

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Russian foreign and security policy

by

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M.A., University of Kansas, 1991

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Abstract

From the time Mikhail Gorbachev signed the CFE Treaty in 1990 until Vladimir Putin abandoned it in 2015, the Soviets and their successors in the Russian Federation showed amazing persistence in their relationship with the “cornerstone of European security.” Unlike earlier proposals by the Soviets for arms control, Moscow’s approach to the CFE Treaty was not just a propaganda ploy, but a genuine attempt to shape the security environment in Europe and the former USSR to create breathing room for the development of the economy. Within this endeavor, the treaty also provided a means to manage the dismantling of the Soviet Union’s large conventional armed forces as they returned from Eastern Europe and transitioned into the armies of the newly independent states of the former USSR. Over time, however, the CFE Treaty proved ineffective in constraining a significant change to the European security landscape, the enlargement of NATO. Simultaneously, Russia’s foreign and security policy evolved, first from that of the Soviet system dominated by the CPSU to the product of the new governing institutions of the Russian Federation; and, second, from one that focused on the domestic development of the country to that of a more confident state that was reasserting itself as a great power, as Putin made clear in his speech to the Munich Security Conference in 2007. Along the way, the CFE Treaty lost its luster, despite Moscow’s dogged engagement with it, and in 2015, the Russians de facto withdrew from it.

This dissertation presents a scholarly examination of the CFE Treaty as a factor in Russia’s foreign and security policy. Although the literature is rich in studies of the CFE Treaty and European security, as well as the development and trajectory of Russia’s foreign and security policy, it lacks one that focuses on the treaty’s efficacy as a tool of policy. Drawing extensively on primary sources and analyses by Russian authors (among whom are those who negotiated and

implemented the CFE Treaty), this dissertation constructs two historical narratives (CFE Treaty, Russian Security Policy), performs detailed case studies, and employs a conceptual framework to show that over time, while Moscow remained engaged with the CFE Treaty (and the adapted version of it that was negotiated at Moscow's insistence), undesired effects gradually accrued at the expense of desired effects of this arms control agreement on Russia's national interests. The expansion of NATO into states near and adjacent to Russia's borders and other actions by the alliance and the U.S., such as refusal to ratify the adapted CFE Treaty pending Russia's fulfilment of the Istanbul Commitments to Georgia and Moldova and the deployment of BMD assets in Eastern Europe, loomed large in the list of Russia's complaints about the CFE Treaty. Nonetheless, it was Moscow's quest to maintain dominance in its immediate neighborhood, the so-called near abroad, increasingly through the presence and employment of the Russian armed forces, that finally led it to abandon the CFE Treaty.

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Table of Contents

List of Figures.....	xii
List of Tables.....	xiii
List of Abbreviations.....	xiv
Acknowledgements.....	xvii
Dedication.....	xix
Chapter 1 - Introduction.....	1
A Puzzle?.....	2
The U.S.S.R., Russia and the CFE Treaty.....	6
Soviet and Russian Foreign and Security Policy.....	14
The Research Approach.....	22
Research Questions.....	22
Research Methodologies.....	22
Chronological Historical Design.....	22
Narrative 1: The CFE Treaty.....	23
Narrative 2: Russian Security Policy.....	23
Linking the Narratives: A Conceptual Framework.....	24
Case Study Design.....	25
Organization of the Dissertation.....	27
Chapter 2 - The U.S.S.R. and Conventional Arms Control: Antecedents to the CFE Treaty.....	32
The Genoa Conference, 1922.....	33
The Strategic Setting.....	33
Moscow's Approach to Conventional Arms Control.....	35
Motivation.....	35
Results and Subsequent Actions.....	39
Conclusion.....	40
The United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament, 1955-1957.....	43
The Strategic Setting.....	43
Moscow's Approach to Conventional Arms Control.....	44

Motivation	44
Proposals.....	46
Results and Subsequent Actions.....	50
Conclusion	51
The Negotiations on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe, 1973-1989	52
The Strategic Setting	52
Moscow’s Approach to Conventional Arms Control	55
Motivation	55
Proposals.....	56
Results and Subsequent Actions.....	58
Conclusion	60
Chapter 3 - Getting to CFE Under Gorbachev	61
The Strategic Setting	61
Moscow’s Approach to Conventional Arms Control.....	64
Motivation	64
Proposals.....	68
Unilateral Reductions of Conventional Forces.....	70
Initial Negotiating Positions	75
Problem Areas: LBNA, Flank Zone, Sufficiency Rule	79
Managing Systemic Change in Europe – Dissolution of the WTO and Reunification of Germany	87
Results and Subsequent Actions.....	92
The Military Pushes Back	93
Conclusion.....	106
Chapter 4 - The CFE Treaty and Transition to the New Russian State (1992-1999).....	110
Russian Foreign and Security Policy – 1992-1999	114
Concept of Russian Foreign Policy, 1993	120
Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 1993	122
Russian Federation National Security Concept, 1997	126
Russia and the CFE Treaty – 1992-1999.....	134

Getting to Ratification and Entry into Force	136
The Flank Zone.....	144
Russian Forces in Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova.....	148
Efforts to Resolve the Flank Zone Issue, 1993-1995	152
Destruction of TLE East of the Urals	157
NATO Enlargement.....	162
The Baltic States	164
The First CFE Review Conference (May 1996).....	169
The Adaptation of the CFE Treaty	180
Case Study: 1999.....	188
The “Istanbul Commitments”	202
The CFE Treaty and Russian Foreign and Security Policy	210
Chapter 5 - The CFE Treaty During Putin’s Ascendancy (2000-2006).....	214
Russian Foreign and Security Policy – 2000-2006	217
The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, January 2000	221
The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, April 2000	224
The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, June 2000.....	229
The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces, October 2003	233
Russia and the CFE Treaty – 2000-2006.....	237
The (Bumpy) Road toward Entry-into-Force of the Adapted CFE Treaty.....	238
The Second CFE Review Conference (28 May – 1 June 2001).....	253
Problems with NATO Enlargement and the CFE Treaty (2001-2003).....	256
Case Study: 2004.....	258
The Third CFE Review Conference (31 May-2 June 2006)	282
The CFE Treaty and Russian Foreign and Security Policy	291
Chapter 6 - The Russians Abandon the CFE Treaty (2007-2015)	295
Russian Foreign and Security Policy – 2007-2015	297
The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, July 2008	300
The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020, May 2009	303
The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, February 2010	307
The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, February 2013	311

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, December 2014	314
Russia and the CFE Treaty – 2007-2015.....	318
Case Study: 2007	318
The Extraordinary Conference of the CFE States Parties – June 2007	326
The Suspension of Implementation of the CFE Treaty – July-November 2007	332
From Suspension to Withdrawal (2008-2015)	348
The CFE Treaty and Russian Foreign and Security Policy	360
Chapter 7 - Conclusions	370
Bibliography	378
Appendix A - Unilateral Reductions of Soviet Forces	420
Appendix B - CFE Treaty Zones and Limitations.....	422
Appendix C - Transfers of Conventional Armaments East of the Urals and CFE Treaty Levels	423
Appendix D - The Flank Agreement (Annex A to the Final Document of the First CFE Review Conference, 31 May 1996).....	424

List of Figures

Figure 1.1. CFE Treaty Narrative	23
Figure 1.2. Russian Security Policy Narrative	24
Figure 1.3. Visualization of Chapters 4-6	31
Figure 3.1 Proposals for Conventional Forces Reductions, 1986	69
Figure 3.2. Military Districts of the USSR.....	82
Figure 4.1. Parliamentary Report on CFE, 1992	143
Figure 4.2. Former Soviet Bases in Georgia	150
Figure 4.3. The Revised Flank Zone, 1996	172
Figure 5.1. The State Duma's Conditions for Ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty.....	273
Figure 6.1. The Extraordinary Circumstances Behind Russia's Consideration of Suspension of the CFE Treaty.....	329
Figure 6.2. Legislative Journey of the "Law on the Suspension by the Russian Federation of the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe"	336
Figure 6.3. General Baluyevskiy's Comparison of Circumstances in 1999 and 2007	340
Figure 7.1. Cross-Case Comparison (1999, 2004, 2007)	373

List of Tables

Table 3.1. Changes in Levels of Soviet Armaments in Europe.....	97
Table 4.2. Russian Holdings and Reduction Liability.....	161

List of Abbreviations

ACV	Armored Combat Vehicle
AOA	Area of Application
A/CFE	Adapted CFE Treaty [Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe]
ATTU	Atlantic to the Urals
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
CFE Treaty	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSBMs	Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EIF	Entry into Force
ETD	Extraordinary Temporary Deployment
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GLCM	Ground-launched Cruise Missile
HLWG	High Level Working Group
IMEMO	Institute of World Economy and International Relations
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [Treaty]
IRBM	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile

JCG	Joint Consultative Group
KGB	Committee on State Security [<i>Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti</i>]
LBNA	Land-based Naval Aircraft
M(B)FR	Mutual (and Balanced) Force Reductions
MD	Military District
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MLH	Maximum Level of Holdings
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MVD	Ministry of Internal Affairs [<i>Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del</i>]
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIC	National Intelligence Council
NEP	New Economic Policy
NRC	NATO-Russia Council [Russia-NATO Council, in Russian parlance]
NSWTO	Non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty Organization
NTM	National Technical Means
OOV	Object of Verification
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCC	Political Consultative Committee [of the WTO]
POET	Protocol on Existing Types
RCP(B)	Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)
REVCON	Review Conference

RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
SVR	Foreign Intelligence Service [<i>Sluzhba vneshkoy razvedki</i>]
TLE	Treaty-Limited Equipment
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UTLE	Unaccounted Treaty Limited Equipment
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

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Notwithstanding all this support, any shortcomings, errors, or omissions are solely my responsibility.

Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my family, beginning with my parents, Bill and Peggy Wilcox. Without their sacrifice, support, and encouragement, my educational journey would not have begun. My children, Ben, Ian and Mady, have always been a source of pride and inspiration. Likewise, my grandchildren Brayden and Berklee are a constant joy and a reminder of the things that really matter in life. Their Mom, Amy, and my son Ben have created a wonderful family.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

As the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), the Soviet Union and the Cold War were reaching their ends in the early 1990s, the “cornerstone of European security” was being laid. After a brief period of negotiations that began in March 1989, the leaders of the states of the WTO and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) in Paris in November 1990. All twenty-two member states of NATO and the WTO were signatories of the treaty, and as the geopolitical landscape in Eastern Europe and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) changed, successor states acceded to the CFE Treaty and the number of parties to it reached thirty.

The CFE Treaty placed limits on holdings of tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery systems of great than 100mm caliber, attack helicopters and combat aircraft in an area ranging from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. Within the treaty’s twenty-three articles and eight protocols are detailed procedures for the destruction of armaments within the five categories of holdings, annual exchanges of data as well as notifications of changes to data between exchanges, intrusive on-site inspections of military facilities where armaments are located, and the operation of a deliberative body – the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) – in which states that are parties to the CFE Treaty can discuss issues related to its operation. The treaty has been amended and revised in light of the geopolitical realities of the post-Cold War European security architecture, of which the CFE Treaty and two other agreements, the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe and the Treaty on Open Skies, have been key components.

By the time the treaty entered in force in 1992, changes in the European political landscape, in particular the dissolution of the WTO and the USSR, had rendered the CFE Treaty almost obsolete, especially from Moscow's perspective. Notwithstanding this seeming obsolescence, the Russians stuck with it for fifteen more years until they "suspended" their implementation of the CFE Treaty in 2007.¹ A Russian author suggested they continued to adhere to the treaty for so long out of some psychological need "to prove that we are the most honest and decent people...even though it was obvious to everyone that the treaty was unacceptable to Russia."² The treaty's durability and persistent presence in Moscow's national security narrative for eight years after 2007, however, suggest more than a psychological attachment to it.

A Puzzle?

Moscow's reluctance to formally abandon the CFE Treaty was puzzling. Why not withdraw in 2007 instead of suspending implementation? The United States (U.S.) had already set a precedent when Washington withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002. The Russians could have made as strong a case for withdrawal from the CFE Treaty as the Bush Administration had for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Equally puzzling was Moscow's acceptance of the agreement to adapt the CFE Treaty to the post-Cold War European security situation in 1999, at the height of a dispute with NATO over the war in Kosovo and in the wake of the accession of the first member states of the former WTO to NATO. One could

¹ Article XIX of the CFE Treaty provides for *withdrawal* from the treaty in the event a party to it, "decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." *Suspension* of implementation of the provisions of the treaty is not a part of the treaty. "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe" [hereafter CFE Treaty Text], <http://www.osce.org/library/14087?download=true>, 21.

² "Russian Expert Gives Reasons Why INF Treaty No Longer Meets 'Russia's Interests,'" Moscow *Regnum* in Russian, 18 January 2015, accessed through the Open Source Center (OSC).

argue that in 1999 the Russians still held out hope that the CFE Treaty could serve one objective of their foreign and security policy – to limit or manage the enlargement of NATO. From 1999 to 2007 the Russians argued that NATO states should ratify the 1999 agreement on adaptation because it added an accession clause, which would bring new NATO members like the Baltic States, Slovenia, Albania and Croatia under the limitations of the treaty. By 2007, however, it should have been evident to Moscow that the CFE Treaty was not addressing this national security interest.

The Russians might have viewed their suspension of implementation of the treaty in 2007 as a sufficient signal to all parties that they were turning their backs on the treaty and would pursue a new security regime, for instance the Treaty on European Security President Dmitry Medvedev offered in 2008. Although the CFE Treaty no longer seemed to serve Russia's security interest, Russia's officialdom could not let it go. Six years after the suspension of implementation of the CFE Treaty, for example, in May 2013 at the Moscow European Security Conference, Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov and Deputy Minister of Defense Anatoly Antonov all felt the need to pronounce the (apparently) long-moribund CFE Treaty dead.³ Over a year later the CFE Treaty returned anew to the discourse on security on the eve of the release of a revision to Russia's military doctrine. On 19 November 2014, during regularly scheduled "government hours" in the State Duma, Foreign Minister Lavrov, in reply to a question about Russia's adherence to arms control treaties in the

³ "Interfax: NATO's Refusal to Adapt CFE Harms Conventional Arms Control – Grushko," 2 December 2013, *Johnson's Russia List*, <http://russialist.org/Interfax-natos-refusal-to-adapt-cfe-harms-conventional-arms-control-grushko/>; Roger McDermott, "Moscow Security Conference Declares Death of CFE Treaty," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 10, Issue 105, 4 June 2013, www.jamestown.org, <http://russialist.org/moscow-security-conference-declares-death-of-cfe-treaty/>; "Russian Deputy Defense Minister Says CFE Treaty Dead," *Johnson's Russia List*, 23 May 2013, <http://russialist.org/russian-deputy-defence-minister-says-cfe-treaty-dead/>; "Russian Military Says CFE Treaty Has No Future," *Johnson's Russia List*, 2 April 2013, <http://russialist.org/russian-military-says-cfe-treaty-has-no-future/>.

face of western provocations and the crisis in Ukraine, told the legislators that the CFE Treaty was no longer in effect for Russia, and “It is dead for us, and there will be no return to it.”⁴ The Russian Security Council adopted the revised military doctrine one month later, and President Putin approved it on 26 December 2014.⁵ Between the adoption and approval of the revised military doctrine, Deputy Defense Minister Antonov, in his end-of-year briefing about the achievements of the Russian armed forces, declared the CFE Treaty “an anachronism” which was “de facto dead, although de jure the NATO countries cannot abandon it.”⁶ As all these comments show, Moscow took a dim view of the CFE Treaty after their suspension of its implementation in 2007. That being the case, why continue to beat the dead horse seven years later?

Actions, of course, speak louder than words, and the Russians finally further distanced themselves from the CFE Treaty, yet still could not bring themselves to formally withdraw from it. In March 2015, they declared they would no longer participate in meetings of the JCG.⁷ The puzzle that remains for this researcher is the Russians’ fixation on the CFE Treaty. Why did they not completely withdraw from it? Why had they remained so seized with this treaty?

⁴ “Vystuplenie i otvety na voprosy Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V. Lavrova v ramkakh ‘pravitel’svennogo chasa’ v Gosudarstvennoy Dume Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoy Federatsii, Moskva, 19 noyabrya 2014 goda,” 19 November 2014, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/B3A0155EC8B4FE3C3257D95003A6400.

⁵ “Operativnoe soveshchanie s postoyannymi chlenami Soveta Bezopasnosti,” <http://state.kremlin.ru/face/47262>; “Prezident utverdil novuyu redaktsiyu Voennoy doktrinoy,” <http://kremlin.ru/news/47334>.

⁶ “Zamestitel’ Ministra oborony Anatoliy Antonov rasskazal ob osnovnykh itogakh mezhdunarodnoy deatel’nosti voennogo vedomstva v 2014 godu,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 24 December 2014, http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12004548@egNews.

⁷ Katherine Hill and Neil Buckley, “Russia Quits Arms Pact as Estrangement with NATO Grows,” *Financial Times*, 10 March 2015, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cm/0/f6c814a6-c750-11e4-9e34-00144feab7de.html?Siteedition=intl#axzz3U4ao2P8J>; “Russia Withdraws from Joint Group on Conventional Forces Treaty,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation* in Russian, 10 March 2015, accessed through the OSC.

The return of the CFE Treaty to the discourse on security by high-level officials of the ministries of foreign affairs and defense concurrently with the release of a revision of a key security policy document – the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation – hinted at a connection between the treaty and security policy. The thesis of this dissertation is that Moscow’s approach to the CFE Treaty has been consistent with Russian foreign and security policies – the treaty has, in fact, been a deliberate tool of these policies *and their authors*, rather than just a beneficiary (or casualty) of them. The CFE Treaty, moreover, has been more congruent with the political goals of Russian foreign policy, for instance projecting Russia’s status as a great power, preserving Russia’s influence in Europe (to include contributing to the development and governance of the European security system), and promoting a “treaty-legal” system of politically-binding rules, than the military security goals of Russian security policy, i.e. maintaining a balance of forces and capabilities, facilitating force posture (stationing and deployment of forces), and preserving the operational security of Russia’s armed forces and military technology. The treaty’s longevity under these circumstances may be indicative of a tension among actors in Moscow’s policy process, one that prolonged the armed forces’ eventual emergence (one could argue, “re-emergence”) as the preeminent tool in the foreign and security policy toolkit.

To describe how the dissertation will address the thesis, the remainder of this chapter will be organized as follows. First, the chapter will provide brief descriptions of the two historical narratives that will make up the dissertation - *The USSR, Russia and the CFE Treaty* and *Soviet and Russian Foreign and Security Policy* – in both cases drawing on the extant literature. Second, a description of the *Research Approach* will begin with the research question and then set out how the dissertation will employ a chronological historical design methodology and the

methodologies of process tracing and structured, focused comparison. The *Research Approach* will also include the organization of the chapters of the dissertation.

The U.S.S.R., Russia and the CFE Treaty

The USSR and Russia have occupied center stage in the history of the CFE Treaty and in the literature that has chronicled and analyzed it. The impetus for a new forum for negotiations on conventional armed forces, after over a decade of stalemate in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (M(B)FR) talks, rested mainly with Mikhail Gorbachev and his polices. Gorbachev called for new conventional arms control negotiations in a speech he delivered in Berlin in April 1986, and the WTO confirmed Gorbachev's desire in the "Budapest Appeal" they issued that June.⁸ Gorbachev gave an additional prod to the process when he "pulled another propaganda rabbit out of his hat" and announced, at the United Nations General Assembly on 7 December 1988, substantial unilateral reductions in Soviet forces.⁹ Gorbachev's announcement proved to be more than a mere propaganda ploy. In the space of less than two years, a dizzying pace considering the complexity of the agreement and the sixteen-year ordeal of the M(B)FR negotiations, the Soviets and their WTO allies concluded a treaty with the U.S. and the NATO allies. Along the way, Moscow accepted asymmetrical reductions in conventional weapons,

⁸ Richard Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order: The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1995), 27.

⁹ Jane M.O. Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe: Negotiation, Implementation and Adaptation of the CFE Treaty* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 32. Matthew Evangelista uses Gorbachev's speech at the UN in 1988 as the "single event" that is the starting point for an analysis of process tracing as a means to examine theoretical explanations for the end of the Cold War. His analysis includes debates about the CFE Treaty among components of the Soviet policy apparatus in the wake of the speech. Matthew Evangelista, "Explaining the Cold War's End: Process Tracing All the Way Down?" in *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytical Tool*, ed. Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 153-185.

abandoned their effort to include naval armaments in the negotiations, and agreed to the unification of East and West Germany.

Initial signs of problems from the Soviet side, however, became evident almost immediately after the CFE Treaty's signing and before its entry into force. These signs also pointed to divisions between the armed forces' leadership and Eduard Shevardnadze's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and, therefore, with Gorbachev's approach to military and defense strategy.¹⁰ The Soviets' initial declaration of data about their armed forces was strikingly at odds with estimates by the intelligence services of the NATO states and indicated a significant underreporting of holdings.¹¹ By underreporting their holdings, the Soviets would reduce both their liability for destruction of armaments to meet the limitations imposed by the treaty and the number of inspections they would have to receive on an annual basis.¹² Two actions by the Soviet armed forces had created this situation. First, they reclassified three motorized rifle divisions of the ground forces as coastal defense divisions of the navy. The association of these forces with naval activity would exempt them from the CFE Treaty, which did not include naval forces.¹³ Second, almost 60,000 conventional weapons systems that had been in the area of application (AOA) for the treaty, which stretched to the Ural Mountains, were re-located east of

¹⁰ Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order*, 125-126.

¹¹ That is, to units and their holdings of the five categories of treaty-limited equipment (TLE).

¹² Article IV of the CFE Treaty sets out the limits on TLE for each group of states parties. CFE Treaty Text, 7-9. The Protocol on Inspections, section II, paragraph 10, sets out the rules for calculating each state's inspection quotas, which are based on the number of "objects of verification" (OOV), which is based, primarily, on the number of units a state reports in the data on its armed forces. CFE Treaty Text, 89 (calculation of inspection quotas) and 85 (definition of OOV).

¹³ Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order*, 131-135; Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 91-92.

the Urals.¹⁴ Although these and other issues were resolved prior to the entry into force of the agreement, they foreshadowed problems down the road for the CFE Treaty itself and for its place in Soviet and, later, Russian foreign and security policy. As would become even more evident as events progressed in Eastern Europe and the USSR itself from 1990-1992, the CFE Treaty had lost its luster in Moscow's eyes even before it fully came into effect.

The CFE Treaty must have seemed anachronistic to the Russian Federation and other successor states of the former Soviet Union when they inherited it in 1992. The dissolution of the WTO, the reunification of Germany, and the break-up of the USSR all undermined the treaty's value to Moscow. Unrest within the Russian Federation, specifically in the North Caucasus region, also contributed to a perception that the CFE Treaty would require change to meet the security needs of Moscow and the other states of the former USSR that fell within the treaty's AOA.¹⁵

The passing of the WTO and the USSR in 1991 were defining events for Moscow's national security and foreign policy and the CFE Treaty. The demise of the WTO undermined the structure of the treaty. Although neither it nor NATO are mentioned by name in the text of the treaty, the overall limitations enshrined therein are for two "groups of states parties," whose

¹⁴ Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order*, 144-146; Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 88. A Russian account of the history of the CFE Treaty noted the "disagreement" over the movement of armaments east of the Urals and the redesignation of units to the coastal defense forces. Anatoliy Anin and Rodion Ayumov, "DOVSE – Vchera...Segodnya... Zavtra?...stat'ya pervaya," *Indeks bezopasnosti* 17, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 68. A year later Ayumov co-authored a monograph on the CFE Treaty with then-Deputy Defense Minister Anatoliy Antonov for the PIR Center in Moscow, which also publishes *Indeks bezopasnosti*. This version of the history of the CFE Treaty ignored these points of "disagreement." Anatoliy Antonov and Rodion Ayumov, *Kontrol' nad obychnymi vooruzheniyami v evrope – konets regima ili istoriya s prodolzheniem?* (Moscow: PIR Center, 2012).

¹⁵ The complete territories of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and a portion of Kazakhstan fell within the AOA. In late 1991, the states that were party to the treaty agreed to exempt the territories of the three Baltic states from the AOA. On the exclusion of the Baltic States, see Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order*, 186-190; Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 99-101.

composition corresponds to that of the two alliances.¹⁶ The effect of the end of the WTO was threefold. First, during the negotiations, the Soviets' allies proved to be progressively less amenable to subordinating their interests to those of Moscow or, in fact, even coordinating negotiating positions. Second, a formal agreement – the Budapest Agreement of 30 November 1990, which was the result of “a distinct and highly contentious set of negotiations” - was required to allocate ceilings for holdings of conventional armaments among the USSR and its former allies.¹⁷ Third, when former states of the WTO began to join NATO, starting with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999, the Russians asserted that they could not take their ceilings on conventional equipment holdings from the “eastern group of states parties,” the erstwhile WTO, to the “western group,” NATO.

As had been the case with the end of the WTO, the dissolution of the USSR required a formal agreement between the now-independent states whose territories fell within the purview of the CFE Treaty (see footnote 15, above). Whereas the signing of the Budapest Agreement was a milestone for both the treaty and Moscow's broader security posture and policy, the conclusion of the Tashkent Agreement and its signing on 15 May 1992 carried a greater meaning. In terms of the CFE Treaty, the accord reached at the summit meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) divided the entitlements for conventional armaments of the USSR among the newly independent states.¹⁸ More broadly, however, the

¹⁶Article II, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A) defines the groups of states parties in terms of the applicable treaties, i.e. the Treaty of Warsaw of 1955, the Treaty of Brussels of 1948, and the Treaty of Washington of 1949, as well as lists of the states that were parties to those treaties. CFE Treaty Text, 2-3. This euphemism entered the vocabulary of the CFE Treaty in large part to placate the French, who wanted to avoid any appearance of an inter-alliance negotiation and agreement. Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 17.

¹⁷ Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order* 100; Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 58.

¹⁸ This accord was one of four concluded at the Tashkent summit meeting. The remaining agreements included two others that pertained to the CFE Treaty and an agreement on collective security within the CIS. Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 111.

summit was a defining moment for Russia's security policy and that of her neighbors because it signaled the end of the Soviet armed forces and the formal acknowledgement of new national armies in the post-Soviet space.¹⁹

Although the period of the negotiation and entry into force of the CFE Treaty encompassed the two processes of "de-unification," it was a re-unification that might have had the most significant impact on the CFE Treaty and Moscow's foreign and security policy. The re-unification of Germany through the absorption of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Gorbachev's acquiescence to it under terms that included the unified Germany's full membership in NATO, were facilitated in part by the prospect of the CFE Treaty. The treaty-imposed limitations on the unified Germany's conventional armaments within the overall limits for NATO (the "western group of states parties") precluded the need to impose limitations specifically on Germany. From Moscow's perspective, the manpower level of the unified Germany's armed forces was the more contentious issue. Given that the CFE Treaty would not place limitations on manpower, the Soviets pushed for a legally binding ceiling on Germany's armed forces.²⁰ Rather than single out Germany, the CFE negotiators proposed a separate arrangement, the so-called "CFE- 1A" agreement, by which the parties to the CFE Treaty made voluntary commitments on manpower levels to accompany Germany's legally binding obligation. In one author's characterization, "...the CFE Treaty was the legal linchpin in the package of deals surrounding unification.

¹⁹ Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order*, 179.

²⁰ Disagreements over manpower levels had been a major factor in the deadlock in the M(B)FR negotiations, which had preceded CFE. Therefore, the CFE negotiations addressed equipment, rather than manpower in the armed forces.

Moreover, the CFE Treaty allowed Bonn to square the circle of its desire to satisfy Soviet security concerns without unduly singularizing the new German state.”²¹

The final aspect of the CFE Treaty that rendered it anachronistic before its entry into force was the so-called “flank regime,” which the Russians viewed as impinging on their ability to maintain security in the North Caucasus region, especially Chechnya. The aggregate limitations on conventional armaments in the CFE Treaty are further refined in a series of concentric geographic zones that emanate from the former inter-German border.²² Two NATO states, Norway and Turkey, feared that in response to the limitations imposed on forces in each concentric zone, the Soviets would shift forces either north or south to territory opposite their borders. To address this possibility, the parties to the treaty agreed to the establishment of the “flank” zone, which would encompass specific military districts in the USSR opposite Norway and Turkey, as well as the territories of Turkey, Norway, Greece, Iceland, Bulgaria, and Romania. Separate sub-limits would apply to tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery (but not to combat aircraft and attack helicopters) located in the flank zone.²³ By 1993, two factors led Russia, along with Ukraine, to seek changes to the provisions of the treaty that governed the flank zone: the dissolution of the USSR, which required the division of the Soviets’ flank limits between Russia, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine; and the outbreak of the conflict in Chechnya. The combination of these two factors placed the Russians in breach of

²¹ Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe’s Military Order*, 76. Falkenrath (68-77) and Sharp (73-81) ably explain this aspect of the CFE negotiations. On the CFE Treaty in the broader context of German reunification, see also Angela E. Stent, *Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999) and Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).

²² Article IV of the CFE Treaty sets limits on armaments by defined geographic zones. CFE Treaty Text, 7-9.

²³ Article V of the CFE Treaty defines the territory of the so-called flank zone and sub-limits on armaments within that zone. CFE Treaty Text, 9-10.

their flank limit for armored combat vehicles and, in their view, hamstrung in the ability to shift armed forces within their own territory to meet security needs.²⁴ Although the parties to the CFE Treaty agreed to Russia's request to modify the flank regime in 1996, this issue remained a sore spot for the Russians throughout the life of the treaty.²⁵ As one author noted, "The Russian military had never liked the CFE Treaty, but now that treaty limits began to impinge on their operations in the Caucasus, it became virtually intolerable."²⁶ Like the other issues addressed in the preceding paragraphs, the flank issue is one that points to tension between the political goals of Russian foreign policy and the military goals of Russian security policy, as well as a disconnect between elements of the policy apparatus.

The resolution of the flank issue did not fix the CFE Treaty, in Moscow's view. Acknowledging Russia's concerns, the parties to the treaty therefore agreed in 1996 on the scope and parameters of negotiations to update the treaty to deal with the changes in the security situation in Europe that had taken place since the treaty was signed in December 1990. The negotiations concluded with the signing by heads of state and government, on the margins of the summit meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul in November 1999, of the Agreement on the Adaptation of the CFE Treaty. Two provisions of the adaptation agreement specifically addressed Russia's desiderata. First, in recognition of the end of the WTO, the bloc-to-bloc structure of limitations on conventional armaments was

²⁴ Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order*, 231-239; Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, chapter 8.

²⁵ "Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990," "Final Document of the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength," 15-31 May 1996, www.osce.org/library/14099. See Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, chapter 9, on the negotiation and conclusion of the so-called "flank agreement," and Richard Falkenrath, "The CFE Flank Dispute: Waiting in the Wings," *International Security* 19, no. 4, (Spring 1995): 118-144.

²⁶ Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 149.

replaced by one of national and territorial limits.²⁷ Second, the agreement on adaptation added a provision for the accession of states to the CFE Treaty.²⁸ This provision was especially important to the Russians as a means to extend the limitations of the treaty to new members of NATO that had not been parties to the treaty, specifically the three Baltic states, Slovenia, Albania and Croatia.

Notwithstanding these positive developments, the agreements concluded in Istanbul also proved problematic for Moscow regarding the presence of Russian forces on the territory of states of the former USSR. The adaptation agreement included a provision that specified that foreign forces stationed on a state's territory must be there with the permission of the hosting state.²⁹ Although not in the text of the adaptation agreement, a set of bilateral agreements between the parties to the CFE Treaty, among other things, committed Russia to withdraw forces present in Georgia and Moldova by a specific date.³⁰ These so-called "Istanbul Commitments" would prove to be a bone of contention between Russia, the affected states, and NATO for the remainder of the life of the treaty. Russia's failure to fulfill the commitments led the NATO states to refuse en masse to ratify the adaptation agreement, thereby preventing its entry into

²⁷ Article 5 of the Agreement on Adaptation replaced Article IV of the original CFE Treaty. The new article established national limits (armaments each party to the treaty could possess) and territorial limits (armaments that could be located on the territory of each party to the treaty, including those of foreign forces) in place of the zonal limits on armaments. "Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," CFE.DOC/1/99, 19 November 1999 (hereafter A/CFE Treaty Text), 5-7, www.osce.org/library/14108.

²⁸ Article 18 of the Agreement on Adaptation (A/CFE) replaced Article XVIII of the original CFE Treaty. A/CFE Treaty Text, 17. New preambular language in Article 1 also highlights the provision for accession of new parties to the CFE Treaty. A/CFE Treaty Text, 2.

²⁹ Article 2 of the A/CFE replaced Article I of the original CFE Treaty. A/CFE Treaty Text, 3.

³⁰ These commitments are annexes to the "Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," CFE.DOC/2/99, 19 November 1999, www.osce.org/library/14114. The conference took place on the margins of the OSCE Istanbul Summit. The most problematic of the commitments were those that pertained to the presence of Russian forces in Moldova and Georgia.

force. The Russians consistently rejected any connection between the commitments and ratification, arguing that they are not constituent parts of the treaty.³¹ When they suspended implementation of the CFE Treaty in 2007, the Russians blamed the NATO states' failure to ratify the 1999 adaptation agreement, along with other actions that were incongruent with Moscow's foreign and security policy interests, for their action.³²

Soviet and Russian Foreign and Security Policy

The field of Soviet and Russian foreign and security policy encompasses two broad areas of study. First, it focuses on the exposition of policy, through programs of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and reports to CPSU congresses, conferences and other meetings (in Soviet times) and the policy documents that emanated from the Russian government. These documents include foreign policy concepts, national security strategies, and military doctrines. Second, the field considers the actors, processes and institutions by whom and wherein policy is formulated and implemented. Before turning to these two areas, it is necessary to define the term "foreign and security policy."

³¹ Russia's position is that these commitments were taken "in parallel" with the signing of the A/CFE and "had a political character and were not subject to ratification, although they were part of the package that made up the single regime of the adapted CFE Treaty." "Rossiya priostanavlivayet uchastiye v zasedaniyakh Sovmestnoy konsul'tativnoy gruppy DOVSE," TASS, 10 March 2015, <http://tass.ru/politika/1818706>. See also Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 196-202; Antonov and Ayumov, *Kontrol' nad obychnymi vooruzheniyami v evrope*, 30-32; and V. Chernov and A. Mazur, "CFE Treaty: Russia Has Traveled Its Part of the Road," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 51, no. 1 (February 2005): 79-84.

³² Wade Boese, "Russia Suspends CFE Treaty Implementation." *Arms Control Today*, January/February 2008 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_01-02/cfe; Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The Unraveling of the Cold War Settlement," *Survival* 51, no. 6 (December 2009-January 2010): 39-62; Sergey Permiakov, "DOVSE: proshay ili do svidaniya?" *Voенно-promyshlennyi kur'er* (hereafter *VPK*), 14 November 2007, <http://vpk-news.ru/print/articles/4930>; Vladimir Shustov, "DOVSE: Poxhoronit' ili reanimirovat'?" *Indeks bezopasnosti* 14, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 89-95, <http://pircenter.org/data/publications/sirus1-08/Shustov.pdf>; and Wolfgang Zellner, "Will the 'Cornerstone of European Security' Come Crashing Down? On the Current Crisis of the (Adapted) CFE Treaty," *OSCE Yearbook 2007*, Hamburg: Centre for OSCE Research, <http://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/07/Zellner-en.pdf>.

R. Craig Nation, in his expansive study of Soviet security policy, offers a broad definition of security, which encompasses military, political and socio-economic aspects. He acknowledges that his approach to the definition merges security policy with foreign policy but finds it acceptable because “security has always been the essential goal of foreign policy.” Drawing on work by Bruce Parrott, he defines “national security” as “military, economic and political protection against external threats.” National security policy thereby “encompasses military programs, diplomatic interactions, economic choices affecting the state’s geopolitical position, and policy toward foreign economic and social contacts.”³³ Marcel de Haas uses the term “foreign security policy” in his study of Russian policy under Vladimir Putin and Dmitriy Medvedev (he also uses “international security policy” and “external security policy” synonymously). Although he does not explicitly define the term, he distinguishes between three types of policies as defined in Russian policy documents, which are the units of analysis in his book. Security policy aims at “safeguarding national interests against external and internal threats.” Foreign policy “deals with maintaining relations with actors in the international arena.” Finally, the purview of military policy is “war, conflicts, crises and their prevention, deterrence and suppression of aggression, force generation and preparation of armed forces, population and economy in securing vital interests of the state.”³⁴

This dissertation will use a hybrid of Nation and de Haas’s formulations: *foreign and security policy*. While Nation’s point about security being the goal of foreign policy is well taken, the Russian government’s promulgation of separate documents over time to communicate

³³ R. Craig Nation. *Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1992), xi-xii.

³⁴ Marcel de Haas, *Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 5.

national security policy, foreign policy and military doctrine argues for a term that better conveys the scope of this area of national policy. Moreover, given this dissertation's focus on an arms control agreement, the CFE Treaty, a formulation that more explicitly links the treaty to the foreign relations and military security of the Russian Federation is more appropriate. This formulation therefore also accords with Moscow's view that "arms control policies constituted a subset of national security policy, at once connected to and distinct from both foreign and military policy considerations." As long as the international political and military objectives of the USSR and then Russia coincided, arms control could "serve two masters simultaneously." Should the objectives diverge, the leadership in Moscow would have had to decide "whether the pursuit of negotiated constraints on military forces is preeminently a *political instrument*, to be used in the service of broader diplomatic goals, or, more narrowly, an adjunct to *defense policy* "[emphasis in the original].³⁵

During the Soviet era, the leadership of the CPSU determined foreign and security policy in terms of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The authoritative statements of policy were the relevant reports by the party's leadership to the congresses and conferences of the CPSU. Changes in policy reflected the party's views on the nature of the international class conflict and the means by which the capitalist states might pursue it. The so-called correlation of forces between the socialist and capitalist camps was a key component in foreign and security policy, and its evolution over time, particularly in the comparison of the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the U.S., was also reflected in changes to Moscow's perception of and approach to security.

³⁵ Coit D. Blacker, *Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985-1991* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 91-92.

The literature offers several approaches to analyze change over time in Soviet foreign and security policy. Nation proposes seven security paradigms “to characterize clearly discernable phases in the evolution of policy, to structure the attempt to understand its motive forces, and to represent the evolution in Soviet thinking about the security problem somewhat more formally.”³⁶ Of interest to this dissertation are Nation’s paradigms in which the Soviets also explored conventional arms control, specifically accommodation and retreat (1921-1929), competitive coexistence (1953-1985), and mutual security (1985-1991).³⁷ Robert Legvold posits five great state transformations in Russian history, two of which occurred in the Soviet period: Lenin/Stalin and Gorbachev/Yeltsin. As for foreign policy, Legvold identifies a number of factors that, to one degree or another, help to define these transformations: war, Russia’s vulnerabilities, sometimes exacerbated by internal weaknesses, and “unnerving international trends.”³⁸ One common thread runs through all the transformations, however, Russia’s sense of national identity, which is characterized as *derzhavnost’*, or “asserting their natural right to the role and influence of a great power whether they have the wherewithal or not.”³⁹ Finally, Michael MccGwire traces the evolution of Soviet foreign and security policy based on a linkage to military objectives as defined by Soviet military doctrine. He asserts that “decision periods” produced changes in Soviet military doctrine. One such period occurred in the late 1960’s, when the Soviets, having taken account of the adoption by the U.S. and NATO of the doctrine of flexible response, changed their military doctrine from one based on the inevitability of nuclear

³⁶ Nation, *Black Earth, Red Star*, xiii-xiv.

³⁷ Nation, *Black Earth, Red Star*, xiii. Nation devotes a chapter of his book to each security paradigm.

³⁸ Robert Legvold, “Russian Foreign Policy During State Transformation,” in *Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century and the Shadow of the Past*, ed. Robert Legvold (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 92.

³⁹ Robert Legvold, “Russian Foreign Policy During State Transformation,” 114.

war in the event of conflict between themselves and the West to one of avoidance of such a war, particularly on Soviet territory.⁴⁰ A second decision period culminated in 1987, when the CPSU Central Committee plenum accepted Gorbachev's call for democratization and a new military doctrine, which would be based on the assumption that world war was not just undesirable, but not possible because it would be averted by political means.⁴¹ This change in military objectives and doctrine set the conditions for Gorbachev to pursue significant reductions of conventional forces, first unilaterally and then through negotiations that would lead to the signing of the CFE Treaty.

Following the dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of the Russian Federation as a successor state, the CPSU and Marxist-Leninist ideology fell by the wayside. The sudden absence of "a theoretical fundament for policy making" created a vacuum that policy makers in Boris Yeltsin's government filled with a National Security Concept, a Foreign Policy Concept, and a new Military Doctrine to "replace the annulled ideology."⁴² The use of these basic statements of foreign and security policy persisted through the Putin and Medvedev regimes, with periodic updating.

Notwithstanding the abandonment of Marxist-Leninist ideology, Russian foreign and security policy has displayed some elements of continuity with its Soviet predecessors. Echoing Legvold's point about *derzhavnost'*, for example, the policies perpetuated the idea of Russia as a key actor in the international arena. The policies also retained the idea of encirclement of Russia

⁴⁰ Michael MccGwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), 29.

⁴¹ Michael MccGwire, *Perestroika and Soviet National Security* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991), 11.

⁴² de Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*, 4-5.

by hostile forces.⁴³ Beginning with Putin's first term as Russia's president, Russian foreign and security policy increasingly emphasized the concept of Eurasianism and Russia's unique position and role in Eurasia, especially in relations with the states of the "near abroad," i.e. the former republics of the USSR.⁴⁴ By 2005, Russia had "decoupled" itself from the West in its foreign and security policies, and Putin's government had essentially repudiated Gorbachev and Yeltsin's policy of common security.⁴⁵

Statements of policy, doctrine and strategy themselves, however, do not influence a state's approach to an issue, such as conventional arms control. Whether one views these statements as pronouncements from on high, strategic communications to influence public opinion or other states' behavior, or marching orders to the state bureaucracy, they are reflections of the interests and behavior of actors operating within a system. Therefore, the literature on the actors, institutions and processes in which those policies are formulated, debated, approved and implemented also underpins this dissertation. In seeking to determine the relationship between Russian foreign and security policy and the CFE Treaty, in particular through the use of a process-tracing methodology (see "The Research Approach," below), this dissertation will also need to identify these actors, institutions and processes.

⁴³ de Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*, 5. For more on the development of Russian foreign and security policies and the continuity of these policies from the end of the Soviet era to 2010, see, respectively, Marcel de Haas, "Russia's Military Doctrine Development (2000-2010)" and Jacob Kipp, "Russian Military Doctrine: Past, Present and Future" in *Russian Military Politics and Russia's 2010 Defense Doctrine*, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), as well as de Haas, "Medvedev's Security Policy: A Provisional Assessment" and Henning Schroeder, "Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020" in *Russia's National Security Strategy*, Russian Analytical Digest No. 62 (18 June 2009).

⁴⁴ R. Craig Nation, "U.S. Interests in the New Eurasia" in *Russian Security Strategy Under Putin: U.S. and Russian Perspectives* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 3-4. Russia's unique position vis-à-vis the near abroad was already set out in the Yeltsin government's Military Doctrine and Foreign Policy Concept of 1993, according to Nation.

⁴⁵ Dmitri Trenin, "Russia's Threat Perception and Strategic Posture" in *Russian Security Strategy Under Putin: U.S. and Russian Perspectives*, 34-35.

Accounts of the policy apparatus in the later years of the Soviet Union provide background and a baseline for understanding the post-Soviet period. Prior to Gorbachev's assumption of power, the Soviets created a policy process to deal with arms control. "The Big Five," as it was known, brought together officials from key ministries and the CPSU under the Politburo from 1969 to the demise of the USSR in 1991.⁴⁶ Changes Gorbachev instituted in the organization of the CPSU (especially in the International Department) and in the MFA (particularly Eduard Shevardnadze's assertion of authority) figure prominently in these accounts.⁴⁷ Structural changes and the evolution of the perspectives of specific actors and institutions contributed to the development of Soviet foreign and security policy under Gorbachev, in that they exercised a moderating influence and produced a reorientation of Soviet military strategy in a more defensive direction.⁴⁸

The foreign and security policy apparatus, like many of the governing institutions of the Russian Federation, experienced growing pains under President Yeltsin.⁴⁹ Notwithstanding this

⁴⁶ Aleksandr G. Savel'ev and Nikolay N. Detinov, *The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1995). Officially the Politburo Commission for the Supervision of the Negotiations, the Big Five brought together the heads of the Ministry of Defense, Central Committee of the CPSU Department of Defense Industries, Foreign Ministry, Military-Industrial Commission of the Council of Ministers, and the Committee for State Security (KGB).

⁴⁷ Harry Gelman, *The Rise and Fall of National Security Decisionmaking in the Former USSR* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1992). On the International Department of the CPSU, see *The International Department of the CC CPSU Under Dobrynin* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Department of State, 1989); Mark Kramer, "The Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security Policy," *Soviet Studies* 42, no. 3 (July 1990): 429-446. On Shevardnadze, see Eduard Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom*, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: The Free Press, 1991). For additional insights and criticisms of these developments, see S.F. Akhromeyev and G.M. Kornienko, *Glazami Marshala i Diplomata* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1992).

⁴⁸ On the former point, see Matthew Evangelista, "Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy," in *Behavior, Society and Nuclear War, Vol. II*, eds. Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilley (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 254-354. On the latter point, see Gerard Snel, *From the Atlantic to the Urals: The Reorientation of Soviet Military Strategy, 1981-1990* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1996).

⁴⁹ F. Stephen Larrabee and Theodore W. Karasik. *Foreign and Security Policy Decisionmaking Under Yeltsin* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997).

initial assessment, to this researcher's knowledge, detailed studies of the foreign and security policy actors, institutions and processes in the Putin and Medvedev years have yet to be written. An extant study of the foreign and security policy documents of this period takes into consideration the apparatus but does not explore its workings because the study's focus is on the policy documents, themselves.⁵⁰ A work on Russian foreign policy under Dmitry Medvedev also highlights the role of key individuals and institutions in the development of policy but retains a focus on the Russian presidency rather than on the other actors in the process.⁵¹

The secondary literature is rich as it pertains to the historical narratives of this dissertation - the CFE Treaty and Soviet and Russian foreign and security policy. The richness, however, diminishes in its treatment of the post-Soviet period and the Russian Federation. Although some authors take account of the CFE Treaty in their examinations of Moscow's foreign and security policy, this researcher is not aware of any works that specifically explore the extent to which the CFE Treaty has been a deliberate tool of that policy for the Russian Federation.⁵² While the Gorbachev era has been the subject of a large body of literature, a goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the academic body of work on the foreign and security policy of the Russian Federation.

⁵⁰ de Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*.

⁵¹ Valerie A Pacer. *Russian Foreign Policy Under Dmitry Medvedev, 2008-2012* (London: Routledge, 2016).

⁵² Four examples are de Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*; Snel, *From the Atlantic to the Urals*; Evangelista, "Explaining the Cold War's End;" and Pacer, *Russian Foreign Policy Under Dmitry Medvedev, 2008-2012*.

The Research Approach

Research Questions

The primary research question for this dissertation is: to what extent has the CFE Treaty served the national security interests of the USSR and the Russian Federation? Secondary research questions are: What has been Moscow's approach to the negotiation and implementation of the CFE Treaty? What have been the foreign and security policies of the USSR and the Russian Federation? What actors have determined Soviet and Russian foreign and security policy, and through what processes have they done so?

Research Methodologies

To answer the research questions, this dissertation will employ a chronological historical design methodology and the methodologies of process tracing and structured, focused comparison.

Chronological Historical Design

The chronological historical design will consider two parallel historical narratives over the life of the CFE Treaty, from entry into force (EIF) of the original agreement in 1992 to 2015, when the Russians withdrew from participation in the JCG, the deliberative body established in the CFE Treaty.⁵³ For explanatory purposes in this chapter, the historical narratives will be depicted graphically, as well as explained in prose.

⁵³ *Entry into force* for a treaty is a point in time, following negotiation and signing of the treaty, when parties to the treaty complete their national procedures for ratification and the treaty comes into operation. Article XXII of the CFE Treaty stipulated that it would enter into force 10 days after all parties to the treaty had deposited their instruments of ratification with the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which is the Depository for the treaty. CFE Treaty Text, 23.

Narrative 1: The CFE Treaty

The first narrative, labeled “CFE Treaty,” traces a series of events in the life of the treaty, some of which, like review conferences (REVCONs), were endogenous to the treaty and others, such as the Russians’ suspension of implementation of the treaty, were exogenous to it (Figure 1.1. CFE Treaty Narrative).




Figure 1.1. CFE Treaty Narrative

Narrative 2: Russian Security Policy

The second narrative, labeled “Russian Security Policy,” examines the various iterations of Moscow’s officially promulgated foreign and security policies. These statements of policy, strategy and doctrine, as depicted in Figure 1.2. Russian Security Policy Narrative, graphically represent proxies for the actors whose interests they represent and the processes through which they are developed.




Figure 1.2. Russian Security Policy Narrative

Linking the Narratives: A Conceptual Framework

To provide a connective tissue between the two narratives, the dissertation will use a conceptual framework of the relationship between foreign and security policy and arms control. The framework is grounded in Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin’s observation that “arms control, if properly conceived, is not hostile to, or incompatible with, or alternative to, a military policy properly conceived.”⁵⁴ As a component of “military policy” and the more encompassing foreign and security policy, states pursue arms control as a means to mitigate threats and to shape and influence the security environment. Arms control could also constitute a “new political regime” for the management of improving relations between states, “a continuation of politics by

⁵⁴ Thomas C. Schelling and Morton Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (McLean, Virginia: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1985), 141. See also Robert Jervis’ “second postulate” of arms control: “arms control and security policy are not opposed to each other.” Robert Jervis, “Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War,” *Political Science Quarterly* 108, No. 2 (Summer 1993): 241.

other means.”⁵⁵ In pursuing arms control, however, states incur costs: limitations and constraints on their own military forces and activities, potentially unwanted transparency regarding forces and activities, and fiscal costs associated with, for example, destruction of armaments and conduct of verification activities.

The conceptual framework of the linkages between foreign and security policy and arms control is operationalized through two types of observations: content and effects. Regarding content, the linkages will be fairly explicit reflections of provisions of Russian foreign and security policy in the Russians’ words and actions in the negotiation and implementation of the CFE Treaty. Content will also include the roles of specific actors, institutions, and policy processes in both foreign and security policy and the CFE Treaty. Effects are further subdivided into desired and undesired effects. The former links Russia’s approach to the CFE Treaty to the mitigation of threats and favorable changes in the security environment as set out in foreign and security policy. The latter associates Russia’s approach to the CFE Treaty with costs as described above and their impact on foreign and security policy.

Case Study Design

The outcome of the application of the research design described above will likely be some degree of correlation between Russian foreign and security policy and approaches to the CFE Treaty. To take the results of the research beyond correlation, the dissertation will apply the methodologies of process tracing and structured, focused comparison to several detailed case studies to draw inferences about a causal relationship between actors in the Russian government

⁵⁵ Marc Trachtenberg, “The Past and Future of Arms Control” in Emanuel Adler, ed. *The International Practice of Arms Control* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 224-227. Trachtenberg cited the post-Cold War European security environment as one in which such a regime might arise.

apparatus whose interests and perspectives are represented in Russian foreign and security policy and the CFE Treaty. As noted by two practitioners of these methodologies, the use of both approaches can be a powerful source of inference.⁵⁶

The three cases for detailed study are drawn from specific years in the life of the CFE Treaty. The first case is the year 1999, in which Russia's opposition to NATO's operation ALLIED FORCE against the former Yugoslavia produced a breach in relations between Moscow and the alliance. Moscow's angst over NATO's air operations was compounded by the entry of the first tranche of former member states of the WTO (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) into the alliance. This hostility notwithstanding, the Russians signed the agreement to adapt the CFE Treaty at the Istanbul Summit of the OSCE in November 1999. The second case is the year 2004, in which the second tranche of NATO enlargement took place. This tranche was distinguished from the first by the inclusion of the three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which had de facto been part of the USSR. The selection of these first two cases also allows for study of one tranche of NATO enlargement that took place before Putin's ascendancy to the presidency of the Russian Federation and one that occurred during Putin's first term as president, thereby providing some control for the effect of Putin's rule on Russian security policy and the CFE Treaty. The third case is the year 2007, which began with Putin's "Russia is back"

⁵⁶ Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel, "Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices," in Bennett and Checkel, *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytical Tool*, 29. Matthew Evangelista, writing in the same volume, combines process tracing and comparative case studies of specific policy choices by Mikhail Gorbachev that contributed to the end of the Cold War (including agreement to the CFE Treaty) and Nikita Khrushchev's policies on the reduction of conventional armed forces in the 1950s (which also included a conventional arms control component). Evangelista's approach informs the methodology of this dissertation, which will carry the narrative forward beyond the signing of the CFE Treaty and its entry into force and through its de facto demise beginning in 2007. Evangelista, "Explaining the Cold War's End." On structured, focused comparison see Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Practice*, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 43-68; and "The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, ed. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005).

speech to the Munich Security Conference in February and ended with Moscow's suspension of implementation of the CFE Treaty in December, following an extraordinary meeting of the parties to the CFE Treaty that was convened at Moscow's request in June 2007.

Organization of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized as follows. **Chapter 1** introduces the dissertation. **Chapter 2** covers the history of the Soviets' approach to conventional arms control and provides context for the remainder of the study. This portion of the dissertation examines historically three instances in which the USSR pursued conventional arms control: the Genoa Conference in 1922, the negotiations in the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament in the mid-1950s and Nikita Khrushchev's unilateral reductions of conventional forces, and the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (M(B)FR) that took place from 1974 to 1989. An aim of this chapter is to assess whether the Soviets' advocacy of conventional arms control was more than just propaganda.

The topic of **Chapter 3** is the Gorbachev era, in which the USSR and the states of the WTO negotiated and signed the CFE Treaty with the U.S. and the NATO allies. Through an examination of the changes Gorbachev introduced into Soviet foreign and security policy, i.e. "new thinking" in international relations, defensive sufficiency, the idea of a "common European home," and the Soviets' approach to reductions in conventional arms and CFE Treaty negotiations, this chapter explains why the Soviets embraced the treaty. The chapter serves as a transition between Chapter 2 and the succeeding chapters, which chronicle the evolution of the

Russian Federation's foreign and security policies and attitude towards the CFE Treaty "from cautious optimism through growing frustration to outright hostility."⁵⁷

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 form the heart of the chronological historical design. Each examines the relationship between actors in the Russian government apparatus whose interests and perspectives are represented in Russian foreign and security policy and the CFE Treaty, and thereby seeks to identify causal aspects of the relationship through two means. First, the chapters set out the two historical narratives described above, CFE Treaty and Russian Security Policy. Second, the chapters include detailed case studies, which employ process tracing within the cases and structured, focused comparison across the cases. Figure 1.3, on page 31, offers a visualization of the contents and flow of these three chapters.

Chapter 4 covers the period 1992-1999. During this period, the treaty evolved to meet the demands of a security situation in Europe that had undergone fundamental change. Key events in the treaty's life during this period were the signing of the CFE 1A agreement on levels of military personnel in July 1992, the First REVCON and agreement on reducing Russian treaty liabilities in the so-called "flank" region in 1996, the agreement on the scope and parameters and basic elements of the negotiations mandate for the adaptation of the CFE Treaty to the changed security situation, and the negotiations and signing of the Agreement on the Adaptation of the CFE Treaty at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999. During this period, Boris Yeltsin's government formulated and issued the first formal statements of national security and foreign policy of the Russian Federation: the "National Security Concept" of 1997 and the

⁵⁷ Mark R. Wilcox, "Russia and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty): A Paradigm Change?" *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 24, no. 4 (December 2011): 580.

“Foreign Policy Concept” and “Military Doctrine” of 2003. The detailed case study for Chapter 4 is 1999, as described above on page 26.

Chapter 5 spans 2000-2006. The events in the life of the CFE Treaty during this period were the second and third REVCONs, which were held in 2001 and 2006, respectively. With the ascension of Vladimir Putin to the presidency in 2000, the Russian government revised the key national security and foreign policy documents Yeltsin’s government had adopted. A new document, the “Priority Tasks of the Armed Forces,” appeared in 2003. The detailed case study for Chapter 5 is 2004, the year in which the Russian legislature ratified the CFE adaptation agreement and the second tranche of NATO enlargement took place, as described above on page 26.

The period covered in **Chapter 6** begins in 2007 and ends in 2015. Key events in the life of the treaty occurred in 2007 and were all the products of Russia’s disenchantment with it. An extraordinary conference of the parties to the CFE Treaty took place in June 2007 at the request of the Russian Federation.⁵⁸ Having not obtained satisfaction at the conference, Putin decreed that the Russian Federation would end implementation of the treaty if the issues Moscow had raised were not addressed by that December. When this did not come to pass, the Russians officially suspended their implementation of inspections and exchanges of information about their armed forces effective December 2007. The Russian Federation de facto abandoned the CFE Treaty in 2015, when they withdrew from the JCG. As in the period covered in Chapter 5, the basic national security and foreign policies of the Russian Federation underwent revision, with new versions of the “Military Doctrine” and “Foreign Policy Concept” appearing in 2010,

⁵⁸ Article XXI of the CFE Treaty also allows for the convening of an extraordinary conference, “if requested to do so by any State Party which considers that exceptional circumstances relating to this Treaty have arisen.” CFE Treaty Text, 22.

2008 and 2013. Putin's government added a new document, the "National Security Strategy to 2020," in 2009. The detailed case for this chapter, as described above on pages 26-27, is the year 2007.

Chapters 4 through 6 are summarized graphically in Figure 1.3. Visualization of Chapters 4-6, below. Chapter 4 is rendered in red, Chapter 5 in blue and Chapter 6 in yellow.




Figure 1.3. Visualization of Chapters 4-6

Chapter 2 - The U.S.S.R. and Conventional Arms Control:

Antecedents to the CFE Treaty

Until the Gorbachev years, conventional arms control had been a subject to be supported for political reasons but not pursued seriously.

*Oleg Grinevskiy, Head of the Soviet Delegation to the CFE Treaty Negotiations*⁵⁹

In November 1990, the leaders of the Soviet Union, the remaining states of the WTO, and NATO signed the CFE Treaty. By the time the treaty entered into force in 1992, the USSR and the WTO no longer existed. In 2007, the successor state to the USSR, the Russian Federation, suspended implementation of the treaty.

In order to set the context for these events, this chapter will consider three instances in which the Soviets engaged in negotiations on conventional arms control (or at least offered a proposal): the Genoa Conference of 1922, the negotiations in and around the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee in London, c. 1955-1957, and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations held in Vienna, 1973-1986. The purpose of this chapter is not to examine proposals in detail, nor is it to offer a blow-by-blow account of the negotiations. Rather, the intent is to discern broad trends that might contribute to an understanding of Moscow's equities in and approach to conventional arms control negotiations.

In none of the three instances under consideration this chapter did Moscow's proposals lead to an agreement. In 1922, Lenin's motivation was pure political mischief-making in the form of using an unexpected and unwelcome arms control proposal as a means to divide the

⁵⁹ Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Jane M.O. Sharpe and Lawrence Freedman, eds. *The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: The Politics of Post-Wall Arms Control* (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996), 14.

bourgeois states that were represented at the Genoa Conference. Khrushchev's arms control initiatives in the mid-1950's also served a political purpose as part of a post-Stalin policy of détente. Unlike in 1922, however the proposals had some substance and included measures that would reappear in the CFE Treaty negotiations. In the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations, under Brezhnev's leadership the Soviets also pursued arms control as part of a policy of détente with the West. Over the course of more than a decade, however, they proved unable to overcome basic conceptual differences with their western counterparts over the degree of balance or imbalance between the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

The Genoa Conference, 1922

The Strategic Setting

Disarmament made its debut in Soviet foreign policy, albeit in a minor supporting role, concurrently with the Bolshevik regime's first steps onto the international diplomatic stage.⁶⁰ The Soviets' initial foray into multilateral diplomacy at the Genoa Conference in 1922 reflected a shift in foreign policy to account for the realities of a situation in which socialist revolutions were not breaking out everywhere, let alone just in Germany, the prospects for a crisis in capitalism were not bright, and the dangers of international and external military threats to the Bolshevik regime had diminished. Facing an economic crisis at home, the Soviet leadership turned abroad for financial assistance.⁶¹ In the words of one author, "The conference was the

⁶⁰ "The world's first socialist state began its participation in multilateral international conferences by putting forward concrete disarmament proposals." V. Viktorov, "The Soviet Programme of Struggle for Disarmament, *International Affairs*, January 1977, (Vol. 23, No. 1): 74; A. Karenin, "The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament, *International Affairs*, September 1975, (Vol. 21, No. 9): 14.

⁶¹ For a concise and thorough account of this adjustment in Soviet foreign policy and the debate about it within the Bolshevik leadership, see Teddy J. Uldricks, "Russia and Europe: Diplomacy, Revolution, and Economic Development in the 1920s," *The International History Review*, January 1979 (Vol. 1, No. 1): 55-83.

central event in a tentative and contentious postwar détente between Soviet Russia and the Allied powers,” although one that would produce few results.⁶² In fact, the main achievement of the Genoa Conference for Moscow was the Treaty of Rapallo, which the Soviets concluded with Germany on the margins of the conference.

This is not to say that Moscow had not raised disarmament issues prior to the Genoa Conference. The Soviets, although excluded from attending the Washington Naval Conference in 1921, viewed it in a positive light, at least from a class perspective. People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin, in protesting Russia’s exclusion, declared that Moscow “could only give a warm welcome to disarmament of any kind or to the reduction of military expenditure, under which the workers of the world were prostrated.”⁶³ Chicherin’s comment, transmitted in a telegram to governments that had been invited to the Washington Conference, was the Russian government’s first formal position on disarmament.⁶⁴

The Soviets’ preparations for the Genoa Conference included appeals with a disarmament angle targeted at specific European powers. Chicherin, for example, declared Russia’s support for a disarmament program “if the matter was discussed at Genoa.”⁶⁵ While in Berlin on the way to Genoa, Chicherin drew attention to a speech by British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and agreed with the prime minister that “the problem of a general reduction of land armies [is] the most important task of the Genoa conference” because, in part, the danger of war and

⁶² John Jacobson, *When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 82.

⁶³ Walter C. Clemens, Jr., “Lenin on Disarmament,” *Slavic Review*, September 1964 (Vol. 23, No. 3): 508.

⁶⁴ Department of State, Regulation of Armaments Branch, Division of International Security Affairs, “The USSR and Disarmament, 1921-1932,” August 1946, 1, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010011-5.pdf>.

⁶⁵ Walter Duranty, “Tells Soviet Plans for Genoa Parley,” *The New York Times*, 23 January 1922.

“continued arming” were factors that contributed to “economic disorganization.”⁶⁶ People’s Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs Leon Trotsky also raised disarmament prior to the conference. Trotsky indicated that Russia would support the disarmament question at Genoa “to the utmost” if it was raised and “if America supported it.”⁶⁷ Trotsky’s public comments, like Chicherin’s, should have alerted the other European governments to the Russians’ intent to raise disarmament at Genoa, heedless of the exclusion of the topic from the agenda of the conference, primarily at the urging of the French.⁶⁸

The Genoa Conference of April-June 1922 and a follow-up conference held in Moscow in December of that year marked the Russians’ first use of arms control as an instrument of policy. The very fact of Russia’s attendance at the conference strengthened its recognition as a power that would have to be reckoned with in European affairs.⁶⁹

Moscow’s Approach to Conventional Arms Control

Motivation

The policy context for disarmament measures with the capitalist states (or even normal diplomatic intercourse, for that matter) was peaceful coexistence.⁷⁰ Just as the New Economic

⁶⁶ “Tchitcherin [sic] Lauds Views of Premier,” *The New York Times*, 5 April 1922.

⁶⁷ Duranty, “Genoa Parleys Will Fail, Trotsky Says, If We Don’t Attend,” *The New York Times*, 19 January 1922.

⁶⁸ When French Prime Minister Poincaré met with British Prime Minister Lloyd George in Boulogne in February 1922 to plan for the Genoa Conference, Poincaré urged that disarmament not be raised at the conference. Lloyd George agreed, given that the issue was being considered by the League of Nations. Stephen White, *The Origins of Détente: The Genoa Conference and Soviet-Western Relations, 1921-1922* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 70.

⁶⁹ A.A. Gromyko and B.N. Ponomarev, eds. *Istoriya Vneshney Politiki SSSR, 1917-1985, Tom pervyi, 1917-1945 gg.*, (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), 160.

⁷⁰ Franklyn Griffiths, “The Origins of Peaceful Coexistence,” *Survey*, January 1964 (No. 50): 195.

Policy (NEP) redefined economic relations within Russia in the early 1920s, a new emphasis on traditional diplomacy laid out a new path for relations between Russia and the great powers. The advocacy of disarmament signaled a shift (in 1921-1922) for Lenin and the Soviet leadership away from criticism of disarmament as an abandonment of the proletarian revolution.⁷¹

The Soviets' focus at the Genoa Conference was on economic matters, in particular a favorable resolution of disputes with other powers over debts and property and a flow of foreign investment into Russia. As Lenin told the XI Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) (RCP(B)) shortly before the Genoa Conference, "We will go to Genoa with a practical goal – to broaden trade and create conditions under which it would develop much more broadly and successfully."⁷² To achieve this goal, or at least to gain a favorable outcome should this not prove possible, the Soviet delegation would seek to divide the other powers that would be attending the conference.⁷³ Disarmament, as one element – certainly not one of the main ones - of the Soviets' approach to the Genoa Conference, would be a means to try to sow this division.⁷⁴

The delegation's position, which Chicherin prepared based on guidance from Lenin, was to be a "broad pacifist program" whose goal was to divide the Western powers and convince the more "pacifist and semi-pacifist wing" of the bourgeoisie" to reach agreement with Russia on

⁷¹ Clemens, "Lenin on Disarmament:" 506, 516.

⁷² Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the CPSU, *V.I. Lenin – Polnoe sobranie sochineniy*, (Moscow: Political Literature Publishing, 1970,) volume 45, 70.

⁷³ *V.I. Lenin – Polnoe sobranie sochineniy*, volume 45, 70.

⁷⁴ In one account that is sympathetic to the Soviets, disarmament is relegated to a parenthetical reference in a description of Chicherin's opening speech to the conference. Evgeny Chossudovsky, "Genoa Revisited: Russia and Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1972 (Vol. 50, No. 3): 556. An account in a Soviet journal elevated the disarmament proposal to "one of the major items in Lenin's programme" for Genoa." M. Trush, "Lenin's Foreign Policy Activity (April-July 1922)," *International Affairs* (Moscow), January 1970 (Vol. 16, No. 1): 63.

the economic issues that would dominate the agenda of the conference.⁷⁵ One of the thirteen points for the “broad pacifist program” was a disarmament proposal, “which would not be acceptable to western governments.”⁷⁶ Lenin noted that the program should include “an amendment to the rules of war with various prohibitions: abolition of submarines, chemical gases, mortars, flamethrowers, and aerial armed combat.”⁷⁷

Prior to the Genoa Conference, the Soviets obtained agreement from Estonia, Latvia and Poland on a protocol, which included a joint declaration on limitations on armaments. The declaration included specific provisions about the security of borders and frontier areas, as well as the dangers of “concentrations of hostile forces in the vicinity of their frontiers, as well as raids of these forces into the territory of the neighbouring [sic] country.” Finally, it recognized “that each government bears responsibility for the formation on its territory of armed bands, as well as for their incursions into the territory of the neighbouring State.” These latter provisions seem to have been aimed at preventing support for opposition forces, such as the White forces that had fought the Bolsheviks during the civil war, which had recently ended in Russia. Having endorsed these provisions, the delegates at Riga expressed their opinion “that it would be useful if the countries here represented were to work out at Genoa precise proposals for the realization of the above principles.”⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Jacobson, *When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics*, 88. The broad elements of this program were diplomatic recognition, pledges of nonaggression, equality in relations, noninterference in states’ internal affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes, general reduction of armaments and a prohibition on submarine, aerial and chemical warfare, and an international conference on economic recovery.

⁷⁶ Griffiths, “The Origins of Peaceful Coexistence:” 199. On Chicherin’s proposed points and Lenin’s comments on them, see also Chossudovsky, “Genoa Revisited: Russia and Coexistence:” 564.

⁷⁷ *V.I. Lenin – Polnoe sobranie sochineniy*, volume 45, 38.

⁷⁸ White, *The Origins of Détente*, 120. Text of the Riga Protocol is from Jane Degras, ed., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy: Volume I, 1917-1924* (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), 296-298.

Chicherin's introduction of a disarmament proposal during the opening session of the conference appeared to at least one western observer as an attempt "to start trouble among the countries facing Russia." Chicherin was, after all, aware that disarmament was not to be a topic for discussion at the Genoa Conference.⁷⁹ A contemporary assessment suggested two reasons to view the Soviets' disarmament offer at Genoa as a tactical move only. First, behind the Soviets' rhetoric and ideas, including "the burning desire for disarmament," lurked one motivation – obtain money from the western countries. Second, the Soviets' apparent offer to make substantial cuts in their armed forces if other nations would do the same was based on suspect numbers. The offer was based on declared Soviet manpower strength of 1,450,000. The seriousness of this offer, essentially the only specific provision the Soviets suggested, was doubtful. As a press report noted, "The chief trouble of this offer is that all the allied reports show that the Russian Army is not more than 600,000 men."⁸⁰

Chicherin, in the speech he delivered to the conference's first plenary session on 10 April 1922, used the New Economic Policy (NEP), which had been introduced by Lenin in 1921 and which, among other things, created favorable legal guarantees to support economic cooperation between countries and Soviet Russia, to tee up his disarmament proposal. He told the conference that his delegation would "propose a general reduction of armaments," to include "a complete prohibition of [war's] most barbarous forms, like poisonous gases, aerial armed

⁷⁹ Edwin L. James, "Genoa 'Big Four' To Act as One Unit on Soviets' Demands," *The New York Times*, 14 April 1922.

⁸⁰ Edwin L. James, "Russia's Real Aim Is a Foreign Loan; Britain Only Ally Likely to Make One; Lloyd George Terms May Be Accepted," *The New York Times*, 17 April 1922. A sub-heading to the headline was "Truth About Army Known – Is 600,000 Men Instead of 1,450,000 Soviet Offered to Reduce by 50 Per Cent." This apparent obfuscation by the Soviets of military manpower numbers presaged similar ambiguity about armed forces that western negotiators would face over the life of the USSR.

combat and others, in particular employment of means of destruction directed against the peaceful population.” Russia was ‘prepared to carry out a reduction of armaments...under conditions of full and unconditional reciprocity and creation for it of necessary guarantees from any possible attack and interference in its internal affairs.’”⁸¹

Results and Subsequent Actions

The disarmament proposals Chicherin set out in his opening statement to the Genoa Conference on 10 April 1922 met swift rejection by the other states, led by the French delegation. Although, according to the American ambassador to Italy, Chicherin’s statement was the sole highlight of the session, the other delegations gained the impression that the Russians’ interests were in scoring propaganda points rather than offering any guarantees so the conference as a whole could deal with the “Russian problem.”⁸² Notwithstanding the failure of the disarmament initiative at the Genoa Conference, the Soviets revived it at the follow-up conference held at The Hague in June 1922. A Dutch newspaper quoted Trotsky in May 1922 to the effect that a reduction of the Soviet army by half “depended on the final success of the conference.”⁸³

As that session also collapsed, Chicherin issued invitations to the delegations of Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Poland to attend a conference on disarmament that would eventually take

⁸¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Russia, Historic-Documentation Department. “Neizvestnyi Chicherin: Rech’ na pervom plenarnom zasedanii Genuezskoy konferentsii, 10 aprelya 1922 g.,” http://www.idd.mid.ru/inf/inf_35.html.

⁸² “Failure of the Genoa Conference to Achieve an Understanding between Russia and the Other Powers,” telegram from The Ambassador in Italy (Child) to the Secretary of State, 11 April 1922, in United States Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, Vol. 2*. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1922), 770-771, <http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1922v02/reference/frus.frus1922v02.i0028.pdf>.

⁸³ “Trotsky Now Says War Is Impossible,” *The New York Times*, 31 May 1922.

place in Moscow in December 1922.⁸⁴ This conference also ended without an agreement, reportedly over a discrepancy in the military personnel strength Poland reported to the conference and to the League of Nations.⁸⁵ The motivation behind the organization of the Moscow Conference may have been more directly linked to the military security of the Soviet state than that behind the proposal tabled at Genoa. Had Moscow still been sensitive to the possibility of an invasion, Poland would have been the likely place of its origin, so the Soviets unsuccessfully pressed the Poles for limitations on their land forces.⁸⁶ The reductions the Russians proposed to neighboring states at the Moscow Conference, proportional reductions in ground forces, reductions in military budgets, neutralization of border zones and the elimination of irregular armed formations, suffered the same fate as Chicherin's proposals at Genoa.⁸⁷

Conclusion

Was the introduction of a disarmament proposal by the Soviets at the Genoa Conference purely a tactical move? The evidence points to such a conclusion; however, one account suggests a motive that went beyond purely divide-and-conquer tactics. A task of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in January 1921 was the development of a campaign to inform the public about Soviet aims for the conference. One of Chicherin's suggestions for this campaign was for it to "stigmatize the danger of fresh military intervention against Soviet Russia

⁸⁴ Degras, ed., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, 321-322.

