

Revolution and International Tension

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Abstract

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Revolutions have a tremendous impact on international relations, yet the relationship between the two has not been studied sufficiently. This thesis attempts to shed light on this issue. It explores the weaknesses in the pre-existing literature and recommends a new approach and mechanism on how revolutions cause international tension. Through the study, a revamped definition and categorization of revolution is offered for a better understanding of the revolution. The proposition is that revolutions that affect the balance of threat significantly or have social revolution characteristics, and inflict considerable misery to a country are likely to generate significant tension with other countries and, ultimately, war. Sixty revolutions are examined both quantitatively (by an OLS regression) and qualitatively to test the hypothesis. The regression illustrates that the model has substantial correlation value and the qualitative study of the sixty cases, confirm the quantitative findings more in-depth.

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Chapter 1 : Introduction

“What? are we going to have foreign affairs?” said Lenin in October 1917.¹ Contradictory to what Lenin said, revolutions and the survival of the new regime to a high degree were the results of interactions with foreign nations. Lenin himself sent a diplomatic envoy to Brest-Litovsk to make peace with the Germans in WWI. These types of interactions were determinative of the development of revolutionary states, and the international political system. Revolutionaries can transfer the bloody street fight of the revolution into inter-state battlefields and turn former allies into sworn enemies. “A people which has just won its liberty after ten centuries of slavery needs a war to bring about its consolidation,” Jacques Pierre Brissot the flamboyant Girondin statesman told the Jacobine club in December 1791.²

Revolutions cause sudden shifts in the balance of power,³ international alignments; and invite opportunities for other countries to improve their position.⁴ In fact, according to several purely quantitative studies, states that undergo a revolutionary political process versus evolutionary change, are twice as likely to end up in an inter-state war.⁵ However, despite strong correlations between revolution and war, too little research has been done on the precise causal relationship between revolutions and war.⁶ Hannah Arendt remarked that the twentieth century was shaped by wars and revolutions, but it is striking how, in International Relations studies, these

¹ Walt, Stephen M. *Revolution and War*. Cornell University Press, (1996), Chapter 6.

² Ibid, Chapter 3.

³ Balance of Power in Rousseau’s word is: “The balance existing between the power of these diverse members of the European society is more of the work of nature than of art. It maintains itself without effort, in such a manner that if it sinks on one side, it reestablishes itself very soon on the other.” Haas, Ernst B. “The balance of power: prescription, concept, or propaganda?” *World Politics* 5, no. 4 (1953), 442-477.

⁴ Walt, *Revolution and War*. Chapter 1.

⁵ Maoz, Zeev. “Joining the club of nations: Political development and international conflict, 1816–1976.” *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 2 (1989), 199-231.; Adelman, Jonathan R. *Revolution, armies, and war: a political history*. Rienner, 1985.

⁶ Maoz, Zeev. “Joining the club of nations,” 199-231.

are often treated as two distinct phenomena. While studies on conflict are plentiful and is a central theme in IR, revolutions have received marginal attention.⁷ Stephen Walt's *Revolution and War* (1996) has paid particular attention to this issue and provides us with an extensive and overarching set of propositions and knowledge of the effects of revolutions and war that forms the conventional wisdom in the field. However, his theory is flawed, to mention a few, it has a significant amount of non-treatment of events, weak methodology, and importantly cannot explain the simple observation that a great many revolutions did not end in wars. It also cannot explain the many different types of war, including low-level foreign intervention, in which a foreign power may support one side of the revolution with financial assistance.

Besides Walt's work, the strength and weaknesses of other scholarly works in the field, such as Theda Skocpol's *Social Revolutions* or Zeev Maoz's *Joining the Club of Nations* (1988), shall be further discussed in the literature review section. These are substantial works and are quite relevant to the domain of revolutions and international relations, and one cannot ignore them in the study of this field. This paper seeks to expose the flaw of conventional wisdom and other scholarly works in the field to redefine and re-examine revolutions, and finally to propose alternative hypotheses to enhance the study of revolution and international conflict.

This research is conducted through a mix method research and study cases from the French Revolution up until 2018. The existing literature on revolution and international relations has taken a qualitative approach or a purely quantitative one. This research seeks to bridge in between the two approaches and at the same time test the statistical findings qualitatively. The core concept of the quantitative hypothesis argues that the key determinative causes of war with a revolutionary

⁷ Halliday, Fred. "The sixth great power': on the study of revolution and international relations." *Review of International Studies* 16, no. 3 (1990), 207.

state, are the duration of the revolutions, the level of their casualties, the revisionist⁸ orientation of the revolutionaries, and the extent to which there is a thriving social revolution.⁹ The proposition is that, the longer the revolution takes, and the higher the casualties are (resulting from intra-state violence), the greater the impact on increasing international inter-state tensions. I also propose that revisionist and successful social revolutions tend to have higher conflict levels with the outside world than more socially conservative changes of government.¹⁰ The theory of this research is also studied case by case qualitatively, and its implications are discussed in details, to test the strength of the quantitative findings.

Literature Review

In this part, first, the definition of revolution is discussed through different academic works. Then, different scholarly works mainly related to the field of revolutions and international relations and international security are examined. More focus is paid in the literature on Walt's *Revolution and War* as it is the most relevant work to this research and is the most cited in the field; thus, forms the conventional wisdom. The balance of threat is a concept developed by Stephen Walt that indicates how a revolution intensifies the level of threat perceived by other countries.¹¹ Certain characteristics of each revolution can produce specific threats to other countries, and they may act accordingly. The literature is mostly evaluated through their capacity to scientifically advance the field of revolutions and international relations. To measure the scientific advance, Popper's three criteria for the growth of knowledge is studied. First, a new theory should have "simple, new, and powerful, unifying idea." Furthermore, the theory should be "independently testable." Meaning

⁸ By revisionism it is meant if they have a revisionist foreign policy that threatens other countries.

⁹ Social revolutions as discussed by Theda Skocpol in her *Social revolutions in the modern world* involves rapid transformation of a society's state and class structures; accompanied by class revolts from below.

¹⁰ As it will be discussed further in the studies, particularly chapter 2.2, the revisionist states increase the threat for other states.

¹¹ Walt, *Revolution and War*, Chapter, 1.

that it should lead to the prediction of new and unexpected phenomena. Lastly, the new theory should be severely tested, and some of the predictions must be corroborated.¹²

There is a vital need to establish what is meant by the term revolution. The lack of a standard definition for revolution is a pitfall for the conventional wisdom and other scholarly works in the field, which sometimes makes their case selection and approach inconsistent. Furthermore, there are issues with the existing literature' approach to the revolution, that require attention and enhancement. Therefore, studying the literature on the concept of the revolution helps to come up with a comprehensive and accurate definition of the revolution to identify the revolutions and define the scope of this research. In short, to diagnose a revolution from a non-revolution.

Jack Goldstone defines revolution to include forcible government change, mass participation, and a change in institutions.¹³ However, many regime changes were conducted by a small elite leadership. His scope is very narrow, that misses a significant number of revolutions. Theda Skocpol's approach to social revolution, emphasizes the fundamental and rapid transformation of a society's state and class structures; accompanied by class revolts from below.¹⁴ A classic example of this concept is the French Revolution of 1789. However, her definition describes certain types of revolutions and can be used in this research that seeks to explain all the revolutions since the French Revolution of 1789. Stephen Walt distinguishes between mass and elite revolutions. In mass revolutions, the society rose and overthrew the state, while in the other one, the elite deposes the state, and the change comes from above.¹⁵ He adds that mass revolutions are often accompanied by violence and can result in bloody civil wars. The issue with Walt's

¹² Michael, Burawoy. "Two Methods in Search of Science: Skocpol Versus Trotsky." *Theory and Society* 18 (1989), 762.

¹³ Goldstone, Jack A. *Revolutions: A very short introduction*. Oxford University Press, 2014.

¹⁴ Skocpol, Theda. *Social revolutions in the modern world*. Cambridge University Press (1994), 4.

¹⁵ Walt, *Revolution and War*. Chapter 1.

approach is that certain revolutions cannot be categorized into the binary of mass revolutions and elite revolutions. His approach does not include the revolutions that were conducted neither in mass nor elite forms. Certain revolutions were characterized by a small number of revolutionaries not from the elite establishment to spearhead the revolution and overthrow the regime. Barrington Moore distinguishes three types of revolutions.¹⁶ The first one is bourgeois revolutions, which brought capitalist democracy (i.e., French and English Revolutions).¹⁷ The second group is revolutions from above by which the traditional landlords defeat popular revolution and remain in power during industrialization, which culminates to fascism (i.e., Germany and Japan).¹⁸ Third, peasant revolutions or the path of communism has occurred in those societies that the ruling classes could not successfully industrialize (i.e., Russia and China).¹⁹ Moore's categorization cannot interpret certain revolutions of the past decades like pro-democracy peaceful revolutions.

Having observed the limitation of the above categorizations, we offer an alternative grouping of the revolutions. This categorization is done based on the major characteristics of each revolution; the way it was conducted and how it ended. The two notions of mass revolutions and elite revolutions are influenced by Walt's *Revolution and War* (1996), but having observed their weaknesses, they are modified and enhanced in this study to explain different revolution more accurately. The rest of groupings are not based on the literature and are termed to describe different varieties of the revolution. The first category is mass revolutions, including violent and peaceful ones. The violent mass revolutions undergo a popular revolution that results in bloodshed; while, the latter is characterized by a mass revolution that does not undergo the violent phase. The second

¹⁶ Moore, Barrington. *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: Lord and peasant in the making of the modern world*. Vol. 268. Beacon Press, 1993.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Chapter 7.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Chapter 8.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Chapter 9.

category is elite revolutions, which itself is divided into coups and popular coups. The coups are conducted by military elites, while popular coups are often carried through lower ranks of the military and include mass mobilization of the population for their cause. The last category is the guerrilla revolutions, in which a small number of revolutionaries overthrow the regime or control significant parts of the country (holding at least one major town) through guerrilla warfare. Holding a major town is important as it means the revolution has a considerable influence in urban areas which are essential for revolution's success.²⁰ This categorization of revolutions and their impacts on international relations will be elaborated further in the case study, and the qualitative section of this research.

There have been substantial works on the causes and domestic consequences of revolutions, such as Brinton's *Anatomy of Revolutions* (1938); Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966); Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968); Skocpol's *Social Revolutions*; and Tilly's numerous works on revolutions and social movements.²¹ However, there has been far less literature on the international consequences of the revolutions. Works, such as Kyung-Won Kim's *Revolution and International System* (1971) have either relied on a single case (French Revolution), or like Mansfield and Snyder's "Democratization and War" have partially studied revolutions and wars. This vacuum was filled by Stephen Walt when he introduced his *Revolution and War*, which offered comprehensive theories on revolutions and inter-state wars. Walt proposes a balance of threat as an alternative to the balance of power that can improve our understanding of why revolutions end up in inter-state wars. His theory is derived from detailed case studies of the French, Russian, Iranian, American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions.

²⁰ Goldstone, Jack A., ed. *Revolutions: theoretical, comparative, and historical studies*. (San Diego: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994), 12.

²¹ Including *Social Movements* (2009) and *European Revolutions* (1993).

Due to pervasiveness, comprehensiveness, and relevance of Walt's theory on the relationship between revolution and war, most of the literature review is dedicated to his theory and work. His work is mainly persuasive for the time that he wrote due to studying eight historical cases in details through Mill's "method of difference." His theory is also compelling in highlighting the importance of revolutions in the study of international relations. I will discuss, other relevant works by scholars in the field, including Kyung-Won 1970; Skocpol 1988; Maoz 1989; Regan 2002; Mansfield and Snyder 2005 to get a better perspective of the existing literature on revolution and international relations.

Kyung-won's *Revolution and International System* is an early work in this field and seems to have influenced later works, but it is filled with limitations. He studies the interaction of the French Revolution of 1789 with the international system in which he discusses intriguing findings and tries to theorize it. One of the most frequently asked questions on the French Revolution is what made its expansionism and military success possible in 1792. According to Kyung-Won, "Revolutionary ideology, military technology, new strategic concepts, rising nationalism, and necessary actors were all present, impinging upon the inevitably fragile international system at the turn of the century."²² He adds that the international behavior of France in that period was a product of its sense of insecurity on the one hand, and the struggle for power within France on the other hand.²³ Kyung-won emphasizes the ability of the revolution to mobilize resources, primarily through mass mobilization unprecedentedly.²⁴ This pattern significantly affected the international relations and led to the beginning of an era that can be called an era of total war, and its effects

²²Kim, Kyung-Won. *Revolution and International System*. (New York: New York University Press, 1970), 49.

²³ Ibid., 78.

²⁴ Ibid., 90.

could mainly be seen a hundred years later in the WW I.²⁵ The author also emphasizes the anti-systemic nature of revolutions. He argues that the emergence of anti-systematic foreign policy in a revolutionary state is a function of the interaction between the revolutionary domestic struggles and its international predicament.²⁶ However, the empirical studies demonstrate that many revolutions have been quickly absorbed to the international system, and have not created tensions. In addition, Kyung-won's assertion has virtue and is based on the French experience; yet the problem is that it is not logical to assume other cases have the same links between revolution and war. This is a grave weakness that jeopardizes the validity of his claims and theories.

Skocpol has a long list of works on revolution, and in her *Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization* (1988), she pays particular attention to revolution's effect on mass mobilization of the population and war. Her theory is very similar to what Kyung-Won discussed earlier on mobilization as they both find the significant power of the revolution in resisting foreign powers through mass mobilization. She argues that the task which revolutionary regimes have performed the best is the mobilization of citizens across class lines for international warfare.²⁷ France, Vietnam, and Iran are typical examples of significant power of revolutionary social regimes to wage humanly costly wars and to transform the global balance of power.²⁸ The reason behind this is that the type of organizations formed and the ties between the vanguard party and supporters.²⁹ Revolutionary leaders seek to link war with a foreign nation to the domestic struggles and may be able to tap into nationalism and exploit political and class divisions for their benefit.³⁰ However, she does not explain under what circumstances and what types of organizations,

²⁵ Kim, *Revolution and International System*. 93.

²⁶ Ibid., 127.

²⁷ Skocpol, Theda. "Social revolutions and mass military mobilization." *World Politics* 40, no. 2 (1988), 149.

²⁸ Ibid., 162.

²⁹ Ibid., 149.

³⁰ Ibid., 150.

revolutionary leaders tap use such policies, or why they can do so. These are questions that go unanswered by her in her work.

Skocpol argues, “revolutionary elites have been able to build the strongest states in those countries whose geopolitical circumstances allowed or required the emerging new regimes to become engaged in protracted and labor-intensive international warfare.”³¹ Thus, wars are crucial in creating a robust revolutionary regime. Skocpol discusses the importance of geopolitics in the cases of consolidation of the revolutions in Iran and Vietnam. The distance of Vietnam to the US and France and the latter’s reluctance to use nuclear weapons was crucial in the victory of North Vietnam over its southern counterpart.³² In the Iranian case, the revenues from the oil exports and its geopolitical location that lied between the two spheres of direct control between the US and USSR saved it from a military intervention from either side.³³ Another important point that Skocpol makes with the exception of the Iranian Revolution, the most of revolutions of the third-world in the 20th century were conducted through guerrilla warfare both by peasants and city dwellers. Thus, most of these revolutions were military struggles to create and redefine the national states.³⁴

One of Theda Skocpol’s strength compared to her contemporary scholars is that she was not ideological like Immanuel Wallerstein and sought to expose their errors, but her understanding that ideology was irrelevant, caused her to ignore this influential variable.³⁵ Her heavy emphasis on the structural conditions that determine revolutions leads her to omit the ideological intent of those who take power. As Himmelstein and Kimmel point out; “Theda Skocpol is perhaps the

³¹ Skocpol, "Social revolutions and mass military mobilization," 150

³² Skocpol, *Social Revolutions and Mass Military*. 164.

³³ *Ibid.*, 166

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 158.

³⁵ Chiot, Daniel. *Social change in the twentieth century*. (New York: Harcourt College Pub, 1977), 1124.

most ambitious and exciting of a new generation of historical-comparative sociologists who have focused their attention squarely on the big issues of social change.”³⁶ Skocpol, unlike the Marxists, sees the state primarily as a separate and autonomous institution, though with essential relations to the socioeconomic structure. For her, the main result of revolution is not a more advanced mode of production, but a more centralized bureaucratic state, similar to Tocqueville who argued that revolutions lead to centralization of power.³⁷ Her approach towards ideology changes in her later writings, as in her article *Rentier State and Shia Islam in Iranian Revolution* (1982) she discusses how Shia Islam was necessary for the empowerment of the Islamic Republic Faction and successful revolution. Skocpol’s major weakness lies in her purely structuralist point of view that does not explain involved discontinuities. For example, Skocpol’s theory is ill-prepared for the 1989 Revolutions in Eastern Europe, as the communism fell in Eastern Europe when the relations between the Soviet Bloc and the rest of the world was the warmest. While just a decade ago at the height of international pressure on the USSR, it was expanding. A firm understanding of the interdependencies among individual and public preferences would have prepared academia better to predict and understand 1989 revolutions.³⁸ This is important as Skocpol and other scholars discussed in this research claimed predictability of their theories, but in many cases, they have a lack of corroboration.

Patrick Regan’s *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers* is a comprehensive contribution to the literature of international interventions in civil wars. He has created a data set of 138 intrastate conflicts within fifty years (1944 - 1994), in which there were 194 separate international

³⁶ Himmelstein, Jerome L., and Michael S. Kimmel. "States and Revolutions: The Implications and Limits of Skocpol's Structural Model." (1981), 1145.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 1150.

³⁸ Kuran, Timur. "The East European revolution of 1989: is it surprising that we were surprised?" *The American Economic Review* 81, no. 2 (1991), 124.

interventions. The author produces intriguing analyses of both causes and consequences of interventions in civil wars in a field, where most studies do not address both issues together.³⁹ It also studies both economic and military interventions of both unilateral and multilateral interventions. Regan is very discreet in making sure that his assumptions, analyses are precise. His work is mostly focused under what conditions state do a humanitarian intervention in the cases of civil wars. Through a strong use of quantitative analysis (logit regression), he analyzes different forms of intervention and whether interventions can resolve the conflict. However, he does not elaborate on the techniques and statistical tests he has used, such as the test for multicollinearity to demonstrate to what degree his independent variables are correlated. In addition, there are other important weaknesses to his work, such as his narrow definition of intervention and the goals of interventions together with his underlying assumptions. Regan's analysis focuses on external factors of nations' decisions to intervene, naturally neglecting possible internal and hidden connections. For example, the French so-called humanitarian intervention in Rwanda at the end of the genocide there in 1994 was to a great degree to provide cover for the removal of physical and human assets that had performed a secret role for France in the Rwandan conflict.⁴⁰ Without this motive, it is hard to imagine if the French would have taken serious steps for their intervention.

The gravest weakness of Regan's workflows from his attempt to be purely policy-relevant. Although he studies 50 years of civil wars, most of his work is focused on recent cases. He assumes that states intervene to stop the fighting between groups and not necessarily for their own interests.⁴¹ This narrow definition of success is problematic as Regan utilizes lessons for ending

³⁹ Regan, Patrick M. "Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict," review of Mark Peceny. (*University of Chicago Press*, 2005), 1282.

⁴⁰ Blechman, Barry M. "Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict by Patrick M. Regan." *Political Science Quarterly* 118, no. 1 (2003), 158.

⁴¹ Regan, Patrick M. *Civil wars and foreign powers: Outside intervention in intrastate conflict*. University of Michigan Press, 2002. 10-14.

wars in the contemporary era mostly from the cold war era cases, a period when victory or denial of victory to the enemy was often the main objective of the intervening states.⁴² For example, the US supported Sandinista or intensified the civil war rather than having an intention to bring peace to Nicaragua. He argues that intervention usually fails to achieve the desired outcomes (peace), but if we consider the goal of intervention denial of victory or prolonging the civil war, then the ratio of success is quite high for intervening powers. Thus the ‘lower success’ rate of interventions in ideological conflicts can be explained by the goals of the inventors rather than the character of the conflicts.⁴³ Even civil wars with non-ideological such as the recent Syrian Civil (although ideological for radical Islamist factions) foreign powers have intervened not for the end goal of cessation of hostilities, but to deny victory for the adversary. For example, US presence in Syria to prevent Iranian led forces take vital areas (such as the Baghdad-Damascus Road) and to expand their control. Perhaps his work would be stronger if he had chosen to focus on either academic aspects or policy relevance since these two areas seem to collide in his work.

Zeev Maoz is another scholar who has studied revolutions and their effects on international relations, particularly in his works of *Joining the Club of Nations* 1976 and *Regime Types and International Conflict* 1989. Maoz distinguishes between two types of state transformations. The first one is evolutionary, in which society undergoes a gradual transformation and assumes a more significant role and control over the government, which is the abrupt and evolutionary change that is gradual. The examples are the gradual independence of the many European colonies in Africa in 1960s.⁴⁴ Maoz focuses primarily on political transformation, which involves a change in the structure of the political system. He calls the second type of state transformation, revolutionary

⁴² Peceny. *Civil Wars*, 1282.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 1283.

⁴⁴ Maoz, “Joining the Club of Nations,” 203.

state change. It entails an intense and violent struggle between the revolutionaries and the state, like the French Revolution.⁴⁵ Maoz runs a statistical analysis and concludes that revolutionary transitions are twice as likely to end up in an inter-state war in comparison to the evolutionary changes. However, he does not elaborate on his methodology and does not offer a mechanism to test the findings. In addition, more clarification on how he defines the revolutions would be needed. For example, he discusses evolutionary regime transformation, which is a vague term as all the countries are constantly evolving, and there should be a precise definition and criteria to define what is a structural evolutionary regime transformation.

Mansfield and Snyder, in their *Democratization and War*, highlight the importance of the incomplete process of democratization that can lead to war.⁴⁶ Their main argument is that regime changes toward autocracy increase the probability of war and a smaller likelihood when changes toward democracy.⁴⁷ They briefly mention that the French Revolution's incomplete democratization polarized and radicalized the politics that brought Europe to war.⁴⁸ However, Mansfield and Snyder's measure conflates incomplete revolution with revolution.⁴⁹ It could be argued that it was because France was revolutionary not that it had incomplete democratization that led to war. In short, they argue that democratizing states are war-prone not because war is popular with the mass public, but because domestic pressures create incentives for elites to drum up nationalist sentiment and to pursue prestige strategies.⁵⁰ This happens in the countries where political and representative institutions are in infancy. They are encouraged to pursue prestige seeking strategies. During the military regime of Argentina, "they needed a nationalist victory to

⁴⁵ Maoz, "Joining the Club of Nations," 204.

⁴⁶ Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. "Democratization and war." *Foreign Affairs* (1995), 79-97.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 85.

⁴⁹ Colgan, Jeff. "Measuring revolution." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29, no. 4 (2012), 450.

⁵⁰ Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and War," 88-94.

stave off the pressure to return to democracy.”⁵¹ However, they are making a mistake by considering the revolutionary regimes the aggressor by default. They are in fact, more the victim of foreign aggression than being assailant.

Mansfield and Snyder’s study include every violent regime change or irregular transition as a revolution.⁵² This approach is very similar to the one used by Maoz, as they all similarly rely on Polity IV data and observe a change in political transformation.⁵³ There are a number of problems with this perspective. This very broad approach is problematic since many violent regime changes have occurred without causing a significant change in the social and political structure (i.e., Pakistani coup in 1958⁵⁴, Venezuelan Coups of 1945 and 1948⁵⁵). The Polity IV data is based on democracy, and a revolution may not change the level of democracy and make this data irrelevant to the research. Thus, this approach can skew the results significantly. To conclude, there is a need for more comprehensive research to cover a large number of revolutions, without sacrificing an in-depth study of each case.

Ted Robert Gurr explicitly discusses how revolutions increase the risk of warfare. He states that successful revolutions breed external challenges by seeking to export their revolutions abroad, thus would face foreign opposition. Since they likely came to power through coercive strategies, they would rally around the revolutionary fighters and turn to revolutionary garrison states to fight foreign countries.⁵⁶ Thus, post-revolutionary states demonstrate a significant connection between

⁵¹ Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and War,” 89-95.

⁵² Maoz, “Joining the Club of Nations,”

⁵³ Colgan, “Measuring revolution.”

⁵⁴ Tudor, Maya. *The promise of power: The origins of democracy in India and autocracy in Pakistan*. Cambridge University Press, 2013.

⁵⁵ Karl, Terry Lynn. “Petroleum and political pacts: The transition to democracy in Venezuela.” *Latin American Research Review* 22, no. 1 (1987), 63-94.

⁵⁶ Gurr, Ted Robert. “War, revolution, and the growth of the coercive state.” *Comparative Political Studies* 21, no. 1 (1988), 57.

internal and external coercion. Revolutionary leaders similarly draw from their domestic struggle and justify violence against all enemies of the revolution. Gurr adds that the organizational consequences between domestic and external behavior of post-revolutionary regimes are parallel. The personnel and agencies of international warfare and internal security are interchangeable, although they have different functional specializations.⁵⁷

Gurr makes two viable points. Indeed, domestic coercion experience can also reflect itself in a post-revolutionary regime's foreign relation. Personnel and agencies of war and internal security are indeed interchangeable, as Iran's Revolutionary Guards established by 1979 Revolution were prioritized with the internal security, but with the outbreak of war with Iraq, they took over the conventional army in many fronts and have remained a dominant force since in security, economy, and politics.⁵⁸ However, it was not Iran, who started the war but Iraq. Thus, his approach is problematic similar to Mansfield and Snyder as he views revolutionary regimes aggression solely, and he does not observe other countries taking advantage of the possible weakness due to the revolution. Empirically revolutionary regimes were often not the first to start the war;⁵⁹ Russian revolution, Mexican Revolution, Iranian Revolution, Cuban, Nicaraguan and Cambodian Revolutions are only a few examples to mention in which revolutionary regimes were attacked. Stephen Walt specifically explains this puzzle by discussing how foreign powers take advantage of windows of opportunity and invade the revolutionary countries to improve their position. More on his observations on this issue will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

⁵⁷ Gurr, "War, revolution, and the growth of the coercive state," 58.

⁵⁸ Chubin, Shahram. "The last phase of the Iran-Iraq war: From stalemate to ceasefire." *Third World Quarterly* 11, no. 2 (1989), 1-14.

⁵⁹ Walt, *Revolution and War*. Chapter 1.

Stephen Walt elaborates on how revolutions incite hostilities in his *Revolution and war*. No other scholarly work has focused on the relation between revolutions and war, as this work. Thus, it is the most cited and reviewed work by the researchers working in this field. Walt argues that a shift in the balance of threat incited by the revolution, coupled with the spiral of suspicion⁶⁰ caused by the interaction of offensive, and defensive balance leads to conflict.⁶¹ He seeks to maintain the validity of the realist paradigm⁶² by substituting balance of threat for the balance of power as the major factor and in doing so, he incorporates a wide range of domestic variables (i.e., intention, ideology, and perception) that are affiliated with liberalism into the realist model and transfers it into something new.⁶³ Domestic variables, unlike constructivism and liberalism, do not have significant importance for the realist school. However, their omission can flaw the understanding of the outcome, as they are essential variables in determining foreign policy and power levels. Walt tries to bridge this gap between domestic and international affairs and essentially realism with other schools of thought in international relations in his ambitious work the realist paradigm on the understanding of the revolution. Here, the core elements of his theory will be discussed.

⁶⁰ Also called security dilemma meaning that actions by state intended to increase its security, such as military strength or making alliance, can provoke other countries to respond with similar measures; producing increased tensions. Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation under the security dilemma." *World politics* 30, no. 2 (1978), 167-214. Walt discusses how spiral of suspicion of a revolutionary regime can raise tensions. Revolutionary states are prone to spiral models due to their ideological nature. Secondly, they harbour suspicions based on negative historical experiences with foreign powers. Thirdly, revolutionary regimes also exaggerate foreign threat to improve their positions. Other states also fail to understand the revolutionary regime's perception of history and may feel threatened by the spread of the revolution. Another factor that adds to the spiral of suspicion is the loss of established communication and diplomatic experts of the previous regime in the case of revolution. Lastly, the large exile population who have fled from the revolution to other countries can exaggerate in their depiction of the revolutionary regime as hostile. Walt. *Revolution and War*. Chapter 1.

⁶¹ Incentives to use force increases when the offense has advantages, which is defined in terms of military capabilities that favors attacking or defending. However, political factors can be equally important, such as the ability to hinder another government through propaganda or subversion. Walt. *Revolution and War*. Chapter 1.

⁶² States exist in an anarchic environment, which leads them to place a very high value on security. Other principles are that states are the central actors of international politics rather than individuals or international organizations. Goodin, Robert E. *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*. (Oxford University Press, 2010), 132.

⁶³ Fukuyama, Francis. "Revolution and War." *Foreign Affairs*. Last modified 1, 2018.

Walt has developed his analysis of the relationship between revolution and war based on his balance of threat theory. According to the balance of power, increased power would make a revolutionary state more aggressive while declining power would encourage others to exploit its vulnerability. The opposite logic is also compelling, that it increased power might enhance the new regime's security and obviate the need to expand. Thus, according to Walt, the balance of power cannot explain this situation alone. Revolutions affect the balance of threat and encourage states to via the external environment that intensifies their security competition and causes war to be a more attractive option in three ways.⁶⁴

Walt explains that revolutions affect the balance of threat in several ways. First, revolutions usually exert significant effects on a state's overall capabilities, especially in its ability to fight. Even if the revolution's capabilities have been decreased, it invites other states to take advantage of it as a window of opportunity and improve their position versus others.⁶⁵ Revolutions usually reduce a state's capabilities in the short term but may increase it in the long term. The demise of the old regime handicaps any efforts to mobilize resources for war until the new regime obtains the institutional capacity to tax and allocate resources effectively and to rebuild and reorganize the severely disrupted armed forces. Also, previously suppressed groups may assert new claims, and certain regions may seek independence, which adds to the new regime's burden and increases its weakness. Besides, many revolutionaries would be poorly prepared to administer and run the government, particularly its diplomatic machine, unless the revolutionaries have also fought a civil war and thus controls an establishment of its own.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Walt, *Revolution and War*. 150-151, 532.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Gurr, "War, revolution, and the growth," 50.

Second, the level of threat is greatly affected by the perception of intent. Revolutions often give rise to movements that are vehemently opposed to the policies of the old regime, and their motivating ideology portrays their opponents in harsh and uncompromising manners. Hence, revolutions create a severe clash of interest between the new regime and other countries, especially the allies of the old regime. New regimes often exaggerate the degree to which other states are hostile and are conspiring against it. Other states usually react negatively, consequently creating an atmosphere of intense suspicion and increased security. If a state is believed to be unusually aggressive, potential victims will be more willing to use force to reduce its power or to eliminate it.⁶⁷ Revolutionary states behave that way, partially because they usually have a Manichean worldview; they portray opponents as intrinsically evil and incapable of meaningful reform. They are often overconfident about their ‘inevitable victory’ but insecure at the same time, and meanwhile, believe that their revolution has universal meaning.⁶⁸ However, these are often rhetoric, and in the conduct of the war, the new regime acted more practically.

Third, the level of threat is also affected by the offense-defense balance. The impetus to use force increases when the offense has the advantage as the expected cost to the attacker will decline, and the expected benefits of aggression will increase. The offensive power is usually defined regarding specific military capabilities (whether the current state of military technology favors attacking or defending), but political factors can be quite important as well. For example, the ability to undermine another state through the extensive use of propaganda or subversion can be potentially offensive powers, as they allow one state to conquer others with little or no cost incurred by itself. The greater the threat is, the greater their incentive to try to contain the danger.

⁶⁷ Walt, *Revolution and War*. 150-151, 532.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 586, 719.

The assumption that revolutions are both easy to export and easy to overthrow (although illusions in Walt's opinion) creates an acute security dilemma and increases the danger of war. In the wake of revolutions, uncertainty about the balance of power grows together with the danger of war through miscalculation. The new statesmen lack direct experience in diplomacy and governance. Hence, they rely on the ideology to predict how others will behave, while other states would use the same ideology as a guide to the possible conducts of the new regime. In this situation, estimating intentions, prior commitments, and understanding of both sides from each other are very difficult, which dramatically increases the level of threat.⁶⁹

Walt conducts a detailed case study of French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions to test his theories. For the cases of France he concludes that war was caused by the Prussian ambition to take advantage of the French weakness; French internal political situation; series of misperceptions; and miscalculations between France and its main antagonists that stimulated perceptions of hostility and pro-war factions on both sides.⁷⁰ For the Soviet and Iranian cases, he similarly shows how his balance of threat and balance of power played out to the war scenario. He discusses that absence of full-scale war in these cases is due to their low threat nature, thus confirming his theory.⁷¹ Walt argues that American, Turkish, and Mexican Revolutions did not end in the war due to a high level of defensive dominance that characterized them. The threats of contagion either was non-existent or greatly silenced. In addition, each occurred in geopolitical circumstances that discouraged the use of force. He concludes that a series of misperceptions and

⁶⁹ Walt, *Revolution and War*, 730.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 1637.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, Chapter 6.

misunderstandings that had increased the spiral of suspicion, and offense-defense advantages caused the Chinese intervention into the Korean peninsula.

To sum up Walt's arguments, revolutions dramatically affect the revolutionary state by changing its capabilities, preferences, and perceptions of an external environment shaped by revolutionary ideology, and increased uncertainty and misinformation. Change in capabilities (often weakened by the revolution) may provide windows of opportunity for other states to improve their position. Change in preferences will bring conflicts of interest, particularly between the new state and the old regime's allies, or in the case of the cold war, contrasting ideologies. Perceptions of the external environment increased uncertainty, and misinformation would significantly contribute to the spirals of suspicion and perceptions of offensive advantage.⁷²

Waltz proposes a robust theory that demonstrates how revolutions tend to end up in interstate war. However, it contains significant flaws that need to be highlighted. As Fred Halliday mentions, Walt's epistemology is bolted-on subjectivity.⁷³ Walt takes for granted that revolutions necessarily affect the balance of threat negatively and create fear amongst the foreign leaders and would usually end up deteriorating international relations. However, empirics demonstrate that depending on the situation, a revolution may bring countries closer to each other rather than distancing them and creating fear.⁷⁴ For example, the Chinese Nationalist Revolution in 1911 that

⁷² Walt, *Revolution and War.*, 1004.

⁷³ Halliday, Fred. "Book Review: Stephen M. Walt, *Revolution and War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996)." *Millennium* 26, no. 1 (1997), 230–232.

⁷⁴ Bemis, Samuel Flagg. *John Quincy Adams and the foundations of American foreign policy*. Vol. 5 (New York: AA Knopf, 1949).

won the sympathy of Japanese public opinion and government support eventually as they thought revolutionaries would serve their geopolitical interests in China better than the Manchu Regime.⁷⁵

There is also a significant number of non-treatment of events and picks samples that can easily explain his theory; and in doing so, he neglects many essential cases. For example, the 1830 revolution ended the absolute monarchy in France and brought a rather liberal and pro-constitution king, who could endanger the Concert of Europe. Metternich, the architect of the concert of Europe – created to suppress revolutions – once remarked: “When France sneezes, Europe catches a cold.”⁷⁶ Despite France’s gravity and importance in Europe, these radical changes did not lead to intensified security competition and the conservative powers of Europe did not respond with a military intervention. The 1848 Revolutions failed in much of Europe and the conservatives were able to crush it everywhere, yet they did not initiate hostilities with France as they did after the 1789 revolution. Nor did the Chinese Nationalist Revolution in 1911 encouraged Japan to attack it. These cases beg the question, why some revolutions do not end up in dyadic war, despite demonstrating many qualifications described by Walt. In short, Walt’s work tests mostly easy cases by looking at classical samples of French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions, rather than other revolutions with more complex or non-war outcomes.

Walt also underestimates how a revolution can increase a country’s capability to fight, thus increase its aggressiveness. He considers revolutions to decrease states power significantly in the short term, which provides a window of opportunity for others. Although this is true for many revolutions, many revolutions have experienced no change or even increase in their power

⁷⁵ Ikei, Masaru. "Japan's Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 25, no. 2 (1966), 213-227.; Koyama, Mark, Chiaki Moriguchi, and Tuan-Hwee Sng. "Geopolitics and Asia’s Little Divergence: State Building in China and Japan After 1850." *Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study* (2017).

⁷⁶ Lubin, Alex. “Reading America from the Peripheries.” *American Quarterly*, 67(1) (March 2015), 219.

immediately with the revolution. Similar to Walt, Sargent Velde argues that the revolution in 1789 hindered the French ability to collect taxation;⁷⁷ but, what Walt does not discuss is revolution's new ability to raise arms in a way unprecedented in history that gave it a significant offensive power.⁷⁸ Men from all over the country were enthusiastic about serving their nation, desertion in the army dropped significantly, and with it the need for rigid discipline.⁷⁹ The overthrow of the old regime allowed the rise of the young officers from different backgrounds, who were not bound to class or military traditions and brought new ideas with themselves, that revolutionized the French Army, and the conduct of battle and allowed it to appear unstoppable until it was exhausted by the Russian winter.

An additional issue is that several of Walt's assumptions cannot be demonstrated empirically, nor does he attempt to do so. For example, he proposes that revolutions cannot be exported due to each country's unique characteristics. However, revolutions of 1820, 1830, 1848, 1917-1923, communist revolutions during the cold war and Arab Spring occurred in waves across different countries. A successful challenge against a seemingly powerful ruler can encourage others in similar conditions to dare to challenge their rulers.⁸⁰ Empirical work of many scholars demonstrates that revolutions can have a spillover impact.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Sargent, Thomas J., and François R. Velde. "Macroeconomic features of the French Revolution." *Journal of Political Economy* 103, no. 3 (1995), 474-518.

