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**Reggae borderzones, reggae graveyards**  
***Bob Marley fandom in Bali***

**Introduction<sup>1</sup>**

The road from Bali's international airport to the island's most renowned tourist area, Kuta Beach, leads past a number of establishments claiming affiliation to reggae music and Rastafarianism in large, appropriately coloured billboards. A sign outside a tee shirt shop bears the words RASTA MANIA within a green, yellow and red border, and a stick figure caricaturing negritude, the logo of this clothing label. In the window display hangs a tee shirt, and upon it Bob Marley's wizened face. His lips pinch a cone-shaped spliff, and he squints behind a veil of airbrushed smoke. A lean-to sign on the sidewalk outside Apache Bar announce REGGAE BANDS NIGHTLY. This barn of coconut wood and thatch nestles behind Wendy's Ice Cream Parlour and Chi Chi's Mexican Bar. Its timber walls emulate a rustic, spaghetti Western aesthetic and are adorned with portraits of native Americans. In addition to the reggae bands, nightly, Apache bar unites young Japanese women with local 'guides'.<sup>2</sup>

In other coastal resorts around the island, one finds other bars devoted to the nightly reproduction of reggae music. Sanur has Mango Sindhu, where Magic Voice strikes up at 9pm, and middle aged European couples take timidly to the dance floor in a valiant effort to dance off their dinner of pizza, chips and Bintang beer. Legend is a lonely bar in sleepy Candi Dasa. There, young men from all over the rocky precinct of Karangasem come to perform, to dance beneath the bar's feature Bob Marley mural to a disco-versions of Get Up Stand Up (For Your Rights). Lovina on the island's north coast has Malibu, which does a roaring trade every Saturday night when the reggae band from Denpasar is in town.

A Balinese reggae scene first emerged in the early 1990s, and centred on a beachside bar called Bruna, located in one of the island's main tourist areas, Kuta. Every Saturday night, a local Bob Marley and the Wailers covers band, Legend, played at Bruna. This event attracted a sizeable local fandom in which reggae was associated with an inclusiveness which, like preceding youth scenes which also centred on Kuta Beach, contested demonisation of the West in elite Balinese discourses of identity.<sup>3</sup>

By 1996, the Bruna bar had lost its license and the reggae scene had lost its core 'turf'. This early scene then metamorphosed into a later scene (as I shall distinguish the two scenes throughout this paper), and came to centre on a less regular event - an annual Festival. This Festival was a contest among bands, convened by the Bali Tourism Academy (*Sekolah Tinggi Pariwisata: STP*), the first of which took place in 1994. Local reggae bands were invited to compete for prize money, and the

opportunity to secure contracts with renowned live music venues in tourist areas, hence reorienting the Balinese reggae scene toward an event where bands vied for contracts with tourist bars.

This article pursues questions about reggae's curious transformation from a genre of music associated with Rastafarianism, a form of resistance devised by the slum dwellers of Kingston to protest colonial exploitation, to one which appeared to revel in and understand itself by looking to the tourist gaze as a mirror. Certainly, in the global marketing of Marley's music, transformations had taken place prior to its arrival in Bali. Nevertheless, as Balinese punks later demonstrated, it was possible for local youth to expropriate recuperated global styles, and use them to generate revisions of New Order official and elite Balinese discourses of identity (Baulch, 2002).<sup>4</sup> This prompts the question of what may have prevented Balinese reggae musicians from undertaking similar appropriations. The fact that, in the 1990s, alternate, non-official articulations of Balinese-ness were re-empowered in the local press only reinforces the urgency of this question, which I pursue in reverse, as it were – not through participant observation, for when I began to research this essay in 1996 the scene was already in its dying days. At the Balinese reggae scene's death bed, then, I attempted something of an excavation, and this essay is based on interviews with scene participants in which I urged them to both recollect an earlier, Bruna-based scene and characterise the later, Festival-oriented scene of the mid 1990s.

This essay begins with a review of reggae music's internationalisation as a prelude to my account of how participants in the Balinese reggae scene uniformly associated reggae music with tropical zones, tourist destinations and the beach. I attempt to locate reggae's apparent 'touristification' in Bali within the context of the internationalisation of reggae, and particularly of the music of Bob Marley and the Wailers, as already widely examined (Cushman 1991; King, 1988; Regis, 1988). I note how, when viewed in the context of these scholarly writings about reggae's internationalisation, Bob Marley fandom in Bali appears divorced from its Rastafarian, anti-colonial message. Furthermore, when viewed through a different lens, that of local Balinese and Indonesian identity discourses, it becomes clear that such labels scarcely contain the ways in which Balinese Marley fandoms were expressed, particularly among members of the earlier scene. Firstly, there is evidence to suggest that Bob Marley's international image fed into barely veiled criticisms of the New Order government. Secondly, once the aforementioned Bruna scene is positioned vis-à-vis local elite discourses of identity, it appears as a borderzone and a ludic fringe where young local men contested dominant notions of Balineseness, hence conforming to scholarly characterisations of Rastafarianism's 'original' message. Based on interviewees' recollections, I draw attention to similarities between the Balinese reggae scene of the early 1990s, Hetherington's (1997: 28) discussions of the role of Foucauldian heterotopia in processes of social change, and Warren's (1998a: 102) characterisations Balinese borderzones.

Finally, I explore the impact of state deregulation policies upon these 'ludic fringes' at Kuta. Specifically, I argue below that reggae's rationalisation in Bali may be seen

as evidence of the power of national centres and nation states to determine how people interact with global media products, such as Bob Marley and the Wailers' songs, by imposing developmentalist discourses and market logics, transforming the spaces in which youth seek to revise and contest dominant discourses of identity on the local level.

**International reggae: co-relations and routinisations**

*"The presence of reggae artists on the international scene has been a self-perpetuating Garveyist prophesy"* (Potash, 1997: xxviii).

On the event of his departure from Jamaica in 1916, Marcus Garvey is said to have urged his supporters to "[l]ook to Africa for the crowning of a black King, he shall be the Redeemer" (Barrett, 1977: 67). Two years earlier, Garvey and Amy Ashwood had formed the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in Kingston, which championed black pride and sought to unite a fragmented black diaspora under a single banner: "One God, one aim, one destiny!"

There is a direct link between Marcus Garvey and the emergence of Rastafarianism in Jamaica. In 1930, Haile Selassie, or Ras Tafari, was crowned King of Ethiopia. Garvey's followers in Jamaica understood this as a fulfilment of his prophesy that their emancipation lay the coming of a black king in Africa (Cushman, 1991: 31). Barrett attributes the emergence of Jamaican Rastafarianism to four ministers – Leonard Howell, Joseph Hibbert, Archibald Dunkley and Robert Hinds - who formed separate groups, all "claiming to have received the revelation that the newly crowned King of Ethiopia was the Messiah", and began recruiting Garveyites in the slums of Kingston who, by 1934, formed a "solid nucleus of Rastafarians" (Barrett, 1977: 82).<sup>5</sup>

The Rastafarians revered Garvey, but their 'dread'ful aesthetic (Hebdige, 1973) and inherent disorder (Lewis, 1994) was quite a departure from the Garveyites' fondness for the clean-cut military dress style and postures as displayed at UNIA mass rallies in the 1920s. Like the Garveyites, they identified as members of an African diaspora. But further to this, they cast Jamaica as Babylon to Ethiopia's Zion, and set about to unveil Jamaica's truly Babylonian nature by fetishising their alienated condition, thus inviting stigma. Their dreads accentuated and exhibited this alien-ness and, in Hebdige's view, suggests that the Rastafarians were "determined to reverse that insidious process whereby ideology perpetuates itself in disguised form (as 'common sense' etc) by evolving more radical and effective techniques of cultural appropriation" (Hebdige, 1973: 2).

