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Flooding of Chinese goods and their impacts on exports of other countries: a firm-level investigation

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Abstract

China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) has shifted international trade and the literature on its impact on other countries' exports is still scant. This paper aims to contribute to this literature by investigating the impact of Chinese expansion in the international trade on the exports of three Latin-American (LA) countries: Brazil, Mexico and Peru. Considering developed and developing countries as destinations from these LA countries, results suggest that these three countries were affected by the insertion of China into the international trade. Overall, firms of these three countries lost 5.7% of their exports to the United States of America (USA) and 7.2% to the European Union due to Chinese expansion. In terms of volume, these three countries lost USD 9 billion of exports just in the US market. Comparing the outcomes between countries, Brazil seems to be the most affected compared to Mexico and Peru in relative terms. Looking at the margins and types of goods, final goods suffered more from the Chinese competition compared to intermediaries, yet it is not feasible to distinguish which margin, intensive or extensive, was mostly affected.

Keywords: China. Export. Firm level.

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1. Introduction

Trade policies (such as trade liberalization, trade agreements and so forth) have dominated international trade literature as the main economic shock to affect trade. However, this emphasis began to be questioned by some scholars. For instance, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2016) argue that other economic shocks, such as Chinese productivity growth and its entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, became more relevant in affecting international trade than trade policies *per se*. Different scholars have already started to investigate the impacts of China on developed and developing countries (ACEMOGLU *et al.*, 2016, AUTOR; DORN; HANSON, 2013 and PIERCE; SCHOTT, 2016 for the United States of America [USA], MION; ZHU, 2013 for Belgium, UTAR; RUIZ, 2013 and BLYDE *et al.*, 2017 for Mexico, COSTA; GARRED; PESSOA, 2016, MOREIRA; LAGE DE SOUSA, 2017 and PAZ, 2017 for Brazil). Most of these papers focuses on labor market adjustments and some on firm's efficiency.¹ Although Chinese import penetration has displaced some domestic producers, it has also substituted imports from other countries in a diverse range of markets. While the effects on the former are widely explored, the impacts on the latter are still scant. Closer to the spirit of this paper is Bas and Bombarda (2012), since it investigates the liberalization occurred in Asian countries on the French exports. This paper tries to fill in the gap in the literature on how exports from other developing countries have been affected by the entrance of China into the WTO using export micro data from three developing countries: Brazil, Mexico and Peru.

This paper contributes to that literature on the effects of trade on the extensive margin. A part of the literature investigates the impact of trade in general on the extensive margin, such as Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006) and their results suggest a substantial impact of trade on the extensive margin. Another part assesses the impact of trade policies on the extensive margin either new variety or new destination (KLENOW; RODRIGUEZ-CLARE, 1997, ARKOLAKIS *et al.*, 2008 and GOLDBERG *et al.*, 2010), while another on the extensive margin of entry (see CALIENDO *et al.*, 2015 as an example). Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Arkolakis *et al.* (2008) found limited impact of trade policy on the extensive margins in Costa Rica, yet these results are not corroborated in Goldberg *et al.* (2010) in India since their results suggest an impact on new products. Moreover, Caliendo *et al.* (2015) evidences infer that trade policy has a large impact on firm entry and the effect is more pronounced in developed rather than in developing countries. Therefore, much more work in this area should be pursued in order to have a general assessment of the effects of trade on the extensive margins, as pointed out by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2016).

¹ Only Blyde *et al.* (2017) and Moreira and Lage de Sousa (2017) investigate the effect on another firms' performance, for example productivity. All other papers listed investigate only labor outcomes.

Given this background, this paper adds to the literature on two fronts. First, it assesses the impact of an economic shock, Chinese shock, more relevant to international trade than a trade policy *per se*. Moreover, it was a shock on international scale which has affected a diverse range of countries not only inward to their economies but also outward. Second, it contributes to the recent investigation of the margins of trade, which has received increasing attention by the literature.

In order to investigate this issue, this paper uses export firm-level data from Latin-American (LA) countries representing three different economic trade blocks: Brazil (Mercosur); Peru (Andean Community); Mexico (Nafta).² Using detailed firm-level data, this investigation evaluates how much firms from these countries have reduced their exports to relevant markets, such as the United States and the European Union (EU), and to other developing countries, which is represented by the bilateral trade between them. Additionally, differences between intensive and extensive margins are explored as well as product classification between final and intermediate goods. Results suggest that firms in these countries were negatively affected by the expansion of Chinese goods in any kind of markets. Moreover, final goods suffered more from the Chinese competition compared to intermediaries, yet it is not clear which margin, intensive or extensive, was mostly affected by the Chinese shock. Although it is not distinguishable between intensive and extensive margins, outcomes are robust to find an impact of a trade shock on the margins, which is contribution to the literature which was controversial as described in Goldberg and Pavcnik (2016).

In order to explore this issue, this paper is structured as follows apart from this introduction. Section 2 provides an economic background of these countries export performance after the emergence of China in the international trade market. Methodology is described in Section 3 followed by data description in the next section. Section 5 provides the results in different markets. Different angles of exports are explored in Section 6, such as intensive *versus* extensive margins as well as distinct types of goods. The last section provides the concluding remarks.