⁷⁸ Blainey, Geoffrey. *Causes of war*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 195.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 195.

⁸⁰ Lohmann, Susanne. "The dynamics of informational cascades: the Monday demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91." *World politics* 47, no. 1 (1994), 42-101. Kuran, Timur. *Private truths, public lies: The social consequences of preference falsification*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).

⁸¹ Weyland, Kurt. "The diffusion of revolution: '1848' in Europe and Latin America." *International Organization* 63, no. 3 (2009), 391-423; David S. Meyer; Nancy Whittier, "Social Movement Spillover," *Social Problems* 41, no. 2 (May 1994), 277-298; Maoz, Zeev. "Joining the club of nations,"; Ambrosio, Thomas. "Insulating Russia from a colour revolution: How the Kremlin resists regional democratic trends." *Democratisation* 14, no. 2 (2007), 232-252.

Stephen Walt does not demonstrate how revolutions decrease the nation's capability necessarily decreases by a revolution. In fact, we conducted a quantitative analysis using the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) as the closest quantified variable to study a nation's strength through and see how revolution affects it. CINC is a statistical measure created by David Singer for the *Correlates of War* project that uses average percentages of world totals of demographic, economic, and military strength components of each nation.⁸² The strength of this variable is that it goes beyond GDP and is more salient to the perception of state power.⁸³ We ran an SPSS multilinear regression of the CINC as the independent variable and international tension as the dependent variable. Seventy-seven revolutions were studied from 1816 to 2012 the period for which the CINC data is available. However, the findings show almost no relationship between the national capability change and increased international tensions as the adjusted R square of 0.035 was achieved with a poor significance test. The results respond to the question that whether revolutions affect a nation's strength at least in the quantifiable term. Thus, unlike what Walt argues, statistically speaking revolutions do not necessarily weaken countries and provide a window of opportunity for other countries to intervene for their interests. In addition, measuring a country's material capability could be irrelevant when considering a great power intervention in a small nation, as for a superpower like the Soviet Union, the military capabilities of the Afghani Army in 1979 was not a source of concern.

⁸² Greig, J. Michael, and Andrew J. Enterline. "Correlates of War Project: National Material Capabilities Data Documentation, Version 4.0." (2016).

⁸³ Heckman, Garrett Alan. "Power capabilities and similarity of interests: a test of the power transition theory." (2009).

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.227 ^a	.051	.035	3.789

a. Predictors: (Constant), CINC Change
b. Dependent Variable: TensionLevel

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	44.355	1	44.355	3.089	.084 ^b
	Residual	818.493	57	14.360		
	Total	862.847	58			

a. Dependent Variable: TensionLevel
b. Predictors: (Constant), CINC Change

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	3.779	.517		7.310	.000
	CINC Change	2.833	1.612	.227	1.758	.084

a. Dependent Variable: TensionLevel

Table 1⁸⁴

Walt's theory does not guide us to precise outcomes or to what extent each variable plays a significant role or, how the absence of the other variable affects the situation. This is an important issue because there are variations to how other state's face the new revolutionary regime. Walt's narrow approach omits different levels of tensions. The circumstances are often complicated, and states may use options, such as supporting anti-revolution or military to conduct a coup, rather than sending the military to fight directly. Thus, it is essential to have a mechanism to distinguish variation; and to explain and predict trends more accurately.

There is also an issue of scope conditions in Walt's work. He emphasizes that he analyze only the civil wars that led to a political structure change — for example, the Chinese revolution of 1949 which was part of the renewed civil war with the end of WWII that lasted for several years with the loss of the Republicans and their flight to Taiwan.⁸⁵ The problem with this approach is that it simply filters out long-lasting civil wars such as the Nicaraguan Civil War (1979-1990) in

⁸⁴ The adjusted R square of 0.035 is a very weak value, which means there is only 3.5 likelihood of correlation in the sample. The f-sig and t-sig tests demonstrates that there are 8.4% chance of finding false association, which is more than the permittable 5% in social sciences. Therefore, the value is very weak with a high chance of false association.

⁸⁵ Dolan, Thomas, "Chinese Civil War." *Faculty Bibliography*, no. 171 (2009), 411.

which the country was divided between the state and rebels, and there was a political structure change in the areas held by the leftist insurgents.⁸⁶ In addition, Walt clarifies in the beginning that his research does not include coups, yet he utilizes the Turkish Revolution as one of his case studies even though it was done by a series of coups over decades.⁸⁷ Hence, it would not qualify to be under the scope of his theory, yet he presented it as a revolution; thus making a contradiction.

⁸⁶ Wood, Elisabeth Jean. *Insurgent collective action and civil war in El Salvador*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁸⁷ Turfan, Naim. *Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the military and Ottoman collapse*. (London: IB Tauris), 2000.; Ahmad, Feroz. "War and society under the Young Turks, 1908-18." *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 11, no. 2 (1988), 265-286.

Chapter 2 : Research Design

2.1. Unit of Analysis:

Conventional wisdom on revolution and wars is robust, but having observed its flaws and contradictions, I propose to redefine political revolutions and expand our scope into developing a perspective to comprehend the complex underpinnings of revolutions and wars. As learned from the literature review, a regime changes to be considered revolutionary, on one side should be seeking to change both the political and social structure of the society. The criteria that are proposed here are based on Polity IV and Colgan's criterions.⁸⁸ Criteria influenced by Colgan is: change on executive power and selection; political ideology; foreign policy orientation; official state name; property ownership; gender and ethnic status; forces by people mass demonstration; and state-religion relationship. For any regime change to be considered revolutionary, it should achieve at least four of the mentioned principles (table 2). Besides the Colgan's criterions, the revolution also should be defined as a regime transition by Polity IV Project dataset⁸⁹ to increase the precision and decrease the possible biases in the case selection. Rather, intervening powers typically provide support to whatever regime has managed to survive to re-establish order, which consequently contributes to international security.

1	Change in executive power and selection.
2	Shift in foreign policy orientation.
3	Change in official state name.
4	Shift in property ownership.

⁸⁸ Colgan, "Measuring revolution," 2012.

⁸⁹ Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jagers. "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2017." Dataset Users' Manual. Ccessed on 19 October 2018.
<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/>

5	Change in gender and ethnic status.
6	Revolution succeeded by mass demonstration.
7	Change in state-religion relationship.

Table 2: Criteria for being Revolutionary Influenced by Colgan (should achieve four of criterions)

Failed revolutions or civil wars are not studied unless they were able to control the territory of a country for at least three months and meet at least four revolutionary criterions from the ones mentioned above. This approach is taken to filter out failed and insignificant social movements that would not affect a nation and international relations tremendously. Also, national liberation movements and colonial revolutions are excluded, as they have a different mechanism, due to natural involvement of a foreign state in occupying another it is already internationalized. Croatian separation from Yugoslavia; for example, is not considered as a revolutionary regime change but rather an ethnic-centered civil war and does not meet at least four criteria mentioned earlier for the revolution. Moreover, purely religious based insurgencies or organizations that are categorized terrorist under the UN; such as ISIS insurgency in Syria and Iraq, do not fall under the category of the revolutions; as they have different mechanism and explanations that do not fall under the focus of this study. This is because groups such as ISIS or Taliban do not operate in the context of the nation-state and do not fit into the international system. Groups like the Islamic State created an organization that controlled vast territories without establishing a modern state. Thus, it makes the discussion of outside intervention irrelevant as no state is established to be attacked in the first place.

In doing so, we incorporate every revolution into the studies since the French Revolution in 1789. The French Revolution is chosen as the start date as it painfully gave birth to the modern

nation-state.⁹⁰ The sense of nationality created by the revolution was the cement that held the societies together in an age when dynastic and religious allegiance was in decline; producing the modern societies. Through filtering the cases with the guidance of the criteria mentioned earlier, 60 cases are passed as revolutionary regime changes through a careful examination since the French Revolution until 2019.

The research method is a mixed qualitative and quantitative one. The quantitative approach allows to study a large number of cases, present clear documentation, reveal the obscured structures, and observe the patterns. The qualitative side helps to avoid biased generalizations and going more in-depth with the cases. Thus, this mixed approach complements the weaknesses of each approach and permits a more complete and synergistic utilization of data.⁹¹

2.2. Dependent Variable:

Having observed the deficiency of Walt's simple dependent variable in responding to the complex interactions between revolutions and foreign states, we propose a multi-level dependent variable, which starts from a low-level hostility to a large-scale war. The dependent variable (table 3) is named tension level and is composed of seven levels; 1- economic support or embargo; 2- logistics support and political pressure 3- military assistance (training and intelligence); 4- airstrike or naval blockades or a minimal military intervention by a force less than a 1,000 men; 5- moderate intervention by a force of 1,000 – 5,000 men; 6- significant intervention between 5,000 to 15,000 7- Large-scale intervention by a force higher than one division or 15,000 men. This categorization is based on different tools that states use to induce their will and military organization. The multi-

⁹⁰ Bhambra, Gurinder K. *Myths of the Modern Nation-State —The French Revolution*. In *Rethinking Modernity*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 106-123.

⁹¹ Wisdom, Jennifer, and John W. Creswell. "Mixed methods: integrating quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis while studying patient-centered medical home models." *Rockville: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality* (2013).

level system will help to understand to distinguish the variation of outcomes and to understand why states intervene in different scales. The first four variances indicate a proxy war, which is defined as an indirect war between states without their forces becoming directly involved in the conflict.⁹² Proxy wars are also very cost-effective, hence widely used by major powers. As President Eisenhower pointed out, they are “the cheapest insurance in the world.”⁹³ The last five stages are considered as merely inter-state war as they involve two states directly in a war with each other.⁹⁴ If the intervening force is composed of 5% percent of the targeted country, not considering whether they are 5,000 or 50,000, the tension level automatically rises to the last (level 7). It is important to note that the revolutionary country does not necessarily have to be the target, and in case of it going offensive it is the one who is intervening; thus, its behavior is counted as above for the tension level. Therefore, intervention is bidirectional, and goes for revolutionary and non-revolutionary countries, as it happens in history both ways.

1	Economic support/embargo or effective targeted propaganda against a country
2	Logistics support and political pressure
3	Military assistance through training and providing intelligence
4	Air strike or naval blockades, or a minimal military intervention by a force less than 1,000 men
5	Moderate intervention by a force of 1,000 – 5,000 men
6	Significant intervention between 5,000 to 15,000
7	Large-scale intervention by a force higher than one division or 15,000 men.

Table 3

⁹² Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov. “The Strategy of War by Proxy.” *Cooperation and Conflict* 19, no. 4 (November 1984), 263–73.

⁹³ Mumford, Andrew. “Proxy warfare and the future of conflict.” *The RUSI Journal* 158, no.2, (2013), 40-46.

⁹⁴ Sarkees, Meredith Reid. "The COW typology of war: Defining and categorizing wars (version 4 of the data)." Note with version 4 of the Correlates of War Data. *Correlates of War* (2010).

2.3. Independent Variables

The Independent variables for the quantitative model are misery, the balance of threat, and social revolutions. We propose that the longer the revolution lasts the tension with other countries will typically increase. The misery is a binary variable here and captures the impact of lengthening wars on misery. The longer the revolutions take, the more destroyed the infrastructure, economy, and mortalities get. It can also demonstrate the intensity of the revolution that can influence foreign intervention. The number of deaths caused by the revolution is crucial in measuring the misery incurred to a revolutionary country. First, death is the ultimate misery and sign of upmost violence caused to any nation and it demonstrates more security threat and capture more foreign attention. Second, many non-fatal causalities such as hunger could also end up in deaths, thus fatalities are more comprehensive in describing the situation. Third, the data for fatalities is more extensive and, in many cases, there is an absence of non-fatal violence, which would make it hard to measure. This link has been tested by running a correlation between the length of the revolutions, their fatalities, and a Pearson correlation of 0.917 was achieved, which means they explain the same thing. The misery variables are measured by the fact that whether a revolution takes less or more than three months. Three months should give enough time for the international community to react, revolutions that finish overnight are less likely to allow for the foreign countries to respond.

The reason behind studying it in a binary way is that some revolutions end up in a civil war that takes decades, and this could skew the results when compared to many revolutions that take place in a few months. It is not the duration alone, but rather the complex underlying process that causes the revolution to be lengthier can lead to a more hostile international environment. For example, a mixture of characteristics of the revolution, such as ethnic heterogeneity, ideology, and

foreign intervention can shorten or prolong the revolution or civil war.⁹⁵ The lengthier revolutions also can be more severe and cause more turbulence and disruption in the international system and invite foreign intervention. Thus, misery is an important independent variable.

Balance of threat variable measures how each revolution produces a threat through a point-based system building upon and enhancing Stephen Walt’s definition. We propose that the balance of threat can be negative as well; meaning that it can rather incite certainty and friendly relations (table 4). For example, one positive point if the revolution has a universal message; another if propaganda is used against a country; one more point if the revolutionary state tries to export the revolution by supporting revolutionaries abroad; and another point if the revolutionary regime is located within the densely populated areas of the neighboring country. One negative point if it is an elite revolution, another negative point if the revolutionary leaders seek friendly international relations, and another negative one if it is a local revolution and cannot concern other countries.⁹⁶

If the revolution has a universal message and is applicable to other countries. For example, the French Revolution that affected Europe and the world heavily.	+1
If the revolutionary country uses propaganda against another country.	+1
If the revolutionary state tries to export the revolution by supporting revolutionaries abroad.	+1
If the revolutionary regime is located within the densely populated areas of the neighboring country. For example, the Rhine region between France and German States in 1789 which was consisted of densely populated areas on both fronts, that facilitated spread of the revolution from France to German States.	+1

⁹⁵ Regan, Patrick M. *Civil wars and foreign powers: Outside intervention in intrastate conflict*. University of Michigan Press, 2002.

⁹⁶ Local revolution means here a revolution that does not have a universal language or due to the special situation of the country (such as having different socio-economic situation and culture) it is highly unlikely that the revolution can spillover.

Elite revolutions create less threat for other countries as they are less radical and create less chaos.	-1
If the revolutionary leaders seek friendly international relations and try to deescalate.	-1
If there is a political affinity between the revolutionary regime and surrounding countries or great powers.	-1
If it is a local revolution and cannot concern other countries.	-1

Table 4

Generally, revolutions that seek to revise the status quo in the international system produce a great balance of threat. The Russian Revolution of February 1917 would be an example of status quo preserving revolution since it did not seek to revise the international politics. While the October revolution by Lenin half a year later would be a revisionist revolution that sought to not only revolutionize the society, but also the whole international relations. If the overall score is negative, then the revolution does not produce a threat, and it is unlikely to cause war because of this variable.⁹⁷ The negative score is coded as zero, and the positive score is coded as one in the dataset.

Balance of threat is a binary variable in the quantitative analysis, and it is given a 0 if the case receives a negative score and does not produce threat, and if it produces threat, it is given 1. In order to measure the balance of threat, foreign policy approaches, and primary sources; such as interviews with prominent figures of the governments are used. For example, the interview with Brzezinski in 1998, that revealed CIA aided the mujahedeen on purpose of creating a threat for the USSR in Afghanistan and encourage its intervention in Afghanistan to trap it into a swamp.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Walt, Stephen M. *Revolution and War*. Chapter 6.

⁹⁸ Robert M. Gaes, *From the shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and how they Won the Cold War*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 143-149.

Last but not least, the social revolution variable based on Skocpol's explanation of social revolutions.⁹⁹ We propose that social revolutions can increase international tensions due to the fact that they revolutionize everything from society to international affairs. These revolutions can also boost the revolutionary regime's power due to their ability to mobilize forces and resources in a short period.¹⁰⁰ Based on Skocpol's definition, any class-based revolution that causes a rapid transformation of society's state and class structure, they are often accompanied by violence and civil war.¹⁰¹ Through this definition, we also include social revolutions that do not achieve their goals and are not successful. These cases are considered with the condition that they take at least half a year in an area that encompasses at least half of the country. They are considered in the research due to the fact that they can establish revolution over a portion of a country, although they may not revolutionize the whole country. Their complete control over at least one major city and practice social revolution for more than two months demonstrate that the revolution is serious enough for the foreign countries and revolutionaries can take over the country. This period should also be enough for the international system to respond. For example, the Finnish Civil War in 1918 although it failed, it is considered a social revolution as it lasted more than two months and communists who sought a social revolution enforced communism in an area that involved half of the population.¹⁰² This variable is also a binary variable, and social revolutions are coded as 1 and non-social revolutions as 0. For example, the Persian Socialist Soviet Republic lasted from June 1920 to September 1921, although it failed, but it is considered a social revolution as it lasted more than two months and communists enforced social revolution in one of the provinces of Iran and

⁹⁹ Social revolutions as discussed by Theda Skocpol in her *Social revolutions in the modern world* involves rapid transformation of a society's state and class structures; accompanied by class revolts from below

¹⁰⁰ Skocpol, Theda. "Social revolutions and mass military mobilization." *World Politics* 40, no. 2 (1988), 147-168.

¹⁰¹ Skocpol. "Social revolutions in the modern world."

¹⁰² Alapuro, Risto. *State and revolution in Finland*. (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 40-51.

held major towns, like Rasht and Anzali.¹⁰³ This variable is also a binary variable, and social revolutions are coded as 1 and non-social revolutions as 0.

2.4. Quantitative Model Procedure:

This research seeks to examine the strength of the relationship between the variables by running a multiple linear regression through the SPSS program. The dependent variable, as mentioned earlier, is tension level. While independent variables are duration, fatalities, the balance of threat, and social revolution. The first procedure was running a descriptive statistic to obtain the skewness. As seen in the table (5) in the appendix, the skewness for the variables are below the tolerable limit of +/- 2, and this means that the variables have a normal distribution. At the second step, a Pearson's r between each independent variable was run to control for multicollinearity. As observed in the table (5) there is no multicollinearity of between the variables, as their Pearson correlation falls below the limit of 0.75 and means that the two variables are not closely related.

	N Statistic	Minimum Statistic	Maximum Statistic	Mean Statistic	Std. Deviation Statistic	Skewness		Kurtosis	
						Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Std. Error
duration (misery)	60	0	1	.53	.503	-.137	.309	-2.051	.608
socialrev	60	0	1	.33	.475	.725	.309	-1.526	.608
balance of threat	60	0	1	.77	.427	-1.294	.309	-.339	.608
Valid N (listwise)	60								

table 5

Then a scatterplot of individual IVs with DV is run to assure no curvilinearity. In the matrix scatter, there is no sign of a curvilinear relationship (table 6). Then, multiple linear regression is run to examine the strength of the model. The findings (table 7) illustrates a robust correlational

¹⁰³ Shabani, Reza. *Iranian history at a glance*. (London: Alhoda UK, 2005).

value of 0.868; meaning that there is an 87% of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the three independent variables the balance of threat, social revolutions, and misery exist. The ANOVA analysis (table 8) also demonstrates that the overall regression model is a good fit for the data as the F-statistics shows that there is a near-zero chance of the finding that could occur by chance.




Table 6

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.935 ^a	.874	.868	1.167

a. Predictors: (Constant), duration (misery), balance of threat, socialrev

b. Dependent Variable: Tension Level

Table 7

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	531.342	3	177.114	130.063	.000 ^b
	Residual	76.258	56	1.362		
	Total	607.600	59			

a. Dependent Variable: Tension Level
b. Predictors: (Constant), duration (misery), balance of threat, socialrev

Table 8

The findings (table 9) demonstrate that misery is the most influential variables with an unstandardized coefficient of 4.874. This combined variable has a significant t-test significance as they stand at 0, meaning that the results are correct and not found by chance, and can be generalized to the entire population. The social revolution has an unstandardized coefficient of 1.093, and t-sig of 0.014; thus, it is highly reliable as it is well below the 0.05 cap for social sciences. Balance of threat has an unstandardized coefficient of 0.829 with a relatively weaker t-test significance of 0.039 (table 9). This means that there is a 3.9% of the false association, but it still falls well below the maximum limit of 5%, which is commonly used in Social Sciences. The regression formula would be as below:

$$Y = \text{Constant} (-0.411) + 4.874 (X_{\text{Misery}}) + 1.093 (X_{\text{Social Revolutions}}) + 0.844 (X_{\text{Balance of Threat}})$$

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-.411	.317		-1.293	.201
	socialrev	1.093	.431	.162	2.534	.014
	balance of threat	.844	.400	.112	2.111	.039
	duration (misery)	4.874	.416	.764	11.717	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Tension Level

Table 9

The sum of residuals should be zero, which regresses the residuals and the predicted values to show no pattern. Regressing Standardized Predicted Value with Studentized Deleted (table 10) Residuals shows no pattern so, Weighted Least Square is not required. However, the equality of variance assumption was tested, and there was no heteroskedasticity, thus no patterns among the residuals.

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-.411	.317		-1.293	.201
	socialrev	1.093	.431	.162	2.534	.014
	balance of threat	.844	.400	.112	2.111	.039
	duration (misery)	4.874	.416	.764	11.717	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Tension Level

table 10

2.5. Discussions:

Statistical analysis considering an adjusted R squared of 0.87 has provided a strong correlation between international tension levels and the independent variables; namely misery, social revolutions, and balance of threat. The importance of the misery variable is demonstrated by its high coefficient of 4.874 and zero t-significance. The longer the revolutions take, they demonstrate to be serious and can bring disruption to the international system and increase the tension. These revolutions also have negative spillovers to neighboring nations from, collateral damage, resources spent to assist the refugees and disruption of trade.¹⁰⁴ Such revolutions allow

¹⁰⁴ Murdoch, James C., and Todd Sandler. "Civil wars and economic growth: Spatial dispersion." *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 1 (2004), 138-151, 92.

for more time for the international community to react, that could sometimes lead to great tensions and war. External intervention could also make the revolution or civil war longer.¹⁰⁵

The lengthier and more destructive are the revolution; they also cause more exile that could encourage foreign countries to act by exaggerating the dangers of the revolution, as discussed earlier by Walt.¹⁰⁶ This variable also exposes the importance of the relation between the domestic misery and international tension. Moreover, the lengthier the revolutions get the government or revolutionaries may blame foreign countries for covering their failures, which could increase hostilities with those nations. In addition, revolution with more misery can illustrate a social weakness that invites intervention.¹⁰⁷ The fact that they have become weak does not necessarily make them a target but also can be used as an explanation for the initiation of war.¹⁰⁸ The revolutionary regimes weakened and destructed by internal conflict may be looking on other countries for extract resources or may feel vulnerable and try to spread their revolution before they are attacked, to protect the revolution in a pre-emptive manner.¹⁰⁹ Diversionary war theory also could explain when a revolutionary becomes the aggressor and invades another country to divert population for domestic grievance and violence; to promote cohesion in a divided society through concentration on the external enemy.¹¹⁰ Amongst the 60 revolutions, there are only 3 cases that despite being long and causing much destruction and misery do not end, increase the tensions significantly (more than level 3). They are, namely, Algerian, Tajik, and Nepalese Civil Wars.

¹⁰⁵ Elbadawi, Ibrahim. "External interventions and the duration of civil wars." (2000), 2.; Balch-Lindsay, Dylan, and Andrew J. Enterline. "Killing time: The world politics of civil war duration, 1820–1992." *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 4 (2000), 615-642.

¹⁰⁶ Walt, *Revolution and War*.

¹⁰⁷ Starr, Harvey. "The Relationship between Revolution and War: A Theoretical Overview." In annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Vancouver, BC, Canada. 1991.

¹⁰⁸ Wintrobe, Ronald. "The tinpot and the totalitarian: An economic theory of dictatorship." *American Political Science Review* 84, no. 3 (1990), 849-872.

¹⁰⁹ Harvey. "The Relationship between Revolution and War," 19.

¹¹⁰ Levy, Jack S. "The diversionary theory of war: A critique." *Handbook of war studies* 1 (1989), 259-288.

They all took place in the 1990s at a time where the US was at the height of its hegemonic power, and great power rivalry was lowest. None of them were social revolutions. In short, the more misery the revolutions cause, can lead to a greater international crisis.

Social revolutions are violent, rapid, class-based, and destructive. As demonstrated in the statistical analysis, they are influential in bringing countries closer to war. One can notice from the data that there are nine significant international tensions (above 5 level) following the revolutions that do not necessarily have the social revolution component. Meanwhile, there is no single social revolution that is not followed by international tension. This is an important observation as it illustrates the fact that social revolutions are not only violent domestically, but also internationally. Social revolutions, as Skocpol discusses,¹¹¹ are very efficient at mass mobilization, and this could give them offensive and defensive advantages and lead to a spiral of suspicion between them and outer countries. The social revolutions can significantly affect the balance of threat.

Balance of threat demonstrates levels of correlations with the tension level. There are only four cases do not comply with the hypothesis, which is when there is a positive balance of threat; it is likely to see the international tension increased. This could be due to the short time of the revolution, not being a social revolution and not having significant fatalities. Other specific factors that can explain it are the inability of other countries to respond to the balance of threat created by the revolution. For example, when the 1848 revolution succeeded in France, other countries in Europe were busy with quelling their revolutions, thus were not able to respond to the revolution in France. These cases will be discussed further in the qualitative section.

¹¹¹ Skocpol, "Social Revolutions and Mass Military," 149.

Qualitative Section/Case Studies:

At the qualitative section, all the revolutions used in the statistic part will be discussed elaborately, and the theory of this research will be tested on them just as it was tested statistically earlier. As discussed earlier the theory of this research is that revolution with a significant level of misery, generation of threat, and social revolutionary characteristics have a higher risk of creating tensions and eventually bringing about a war. The causes of the revolutions are not studied as they fall outside of the focus of this study; but rather the interaction of the revolution with the international system is discussed. The basis on which a revolution is chosen is, as discussed earlier at the unit of analysis sub-chapter under the research design chapter. The criteria under which basis revolution is diagnosed from a non-revolution is based on Colgan's criteria (table 2 – found under chapter 2.1 or appendix) and PolityIV dataset. Four of the table 2 criteria's must be met and in addition as Maoz has defined a regime change under PolityIV dataset it also has to change by two points in this dataset, to make sure that the case is in fact revolutionary. Every regime change and revolutionary effort is studied since the French Revolution and out of more than a hundred cases tested based on the criteria, sixty cases are found to be revolutionary.

The revolutions are categorized based on how they were formed and conducted, into mass revolutions, elite revolutions, and guerrilla revolutions. In the mass revolutions, the old regime is overthrown in an explosion of political participation of different groups and individuals in society.¹¹² The mass revolutions here are also divided into two categories of violent and peaceful. The violent ones are mass revolutions that take a violent form, and people die in the process of the revolution, while the peaceful ones overthrow the old regime peacefully. Non-violent revolutions

¹¹² Walt, *Revolution and War*, Chapter 1.

are characterized by pro-democratic and non-ideologic fervor.¹¹³ The second category is the elite revolutions that are from the above meaning that is conducted by the pre-existing elites. The elite is divided here into two categories of coup d'états and popular coup d'états. The first is coups purely done by the military, while the latter includes revolutions that are initiated by the army but are accompanied with broad participation of people in the process. The third and last category is guerrilla revolutions. These revolutions happen when the revolutionaries take guerrilla measures to topple the government or when reactionary forces take their weapon and start a civil war. The guerrilla revolutions often appeared with the rise of communist ideology in the 20th century. The guerrilla revolution should at least secure a major town, and without it, it means the revolution does not have a considerable influence in urban areas which are essential for revolution's success.¹¹⁴ The exhaustive case study contributes to a better comprehending of revolutions and international tensions. The study of all revolutions qualitatively helps with testing the robustness of the theory.

¹¹³ Goldstone, *Revolutions: A very short introduction*, 37.

¹¹⁴ Goldstone, Jack A., ed. *Revolutions: theoretical, comparative, and historical studies*. (San Diego: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994), 12.

Chapter 3 : Mass Revolutions

3.1. Violent Revolutions:

Violent mass revolutions have a high potential for experiencing a foreign intervention during its course or experience an inter-state war after the revolution. These revolutions are often not very long in duration and misery like to guerrilla revolutions, but with the massive participation of population that often radicalizes the revolutionary movement. These radical revolutions are highly likely to turn into a social revolution and uproot traditional society. These revolutions also tend to develop a universal language, and its leaders might be interested in actively exporting their revolution. This is exacerbated by the large exile population fleeing the mass revolution their country who exaggerate the dangers of the revolution. At the same time, other countries may see their interests jeopardized by the path that to them the irrational revolutionaries have taken or may find an opportunity in the new opportunity created by the chaos of the mass revolution. Thus, they may intervene to improve their position.

3.1.1. French Revolution of 1789

French Revolution was not a short one as it took at least ten years until the Napoleonic era to pass from the revolutionary period which saw itself the execution of Louis XVI in 1794; constant rebellions and the toppling of governments. Thus, it is categorized as a long revolution. It was also a very violent revolution. The estimation of deaths caused by the revolution goes far beyond 100,000 and according to some estimates goes as far as 450,000 and the minimum number is 117,000.¹¹⁵ Thus, this revolution indeed caused significant misery. The high violence level of revolution could expose more underlying factors; such as how the internal divider and suffering

¹¹⁵ Linton, Marisa. "The Terror in the French Revolution." *Kingston University* (2011), 72.

encouraged France to pursue foreign adventures and go on the offensive. It also demonstrated France as a superpower gravely weakened by the internal strife.¹¹⁶

French Revolution of 1789 is a classic example of social revolution. Skocpol has worked in details in her *States and Social Revolutions*. French Revolution transformed society rapidly and accompanied by the participation of the masses and violence. The feudal peasants suddenly found themselves citizens. Moreover, the properties of the church and the king were nationalized; while, the middle class ascended. New regulations and rules, such as the declaration of the Rights of Man, revolutionized the whole society. By introducing new notions on governing and relationship between the state and citizens. French Revolution not only shook the pillars of the monarchy in France but all Europe. European monarchs sent armies to contain and if possible, defeat the revolution. Initial and unexpected victories at Valmy encouraged the revolutionaries to go on the offensive and be more messianic. The zeal for ideological liberation decreased by 1794, but the French Revolutionaries, including Napoleon, were waging war and expanding in the name of liberty. Below, more details on how the French Revolution interacted with the three variables of this study, namely duration, mortality, the balance of threat, and social revolutions. Mansfield and Snyder particularly remark on the French 1789 Revolution and argue that when a regime change moves the nation towards more autocracy and incomplete democratization leads to radicalization and increases the probabilities of war.¹¹⁷ As mentioned earlier in the literature review based on their argument, democratizing states are more likely to go to the war as there is a significant domestic pressure to pursue nationalist policies to “stave off the pressure to return to

¹¹⁶ Walt, *Revolution and War*, Chapter 3.

¹¹⁷ Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. "Democratization and war." *Foreign Affairs* (1995), 79-97.

democracy.”¹¹⁸ Gurr, as mentioned in the literature review, theorizes that revolutionary regimes breed war by seeking to export their revolution elsewhere.

In terms of the balance of the threat, the French Revolution significantly increased the threat, as it was a mass revolution that had a universal message, actively tried to export its revolution and had densely populated neighboring areas with other countries. The Declaration of the Rights of Man was the product of the revolution that did not only concern only the Frenchmen but all the world.¹¹⁹ By announcing that all men had the right to govern themselves, the universalist language of the Declaration of the Rights of Man established a tacit challenge to the legitimacy of the other states.¹²⁰ Importantly, ideological liberation, government composition, and state creation became the significant causes of war as a result of the French Revolution;¹²¹ and such issues became foreign policy goals for France.¹²² Confronting the revolutionary France that sought to harm the monarchy was an immediate cause of the first revolutionary wars.¹²³

Revolutionary France actively tried to expand and export its revolution. Revolutionaries feel very vulnerable in the beginning and fear of an aristocratic plot aided with foreign powers directs them towards more radicalism and suspicious in their foreign policy that created a spiral to war. French and other European powers actively engaged against each other either through propaganda, subversion, and military campaign. Although France was not able to export its revolution without direct occupation. In addition, French Émigré spread self-serving myths on the danger of

¹¹⁸ Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and War,” 88-94.

¹¹⁹ Harvey. “The Relationship between Revolution and War,” 26.

¹²⁰ Walt, *Revolution and War*. Chapter 3.

¹²¹ Holsti, *Peace and war*, 88.

¹²² Holsti, Kalevi J., and Kalevi Jaakko Holsti. *Peace and war: Armed conflicts and international order*, 1648-1989. Vol. 14. (Cambridge University Press, 1991). 104.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 96.

revolutionaries for the host countries that affected foreign power's decision making.¹²⁴ Fear from the French Revolution was exacerbated by the imperfect information available on the revolutionary leaders and their intentions, that mislead both sides.

The power struggle among the revolutionaries, particularly the Girondin's branch of the Jacobines campaign for war was another reason that led to the international conflict. To strengthen their influence and dismantle monarchy, they advocated for war as they believed it would either expose the king's disloyalty, weaken the émigrés. It is widely believed by the revolutionaries that a war would be necessary to rally the public opinion behind the national assembly and constitution. "Peace will set us back,"¹²⁵ stated Madame Roland. Shaken by the dangers of within France and internal conflict, revolutionaries pressed for the continuation of the revolution abroad. Lafayette, contrary to Girondins, believed that war would establish the king's authority rather than losing it.¹²⁶

Revolution instilled ideological goals into the French Foreign Policy and distorted other state's perceptions of French intentions.¹²⁷ "French revolutionary foreign policy sought to spread the blessings of liberty, equality, and fraternity to the oppressed peoples of Europe."¹²⁸ The expansion of revolution served imperially purposed of France, maintained their armies (as their costs were covered by taxes and levies on the occupied territories) and kept the revolutionary morale high at home.¹²⁹ France also has had densely populated areas with neighboring countries in the Rhine (Wurttemberg) and Flandres (Austrian Netherlands). This fact made foreign powers

¹²⁴ Walt, *Revolution and War*. Chapter 3..

¹²⁵ Wheatcroft, Andrew. *The world atlas of revolutions*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983).

¹²⁶ Walt, *Revolution and War*. Chapter 3.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Holsti, *Peace and war*, 101.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 105.

more concerned as it would increase the prospect of spilling over the revolution and its effect. Ideological liberation was supported and reinforced by the ideas of “natural borders” for France, so annexations did not always take place solely for humanitarian and ideological reasons.¹³⁰

Findings reveal weaknesses of Stephen Walt’s theory, although he points out to several instances correctly, such as the importance of émigré and spiral of suspicion in influencing the outcome of the war between the revolutionary state and foreign powers. This case study demonstrates that France was to a great extent, the country to go on the offensive and was not a pure victim of outside intervene. Meanwhile, Walt’s theory systematically labels the foreign powers, as the initiator of war with the revolutionary countries. In addition, he does not discuss other factors to determine which countries are going to war with the revolutionary state. Here, the geographical factors (densely populated region of Rhine and Flanders) was influential in bringing revolutionary France into the conflict with the Austrian and Prussian Empires.

Skocpol’s theory is more precise on this social revolution than Walt’s. Skocpol has conceptualized that the social revolution led to a significant increase in war capabilities of France and encouraged it to go on the offensive.¹³¹ The French Revolutionary Regime instilled the idea that all citizens were obliged to assist in the national war efforts. Mass mobilization and government control of economy¹³² gave the revolutionary regime a superior force against the rival powers, some of which had to rely on feudal ways to mobilize forces and sources. Plentiful human resources, motivated and ideological zealous army was the fruit of revolution. In addition, Mansfield and Snyder theory of incomplete democratization and war is applicable to this case.

¹³⁰ Holsti, *Peace and war*, 101.

¹³¹ Skocpol, “Social Revolutions and Mass Military,”

¹³² Holsti, *Peace and war*, 104.

Their argument that new regimes seek prestige and drum up nationalist sentiments to make up for their undemocratic nature opens an alternative in the view of revolutions and international relations. Gurr's theory is also solid on the French Revolution, as the French Revolutionary regime sought to expand itself beyond its borders.

This research's theory has accurately predicted this case; there were significant misery and threat created by the revolutionaries, not to mention a radical social revolution. The revolutionary period took at least ten years and left hundreds of thousands of mortalities, which significantly weakened the nation. Its social revolution character made the revolution more radical and increased the new regime's ability to mobilize forces and resources for war efforts. Furthermore, the revolution created threat for other monarchies in Europe and urged them to counter it. Conventional wisdom is relatively precise, ignoring Walt's projection of revolutionary France as the victim of foreign aggression when applied to 1789 Revolution, but one must bear in mind that it is not a hard case and most of the scholars base their arguments on the French Revolution.

3.1.2. French Revolution of 1830

France was to see several revolutions in the 19th century, and the first was the July 1830 Revolution, which took place against the increase in authoritarianism and resorting the clerical power. Charles X the Bourbon saw radical efforts to restore the ancient regime. The church was given more power, and provisions were given to anyone who had been declared 'enemies of the revolution' during the 1789 revolution.¹³³ Charles X was receiving much criticism on his performance and his disrespect for the constitution. On 25th July, he signed the 'July Ordinance' to suspend the liberty of the press, dissolve the newly elected chamber and to exclude the middle

¹³³ Mansel, Philip. *Paris Between Empires, 1814-1852: Monarchy and Revolution*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2003, 198).

class from the future elections. The next day Paris was on fire for three days as people set up barricades; revolted and toppled Charles from the throne.¹³⁴ Most of the people who rioted in the streets were unemployed workers; university student along with a handful of members of the middle class, called for a new republic just as their fathers and grandparents had four decades ago.¹³⁵

Lamartine long after the revolution wrote; “the republican kiss of Lafayette¹³⁶ had made a king.”¹³⁷ Soon revolutionaries found their revolution smuggled by the conservative forces and their resistance suppressed by 1832. The new revolution brought the conservative bourgeoisie and landowning class in power who were determined to prevent the radical period of post-1789 revolution that led to upheavals and over twenty years of war.¹³⁸ The conservatives were quick to take control of the “three glorious days” revolution pushed for a monarchical system in 1830 because of the threat of civil war and foreign civil war. The continuation of widespread unrest allowed the most conservative supporters of Louis-Philippe to assume permanent control. The revolution caused a shift from Bourbon constitutional monarchy to July constitutional monarchy, from hereditary monarchy to popular sovereignty. The citizen-king was owning his legitimacy to the people rather than the god. The eligible voters were doubled from 100,000 to 200,000, which was still insignificant for the large French population.¹³⁹

¹³⁴ Philip, *Paris Between Empires*, 238.