In the context of this essay, Hebdige's (1973) account is particularly useful for his lucid interpretations of Rastafarian dress style as an important subcultural strategy, as well as for his cross cultural comparisons. In *Reggae, Rasta and Rudies* (1973) he describes Rastafarian 'dread' as an expression of alien-ness and a subcultural strategy with which to menace. In *Subculture, the meaning of style* (1979) he contrasts the Rastafarians use of 'dread' to dislocate from Jamaican-ness with the English skinheads' tendencies to embrace their working class roots. By contrast, he

argues, English punks appropriated Rastafarian dread and developed a 'white ethnicity', which 'gestured nowhere'. As the Rastas with their dreadlocks, the punks used this white ethnicity to accentuate and illuminate the conditions of their alienation. This punk-Rasta alliance shows how oppressed groups can wrest power from an alienating environment by fetishising alien-ness.

Demonstrating the black roots of contemporary white subcultures has indeed been a feature of a number of CCCS ('Birmingham School') analyses of the late 1970s. Chambers (1975: 161), for example, argues that as outsiders, black working class people "were in a better position than the white working class to produce a positive and coherent expression of their oppression." Such expressions, in his view, were subsequently taken up, redefined and emasculated by white, working class performers and musicians (such as Elvis Presley). Further, he asserts that the "oppositional" values "embedded" in black culture and black music "served to symbolise and symptomatise the contradictions and tensions played out in British working class youth subcultures" (Chambers, 1975: 165). Hebdige takes this line of argument further, and contends that, just as punks appropriated elements of Rastafarian style to effect alien-ness (Hebdige, 1979: 64), so did English skinheads draw on West Indian immigrant cultures to express a lumpen identity:

*It was not only by congregating on the all-white football terraces but through consorting with West Indians at the local youth clubs and on street corners, by copying their mannerisms, their curses, dancing to their music, that the skinheads magically recovered the lost sense of working class community.*

Hebdige, 1979: 56

In this article, I aim to demonstrate how, in spite of its role in bringing Rastafarianism to world attention, reggae music was not inherently subcultural, resistant or of the oppressed - characterisations suggestive of a sonic essentialism. Rather, reggae codes' discursive construction renders them amoebic and malleable, as becomes clear in the genres' global mediations. Indeed, reggae's recuperable dimensions have been thoroughly explored in a number of accounts of reggae's internationalisation. Some writers have argued that reggae's laid back nuances made the genre ripe for appropriation by a global tourism industry (Cushman, 1991). Others that as reggae became popular in the North, song lyrics were re-interpreted according to North American middle class progressive norms, which subsequently came to define reggae practice in and outside the Caribbean (Regis, 1988; King, 1988).

Below, I argue that similar appropriations indeed become clear in the Balinese case, and highlight the need to refrain from romanticising reggae by assuming its revolutionary connotations, as did former Prime Minister of Jamaica, Michael Manley, when he referred to reggae as the "spontaneous sound of a local revolutionary impulse" (in O'Gorman, 1997: 256), and Dick Hebdige (1973: 26) who has proclaimed that because it "reversed the established pattern of pop music", reggae is therefore "inherently subversive". By the latter half of the 1990s, to be a Balinese reggae musician was to aspire to the employ of tourist bars and hotels,

where musicians were paid to cover Marley and the Wailers' songs because they were inherently Balinese - peaceful and relaxing - in line with tourists' expectations of a Third World holiday destination. In such a context, surely reggae did not "escape the limitations of a Western aesthetic" (Hebdige, 1973: 26). Nor do I contend, however, that Balinese reggae practices, although rationalised, ought to be characterised as inherently 'recuperated'. Marley-related symbology was drawn into relatively distinct global tourism and Balinese populist discourses alike, and individual reggae enthusiasts experienced reggae fandom in multiple ways. Sometimes they embraced it as model, happy-go-lucky Balinese youths, hence welcoming tourists by identifying Bali with the image of a tropical holiday destination. Other times, they embraced Bob Marley for his capacity to liberate them from official, New Order discourses of identity, particularly for the peculiar ways in which these official discourses were expressed as they engaged with the Balinese tourism industry. Balinese reggae practices therefore attest to the refractive effects of reggae's internationalisation, and hence the genre's polysemic capacities.

### **The globalisation of Bob Marley fandom**

Originally, reggae music did not have firm political allegiances. As Fergusson (1997: 52) notes, it was only after reggae artist Bob Marley's group The Wailers "became the first popular Jamaican group to make Rastafari philosophies and Rasta drumming the main thrust of their music", that increasing numbers of Jamaican musicians also converted to Rastafarianism, and reggae became the primary medium for expressing their beliefs. Later, in 1972, the Wailers signed with Island Records, a London-based label owned by a (white) Jamaican Chris Blackwell. Between that date and Marley's death in 1981, The Wailers produced ten albums with Island, all of which went gold (Fergusson, 1997: 52).

Marley's success was politically significant in several respects. Firstly, it elevated the role of Jamaican music in the context of an international music industry dominated by musicians from first world, developed countries. Secondly, his lyrics articulated Rastafarian concerns – concerns of poor people, black people, slum-dwellers and colonised people. As a result, as King and Jensen note, Marley's success inspired the expansion of Rastafarianism within Jamaica (King and Jensen, 1996: 18). Further, on an international level, Marley's reggae brought Rastafarianism to world attention, and his music operated as an expressive vehicle for marginalised and underclass people everywhere (see O'Gormon, 1997).

Other accounts of the internationalisation of Jamaican reggae are more concerned with the question of cultural appropriation. For example, Regis (1994,1988) and King (1998) describe how reggae music, particularly that of Jimmy Cliff and Bob Marley, became popular among North American university students. Cushman (1991: 36) and King (1998: 39) both allude to the important role of Chris Blackwell, the President of Island Records, who signed Bob Marley, in the promotion and marketing of reggae in the US. Cushman observes how "[a]s the cultural entrepreneur Blackwell had realised when he marketed the music, Rasta codes, styles of dress, use of *ganja*, dreadlocks, etc., would create the social dissonance necessary to attract the attention of potential audiences." Similarly, in King's (1998: 49) view,

the forms of reggae that were marketed to American college students and young Europeans retained a politically radical content but were stylistically altered in order to appeal to white middle class audiences.

