

NEW RULES FOR SECURITY AND SURVIVAL:

SOUTHERN AFRICA'S ADAPTATION TO A CHANGING WORLD ENVIRONMENT

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ABSTRACT

In the wake of the post-Cold War era, students of international relations were forced to review their theoretical frameworks to explain new rules for international peace and security. States are now confronted with new constraints for their security and survival as current trends in international politics depict a 'regionalisation' of peace and security. For southern Africa, likewise, the end of the Cold War and, moreover, apartheid, compels its member states to redefine their security strategies and mechanisms for survival. This thesis undertakes to examine southern Africa's adaptation to new rules of a changing world environment, to ensure a stable and secure region, into the next millennium.

At the outset of this thesis lies a conceptual contextualisation of security within the major contemporary theoretical approaches of international relations. By examining the essential differences between the redefinitions and new conceptualisations of security, this thesis, firstly argues that the state in southern Africa must be retained as a primary referent of security. This argument is premised on the need to create stronger states for a 'regionalisation' of security in southern Africa. The second issue examined is the changing world environment and its impact on the state and development in Africa, as the new constraints to which the continent must adapt, for security and survival. Arguing that the new international economic order and 'globalisation' dictate the new rules, this chapter asserts that the 'weak' states in Africa need to be strengthened to have the necessary capacity to be the means for its people's security.

Finally this thesis examines the new rules for southern Africa's adaptation to a changing world environment. The new rules for the African sub-continent involve the formation of a security regime and economic community with, the power-house, South Africa. Using the Southern African Development Community(SADC) as the umbrella body, the formation of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, and signing of trade protocols for a movement towards a free trade area, are evidence of southern Africa's attempts to adapt to new rules for its security. Such adaptation cannot, however, be accomplished with 'weak' states. Southern African states will have to, therefore, be strengthened to attain a more secure adaptation to the new international (economic) order.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

"The future of international peace lies in the ability of individual regions to develop their own capacities and mobilise first their own resources to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts that threaten regional stability," (Robert Mugabe,1994)

1.1 THE SEARCH FOR A NEW SECURITY ORDER IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

In the post-Cold War era, the termination of the East-West conflict and superpower rivalry has created conditions for a new international security order. Southern Africa and the rest of the continent were not immune to this change. In the absence of the 'communist threat' and ideological struggle to dominate the world, the former superpowers have relinquished their strategic interests and support of their surrogate clients in the region. The ending of the Cold War and the attainment of peace and security in southern Africa are indeed "intimately associated" (Vale,1995:2).

Moreover the defeat of apartheid forces in Cuito Cuanavale, in late 1987, led to the New York agreement a year later on South African and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and Namibia's independence. Subsequently the conditions necessary for the adoption of multi-party systems of government were installed firstly in Namibia 1989, Angola 1992, and thereafter, South Africa, Malawi and Mozambique in 1994. But more importantly, the demise of apartheid, undoubtedly signalled an end to the days of destabilisation and South African military aggression in the sub-continent. As a result, the prospects for peace and security in southern Africa could not have looked better.

The new international security order has indeed diminished superpower military intervention in the greater Third World and in Africa in particular. According to Edmond Keller (1996:10), "the international system is now being forced to rethink the notion of state sovereignty and is being challenged to establish new rules to govern when and how international and regional organisations should intervene in domestic conflicts that have

international implications". This has led to, following President Robert Mugabe¹, the 'regionalisation of international security'. In other words the efforts by states to achieve economic integration, is presently been accompanied by the need to form regional security regimes or communities, to attain the necessary security for its people. These are new rules and mechanisms for security and survival that states need to adapt to. However adaptation varies among states since this process, ultimately, depends on a state's strength². In the wake of these changes it is, therefore, only proper to inquire whether southern Africa will achieve a stable security order, that it lacked in the past. In other words will there be a 'peace dividend' or secure environment in southern Africa that will allow the region to recover and develop, "once it has occupied its new niche in the new world order"? (Thebe,1993:6.) This requires grappling with redefinitions and conceptualisations of security that are not only appropriate for, but also implementable in, the region.

The changes internationally and regionally have produced redefinitions of security that involve an expanded or broadened interpretation of: *What is security? Whose security? and What threats?* (Booth,1994:7). Consequently issues such as the primary referent of security and the role of the state, in focusing on new threats, have once again emerged as fundamental differences in the redefinitions and new conceptualisations of security, internationally and in southern Africa. Ken Booth argues that "those who would discuss security in southern Africa must decide on the primary referent....In considering this, policymakers and others have to make a number of moral choices: should states be considered as means and not the ends" (Booth,1994:5). This thesis argues that the states of southern Africa, is the principal means for the security of its citizens, and must therefore be strengthened for an adaption to a changing international security order.

Premised on the state being the primary object or referent of security, this thesis does not

¹See above quotation. This statement was made by President Mugabe in a speech on peace keeping in southern Africa at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London on 20 May 1994.

²The strength of a state according to Buzan refers to its degree of socio-political cohesion. However for 'weak' states in the 1990's, such strength is dependent on economic power. See chapter Two for a greater discussion.

argue that the state is the sole or unitary referent of security, but rather that the security of states in the region should continue to remain primary, since the "main aim is to build the capacity of the state to provide and maintain security for its citizens" (van Aardt, 1997: 5). The hypothesis pursued by this thesis is that the state must remain the object referent of security analysis for southern Africa, since the major source of insecurity for the its citizens is being part of a new international security order where economic power is the guiding force behind inter-state relations.

Booth (1994:4-5), has argued that state security was used, by "governments that posed as guardians of their peoples security, to cloak reality and hide what essentially was the security of their regime and its supporters and the state should therefore be dislodged as a (primary) referent of security". But this argument cannot mean an eradication of the state per se, as a referent to security, but rather it is the type of state that has been unable to deliver security to its people, that should be in question. It is governments that do not allow their states to fulfil their functions of statehood, that need to be eradicated and 'dislodged'. This thesis asserts that states, especially those in the 'South', which are 'weak' will have to retain the responsibility of creating the necessary security for its citizens and must, therefore, remain a primary referent in the context of the new outlook to security.

Although the end of apartheid and the Cold War has indeed meant, greater opportunities for the long awaited peace and co-operation, a movement toward multi-party democracy and the prospects for development in southern Africa, citizens of member states are far from being secure. New challenges face southern Africa and its people as conflicts and threats that were previously hidden or subdued, emerge to find their place on the security agenda. At present the region is confronted with and "plagued by a variety of traditional and more contemporary human security concerns" (Solomon & Cilliers,1996:1). These range from mass migration to the spread of killer diseases, from poverty to the proliferation of small-arms, from drug trafficking to drought. Whilst the region lacks alternative institutions and structures, like a regional civil society, to create and maintain a secure region, stronger states become a prerequisite to address the issues of security and survival of southern Africa into the next millennium.

The termination of ideological rivalry and apartheid has meant an end to major source of military conflict for southern Africa. The military-orientated interpretation of security that dominated international relations during the Cold War, has become incapable of explaining threats that do not derive from military confrontation. Barry Buzan (1991) argued that the “simple-minded” or 'straitjacket' approach to security during the Cold War has led to the underdevelopment of the concept. This interpretation, for Buzan (op.cit.), ignored the high levels of interdependence among actors trying to make themselves secure. Subsequently the concept security needs to be broadened to include political, economic, social, environmental, as well as military threats (see Buzan,1991:2-19 & Booth,1994:3). But this need not imply that the state ought to be dislodged as a primary referent.

As early as the 1970's, a superpower like the United States, had expanded their definition of national security to include international economics. This is, when it became "clear that the US economy was no longer the independent force it had once been, but affected by economic policies in a dozen of other countries" (Mathews,1989:1). However "a fully fledged debate about the meaning of security did not begin until the early 1980's" (Tickner,1995:177). Although this broadening of security issues, in a changing world environment, involves the conceiving of more than just military threats or solutions, what has become contentious, however, is: "What is it that is to be made secure?" (Buzan, 1991:15). In other words determining the primary referent and the central unit or level of analysis, in international and southern African security issues, has been the fundamental difference among the redefinitions on security. This has generated a debate about the new security discourse among state officials, academics worldwide and the private sector within regions.

1.2 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS: NEW RULES FOR SECURITY AND SURVIVAL

Since the concept like security is an “ambiguous” and “contested” one (especially in the aftermath of the Cold War and apartheid destabilisation), for southern Africa, it is only necessary to provide clarification on the concepts used in this thesis, at the outset (Rugumumu,1993:2 and du Pisani,1992:5). The term '*New Rules*' for security and survival

refers to the new ways and mechanisms that states, in an international security order, need to adapt to for their security and development.

The concept security, until the oil shocks of 1973-9, was synonymous with a state's "military defence and stability" (Booth,1994:3). However as Swatuk and Omari (1997:2) have put it: "Arms races, alliance systems and well patrolled state borders were joined by socio-economic disparities, environmental change and the spread of populations, cultures, pollutants and infectious diseases as primary threats to security in the late 20th century world". As a result the conceptualisation of security has been broadened, "horizontally" to include, political, social, economic and environmental threats to security, in addition to those that are military (Booth,1994:3 and Buzan,1991:19). This thesis contends that this reconceptualisation forms an integral part of the *New Rules* for attaining security in southern Africa.

Nevertheless what remains contentious of the new conceptualisation, is specifying the referent object of peace and security. Using Servine Rugumumu's words: "the term security was an ambiguous symbol with many meanings derived from different security levels of analysis, from the individual and the ethnic group to the nation state, regional blocs and the entire globe" (Rugumumu,1993:2). Put differently, the redefinition of security has been fraught with differences on the unit or level of analysis. Although the conceptualisation of security must make the security of people and human beings its end, the state as the means, cannot be dislodged as a primary referent. "After all if the state is to provide and maintain security, it has to be secure itself or to use Buzan's words, it has to be or become a strong state" (van Aardt,1996:24). Widening the concept of security, "vertically" to include individuals and ethnic groups, this thesis argues, would be harmful for the creation of stronger states. This thesis therefore does not subscribe to a conceptualisation that dislodges the state as a primary referent.

Survival, to a large part of this thesis is synonymous with security. Like security, survival ultimately refers to the survival of human beings or, to use another Buzan term, "human collectivities" (Buzan,1991:12). However survival of people in 'weak' states, especially those who are impoverished, would need the intervention of the state to create the necessary

conditions for their survival. In southern Africa survival and security go hand in hand. In other words one cannot be achieved without the other. Survival therefore refers to the survival of people within states.

CHAPTER TWO: A THEORETICAL CONCEPTUALISATION OF SECURITY

“One of the primary roles of the state is to provide peace and security for its citizens both within the nation-state and to ensure their protection against threats from outside”

(Severine Rugumumu,1993:1)

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In the 1990's, the end of the Cold War and apartheid has surely meant a reduction in external military threats for southern Africa's security. Accompanying this change, is the need for new conceptualisations and redefinitions for a security 'dividend' in the region. The differences in the new thinking on security have, however, complicated the process to attain a more secure region. In other words, the disagreements in the new conceptualisations and redefinitions of security have prevented consensus on the appropriate framework for southern Africa's security in the post-Cold War and post-apartheid era. The complexity of achieving greater security for southern Africa within the new international security order can, therefore, only be appreciated by understanding the debate on the new security outlook.

The debate on security can be located within two major contemporary theories of international politics. On one end stands an approach that is based on a neo-realist theoretical framework which maintains a continued emphasis on the primacy of the state within a broadened conceptualisation of security. The other side of the debate is posed by, a postmodernist, approach that is rooted within the pluralist theory of international politics. Pluralism is based on a set of assumptions that dislodge the state as the primary referent of international politics and place greater emphasis on the interdependency and transnationalisation of international (economic) affairs, given rise to by non-state actors and global 'institutions'. An understanding of this debate must, therefore, commence with understanding its roots within contemporary international relations theory.

2.2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: NEO-REALISM versus PLURALISM

NEO-REALISM

Neo-realism is a development of the classical realist thought on international politics. While retaining features of the traditional thought, like "power as a central analytical concept, neo-realism focuses on the structural characteristics of an international system of states rather than its component units" (Solomon,1996:4). This theory has been built on the assumptions that the state is the primary actor in international politics, international anarchy is the principle force shaping the motives and actions of states, states in anarchy are preoccupied with power and security that is inclined toward conflict and competition rather than co-operation, and finally, international institutions and non-state actors affect the prospects for co-operation only marginally (Grieco,1993:118-119).

The neo-realist theory has its roots in Kenneth Waltz's classical works: *Man, The State and War* (1959) and *The Theory of International Politics* (1979). In the former are his "efforts to locate the causes of war and define the conditions of peace", according to the level or 'image' at which causes can be located - "whether in man, the state or the state system" (Waltz,1979 :18). The author concluded that it was the third 'image' or level which was most important for locating the causes of war. Although states, still constitute the most important actors or units in the international system, this theory, has nevertheless recognised the need to look beyond the state for explanations of state behaviour.

In *The Theory of International Politics*, this author argued that theories and explanations of international politics can have a simpler division of being either 'reductionist' or 'systemic'. Theories of international politics that concentrate the causes of war at the individual or national level are reductionist; while theories that conceive of causes operating at the international level are systemic (Waltz,1979:18). Subsequently the causes of war and international conflict or even the behaviour of states, cannot be explained using a reductive analysis. Reductionism, for Waltz, does not explain why states behave in similar ways despite

their diverse political systems and contrasting ideologies. Instead one must look at the systemic constraints that are interposed between states and their foreign policy behaviour since these constraints are responsible for remarkable similarities in the foreign policies of different states (Linklater,1995:242).

Neo-realism argues that states are concerned with relative rather than absolute gains. Waltz (op.cit.) asserts: "states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They must not ask 'Will both of us gain?' but 'Who will gain more?' " (Waltz,1979:105). The states concern for relative gains is the product or constraint of the international environment in which they find themselves. A state would want to gain, militarily and economically, relatively more than another state in order to prevent itself from the dominance of that state. Now that states in southern Africa no longer pursue collective policies of mutual defence against apartheid, concerns of relative economic and political gains "will dominate regional economic development" and security co-operation (Hull,1996:46). An increase in trade wars between member states can, therefore, be expected in a post-apartheid era.

The days of apartheid destabilisation made it "logical and relatively easy for southern African states to embrace mutual defence" (Hull,1996:46). However, according to Adrian Prentice Hull (1996), behind this broad consensus on security interests, there lay substantial economic and political differences. "Now that the enemy has disappeared..... concerns about relative gains will dominate regional relations" (Hull,1996:46-7). Other writers have asked "now that the glue of the liberation struggle has come unstuck along with apartheid, what new challenges to the region can serve to bind these states together and keep them from drifting apart?" (Swatuk and Omari,1997:3)

The system or structure is a "set of constraining conditions" (Waltz in Powell,1994:316). States may be constrained by many things, for example the distribution of power, whether in terms of military technology or a states comparative and competitive advantage in the international economy. Certain constraints dominate international politics more than the others, during a certain period. For example, at the height of the Cold War, military power, as a constraint of the international system, determined security alliances and dominated inter-

state relations. However from the early 1970's, in the wake of the oil shocks, economic issues that were traditionally relegated to "the realm of 'low politics' " became increasingly influential in international relations" (Vale,1994:xviii). Therefore greater focus was being placed on economic power and economic relations as constraints imposed on states, by a changing international system. According to Joseph Nye (1990):

"In the traditional view, states gave priority to military security to ensure their survival. Today, however states must consider new dimensions of security. National security has become more complicated as threats shift from the military to the economic and ecological"

(Nye quoted in Rugumumu1993:4).

Robert Powell (1994) notes that Waltz tried to define a political structure so that it would show purely a positional picture. "The advantage of a positional picture is that many systems can be seen as similar regardless of the particular substantive context in which the units interact....Thus, firms facing a high risk of bankruptcy in an oligopolistic market may be seen to be in an anarchical, self-help system in much the same way that states facing a high risk of war in the international system, are in an anarchical, self-help system" (Powell,1994:317). International economic relations that dominate inter-state relations today, can also be viewed as anarchical and as the "management of conflict and cooperation in the absence of an international government. As with all international political interaction, economic interaction ranges from pure conflict when wealth is being pursued in the presence of scarce resources. Conflict can arise over the access to markets, the control of raw materials and the control of the means of production" (Spero,1992:10). Moreover if one accepts that the bi-polar world ensured greater stability in the world, then "neo-realism will remain central to analyses of long-term trends in international relations, if the stability of the last forty-five years is unlikely to be repeated in the next few decades" (Linklater,1995:246). Explanations for the behaviour of actors in the international arena must therefore be sought for, at the systemic level.

PLURALISM

The central objective of pluralism is to place greater emphasis on non-state actors in locating the causes of conflict and insecurity in the world. As a theory of international relations,

pluralism attempts to dislodge the nation-state as a primary and unitary actor. Pluralism argues that states must not seek security relative to other states, but should rather attain absolute security. In his critique of neo-realism, Robert Keohane (1989), argued that states which are trying to maximize their absolute gains, are states whose preferences "are based on their assessments of their own welfare, not that of others" (Keohane in Powell, 1994:335). In other words pluralism argues that states ought not to be concerned with another state's economic wealth or nuclear capabilities, because threats derived from intra-state conflict or by non-state actors like ethnic groups, are more of a threat to its people's security.

Pluralism is based on four assumptions. Firstly, this theory assumes that non-state actors are the primary referents in international relations. The interdependence of actors in the world, they argue, has allowed non-state actors such as multinational corporations (MNC's), the capabilities of "circumventing the authority of the state" (Viotti & Kaupi, 1993:7). The second assumption is that the state is not a unitary actor in international relations, but consists of individuals, ethnic groups, bureaucracies and MNC's. Pluralists stress that the interactions of these actors are not confined within a state, but are increasingly becoming transnational. Thirdly, pluralism challenges the state as a rational actor. Finally, this theory argues that the international agenda needs to be released from the dominance of military-security issues (Viotti & Kaupi, 1993:7-8). The pluralist theory of international politics has been advocated by the interdependence and transnational school.