¹³⁵ McNeese, Tim and Samuel Willard Crompton, *Political Revolutions of the 18th, 19th, and 20th Centuries*, (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 2005), 163.

¹³⁶ Lafayette as a popular and charismatic figure rallied support for Louis-Philippe. He was approached to become the president of a new French Republic, but he rejected the proposition and believed that France was immature for democracy and another republic would mean another civil war. McNeese, *Political Revolutions*, 105.

¹³⁷ Pinkney, David H. *The French revolution of 1830*. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972).

¹³⁸ Pilbeam, Pamela M. *The French Revolution of 1830*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

¹³⁹ Mcneese and Crompton, *Political Revolutions*, 163.

The violent struggle of the July revolution only lasted for three days and experienced a much shorter period and level of violence compared to the 1789 revolution. This short period could have significantly decreased the window of opportunity for foreign countries to respond and consider responding. There was no purge, and mass execution after and during the revolution and Charles X could depart to Great Britain rather than going through the same fate of Louis XVI. Less than 1,000 people died in the street fights between the forces loyal to Charles X and revolutionaries.¹⁴⁰ The situation in the July Revolution was well controlled and did not resemble the anarchic situation of the 1789 French Revolution.

Importantly, the 1830 revolution was not a social revolution and did not significantly affect the balance of threat. Although the revolution saw an active participation of different classes in a rapid and violent phase. The Republicans were sidelined, and conservative took power and the pre-existing elite such as Louis-Phillip Duke of Orleans became the king. Foreign powers were content to see the events did not turn out radical and expansionist. Louis-Philippe and its conservative government were wary of creating another significant war; thus, they did not intervene against other revolutions taking place in Europe in 1830 and took a non-intervention approach. Particularly in Italy, Louis-Philippe bailed on its promise to support the revolutionary Ciro Menotti in Italy against the Austrians.¹⁴¹ Metternich, the mastermind behind the Concert of Europe, was pleased to see that 1830 revolutions were followed by rather stable regimes.¹⁴²

July Revolution was not studied by Walt yet, his framework is to some extent applicable to this case, as the revolution created too little threat to other powers to lead to war, and French

¹⁴⁰ Lorieux, Auguste. *Histoire du règne et de la chute de Charles X: précédée de considérations générales sur les révolutions comparées de France et d'Angleterre en 1688 et 1830*. Dumont, 1834.

¹⁴¹ Holmes, George, ed. *The Oxford illustrated history of Italy*. (Oxford University Press, 1997), 188.

¹⁴² McNeese and Crompton, *Political Revolutions*, 163.

fighting capabilities were not affected. The country's power was not affected as the CINC data demonstrates; the nation was not significantly affected by the revolution. Thus, it did not create an incentive for other countries to take advantage of the French weakness caused by the revolution. What is important here is that the revolution took place in just a few days, and misery variable was not fulfilled; which, can explain why the CINC was not affected. Mansfield and Snyder theory of incomplete democratization is another relevant conventional theory to this case. According to their framework, the country should have ended up in war since 1830 Revolution was incomplete democratization and ended up in another monarchy. Their theory demonstrates impotent when applied to this case, incomplete democratization did not lead to war, but rather peace. Therefore, the inexistence of a variable similar to the misery or duration in his research can be problematic in explaining revolutions and war.

The French Revolution of 1830 is a hard case for this research's theory. The revolution did not lead to war, simply because the variables of misery, the balance of threat, and social revolution were not provoked. The revolution took only several days led by moderate elites, such as Lafayette, who did not seek radical reforms or a social revolution, and the radical segments were sidelined. The theory of this research has predicted the dynamic of this revolution well.

3.1.3. French Revolution of 1848

In the 1840s most of the European countries were undergoing harsh economic situation, lousy harvest and subsequently massive unemployment; and many of them experienced revolutions in 1848 out of which only the French one was successful. Hungarian revolution was successful for several years until it was crushed by Austria and Russian armies; however, it is not

studied as it was primarily a national liberation revolution.¹⁴³ The historians called the 1840s “the hungry forties.”¹⁴⁴ Louis-Philippe had proven to be a disappointment as his domestic policies appeared to favor the wealthy class and his foreign policy uninspiring.¹⁴⁵ At the same time, Louis-Philippe increased the pressure on freedom of the press, and by 1847 a coalition of republicans and liberals was formed.

In February Louis-Philippe banned social banquets, as they had become a center for criticism of him. This provoked outrage and people were in the streets again to conduct another revolution. Middle class led, and the urban lower class did most of the fighting in the streets.¹⁴⁶ The Orléans King fled to England like Charles X; thus, a provisional government was formed. In the beginning, the reforms under the provisional government were remarkable and radical. The French Revolution in 1848 could have turned into a social revolution like 1789. The provisional government empowered by the radical republicans and socialists such as Louis Blanc established “right to work” that obligated the government to provide a job for the unemployed. To fund this expensive program, the government to place new taxes on land, which alienated the peasantry and aristocracy.¹⁴⁷ There were even calls for an international crusade to assist other nations of Europe going through revolution and struggle.¹⁴⁸

Fear of new taxes and falling into disorder and major war alarmed the conservative middle class formed the reactionary Party of Order. They intended to keep reform to a limited agenda. It became dominant in the government and disbanded the right to work on 22 June. This provoked

¹⁴³ Greg, William. R. *Essays on Political and Social Science Contributed Chiefly to the Edinburgh Review*. (London: Longman, 1853).

¹⁴⁴ Coffin, Judith G. *Western Civilization*. 2002.; McNeese and Crompton, *Political Revolutions*, 171.

¹⁴⁵ McNeese and Crompton, *Political Revolutions*, 170.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 169-170.

¹⁴⁷ Moggach, Douglas, and Gareth Stedman Jones, eds. *The 1848 Revolutions and European Political Thought*. (Cambridge University Press, 2018).

¹⁴⁸ Sperber, Jonathan. *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851*, Vol. 29. (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

the working class of Paris to come into streets and set-up barricades on June 23rd.¹⁴⁹ As Tocqueville puts it into words, it was “the revolt of one whole section of the population against another.”¹⁵⁰ The army crushed the rioters in 2 days and left at least 4,000 death. Soon after a presidential election was held and Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte using his uncle name that conveys a sense of awe, grandeur, and fear promised the bring back the former glory to France and won the elections by a large margin.¹⁵¹ However, unlike his uncle, he had no radical dreams and had no wish for war early on and maintained good relations with England and maintained peace for a few years.¹⁵²

The 1848 Revolution did not rise the tension between France and foreign powers, as predicted by this research’s theory, since none of the independent variables namely: misery, balance of threat and social revolution were presented during this revolution. Although the revolution was violent, the violent stage lasted only for a few days, which did not weaken France and did not create chaos in a short time to concern the neighboring countries or provide them with a window of opportunity. In other words, the revolution did not cause significant misery. The revolution could potentially turn into a social revolution and had the capacities to affect the balance of threat, but soon, the conservative took power and suppressed these possibilities. Louis-Napoleon restored order; cultivated good relations with other powers and domestically reverted many liberal achievements of liberalism to the age of Louis-Philippe of Orleans, and after two years he did a coup and announced himself as an emperor.

The 1848 revolution is in accordance with Walt’s approach, as the revolution was taken over by a moderate and then monarchist leadership; causing little threat for great powers. In addition,

¹⁴⁹ Douglas and Jones, *The 1848 Revolutions*, 24.

¹⁵⁰ De Tocqueville, Alexis. *Souvenirs de Alexis de Tocqueville*. (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1893), 136.

¹⁵¹ McNeese and Crompton, *Political Revolutions*, 173.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 172.

the fighting capabilities of the nation was affected by only 7% based on the CINC data, which is not a significant number, as it is below 10%. As Gurr would discuss, the new French Revolution did not actively try to export its revolution, thus it did not go to war. However, similar to 1830 Revolution, Mansfield and Snyder theory of incomplete democratization and war demonstrates to be inaccurate, since the revolution similar to 1830 revolution was heavily characterized by failure of democratization as the President Napoleon crowned himself the emperor.

The French Revolution of 1848, similar to its predecessor in 1830, demonstrates how not causing misery, a social revolution and threat for outside powers can cause no intervention against the revolution complies to this research's prediction. Similar to the 1830 revolution, the radical elements were sidelined, and the support was concentrated on one man's leadership, namely Napoleon III, who moderated the revolution and eventually ended the French Second Republic in 1851 and steered the country back into monarchy.

3.1.4. Iran Constitutional Revolution of 1905

Iran had been governed by the corrupt and weak Qajar dynasty since the late 18th century. The discontent towards their failure to modernize Iran and continuous losses of territory to Russia. The liberal, constitutional and nationalist movements in Europe inspired Iranian dissidents; and finally, in 1905 they revolted to realize the long-time dream of a constitutional dream and they succeeded to compel the sick Mozzafar ad-Din Shah Qajar to sign the constitutional law and parliament in 1906.

Since the beginning of the 19th century, Iran had occupied an important strategic position for both Britain and Russian.¹⁵³ For Britain, Iran played as the passage to its jewel in the crown to its

¹⁵³ McNeese and Crompton, *Political Revolutions*, 186.

continental rivals, particularly Russia. For Great Britain, the prime goal was to keep foreign powers out of Iran's hinterland as much as possible. However, this policy was changing as Germany was replacing the Russian Empire as a rival power. Russia was primarily inspired by Britain to check on Germany's rising power; urged Great Britain to give concessions to Russia in Persia and tolerate its intervention against the constitutional revolution. Russia and Great Britain came into an agreement regarding Iran in 1907, northern Iran, including Tehran were designated as the Russian zone, and the south-eastern area bordering British India was marked as a British Sphere.¹⁵⁴ This approach was unpopular at home as the liberal and labor opposition at the parliament and parts of conservative British diplomatic machine were sympathetic to the Iranian liberal cause and disregard for Russian autocratic regime's expansionism.¹⁵⁵ However, this opposition was insignificant to the need to accommodate Russia.

Russia at the same time as Iran in 1905 experienced mass rebellions over the country and as a result established a parliament only to deny and suppress it soon after the end of 1905 rebellions.¹⁵⁶ At the same time, a constitutional revolution at the south of its border not only threaten its interests in the region but also resembled its own revolution in 1905, in which many revolutionaries of Caucasus participated. While Russia was busy suppressing its own rebellion, another revolution at the other side of the border, where there was a cultural and historical affinity and were part of Iran decades ago; could seriously imperil Russian effort to suppress the revolution.¹⁵⁷ Thus, it had to quell the rebellions there too.

¹⁵⁴ McNeese and Crompton, *Political Revolutions*, 188.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 187.

¹⁵⁶ Bonakdarian, Mansour. "The Persia committee and the constitutional revolution in Iran." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 18, no. 2 (1991), 186-207.

¹⁵⁷ Mamontov, N. P. "Ocherki sovremennoi Persii." (Saint Petersburg: Tip VF Kirshbauma 1909), 202-4.; Nāzem-al-Eslām Kermāni, *Tāriḵ-e bidāri-e Irāniān*, ed. 'Ali-Akbar Sa'idi Sirjāni, 6 vols. in 2, (Tehran: Bonyad-e Farhang-e

After the 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement on dividing the country into spheres of influences; the new Russophile Shah staged a coup with the help of Russian Cossack Brigade colonel, Liakhoff, and bombarded the Parliament and killed the leading opposition members. Great Britain was convinced that Russia was directly involved in the coup but decided to take a non-intervention approach to appease Russia. However, the coup failed to stop the revolutionary sentiment in Iran, and soon Tabriz rose and then from all over the country the revolutionaries gathered, and captured Tehran and the Shah fled to Russia. These events alarmed Russia that there was a need to send Russian armies to crush the revolution.

The revolution in Iran was not a social revolution as it was not a very radical one that wanted to disband monarchy at once and change the class composition. Constitutionalist did not seek a sudden and complete overthrow of the institutions of the old regime, but instead strove for more representation and holding the monarchy accountable.¹⁵⁸ Although there were radical republican and even Marxist¹⁵⁹ elements among the revolutionaries, they did not compose major parties among the revolutionaries. However, it had significantly increased the balance of threat to Russia. North-Western Iran was quite active in the revolution, and there was a possibility that they spread the revolution to their brothers on the other side of the border. In Tabriz alone, 1200 activists were executed when the Russian Army captured it.¹⁶⁰ Universalist language as they both discussed the importance of constitution and dependence from the Russian imperialism. By 1911 the Russian army had occupied large parts of the country and compelled Tehran to arrest the radical politicians

Iran, 1983), 156.; Mahdi Malekzāda, *Tāriḳ-e enqelāb-e mašruḩiyat-e Irān IV: Oful-e setāra-ye āzādi*, (Tehran: Entesharat-e Shargh, 1952), 71.

¹⁵⁸ Sohrabi, Nader. "Historicizing revolutions: constitutional revolutions in the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Russia, 1905-1908." *American Journal of Sociology* 100, no. 6 (1995), 1383-1447.

¹⁵⁹ Jangalist movement in Gilan Province

¹⁶⁰ Javadi, Hasan, and Edward Granville Browne, eds. *Letters from Tabriz: the Russian suppression of the Iranian constitutional movement*. Mage Pub, 2008).

and comply with Russian demands and limit the reforms.¹⁶¹ In addition, Russia feared that a liberal Persia would side more with Great Britain. Iranian constitutional revolution lasted for six years and was quite long enough for the Russian and British government to coordinate and respond by which Britain gave Russia an open hand in the Iranian affair. Moreover, Persia experienced tens of thousands of fatalities as the result of the revolution and internal conflict that had significantly weakened it, which paved the way for foreign intervention. In a nutshell, the Iranian Constitution Revolution is an example of nationalist and liberal revolution that was suppressed by the Russian Empire, like many revolutionary movements in 19th century Europe.

The Iranian Constitutional Revolution case supports the theory of this research. The revolution was not a social revolution but slowly fits the misery and balance of threats variable. The revolution lasted six years claiming many lives and created a significant balance of threat to Russia, with its nationalist and liberalism aims. Walt's balance of threat theory is too simplistic to identify why it was Russia who invaded Iran, and not Great Britain. Based on our point formed and revised the definition of balance of threat, it can be identified why Russia invaded Iran. Russian Empire bordered Iran's densely populated regions in Caspian and Azerbaijan; and faced a revolution in Iran that had a universal language for people on the other side of the border in Russia too. Meanwhile, Iran's border with British India was sparsely populated, and its revolution did not concern the people on the other side of the border, due to lesser cultural affinity and the fact that Great Britain was already a liberal country. Therefore, there were parties in Great Britain that sympathized with the Iranian cause, while in Russia, it was taken as a threat.

¹⁶¹ Bonakdaria, "The Persia Committee,"

3.1.5. Mexican Revolution, 1910-1920

The Mexican revolution started with the rebellion of Madero against the 31-year presidency of Porfirio Diaz in 1910, who had sold the nation to the foreigners for the cause of industrialization. Diaz lasted one year from the start of the revolution, and soon Mexico was embroiled into a ten-year civil war in, which different factions come and go. Mexican revolution during its course had become a center for the rivalry of foreign powers' interest; and armed American intervention. Finally, Caranza had defeated other factions by 1920 and established the revolution.¹⁶²

The Mexican Revolution was a very bloody and long one. With over a million dead, Mexico had collapsed in many levels and was highly divided.¹⁶³ Its lengthy duration also allowed for foreign powers to react and intervene ultimately. The Mexican revolution was concurrent with the events in Europe and WWI, that prevented a full-scale intervention that had secondary importance compared to the Great War. Still, at times, there were 10,000 US army men (level 6 of the international tension) involved in operations against the Mexican revolutionaries, such as Pancho Villa Expedition were sent to Northern Mexico between 1916 to 1917.

The Mexican revolution was a social revolution in many senses that completely changed the social class relations in a violent manner.¹⁶⁴ Its hostility towards church even feared the American Catholic church, which lobbied for US intervention, although the church's pressure was not taken seriously by the US government.¹⁶⁵ In terms of However, the balance of threat, the Mexican Revolution created a danger for the American interests to certain levels in its backyard. The

¹⁶² McNeese and Crompton, "Political Revolutions", 193-195.

¹⁶³ McCaa, Robert. "Missing millions: the human cost of the Mexican Revolution." *University of Minnesota Population Center* (2001).

¹⁶⁴ Knight, Alan. "Social Revolution: A Latin American Perspective." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 9, no. 2 (1990), 175-202.

¹⁶⁵ Edwards III, Warrick Ridgely. "United States-Mexican relations, 1913-1916: revolution, oil, and intervention." (PhD Thesis, LSU, 1971).

possibility of German Mexican rapprochement influenced the decision to intervene in Mexico in 1914. The Mexican revolution was concurrent with the WWI, and that saved it as major powers were busy fighting for their existence and even the US had to continually keep an eye on Europe and prepare troops for a potential great war there. For example, Great Britain had considerable interests in Mexico second to the US, but due to events in Europe, it had to keep away from Mexico. However, the Great War increased the interest of Germany in Mexico to hinder US support for Britain and France. Germany tried to stay rather neutral politically to not provoke the US.¹⁶⁶ However, with the increase in the submarine warfare and inevitable of conflict with the US, the Kaiser tried allying with the Mexican revolutionary regime against the US and its efforts through Zimmerman Telegram to do so finally provoked the US to declare war on Germany.¹⁶⁷

The US had extensive investments and business interests in Mexico and desired to prevent the spread of economic nationalism in Latin America. Threats were used to persuade Carranza to moderate his policies, but support for a full intervention remained weak with the population and President Wilson. Carranza's version of nationalism was not a severe threat to American interests, and in fact many US businessmen believed that a full war might instead hamper American assets rather than protecting them.¹⁶⁸ The Mexican government that came to power in the post-revolutionary period was rather pragmatic, elastic, and eclectic. In short, the social revolution fervor started to fade away when it began to rule the country. Importantly the Mexican revolutionary state did not develop a universal language, and it did not try to spread the revolution to other parts of Latin America.¹⁶⁹ This could be one of the explanations why there was no tension

¹⁶⁶ Leffler, John Joseph. "Germany, Mexico, and the United States, 1911-1917." (Master Thesis, Portland State University, 1982), 59.

¹⁶⁷ Walt, *Revolution and War*, Chapter 6.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Cline, Howard F. "Mexico: A Matured Latin-American Revolution, 1910-1960." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 334, no. 1 (1961), 89.

between Mexico and other countries in the post-revolutionary period, but it cannot illustrate why the intervention during the revolution, in which there were radical groups that threatened the US interests, the US response was mild.

Due to the sheer size of Mexico and limited US Army manpower a full-scale war and occupation were not implemented. It was estimated that a half-million army was necessary for an all-out intervention, while the war in Europe was the priority.¹⁷⁰ Another matter that would complicate a full-scale invasion, according to President Wilson, was that it would unite all the Mexican factions against the US.¹⁷¹ Although there were many divisions amongst the revolutionaries, they all shared a negative view of foreign intervention. President Wilson had tried to negotiate with some revolutionary factions to gain their support against the government of Huerta for example, drastically failed and they all asked the US to stay out of Mexican affair.

Walt admits that the Mexican revolution is different from other revolutions he studied, and its international effects were mild despite having the potentials, yet he insists that the case is still in accordance with his theory, since the US did intervene to some extent. However, this shows the weakness of his theory, since he does not offer a mechanism to measure the significance of the threat caused by the Mexican Revolution. Meanwhile, this research suggests a mechanism to measure the threat. Instability caused by the social revolution and long internal strife together with the threat of relations with hostile Germany alarmed the politicians in Washington to intervene. However, geographically Mexico bordered areas in the US that were sparsely populated, nor there was much cultural affinity on both sides of the border. In addition, the US was a democracy and an isolationist country at the time, which made foreign intervention not popular at home. Thus, the

¹⁷⁰ Walt, *Revolution and War*, Chapter 6.

¹⁷¹ Link, Arthur S. Wilson: *The New Freedom*. (Princeton University Press, 1947).

intervention was rather mild and not a full-scale one. US sent around 10,000 men to secure its objectives. However, most of them were used on the border to pursue Pancho Villa, and its deepest venture into Mexico was the occupation of Veracruz that lasted from April to November 1914. On the other hands, the significant misery and social revolution characteristics should have brought a stronger intervention. Therefore, this case is an exception to this research's theory and does not fully comply it.

3.1.6. Chinese National (Xinhai) Revolution of 1911

Qing dynasty was corrupt, inefficient, and had humiliated China by its repeated defeats to foreign powers. The opposition to the dynasty grew over time and called for a republic or constitutional monarchy, finally led to a nationalist revolution in 1911. The revolution was a bloody one as at least 200,000 died in a relatively short time of four months.¹⁷² This significant level of violence and its period longer than two months would increase the expectations for foreign intervention, yet the revolution did not see an armed intervention. However, it is important to note that the Xinhai revolution does not meet the other two variables; namely, the balance of threat and social revolutions. The revolution was not a social revolution as it did not affect the class system and did not develop a universal language and on Chinese issues. In addition, the nationalist revolutionaries learned from Boxer rebellion mistakes and were solicitous toward foreign interests in China.¹⁷³

The revolution in China came as a shock to Japan, as the Japanese had taken advantage of their victory over Russia to annex Korea and were extending their influence into China,

¹⁷² Tuchman, Barbara Wertheim. *Stilwell and the American Experience in China: 1911-1945*. Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2017.

¹⁷³ Esherick, Joseph W. "Reconsidering 1911: Lessons of a sudden revolution." *Journal of Modern Chinese History* 6, no. 1 (2012), 11.

particularly Manchuria.¹⁷⁴ The revolution occupied the mind of Japanese leaders on how to respond to it. Japan was the closest major power and had substantial stakes in China, yet it perceived the revolution to some extent in favor of its interests.

When the revolution erupted in China, the War Ministry of the Manchu Government secretly requested the Japanese to supply arms to help subdue the revolution.¹⁷⁵ Japan's policy regarding China was to wait and not to provoke other major powers into the attention of China. In addition, Japan also took a cautious path towards both revolutionaries and the central government as she was uncertain, which side would win or was better for the Japanese interests. The foreign ministry provided arms to the Manchu Regime with the condition to get concessions in Manchuria; while, the Japanese Army provided arms to rebels as they were based in the south and Japan had continental interests in Southern China.¹⁷⁶ In addition, the Japanese public opinion was in favor of revolutionaries, and right-wing black dragons sent armed volunteers to aid the revolutionaries. They believed that Han people would not oppose a Japanese take-over of Manchu, and such a revolution would benefit Japanese interests.¹⁷⁷ The opinion towards Japan in China was a love and hate relationship. Although there was a dislike for Japan among many Chinese; but, many revolutionaries like Sun Yat-Sen saw the island nation as an example of successful modernization.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁴ Ikei, Masaru. "Japan's Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 25, no. 2 (1966), 213-227.

¹⁷⁵ Ijii to Hayashi, October 13, 1911. Japan Foreign Ministry, *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho* (The Diplomatic Documents of Japan), special Vols. XLIV-XLV, *Shinkoku liken* (The Chinese Revolution of 1911) (hereafter NGB XLIV-XLV) (Tokyo, 1961), No. 261.

¹⁷⁶ Ikei, "Japan's Response," 214-216.

¹⁷⁷ Nash, Jay Robert. *Spies: A Narrative Encyclopedia of Dirty Tricks and Double Dealing from Biblical Times to Today*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.

¹⁷⁸ McNeese and Crompton, "Political Revolutions," 289.

Chinese Xinhai revolution was not a social revolution like the boxer revolution and not an all-out threat to foreign interests. The revolutionary leaders were able to successfully communicate with foreign powers, negotiation, and even make concessions¹⁷⁹ in order to avoid foreign intervention. In addition, China's vast territory and population would require amassing a large army for invasion for which no outside power desire without facing a significant threat. Japan was the closest country and the most intrigued in an intervention in the revolution, but it was cautious as it learned other parties, such as United States, Russia and to some extent would not be content with a specific Japanese intervention. Bringing other great powers to China would disadvantage Japan. Thus, it took discreet steps and implicit interventions not to attract attention.¹⁸⁰ The Xinhai Revolution caused much bloodshed and destruction, but it did not make a threat for foreign interests, nor was it a social revolution. Therefore, the Chinese revolution did not see considerable foreign intervention.

Walt's theory partially fails to explain the Xinhai Revolution and its international impacts. The revolution did not create a threat to other countries, which could explain why there was no foreign intervention. However, based on his theory, we should have expected a foreign invasion considering the fact that there were many countries that would want to take advantage of the window of opportunity caused by the revolution in China. In fact, the CINC data demonstrates a 26% drop in the fighting capabilities from just before and after the revolution,¹⁸¹ yet no country took advantage of it. His overemphasis on the window of opportunity and ignoring social revolution variable demonstrates to be problematic here.

¹⁷⁹ Qi Douji. "The Central Academy of Modern Studies, Collection of Modern History Research Institute, No. 1, Taipei, 1969. 8. 4.6 times version 438." *Dong-yangshahag-yeongu* 4 (1970), 100-105.

¹⁸⁰ Ikei, "Japan's Response," 213-227.

¹⁸¹ The Chinese CINC for 1910 stands as 0.13 and 0.96 in 1913.

Xinhai Revolution is mostly in accordance with this research's theory, as it was not a social revolution and did create a threat for other countries. However, the revolution was not a very short one and took a large number of deaths, which should have increased the chance of international tension, which did not happen. The fact that it was not a social revolution and created little threat could have offset its enormous casualties and duration.

3.1.7. Russian Revolution of 1917

There have been many works on the causes and effects of the Russian revolution. It is a classic case that meets the three variables of this study, namely misery, social revolution, and balance of threat; thus, saw different foreign countries intervening. The first phase of the Revolution in February 1917 was not a social revolution, nor did it create a significant balance of revolution. The provisional government that had come to power did not try to dismantle the pre-existing social status overnight; create a universal revolutionary language to export. It also did not change its foreign policies and did not end its participation in the World War I. With the communist take over of Russia in October Revolution a wave of long, violent, social revolutions with a high balance of threat was produced that shook the world for much of the 20th century.¹⁸²

The civil war that started right after the communist take over of the government took the life of between seven to twelve million people.¹⁸³ This staggering casualty demonstrates how the Russia Empire had collapsed and was seriously divided and weakened. The civil war that preceded the October Revolution took five years, allowing enough time for the foreign powers to respond

¹⁸² Walt, *Revolution and War*, Chapter 4.

¹⁸³ Fuller Jr, William C., Peter Gatrell, Peter Holquist, Eric Lohr, and Joshua A. Sanborn. "Casualties, Russian Civil War." *Russia at War: From the Mongol Conquest to Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Beyond [2 volumes]* (2014), 170.

to it. Allied forces occupied important ports of Archangel and Vladivostok and provided support for the anti-revolutionary white forces until they lost to the Bolsheviks.

October revolution was a tremendous social revolution as it uprooted the class system rapidly and violently. The communists strove to create a classless society, and not only they wanted to implement it to Russia; but as they did not believe in the Westphalian system, they used the universal language of their revolution to export it to other countries. Revolutionary leaders like Trotsky advocated for permanent revolution as he believed the revolution would not be able to hold out against the hostile pressure of the capitalist world unless the revolutionary state spread the revolution to all over the world.¹⁸⁴ After the Russian Revolution a wave of revolutions spread across Europe, although failed but were able to demonstrate the strong universal language of the Russian Revolution and its ability and wish to affect other countries.¹⁸⁵ The revolution also had increased the capacity of Communist Russia to amass zealous and loyal soldiers, that gave it an advantage over the White Russians.¹⁸⁶

Russian Revolution like the French Revolution of 1789 is not a hard case, and conventional wisdom can predict it well. This could be due to the fact that much of its theory is derived from these revolutions. Walt's approach is applicable to this case, as he discussed, the Bolshevik regime also made peace with the Germans and withdrew from the war, creating a significant threat for the allied forces. Thus, the Russian Revolution effectively created threat and compelled the foreign nations to intervene against it. Skocpol's social revolution theory can also predict the Russian Revolution as mentioned earlier, as the violence of the social revolution was transformed into the

¹⁸⁴ Trotsky, L. "The Permanent Revolution is not a 'leap' by the Proletariat, but the reconstruction of the nation under the leadership of the Proletariat." *Marxists.org*, accessed April 25 (1931), 2019.

¹⁸⁵ Motadel, David. "Waves of revolution." *History Today* 61, no. 4 (2011), 3-4.

¹⁸⁶ Skocpol, "Social Revolutions and Mass Military," 156-157.

international relations arena. However, each theory of conventional wisdom has a limited approach to the revolution. Walt's ignores the role of ideology and social revolution in relevance to the intensity of the revolution. On the other side, Skocpol does not mention how a social revolution may weaken a society and not necessarily strengthen it, which could provide a window of opportunity for other powers to take advantage of.

The Russian Revolution case supports the theory of this research and offers a more comprehensive explanation. The revolution created a significant threat for other nations, much misery internally and a radical social revolution. The revolution was prolonged with internal fighting in the vast remains of the Russian Empire causing millions of deaths in less than eight years, significantly weakened the society, which allowed other powers to take advantage of it and invade the country to improve their position. Particularly, the Japanese Empire which held significant interests in the Eastern Siberian Region and did not leave until Russia began to recover in 1925. Allied intervention in favor of the White Army to contain the threats created by the radical communist revolution. The intervention did not last very long as the white forces proved to be ineffective. Importantly, the war-weariness and divided objectives among Great Britain, France, Japan, and the US induced the allied forces to pull out Russia entirely by 1925.¹⁸⁷ The relation between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, slowly started to improved as the Russian Revolutionary shifted from an "International Socialism" held by Trotsky and classical Marxists to "Socialism in one Country," decreased the threat of revolution and instability for other countries and slowly improved the relations with the USSR and other nations. This was aided by the harsh economic situation, and after several years of coming into power, Lenin realized that he could not

¹⁸⁷ Foglesong, David S. *America's secret war against Bolshevism: US intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920*. Chapel Hill: UNC Press Books, 2014.

govern the Soviet Union in isolation and enmity with the capitalist world, thus requested trade with Great Britain; and concluded Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement in 1921.¹⁸⁸

3.1.8. Finnish Revolution 1918

Finland was to turn into a communist state like Russia at the beginning of 1918, with the socialists (reds) controlling major industrial and cities of Southern Finland, and the whites controlled rural northern Finland.¹⁸⁹ The Finnish Civil War had become the ideological battleground with the Soviet Union supporting the Finnish communists at one side and German Imperial Army together with volunteers across the Baltics supporting the Finnish Whites on the other side.¹⁹⁰ The red's rising in Finland after the communist's success in taking over Moscow had significantly increased the threat in the region, particularly German's sphere of influence, while on the other side the Russians saw it as the extension of their revolution.¹⁹¹ There were at least 20,000 foreign troops involved at the Finnish Civil War that makes a full-scale intervention, half of the German Baltic Division that helped the Whites to defeat the Reds.¹⁹² In terms of fatalities, it was deadly with around 40,000 death for in three months and a half.¹⁹³ Thus, the Finnish failed revolution or civil war meets all the three variables, and consequently, it ended up in with a decisive foreign intervention. All the independent variables of this research were met, and not surprisingly, there were extensive foreign interventions in the Finnish Revolution. Walt's theory is also precise regarding this and could explain well with its balance of threat approach.

¹⁸⁸ White, Christine A. *British and American commercial relations with Soviet Russia, 1918-1924*. Chapel Hills: UNC Press Books, 2017.

¹⁸⁹ Alapuro, Risto. *State and revolution in Finland*. (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 40-51.

¹⁹⁰ McMeekin, Sean. *The Russian revolution: A new history*. (London; Profile Books, 2017).

¹⁹¹ Roselius, Aapo. "4 Holy War: Finnish Irredentist Campaigns in the Aftermath of the Civil War." *In The Finnish Civil War 1918* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 119-156.

¹⁹² Tepora, Tuomas, and Aapo Roselius. *The Finnish Civil War 1918: History, Memory, Legacy*. (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 90-118.

¹⁹³ Tepora, Tuomas, and Aapo Roselius. "Introduction: The Finnish Civil War, Revolution, and Scholarship." *In The Finnish Civil War 1918* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 1-19.

3.1.10. Chinese Civil War 1927-1937

China had survived since the major powers sought to share equally in her exploitation. The various powers maintained a balance of power, which gave the country hollow sovereignty.¹⁹⁴ The 1911 revolution brought the nationalists into power, but soon the divisions between the revolutionaries increased; and finally, in August 1927, the communists initiate a long-lasting civil war against the nationalist government.¹⁹⁵ The war represented an ideological split between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Nationalist Party. The first phase of the revolution lasted until 1937 when both parties agreed to cease the civil war and unite against the foreign enemy. Japan using the state of disarray and civil war in China to take over Manchuria in 1931. As China was more and more burning in the fire of civil war, Japan took the opportunity and initiated a full invasion of China in 1937. Unlike what Waltz argues, one cannot base the argument on the decrease in military capabilities of the Nationalist government as its CINC had not decreased, but rather it is due to Chinese division over its civil war. Japan preferred the Nationalist over the communist government but preferred it to be busy fighting the red army and to be weakened. Some five million Chinese had died due to the civil war period from 1927 to 1937.¹⁹⁶ The long duration of the Chinese Revolution and its very high casualties demonstrates an exhausted China that gave Imperial Japan a window of opportunity to use for its benefit. The Nationalists had a 3-million-man army, which was much higher than the period before the civil war. However, since it had to

¹⁹⁴ Bedeski, Robert E. "The Tutelary State and National Revolution in Kuomintang Ideology, 1928–31." *The China Quarterly* 46 (1971), 308-330, 313.

¹⁹⁵ Lee, Lai To, and Lee Lai To. *Trade Unions in China, 1949 to the Present: The Organization and Leadership of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions* (Singapore: NUS press, 1986).

¹⁹⁶ White, Matthew. *Atrocities: The 100 deadliest episodes in human history* (New York: WW Norton & Company 2011).

deploy most of them to contain the communist uprising, China could not allocate resources and men against the Japanese armed forces.¹⁹⁷

The Communist rebels did not control important parts of the country nor areas that Japan was interested. Japan did not attack China because it feared a communist regime as communists were still rather weak and far from areas that Japan controlled. Japan invaded China to implement its imperial goals and policies; however, the communist uprising was effective in encouraging Japan to do so due to the state of disarray in China caused by a long and bloody revolution.

Due to the occupation of Chiang with the communists, Japan took advantage by the invasion of several coastal cities in Manchuria. However, the nationalists did not respond as they were receiving aid from Japan, and their forces were no match for their highly trained, and aggressive troops. Chiang explained that the Japanese represented a “disease of the skin,” while the communists were “a disease of the heart.”¹⁹⁸ Defeating the communists was a priority for the nationalists, and the general believed a divided China could not stand a chance against the formidable Japan. Nationalists were not only losing significant territories to Japan, but they were also losing the battle for the control of minds and hearts of Chinese people.¹⁹⁹

Internationally, the business-friendly General, Chiang Kai-Shek had gained foreign support in contrast to Mao’s communist revolutionaries. In good faith, Great Britain abandoned two of its Chinese treaty port cities. The United States was also supportive of Chiang, due to his representation of substantial business interests; and his support for Christians in China.²⁰⁰ Even the Soviet Union was reluctant to aid the Chinese revolutionaries. Stalin considered Mao a traitor

¹⁹⁷ McNeese and Crompton, “Political Revolutions,” 322.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 307-308.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 319.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 304.

to the communist cause and calling Chinese communism nothing more than “two peasants wearing the same pair of pants.”²⁰¹ Thus, Mao’s revolution was considered a threat to all parties. Germans provided extensive support for the nationalist forces,²⁰² while Japanese before their full-scale military invasion in 1937 supported the nationalist forces against the Communists.²⁰³

The communist uprising supports the theory of this research. It was surely a social revolution as they sought and did abolish the social class system under territories occupied.²⁰⁴ This social revolution with serious ideological Agendas was the main strength of the red army. While lacking proper equipment and training, the Chinese Red Army made up for these deficiencies with ideologic zealousness and determined sense of spirit and drive.²⁰⁵ In short, the first phase of the Chinese Civil War, although its balance of threat was not much of a threat to the Japanese, due to its destruction and division of China, it provided the Japanese a window of opportunity for its long-time imperial plans. Therefore, the first phase of the Chinese Civil War is in accordance with Walt’s framework, as the window of opportunity was an important factor that led to the Japanese invasion. Chinese fighting capabilities based on CINC dataset was decreased by 15% due to civil war, and the Chinese society had become gravely divided.

3.1.11. Chinese Revolution 1946-1949

The bloodshed of the Chinese Civil war resumed shortly after the end of WWII in March 1946. The CCP (Chinese Communist Party) was strengthened by Soviet handover of equipment and military hardware after the defeat of the Japanese; and allowing them to enter in Manchuria, while the Soviet army withdrew. The Soviet Union was limit by the Sino-Soviet Treaty of

²⁰¹ McNeese and Crompton, “Political Revolutions,” 322.

²⁰² Kirby, William C. *Germany and Republican China*. (Stanford University Press, 1984).

