970 and it was thought to be an appropriate time to reassure the ROK of the firm US commitment to defend South Korea under the Mutual Defense Treaty and also the support it would receive

²⁷ Background Paper; U.S. Commitments to the Republic of Korea; undated; (Visit of Park Chung Hee - Pres. of Korea Briefing Book) August 21-22, 1969; Box 930; NSC Files: VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

²⁸ Memorandum; Kissinger to President Nixon; 28 June 1970; Korea: President Chung Hee Park 1970; Box 757; NSC Files: Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

²⁹ Letter; President Nixon to President Park; 7 July 1970; Korea: President Chung Hee Park 1970; Box 757; NSC Files: Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³⁰ TNA: PRO FCO 21/786, 31 July 1970, J.C. Moberly to J.A.L. Morgan.

under the principles of the Nixon Doctrine. Moreover, it was thought that the DPRK was not as aggressive as previously due to the decreasing incidents of military harassments across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and also other areas. The US was prepared to give the ROK \$1.5 billion in grant aid and excess over five years for force modernisation, as a show of its continued commitment to the ROK despite the cut in US troops. Agnew was advised to inform Park that the remaining US troops along with the modernised ROK forces would be able to repel any DPRK attacks, even if the North was to be supported by the PRC. Park had to be warned that further troop cuts might occur due to public and Congressional pressures.³¹

Agnew told Park that the US troop withdrawals from South Korea were set and no changes could be made. He added that the rate of troop reductions in the future would be carried out in tandem with greater automatic US assistance in case of an attack from the DPRK.³² During the first meeting between Park and Agnew on 24 August 1970, Park commented that Nixon had not mentioned anything about reducing US troops during their meeting in 1969 and wished to know the reasons and domestic concerns which had led to the US to begin the withdrawal of troops from FY 71. He said that the Korean people were demoralised by the US decision and he could only wish that "wisdom will prevail." Agnew assured Park that "substantial action" would be taken in view of the troop cut.³³ Park told Agnew that the ROK was grateful for all the assistance the US had given to the South Koreans but it was important not to be overly dependent on the US. He said that he was making all efforts to make sure that the ROK could depend on itself in defence and economic matters and not to be excessively reliant on the US. However, the ROK needed time to achieve the goal of self-reliance. At that moment, the ROK was not yet ready to support its own needs. Park added that the US was possibly too optimistic about the ROK's problems with the communists and also the situation on the Korean Peninsula. He emphasised to Agnew his perception of the continual threat of the DPRK despite US views that the North Koreans were unlikely to start another war due to the limited or zero support from Soviets and also the incapability of their PRC

³¹ Memorandum; Kissinger to Agnew; 22 August 1970; Vice President's SEA Trip August 1970 [3 of 3]; Box 449; NSC Files: President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³² TNA: PRO FCO 21/780, 15 September 1970, N.C.C. Trench to FCO.

³³ Telegram; US Embassy Seoul to Secretary of State Washington DC; 25 August 1970; Vice President's SEA Trip August 1970 [1 of 3]; Box 449; NSC Files: President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

allies to render any support due to their own domestic turmoil. In Park's view, the DPRK was much stronger than the North Vietnamese and could possibly sustain a much longer war of attrition than what was going on in Vietnam at the time.³⁴ Agnew reaffirmed the US commitment to the ROK that if it was under any external threat, the US, according to the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, would not hesitate to "act to meet that situation in accordance with our constitutional processes." Agnew went further to pledge that the US would "stand by its commitments regardless of some attitudes expressed by certain individuals in Congress."³⁵

Park seemed to be on the offensive when he told Agnew that the US was not "entitled" to reduce the number of troops from the Korean peninsula unless the US would accede to his three conditions. Firstly, US troops could only be withdrawn when the modernisation of the ROK military equipment was completed. Secondly, the US should not conduct anymore further withdrawals after the initial withdrawal. The last condition was that the US should give the ROK a written commitment of automatic assistance to the ROK in case of a DPRK attack.³⁶ Agnew explained that it would be very difficult for the Americans to accede to these conditions. This was because approval had to be sought from Congress for the funds needed for the modernisation of military equipment. He said that Congress could only approve of any proposals once the US and ROK experts come to a consensus regarding the funds required. He emphasised the need for the ROK to be more self-reliant so as to eliminate the need for the presence of American troops in South Korea. With regards to the Mutual Defense Treaty, Agnew explained that it would not be possible for the US to provide automatic assistance as this would mean a disregard for the constitutional processes of the US and also a sign of a lack of confidence for the Nixon administration to come to the aid of its ally in times of danger. Moreover, the US had also just reaffirmed its commitment to the ROK.³⁷

In another statement, Park repeated that he was not opposed to the US troop cut of FY 71, as long as the number of US troops left in South Korea remained the same until the modernisation

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ TNA: PRO FCO 21/780, 15 September 1970, N.C.C. Trench to FCO.

³⁷ TNA: PRO FCO 21/780, 15 September 1970, N.C.C. Trench to FCO.

of ROK forces had been implemented and the ROK military grew stronger.³⁸ He reiterated this concern to Agnew on 26 August 1970 and asked the Vice President to convey to Nixon the serious problem that would befall his people if the US continued to administer troop cuts when the modernisation program was no where near its completion.³⁹

While on a flight leaving Seoul for Taipei, Agnew revealed to reporters information regarding the troop cuts and the modernisation programme which infuriated the ROK when they found out what was being said. Agnew told reporters that there was no direct relationship between troop reductions and the modernisation programme as the two were not mutually dependent. He added that the US might withdraw completely from South Korea, probably in five years, once the ROK military was fully re-equipped. He also suggested that he had “discussed [this] hypothetically” with Park. The ROK government was furious and stated that no agreement had been reached regarding the reduction of US forces and that any withdrawals would only be conducted after the complete modernisation of ROK equipment.⁴⁰ J.D.I Boyd of the British Embassy in Washington spoke to Ranard who told the British that Agnew’s trip to South Korea was indeed “sticky” and the ROK did not receive the guarantee from Agnew that the US would not conduct further withdrawals after the initial reductions.⁴¹

More reassurances from the US regarding the modernisation programme came in a joint statement between the US and the ROK issued on 6 February 1971. The US stated that it would aid the ROK with the modernisation of its military through a long range military assistance programme which would operate on the recommendations of the ROK and the US. The US Congress approved the provision of \$150 million worth of supplemental funds which would make up the amount needed for the first year of the programme.⁴² The US was also transferring some of the defence responsibilities to the ROK, moving the US away from South Korea’s frontline. In 1971, it was arranged that the ROK forces would be taking over the responsibility of looking after the whole of

³⁸ Telegram; US Embassy Seoul to Secretary of State Washington DC; 25 August 1970; Vice President's SEA Trip August 1970 [1 of 3]; Box 449; NSC Files: President's Trip Files; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³⁹ Telegram; CINCPAC to RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC; 30 August 1970; Vice President's SEA Trip August 1970 [2 of 3]; Box 449; NSC Files: President's Trip Files; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁴⁰ TNA: PRO FCO 21/780, 15 September 1970, N.C.C. Trench to FCO.

⁴¹ TNA: PRO FCO 21/780, 24 September 1970, J.D.I. Boyd to F.J. Roberts.

⁴² TNA: PRO FCO 21/946, 12 February 1971, M E J Gore to P J Roberts.

the demilitarised zone from the Americans. This meant that other than the small detachment in the Joint Security Area at *Panmunjom*, the American forces would be out of the frontline.⁴³

On the first Annual US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting held from 11 to 12 July 1971, the issue of the US rapprochement with the PRC was brought up. There were already apprehensions from the ROK regarding recent developments of the US-PRC relationship. The criticism was that the US was moving too fast in its quest to mend ties with the PRC, thus overlooking the possible long term problems. The ROK apprehensions regarding the rapprochement were that the US views on the defence needs of the ROK might be affected.⁴⁴ The South Koreans were said to be “hurt” and “alarmed” by the shifts in the policies of the Nixon administration. The ROK felt that the US were giving in to the PRC and ultimately, the South Koreans would suffer, maybe even more so than the US, should the PRC surprise the US with duplicity.⁴⁵ The US move towards the PRC might affect the ROK’s trade ties with those non-communist countries trying to open up trade ties with the PRC too enthusiastically.⁴⁶ It was reported that some Japanese firms interested in opening up trade links with the PRC, were intending to not attend the Korean-Japanese economic cooperation committee meeting.⁴⁷

ROK’s Response to the US-PRC Rapprochement

On 15 July 1971, Nixon dropped the bombshell with his announcement of Kissinger’s visit to Beijing. Due to Nixon’s penchant for secrecy, and perhaps to save himself the embarrassment should his China initiative end in failure, he was determined that no one outside of the White House circle had any knowledge of the opening to the PRC. This meant that most allies, including the ROK were taken by surprise by the announcement and were not consulted beforehand. Park was reported to have suffered “one hell of a jolt” by the shock of Nixon’s announcement as there was no consultation with the ROK before 15 July.⁴⁸ The ROK was surprised by the

⁴³ TNA: PRO FCO 21/946, 12 February 1971, M E J Gore to P J Roberts.

⁴⁴ TNA: PRO FCO 21/938, 30 July 1971, Taggart to Ministry of Defence.

⁴⁵ TNA: PRO FCO 21/938, 28 July 1971, P J George to J A L Morgan.

⁴⁶ TNA: PRO FCO 21/938, 30 July 1971, Taggart to Ministry of Defence.

⁴⁷ TNA: PRO FCO 21/938, 28 July 1971, P J George to J A L Morgan.

⁴⁸ Lee and Sato, U.S. Policy toward Japan and Korea: A Changing Influence Relationship, 65.

announcement, just like the ROC and Japan who were not consulted in advance regarding the rapprochement.

The media reaction to the Nixon's announcement was encouraging. The government-owned daily *Seoul Shinmun* reported on 20 July that Nixon's China initiative was in line with ROK's quest for peace in Asia and was a long-awaited development in international politics. The National Democratic Party, a major opposition party, urged that in view of the changing international situation, the Park government should embark on its own brand new foreign policy initiative.⁴⁹

The official reactions from the Foreign Ministry and the ruling Democratic Republican Party were somewhat contradictory. The Foreign Ministry said that the 15 July announcement was a piece of "shocking news" but hoped that the US-PRC rapprochement would lead to the "restoration of peace and maintenance of order in Asia." A spokesman of the ruling Democratic Republican Party expressed the sentiment that Nixon's move towards the PRC was hardly a surprise and commented that any move towards rapprochement should not be hastily made because of the possible undesirable side effects it could bring.⁵⁰

The official Park government's reactions to the rapprochement was reiterated in a letter to Nixon, dated 16 September 1971, which stated Park's concerns regarding the US move towards the PRC. He applauded the Nixon administration's China initiative and also the positive effect it would have on easing the tense situation in Asia. However, Park had several concerns regarding how the talks in Beijing might affect the ROK and raised these concerns to Nixon. He hoped that the US would first consult the ROK if the issue of Korea was to be raised in Beijing. Park went on to attempt to extract more aid from the US. He stated that since the DPRK was receiving support from the PRC to strengthen its military power, the US should stand firmly by its commitment to the ROK by providing substantial economic and military aid and adhere to the terms of the defence treaty. The modernisation of the Korean forces should also be speeded up. The ROK would

⁴⁹ Memorandum; Department of State to Kissinger; 22 July 1971; Reaction to China Initiative Memos, Letters, etc. July 1971; Box 499; NSC Files: President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵⁰ Memorandum; Theodore L. Eliot, Jr to Kissinger; 16 July 1971; Reaction to China Initiative Memos, Letters, etc. July 1971; Box 499; NSC Files: President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

naturally be opposed to any possible PRC demands for withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea. The ROK viewed the presence of foreign troops and also the presence of the UN Command (UNC) as vital to the defence of South Korea.⁵¹

The US continued its attempts to reassure the ROK after its rapprochement with the PRC. Rogers met with ROK Foreign Minister Kim Yong-sik and told him that Nixon's trip to China would not be made at the expense of the US allies and friends. There were no agreements made or preconditions agreed to and the objective of Nixon's visit was to improve US ties with the PRC through direct communications. The US would not make any decisions regarding the Korean issue without prior consultations with the ROK. The US-ROK alliance would not be jeopardised. There were no plans to decrease the US troop levels in FY 72.⁵²

Foreign Minister Kim tried to seek confirmation of the continual US support for the ROK defence during his conversation with Kissinger. Kim also highlighted the ROK apprehensions regarding the future of the Mutual Defense Treaty as Zhou Enlai had been telling the western media that the US would be retreating from South Korea and terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty.⁵³ Kissinger clarified that the US had no intention to renege on the Mutual Defense Treaty. Zhou was free to say whatever he wanted and wished for the desired outcome of the Korean issue but it was not the role of the US to bring his wishes into fruition. He emphasised that the Korean issue would not be the topic of discussion between the US and the PRC. He added that the US would not jeopardise the interest of its friend with a country which was still an enemy. He said that the US had made clear to Zhou the continual US commitment to the ROK.⁵⁴ There were also no plans to reduce US troop levels at least till July 1973 and the modernisation of ROK forces would proceed.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Memorandum; Kissinger to President Nixon; 26 November 1971; Korea: President Chung Hee Park 1971 ; Box 757; NSC Files: Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵² Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, Washington, September 23, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 XIX Korea(Part I), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/media/pdf/frus1969-76v19p1.pdf> accessed 20 May 2010, 280.

⁵³ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 28, 1971, 5:30 p.m., FRUS 1969-1976 XIX Korea(Part I), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/media/pdf/frus1969-76v19p1.pdf> accessed 20 May 2010, 282.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 282-3.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 283.

In a letter from Nixon to Park, dated 29 November 1971, Nixon explained that the move towards the PRC was made with the hope that it would lead to a lessening of tensions in Asia. This could only be achieved with the opening of communications so that the two sides could have a better understanding of their differences. The talks would strictly concentrate on bilateral issues, but if any issues regarding Korea were discussed, the US would not compromise the interests of the ROK and would affirm the strong bond it shared with the ROK.⁵⁶ Nixon repeated once again that US treaty obligations with its allies would be upheld and it would not fully eradicate its involvement in Asia. Nixon added that the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty was most crucial to peace and stability in Asia. Nixon told Park that the US was fully committed to the defence of the ROK and cited the modernisation of ROK forces as evidence of US commitment. Nixon stated his approval of the increasing self-reliance of the ROK in sharing the defence burden of South Korea. He told Park that the US had no intention to withdraw any more troops from South Korea for the moment.⁵⁷

Park expressed his appreciation for Nixon's letter but stated his apprehension that the US-PRC rapprochement might be detrimental to the ROK, the same way it had affected the ROC. He stressed the importance of the Mutual Defense Treaty as deterrence against war and was the main reason for the absence of war in the region. Park was in favour of Nixon's desire to ease tensions in the region. He believed that the ROK should embark on self-reliance, and this coupled with the Mutual Defense Treaty would ensure the security of the nation.⁵⁸ Hence, Park recognised the importance of keeping close to the US and holding on to the Mutual Defense Treaty. Park expressed his worry that the entry of the PRC into the UN would work to the advantage of the DPRK as the PRC would speak for the North Koreans in the UN. There was a fear that the PRC supported the reunification of Korea by force as it had express full support for DPRK's policies.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Letter; President Nixon to President Park Chung Hee; 29 November 1971; Korea: President Chung Hee Park 1971; Box 757; NSC Files: Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, Seoul, December 13, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 XIX Korea (Part I), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/media/pdf/frus1969-76v19p1.pdf> accessed 20 May 2010, 303.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

NSC member John Holdridge reported to Kissinger that Park was feeling nervous about the upcoming Nixon trip to China and was worried about the future of Korea in relation to the US-PRC rapprochement. Park's imposition of a limited emergency in South Korea was due to his concerns regarding Korea's plight in the changing circumstances of Northeast Asia. He was also pushing for a summit meeting with Nixon, which could be seen as a move to preserve the US-ROK relationship at the highest level. This also indicated a loss of confidence in bilateral ties and thus reassurances needed to be sought.⁶⁰

During the July secret meetings and October talks between Zhou and Kissinger and also the Nixon-Zhou talks in February 1972, the issue of Korea was brought up several times. The ROK was told by the US that the issue of Korea was not featured prominently. The presence of foreign troops in South Korea was one of the concerns of the PRC. Zhou told Kissinger in July 1971 that there should be no foreign intervention in the affairs of other countries. Hence, there should be no foreign troops present in other countries and internal affairs should be resolved by the people of the nations involved. The PRC had already withdrawn its troops from Korea long ago in 1958 and US troops in South Korea should be withdrawn as well.⁶¹ He added that he could not understand why US troops had to remain in South Korea since there was already a Mutual Defense Treaty.⁶² The PRC was concerned about the presence of ROK troops in Vietnam and demanded that these troops should be withdrawn from Vietnam too.⁶³ Kissinger tried to link the issue of US troop withdrawals from South Korea to the end of the war in Vietnam and also the development of the US-PRC relationship. He told Zhou that the issue of US troops in South Korea was related to "the general relationships in this area" and the US-PRC handling of "the transition from one phase of international relations to another phase of international relations." He emphasised that time was needed for the completion of the US withdrawal from South Korea and if the US and the PRC maintained a cordial relationship and the war in Vietnam could be successfully concluded, an

⁶⁰ Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 12, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XIX Korea (Part I), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/media/pdf/frus1969-76v19p1.pdf> accessed 20 May 2010, 317.

⁶¹ Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, July 9, 1971, 4:35-11:20 p.m., FRUS 1969-76, XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 388-9.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 391.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 388.

almost complete US withdrawal from South Korea would be possible by the end of Nixon's next term.⁶⁴ Kissinger could be perceived as giving the PRC another stake in helping to end the war in Vietnam, the other being the link between the withdrawal of US forces in Taiwan and the end of the Vietnam War, and also a reassurance that the US-PRC relationship would continue to improve.

The issue of "Japanese militarism" was brought up in relation to the Korean problem. The PRC was concerned that US troops would be replaced by Japanese troops after the US made its complete withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula. Zhou based his belief on the fact that the ROK and Japan had signed a treaty in 1965 and the Japanese regarded Korea and Taiwan as a "springboard" for further external expansion. He thought that the "Japanese militarists" would take the opportunity to send their own forces into South Korea once the US completed its withdrawal.⁶⁵ Kissinger assured Zhou that the US was against any Japanese expansion and Japanese troops would never replace US troops in Korea or Taiwan. He also informed Zhou that since July, the US had investigated and looked into the problem of Japanese officers visiting Korea in 1971 and would keep an eye on the situation.⁶⁶ In February 1972, Nixon added his own assurance by stating that "we cannot guarantee we can keep out Japanese intervention, but to the extent we can do so, we will use our influence to discourage it."⁶⁷

Nixon arrived in Beijing on 21 February 1972 and began his one-week visit of China. In the Shanghai Communiqué, the US and the PRC affirmed their support for their respective Korean allies. The US stated the following:

The United States will maintain its close ties and support of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean Peninsula.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 390-1.

⁶⁵ Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, "Korea, Japan, South Asia, Soviet Union, Arms Control," 22 October 1971, 4:15 - 8:28 p.m., reproduced at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc13.pdf> accessed 20 June 2008, 6.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 10.

⁶⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, 24 February 1972, 5:15 p.m. - 8:05 p.m., reproduced at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/NZ-3.pdf>, accessed 20 June 2008, 25.

The PRC declared that

It firmly supports the eight point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea."⁶⁸

By indicating the US and PRC's respective positions instead of coming to agreement on the issues which separated the two sides apparently worked to the advantage of the US. The text in the communiqué appeared to the ROK as an indication that there was no consensus between the US and the PRC on issues related to Korea. Foreign Minister Kim Yong-shik said that the ROK did not expect the two sides to come to any agreement and assumed that the US had supported the ROK position during its talks with the PRC. The opposition, New Democratic Party (NDP) was more wary of the results of Nixon's visit and suggested that in order to prevent the ROK from suffering the same fate as the ROC, the ROK government should conduct further diplomatic overtures towards the US.⁶⁹

The press were sceptical that no secret understandings regarding Korea were made during the Nixon visit despite Nixon's reassurances that none were made and warned against accepting the communiqué at face value.⁷⁰ The independent and influential *Joongang Ilbo* of Seoul wrote, "Although the US is making clear that its rapprochement with Red China will not be at the expense of its allies, and that it will continue to maintain close ties with and support to Korea, nevertheless there is no doubt that the US policy toward Asia is bound to undergo a drastic shift."⁷¹ *Joongang*

⁶⁸ The complete text of the Shanghai communiqué can be found in, Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 1490-2; footnote 3 of XXIV

⁶⁹ Report; Peking Visit Communiqué; 28 February 1972; China Trip February-March 1972 [1 of 2]; Box 501; NSC Files: President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁷⁰ TNA: PRO FCO 21/1065, 4 March 1972, Petersen to FCO.

⁷¹ Report; Peking Visit Communiqué; 28 February 1972; China Trip February-March 1972 [1 of 2]; Box 501; NSC Files: President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

Ilbo interpreted the text of the communiqué as “a clear cut demonstration of US intent to substantially reduce American involvement on the promise of freezing the status quo in Asia.”⁷²

The media placed a considerable amount of emphasis on Marshall Green and John Holdridge’s tour of Asia. The two men were scheduled to travel to various Asian capitals to brief the allies on the US rapprochement with the PRC. The pro-government *Kyunghyang Shinmun* of Seoul said that it had “high expectations for the visit” and there would be an interest amongst Koreans to find out what was exchanged between the US and the PRC on issues relating to Korea during the Beijing Summit. There was a particular interest to find out if the two sides exchanged views on the “two Koreas” which was a topic the ROK was extremely sensitive to.⁷³

Green and Holdridge visited South Korea on 1 and 2 March. The ROK was told by Green that the Korean situation and the US withdrawal from South Korea were not major issues of concern during the Nixon visit. However, the PRC brought up the issue with the US as part of the issue related to divided nations.⁷⁴ Green and Holdridge spoke to Foreign Minister Kim on 1 March 1972 and discussed the Nixon trip to China. Kim was interested to find out the topics which were discussed in China and how serious the PRC was in topics related to Korea. He wanted to know if the PRC gave any reasons for its support for the DPRK’s Eight Points on Reunification.⁷⁵ Green and Holdridge revealed that the PRC was first to express its views regarding Korea during the Summit and that the discussion, as was the same as the other topics discussed, was brief and adhered to the communiqué. He added that he felt that the PRC only talked about Korea in conventional terms because of its ties with the DPRK and also to pre-empt criticism from the USSR that the PRC was not supporting its North Korean ally. The ROK was concerned about the issue of whether or not the PRC opposed to the US forces in South Korea, as there was no specific indication from the PRC in the communiqué calling for a withdrawal of US forces from South Korea while demanding for the abolition of UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation

⁷² Report; Foreign Media Treatment of President Nixon’s Visit to China; 28 February 1972; China Trip February-March 1972 [1 of 2]; Box 501; NSC Files: President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁷³ Report; Peking Visit Communiqué; 28 February 1972; China Trip February-March 1972 [1 of 2]; Box 501; NSC Files: President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁷⁴ TNA: PRO FCO 21/1065, 9 March 1972, J C Petersen to Morgan.

⁷⁵ Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, Seoul, March 2, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XIX Korea (Part I), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976v19p1/media/pdf/frus1969-76v19p1.pdf> accessed 20 May 2010, 319.

of Korea (UNCURK). Green's answer was that the PRC had stated on the communiqué that "all foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own country".⁷⁶ On the question of PRC support for the DPRK using military means against the ROK, Green said that in his opinion, the PRC was not in favour of another war in Korea due to the lesson of the Korean War.⁷⁷

The Park government was reportedly satisfied with the wording of the Communiqué and believed that it "contains the sum and substance of the discussion on the Korean problem". Hence, it was "considerably reassured" over the result of Nixon's China visit.⁷⁸ According to a British report on the assessment of the ROK reactions to Shanghai Communiqué, the official reaction of the ROK was that it was pleased with the reaffirmation of the US commitment to the ROK as stated in the communiqué.⁷⁹ The South Koreans were most concerned about the Taiwan section of the communiqué. It was concerned about the US pledge to reduce its troops in Taiwan, as this would mean that US forces in South Korea would appear to be an abnormal occurrence.⁸⁰ This meant that the US would be in danger of losing its justification to stay in South Korea and might have to withdraw completely to avoid criticisms. The US promise to withdraw from Taiwan was deemed by some South Koreans, including some ROK officials, as a "sellout". The ROK concern for the Taiwanese issue could not be allayed despite the reassurances from the US regarding its concern for the security of Taiwan.⁸¹ However, when Secretary Rogers declared during a press conference that the US had received "indications" that North Korea was in favour of détente and this was in line with the US readiness to seek better relations with every country and that included North Korea, the ROK suspected that the Communist Chinese had provided the US with these "indications".⁸²

The US rapprochement with the PRC was not the only issue which caught the attention of the ROK. The US was moving towards détente with the USSR, another ally of the North Koreans,

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 320.

⁷⁸ Memorandum; Haig to President Nixon; 24 March 1972; China Trip February-March 1972 [2 of 2]; Box 501; NSC Files: President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁷⁹ TNA: PRO FCO 21/1065, 4 March 1972, Petersen to FCO.

⁸⁰ TNA PRO FCO 21/1065, 9 March 1972, Petersen to Morgan.

⁸¹ TNA: PRO FCO 21/1065, 4 March 1972, Petersen to FCO.

⁸² Memorandum; Haig to President Nixon; 24 March 1972; China Trip February-March 1972 [2 of 2]; Box 501; NSC Files: President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

and this development would raise apprehensions in Seoul. With the conclusion of Nixon's historic visit to China, it was time for Park to concentrate on getting assurances from the US with regards to the Moscow Summit. This was evident in Park's letter to Nixon dated 23 March 1972 as he sought US assurances that the interest of US allies and friends would not be compromised during the upcoming summit.⁸³ Nixon assured Park that the purpose of opening up communications with the PRC and the USSR was to ensure that there would be peace and progress in Asia.⁸⁴

The Nixon administration's twin pursuits of rapprochement with the PRC and détente with the USSR led to a changing international environment and meant that the two communist giants would not encourage a war in the Korean Peninsula. With this, the military justification for the continued presence of US forces on Korea was losing its validity.⁸⁵ The development towards friendlier relations with the USSR and the PRC meant that a withdrawal of the US troops in South Korea was not at all unrealistic. Moreover, the ROK's own military capabilities plus the military aid from the US meant that the South Koreans could easily defend themselves, moving towards greater self-reliance. With the withdrawal of 10,000 ROK troops from Vietnam, about 39,000 still remained there. The US hoped that the remaining ROK troops would stay in Vietnam.⁸⁶

In 1972, ROK Foreign Minister Kim visited Washington and held talks with Rogers and U Alexis Johnson. Kim had been reassured that US military aid would remain forthcoming and that there were no plans, at that moment, to further reduce the US troops in South Korea.⁸⁷ The official stance of the US remained the same in 1973, which was that the US had no plans to make any additional withdrawals during the fiscal year of 1973.⁸⁸ When Kissinger visited South Korea in 1973, Park was again reassured of the continued US commitment to the US-ROK defence

⁸³ Memorandum; Theodore L. Eliot, Jr to Kissinger; 7 April 1972; Korea: President Parks [sic] (1972) 1972; Box 757; NSC Files: Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁸⁴ Letter; President Nixon to President Park Chung Hee; 19 May 1972; Korea: President Parks [sic] (1972) 1972; Box 757; NSC Files: Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁸⁵ Kwak, "U.S.-Korea Security Relations", 230.

⁸⁶ TNA: PRO FCO 21/1065, 15 May 1972, J C Moberly to R M Evans.

⁸⁷ TNA: PRO FCO21/1065, 29 September 1972, Cromer to FCO.

⁸⁸ TNA: PRO FCO 21/1191, 16 March 1973, Moberly to R M Evans.

arrangements. Kissinger told Park that in his recent visit to Beijing, the issue of the withdrawal of US troops in South Korea was not mentioned.⁸⁹

As the US moved towards mending ties with the PRC, alarm bells were ringing in both Pyongyang and Seoul. In order to prevent the US and the PRC from dictating the fate of the Korean people, both Koreas came up with a “creative approach to Korean unification.”⁹⁰ In August 1971, Seoul approached Pyongyang to discuss the commencement of Red Cross talks which would allow the exchange of information pertaining to Koreans who were displaced during the Korean War.⁹¹ The DPRK responded well to Seoul’s suggestion and the result was the beginning of direct communications between the Red Cross Societies of both Koreas. Further action towards greater communications was taken as a high level North-South coordinating committee was established to work towards unification. There were moves taken to lower the threat of an accidental war and a “hotline” between the two capitals was set up.⁹²

In the spirit of Nixon and Kissinger’s brand of secret diplomacy, the South Korean CIA Chief made a secret visit to North Korea and returned to Seoul with an agreement regarding possible reunification. On July 4 1972, a joint communiqué on the principles of the reunification of Korea was released by both Pyongyang and Seoul:

- I. Unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts without being subjected to external imposition or interference.
- II. Unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force against each other.
- III. As a homogenous people, a great national unity shall be sought above all, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems.⁹³

⁸⁹ TNA: PRO FCO 21/1191, 17 November 1973, Petersen to FCO.

⁹⁰ Baron, “The United States, the United Nations, and Korean Unification”, 343.

⁹¹ Cho, “American Policy toward Korean Unification, 1945-1980”, 86-7.

⁹² Baron, “The United States, the United Nations, and Korean Unification”, 343.

⁹³ Cho, “American Policy toward Korean Unification, 1945-1980”, 88.

The US expressed its support for the North-South Communiqué and Green told Park on 6 July 1972, that the Americans “commended [the] ROK initiative and courage”.⁹⁴ In a memo from Kissinger to Nixon, he stated that the North-South joint communiqué was brought about mainly by the US-PRC rapprochement. The communiqué could act as a deterrent against a North Korean attack on the south.⁹⁵ The ROK could be interpreted as losing confidence in US commitment in light of the rapprochement and its gradual reduction of its presence in Asia. The ROK could be worried that its interest could be bargained away and the US might not come to its aid if the DPRK were to launch an offensive on the South. As such, the move towards friendlier ties with the DPRK was essentially to improve ties with the DPRK so as to pre-empt an attack on the South.

However the honeymoon period of Seoul-Pyongyang relations ended at the beginning of 1973, as both sides no longer saw eye to eye. There was a lack of trust between the two sides and abusive language was rampant in the media. Eventually, using the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung as an excuse, talks were suspended indefinitely in August 1973 and both sides accused each other of violating the terms of the 1972 joint communiqué.⁹⁶

The US was convinced that the PRC was using its influence and leverage over the DPRK to neutralise the tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The US believed that the PRC was responsible for Pyongyang’s sudden change of attitude in its foreign affairs. Kim Il Sung had expressed the view that the DPRK welcomed the Nixon trip to China. In his public statements, there was a display of a moderate attitude towards Korean reunification as Kim no longer insisted on the use of force to reunite the country. He seemed to be attempting to solve the Korean problem through diplomatic means. Kim was willing to negotiate a peace agreement with the South, provided that the US withdrew its troops from South Korea and also that both the North and the South should proceed with the reduction of their armed forces. Korean reunification should be resolved through

⁹⁴ Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, Seoul, July 7, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XIX Korea(Part I), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976v19p1/media/pdf/frus1969-76v19p1.pdf> accessed 20 May 2010, 372.

⁹⁵ Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 27, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XIX Korea(Part I), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976v19p1/media/pdf/frus1969-76v19p1.pdf> accessed 20 May 2010, 377.

⁹⁶ Cho, “American Policy toward Korean Unification, 1945-1980”, 90-1; Lee and Sato, *U.S. Policy toward Japan and Korea: A Changing Influence Relationship*, 66.

negotiations between the two Koreas and there should be greater contacts between the two sides. The US speculated that the PRC was paying off the DPRK with military aid in exchange for its less belligerent stance.⁹⁷ Apparently, this was not the first time that the PRC used its leverage over its allies to “achieve greater peace in Asia” which would also sustain the development of the US-PRC rapprochement. According to Evelyn Goh, there was evidence showing that the PRC attempted to persuade the North Vietnamese to end the war swiftly. She explains that despite what was articulated by Zhou in the meetings with the Americans that the PRC would not meddle in the affairs of its allies, he acknowledged that in order to carry on the process of the rapprochement the Vietnam War had to be ended on American terms.⁹⁸

According to a British report, the ROK was already trying to sound the PRC out on better ties in 1971. The British had received information from a usually reliable source that during Special Assistant to President Park Hahm Pyong Choon's visit to Ottawa, he asked the Canadians to help the ROK to establish some form of contact with the PRC.⁹⁹ There were other reports pointing to the ROK's hope for better ties with the PRC. According to the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*, the purpose of Hahm's visit to Ottawa was to send a secret message for diplomatic recognition by the PRC. Moreover, the ROK was said to be in favour of both Koreas being represented in the UN and would not support any military alliances with Japan. Kim I Kyong of the UN section stated that a China Desk was set up in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). All these reports were denied by the ROK leadership.¹⁰⁰

The MFA made a statement on 16 March in reply to the PRC statement of 15 March 1973. The PRC statement charged the ROK with giving its consent to the operations of an offshore oil rig in exploratory drilling in the Yellow Sea and East China Sea, which the PRC viewed as a violation of their rights over the Chinese continental shelf. The significance of this statement was the use of the name the “People's Republic of China” to refer to Communist China. The British were told by the MFA that the name was used after a decision made by the highest level of the ROK

⁹⁷ Briefing Paper, Korea; Undated; PRC Briefing Papers Sent to President February 1972; Box 91; HAK Office Files: Country Files-Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁹⁸ Goh, *Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974*, 182.