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1989) in their pioneering work *Power and Interdependence*, raised a great deal of concern among students and practitioners of international politics over the "vagaries of economic interdependence.... Scholars of interdependence tend to focus on international economic relations and regularised patterns of cooperation" (Haglund & Hawes, 1990:153). Interdependence defined by Keohane and Nye simply means mutual dependence where dependence simply means external reliance. "Where there are reciprocal, ... not necessarily symmetrical, costly effects of transactions, there is interdependence" (Keohane & Nye, 1989). These theorists also stress the capabilities of 'international institutions' to achieve international cooperation.

The mutuality with which these authors and pluralism have viewed interdependence, is what Joan Spero (1992:11) has called the "Western system of interdependence". He argues that interdependence exists at a high level of mutual economic interaction among the developed economies of North America, Western Europe and Japan, whereas dependence is an asymmetrical relationship that is to be found in the 'North-South' system, "which is composed of.....disparity and inequality" (Spero,1992:13). Spero (op.cit.) notes that this dependence occurs when a 'Southern' country has a high level of economic interaction with a 'Northern' country in such a way that the national economy of the former is influenced by actors or events in the latter (Spero,1992:13). Pluralism and interdependency scholars have presented the mutual economic interaction of developed economies as a general phenomena of the world and as a result downplayed the asymmetrical nature of the 'North-South' divide that characterizes international relations today. This theory underscores the reality of an international (political economic) structure, which is governed by institutions like the IMF, WB, WTO and the UN, and is able to directly influence the national economies of the South.

The basic points of disagreement between these two theories, are the meaning and implications of anarchy, the problem of absolute and relative gains, and the dispute over cooperation and competition. And in essence the debate on relative and absolute gains are about a "state's utility function" and its role in international politics (Powell,1994:335). The assumptions pursued by these two theories, have influenced the current discourse and debate on security, in southern Africa and the rest of the world.

2.3 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO SECURITY IN THE 1990's: NEO-REALISM AND POSTMODERNISM.

The discourse on security, in the 1990's, has been influenced by two approaches outlined above. The two approaches agree that security must be broadened beyond the military conceptualisation to include political, societal, economic and environmental threats. However, similar to the theories of international politics, these approaches on security disagree on the primary referent and object of security. To the neo-realist it remains integral

to international security and world peace that states remain primary referents of security, whereas the postmodernist is determined that the state should be dislodged as a primary referent in conceptualising security.

THE NEO-REALIST APPROACH

The neo-realist approach to security has been advocated by a “structural realists” like Barry Buzan in his “seminal work” *People, States and Fear* (1991) (Booth,1994:3 & du Pisani, 1992:6). Rooted in the neo-realist theory, this approach forms “the most important and extensive re-examination of security from this perspective which attempts to get beyond the military focus..... Nevertheless while Buzan examines security from the perspectives of the individual, the state, as well as the international system, he concludes that the most important and effective provider of security is likely to remain the sovereign state” (Tickner,1995:185). His work critiqued the traditional approach and conceptualisation of security and attempted to transcend the pluralist approach to peace, as well as the realist fixation with power.

Buzan (op.cit) also refers to "the fate of human collectivities" as being the primary object or referent of security (Buzan,1991:20). He however maintains that the term 'human collectivities' means the citizens of a state. The state, as the representative institution of 'human collectivities', is therefore the principal referent of security. However societal security, can only "be placed alongside state security as a twin referent in the theory and practice of security - at least in Europe" (Booth,1994:3). For Buzan, 'strong states', "which he equates with Western democracies, can be successful security providers for all their citizens" (Tickner,1995:186).

This approach draws a lot from Kenneth Waltz's systemic conception of the causes of war and international politics. Buzan(1991) accordingly places emphasis on the international system as the source of structural explanations for the new security threats. He argues that since states are the dominant units in the international system that is anarchic (without a central government), security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity. A similar argument has been pursued by

Michael Mandelbaum (1988), in his work *The Fate of Nations*, where he argues that a state's security policy is determined in the first instance by the features of the international system, not the state itself. States, although with different domestic orders, have a similar security policy because they are positioned similarly in the international system (Mandelbaum, 1988: 2).

The neo-realist approach, however, does not mean that states should not seek co-operation with one another for ensuring greater security for themselves. Because new security threats (both military and non-military) are of a transnational nature, co-operation between member states cannot be avoided. A neo-realist, nevertheless, notes that such co-operation can only be institutionalised if the national interests of the participating members are considered, especially if they are 'weak' states. 'Weak' states according to Swatuk and Omari (1997:3), "inhibits the capacity to build a stronger region". States will therefore require a framework that accommodates the strengthening of individual states, while simultaneously co-operating with each other. Although these processes are not always compatible, neo-realists argue that a security regime, which involves co-operation and collaboration that is linked to and informed by what is in the best interest of individual states, is the most appropriate framework for security co-operation among states.

In discussing the state as a source of both threats to and security for individuals, Buzan (1991:38) maintains that citizens would ultimately have to decide from "the lesser of the two evils", that is to accept the threats that come from the state or to accept the threats that arise in the absence of the state. The assumption that whatever threats come from the state will be of a lower magnitude than those arising in its absence, Buzan (op.cit.) asserts, "grows as society develops around the state, becoming increasingly dependent on it as a lynchpin for social and economic structures" of security (Buzan, 1991:38). This author has noted that "in seeking security, state and society are sometimes in harmony with each other, sometimes opposed. Its bottom line is about survival" (Buzan, 1991:19). Security of individuals within the state is, inseparably entangled with that of the state. Such an approach adopts a maximal conception of a state which assumes the state to be "considerably more than just the sum of its parts and therefore has interests of its own....Here the argument is that the state acquires an independent

standing above its citizens because of the essential role it plays in the realisation of individual interests" (Buzan,1991:40).

Southern African states are weak "and trapped by its historical patterns of economic development and political power which leave them underdeveloped and politically penetrated, and therefore unable to muster the economic and political resources necessary to build a stronger state" (Buzan,1991:99). A secure regional community in southern Africa can only be established with stronger states and the proper institutions in place. But, stronger states can only be achieved with a maximal approach. Southern Africa requires therefore the functional role of the state in providing security for the people in the region.

The obvious tension between the individual and state levels of security, where civil society is not strong or well-developed and independent enough to act as watchdogs over states performance, as in the case of 'weak' southern African states, will only be worsened by focussing on the parts rather than the whole. A maximalist approach avoids the dangers of insecurity to one part arising from the provision of security to another. In the case of southern Africa, securing the interests of a small business community in South Africa, albeit they hold the capital for development, would undoubtedly lead to the insecurity of an impoverished majority.

THE POSTMODERNIST APPROACH

The second approach which has been called a critical and postmodernist approach also advocates a broadened conceptualisation of security that goes beyond a military fixation on threats. However the post-modernists stress quite explicitly that the state must be dislodged as the primary referent and encompass instead individual human beings, ethnic and kinship groups, nations and the entire global community of humankind (Booth,1994:4). Ultimately it is the "security of the individual that takes precedence over the security of the state" (Tickner,1995:188).

Postmodernism's primary focus is not the state or state security, but on human security (Carim,1996:13). Ken Booth (1994) in expanding the concept security, horizontally and vertically, has argued that human security is ultimately more important than state security. Conceiving security vertically and as a level-of-analysis problem, this author maintains that individual and global security raises a wider set of issues than state security which traditionally involved exclusively military issues (Booth,1994:4).

In Booth's view, states and implicitly governments must no longer be the primary referents of security since "as the guardians of 'their' peoples' security", governments have instead become the primary source of insecurity for the many people who live under their sovereignty, and "not the armed forces of a neighbouring country" (Booth,1994:5). In the horizontal direction of the expansion, Booth(1994) adopted Buzan's categorisation a wider agenda in terms of five sectors: political, economic, societal, environmental as well as military. A widened approach must, therefore, include non-military threats to security such as "democracy, economic development and environmental degradation in addition to its military focus" (Carim,1995:54).

Although, he admits that the focus and theoretical reflection on non-military threats and non-state relations remains embryonic and underdeveloped, Xavier Carim(1995:54), nevertheless maintains that current discourses in security studies advocated by the postmodernist school aim at challenging conventional conceptions. Security, for the postmodernist, must be defined in broad terms to include "deepening democratic participation and the honouring of human rights, promoting social and economic development, and encouraging policies that promote environmental sustainability" (Carim,1996:53). To use Carim's words:

"The contemporary period has witnessed a phenomenal growth in global interdependence, an erosion of state sovereignty, rapid advances in communications and technological innovation, profound ecological degradation, massive population growth, internationalisation of the global economy and growing scope of non-state actors in world affairs. Simply put, long-standing patterns of global interaction have transformed and new ways of identifying threats and understanding potential sources of conflict have become imperative ". Carim,1995:56

The traditional orthodoxy of conceptualising security, for the postmodernist, was based on "a

simplified narrative of a particular and inviolable interpretation of state sovereignty and international anarchy which were presented as fixed, unchanging and ahistorical givens in the global system", (Carim,1995:55). Postmodernism is based on the pluralist assumptions of international politics and in contrast to the neo-realist, "see reality in a state of perpetual flux of movement, change and instability" that defy structural constraints. (Solomon,1996:6). Postmodernists, have accordingly, focused on the political and economic interests of human actors, rather than the state system or structure, to explain changes in the global system (Carim,1995:58).

Such an approach has a minimal conception of the state as an agent of security. In this regard the state is no more than the sum of its parts and as such "leads to an interpretation of national security which places great emphasis on values derived from the interests of individual citizens" (Buzan,1991:39). This view to security, subsequently challenges the state as an effective and adequate provider of security, "in an increasingly interdependent world, where weapons of mass destruction threaten both victors and vanquished alike,..." (Tickner,1995:186).

In keeping with their belief that the state can be dislodged as a referent of security, the postmodernist argues that a security community is the most appropriate framework for the institutionalisation of security at the regional level. While the members of a security community remain separate entities and their co-operation accommodates issues of national security, the overriding concern is a belief that the security of the region is indivisible and of primary concern. The primary referent of security in this case is the region (within the broader definition of security), and not the state.

AN EVALUATION OF THESE APPROACHES FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA.

Buzan's state-centric approach within a broadened outlook to security is useful for southern Africa in as far as the approach argues that state is a vital unit for the security of its citizens. This argument introduces the concepts of 'strong' and 'weak' states to show that "the creation of stronger states is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for improved individual and

national security" (Buzan,1991:106). In other words the existence of 'strong' states would not, by itself, guarantee security but its absence would certainly sustain insecurity. However Buzan (op.cit.), draws a distinction between 'weak' and 'strong' states on one hand and 'weak' and 'strong' powers on the other.³ Southern Africa, in this sense, is made up of weak states and powers. For Buzan (op.cit.), security at the international and national or any other level, can only be attained once the anarchy of the international system has 'matured'. "A mature anarchy must be composed of 'strong' states that are well ordered and stable within themselves, to generate strong common norms for the system as a whole"(Buzan,1992:176).

What Buzan does not make clear, is how weak powers and states can become strong. Moreover, he argues that the relationship or interaction between powers and states are minimal. However strong 'states' in the present world order are also strong 'powers'. In other words strong socio-political cohesions have been the result of strong powers with the necessary economic power. Buzan (1991:98-99), acknowledges that almost all weak states are found in the Third World, were they find themselves trapped by historical patterns of economic development and political power which leave them underdeveloped and therefore unable to muster the economic and political resources necessary to build a stronger state .

However, as J. Ann Tickner has correctly observed, Buzan "claims that the integrative features of an increasingly interdependent international market economy would contribute to movement towards a mature anarchy with its promise of greater international security" (Tickner,1995:185). This would be problematic for peripheral states like those in southern Africa, which are not only trapped by historical patterns of development, but more crucially, whose economic security is vulnerable to market forces in an integrated or 'globalised' 'world economy (see chapter two).

Although as Richard Falk has pointed out, the new threats to security which defy boundaries,

³States in this case refer to the degree of socio-political cohesion, while *powers* refer to the traditional distinction among states in respect of their military and economic capability in relation to each other.

⁴Globalisation as defined by this thesis relates to the rapid mobility of capital and information across borders together with an increase in economic liberalisation and opened markets.

cannot be solved by one state alone, he has also correctly observed that the uneven development fostered by an hierarchical international system of states and a global capitalist economy, has contributed to an intolerable situation where the security of the rich seems to be increasingly diminishing, the security of the poor (Falk in Tickner,1995:189). Accepting Falk's argument, it is clear that Buzan (op.cit.) assumes an 'integrated' world economy to have mutual gains for 'weak' and 'strong' states, alike. It is at this juncture that the Modern World System(MWS) theory is useful, when it asserts that an integrated world economy "extracts economic surplus and transfers wealth from the dependent periphery to imperial centers" (Gilpin,1987:71).

Robert Gilpin (1987) argued that the placement of a state in the international division of labour, defined by the MWS theory as between core, semi-periphery and periphery, determines whether a state is " 'hard' or 'soft'. Whereas the former is able to resist external market forces, channel them to its own advantage, and can effectively manage its own economy, the latter is pliable, at the mercy of external market forces and cannot control its own economic affairs" (Gilpin,1987:71). Southern African states being 'soft' and peripheral, by Gilpin's (op.cit.) definition, would not find an 'integrated' world economy, being beneficial for their economic development and security. In other words the uneven development by the world capitalist economy, are structural constraints on the achievement of security for the poorest states and individuals. In this sense southern African states would never become 'strong' or 'hard' to form part of, what Buzan (op.cit.) calls, a 'mature' anarchy.

Nevertheless Buzan has moved beyond the traditional realist fixation of security with military power. In defining the term density to describe the interference that people's activities will have on the existence of others, Buzan (1991:152-3) argues that the present "natural pressure of rising density is away from the military security-driven imperative of 'look after yourself!', and towards the more economic imperative: 'specialize!' ". In this regard Buzan's state-centric or maximal conceptualisation of security is useful to show the need for a functional and interventionist state in addressing the security concerns of people in a region with 'weak' states, like that in southern Africa.

The distinction between pluralism and postmodernist is that the latter theory regards the assumptions made by the former, as proven and existent. Postmodernists subsequently, argue that the primary referent of security must be broadened to include a wide range of non-state actors, such as individuals, ethnic and cultural groups, regional economic blocs, (MNC's), international nongovernmental organisations (INGO's), and the entire humankind. It is argued in this regard that "the geopolitics of the Cold War has rapidly been replaced by many old unresolved problems: the resurgence of traditional, religious, national and ethnic disputes" (Carim,1995:56). Proponents of this approach have accordingly argued, that the neo-realist reduction of "global politics to the incessant, anarchical power struggle among states and 'rational' interstate activity to the single utilitarian pursuit of self-interest", has become irrelevant in a vastly interdependent world (Solomon,1996:9).

It is clear, in the context of the dramatic global changes, postmodernists assert, that national sovereignty is unravelling and states are proving less and less capable of performing their traditional tasks. For example, Carim (1995:59), argues that global factors increasingly impinge on government decisions and undermine their capacity to control either external or domestic politics and "if state sovereignty has not actually ended, it is under severe challenge". Consequently the logical alternative to modern states as units, for Booth (1991:14), is the defusion of power away from the states to local communities to cater for cultural diversity, for example, wider problems of economics could effectively be dealt with at the regional level. A broadened approach to security for the postmodernist must reveal, essentially, the non-militaristic nature of threats and confirm that "security is essentially for people and needs, therefore, to be divorced from the monopoly of the state" (du Pisani,1992: 8).

The broadening of the primary referents to security will be problematic in its operationalisation. The focus on the security of constituent parts, rather than the whole, overlooks the situation where the security of one part can lead to the insecurity of another, or the whole itself. If individuals are made the primary referent of security, distinctions of race, class, political affiliation, ethnicity or religious domination; will undoubtedly surface to inhibit the operationalisation of security for the greater 'human collectivity'. Clearly the security of the

rich means the continued insecurity of the poor, or the security of the Zulu and Afrikaner in the attainment of a 'Kingdom' or 'Volkstaat', could mean secessionism and to the detriment, of not only a unified South Africa, but also, for the creation of a more homogeneous regional (security) community. This would only reinforce the boundary distinctions between Us and Them, citizen and foreigner, Zulu and South African. With a result the postmodernist argument that "anarchy presented, by the (neo)realists, as part and parcel of a binary or dichotomous conceptions of identity formation - Us/Them - based on claims of political community 'inside' and anarchy 'outside' ", would actually be intensified (Carim,1995:58). Therefore securing a certain class, ethnic or religious group of individuals, reverts to the dilemma which the postmodernists seek to get rid off, themselves.

For the postmodernists, anarchy of the international system should no longer dominate security policies, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The demise of the Cold War has indeed ended the East-West conflict, but the world is far from stable. As an assessment of the world today, John Garnett wrote:

"The events of 1989 may have signalled a shift in the balance of power, but there was never any possibility that this would bring about a transformation in international politics. The last decade of the century is, in essentials, no different from any of the decades which preceded it. We still live in a ungoverned world of states which recognise no authority above themselves and whose conduct is minimally constrained by considerations of law and morality. We still live in a world where ordinary people, in both developed and developing worlds have not experienced a quantum improvement in their living conditions and are condemned to live their lives in abject poverty" (Garnett,1996:2).

Although the end to ideological rivalry has reduced the possibilities of inter-state military conflict, the world has not experienced a reduction in its 'North-South' divide. With a result the international economy is in one sense the main component and in another the main consequence of the rising density and interdependence of the international system. In other words the international system remains dominated by powerful states where the traditional balance of power is no longer glued to a military focus, but has instead shifted to economic dimensions of power. States will, therefore, have to integrate into an international economy that is "penetrated by state structures and dynamics of power" (Buzan,1992:232). Anarchy, in the post-Cold War era, must be located in the relationship between the international economy and the state structure.