²⁰³ McNeese and Crompton, *Political Revolutions*,

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 319.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 304.

Friendship and Alliance with the Nationalist Government since August 1945.²⁰⁶ Throughout the internal conflict, the US, USSR, and North Korea supported their belligerents to change the outcome of the civil war in their favor. However, shortly after winning the civil war, China decided to intervene in the Korean war and attack the US forces there. The Korean war was a defining moment during the initial stages of the Cold War. China's military conflict with the United States finally buried any chance for a communist China and America accommodation, and the Cold War in Asia entered a new stage which lasted until the early 1970s. The newly established communist regime in China was facing tremendous problems during its first year, such as consolidating power, reunifying the country and rebuilding the destroyed economy; shattered by decades of war.²⁰⁷ Why then the CCP leadership decided to fight against the Western Powers in Korea right after the end of ruinous civil war? The Chinese case is an exception that will be elaborated in this chapter.

China was weakened and devastated by the first phase of the civil war (1927-1937), the Japanese invasion, and the second phase of the Chinese Revolution (1945-1949). The disastrous internal conflict had weakened China severely and given enough time for the foreign powers to respond to it. The misery variable was fulfilled in this case. The Chinese Revolution also significantly increased the balance of threat against American interests in East-Asia region. The communist revolution in China had a universal language and sought to expand it to other countries in Asia if not the whole world. Therefore, the US came to aid the KMT regime to prevent such radical take over of China by the communists. However, the US actions mounted a distrust and hostility between the US and CCP.

²⁰⁶ Kara, György. *The Black Master: Essays on Central Eurasia in Honor of György Kara on His 70th Birthday*. (Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 2005).

²⁰⁷ Chen, Jian. "China's Changing Aims during the Korean War, 1950-1951." *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 1, no. 1 (1992), 8-41.

The need to resist the Japanese invasion and to balance the influence of the Soviet Union, the CCP since the early 1940s had sought to establish some relationship. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai showed a willingness to be equipped and commanded by Americans and even to go to the United States to meet President Roosevelt.²⁰⁸ However, they were humiliated by being ignored by the Americans. The US preferred a one-sided policy of supporting the ruling Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) in China.²⁰⁹

Washington became deeply involved in Chinese politics right after the end of WWII. Although it did not get involved directly in the Chinese Civil War, it continued to provide the KMT with diplomatic, economic, and military assistance.²¹⁰ During this period of 1946-1949 that Mao increasingly adopted a one-sided policy of leaning towards Moscow, due to his disappointment with the Americans. Washington found the international communist movement around the world, including CCP as monolithic and viewed them all as Moscow's proxy to destabilize the world and to endanger American interests.²¹¹ To help the Chiang Kai-shek's government eliminate the communists, the Truman administration provided with more than US\$2 billion of military and economic aid during the civil war.²¹² At the same time, General Marshall was sent to China to negotiate between the Communists and KMT and compel them to form a unified non-communist state, which was rejected by both sides. The failure of Marshall negotiations and KMT's corruption decreased American support for the Nationalists.²¹³ However,

²⁰⁸ Cohen, Warren I. "The United States and China since 1945." *New Frontiers in American East Asian Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 130-46.

²⁰⁹ Yufan, Hao, and Zhai Zhihai. "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisted." *The China Quarterly* 121 (1990), 95.

²¹⁰ Tsou, Tang. *America's Failure in China, 1941-50*. University of Chicago Press, 1963.

²¹¹ Yufan and Zhihai, "China's Decision," 95.

²¹² Tang. *America's Failure*, 443-95.

²¹³ Sun, Tung-hsung "Some Recent American Interpretations of Sino-American Relations of the Late 1940's: An Assessment." (1982), 29-51.

by the end of 1948, it was clear that his government was no match for the communists and was going to fall promptly. Thus, the US followed an ambiguous policy of disengagement and non-intervention. However, due to pressure from public opinion in the United States, the Truman administration still provided limited support despite announcing the policy of non-intervention.

The ambiguity of Washington's China policy only deepened Mao's suspicion and distrust of the US. The CCP leadership began to seriously consider an American military intervention to save the KMT in late 1948.²¹⁴ By early 1949 Mao had given up on his hope to balance between the US and USSR and began to lean more towards the Soviet Union and to seek the economic and military aid gravely needed.²¹⁵ CCP's concerns deepened when General MacArthur visited Taipei and raised the possibility of using KMT troops in Korea, and at the same time, KMT remnant became more active domestically by harassment of local governments.²¹⁶

Importantly, Truman did at the end intervene to some extent in the Chinese civil war by ordering the 7th Fleet to neutralize the strait of Taiwan and block the path of Chinese Red Army to the island, where the remaining Nationalist forces had fled.²¹⁷ Mao took the American action as armed aggression against Chia, which confirmed CCP's fears about the threat from the US. Zhou Enlai on behalf of the Chinese government declared that the American actions "constituted armed aggression against the territory of China and a gross violation of the United Nations Charter."²¹⁸ The CCP leaders had to put aside their plans for "liberating" Taiwan and reconsider how to deal with the US hostility towards the newly established the People's Republic of China.²¹⁹ As Zhou

²¹⁴ Yufan and Zhihai, "China's Decision," 96.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 97.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 104.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 100.

²¹⁸ Ibid, 101.

²¹⁹ Chen, "China's Changing Aims," 10.

Enlai said, they saw the war in Korea as the continuation of their civil war and confrontation with the Americans related to Taiwan issue.²²⁰

The relationship between the CCP and North Korea had been intimately close due to their cooperation during the civil war period. North Korea provided military support and allowed its territory to become a rear base. In return, it received the urgently required necessities such as food.²²¹ They also had beneficial economic cooperation through the exchange of material and food resources. Additionally, the North Korean leader, Kim Il-Sung, encouraged the Chinese-Koreans to join CCP and fight alongside them against the Nationalists.²²² On the other side, Stalin considered Mao as a nationalist rather than a Marxists. He even tried to have him replaced with Moscow-indoctrinated leaders. Sometimes he was doubtful whether Mao's success would be an advantage of the socialist camp. Mao's strive to improve relations with the US during the 1930s and 1940s did not occur as a trustworthy fighter against the US to the Soviet Union. Therefore, USSR kept relations with the KMT until the end of the civil war.²²³

The communist revolution in China had a very universalistic tone similar to the previous Russian and French revolutions. Since 1946 the CCP leadership had viewed the victorious Chinese revolution as a decisive step towards an Asia-wide or even a world-wide revolution.²²⁴ Korean War offered the CCP an opportunity to conduct its international revolutionary program.²²⁵ The Chinese communists believed the revolution would revitalize the Chinese nation and destruct the

²²⁰ Yufan and Zhihai, "China's Decision," 103.

²²¹ Won, Kim Sang. "The Chinese Civil War and Sino-North Korea Relations, 1945–50." *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies* 27, no. 1 (2014), 91.

²²² Ibid, 100-105.

²²³ Yufan and Zhihai, "China's Decision," 109.

²²⁴ Chen, "China's Changing," 9.

²²⁵ Ibid., 10.

old-world order and resume China's position as a central kingdom in the new world.²²⁶ Mao perceived his revolution knitted with Chinese ethnocentrism and universalism; thus, it had to go beyond China.²²⁷ Mao saw the Korean War in the context of Asian revolutions in which China played a central role. He thought that it was the duty of Communist China to defeat Americans in Korea and promote the coming of the high tide of Asian revolutions following the Chinese model. Through internationalist eyes of Mao, Communist China would be secure only after revolutions swept through all Asia and the world.²²⁸ Mao repeatedly stressed the need to send troops to Korea by stating that the Korean war was not an isolated one and it was a confrontation between socialist and imperialist camp in the East and it was to rescue the revolution in Asia and world. China became the advocator of the revolution in Asia and at the same time accelerated military assistance to the Vietnamese Communists fighting the French.²²⁹ In Mao's point of view, if China did not intervene in favor of North Korea when it was in trouble; then the USSR could also stand by when China herself was in peril, and Internationalism would be meaningless talk.²³⁰ Improvement in Sino-Soviet relations and improvement of China's status in Asia was an important motivation to enter the war.²³¹

There was also a strategic aspect of the balance of threat that facilitated the war. Korea bordered the industrial heartland of China. CCP leadership viewed the American foreign policy a reflection of Japan's former imperialism in China. Zhou Enlai stated that with the United States with acquiring bases in Japan, it inherited the adventurism of the Japanese militarists.²³² Namely,

²²⁶ Chen, Jian. *China's road to the Korean War: The making of the Sino-American confrontation*. (Columbia University Press, 1994), Chapter 2.

²²⁷ Chen, "China's Decision," 40.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 40-41.

²²⁹ Chen, "China's Changing," 11.

²³⁰ Hao and Zhihai, "China's Decision," 106.

²³¹ Whiting, Allen Sues, and Allen Sues Whiting. *China crosses the Yalu*. (New York: Macmillan, 1960).

²³² *Ibid.*, 103.

to occupy Korea and then North-eastern China before threatening China. For CCP leadership, the Korean question was also related to Taiwan.²³³ The CCP leadership believed that even if the US did not attack China directly, it could establish a hostile regime in the Korean peninsula bordering the industrial heartland of China. Thus, China had to always hold a large number of troops at the one thousand kilometers border on guard at the Yalu River.²³⁴ An important aspect of Chinese intervention in Korea was to maintain the Chinese nation's security.²³⁵

The CCP leadership saw a war with the US inevitable and found Korea a suitable place to do so. Mao and General Peng Dehuai believed that the US was overextended with military deployment in 49 countries, and Korea was not a priority for it. In addition, the narrow shape of the Korean peninsula and mountainous North Korea would greatly limit the mobility of American troops. Besides, the Korean peninsula was close to Chinese industrial heartland, supply network and Soviet border; while a great part of supplies had to transport from 10,000 miles away for the US military venture in Korea.²³⁶

The Chinese Revolution is a classic example of a social revolution in which masses of people overhaul the class system of the country rapidly. Through social revolution, China was able to mobilize and motivate masses for its goals, including rapid industrialization and armed forces struggle.²³⁷ The fact that Communist China arouses from an ideological, social revolution gave it a large boost in morale. While lacking proper equipment and training, the Chinese Red Army made up for these deficiencies with ideologic zealously and determined sense of spirit and drive.²³⁸

²³³ Enlai, Zhou. *Zhou Enlai xuanji (Selected Works of Zhou Enlai)*. Vol. II (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984), 52.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, 51.

²³⁵ Chen, "China's Decision," 40.

²³⁶ Hao and Zhihai, "China's Decision," 107.

²³⁷ Skocpol, "Social Revolutions and Mass Military," 149-151.

²³⁸ McNeese and Crompton, *Political Revolutions*, 304.

The ideological side of this social revolution brought cohesion and dedication to the Chinese Communist Party and common goals such as the abolishment of all classes. Such cohesion was absent among its opponents.²³⁹ The social revolution aspect of the Chinese revolution made the CCP a formidable body and significantly increased its morale and believe in being able to defeat the superior weapons of the Americans.

CCP's leadership found it essential to rapidly recover and reconstruct the economy in preparation for a possible US blockade. Facing harsh economic situation and harassment by the KMT remnants, the CCP decided to centralize economy, unify the currency, decrease the expenditure, enhance food supply, and increase the production efficiency. Miraculously, the Chinese economy recovers with astonishing speed, and output roughly doubled from 1949 to 1950.²⁴⁰ The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) data by correlates of war also supports this rapid growth. The overall CINC increased by 8% over a year from 1949 to 1950. The energy consumption more than doubled, and steel and iron production vastly increased.²⁴¹

Another factor that may have caused China to go on the offensive is that China was already able to secure a great power (USSR) as an ally and receive its blessing to go war with the US. In addition, Truman's passiveness towards the Chinese issue also strengthened Mao's perception that East Asia was "the weak point of the international front of imperialism."²⁴² Moreover, the lack of information about the Korean situation is another critical factor that contributed to the decision of entering the war. The CCP leaders had paid very little attention to the escalations at the Korean

²³⁹ Boorman, Howard L., and Scott A. Boorman. "Chinese Communist Insurgent Warfare, 1935-49." *Political Science Quarterly* 81, no. 2 (1966), 171-195.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 99.

²⁴¹ Singer, J. David. "Reconstructing the correlates of war dataset on material capabilities of states, 1816-1985." *International Interactions* 14, no. 2 (1988), 115-132.

²⁴² Chen. "China's Changing," 9.

peninsula and had limited knowledge about the situation. The Chinese Embassy at Pyongyang had not been established yet when the war broke out, and the Chinese ambassador was not in there until late August 1950.²⁴³

On June 25th the North Korean forces invaded South Korea, and on 27th June Truman announced that the US would come to rescue South Korea. Mao Zedong believed that American intervention was imminent, decided not to demobilize the army.²⁴⁴ The Chinese leaders did not intend to intervene in the war in the beginning. They provided only with sending the Korean Chinese who were serving in the Red Army (14,000) to Korea.²⁴⁵ Zhou Enlai warned that China would not tolerate seeing her neighbor being “savagely invaded by the Imperialists.”²⁴⁶ However, Chinese threats were not taken seriously. By the first of September, it was decided among the Chinese leadership to intervene in the Korean War, even before the American landing at Korea; it was just about the issue of the final order.²⁴⁷ A large number of Chinese forces up to 700,000 were deployed at the border with Korea. Mao’s concentrating of forces at the Korean border and intervention in the peninsula also accorded with his philosophy of “striving for the best while preparing for the worst.”²⁴⁸ However, China’s decision to enter the war was restricted by aspects other than its speed of preparation and mobilization. Before, Mao could send troops he needed to get the cooperation of the Soviet Union; and consent of Kim Il-Sung. North Korea preferred to defeat its southern counterpart alone and thought it could do so. It was not until the UN landing at Inchon and disintegration of the North Korean Army that Kim Il Sung saw his regime on the verge

²⁴³ Hao and Zhihai, “China’s Decision,” 99.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 98.

²⁴⁵ Xu, Yao, and Cong Yalujiang dao Banmendan. "From Yalu River to Panmunjon." (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe 1985), 2.

²⁴⁶ Hao and Zhihai, “China’s Decision,” 102.

²⁴⁷ Chen, “China’s Changing,” 15-16.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 12.

of collapse and he finally turned to the Chinese.²⁴⁹ As the UN forces were advancing towards the Yalu River at the border with China, the Chinese army poured into the Korean peninsula and pushed them back. Eventually, there was a statement around the 38-parallel line as the Chinese forces could not overcome UN forces superiority in weapon and equipment. Mao's insistence on continuing offensive operations throughout the war reflected his determination to gain a total victory over in Korea and kick the Americans out of the peninsula.²⁵⁰ Being unable to do so he agreed to an armistice, and the war ended on 27th July.

Another factor that can explain why the revolutionary regime of China went on the offensive is the fact that US's upmost intervention was sending the 7th fleet to save Taiwan in case of People's Republic of China's attack. Had Truman showed a heavier hand against Mao, he would not have gone bold to go on the offensive. Importantly, from the leadership perspective, Mao gained more courage when he saw that the US was reluctant to save the KMT regime in China's civil war.²⁵¹ The US in the 1940s was concerned with Europe, the Middle East, and Japan; and much of Africa and Asia, including China, was not a priority. Truman administration perceived China as a country with little potential for modernization and an enemy dangerous only on its periphery; an area which the United States did not intend to enter. Chiang Kai-shek of KMT was not popular amongst the US policymakers, and Chinese communists were thought to be tolerable. Kennan did not believe that Mao would become Stalin's puppet, and the US should focus on trying to distance Mao from the USSR.²⁵²

²⁴⁹ Chen, "China's Changing," 15-17.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 28.

²⁵¹ Yufan and Zhihai, "China's Decision,"

²⁵² Cohen, Warren I. "Harry Truman, China, and the Cold War in Asia." *Reviews in American History* (1978), 146-154.

The Chinese Revolution of 1949 illustrates that many weaknesses in Walt's analysis and his framework. The Chinese Revolution demonstrates that a revolutionary regime is not necessarily a victim of foreign invasion; and it can go on the offensive instead, as Mao sent hundreds of thousands of troops to the Korean Peninsula to fight the UN troops. This is while Walt proposed that revolutionary regimes have always been attacked in history. Meanwhile, he does not discuss how the Chinese offensive in Korea affects his theory and make his work appear inconsistency.

In conclusion, due to universalistic approach towards revolution, the strategical situation of Korea, mistrust of the United States, lack of knowledge on the Korean issue, a sudden increase in economic output encouraged it to be more offensive; and the decision of Truman to not intervene militarily in the Chinese civil war. These factors could explain why in the case, unlike the other revolution, the revolutionary regime goes on the offensive. Therefore, this case strongly supports this research's theory.

3.1.12. Spanish Revolution 1936-1939

The Spanish Civil war began when several generals rebelled against the left-leaning Spanish Second Republic in 1936. The Republicans were allied with communists and anarchists and on the side of Nationalists were the Falangists, monarchists, and Catholics under the leadership of General Franco. The internal struggle in Spain promptly attracted foreign nations and experienced extensive outside intervention despite the efforts of many countries such as the UK and France to enforce non-intervention on the Spanish issue. The foreign intervention in the Spanish Civil War had significant impacts on its outcome. For example, it was only through the provision of the Italian and German aircraft that General Franco was able to transfer its Spanish Moroccan troops

to southern Spain during the crucial times of the early civil war.²⁵³ That decisively turned the outcome of the combat in the south. Moreover, it was only through the Soviet provision of arms and aircraft, coupled with the international brigade that prevented the fall of the Republican Madrid and prolonged the civil war for another two years.²⁵⁴

The Spanish Civil War took more than two years and eight months and caused at least several hundred thousand death up to two million deaths a significant portion of which was executed; the number varies depending on the sources.²⁵⁵ The profound number of deaths and its length illustrates the extent of the misery of this revolutionary conflict and its weakening effects for Spain, opening the way for outside intervention. The long period of the conflict also provided enough time for the foreign powers to respond accordingly and facilitated their intervention.

The Spanish Civil was a social revolution in many ways and fueled the fire to the intensity of the civil war. The communists and anarchists on the side of the Republicans were very active during the civil war and were striving to achieve a classless society and in the case of anarchists a syndicalists system in a rapid manner. In some parts of Spain, such as Zaragoza and Catalonia, the Anarchists were able to govern according to their principles. The highlight of this social revolution was the establishment of a libertarian socialist economy based on coordination through decentralization, federations, industrial syndicates, and agrarian communes.²⁵⁶ The sharp ideological aspect of this social revolution attracted volunteers around 32,000 strong, also from the fascist states that helped to internationalize the conflict.²⁵⁷

²⁵³ Stone, Glyn. "The European Great Powers and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 *In Paths to War*" (London: Palgrave, 1989). 199-232.

²⁵⁴ Ibid, 199.

²⁵⁵ Tucker, Spencer C., ed. *World War II: The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection [5 volumes]: The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection*. (Santa Barbar: ABC-CLIO, 2016).

²⁵⁶ Rocker, Rudolf. *Anarcho-syndicalism: Theory and practice*. Vol. 3. (AK Press, 2004), 66-67.

²⁵⁷ Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War*.

The Spanish Revolution had a significant balance of threat implications for the European powers, notably the fascist ones. Spanish Civil War was internationalized with volunteers and armies participating in it from around the world many of them with ideological goals. The left-leaning republicans allied with Marxists and anarchists had worried not only Germany and Italy but also England.²⁵⁸ More than 16,000 German forces and 50,000 Italians assisted the Nationalists forces. The intervention cost both countries a substantial fortune. Italy spent 64 million pounds and Germany between 35 and 46 million pounds.²⁵⁹ The massive costs incurred by both powers illustrates the steely determination of both dictators to ensure the victory of the Nationalists Spain, despite accepting the risk of deteriorating relations with other European powers, particularly France and Britain.²⁶⁰

A victory for the socialists in Spain would be a serious menace as it could encourage revolutionaries in France and elsewhere in Europe and threaten Fascist Italy and Germany. As Mussolini told his wife Rachele: “Bolshevism in Spain would mean Bolshevism in France, Bolshevism at Italy’s back, and danger of Bolshevism of Europe.” The Duce regarded his intervention in Spain as safeguarding Fascism in Italy.²⁶¹ For Germany, the ideological motive was also strong to intervene in Spain. Hitler’s intention was not to establish a Nationalist Socialist regime in Spain, an exercise which Hitler himself believed would be impossible and absurd. His aim was rather a contagion of Bolshevism. Five years after his intervention explained that if “there

²⁵⁸ Stone, “The European,” 199.

²⁵⁹ Whealey, Robert H. "Foreign Intervention in the Spanish Civil War." *In The Republic and the Civil War in Spain*, (London: Palgrave, 1971), 219.

²⁶⁰ Stone, “The European Great,” 200.

²⁶¹ *Ibid*, 201.

was had not been the danger of red peril overwhelming Europe,” he would not have intervened in Spain on July 26, 1936.²⁶²

The ideological preoccupation of Germany with Spain was linked with the strategical considerations that Denis Smyth refers to as geo-ideological conception of the international system. What Germany feared was that communism could extend in Europe and encircle Germany. The Nazis concern about their strategic position. The victory of leftist Popular Front in France in the elections of May 1936, was too real.²⁶³ A potentially Bolshevist Spain would strengthen France by constituting a land bridge for France to North Africa, which would empower it significantly.

On the other hand, a victory for the militarist general Franco in Spain would weaken Germany's potential adversaries and enhance its prospect for the conquest of the East.²⁶⁴ The ideological conflict in Spain also benefitted Germany by serving as a distraction from Nazi political and military expansion in central and eastern Europe. Thus, Hitler purposely limited the extent of German intervention in Spain in order to prolong the conflict and keep the tensions alive.²⁶⁵

The Soviet Union, on the other side, provided extensive aids to the republican forces, including aircraft, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, lorries, and weapons. They also provided most of the Spanish government's needed oil. During the civil war between 2,000 and 3,000 Russians were present in Spain. The Soviet influence extended to the political and military organization of Republican Spain was extensive. The Soviet advisors had penetrated institutions of the Spanish Government such as the Communist Party of Spain. The Soviet intervention had roots in its geo-

²⁶² Thomas, Hugh. *The Spanish Civil War: Revised Edition*. (New York: Modern Library, 2013), 356.

²⁶³ Stone, "The European Great," 202.

²⁶⁴ Hildebrand, Klaus. *The foreign policy of the Third Reich* Vol. 105. (University of California Press, 1973).

²⁶⁵ Weinberg, Gerhard L. *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany*. Vol. 1. (University of Chicago Press, 1970) 143-144.

ideological concerns. The Soviet policy in the mid-1930s was to co-operate and collaborate with different socialist factions. The Soviet Union believed that a victory for the Falangists in Spain backed by Nazi Germany and Italy would leave France with its socialists' government and Russia's new partner surrounded by hostile regimes. Besides, the collapse of the socialists in Madrid would have severe consequences for their counterparts in Paris and international socialism elsewhere.²⁶⁶

Walt's theory is partially applicable to this case as there was a significant threat made to major powers by the Spanish Revolution. However, the CINC data demonstrates that the fighting capability of Spain was improved significantly during the revolution. This could be due to the influx of international support for both sides of the revolution. Thus, the window of opportunity, discussed by Walt, is irrelevant to this case, and other factors than material power could be more important. Gurr's theory can also partially explain the Spanish Revolution and foreign intervention, as the fear of the spread of communism from Spain had urged Italy and Germany to rush into the country to contain it.

The policy of non-intervention in the Spanish civil war was the invention of the French authorities, and the British government was already committed to it. However, the French were not totally abided to it. They sold aircraft to the Republicans, and the largest contingent of the international brigade was composed of Frenchmen, around 10,000 strong.²⁶⁷ The French Popular Front government was inclined to provide military assistance for the Republicans in Spain. Nevertheless, the fears of provoking the right-wing in France and creating civil disorder,

²⁶⁶ Stone, "The European Great," 208-2010.

²⁶⁷ Viñas, Angel. "The financing of the Spanish civil war." *Revolution and War in Spain 1939* (1984), 268-270.

ideological division, and civil war, induced a more cautious response.²⁶⁸ The Spanish Revolution fulfilled all the three variables extensively, including misery, social revolution, and balance of threat; thus, saw significant foreign intervention.

3.1.13. Bolivian 1952 Revolution:

The 1952 Bolivian revolution took place when the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) ousted the military junta that controlled Bolivia. The prelude to the revolution was when the MNR's party leader won the 1951 elections but was not allowed to be seated.²⁶⁹ The revolution took the lives of 600 people and took three days,²⁷⁰ thus caused relatively little misery. The 1952 revolution was not a social revolution did not have significant effects on the society and economy of Bolivia as the new regime did not have the resources to implement major centralization and leftist policies.²⁷¹ The new Bolivian government also was not vocal about its socialism and did not try to spread it in other countries. Therefore, the balance of threat was not affected, and other countries did not feel threatened by this revolution. The US approach towards the new leftist Bolivian regime was friendly and provided early support.²⁷² The US aid made up 32% of the total income of the Bolivarian government in 1957.²⁷³ The US interests in the post-revolutionary Bolivia besides humanitarian reasons have been attributed to the implicit goal of moderating the revolution.²⁷⁴ The relatively low fatalities, short duration, little threat, and the fact that it was not a social revolution made a foreign intervention irrelevant and unnecessary. Walt's prediction is

²⁶⁸ Young, Robert J. *In command of France: French foreign policy and military planning, 1933-1940*. (Harvard University Press, 1978). 139-141.

²⁶⁹ Malloy, James, and Richard Thorn, eds. *Beyond the revolution: Bolivia since 1952*. (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), 40.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 46.

²⁷¹ Berg, Andrew, and Jeffrey Sachs. "The debt crisis structural explanations of country performance." *Journal of Development Economics* 29, no. 3 (1988), 275.

²⁷² Malloy and Thorn. *Beyond the revolution*. 53.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, 88.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 100-101.

partially applicable to this case, as no significant balance of threat was created. However, the CINC data demonstrates that the nation's fighting capabilities were decreased by 16% from 1951 to 1951, yet there was no foreign intervention, and his window of opportunity variable demonstrates to be impertinent here.

3.1.14. Iranian Revolution, 1979

The Iranian of 1979 was won by an unlikely coalition of communists and Islamists that overthrew the “2,500 years of continuous monarchy.” After the revolution, the Islamic Republic party under the spiritual leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini swallowed the rest of the revolutionaries and purged the former officials and officers. Western-style industries, strong armies, and education were dismantled, and a new and only theocratic country²⁷⁵ was born.²⁷⁶ In terms of duration and casualties, it took about 500 fatalities in one year from January 1978 to February 1979.²⁷⁷ The casualties of the revolution were not very high, but the revolution's view on dismantling many industries and modern army institution contributed significantly to its weakness. The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) shows a 24% drop in overall capability of the nation comparing the year before and after the revolution. This significant drop in nation's power could have motivated Saddam Hussein to make use of the window of opportunity and attack Iran in 1980 to annex the oil-rich Khuzestan province and add to its fragile and limited sea access.²⁷⁸ However, the Iranian revolution was a social revolution that allowed Iran to mass mobilized shortly after the invasion of Iraq and reverse its advances.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁵ Except for the Holy Sea, Vatican.

²⁷⁶ Keddie, “Iranian Revolution,” 594.

²⁷⁷ Charles, Kurzman. *The unthinkable revolution in Iran*. (Harvard University Press: 2004), 109.

²⁷⁸ Karsh, Efraim. *The Iran-Iraq War*. (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2009), 1-8.

²⁷⁹ Skocpol, “Social Revolutions,” 149.

The Iranian Revolution also increased the balance of threat significantly. This social revolution had a universalist language, and its proponents advocated its export abroad, particularly to other Muslim countries. In addition, for the first time, a theocracy had been established in a vast country, which encouraged other Islamic militants and activists in other countries to be more determined in their fight. Ayatollah Khomeini repeatedly mentioned that we would expand revolution as in one of his speeches he said: "We will export our revolution to the four corners of the world because our revolution is Islamic, and the struggle will continue until the cry of 'there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his Messenger' prevails throughout the world."²⁸⁰

Iran was particularly was looking to Iraq to expand where the second-largest Shia population lived after Iran.²⁸¹ As Henry Kissinger mentioned the world view of the new Iranian regime was not the Westphalian nation-state and separation of church and state, but rather the Islamic world and non-Islamic world.²⁸² However, it is essential to note that the new Iran gave and sought support from non-muslim revolutionary movements around the world including, IRA in Ireland and Sandinistas in Nicaragua.²⁸³ Saddam Hussein who was a paranoid leader misunderstood the revolution in Iran and felt insecure, thus committed significant reforms to incorporate the Shias into the leadership, and well into the 80s, they formed the majority in the ranks of the army and parliament, overtaking the traditional Sunni position.²⁸⁴ The combination of a significant decline in Iran's capabilities and balance of threat compelled Iraq to attack and start an eight-year war.

The revolution in Iran also increased the threats for the US interests in the region as, Iran was the Gendarme of the Region under the Nixon Doctrine, its embassy staff was also taken as the

²⁸⁰ Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, and Shaheen Ayubi, eds. *The Iran-Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conflicts*. (Santa Barbara: Praeger Publishers, 1983).

²⁸¹ Cruze, Gregory S. "Iran and Iraq: Perspectives in Conflict." *USMC Command and Staff College* (1988).

²⁸² Kissinger, Henry. *World order*. (New York: Penguin Books, 2015), Chapter 4.

²⁸³ Roy, Olivier. *The failure of political Islam*. (Harvard University Press, 1994), 175.

²⁸⁴ CIA Declassified Report. "Iraq's Shias: Saddam Blunts A Potential Threat." 2012.

hostage by the revolutionaries that deteriorated their relations gravely. However, the US refrained from an extensive intervention against it, which could be explained by the Vietnam Syndrome and large size of Iran. The most important factor, however, was the statement of Brezhnev in November 1978 on the Soviet Union's strong position on non-interference and would perceive US meddling as hostile.²⁸⁵ Fear of escalation of a coup or a civil war that could escalate the situation and invite the Soviet invasion like the case of Afghanistan compelled the US to not interfere against the revolution, and help to its smooth success by sending general Huyser to discourage the general from conducting a pro-Shah coup.²⁸⁶

The revolution in Iran fulfilled all three variables in this research. It took one intense year, in which many people died, and the economy was destroyed. It was a menace for neighboring nations and foreign powers. It was also a social revolution that overhauled a society. Walt's predictions are pertinent to this case as, nations capability to fight was weakened by 22% according to the CINC data, which created a window of opportunity for Iraq. As mentioned earlier, it also created a threat for other countries in the region, particularly Iraq.

3.1.15. The Algerian Civil War, 1992-1998

The Algerian Civil War was a failed Islamic take over of the country that started in 1990 and took a violent form, from 1992 to 1998, in which potentially 150,000 were killed.²⁸⁷ The drop of oil prices in the late 80s sparked mass protests by disenfranchised youth called for the ruling elites. The Algerian government first resisted reforms by trying to suppress the protests; however, it did not work, and President Chadli chose the path of Gorbachev by initiating ambitious reforms and ended the political monopoly of National Liberation Front party (FLN). As a result, more than

²⁸⁵ Asinovsky, Dmitry. "The Soviet Union and the Iranian Revolution," *Russia in Global Affairs* (2018), 195.

²⁸⁶ Huyser, Robert E., and Alexander Meigs Haig. *Mission to Tehran*. (New York: Harper & Row, 1986).

²⁸⁷ Martinez, Luis. "Why the violence in Algeria?" *The Journal of North African Studies* 9, no. 2 (2004), 14-27.

thirty new political parties appeared in Algerian politics. In January 1992, the Islamic Salvation Front (FLS) won the elections and caused a staggering defeat on the nationalists by winning twice as many votes. However, the military could not stand aside from the Islamization of Algeria and annulled the elections. Which immediately triggered a violent uprising in the country.²⁸⁸ They were encouraged by the Islamic revolution in Iran and Mujahideen's success in Afghanistan.²⁸⁹ Specific segments of rebels enforced their revolution based on radical Islamic teachings.²⁹⁰ Besides, it created a threat for some countries, while it was used by others to expand their influence.

France was the most vulnerable to the threat created by the Islamic uprising in Algeria and the fear that Algeria could become a theocracy like Iran.²⁹¹ There were four million Muslims living in France in 1996, there were one million Algerians, and similarly, in Algeria, there was a large French community.²⁹² The Islamic Revolutionaries could and tried to spread their words to their fellow Algerians to internationalize their struggle. The rebels targeted the foreign population, slain and kidnapped hundreds (most of them French). They also caused several bombings in France and hijacked Air France 8969. The French Government in return started to crack down on Islamic Salvation Front activists in France and increase its aid to Algeria mostly in terms of financial aids and loans for the secular military government to sustain its suppression of the rebels.²⁹³ On the other side, the Islamists were well funded by Iranian and Saudi sources, which helped them to buy popular support through their social welfare programs.²⁹⁴ For the religious government of Iran who

²⁸⁸ DeRouen and Heo, "Civil Wars," 103.

²⁸⁹ Shabafrouz, Miriam. "Oil and the eruption of the Algerian civil war: a context-sensitive analysis of the ambivalent impact of resource abundance." *GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies* (2010), 32.

²⁹⁰ Kepel, Gilles. *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. (Harvard University Press 2002), 263.

²⁹¹ Werenfels, Isabelle. "Entre l'intégration et la répression: les stratégies des Etats face à l'islamisme au Maghreb." *Maghreb Machrek* 191 (2007), 81.

²⁹² Shabafrouz, "Oil and the eruption of the Algerian civil war," 31-4.

²⁹³ St. John, Peter. "Insurgency, Legitimacy & Intervention in Algeria." *Canadian Security Intelligence Service*, (1996).

²⁹⁴ Lloyd, Cathie. *Multi-causal Conflict in Algeria: National Identity, Inequality and Political Islam*. No. qehwps 104. (Queen Elizabeth House: University of Oxford, 2003), 37.

sought to export its revolution, the establishment of another Islamic Republic in Algeria could significantly increase its influence in the Islamic world.²⁹⁵ Eventually, the “Islamic Revolution” declined in the late 90s and many rebels put their weapons aside; and the pro-military Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected in 1999 as the new president.

The Algerian Civil War did create misery, relatively little threat for foreign countries, and was not a social revolution. Therefore, the foreign intervention was low at level 2, limited to logistic support for both the Algerian government and the rebels. Thus, the theory of this research has successfully predicted this case. Walt’s weakness appears acute in this case, and many other circumstances, in which the tension is not either war or peace. This is because he has not introduced a method to measure the different levels of international tension; which, would make it difficult to study the matters that are neither war nor peace in international study.

3.1.16. Tajik Civil War, 1992-1997

Tajikistan declared independence from the Soviet Union in September 1991. However, the troubles for the country were only beginning for this republic that relied on USSR subsidies and generous budget transfers (equivalent to 40% of GDP), and an open market for Tajik goods. At the same time, Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost allowed for the formation of social movements and opposition political parties to be formed by the end of the Soviet Union. Different political movements from pro-democratic to Islamists formed the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) by 1990. In 1991 Nabiev, the former Secretary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan (1982-85) was elected as the President and started cracking down on the opposition. Violence erupted, and pro-government and protestors clashed in Dushanbe and the country was to be divided until 1997,

²⁹⁵ St. John. “Insurgency.”

when the opposition was defeated thanks to the Russian and Uzbek intervention. The internal struggle cost the lives of 50,000 deaths.²⁹⁶

In September 1993 Russians used their 201st Motorized Rifle Division (25,000) strong alongside the Uzbek Air support to help the government forces suppress the opposition. (759) The Tajik civil war, although not a social revolution as the Islamist revolution is not considered one due to its adherence to conservatism and old traditions; yet it produced a significant balance of threat for Uzbekistan and Russia.²⁹⁷ Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan's President, feared that an Islamic-democratic opposition taking over the power in Tajikistan might be viewed as an alternative for its own country.²⁹⁸ In addition, He was concerned about potential territorial claims over Samarkand and Bukhara from opposition seeking to recover the Tajik national identity. He also played on fears of Islamic fundamentalism to justify the intervention.²⁹⁹ Russia was concerned that political Islam would have a domino effect in the region that could threaten Russian interests and reach its southern borders.³⁰⁰ Its perceptions were confirmed by an attack on the Russian border post in 1993.³⁰¹

On the other side, the rebel's funding mostly came from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Iran particularly had significant political influence over the opposition. Iran could have been motivated to prevent Turkey and United State's influence in Tajikistan and to spread political Islam in a country with cultural affinity by aiding the opposition. It was not until Taliban advances

²⁹⁶ DeRouen and Heo, "Civil Wars," 753-59.

²⁹⁷ Ibid, 759-64.

²⁹⁸ Akbarzadeh, Shahram. "Why did nationalism fail in Tajikistan?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 48, no. 7 (1996), 1105-1129.

²⁹⁹ DeRouen and Heo, "Civil Wars," 764.

³⁰⁰ Plater-Zyberk, Henry. *Tajikistan: Waiting for a storm*. (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2004), 8.

³⁰¹ Sherr, James. "Escalation of the Tajikistan Conflict." *Janes Intelligence Review* 5 (1993), 514-514.

in 1995, Iran, together with Russia, became seriously interested in ending the conflict in Tajikistan through extensive peace negotiations.

The Tajik Civil War fulfilled the balance of threat and misery variables. The bloody civil war took five years and created a significant threat for Russia and Central Asian countries. Walt discussed that in the case of revolutions, other countries may intervene or to go war with the revolutionary regime to improve their position and make use of the revolutionary regime's weakness. However, in the Tajik case, this argument would be impertinent as Russia and Uzbekistan intervened to improve the Tajik state's position in the country and not to make use of its weakness. Therefore, unlike what Walt argued, the foreign countries could intervene to strengthen a state undergoing a revolution and not necessarily to make use of a window of opportunity.