2. Economic background

The three countries investigated in this paper have close ties to the USA and the EU. For instance, nearly 90% of Mexican and a quarter of the Brazilian and Peruvian exports were destined to the US market in 2000. After 13 years, their export shares to the US have reduced to 78.8% for Mexico, 10.2% for Brazil and 18.3% for Peru. One part is explained by the increased importance of China in the export basket from these LA countries, but another is their loss of market share in the US market. In order to have an idea on how much these countries have lost market share in the US and European market, Graph 1 presents the share of these three countries in

² For analysis on how China has impacted the export performance in Latin America using aggregate data, see Jenkins, Peter and Moreira (2008), Machado and Ferraz (2006) and Pereira (2014).

both markets from the 1990s until 2013.³ As shown, similarities between these two destinations exist, but also there are distinct patterns. One different fact is that China already had a larger share of the EU imports compared to these three countries in the 1990s, but the opposite occurs in the US market. Another distinction between these US and EU markets is that the shares of Chinese exports and the share of these three LA countries were stable in the EU market in the 1990s, yet an upward trend in the US market is perceived for both (China and LA countries) during the same period. The path changes completely after 2000 for China and these three LA countries. On one hand, China remains acquiring market share in the USA yet at a higher speed, reaching 20% of total US imports. On the other hand, these LA countries stalled completely around 12.5% in the 21st century. In the EU market, Chinese shares jumped to over 10% while imports from these three LA countries remained less than 2%.

Graph 1. Import share of China and three LA countries (Brazil, Mexico and Peru) in two markets: the USA and the EU



Source: Elaborated by the author, based on UN Comtrade.

Overall, China gained substantial market share in the US and EU markets since their ascension into the WTO (10.6 p.p. and 6.7 p.p., respectively), while these three LA countries stagnated. The increased participation of Chinese goods in these markets enhanced the competition for exporters from those three LA countries.

Chinese export success is not restricted to the main markets, US and EU; thus, it is also interesting to consider the impact of China on the exports from these three LA countries to other developing countries. As Brazil, Mexico and Peru are considered similar in terms of their export performance, according to the World Bank, considering each of them as a destination from another one seems reasonable. In other words, how much was lost from Brazilian exporters due to the imports of Chinese products in Mexico and Peru is considered in this investigation. This might be important for Brazil and to a less extent to Mexico and Peru, since Brazilian manufacturing exports to Latin America is a relevant share of its total exports.

³ The share of these LA countries is the total US or EU imports from these three countries divided by the total imports from the USA and EU.

3. Methodology

Our empirical strategy begins by pooling all export information from three origin countries (Brazil, Mexico and Peru) to five destinations: USA, EU and the other two LA countries. For instance, Mexico and Peru are the destinations considered in the Brazilian exports, and so forth. For econometric specification, this paper follows the commonly empirical trade literature which works with firm-level data, sometimes named “shift-share” analysis. While the dependent variable is at firm level, the main important independent variable is aggregated at product level, which provides an exogenous measure for this investigation. In summary, basic econometric specification utilized in this paper is described by equation 1.

$$\text{Log}(Y_{iodp,t+1}) = c + \gamma \log(\text{ChinaShare}_{dp,t}) + \alpha V'_{iodp,t} + \mu_{iodp} + \theta_t + \varepsilon_{iodp,t} \quad (1)$$

$Y_{iodp,t+1}$ is the export value of firm i from country o to destination d of product p in time $t+1$, $\text{ChinaShare}_{dp,t}$ is the Chinese export share in destination d of product p in time t , $V'_{iodp,t}$ is a vector of controls, μ_{iodp} is the firm-origin-destination-product fixed effect (FE), θ_t is the year fixed effect and $\varepsilon_{iodp,t}$ is the error term. In other words, the estimations consider fixed effects in terms of firm, product, origin, destination and year. Therefore, all time-invariant characteristics which could explain any of these dimensions, such as country’s geographical location, natural comparative advantage to produce a certain product, bilateral trade advantage, or even firm’s location close to good infrastructure, are captured by these fixed effects.

Moreover, the specification has one-year lag between the independent and dependent variable to provide a more exogenous independent variable, which is commonly used in the literature, see Bas and Bombarda (2012) as an example. As the main variables are in logs, the coefficient gamma (γ) is the elasticity between the import share of Chinese goods and the firm’s export of each product.

For controls, aside from the fixed effects, a combination of time-variant characteristics is also considered. First, total exports of the firm to the world is utilized to capture any size variation at firm level. Since the independent variable is lagged one-year, then the total amount exported in the previous year is utilized as a measure of the firms’ size. As there are other factors at firm level that vary over time, such as efficiency measured by productivity, firm-year fixed effect is included to capture the entire time-varying characteristic at firm level that affects the firms’ capability to export.

Other two extra controls are considered at product level. First, goods exported from these countries face different import tariffs in distinct destinations. Therefore, effective import tariffs faced by each product at HS 4 level in each destination is included to absorb that, as used in Li and Moreira (2018). Products from these

countries might have a different performance over the years, for example a policy aiming to improve the productivity of specific products, thus share of each product for each country in the world market aside China is calculated to capture any kind of improvement of comparative advantage obtained during the period or even any kind of change in bilateral trade agreement.

After having the full picture of the exports of all three investigated countries in four markets, being two developed markets and another two developing countries, it is interesting to break down the sample in order to investigate the effects in each market. First, effects in the EU and US markets should be investigated. Therefore, all the firm-level database from Brazil, Mexico and Peru are pooled to see if the Chinese share in the American and European markets have reduced the level of exports of these three LA countries as a whole. In order to estimate this, one fixed effect should be discarded as only one destination for all countries is considered, therefore fixed effect shifts from firm-product-origin-destination to firm-product-origin only. However, firms in each country face different market access, for instance, Mexican firms have Nafta yet Brazilian and Peruvian do not, yet when estimating by country of origin, it is relevant to remove another fixed effect (origin), therefore fixed effect remains solely as firm-product.

Aside from time-invariant characteristics, this paper estimates the model considering some characteristics jointly with year. This strategy aims to control for any characteristic-year fixed effects in order to capture any change overtime from specific characteristics, ranging from origin-destination-product-firm-year FE to only firm-year FE. As a consequence, any change in trade policy between two countries will be absorbed by this FE as well as any modification in firm's performance, depending on how data are structured. As described in the time-invariant fixed effects, each data used will require a different characteristic-year fixed effect, ranging from firm-product-origin-destination-year fixed effect to only firm-product-year fixed effect depending on which subsample is considered.