Furthermore, Booth's (1994) conceptualisation of an alternative to the state is actually not an alternative, but rather a different form of state. His alternative would create more states and not really move beyond the characteristics of the nation-state, unlike Richard Rosecrance's (1996) conceptualisation of a 'virtual state'. The postmodernist argument of a declining role of the state in international and southern African security, has also been founded on pluralist assumptions of non-state actors commanding greater power; the concepts national interest and sovereignty being withered away by the increasing levels of interdependence and integration; and global communications and culture, eroding state boundaries (Solomon,1996 :14-19).

Postmodernists have very often stressed the power of non-state actors such as MNC's, crime syndicates and NGO's to operate beyond the control of the state. This however, should not be taken to be a general phenomena of all states, nor should it be construed as an end to state sovereignty. Clearly, weak states would be more easily overpowered by these non-state actors, than strong states. But non-state actors throughout history have always co-existed with states. At times the power of non-state actors were predominant and at other times the power of the state was predominant. The predominance of the power of non-state actors, however did not mean a the death of a state.⁵

It has, likewise been argued that MNC's have no state attachment to and operate beyond the control of, any state. Firstly this implies that the MNC's function independent of their home-country. However, some writers have argued that the earliest MNC's such as the Dutch East India Company and English East India Company, operated to enhance the power of the respective states (Solomon,1996:15). Howard Perlmutter (1969:35), argued that the degree of multinationality of an enterprise is positively related to the firms long-term viability. A MNC will retain its home-country identity, in the need to be protected from outside interference⁶.

⁵For example in a recent article, *Police can't cope with organised crime*, by Gustav Thiel, Mark Shaw of the Institute for Security Studies, in commenting on the 700 organised crime syndicates operating in and around South Africa, argued that the "weaker the state becomes over time, it is more likely that criminal organisations will form competing points of power which will be difficult to displace" (Mail & Guardian, October 24,1997:8).

⁶For instance a MNC would rely on its home country or state to impose trade sanctions and other measures if it need be, on the host-country; if the latter endangers its operations. The recent example of the US suspending

The second assumption that MNC's operate increasing beyond the control of national governments and the state, ignores the process of liberalisation in the world economy and new rules that govern world trade and integration into the world economy. The addition of new rules like the Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIM's), allows MNC's the privilege of access to any economic sector of the host country, stipulates the removal of any discriminatory legislation against foreign firms, and caters for full profit repatriation by the MNC's (Gumende,1996: 27). Therefore the power and mobility of MNC's are not only derived from advances in technology, but moreover have been the result of economic liberalisation that is driven by the advanced capitalist countries (ACC's). Martin Wolf (1997:13) argued that the revolutionary advances in technology "makes globalisation feasible, but it is liberalisation that makes it happen". It is, therefore, the MNC's of Advanced Capitalist Countries (ACC's) that are able to operate beyond the control of 'soft', dependent and 'weak', peripheral states, precisely because of rules created by the former to guarantee uninhibited access to the latter's economy.

Postmodernists also argue that global interdependence and regional integration undermine the sovereignty of the state. The pluralist interpretation of interdependent relations as mutual and its implications have been dealt with above. What needs to be repeated is that the postmodernism adopts this conceptualisation and "invariably attempts to show it occurring in an harmonious and equitable manner" (Solomon,1996:17). Clearly this is not the case, at least not in southern Africa. It would be wrong to assume that South Africa is dependent on Lesotho, as the latter is on the former, given the simple fact that South Africa's, GNP, in 1993, was almost four times that of the other eleven states in the region, combined (Leistner,1995:1). For Hussein Solomon, postmodernism ignores the "reality that states will co-operate with each other because it is in their national interest to do so, and where such co-operation comes into conflict with the interest of the state, it would cease" (Solomon,1996

China's Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status for the violation of copyrights and patents, is an example that comes to mind. Moreover as Gilpin (1979:70) has argued, transnational actors have been able to play an important role in world affairs because it has been consistent with the interests of the predominant powers for them to do so. It would be rash anyway to detach national labels from MNC's. After all the British state was protecting the interests of Royal-Dutch Shell when its government failed to impose sanctions on the Nigerian military junta for the execution of the Ogoni-Land activists.

:17). Regional integration cannot be assumed to be an harmonious process or even a process that has reached completion anywhere in the world.

In southern Africa, evidence of the above point can be found when the trade protocol that was put up for ratification in the 1997 SADC economic summit, had been only ratified by two member states, Mauritius and Tanzania. And although South Africa has been often accused of being the most protectionist member and hence not willing to commit itself to any free trade agreement, "the biggest culprit is in fact Mauritius" (Wackernagel,1997:39). This shows that co-operation and integration will not be as harmonious as the postmodernists would want us to believe. The 1995 Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the SADC assumed, as Solomon(1997) has noted, that free movement of people in the region would result in the "interdependence and integration of our national economies for the harmonious, balanced and equitable development of the region" (Quotation of Draft Protocol in Solomon,1997:2). However it had to be retracted and replaced in 1997 by a Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the SADC, after it became evident that free movement of people in southern Africa would not benefit the developed, nor the least developed states in the region.⁷ Regional integration cannot, therefore, be assumed to be an harmonious process. Neither does regional integration displace the state in any positive way.

2.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented a theoretical analysis of two different approaches to security in southern Africa, and in doing so highlighted the controversy and difficulty in implementing a broadened conceptualisation of security. The central premise is therefore based on a neo-realist framework of a continued emphasis on state security. In the medium term southern Africa does not require a security community, but rather a security regime, since southern African states are too 'weak' and 'soft' to form a community. Maxi van Aardt (1997) has noted

⁷ The great flows of unskilled labour into South Africa began to pose a threat for local employment, since such migrants work long hours for little or no remuneration and moreover become resistant to unionisation because of their illegal status. The influx of migrants has, in addition, been associated with the spread of diseases such as Aids, and the flourishing of crime syndicates. Indeed the lifting of controls in SADC would open the floodgates to criminals and boost the illicit activities of drug trafficking and arms smuggling in the region (Solomon,1997:2-3).

that a security regime in essence involves co-operation and collaboration that is limited to and informed by what is in the best interest of the individual states whereas a security community presents a much more radical change in the way in which states relate to each other, because there is a sense of mutuality and sharing, that implies a vast difference from the way in which the traditional Westphalian state system operates or has operated (van Aardt,1997:4-11).

Southern African states do not display characteristics of moving beyond a Westphalian state system. Those who advocate the building of a security community are inclined towards the postmodernist approach to security and foresee the decline of the nation-state. Moreover the alternatives to the nation-state that are presented, like that of Booth's, cannot be implemented in the region. To charge the citizens and local communities with the normal state functions would require a strong civil society. As Nancy Thede(1993) has noted, in all countries of the region, civil society is extremely weak. Even South Africa, she adds, the country with the most diversified civil society remains weak (Thede,1993:7). In dislodging the state as the prime referent of security in southern Africa, the space created for the role of a civil society would, therefore, not be filled.

To conclude, both approaches to southern African security, in the 1990's, regard people as the end of security. However, they have disagreed fundamentally on the means to attaining such security. The postmodernist approach which maintains that non-state actors are the best means to achieving security, has been shown to be unimplementable for the region. Surely, "it is only academic to conceive of rudimentary security and development without strong, legitimate states" (du Pisani,1992:13). Consequently, in the context of southern Africa's 'soft states', strengthening the state, is a necessary pre-condition the institutionalisation of peace and security (du Pisani,op.cit). Southern African members will therefore require the interventionist role of the state to build the institutional capacity to manage the non-traditional threats to the region's security.

As an institutional component, (economic) development will have to be on top of the agenda, since development and security are the "two sides of the same coin" (Mandaza,1995:29). Such development, for a resolution to new security threats, cannot be accomplished by

non-state actors, alone or with only the minimum intervention of the state. Southern Africa is in such a situation where the state needs to be retained as a prime referent to be an effective means for its peoples' security.

CHAPTER THREE: NEW CONSTRAINTS FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA'S SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD ENVIRONMENT.

“Political power and wealth creation have been intimately intertwined throughout history of the modern international system. As we enter the next millennium, the relationship between power and wealth would be further reinforced as nations compete to manipulate science and technology for economic development”
(Underhill in Edoho,1997:100)

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The demise of the Soviet Union put an end to a dual world economic system, leaving no alternative but to integrate into a capitalist world economy that is becoming vastly liberalised. The termination of the Cold War, also resulted in the collapse of centrally planned and controlled economies. Consequently, the market-based economy stands as a dominant and sole model for economic practice, throughout the globe (Buzan,1991:24). In the absence of superpower rivalry and an alternative economic system, the international capitalist economy is able, therefore, to liberalise with even greater ease and speed. This coupled with the increase mobility of capital and information, is the phenomena termed as ‘globalisation’.

The epochal shift in capital accumulation, caused by technological revolutions within the service industry, is not a new phenomena. It is the tools and means used for such accumulation that are new. In other words the use of information technology in the expansion of finance and advanced corporate services as a key feature of globalisation, "was not simply a matter of raising profits and lowering costs, as with many manufacturing industries, but reducing the regulatory role of the state" (Sassen,1996:42). The use of information technology, in this sense has certainly become an advanced and unprecedented means, in attempts to transcend beyond the control of the state, for the global expansion and accumulation of capital. In short, the hypermobility of capital and information aim to escape the need for states to ensure a liberalised and free trade environment, like was the case for industrial and monopoly capital. This has however yet to be achieved, since liberalisation, the motor force behind economic globalisation, remains state driven.

3.2 A CHANGING WORLD ORDER AND IT'S IMPACT ON THE ROLE OF THE STATE.

To understand what is being called globalisation and its impact on the world, one would have to start by examining key features in the explanations of this term. The key issue within the globalisation discourse that is central to the debate between those, like Martin Wolf (1997), who see globalisation as great event and those, like Antonio Gumende (1996), who view globalisation as breeding inequality and poverty, is the regulatory role of the state. In defining what governments can and should do, globalisation is often explained in terms of its ability to push the sovereignty of the nation-state to its limits. In the new world order, in which the international economy is rapidly changing, economics, however has become the arena in which states seek to maximise power and achieve security for survival into the next millennium. According to James Mittelman (1996), 'globalisation' is crucial in understanding the international political economy, for it directs attention to fundamental changes under way in the post-Cold War era, some of which include the: spatial reorganisation of production, the interpenetration of industries across borders, the spread of financial markets and the diffusion of identical consumer goods to distant countries (Mittelman,1996:2).

Michael Tanzer (1995) has noted that in its common usage, globalisation refers to the explosive growth in the past twenty-five years of huge multinational corporations and vast pools of capital that have crossed national borders which has largely been due to a parallel technological explosion in computerisation, telecommunications and rapid transportation (Tanzer,1995:1). Although it would be appropriate to understand globalisation as an all-encompassing concept with political, economic, social and environmental dimensions, gathering from the above explanations, it has nevertheless been considered largely an economic phenomenon. As a 'new' term, 'globalisation', therefore, does not enjoy the levels of conceptualisation like power in the international relations discourse, nor has its frequent usage "provided a basis for an overall theory...."(Cardoso,1996:1) Nevertheless, as with all other explanations of the economic dimensions of 'globalisation', the central feature is that of the declining (and) regulatory role of the state.

Writers, who have “defended globalisation with determination and passion” attempt to separate economics from politics (Lehulere,1997:23). This conceptualisation of globalisation has been imbued with economic liberalisation and the pluralist notions of interdependency, integration and transnationalisation. The above explanations have placed all emphasis on the economic dimension of globalisation and negated the politics of this phenomena. This meaning that the hypermobility and transnational aspects have been glorified by detaching politics from economics. Put differently, these writers, in their passionate defenses of globalisation overlook the role of the state in implementing the new global economic system and in producing the new legal forms that contribute to the operation and functioning of such a system. Many of the global processes materialise under various state-centred regulatory umbrellas like the World Trade Organisation(WTO), the IMF and the World Bank (WB), which are driven by ‘core’⁸ states’ economic interests. We cannot, therefore, take the existence of a global economic system has being divorced from the political conditions and inter-state structure that produces economic globalisation.

Robert Cox (1996:27)has argued that states and intergovernmental organisations play a role in enforcing the rules of the global economy and in enhancing international competitiveness, whilst shielding their domestic economies from the negative effects of globalisation. For Cox, globalisation and the ability for "capital to choose the most propitious sites in which to locate diverse phases of a geographically disseminated production process, taking account of labour costs, environmental regulations, fiscal incentives, lowest taxes and political stability", is also due to its ideology (Cox,1996:23). But for Cox, the ideology behind the growing need for national and international deregulation in trade and finance, is the inevitable culmination of the powerful tendencies of the market and not an ideological force driven by the interests of ‘core’ states.

In actuality it has been the revolutionary advances in technology that have made the market powerful, especially in the finance and corporate services, and globalisation 'feasible', but it has been "liberalisation that makes it happen" (Wolf,1997:13). Liberalisation, however, is not

⁸Core’ state refer to the Advanced Industrialised Countries (AIC’s), otherwise known as the ‘North’.

a process dictated by market forces, unlike the Cox's ideology of globalisation, but rather the ideology of dominant state actors in fostering a freer movement of their national capital, globally. "Globalisation does not occur in a political vacuum. Economic liberalisation,....are conscious political decisions" (Edoho,1997:5). It is this political element of globalisation that is ignored in pluralist explanations of the term.

An explanation of liberalisation as an organising ideology of the world economy, would necessitate an historical contextualisation as well as a theoretical outline. Liberalism emerged as a reaction to the protective nature of the mercantilist and the unproductive results of merchant capital. Kay (1975) has noted that merchants did not revolutionise production, but instead reaped higher profits through unequal exchange and intensive control of the markets. With the advent of industrial capital, merchant capital was doubly jeopardised, "for not only did it find itself losing profits to industrial capital, but as capital it was driven by its very nature to accumulate and this meant not merely maintaining profits", but actually increasing them by allowing capital to revolutionise production. As a result the monopolistic privileges of merchant capital were attacked and destroyed by a free trade order mounted by British industrial capital (Kay,1975:97-123).

There was a need for industrial capital, therefore, to again free access to foreign markets. Liberals have pointed out that Britain surpassed its rivals after 1848 because it adopted the policy of free trade. Economic nationalists, on the other hand, have rejected this claim noting that Britain adopted free trade only after its industries had been allowed to develop under protectionist policies (Gilpin,1987:184). Needless to say that free trade and liberal economics were abandoned during years leading to outbreak of the first world war and into the inter-war period where countries reverted to intensive industrial rivalry and protectionist policies. Liberalisation and free trade had, therefore, emerged during a time when Britain, the dominant power and core economy, required the freedom for international expansion and accumulation, for its industrial capital.

The post-war world economy was also liberal in intent. A major reason for the resurgence of liberalisation and free trade, was once again commanded by the need for capital from the

dominant or hegemonic power and 'core' economy to gain free access to foreign markets for its accumulation and expansion. The difference was that this time it was the US driving the liberalisation of the world economy to gain free entry into foreign markets for its, monopoly capital. The US's hegemonic control of the world economy was seen in the establishment of multi-lateral organisations like the stillborn International Trade Organisation (ITO), the IMF, the WB and the United Nations, "that were geared to establishing an international monetary system which would promote free trade", and avert the economic rivalry and the 'beggar thy neighbour' policies, of the inter-war period (Mckinlay,1995:31).

However the destruction to Europe, meant that the much needed reconstruction after the war, take also the form of economic protectionism. This resulted in the failure and the subsequent abandonment of the ITO for a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt) and, as some writers have seen it, the collapse of these Bretton Woods institutions in the early 1970's (Hirst & Thompson,1996:5). But by the late 1970's and early 1980's the policies of relative state autonomy and protection were once again challenged "with the rise of the Reagan-Thatcher regime.... governments found themselves in an ideology that proclaimed the necessity of state subordination to the requirements of capital accumulation and markets" (Panitch,1996:83-84).

At present the world economy is greatly driven by the trade in services. Since the 'North' and the 'core' states have monopolised the service industry, they require access to foreign markets for the consumption of these services, to generate and expand their service capital. Economic liberalisation, as a constraint and condition of contemporary international relations, is being advanced by the economic interests of the 'core' states to create a safer access for their new tools of capital accumulation. The point being made here is that liberalisation is not a new phenomena and ideology in governing the world economy. This is not to argue that globalisation is nothing new. Unlike Hirst and Thompson (1996:8) who argue that globalisation is a 'myth', this section contends that it is a feature of reality in the 1990's. What is new are the state(s) that are championing this ideological structuring of the world economy and the tools that are used to secure their domination of the global market.

Indeed there has been dramatic advances in information technology, communications and transport which have resulted in the rapid mobility of capital and information, allowing for a boom in information industries and international financial and corporate services. As Richard Rosecrance (1996), has noted service industries like media, finance and telecommunications have become increasingly important in the world economy (Rosecrance,1996:53). In fact services have grown to displace manufacturing as the basis of export-led growth. The present wave of economic liberalisation is, therefore, being advanced by the economic interests of the 'North'.

This had created a shift in the international division of labour where the advanced industrialised countries of the North have moved their labour-intensive manufacturing to low-wage countries (especially the Asian-pacific region). What now looms in the place of this economic sector, is an upheaval in services. Such an epochal shift in capital accumulation has led to some writers arguing that globalisation is a result of the dispersal of economic activities across national boundaries, "shrinking international space by linking tightly national economies and rendering their borders porous as trade, services, people, values, ideas, and technologies flow across them with relative ease and unrelenting intensity" (Edoho,1997:4).

This approach has been well illustrated in Kenichi Ohmae's (1995), *The End of the Nation State*, where the author argues that the global economy in the post-Cold War era, is driven by the rapid mobility of '4 i's': investments, information, industry and individuals which flow unimpeded across national borders. In Ohmae's view the nation state is becoming, if not already is, a dysfunctional, irrelevant and incapable unit in controlling or managing its economic activities. Nation states do not provide the best 'port of access' to the global economy and where the '4 i's' are not dependent on governments to attract resources, the middleman function of the nation-state has become redundant (Ohmae,1995:2-6).