3.1.17. Kyrgyzstan Revolution, 2010

The 2010 revolution in Kyrgyzstan put an end to the era of Color Revolutions in the post-Soviet sphere when presidents would depart from power without any bloodshed. The uprising in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010 claimed at least 80 lives.³⁰² The Tulip Revolution in 2005 had brought Bakiyev into power to bring the country closer to democracy and fight the corruption, a difficult task that he failed to achieve, combined with the deterioration of the economic situation led to the revolution.³⁰³ The uprising was overwhelming, and most elements of the army claimed neutrality

³⁰² Cherniavskiy, Stanislav. "The Kyrgyz Revolution of 2010: The Causes and Possible Post-Revolutionary Developments." *Central Asia and the Caucasus* 11, no. 2 (2010), 39.

³⁰³ Cherniavskiy, "The Kyrgyz Revolution," 40.; Nichol, Jim. "The April 2010 coup in Kyrgyzstan and its aftermath: context and implications for US interests." *Library of Congress Washington DC Congressional Research Service*, (2010), 6.

and in a matter of several days Bakiyev administration fell and the political system from a presidential regime was changed to a parliamentary one, to limit the presidential powers.³⁰⁴

The 2010 revolution is largely viewed as engineered by Russia to setback on the color revolution that installed pro-American figures. Russia growingly became distrustful of Bakiyev as not only he had not closed the Manas base as he promised to Russia but also he renewed the lease for the US on July 2009, and also agreed with the US to build a training center in Kyrgyzstan.³⁰⁵ Russia had traditionally eschewed regime change by revolution in the post-Soviet states; however, it immediately offered financial, political and military aid to the provisional government that promoted many observers to speculate that Kremlin had incited the revolution.³⁰⁶ Furthermore, before the revolution, Russia had launched a media campaign in Kyrgyzstan against Bakiyev that was very influential in triggering the popular discontent.³⁰⁷ The results were in favor of Russia and the new president, Almazbek Atambayev, announced that he would close the Manas airbase after its lease ran out in 2014.³⁰⁸

The Kyrgyz revolution is pertinent to this research's theory as it did not affect any of the three variables, as it did not create significant threat, misery, and was not a social revolution. Therefore, it saw almost no foreign intervention. Walt's framework is also applicable to this case as the balance of threat and the nation's capabilities were not significantly affected.

³⁰⁴ "Kyrgyzstan's New Leaders Set October Election Date." BBC News. Last modified April 22, 2010.

³⁰⁵ Pan, Philip P. "Russia is said to have fueled unrest in Kyrgyzstan." *The Washington Post* 12 (2010).

³⁰⁶ Bohr, Annette. "Revolution in Kyrgyzstan - Again." *Universitäts-und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt*, (2010), 4.

³⁰⁷ Nichold, "The April 2010 Coup," 2.

³⁰⁸ Schwirtz, Michael. "New Leader says US Base in Kyrgyzstan will be shut." *The New York Times*, Last modified November 1, 2011.

3.1.18. The Arab Spring, 2011

Sometimes it takes one man to start a revolution and this time self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi as a way to protest in Tunisia not only rocked his own country but also ignited a wave of revolutions all around the Middle East and North Africa region. The “Arab Spring” revolts of 2011 incited many social movements, regime changes across the Arab World; some of which ended up into civil wars. In this chapter, the revolutions that led to regime change or have led to civil wars and are still ongoing are discussed in the perspective of the theoretical framework of this research.

Tunisia:

The Tunisian Revolution started in December 2010 and toppled the Ben Ali Government in 28 intensive days with the cost of at least three hundred deaths. The revolution led to democratization and a moderate regime and was the smoothest revolution among the Arab Spring revolutions. This is thanks to Tunisia’s rather homogenous society and strong institution with a military that has never done a coup and has stayed out of the politics.³⁰⁹ The post-revolutionary regime has been moderate and sought peaceful relations with its neighbors and did not rise as a propagator of revolution in other Arab countries; therefore reducing its potential balance of threat to other countries. It was also not a social revolution as revolutionaries did not seek radical goals to uproot society. Therefore, the independent variables were not met, and consequently, there was no foreign intervention.

Libya:

The revolution in Libya, the eastern neighbor of revolutionary Tunisia, began on February 2011, concentrating on human rights abuses, corruption, and mismanagement; and demanded

³⁰⁹ Barany, Zoltan. "The role of the military." *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 4 (2011), 24-35.

Gaddafi's resignation, the four-decade-long president of Libya.³¹⁰ Gaddafi's brutal reaction backlashed a violent uprising that led to a civil war that was ended thanks to NATO's intervention under UN Security Council approval,³¹¹ which provided air-strike, naval blockade of Gaddafi's regime, weapon, and training for the anti-regime forces. A total of 21,500 persons died in the eight months of revolution from February to October.³¹²

The Libyan Revolution was the first Arab Spring uprising to get intensely violent, and a long term and violent civil war at the southern borders of Europe could affect stability in Europe negatively. In addition, absence of foreign intervention in Libya could encourage other dictators struggling with the Arab Spring uprisings to use excessive violence to suppress the social movements that could destabilize the region significantly and raise the balance of threat for Europe and the United States. President Obama stated in his speech on March 28, 2011, that "democratic impulses... would be eclipsed by the darkest form of dictatorship, as repressive leaders concluded that violence is the best strategy to cling to power."³¹³ What eased intervention against the Libyan State beside violent oppression, was Gaddafi's bizarre foreign policy had been a pariah state, and its isolation allowed its neighbors such as, interim governments of Egypt and Tunisia alongside with other Arab and NATO countries to support the opposition militarily conveniently and welcome an opportunity for the regime change in Libya.³¹⁴

³¹⁰ Bhardwaj, Maya. "Development of conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria: From revolution to civil war." Washington University International Review 1, no. 1 (2012), 81.

³¹¹ United Nations Security Council, 66th year. "Resolution 1973." 17 March, 2011, S/RES/1973(2011), <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4d885fc42>

³¹² Daw, Mohamed A., Abdallah El-Bouzedi, and Aghnaya A. Dau. "Libyan armed conflict 2011: mortality, injury and population displacement." *African Journal of Emergency Medicine* 5, no. 3 (2015), 101-107.

³¹³ Zenko, Micah. "Libya: "Justifications" for Intervention." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Last modified June 24, 2011. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/libya-justifications-intervention>.

³¹⁴ Bhardwaj, Maya. "Development of conflict," 83-84.

Syria:

The uprising in Syria began in 26th January 201, the violent suppression attempts of Bashar al-Assad backfired, many members of the army deserted and people took arms; and by the end of 2012 the country was drawn into a full-scale civil war that has left 570,000 deaths so far and no end to is seen as of today, June 2019.³¹⁵ The Syrian Civil War has been a battleground and proxy war for many actors including, Iran, Israel, Turkey, Russia and US and to the lesser extent involving other regional players such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates.³¹⁶ The Syrian case has created a significant threat to many countries. It is also considered a social revolution as many groups in the conflict such as the PYD (Democratic Union Party) enforce their radical revolution in the areas they hold.

It is widely argued that Rojava Revolution as part of the Syrian Civil War in North of Syria constitutes a social revolution in which a prominent role for women and new political system that absolutely uprooted the previous establishment. The new system emphasizes on direct democracy, gender equality, decentralization and cooperative economy inspired by the libertarian socialist leader Abdullah Ocalan.³¹⁷ Women empowerment is at the heart of this social revolution. Child marriages, polygamy, and honor killings are banned. In addition, every major position is led by a man and woman, and there is a 40% gender quota required for all councils.³¹⁸

³¹⁵ "More than 570 thousand people were killed on the Syrian territory within 8 years of revolution demanding freedom, democracy, justice, and equality." *Syrian Observatory for Human Rights*. Last modified March 15, 2019. <http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=120851>.

³¹⁶ Ahmadian, Hassan, and Payam Mohseni. "Iran's Syria strategy: the evolution of deterrence." *International Affairs* 95, no. 2 (2019), 341.

³¹⁷ Enzinna, Wes. "A dream of secular utopia in ISIS'backyard." *New York Times* 24, no. 11 (2015).

³¹⁸ Bengio, Ofra. "Game changers: Kurdish women in peace and war." *The Middle East Journal* 70, no. 1 (2016), 32.; Bateson, Florence, Toon Dirx, Georg Frerks, Donna Middelkoop, and Noralie Tukker. "Exploring women's role in peace and security in the self-administered areas of Northern Syria." (2016), 32.

The Syrian Civil War significantly create a balance of threat for Iran as four-decade-long Syria's major partner and ally. Damascus had been a strategical axis for Iran not only to deter Israel but also as a transit to nourish Hezbollah, its non-state counterpart in Lebanon. Therefore, it was essential for Iran to keep Assad in power, who has benevolent standing towards Iran, to maintain Iran's predominance in the region.³¹⁹ Iran has spent rigorous political and economic support for the Syrian regime, and militarily it has sent its special forces, military advisors and militia. It has played a great role in the survival of Assad by sending Shia militia, such as Hezbollah and significant financial aid.³²⁰

For Russia fall of pro-Russian Assad would jeopardize its naval base in Syria and also would strengthen America's position in the Middle East and leverage against Russia. In addition, Syria had turned into a hub for Russian and post-Soviet states Jihadists fighting against Assad in Syria, their return to Russia could endanger its security. It was estimated that between 2,000 to 5,000 Russian Jihadists were fighting in Syria.³²¹ When prospects of Assad losing the civil war was high, Russia militarily intervened in September 2015 with heavy aerial bombardment and special forces.³²² One of the most important impacts of Russia intervention was that it raised the threshold for other nations to engage against Assad's regime.³²³

Turkey shares an 822 Kilometer, and since the start of the Syrian unrest, it has watched it worriedly and has been a refuge for millions of Syrians since then. Turkey's Erdogan had established close relations with Assad, which was in accordance with its "zero problems" with

³¹⁹ Ahmadian and Mohseni, "Iran's Syria's Strategy," 342.

³²⁰ Juneau, Thomas. "Iran's costly intervention in Syria: A pyrrhic victory." *Mediterranean Politics* (2018), 1-19.

³²¹ Walker, Shaun. "Russian-speaking Jihadis in Syria 'could Threaten Moscow in Future'." *The Guardian*. Last modified March 16, 2016.

³²² "Russia's Military Role in Syria Grows." *BBC News*. Last modified August 23, 2018.

³²³ Kausch, Kristina. "Is the Middle East the Transatlantic Achilles' Heels?" *Shifting Global Politics and the Middle East* (2019), 43.

neighbors. However, as the revolution turned violent, he believed that Assad would be soon overthrown and a friendly state to Turkey, similar to the ones of Tunisia and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood would be established. As the revolution turned into a bloody civil war, Turkey turned into a passage for the weapons and logistics much needed by the rebels.³²⁴ At the same time radicalization of the Syrian Civil War and development of ISIS destabilized Turkey it started the invasion of Northern Syria under the Operation Euphrates Shield to secure its southern border from ISIS, potential Syrian regime takeover and to make a stronghold for the rebels it supported. In addition, the rise of Kurds under YPG (People's Protection Units) an affiliate of Turkish PKK (Kurdistan Worker's party) posed a great threat to Turkey. The YPG rose to hold the grip of one-third of Syria just south of the Turkish border a haven for PKK members to conduct their operations in Turkey and refuge in YPG controlled Syria.³²⁵ Importantly, millions of Syrians have refuged in Turkey; this significant number has influenced Turkish leadership the importance of securing its border to decrease the influx and provide security and shelter for a number of refugee camps to be bordered at the Syrian territory controlled by Syrian Free Army.³²⁶ Therefore, Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch in January 2018 against YPG and could successfully take over Afrin Canton, but as of today it has not been able to push further to Manbij, and Kurdish held areas east of the Euphrates due to American pressure.³²⁷

Table 11- Source - UNHCR, Government of Turkey³²⁸


³²⁴ Barkey, Henri J. "Erdogan's Foreign Policy is in Ruins. Foreign Policy." (2016).; Ayata, Bilgin. "Turkish foreign policy in a changing Arab World: rise and fall of a regional actor?." *Journal of European Integration* 37, no. 1 (2015), 95-112.

³²⁵ Oktav, Özden Zeynep, Emel Parlar Dal, and Ali Murat Kurşun. *Violent Non-state Actors and the Syrian Civil War*. (Berlin: Springer, 2018).

³²⁶ Gauthier-Villars, David. "Turkey Aims to End a Backlash by Sending Syrian Refugees Home." *WSJ*. Last modified August 9, 2019.

³²⁷ Kasapoğlu, Can, Sinan Ülgen, and E. D. A. M. Chairman. "Operation Olive Branch: A Political–Military Assessment." *Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM)* (2018).

³²⁸ "Syria Regional Refugee Response." *UNCHR*. Last modified August 15, 2019. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113>.



Saudi Arabia and Qatar were influential in the course of the militarization of the revolution and civil war by providing funds and weapons for the rebels to face the violent suppression of protests by Assad; thus, intervening indirectly. Qatar channeled arms through its Libyan allies who had just overthrown Gaddafi and were experienced revolutionaries. Qatar tried to expand its influence to bring in power Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in Syria, similar to Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia used tribal allies to procure arms in Syria. For Saudi Arabia, Syria was a grave security issue as it was worried that it would cause an increase in the Iranian ‘hegemony’ in the region should the revolution fail. Saudi Arabia, after the ‘loss’ of Iraq in 2003, looked at Syria in 2011 as an opportunity to improve its position vis-à-vis Iran.³²⁹

America’s intervention in Syria has been ambivalent for the most part. Obama supported the Syrian opposition and drew a red line for Assad in reference to his chemical weapon use in August 2012. However, Obama at the end accepted not to attack if Syria submits its chemical weapon deposit to Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), nevertheless the chemical attacks by the Syrian regime were to be continued.³³⁰ Assad’s Syria similar to Gaddafi’s Libya was a rogue state and had unfriendly relations with the US, and beside the longtime destabilization and violence that was caused by the Syrian Civil War, Assad regime’s victory in the internal

³²⁹ Kausch, Kristina. “Structure, Agency and External Involvement in the Syria Conflict,” *Shifting Global Politics and the Middle East* (2019), 68-69.

³³⁰ Aziz, Sajid. "Emerging Security Dynamics in Syria: Role of Foreign Powers." *CISS Insight: Quarterly News & Views* (2017), 42.

struggle would strengthen Iran's position in the region. Therefore, the US intervened limitedly, particularly by supporting YPG to hold the balance of power in Syria and leverage against Iran supported Syria.³³¹ Due to the involvement of the many actors in Syria and failed experience of intervention in Libya, a serious military intervention in Syria was not considered by the US and other Western powers.

For Israel, it was not easy to take a stance towards the Syrian crisis. There are two schools of thoughts in Israel on how to deal with the Syrian civil war. The first school advocates for the "devil we know" that argues that with all his shortcomings, Assad remaining in power is more suitable for Israel to the alternative of chaos at its neighbors or Islamic take-over of the country. The second school, still fresh with the memory of 2006 war with Hezbollah, argues that Assad staying in power would leave Israel vulnerable to a dangerous and hostile Iran, Syria and Hezbollah alliance on its northern borders. However, indirect intervention by supporting Assad's moderate and secular opposition was not feasible and was not an option; nor was it desirable to most of the opposition as it could deprive them of the legitimacy in Syria.³³² Israel's response to the Syrian crisis had been cautious and limited in the beginning, but the situation started to change as the Syrian Regime gradually established hegemony in southern Syria by clearing the rebel pockets from the surroundings of Israel's strategic Golan Heights together. The increased presence of Hezbollah and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and support from President Trump, Israel increasingly became more involved in the Syrian conflict since February 2018 by bombing,

³³¹ Kagan, Frederick W., Kimberly Kagan, Jennifer Gafarella, Harleen Gambhir, Christopher Kozak, Hugo Spaulding, and Katherine Zimmerman. "US Grand Strategy: Destroying ISIS and Al Qaeda, Report four: America's Way Ahead in Syria." AEI Paper & Studies (2017), A3.

³³² Rabinovich, Itamar. "Israel and the changing Middle East." *Brookings Institution Middle East Memo* 34.

Iranian and Hezbollahi infrastructure in Syria to impede their build-up. It is important to note that Israel's raid on Iran has been with the tacit approval of Russia.³³³

Egypt:

When the Egyptian gathered in Tahrir square in Cairo in millions in late January and February and toppled the Hosni Mubarak from power, as the most prominent Arab country, they inspired other revolutionaries from the west to the east of the Arab world.³³⁴ The mass protests cost at least 800 lives in about two weeks, which led to overthrow of Mubarak government and democratic elections that elected Mohamed Morsi from the Muslim Brotherhood as the president. Two years after the revolution, in summer 2013, the grave economic situation and Islamization of Egypt another wave of massive protests, this time against Morsi swept across Egypt. The Army took the opportunity and overthrew Morsi by a coup supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Arab countries of the Persian Gulf were threatened and vulnerable to the politicization of Islam. KSA particularly had bitter memories of Muslim Brotherhood in its country as its Saudi branch called 'Sahwa' blamed the kingdom for inviting American forces into the country during the Gulf War and called for radical reforms in the Saudi regime. Its stance led to the confrontation with the Saudi regime and thus its suppression and exile of members in 1994-1995. With the Arab Spring and ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the biggest Arab country, the KSA felt threatened. Not surprisingly, alongside UAE, they promptly

³³³ Ford, Robert. "What is Trump's Real Policy in Syria?" *Aljazeera*, last modified May 21, 2018.

³³⁴ Rougier, Bernard, and Stéphane Lacroix, eds. *Egypt's Revolutions: Politics, Religion, and Social Movements*. Berlin: Springer, 2016).

announced generous financial aid worth of billions of dollars to the new Egyptian military regime.³³⁵

The regional context developed out of Arab Spring in 2011 posed serious challenges and balance of threat for not only the conservative Arab camp, including Saudi Arabia and Gulf Countries but also for Israel. Events in Egypt, particularly, a country that dwarfs Egypt in size and population, could not go unnoticed in Tel Aviv. The uprisings alarmed Israel by their political vagueness and the potential threat of revival of Islamism and pan-Arabism, and could eventually dissolve the former treaties with Israel.³³⁶ Jordan and Egypt were perceived as strategic partners of Israel that shared its imperatives in upholding the peace accords and had favorable position towards Israel. They operated as pillars of the peace and national security for Israel.³³⁷

Egypt, with its prominence in the Arab world and the Middle East, was at the center of gravity in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and Israel could not afford revolutionary changes in Egypt that would jeopardize its security. The former regime had cooperated with Israel on Gaza and had upheld its commitments to peace, and it was not clear that revolutionary Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood would do the same. Therefore, Netanyahu called the United States to not abandon Hosni Mubarak even at his final days.³³⁸ Revolutionaries in Egypt put various peace and economic treaties with Israel in question. Rashad al-Bayoumi, a Muslim Brotherhood leader, stated: “after President Mubarak steps down and a provisional government is formed, there is a need to dissolve the peace treaty with Israel.”³³⁹ Netanyahu was anxious that Iran would try to use

³³⁵ Lacroix, Stephane. “Saudi Arabia’s Muslim Brotherhood Predicament.” *POMPES Briefings* (2017), 51.

³³⁶ Danahar, Paul. *The new Middle East: The world after the Arab spring*. (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), 146.

³³⁷ Valbjørn, Morten, and André Bank. "The new Arab Cold War: rediscovering the Arab dimension of Middle East regional politics." *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 1 (2012), 4-9.

³³⁸ Agdemir, A. Murat. "The Arab Spring and Israel's Relations with Egypt: A View from Turkey." *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 10, no. 2 (2016), 224-25.

³³⁹ Lake, Eli. "Muslim Brotherhood seeks end to Israel treaty." *Washington Times*, last modified February 3, 2011.

the Egypt Revolution in its own benefit to increase its influence as a direct security threat to Israel.³⁴⁰ Thus, not surprisingly the pre-Arab order in the Middle East was preferred by Israel.³⁴¹

Morsi quitted power after eighteen days of mass protests and concerns over damage to the Israeli-Egyptian relations was diminished, as Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak received reassurance from the Egyptian Armed Forces that they would abide by former treaties with Israel under the previous regime; thus reducing the balance of threat.³⁴² Nonetheless, the relations between Israel and Egypt were not as smooth as the past under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. Sale of gas to Israel was one of the main grievances in the Egyptian public and unilaterally canceled by Egypt in April 2012. In addition, in May 2011 for the first time, the crossing from Egypt to Gaza was opened for the first time since Hamas take-over of Gaza, which indicated warmer relations between Gaza and the new regime of Egypt.³⁴³

Despite initial fears, Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood was rather pragmatic on relations with Israel as, despite anti-Israeli rhetoric, it cooperated with Israel on security issues.³⁴⁴ Anti-Israeli rhetoric was also widely cultivated under Hosni Mubarak.³⁴⁵ Since summer 2013 the course of Arab Spring turned in favor, the Egyptian military conducted a coup against the Muslim Brotherhood and re-emergence of conservative-moderate camp that generally had been in favor of Israel.³⁴⁶ The coup under Sisi has brought an anti-Muslim Brotherhood regime in power that takes a hardline policy towards Hamas as the collaborator of the regime that it toppled. Sisi has also improved relations with Israel through intensive military cooperation to secure Sinai from the

³⁴⁰ Berti, Benedetta. "Israel and the Arab Spring: Understanding Attitudes and Responses to the "New Middle East"." *Al Mesbar Studies and Research Center* (2012), 132.

³⁴¹ Stoil, Rebecca Anna. "Mofaz: It's Best for Israel if Mubarak Overcomes Protests." *Jerusalem Post* (2011), 49-51.

³⁴² Berti, "Israel and the Arab Spring," 133.

³⁴³ Agdemir, "The Arab Spring," 227.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 228.

³⁴⁵ Berti, "Israel and the Arab Spring," 132.

³⁴⁶ Bhardwaj, "Development of Conflict," 301.

insurgents that have to destabilize the border with Israel.³⁴⁷ Moreover, Israel has benefitted from the regional developments since the Arab Spring that increased the tensions between the Sunni Arab states, including Egypt and Iran and its Shia counterparts, it has tacitly aligned itself with the Sunni camp.³⁴⁸ The fact that throughout the revolution the military institution in Egypt remained untouched and unlike the Iranian revolution it was able to keep its conservative establishment and to moderate the destructive effects particularly on foreign policy significantly reduced its balance of threat. Lastly, Israel kept a rather low profile during Arab spring, as it was aware of its unpopularity in the Middle East and lack of political and diplomatic tools in the region to have a significant impact.³⁴⁹

Yemen:

Yemen is another example of how the Arab Spring turned into an Arab Winter. In 2011 the mass protest uprooted President Abdullah Saleh from power. The Houthis put down their weapons and also joined the revolution as the new channel for their dissatisfaction with the central government. Saudi Arabia, alongside other Persian Gulf monarchies, promptly arranged a transitional plan for Yemen to ensure that Saleh was succeeded by a friendly leader, Mansour Hadi.³⁵⁰

In March 2015, a Saudi led coalition³⁵¹ launched a large military operation to restore the rule of President Mansour Hadi, who was toppled by an alliance of pro-Iran Houthi movement and

³⁴⁷ Agdemir, "The Arab Spring," 228-29.

³⁴⁸ Ibid., 229.

³⁴⁹ Berti, "Israel and the Arab Spring" Agdemir," 144.

³⁵⁰ Darwich, May. "The Saudi Intervention in Yemen: Struggling for Status." *Insight Turkey* 20, No. 2 (2018), 130-31.

³⁵¹ The coalition includes the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar (until 2017), Egypt, Jordam, Morocco, Senegal, and Sudan with the support of the United States and United Kingdom. Darwich, "The Saudi Intervention," 126.

forces loyal to the previous President, Ali Abdullah Saleh.³⁵² The international intervention remains strong and continues today, and no way out of this stalemate is yet clear in this civil war like the Syrian case. Yemen located at the Bab al-Mandab Strait at the southern entrance of the Red Sea with it has played an important role in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy.³⁵³ Riyadh acceded to Hadi's request to intervene militarily to a great part due to concerns over Yemen falling under the Iranian influence by a Houthi takeover.³⁵⁴ Yemen immediately was on the global spotlight as a new stage of a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.³⁵⁵ By November 2018, at least 70,000 civilians and combatants had died in the civil war, and as of today, the civil war has been continuing for four years that shows its intensively and violence.³⁵⁶

Walt's would be problematic here as he ruled out the possibility of the revolution spreading to other countries, as was the case in the Arab Spring. All of the mentioned five countries created threat and experienced fall in their capabilities based on CINC data due to the revolution, but not all created significant international tension. His framework lacks the misery variable, which hinders its ability to explain the revolutionary cases and their international relations. Furthermore, he discusses the importance of émigré in increasing the chance of foreign intervention due to encouraging foreign governments to attack. However, this argument is irrelevant for modern decision making, as the leadership of a country has a vast array of resources to consider. For example, it is very difficult to demonstrate if the opinion of Syrian refugees have directly

³⁵² Sharp, Jeremy M. "Yemen: civil war and regional intervention." *Congressional Research Service* (2015).

³⁵³ Darwich, "The Saudi Intervention," 126.

³⁵⁴ Riedel, Bruce. "Yemen War Turns Two." *Al-Monitor*. Last modified April 11, 2018.

³⁵⁵ Darwich, "The Saudi Intervention," 127.

³⁵⁶ "Civilian Death Toll in Yemen Mounting Despite US Assurances." *AP NEWS*. Last modified November 10, 2018.

influenced Erdogan to order Turkish Army intervention in Syria, as there are great resources and intelligence available to the Turkish Government to make policies with regards to Syria.

The Arab Spring shook most of the Arab World, but it was able to overthrow the regime or establish itself partially in five countries: Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Egypt, and Yemen. The revolution escalated the balance of threat in all of these revolutions. It caused much misery for these nations with the exception of Tunisia and Egypt; which, could explain why these two countries did not create a significant international tension, compared to the other three. Furthermore, the Syrian Revolution addition to fulfilling other independent variables, it is also a social revolution that could describe how it has been the most intense revolution of the Arab Spring.

3.1.19. Ukraine Euromaidan Revolution, 2014

On February 18th, 2014, mass protest in Maidan Square in Kyiv with the goal of overthrowing Yanukovich and restoration of 2004 amendments to Constitution of Ukraine turned bloody, and in a matter of five days, the President fled to Russia and the revolution succeeded at the cost of at least a hundred people.³⁵⁷ However, this was just the beginning. The revolution threatened vital Russian interests in Ukraine. Thus, it did not hesitate to react by annexing Crimea and supporting separatists in Donbas that has brought Ukraine into a civil war that is ongoing as of today, with around 13,000 deaths.³⁵⁸ The Russian intervention in Ukraine is one of the latest examples of hybrid military interventions against a revolutionary country.³⁵⁹

It is important to understand Kremlin's approach towards the revolutions in its periphery. Color Revolutions had been a major source of concern for the Russian authorities since they swept

³⁵⁷ Onuch, Olga. "Who were the protesters?" *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 3 (2014), 46.

³⁵⁸ "Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 February to 15 May 2019," *OHCHR*. Last modified June 13, 2019.

³⁵⁹ Lanoszka, Alexander. "Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in eastern Europe." *International affairs* 92, no. 1 (2016), 175-195.

across the post-Soviet sphere in the 2000s. The Russian leadership has slowly moved from securitizing the issue of mass protests and regime change to militarizing it.³⁶⁰ The phobia of color revolutions is deeply embedded in Russia's bitter memory of losing the Soviet sphere of influence to the West, reinforced by color revolutions and the Arab Spring in 2011.³⁶¹ Putin's fears were confirmed when the largest anti-government protests took place in Russia in 2011-2012, he stated that "it was unacceptable to Russia that the United States promoted regime change by using 'soft power' methods to destabilize countries and stoke extremist or separatist sentiments."³⁶² Putin linked color revolutions with extremism and stated that they were a form of "hybrid warfare" against Russia and its post-Soviet space to undermine Russia's role and status in Eurasia.³⁶³ Therefore, the Russian military doctrine emphasized on countering regime change. After the 2008 Georgian War, Russia had reformed its military to increase its ability to deploy forces in neighboring countries in short notice and how to ally with local forces in its intervention to achieve the desired outcomes, which showed effective in the case of Ukraine. The Arab spring had exacerbated the Russian fear of the revolutions. Valery Gerasimov, the Russian Chief of the General Staff, wrote that the Arab Revolutions were examples of a modern type of warfare orchestrated by the 'foreign agents.' Russia saw regime changes that were not in its favor as a form of warfare that needed a military response.³⁶⁴

Ukraine held tremendous geopolitical value for Russia. The two countries share a long border and with significant historical and cultural ties, with interdependent economies.³⁶⁵ Around

³⁶⁰ Bouchet, Nicolas. "Russia's "militarization" of colour revolutions." *Policy Perspectives* 4, no. 2 (2016).

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

³⁶² *Ibid.*

³⁶³ Tsygankov, Andrei. "Vladimir Putin's last stand: the sources of Russia's Ukraine policy." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 31, no. 4 (2015), 280.

³⁶⁴ Bouchet, "Russia's Militarization," 3.

³⁶⁵ Molchanov, Mikhail. *Political culture and national identity in Russian-Ukrainian relations.* (Texas A&M University Press, 2002).

50% of Russia's energy export to Europe went through Ukraine. Ukraine, as a large borderland, protects Russia from potential military intervention from the West, which serves as its last pillar of stability and power, for Russia to preserve its sovereignty and influence.³⁶⁶

When Orange Revolution overthrew President Leonid Kuchma in 2004, who had improved relations with Russia. Russia felt threatened of the pro-democracy and Western revolution, and was frustrated with Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko's governments but never considered using military force in Ukraine. In the 2000s, Putin was not ready to sacrifice his relations with the West and confront it over Ukraine. Nor was the threat that Russia perceived from the West, and its own ambitions were considerably in that period. Thus, Putin instead relied on economic, political pressure and supported Yanukovich through its soft power.³⁶⁷

Under President Yanukovich, Russia had improved relations with Ukraine as he had relinquished the aspirations to join NATO and renewed Russia's long-term lease on Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. To Putin, the West's efforts to draw Ukraine closer to itself particularly through Eastern Partnership with the EU in summer 2013, which was postponed by Yanukovich due to Russia's economic stimulus. Ukraine was put in a difficult position that had to choose between Russia and the EU, and Yanukovich was more inclined to Russia. Meanwhile, many people were looking forward with closer ties with the EU than Russia, and this was one of the main reasons that led to the collapse of Yanukovich, which was to Putin the final straw of the West betraying Russia and design to install a pro-western regime in Ukraine.³⁶⁸ A pro-western Ukraine could cancel the lease agreement for Sevastopol base that had been the stronghold for

³⁶⁶ Tsygankov, "Vladimir Putin's last stand," 282-289.

³⁶⁷ Ibid., 291.

³⁶⁸ Tsygankov, "Vladimir Putin's last stand," 282-85.; "Ukraine Drops EU Plans and Looks to Russia." *Al-Jazeera*. Last modified November 21, 2013.

Russian Black Sea Fleet since the 1700s.³⁶⁹ This could restrict Russia's dominance and naval capabilities as it was the only base that is operational four seasons and is not blocked by ice during the winter. Walt's approach works well with this case balance of threat, was a crucial factor in defining the Russian intervention. However, Walt's other variable (window of opportunity) cannot be measured by CINC for this case as it is passed the data that the dataset covers. However, the qualitative measures, such as the divide in the Ukrainian Society was divided between, due to the Euromaidan Revolution, and Russia took the opportunity to seize Crimea; thanks to the chaos created by the revolution.³⁷⁰

Russia's hybrid intervention included sending troops without country insignia and supporting the separatists; and use of mass propaganda against the Maidan Square Revolution and its subsequent regime. "Little Green Men" without country insignia and with Russian weaponry appeared in Crimea in February 2014 and took over the peninsula, and it was officially joined to the Russian Federation by a referendum organized hastily on March 16.³⁷¹ Putin later admitted that those green men were Russian troops and they are "resolving various issues" in Eastern Ukraine.³⁷² Moscow also generously supported the pro-Russian rebels in Donetsk and Lugansk contributed both men and weapons to them.³⁷³ To justify its intervention, Moscow relied on the provoked Russian nationalism and celebrated the events in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea as an authentic

³⁶⁹ Cameron, David R. "Why Putin Doesn't Care About Sanctions." *Yale University*. Last modified March 25, 2014.

³⁷⁰ Zhurzhenko, Tatiana. "A divided nation? Reconsidering the role of identity politics in the Ukraine crisis." *Die Friedens-Warte* (2014), 249-267.

³⁷¹ Rutland, Peter. "The impact of sanctions on Russia." *Russian Analytical Digest* 157 (2014), 2.

³⁷² Walker, Shaun. "Putin admits Russian military presence in Ukraine for first time." *The Guardian*, Last modified December 17, 2015.

³⁷³ Tsygankov, "Vladimir Putin's last stand," 285.

uprising called, “the Russian Spring.” Kremlin used the unrest in Ukraine to use in its advantage at the domestic arena and incited nationalism to rally people around the flag.³⁷⁴

In short, the 2014 Ukraine Revolution met all the variables, discussed in this research, except for the social revolutions and consequently experienced foreign military intervention, Russia. This time unlike the Orange Revolution in 2004, the revolution was violent, took a long time, and ended up in a civil war. It significantly created threat for Russian interests. Russia felt it could lose its influence in Ukraine to the West by a regime change thanks to the culmination of bitter experiences of numerous regime changes that had happened in the years preceding the Maidan Square Revolution. Ukraine (Donbas) and Russia (Rostov Oblast) shared not only densely populated areas along their border, but the existence of large Russian speaking population in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine allowed Kremlin to tap into nationalism for its interests. Walt’s framework could be applicable to this case as well. However, there is no mechanism to measure it, as the CINC data is not available after the year 2012 nor he has offered a mechanism to weight how Maidan Revolution affected the balance of threat in 2014.

Remarks:

Violent mass revolutions are the most common and oldest type of revolutions. More than one fourth, accounting for 21 of all the revolutions are from this category. Only four revolutions among these (19%) did not end up in a war with other states. All of these four cases that did not experience the inter-state war took place in the post-cold war era. This could be due to the strengthening of notions such as non-interference in other nations affairs. In addition, with the fall of the USSR, the great power rivalry has been significantly reduced in today’s monopolar world;

³⁷⁴ Horvath, Robert. "The Euromaidan and the crisis of Russian nationalism." *Nationalities Papers* 43, no. 6 (2015), 819.

therefore, revolution and regime changes have lost their value as a vital security issue to the great powers. Moreover, democratic peace theory³⁷⁵ which discusses that democracies do not fight each other and since there are more democracies today than before, there is also less war and less will to fight against other people's self-determination. The majority of these revolutions have a universal language and affect the balance of threat. They also tend to bring about social revolution due to their mass mobilization, which reconstructs the society. Except for a few cases, all these violent revolutions end up in lengthy civil wars that devastate the country and increase the chance of foreign intervention or war with another state. Almost all of them created international tension with the majority of these revolutions producing a full-scale inter-state war.

3.2. Peaceful Revolutions:

Peaceful revolutions tend to take a shorter time and cause less damage and fatalities; thus, an absence of misery variable. The peaceful revolutions tend to be moderate in their course and often overthrow the old regime by negotiation and coming into agreement with different parties and even with the members of the Ancien Régime. The smooth transition reduces from the radicalness of the revolution and creates less of threat for other countries. Even if it does due to its peacefulness, military intervention against it would be hardly justifiable. None of these peaceful revolutions are social revolutions. As discussed earlier, Skocpol argues that social revolutions are accompanied by significant violence to overhaul society in a short time.³⁷⁶

Nonviolent resistance turns into a successful revolution where the rulers depend on support from a democratic foreign power that would not tolerate a brutal against a peaceful opposition nor would pay a high price to support the existing regime. For example, the Shah of Iran depended on

³⁷⁵ Russett, Bruce. *Grasping the democratic peace: Principles for a post-Cold War world*. (Princeton university press, 1994).

³⁷⁶ Skocpol. *Social revolutions*. 4

the United States for weapons and military and was vulnerable when Jimmy Carter of the United States pressured the Shah to call off his secret service (SAVAK) and allow the opposition to conduct a peaceful demonstration. On the other side, the pro-democracy revolts in Burma in 1988, and the Tiananmen Square of Peking in 1989, due to their independence and having a loyal military turned into a massacre.³⁷⁷ This trend has been particularly increased due to trends such as human rights developed in the late cold war era.

The prospect for nonviolent resistances democratic revolutions has improved since the mid-1980s. First, the global norm has moved in the direction of requiring elections for regimes to claim legitimacy, even the autocratic ones; and from the Philippines to Armenia, protests over flawed elections have become a powerful force of regime change. Second, new mass media has made it easier for the opposition to disseminate evidence of the regime's corruptions and abuses; and has allowed the rise of international networks of activists providing training in nonviolent resistance. Lastly, with the end of the Cold War, the willingness to intervene militarily to save authoritarian regimes.³⁷⁸ It is also important to note that the pro-democratic revolutions are often non-ideologic and produce little balance of threat also thanks to its non-violent nature. In addition, thanks to its non-violent nature, the nation's capabilities are not significantly decreased as observed in each non-violent revolution's CINC. Moreover, this nature gives less excuse to other countries to intervene for humanitarian reasons and intervening against a democratic revolution would have high costs internationally, such as the Russian intervention against the Ukrainian revolution in 2014.³⁷⁹ In addition, with the end of the bipolar cold war and ideological conflicts, the revolutions are perceived as a less threat in today's world.³⁸⁰ Peaceful revolutions are totally neglected by

³⁷⁷ Goldstone, *Revolutions*, 104-105.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 105.