Although the main variable is lagged in time and aggregated at product level, it remains endogenous since an exogenous demand shock might be correlated to the participation of China in the total import from each country. Following Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) instrumental variable (IV) methodology, the share of China in a similar region lagged another three years is used as an instrument. For example, when investigating the effects of Chinese imports in the US market on the Brazilian exports, the share of Chinese imports in the EU market is used as an instrument lagged in time, and vice-versa. For exports to other LA countries, information between them is triangulated. Since these countries are similar in terms of export performance, using the remaining country as an instrument seems reasonable. For instance, the share of Chinese imports in Peru is used as the instrument lagged in time when estimating the impact of Chinese goods in the exports of Brazilian firms to Mexico, and so forth.

4. Data

To implement this investigation, export firm-level dataset from the three countries mentioned previously is utilized: Brazil, Mexico and Peru. Peruvian and Mexican datasets are from the Export Dynamic Database created by the World Bank, see Fernandes, Freund and Pierola (2016) for further information. While the Brazilian export data was provided by the Brazilian Trade Secretary (Secretaria de Comércio Exterior – Secex). All these data are disaggregated as firm-year-product-destination.

Different Harmonized Systems (HS) classification occurred in the investigated period. Cebeci (2015) is used as a guide to create a homogenous product classification over the years. The period available differs from each country, while Peruvian data is from 1993 until 2007, the Mexican ranges from 2000 until 2007 and the Brazilian, from 1997 until 2010. Therefore, the common period for this investigation is from 2000 until 2007, which is the base period for this paper.⁴

Our independent variable is constructed by using the UN Comtrade product-year level dataset from the following economic regions: EU, USA, Brazil, Mexico and Peru. Chinese import shares in the EU and USA are used for the three countries investigated. The information on the Chinese import share in each of the investigated countries is used in a triangular way between them, as explained in the empirical strategy.

Controls measured at product level have two different sources. Tariffs are extracted mainly from World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) but some more detailed information is obtained from the Latin-American Integration Association (its acronym Aladi in Spanish) or Central American Common Market (CACM). The value of the tariff represents the preferential tariff which each product of these countries faces in each market. For the share of each product from each country, trade information from the UN Comtrade dataset is utilized.

5. Results

First results are presented in Table 1 and they are based on estimating equation 1 using the firm-level data from the three countries pooled together to all destinations considered in this investigation. The first three columns present the outcomes using only fixed-effects approach, while the last three columns show the results using IV approach, where the share of Chinese goods in the other market lagged three years is utilized as instrument. The first columns of each method (columns 1 and 4) present results using only the time-invariant FE at firm, product, origin and

⁴ Brazilian and Peruvian datasets are also explored using the full period and results are similar to those shown in this paper and available upon request.

destination level as well as year FE. The second columns (2 and 5) incorporate the firm-year FE. The last columns (3 and 6) is the most complete specification since it considers firm-origin-destination-year FE.

Considering controls used, they all present the expected outcomes, which larger firms and those exporting products with higher comparative advantage (measured by the product share in total exports averaged at firm-level) tend to export more, while those facing larger barriers by import tariffs appear to export less. Focusing on the main investigated variable, results back up the idea that Chinese penetration in the international trade has reduced the exports of LA firms, since it is negative despite which approach is considered. Although negative, some results seem to be elastic while others not much. Using the IV estimation with all the controls available, for every 1% increase of Chinese exports to the USA, a firm in these countries diminishes its export of that good by 0.9%. It is important to mention that instrument used shows reasonable first-stage evidence.

Table 1. Chinese impact in the exports from Brazil, Mexico and Peru to the US, EU and each other markets

Variables	FE			IV FE		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ChinaShare	-0.845*** (0.061)	-1.443*** (0.027)	-0.854*** (0.029)	-2.139*** (0.198)	-1.449*** (0.028)	-0.891*** (0.031)
Size	0.029*** (0.001)	0.104*** (0.001)		0.029*** (0.001)	0.104*** (0.001)	
Country's Market Share in RoW	0.178*** (0.005)	0.351*** (0.002)	0.310*** (0.003)	0.175*** (0.005)	0.350*** (0.002)	0.310*** (0.003)
MFN tariffs	-0.171*** (0.014)	-0.134*** (0.008)	-0.180*** (0.010)	-0.164*** (0.014)	-0.135*** (0.008)	-0.179*** (0.010)
Observations	1,650,721	1,584,784	1,458,478	1,640,561	1,576,584	1,452,905
R-squared	0.116	0.417	0.468	0.106	0.335	0.340
Fixed effects						
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm-Prod-Orig-Dest FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm-Year FE	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Firm-Orig-Dest-Year FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
First stage results						
R-squared				0.331	0.335	0.340
F-stat model				3.049	3.049	3.050
F-test endog var				74410	70898	61809
Prob > F endog var				0	0	0

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at firm-product-origin-destination in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Estimating the effects in the US market is important because it was the market in which Chinese goods had an incredible growth reaching nearly 1 in every USD 5

imported from Americans. Then, focus on this market to evaluate what was the impact of Chinese imports is relevant. Table 2 shows the results in the US market following the same structure from Table 1.