⁹⁹ TNA: PRO FCO 21/937, 23 September 1971, George to R.S. Crowson.

¹⁰⁰ TNA: PRO FCO 21/937, 23 September 1971, George to R.S. Crowson.

leadership.¹⁰¹ The ROK stated that it would be interested in setting up diplomatic ties with “non-hostile” communist states so as to counter the diplomatic recognition the DPRK was getting from the non-communist states. As such, the ROK was interested in setting up communications with the PRC and was even said to be actually trying to achieve that. However, the PRC was not reciprocating the ROK advances.¹⁰²

The ROK sought Australian assistance to approach the PRC. Australian Ambassador Murray Bouchier told the US that the ROK hoped that a Korean Trade Delegation could visit China and also that Foreign Ministry Asian Bureau Director Chi Song Ku would be able to go to China on an unpublicised visit.¹⁰³ The Australians approached the PRC with both of the ROK’s requests which were duly rejected by the PRC.¹⁰⁴ The British were told by the ROK ambassador on 25 June 1973 that the ROK was very eager to set up diplomatic ties with the PRC. The ROK seemed to be willing to sever its ties with the ROC.¹⁰⁵ However, the PRC was not interested in diplomatic ties with the ROK. This was apparent in a conversation between Ohira and Zhou in which Zhou told Ohira that it was out of the question and that the PRC would “never recognise the ROK”. However, Ohira felt that Zhou was hinting that the PRC would be willing to set up other exchanges with the ROK, short of diplomatic recognition.¹⁰⁶

The US-ROK relationship was changing as a result of Nixon’s policies in Asia and the rapprochement with the PRC. US Ambassador to the ROK Philip C. Habib observed “a submerged but real feeling of concern” in the ROK regarding US commitment. There were feelings of neglect by the US especially with the developments of the Vietnam War. The South Koreans felt that they were “being swept along by currents concerning which they have no knowledge, and over which

¹⁰¹ TNA: PRO FCO 21/1189, 22 March 1973, Jennifer Dimond to C J A Denne.

¹⁰² Telegram: AMEMBASSY Seoul to SECSTATE Washington DC; June 15, 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=36369&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 April 2010.

¹⁰³ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Seoul to SECSTATE Washington DC; June 19, 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=34184&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 April 2010.

¹⁰⁴ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Seoul to SECSTATE Washington DC; July 10, 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=41814&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 April 2010.

¹⁰⁵ TNA: PRC FCO 21/1189, 26 June 1973, Denne to Hervey.

¹⁰⁶ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Seoul to SECSTATE Washington DC; January 15, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=789&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 April 2010.

they have no control.” As the ROK was the last US ally to maintain troops in Vietnam, it felt that the US should share some information with it.¹⁰⁷

The ROK’s lack of confidence over US commitment was evident when Park proclaimed martial law in the ROK in October 1972, which would perpetuate his position as the President of the ROK. According to Park’s proclamation, martial law in the ROK was triggered by the “international instability” partly caused by Nixon’s China policy and also the Japanese normalisation of relations with the PRC.¹⁰⁸ The US was not pleased with this development. Rogers told Ambassador Kim Dong Jo on 16 October 1972 that the reasons given for the imposition of martial law were unacceptable and could not comprehend the attack on US policy in Asia which was implied in Park’s presidential proclamation. It clearly indicated that the ROK was querying the “wisdom and morality” of US policy and also stated that US actions was detrimental to the ROK. The US was clearly unhappy with the language of the proclamation and stated that it would cause great problems to bilateral ties and the US would denounce such statements publicly as appropriate. Green added that the imposition of martial law was “erroneous” on the part of the Park leadership. It could be viewed as “an attack on US policy by an old and trusted friend.”¹⁰⁹ The US was apparently annoyed by the declaration of martial law in the ROK and this was illuminated by the conversation between Ambassador Kim and Under Secretary Johnson. Johnson said that the US government was “deeply disappointed” by the ROK decision to impose martial law. He said that the world would question whether ROK was any different from the DPRK in view of its authoritarian ways.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, Seoul, May 19, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XIX Korea (Part I), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976v19p1/media/pdf/frus1969-76v19p1.pdf> accessed 20 May 2010, 351.

¹⁰⁸ Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 17, 1972. FRUS 1969-1976 XIX Korea (Part I), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976v19p1/media/pdf/frus1969-76v19p1.pdf> accessed 20 May 2010, 418-9.

¹⁰⁹ Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, Washington, October 17, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XIX Korea (Part I), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976v19p1/media/pdf/frus1969-76v19p1.pdf> accessed 20 May 2010, 417.

¹¹⁰ Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, Washington, October 18, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XIX Korea (Part I), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976v19p1/media/pdf/frus1969-76v19p1.pdf> accessed 20 May 2010, 421-2.

Conclusion

The policy of containment of Communist China was no longer appropriate due to the changing international political climate and the final breakdown of the relationship between the USSR and the PRC. Already troubled by the Nixon Doctrine and reduction of US forces, the ROK was shocked by the Kissinger secret visit to Beijing. The Park government tried to bargain with the US for further reinforcements to the ROK defence capabilities and to speed up the process of the modernisation of the ROK forces. The ROK cited the inferiority of the ROK forces, as compared to that of the DPRK, and the belligerency of the North Koreans as reasons why the US should comply with its requests. The ROK was worried that its interests would be gambled away by the US during its talks with the PRC and reassurances were needed from the US. There were also fears that the US might withdraw completely from South Korea as per the Taiwan section on the Shanghai communiqué, which indicated that the US intention to withdraw from Taiwan, and which would render the continual US presence in South Korea as invalid. Moreover, as the US improved its relations with the USSR and the PRC, the prospect of the US withdrawing completely from South Korea was not at all impossible. There was an improvement of Seoul-Pyongyang relations, as the initial apprehensions regarding the US-PRC rapprochement drove the two Koreas towards discussions so that the fate of Korea would not rest in the hands of their big power allies. However, this improvement proved to be short-lived. Park's declaration of martial law, which was brought about by ROK anxieties regarding the US-PRC rapprochement, soured US-ROK relations.

Nixon's wish to decrease the US presence in Korea was carried on by President Jimmy Carter who shared the sentiment that US troops in Korea should be withdrawn. Carter announced on 9 March 1977 that there was no longer a need for US troops to remain in South Korea. However, despite Carter's announcement, the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea was never carried out. The troop withdrawal issue, along with the Koreagate scandal¹¹¹ and the problems of human rights in the ROK created many difficulties in the US-ROK relationship during the years of the

¹¹¹ The Koreagate scandal involved ROK agents' attempts to extract favours from the US congress through bribes.

Carter administration.¹¹² In 1981, President Ronald Reagan assured the ROK President Chun Doo Hwan that there were no plans to carry out further troop withdrawals under the new administration.¹¹³ This seemed to echo Johnson pledge, back in 1966, that the US would not commence any reduction of US forces in Korea. ROK-PRC relations progressed slowly as diplomatic ties were only established in 1992.

The thesis now turns its focus onto the states in Southeast Asia. The next chapter is on The Philippines, another ally of the US in Asia that was facing a situation similar to that of the ROK as Nixon attempted to decrease the US presence in Asia and seek rapprochement with the PRC.

¹¹² Claude A. Buss, *The United States and the Republic of Korea: Background for Policy* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), 149.

¹¹³ Choi Chong-Ki, "American-Korean Diplomatic Relations, 1961-1982", in *U.S.- Korean Relations 1882-1982* (ed) Kwak, Tae-Hwan in collaborations with John Chay, Soon Sung Cho and Shannon McCune (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1982), 112.

4. The Philippines

The Philippines, which was formerly a Spanish colony, came under American occupation in 1898 when Admiral George Dewey defeated the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay. Spain ceded the Philippines to the US under the terms of the Treaty of Paris which was signed on 10 December. American military rule was proclaimed in Manila on 21 December, after the surrender by the Spaniards, and subsequently extended to the entire archipelago. The colonial relationship lasted till 4 July 1946 when President Truman declared that American sovereignty over the Philippines had ended, making the Philippines an independent state.

The Philippines kept a close relationship with the US and was said to be the oldest and most reliable ally of the US in Asia.¹ Shortly before his death in 1948, Manuel Roxas, the first President of the Philippines, stated that the US and the Philippines would fight “side by side” in a war “waged by aggressor nations against the forces of freedom and liberty.”² It was a bonafide US ally, as there were American troops stationed in the Philippines. The defence alliance was affirmed with the signing of the Mutual Defence Treaty of 1951 and the Philippines was a founding member of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954. It relied heavily on its American ally for economic and military aid. The Philippines was a close friend of the ROC and had no diplomatic ties with the PRC. Domestically, it was threatened by the presence of communist elements influenced by Maoism.

The Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization hit the Ferdinand Marcos government hard as the Nixon administration proceeded to reduce its presence in the Philippines. This chapter explores the American impression of the reactions of the Marcos government towards Nixon’s strategy in Asia and the reduction of the US presence in the Philippines. The Philippine responses and views regarding the US rapprochement with the PRC, as were conveyed to the US, will be discussed. The Philippine stand on the issue of the Chinese representation in the UN will be analysed. The chapter will discuss the development of US-Philippines relationship after the Nixon visit and how the

¹ Bjorn Hegelin, “Military Dependency: Thailand and the Philippines”, *Journal of Peace Research* 25, 4(1988): 434.

² Claude A. Buss, *The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy*. (Washington D.C: American Enterprise for Public Policy Research, 1977), 25-6.

rapprochement seemingly accelerated the establishment of diplomatic ties between Beijing and Manila.

Background: The US Alliance with the Philippines

According to the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos Romulo, “the Philippines is committed to the fullest possible collaboration with the United States of America on all matters that are essential to their mutual security.”³ The collaboration was made possible with the signing of the Military Bases Agreement and also the Military Assistance Agreement between the US and the Philippines in 1947. The Military Bases Agreement stipulated that the Americans would be allowed to use 23 army, navy and air force bases without the need for the payment of rent for 99 years. Over the years, the agreement was subjected to various negotiations which included moving forward the end of the lease date from 2046 to 1991.

The defence relationship between the two sides was further strengthened with the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the US in 1951. The treaty stated that in the event that the Philippines were to come under attack, the US would act according to the constitutional processes. However, this meant that, just like the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, there was no guarantee of automatic assistance. This was illustrated in Article IV of the treaty which stated that

Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its processes.⁴

President Quirino was apparently unsatisfied with the treaty and criticised its lack of automatic assistance.⁵

³ Jose D. Ingles, *Philippine Foreign Policy* (Manila: Lyceum of the Philippines, 1980 and 1982), 18.

⁴ Background; U.S. Defense Commitments to the Philippines; December 8 1969; VP Agnew’s Trip Dec 1969-Jan 1970 The Philippines; Box 82; NSC Files: HAKOF; Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵ Virginia S. Capulong-Hallenberg, *Philippine Foreign Policy Toward the U.S. 1972-1980: Reorientation?*, (Stockholm: Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm, 1987), 39.

In 1954, the Philippines became a signatory of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Pact, also known as the Manila Pact. SEATO was subsequently established. Australia, New Zealand, the US, Great Britain, France, Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan met in Manila from 6-8 September 1954 to discuss the terms of the treaty. The treaty specified that, in times of danger to any other countries covered by the treaty, the signatories would act with respect to their constitutional processes and would consult with one another to agree on the defence measures to be used.⁶ There was still no promise of automatic assistance. This lack of this promise also affected fellow SEATO member, Thailand. Article II stipulated that “mutual aid... to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability” would be provided to the Philippines when needed. The US claimed that this meant that the Philippines could use Article II to request for an expanded military assistance programme when required.⁷

The US and the Philippines were tied closely together economically with the signing of the Laurel-Langley agreement. The Philippine Economic Mission led by Senator José P. Laurel began negotiations with the US party under the leadership of Senator James M. Langley on a new trade agreement. In 1956, the negotiations concluded and the Laurel-Langley trade agreement which would guarantee a special economic relationship until 4 July 1974, was completed.⁸ The Philippines was granted a preferential tariff treatment for sugar and other key exports with the ratification of the Laurel-Langley agreement in 1955. The agreement was due to expire in 1974 and negotiations were underway between the two sides to come up with a new agreement to replace Laurel-Langley. The Marcos government was anxious to extend the preferential rights as it was important to the continued viability of the Philippine economy. Marcos stressed that some industries, such as the sugar industry would face imminent collapse if the preferential rights were to be taken away.⁹ Marcos also told Nixon that such privileges had to be extended or else the entire

⁶ Buss, *The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy*, 33.

⁷ Background; U.S. Defense Commitments to the Philippines; December 8 1969; VP Agnew's Trip Dec 1969-Jan 1970 The Philippines; Box 82; NSC Files: HAKOF; Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁸ Buss, *The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy*, 35.

⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 2 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 395.

Philippine economy would collapse.¹⁰ This illustrated that the Philippines was not only dependent on Washington for its defence and security, but also in the realm of economics.

The Philippine image as the loyal American ally was further affirmed by its support of the US effort in fighting the wars against the communist forces in Korea and Vietnam. The government under President Quirino showed tremendous support for the Republic of Korea during the Korean War by sending a Philippine regiment of 5000 men into South Korea. Moreover, the 5000 men were placed under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. Over a three-year period, the Philippine Government dispatched a total of 1200 men per year into South Korea and the US was in charge of supplying its military equipment.¹¹ This showed that not only was the Philippines supporting the ROK against the communists, it was also working closely with the US. It further illustrated that a tight military relationship existed between the US and the Philippines.

The Marcos government demonstrated its support for the Americans and the South Vietnamese in the Vietnam War by sending an engineer battalion known as the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) to Vietnam. During the Nixon administration, the PHILCAG was generating criticism in the Philippines and also in the US, creating much tension in bilateral ties. The PHILCAG had been receiving criticism in the Philippines because many viewed it as drawing precious funds away from national development.¹² Marcos was considering abandoning PHILCAG and to continue his support for the South Vietnam government through assisting in the development of an effective constabulary force.¹³ The US was reported to have provided a total of \$35 million towards PHILCAG during its time in Vietnam. The funds were used to pay for equipment, logistical support and additional allowances for the manpower. The Philippine government was responsible for paying the basic salary and other allowances.¹⁴ The Nixon

¹⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 2, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 398.

¹¹ Benjamin B. Domingo, *The Making of Filipino Foreign Policy* (Manila: Foreign Service Institute, 1983), 158.

¹² Memorandum: Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon; July 17, 1969; President Nixon's Trip July-Aug 1969 Country Briefing Book The Philippines; Box 454; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

¹³ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 2 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 395.

¹⁴ TNA: PRC FCO 15/ 1286, 4 Feb 1970, D. McD. Gordon to Wilford.

administration speculated that Marcos could have used the funds provided by the US for his personal political activities, rather than for PHILCAG matters. Marshall Green told Philippine Ambassador Lagdameo that the use of funds for non-PHILCAG matters would create a lot of implications for the US especially in light of the criticisms of the Symington Subcommittee.¹⁵ The Symington Subcommittee, chaired by Senator Stuart Symington, looked into US commitments and agreements with its overseas friends and allies. One such criticism was that the PHILCAG was a “mercenary” force and this greatly offended the Filipinos.¹⁶ The disparity of the US and Philippine financial contributions towards PHILCAG led to many Filipinos to resent PHILCAG and viewed it as indeed nothing but a mercenary force.¹⁷

The Philippines had a close relationship with the ROC. The friendship was bolstered with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship between the Manuel Roxas government and the ROC. The consequence of this treaty was that the ROC had the right to defend the interests of the Philippine Chinese community.¹⁸ The Philippines was taking on an increasingly anti-PRC and pro-ROC line in the 1950s. President Ramon Magsaysay did not recognise the PRC and opposed its admission to the UN. Magsaysay preferred that there would be no changes to the US China policy. He was facing a very powerful ethnic Chinese minority in Philippines, and felt that by having an understanding with Chiang Kai Shek, he could deal with the Chinese minority better.¹⁹

Vietnamization, the Nixon Doctrine and the Philippines

Marcos was said to be worried that insurgent activities in Asia would increase as a result of the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization.²⁰ During Nixon’s visit to Asia and Romania in 1969, he made a stop at Manila and spoke with the Philippine leadership. Nixon stated that a brand new relationship of “mutuality of interest and mutual respect” had to be forged and the “old special

¹⁵ Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 14, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 424.

¹⁶ Memorandum: Kissinger to Agnew; undated; VP Trip East Asia Jan 1970; Box 450; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

¹⁷ TNA: PRC FCO 15/ 1286, 4 Feb 1970, D. McD. Gordon to Wilford.

¹⁸ Buss, *The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy*, 25.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 33.

²⁰ Capulong-Hallenberg, *Philippine Foreign Policy Toward the U.S. 1972-1980: Reorientation?*, 195.

relations” would be abandoned.²¹ This came at the same time when Nixon was decreasing the US presence in Asia and could be seen as a first step towards reducing the level of Philippine dependency on the Americans. As noted above, the Philippines was extremely dependent on the US both militarily and economically. The Philippines could not do anything to change the US decision but it could try to gain some concessions from the US so as to ensure that they would not be at a disadvantage under these new circumstances.

While in Manila, Nixon met with Marcos on 26 July 1969. Marcos conveyed his views of the Nixon Doctrine to the US President. Nixon explained that, as a Pacific power, the US would continue to play an important role in an “area of vital future significance.” Nixon told Marcos that how the conclusion of the Vietnam War was reached would have an effect on the future US role in Asia. The US would continue to assist the South Vietnamese, albeit on a reduced scale. The South Vietnamese would have to share the defence burden as the Americans could no longer do it all by themselves. He reiterated his statement in Guam by declaring that the US was a Pacific power and would retain a major role in the region. The US would aid its Asian allies, but it was not possible to provide the same level of assistance as before. Marcos had been worrying about the proposed American withdrawal. He told Nixon that he fully understood US actions in Asia and Vietnam and also the difficulties the US was facing at that moment. He was glad to learn that the US was not planning to conduct a sudden withdrawal from the region.²² In spite of his feelings of having been reassured of the US commitment to Asia, he went on to ask for more aid, in terms of material help and not US forces, to counter the dangers of internal subversion. He was aware that the PRC was still keen on exporting wars of subversion abroad.²³ As an insurance against the possible complete American withdrawal from Vietnam, Marcos had requested \$826 million in equipment to strengthen the Philippine armed forces and also more aid to build air and naval bases in Mindanao,

²¹ Domingo, *The Making of Filipino Foreign Policy*, 203.

²² Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State | Manila, August 4, 1969 FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 409.

²³ *Ibid.*

via aide memoires handed to Nixon in Manila on 26 July 1969. The US commented that it would not be acceding to these requests.²⁴

The media response to Nixon's visit to Manila was generally optimistic. *The Manila Times* perceived that the short visit by Nixon "should go a long way in establishing a basis for future talks where the hard facts of Philippine-US relations can be realistically dealt with." *The Manila Bulletin* hoped Nixon would explain more about the possible impact of his policies on the Philippines.²⁵

Foreign Secretary Romulo was reported to have said that the visit was a great success. He was convinced that the US would not abandon Asia due to its national interests. However, he acknowledged that American troops should not stay in the Philippines as the presence of foreign troops "irritates" the nation more than anything else. Indeed, there was opposition by the public against the presence of American troops in the Philippines.²⁶ On the other hand, the local leaders were not in favour of the Nixon Doctrine as they felt that it was "a policy of cutting and running beyond what the nations out here believe[d] to be their best interests."²⁷

Despite the general sense of optimism showed by the Philippines, it was perceived by the US that the Philippines did not have a full understanding of the Nixon Doctrine. The Philippines thought that this could mean US interest in the Philippines was waning and also the US was no longer willing to "pay too high a price" to maintain the bilateral relationship.²⁸ This illustrated that the Philippines was feeling less certain of the US commitment to it, a sentiment which was brought about by the shift in Nixon's policies in Asia.

²⁴ Background: Presidential Requests (Philippines); December 8, 1969; VP Agnew's Trip Dec 1969-Jan 1970 The Philippines; Box 82; NSC Files: HAKOF; Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

²⁵ Memorandum: Foreign Radio and Press Reaction to President Nixon's Trip to Asia and Romania 23 July- 3 August 1969; August 6 1969; East Asia Trip 1969; Box 464; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to the Philippines (Byroade) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green), Manila, January 2, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 434.

²⁸ Memorandum: Kissinger to Agnew; undated; VP Trip East Asia Jan 1970 Part 3; Box 450; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

The Marcos administration continued to request more aid from the US. Marcos claimed that he could handle the internal problems himself but needed US logistical support.²⁹ Marcos was going to “clean up Central Luzon once and for all” and asked the US to provide more military supplies for his armed forces as soon as possible.³⁰ Marcos had previously tried to ask for a total of \$24 million in logistical assistance for an anti-dissident campaign in central Luzon.³¹ Marcos’ wife, Imelda Marcos, appealed to the US for additional aid in view of the communist threat in the Philippines during a conversation with Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms on 22 September 1970. There was a certain element of exaggeration in Mrs Marcos’ words. She said that a crash programme was needed to ensure that Marcos would win the upcoming elections. The urgency of the situation was heightened because of the presence of potential candidates with communists and socialist leanings. In her opinion, if these candidates were to win the elections, the Philippines would turn communist or socialist. She emphasised that the Marcos government needed help from the Americans to ensure the survival of democracy in the Philippines.³² She hoped that the US would help to organise the crash programme for the Philippines. The crash programme consisted of a rural electrification programme for the Philippines costing between 300 and 500 million dollars over a ten to twenty year period, financial support for some of Marcos’ candidates at the barrio level, support for a better exchange rate between the peso and the dollar and birth control and family planning programmes. She also asked for funding for the election at the barrio level which would cost 4000 pesos for 35,000 barrios.³³ \$300 million was also needed to stabilise the Peso.³⁴ On another occasion, US Ambassador to the Philippines Henry Byroade tried to explain to Imelda Marcos that aid to the Philippines through huge cash donations was not feasible due to budgetary constraints and such a move would be incompatible with the policy of

²⁹ Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, Manila, February 17, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 446.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 445.

³¹ Background: Presidential Requests; December 8, 1969; VP Agnew’s Trip Dec 1969- Jan 1970 The Philippines; Box 82; NSC Files: HAKOF; Country Files- Far East; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³² Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 22, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 482.

³³ *Ibid.*, 483-4.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 485.

the US government. The US placed a strong emphasis on “multilateralism” and the Nixon Doctrine.³⁵ Cooperation amongst the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states would be beneficial to the Philippines in an era where the US was no longer able to render huge amounts of aid due to budgetary constraints.

In another conversation with Rogers, Marcos appealed to the US for more military aid so that the Philippines could enhance its defence against internal threats. This was because the army only had the ability to deal with such problems to a certain extent, and had a virtually non-existent navy and air force.³⁶ The Philippines could not strengthen the army due to the prevailing financial situation in the country. He understood Nixon’s opinion that Asian allies had to be self-reliant when dealing with internal problems, but still hoped that the US would assist the Philippines in this aspect.³⁷

On 3 November 1969, Nixon reiterated that the Nixon Doctrine was a response to changes in Asian leadership. Asian states were developing economically and the leaderships were maturing, thus they were gaining a greater sense of confidence. A regional organisation emphasising cooperation amongst the various Asian states was in its infancy. The US believed that Asian leaders were embracing the Nixon Doctrine and viewed it as an opportunity for them to work together as “equals” to build a Pacific community with greater security and stability. The US hoped that greater initiatives would come from Asian nations via the various regional organisations which were in development.³⁸ By promoting regional cooperation, the Asian states would grow stronger due to a collective effort and would be able to defend themselves more effectively. The US could gradually reduce its presence in Asia with minimum disruptions to the peace of the region, while maintaining its role as a Pacific power keeping the balance of power in check.

One such organisation was ASEAN. The formation of ASEAN was a step towards greater regional cooperation in South East Asia. ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967, with the

³⁵ Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, Manila, October 3, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 487.

³⁶ Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State Manila, July 2, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 475.

³⁷ Ibid., 475-6.

³⁸ The Guam Declaration and the Nixon Doctrine; December 10 1969; VP Agnew’s Trip Dec 1969- Jan 1970; Box 82; NSC Files: HAKOF; Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore as its founding members. It sought to promote economic, social, cultural cooperation amongst the member states and regional peace and stability. The ASEAN declaration of the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia was apparently a form of cooperation amongst the ASEAN nations, working towards greater regional peace. Greater regional cooperation amongst ASEAN states would serve to reduce the level of Philippine dependency on the US. If a regional security arrangement could be set up through ASEAN, US military bases and US military aid would no longer be necessary. The collective military might of the ASEAN states would be a force strong enough to be included in a proposed balance of power in an Asia after Vietnam.³⁹ The Philippine participation in regional affairs was an encouraging step as it would ensure that the nation would not feel lost in a future of lesser dependency on the US.

The principles of the Nixon Doctrine were applied to the Philippines when the Nixon Administration began to gradually reduce its presence in the country. Civilian and military personnel based at Clark airfield would be reduced by one third by 1 September 1970. Nixon had further asked for the civilian and military personnel of other agencies in the Philippines to be reduced, by twenty five percent no later than 30 June 1970.⁴⁰ Opposition to the reduction of the US presence in the Philippines was expressed by Kissinger's Senior Military Assistant, Brigadier General Alexander Haig, who viewed it as "ridiculous" no matter how "unnecessary" US presence was.⁴¹ Haig felt that the US presence in the Philippines was necessary, as it was closely linked to the US war effort in Vietnam. The US should take into consideration the impact of the reduction of the US presence in the Philippines would have on Vietnam.⁴² He felt that the decision to reduce the US presence in the Philippines should undergo a "clear and systematic interdepartmental review" so as to determine whether or not the decision was realistic. He was apprehensive of the effects of

³⁹ Buss, *The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy*, 57.

⁴⁰ Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the National Security Council's Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson), Washington, March 25, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 454.

⁴¹ Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 4, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 450.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 450-1.

such a reduction on the people and economy of the Philippines. He said, "Such a drastic reduction could not but be interpreted as a wholesale bug-out, which will have an incalculable impact on our efforts in Southeast Asia to say nothing of inflicting untold hardships on the economy and people of the Philippines." Moreover, the level of confidence the Philippines had for the US to effectively manage its own foreign affairs would be consequently reduced.⁴³

The US leadership believed that the long term effect of the reduction of US presence would be beneficial to the Philippines. The Philippines could become more self-reliant and this would bode well for the US-Philippine relationship. The short term effects would cause problems for the Philippine economy. There would be unemployment issues as Filipinos would lose their jobs at the bases and there would be a loss of income from foreign exchange. US bases in the Philippines were important and the reduction of the bases could be viewed as a US withdrawal from the country. It could also be perceived as a disapproval of the Marcos administration. It was important to link the reductions to the situation in Vietnam and to the world-wide budgetary and manpower constraints, so as to decrease dissatisfaction with US policy.⁴⁴

The US perceptions were confirmed as Marcos was indeed worried about the negative effects the US reduction would have on the Philippines, in particular the impact it would have on the economy. Marcos was reported to have felt "a bit of a jolt" over the scale of the cuts and the fact that it would start immediately. He was afraid that the reductions would affect the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and also the Philippine economy. He was concerned that the reductions would mean a loss of foreign exchange earnings from the bases and also a loss of jobs for Filipinos. Byroade reassured him that the reductions would not affect the Mutual Defense Treaty and US commitments to the Philippines would remain intact. Marcos was concerned about the Philippine public opinion regarding the reductions and hoped that he could explain the issue to the public with minimal damage.⁴⁵

⁴³ Ibid., 451.

⁴⁴ Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 13, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 477.

⁴⁵ Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, Manila, July 22, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 480.

The Philippine Response to the US-PRC Rapprochement

After Nixon made his announcement on 15 July regarding the US-PRC rapprochement, Mrs Marcos told Nixon that “certain nervousness” had resulted from the 15 July announcement.⁴⁶ She emphasised to Nixon the effect his China initiative had on the confidence of the communist insurgents in the Philippines. The insurgents were seemingly stepping up their activities as their confidence had increased as a result of the revelation of Nixon’s China initiative. She added that her husband understood the rationale behind Nixon’s impending visit to China, although it had caused anxieties amongst the Asian allies. Nixon replied by highlighting that his China visit should not be misinterpreted. He would not sacrifice the interests of “America’s traditional friends” in his pursuit of the new friendship with the PRC. He emphasised that the people of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan, and the ROK “produced far more than all of Mainland China and constituted the bedrock base of freedom in the area” and thus no US president would abandon the interests of these Asian states for the sake of the PRC. He explained to Mrs Marcos that his China initiative was made because he felt that it would be beneficial to global stability to start communicating with the PRC. Nixon was informed that the Marcoses fully comprehended that.⁴⁷

Marcos seemed to state his approval of US China policy by conveying to Nixon that tensions in Asia had alleviated due to Nixon’s announcement of his upcoming trip to China. He also stated in his letter to Nixon that his China initiative had led to more support from the UN members for the PRC entry into the global organisation.⁴⁸ In Nixon’s reply to Marcos, he wrote that he took the opportunity to build friendly ties with the PRC with the hope that other nations would be able to benefit from a possible improvement in US-PRC ties.⁴⁹ According to Marcos,

⁴⁶ Memorandum for the President’s File, Washington, October 22, 1971, 11:45 a.m.–12:15 p.m., FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 517.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 516.

⁴⁸ Letter: Marcos to Nixon; October 8 1971; 1969-1974 Philippines Marcos Correspondence (Jun 1969- May 1973; Box 760; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁴⁹ Letter: Nixon to Marcos; November 18 1971; 1969-1974 Philippines Marcos Correspondence (Jun 1969- May 1973; Box 760; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

more UN members are in favour of the PRC's entry to the UN because of Nixon's China policy.⁵⁰ He believed that policies which would promote cooperation and contribute to peace, especially when the great powers were involved, should be encouraged. He had earlier on 5 May 1971 stated that the Philippines was re-evaluating its position in the Chinese representation issue in the UN through a special panel created for the discussion of the issue.⁵¹

Indeed, support for the "important question" resolution was dropping while support for the Albanian Resolution was rising. Furthermore, the issue of Chinese representation in the UN was complicated by Nixon's China policy. The US, the ROC's biggest western ally, could no longer block the PRC's entry and was having difficulties trying to preserve the ROC's seat in the UN. The US formally confirmed that it would go ahead with the dual representation formula of seating the PRC and preventing the expulsion of the ROC. The fate of the Security Council seat would depend on the decision of the UN members.⁵² However, this strategy would not work. Global opinion was shifting towards favouring a Security Council seat for the PRC. Philippine Permanent Representative to the United Nations Narciso Reyes highlighted that the Albanian resolution made a reference to the Security Council seat and asked the US to clarify its position on the issue of the Security Council seat. The Philippines predicted that the Albanian resolution might turn out to be more attractive than the vote on the representation resolution. The Philippines recognised that it was not possible to deny the PRC the Security Council seat. Reyes said that the issue of the Security Council seat "must be dealt with in drafts in some form."⁵³

The US chose to amend the draft resolution to award the Security Council seat to the PRC. It was difficult for the US to gain support from its allies for the draft resolution as it did not mention the issue of the Security Council seat and thus, the US could not gather enough co-sponsors for the resolution. It could not even garner the support of its staunch ally, the

⁵⁰ Letter: Marcos to Nixon; October 8 1971; 1969-1974 Philippines Marcos Correspondence (Jun 1969- May 1973; Box 760; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵¹ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1613, undated, Philippines: Relations with China.

⁵² Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts, Washington, August 1, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 765.

⁵³ Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, New York, August 11, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 780-1.