⁸⁵ Clemens, "Lenin on Disarmament:" 515. See also Department of State, "The USSR and Disarmament," 2. This result seemed to presage the difficulties that arose six decades later in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (M(B)FR) talks, in which disagreements over levels of personnel contributed to the deadlock in the negotiations.

⁸⁶ P.H. Vigor, *The Soviet View of Disarmament* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 79.

⁸⁷ Gromyko and Ponomarev, *Istoriya Vneshney Politiki SSSR*, 172-173.

...because it would endanger the country's efforts at economic reconstruction."⁸⁸ Bearing in mind the situation in 1922 – fresh memories of the civil war and military defeat at the hands of the Poles, shift to the NEP to hasten economic reconstruction, and a military build-up that still lay in the future – this rationale seems to be a reasonable adjunct to the tactical value of the disarmament proposal.

The failure of the Soviets' first attempt at disarmament diplomacy was no surprise. Their disarmament proposal was subordinated to a larger agenda, namely a quest for diplomatic recognition and financial engagement with the other major powers. A product of the broader policy of peaceful coexistence, this gambit neither contributed to Russia's security nor placed limitations on either armed forces or armaments. Within four years of the Genoa Conference, the Soviets would embark on a retooling of the economy to support a massive industrial build-up to support the construction of a powerful military capability.⁸⁹

One could argue that all was not lost in the Russians' arms control adventure at Genoa and Moscow in 1922. They succeeded in insinuating arms control into the agenda of European politics. The Moscow Conference, in particular, "played a great role in propaganda of the idea of peace and called attention of the popular masses to the issue of Russians took shortly after these meetings – unilateral reductions in the manpower of the armed forces to reduce the burden of military spending."⁹⁰ Kliment Voroshilov, the people's commissar for defense, followed this narrative in an article he published in 1926, in which he criticized the capitalist states' approach to disarmament, emphasized the Soviet Union's "adherence to the cause of disarmament," and

⁸⁸ Chossudovsky, "Genoa Revisited: Russia and Coexistence:" 562.

⁸⁹ For an account of this transformation and rearmament, see David R. Stone, *Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000).

⁹⁰ Gromyko and Ponomarev, *Istoriya Vneshney Politiki SSSR*, 173.

noted approvingly Chicherin's proposals at the Genoa Conference.⁹¹ By 1924, the Red Army had shrunk from 5.5 million men to 562,000 and was moving away from a large standing army to a smaller one supplemented by territorial formations that could be called up when needed.⁹² Not for the last time, the Russians followed a course of proposing arms control measures and then carrying out unilateral reductions in conventional forces in the face of economic demands. Nikita Khrushchev did so in the late 1950s and Mikhail Gorbachev followed three decades later.⁹³

The Soviets continued to propose various disarmament measures throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and again after the Second World War. Not until the mid-1950s, however, did their proposals gain serious attention from the other powers and engender extended negotiations. Rather than a broad call for general disarmament, the Soviet arms control proposals of the 1950s would be quite specific, especially in their treatment of conventional forces and armaments.

⁹¹ Andrey A. Kokoshin, *Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-91* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998), 80.

⁹² Gromyko and Ponomarev, *Istoriya Vneshney Politiki SSSR*, 173. On the reductions in manpower and restructuring, see A.A. Grechko, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State: A Soviet View*, trans. under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 38; David Stone, *Hammer and Rifle*, 20; Harriet Fast Scott and William Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), 9.

⁹³ It is perhaps not a coincidence that Gromyko and Ponomarev's history of Soviet foreign relations cited above was published in 1986, when Gorbachev was preparing a sweeping arms control proposal.

The United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament, 1955-1957

The Strategic Setting

As was the case in 1922, the context for the Soviets' approach toward disarmament in the mid 1950s included broader domestic political and external issues. Domestically, the jockeying for influence among Stalin's successors came to a head in February 1955, one month before the Soviets tabled a comprehensive arms control proposal. Nikita Khrushchev engineered the ouster of Georgiy Malenkov as head of the Soviet government and his replacement by Mikhail Bulganin (the Defense Minister), as well as the elevation of Marshal Georgiy Zhukov to succeed Bulganin. Security concerns for the Soviets in the mid-1950s included, but were not limited to, the consolidation of NATO and the status of Germany. Zhukov warned of the unfavorable development of the balance of forces in Europe in a speech published in the armed forces' newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star) in late February 1955.⁹⁴

To address these security concerns, the Soviet leadership struck out in a number of directions in Europe. As one expert pointed out in 1956, specific actions by the Soviets in the mid-1950s – withdrawal of troops from Austria, reconciliation with Tito's Yugoslavia, grant of limited autonomy to the Polish government, and repression of the rebellion in Hungary – had to be taken into consideration in order to gain an understanding of the Soviets' approach to disarmament and conventional arms control at the time.⁹⁵ The addition of the signing of the

⁹⁴ Matthew Evangelista, "Cooperation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1950s," *World Politics* 42, no. 4 (July 1990): 510.

⁹⁵ United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament. "Control and Reduction of Armaments: Attitudes of Soviet Leaders Toward Disarmament," Staff Study No. 8, 6 June 1957 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1957), 32. The expert, Harold J. Berman of Harvard University, characterized these actions as parts of a retreat by the USSR in response to a realization by the post-Stalin leadership of the costs of maintaining control over Eastern Europe.

Warsaw Treaty in May 1955 completed the picture of the breadth of the evolution of the Soviets' policy towards Europe in the mid-1950s. In rapid succession, the Soviets tabled a comprehensive arms control proposal at the UN Disarmament Subcommittee in London (10 May), oversaw the signing of the Warsaw Treaty (14 May), and signed the Austrian State Treaty (15 May). For good measure, they announced a forthcoming summit meeting of the wartime allies and a visit by a Soviet delegation to Yugoslavia.⁹⁶

Moscow's Approach to Conventional Arms Control

Motivation

In contrast to the Soviets' approach to the Genoa Conference in 1922, however, the specificity of Soviet proposals in the mid-1950s and concrete unilateral measures undertaken by Khrushchev offer clues to Moscow's motivation and goals. They also point to an approach to arms control distinct from Stalin's, which was characterized by "sweeping and immediate measures that were crudely aimed at crippling the West militarily."⁹⁷ This new approach transcended considerations of tactics and propaganda value.

The agreement by the Soviets to the Austrian State Treaty in May 1955, and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria, is especially illustrative of an approach to foreign relations that differed from what the USSR pursued during Stalin's rule. The Soviets abandoned their obstruction of a treaty that had languished for eight years, agreed to terms that

⁹⁶ Vojtech Mastny, "Kremlin Politics and the Austria Settlement," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1982 (Vol. 31, No. 4): 47. See also Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991* (New York: Central European University Press, 2005), 2-4.

⁹⁷ Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens and Franklyn Griffiths, *Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament: The Decade Under Khrushchev, 1954-1964* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1965), 8.

were less favorable than those that had originally been proposed, and reached agreement with the Austrians before the Western powers had had the chance to digest the deal. According to one author, “The Austrian State Treaty, reversing the previous trend in East-West relations, inaugurated what might be called the first period of détente.”⁹⁸ Khrushchev, himself, compared the deliberations that led to the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty to Soviet disarmament efforts. Facing criticism for his handling of Soviet foreign policy from Vyacheslav Molotov at a CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 12 July 1955, Khrushchev chided the foreign minister for having dragged his feet on a resolution of the Austrian issue and then taking credit for having resolved it.⁹⁹ Khrushchev then turned to arms control, drawing a parallel with Soviet behavior towards Austria: “For a long time we took an incorrect position, proposing to cut the armed forces of all countries by one third...By making that sort of proposal, we give the imperialists trump cards to decline our proposal; we will look like opponents of disarmament.” The Soviets’ answer to this misstep was a new arms control offer, which took a more realistic approach that accounted for the specific characteristics of states “to attain arms cuts to an appropriate level.” In Khrushchev’s view, the correctness of this action was evident in that it permitted the Soviets “the possibility of taking the initiative.”¹⁰⁰ In a word, Khrushchev was making the case for a type of new thinking in Soviet foreign policy.

⁹⁸ Mastny, “Kremlin Politics and the Austria Settlement,” 37. Mastny describes how debates in Moscow about resolving the issue of Austria were linked to internal disputes among the post-Stalin leadership (especially Khrushchev and Molotov) and Khrushchev’s initiative for a reconciliation with Tito’s Yugoslavia.

⁹⁹ “Central Committee Plenum of the CPSU Ninth Session, Concluding Words by Com. N.S. Khrushchev, 12 July 1955,” *Cold War International History Project Digital Archive*, Soviet Foreign Policy Collection, http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/va2/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=home.document&identifier=5034F2BA-96B6-175C-991C792058E56E6D&sort=collection&item=Soviet%20Foreign%20Policy.

¹⁰⁰ “Central Committee Plenum of the CPSU Ninth Session, Concluding Words by Com. N.S. Khrushchev, 12 July 1955.”

Proposals

Specificity was a characteristic of Moscow's arms control proposals in the 1950s.

Proposals the Soviet delegation offered at meetings of the UN Disarmament Commission in 1955 and 1956 included a phased approach for a freeze and subsequent reduction in the levels of armaments, personnel and military spending for the five permanent members of the UN within a given time frame, the establishment of a "control organ" to monitor the reductions at fixed posts on the territories of the states, submission of data on armaments, personnel and budget to the control organ, "objects of control" to which the control organ would have unfettered access, a "zone of limitation and inspection of armaments" that would encompass the two Germanies, and (in the proposal of 1956) the possibility of aerial observation as a confidence-building measure.¹⁰¹ Some of the details bear brief examination, because they offer insights into the Soviets' approaches and goals, and because certain of them foreshadowed measures that would appear several decades later in the CFE Treaty.¹⁰²

On 10 May 1955 the Soviets tabled a "proposal for cutting armaments that contained some advances over their previous announcements, particularly on conventional weapons."¹⁰³ They later boldly asserted that the provisions of this proposal, "occupy one of the most important places in the history of negotiations on this problem."¹⁰⁴ Specific provisions of the proposal

¹⁰¹ "Differences Between Soviet Proposals of March 27 and May 10," annex to "Memorandum to Governor Stassen, subject: Soviet Disarmament Policy, 1956," 31 March 1956, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament (Harold Stassen): Records, 1955-58; Box 11; UN Disarmament Subcommittee – London, Mar 21-31, 1956 (4), Dwight D. Eisenhower (DDE) Library.

¹⁰² Matthew Evangelista identifies "a number of remarkable parallels" between Khrushchev's approach and Mikhail Gorbachev's in the 1980s. They include specific measures and unilateral reductions in conventional forces. Evangelista, "Cooperation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1950s:" 525.

¹⁰³ "Random Notes from Washington: Bohlen Coaches Team for Geneva," *The New York Times*, 27 June 1955.

¹⁰⁴ Zorin, *Bor'ba sovetskogo soyuza za razoruzheniye*, 185.

included the removal of occupation forces from Germany and the “liquidation” of military bases on the territory of other states, both aimed at subverting the processes of West Germany’s rearmament and the country’s integration into NATO. Along with a prohibition on nuclear weapons and the establishment of a “control organ” (a body charged with verifying compliance with the terms of an agreement), the Soviets proposed “[a] major reduction in all armed forces and all conventional armaments.”¹⁰⁵ The Soviets designed the first stage of their disarmament plan to include only conventional forces, in the form of a pledge by the parties “not to increase their armed forces and conventional armaments above the level obtaining on 31 December 1954” and an exchange of information by the U.S., USSR, China, the United Kingdom and France on “complete official figures of their armed forces, conventional armaments and expenditures for military requirements.” Along with reductions in manpower the five powers would work to reduce their conventional armaments.¹⁰⁶

Was this offer a genuine first step by the Soviets towards conventional disarmament? The most significant aspects of the proposal of 10 May 1955 were the sequencing of measures of conventional disarmament before nuclear reductions and specified levels for the armed forces of the major powers. Aggregate limitations on the levels of manpower of armed forces, along with corresponding quantities of conventional armaments, constitute a fundamental element of conventional arms control that would bedevil negotiators in the mid-1950’s and their successors decades later. As for the sincerity of this proposal, according to one author, the Soviets’

¹⁰⁵ “Soviet Proposal Introduced in the Disarmament Subcommittee: Reduction of Armaments, the Prohibition of Atomic Weapons, and the Elimination of the Threat of a New War, May 10, 1955,” U.S. Department of State, *Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959*, vol. 1 (1945-1956) (Washington, DC, 1960), 460.

¹⁰⁶ “Soviet Proposal Introduced in the Disarmament Subcommittee: Reduction of Armaments, the Prohibition of Atomic Weapons, and the Elimination of the Threat of a New War, May 10, 1955,” 461.

unilateral reductions of their armed forces by approximately 1.84 million men, in the wake of the rejection by the U.S. of the 10 May proposal, demonstrated “Soviet interest in some form of disarmament...If the Soviets were willing to undertake such measures unilaterally...they would have preferred to have the Western powers limit their forces as well.”¹⁰⁷

The Soviets persisted in their efforts in the wake of the Western powers’ rejection of their proposal, Germany’s entry into NATO, and the signing of the Warsaw Treaty. The USSR tabled a “Draft Agreement on the Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Armed Forces” on 27 March 1956, a “sharp reversal of previous Soviet proposals which concentrated on the elimination of nuclear weapons as a precondition for any agreement,” in that it covered only conventional armaments and armed forces.¹⁰⁸ Soviet delegate Andrey Gromyko explained that the USSR was proposing a “‘different approach’ to the disarmament [problem] since the linking of conventional and atomic disarmament ‘has been a serious trouble on the way to an agreement.’”¹⁰⁹ Moscow also brought their WTO allies on board with the proposal that included a zone of limited armaments in the two Germanies and neighboring states, reductions or total withdrawal of foreign forces from that zone, and the prohibition of nuclear weapons there.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Evangelista, “Cooperation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1950s:” 510-511.

¹⁰⁸ “USSR: Proposal, Agreement on the Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Armed Forces” (official translation), *Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS)* 1989, fiche 24, document 368. See also Memorandum for Stassen, “Soviet Disarmament Policy, 1956,” March 31, 1956; White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament (Harold Stassen): Records, 1955-58; Box 11; UN Disarmament Subcommittee – London, Mar 21-31, 1956 (4), DDE Library; and “Confidential Sections of Intelligence Report on Soviet March 27 Proposal” (Secretariat Note 65), April 4, 1956, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament (Harold Stassen): Records, 1955-58; Box 18; USSR – Disarmament Proposals (1956) (15), DDE Library.

¹⁰⁹ Bloomfield, Clemens and Griffiths. *Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament*, 16; Zorin, *Bor’ba sovetskogo soyuza za razoruzheniye*, 204.

¹¹⁰ Catherine McArdle Kelleher, “The Political Context of Conventional Arms Control Efforts in Europe,” in Kelleher, Sharpe and Freedman, eds., *The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: The Politics of Post-Wall Arms Control*, 41. See also V.A. Zorin, ed., *Bor’ba sovetskogo soyuza za razoruzheniye, 1946-1960 gody*, (Moscow: International Relations Institute, 1961), 416, 418.

The Soviets later asserted that they changed their tack from 1955 to 1956 in order to overcome Western resistance to reductions in atomic weapons as a part of an arms control agreement.

The Soviet proposal of 1956 also introduced another component that would appear decades later in the CFE Treaty, “objects of control,” which linked limitations, information exchanged and verification. Under the proposals, a “control organ” (a body charged with verification responsibilities), would have the right to station on the territory of parties to the agreement inspectors, who would enjoy “unimpeded access at all times to all objects of control [which were] military units; stores of military equipment and ammunition; land, naval and air bases; factories manufacturing conventional armaments and ammunition.”¹¹¹ The detailed specification of “objects of control” was a positive development because it indicated the Soviets were looking seriously at the functioning of the “control organ,” rather than just throwing an abstraction onto the negotiating table.¹¹² According to the U.S. State Department, Moscow had found itself in a situation in which it could count on its nuclear deterrent and draw significant manpower reserves to be activated in the event of a crisis. Therefore, “while there may have been certain tactical motivations underlying the new Soviet move, and Moscow may expect considerable tactical advantages from its rejection by the West, *the proposal may in fact constitute an effort to come to a limited agreement in the field of conventional disarmament*” (emphasis added).¹¹³

¹¹¹ “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Proposal” (DPC Note 44), March 29, 1956; White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament (Harold Stassen): Records, 1955-58; Box 1; D[isarmament] P[roblem] C[ommittee] Notes [18-63] (4); DDE Library.

¹¹² Memorandum for Stassen, “Soviet Disarmament Policy, 1956.”

¹¹³ “Confidential Sections of Intelligence Report on Soviet March 27 Proposal.” Additional discussion and analysis of the Soviet proposals are in “Summary Minutes, Meeting of the President’s Special Committee on Disarmament Problems, Chart Room, Executive Office Building, March 30, 1956 – 10:30 a.m. “ (DPC/RA-18), *DDRS* 1989, fiche 158, document 2849; and “Analysis of Soviet Proposals of March 27, 1956 Re: Disarmament,” *DDRS* 1985, fiche 37, document 507).

Results and Subsequent Actions

Why would the Soviets seek manpower limits and other controls on conventional armaments? Both Washington and Moscow were carrying out defense reforms that envisioned reductions in conventional armed forces, especially ground forces, and reliance instead on nuclear capabilities. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was not alone in holding the opinion that the Soviets' motivation was that a disarmament agreement "would allow them to release manpower for increasing consumer goods production as well as to achieve a better position in economic warfare with the West."¹¹⁴ One Western analyst, drawing on accounts from defectors and a work published in 1988 by a Soviet participant in the disarmament negotiations, suggested that this offer, like all Soviet proposals of the period, was a serious step toward disarmament by Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership.¹¹⁵

In addition to offering specific proposals for the reduction of conventional armed forces, the Soviets took unilateral action. On 14 May 1956, Moscow announced a plan to reduce the armed forces by 1,200,000 men. According to an analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency, "The Soviet leaders appeared confident that their unilateral force reductions will eventually force the Western powers to curtail their military spending and reduce their armed forces, even in the absence of a formal disarmament agreement."¹¹⁶ Western rejection of the Soviet proposal of 10

¹¹⁴ "Secretary's Briefing on Disarmament, April 3, 1956;" White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament (Harold Stassen): Records, 1955-58; Box 11; UN Disarmament Subcommittee – London, Apr 1-15, 1956 (6); DDE Library. See also Stassen aide Howard Meyers' comments to Stassen following the latter's meeting with Khrushchev and Bulganin in London, April 24, 1956, "Comments on Stassen-Khrushchev Conversation, April 24," *DDRS* 1993, fiche 219, document 2543.

¹¹⁵ Matthew Evangelista, "Why Keep Such an Army?": Khrushchev's Troop Reductions," Working Paper No. 19, *Cold War International History Project*, December 1997, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ACFB43.pdf>.

¹¹⁶ "Bulganin's Letter to President Eisenhower," Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Memorandum for Deputy Director (Intelligence), June 9, 1956; White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament (Harold Stassen): Records, 1955-58; Box 18; USSR Disarmament Proposals (1956) (8); DDE Library.

May 1955 notwithstanding, Khrushchev oversaw a significant reduction in the manning of the Soviet armed forces, from an authorized strength of 5,396,038 in 1953 to an actual strength of 4,147,496 in January 1956.¹¹⁷ These reductions have also been linked to changing military requirements, based on new doctrine and force modernization in the nuclear age, or economic requirements for more manpower to satisfy agricultural needs.¹¹⁸ Writing later, “Khrushchev justified the cuts by associating them with his broader disarmament proposals: ‘to fight for disarmament or arms reductions at the time the Soviet Union had such an enormous army – no one would believe it.’”¹¹⁹

Conclusion

The Soviets pursued an ambitious foreign policy agenda following Stalin’s death and sought to achieve results on several fronts in a short period of time. In the field of arms control, Khrushchev took bold steps, for example, de-linking, to an extent, conventional from nuclear armaments and ordering unilateral reductions in forces. The specificity of the Soviets’ proposals (some of which would reappear decades later in the CFE Treaty) and their persistence and adaptability in the face of resistance from the Western powers point to a genuine effort to use arms control as a means to achieve Moscow’s objectives, rather than just tactical moves or propaganda. These objectives included the need to reduce the manning and funding of the armed forces in the interest of developing the economy of the USSR. From the perspective of foreign

¹¹⁷ Evangelista, “Why Keep Such an Army,” 6.

¹¹⁸ Evangelista, “Why Keep Such an Army,” 20-22. “The expected release of 1,200,000 men from the forces in 1956 would alone explain how the Soviet planners thought it would be possible to continue the rapid expansion of the Soviet labor force at a time when the age structure of the population was becoming so unfavorable.”

¹¹⁹ Evangelista, “Why Keep Such an Army,” 27.

and security policy, while Moscow's interest in arms control policy at the time was to influence the effectiveness of western defense efforts, "the *increased feasibility and realism in Soviet policy* [emphasis added] suggested there might also be a qualified but growing Soviet interest in enacting certain measures that might reduce the danger of surprise attack and impede German rearmament," as well as preserve a situation with nuclear weapons that might have favored the USSR.¹²⁰

Nonetheless, as was the case in the early 1920s, no agreements were reached. The Soviet armed forces underwent a significant build-up and Khrushchev's successors reversed the unilateral reductions. By the time of the next attempt at talks on conventional arms control, the correlation of nuclear forces would be significantly different, and the Soviets would be in the midst of a new era of détente. As was the case in the mid-1950s, the Soviets would once again undertake a number of initiatives in pursuit of their security objectives in Europe.

The Negotiations on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe, 1973-1989¹²¹

The Strategic Setting

From the latter half of the 1960s into the 1970s, détente between East and West and parallel approaches to European security provided the backdrop for the USSR once again to enter

¹²⁰ Bloomfield, Clemens and Griffiths. *Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament: The Decade Under Khrushchev, 1954-1964*, 199. According to a contemporaneous assessment from the State Department, some of the proposals "constituted a major departure from past Soviet positions...[and] represented a further move by the USSR towards a more serious negotiating approach to disarmament." "Memorandum to IO – Mr. Wilcox from UNP – Niles W. Bond, subject: Soviet March 27 Disarmament Proposal," 28 March 1956, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament (Harold Stassen): Records, 1955-58; Box 11; UN Disarmament Subcommittee – London, Mar 21-31, 1956 (4), DDE Library

¹²¹ This cumbersome title is the official name for the negotiations. NATO countries referred to them as the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, a name the Soviet and WTO side never accepted. Moscow and their

into negotiations with the Western powers on conventional arms control. Détente, the hallmark of Leonid Brezhnev's foreign policy, had produced a reduction in tensions and the first agreement to limit strategic nuclear forces, SALT I and its companion treaty on anti-ballistic missiles, the ABM Treaty. As for security in Europe, the Soviets and their allies were inclined toward convening a Conference on European Security, while the NATO allies favored mutual and balanced force reduction (M(B)FR) talks.

A logical starting point for this period of Soviet interest in conventional arms control is a speech Brezhnev delivered in Tbilisi in May 1971, in which he “went out of his way to emphasize Soviet readiness to begin negotiations over mutual troop reductions in Europe.”¹²² Brezhnev's speech, along with an address to the 24th CPSU Congress in March 1971, were the first official replies from the Eastern Bloc to proposals NATO had first issued in 1968 for negotiations on force reductions. They reflected a change in the Soviets' thinking on European security. Brezhnev's speech to the Party Congress, along with remarks delivered by other Soviet officials in the following months, appeared to have been aimed at gaining the West's attention.¹²³

By 1974, the Soviets were openly linking three ongoing arms control and security negotiations in a sort of “trifecta” (the author's term, not the Soviets') on which the future of Europe would largely depend. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),

allies preferred, instead, “the talks on the mutual reductions of forces and armaments in Europe.” *The Arms Control Reporter: A Chronicle of Treaties, Negotiations, Proposals, Weapons and Policy, 1985* (Brookline, MA: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, 1985): 401.A.1. Given the focus of this research on Russia, the abbreviation M(B)FR will be used to reflect Moscow's discomfort with the use of “balanced” in this context.

¹²² “Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” Washington, 15 May 1971, *Foreign Relations of the United State [FRUS], 1969-1976*, Vol. XXXIX (European Security), Doc. 49, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v39/d49>.

¹²³ Cristoph Bertram, *Mutual Force Reductions in Europe: The Political Aspects*, Adelphi Papers No. 84 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (hereafter IISS), 1972), 5.

the Vienna negotiations on reductions of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, and the strategic arms limitation talks constituted an approach that would “make the achievement of political détente [in Europe] irreversible and, moreover...rid the continent of the danger of an outbreak of armed conflicts.”¹²⁴ Prior to 1971, the Soviets and their allies in the WTO placed a priority on convening a European security conference, judging by the contents of the communiqués they issued as they concluded their periodic meetings.¹²⁵ Nonetheless, following Brezhnev’s speech, both Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoliy Dobrynin told their interlocutors that the Soviets could accept conducting negotiations on force reductions in Europe either within the Conference on European Security (CES) or in a separate forum. Gromyko expressed a preference for the latter option, telling Henry Kissinger, “if the Western powers agree that the question [M(B)FR] should be examined outside a CES, this would be much simpler *and more productive*” and “Since questions such as scale of reductions of foreign or national troops as well as other questions arise...a non CES forum would be better.”¹²⁶ Having secured with the CSCE the forum that they desired in order to resolve political issues, like agreement on the post-World War II boundaries in Europe, the Soviets seemed to be content to deal with military security issues in a separate negotiation.

¹²⁴ N. Polyanov, “Europe at a Historical Turning Point” in “Urgent Problems of Security and Cooperation in Europe,” *International Affairs* (Moscow), June 1974 Vol. 18, No. 6): 53.

¹²⁵ John G. Keliher, *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980). See, especially, chapter 2, “The Road to MBFR: 1968-1973.”

¹²⁶ Keliher, *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions*; “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union,” Washington, 17 June 1971, *Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1969-1976*, Vol. XXXIX (European Security), Doc. 61 <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v39/d61>.

Another factor that boosted the Soviets' confidence to enter into conventional arms control talks was their achievement of nuclear parity with the United States.¹²⁷ Balance at the strategic level notwithstanding, the Soviets sought to include tactical nuclear weapons systems (aircraft, nuclear-capable artillery, and missiles, generally under a range of 300-400 miles) in M(B)FR. The Soviets' insistence on retaining air forces and certain missiles on the agenda of the M(B)FR talks would assume even more importance once Soviet negotiators agreed to drop the forward-based systems (FBS) of U.S. forces (aircraft and missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons that were stationed on the territories of NATO member states) from the *strategic* arms talks in 1974. The U.S. FBS elicited particular concern because they could strike into the territory of the USSR, as well as fulfill tactical and operational tasks. Moscow's preoccupation with limiting air forces, though, would survive well into the negotiations on the CFE Treaty.

Moscow's Approach to Conventional Arms Control

Motivation

How did the M(B)FR, or Vienna talks fit into the paradigm of *détente*? The Soviets placed their proposals squarely within the context of a concept they dubbed "military *détente*...an intricate and multifaceted process of transition of military and political relations among states from confrontation to lower tensions, to a reduction in the danger of wars and their

¹²⁷ V. Viktorov, "The Vienna Talks (On the Question of Troop and Arms Cuts in Central Europe)," *International Affairs* (Moscow), August 1974 (Vol. 18, No. 8): 23. Another author wrote more directly the following year in *International Affairs*: "An important aspect of present-day international development is that the balance of forces in the world today has made disarmament an attainable aim." A. Karenin, "The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament," *International Affairs* (Moscow), September 1975 (Vol. 21, No. 9): 13.

prevention, to a reduction of the role of armed forces in international relations.”¹²⁸ The Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the WTO characterized success in the negotiations as a means of supplementing the ongoing political détente with military détente.¹²⁹ In essence, the political détente between East and West set the conditions under which measures of so-called military détente might be developed. At the end of the day, according to an analysis by the U.S. intelligence community, the Soviets’ “overriding interest [was] in détente not in force reduction *per se*.”¹³⁰

Proposals

A number of concepts attributed to military détente would figure in Soviet, and later Russian, arms control and security proposals: equal security for all parties, the importance of qualitative measures of armed strength, the limited value of reductions in the personnel of armed forces without corresponding reductions in equipment, and “the assumption that foreign and national troops constitute a single strategic and operational grouping.”¹³¹ At the M(B)FR negotiations in Vienna, the Soviets and their allies proposed arms reductions that would capture troops and equipment, to include tanks and certain nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles, in order

¹²⁸ D. Proektor, “Military Détente: Primary Task,” *International Affairs* (Moscow), June 1976 (Vol. 20, No. 6): 35.

¹²⁹ Viktorov, “The Vienna Talks (On the Question of Troop and Arms Cuts in Central Europe),” 30.

¹³⁰ Director of Central Intelligence, “Soviet and East European Attitudes Toward MBFR,” National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11/12-73, 4 October 1973, 4, http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000273229/DOC_0000273229.pdf.

¹³¹ Director of Central Intelligence, “Soviet and East European Attitudes Toward MBFR,” 37, 40. The latter point about foreign and national troops constituting a single national grouping is not unlike a provision of the Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1999) for territorial limits for each state that was a signatory of the treaty and which had territory in the area of application of the treaty. The territorial limits encompass both national (indigenous) forces and stationed forces of other countries.

to preserve the “virtual balance of forces” in Europe (as opposed to the imbalance of forces that the NATO states claimed would require greater reductions by the Soviets and their allies).¹³²

The opening proposal the Soviets and the WTO states tabled in November 1973 was for a three-stage process of reductions in Central Europe that would begin in 1975 with an aggregate cut by each side (U.S., Belgium, Canada, UK, FRG, Luxembourg, Netherlands on one side and USSR, GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia on the other) of 20,000 troops, along with their weapons and equipment. The second and third stages, in 1976 and 1977, would involve cuts of five and ten percent, respectively, by *each country*.¹³³ The proposal, which was based on declarations by the WTO PCC, struck familiar themes for European security and arms control: withdrawal of foreign forces from states, broad reductions in troops and armaments in Europe, and targeted reductions in forces on the territories of the two German states.¹³⁴

The concepts of equal security and balance of forces formed the basis for a key position the Soviets held for the life of the M(B)FR negotiations, opposition to asymmetrical reductions between the two military blocs in Europe. Soviet interlocutors focused on the term “balanced,” which was included in the basic principles the NATO allies had adopted at a meeting in Rome in 1970.¹³⁵ Articles in the journal of the USSR MFA supported this line from the very start of the negotiations, questioning the meaning of the “mutual and balanced reduction” formula and

¹³² Director of Central Intelligence, “Soviet and East European Attitudes Toward MBFR,” 39.

¹³³ Viktorov, “The Vienna Talks (On the Question of Troop and Arms Cuts in Central Europe),” 26-27.

¹³⁴ Director of Central Intelligence, “Soviet and East European Attitudes Toward MBFR,” 25.

¹³⁵ See Gromyko’s comments in “Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” Washington, 26 May 1971 and Soviet Ambassador Dobynin’s views in “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union,” Washington, 17 June 1971.

criticizing the “asymmetrical” reductions they attributed to the proposal offered by NATO.¹³⁶ The Soviets did not stray from the rejection of asymmetrical reductions in weapons until the negotiations on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in the mid-1980s.

The draft agreement the Soviets tabled in November 1973 remained the basis for Moscow’s approach to the negotiations, with adjustments, in some cases, in response to proposals from the NATO side. The negotiations remained inconclusive throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s.

Results and Subsequent Actions

The Soviets, and Brezhnev, in particular, retained their interest in pursuing arms reductions in Europe through the late 1970s and into the 1980s, even as the M(B)FR negotiations produced scant progress and the fabric of détente with the West began to fray. Conventional forces reductions remained one component of the “trifecta,” along with limitations on strategic nuclear arms and the results of the European security conference. In a speech in Tula in January 1977, a watershed moment that signaled a change in Soviet security thinking away from acceptance of the inevitability of nuclear war between the two social systems, Brezhnev cited the Vienna negotiations twice – once on a positive note and once negatively. On the positive side, along with drafting an agreement on strategic weapons to build on the Vladivostok accords of 1974 and implementing the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, “We would like to reach an early agreement on the reduction of armed forces in Central Europe.”¹³⁷ From a

¹³⁶ Viktorov, “The Vienna Talks (On the Question of Troop and Arms Cuts in Central Europe):” 28. See also V. Viktorov, “The Soviet Programme of Struggle for Disarmament,” *International Affairs* (Moscow), January 1977 (Vol. 23, No. 1): 83; Proektor, “Military Détente: Primary Task:” 40.

¹³⁷ “Brezhnev Speech,” Moscow TASS in English, 18 January 1977, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report – Soviet Union* (hereafter FBIS-SOV), FBIS-SOV-77-112, 18 January 1977, R3.

negative perspective, Brezhnev also criticized the insistence of the NATO allies at the negotiations on asymmetrical reductions (“You [the USSR and her allies] reduce more, while we [NATO] reduce less.”). He warned that this example of “mute resistance and even open opposition” to constructive proposals from the Soviet side “cannot advance the negotiations.”¹³⁸

Brezhnev became disappointed with the lack of response from NATO to the WTO’s proposals. He told the WTO PCC in Moscow on 22 November 1978 that “Negotiations on reductions of conventional forces and armaments in Central Europe remain an important area,” however, “serious steps toward accommodating the Western position in the name of achieving an agreement” had yet to receive a response. Brezhnev laid much of the blame for NATO’s unresponsiveness at the feet of the Germans.¹³⁹ By 1978, frustration with the lack of progress in the negotiations and a concern over the expenditure of resources on defense had colored the Soviets’ view of the M(B)FR talks.

Given the gradual slowing of the Soviet economy during Brezhnev’s rule and the contribution of the burden of maintaining large military forces (Brezhnev had reversed Khrushchev’s reductions in forces) to the slowdown, a fair question would be whether economic considerations played a role in Soviet participation in the M(B)FR negotiations. Brezhnev’s comment to his WTO colleagues on the costs of defense appears to have reflected a genuine concern on the part of the Soviets, or at least Brezhnev, over the costs of maintaining their armed

¹³⁸ “Brezhnev Speech,” R9.

¹³⁹ Mastny and Byrne, eds. *A Cardboard Castle?* 420. Another account of the meeting, based on notes taken by a Romanian diplomat, adds this text at this point: “We should intensify pressures on the West...An evident adversary of the progress of these negotiations is the Federal Republic of Germany, which wants to avoid any limitation of the force of the Bundeswehr and of its weight in NATO.” “The meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member countries,” 22 November 1978, *Cold War International History Project Digital Archive*, http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/va2/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=home.document&identifier=BA69712A-5056-9700-03CE92D42B61264E &sort=collection&item=Warsaw%20Pact.

forces that pre-dated his speech in 1978. The previous year, a writer in the journal of the MFA had written that for this reason, “the struggle for disarmament [was] an integral part of Soviet foreign policy.” While the Soviets’ investment in armed strength was a necessity, in order to secure the USSR and the other socialist states, “the Soviet people’s money that [went] into defense [was] not an investment in a profitable line of business but forced and unproductive expenditure which could have been used with much greater benefit for peaceful purposes.”¹⁴⁰ By 1978, five years into the M(B)FR negotiations, no progress had been made that would have allowed for some of that “forced and unproductive expenditure” to be shifted in another direction.

Conclusion

The Soviets’ participation in the M(B)FR talks through the 1970s and into the 1980s took place in a period of détente, or peaceful coexistence.¹⁴¹ Like their predecessors in the mid-1950s and 1922, the talks did not produce the détente, they merely reflected it. Unlike in the two earlier situations, a build-up of Soviet military forces did not follow the period of the M(B)FR negotiations. To the contrary, as the M(B)FR talks ground into their final stalemate in the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev had announced unilateral reductions in the Soviet armed forces. In contrast to Khrushchev’s reductions in the 1950s, these would remain in place until the end of the USSR and beyond.

¹⁴⁰ Viktorov, “The Soviet Programme of Struggle for Disarmament:” 76.

¹⁴¹ The M(B)FR negotiations would continue inconclusively until February 1989 and the 47th negotiating round, to be succeeded a month later by the CFE Treaty negotiations.

Chapter 3 - Getting to CFE Under Gorbachev

The Strategic Setting

In the early 1980s, political conditions in the USSR, developments in the relationship between the USSR and the U.S., and the state of the European security environment set the conditions for the negotiation and signing of the CFE Treaty. Within the USSR, a series of transitions in the leadership of the CPSU brought Mikhail Gorbachev to the post of General Secretary in 1985. Gorbachev's pursuit of economic and political reform led, in part, to his efforts to reduce tensions, including in Europe, and therefore allow for a reduction in the economic burden of maintaining the Soviet armed forces. Tensions with the U.S. derived from President Ronald Reagan's hostile rhetoric toward the USSR, investment in U.S. defense capabilities and, in particular, the Strategic Defense Initiative, which the Soviets saw as endangering strategic stability.¹⁴² The deployment by the USSR of SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in the late 1970s to modernize their theater nuclear forces and NATO's response (the dual-track decision of 1979 to deploy Pershing II IRBMs and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe and to pursue negotiations on the reduction or elimination of the missiles) also defined the European security environment.

As it became apparent that "We can do business together [with Gorbachev]," as British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told a BBC interviewer, and Gorbachev brought the Soviets back to arms control talks in 1985, the character of the Soviet Union's relationship with the West

¹⁴² Gorbachev himself referred to tensions in the environment at the time. "We started perestroika in a time of growing international tension. The détente of the 1970s was, in effect curtailed. Our calls for peace found no quarter in the ruling quarters of the West. Soviet foreign policy was skidding. The arms race was spiraling anew. The war threat was increasing." Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1988), 122.

evolved in a positive direction.¹⁴³ The conclusion of the “Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles” (INF Treaty) in 1987 and progress in negotiations for a nuclear arms accord were pre-conditions for the two sides to enter into negotiations on conventional forces and armaments in Europe.

Processes of rapid change in Eastern Europe and the USSR figured prominently in the Soviet Union’s approach to European security and conventional arms negotiations. The rise of the Solidarity trade union and subsequent imposition of martial law in Poland in the early 1980s set in motion a fundamental makeover of the political system in Eastern Europe that led to the withdrawal of Soviet forces, dissolution of the WTO, and fall of communist governments. Gorbachev’s adoption of the “Sinatra doctrine,” so called because each country in Eastern Europe could pursue their own path, removed one of the justifications for the stationing of groups of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe: to maintain control.¹⁴⁴

Along with these changes in the security environment, the perspectives and diplomatic approaches of Moscow’s key interlocutors, especially the U.S., the FRG and the other NATO allies, formed the context for Gorbachev’s approach to conventional arms control and European security. President Ronald Reagan placed nuclear disarmament squarely in the middle of his relationship with Gorbachev, most famously in the near agreement at Reykjavik in 1986 to eliminate the U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons and the signing of the INF Treaty in 1987. Under Reagan’s successor, George H.W. Bush, the U.S., along with the NATO allies, turned to

¹⁴³ “TV Interview for BBC (‘I Like Mr. Gorbachev. We can do business together.’),” 17 December 1984, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105592>. For a glowing account of Gorbachev and Reagan’s cooperation in contributing to the end of the Cold War, see Jack F. Matlock, Jr., *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2004).

¹⁴⁴ Foreign ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov coined this term in October 1989.

multilateral regimes and agreements, like negotiations for the CFE Treaty (1990-1992), the Open Skies Treaty (1989-1992), and the Charter of Paris (adopted at the same summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Confidence in Europe – CSCE – at which the CFE Treaty was signed) to manage and memorialize the changes that were rapidly occurring in Europe. One ally in particular, the FRG, drove the process of its reunification with the GDR, which proceeded rapidly after the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. The West Germans and the Bush Administration drew on the prospect of the CFE Treaty and various assurances made to Gorbachev and the Soviet government to secure agreement to a reunified Germany within NATO. All the aforementioned negotiations, processes and agreements served to support Gorbachev, as he strove to abandon the USSR’s dominance in Eastern Europe and shift to a foreign and security policy less reliant on the armed forces.

Finally, Gorbachev reformed the policy-making enterprise in the Soviet government as he carried out reforms through restructuring (*perestroika*) and openness (*glasnost*), which affected governing institutions as well as society at large. As he consolidated power within the CPSU, Gorbachev engineered the replacement of officials like long-time foreign minister Andrey Gromyko by others who were more attuned to “new thinking” in foreign affairs, such as Eduard Shevardnadze. As Shevardnadze asserted his authority and Gorbachev reformed the Secretariat of the CPSU, the influence of the military (and the General Staff in particular) waned as more civilian experts joined the policy process. The establishment of the Congress of People’s Deputies and empowerment of the Supreme Soviet added other players to the security enterprise.

Unlike in the three cases examined in Chapter 2, Gorbachev used arms control not to score political points but as a way to lower tensions with the West and thereby reduce the fiscal burden of maintaining large armed forces. By empowering civilians in the government,

especially Shevardnadze and the MFA, he was able to overcome resistance from the military and carry out unilateral withdrawals and multilateral reductions in forces, the latter under the CFE Treaty, which he signed in 1990. The CFE Treaty helped Gorbachev to manage the consequences for the security of the USSR of the dissolution of the WTO and the reunification of Germany. The military leadership clashed with Shevardnadze and the MFA over concessions in the negotiations for the CFE Treaty, however, and they undertook several actions late in the process to exclude some forces from the treaty, actions that contributed to the foreign minister's resignation in late 1990. Gorbachev's government never ratified the treaty – that task would be left to the successor states of the USSR, especially the Russian Federation.

Moscow's Approach to Conventional Arms Control

Motivation

At the time Gorbachev assumed power as the General Secretary of the CPSU, the USSR had been experiencing declining economic growth for fifteen years, national income growth rates had approached a level “close to economic stagnation,” and the gap between the USSR and advanced nations in scientific and technological development had begun to widen, “and not to [the USSR's] advantage.”¹⁴⁵ Gorbachev's effort to restructure the Soviet economy, society, government, and relations with the rest of the world was grounded in this reality. The linkage between foreign and security policy and the need to free up resources for the development of the economy was made explicit in 1988 in the Resolutions of the All-Union Conference of the CPSU.

¹⁴⁵ Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 5.

Foreign policy activity should increasingly contribute to releasing the country's resources for peaceful construction, for perestroika...All defense matters should henceforth be primarily oriented toward qualitative parameters [Note: as opposed to quantitative measures] – as regards technology and military science, and the structure of the armed forces.¹⁴⁶

Arms control became a tool for fixing the economy by reducing the military burden directly through reductions in forces and armaments and indirectly by fostering a more favorable security environment. From the beginning of Gorbachev's tenure, his motivation reflected “a surprisingly broad consensus among most of the Soviet elite that the Soviet economy was in serious trouble and that the burden of military expenditure was much to blame. *To reduce it, Gorbachev turned to disarmament through arms control*” [emphasis added].¹⁴⁷

Several broad concepts that undergirded Gorbachev's approach to arms control - new political thinking, defensive sufficiency, and the common European home - were codified as strategic guidance in the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress (25 February – 6 March 1986) and the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU (28 June – 1 July 1988), as well as declarations of the PCC of the WTO. The resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress included two provisions of the new political thinking: the resolution of international problems by political, rather than military means and defensive sufficiency.¹⁴⁸ Gorbachev explicitly linked the new political thinking, the common European home, and the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments in a

¹⁴⁶ Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 266.

¹⁴⁷ William E. Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (New Haven: The Yale University Press, 1998), 115.

¹⁴⁸ Mikhail Gorbachev, *The Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th CPSU Party Congress* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986), 148-149.

speech he delivered in Prague in April 1987.¹⁴⁹ The 19th All-Union CPSU Party Conference affirmed the new political thinking. The resolution on foreign policy “deem[ed] correct the Soviet leaders’ approach to the problem of removing the threat of war by means of an open and constructive dialogue,” stressed that “foreign-policy activity should contribute more and more to releasing the country’s resources for peaceful construction, and for perestroika,” and directed that “all defense development should be geared from now on predominantly to qualitative parameters both in respect of technology and military science and the composition of the armed forces” and should be “carried out in strict compliance with our defensive doctrine.”¹⁵⁰

A new military doctrine, in accordance with which reductions in nuclear and conventional forces would be carried out, was the subject of significant debate. Theorists struggled to reconcile the defensive character of the political component of military doctrine with the offensive character of its military side. As General Makhmut Gareyev of the Soviet General Staff explained in 1987, “in accordance with the new doctrine of the Soviet Union and the [WTO], first priority was given to defensive operations.” Colonel General N.F. Chervov, also of the General Staff, emphasized that “our country stands for the reduction of its military potential in line with the limits of reasonable sufficiency. By this we mean that the structure and role of the armed forces will allow them to carry out only defensive operations.”¹⁵¹ Chief of the General Staff General Mikhail Moiseyev described in 1989 the practical implications of defensive sufficiency for the armed forces: a non-offensive structure, limitation of offensive systems,

¹⁴⁹ M.S. Gorbachev, “For A ‘Common European Home’, for a New Way of Thinking”, Speech at Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Meeting (10 Apr 87),’ in J.L. Black, ed., *USSR Documents 1987: The Gorbachev Reforms* (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press: 1988), 319, 322.

¹⁵⁰ “19th All-Union Party Conference Resolutions (4 Jul),” in J.L. Black, ed., *USSR Documents 1988: Perestroika – The Second Stage* (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press: 1989), 201.

¹⁵¹ Andrei A. Kokoshin, *Soviet Strategic Thought: 1917-91*, 189.

changes in their development with a view to fulfilling strictly defensive missions, reduced capacity for mobilization, and a lower volume of defense production.¹⁵²

The WTO adopted the new military doctrine at the Berlin Meeting of the PCC held on 9 May 1987. “On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty States” was aimed at averting war and was “strictly defensive” in character.” It was also tied to earlier statements about the need to reduce conventional forces and weapons in Europe.¹⁵³ Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, in a conversation with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 1987, explicitly linked “reasonable sufficiency” with the mitigation of “disbalances” between the armed forces of the WTO and NATO through conventional arms control negotiations.¹⁵⁴ The military leadership was preparing the doctrinal basis for reductions in armed forces, although as Akhromeyev’s remarks and those of Moiseyev and Chervov on the preceding page imply, there was some ambiguity about concepts like “reasonable sufficiency” and “defensive sufficiency,” which underpinned moves to re-size and restructure the Soviet armed forces.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² M.A. Moiseyev, “Soviet Military Doctrine: The Realization of Its Defensive Orientation (13 Mar)” in J.L. Black, ed., *USSR Documents 1989: The Gorbachev Reforms Continue, The End of Empire?* (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press: 19), 387.

¹⁵³ Kokoshin, *Soviet Strategic Thought: 1917-91*, 187. See also Kokoshin’s article, “Razvitie voennogo dela i sokrashchenie vooruzhennykh sil i obychnykh vooruzheniy,” *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya* 1 (1988): 30.

¹⁵⁴ Soviet Union Communist Party, Central Committee. “Record of Conversation between Chief of USSR General Staff Marshal Sergey Fyodorovich Akhromeyev and William J. Crowe with Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon, December 10, 1987 (8.00-9.30),” 1987, accessed through ProQuest. Akhromeyev explained, “we have to bring our armed forces to such a condition where the disbalances currently present on each side are liquidated. Let us suppose that we have more of a certain type of weapons in Europe—and such weapons exist—we are ready to liquidate them unilaterally. But your armed forces have more of a different type of weapon; consequently, we would expect reductions from your side. If we sit down at the table of negotiations and lay the data out before each other, we could count the weapons and agree on the appropriate reductions.”

¹⁵⁵ William Odom observed that the military leadership used the terms interchangeably. Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military*, 116. To further complicate matters, Moiseyev cited “reasonable defensive sufficiency” at a CSCE seminar on military doctrines in 1990 as the basis for the new military doctrine of the USSR. Peter Almquist, “The Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar: Flexible Response vs. Defensive Sufficiency,” *Arms Control Today* 20, No. 3 (April 1990): 22. Gorbachev defined “reasonable sufficiency” at the 27th CPSU Congress in 1986 as a “structure of a state’s armed forces which is enough to repulse any possible aggression, but which is inadequate for the conduct of

Proposals

In directing that arms control policy serve the larger political purposes of the state, even at the possible expense of the country's military strength, Gorbachev took a critical first step toward demonstrating the sincerity of his commitment to demilitarize the Kremlin's foreign policy and to impart much needed substance to the rhetoric of the 'new political thinking.'¹⁵⁶ As early as October 1985, during his first trip outside the USSR as General Secretary, he told French parliamentarians, "The Soviet Union proposes to start a reduction of the armed forces and armaments of both sides in Central Europe – and to start with a reduction of Soviet and American troops. Moreover, we are prepared to reduce more troops than the Americans."¹⁵⁷ His early proposals for reductions in armaments and unilateral cuts to the Soviet armed forces hastened the demise of the M(B)FR talks and set the conditions for what would become the negotiations for the CFE Treaty. In January 1986, Gorbachev offered a plan to eliminate all nuclear weapons by 2000. The plan met with skepticism from the West, in light of assessments that Soviet superiority in conventional armaments in Europe would preserve Moscow's edge in military capabilities in a nuclear-weapons free environment.¹⁵⁸ Three months later, Gorbachev

offensive operations." "Defensive sufficiency" (or "defensive defense") described an approach to warfare that excluded, or at least minimized, offensive capabilities and operations. Debates over these concepts and what they meant for the size and structure of the USSR's armed forces, as well as the acceptability of asymmetric reductions in forces vis-à-vis those of the U.S. and NATO (both nuclear and conventional forces), raged within the military and between military and civilian commentators. See R. Hyland Phillips and Jeffrey I. Sands, "Reasonable Sufficiency and Soviet Conventional Defense: A Research Note," *International Security* 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988): 164-178; Gloria Duffy and Jennifer Lee, "The Soviet Debate on 'Reasonable Sufficiency,'" *Arms Control Today* 18, No. 8 (October 1988): 19-24.

¹⁵⁶ Blacker, *Hostage to Revolution*, 93.

¹⁵⁷ United States Department of State Delegation to Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Negotiations. "Gorbachev Speech to French Parliament and MBFR" 1985, accessed through ProQuest.

¹⁵⁸ A general skepticism about Gorbachev and his arms control proposals was evident in an assessment submitted to the U.S. National Intelligence Council on 31 October 1986 by Fritz Ermath, the National Intelligence Officer for the USSR. Among the judgments he offered in *Soviet Grand Deception and Other Games*: "...the content of Soviet proposals during the last year to the present involve – if seriously believed – a wrenching and revolutionary change

proposed significant reductions in conventional armed forces in the area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains (a geographical scope larger than that of the M(B)FR negotiations, which only encompassed the countries of Central Europe). The WTO refined this proposal in the Budapest Communique of 11 June 1986 (see Figure 3.1).

Gorbachev Proposal, 18 April 1986 Speech at East German Party Congress	Budapest Communique, 11 June 1986 WTO PCC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Substantial reductions” of ground and air forces of European states, U.S. and Canada “deployed in Europe” - Disband formations and units reduced; destroy armaments and equipment or store on national territory - Reduction area to cover the ATTU region - “Operational-tactical nuclear weapons” included in reductions - Verification by national technical means (NTM) “and international forms of verification,” to include on-site verification 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - First step: NATO and WTO reduce by 100-150K personnel “within a year or two;” majority of reductions in tactical air forces; “nuclear operational technical means” with ranges to 1000 km included - Next steps: “negotiated and phased reductions” of ground and tactical air forces to achieve 25% reduction in both alliances by 1990s; missiles with ranges to 1000 km could be included; reductions by alliances could draw in non-allied states - Verification by NTM, international inspections (including on site), international monitoring posts at major railway junctions, airfields, ports - Detailed exchange of data on forces to be reduced

Figure 3.1 Proposals for Conventional Forces Reductions, 1986

Source: *Arms Control Reporter 1986*, M(B)FR Vienna Talks, 401.B.108 [Gorbachev Proposal] and 401.B.114 [Budapest Declaration].¹⁵⁹

Drawing on the momentum Gorbachev had generated, members of the M(B)FR and CSCE delegations of the states of NATO and the WTO held the first meeting of the so-called “Group of 23” in Vienna on 17 February 1987 to begin discussions about new negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe.¹⁶⁰ After almost two years of at least weekly meetings

in the perspective of many Soviet institutions on what constitutes security” [emphasis in the original]. United States Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Officer for Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. *Soviet Grand Deception and Other Games Attached to Forwarding Memorandum; [Attachment Not Included]* 1986, accessed through ProQuest.

¹⁵⁹ Gorbachev told the WTO PCC at Budapest, “As soon as this process [of conventional forces reductions] would start, a reduction in military expenditure would follow.” Mastny and Byrne, eds. *A Cardboard Castle?* 538.

¹⁶⁰ *Arms Control Reporter 1989*, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Status, p. 407.A.1.

hosted by various delegations in Vienna (conducted simultaneously with the 40th through 46th rounds of the M(B)FR talks), the Group of 23 agreed to a mandate for new negotiations on 14 January 1989. The Concluding Document of the CSCE Vienna Review Conference, issued on 15 January 1989, formally established negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) among all thirty-five CSCE participating states, and the CFE talks, which would include only the twenty-three states of NATO and the WTO, but would be conducted “within the framework of the CSCE process.”¹⁶¹ The M(B)FR negotiations officially closed during their 47th round on 2 February 1989, “In view of the decision to open talks on conventional armaments in Europe in March 1989.”¹⁶² At the end of the day, the Gorbachev-inspired Budapest Communique of June 1986 caused the WTO to lose interest in M(B)FR, and NATO’s call for bloc-to-bloc talks and the meetings of the Group of 23 rendered M(B)FR superfluous.¹⁶³

Unilateral Reductions of Conventional Forces

During the period leading up to the beginning of the negotiations on the CFE Treaty, the Soviets carried out a series of unilateral reductions and withdrawals of forces from Eastern Europe. While these moves supported Gorbachev’s goal to reduce the burden of defense expenditures on the USSR’s economy, they also served two other related purposes: first, to demonstrate that under Gorbachev and as a part of the new political thinking, the USSR and the

¹⁶¹ *Arms Control Reporter 1989*, pp. 402.A.1, 407.B.118, 407.B.133. “The Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting 1986 of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe, held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act Relating to the Follow-up to the Conference (Vienna 1989)” can be found at <https://www.osce.org/mc/40881?download=true>. The relevant text of the Concluding Document, which contains the mandate for the CFE Treaty negotiations, is on pages 13-14 and in Annex III, “Chairman’s Statement, Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” pages 43-54.

¹⁶² *Arms Control Reporter 1989*, p. 401.B.205.

¹⁶³ *Arms Control Reporter 1989*, p. 401.A.1.

WTO allies were sincere about reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe, and, second, to give impetus to the CFE negotiations. Although Gorbachev's proposals of April 1986 and December 1988 (the latter in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)) were the most comprehensive and best publicized, the list of the reductions and withdrawals was quite extensive (see Appendix 1, which depicts reductions and withdrawals that the Soviets announced from December 1988 to April 1989).

The Moscow summit meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in June 1988 provided an impetus for the Central Committee of the CPSU to accelerate the process of pursuing reductions in conventional armed forces in Europe.¹⁶⁴ According to a post-summit analysis produced by the Central Committee,

Until now, all our proposals...were hushed up...The USA and NATO for decades taught the publics of Western countries to believe that the resolution of the issue of conventional weapons in Europe comes down to the 'USSR unwillingness' to deal with it. Now it became clear that the whole business is deadlocked by the Western position. This [development] shifts the struggle around this problem onto a different plane, which we should make use of.¹⁶⁵

Having assessed that the Reagan administration would be limited in what it could accomplish in the following months, the analysis proposed turning toward developing relations

¹⁶⁴ For the substance of the plan for reductions on conventional armed forces in Europe Gorbachev presented at the summit, see the Soviet record of the meeting in Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton, eds., *The Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush – Conversations that Ended the Cold War* (Budapest, Hungary: Central European University Press, 2016), 371, 413-414.

¹⁶⁵ Soviet Union Communist Party, Central Committee. *About the Results of the Moscow Summit and Their Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy and Soviet-American Relations* 1988, accessed through ProQuest.

with Western Europe, drawing on “the factor of conventional weapons.” Unilateral actions would be appropriate, “but as a thought-out political action.” Specific measures might include reductions in the number of the tanks, river-crossing equipment, and artillery. “With the help of such ‘material evidence’ we would be able better to illustrate the truth about our intentions and proposals to the Western publics.”¹⁶⁶ The reductions Gorbachev offered in his speech to the UNGA included these Soviet capabilities.

Gorbachev’s announcement of significant reductions in the Soviet armed forces at the UNGA in December 1988 was also motivated, in part, by the need to reconcile inconsistencies between the Soviets’ statements and the reality of the size of their armed forces. The Central Committee had recognized in early 1987 that “the underestimated numerical data given by the soviet side on the number of forces of the countries of the Warsaw Pact” was one of the main reasons for the deadlock in the M(B)FR negotiations. This stumbling block was preventing “the achievement of possible agreements and reducing the political effects of the latest major initiatives by the USSR in the area of foreign policy.”¹⁶⁷ A draft paper from the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in April 1987 attributed this problem to the unfavorable circumstances of the geographical scope of the M(B)FR talks, which included only the territories of East and West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, where the armed forces of the WTO enjoyed numerical advantages over those of NATO. The expansion of the area of application for conventional arms negotiations to include all territory from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural

¹⁶⁶ Soviet Union Communist Party, Central Committee. *About the Results of the Moscow Summit and their Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy and Soviet-American Relations*.

¹⁶⁷ “TsK KPSS – O dopolnitel’noy prarabotke voprosov nashey dal’neyshey pozitsii na Venskikh peregovorakh o vzaimnom sokrashcheniy vooruzhenykh sil i vooruzheniy v Tsentral’noy Evrope,” 20 February 1987, Vitaliy Leonidovich Kataev Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University (hereafter Kataev Papers), Box 8, Folder 20.

Mountains, as proposed in the Budapest Declaration of the WTO PCC of April 1986, would address this problem.¹⁶⁸ By November 1988, as he consulted with the Politburo about his speech to the UNGA, Gorbachev lamented both the size of the Soviet army for its impact on the economy and the consequences of revealing the actual size of the Soviet armed forces and their budget.

The military doctrine we announced differs from what we are actually doing in military building. If we publish how the matters stand, that we spend over twice as much as the US on military needs, if we let the scope of our expenses be known, all our new thinking and our new foreign policy will go to hell...When all this hangs over them, how can they believe that our doctrine is defensive?!¹⁶⁹

As William Odom observed, Gorbachev had come to grasp “the special advantages he had in the arms control game.” Although the General Staff could give lip service to defensive sufficiency, “sooner or later it would have to deliver on reductions or reveal to the world that the new military doctrine was a sham.”¹⁷⁰

Did Gorbachev and the armed forces deliver on reductions? The U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) assessed that the unilateral withdrawals were genuine and were accomplishing Gorbachev’s goals to transform the Soviet military to a more defensive posture,

¹⁶⁸ “TsK KPSS – Variant MO,” April 1987, Kataev Papers, Box 8, Folder 20.

¹⁶⁹ Soviet Union Communist Party General Secretary Assistant for International Affairs. [November 3, 1988, *Politburo Unilateral Force Reductions*] 1988, accessed through ProQuest. One of the reasons for proposing the unilateral reductions in Eastern Europe, according to Andrey Grachev, one of Gorbachev’s political advisers, was to eliminate the USSR’s “never before admitted conventional arms and troops superiority over NATO” before the start of the CFE Treaty negotiations. Andrey Grachev, *Gorbachev’s Gamble: Soviet Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War*, (Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2008), 166.

¹⁷⁰ Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military*, 124.

reduce the burden on the Soviet economy of maintaining the armed forces, and advance the CFE negotiations. In October 1989, the NIC concluded that Gorbachev's reassertion of "the Party's leading role in determining the sociopolitical content of Soviet military doctrine" was a key factor in the reductions in Soviet forces and changes to their missions. The withdrawals and reductions were "generally consistent" with Gorbachev's statement to the UNGA in December 1988. They would "result in a smaller standing force optimized for defense, but still capable of smaller scale offensive operations," which would require a "massive and lengthy mobilization in order to perform deep strategic offensive operations against NATO."¹⁷¹ The combination of the unilateral cuts and reductions envisioned in the proposals tabled by the WTO and NATO at the CFE negotiations would lead to a situation in which,

After such cuts, and assuming that equipment is destroyed and that NATO maintains parity, we believe that the Soviets would judge Warsaw Pact Post-CFE Forces incapable - even after full mobilization of reserves and deployment of standing forces within the ATTU Zone - of achieving the political-military objectives traditionally associated with Soviet strategy for a theater-strategic offensive. *Their CFE proposal serves as one of the most convincing indicators to date of the defensive reorientation of their military doctrine and their intent to decrease the economic burden of the Soviet theater force structure through aggressive pursuit of conventional arms control* [emphasis added].¹⁷²

¹⁷¹ United States Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Council, *Status of Soviet Unilateral Withdrawals [Best Available Copy]* 1989, accessed through ProQuest.

¹⁷² United States Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Council, *The Direction of Change in the Warsaw Pact* 1990, 12.

Initial Negotiating Positions

As the Soviets began to develop their negotiating positions for the conventional arms talks, the challenge they faced was readily apparent. By July 1987, the Defense Council had considered opening positions, but a working group under the chairmanship of Lev Zaykov of the Central Committee Secretariat requested an extension of two months to conduct “additional study” on the approach to the negotiations. The negotiations on conventional armed forces “would be difficult, maybe exceeding in the multiplicity of difficulties the problems of the negotiations on nuclear issues.” The USSR’s negotiating positions would have to “not weaken in any measure our defense capability and fully correspond to the idea of strengthening European security within the framework of the concept of a common European home.”¹⁷³

The Soviets’ initial thinking about the CFE negotiations emphasized that their approach must be guided by the “new political thinking” and based on the principles of reasonable sufficiency, elimination of imbalances, and the return of forces to national borders. The desired end state toward which the Soviets’ proposals should be aimed included a Pan-European security system “which would facilitate gradual movement to the perspective of winding down [*svertyvaniye*] of the American military presence.”¹⁷⁴ Draft instructions to the Soviet delegation in Vienna prepared in January 1988 highlighted some of the Soviets’ desiderata for the mandate for the negotiations. Fallback positions indicated Moscow’s openness to compromise at an early stage in the process in order to achieve an agreement and, as a side benefit, to join the Western

¹⁷³ Lev Zaykov and Eduard Shevardnadze, “Tovarishchu Gorbachevu M.S. – O nodgotovke nashey pozitsii dlya peregovorov o sokrashchenii vooruzhenykh sil i vooruzheniy v Evrope,” 3 July 1987, Kataev Papers, Box 8, Folder 22.

¹⁷⁴ Zaykov and Shevardnadze, “Tovarishchu Gorbachevu M.S. – O podgotovke nashey pozitsii dlya peregovorov o sokrashchenii vooruzhenykh sil i vooruzheniy v Evrope,” 1-9.

countries to the new thinking in international relations. The subject of the negotiations should be “armed forces, conventional armaments and equipment, located on land [*na sushe*], including also dual capable means” (weapons systems capable of firing or launching both conventional and nuclear munitions). If NATO balked at this formula, the Soviet delegation could fall back to one that added the caveat “although without their nuclear component” after “dual capable means.”¹⁷⁵ Air defense [PVO – *protivovozdushnaya oborona*] aviation was not to be included in the negotiations. If NATO insisted on including PVO aviation, the Soviet delegation was to counter that naval aviation, including carrier-based aircraft, should be included. The geographic zone for the negotiations should include all of Turkey and the Transcaucasus region of the USSR, although the delegation had flexibility to consider other formulas for Turkey and the Transcaucasus, “taking account of the geostrategic particulars of this region” (Turkey was seeking the exclusion of a portion of its territory in the southern part of the country, where the Turkish army operated against Kurdish forces). Participation in the negotiations should maintain some form of close connection between the conventional arms negotiations and the CSCE process, i.e. not be restricted to the states of the WTO and NATO. If non-NATO and non-WTO states accepted that the conventional arms negotiations would only be conducted by the twenty-three WTO and NATO states, then it would be desirable “to include in the final document of the

¹⁷⁵ Characteristic of the Soviets’ quest to include dual-use weapons systems were comments by Marshal Akhromeyev to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe, during a visit to Washington in December 1987: “...work is going on in Vienna between representatives of 23 countries, and the main obstacle is the issue of dual-use weapons. As far as I know, you and your allies are proposing to remove these weapons from the negotiations agenda. A question arises: what types of weapons will we be able to discuss at the negotiations at all? We propose to discuss ground forces and strategic aviation. In case the dual-use means are excluded from the negotiations table, the 155-mm and higher caliber artillery will be excluded, as well as strategic missiles, and all combat aviation aircraft—nuclear and conventional weapons carriers. Then it is not clear what kind of weapons will remain for discussion at the negotiations.” Soviet Union Communist Party, Central Committee, “Record of Conversation between Chief of USSR General Staff Marshal Sergey Fyodorovich Akhromeyev and William J. Crowe with Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.”

Vienna meeting that at a certain stage of the negotiations neutral and non-allied European countries might be included.” Verification and information exchange could include NTM and “international procedures, including on-site inspections without right of refusal.”¹⁷⁶

The Soviets’ aim was to limit NATO’s capabilities to execute the U.S. Air-Land Battle doctrine and the related NATO doctrine of Follow-on Forces Attack, both of which involved close integration of ground and air forces and deep attack against second-echelon attacking Soviet and WTO formations.¹⁷⁷ The Soviets were unable to preserve tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear munitions for dual-capable aircraft and artillery systems, or naval forces in the mandate for the CFE Treaty negotiations. Throughout the negotiations, the Soviets would return repeatedly to naval forces. For example, during his meeting with President George H.W. Bush in Malta in December 1989, Gorbachev, likely at the behest of the military, zeroed in on naval forces and the absence of consideration of naval arms control measures, “an emotional issue for previous Administrations and ours...After we are finished with CFE and START, we need to go over to naval issues.”¹⁷⁸ Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also included naval forces in the WTO

¹⁷⁶ “TsK KPSS – O polozhenii del na obshcheevropeyskoy vstreche v Vene – konsul’tatsiyakh OVD-NATO i dopolnitel’nykh ukazaniyakh delegatsii SSSR,” 22 January 1988, Kataev Papers, Box 8, Folder 20. Regarding the geographic zone for the negotiations, the Soviet delegation in Vienna recommended in December 1988 a compromise on the exclusion of Turkish territory, based on assurances by the Turkish foreign minister and the need to get the NATO side to agree to the parameters for negotiations that were in Moscow’s interest. This compromise would be conditioned on the area being small in size, Turkish forces in the area limited to 10-12 brigades, and foreign military bases not being placed there. “K voprosu o zone budushchikh peregovorov po obychnym vooruzheniyam v Evrope,” undated and unattributed paper, Kataev Papers, Box 8, Folder 22.

¹⁷⁷ Thus, the Soviets’ fixation on tactical aircraft, both land- and carrier-based. “Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” in *Disarmament and Security: 1988-1989 Yearbook*, ed. Yevgeny Primakov (London: Routledge, 1990), 258.

¹⁷⁸ “Memorandum of Conversation, Second Expanded Bilateral Session, December 3, 1989, 4:35-6:45 pm, Maxim Gorky Cruise Liner, Malta,” George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Kanter, Arnold, Files, Subject Files, Malta Summit – December 89, [OA/ID CF00796-005], 3.

position at the opening session of the CFE Treaty negotiations in Vienna on 6 March 1989, despite their exclusion from the mandate for the negotiations.¹⁷⁹

The Soviets' sought to eliminate what they termed "asymmetries" in the forces of the WTO and NATO through limitations on a number of types of armaments and forces - aircraft, combat helicopters, manpower, and equipment in storage - that NATO initially opposed.¹⁸⁰ This approach was grounded in a perspective that was evident in an analysis produced for the Central Committee, "On Data on the Strength of the Armed Forces and Armaments of the Countries of the Warsaw Pact and the NATO Bloc," which drew on information provided by the general staffs of the WTO states and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR. The conclusion of the analysis reflected the Soviets' perception of asymmetries and the utility of the CFE negotiations in resolving them:

The existence of a general balance of forces and means in Europe, disproportions and advantages in certain types of armaments for the countries of the Warsaw Pact as well as the NATO bloc again confirm that lowering the general level of armaments of the opposing groups is possible none other than on the basis of the mutual elimination of existing asymmetries, and further on mutual reductions, which can be achieved on the basis of conducting the negotiations on armed forces and armaments in Europe.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ Joint Staff Washington DC 050519Z Apr 89 retransmission of SecState Washington DC 050448Z Apr 89, subject: INR/WECA Western Europe-Canada Monthly, March 1989, unpublished collection, The National Security Archive, Washington, DC.

¹⁸⁰ Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 40-41. These limitations would all find their way into the CFE Treaty, except manpower, which was dropped from the negotiations in the summer of 1990 and later taken up in the separate CFE 1A talks.

¹⁸¹ "TsK KPSS – O nashikh shagakh v svyazi s opublikovaniem NATO dannykh o vooruzhenykh silakh i obychnykh vooruzheniyakh OBD i NATO v Evrope," undated [content indicates it was prepared between the end of November 1988 and late December 1988], Kataev Papers, Box 8, Folder 20. The document, signed by Lev Zaykov, Viktor Chebrikov, Eduard Shevardnadze, Aleksandr Yakovlev, Dmitriy Yazov, Viktor Baklanov, and Igor Belousov, characterized NATO's data as "tendentious" and "based on a selective approach to the components of the

As the negotiations progressed and changes occurred within the USSR and in Eastern Europe, tensions arose within the Soviet national security enterprise that reflected the difficulty of the issues in the negotiations and the political tensions and resistance Gorbachev was confronting. The most challenging issues for the Soviets as the negotiations approached endgame were the status of land-based naval aircraft (LBNA), the zonal structure of limitations (especially the so-called flank zone), and the sufficiency rule, whereby one party to the CFE Treaty could not hold more than a given percentage of armaments within the zone of application of the treaty. Resolution of these issues in the negotiations would require high-level intervention by Gorbachev with President Bush and Shevardnadze with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. The following section of this dissertation will examine these issues.

Problem Areas: LBNA, Flank Zone, Sufficiency Rule

The inclusion of LBNA in the CFE Treaty touched on two military issues that were sensitive for the Soviets: air power and naval forces. Differences in force structure between the armed forces of the USSR and the WTO, on one side, and the U.S. and NATO, on the other, accounted for much of the dispute over LBNA. Whereas naval aircraft of the U.S. and other NATO forces were generally based at sea on aircraft carriers, those of the USSR and the WTO, the most prominent of which was the TU-22M medium bomber, were land-based. The Soviets, *especially the military*, argued that LBNA should be excluded because naval forces were outside the scope of the CFE negotiations. The U.S. held that because the mandate for the CFE negotiations included forces “on land,” LBNA were subject to treaty limitations.

armed forces and armaments” that was focused on land forces, where the WTO “had an advantage,” and not on strike aviation and naval forces, where NATO had a “clear advantage.”

The problem with LBNA was the subject of intense debate in the latter half of 1990 between the General Staff and the MFA. In July, the MFA had proposed a freeze on holdings of the TU-22M at 200 and their inclusion in the CFE Treaty's provisions for information exchange and verification. The General Staff countered that this freeze would place the USSR at a disadvantage, because it would exclude NATO forces, whose naval aircraft were sea-based. While the military could accept a politically binding statement on the level of 200 aircraft, it could not accept verification measures, except in talks on naval armaments.¹⁸² After Shevardnadze reached agreement with Secretary Baker in New York in October 1990 to freeze LBNA at 400 by way of a politically binding declaration outside the CFE Treaty, Defense Minister Yazov accused him of having exceeded his instructions by agreeing to a freeze on only LBNA, not all naval aviation (land- and carrier-based).¹⁸³ Shevardnadze challenged Yazov's view, wondering in late October 1990 where the Soviets had found so many naval aircraft and asserting that "hundreds" of aircraft of the air forces had been "repainted in the colors of the Navy and resubordinated to it." Yazov confirmed Shevardnadze's assertion in a meeting held

¹⁸² "Vopros dlya rassmotreniya v Sovete oborony u tov. Zaykova L.N., 23 iulya 1990 goda v 17 chasov, O materialakh dlya peregovorov v Vene," Kataev Papers, Box 13 Folder 30. These differing proposals were reflected in draft instructions to the Soviet delegation to the CFE negotiations, dated 24 August 1990. The position favored by the General Staff was the basic position in the draft instructions, whereas the position of the MFA was included in brackets as a "Proposal of the MFA of the USSR." "Direktivy sovetskoy delegatsii na 8-y raund peregovorov po obychnym vooruzhenym silam v Evrope i po meram ukrepleniya doveriya i bezopasnosti v Evrope," 24 August 1990, Kataev Papers, Box 8 Folder 21.