A similar explanation of globalisation has been forwarded by Barnet and Cavanagh (1994), in their work *Global Dreams*. These authors have explained globalisation as the growing ability of MNC's or 'global corporations' to be mobile and transnational in their production systems. They assert that global corporations have come to integrate and intertwine national economies

with '4 webs' of economic activity: the *global cultural bazaar*, the *global shopping mall*, the *global workplace* and the *global financial network* (Barnet & Cavanagh,1994:2). This has resulted, according to the authors, in the decline of the modern nation-state and its ability to control the activities of MNC's and other forces of the market.

However it is not possible for all products and commodities or services to be dispatched anywhere in the world uninhibited by the state. As Robert Samuelson(1997) has correctly pointed out, "it is only services that can be digitized and transmitted, such as banking services, which can be produced and sold anywhere in the world" (Samuelson,1997:20). It is not, therefore, just the advances in technology that makes globalisation happen. It is actually the liberalisation of the domestic economies, which has not only become a key requirement for integration into a changing world economy, but is driving, moreover, the need for service economies and their finance capital to freely lock into foreign markets for further expansion and continued accumulation. This has been witnessed by the addition of trade in services, trade related investment measures and intellectual property rights onto the GATT at the Uruguay Round of talks, and more recently the push by the European Commission to introduce the Multilateral Investment Agreement(MIA) in the WTO (Gumende,1996:27). "It is clear that the Uruguay Round has primarily focused on the need to rationalise trade in goods and services in accordance with the new imperatives of globalisation" (Mhone,1994 :34).

To demonstrate how globalisation affects the role and function of the state, liberalisation would need to be examined at a theoretical level. Embedded in the writings of Adam Smith, liberalism maintains that only a strict separation of politics from economics can allow the productive capacity of capital to materialise. This ideology argued that a market economy free from the parasitic control of the state is crucial for the achievement of economic growth, welfare, security and even ultimate power of a state in the world economic system (Gilpin, 1987:29). According to Kidane Mengisteab (1995), the liberalisation school views state intervention as self-serving and inefficient. Proponents of this school, he adds, advocate the curtailment of the role of the state and the expansion of the market mechanism. More specifically this meant, in this author's words:

"the reduction of public expenditures, elimination of subsidies, privatization of publicly owned enterprises and decontrolling prices, interest rates and imports. Sponsored by the IMF, the WB and the industrial powers led by the US, liberalisation has now become the dominant ideology on the basis of which much of North-South economic interaction takes place" (Mengisteab,1995:164)

As noted the inclusion of Trade Related Investment Measure's (TRIM's) under the Uruguay Round of talks, is a vivid illustration of the determination by the advanced service economies to be guaranteed free and safe entry and movement in foreign markets. Guy Mhone (1994) noted that the TRIM agreement attempts to forbid domestic restrictions or conditionalities on foreign investment, restrictions with regard to access to foreign exchange and in many ways, complements the liberalisation conditionalities related to capital movements and foreign investment generally embodied under structural adjustment programmes of the IMF and WB.

In short, the "TRIM Agreement constitutes another measure contributing to undermining national sovereignty in the South" (Mhone,1994:38). This would be an obstacle for those in the South that want to pursue a more cautious, managed and controlled approach to attracting investment. Similarly if the Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA) is adopted within the WTO rules, it would mean free access by foreign companies to any economic sector of the host country, the removal of any discriminatory legislation against foreign firms and full guarantee of profit repatriation. The MIA argues that the new regime would remove a host of barriers that prevent foreign investors to enter the host country freely. In the words of Antonio Gumende:

"For developing countries, the treaty would have the effect of removing the right of governments to determine the form and type of investment that fits into development priorities of any given country, a requirement that would have far reaching consequences. Some call it colonialism through globalisation" (Gumende,1996:27).

Economic liberalism implies that all types of intervention are harmful to economic development and ignores the important types of intervention and functions that can be fulfilled by governments. Robert Gilpin (1996:411), argues that the world economic evolution is presently marked by an "intensification of international competition, the rapid expansion of international trade and the accelerating shift in comparative advantage, to introduce a Malthusian '*survival of the fittest*' element in global economic affairs" (Gilpin,1996:411). However, Gilpin argues that the "economic success or evolutionary

fitness” entails far more than the strategy or structure of individual enterprises or market forces. “Economic success or *fitness* involves the strategy and structure of the overall national economy” (Gilpin,1996:412).

For this writer “national economies” and states are “better able” to develop and implement “an innovative response and strategy for the adaptation to environmental change”, than the market can create (Gilpin,1996:413). The role of the state in the economy is primarily determined by whether a state is 'strong' or 'weak'. A strong state is depicted by its 'minimal' role and the "welfare of the consumer and the autonomy of the market", whereas a weak state requires the regulatory and facilitating role of a 'maximal' state (Gilpin,1996:415). States are nevertheless needed for the required “planned coordination among economic activities for a more favourable capitalist organisation” of the world economy (Gilpin,1996:413).

Mengisteab(1995), asserts that states in the developing world generally face more compelling reasons to intervene in the economy than states in the industrialised market economies. According to this author there are various reasons for intervention. Some of which include: weak linkages between a large peasant sector and the small modern sector, the inability of the private sector to generate sufficient capital that is essential for national development, and the difficult international competition they face as newcomers to industrialisation (Mengisteab, 1995:165).

The role of the state in facilitating economic growth within the Newly Industrialised Countries (NIC's), has also been acknowledged by those for and against state intervention. Krugman (1995) argues that state intervention within the NIC's played a crucial function in identifying a dynamic economic niche in the international division of labour, directing investment to move towards this niche and promoting necessary technological innovation (Krugman,1995:144). Even the WB, a major proponent of liberalisation, acknowledged that state intervention among the Asian Tigers promoted economic development. This was part of the WB's 'revisionist' views on the role of the state, which was released in their 1993 report titled *The East Asian Miracle: Economic growth and public policy* (Mhone,1993:50). While the report demonstrated the interaction between market-based and state-led policies, it was,

nevertheless "at pains to persuade us that the East Asian experience is either too complex and demanding to replicate or even attempt, or, because of the high risk that the interventions entail, 'makes them unsustainable for adaptation in parts of Africa....., where activist government in the economy has often gone awry' " (Mhone,1993:51). However the importance of the WB's revisionist outlook, was that the East Asian experience confirmed that "an underdeveloped country cannot initiate economic transformation solely on the basis of laissez-faire market oriented policies (Mhone,1993:51). This suggests that the liberal dichotomy and trade-offs of market versus state, are artificial and unhelpful.

'Globalisation' and the deregulation of finance where firms operate uninhibited across territorial demarcations, does not mean the end of the functional role of the state. Firms, MNC's and global corporations "need to ensure the functions traditionally exercised by the state in the national realm of the economy - notably guaranteeing property rights and contracts" (Sassen,1996:42). In addition to this Leo Panitch (1996) has argued that the duties of standardising currency, ensuring the availability of key inputs like labour, land, finance, technology and providing the conditions for production, would have to be taken over by the force that can extend itself beyond the territorial boundaries of a state (Panitch,1996:86). A central issue of the discourse on 'globalisation' as nevertheless been the creation of such a force at the regional level - a regional (economic) state or community. However such a force has been, throughout the years, thwarted by states' national interests. Surrendering autonomy and power to regional force would not be in the interests of 'weak' states, especially where this force would mean domination by stronger states. Multilateral institutions like regional blocs, have not reached a level that displaces a state completely from its functional position.

Indeed, we are presently, witnessing the restructuring of the state in its adaptation to globalisation. The role of the state is complex and such complexity has been severely intensified in an era of globalisation. But far from the implications of Ohmae's conceptualisation as the total decline of the nation-state, 'globalisation' and government deregulation have not meant "the absence of regulatory regimes and institutions for the governance of international economic relations" (Sassen,1996:43). The boundaries within which the market operates are after all defined and determined by multilateral fora, like the

WTO, which is driven by powerful and strong states' interests. 'Globalisation' has not brought a total collapse of state sovereignty, as the definitions frequently have made it out to be. The process that is of greater responsibility for any erosion to the state's autonomy, is economic liberalisation.

In the 1990's there has been a resurgence of the classical liberal orthodoxy, not only in governing the world economy, but also with economic development strategies, that views state intervention as the primary cause of economic problems in developing countries, particularly in Africa. Hartmut Krugman (1995), maintains that the post-independent African state did not live up to the earlier expectations of state-led economic and social liberation. The African state, succumbing to the special interests of elites and becoming corrupt, hampered socio-economic development on the continent. This as a diagnosis of the problem often propelled by liberal economists, is agreeable, says Krugman (1995:144). However, this writer disagrees with the liberal's recommended solution to the problem. For Krugman, the recipe of simply replacing the state with the market, has serious flaws. He argues that the inefficiency of the African state in the past should not mean that state intervention by necessity is unhelpful and counterproductive (Krugman,1995:144-5). As put by another writer, the failure of the state has occurred, however, not because it intervened, but rather it lost its commitment to economic liberation of the masses (Mengisteab,1995 :169).

In a changing world environment where the role of the state in the economy is becoming increasingly regulated by the forces of globalisation, African development is in serious jeopardy. The developing world and Africa in particular, consisting of 'weak' states in Gilpin's terms, would require state intervention in the economy to fulfill a functional duty of ensuring that market forces contribute to its strengthening and economic development. Economic liberalisation is a threat to the facilitatory and functional intervention needed by weak African states to achieve the necessary development for its people's security. So far, reduced state intervention in the African economy, has been marked by food riots, the spread of killer diseases, a high infant mortality rate and an unskilled population.⁹ Tighter

⁹African states have undertaken world bank and IMF structural adjustment programmes that stipulate drastic cuts in government subsidies on basis foods, health and education. This has exasperated the new threats

regulations on the role of the African state in the market, would only contribute to its weakening and create greater instability and insecurity for its people.

3.3 A 'GLOBALISING' WORLD ECONOMY AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

The economic growth and development of southern Africa at the dawn of the twenty first century will be greatly determined by the position of the African continent in a 'globalising' world economy, rather than by ideological interests of the US or Russia. Analysing the part that Africa plays in the changing world economy enables one to understand the realities that challenge southern Africa's economic prosperity and the attainment of a more secure region. In the age of 'globalisation', however, where "going global" according to Barnett & Cavanagh (1994:4) means a "threat for people that are tied to one place, because they are dependent on a piece of ground for their livelihood and on a particular culture and language for their sense of well-being", then the developing world and Africa in particular, will be losers in the 'globalisation' process. 'Globalisation' as the new constraints and challenges for poorer nations of the 'South', and 'weak' states in Africa, has indeed negative impacts on the political and socio-economic development and security of the sub-continent.

Africa's role in global affairs in the past, had been determined by the ability of African countries to enhance the strategic interests of the superpowers. However the end of the Cold War, has meant an end to both, Soviet alliances as well as the battlefields for anticommunist struggles. On the birth of this new world order, Africa faces the threat of becoming increasingly marginalised and detached from a globalising world economy. Africa on the eve of the twenty-first century, according to Felix Edoho(1997:12), "has been involuntarily delinked from the global economic system". An explanation of the position of African economies in the globalisation process and the consequences for the continent's development

to southern Africa's security.

and security, must take account of the present economic crisis.

After three decades of political independence, in the case of some countries, African economies, by most of the accepted indicators of progress, have moved backward. Despite the agreements and attempts by fifty African ministers in 1979 to implement the Lagos Plan of Action which was supposed to "put development at the disposal of the people", the 1980's was declared Africa's lost decade (Cheru,1989:8 & Edoho,1997:2). Africa's current economic decline is ironic because in the 1960's it was believed that the continent had a better prospect of economic transformation than East Asia. Yet over the past three decades Asian countries "have left even South Africa far behind" (Leistner,1996:307). African economies have declined into the "never to be developed world, euphemistically labeled the Fourth and Fifth Worlds" (Edoho,1997:12, Buzan,1991:431-451 & Mahmud,1995:3). And has the 1990's draw to a close, Africa's struggle for economic independence will be even more difficult.

The state of the crisis within African states' economies, has been described by some writers as: "slow economic growth rates, food shortages, frequent famines, high rates of unemployment, widespread poverty, declining export earnings, burgeoning debts and a growing marginalisation from the global economy" (Logan & Mengisteab,1995:2). In addition, Adebayo Olukoshi (1994), has noted a worsening balance of payments, growing budgetary deficits, increasing levels of inflation, declining agricultural productivity and collapsing industrial infrastructure (Olukoshi,1994:44). These writers point out that while many developing countries have faced similar economic problems, the crisis is generally more serious in Africa for a variety of reasons.

Bade Onimode (1992) argues that the nature of the crisis is not only economic but also political and social. While the pervasive lack of democracy in Africa, according to Onimode, has been of "how politics underdevelops the continent", anti-rural bias in development strategies and ethnic conflicts have been the social factors of the crisis (Onimode,1992:2). These factors, are further categorised as being both internal and external (Cheru,1989:6 & Onimode,1992:10). Domestic and internal failures that have contributed to the African economic crisis have been the inability to move beyond inherited colonial economic and

socio-political structures. Resulting in a quasi post-colonial African state, economic structures preserved colonial patterns of producing what “we Africans not do consume, and consuming what we do not produce” (Onimode,1992:10). The post-colonial African state is further charged with being repressive and incapable of mobilising its population for development. And in addition to the excessive defense expenditures that marked the budgets of African economies during the Cold War, other internal factors pertain to gross economic mismanagement, corruption and capital flight from the diversion of "billions of dollars of state funds into private foreign bank accounts" (Onimode,1992:11).

It is however the external causes to Africa’s economic crisis that will be intensified in a globalising world economy. External causes for the crisis, according to Fantu Cheru (1989), are due to: “two rounds of oil increases, the world economic recession, the steep rise in international interest rates and the deterioration in terms of trade for Africa’s raw materials” (Cheru,1989:6). In addition to these factors, the inappropriate structural adjustments to the economies, profit expatriation by MNC’s, decreasing foreign investment, declining commodity prices and terms of trade, and a burgeoning balance of payments deficit; have undeniably been, and continues to be, the major causes for the underdevelopment of the continent’s economies.

Although most African countries “embraced structural adjustment programmes (SAP’s) as the main framework for the stabilisation and recovery of their economies, from as early as the 1980’s, African states were nevertheless adopting “low intensity conditionalities” that gave them access to “petrodollars”, as early as the 1970’s (Cheru,1989:16). Between 1980 and 1989 alone, 33 African countries received structural adjustment loans and 36 countries initiated 241 adjustment programmes (Cheru,1995:236 & George, 1995:16). During this same period, Susan George has noted that, “the average GDP per capita in Africa fell by 1.1% a year, while per capita food production also experienced a steady decline. The real value of the minimum wage dropped from 80% in the 1980, to 69% in 1990. The number of poor people in these countries rose from 184 million in 1985 to 216 million in 1990, an increase of 17%” (George,1995:16). Rules for adjustment or conditionalities for the access to loans, has had adverse effects on Africa’s ‘weak’ states and economy.

Some of the central conditionalities insisted by the IMF and World Bank, under rubric of economic liberalisation and a regulatory role of the state in the market, are:

- * the privatisation of state controlled companies,
- * the devaluation of currencies,
- * liberalisation of import controls, with reductions on tariffs and subsidies, and
- * fiscal and debt management including changes in the budget such as the decrease in subsidisation of basic products and services of consumption, namely: health, food and education; while increasing user fees on services like electricity and water.

(Onimode,1992:12).

Structural adjustments to the role of the state in the economy has been harmful to the social and economic security for millions of Africans. According to Kwaku Danso (1995), government expenditures in health and education declined from 25,2% in 1986, to 19% in 1988. "Reduced state subsidisation results in the death of about 10 000 African children each day of malnutrition and the non-availability of the most rudimentary health care" (Danso, 1995:31). The United Nations Children's Fund (Unicef), estimated 4,2 million African children under the age of five died in 1990 as a result of malnutrition related diseases which was a direct cause of reduction in food subsidies (Cheru,1995:237). In this regard, Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1991), argued that SAP's in very poor countries constitute a gratuitous obstruction. "In very poor countries, privatisation and the removal of infant industry protective structures are at best an irrelevance. True structural adjustment requires the building up of the countries export sectors and associated infrastructure, which in the short term may require more rather than less state intervention" (Mosley, et.al,1991:304).

SAP's were implemented on the presumption that trade and economic liberalisation will generate growth, commodity prices will increase and protectionist policies by the Advanced Industrialised Countries (AIC's) would be removed. However, "commodity prices are now at their lowest in fifty years, making it even harder for Africa to export its way out of the debt crisis" (Cheru,1995:238). In one year alone, 1985-86, African economies lost an estimated

US\$ 49 billion from the collapse in commodity prices (Onimode,1991:65). The import policies of the AIC's, have equally hindered Africa's exports. Protectionist measures and tariff barriers on developing countries exports, have cost poor nations between US\$ 50 billion to US\$ 100 billion a year in the overproduction of goods (Madeley,1992:55). The Overseas Development Institute has estimated that a 50% reduction in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) trade barriers would create room for a net annual increase of about US\$ 87 million in Africa's exports (Danso,1995:33).

Attempts by African countries to increase their exports in the present international trading order, continue to be hindered by trade barriers from AIC's. Contrary to the principles of freer and fairer trade, unconditional reciprocity and non-discrimination, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), however, became more of a mechanism for the 'North' and AIC's to protect their economies while creating a more open and freer world market, and guaranteed access for capital accumulation. Tariffs on African goods of interest to the AIC's, even under the Uruguay Round of GATT- a round of agreements that was supposed to benefit developing countries exports - remains at higher levels than those applied to products among developed countries. Wilfred Ndongko (1996), informs us that Africa's exports in the future,would confront an increase in tariffs of 28% in the EU, 40% in Japan and 16% in the United States (Ndongko,1996:5). In fact while the Uruguay Round agreement would enrich world trade by at least US\$ 500 billion, Africa stands to loose some US\$ 3 billion annually (Ndongko,1996: 1).