Philippines.⁵⁴ During the co-sponsors' meeting on 16 September 1971, Reyes commented that the US decision to amend the Dual Representation was a difficult one. The Philippines had long realised that the original draft was weak because of the way the Security Council seat issue was dealt with. The Dual Representation resolution could encounter a serious roadblock as there had been no preceding case of two representatives of one single state having individual seats in the UN. Nonetheless, the Philippines would cosponsor both resolutions.⁵⁵ The Philippines knew that it would be difficult for the ROC to remain as a member of the UN, but pledged that it would be supporting the US in the Chinese representation issue.⁵⁶ During the UN debate on the Chinese representation issue on 21 October 1971, Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo charged the member nations which were supporting the Albanian Resolution with being "out of step" with the prevailing situation through their support of the expulsion of the ROC from the UN. The Philippines gave the ROC added assurance and vowed to continue its current relationship with the ROC, regardless of the result of the UN vote. Philippine Foreign Secretary Manuel Collantes was reported to have said to the press that the Philippine relationship with the ROC remained as before and diplomatic ties would be retained. Marcos reassured the ROC that his government would not establish diplomatic ties with the PRC.⁵⁷

It was possible that the perceived loyalty of the Philippines to its American ally was not the main reason for its support of the US position on the Chinese representation issue. The Philippine relationship with the ROC should be taken into account for its decision to support the US and thus the ROC. The ROC and the Philippines held a close relationship throughout the years and it would be difficult for the Philippines to ignore its long time friend and support the PRC in the UN. Moreover, the PRC entry into the UN was inevitable. It was a consequence of the US-PRC rapprochement and the changing international status of the PRC. The Philippines conceded that it

⁵⁴ Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, undated, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 799.

⁵⁵ Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, New York, September 17, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 813-4.

⁵⁶ Letter: Marcos to Nixon; October 8 1971; 1969-1974 Philippines Marcos Correspondence (Jun 1969- May 1973; Box 760; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵⁷ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1613, undated, Philippines: Relations with China.

would be difficult for the ROC to remain in the UN. Hence it did not matter much that the Philippines decided to support the ROC instead of the PRC. The Philippines decision to support the US position on the Chinese representation issue was a gesture of its friendship with both the US and the ROC.

The Nixon Administration sought to quell any Philippine apprehensions of the President's trip to the PRC by making an effort to brief the Philippines in advance, through a message from Nixon to Marcos sent via Byroade. This message was similar to those sent to Thailand and Indonesia. The purpose of the briefing was, apparently, to reassure the Philippines that its interests would not be undermined and that the US commitment to the Philippines did not diminish due to the US new approach towards the PRC. Marcos reportedly felt reassured by the US promise that its treaty obligations with the Philippines would remain intact despite the Beijing and Moscow summits.⁵⁸ Nixon explained that the US hoped to establish greater understanding and rapport with the PRC through his Beijing summit in February 1972. He hoped that a long term channel of communication could be set up with the PRC. Nixon hoped that, at a minimum, both sides could start with non political, people-to-people exchanges. Nixon knew that the differences between the two sides could not be resolved overnight. The purpose of the Beijing summit meetings, therefore, was to enable the two sides to begin to move towards shedding light on their respective positions and to resolve the real differences that existed between them. He hoped that his China initiative would result in greater peace in Asia and the world. The success of the summit in Beijing would in turn benefit the Asian Allies as tensions in Asia would be reduced. He added that the interests of the Philippines would be preserved and no agreements would be concluded at the expense of any other countries. He clarified that during the Beijing Summit only bilateral issues would be discussed. The US would not be working towards diplomatic ties with the PRC and the interests of

⁵⁸ Memorandum: Kissinger to Nixon; February 7, 1972; China Trip- Misc; Box 502; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

the Philippines would be kept in mind at all times.⁵⁹ Treaty commitments of the US to any other countries would remain intact.⁶⁰

Previously, Marcos had stated his approval of the rapprochement after Nixon's 15 July announcement. However, this changed with the release of the Shanghai Communiqué. In the Shanghai Communiqué, the American stand on the status of Taiwan was that it "acknowledged" that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China. The US goal was to withdraw all its forces and military installations from Taiwan "as the tension in the area diminishes."⁶¹ The US declaration that it would be prepared to withdraw from Taiwan had raised the apprehensions of the ROK and Japan. The Philippines was alarmed by this development as well. In these circumstances, due to Philippines' geographical proximity to Taiwan, the security of the Philippines would be in jeopardy if any crises were to arise in Taiwan. The concern for the security of the Philippines made the Marcos government reconsider the possible implications of Nixon's China initiative on the future of the Philippines.

As part of their tour of Asia, Marshall Green and John Holdridge met with the Philippine leadership. Their conversations revealed the concerns and anxieties of the Philippines regarding the future of Taiwan in light of the US China policy. There was a fear that Taiwan might be absorbed by the PRC in the future and how this would be detrimental to the security of the Philippines.⁶² The Philippine leadership wanted explanations regarding what it perceived as the US "reneging on its two-China policy". In Holdridge's opinion, the Philippines was most disturbed by the fact that it was "blind-sided" by its biggest western ally.⁶³ This illustrated the point that the secrecy which surrounded the US-PRC rapprochement did not bode well with its Asian friends and allies. The Philippines would rather be briefed by the US on the issue of Taiwan than being shocked by its revelation through the Shanghai Communiqué.

⁵⁹ Memorandum; Jeanne W. Davis to Kissinger: Tab A-12; December 10, 1971; China Trip: December 1971 Part 1; Box 500; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁶⁰ Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, Washington, January 4, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 520-1.

⁶¹ The complete text of the Shanghai Communiqué can be found in, Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 1490-2; footnote 3 of XXIV.

⁶² Memorandum: Haig to Nixon; March 24, 1972; China Trip February-March 1972; Box 501; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁶³ John H. Holdridge, *Crossing the Divide: An Insider's Account of Normalization of U.S.-China Relations* (Lanham, Md.; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 100.

The Philippines was particularly worried about the implications of Nixon's China policy on Taiwan, which was geographically close to the Philippines and the ROC and the Philippines shared a cordial and tight relationship. Marcos questioned the ambiguity of the US position on Taiwan. The US had accepted that Taiwan was an internal problem, yet Kissinger reassured the ROC of the US commitment to the ROC.⁶⁴ Green told Marcos that US commitments to the ROC would not be changed and the PRC was aware of that. The achievements of the opening to the PRC were obtained without jeopardising the interests of the US and its Asian Allies. Marcos warned the US that the ROC would fall to the communists within ten years and this, in turn, would threaten the survival of the Philippines. Green commented that the ROC was in a better position than the PRC in terms of economics and thus Marcos did not have to fear for the worst. Moreover, the PRC was plagued with internal instability and serious external problems.⁶⁵

Romulo enquired about the language in the Shanghai Communiqué, which stated that the level of US military forces in Taiwan would be decreased. Green said that this was in line with the Nixon Doctrine and that a full withdrawal would only happen with the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. The US would remain committed to the ROC if the conflict was not settled peacefully. However, Green commented that the PRC would most likely not resort to violence towards the ROC, as it had toned down its militarism since the Korean War to avoid "adventuristic actions" and it would not want to hurt the budding relationship with the US. Green believed that the US-PRC rapprochement would lead to peace, not war. He also told Marcos and Romulo that there would not be US-PRC diplomatic relations in the near future. It would be more ideal to send representatives on visit to the PRC rather than having a resident mission in Beijing. In light of the rapprochement with the PRC, the Philippines was wondering if the US would still adhere to Article IV of the defence treaty which was limited to communist aggression.⁶⁶ Green insisted that there was no change in US commitments. Towards the end of the meeting, Green reaffirmed the US

⁶⁴ Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, Manila, March 5, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 526.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 527.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 528

commitment to the Philippines.⁶⁷ Green reassured Marcos that US bases in the Philippines were very much needed by the US despite recent developments.⁶⁸ The US would not withdraw from Asia or abandon its Philippine ally. There was no set timetable for the withdrawal of troops from Taiwan. The US relationship with the ROC remained unaffected by the rapprochement. The US did not conclude any secret deals with the PRC.⁶⁹

The Philippines remained suspicious of US intentions. The press was sceptical of Green's visit especially of the discrepancies between what had been transpired between the US and the PRC and what Green was told to convey to the Asian nations. They felt that Nixon's proclamation that the visit had changed the world was inconsistent with Green's assurance that the US made no alterations to its foreign policy.⁷⁰ The reactions of the Filipinos regarding the Nixon visit were a combination of "disillusion" and "anxiety" for the future of their nation. There was the sentiment that Nixon suffered embarrassment by dealing with Zhou and not Mao. The lack of notification and prior consultation with the US friends and allies were seen as unacceptable and the US was accused of "selling them down the river." The Philippines was worried that the ROC might turn communist and put the Philippine security at great risk. Contradictory US statements were pointed out. Nixon's position that the US was set to withdraw its troops from Taiwan seemed to contradict with Kissinger's statement that the US would not abandon Taiwan.⁷¹

After the Nixon Visit: Philippine Relations with the US and the PRC

In order to achieve peace in the region, there had to be cooperation amongst the world powers. The US was determined to create "mutual understanding and mutual restraint" amongst the great powers of Asia which included the USSR and the PRC. The US would continue to aid its Asian allies in their pursuit of development and in their defence. The US would maintain a degree of presence in Asia. In the case of the Philippines, US presence complimented the Mutual Defence Treaty. The US knew the importance of having a close security relationship with the Philippines

⁶⁷ Ibid., 529.

⁶⁸ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1617 29 March 1972, J N O Curle to A B P Smart; TNA: PRO FCO 15/1617, 6 March 1972, Curle to K M Wilford.

⁶⁹ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1617, 6 March 1972, Curle to K M Wilford.

⁷⁰ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1617, 9 March 1972, Curle to Wilford.

⁷¹ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1617, 6 March 1972, Curle to Wilford.

and would ensure that it remained that way.⁷² As early as 1972, the US already recognised the importance of maintaining a close relationship with the Philippines. Apparently, continual access to bases in Asia, such as those in Okinawa and also in the Philippines, was important to the US since it was gradually reducing its presence in the region. In a Policy Analysis Resource Allocation Study, the US emphasised the need to preserve a “satisfactory” relationship with the Philippines so as to continue to utilise the bases.⁷³ Moreover, the Subic Bay Naval Base would be needed to provide support facilities for the Seventh Fleet which the US was obliged to maintain. The Americans added that even with the conclusion of the war in Vietnam, there would be reductions in strength at the bases. Even then, it would be maintained at the pre-Vietnam level.⁷⁴ The US continued to be supportive of the Philippine economy. Nixon pledged that he would be pushing for the Congress to approve the US aid of \$100 million for the Asian Development Bank’s special funds resources.⁷⁵ Both sides were also in negotiations to come up with a new agreement to replace the Laurel-Langley agreement which was due to expire in 1974.⁷⁶

A possible reason for Philippine interest in diplomatic ties with the PRC was its feelings of insecurity due to the US declaration regarding Taiwan in the Shanghai Communiqué. As noted above, the Philippines was apprehensive of the future of Taiwan and how it would affect Philippine security, should Taiwan fall to the Communists. To counteract this problem, it would be ideal to set up diplomatic ties with the enemy and keep the threat of communism at bay. The US rapprochement with the PRC gave the Philippines the opportunity to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC, without the fear of offending old friends. The Philippines did not have to worry about upsetting the US as the Americans were communicating with the Communist Chinese and moving

⁷² Telegram: AMEMBASSY Manila to SECSTATE Washington DC; February 5, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=16562&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 25 May 2009.

⁷³ Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green), Washington, March 18, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 531 and 540.

⁷⁴ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1617, 29 March 1972, Curle to Smart.

⁷⁵ Letter: Nixon to Marcos; May 12, 1973; 1969-1974 Philippines Marcos Correspondence (Jun 1969- May 1973; Box 760; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁷⁶ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Manila to SECSTATE Washington DC; February 5, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=16562&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 25 May 2009.

towards the normalisation of relations with the PRC, with the setting up of liaison offices in Beijing. Other countries, such as Japan and Australia, had already moved towards diplomatic ties with the PRC. Hence, the Philippines could sever its ties with the ROC without having to worry about upsetting the US. Another possible reason was the Philippines could be seen as following the lead of the US and move towards diplomatic ties with the PRC, as the US embarked on rapprochement with the PRC. However, this appeared less probable as the US had told the Philippines in 1972 that there would be no US-PRC diplomatic ties in the future. Moreover, during a meeting with the press in 1974, Ambassador Lapus denied that the US rapprochement with the PRC would have an effect on the Philippine move towards diplomatic ties with Beijing.⁷⁷ Hence, the Philippine move towards diplomatic relations with the PRC could be viewed a genuine attempt at self preservation due to the diminishing confidence the Philippines had for the level of US commitment. This lack of confidence was already evident when Nixon began to reduce the US presence in the Philippines and was compounded by the release of the Shanghai Communiqué.

The Philippines began its own overtures towards the PRC when, in February 1972, Governor Benjamin Romualdez went to China as the personal emissary of Marcos to find out from the PRC its views on matters pertaining to the normalisation of relations. He was to ask the PRC if it would be interested in having cultural, trade and economic ties, but not diplomatic relations with the Philippines. If the two sides were to set up diplomatic ties, the Philippines wanted to know whether or not the PRC would be open to the Philippines preserving its relations with the ROC at the same time. The Philippines also hoped that the PRC would not support renegade groups of overseas Chinese in the Philippines which were keen on conducting subversive activities.⁷⁸ The PRC was reported to be interested in establishing ties short of diplomatic relations with the Philippines, but full diplomatic ties could only be established with the severance of ties with the ROC. The PRC's answer to the third question was ambiguous. It claimed to adhere to the Bandung Declaration and the "principle of non-intervention" in the affairs of other nations, but the PRC

⁷⁷ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Taipei to SECSTATE Washington DC; November 19, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=172717&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 25 May 2009.

⁷⁸ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1613, 24 Feb 1972, Memorandum for the President.

would also be committed to support wars of national liberations to relinquish the tyranny of “imperialist aggressors.”⁷⁹

Filipino Senator Salvadore Laurel went on an observation tour of China in March 1972. He was to collect data on the proposed trade relations with the PRC. Although there were no high-level meetings with the PRC leadership, Laurel reported that the prospects of friendlier ties with Beijing were looking good.⁸⁰ However, it was unclear whether or not the Marcos administration actually supported this initiative as it was stated that Laurel did not speak for the Marcos Administration. Byroade commented that the trip may not have significant impact on relations with the PRC but would continue to stir up interest in the Philippines regarding Philippines-PRC relations and also the future role of the PRC in Southeast Asia.⁸¹

The PRC was reported to be eager to establish diplomatic ties with the Philippines. Ambassador Romualdez met with Zhou in Beijing and Romualdez perceived Zhou as being “surprisingly eager” to establish formal diplomatic ties with Manila.⁸² There were three issues which had to be smoothed out before the PRC and the Philippines could move towards a new era of diplomatic ties. The PRC should cease its support for communist subversion and also the issue of the citizenship of the Chinese nationals in the Philippines. The reaction of long-time friend the ROC had to be taken into consideration.⁸³ Naturally, diplomatic ties with the ROC had to be severed before the Philippines could recognise Beijing. There were about 500,000 Chinese nationals who possessed ROC passports in the Philippines, thus complicating the issue further.⁸⁴

The Philippines was also keeping the US informed of its moves towards the PRC, which American officials felt was an effort to minimise any damage to US-Philippine bilateral ties.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Imelda to Moscow: Laurel to Peking, 17 March 1972, DNSA The Philippines, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/PH/00481/all.pdf> accessed 12 October 2007.

⁸¹ Further on Laurel Visit to PRC, 22 March 1972, DNSA The Philippines, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/PH/00485/all.pdf> accessed 12 October 2007

⁸² Telegram: AMEMBASSY Manila to SECSTATE Washington DC; April 2, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=47070&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 May 2009.

⁸³ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Manila to SECSTATE Washington DC; September 13, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=133664&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 May 2009.

⁸⁴ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Manila to SECSTATE Washington DC; April 2, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=47070&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 May 2009.

Marcos surely did not want to be surprised should the US move towards diplomatic ties with the PRC.⁸⁵ Marcos also told the US that developments in the PRC-Philippines relationship would not alter his government's relationship with Washington. He showed some deep concerns for the US feelings by encouraging the US to keep an eye on the PRC-Philippines relationship and to let him know if some of his actions, with regards to the PRC, were of discomfort to the US.⁸⁶

Romulo stated that the Philippines would be setting up diplomatic ties with the PRC shortly as it would benefit the Philippines.⁸⁷ Mrs Marcos visited China in September 1974 and met with Zhou and Mao. Marcos had announced in his speech of 21 September that the trip would pave the way towards the establishment of diplomatic ties with the PRC.⁸⁸ It was during this visit that Mrs Marcos praised Mao as "one of the greatest leaders in history".⁸⁹ A trade agreement was concluded between the Philippines and the PRC. Disregarding the feelings of the ROC in Taiwan, Mrs Marcos arranged for her husband to visit the PRC in June 1975. Diplomatic relations was established between the two sides during the Marcos visit. Marcos abolished all of the Philippines treaties and agreements with the ROC, a long time friend, and moved to set up relations with the PRC.⁹⁰

Conclusion

The Philippines held close relationships with both the US and the ROC. As Nixon began to carry out his twin policies of Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine, the reduction of the US presence in Asia was set in motion. The US also encouraged greater regional cooperation amongst the Asian states and began to reduce its presence in the Philippines. The Philippines participated actively in ASEAN, while continuing to extract more aid from the US and to maintain a close

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Manila to SECSTATE Washington DC; October 7, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=155447&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 May 2009.

⁸⁷ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Bangkok to SECSTATE Washington DC; August 22, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=119039&dt=1572&dl=823>; accessed 20 May 2009.

⁸⁸ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Manila to SECSTATE Washington DC; September 24, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=135014&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 May 2009.

⁸⁹ Buss, *The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy*, 84.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

relationship with its American ally. Evidently, the Philippines knew the importance of keeping close to the US and did not want to be at a disadvantage despite Nixon's decision to reduce the number of US personnel in the Philippines. The Marcos administration appeared to be in favour of the US-PRC rapprochement after Nixon's 15 July announcement. It continued to support the US and the ROC in the UN and to demonstrate its loyalty to its American and Nationalist Chinese allies. However, the Marcos administration began to voice its apprehensions regarding the US-PRC rapprochement after it had read the US stand on Taiwan in the Shanghai Communiqué. The Philippines was particularly worried about the possible repercussions of Nixon's China policy on the ROC. This was because if Taiwan were to fall to the PRC, the Philippines would be in danger due to its geographical proximity to Taiwan. Despite the implications brought forth by Nixon's strategy in Asia, the US-Philippine relationship was not severely damaged by Nixon's strategy in Asia. The US recognised the importance of maintaining close military and economic ties with the Philippines, especially since it needed continual access to its bases. The Philippines was concerned about the American sensitivities regarding the establishment of relations between Manila and Beijing. As for its long-time friend, the ROC, the friendship had to be abandoned for the national interest and security of the Philippines. Nixon's China initiative gave the Philippines a great opportunity to make friends with the PRC, which was no doubt a great power in Asia. The Philippines would eventually abandon its long time friend, the ROC, and established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1975. Thailand, another signatory of SEATO, was faced with US troop reductions as well. Thailand, just like the Philippines, would eventually establish diplomatic ties with the PRC, but not for the same reasons. The next chapter will discuss these issues in greater detail.

5. Thailand

Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia which has never been colonised by any foreign power. Thailand was ruled by an absolute monarch until 24 June 1932 when the Chakri Dynasty was overthrown by a group of young army officers and civilians in a bloodless coup. The King lost his power but was allowed to keep his throne, leading to the creation of a constitutional monarch system of government in Thailand. A power struggle between the military and civilian factions within the leadership ensued and the military faction led by Phibun Songkhram emerged victorious in 1938. During World War II, Thailand was invaded by Japan and “not altogether unwillingly” chose to collaborate with the Japanese. Thailand went into an alliance with Japan and declared war on Britain and the US.¹ As the war in the Pacific was drawing to a close, with the Japanese seemingly on the losing end, Phibun resigned from his position. The civilian faction of the Thai leadership, led by Pridi Phanomyong, took over the reins of the government in 1945.

Thai foreign policy was described as “pragmatic” and “opportunistic.” Thailand managed to retain its independent status and avoided colonialism because it “yielded before the pressures of the dominant power of the region, surrendering diplomatic ground and territory to the extent necessary to retain intact the essential attributes of Thai independence” and tried not to be entangled in a situation where it would be deemed as resisting a greater power.²

As the Cold War began to emerge, it was apparent that communism was threatening to engulf Asia. This was illuminated by the fall of the KMT in China, the conflict between Vietnam and France and also the invasion of South Korea by the communist North Korea. Thailand allied itself with the US in order to fend off the threat of communism. It was also supporting the US effort in the Vietnam War by offering the use of its bases for US bombing raids on North Vietnam and Cambodia. The US was providing Thailand with substantial economic and technical aid. A close security relationship began to emerge between the Thais and the Americans. However, the Thai leadership was doubtful of the future of US-Thai bilateral relations due to the policies of Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine. The Nixon administration began to reduce its presence in Thailand. There was always a lingering fear

¹ Randolph, *The United States and Thailand*, 6.

² *Ibid.*, 10.

amongst the Thai leadership of the threat of Communist China especially in its support for the Maoist-inspired Communist Party of Thailand, which created many problems for the Thai government with its subversive activities. The chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission of the PRC Liao Cheng-chih stated that the PRC's role was "to support the struggle of the people of Thailand".³ A Communist insurgency broke out in the Northeast of Thailand in 1965, but the Thai government was eventually able to defeat the communists. The Thais were further perplexed by the Nixon Administration as it sought rapprochement with the PRC.

This chapter discusses what the Thai leadership told the US regarding their views towards Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine and the reduction of US presence in Thailand. The Thai leadership was wary of the PRC's support for subversions overseas and thus were concerned when Washington embarked on a rapprochement with Beijing. The chapter will explore how the Nixon administration tried to explain the motivations behind its China policy and the Thai response to US reassurances. It will move on to discuss the development of Thailand's relationship with the US and the PRC after 1972.

The US-Thailand Alliance

By the advent of the Korean War, Phibun was once again the Prime Minister of Thailand, having reassumed the position in 1948. US-Thailand relations grew tighter as Thailand was the first Asia nation to support the United Nations Security Council resolution to counter the communist offensive against South Korea by force.⁴ Thailand was also the first Asian nation to offer to send troops, 4000 in total, to help in the defence of South Korea. 400,000 metric tons of rice was also sent to South Korea as food aid.⁵ The relationship between the US and Thailand grew closer with a series of agreements signed in 1950. These included an educational and cultural agreement signed on 1 July 1950 and a technical and economic cooperation agreement and also a military agreement signed on 19 September and 17 October respectively.⁶

³ Ibid., 84-5.

⁴ Wiwat Mungkandi, "Thai-American Relations in Historical Perspective" in *United States- Thailand Relations*, ed. Karl D. Jackson and Wiwat Mungkandi (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1986), 14.

⁵ Randolph, *The United States and Thailand*, 13.

⁶ Mungkandi, "Thai-American Relations in Historical Perspective", 14.

The alliance between the two sides was formalised with the Manila Pact and the establishment of SEATO in 1954. This meant that the US would have a multilateral defence pact which was in line with the UN Charter. Thailand would be shielded from any incursion by Communist China.⁷ However, the Thais were never fully satisfied with the treaty which was signed in Manila, due to the lack of automatic assistance from the US. In the event of subversion from within, there was no guarantee of automatic assistance, as the treaty stipulated that both sides would “consult in order to agree on measures”.⁸ The Philippines, a fellow member of SEATO, was affected by this lack of automatic assistance. Moreover, its Mutual Defense Treaty with the US did not include the promise of automatic assistance either. Similarly, the ROK was also displeased with the lack of automatic assistance in its bilateral treaty with the US and this caused much tensions in the US-ROK relationship.

US-Thailand relations were given a much needed boost with the issuance of the joint statement known as the Rusk-Thanat Communiqué. Secretary of State Dean Rusk reassured the Thais that the US obligation under Article IV of SEATO was “individual as well as collective”. as the US obligation under the treaty was independent of any prior agreement by the other signatories. The Rusk-Thanat Communiqué was significant as it “expressed the firm intention of the United States to aid Thailand, its ally and historic friend, in resisting communist aggression and subversion.”⁹ The US was committed to Thailand’s independence and integrity as it was important to global peace and also to the US national interest.¹⁰

Thai involvement in Vietnam began in 1964 when a small air force contingent was sent to South Vietnam. This was followed by a naval unit in 1966, an infantry regiment in 1967, which was then upgraded to a full division in 1968. The US began to support the Thai effort in the Vietnam War in 1966.¹¹ The US-Thailand cooperation in Vietnam further cemented the security relationship, leading to closer ties.

By 1969, the Thais were having doubts about their involvement in Vietnam. This was due to the calls for troop withdrawals in the US. They were wondering if by sending troops to

⁷ Ibid., 15.

⁸ Randolph, *The United States and Thailand*, 30.

⁹ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1301, Text of the Joint Statement issued on March 6, 1962, By the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the United States Secretary of State, undated.

¹⁰ Mungkandi, “Thai-American Relations in Historical Perspective”, 15.

¹¹ Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, Bangkok, October 31, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 70.

Vietnam, they were getting too deeply involved. Thailand also allowed the US to use its air bases to conduct the bombing of the communist North Vietnam.¹² Moreover, there were criticisms within the Senate regarding the level of US aid provided to Thailand. The Thais were viewed as not bearing the appropriate share of the cost of the Vietnam War. Ambassador Unger and the other witnesses who testified on the Symington hearings said that US presence in Thailand and also the provision of aid were linked to the Vietnam War and not related to Thailand's internal or external security.¹³

The reason for Thailand's involvement in Vietnam was due to its fear of the communist threat in Thailand, if South Vietnam were to fall to communism. It was important to Thailand that South Vietnam should never fall to Communism. Thailand was right on the doorstep of the warzone, making it more crucial as compared to other free nations of Southeast Asia that the threat of communism had to be kept at bay. They were worried that if a North Vietnamese victory materialised, Thailand would be "boxed on the north and east by borders under hostile Communist control, Chinese or Vietnamese." This could further lead to a rise in external communist support for the still manageable insurgency menace in Thailand. The Thais could be faced with serious internal woes should Hanoi win the war.¹⁴ When Nixon announced his plan to withdraw from Vietnam, the Thai leadership was worried that once the withdrawal was completed, Laos would be captured by the communists. A communist Laos would be able to provide communist insurgents of the northeast with material aid from across the Mekong River. The Thai leaders were aware that the US involvement in the region was bound to be reduced gradually. The main concern of the Thais was that Vietnamization was the beginning of a US disengagement from the region, which would leave the free nations of the region vulnerable to the communists of North Vietnam and the PRC.¹⁵

¹² Department of State Briefing Paper, Washington, July 11, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 33

¹³ Editorial Note, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 81.

¹⁴ Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Nixon, Washington, October 23, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 195.

¹⁵ Memorandum; Kissinger to Nixon; undated; President Nixon's Trip July-Aug 69 Country Briefing Book- Thailand; Box 454; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

The Nixon administration reaffirmed the US commitment to Thailand once it assumed power in 1969. The US commitment to Thailand through SEATO would not be abandoned and the US would aid Thailand in its struggle against communist aggression and subversive activities.¹⁶ Rogers further reinforced the US commitment to Thailand by stressing that the US would continue to render assistance to Thailand "in any way we [the US] could."¹⁷ During the press conference in Guam on 25 July 1969 when Nixon introduced the Nixon Doctrine, he again reaffirmed the US commitment to Thailand. Treaty commitments between the US and any Asian nation would be kept; US commitment to Thailand through SEATO was given a special mention as an example of US treaty commitments. With regards to internal security problems, Asian nations had to take on the responsibility of defence. The US would not intervene, unless the threat involved the use of nuclear weapons by a major power. During the question and answer session, Nixon told reporters that there was no secret defence agreement with Thailand. Thai security was bound to the US by SEATO and the Rusk-Thanat Communiqué. He declared that the US would keep to these commitments as well.¹⁸

Vietnamization, the Nixon Doctrine and Thailand

Nixon made a stop in Bangkok during his July 1969 trip around the world to meet with the Thai leaders and to soothe their fears regarding his plans for Asia. He met with Thai Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn and exchanged views regarding the situation in Vietnam. The Thais expressed the view that they were not alarmed by Nixon's Vietnamization policy as South Vietnamese forces would be properly trained to be more effective in defence.¹⁹ Thanom conveyed to Nixon that Thailand did not require ground forces, but instead would need material assistance from the US. However, if an unconventional revolutionary type war was to occur in Thailand, ground forces would be necessary. The Thais would still try to be self-

¹⁶ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand, Washington, March 26, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 13.

¹⁷ Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, Bangkok, May 23, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 21

¹⁸ Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen, July 25, 1969, PPP, reproduced at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2140&st=&st1=> accessed 12 September 2010.

¹⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, Bangkok, July 29, 1969, 10:10a.m. - 2.28 p.m., FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 38.

reliant and use their own forces.²⁰ This mirrored the opinions of other Asian allies, such as the Philippines and the ROK, who shared the sentiment that US assistance was still needed as they embarked on greater self-reliance.

The media reaction to Nixon's visit to Thailand was generally positive. The visit served to lessen the prevailing anxiety amongst the Thais that the US was ready to desert its Asian allies and its role in the region. Press reports of Nixon's earlier statements in Guam, Manila and Jakarta, which talked about the need for Asia nations to be self reliant in defence matters, had led many to believe that the US was ready to withdraw from Asia completely. Nixon was said to have explained the US policy in Asia in clearer terms during the visit, which was deemed a "successful exercise in diplomacy."²¹ The *Bangkok Post* expressed the sentiment that Nixon had embarked on a policy "which somehow turns out to be quite sensible."²² The *Siam Rath* enunciated the view that Nixon's policy was different from that of his predecessors "only in implementation, not in principle." It went on to say that the policy should be embraced fully by those Asian Allies who received aid from the US as this would preserve their security and also "for the sake of their self esteem."²³

In light of Nixon's new policy in Asia, the press stressed the importance of greater self reliance of the Asian nations in handling their own defence. The *Bangkok Post* highlighted that Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman had always stressed the need for regional cooperation to enable Asian nations to settle their own problems and issues.²⁴ *Siam Rath* cautioned the Thais that "Thailand's self reliance must extend beyond mere manpower and must make allowances for unforeseen changes or cuts in US aid." It also called for the nations of the region to form a military pact as they could no longer depend on the big powers to come to their aid.²⁵ The formation of ASEAN on 8 August 1967 was a step towards greater regional cooperation in South East Asia, although it was not a military organisation. It sought to

²⁰ Ibid., 36.

²¹ Memorandum: Foreign Radio and Press Reaction to President Nixon's Trip to Asia and Romania 23 July- 3 August 1969; August 6 1969; East Asia Trip 1969; Box 464; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Memorandum: Kissinger to Nixon; August 4, 1969; President's Trip: Reactions-Communications: Jul 22- Aug 3, 1969; Box 462; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

promote economic, social, cultural cooperation amongst the member states and regional peace and stability.

Indeed, Thailand was in favour of greater self reliance and also cooperation amongst the Asian nations. However, it hoped that the US could form some kind of defence link to any regional power groupings so that Thailand could still seek assistance from the US. While Thanat felt that US forces should withdraw from Thailand with the conclusion of the Vietnam War, he was not against the idea of having some US troops in Thailand for the purpose of fending off communist aggression.²⁶

The Thais were particularly wary of Communist China, especially the potential threat it posed to Thailand and also its support for local communists. In particular, the PRC road building activities in Laos worried the Thais. A potential communist threat could come from Laos with the advancement of the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese into the territory. The roads built by the Chinese Communists were very close to the borders of Thailand and could be used by the communists for the purpose of infiltration.²⁷ The Thais believed that although the communists in North Thailand were usually from hill tribes, there was still a risk of a linkup with the Pathet Lao in Sayabouri. The Chinese Communist road leading to Sayabouri was a sign that the PRC was still bent on supporting the Thai insurgents.²⁸

The Thais felt intimidated by the threat of communism posed by the PRC and its persistency in aiding the Thai insurgents was illuminated in a memorandum of conversation from Kissinger to Agnew dated 17 December 1969. The Thais were particularly concerned with the long term Chinese communist threat. There were fears that US withdrawal from Vietnam could leave Thailand and other free nations of the region vulnerable to the communist threat posed by Beijing and Hanoi. In addition, if Laos was to fall to communism, the

²⁶ Vice President Agnew's Trip December 1969-January 1970: Thailand; December 9 1969, 3; V.P. Agnew's Trip Dec 1979-Jan 1970 Thailand; Box 83; NSC Files; HAKOF; Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

²⁷ Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, Bangkok, May 23, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 21.