¹⁸³ Shevardnadze's detailed report of the results of his trip to attend the UNGA session and his discussions with Baker are in E. Shevardnadze, "Prezidentu SSSR Gorbachevu M.S. ob itogov peregovorov v Nyu Uorke 22 sentyabrya – 5 oktyabrya 1990 g.," 10 October 1990, Kataev Papers, Box 4 Folder 53. The compromise on LBNA is on pages 9-10. Yazov's critique is in Dmitry Yazov, "Prezidentu Soyuzu Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik tovarishchu Gorbachevu M.S. o predlozheniyakh Ministerstva oborony SSSR no venskim peregovoram v svyazi s itogami peregovorov v Nyu-Uorke 22 sentyabrya – 5 oktyabrya 1990 g.," 16 October 1990, Kataev Papers, Box 8 Folder 21, 2-3. He also observed, "From a military point of view, a paradoxical situation is maintained: carrier aviation of the USA and other NATO countries, designated, above all, for operations against the USSR, will not be limited by any agreement. At the same time, our naval aviation, having the main mission of combat against carrier-based strike aviation groups of the USA, must be sharply cut. Our PVO aircraft, assigned for combat including against carrier aircraft, are included in the overall level and also fall under reduction."

five days later, when he explained, “The transfer of our frontal aviation to the Navy was carried out *with the goal to force the Americans to sit at the negotiating table for naval forces issues*” [emphasis added].¹⁸⁴ The final resolution of the issue of LBNA was a politically blinding declaration outside the CFE Treaty that limited LBNA to 400 for any single state and 430 for each alliance.¹⁸⁵ The tussle over LBNA exemplified the acrimony between Shevardnadze and his military counterparts, which would seep throughout the process of negotiating the CFE Treaty. Another battleground between the MFA and the armed forces was the flank zone and its sub-limits on TLE.

The zonal structure of limitations in the treaty was generally acceptable to the Soviets, and was, in fact, part of Moscow’s proposals (for a depiction of the structure, see Appendix B, CFE Treaty Zones and Limitations). A point of dispute was the flank zone. The sublimits in the flank zone (those areas on the northern and southern extremes of the ATTU area), the Soviets argued, would cause problems for the repositioning of forces withdrawn from Eastern Europe, particularly if the Kiev Military District (MD) was included in it (see Figure 3.2 for the location of the MDs) and for dealing with unrest in the Transcaucasus region. The dispute over the composition of the flank zone was another instance of the Soviet military throwing a wrench into the works as the negotiations neared endgame.

¹⁸⁴ Shevardnadze’s comments are in E. Shevardnadze, “Prezidentu SSSR tovarishchu Gorbachevu M.S.,” 20 October 1990, 5. Yazov’s comment is in “Protokol zasedaniya komissii po voprosam peregorov o sokrashchenii vooruzheniy i bezopasnosti strany, 25 oktyabrya 1990 goda,” October 1990, Kataev Papers, Box 15 Folder 50, 2. A U.S. delegate to the CFE negotiations observed, “the Soviet position is essentially if you paint naval tail markings on a Backfire [TU-22M] it doesn’t count, it’s not limited. And if you paint air force markings on it, it is limited.” US. Secretary of Defense Cheney complained that Su-27 fighter-bombers withdrawn from Hungary reappeared as naval aircraft at bases on the Kola Peninsula. Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 51.

¹⁸⁵ “Declaration of The States Parties to The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe With Respect to Land Based Naval Aircraft, Paris, 19 November 1990,” <https://fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/text/paris2.htm>.

The Norwegians and the Turks led the effort to establish specific limitations on conventional armaments on territory to the north and south of the central zone during the negotiations. During 1990, the Norwegians reported that Soviet aircraft withdrawn from Hungary had appeared on the Kola Peninsula and the Turks observed that not only forces being withdrawn from Afghanistan, but also some of those being redeployed to the USSR from Eastern Europe, were appearing in the southern MDs of the USSR near Turkey. The parties to the negotiations reached agreement on limitations in the flank zone; however, as soon as they had done so, the Soviet General Staff warned in late October 1990 that the USSR could not meet these limitations as long as the Kiev MD was included in the flank region.¹⁸⁶




Figure 3.2. Military Districts of the USSR

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 100-2-1, The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 1-2.

¹⁸⁶ Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 46. On Norway's concerns, see Gunn Gravdal: "Soviet Fighters on Kola," *Aftenposten*, 15 June 1990, translated as "Soviet Fighter Bombers Stationed on Kola," Joint Publications Research Service – Arms Control (JPRS-TAC)-90-020, 20 July 1990, 28.

The General Staff had voiced their opposition to the inclusion of the Kiev MD in the flank zone in September 1990, as preparation of negotiating positions was underway prior to Shevardnadze's meeting with Baker in New York. They argued that the withdrawals of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe (both unilaterally and under the provisions of a prospective CFE Treaty) would create a disbalance that favored NATO over the WTO in Central Europe. This disbalance would partly be the result of a Soviet proposal for lower limits on armaments in the central and expanded central zones.¹⁸⁷ Having offered this proposal, the Soviets counted on NATO's understanding of not only the prospective disbalance in forces, but also the problems posed by the relocation of their military potential. Retention of the Kiev MD in the flank zone would require the construction outside the MD of new facilities for Soviet forces being withdrawn from Eastern Europe, facilities that already existed in the Kiev MD. "In other words, the retention of the KMD in the flank zone breaks all our infrastructure of the Armed Forces with all the consequences and costs of military, political, economic and moral character associated with this."¹⁸⁸ The General Staff also asserted that, given the plans for the development of the Soviet armed forces and historical experience associated with the Kiev MD, "associating the KMD with the flank region [would be] unthinkable, since the military potential in it is assigned for defense in the western direction."¹⁸⁹

Despite the objections of the military, Shevardnadze, probably exceeding his instructions, reached a preliminary agreement with Baker that included the Kiev MD in the flank zone. While

¹⁸⁷ The central zone included the FRG, Denmark and the Benelux countries on the NATO side and the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the WTO side. The expanded central zone added France and the United Kingdom on the NATO side and the Baltic, Belarussian, and Transcarpathian MDs on the WTO side.

¹⁸⁸ "Argumentatsiya k regional'nomu deleniyu," undated paper, Kataev Papers, Box 8, Folder 19, 2.

¹⁸⁹ "Argumentatsiya k voprosu o regional'nomu deleniyu."

Shevardnadze was still in New York, Yazov raised concerns over what appeared to be shifts in the Soviets' negotiating positions, including on the flank issue.¹⁹⁰ Yazov and Chief of the General Staff Moiseyev reiterated the objections of the MOD after Shevardnadze's return from New York, including at the same meeting in late October in which they clashed over LBNA.¹⁹¹ The most convincing evidence that Shevardnadze had gotten ahead of the other members of the Soviet security apparatus, specifically the armed forces, is in a letter he sent to Baker on 30 October:

...in evaluating the New York agreement, the Soviet leadership was confronted with an issue...the problem of regional division relating to the flanks. By and large, the agreement we reached is a right one, and the agreed numerical parameters correctly take into account the situation, including in the unstable south. The problem we are facing has to do with the location of the Kiev Military District (KMD). The fact of the matter is that both geographically and in terms of climate, and from the standpoint of its possibilities, it is best suited for stationing there the armed forces and armaments that we are presently withdrawing from the Central [sic] and Eastern Europe. We simply have no

¹⁹⁰ Shevardnadze's detailed report of the results of his trip to attend the UNGA session and his discussions with Baker are in Shevardnadze, "Prezidentu SSSR Gorbachevu M.S. ob itogov peregovorov v Nyu Uorke 22 sentyabrya – 5 oktyabrya 1990 g." The compromise on the flank region is on page 11. Yazov's objection is in D. Yazov, "Tovarishchu Zaykovu L.N., O neobkhodimosti ucheta mneniya Ministerstva oborony SSSR v khode vstrech i besed Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR v Nyu-Uorke po voprosam venskikh peregovorov," 2 October 1990, Kataev Papers, Box 8 Folder 21, 2.

¹⁹¹ The flank limits on armaments agreed to at New York and the reassignment of the Kiev MD to the flank region "create great difficulties for us...The implementation of the variant agreed to in New York of the regional issue demands of us additional large reductions in the combat staffing of the flank districts [*okrugov*], a fundamental reexamination of the organizational manning structure of the forces, their regrouping to the central regions of the country, and also a substantive adjustment of the withdrawal of groups of forces from the east European countries." "Prezidentu Soyuzu Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik tovarishchu Gorbachevu M.S. o predlozheniyakh Ministerstva oborony SSSR no venskim peregovoram v svyazi s itogami peregovorov v Nyu-Uorke 22 sentyabrya – 5 oktyabrya 1990 g.," 3-4; "Protokol zasedaniya komissii po voprosam peregovorov o sokrashchenii vooruzheniy i bezopasnosti strany, 25 oktyabrya 1990 goda," 2.

other place – and you will see that easily if you take a look at the map. Unfortunately, *those realities that emerged only recently do not, in any way, fit into the numerical parameters that you and I agreed upon in New York* [emphasis added] with the final understanding that the final decision would be made after we have consulted our respective allies.¹⁹²

A week after Shevardnadze sent his letter, Baker met with Yazov in Moscow, where they agreed to remove the Kiev MD from the flank zone to the so-called expanded central zone (the area defined in Article IV, paragraph 3 of the treaty).¹⁹³ Shevardnadze had been overruled, although from the perspective of the Soviet military, this result demonstrated the smooth functioning of the interdepartmental policy process on arms control and the military's role in “promoting the quest for mutually acceptable solutions to all questions demanding professionalism and competence in the military sphere.”¹⁹⁴ Although the Soviets were successful in relocating the Kiev MD to the expanded central zone, once the overall limits on armaments in the flank zone were divided among the states of the WTO (Romania and Bulgaria lay fully within the zone) and former states of the USSR (Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan lay fully in the zone and Ukraine and Russia included territory in the zone), the armed forces of the successor state to the USSR – the Russian Federation – would find

¹⁹² “Shevardnadze Letter on CFE, 30 October 1990,” George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, Scowcroft, Brent Collection, USSR Chronological Files, CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Files, CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 [May 1990] [OA/ID 91121-006], 1.

¹⁹³ Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 46. Within the expanded central zone, the Kiev MD was nonetheless bounded by sublimits of 2250 tanks, 2500 ACVs and 1500 pieces of artillery. CFE Treaty Text, Article IV, paragraph 3(D).

¹⁹⁴ V. Izgarshev, “Our Interview,” *Pravda*, 7 December 1990, translated as “General Staff Officer Reviews CFE Treaty,” JPRS-TAC-90-034, 19 December 1990, 53.

themselves short of at least tanks and ACVs in the *oblasts* that fell within the northern and southern portions of the flank zone. This problem became acute before the CFE Treaty entered into force in 1992 and would haunt the parties to the agreement for years to come. Somewhat less problematic, although still a point of dispute, was the so-called sufficiency rule.

The sufficiency rule, under which no single state party to the CFE Treaty could possess more than a given percentage of all the armaments limited by the treaty, also challenged the Soviets because they felt they needed to retain significant forces in the ATTU region. By July 1990, the General Staff, citing the changes that were rapidly taking place in Eastern Europe, determined that they should seek changes to the negotiating position on the sufficiency rule. Whereas the General Staff had previously advocated that no single party to the CFE Treaty should have more than 35-40 percent of overall holdings of armaments in each category of TLE, they sought to increase the level to 40-45 percent (the MFA favored thirty-five percent).¹⁹⁵ Even forty percent, however, proved unsustainable in the CFE negotiations. In talks with Baker in New York, Shevardnadze reached agreement on levels ranging from 33.3 percent for tanks and ACVs to 37.5 percent for combat helicopters, which Yazov criticized as another “shift” in the Soviet position that would complicate further negotiations.¹⁹⁶

The debate over the sufficiency rule was unique in that it was not limited to the Soviet interdepartmental policy formulation enterprise or, in fact, the WTO versus NATO. It also pitted the non-Soviet WTO (NSWTO) states, who were acting increasingly autonomously of the USSR

¹⁹⁵ Vopros dlya rassmotreniya v Sovete oborony u tov. Zaykova L.N., 23 iulya 1990 goda v 17 chasov, O materialakh dlya peregovorov v Vene,” 2.

¹⁹⁶ Shevardnadze’s agreement is in Shevardnadze, “Prezidentu SSSR Gorbachevu M.S. ob itogov peregovorov v Nyu Uorke 22 sentyabrya – 5 oktyabrya 1990 g.,” 8. Yazov’s objection is in “Tovarishchu Zaykovu L.N., O neobkhodimosti ucheta mneniya Ministerstva oborony SSSR v khode vstrech i besed Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR v Nyu-Uorke po voprosam venskikh peregovorov,” 2-3.

in the negotiations, against Moscow. The main purpose for including the rule in the CFE Treaty was to limit Soviet stationed forces on the territory of the NSWTO states. In late August 1990, when Oleg Grinevskiy, the head of the Soviet delegation to the CFE negotiations, offered a forty percent figure for the sufficiency rule, he was vigorously “harangued” by four NSWTO delegations. To resolve the issue among the WTO states required a series of meetings in September through November 1990.¹⁹⁷ Achievement of agreement (the final level in the treaty was about 33.3 percent) paved the way for completion of the CFE Treaty negotiations and allowed the WTO states to divide the overall ceilings for TLE for the eastern group of states parties among themselves in the Budapest Agreement of 3 November 1990.

Managing Systemic Change in Europe – Dissolution of the WTO and Reunification of Germany

Two processes of systemic change in Europe, the dissolution of the WTO and the reunification of Germany, played out concurrently with the CFE Treaty negotiations. The end states of both processes owed much to Gorbachev’s policy choices. They also defined a security environment in which the USSR and its successor states would have to adjust to a new status. The CFE Treaty figured in both processes as a means for Moscow to exercise some influence over their outcomes.

The end of the WTO, including WTO states’ divergence from Soviet positions during the CFE negotiations, previewed Moscow’s later concerns about NATO enlargement. The formal process of the dissolution of the WTO began at the Moscow meeting of the WTO PCC on 7 June 1990. Owing in part to the demands of the ongoing CFE Treaty negotiations, this process was not completed until 1 March 1991, following a decision by the PCC at its meeting in Budapest

¹⁹⁷ Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 57-58.

on 25 February 1991.¹⁹⁸ At the June 1990 PCC meeting, “The participants were critical of the status of the Vienna negotiations. The Soviet Union, GDR, Poland and Hungary reinforced the importance of accelerating this work so that the agreement would be ready to sign by the CSCE conference” scheduled for November 1990. At Gorbachev’s urging, the PCC formed a disarmament commission to coordinate negotiating positions among the WTO states.¹⁹⁹ A Czechoslovakian diplomat who attended the PCC meeting explained that the “practical purpose” of the disarmament commission was to divide the quotas of armaments in a prospective CFE Treaty among the states of the WTO. He also explained that the PCC decided to abolish a committee of experts that had been formed in 1988 to coordinate among the WTO states during the negotiations.²⁰⁰ As the Eastern European states became more assertive in their relations with the USSR, this coordination had become more difficult. As Gorbachev granted the countries of the WTO greater latitude in developing their own foreign policies, those states enjoyed more sovereignty and political equality, and the WTO no longer spoke with one voice on defense and disarmament, to include on the CFE negotiations.²⁰¹ The reunification of Germany presented challenges of equal, or greater, magnitude.

¹⁹⁸ Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military*, 274-275.

¹⁹⁹ “Document No. 153: Records of the Political Consultative Committee in Moscow, June 7, 1990,” in Mastny and Byrne, eds. *A Cardboard Castle?* 675.

²⁰⁰ “Document No. 154: Recollections of Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Adviser Jaroslav Sedivy, 1990-1991,” in Mastny and Byrne, eds. *A Cardboard Castle?* 680.

²⁰¹ Richard Sakwa, *Gorbachev and His Reforms, 1985-1990* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1990), 343. Illustrative of the problematic situation in intra-WTO policy formulation on the CFE negotiations was an exchange between a Hungarian reporter and David Meitszter, deputy state secretary of foreign affairs of Hungary, shortly after Shevardnadze and Baker met in New York and reached agreement on a number of issues in the negotiations. After Meitszter took issue with the applicability of the agreements, the interviewer asked, “Is it not about the fact that today the Soviet foreign minister cannot speak alone on behalf of the collapsing Warsaw Pact or, let us say, of the six Warsaw Pact member states?” Meitszter replied, “That is it, certainly. The European order based on the opposition of the two military alliances has ceased; furthermore, this order has been gradually replaced by a new cooperative security order based on the agreement between sovereign European countries. One of its manifestations is the fact that although the foreign ministers of two countries which possess the greatest military potential agreed on

As the process of the reunification of the FRG and the GDR proceeded apace, a key goal for Moscow was to limit the size of the armed forces of a unified Germany. The rapid pace of the reunification process overtook the Soviets' pursuit of this goal. Various Soviet positions, such as exclusion of a unified Germany from membership in NATO and managing "the process of unity" so that it would "run synchronously with the shaping of the pan-European security structures," among which would be the CFE Treaty regime, rapidly fell by the wayside.²⁰² In June 1990, for example, in an address to the Supreme Soviet following his meeting with President Bush in Washington, Gorbachev criticized the U.S. position on including a unified Germany in NATO, "something that could substantially alter the balance and distort the existing security structure." Should this come to pass, "we would be forced to reconsider anew much of what constitutes the subject of the Vienna [CFE] talks, inasmuch as the continent's whole strategic situation would change." Nonetheless, Gorbachev reached an agreement with Chancellor Helmut Kohl (who was seeking to avoid having Germany singled out for unique limitations in a future CFE Treaty) at a meeting the next month in Stavropol whereby a unified Germany would be allowed, if it so decided, to join NATO and the FRG would commit itself to reduce the personnel strength of the armed forces to 370,000 in three to four years from the entry into force of the CFE agreement.²⁰³ A commentary published in the Soviet Army's newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star) in late August 1990, about a month before the two Germanies

something, it has not automatically become the agreement of the European countries." Istvan Kulcsar, Ministry Official on Intra-Pact CFE Force Level Talks," Budapest Domestic Service, 14 October 1990, translated in JPRS-TAC-90-029, 22 October 1990, 9.

²⁰² "Shevardnadze on 'Compromise' on NATO Membership," Hamburg DPA, 4 May 1990, JPRS-TAC-90-015, 16 May 1990, 29.

²⁰³ For an account of the talks between Gorbachev and Kohl and the basic points of the agreement, see Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft*, 333-342.

reunified, captured the dynamic of the intersecting processes of the CFE negotiations and German reunification:

...how many complications and underwater reefs are contained in, for instance, a historically determined and natural process like Germany's reunification. It is proceeding at an accelerated pace and for that reason a whole series of problems is arising. *One of them is how to achieve harmony between the setting of the level for the limitation on the numerical strength of a united Germany's armed forces and the talks process of the "23"* [Emphasis added. "The talks process of the '23'" referred to the CFE negotiations]. A specific task has arisen - taking legal consideration of the accord between the USSR and the FRG on the reduction of the future German army's troops to 370,000 men within three to four years within the context of the Vienna talks. That is no simple matter. Germany's unification and its membership in NATO and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the GDR create a new military-political situation in Central Europe and raise in a different way questions concerning the balance of forces and interests of many states of this region.²⁰⁴

Although Soviet negotiator Grinevskiy identified a "specific task" of the CFE talks as translating the agreement between Gorbachev and Kohl "into the legal language in the framework of the Vienna talks," the agreement remained outside the legal framework of the CFE

²⁰⁴ Colonel V. Nazarenko: "Without Vacation Is How Delegations of 23 Countries Are Working at Vienna Talks," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (hereafter *KZ*), 28 August 1990, translated as "Conventional Arms Talks Progress Viewed," JPRS-TAC-90-026, 18 September 1990, 17. A military analyst for the TASS news agency made a similar observation at the end of August. Despite progress in the CFE negotiations, "All grounds for concern, however, have not been removed. Unfortunately, developments in Europe run far ahead of the Vienna talks. With German unification, a united Germany's membership of NATO and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from central Europe, the military political situation in the region is changing dramatically." Viktor Chernyshev, "Chernyshev Views Vienna Arms Cut Proposals," TASS, 31 August 1990, translated in JPRS-TAC-90-026, 18 September 1990, 20.

Treaty.²⁰⁵ The processes of German reunification and the CFE negotiations were reconciled in politically binding statements by Lothar de Maiziere, the prime minister of the GDR, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the foreign minister of the FRG, at a session of the CFE negotiations on 30 August 1990. They officials affirmed that the personnel strength of the armed forces of a unified Germany would not exceed 370,000 personnel.²⁰⁶ Although this voluntary limit on the size of the German armed forces was not legally codified in the CFE Treaty, it was recorded in the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-1A Agreement) of 1 July 1992. This agreement, which Moscow pursued when it became apparent that personnel limits would not be included in the CFE Treaty, established politically binding limits on the personnel level of military formations of all the states parties to the CFE Treaty (with the exception of sea-based naval forces, internal security forces or forces serving under United Nations command) in the AOA of the CFE Treaty.²⁰⁷ In the end, the Vienna negotiations and the CFE treaty provided some political cover to Gorbachev as he tried to keep up with the process of the reunification of Germany. Moscow got what it wanted, a limit

²⁰⁵ Vladimir Smelov, "Grinevskiy Sees 'Tough Test' in Vienna Talks," TASS, 9 August 1990, translated in JPRS-TAC-90-024, 15 August 1990, 53. Draft instructions to the Soviet delegation in Vienna specified that the treaty should "reinforce" the agreement reached by Gorbachev and Kohl in the form of a "precise treaty legal... declaration" that should be a "constituent part" of the treaty. "Direktivny sovetskoy delegatsii na 8-y raund peregorov po obychnym vooruzhenym silam v Evrope i po meram ukrepleniya doveriya i bezopasnosti v Evrope," 1.

²⁰⁶ "Foreign Ministry Welcomes German Army Cuts," TASS, 31 August 1990, translated in JPRS-TAC-90-026, 18 September 1990, 21. Additional Soviet reporting, including an interview with Moscow's CFE negotiator Grinevskiy, noted approvingly the direct link between the agreement Gorbachev reached with Kohl in July and the statements at the negotiations. I. Melnikov, "Military Detente for Europe": "An Important Milestone," *Pravda*, 1 September 1990, translated as "Grinevskiy Cited on Resumption of Vienna Talks: Comments to Pravda" and S. Tosunyan: "Vienna: Decisive Round," *Izvestiya*, 1 September 1990, translated as "Grinevskiy Cited on Resumption of Vienna Talks: Izvestiya Interview," both in JPRS-TAC-90-026, 23-24.

²⁰⁷ The text of the CFE 1A agreement is at <https://www.osce.org/library/14093?download=true>. The FRG committed to a lower level of personnel – 345,000 – than had been agreed by Gorbachev and Kohl.

on the size of the armed forces of a unified Germany, but not in the form it desired, settling for a politically binding commitment rather than a legally binding obligation.

Results and Subsequent Actions

The CFE Treaty Gorbachev signed in Paris on 19 November 1990 did not satisfy all Moscow's desiderata. In a brief period – less than two years – the negotiators had achieved a “gradual coming together of the sides’ positions” that led to “mutually acceptable positions.”²⁰⁸ Taken together with the “Vienna Document 1990 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe,” which the CSCE states also adopted at the meeting in Paris, and the “Treaty on Open Skies,” which was signed in 1992, the CFE Treaty made up one room in Gorbachev's common European home. The USSR, however, would never ratify the treaty. Unsurprisingly, in the aftermath of the attempted coup against Gorbachev, it was clear by late November 1991 that the prospects for ratification had dimmed. Soviet officials conveyed mixed messages to western interlocutors about the prospects for ratification, with then-departing CFE negotiator Grinevskiy expressing “uncertainty” about the treaty's prospects in the Supreme Soviet, while Defense Minister Marshal Evgeniy Shaposhnikov and Gorbachev's aide Aleksandr Yakovlev were more optimistic.²⁰⁹ It would remain for the successor state to the USSR, the Russian Federation, to ratify the treaty on 8 July 1992.

²⁰⁸ Antonov and Ayumov, *Kontrol' nad obychnymi vooruzheniyami v evrope*, 10.

²⁰⁹ Grinevskiy was “concerned that ratification [would] be lost in the plethora of issues confronting the center in Moscow.” “CFE: The Soviet Union, Ukraine and CFE Ratification,” USMISSION USVIENNA 191447z November 91, George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Craig Chellis Files, Subject Files, CFE - Ukraine, [OA/ID CF01581-008]. Shaposhnikov told his German counterpart that he expected ratification soon. “Shaposhnikov: CFE Treaty to Be Ratified Soon,” Berlin ADN, 13 November 1991, translated in JPRS-TAC-91-030, 20 December 1991, 24. “Yakovlev was confident that the Union Supreme Soviet would ratify the CFE Treaty and that the republics would assume obligations for the implementation of it.” “Aleksandr Yakovlev on START/CFE Ratification; The Ukraine and Republican Armies,” AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 240121z OCT 91,

The Military Pushes Back

A significant byproduct of the negotiations and the CFE Treaty itself was an increasingly vigorous reaction by the military in the form of resistance to proposals for the negotiations (for instance, on LBNA, limitations in the flanks region, and the sufficiency rule), moves to exclude units and armaments from the treaty's limitations and verification provisions, and overt hostility toward the MFA and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Gorbachev's announcement of unilateral cuts to the Soviet armed forces at the UNGA session in December 1988 might have been the tipping point; for example, Marshal Akhromeyev resigned as Chief of the General Staff immediately after Gorbachev's announcement.²¹⁰ Tension between Shevardnadze and Defense Minister Yazov was already evident at a meeting of the Politburo in late December 1988, during a discussion of next steps after Gorbachev's UNGA speech.²¹¹ The degree of this opposition was such that, according to former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Jack Matlock, contacts in the General Staff told a U.S. official in early 1990 that "senior military leaders were wishing they had shot Gorbachev on the tarmac when he flew back from his December 1988 visit to the United States."²¹²

By late 1990, as the CFE negotiations were approaching endgame, and then, when the states parties to the treaty provided their initial data on armed forces and armaments, it became

George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Craig Chellis Files, Subject Files, CFE - Ukraine, [OA/ID CF01581-008].

²¹⁰ Akhromeyev's resignation followed what was likely an acrimonious debate within the Defense Council following initial discussion of possible unilateral reductions in the Politburo in November 1988. Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military*, 144.

²¹¹ Soviet Union, Communist Party Central Committee. (1988), *Meeting of the Politburo of the CC CPSU*, accessed through ProQuest.

²¹² Mary Elise Sarotte, *1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 156 and footnote 17.

apparent that what the Soviets were reporting differed significantly from what was already known about their forces in the ATTU region.²¹³ As one author noted, “The Soviet military were acutely conscious of the diminishing power of the Soviet Union and took a number of steps to compensate for the limits imposed by the CFE Treaty *even before it was signed*” [emphasis added].²¹⁴ The Soviets underreported the number of OOVs (which would have the effect of lowering the number of inspections the USSR would have to accept), moved TLE east of the Ural Mountains (and therefore outside the AOA of the treaty), and redesignated formations of the ground forces as naval infantry and coastal artillery units (thereby exempting them from the treaty as naval forces).

As Jane M.O. Sharp points out, of all the issues associated with the Soviets’ counting and reporting of their forces, the underreporting of OOVs was the easiest to resolve.²¹⁵ The Soviets acknowledged some discrepancies in the baseline data, which included the number of OOVs, they provided when the CFE Treaty was signed. They provided plausible explanations for the discrepancy between the number of OOVs they reported in November 1990 (895) and what they had offered earlier during the negotiations (1500). Colonel General Nikolai Chervov of the General Staff explained in December 1990 that the earlier figure (1500) had been provided in 1988, when the treaty definition of an OOV had not been set and before some reductions and reorganizations in the Soviet armed forces had taken place.²¹⁶ Moscow’s official policy line

²¹³ The requirement for initial data is in CFE Treaty Text, Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, Section VII, paragraph 1(A). The treaty allowed for a period of 90 days (to 18 February 1991) to make corrections to submissions of data.

²¹⁴ Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 85.

²¹⁵ Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 87.

²¹⁶ Oleg Moskovskiy, “Chervov Clarifies CFE Inspection Site Numbers,” TASS, 7 December 1990, translated in JPRS-TAC-90-034, 19 December 1990, 50.

regarding these “alleged” inadequacies, as set out in instructions for Shevardnadze’s meeting with Secretary Baker in March 1991, was that they had provided corrections to the data. The Soviets also highlighted their own reaction to inconsistencies in the data from the U.S. and other NATO countries, which was not to “dramatize” the issue.²¹⁷ The Soviets’ openness to offering explanations and corrections was apparent in instructions to the delegation in Vienna approved by Chief of the General Staff General Vladimir Lobov and Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov on 31 October 1991. The Soviets offered clarifications [*utochneniya*] in response to questions the American side had raised. Of twenty-one OOVs under question, eight (including a repair facility at Kushchevskaya in southern Russia, at which 700 ACVs awaiting destruction were present) had not been declared but would be added in the subsequent exchange of data.²¹⁸ In line with the desire to avoid dramatizing this issue, Moscow preferred to work within the consultative body in the CFE Treaty, the JCG, which proved to be a satisfactory forum for resolving questions about data throughout the life of the treaty.

The transfer by the Soviet armed forces of large quantities of TLE east of the Urals and the redesignation of ground forces formations as naval infantry and coastal defense units proved to be more problematic for the fate of the CFE Treaty and would require intervention at the highest levels to resolve. They also were also exemplars of the General Staff’s attempts to obstruct the negotiating process, if not to thwart it, and to undermine the MFA and Shevardnadze. The final resolution of the problem of TLE moved east of the Urals was the

²¹⁷ “Soobrazheniya k vstreche ministra inostranykh del SSSR i gossekretarya SShA (Moskva, mart 1991 r.),” 3 February 1991, Kataev Papers, Box 8 Folder 21, 5. The instructions also contrasted the corrections the Soviets had submitted, which added more than 700 items of TLE “and also fully depicted all objects of verification” with NATO’s, which reported 1500 *fewer* pieces of TLE.

²¹⁸ “Dopolnitel’nye ukazaniya sovetskoy delegatsii na venskikh peregovorov,” “Prilozhenie 1 – Otvet na voprosam SShA v otnoshenii sovetskikh ODVT v svyazi s podgotovkoi k ratifikatsii Dogovora ob OVSE,” Kataev Papers, Box 9 Folder 1.

issuance by the Soviet representative to the JCG of a politically binding statement, outside the treaty, on 14 June 1991 that reported and explained the numbers of TLE that had been withdrawn east of the Urals and pledged that a certain quantity would be reduced or converted to civilian use.²¹⁹

In September 1990, Shevardnadze told Gorbachev the “continuing” transfer of tanks east of the Urals was becoming one of the main obstacles to the completion of the treaty. The western countries perceived this action as an attempt to exclude these armaments from the limits and verification measures of the prospective treaty that was inconsistent with assurances Moscow had provided at the highest levels about the elimination of armaments that were being unilaterally reduced by the USSR.²²⁰ The Soviet armed forces took two approaches toward pushing back against the allegations from the West and, implicitly, Shevardnadze. First, as is evident in a paper signed by Chief of the General Staff Moiseyev in late 1990, the Soviets sought to deflect attention away from their own action by drawing attention to transfers of TLE out of the AOA by the U.S., primarily to the Persian Gulf region.²²¹

The Soviets’ second approach was to offer explanations and assurances about the movement of TLE east of the Urals. In a letter to Baker dated 13 October 1990, and as a follow-up to their discussions in New York earlier that month, Shevardnadze tried to explain the large

²¹⁹ “Statement by the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Joint Consultative Group, Vienna, 14 June 1991, <https://fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/text/vienna1.htm>.

²²⁰ Eduard Shevardnadze, “Prezidentu SSSR tovarishchu Gorbachevu M.S. o srochnykh merakh v svyazi s zavereniem raboty nad dogovorom po obychnym vooruzhenym silam v Evrope i dogovorom o sokrashchenii i ogranichenii strategicheskikh nastupatel’nykh vooruzheniy,” 18 September 1990, Kataev Papers, Box 4 Folder 53, 5.

²²¹ Untitled and undated paper [the text of the paper indicates it was prepared after 26 November 1990 and before January 1991], signed by M.A. Moiseyev, Kataev Papers, Box 8 Folder 21.

changes in the numbers of tanks, ACVs and artillery from 1988 to late 1990, which are shown in Table 3.1. He attributed them to the unilateral cuts Gorbachev announced in December 1988 and

Table 3.1. Changes in Levels of Soviet Armaments in Europe²²²

Date	Tanks	Armored Combat Vehicles	Artillery
1 July 1988	41,580	57,800	42,400
1 August 1990	24,898	32,320	18,300

Source: “Reference on the Quantity of Conventional Armaments Moved from Europe to the Asian Part of the USSR” [undated chart – probably late 1990, because it includes data on holdings in Europe on 19 November 1990 (date of signing of the CFE Treaty)], Kataev Papers, Box 8 Folder 21.

unspecified “measures implementing the new defensive doctrine.” Of the tanks that had been shifted east of the Urals, a quantity of “modern types” were transferred to units in the Asian part of the USSR to re-equip them, while the remaining ones were slated for destruction locally or conversion to civilian use.²²³ Chief of the General Staff General Moiseyev offered a similar explanation to Canadian authorities in May 1991.²²⁴ Marshal Akhromeyev (by then an advisor to Gorbachev) added in December 1990 that the need to move so much TLE east of the Urals was also dictated by the convergence of the rapid pace of the unilateral reductions and withdrawals from Eastern Europe with “the lack of the necessary material bases for [the forces’] redeployment in Europe.”²²⁵

²²² For a more detailed accounting of the transfers of TLE east of the Urals, see Appendix C.

²²³ Eduard Shevardnadze letter to James Baker, 13 October 1990, George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, Scowcroft, Brent Collection, USSR Chronological Files, CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Files, CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 [December 1990] [OA/ID 91121-012].

²²⁴ “Moiseyev Takes Tough Line on CFE and NATO,” AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 141849z May 91, George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Heather Wilson, Subject Files, CFE – Moiseyev Visit [1] May 20-21, 1991 [OA/ID CF00281].

²²⁵ Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, Letter to Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor, 20 December 1990, George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Gordon, John A. Files, Subject Files, CFE

Regardless of the credibility of their explanations for the transfer of TLE east of the Urals, the Soviets, specifically the General Staff, managed to exempt a large quantity of armaments from the limitations of the CFE Treaty, the potential cost of destroying or converting the armaments (especially tanks) in accordance with the exacting standards of the treaty, and the transparency associated with inspections of sites where the armaments were based. As late as February 1991, the Soviets were adamant that “familiarization inspections” of sites east of the Urals not be allowed nor information provided on TLE there.²²⁶ The armed forces also gained a potential reserve force to compensate for the withdrawals of forces from Eastern Europe and limits imposed by the CFE Treaty. A report to Gorbachev in December 1990 explained

The creation of a certain reserve of combat equipment in the East of the country is extremely necessary, because under the conditions of the destruction of the military organization of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the correlation of forces between the USSR and NATO, with the departure to maximum levels envisioned by the treaty, will be in total 1:1.4 in NATO’s favor, even without taking into account the West’s advantage in naval forces. To compensate for this imbalance, we must have a certain reserve quantity of combat equipment *in a mobilization reserve outside the*

[Conventional Forces in Europe] – March 1991 [3] [OA/ID CF01035-015]. Akhromeyev was responding to a letter from Scowcroft, in which the U.S. National Security Advisor called attention to issues with the data the Soviets had provided that was supposed to “accurately reflect actual equipment levels as of signature – November 19 [1990].” Scowcroft asked the Soviets to “examine the data and make necessary adjustments,” the result of which should be “a substantial increase in the Tables reporting what was actually present in the Atlantic-to-the Urals zone at treaty signature, and thus an increase in your destruction obligation under the treaty.” White House cable, 050729Z December 1990, To Ambassador Matlock – Message to be Passed to Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev from Brent Scowcroft, George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, Scowcroft, Brent Collection, USSR Chronological Files, CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Files, CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 [December 1990] [OA/ID 91121-013].

²²⁶ “Soobrazheniya k vstreche ministra innostranykh del SSSR i gossekretarya SShA (Moskva, mart 1991 r.),” 5.

area of application of the treaty, that is, beyond the Urals
[emphasis added].²²⁷

Within two months of reporting to Gorbachev the need for a mobilization reserve east of the Urals, however, the same officials who signed the report (with the exception of Shevardnadze, who had resigned) approved instructions to new Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh for a meeting with Secretary Baker to be held in March 1991. If the U.S. side raised the issue, the foreign minister was to “Affirm that *we do not intend to create beyond the Urals a strategic reserve* or any kind of large army groups” [emphasis added].²²⁸ It appears the General Staff succeeded in convincing Gorbachev and the other members of the Soviet national security leadership to mislead their western counterparts in this instance. More certainly, given the late stage in the CFE negotiating process at which Shevardnadze engaged on this issue (September 1990), the General Staff deceived the MFA and Shevardnadze. It is no coincidence that Shevardnadze resigned shortly after this deception became apparent. In fact, some reporting in the Soviet press at the time attributed Shevardnadze’s resignation to what they characterized as the General Staff’s clever operation to “repair the errors of diplomacy” (an assertion the armed forces denied).²²⁹

²²⁷ “Presidentu Soyuzu Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik tovarishchu Gorbachevu M.S. o nekotorykh voprosakh, vozniknukh v svyazi s obmenom dannymi po Dogovoru ob obychnykh vooruzhenykh silakh v Evrope,” 17 December 1990, Kataev Papers, Box 8 Folder 21.

²²⁸ “Soobrazheniya k vstreche ministra innostranykh del SSSR i gossekretarya SShA (Moskva, mart 1991 r.),” 5.

²²⁹ The initial article appeared in the conservative newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya* and was reported to Washington in National Security Council Memorandum, 9 January 1991, retransmission of Reuters report, released 9 January 1991, “Moscow Newspaper Admits West’s Charges over Tank Movements,” George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Gordon, John A. Files, Subject Files, CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] – January 1991 [OA/ID CF01034-021]. See also Aleksandr Ignatov, “What Is Behind Shevardnadze’s Resignation,” *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 3 January 1991, translated as “Shevardnadze Said to Quit Over CFE Tank Dispute,” JPRS-TAC-91-003, 30 January 1991, 28. For denials and clarifications from the General Staff, see N. Belan, “Who Benefits from This: The Legend of the Vanishing Tanks,” *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 5 January 1991, translated as “Reports on Arms Movement Seen as ‘Sensationalism,’” JPRS-TAC-91-003, 30 January 1991, 29 and Yuriy

The redesignation of formations of the ground forces as naval infantry and coastal defense units was another effort by the General Staff to reduce the Soviet armed forces' holdings of TLE. This action also caught the MFA and Shevardnadze unawares and complicated ratification of the treaty by the USSR's treaty partners. The Soviet military broached this action at a meeting with Baker in Houston in December 1990, when Shevardnadze apparently also heard it for the first time.²³⁰ An additional benefit of this ploy was that it raised anew the issue of naval arms control, which had been excluded, to Moscow's disappointment, from the mandate for the negotiations of the CFE Treaty. Surprise on the part of the U.S. and Shevardnadze was understandable because up to that point, at least at the working level, the Soviets had not pursued these claims, despite having had several opportunities to do so.²³¹ Shevardnadze might also have been surprised to learn that Defense Minister Yazov, in a meeting in Moscow in December 1990, told lead U.S. CFE Treaty negotiator James Woolsey that "had he been negotiating the treaty,"

Lebedev, "Where Did the Tanks Disappear," Bratislava *Verejnost*, 8 January 1991, translated as "Chervov on Soviet Tank Redeployment Behind Urals," JPRS-TAC-91-003, 30 January 1991, 32.

²³⁰ James Woolsey, who was present at the meeting in Houston, offered a detailed recollection: "Baker raised [naval infantry] with Shevardnadze...and Shevardnadze did not respond. He just said, 'I'm going to let the representative of the General Staff explain.' He did not defend the Soviet position at all. This general, Ladygin, was sort of a Chief of Arms Control. He gave a tangled explanation, Baker let me ask him a few questions. Then Baker asked him a few questions, and it was clear their position was completely indefensible...Shevardnadze just sat there. I can still see him. He just sat there watching Ladygin stone faced. It was clear this was not something he was standing by or something he backed. He did not say, at least in my presence... 'I don't back this.' But every bit of body language and his lack of participation showed that. It was about a week or two later that Shevardnadze resigned." P. Edward Jaley, ed. *Arms Control and the End of the Cold War: An Oral History of the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe* (Claremont, California: The Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, Claremont McKenna College, 2002), 94.

²³¹ "Senator Biden, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 7, 1991," undated and unattributed answers to questions, George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Gordon, John A. Files, Subject Files, CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] – May 1991 [1] [OA/ID CF01037-008], Box No. 61, Stack G. The relevant portion of the CFE Treaty is the "Protocol on Notification and Information Exchange," section III, paragraph 2, CFE Treaty Text, 63.

he *would have* pursued a written exemption for land-based naval equipment similar to the one for LBNA.²³²

The armed forces took the lead in negotiations for a resolution of the issue of the resubordination of ground forces formations to the naval forces. General Moiseyev was the primary interlocutor with U.S. officials, for instance at talks held in Washington and Moscow.²³³ Although Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh discussed these issues with Baker, the MFA had been sidelined following Grinevskiy's departure as the lead CFE negotiator and Shevardnadze's resignation in December 1990. Moscow's position, the same as the armed forces', was that these forces were not subject to the CFE Treaty because they were naval forces and any redesignation of forces had taken place well in advance of the conclusion of the CFE negotiations as part of the reform of the Soviet armed forces. Yazov also warned that acceptance of the U.S. position would vastly increase the USSR's destruction obligation (adding an additional 3439 pieces of equipment to the 19,700 already to be destroyed), acknowledge the "correctness" of the U.S. and NATO position, and set the Soviets on a slippery slope that could lead to inclusion of LBNA under CFE and thereby add limits "on important components of our Navy, while at the same time their [the U.S.] Navy would remain untouched. In essence, we would be deprived of the possibility to influence the USA to begin negotiations on naval forces."²³⁴ Following

²³² "CFE: Visit of General Moiseyev – Thrust, Parry, and Riposte," USMISSION USVIENNA 161718z May 1991, George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Gordon, John A. Files, Subject Files, [Soviet Chief of the General Staff Mikhail] Moiseyev – May [20-21], 1991 [OA/ID CF01036-025], Box No. 61, Stack G.

²³³ Jack Matlock recalled that when he met with Gorbachev on 7 May 1991, "Since the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been unable to bring the Soviet military into line, we proposed that Gorbachev send General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff, to Washington to deal with the issue directly," to which Gorbachev agreed. Jack F. Matlock, Jr. *Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1995), 525.

²³⁴ Dmitriy Yazov, "Presidentu Soyuzha Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik, tovarishchu Gorbachevu, M.S., o vooruzheniyakh morskoy pekhoty, soedinenii beregovoy oborony i bronemashinakh RVSN s Dogovorom ob obychnykh vooruzhenykh silakh v Evrope," 4 March 1991, Kataev Papers, Box 8 Folder 21. The same points are in

negotiations by Moiseyev and Bessmertnykh with Baker and the intervention of Bush and Gorbachev, the USSR undertook legally binding “obligations outside the framework of the Treaty” to accept limits on tanks, ACVs and artillery in naval infantry and coastal defense forces (as well as ACVs in the Strategic Rocket Forces) and to reduce tanks, ACVs and artillery in their ground forces to compensate for these holdings.²³⁵

The armed forces’ actions to defend their interests and counter Shevardnadze and the MFA over these issues demonstrated enmity towards the USSR’s diplomats and a reassertion of their influence over matters of military security. Gorbachev had initially gained the support of the military leadership because they, too, realized that the further development of the armed forces would require a renewal of the economy. By late 1988, however, when Gorbachev announced, and then actually implemented, unilateral cuts in Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, the military began to feel threatened. The process of the reunification of Germany proved to be particularly sensitive for the armed forces. As Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice observe,

Throughout 1989 and the beginning of 1990, the Soviet military had been strangely silent about events in Germany. But as it became clear that developments in Germany and Eastern Europe were about to threaten the basic posture of the armed forces, the men in uniform started to find their bureaucratic footing.

instructions to Bessmertnykh for his meeting with Baker in Moscow. “Soobrazheniya k vstreche ministra inostranykh del SSSR i gossekretarya SShA (Moskva, mart 1991 g.),” 5. First deputy Chief of the General Staff General Bronislav Omelichev asserted that the three ground forces divisions had been transferred to the coastal defense forces beginning in 1987, when “the USSR took measures to ensure more reliable protection for its sea lanes in view of the considerable advantage held by the United States and NATO in strike and mobile naval systems.” Colonel M. Ponomarev, “‘We Are Following an Honest and Principled Line;’ First Deputy Chief of USSR Armed Forces General Staff Answers Krasnaya Zvezda Observer’s Questions,” *KZ*, 16 February 1991, translated as “General Denies Arms Control ‘Backtracking’ Charges,” JPRS-TAC-91-006, 15 March 1991, 12.

²³⁵ “Statement by The Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Vienna, 14 June 1991, <https://fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/text/vienna2.htm>. The Soviets issued this statement the same day the “Representative of the [USSR] to the Joint Consultative issued the statement on TLE transferred east of the Urals. See page 94 and footnote 220 of this dissertation.

[Gorbachev's foreign policy advisor] Anatoliy Chernyayev has said that it was the CFE negotiations that heightened the sensitivity of the armed forces to the Soviet Union's deteriorating position in Central Europe.²³⁶

The General Staff "found its bureaucratic footing" in a policy-making apparatus Gorbachev had reformed to support perestroika and implement the new political thinking in international affairs. His reforms included empowering the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU through, in part, the establishment of commissions with the responsibility to coordinate policy on issues such as arms control. The so-called "Big Five," or the Politburo Commission for the Supervision of Negotiations, under the chairmanship of Lev Zaykov, assumed responsibility for arms control policymaking that hitherto had been held exclusively in the MOD.²³⁷ Within the commission and a working group for the preparation of directives of the CC CPSU on military-political issues, Gorbachev made equal the voices of other departments with that of the MOD in the arms control policy process.²³⁸ He also strengthened the voice of the MFA in arms control by appointing Eduard Shevardnadze as Minister of Foreign Affairs. All these reforms notwithstanding, by early 1991, as Baker observed, "the Soviet military's challenge to CFE was not an isolated event, but reflected a broad pattern of Soviet military behavior questioning the agreements negotiated by the USSR under the leadership of Foreign

²³⁶ Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft*, 261.

²³⁷ Savel'ev and Detinov, *The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union*, 111-113.

²³⁸ "Interv'yu s V.L. Kataevym," in A.S. Chernyayev and A.B. Veber, eds., *Otvechaya na vyzov vremeni: Vneshnyaya politika perestroika: dokumental'nye svidetel'stva* (Moscow: Ves' Mir, 2010), 306. The organization and procedures for the working group for the preparation of directives of the CC CPSU on military-political issues are set out in "TsK KPSS – O poryadke podgotovki dokumentov po voenno-politicheskim voprosam dlya doklada TsK KPSS," 19 May 1987, Kataev Papers, Box 13 Folder 31.

Minister Shevardnadze.”²³⁹ Brent Scowcroft summed up the situation well when he wrote, in December 1990 after Shevardnadze’s resignation, “Having signed a CFE treaty that the General Staff views as unequal, the Soviets have begun to redefine various aspects of the agreement in ways that we cannot accept. There is abundant evidence that the Ministry of Defense is acting largely on its own -- without either the knowledge or agreement of the Foreign Ministry. Shevardnadze's departure is likely to exacerbate that problem.”²⁴⁰

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, himself, best captured his frustration over the General Staff’s newfound footing in the policymaking apparatus. In an appeal he wrote to Gorbachev on 20 October 1990, two months before he resigned, Shevardnadze responded forcefully to the MOD’s gripes about the results of his negotiations with Baker in New York. He also made an impassioned pitch, mostly at a political level, to Gorbachev to look beyond the military’s objections to various provisions of CFE and see the treaty in the context of the USSR’s overall relationship with the West and Gorbachev’s efforts to integrate the USSR into Europe. In general, he questioned the assessment of “military comrades” that the state of the negotiations was not satisfactory. He drew attention to the fact that “...we always declared, that these negotiations are about radical cuts in conventional armaments” [emphasis in the original]. After conveying to Gorbachev his disdain for the positions of the military on the transfer of TLE east of the Urals and the General Staff’s obsession with naval forces (observing dryly “Today naval armaments – are the alchemy, with whose help a dead end can be reached in any negotiations”),

²³⁹ “CFE: Secretary’s Review of Moscow Discussions, “SECSTATE WASHDC 220345z March 1991, George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Gordon, John A. Files, Subject Files, CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] – March 1991 [3] [OA/ID CF01035-015], Box No. 60, Stack G.

²⁴⁰ United States Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. *Responding to the Toughening Line in Moscow* 1990, accessed through ProQuest.

he concluded by cautioning Gorbachev that time was of the essence and urging him not to forget why they were pursuing agreement on CFE (and the military was not):

Today our internal situation for the time being, repeat for the time being, allows for the conclusion of this agreement. Tomorrow it might not be so, it might be too late. We cannot go back to the primitive arithmetic of conflict, when the fate of the nation is being decided. It is necessary to go on the path, which the country's leadership has developed, based on the new political thinking. It, by the way, includes a new conception of guaranteeing security – by primarily political means, and not only by the quantity of armaments. In this is the essence of what is going on now concerning the negotiations on disarmament and foreign policy in general. In this is the essence of our divergence from the General Staff.²⁴¹

After Gorbachev signed the CFE Treaty in November 1990, two major issues remained unresolved, and they would come to the fore again for his (and the USSR's) successors: naval arms control and the status of the Baltic States. The Soviets had never given up on naval arms control. They returned to it at various stages of the negotiations and remained committed to its pursuit in the next stage of arms control. Bessmertnykh was instructed to draw Baker's attention in March 1991 "to the necessity – in the wake of agreement on limiting conventional armed forces in Europe – to begin negotiations on reducing naval armaments."²⁴² The exclusion of

²⁴¹ Eduard Shevardnadze, "Presidentu SSSR tovarishchu Gorbachevu M.S.," 20 October 1990, Kataev Papers, Box 8 Folder 22. Shevardnadze minced no words in his assessment of those in the USSR (i.e. the military) who opposed the CFE Treaty and tried to undermine it: "I consider the demagogic attacks by certain military and non-military experts on the conditions and parameters for the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe to be the height of irresponsibility...Only genuine patriotism – not ministerial loyalty – will motivate us to think seriously about the kind of army we need." Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom*, 150.

²⁴² "Soobrazheniya k vstreche ministra innostranykh del SSSR i gossekretarya SShA (Moskva, mart 1991 g.) po voprosam ob obychnykh vooruzhennykh silakh," 3 February 1991, Kataev Papers, Box 9 Folder 1.

naval forces remained a continuing issue with the U.S., and, to an extent, previewed the later dispute over ballistic missile defense, another area of perceived advantage for the U.S.

The issue of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and the CFE Treaty regime was resolved in favor of their exclusion from it. The governments of the newly independent Baltic states insisted they had never been legally incorporated into the USSR; therefore, they could not assume any of the obligations of the successor states, despite their territory being situated within the ATTU area. In October 1991, all the states parties to the CFE Treaty agreed that “in view of the sovereignty of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,” the AOA for the CFE Treaty would not include those countries’ territories. Further, the USSR agreed that all TLE of the Soviet armed forces present in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on 14 November 1990 would be subject to the limitations of the treaty. This equipment would be subject to notification to treaty partners and to inspection, “subject to the consent and cooperation” of the Baltic States.²⁴³ This decision helped to set the conditions for the entry into force of the CFE Treaty, but it left the door open for issues later with the withdrawal of Russian forces and the Baltic states’ entry into NATO in 2004.²⁴⁴

Conclusion

The participation of the USSR in the CFE negotiations was an integral part of Gorbachev’s foreign and security policy. Over time, it also evolved into a part of an effort to

²⁴³ “Statement of the Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group, 18 October 1991, *Arms Control Reporter*, 1991, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in the Framework of the CSCE Process, 407.D.83.

²⁴⁴ These issues also included the status of the Kaliningrad *oblast*, which remained the only part of the Baltic MD (which Gorbachev redesignated as the North-Western Group of Forces) in the AOA of the CFE Treaty. The Poles were especially concerned with excluding the Baltic states from the CFE Treaty. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (hereafter SIPRI), *SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament* (New York: Oxford Press, 1992), 466, 470.

manage processes of rapid change within the WTO and the USSR, itself. The CFE Treaty helped to soften the twin blows of the loss of the USSR's military position in Europe and the inclusion of a reunified Germany in NATO. The treaty supported Gorbachev's foreign and security policy by producing several desired effects of arms control, namely mitigation of the threat from NATO, contribution to the shaping of a security environment more oriented to Moscow's interests, allowing for cost savings as the result of a reduction of the USSR's armed forces, and expanding transparency of military forces and capabilities.

Nonetheless, a key Soviet institution, the armed forces, perceived the CFE Treaty in terms of the undesired effects of arms control. They assessed the change to the security environment, in which the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe was codified in the treaty, as detrimental to Moscow's interests. Likewise, they emphasized the fiscal costs to the USSR of the treaty for the destruction of thousands of pieces of TLE and the hosting of foreign inspection teams, not to mention the expenses associated with the relocation of military units and personnel from Eastern Europe to the territory of the USSR. The armed forces also resented the transparency imposed on them, first by Gorbachev's extension of access to detailed knowledge about the armed forces to entities outside the MOD, such as the MFA and civilian experts, and second, through the detailed requirements of the CFE Treaty for the exchange of information and intrusive on-site inspections.

Notwithstanding the efforts of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, the place of the armed forces in the Soviet and, later, Russian foreign and security policy enterprise, and the influence of the military as an institution persisted. Although they recognized, by 1988, a need to reduce the size and cost of the Soviet armed forces, the military leadership "never signed on to the broader implications of the posture of 'nonoffensive defense' and common security – that the

Soviet Union renounce the use of its military forces to impose its political system in neighboring countries in Eastern Europe, and that those countries would be given ‘freedom of choice,’ including the choice of disbanding the Warsaw Pact and requesting Soviet troops leave their territory.”²⁴⁵ At the end of the day, the “new thinking” and shift from reliance on the armed forces for security was just a tactical pause.

The leadership of the Soviet armed forces publicly expressed varying degrees of enthusiasm for the CFE Treaty when it was signed. “The treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe signed in Paris today is a watershed event on the road toward a political alliance of European countries within the framework of continental confederation. This is the first stone in the foundation of our common European home,” Soviet Chief of Staff General Mikhail Moiseyev told TASS.²⁴⁶ When asked for his assessment of the just-concluded CFE Treaty, Soviet Defense Minister Yazov offered an anodyne assessment.²⁴⁷ According to Gorbachev’s aide Andrey Grachev, though, at the signing of the CFE Treaty in Paris, Yazov “was angry enough to lose all reserve and say to the other members of the Soviet delegation: ‘This Treaty means we have lost World War III without a shot being fired.’”²⁴⁸

²⁴⁵ Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), 303.

²⁴⁶ Oleg Moskovskiy, “Chief of Staff Notes CFE Cuts,” TASS, 19 November 1990, translated in JPRS-TAC-90-032, 29 November 1990, 24.

²⁴⁷ “The More Weapons - the Greater the Reduction,” *Polska Zbrojna*, 23-25 November 1990, translated as “Yazov Assesses Conventional Arms Treaty,” JPRS-TAC-90-034, 19 December 1990, 27.

²⁴⁸ Grachev, *Gorbachev’s Gamble: Soviet Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War*, 190. Later, while in jail for his participation in the August 1991 coup attempt against Gorbachev, Yazov told a newspaper interviewer that “the destruction of what had been the most powerful army in the world had begun with the development of the CFE Treaty negotiating proposals, for which he blamed Gorbachev and Shevardnadze.” Ruediger Hartmann, “The CFE Treaty, or: Can Europe Do Without Cooperative Security,” in Wolfgang Zellner, Hans-Joachim Schmidt and Goetz Neuneck, eds., *The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009), 62.

As the USSR and Gorbachev's tenure as its leader entered their last months, the breadth and depth of the challenges they faced were daunting. An analyst from the State Department might have best described the situation in late September 1991: "From the perspective of Moscow, in the next few months or even weeks, Russia's borders could return to those of the late 18th and early 19th century in the Caucasus, to 1648 with the Ukraine, and to the XVth–XVIth centuries in the West, depending on the ultimate fate of Belarussia. The prospect of rummaging through the Tsar's archives for policy guidance probably overshadows thoughts about preserving CFE limits."²⁴⁹ This analysis proved accurate, and the CFE Treaty was certainly not at the top of the "to do" list for Gorbachev and the leaders of the soon-to-be post-Soviet states as 1991 drew to a close. Thoughts about preserving – and even adjusting – CFE Treaty limits would surface again as Boris Yeltsin and his Russian government worked to develop their own foreign and security policies.

²⁴⁹ S.W. Garnett, "CFE and Its Potential Impact on Post-Soviet Eastern and Central Europe," U.S. Department of State ISP/ESN, 27 September 1991, George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Craig Chellis Files, Subject Files, CFE - Ukraine, [OA/ID CF01581-008].

Chapter 4 - The CFE Treaty and Transition to the New Russian State (1992-1999)

Following the signing of the Belavezka Agreement with the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine on 8 December 1991, and Gorbachev's resignation as the president of the USSR on 25 December, Boris Yeltsin found himself as the head of a new state – the Russian Federation – in 1992.²⁵⁰ Free of the ideological bonds of Marxism-Leninism and shorn of allies in Eastern Europe and the former republics of the Soviet Union, Moscow faced foreign and security policy challenges at the macro level – such as how to define national identity and national interests – and the micro level – how to protect the interests of the twenty-million plus Russians who found themselves outside the borders of the Russian Federation and what to do with military forces of the USSR that were now located on the territories of fifteen independent states. Yeltsin's government also confronted choices about the orientation of Russian foreign and security policy, whether toward the United States and the West, toward the new states of the former USSR, which became known as the “near abroad,” or in some other direction. Yeltsin would have to address these challenges and make these choices in the shadow of the policies of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze.²⁵¹ He would have to do so in a broader context of domestic political turmoil and external crises in Europe.

²⁵⁰ The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) of the USSR was officially renamed the Russian Federation when the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR approved the Law of the RSFSR "On renaming of the State of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic" on 25 December 1991. “The Belavezka Accords Signed,” Presidential Library, <https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619792>.

²⁵¹ As George Breslauer observed, Yeltsin “inherited a drastically altered position in the world, as Russia was shorn of the USSR's Eastern European alliance system and its global power status. Gorbachev's concessionary foreign policy had tried to make the best of this situation by making a virtue of necessity, by attempting to integrate into Western multilateral organizations, by doing the bidding of the West on most issues of contention, and by seeking as

Within this context, the U.S. and the European allies generally supported Yeltsin as he tried to stabilize the new Russian state. For example, Washington sided with Yeltsin in his battle with the parliament in 1993 and spoke in favor of Russia's territorial integrity, even while it criticized the Russian armed forces' methods in the first Chechen War. Economic stability and security of nuclear weapons (and the entire nuclear enterprise) were priorities for the U.S. and other European powers. Economic assistance, expert assistance, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, and the Budapest Memorandum (by which Ukraine relinquished its share of the USSR's nuclear arsenal) were examples of programs that were designed to facilitate the post-Soviet transition of Russia and other states of the former USSR from communism to market economics and a non-hostile security posture.

The emergence of NATO as a key security actor in Europe, which Washington advocated, became a point of contention among Russia, the U.S., and the allies. Especially problematic for Moscow was the alliance's shift to "out of area" operations (conducted outside the territory of NATO members), such as air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces in 1994-1995 and the air operation against Serbia during the conflict over Kosovo in 1999.²⁵² The entry of three former WTO member states into NATO in 1999, also pushed by Washington, made the security relationship between Russia and the alliance more complicated. The allies, with significant input from the U.S., created several bodies to integrate Russia and other non-NATO states into closer relations with the alliance: the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991 – later

much economic assistance from the West as he could hope to secure. Yeltsin...did not dissent from these aspects of his foreign policy." George W. Breslauer, *Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders* (New York: Cambridge Press, 2002), 156.

²⁵² A point of intersection between the resolution of the conflict in Bosnia and the CFE Treaty is found in Annex 1B of the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was negotiated in Dayton in 1995. Article IV of the annex mandated the negotiation of a CFE-like pact between the warring parties. The agreement was signed in 1996.

the Euro-Atlantic Policy Council), the Partnership for Peace (1994), and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (created through the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997). All these diplomatic initiatives had an impact on Russia's view of the viability of the CFE Treaty and the negotiations for its adaptation, both of which were priorities for the U.S. and the allies.

In the wake of the demise of the centralized system for decision-making and policy formulation that had characterized the CPSU, Yeltsin also had to refine the governmental structure of the RSFSR to accommodate foreign policy and national security decision-making and manage the relationships between the actors in the system, specifically the post-Soviet MFA, armed forces, and security services. Absent guidance from the CPSU, Yeltsin's government had to develop their own approaches to military doctrine and foreign and security policy.

Although not a priority, CFE remained on the agenda, and Yeltsin embraced it, and other arms control agreements the USSR had concluded, as a part of his western-oriented foreign policy. As a legal successor state to the USSR, Russia assumed all obligations under the CFE Treaty.²⁵³ As a precursor to the ratification of the treaty in July 1992, Yeltsin's government concluded the Tashkent Treaty with the other successor states of the USSR. The CFE Treaty thereby indirectly facilitated the division of the armed forces of the USSR and prevented an uncontrolled arms race among the successor states.

This period, from the Russians' perspective, was one of correction and adaptation of the CFE Treaty. Over the course of several years, from 1992-1996, the Russians succeeded in

²⁵³ Following a meeting of a working group on arms control of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) on 10 January 1992, Russian representative Vladimir Petrovskiy said, "The Russian Federation, which is a legal successor to the USSR, bears full responsibility for all the rights and obligations, arising from the conventional armed forces treaty." Valeriy Shashkov, "NACC Working Group Reviews CFE Implementation," TASS (in English), 10 January 1992, JPRS-TAC-92-004, 30 January 1992, 19. The Russian Federation became the de facto successor state to the USSR when it assumed the USSR's seat in the UN Security Council with the agreement of the heads of state and government of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on 21 December 1991.

negotiating at least partial solutions to their treaty-related dilemmas, such as limitations in the flank regions that constrained their ability to redeploy forces to combat threats in the North Caucasus and unfulfilled reduction obligations. The prospect of NATO enlargement provided an impetus to Moscow's push for the adaptation of the CFE Treaty to address a changed European security environment in which both the USSR and the WTO had ceased to exist. In 1999, the entry of the first tranche of new members (and former WTO states) into NATO and the alliance's air operation against Serbia (Operation ALLIED FORCE) could have derailed the adaptation negotiations, which had begun in 1997. Nonetheless, the Russians remained at the negotiating table and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov signed the Agreement on the Adaptation of the CFE Treaty at the Istanbul Summit meeting of the OSCE. Although the adaptation agreement met many of Moscow's demands, it would prove not to have been the panacea they had hoped for, especially as a means to manage the enlargement of NATO. Among a group of commitments the parties to the adaptation agreement made at Istanbul, Russia pledged to withdraw its forces from Moldova and Georgia within a certain time period. These commitments would soon prove problematic when the NATO states linked the ratification and EIF of the adapted CFE Treaty to Russia's fulfillment of them.

This chapter will examine the CFE Treaty and Russian foreign and security policy during Boris Yeltsin's tenure as the president of the Russian Federation by first describing the development of foreign and security policy during this period and the various attempts by the Russian government to articulate this policy. It will then turn to the CFE Treaty itself, specifically events in the life of the treaty and Russia's approach to it. The chapter will then offer a detailed study of the year 1999, in which Moscow faced the first tranche of NATO enlargement and NATO's armed intervention against Yugoslavia, yet still agreed to conclude

and sign the Agreement on the Adaptation of the CFE Treaty (A/CFE) at the Istanbul Summit of the OSCE in November 1999. The chapter will conclude with an analysis to draw linkages between Russia's foreign and security policy and the CFE Treaty, using the conceptual framework set out in Chapter 1.

Russian Foreign and Security Policy – 1992-1999

Even before Yeltsin led the RSFSR out of the wreckage of the USSR (wreckage he had helped to create by engineering the Belavezhka accord and the CIS), he and his government had grappled with defining Russia's identity and national interests. After envisioning Russia free of empire and focused on its own development, a "Little Russia" policy, Yeltsin, his foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev, and other members of the government embraced a more expansive view of Russian interests by early 1993.²⁵⁴ Events in the CIS, such as instability in Georgia and Moldova, as well as domestic political opposition, influenced this change in perspective, which had already been evident in the conduct of certain elements of the government, such as the armed forces, since the waning days of the USSR. A focus on the West ended up competing with a more Eurasian perspective when Yevgeniy Primakov, an oriental specialist, replaced Kozyrev as foreign minister in early 1996. During Russia's emergence as a "normal great power," to use Kozyrev's term, its sense of national identity and perception of national interests evolved rapidly in the face of domestic and external challenges and influences.²⁵⁵

²⁵⁴ Eugene B. Rumer, *Russian National Security and Foreign Policy in Transition* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1995), 13.

²⁵⁵ Andrey Kozyrev, "Russia: A Chance for Survival," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 10.

As Russia attempted to gain its footing following the end of the USSR, foreign and security policy became inextricably linked, or even “subjugated,” to internal needs.²⁵⁶ Domestically, the Russian economy was in a parlous state and Yeltsin needed western economic aid. A holdover from Gorbachev’s rule was the active opposition to a western-oriented policy by communists and Russian nationalists, the so-called “red-brown” alliance whose influence contributed to Shevardnadze’s resignation in 1990 and the attempted coup against Gorbachev in 1991. This alignment of domestic political forces, which was personified by Gennady Zyuganov of the Russian Communist Party and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy of the Liberal Democratic Party, challenged Yeltsin throughout his first term. Yeltsin’s domestic woes also included a conflict over constitutional power with the State Duma, which culminated with Yeltsin ordering the armed forces to attack the Russian White House, the seat of the legislature. His internal foes also included separatists in Chechnya, against whom the efforts of his government and the armed forces would result in the disastrous First Chechen War of 1994-1996.

Moscow’s approach to foreign and security policy during Yeltsin’s two terms in office was also the product of exogenous factors in the European security environment. Foremost among them were byproducts of the demise of the USSR: the newly independent states of the former USSR that the Russians collectively termed the “near abroad” (nine of which lay in the ATTU region: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), a large Russian diaspora in the non-Russian former republics of the USSR, and the establishment of the CIS (an attempt to preserve a common economic and security space).

²⁵⁶ Vladimir Savelyev and Robert Huber, “Russian Parliament and Foreign Policy,” *International Affairs* (Moscow) 3, no. 3 (March 1993): 33. “Now it is not only of the lack of confrontation with Western Europe and the United States but rather the need to encourage direct aid of these states to radical economic reforms.”

Outside the territory of the former USSR, Moscow also confronted NATO's enlargement into states of the defunct WTO and crises in the former Yugoslavia.

Yeltsin had to build on the institutions of the government of the RSFSR to develop a post-Soviet security enterprise for the Russian Federation. The MFA of the RSFSR formed the foundation for the same ministry in the Russian Federation. Yeltsin had to create defense and intelligence institutions, thanks to the absence of a republic-level military structure in the RSFSR and the abolition of the KGB. The demise of the CPSU left a void that would need to be filled with new institutions for policy formulation and interdepartmental coordination. Outside the executive branch of the Russian government, Yeltsin faced off against a fractious legislature whose members were not reticent to challenge the government on matters of foreign policy and national security.

A shifting correlation of forces within the Russian foreign and security policy process led to a change in policy (by early 1993) from Gorbachev and Shevardnadze's pro-western orientation to one that emphasized Russia's great-power status and prioritized relations with the states of the near abroad.²⁵⁷ Foreign Minister Kozyrev and the MFA found themselves increasingly outgunned by the military and those in the Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet who shared a view "on the need for Russia to craft an international identity – other than that of a supplicant...Russia is, and must be treated as, a 'great power' (*derzhava*)."²⁵⁸ Yeltsin charged the MFA to "coordinate and monitor" the activities of other ministries to ensure

²⁵⁷ An expert from the CIA argued that Yeltsin's government had to pursue simultaneously both a "western" policy towards Western Europe and the United States and a more assertive policy, perhaps including the use of the Russian armed forces to protect security interests, toward the near abroad. Memorandum for the Record, "General Odom's Assessment of Russian Policy Toward the New Independent States, 5 January 1994, http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs_full.asp.

²⁵⁸ Breslauer, *Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders*, 162.

a ‘unified policy line by the Russian Federation in relations with foreign states.’ As Yeltsin’s policies shifted rightward, Kozyrev’s shortcomings in this role contributed to his dismissal in early 1996 and the appointment of Yevgeniy Primakov, the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR, from its Russian acronym), as his successor.²⁵⁹

As the influence of Kozyrev and the MFA waned, Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev and the armed forces became more assertive, to the point that by 1995 two Russian journalists described the MOD’s activity in foreign relations as “diplomacy in shoulder straps.”²⁶⁰ Grachev proved his loyalty to Yeltsin during the coup attempt against Gorbachev in August 1991 and the constitutional crisis in October 1993, when he directed the employment of the armed forces against the Russian White House. The military as an institution was a logical proponent of a foreign and security policy more oriented toward the near abroad and less focused on cooperative relations with the West. Their forces were scattered throughout the newly independent states, they still chafed over Gorbachev and Shevardnadze’s concessions on Eastern Europe, Germany and arms reductions, and they wanted to minimize the damage from the breakup of the USSR. Although the military’s positions gained traction through 1995, thanks to support from sympathetic factions within the legislature, Grachev fell from Yeltsin’s favor over the conduct of military operations in Chechnya, persistent allegations of corruption, and lack of enthusiasm for

²⁵⁹ Larrabee and Karasik, *Foreign and Security Policy Decisionmaking Under Yeltsin*, 5-7; Robert H. Donaldson, “Boris Yeltsin’s Foreign Policy Legacy,” *Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law* 7, Issue 2 (2000): 298, <http://digitalcommons.law.tulsa.edu/tjcil/vol7/iss2/2>.

²⁶⁰ Larrabee and Karasik, *Foreign and Security Policy Decisionmaking Under Yeltsin*, 6. Frank Umbach, “The Role and Influence of the Military Establishment in Russia’s Foreign and Security Policies in the Yeltsin Era,” *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 9, No. 3 (1996): 468. Both sources cite an article published in *The Moscow Times* in November 1995 by Aleksandr Zhilin and Sergey Strokan, “Diplomacy in Shoulder Straps Comes Out into the Open.” This title is an awkward translation of дипломатия в погонах, which translates as “diplomacy in shoulder boards,” referring to the rank insignia Russian officers wear on the shoulders of their uniforms.

military reform. His successor (in 1996), Igor Rodionov, albeit more amenable to military reform, found himself replaced by General Igor Sergeev in 1997.

The competition between the ministries of foreign affairs and defense over the direction of Russia's foreign and security policy was symptomatic of the larger problem of the ineffectiveness of institutions charged with coordinating policy across departmental lines. As already noted, the MFA proved unable to carry out this function. Likewise, the Security Council Yeltsin established in June 1992 failed to justify fears that it might assume a role akin the Politburo of the CPSU.²⁶¹ The Defense Council, which Yeltsin established in July 1996, proved more effective, likely because of its focus on military reform that encompassed a smaller cast of interdepartmental players.²⁶² A final indicator of dysfunction within the foreign and security policy enterprise was the very public intervention of the intelligence service in a policy debate over NATO enlargement. In November 1993, the newspaper *Izvestiya* published excerpts from a report attributed to the director of the SVR, Yevgeniy Primakov.²⁶³ Rather than simply providing information and analysis for use by decisionmakers, the SVR and Primakov publicly staked out a position. Concurrently, he joined the debate over the influence of the MOD and MFA in the policy formulation process by, first, qualifying as "speculative" assertions that the military's influence on the taking of political decisions had increased and, second, expressing

²⁶¹ Larrabee and Karasik, *Foreign and Security Policy Decisionmaking Under Yeltsin*, 36; Donaldson, "Boris Yeltsin's Foreign Policy Legacy:" 298.