Regis (1994, 1988), however, contends that to begin with reggae was not politically radical as commonly alleged, but that American audiences read revolutionary content into the genre. In Regis view, following reggae's popularisation in the US, individualist values were grafted onto the code, erasing its 'traditional' orientation toward balance and collectivism. Firstly, reggae musicians such as Bob Marley came to be revered as superstars, increasingly distanced from their audiences. Secondly, oppositional themes, with which middle class progressives could identify, began to dominate reggae lyrics as "dichomotisation songs", which divided "the world into the virtuous 'progressives' and the wretched 'establishment'" (Regis, 1994: 46). Further, he argues, this middle class American reinterpretation was sold back to Jamaican enthusiasts, hence typifying cultural imperialism by re-exportation, whereby the developed world appropriates the cultural products of the developing world, then re-exports them in their altered state (Regis, 1988: 67).<sup>6</sup>

Balinese reggae was also exclusively focussed on Bob Marley and the Wailers' songs and images of Marley himself. In Bali, one rarely saw images of any other reggae artist, nor heard their music, and enthusiasm for reggae in Bali may be described as part of the global Marley fandom mentioned above. Certainly, the role of Chris Blackwell in the recontextualisation of Marley's music in its passage to Bali must also have been pivotal. However, the way Balinese musicians of the later scene described their reggae-related practices in the context of the local tourism industry typifies neither expressive vehicle for marginalised people O'Gormon (1997) discusses, nor the re-exported, culturally imperialist, revolutionary content songs that Regis mentions. Rather, it echoed the example that introduces Cushman's article. He cites the use of voice-overs inflected with a heavy Jamaican accent and distinctly reggae jingles became common in a number of American beer advertisements, one of which offered a chance to win prizes ranging from a holiday to Jamaica to "a varied assortment of cultural kitsch emblazoned with Rastafarian themes" (Cushman, 1991: 17). Setting out to explore how a revolutionary, anti-capitalist code ended up as part of an advertisement for American beer, concludes that:

*[T]he appropriation of reggae represents a particular case of a more general process of what Russell Berman refers to as the 'routinisation of charismatic modernism' in which charismatic challenges to modernity from the realm of culture are increasingly diffused" (ibid: 38).*

Reggae's presence in the Balinese tourism industry may inspire similar enquiries.

### **My Beautiful Kuta**

In the early to mid- 1990s, a Balinese regionalism began to emerge in the wake of important changes in the tourism industry. The central governments deregulation packages, vigorous promotion of Indonesia as a tourist destination, relaxed visa regulations, the growing importance of tourism in the domestic economy, and the

expansion of the tourism industry worldwide all contributed to the Balinese tourism industry's growth from the late 1980s. The boom led to the effective scrapping of the initial concept for the development of Balinese tourism industry, which placed strict limits on resort development, and its replacement with a more liberal, less regulative approach, locally referred to as 'mass tourism' (see Aditjondro, 1995; McCarthy, 1994).

Images by Balinese cartoonists run in the local press reveal that this nascent regionalist discourse, which contested accelerated development, commonly attributed to Balinese people an authentic 'low'-ness, in contrast to the (perceived) flashy, greedy, be-suited Jakartanese investors who allegedly enjoyed much of the tourism boom's spoils (Warren, 1998). Notably, in the articulations of Balinese identity that monopolised public discourse in the seventies and eighties, Bali and the West, but not Bali and Jakarta, had been diametrically opposed. But over the course of the 1990s, Jakarta indeed began to assume the West's former role as Other which serves to define the local self, and a 'regionalist discourse' began to emerge.

In spite of the clear Babylonian inferences of the way in which Jakarta was being constituted in the budding regionalist discourse, reggae's anti-colonial message appeared to have little resonance among Balinese enthusiasts. Rather, and quite at odds with a prevailing regionalism, when I arrived in Bali in 1996, reggae was being played to assure tourists of Bali's inherent peace. In interviews conducted at the beginning of that year, reggae musicians were most optimistic about their futures as cover bands in tourism bars, and Gus They's comments typify the attitude of many of his contemporaries:

*It's easy to find a job in a bar if you are a reggae band because tourists really like reggae. That's why, from 1994, we decided that Fatamorgana would be a reggae band. We play in hotels because it is really hard to record in Bali, there are no studios, or people who are expert at promoting a band. That's why we are better off playing on hotels. We seek a name for our band on the (festival) stage, then hope that on the basis of our performance at the festival the hotels will offer us gigs.*

Interview, 10 June, 1996.

As They's comments suggest, this was more than mere opportunism. It was an identity practice, for it influenced the way in which they perceived themselves as Balinese. Firstly, in the view of participants in both earlier and later reggae scenes, playing reggae covers reinforced Bali's image as a tropical, beachside destination. Rudi, who sang with the first reggae band to be formed in Bali, and was central to the establishment of Bruna as a reggae venue, recalled that "Bruna had potential because it was by the beach, had a tropical feeling like in Jamaica, so we painted it red, yellow and green and people understood that there was reggae there" (Interview, 15 June, 1998). Similarly, Agung Joni recounted thus: "My friend Wayan went to Jamaica, to the Caribbean, and found out that there was reggae everywhere there. He thought it was strange that there was no reggae in Bali, even though it's a tropical place too. That's good for the reggae music business." Musicians with the Marley



cover band Soul Rebel which, in 1998, had a contract to play twice a week at All Stars Café in Kuta, told me that “Reggae is big here and not in Jakarta. That’s because Bali is close to the beach [sic.] and reggae is associated with the beach, relaxation, the beach” (Interview, 16 July, 1998).

Secondly, in the view of musicians, playing reggae covers confirmed Balinese people’s alleged relaxed and peaceful proclivities. Soul Rebel musicians told me that “we like listening to reggae because it is relaxed, peaceful...” (Interview, 6 July, 1998). Notably, on this point, reggae musicians contrasted reggae’s inherent Balinese-ness with thrash metal’s inherent violence and foreign-ness. Riots had taken place at a Metallica concert in Jakarta in 1993, and in the mid 1990s, in the context of thrash metal’s official demonisation, growing numbers of thrash metal bands formed in Bali. Said They:

*Thrash music is not appropriate for Bali because it is heavy and promotes violence. We Balinese are peaceful, relaxed. Reggae songs can really be enjoyed, you can listen to the lyrics, the melody, isn’t it better that way?”* (Interview with the author, 10 June, 1996).

Rather than appropriated and routinised, however, I contend that the later Balinese reggae scene may be more aptly described as rationalised and hence recontextualised. Indeed, the fact that by 1996, the Balinese reggae scene comprised a contest, organised by the island’s Tourism Academy, and sponsored by ‘big capital’ tourism ventures, such as Hackett Bungee Jump, Waterbom Park and Bali Hai cruises (interview, Soul Rebel) is suggestive of rationalisation, as is the fact that reggae musicians associated playing reggae with as exchange value on the tourism industry’s labour market. Further, consensus among enthusiasts that playing Marley covers was about the beach, relaxation and getting a regular hotel gig suggests that in Bali, reggae-related symbols were not merely commodities defused of charisma like the Rastafarian symbols Cushman discusses, but had been invested with new meanings within the global tourism industry. Relying on Jamaica’s renown as a tourist destination and pre-existing stereotypical depictions of ‘non-whiteness’, in the Balinese tourism industry, ‘Rasta’ symbolised beachside destinations, hedonism, abandon and a Jah Jah Binks kind of innocence, as it did in other beachside tourist destinations all over the (developing) world.<sup>7</sup> Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that the sole original lyric, written in Bahasa Indonesia, I was able to attain from a reggae musician in mid-1996 is an ode to Kuta Beach.