Table 2. Impact of China on the exports from Brazil, Mexico and Peru in the US market

Variables	FE			IV – EU as instrument, 3-year lag		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ChinaShare in USA, 1-year lag	-0.543*** (0.077)	-1.108*** (0.033)	-0.814*** (0.035)	-1.183*** (0.272)	-1.106*** (0.042)	-0.749*** (0.044)
Size	0.037*** (0.001)	0.108*** (0.002)		0.037*** (0.001)	0.108*** (0.002)	
Country's Market Share in RoW	0.151*** (0.006)	0.325*** (0.003)	0.307*** (0.003)	0.149*** (0.006)	0.325*** (0.003)	0.307*** (0.003)
Tariff	-0.000 (0.026)	-0.043*** (0.011)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.008 (0.026)	-0.042*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.013)
Observations	1,080,043	1,004,217	965,383	1,071,976	998,761	961,625
R-squared	0.124	0.408	0.425	0.121	0.407	0.424
Fixed effects						
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm-Prod-Orig FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm-Year FE	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Firm-Orig-Year FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
First stage results						
R-squared				0.373	0.380	0.383
F-stat model				18.62	18.82	18.80
F-test endog var				43776	38118	36490
Prob > F endog var				0	0	0

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at firm-product-origin-destination in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Results in the US market remain similar to those presented in Table 1. For controls, the only difference occurs in the tariffs which become non-significant in most cases, including the most complete one. The main reason might be that existent trade agreements have removed the explanation power of tariffs in firms' export performance, especially considering that most of the observations are from Mexico which signed Nafta in the 1990s. Looking at the main investigated variable, ChinaShare, it is easy to observe that the Chinese expansion has reduced the level of exports from each firm; however, at a lower magnitude. In the most complete model, the elasticity is 0.75 which means that any 1% increase in imports from China would reduce the exports from LA firms by 0.75%.

Another important market for LA countries is the EU. Table 3 presents the results considering only this destination as a market for LA goods. Results become even more similar to Table 1, since the parameter for tariffs consistently shift back

to negative. ChinaShare persists negative across specifications as in previous results. However, the magnitude is larger in all specifications, which means that the elasticity regarding the European market is higher. Considering the most reliable estimate, column 6, an increase of 1% of Chinese exports to the EU reduces the exports by 1.6% from firms of these three LA countries. In other words, the effects on the European market is twice more intense than in the US market. This might indicate that the commercial ties between the US and these LA countries are stronger than those with the EU.

Table 3. Impact of China on the exports from Brazil, Mexico and Peru in the EU market

Variables	FE			IV – US as instrument, 3-year lag		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ChinaShare in EU, 1-year lag	-1.372*** (0.213)	-1.218*** (0.060)	-0.858*** (0.061)	-3.249*** (0.873)	-2.045*** (0.086)	-1.575*** (0.087)
Size	0.019*** (0.001)	0.104*** (0.004)		0.019*** (0.001)	0.102*** (0.004)	
Country's Market Share in RoW	0.171*** (0.011)	0.326*** (0.005)	0.305*** (0.005)	0.171*** (0.010)	0.325*** (0.005)	0.304*** (0.005)
Tariff	0.251 (0.173)	-0.175*** (0.017)	-0.156*** (0.018)	0.240 (0.174)	-0.150*** (0.018)	-0.136*** (0.019)
Observations	380,126	339,049	328,881	378,723	337,729	327,620
R-squared	0.114	0.553	0.566	0.123	0.550	0.564
Fixed effects						
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm-Prod-Orig FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm-Year FE	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Firm-Orig-Year FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
First stage results						
R-squared				0.326	0.332	0.334
F-stat model				24.86	24.36	24.46
F-test endog var				10162	8062	7751
Prob > F endog var				0	0	0

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at firm-product-origin-destination in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Analysis shifts to how Chinese import penetration in the US and the EU markets has impacted each of these three countries individually. Although these three countries are similar in terms of export performance, they still have their own particularity, especially in terms of their export destination. Table 4 shows the estimation of equation 1 for each of these three countries and the USA as a destination of their exports. The first six columns show the estimation without instruments and the last six columns, using an IV approach. Each country has two columns. Those with odd numbers do not contemplate the firm-year FE, but they include size as a control. Columns with even numbers include the firm-year FE, which drops the size as control.

Table 4. Impact of China on the exports from Brazil, Mexico and Peru in the US market by country

Variables	FE											
	BRA			PER			MEX			IV – EU as instrument, 3-year lag		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
ChinaShare in USA, 1-year lag	-0.287 (0.193)	-1.279*** (0.092)	-0.511** (0.213)	-0.783*** (0.077)	-0.551*** (0.091)	-0.743*** (0.041)	-2.091** (0.959)	-0.960*** (0.120)	-2.612*** (0.876)	-1.004*** (0.104)	-1.049*** (0.295)	-0.654*** (0.053)
Size	0.015*** (0.001)	0.036*** (0.003)	0.036*** (0.003)	0.044*** (0.001)	0.044*** (0.001)	0.044*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)	0.037*** (0.003)	0.037*** (0.003)	0.044*** (0.001)	0.044*** (0.001)
Country's Market Share in RoW	0.212*** (0.016)	0.356*** (0.010)	0.095*** (0.015)	0.284*** (0.007)	0.085*** (0.007)	0.302*** (0.004)	0.218*** (0.017)	0.356*** (0.010)	0.093*** (0.015)	0.284*** (0.007)	0.083*** (0.007)	0.302*** (0.004)
Tariff	-0.031 (0.155)	-0.176*** (0.020)	0.015 (0.057)	-0.013 (0.020)	-0.148*** (0.030)	0.451*** (0.026)	-0.038 (0.156)	-0.173*** (0.020)	0.012 (0.057)	-0.019 (0.020)	-0.137*** (0.030)	0.460*** (0.026)
Observations	161,859	137,613	88,904	81,144	829,280	746,626	161,129	137,004	88,727	80,959	822,120	743,662
R-squared	0.131	0.506	0.173	0.555	0.116	0.383	0.106	0.503	0.174	0.555	0.114	0.383
Fixed effects												
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm-Product FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm-Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
First stage results												
R-squared							0.384	0.389	0.320	0.327	0.384	0.396
F-stat model							22.87	21.08	13.09	12.77	18.70	19.38
F-test endog var							3551	2740	2455	1940	39795	33573
Prob > F endog var							0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at firm-product in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Results remain consistent with all the countries pooled together, which means: Chinese penetration in the US market has reduced the exports of firms in these three LA countries. Using or not an instrument, firms in Brazil, Peru and Mexico have their exports reduced to the USA due to the increased competition of Chinese goods. However, countries differ in terms of the effects. Looking at the IV results using firm-year FE, Brazil and Peru show elasticity equal to one, while Mexico shows a lower magnitude. For every 1% increase of Chinese imports in the US market reduced the export volume of Brazilian or Peruvian firms by around 1%, but only 0.65% from a Mexican firm. These results may suggest that countries with a trade agreement tend to suffer much less than others. For instance, Mexico has had a trade agreement with the USA since 1994 and the effect of Chinese goods on Mexican exports was inelastic and around a third lower of what Brazilian and Peruvian firms suffered.