²⁶² Larrabee and Karasik, *Foreign and Security Policy Decisionmaking Under Yeltsin*, 21.

²⁶³ "Prospects for NATO Expansion and Russian Interests. Foreign Intelligence Service Report," *Izvestiya*, 26 November 1993, translated as "NATO Report Summarized," FBIS-SOV-93-226, 26 November 1993, 6-8.

confidence that the MFA worked to protect Russians interests, while conceding that “some differences between departments always exist.”²⁶⁴

Yeltsin and Kozyrev faced criticism that they were overly focused on relations with the West while “trying to leapfrog relations with immediate neighbors and neglecting Russian interests in the newly independent states.” In response, they affirmed that, while they would continue a pro-western policy line, Russia’s “main foreign policy priority” would be relations with its neighbors in the CIS.²⁶⁵ This adjustment to foreign and security policy reflected an ongoing debate over Russia’s national identity and interests (which, in turn had become entangled in the struggle for power between Yeltsin and the parliament) and a realization within the government and outside the Kremlin that to at least preserve its status as a great power, Russia would have to assert influence in the states of the near abroad. This “pragmatic nationalist” approach found voice in the foreign and security policy documents published in 1993.²⁶⁶ The enshrinement of the approach in formal documents, in one author’s view, showed that “the tradition of expressing the basic principles of policy in a programmatic and officially endorsed statement still ran strong in post-Soviet Russia.”²⁶⁷

²⁶⁴ Dmitriy Voskoboinikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy, and others, “Diplomatic Panorama,” *Interfax* in English, 25 November 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-226, 26 November 1993, 6. The release of this report by the SVR and Primakov’s remarks were part of a campaign to clarify, if not walk back, a joint statement Yeltsin had made with Polish President Lech Walesa in Warsaw in late August 1993 that a decision by Poland to join NATO was “not in conflict with the interests of other states, including those of Russia.” Andrey Zagorski, “Russia and NATO in the 1990s,” in Daniel S. Hamilton and Kristina Spohr, eds., *Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Paul H. Nitzke School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2019): 470.

²⁶⁵ Kozyrev, “Russia: A Chance for Survival,” 10; Rumer, *Russian National Security and Foreign Policy in Transition*, 20.

²⁶⁶ Margot Light, “In Search of an Ideology: Russian Foreign Policy and the End of Ideology,” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 19, No. 3, 45-46, DOI: 10.1080/13523270300660017; Umbach, “The Role and Influence of the Military Establishment in Russia’s Foreign and Security Policies in the Yeltsin Era,” 478.

²⁶⁷ Donaldson, “Boris Yeltsin’s Foreign Policy Legacy,” 292.

Concept of Russian Foreign Policy, 1993

The “Concept of Russian Foreign Policy,” which Yeltsin approved in April 1993, was the product of a lengthy and inclusive drafting process. It was never publicly released, and knowledge of its contents comes from an article published in *Nezavisimaya gazeta* under the authorship of Vladislav Chernov, the deputy director the Security Council’s Strategic Security Administration.²⁶⁸ Experts from three ministries, the SVR, and the staffs of the Security Council and two committees of the Supreme Soviet prepared the document, which then underwent review by one interdepartmental body (the Foreign Policy Commission) and approval by another (the Security Council).²⁶⁹ The authors drew on drafts from the MFA and a semi-official group, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy.²⁷⁰ The downside of such an inclusive process was that its output tended toward a least-common-denominator perspective.

The main provisions of the foreign policy concept affirmed a non-ideological approach to foreign relations that was oriented on Russia’s national interests. Among its “fundamental tenets” was Russia’s great-power status in the international system “and the responsibility

²⁶⁸ Chernov was also well connected with the CFE Treaty, having accompanied it “throughout its entire life – from its drafting and signing in November 1990 to the third CFE Treaty Review Conference in June 2006.” His relationship with the treaty included a stint as the Russian representative to the JCG. “Keynote Presentation by Mr. Vladislav Chernov, Former Head of the Delegation of The Russian Federation to the Vienna Talks on Military Security and Arms Control, at the 2010 Annual Security Review Conference,” Vienna, 15 June 2010, PC.DEL/480/10/Corr.1, <https://www.osce.org/cio/68285?download=true>.

²⁶⁹ Vladislav Chernov, “Russia’s National Interests and Threats to Its Security: Boris Yeltsin Approves Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Concept,” *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 29 April 1993, translated as “Yeltsin Okays Russian Foreign-Policy Concept,” *CDSP* 45, No. 17 (1993), 29 May 1993, 13.

²⁷⁰ Chernov, “Russia’s National Interests and Threats to Its Security: Boris Yeltsin Approves Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Concept,” 14. On the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, among whose members were Foreign Minister Kozyrev, First Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin, and chairman of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, see Rumer, *Russian National Security and Foreign Policy in Transition*, 31.

[Russia] bears as a result of this,” for instance, in relations with the CIS and the other states of the former USSR. Among the threats to Russia’s interests were actions that might undermine “integrative processes in the CIS,” as well as “violations of human rights and freedoms [a veiled reference to perceived discrimination against Russians abroad] and armed conflicts in adjacent states.” Military threats included “local conflicts in direct proximity to Russia’s borders” and military problems associated with the end of the USSR, like the “the status of Russian troops on the territories of the near foreign countries,” which remained “undefined” (although Chernov did not identify any states by name, the Baltic states, Georgia, and Moldova were the obvious candidates at the time).²⁷¹

The foreign policy concept described the role of the armed forces in the context of Russia’s relations with the near abroad, the area of “top priority” for Russian foreign policy in which “Russia’s responsibility for strengthening stability and security...predetermined the inclusion...of provisions on developing cooperation in the politico-military sphere, with a view to creating an effective collective security system.” Russia would therefore need to preserve “military infrastructure and installations,” which would include bases in other countries that housed Russia’s forces.²⁷² Peacekeeping would also play a significant role in Russia’s relations with the CIS, “including...on the basis of a mandate from the UN or the CSCE.”²⁷³ This

²⁷¹ Chernov, “Russia’s National Interests and Threats to Its Security: Boris Yeltsin Approves Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Concept,” 14.

²⁷² Chernov, “Russia’s National Interests and Threats to Its Security: Boris Yeltsin Approves Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Concept,” 14.

²⁷³ Chernov, “Russia’s National Interests and Threats to Its Security: Boris Yeltsin Approves Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Concept,” 15. Kozyrev echoed this line in his speeches to the UNGA in September 1992 and September 1993. United Nations General Assembly, “Forty-seventh Session, General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6th Meeting, Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 22 September 1992, at 10 a.m.,” A/47/PV.6, 29 September 1992, 58, <https://undocs.org/en/A/47/PV.6>; “Forty-eighth Session, General Assembly, 6th Plenary Meeting, New York, Wednesday, 28 September 1993,” <https://undocs.org/en/A/48/PV.6>.

provision of the foreign policy concept codified a position Yeltsin had articulated in speeches in late February and early March 1993, that it was time for Russia to be granted “special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the region of the former union.”²⁷⁴ In other words, Yeltsin was proposing that Russia serve as more a “gendarme” than peacekeeper in an area that fell within its sphere of vital interests, with the authority to act with *or without* a mandate from the UN or the CSCE.²⁷⁵

Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 1993

Russia’s unique role in the CIS and the rest of the former USSR also influenced “The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Federation,” which the Security Council approved, and Yeltsin adopted on 2 November 1993. Production of the military doctrine began at the same time Yeltsin established the armed forces of the Russian Federation, in May 1992, when a first draft appeared in the General Staff’s theoretical journal, *Voennaya mysl’* (Military Thought).²⁷⁶ Yeltsin’s conflict with the Supreme Soviet, or at least the legislature’s preoccupation with domestic matters, delayed approval of the military doctrine. Although the deputy secretary of the Security Council announced that it would not be released publicly, by mid-November 1993, both *Izvestiya* and *Krasnaya Zvezda* published summaries, but not the full

²⁷⁴ Serge Schmemmann, “Yeltsin Suggests Russian Regional Role, *New York Times*, 1 March 1993, <https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1993/03/01/issue.html>; Leslie H. Gelb, “Foreign Affairs: Yeltsin as Monroe,” *New York Times*, 7 March 1993, <https://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/07/opinion/foreign-affairs-yeltsin-as-monroe.html>.

²⁷⁵ Rumer, *Russian National Security and Foreign Policy in Transition*, 25.

²⁷⁶ Yeltsin did not order the establishment of armed forces of the Russian Federation until May 1992. Only when the prospect of creating unified armed forces of the CIS states (under Russian leadership) proved illusory, largely thanks to Ukraine’s resistance, did Yeltsin take this step. Umbach, “The Role and Influence of the Military Establishment in Russia’s Foreign and Security Policies in the Yeltsin Era:” 474.

text (the version published in *Izvestiya*, for example, referred to the document in the third person – “The document” – five times).²⁷⁷

The military doctrine was “a constituent component of the overall concept of security” and a complement to the “Foreign Policy Concept.”²⁷⁸ Its organization (political foundations, military foundations, and military-technical and economic foundations) was consistent with the Soviet and Russian concept of “military doctrine,” which included military-political and military-technical aspects. The content of the military doctrine reflected the tension between its military aspect, and therefore the leading role of the General Staff in drafting it, and its political character, which assumed a role for the presidential apparatus and the MFA in its preparation. Charles Dick observed that the “overwhelmingly military view of the world” in the doctrine might have reflected the influence the armed forces gained by supporting Yeltsin in his conflict with the Supreme Soviet that culminated in October 1993.²⁷⁹ Nonetheless, changes to the General Staff’s original draft on threat perception, a part of the political foundation of the military doctrine, suggest influence by the political leadership - Yeltsin, the MOD, and the MFA. Whereas the 1992 draft identified as a threat “some states and coalitions” (a thinly veiled reference to the U.S. and NATO) that sought to exercise domination, the approved version of 1993 emphasized dangers and threats of a smaller scale on the periphery of and within the

²⁷⁷ Charles J. Dick, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 7, No.3 (September 1994): 482. The version published in *Izvestiya* appears to be the one most readily available in English translation and can be found on the website of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html>.

²⁷⁸ “The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” 20, <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html>.

²⁷⁹ A report in the newspaper *Segodnya* from November 1993 suggested the adoption of the MOD’s draft of the doctrine, rather than the Security Council’s, had been “part of the price President Yeltsin...had to pay for the Army’s loyalty.” Dick, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation:” 494.

Russian Federation.²⁸⁰ Repeated references to peacekeeping and the CIS that were consistent with statements attributed to Yeltsin and Kozyrev also pointed to influence on the military doctrine from outside the General Staff. This non-military influence and the “politically correct” approach of the doctrine did not sit well with some parts of the armed forces.²⁸¹

Provisions of the 1993 military doctrine on security within the CIS and other states of the former USSR, the presence of Russian forces outside the territory of the Russian Federation, peacekeeping operations, the enlargement of NATO, and combating internal threats were germane to the structure, arming, stationing and employment of Russia’s armed forces in the ATTU area. A premise of the doctrine was that Russia’s military security depended on the state of relations primarily with neighboring states and major powers. Sources of military danger included regional challenges such as local wars and armed conflicts near Russia’s borders, as well as the interests of Russian citizens outside the Russian Federation. Among the guidelines for assuring Russia’s military security were the “inclusion of the Russian Federation in collective security structures” like the CIS, and military cooperation with member states of the CIS (“the priority for the Russian Federation” in preserving peace and security and preventing conflicts).²⁸²

The military doctrine dealt in some detail with the status of Russian armed forces that were present outside the territory of the Russian Federation, for instance, in the Baltic states.

²⁸⁰ Dick, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation:” 494. Several authors, among them Dick, characterized the 1992 draft doctrine as a return to a neo-Soviet approach (after the Gorbachev years) in threat perception and the development and use of Russian military forces. See Charles J. Dick, “Initial Thoughts on Russia’s Draft Military Doctrine,” *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 5, No. 4 (1992); Mary C. Fitzgerald, “Russia’s New Military Doctrine,” *Naval War College Review* 46, No. 2 (1993); James H. Slagle, “New Russian Military Doctrine: Sign of the Times,” *Parameters* 24, No. 1 (1994).

²⁸¹ William D. Jackson, “Encircled Again: Russia’s Military Assesses Threats in a Post-Soviet World,” *Political Science Quarterly* 177, No. 3 (2002): 378-379.

²⁸² “The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” 3, 5-8.

Potential military dangers and threats included “attacks on military installations of the Russian Federation Armed Forces sited on the territory of foreign states,” owing in part to the unresolved “legal status of the presence of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops outside the borders” of Russia. The continued stationing of forces in other states was linked to Russia’s ability to influence potential local wars and armed conflicts (such as those in Transdnistria (Moldova), South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia), and Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan)) using “peacetime groupings of troops (forces) stationed in the conflict zone.” Unlike other types of military operations, the military doctrine described in detail peacekeeping operations.²⁸³

Although the first invitations to states of the former WTO to join NATO would not come for four years, the military doctrine identified “the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of the Russia Federation’s military security” as a military danger. This danger could become a military threat with “the introduction of foreign troops in the territory of neighboring states” and “the buildup of groupings of troops (forces) on the borders of the Russian Federation to the point where they disrupt the prevailing correlation of forces.” The military doctrine did not exclude the possibility of a cooperative relationship with NATO - one of the guidelines for safeguarding Russia’s military security was “the establishment of relations of cooperation with such structures.”²⁸⁴

The military doctrine set combating internal threats as one of the tasks for the armed forces. The potential for the armed forces to become involved in internal conflicts was “anathema to the traditional military,” yet would prove to be unavoidable in the transitional period in Russia’s development when armed challenges to Russia’s territorial integrity emerged

²⁸³ “The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” 4-8, 10, 12-13, 15.

²⁸⁴ “The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” 5, 6.

in the Caucasus region.²⁸⁵ It would also create difficulties for the Russian government as it tried to maintain the required forces and equipment in the region, using either permanently stationed forces or temporary reinforcement, while remaining in compliance with treaty obligations.

Finally, the military doctrine explicitly addressed international treaties and agreements, including the CFE Treaty. A factor in the Russian Federation's approach toward armed conflict and the use of the armed forces was the ongoing process of the reduction of conventional armaments, and a potential threat was "the possibility of strategic stability being undermined as a result of the violation of international accords in the sphere of arms limitation and reduction and the qualitative and quantitative buildup of armaments by other countries." "The consistent implementation" of the CFE Treaty, as well as the pursuit of "the reduction of naval forces and arms and the limitation of naval activity," and, more broadly, "the observance of international commitments and the promotion of the objectives of treaties and agreements to which the Russian Federation is a party," would contribute to preserving Russia's military security.²⁸⁶

Russian Federation National Security Concept, 1997

Between 1993 and 1996, Yeltsin replaced key actors on his national security team and revised Russia's foreign and security policy. The Russian armed forces had become mired in the conflict in Chechnya, which Defense Minister Grachev had promised would end with a rapid defeat of the Chechen insurgency. Yeltsin crushed a parliamentary challenge in October 1993 and pushed through changes to the Russian constitution, yet he still faced opposition from nationalist and communist forces that advocated foreign and security policies that were oriented

²⁸⁵ Dick, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation:" 494.

²⁸⁶ "The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," 2,5,7.

less toward cooperation with the West and more toward asserting Russia's great power status, especially in relations with the states of the near abroad. In Europe, NATO's use of airpower against Bosnian Serb forces in 1994-1995, and decisions to establish the Partnership for Peace (which both allies and the Russians construed as a path to membership in the alliance) and to conduct a study on enlargement, pointed toward a less benign security environment and seemed dismissive of Russia's views.²⁸⁷

Under these circumstances, Yeltsin changed his national security team. In January 1996, he appointed Yevgeniy Primakov as foreign minister to succeed Andrey Kozyrev, who had become a target for nationalists' ire.²⁸⁸ Primakov brought to the MFA what authors have called either a "pragmatic nationalist" or "statist" view of Russia's place in the world. Both views emphasized Russia's position as a great power whose policies might not always be congruent with those of the West, especially in relations with the states of the CIS and near abroad, where Russia had vital national interests.²⁸⁹ He also increased the influence of the MFA in the development of foreign and security policy.²⁹⁰ Yeltsin sacked Defense Minister Grachev in June 1996 and his successor, former Chief of the General Staff Igor Rodionov, in May 1997, eventually settling on General Igor Sergeyev. Allegations of corruption against Grachev, the

²⁸⁷ On the allies, see Volker Ruehe, "Opening NATO's Door," in Daniel S. Hamilton and Kristina Spohr, eds., *Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War*, 225. On the Russians, see Andrey Kozyrev, "Russia and NATO Enlargement: An Insider's Account," in Daniel S. Hamilton and Kristina Spohr, eds., *Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War*, 455.

²⁸⁸ Donaldson, "Boris Yeltsin's Foreign Policy Legacy:" 295. On criticism of Kozyrev from the parliament, see Rumer, *Russian National Security and Foreign Policy in Transition*, 43; and Larrabee and Karasik, *Foreign and Security Policy Decisionmaking Under Yeltsin*, 5-6.

²⁸⁹ Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010), 95-97. Kozyrev warned that his replacement by Primakov and Defense Minister Grachev's removal in favor of "an even more traditionalist general" were "[a turn] away from Western values." Andrey Kozyrev, "Russia and NATO Enlargement: An Insider's Account," 457.

²⁹⁰ Larrabee and Karasik, *Foreign and Security Policy Decisionmaking Under Yeltsin*, 7.

armed forces' dismal performance in Chechnya, and resistance to military reform within the defense institution contributed to these changes.²⁹¹

The “Russian Federation National Security Concept,” which Yeltsin approved on 17 December 1997, about a year into his second term as president, was a product of these changes to the foreign and security policy enterprise.²⁹² Its overall tone, definition of national interests, descriptions of threats and challenges, and policy guidance reflected Primakov’s statist (pragmatic nationalist) approach. Over a year earlier, in mid-1996, Yeltsin delivered a message to the Federal Assembly on “the national security policy for the period 1996-2000.”²⁹³ This statement of policy expanded on the foreign policy and military doctrine documents of 1993 by adding lengthy sections on domestic interests, threats, challenges, and policies, all of which addressed the “difficulties of the transitional period” and the “crisis phenomena” associated with it (as well as with the long-term effects of the “systematic crisis of the Soviet period”).²⁹⁴ Following an examination of the 1996 statement to the Federal Assembly on national security, the current study will return to the 1997 National Security Concept.²⁹⁵

²⁹¹ Donaldson, “Boris Yeltsin’s Foreign Policy Legacy:” 298-299; Larrabee and Karasik, *Foreign and Security Policy Decisionmaking Under Yeltsin*, 16-17.

²⁹² On other factors that might have delayed the development and publication of a comprehensive national security concept for the Russian Federation until 1997, see de Haas, *Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century – Putin, Medvedev and Beyond*, 6.

²⁹³ “V Federal’nom Sobranii Rossiiskoy Federatsii, O natsional’noy bezopasnosti, Poslanie Prezidenta Rossiiskoy Federatsii Federal’nomu Sobraniyu,” *Diplomaticheskiiy vestnik* (hereafter *DV*) No. 7 (July 1996): 24. It is likely this message was delivered to the Federal Assembly between 3 July (the date of the presidential run-off vote) and 9 July, when Yeltsin’s foreign policy adviser, Dmitriy Ryurikov, raised Russia’s objections to NATO enlargement at the World Economic Forum in Salzburg, Austria, in Russia’s “first major policy statement on the issue since the country’s presidential elections.” “Russia Renews Objections to Expansion of NATO,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 9 July 1996, accessed 24 September 2019, accessed through ProQuest.

²⁹⁴ “V Federal’nom Sobranii Rossiiskoy Federatsii, O natsional’noy bezopasnosti, Poslanie Prezidenta Rossiiskoy Federatsii Federal’nomu Sobraniyu, 25, 27.

²⁹⁵ The extant literature on Russia’s security strategies and military doctrine during the Yeltsin era overlooks this lengthy and detailed statement of national security policy. Nonetheless, its publication in *Diplomaticheskiiy vestnik*, the official outlet of the Russian MFA, lends it legitimacy and supports Primakov’s influence on Moscow’s foreign

The internally focused portions of the strategy of 1996 dealt primarily with building civil society, reforming the economy, strengthening governance, and combating crime and corruption. For the purposes of the current study, the relevant internal threats and challenges were regional separatism, specifically in Chechnya, and a decline in military readiness that was associated, in part, with the slow progress of military reform.²⁹⁶ Each would affect Russia's military posture and therefore the implementation of the CFE Treaty.

In the international sphere, "a relatively favorable international situation" was required for Russia to overcome the difficulties it faced. Among the positive aspects of the extant environment was a "strengthening tendency toward the further demilitarization of international relations." A significantly negative development was the prospect of NATO's enlargement closer to the Russian border, which would change the correlation of forces to Russia's detriment and potentially threaten Russia's isolation.²⁹⁷ The main threats and challenges to Russia's security were in and around the former USSR: instability in the newly independent states, actions that threatened Russia's ties with those states, as well as with the states of Eastern and Central Europe, and violations of the rights of Russian-speaking populations. The description of military threats included oblique references to the United States and NATO: attempts by some states to

and security policy at the time. For the literature on Russia's strategy documents during Yeltsin's presidency, see Jakub M. Godzimirski, "Russian National Security Concepts 1997 and 2000: A Comparative Analysis," *European Security* 9, No. 4 (Winter 2000): 73-91; Margot Light, "In Search of an Identity: Russian Foreign Policy and the End of Ideology;" Margot Light, "Russian Foreign Policy Themes in Official Documents and Speeches: Tracing Continuity and Change," in David Cadler and Margot Light, eds., *Russia's Foreign Policy: Ideas, Domestic Politics and External Relations* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 13-29; Robert H. Donaldson, "Boris Yeltsin's Foreign Policy Legacy;" and Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, 98-99.

²⁹⁶ "V Federal'nom Sobranii Rossiiskoy Federatsii, O natsional'noy bezopasnosti, Poslanie Prezidenta Rossiiskoy Federatsii Federal'nomu Sobraniyu," 27-28.

²⁹⁷ "V Federal'nom Sobranii Rossiiskoy Federatsii, O natsional'noy bezopasnosti, Poslanie Prezidenta Rossiiskoy Federatsii Federal'nomu Sobraniyu," 25.

use military strength to reinforce their status and exercise influence both internationally and regionally using force, and the prospect of the establishment of large groupings of foreign military forces near Russia's borders.²⁹⁸ To address the threats and challenges, Russia's foreign policy would be focused primarily on relations with the CIS, to include the strengthening of integrative mechanisms in the political, economic and military areas, in order to protect Moscow's many interests in those countries. Among those interests was the protection of Russians who were living in the countries of the CIS and the rest of the former USSR and the conduct of peacekeeping operations. Russia would also pursue cooperation with NATO and the European Union (EU), within the context of creating a pan-European security mechanism and preventing "a new division" on the continent.

Russia's military policy placed priority on the creation of a collective security system across the territory of the CIS, to include extending the nuclear umbrella over those states. As for conventional armed forces, the Russian army would be modernized and reformed (the message included a lengthy section on military reform), and the Russian Federation would support "further limitation of conventional armed forces and armaments" consistent with the principle of "defensive sufficiency."²⁹⁹ A major role for military industry would be related to its ongoing conversion and program of the "*utilizatsiya*," which translates as "utilization" or, in CFE Treaty terms, "reduction" or "disposal" of armaments and military equipment.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁸ "V Federal'nom Sobranii Rossiiskoy Federatsii, O natsional'noy bezopasnosti, Poslanie Prezidenta Rossiiskoy Federatsii Federal'nomu Sobraniyu," 28-29.

²⁹⁹ "V Federal'nom Sobranii Rossiiskoy Federatsii, O natsional'noy bezopasnosti, Poslanie Prezidenta Rossiiskoy Federatsii Federal'nomu Sobraniyu," 31-33, 35.

³⁰⁰ "V Federal'nom Sobranii Rossiiskoy Federatsii, O natsional'noy bezopasnosti, Poslanie Prezidenta Rossiiskoy Federatsii Federal'nomu Sobraniyu," 34.

The “National Security Concept,” which Yeltsin approved on 17 December 1997, retained a focus on domestic challenges (especially the “critical state of the economy...the main cause of the emergence of a threat to...national security”), yet reflected a less optimistic and darker view of the external situation than was the case in Yeltsin’s 1996 message to the Federal Assembly.³⁰¹ In contrast to the 1996 document, which focused heavily on a process of domestic transformation, the “National Security Concept” emphasized a different transformation, “the formation of a multipolar world,” which would be a “lengthy process.”³⁰² This shift in focus away from a mainly U.S.- and Euro-centric approach reflected Primakov’s influence. Several negative geopolitical trends created threats to Russia’s national security:

- Decreased ability of Russia to influence major issues,
- Attempts by other (unnamed) states to weaken Russia’s military, political and economic position,
- “The prospect of NATO expansion to the East,” which was “unacceptable to Russia since it represents a threat to its national security” (a direct reference to NATO, in contrast to the oblique ones in the 1996 message to the Federal Assembly),
- Disruption of Russia’s defense system and the slow pace of its replacement (i.e. military reform),
- Territorial claims by other states based on undefined borders (e.g. by Estonia).³⁰³

³⁰¹ “Russian National Security Concept,” <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/blueprint.html>, 6. The FAS site attributes this translation to FBIS, based on a Russian-language text published 26 December 1997 in the newspaper *Rossiiskaya gazeta* (hereafter *RG*). As was the case with Yeltsin’s message to the Federal Assembly on a national security policy for 1996-2000, this document was also published in *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, in this case as “The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation” (*DV* No. 2, February 1998). The document was the product of a drafting process that began in May 1996 under the supervision of the chairman of the Security Council, Ivan Rybkin, pursuant to a directive from Yeltsin. Jakub M. Godzimirski, “Russian National Security Concepts 1997 and 2000: A Comparative Analysis,” 76.

³⁰² “Russian National Security Concept,” 1.

³⁰³ “Russian National Security Concept,” 2,3,7. NATO elicited particular ire as a threat in the defense sphere: “NATO’s expansion to the East and its transformation into a dominant military-political force in Europe create the threat of a new split in the continent which would be extremely dangerous given the preservation in Europe of mobile strike groupings of troops and nuclear weapons and also the inadequate effectiveness of multilateral mechanisms for maintaining peace.” “Russian National Security Concept,” 12.

On the bright side, according to the 1997 Concept, cooperation among “a number of” states of the CIS was on the upswing, and Russia had “all the preconditions” to preserve its ability to protect the interests of the Russian people and to play “an important role in world processes.” The lack of progress of military reform was mitigated by the fact that the main threats to Russia’s national security “right now and for the foreseeable future” were not of a military nature.³⁰⁴

To protect Russia’s national security interests within the ATTU region, the 1997 concept included policies that were consistent with those of Yeltsin’s 1996 message to the Federal Assembly. Moscow’s approach to peacekeeping and the basing of Russian armed forces abroad was more explicit in the 1997 concept than in Yeltsin’s 1996 message to the Federal Assembly. They reflected a more expansive understanding of the role of the armed forces in maintaining stability and a measure of control within the near abroad and the AOA of the CFE Treaty. As for peacekeeping,

The long-term objectives of ensuring the Russian Federation's national security determine the need for wide participation by Russia in peace-keeping operations. The implementation of such operations should be an important means of preventing or eliminating crisis situations at the stage of their emergence and development...the Russian Federation Armed Forces must ensure the Russian Federation's implementation of peace-keeping activity

³⁰⁴ “Russian National Security Concept,” 2,3,13. One analyst observed that the 1997 Concept was ‘relatively optimistic with regards to the country’s international situation in all its assessments,’ and concluded that, “due to the development of entirely new relations with the major powers, the absence of an immediate military threat, and not least Russia’s nuclear deterrent, resources could be distributed and used to deal with acute domestic problems.” Jakub M. Godzimirski, “Russian National Security Concepts 1997 and 2000: A Comparative Analysis,” 84.

both *in its own right* [emphasis added] and within international organizations.³⁰⁵

While the language about the stationing of Russian armed forces abroad made generic reference to “certain strategically important regions of the world,” the disposition of those forces at the time, almost exclusively within the territory of the former USSR, revealed the purpose of this provision of the concept:

The stationing of limited troop contingents (military bases)...on a treaty basis and on the principles of partnership should demonstrate the Russian Federation's readiness to fulfill its alliance commitments, promote the formation of a stable military-strategic balance of forces in the regions, and give the Russian Federation the potential to react to a crisis situation at the initial stages of its emergence.³⁰⁶

The provisions of the “Russian National Security Concept” of 1997, while strategic guidelines for future action, also reflected the status quo, especially on the territory of the states of the CIS and rest of the near abroad. This status quo was the result of a rapid evolution of Russia’s foreign and security policies during Boris Yeltsin’s terms as president from maintaining friendly and cooperative relations with the U.S. and Western Europe to preserving Moscow’s influence in the states of the former USSR. Also evident was an increasing reliance on the armed forces as an instrument of foreign and security policy. Whether conducting so-called peacekeeping operations in Moldova (Transdniestria) and Georgia (Abkhazia and South

³⁰⁵ “Russian National Security Concept,” 23-24.

³⁰⁶ “Russian National Security Concept,” 23.

Ossetia), or maintaining stationed forces in those countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and the Central Asian states, the Russian armed forces played a balancing act between influencing and executing policy and coping with the consequences of the dissolution of the WTO and the Soviet armed forces. They carried out this act within the constraints of the CFE Treaty, which was in its initial stage of implementation, yet would have significant implications for Russia's foreign and security policy. It is to the CFE Treaty during this period that we now turn.

Russia and the CFE Treaty – 1992-1999

The period 1992-1999 constituted a life cycle for the CFE Treaty. It began with the treaty signatories' ratification of the agreement and its entry into force (EIF) and ended with the signing by heads of state and government of an agreement to adapt the treaty to the realities of a new European security environment. The newly independent states of the former USSR with territory in the ATTU region agreed in Tashkent, Uzbekistan on 15 May 1992 on the division of the USSR's ceilings for TLE (tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters), thereby setting a key condition for the Russian Supreme Soviet to ratify the CFE Treaty on 8 July 1992. Shortly thereafter, at the CSCE Helsinki Summit, the CFE Treaty states parties adopted the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the so-called CFE 1A Agreement.³⁰⁷ They also agreed to

³⁰⁷ In the negotiations for the agreement on personnel limitations, the Russian delegation resisted what it viewed as attempts by other delegations to expand the agreement to "cover more and more elements that have no connection with conventional armed forces, which are considered within the framework of the [CFE] treaty." These "elements" concerned types of armed forces that had proven problematic for the USSR during the negotiations of the CFE Treaty itself, such as land-based naval forces and internal security forces. Vladimir Smelov, "CFE Manpower Limitations Discussed," *ITAR-TASS World Service*, 11 June 1992, translated in JPRS-TAC-92-021, 13 July 1992, 27. The chief Russian negotiator, Vladimir Shustov, listed the benefits of the accord for Russia: political commitments to agreed limits on the size of conventional armed forces by all states in the ATTU area, all states treated equally (specifically, Germany, which had had a limit set by the Two-Plus Four Agreement, which could no longer complain about discrimination), the long implementation timetable that allowed for reorganization of the Russian armed forces, and the agreement would "regulate our mutual relations in the military-political sphere not

the provisional EIF of the treaty, even though four states had not yet delivered their instruments of ratification to the treaty's depository, the Kingdom of the Netherlands.³⁰⁸ On 17 July 1992, the treaty entered into force.

Entry into force started the clock for various processes and events in the life of the CFE Treaty. A baseline validation period, during which the CFE states conducted an intensive period of inspections to validate the initial data they had exchanged, ended in November 1992. A forty-month reduction period began upon EIF, during which the parties to the treaty had to reduce their holdings of TLE to reach the limits in the treaty by November 1995.³⁰⁹ Following completion of the reduction period, another 120-day period of intensive inspections took place to verify the reductions had occurred. Entry into force also set the timing for the first conference to review the operation of the treaty, which was to take place forty-six months after EIF.³¹⁰ The first review conference took place in Vienna 15-31 May 1996 and produced agreements on procedures for destruction of Russian TLE that had been moved east of the Ural Mountains and modification of the treaty's provisions on the flank zone.

Throughout this period, the CFE Treaty states also acted to ease implementation of the treaty in light of the challenges posed by some of its provisions. In a series of decisions adopted from 1993 to 1995, primarily at Russia's request, the JCG modified the rigorous procedures for

only with the European countries, the United States, and Canada, *but also with the former republics of the USSR at the same time*" [emphasis added]. Sergey Tosunyan, "European States Reducing Armies from Atlantic to Urals," *Izvestiya*, 7 July 1992, translated as "Pact on Conventional Force Ceilings Viewed," JPRS-TAC-92-024, 14 August 1992, 18.

³⁰⁸ Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 114. Article XXII of the CFE Treaty designated the Kingdom of the Netherlands as the Depository.

³⁰⁹ Each state party was obligated to complete twenty-five percent of reductions by November 1993, sixty percent by November 1994, and 100 percent by November 1995. CFE Treaty Text, Article VIII.

³¹⁰ CFE Treaty Text, Article XXI.

reduction of TLE so they would not count against the treaty's limits.³¹¹ The CFE treaty states also took a number of decisions on the process to adapt the treaty to the new European security environment in which neither the WTO nor the USSR existed. On 1 December 1996, on the margins of the Lisbon Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE, they adopted a document that set out the "scope and parameters" for the process of adaptation. The JCG then issued, on 17 February 1997, a more detailed statement of the basic elements for the adaptation of the CFE Treaty. After two years of negotiation, the heads of state and government of the CFE Treaty states parties signed the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe at the Istanbul Summit of the OSCE on 19 November 1999. All these decisions and agreements addressed Moscow's concerns and, to one extent or another, satisfied Russia's desiderata.

Getting to Ratification and Entry into Force

From Moscow's point of view, the period from 1992-1999 was one of correction (*korrektirovka*) and then adaptation (*adaptatsiya*) of the CFE Treaty.³¹² Before any correction or adaptation could take place, however, the Russian government would have to ratify the original CFE Treaty, thereby helping to pave the way for the treaty's EIF. On 10 February 1992, Foreign Minister Kozyrev presented to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet the START and CFE treaties for ratification. Kozyrev said that the treaty was "laying the foundation for the new political realities." The treaty's "intensive and unprecedented" information exchange and "all

³¹¹ Decisions on reduction of artillery (8 March and 24 May 1994), tanks and ACVs (11 May 1993), ACVs (29 June 1993), modified procedures for reduction of all types of TLE (14 July 1995), and conversion of T34 tanks (3 May 1994) and PT76 heavy armored combat vehicles for civilian purposes (12 October 1993). Texts of these decisions are at <https://fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/text/index.html>.

³¹² Antonov and Ayumov, *Kontrol' nad obychnymi vooruzheniyami v evrope*. The two chapters that cover this time period are entitled "Korretirovka DOVSE v 1991-1996" [Correction of the CFE Treaty, 1991-1996] and "Adaptatsiya DOVSE" [Adaptation of the CFE Treaty].

encompassing” verification provisions had created “such a high level of transparency of the military situation that to circumvent the treaty, and even more to secretly carry out preparation for aggression [was becoming] practically impossible.” The treaty’s provisions were characterized by the principle of “equal security and reciprocity.” Kozyrev also focused on its “not trivial” positive implications for the CIS: the treaty, “in regulating the distribution of military power in the European part of the territory of the former USSR, guarantees for the [CIS] stable and secure relations with neighbors, and also within the Commonwealth are established reserve brakes on an ‘internal’ arms race, should the desire to enter into one arise” (The “internal arms race” was an indirect reference to Ukraine, whose initial plans for independent armed forces were quite ambitious). The CFE Treaty (along with START) were “laying the foundation to place before us the question of a transition not only to post-conflict, but to friendly, and in the future to alliance relations with the main states-parties, including the United States of America.”³¹³ During the session of the Supreme Soviet, the deputy chairman of the defense committee cautioned that ratification of the CFE Treaty would prove more difficult than for the START agreement, thanks to the demands of Ukraine and Belarus for TLE allocations, which, if met, would require Russia to “disarm almost completely.” Therefore, talks among the states of the CIS would have to precede the ratification of the CFE Treaty.³¹⁴

The determination of the treaty legal status of the other former republics of the USSR that fell within the AOA of the CFE Treaty (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Ukraine), a precondition for the treaty’s EIF, proved to be difficult. The member

³¹³ “V Verkhovnom Sovete RF (Rossii) - Vystuplenie A.V. Kozyreva o Dogovore ob Obychnykh vooruzhenykh Silakh v Evrope,” 10 February 1992, *DV* No. 4-5, 29 February-15 March 1992, 69-70.

³¹⁴ Sergey Chugayev, “Reform in First Place. Constitution Later,” *Izvestiya*, 12 February 1992, translated as “Presidium Begins START, CFE Treaty Ratification Process,” JPRS-TAC-92-009, 18 March 1992, 20.

states of the CIS (which excluded Georgia at the time) took the first step when they adopted the “Alma Ata Declaration” on 21 December 1991, which formally established the CIS, and committed themselves “in accordance with their constitutional procedures, [to] the fulfillment of international obligations stemming from the treaties and agreements of the former U.S.S.R.”³¹⁵ While the newly independent states and members of the CIS might have aspired to ratify the CFE Treaty and other agreements, to achieve this rapidly was not a realistic expectation. These states were in the process of setting up their own defense establishments, so a more difficult step proved to be the distribution of maximum levels of holdings (MLH) of TLE among the states of the CIS within the ATTU, which would amount to a de facto division of the former Soviet armed forces. General Leonid Ivashov of the CIS Unified Armed Forces offered an example of the difficulty of the task when he asserted that the demands by Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia for allocations of tanks would have left Russia with none in the flank zone.³¹⁶ Jane M.O. Sharp vividly captured the challenge for Russia, given that many the most modern Soviet conventional armaments were positioned outside the Russian Federation in areas facing NATO, a policy that “left larger amounts of modern equipment in Belarus and Ukraine than Russia was comfortable with after the break-up of the USSR.”

³¹⁵ “The End of the Soviet Union – Text of Accords by Former Soviet Republics Setting Up a Commonwealth,” *The New York Times*, 23 December 1991, <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/23/world/end-soviet-union-text-accords-former-soviet-republics-setting-up-commonwealth.html>.

³¹⁶ “Prospects for Post-Soviet START, CFE Ratification Viewed,” Radio Moscow World Service in English, JPRS-TAC-92-013, 17 April 1992, 5. A Russian military commentator observed that the reasons for the difficulty in dividing the CFE MLH for CIS states included the lack of a “principle for determining what constitutes adequate arms” for each country (the method used previously to calculate the division of MLH for the WTO states proved unacceptable for the CIS states), some CIS states’ – especially Ukraine’s – pursuit of very large MLH, and a “veil of silence” regarding how deal with commitments made by the USSR regarding TLE in coastal artillery and naval infantry units and TLE moved east of the Ural Mountains. Lieutenant Colonel A. Dosuchayev, “If Arms Must Be Divided Up, Let’s Do It in a Civilized Way, Not Forgetting About International Treaties,” *KZ*, 19 March 1992, translated as “Probable Outcome of Army ‘Division’ Considered,” JPRS-TAC-92-013, 17 April 1992, 11.

In addition, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were trying to resolve the issue of control over former Soviet nuclear weapons as well as ground equipment. Russia and Ukraine also disagreed over who should control the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet, and several of the former republics were at war and in no mood to accept limits on their armed forces.³¹⁷

A sticking point in the division of TLE allocations and holdings proved to be Moscow's advocacy of a formula that would heavily favor Russia over the other CIS states. This formula, which had been used earlier to allocate armaments between the USSR and the other states of the WTO, was based on a calculation of each country's land area, length of borders, and size of population. Taking tanks as an example, by Russia's calculation, its MLH should have been 8800, Ukraine's 2800, and Belarus's 1125. Ukraine, on the other hand, proposed MLH of 5888, 4800, and 2000 tanks for Russia, itself, and Belarus, respectively.³¹⁸ After the leaders of the CIS states failed to reach agreement on the MLH of TLE for each CIS state (plus Georgia, which had not yet joined) at a summit meeting in Minsk on 14 February 1992, an intensive period of meetings within the CIS and between the CIS states and NATO in a High Level Working Group (HLWG) created by the alliance, as well as shuttle diplomacy by the U.S. delegation in Vienna, led to the Tashkent Agreement ("Agreement on the Principles and Procedure for Implementation of the CFE Treaty") of 15 May 1992.³¹⁹ Although it never formally entered into force, the

³¹⁷ Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 104.

³¹⁸ IISS, *The Military Balance 1992-1993* (London: Brassey's, 1992), 238.

³¹⁹ For an account of this process of negotiations, see Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order*, 190-203. The HLWG, which included the former Soviet republics with territory in the ATTU region, NATO allies, and the Baltic states, reached agreement 21 February 1992 on a two-stage plan to bring the CFE Treaty into force. In the first stage, the former Soviet states would agree on the division of the USSR's allocations of TLE and in the second stage, those states would ratify the CFE Treaty. Valeriy Shastov, "CFE Implementation Agreement Finalized," *TASS in English*, 1417 GMT 22 February 1992, JPRS-TAC-92-010, 24 March 1992, 32.

signatories generally adhered to its provisions, the most important of which was the distribution of the USSR's MLH for the five categories of TLE.³²⁰ While "ambivalent" about the Tashkent Agreement, the Russians agreed to it in order to preserve the viability of the nascent treaty, whose benefits Foreign Minister Kozyrev had set out before the Supreme Soviet in February. The distribution of MLH proved to be so contentious that the chiefs of defense of the states of the CIS were unable to reach agreement on it at a meeting held on 14 May, so the issue had to be elevated to the level of heads of state and government.³²¹ In the end, the Russians – especially the leadership of the armed forces – accepted the argument that *entitlements* of TLE under CFE were just that, and not actual *ownership* of armaments. Thus, the Russian armed forces, which controlled much of the inventory of conventional armaments in the CIS, could still exercise discretion in how they parceled out TLE to other CIS states.³²²

The results of the Tashkent Agreement, especially the resolution of the legal status of Russia and the other USSR successor states vis-à-vis the CFE Treaty, were enshrined within the CFE Treaty through the "Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties

³²⁰ Anin and Ayumov. "DOVSE – Vchera...Segodnya... Zavtra?...stat'ya pervaya:" 68.

³²¹ Lieutenant Colonel V. Astafyev and Captain 3rd Rank V. Yermolin, "Tashkent: Military Delegations Failed to Resolve the Main Tasks. Will the Politicians Succeed?" *KZ*, 15 May 1992, translated as "CIS Defense Ministers Hold Meeting in Moscow – Further on Military Meeting," JPRS-TAC-92-019, 16 June 1992, 19. For a Ukrainian perspective on the "selfishness" of Russia's position in these talks, see Maj Gen Vadim Grechaninov and Lt Col Vladimir Lartsev, "The Difficult Path to Compromise," *Golos Ukrainy* in Russian, 23 June 1992, translated as "Ukrainian Aide Views Talks on Arms Allocations," JPRS-TAC-92-027, 11 September 1992, 13. A detailed explanation and depiction of the division of the quotas of TLE and other conventional arms and equipment subject to the CFE Treaty (i.e. armored vehicle launched bridges, land-based naval aircraft, certain types of the Mi-24 helicopter, and heavy armaments assigned to coastal defense and naval infantry forces, as well as the Strategic Rocket Forces) can be found in IISS, *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, 237-241.

³²² Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order*, 202-203; Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 111. The commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS, Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, praised the Tashkent Agreement, to include the "figures and quotas [for TLE] mutually agreeable to all countries concerned." One of the goals of this aspect of the agreement was "to reach a parity of the forces involved in the conflict on the Trans-Caucasian region [by ensuring that] each of the involved countries, including Georgia [which was still outside the CIS] should have the same amount of equipment and armaments." Roman Zadunaiskiy, "News Conference on Tashkent Summit," *ITAR-TASS* in English, 20 May 1992, JPRS-TAC-92-019, 16 June 1992, 14.

to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” which was adopted in Oslo 4-5 June 1992. The Oslo Final Document made changes to the text of the CFE Treaty to include the post-Soviet states (a similar document would do the same for the Czech Republic and Slovakia after the “Velvet Divorce” that divided Czechoslovakia) and confirmed all parties’ acceptance of the JCG decisions and political declarations associated with the treaty.³²³ In a “Declaration by the Delegation of the Russian Federation” to the JCG, which was appended to the Oslo Final Document, the Russians stated, “Information concerning objects of verifications and declared sites does not prejudice the resolution of the question of the ownership, status and subordination of the corresponding formations and units of conventional armed forces,” thereby affirming the understanding that underpinned their acceptance of the Tashkent Agreement, that provisions of the treaty regarding armaments, bases and units did not equate to ownership of the same.³²⁴

On 8 July 1992, the Supreme Soviet of the Russia Federation ratified the CFE Treaty. The resolution on ratification urged the government to rapidly work out the remaining technical details of the treaty's implementation (reduction quotas, conduct of inspections, division of expenditures) with the other countries of the CIS.³²⁵ Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Berdennikov praised the treaty’s ratification as a positive development for Russia’s place in

³²³ At a meeting of the NACC in March 1992, Foreign Minister Kozyrev shared Moscow’s expectation that the upcoming extraordinary conference would adopt only these technical changes and would not require a re-signing of the CFE Treaty. He also indicated Moscow was proceeding from the assumption that the issue of the distribution of the MLH of the former USSR would be resolved in time for the conference. “Rossiya-NATO – Vneocherednaya sessiya Soveta Severoatlanticheskogo Sotrudnichestva: Vystuplenie A.V. Kozyreva,” *DV* No. 7, 15 April 1992: 33.

³²⁴ “Declaration by the Delegation of the Russian Federation,” Vienna, 2 June 1992, “Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.”

³²⁵ “Russian Parliament Ratifies CFE Treaty, Implementation Accord – Supreme Soviet Resolution,” Moscow *Interfax*, 8 July 1992, JPRS-TAC-92-024, 14 August 1992, 18.

Europe and a means to lessen pressure on Russia's troubled economy.³²⁶ Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Valeriy Mironov offered faint praise for the treaty, which could "by no means be considered as a document undermining this country's security." According to Mironov, Russia's accession to the treaty was consistent with the principles of "reasonable sufficiency" and supportive of goals to reform and reduce the armed forces. While Russia acquired "the status of Europe's leading state in politico-military terms," even while reducing forces and armaments, Russia would "continue to have the opportunity to keep 'powerful enough' army reserves in the areas not covered by the treaty, such as the Urals and Siberia."³²⁷ A committee report prepared for the Supreme Soviet highlighted the positive aspects of the CFE Treaty, while pointing out the challenges Russia would face in implementing it. The key points of the report, a truncated version of which appeared in the Russian press, are shown in Figure 4.1 on the following page.

³²⁶ Lyudmila Semina, Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Berdennikov, 8 July 1992, translated as "Russian Parliament Ratifies CFE Treaty, Implementation Accord – Foreign Ministry Official Comments," Moscow *Radio Mayak* 8 July 1992, JPRS-TAC-92-024, 14 August 1992, 19.

³²⁷ "Diplomatic Panorama – Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Doesn't Undermine Russia's Security," Moscow *Interfax* 8 July 1992, "Russian Parliament Ratifies CFE Treaty, Implementation Accord – [Deputy Defense Minister] Outlines Reductions," JPRS-TAC-92-024, 14 August 1992, 19. Mironov's offhand comment about reserves east of the Urals called into question assurances the Soviets had provided about the withdrawals of large quantities of armored vehicles from the ATTU region before signing the CFE Treaty in 1990.

Positive Aspects of the CFE Treaty	Challenges for Implementation
<p>Division of the Soviet quotas for TLE among European states of the CIS (in the Tashkent Agreement) “does not encroach upon the interests of the security of Russia.” *</p> <p>“Taking into account the considerable potential of combat equipment in the Asiatic part of Russia [the report took note of the approximately 70,000 heavy weapons that had been moved east of the Ural Mountains]...the Tashkent Agreement creates no imbalances that endanger Russia’s security interests.” CFE is “the only legal document and the only real instrument making it possible to prevent an arms race among the states of the CIS.”</p>	<p>Distribution of “financial and technical participation” of the CIS states in the treaty remains unresolved - “one can assume that Russia will have to take on all the financial and technical burden...which can hardly be called fair.”</p> <p>40-month reduction period “does not leave us time for a prolonged reduction and a radical reorganization of the armed forces Russia has today.</p> <p>The time periods and limits in the treaty do not allow for keeping the existing group of Russian forces in the Baltics and other former Soviet republics for “a long time.” Withdrawal and re-stationing of these forces “would not only require colossal means but also could lead to a situation where we violate international commitments we have made under the CFE Treaty and the Tashkent Agreement.”</p>

* The division of quotas of TLE produced favorable ratios for Russia in tanks and ACVs vis-a-vis Ukraine of 1.5-2:1 and in combat aircraft and attack helicopters of 3:1. Russia received in entitlements in the European portion of the former USSR 48% of tanks, 57% of ACVs, 48% of artillery, 67% of combat aircraft and 59% of attack helicopters.

Figure 4.1. Parliamentary Report on CFE, 1992

Source: “Report by the Center for National Security and International Relations of the Committee for Foreign Relations and Foreign Economic Ties of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation (Abbreviated Account): Conventional Arms Treaty: Consequences for Russia,” *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 29 July 1992, translated as “Russian Parliament Report on CFE Impact on Forces,” JPRS-TAC-92-024, 14 August 1992, 23-25.

The report proved to be on the mark about the fiscal and political challenges. Nonetheless, the report concluded that “the ratification of the CFE Treaty and its implementation were fully in keeping with the interests of Russia and would contribute to strengthening its security.”³²⁸

³²⁸ “Report by the Center for National Security and International Relations of the Committee for Foreign Relations and Foreign Economic Ties of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation (Abbreviated Account): Conventional Arms Treaty: Consequences for Russia,” *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 29 July 1992, translated as “Russian Parliament Report on CFE Impact on Forces,” JPRS-TAC-92-024, 14 August 1992, 23-25.

Within a month of the Supreme Soviet's ratification of the CFE Treaty, it provisionally entered into force through a decision adopted on 10 July 1992 at a summit meeting of the CSCE in Helsinki. Following the delivery of the final national instruments of ratification to the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands several months later, the treaty formally entered into force on 9 November 1992. In short order Russia raised four issues that, in their view, challenged the implementation and the viability of the CFE Treaty: the flank limitations, the destruction of TLE to meet the treaty's limits, the status of the Baltic States, and the enlargement of NATO. These interrelated issues and their impact on the treaty reflected the changed European security environment in which Russia was carving out for itself a leading role in the CIS and other portions of the former USSR while trying to avoid being marginalized in the broader European security system.

The Flank Zone

The desire for "correction" of the CFE Treaty was primarily rooted in Moscow's objection to the provision of the treaty that governed the flank zone (article V). The so-called flank zone was included in the CFE Treaty primarily at the insistence of Norway and Turkey, which feared that forces and armaments moved out of the central zones to meet treaty limits would then end up concentrated on the northern and southern flanks of those areas, i.e. opposite their borders. The Soviets, particularly the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and General Staff, only grudgingly accepted this provision of the treaty, mainly because it restricted their ability to move forces within their own territory.³²⁹ In the waning months of the negotiations on the CFE Treaty, the Soviets obtained some relief from the flank restrictions when they succeeded in having the

³²⁹ This restriction was unique to the USSR among the original states parties to the CFE Treaty, because the *entire* territories of other flank states fell within the flank zone. Upon the break-up of the USSR, Ukraine joined the Russian Federation in facing this constraint.

Kiev MD removed from the flank zone to the so-called expanded central zone (the area defined in Article IV, paragraph 3 of the treaty). This relief that would be overcome by events after the break-up of the USSR, when the former Kiev MD became a part of Ukraine. Whereas the front-line territories for the USSR's armed forces encompassed the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Baltic, Belarusian and Carpathian MDs, the MDs in the flank zone – Leningrad, Odessa, and Transcaucasus – were considered rear areas. As one western analyst pointed out, the Soviets accepted the flank ceilings “when the south was not envisaged as militarily important.” In general, “the CFE Treaty’s high limits in the central zone, coupled with its comparatively low limits in the flank zone, conformed in a rough sense to the traditional Soviet strategic orientation.”³³⁰ A pair of Russian analysts also observed that the flank limitations “did not create special problems for the Soviet Union,” although they “turned out to be especially unacceptable for the Russian Federation.”³³¹ The situation became acute as the North Caucasus region began to pose “the greatest threat” and the forces in the North Caucasus MD were identified as “the bedrock of the operational forward echelon” of the Russian Army.³³²

The Russians began their campaign for relief from the flank limitations in March 1993. Defense Minister Grachev, after returning from a visit to the North Caucasus MD, told an interviewer, “owing to the changes in the situation, new quotas are required: It will be necessary to relocate weapons from one district to another” while preserving the overall ceilings of the CFE Treaty. The North Caucasus MD, no longer a backwater, was becoming one of the most

³³⁰ Richard Falkenrath, “The CFE Flank Dispute: Waiting in the Wings,” *International Security* 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995): 125.

³³¹ Anin and Ayumov. “DOVSE – Vchera...Segodnya... Zavtra?...stat’ya pervaya:” 69.

³³² “Defense Minister Grachev Discusses Force Reductions,” *Interfax* 28 November 1992, JPRS-TAC-92-035, 5 December 1992, 22.

important for the Russian armed forces, yet the allocation of armaments to the entire flank region (northern and southern portions) included only 5.5 percent of Russia's ACV entitlements and fourteen percent of tanks.³³³ On 31 May, the senior leadership of the armed forces reiterated Grachev's concern that "regional restrictions" set by the treaty did not take into account changes in the security environment and, "in some cases Russia is forced to distribute arms and equipment of the land forces on the territory of the European part of the country without taking into consideration the interests of reliable defense."³³⁴ On 17 September, Yeltsin sent a letter to his counterparts in the major CFE states (e.g. the U.S., UK, and France) in which he explained Russia's problems with the flank limitations and sought relief from them. Eleven days later, the chief of the Russian delegation, Vladislav Kulebyakin, submitted a demarche to the JCG requesting a suspension of the flank limits, which would not serve as a precedent, despite its proposed legally binding character. The demarche included what would become the standard list of Russian complaints about the flank limits: their discriminatory character, the growing importance of the Caucasus region for Russia's security, the need to use existing infrastructure in the North Caucasus MD to relocate forces withdrawn from Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, and the impossibility for Russia to meet the requirement for the reduction of TLE in the flank

³³³ Pavel Felgengauer, "New Difficulties Over Treaty on Arms Reductions in Europe. Russia Will Press for Reapportionment of Quota Allocated." *Segodnya* No. 3, 11 March 1993, translated as "Russian Defense Minister Calls for New CFE Quotas within Russia, JPRS-TAC-93-007, 13 April 1993, 28. Felgengauer, a leading Russian military analyst at the time, offered a more detailed analysis and commentary in "CFE Treaty Needs Correction Again. Western Democracies Express Understanding and Sympathy, But This Does Not Solve the Problem of Russian Flank Quotas," *Segodnya* No. 14, 7 May 93, translated as "Russia's Flanks Seen Weakened by CFE Treaty," JPRS-TAC-93-011, 19 May 1993, 45.

³³⁴ Sergey Ostanin, "Russia Defense Ministry Meeting Views Treaty Fulfillment," ITAR-TASS World Service, translated in JPRS-TAC-93-013, 21 June 1993, 38. The first deputy chief of the General Staff observed five months later that the flank limits had "not only lost political and military significance but [had] also acquired a character that for Russia was particularly discriminatory, and has placed it in a position of inequality with regard to other parties to the treaty." Lieutenant General Vladimir Zhurbenko, "CFE Treaty: One Year On. Commitments Being Met but Problems Remain," *KZ*, 16 November 1993, translated as "Understanding Sought on CFE 'Flank' Limits," FBIS-SOV-93-220, 17 November 1993, 12.

region.³³⁵ The Russians, while reaffirming their adherence to the CFE Treaty, nonetheless warned:

The lack of a solution to the flank limitations' problem given the preservation of the complicated military and political situation in the region in the future could force Russia to consider the possibility of taking adequate unilateral measures to ensure its security, including those that wouldn't respond fully to the spirit of the treaty.³³⁶

Neither the demarche nor Yeltsin's letters to his counterparts elicited sympathy from other CFE states, especially those in NATO. An assessment by the SVR predicted with some accuracy that the NATO states would retain this stance until the end of the forty-month period for reductions of conventional armaments to meet the limits set in the treaty in 1995.³³⁷ The flurry of diplomatic activity by the Russians over the CFE flank limits (and NATO enlargement)

³³⁵ Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 137-138. Four days earlier, Yeltsin had sent a letter to President Clinton in which he argued against NATO enlargement, which the Russians knew would be a topic of discussion at an upcoming NATO summit meeting. Although Yeltsin did not explicitly mention the CFE Treaty, he implied a connection between the two: "I cannot fail to express our concern over the fact that the debate about possible evolution of NATO increasingly dwells on the option of *quantitative build-up of the Alliance* [emphasis added] by adding East European countries to it." The text of Yeltsin's letter to Clinton on NATO enlargement is in SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 1994* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 249-250. Explanations of Russia's key problems with the flank limits can be found in Falkenrath, "The CFE Flank Dispute: Waiting in the Wings:" 130-131; Anin and Ayumov, "DOVSE – Vchera...Segodnya... Zavtra?...stat'ya pervaya:" 70; and Aleksandr Vorobyov and Boris Kvok, "Disarmament: The Need for Patience and Willpower," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 42, No. 1 (January-February 1996): 101. For a contemporaneous Russian commentary on Yeltsin's letter and the flanks issue, see Manki Ponomarev, "Moving Away from Flank Restrictions. The CFE Treaty and Realities of Life," *KZ*, 21 October 1993, translated as "Yeltsin Message to CFE Leaders Viewed," FBIS-SOV-93-203, 22 October 1993, 18-20.

³³⁶ Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order*, 235.

³³⁷ "NATO Report Summarized," 8. Repeated efforts by the U.S. to work with Moscow to reach a solution to the flank problem were an exception.

in the second half of 1993 was seen as a sign of Yeltsin's deference to the military, whose support he would shortly call upon to resolve his ongoing dispute with the parliament.³³⁸

Russian Forces in Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova

The impact of the flank issue extended beyond the territory of the Russia Federation. The Russian army also maintained forces in other states of the former USSR, whose territory lay within the flank zone: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The Russians therefore had an additional interest in gaining more flexibility to deploy and station forces in this portion of the CIS in order to assert their influence and conduct so-called peacekeeping operations in conflict zones.³³⁹ By 1995, Moscow had either signed agreements or taken unilateral measures to legitimize the presence of Russian forces in Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova (Azerbaijan resisted attempts to retain Russian conventional forces on its territory and the status of the Russian portion of the Black Sea fleet in Ukraine was not resolved until 1997).³⁴⁰

³³⁸ Sharp, *Striving for Military Security in Europe*, 137. See also "Russia: Kremlin Niggles on Treaty Disturb Nato." *The Independent*, Oct 07, 1993, accessed through ProQuest. According to this report, "Though most officials were unwilling to guess at Moscow's motives, there was speculation that Mr. Yeltsin had been pushed into action by the Russian military. 'It's no secret that the military doesn't like it,' said a diplomat, because they see it as overly restrictive...At around the same time as the CFE letter another was sent saying that Nato should not take in new members from central and eastern Europe..." See also Martin Ivens and Michael Evans. "Election in Russia to Proceed on Schedule; Russia." *The Times*, Oct 07, 1993, accessed through ProQuest, and "Caucasian Wars Put Arms Pact at Risk Yeltsin Undermines Chances of State Based on Law - Russia Threatens Treaty on Weapons Cuts." *The Guardian (Pre-1997 Fulltext)*, Oct 07, 1993, accessed through ProQuest.

³³⁹ In November 1992, Defense Minister Grachev declared, "All the Russian divisions operating outside Russia have the status of peacekeeping forces" and would have to remain in conflict areas "until the politicians reach political solutions to the confrontations under peaceful conditions." "Defense Minister Grachev Discusses Force Reductions," *Interfax* 28 November 1992, JPRS-TAC-92-035, 5 December 1992, 22.

³⁴⁰ See the chart that depicts these agreements in Umbach, "The Role and Influence of the Russian Military Establishment in Russia's Foreign and Security Policies in the Yeltsin Era:" 483. On Russia's pressure on these states to retain bases, see Renee de Nevers, *Russia's Strategic Renovation* (London: Brassey's, 1994) (Adelphi Paper 289), 53-56. De Nevers also links Moscow's efforts to gain relief from the flank limits to their desire to station Russian forces in the North Caucasus region.

The status of Russian forces in Armenia proved to be the least controversial. On 16 March 1995, presidents Yeltsin and Levon Ter Petrosian signed the “Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia Regarding the Russian Military Base on the Territory of Armenia,” which granted the Russian armed forces the use of bases at Gyumri and Yerevan for twenty-five years. The ostensible reason for the presence of Russian forces was to secure Armenia from potential threats from Turkey, although the conflict with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region was the Armenians’ primary concern. Armenia also transferred to Russia allocations of TLE, thereby helping Russia to meet its CFE flank obligations.³⁴¹

The situations in Georgia and Moldova proved more problematic. Georgian President Shevardnadze, facing separatist threats in Abkhazia, Adjara, and South Ossetia, signed an agreement with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on 16 September 1995 to maintain Russian forces at four bases in Georgia (Batumi, Akhalkalaki, Vaziani and Tbilisi – see Figure 4.2. Former Soviet Bases in Georgia) for twenty-five years. The Georgian parliament never ratified this agreement, thereby setting the stage for a protracted dispute over the presence of Russia troops that would surface in the negotiations for the adaptation of the CFE Treaty (see the case study in this chapter).³⁴²

³⁴¹ Mihai Gribincea, *The Russian Policy on Military Bases: Georgia and Moldova*, Oradea, Romania: Cogito Publishing House, 2001, 31,33.

³⁴² Gribincea, *The Russian Policy on Military Bases: Georgia and Moldova*, 44, 58.



Figure 4.2. Former Soviet Bases in Georgia

Source: *CIA World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/maps/GG-map.gif> (modified by the author).

As for Moldova, Yeltsin declared on 1 April 1992 that former Soviet forces not yet subordinated to the Moldovan authorities would be transferred to the Russian Army. Defense Minister Grachev added in June 1992 that the withdrawal of Russian troops from all foreign territories was “a legitimate and predecided matter,” although the withdrawal of the former Soviet 14th Army from Moldova would be predicated on reaching agreement on the temporary stationing of its forces there, to be followed by a “long process” of negotiations and actions that might last five to six years.³⁴³ Negotiations between Chisinau and Moscow produced an agreement on the withdrawal of Russian forces in three years.³⁴⁴ The withdrawal did not occur,

³⁴³ Tatyana Chemodanova, “Grachev Discusses 14th Army Withdrawal from Moldova,” *Mayak Radio Network*, 10 June 1992, translated in *JPRS-TAC-92-021*, 13 July 1992, 26.

³⁴⁴ The Russians and Moldovans signed the agreement in Moscow on 21 October 1994. Russian troops were to have been withdrawn within three years after the agreement entered into force after “necessary inner-state procedures are carried out,” i.e. a political resolution of the conflict between Chisinau and the Transdnestrian authorities. Gennadiy Yezhov, Anna Melnikova and Andrey Serov, “Troop Withdrawal Accord Signed with Moldova,” *ITAR-TASS World Service*, 21 October 1994, translated in *FBIS-SOV-94-205*, 24 October 1994, 11.

in large part because it was to have been synchronized with a political settlement to the conflict over the separatist Transdnestr region. From 1992 through 1995, the Russians made several unsuccessful attempts to legalize the presence of the former Soviet 14th Army, redesignated the Operational Group of Russian Forces. In early 1995, they asked the Moldovans to transfer TLE allocations to Russia. After Chisinau rejected this request, the Russians then proposed to temporarily deploy on the territory of Moldova 116 tanks, fifty-five ACVs and ninety-three pieces of artillery.³⁴⁵ Although Chisinau rejected Russian efforts to redesignate these forces as peacekeeping forces, and thereby exempt them from CFE Treaty limits, Moscow de facto made this switch during a troop rotation in May 1996.³⁴⁶ To register their rejection of Moscow's moves, the government of Moldova appended an interpretive statement to the flank agreement reached at the first CFE Treaty REVCON (as will be discussed below). As with the presence of Russia forces in Georgia, the situation in Moldova would affect the talks on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty.

In all three cases (Armenia, Georgia and Moldova), Moscow exploited threats of separatism and ethnic violence to pressure host governments to accept the presence of Russian forces. They also drew on flexibilities inherent in the CFE Treaty, i.e. transfer of allocations of TLE, temporary deployments, and redesignation of forces as peacekeepers, to meet their flank obligations by the end of the reduction period in November 1995.³⁴⁷ To accomplish this feat,

³⁴⁵ Article V, paragraph 1C of the CFE Treaty allows for such temporary deployments in excess of limits on TLE.

³⁴⁶ Gribincea, *The Russian Policy on Military Bases: Georgia and Moldova*, 173, 209-211, 242.

³⁴⁷ Moscow's CFE-related challenges in these countries were not limited to levels of forces. On the eve of the Supreme Soviet's ratification of the CFE Treaty, officers of the Ground Forces had identified potential problems in implementation of the treaty associated with these Russian forces. In particular, it was not clear how inspections of Russian forces located outside the Russian Federation, in "hot spots," might be conducted. "Problems for Disarmament People, Too," KZ, 23 June 1992, translated as "Russia Not 'Entirely prepared' to Implement CFE," JPRS-TAC-92-022, 27 July 1992, 36.

and to fulfill their pledge to destroy TLE removed east of the Ural Mountains in 1990, the Russians would require help from the U.S. and a temporary adjustment to the CFE Treaty.

Efforts to Resolve the Flank Zone Issue, 1993-1995

Russia doggedly pursued a solution the problem with the flank limits in the JCG and in engagements at the highest levels with the U.S. from 1993 to 1995. In October 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher expressed his understanding of the problem and Russia's "legitimate concerns," while cautioning against any solution that might require that the treaty be reopened. Christopher might have been encouraged by Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov's claim that he had had productive discussions with the Russian military on the issue.³⁴⁸ In early 1994, the Russian delegation to the JCG introduced new proposals "to rectify the noted disbalance" in the distribution of the Russian armed forces in the northern and southern flank areas.³⁴⁹ At the same time, President Lech Walesa of Poland and the Hungarian foreign minister shared with the U.S. their worries about the large concentration of Russian forces in the Kaliningrad *oblast* and cautioned against Moscow's attempts to modify the flank limits.³⁵⁰ Later that year, while in

³⁴⁸ USDEL SECRETARY IN UKRAINE cable 250251Z October 1993, Subj: Secretary Christopher's Meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev: NATO, Elections, Regional Issues, National Security Archive, "NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard," Briefing Book #621, document 7, published 16 March 2018, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard>.

³⁴⁹ "Brifing 29 marta - Brifing provodil director Departamenta po razoruzheniyu i kontrolyu za voennymi tekhnologiyami MID RF O.M. Sokolov, O razoruzhenii i kontrole nad vooruzheniyami," 29 March 1994, *DV* No. 7-8 (April 1994): 69.

³⁵⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: The President's Luncheon Plenary Meeting with the Heads of State and Government of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, 12 January 1994, Prague, Czech Republic, National Security Archive, "NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard," Briefing Book #621, document 12, published 16 March 2018, pp. 4-5, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard>. As for the Kaliningrad *oblast*, two Russian authors later asserted that the flank provision of the CFE Treaty undermined stability in this region, because it "forced Russia to concentrate its weapons in areas that are closest to NATO – Kaliningrad oblast and along the borders with Belarus and Ukraine...although the territory of Kaliningrad Oblast, which is part of 'greater Central Europe' [and not the flank zone], is less than 0.5 percent of Russia's European part, Moscow can deploy there six times as many tanks and 15 times as many [ACVs] compared to the entire flank area." Vorobyov and Kvok, "Disarmament: The Need for Patience and Willpower," 101.

Brussels for a meeting with the chief of the NATO Military Committee, Defense Minister Grachev asserted that the flank limits conflicted with “Russia’s vital security interests,” and Russia required 1100 tanks, 3000 ACVs and 2100 artillery pieces (400 tanks, 2420 ACVs and 820 artillery pieces more than permitted by the flank zone limits) there, with a significant portion of the armaments needed in the North Caucasus MD.³⁵¹

Moscow faced a potential conflict between protecting the nation’s security interests and meeting the limits of the CFE Treaty by November 1995. The simmering threat of instability in the North Caucasus had been a major factor in Moscow’s policy, but the dispatch of the Russian army to Chechnya in December 1994 lent urgency to efforts to relax or eliminate the flank restrictions. The need to relocate forces being withdrawn from Eastern Europe and the Baltic states added motivation to intensify diplomatic efforts to gain relief. On the eve of the start of a new session of the JCG in January 1995, Moscow tried to pressure the NATO states because earlier proposals to fix the flank provisions of the treaty, to include during the fall 1994 session of the JCG, had not gained traction. The MFA warned, “If the line of Western partners on protracting the search for mutually acceptable resolutions... continued, then Russia would have to take such measures independently.”³⁵² A spokesman for the MFA explicitly linked the process in the JCG to the worsening situation in the North Caucasus.³⁵³ The U.S. State Department

³⁵¹ “Reportage of Grachev Remarks at NATO Meeting – Calls Conventional Forces Treaty Too Tough,” *Interfax* in English, 5 September 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-172, 6 September 1994, 4; Aleksandr Koretskiy and Ilya Bulavinov, “Grachev on Conventional Weapons Cuts. Russia Insists on Amending Paragraph 5,” *Kommersant Daily*, 7 September 1994, translated in FBIS-SOV-94-174, 8 September 1994, 1.

³⁵² “Dogovor ob OBSE: Novye realii trebuyut novykh podkhodov,” *DV* No. 1 (January 1995): 77. The Defense Ministry had contributed a proposal for the temporary suspension of the flank provisions of the treaty for consideration by the JCG. The proposal was predicated on the need to create a group of Russian forces in the North Caucasus. Sergey Ostanin, “Defense Ministry Calls for Changes to CFE Treaty,” *ITAR-TASS World Service*, 5 December 1994, translated in FBIS-SOV-94-233, 5 December 1994, 13.

³⁵³ “Karasin: CFE Flank Restrictions ‘May’ Be Reconsidered,” *Interfax* in English, 27 December 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-249, 28 December 1994, 5; Boris Vinogradov, “Russia Wants to ‘Out-flank’ CFE Treaty,” *Izvestiya*, 31

countered by reminding Russia that almost a year remained (until November 1995) to meet the flank limits, so debates in the JCG at the time could not have affected events in Chechnya.³⁵⁴ Although he did not mention the conflict in Chechnya, in January 1995 the chairman of the State Duma's committee on international affairs added his voice to those calling for an amendment to the CFE Treaty or, alternatively, for Russia to consider abandoning the treaty.³⁵⁵ Several months later, Defense Minister Grachev offered a new Russian proposal to solve the problem of the flank limits in the North Caucasus: "areas of combat operations and of situations of conflict be designated as outside the frame work conditions" of the CFE Treaty. Therefore, limits on the TLE being used in a conflict would be exempt from the treaty's limits.³⁵⁶ This proposal also fell on deaf ears, and the search for a resolution of the flank issue shifted to the highest political levels of government.

With the end of the CFE Treaty reduction period looming ahead and the JCG having achieved no progress on the flank limits and other treaty issues, presidents Yeltsin and Clinton took on CFE at meetings in Moscow and Halifax, Nova Scotia in mid-1995. In Halifax, Clinton reminded Yeltsin of the need to remain engaged and work quickly on the flank issue. As the meeting ended, Yeltsin, "reminded by one of his cards," said that Russia only "had a temporary

December 1994, translated as "Differences with NATO on CFE Flank Restrictions Aired," FBIS-SOV-95-002, 4 January 1995, 3. Vinogradov observed that when the CFE Treaty was signed in 1990, "The Chechnya war – on one of Europe's flanks – was the stuff of fantasy."

³⁵⁴ Andrey Loshchilin, "Washington, Moscow Disagree on Arms Treaty Changes," *ITAR-TASS* in English, 29 December 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-250, 29 December 1994, 3.

³⁵⁵ Yuriy Kozlov, "Conventional Armed Forces Treaty Not in Russia's Interest," *ITAR-TASS* in English, 10 January 1995, FBIS-SOV-95-007, 11 January 1995, 19.