*Walking on the white sand at dusk/ Relieves my tired heart/ Around me, the  
spray of the waves/ Enticing me to daydream  
From behind the clouds/ A ray of light calms my soul/ will all this continue to  
be/ will my beautiful Kuta be preserved  
My beautiful Kuta, even your sunset smiles/ My beautiful Kuta will I see you  
again*

*My Beautiful Kuta*, by vocalist for Fatamorgana, Gus They<sup>8</sup>

Reggae's commodification by the tourism industry appears akin to Hebdige's characterisations of the process of recuperation, by which "the fractured order is repaired and the subculture is incorporated as a diverting spectacle within the dominant mythology, as 'folk devil', as other, as enemy" (Hebdige, 1997: 131). Here, however, I wish to refrain from such judgements, reminded of Sarah Thornton's (1997: 201) charges that, "diverted by the task of puncturing and contesting dominant ideologies", the Birmingham tradition has "overpoliticised leisure and at the same time ignored the subtle relations of power at play within it."

Indeed, Balinese reggae practices included the kinds of subtle power plays that the notion of recuperation fails to grasp. It would certainly be misleading to cast Balinese reggae musicians as victims of capitalism and development, for could be argued that reggae's rationalisation empowered them to pursue careers as reggae musicians, which freed them from other more mundane options, such as unemployment, civil service, hospitality. Moreover, as I discuss below, Bob Marley's image and music resonated in different Balinese contexts in a variety of ways too, hence attesting to the fragmentary capacity of global mediations and the polysemic nature of localisation processes. In other contexts in Bali, for example, reggae symbols **did** seem to contain the "progressive" or "radical" elements that Regis (1988) and King (1998) identify in the reggae that became popular among North American university students. Further, there is also evidence that the survival of these progressive elements in Bali was not due to cultural imperialism by re-exportation, but to their resonance with pre-existing local political traditions.

### **Marley as folk hero**

As well as being a common feature in tourist bars, Bob Marley's face could also be seen in public spaces in the city of Denpasar, which attracts few tourists. Along with Indonesia's first President, Sukarno, Megawati Sukarnoputri, and Indonesian folk singer Iwan Fals, Bob Marley's face is among those most commonly stuck to the back of windows of *bemos* (public minibuses). Stalls line the outside wall of the barn-like building that houses Sanglah marketplace, and specialise in stickers and posters. Here, Apache chiefs are absent, as Iwan Fals, Mbak Mega and Sukarno are in Kuta. Alongside them, Bob Marley no longer symbolises hedonism in a beachside tourist haven. He is now a folk hero, someone who stands up for the little people. In these Balinese contexts, Bob Marley's image now does seem to support O'Gorman's (1997) abovementioned contention that marginalized people all over the world referred to Bob Marley in protesting the conditions of their oppression. Clearly then, the dichotomisation songs Regis (1988) recognised in international reggae resonated not only with American progressives, but in Bali, too.

By the mid-1990s, Megawati Soekarnoputri's *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (PDI: Indonesian Democratic Party) was fast amassing supporters in Bali, who cast Suharto as the antipathy of his predecessor. More than two decades after his death, Megawati's father, Indonesia's first President Sukarno, also became a potent symbol of a pan-ethnic, pan-religious, popular discontent with Suharto's rule.<sup>9</sup> Warren (1994: 1) describes how "the Balinese public has been inclined to accept the government party (Golkar) line and enthusiastically support the rhetoric of the

national philosophy, Pancasila, in principle – though never without critical attention to divergence in practice....” After the 1992 general election, however, she observed that

*Popular perceptions of the New Order government [began] to shift...as indicated by the growth in support for the opposition PDI party in the 1992 election. The PDI doubled its vote province-wide to 20%, but actually reached 40% in areas such as the village of my research, which sits on the fringe of one of the cinderella zones of development.(ibid: 1)*

Marley’s place alongside Sukarno at Denpasar’s Sanglah market reveals a telling, if not explicit, association, underscored by Made Arthana’s assertion that “the perception of Rasta here is that it is of the people, of the little people”, is also reminiscent of PDI populism, as is Agung Joni’s version of reggae’s passage to Bali and its local appeal:

*Bob Marley spoke a message which people could hear. About love, about God, and the need for a united humanity. Sometimes people like to proclaim their national identity, but Rastafarians are one race, one blood, one love. This is what I like about reggae.*

Agung Joni. Interview, 16 March, 1996

Marley’s status as folk hero appears to contradict Balinese Marley cover musicians of the later scene who complied with accelerated tourism development, and may be read as a faint echo of an earlier scene which was territorially rooted in Kuta – a disorderly, inclusive scene in which East/West, rich/poor, exterior/interior dichotomies were broken down. This earlier scene may be compared to both Foucauldian heterotopia – “counter sites... in which... all other real sites that can be found within the culture are simultaneously represented, contested and inverted (Foucault, 1986), and the Balinese borderzones Warren (1998a 102) describes as “ambivalent and ambiguous site of identity construction arising at the meeting places between equally complex spaces of past/present, tradition/ modernity, East/West.”

### **The Bruna borderzone**

Elite Balinese discourses of identity during the 1970s and 1980s cast Balineseness as the West’s opposite, particularly by “defining Balinese identity in terms of opposition to and threats from tourism” (Vickers, 1989: 176). The perception of tourism in dominant Balinese identity discourses as a force of cultural imperialism directly implicated local youth culture as a potential inroad for Western cultural pollutants, due to the perceived Western proclivities of global youth culture. In the mid 1970s, Balinese intellectuals authored a report in which they expressed concern that “that “...the way young foreign tourists are seen to mix freely has been quickly imitated by our youth...(among whom)...the standard of decency is getting very low” (in Universitas Udayana and Francillon, 1975: 745).