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules for trade in agricultural subsidies, trade related investment measures and services would constrain the policy options of African countries in the agriculture, industrial and service sectors (Ndongko,1996:2). In addition to a GATT, a General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), was established under the WTO, to cover a wide range of activities such as tourism, transport, telecommunications, insurance, banking, business and financial services. "In all of these areas Africa's services are relatively more undeveloped, compared with those of the other developing countries. Opening up these services to foreign competition would have a negative impact on the indigenous service industries in African countries" (Ndongko,1996:7).

The agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIP's) will constrain African states decisions over seeds and patents and affects the cost of medicinal products. African countries may also have to face higher costs in their quest for technological development, since they have to pay for copyrights and patents. However, as the world approaches the next millenium, the level of technological development will not only define the "economic health" of a state or economic community, but also be a major determinant of wealth and power in the world (Edoho,1997:100-2). Technological advancement defines the opportunities and constraints that Africa will face in the quest for economic development, wealth and power.

For any country to participate meaningfully in the global economy, it must control or at least have access to technology. However the rapid advances in science and technology has generated new waves of the Industrial Revolution in the AIC's" which maintains greater concentration of the worlds resources and technology within the 'Triad'¹⁰. And because of the control and power the Triad has over the flow of technology and "global intellectual capital, about 85% to 95% of all high-technology manufacturing are produced and consumed in the Triad" (Ohmae,1978:17). With a result it has been an 'Herculean task' for Africa, especially, to penetrate the walls of protectionism surrounding technological control by the AIC's. Further, the additional of Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIM's) to rules of world trade, will make it difficult for African countries to use policy measures, such as domestic content and trade balancing requirements to regulate the activities of foreign investors in the interest of national development. Africa's weak economies will be restricted in preventing MNC's from stifling the growth of infant industries in host countries, with unfair competition and dumping practices.

3.4 CONCLUSION

It is clear that the new international economic order, has "primarily focussed on the need to

¹⁰The Triad refers to the three most powerful economic blocs in the world - the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

rationalise trade in goods and services in accordance with the new imperatives of 'globalisation', where the 'North' is concerned about the medium term impact of low cost goods and services from the 'South' and piracy of intellectual property by newly industrialising and developing countries" (Mhone,1994:34). The new international trading order therefore reflects the concern of the AIC's to maintain a technological edge in order to sustain their strategic advantage and high living standards. As external factors that are responsible for Africa's economic crisis, these constraints would prevent the continent from effectively participating in and benefiting from, the process of economic liberalisation and 'globalisation'. Africa's destiny and position in the new world economic order will continue to be determined by external forces and factors.

For Africa, peace and security is integral to its economic development. Robert McNamara's argument that "security is development and without development there can be no security", is indeed relevant for the peace and security of the people in Africa. The present wave of economic (and political) liberalisation, together with the advances in technology, compels Africa's weak states to divorce themselves from their economies by reducing export, food, health and education subsidies. The consequences, have been increases in international prices for food importers, which have led to greater food insecurity for millions of Africans already starving while "unbridled market forces and powerful corporate interests erode the social fabric of society, threaten the integrity of ecosystems, hinder the evolution a strong civil society and at the same time weaken the state as an instrument for societies' " security and survival (Krugman, 1995:145). As the destiny of Africa's economic development remains constrained by external forces, beyond the control of the continent, the security and survival of the people in Africa, becomes integral to the strengthening of its weak states. In other words, conflict and insecurity, can only be resolved by the economic, political and social processes that are advanced by stronger African states.

Although southern Africa hosts the continent's economic giant - South Africa, the region has not been immune to conditions facing the rest of the continent and especially sub-Saharan Africa. Southern Africa, in recent years, the collapse of prices of primary commodities, mounting external indebtedness, the declining net flows of investment and tighter regulations

on the state have all contributed to the worsening of human security on the African sub-continent.

CHAPTER FOUR: SOUTHERN AFRICA'S ADAPTATION TO THE CHANGING WORLD ENVIRONMENT

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In the post-Cold War and post-apartheid era, a number of different opinions concerning the overall future of southern Africa, are particularly striking. According to Thede (1993:18), on one hand are those who believe that the region has regained its autonomy and in the future member states will be able to determine their own economic relations, while on the other hand there are those who maintain that the ultimate winner in the new regional order is western imperialism, acting independently and through its South African ally. "A more balanced approach that takes account of both factors, argues that the rules or the parameters of the playing field have been largely determined by external forces and global processes, but the regional states are relatively autonomous in their determination of their national interests" (Thede,1993: 18). Flowing from these approaches, a peace and security order for southern Africa in the 1990's will be directly affected by, firstly, the role a post-apartheid South Africa plays in the region, and secondly, the impact a changing international system has for the development of its members.

With South Africa joining its fellow neighbours to resolve the twin issues of security and development, there is a rising expectation for the country to fill the void created by the apartheid state so that the SADC concept may no longer be a "mission impossible" (Venter,1994:158). The role South Africa plays in the region will, however, be influenced "by the extent to which the burdens of the past can be assuaged at home and domestic stability, normalcy and growth achieved" (Daniel,1994:30). In other words South Africa can only play a progressive and constructive role in the region if it "does not fudge its domestic transformation" (Venter,1994:158). Whatever its contribution, South Africa will remain the natural leader in the region, albeit a more benevolent hegemon.

A post-apartheid South Africa would, nevertheless, have to be cautious about how it expresses its inherited hegemony in the region. South Africa must resist the temptation of maintaining a network of weak states dominated by its economic and military power, for a weak region would only worsen its own security. Increasing dependence of the region on South Africa, as argued by

Davies (1992), would not be in the interests of either the region, or, in the long run, of a democratic, non-racial South Africa. A situation in which the wealthiest country in southern Africa continues to overwhelmingly benefit from the impoverishment of 'weaker' states, in a new regional security order, would "firstly not be conducive for peace, stability and good neighbourliness" (Davies in Beaudet,1993:163).

In southern Africa, "without a satisfactory degree of equitable economic development and cooperation among member states, there can be no peace and security," (Mandaza,199:29). Three possible scenarios for regional relations have been developed by Rob Davies (1992: 51-71). The first approach, which he terms 'failed co-operation', assumes that all attempts at greater economic or security co-operation will fail, giving rise rather to ad hoc bilateral arrangements. Secondly, southern Africa can attain "integration under South African hegemony" where the latter initiates regional co-operation and project integration to further its own interests - as the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Davies,1992:68). And the last approach looks at the "non-hegemonic regional co-operation and integration" which is based on a view that the region is a market of great potential for the South African economy. Following any one of this writer's approaches, it is clear that southern Africa's adaptation to a changing world environment, for its development and security, will depend on the role South Africa plays in the region as well as the need for economic integration.

4.2 SOUTH AFRICA'S FUTURE ROLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

As South Africa re-enters the international arena, many believe that it has a moral obligation to the region for the latter's role in the anti-apartheid struggle and housing the exiled liberation movements at high cost to themselves during the days of destabilisation (see Johnson & Martin,1989). There is also a propounding view among SADC members and within South Africa that the end of apartheid and the transition to democratic rule will open the door for the establishment of new and mutually beneficial economic relations between South Africa and its neighbours. A democratic South Africa has, however entered a harsh international environment that is based on geo-economic rather than geo-political factors. The constraints placed on South

Africa by a changing international environment will constitute a major factor for its minimal role in the region's development. In other words South Africa's relationship with its fellow neighbours "will be largely influenced by the way it fits itself into the world scene", first (Beaudet,1993:142).

Indeed, "it has become a cliché to say that the new South Africa is taking its place in a world which has changed dramatically" (Davies,1995:1). In a world where previous patterns of international relations have been altered and reshaped to create "a completely new global conjuncture.... in which international economic relations have come to impact to an unprecedented degree on domestic policy of countries in the 'South' to open up their economies and become internationally competitive", there can be no guarantee that South Africa will be equally successful in reactivating its economy as it was in changing to a new political order (Davies,1995:1). In short, South Africa will not find the present world order conducive for achieving its own economic development, let alone steering the region out of its underdevelopment.

Erich Leistner (1995:60) maintains that it has been generally appreciated that South Africa's own socio-economic backlogs do not allow it to directly assist neighbouring countries on a major scale. The end of apartheid will be accompanied by a demand for more social expenditure on education health, housing and stimulation of labour intensive production of basic goods for low income groups. It will be difficult for the domestic economy to mobilise the investment needed to meet these demands and also generate any significant surplus to contribute to the development and growth of the region. "The first point to consider, therefore is that any short-term hope that the South African economy will be a locomotive pulling southern Africa out of the recession, is unrealistic. The internal crisis of South Africa does not permit it to play such a role" (Beaudet,1993:154).

Moreover, given the enormous unequal income distribution in the South African economy, it will be the democratic government's priority to redirect an exclusive "white economy... for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of an underdeveloped black majority before it can serve as an engine of growth for the sub-region" (Cheru,1992:23). In other words South Africa will have to "pull the underdeveloped sections of its own population before it can pull the rest of southern

Africa out of stagnation" (Cheru,1992:22).

Any attempt that South Africa makes to promote economic development and growth, not only within its borders but also for its neighbours, will be "from the outset handicapped by the impact of its prolonged economic decline" (Black & Swatuk, 1997: 36). The economic decline of South Africa during the 1980's and into the 1990's has been "widely demonstrated" (Beaudet,1993:148). According to Pierre Beaudet (1993:148), South Africa's structural economic crisis has been demonstrated by its negative real growth rate since the late seventies, high levels of inflation, rising levels of unemployment and poverty, decline of domestic and foreign investment, stagnation of manufacturing coupled with a decreasing mining sector and uncontrollable state deficits despite increased taxation. Currently, over 45 per cent of South Africa's labour force is unemployed. This figure will increase with a continuation of retrenchments especially in the mining industry - the engine of the economy. Beaudet (op cit.) informs us that more than 50 000 miners lost their jobs during 1991 and an estimated 3 000 per month throughout 1992. The gold mines, once South Africa's leading sector in exports and revenues, is under serious threat because "they are presently operating at a loss, while further declines of gold output are expected" (Beaudet,opcit). Moreover the "GDP growth estimates for 1997 of 2,5-3% remain short of the 4% required to make any inroads into South Africa's acute unemployment problem" (Black & Swatuk,1997:36).

Since the South African mining industry had historically employed miners also from Lesotho, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi, retrenchments of miners will directly affect regional economies¹¹. The extent to which South Africa revives its own economy, economies in the region will be directly affected, since "business and investment throughout the region is influenced by the state of affairs in South Africa" (Leistner,1995:60). Southern Africa's economies are by no doubt well-integrated and dominated by that of South Africa. According to Dan O' Meara (1991:132), competing European colonialism fashioned a southern African region marked by fairly high degree of what can be called skewed integration - an essentially regional economy in which the central pole of accumulation was the mining and later the agriculture, industrial and

¹¹The consequences for countries most dependent on migrant labour revenue, such as Lesotho where 86% of the labour force is employed in South African mines, and Mozambique where the figure is 20%, have been disastrous (Beaudet,1993:157).

service sectors of the South African economy. All other economies in the region except that of Angola were locked into this regional economy as suppliers of cheap migrant labour, certain goods and services (water, energy, transport, etc.) to the South African economy, and as markets for its manufactures and capital. The success of economic development in regional states will therefore be dependent on the success of South Africa's own economic development and vice versa.

Along with the limitations that South Africa's economic decline has for its interaction with its neighbours, there are "strong forces of continuity in the South African political economy and society where policy options are constrained and moderated by the central role which a small number of highly concentrated corporations continue to play" (Black & Swatuk, 1997:38). But also South Africa's economic restructuring is being pursued by a process of integration into the world economy. And with the demise of apartheid, South Africa will be just another country having to compete for scarce resources by way of investment, trade and aid. South Africa's re-entry into the world has been complicated by the emergence of the former Soviet Union as a competitive market for international capital, Western donor fatigue and its membership to multilateral trading agreements like the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

According to Greg Mills (1994:5), South Africa in world terms belongs to a group of small states with limited ability to exert any influence internationally. And "now that the major battle against apartheid has been won, it will be difficult in the future to convince the international community that it owes South Africa anything" (Mills, 1994:5). South Africa's geo-strategic and international image, in other words, is no guarantee for entry into an international arena based not on solidarity, but on economic interests of western powers - the spread of capitalism and accumulation on a world scale - which has not come to an end with the demise of the Cold War. Integration into the world economy will, therefore, demand that South Africa adapt its economic system to "the norms of a given external reality and strive to become a 'winning nation' in a fiercely competitive world" (Davies, 1995:1).

South Africa's entry into the new multilateral trading community entails operating within new constraints. For example because South Africa operated beyond the rules of GATT in the past,

its return as a "full member of the world trading community was celebrated with an unusual spate of anti-dumping and countervailing duties against SA's exports, as well as new pressures to reduce tariffs" (Hirsch,1995:41). In June 1995 the EU's Council of Ministers rejected South Africa's request to be granted full membership to the Lome Convention. Instead it suggested a qualified access to Lome, with both sides phasing out tariff barriers on industrial and some agricultural products over ten years. However 40% of South Africa's agricultural products will be excluded from the country's qualified accession (Moledi,1997:12). South Africa will in fact "derive very few direct economic benefits from its qualified membership of Lome"(Davies in Loxton,1997 (a)).

The complexities and negative impact a free trade agreement with the EU will have on southern Africa relate firstly to the SACU and secondly the role within SADC "around the process of integration" (Mills,1997:28). According to Thalitha Bertelsmann (in Fabricius & Leshilo,1997:3), South Africa's SACU partners - the BLSN states - will lose fiscal income and experience a rise in unemployment because of the free trade agreement. And because SACU, and the greater SADC countries will have to compete with European goods that have greater technological inputs, "fragile industries may be destroyed and infrastructural development curtailed" as EU states gain more preferential access to the South African market. (Bertelsmann, op.cit.). South Africa had recently ended direct controls or quotas on imported beef at a time of a huge beef surplus in Europe because of the mad cow disease scare. The result was a massive increase in beef imports from 7 000 tons to 47 000 tons (Davies in Loxton, op.cit.). But because the imported beef "draws subsidies of about R6/ton and therefore comes in at about half the South African landed price, not only is South Africa's beef industry under threat, but also that of neighbouring countries"¹² (Davies in Loxton, op.cit.).

South Africa's own economic development also complicates its role in regional economic integration. "While it is widely assumed that in an integrated market, South African exports would ruin many producers in neighbouring countries, there are also South African producers of clothing and textiles, footwear, furniture, leather goods, fruit juices, sugar, etc who need

¹²It is estimated that the loss to South African and Namibian producers is larger than the total amount of EU aid made available to these countries. Namibia was estimated to have lost about 11% of its beef export market.

protection against products from other African countries" (Leistner,1995:55). This has been clearly demonstrated when in 1993 the "white South African Chamber of Business abandoned calls, made a few years earlier, for a regional common market. Appealing for caution, it now urged that a new government should not 'cede sovereignty to any supra-national body and that the SADC should be rationalised as a prerequisite for SA membership" (Vale,1994:xix).

Because of its national economic interest, the formal end of apartheid has not dented the South African arms industry which was instrumental in contributing to the destabilisation of the region. In recent years that have followed political change, "military sales have been growing slowly but surely and sales of civilian products made by South Africa's defence industry have doubled, accounting now for about 50% of the industry's annual output" (Smith,1997:22). That output is now worth US \$1.6 billion of which 90% comes from foreign arms sales. Given all the jobs this industry generates and the foreign exchange it earns, and could earn, an ANC government, clearly, cannot afford to have such an industry grind to an halt. As one of apartheid's legacies, the South African defence industry is not only the largest and most advanced defence industry in the Africa, but more importantly for a post-apartheid government, an employer of 50 000 workers in "real high tech manufacturing" (Smith,1997:22-23). This signals the need to maintain an industry because of its necessary comparative advantage, albeit a contributor for wars and instability in southern Africa or abroad.¹³

South Africa's role in southern Africa has largely been defined as a "sub-imperial organiser of the region with and on behalf of the industrialised nations" (Beaudet, 1993:143). Militarily and especially economically, South Africa is a giant not just in southern Africa, but throughout sub-Saharan Africa. "Accounting for 45 per cent of Africa's gross national product (GNP)", South Africa's economy is also nearly four times as big as the remaining SADC members, excluding the Democratic Republic of Congo and Seychelles¹⁴ (Venter,1996:139). As Davies (1997:4)

¹³According to reports by Jakkie Potgieter, senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, "war material from South Africa was being supplied to Angola's Unita movement", despite SA being instrumental in brokering a peace deal between the two warring parties. Potgieter said that he had seen military supplies being off-loaded and stored in northern Mozambique for shipment to Unita forces along Angola's border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (Thornycroft,1997:3).

¹⁴This statistic was compiled before these two countries joined SADC in September 1997.

pionts out, Africa is the Republic's single largest export market. In 1993 the continent accounted for 31,7% of SA's exports (Davies,1997:4). Pat McGowan (1997:3) argues that Merle Holden's (1996) assessment of South Africa's major trading partners as being the "high income developed countries of the world", is just partially true. Given that seven southern African nations¹⁵ rank among South Africa's top twenty export markets and that five are among SA's top ten markets, "one can no longer claim with accuracy that South Africa's trade partners are primarily in the northern Triad" (McGowan,1997:4).

McGowan (1997:3) informs us that in 1994/95 these southern African states purchased a total of R23,9 billion worth of South African goods, almost as much as the top four G7 nations and far more than any single export market such as the UK. In 1994 Africa purchased R22 420 million worth of South African goods and services making the continent the largest export market for SA. By 1995, however, SADC countries purchased 89.5% of SA's exports to Africa (McGowan,1997:4). McGowan(1997:5) further demonstrates that it is not SADC as a whole, but rather its four members who belong to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) that contribute most to Africa's trade with South Africa. Thus Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLSN) maybe juridicially independent, sovereign states, but from the point of view of regional trade they are totally dependent on South Africa. The penetration of southern Africa's economies by "the still largely white big business sector" in South Africa, provides, therefore, the potential for the latter to "behave as a regional hegemon rather than a mutually beneficial partner" (McGowan,1997:1).