³⁵⁶ Mikhail Shevtsov, "Grachev: Combat Zone Hardware to Be Outside CFE Treaty," *ITAR-TASS* World Service, 3 April 1995, translated in FBIS-SOV-95-064, 4 April 1995, 7.

interest in the North Caucasus as an exclusion zone.”³⁵⁷ By the end of the summer, the situation with the flank limits had become, in the words of the MFA, “rather acute.” Nonetheless, in the type of near-term action Clinton had advocated, the Russians provided information “in an exhaustive manner on the parameters of the planned configuration of conventional armed forces in the flank region, including the North Caucasus zone, where instability remains.” The MFA also took note of a proposal about changing the borders of the flank region the NATO states had offered on 20 September, although cautioned that “the proposed ‘geographical’ measures were insufficient to eliminate Russia’s concerns.”³⁵⁸

In light of the Russians’ continued rejection of the allies’ proposals on the flank limits and the impending deadline for Russia to meet them, Clinton hosted Yeltsin at Hyde Park, New York in October 1995 in conjunction with the session of the UNGA. Yeltsin laid out in frank terms Moscow’s dilemma:

On CFE...we fell into a trap here. Because of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the flank limitations have changed radically. We do not seek any benefits or advantages. The CIS makes the numerical limits very confused. I realize you’ve supported me on changing the flank limits. I ask you to confirm now that you’ll continue to move in this direction – which is especially important, since we face in November what we call in Muslim parlance a “circumcision.”³⁵⁹

³⁵⁷ “Clinton -Yeltsin Meeting, June 17, 1995, 2:45-3:55pm, Citadel Inn, Halifax, Nova Scotia,” National Security Archive, “NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard,” Briefing Book #621, document 20, published 16 March 2018, pp. 4,7, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard>.

³⁵⁸ “O realizatsii Dogovora ob OVSE,” From an MFA briefing, late September/Early October 1995, *DV* No. 10 (October 1995): 76.

³⁵⁹ “Clinton-Yeltsin One-on-One, Hyde Park, NY, October 23, 1995, 11:30 a.m. - 1:35 p.m.,” National Security Council and NSC Records Management System, “Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin,” Clinton Digital Library, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/57603>, 13. This document is the

When Yeltsin's foreign policy aide, Dmitriy Ryurikov left the room to retrieve some papers (likely a new counterproposal), Clinton successfully pressed Yeltsin, who had been drinking during lunch, to accept western proposals for changes to the map of the flank zone without further "haggling."³⁶⁰ The basis for a later compromise on the flank issue had been laid, although without the advice or concurrence of Russia's security establishment. Notwithstanding this effort and others by the U.S. and NATO to assist Russia with the flank zone problem, as late as 15 November 1995, two days before the deadline for CFE states to meet their reduction obligations, Grachev warned, "We are not prepared to respect the current treaty on conventional arms reductions in Europe."³⁶¹ Yeltsin's acceptance of Clinton's proposal, however, helped to pave the way for a statement by the JCG on 17 November 1995, which avoided a flank-induced crisis for the treaty. All the parties to the CFE Treaty recommitted themselves to the basic goals of the treaty, agreed to redefine the geographic parameters of the flank zone, and agreed to negotiate new transparency measures for the redefined zone.³⁶² When Yeltsin met Clinton in

SECRET/NODIS (No Distribution) and Limited Access version of the notes of the conversation (Strobe Talbott was the U.S. notetaker). The CONFIDENTIAL version produced for wider distribution, which is a part of the same digital file, does not include Yeltsin's colorful comment.

³⁶⁰ Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, 182-183.

³⁶¹ U.S. Government Printing Office, Senate Executive Report 105-1, *Flank Document Agreement to the CFE Treaty*, 9 May 1997, 18.

³⁶² Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 160. At a meeting with Secretary Christopher in December, Kozyrev acknowledged the need to complete the work on an agreement, based on the JCG statement, and "to preserve the positive working tone of the talks" while avoiding "engaging in noisy polemics." USDEL SECRETARY IN UKRAINE cable 111938z December 1995 "Secretary Christopher's Meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev, December 9, 1995, 9:00-10:00 A.M., Hotel Conrad, Brussels Belgium," National Security Archive, "NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard," Briefing Book #621, document 21, published 16 March 2018, pp. 4-5, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard>. The MFA lauded the JCG decision, as having "...emphasized...that the common goal of the participants in the treaty [was] the creation of new structures for security in Europe, and literally in these frameworks must be guaranteed integrity and effectiveness of the treaty in the future." Additionally, "For the first time at an official level it was recognized by our partners that the problem of the flank limits, as it was raised by Russia and Ukraine, must be resolved in light of the political realities in Europe prevailing after the signing of the treaty in 1990." "O reshenii SKG po Dogovoru ob OVSE," MFA press release after 17 November 1995, *DV* No. 12 (December 1995): 71.

Moscow in April 1996, they continued to achieve progress toward a solution to the flank problem, yet differences remained.³⁶³ Despite the positive momentum generated by the two heads of state, the Russians were still haggling over numbers as late as 7 May 1996, a week before the start of the CFE Review Conference at which the flank agreement was concluded.³⁶⁴

Destruction of TLE East of the Urals

Another aspect of the treaty that warranted “correction” in Moscow’s eyes were the obligations to reduce TLE in order to meet the treaty’s limits. Russia faced a unique set of challenges in assuming the obligations of the USSR to implement the CFE Treaty. As the head of the center within the General Staff tasked with ensuring the implementation of arms control treaties observed in April 1992, in contrast to nuclear weapons,

...conventional weapons ...are currently being used widely on CIS territory in military conflicts in which people are dying. Meeting the requirements of the CFE Treaty is a multifaceted task whose distinctive peculiarities are a large number of monitored sites, a considerable range of categories and types of weapons, intense inspection activity, and an unprecedented military equipment reduction volume.³⁶⁵

During the initial period of the implementation of the CFE Treaty, the forty-month reduction period of 1992-1995, the Russians were also coping with a “complex” economic situation,

³⁶³ “Russia: Clinton Yeltsin Discuss Disarmament, CFE Treaty,” *Interfax* in English, 21 April 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-078, 22 April 1996, 26.

³⁶⁴ Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: “Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin on CTBT, Chechnya, Economics, CFE and Russian Election,” 7 May 1996, National Security Archive, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4950566-Document-07-Memorandum-of-Telephone-Conversation>.

³⁶⁵ Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev, “Coming Out of Disarmament Orbit?” *KZ*, 28 April 1992, translated in JPRS-TAC-92-016, 18 May 1992, 25.

managing withdrawals of forces from the states of the former WTO and the Baltics, and beginning a process of military reform.³⁶⁶ During the first year of the implementation of the treaty, the Russians hosted inspections at ninety-nine military bases and fifty-five reduction sites, prepared and transmitted 500 and received and processed 2000 treaty-related notifications (e.g. on changes in levels of TLE in units, relocation of TLE, and changes in organizational structures of military formations), and reduced 4000 pieces of TLE in the ATTU area. According to the head of the Russian delegation to the JCG, the Russians had reduced 804 tanks, 2368 ACVs, 173 artillery pieces, 324 combat aircraft, and twenty-five attack helicopters in the ATTU region, as well as 446 tanks, 439 ACVs, and 219 artillery pieces “under obligations taken upon itself by Russia outside the framework of the treaty” (east of the Ural Mountains).³⁶⁷ The Russians’ challenge in carrying out their obligation to reduce TLE was twofold. First, the former USSR had established the facilities for reduction at sites where the TLE was located, which were in the MDs in what became Belarus and Ukraine, to reduce costs. When these countries became independent, the Russian armed forces had to establish new reduction sites.³⁶⁸ Second, the cost of destroying heavy armaments was high, for example 800,000 rubles for a single tank.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁶ The IISS observed in 1993, “The Russian Army has made more progress in disbanding formations and units than in eliminating TLE as required by the CFE Treaty.” IISS, *The Military Balance 1993-1994* (London: Brassey’s, 1993), 96.

³⁶⁷ Aleksandr Kuzmin, “Reductions Under Treaty Detailed,” *ITAR-TASS World Service*, 17 November 1993, translated in FBIS-SOV-93-221, 18 November 1993, 3.

³⁶⁸ This assertion by a senior Russian officer with responsibilities for the implementation of the CFE Treaty (see following footnote) indicates that Russia and their former Soviet partners did not implement the provision of the Tashkent Agreement of 15 May 1992 (Article 4, paragraph 2) by which Russia and the other states of the former USSR would “jointly utilize reduction sites” to optimize the reduction process and decrease reduction costs. “Agreement on the Principles and Procedures for Implementing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe” in the “Tashkent Document,” 15 May 1992, SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*, 673.

³⁶⁹ Lieutenant General Vladimir Zhurbenko, “CFE Treaty: One Year On. Commitments Being Met but Problems Remain,” *KZ*, 16 November 1993, translated as “Understanding Sought on CFE ‘Flank’ Limits,” FBIS-SOV-93-220, 17 November 1993, 11-12. The cost for the reduction of a tank was approximately .01% of Russia’s defense budget (estimated) of 7.7 billion rubles. For estimates of Russia’s defense budget, see SIPRI, “Military expenditure

The other major challenge Russia faced in the initial period of the implementation of the CFE Treaty was the destruction of the large amount of TLE the Soviet armed forces had moved east of the Ural Mountains in the months leading up to the signing of the treaty in 1990.³⁷⁰ The Soviets had pledged in June 1991 to destroy 14,500 pieces of this TLE (6000 tanks, 1500 ACVs, 7000 artillery) by the end of December 1995. With the demise of the USSR, Russia had to negotiate the division of this reduction obligation with other successor states to the USSR. As with much of the process of dividing up the former Soviet armed forces and related treaty obligations, this proved difficult. At a meeting of the CIS Joint Consultative Commission on 2 September 1993, the defense ministers of Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan reached agreement on each country's share of the reduction liability. At the time, Grachev commented that funding remained an obstacle to fulfilling this obligation.³⁷¹ Although, by their own account, they had destroyed 8300 heavy armaments by early 1995, the Russians proved unable to fulfill their commitment to destroy TLE east of the Urals.³⁷²

by country, in local currency, 1988-2018," <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988-2018%20in%20local%20currency%20%28pdf%29.pdf>. On the impact of the "poor material base" on Russia's ability to meet its reduction obligations, see the interview with the head of the center responsible for the implementation of the treaty in Aleksandr Ostrovskiy, "Fulfillment of Treaty Hampered," Ostankino Television First Channel Network, 17 November 1993, translated in FBIS-SOV-93-221, 18 November 1993, 3.

³⁷⁰ To complicate matters, the Russians also had difficulty accounting for all the TLE that would have to be reduced. With the breakup of the USSR, the data the Soviets had submitted did not correspond to the reality the Russians faced. Manki Ponomarev, "State Security Is Our Priority," *KZ*, 6 November 1992, translated as "Defense Ministry Treaty Directorate Chief Interviewed," JPRS-TAC-92-034, 27 November 1992, 12.

³⁷¹ Zdzislaw Lachowski, "Conventional Arms Control and Security Co-operation in Europe," SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 569; Andrey Narishkin, "Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan Discuss Arms Cuts," ITAR-TASS in English, 2 September 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-170, 3 September 1993, 2.

³⁷² "Dogovor ob OBSE: Novye realii trebuyut novykh podkhodov."

According to an official from the MFA, the problem was one of a lack of resources. Although Russia intended to meet the treaty's reduction schedule, the implementation of the treaty was "straining its struggling economy."³⁷³ An officer estimated in 1991 that the costs of inspections under the CFE Treaty (along with the START agreement) would "greatly exceed the sums for destruction of weapons and may be reckoned, due to hyperinflation, in the billions of rubles." Nonetheless, "the trust among the states taking part in the disarmament process" would be worth more than this cost.³⁷⁴ By November 1992, two years after the signing of the CFE Treaty, the Russians began to question some economic aspects of its implementation and pursue "such changes in the procedures for reducing arms as would allow the sides to carry out their obligations within the established time frame without attracting additional financial funds."³⁷⁵ Starting with the session of the JCG that began in January 1993, Russia, joined by Romania and Ukraine, lobbied for such relief. Russia argued, for instance, that partially disabling a tank's drive system or cutting part way through a gun barrel or turret ring was as effective as fully doing so in order to render the vehicle irreversibly reduced.³⁷⁶ In early 1994, Russia proposed that a treaty support fund be established to assist states to meet the costs of their CFE Treaty obligations.³⁷⁷

³⁷³ Vladislav Chernov, "View from Russia: The Expansion of NATO and the Future of the CFE Treaty," *Comparative Strategy* 14, No. 1 (1995): 87.

³⁷⁴ Lt Col P. Vladimirov, "The Inspector Is Coming to You," *Pravitelstvenniy Vestnik* 33 (August 1991), translated as "Modalities, Costs of Inspection Trips," JPRS-TAC-91-029, 11 December 1991, 20.

³⁷⁵ Anatoliy Karigin, "Not in Step with Moscow: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Implemented, But Problems Remain," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 24 November 1992, translated as "Problems Seen in CFE Implementation," JPRS-TAC-92-037, 30 December 1992, 46. The JCG addressed some of these problems in decisions it took from 1993 to 1995 to relax the standards for the destruction of certain types of TLE. See page 136 and footnote 311 above.

³⁷⁶ Lachowski, "Conventional Arms Control and Security Co-operation in Europe," *SIPRI Yearbook 1994*, 568.

³⁷⁷ Zdzislaw Lachowski, "Conventional Arms Control and Security Co-operation in Europe," SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 767.

Although the Russians had met their overall requirement for reduction of TLE in the ATTU area at the end of the forty-month reduction period (as shown in Table 4.2. Russian Holdings and Reduction Liability), they candidly admitted in January 1996 that they had failed to meet the commitment they had made “outside the framework of the treaty” on 14 June 1991 to reduce TLE east of the Ural Mountains. They had destroyed 1264 (of 6000) tanks, 685 (of 1500) ACVs, and 3453 (of 7000) artillery pieces. Colonel General Dmitriy Kharchenko of the Russian General Staff attributed the shortfalls to a lack of facilities in the area for the destruction of heavy armaments and financial constraints on the ability of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan (where much of the TLE had landed after its journey past the Ural Mountains) to help meet the commitment made by the USSR in June 1991.³⁷⁸

Table 4.1. Russian Holdings and Reduction Liability

	Tanks	Armored Combat Vehicles	Artillery	Combat Aircraft	Attack Helicopters
Ceiling (MLH)*	6400	11,480	6415	3450	890
In Active Units	4975	10,525	5105	N/A**	N/A
In Storage	1425	955	1310	N/A	N/A
Holdings					
At Signing (Nov 1991)	10,333	16,589	7719	4161	1035
At Entry into Force (EIF) (Jul 1992)	9338	19,399	8326	4624	1005
Reduction Liability (Holdings at EIF minus Ceiling (MLH))	2938	7919	1911	1174	115
Holdings At end of 40-month reduction period (Nov 1995)	5492	10,372	5680	2986	826

All figures are for the ATTU area, so do not include additional reduction liabilities for TLE moved east of the Ural Mountains and outside the AOA of the CFE Treaty.

* MLH = Maximum Level of Holdings (CFE Treaty, Article VII), as notified by the USSR at treaty signing and modified in the Tashkent Agreement of 15 May 1992.

** Sublimits for TLE in active units and permanent designated storage sites do not apply to combat aircraft and attack helicopters (CFE Treaty, Article IV).

³⁷⁸ “General Kharchenko on Failure to Scrap Military Hardware,” *Interfax* in English, 1630 GMT 1 January 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-001, 2 January 1996, 10. Russia had also rejected a suggestion from western experts to reduce the tanks by filling them with concrete, because they wanted to be able to use the scrap metal.

Source: Chart prepared by the author using data from Dorn Crawford, *Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2010).

The causes of Moscow's inability to satisfy their obligations under the CFE Treaty in the flank region and east of the Ural Mountains were primarily internal to the Russian Federation, such as unrest in the North Caucasus, the need to relocate forces withdrawn from Eastern Europe, and fiscal costs. Two exogenous issues in the post-Soviet security environment – the enlargement of NATO and the status of the Baltic states – also led the Russians to challenge the CFE Treaty's value to Russia's security interests.

NATO Enlargement

Moscow's position on the linkage between the enlargement of NATO and the CFE Treaty evolved over time from warning about the fate of the treaty to forestall potential enlargement to striving to adapt the treaty to mitigate the consequences of enlargement. As early as 1993, the Russians asserted a nexus between the two phenomena. In a report released in November 1993 (see pages 118-119 and footnotes 263-264, this dissertation), the SVR warned, "a change in NATO membership is bound to undermine a number of the alliance's international commitments...in particular the [CFE Treaty]." NATO's expansion by the addition of countries of the former WTO would upset the limits on conventional armaments, which "in particular on the flanks, would be called into question."³⁷⁹ Mechanisms like the CFE Treaty that supported

³⁷⁹ "Prospects for NATO Expansion and Russian Interests. Foreign Intelligence Service Report."

European security would lose their effectiveness or be completely undermined by NATO's expansion. Therefore, the treaty needed not just a correction, but a wholesale adaptation.³⁸⁰

The heart of the matter was one of a balance of forces and means, which had been upset by the collapse of the WTO and the USSR. On one side of the balance was NATO and on the other side a "rather diverse group of independent states." To upset the balance, for example through the entry of new members into NATO and the alliance's expansion closer to Russia's borders, would lead to dire consequences - the treaty would be "destroyed" and the treaty's limits rendered "meaningless." In short, "NATO expansion to the east would destroy every component of the treaty's integrity." Even concessions by NATO on the flank issue, so dear to Moscow's heart, could not save the CFE Treaty in such a situation.³⁸¹ The Russian State Duma issued its own appeal in late 1996 in which it asserted that the expansion of NATO would create a situation akin to that of the 1980's when the USSR and the U.S. deployed intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The Duma further suggested that with the entry "of just one state of Central or Eastern Europe" into NATO, the alliance's limits on heavy armaments would be "significantly

³⁸⁰ Antonov and Ayumov, *Kontrol' nad obychnymi vooruzheniyami v evrope*, 22. On the eve of the NATO Summit in Brussels in January 1994, a senior military officer suggested darkly, although nonspecifically, that NATO expansion might "undermine the established legal treaty system on our continent – above all the [CFE Treaty]." Lieutenant General Dmitry Kharchenko, "On Eve of Event – What to Expect from the Meeting in Brussels," *KZ*, 5 January 1994, translated as "NACC Seen as Alternative to Expanded, Reformed NATO," FBIS-SOV-94-004, 6 January 1994, 15.

³⁸¹ Vladislav Chernov, "View from Russia: The Expansion of NATO and the Future of the CFE Treaty:" 87-89. Army General Makhmut Gareyev, one of the General Staff's most respected thinkers, argued that the entry of former WTO states into NATO would "aggravate the imbalance which has formed between Russia and the West" and would "ruin the ratio of power and proportion of military equipment" established by the treaty. This action would be especially egregious because "It is well known that the USSR, having given its approval to the reuniting of the Germany's and of the withdrawal of its troops from Central Europe, received assurance from the leading NATO countries that they would not use that step to change the strategic military balance in Europe in their favor." Makhmut Gareyev, "The Expansion of NATO Does not Solve, But Aggravates Security Issues," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 42, No. 3 (1996): 141. Russian analyst Sergey Kortunov, writing in 1996, echoed Chernov's dire warning about NATO enlargement and the fate of the CFE Treaty: "The ceremonial procedure for accepting new members into [NATO] may simultaneously become a funeral repast for the treaty." Sergey Kortunov, "Disarmament and National Goals," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 42, No.4 (1996): 80.

exceeded” and the CFE Treaty “as an international-legal guarantee of limitation of armaments and arms control [would] be broken.”³⁸² While exaggerated in its characterization of the impact of the enlargement of NATO, the Duma’s statement exemplified the linkages the various elements of the Russian government were making to stake out positions in opposition to the process.

The Baltic States

The status of the Baltic states represented everything that was wrong, from the Russian perspective, with the European security environment in the 1990s: disintegration of the USSR, withdrawal of Russian armed forces, mistreatment of ethnic Russians, enlargement of NATO, and inadequacy of the CFE Treaty in its current form.

Even before the end of the USSR, negotiations had begun with the newly independent Baltic states for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from their territories. In late 1991, facing demands that Soviet troops be withdrawn sooner rather than later, the leadership of the MOD projected that the withdrawals would not be completed until 1994 and would be conditioned on the conclusion of formal treaties with the governments of the Baltic states and the resolution of “social problems connected with military resettlement.”³⁸³ Given the JCG’s decision in October 1991 to exclude the territory of the Baltic states from the AOA of the CFE Treaty, but still require that Soviet (and then Russian) conventional forces that remained there be subject to the

³⁸² “V Federal’nom Sobranii RF – Obrashcheniya Gosudarstvennoy Dumy v svyazi s planami rashireniya NATO,” 26 October 1996, *DV* No. 12, December 1996: 28.

³⁸³ “Baltics Withdrawal Not Before 1994,” Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian, 24 October 1991, translated in JPRS-TAC-91-028, 5 December 1991, 34. On the Baltic states’ demands, see “Lithuania Demands ‘Immediate Withdrawal,’” Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian, 31 October 1991, translated in JPRS-TAC-91-027, 22 November 1991, 26; “Withdrawal from Estonia to Begin 3 November,” *TASS* in English, 1 November 1991, JPRS-TAC-91-027, 22 November 1991, 27.

information and inspection provisions of the treaty, the Soviet MOD had identified in late 1991 the need to develop with the Baltic states modalities for the conduct of inspections of those forces.³⁸⁴

The formal process for the withdrawal of Russian forces (which had been redesignated as the Northwestern Group of Forces and the Baltic Fleet) from the Baltic states began in January 1992 when Yeltsin placed the forces under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and specified that their operation would be financed from Moscow's budget. He directed that Russia embark on talks with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia "on questions on determining the status and arrangements for the withdrawal of troops and fleet forces from the territory of the aforementioned states."³⁸⁵ Shortly after Yeltsin issued the decree, his lead negotiator in talks with the Baltic states stated that, although no timetable had been set and complicated negotiations lay ahead, the process of withdrawing former Soviet troops was "under control."³⁸⁶ While the process might have been "under control," the negotiations turned out to be predictably challenging. For example, by mid-April 1992, negotiations between Moscow and Tallinn were just beginning and talks with Riga had not even started. The withdrawal of Russian troops became intertwined with the protection of ethnic Russians in the three states and the Baltic states' view (particularly in Latvia) that the former Soviet forces had illegally occupied their

³⁸⁴ "Implementation of Disarmament Treaties Viewed," Radio Moscow World Service in English, 7 November 1991, JPRS-TAC-91-029, 11 December 1991, 20.

³⁸⁵ "Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the Transfer of the Northwestern Group of Forces and the Baltic Fleet to the Jurisdiction of the Russian Federation," 27 January 1992, *RG*, 1 February 1992, translated as "Russia to Negotiate with Baltics on CIS Forces Withdrawal – Russian Decree on Forces Jurisdiction," JPRS-TAC-92-007, 3 March 1992, 25. Yeltsin also appointed the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Valeriy Mironov, as the "authorized representative of the Russian Federation" on this matter.

³⁸⁶ "Russia to Negotiate with Baltics on CIS Forces Withdrawal – Withdrawal Now 'Under Control,'" TASS International Service, translated in JPRS-TAC-92-007, 3 March 1992, 26.

territories since 1940. While the Baltic states' governments sought a rapid departure of the Russian forces, the Russian side favored a gradual withdrawal over several years, "given its socioeconomic problems."³⁸⁷ In May 1992, following a meeting of the Russian Security Council, Defense Minister Grachev told the press that the pace of the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic states would be conditioned on the result of negotiations with the affected states and on the completion of the withdrawal of former Soviet forces from Poland and Germany, i.e. beyond 1994, with forty percent leaving the Baltic states from 1992 to 1994 and the remaining sixty percent sometime after 1994. That same month, the Russian Federation's rights and obligations under the CFE Treaty vis-à-vis their forces stationed in those five countries "and subject to withdrawal to the territory of the Russian Federation" were codified in the Tashkent Agreement.³⁸⁸

The negotiations between Moscow and the governments of the Baltic states proved to be so difficult that Foreign Minister Kozyrev intervened. In a meeting with his Baltic counterparts on 6 August 1992, he set out the conditions for an "accelerated" withdrawal by 1994. A key condition was to determine a legal status for Russian forces in the Baltic republics during the period of the withdrawal. Although not specifically mentioned, a reasonable assumption would be that an aspect of this legal status would have been the means to facilitate inspections of the

³⁸⁷ See, for example, Peter Martos, "Latvia's Problems with the Soviet Heritage," Vienna *Die Presse*, 16 April 1992, translated as "Further on Latvian-Russian Troop Withdrawal Talks – Foreign Minister Hits Russian Stance," JPRS-TAC-92-015, 8 May 1992, 20; "Estonian-Russian Talks on Troop Withdrawal Start – Differences Noted," Moscow BALTFAX in English, 14 April 1992, JPRS-TAC-92-015, 8 May 1992, 21. According to "sources close to the Estonian delegation... the Russian delegation [had] not displayed particular interest in rapid negotiations."

³⁸⁸ "Agreement on the Principles and Procedures for Implementing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe" in the "Tashkent Document," 15 May 1992, SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*, 672.

Russians forces under the CFE Treaty, as prescribed in the statement of the JCG of October 1991.³⁸⁹

After agreeing to a protocol with Lithuania in September 1992 whereby forces would be removed by 31 August 1993, the following month Yeltsin suspended the relocation of forces from the Baltic states until formal agreements were signed with all three and the welfare of Russian soldiers and their families could be guaranteed.³⁹⁰ The official in charge of implementing Yeltsin's decree, First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeiko, linked the withdrawal of forces from the Baltic states to the correlation of forces between Russia and NATO:

...the Russian forces stationed in the Baltic states are part of the armed forces of the former Soviet Union, and their withdrawal will change the military and political situation in the world as a whole, changing the balance of power between military alliances, the location of bases, and so on. If we pull our forces from the Baltics, NATO countries should withdraw their forces from other regions in order not to ruin the military and political parity.³⁹¹

³⁸⁹ A. Budris, I. Porshnev, and others, "Diplomatic Panorama," *Interfax* in English, 6 August 1992, "Kozyrev Gives Conditions for Withdrawal," JPRS-TAC-92-025, 17 August 1992, 46.

³⁹⁰ Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy and Vladimir Shishlin, "Presidential Bulletin," *Interfax* in English, 30 October 1992, "Yeltsin Orders Suspension of Baltic Troop Withdrawal – Text of Decree," JPRS-TAC-92-033, 14 November 1992, 25; "Yeltsin Orders Suspension of Baltic Troop Withdrawal – Pullout to Resume When Agreements Are Signed," JPRS-TAC-92-033, 14 November 1992, 25. Yeltsin's decree reflected the influence of the military leadership at the time, given that a week earlier, Defense Minister Grachev had declared, "If the discrimination against the Russian-speaking population in Latvia and Estonia continues, Russian troops will stay in those countries as long as it takes to solve the problem." Gennadiy Charodeyev and Konstantin Eggert, "Pavel Grachev Blackmailing Riga and Tallinn on His Own Initiative, Russian Diplomats Claim," 7.

³⁹¹ Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy and Vladimir Shishlin, "Presidential Bulletin," *Interfax* in English, 18 November 1992, "Deputy Premier Shumeiko on Problems of Troop Withdrawal from Baltics," JPRS-TAC-92-035, 5 December 1992, 16.

A final sensitive point in Russia's relations with the Baltic states that had implications for the CFE Treaty was the status of the Kaliningrad *oblast*. This region was the rump of the former Soviet Baltic MD, and as such lay outside the flank zone and its associated sublimits on TLE. Polish President Walesa raised concerns in the first half of 1994 about the size of the Russian armed forces in the region. The Lithuanian authorities shared Walesa's concerns, especially after Grachev, while visiting the Kaliningrad *oblast* in March, announced his intention to establish a "special defense region" there. The Russian Defense Ministry asserted that under the CFE Treaty, the Russian armed forces could station "3800 tanks and one-third of all its Armed Forces" in the region, and therefore, because the forces there had not come close to approaching these limits, the "militarization" that the Poles and Lithuania's had alleged was not occurring.³⁹² The Russians also dismissed calls by regional parliamentarians for the demilitarization of the Kaliningrad *oblast*.³⁹³ Notwithstanding these statements about the Kaliningrad *oblast*, in late 1994 Grachev told his Danish counterpart that if Russia could gain some relief from the flank limits, then it could reduce the "powerful contingent" of Russian forces in Kaliningrad by redeploying forces from there to the Leningrad and North Caucasus MDs.³⁹⁴

³⁹² Boris Vinogradov, "Pavel Grachev Creating Special Region in Kaliningrad. Lech Walesa Alarmed," *Izvestiya*, 9 April 1994, translated as "Ministry Cites CFE Treaty on Kaliningrad Troops," FBIS-SOV-94-070, 12 April 1994, 17. How the Russian Defense Ministry made their calculations of the forces they could place in the Kaliningrad *oblast* within the limits of the CFE Treaty is not apparent.

³⁹³ Boris Krivoshey and Aleksandr Krylovich, "Lithuanian Statements on Kaliningrad 'Unfriendly,'" *ITAR-TASS* World Service, 6 January 1994, translated in FBIS-SOV-94-005, 7 January 1994, 3; Anatoliy Mikhaylov, "When A Sense of Reality Is Lost. A 'Problem for All of Europe' Is Being Invented in the Baltic," *KZ*, 17 November 1994, translated as "More on Foreign Ministry Statement on Baltics' Resolution," FBIS-SOV-94-223, 18 November 1994, 12.

³⁹⁴ "Comments on Security in Baltics," *Interfax* in English, 1223 GMT 11 September 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-176, 12 September 1994, 11.

By the end of the forty-month reduction period set by the CFE Treaty, a series of problems with Russia's implementation of it remained unresolved. Although Moscow had been pressuring its treaty partners from 1993 to fix the problems with the CFE Treaty by November 1995, they achieved only limited progress. All roads, it seemed, were leading to the next major event in the life of the CFE Treaty, the first review conference, scheduled for forty-six months after the EIF of the treaty.

The First CFE Review Conference (May 1996)

The First REVCON signaled the end of the correction of the treaty and the beginning of its adaptation. The main purpose of the conference, which took place in Vienna 15-31 May 1996, was to examine the implementation of the treaty's provisions for limitation and reduction of TLE, as well as verification and exchange of information.³⁹⁵ In practice, the REVCON provided a forum to address some of the Russians' concerns and to set in motion the process of negotiation that would eventually lead to the signing of the agreement on adaptation of the CFE Treaty three and a half years later.

In the months leading up to the REVCON, Moscow shared their expectations for the completion of the correction of the CFE Treaty and its adaptation to the security situation in Europe. The limits in the flank zone figured prominently, because "some objective reasons, including developments in Chechnya, prevented Russia from fulfillment of its obligations in the flank region." While "the search for compromise [was] uneasy," Moscow hoped for a resolution

³⁹⁵ CFE Treaty Text, Article XXI; U.S. Department of State, "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Review Conference 1996," 8 May 1996, <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/factsheets/conwpm/cfecon96.html>.

of this issue before the conference. The goal of the adaptation of the CFE Treaty was to “upgrade the treaty and keep it at the core of a future collective security system in Europe” by, for example, opening it up to accession by other European states.³⁹⁶ One Russian commentator, drawing on information from contacts in Germany, anticipated that the REVCON would focus on “the state of the Soviet military legacy,” in particular the status of TLE that had been moved east of the Ural Mountains (which Moscow was claiming had not survived “Siberia’s grim climate” and could no longer function). One topic that would likely not come up was the enlargement of NATO, which the Germans, at least, did not see as “related to the verification of the CFE treaty,” the subject of the conference.³⁹⁷

The Russian delegation at the REVCON declared from the outset Moscow’s desire for “certain adjustment and renewal” of the CFE Treaty, in particular the provision regarding the flank zone.³⁹⁸ Russia’s proposals, according to MFA spokesman Grigoriy Karasin, enjoyed support, especially from countries that had been part of the USSR. Nonetheless, the Russian proposals on the destruction of TLE east of the Ural Mountains encountered resistance, leading Karasin to question whether all the participants in the review conference shared “Moscow’s

³⁹⁶ “Diplomatic Panorama,” *Interfax* in English, 16 February 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-034, 20 February 1994, 22. Sergey Kislyak, then the director of the MFA’s department for security and disarmament, made a plea to an audience in Germany on 20 May 1996 for solutions to the flank area issue that would provide for the necessary forces in the region and “promote the stability” of the CFE Treaty. Gennadiy Temnenkov, “Russia: Official Confirms Russia’s Adherence to Weapons Treaties,” *ITAR-TASS* in English, 20 May 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-099, 21 May 1996, 17.

³⁹⁷ Yevgeniy Bovkun, “The West Suspects That Russia Is Hiding Unlisted Tanks in Siberia,” *Izvestiya*, 17 May 1996, translated as “West Will Insist on CFE Flank, Trans-Ural Inspections,” FBIS-SOV-96-098, 20 May 1996, 17. Bovkun sardonically observed, “The experts in Vienna will insist that Russia present these ‘rusty’ and ‘unserviceable’ armaments [east of the Urals] to the Western observers. Lest some arms dump chief should try to ship out some of his stock as ‘scrap metal.’”

³⁹⁸ Aleksandr Kuzmin, “Russia: Russia Seeks Amendments to CFE Treaty at Vienna Conference,” *ITAR-TASS* in English, FBIS-SOV-96-101, 23 May 1996, 14.

intention to see the conference succeed and strengthen the restrictions regarding conventional arms in Europe.”³⁹⁹

“The Final Document of the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act on the Negotiation on Personnel Strength,” which representatives adopted at the end of the final plenary session of the REVCON on 31 May 1996, resolved Russia’s key issues with the treaty and its implementation, albeit only temporarily, and highlighted areas where Russia’s interests would clash with those of its neighbors in the near abroad. The Russians gained temporary relief from meeting the flank limitations set out in Article V of the CFE Treaty and flexibility in meeting obligations the USSR had assumed in June 1991 to reduce TLE east of the Ural Mountains. The “Document Agreed Among the States Parties to The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces In Europe of November 19, 1990” (Annex A to the Final Document), the so-called “flank agreement,” allowed Russia to exceed its original limitations on TLE in the flank zone (as per the original CFE Treaty and the Tashkent Agreement) by ninety-seven tanks, twenty-two artillery pieces, and 697 ACVs until 31 December 1999, at which time the holdings would have to conform to the original limitations. As depicted in Figure 4.3. The Revised Flank Zone, 1996, the flank agreement also reduced the size of the flank zone on Russian territory by relocating the Pskov *oblast* (in the northern flank area), the Volgograd and Astrakhan *oblasts*, part of the Rostov *oblast*, and a corridor in the Krasnodar *kray* leading to the city of Kushchevskaya, the site of a major repair facility for armored vehicles (in the southern flank area) to the area covered by Article IV, paragraph 2 of

³⁹⁹ “Russia: Moscow Wants CFE Treaty Adapted to New Political Reality,” *Interfax* in English, 21 May 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-100, 22 May 1996, 17.

the CFE Treaty, which encompasses the entire AOA for the treaty, less the flank zone (see Appendix D, The Flank Agreement).

Revised CFE Flank Zone with Current and Adapted Treaty Limits



Figure 4.3. The Revised Flank Zone, 1996

Source: United Kingdom Parliament, House of Commons, Select Committee on Defense, Joint Memorandum Submitted by the Ministry of Defense and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 14

April 2003, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmdfence/321/3022702.htm>.

The agreement also recognized Russia's right to use temporary deployments of forces "within its territory and outside its territory," the latter achieved "by means of full negotiations and with full respect for the sovereignty of the States Parties involved." Russia also had the right to use reallocations of quotas of tanks, artillery and ACVs of neighboring countries in the flank zone (Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) to alleviate its problem with flank limits, again "by means of free negotiations and respect for the sovereignty of the States Parties involved." The price for these flexibilities was more frequent notifications to other treaty states on holdings of TLE in the flank zone and additional inspections (at the expense of the inspecting parties, not Russia) of OOVs in the areas that were removed from the flank zone.⁴⁰⁰

The second major challenge for Russia's implementation of the CFE Treaty that was ameliorated at the REVCON was the destruction of TLE east of the Urals. In May 1996, seven months after the end of the reduction period, the Russian Federation still had not met its reduction obligations, to include those it had assumed on 14 June 1991 with respect to TLE east of the Urals. In a "Statement of the Representative of the Russia Federation" (Annex E to the Final Document), Russia committed itself to meet the destruction requirement using flexibilities agreed by other treaty parties, that is, methods that did not meet the destruction requirements set out in the CFE Treaty and the Protocol on Reduction. The allowable means of destruction

⁴⁰⁰ Annex A, "Document Agreed Among the States Parties to The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990," "CFE Treaty Review Conference, Vienna 1996, CFE-TRC/JOURNAL No. 11, "Fourth Plenary Meeting," 31 May 1996, 6-9. Resolution of this "fundamental issue" opened the door for the REVCON to tackle other issues with the implementation of the treaty. Crawford, *Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements*, 12. See also Anin and Ayumov, "DOVSE – Vchera...Segodnya... Zavtra?...stat'ya pervaya:" 70.

included exposure of tanks and ACVs to the elements, with hatches and engine covers opened, transfers of TLE to other parties to the treaty, and documentary evidence of reductions carried out before the REVCON. If the Russians proved unable to meet the quota for destruction of 6000 tanks, they could substitute up to 2300 ACVs (above the quota of 1500 ACVs to be reduced). Completion of this reduction would “depend on the duration of their operational and service life and the availability of financial resources.”⁴⁰¹ This agreement, to which the NATO states had been “forced” to agree, when combined with other decisions the JCG had taken from 1993-1995 to relax standards for the reduction of TLE, produced significant cost savings in the process of this reduction.⁴⁰² Based on information from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the agreement on reduction of TLE east of the Urals might have had its desired effect, because by 7 March 1997, the Russians had destroyed 2934 tanks, 2434 ACVs, and 4723 artillery pieces.⁴⁰³

The REVCON was not a complete victory for Russia. The flank agreement was only a stop-gap measure, given that Moscow wanted the elimination, not modification of the flank limits. The Russians used a unilateral statement the Russian representative attached to the journal of the closing plenary of the Review Conference to express doubt that the agreement would achieve its desired results: “Unless the flexibilities listed in the agreement on the flank issue are given effect by 31 May 1999, the Russian Federation reserves the right to use the other

⁴⁰¹ Annex E, “Statement of the Representative of the Russian Federation,” “CFE Treaty Review Conference, Vienna 1996, CFE-TRC/JOURNAL No. 11, “Fourth Plenary Meeting,” 31 May 1996, 15-16.

⁴⁰² Anin and Ayumov, “DOVSE – Vchera... Segodnya... Zavtra?... stat’ya pervaya:” 70.

⁴⁰³ UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Background Brief, “Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: An Implementation Update,” September 1997.

Treaty flexibilities discussed but not referred to in the above agreement.”⁴⁰⁴ The delegations of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia laid down markers about the presence of Russian forces on their territories that hinted at future problems. Ukraine made clear that the flexibilities afforded to Russia in the flank region “shall not extend to the territory of Ukraine, namely the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea, and Nikolayev, Zaporozhe and Kherson oblasts,” the areas where Russian forces were assigned to the Black Sea Fleet, whose ownership had not yet been hashed out by Moscow and Kyiv.⁴⁰⁵ The Georgian delegation expressed “very serious concerns” about the implementation of those aspects of the flank agreement that pertained to continued stationing of Russian forces and reallocation of TLE quotas, pointing out that any agreements “must be taken with full respect for the sovereignty of Georgia and for its Constitution.” The Moldovans noted that the “early entry into force” of an agreement they had signed with Russia on 21 October 1994 for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova would facilitate the implementation of the flank agreement and reminded the parties to the CFE treaty of Moldova’s neutral status, which prohibited the stationing of foreign troops and “even temporary deployment of conventional armaments belonging to other countries on [Moldova’s] territory.”⁴⁰⁶ Notwithstanding these potential problems, the main outcome of the REVCON, in the words of a Russian commentator, was that the CFE Treaty was preserved and “a scandal was avoided in

⁴⁰⁴ “Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” CFE Treaty Review Conference, Vienna 1996, CFE-TRC/JOURNAL No. 11, “Fourth Plenary Meeting,” 31 May 1996, 18.

⁴⁰⁵ “Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine at the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” “CFE Treaty Review Conference, Vienna 1996, CFE-TRC/JOURNAL No. 11, “Fourth Plenary Meeting,” 31 May 1996, 20. The Russian delegation responded that Ukraine’s statement would “in no way impede the implementation of the aforementioned Document.”

⁴⁰⁶ The statements are in “CFE Treaty Review Conference, Vienna 1996, CFE-TRC/JOURNAL No. 11, “Fourth Plenary Meeting,” 31 May 1996, pages 23 and 24, respectively.

connection with impossibilities for Russia to fulfill the conditions that were taken up by the former USSR in relation to flank limitations.”⁴⁰⁷

More importantly than saving the Russian Federation from scandals related to the implementation of the treaty, the First REVCON tasked the JCG to begin the process of “improving the operation of the Treaty in a changing environment.”⁴⁰⁸ Along with the “Scope and Parameters” for negotiations adopted by the parties to the CFE Treaty at the OSCE Lisbon Summit in December 1996 and the agreement in the JCG in February 1997 on the basic elements for an adapted CFE Treaty, this tasking set in motion the process that Moscow had been seeking to adapt the treaty to the changed security environment in Europe.

From Moscow’s perspective, both diplomatic and military, the First REVCON was a great success. The official statement from the MFA on the REVCON lauded the decision to begin the process of adapting the CFE Treaty (a result “of special importance”), as well as agreements on the flank region and the destruction of TLE east of the Urals.⁴⁰⁹ Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov took special note of the roles of Russia and the U.S. in resolving the flank problem: “The major result of the conference is the accord between Russia and the U.S. on further moves to implement the CFE treaty *with consideration for the two states’ influence and amounts of arms* [emphasis added],” an accord that “had been facilitated by the Moscow summit

⁴⁰⁷ Kortunov, “Disarmament and National Goals:” 77.

⁴⁰⁸ “Final Document of the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act on the Negotiation on Personnel Strength,” Vienna, 15-31 May 1996, www.osce.org/library/14099, 5.

⁴⁰⁹ “Konferentsiya po rassmotreniyu deystviya Dogovora ob OVSE,” *DV* No. 7, July 1996: 23. In a departure from previous practice, the press release did not refer to the flank limits as “so-called” limits, perhaps implicitly conveying the MFA’s satisfaction with the accord on the flanks.

of the Russian and American presidents.”⁴¹⁰ Russia had, therefore, been able to assert its role as a great power on par with the U.S. at the REVCON. Sergey Mostinskiy, a member of the Russian delegation to the conference, explained that Russia had avoided a “trap,” whereby Russia had been placed at a disadvantage by adhering to the CFE Treaty while facing the prospective enlargement of NATO, meeting unjust flank limits, and grappling with the status of the Black Sea Fleet. The Russians had been able to avoid the trap by making concessions – but not capitulating – and gaining agreement to begin the adaptation of the treaty, whose “modernized form...could serve as a basis for creating a new European security model for the 21st century.”⁴¹¹

The MOD and General Staff were as effusive in their praise as the MFA. Defense Minister Grachev was pleased with the flank agreement, which enabled Russia “to fully ensure its security” and showed that the NATO states acknowledged Russia’s position.⁴¹² The International Military Cooperation Department of the General Staff also praised the flank agreement, which “suit[ed] Russia’s national security interests,” remedied a “discriminatory situation,” and became “the initial step in the process to modernize the CFE Treaty.”⁴¹³ The

⁴¹⁰ Aleksandr Kuzmin, “Russia: Spokesman: Moscow Content with Results of CFE Conference,” *ITAR-TASS* in English, 31 May 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-107, 3 June 1996, 28.

⁴¹¹ Sergey Buneyev, “We Must Avoid a Trap, Russian Delegation At Vienna Conference to Examine Operation of CFE Treaty Believes,” *Trud* in Russian, 30 May 1996, translated as “CFE: Delegation Aide Explains ‘Tough Line’ on CFE,” FBIS-SOV-96-108, 4 June 1996, 21. A leading defense journalist also saw the results of the Review Conference as paving the way for “security guarantees for all European states without the need to join a military-political bloc.” Aleksandr Golts, “Observer’s Comments: NATO Evolution: Illusions and Reality,” *KZ*, 11 June 1996, translated as “Russia: NATO Expansion, Evolution Issues Examined,” FBIS-SOV-96-115, 13 June 1996, 24.

⁴¹² “Russia: Grachev Praises Vienna Conference on CFE Treaty,” *Interfax* in English, 9 June 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-112, 10 June 1996, 37. Not missing a beat during the Russian presidential election campaign, Grachev added: “[The] compromises on the part of West Europe with regard to Russia were hardly possible several years ago and would have been difficult without the democratic reforms implemented in our country under the incumbent president.”

⁴¹³ Anatoliy Yurkin, “Russia: CFE Members Extend Russia’s Term for Arms Destruction,” *ITAR-TASS* in English, 3 June 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-108, 4 June 1996, 21.

deputy chief the General Staff, Colonel General Kharchenko, offered the most detailed assessment of the REVCON in the Army's newspaper *Krasnaya zvezda*. The conference had been "a major international success for our country" whose accords would "strengthen the country's security and help us economically, albeit only a bit." He lauded the flank agreement and, like Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov, emphasized the bilateral negotiations with the U.S. that led to it. In describing the flexibilities at Russia's disposal in the flank region, however, Kharchenko omitted a key clause – the need for host-nation consent to these deployments and reallocations – that would continue to be a stumbling block for Russia's implementation of the CFE Treaty, especially in the Caucasus region. Finally, he described the favorable results of the REVCON as refutation of "the still current opinion that Russia is unable to effectively defend its interests in the international arena because of the difficulties of the transitional period."⁴¹⁴ In other words, Russia remained a great power.

In the wake of the First REVCON, and as the JCG began work on adapting the CFE Treaty, the Russians made use of flexibilities to reduce their holdings of TLE in the flank zone. Building on a preliminary agreement that had been reached in February 1996, the Russians and Georgians agreed to transfer some of Georgia's TLE allocation to Russia, thereby helping to bring Russian forces closer to compliance with the flank limits.⁴¹⁵ The Russians also "cascaded"

⁴¹⁴ Colonel-General Dmitriy Kharchenko, "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Now Accords with Russia's Interests," *KZ* 7 June 1996, translated as "Russia: CFE Compromise Seen as 'Major' Success," FBIS-SOV-96-112, 10 June 1996, 26-27. Like Grachev, Kharchenko offered a shout-out to President Yeltsin: "The success became reality because the country's president set a clear task." He also praised the "harmonious, coordinated work" of the MOD, General Staff, MFA and Foreign Intelligence Service in "elaborating and implementing the Russian position."

⁴¹⁵ "Russia: General Seeks Clarification of Troops' Status in Georgia," *Interfax* in English, 5 July 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-131, 8 July 1996, 25. At the time, the legal status of the Russian forces was still in doubt, because neither the Georgian parliament nor the Russian Duma had ratified an agreement signed in 1993 by the two countries' presidents. See also Vitaliy Denisov, "Georgia Has Transferred Its Part of the Quotas to Russia But Could Ask for Them Back at Any Moment," *KZ*, 10 February 1996, translated in FBIS-SOV-96-030, 13 February 1996, 23.

(transferred) heavy armaments to another country. The U.S. and other NATO countries had used this practice to pass older tanks, ACVs and artillery to allies like Turkey, Greece and Italy, thereby reducing their holdings of TLE. The Russians had criticized “the so-called ‘cascade’ principle” as an indicator of the inequality between states in alliances and those, like Russia, that were outside them.⁴¹⁶ Moscow later reassessed their position and, on 22 July, Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin turned over 100 T-72 tanks and 100 ACVs to the Bulgarian armed forces. Taken together with Bulgaria’s commitment to destroy a similar amount of older armored vehicles, this transfer contributed to both states’ compliance with the CFE Treaty’s flank limits (the entire territory of Bulgaria was located in the flank zone). In explaining the timing of the transfer of TLE to Bulgaria, a Russian journalist, quoting officials of the MOD, noted that the U.S. and Germany had already carried out this type of “philanthropy” with certain partners. “It is obvious that partners are chosen according to the principle of ‘helping a friend.’ In this regard, Russia [was] lagging somewhat behind the West and took a long time to choose its friends.”⁴¹⁷

The Russians continued to seek further relaxation, if not outright elimination, of the flank limits. They also ascribed special importance to managing the enlargement of NATO and the related issue of the status of the Baltic states, all of whom by 1996 had expressed interest in acceding to the alliance. Moscow tried, with a modicum of success, to resolve these latter issues, which predated the First REVCON, during the adaptation negotiations.

⁴¹⁶ Sergey Buneyev, “We Must Avoid a Trap, Russian Delegation at Vienna Conference to Examine Operation of CFE Treaty Believes.”

⁴¹⁷ “Russia: Russian Defense Chief Delivers 100 New Tanks to Bulgaria,” *Interfax* in English, 22 July 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-142, 23 July 1996, 8; Boris Vinogradov, “Armored Gift to Slavs,” *Izvestiya*, 24 July 1996, translated in FBIS-SOV-96-144, 25 July 1996, 6; Russian Federation Defense Ministry Information Directorate, “Russian Combat Equipment for Bulgaria,” *KZ*, 24 July 1996, translated in FBIS-SOV-96-144, 25 July 1996, 6.

The Adaptation of the CFE Treaty

The decision by the First REVCON to begin the process of adapting the CFE Treaty to the extant politico-military situation in Europe was a significant achievement for the Russians. According to information from “local diplomatic circles” in Moscow, the negotiations would last at least a year and would not be easy. Russia would judge NATO’s seriousness in developing mutual relations “according to the readiness of the alliance to take into consideration Russian demands for changes to the CFE Treaty.”⁴¹⁸

Russia and the NATO states offered their initial proposals for the treaty’s adaptation in early 1997. The JCG was the forum for the negotiations, which began on 21 January. According to the MFA, Russia’s main goals were to:

- Set lower maximum levels of holdings of TLE for political-military alliances [i.e. NATO];
- Introduce limits on the stationing/deployment [*razmeshchenie*] of conventional armed forces on foreign territory;
- Guarantee the applicability of the CFE Treaty in crisis situations; and
- Include new categories of military equipment in the treaty.⁴¹⁹

The NATO allies tabled their initial proposal on 20 February. It included the replacement of the treaty’s bloc limits with national limits on armed forces as a way to reassure non-NATO parties to the treaty about enlargement of the alliance. According to the U.S. Mission to NATO, “...while NATO enlargement can proceed without Treaty adaptation, revisions will make it possible to integrate new members fully into the Alliance military structures. CFE adaptation

⁴¹⁸ “Nachalis’ peregovory po Dogovoru ob OBSE,” *KZ*, 23 January 1997, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3337096>. Foreign Minister Primakov made the same point about NATO’s relationship with Russia and its approach to the adaptation negotiations in “Evgeniy Primakov o vneshney politike Rossii v novom godu,” *KZ*, 10 January 1997, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3336691>.

⁴¹⁹ “Brifing 21 yanvarya – brifing provodil G.P. Tarasov: O DOVSE,” *DV* No. 2, February 1997: 71.

will also provide assurance to Russia and other states that NATO enlargement will not mean a destabilizing eastward shift in NATO's military capabilities.”

The MFA welcomed the proposal, with the caveat that it did not “fully address” Russia's concerns about NATO enlargement “and the contingency of NATO forward-deployed combat forces.”⁴²⁰ On 22 April, the Russians presented their counterproposal. Not surprisingly, it singled out NATO for limitations, for instance by “barring the permanent stationing of foreign [TLE] ‘in areas where they do not exist at present’” (that is, on the territory of prospective new members of NATO). The Russians quickly abandoned their effort to impose limitations on alliances, however, following the end of discussions between Foreign Minister Primakov and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.⁴²¹ Moscow understood that it would have to make some compromises in its effort to constrain NATO through the adaptation of the CFE Treaty

Regardless of some grim assessments from Russia sources of the deleterious, if not outright toxic, effect of NATO enlargement on the CFE Treaty, the two became intertwined during the period of the negotiations for the adaptation of the treaty. Throughout the first half of 1997, the locus of negotiations on the CFE Treaty, the enlargement of NATO, and NATO-Russia relations shifted from the JCG in Vienna to talks that led to the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in Paris on 27 May. Although the two negotiations moved in parallel, they touched at certain points, for example in a paper the chairman of the JCG's adaptation working group circulated on 23 May, which “sought consensus between proposals by NATO, Russia and the other states parties, *as well as the NATO-Russia discussions with respect to the Founding*

⁴²⁰ Sarah Walkling, “NATO Presents Initial Proposal for Adaptation of CFE Treaty,” *Arms Control Today*, March 1997, Vol. 27, No. 1, 24.

⁴²¹ Sarah Walkling, “Russian Proposal for CFE Adaptation Seeks New Limits on NATO Arms,” *Arms Control Today*, April 1997, Vol. 27, No. 2, 36. See also Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 175.

Act” [emphasis added].⁴²² In fact, according to two Russian analysts, the “basic intrigue” [*osnovnaya intriga*] of the adaptation negotiations was the interplay [*vzaimodeystviye*] of Russia with the NATO states. The first stage of the negotiations on CFE adaptation coincided with the development of the NATO-Russia Founding Act (which the Russians call the Russia-NATO Founding Act), and “From here the principle connection between the two agreements is evident – the adapted CFE Treaty strengthened the material guarantees of Russia’s security in the new conditions, expressed in framework form in paragraph IV of the Founding Act.”⁴²³ This portion of the Founding Act, which the Russians would repeatedly invoke throughout the life of the CFE Treaty, reads as follows:

NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly, it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks. In this context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event of defense against a threat of aggression and missions in support of peace consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE governing principles, as well as for exercises consistent with the adapted CFE Treaty, the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 and mutually

⁴²² Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 176.

⁴²³ Anin and Ayumov, “DOVSE – Vchera...Segodnya... Zavtra?...stat’ya pervaya:” 71. Anin and Ayumov seem to have lifted this text verbatim from an article penned nine years earlier by Moscow’s chief delegate to the JCG. See Vladislav Chernov, “Notes on the CFE Treaty,” 47. Although neither Antonov and Anin, nor Chernov, mention it, Russia, NATO and the CFE Treaty had already been intertwined in late 1991 and 1992. At the first meeting of the NACC in December 1991, the allies proposed the formation of a High-Level Working Group to work with the former states of the USSR with territory in the ATTU region toward achieving the ratification and entry into force of the treaty. Jane M.O. Sharp, “Conventional Arms Control in Europe,” in *SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament*, 594-596.

agreed transparency measures. Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.⁴²⁴

The same portion of the Founding Act also records mutual understandings between Russia and the NATO allies about the CFE Treaty and the negotiations for its adaptation, including a number of Russia's objectives in the negotiations: lowering of the amount of TLE in the treaty's AOA, equal security for all the treaty's states parties "irrespective of their membership of a politico-military alliance," enhanced verification and information exchange, and accession by other states. As a "first step" in the expeditious conclusion of an agreement, Russia, NATO allies and the other parties to the CFE Treaty would "seek to conclude as soon as possible a framework agreement setting forth the basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty."⁴²⁵

On 23 July 1997, after a period of intensified negotiations in Vienna that followed the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the JCG adopted a draft framework of the "basic elements" of an agreement on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty.⁴²⁶ A spokesman for the MFA deemed the document satisfactory for Russia, while offering the diplomatic bromide "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed." Nonetheless, some "complicated issues" remained to be resolved:

⁴²⁴ "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation" signed in Paris, France, 27 May 1997, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm? The alliance originally made this pledge on 14 March 1997.

⁴²⁵ "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation."

⁴²⁶ The initiative for the "Basic Elements" agreement came from the U.S. side during NATO's Madrid Summit as a way to demonstrate to the Russians "tangible movement" towards an agreement on CFE adaptation as new members were being invited into the alliance. Craig Dunkerley, oral history interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 15 March 2004, <https://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Dunkerley-Craig.pdf>. On the "intensified" negotiations, see also IISS, *The Military Balance 1997-1998* (London: Brassey's, 1997), 33.

- Agreement on how to define “substantial forces” as it pertains to their deployment on a permanent basis (stationing) by NATO states on the territory of “possible new members of the North Atlantic alliance;”
- “Adaptation” of the flank agreement (from the First REVCON); and
- A formulation to the effect that all CFE ceilings would be set to take account of declared voluntary reductions of armaments and would not violate the treaty’s fundamental balance.⁴²⁷

The MFA briefer’s first point about a definition of “substantial forces,” a term taken from the NATO-Russia Founding Act, raised the question of how the Russians viewed the connection – legal, political, or otherwise – between commitments made outside the CFE Treaty and the treaty itself. This issue would take center stage when Russia made commitments in November 1999 at the time of the signing of the adaptation agreement and the NATO allies subsequently refused to ratify the agreement pending Russia’s fulfillment of them. Moscow would emphatically reject a tie between the commitments and the CFE Treaty, whereas they made such a linkage between the pledge NATO made in the Founding Act, also outside the CFE Treaty, and the negotiations for an adapted treaty.

The MOD, like the MFA, endorsed the agreement on the draft framework of the basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty. An analysis published in *Krasnaya zvezda* in August 1997 noted the “appreciable impulse” the conclusion of the NATO-Russia Founding Act had given to the work of the JCG toward reaching the agreement. The MOD’s analysis also included an issue that was central to the military’s approach to the CFE Treaty, limitations on aviation. The Russians, “unlike our negotiating partners,” rejected the omission of combat aircraft and attack helicopters from the territorial limits on TLE that were proposed for the adapted CFE Treaty, because “in contemporary combat operations, aviation means play a significant role. Aviation

⁴²⁷ “Brifing 24 iyulya – brifing provodil G.P. Tarasov: O soglasovanii ‘Promezhutochnogo Dokumenta’ po adaptatsii DOVSE,” *DV* No. 8, August 1997: 76.

long ago stopped being only a means supplying and supporting land forces and is capable of independently completing tasks that determine the success of operations as a whole.”⁴²⁸ The MOD’s preoccupation with air power dated back to the beginning of the negotiations for the original CFE Treaty, and was based on study of the use of aviation by the U.S., especially during operation DESERT STORM against Iraq in 1991. Their long-standing frustration over the limited constraints on aircraft in the CFE Treaty would not be mitigated by the eventual agreement on the adaptation of the treaty.

A year after the adoption of the draft framework for the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, the armed forces came to frame the negotiations as a struggle by Russia against the challenge posed by NATO. Colonel Vyacheslav Proshkin, a member of the Russian delegation to the negotiations, described the key aspects of this struggle, in which NATO seemed to enjoy several advantages. Troublesome for Russia, for example, was the coordination of negotiating positions among the NATO allies, which seemed to “contradict the new character of relations in Europe and the concept of the new treaty, which should be without blocs.” Proshkin also echoed the MOD’s fetish with the omission from territorial limits of aviation, which could operate beyond one country and “substantially influence the situation in a much larger geographic area, having compensated for a lower concentration there, for example, of tanks and armored combat vehicles.” His concern over aviation proved prescient, given NATO’s use of air power (including naval aviation that remained outside the ambit of the CFE Treaty) in 1999 in response to the crisis in Kosovo. Another point of contention was the flank limits, which Proshkin compared to NATO’s quest for treaty flexibilities in Eastern and Central Europe. In his

⁴²⁸ Aleksandr Balashof, “Mnenie eksperta. Problemy modernizatsii Dogovora ob OBSE,” *KZ*, 15 August 1997, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3330988>.

assessment, the negotiations, whose discussions frequently went in a “vicious circle,” demonstrated that Russia’s partners were not yet ready to take Moscow’s considerations seriously in developing a new agreement.⁴²⁹

By late 1998, the enlargement of NATO had become a central point in the Russians’ approach toward the adaptation of the CFE Treaty. On 1 October, a briefer from the MFA explained that “it was important to find mutually acceptable solutions to the problems of adaptation before the accession of new members to NATO” (which would likely take place in the spring of 1999). The Russian delegation in Vienna had therefore been issued unspecified new instructions. His concluding comment summed up Moscow’s view of the interdependence between the two processes:

The timely adaptation of the [CFE Treaty] to new conditions will have a key significance for Russia’s relations with NATO. The Russian side proceeds from the fact that updating the CFE mechanism, taking into account new conditions, will facilitate the mitigation of the negative consequences for European security of the expansion of the North Atlantic alliance, and will become a practical confirmation of declarations that its military policy is not directed against Russia and other states in Eastern Europe.⁴³⁰

In early December 1998, the participating states of the OSCE and the NATO allies committed themselves to complete the negotiations for the adaptation of the CFE Treaty and to assuage Moscow’s concerns about NATO enlargement. The timing of these commitments affirmed the linkage between the adaptation of the CFE Treaty and the process of NATO

⁴²⁹ Vladimir Kuzar’, “Partnery poka ne gotovy,” *KZ*, 14 July 1998, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3341939>.

⁴³⁰ “Brifing 1 oktyabrya – Brifing provodil V.O. Rakhmanin: O DOVSE,” *DV* No. 11, November 1998: 69.

enlargement. At the OSCE Ministerial Meeting in Oslo, held 2-3 December, the parties to the CFE Treaty pledged to complete the negotiations by the OSCE Istanbul Summit scheduled for November 1999. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov repeated Russia's demand that the negotiations be completed by April 1999, when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were slated to join NATO.⁴³¹ It thus appeared that Moscow's call for the "timely" adaptation of the CFE Treaty by April 1999 would not be heeded.

Within a week of the completion of the OSCE ministerial meeting, on 8 December 1998, NATO reiterated its pledge from the NATO-Russia Founding Act to pursue collective defense through "ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." The allies also declared that temporary deployments in excess of limits on TLE, as envisioned in the proposals for the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, would not be used for permanent stationing of forces, would not be "routine," and would not be used against any specific country. Such pledges, however, did not address Russia's desiderata for firm limits in the treaty.⁴³² Nonetheless, at least from the perspective of NATO, the joint statement by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, "Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Restraint and Flexibility," was aimed explicitly at assisting the process "aimed at the resolution of key outstanding issues [in the negotiations on adaptation] and the start of

⁴³¹ "Parties Aim to Complete CFE by November 1999," *Arms Control Today* 28, No. 8, November/December 1998, 27. The commitment to complete negotiations by November 1999 is found in "Letter From The Chairman Of The Joint Consultative Group To The Minister Of Foreign Affairs Of Poland, Chairman Of The Seventh Ministerial Council Of The OSCE," in OSCE, *Seventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council*, MC.DOC/1/98, 3 December 1998, <https://www.osce.org/mc/40439?download=true>, 99.

⁴³² "Parties Aim to Complete CFE by November 1999," 27.

drafting work in the first months” of 1999.⁴³³ Nonetheless, the jury was still out as to whether the adapted treaty would “facilitate the mitigation of the negative consequences...of the expansion of the North Atlantic alliance.”

Such was the status of the adaptation of the CFE Treaty for Russia on the eve of the final year of negotiations. Two other significant developments in Russia and Europe in the latter half of 1998 also shaped the context within which the negotiations would proceed toward their conclusion in November 1999. Beginning in August 1998, Russia entered a period of acute economic distress as a result of the Asian financial crisis and its effect on a vulnerable Russian economy. At the same time, the conflict between the security forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo had also reached a critical stage. Thanks to Richard Holbrooke’s mediation between Slobodan Milosevic and the Kosovar Albanians, a cease-fire was reached and international monitors from the OSCE deployed to Kosovo, thereby averting, for a time, a potentially broader conflict. These two events, and the course of their development in 1999, bear consideration when examining why and how Russia chose to accept the agreement on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty. The following section of this chapter will examine this process.

Case Study: 1999

The year 1999 is chosen for a detailed examination because, first, it ended with agreement to update the CFE Treaty and, second, events that occurred during the year could have derailed the talks that produced the agreement. In line with Moscow’s vigorous opposition to

⁴³³ “Final Communiqué: Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels,” Press Release M-NAC-2 (98), 8 December 1998, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25942.htm?selectedLocale=en.

NATO's air operation against the FRY, which began in late March, the Russians could have either walked away from the negotiations or delayed them by digging in their heels and not compromising over provisions that might have placed more constraints on the alliance than the final agreement did. In tracing the process of the negotiations throughout 1999, the goal of this case study is to identify the factor(s) that induced or forced Moscow to reach the agreement on the CFE Treaty's adaptation, which is the de facto dependent variable. In so doing, the case study will also provide a basis for comparison with case studies in the next two chapters of the dissertation. The process trace will use proxies, because the decision-making process for foreign and security policy in the Russian government remains relatively opaque (lacking insights on the scale of the Vitaly Kataev papers the author drew on for Chapter 3 of this dissertation, for example). In this case, statements by Russian government officials and other accounts of what Moscow accepted in the CFE negotiations will serve as the proxies. Although, as one practitioner of process tracing observed, "proxies are a pain," they are often the only source of observations of the phenomena we choose to study.⁴³⁴

The Russian government began the year by reminding the international community of the importance of completing the negotiations for the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, especially given the impending accession of new members into NATO. A Russian representative made the case for the potentially destructive impact of NATO enlargement on the CFE Treaty, should an agreement on adaptation not be concluded, to the UN Conference on Disarmament on 6 January 1999:

...the expansion of the alliance will create a threat to the current CFE, which was founded on the principle of upholding equality of

⁴³⁴ Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Process Tracing," in Audrey Klotz and Deepa Prakash, eds., *Qualitative Methods in International Relations – A Pluralist Guide* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 122.

forces between the two groups of states parties. If the new members of NATO do not declare their membership of the group of countries which signed or acceded to the 1948 Treaty of Brussels or the 1949 Treaty of Washington, and if they are not included in that group's quota for arms and equipment, the entire system of equilibrium underlying the CFE will be destroyed, and its group-based machinery will be undermined. Because of the specific nature of the provisions of the instrument, Russia's right to conduct inspection activity on the territory of new NATO members on the same scale as on the territory of the other members of the alliance will be infringed. All this will call into question the future existence of the treaty.

He added, "if one group of countries deliberately violates a treaty, they will not be entitled to count on its scrupulous observance by other parties," and ended by putting the ball squarely in NATO's court.⁴³⁵ On the same day, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov implicitly acknowledged that the process of the adaptation of the CFE Treaty would not be completed before NATO accepted the first three new members, when he stated that they should be completed by the Istanbul OSCE Summit, scheduled for November 1999.⁴³⁶

By early February, the Russians were optimistic about progress in the negotiations, especially in light of "intensive consultations" that were taking place bilaterally and in

⁴³⁵ Vasily S. Sidorov, "Letter Dated 6 January 1999 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation Addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament Transmitting a Statement Made by a Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Concerning Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," CD/1560, 6 January 1999, www.unog.ch/disarm/curdoc/1560.htm. Russia's circulation of this statement to the CD, well outside the forum for the negotiation of the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, attests to the urgency for Russia of the timely completion of the negotiations as a means to manage the process of NATO enlargement. See also "Zayavlenie predstavatelya MID Rossii, 2 yanvarya," *DV* No. 2, February 1999: 48-49.

⁴³⁶ "Itogi goda – Press-Konferentsiya Ministra Innostrannykh del Rossiiskoy Federatsii I.S. Ivanova po itogam venshnepoliticheskogo 1998 goda," 22 January 1999, 4.

multilateral forums. The MFA was especially pleased with talks they had conducted in Ankara, given that Turkey's acquiescence would be required for any changes to the treaty's flank area. Ongoing consultations with NATO's High-Level Task Force (HLTF) in Brussels were also bearing fruit.⁴³⁷ On 9 March, three days before the entry of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO, Russia and the allies reported to the JCG that they had reached agreement on the basic issues in the adaptation negotiations and confirmed their readiness to join the other parties to the treaty to adopt the parameters of an adapted CFE Treaty. An agreement on adaptation would have to include, in particular, "agreed approaches to the problems of the flank limits and strengthening of stability in Central Europe." The Russians also "insisted" on the timely settlement of the issues associated with CFE adaptation, given the timeline for NATO enlargement and the need to gain domestic approval of the agreement.⁴³⁸

The official accession of the three new allies to NATO on 12 March and its impact on the CFE Treaty did not escape Moscow's notice. As they had done in 1998, the Russians explicitly linked the process of the adaptation of the CFE Treaty and the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Although NATO and Russia were making progress on CFE, "the fulfillment of the key provisions of the Russia-NATO Founding Act in relation to accounting for the security interests of the Russian Federation in changing military-political conditions" had to be guaranteed.⁴³⁹

NATO's air operation against the FRY in response to the crisis in Kosovo – or "NATO's aggression against the FRY," as the Russians called it – posed a potential threat to the adaptation

⁴³⁷ "Brifing 11 fevralya – Brifing provodil V.O. Rakhmanin – K voprosu adaptatsii DOVSE," *DV* No. 3, March 1999: 72.

⁴³⁸ "Brifing 10 marta – Brifing provodil V.O. Rakhmanin, Konsul'tatsii mezhdru Rossiey i NATO," *DV* No. 4, April 1999: 86.

⁴³⁹ "Zayavlenie predstavatelya MID Rossii – 12 marta," *DV* No. 4, April 1999: 71-72.

negotiations. Had they so chosen, the Russians could have used the operation as either an off-ramp from the negotiations or leverage to gain concessions from the NATO allies. Moscow reacted swiftly to the start of hostilities. President Yeltsin directed a series of actions to suspend or downgrade Russia's relationship with the alliance: recall of Russia's chief military representative to NATO, suspension of participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and in implementation of the Russia-NATO program under the Founding Act, and suspension of talks on the establishment of a NATO military mission in Moscow.⁴⁴⁰

The armed forces took a particularly dim view of NATO's action, which they linked to NATO's new strategic concept, the entry of new members into the alliance, and arms control agreements like the CFE Treaty. Defense Minister Sergeyev told his northern European counterparts that Russia had suspended cooperation with the alliance under the NATO-Russia Founding Act because NATO's "aggression" had violated the "main principles" of cooperation as set forth in the Act. The continuation of NATO's operation "could force Russia to reexamine" their international obligations, including the CFE Treaty. He tempered his remarks by emphasizing the importance of the adaptation negotiations to Russia and declaring that the "updated treaty should guarantee equal security for all participating states, including those that are not part of military alliances" as "one of the basic elements of the 21st century security system."⁴⁴¹ Major General Aleksandr Sinayskiy of the Military University cautioned that Russia's potential responses to the "aggression" against the FRY and the expansion of NATO

⁴⁴⁰ "The Balkan Crisis. To Prevent the World from Splitting," *Military News Bulletin* No. 4, 1 April 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/137570>.

⁴⁴¹ "Doverie. Vstrechi v Stavangere," *KZ* No. 99, 5 May 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3349229>; Oleg Falichev, "Severnaya initsiativa," *KZ* No. 100, 6 May 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3349272>.

might include a reexamination of international obligations, to include the CFE Treaty.⁴⁴² Retired Colonel General Fedor Ladygin, the former chief of the GRU, went further and argued that when NATO commenced air operations on 24 March, “we all woke up in a new world and system of international relations.” He highlighted the threat posed by the deployment of NATO aircraft to airfields of the former WTO (like the air base at Taszar, Hungary), which placed Russia under “permanent threat of attack.” The CFE Treaty might require revision, because it had not accounted for the possibility that a conflict could start with massive air and missile strikes, rather than attacks by land formations.⁴⁴³ For the armed forces, NATO’s operation against the FRY laid bare the shortcomings of the CFE Treaty (and provided an opportunity to bang the drum for limitations on NATO’s air power).

Moscow’s suspension of contacts with NATO over ALLIED FORCE, however, did not extend to the Vienna negotiations for the adaptation of the CFE Treaty. Aleksandr Grushko, the Russian representative to the JCG and lead negotiator, warned U.S. officials that the talks were in jeopardy because of NATO’s actions, but then “tried to put the best face on why [the adaptation negotiations] were not going to be part of a Russian walkout...he did not like what he was having to do: capitulate.”⁴⁴⁴ Grushko later described the paradox of the situation for Russia. One the one hand, “...it is legitimate to say that the first stage in Russia-NATO relations ended simultaneously with the tragic events of March 1999, when the North Atlantic Alliance started an air operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” On the other hand, in spite of

⁴⁴² Vladimir Mukhin, “Podmena ponyatij,” *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie* No. 18 (141), 14 May 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3515385>.

⁴⁴³ Aleksey Lyashchenko, “Tochka zreniya. 24 marta my prosnulis’ v drugom mire,” *KZ* No. 101, 7 May 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3349323>.