³⁷⁹ Rutland, Peter. "The impact of sanctions on Russia." *Russian Analytical Digest* 157 (2014), 2-8.

³⁸⁰ Goldstone, *Revolutions*, 105.

Walt; thus, in this section, a group of revolutions is studied that has been less discussed by conventional wisdom.

3.2.1. 1820 Revolutions: Spanish Trienio Liberal and Portuguese Liberal Revolution

French Revolution and its expansion through Napoleonic wars changed the course of history forever as they inspired revolutionaries across the world. Revolutions in the following decades were mostly liberal in nature and called for greater representation; decentralization, empowerment of working and middle classes; recognition of civil rights; and universal suffrage.³⁸¹ In 1820 revolutions unfolded in Spain, Portugal, Russia, Poland, Russia, Kingdom of Naples and Piedmont with nationalist and liberal aims.³⁸² The reactionary governments of Austria, Prussia, and Russia (France and Great Britain were encouraged to join) similar saw the revolutionary wave as a threat and were quick to sign the Troppau Memorandum to aid each other in the suppression of revolutions.³⁸³ All these revolutions, with the exception of Spain and Portugal, had significant national liberation orientations; thus, they do not fall in the scope of this study. The Italian revolutionaries were also looking towards the unification of Italy and free it from the foreign power influence, particularly the Austrian Empire.³⁸⁴ The revolution in Greece and Poland were also national liberation attempt, while in Russia the liberal revolution was suppressed immediately and failed to take control of any part in the country and the revolutionaries were exiled to Siberia.³⁸⁵

The revolution in Spain and Portugal are the only ones that fall under the focus of this study among the 1820s revolutions as it is not a national liberation movement. The Trienio Liberal

³⁸¹ McNeese, Tim. *The Industrial Revolution*. (Milliken Publishing Company, 2000).

³⁸² *Ibid.*, 153.

³⁸³ *Ibid.*, 154.

³⁸⁴ Chapman, Tim. *The Risorgimento: Italy, 1815-1871*. (Humanities-Ebook, 2008).

³⁸⁵ McNeese, *Political Revolutions*, 154.

Revolution in Spain was the first of the 1820 revolutions to be ignited in 1820 and lasted until 1823 when it was defeated by the *Hundred Thousand Sons of Saint Louis*.³⁸⁶ The revolution started to restore the radical constitution of 1812 that was one of the most liberal constitutions at the time that allowed universal male suffrage and had become a role model for liberal activists around the world.³⁸⁷

The revolution and the internal divisions that were followed as the result of it took three years and this long period allowed the Quintuple Alliance to react and give a mandate to France to amass a large army and crush the liberal revolution in Spain.³⁸⁸ The casualties of the revolution in Spain was mostly caused by the French Army intervention, and according to estimates, it was less than 1,500 men strong.³⁸⁹ The internal strives were not highly violent; thus misery variable could not have been determinable for the foreign intervention and concern of foreign powers in the Congress of Verona. Neither it was a social revolution since its agendas were highly liberal and not very radical and class-based like the French revolution. It tried to limit the power of the monarchy and the church and not to dismantle it at once.³⁹⁰

The reason behind foreign concern and subsequent intervention to cease the liberal revolution in Spain lies behind the balance of threat variable. The revolution started to restore the radical constitution of 1812 that was one of the most liberal constitutions at the time that allowed

³⁸⁶ Hundred Thousand Sons of Saint Louis was the popular name for the French Army mobilized in 1823 by the Bourbon King of France, Louis XVIII to assist the Spanish Royalists to restore King Ferdinand VII of Spain to restore the absolute power and defeat the revolutionaries

³⁸⁷ Esdaile, Charles J. *Spain in the liberal age: from Constitution to Civil War, 1808-1939*. (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2000), 22.; Yamada, Norihito. "Canning, the principle of non-interference and the struggle for influence in Portugal, 1822-5." *Historical Research* 86, no. 234 (2013), 661-683.

³⁸⁸ Nichols, Irby Coghill. *The European Pentarchy and the Congress of Verona, 1822*. (The Hague: Springer Netherlands, 2012).

³⁸⁹ Nash, Jay Robert. *Darkest hours*. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1976).

³⁹⁰ Payne, Stanley G. *A history of Spain and Portugal*. Vol. 2. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973).

universal male suffrage and had become a role model for liberal activists around the world.³⁹¹ It had a universal and promising language, and liberal revolutions in Russia, Italy, and Portugal in 1820s were all influenced by the Spanish constitution of 1812.³⁹² This threatened other conservative power's interests and allowed France to intervene militarily to set back the revolution in 1823.³⁹³

The Liberal Revolution in Portugal was the only successful case amongst the early 1820s liberal revolutionary wave that swept across Russia, Poland, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Portuguese Revolutionaries in August and September quickly took over the country swiftly and demanded a constitutional monarchy, be established and Portuguese trade exclusivity over Brazil to be restored.³⁹⁴ The revolutionaries consisted of military and middle class Portuguese.³⁹⁵ The revolutionaries organized a constitutional assembly and approved the new constitution in 1822 that was heavily based on the 1812 Spanish Constitution.³⁹⁶

The revolution, unlike the Spanish one, did not see foreign intervention. This could be due to its short duration, non-violent nature, and not creating a significant balance of threat when compared to the Spanish revolution. Portugal at the edges of Europe did not have a substantial influence on the European Great Power's interests as Spain did. Nevertheless, Great Britain held significant interests in Portugal and Brazil, and liberal nationalist uprising in Portugal was a threat

³⁹¹ Esdaile, C. J. (2000). *Spain in the liberal age: from Constitution to Civil War, 1808-1939*. Wiley-Blackwell, 22.; Yamada, Norihito. "Canning, the principle of non-interference and the struggle for influence in Portugal, 1822-5." *Historical Research* 86, no. 234 (2013), 661-683.

³⁹² Payne, A history of Spain and Portugal, 432-433.

³⁹³ Nicholas J.R., Irby C. "The Congress of Verona, 1822: A Reappraisal." *The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly* (1966), 385-399.

³⁹⁴ Aidt, Toke Skovsgaard, and Peter S. Jensen. "Workers of the world, unite! Franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in Europe, 1820-1938." (2011), 90.

³⁹⁵ Fernandes, Paulo Jorge, Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, and Manuel Baiôa. "The political history of nineteenth century Portugal." e-JPH, Vol. 1, (2003), 5.

³⁹⁶ Birmingham, David. *A Concise History of Portugal*. (Cambridge University Press, 2018).

to these interests. The absolutist monarchy had given exclusive trade right to Great Britain in Portugal and Brazil since the Napoleonic Wars, that was one of the main reasons of discontent amongst the Portuguese Revolutionaries, who sought to cancel these rights; thus, threatening British interests. However, at the same time in Great Britain fortunately for Portugal there George Canning, the liberal Tory British Prime Minister advocated for the non-interference approach in Portugal, and according to many he was indirectly helping his liberal counterparts in Portugal.³⁹⁷ Had there been another prime minister in power in Britain or more radical revolutionaries in Portugal, a British intervention might have been possible.

The Spanish Liberal Revolution affected the balance of threat and decreased the country's CINC by 25% that eased a foreign intervention. Walt's theory could explain that the Portuguese Revolution did not end in an inter-state war, unlike the Spanish one. This is because it was not a threat, as it was rather moderate and did not see a change in its capability measured by CINC.

The liberal revolutions also support the theory of this research. The Spanish Trienio Revolution was a lengthy revolution, as it took three years, and generated threat for European Powers; thus, experienced the French. The revolution in Portugal was more moderate and created less threat to other powers. Importantly, the revolution only took place in one day in Portugal on the 24th of August; causing less misery and giving less time to foreign powers to react. These two revolutions are following Walt's theory as well.

3.2.2. Portugal 1910 republican revolution:

The Republican revolution in Portugal in 1910 made Portugal one of very few republics in Europe together with France and Switzerland. Thus, it could be a threat for other monarchies in

³⁹⁷ Rolo, Paul Jacques Victor, and George Canning. *George Canning: three biographical studies*. (London: Macmillan, 1965: 218).

Europe; however, due to its occurrence in only two days, little fatalities (less than 50), little balance of threat and not being a social revolution, it did not invite other monarchies in Europe for an intervention. In terms of the balance of threat, revolutionaries did not have a universal language and did not try to export their values and republicanism to other countries. Instead, they were cautious and sought the recognition of other countries and announced that they were bounded to former international treaties. Despite having anticlerical sentiments, the revolution was not radical enough to upset the class system; thus, not a social revolution. In addition, Portugal's rather isolated location; not having significant influence and interest for great power's politics made it less relevant for foreign intervention.³⁹⁸ The Portuguese Revolution of 1920, did not meet any of the independent variables and not surprisingly, it was not attacked; thus, it is in accordance with this research's theory. However, it did experience a major decrease by 16% in the year of revolution, but it created no level of tension; which questions the validity of Walt's argument that revolutionary regimes are far more likely to get invaded as their capability to defend is significantly decreased.

3.2.3. The Carnation Revolution (1974):

The Carnation Revolution was a non-violent revolution with the help of Portuguese armed forces against the authoritarian Estado Novo regime of Portugal. This case is an early example of non-violent and pro-democracy revolutions to sweep across many countries in the following decade. Four people were killed by Estado Novo's regime before surrendering; but, the revolutionaries' peaceful methods to achieve their goals was unusual for the time.³⁹⁹ The aftermath

³⁹⁸ Medina, João, ed. *História de Portugal: dos tempos pré-históricos aos nossos dias*. 1993: 445.; Rezola, Maria Inácia. "The Portuguese transition to democracy." *Portuguese Republic at One Hundred* (2012), 83-99.

³⁹⁹ Osuna, José Javier Olivas. "The deep roots of the Carnation Revolution: 150 years of military interventionism in Portugal." *Portuguese Journal of Social Science* 13, no. 2 (2014), 225.

of the revolution, the democratic reforms were implemented by drafting a new constitution, and permitting freedom of speech and releasing political prisoners and granting independence to oversee territories of sub-Saharan Africa and East Timor.⁴⁰⁰

The revolutionaries had left-leaning tendencies, but they were moderate and did not create a social revolution. In addition, they were not universalist and did not try to rhetorically expand the revolution to neighboring Spain. Spain was at the same time moving towards reforms for democracy and old General Franco was cautious and inward-looking and did not seek meddling in other countries.⁴⁰¹ Moreover, the revolution was well managed took one day on 25th April 1974, and the Armed Forces Movement implementing the revolution were ordered to move along the border with Spain to prevent any Spanish intervention.⁴⁰²

The Carnation Revolution is in accordance with this research's work, as this peaceful revolution did not create misery, threat, or a social revolution. Like most of the peaceful revolution, the Carnation Revolution illustrates the limitations of Walt's logic regarding revolutions, and international tension. The CINC data dropped by 38% due to the revolution, yet no international tension was made. This is because Walt simply neglected peaceful revolutions and their international effects; which is a grave flaw as, in the last decades, the number of peaceful revolutions has increased significantly.

3.2.4. Philippine Revolution of 1986

Philippine Revolution of 1986 or People Power Revolution was a pro-democracy revolution that non-violently and through mass protests shook the power from February 22 to 25th and

⁴⁰⁰ Lockyer, Adam. "Foreign Intervention and Warfare in Civil Wars: The effect of exogenous resources on the course and nature of the Angolan and Afghan conflicts." (2008), 131.

⁴⁰¹ Frain, Maritheresa F. "The Spanish Transition to Democracy." *South European Society and Politics* 1, no. 2 (1996), 321.

⁴⁰² Osuna, "The Deep Roots," 225.

deposed the 21-year presidential rule of dictator Marcos.⁴⁰³ The revolution took place after he was announced the winner of the flawed 1986 February elections. However, the opposition was prepared and its leader Cory Aquino in the next day of elections called for a mass civil disobedience campaign to oust Marcos. The army was called in to crush the revolution but facing well-organized nonviolent revolutionaries they defected in large numbers. On 25th February Marcos took the advice of the White House and left the Philippines, and People Power Revolution was accomplished.⁴⁰⁴

The Philippines Revolution of 1986 was a classic example of nonviolent revolutions that occurred in a short time without bloodshed. In addition, it was not a social revolution as it did not have a radical agenda to overturn the social structure, nor did it affect the balance of threat as it simply sought to achieve democracy. Therefore, not surprisingly like other nonviolent revolutions, it did not raise the international tension. This case could also be in accordance with Walt's approach, as the revolution did not create a threat for any country, and the nation's capability was not affected as CINC data demonstrates. But, his theory still fails to explain how peacefulness of the revolution was crucial in not raising international tensions.

3.2.5. 1989 Revolutions in Eastern Europe:

The success of 1989 non-violent revolutions “stunned their leaders, participants, victims, and observers.”⁴⁰⁵ Four months after toppling the Berlin Wall, the Allens-bach Institute surveyed the East Germans and asked them whether they expected such a peaceful revolution a year ago, and only 5% answered yes immediately, and 76% admitted that they were stunned.⁴⁰⁶ By the end

⁴⁰³ Iletto, Reynold C. "The 'unfinished revolution' in Philippine political discourse." *Japanese Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 31, no. 1 (1993), 62.

⁴⁰⁴ Brands, Henry William. "Reagan: The Life." (New York: Doubleday, 2016).; Goldstone, *Revolutions*, 105-108.

⁴⁰⁵ Kuran, "The East European revolution of 1989," 124.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 121.

of World War II, the Soviet Union had occupied all of Eastern Europe and supported local communist parties in taking over the governments. Keeping the communist regimes of Eastern Europe was one of the main pillars of its foreign policy approach and in several cases the USSR had to roll its tanks in the streets of East Berlin (1953), Budapest (1956) and Prague (1968) to save its fellow socialist regimes and prevent the spillover of “counterrevolutionary” to its own territory.⁴⁰⁷ So how come the USSR did not intervene militarily and rather helped the social movements by applying political pressure on its fellow communist regimes? This is what is investigated in this part too, where the variables of this research can give us a good account of the interaction between the USSR and revolutions at its satellite regimes in 1989.

The 1989 revolutions with the exception of Poland often took less than two months and were non-violent except Romania, where between 1,000 to 2,000 died in just eleven days.⁴⁰⁸ Had the violent revolution in Romania last longer perhaps an intervention would be imminent. They were all pro-democratic with non-social revolutionary characteristics. The revolutions encompassed much of the Soviet’s communist bloc countries including, German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Mongolia. These revolutions increased the balance of threat for the Soviet Union as it was losing its influence. The threats were perceived and responded rather mildly by the Soviet leadership compared to the earlier events in Prague 1968 and Budapest 1956. The change in Soviet approach towards its western neighbors would not be possible without its experience from previous military interventions, changes in the international arena and its domestic politics. The fall of communism in Albania, Yugoslavia, and USSR is not considered revolutionary as they do not meet the requirements (refer to page) mentioned earlier in

⁴⁰⁷ Goldstone, *109*.

⁴⁰⁸ Roper, Stephen D. *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), 64.

this paper for being revolutionary. They were rather gradual, and in the case of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, they had a substantial nationalist tendency.

The change in Soviet approach towards its Eastern European sphere of influence had become apparent since the unrests in Poland in 1980. At that year, the question of military intervention was discussed once again when a strike movement hit Poland and was met with Warsaw's soft response. Developments in Poland were alarming for other members of the Warsaw Pact, and they were afraid that social movements could spillover inside their borders.⁴⁰⁹ Erich Honecker, German Democratic Republic's leader, whose country was the most vulnerable to the events in Poland, watched the passivity of the USSR anxiously and repeatedly advised his Polish comrades to take a more appropriate measure towards the workers of *Solidarnosc*.⁴¹⁰ The Soviet Union was preparing to send four divisions to Poland for Warsaw Pact maneuvers and to use them in support of the Polish Army should martial law be declared. However, Brezhnev was warned by Jaruzelski the Polish defense minister Stanisław Kania, the Polish leader in a secret conversation warned Brezhnev that military intervention would cause a national uprising and "even if angels entered Poland they would be treated as bloodthirsty vampires, and the socialist ideas would be swimming in blood."⁴¹¹ Brezhnev reportedly complied and said, "ok, we are not going to intervene."⁴¹² The question is how Brezhnev who did not tolerate any degeneration of Socialism in Eastern Europe and would respond with an iron fist, with a policy that became famous as Brezhnev doctrine, since

⁴⁰⁹ Loth, Wilfried. "Moscow, Prague and Warsaw: Overcoming the Brezhnev Doctrine." *Cold War History* 1, no. 2 (2001), 109.

⁴¹⁰ Solidarnosc or solidarity was a social movement that used civil resistance methods to advance worker's rights and social change.; Roberts, Adam. *Civil resistance and power politics: The experience of non-violent action from Gandhi to the present*. (Oxford university press, 2009).

⁴¹¹Kenia's report at the international conference on the Polish Crisis 1980-1982 in Jachranja, 8-10 November, 1997.; Loth, Wilfried. "Moscow, Prague and Warsaw: Overcoming the Brezhnev Doctrine." *Cold War History* 1, no. 2 (2001), 103-118.

⁴¹² Translated from Kania, Stanisław. *Zatrzymac konfrontacje*. Warsaw (1991), 91.

the Prague Spring in 1968, now showed flexibility towards the events in Poland? The change in Soviet approach towards its western neighbors would not be possible without its experience from previous military interventions, changes in the international arena and its domestic politics.

The past experiences brought the Soviet leadership into a realist understanding of its empire. Earlier military interventions in Czechoslovakia 1968 and Afghanistan 1979 to save socialism had failed to achieve the outcomes that Kremlin had thought it would.⁴¹³ Prague invasion had negative consequences for the unity of the communist bloc. Ceausescu, Romania's leader and a member of Warsaw Pact boldly denounced the invasion in a speech addressing before 100,000 people in Palace Square in Bucharest and tried to distance itself from the Soviet Union.⁴¹⁴ Albania left the Warsaw Pact one month after the invasion and improved the relations with the Soviet's rival in the communist bloc, China, whose relation had also deteriorated with the Soviet Union. The majority of Western communist parties also denounced the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.⁴¹⁵ Therefore, the propagators of the intervention in Prague who had the motivation to keep cohesiveness of the communism had unintendedly made cracks on it. In addition, sending Soviet troops to Afghanistan in 1979 had only created more problems and intensified the anti-communist uprising, that dragged the superpower in a bloody civil war. Therefore, military intervention against the setbacks in communism in its sphere of influence was becoming more and more obsolete.

⁴¹³ Westad, Odd Arne. "Concerning the Situation in A: New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan." *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars* (1996).

⁴¹⁴ Jarausch, Konrad H., and Thomas Lindenberger, eds. *Conflicted memories: Europeanizing contemporary histories*. Vol. 3. Berghahn Books, (2007), 43.

⁴¹⁵ Stolarik, M. Mark, ed. *The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: forty years later*. Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, (2010), 137-164.

Change in the international environment was also another important factor that had compelled the USSR to gradually adopt non-intervention in Eastern Europe. In a conversation between Husak, the Czechoslovak president, Honecker and Tichonov the Soviet Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Tikhonov stated that: “in the present situation, an intervention would not work.”⁴¹⁶ The promotion of détente despite all its upheavals had helped the USSR to overcome its fears of encirclement. This situation was exacerbated as Gorbachev came into power and tried to end the cold war. In addition, détente had created a more cooperative relationship with the West, and it was important for the Soviet Union not to jeopardize these relations, particularly after the deterioration of relations after the intervention in Afghanistan.⁴¹⁷ The USSR leadership had realized it was more important to cooperate with the West than to maintain their sphere of influence. The Sinatra doctrine can be said to be a child of Détente, as it played a major role by encouraging the USSR to cooperate and feel more secure from an encirclement.⁴¹⁸

Mikhail Suslov, the secretary of the communist party, argued it would be preferable to have social democrats into Poland’s communist government than to use the Soviet troops.⁴¹⁹ Jaruzelski replaced reformist Kania, as the prime minister of Poland, but his urgent demand for troops to hold the martial law was rejected.⁴²⁰ The USSR did not even provide Jaruzelski a statement in support of the Polish army against the Solidarity movement. Andropov, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, stated the Soviet Union’s position even more directly:

⁴¹⁶ Loth, “Moscow,” 112.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid., 117.

⁴¹⁹ Dobrynin, Anatoly. *In confidence: Moscow's ambassador to America's six Cold War presidents (1962-1986)*. (New York: Times Books, 1995), 500.

⁴²⁰ Loth, “Moscow.” 114.

We cannot risk such a step. I do not know how things will turn out in Poland, but even if Poland falls under the control of *Solidarnosc*, that is the way it will be. We must be concerned above all with our own country and about the strengthening of the Soviet Union. That is our mainline.⁴²¹

Unfortunate for Gorbachev by late 80s all the communist economies in Eastern Europe were in grave decline and were looking towards their patron, the Soviet Union for its support⁴²². Growing economic problems for the USSR compelled its leadership to prioritize addressing its own issues. Gorbachev ascendance to power as a new generation of Soviet statemen facilitated the process of reforms, improving relations with the West and non-intervention. In his report to the 27th Party Convention of the CPSU on 25 February 1986, he redrew the Soviet foreign interests and the traditional contradiction between imperialism and socialism. The support for revolutions was pushed to the periphery in favor of the continuation of civilization and the global community. The Soviet Union now emphasized on non-military measures to build trust and achieve security in the international community.⁴²³ Gorbachev clearly stated in Prague in April 1987 that “we consider the independence of every party, its responsibility to the people of its own country, and its right to decide the question of the country’s development to be unconditional principles.”⁴²⁴ Another important statement of change in policy came at the UN in December 1988, when Gorbachev highlighted his commitment to the “freedom of choice” of all nations and that he did not know any

⁴²¹ Ibid., 113-14.

⁴²² Goldstone, *Revolutions*, 110.

⁴²³ Loth, “Moscow,” 115-16.

⁴²⁴ Gorbachev, Mikhail. "For a common European home, for a new way of thinking." speech, Prague, April (1987), 10.

exception to this principle and announced the unilateral withdrawal of 50,000 Soviet troops together with 5,000 tanks from Eastern Europe.⁴²⁵

The Soviet domestic reforms of *perestroika*,⁴²⁶ *glasnost*⁴²⁷, and *demokratizatsiya*⁴²⁸ that opened the way for democratization and limited liberalization of the economy slowly removed the fears of Soviet military intervention and created dilemmas and problems for the hardline and old guard East European communist leaders in terms of how they should respond and deal with the changes from their overlord.⁴²⁹ Gorbachev in Bucharest in November 1986 announced to his fellow Eastern European leaders to democratize and restructure their country and explained that they could no longer depend on the USSR to keep them in power.⁴³⁰ The Soviet policy soon had its effects on the Eastern European regimes as they started to accede to the demands of strikers and protesters. The first one being the Polish government that started round table negotiations with the *Solidarnosc* in response to the August 1988 strikes despite being smaller than the 1980 strikes.⁴³¹ The willingness to negotiate with the protestors and concede to their demands was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that a month before Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister had spoken of the importance of “non-aggression, respect for sovereignty and national independence, non- interference in internal affairs” for the Soviet Union.⁴³² Gorbachev also encouraged the Polish Communist Party to cooperate and to form a coalition government with the *Solidarnosc*, which was accepted. The power was surrounded to a non-communist government in Warsaw had a

⁴²⁵ Wilton, John. "Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe Post 1985, 'Sinatra Doctrine' or 'Mozart Doctrine'?" *Politologicka Revue* 1, no. 2 (1997), 94.

⁴²⁶ Restructuring in Russian and refers to restructuring the Soviet politics and economy.

⁴²⁷ Openness and transparency in Russian.

⁴²⁸ Democratization in Russian.

⁴²⁹ Wilton, "Soviet Policy," 95.

⁴³⁰ Garthoff, Raymond L. *The Great Transition*. Brookings Institution Press, (2000), 574.

⁴³¹ Wilton, "Soviet Policy," 96.

⁴³² "19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU: Foreign Politics and Diplomacy", *Pravda*, 26th July, 1988.

formidable impact on politics and society of Eastern Europe as it sent a clear message of Soviet military non-intervention against the dissident movements.⁴³³

Thus, the Sinatra doctrine was born out of the change in the domestic and international environment. The Brezhnev doctrine of the intervention was relinquished in favor of the neutrality of what became known as the Sinatra doctrine. The phrase “Sinatra doctrine” was first stated by the Soviet government spokesman, Gennady Gerasimov, in 1987. It highlighted discarding the Brezhnev doctrine by the USSR leadership that gave autonomy to the Eastern European countries to do things their own way as referenced by Gerasimov to the popular song of “My Way” by Frank Sinatra.⁴³⁴ Before this approach, the Brezhnev doctrine firmly was centered on military intervention if needed to prevent the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. This was just as in Lenin’s words: “The weakening of any link in the world socialist system has a direct effect on all the socialist countries, which cannot be indifferent to this.”⁴³⁵ Therefore, the military interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia were justified to prevent the detachment of Eastern European countries from the Soviet bloc and anti-socialist degeneration would not be tolerated.⁴³⁶

While the Soviet Union was advocating Sinatra doctrine publicly, it was applying diplomatic and political pressure to maintain influence in Eastern Europe through its other key institutions such as KGB. It attempted to orchestrate the removal of hard-line Stalinist leaders in certain Eastern European countries and to replace them with reformers. Soviet pressure on Polish regime to accede with the demands of the dissidents and KGB’s attempt to overthrow the hard-line communist regime of Jakes through popular demonstrations and to replace him with Zdenek

⁴³³ Wilton, “Soviet Policy,” 97.

⁴³⁴ Ibid., 87.

⁴³⁵ Ibid., 88.

⁴³⁶ Ibid., 89.

Mlynar, a friend of Gorbachev, who was a reformer like him.⁴³⁷ Eleven days after Gorbachev's visit to the German Democratic Republic, hard-line Honecker was removed and was replaced by Egon Krenz and shortly after by reformist Hans Modrow acknowledged "necessary renovations" started firing Stalinists, and began following Gorbachev's *perestroika* line.⁴³⁸ Gorbachev even advised Krenz to open the border between East and West Germany to provide an escape faucet and decrease the unrest that threatened the communist government.⁴³⁹

Moscow also played a prominent role in December 1989 Revolution in Romania. KGB agents were actively involved and participated in Ceausescu's removal and facilitated Ion Iliescu's ascendance to the position of the first post-1989 revolution president, who was a reformer and a close friend of Gorbachev.⁴⁴⁰ The Soviet leadership believed that the pro-democracy events would lead to the establishment of truly democratic socialist states.⁴⁴¹ Gorbachev indirectly and directly helped the social movements in Eastern Europe as embracing a revolutionary third way between capitalism and traditional Soviet communism, socialism with a human face. Gorbachev also puts a great emphasis on this approach due to Soviet economic necessity in his memoirs.⁴⁴² The traditional Comecon (council for mutual economic assistant) was a significant burden on the Soviet economy, which led to the promotion of Sinatra doctrine and pressure for reforms among Eastern European countries.

Gorbachev's reforms at the Soviet Union kindled hopes of more independence and significant social change in Eastern Europe as it fueled expectations of a freer Eastern Europe with

⁴³⁷ Ibid., 98-99.

⁴³⁸ Ibid., 100.

⁴³⁹ Marc, Fisher, "One Year Later, World Is Learning How Berlin Wall Opened", *Washington Post*, 10th November, (1990), 23.

⁴⁴⁰ Castex, Michel. *Un mensonge gros comme le siècle: Roumanie, histoire d'une manipulation*. FeniXX, 1990.

⁴⁴¹ Oberdorfer, Don. *The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1990*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 364.

⁴⁴² Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich chapter *Mikhail Gorbachev: Memoirs*. (London: Doubleday, 1996), 464-86.

less risk for dissidents. Amid the unstable and revolutionary 1989, some East European leaders were contemplating whether to use force or not. Gorbachev's remark that his country had no right to interfere in their affairs came as the final blow to these regimes that were hoping the USSR would save them like in 1968 and 1956 and were forced to exercise restraint and eventually collapse like a house of cards.⁴⁴³

The 1989 Revolutions reveal the weakness of Walt's theory. Stephen Walt disregarded these important revolutions and did not discuss them in his work. He does not offer a framework to study and predict the effects of the revolutions that are not violent. This vacuum is repeatedly felt in the study of all the peaceful revolutions when using his theories.

The 1989 Revolutions in Eastern Europe have changed the world history ever since. They were existential threats to the Soviet Union itself. However, as the study demonstrated, they were peaceful revolutions that did not cause misery and were short in duration. Their peacefulness would make it hard to justify military intervention against them, particularly in a time that use of forces was becoming more and more a taboo. The 1989 Revolutions support the theory of this research. They fulfilled all the important variables of his research, including the balance of threat and drop in nations capabilities, yet they did not create international tension. Revolutions of 1989 are just several cases of many revolutions that highlight the importance of the need for an alternative approach to revolution and international relations.

⁴⁴³ Kuran, "The East European revolution of 1989," 121-124.

3.2.6. Color Revolutions in the Post-Communist States: Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia

Bulldozer Revolution was a non-violent and pro-democracy revolution led by university students that led to the overthrow of autocratic Slobodan Milošević in six days from 29th September to 5th October 2000. The revolution started over an election Fraud on September 24, and student-organized under the anti-government movement of *Otpor*, meaning resistance, led the revolution. The peaceful Serbian revolution was to inspire other social movements around the world in the years to come.⁴⁴⁴ The successful ones after Serbia (2000) include Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), Kyrgyzstan (2005), and Armenia (2018). The term ‘Color Revolution’ was widely used to describe these revolutions have adapted a color as a symbol to identify and characterized their movement. These revolutions are known for their non-violence and pro-democratic appeals.⁴⁴⁵

After the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, many corrupt and authoritarian regimes rose to power in the region. They as competitive authoritarian regimes held elections but were authoritarian in their nature. Such regimes are most vulnerable during election cycles to a regime change. Bulldozer Revolution (Serbia in 2000), Rose Revolution (Georgia in 2003), Orange Revolution (Ukraine in 2004) and Tulip Revolution (Kyrgyzstan in 2005) were all part of this wave of color revolution in post-communist countries. There were high levels of imitation and emulation among these revolutions. In all of these revolutions at the forefront of the opposition were the youth organizations prepared to confront the election fraud. These youth NGOs overcame divisions of the older generation movements and helped to create a unified front against the governments.⁴⁴⁶ These organizations also enabled the opposition to pass on their experience and

⁴⁴⁴ Kuzio, "Civil society," 365-386.

⁴⁴⁵ Lane, David. "'Coloured Revolution' as a Political Phenomenon." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 25, no. 2-3 (2009), 113-135.

⁴⁴⁶ Kuzio, "Civil society," 367.

training with the foreign financial aid to the other revolutionary youth organization seeking democracy. George Bush gave a speech before the National Endowment for Democracy, where he mentioned the American Invasion of Iraq only the beginning of a “global democratic revolution.”⁴⁴⁷ The United States spent \$65 million, promoting democracy mostly through NGOs in the immediate years preceding the Orange Revolution.⁴⁴⁸ On the other side, Russia spent a large sum to have figures close to Russia in power.⁴⁴⁹ The Armenian Revolution (2018) overthrew Serzh Sargsyan government who held warm relations with Russia, the revolutionary leader Nikol Pashinyan has promised friendly relations with the ally of the former president. Russia knew that Armenia’s dependence on Russia due to its fragile situation would not change even with a color revolution and indeed it has not.⁴⁵⁰

These revolutions were very short in duration and peaceful in their conduct. They were pro-democratic and not radical and often created a balance of threat for other autocratic countries that shared a similar socio-political situation. Opposition leaders of other countries were inspired by the success of such revolution and actively attempted to learn from their success. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstani opposition leaders immediately went to Kyiv after the Orange Revolution to see how they could emulate the Ukrainian success.⁴⁵¹ In the Russian view, these revolutions indicated the efforts of the US and its Western partners to initiate regime change in the post-Soviet states and its sphere of influence to potentially penetrate the Russian institutions through the methods of

⁴⁴⁷ Barbash, Fred. "Bush: Iraq Part of Global Democratic Revolution." *Washington Post* 6 (2003).

⁴⁴⁸ Beissinger, Mark R. "Structure and example in modular political phenomena: The diffusion of bulldozer/rose/orange/tulip revolutions." *Perspectives on politics* 5, no. 2 (2007), 261.

⁴⁴⁹ Wilson, Jeanne L. "The legacy of the color revolutions for Russian politics and foreign policy." *Problems of post-communism* 57, no. 2 (2010), 28-9.

⁴⁵⁰ Demytrie, Rayhan. "'Velvet Revolution' That Won Without a Bullet Fired." *BBC News*. Last modified May 1, 2018.

⁴⁵¹ Beissinger, "Structures and Example," 262.

employing soft power.⁴⁵² As Gleb Pavlovski a close adviser to the Kremlin has put it in words: “The US has been using various means to expand its sphere of influence since the Soviet Union dismembered. By supporting pro-West opposition factions in CIS countries, Washington also tried to exert political pressure on Russia through Colored Revolutions,” complaining how the West had created a state of “permanent revolution” in the post-Soviet space.⁴⁵³ Russian government tried to reverse color revolutions, particularly the Orange Revolution in Ukraine as it was a strategically important country to Russia by pouring money and advised pro-Russian candidates such as Viktor Yanukovich for his presidential campaign. This was thanks to both relatively democratic and corrupt dynamics that great powers could protect their interests through soft-power and supporting their candidate, instead of hard intervention.

The Color Revolutions are in accordance with this research’s theory. The Bulldozer and Tulip revolutions did not affect the balance of threat. Rose and Orange Revolution created a threat for Russian interest, yet they did not cause tension between the revolutionary states and Russia. Thanks to their peacefulness similar to 1989 revolutions, the color revolutions did not cause misery as they took a short time and through mass participation that overwhelmed the regimes that were incapable of suppressing them. Similar to 1989 Revolutions, Walt’s framework also fails to explain how despite both decreases in countries’ capability to defend themselves due to the revolution⁴⁵⁴ and creating significant threat to Soviet Union’s interest, they did not end up in war.

Remarks:

The peaceful revolutions have been neglected from the study of war and international relations, even though they are vital in the understanding of how revolution and the world system

⁴⁵² Wilson, "The legacy," 21.

⁴⁵³ Ibid., 22.

⁴⁵⁴ Based on the CINC dataset.

interact. The peaceful mass revolutions except for Spanish Trinio Liberal have not created international tension. The French intervention against Trinio Liberal took place in 1823, and since then no armed intervention has taken place against a peaceful revolution. These revolutions tend to be short, negligible in violence, devastation, and misery. None of these peaceful revolutions have led to social revolutions as they seek a moderate revolution. Certain peaceful revolutions affect the balance of threat negative, but their peacefulness reduces the threat and does not justify an intervention against it. Inadequacy of Walt's theory to explain the peaceful revolutions remarks on the importance of variables, such as misery in the study of revolutions and war. Misery is a variable absent from all the peaceful revolutions (except for Spanish 1820 Revolution), which can explain why peaceful revolutions did not end up into a war.

Chapter 4 : Elite Revolutions:

4.1. Coup d'états

An Elite revolution conducted by members of the old regime, particularly military bureaucrats. Coups tend to be less radical and less disrupting of the ancient regime. Because such revolutions are committed by the pre-existing elites who do not seek a total overhaul of the society to threaten their position. This means the outcomes of the revolution is more predictable, and the already existing diplomatic channels with other countries are less affected. Furthermore, military coups tend to be less violent and involve less social transformation than mass revolutions, and internationally; they also have fewer consequences. Therefore, these revolutions are highly unlikely to create international tensions.⁴⁵⁵

4.1.1. Ottoman 1908 Young Turks Revolution:

At the early 20th century, the Ottoman Empire was falling apart, and a need for serious reformation was felt by a segment of elites to keep the Empire in one piece. The inefficiency of the system signifying itself through the country's finance and disability to maintain the integrity of the Empire led to dissatisfaction with many army officers and civil servants.⁴⁵⁶ In June 1908 in a meeting between the British King Edward VII and Russian Emperor Nicholas II, both parties agreed on conducting a new reformation policy in Macedonia.⁴⁵⁷ This initiative was taken as a genuine violation of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. There was a great fear that Great Britain and Russian Empires would intervene and detach turbulent Macedonia from the Ottoman Empire,

⁴⁵⁵ Walt, *Revolution and War*. Chapter 2.

⁴⁵⁶ Ahmad, Feroz. "The Young Turk Revolution." *Journal of Contemporary History* 3, no. 3 (1968), 19-36.

⁴⁵⁷ Bojinov, Voin. "Bulgaria and the Young Turk Revolution (June 1908–April 1909), The Beginning of the End of Ottoman Empire/Bulgaristan ve Genç Türkler Devrimi (Haziran 1908-Nisan 1909), Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Bitişinin Başlangıcı." *ADAM AKADEMİ Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 2, no. 1 (2012), 83.

where many Young Turks⁴⁵⁸ officers were located to suppress the rebellion and prevent foreign incursion.⁴⁵⁹ The Young Turks were convinced that they had to take control of the government and conduct meaningful reforms to revive the sick man of Europe. Encouraged by the constitutional revolutions in neighboring Persia and Russia, they revolted and rapidly took control in a bloodless coup and induced Sultan Abdul Hamid II to restore the constitution of 1876.⁴⁶⁰

The revolution did not create a balance of threat as the revolutionaries were majorly pre-existing elites and did not seek enmity with foreign countries. Nor, there was an affiliation between the Ottoman revolutionaries and other revolutionaries in other countries, as was the case with the Iranian and Russian revolutions in 1905. In the Ottoman Empire, the revolutionaries were composed of the elite segments of society. The oppositionists were mostly minority nationalists, professionals, university students, military officers, and bureaucrats.⁴⁶¹

Although the 1908 revolution by the young Turks deteriorated the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the foreign powers, as nationalist reforms were implemented that hindered foreign businesses.⁴⁶² The Young Turks were very cautious and conservative in dealing with foreign powers. Despite their state of disarray, and observing Bulgaria announcing its formal independence with the backing of Russia; Greece annexing Crete and Austro-Hungarian Empire

⁴⁵⁸ The Young Turks consisted of students, professionals, bureaucrats and military officers was a political reform movement and a society that sought replacing the absolutist monarchy with a constitutional one

⁴⁵⁹ Ahmad, "The Young Turks Revolution," 19-36.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁶¹ Sohrabi, "Historicizing Revolutions," 1397.