The Balinese reggae scene can be traced to the coming together of a Bali-based, Javanese Rastafarian and reggae musician, Rudi, and a man from Jamaica called

Sam. In the late 1980s, Rudi returned with his English wife and their child to live in England. Rudi frequently busked at Camden market, playing Rolling Stones and Dylan covers, often using guitar and mouth organ in typical Dylan style. Incongruously, however, his hair was dreaded, not because he was a Rastafarian, but because he claimed that cutting his hair gave him a headache. The dreads nevertheless brought him into contact with a local Rastafarian scene. Soon, he adopted the Rastafarian lifestyle and beliefs:

*One day a guy with really long dreads went by. A Jamaican guy. He said 'Hey, dreadlocks, natty dread,' then he said, "You follow me. What are you doing busking here? Follow me." He took me to a place where there were all these Rastafarian people drumming and chanting. It was full of smoke, everybody was smoking. After that, I never played rock and roll again.... I entered the Rastafarian religion. I used to really like eating steak and sate, and I gave up all that and became vegetarian.*

Rudi. Interview, 15 June, 1998

By the time I met Rudi in 1998, the strength of his piety had waned, but his dreadlocks remained. One thick pipe of matted hair arced rigidly under his chin, framing paper-y skin, stretched taut across a delicate jaw. He told me that:

*After returning from England, around 1989, I met up with Sam and we formed a reggae band together, called Jamasyah. There was no reggae at Bruna bar at that time, and it was very quiet. We injected some life into it. We took over the place once a week, as well as the catering. We printed tickets, and did our own promotions....(ibid)*

The role of Jamasyah's performances at Bruna in drawing increasing numbers of punters to the bar was corroborated by other musicians, but interviewees more commonly referred to the establishment of Legend band and their regular gig at Bruna, which took place after Jamasyah's dissolution, as the event which inspired the formation of a local reggae scene. Notably, reggae musicians' remembered the reggae scene of the early 1990s as an authentic core which held sway over musicians from the metropolis. In this way, Bruna was remembered as a site of pilgrimage, with nationwide resonance.

*Bruna influenced bands from Jakarta, like Slank who, after visiting Bali began to insert reggae riffs into their songs.(Gus Martin. Interview with the author, 3 May, 1998)*

*Many musicians who visited here to check out the scene returned to Jakarta and began to write songs in Indonesian, but with a reggae beat.(Rudi. Interview with the author, 15 June 1998)*

*Many Jakartanese musicians looked for inspiration here. Slank, for example, were heavily influenced by their experiences in Bali. They became interested in reggae music. (Cahyadi. Interview with the author, 8 July, 1998)*

Jakarta-based rock band Slank's song, *Bali Bagus*, included on the album *Kampungan*, sheds light on the nature of this centre-periphery relationship:

*Thank you my Bali, for your culture and your nature/Thank you for your  
beautiful girls/And the strength of your Balinese arak  
Watching the sunset at the beach takes away my weariness/Bathing in the sea  
eases my stress/Watching your girls dance is a sight for sore eyes/The night air  
of Kuta takes away my anger  
For a moment I forget the conflicts of my ego/Living in Jakarta, full of  
rules/Where saying or wearing what you want is forbidden/Where people  
whisper and gossip if I hang out with whomever I please*

Slank, 1992

The depiction of Kuta Beach in this song is similar to that of Gus They's *My Beautiful Kuta*. But unlike Gus They's song, the Slank track does not forewarn against the potential loss of a paradise, and merely celebrates their experience of the beach as an innocent, unregulated realm – a welcome contrast to the highly regulated nature of their metropolitan home. To them, Bali was the beach, a place of hedonism, and they experienced it as tourists.

Far from protesting the Jakartanese experience of Bali, local reggae enthusiasts embraced it. As evident in the above-cited comments, local reggae enthusiasts took pride in the influence of their beach culture over the Jakarta rock scene. This supports Balinese authorities' contention that tourism "reinforced the sense of cultural identity and pride of the people of Bali" (Picard, 1990: 43). But local elites are unlikely to cite influence of the Bruna reggae scene over Jakarta-based rock bands as an instance of cultural preservation due to tourism, for the Bruna scene was a far cry from any elite discourses on authentic Balineseness, which rarely reify *arak*-drinking as a favourable aspect of Balinese masculinity. Indeed, the way in which enthusiasts recalled the Bruna scene suggests that the bar was able to serve as a kind of free zone, where behaviour could be cut loose from the demands of cultural preservation. This further suggests that tourists and locals may have had quite different understandings of reggae's significance in the context of tourism. In contrast to the dominant local discourses of identity, which sought to uphold Baliness as unique, reggae enthusiasts pinned the authenticity of the Bruna scene to a cosmopolitan inclusiveness and the dissolution of racial and socio-economic divisions. There, the experience of marginality or Otherness was exacerbated through the liberal use of *ganja*.

*Bruna was an easygoing place. Anyone was welcome there.* (Agung Alit and Ngurah Karyadi. interview with the author, 25 June, 1998)

*There were all sorts at Bruna, beach boys, fishermen, and even millionaires.* (Gus Martin. interview with the author, 3 May, 1998)

*Japanese, Americans, Australians, black people, everybody came together there, that was the good thing about the Bruna reggae club.* (Rudi . interview with the author, 15 June, 1998)

*You could smoke joints freely at Bruna, that's why so many people went there.* (Soul Rebel, interview with the author, 16 July, 1998)

These reggae enthusiasts did not appear to be concerned, as were Balinese academics cited above, that their “standard of decency [was] getting very low” (in Francillon and Universitas Udayana, 1975: 745). Indeed, some recent discussions of Balinese identity intimate that the singularity of public/official discourse during the 1970s and 1980s did not represent consent, but rather papered over more critical and innovative formulations. Warren (1998) , for example, cites Bali as a prime instance of the kind of cultural borderzone in which “invented” dichotomies, such as past/present, East/West, traditional/modern, converge, giving rise to ambiguous and ambivalent meanings. As such, she argues, these cultural borderzones become important sites for identity construction and revision. In a similar vein, adopting the Foucauldian (1986) term, heterotopia, Hetherington (1997: 107-8) has argued that marginal space assumes “social centrality” in the formation and performance of expressive identities. Like Warren’s borderzones, Hetherington’s margins “are not things pushed to the edge, they can also be in-between spaces, spaces of traffic, right at the centre of things”. Warren presents the example of the important role of ‘traditional’ Balinese *dalangs* (shadow puppeteers) in identity revisions, for they, too, occupy one such borderzone which marks the meeting of the this- and other-worldly.

Warren’s (1998: 101) conclusion that “[i]n Bali, the ambivalent and heteroglossic magic-real cultural domain is profoundly connected to the Balinese constructions of identity and difference” does not apply to the reggae scene in the early nineties. That is, the Magic Real domain, *niskala*, did not feature in Balinese reggae enthusiasts’ recollections of the scene in the early 1990s. But the way in which they described the space in which a reggae scene first emerged is nonetheless similar to the borderzones she describes.

Above, I differentiated between two different local conceptions of Bob Marley. In beachside tourist destinations across the world, he signaled hedonism, peace and relaxation, and indeed Balinese enthusiasts uniformly subscribed to this view. In certain Balinese contexts, however, to the very same enthusiasts, far from being a hedonist, Marley, like Iwan Fals, Mbak Mega and Sukarno, represented justice and courage; somebody who stood up for the ‘little people’. Therefore, like that of Warren’s *dalang* (puppetmaster), practices associated with reggae fandom in Bali in the early 1990s were similarly heteroglossic. That is, as tourists flocked to hear reggae bands play, and locals revelled in the nascent reggae scene, different readings of reggae-related symbolism converged at Bruna bar. Furthermore, the location of Bruna bar by the beach appeared to blur the distinction between exteriority and interiority, which was also aided by the fact that, up until 1995, entry was free. In short, according to the above-cited comments, anyone and everyone ebbed and flowed through Bruna’s doors, and as local and tourist understandings of

'reggaeness' converged, so did other, parallel, dichotomies: East/West; centre/periphery; rich/poor. In this way, Bruna indeed recalls Warren's borderzones, for it harboured experiences of Marley fandom suggestive of local critical responses to New Order developmentalism, and a global space on the fringes of local elite constructions of the Balinese identity.