⁴⁴⁴ Gregory G. Govan, U.S. Representative to the JCG and lead U.S. negotiator, email message to the author, 2 October 2019.

these events, and “...against the backdrop of the utter cooling-off of political relations with the alliance, there was still a dialogue in progress in Vienna on the basic issues of organization of the European security field, in the course of which the Russian side was insistently seeking decisions aimed at the real strengthening of the European security instruments and reliably guaranteeing everyone’s interests regardless of participation in military-political alliances.”⁴⁴⁵ While not having derailed the negotiations, NATO’s air operation complicated the process and stymied progress in the talks from the end of March, when the JCG adopted a key decision, until mid-July, when they entered a recess.⁴⁴⁶

On 30 March 1999, while NATO was conducting air strikes against the FRY and NATO enlargement was proceeding apace, the Russians joined the other CFE states in a preliminary agreement on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty.⁴⁴⁷ According to the U.S. lead negotiator in the adaptation talks, the Russians were “desperate” to have this decision taken in the same month as the first tranche of admission of new members to NATO.⁴⁴⁸ The agreement set out the provisions of a formal agreement and provided guidelines for the remainder of the negotiations. The parties to the treaty also estimated their national and territorial limits for TLE, along with commitments for restraint, for example, in raising their ceilings either permanently or

⁴⁴⁵ Alexandr Grushko, “On the New Quality of Russia-NATO Relations,” *International Affairs* (Moscow) 48, No. 5 (2002): 23-24.

⁴⁴⁶ Colonel Jeffrey D. McCausland, “Endgame: CFE Adaptation and the OSCE Summit,” *Arms Control Today*, November 1999, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000-03/endgame-cfe-adaptation-osce-summit>.

⁴⁴⁷ The U.S. Special Envoy for CFE, Craig Dunkerley, observed at the time, “That this critical negotiating progress on the future rules of Europe’s conventional military environment was achieved in the spring of 1999 – even in the midst of sharp political disagreement between members of NATO and the Russian Federation – reflects the importance that all participating states attach to maintaining and strengthening CFE.” Craig Gordon Dunkerley, “Adapting the CFE Treaty to New Realities and Challenges,” *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* 4, No. 2 (September 1999): 21, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=3525>. See also Jeffrey D. McCausland, “Endgame: CFE Adaptation and the OSCE Summit.”

⁴⁴⁸ Gregory G. Govan, email message to the author, 2 October 2019.

temporarily.⁴⁴⁹ A lengthy section on the flank zone included language on the “desirability of mutually acceptable results” of efforts to resolve the number and status of Russian forces in Georgia and Moldova.⁴⁵⁰ Moscow’s official reaction to the agreement, as expressed by the MFA, obliquely referred to the ongoing air operation and the effect of NATO’s behavior on the security environment, which had produced “the current complicated international situation.” The agreement the parties to the CFE Treaty reached in the JCG was a step toward “strengthening the long-term treaty-legal basis of European security” and mitigating the “negative consequences of the expansion of NATO for European stability.”⁴⁵¹ Although Moscow welcomed the agreement, a spokesman for the MFA cautioned that the decisions had left some problems unresolved. Territorial limitations on attack helicopters and combat aircraft (to replace AOA-wide limits) were missing from the agreement. The agreement also did not eliminate the flank provisions of the treaty, although it did modify them. Finally, the agreement included a provision for extraordinary temporary deployment of TLE, which Russia had opposed, seeing it as a possible way for NATO to skirt the new system of territorial limits and deploy forces on the territory of new NATO members.⁴⁵²

⁴⁴⁹ *National limits* set the amount of TLE each party to the CFE Treaty could possess, while *territorial limits* set the amount of TLE (whether indigenous or foreign) that could be present on the territory of a party in the treaty’s AOA. The U.S. and Canada did not have territorial ceilings, because they had no territory in the treaty’s AOA. These limits replaced the group – or bloc-to-bloc – limits in the original CFE Treaty.

⁴⁵⁰ “Decision of the Joint Consultative Group on CFE Treaty Adaptation” [JCG Dec. 3/99], 30 March 1999, <http://www.bits.de/ac-archive/3ru/on/cfe/JCG.htm>. The language on the flank region, Georgia and Moldova is in paragraph 14.

⁴⁵¹ “V tsentral’nom apparate MID Rossii. Zayavlenie predstavatelya MID Rossii, 1 aprelya” *DV* No. 5, 1 May 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5555884>.

⁴⁵² Wade Boese, “CFE Parties Outline Adapted Treaty; Limits to Allow NATO Growth,” *Arms Control Today* March 1999, Vol. 29, No. 2: 28.

The Russians' faith in the process of the negotiations on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty was shaken by the deployment in mid-May to Taszar Air Base, Hungary, of F/A-18D aircraft of the United States Marine Corps to support ALLIED FORCE.⁴⁵³ For Moscow, this deployment was a perfect storm that combined inadequacies of the CFE Treaty with the undesirability of NATO enlargement: the aircraft were carrier-based aviation (although they were operating from a base on land) and therefore not subject to the provisions of the CFE Treaty, and the deployment contravened commitments by NATO in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the decision on the basic elements of the adaptation of the CFE Treaty taken by the JCG in July 1997, and a declaration by the NAC of December 1998 regarding temporary reinforcement on the territory of new members of the alliance. The MFA warned that this action – “yet one more disregard by NATO of the provisions of important international documents in the sphere of guaranteeing military security in Europe” – was a “violation that inflicted a blow on the negotiations in Vienna on the adaptation of the [CFE Treaty] that were entering a decisive stage.”⁴⁵⁴ As if to confirm the Russians' concerns about this deployment and the CFE Treaty, when a Russian team conducted a CFE inspection at Taszar Air Base from 25-26 May, it noted that the presence of twenty-two F/A-18s had neither been declared nor explained in the annual data exchange or treaty notifications.⁴⁵⁵ During the negotiations on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, the Russians

⁴⁵³ For details on this deployment, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1365.html.

⁴⁵⁴ “Agressiya NATO protiv Yugoslavii, 1 iyunya, zayavlenie predstavatelya MID Rossii,” *DV* No. 7, 1 July 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5381292>.

⁴⁵⁵ Information provided to the author by a Hungarian Government Official by email, 13 May 2020. A similar inspection by a Russian team at Aviano Air Base, Italy, one of the primary bases for air strikes against the FRY, proceeded without incident. According to two western authors, Jane M.O. Sharpe and Jeffrey McCausland, these inspections took place without any problems and provided evidence of the value of the CFE Treaty, even during times of crisis. Sharpe, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 181; McCausland, “Endgame: CFE Adaptation and the OSCE Summit.” Two Russian works on the CFE Treaty, Antonov and Ayumov. *Kontrol' nad obychnymi*

repeatedly sought to rectify what they viewed as insufficient limits on air forces. Their efforts only increased in the wake of NATO's operation, which had been carried out exclusively with air power. Having fought unsuccessfully for limitations in the CFE Treaty on where NATO aircraft could be deployed, Moscow pressed, also without success, for increased transparency of aviation.⁴⁵⁶ Their attempt to remove the flank zone limits from the CFE Treaty was equally futile.

The Russians' campaign for removal of limits on forces in the flank zone of the CFE Treaty never gained momentum. The negotiations therefore focused on easing the burden of the flank limits while preserving the integrity of the treaty. The agreement the JCG reached on 30 March included a compromise to increase the limit on ACVs in Russia's revised flank area (per the flank agreement of 1996) from 1380 to 2140 in the adapted treaty.⁴⁵⁷ Once the flank agreement of 1996 came into effect on 31 May 1999, however, it was apparent that Russia would not be able to meet even this higher limit. In data presented to the other CFE states on 1 July, Moscow reported that holdings of tanks, ACVs and artillery in the modified flank zone all exceeded the agreed limits, by 260, 1500 and 200, respectively.⁴⁵⁸ Another approach to addressing the flank issue was through temporary deployments of TLE in excess of the limits set

vooruzheniyami v evrope and Anin and Ayumov, "DOVSE – Vchera...Segodnya... Zavtra?...stat'ya pervaya," do not mention either ALLIED FORCE or these inspections in their accounts of the adaptation negotiations.

⁴⁵⁶ Wade Boese, "Russia Not in Compliance with CFE Flank Limits," *Arms Control Today* 29, No. 5, July/August 1999: 24.

⁴⁵⁷ The Russian MFA praised the JCG's "overcoming" the limit set in the 1996 Final Document of the First REVCON as testimony to "the strengthening of the viability of the CFE Treaty, which is especially relevant in the current tense situation in Europe" and as "one more step toward the signing...of the updated variant of the treaty." "Zayavlenie predstavatelya MID Rossii, 11 iyunya," *DV* No. 7, 1 July 1999: 54, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5381314>.

⁴⁵⁸ Wade Boese, "Russia Not in Compliance with CFE Flank Limits:" 24; Wade Boese, "Russian Compliance with CFE 'Flank' Limit in Doubt," *Arms Control Today* April/May 1999, Vol. 29, No. 3: 46.

in the treaty. On 23 June 1999, NATO proposed that limits could be exceeded temporarily in the flank zone by 153 tanks, 241 ACVS and 140 artillery pieces, whereas outside the flank zone, temporary deployments of up to 459 tanks, 723 ACVs and 420 artillery pieces would be allowed. The price for these deployments in excess of limits would be enhanced transparency measures (more notifications and inspections). The Russians did not formally respond to this proposal before the negotiations broke for a summer recess on 25 July, however, a spokesman for the MFA termed it “very one sided.”⁴⁵⁹ The reaction from the MFA was in keeping with Moscow’s consistent characterization of the flank provisions of the CFE Treaty as discriminatory against them.

As the Istanbul Summit approached and the negotiations on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty neared their conclusion, operations by Russian military forces in Chechnya required the deployment of TLE to the North Caucasus region that exceeded the flank limits. The Russians tried their best to appear sensitive to their treaty partners’ concerns. On 12 October, a spokesman for the Russian MFA explained that the Russian deployments “were of a temporary and forced character” and that Moscow did not want events in the Caucasus to have a negative effect on the adaptation negotiations.⁴⁶⁰ According to a senior diplomat, when Moscow had informed the other parties to the treaty about the situation, “they expressed complete understanding of the nature of Russia’s actions in the Northern Caucasus.” Then-Prime Minister Putin affirmed on 1 November that Russia “was fully observing the Treaty and the agreements

⁴⁵⁹ Wade Boese, “CFE Compliance Report Issued; Treaty Adaptation Talks Continue,” *Arms Control Today* June/July 1998, Vol. 28, No. 5: 30.

⁴⁶⁰ “Brifing 12 oktyabrya. Brifing provodil V.O. Rakhmanin, Severokavkazskiy aspekt DOVSE,” *DV* No. 11, 1 November 1999: 82, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5381555>; “Russia Admits CFE Violations,” *Arms Control Today* 29, No. 6, September/October 1999: 38.

on flank limitations,” although violations of such limitations would be temporary and “Russia pledged to remove excessive weapons and materiel as soon as the situation allowed.”⁴⁶¹ In the interest of transparency, Russia was prepared to offer additional information on forces in the region and to receive extra inspections (when it became possible to guarantee the inspectors’ security).⁴⁶² The MOD, while reinforcing these messages, also denied rumors in the press that the Russian forces command in the North Caucasus region planned to initiate an anti-terrorist operation in conjunction with the signing of the agreement on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty on 19 November.⁴⁶³ Perhaps mindful of their willingness to overlook ALLIED FORCE as a threat to the negotiations, the Russians made every attempt to elicit the NATO allies’ understanding for their own operation in Chechnya and its impact on the CFE Treaty.

The operation in Chechnya cast a wide shadow over Moscow’s goals for the Istanbul Summit. President Yeltsin recalled, “The Western countries were preparing an extremely tough statement on Chechnya...a new stage in the isolation of Russia was beginning. This had to be

⁴⁶¹ Vladimir Chizhov, “The Istanbul Summit,” *International Affairs* (Moscow) 46, No. 1 (2000): 72. Putin and President Clinton discussed the conflict in Chechnya and the CFE Treaty at a bilateral meeting in Oslo on 2 November. Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Russian Summits, 1992-2000,” July 2000, https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/nis/chron_summits_russia_us.html. Putin referred to this meeting in an opinion piece he published in *The New York Times* on 14 November 1999, <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/14/opinion/why-we-must-act.html>. To underscore Moscow’s sensitivity to the impact of the events in Chechnya on negotiations in the lead-up to the Istanbul Summit and to forestall criticism at the summit, while at Oslo Putin also announced that Russia would host a delegation from the OSCE chairmanship (Norway, at the time) to visit the Northern Caucasus region to assess the humanitarian situation there. OSCE Chairmanship, “OSCE Delegation to Visit North Caucasus, 10-12 November,” 10 November 1999, <https://www.osce.org/cio/52261>.

⁴⁶² “Brifing 2 noyabrya. Brifing provodil V.O. Rakhmanin. Podtverzhdenie priverzhennosti Rossii ob’yazatel’stvam po DOVSE,” *DV* No. 12, 1 December 1999: 58, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5381611>. On this visit by Putin, see “Prebyvanie V.V. Putin v Oslo,” *DV* No. 12, 1 December 1999: 6-7, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5381611>.

⁴⁶³ Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Ofitsial’no. S dogovorom ne svyazano,” *KZ*, No. 233, 2 November 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3353875>. For emphasis, the release added: “The press service of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is authorized to officially declare that the period of the execution of a counterterrorist operation in the North Caucasus region is in no way linked to the signing in Turkey of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.”

prevented no matter what.”⁴⁶⁴ Fearing castigation at the summit for actions in Chechnya and domination of the agenda by efforts to take a decision on the situation in the North Caucasus, the MFA suggested a “time out” might be needed to allow for “conditions to improve” and for other OSCE states (i.e. NATO members) to reconsider their unwillingness “to take Russia’s opinion into account on issues of vital importance to us.” According to one Russian commentator writing at the time, “Moscow’s hint is transparent: If Western leaders decide to use the summit as a platform for discussing the Chechen problem, Russia might not sign the Charter for European Security and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which are the main items of the summit’s agenda.”⁴⁶⁵

As the date for the Istanbul Summit approached, the situation with Russian forces stationed in other states in the Caucasus Region came to the forefront. On 15 November, on the eve of the meeting, Georgian President Shevardnadze declared that Russia would not receive any of his country’s quota for TLE, thereby denying Moscow a partial solution to their problem of meeting the flank limits.⁴⁶⁶ As for forces in Moldova, on 13 November, the Russians reduced fifty-six pieces of armaments and equipment (including twelve tanks) in Tiraspol. Four days later, the first of three trainloads of equipment were withdrawn from Moldova through Ukraine.⁴⁶⁷ Notwithstanding these positive developments, in a preview of things to come in the

⁴⁶⁴ Boris Yeltsin, *Midnight Diaries*, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), 347.

⁴⁶⁵ Yevgeny Antonov, “Take a Time Out – Russia Proposes Suspending Cooperation with the West,” *Vremya MN* 17 November 1999, translated in *CDSP* 51, No. 46, 15 December 1999: 6, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/19928395>. See also Leonid Gankin, “War and the Foreign Ministry,” *Kommersant*, 16 November 1999, translated in *CDSP* 51, No. 46, 15 December 1999: 6, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/19928352>.

⁴⁶⁶ “Khronika armeyskoy zhizni v Rossii - Voennoe sotrudnichestvo,” *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie* No. 45 (168), 19 November 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3516025>.

⁴⁶⁷ “Soobshchenie MID Rossii,” *DV* No. 12, 1 December 1999: 33, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5381596>.

end game of the negotiations, the Moldovan government made clear that the status of Russian forces there could not be separated from the CFE Treaty, a position Russia rejected. The Russian MFA was quite blunt (and incorrect) on this matter:

As for the [Moldovan government's] intention to tie the bilateral issue of Russian forces in Moldova with the ratification by Kishinev of the multilateral adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the counter-productiveness of such an intention is obvious, and it will certainly not find understanding from any of the participants in the CFE Treaty.⁴⁶⁸

The MFA's bluntness notwithstanding, despite the challenges posed by the expansion of NATO, the status of Russian forces stationed on the territory of other states of the CIS, NATO's air operation against the FRY, and the renewed military operation in Chechnya – not to mention months of contentious negotiations that had not yet concluded – the Russian delegation went to Istanbul with a mandate to reach agreement on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty. In a directive he signed on 17 November, Yeltsin accepted the recommendation by the MFA, MOD and SVR to sign the agreement on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, approved the basic provisions of the draft agreement, and authorized negotiators from the MFA to accept changes and additions to the text that would not affect its basic provisions.⁴⁶⁹ Those provisions supported some of the Russian negotiators' goals: the replacement of the bloc-to-bloc structure of limits with one of national and territorial limits, higher limits on TLE in Russia's flank region (at the cost of ten

⁴⁶⁸ "Zayavlenie predstavatelya MID Rossii, 23 oktyabrya," *DV* No. 11, 1 November 1999: 50, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5507925>.

⁴⁶⁹ "Rasporyazhenie Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii o Podpisanii soglasheniya ob adaptatsiya Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhenykh silakh v Evrope," 17 November 1999, Boris Yeltsin Library and Archive Materials, <https://yeltsin.ru/archive/act/47029/>.

additional inspections of Russian sites in the flank region annually), relaxed procedures (and therefore lower costs) for the reduction of TLE to meet limitations, more flexible provisions for shifting TLE from designated permanent storage sites (DPSS) to active units, and the accession of new states to the CFE Treaty.⁴⁷⁰ Absent from the draft agreement were a number of provisions Moscow had sought: collective limits on TLE held by states that comprised military alliances, additional limitations on aircraft, and elimination of sublimits for territory of the Russian Federation located in the flank region. Finally, the draft agreement included provisions that would later prove problematic for Russia and its relationship to the CFE Treaty: a requirement for consent by the host nation for “any presence of conventional armed forces on foreign territory” and, in the new Protocol on Territorial Ceilings, explicit reference to “political commitments appended to the Final Act of the negotiations on the adaptation of the Treaty,” the so-called Istanbul Commitments.⁴⁷¹

The “Istanbul Commitments”

The Russians and the other twenty-nine parties to the CFE Treaty concluded the process of the adaptation of the treaty, which Moscow had sought almost from the time of the original treaty’s EIF, at the OSCE Istanbul Summit on 19 November 1999. The negotiations concluded with a Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which ended on 19 November, and the signing of the “Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe” (A/CFE) by the thirty heads of state and

⁴⁷⁰ “Rasporyazhenie Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii o Podpisanii soglasheniya ob adaptatsiya Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhenykh silakh v Evrope,” paragraphs 4, 18, 5, 7, and 12, respectively.

⁴⁷¹ “Rasporyazhenie Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii o Podpisanii soglasheniya ob adaptatsiya Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhenykh silakh v Evrope,” paragraphs 4 and 15, respectively.

government at a separate ceremony. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov signed the agreement for President Yeltsin, who left the summit meeting (his last major international meeting as president) early after being pilloried in the plenary session and various bilateral encounters over the conflict in Chechnya.

The status of the Russian forces in Georgia and Moldova and the presence of TLE not controlled by those governments on their territories (as well as in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan) posed a fundamental challenge to the negotiators. Russia's commitments regarding their forces in Georgia and Moldova "opened the door," however, to the signing of the adaptation agreement.⁴⁷² The conclusion of the negotiations remained in doubt up to the last moment because of a dispute over the language of a commitment pertaining to the status of Russian troops and armaments in Moldova.⁴⁷³ This commitment, along with an agreement between Russia and Georgia and a series of other commitments by Russia (regarding restraint on forces in the northern flank area), the new NATO allies, and other parties to the treaty were recorded in the preamble and the fourteen annexes to the Final Act.⁴⁷⁴ Most of them are linked to the text of the A/CFE through footnotes to the charts that set out each state's national and

⁴⁷² Andrey V. Zagorskiy, "Krisis kontrolya obychnykh vooruzhennykh sil v Evrope – sud'ba Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhennykh silakh," in *Mirovaya politika: vzglyad iz budushchego*, A.V. Torkunov, editor (Moscow: MGIMO Universitet, 2009), 140, <http://www.mgimo.ru/publications/?id=176102>.

⁴⁷³ Craig Dunkerley, oral history interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project. See also Ulrich Kuehn, *From Capitol Hill to Istanbul: The Origins of the Current CFE Deadlock*, Working Paper 19, Hamburg: Centre for OSCE Research, December 2009, 14. Colonel General Leonid Ivashov of the Russian General Staff stated that intervention by third-party delegations had been required to induce the Moldovan delegation to agree to this commitment. No such intervention was required to achieve agreement with the Georgians. Oleg Vladygin, "Breakthrough on the Flanks," *Obshchaya gazeta* No. 51, 23-29 December 1999, translated in *CDSP* 51, No. 52, 26 January 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/19942350>; Vladimir Kuzar', "Nam udalos' otstoyat' rossiyskie interesy," *KZ* No. 260, 10 December 1999, <https://dib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3354784>.

⁴⁷⁴ Aleksandr Shaburkin, "Voennye itogi stambul'skogo sammita," *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie* No. 46 (169), 26 November 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3516037>.

territorial limits for the five categories of TLE, in the case of national limits, and the three categories of land-based TLE (tanks, ACVs and artillery), in the case of territorial limits.⁴⁷⁵

For their part, the Russians made commitments to adhere to all CFE Treaty obligations, including limitations on TLE (i.e. in the flank region) and to exercise restraint in stationing and deploying ground TLE in the Kaliningrad and Pskov *oblasts*, as well as to use only temporary deployments of such TLE should reinforcement be required. Russia also pledged to “withdraw and/or destroy” TLE in Moldova not later than the end of 2001, in the context of the commitment referred to in paragraph 19 of the Istanbul Summit Declaration (see footnote 478, following page). As for Russian forces in Georgia, the two governments agreed to the following:

- The Russian side would reduce, by no later than 31 December 2000, the levels of its TLE located within the territory of Georgia to not exceed 153 tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery systems.
- No later than 31 December 2000, the Russians would withdraw (or dispose of) the TLE located at the Russian military bases at Vaziani and Gudauta and at the repair facilities in Tbilisi.
- The Russian military bases at Gudauta and Vaziani would be disbanded and withdrawn by 1 July 2001. The issue of the utilization, including the joint utilization, of the military facilities and infrastructure of the disbanded Russian military bases remaining at those locations would be resolved within the same timeframe.
- The Georgian Side would grant to the Russians the right to basic temporary deployment (153 tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery systems) at facilities of the Russian military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki.
- The Georgian Side would facilitate the creation of the conditions necessary for reducing and withdrawing the Russian forces. In this connection, the two Sides note the readiness of OSCE participating States to provide financial support for this process.

⁴⁷⁵ “Protocol on National Ceilings for Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe” and “Protocol on Territorial Ceilings for Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” “Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” (hereafter A/CFE) CFE.DOC/1/99, 19 November 1999, www.osce.org/library/14108.

- During the year 2000 the two sides would complete negotiations regarding the duration and modalities of the functioning of the Russian military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki and the Russian military facilities within the territory of Georgia.⁴⁷⁶

The Russians emphasized that they had taken these politically binding commitments outside, or “parallel to,” the treaty.⁴⁷⁷ Vladislav Chernov, the Deputy Director of the Security and Disarmament Department of the MFA (and Grushko’s successor as Moscow’s representative to the JCG) described the commitments in this way: “For its part, Russia assumed political obligations to exercise restraint in force deployment on the territory of the Kaliningrad and Pskov regions and on pulling out surplus TLE from Georgia and the entire TLE from Moldova. *Although all of these obligations are purely political and not subject to ratification, they are part of a package constituting an adapted-CFE unified regime*” [emphasis added]. Chernov failed to mention *bases* in Georgia, which are addressed in paragraphs 2 (disbandment and withdrawal of bases at Gudauta and Vaziani by 1 July 2001) and 5 (completion of negotiations during 2000 on duration and modalities of functioning of bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki) of the “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and Georgia, Annex 14 to the Final Act, Istanbul, 17 November 1999.” He also omitted Russia’s commitment to withdraw forces from Moldova by the end of 2002, as noted in paragraph 19 of the Istanbul Summit Declaration, which is cited in the preambular text of the Final Act.⁴⁷⁸ Russia’s failure to meet their commitments vis-à-vis

⁴⁷⁶ “Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” CFE.DOC/2/99, 19 November 1999, 12-13, www.osce.org/library/14114.

⁴⁷⁷ Anin and Ayumov, “DOVSE – Vchera...Segodnya... Zavtra?...stat’ya pervaya:” 73. Antonov and Ayumov, *Kontrol’ nad obychnymi vooruzheniyami v evrope*, 26.

⁴⁷⁸ Vladislav Chernov, “Notes on the CFE Treaty” *International Affairs* (Moscow) 48, No. 4 (2002): 46-52. Paragraph 19 of the Istanbul Summit Declaration reads, in part, as follows: “...we reiterate our expectation of an early, orderly and complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova...we welcome the recent progress achieved in the removal and destruction of the Russian military equipment stockpiled in the Trans-Dniestrian region of Moldova and the completion of the destruction of non-transportable ammunition. We welcome the commitment by

Georgia and Moldova and their linkage by NATO allies to the ratification of the A/CFE would lead to a stalemate that would rapidly dispel any claims by Moscow about success at Istanbul.

The Russians praised their performance and the results of the Istanbul OSCE Summit, to include the signing of the A/CFE, although with the caveat that things could have been worse. In Yeltsin's assessment, "The final resolution of the Istanbul meeting did not contain the condemnation of our position in Chechnya as originally planned...The summit was an important international victory for Russia."⁴⁷⁹ In the words of one commentator, "Russia went the distance and won," and the A/CFE was "another fairly important event," in that it set new limits on conventional armaments and resolved inequities in forces that resulted from the dissolution of the WTO. The signing also represented a concession by the U.S. that was "tantamount to conceding Russia's victory in Istanbul."⁴⁸⁰

The Director of the MFA's Department of European Cooperation, Vladimir Chizhov, offered a more nuanced assessment of the summit that hinted at difficult choices and less-than-satisfactory outcomes: "Russian diplomats obtained the best possible results in the course of a fierce diplomatic battle. All the decisions were born by compromises that took account of the sides' interests – which was far from simple." Among the summit's most important results was

the Russian Federation to complete withdrawal of the Russian forces from the territory of Moldova by the end of 2002. We also welcome the willingness of the Republic of Moldova and of the OSCE to facilitate this process...by the agreed deadline...we agree to consider the establishment of a fund for voluntary international financial assistance to be administered by the OSCE." OSCE, *Istanbul Document 1999*, 49-50, <https://www.osce.org/mc/39569?download=true>.

⁴⁷⁹ Boris Yeltsin, *Midnight Diaries*, 348. Yeltsin did not mention the CFE adaptation agreement in the account of the Istanbul Summit, perhaps because he had departed the summit meeting early.

⁴⁸⁰ Dmitry Gornostayev, "Russia Takes Istanbul Round from West," *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 20 November 1999, translated as "NG's Gornostayev Hails All-Round Victory for Russian Delegation: It Kept Criticism of Chechen Policy Out of Summit Declaration, Got What It Wanted in European Security Charter, Updating of CFE Treaty; Yeltsin Was in 'Fighting Form,'" *CDSP* 51, No. 47, 22 December 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/19942375>.

the A/CFE. Along with the revised Vienna Document on CSBMs, the adapted CFE Treaty remained one of “the two keys to European security.” Chizhov was blasé about the commitments Russia made to Georgia and Moldova: “At the summit Russia reached an agreement with Moldova on removing the Russian forces stationed there before the end of 2002; Georgia and Russia reached an agreement on smaller Russian military presence there.”⁴⁸¹ Like Chizhov, Aleksandr Grushko, Moscow’s lead negotiator, was not sanguine about the results of almost three years of talks. As Gregory Govan, the U.S. lead negotiator and primary interlocutor with Grushko throughout the adaptation process, recalled,

at the end of the endgame for A/CFE negotiations in Istanbul, we met, sleep deprived and only a few hours before our political leaders were to gather to sign the Treaty, and, after his delegation threw in the towel on the last holdout issue, some minor point of monitoring A/CFE, Grushko pointedly refused to shake hands on reaching agreement, an uncharacteristic gesture on his part. The stress had overwhelmed his usual cool demeanor and I guess I had a glimpse of the weakness of the hand he had been forced to play, and that he had nothing to show the General Staff, even symbolically, that he had won for them.⁴⁸²

⁴⁸¹ Vladimir Chizhov, “The Istanbul Summit,” *International Affairs* (Moscow) 46, No. 1 (2000): 71-73.

⁴⁸² Gregory G. Govan, email message to the author, 2 October 2019. Vladislav Chernov described an incident that also captured the frustration members of the MFA felt. Shortly before the Istanbul Summit, a U.S. delegation visited Moscow “with a proposal that looked rather strange to us” for inclusion “in the already overloaded information exchange section,” a requirement to report a change in numbers of TLE – “below any meaningful level” – in excess of some number set in the adapted CFE Treaty. “They continued to press very strongly on this two weeks later in Istanbul and Washington only agreed to withdraw its proposal a matter of hours before the signing ceremony.” Vladislav L. Chernov, “The Collapse of the CFE Treaty and the Prospects for Conventional Arms Control in Europe,” in Wolfgang Zellner, Hans-Joachim Schmidt and Goetz Neuneck, eds., *The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe* (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009), 186.

In contrast to the lack of enthusiasm, or even frustration, on the part of the MFA, the armed forces seemed satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations. Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, the head of the Chief Administration for International Military Cooperation of the MOD, suggested that the members of the MFA who served in the Russian delegation be awarded medals, a “particularly interesting” development given reports of disagreements between MFA and MOD officials at the negotiations and pressure on Defense Minister Sergeyev to consent to a timetable for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova. At the end of the day, the other states parties to the CFE Treaty “gave Russia the green light” to “create a security zone along its European borders” as well as to deal with domestic security challenges in the North Caucasus region. Additionally, according to Ivashov, “Now the treaty served to contain NATO’s runaway military ambitions in Europe.”⁴⁸³ A number of issues remained unresolved, including some raised by “Russian military diplomats” in the process of consultations and discussions surrounding the negotiations. The Russians failed to gain agreement on aggregate limitations on TLE in military-political blocs, a formula for territorial limits that would include existing levels of foreign forces on a state’s territory (thereby constraining additional presence of forces in new members of NATO), and provisions to address the “main threat – aviation and naval forces.”⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸³ Oleg Vladygin, “Breakthrough on the Flanks,” *Obshchaya gazeta* No. 51, 23-29 December 1999, translated in *CDSP* 51, No. 52, 26 January 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/brose/doc/19942350>; Vladimir Kuzar’, “Nam udalos’ otstoyat’ rossiyskie interesy,” *KZ* No. 260, 10 December 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3354784>. Ivashov emphasized that despite reports about disagreements within the Russian delegation, “It is one team, which effectively uses for its interests both the experience of diplomats and concrete knowledge in military issues.” Although arguments and persuasion occurred in the process of developing common positions – “a normal process” – “Once a decision is taken, we fight with our opponents as one team.”

⁴⁸⁴ Vladimir Mukhin and Vyacheslav Proshkin, “Ustanovlen novy rasklad sil v Evrope,” *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie* No. 48 (171), 10 December 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3516075>.

At the end of the day, the Russians agreed to an adaptation of the CFE Treaty, the de facto dependent variable in this case study, that fell short of meeting their desiderata. Why did they accept such an outcome? The Russian Federation was in a position of diminished power, economically, militarily, and diplomatically, that left their leaders and negotiators “little choice but to go along with the best deal the West was willing to offer.” After the financial crisis of 1998, Moscow needed Western assistance and support.⁴⁸⁵ The armed forces were still reeling from their withdrawals from the former states of the WTO and the Baltic states, not to mention the consequences of the dissolution of the USSR. Despite having assisted Yeltsin to quell the parliamentary revolt in 1993, the military leadership proved unable (yet) to impose a hard line in the face of NATO enlargement and the alliance’s use of force against Russia’s friend Yugoslavia. Russian diplomats found themselves playing a weak hand in the negotiations.⁴⁸⁶ The key independent variable in this case proved to be a domestic, and primarily economic, situation that kept Russia in a position of relative weakness.

By the end of 1999, the Russians were trying to put the best face on the outcome of a long and difficult process that had not met all their goals. An author from the Diplomatic Academy of the MFA described the situation well in an article in the ministry’s journal: “On

⁴⁸⁵ Gregory G. Govan, email message to the author, 2 October 2019; Elena Kropatcheva, “The Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis,” *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* (2015): 7, DOI 10.1080/14782804.2014.1001823. As Kropatcheva observed, “After its financial crisis of 1998, Russia was weak and needed cooperation with and support of the West. This also had an effect on the OSCE so that it was possible to organize the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999 – shortly after a major crisis – and to agree on important political decisions,” one of which was agreement on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty. When asked why Russia continued to pursue an agreement on adaptation of the CFE Treaty in 1999 – in spite of NATO’s actions - an official of the Russian MFA told the author, in a conversation held on 15 August 2019, that 1999 was a difficult time, especially economically, and getting aid from the West was important for Russia.

⁴⁸⁶ Gregory G. Govan, email message to the author, 2 October 2019. Govan’s British counterpart, Paul Flaherty, made the same point, noting, “They couldn’t stop [NATO] enlargement. Their forces weren’t in any great shape and the CFE Treaty offered them one of the few (if not the only) routes to exercise any control over numbers in the expanded territory of NATO.” Paul Flaherty CBE FRSA, email message to the author, 15 October 2019.

aggregate, these regimes (center and flanks) of the adapted CFE Treaty constitute a kind of a security belt on the perimeter of Russia's European borders. At the same time Russia has retained the right to redeploy armed forces from the now calm northern zone to crisis areas in the south. *All in all, this essentially offsets the negative implications from NATO of eastward expansion for Russia's security and for European stability as a whole* [emphasis added]. Despite compromises, "...on balance, the adapted CFE Treaty responds to the interests of State Parties, including Russia's national interests."⁴⁸⁷

The CFE Treaty and Russian Foreign and Security Policy

The conceptual framework of the relationship between the CFE Treaty and foreign and security policy, as described in Chapter 1 (pages 23-24) guides this analysis. Looking at content, the expectation is that the documents of foreign and security policy will contain explicit and implicit references to the CFE Treaty. Effects, desired and undesired, include the mitigation of threats and shaping the security environment (desired effects) and costs – limits or constraints on one's own capabilities, transparency, and fiscal expenditures – that are undesired effects. The application of the framework divides Yeltsin's tenure into two periods, with 1996, when Yeltsin switched foreign ministers and the focus of foreign and security policy shifted away from a predominantly western direction, serving as the dividing line.

In terms of content, the CFE-policy link was evident in "The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" of 1993. Among the guidelines for preserving Russia's military security was the "consistent implementation" of the CFE Treaty. Threats to military security included violations of arms agreements by other countries. The inclusion of

⁴⁸⁷ Mikhail Shelepin, "Equal Security for OSCE Countries," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 46, No. 3 (2000): 178-179.

this explicit reference to arms control and the CFE Treaty among the basic principles of the military doctrine attested to the continuing influence of the MFA in formulating foreign and security policy, even after the intervention by the armed forces in Yeltsin's fight with the parliament in 1993.

Russia's ratification and implementation of the CFE Treaty from 1992-1996 produced some desired effects. By contributing to the reduction of the threat of large-scale conflict in the ATTU region, the CFE Treaty eliminated a long-standing security threat. In terms of threats identified in the "Foreign Policy Concept" and "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" of 1993, the CFE Treaty had limited influence on local and small-scale conflicts on Russia's borders. The agreement between Russia and the governments of the Baltic States to cooperatively facilitate CFE inspections of Russian forces prior to their withdrawal from those states was a contribution, albeit an indirect one, to mitigating threats against Russian bases outside the Russian Federation.

Another desired effect was the CFE Treaty's role in shaping the security environment. Russia's very participation in the treaty affirmed Russia's status as a responsible power in Europe, a tenet of the "Foreign Policy Concept." Russia's participation also shaped an environment within which they and their neighbors could manage the dissolution of the USSR and its armed forces. The Tashkent Agreement of 1992, painful as it was to negotiate, drew on ratification of the CFE Treaty as a forcing function to produce an accommodation on the division of quotas of TLE among states of the former USSR. It thereby indirectly supported the cooperation among states of the CIS that Moscow sought.

The costs, or undesired effects, of the CFE Treaty on Russia's foreign and security policy were also quite evident. Foremost among them was the constraint on Moscow's ability to shift

armed forces to the Caucasus region, where they were most needed, that the flank provision of the treaty imposed. Unsurprisingly, the Russians devoted the majority of their energy aimed at “correction” of the treaty toward mitigating this effect. The fiscal costs of the treaty, measured in terms of the reduction of armaments (including those the Soviet armed forces had shifted east of the Ural Mountains) and implementation of the inspection regime, were burdensome to the Russian state and armed forces, both of which were struggling with inadequate resources.

The threat picture Yeltsin and his new government painted in his speech to the Federal Assembly in 1996 and in the “National Security Concept” of 1997 highlighted a host of domestic issues, which Russia’s engagement with the CFE Treaty could only help to mitigate by supporting a favorable – or at least benign – external security environment. A new threat that emerged in this depiction, and which had been obliquely raised previously, was the expansion of NATO (“an unacceptable threat”) and the unfavorable correlation of forces it would generate. The Russians enjoyed some success at linking the processes of NATO expansion, Russia-NATO relations, and the adaptation of the CFE Treaty. The A/CFE the Russians accepted mitigated the challenge of expansion to an extent but left relatively untouched critical capabilities the alliance had brought to bear in conflicts in the Balkans: aviation and naval forces. In continuing to limit the scope of the CFE Treaty to conventional armaments and equipment, the A/CFE also left free of legally binding constraints military infrastructure and the potential for its development on the territory of new members of NATO. The Russians would have to continue to rely on the politically binding pledge the allies had made in 1997.

Constraints on Russia’s ability to deploy forces within their own borders, especially in the North Caucasus region, and to base forces, including those they considered to be peacekeepers, in other states of the near abroad were relaxed, to an extent. Agreements on flank

limits reached at the First REVCON in 1996 and in the adaptation negotiations granted the Russians higher limits and new flexibilities, but did not eliminate the flank provision as Moscow had desired. Likewise, political understandings and commitments reached between Russia and Georgia and Moldova, while appearing to offer pathways toward resolving the issue of the presence of Russian forces, ended up setting the stage for further disputes.

Chapter 5 - The CFE Treaty During Putin's Ascendancy (2000-2006)

As a new millennium dawned, Russia again found itself under new leadership, with Vladimir Putin having succeeded Boris Yeltsin upon the latter's resignation from the presidency on 31 December 1999. Putin won election to the presidency outright in March 2000. While facing the same demands as Yeltsin to bring Russia forward economically and socially, Putin began the process of pulling the country out of its post-Soviet malaise and reasserting it as a great power. Russia remained anchored to Europe and the West but began to show less desire to acquiesce to the demands of western partners.

Russia continued to face security challenges of the preceding decade, in particular instability and conflict within its borders in Chechnya as well as elsewhere in the Transcaucasus region. The presence of Russian forces in or near conflict areas and perceived support from Moscow for separatists in Georgia and Moldova also characterized the security environment and exacerbated tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi beginning in 2005. The effects of the entry of new members into NATO and the prospect of additional expansion of the alliance remained an enduring challenge. Terrorism came to the fore as a major international and domestic challenge, especially in the wake of the attacks against the U.S. in September 2001. Attacks against a theater in Moscow in 2002 and a school in Beslan, Dagestan in 2004 contributed to a shift in focus for Russia's perceived security requirements. The invasion of Iraq by the U.S. and the United Kingdom in 2003, carried out, as had been the case with the air operation against the FRY, without a mandate from the UN Security Council, affected not only Russia's relations with the West, but also its perception of the efficacy of the extant system that governed international relations.

Policies pursued by the U.S. and NATO proved to be a mixed bag in terms of these security challenges. The George W. Bush administration's focus on terrorism provided an opportunity for cooperative diplomacy, whereby the U.S. gained access to facilities in Central Asia and Russia gained some support for its struggle against Chechen and other insurgents in the North Caucasus. Washington's support for the new Georgian government of Mikheil Saakashvili following the Rose Revolution in 2003 (on top of ongoing calls for Russia to fulfill its Istanbul Commitments vis-à-vis Georgia), as well as the change in government in Ukraine as a result of the Orange Revolution in 2005, challenged Russia's influence in the near abroad. Washington's abandonment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002 and subsequent initiative to emplace ballistic missile systems in Eastern Europe also met with Russian opposition. NATO's admission of a second tranche of new members, strongly supported by the U.S., also met with opposition from Moscow, particularly because it included the three Baltic states and thereby brought the alliance adjacent to Russia. The allies offered a new quality of relationship to Russia with the replacement of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council with the NATO-Russia Council in 2002, however the arrangement fell short of fully integrating Moscow into the alliance's decision-making.

As for the CFE Treaty itself, starting in 2000, the U.S. and the NATO allies settled into a routine of refusing to ratify the A/CFE until Russia fulfilled its Istanbul Commitments to withdraw from Georgia and Moldova. Allies, including the U.S., offered assistance to Moscow to facilitate the reduction and removal of TLE in Georgia and Moldova and ammunition in the latter country. The clash between the U.S. and the allies, on one side, and Russia, on the other, also led to deadlock within the OSCE over the adoption of ministerial statements about the situations in Georgia and Moldova beginning in 2000. These differences over policies regarding

security in Europe, particularly in the near abroad, influenced the approach of Putin and his government to the CFE Treaty.

If the 1990s could be characterized as a period of the CFE Treaty's correction and adaptation, then the first years of the new millennium signaled the beginning of "disappointment" with the treaty. Hopes for the EIF of the A/CFE were dashed in fairly short order as it became evident that NATO states would not submit it for ratification until Russia brought their forces into compliance with the limits for the flank region (which they reported in early 2002) and fulfilled the commitments they made at Istanbul regarding their forces in Georgia and Moldova (which NATO raised as a condition for EIF later in 2002). "In spite of the unconstructive position of the NATO states," Russia ratified the agreement on adaptation in 2004.⁴⁸⁸ The entry of a second tranche of new members to the alliance the same year, which included four non-CFE states (the three Baltic states and Slovenia) and two states in the flank zone (Bulgaria and Romania) added to Russia's concerns about the treaty. In particular, the Russians complained about a "grey zone" on their border in the Baltic states that lay outside the limitations of the treaty, a situation that could not be resolved until the A/CFE entered into force and its accession clause became operative. Russia raised its concerns about all these issues with the CFE Treaty at the JCG, the NRC, the OSCE and at once-every-five-years review conferences (in 2001 and 2006). Their entreaties fell on deaf ears, which called into question the NATO states' respect for Russia's status as a great power. By the end of the review conference in 2006, the Russians had had enough, and they warned the other parties to the treaty that Moscow would reexamine its value to Russia's national security.

⁴⁸⁸ Anatoly Anin and Rodion Ayumov, "DOVSE – Vchera, Segodnya...Zavtra? (stat'ya vtoraya)," *Indeks bezopasnosti*, Summer 2011 (Vol. 17, No. 2): 22, <http://pircenter.org/data/publications/sirus1-11/Analysis-Anin-Ayumov.pdf>.

Russia's national security enterprise did not experience major structural changes, although the locus of influence shifted more toward the Kremlin and the presidential apparatus. This period began with a flurry of refinements and restatements of foreign and security policy. Putin's government issued a national security concept, a military doctrine, and a foreign policy concept in the first six months of 2000. The armed forces received additional guidance in 2003 in the "Priority Tasks of the Armed Forces."

This chapter is organized similarly to the preceding one. It begins with an account of the development and articulation of foreign and security policy during this period, and then turns to the CFE Treaty itself, specifically events in the life of the treaty and Russia's approach to it. The chapter will include a detailed study of the year 2004, in which Moscow faced the second tranche of NATO enlargement while chafing over the delay in ratification of the A/CFE which precluded its EIF. The chapter will then seek to draw linkages between Russia's foreign and security policy and the CFE Treaty, using the conceptual framework set out in Chapter 1.

Russian Foreign and Security Policy – 2000-2006

As acting president and then president of the Russia Federation beginning in 2000, Vladimir Putin found himself in a more enviable position than Yeltsin in 1992. Unlike his predecessor, Putin did not face the task of building the state institutions for national security, for example, an army, nor did he have to quarrel with the other successor states to the USSR over the division of the remnants of the Soviet armed forces. Russian diplomats were carrying out diplomacy in support of policies that had had the chance to gel over the course of almost a decade. The well-orchestrated presidential transition simplified Putin's job. Having served as

the director of the FSB, secretary of the Security Council and prime minister under Yeltsin, Putin did not face a steep learning curve when it came to matters of foreign and security policy.⁴⁸⁹

Putin's experience in Yeltsin's government set the context for changes in the national security enterprise. During his first two terms as president (2000-2008), Putin changed foreign ministers once, and twice changed defense ministers, chiefs of the General Staff, and directors of the SVR. One interpretation of this rate of change would be that Putin was more satisfied with the performance of the MFA, because he changed ministers fewer times (from Igor Ivanov, whom he inherited from Yeltsin, to Sergey Lavrov) than the remaining heads of departments and agencies. Another interpretation, however, is that Putin was more sensitive to the contributions of the armed forces and the intelligence service to policy than those of the MFA, so he more readily changed their leaders to ensure the right people were in place.⁴⁹⁰ The relative stability in the leadership of the ministries also pointed to a greater concentration of policymaking responsibility within the Kremlin, specifically the Security Council. Putin had been secretary of the Security Council while he served as the director of the FSB, and his fellow veteran of the security services and ally from St. Petersburg Sergey Ivanov (later Putin's defense minister) succeeded him in the post. According to reporting at the time, Putin strengthened the role of the Security Council, which "burst into unprecedented activity" that included approving documents

⁴⁸⁹ For example, Putin, through this experience in Yeltsin's government prior to assuming the presidency, might have worked on the new security concept, which he approved in January 2000. Jakub M. Godzimirski, "Russian National Security Concepts 1997 and 2000: A Comparative Analysis:" 78-79.

⁴⁹⁰ Some support for the latter interpretation, which is the author's, comes from Jeffrey Mankoff, who wrote, "...while it makes sense to speak of a Kozyrev foreign policy or a Primakov foreign policy, the same does not hold for a Lavrov foreign policy, since Sergey Vladimirovich's role has been principally to implement the concepts developed by his political superiors in the Kremlin. Under Putin, a few close associates, including Sergey Ivanov (former chairman of the Security Council, defense minister and first deputy prime minister) and presidential aide Sergey Prikhodko, were the president's key foreign policy advisers." Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return to Great Power Politics* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009), 55.

of national strategy, such as the new military doctrine.⁴⁹¹ According to the IISS, though, the influence on policy, particularly military reform, of Putin's changes, even the near wholesale replacement of leaders of the key national security bodies in 2001, was debatable. Defense Minister Sergeyev had clashed with the chief of the General Staff, General Kvashnin, over funding priorities for the armed forces, with Sergeyev favoring the nuclear forces and Kvashnin conventional forces. Although Sergey Ivanov became the minister of defense, Sergeyev remained a security advisor to Putin, thereby remaining in a position to undercut Kvashnin.⁴⁹²

Aside from developments in Russia's national security enterprise, the significant events of 1999 continued to influence the development of foreign and security policy during Putin's first term as president. NATO's air operation against the FRY had laid bare the gap in conventional military capabilities between Russia and the alliance and the limitations of Moscow's main tool for the management of the use of military force, the veto in the UN Security Council. The first tranche of NATO enlargement also exposed Moscow's limited say in the European security environment that was changing in ways that were not favorable to Russia's interests. Finally, the renewal of military operations in Chechnya exemplified greater acceptance of the use of the army to confront domestic threats.⁴⁹³

The crisis in Kosovo and NATO's operation against the FRY occupied a place of *primus inter pares* among the factors that imbued a more strategic direction to Russia's foreign and

⁴⁹¹ Anna Badkhen, "Security Council Rapidly Gains Power," *Moscow Times*, 30 June 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/227135>.

⁴⁹² "Russia: Strengthening the State," IISS, *Strategic Survey 2000/2001* (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), 119-120.

⁴⁹³ On this point, see Aleksey G. Arbatov, *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya* (Garmisch, Germany: The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2000), 16.

security policies. According to one participant in these policies' revision, "Russia entered the period of late 1999 to early 2000 with its foreign policy in a state of crisis. That policy amounted to a set of ties to foreign countries and an aggregate of tactical measures designed to hold onto various concrete but largely disconnected positions, and also to preserve the image of Russia as a virtual great power, an image meant primarily for domestic consumption."⁴⁹⁴ Whereas, prior to 2000, "official documents were purely declaratory and had nothing to do with actual diplomatic, military, and budgetary circumstances," Putin's policy documents were "very much in line with the current practice of Russian foreign and defense policies and programs."⁴⁹⁵ The reason for this change? NATO's operation against the FRY, which "marked a watershed in Russia's assessment of its own military requirements and defense priorities" and compelled the General Staff and armed forces, the Security Council, the MFA and the Duma to face the possibility of military conflict with NATO and revisit the basic tenets of Russia's security policy. As a result, the new versions of the "National Security Concept" and "Military Doctrine" largely reflected reaction to the war in Kosovo, albeit moderated by compromises, not all of which favored the armed forces.⁴⁹⁶ These statements of Russia's foreign and security policies, along with the "Foreign Policy Concept" of June 2000 and a mid-course correction to guidance to the armed forces that was published in 2003, are the subject of the remainder of this section of Chapter 5.

⁴⁹⁴ Sergey Karaganov, "The New Foreign Policy. What Is Russia To Do? What Is to Be Done with Russia?" *Moskovskiye novosti*, No.8, Feb.29-March 6, 2000, translated in *CDSF*, No.10, Vol.52, April 05, 2000,1-4, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/13616515>.

⁴⁹⁵ Arbatov, *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya*, 4.

⁴⁹⁶ Arbatov, *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya*, 9, 15-16. According to Andrey Kokoshin, the military doctrine of 2000 addressed "problems and challenges resulting from NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia." Anatoliy Yurkin, "Russian MP Welcomes endorsement of New Military Doctrine," *ITAR TASS Weekly News*, 21 April 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2851160>. On the compromises, especially regarding threat perceptions, see William D. Jackson, "Encircled Again: Russia's Military Assesses Threats in a Post-Soviet World," *Political Science Quarterly* 177, No. 3 (2002): 394.

The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, January 2000

Putin set out his administration's perception of the security environment, national interests and threats to them, as well as a vision of how to ensure Russia's national security, in the "National Security Concept," which he approved less than two weeks after assuming the presidency on an acting basis, on 10 January 2000. The government had begun work on it in 1999, likely at the same time the MOD began work on the revision of the military doctrine after the entry of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO and the start of NATO's operation ALLIED FORCE. Like its predecessor of 1997, the "National Security Concept" of 2000 devoted the majority of its content to domestic aspects of the nation's security, to include economic, social, and governance issues, a characteristic that distinguished Russia's national security concept from those of other states.⁴⁹⁷ The economy remained paramount, because the realization of Russia's national interests was possible "only on the basis of stable development of the economy."⁴⁹⁸ The new national security concept highlighted the need to strengthen state institutions to address a range of economic, societal, governance and even spiritual challenges. The provisions related to foreign policy and military security, which occupy only four of the twenty-seven pages of the "National Security Concept" (not appearing until page 20), are the focus of the remainder of this section, as they are the most relevant to the CFE Treaty.⁴⁹⁹

⁴⁹⁷ "Brifing Sekretariya Soveta Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii," *DV* No. 3, 1 March 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5201969>.

⁴⁹⁸ "Kontsepsiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii," 10 January 2000, 4, https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCk6B6Z29/content/id/589768. An English translation can be found at "*Military News Bulletin*," 1 February 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/136450>.

⁴⁹⁹ For broader examinations of the "National Security Concept" of 2000 and comparisons to the 1997 version, see Jakub M. Godzimirski, "Russian National Security Concepts 1997 and 2000: A Comparative Analysis" and two publications by Marcel de Haas, "Putin's Security Policy in the Past, Present and Future," *Baltic Defense Review* 2,

Assertiveness in the face of unfavorable developments in the security environment is evident from the beginning of the security concept. While an assertion of Russia's great-power status and attempts by other states to weaken its position were nothing new, a direct reference to the U.S. as playing a negative role in the international environment was new. In an implicit, yet clear, reference to the Kosovo crisis and NATO's operation against the FRY, the concept included as a negative tendency "the attempt to create a structure of international relations based on the domination of developed Western countries, led by the USA, in the international community" [NATO]; "providing for unilateral solution of the key problems of global politics, above all with the use of military force" [the Kosovo crisis and operation ALLIED FORCE]; "in violation of the fundamental norms of international law" [without sanction by the UN Security Council].⁵⁰⁰ In a more explicit acknowledgment of the impact of the conflict in Kosovo, the security concept included among the peacetime capabilities for the armed forces the "guarantee of the reliable defense of the country from air attack," a refinement of the 1997 version's broader task for defense from air and space attack. Direct references to NATO's expansion and the appearance of foreign military bases and groupings of forces near Russia's borders were the same as in the 1997 security strategy, although in 2000, following the entry of new members into NATO in 1999, these challenges acquired more immediacy.⁵⁰¹

Although the CFE Treaty does not appear in the "National Security Concept" of 2000, a number of the document's provisions pertained to it. As with the 1997 security concept, the

No. 12 (2004), 39-54, and *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century – Putin, Medvedev and Beyond* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010).

⁵⁰⁰ "Kontsepsiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii," 1.

⁵⁰¹ "Kontsepsiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii," 9, 22.

2000 version affirmed Russia's adherence to arms control agreements, including for conventional armaments. It also added language about Russia's willingness to pursue adaptation of existing arms control agreements "to new conditions of international relations."⁵⁰² The two changes to the provisions on military security that garnered the most attention, those pertaining to the use of nuclear weapons and the use of the armed forces internally, also had implications for the CFE Treaty. The language on nuclear weapons offered a more expansive scope for their use. Whereas in 1997, Russia reserved the right to use those weapons in situations where armed aggression resulted in a "threat to the actual existence of the Russian Federation as a sovereign state," the 2000 version of the "National Security Concept" expanded that condition to armed aggression "if all other means of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted or have proven ineffective."⁵⁰³ This formulation implied limited confidence in the capabilities of Russia's conventional armed forces to meet potential threats, thanks to the drawn-out process of military reform (which does not appear in the 2000 version) and the limited resources devoted to the armed forces during the time of economic crisis. The CFE Treaty could have played a role in this instance as a way to mitigate an imbalance in the correlation of forces between Russia and NATO. The second change to the provisions on military security was the replacement of the 1997 version's ban on the use of military force against civilians with a more oblique reference to the constitution and laws of the Russian Federation as guides for the use of the armed forces inside the country.⁵⁰⁴ This change begged the question as to which types of forces might engage

⁵⁰² "Kontsepsiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii," 21.

⁵⁰³ "Russian National Security Concept," 1 (1997) and "Kontsepsiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii," 21. The secretary of the Security Council, Sergey Ivanov, assured foreign diplomats in Moscow that this formulation did not signify the lowering of the threshold for the possible use of nuclear weapons. "Brifing Sekretariya Soveta Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii," *DV* No. 3, 1 March 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5201969>.

⁵⁰⁴ "Kontsepsiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii," 21.

in combatting internal threats – those of the MOD? the Interior Ministry (MVD – *Ministerstvo vnutrennykh del*)? If the latter, would forces and their TLE be transferred to the MVD and thereby outside the scope of the CFE Treaty? A final change in the 2000 edition of the “National Security Concept” was the addition of language about the stationing of Russian forces outside the territory of the Russian Federation. The relevant provision states that the deployment (*razmeshchenie*, which also translates as “stationing”) of Russian forces, specifically including “military bases,” in “strategically important regions of the world...*on a treaty and international legal basis* [emphasis added] would serve Russia’s national interests.⁵⁰⁵ This portion of the “National Security Concept” could have clashed with a provision in the A/CFE that mandated host-nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces and the Istanbul Commitments Russia made to Georgia and Moldova.⁵⁰⁶

The portions of the “National Security Concept” of 2000 that covered foreign policy and the armed forces set the broader context for the development of the other documents Russia’s national security enterprise produced in 2000, the “Military Doctrine” and the “Foreign Policy Concept.” The interval between the adoption of the “National Security Concept” in January and the military doctrine and foreign policy concept in April and June, respectively, was probably attributable to a desire for consistency among the provisions of the three documents.

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, April 2000

The process of revising Russia’s military doctrine began in the spring of 1999, after the beginning of NATO’s air operation against the FRY. By late May, the Security Council had held

⁵⁰⁵ “Kontsepsiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” 22.

⁵⁰⁶ A/CFE, Article 1, paragraph 3.

two meetings on the subject and Defense Minister Sergeyev had received instructions from President Yeltsin to start work.⁵⁰⁷ The doctrine's revision was likely informed by the exercise ZAPAD (West) 1999, which took place toward the end of June, and whose scenario had been adjusted to take into account NATO's operation against the FRY.⁵⁰⁸ On 29 September, an expanded Collegium of the Ministry of Defense ("expanded" because it included representatives of the Security Council, MFA, Economics Ministry, MVD and Federal Border Service) approved a draft, with comments, for further revision and transmission to the Security Council for approval.⁵⁰⁹ The draft was the product of three years' worth of on-again, off-again efforts to update the doctrine of 1993.⁵¹⁰

The Security Council, rather than the MOD, did the heavy lifting in preparing the military doctrine, whose formal adoption required about four months in the first half of 2000. On 21

⁵⁰⁷ Vyacheslav Bantin, "Russian Defense Doctrine to Be Amended," *ITAR TASS Weekly News*, 25 May 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2989149>; Andrey Yarushin, "Russia Could Reconsider Defense Doctrine – Prikhodko," *ITAR TASS Weekly News*, 9 April 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2982545>. Sergey Prikhodko was a deputy chief of staff for Yeltsin, whose portfolio included foreign policy issues.

⁵⁰⁸ Pavel Koryashkin, "West 99 Exercise May Alter Military Doctrine – General," *ITAR TASS Weekly News*, 24 June 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2993775>. On ZAPAD 99; see also Oksana Antonenko, "Russia, NATO and European Security After Kosovo," *Survival* 41:4, 124-144, DOI: 10.1080/713660137: 135.

⁵⁰⁹ "Draft Military Doctrine Discussed," *Military News Bulletin*, 1 October 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/137646>. According to senior military officials, including First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Vladimir Manilov and General Makhmut Gareyev, experts and academicians assisted in drafting the revised military doctrine. Anatoliy Yurkin, "Russia May Adopt a New Military Doctrine, General Says," *ITAR TASS Weekly News*, 25 October 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3010554>; Anatoliy Yurkin, "New Military Doctrine Thoroughly Studied by Experts," *ITAR TASS Weekly News*, 12 November 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3014309>.

⁵¹⁰ Antonenko, "Russia, NATO and European Security After Kosovo:" 135. On the origins of the process of revision, see also Andrey Korbut, "In Places, Draft Military Doctrine Would Supplant the Constitution. – For Unclear Reasons, a Political Document Was Drafted in the Defense Ministry," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 13 October 1999, translated in *CDSP* 51, No. 41, 10 November 1999, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/19928139>. According to a report published in *Segodnya*, drafting the new military doctrine "was not only a long process, but also a contradictory one...four different (and absolutely incompatible) versions were drafted." Oleg Odnokolenko, "A Stale Doctrine: Strategists Do Not Regard the Chechen War as a War," *Segodnya*, 22 April 2000, translated in *CDSP* 52, No. 17 (24 May 2000), 15, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/13529285>.

April, “After receiving instructions from president-elect Vladimir Putin (‘We have to finish up this business today!’)...and without extraneous ceremony,” the Security Council approved the final version of the military doctrine.⁵¹¹

Although the authors of the “Military Doctrine of the Russia Federation” did not include NATO or the Kosovo crisis in the text, both influenced the document’s content. Several of the external threats referred obliquely to the alliance, its Strategic Concept, enlargement and operations:

- the creation (build-up) of groups of troops (forces) that disrupts the balance of forces close to the state border of the Russian Federation and the borders of its allies, as well as on the seas adjacent to their territory;
- the enlargement of military blocs and unions detrimental to the military security of the Russian Federation;
- the deployment of foreign troops, in violation of the UN Charter, on the territory of states that are adjacent to and are friendly with Russia.⁵¹²

Writing in the MFA’s journal, General Manilov, the General Staff’s point person for the new doctrine, mentioned NATO seventeen times and the air operation four times (the latter twice as the “Balkan tragedy”).⁵¹³ The omission of direct references to NATO might have reflected a desire to keep the door open for cooperation between Russia and the alliance. In late July, in fact, Manilov traveled to Brussels, where he presented the doctrine and compared it with

⁵¹¹ Pavel Koryashkin, “Russian Security Council Approves New Military Doctrine,” *ITAR TASS Weekly News*, 4 February 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2839717>; Oleg Odnokolenko, “A Stale Doctrine: Strategists Do Not Regard the Chechen War as a War.”

⁵¹² “Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” *KZ*, 12 May 2000, 3, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3314641>. An (awkward) English translation is at “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” *Military News Bulletin*, 1 May 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/136494>.

⁵¹³ Manilov also published a detailed three-part analysis of the doctrine. See *Military News Bulletin*, 1 June, 1 July and 1 August 2000 (<https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/136500>, [136513](https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/136513), and [136524](https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/136524), respectively). In total he mentioned NATO ten times and the air operation against the FRY five times.

NATO's Strategic Concept at a meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC).⁵¹⁴ While Manilov might not have changed any minds in Brussels about Russia's military doctrine or NATO's Strategic Concept, his outreach showed a potential for cooperation.

A significant point of the military doctrine was its approach toward the possible use of nuclear weapons. This provision of the military doctrine was an example of the operationalization of the "National Security Concept" in the military domain, as Russian commentators noted when the doctrine was adopted.⁵¹⁵ Russia retained the right to use nuclear weapons in response to use against it or its allies of such weapons, "as well as in reply to a large-scale aggression with the use of conventional weapons in situations critical for the national security of the Russian Federation."⁵¹⁶ The language in the military doctrine was looser than that of the "National Security Concept," however, in that it omitted the caveat "if all other means of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted or have proven ineffective." The addition of this provision to the military doctrine was a significant change from the 1993 version which, General Manilov explained, had only listed conditions under which nuclear weapons could *not* be used.⁵¹⁷ A catalyst for the overall change in doctrine, specifically regarding nuclear weapons, was the sorry state of Russia's conventional armed forces, especially in comparison to those of

⁵¹⁴ Pavel Koryashkin, "Manilov to Report Mil Doctrine at PJC Meeting," *ITAR-TASS Weekly News*, 24 July 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2864544> and Alexander Miniyev, "Russia, NATO Exchange Information on Defence Concepts," *ITAR-TASS Weekly News*, 25 July 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2864686>.

⁵¹⁵ Anatoliy Yurkin, "New Military Doctrine Guarantees Russia's National Interests," *ITAR TASS Weekly News*, 4 February 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2839681>; Andrey Shaburkin, "Russia Changes Its Military Doctrine," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 5 February 2000, translated in *CDSP* 52, No. 6 (8 March 2000), 13, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/13528323>.

⁵¹⁶ "Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii," 5-6.

⁵¹⁷ Mikhail Shevtsov, "Russian Security Council to Discuss Military Doctrine Soon," *ITAR TASS Weekly News*, 28 January 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2838626>.

the NATO states. According to Viktor Yesin, the head of the Security Council staff's administration for military development, "No matter how much progress Russia may make in economic terms, it will never be able to stand up to an organization like NATO with conventional weapons."⁵¹⁸

The "Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" offered a broad conceptual explanation of warfare and described the tasks of the armed forces and other state institutions in preserving the security of the state. The military doctrine offered an ambitious approach, while bearing in mind the state of the armed forces, that spanned the spectrum of conflict that included large-scale (regional) wars, local wars and conflicts, internal armed conflicts, and peacekeeping operations.⁵¹⁹ Nonetheless, it was also realistic in defining the missions of Russia's conventional armed forces (those subject to the CFE Treaty), which, in peacetime, should be able to repel "local scale aggression."⁵²⁰ In order to generate additional forces for larger-scale conflict, the military doctrine envisioned significant mobilization capabilities. Echoing a provision of the "National Security Concept," the military doctrine also noted that to carry out their missions, "limited contingents" of the Russian armed forces might be deployed in "strategically important regions" outside the territory of the Russian Federation under conditions "determined by relevant international legal documents."⁵²¹

⁵¹⁸ Andrey Shaburkin, "Russia Changes Its Military Doctrine." Shaburkin later commented "NATO's enlargement, expansion of its sphere of interests, and what has now become a regular practice of NATO deploying its troops on the territory of other countries without appropriate sanction from the UN Security Council" was also behind this change. Andrey Shaburkin, "Military Problems – Russia's New Military Doctrine Entitles It to First Use of Nuclear Weapons," *Moscow News*, 25 April 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/219633>.

⁵¹⁹ "Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii" [Military Doctrine of the Russia Federation], 15-16.

⁵²⁰ "Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii [Military Doctrine of the Russia Federation], 17.

⁵²¹ "Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii [Military Doctrine of the Russia Federation], 20.

The “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” was a concept for the armed forces’ implementation of a portion of the “National Security Concept” of January 2000. Two months after the Security Council adopted the doctrine, in June 2000, the MFA published their contribution to Russia’s foreign and security policy under President Putin, “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russia Federation.”

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, June 2000

The development of “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” was not as lengthy a process as the one that led to the publication of the new military doctrine. The Security Council adopted the concept in principle on 24 March and Putin approved it on 28 June. The brevity of the process, however, did not mean that it was simple or free of dispute. In the words of Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, the concept was the product of “very complicated and painstaking work” by not only the MFA, but also other ministries and departments with direct interest in the conduct of foreign affairs, to include the Security Council and the Presidential Administration. The concept’s development also took place while the influence of the MFA in the formulation of Russia’s foreign policy was under question. A member of the press asked Foreign Minister Ivanov which of the Ivanovs, he or the secretary of the Security Council, Sergey Ivanov, was more influential. The foreign minister answered that the MFA, guided by both Ivanovs, directly executed foreign policy as determined by the president.⁵²² The foreign

⁵²² “Press-Konferentsiya Ministra Innostrnykh del Rossiiskoy Federatsii I.S. Ivanova v Svyazi s Utverzhdeniem Kontseptsii Vneshney Politiki Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” *DV*, No. 8, 1 August 2000, 91-92, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5505978>. The reporter from *Golos Rossii* asked, “Recently there has been much discussion about who really executes Russia’s foreign policy line – people in shoulder boards [the military] or diplomats – and how authority is distributed between the Security Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation? In other words, who of the Ivanovs is more influential in the formation of Russia’s foreign policy?”

minister also parried an assertion that the security services were gaining influence, perhaps because of a lack of trust in the MFA, given recent and sudden appointments of two veterans of the services as deputy foreign ministers. Foreign Minister Ivanov responded by citing the relevant portion of the foreign policy concept that charged the MFA with “the direct implementation of the foreign policy course approved by the President” and coordination of the foreign policy activities of other Russian federal entities.⁵²³

The new foreign policy concept had to strike a balance between addressing “serious changes” that had occurred in the world and within Russia over the preceding years and the availability of resources.⁵²⁴ Therefore, the “novelty” of the new concept was its “realism,” in essence a more circumscribed set of priorities tied to the long-term tasks of internal development and the resources of the country. Despite these limitations, Russia would remain one of the most important factors in preserving international stability. Russia also remained a great power, although militarily as a “nuclear power” (and, by implication, and in line with the military doctrine, limited in conventional military forces and capabilities).⁵²⁵

Among the changes in the international environment behind the new foreign policy concept were threats and challenges that had not been as topical when the previous concept was issued in 1993. Terrorism and other transnational phenomena, for example, were “beginning to exert substantial influence on global and regional stability.” NATO, while not named explicitly,

⁵²³ “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” *International Affairs* (Moscow) 46, No. 5 (2000): 14.

⁵²⁴ “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation:” 1, 4.

⁵²⁵ “O Kontseptsii Vneshney Politiki Rossii,” *DV*, No. 4, 1 April 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5201850>. Another key characteristic of the concept was “healthy pragmatism,” which recognized the role of foreign policy in the internal development of Russia at a “critical period” and the “objectively limited” resources at its disposal. “Press-Konferentsiya Ministra Innostranykh del Rossiiskoy Federatsii I.S. Ivanova v Svyazi s Utverzhdeniem Kontseptsii Vneshney Politiki Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” *DV*, No. 8, 1 August 2000, 90, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5505978>.

emerged as a challenge to Russia's national interests as part of a trend "towards the establishment of a unipolar world structure that would be dominated by the U.S. economically and through force" that included "a focus on restricted-membership Western institutions and fora in addressing fundamental issues of international security." Similarly, the foreign policy concept flagged as problematic the "use of force-based methods in circumvention of the existing international legal mechanisms," a less-than-subtle reference to NATO's operation against the FRY in 1999.⁵²⁶

"The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation" hewed to former foreign minister Primakov's line of a balanced policy that supported Russia's interests globally and avoided a Euro-centric approach. Nonetheless, a "priority area" was Russia's relations with the states of the CIS. Relations with Europe remained Russia's "traditional foreign policy priority" and were focused on the development of a pan-European security system that was based on the OSCE. A European regional priority for Russia's foreign policy was to ensure that the A/CFE became "an effective instrument of ensuring European security." In an indirect acknowledgment of the shortcomings of the A/CFE, the "Foreign Policy Concept" also indicated that Russia would pursue the adoption of CSBMs (likely in the politically binding Vienna Document 1999) to cover coalition military activities and naval operations.⁵²⁷

Events of the preceding year framed the depiction of Russia's relations with NATO in the "Foreign Policy Concept." Although "cooperation" and "constructive interaction" with the alliance were possible, Russia's national interests and NATO's political and military goals "in many ways" diverged and were "occasionally" directly contradictory. The strategic concept

⁵²⁶ "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation:" 3.

⁵²⁷ "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation:" 10.

adopted by the allies in 1999 that allowed “for the conduct of force-based operations outside the zone of the Washington Treaty” (like the operation in Kosovo) and the expansion of NATO (which Russia “continued to negatively view”) exemplified these divergences and contradictions. The foreign policy concept also highlighted the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, particularly the provisions about “non-use of force; or threat of force and non-deployment of conventional armed force groupings or nuclear weapons and means of delivery thereof in the territories of new members.”⁵²⁸ Perhaps as a way of slowing or preempting the entry of the Baltic states into NATO, the foreign policy concept cited “good prospects” for relations with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia “onto the track of good neighborliness and mutually-beneficial cooperation,” as long as those states respected the rights of their Russian-speaking populations.⁵²⁹ These prospects would dim when all three Baltic states moved toward entry into NATO in 2004.

By the summer of 2000, six months into Vladimir Putin’s first term as Russia’s president, the government had adopted top-level guidance for the foreign and security policies of the Russian Federation. The provisions of the guidance as set out in the “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation,” the “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” and the “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” tracked consistently across all three documents, proof, according to one analyst, of “a well-coordinated and comprehensive approach” to foreign and security policy that stood in contrast to policy formulation in the “roaring 1990s.”⁵³⁰ The basic strategic guidance remained unchanged until 2003. Much as events of 1999 had been the

⁵²⁸ “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation:” 10-11.

⁵²⁹ “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation:” 11.

⁵³⁰ de Haas, *Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century – Putin, Medvedev and Beyond*, 16.

catalyst for changes to Russia's foreign and security policy in 2000, developments in the security environment from 2001-2003 precipitated further review of, primarily, its military aspects.

The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces, October 2003

Events that occurred after 2000 drove a reassessment of Russia's security policies. Terrorism took on greater priority for Putin's government in the wake of the attacks against the U.S. in September 2001 and the siege of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow in October 2002. In March 2003, Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, whom Putin had appointed to replace Marshal Sergeyev in 2001, told an interviewer, "Russia would be compelled to specify some points of its Security Concept and Military Doctrine to counter the menace of international terrorism" and that efforts were underway in this direction under the auspices of the Security Council. In particular, the role of the armed forces in combating terrorism required definition.⁵³¹ In fact, the Security Council had been working since 2000 to determine the authorities, and the legal basis for them, of the MOD, General Staff, Security Council and other law enforcement and security bodies for planning and other defense-related tasks.⁵³²

Further motivation for a reexamination of Russia's foreign and security policies, especially their military component, came from U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁵³³ The impact of these operations and the ongoing transformation of NATO, as well as

⁵³¹ "Russia's Security Concept Must Be Partly Specified – Sergey Ivanov," *ITAR TASS Weekly News*, 28 March 2003, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/4809845>.

⁵³² "RF Security Council Working Group Discusses Military Organization Reform," *Military News Agency*, 22 December 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/126075>. The General Staff cited concerns over limitations set by the CFE Treaty to argue for keeping the forces of the MVD outside the "armed forces," and thereby outside the scope of the treaty.

⁵³³ Anatoliy Yurkin, "Iraq War Urges Russia to Change Its Military Doctrine," *ITAR TASS Weekly News*, 21 April 2003, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/4875349>.

lingering resentment over the alliance's operation against the FRY in 1999, formed the basis for a reassessment of Russia's military policy that was published in October 2003.