⁴⁶² Geyikdagi, V. Necla, and M. Yasar Geyikdagi. "Foreign direct investment in the Ottoman Empire: Attitudes and political risk." *Business History* 53, no. 3 (2011), 375-400.

officially annexing Bosnia; they still relied on diplomatic negotiations rather than mobilizing forces and people as many other revolutionary governments did.⁴⁶³

The revolution was bloodless and very rapid as the revolt began in early July and on 24th July the Sultan was capitulated and ordered the restoration of the 1876 constitution. Due to its short period and bloodless nature, it did not cause significantly weakened the Empire and was not completely carved off the map as many great powers were waiting. Besides, there was no sign in military capabilities of the Ottoman Empire. However, the internal division was sufficient for the territories (Bosnia, Crete, and Bulgaria) that for long *de-facto* had been out of the reach of the Sultan to be annexed or claim independence.

The only military coup discussed by Walt is Ataturk's coup in 1920 when he was chosen the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in Ankara, while Turkey was partially occupied by allies, and the Sultan was in the hand of British in Istanbul. Walt claimed Ataturk's ascendance into power as a coup, and his conflict with foreign countries was to a great degree due to causing threat for foreign powers. However, this is a fallacy as the Ataturk's ascendance into power in 1920 cannot really be qualified as a coup, or revolution, as he was part of the ruling system and was initially chosen to save the nation from the chaos and foreign occupation.⁴⁶⁴ Ataturk reforms, in the beginning, were gradual, and he did not dissolve the empire up until 1923, three years after he came into power. Furthermore, the foreign occupation of Turkey is related to WWI, and cannot be seen considerably relevant to the Ataturk's ascendance into power. Therefore, Walt makes grave

⁴⁶³ Bojinov, Voin. "Bulgaria and the Young Turk Revolution (June 1908–April 1909), The Beginning of the End of Ottoman Empire/Bulgaristan ve Genç Türkler Devrimi (Haziran 1908–Nisan 1909), Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Bitişinin Başlangıcı." *ADAM AKADEMİ Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 2, no. 1.

⁴⁶⁴ Harris, George S. "Shaw: History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume I: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808 (Book Review)." *Middle East Journal* 34, no. 1 (1980), 357.

mistakes in choosing his case and analyzing the situation. Had he chosen to examine the Young Turks Revolution in 1908, his theory would have been applicable to it, as the revolution did not affect the balance of threat, and there was no significant change in the nation's capability.

The theory of this research successfully predicts the international tension effect of the Turkish 1908 Revolution. The revolution caused little misery as it took place overnight. The revolution was not a social one, but rather an elite-led revolution with moderate demands. Therefore, as expected it did not raise the stakes for other powers and did not create tension.

4.1.2. Egyptian Revolution, 1952:

On July 23rd the Free Officers Movement conducted a coup and overthrew a monarchy. Major land and industrialization reforms and transformed the coup into a revolution.⁴⁶⁵ The Egyptian revolution was not radical until 1954 when Nasser's position was consolidated and deposed Naguib, Egypt's first president; and became the undisputed leader of Egypt.⁴⁶⁶ Therefore, it did not produce a significant balance of threat, and nevertheless, it was not a social revolution. The strong pan-Arab and anti-western rhetoric of Nasser appeared in the post-1954 years.⁴⁶⁷ In addition, Nasser was cautious at the early stages and until 1955 made secret contacts with Israel, but decided that peace with Israel was impossible.⁴⁶⁸ Therefore, Nasser's revolution did not have significant implications for the balance of threat and was his domestic reforms were not very radical to upset the class system for it to be classified as a social revolutionary one.

The US tried to appease Nasser, but it was not successful. US priority in the Middle East was to keep the Soviet Union out of the region and acknowledging that Nasser was not a

⁴⁶⁵ Aburish, Said K. *Nasser: The Last Arab*. (London: Ducksworth, 2004), 45.

⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 46-47.

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 239.

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

communist, Eisenhower was hoping, in the beginning, to include Egypt in the projected Middle East Defense Organization against the Soviet expansion.⁴⁶⁹ However, Nasser had other plans for the Middle East with Egypt as its leader and pan-Arabist ideology. Nasser's pan-Arabism was despite not being communist was still a threat to the pro-Western interests in the region; due to the inclination to nationalize industries, specifically Suez Canal, and it could potentially increase Soviet's influence in the region. Therefore, the US tried to counterweighting it by supporting Saudi Arabia.⁴⁷⁰ In addition, Nasser's recognition of Communist China and major arms deals with the Eastern Block alienated the US.⁴⁷¹ After 1954 he banned other parties and started to move towards the nationalization of the Suez Canal and confronting Great Britain. The conflict and cold war between Nasser and foreign powers slowly culminated, and finally, after five years in 1957 turned into a real war, which was ended by the US and USSR intervention. Lastly, the revolution or the coup happened overnight, and it was bloodless. Thus, it did not provide a window of opportunity for the foreign powers to intervene. These factors, combined with little balance of threat, in the beginning, caused the Egyptian revolution to not experience a foreign intervention up until 1956 when it nationalized the Suez Canal.⁴⁷² Walt's approach would also come into a similar conclusion, as the CINC did not change, nor there was a significant threat to other power's interest in the beginning of the revolution.

4.1.3. Iraqi 14 July Revolution:

The 14 July Revolution or 1958 coup by Free Officers influenced by Gamal Nasser, resulted in the fall of pro-Western Hashemite monarchy that had been established by King Faisal I in 1921,

⁴⁶⁹ Burns, William J. *Economic aid and American policy toward Egypt, 1955-1981*. (Albany: Suny Press, 1985).

⁴⁷⁰ Aburish, "The Last Arab," 127.

⁴⁷¹ James, Laura M. "When Did Nasser Expect War? The Suez Nationalization and its Aftermath in Egypt." *Simon C. Smith, Reassessing Suez* (1956), 149.

⁴⁷² Two years that is the scope of this research, hence the 1956 war does not fall into this research chapter

under the presence of British. The coup occurred overnight and caused around one hundred deaths, including, 3 US citizens that were killed by the mob.⁴⁷³ The revolution was not a social revolution one but affected the balance of threat by creating an anti-Western regime that existed from the Baghdad Pact, which was to unite Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan against the Soviet expansion. This treaty, together with the Iraqi government endorsement of Suez Canal invasion, was greatly resented by many Iraqis, particularly military officers, as they sympathized with the pan-Arab cause.⁴⁷⁴ The coup took the US government by surprise and was concerned that a chain reaction would occur and pro-Western middle eastern governments would fall one after another. Thus, it moved to contain pan-Arabism as the British increased their support for Hashemite Jordan and US intervention in Lebanon to save it from the pro-Nasserist forces.⁴⁷⁵ The Lebanese case, however, is not included in this research as it has a significant ethnic tension factor; thus, it falls out of the scope of this study.

The Iraqi July Revolution affected the balance of threat against the pro-US camp in the height of the Cold War, as the country had moved towards nationalism and closer to the Soviet camp. The revolution was not a social one, nor did it cause considerable misery as it only took place in one day, which could explain why the revolution did not create international tension. Walt's theory is not entirely in accordance with this case. The balance of threat was affected by the Iraqi Revolution, yet there was no intervention. The only variable in his theory can explain why the revolution did not create international tension is to look at whether its material capabilities were

⁴⁷³ Romero, Juan. *The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: A Revolutionary Quest for Unity and Security*. (Lanham: University Press of America, 2011).

⁴⁷⁴ Hunt, Courtney. *The history of Iraq*. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005), 75.

⁴⁷⁵ Barrett, Roby. "Intervention in Iraq, 1958-1959." *The Middle East Institute Policy Brief* 11 (2008), 1-12.

affected. Looking at the CINC data shows that it was not affected, which is due to the extremely short time of the revolution that did not affect the country's power.

4.1.4. North Yemen Civil War:

The 26 September Revolution or North Yemen Civil War was fought from 1962 to 1970 between the royalists and the supporters of the pan-Arab Yemen Arab Republic. The revolution started as a coup d'état with the support of the Egyptian intelligence services in Sana'a, North Yemen's capital.⁴⁷⁶ The Republican and pan-Arab revolution in Northern Yemen rang the bells among the conservative Arab countries and Great Britain. The revolution was not a social revolution, but Southern Yemen and other British protectorates in the middle east could be affected by the pan-Arabism. Therefore, the balance of threat was significantly affected. Saudi Arabia and Jordan started providing military materials for the royalist tribesmen, and Great Britain hired mercenaries. They did not send soldiers directly as they could meet with Soviet and Egyptian hostilities.⁴⁷⁷ In addition, Nasser's Egypt had sent a large force of 70,000 men to consolidate the republic and defeat the rebels.⁴⁷⁸ The Yemeni Civil War was a long and bloody one with one hundred thousand deaths in eight years that shows the graveness of the revolution.⁴⁷⁹ For Nasser Yemen held a special place as the failure of union with Syria, he needed a new victory; confronting imperialism; spreading pan-Arabism, and guaranteeing the dominance of the Red Sea.⁴⁸⁰ The Egyptian forces remained in Yemen until the peace talks were held and the 1967 war with Israel caused their withdrawal.

⁴⁷⁶ Schmidt, Dana Adams. *Yemen; the unknown war*. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968).

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁴⁷⁸ Pollack, Kenneth M. "Arabs at war: military effectiveness, 1948-1991." *University of Nebraska Press*, (2004), 55.

⁴⁷⁹ Singer, David. *The Wages of War. 1816—1965*. (Hoboken: Wiley, 1972).

⁴⁸⁰ Aboul-Enein, Youssef. "The Egyptian-Yemen War (1962-67), Egyptian perspectives on Guerrilla warfare." *Infantry Magazine* (2004).

The Yemeni revolution demonstrates the irrelevance of Walt's discussion of the window of opportunity. The data shows that the Yemeni CINC was increased by 33% right after the September Revolution; which, demonstrates that even a significant increase in the country's capabilities can lead to war, and window of opportunity as a cause of war can be insignificant. The Yemeni September Revolution in September 1962 supports the theory of this research. The revolution led by military elite loyal to Gamal Nasser's pan-Arabism caused a miserable civil war that raised the threat for many countries. Not surprisingly it experienced a very high international tension, as Egypt landed tens of thousands of troops in support of the republic, and on the other side, Saudi Arabia and Great Britain supported the Kingdom of Yemen.

4.1.5. Somalian 1969 Coup:

The bloodless coup occurred on 21st October 1969, and the Supreme Revolutionary Council of Somalia took power. The coup is seen appraised by the Soviet Union in order to reverse Somalia's drift towards the West. The USSR had already had 300 advisors on the ground and an active intelligence network in the country by which it could influence the Horn of Africa. Somalia had especially become important with the deterioration of the relations with China and possible impediment of Russian sea access to South East Asia and the need for an alternative route of Mediterranean-Red Sea. Therefore, having a friendly state at the horn of Africa was necessary.⁴⁸¹

Walt's theory cannot explain the Somalian Revolution accurately. The revolution affected the balance of threat by the fear of spreading communism in East Africa, yet there was no foreign response to it. Walt's only variable that could partially explain this anomaly is that Somalia's

⁴⁸¹ Payton, Gary D. "The Somali Coup of 1969: The Case for Soviet Complicity." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 18, no. 3 (1980), 493-508.

material capabilities did not change. The CINC data shows that the country's capabilities did not drop, so it did not create a window of opportunity for other countries to make use.

The Somalian revolution supports the theory of this research. It affected the balance of threat by increasing the possibility of spreading communism to other countries in East Africa, including Ethiopia and Kenya. Both of which held a large Somalian population that could ease transferring the revolution and causing internal conflict.⁴⁸² However, the other three variables for it to cause international tension were nonexistence. It was a coup and happened rapidly over-night a new regime was established. It was also bloodless attracting less international attention. Finally, despite being a socialist coup, it was not a social revolution according to the definition set by Skocpol discussed earlier.⁴⁸³ This is due to the fact that it was not a mass revolution, and the social changes were not rapid, but rather slow. It took the new Somalian regime two years, in 1971, to start talking about socialism as the ideology of the state and started nationalizing banks.⁴⁸⁴ Therefore, in the end, the Somalian Coup experienced no foreign intervention.

4.1.5. French Upper Volta 1983 Coup:

A bloodless coup made Thomas Sankara the president of the French Upper Volta and changed the name of the country to Burkina Faso and established a one-party communist state and became well known as "Africa's Che Guevara."⁴⁸⁵ He immediately launched extensive programs for social and economic change and integrated an anti-imperialist theme in his foreign policy. Another communist take-over in Africa affected the balance of threat; however, he did not seek to

⁴⁸² Lewis, Ioan M. "The politics of the 1969 Somali coup." *The Journal of modern African studies* 10, no. 3 (1972), 383-408.

⁴⁸³ Social revolutions as discussed by Theda Skocpol in her *Social revolutions in the modern world* involves rapid transformation of a society's state and class structures; accompanied by class revolts from below

⁴⁸⁴ Davidson, Basil. "Somalia: towards socialism." *Race & Class* 17, no. 1 (1975), 28.

⁴⁸⁵ Thomas Sankara. *Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution, 1983-1987*. (Pathfinder Press, 2007), 11.

establish extensive relations with the Eastern Block and followed a rather a neutralist path. He emphasized on self-sufficiency and autarkist economy as he once said, “Our country produces enough to feed us all. Alas, for lack of organization, we are forced to beg for food aid. It's this aid that instills in our spirits the attitude of beggars.”⁴⁸⁶ His relations with former colonial France and its neighbors, such as Mali and Ivory Coast was deteriorated.⁴⁸⁷ However, as it was not a social, long and bloody revolution Sankara was safe from foreign intervention, and he lasted for four years until he was overthrown killed by a military coup. Walt’s theory is partially applicable to this case as the CINC data shows no sign of window of opportunity. However, the balance of threat was affected yet there was no conflict. Walt does not have an appropriate variable to explain this situation.

Remarks:

The case studies on coups illustrate that they often take place overnight and do not cause bloodshed. Therefore, the misery variable is absent in these cases. The North Yemen Civil War was the exception as the coup by officers led to an adverse reaction from the traditional society. The Yemeni exception can be due to the combination of its tremendous geopolitical importance, and heterogeneous and divided society that prepared the ground for foreign intervention. These types of revolutions also do not end up in social revolutions as they do not involve mass mobilization, which is a necessary step for a social revolution.

4.2. Popular Coup d'états

Popular coups tend to be more radical than coups solely done by the military. They involve mass mobilization and civilian participation to reach their desired outcome. Because such coups

⁴⁸⁶ Thomas, *Thomas Sankara*,” 11.

⁴⁸⁷ Salliot, Emmanuel. "A review of past security events in the Sahel 1967–2007." *OECD Review* (2010).

are done by lower segments of the pre-existing elites who do not have the necessary capital to conduct their revolution and have to rely on popular support. This could also be due to the fact that the coup propagators have fundamental goals, such as conducting a social revolution that would necessitate mass support. This type of coups is similar to the mass revolution in many ways, and likewise, they can affect the balance of power; and cause violent and lengthy revolutions. Consequently, they are highly likely to increase international tension.

4.2.1. Dominican Republic Revolution 1965 (April-September):

The Dominican revolution, which started in April 1965 and the American intervention was among critical points in the history of Latin America that have not received much attention. Juan Bosch holds the title of the first democratically elected President of Dominican Republic. He was elected in 1963, but fearful of Bosch's reformist, leftist, "atheist" and nationalist discourse together with his popularity and popular mobilization the church and business class ousted him by a coup in 1963.⁴⁸⁸ Consequently, two years after the dissatisfied military personnel with the help of popular mobilization conducted a coup in 1965 to bring him back into power. On April 28, 1965, the United States army contingent, 23,000 troops strong was ordered into the Dominican Republic in favor of the loyalists to General Wessin to thwart the victory of pro-Bosch constitutionalist social democratic forces.⁴⁸⁹ The revolution in four months took the lives of at least 6,000 Dominicans.⁴⁹⁰ The violence of the revolution considerable for its small size one of the reasons

⁴⁸⁸ Conaghan, Catherine M., and Rosario Espinal. "Unlikely transitions to uncertain regimes? Democracy without compromise in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 22, no. 3 (1990), 560.

⁴⁸⁹ Wiarda, Howard J. "The United States and the Dominican Republic: Intervention, Dependency, and Tyrannicide." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 22, no. 2 (1980), 247-60.

⁴⁹⁰ Palmer Jr, General Bruce. *Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965*. (University Press of Kentucky, 2015), 137.

that the US used it to justify its intervention together (although its intervention was one-sided) with saving American civilians living on the island.⁴⁹¹

The principal rationale behind US intervention was to prevent the creation of second Cuba in the American backyard.⁴⁹² The constitutionalists were left-leaning, and their stance of the left spectrum had been exaggerated, and clearly their revolution was not a social one. However, due to the Cuban experience, and increasing losses to communism in the Third World, including difficulties in South East Asia to contain the communist revolutions. The Johnson administration considered expansion of socialism in the western hemisphere a severe threat and did not hesitate to contain it.⁴⁹³

The Dominican Revolution was not a social revolution, but it still generated threat to the US interests in the region and caused misery for the small nation. Thus, as predicted by the theory of this research the revolution led to a significant international tension or war. Walt's balance of threat variable is applicable to this revolution as one of the causes of war, but his window of opportunity variable seems to be irrelevant as the nation's CINC was not affected yet it experienced war.

4.2.2. Ethiopian Revolution and Civil War (1974-1991):

On September 1974, a military junta overthrew the government of the Ethiopian Empire together with mass protests. The junta adopted communist ideology in 1975 and was officially named the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia (Derg). The Marxist revolution established was a social revolution, a one-party authoritarian state that transformed Ethiopia by

⁴⁹¹ Palmer Jr, General Bruce. *Intervention in the Caribbean*, 250.

⁴⁹² Greenberg, Lawrence M. *United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations in the 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention*. (Washington DC Army Center of Military History), 1986.

⁴⁹³ Wiarda, "The United States," 250.

abolition feudalism, nationalization of industries, and introducing sweeping land reforms.⁴⁹⁴ These radical changes and red terror organized by Derg created a strong-armed opposition to the communist state that led to a bloody and protracted civil war combined with the foreign invasion that took the lives of more than one million Ethiopians in 16 years.⁴⁹⁵ The high casualties of the revolution with its long duration demonstrate the seriousness of the internal conflict and underlying factors such as exhaustion of Ethiopia and opening windows of opportunity for foreign adventure.

The Ethiopian Communist take-over increased the balance of threat as Ethiopia was major country in Africa and become a base for the USSR to spread communism to neighboring countries. Therefore, various countries supported and provided aid for the rebels, including, the US, Somalia, Sudan, China, and Saudi Arabia, to contain and eventually overthrow the Derg regime.⁴⁹⁶ On the other side, the Soviet Union, South Yemen, and Cuba provided extensive support for the fellow communist regime of Ethiopia.⁴⁹⁷ Somalia had for long claimed the Ogaden region from Ethiopia, where there was a substantial Somalian ethnic majority. Somalia took the opportunity in July 1977 to capitalize on the weakness of revolution-torn Ethiopia by invading it. The Somalian advances were reversed, due to Soviet's massive military assistance and Cuban expeditionary force of 17,000.⁴⁹⁸ Eventually, with the fall of communism in Europe and cut in their support for Derg, it fell to the rebel coalition in January 1991.⁴⁹⁹

⁴⁹⁴ De Waal, Alexander. *Evil days: Thirty years of war and famine in Ethiopia*. Vol. 3169, no. 69. *Human Rights Watch*, 1991.

⁴⁹⁵ Gill, Peter. *Famine and foreigners: Ethiopia since live aid*. (Oxford University Press, 2010), 43-44.

⁴⁹⁶ Schmidt, Elizabeth. Foreign intervention in Africa: From the cold war to the war on terror. Vol. 7. *Cambridge University Press*, (2013), 158.

⁴⁹⁷ Brind, Harry. "Soviet policy in the Horn of Africa." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 60, no. 1 (1983), 76.

⁴⁹⁸ "The Ogaden Situation." *Central Intelligence Agency*. Last modified March 20, (2012), 1. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190006-3.pdf>.

⁴⁹⁹ Henze, Paul B. *Layers of time*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 322.

This research's theory has precisely predicted the Ethiopian Revolution. The Ethiopian Revolution has met all the three variables. It caused much misery, was a social revolution and raised the threat for the United State's interests in East Africa, as communism was spreading in the region. The Ethiopian Revolution was prolonged and turned into a civil war, which caused significant misery for the nation. Somalia took advantage of the misery and long duration of the civil war caused revolution and invaded Ethiopia with the support of the United States. Walt's approach cannot accurately explain the Ethiopian Revolution. The CINC dataset shows that the Ethiopian capabilities remain untouched by the revolution and when Somalia attacks it even increases due to substantial Soviet support. Therefore, Walt's logic on this is questionable.

4.2.3. Saur Revolution (1978)

The Saur Revolution was a coup led by People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) against the rule of President Daoud Khan on April 27, 1978. The revolution took one day, but it created a long bloody civil war that has torn the country apart. The radical new government in Kabul started implementing its Marxist social revolution in the countryside with the intention of modernizing Afghanistan. The revolution that began by the military was soon turned into a mass revolution, although mostly limited to the urban middle class. Young and passionate Marxists from Kabul poured into villages and distorted the traditional society and began implementing PDPA's new policies, including land reform, abolishing feudalism, banning certain religious customs and establishment of literacy classes.⁵⁰⁰ Their efforts backlashed by the traditional society and provoked a violent civil war to be continued for decades and took the lives of 1.5 million people.⁵⁰¹ The civil war saw the extensive intervention of the belligerents of the cold war, with the Soviet

⁵⁰⁰ Dorransoro, Gilles, and Chantal Lobato. "The Militia in Afghanistan." *Central Asian Survey* 8, no. 4 (1989), 95.

⁵⁰¹ Sliwinski, Marek. "Afghanistan: the decimation of a people/by Marek Sliwinski." *Afghan Digital Libraries* (1989), 244.

Union stationing more than 100,000 forces at its peak, the US, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran providing material and training support for the Mujahideen.⁵⁰²

The civil war caused by the communist revolution in Afghanistan calumniated to the balance of threat for the Soviet Union. At the beginning of the civil war, President Taraki increasingly asked for Soviet's more involvement, but the USSR leadership was reluctant to intervene. The Soviet's opinion started to change when the situation deteriorated in Afghanistan and internationally. The PDPA was incapable of quashing the rebellion, and its army proved unreliable as was the case of Herat uprising, where the whole 17th division deserted and half of them joined the rebels in March 1979.⁵⁰³ In addition, the success of Iranian Revolution in establishing an Islamic theocracy at the southern borders of the USSR and western borders of Afghanistan had led to fears that religious fanaticism would spread through Afghanistan and then into Soviet Muslim Central Asian republics. Moreover, the failure of the Congress to ratify the SALT II treaty had deteriorated ties with the US and increased the insecurity and suspicion of Afghanistan's situation and the need for profound intervention.⁵⁰⁴ Importantly, the PDPA's leadership had proven unreliable under Hafizullah Amin, and the situation in Afghanistan had become uncontrollable. Thus, it sent special forces to Kabul and brought Babrak Karmal to power by conducting a coup against prime minister Hafizullah Amin on December 27th, who had killed the pro-Soviet Taraki and his harsh policies towards his opponents was increasing opposition to the communist rule of Afghanistan. Moreover, the KGB had informed the Soviet leaders that his loyalty towards Moscow was treacherous as he was in contact with China and CIA; and could turn against the USSR at any

⁵⁰² Grau, Lester W. "The takedown of Kabul: an effective coup de main'." *Block by block: the challenges of urban operations* (2014), 291-324.

⁵⁰³ Urban, Mark. *War in Afghanistan*. (Leiden: Springer, 2016), 30.

⁵⁰⁴ "Documents on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan e-Dossier No. 4. p. 70-75." *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*. November, 2001.

moment.⁵⁰⁵ After the coup, the Soviet Army sent the 40th Army to support the new leader and helped defeat the rebellion and was to stay there for nine years.

On the other side, the great powers of US and China wanted to use Afghanistan as a bear trap⁵⁰⁶ International Protection like the case of Cuba or a significant increase in the power of the revolutionary state like in China.⁵⁰⁷ Meanwhile, Pakistan, Afghanistan's neighbor played a crucial role in this trap with the help of Saudi funding.⁵⁰⁸ When PDPA came into power in Afghanistan and worsening domestic situation in the country, Taraki started publicly support for Pashtun and Baloch self-determination, to neutralize the increasing support of Pakistan for the Mujahideen and to divert its attention. In addition, as discussed by Dr. Schofield, Pakistan under President Zia ul-Haq sought to strengthen domestic Islamic values in Pakistan through supporting Islamic militants in their war against the communism and the Soviet Union to negate the socialist mobilization by Bhutto and the possible influence of the Iranian Revolution.⁵⁰⁹ The Saur Revolution turned the country into a playground for the cold war's ideological confrontation that destructed Afghanistan.

Walt's approach towards the window of opportunity. Based on Walt's framework, the Communist Afghani State convinced the USSR that the Islamist Rebellion in Afghanistan is a threat to its interests, particularly its Central Asian States. It could also be argued through his perspective that the Afghani Revolution provided it a window of opportunity to expand its influence on its southern neighbor. Table 11 demonstrates how the Soviet Union intervened at a

⁵⁰⁵ Coll, Steve. *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 44.

⁵⁰⁶ Yousaf, Mohammad. *Afghanistan: The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower*. (Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 1992), 159.

⁵⁰⁷ Goodwin, Jeff. *No other way out: states and revolutionary movements, 1945-1991*. Cambridge University Press, (2001), 4.

⁵⁰⁸ Bearden, Milton. "Afghanistan, graveyard of empires." *Foreign Affairs*. 80 (2001).

⁵⁰⁹ Schofield, Julian. "Diversionary wars: Pashtun unrest and the sources of the Pakistan-Afghan confrontation." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 17, no. 1 (2011), 44.

time that the country's CINC was going downhill. However, Walt's theory is questionable whether the insignificant CINC and material power of Afghanistan played a decisive role in determining the USSR to attack or not.




Table 11

The Saur Revolution met all the three variables of this research; consequently, it experienced significant foreign intervention. The revolution created vital threats to both US and USSR interests. It was a social revolution in a very traditional country, which intensified the conflict. Importantly, it caused much misery for the nation, which weakened and divided the society and allowed for foreign intervention. Long term internal conflict which this research has studied is a better representative of material power discussed by Walt, as power comparison could be irrelevant when comparing a superpower to a small power. In addition, the in-fighting could artificially increase the quantitative measures of a nation's power, due to mass conscription and military buildup. Meanwhile, the qualitative characteristics of a weakened country can be more accurately achieved through measuring the intensiveness of the violence and length of the revolution, which is measured by the misery independent variable in this research.

Remarks:

The popular coups tend to have radical orientations and be violent, long in duration, tend to turn in social revolutions and significantly affect the balance of threat, but also are highly likely to cause a social revolution. Therefore, as the cases have shown, they all create significant international tension.

Chapter 5 : Guerrilla Revolutions

Guerrilla revolutions became popular in the 20th century due to Leninist teachings, particularly the notion of vanguardism which advocated for the most ideologically advanced and class-conscious workers to lead the revolution and take arms against the old regime.⁵¹⁰ The revolutionaries often take control of the countryside and spread their revolution slowly to the urban centers and strongholds of the old regime. These types of revolutions often take a long time and embroil the nation into devastation. They could easily be spread to the neighboring nations as revolutionaries could also use bases in other countries and are interested in exporting their revolution. Therefore, a significant impact on the balance of threat is made, and there is a very high chance of outside intervention. This is also helped by the fact that outside intervention can also rely on the old regime capital and does not have to fight a whole revolutionary regime yet, which encourages it to act before the revolution succeeds and costs of confronting it increases.

5.1. Gilan Marxist Revolution 1915-1921

Gilan Province situated at north-western Iran at the shores of the Caspian Sea had become a gateway to Europe and center for commerce in the 19th century. Gilan due to its densely populated areas of heavy rainfall in comparison to most of Iran, the peasants could mobilize better and fight the authority. Gilan's mountainous and densely forests provided a suitable ambiance for Guerrilla activities. Thus, Gilan had become the hub for revolutionary activities.⁵¹¹ Due to its proximity to Russia, it was influenced by Marxist ideology. During the Persian Constitutional revolution close contact of Caucasian socialists and Northern Iranian Revolutionaries, Gilani activists became more

⁵¹⁰ Telleria, Gabriel M. "Vanguardism and the Vanguardist Organization: A Study of the Sandinista National Liberation Front and its Rise to Power." *Latin American Policy* 8, no. 1 (2017), 27-40.

⁵¹¹ Keddie, Nikki R. "Iranian revolutions in comparative perspective." *The American Historical Review* 88, no. 3 (1983), 579-598.

radical and forged strong bindings with the Bolsheviks from the other side of the border.⁵¹² The Marxists had rebelled in Gilan since 1915, and the Russian Empire and Great Britain had sent a 20,000 Army to quell their rebellion.⁵¹³ With the success of the communist revolution in Russia, the Marxist rebels gained strength in Gilan. Finally, with the Soviet Caspian Fleet invasion of Anzali that was being held by English and White forces, the people of province rebelled and announced a socialist republic with the leadership of Mirza Khuchak Khan and Ehsanollah Dustdar. The joint Russian and Iranian red armies chased the British soldiers out of Gilan and were on the way to Tehran. That the Soviet Union signed the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement and had to cease supporting the Iranian rebels. With the breakup of the Soviet officers from the Iranian red army, it collapsed and easily was defeated by the combined English and central Iranian army; and Rasht (the largest city in Gilan) was re-captured in 1921.⁵¹⁴

The Marxist revolution in Gilan province Iran meets all the four criteria to create significant international tension, and it did. The Jangalist Movement lasted from 1915 to 1921. Thus, it gave enough time for the foreign powers to intervene. It was moderately violent with the number of casualties of at least several thousand.⁵¹⁵ In addition, it was a social revolution as the revolutionary committee based on Marxist principles redistributed land and confiscated lands belonging to Mosque; and tried to change the social class composition.⁵¹⁶ Moreover, it created a considerable threat and if the movement would be able to conquer Tehran; Persia could become a base for the expansion of the communism across the Middle East and fundamentally threaten English interests

⁵¹² Dailami, Pezhmann. "The Bolsheviks and the Jangali revolutionary movement, 1915-1920." *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* (1990), 43-59.

⁵¹³ Shabani, Reza. *Iranian history at a glance*. (Alhoda UK, 2005).

⁵¹⁴ Behrooz, Maziar. "Iran and the Rise of Its Neoconservatives: The Politics of Tehran's Silent Revolution." (2009), 662-664.

⁵¹⁵ Zarin-Kub, Abdol-Hossein. *Roostgaran*. (Tehran: Sokhan Publications, 2012).

⁵¹⁶ Asgharzadeh, Ailreza. *Iran and the challenge of diversity: Islamic fundamentalism, Aryanist racism, and democratic struggles*. (Leiden: Springer, 2007). 86.

and British Empire protectorates and territories.⁵¹⁷ Therefore, an intervention was found necessary by great powers.

The Marxist Revolution in Gilan, Iran fits very well into the framework of this research. It was a social revolution, which produced a significant threat for the British and Russian Empire's interests. It took six years to quell the revolution and end communism in this northern province of Iran. Walt's theory cannot precisely explain the Marxist Revolution in Iran, as the CINC data does not change during the revolution, yet it gets attacked, which shows that the revolution does not have to necessarily produce window of opportunity to increase the chance of foreign intervention. Moreover, it could also demonstrate that great powers do not necessarily look into a window of opportunity when considering attacking a weak nation. Which makes the window of opportunity rather irrelevant.

5.2. Greek Civil War: (1944-1949)

The Greek Civil War is a new case of bloody and long internal struggles between the left and right with the beginning of the Cold War. During the German occupation of Greece in WW2, the communists took the lead in the resistance movement and a National Liberation Front (EAM), with its military wing (ELAS) was formed.⁵¹⁸ The civil strife started in the winter of 1943-1944 at the mountains between ELAS and National Republican Greek League.⁵¹⁹ However, further clashes were paused due to British intervention, and it mediated an uneasy peace accord. The extent of foreign intervention in Greece was very prominent.⁵²⁰ The Greek Civil War fulfills all the variables

⁵¹⁷ Zirinsky, Michael P. "Imperial power and dictatorship: Britain and the rise of Reza Shah, 1921–1926." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24, no. 4 (1992), 639-663.

⁵¹⁸ Casanova, Julián. "Civil wars, revolutions and counterrevolutions in Finland, Spain, and Greece (1918-1949), A comparative analysis." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 13, no. 3 (2000), 515-537.

⁵¹⁹ Sfikas, Thanasis D. *Reviews: David H. Close, ed., The Greek Civil War, 1943-1950: Studies of Polarization*, (London and New York, Routledge, 1994), 255.

⁵²⁰ Nachmani, Amikam. "Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece: 1946-49." *Journal of Contemporary History* 25, no. 4 (1990), 489-522.

for leading to foreign intervention and during its course saw extensive foreign interference, particularly in its beginning phase until 1946, when the central Greek government was consolidated. At its first phase, there were some 80,000 British troops involved.⁵²¹ The Communist uprising in Greece was a bloody and long one that took five years and left at least 150,000 death.⁵²²

The communist uprising led to a significant increase in the balance of threat. The cold war had just started, and the threat of the expansion of communism as a radical social revolution in the areas taken outside of the Soviet Union's sphere of influence was taken seriously by the western powers. Foreign powers were soon attracted to the conflict. Churchill was haunted by the danger of a communist take-over of the country which traditionally held a vital place to the British interests and security.⁵²³ The British intervention in the Greek Civil War on the anti-communist side determined the outcome of the internal conflict, as, without its interference, the Greek communists would have certainly won Athens.⁵²⁴ The US also provided massive military and economic aid that turned the tide against the communists.⁵²⁵ The Truman Doctrine implied a non-compromise approach towards the communist insurgents, which was to shape the following ideological revolutions during the cold war. Had Great Britain and the US not interfered and allowed a communist take over of Greece the communist wave could have spread towards Southern Europe and Western Asia. Thus an overwhelming intervention was required.⁵²⁶ For western communist parties, especially the Italian one that meant a warning if they chose the road

⁵²¹ Woodhouse, Christopher Montague. *The struggle for Greece: 1941-1949*. (Oxford University Press, 2018).

⁵²² O'Ballance, Edgar. *The Greek civil war, 1944-1949*. (London: Faber, 1966).

⁵²³ Casanova, "Civil Wars, revolutions and counterrevolutions," 520.

⁵²⁴ Baerentzen, Lars, and David H. Close. "The British defeat of EAM, 1944-5." *The Greek civil war, 1943-1950: Studies of polarization* (1993), 72-96.

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*, 521.

⁵²⁶ Nachmani, "Civil War and Foreign Intervention," 499.

of revolution.⁵²⁷ The foreign power's military support was mostly limited to non-combat roles such as training after they were able to establish the Greek government in 1946.

With the support of Greece's communist neighbors, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania, the communists were able to hold effective guerrilla campaigns against the central government. The Greek communists sided with Stalin in his quarrel with Tito's Yugoslavia in 1948, thus were deprived of essential Yugoslavia's support and were soon defeated afterward.⁵²⁸ Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had other fish to fry and was not concerned with the defeat of communist revolution Greece.⁵²⁹ As the result of post-war agreements between the USSR and Great Britain, the latter was to keep Greece as a sphere of influence in return for allowing the Soviets to have Bulgaria and Romania.⁵³⁰

Thus, the Greek Civil war, with its long duration and massive destruction, the significant balance of threat, and social revolution character fulfilled the variables of this research and accordingly experienced extensive foreign intervention. Walt's balance of threat and window of opportunity can also explain this case. World War II significantly weakened Greece; therefore, it created an opportunity for other countries including Yugoslavia and UK to expand their influence by supporting their preferred sides.

5.3. Cuban Revolution (1958-1959):

The Cuban Revolution is a milestone in Latin American history and not only has changed the region's trajectory by bringing communism to the Western hemisphere but also brought the US and USSR close to total war. However, it was the US intervention. It was limited to the

⁵²⁷ Casanova, "Civil Wars, revolutions and counterrevolutions," 523.

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*, 521.

⁵²⁹ Nachmani, "Civil War and Foreign Intervention," 490.