²⁸ Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand, Washington, September 5, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 173.

communists could supply the Thai insurgents in the northeast with aid. In the long run, the Thais might not be able to curb the Chinese communist backed insurgency in the north.²⁹

Agnew visited Thailand from 3 to 5 January 1970 and reassured the Thai leaders that that US policy would remain unchanged and there would be no weakening of US obligations to Thailand and SEATO.³⁰ The Thai leadership tried to seek an increase in US aid to Thailand during a meeting between Thanom and Agnew on 4 January 1970, Agnew opened the conversation with the assurance that the US would stand by all its treaty commitments with Thailand as the Prime Minister asked for a clarification on the US commitment to Thailand and also to the rest of Southeast Asia. He added that the US would aid the Thais to quash any insurgencies and also economic and military programmes.³¹ Agnew also tried to crush any rumours stating that the US would be withdrawing from Southeast Asia.³² Thanom seemed to indicate to Agnew the Thai support for the Nixon Doctrine. He told Agnew that the Thais intended to use their own forces against threats from insurgents. However, he appealed to Agnew for more material support from the US.³³ Since the US could not provide manpower support for combating insurgencies, requesting for material support should be in line with the Nixon Doctrine. The Thai interpretation of the applicability of the Nixon Doctrine was not lost on the Americans. In a memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, to President Nixon, Helms stated that they expected US material and economic support as the Thais were using their own manpower in Vietnam and were also providing bases in Thailand.³⁴

Rogers met with Thanat in February 1970 and reassured the Thai leadership that the US would not abandon its allies in Asia and instead would be gradually reducing its presence in the region as the allies increased their ability to take over the responsibility of their own defence. He reassured the Thais that treaty obligations would continue to be adhered to. Thanat stressed that the Thais would be grateful if the US continued to support the Thais and

²⁹ Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Vice President Agnew, Washington, December 17, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 86.

³⁰ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1301, 12 Jan 1970, C.W. Squire to K. Hamylton Jones.

³¹ Telegram From the Vice President's Party to the Department of State, Bali, January 11, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 93.

³² *Ibid.*, 94.

³³ *Ibid.*, 96.

³⁴ Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Nixon, Washington, October 23, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 195.

the leadership would not request for help from any external manpower to crush its insurgency problems.³⁵

Thanom told Agnew, during another visit by the Vice President to Thailand in August 1970, that he was in favour of Vietnamization and that South Vietnam need to be stronger in order to defend itself without the assistance of the US. He added that South Vietnam's neighbours, namely Laos, Cambodia and Thailand needed assistance to fight against the communist threat. If these states were weakened, South Vietnam might not be able to survive on its own strength.³⁶ In order to set the Nixon Doctrine in motion, material aid, and not manpower, would be required by the Thais.³⁷ This point was given greater emphasis during Thanat's meeting with the Press after the talks with Agnew. He said that Thanom had stated that the Thais had been practicing a policy similar to the Nixon Doctrine for many years. Thailand would still require economic aid and military equipment from friendly nations but did not want aid in the form of manpower. Thailand would rather use its own men to fight its battles than to see foreign forces endangering their lives for the purpose of defending the Thai nation.³⁸

During another conversation with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Thanom, again, expressed his support for the Nixon Doctrine but said that substantial US assistance for the Southeast Asian nations was necessary. As for US troop withdrawals, the Thais felt that such plans should be made while bearing in mind the strength of the communists and their activities in the region.³⁹ Southeast Asian countries were mostly still in the process of developing their defence and at the same time was trying to improve living standards. While trying to accomplish all this, the threat of communism loomed large in Asia. While the onus was on Southeast Asian nations to defend themselves, American aid was still required. Laird placated Thanom by saying that the Nixon Administration would provide air, logistic and artillery

³⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 25, 1970, 5p.m., FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 110.

³⁶ Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand, Washington, September 5 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 175.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 176.

³⁸ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Bangkok to SECSTATE Washington DC; September 7 1970; Vice President's SEA Trip August 1970 Part 1; Box 449 NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³⁹ Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, Bangkok, January 11, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 213.

support. He added that a full withdrawal from Asia was not on the cards at the moment. The US was only trying to decrease its involvement in combat.⁴⁰

In line with the Nixon Doctrine, the US began to gradually reduce its presence in Thailand. By 1 July 1971, the number of US military personnel would be reduced to about 32,000. The two governments “[would] continue to evaluate the level of the US armed forces in Thailand in light of the assessment of the progress of Vietnamization and the security of this area”.⁴¹ Agnew had previously told the Thais that the US would continue to assist them in their struggle against the insurgency problems through the provision of economic and military aid.⁴² However, according to a British report, “there was no implication that the US was stepping up aid for that purpose.”⁴³

US Ambassador to Thailand Leonard Unger was against the Nixon Doctrine and believed that the US should increase its support for Thailand’s counterinsurgency operations. He added that US disengagement from Thailand would cause the Thais to wonder if the US and Thailand share common objectives. This might lead to an “agonizing reappraisal” of the US-Thailand relationship by the Thais.⁴⁴ The Thais expected the US to assist them by providing manpower, material and economic aid related to additional activities against North Vietnam in return for the Thai effort in the Vietnam War.⁴⁵ Apparently, Unger’s predictions seemed to be true, as Thanat was expressing his doubts, in a conversation with Under Secretary of State John Irwin on 27 May 1971, regarding the US commitment to Thailand. There was no sign of any manpower and economic aid from the US. Aid from the US was crucial for Thailand as the Thais would try to use their own manpower and resources but aid from external sources was still very much desired.⁴⁶ According a British source in 1971, the Thais were

⁴⁰ Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, Bangkok, January 11, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 213.

⁴¹ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1301, 9 Sep 1970, Bangkok to Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

⁴² TNA: PRO FCO 15/1301, 31 Aug 1970, Telegram No. 411.

⁴³ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1301, 31 Aug 1970, Telegram No. 412.

⁴⁴ Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 5, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 76.

⁴⁵ Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Nixon, Washington, October 23, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 195

⁴⁶ Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Consulate in Hong Kong, Bangkok, May 28, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 254.

getting increasingly unhappy with the level of US commitment and were said to be displaying “open signs of increasing disillusion with and resentment against the United States.”⁴⁷

The US-PRC Rapprochement and Thailand

Despite their disdain for the PRC, the Thais tried to make some limited contacts with the Communist Chinese. According to Randolph, the Thais had anticipated a US withdrawal from Thailand. Thanat came up with a new blueprint for Thai foreign policy which included a rapprochement with Beijing.⁴⁸ As early as 1969, efforts had been made to establish contact with the PRC but nothing came out of these.⁴⁹ In a conversation with Under Secretary Irwin, Thanat said that Thailand would try to persuade the PRC to cease its support for the communist insurgents in Thailand also to stop the infiltration of men into the region. If the PRC would change their policy, such as its stand in the Paris negotiations, the Thai leadership would know that the PRC wanted to assume a constructive role in the region. Thailand hoped to get the PRC to participate in a Bandung type conference eventually. He felt that this would mean that the PRC had reverted to adopting a foreign policy similar to that of the pre-Bandung period.⁵⁰ Thanat’s view was that the PRC could be persuaded to abandon its militant stance and co-exist with its Asian neighbours through a collective effort by the Asian and Pacific countries. These nations could muster their “moral, political and diplomatic resources and ingenuity” to bring the PRC into the community of Asian nations.⁵¹

While Thanat was expressing the need to have better ties with the PRC, Thanom and other members of the Thai leadership did not agree with him. Thanom was adamant that contacts between the two sides should only develop further when the PRC scaled down its support for the insurgency in Thailand. Trade ties and exchanges with the PRC were discouraged as well. Thanom and the Thai Finance Minister were against legalising trade with the PRC, an idea put forward by members of the government and opposition parties. Similarly, when members of the House of Assembly from opposition parties in the North East and

⁴⁷ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1447, 6 Jul 1971, De la Mare to FCO.

⁴⁸ Randolph, *The United States and Thailand*, 136.

⁴⁹ Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, Saigon, July 5, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 150.

⁵⁰ Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Consulate in Hong Kong Bangkok, May 28, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 255.

⁵¹ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1299, 15 Apr 1970, C.W. Squire to K. Hamylton Jones.

elsewhere requested that a fact finding or trade mission to be sent to China, Thanom rejected the request.⁵² Thailand seemed to be taking a more hardline approach in its relations with the PRC as it was adamant not to have any trade ties with the PRC while trade was promoted with other communist states such as the USSR and the East European countries. One possible reason why the Thai leadership would not have any sort of ties with the PRC was that it feared that this would encourage the local Chinese minority to embark on subversive activities.⁵³ Another possible reason could be that the Thai leadership did not want to annoy its Nationalist Chinese friend and its American ally. Thanat could be perceived as adopting a more progressive and independent stance in Thailand's relations with the PRC while Thanom was seemingly following closely the China policy of the US. Little did Thanom know that Nixon was deviating from the usual US China policy and was seeking rapprochement with the Communist Chinese.

After Nixon made his 15 July 1971 announcement regarding the US rapprochement with the PRC, the Thai leadership conceded, albeit reluctantly, the need for some kind of re-evaluation at their end. The twist in the tale was that with the US rapprochement with the PRC, Thanat could continue with his plan towards better relations with Beijing.⁵⁴ He could convince Thanom and the others of the merits of having better ties with the PRC. Furthermore, the Thai leadership could take this opportunity to build friendly ties with the PRC without having to fear that such a move would upset the Americans. However, Thanat was unable to move further towards a rapprochement with the PRC as he vanished from the political scene after the November 1971 coup by the Thai ruling generals.

The 15 July 1971 announcement came as a shock to the Thai leadership as it was disturbed by the fact that the US did not consult them beforehand and that they were not informed about it before the announcement,⁵⁵ unlike the ROC and Japan which received notices, albeit short. To further confound the Thai leadership, just days before Kissinger's trip to China, Kissinger had spoken with Thanat and told him that the US would try to keep Thailand fully informed of US policy towards the PRC. This was to ensure that the Thais

⁵² TNA: PRO FCO 15/1446, 3 Sep 1971, C. W. Squire to A.P.B Smart.

⁵³ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1446, 5 Jul 1971, Bangkok Post: Thanom Halts Contact with Peking.

⁵⁴ Randolph, *The United States and Thailand*, 141.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

would not be hit by any “drastic surprises.”⁵⁶ The secrecy surrounding the US rapprochement with the PRC caused many loyal Asian allies and friends to feel some amount of unhappiness and resentment towards the US, as they felt that they were totally blindsided. This meant that the US would have a mammoth task explaining their position to these allies, trying not to further upset them.

The Thais were already confused as to how committed the US was to the security of Thailand and if the US was able to keep its vow of “perpetual protection” of the Thai nation. The US withdrawal from Thailand was the initial cause of Thai woes and Nixon’s announcement of his impending visit to China added to their worries. The British opinion was that the Thais were hoping that Nixon’s China initiative would fail while, at the same time, they were attempting to find out how they could make their own moves towards the PRC in order to reduce the level of hostility.⁵⁷ Thailand took the initiative to establish a study group to take a closer look at the “question” and “implications” of the US-PRC rapprochement. Other Southeast Asian countries had been asked to join the study group.⁵⁸

The Nixon administration sought to explain its new China policy to Thailand and also tried to reassure the Thais of continued US commitment. During a conversation between Connally and Thanom, Connally made a forceful declaration of US commitment to Thailand and also the other countries of Southeast Asia. He told Thanom that Nixon had asked him to affirm that US military and economic presence in Southeast Asia would remain as long as it was needed.⁵⁹ The US would continue to assist the Thais to meet its economic and military needs, according to the Nixon Doctrine. He went on to explain the rationale behind Nixon’s upcoming visit to China. Nixon wanted to pursue an improvement of relations with the communist Chinese and also to bring the PRC into the international community using peaceful means. He emphasised to Thanom that the US would never forsake its old friends for new ones. He told Thanom that only bilateral issues would be discussed between the US and the PRC and that third countries need not worry that their interests would be affected. Thanom was

⁵⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, Bangkok, July 6, 1971, 10 a.m., FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 278-9.

⁵⁷ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1446, 30 Jul 1971, Telegram no. 441.

⁵⁸ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1447, 13 Aug 1971, J W D Margetson to Crowson..

⁵⁹ Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, Bangkok, November 3, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 302

concerned about the threat of the PRC to Asia and urged the US to maintain its “military/economic/political umbrella” over Southeast Asia while it sought to mend ties with the PRC. He was apprehensive that should the US show a reduced interest in Southeast Asia, the Communist Chinese could move in to fill up the power vacuum. He was suspicious of the communist Chinese road building activities in Laos and Burma and was wary of the purposes of these roads. Connally reaffirmed that the US would continue to maintain a strong presence in Asia as long as it was needed.⁶⁰

The Chinese Representation Issue in the UN and Thailand

Thailand’s view regarding the Chinese representation issue in the UN was that the “important question” would not work anymore. Thanat was not in favour of the “important question” approach and told Rogers that it should not be used during the upcoming UN vote on Chinese representation. He believed that if the “important question” was used, the ROC would be removed from the UN. He spoke with Rogers regarding a new approach which would involve seeking approval for the admission of the PRC into the UN. According to Thanat, Thailand was strongly against the expulsion of the ROC from the UN and using this tactic would prevent that from happening.⁶¹ On another occasion, Thanat told Kissinger that there was no chance that the current formula would succeed during the next UN vote on the Chinese representation issue.⁶² Thanat believed that a new strategy was necessary.⁶³ The Thais were not against the PRC entering the UN. In fact, Thanom had conveyed to Connally, in a post 15 July meeting, that it was about time for the PRC to join the UN.⁶⁴ Thanat also told Marshall Green that the ROC was “inflexible” and “simplistic” in its thinking regarding the Chinese representation issue.⁶⁵

⁶⁰ Ibid., 303.

⁶¹ Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State London, April 28, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 248

⁶² Memorandum of Conversation, Bangkok, July 6, 1971, 10 a.m., FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 280

⁶³ Talking Points: Thailand; 24 June 1971; Vice President’s Trip Jun-Jul 1971; Box 951; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁶⁴ Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State Bangkok, November 3, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 303.

⁶⁵ Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Consulate in Hong Kong, Bangkok, May 28, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 256.

During a meeting of the inner core group of potential co-sponsors on 11 August 1971, which Thailand took part in, Thai representative Klos Visessurakarn stated that he agreed with New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations John Vivian Scott who commented that a reference to the Security Council seat in the resolution text would “greatly improve credibility of our seriousness.” There would be no criticism that the US was not “going insufficient distance to meet Peking” and would eliminate all rumours that the US approach was gimmicky.⁶⁶

The local press criticised the Thai leadership for “blindly” following the US China policy and with renegeing on its promise of total support for Taipei because of its abstention on the Albanian Resolution. The Thai government clarified that Thailand-ROC relations would not be affected by the UN issue. However, Thailand would be ready to receive the PRC representatives at the annual Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East meeting next March.⁶⁷ The Thai leadership was said to be open to conducting dialogues with the PRC on the condition that the PRC would cease its support for the Thai communists.⁶⁸ With the entry of the PRC into the UN, Thailand was trying to adopt a less hostile stance towards the PRC while trying to maintain a cordial relationship with the ROC. This UN episode also showed that Thailand was still sticking very closely to the US policy by supporting the “important question” resolution. Its abstention from the Albanian resolution was a sign of indecision, as Thailand should have voted against it if it was truly supporting the ROC. As noted previously, Thailand conceded that it was time for the PRC to enter the UN. The abstention could be viewed as a way for the Thais to indirectly express its support for the PRC entry to the UN, without having to vote for ROC’s expulsion.

Pre-Briefing and Thailand’s Reactions to Nixon’s China Visit

The Nixon Administration sought to quell any Thai apprehensions of the President’s trip to China by making an effort to brief the Thais beforehand, through a message from Nixon to Thanom sent via Unger. This message was similar to the ones sent to the Philippines and Indonesia. The purpose of the briefing was, apparently, to reassure Thailand that its interests

⁶⁶ Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, New York, August 11, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 V, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/media/pdf/frus1969-76v05.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 782.

⁶⁷ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1446, 3 Nov 1971, J. P. Millington to A. Carter.

⁶⁸ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1446, 4 Nov 1971, De La Mare to FCO.

would not be undermined and that the US commitment to Thailand did not diminish due to the new US approach towards the PRC. Nixon explained that the US hoped to establish greater understanding and rapport with the PRC through his Beijing Summit in February 1972. He hoped that a long-term channel of communication could be set up with the PRC and, at the minimum, both sides could start with non political people to people exchanges. The purpose of the Beijing summit meetings was to enable the two sides to begin to move towards shedding light on their respective positions and to resolve the real differences that existed between them. Nixon hoped that his China initiative would contribute to promoting greater peace in Asia and the world, and would be to the interest of the Asian states as tensions in Asia would be reduced. He added that the interests of Thailand would be preserved and no agreements would be concluded at the expense of any other countries. He clarified that during the Beijing summit only bilateral issues would be discussed. The US would not be working towards diplomatic ties with the PRC and the interests of Thailand would be kept in mind at all times.⁶⁹ Thanom was grateful for the briefing given by Nixon before his trip to Beijing but expressed a lingering fear of the PRC threat to Thailand because of Beijing's support for Hanoi.⁷⁰

The US rapprochement with the PRC was made with the hope of moving the world towards greater peace as the US attempted to bring the PRC into the world community. The US hoped that the PRC would moderate its aggressive behaviour. The Thais hoped that the rapprochement would work to their advantage as the PRC could decrease its support for insurgents in Thailand on the account of the close alliance between the US and Thailand. Thailand tried to persuade the PRC to cease its support for the Thai communist insurgents by asking the US to speak to the Communist Chinese on their behalf. Thanom spoke with Unger on 14 January 1972 and requested the US to convey to the PRC during the Beijing Summit his concerns over the PRC support for the Thai insurgents. He wanted the PRC to know that the Thai government had terminated all its anti-Peking broadcasts and hoped to establish friendly ties with the PRC on the basis of non-interference in each other's affairs.⁷¹ The US did bring

⁶⁹ Memorandum; Jeanne W. Davis to Kissinger: Tab A-14; December 10, 1971; China Trip: December 1971 Part 1; Box 500; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁷⁰ Memorandum: Kissinger to Nixon; February 7, 1972; China Trip- Misc; Box 502; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁷¹ Telegram From the Embassy in Malaysia to the Department of State, Kuala Lumpur, March 10, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 338.

this issue up to the PRC during a meeting between Rogers and PRC Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Chi Peng Fei. Chi said that the PRC did not meddle in Thai affairs or the activities of the Thai guerrillas. He also revealed that the PRC wanted diplomatic relations with Thailand based on the Five Principles.⁷²

Nixon arrived in Beijing on 21 February 1972 to begin his historic one week visit of China, during which he engaged in talks with the PRC leadership. Marshall Green met with Thanom on 8 March 1972 to brief the Thais on the Nixon trip. Green explained to Thanom that Nixon had managed to open talks with the PRC without jeopardising the relationship with the ROC or with any other countries. The rapprochement with the PRC was made with good intentions in mind. A cordial relationship with the PRC served to “open a real opportunity to move the world in a better direction.”⁷³ To achieve this, strong ties with the American Asian allies had to be maintained, and the US would continue to support its allies.⁷⁴

Thanom pointed out that there was no mention of Thailand in the Shanghai Communiqué. Green assured Thanom that his assumptions that Thailand-US relations would remain unchanged and commitments stipulated by SEATO and the Rusk-Thanat Communiqué would remain intact were true.⁷⁵ Despite the rapprochement, the Thais did not perceive that the PRC was going to adopt a less adversarial stance in Asia. Thanom was still very much concerned about Communist Chinese support for “wars of liberation” as “Communist terrorists” in Thailand were supplied with Chinese equipment. He asked Green if such activities would continue. Green told Thanom that the PRC had declared publicly with the US that it would be against interfering with the affairs of other sovereign states. If the PRC were to continue with such activities, it would be charged with bad faith. He hoped that successful US diplomacy would lead to a decrease in PRC support for such activities. The PRC knew that the Thais and the Americans had a close alliance and the PRC wanted better relations with the US. As such, he hoped that the US would gain some leverage over the PRC when it involved Thai affairs.⁷⁶ Thanom highlighted to Green that Communist Chinese were still supplying the Thai insurgents with aid and were seemingly not going to cease their support for them. Green told

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, Bangkok, March 10, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 331.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 332.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 333.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 334.

Thanom that he understood this and repeated that US diplomacy could help to alleviate this problem.⁷⁷ This conversation showed that, although Thailand was still suspicious of the PRC, it hoped that friendlier ties between US and the PRC would work to Thailand's advantage.

Green met with the Thai King on 9 March 1972 and explained to him the purpose of the Nixon trip to China. The King did not perceive that US diplomacy would result in a change in the PRC's policy and actions. He was wary of PRC's intentions in Southeast Asia and was certain that the Communist Chinese were keen on dominating the region. He was convinced that the PRC would swallow Thailand up. He told Green that Westerners did not have a good understanding of the Communist Chinese and Nixon's move towards the PRC might lead the US to "false conclusions and unrealistic expectations." Green refuted the King's stand by saying that the US had a good track record of aiding its allies in times of danger and also that the US was seeking to form diplomatic ties with the PRC realistically and without any illusions.⁷⁸

The British reported that Thailand was reassured by Green that the US and the PRC did not make any agreements regarding Thailand or Vietnam and Indochina. They were also convinced that the US would not forsake its commitments and obligations to Thailand, in particular the Rusk-Thanat Communiqué.⁷⁹ The US had repeatedly emphasised that its commitment to the Thais would remain unchanged and that the treaty obligations would be adhered to. However, it was apparent that Thai interest could be sacrificed in the advent of a Sino-Thai conflict. This was illuminated in Nixon's conversation with Green on 23 March 1972. Nixon commented that if the PRC "made a run at Thailand" and the Thais appeal for US help on the grounds that the US had treaty obligations with Thailand, it would be ridiculous for a US president to go to Congress saying that the US had to declare war on the PRC because of treaty commitments with Thailand. However, the Thais and also the Communist Chinese must believe that US treaty obligations would be kept at all times.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 335.

⁷⁸ Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Djakarta, March 13, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20.pdf](http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf) accessed 20 April 2010, 340.

⁷⁹ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1637, 17 March 1972, E J Sharland to A P B Smart,

⁸⁰ Editorial Note FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20.pdf](http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf) accessed 20 April 2010, 344.

After the Nixon Visit: Thailand's Relations with the US and the PRC

With the US decreasing its presence in Thailand, the ongoing process of Vietnamization and the US rapprochement with the PRC, its relationship with Thailand had undergone some significant changes. At this juncture, doubts began to arise yet again regarding the level of US commitment to Thailand. The issue of concern was the quality of aid given to the Thais by the Americans. One example was the provision of outdated or used weapons to the Thai Armed Forces and Police. It was viewed by the Thais as a chance for the Americans to get rid of their unwanted weapons. Furthermore, the Thais were required to pay for some of the weapons it had ordered for its armed forces from the US. The US was, in Thai opinion, not providing enough reserve ammunition to Thailand.⁸¹ Thailand was apprehensive of its ability to defend itself, although it had mentioned to the US on many occasions that it would be ready to use its own manpower for defence purposes. There were increasing doubts of the willingness of the US to provide Thailand with sufficient military aid.⁸²

The Thai leadership believed that US presence in Thailand was needed until the conflict in Indochina was resolved. The *Bangkok Post* wrote that the US forces should not withdraw suddenly from Thailand as this would lead to a vacuum and "power hates a vacuum" and other major powers would move in to take over.⁸³ Thanom told the press that US presence would be needed after the war in Vietnam ended. He said that some countries in the region felt that US air force units should be ready to protect the region as Thailand and these countries were wary of powers such as the USSR who might come in and extend its influence in the region. He added that the PRC and other Asian communists already viewed the region as their sphere of influence.⁸⁴ US withdrawal from Thailand would lead to economic problems such as a rise in unemployment and loss of foreign exchange. Thailand would also lose its bargaining

⁸¹ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Bangkok to SECSTATE Washington DC; Jul 24 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=47943&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2009.

⁸² Telegram: AMEMBASSY Bangkok to CINCPAC HONOLULU; Sep 7 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=63869&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2009.

⁸³ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Bangkok to SECSTATE Washington DC; Aug 3 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=51564&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2009.

⁸⁴ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Bangkok to SECSTATE Washington DC; 20 Jul 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=46497&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2009.

power if it needed to obtain more US aid. Thailand was beginning to reassess the merits of US presence in Thailand.⁸⁵

The containment of the PRC was an objective of SEATO. With the US-PRC rapprochement, SEATO was on the verge of being obsolete.⁸⁶ This added to Thai doubts regarding the US commitment to them as it largely depended on the treaty obligations under SEATO. As SEATO began to lose its viability, it would be beneficial for Thailand and also for other Asian nations to be part of a regional organisation which promoted greater cooperation, without any influence from a great power. As such, Thailand would be better off without the close relationship with the US and began to engage with its neighbours in Asia. Moreover, the presence of US forces in Thailand was viewed as an obstacle to building long term ties with Thailand's neighbours. This reason, coupled with the doubts over the level of US commitment to Thailand, prompted the Thai Foreign Ministry to bring to the front the questions pertaining to troop reductions.⁸⁷

The new Thai government, led by Sanya Dharmasakti, came to power after the Thanom regime was brought down by the student uprising of October 1973. The *Bangkok Post* published an article which summarised the foreign policy objectives of the new government. The new government would adopt a more flexible approach and would focus on its own national interests and would refrain from "bending with the free world". The article quoted that unidentified sources had stated that the new government would make friends with all friendly nations regardless of ideology or of political and economic background.⁸⁸

Unlike the previous regime, the new government of Thailand did not favour the presence of US forces on Thai soil after the conclusion of the Indochina conflict. The new civilian government sought to reduce US military presence in Thailand. More freedom of speech meant that voices of resentment against the presence of American troops on Thailand

⁸⁵ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Bangkok to SECSTATE Washington DC; Sep 1 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=63860&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2009.

⁸⁶ Telegram: SECSTATE Washington DC to AMEMBASSY Bangkok; Aug 9 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=54528&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2009.

⁸⁷ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Bangkok to SECSTATE Washington DC; Sep 1 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=63860&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2009.

⁸⁸ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Bangkok to SECSTATE Washington DC; Oct 24 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=89853&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2009.

became amplified.⁸⁹ Deputy Foreign Minister Chartchai Chunhawan said that Thailand would be asking the US to withdraw from Thailand once the war in Indochina came to an end. Thailand was pressing for the withdrawal of US forces in a bid to establish better ties with Hanoi. Hanoi had said that such ties will only be possible if the US were to withdraw from Thailand. Thailand had friendly ties with the USSR, Mongolia, PRC and North Korea, and would like to add North Vietnam to the list. Friendly ties with North Vietnam would “eliminate the sense of mutual threat”.⁹⁰

The US military presence in Thailand was less of an issue for the PRC. Director General Paen Wanamaethi of the Thai Foreign Ministry’s Political Department went on a trip to China with the Thai Badminton Team. He reported on 27 August 1973 that the PRC did not have any apprehensions regarding the presence of US troops in Thailand.⁹¹ The PRC was friendlier with the US than the USSR. It would hate to see a power vacuum left by the US being taken over by the USSR. Hence, allowing the US to stay in Asia was a lesser of two evils.

Greater Sino-Thai contact was to follow after the US rapprochement with the PRC. Ping Pong Diplomacy was extended to Thailand as well. Thai Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs Prasit Kanjonawatana, together with the Thai Table Tennis Team, went to China. The Communist Chinese took special care of Prasit and treated the Thai visitors well. Prasit later met with Zhou. The PRC warned the Thais of the Soviet interest in the Kra Canal.⁹² It was apparent that the Chinese were trying to establish friendlier ties with the Thais by showing that they were the friendlier of the two communist powers. However, the Thais were not sure of PRC’s intentions yet.⁹³

Thailand aimed to build a “normal” relationship with the PRC without the need for diplomatic ties. Thailand would be moving slowly and carefully towards better ties with the Chinese. A Thai delegation, albeit a small one, would be sent to the Canton Trade Fair during

⁸⁹ Corrine Phuangkasem, *Thailand’s Foreign Relations, 1964-80* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), 36-7.

⁹⁰ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Bangkok to SECSTATE Washington DC; Feb 13 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=15556&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2009.

⁹¹ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Bangkok to SECSTATE Washington DC; Aug 28 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=62155&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2009.

⁹² Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 2, 1972, 3 p.m., FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 385.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

the fall.⁹⁴ The initiation of satellite communications service between the PRC and Thailand was to a move towards a “progressive easing of relations” with Beijing so as not to forsake their Nationalist Chinese friends all of a sudden.⁹⁵

More high level contact was achieved when Thai Deputy Foreign Minister Chartchai, responding to an invitation from PRC Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-Hua went on a visit to China from 21 to 29 December 1973.⁹⁶ During his meeting with Chartchai, Zhou commented that he was happy that the US had started to gradually withdraw from Thailand. He was particularly pleased with the fact that the US was not withdrawing precipitately from Thailand. The Thais in turn invited the Communist Chinese to Thailand for official purposes and trade exchanges. The PRC was said to be supportive of the neutralisation of Southeast Asia and the proposed conference of ten nations with the objective to form a stable bloc out of the small Southeast Asian Nations.⁹⁷ However, Chartchai’s visit was viewed by the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be “a successful Goodwill Mission” but nothing significant was discussed between the two sides.⁹⁸

The new Thai government was taking a gradual approach in its relations with the PRC. The Foreign Ministry would maintain a cordial relationship with Beijing, build up a sense of mutual understanding, in order to ensure that a normal relationship with the PRC could be established later on.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 5, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 386.

⁹⁵ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Bangkok to SECSTATE Washington DC; Mar 29, 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=2602&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2009.

⁹⁶ Telegram: AMCONSUL Hong Kong to SECSTATE Washington DC; Dec 20, 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=118106&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2009.

⁹⁷ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Bangkok to SECSTATE Washington DC; Jan 4, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=6996&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2009.

⁹⁸ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Bangkok to SECSTATE Washington DC; Jan 11, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=1001&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2009.

⁹⁹ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Bangkok to SECSTATE Washington DC; Jun 13, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=91022&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2009.

Conclusion

Nixon's strategy in Asia, which included Vietnamization, the Nixon Doctrine and also the rapprochement with the PRC, deeply concerned Thailand. Thailand, just a stone's throw away from South Vietnam, was worried that if its neighbour in Indochina became communist Thailand's security would be jeopardised. Thailand was apparently not too alarmed by the Vietnamization of the war and the possible US disengagement from Asia, as perceived through the Nixon Doctrine, as long as the US would continue to support Thailand through the provision of military and economic aid. Thailand would then be able to defend itself using its own forces, while being supplemented by US aid. However, when the US began to gradually reduce its troop levels in Thailand and no aid was forthcoming, Thailand began to feel a sense of resentment towards the US and this strained the bilateral relationship. When Nixon announced that he had begun the process of rapprochement with the PRC, the Thais were taken by surprise but tried to work it to their advantage. It was hoped that the amicable ties between the US and the PRC could induce the Communist Chinese to halt its support for Thai insurgents. The Thais began to express more doubts about the US commitment to Thailand. Nixon's strategy in Asia meant that the Thais had to rethink their own foreign policy strategy and re-evaluate the value of its close association with the US. SEATO, on which US commitment was firmly based, was beginning to lose its viability. Thailand could choose to continue to stick to the US or venture out and build closer ties with its neighbours and promote greater regional cooperation. The Thanom regime preferred that US troops remain in Thailand even after the conclusion of the Vietnam War. The new government under Sanya decided to distance itself from the US and begin to build closer ties with its neighbours. US-Thailand relations were further strained when the government under Kukrit Pramoj began to demand for the withdrawal of US troops from Thailand by March 1976. Contacts between the PRC and Thailand increased, albeit slowly, after the Nixon trip to China. Thailand would eventually normalise its relations with the PRC on 1 July 1975. The Thai governments after Thanom had gone one step further and distanced itself from the US and moved towards becoming a neutral party in Asia.

6. Indonesia

Indonesia, which was a Dutch colony since the early 17th century, was under Japanese occupation from 1942-1945. After the war in the Pacific concluded, a nationalist movement led by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed the independence of Indonesia from foreign rule. The Republic of Indonesia was subsequently established in August 1945. The Dutch tried to re-assert their authority in Indonesia but this was met with resistance from the people. The Dutch ceased to be the colonial masters of Indonesia as sovereignty was transferred to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia in December 1949 at the Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference held in The Hague.

Upon gaining independence, Indonesia chose not to be aligned with the US or the USSR and was determined not to be influenced by any of the great powers and to manage its own foreign and domestic affairs. Indonesia was actively involved in non-aligned and Afro-Asian conferences and was fervently against the Manila Pact. Under the “Guided Democracy” of the Sukarno government, Indonesia was increasingly anti- Western and moving closer to the PRC. The failed coup of 1965 led to the fall of Sukarno and the rise of Suharto. Unlike the Sukarno government, the anti-communist Suharto government shunned socialist countries and chose to build better ties with the West.¹ The anti-communist Suharto government leaned closer towards the US and displayed a great disdain for Communist China, viewing it as an archenemy and menace. Relations with the PRC were frozen due to Indonesian suspicions of Beijing’s complicity in the 1965 coup.

Indonesia was not considered an American ally in the formal sense because it did not sign a defence treaty with the US and there were no American troops on Indonesian soil. However, it relied heavily on the US and viewed it as a main source of economic and military aid. Doubts were cast on the future of bilateral relations after Nixon enunciated his new Asian strategy in 1969. The impending withdrawal of the British from Southeast Asia, coupled with Nixon’s Asian strategy, raised the concerns of the Suharto government that friendly western powers might leave the region entirely. This was followed by the move towards rapprochement with the PRC when Kissinger met

¹ Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 103.

with Zhou Enlai in Beijing in July 1971. These policies worried the Indonesian government due to its anti-communism, reliance on the US for aid and disdain for the PRC.