A number of cultural geographers (Keith and Pile, 1993; Bell and Valentine, 1995; Pile and Thrift, 1995; Shields, 1991) have also drawn attention to the importance of margins in cultural critique and acts of resistance. Hetherington (1997) provides a thoroughgoing critique of a tendency among such writers to valorise the margins by depicting them as sanctuaries of transgression, and oases of carnivalism. He explores the role of heterotopia, in which order, control and discipline co-exist with resistance (to order), in the progressive constitution of modernity. Although Warren does not refer to Hetherington's work, her borderzones may also be viewed as heterotopic for their ambivalent dimensions. Moreover, both aptly describe the Bruna bar of the early 1990s which harboured a nascent reggae scene. In this way, the case of reggae's development in Bali supports Hetherington's argument for the need to recognise the importance of ambivalent spaces in accommodating identity revisions, yet refrain from romanticising their subversive potential. Similarly, the Bruna reggae scene was marginal, but not necessarily transgressive or subversive.

Nevertheless, ambivalent spaces can also be erased by developmentalist notions of progress. Lewis (1994) infers as much in his discussion of how spontaneity and trickery among the Jamaican Rastafarians were obliterated by a market logic. Warren (1998) also provides examples of how monologic modernity can obliterate Balinese magic-real domains' heteroglossies. Similarly, the fate of the Bruna reggae scene is also revealing of the importance of refraining from over-estimating locals' capacity to draw global media products into their own, self-determined identity practices. The fate of the Balinese reggae scene, like that of the graveyard Warren discusses, is testimony to the power of state discourses to obliterate such heteroglossies by physically transforming local landscapes, and hence the very tenuous position of the ambivalent spatial discourses that harbour identity revisions.

### **The reggae graveyard**

Picard notes how, although Kuta was included as a designated tourism zone in the first development plan for Bali, its development "long remained anarchistic, without control or direction of any sort" (Picard, 1996: 77). In the 1970s, locals established small-scale ventures which accommodated foreign surfers who favoured the area's local flavour over Nusa Dua's resorts (see Neely, 1998). As argued above, enthusiasts' accounts of changes in the reggae scene suggest that up until the 1990s, Kuta provided young Balinese men with a space on the fringes of local society; a margin or borderzone where liminal behaviour was sanctioned. After the investment boom, Kuta was transformed from a place where locals could mix freely with foreign tourists, to a playground for domestic tourists from Jakarta from which young local men were largely marginalised.

If previously, local enthusiasts had prided the Bruna scene's influence over Jakartan rock bands, by the mid-1990s, the reggae scene was being ordered by 'Big Capital' commercial interests. Over the course of 1995, the Bruna scene underwent demise. This was probably less due to the institution of a Rp 10,000 a door charge - former vocalist with Legend, Frit, maintained that the charge was not applied to local regulars - than the construction of a tarmac-ed esplanade which forced Bruna back from the shore. Frit maintained that the latter was more important in reducing Bruna's accessibility to a broad variety of people, hence attesting to the importance of the beach as a borderzone which blurred distinctions between interiority and exteriority, hence helped maintained Bruna's heterotopic qualities. Furthermore, in 1996, Bruna was closed down after local police allegedly found that it did not have the proper licence (Tiga, 1996; Setelah, 1996; Diskotek, 1996; Di, 1996). Henceforth, the Balinese reggae scene became an annual festival in which bands competed for contracts in tourist bars, organised by the Nusa Dua based Tourism Academy, and sponsored by Waterbom Park, Hacket Bungee Jump, a Nusa Dua Hotel and Bali Hai day cruises.

Bruna's closure may not have had such dire consequences, had local reggae enthusiasts been able to move elsewhere. By that time, however, Kuta had been considerably transformed from the place it was in the late 1980s, when Sam and Rudi's reggae parties had spawned a local fandom, to a kind of supercultural wonderland, replete with malls, plazas, multinational brand name clothing stores and fast food chains. Local night life also came to be dominated by such international chains, such as Hard Rock Cafe and Studebakers, and local youth were marginalised by the widespread introduction of cover charges.

Kuta's transformation, and its night life's, can be seen as part of similar transformations of the whole island over the same 'tourism boom' period, during which the initial concept for the development of Bali's tourism industry was effectively scrapped, and replaced with a more liberal, less regulative approach, locally referred to as 'mass tourism' (as opposed to cultural tourism). The original plan for Bali limited resort development to Nusa Dua in southern Bali and designated thirteen 'stop-overs' which tourists could visit on day trips or to stay at locally run homestays. The local bureaucracy adopted this concept, Cultural Tourism, which endeavoured both to protect Balinese culture from, and involve it in tourism. While the heart of the industry would be in south Bali, the 'stop-overs' theoretically allowed for other districts to partake in some of tourism's projected benefits. In 1988, Bali's third New Order Governor, Ida Bagus Oka, issued a decree that allowed for resort development in fifteen tourism zones located all over the island, and in 1993 a further decree which increased the number of tourism zones to 21 (Statistik Pariwisata, 1993; McCarthy, 1994).

In this context, the aforementioned regionalist discourse was given focus by the emergence of opposition movements to two development projects in the early 1990s. Firstly, a major Jakarta-based conglomerate, the Bakrie Group, made plans to construct a luxury resort (Bakrie Nirwana Resort: BNR), including a golf course, adjacent to an important temple, Tanah Lot, on the island's south west



coast. Subsequently, in 1994 the local daily, the *Bali Post*, published a series of debates on the issue, and locals staged a number of street demonstrations, which protested the construction of the golf course and were “unprecedented since the 1960s” (Suasta and Connor, 1999: 98; see also Warren, 1994; 1998). The second project included plans to construct a statue of the Garuda and a Hindu theme park -- a ‘megacomplex’ that was to dominate the heavily touristed southern peninsula. Citing the following letter to the *Bali Post*, Warren (1995: 387) describes an emerging environmentalism in Bali – “an attempt to resist the combined mega-forces of Big Capital and Central Government in Indonesia of the Late New Order”:

*[It is] too big and will give the impression of overacting (...). Bali is small (...). Don't... don't have Bali's future drowned with the coming of a statue which does not sit in harmony with an environment that is full of simplicity. (ibid: 382)*

Similarly, reggae enthusiasts who had been part of the earlier scene understood the closure of Bruna in 1996 in the context of the marginalisation of local entrepreneurs and other local interests, by the investment interests of the Suharto family and their associates, who were closely involved in the ‘booming’ Balinese tourism industry (Aditjondro, 1995). Indeed, it was rumoured that the five longstanding nightclubs to be closed down in 1996 were to make way for Jakartan competitors, and in October, 1996, the governor of the province decreed that only five star hotels would be allowed to operate discotheques, in the interests of community order and safety (*kamtibmas: keamanan dan ketertiban masyarakat*) (Diskotek, 1996; Buntut, 1996; Setelah, 1996).