As described previously, it is relevant to investigate the effects on the EU market. Table 5 presents the outcomes on how these three LA countries were affected by the import of Chinese goods from the EU market following the structure of Table 4. Results remain similar to those from Table 4, since the main estimated parameters, *ChinaShare*, are negative in most specifications. For comparison between countries, the most reliable result is considered, which contains the IV estimation and controls for firm-year FE (columns 8, 10 and 12). Looking at these results, it is feasible to conclude that Brazil and Mexico were more impacted than Peru, around ten times more. For every 1% growth of Chinese imported goods in the EU market, exports from Brazilian and Mexican firms dropped by 2% yet from Peruvian firms, only 0.2%. This evidence confirms that Chinese goods tend to be more substitutes of Brazilian and Mexican goods compared to Peruvian, which seems plausible as the economies of Brazil and Mexico are more diverse than Peru.

Another interesting comparison is in which market these countries were most affected by the increased competition of Chinese goods in the US and EU markets. Peru seems to be less impacted in its exports to the EU market than to the US market, because results are more robust across specifications in the latter than in the former. Moreover, the elasticity in the US market is five times higher in magnitude than the same for the EU market. In this regard, results suggest that Peruvian exports tend to be more similar to Chinese goods in the US market than in the EU market.

Table 5. Impact of China on the exports from Brazil, Mexico and Peru in the EU market by country

Variables	FE																
	BRA			PER			MEX			IV – BRA			IV – PER			IV – MEX	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)					
ChinaShare in EU	-1.472*** (0.290)	-0.713*** (0.107)	-1.297*** (0.378)	-0.341*** (0.089)	-1.437*** (0.555)	-1.551*** (0.125)	-3.741*** (1.258)	-1.931*** (0.164)	-0.904 (1.879)	-0.224* (0.120)	-2.334 (1.523)	-2.357*** (0.170)					
Size	0.012*** (0.001)		0.030*** (0.003)		0.037*** (0.003)		0.012*** (0.001)		0.030*** (0.003)		0.037*** (0.003)						
Country's Market Share in RoW	0.174*** (0.015)	0.370*** (0.009)	0.075*** (0.020)	0.326*** (0.007)	0.096*** (0.020)	0.181*** (0.008)	0.176*** (0.015)	0.363*** (0.009)	0.071*** (0.019)	0.326*** (0.007)	0.093*** (0.021)	0.182*** (0.008)					
Tariff	-1.032*** (0.273)	-0.241*** (0.027)	0.284 (0.332)	0.245*** (0.037)	-1.102*** (0.347)	-0.256*** (0.033)	-1.016*** (0.275)	-0.210*** (0.028)	0.195 (0.343)	0.247*** (0.037)	-1.098*** (0.349)	-0.227*** (0.034)					
Observations	192,824	163,779	76,890	71,346	110,412	93,756	191,990	163,058	76,623	71,067	110,110	93,495					
R-squared	0.087	0.541	0.157	0.582	0.056	0.512	0.091	0.538	0.167	0.579	0.058	0.511					
Fixed effects																	
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes					
Firm-Product FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes					
Firm-Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes					
First stage results																	
R-squared							0.311	0.315	0.376	0.394	0.367	0.368					
F-stat model							24.51	23.88	25.61	25.56	24.52	24.81					
F-test endog var							4720	3487	1467	1292	6135	4493					
Prob > F endog var							0	0	0	0	0	0					

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at firm-product-origin-destination in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Brazil and Mexico suffered more from the competition of Chinese goods in the EU market than in the US market, yet these two countries differ substantially in terms of their intensity in each market. While Mexican firms were affected nearly four times more in the EU (2.3/0.6) than in the USA, Brazilian firms less than double (1.9/0.9). For Mexico, one possible explanation might be the length of time of the Mexican trade agreement with these two destinations. Mexico signed a Nafta free trade agreement in 1994 and with the EU six years later; therefore, trade relationships between Mexico and the USA seem more resistant than those between Mexico and the EU to an exogenous shock (the emergence of China). This evidence suggests that the length of a trade agreement might attenuate the effects of the Chinese shock.

The impact of Chinese goods is not restricted to the main markets, such as the US and EU, but rather all other destinations. In order to evaluate the impact of the Chinese expansion in the developing world, the impact on the export of these countries to each other is estimated, as explained in the empirical strategy section. Table 6 shows the results using the most complete method, which is the IV approach using firm-year FE (last columns from each case in previous tables).