“The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces” was more than an update to the military doctrine of 2000. The document was mostly an account of the progress of military reform and a lengthy list of measures yet to be taken, along with benchmarks for their completion. It was a “report [*doklad*] that contained the basic views of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense on the specifics of the development of the Armed Forces for the foreseeable future,” what one western analyst termed more a defense white paper than a doctrine.⁵³⁴ In its tone and structure, the document comes across as the military establishment's assertion of its rightful role in Russia's national security enterprise and a detailed programmatical, as opposed to just conceptual, justification for that role. Russian military policy was a “component of national security policy” and was based on both the national security and foreign policy concepts. “In fact, the Russian Armed Forces are at the center of the formulation of a new paradigm of national security of the Russian Federation.”⁵³⁵ In some parts, however, the document seemed a rationalization for resource-driven reductions in the armed forces, for instance implying that reduction of the personnel strength of the armed forces to a level of “defensive sufficiency” was the result of a “new level” of relations that excluded global nuclear war and major armed conflict with the U.S. or NATO (which set the conditions for “significant reduction” of nuclear and conventional forces), rather than constraints on resources.⁵³⁶

⁵³⁴ “Aktual'nye zadachi razvitiya vooruzhennykh Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” October 2003, 1, http://supol.narod.ru/archive/official_documents/doctrine/war_doctrine.htm. The moniker “defense white paper” is from de Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century – Putin, Medvedev and Beyond*, 20.

⁵³⁵ “Aktual'nye zadachi razvitiya vooruzhennykh Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” 1-2.

⁵³⁶ “Aktual'nye zadachi razvitiya vooruzhennykh Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” 2. The aggregate level of manning of all the branches of the armed forces, 1.16 million in 2003 and 1.0 million projected for 2005, were well within the limit of 1.45 million for forces in the ATTU region set in the CFE 1A Agreement of 10 July 1992, www.osce.org/

“The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces” offered a global view of Russia’s military policy, which accounted for the country’s “three faces” that looked to the west, the south, and the east (the Arctic was not yet a focus of policy, thus the omission of the north).⁵³⁷ As the focus of this research is on the AOA of the CFE Treaty, i.e. the ATTU region, the view to the west, toward the “euro-American world” (*evroamerikanskiy mir*) is most relevant. Among the achievements of the Russian armed forces in their development from 1992 was the formation of a “new system of military-political commitments towards allies.” At the time of the document’s release on 2 October 2003 at a meeting of the leadership of the armed forces, Russian press reporting chose to highlight remarks by Defense Minister Ivanov and Chief of the General Staff Colonel General Yuriy Baluyevskiy that were critical of NATO, despite the fact that the document itself reflected an “ambiguity” toward the alliance.⁵³⁸ Ivanov’s comments surprised and concerned NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and the alliance’s defense ministers, who met a week later. Provisions of the new policy about the possibility of the preventive use of the armed forces outside the territory of the Russian Federation also drew criticism from Georgia’s President Eduard Shevardnadze.⁵³⁹ As in other statements of Russia’s

library/14093.

⁵³⁷ “Aktual’nye zadachi razvitiya vooruzhennykh Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” 1.

⁵³⁸ de Haas, *Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century – Putin, Medvedev and Beyond*, 21-22. On the one hand, the document decried NATO’s offensive doctrine and anti-Russia attitude, while on the other hand, it dangled possibility for cooperation between Russia and NATO. See also Dmitry Suslov, “Russia Declares Cold War on NATO – The Alliance Calls on Sergey Ivanov to Clarify His New ‘Doctrine,’” *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 10 October 2003, translated in *CDSP* 55, No. 40 (5 November 2003), <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/19935200> and “Russia’s Doctrine Extends Hope for Constructive Ties with EU,” *ITAR TASS Weekly News*, 2 October 2003, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5347009>.

⁵³⁹ Dmitry Suslov, “Russia Declares Cold War on NATO – The Alliance Calls on Sergey Ivanov to Clarify His New ‘Doctrine.’” On Shevardnadze’s comments (and Ivanov’s dismissal of them), see Alexander Konovalov and Nikolay Palagichev, “Russia’s Military Doctrine Proceeds from Existing Threats – Comment,” *ITAR TASS Weekly News*, 12 October 2003, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5390975>. Shevardnadze was likely reacting to a provision of the policy that left open the possibility for “fundamental change in the posturing of groups of forces” in the event of

foreign and security policy, NATO was not named as a threat. However, several of the by-then-familiar external threats pointed to the alliance:

- Conduct of exercises near Russia’s borders “with provocative objectives,”
- Build-up of groupings of forces near the borders of Russia of its allies, “leading to violation of the existing balance of forces,”
- Expansion of military blocs or alliances “to the detriment of the military security of Russia or its allies,” and
- Introduction of foreign forces without Russia’s agreement or a resolution of the UN Security Council on the territory of neighboring states and those friendly to Russia.⁵⁴⁰

Two characteristics of (then) contemporary warfare that also bear mention were the relationship between conventional armed forces and nuclear deterrence and the importance of air defense forces. As for the former, the military doctrine of 2000 had included language about the possible use of nuclear weapons in the event of an attack against the Russian Federation using only conventional forces. In “The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces,” the leadership of the armed forces took the point further in the context of the development of the armed forces to meet the challenges of the full spectrum of conflict. For nuclear weapons to present a credible deterrent to attack by an enemy using conventional armed forces, Russia would have to possess “highly equipped, combat ready conventional forces,” an apparent compromise between supporters of Russia’s nuclear forces, like former defense minister Sergeyev, and those who sought more resources for the conventional armed forces.⁵⁴¹ Regarding air defense, the lessons of U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq had reinforced what the military leadership had learned from NATO’s operation against the FRY in 1999: a “well

the appearance of “large internal or interstate tensions” in areas bordering the CIS. “Aktual’nye zadachi razvitiya vooruzhennykh Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” 7.

⁵⁴⁰ “Aktual’nye zadachi razvitiya vooruzhennykh Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” 6.

⁵⁴¹ “Aktual’nye zadachi razvitiya vooruzhennykh Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” 9.

defended, jamming resistant air defense system” capable of defending against all aviation platforms, even those using stealth technology, would play a “decisive role” in future warfare.⁵⁴²

“The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” joined the “National Security Concept,” “Foreign Policy Concept,” and “Military Doctrine” of 2000 as the explication of Russia’s foreign and security policies for the evolving security environment of the early years of the new millennium and for a new, one might say, post-post-Soviet government under Vladimir Putin. These policies aimed to reassert Russia’s role, regionally and globally, and to jump-start the process of the reform of the armed forces in support of this role. At the same time, though, they were grounded in the reality of the ongoing domestic development of the Russian Federation, which was, like the reform of the armed forces, very much still a work in progress. This foreign and security policy was the product of a European security environment that was in part shaped by the conclusion of the A/CFE in November 1999. The agreement, once it entered into force, would support two goals of Russia’s policy: reducing the possibility of major armed conflict in Europe and mitigating the negative consequences of the first tranche of the expansion of NATO. Russia’s approach to the treaty during this period, to include the quest for its EIF, is the topic of the next section of this chapter.

Russia and the CFE Treaty – 2000-2006

The value of the CFE Treaty in support of Russia’s foreign and security policy became less and less apparent during the first years of the twenty-first century. The cautious optimism that followed the signing of the A/CFE in November 1999 gradually dissolved as the Russians realized that the adapted treaty would not enter into force quickly and the European security

⁵⁴² “Aktual’nye zadachi razvitiya vooruzhennykh Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” 10.

environment seemed to continue to develop to Russia's detriment. The positive energy from Istanbul carried over to the Second REVCON six months later, when the parties to the CFE Treaty pledged renewed efforts toward ratification and EIF. By the time of the Third REVCON in 2006, however, prospects for EIF had become dim and the Russian delegation's calls for action fell on deaf ears because of the linkage by the NATO states of ratification of the A/CFE and Russia's fulfillment of the Istanbul Commitments it had made to Georgia and Moldova. Between the two conferences, Russia, joined by Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, ratified the A/CFE and NATO took in more new members that were not parties to the CFE Treaty. From the Russians' perspective, the "cornerstone of European security," while not yet cracked, was under severe stress. The CFE Treaty had entered a period of crisis.⁵⁴³

The (Bumpy) Road toward Entry-into-Force of the Adapted CFE Treaty

The Russians' priority after the Istanbul Summit was for all the states parties to the CFE Treaty to ratify the A/CFE and thereby bring about its EIF.⁵⁴⁴ Why was EIF so important in this case? Although the original CFE Treaty had provisionally entered into force some months before its formal EIF, that was not the case with the A/CFE. Therefore, the provisions of the A/CFE that mattered most to Moscow as constraints on an expanding NATO – the system of national and territorial limits in place of the bloc-to-bloc limits and the accession of new states to the treaty – were not operative pending ratification by all the states parties to the agreement. To

⁵⁴³ Wilcox, "Russia and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) – A Paradigm Change?" 576.

⁵⁴⁴ The states parties to the CFE Treaty had "undertaken to move forward expeditiously to facilitate completion of national ratification procedures, so that the Agreement on Adaptation [could] enter into force as soon as possible" at the Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty at Istanbul in November 1999. "Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe."

advance this process, the government would have to gain the concurrence of both houses of the Federal Assembly, the State Duma and the Federation Council, to ratify the agreement, and the level of armed forces in the North Caucasus region would have to be reduced to meet the modified sub-limits for the flank region in the adaptation agreement. Moscow also recognized the need to demonstrate progress in meeting commitments to reduce arms and equipment in Georgia and Moldova, in accordance with the Istanbul Commitments, which had “opened the door” to the signing of the A/CFE.⁵⁴⁵

The Russians had assumed, based on statements by President Clinton at the Istanbul Summit and the NATO allies in December 1999, that the only condition they had to satisfy in order for the process of ratification to proceed was to meet the flank limits.⁵⁴⁶ At a meeting on 3 March 2000, the Russian delegation informed the JCG that Russian forces would meet the flank limits (1300 tanks, 2140 ACVs, 1680 artillery pieces) once the situation in Chechnya stabilized. Putin reaffirmed this statement on 20 March, when he told reporters that Russia would “gradually” comply with the flank limits while operations in Chechnya continued.⁵⁴⁷ He repeated this message in November, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the original CFE Treaty, and also expressed appreciation for “the understanding with which our

⁵⁴⁵ Zagorskiy, “Krisis kontrolya obychnykh vooruzhennykh sil v Evrope – sud”ba Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhennykh silakh,” 140.

⁵⁴⁶ Ulrich Kuehn, *From Capitol Hill to Istanbul: The Origins of the Current CFE Deadlock*, 15.

⁵⁴⁷ “Russia Pledges CFE Compliance,” *Arms Control Today* 30 (April 2000), <https://www.armscontrol.org/node/2932>. According to this report, Russia’s operation in Chechnya and the status of Russian TLE in Georgia and Moldova had been “the main topics of discussion” in the JCG.

forced measures to rebuff a large-scale terrorist aggression, which led to our temporarily exceeding flank limitations, were met.”⁵⁴⁸

Moscow demonstrated the seriousness of their commitment to meet the flank limits when they agreed to host a visit by observers from participating states of the OSCE to Russian forces in Chechnya from 19 to 22 June 2000. Although Russia hosted this event under the auspices of the Vienna Document 1999, Foreign Minister Ivanov linked it to the CFE Treaty during a press conference in July. He noted that one of the motivations behind the hosting of the “unprecedented” event was to demonstrate that Russia “strictly fulfills and will fulfill all its obligations (*obyazatel'stva*), including on the flank limits, which it took upon itself in accordance with the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.” Ivanov also expressed hope that Russia’s “openness” and “constructive approach” in this instance would be “properly assessed by Western partners.”⁵⁴⁹ The Russians had long resisted calls from delegations in Vienna to host such a visit, and their decision to proceed with it in mid-2000 was likely tied to compliance with flank limits (and transparency about this compliance) as much as it was to silencing western criticism in the OSCE. Transparency had become an issue because the Russians had refused to provide supplemental data on additional TLE in the flank zone as requested by NATO CFE states, as well as to approve requests for inspections in the North Caucasus, especially in Chechnya. Not until 2002 could NATO states indirectly verify Russian compliance with the flank limits using inspections of Russian units outside the flank zone that

⁵⁴⁸ Press Service of the President of the Russian Federation, “Statement by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of Signing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” *Military News Bulletin* 1 December 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse.doc/136577>.

⁵⁴⁹ “Press-Konferentsiya Ministra Innostranykh del Rossiiskoy Federatsii I.S. Ivanova v Svyazi s Utverzheniem Kontseptsii Vneshney Politiki Rossiiskoy Federatsii:” 92. *Obyazatel'stva* translates as both “obligation,” which is legally binding, and “commitment,” which is politically binding.

were likely to have sent TLE to the North Caucasus.⁵⁵⁰ When the Russians did facilitate an inspection by NATO states in the region, they emphasized its contribution to transparency. In June 2001, for example, a German-led team that included inspectors from Poland and Turkey visited units in the Caspiisk region, which was located in the North Caucasus and the flank zone. The conduct of the inspection was “confirmation of efforts undertaken by Russia in fulfillment of its obligations and the guarantee of the maximum possible transparency” regarding the elimination of excess TLE in the flank zone, which refuted allegations that Russia had not been providing sufficient transparency of the removal of excess TLE from the area.⁵⁵¹

The Russian government would not be able to claim compliance with the flank limits of the A/CFE until 2002, when Russia reported 1294 tanks, 2044 ACVs, and 1557 artillery pieces in the flank zone (against limits of 1300, 2140, and 1680, respectively). The NATO allies were skeptical about the Russians’ claim, because the manner in which the data was presented was not to the degree of detail required by the treaty and because the Russians excluded TLE that was “non-combat capable” (a unilateral Russian definition). A western analyst observed that this “creative accounting” by the Russians produced “dubious reporting [that] almost certainly reflected disputes between the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian military who

⁵⁵⁰ United Kingdom Parliament, House of Commons, Select Committee on Defense, *Joint Memorandum Submitted by the Ministry of Defense and Foreign and Commonwealth Office*, 14 April 2003, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmdfence/321/3022702.htm>. An analyst from SIPRI attributed the problem of transparency of Russia’s compliance with TLE limits in the flank zone and fulfillment of other CFE Treaty-related commitments, such as for reductions of TLE east of the Ural Mountains, to Russia’s simultaneous use of the higher limits of the A/CFE in the information they provided and avoidance of the stricter transparency measures in the same agreement. Zdzislaw Lachowski, “Conventional Arms Control,” in SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), 553-554.

⁵⁵¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (hereafter MFA RF), “Ob itogakh inspeptsii v ramkakh DOVSE Rossiiskogo voennogo ob”ekta v Kaspiiske,” 17 July 2001, http://www.mid.ru/obyecne-vooruzenia/-/asset_publisher/MUdOT56NKlk/content/id/577022.

still found transparency a dangerous concept.”⁵⁵² Creative accounting practices aside, the Russians credited the achievement of these levels of TLE to the planning and execution by the MOD and General Staff of a “whole complex of measures” to withdraw forces from the “antiterrorist operation in the North Caucasus.” Having met their obligation regarding the flank limits, as well as others pertaining to Russian forces in Georgia and Moldova (see below on withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova), the Russians in early 2002 looked to the NATO states to accelerate their processes of ratification of the A/CFE.⁵⁵³ The Russians also began their own process of ratification.

The formal process of ratification of the A/CFE by the Russian government began in 2002 with the government’s transmission of the documents on ratification to the State Duma. Hearings by the Duma and the Federation Council would not take place until 2004, though. In the interim, the treaty popped up in debates over other matters in the Duma, specifically proposed declarations on NATO expansion and a defense agreement between Georgia and the U.S., as well as a draft border treaty between Russia and Lithuania. During each debate in the Duma, speakers raised the implications of the issue for the A/CFE. In the debates about the draft declaration on NATO expansion and the draft border agreement between Russia and Lithuania, a member of the Duma and a representative of the MFA, respectively, decried the position of NATO states, in particular the U.S., that linked Russia’s fulfillment of the Istanbul Commitments to ratification and, thereby, EIF of the A/CFE.⁵⁵⁴ The declaration the Duma approved on NATO

⁵⁵² Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 207.

⁵⁵³ Aleksey Lyashchenko, “My slovo sderzhali. Otveteper’ za partnerami,” *KZ* 17 January 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3403300>.

⁵⁵⁴ For the debate on NATO expansion, see “Zdanie Gosudarstvennoy Dumy. Bol’shoi zal. 24 dekabrya 2002 goda,” *Stenogramma zasedanii Gosdumy*, 24 December 2002, 90, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/4619684>. On the Georgia-U.S. defense agreement, see “Zdanie Gosudarstvennoy Dumy. Bol’shoi zal. 16 aprelya 2003 goda,” *Stenogramma zasedanii Gosdumy*, 16 April 2003, 25, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/4939395>. On the

expansion (for transmission to President Putin, the Russian government, the UN Security Council, the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly) warned of the negative consequences of the accession of the Baltic states to the alliance and the need for them to accede to the A/CFE. It also criticized efforts by NATO states, especially the U.S. and Turkey, to artificially obstruct the EIF of the A/CFE.⁵⁵⁵ The declaration on the defense agreement between Georgia and the U.S. drew attention to both countries' commitments to restraint in deployments of forces in the region (while ignoring Russia's commitments vis-à-vis Georgia) and called for the soonest possible ratification of A/CFE.⁵⁵⁶

The case for ratification of the A/CFE in 2002 rested mainly on two points: the agreement contributed to a secure balance of forces in Europe and its provisions constrained NATO. According to the chairman of the Duma's defense committee, General Andrey Nikolayev, the various politically binding commitments Russia, a number of NATO allies, and other parties to the treaty undertook "parallel with the signing of the Agreement" and without the requirement for ratification (the Istanbul Commitments), were "part of a package that forms the single (*edinyi*, which also translates as "unified") regime of the updated Treaty."⁵⁵⁷ This framing

Russia-Lithuania border agreement, see "Zdanie Gosudarstvennoy Dumy. Bol'shoy zal. 21 maya 2003 goda," *Stenogramma zasedanii Gosdumy*, 21 May 2003, 52, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5031233>.

⁵⁵⁵ "O zayavlenii Gosudarstvennoy Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoy Federatsii 'O situatsii v svyazi s rashireniem NATO,'" *Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Postanovleniya*, 24 December 2002, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/4605012>.

⁵⁵⁶ "Zayavlenie Gosudarstvennoy Dumy o Soglashenii o sotrudnichestve v sfere oborony mezhdru pravitel'stvami Gruzii i SShA," *Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Zayavleniya i obrashcheniya po voprosam vneshney politiki* No. 3889-III, 2003, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/22377691>.

⁵⁵⁷ Vitaliy Strugovets, "Ogranichennaya Evropa," *KZ*, 17 May 2002, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6687335>. Experts from the MFA and the General Staff with experience in the negotiations on the CFE Treaty, Vladislav Chernov and Colonel Nikolai Proshkin, respectively, made the same general points in favor of ratification of the agreement in this article, under the heading "Opinion of Specialists." See also MFA RF, "O proekte Federal'nogo zakona 'O ratifikatsii soglasheniya ob adaptatsii Dogovora ob Obychnykh Vooruzhennykh Silakh v

of the Istanbul Commitments captured the inner contradiction of Moscow's approach to them: they were taken outside the treaty yet constituted a part of the treaty regime. In terms of limiting NATO's capabilities, the adapted treaty set levels of TLE for the members of NATO that were significantly lower than those permitted under the original treaty, limited the possibilities for the deployment of NATO forces in central Europe, and precluded NATO from conducting an extraordinary temporary deployment (ETD) on the territory of new and prospective members in the flank zone.⁵⁵⁸

As for the benefits of the adapted CFE Treaty for Russia, according to General Nikolayev, first and foremost, the Russian armed forces would not have to reduce their holdings of TLE because Russia's declared national holdings under the adapted treaty were the same as those under the original one. Second, Russia gained more flexibility to maintain forces in the flank area. Third, the adapted treaty and politically binding agreements reached at the time of its signature permitted Russia to maintain armaments and equipment in Armenia, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Fourth, the adapted treaty was open to accession by new parties, e.g. new members of NATO that were not parties to the original treaty. Finally, the enhanced provisions for exchange of information and verification offered greater transparency over movements of NATO states' forces. Curiously, General Nikolaev's sales pitch for the adapted CFE Treaty also included the provision for host-nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces on a state's

Evrope' (Po materialam byulletenya 'Dumskoe obozrenie' No. 39 (1193) 23 marta 2002 goda)," 27 March 2002, http://www.mid.ru/obychnye-vooruzhenia/-/asset_publisher/MUdOT56NKlk/content/id/562136.

⁵⁵⁸ Per the provisions of the A/CFE, an ETD could include no more than 459 tanks, 723 ACVs and 420 artillery pieces in excess of declared territorial limits of TLE.

territory, a concept that would dog the Russians vis-à-vis their continued presence in Georgia and Moldova.⁵⁵⁹

The case for the ratification of the agreement on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty came with two provisos. First, the agreement was consistent with Russia's national security interests "at the current time." Changes to the security environment in Europe, for instance through the entry of new members, like the Baltic states, into NATO, might change that assessment. Second, as Putin explained in his letter to the Duma that accompanied the ratification documents, should the treaty be ratified, the government would rapidly pursue a new initiative for conventional arms reductions, one that would "cut the ground from under the feet of critics of our temporary exceeding of the flank limits in connection with the necessity to conduct the antiterrorist operation in the Chechen Republic," critics who would "try to use that fact to exert pressure on Russia." At the end of the day, the best course for the Duma would be to wait for the results of NATO's Prague Summit, scheduled for November 2002, at which the Baltic states and Slovenia were expected to receive invitations to join the alliance.⁵⁶⁰ The Duma seems to have followed that course, because hearings on the ratification of the treaty did not begin until 2004.

The most contentious issue that came to affect the ratification and EIF of the A/CFE was the status of Russian forces and their TLE in Georgia and Moldova, the legacy of the disposition of the Soviet army and Russian intervention in separatist conflicts that arose there. Moscow portrayed their forces as peacekeepers, although in both cases they lacked a mandate from the UN or OSCE. The extent to which this issue would dash Russia's hopes about the A/CFE was

⁵⁵⁹ Strugovets, "Ogranichennaya Evropa."

⁵⁶⁰ Strugovets, "Ogranichennaya Evropa."

not evident in 2000 and 2001. In fact, both the MFA and the MOD painted a positive picture of Russia's implementation of the commitments Moscow had assumed in Istanbul in 1999.

Under the terms of the agreement between Russia and Georgia, Russia pledged to reduce TLE present in Georgia to 153 tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery systems, to include reducing all TLE at bases at Gudauta and Vaziani (with these bases being disbanded and withdrawn by 1 July 2001) by 31 December 2000. Russia would be granted a basic temporary deployment of 153 tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery systems at bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki. Throughout 2000 and 2001, Russia and Georgia were to negotiate the final disposition of the aforementioned bases in Georgia. The removal of Russian heavy armaments proved less challenging than determining the fate of the Russian bases in Georgia. Withdrawals and reductions (conversion to civilian use or destruction) of TLE at Gudauta and Vaziani began in early August, with TLE being withdrawn by rail and then sea through the port of Batumi and reductions conducted at the 142d ordnance repair plant at Tbilisi.⁵⁶¹ During this process, and not for the first time in the history of the implementation of the CFE Treaty by the USSR and Russia, Moscow relied on funding from outside sources (in this case the U.S., UK and a voluntary fund established by the OSCE) to cover costs of fulfilling these commitments. According to the Russian military press, this reliance on foreign funding was "logical," because the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia was carried out in accordance with the CFE Treaty.⁵⁶² In a flurry of activity that

⁵⁶¹ "Russia Unloading Part of Ordnance Withdrawn from Georgia," *Military News Agency*, 9 August 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/123529>. "Second Train with Russian Armament to Leave Tbilisi September 5," *Military News Agency*, 30 August 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/123935>. On problems the 142d ordnance repair facility experienced with funding for the reductions, see "Russian Plant in Georgia Finances Ordnance Scrapping Out of Own Funds," *Military News Agency*, 5 September 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/124033>. See also Zdzislaw Lachowski, "Conventional Arms Control," in *SIPRI Yearbook 2001*, 556-557.

⁵⁶² Aleksandr Tikhonov, "Dogovor dorozhe deneg. K vyvodu rossiiskikh voisk iz Gruzii sledyet podkhodit' s pozitsii pragmatizma i natsional'nykh interesov," *KZ*, No. 145, 5 August 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3316658>.

involved loading and moving three trainloads of equipment, the Russians worked to the last minute to complete the removal of TLE from Gudauta by the deadline of 31 December 2000. The successful completion of the removal of TLE from Gudauta was contingent on the cooperation – or, at least, non-interference – of the Abkhazian authorities who controlled the territory and opposed the move. To preempt accusations of a lack of transparency regarding the withdrawal, the Russians hosted foreign observers to the loading and departure of the trains.⁵⁶³ On 26 December, a spokesman for the Russian Group of Forces in the Transcaucasus announced the departure of the final trainload of equipment and Russia's fulfillment of "the obligations it assumed under the agreements with Georgia achieved at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999 and the adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty."⁵⁶⁴

One potential hiccup in the removal of Russian TLE from Georgia was the transfer of some of it to Armenia instead of back to Russia. In late October 2000, the Russians moved seventy-six ACVs from the base in Akhalkalaki to another Russian base in Gyumri, Armenia. The Azerbaijanis alleged that the TLE had really been shifted to the conflict zone in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.⁵⁶⁵ Responding to this allegation, as well as statements of concern by the U.S. and an accusation by Turkey that the transfer violated the CFE Treaty, the Armenian and Russian foreign ministries, as well as Armenian Defense Minister Serzh Sarkisyan, explained that the TLE would remain under Russian control at the 102nd base in Gyumri and its

⁵⁶³ "Russia Drafting Schedule of Armament Withdrawal from Georgia," *Military News Agency*, 24 October 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/124963>; "50th Military Base to Be Withdrawn from Abkhazia Dec. 10-31," *Military News Agency*, 6 December 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/125745>; Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, "Iz Minoborony. Vypolnyaya stambulskie dogovorennosti," KZ No. 232, 8 December 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3319321>.

⁵⁶⁴ "Russia Completes Ordnance Withdrawal from Base in Georgia," *Military News Agency*, 20 December 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/126012>.

⁵⁶⁵ Lachowski, "Conventional Arms Control," in *SIPRI Yearbook 2001*, 557.

presence in Armenia did not violate provisions of the CFE Treaty or any agreements reached at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999. The Russian MFA added that the move from Akhalkalaki, which is near Armenia, had been undertaken for “technical and financial reasons.”⁵⁶⁶

Negotiations on the disposition of the Russian bases in Georgia were more contentious. From the perspective of the provisions of the A/CFE, the issue was consent of the host nation, Georgia, for the presence of foreign forces. Tbilisi’s lack of control over parts of its territory, for example Abkhazia, compounded the problem. Notwithstanding the Istanbul Commitments, the two sides failed to reach agreement on the status of the facilities at Gudauta, Vaziani, Batumi and Akhalkalaki by 1 July 2001. The Georgians rejected Russia’s proposals to maintain TLE at Batumi and Akhalkalaki for as long as fifteen to twenty-five years.⁵⁶⁷ The Russian side harshly criticized the Georgians for not fulfilling their part of the agreement:

We cannot allow a situation similar to the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from Germany, when servicemen during winter found themselves simply in inhuman conditions. To close the bases in Akhalkalaki and Batumi requires 10-11 years, for financial reasons. And they know this in Georgia, but they say: “You want it – you can fit it in 3.5 years.”⁵⁶⁸

⁵⁶⁶ “Move of Russian Ordnance Matches CFE Treaty – Armenian Diplomat,” *Military News Agency*, 25 October 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/125006>; “Russia to Complete Armament Relocation in Trans Caucasus Nov. 15,” *Military News Agency*, 9 November 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/125259>; “CIS Defense. Relocation of Russian Military Hardware from Georgia to Armenia,” *Parlamentskaya gazeta*, 21 December 2000, translated in *Defense and Security*, 25 December 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2724843>. The Russian MFA noted that it was “completely natural that in fulfilling its Istanbul commitments in the context of the CFE Treaty, the Russian side rightly chooses optimal, including economically justified, decisions.” “Zayavlenie ofitsial’nogo predstavatelya MID Rossii, 3 noyabrya,” *DV* No. 12, 1 December 2000: 78, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5198448>.

⁵⁶⁷ Lachowski, “Conventional Arms Control,” in *SIPRI Yearbook 2001*, 557.

⁵⁶⁸ “Rossiya-Gruziya. Interv’yu spetsial’nogo predstavatelya Prezidenta Rossiiskoy Federatsii po gruzino-abkhazkomu uregulirovaniyu stats-sekretarya-pervogo zamestitya ministra inostrannykh del V.V. Loshinina

Negotiations that included talks between Russian and Georgian representatives to the JCG beginning in 2002 remained deadlocked over a host of issues, the primary one being the length of time Russian forces could remain at Batumi and Akhalkalaki. President Putin even conditioned his attendance at the NATO Summit at Istanbul in 2004 on agreement to a seven-year period (which was not accepted, so Putin did not attend the meeting).⁵⁶⁹ As tensions between Russia and Georgia increased over time, incidents like Georgia's accusation that the Russians had moved tanks into South Ossetia in violation of the CFE Treaty in February 2003 further complicated the negotiations.⁵⁷⁰ Only in May 2005 did the two sides reach agreement on the withdrawal of Russian forces and reversion of the bases to Georgian control, with the exception of the base for Russian "peacekeepers" at Gudauta, Abkhazia, which remained outside the control of the Georgian government. The withdrawal was completed in 2007.⁵⁷¹

Russia's commitments to Moldova were broadly similar to those to Georgia, i.e. to withdraw Russian conventional arms and equipment from the country by the end of 2001 and completely withdraw Russian forces by the end of 2002. The situation in Moldova was also similar to that in Georgia, although in the former case, all Russian forces were located on

gazete "Vremya novostey," *DV* No. 2, 28 February 2003, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/4901744>. The Russian MOD asserted "the timetable for Russia's withdrawal did not allow time to build new accommodation in Russia for the hardware and troops stationed there." Pal Dunay, "Either Bring the Adapted CFE Treaty into Force or Do Not – But Face the Consequences," in Centre for OSCE Research, *OSCE Yearbook 2003*, 278, http://www.core-hamburg.de/CORE_English/pub_osce_inh_03.htm.

⁵⁶⁹ On Putin and the 2004 NATO Summit, see Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 203. The ups and downs of the negotiations over the bases in Georgia are concisely chronicled in the entries on Conventional Arms Control in the annual yearbooks of SIPRI for 2001-2006.

⁵⁷⁰ Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 202; Zdzislaw Lachowski and Martin Sjorgren, "Conventional Arms Control," in SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (London: Oxford University Press, 2004), 718.

⁵⁷¹ Zagorskiy, "Krisis kontrolya obychnykh vooruzhennykh sil v Evrope – sud"ba Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhennykh silakh," 141.

territory the central government in Chisinau did not control, the Transdnestrian region. The Russian forces and facilities included so-called peacekeeping forces, troops assigned to guard a large arms depot at Kolbasna, and the vast quantity of ammunition (approximately 40,000 tons) stored at the depot. Moldova differed from Georgia in one respect – its neutrality. The Moldovan government made a commitment at Istanbul to renounce the right to receive a temporary deployment in excess of its declared national limit of TLE “due to its Constitutional provisions which control and prohibit any presence of foreign military forces on the territory of Moldova.”⁵⁷² Therefore, the government in Chisinau would also be unable, constitutionally, to grant host-nation consent for the presence of foreign armed forces on Moldovan territory.

A major complication in the process of Russia’s fulfillment of its Istanbul Commitments to Moldova was the status of the Transdnestrian region. The de facto authorities in Transdnestria opposed the departure of the Russian forces, and they periodically obstructed the process (Moscow did not hesitate to exploit this situation as needed). The complexity of this situation was illustrated by at least one ill-fated CFE inspection of Russian forces in the Transdnestrian region in late January 2000. The Transdnestrian authorities denied entrance to a Spanish-led inspection team because they were accompanied by escorts from the Moldovan government. The Russians took the Transdnestrian authorities to task for this action, which was apparently not a one-off occurrence, as having obstructed the “normal functioning” of the CFE Treaty.⁵⁷³

⁵⁷² Annex 13 to the “Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.”

⁵⁷³ MFA RF, “Zayavlenie MID Rossii, 24 fevralya,” *DV* No. 3, 1 March 2000: 46, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5201946>; “Moldovans Not Allowed to Russian Military Installations in Near Dniestr,” *Military News Agency*, 7 February 2000, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/121308>.

The withdrawal of Russian armaments, equipment and ammunition proceeded in fits and starts beginning with three trainloads that left the Transdnestrian region during the OSCE Istanbul Summit meeting in November 1999. As was the case with withdrawals from Georgia and the return of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, Moscow sought outside funding. The U.S. offered financial assistance and the OSCE set up a voluntary fund to facilitate the movement of equipment, to include TLE, from Moldova and, eventually, the safe destruction of ammunition on site at the depot at Kolbasna.⁵⁷⁴ A firm commitment by the OSCE to fund the process jump-started the reduction and removal of Russian TLE from Moldova in mid-2001, and 108 tanks, 131 ACVs and 125 artillery pieces were destroyed or removed during July and August. Moscow's agreement in September to reduce the region's debt convinced the Transdnestrian authorities to cease their obstruction of the reductions. The Russians announced they had completed the reductions and withdrawal of their TLE in November 2001.⁵⁷⁵ The Russian MFA reported, "In this way, Russia completely and in full, even early, fulfilled the cited commitments it assumed at Istanbul. The process of the further execution of the Istanbul decisions (outside the context of CFE) will be continued." The MFA also noted that Russia had "in full measure" also fulfilled its Istanbul CFE commitments regarding Georgia. Moscow counted on the other CFE states parties who had taken on commitments at Istanbul to also "scrupulously and in good faith" fulfill them.⁵⁷⁶ In other words, it was time for the other states parties to the CFE Treaty, especially NATO allies, to ratify the A/CFE.

⁵⁷⁴ Lachowski, "Conventional Arms Control," in *SIPRI Yearbook 2001*, 558-559.

⁵⁷⁵ Zdzislaw Lachowski, "Conventional Arms Control," in *SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (London: Oxford University Press, 2002), 718.

⁵⁷⁶ "Zayavlenie MID Rossii, 16 noyabrya, V svyazi s vyvodom poslednogo eshelona s vooruzheniem i voennoy tekhnikoy iz Pridnestrovskogo regiona v Rossiyu," *DV* No. 12, 1 December 2001: 154, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/4784378>.

As was the case with Russian forces in Georgia, most other parties to the treaty did not share Moscow's assessment of what constituted their Istanbul Commitments toward Moldova. The NATO allies, especially, held a broader view of the commitments, which was not limited to the reduction and removal of TLE. The process of removal or destruction of ammunition at the Kolbasna depot and the withdrawal of the remaining Russian "peacekeepers" lurched along, although progress suffered from intransigence by the Transdniestrian authorities, frustration on the part of the government in Chisinau, and occasional shifting of the goalposts by the Russians to include, for example, resolution of the conflict between the two sides as a condition for withdrawal of their forces. A "critical turning point" in both the solidification of the NATO allies' view of the Istanbul Commitments and the hardening of Moscow's position toward them was the NATO Prague Summit in 2002. Whereas the Russians were confident they had fulfilled their CFE Treaty-related commitments, the summit declaration hewed to the broader view of them. While welcoming "the significant results of Russia's effort to reduce forces" in the flank region, the allies "urged swift fulfillment of the outstanding Istanbul commitments on Georgia and Moldova, which will create the conditions for Allies and other States Parties to move forward on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty."⁵⁷⁷ The Russians were likely particularly irked at the fact that NATO also used this summit meeting to issue invitations to the second tranche of new members, including states that were not parties to the CFE Treaty (the three Baltic states and Slovenia). For Moscow, adding another obstacle to the EIF of the A/CFE and inviting these states into the alliance proved to be a toxic combination.

⁵⁷⁷ Ulrich Kuehn, *From Capitol Hill to Istanbul: The Origins of the Current CFE Deadlock*, 15. The text of the Prague Summit Declaration, 21 November 2002, is at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19552.htm?

In preparing the ground for the ratification and EIF of the A/CFE, the Russians also tied up a loose end in their compliance with the treaty – the reduction of TLE the Soviet armed forces had moved east of the Ural Mountains before the EIF of the original treaty. In accordance with a commitment the USSR made on 14 June 1991, as modified by a statement to the First REVCON in May 1996, the Russians needed to destroy, convert to civilian use, or reduce through exposure to the environment 6000 tanks (for which up to 2300 ACVs could be substituted), 1500 ACVs and 7000 artillery pieces east of the Urals (a quantity of which was located in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) by 2000.⁵⁷⁸ Not until 2003, however, could the Russians inform the other parties to the CFE Treaty that they had completed these reductions. In closing the book on this issue, the MFA drew attention to the massive efforts Russia had undertaken under difficult economic circumstances to “fulfill this large international obligation in full measure.” The completion of this reduction, twelve years in the making and a number of years late, in the words of the MFA “once again convincingly attested to our country’s commitment to the existing conventional arms control regime.”⁵⁷⁹

The Second CFE Review Conference (28 May – 1 June 2001)

In the words of Anton Mazur, a Russian diplomat with extensive experience in conventional arms control issues, the Second CFE REVCON, which took place in Vienna, 28 May – 1 June 2001, was a “major event” in Russia’s quest for the entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty. In remarks less effusive than Mazur’s, the MFA stated simply, “In Russia, the

⁵⁷⁸ See pages 173-174 and footnotes 401-403 of this dissertation.

⁵⁷⁹ MFA RF, “O zavershenii protsedur unichtozheniya vooruzheniy, vyvedennykh za predely primeneniya Dogovora ob Obychnykh Vooruzhennykh Silakh do ego podpisaniya,” 7 June 2003, http://www.mid.ru/obyecne-vooruzeniya/-/asset_publisher/MUDOT56NKIk/content/id/517898.

results of the Conference are assessed positively.”⁵⁸⁰ The Russians joined the other parties to the CFE Treaty in adopting “formal conclusions” of the review conference, a number of which were consistent with Russia’s policies and goals for the treaty: significant reductions in TLE, acknowledgment that Russia had made progress in reducing their excess TLE in the flank region, reiteration of the accession clause in the adapted CFE Treaty that would permit other states in the ATTU region to join the treaty regime, recognition of the states parties’ commitment to soonest possible EIF of the adaptation agreement, and acknowledgment of progress in meeting the Istanbul Commitments and fulfillment of the commitment to reduce TLE that had been moved east of the Ural Mountains.⁵⁸¹ For Russia, the most important of these conclusions was the intent to pursue EIF of the adaptation agreement as soon as possible.

The Russians’ relative success at the REVCON could be attributed in large part to “the masterly manner” by which they preempted a focus on their operations in the Transcaucasus region when they issued, just before the conference, notifications that depicted progress in the reduction of TLE in excess of the flank limits.⁵⁸² The Russians were then able to focus on issues more in keeping with their agenda about the CFE Treaty. For example, the Russian delegation turned to one of their hobby horses, combat aviation. As part of an effort to update the CFE

⁵⁸⁰ Anton Mazur, “Rossiya i kontrol’ nad vooruzhenniyami v Evrope,” in *Bezopasnost’ Evropy*, V.V. Zhurkin, ed. (Moscow: Ves’ Mir, 2011), 278; MFA RF, “Soobshchenie MID Rossii, 4 iyunya, O zavershenii raboty vtoroy Konferentsii po rassmotreniyu deystviya DOVSE,” *DV* No. 7, 1 July 2001: 95, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/4817125>.

⁵⁸¹ “Formal Conclusions of the Second Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act on Personnel Strength,” CFE.DOC/1/01, 1 June 2001, <https://www.osce.org/library/14121?download=true>; Wade Boese, “CFE Review Conference Held, Russian Compliance Urged,” *Arms Control Today*, armscontrol.org/act/2001-07/press-releases/cfe-review-conference-held-russian-compliance-urged.

⁵⁸² Pal Dunay, “The CFE Process after the Second Review Conference of the Treaty,” in Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, ed., *OSCE Yearbook 2001* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002), 302-303. Although they welcomed the information, other delegations still sought more details and transparency that Russia had promised to provide.

Treaty's Protocol on Existing Types (POET), the list of weapons systems held by the parties to the treaty that fell under the five categories of TLE, the Russians suggested adding unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs, known today as drones or UAVs) as a type of combat aircraft subject to the reporting, verification, and limits of the treaty. At the time, only the U.S. employed these systems.⁵⁸³ The Russians also on the states parties to the treaty to avoid decisions or actions that might "destabilize" (*rasshatat*) it, such as violation of the existing correlation of forces in Europe or any of its regions (read: through expansion of NATO or redeployment of U.S. forces), use of force or threat of force without a UN Security Council resolution, and "ill-conceived bloc policy." The Russians, as part of their campaign against NATO expansion, emphasized that the possible accession of the Baltic states into NATO would, "without exaggeration," have negative consequences for key provisions of the CFE Treaty.⁵⁸⁴

"Guarded optimism" might have best characterized Moscow's perspective on the CFE Treaty upon the conclusion of the Second REVCON. Nonetheless, the fact that the Russian delegation's concerns fell on deaf ears among the NATO states boded ill for the treaty and Russia's approach to it.⁵⁸⁵ NATO's tone-deafness to Russia's entreaties must have become particularly evident to Moscow when the allies, at the Prague Summit meeting in 2002, hardened their position on fulfillment of the Istanbul Commitments as a condition for ratification of the A/CFE and formally invited non-CFE states Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia to open talks to join the alliance.

⁵⁸³ Sharp, *Striving for Military Stability in Europe*, 206.

⁵⁸⁴ MFA RF, "Soobshchenie MID Rossii, 4 iyunya, O zavershenii raboty vtoroy Konferentsii po rassmotreniyu deystviya DOVSE," 95.

⁵⁸⁵ On "guarded optimism," see Wilcox, "Russia and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty): A Paradigm Change?": 572. On NATO not hearing the Russians' call, see Anin and Ayumov, "DOVSE – Vchera...Segodnya... Zavtra?...stat'ya vtoraya:" 21.

Problems with NATO Enlargement and the CFE Treaty (2001-2003)

Allegations about purported plans for malign actions by established, newer, and prospective members of NATO raised troubling questions about Russia's view of NATO and the as-yet-not-ratified A/CFE. In April 2001, MFA spokesman Aleksandr Yakovenko addressed "reports in the Russian media" about alleged plans by the U.S., with the acquiescence of Hungary, to use Taszar Air Base for a supposed Balkans rapid reaction force. Although noting that both Budapest and Washington had assured Moscow that no such plans existed, Yakovenko reminded NATO of the commitments found in the Russia-NATO Founding Act of 1997 and reaffirmed in a declaration of 8 December 1998 that the alliance had no plans for "additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces" on the territories of new NATO member states. These assurances, which were cited in the "Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty" of November 1999, were part of a "*package of Istanbul commitments* [emphasis added] taken in the context of the adaptation of the CFE Treaty" whose observance Russia would bear in mind "in determining its relationship to the future fate of the Treaty."⁵⁸⁶ The MFA made the same points in February 2003 in response, once again, to "inquiries from the Russian press," this time about alleged plans to relocate American bases from Germany to Poland. Despite having "deep doubts" about the rumors, the MFA again recalled assurances from NATO about permanent stationing of forces on the territories of new member states, to include one made at meeting of the NRC at the level of foreign ministers held in Prague on 22

⁵⁸⁶ MFA RF, "Soobshchenie MID Rossii, 28 aprelya, Otvet ofitsial'nogo predstavatelya MID Rossii na voprosakh rossiiskikh SMI otnositel'no soobshcheniy o planakh prevrashcheniya vengerskoy aviabazy Tasar v bazu sil bytstrogo pazvertivaniya SShA na Balkanakh," *DV* No. 5, 1 May 2001, <https://dlib.eastrview.com/browse/doc/5505399>; "Moscow Concerned by U.S. Use of Hungarian Base," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newswire*, 30 April 2001, <https://www.rferl.org/a/1142393.html>.

November 2002. Such “commitments on restraint in the military sphere are also *an integral part* [emphasis added] of the adapted CFE Treaty” and a part of the “package of political commitments” adopted at Istanbul.⁵⁸⁷

Later in 2003, the Lithuanian defense minister’s comments about the establishment of NATO bases on the territory of the Baltic states after their accession to the alliance caused the Russian MFA to return again to the political commitments for restraint in stationing of forces. By July 2003, the pending accession of the Baltic states to NATO led the MFA to highlight those states’ intention to accede to the adapted CFE Treaty and the requirement for them, as soon-to-be members of the alliance, to adhere to the whole complex of political commitments the allies had made to Russia beginning with the NATO-Russia Founding Act.⁵⁸⁸ At roughly the same time, Foreign Minister Ivanov, in separate meetings with the foreign ministers of Latvia and Estonia, drew their attention to a proposal the Russian delegation had made at the JCG on 11 March 2003 for all parties to the CFE Treaty and states that had expressed an intent to accede to it to make political commitments for restraint in the development of their armed forces in the ATTU area.⁵⁸⁹

⁵⁸⁷ MFA RF, “Otvét ofitsial’nogo predstavatelya MID Rossii na vopros rossiiskikh SMI v svyazi s soobshcheniyami o yakoby imeyushchikhsya planakh peredislókatsii amerikanskikh voennykh baz iz Germanii v Polshu, 13 fevralya,” *DV* No. 3, 1 March 2003 <https://dlib.eastrview.com/browse/doc/4995352>. The operative language from the Prague meeting of the NRC at the level of foreign ministers is the chairman’s statement issued by Lord Robertson, the NATO Secretary General, <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p021122e.htm>.

⁵⁸⁸ MFA RF, “Otvét ofitsial’nogo predstavatelya MID Rossii na vopros rossiiskikh SMI v svyazi s zayavleniem ministra okhrany kraya (oborony) Litvy L. Linyavichyusa otnositel’no razmeshcheniya baz NATO v baltiiskikh stranakh, 25 iyunya,” *DV* No. 7, 31 July 2003, <https://dlib.eastrview.com/browse/doc/5259306>. The operative language in the declaration of the Madrid meeting of the NRC at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is at https://www.nato.int/nrc-website/media/59559/2003.06.04_nrc_official_statement_fms.pdf, pages 4-5.

⁵⁸⁹ “XII Ministerskaya sessiya Soveta Gosudarstv Baltiiskogo Morya. Vstrechi I.S. Ivanova v Finlyandii,” *DV* No. 7, 31 July 2003, <https://dlib.eastrview.com/browse/doc/52591787>.

By late 2003, these allegations, and the linkage the MFA made between them and the CFE Treaty, appeared as clouds on the horizon that obscured the prospective of the CFE Treaty as a contributor to Russia's national security. They were symptomatic of an increasing level of frustration with the refusal by NATO states to ratify the agreement on adaptation, based on what Moscow viewed as an artificial linkage to the Istanbul commitments, "voluntary political commitments that have no legal force," vis-à-vis Georgia and Moldova.⁵⁹⁰ The Russians, nonetheless, readily bundled commitments by the alliance and individual allies that had also been recorded at Istanbul into a package that constituted the A/CFE. The situation also demonstrated the Russians' anxiety over a pending second tranche of accession of new members to the alliance that would include states not subject to the limits and transparency measures of the CFE Treaty. All in all, a preview of events to come in 2004.

Case Study: 2004

The case study for this chapter is the year 2004, a period of substantive developments in the European security environment and the Russian Federation's approach to the CFE Treaty. In June, seven states joined NATO. Of the seven, four (the three Baltic states and Slovenia) were not parties to the CFE Treaty and two (Bulgaria and Romania) were situated within the treaty's flank zone. In June and July, the State Duma and Federation Council ratified the A/CFE. After President Putin signed the law on ratification on 19 July, Russia became one of four states to have ratified the agreement, the others being Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. As was the case

⁵⁹⁰ "Interv'yu zamestitelya ministra innostranykh del Rossii V.A. Chizhova gazete 'Vremya Novostey,'" *DV* No. 1, 31 January 2003, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/4796549>. Chizhov made the same point about the "so-called commitments" in an interview a year later. "Press tsentr. Inter'vyu zamestitelya ministra innostranykh del Rossii V.A. Chizhova RIA 'Novosti' v svyazi s zasedaniyami CMID OBSE I Soveta Rossiya-NATO, 28 noyabrya 2003 g.," *DV* No. 1, 31 January 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5910438>.

in 1999 (the case study in the preceding chapter), the Russians could have protested NATO's action and its implications for the viability of the CFE Treaty by delaying or rejecting ratification of the A/CFE. In tracing ratification and the further development of Russia's position toward the treaty in the remainder of 2004, the goal of the case study is to identify the factor(s) that led Moscow to ratify the agreement and then to arrive at a less sanguine position toward the CFE Treaty by the end of the year. A record of hearings in the two houses of the Federal Assembly and statements by government officials throughout the year offer both direct insights into and proxies for the decision-making process for policy toward the CFE Treaty in 2004.

The Russians teed up their approach to the CFE Treaty in 2004 at the meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, held in Maastricht, 1-2 December 2003. In the run-up to the meeting, the Russian delegation reportedly pressured the Armenian chairman of the JCG not to submit to the ministerial council a routine letter on the activities of the JCG during the year, because it would have mentioned Russia's non-compliance with the Istanbul Commitments.⁵⁹¹ The dispute between the NATO allies and Russia over the commitments blocked the adoption of a ministerial statement about the situation in Georgia and Moldova. The Russian Federation continued to firmly reject any linkage between the commitments and the ratification of the A/CFE. Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Chizhov warned that the failure of some states to ratify the A/CFE "under the conditions of the expansion of NATO" would "place before Russia the need for a search for alternate paths to supporting a sufficient level of national security and development of defense potential."⁵⁹² Foreign Minister Ivanov reiterated less bluntly at a

⁵⁹¹ Zdzislaw Lachowski and Pal Dunay, "Conventional Arms Control and Military Confidence Building," in SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (London: Oxford University Press, 2005), 651.

⁵⁹² Yuriy Ershov, "Mir i Rossiya. Ivanov i Pauell razminulis," *RG*, 3 December 2003, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5620116>. One unnamed Russian commentator called the situation with the Istanbul Commitments, the

meeting of the NRC, held shortly after the Maastricht Ministerial, Russia's position that the problem of the ratification of the A/CFE should be resolved before the accession of new members to NATO in the middle of 2004. Ivanov also noted that Russia had fulfilled its commitments "within the framework of the CFE Treaty" in 2001.⁵⁹³

In the early part of 2004, the Russians' approach to the CFE Treaty was to cajole NATO allies – and attempt to divide them – while reassuring legislators in the Federal Assembly whose votes would be needed for ratification of the A/CFE. The full-court press involved the MFA, MOD, General Staff and the Duma.

The first major event in this effort was a speech by Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov on 9 February at the 40th Munich Security Conference. This appearance was not Ivanov's first at the conference. He had warned the previous year that the entry of the Baltic states into NATO while remaining outside the CFE Treaty regime was "absolutely unacceptable" for Russia.⁵⁹⁴ Speaking in Munich in 2004, Ivanov offered a wide-ranging perspective on international security under the rubric, "International Security in the Context of the Russia-NATO Relationship." While lauding cooperation between the alliance and Russia on a host of issues, such as combating terrorism, he observed, "So far the Russia-NATO cooperation is not all rosy" and "the problem hindering further progress is the current situation around the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty." He affirmed Russia's intention to ratify the agreement on adaptation in the near future

adapted CFE Treaty, and NATO expansion, and the way it reflected on the military security dimension of the OSCE, as one of the "scandals" of the Maastricht Ministerial. "Kommentariy Obozratel'ya. Skandal'nyi sammit," *KZ*, 5 December 2003, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5632356>.

⁵⁹³ Igor' Galkin, "Goryachie Novosti. Obespechat prava – poluchat i granitsu," *Parlamentskaya gazeta*, 6 December 2003, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5640054>.

⁵⁹⁴ Vitaliy Strugovets, "Dogovor, Vazhnyi dlya Vsey Evropy," *KZ*, 14 February 2003, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/4698616>.

and questioned the changing demands of NATO allies (meet the flank limits, provide additional data and transparency for withdrawals from the North Caucasus), the fulfillment of which did not bring ratification by those states any closer. Noting that the Istanbul Commitments had become the “stumbling block,” Ivanov questioned whether the CFE Treaty was still capable of ensuring security in Europe or would suffer the same fate as the ABM Treaty. The admission of the seven new members to NATO, which would bring the alliance into a “zone of vitally important interests to our country,” would render the existing CFE Treaty ineffective. Ivanov’s bottom line included the following points:

- NATO should consider admitting permanent Russian monitors to new facilities on the territory of new members (especially in Poland and the Baltic states);
- Russia would review commitments to restraint and force reductions in the Kaliningrad and Pskov regions, as well as the Leningrad MD, which were taken in a security environment that would “drastically change” with the admission of the new NATO members;
- The weakening of the conventional arms control regime in Europe would not be an “irreparable loss” to Russia’s national security;
- In place of a campaign of continuing pressure on Russia to accelerate the fulfillment of the Istanbul Commitments, “a wide-ranging discussion should have been started on a new system of arms control and confidence-building measures, which would proceed from the new realities” – the mandate for which could be worked in the NRC.⁵⁹⁵

Defense Minister Ivanov thus set out the main points of Russia’s evolving approach to the CFE Treaty, i.e. that Moscow was losing patience with the slow pace of ratification of the

⁵⁹⁵ “Speech by Sergey B. Ivanov at the 40th Munich Conference on Security Policy,” 9 February 2004, <https://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Europe-NATO-Russia/Ivanov-Sergey/Speech-by-Sergey-B.-Ivanov-at-the-40th-Munich-Conference-on-Security-Policy>. This English-language version of Ivanov’s speech seems to be the only one available, and the author was unable to locate a Russian-language version. The translation is clumsy in places, but contemporary reporting from Russian press sources, e.g. RIA Novosti, lenta.ru and the Russian military press confirm the veracity of the major points. See, for example, “Ivanov prigrozil Evrope vykhodom iz dogovora po obychnym vooruzheniyam,” Lenta.RU, 9 February 2004, <https://lenta.ru/news/2004/02/09/treaty>; Vadim Markushin, “Rossiya-NATO. Iskomyi zapas proynosti,” KZ, 10 February 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5870933>.

A/CFE based on linkage to the Istanbul commitments, and the Russians were prepared to walk away from the CFE Treaty and seek a new approach to conventional arms control.

Moscow's line on NATO enlargement and the CFE Treaty became clearer in a series of statements that emanated from the MFA, General Staff, State Duma and elsewhere in the government from February to April. Two of the main spokesmen for the MFA on these issues were Deputy Foreign Minister Chizhov, who had spoken so bluntly at the OSCE Maastricht Ministerial meeting, and Aleksandr Grushko, the director of the Department of Pan-European Cooperation and former negotiator of the A/CFE. In a speech he delivered about two weeks after Ivanov addressed the Munich Security Conference, Chizhov praised the political dialogue between Russia and NATO since the establishment of the NRC in 2002. Nonetheless, Russia was alarmed at the expansion of the alliance while the "CFE-Baltics-NATO" problem remained unresolved and American plans to reconfigure their force posture in Europe remained undefined.⁵⁹⁶ Chizhov later elaborated on the nature of the "CFE-Baltics-NATO" problem, keying off NATO's plan to deploy four aircraft to Lithuania to help the new ally to control its airspace. The entry of the Baltic states and Slovenia into NATO while they remained outside the CFE Treaty created a "grey zone" that was ungoverned by the limits of the CFE Treaty, a situation that qualitatively distinguished this tranche of the enlargement of the alliance from the first one. In the case of the Baltic states, the "grey zone" was in the "immediate proximity" to Russia's border and to "important centers" of Russia, like St. Petersburg, as well. The four aircraft did not, in themselves, matter. Rather, "The subject of our potential concern was tied to the possible appearance on their [the Baltic states'] territory of forces and armaments of third

⁵⁹⁶ "Diplomatiya, Nauka, Obshchestvennost'. Vystuplenie zamestitelya ministra inostrannykh del Rossii V. A. Chizhova na konferentsii 'Obshchie tseli i vyzovy vneshney politiki Rossii i ES,'" *DV* No. 3, 31 March 2004: 162, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6152739>.

countries.” Having raised these concerns, and in contrast to Ivanov’s remarks, Chizhov denied that Russia intended to withdraw from the CFE Treaty, because it remained the “cornerstone of European security” and Moscow could not envision an alternative to the EIF of the adapted treaty.⁵⁹⁷

Aleksandr Grushko, in an interview published at about the same time as Chizhov’s, identified the “CFE-Baltics-NATO” problem as a threat to arms control. Like Chizhov, he acknowledged that the second tranche of NATO expansion was different than the first, although he added that Russia had also been bothered by the first one (their concerns were addressed by assurances from NATO and the negotiation of the A/CFE). For Grushko, the crux of the matter was that the CFE Treaty was a collection of rules, which should apply equally to everyone. While the Baltic states remained outside the treaty, this was not the case, so they needed to accede to the A/CFE. He, too, did not envision withdrawing from the treaty. In fact, the CFE Treaty, as one of the central elements of the military component of the international security structure that had been “created through the labor of our predecessors,” had to be preserved.⁵⁹⁸

Russia’s representative to NATO, Konstantin Totskoy, echoed the line laid out by Ivanov, Chizhov and Grushko. The situation with the CFE Treaty was the major problem between Russia and the alliance and the pending entry into NATO of new members threatened to damage the CFE Treaty’s role in supporting stability in Europe. Totskoy linked the problem with the CFE Treaty to purported plans to reconfigure the posture of military forces near Russia’s borders, plans that could also disrupt the progress achieved to date in relations between

⁵⁹⁷ “Press Tsentr. Inter’vyu zamestitelya ministra inostrannykh del Rossii V.A. Chizhova agensstvu Interfaks, 31 marta,” *DV* No. 5, 31 May 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6458388>.

⁵⁹⁸ “Press Tsentr. Inter’vyu direktora Departamenta obshcheevropeyskogo sotrudnichestva MID Rossii A.V. Grushko gazete ‘Vremya novostey,’” *DV* No. 5, 31 May 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6458388>.

Russia and NATO.⁵⁹⁹ The official statement by the MFA at the time of the new allies' accession to the Washington Treaty added the need to take a wait-and-see attitude toward the alliance, its transformation, and the prospects for cooperation between Russia and NATO (notwithstanding concerns over the prospects of the expansion of NATO's military infrastructure into the Baltic states, Romania, and Bulgaria). The MFA pledged to continue Russia's "multivector" policy toward creating a European security system that protected the interests of all states and to pursue the soonest possible inclusion of the Baltic states and Slovenia in the CFE Treaty regime.⁶⁰⁰

The armed forces made their position clear in March and April, in commentaries published in *Krasnaya zvezda* and in a press conference that featured senior members of the General Staff.⁶⁰¹ The press commentaries tended toward worst-case scenarios about the impact of the newest wave of enlargement of the alliance, whereas the officials of the General Staff were less alarmist. Commentator Aleksey Lyashchenko cited supposed plans for U.S. and NATO bases on the territories of new members as well as a prospective third wave of enlargement – to include Georgia – as among the serious implications of the entry of the seven new members into the alliance. In terms of the CFE Treaty, the entry of these states into NATO would inflict a "mortal blow" (*smertel'nyi udar*) on the agreement. The negative effects of the entry of the Baltic states were already evident in flights by NATO and U.S. early warning (AWACS) aircraft, the deployment of air defense radars, exercises involving U.S. and other

⁵⁹⁹ "Press Tsentr. Stat'ya Postoyannogo predstavatelya Rossiiskoy Federatsii pri Organizatsii Severoatlanticheskogo dogovora K.V. Totskogo v 'Diplomaticheskome ezhegodnike' za 2003 god," *DV* No. 2, 29 February 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6112428>.

⁶⁰⁰ MFA RF, "Zayavlenie ofitsial'nogo predstavatelya MID Rossii, 29 aprelya, V svyazi s rasshireniem NATO," *DV* No. 4, 30 April 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6337700>.

⁶⁰¹ The timing was linked to the new members' depositing their instruments of ratification of the Washington Treaty in Washington, DC on 29 April and their first participation in meetings in Brussels – to include a meeting of the NRC – on 2 April.

NATO forces, and the planned deployment of NATO fighter aircraft to secure the airspace of the three states. At the end of the day, the Baltic states would become a “grey zone” outside the limitations of the CFE Treaty. Under such circumstances, Russia’s observance of their obligations under the treaty would be not only “an absurdity” but also “unprecedented” in the history of arms control. Russia would possibly have to take defensive measures, such as the deployment of groupings of ground forces in the region.⁶⁰² A lengthy, unattributed commentary published in early April asserted that the entry of the seven states into NATO increased the possibility of the deployment of groups of ground, air and naval forces of NATO from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Slovenia and Slovakia’s accession to the alliance completed NATO’s expansion into the states of the former WTO, while the entry of Bulgaria and Romania provided the opportunity for the alliance (and the U.S.) to exercise control over the Danube, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, as well as to exercise influence in the Balkans, which NATO had begun with their operations in the former Yugoslavia. All these developments affected the “cornerstone of security on the continent,” the CFE Treaty, in great part because, absent explanations from Brussels as to why countries in secure areas (like the Baltic states) needed to be in the alliance, it was evident that NATO would be gaining the possibility to concentrate any armaments in any quantities there.⁶⁰³

⁶⁰² Aleksey Lyashchenko, “Zametki obozrevatel’ya. NATO Speshit rasshirit’sya,” *KZ*, 4 March 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5972720>. The MFA also expressed concern over the deployment of NATO aircraft and air defense radars to the Baltic states and its apparent inconsistency with commitments the alliance had taken in the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the A/CFE. MF RF, “Press-Tsent. Otvet ofitsial’nogo predstavatelya MID Rossii na vopros rossiiskikh SMI v svyazi s resheniem Soveta NATO ob obespechenii vozdušnogo prikrityiya territorii trekh baltiiskikh gosudarst, 23 marta,” *DV*, No. 4, 30 March 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6337684>.

⁶⁰³ “NATO u nashikh granits,” *KZ*, 1 April 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6096089>. For more commentary along these lines, see Mikhail Khodarenok, “Tendentsii, Cherepovets – Tver’ – Vyaz’ma,” *Voennyi promyshlennyi kur’er* (hereafter *VPK*), 31 March 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6101961>.

Three senior members of the General Staff, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel General Yuriy Baluyevskiy, Major General Vladimir Nikishin, of the International Legal Department, and Major General Yuriy Portyannikov of the Main Operational Directorate, addressed issues related to the entry of the seven states into NATO in mid-April. Baluyevskiy wondered whether Russia could take back Boris Yeltsin's pledge to unilaterally reduce Russian forces in the Baltic region. He also framed the challenge Russia faced in terms of, for example, reduced flight time for NATO aircraft to St. Petersburg should they be based in the Baltic states. The only solution to this problem would be for the Baltic states to accede to the A/CFE. Nikishin noted that the Baltic states could not accede to the treaty because its ratification was being obstructed by the NATO states over the Istanbul Commitments. The NATO states' demands only applied to the adaptation agreement "indirectly," so there were no obstacles on the path to ratification. Russia's concern vis-à-vis the Baltic states was that NATO's military potential would be increased in terms of both quantity of armaments and the capacity for reinforcement in the three countries, without the limits of the CFE Treaty.⁶⁰⁴ While Moscow recognized the assurances regarding restraint NATO had issued beginning in 1997, Russia preferred more legally-binding reinforcement of them. Portyannikov stated that it was better to cooperate with than enter into conflict with NATO, as long as Russia's interests were protected. As for such cooperation in the NRC, Nikishin noted that the Russian representative had raised the issue of the entry of new members and compliance with the CFE Treaty, to include having the Baltic states assume additional commitments, but to no avail. The Duma's approach to

⁶⁰⁴ Sergey Sumbaev, "Rossiya samodostatochna, chtoby zashchitit' sebya," *KZ*, 15 April 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6148847>.

ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty would depend on how NATO acknowledged and addressed Moscow's concerns.⁶⁰⁵

The State Duma took up the topic of NATO expansion in March in a closed hearing of four committees with the participation of representatives of the MFA and the MOD. The committees reported out a draft declaration for adoption by the Duma that expressed concern that the entry of states into NATO that were outside the CFE Treaty made the security situation in Europe unstable. The refusal by NATO states to ratify the A/CFE because of the presence of Russian forces in Georgia and Moldova demonstrated NATO's unwillingness to consider Russia's concerns about "the appearance in Europe of a zone free of an arms control regime."⁶⁰⁶ The Duma adopted the declaration on 31 March by a vote of 305-41. The declaration, while noting the positive developments in Russia-NATO relations since 1997, included specific concerns about the fate of the CFE Treaty in light of the alliance's expansion into the Baltic states. It questioned whether Russia's Istanbul Commitment to restraint in the deployment of forces in the Baltic region might be losing its relevance. Duma deputies also urged NATO states to ratify the A/CFE, welcomed the intention of the governments of the three Baltic states and Slovenia to accede to the treaty, and urged President Putin to convene a meeting of his Security Council to consider the situation and possible counteractions by Russia.⁶⁰⁷

⁶⁰⁵ Oleg Falichev, "Aktsept. Kholodnyi veter s Zapada," *VPK*, 21 April 2020, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6177219>.

⁶⁰⁶ "Novosti. Parlamentarii obespokoeny," *VPK*, 31 March 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6101962>.

⁶⁰⁷ Lyudmila Alexandrova, "NATO's Expansion Hampers Stability in Europe – Duma," *ITAR-TASS Weekly News*, 31 March 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6096977> and "Duma Issues Statement on Russia-NATO Relations," *ITAR-TASS Weekly News*, 31 March 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6096979>. The text of the Duma's declaration is at "Zayavlenie Gosudarstvennoy Dumy v svyazi s Rasshireniem NATO," *Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Zayavleniya i obrashcheniya po voprosam vneshney politiki* No. 300-IV, 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/22372237>.

Within weeks after the Duma's adoption of the declaration on NATO expansion, and on the eve of hearings on the ratification of the A/CFE in the Committee on International Relations, deputies Colonel General Viktor Zavarzin, the chairman of the Duma's Committee on Defense, and Andrey Kokoshin, chairman of the Committee on CIS Affairs and Ties with Compatriots (and a former deputy defense minister and secretary of the Defense Council) weighed in. Zavarzin urged the government to develop measures to counter NATO's move, which he linked to the signing of a memorandum of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO while the Baltic states were entering the alliance, and the allies' delay of ratification of the A/CFE. Kokoshin, like Zavarzin, viewed NATO's expansion into the Baltic states as contrary to Russia's national interest, particularly because of the prospect of development of infrastructure in the three states that would facilitate the rapid introduction of strike forces and the creation of a "striking fist of air forces." If NATO and the U.S. wanted to cooperate with Russia, for example on fighting against terrorism, then they needed to adopt commitments for restraint in the deployment of forces and conduct of exercises near Russia's borders.⁶⁰⁸

Notwithstanding the angst over NATO's addition of seven new members and expansion into the CFE-Treaty-free Baltic states, as well as NATO's "unconstructive position" on ratification, the Federal Assembly began the process of ratification of the agreement on adaptation in late April, two years after President Putin transmitted it to the parliament for ratification.⁶⁰⁹ The ratification process included hearings in the relevant committees of both

⁶⁰⁸ Aleksey Lyashchenko, "Resonans. Parlamentarii preduprzhdayut...", *KZ*, 23 April 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6179570>.

⁶⁰⁹ Anin and Ayumov, "DOVSE – Vchera...Segodnya... Zavtra?...stat'ya vtoraya:" 22. The head of the delegation of the Federation Council to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Vladimir Kulakov, opined in June 2003 that the process of ratification of the A/CFE would have proceeded more smoothly if NATO had provided more clarity regarding the accession of new states to the alliance in the context of the CFE Treaty. Vitaliy Denisov, "Evropeyskie Prioritety Rossii," *KZ*, 19 June 2003, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5029038>. See also Mazur, "Rossiya i kontrol' nad vooruzhenniyami v Evrope," 280.

houses of the Federal Assembly and votes, first in the Duma and then in the Federation Council. In the case of the State Duma, this process began with a “broad parliamentary hearing” in the Duma, itself, in April, followed by separate hearings in the committees on International Affairs, Defense, and Security. In the hearing in April, the deputies also came up with the idea not only to ratify the agreement, but to add a declaration of the Duma.⁶¹⁰ The Committee on International Affairs held their hearing on 1 June. Although the committee did not make a recommendation on ratification, it determined that the A/CFE would not require Russia to lower its maximum holdings of TLE, and from diplomatic and military perspectives, its ratification would support Russia’s basic security interests, although with one condition: a guarantee that its provisions would “100 percent” apply to all countries in the treaty’s AOA. The committee also concluded that a declaration of the Duma that would address Russia’s concerns and expectations should accompany ratification.⁶¹¹ At the time of the hearing (perhaps at the hearing itself, although the reporting is not clear on this point), Lieutenant General Evgeniy Buzhinskiy, the deputy chief of the General Staff’s Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation, stated that the A/CFE did not adversely affect Russia’s defense capabilities and served Russia’s national interests, especially given the imperative for the Baltic states to join the treaty regime as soon as possible. At the same time, other representatives of the MOD doubted that Russia’s ratification would motivate the other CFE Treaty states to follow suit.⁶¹²

⁶¹⁰ “Zdanie Gosudarstvennoy Dumy. Bol’shoy zal. 25 iyunya 2004 goda,” *Stenogramma zasedanii Gosdumy*, 25 June 2004, 35, accessed 21 January 2020, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6913496>. Konstantin Kosyachev, the chairman of the Duma Committee on International Affairs, provided this account in his testimony.

⁶¹¹ “Parlamentskie slushaniya v Gosudarstvennoy Dume (yanvar’ – iyun’ 2004 goda), Federal’noe Sobranie Rossiiskoy Federatsii (khronika, annotatsii, obzor), Vypusk XIX,” (Moscow: State Duma Press, 2004), *Parlamentskie slushaniya v Gosdume*, 31 January 2004, 36, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/77088280>.

⁶¹² “Ofitsial’naya sreda. Ofitsial’naya sreda.,” *RG*, 2 June 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6301903>.

The full State Duma took up the ratification of the A/CFE on 25 June. Defense Minister Ivanov and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kislyak spoke on behalf of the government and Konstantin Kosyachev, the chairman of the Duma's Committee on International Affairs, spoke on behalf of his committee and the committees on defense and security. In supporting the ratification of the agreement, Ivanov argued that it would reduce the chance of NATO deploying large groups of forces in areas important to Russia, i.e. Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and the Baltic states. Addressing one of the Russians' primary concerns, insufficient controls on aviation assets, he noted that the additional reporting requirements for movements of aircraft in the adapted treaty would allow for a more precise view of the deployment of NATO's aircraft. Russia would gain some relief from the limits in the flank area, and commitments Moscow had made for restraint on armaments in the Leningrad MD to gain these benefits were of a politically binding character only (and, by implication, could easily be ignored). Curiously, Ivanov cited the provision of the A/CFE that required host-nation consent for the stationing of any foreign forces on its territory as a positive point, notwithstanding the challenges it would present for the continued presence of Russian forces in Georgia and Moldova.

Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak argued that the ratification of the A/CFE would contribute to preventing destabilizing concentrations of forces on Russia's borders, improve predictability and stability, relieve Russia of some limits on the flank area, and help to create the "necessary critical mass" to move the NATO countries to also begin the process of ratification. The deputy foreign minister, in spite of Moscow's protestations that Russia's so-called Istanbul Commitments were not part of the CFE Treaty, seemed to make a closer connection:

A series of state parties, among which are countries of NATO and a series of states of the CIS, including Russia, also assumed additional political commitments on restraint in relation to the

level of the scale of the deployment of their conventional armaments. These commitments reflect their political readiness to go even more deeply than the legal provisions of the CFE Treaty in guaranteeing mutual security, they strengthen the system of treaty levels, and are not part of the legal agreement. In this way, all the...provisions, taken together, in aggregate, obstruct the uncontrolled build-up of armed forces on our borders and, consequently, answer our interests.⁶¹³

Finally, Kislyak emphasized that ratification would move the adapted treaty closer to EIF, which would then enable the Baltic states to accede to it, thereby making those three states' political commitments for restraint on the deployment of forces on their territories legally binding obligations. The chairman of the Duma's International Relations committee, Konstantin Kosyachev, made many of the same points as Ivanov and Kislyak. He added that although the continued expansion of NATO had "darkened" the process of ratification, the Duma's action would be justified, given that Russia had initiated the negotiations on the A/CFE and had gained some positive results from them. Ratification would demonstrate good will, as Russia would be one of the first states to do it, and it would take some heat off Moscow for the problems with Russian forces in Georgia and Moldova.⁶¹⁴

The Duma voted in favor of ratification, but not without objections. Two traditionally hard line deputies, Viktor Alksnis and Albert Makashov, both retired military officers whose time in the parliament dated to the USSR Supreme Soviet, viewed the A/CFE and Russia's

⁶¹³ "Zdanie Gosudarstvennoy Dumy. Bol'shoy zal. 25 iyunya 2004 goda," 62.