However, there could be "tremendous advantages which could accrue from functional cooperation in using South Africa's relatively sophisticated infrastructure to help develop the region. Pragmatic functionalism, already evident to a certain extent, could provide both South Africa and its neighbours with considerable benefits without South Africans feeling they are wasting their time or other Southern African countries feeling they are under the totally dominant economic spell of their southern African neighbour" (Jammie,1992:13). A flourishing South African economy would mean after all growing markets for the products of its neighbours. Therefore "enlightened self-interest indicates that South Africa needs economically and

¹⁵For a list of these countries see Table 1 in McGowan (1997:31)

politically stable neighbours because of the important markets for its exports of manufactured products" and to avoid conditions that affect South Africa through mass migration, 'gun running', cross border stock theft and the spread of killer diseases (Leistner,1995:55).

The ANC in their discussion document titled UmraBulo - Let's talk politics (1997), stressed that a South Africa thriving and experiencing growth and development in a southern Africa that is experiencing poverty and underdevelopment will increase the problems of illegal entry into the country, drug trafficking and other related security threats. The revival, economic growth and development of southern Africa, is unmistakably integral to that of South Africa. It appears, therefore that South Africa would need to, paradoxically, maintain it's economic status as the regional power house, but at the same time reduce it dominance in the region. In other words South Africa's own economic development has "not only questioned the existing structure of accumulation, but has placed a wedge between economic and political hegemony and dominance" (Mhone,1993:41).

A post-apartheid South Africa has many complexities in managing the nature of its co-operation (let alone integration) with the southern African region (Mills,1997:28). Evidence shows that especially when parity in levels of development do not exist between countries, making across-the-board tariff reductions and dismantling non-tariff barriers to trade can prove to be somewhat difficult. Because a democratic South Africa has to accomplish its own economic interests first, the new majority government favoured "an incremental, pragmatic approach to integration, beginning with sectoral coordination and proceeding to closer links of a solid bases of cooperation" (Leistner, 1995:57).

Although regional economic integration and multilateral co-operation may be a slow process, bilateral agreements between South Africa and its neighbours have been growing. Security arrangements include, for example measures to counter weapon smuggling like the recent (June to Sept. 1995) joint operation between South African Police and Mozambican authorities which resulted more than a thousand weapons being destroyed (Cilliers,1996:14). While economic co-operation with countries in the region "in respect of transport, telecommunications, power, water supplies, river basin management, veterinary services, human health...." is also quite evident with

the recent opening of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Leistner,1995:57).

The Government of National Unity has to, undoubtedly, accomplish "an indomitable task.... It will have to harness dominant class forces under its hegemony while simultaneously fulfilling the hitherto unmet needs of the masses" (Mhone, 1993:42). In other words South Africa will have paradoxically, juggle its national interest of economic growth with the need to foster greater regional development, since the weaknesses of a post-apartheid South African state will restrain and limit its direct involvement in economic development of its fellow neighbours.

4.3 REGIONAL INTEGRATION AS A WAY FORWARD.

The world in the aftermath of the Cold War, witnesses a decline in the importance of military alliances, while greater attention is placed on economic or trading blocs. It is a world in which concentration of political, economic and military power will be found in three "power points", the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU) and the "incipient East Asian trading bloc under the leadership of Japan" (Cheru,1992:1 & Daniel,1994:31). Organised as three "power centres", these trading blocs have created a harsh international trading environment for weak economies like those in southern Africa (Daniel,1994:31). States in southern Africa will, however, find themselves more vulnerable to an hostile international economic environment if they choose to remain a collection of fourteen, "small, competing exporters, dependent on the regional hegemon to purchase its output and supply its needs" (Cheru,1992:1). In this new world economic order, southern African states are, therefore, compelled to form regional integration schemes for the "sustainable and rapid economic growth that are clearly the building blocks for greater regional, national and individual security" (Cilliers,1996:13).

There are many reasons why governments in southern Africa pin a great deal of hope on regional integration. Fearing that the sub-continent will become more peripheralised if states choose to remain disunited and dependent on the regional giant, southern African leaders have opted for greater cooperation towards economic integration. Three possible approaches on the future of

southern Africa, identified by Ohlson and Stedman (in Thede,1993:19), all foresee the imminent marginalisation of the region from the new international economic order. These authors argue that the region can firstly experience a total de-linking or annihilation together with the rest of the continent. Secondly, South Africa will remain the region's dominant player through which relations with the global powers take place. And finally a regionalisation, where imposed marginalisation is used to increase their autonomy as a group states from the global system. Therefore, "if we are going to ask the countries of the 'North' to join us in restructuring the world economy to narrow the gaps between the 'North' and the 'South', we must first improve relations between ourselves" (Shamuyarira,1992:10).

Moreover, given the transnational nature of threats in southern Africa, it's little wonder that many commentators have suggested that regional integration is the only way that such threats can be dealt with effectively. The utility of regional integration as a mechanism to deal with southern Africa's security issues will require a high degree of integration in the economies of member states. According to Gavin Maasdorp (1994:14), the term economic integration is used by economists to denote the integration of markets. In other words regional economic integration is a process through which a group of states, in various degrees, share each others markets and establish mechanisms and techniques that minimise conflicts while maximising economic, political, social and cultural benefits from their interaction. For Richard Gibb (1996:2), the main benefits associated with economic integration arise from restructuring the economies as a result of a more efficient allocation of regional resources. It is also seen as a way to reduce exploitative dependency relationships arising from limited and unspecialised internal markets which lack economies of scale. Associated political benefits include an improvement of relations between states, enhanced capacity to negotiate with third countries and the possibility of accelerating South-South collective reliance.

It is not surprising in this regard, that "there is a remarkable degree of consensus over the desirability of some form of regional integration in southern Africa" (Gibb,1996:3). However as Gibb (1996:3) argues, "below this veneer of consensus lies a serious division between those groups that advocate a regional structure based on intervention by the state to assist underdeveloped regions and those advocating a regionalism that is driven by market forces based

on competition and comparative advantage" (Gibb,1996:3). Regional economic integration in southern Africa is dominated by two theoretical paradigms, focusing, on one hand, on state intervention and co-ordination, and on the other, on free market driven liberalisation.

Scholars that have rejected neo-liberalism and trade liberalisation as an organising principle for regional integration, argue that the indiscriminate opening-up of the southern African market to South African business would be detrimental to the long-term development of the region as a whole, including South Africa. Instead "southern African development must be pursued by regional economic integration based on: import substitution, subsidies for exports, active state intervention in markets and an end to competition amongst member countries" (Gibb,1996:4). Balefi Tsie (1996:93), argues that neo-liberal prescriptions and market forces are inappropriate to a developing region such as southern Africa. For Tsie (op.cit.), neo-liberalism is based on an ideological fallacy of genuine 'free' markets. As an organising principle for regional integration, this ideology is interpreted as a 'Northern' agenda designed to reinforce existing links between southern Africa and the Advanced Industrialised Countries (AIC's) for guaranteeing greater access to the region's market.

Nevertheless arguments advanced by the World Bank in a collaborative research, undertaken together with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Commission for European Communities (EU), on cross-border initiatives in Eastern and Southern Africa, and the Indian Ocean, maintained that both, unilateral and multilateral liberalisation driven by market forces are preconditions for regional economic integration. "Powerfully reinforced by the prescriptions of the IMF and World Bank, the influence of corporate South Africa will sharply discourage options entailing state planning and intervention", not only in its own economy but also that of its neighbours (Black & Swatuk,1997:38). This was clearly demonstrated when industrialists at the World Economic Forum Southern African summit held in Midrand, gave the leaders of southern Africa 'Ten Commandments' - most of which pertain to trade liberalisation and market deregulation - to make the region more investor friendly.

Regional economic integration as a current trend within the international system is pursued at

different levels to achieve various goals for member states. There are four distinguishable types or models of economic integration. The first is a free trade area that entails the removal of customs tariffs and quantitative restrictions (quotas) among member states. The second is a customs union which in addition to a free trade area, establishes a common external tariff against the rest of the world. The third type of integration is the common market which, in addition to the conditions of a customs union, includes the free mobility of factors of production (capital and labour) among member countries. Finally at the top of the hierarchy, is an economic union that builds on a common market by adding the harmonisation of economic policies, that is, fiscal and monetary policies (Maasdorp,1994:14).

There has been no shortage of regional organisations in southern Africa that were designed to foster regional economic cooperation or integration. There are four economic groupings in the region. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Common Monetary Area (CMA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa). It has become fashionable to regard the SACU not only as the longest-surviving but also as the 'most successful' integration scheme in Africa. The SACU goes some way beyond a pure customs union in that it includes excise duties in its common revenue pool which is administered by the South African Reserve Bank. Revenue payments to Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia (the BLSN states) are made out of this pool according to a formula that includes a raising factor of 42% to compensate member states for being in a customs union with a more developed and industrialised country like South Africa.

The BLSN countries have, however, been concerned about the "time-lag" in revenue payments since "payments for any one year are made to member states over three years because of problems in finalising trade statistics" (Maasdorp,1994:18-19). This means that member states are always owed money by the common pool and thereby making an interest-free loan available to South Africa. Other concerns raised by the BLSN states relate to: "inadequate provision for the protection of their infant industries, the weakness in the treatment of dumping and inadequate machinery for consultation" on the revenue sharing formula, since member countries have no representation on the Board of Trade and Tariffs which is accountable only to the South African government (Maasdorp,1994:19).

In 1993 members of SACU were "seen to be embroiled in an acrimonious dispute over which of them benefited most from the agreement" (Vale, 1994:xix). The South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) argued that the formula was too generous and that South Africa could no longer afford the arrangement. In fact as early as 1992 "the Department of Finance reportedly proposed ending the agreement unless members agreed to substantial cuts in their disbursements" (Davies,1994:3). But SACU is of considerable importance to all participants and cannot be abandoned. Contrary to the views of the DTI organised business in, South Africa and other member states, and even in non-member states like of Zimbabwe and Malawi, favour the continuation of the arrangement. The reasons for firms in these countries favouring SACU membership were grouped around "four points: ease of trade, the lowering of prices, the availability of goods and services, and access to markets" (Maasdorp,1994:20). Subsequently the proposal to end the SACU was "dissuaded with intervention by the Department of Foreign Affairs" (Davies,1994:3).

In 1994 South Africa and its partners agreed that the 1969 Customs Union Agreement had become outdated and that SACU had to be democratised and renegotiated. Subsequently a Customs Union Task Team (CUTT) was instituted for the development of a new revenue-sharing formula that will not only be fair and sustainable, but also development-orientated. In July 1995 SACU Ministers agreed on an approach to joint decision-making on critical economic development, the setting of import tariffs and a neutral secretariat; to make the union more democratic. Gavin Maasdorp (1990 in Davies,1994:6) has suggested that such restructuring of SACU could, with the (re)introduction of free labour mobility within the union, be upgraded into a common market.

According to a document released by the DTI in early 1995, SACU could form the base around which there could simultaneously be:

- * an economic union between South Africa and Lesotho,
- * a common market between that economic union, Swaziland and Namibia,
- * a free-trade area between SACU and Zimbabwe,
- * a preferential trade area between the free-trade area and the rest of the region.

(Leistner,1995:60)

Given this positive prospect for the SACU, negotiations between members on the exact nature of the union's restructuring, are continuing.

The Common Monetary Area (CMA) has been a result of the Rand Monetary Agreement (RMA), signed in 1974 by South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland. Botswana had opted out of the negotiations and introduced its own currency in 1976. In 1986, following the Trilateral Monetary Agreement (TMA), the RMA became the CMA. Since 1992 this TMA has been replaced by a Multilateral Monetary Agreement (MMA) to accommodate independent Namibia as a formal member. Each of the three smaller partners has its own currency which is at par with the rand. In addition to the MMA, there are bilateral agreements between South Africa and each of the members to vary the precise terms of monetary integration (Maasdorp,1994:21).

The 87,5% of firms in member states that support the Agreement argued that they benefit from the free flows of capital and currency, the reduction of exchange control problems (because of the ability to pay in local currency), the reduction of bureaucratic and administrative problems, the absence of delays in payments, and the facilitating of inter-company business activities and transfer of funds. In addition, the rand parity was regarded as useful, because the exchange rate was favourable for exporters and foreign exchange fluctuations with neighbouring countries were eliminated. The rand was a fully convertible currency accepted worldwide and the CMA was also good for tourism (Maasdorp,1994:21-22). The CMA complements the operation of SACU and as Maasdorp (1994:21) has pointed out, the SACU and CMA together give southern Africa a degree of integration hardly matched anywhere else in the world. Suggestions to extend the CMA to the entire region have, however, been rejected by the African Development Bank (ADB) as being unrealistic and "exceedingly unlikely that South Africa would be prepared to incur costs involved in doing so" (Leistner,1995:272).

A combination of global change and the acceptance of a post-apartheid South Africa as a full partner in the region, has resulted in the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC), becoming the Southern African Development Community (SADC), where emphasis has been shifted from sectoral co-operation to trade integration. The decision to transform the organisation has been interpreted as the desperate move by member states for their adaptation to

competitive world environment. For the African sub-continent to avoid its marginalisation in the new world order, the formation of the SADC has, therefore, been a necessity. The overall aim of the SADC is to provide for regional peace and security, sector co-operation and an integrated regional economy. As a regional institution, it has laid the basis on which regional planning and development is pursued sectoral co-ordination. But while the SADC provides the most viable vehicle through which regional planning and development can be accomplished, it remains a daunting task to implement these strategies of planning and development in an integrated approach.

Leistner (1995:272) argues that since the signing of the SADC treaty in August 1992, virtually nothing has happened to give concrete shape to the new objectives, nor are there signs that the organisation's weaknesses have been addressed with the inefficient system of allocating sectoral responsibilities to particular member countries, remaining. SADC, he adds also lacks clear lines of authority and accountability, different traditions, management and administrative procedures; and often inadequate provision of staff and other resources for the co-ordination and management of the regional programmes (Leistner,1995:272).

But since the 15th annual summit, held at the World Trade Centre in Johannesburg during August 1995, the SADC has been making further efforts towards regional co-operation and integration. At this summit although the issue of security was "dodged", SADC members did sign their first protocols on sharing of water course systems and establishing a common pool for electricity in the region (Cornish,1995:21). In addition, at the end of this summit it was announced that three other protocols relating to energy, free movement of SADC persons and trade were near completion (Sparks,1995:20). Not surprising therefore member states signed a trade protocol on 25 August 1996. The objective of the trade protocol is to establish a Free Trade Area (FTA) within eight years. This is supposed to enhance trade in goods and services in the region "as both tariff and non-tariff barriers are eliminated, customs procedures are made less complicated and trade laws within SADC are harmonised" (Patel,1996:14).

Given that the complaints launched by delegates at the SADC conference in Midrand on February 1996, relate to South Africa's use of protectionist policies and export incentives causing damage

to its neighbouring economies, the FTA is seen as an essential "step to cater for the differences in economic development between the member states" (Keet,1997:7). Dot Keet (op.cit.) argues that by registering SADC as a new trade grouping with the WTO, regional states are securing their legal right to trade preferentially with each other. This, she stresses, will avoid the dangers of being flooded with goods from outside the region. But one of the WTO regulations for the formation of an economic bloc, is that "the lowest tariff of the poorest nation must be chosen" (Mamabolo,1996:33). All countries in the region which have higher tariffs would not accept such an arrangement because it will undermine their economies. Establishing a FTA will also increase and regulate competition among SADC countries which can have negative effects as in closures of plants and factories that are less productive and competitive. And as trade topped the agenda at the September 1997 summit in Blantyre, Malawi; national 'sensitivities' or interest continued to bedevil the SADC negotiations on movement towards a FTA. Member states accused South Africa of being protectionist and dominating the region by placing high tariffs on imports, making SADC exports uncompetitive (Loxton,1997:40). As testimony of the problems faced by the organisation, only Tanzania and Mauritius have so far ratified the protocol (Wackernagel,1997(b):40).

Not only does the proposed FTA between South Africa and the EU, undermine intra-regional trade (as discussed above), but the overlap between the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and SADC also hampers movements toward greater economic integration. The COMESA emerged from the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) which was a project of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) that has been in force since 1983. The PTA focused on trade integration and included the establishment of a clearing house for regional trade payments and negotiations to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers on the growth of trade among its members (Davies,1994:6).

At the 1992 summit, members endorsed the goal of a COMESA to be achieved by the year 2000. And because the Lusaka-based 23 nation Common Market, seeks to integrate the region from "Djibouti to Cape Town", there is some duplication with regards to the goals of SADC. "Of the SADC states, only South Africa, Namibia and Botswana are not COMESA members" (Mills,1995:10). As a result at its January 1992 summit the PTA called for a merger with SADC.

This was also considered at the SADC summit in August of the same year, but was rejected on the grounds that both organisations had their own mandates, programmes and approaches and a merger would be premature.

But at the 15th annual SADC summit, heads of state agreed that a joint summit should take place with COMESA. The SADC executive secretary, Kaire Mbuende, said that the objective of the COMESA-SADC conference would be to look into whether there was room for co-existence and harmonisation of trade between the two organisations so that trade between member countries could be expanded (Sapa,1995:6). However "overlapping membership, presents many problems for such a meeting, as it is unclear exactly 'who would be representing which body as they are nearly all members of both" (Mills,1995:10).

Institutionalising the appropriate framework for any programme of regional economic, co-operation, co-ordination or integration, is therefore complicated by the presence of several multilateral organisations. The prospects for greater regional economic integration in southern Africa, according to Jakkie Cilliers (1996:13), "are not favourable. This is principally due to the fact that regional economies are similarly structured, in that they produce, consume, export and import essentially similar products". In other words, "instead of complementing each other, regional states are competing, especially in exports of most primary commodities that are sent to similar markets, generally in Western Europe. They also compete in importing the same products from the same sources - again mostly Western Europe" (Cilliers,1996:13). This low level of complementarity which clearly is an obstacle for successful economic integration, is nevertheless the result of internal and external weaknesses of member states.