If previously, local enthusiasts had prided the Bruna scene’s influence over Jakartan rock bands, by the mid-1990s, the reggae scene was being ordered by ‘Big Capital’ commercial interests, such as the Nusa Dua based Tourism Academy, and sponsored by Waterbom Park, Hacket Bungee Jump, a Nusa Dua Hotel and Bali Hai day cruises, all of which sponsored the annual reggae ‘festival’ (Soul Rebel, Interview 16 July 1998). Indeed, in the late 1990s, *lomba* (competitions) became a common mode by which the New Order state attempted to impose social order, as evident in other realms as well as the music scene. Warren, for example, refers to the ‘New Ordering’ of space in Bali by way of cleanliness competitions. In particular, she discusses the fate of the Ubud graveyard when subjected to one such ‘tidy town’ *lomba*, much to locals’ chagrin. She also cites this as an example of the impact of a “monologic” modernity upon “heteroglossic magic-real cultural domain”.

*As an illustration Gusti Ngurah was making about the great debates on globalization and modernity which currently raged, he pointed across the path and waving his finger with a mocking gesture said: ‘Look, can you believe it! Now we even have “lomba kuburan” [graveyard competitions]. Look at the result!’ Suddenly the blank uninterested expression on Ida Bagus Made’s face*

*was replaced with a fiery one and he joined in with a derisory tirade mixing anger and laughter.*

*...[The] gesture was too much for both of them. It was no longer 'natural' (alam), like a 'hotel', it had lost its aesthetic (kurang seni) and its magical enchantment (angker).*

Warren, 1998: 100

In certain respects, the fate of Bruna's borderzone was similar to that of the Ubud graveyard. For example, if Ubud locals critiqued the development of their graveyard, now seen as "no longer 'natural' (*alam*)", many reggae enthusiasts lamented the loss Bruna's cosmopolitan, inclusive space:

*Reggae has been commercialised. Many good musicians play in reggae bands, but there is no place for them, so they just play covers in the commercial sector. Bruna offered a place which was not commercial, because anyone could go there. Market demands are now withering away reggae musicians' idealism. (Frit. interview with the author, 3 July, 1998)*

*Nowadays, we are flooded with Jakartan culture. Jakartan people now determine our culture of leisure. (Agung Alit and Ngurah Karyadi. interview with the author, 25 June, 1998)*

*Bruna was a far cry from the Hard Rock Café of today. It catered more to the lower classes. At Bruna, locals and Westerners came together. Bruna catered more for the lower classes than does Hard Rock Café. This is in line with the way in which people perceived the Rastafarian movement; that it was for the people. (Made Arthana. interview with the author, 4 October, 1998)*

*[In comparison to Bruna], Hard Rock is too high class. Lower class people can't go there. (Soul Rebel. interview with the author, 16 July, 1998)*

Further, if local Ubud bureaucrats successfully tamed the town's 'wild' areas with concrete and walls, the reggae scene was similarly ordered. Now, beneath the auspices of the Tourism Academy, the bands competed for contracts in bars where they were to labour, as tourists' entertainers.

Other writers also provide examples of how marginal identities and spaces can become appropriated, subsumed beneath modernity's trademark rationality. Lewis (1994) highlights elusion and trickery as an important subcultural strategy among Rastafarians -- he refers to the Rastas as tricksters who resist the codifying urges of modern society through ludic means. Lewis also draws attention to the way in which Rastafarians sought to profit from reggae's international popularity, and improved their image in elite discourses of Jamaican identity, which now accepted the Rastafarians as authentic Jamaicans. Far from viewing this as evidence of Rastafarians' empowerment, however, Lewis argues that their involvement in the tourist trade signaled the erasure of the Rastafarians' characteristic trickery and its replacement with a rational modernity.

Ruddick's observations of the correlations between marginal spaces and the emergence of novel identities among youth also recall the rationalization of the Balinese reggae scene following Bruna's demise. She contends that the relative longevity of the squatting punk sub-culture in Hollywood "was partly due to the ready availability of condemned buildings for use and, initially, clubs to play in. But the erosion of quality marginal space and the transformation of the subculture went hand in hand" (Ruddick, 1998: 349)

The fate of the Balinese reggae scene attests, therefore, to the need to refrain from overestimating reggae's polysemic capacities. Like the Hollywood punks of which Ruddick (1998) writes, Balinese reggae fans retained ambiguous and marginal dimensions as long as enthusiasts could come together in a space approximating heterotopia, or borderzones. After the demise of the Bruna scene, playing reggae became unequivocally associated with an exchange value on the tourism industry's labour market. This exchange value rested on musicians' compliance with the industry's demands (such as playing covers' according to employers' stipulations), and in this way contrasted an emerging regionalist discourse in which Balinese-ness was becoming aligned with increasing opposition to the industry's new development direction. Nevertheless, those who aspired to or secured jobs on that market associated that exchange value with certain 'essentially Balinese' qualities, such as peace and relaxation, hence generating a new kind of reggae authenticity, which musicians highlighted by way of Othering 'violent, un-Balinese' thrash music. Other enthusiasts, cited above, indeed lamented reggae's so-called 'commercialisation', thus contested this new authenticity. In spite of such apparent contestations among enthusiasts, in the late 1990s, after the demise of the Bruna scene, reggae practice in Bali appears to have been notably recontextualised and, indeed, rationalised.

## **Conclusion**

*Reggae itself is polymorphous – and to concentrate on one component at the expense of all others involves a reduction of what are complex cultural processes. Thus, reggae is transmogrified American soul, with an overlay of salvaged African rhythms, and an undercurrent of pure Jamaican rebellion. Reggae is transplanted Pentecostal. Reggae is the Rasta hymnal, the heartcry of the Kingston rude boy, the nativised national anthem of the new Jamaican government The music is all these things and more – a mosaic which incorporates all the strands that make up black Jamaican culture; the call and response patterns of the Pentecostal Church, the devious scansion of Jamaican street talk, the sex and the cool of U.S. R and B, the insistent percussion of the locksmen's jam sessions, all find representation in reggae.*

Hebdige (1973: 18)

This essay has argued that Balinese reggae was indeed polymorphous. However, it was neither necessarily of oppressed people nor expressive of marginalization, as Hebdige's description of Jamaican reggae's component parts infer. In fact, in many respects, Balinese reggae enthusiasts' unanimity on reggae's 'beachside, relaxing'

nuances are suggestive of the scene's roots in the kind of reggae Cushman describes as a commodity of the tourism industry. At the same time, I have argued, when commodified versions of Bob Marley symbology became drawn into local discourses, it presented young Balinese men with a margin where they fled in their quest to revise elite Balinese discourses of identity. Further, this margin happened to be effective in Bali because the early reggae scene was spatially rooted at Bruna bar, which had distinct heterotopic qualities.