Table 6. Impact of China on the exports from Brazil, Mexico and Peru in the each other market

Exporting country	Brazil		Mexico		Peru	
Destination country	MEX	PER	BRA	PER	MEX	BRA
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ChinaShare	-1.874*** (0.446)	-1.429*** (0.292)	-2.035*** (0.411)	-1.985*** (0.326)	-0.093 (0.422)	-0.845 (0.958)
Observations	60,867	62,378	15,511	15,532	6,979	2,393
R-squared	0.417	0.438	0.516	0.516	0.655	0.761
First stage results						
R-squared	0.257	0.169	0.186	0.097	0.140	0.190
F-stat model	8.955	7.062	8.095	6.040	12.05	5.720
F-test endog var	697.3	395.5	124.4	24.37	4.251	56.19
Prob > F endog var	0	0	0	8.12e-07	0.0393	0

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at firm-product-origin-destination in parentheses.


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Brazil and Mexico are the countries which have a larger export base than Peru to developing countries, especially in terms of manufacturing goods. As a consequence, these two countries were the most affected by the Chinese import penetration while exporting to other LA countries. The elasticity from these two countries ranges from 1.5 to 2, which means that every 1% increase in imports from China reduces the export of Brazilian and Mexican firms by nearly 1.5% to 2%. Peruvian exporters were the only ones not affected by the competition of Chinese goods in the Brazilian and Mexican markets, since the elasticity estimated is

non-significant. Overall, it is feasible to infer that Peruvian goods are not competitors of Chinese goods in developing countries, while Brazilian and Mexican goods are. Moreover, these results suggest that the loss derived by the Chinese competition for Brazilian and Mexican exports to developing countries is similar to that observed in the EU. Therefore, firms from Brazil and Mexico compete with similar Chinese products in developing countries as in the European market. Therefore, a policy recommendation might be the expansion of trade agreements within LA countries in order to mitigate the impact of Chinese expansion in these markets.

6. Further results

Outcomes from this paper have shown that Brazilian, Mexican and Peruvian exporters were affected by the Chinese penetration in a diverse range of markets, but so far, they are silent in what type of exports has been mostly affected, such as by intensive *versus* extensive margins and by product type (final *versus* intermediary).⁵ In this section, these possibilities are explored. Initially, intensive *versus* extensive margins are assessed by dividing the sample into these two categories. In sequence, extensive margin is split into entry in the investigated market and exporting a new product to this aforementioned market. Every export belonging to the intensive margin means that a firm has exported the same good to the same destination in a previous year. If they have started to export to the investigated destination or a new product to the designated destination, then it is considered an extensive margin.⁶ Basically, data is divided according to the diagram below:



Outcomes for intensive and extensive margins are presented in Table 6 for all three LA countries investigated in this paper to all destinations considered:

⁵ Nearly 90% of the HS products are from the manufacturing sector and estimating for manufacturing goods does not differ from the overall results.

⁶ As it is investigating only one destination, it is assumed that a new country destination is considered a new entry. For instance, consider a firm which was exporting to other countries but not the USA, if it starts exporting to the USA, it is considered a new entry rather than a new destination. Moreover, classification of intensive and extensive margin is made on a year by year case. For instance, the previous year is considered to establish if it is an intensive or extensive margin, as well as to classify them by entry or product.

developed region (USA and EU) and developing countries (Brazil, Mexico and Peru). The table is structured as follows, the first four columns show the results in the US market, followed by four other columns on the EU market and the last six columns to the LA countries as destinations. The first four lines show the results on intensive margin, followed by four other lines on the extensive margin, another four lines for extensive margin entry and the last four lines, extensive margin product. All results are based on the most reliable result as shown in Table 6: IV approach with firm-year FE for countries individually and firm-origin-year FE when pooling Brazil, Mexico and Peru together (columns 1 and 5). Contrary to the existent literature on the effects of trade shocks on the margins, our results suggest robust evidence that the Chinese shock has impacted negatively on any kind of margin.

Overall, the Chinese invasion into the US market has negatively impacted exports of intensive margin from these three countries jointly, but this result is mostly driven by Brazil and Peru, since Mexican exports were not impacted. This is evidence that the bilateral trade developed after Nafta came into force might have attenuated the Chinese impact. In the EU market, all countries show a negative sign in the intensive margin, not only jointly but also isolated. Brazil was the most affected as an increase of 1% from Chinese imports reduced the exports in the intensive margin of Brazilian goods by 2.5%, while the Mexican by 1.8% and Peru 0.5%. Comparing these results with the USA, Brazil has suffered more in the EU market, but Peru in the US market. When estimating these elasticities in the intensive margin for the exports to developing countries, Brazil and Mexico were also affected by the Chinese penetration in these markets; Peru does not show any effect. However, the magnitude is similar to what was observed in the European market. Comparing which markets, either from developing countries or from developed countries, only Peruvian exports shows a distinction, since only their exports to developed countries were affected by the Chinese expansion in the international trade market.

The effect of Chinese expansion in international trade seems to have distinct impacts on the extensive margin compared to intensive margin depending on which bilateral trade is considered. Considering the three LA countries jointly, outcomes suggest that extensive margin was more impacted in their exports to the USA compared to intensive margin, yet differences in the European market does not allow us to say which margin suffered more. In the US market, Mexico is the only case where it is possible to infer that the extensive margin was more affected than intensive margin. Thus, although existent relationships between Mexico exporters and US importers appears to not be impacted by the Chinese Shock, the possibility to enter into the US market, either by a new firm or by exporting a new product, has become harder for Mexican exporters due to the increased presence of China in the US market. In terms of exports of extensive margin to developing countries, Peru remains not being affected by the Chinese invasion in the Brazilian and Mexico markets, yet Mexico and Brazil were negatively affected in their bilateral trade.