4.4 CONCLUSION

With the euphoria over a democratic South Africa now coming to an end, regional and continental solidarity forged over the past thirty years to oppose apartheid has been replaced by "economic pragmatism dictated by national self-interest" (Cheru,1992:7). Crises within the regional economies, including that of South Africa, and current trends in the world economy, "impose constraints on the emergence of a creditable and viable strategy for regional economic

integration and development in a post-apartheid, post-Cold War era" (Padayachee & Motala,1994:72).

Although the new government is broadly supportive of SADC's objectives, it appears unlikely that a post-apartheid South Africa will embark on a course of comprehensive market integration. South Africa has not yet succeeded in formulating a long term strategy for its own economic development and hence cannot at this stage commit itself to far reaching structural changes in pursuance of regional integration. Therefore, "despite the assurances given by the ANC officials that a democratic South Africa will not try to dominate the region, a post-apartheid government will be forced to aggressively pursue trade relations to penetrate the southern African market on behalf of its business community and new social classes" (Cheru,1992:7). "South Africa's economic well-being depends primarily on its ability to compete on world markets, and would harm itself if regional obligations were to weaken its position in the rest of the world" (Leistner,1995:55). And since, South Africa "will be fortunate to retain a place among the world's semi-peripheral powers over the next twenty years", it has emerged both as "a periphery vis-a-vis the developed Western countries", and 'a sub-centre' or 'regional hegemon', vis-a-vis southern African" (McGowan in Black & Swatuk,1997:36 and Mhone,1993:41).

Although southern Africa can expect no further destabilisation from a new South Africa, "socio-economic problems are the main threats to regional security and a new co-operative approach to security is essential to encourage disarmament and release resources for development" (Davies,1994:3). The success of a regional security programme will depend on promoting co-operation (or integration) among regional economies and vice versa. A regional economic programme cannot be viewed as an option. It will have to be an essential component of any strategy to promote growth and development in southern Africa. However, as a basic prerequisite for regional integration, the willingness on the part of states to surrender certain powers to a central supranational body, is presently absent in southern Africa. The explicit disparities in income levels between South Africa and its neighbours make it, unavoidably, difficult for member states to agree on common objectives for closer regional integration. Explicit in southern African countries' attempts to integrate for survival are: "weak commitments by weak states lead to weak organisations" (Davies in Leistner,1995:273). As new rules for security and survival,

weak states must, therefore, remain object referent.

CHAPTER FIVE: DEVELOPING A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The transition to democratic rule in South Africa has indeed changed the rules for security in southern Africa, dramatically. Regional states are now in a position to cooperate with South Africa to find lasting solutions to common security threats. These states have chosen to cooperate within the Southern African Development Community (SADC), to resolve security threats that respect no national boundaries. At the inauguration of the SADC in Windhoek in 1992, Heads of States "expressed confidence that the independence of Namibia and transition in South Africa will take the region out of an era of conflict and confrontation to one of cooperation in a climate of peace, security and stability" (Cilliers,1996:18). However, southern African cooperation, in the post-apartheid era has been fraught with difficulties. "While cooperation is easily achievable amongst partners sharing a common value system and similar levels of development, it is more difficult to attain when significant disparities exist among participating countries", like those in southern Africa (Cilliers,1996:14).

During the post-colonial era, the greatest threat to the security of southern African states, was South Africa's regional policy of military destabilisation and "total strategy". Based on the primacy of 'high politics' and the assumptions that threats are mostly external and military in form, security in southern Africa during this period was focused primarily on military issues and the hostile military behavior of South Africa. This approach has however become incapable of explaining threats to southern Africa's security that are not a result of inter-state military conflict. And in the absence of military destabilisation by an apartheid regime, this approach requires serious redefinition. "The process of developing a regional approach to security must therefore incorporate new members - most notably South Africa, and a new thinking about the nature and content of security" (van Aardt,1997(a):2).

The key aspects of the new thinking on regional security must be concerned not only with

defence, but with the pursuit of democracy, sustainable economic development, social justice and the protection of the environment. In other words threats to southern Africa's security, "arise not only from armed forces or challenges to sovereignty and territorial integrity but also from poverty, oppression, injustice and ecological degradation" (CIIR,1995:8). This holistic approach to security is crucial for southern Africa, since it reveals the intrinsic link between development and regional insecurity. For instance, economic decline that results in the emiseration of the population will inevitably fuel political and social unrest, which itself may spill over borders.

Together with other threats that are associated with the unravelling and weakening of the nation-state, these sources of insecurity for the region are not entirely new. The prominence of these threats are directly related to the disappearance of apartheid-generated insecurity across the region. But because these threats are not experienced by all states to the same extent, institutionalising a framework for regional security will have to accommodate individual states' interests, especially now that the mutual threat of apartheid destabilisation has ended. Southern African security will therefore need to be institutionalised by a security regime rather than a security community.

5.2 POST-COLD WAR AND POST-APARTHEID SECURITY THREATS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

The contemporary security concerns of southern Africa cannot be resolved by the traditional conceptualisation of security. Although the region has benefited from the end of military destabilisation by South Africa, future economic, political and social relations remain uncertain. Security for southern African states must go beyond military threats. New threats to the region's security include a range of non-military and unconventional threats such as economic marginalisation, poverty and a lack of food security, mass migration, a landmine menace, the infiltration of international crime syndicates, small arms smuggling, drug trafficking and droughts. The region also "suffers from chronic underdevelopment, poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy, lack of social services and environmental degradation" (Nathan,1992:12).

The demise of external military aggression for southern Africans does not change their position within a 'globalising' world economy. A major threat to the people of southern Africa, in recent years, is being involuntarily de-linked from the world economy. "The collapse of the Soviet bloc has opened Eastern Europe as a potentially lucrative and more attractive mass market for international capital" (Theede,1993:2). With new markets in the former Warsaw Pact countries, the US, for instance, announced its intentions to reduce its intake of commodities like chromium, manganese and cobalt. "Such reductions will have a significant impact on the export earnings of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Zaire" (Baynham,1993:179). A shortage of foreign exchange will only worsen the regions external debt, balance of payment deficits and prevent member states from being the means to its peoples' social, economic and political security. The peace dividend in the region may, therefore, have unexpected economic costs.

Developments in the world economy and in particular the trends towards increasing international competition and 'globalisation' will, indeed, have enormous impacts on the future economic health of southern African states. The success of the World Trade Organisation's multilateral process of trade liberalisation, which essentially means the elimination of state regulation and support to the economy, undermines the region's 'weak' economies from generating internal capital, industrialisation and diversification, on their own. As a consequence of this loss of sovereignty, 'globalisation' severely restricts reforming or creating alternative national strategies, "categorising them as unviable in the face of international market pressures" (Gibb,1996:8). State withdrawal has, however, been most clearly seen in the elimination of "subsidies to socially-necessary goods and services for underprivileged sectors of the population" (Theede,1993:6). These pressures on individual states will exacerbate the current problems of poverty, food security, malnutrition, health care, the spread of killer diseases and illiteracy, faced by millions of southern Africans.

In southern Africa, non-military issues such as poverty and inequality manifest themselves in a high crime rate and influx of illegal immigrants. Given that the average South African income is 39 times the average Mozambican, hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans routinely migrate illegally into South Africa in search for better life opportunities (CIIR,1995:8). South Africa's relatively developed economy is a magnet for those fleeing famine, drought, economic

deprivation and conflict. There are an estimated eight million illegal people from the region, taking refuge within South Africa's borders (Solomon & Cilliers,1996:8). The economic implications of a large immigrant population to the host state is dangerous. In 1994, it was estimated that five million illegal immigrants cost the South African state R 1 985 million (Solomon & Cilliers,1996:8). To house, educate, police and give medical attention to Mozambicans alone, cost South Africa more than R 210 million in 1995 - one tenth of the entire amount budgeted for the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (CIIR,1995:10). Deporting illegal immigrants has serious implications for development prospects of a country emerging from the dire effects of apartheid with a profound socio-economic backlog. Illegal immigration, however, does not only have economic implications, but social and political as well. The rising rate of crime in small arms smuggling, drug trafficking, car hijackings, armed robbery, the spread of killer diseases such as AIDS, cholera and malaria, and prostitution; are being increasingly linked to illegal immigrants.¹⁶

Illegal immigration is nevertheless about a human condition - about people fleeing from poverty, civil war, drought and the ruins of apartheid destabilisation. "When people face famine, no fence, army or government policy will keep them from seeking - even marginally - better conditions" (CIIR,1995:10). Deporting illegal immigrants have not stopped their re-entry to South Africa. However, deportation will seriously drain the countries resources for its post-apartheid reconstruction and development. This becomes a security threat for the entire region, since "southern Africa cannot benefit from an impoverished South Africa as a result of hosting millions of migrants" (Solomon & Cilliers,1996:10). South Africa's own reconstruction and development would have to take precedence over those of other states in the region. If it cannot play the role of regional developer, then at least it may act as an intermediate agent for broader regional security and development. An effective strategy must nevertheless be based on a more holistic approach to security that also takes into account its political, economic, social and environment dimensions.

Although mass migration exemplifies a wide range of security threats that confront southern

¹⁶In 1995 police in South Africa estimated that 14% of the crime committed in the country, was by illegal immigrants (CIIR, 1995:10).

Africa, there are also other sources of insecurity that need equal attention. Landmines is one such threat. "Scattered like seeds of death" across the region, landmines have become a major source of insecurity for southern Africans (Baynham,1994:264). Southern Africa is home to the two most mine-infested countries in the world - Mozambique and Angola (Boulden,1997:10). The de-mining programme in Angola, estimates that there are about nine million landmines scattered across the country while Mozambique is known to have at least 2 million and Zimbabwe 1.5 million (Mutume,1997:11). The costs to the fragile economies of these countries are severe. Firstly, landmines have claimed the lives of thousands of civilians¹⁷ - that were productive contributors to their economies. Secondly, more hospitals had to be build and better staffed¹⁸, together with factories to manufacture artificial limbs. Thirdly, given that a landmine can be bought for as little as R10, but costs up R5 000 each to detect and remove - which makes the cost of unearthing southern Africa's estimated 20 million landmines about R80 billion - the economies of these mine-infested states would be seriously weakened and drained (Baynham,1994:264 & Lund,1997:1).

Moreover, landmines cannot tell the difference between "friend or foe, war and ceasefire" (Tutu in Lund, 1997:1). The longterm implications for our mine-infested neighbours are that civilians become casualties even fifty years after the war has ended. Agriculture and Industries are seriously affected since large tracts of land are made impossible to farm or live on¹⁹ and "fields, roads, rivers, powerlines and factories cannot be utilised until the mines are removed" (Boulden,1997:10). Clearly economic recovery cannot occur until infrastructure and resources are freed from the cost of mines and demining. In southern Africa, the security, meaningful development and survival of the people are, therefore, inconceivable without a total removal of and complete ban on, landmines.

¹⁷In Angola 700 000 people have already been killed by landmines while one in every 470 persons has had a limb amputated. More than 20 000 Mozambicans have died from landmines, whilst thousands more have been maimed (Mutume, 1997:11) "In the first six months of 1994 alone, the Mount Darwin hospital, 110 km south of Harare, has dealt with half a dozen cases of people seriously injured after stepping on mines" (Baynham,1994:226).

¹⁸For example the hospital in Cuito, Angola, has only two medical technicians for every twelve landmine victims (SABC,1995:television 1 news at 8pm, 4 Oct.).

¹⁹Since only 10% of Zimbabwe's mines have been lifted, mines continue to prevent the use of 1 million hectares of prime farmland (Africa analysis, 21 March 1997:7).

Other non-military threats to southern Africa's security relate to population growth, ethno-centric nationalism, small arms proliferation, food security, water shortages and the spread of AIDS. These threats need not only the functional role of the state to be resolved, but moreover require security to be a much more encapsulating and broadened concept. An uncontrolled growth of southern Africa's population would only fuel the rapid urbanisation and mass migration in the region. Since "uncontrolled population growth seems to be on the increase especially in poorer countries in region, such as Malawi and Swaziland", these weaker economies would need to be firstly strengthened (Solomon & Cilliers,1996:7). The lack of food security has, in the past and continues in the present to "foment riots and public disorder", most notably in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Swaziland (Solomon & Cilliers,1996:11). Moreover the region increasingly witnesses the potency of resource-based conflicts. For example the problems arising from scarcity of water raises the prospect of competition for and conflict over water resources. In southern Africa such conflict has already occurred when "Botswana and Zimbabwe nearly went to war in the early 1990's", when Zimbabwe attempted to construct a dam on the Saabi River, thereby reducing the flow of the river downstream to Botswana (Solomon & Cilliers,1996:22 & Solomon,1996:1).

Botswana has also strained relations with Namibia over a dispute about the ownership of a 3,5 square kilometre island along the Chobe River which officially forms their common border . The failure of two country's to arrive at any "amicable solution has resulted in the matter being refered to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)" (Goncalves,1996:12). These incidents display the potential for conflict when states, even in southern Africa, pursue relative gains in the name of their national interest. It is imperative, therefore that the 'new' outlook to security for southern Africa considers resource-based conflicts to be potentially dangerous for the region .

Free from conflict brought about by the bipolarity of the Cold War, and military aggression by the apartheid state, an holistic and broadened approach to security for the region should, however, not mean a total eradication of military threats. The likelihood of an arms race being triggered in the region seem great "with South Africa, the military (and economic) giant of southern Africa planning to refurbish its army at the tune of R2.9 billion a year for the next ten years" (Sechele,1996:5). Botswana and Namibia have also embarked on a similar modernisation of their

armed forces²⁰. Even though the region encounters a reduction to external military aggression, member states still do not feel safe with the retention and modernisation of militaries in other states both regionally and internationally. For example, the commander of Botswana's Defence Force has argued that they are building a "force which will deter any potential threat" (Solomon & Cilliers,1996:23). Even South Africa's Defence Minister, Joe Modise, "when asked: Who is South Africa's potential enemy, Modise is quoted as having replied: Who is Britain's enemy? Who is America's enemy? And why are they doing away with their conventional submarines and building nuclear ones? Who is Botswana's enemy? Why are they buying tanks?" (Sechele,1996:5).

5.3 DEVELOPING A SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR SOUTHERNAFRICA: REGIME or COMMUNITY

Booth(1994:10-15) maintains that there are two possible forms or frameworks of security cooperation that could be adopted and implemented in southern Africa. The first model for regional security cooperation is a security community where the mutual and compatible interests of the region are of prime importance. The second framework is that of a security regime which is based on a neo-realist, statist world view in which the interests of the state are of prime concern. The need for southern African states to foster greater security cooperation, will have to accommodate the SADC principles of sovereignty of member states and non-interference in one another's internal affairs.

A SECURITY COMMUNITY

Given the transnational character of threats to southern Africa's security, many commentators, like Sam Nolutshungu (1994), have forwarded a strong case for a southern African security community. A security community is where members do not target each other in a military sense, because inter-state relations are of such a nature that there are dependable expectations of long-

²⁰Botswana is reported to have expanded its defence force to 10 000, placed orders for 13 F-5 fighter bombers from Canada, 50 German-made Leopard tanks and 200 troop carriers from the Netherlands, at the cost of US\$ 100 million, in addition to the construction of a massive American "encouraged" air base 105 kilometres from the capital city, Gaborone (Goncalves,1996:12)

lasting peace and "problems will be solved without resort to large-scale physical force" (Deutsch in van Aardt,1997:7). According to Karl Deutsch(1957), a security community grows out of the mutual compatibility of values, strong economic ties, multifaceted social, political and cultural transactions, mutual responsiveness and mutual predictability of behaviour (Deutsch in Booth & Vale,1995:290). Can a sense of regional community - the only guarantee of long-term security - therefore, grow in a region in which there has been so much enmity and violence? Community-building in southern Africa, both in theory and practice, will be a complex process and should rather be seen as an end to which states in the region must work towards.

The concept of a security community, developed by Deutsch in the 1950's argued that a security community was formed among participating states when their peoples, and particularly their political elite, held stable expectations of peace between themselves in the present and the future. According to Deutsch the two main indicators of a security community are:

- * where policy-makers of political units and their respective societies cease to contemplate the possibility of mutual warfare; and
- * where states cease to allocate resources for building military capabilities aimed at each other. (Solomon & Cilliers,1996:22)

In addition to Deutsch's criteria, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1981:418), have argued that the presence of an external military threat is a central factor in the formation of a security community. Security communities are by nature intent on and committed to the defence of its members against external threats and aggression, be these defined in terms of conventional or 'new' security threats (van Aardt,1997(a):7). The European Union, which is probably the most successful example of regional cooperation, began less on the basis of solidarity than the real fear of another war in a Europe, already ravaged by two major wars within the first half of this century. In southern Africa it was apartheid destabilisation that compelled regional states to form the Frontline States (FLS) and the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), as institutional frameworks for member states' mutual defence. To what extent does southern Africa, in the post-apartheid and post-Cold War era, meet these criteria?

Although the states of the region may not target each other militarily, their pursuit for relative

economic and military empowerment, does allow for the predictable peace, mutual defence or mutual compatibility of values, required in a security community. As the end of apartheid and the Cold War "gives way to a new economic pragmatism", regional states would be occupied with their national economic interests rather than that of the regions (Swatuk,1991:xv). For example, SADC states which have higher tariffs are not likely to accept the proposed trade protocol that aims to remove all forms of trade barriers, "because it would undermine their economies" (Kapata,1996:33). The weakness of southern African economies, therefore, require "scarce resources to be channeled toward strengthening state-based economies so that a more selective, nuanced and efficient security policy emerges" (Swatuk,1991:xv). This means that the region cannot be made the primary referent, as in the case of a security community.