⁵³⁰ *Ibid.*, 496.

blockade, airstrike, and logistics for the rebels until 1962 that is level 4 of the conflict in this research. As the US pledged not to invade Cuba, without its direct provocation as the result of Cuba Missile Crisis.⁵³¹ The revolution was long in duration and started when Fidel Castro landed in Cuba in 1956 to start his revolutionary campaign, which succeeded in 1959. The revolution took at least 5,000 combat-related deaths, and 500 executions were carried out by the rebels, causing misery for the island nation.⁵³²

The balance of threat was not significantly affected in the beginning, and its social revolution characteristics started to gain weight after the revolution when Castro slowly started to implement his utopian communist society. When Castro's revolution succeeded in Cuba and deposed Batista's regime in 1959, he was not considered to be a communist and a threat to US threat, but instead, someone that the US could work with. The United States even provided support for Fidel Castro by imposing a 1958 arms embargo against the Batista's government and immediately recognized the new regime in 1959.⁵³³ Castro on 15 April 1959 went on 11 days visit and met Richard Nixon, the US Vice President. During his visit, he said: "I know the world thinks of us, we are Communists, and of course, I have said obviously that we are not Communists; very clear."⁵³⁴ Therefore, there was no US intervention in the beginning.

Only after Castro was consolidating power and leaned towards more radical socialist policies, the Americans started to allocate funds and plan to overthrow him, which led to support for Escambray Rebellion and Bay of Pig Invasion. Castro's increasingly communist tendencies,

⁵³¹ Fagen, Richard R. "Cuba and the Soviet Union." *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-) 2, no. 1 (1978), 71.

⁵³² Bercovitch, Jacob, and Richard Jackson. *International conflict: A chronological encyclopedia of conflicts and their management*, 1945-1995. (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1997).

⁵³³ Suddath, Claire. "A brief history of US-Cuba relations." *Time*, April 15 (2009).

⁵³⁴ Kellogg, Paul. "ALBA and UNASUR—The Emergence of Counter-hegemonic Regional Associations in Latin America and the Caribbean." (2013), 10.

nationalization of American businesses and industries in Cuba and extensive relations with the Soviet Union, had concerned Washington. The US support in these operations was limited to air support and logistics, thus level four of this study. In addition, there was a significant number of Cuban exiles in the US that had fled from Castro, which could have attributed to the choice of using the dissident as foot soldiers rather than sending American boots.⁵³⁵ After gaining Soviet support, Castro became bolder and through his universalist communist ideology said in October 1962: "Our revolution is endangering all American possessions in Latin America. We are telling these countries to make their revolution."⁵³⁶ However, the Soviet protection and agreement with the US to not intervene in Cuba, made Cuba an exception with a significant balance of threat at the back yard of the United States from which, it was immune to a full-scale attack.

The Cuban Revolution demonstrates the weakness of Walt's approach to revolutions and war. As the data shows the Cuban capabilities were increased due to the revolution. In the year of Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, the Cuban CINC had doubled thanks to efforts to empower the country, including purchasing foreign weaponry.⁵³⁷ Therefore, the case illustrates unlike Walt's theory relation between foreign intervention and revolutionary regime's capabilities is rather extraneous.

The Cuban Revolution is another example of how a revolution fulfilling all the three independent variables of this research can lean to international tensions, and in this case in particular, the world came close to a third world war. The guerrilla revolution led by Castro overhauled the society and turned it into a communist one that lasts as of today. In addition, the

⁵³⁵ Rodríguez, Juan Carlos. "The Bay of Pigs and the CIA: Cuban Secret Files Reveal the Story Behind the 1961 Invasion." *Ocean*, 1999, 78.

⁵³⁶ Brandon, Henry. "Attack us at your Peril, Cocky Cuba Warns US." *The Sunday Times* (1962).

⁵³⁷ Quirk, Robert E. *Fidel Castro: The Full Story of His Rise to Power, His Regime, His Allies, and His Adversaries*. New York: W. W. Norton, (1993), 300.

revolution took several years, causing misery for the island nation, with the year 1958, is the most intense year of the guerrilla campaign. Lastly, it raised a threat to the US interests when the revolutionary regime started nationalizing the businesses in Cuba and established relations with the Soviet Union. Therefore, it was natural that the US would plot against the Revolutionary Cuban Regime through embargo and then Bay of Pigs Invasion.

5.4. Indochina: Vietnamese (1955-1975), Laotian (1960-1970), and Cambodian Civil Wars (1958-1975)

Vietnam and Laotian wars are considered in this study, as they were revolutionary cases that turned into a civil war due to foreign intervention. The Vietnamese communists led by Ho Chi Minh supported the communist insurgency in Southern Vietnam and sought to unite it with its northern counterpart. Similarly, the Laotians and Cambodian communists with the help of Northern Vietnamese, China, and the Soviet Union were conducting their revolutions and at the same time gave the Northern Vietnamese a back door to infiltrate into the South.⁵³⁸ The US, however, did not stand idly and intervened to prevent the spread of communism in South-Eastern Asia, which eventually failed. The Vietnamese Civil War led to at least 2 million deaths⁵³⁹ and up to 60 thousand deaths in Laos,⁵⁴⁰ 275,000 deaths in Cambodia,⁵⁴¹ with at least 58 thousand American fatalities.⁵⁴² Vietnam had been in continuous civil war and war of independence against the French since 1945. The phase that is studied in this research started in 1955 when the revolution

⁵³⁸ Lipsman, Samuel, and Edward Doyle. *Fighting for Time, 1969-70*. (Boston Publishing Company, 1983).

⁵³⁹ Shenon, Philip. "Years After Victory, Vietnamese Communists Ponder How to Celebrate," *New York Times* 23 (1995).

⁵⁴⁰ Obermeyer, Ziad, Christopher JL Murray, and Emmanuela Gakidou. "Fifty years of violent war deaths from Vietnam to Bosnia: analysis of data from the world health survey programme." *Bmj* 336, no. 7659 (2008), 1482-1486.

⁵⁴¹ Banister, Judith, and Paige Johnson. "After the nightmare: The population of Cambodia." *Center for International Research*, (1993), 87.

⁵⁴² Hirschman, Charles, Samuel Preston, and Vu Manh Loi. "Vietnamese casualties during the American war: A new estimate." *Population and Development Review* (1995), 783-812.

started in Southern Vietnam with the support of the northern one that took until 1975, with the collapse of Saigon. This long period allowed for the US to slowly increase its intervention from arms provision to full-scale military invasion in 1964 (following the Gulf of Tonkin incident), that peaked half a million soldiers in 1968.⁵⁴³ The long duration of the guerrilla revolution in Vietnam allowed the United States to consider and plan a large scale military intervention.

The US campaign in Laos was more limited to aerial bombings on Ho Chi Minh Trail, while in Cambodia together with South Vietnam it sent 50,000 soldiers to destroy the Vietnamese bases there. However, the short-lived US campaign (3 months) did little damage, and it is argued that it strengthens Khmer Rouge by giving it a cause to recruit and heated the civil war.⁵⁴⁴ The Vietnamese and Americans were fighting each other in the civil war-torn Laos and Cambodia as the extension of Vietnamese conflict; thus, their conflict is not counted as an intervention against or in favor of Pathet Lao and Khmer Rouges. Their support for the insurgents and their governments was limited to advisory and logistical roles rather than direct intervention.

Walt's window of opportunity variable seems irrelevant in predicting the international tension for the Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian Revolutions as well. When looking at the CINC data (table 12), there is no relationship found between the US interference in those revolutions and a drop in their CINC. Only his explanation of balance of threat could help to analyze the foreign intervention in Indochina Revolutions, as the communist revolutions there gravely affected the balance of threat against the US interests at the height of the Cold War.

⁵⁴³ Kane, Tim. *Global US troop deployment, 1950-2003*. (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2004).

⁵⁴⁴ Sutsakhan, Sak. *The Khmer Republic at war and the final collapse*. US Army Center of Military History, (1980), 173-4.






Table 12

The US, particularly under the Johnson administration, strongly believed in the domino effect and danger of the spread of communism if Southern Vietnam would fall. The US policymakers took the universal and revolutionary language of Ho Chi Minh seriously and were afraid that his revolution would soon take over south-east Asia. Chinese and Soviet support for the North Vietnamese and spread of communist insurgents based on the Vietnamese model in Laos and Cambodia, strengthened the domino concept. Thus, there was a need for intervention to stop this social revolution.⁵⁴⁵ These revolutions took many years and caused significant misery for these Indochinese nations.

5.5. Congo Simba Rebellion 1964-1965:

Congo Simba Rebellion was one of the ideological revolutions during the cold war that attracted both superpowers, which was suppressed by November 1965. With Belgian and American special forces supporting the Congolese Government; and the Soviet and Cuban advisors on the other side helping the Simba rebels.⁵⁴⁶ The revolution took life at least 100,000 people within almost two years.⁵⁴⁷ The rebellion could not be considered as the objectives of the rebels was not to uproot the societal structure and, in many ways, they were traditionalists. While the leaders claimed to be influenced by Maoist ideology, the majority of the rebels did not hold such views and instead practiced traditional beliefs.⁵⁴⁸ This Guerrilla revolution affected the balance of threat and consequently, there was a rather moderate to significant foreign intervention in which, up to 1,000 foreign troops involved.⁵⁴⁹ Walt's balance of threat is applicable to this case, but the window of opportunity is not applicable as the CINC data show no significant change

⁵⁴⁵ Hunt, Michael H. *The World Transformed: 1945 to the present*. Oxford University Press, 2014.

⁵⁴⁶ Abbott, Peter. *Modern African Wars (4), The Congo 1960–2002*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, (2014), 18.

⁵⁴⁷ Oliver, Lanotte. "Chronology of the Democratic Republic of Congo/Zaire (1960-1997)." *Sciences Po*. Last modified April 6, 2010.

⁵⁴⁸ Abbott, "Chronology", 14-20.

⁵⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 18.

before the foreign intervention, nor Congo's capabilities as a divided nation in the 1960s were considerable for any outside power.

5.6. Dhofar Revolution (1963-1976):

Dhofar rebellion is a failed revolution by Omani Marxist insurgents. Although their revolution ultimately failed, they were able to control large parts of the country, particularly in Dhofar governate for years,⁵⁵⁰ where they enforced their social revolution by the collectivization of land-based on political indoctrination of Marxist-Leninist and distorting the traditional society, which caused discontent among a large portion of the population.⁵⁵¹ The revolution saw the extensive intervention of the Imperial Iranian Army (4,000 men), British Forces (1,000) together with the Jordanian Army (800).⁵⁵²

The Dhofar rebellion had significantly increased the balance of threat in the region, particularly for the gendarme of the region, Iran. The Shah's for intervention in Omani Civil War was primarily his concern over the expansion of communism in the south of Iran, and to avoid a potential surrender by hostile regimes. As it was facing the communist Soviet Union from the North and Pan-Arab Iraq. Importantly, as the name of the rebel group (Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf) suggested there was a potential security threat for other Gulf nations at the Persian Gulf if Oman was to fall to the revolutionaries.⁵⁵³ This fear was strengthened as communist South Yemen had become a base for the spread of Marxism to

⁵⁵⁰ Gardiner, Ian. *In the service of the Sultan: a first-hand account of the Dhofar insurgency*. (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2007).

⁵⁵¹ Peterson, John E. "Guerrilla Warfare and Ideological Confrontation in the Arabian Peninsula: The Rebellion in Dhufar." *World Affairs* 139, no. 4 (1977), 278-295.

⁵⁵² DeVore, Marc R. "A more complex and conventional victory: revisiting the Dhofar counterinsurgency, 1963–1975." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23, no. 1 (2012), 163.

⁵⁵³ Peterson, "Guerrilla Warfare," 286.

Oman.⁵⁵⁴ Shah's commitment to send 4,000 forces to suppress the rebellion shows Iran had taken the threat seriously. After Iran established relations with China in 1971, the latter cut its support for the rebels and Dhofar rebels were to fall by 1976.⁵⁵⁵

The Dhofar Guerrilla Revolution fulfilled all the three independent variables of this research and as predicted by the framework of this research this revolution also experienced significant international tension and foreign intervention. Walt's window of opportunity is not applicable to this case as well like many other revolutions discussed. Oman's CINC was increasing in the 1970s when Iran intervened; which, demonstrates that the logic of connecting a nation's capabilities to window of opportunity by Walt is flawed.

5.7. Angolan Civil War (1975-2002):

The Angolan Civil War started as soon as it got independence from Portugal in 1975, and the former anti-colonial rebels were divided into communist and anti-communist forces and started fighting against each. The civil war lasted for 27 years and caused 1,100,000 deaths.⁵⁵⁶ The long duration and extensive violence of this miserable internal conflict significantly weakened Angola and allowed for foreign intervention. In addition, the Angolan civil conflict was a social revolution in which, the communist MPLA⁵⁵⁷ were based on Luanda, the Angolan capital, and by contrast, the anti-communist UNITA⁵⁵⁸ were based in rural areas.⁵⁵⁹ The MPLA institutionalized the social

⁵⁵⁴ Calabrese, John. "From flyswatters to silkworms: the evolution of China's role in West Asia." *Asian Survey* 30, no. 9 (1990), 867.

⁵⁵⁵ Garver, John W. *China and Iran: ancient partners in a post-imperial world*. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011), 49.

⁵⁵⁶ Querido, Chyanda M. "State-sponsored mass killing in African wars—greed or grievance?." *International Advances in Economic Research* 15, no. 3 (2009), 352.

⁵⁵⁷ People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

⁵⁵⁸ National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

⁵⁵⁹ Stuvøy, Kristi. "War Economy and the Social Order of Insurgencies: An Analysis of the Internal Structure of UNITA's War Economy." (2002), 44.

revolution by enforcing Marxist policies in areas it controlled.⁵⁶⁰ This social revolution and expansion of communist in South Africa raised the balance of threat and [alarmed South Africa with its possible spillover to South Africa itself. Thus, it intervened in Angolan civil war to contain the “Soviet expansionism” and deployed some 20,000 forces for its war.⁵⁶¹ On the other side beside Soviet material and advisory aid to MPLA, 400,000 Cubans served between 1975 and 1991 on an internationalist mission either as military or civilian mission as teachers and doctors.⁵⁶² The Angolan Guerrilla Revolution is another example how misery, balance of threat and social revolution variables are crucial in determining the level of tension. Conventional wisdom’s window of opportunity is rather irrelevant like other guerrilla revolutions discussed since foreign intervention took place when Angolan fighting capabilities were increasing due to CINC dataset.

5.8. Nicaraguan Revolution 1978-1990:

The Nicaraguan Revolution was an armed overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship by Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in 1979. However, the fire of revolution did not extinguish, and US-backed right-wing Contras waged war against the new communist regime until 1990.⁵⁶³ The Sandinistas’ revolution was a social one that was inspired by the Cuban revolution and was ideologically Marxists that implemented radical land reforms and redistribution of wealth.⁵⁶⁴ The Revolution and its subsequent civil war caused 93,000 deaths in 12 years; incurring

⁵⁶⁰ Luke, Timothy W. "Angola and Mozambique: institutionalizing social revolution in Africa." *The Review of Politics* 44, no. 3 (1982), 413-436.

⁵⁶¹ Mashiri, Mac, and Timothy M. Shaw. *Africa in World Politics: Into the 1990s*. (Leiden: Springer, 1989), 208-209.

⁵⁶² George, Edward. *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale*. Routledge, (2004), 143.

⁵⁶³ Dore, Elizabeth, and John Weeks. "The Red and the Black. The Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution." *ISA Research Papers* 28 (1992), 1.

⁵⁶⁴ DeRouen, Karl R., and Uk Heo, eds. *Civil wars of the world: major conflicts since World War II*. Vol. 1. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2007), 50-53.; Tarrow, Sidney, and Charles Tilly. "Contentious politics and social movements." *In the Oxford handbook of comparative politics*. (2007), 185.

much misery to the country.⁵⁶⁵ It experienced heavy armament of both sides by the US and USSR as one of the proxy wars of the cold war era. The US also imposed a total trade embargo on Nicaragua that made the tension level based on this research to level four (minimal military intervention and embargo).

The Sandinistas revolution generated threat by creating another Cuba in Central America, and the US sought to contain them in the region (as they were supporting the Salvadorian rebels and, to decrease Cuban and Soviet influence in the region.⁵⁶⁶ Therefore, it provided extensive aid and training for Contra forces in their fight against Sandinistas. The US support for the Contras was a low-intensity conflict without committing American troops to keep the pressure on the Sandinista government to consume its resources and to make it repressive, which would eventually drive the population away from supporting it. This strategy was supplement by a trade embargo imposed in 1986 by the US that accounted for 30% of the Nicaraguan trade.⁵⁶⁷ However, in the end, Contras were more brutal and abusive of the civilian population that deprived them of popular support and coupled with Iran-Contra scandal the support for the Contras.⁵⁶⁸

The Nicaraguan Revolution fulfilled all three variables of this research. It was a long in duration; it was a social revolution and affected the balance of threat. However, it did not see a full military foreign intervention, but rather external support for the counter-revolutionary forces and embargoed Nicaragua. Conventional wisdom's theory is problematic in the study of the Nicaraguan Revolution. This is because it sees the international tension as a binary war or peace, which does not allow to study cases, like the Nicaraguan one that is neither peace nor war. The US

⁵⁶⁵ Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. "International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis." *American political science review* 94, no. 4 (2000), 779-801.

⁵⁶⁶ DeReouen and Heo, *Civil Wars*, 560.

⁵⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 556.

⁵⁶⁸ DeFronzo, James. *Revolutions and revolutionary movements*. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 213.

support for the Contras was the main driving force of lengthening the Nicaraguan Revolution, even though American soldiers were not on the ground. Therefore, it is crucial to have a theory that includes the revolutions that do not directly go to war with other countries, but instead in more subtle manners.

5.9. Nepalese Civil War:

The Nepalese civil war started as the Communist Party of Nepal with a Maoist affiliation started their revolution by launching “People’s War” in the year 1996. In ten years, they control over 90% of the rural areas and win the internal struggle for control of Nepal. A secular republic was established, and the monarchy was deposed.⁵⁶⁹ The 10-year civil war left 13,000 deaths; making it relatively not very violent for a long civil war.⁵⁷⁰ The Maoist insurgency did not create a significant balance of threat to India due to its seclusion and small size when compared to India. It was seen as a low threat local insurgency that could have a minimal impact on India, thus in the initial stages of the Civil War Nepalese India and the United States, supported the Royal Nepal military hardware and economic assistance.⁵⁷¹

The Maoist became more pragmatic over-time and dropped the goal of a new democratic revolution and a social revolution in favor of establishing a democratic republic in cooperation with other political parties. Their pragmatism allowed them to take-over of Nepal in 2006 rather peacefully. Losing territory to Maoists and nationwide protests compelled the government to dismiss the king and to negotiate with the revolutionaries. The Maoists and the government signed a peace deal; and agreed on arms management and elections for a constituent assembly. As they

⁵⁶⁹ Basnett, Yurendra. "From politicization of grievances to political violence: An analysis of the Maoist movement in Nepal." *London School of Economics (LSE)*, no. 78 (2009), 18.

⁵⁷⁰ OHCHR, UN. "Nepal Conflict Report." (2012), 3.

⁵⁷¹ Dixit, Priya. "The rhetoric of ‘terrorism’ and the evolution of a counterterrorist state in Nepal." *Global Change, Peace & Security* 25, no. 2 (2013), 172.

got the power, they ceased the use of original language and policies.⁵⁷² Their revolution proved to be no threat to India and other neighboring countries as the Nepalese Maoists were progressive and did not try to expand their revolution to bordering countries.⁵⁷³ The Nepalese case is an exception amongst the guerrilla revolutions as it does not lead to considerable international tension. It could be said that this case is an exception that proves the rule as it did not create significant threat to other countries and was not a social revolution. Despite its lengthiness, it was not an intense civil war. Walt's approach is applicable to this case as the revolution did not affect the nation's strength based on CINC data and the balance of threat was not significantly affected.

Remarks:

The guerrilla revolutions as their name suggest are highly violent and lengthy in their duration. They all except the Nepalese case (whose revolutionaries were rather moderate) are all social revolutions and produce a significant amount of balance of threat. Guerrilla revolution is expensive for revolutionaries; therefore, they often thrive with the assistance of foreign powers. They also often use neighboring countries as safe havens, where they can be safe from government forces. Meanwhile, as they fulfill all the independent variables of this research, they highly increase the international tension and lead to war. Another finding is that conventional wisdom's window of opportunity variable is irrelevant to most of the guerrilla revolution cases. The majority of these cases demonstrate that their national capabilities based on CINC data were either constant or increasing during the foreign intervention, despite what Walt suggested.

⁵⁷² Goby, Winne. "From war to peace: The Nepalese Maoists' strategic and ideological thinking." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32, no. 5 (2009), 430-33.

⁵⁷³ Pfaff-Czarnecka, Joanna. "No end to Nepal's Maoist rebellion." *Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology* (2005), 164.

Chapter 6 : Findings and Implications

Findings:

The quantitative study of the revolutionary cases through OLS regression indicates that the theory of research, namely that misery, social revolution, and balance of threat has a significant impact on international tension is a robust one. The substantial value of 0.087 for the adjusted R square has been gained after conducting rigorous tests to assure of negligible or no bias at all for the regression. Therefore, the model is reliable, and the model explains 87% of the variation in the response variable around its mean. The exhaustive qualitative case study confirms the findings. The case studies illustrate that the vast majority of the revolutions and their impact on international tensions have been in accordance with the theory of this research.

The misery is the most significant independent variable with the coefficient of 4.874 and zero t-significance. There is no revolution with high international tension and military conflict that did not have misery variable. The revolutions that cause more suffering and misery for the society are thus highly likely to see a foreign intervention. This is a variable that measures underlying factors that cannot be quantified precisely throughout history. The longer the revolutions take the more destructions and fatalities they can provide a window of opportunity for foreign powers to improve their position and protect their interests.⁵⁷⁴ The lengthier the revolutions are they also allow more time for others consider how to react. Revolutions that take overnight are highly unlikely to have as notable impacts, both on domestic and international politics, as revolutions that take longer. The revolutions that are very short in duration tend to be elite led, which makes the transition to the new regime smoother. The peaceful revolutions also tend to be short in duration,

⁵⁷⁴ Walt, "Revolution and War," Chapter, 2.

many of the violent mass revolutions were also peaceful in the beginning but government's decision to suppress them violently as in the case of Syria in 2011, they turned into long and destructive civil wars.

The social revolution is also influential on the outcome of the events. It has a coefficient of 1.093 and t-significance of 0.014. In fact, there are only three cases of high international tensions that were not social revolutions. These revolutions cause rapid social transformation and tend to end up in civil wars. Mass revolutions are the most common types of social revolutions as the studies of this research suggest. Similar to the misery variable, these revolutions tend to open a window of opportunity for other countries to intervene as the society is divided and in conflict due to social revolution. On the other hand, if the social revolution succeeds its likely that its ability to fight significantly increases and may encourage them to attack other countries, whom they find a threat to their revolution or in order to spread their radical revolution. This is because social revolutions boost the revolutionary regime's capabilities to mobilize the citizens and resources significantly for its war efforts.⁵⁷⁵ Therefore, there is a strong correlation between social revolutions and international tension.

The last but not least, the balance of threat also plays a vital role in this model, although to a lesser degree when compared to misery and social revolutions. It has an unstandardized coefficient value of .0829 with a t-significance of 0.043. The balance of threat measures how a revolution produces a threat for other countries. The qualitative study demonstrates that revolutions with radical and ideological orientations that seek to revise the status quo in the international arena would create a threat for other countries and move towards the direction of the

⁵⁷⁵ Skocpol. "Social revolutions," 149.

war. This is the most common for mass and violent revolutions together with the guerrilla revolutions and famous coups. Meanwhile, peaceful revolutions and elite coups tend to not affect the balance of threat, mainly due to their moderate nature. In the case studies, the balance of threat also illustrated a high correlation with the international tension with the exception of the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and certain peaceful revolutions in the post-Cold War era. This is mainly due to the absence of other independent variables. In addition, the ascendance of values such as non-interference and human rights in the international political arena in that period, which is outside of the scope of this research, was influential in the fate of those revolutions not creating international tension.

Alternative Explanations:

Based on the regression findings (0.87 adjusted r square), the model should explain 87% of the variance. The remaining 13% could be explained by other measures that were included in this research or were out of its scope. The window of opportunity could be influential for foreign intervention in certain revolutions. For example, the Iranian Revolution (1979) severely decreased the country's conventional war capabilities and created a window of opportunity for Saddam Hussein who was humiliated by Iran through the Algiers 1975 agreement found an opportunity to reverse the situation and potentially take over the oil-rich Khuzestan province of Iran. The window of opportunity is not feasible to quantify; therefore, was not included in this research. Leadership could also be another explanation. For instance, should there have been President Reagan instead of Carter, the US response towards the Iranian Revolution could have been stronger.

Values such as non-interference, peaceful protests, and human rights have become important in recent decades. These qualitative notions are essential in explaining why so many revolutions have not caused significant international tension as illustrated earlier in the case studies of Eastern

European Revolutions of 1848 and Color Revolutions. The creation of the United Nations could be another reason that explains lesser international crisis due to the revolutions in the last decades. Holsti discusses international order arising from peace settlements, such as Westphalian treaty in 1648, is the most influential in upholding the peace in international affairs. Holsti highlights the San Francisco Conference in 1945 that created in the creation of the United Nations Charter, which he discusses that mainly due to the strength of its mechanisms the world is a more peaceful world than ever.⁵⁷⁶ However, the inter-state wars may have been decreased as the results of the UN, but there are numerous cases of interventions against revolutionary states since the creation of the UN; particularly during the cold war era.

The world order could be another alternative factor. For long the notion of world order in international relations has been centered around the balance of power dynamics that leads unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar world orders. A unipolar world could decrease the war with the revolutions as discussed by 'Hegemonic Stability Theory' (HST). Thomas J. McCormick defines hegemonic power as a single power's domination of "simultaneous superior economic efficiency in production, trade, and finance."⁵⁷⁷ The HST suggests that the international system is more likely to be stable and peaceful under a hegemonic system than other world orders.⁵⁷⁸ A multipolar world order could be more chaotic than a unipolar one. Great powers could use revolutions as proving ground and use proxies or sent armies to change the outcome of the revolutions, like the Spanish Revolution in 1936. Bipolar world order could cause numerous interventions against revolutions. As it is characterized by intense rivalry between two superpowers in which a revolution for them could be an opportunity or threat that has to be responded appropriately. Kenneth Walt theory that

⁵⁷⁶ Holsti, Kalevi J., and Kalevi Jaakko Holsti. *Peace and war: Armed conflicts and international order, 1648-1989*. Vol. 14. (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 348.

⁵⁷⁷ McCormick, Thomas J. "World systems." *The Journal of American History* 77, no. 1 (1990), 128.

⁵⁷⁸ Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse. "International Relations." (2007), 107.

bipolar world is more stable in his writings⁵⁷⁹ due to their nuclear weapons. However, it could be argued that the world was so close to a nuclear war due to the revolution in Cuba that brought a friendly government to the USSR and hostile to the US.

Limitations:

The foremost limitation is that the study of this research like many other quantitative in order to measure the variables they are coded and evaluated into different categories. Variables that are used in this research are not numerical and although they are coded carefully and with utmost endeavors to be objective in the research. However, like other research, it can be subject to slight bias or subjectivity. Therefore, exhaustive qualitative research was done to test the validity of the quantitative findings.

Policy Implications:

Revolutions have a substantial impact on international relations; thus, in this part, a number of policy prescriptions that could contribute to policymaking based on the findings. As it was noted in this research the longer the revolutions take, they are more likely to cause international conflict. All the revolutions that were studied, which took less than three months did not create an international crisis, except for two cases that only caused very limited (level one tension).⁵⁸⁰ The longer the revolutions also take, the more violent they are likely to become. Therefore, it is recommended that in the cases of revolutions the UN should overpass the Westphalia limits and take a more assertive role and at the first level to prevent such issue from arising, strongly encourage countries for democratic reforms that would make revolution and unnecessary option. At the second level, it should mediate between the government and revolutionaries to smoothen

⁵⁷⁹ Waltz, Kenneth N. "The stability of a bipolar world." *Daedalus* (1964), 881-909.

⁵⁸⁰ Level 1 tension includes political and economic support for the revolutionaries or counter revolutionaries.

the transition. The worldwide pressure on the regime to perform a free election by international monitoring, when people are mass revolting could prevent political stalemate and potentially civil wars. This would reduce the length of the revolution, its violence and potentially contain its impacts on international tension and prevent other countries from going war with the revolutionary state.⁵⁸¹ By making the revolution a collective security issue that has to be addressed at the United Nations concerning the pro-democratic demands of the revolutionaries.

Foreign pressure through the use of extensive diplomacy and political conditionalities to persuade countries for democratic reforms and sending international observers for the elections is a preferred way of intervention. However, in extreme cases when revolution turns into an intensive intra-state conflict and genocide, a collective military intervention under the UN authorization to cease the violence.⁵⁸² Such as, the UNSC Resolution 1973 that authorized NATO to intervene in Libya. However, leaving the country by itself in chaos without helping it to rebuild a democratic society, turned into turmoil. President has acknowledged regrets about Libya and back in 2014 in an interview with Thomas Friedman, he stated that: “I think we underestimated . . . the need to come in full force” and “there has to be a much more aggressive effort to rebuild societies.”⁵⁸³ He counted this is his most significant foreign policy regrets. The Syrian, Yemeni, Ukrainian, and Libyan cases are a recent example of the international community’s failure to mediate in these revolutions that have made them into proxy wars that have had grave worldwide consequences.

⁵⁸¹ Regan, *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers*, 135.

⁵⁸² Schraeder, Peter J. "Tunisia's jasmine revolution & the arab spring: implications for international intervention." *Orbis* 56, no. 4 (2012), 671.

⁵⁸³ Friedman, Thomas L. "Obama on the World." *New York Times*. Last modified August 8 (2014).

Topics for Further Research:

The effects of world orders under hegemonic, bipolar, and multipolar systems could be studied on the revolutions and the international tensions that they create. Another approach to take is to study the role of international organizations, particularly by considering Holsti's works⁵⁸⁴ on governing systems. Revolutionary state, high power, and neighboring countries' leadership could also be studied, which potentially affect the outcome of the revolutions and whether they end up in a war or not. Warmonger leaderships like Hitler or Saddam could be more likely to get involve with revolutions and intervene. The research demonstrated that peaceful and pro-democracy revolutions are less likely to be intervened by foreign countries. However, what about the countries that intervene? Regime types such as democratic versus authoritarian could be influential in defining whether a power intervenes in a revolution or not. Extending the data on Gross Domestic Product data for every revolutionary country back to the French Revolution 1789 to see how the economic consequences of revolution may have an impact on international tension. Digging more in-depth on the role of Ideology, such as communism and political Islam on the relation between revolutions and international hostilities could also shed more light on this issue. Universalist ideologies like communism and political Islam could also increase the chance of radical revolutions that lead to international conflict. Diversionary wars could also be studied further to see if revolutionary countries would seek war with other countries to rally people around the flag and cover up their incompetencies at home?

⁵⁸⁴ Holsti, Kalevi J., and Kalevi Jaakko Holsti. *Peace and war: Armed conflicts and international order, 1648-1989*. Vol. 14. Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Chapter 7 : Conclusion

Revolutions are game-changers and have tremendous impacts on international politics. Revolutions tend to increase the chance of inter-state war, yet little research has been done in the field of international relations. Therefore, I was encouraged to discover the complex underpinnings of the relation between revolutions and international tensions. Several scholars whose theories were discussed at the literature review, including Kyung-won, Theda Skocpol, Patrick Regan, Zeev Maoz, Mansfield and Snyder, Ted Gurr and Stephen Walt have tried to address the issue of revolutions and their global impacts. However, their frameworks are not comprehensive enough to be applied to all revolutions and are often limited by a purely quantitative approach or a qualitative approach of only several most famous revolutions. For example, Kyung-won draws general conclusions on the relation between revolution and war from the French Revolution only. One of the main issues in studying revolutions and its implications is a lack of standard definition of revolution.

In order to select the revolutions from a large number of civil conflicts I relied on Polity IV dataset and Colgan's criteria which are executive power and selection; political ideology; foreign policy orientation; official state name; property ownership; gender and ethnic status; forces by people mass demonstration; and state-religion relationship. A political overthrow of the government should accomplish at least four of the above of criteria. In addition, to the Colgan's criteria, a revolution should also meet the regime transition based on Polity IV dataset. These two levels of filtering are used to make sure that the case selection is not biased.

The main concern of this research is how revolutions affect the tensions with other states. Therefore, the dependent variable is created to measure the hostilities level between the revolutionary regime. The international tension as the dependent variable is categorized into seven

levels, from economic intervention to full-scale military intervention that includes one division or 15,000 military personnel against the other country. It is often the revolutionary regime that falls victim to other state's aggression; except French 1789 and Chinese 1949 Revolutions. The independent variables were misery, social revolution, and balance of threat. The approach of this paper is a mix of qualitative and quantitative one to offset the weakness and disadvantages of each approach. The quantitative study was done by running an OLS regression that achieved an adjusted R square of 0.87 and the qualitative approach taken here by doing an exhaustive qualitative study over sixty cases of the revolution that confirms the quantitative findings.

The misery is the most significant variable with a coefficient of 4.874 and zero t-significance. There is simply no revolution that did not fulfill the misery variable and in other words took less than two months. The longer a revolution takes, more misery is caused, and consequently more destruction and fatalities that weaken society's ability to respond to foreign intervention and some would welcome it with the hope of an end to the internal struggles. The more time also allows other states to have the required time to respond to a revolution. Therefore, peaceful revolutions take a short time and experience little to no misery, while violent revolutions often take long and bloodshed, and most are faced with foreign intervention. The social revolution is the second independent variable in this research. Revolutions that have social revolution characteristic tend to end up in conflict with other states. These revolutions are very radical and are often not perceived positively by other countries. The balance of threat is the third independent variable, which measures the threat that each revolution creates. As the findings suggest, the revolutions that create more danger through endangering great power's interests or a universal language to export their revolutions are highly likely to meet foreign hostilities.

The history has not ended as Francis Fukuyama had suggested in 1992 as the last decades demonstrate; revolutions are frequently occurring, and humankind is still experimenting different types of political systems, and we are from the domination of liberal democracy or any other single ideology. The revolutions are part of today's world reality, and their continuation is inevitable and cannot be ruled out, but not deteriorating their violence and intensity can. Further studies on revolutions and international relations may strengthen our understanding of such complex issue and enhance the international community's ability to respond better to it to save more lives and prevent disasters like Syria.

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Appendix

Table 1

Model Summary ^b					
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	
1	.227 ^a	.051	.035	3.789	

a. Predictors: (Constant), CINC Change
b. Dependent Variable: TensionLevel

ANOVA ^a						
Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	44.355	1	44.355	3.089	.084 ^b
	Residual	818.493	57	14.360		
	Total	862.847	58			

a. Dependent Variable: TensionLevel
b. Predictors: (Constant), CINC Change

Coefficients ^a						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	3.779	.517		7.310	.000
	CINC Change	2.833	1.612	.227	1.758	.084

a. Dependent Variable: TensionLevel

Table 2 : Criteria for being Revolutionary Influenced by Colgan (should achieve four of criterions below):

1	Change in executive power and selection.
2	Shift in foreign policy orientation.
3	Change in official state name.
4	Shift in property ownership.
5	Change in gender and ethnic status.
6	Revolution succeeded by mass demonstration.
7	Change in state-religion relationship.

Table 3:

1	Economic support/embargo or effective targeted propaganda against a country
2	Logistics support and political pressure
3	Military assistance through training and providing intelligence
4	Air strike or naval blockades, or a minimal military intervention by a force less than 1,000 men
5	Moderate intervention by a force of 1,000 – 5,000 men
6	Significant intervention between 5,000 to 15,000
7	Large-scale intervention by a force higher than one division or 15,000 men.

Table 4: Balance of Threat Scoring

If the revolution has a universal message and is applicable to other countries. For example, the French Revolution that affected Europe and the world heavily.	+1
If the revolutionary country uses propaganda against another country.	+1
If the revolutionary state tries to export the revolution by supporting revolutionaries abroad.	+1
If the revolutionary regime is located within the densely populated areas of the neighboring country. For example, Rhine region between France and German States in 1789 which was consisted of densely population on both fronts, that facilitated spread of the revolution from France to German States.	+1

Elite revolutions create less threat for other countries as they are less radical and create less chaos.	-1
If the revolutionary leaders seek friendly international relations and try to deescalate.	-1
If there are political affinity between the revolutionary regime and surrounding countries or great powers.	-1
If it is a local revolution and cannot concern other countries.	-1

Table 5:

	N Statistic	Minimum Statistic	Maximum Statistic	Mean Statistic	Std. Deviation Statistic	Skewness		Kurtosis	
						Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Std. Error
duration (misery)	60	0	1	.53	.503	-.137	.309	-2.051	.608
socialrev	60	0	1	.33	.475	.725	.309	-1.526	.608
balance of threat	60	0	1	.77	.427	-1.294	.309	-.339	.608
Valid N (listwise)	60								

Table 6:

		duration (misery)	socialrev	balance of threat
duration (misery)	Pearson Correlation	1	.661**	.432**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.001
	N	60	60	60
socialrev	Pearson Correlation	.661**	1	.390**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.002
	N	60	60	60
balance of threat	Pearson Correlation	.432**	.390**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.002	
	N	60	60	60

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 7:




Table 8:

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.935 ^a	.874	.868	1.167

a. Predictors: (Constant), duration (misery), balance of threat, socialrev

b. Dependent Variable: Tension Level

Table 9:

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	531.342	3	177.114	130.063	.000 ^b
	Residual	76.258	56	1.362		
	Total	607.600	59			

a. Dependent Variable: Tension Level

b. Predictors: (Constant), duration (misery), balance of threat, socialrev

Table 10:

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-.411	.317		-1.293	.201
	socialrev	1.093	.431	.162	2.534	.014
	balance of threat	.844	.400	.112	2.111	.039
	duration (misery)	4.874	.416	.764	11.717	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Tension Level

Table 11:




Table 12: Afghanistan's CINC




Table 13




Table 14




Table 15