Table 7. Impact of China on the exports from Brazil, Mexico and Peru by distinct margins (intensive and extensive)

Exporting country	Intensive margin													
	All	Brazil	Mexico	Peru	All	Brazil	Mexico	Peru	Brazil	Mexico	Peru	Peru		
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(12)	
Destination	USA			EU			MEX			PER			MEX	
ChinaShare	-0.195** (0.080)	-1.088*** (0.252)	0.142 (0.092)	-1.586*** (0.198)	-1.626*** (0.170)	-2.476*** (0.339)	-1.788*** (0.347)	-0.479** (0.209)	-1.925*** (0.799)	-2.195*** (0.494)	-2.836*** (0.674)	-2.096*** (0.500)	-2.159 (1.942)	-1.050 (0.697)
Observations	404,113	55,572	318,258	30,283	123,495	65,719	30,296	27,480	29,431	30,505	5,839	6,661	691	2,663
R-squared	0.432	0.525	0.388	0.604	0.582	0.552	0.494	0.659	0.422	0.460	0.540	0.543	0.825	0.658
Extensive margin														
ChinaShare	-0.825*** (0.032)	-0.803*** (0.095)	-0.794*** (0.037)	-0.783*** (0.082)	-1.355*** (0.070)	-1.477*** (0.126)	-1.951*** (0.134)	-0.311*** (0.102)	-1.578*** (0.376)	-0.230 (0.239)	-0.978** (0.413)	-1.386*** (0.298)	-0.267 (0.801)	0.538 (0.421)
Observations	511,843	72,998	390,951	47,894	186,297	87,346	57,549	41,402	28,169	29,153	8,302	7,641	1,424	3,820
R-squared	0.520	0.530	0.501	0.550	0.596	0.567	0.584	0.546	0.501	0.502	0.575	0.594	0.714	0.665
Extensive margin: entry														
ChinaShare	-1.138*** (0.061)	-0.946*** (0.149)	-1.201*** (0.079)	-0.972*** (0.127)	-0.917*** (0.114)	-1.177*** (0.197)	-1.180*** (0.234)	-0.251 (0.165)	-1.625* (0.933)	-1.807** (0.719)	-1.044 (1.283)	0.398 (2.598)	-0.139 (1.643)	0.499 (0.669)
Observations	133,597	29,385	87,502	16,710	59,157	33,440	11,690	14,027	6,812	6,106	742	598	316	1,109
R-squared	0.588	0.549	0.571	0.575	0.649	0.599	0.677	0.551	0.446	0.468	0.722	0.666	0.707	0.697
Extensive margin: product														
ChinaShare	-0.691*** (0.038)	-0.731*** (0.133)	-0.662*** (0.042)	-0.652*** (0.116)	-1.611*** (0.095)	-1.814*** (0.180)	-2.211*** (0.176)	-0.340** (0.139)	-1.731*** (0.443)	0.230 (0.280)	-0.863* (0.486)	-1.474*** (0.306)	0.395 (1.482)	0.753 (0.587)
Observations	357,959	35,362	296,316	26,281	104,177	43,659	37,208	23,310	16,155	17,078	5,735	5,397	602	1,641
R-squared	0.485	0.478	0.472	0.531	0.543	0.511	0.526	0.520	0.472	0.458	0.512	0.550	0.702	0.628

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at firm-product-origin-destination in parentheses, depending on the specification.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Looking at the impacts of the two types of extensive margin, Chinese competition was fiercer in the extensive margin of entry compared to the extensive margin of products in the US market (1.1 *versus* 0.7), yet the opposite occurs in the EU market (1.6 *versus* 0.9). In other words, Chinese imports in the USA make it more difficult for LA firms to enter into this market than in the EU market, but the exports of a new product from these three LA countries to the EU become more challenging compared to the USA. This suggests that once firms from LA countries are able to establish a relationship with the USA, they suffer less from other competitors compared to the EU whose entrance seems easier, yet difficult to export a new good. Regarding the extensive margin for entry and product to developing countries, only Brazilian exports to Mexico show robust results in the two dimensions (entry and product). Mexican exports to either Brazil or Peru were also negatively impacted with the introduction of a new product in these markets by the Chinese competition.

Evidence on extensive and intensive margin are linked with the idea that Mexican and Brazilian economies tend to export products similar to Chinese goods compared to Peru. Therefore, larger and more diversified economies in the developing world tend to suffer more from the competition from Chinese goods. Moreover, the elasticities obtained in this paper are generally above one, which means that for any increase of Chinese exports, firms from those countries tend to lose much more.

Another venue which could be explored is evaluating the impact on distinct types of goods, as done in Bas and Bombarda (2012). Following this aforementioned paper methodology, products are reclassified into two categories: final and intermediary.⁷ Following the format of Table 7, results splitting the sample into these two product categories are presented in Table 8. The only difference from Table 7 is how lines are distributed. The first lines are now for final goods, followed by lines for intermediary goods.

In terms of final goods, Brazil and Mexico seem to be the most affected, since all the elasticities estimated are superior to what is encountered in Peru regardless which destination, either developed countries (EU and USA) or developing countries (Mexico or Peru). According to the outcomes, Brazil appears to be mostly affected than Mexico, especially in the USA and in developing countries. Moreover, most of all the significant elasticities are above one, which means that any increase of imports of Chinese final goods will reduce the export of those countries more than proportionally.

⁷ Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification is used to define which product could be considered a final or intermediary good. Correspondence from BEC to HS 6-digit is used for reclassifying all goods into BEC and then into these two categories, as shown in the Appendix.