This chapter examines the American impression of the reactions of the Indonesian leadership towards Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine. It also explores the response of the Indonesian leadership to the US when Nixon tried to explain his China initiative to Indonesia. Indonesia's voting behaviour on the Chinese representation issue in the UN will be examined. Asian states moved swiftly to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC in the 1970s, but Indonesia only restored relations with the Beijing in 1989. The chapter discusses Indonesia's relations with the PRC after 1972 so as to shed light on why the restoration of relations between Indonesia and the PRC only happened in 1989.

Indonesia: from Anti-West to Pro-US

Indonesia adopted a non-aligned position in the world of superpower politics upon independence. It was the host of the April 1955 Bandung Conference, which advocated non-interference in the domestic affairs of every nation and the solidarity of Afro-Asian nations.² It also conveyed the message that former colonies were to be recognised as independent nations and should not be ignored in the management of global affairs.³ Indonesia was not a signatory of the Manila Pact (SEATO) of 1954 and went further to condemn it as "an unwarranted intrusion of the Cold War into Southeast Asia."⁴ Indonesia's neutral stance did not bode well for relations with the US. Indonesia's "independent and active" foreign policy worried the US, which viewed it as a "dangerous flirtation with forces ranged against America and its allies." To the Americans, Indonesia's neutralism had jeopardised US security policy in Southeast Asia. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed that countries should align with either the USSR or the US in the Cold War, meaning that there was no room for neutralism.⁵

² Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto*, 27.

³ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), 38.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁵ Andrew Roadnight, *United States Policy towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower Years* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 183.

The US relationship with Indonesia during the Eisenhower administration was troubled. On the national front, the US sympathy for the regional rebels responsible for the rebellions in central Sulawesi and Sumatra of 1958 upset the Sukarno government. Dulles openly criticised the Sukarno government by stating in a press conference that the political system in Indonesia had disappointed its citizens. The US went further to support the regional rebels by making encouraging public statements and supplied weapons to the rebels through its friends in the region.⁶ Sukarno did not have a good personal relationship with Eisenhower. He felt “slighted” when Eisenhower did not include Indonesia as one of the destinations of his Asian tour between the end of 1959 and June 1960.⁷ He was annoyed when Eisenhower rejected his invitation for him to visit Indonesia. He was also resentful towards Eisenhower for not treating him with the “appropriate courtesy and consideration” during his first trip to the USA.⁸

The Indonesians were unhappy with the concessions demanded from them at the Hague conference. Indonesia had to bear \$1.13 billion of the debt of the Netherlands East Indies. The sovereignty of West Irian was not transferred to the Indonesia until further negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia had been concluded.⁹ The US took on a neutral position in the dispute over West Irian, which in Indonesia’s view was essentially an adherence to the status quo which translated to support for the Dutch.¹⁰ The sovereignty of West Irian was finally transferred to Indonesia with the mediation of the Kennedy Administration. However, such remedial actions came too late and were too little, as the damage to US-Indonesian relations had already been done.¹¹

With the West Irian issue resolved, Sukarno was faced with the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. Indonesia objected to this development and Sukarno embarked on a campaign, known as *Konfrontasi* or Confrontation, to prevent the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. Being a leader of a huge country such as Indonesia, Sukarno was disappointed that he

⁶ Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy*, 50.

⁷ Matthew Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the United States and the Creation of Malaysia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 32.

⁸ Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy*, 57.

⁹ Audrey R. Kahin, and George McT. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles debacle in Indonesia* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1995), 34.

¹⁰ Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965*, 33.

¹¹ Roadnight, *United States Policy towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower Years*, 185.

was not consulted beforehand with regards to the merger.¹² The US supported the Malaysians against the Indonesians and offered military aid to the Malaysian government.¹³

Since independence, Indonesia established diplomatic relations with both communist and non-communist countries, including the PRC which it recognised as the only representative of China.¹⁴ During the rule of Sukarno, Indonesia was becoming increasingly close to the PRC. According to Leifer, Indonesia's exit from the UN in 1965, due to its opposition to Malaysia taking up a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council, pushed it towards a closer relationship with the Communist Chinese.¹⁵ Indonesia introduced the idea of a Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) and received immense support from the PRC. Other countries interested in joining CONEFO included North Korea and North Vietnam, making this a potentially anti-west coalition.¹⁶

1965 could be regarded as a watershed year for the relationship between the US and Indonesia. The "30 September Movement" which was a coup led by the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI) was unleashed on 1 October 1965. Six top anti-communist generals were murdered and the rebels captured parts of Jakarta. General Suharto led the Strategic Reserve and recaptured the city. He then took over the leadership of the army. Suharto launched a campaign to eliminate the communists whom he alleged to be the culprits responsible for the coup. A bloodbath ensued and Sukarno tried to put a stop to the massacre, but to no avail. The PKI, the military's main rival, met its demise as the result of the failed coup. Sukarno was forced to relinquish his position and hand over the reins of leadership to Suharto in 1966. The New Order government under Suharto brought in a brand new era of cordial and close ties with the US. Indonesia's claim to neutralism was often criticised as it was viewed as a "client state" firmly in the "orbit" of the US.¹⁷ On the other hand, Indonesia's diplomatic ties with the PRC were frozen from 1967 onwards. Suharto took the opportunity presented to him by the coup and also his counter coup to attack the three top threats to the security of Indonesia: the communists, the overseas Chinese and the PRC. Although there was

¹² Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto*, 30.

¹³ Sodhy, *The US-Malaysian Nexus*, 264-5.

¹⁴ Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto*, 27; Leo Suryadinata, *Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and China: A Study of Perceptions and Policies* (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) LTD, 1978), 167-8.

¹⁵ Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 103.

¹⁶ Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto*, 30.

¹⁷ Robert C. Horn, "Indonesia's Response to Changing Big Power Alignments", *Pacific Affairs* 46, 4 (1973-1974): 519.

no direct evidence linking the PRC to the coup, the military deemed that the PRC was involved and broke relations with the Communist Chinese.¹⁸ The Indonesians also resented the PRC's association with the PKI. On the other hand, Beijing was not too fond of the Suharto Government which had taken over the reins of power after the PKI was crushed.¹⁹ The PRC had a great disdain for the Indonesian army and regarded it as "fascist" and "reactionary." It rendered support to the PKI and offered political asylum to some of its leaders.²⁰

The Sukarno government's militant approach in foreign policy left the Indonesian economy in tatters, sapping its resources and depleting its foreign exchange reserves. The economic situation was deteriorating with an inflation rate of 900 per cent during the period from December 1962 to December 1963. In 1965, the economy was on the verge of collapse.²¹ When the Suharto government came to power, it viewed the rehabilitation of economy as its prime task. The Suharto government hoped that by rehabilitating the economy, there would be greater political stability in Indonesia. A stronger economy would also give the New Order government the legitimacy to rule as the true leaders of Indonesia.²²

Sukarno's brand of self reliance was deemed unfeasible and the Suharto government began to welcome foreign investment and aid. Suharto's attempts to rehabilitate the economy led to closer economic ties with the US. An agreement which would guarantee American investors was signed with Washington.²³ In 1966, the US decided that, because of its own national interest, a new strategy was needed in the provision of aid to Indonesia. The US plan was to "maximise aid from other nations, deeply involve international agencies, and minimise direct U.S. Government involvement in Indonesian initiative and decision-making."²⁴ Thus, the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) was formed in 1967 to assist Indonesia in the rebuilding of its economy. The group comprised Australia, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the US.

¹⁸ Michael Williams, "China and Indonesia Make Up: Reflections on a Troubled Relationship". *Indonesia* 51(1991): 149-50.

¹⁹ Leo Suryadinata, *China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985), 115.

²⁰ Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto*, 103.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 31.

²² *Ibid.*, 139.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, April 1, 1969 FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 568.

Each member contributed a fair share of aid to Indonesia, with the US and Japan being the biggest contributors.²⁵ The IGGI fitted America's plan appropriately as it would be providing aid to Indonesia as part of a collective effort, and not on an individual basis. This would help to preserve Indonesia's non-aligned image and not be viewed as being too close to the US.

According to the IMF's International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Indonesia would require a total of \$600 million in government aid in 1970. The US would contribute a third of the total aid provided by the IGGI nations to Indonesia.²⁶ The US contribution in 1971/1972 was around one third of the total IGGI aid. The amount that the US would provide was \$215 million. The total IGGI aid for that period was \$640 million.²⁷ The US contribution, until 1973, was kept at the same level. US investment in Indonesia from 1967 to 1988 was US\$21.2 billion.²⁸ Indonesia was indeed closely tied to the US which was its main provider of economic aid.

In January 1969, during his farewell call on the Indonesian President, the then US Ambassador to Indonesia Marshall Green²⁹ and Suharto discussed various issues. Suharto stressed that there should be regional cooperation between Indonesia and its neighbours. He said that if Malaysia was faced with external threats and required military assistance, Indonesia would not hesitate to send in its troops to help in its defence. Based on Suharto's comments, Green noted that Suharto and the military had a more "relaxed" concept of non-alignment than Foreign Minister Adam Malik and the Foreign Office.³⁰ The US and Indonesia believed that their cooperation would not jeopardise Indonesia's non-aligned status and Indonesia would continue to practice an independent foreign policy, free from superpower influence. It was reported that both Nixon and

²⁵ Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto*, 139.

²⁶ Memorandum: Henry A. Kissinger to Spiro Agnew; undated; VP Trip East Asia Jan 1970 Part 2; Box 450; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, Maryland.

²⁷ Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, undated, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 687.

²⁸ Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto*, 139.

²⁹ Marshall Green was the US Ambassador to Indonesia until January 1969.

³⁰ Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 26, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 566.

Suharto understood that despite the close cooperation that existed between Indonesia and the US, Jakarta was in no way forsaking its “active and independent foreign policy.”³¹

Vietnamization, the Nixon Doctrine and Indonesia

The Indonesian government’s opinion of Vietnamization was that a sudden withdrawal from Vietnam would be undesirable. While expressing its approval of the phased withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam, the Indonesian leadership felt that the withdrawal might be proceeding too rapidly. There were also concerns that a full withdrawal could be completed before the free nations of Southeast Asia could build up their own defence capabilities.³²

Malik expressed Indonesian views on the US withdrawal from Vietnam during a meeting with Rogers in July 1969. He said that the Suharto Government would be glad if the US would to eradicate its presence in Vietnam. This was in line with their belief that there should be no interference in the affairs of Vietnam and the conflict should be resolved by the Vietnamese.³³ This was also compatible with the Indonesian opposition to the presence of foreign troops on Southeast Asian soil as displayed by its disdain for the presence of American troops in the Philippines. However, the Suharto government was not in favour of a sudden withdrawal of the US from Vietnam, as it feared that it would lead to an equally sudden takeover of Saigon and subsequently the neighbouring countries by the communist forces. The US should work on building up the defence capabilities of the South Vietnamese and its neighbours against communism when planning its withdrawal from Vietnam.³⁴ Hence, like many of the Asian allies, Indonesia believed that US aid was still essential as Asian states embarked on greater self-reliance. There were prevailing fears that Indonesia would be the prime target for any communist strike on Asia. The Indonesians were concerned about their own security and wanted to guarantee the stability of the

³¹ Memorandum: Foreign Radio and Press Reaction to President Nixon’s Trip to Asia and Romania 23 July- 3 August 1969; August 6 1969; East Asia Trip 1969; Box 464; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³² Memorandum: Kissinger to Agnew; Undated; V.P. Agnew’s Trip Dec 1969-Jan 1970 Indonesia; Box 82; HAKOF; Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland, 3; Talking Points: Indonesia; Dec 8 1969; V.P. Agnew’s Trip Dec 1969-Jan 1970 Indonesia; Box 82; HAKOF; Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

³³ 271 Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, July 29, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 577.

³⁴ Ibid.

nation and also the promotion of greater cooperation of the Asian states before the impending US withdrawal. The US was said to have reassured the Indonesians that US withdrawal would be done in tandem with the gradual strengthening of the defence of the regional states. Malik said that Indonesia would require foreign aid so as to carry out the five year economic plan which would assist the nation to fend off subversion. The US was said to have assured Malik that such aid would be provided "at an adequate level" in the future.³⁵

Suharto expressed similar views regarding the US withdrawal from Vietnam as Malik. He thought that any US withdrawal from Vietnam should be a gradual process and in connection with South Vietnam's ability to consolidate its strength. Efforts should be made to find a common ideology for the nation. The government should try to gain more popular support from the people and this in turn would lead to greater national will and ability to fight against any threats.³⁶

Kissinger had a meeting with Indonesian generals Sumitro, Tjakradipura and Sutopo Juwono on 27 July 1969. The generals' view was that the US should remain in Vietnam long enough to buy time for South Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries to build up their defence against the communist threat. They were initially worried by reports that the US was going to withdraw from Vietnam by the end of 1970. Kissinger reassured the generals that the US would not withdraw from Vietnam without considering the prevailing circumstances. The generals told Kissinger that the US should take a minimum of five years to equip the South Vietnamese with the ability to defend themselves effectively.³⁷

Malik conveyed to Agnew that Southeast Asian nations were not yet ready to assume the responsibility of their own defence and thus were not in favour of a sudden withdrawal of the US from Asia. Indonesia's view on the US role in Asia post Vietnam was that the US should not turn inward as Asian nations needed US assistance.³⁸ Agnew tried to explain to Malik how

³⁵ TNA: PRO FCO 24/455, 1 August 1969, Sutherland to FCO.

³⁶ Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, Bali, August 5, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 587.

³⁷ Memorandum for the Record, Jakarta, July 27, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 574.

³⁸ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Canberra to RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC; January 14 1970; VP Trip East Asia Jan 1970; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; Box 450; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

Vietnamization would work in the long run. Agnew was optimistic about the success of Vietnamization because he had witnessed the cooperation between the US and the South Vietnamese troops. He believed that if the US was to withdraw from Vietnam by “reasonable” levels, the South Vietnamese could take over the fighting of the war from the American troops. Agnew added that South Korea was a successful case because very few US troops were needed for its defence and economic stability was an important factor which determined if a country could take on the responsibility of defending itself.³⁹

The British announced that they would be withdrawing their military presence from the region east of Suez in 1971. A Five Power Defence Arrangement, the five powers being Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom, would eventually replace the British defence role.⁴⁰ Malik had stated publicly that the Indonesian leadership would not be opposed to a temporary British presence in Malaysia and Singapore. The British commented that many Indonesians, especially those in the military, were secretly in favour of a British presence in Asia which would act as a stabilising factor in the region.⁴¹ It did not oppose the stationing of Australian and New Zealand forces in Malaysia and Singapore. However, Indonesia would oppose the presence of any other foreign power keen on replacing the British presence in these two countries.⁴² Rogers told Malik that the US was not planning on replacing the British and would be concerned if any other nation was keen to take over the British role.⁴³ The Indonesian press reported after Agnew’s trip to Asia in 1969 that the US would remain in Asia but would not be sending its own forces to Singapore.⁴⁴

According to the Nixon Doctrine, to continue to play a significant role in Asia, it was important that the US not adopt policies which would make Asian nations be overly dependent and

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Memorandum; Henry Kissinger to Spiro Agnew; December 17, 1969; VP Trip East Asia Jan 1970 Part 2; Box 450; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁴¹ TNA: PRO FCO24/758, 13 Oct 1970, Visit of the Prime Minister to the UN 19-24 Oct 1970: Meeting with President Soeharto of Indonesia: Brief by FCO.

⁴² Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State Jakarta, July 29, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 577.

⁴³ Ibid., 578.

⁴⁴ Foreign Media Reaction Reports: Vice President’s Trip; January 17, 1970; V.P. Agnew’s Trip Dec 1969-Jan 1970 Indonesia, Box 82; HAKOF; Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

consequently would drag the US into another Vietnam-type war.⁴⁵ In this sense, Indonesia's relationship with the US was the perfect example of dependency short of a security treaty. The US could keep its friends close but would not be obliged to defend them in times of war due to the lack of security treaties. However, it should be noted that US treaty obligations with its Asian allies such as Thailand, the Philippines and the ROK lacked the promise of automatic assistance. Hence, support might not be forthcoming in times of danger, even with the existence of bilateral treaties. During the press conference, Nixon praised Suharto for his success in decreasing the inflation rate of Indonesia from 635% in 1965 to zero in 1969 and said that he would like to learn from Suharto. He added that Indonesia was a country with immense resources and it was very much in US interest to aid Indonesia in its economic development.⁴⁶

Suharto was reportedly expressing his apprehensions regarding the reduction of American aid before Nixon introduced his new policy in Guam. Suharto lamented that it was most "ironic" that the US was going to reduce aid to Asia at the time when Indonesia had achieved stability politically, economically and militarily, and was exploring its "opportunities to grow." He added that the American people would appreciate the idea of providing foreign aid without the need to contribute in terms of US manpower. However, Suharto did not believe that the mere provision of material aid was enough. He said that "men with their guns still do not guarantee a victory."⁴⁷

Indonesia hoped that the US would only decrease its presence in Southeast Asia gradually.⁴⁸ Acting Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson explained to the Indonesians that the Nixon Doctrine was not a way for the US to abandon its commitments to Asia but was an "adjustment of US policy to actual conditions." It also meant that neither superpower should exert too much influence on Asian states that possessed the ability to rally together for regional cooperation. Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Malik stated that the Indonesians had a perfect understanding of the Nixon Doctrine and felt that the time was ripe for the US to reassess

⁴⁵Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen, July 25, 1969, Public Papers of the Presidents (PPP), reproduced at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2140&st=&st1=> accessed 12 September 2010.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ TNA: PRO FCO 24/455, 24 July 1969, International Herald Tribune, Suharto is Worried That U.S. will lose interest in SE Asia.

⁴⁸ Talking Points: Indonesia; July 10, 1969; President Nixon's Trip Country Briefing Book Indonesia July-August 1969; Box 453; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

its policy in Asia along these lines. He hoped that the US would not “equate” all problems of Southeast Asia and felt that it was vital that the US “stress or even increase its commitments as far as certain problems are concerned.”⁴⁹

Rogers reiterated Nixon’s views of US presence in Asia to Malik. As a Pacific power, the US would not forsake its treaty obligations with its allies and would aid the Asian countries in its economic, educational and cultural development. The US would not be withdrawing from Asia. However, it would no longer commit its troops to defend an Asia state unless it was in accordance to the terms of a defence treaty. Asian states had to be self-reliant when faced with any insurgencies at home. The US would help these states to strengthen their defence prowess but would not get involved militarily. The US respected the sovereignty of the Asian nations.⁵⁰ Nixon and Rogers had, on another occasion, told the Indonesians that the US would continue to play a role in Southeast Asia.⁵¹ During a meeting with Suharto at the White House in May 1970, Nixon reassured Suharto that the US would not be withdrawing from Asia. Suharto expressed his full support for the Nixon Doctrine and told the President that he hoped that it would continue to be implemented.⁵²

A number of young Indonesian intellectuals met with the Americans in Jakarta and their views on the Nixon Doctrine were that they believed the US was adamant on withdrawing from Asia. They were “uncertain” and “apprehensive” about the extent and nature of the US withdrawal. The US sensed that the intellectuals had feelings of being abandoned and betrayed by the Americans. The intellectuals hoped that the US would continue to play a major role in Asia. They were worried about the possibility of a Japanese rearmament and its economic domination of the region.⁵³ Their views on Vietnam differed from that of the Indonesia leadership as they preferred

⁴⁹ Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 26, 1970, 10:30 a.m. FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 637.

⁵⁰ Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, July 29, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 579.

⁵¹ Memorandum: Kissinger to Agnew; VP Trip East Asia Jan 1970; Box 450; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵² Memcon: May 28, 1970; Memcon- The President/President Suharto/Kissinger May 26, 1970; Box 1024; NSC Files; Presidential/HAK MemCons; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵³ Memorandum: Ray Price to Kissinger; July 30, 1969; Meeting Memos July 1969; Box 452; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

the US to “stick it out” in Vietnam. This was due to their concerns regarding the repercussions which would follow should the Communists win the war.⁵⁴

The Suharto government was apprehensive of the threat from the communists and also the PRC even after the large scale purges of communist related elements in 1965. The Suharto Government viewed Communism as the main source of threat to Indonesia and believed that economic prosperity would prevent communism from gaining a foothold in the country again.⁵⁵ Suharto blamed the Communist Chinese for the revival of insurgent activities in Indonesia.⁵⁶ He told Nixon that the biggest threat to Indonesia was not Communist subversion, the re-emergence of the PKI or the PRC, but the possible failure of the five-year development plan. However, he linked the possible failure of the programme as a catalyst for the communists in Indonesia to make a comeback as national will would be weakened and the ability to resist would be reduced.⁵⁷ This meant that the fear of the communist threat still loomed large in the mind of Suharto. The US did not support the Indonesian Five Year Plan as it had a “vague and over-ambitious” schedule of developmental objectives. Hence, it was not going to commit itself to provide the aid needed to ensure its success.⁵⁸

Suharto was also pursuing a closer bilateral relationship with the US. He asked that projects which could serve as “long-term monuments to US-Indonesia friendship and cooperation” be provided on a bilateral basis. He also asked for US aid for training in modern weaponry and tactics and also for the US to supply the Indonesians with conventional and transport aircraft.⁵⁹ Suharto requested more US assistance such as obsolete conventional aircraft and the training of Indonesian pilots so as to carry out the process of “territorial and people’s defense” to ensure the

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Memorandum: Kissinger to Nixon; July 26, 1969; Meeting Memos July 1969; Box 452; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵⁶ Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 26, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 566.

⁵⁷ Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, Bali, August 5, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 588.

⁵⁸ Memorandum: Kissinger to Agnew; undated; V.P. Agnew’s Trip Dec 1969-Jan 1970 Indonesia; Box 82, HAKOF; Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland, 3.

⁵⁹ Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, Bali, August 5, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 587-8.

stability of Indonesia.⁶⁰ Rogers commented that Indonesia was leaning towards the US as the main source of foreign support, despite its supposedly independent domestic and foreign policy.⁶¹ Furthermore, Soviet technicians had been sent home by the Indonesians. Suharto's request for military training rather than weapons boded well with the Nixon administration who viewed it as being in line with the Nixon Doctrine.⁶²

The US affirmed its commitment to provide Indonesia with economic aid. However, it was ambiguous in pledging to provide Indonesia with more military aid.⁶³ Suharto said, "In order to make an effective contribution to the efforts at world peace, the Republic of Indonesia must be strong internally."⁶⁴ In a bid to rehabilitate the economy, Indonesia had used most of its domestic and foreign resources for the development of its economy, at the expense of its budget for the armed forces. The US supported Indonesia's decision but did not want the Indonesians to believe that the US would be willing to assume the responsibility of re-equipping the armed forces.⁶⁵

During a meeting with Suharto at the White House in May 1970, Nixon discussed the dilemmas surrounding the provision of US military aid to Indonesia. Nixon explained that both sides should be aware that there was opposition in both Indonesia and the US regarding the level of US military aid to Indonesia. Domestically, the Americans were worried that large amounts of aid would mean a greater financial burden. The US also did not want to jeopardise the image of Indonesia as a non-aligned state. Nixon told Suharto that his administration would be willing to provide Indonesia with the aid it required, but not at the expense of its political situation. The needs of Indonesia had to be fulfilled so that it could play a bigger role in Southeast Asia, which would

⁶⁰ Memorandum: Kissinger to Nixon; July 26, 1969; Meeting Memos July 1969; Box 452; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁶¹ Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, Bali, August 5, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 588.

⁶² Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 21, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 623.

⁶³ Talking Points: Third Day: Indonesia; July 27, 1969; Meeting Memos July 1969; Box 452; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁶⁴ R. E. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 181.

⁶⁵ Talking Points: Indonesia; Dec 8 1969; V.P. Agnew's Trip Dec 1969-Jan 1970 Indonesia; Box 82; HAKOF; Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

be a step towards greater regional cooperation.⁶⁶ It appeared that an increase in aid to Indonesia would invite criticism in both countries. The hands of the US were tied on this issue by domestic constraints.

As the US was decreasing its presence in Asia, the nations of Southeast Asia could no longer rely on the US to aid in its defence, as much as before. Hence, regional cooperation was deemed the way in which the nations of Southeast Asia could defend themselves against threats to their security. Indonesia was a founding member of ASEAN, an organisation dedicated to the promotion of regional cooperation, albeit not in the military sense. It hoped to achieve greater regional peace and stability in Asia through the formation of this regional organisation. During a conversation between Soedjatmoko and Kissinger on 30 January 1969, the ambassador stated that ASEAN could evolve into a “neutral block” with Cambodia, Laos, Burma and South Vietnam added as members.⁶⁷ This would no doubt expand the function and scope of ASEAN and would help to promote greater regional cooperation, with the other nations lending a hand to these troubled nations. In Nixon’s talking points for his meeting with Suharto during his 1969 visit to Indonesia, it was stated that after the end of the Vietnam War, the US would continue to play a stabilising political and economic role in Southeast Asia. In addition, regional cooperation was encouraged so that the nations in Southeast Asia could take on the burden of defending themselves.⁶⁸ During a meeting with the Indonesians on 29 July 1969, the US encouraged regional cooperation amongst Asian countries and viewed it as an important strategy for them to preserve their sovereignty. The US expressed its appreciation of Indonesia’s efforts in bringing about more regional cooperation.⁶⁹ Indonesia took the lead in organising and hosting the 12-nations meeting on Cambodia. The meeting advocated the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cambodia so as to “preserve Cambodia’s neutrality and territorial integrity.” The US viewed the Indonesian initiative

⁶⁶ Memcon: May 28, 1970; Memcon- The President/President Suharto/Kissinger May 26, 1970; Box 1024; NSC Files; Presidential/HAK MemCons; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁶⁷ Cheng Guan Ang, *Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War* (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 63.

⁶⁸ Talking Points: Third Day: Indonesia; July 27, 1969; Meeting Memos July 1969; Box 452; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁶⁹ Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, July 29, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 579.

as in line with the Nixon Doctrine which called for the Asian nations to take on their own defence responsibilities.⁷⁰

The Indonesian General Sumitro felt that the military vacuum left by the Nixon Doctrine and also Britain's "East of Suez" policy could result in the communists, especially the PRC, increasing their influence in Southeast Asia through protracted wars of liberation. The free nations of the region could rally together to coordinate on foreign policy and defence matters against the communist menace, "if someone shows the way." This would not mean a formation of a military pact but a military "gentleman's agreement." In this context, Sumitro said that US assistance to Indonesia was needed for the purpose of "furthering Southeast Asian regional military cooperation."⁷¹

Indonesia's Response to the 15 July Announcement

Nixon's announcement on 15 July 1971 that Kissinger had just returned from a trip to Beijing and he would visit China sometime before May 1972 sent alarm bells ringing in Indonesia as the US had reconciled with Indonesia's nemesis, the PRC. Nixon's China policy raised anxieties within the Indonesian leadership and military who were already worried about the nature of future US presence in Asia and the security problems which would ensue should the US withdraw from Asia.

Indonesian Ambassador Soedjatmoko met Nixon on 27 July 1971 and Nixon took the opportunity to explain his China initiative to the Indonesian leadership. He started by giving the reassurance that his China initiative was purely driven by the need for US-PRC bilateral ties and was not in "derogation" of any of the US allies. The US would never do anything that would jeopardise the interests of the Indonesians. Kissinger said that the US had already increased the

⁷⁰ Memorandum: Kissinger to Nixon; undated; Indonesia, President Suharto State Visit May 20-June 1 1970; Box 919; NSC Files; VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁷¹ Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, October 13, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 677.

amount of military aid to Indonesia.⁷² Indonesia was already concerned about the US presence in Asia and Nixon's China initiative added to these concerns. Soedjatmoko said that his government was most concerned about the sort of presence, relating to military and economic aid, the US would have in Asia in the future. Nixon said that US military presence would remain and economic aid would still be provided. There would not be an American withdrawal. Soedjatmoko stressed that the US withdrawal from Vietnam should fit into a future system. The US had to make plans for the future and not just give personal assurances.⁷³ Previously, the Indonesian intellectuals had raised the concerns they had regarding the remilitarisation of Japan. This view was echoed by the Ambassador. He stated that he was also worried about the remilitarisation of Japan which should never be allowed to go nuclear. Nixon seemed to agree with Soedjatmoko on this. He told Soedjatmoko that if the US were to withdraw from Asia, Japan would either acquire nuclear weapons or make a deal with some country.⁷⁴

Shortly after the 15 July announcement, Suharto stated that the Indonesian leadership welcomed the Nixon visit to the PRC and regarded it as contributing to the alleviation of world tensions. Malik was reported to be adopting a "cooler" attitude towards the rapprochement and was surprised by the US move towards the PRC.⁷⁵ The British were told by the Indonesians that they were "fairly relaxed" about the US-PRC rapprochement and did not perceive it as "directly affecting" the interests of Indonesia. They stated that Indonesia was always supportive of the principle of "Asian countries should solve Asian problems." Asian nations should not be overly reliant on the US and should build up their own defence capabilities. The British said that the Indonesians were patronising towards close American allies in the region, such as the Thais and the Filipinos and were seemingly adopting a "cautious" stance towards Marco's proposal to organise a conference of Southeast Asian nations which would hold dialogues to discuss the rapprochement.⁷⁶ Despite the show of support for Nixon's policies, the Indonesians continued to be suspicious of the intentions of the PRC and did not perceive the PRC rapprochement with the US and the invitation

⁷² Memorandum for the President's File Washington, July 27, 1971, 11 a.m., FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 692-3.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 693.

⁷⁵ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1112, 24 August 1971, J R de Fonblanquet P J Sullivan.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

for Nixon to visit China as indications that there was the possibility of a change in the PRC policy towards Southeast Asia. Indonesia would not alter its policy towards the PRC despite the rapprochement. This was confirmed by Malik who stated that Indonesia would not follow the lead of the US to mend its own ties with the PRC.⁷⁷

On the contrary, according to US Ambassador to Indonesia Francis Galbraith, the Indonesians were apprehensive of Nixon's China policy as they were feeling a kind of "underlying nervousness" with regards to the US-PRC rapprochement. Nixon told Galbraith to make it clear to the Indonesians that the US opening to China was "deliberate and calculated." It was not based on the belief that the PRC would change because of the US initiative. Nixon justified his move towards the PRC by stating that this would lead to greater peace in Asia. He said that the PRC should not be isolated from the world community because the danger posed by a PRC still isolated from the world was undesirable. He added that the "pragmatic opening towards normalisation represented in the long run a strengthening of the security of the countries in the area and reduced the risks that an atmosphere of isolation and confrontation would entail."⁷⁸ The development of the US-PRC relations added to Indonesia's worries that the US would withdraw from Asia. Philip C. Habib, the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff, was in Washington to find out what were the long range plans for US military presence in Asia. Nixon's reply was that the US would not be disengaging militarily from Asia but conceded that it would no doubt be reduced with the end of the war in Vietnam. Apart from their apprehensions regarding the future of the US presence in Asia, the Indonesians were still worried that the US withdrawal from Vietnam would be a swift one.⁷⁹

Secretary Connally visited Asia in November 1971 and met with Suharto. Connally reiterated the Nixon Doctrine and explained to Suharto that the US policy was to eradicate its presence in Vietnam and to refrain from engaging itself in another Vietnam-type conflict in Southeast Asia in the future. The US would continue to help the Southeast Asian states to increase

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Memorandum for the President's File, Washington, September 14, 1971, 10:45–11:45 a.m., FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 695.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

their defence ability and to retain an amount of influence in the region.⁸⁰ He went on to explain the rationale behind Nixon's visits to Beijing and Moscow. The visits would contribute to the reduction of tensions and misunderstandings which would otherwise lead to more global conflict. He told Suharto that the presidential trips were made possible because of the ability of the Southeast Asians to strengthen their capacities along with the success of the US efforts to assist them in achieving those capacities.⁸¹

Indonesia and the Chinese Representation Issue in the UN

Indonesia's voting behaviour on issues pertaining to the PRC changed with the advent of the Suharto government. Under the leadership of Sukarno, Indonesia tended to side with the PRC or maintain a neutral stance. During 1951, as a response to the PRC involvement in the Korean War, UN members voted on a motion to denounce the PRC as an aggressor. Indonesia chose to abstain from the vote.⁸² In the same year, Indonesia abstained from voting on the moratorium procedure. Indonesia continued to abstain from the moratorium during the period from 1951 to 1954. In 1955, it voted against it and continued to do so until 1960.⁸³ Sukarno openly declared his support for the PRC entry into the UN during the 15th UN General Assembly. He argued that the PRC was the "real China" and that the UN should allow the PRC to enter the UN especially since it was the biggest nation in the world.⁸⁴ From 1961 to its departure from the UN in 1965, Indonesia voted for the Albanian Resolution and against the "important question".⁸⁵ Indonesia re-entered the UN in September 1966. The anti-communist Suharto government viewed the PRC as its enemy and began to alter Indonesia's position regarding the Chinese representation question. In 1967, it voted for both the "important question" and the Albanian Resolution. From 1968 to 1970, Indonesia was

⁸⁰ Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, Tokyo, November 12, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 702.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Suryadinata, *Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and China*, 169.