Moreover an "institutionalised centre of regional cooperation" and a regional "civil society", which are the other "agents" in a security community, are not adequately developed for the complete formation of a southern African security community (van Aardt,1997(a):8). A radical interpretation of a security community that does not envisage becoming a larger state in fear of it being "constructed like the older small ones, behaving in the traditional way on their account in international organisations", is nevertheless based on the mutual interests of participating states, which is absent in southern Africa (Taylor in van Aardt,1997:11). If the problem in southern Africa is weak states, then, to use Booth's (1994:22) words, it is important that a regional security regime be appropriately adapted to local conditions - which means that state-building be given greater priority in institutionalising regional security.

A SECURITY REGIME

According to Maxi van Aardt's (1997(a):5) analysis, the essence of a security regime is one of cooperation within a framework of shared norms of reciprocity and restraint that builds and strengthens a society of states through which defence and promotion of its individual members national and security interests are pursued. A security regime is based on cooperation at the regional level "as a compromise through which the negative effects of international anarchy are mitigated, order and stability are maintained and national security of member states enhanced" (van Aardt, 1997(a):5). Regimes, for Steven Krasner (1983:1), are sets of implicit or explicit

principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. In Booth's (1994:11) words:

"Regimes in international relations consist of common rules, norms, principles and decision-making procedures that permits governments to be restraint in the belief that others will reciprocate....In the security field this involves the promotion of peace not through the accumulation of weaponry but through reciprocity and restraint based on a shared sense of security interdependence"

Regimes and regime theory are statist even though most definitions do not single out states as the only actors in the creation and development of regimes. What distinguishes such an approach to security from the conventional military-political conceptualisation, is that it contains a broader definition of security which includes various dimensions and places people as a prime referent of security. The security of the state is just as, if not more, important, in order to attain the capacity to be an efficient means for its 'citizens' security. Weak states, like those of southern Africa, will necessitate that "state-building be given greater priority in security policy, even more than confidence-building" (Booth,1994:22).

Other central features of a security regime, identified by van Aardt (1997(a):5), are that "it is based on a strong sectoral approach to security and it is an incremental approach in which norms develop and rules formulated, as needs arise and patterns of behaviour established over time that would determine or at the very least influence new developments". In short, a security regime is something that states, whilst remaining separate and sovereign entities, participate in to the extent of maintaining and promoting their individual security interests.

For a security regime to be institutionalised in Southern Africa, several conditions, according to Andre du Pisani (1992:11), will have to be met. These include:

- * the strengthening and sustaining both national and intra-regional civil society;
- * conceiving of security and peace as the need to transcend the jurisdiction of individual states (which in turn calls for a redefinition of the concept sovereignty);
- * developing inter-state institutional capabilities within state and other bureaucracies;

- * expanding and improving transport infrastructure and other physical communication networks;
- * and molding a regional identity, at both the institutional and symbolic levels.

INSTITUTIONALISING SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

In exploring security cooperation and interdependence in southern Africa, "the Windhoek Declaration of 1992 that established the SADC, called for a framework of cooperation which provides for strengthening regional solidarity, peace and security in order for the people to live and work together in peace and harmony" (Cilliers,1996:19). According to Nathan & Honwana (1995), the Ministerial workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security, convened by SADC in July 1994 at Windhoek, was a watershed event for two reasons. Firstly it went beyond interministerial discussions to include a wide range of individuals and institutions from the region. Secondly it articulated a framework upon which to build a regional security regime (Swatuk & Omari, 1997:19).

A sub-regional body, closely affiliated with SADC and with long experience of regional cooperation in terms of conventional security, namely the FLS, was therefore to be converted into a regional security institution - the Association of Southern African states (ASAS) - under the umbrella of SADC. This conversion process was nevertheless marked by opposition from member states who favoured the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) being the political pillar for the new security body (van Aardt,1996:15). During the August 1994 SADC Summit it was however decided that these two recommendations should be merged for the establishment of a security sector to be formalised at the 1995 Summit.

However what was thought to be a mere formality resulted in the matter being heavily politicised and "the issue was deferred for another year to provide more time for consultation about the structure, terms of reference and operational procedures for the sector" (van Aardt,1997(b):147). Two issues about control emerged to prevent the formalisation and creation of a regional security structure. The first, was whether the new sector should fall under the heads of states and governments of the region, a decision that would make it a rather informal regime similar to the

FLS, or whether it should be a formal sector falling under the authority of the SADC secretariat (van Aardt,1996:15).

Secondly, no agreement could be reached on whether this sector, formal or not, should be co-ordinated and chaired by a single country, or whether the sector should be co-ordinated by a revolving chair. Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Namibia were in favour of the formal sector with the exclusion of the ASAS, while South Africa, Tanzania, Mozambique and Zimbabwe favoured the idea of ASAS, rejecting the more formalised structure (van Aardt,1996:16). The preference for an informal arrangement has been due to the greater degree of flexibility needed in the conduct of inter-state relations and the speed and ease with which state officials can communicate with each other. The delays in the formalisation of a security sector, nevertheless revealed that member states were not willing to allow the organisation (SADC) to play the role of an independent or supranational actor, or for any one state or leader to exercise long-term authority over their interests.

After two more meetings in January and May 1996 the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (herein referred to as the Organ) was launched in June that year. The establishment of the Organ, which was indeed a victory for the negotiating Ministers, not only brings to close the transformation of SADCC to SADC, but more importantly, "it constitutes the formalisation of a more inclusive approach to security in southern Africa" (van Aardt,1997(b):144). The creation of the Organ and its functioning must be assessed to determine whether it can provide the conditions and mechanisms necessary to establish and develop a security community in the southern African region.

The legal basis and guiding principles of the Organ, as set out in article 4 of the SADC treaty, include:

- * sovereign equality of all member states;
- * respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence;
- * achievement of solidarity, peace and security in the region;
- * observance of human rights, democracy and the rule of law;

- * promotion of economic development in the SADC region in order to achieve for all member states, equity, balance and mutual benefit;
- * peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation and arbitration; and
- * military intervention of whatever nature shall be decided upon only after all possible remedies have been exhausted in accordance with the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations. (Campbell,1997:5).

At the SADC Summit in Blantyre during September 1997, heads of states were once again at "loggerheads" over the institutional framework that would guide the newly created Organ. The draft protocol on the Organ empowers it to intervene in intra-state conflicts including coups and large scale violence upon invitation by the affected country. However if the invitation "is not forthcoming, the Organ should endeavour to persuade the country to allow it to mediate" (Goncalves,1997:10). This carte blanche on the Organ to intervene in domestic issues of member states goes against the guiding principles of the Organ itself. President Mandela, believes that the Organ should not become an African version of NATO, with a free hand to meddle in the domestic problems of individual member states. At the Blantyre Summit he asserted that, "Amongst SADC's basic principles, the respect for sovereignty of member states and non-interference in one another's internal affairs are the basis of good governance on the inter-state level" (Mandela quoted in Gancalves,1997:10).

Zimbabwe and its government sees things differently, insisting that while the Organ must operate within the overall institutional framework of SADC, it has to maintain a certain level of autonomy, under a distinct chair, and with specific summits being held to discuss the Organ's operations. This position has been primarily due to the lack of trust Zimbabwe has in the Mandela Government. "In Zimbabwe's eyes, the barrage of white civil servants responsible for formulating Mandela's foreign, defence and security policies are more concerned with perpetuating white privileges and preventing South Africa from active participation in African peace keeping operations" (Goncalves,1997:11). With a result the rift within the organisation has become so deep that a compromise, according to SADC diplomats, seems highly unlikely. Fernando Goncalves (1997:10) asks in this regard, "But what is so dear with the Organ, that it has for the first time in 17 years of SADC's history so publicly divided the organisation to the

extent where discussions even at the summit level have become so acrimonious?"

The objectives of the Organ, place heavy emphasis on political and diplomatic mechanisms for securing the region. Yet according to van Aardt (1997(b):151), these are the least developed in terms of practical implementation and institutional structure. And in addition to not establishing an 'early warning system', the Organ has allowed very little involvement of civil society in its operationalisation. More importantly, the lack of connection and formal interaction between the social and economic wing and the politics and security wing (the Organ), is problematic for the implementation of a wider conceptualisation of security that is needed in southern Africa.

Southern Africa's current security threats which range from mass migration to landmines, are related to the economic strength of member states. Davies (1994:3) has, accordingly argued, that socio-economic problems constitute the main threats to regional security. In other words, while migrants escape impoverished economies, large sums of money are required to remove landmines. However equating security with socio-economic development is, presently, not being institutionalised at a regional level. This is because, "the weaknesses of national institutions are automatically transferred to regional organisations" (Nathan,1994:14). For southern Africa, therefore, rudimentary peace, security and development in the absence of strong, legitimate states", will be difficult, if not unattainable (du Pisani,1992:13). To deliver security to the people, the SADC would need to "change from the conventional preoccupation with short-term problems to a long-term perspective of not only maintaining security, but actually building it" (van Aardt,1997(b):153).

In the meantime, therefore member states have been involved in implementing 'ad hoc' forms of a security regime²¹. In other words southern African states have opted for informal arrangements instead of "formal procedures in the conduct of inter-state security relations because 'structured informality' allows for a greater degree offlexibility" (Honwana,1995:67). A major component of this "structured informality", evident in regional security co-operation, has been bilateral security agreements between South Africa and neighbouring states, on a variety of issues

²¹This thesis uses this term to conceptualise the present form or framework of security co-operation in southern Africa. The essence of such form of co-operation is that it is a temporary arrangement to achieve the more permanent and institutionalised framework - a security regime.

of mutual interest. Examples include measures to counter weapon and drug smuggling, cattle rustling and vehicle theft, disaster relief, security training and assistance, and policing of maritime exclusion zones²². The outcomes of these agreements have been rather positive and essential for the actual building or institutionalising of a security regime for the region. For example, the agreement between South Africa and Mozambique to counter the trade in small arms led to a joint operation (code-named Rachel), during which the task force destroyed more than a thousand weapons (Cilliers,1996:14).

In addition to these bi-lateral agreements, the meeting in February 1996, in South Africa, where police from the region discussed strategies for the sub-continent's security, police from South Africa, Zambia, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Botswana completed their first multilateral police operation, from April 6-13 that year, in northern Botswana which involved searching 339 vehicles at Kazungula border post (SouthScan,1996:142).

Furthermore, southern African defence and police chiefs met in Cape Town, for a week, from 4 September 1995, to find common solutions to the region's security threats. Among the issues discussed were the common training of security forces, the standardisation of equipment, and the future of peacekeeping and the circumstances under which a regional military force can enter another country. As a result in May 1997, the first attempt to train southern African armies in joint peacekeeping operations took place in eastern Zimbabwe. Named 'Blue Hungwe' (Blue Eagle), this exercise which was organised by Britain and Zimbabwe, brought together 1 400 soldiers from ten countries (Shaw,1997:13).

In September 1997, a naval exercise in the west Indian Ocean, by a South African task force, aimed at improving and promoting regional defence co-ordination, took place. This exercise took the form of joint exercises, the training of inter-state defence security committee officers on

²²On 12 June 1995 South Africa and Mozambique signed a comprehensive agreement on crossborder policing aimed at combatting drugs and arms smuggling and vehicle theft. This agreement contained provisions for joint border patrols and sharing of specialised training and technology (Cilliers,1996:14). In addition even individual provinces are becoming involved in the execution of their states' security, when the Mpumalanga province in South Africa signed an agreement with the neighbouring provinces of Maputo and Gaza, in Mozambique, on security measures against highway bandits, wildlife protection, organised tourist promotion, agriculture, the use of common water resources and training of administrative cultural and sports staff (Cilliers,op.cit.). Similar agreements have been concluded with Lesotho and Swaziland.

board the task force ships and conducting patrol exercises that focussed on monitoring illegal fishing activity (Dodd,1997:8).

5.4 CONCLUSION

Although both approaches to regional security (as outlined above), are concerned with the security of the people, individual state interests, for its strengthening, will need to be accommodated for in the institutionalising of regional security. A security regime is the appropriate framework. However inspite of increased recognition of the need to coordinate matters of regional security, in southern Africa, 'hiccups' in creating mechanisms and institutionalising security, demonstrate the complexity of attaining collective security at the regional level.

At the heart of the problem is the lack of political will to surrender issues of national interest and sovereignty, as well as the desire by nation states to take care of their own security affairs rather than place them in the hands of a supranational structure which most fear they can have no control over. Closely related to this has been the perception that South Africa, now a full member of SADC, may use its immense economic and military advantage to impose its own agenda with little regard for the interests of its weaker neighbours. In Peter Vale's (1997) words: "a political truism applies to southern Africa in the mid-1990's: weak commitments by weak states create weak regional communities" (Vale,1994:xxii).

The terms for collective regional security that are based on the model of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), now the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as an example of a security community cannot, presently, be established in southern Africa. The success of institutionalising security in Europe was due to the "sharing of common values, parity in levels of development and similarity of geo-political constellations" (Cilliers,1996:14). By comparison, southern African member states clearly do not enjoy a parity in levels of development amongst themselves, (as in the case of Europe) to ensure for full institutionalisation of a security community. And because members states cannot even fulfil the

pre-conditions for a security regime, there will be a need for them, in the short term, to continue to cooperate on an 'ad hoc' basis.

In southern Africa, as in the rest of the continent, an adverse external environment, the collapse of prices on primary commodities, mounting external indebtedness and declining net flows of investment, all contribute to the weakening of member states and their failing economies. Moreover, because all member states are not equally developed, the problem of "vertical integration" into the 'North' undermines their capacity to "come together in cooperative and integrative ventures, and might even constitute a potential for inter-state conflict as southern African states begin to compete for comparative advantage in trade with the 'North' " (Mandaza,1995:30). Unequal development between nations - even if bound together by geographical proximity - can result in them having different perceptions about security and development policies for the entire region. If institutionalising security in southern Africa, is to move beyond an Heads of State Summit, "the underlying idea of regional cooperation must be, the strengthening of member states in order to provide security and the necessary conditions for development for their people" (van Aardt,1997(b):159). Although regional security co-operation in southern Africa is a complex process, states are, nevertheless, seen to be taking strides within "structured informalities" or an 'ad hoc' regime, as a means to an actual security regime (Honwana,1995:67).

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

In the aftermath of the Cold War and apartheid, a new security order gave rise to two opposing theoretical approaches for the future security of southern Africa. Although both these approaches have adopted a broadened conceptualisation of security, they differ on stipulating the object referent of security. A postmodernist approach aims to 'dislodge' the state as the primary referent of security because of its past inability to be an effective means for its citizens' security. This thesis has argued that it is the type of state that needs to be questioned rather than attributing the poor record of securing its citizens on the state per se. Clearly, the collapse of the Soviet Union has not brought an end to the 'North/South' conflict or the expansion of capitalism. The search for security in southern Africa will depend on the region's adaptation to an international system where constraints based on superpower alliances have faded to give world economic forces unrivalled domination.

This has meant that states' national self-interest is now dictated by economic pragmatism for development that is crucial for their security. So contrary to the wishes of the postmodernist, state security, the strengthening of 'weak' states, will need to be retained as a primary referent in southern Africa (and other regions alike). State security cannot, however, be synonymous with military security or the security of a ruling elite, nor can threats be confined to inter-state conflict. Current threats are as much developmental as they are security challenges. A neo-realist approach that retains the state as a primary object of security, while moving beyond the traditional military fixation and acknowledging other referents, is therefore the appropriate conceptualisation for southern Africa's security in a changing world environment.

In a world where geo-economic stratifications will increasingly force Africa to the periphery, neither southern Africa, nor South Africa, can hope to escape its inherent effects and as a result will have only a minor position in world affairs. With the demise of a dual economic system there is also a greater move by states away from the state-directed economies to more market-orientated economies. These together with a demand for greater liberalisation, as part of a 'globalising' world economy, are the new constraints which states will have to adapt to for economic development that is integral to the security of 'weak' states. But this does not spell

doom for the role of the state. As the executive secretary of SADC, Kaire Mbuende, argued, "there will always be a role for the State, to create an environment conducive to investment and development, a stable and peaceful region and also corrective measures in terms of redirecting and facilitating equitable distribution of resources, including investment capital at the national and regional level" (Mbuende in SAPEM interview, 1994:32).

In the post-Cold War and post-apartheid era, southern Africa has gone through major political, social and economic transformations. Central to these changes are the participation of a democratic South Africa in regional security and development, and the movement towards greater regional integration. However the weaknesses within individual states, including that of South Africa's, does not allow members to achieve the levels of co-operation needed for a formal *institutionalising of security or development at the regional level*. South Africa's own development, hampers its involvement in regional development and dispels expectations of being the "Fairy Godmother" in southern Africa (Solomon, 1997:1). In the meantime "pragmatic functionalism" must be adopted because of the tremendous advantages that could accrue from functional co-operation in using South Africa's relatively sophisticated infrastructure to coordinate and facilitate projects for regional development (Jammie, 1992:13). South Africa's international credibility and economic position, can also be used to promote and secure greater economic support, in the form of debt relief, for example, with the 'North'.

In the 1990's, threats to southern Africa's security are non-conventional and quite clearly, transnational. These characteristics compels states to seek co-operation in attaining a more secure environment. But given individual states' weaknesses, their capacity to secure their citizenry within a regional framework must accommodate national interests of members. A security regime, which in essence involves a broadened approach to security while accommodating states' national interests, is the appropriate mechanism for the institutionalisation of regional security in southern Africa. However even formalising a security regime, at present, seems problematic. To build a security regime member states are, in the interim, forming ad hoc institutions for regional co-operation on security and development. This is part of the process required by weak states to attain the capacity of not only maintaining peace but more importantly building security. After all, "regional security will only be achieved if short-term goals match short-term

capabilities” (Swatuk & Omari, 1997:22). In adapting to a changing world environment, these are new rules that will ensure southern Africans the security and development needed, not only for survival into the next millennium, but moreover to enter the fast lane and of becoming a winning region.

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