Table 8. Impact of China on the exports from Brazil, Mexico and Peru by Distinct Products Classification: Final e Intermediary

Country	Final goods																			
	All			Brazil		Mexico		Peru		Brazil		Mexico		Peru						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(11)	(12)						
Variables																				
Destination		USA				EU				MEX			PER			BRA			MEX	
ChinaShare	-2.208*** (0.056)	-3.069*** (0.152)	-2.139*** (0.069)	-1.860*** (0.118)	-2.124*** (0.096)	-3.367*** (0.187)	-3.071*** (0.210)	-0.439** (0.129)	-5.174*** (0.589)	-3.184*** (0.393)	-2.790*** (0.495)	-2.932*** (0.430)	0.426 (0.942)	-0.857* (0.480)						
Observations	466,962	59,578	347,197	60,187	170,297	72,836	41,847	55,614	20,093	19,320	3,902	5,548	882	4,689						
R-squared	0.522	0.532	0.485	0.586	0.578	0.534	0.564	0.553	0.432	0.477	0.569	0.551	0.797	0.634						
	Intermediaries goods																			
ChinaShare	-0.501*** (0.092)	-0.003 (0.246)	-0.583*** (0.103)	-0.227 (0.305)	-2.451*** (0.264)	-2.228*** (0.452)	-3.198*** (0.398)	-0.490 (0.464)	-1.882** (0.907)	-2.420*** (0.569)	-1.874** (0.949)	-1.689*** (0.586)	-5.379 (3.989)	-1.080 (1.706)						
Observations	453,732	69,579	366,169	17,984	140,266	81,066	45,836	13,364	37,518	40,193	10,438	8,941	1,324	1,940						
R-squared	0.425	0.564	0.385	0.616	0.612	0.614	0.532	0.734	0.484	0.481	0.528	0.560	0.766	0.738						

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at firm-product-origin-destination in parentheses, depending on the specification.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

As for intermediaries, the elasticity is lower in the US market compared to the EU, which is the opposite of what was found for final goods. In the US market, only Mexico seems to be affected by Chinese imported goods and with an elasticity below one, which means that the effect in the US market was very limited. In the EU market, estimated elasticities for Brazil and Mexico are above two, and then exports of these two countries suffered more than proportionately by the import of Chinese goods. In developing markets, the effect is very similar to the EU market, as the estimated elasticity was around 2 for Brazil and Mexico. Peruvian intermediary goods exported were not affected by the Chinese competition in neither market: developed and developing regions.

7. Conclusion

In this paper, the impact of Chinese goods on the exports of three LA countries (Brazil, Mexico and Peru) to developed and developing regions is estimated. These three countries represent different trade economic zones in LA: Mercosur, Nafta and the Andean Community. Results suggest that these countries were highly affected by the Chinese competition in both regions. Overall, elasticities estimated show that an increase of Chinese penetration in any market generally imposes a larger loss in these countries exports, since the elasticities magnitude is over 1 in most cases. Considering the expansion of China was 7.7% in the USA and 4.5% in the EU from 2000 until 2007, the loss of the exports due to the Chinese expansion in these markets was 5.7% and 7.2%, respectively.⁸ This evidence contrasts with those using aggregate data, which showed a higher impact in the USA rather than in the EU, see Pereira (2014). However, results using aggregate data are based on the comparison of absolute value of the loss in USD and they neglect many aspects which affect export performance, such as tariffs considered in paper using micro-level data. In this paper, just considering the USA as a destination, these three countries lost USD 9 billion dollars in exports because of Chinese goods.

Comparing results of which country was mostly affected, outcomes suggest that countries with a trade agreement, such as Nafta from Mexico and the USA, tend to be less impacted by the inclusion of a new competitor in relative terms, but these results need to be corroborated with other investigations since most of the effect might have taken place before signing the trade agreement.⁹ Despite this discussion on trade agreements, it is evident that Brazil was the most affected by the Chinese shock, since elasticities estimated are predominantly higher in the Brazilian case.

⁸ Elasticity in the US market was 0.75, while in the EU market 1.58, see tables 2 and 3.

⁹ Mexico's export volume to the USA is ten times larger than Brazil's, for example. Therefore, the total amount lost in the Mexican case is definitely larger than the other two countries, although estimated elasticity is lower.

Impact of trade shocks on the margins is still debatable in the current trade literature (GOLDBERG; PAVCNIK, 2016), but outcomes of this paper provide robust evidence of the effect of the Chinese shock on the margins of trade. However, it is not clear which margin, intensive or extensive, was mostly affected by the Chinese shock, because results differ substantially across countries. However, evidence on different types of goods seems more robust as they show a higher impact on final goods compared to intermediary goods. These results on types of goods are complementary to what Bas and Bombarda (2012) found for French exporters. According to their findings, intermediary goods were more imported after the liberalization process occurred in Asian countries, especially China, which means that these countries are assembling goods in their territory to export to other countries. This is not surprising as China has become the main manufacturing country in the world.

Although this paper has shed some light on the impacts of China on exporting firms from other developing countries, other venues should be explored. For instance, outcomes suggest that trade agreements might be an important tool to mitigate the impact in trade relations originated by an exogenous shock, especially by the increased competition from other countries. However, further research should be pursued in order to confirm this hypothesis, which may provide an additional argument to foster trade agreements between countries.

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Appendix

Beside the concordance between BEC and HS 6-digit, we classify the BEC classification into Final and Intermediary goods as described in Table A.1.

Table A1. Correspondence between BEC classification and Use classification

BEC classification		Use classification	
1. Food and beverages	11. Primary	111. Mainly for industry	Intermediary
		112. Mainly for household consumption	Final
	12. Processed	121. Mainly for industry	Intermediary
		122. Mainly for household consumption	Final
2. Industrial supplies	21. Primary		Intermediary
	22. Processed		Intermediary
3. Fuels and lubricants	31. Primary		Intermediary
	32. Processed		Intermediary
4. Capital goods	41. Capital goods		Final
	42. Parts and accessories		Intermediary
5. Transport equipment	51. Passenger motor cars		Final
	52. Other		Final
	53. Parts and accessories		Intermediary
6. Consumer goods			Final
7. Other goods			Final

Source: Elaborated by the author.

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