⁸³ Ibid., 172.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 178.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 179.

not involved in the voting of either resolution. In 1971, Indonesia voted for the “important question” and abstained from the voting of the Albanian Resolution.⁸⁶

Despite the animosity Indonesia had for Communist China, there were still feelings amongst the Indonesian leadership regarding the need to bring the PRC out of isolation and into the international community. Suharto believed that the PRC should enter the UN and end its isolationism.⁸⁷ Malik said that the PRC should join the community of nations since it was the representative of the Chinese people. He added that the PRC might gradually evolve into a responsible member of the world community.⁸⁸ Malik even acknowledged that Beijing was the government of the whole of China but the existence of the ROC on Taiwan could not be ignored. Taiwan could one day be under Beijing’s control. Otherwise, the ROC should reconcile with the fact that it only governed the people on the island of Taiwan and should base its membership of the UN on that.⁸⁹ However, due to the state of relations between Indonesia and the PRC, Jakarta could not support Beijing’s admission into the UN.⁹⁰ Indeed, Indonesia voted in favour of the “important question” and abstained from the Albanian resolution. This illuminated the policy dilemma of the Government of Indonesia. It was in a state of indecision with regards to its policy towards the PRC. On one hand it felt that both the ROC and the PRC should be in the UN and was following to the policy of the US closely, on the other hand, it was showing its “neutrality” by neither supporting nor opposing the Albanian resolution.

Pre-Briefing and Indonesia’s Reactions to the Beijing Summit

Nixon was scheduled to arrive in Beijing on 21 February 1972 to begin his historic one week visit of China. In order to reassure and brief the Indonesians before the Beijing and Moscow summits in 1972, Nixon wrote a letter to Suharto and also sent a message to him via Ambassador

⁸⁶ Ibid., 185.

⁸⁷ Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, Bali, August 5, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 588.

⁸⁸ Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, July 29, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 577.

⁸⁹ Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State Djakarta, July 29, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 584.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 583.

Galbraith in 1971 and 1972 respectively. In the letter to Suharto, Nixon explained why he decided to accept the PRC invitation to visit Beijing. He told Suharto that his China visit did not represent a sudden change in the US China policy. He was planning to establish communications with the PRC since the early days of his administration and had set the goal to normalise relations with the PRC last December. By embarking on his visit to China, he was fulfilling his wish to visit the country "either as President or in a private capacity." In his letter, he highlighted that he was under no illusions that the issues that separated the two sides were no longer plaguing the US-PRC relationship. He hoped that his China visit would lead to amicable relations with the PRC and the US could help to contribute to greater peace in Asia and the world.⁹¹ In his message, which was similar to the ones sent to the Philippines and Thailand and conveyed orally via Galbraith, Nixon gave Suharto his assurances that he would have the interests of the Asian states in mind during his conversations with the PRC leadership. Nixon hoped that both sides could set up a more permanent channel of communications in the future. He knew that it was not possible for the two sides to resolve their differences at once. Instead, the visit was the first step towards sorting out the "real differences" between the two sides, and would consequently prove to be beneficial to Asia, as tensions in the region were alleviated. Nixon would bear in mind the interests of Indonesia during his conversations with the PRC leadership. During the Beijing summit, only bilateral issues would be discussed. The US would not go into any agreements pertaining to third parties with the PRC. Nixon did not foresee the normalisation of US-PRC relations to happen during his visit in 1972.⁹² He assured Suharto that the visit was not directed against any other country and not at the expense of the US friends and allies.⁹³

Galbraith conveyed Nixon's assurances regarding his Beijing and Moscow summits to Suharto on 10 January 1972. Suharto was grateful for the Ambassador's briefing and said that he understood Nixon's purpose. Indonesia would do its utmost to assist Asian nations so as to toughen their will and ability to resist communism. To enable Indonesia to do that, Suharto hoped that the

⁹¹ Letter: Nixon to Suharto; August 3, 1971; Indonesia, Suharto, Correspondence 1970-1974; Box 755; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁹² Memorandum; Jeanne W. Davis to Kissinger: Tab A-8; December 10, 1971; China Trip: December 1971 Part 1; Box 500; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁹³ Letter: Nixon to Suharto; August 3, 1971; Indonesia, Suharto, Correspondence 1970-1974; Box 755; NSC Files; Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

US would help Indonesia in its bid to establish better relations with Japan and Australia. Suharto expressed an underlying fear of the threat of communism, originating from the USSR and PRC, to the security of Indonesia. He viewed the Indo-Pakistani conflict to have enabled both the communist states to encroach upon South Asia.⁹⁴ In a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, Nixon wrote next to the point made on communist encroachment on South Asia, “K—of top priority—Keep close to Indonesia.”⁹⁵ This indicated that Nixon viewed Indonesia as important to the US and wished to continue to maintain a close relationship with the country.

This point was made apparent in a letter from Nixon to Suharto on 25 January 1972, as he promised the Indonesian leader that the US would continue to provide Indonesia with almost the same amount of military aid as the last fiscal year, despite the heavy limitation placed by the Congress on military aid to other nations. He even promised to increase the amount of aid for fiscal year 1973. He went on to address the Indonesian fear of US withdrawal from the region by saying that it was the intention of the US to stay in Asia as a “balancing” factor and all treaty commitments would not be forsaken. The US would keep in Asia “sufficient” air, naval and ground forces. He once again told Suharto that he would keep Indonesia’s interest in consideration during his China trip.⁹⁶ Nixon’s words seem to reflect a policy change in the provision of military aid to Indonesia, since previously the US was non-committal when Indonesia was trying to get more military aid from the Americans.

Green, Holdridge and Galbraith met with Suharto on 11 March 1972 to brief him on the Beijing Summit. Green gave Suharto a detailed description of talks, atmospherics and flavour of Nixon’s trip to the PRC. Green assured Suharto that no secret deals pertaining to any third parties were concluded in Beijing. Again, the Nixon administration stated that it would stick to its commitments with its allies and that the China initiative was made realistically, under no illusions. Green provided Suharto with a summary of what was discussed in Beijing. He gave assurances of

⁹⁴ Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 12, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 705.

⁹⁵ Ibid., footnote no. 4.

⁹⁶ Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, Washington, January 25, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 707.

US support for its allies and also Nixon's promise that the US would remain as a power in the Western Pacific.⁹⁷ Suharto stated that he supported Nixon's bid "to reduce world tensions and strengthen peace." In the communiqué, the PRC stated that it would not interfere in the affairs of other nations. On the other hand, the PRC made it known publicly that it supported "suppressed peoples." Suharto believed that the PRC would continue to support national liberation movements and also communist subversive activities. To counter PRC support for subversion, Suharto stated that countries in Southeast Asia needed moral support and also other forms of aid to augment their ability to counter any threats. The US should reaffirm its commitment to its Asian allies.⁹⁸

On another occasion, the subject of the China summit was brought up in a meeting between Rogers and Suharto. Rogers explained the rationale behind the Beijing and Moscow summits which was to reduce tensions and thus independent nations like Indonesia did not have to fear for their security. Rogers also gave Suharto a description of how US-PRC relations would proceed after the summit meeting.⁹⁹ Rogers said that Nixon was wary of the PRC because the US might not fully understand the PRC's intentions and that the Communist Chinese might be "deceitful and take advantage" of the situation. He added that nothing would be based on blind trust.¹⁰⁰ Suharto pointed out again the discrepancy between PRC claim to non-interference in other countries' affairs and its proclamation of support for "oppressed peoples" to Rogers. Rogers said the US knew of PRC's support for subversion abroad but the PRC had indicated that it did not want to commit any of its own troops abroad. In this light, the US would continue to support independent nations economically and militarily.¹⁰¹ Suharto was apprehensive of the possible vacuum which would result as a consequence of US and British withdrawals from Asia. This might give the USSR an opportunity to move into Asia. The prevailing hostilities between the USSR and the PRC would lead to more subversive activities. Rogers reassured Suharto that any US withdrawal would be done with caution so that there would be no resulting power vacuum. If the

⁹⁷ Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Djakarta, March 13, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 712-3.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 713.

⁹⁹ Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, Belgrade, July 7, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 714-5.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 715.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 715-6.

USSR and the PRC were to interfere in the affairs of other states, they could be reminded that they had pledged to the principle of non-interference, in both the communiqué with the PRC and the statement of principles with the USSR. He speculated that the Sino-Soviet split could actually mean that the communists were too preoccupied with their own conflict and would not get themselves involved in subversions abroad.¹⁰² During a conversation between Agnew and Suharto on 6 February 1973, Suharto told Agnew that the Indonesian leadership was not prompting the US to reduce the number of military bases but hoped that the Asian states would grow stronger to render the presence of such bases obsolete.¹⁰³

According to a British report, the Indonesians appeared to have publicly embraced Nixon's Beijing and Moscow summits as moving towards détente with the communists. However, it seemed that the Indonesians perceived the Americans as no longer a definitive factor in the regional power relationships. Suharto told the British that the US might have concluded agreements related to Asia with the PRC and the USSR. Suharto wanted to build up its ties with Australia and New Zealand, in view of this development.¹⁰⁴

The Indonesia-PRC Relationship after the Nixon Visit to China

The PRC was said to have initiated the normalisation of relations with Indonesia in 1969, but these moves were rebuffed by Indonesia.¹⁰⁵ Upon the PRC entry to the UN, its UN representatives began to approach the Indonesian representatives, hoping to move towards friendlier ties. However, the Indonesians did not reciprocate. Malik cited the involvement of the PRC in the 1965 coup and also its support for the exiled PKI leaders as reasons why friendly ties were not possible.¹⁰⁶ The PRC again approached Indonesia during the 12-Nation Conference on Vietnam. Chi Peng Fei spoke with Malik and proposed that Indonesian relations with the PRC ought to be reinstated as soon as possible.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 718.

¹⁰³ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1708, 12 February 1973, J L Beaven to J S Chick.

¹⁰⁴ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1399, 31 July 1972, W I Combs to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 7.

¹⁰⁵ Suryadinata, *China and the ASEAN States*, 115.

¹⁰⁶ Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto*, 103-4.

¹⁰⁷ Telegram: Jakarta to SECSTATE Washington DC; April 26, 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973;

<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=10309&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 March 2009, 2.

The PRC tried to approach Indonesia by inviting it to participate in its badminton and ping-pong tournaments. The PRC extended its Ping-pong/Badminton Diplomacy to Suharto by inviting an Indonesian team to join the Asian Table Tennis Union Championships in Beijing in 1972. However, the invitation was turned down by the Indonesians,¹⁰⁸ proving that suspicions of the PRC still lingered. The PRC tried again in 1973 when it invited Indonesia to participate in the Asia-Africa-Latin American Ping-pong Championship, to be held in Beijing in August 1974. Indonesia, again, rejected the invitation.¹⁰⁹ In 1973, Indonesia turned down Malaysia's invitation to take part in a three-way badminton tournament, in which the PRC would be a participant. The US view was that Indonesia was not keen on dabbling in Ping-pong or Badminton diplomacy.¹¹⁰ The PRC showed an interest in "facilitating rapprochement with Indonesia" through exchanging sport teams. The PRC took the opportunity presented to them by the Seven-Asian Nation Badminton tournament, in which the Indonesians were competing, to sound the Indonesians out regarding the sport exchanges.¹¹¹

Indonesia observed that the PRC seemed to be using Ping-pong diplomacy to approach nations which had not established relations with Beijing. Thus, in the case of Indonesia, Ping-pong diplomacy was not relevant as PRC-Indonesia relations had already been established, albeit frozen.¹¹² It was Indonesia's policy that any PRC-Indonesian sporting events would not be allowed to take place in either country. However, it had been seen participating in events held in a third country where the PRC was competing in. One example was the 1972 World Ping-pong Championship in Yugoslavia. Indonesia was also planning to compete in the Asian Table Tennis

¹⁰⁸ Horn, "Indonesia's Response to Changing Big Power Alignments", 529.

¹⁰⁹ Telegram: Jakarta to SECSTATE Washington DC; May 10, 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973;

<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=27287&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 March 2009,

¹¹⁰ Telegram: Jakarta to SECSTATE Washington DC; June 27, 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973;

<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=30985&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 March 2009.

¹¹¹ Telegram: Jakarta to SECSTATE Washington DC; May 23, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974;

<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=66543&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 March 2009.

¹¹² Telegram: Jakarta to SECSTATE Washington DC; July 25, 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973;

<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=48458&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 March 2009, 1.

Union Meet, to be held in Yokohama the following year, which was jointly sponsored by the PRC and Japan.¹¹³

The process towards the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and other Southeast Asian countries was accelerated by the rapprochement between the US and the PRC. Beijing became a member of the UN with a permanent seat in the Security Council and also welcomed Nixon to Beijing in 1972. The PRC's international status was enhanced by the consequences brought forth by Nixon's China policy. American allies and friends would see no conflict of interest in recognising the PRC, especially since the US was moving towards friendly ties with Beijing. Many countries such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand rushed towards establishing diplomatic ties with the PRC. Indonesia's Southeast Asian neighbours, such as the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand had established diplomatic ties with the PRC. Malaysia became the first ASEAN member to do so in 1974 and was followed shortly by Thailand and the Philippines in 1975. Despite these developments, PRC-Indonesia relations remained frozen and were only restored in 1989. Singapore established diplomatic relations with the PRC only in October 1990 after Indonesia had done so in the previous year. Indonesia still could not forget the perceived complicity of the PRC in the 1965 coup and was annoyed by its harbouring of the exiled PKI leaders. Indeed, Suharto told Rogers that Indonesia was still suspicious of the PRC's support and involvement with the PKI. Suharto pointed out that the PRC was still intervening in his country's affairs. These activities had prevailed, albeit on a reduced scale.¹¹⁴ Indonesia believed that the PRC would continue to support subversions in Southeast Asia.

Despite its fear of the threat of Communist China, the Indonesian government was not wholly against re-establishing relations with the PRC. However, the PRC had to adhere to the conditions set by the Indonesians. The conditions included recognition of the Suharto government by the PRC, non-interference of Indonesian affairs and Indonesian language propaganda broadcasts

¹¹³ Telegram: Jakarta to SECSTATE Washington DC; July 14, 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=43901&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 March 2009.

¹¹⁴ Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, Belgrade, July 7, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 XX Southeast Asia <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/media/pdf/frus1969-76v20.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 718.

into Indonesia had to be stopped.¹¹⁵ This meant that diplomatic ties would not be restored unless the PRC changed its “aggressive” stance. Nixon’s China policy and the PRC’s entry into the UN led to some debate within the Indonesian leadership regarding the need to normalise relations with the PRC. It should be noted that there were two camps within the Indonesian leadership with differing opinions as to how relations with the PRC should be managed. Malik preferred friendlier ties with the PRC whereas the military were sticking to the existing hard-line policy. In early 1972, Malik advocated the need to normalise relations with the PRC to prevent the over-reliance on or dominance by one major world power.¹¹⁶

Indonesia was apparently not rushing to normalise relations with the PRC. Malik explained that the Suharto government would rather let the other ASEAN states establish diplomatic relations with the PRC and would then proceed with its own process of restoring its ties with the PRC. Indonesia did not want to be seen as “cornering” its ASEAN partners by moving towards the restoration of ties with the PRC first. Malik also declared that the normalisation of ties with the PRC was “no longer a problem.”¹¹⁷ Malik stressed that there was no “uniform policy” for the ASEAN states with regards to their relations with the PRC. Despite that, Indonesia still did not wish to “get ahead” of its ASEAN partners by rushing into relations with the PRC. Indonesia would consult them prior to making any moves towards the PRC.¹¹⁸

There were several factors which hindered the restoration of Indonesia-PRC relations. The Suharto government felt that Indonesia would have less to gain than the PRC should ties be restored. The problem of the Overseas Chinese was an obstacle to normalisation as these individuals were still oriented towards the PRC. Although Zhou Enlai had stressed that the PRC had ceased its subversive activities in Indonesia and encouraged Overseas Chinese to remain loyal to their host countries, the problem of the Overseas Chinese still remained. They had to be “educated” and the process might take ten years to complete. The PRC leadership was said to be

¹¹⁵ Horn, “Indonesia’s Response to Changing Big Power Alignments”, 528.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 528-9.

¹¹⁷ Telegram: Jakarta to SECSTATE Washington DC; March 29, 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=1808&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 March 2009.

¹¹⁸ Telegram: Jakarta to SECSTATE Washington DC; April 26, 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=10309&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 March 2009, 2.

aware of the unwillingness of Indonesia to restore relations with the PRC quickly.¹¹⁹ In his statement to the press on 24 May 1974, Malik again reiterated the problem of the overseas Chinese as an obstacle to the restoration of ties with the PRC.¹²⁰

Malik was questioned by the Indonesian press on 14 June 1973 regarding the restoration of relations with the PRC. Malik reiterated the usual government line on the issue. However, there was a sense of optimism in his statement. The preparations for the normalisation of relations were underway, but Malik did not reveal when it would be completed. Indonesia would inform the PRC once the preparations were completed as was agreed during Malik's conversation with Chi Peng Fei at the 12-nation Conference in February 1973. Malik believed that the PRC was anxious to normalise relations and it was up to Indonesia to initialise the process.¹²¹

In a news report dated 23 July 1974, Malik was quoted to have stated that during the talks with the PRC in Paris the previous year, both sides had come to a consensus on the restoration of relations. It seemed like a breakthrough was made, but in reality Indonesia was still not ready to normalise relations due to the Overseas Chinese problem. This was confirmed by Malik's statement that there was no date set for the normalisation of relations. This was the first time the US had heard that an agreement was reached between Beijing and Jakarta since earlier reports had indicated that Suharto government did not respond when the PRC approached the Indonesians in Paris. The US did not believe that the new developments meant that Indonesia had altered its position with regard to their relations with the PRC.¹²² Indeed, in another meeting with the press in October 1974, Malik announced that there was no development towards the restoration of ties as

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Telegram: Jakarta to SECSTATE Washington DC; May 28, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=64645&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 March 2009.

¹²¹ Telegram: Jakarta to SECSTATE Washington DC; June 15, 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=35808&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 March 2009.

¹²² Telegram: Jakarta to SECSTATE Washington DC; July 23, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=104241&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 March 2009.

the Suharto government was “not yet ready” to do so. The PRC was said to be anxious to restore ties and would agree to all of Indonesia’s conditions.¹²³

Conclusion

Indonesia’s relations with the US became close after Suharto came to power in 1965. The Indonesians relied heavily on the US for military and economic aid, especially since the economy was severely weakened under the rule of the Sukarno government. Although Indonesia’s relationship with the US was close but short of a formal alliance, it was firmly in the orbit of the US. This made the Indonesian claim to neutralism seem increasingly weak. When Nixon started to pursue the policy of Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine, Indonesia was worried that the US would withdraw too swiftly from Vietnam and Asia, before the free nations of Southeast Asia could build up their defence capability. The Nixon administration was a major contributor of economic aid to Indonesia through the IGGI but was non-committal when it came to military aid. Indonesia’s relations with the PRC were frozen as it was suspicious of the PRC’s continual involvement with the PKI and its intentions in Indonesia and also in Southeast Asia. Indonesian anxieties were no doubt raised by the US rapprochement with the PRC. The Nixon administration tried to lessen Indonesia’s nervousness by being more forthcoming in providing military aid to the Indonesians. This was also a strategy to keep Indonesia close to the US. It appeared that Indonesian views on the PRC were not as rigid as one would imagine. Suharto and Malik both agreed that the PRC should be brought out of isolation and into the UN. Malik went further to embrace the concept of “one China and one Taiwan.” There was also debate within the Indonesian leadership, after Nixon’s China initiative, that a reassessment of Indonesia’s relations with the PRC was needed. However, lingering suspicions of PRC meddling in Indonesian affairs and also the issue of the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia meant that any change in the relationship was not forthcoming. The PRC-Indonesian relationship was finally reinstated only in 1989 which made Indonesia the next to last country in Asia to do so. Indonesia’s neighbours Malaysia and Singapore were also non-US

¹²³ Telegram: Jakarta to SECSTATE Washington DC ; October 8, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=155341&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 March 2009.

allies who were firmly on the US side and thus were very interested in Nixon's new strategy in Asia. The next chapter will be a joint case study of these two former British colonies.

7. Malaysia and Singapore

Malaysia and Singapore were not formal US allies as there were no treaty obligations and no US troops were stationed in these two countries. Malaysia and Singapore claimed to be non-aligned and were not members of SEATO, unlike their Thai and Filipino neighbours. In fact, both were opposed to joining the organisation. Despite their claim of neutralism, however, it was apparent that both were supportive of the US presence in Vietnam and Asia.

Malaysia and Singapore were both anti-communist, and each was involved in struggles against the communist elements on their territories. Malaya, along with the British, crushed the Communist insurgency led by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) during the Malayan Emergency of 1948 to 1960. MCP's leader, Chin Peng, fled Malaya and resurfaced in China in the 1960s. The People's Action Party (PAP) of Singapore was wary of the pro-communist Barisan Sosialis and thought that its politics, policies and inclinations would transform Singapore into a third China, if it was able to dominate the political arena of Singapore.¹ The PAP successfully overcame the challenge posed by the Barisan Sosialis and won the 1963 elections, gaining thirty seven seats. Barisan Sosialis failed to garner much support and won only thirteen seats.² The PAP emerged as the dominant political force in Singapore after its independence in 1965, while the Barisan Sosialis's influence dwindled and gradually vanished from the political scene.³

Both Malaysia and Singapore were in favour of a continued US presence in Vietnam as they feared that if the US were to gradually withdraw, Saigon would eventually fall to the communists. This development could put the security of Asia in jeopardy and result in the free nations of Southeast Asia falling to communism one by one, like dominoes. Malaysia and Singapore were apprehensive of the policy of Vietnamization. This problem was further compounded by the Nixon Doctrine which called for a reduction of the US presence in Asia and the Pacific, Nixon's pursuit of rapprochement would no doubt raise the concerns of the Malaysian and Singaporean leaderships. Both states were sensitive towards Beijing due to its support for

¹ Raj Vasil, *Governing Singapore: A History of National Development and Democracy* (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2000), 53.

² Ibid, 28-9.

³ Ibid., 29-30.

communist subversion overseas and also because of the large Chinese population within the two countries. Hence, Nixon's new strategy in Asia certainly captured the attention of both Malaysia and Singapore.

This chapter discusses the responses and opinions of the Malaysian and Singaporean leaderships towards Vietnamization and also the Nixon Doctrine. It moves on to discuss their initial response towards the 15 July announcement by Nixon, which were conveyed either to the US or iterated privately. This chapter also looks into the opinions of Malaysia and Singapore regarding Chinese representation in the UN and also the voting patterns of both states. Their views regarding Nixon's visit to Beijing will be analysed. Lastly, the chapter will trace Malaysia's road to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1974. Despite the fact that most of Singapore's Southeast Asian neighbours were setting up diplomatic ties with the PRC during the 1970s, Singapore did not follow suit. The chapter hopes to shed some light on this issue.

Malaysia, Singapore and the US

Malaysia and Singapore were both former British colonies. After the Second World War, changes were made to their statuses. By 1946, the Straits Settlements had ceased to exist, making Singapore a full British colony. The Federation of Malaya was established with the union of the territories of Peninsular Malaysia in 1948. Malaya gained its independence in 1957. Shortly after, in 1959, Singapore was transformed into a self-governing state with an elected legislature and a government with power over all matters except defence, internal security, and foreign policy.⁴ The Federation of Malaya and Singapore, along with Sarawak and Sabah, merged to form Malaysia in 1963. This union proved to be short-lived as conflict between the central government and the Singapore government led to the separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965. The Republic of Singapore was established on 9 August 1965. Malaysia and Singapore were closely linked due to their historical background, and geographical proximity.

Malaysia and Singapore claimed to be neutral and not aligned with either of the superpowers. Both states refused to join SEATO so as to keep up their non-aligned image. Malaya

⁴ Kawin Wilairat, *Singapore's Foreign Policy: The First Decade* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975), 3.

had formerly rebuffed the US invitation to join SEATO as it did not want to be seen as aligned with the Americans. It was also under the misconception that it would have to make bases available to SEATO partners if it were to become a member of SEATO. However, Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman told US Ambassador to Malaya, Charles Baldwin, that Malaya would not be opposed to making bases available in the advent of a war.⁵

Malaysia was not particularly popular amongst the other non aligned and Afro-Asian states. It was viewed as a neo-colonialist state and not truly non-aligned because of its bilateral defence agreement with Great Britain. When it was still the Federation of Malaya, it was not invited to the 1961 Belgrade Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. As Malaysia, it was excluded from the Non-Aligned Conference in Egypt in 1964. Due to protest from the Indonesian leadership, it failed to secure an invitation to attend the abortive 1965 Algiers Afro-Asian Summit Conference.⁶

American assistance to Malaysia consisted of loans through the Development Loan Fund (DLF). Loans worth \$20 million were granted to the then Malaya in 1959 as a response to its numerous appeals for aid. The money was mainly for the building of infrastructure such as roads, bridges and the development of deep water port facilities in the North Klang Straits for the newly independent nation.⁷ Despite its acceptance of loans from the US, Malaya was not as forthcoming when the John F. Kennedy administration placed it under consideration as one of the countries where an AID mission could be established.⁸ It was possible that Malaya rejected the AID mission proposal because it did not want to be seen as moving closer to the US and risked tainting its non-aligned image. Assistance was provided to Malaya on a small scale and no AID mission existed between the US and Malaya.⁹ In 1967, the Export-Import Bank provided a credit of \$50 million for Port Swettenham, harbours and the East-West highway and another \$40 million for the purchase of American jets which would be used by the Malaysian-Singaporean Airways.¹⁰

⁵ Sodhy, *The US-Malaysian Nexus*, 214.

⁶ Wilairat, *Singapore's Foreign Policy: The First Decade*, 16-7.

⁷ Sodhy, *The US-Malaysian Nexus*, 197.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 206.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ James W. Gould, *The United States and Malaysia* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), 229.

The US modestly contributed to the defence of Malaysia by offering the training of officers and also providing arms assistance. For example, in July 1964, the US offered limited military assistance to Malaysia during the Confrontation with Indonesia.¹¹ US-Malaysia ties were hence brought closer during the Confrontation period as the US opposed Indonesia's campaign against Malaysia.¹² The US provided loans to Malaysia, which totaled US\$16 million so that it could afford to buy more weapons.¹³

A significant contribution of the US to the nation building efforts of Malaysia was made through the Peace Corps programme. The programme was started at the initiative of the Kennedy administration and the then Federation of Malaya was quick to respond to Kennedy's offer to send Peace Corps volunteers to Malaya.¹⁴ These volunteers included high school teachers, nurses, doctors and other technical personnel. The pioneer group of volunteers entered Malaya on 12 January 1962. The second batch of volunteers arrived on 2 June 1962.¹⁵ By 1966, 1000 volunteers had served in Malaysia.¹⁶ In 1967, Malaysia had the largest number of Peace Corps volunteers in the world. The number of volunteers totaled up to 558.¹⁷

Malaysia was a supporter of South Vietnam and was providing assistance to its war effort. After 1958, as Malaya, it demonstrated its support for the American involvement in Vietnam by offering to train South Vietnamese officers in counter insurgency methods. With the conclusion of the Malayan Emergency, the Malayan government gave most of its military equipment to the South Vietnamese.¹⁸ From 1961 to 1966, more than 3000 South Vietnamese officers were in Malaysia to be trained in anti guerilla operations.¹⁹

As the war in Vietnam escalated, Malaysia began to fervently support the US in its war against the communists in Vietnam. Malaysia viewed the security of Saigon as closely linked to its own. The Malaysian government subscribed to the domino theory and believed that if Saigon were to fall to the Communists, it would mean that the other free nations of Southeast Asia would fall to

¹¹ Gould, *The United States and Malaysia*, 224-5.

¹² Sodhy, *The US-Malaysian Nexus*, 264-5.

¹³ Gould, *The United States and Malaysia*, 225.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 227.

¹⁵ Sodhy, *The US-Malaysian Nexus*, 208.

¹⁶ Gould, *The United States and Malaysia*, 228.

¹⁷ Sodhy, *The US-Malaysian Nexus*, 286.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 209.

¹⁹ Gould, *The United States and Malaysia*, 232

communism one after another. The Malaysian leadership viewed US support to South Vietnam as an indirect form of support to ensure the security of Malaysia. This view was evident in Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak's statement in the *Straits Times* dated 18 January 1965, indicating his appreciation of the US involvement in the Vietnam War. He said, "American aid to South Vietnam, another country like Malaysia which is fighting a life and death battle against communists, is appreciated by us."²⁰

In another *Straits Times* article dated 18 April 1965, Tun Razak reportedly expressed his view that the American bombing of Vietnam was a justifiable act. He stated, "All the bombings by the Americans on military installations and communications, are, I consider, justified because they are being used by the Vietcong to attack South Vietnam."²¹

Malaysia continued to render support to South Vietnam by sending an economic mission to assist in the rural and economic development of the war torn state.²² As a gesture of friendship and goodwill, Malaysia allowed American troops stationed in Vietnam to visit Penang for "rest and recreation" purposes.²³ Despite the show of support for the US involvement in Vietnam, the Malaysian leadership was careful not to appear to be too closely aligned to the US, as it refused to send its troops to Vietnam.²⁴

Singapore, like Malaysia, claimed to be non-aligned in the arena of superpower politics. The meaning of non-alignment for the Singapore leadership could be summarised as

staying out of 'any competition, or conflict between power blocs,' but where the 'survival, security, or prosperity' of 'an independent, democratic, non-communist Singapore including Malaysia' is threatened, she 'cannot be neutral.'²⁵

²⁰ Sodhy, *The US-Malaysian Nexus*, 282.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Gould, *The United States and Malaysia*, 233.

²³ Gould, *The United States and Malaysia*, 233. Sodhy, *The US-Malaysian Nexus*, 282-3.

²⁴ Sodhy, *The US-Malaysian Nexus*, 283.

²⁵ Wilairat, *Singapore's Foreign Policy*, 35.

The view was repeated in Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's address to the American Association in 1967. He stated that, "Singapore's attitude to any conflict between power blocs was one of non-alignment but she could not be neutral where her survival was at stake."²⁶

In order to maintain the non-aligned image, Singapore refrained from seeking American aid. In November 1966, Special Adviser to the President for Southeast Asia Eugene Black visited Singapore and offered assistance to the newly established republic. The Singapore leadership told the US that Singapore would not seek American aid as it did not want to be seen as leaning towards the Western camp. However, Singapore would welcome any aid which the US was giving out multilaterally.²⁷ The Nixon administration understood this, as Singapore preferred private American investment, which would create employment for its people, rather than aid from the US.²⁸

In 1966, just a year after Singapore became an independent nation, the British announced that they would be withdrawing their military presence from the region east of Suez. The British Government announced in July 1967 that British forces in Malaysia and Singapore would be reduced by one half over the next four years with a full withdrawal to be completed by the mid 1970s.²⁹ However, the British changed their plans in early 1968 and decided to achieve a complete withdrawal by 1971.³⁰ According to Michael Leifer, Singapore could no longer look to the British as its protector.³¹ With the British withdrawal from the region, the potential burden on the US to shoulder the responsibilities of the British greatly increased.³²

Singapore was openly supporting the American presence in Vietnam. The Singapore leadership recognised the importance of South Vietnam's security to the other nations in the region. American presence in Vietnam was vital in keeping the stability of the area in check. During his visit to the United States in October 1967, Prime Minister Lee enunciated his view that the US was "buying time in South Vietnam for the rest of the world, particularly Southeast Asia" and that if the

²⁶ TNA: PRO FCO 24/291, 15 Nov 1967, Telegram No.35 from Holmer to Commonwealth Office.

²⁷ Gould, *The United States and Malaysia*, 231.

²⁸ Memorandum Henry Kissinger to Spiro Agnew; (undated); VP Agnew's Trip to Singapore Dec 1969-Jan 1970; Box 83; NSC Files: HAKOF: Country Files- Far East; RNPLM; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

²⁹ Wilairat, *Singapore's Foreign Policy: The First Decade*, 41.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.

³¹ Leifer, *Singapore's Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability* (London: Routledge, 2000), 100.

³² Wilairat, *Singapore's Foreign Policy: The First Decade*, 42.

US were to abruptly withdraw from the region, the end result would be “disastrous.”³³ Like its Malaysian neighbour, Singapore was providing rest and recreation facilities for American servicemen on leave from Vietnam.