Further attesting to its polymorphism, Balinese Bob Marley fandom was in part sparked by an Indonesian man whose dreadlocks brought him into contact with Rastafarians in England. Through them, he adopted the Rastafarian lifestyle and came into contact with reggae music which, in turn, on his return to Bali, acquainted him with a Bali-resident Jamaican, Sam, with whom he formed the island's first reggae band. Rudi was not forthcoming on whether he saw reggae as linking him to other, similarly oppressed, 'people of colour', such as the English Rastafarians and Sam, so his encounters do not necessarily affirm O'Gorman's contention that the reggae's internationalization provided marginalized people with an expressive vehicle (O'Gorman, 1997). But Rudi's recollections do attest to the Balinese reggae scene's disparate roots. Reggae's passage to Bali, that is, can be traced not only to the global tourism industry in which Bob Marley's image and music came to be associated with tropical, beachside destinations, but also to more interpersonal encounters between Indonesians, Jamaicans and other Rastafarian communities abroad. Notably, Rudi stressed the coincidental nature of how his friendship with the Rastas was sparked. Such coincidences, nonetheless important in the eventual establishment of a Balinese reggae scene, suggest that the global dissemination of Rastafarian and reggae-related symbols may not always be as purposeful as much of the literature on the internationalization of reggae suggests.

The later, festival-oriented scene may indeed be more unequivocally compared to the routinised versions to which Cushman refers. Unlike participants in the earlier scene, who valued reggae for its (perceived) capacity to create inclusive marginal spaces, those of the later scene valued reggae's exchange value on the tourist bar circuit. Authenticity discourses of the later scene, which cast reggae as peaceful and orderly as opposed to thrash music, also contrast those of a broader, emerging regionalism which cast Balineness as authentically low and disorderly. These later scene authenticities nonetheless co-existed with images of Bob Marley in other spaces, beyond those of tourism, which *were* suggestive of their incorporation into local populist discourses.

Balinese reggae's refractive and polysemic dimensions in Bali therefore point to the importance of acknowledging the validity of all the abovementioned studies on reggae's internationalisation. Based on the Balinese case, one could surmise that following its internationalisation under Blackwell's Island Records, reggae music went on to serve a variety of ends. Both reggae and Rastafarian symbols were taken up in different ways, that is, by middle class American progressives, recording companies, Jamaican politicians, Rastafarians eager to profit from their newfound

positive image among tourists due to reggae's international popularity, people of colour outside the Caribbean, and global tourism.

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### **Dicosgraphy**

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Gus They, vocalist for reggae band Fatamorgana. 10 June, 1996.

Frit, vocalist with reggae band Legend. 3 July, 1998.

Made Arthana, owner of reggae merchandise shop. 4 October, 1998.

Rudi, ex-vocalist with Bali's first reggae band, Jamasyah. 15 June, 1998.

Soul Rebel, reggae band. 16 July, 1998.

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> This essay is adapted from a chapter of my doctoral dissertation, which compares reggae, punk and death metal scenes in Bali, and which I undertook in the Politics Department at Monash University. The chapter was first revised in early 2003 with the assistance of a Monash University Publications Award, and again later in the year with the help of the Indonesian Mediations Program at Leiden University.

<sup>2</sup> In a feature article, Wolf (1993: 16) describes the young men who make a living by befriending single female tourists thus:

*In the tourist haven of Bali, and now in the neighbouring island of Lombok, you can find amongst the male youth a subculture whose peripheral yet lasting flirtation with the West has left them with a taste for drugs, alcohol and one night/one month relationships with tourist girls. They're called variously 'bad boys', 'Kuta cowboys', 'gigolos' (by other people) or 'guides' (their own term).*

<sup>3</sup> Aside from Nilan's (1996) analysis of Denpasar-based youth media, Wiyata Mandala, and Parker's (1992) study of Balinese primary school curricula, there is a dearth of academic studies on Balinese youth culture during the New Order period. My knowledge of local youth scenes around Kuta Beach derives mainly from interviews cited later in this chapter, conversation with locals, disparate journalistic accounts such as Wolf (1993) and Neely (1998), as well as my own investigations for regular profiles of Balinese surfers and the Balinese surf scene, published as part of a regular feature on the Balinese surfing scene in *Bali Echo* over the course of 1998-1999 (Baulch, 1999; 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; 1998e).

<sup>4</sup> Excorporation describes the process by which by which "the subordinate make their own culture out of the resources and commodities provided by the dominant culture" (Fiske in Lentini, 1999: 42).

<sup>5</sup> The Rastafarians' Garveyist links are nonetheless tenuous, and White (1983: 8) claims that there is no evidence to suggest that Garvey ever prophesied the coming of a black King. Furthermore, White asserts, when Selassie rose to prominence, Garvey was highly critical of him, and pointed to his "imperial ineptitude" as the cause of Mussolini's successful invasion of Ethiopia in 1934. White acknowledges that most Rastafarians saw Garvey as the founding father of their 'new religion'. However, citing a *Jamaica Times* report of Garvey's address to an UNIA convention in 1934, at which Garvey is said to have spoken of the Rastafarians "with contempt" (White, 1983: 8), White infers that Garvey did not see himself in this light. Furthermore, White (1983: 9) also argues for the importance of contextualising Rastafarianism in a "tradition of messianic black mysticism that had been in full flower in Jamaica and elsewhere for some time" and, like Barrett, he stresses the seminal roles of the above-mentioned Hinkley, Hibbert, Dunkley and Hinds in devising, and soliciting support for, the 'new religion'.

<sup>6</sup> Curiously, Regis makes no mention of Hebdige's work of the previous decade (1973, 1979) in which he charts the progression of reggae from Jamaica to (similarly under-privileged) English West Indians. As mentioned above, Hebdige argues that, in spite of Chris Blackwell's role in reggae's passage to England, English West Indians nevertheless took up reggae and practised it in subversive fashion, similar to its original Jamaican form. This, he surmises, exemplifies how deviant groups undertake cultural appropriation – "ways in which an increasingly alien environment could be conquered and invested with meaning" (Hebdige, 1973: 1). This directly contradicts Regis argument for cultural imperialism by re-exportation, and his argument that reggae music helped West Indians in South London develop cultural autonomy is also at variance with Cushman's argument for routinisation.

<sup>7</sup> The importance of hedonism and abandon to reggae symbology in these tourist areas directly contradicts Lewis' (1994: 288) description of how "[I]n their deportment [the Rastafarians] purposely blurred the image of the black person as a happy-go-lucky quashie, and stood proudly in the rebellious ways of the beleaguered peasantry".

<sup>8</sup> As far as I am aware, this song was never publicly performed.

<sup>9</sup> Eklof (1999: <http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit57/pdi.htm>) notes the reception Megawati received when she opened the PDI's fifth party congress in Bali in October 1998. In the lead up to the event, local youths' allegiances to the PDI became demonstrably evident and led him to conclude that

*Megawati is able to benefit from her father's popularity because she has built a reputation for certain moral qualities of her own. Megawati's struggle against the New Order government boosted her reputation for justice, righteousness, integrity and political courage. These are also qualities that Sukarno's name represents to those Indonesians who still hold the former president's name dear. Many people also tend to see*

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*Megawati's struggle for justice against the New Order as an analogy to Sukarno's struggle for justice and independence against the Dutch in the 1930s.*