By 1967, Lee recognised that the battle in Vietnam had to be fought and US support was essential. He said, “It may not be the best ground on which to fight... but now the battle is joined it must be pursued with patience and determination.” Lee recognised the dangers of the domino theory and believed that if Saigon were to fall, Communism would take over the rest of Southeast Asia and even as far as Iran in the Middle East.³⁴ Lee saw the importance of having a “non communist progressive” South Vietnam in Southeast Asia, as it contributed to the stability of the entire region. He added that this would ensure that there would be greater prospects for peace and also the economies of the region would prosper with more regional cooperation.³⁵

In a television interview on 8 November 1967, Lee talked about his views of the American involvement in Vietnam. Lee said that the US should have never in the first place stood on the “soft ground” of Vietnam. Since this had been done, he hoped that “American piling” would continue until the US “struck hard ground” eventually.³⁶ On another occasion, Lee said that a premature withdrawal from Vietnam would cause the Thais to “feel compelled to make some accommodation with what look like the stronger side and communist subversion would soon be active again in Malaysia after which they would soon have Singapore by the throat”.³⁷

About three quarters of Singapore’s population were of ethnic Chinese descent. This was a source of problem for the Singapore leadership and also stirred up the suspicions of its neighbours. Singapore was concerned about being linked to the PRC or being labeled as a “third China.”³⁸ Lee said that Singaporeans of ethnic Chinese descent were more Singaporean than Chinese, as they had “undergone an irreversible process of transformation into Singaporeans.” He added that although

³³ Wilairat, *Singapore’s Foreign Policy: The First Decade*, 42.

³⁴ TNA: PRO FCO 24/291, Extract from Australian and Foreign Affairs Digest of Press Opinion, 13 Dec 1967.

³⁵ TNA: PRO FCO 24/291, 15 Nov 1967, Telegram No. 35 from Holmer to Commonwealth Office.

³⁶ TNA: PRO FCO 24/291, 15 Nov 1967, Telegram No. 34 from Holmer to Commonwealth Office.

³⁷ TNA: PRO FCO 24/291, 10 Nov 1967, Telegram No. 785 from Holmer to Commonwealth Office.

³⁸ Leifer, *Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability*, 110.

Singaporeans were ethnically Chinese, they only had the interests of Singapore in mind and he also thought it was important that the US and the rest of the world understood that.³⁹

According to Leifer, "Singapore adhered to a One-China policy from the outset but without giving it operational expression."⁴⁰ Singapore recognised the ROC as the "de facto" authority of Taipei in Taiwan but had no diplomatic ties with Taipei. There were no diplomatic ties with the PRC as well. Likewise, the PRC did not recognise Singapore after it gained its independence in 1965. However, there was a considerable amount of Taiwanese investment in Singapore. The number of Taiwanese factories totalled up to 73 as at 31 March 1967. Meanwhile investments from the mainland came to Singapore through the Bank of China.⁴¹

Malaysia and Singapore's Response to Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine

The Malaysian leadership was worried that the US would withdraw from Vietnam. In a September 1969 conversation between Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister Tun Razak and the Australian Minister of Defence Allen Fairhall, Tun Razak conveyed his anxieties regarding the possible effect of an American withdrawal from Vietnam on the security of Malaysia. Malaysia shared Thailand's apprehension regarding Vietnamization as both felt that their security would be affected if Saigon was to fall to communism, due to the two countries' geographical proximity to Vietnam. Malaysia was worried that if Saigon was defeated in the war, an opening would be available for infiltrators to enter Malaysian territories using small boats. The security of Cambodia, Laos and Thailand would be threatened, if the Americans were to withdraw from Vietnam.⁴² The Singapore leadership's opinion of the US presence in Vietnam was that the US should stay in Vietnam until the South Vietnamese had demonstrated that they could defend themselves against the communist North.⁴³

The leaderships of Malaysia and Singapore were worried that the reduction of the US presence in Vietnam was a step towards an American withdrawal from Southeast Asia. Their

³⁹ TNA: PRO FCO 24/291, 15 Nov 1967, Telegram No. 35 from Holmer to Commonwealth Office.

⁴⁰ Leifer, *Singapore's Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability*, 112.

⁴¹ TNA: PRO FCO 24/545, 12 Dec 1968, R.F. Stimson to G. Underwood.

⁴² TNA: PRO FCO 24/532, 15 October 1969, R.D. Clift to D.F.B. Le Breton.

⁴³ Talking Points: Singapore; December 8, 1969; VP Agnew's Trip to Singapore Dec 1969-Jan 1970; Box 83; NSC Files: HAKOF: Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

apprehensions were heightened due to the ongoing British withdrawal from the region and also their lack of confidence over the commitment of Australia and New Zealand to retain their forces in Malaysia and Singapore after 1971, the year which the British planned to complete the withdrawal of its troops.⁴⁴ The British planned to withdraw their permanent military presence from the area in 1971 and Australia and New Zealand would retain their forces in Malaysia and Singapore. The Five Power Defence Arrangement would take over the defence of the region.⁴⁵ However, this was not enough as Singapore wanted the US to stay in Asia as a counterweight against the communists.⁴⁶

On 8 January, 1970, Vice President Spiro Agnew met with Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman. The Nixon Doctrine was discussed and Agnew asked the Tunku for his views. The Tunku told Agnew that he agreed with the Nixon Doctrine. The Tunku had previously conveyed these views to Nixon during his 1969 visit to Washington. He was pleased that the Nixon Doctrine would give moral encouragement to nations trying to seek their own peaceful development.⁴⁷ Minister of Home Affairs, Tun Ismail, noted that the Nixon Doctrine advocated that every nation had to take on the responsibility to counter subversion at home. He felt that in order for this to be feasible in reality, there should be free trade and sufficient manpower. With free trade, developing nations would be able to earn income through foreign exchange. However, rich countries were placing restrictions on imports of manufactured goods and Asian nations had to spend a huge amount for the purchase of weapons. Tun Ismail asked the US how it could help to

⁴⁴ Talking Points: Malaysia; December 8, 1969; V.P. Agnew's Trip to Malaysia Dec 1969-Jan 1970; Box 82; NSC Files: HAKOF: Country Files-Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland; Talking Points: Singapore; December 8, 1969; VP Agnew's Trip to Singapore Dec 1969-Jan 1970; Box 83; NSC Files: HAKOF: Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁴⁵ Memorandum; Henry Kissinger to Spiro Agnew; December 17, 1969; VP Trip East Asia Jan 1970 Part 2; Box 450; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁴⁶ Memorandum: Henry Kissinger to Spiro Agnew; (undated); VP Agnew's Trip to Singapore Dec 1969-Jan 1970; Box 83; NSC Files: HAKOF: Country Files- Far East; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁴⁷ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Canberra to RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC; January 14, 1970; VP Trip East Asia Jan 1970 Part 1; Box 450; NSC Files; President's Trip Files; ; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

solve these problems.⁴⁸ It was reported that the Malaysian Home and Foreign Ministries were disappointed that despite the Nixon Doctrine, greater financial aid was not forthcoming.⁴⁹

Agnew met with Lee Kuan Yew during his January 1970 trip to Asia. Lee was particularly concerned about the situation in Vietnam. He had a “strong feeling that any announcements of troop level withdrawals or time schedules for disengagement in Vietnam would be disabling should increased Viet Cong and North Vietnamese action require retreat from those positions.” He recommended that no figures should be made known publicly and Nixon should let it be understood that the Vietnamization would progress in tandem with South Vietnam’s ability to defend itself.⁵⁰ American withdrawal from Vietnam should be made in a “purposeful and gradual” manner so as to ensure a smooth transfer of the responsibility of combat over to the South Vietnamese. Lee suggested that the US should, in accordance with the situation in South Korea, station a number of American soldiers in Vietnam while the South Vietnamese increased their defence capabilities. The US should not be perceived as being pressurised to end the war and working towards a gradual withdrawal from Vietnam.⁵¹ However, it was difficult to hide the growing protests against the war back home. The US was certainly under great pressure to put an end to the Vietnam War. The US should “help the South Vietnamese fight for themselves,” something which was in line with the Nixon Doctrine. Lee added that the US should make sure that ample time and equipment were provided to the South Vietnamese so that if they were to fight for themselves and lost, the US would not be held accountable.⁵²

Malaysia, Singapore and the US-PRC Rapprochement

Malaysia and Singapore hoped that the new relationship between the US and the PRC would bring about a solution to the Vietnam situation. Immediately after the 15 July announcement,

⁴⁸ Telegram; AMEMBASSY CANBERRA to RUEHC/SECSTATE Washington DC; January 14, 1970; VP Trip East Asia Jan 1970 Part 1; Box 450; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; ; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁴⁹ Memorandum; Henry Kissinger to Spiro Agnew; undated; VP Trip East Asia Jan 1970 Part 2; Box 450; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; ; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵⁰ Memorandum; Spiro Agnew to Richard Nixon; January 21, 1970; VP Trip East Asia Jan 1970 Part 3; Box 450; NSC Files; President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland,

⁵¹ Kuan Yew Lee, *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000). 463.

⁵² Ibid.

Tun Razak issued a public statement. He hoped that the move towards the PRC would contribute to greater international peace and security which would translate to an end of the conflict in Indochina. He hoped that the conflict could be resolved after the Nixon visit to Beijing.⁵³ In a speech to the press on 20 July, 1971, Lee said that Nixon's acceptance of the PRC invitation to visit Beijing was a "dramatic gesture." Lee showed his concern for the situation in Vietnam and hoped that the rapprochement would lead to peace in Vietnam but South Vietnam should not be left in a hopeless situation once peace was restored. On the same day, Lee commented that Nixon had successfully overcome his critics and engaged in foreign policies which were of benefit to Southeast Asia.⁵⁴

Malaysia and Singapore welcomed the Nixon move towards Beijing and agreed that it was about time that the PRC was brought out of its isolation and into the international community. Lee had previously suggested in 1970 that the US should "open doors and windows" to the PRC and to commence trade on non-strategic goods.⁵⁵ In Tun Razak's statement, he stressed the Malaysian belief "that China should be brought into the international order particularly in Asia and play her rightful role in maintaining peace and security."⁵⁶

There were more public declarations of Malaysia's support for the rapprochement. During an address at the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) Youth Seminar at Morib on 25 July 1971, Tun Razak said that he was pleased with the US rapprochement with the PRC and hoped that any future progress would benefit US-PRC bilateral ties. He believed that it was important that the US and the PRC come to some form of understanding as it would contribute to greater peace to the world and especially Southeast Asia. The Malaysian leadership viewed the US

⁵³ Memorandum; Theodore L. Eliot Jr. to Henry Kissinger; July 16, 1971, Reaction to China Initiative (Jul 1971) Memos, Letters, etc.; Box 499; NSC Files: President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland; Memorandum; The Situation Room to Kissinger; July 17, 1971; Reaction to China Initiative (Jul 1971) Memos, Letters, etc.; Box 499; NSC Files: President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵⁴ Memorandum; Department of State to Henry Kissinger; July 22, 1971; Reaction to China Initiative (Jul 1971) Memos, Letters, etc.; Box 499; NSC Files: President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵⁵ Memorandum of Conversation; Situation in Southeast Asia, China; Singapore; November 5, 1970, 3:00pm; Singapore, PM Lee Kuan Yew Nov 1970; Box 938; NSC Files: VIP Visits; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland, 2; Lee, *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000*, 463-4.

⁵⁶ Memorandum; Theodore L. Eliot Jr. to Henry Kissinger; July 16, 1971; Reaction to China Initiative (Jul 1971) Memos, Letters, etc.; Box 499; NSC Files: President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland; Memorandum; The Situation Room to Kissinger; July 17, 1971; Reaction to China Initiative (Jul 1971) Memos, Letters, etc.; Box 499; NSC Files: President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

rapprochement with the PRC as beneficial to its own policy of neutralisation. Nixon's announcement was viewed as an "encouraging step" for the neutralisation of Southeast Asia.⁵⁷ In a foreign affairs statement to Parliament on 27 July, Tun Razak stated that the scepticism over the neutralisation policy was replaced by a growing feeling that the policy was realistic because of the US move towards the PRC. Tun Ismail told Japanese journalists that the impending Nixon visit to Beijing benefitted the neutralisation policy greatly by giving it more credibility and a new impetus. In the same interview, Tun Ismail commented that the rapprochement was not a surprise but Malaysia did not expect it to happen so quickly.⁵⁸

Japan and Malaysia voiced their support for Nixon's China policy in a Joint Communiqué issued during Tun Razak's trip to Japan from 13 October to 17 October 1971. Tun Razak visited Japan as the new Prime Minister of Malaysia. Japanese Prime Minister Sato and Tun Razak were glad that the US and PRC were establishing contacts and viewed this as a step towards lesser conflict and greater peace for the world and Asia. It was their hope that by bringing the PRC into the world community would ensure that the world would be a much safer place.⁵⁹

Although Lee had conveyed his approval of the US-China initiative to the Americans, he warned his fellow Singaporeans of the possible difficulties which could possibly be faced by smaller Asian nations following the upcoming visit to the PRC, during the nation's National Day celebration in August 1971.⁶⁰ He expressed more apprehensions regarding the China initiative in private during his conversations with the British. Nixon had conducted the rapprochement with the PRC without consulting or informing any of his Asian allies beforehand. Lee told the British that these new developments in the US-PRC relationship came as "a great shock" to Southeast Asia.⁶¹ Lee later wrote in his memoirs that it made him feel "uneasy" that Nixon did not even inform the Japanese or the Nationalist Chinese before the world learnt about his new policy towards the

⁵⁷ Memorandum; Theodore L. Eliot Jr. to Henry Kissinger; July 16, 1971; Reaction to China Initiative(Jul 1971) Memos, Letters, etc.; Box 499; NSC Files: President's Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁵⁸ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1164, 4 Aug 1971, R.D. Clift to D.F.B. Le Breton.

⁵⁹ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1165, 17 Oct 1971, Malaysia/Japan Joint Communiqué.

⁶⁰ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1235, 10 Nov 1971, Audience for Mr Lee Kuan Yew at Buckingham Palace at 12.40pm on Wednesday 10 November.

⁶¹ TNA: PRO FCO 24 1235, 1 Nov 1971, Record of Meeting between the Defence Secretary and the Prime Minister of Singapore at the Ministry of Defence on 1st November 1971.

PRC.⁶² The shroud of secrecy surrounding the Nixon China policy increased the feeling of uncertainty the allies and friends had regarding US intentions. This coupled with the reduction of US presence in Vietnam and Asia served to further unsettle the US allies and friends.

Malaysia, Singapore and the Chinese Representation Issue in the UN

Since 1966, Singapore's voting pattern pertaining to the Chinese representation in the UN had been to vote against the "important question" resolution and to abstain from the Albanian resolution. The only time Singapore voted for the Albanian resolution was in 1965.⁶³ In a British report, Singapore's voting pattern was explained. It was stated that the Singaporean government wanted to develop its trade links with the ROC which held some joint ventures on the island and trade with the ROC contributed to Singapore's income. It did not wish to increase the political influence of the PRC by supporting its admission into the UN. It also did not want to be seen as fully supporting the PRC entry into the UN for fear that pressure for the establishment of diplomatic relations would increase as a result.⁶⁴ Hence, the "moderate" voting pattern would best serve Singapore's interests.

In 1970, Singapore seemed to be adopting a different game plan. During a Parliamentary debate of 2 September, Singapore Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam appeared to be hinting at a possible change in the Singapore voting pattern by stating that Singapore was prepared to support the PRC entry into the UN to take over the seat occupied by the ROC.⁶⁵ When Lee met with Nixon in Washington on 5 November 1970, he told Nixon that the US should not block the PRC entry into the UN especially when two-thirds of the UN members were in favour of its entry.⁶⁶ In 1971, it seemed that Singapore was swaying towards voting for the Albanian resolution in the next vote on the Chinese representation issue. Rajaratnam said that more UN members would vote for the PRC entry into the UN if the Albanian resolution did not include the expulsion of the ROC. He said that many countries, including Singapore, found it embarrassing to have to vote for the expulsion of the

⁶² Lee, *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000*, 464.

⁶³ TNA:PRO FCO 24/887, 8 October 1970, M.A. Hall to C.A.Munro.

⁶⁴ TNA:PRO FCO 24/887, 6 Nov 1970, C.A.Munro to Chick and Sullivan.

⁶⁵ TNA:PRO FCO 24/887, 8 October 1970, M.A. Hall to C.A.Munro.

⁶⁶ Lee, *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000*, 464.

ROC.⁶⁷ If members only had to vote for PRC entry to the UN, and there was no seat left for the ROC, the ROC might just decide to quietly leave the UN on its own accord. He added that there was no need for the ROC to remain as a member of the UN. On the other hand, the PRC should be in the UN “if there is to be any chance of getting them to behave better in this part of the world.” The ROC would be better off without the UN, establish itself as a separate political entity and its leadership should give up all ambitions to return to the mainland.⁶⁸

Malaysia changed its position in the Chinese representation issue in 1970. Tun Ismail told the British Prime Minister on 22 October that Malaysia would vote for the entry of the PRC into the UN. It would abstain from the Albanian resolution which included the exclusion of the ROC but would vote against the “important question” resolution. Malaysia shared Singapore sentiment that it would be easier for them to vote for the Albanian resolution if it did not include the expulsion clause.⁶⁹

The general trend in the UN was that members were favouring the entry of the PRC. The support for the “important question” resolution was dropping while the support for the Albanian resolution was rising. The issue of Chinese representation in the UN was complicated by Nixon’s revelation of his policy of rapprochement with the PRC. The rapprochement, coupled with the PRC nuclear capabilities contributed to enhance the international status of the PRC. This meant that it was no longer possible to ignore the PRC and it had to be brought out of isolation. Malaysia and Singapore were clearly in favour of the PRC taking up a seat in the UN. Since the US was developing friendly ties with the PRC, it would not be a problem for Malaysia and Singapore to support the PRC’s admission into the UN. Singapore did not have to worry about upsetting its relationship with the ROC or be seen as favouring the PRC since it would be just following the general voting trend in the UN. Moreover, even the US, the ROC’s biggest western ally, could no longer block the PRC’s entry and was having difficulty trying to preserve the ROC’s seat in the UN. Thus, Malaysia and Singapore could not be faulted if they were to support the Albanian resolution.

⁶⁷ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1203, 23 June 1971, The High Commissioner of the New Zealand High Commission to The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Wellington.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ TNA: PRO FCO 24/824, 22 October 1970, Record of The Prime Minister’s meeting with Tun Dr. Ismail, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia at 11am, on October 22, 1970 at the Waldorf Astoria, New York.

Eventually, in 1971, Malaysia and Singapore voted for the Albanian resolution to admit the PRC into the UN at the expense of the ROC.

The Nixon Visit to China

Nixon arrived in Beijing on 21 February 1972 and began his one week visit of China. The media reaction to the Shanghai Communiqué was generally positive with the biggest praise coming from leftist newspapers. The leftist newspapers, *Nanyang Siang Pau* and *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, of Singapore gave positive reviews of the Nixon trip. *Nanyang Siang Pau* of Singapore said, “The President’s trip ‘had already achieved some significant results’ in removing barriers which have separated the two countries.” Leftist *Sin Chew Jit Poh* said, “The Nixon of today has won over the Nixon of yesterday. Awakened from the nightmare of his past struggle against China and Communism, the American President has made a complete change in his policy toward China...” Meanwhile, *Straits Times* of Malaysia had reservations about the communiqué and felt that it confirmed Nixon’s warnings that the world should not expect too much to materialise from his Beijing visit.⁷⁰

Shortly after Nixon’s trip to China, Marshall Green and John Holdridge went on a tour of Asia to brief the Asian allies on the rapprochement with the PRC. Marshall Green reported that Lee Kuan Yew, being a “typical Han Chinese,” recognised the significance of the Nixon visit instantly.⁷¹ Green met with Lee and asked for his views regarding Nixon’s Beijing trip. Lee said that the “element of surprise” related to the July 15 announcement was the only shortcoming of the initiative. He explained to Green that “if it had been done with less surprise, the favourable results would have been even better.” He said that the “element of surprise” caused Japan and other Southeast Asian states to doubt the reliability of the big powers, as they were bound to make radical policy changes at the expense of their allies.⁷² Green clarified to Lee that the secrecy

⁷⁰ Report; World Treatment of Current Issues: Peking Visit Communique No. 28; February 28, 1972; China Trip- February to March 1972 Part 1; Box 501; NSC Files: President’s Trip Files; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

⁷¹ Memorandum for the President’s File by John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff, Washington, March 23, 1972. FRUS 1969-76, XVII
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/media/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf> accessed 20 April 2010, 859.

⁷² Lee, *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000*, 466.

surrounding the China initiative was necessary as the Japanese were unreliable when it came to keeping secrets. US treaty commitments with its allies had not been compromised. The ROK was worried that its interests would be affected but the US-South Korea relationship did not change at all. In fact, the China initiative would lead to greater stability in the region.⁷³ Lee told Holdridge that the US had “sprung the trap” on the friendly nations of Asia. Holdridge reported that Lee seemed to be suspicious of the motives of the Communist Chinese.⁷⁴

Lee was apparently showing more apprehensions towards the rapprochement when he met with the British on 11 December 1972 and exchanged views on the US policy towards the PRC and the USSR. He wondered if the balance of power concept was still valid in US relations with the USSR and PRC. Lee felt that by making friends with the USSR, the Americans were working towards greater peace and prosperity for the global scene. However, he observed that US policy had caused serious consequences for the Southeast Asian allies.⁷⁵

More positive comments came from the Singapore Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam, who viewed the rapprochement, not just as a gesture to establish contact with the PRC, but as a “major revolution” in the arena of international relations and a step towards forging US-PRC cooperation. He added that since the only issue separating the US and the PRC was the “ridiculous question” of Taiwan, he felt that the rapprochement was inevitable and was not surprised when it finally materialised in 1971.⁷⁶

Malaysia, Singapore and the PRC

Informal contacts between Singapore and the PRC existed despite the lack of diplomatic relations. The Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce visited Beijing in October 1971. The last time a mission of this sort was sent to the PRC was in 1956 when a group of sixty Singaporean businessmen made a trip to Beijing.⁷⁷ On another occasion, the Chinese table-tennis team was invited by the Singapore Table-Tennis Association to visit Singapore in the later part of 1972. The

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Holdridge, *Crossing the Divide*, 101.

⁷⁵ TNA: PRO PREM 15/ 1209, 11 December 1972, Record of a Meeting between the Defence Secretary and the Prime Minister of Singapore at the Ministry of Defence on 11th December 1972.

⁷⁶ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1466, 9 March 1972, H.H. Francis to The Secretary of Foreign affairs, Wellington.

⁷⁷ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1203, 2 Nov 1971, R.C. Samuel to S W F Martin; TNA: PRO FCO24/1203, 13 Oct 1971 G Wong to S W F Martin.

invitation was accepted by the PRC table tennis team. The visit appeared to be merely an informal exchange between the two table-tennis teams but the Singapore Government had some amount of control over the Singapore Table-Tennis Association and would be watching the progress of the visit cautiously.⁷⁸

Lee did acknowledge privately that the rapidly improving US-PRC relationship might mean that there would be more pressure on Singapore to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC sooner than desired.⁷⁹ However, Singapore was not encouraged by the US rapprochement with the PRC to commence the establishment of diplomatic ties with the PRC. The reason was that Singapore did not trust the Communist Chinese, despite the positive image portrayed by the PRC during its interactions with the Americans. PRC was viewed as “unreliable” and “unpredictable” largely due to the factional conflict within the Chinese Communist Party. Singapore did not trust the PRC’s “smiling face,” as personified by the friendly attitude of Zhou Enlai and the bureaucrats, and viewed this as nothing but a “temporary phenomenon” which was bound to disappear in no time.⁸⁰

On 18 June 1974, Lee met with David Ennals, the Minister of State at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and told him that it was a matter of time before Singapore established diplomatic ties with the PRC. However, at that time, Lee did not see any incentive to do that. Singapore also had a substantial amount of trade with the PRC. Lee continued to display a degree of distrust of the PRC by telling Ennals that the PRC would gain a huge advantage by establishing relations with Singapore. The PRC would be able to “infiltrate” their men, including those who would be granted diplomatic immunity right into “the heart of Southeast Asia.”⁸¹

On 2 July 1974, during a conversation with French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, Lee stressed that Singapore was “in no hurry” to open up diplomatic ties with the PRC. Singapore

⁷⁸ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1466, 19 May 1972, K Q F Manning to B R T Langridge.

⁷⁹ Ang, *Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War*, 94.

⁸⁰ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1784, 4 Oct 1973, R J Carrick to G E Clark.

⁸¹ TNA: PRO FCO 15/1909, 18 June 1974, Record of Conversation between Mr Lee Kuan Yew Prime Minister of Singapore and the Minister of State and the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 18 June at 10.15 a.m.

preferred to see its ASEAN partners establishing diplomatic ties with Beijing first.⁸² Singapore would rather wait for the right time before making a move on the PRC. It had an understanding with Indonesia that Singapore would only establish diplomatic ties with the PRC after Indonesia had done so.

Despite its reluctance to open up diplomatic ties with the PRC, there was evidence that Singapore was adopting a much friendlier stance towards Beijing and was trying to establish some kind of official contact. On one occasion, the PRC Ambassador to Britain was invited to the National Day reception of Singapore on 9 August 1972. The PRC declined the invitation. The British were surprised that Singapore invited the PRC even though the PRC did not recognise Singapore.⁸³

Malaysia claimed that it adhered to a "One China" policy on several occasions and recognised the PRC as the de facto and de jure government of Mainland China, but the two sides had no diplomatic ties.⁸⁴ Diplomatic ties with the PRC would only be possible when the PRC adhered to Malaysia's conditions. The conditions included the PRC's endorsement of the principle of peaceful coexistence, recognised Malaysia as independent and sovereign and that it would never meddle in the internal affairs of Malaysia.⁸⁵ Tun Razak said that the Malaysian government was supportive of the PRC entry to the UN, but despite its show of friendliness, the PRC had yet to recognise it as the legitimate government of Malaysia.⁸⁶

In Tun Razak's statement of 4 December 1972 to the Malaysian parliament, he announced that Malaysia would be establishing diplomatic ties with the PRC sooner or later. However, it was necessary to consult Malaysia's ASEAN partners for their approval.⁸⁷ ASEAN nations knew that relations with the PRC had to be sought and each nation should follow their own timetable towards diplomatic ties with the PRC. Malaysia was reportedly the "most anxious" of the ASEAN states to

⁸² Telegram: AMEMBASSY Paris to SECSTATE Washington DC; July 8, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=103121&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2008.

⁸³ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1466, 11 Aug 1972, J K Hickman to W J Watts.

⁸⁴ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1164, 4 Aug 1971, R D Clift to D F B Le Breton; TNA: PRO FCO 24/1164, undated, KL to FCO; TNA: PRO FCO 24/1164, 15 Mar 1971, R D Clift to D Le Breton.

⁸⁵ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1164, undated, KL to FCO; TNA: PRO FCO 24/1164, 15 Mar 1971, R D Clift to D Le Breton.

⁸⁶ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1164, 15 Mar 1971, R D Clift to D Le Breton.

⁸⁷ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1445, 12 December 1972, TH Preston to H Li Davies.

set up diplomatic ties with Beijing.⁸⁸ The PRC entry into the UN played a role in speeding up the establishment of Malaysia-PRC diplomatic relations. The PRC entered the UN and, thus had a role to play in the arena of international affairs. The Malaysian leaders felt that the time was ripe to set up diplomatic ties with the PRC, since it had joined the world community of nations.⁸⁹ Moreover, by establishing diplomatic ties with the PRC, Malaysia would be a step closer to its goal of the neutralisation of Southeast Asia.

Tun Razak told Zhou Enlai his concerns regarding the possible roadblocks to the establishment of diplomatic ties through the leader of a Malaysian delegation to Beijing, Raja Moher. The issue of the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia was a problem which had to be resolved before diplomatic ties could be established. Tun Razak was concerned about the intentions of the PRC towards these Chinese who belong to two categories: those who became Malaysian citizens and those whose loyalty lies with Beijing. Zhou reassured the Malaysians that Beijing viewed these overseas Chinese as more of a burden because they were an obstacle to the setting up of diplomatic ties with a number of countries. Overseas Chinese should be loyal to their country of residence, not Beijing.⁹⁰

PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping made a similar statement in September 1973 when he encouraged overseas Chinese to take up the citizenship of the country they were living in.⁹¹ Zhou met Australian Prime Minister Whitlam on 3 November 1973 and told him that he was glad that so many overseas Chinese in Australia had taken up Australian citizenship and were contributing to the building of Australia. Zhou's comment implied his support for the naturalisation of overseas Chinese and would prefer that these Chinese blend in with their country of residence, rather than

⁸⁸ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Jakarta to SECSTATE Washington DC; May 1 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=29295&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2008.

⁸⁹ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1445, 11 Dec 1972, Dewan Rakyat-Jawapan Dertulis.

⁹⁰ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1445, 12 Dec 1972, L J Middleton to W K Slatcher.

⁹¹ Telegram: AMEMBASSY KL to SECSTATE Washington DC; June 3, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=82638&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2008.

returning to China.⁹² This showed that the PRC was willing to compromise on the issue of overseas Chinese for the purpose of establishing diplomatic ties with other Asian nations.

Raja Moher, the leader of a Malaysian delegation which visited China in November 1972, asked Zhou if the PRC would continue to support the communists in Malaysia after the establishment of PRC-Malaysia diplomatic relations. Zhou replied that the PRC would always support parties involved in liberation movements and it would continue to support the communists in Malaysia. The Malaysians viewed this as an indication that Beijing would only be providing moral support, not material, to the communists.⁹³

Moher conveyed to Zhou the Malaysian leaders concerns about the future of Malaysia's relationship with the ROC after the establishment of diplomatic ties with the PRC. Beijing would prefer Malaysia to follow the Japanese model.⁹⁴ This meant that the Malaysian embassy in Taiwan would have to be shut down but it could maintain trade and cultural ties with the Nationalist Chinese through a private, nongovernmental office.⁹⁵ It was important for Malaysia to maintain some sort of presence in Taiwan. One reason was because there were about 3000 Malaysian students in Taiwan. Malaysia was glad that the PRC was willing to compromise on this issue and did not view it as an obstacle to diplomatic relations.⁹⁶

Tun Razak visited the PRC from 28 May to 2 June 1974 to conduct the final negotiations leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC. The Joint Communiqué was issued on 31 May and Malaysia and PRC formally establish diplomatic ties.⁹⁷

The Malaysian obtained some results from the overseas Chinese issue. Dual citizenship became invalid as Chinese who had attained Malaysian citizenship had to give up their Chinese citizenship. Those who retained their Chinese nationality would have their rights and interests protected by the PRC. Permanent residents who had yet to pick up the Malaysian citizenship could

⁹² Telegram: AMCONSUL Hong Kong to AMEMBASSY KL; November 15, 1973; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973;

<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=101272&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2008.

⁹³ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1445, 12 Dec 1972, L J Middleton to W K Slatcher.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Burr, *The Kissinger Transcripts*, 114-5.

⁹⁶ TNA: PRO FCO 24/1747, 19 June 1973, S M Boldt to W K Slatcher.

⁹⁷ Telegram: AMEMBASSY KL to SECSTATE Washington DC; June 3, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=82638&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2008.

remain in Malaysia.⁹⁸ The issue regarding stateless Chinese remained unresolved. The Americans felt that the PRC gained an upper hand as now it could intervene in the affairs of Malaysia under the guise of protecting the interests of the Chinese nationals.⁹⁹

The issue of the PRC support for the communists in Malaysia was not completely resolved. From Tun Razak's statement, which he made after his return, he implicitly told the communists that the PRC had ceased its support for them and he encouraged the communists to end their "futile struggle" and participate in Malaysian politics instead. There were speculations from the press that the PRC had reassured Malaysia regarding its stand on insurgencies. This was because of Tun Razak's firm belief that the PRC would not support the Malaysian communists any more.¹⁰⁰ *Straits Times* reported that, "there is no reason to believe that Peking will aid materially terrorists in the jungle once diplomatic ties are established when they chose not to do so before that diplomatic hand of friendship was extended." In another report dated 28 May 1974, contrary media views were evident. *Straits Times* quoted *Barron's Magazine's* report that the PRC would continue to aid subversions by communists in other countries even though it had developed ties with other non-communist nations.¹⁰¹

The establishment of diplomatic relations meant that ties with the ROC had to be severed. Malaysia recognised that Taiwan was a part of China and moved to end its consular ties with the ROC. The ROC consulate-general office was closed on 31 May. Trade, investment and tourism with the ROC would remain on a people-to-people basis.¹⁰² The ROC issued a statement regarding the recognition of the PRC by Malaysia. The ROC warned Malaysia that its recognition of the PRC would make Malaysia more vulnerable to communist subversion. The PRC, which had been supporting the communists for decades, would continue to do so and the communists would become bolder now that Malaysia had recognised the PRC. Beijing could then slowly begin to

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Telegram: AMEMBASSY KL to SECSTATE Washington DC; May 28, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=64636&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2008.

¹⁰² Telegram: AMEMBASSY KL to SECSTATE Washington DC; June 3, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=82638&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2008.

dominate the other areas in Asia, thus putting the security of the entire region in great jeopardy.¹⁰³ The ROC appealed to the free nations of Southeast Asia not to be deceived by Maoist tactics. The PRC, according to the ROC, had created an illusion that it was a peace-loving member of the international community, while in reality it had never given up its infiltration activities and support for subversions abroad.¹⁰⁴ The ROC tried to salvage whatever was left of the ROC-Malaysia relations by stating that it would make sure that Malaysian citizens in Taiwan would receive fair treatment and protection. The ROC hoped that Malaysia would do the same for the ROC citizens in Malaysia, help protect the ROC nationals against any PRC maneuvers to cause trouble for them.¹⁰⁵ It was also important that trade and other forms of contact would be preserved.¹⁰⁶

Malaysia became the first ASEAN member to recognise the PRC. The Singaporean leadership stated that the recognition of the PRC by Malaysia would help pave the way for its own eventual recognition of the PRC.¹⁰⁷ It was just a matter of time before the nations of Southeast Asia open up diplomatic ties with the PRC. This process was accelerated and made inevitable by the exchange of liaison offices between the US and the PRC and the recognition of the PRC by Japan, Australia and New Zealand.¹⁰⁸ These developments were consequences brought about by Nixon's China policy and increased the international status of the PRC. Malaysia was offered the opportunity to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC by the US rapprochement with the PRC. More US allies were opening up diplomatic ties with the PRC, without the obstacle of US opposition since the US was having friendly ties with the PRC. Hence, it would not be out of the ordinary for Malaysia to do the same and prompted the Malaysian rush towards establishing diplomatic ties with the PRC. However, Singapore did not jump on the bandwagon and only normalised relations with the PRC in October 1990 after Indonesia had done so in 1989. Malaysia

¹⁰³ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Taipei to SECSTATE Washington DC; June 1, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=96141&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2008.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Taipei to SECSTATE Washington DC; May 23, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=66427&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2008.

¹⁰⁷ Telegram: AMEMBASSY Singapore to SECSTATE Washington DC; May 22, 1974; RG59; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 - 12/31/1974; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=66732&dt=1572&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2008.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

recognised the convergence of interest between Nixon's China policy and its national interest. By seeking diplomatic relations with the PRC, Malaysia could solve the problems regarding overseas Chinese and the Malaysian communists and also move closer towards its goal of the neutralisation of Southeast Asia. Even though the ethnic Chinese made up a significant portion of the population, they still constituted the minority in Malaysia and wielded lesser political power. This was not the case in Singapore. Singapore had nothing much to gain from setting up diplomatic ties with the PRC. It was still highly suspicious of the Communist Chinese and wished to preserve the commercial ties it had with the ROC. Singapore did not want to be seen as rushing towards diplomatic relations with the PRC. As the majority of the population in Singapore were people of ethnic Chinese descent, to establish relations with the PRC this early would only invite undue criticisms and suspicions from its neighbours. This goes to show that the US did not exert the same influence over the Asian states in the issue of the diplomatic recognition of the PRC.

Conclusion

Malaysia and Singapore deemed South Vietnam as important to the security of Southeast Asia, due to the fear that the "domino theory" would be set in motion if Saigon fell to the communists. The non-aligned status of Malaysia and Singapore was under scrutiny as the two states were leaning closer towards the Americans. Their support for the American involvement in Vietnam and their strong anti-communist sentiments meant that they were definitely more pro-west than neutral. However, both states tried to maintain a distance from the US by not getting involved in Vietnam militarily. When Nixon introduced his Vietnamization policy and the Nixon Doctrine, Malaysia and Singapore immediately expressed their concerns. Nixon's policies added to their feelings of insecurity, which were first caused by the impending British withdrawal from the region. Hence, there were more calls for the Americans to stay in Vietnam and not forsake Southeast Asia. Nixon began to pursue his policy of rapprochement with the PRC and his announcement of 15 July shocked his Asian allies. Malaysia seemed to be more supportive of the rapprochement while Singapore expressed some apprehensions. Lee, in particular, criticised the secrecy surrounding the Kissinger visit to Beijing in July 1971. A consequence of the rapprochement was the change in

voting pattern in the UN regarding the issue of Chinese representation. The rapprochement did much to increase the international status of the PRC. More UN members were for the PRC entry into the UN. Malaysia and Singapore had no qualms about supporting the PRC entry and voted for the Albanian resolution. Since the rapprochement with the US, the PRC was moving towards establishing friendly ties with its Asian neighbours. Diplomatic ties were established with Japan in 1972. Malaysia began to move towards diplomatic ties with the PRC and the two sides formally established diplomatic relations in May 1974. With direct communications, Malaysia and the PRC could work together to resolve the problems of the overseas Chinese and the communists in Malaysia. Establishing diplomatic ties with the PRC could actually work to Malaysia's advantage and was vital for its national interest. This was not the case for Singapore, as it saw no incentive to join in the race towards recognising the PRC.

Conclusion

Nixon told de Gaulle on 1 March, 1969, that there would be no changes to the US China policy due to his concern of the impact it would have on Asia. He meant that, in the short run, he did not envisage an opening to the PRC. In the same conversation, he mentioned to de Gaulle that he would not disregard the possibility of establishing communications with the PRC in the long run. Nixon was reported to have said:

On a long range policy he [Nixon] felt that it would be detrimental to the interests of the U.S. in 10 years for it to appear that the West was ganging up with the Soviet Union against China...In 10 years when China had made significant nuclear progress we would have to have more communications than we had today.¹

However, Nixon's concern for the Asian states was not what it seemed to be. Despite his concern of the possible impact of his China policy on Asia, he moved ahead to embark on the long term goal of opening up to Beijing during the first term of his presidency, in light of the opportunities it would bring for him to achieve success in the realm of foreign policy. This thesis differs from the existing literature of Nixon's China policy by looking at how the Nixon administration explained its China policy to the East and Southeast Asian states and also the American impression of their reactions to the change in the US China policy. This thesis establishes the relationship between Nixon's strategy in Asia which consisted of the policies of Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine with the US China policy so as to illustrate a clearer and fuller picture of the responses of the East and Southeast Asian states to the Nixon administration's explanation regarding the change in the US China policy.

It could be argued that US China policy saw some changes during the Johnson administration and global opinion was shifting towards emphasising the importance of bringing the

¹ Editorial note of Richard Nixon's conversation with Charles De Gaulle on 1 March 1969, FRUS 1969-1976, I, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d14>, accessed 20 April 2010.

PRC into the global community. The PRC was gradually gaining a higher international standing as more nations were establishing diplomatic ties or trade links with it. Domestic opinion in the 1960s demonstrated a preference for better ties with the PRC and also to engage it in global affairs. There were also some US officials who acknowledged that the US should build friendly ties with the PRC. Johnson indeed demonstrated greater flexibility than his predecessors when dealing with the PRC by loosening stringent trade controls by permitting the shipping of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. There were some easing of the travel restrictions which allowed medical personnel and scientists to travel to China. According to Michael Lumbers, Johnson did make some steps towards friendlier ties with the PRC.² The Johnson administration seemed to be interested in pursuing a less adversarial relationship with Beijing. However, Johnson's efforts were too miniscule to have any considerable impact on US-PRC relations. Despite the change in thinking in the 1960s with regards to the PRC, a rapprochement was hardly on the cards.

Johnson's successor, Nixon, was seen as the most unlikely president to bring about a change to the China policy due to his hard-line anti communist stance and his image as a "Cold Warrior." Kissinger was not an expert in US-PRC affairs and had confessed to his own unfamiliarity with China in his memoirs by saying that, "China had not figured extensively in my own writings."³ Hence, it would appear unlikely that the duo would be bringing about any great changes to US China policy. The opportunity brought forth by the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969 meant a rapprochement with the PRC could assist in speeding up the process of détente with the USSR and in bringing an end to the Vietnam War. Moreover, both men were immensely interested in the conduct of diplomacy and grandiose schemes with high dramatic factor. Such a move would indeed be dramatic as the world would be thoroughly amazed, and to achieve that, the skillful practice of diplomacy at the highest level would be required. Hence, the rapprochement was something which would appeal to Nixon and Kissinger who craved the attention they would receive from such a spectacular and revolutionary move in the practice of diplomacy. Moreover, the rapprochement would also assist them to achieve success in the foreign policy arena in terms of ending the Vietnam War and setting détente with the USSR in motion. Nixon brought forth the

² Lumbers, *Piercing the Bamboo Curtain*.

³ Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 164.

change in the US China policy, leaving the world bewildered, confused and shocked. As was seen throughout this thesis, Nixon practiced utmost secrecy in his conduct of diplomacy with his Asian allies and friends, in affairs concerning the US-PRC rapprochement. The Asian leaders did not see the rapprochement coming, as little or no prior notice was given, due to Nixon's penchant for secrecy. Hence, the US allies and friends were indeed shocked by the US-PRC rapprochement, which happened just two years after Nixon first assumed the presidency. Although most Asian states understood that a change in the US attitude towards the PRC was desirable, they were still shocked by the speed at which the change took place and had to adjust rapidly to the changing situation in Asia and the world. Also, deception was used by Nixon and Kissinger to placate the various Asian leaders and to conceal certain information and facts pertaining to the rapprochement process, which only further frustrated and bemused these Asian allies and friends.

The Asian state most directly affected by the US-PRC rapprochement was the ROC. The early moves made by Nixon towards the PRC in terms of loosening trade and travel restrictions, the resumption of Warsaw talks and the ending of the Taiwan Strait Patrol hinted at a relaxation of tension between the US and the PRC. However, the ROC leaders did not realise that rapprochement was imminent and were bewildered after the Nixon administration informed them of Nixon's impending visit to China. The ROC's international prestige and standing suffered as a result of the US-PRC rapprochement. The ROC lost its seat in the UN and many nations, including its long time friend Japan, severed ties with the ROC in order to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. The US statement regarding Taiwan in the Shanghai Communiqué seemed to indicate an impending withdrawal of the US presence from the region and eventual disengagement from ROC affairs. US commitment to the security of Taiwan and the continual legitimacy of the ROC was under threat. The ROC was dealt another blow with the establishment of the Liaison Offices as the PRC apparently had a de-facto embassy in Washington without even having to normalise relations with the US. Despite the state of relations, the ROC stayed close to the US and remained a loyal ally. It could be argued that for the ROC, there was no other way to turn but to remain close to the US and hope for the best.

Despite the bright start to the US-PRC relationship, Nixon did not normalise relations with the PRC during his period in office. Initially the PRC was patient and did not demand normalisation and the US severance of relations with the ROC immediately. However, the PRC was becoming increasingly frustrated as the US appeared to be reinforcing its relationship with the ROC. The ROC continued to receive US military support and its diplomatic standing within the US seemed to be augmented with the appointment of Leonard Unger as ambassador. The US appeared to be playing a dangerous game of juggling the two Chinas. The US resorted to deception in its relations with the ROC and the PRC in order to conceal certain information regarding the progress of Washington's relationship with Beijing. The US was constantly trying to pacify both sides, so as to reassure the PRC that the plans for normalisation of relations were still alive and forthcoming while attempting to convince the ROC that there would be no changes to the US-ROC relationship, regardless of its newfound friendship with the PRC. It was true that the US was constrained by domestic issues such as the strong support for the ROC within the Nixon administration and also the Watergate scandal. It could not simply abandon the ROC and embrace the PRC completely, something which many of the US allies and friends were able to achieve easily. The real intention of the US move towards rapprochement with the PRC was up for debate. Was the Nixon administration genuinely interested in normalising its relations with the PRC or was it merely a move made in order to unsettle the Soviets and keep the "game" going? Or had Nixon and Kissinger started a show that they found impossible to end? Nonetheless, the long term impact brought forth by Nixon's China policy was that it paved the way for Carter to normalise relations with the PRC and sever ties with the ROC in 1979.

Being economically strong, Japan had the potential to be a regional leader to assist the other Asian states both economically and militarily. The Nixon administration had plans for Japan as it embarked on putting the principles of the Nixon Doctrine into practice. Nixon hoped that the Japanese could take on a military role in Asia as the US gradually withdrew from the region. However, Japan was unwilling to be a military power in Asia and preferred to help the other Asian states economically. The dual shocks did much to sour the relations between Japan and the US, but the two long time allies maintained a close relationship. As noted above, with the US withdrawal

from Asia, the US looked to Japan to play a greater role in the region. Moreover, the US required the free use of the military bases on Okinawa to safeguard the security of Asia after its withdrawal from the region. When Nixon moved towards rapprochement with the PRC, Japan was seriously affected. Nixon's failure to give the Japanese ample notice and prior consultation in advance of the 15 July announcement upset the Sato government. Once again, the use of secrecy did not bode well with a US ally. This situation mirrored the situation in Europe where the US surprised its European allies with its policy of détente with the USSR, causing much friction. Sato seemed to be supportive of the rapprochement but in private, he broke down in tears while confiding with Gough Whitlam who was the Australian Labour Leader at the time. More significantly, Sato had been caught out by the US China initiative. There were calls in Japan for the government to move towards diplomatic ties with the PRC. However, Sato was a supporter of the ROC and the PRC refused to deal with him because of this. Sato was in a difficult position and could hardly move forward in his policy towards the PRC.

The twist in the tale came when Tanaka took over the position of Prime Minister in 1972. A new leader whom the PRC was willing to deal with, Tanaka moved swiftly and succeeded in normalising relations with the PRC. Domestic opinion favoured a Japanese rapprochement with the PRC and meant that Japan could sever ties with the ROC with minimal opposition, a luxury which the US did not possess. The US-PRC rapprochement facilitated Japan's move towards diplomatic ties with the PRC as it did not have to worry about upsetting the US. As the US was seeking rapprochement with the PRC, Japan's moves towards diplomatic ties with the PRC would not have incurred the wrath of the US. The US could not possibly criticise Japan's actions since it had already begin to open up its relations with the PRC in 1971. Tanaka acknowledged that US actions had enabled the Japanese to come to a general consensus that the timing was just right to normalise relations with the PRC.⁴ This implied that the US and Japan were far from being equal partners. It resembled more of an unequal relationship where the US was the senior partner and Japan was the junior partner. However, the US-PRC rapprochement and the subsequent PRC-Japan normalisation

⁴ Memorandum of Conversation between Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Kissinger; 19 August 1972; Memcon- Kissinger and PM Kakuei Tanaka August 19 1972; Box 1026; NSC Files; Presidential/HAK Memcons; RNPLM, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

of relations led to the biggest irony of all, when the PRC told the US that the normalisation of US-PRC relations should adhere to the Japanese solution. The US found it impossible to follow the footsteps of Japan which was a junior partner of the alliance. It was embarrassing that the US was told to learn from its junior partner in its conduct of diplomacy. Japan's normalisation of relations with the PRC had created a problem for the US. The US was literally provided with a model for the normalisation of relations with the PRC and this led to increased pressure from the PRC. The PRC expected the US to move swiftly towards normalisation using the tried and tested Japanese solution.

The Nixon administration began to reduce the US presence in South Korea, leading to the ROK government pushing for more American aid, a modernisation of its military force and also to include an element of automaticity to the Mutual Security Treaty. These demands reflected a lack of confidence in the US commitment. When Park met with Agnew in 1970 to discuss the reduction of US presence in South Korea, the US seemed to be unable to promise anything to Park regarding the demands he made. This caused tensions during and also after the Agnew visit and mirrored the situation in Europe where the reduction of US troop levels in Europe also caused tensions in the US-UK relationship. The ROK, which had already been concerned with the level of US commitment to South Korea, feared that its interests had been bargained away by the US in its talks with the PRC, leaving it vulnerable to attacks by the communists, in particular the DPRK. In response, the ROK began to open up talks with its North Korean neighbour. Furthermore, using the rapprochement as an excuse, Park imposed martial law in South Korea in order to perpetuate his power and authority. These actions simply meant that the ROK doubted the commitment of the US and realised the need for self preservation. Moreover, the ROK was the military partner of the US in the Vietnam War, but was not informed of US plans. The lack of prior consultation was not limited to the conduct of US China policy but also in its handling of the policy in Vietnam as well, thus fueling further discontent of the ROK. This illuminated the fact that the secrecy surrounding the foreign policy of Nixon and Kissinger had done more damage to bilateral ties than desired.

The Philippines was heavily dependent on the US and when the Nixon administration decided to reduce its presence in the Philippines, the Marcos government began to ask for more aid. Marcos supported the US rapprochement with the PRC and followed the US position in the

Chinese representation issue in the UN very closely, further emphasising the degree of the Philippine dependency on the US in their bilateral relationship. The release of the Shanghai communiqué made the Philippines apprehensive of its security due to the uncertainty of the future of Taiwan. The US-PRC rapprochement accelerated the establishment of diplomatic ties with the PRC. It was possible that the Philippine decision was made as an act of self preservation. To prevent any communist threat on the Philippines, should Taiwan fall to communism, the best solution would be to make friends with the PRC. The rapprochement facilitated the establishment of diplomatic ties between the Philippines and the PRC. Manila did not have to worry about upsetting the US. Unlike the US, the Philippines was able to take a further step and swiftly move towards diplomatic ties with the PRC.

As Nixon began to embark on his new strategy in Asia, Thailand was receiving less support from the US and there was also a reduction of American troops in Thailand. Being on the doorstep of the warzone in Vietnam, Thailand was concerned about the future of South Vietnam. It feared the threat of communism and was worried about the possibility of communist infiltration into its territory. It was particularly wary of the PRC support for the communist insurgents in Thailand. When the US moved towards rapprochement with the PRC, Thailand continued to be suspicious of the PRC but hoped the US could speak to the PRC and persuade it to stop supporting the insurgents. Under the leadership of Thanom, Thailand was a loyal US ally and was following the US stand on the Chinese representation at the UN closely. It was in favour of the US military presence on Thailand. However, the US viewed Thailand as dispensable and not worth defending if attacked by the PRC. The Thanom government was beginning to feel that the US was not providing Thailand with enough military aid. The quality of the aid provided was also inferior, leading to doubts over US commitment. Thailand went through a change of leadership when Sanya Dharmasakti came to power after the Thanom regime was brought down by the student uprising of October 1973. This was the beginning of the changes to Thailand's relationships with the US and the PRC. The Sanya government was not in favour of the US presence on Thailand and preferred building friendships with neighbouring countries, even the communist ones, and to promote greater regional cooperation. It went on to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC on 1 July 1975. This

could be seen as a step towards regional cooperation that was not influenced by the US-PRC rapprochement. The government under Kukrit Pramoj distanced itself from the US and demanded the withdrawal of US troops, thus moving Thailand closer towards becoming a neutral player in Asia, just as in the pre-war years when Siam acted as the buffer zone between the imperial powers of Southeast Asia.

Indonesia's relationship with the US was close but short of a formal alliance. It depended heavily on the US for economic aid and viewed the PRC as its adversary. Thus, it was feeling anxious when the US sought rapprochement with the PRC. The rapprochement did not encourage Indonesia to seek diplomatic ties with the PRC, as it still harboured deep suspicions of the Communist Chinese. The US rapprochement with the PRC and détente with the USSR led to the Indonesians to lose confidence in the US. Although briefings were given to Asian friends and allies before and after the summit meetings, and frequent reassurances of US commitment were also given, it was doubtful that the Asian allies and friends had a full picture of what went on in Beijing and Moscow. There was speculation that Asian interests might have been bargained away by the US to the communists. In view of this, the Indonesians recognised the importance of establishing friendships with regional powers as a form of self preservation. Unlike the other Asian nations, such as Thailand, Indonesia was not interested in building ties with communist nations such as the PRC.

Malaysia and Singapore were friends of the US who firmly supported the US presence in Southeast Asia. As there were no US troops in both countries, the main concern of Malaysia and Singapore was that the continual US presence in Asia was beneficial to the balance of power in the region in view of the outgoing British troops. The shroud of secrecy surrounding the US-PRC rapprochement did not bode well with Singapore. European nations shared this sentiment as they were kept in the dark on developments in US-USSR relations only to be surprised later. US-PRC rapprochement provided Malaysia and Singapore with the opportunity to "go with the flow" in their conduct of matters relating to the PRC. This could be seen in their support of the PRC entry into the UN, which was a development welcomed by many countries and viewed as an inevitable outcome. Since the US was developing friendly ties with the PRC, it would not be a problem for

them to support the PRC admission into the UN. Singapore did not have to worry about upsetting its relationship with the ROC or be seen as favouring the PRC since it would be just following the general voting trend in the UN. Malaysia and Singapore voted for the Albanian resolution to admit the PRC into the UN at the expense of the ROC. The US-PRC rapprochement provided the impetus for many nations to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC. The Malaysian leadership perceived the US rapprochement with the PRC as beneficial to the neutralisation of Southeast Asia, a goal which the Malaysian government hoped to achieve. Moreover, establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC could help Malaysia to solve the problems of the overseas Chinese and the Malaysian communists. Hence, the Malaysian government moved swiftly towards diplomatic ties with the PRC and even beat the US to it. Singapore saw no benefit in rushing to recognise the PRC and thus did not set up diplomatic relations with the PRC until October 1990. The US was hardly able to influence these two countries in their conduct of relations with the PRC, further proving that the friends of the US in Asia were capable of making their own decisions and chose whichever path best suited to their national interests.

This thesis has shown that Nixon's policies of Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine were linked to his rapprochement with the PRC. Nixon's policies had received criticisms from his allies and friends and asserted varying degrees of impact on the individual Asian states. It should be noted these states were more alarmed by the pace of change in the US China policy than by the rapprochement itself. Prevailing international attitudes were increasingly in favour of engaging the PRC in world affairs, thus the PRC was bound to join the global community of nations eventually. The fact that it happened so quickly and was orchestrated by a hard-line anti-communist such as Nixon surprised the Asian states. This was compounded by the fact they had no knowledge that the US was embarking on rapprochement with the PRC and were hardly given any notice before the 15 July announcement. Nixon and Kissinger's practice of secrecy and deception in their diplomacy with the Asian leaderships was clearly highlighted in the preceding chapters. The shroud of secrecy surrounding foreign policy issues, which was a prominent feature of the Nixon-Kissinger style of diplomacy, proved to be a major flaw in US foreign policy, and a shortcoming of the US-PRC rapprochement. Furthermore, when questioned, Nixon and Kissinger were often deceptive and

chose not to reveal all to the Asian leaders. This only increased the feeling of uncertainty the Asian states had regarding US intentions, and when coupled with the reduction of US presence in Vietnam and Asia, only served to further unsettle them.

The Asian allies and friends shared similar sentiments on some issues regarding the reduction of US presence in Asia and the US-PRC rapprochement. They were not against taking on more responsibility for their own defence against internal or external threats, but wanted more US aid to help them achieve that. They were against a precipitate withdrawal of the US from the region in view of the communist threat. They were worried that US withdrawal would give the PRC and the USSR a chance to move in and fill the power vacuum, putting the security of the region in jeopardy. This meant that the Asian allies and friends were very concerned about the communist threat and viewed the US as the protector of Asia. Since there was nothing they could do to influence the US to alter its decision, they could only hope that the US would supply them with enough aid. The change in US policy was inevitable, but the Asian states were once again, concerned about the pace of change. They hoped that the US would take a gradual approach and that it would ensure that the defence capabilities of the Asian states be strengthened so as to prepare them to take on the communist threat themselves, before withdrawing from the region completely.

The shroud of secrecy surrounding Nixon's China policy was pointed out as a major flaw in the US China initiative and it had upset many Asian states. Although leaders of Japan, Indonesia and Singapore had conveyed their approval of the rapprochement in their conversations with the Nixon administration, they expressed their apprehensions in private to other parties, as this thesis has shown through the use of British archival sources and also other secondary sources. It meant that these Asian states were not being entirely truthful when conveying their views of the rapprochement to the US and hesitated to reveal all of their concerns. There were concerns regarding the future of the US presence in Taiwan because the US had stated in the Shanghai Communiqué that it would be withdrawing from Taiwan. The Shanghai Communiqué came as a surprise to many Asian states and added to their apprehensions that the change in US policy was happening too quickly. Japan, the ROK and the Philippines, which were US allies linked closely to

Taiwan both geographically and strategically, were upset by the Taiwan section on the Communiqué, but for different reasons. Japan was worried that it would be left on its own to defend the ROC, if the US were to withdraw from Taiwan. The communiqué did much to increase Japan's fears. The ROK was worried that the withdrawal of the US from Taiwan would mean that the continual presence of US troops in South Korea would lose its validity. The ROK definitely did not want the US to leave South Korea, as it needed American strength to counter the communist threat. The Philippines displayed similar anxieties, fearing that its geographical proximity to Taiwan would endanger its security should Taiwan fall to the communists. This further reinforced the point that the Asian states were not in favour of a US withdrawal from Asia.

The Asian states responded differently when Nixon introduced his new strategy in Asia. There are several explanations for their different attitudes, one being the Asian states' degree of dependency on the US. Japan, was not overly dependent on the US on security issues and thus was more concerned about its own ability to assist Asian states after the US withdrawal and also how the US-PRC rapprochement would impact upon its normalisation of relations with Beijing. The ROC was very dependent on the US for its security and the viability of its status in the world community as the representative of the Chinese people and thus hoped to hold on to the US for as long as possible. It feared that US commitment to it would waver as the US sought rapprochement with the PRC. The modification of the Taiwan Strait Patrol raised concerns over the ability of the ROC to defend itself in case of a PRC attack. The ROK, Thailand and the Philippines were dependent on the US on security issues, and thus felt the effects of the Nixon Doctrine when faced with troop cuts. They were anxious that US aid would dry up and this would leave them vulnerable. Their concerns, in terms of US military assistance, were similar to that of the ROC as they were worried that the gradual US withdrawal from Asia would mean that they would be left without the protection of the Americans and thus tried to extract more military aid from the US. Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, which were not tied to the US through defence treaties, had other concerns. They were concerned about the future of the US presence in Asia and how this would affect their own security. The future of Saigon featured prominently while these states were conveying their views to the US. Singapore and Indonesia did not favour a precipitate US

withdrawal from Vietnam, leaving Southeast Asia vulnerable to the communist threat. Malaysia and Singapore preferred the continual US presence in Southeast Asia, and for the Americans to replace the British as the protector of the region, while the Indonesians seemed to be hinting that it did not favour the prospect of the US taking over the British role. With regard to Vietnamization, most Southeast Asian states, namely the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore, were concerned about the pace of withdrawal and agreed that the withdrawal should be gradual, as any sudden withdrawal of the US from Vietnam would be detrimental to the security of the region. Thailand and Malaysia, due to their geographical proximity to Vietnam, were against the US withdrawal as they were worried that if Saigon were to fall, their security against communism would be jeopardised.

The Asian states reacted differently to the US-PRC rapprochement, as the newfound friendship between Beijing and Washington triggered different concerns. Asian states which saw a convergence of interests between the US-PRC rapprochement and their own national interests, swiftly took the opportunity to establish diplomatic ties with their former communist Chinese foe. Japan and Malaysia were able to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC without the fear of any backlash from the Americans. The US-PRC rapprochement was catalytic towards the establishment of diplomatic ties. On the other hand, the rapprochement unsettled some allies such as the ROK and the Philippines so much that they started to communicate with their communist adversaries, ROK with the DPRK and the Philippines with the PRC. The Philippines started to lose confidence over US commitment and went ahead to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC in an act of self preservation. The US-PRC rapprochement made it easier for the Marcos government to achieve that without the fear of offending the US. For the case of the ROK, the rapprochement provided Park with the perfect excuse to perpetuate his power through the imposition of martial law, thus bringing more hardship on the people. This meant that the US did not manage to completely pacify the fears of these allies and they felt that their interests had been bargained away by the US in its pursuit of better ties with the PRC. The rapprochement did not seem to have a direct impact on Singapore, which acted more like a commentator on the situation in Asia and also provided occasional advice to the US. Singapore was not influenced by the US-PRC

rapprochement and only established diplomatic ties with the PRC in 1990, as it did not perceived that setting up diplomatic ties with the PRC would work to its advantage in the 1970s. Thailand and Indonesia remained suspicious of the PRC. For Thailand, the change in leadership armed with fresh ideas on how best to deal with the new situation in Asia, brought about by US policies in Asia, the solution was to make friends with neighbours both communist and non-communist. This led to the eventual establishment of diplomatic ties between Thailand and the PRC in 1975. Indonesia began to recognise the importance of building up relationships with regional powers, due to its lack of confidence of US commitment to Asia. However, it drew the line at normalising relations with the PRC. It remained wary of Beijing and did not normalise relations with it until 1989. In these cases, the US-PRC rapprochement had no direct influence on the decisions of these countries to either establish diplomatic ties with the PRC, or not, proving that some Asian states were paving their own paths in diplomacy instead of following in the footsteps of the US. The ROC was seemingly the country most affected by the rapprochement but the stagnation of US-PRC relations after the initial breakthrough meant that ROC's relationship with the US was not as badly affected as one would imagine. To sum up, the US-PRC rapprochement affected the Asian states' policies towards the PRC in different ways. These Asian states were not all following the path of the US but were setting their own pace which would best suit their national interests.

One result of the US-PRC rapprochement was the promotion of greater regional integration and stability. The containment of the PRC was an objective of SEATO. With the US-PRC rapprochement, SEATO was on the verge of becoming obsolete.⁵ As the Philippines and Thailand were tied to the US through SEATO, the dissolution of SEATO would mean that both states could be left in a lurch without any US protection. Hence, it would be to their benefit and security to set up diplomatic ties with the PRC. The eventual dissolution of SEATO⁶ which signified the demise of an organisation in opposition to the PRC, meant that greater peace would be possible in Asia. With the establishment of diplomatic ties with its neighbours in East and

⁵ Telegram: SECSTATE Washington DC to AMEMBASSY Bangkok; Aug 9 1973; Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973 - 12/31/1973,

<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=54528&dt=1573&dl=823> accessed 20 October 2009.

⁶ SEATO was eventually dissolved on 30 June 1977.

Southeast Asia, Asia had evolved into a region of greater stability and cooperative the as the PRC had become less of an adversary of the Asian states.

In his article "Asia After Viet Nam", Nixon wrote,

Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbours. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.⁷

The US-PRC rapprochement had facilitated the establishment of diplomatic relations among the states in East and Southeast Asia, as brand new relationships were either considered or created with the PRC. This in turn boded well for greater regional cooperation. With the establishment of diplomatic ties with its neighbours in East and Southeast Asia, the PRC had become less of an adversary to the Asian nations and would no longer "threaten its neighbours" and was brought into the Asian community of nations and out of its "angry isolation." As Nixon had predicted, it could be argued that his China policy had indirectly contributed to greater peace and stability in Asia. Nixon's "Grand Design" in foreign policy had resulted in policies, such as the Nixon Doctrine and the rapprochement, which had proved so unsettling to the Asian states that they began to lose confidence over the US commitment and made moves independently of the US to protect their own interests. One such move was to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC. The rapprochement was the catalyst for these states to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. The uncertainties Nixon's China policy had created and also the Asian states' perception that the rapprochement could work to their advantage and facilitate their own establishment of diplomatic ties with the PRC and other foreign policy objectives, prompted some states to bury the hatchet with the PRC. This, along with the US withdrawal from Vietnam and the end of the Vietnam War had led to a more peaceful Asia. Although it seemed that many Asian states were prompted to open up to the PRC by the rapprochement, they were able to take a step further than the US in terms of

⁷ Nixon, "Asia after Viet Nam", 121.

establishing diplomatic ties with Beijing, something which the Nixon administration was unable to accomplish. This was because, unlike the US, there was less opposition domestically against diplomatic ties with the PRC.

This thesis has mentioned the parallels between the impact of Nixon's rapprochement with the PRC on Asia and the impact of his policy of détente on Western Europe. This suggests an agenda for further research on the Nixon Doctrine. The Nixon Doctrine was introduced as a policy to reduce the US formal military presence in Asia; however, was this purely an Asian phenomenon? Faced with the possible reduction of US troops levels, how did the Western European nations react to this development? Was the reasoning behind the possible reduction of US troops in Europe similar to that of the Nixon Doctrine? The stages of development of the Asian and European nations were vastly different, given that the Western European nations were developed nations, while most Asian nations, with the exception of Japan and possibly the ROC, were developing nations. Hence, their perceptions and concerns regarding US presence in the respective regions would also be different. Asian states did not possess adequate resources to defend themselves and were apprehensive of the future of the security of Asia as the US gradually withdrew from the region. On the other hand, European nations were already capable of taking on the responsibility of the defence of their own nations and thus would have different concerns regarding any reduction of US presence. As the US was embarking on détente at that moment, what were the attitudes and reactions of the European allies towards the threat of the possible reduction of the US military presence, when faced with the US-USSR détente? This, again, draws a parallel with the Asian situation as the Asian nations had to deal with the rapprochement while the US was gradually reducing its presence in the region. It would be crucial to examine the attitudes of the US towards Europe and Asia and to find out how the Americans perceived that their interests would be affected if relations between the European states and the USSR were strengthened, just as when Asian states began to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC.

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