⁶¹⁴ Kosyachev also characterized ratification as a way to set a "good example," as opposed to maintaining the status quo, which could undermine the treaty and, possibly, lead to a new arms race in Europe. "Dumskie plany. Ne dat' shansa dlya gonki vooruzhenii," *Parlamentskaya gazeta*, 18 May 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6255076>.

participation in it as just as flawed as had been the Soviet Union's accession to the original treaty.⁶¹⁵ Deputy Yuri Kvitsinskiy of the Communist Party, a former arms control negotiator himself, doubted that Russia's ratification would create a "critical mass" that would cause the NATO countries to change their positions regarding Georgia and Moldova and thereby lead to ratification and EIF of the A/CFE.⁶¹⁶ Despite these objections, the Duma voted to ratify the A/CFE 355-28, with two abstentions and sixty-five not voting.

The Duma also adopted, 398-4 with three abstentions and forty-five not voting, a declaration "In Connection with the Ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe."⁶¹⁷ The declaration, which was to be transmitted to President Putin, the government, the Federation Council, and the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO, criticized the allies for refusing to ratify the A/CFE, especially given the "grey zone" in the Baltic states where the treaty did not apply, and called upon those states to ratify the agreement. The Duma also attached eight conditions to the ratification of the treaty. The conditions, depicted in Figure 5.1 on the following page, covered the full range of Russia's concerns about the slow pace of ratification and EIF of the adaptation agreement in the context of the most recent round of enlargement of the alliance.

⁶¹⁵ Makashov took the opportunity to rail against the "traitors" Gorbachev and Shevardnadze and the political leadership who had "killed" the Soviet Union. "Zdanie Gosudarstvennoy Dumy. Bol'shoy zal. 25 iyunya 2004 goda," 75.

⁶¹⁶ "Zdanie Gosudarstvennoy Dumy. Bol'shoy zal. 25 iyunya 2004 goda," 71.

⁶¹⁷ The text of the declaration and the accompanying ruling by the Duma are at "O zayavlenii Gosudarstvennoy Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoy Federatsii 'V svyazi s ratifikatsiey Soglasheniya ob adaptatsii Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhenykh silakh v Evrope,'" *Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Postanovleniya*, PST No. 767-IV, 25 June 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6422910>.

<p>1. Until EIF of A/CFE, RU will continue to fulfill politically binding commitments from Istanbul as long as others do, including commitment to act to realize EIF.</p> <p>2. Threats to RU interests, including those affecting CFE, could elicit response from RU. Threats include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Withdrawal from or violation of CFE - Refusal by a state or alliance to adjust territorial ceilings of TLE in fulfillment of commitments made at Istanbul in 1999 and Brussels in 1998 - Use of force by a CFE state in violation of the UN Charter - Measures by a CFE state or alliance in military policy or posture that threaten RU national interests <p>3. States joining CFE after signing of ACFE commit to reduce territorial ceilings of CFE and not to subsequently raise them [Note: restricts/precludes stationing of foreign forces]</p> <p>4. In negotiations and agreement with other states, RU will consider:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - States' position on EIF and compliance with A/CFE - Presence of RU forces, armaments, bases - Possibility of third-country deployment of forces, armaments, bases 	<p>5. States acceding to CFE will assume additional commitments/obligations on limiting conventional forces, changes to limits, and temporary presence of forces on their territories.</p> <p>6. After EIF of ACFE, the JCG will begin negotiations on procedures for accession of states to ACFE and further reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe.</p> <p>7. RU, prior to decision by the JCG, reserves the right to determine costs to the inspected party (RU) of CFE inspections of RU forces on RU territory and outside RU.</p> <p>8. No reservations by CFE states will apply to RU that change essential provisions of A/CFE, limit RU rights in A/CFE or contradict provisions of A/CFE.</p>
<p>Key: EIF – entry into force RU – Russia JCG – Joint Consultative Group</p>	
<p>A/CFE – Agreement on the Adaptation of the CFE Treaty TLE – treaty-limited equipment</p>	

Figure 5.1. The State Duma's Conditions for Ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty

Source: “O zayavlenii Gosudarstvennoy Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoy Federatsii ‘V svyazi s ratifikatsiyey Soglasheniya ob adaptatsii Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhenykh silakh v Evrope,’” *Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Postanovleniya*, PST No. 767-IV, 25 June 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6422910>.

Kosyachev called the declaration a “very serious signal to our partners” that had “significantly activated” debate over the need for ratification in other states parties to the CFE

Treaty.⁶¹⁸ The MFA welcomed the Duma's ratification of the A/CFE and hoped the Federation Council would act similarly in the near future.⁶¹⁹

The MFA would not be disappointed. On 7 July, in slightly under twenty minutes, the Federation Council passed the "Federal Law on the Ratification of the Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe" and, like the Duma, adopted a declaration to accompany it.⁶²⁰ Mikhail Margelov, the chairman of the Federation Council's Committee on International Affairs (which had conducted a hearing with testimony by representatives of the MFA and MOD on 5 July), presented the law. Margelov noted that the CFE Treaty had been adapted on Russia's initiative.⁶²¹ As reported by the government, the means for implementing the A/CFE had been programmed in the federal budget. The Committee on Defense and the Legal Directorate of the Administration of the Federation Council also endorsed ratification. The Committee on International Affairs judged that the A/CFE met Russia's national security interests and would "have a series of important foreign policy consequences," one of which would be to mitigate the negative consequences of the expansion of NATO. Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak, in response to a question, addressed the issue of a "grey zone" in the Baltic states and explained that Russia's ratification of the adapted

⁶¹⁸ "Ot pervogo litsa. Na ostrie aktual'nykh problem," *Parlamentskaya gazeta*, 29 July 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6533965>.

⁶¹⁹ MFA RF, "25 iyunya, O prinyatii Gosudarstvennoy Dumoy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoy Federatsii Federal'nogo zakona o ratifikatsii Soglasheniya ob adaptatsii Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhenykh silakh v Evrope," *DV* No. 7, 31 July 2004: 147, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6793801>.

⁶²⁰ Ratification of the A/CFE was item 12 on the Federation Council's agenda, appearing after the announcement of birthdays of members of the upper house of the legislature. "Stenogramma Zasedaniya Soveta Federatsii," SSF-No. 130, 7 July 2004, 41, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6983980>.

⁶²¹ In an indirect commentary on the Istanbul Commitments, Margelov observed that the "Concluding Act of the Conference of the CFE Treaty States Parties," adopted at Istanbul in November 1999, had not required ratification (which would have made its contents, including the commitments, legally binding).

treaty would be a step toward transforming political commitments by the governments of the Baltic states and NATO into legal obligations, by providing an impulse for the other parties to the treaty to ratify it. The Federation Council adopted the law on ratification by a vote of 137-1 (with forty not voting).⁶²²

After voting to ratify the adapted CFE Treaty, the Federation Council, like the Duma, considered an appeal that the Committee on International Affairs had drafted. The appeal, which was directed toward parliamentarians of the states that had yet to ratify the agreement on adaptation (almost all of which were members of NATO), reminded them that the time had come to move the process of ratification forward. The Federation Council approved the appeal by a vote of 138-0, with one abstention and thirty-nine not voting.⁶²³ Within two weeks of the vote by the Federation Council to ratify the adapted CFE Treaty, on 19 July, President Putin signed it into law.

A final piece to the puzzle of identifying the factor(s) that led to the ratification of the agreement and then a less sanguine position toward the CFE Treaty by the end of 2004 is Moscow's interactions with NATO, primarily through the NRC. Foreign Minister Ivanov told the Duma in February that cooperation with NATO in the NRC had developed well during the preceding year. One of the twelve priority tasks for Russian foreign policy in 2004 would be to continue this "effective partnership" (for example in peacekeeping and combating terrorism), in

⁶²² "Stenogramma Zasedaniya Soveta Federatsii," 7 July 2004, 42-45.

⁶²³ "Stenogramma Zasedaniya Soveta Federatsii," 7 July 2004, 46. On ratification and the remaining "difficulty" pertaining to the status of the Baltic states, see "Ratifikatsiya. Rossiiskiy parlament polnost'yu odobril DOVSE," *Parlamentskaya gazeta*, 9 July 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6459754>.

part through resolving “issues connected with the expansion of the alliance, specifically the issue of the adapted CFE Treaty and plans by the U.S. to adjust their force posture in Europe.”⁶²⁴

The Russian government’s pursuit of this “effective partnership” continued in 2004 under Ivanov’s successor, Sergey Lavrov. He retained the basic elements of Russia’s approach to NATO (grudging acceptance, but certainly not an embrace, of the alliance’s expansion; concern over the fate of the adapted CFE Treaty; and acknowledgement that while Russia and NATO did not see eye to eye on any number of issues (e.g. Kosovo and Iraq), dialogue was still important) when he represented Moscow at meetings of the NRC in April and June. The informal meeting of the NRC at the level of Foreign Ministers, held in Brussels on 2 April, was the first for all seven new members of NATO. In the run-up to the meeting, the MFA identified “the main complication” in relations between Russia and NATO as the status of four new members (the three Baltic states and Slovenia) as non-parties to the CFE Treaty. However, given the lack of alternatives to the EIF of the A/CFE, Russia was engaged in “difficult negotiations” with the NATO states to secure guarantees that the four states would accede to the agreement once it had entered into force.⁶²⁵ Lavrov noted the common interest of Russia and NATO in the indivisibility of security, which allowed for the open discussion of difficult issues, including those where the two sides disagreed, such as the situation with the CFE Treaty. At the NRC meeting, the Russian delegation received assurances that the four new members of NATO that

⁶²⁴ MFA RF, “V Federal’nom Sobranii Rossiiskoy Federatsii. Vystuplenie ministra inostrannykh del Rossiiskoy Federatsii I.S. Ivanova na sovместnom zasedanii komitetov Soveta Federatsii i Gosudarstvennoy Dumy po mezhdunarodnym delam,” *DV* No. 3, 31 March 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6156323>.

⁶²⁵ MFA RF, “Press-Tsent. Otveti ofitsial’nogo predstavatelya MID Rossii na voprosy rossiiskikh SMI v svyazi s neformal’noy vstrechey ministrov inostrannykh del Soveta Rossiya-NATO, 1 aprelya,” *DV* No. 5, 31 May 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6458390>.

were outside the CFE Treaty would take action to accede to it as soon as possible and that they would not take any measures before then that contradicted the treaty's principles and goals.⁶²⁶

Foreign Minister Lavrov expressed similar sentiments at the meeting of the NRC at the level of Foreign Ministers, held in Istanbul on 28 June, which took place in conjunction with the first NATO summit meeting with the seven new members (and which President Putin chose not to attend, in large part because of the allies' delay in ratifying the A/CFE and the Baltic states' entry into the alliance while remaining outside the treaty).⁶²⁷ Lavrov assessed the work of the NRC in the two years since its establishment as "on the whole satisfactory" for Russia and responsive to Russia's interests. The CFE Treaty was an especially important factor in relations between Russia and NATO, particularly given the expansion of the alliance and certain military activities on the territory of new members that were close near Russia. He also criticized delay in the ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty, which was based on incorrect legal linkages between agreements Russia had reached with Georgia and Moldova and the CFE Treaty.⁶²⁸ A commentary on the Istanbul meeting, published in the newspaper of the MOD, captured the

⁶²⁶ MFA RF, "Ofitsial'nye materialy. Prebyvanie ministra innostranykh del Rossiiskoy Federatsii S.V. Lavrov v Bryussele. Press-konferentsiya S.V. Lavrova po itogam neformal'noy vstrechi ministrov innostrannykh del Soveta Rossiya-NATO," *DV* No. 5, 31 May 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6458263>. The chairman's statement on the results of the meeting included language that took full account of Russia's position on the A/CFE, including restraint by NATO allies, fulfillment of all commitments made at Istanbul in 1999, cooperative efforts toward ratification and EIF of the agreement, and accession by the four non-CFE member states to the treaty as soon as practicable. "NRC Chairman's Statement, Informal Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Brussels, 2 April 2004," https://www.nato.int/nrc-website/media/59658/2004.04.02_nrc_official_statement_fms.pdf.

⁶²⁷ Lachowski and Dunay, "Conventional Arms Control and Military Confidence Building," *SIPRI Yearbook 2005*: 653.

⁶²⁸ MFA RF, "Ofitsial'nye materialy. Rossiya-NATO. Interv'yu S.V. Lavrova rossiiskim SMI v Stambule," *DV* No. 7, 31 July 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6793698>. The chairman's statement from this meeting of the NRC included language that was identical to the one from the April informal meeting regarding Russia's concerns with the A/CFE. "Chairman's Statement, Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at the Level of Foreign Ministers Held at Istanbul, 28 June 2004," https://www.nato.int/nrc-website/media/59667/2004.06.28_nrc_chairmans_statement_fms.pdf.

complex (perhaps, schizophrenic) nature of Russia's relations with NATO at the time. Although relations at the political level were undergoing "some recession" over the fate of A/CFE, cooperation at the military level was flourishing, as in recent exercises in the Baltic Sea region and Kaliningrad that involved Russian and NATO forces.⁶²⁹ These two meetings of the NRC exemplified Russia's approach to NATO in 2004. Although Moscow was cautiously optimistic about the possibilities of cooperation with the alliance, substantial differences remained over a number of issues, foremost among them the one-two punch of the enlargement of NATO and the delay by NATO states in ratifying the A/CFE over Russia's non-fulfilment of all their Istanbul Commitments. In this context, Aleksandr Grushko summed up Russia's attitude toward NATO's enlargement as "calmly negative."⁶³⁰

Throughout the remainder of 2004, the Russians continued to bang the drum for the ratification and EIF of the A/CFE. While the message remained consistent, its tone evolved over time and began to reflect less patience with the continued delay by NATO states. Deputy Foreign Minister Chizhov renewed the call for the earliest possible ratification and EIF of the A/CFE among a litany of complaints about the effectiveness of the OSCE during a meeting of that organization's Permanent Council in late August. While expressing Russia's concern over the weakening of the "treaty-legal" basis of European security and the increase of the "factor of military force in world politics," Chizhov expressed hope that the ratification of the A/CFE by the Federal Assembly would provide a stimulus to other parties to the CFE Treaty to fulfill "this most important of the complex of the Istanbul commitments," that is, to work toward the EIF of

⁶²⁹ Aleksey Lyashchenko. "Stambul gostyam ne rad," *KZ*, 29 June 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6417797>.

⁶³⁰ Lachowski and Dunay, "Conventional Arms Control and Military Confidence Building," *SIPRI Yearbook 2005*, 653; Wilcox, "Russia and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty): A Paradigm Change?": 574.

the adaptation agreement.⁶³¹ At the opening of the session of the UN First Committee on 5 October, Russian representative Skotnikov offered the ratification of the A/CFE by his parliament as an example of progress in regional arms control and security efforts. For Russia, there was no “constructive alternative” to the soonest possible EIF of the agreement.⁶³² Moscow also drew the member states of the CIS into the effort. The Council of Foreign Ministers of the CIS issued an appeal to other states of the OSCE in late October, in the run-up to the OSCE Ministerial Meeting scheduled for early December. The appeal included a call for the acceleration of the EIF of the A/CFE, as part of the full use and development of the potential of the OSCE in the political-military dimension.⁶³³

By December, the Russians had had enough with continued pressure from NATO members to fulfill the Istanbul Commitments before any progress could be made toward EIF of the A/CFE. At the OSCE ministerial meeting in Sofia held 6-7 December, Foreign Minister Lavrov declared that Russia had fulfilled “all obligations *relating to the CFE Treaty* [emphasis added] that were assumed at the Istanbul Summit of the OSCE in 1999” and renewed the call for other states to follow the example of Russia and the other three CIS states that had ratified the agreement.⁶³⁴ Responding to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Lavrov asserted that the

⁶³¹ MFA RF, “Ofitsial’nye materialy. Rossiya-OBSE. Rasshirennoe zasedanii Postoyanogo soveta OBSE. Vystuplenie V.A. Chizhov na zasedanii,” *DV* No. 8, 31 August 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/6817238>.

⁶³² “Organizatsiya Ob”edinennykh Natsii. Vystuplenie Postoyanogo predstavatelya Rossiiskoy Federatsii pri Otdelenii OON i drugikh mezhdunarodnykh organizatsiyakh v Zheneve L.A. Skotnikova v Pervom komitete 59-i sessii GA OON,” *DV* No. 11, 30 November 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/7245637>.

⁶³³ MFA RF, “Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv. Zasedanie Soveta ministrov inostrannykh del SNG. Obrashchenie gosudarstv-uchastnikov CNG k partneram po OBSE,” *DV* No. 10, 31 October 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/7233550>.

⁶³⁴ Dmitriy Gorokhov, “Russia Calls for Ratification of CFE Treaty Adaptation – Lavrov,” *ITAR-TASS Weekly News*, 7 December 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/7138100>.

linkage of “so-called Istanbul Commitments” to the ratification of the A/CFE was not justified. Russia’s agreements with Georgia and Moldova were bilateral and entailed no obligations by Russia to third parties.⁶³⁵ The fallout from this dispute included Russia, once again, blocking a letter from the chairman of the JCG, Luxembourg, to the ministerial council (because it referred to unaccounted for TLE in, for example, Transnistria and portions of Georgia, and non-fulfillment of Istanbul Commitments), the failure of the ministerial council to agree on a declaration about the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, and the council’s rejection of a Russian proposal to hold a high-level seminar on military doctrines in 2005.⁶³⁶ At the end of 2004, the fall session of the JCG drew to an end with delegations returning home for the holiday break empty-handed because the A/CFE was still not ready for ratification. In the view of one Russian commentator, the situation in the JCG at the time “again demonstrated the full myopia [*vsya nedal’novidnost’*]...of the United States and several other influential western governments to gain political dividends in the game in the negotiating hall of the Hofburg.”⁶³⁷ By implication, Russia was finding itself on the losing end of the CFE Treaty game, a circumstance that could not endure. A change in the game plan would become evident within the next two years.

Based on the case study, what factor(s) led Moscow to ratify the A/CFE and then to arrive at a less sanguine position toward the CFE Treaty by the end of 2004? Why did Moscow not choose to delay or reject ratification of the adapted treaty, given their concerns about NATO? It is first worth considering what process was being traced in the case study. On the one hand, it

⁶³⁵ Aleksey Lyashchenko, “Dialog slepogo s glukhim,” *KZ*, 9 December 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/7142034>.

⁶³⁶ Lachowski and Dunay, “Conventional Arms Control and Military Confidence Building,” *SIPRI Yearbook 2005*, 651; Aleksey Matveev, “Tema, Rossiyu vydavlivayut iz Pridnestrov’ya,” *VPK*, 26 January 2005, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/7296816>.

⁶³⁷ Igor’ Mel’nikov. “Dvoynye standarty. Stariye pesni zvuchat v Khofburge,” *Parlamentskaya gazeta*, 7 December 2004, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/7129883>.

was a path to the entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty. On the other hand, it was also the management of Russia's relations with NATO, which was once again undergoing a wave of expansion. In a broader sense, the process was one of creating and maintaining a security environment in Europe that was supportive of Russia's national security interests. Given the mutually interactive nature of these processes, the relevant factors that led to the policy outcome (and de facto dependent variable), a continued embrace of the adapted CFE Treaty as exemplified in its ratification by the Federal Assembly, can be drawn from all three.

The factors that had been influential in 1999, and then in 2002, when the Russian government submitted the A/CFE to the Federal Assembly for ratification, were still relevant. The Russians were still trying to create a European security system that would encompass all the countries in the ATTU region and reflect the new reality in which bloc-to-bloc competition no longer existed and local conflicts posed the greatest threat. At the same time, Russia's conventional armed forces were smaller and less capable than their Soviet predecessors, and the process of military reform was in its initial stage. While NATO was transforming its capabilities and strategic concept, to include through enlargement, Russia also sought means to mitigate the potential negative effects of this transformation on their own security. The accession of two states (Bulgaria and Romania) that were located in the treaty's flank region, four (the Baltic states and Slovenia) that were not parties to the treaty, and three (the Baltic states) that bordered the Russian Federation presented a challenge, in Moscow's eyes, to the viability of the CFE Treaty regime (still regarded as the "cornerstone of European security") and to Russia's security interests.

At the nexus of two processes – the pursuit of the EIF of the A/CFE and the management of Russia's relationship with NATO – therefore can be found the key factor in Russia's

ratification of the A/CFE in 2004. Ironically, the accession of the seven new members into NATO, with all its aforementioned implications, explains why Moscow could have rejected or delayed ratification, yet also why the Russians acted as they did. The Russians maintained faith that the A/CFE could mitigate the negative consequences of the second wave of enlargement *once it entered into force*. When, by the end of 2004, it dawned on the Russians that their own ratification of the agreement was not stimulating similar action by the NATO CFE states, their perspective on the treaty began to change. The change in perspective was on full display at the next major event in the life of the CFE Treaty, the Third REVCON.

The Third CFE Review Conference (31 May-2 June 2006)

The Russian Federation signaled a major shift in its position toward the CFE Treaty at the Third REVCON. From Moscow's perspective, two distinct approaches to the treaty collided in Vienna. The NATO states that were parties to the treaty and other states closely aligned to them, like Georgia and Moldova, found the operation of the existing treaty to be quite satisfactory. Russia and the other states of the CIS that had ratified the A/CFE, however, found that it had lost touch with reality, given the significant changes that had taken place in the European security environment (especially the expansion of NATO).⁶³⁸ The Russians took an increasingly hostile approach to the situation around the A/CFE and the continued delay in its ratification and EIF.

Throughout the year and half before the Third REVCON, the Russian position developed along three lines. First, the existing CFE Treaty was increasingly losing any connection to the extant politico-military situation in Europe. The CFE Treaty was slowly dying and no longer

⁶³⁸ Mazur, "Rossiya i kontrol' nad vooruzhenniyami v Evrope," 281; Anin and Ayumov, "DOVSE – Vchera...Segodnya... Zavtra?...stat'ya vtoraya:" 23; Antonov and Ayumov, *Kontrol' nad obychnymi vooruzheniyami v evrope – konets regima ili istoriya s prodolzheniem*, 33.

supported security or the “balanced interests” of all parties. The inadequacies of the original CFE Treaty were “inherent” in the adapted version: no limits on geographical basing of air forces, and the exclusion of naval forces, strategic aviation and nuclear deterrent forces. Should the current situation, in which the A/CFE was not operational and perspectives for its EIF looked “foggy,” then a difficult conversation about the fate of the treaty lay ahead at the REVCON. Representatives of the MFA, MOD and General Staff at the highest level took this line in various forums.⁶³⁹

The second of Russia’s policy lines was an aggressive push-back against the insistence by the NATO states that Russia “fully implement” the Istanbul Commitments before those states would ratify the A/CFE. The arguments in this line were threefold. First, the commitments Russia made in agreements with Georgia and Moldova regarding the status of their forces were bilateral and, therefore, they pertained neither to any third party nor to the CFE Treaty, its ratification, or EIF. Second, in an effort to turn the tables on the NATO allies, the Russians asserted that of the twenty or so unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral commitments made at Istanbul, the “main” or “central” one was to pursue the ratification and EIF of the A/CFE as soon as possible.⁶⁴⁰ The NATO states were erecting artificial obstacles to the process and therefore were not fulfilling this commitment. Along these lines, the Russians also asserted an

⁶³⁹ Vladimir Kuzar’, “Nash kommentariy. Vse ta zhe zashopreennost,” *KZ*, 2 September 2005, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/8176214>; Mikhail Tul’ev, “Iz pervykh ruk. DOVSE i bezopasnost’ Evropeyskikh gosudarstv;” Aleksey Ventslovskiy, “Zakavkazskiy rubezh Moskvy,” *KZ*, 25 January 2006, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/8909381>; Svetlana Kuskova, “Bezopasnost’. Global’nye riski,” *VPK*, 8 February 2006, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/8998930>; Marianna Grishina, “Voenno-politicheskoe obozrenie. DOVSE priznayut ne vse,” *KZ*, 23 August 2006, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/9933376>.

⁶⁴⁰ “The Final Act of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe” includes the commitment by all states parties “to move forward expeditiously to facilitate completion of national ratification procedures, so that the Agreement on Adaptation can enter into force as soon as possible.” The Final Act neither assigns nor implies any priority or ranking of the commitments.

inconsistency between NATO's claim that the change in political status of the six (former WTO) new members of NATO had nothing to do with CFE, and the allies' insistence that Russian bilateral arrangements with Georgia and Moldova had everything to do with the CFE Treaty. Finally, they complained that NATO had been moving the goalposts regarding Russia's fulfilment of their commitments. According to this argument, the NATO allies progressively insisted that Russia meet the flank limits, then provide more transparency about meeting flank limits, and then fulfill their commitments to Georgia and Moldova (that were "not connected to CFE Treaty matters").⁶⁴¹ One Russian commentator, who had worked on the development of the mandate for the negotiation of the original CFE Treaty, even questioned whether there was a common understanding of "complete fulfilment."⁶⁴²

The final policy line on the CFE Treaty that emerged in 2005 and 2006 was to absolve Russia from any responsibility for the future of the CFE Treaty. Given that Russia had done all it could do, including fulfilling the Istanbul Commitments that were related to the CFE Treaty, "the further fate of the Agreement of adaptation of the CFE Treaty depended exclusively [*isklyuchitel'no*] on our NATO partners."⁶⁴³ A corollary to this line of reasoning was a professed lack of concern over the NATO states' apparent disinterest in Russia's complaints about the

⁶⁴¹ Aleksandr Yakovenko, "Mir i Rossiya. Mify i realnost' stambul'skikh dogovorennoyey," *RG*, 6 April 2005, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/7567082>; Roman Streshnev, "ODKB. Strategiya bezopasnosti," *KZ*, 23 June 2005, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/7864173>; Mikhail Tul'ev, "Iz pervykh ruk. DOVSE i bezopasnost' Evropeyskikh rosudarstv; Aleksey Lyashchenko, "Krepit' avtoritet i bezopasnost' Rossii," *KZ*, 15 March 2006, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/9163707>; Dmitry Gorokhov, "Lavrov Calls for Ratifying CFE Adaptation Agreement," *ITAR-TASS Weekly News*, 5 December 2005, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/8693476>; Nasdezhda Sorokina, "Mir i Rossiya. Rossiya ne protivostoit OBSE" *RG*, 10 December 2005, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/8720407>; Igor' Mel'nikov, "Zametki po povodu. Kto podtachaivaet 'kraeugol'nyi kamen,'" *Parlamentskaya gazeta*, 21 December 2005, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/8768368>?

⁶⁴² Gennadiy Evstaf'ev, "Razoruzhenie vozvrashchaetsya," *Indeks bezopasnosti* 13, No. 2 (2007): 52, www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/0/13413052180.pdf.

⁶⁴³ Yakovenko, "Mir i Rossiya. Mify i realnost' stambul'skikh dogovorennoyey."

treaty and the possibility that Moscow might reassess its value. In the words of Colonel-General Anatoliy Mazurkevich, the Chief of the Directorate for Military Cooperation of the MOD, “Everyone knows that Russia has a sufficient arsenal of forces, means and capabilities to guarantee its security and achieve its national interests. Therefore, we are sincere, when we say that the collapse of the CFE Treaty will not result in irreparable damage for Russia.”⁶⁴⁴ The outcome of the Third REVCON in 2006 and subsequent events in 2007 confirmed this line of thinking.

The Third REVCON took place from 31 May to 2 June in the Hofburg Palace in Vienna under the chairmanship of Kazakhstan. During opening and closing plenary sessions and four meeting sessions in between them, delegations of the thirty states parties to the CFE Treaty delivered opening and closing statements and reviewed operational issues of the treaty, other issues identified and tasked by the Second REVCON (2001) for further work, and elements mentioned in the “Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty,” 19 November 1999.⁶⁴⁵ The conference was to have ended with the adoption of formal conclusions, however, this did not happen, although the Kazakh chairmanship had prepared a draft, based on consultations that began before the REVCON.⁶⁴⁶ Russia blocked adoption of the conclusions partly because they mentioned non-fulfillment of Istanbul Commitments and issues with unaccounted TLE (UTLE) in disputed areas, such as the Transdniestr region of Moldova and

⁶⁴⁴ Aleksey Lyashchenko, “Krepit’ avtoritet i bezopasnost’ Rossii.”

⁶⁴⁵ The indicative schedule of the conference allowed for eighteen working hours over the course of six meeting sessions. The actual work hours came to less than ten, indicating that much time was spent in consultations outside the meeting hall. “Third CFE Treaty Review Conference,” CFE-TRC3.JOUR, 30 May-2 June 2006: 1,6.

⁶⁴⁶ “Announcement by the Chairperson Regarding the Formal Conclusions of the Third CFE Treaty Review Conference,” CFE-TRC3.JOUR, 1 June 2006, Annex 31.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia.⁶⁴⁷ The conference did not go well and was mired in a deadlock between, mainly, the NATO allies and states associated with their position (Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Ukraine) and Russia (with support from Belarus) over the familiar issues of fulfillment of Istanbul commitments and the delay in the EIF of the A/CFE. In the assessment of the Kazakh chairman at the end of the conference:

The past four days of the Conference have provided a fine opportunity to discuss many important issues and to study the basic provisions governing the application of the Treaty. However, in the majority of cases our work has been reduced for the most part to the establishment of facts and expression of positions and at times to reciprocal bickering and accusations... We regret the unwillingness of some States to listen carefully to one another and to adopt constructive decisions based on compromise... We regret that at the end of our meeting it has not been possible to elaborate a final document with a clear common position.⁶⁴⁸

The Russians followed the three policy lines they had developed in the preceding year and a half at the REVCON. Prior to the conference, Russia circulated a draft of basic elements for a concluding document for the conference that included proposals that states that had not yet ratified the A/CFE do so by the end of 2007 and for provisional application of its provisions

⁶⁴⁷ The U.S., speaking also for the NATO allies, used the complete text of the draft conclusions prepared by Kazakhstan in their concluding statement, assuring its inclusion in the journal of the conference, no doubt to Russia's annoyance. "Statement by the Delegation of the United States of America (On Behalf of Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, The Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, The United Kingdom, The United States of America) at the Third CFE Treaty Review Conference," CFE-TRC3.JOUR, 1 June 2006, Annex 33.

⁶⁴⁸ "Statement by the Delegation of Kazakhstan at the Third CFE Treaty Review Conference," CFE-TRC3.JOUR, 2 June 2006, Annex 36.

from 1 October 2006 until its EIF. None of their proposals gained support (except from Belarus).⁶⁴⁹ Along the first line of Russia's policy, that the CFE Treaty had lost any connection to the reality of the European security situation, the Russians argued that NATO was exceeding the aggregate limits on TLE as a result of the two waves of expansion. When the new members acceded to the Washington Treaty of 1949, they moved from the eastern group of states parties (the former WTO) to the western group (NATO) although their allowed levels of TLE did not move with them. Both the aggregate holdings of TLE for the alliance and, specifically, their holdings on the flank zone therefore exceeded the limits set out in the CFE Treaty. Additionally, the commitment the Russians made for restraint in the deployment of forces in the northern region opposite the Baltic states and Poland was under question, because the conditions there had radically changed with the entry of the Baltic states into NATO while they remained outside the CFE Treaty. Likewise, the political commitments NATO had made beginning in 1997 for restraint in the stationing of "significant combat forces" on the territories of new members were no longer sufficient and needed to be captured in a legally binding manner.⁶⁵⁰

Regarding the second line of policy that dealt with the Istanbul Commitments, the Russians rejected the Moldovan delegation's assertion that the Istanbul commitments were part of a "package" that was a prerequisite for the ratification of the A/CFE. They also asserted that Moldova had given host-nation consent for the presence of Russian forces when they signed an

⁶⁴⁹ "Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Third CFE Treaty Review Conference," CFE-TRC3.JOUR, 30 May 2006, Annex 23, 2. See also Anin and Ayumov, "DOVSE – Vchera...Segodnya...Zavtra?...stat'ya vtoraya:" 23 and Mazur, "Rossiya i kontrol' nad vooruzhenniyami v Evrope," 281. The Russians originally tabled the draft elements in the JCG on 9 May 2006. Zdzislaw Lachowski and Martin Segren, "Conventional Arms Control," in SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (London: Oxford University Press, 2007), 660.

⁶⁵⁰ "Statement under agenda item 3(c)" and "Statement under agenda item 5" in "Statements by the Delegation of the Russian Federation Under Agenda Items 3 and 5 of the Third CFE Treaty Review Conference," RC.DEL/44/06, 2 June 2006, Attachment: 1-3.

agreement with Russia in 1992 on Principles for the Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transnistrian Region of Moldova, an assertion the Moldovans vigorously rejected.⁶⁵¹ As for Georgia, the Russians reiterated their position that they had met all their commitments. They also complained about the changing demands for the fulfillment of Istanbul Commitments and the ambiguous nature of the concept of “full implementation” of them. Finally, the Russians pointed out that other parties to the CFE Treaty were not fulfilling their Istanbul Commitment to facilitate national ratification procedures so the A/CFE could enter into force as soon as possible.⁶⁵² Consistent with the third line of policy, the Russians used their opening and closing statements to make clear that, in view of the lack of success of their attempts to “reanimate the CFE Treaty regime,” the fate of the treaty was in the hands of “our Western partners.”⁶⁵³

The results of the Third REVCON, most conspicuously the failure of the participants to come to agreement on a set of formal conclusions, were unambiguously negative. This much was clear from the assessment by the Kazakh chairman. For the Russians, the conference confirmed their increasingly negative assessment of the treaty’s viability and the wide divergence of views held by them and the NATO allies about its status. The treaty had lost its viability and no longer reflected the balance of forces in the AOA.⁶⁵⁴ The REVCON also

⁶⁵¹ “I would like to state with full authority that the Republic of Moldova does not consider the agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova on the principles of the peace settlement of the conflict in the transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, signed on 21 July 1992, as a legal basis for the Russian military presence on its territory... The Russian military forces should be withdrawn in accordance with the Istanbul commitments, and I believe it unnecessary to engage in discussions over issues clear to all of those who understand what was agreed upon in Istanbul.” “Statement by the Delegation of Moldova at the Third CFE Treaty Review Conference,” CFE-TRC3.JOUR, 1 June 2006, Annex 30.

⁶⁵² “Statement under agenda item 5” in “Statements by the Delegation of the Russian Federation Under Agenda Items 3 and 5 of the Third CFE Treaty Review Conference,” RC.DEL/44/06, 2 June 2006, Attachment: 3-8.

⁶⁵³ “Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Third CFE Treaty Review Conference,” CFE-TRC3.JOUR, 30 May 2006, Annex 23: 3; “Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Third CFE Treaty Review Conference,” RC.DEL/44/06, 2 June 2006: 2.

⁶⁵⁴ Mazur, “Rossiya i kontrol’ nad vooruzhenniyami v Evrope:” 282.

marked a turning point in Moscow's approach to the treaty. The closing statement by the Russian delegation left no doubt about Russia's assessment and their way ahead:

In view of the unwillingness of the NATO countries to start the process of ratifying the Agreement on Adaptation – as confirmed by this conference – the Russian Federation intends to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the current situation as regards conventional arms control in Europe. We will inform the CFE States Parties of the outcome of this analysis.⁶⁵⁵

In the immediate aftermath of the REVCON, comments in the Russian press and remarks by Russian officials affirmed, and even amplified, the consequences of its outcome. Writing in *Parlamentskaya gazeta*, one commentator, having noted the headline in an Austrian newspaper after the close of the conference, “Will Russia leave the treaty?”, asserted that such a result would have been consistent with the tactics of some negotiators from NATO, who were “obsessed” with avoiding ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty. The results of the review conference even impugned the original CFE Treaty, the product of the era of perestroika and the accompanying “disarmament race” that the West used to push the Soviets out of Eastern Europe. In the view of this commentator, “the results of the Vienna review conference confirm the conclusion about the total isolation of the treaty from reality, about its incapability to exert any positive effect on the political-military situation in Europe.”⁶⁵⁶ Lieutenant General Buzhinskiy concluded in his analysis of the REVCON that NATO states seemed to have lost interest in ratifying the A/CFE and, in fact, were more inclined to use it as a way to promote broader

⁶⁵⁵ “Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Third CFE Treaty Review Conference,” RC.DEL/44/06, 2 June 2006: 2.

⁶⁵⁶ “Aktual'nye komentarii. I vse na staryi obrazets,” *Parlamentskaya gazeta*, 7 June 2006, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/9585735>.

geopolitical interests outside the purposes and intent of the treaty.⁶⁵⁷ Senior officials of the MFA offered similarly dire assessments of the state of the CFE Treaty. Anatoliy Antonov, the director of the Department for Security and Arms Control, said that the results of the review conference “decisively confirmed” that the existing CFE Treaty had lost its viability. Foreign Minister Lavrov told an interviewer the treaty “was dying its own death” and emphasized to members of the Duma that Russia would soon “reexamine its approach toward the treaty taking into account the negative results” of the REVCON.⁶⁵⁸ Within a few months, the Russians were drawing the situation surrounding the CFE Treaty, NATO’s role in undermining it, and the influence of the U.S. in the process, into a larger package of concerns about Russia’s security, which came to include the prospect of the placement of U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems on the territory of NATO member states.⁶⁵⁹ The stage was set for Moscow to take decisive action in its approach to the CFE Treaty in 2007.

⁶⁵⁷ Evgeniy Buzhinskiy, “Why and What Prevents Adaptation of the CFE Treaty?” *Russian Military Review* No. 7, July 2006: 21-22, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/11315678>.

⁶⁵⁸ Marianna Grishina, “Voenno-Politicheskoe obozrenie. DOVSE priznayut ne vse.”

⁶⁵⁹ Evgeniy Buzhinskiy, “Protivoraketnaya oborona i Evropeyskaya bezopasnost,” *VPK*, 4 October 2006, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/10133373>. Buzhinskiy’s article begins with several paragraphs on the decline of the CFE Treaty, transitions to changes in NATO, and then moves to the role of the U.S. to prepare the ground for his examination of the ballistic missile defense (BMD) issue. Grishina (see preceding footnote) also places BMD, in the context of “Washington’s plans, approved in Brussels” to station BMD assets in Poland, among several actions “that not only contradict the CFE Treaty, but also force Russia to take additional measures to strengthen its security.”

The CFE Treaty and Russian Foreign and Security Policy

As was the case in Chapter 4, this analysis is guided by the conceptual framework set out in Chapter 1 (pages 23-24). The assessment relies on the content of policy documents and effects (desired and undesired) of concrete actions and policies to describe linkages between the CFE Treaty and Russian foreign and security policy. The key events in the period covered by this chapter, 2000-2006, provide touchpoints for the analysis.

Looking at content, of the four documents that set out Russia's foreign and security policy from 2000 to 2003, the "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation," the "Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," the "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation" and "The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces," only the "Foreign Policy Concept" explicitly mentioned the CFE Treaty. One of the regional priorities for Europe in Russia's foreign policy was to ensure the adapted CFE Treaty became "an active instrument of ensuring European security" through its EIF. The "National Security Concept" implicitly included the CFE Treaty under the rubric of a general willingness to adapt arms control agreements to "new conditions of international relations."

As for the effects of arms control, the undesired effects combined with shortcomings in producing desired ones dominated this period of the research. The main desired effect of the CFE Treaty would have been a security environment in Europe that was favorable to Russia's national security interests. The imposition of the system of national and territorial limits and other constraints of the A/CFE would have mitigated the consequences for Russia and her allies of the expansion of NATO, thereby at least reducing the negative impact on the security environment of NATO's transformation. The continued delay of the ratification and EIF of the

A/CFE, which Moscow blamed squarely on the NATO states, precluded the realization of this desired effect. The second wave of NATO expansion in 2004 only compounded this situation by creating conditions for an unfavorable balance of forces near the borders of the Russian Federation, thereby amplifying the consequences for Russia's security interests and the threats against them of the failure to achieve this desired effect of the A/CFE.

The effects of the CFE Treaty on the security environment also had an impact on Russia's ability to maintain influence in the near abroad, specifically Georgia and Moldova. Although the Russians finally were able to reach agreement with Tbilisi in 2005 on a timetable for the withdrawal of the remaining Russian forces from Georgia, disputes over the Gudauta base in Abkhazia, which was outside the control of the Georgian authorities, and over the reported delivery of TLE to separatist forces there and in South Ossetia, ensured that Russia's role in Georgia remained problematic for the host government and more broadly for the fate of the CFE Treaty. The situation in Moldova was even more unsettled and the prospects for its resolution fewer. Moscow's proclaimed fulfilment of their Istanbul Commitments to Georgia and Moldova that related to the CFE Treaty produced no political gains for them.

Even had the A/CFE entered into force, the Russians also would have continued to face another undesired effect – their inability to secure in the negotiations for the A/CFE limits on capabilities and resources NATO and the U.S. had drawn on in operations in the FRY in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. They included ground- and sea-based aviation, naval capabilities in general, capabilities of alliances or coalitions, and military infrastructure. The documents on foreign and security policy recognized these shortcomings. Both the “National Security Concept” and the “Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces” mentioned

the need to develop reliable defenses to protect the country from air attack. The “Foreign Policy Concept” set as one of its tasks the negotiation of CSBMs on coalition and naval activities.

Another undesired effect of Russia’s participation in the CFE Treaty that became more acute during this period was a lack of respect for the Russian Federation’s status as a great power. The disdain by NATO and the U.S. for Moscow’s concerns about the viability of the CFE Treaty was evident in several forms. First, the Russians’ perceived that NATO had, over time, imposed ever-changing conditions for Moscow to meet in order to begin the process of the ratification of the A/CFE. Second, the Russians’ expenditure of significant political capital in a number of forums, to include the NRC, to seek an accommodation with the allies on the fate of the CFE Treaty, met with no success. The results of the Third REVCON and, from the Russian perspective, the apparent disregard by the allies of assurances about restraint in deployment of forces on the territory of new NATO member states, confirmed this view.

Finally, two costs of arms control arrangements, funding and transparency, also remained as undesired effects of Russia’s embrace of the CFE Treaty. The Russians raised the issue of the costs to the inspected state of inspections on its territory, which would increase because of the larger number of inspections envisioned in the A/CFE, at the Third REVCON. This cost was an ongoing issue for Russia, given broader budget problems the government and armed forces faced and notwithstanding testimony during hearings on the ratification of the A/CFE in both houses of the Federal Assembly that sufficient resources were available. The challenge of transparency raised its head when NATO allies demanded of Russia additional reporting and verification, including through on-site visits, of destruction of TLE to meet the flank limits and withdrawals of Russian TLE, forces and ammunition from Georgia and Moldova.

As the scale measuring the effects of adherence to the CFE Treaty tilted more and more in the direction of undesired ones, Moscow became less tolerant of them and signaled that they would reassess the benefit of preserving this arms control regime. Events, beginning most dramatically in 2007, would demonstrate that the Russians had had enough.

Chapter 6 - The Russians Abandon the CFE Treaty (2007-2015)

The period under study in this chapter encompasses the denouement of Moscow's relationship with the CFE Treaty. It starts in 2007, a momentous year that began with Putin's "Russia is back" address to the Munich Security Conference and included Russia's suspension of implementation of the treaty, along with other assertive military-political moves, such as the resumption of long-range flights by strategic bombers. Dmitriy Medvedev switched his job as prime minister with Putin's in 2008. His presidency during the middle years of the period (2009-2012) was marked by foreign and security policies that, for the most part, differed little from Putin's. Nonetheless, examples such as Medvedev's proposal for a European Security Treaty in 2008 and his differences with Putin over Russia's acquiescence to UNSC sanction of NATO-led air operations against Libya in 2011, pointed to some independence in setting policy.⁶⁶⁰ During this period, the Russians also faced the entry into NATO of two more states that were not parties to the CFE Treaty, Albania and Croatia, and a commitment to Georgia and Ukraine that they would become members of the alliance.

By early 2007, the Russians seem to have decided that the undesired effects of adhering to the CFE Treaty had come to outweigh the desired ones. The constraints and transparency the treaty imposed on the deployment of forces to the near abroad proved to be too much. Key decisions about Russia's relationship with the CFE Treaty – the moratorium on its implementation in 2007 and withdrawal from the JCG in 2015 (both of which Putin took) – roughly corresponded to the use of the armed forces of the Russian Federation in the near

⁶⁶⁰ See, for example, Pacer, *Russian Foreign Policy Under Dmitriy Medvedev*, 190 and 195.

abroad, in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. Nonetheless, Moscow proceeded carefully and went through a series of legal wickets before suspending the implementation of the treaty (an action not provided for in the CFE Treaty). This was a drawn-out process to achieve a pre-determined outcome. Consultations among the thirty CFE Treaty states and the six NATO allies that were not parties to the treaty, from 2010 to 2011, as well as another REVCON in 2011, failed to draw Russia fully back into the CFE Treaty's fold. The provision in the A/CFE for host-nation consent to the presence of foreign forces on its territory (i.e. in Georgia and Moldova) proved to be the stumbling block for Russia in these efforts to salvage the treaty. Already in 2013, Moscow was declaring the treaty's death. By the end of 2015, Russia, although not having exercised the CFE Treaty's provision for withdrawal, had de facto abandoned the treaty when they ended their participation in the JCG.

Although the U.S. and the NATO allies did not abandon their policy of not proceeding with the ratification of the A/CFE until Russia fulfilled its Istanbul Commitments to Georgia and Moldova, they made efforts to maintain the treaty's viability, despite Moscow's suspension of its implementation in 2007. The allies demonstrated their commitment to the CFE Treaty by leading consultations with Russia from 2007-2008. During the "reset" in relations during the administrations of Barack Obama and Dmitriy Medvedev, the U.S. led consultations on CFE that also included the six new NATO members that were not parties to the CFE Treaty.

These policy initiatives by Washington and the NATO allies proved to be unsuccessful. In the case of the consultations from 2007-2008, they faltered in the wake of the Russo-Georgian War of August 2008. Arguably, they were already at risk once NATO, at Washington's urging, offered Georgia and Ukraine membership in the alliance at some future date. When Putin returned to the Russian presidency in 2012, his view that the U.S. was somehow behind the

demonstrations against fraud in the Russian parliamentary elections of 2011 and his own presidential election of 2012 assured that the U.S. CFE initiative of 2010-2011 would not be resurrected. In fact, when the U.S., followed by the allies, announced that it would stop providing annual data on armed forces under the CFE Treaty to Russia (which they had continued to do even after Russia suspended implementation of the CFE Treaty in 2007), prospects for Moscow to return to implementation of the treaty became very dim. Once relations between NATO and Russia (even in the NRC) ruptured in 2014 following the so-called annexation of Crimea and beginning of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the prospects became nil.

This chapter is organized similarly to the preceding two, beginning with an account of the development and promulgation of foreign and security policy during this period. The chapter's case study is the year 2007, in which Moscow, having lost all patience with the delay of the EIF of the A/CFE and a host of other perceived sins by the U.S. and NATO, suspended their implementation of the treaty. The case study sets the stage for an examination of the remaining events in the life of the CFE Treaty to 2015. The chapter concludes by drawing linkages between Russia's foreign and security policy and the CFE Treaty, using the conceptual framework set out in Chapter 1.

Russian Foreign and Security Policy – 2007-2015

Beginning in 2007, Russia's foreign and security policy reflected the country's shift from a state of near-permanent crisis to a more stable footing. As President Putin's first two terms in office drew to a close, he and the country exuded confidence and took a more assertive approach toward actors and issues that affected Russia's security interests. Much of this confidence was based on economic factors, particularly higher prices for Russia's main export, oil, and

Moscow's payment of its debt to the IMF and the Paris Club of sovereign creditors ahead of schedule by 2005.⁶⁶¹

The structure of the national security policy enterprise remained unchanged during this period of transitions from the Putin administration to Medvedev's, and then back again. Medvedev's accession to the presidency, in the words of one Russian expert, was good news for Russia's foreign policy. He had the chance to continue his predecessor's foreign policy course, because he had "had an opportunity not only to analyze foreign policy but also to be in the thick of it as both chief of presidential administration and first deputy prime minister" during Putin's presidency.⁶⁶²

The Presidential Administration retained much of the responsibility for policy development, while the MFA served mainly as an executor of policy.⁶⁶³ The role of the armed forces as a symbol of Russia's power increased, beginning with the resumption of flights of long-range bombers and sorties by naval vessels in 2007, continuing with the revival of a military parade on Red Square on Victory Day in May 2008, and culminating in the employment of the armed forces in Georgia and Ukraine. Changes in defense ministers signaled a renewed emphasis on the stalled process of military reform and a more prominent role for the MOD in foreign and security policy. Putin shifted Sergey Ivanov from Minister of Defense to First Deputy Prime Minister in 2007. His successor, Anatoliy Serdyukov, gave new energy to the

⁶⁶¹ The early payment of the debt reduced "foreign leverage" over Russia's policy. Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*, 34. Marcel de Haas cites a "booming" economy as a basis for Putin's more assertive approach toward the West during his second term (2004-2008). de Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond*, 80. On the impact of higher oil prices, see Daniel Treisman, *The Return: Russia's Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev* (New York, The Free Press, 2011), 234-235.

⁶⁶² "2007 Foreign Policy in Review, Outlook for 2008 [roundtable discussion]," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 54, No. 2 (2008): 71-72, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/19684037>.

⁶⁶³ Pacer, *Russian Foreign Policy Under Dmitriy Medvedev*, 11.

process of military reform under Medvedev after the army's mediocre performance in the war in Georgia. Putin's replacement of Serdyukov with Sergey Shoygu from the Ministry of Emergency Situations in November 2012 marked the start of a period of greater activity by the armed forces in foreign and security policy. One curious development in the MOD was the assignment of a senior diplomat, Anatoliy Antonov, as Deputy Defense Minister in 2011. Antonov had been serving as the head of the Security and Disarmament Department of the MFA (his deputy in the MFA, Sergey Koshelev, followed him to the MOD and became the head of the Department for International Military Cooperation).⁶⁶⁴ A Western ambassador in Moscow speculated at the time that the move was designed to (unsuccessfully) temper the anti-western conservatism of the military.⁶⁶⁵

Developments in the security environment, not just institutionalized anti-westernism, fueled policymakers' skepticism toward the West. Points of dispute, such as the enlargement of NATO, carried over from Putin's presidency to Medvedev's. The challenge of an additional tranche of enlargement became more acute with the prospect that Georgia and Ukraine might join the alliance. The hangover from the so-called color revolutions in those countries in 2003 and 2004, respectively, compounded this threat to Russia's interests. Tensions with Georgia as President Mikheil Saakashvili simultaneously pursued a pro-western course and acted to bring

⁶⁶⁴ Russian reporting at the time linked the appointments to both diplomats' experience in arms control negotiations. Yuriy Gavrilov, "Voennaya diplomatiya: Mezhdunarodnyi glavk minoborony vozglavil vykhodets iz MIDa," *RG*, 5 May 2011, <https://rg.ru/2011/05/05/koshelev.html>; "Civilians Now Top Military Diplomats," *Russian Defense Policy*, 5 May 2011, <https://russiandefpolicy.blog/2011/05/05/civilians-now-top-military-diplomats/>.

⁶⁶⁵ Pacer, *Russian Foreign Policy Under Dmitriy Medvedev*, 11. A former Senior State Department Official offered a different take on Antonov's move. According to this official, who had experience in negotiations with him, Antonov would say that he moved from the MFA to the MOD to improve coordination between the two ministries and to add more diplomacy to the military's approach. Most who were serving in the MFA, however, would say that Antonov was moved because no one there wanted to work with him. Telephone conversation between a Former Senior State Department Official and the author, August 2019. As of the writing of this dissertation, Antonov is the Russian ambassador to the U.S. and Koshelev is his deputy.

rebellious regions to heel came to a head in the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. What Moscow viewed as an attempt by the West, i.e. the EU and NATO, to pull Ukraine into their sphere of influence led to the Maidan protests, the forced departure of President Viktor Yanukovich, and Russia's seizure and annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent conflict in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine. Beyond the near abroad, the Russians also found themselves powerless to prevent actions that threatened their interests, despite clearly expressing their concerns and opposition. Foremost among them were the deployment of U.S. BMD systems to countries of the former WTO and Kosovo's independence in 2010. These events influenced Russian foreign and security policy, in particular as it pertained to the ATTU region.

Two transitions between presidents during this period, along with the events listed above, set the context for the development and publication of five statements of foreign and security policy during this period. Dmitriy Medvedev's government issued a foreign policy concept, national security strategy and military doctrine from 2008-2010. After his return to the presidency in 2013, Putin published a foreign policy concept and military doctrine in 2013 and 2014, respectively.⁶⁶⁶ These statements of Russia's foreign and security policies are the subject of the remainder of this section of Chapter 6.

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, July 2008

Dmitriy Medvedev's first statement of foreign and security policy was the foreign policy concept he approved on 12 July 2008. The concept reflected Russia's entry into "a period of stable development" and an "immeasurable" increase in the country's "capability, role and

⁶⁶⁶ He also issued a revised military doctrine document at the end of 2015, which falls outside the time period of this study.

responsibility” in international affairs. It was not a “Medvedev policy.” Rather, as an official of the MFA wrote, “...it is pointless to speak about D.A. Medvedev’s foreign policy or V.V. Putin’s foreign policy. There is only one foreign policy of new Russia, a product of the new status of the country and the world as a whole.”⁶⁶⁷ Participants in the concept’s development included the MFA and other agencies of the Russian government, “primarily” the MOD, whose “proposals and comments were taken into account at the final stage of the work.” Close cooperation with the Presidential Administration, including the Foreign Policy Directorate of the Executive Office of the president, was a *sine qua non*. Finally, the MFA worked with both houses of the Federal Assembly as well as think tanks and institutions of civil society.⁶⁶⁸ The “Foreign Policy Concept” provided the basis for future planning, which would respond to the world’s calls for Russia to assist with finding solutions to global problems. The document was a “serious and balanced” one that set out direction for Russia’s diplomacy, “based on an analysis of all aspects of contemporary international life.”⁶⁶⁹

The “Foreign Policy Concept” differed from its predecessor in several respects. The new concept omitted reference to resource limitations and the associated “realism” of the policy that was in the 2000 version. It touched on phenomena associated with globalization, such as a more

⁶⁶⁷ A. Kramarenko, “The Ideology of Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept,” *International Affairs* (Moscow) No. 5 (2008): 29, 36, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/19391991>. The author was the Director of the Foreign Policy Planning Department of the MFA, so he likely had a hand in the preparation of the foreign policy concept.

⁶⁶⁸ Kramarenko, “The Ideology of Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept.” 30. Kramarenko hinted at the disputatious nature of the process of coordinating the concept among various entities in the government: the document only contained “that which really reflects our convictions and which we are in a position to uphold in debate both at home and in the international arena. Incidentally, this was precisely what we had to do when harmonizing the text of the foreign policy concept with other government agencies and the various Directorates of the Executive Office of the RF [Russian Federation] President.”

⁶⁶⁹ “Meeting of the President Dmitry Medvedev with Russia’s Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to International Organizations,” *International Affairs* (Moscow) No. 5 (2008): 2, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/19391980>.

globalized economy and an increasing role for the “civilizational factor” in foreign policy. Perhaps in light of Medvedev’s background as a lawyer, the foreign policy concept also emphasized the primacy of international law in international relations. The bloc approach to international relations, according to the concept, had been replaced by “networked” diplomacy, a flexible approach to working with international organizations and groupings to solve global problems. Notwithstanding these changes in the concept’s approach from its predecessor’s, the 2008 foreign policy concept also stressed the multivector character of Russia’s foreign policy and the primacy of the fight against terrorism in domestic and foreign policy.⁶⁷⁰

In two areas of particular relevance to this dissertation, arms control and disarmament and European security, the “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” was broadly consistent with its predecessor, although with some minor adjustments to reflect the extant state of affairs. As part of strengthening international security, Russia called for a “diminished role of the force factor” in international relations and maintained her “unswerving” fulfillment of obligations in arms control and disarmament treaties, as well as in participation in negotiations toward new agreements “consistent with national interests and on the basis of equal and indivisible security.” One of Russia’s approaches to promoting regional stability in Europe would be “through participation in the processes of conventional armed forces limitation and reduction” and CSBMs.⁶⁷¹ The concept did not mention the CFE Treaty, which was understandable in light of Russia’s suspension of its implementation in 2007. A significant addition to the foreign policy concept’s treatment of European security was the inclusion of

⁶⁷⁰ “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” *International Affairs* (Moscow) No. 5 (2008): 9, 12, 15, 17, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/19391984>.

⁶⁷¹ “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” (2008): 15, 16.

Medvedev's proposed European Security Treaty as a means to create a regional collective security system.

The "Foreign Policy Concept" was less strident in its treatment of NATO and the member states of the alliance. Russia would seek to further develop relations with the alliance through the NRC as a forum for dialogue and cooperation. Having put NATO's intervention in the FRY behind, the concept made clear that Russia's relations with the alliance would be conditioned on the implementation by allies of their obligations, including those taken within the NRC, not to increase their security at the expense of Russia's and for military restraint (an indirect reference to commitments NATO had made since 1997 and some allies had made at Istanbul in 1999). Russia retained its negative attitude toward the expansion of NATO, especially into Georgia and Ukraine, and to bringing NATO infrastructure closer to Russia's borders. As for the Baltic states, Russia, having grudgingly come to terms with the three states' entry into NATO, would pursue good-neighborly relations on a reciprocal basis. These relations would be conditioned on the Baltic governments' treatment of their Russia-language populations and Russia's access to the Kaliningrad region through Lithuania.⁶⁷²

The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020, May 2009

By early 2009, President Medvedev and his administration were prepared to issue a new version of Russia's national security strategy and to adopt a complex of documents and processes to support forward-looking, long-term strategic planning and to monitor its execution. Broadly speaking, the new strategy was one of continuity, and its main idea was "security through

⁶⁷² "The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation" (2008): 24.

development.” Consistent with the emphasis on development, Medvedev explained that security was not to be understood solely in terms of foreign relations and defense capability, it also included economic security.⁶⁷³

The preparation of the “National Security Strategy” was a contentious and lengthy process. According to Nikolay Patrushev, the Secretary of the Security Council, work on the strategy had begun as early as 2004. “For various reasons,” the document languished until June 2008, when Medvedev reenergized its development by an interdepartmental working group of the Security Council made up of representatives of the government, the Presidential Administration, Presidential plenipotentiary representatives to the federal districts, the Russian Academy of Science, and experts from society and corporate structures. Both Medvedev and Patrushev cited interdepartmental differences and competing priorities as factors in the development of the strategy. “Departmental approaches” had often dominated the formulation of policy and efforts to manage them had not always been successful. Planning had been oriented for the most part toward departmental interests.⁶⁷⁴ Reportedly, the adoption of the security strategy by the Security Council was delayed from March to April 2009 because participants at a meeting on 24 March had presented “diametrically opposite” proposals.⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁷³ President of the Russian Federation, “Zasedanie Soveta Bezopasnosti po voprosu ‘O Strategii natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda i komplekse mer po eye realizatsii,” 24 March 2009, <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/3530>; President of the Russian Federation, “Nachalo zasedanie Soveta Bezopasnosti po voprosu ‘O Strategii natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda i komplekse mer po eye realizatsii,” 24 March 2009, <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/3534>.

⁶⁷⁴ President of the Russian Federation, “Nachalo zasedanie Soveta Bezopasnosti po voprosu ‘O Strategii natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda i komplekse mer po eye realizatsii.”

⁶⁷⁵ Keir Giles, *Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020*, (Rome: NATO Defense College, June 2009), 2. Giles also observed that the document bore “distinctive symptoms of having been written by a committee, with areas that are less than clear and an occasional lack of coherence.”

Issues of hard security that are most relevant to this research, for example national defense and arms control, lost some emphasis in this “National Security Strategy.” The armed forces did not seem to have played much of a role in its formulation, given that it devoted only nine of its 112 paragraphs to national defense. These nine provisions offered broad conceptual thinking about strategic deterrence, reform of the armed forces, research and development and the military-industrial complex. Russia’s national defense was grounded in “rational sufficiency and effectiveness” (which pointedly included non-military responses in various situations), public diplomacy, peacekeeping, and international military cooperation.⁶⁷⁶ The brevity of the provisions on the armed forces and their paucity of substance was likely tied to the fact that a revision of the military doctrine was still in the works at the time the security strategy was approved. Two of the threats and challenges to Russia’s military security were relevant to this dissertation: the development of a global BMD system and the withdrawal from international agreements on arms reductions and limitations. In both cases, the implied offender was the U.S., because of plans to deploy components of a BMD system in Europe and its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.⁶⁷⁷ Evidently, the Russians did not place their own “suspension” of implementation of the CFE Treaty among these threats and challenges.

In contrast to the amorphous nature of the security strategy’s provisions on defense, those on foreign policy were more focused, and for good reason. Whereas Medvedev would not approve the revised military doctrine for another nine months, he had signed “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” ten months before he approved the “National Security

⁶⁷⁶ President of the Russian Federation, “Strategiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda,” 11-14, <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/424>.

⁶⁷⁷ “Strategiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii do 2020.”

Strategy.”⁶⁷⁸ The relevant provisions of the security strategy tracked very closely with those of the “Foreign Policy Concept,” and in some instances the wording was identical. The “National Security Strategy” reprised familiar themes of Russia’s foreign policy: the primacy of international law and the UN, cooperation with international organizations and multilateral groupings, and the priority of relations with the states of the CIS, CSTO and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). In Europe, a long-range national interest of Russia was the development of a Euro-Atlantic system of collective security, i.e. the negotiation and signing of Medvedev’s proposed European Security Treaty. As for relations with NATO, their development would depend on how the alliance respected Russia’s legitimate interests, which included the “unacceptability” of, among other things, the movement of military infrastructure toward Russia’s borders.⁶⁷⁹

At the end of the day, the “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020” was a forward-looking view for a country that had emerged from internal crisis and a reactive approach to external threats and challenges. As a western analyst observed, “With its upbeat tone and its step away from the narrative of victimhood, it was the product of a Russian leadership that felt stronger and more confident of its ability to influence the world.”⁶⁸⁰

⁶⁷⁸ Keir Giles argues that despite being “out of sequence,” because the security strategy should have preceded the foreign policy concept, the latter document’s “consistency with the foreign policy section of the Strategy...and the timing of its release (shortly after the order was given to re-start work on the Strategy) point reassuringly to its being part of the same broadly coherent master plan.” Giles, *Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020*, 4.

⁶⁷⁹ “Strategiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii do 2020.”

⁶⁸⁰ Giles, *Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020*, 11.

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, February 2010

Like the “National Security Strategy,” the “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” President Medvedev approved in 2010 was the product of work that had begun during Putin’s presidency.⁶⁸¹ The preparation of the updated doctrine took place “in parallel” with the development of the security strategy and a draft was circulated among government departments and institutions early in 2009 for study prior to its submission to the Security Council.⁶⁸² General Makhmut Gareyev explained in 2007 that the Security Council, together with the MOD, MVD, FSB and other government departments, was responsible to determine the basic principles of the doctrine. The Security Council’s efforts would be successful if they drew on the work of military academics and specialists and took heed of input from the components of the armed forces. In an indication that the process of developing the doctrine would be an open one and a hint that the voice of the armed forces would not be ignored, Gareyev also did not exclude the possibility that the Academy of Military Sciences might prepare and publish “for wide discussion” its own alternative military doctrine.⁶⁸³

⁶⁸¹ “Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoy Federatsii – O voennoy doktrine Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” *KZ*, 10 February 2010, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21279613>. At the meeting of the permanent members of the Security Council, Medvedev informed them that he had also approved “The Bases of the State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence to 2020.” “Voennaya doktrina: Prezident postavil tochku,” *VPK*, 10 February 2010, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21281819>.

⁶⁸² Vladimir Lutovinov, “Voennaya doktrina i trebovaniya vremeni,” *VPK*, 29 July 2009, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/20419520>. The former Chief of the General Staff, Yuriy Baluyevskiy, led the working group that drafted the military doctrine. Giles, *Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020*: 4. The draft of the doctrine document was subject to criticism and debate over both its content and structure, as is evident in Lutovinov’s article. The draft doctrine was also the subject of off-site meetings of the Security Council, for instance one held in Novosibirsk in November 2009, that included regional and local government officials and academics. “Voennaya doktrina preterpit izmeneniya,” *VPK*, 14 October 2009, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/20765422>.

⁶⁸³ Gennadiy Miranovich, “Kakoy byt’ voennoy doktrine?” *KZ*, 21 February 2007, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/11547950>. For accounts of the process of the development of the military doctrine from 2005 to 2010, see Giles, *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010*, 9-11 and Marcel de Haas, “Russia’s Military Doctrine Development (2000-2010)” in Stephen J. Blank, ed., *Russian Military Politics and Russia’s 2010 Defense Doctrine* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, March 2011), 35-39.

As was the case with the “National Security Strategy,” Medvedev emphasized the importance of implementation of the doctrine, not just its publication. Implementation would have to be accompanied by some form of monitoring and reporting of its results. Therefore, in approving the military doctrine, Medvedev also tasked the secretary of the Security Council to include the results of its implementation in the president’s annual report on national security to the Federal Assembly.⁶⁸⁴

As one Russian analyst pointed out when it was issued, the “Military Doctrine” was “to a significant extent” based on the version approved by Putin in 2000. “The most important” exception was the new doctrine’s categorization of threats and challenges. Whereas the 2000 version of the doctrine spoke only of “military threats,” (*voennye ugrozy*) the new edition used two terms: “military threat” (*voennaya ugroza*) and “military danger” (*voennaya opasnost*).⁶⁸⁵ Among the military dangers – but not threats – were NATO’s assumption of more global responsibilities and the approach of military infrastructure of NATO member states to Russia’s borders, “including through the expansion of the bloc.” Related dangers were the deployment of foreign military forces on territory adjoining the Russian Federation and its allies and “the creation and deployment” of BMD systems. Echoing the “National Security Strategy,” the “Military Doctrine” included as a military danger “violation by particular states of international agreements, and also the non-observance of earlier concluded international treaties in the area of

⁶⁸⁴ “Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoy Federatsii – O voennoy doctrine Rossiiskoy Federatsii.”

⁶⁸⁵ Aleksandr Khranchikhin, “Starie osnovy novoy doktriny,” *VPK* 17 February 2010, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21315042>.

arms limitation and reduction.”⁶⁸⁶ The Russians’ moratorium (non-observance) of implementation of the provisions of the CFE Treaty apparently was not part of this danger.

The most striking characteristic of the military doctrine was its consistency with its predecessor from 2000. Despite the intervening conflict with Georgia in 2008 and the impetus it gave to reform of the military, the military doctrine of 2010 overlooked the fundamental changes that were taking place, for example, in manning and organization of the army. The relevant portions of the doctrine offered only generic and hortatory comments. Equally striking, given the doctrine’s assertion that the probability of large-scale conflict against the Russian Federation was decreasing, the doctrine included a number of provisions about mobilization of the army and the economy.⁶⁸⁷ Finally, despite intense speculation during the period of the doctrine’s development about the preemptive use of nuclear weapons, the language in the “Military Doctrine” on this subject was little changed from that of the 2000 edition. Russia’s approach to the use of nuclear weapons was likely specified in more detail in a classified document, “The Bases of the State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence to 2020,” which Medvedev approved concurrently with the military doctrine and which was not released to the public.⁶⁸⁸

Although the “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” did not explicitly mention the CFE Treaty, two of its provisions that applied to the treaty would seem to have been problematic for the Russian Federation. Among the basic tasks of the armed forces for “deterrence and

⁶⁸⁶ President of the Russian Federation, “Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” paragraph 8, <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/461>. An English translation of the military doctrine is available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf.

⁶⁸⁷ “Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” paragraphs 7 (lessening of probability of large-scale conflict) and 27, 28, 30, 31, 34, 35, 47, 48 (mobilization).

⁶⁸⁸ For discussion of these points, see Giles, *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010*, 8-9 and de Haas, “Russia’s Military Doctrine Development (2000-2010):” 45-46.

conflict prevention” was the “conclusion and *implementation* [emphasis added] of agreements in the area of conventional arms control.”⁶⁸⁹ The Russian Federation’s suspension of the implementation of the CFE Treaty in 2007 appeared to conflict with this task. According to one of the provisions of military policy, the Russian armed forces could be used rapidly or urgently (*operativno*) outside the borders of the Russian Federation in defense of Russia’s interests *and those of its citizens*, “in accordance with generally recognized principles and norms of international law, international treaties of the Russian Federation and federal law.”⁶⁹⁰ This provision, which followed the policy in the “National Security Strategy” to protect Russians abroad, also codified part of the rationale for Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008. It also set up a potential conflict with the principle of host-nation consent in the A/CFE, which had obstructed the process of the ratification of that agreement because of the presence of Russian forces in Georgia and Moldova.

By mid-2010, two years into his term as president, Dmitriy Medvedev had approved key strategic documents to guide policy for the next few years. The process of their development and approval demonstrated the influence of the Security Council as the locus of foreign and security policy, a degree of centralization that had begun during Putin’s first two terms. The use of the armed forces to resolve the situation in Georgia in 2008 was a significant development, given that both Putin and Medvedev had stated their preference for economic, rather than military, power. The amorphous nature of most of the provisions of the “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” that Medvedev approved in 2010 attested to the armed forces’ borderline performance in the conflict with Georgia and the still-uneven pace of military reform. After

⁶⁸⁹ “Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” paragraph 93.

⁶⁹⁰ “Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” paragraph 26. Keir Giles observed that the term *operativno* is “notoriously easy to mistranslate.” Giles, *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010*, 7.

Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency in 2013, he adjusted foreign and security policy in line with his perception of Russia's national security interests and the means to protect them.

The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, February 2013

Given the continuing transformation of the Russian Federation and the international system as a whole, new threats and challenges, as well as Russia's capabilities to deal with them, "it was not surprising that among the first decrees V.V. Putin signed after his inauguration as the president of Russia was the decree 'On Measures to Ensure the Realization of the Russian Federation's Foreign Policy Course' that instructed the RF Foreign Ministry to present a new draft of the RF foreign policy concept," the country's fourth since the dissolution of the USSR.⁶⁹¹ Although the MFA met Putin's deadline (the end of 2012), an insufficiently tough line toward the U.S. in the draft delayed the concept's approval until mid-February 2013. Foreign Minister Lavrov indicated late in 2012 that the main irritants in Russia-U.S. relations were the Magnitsky Act and associated sanctions against Russian individuals and entities, and the ever-unpopular U.S. BMD system.⁶⁹² The final version, however, pulled punches on both issues. The "Foreign Policy Concept" did not mention the Magnitsky Act by name and made only broad references to sanctions in sections about the UN Security Council and relations with the U.S. As

⁶⁹¹ R. Grinberg, "Apropos Russia's New Foreign Policy Concept," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 59, No. 1 (2013): 25, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/43188555>.

⁶⁹² Yuriy Paniyev, "President Approves Foreign Policy Concept," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, translated in *CDSP* 65, No. 10, 4 March 2013; 2, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/29455265>.

for BMD, it was absent from the section on relations with NATO and Europe but appeared in a paragraph about cooperation between Russia and the U.S. on strategic arms control.⁶⁹³

The “Foreign Policy Concept,” the first revision of foreign and security policy after Putin’s return to the presidency, reflected a return to some of the key provisions of policy from his first terms in office. Although not explicitly anti-Western (it lacked the in-your-face attacks of his speech to the Munich Security Conference in 2007), the concept touched on the same bugaboos of the earlier time: unilateral actions without approval by the UNSC, interference in the internal affairs of states, and use of military force to resolve issues. Economic relations also loomed large, from the concept’s identification of the financial crisis of 2008 as a key influence in the rapidly changing international situation to a focus on economic and trade relations as fundamental components of Russia’s bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. An innovation in the “Foreign Policy Concept” was the inclusion of “soft power” and information security. Putin had earlier criticized Russia’s diplomats for not using soft power, and Russia’s turn to it was a “step in the right direction,” because Russia had relied too much on “traditional ‘tough power.’”⁶⁹⁴ The concept addressed information security from domestic and international perspectives, and included it among efforts to combat terrorism and interference in the internal affairs of states.

The “Foreign Policy Concept” offered little new from the 2008 version regarding issues and regions of relevance to the CFE Treaty. It included familiar provisions about Russia’s “religious” observation of its arms control obligations (along with insistence on the same

⁶⁹³ “Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiiskoy Federatsii, utverzhdena Prezidentom Rossiiskoy Federatsii V.V. Putina 12 fevralya 2013 g.,” paragraphs 31r and 69 (sanctions) and 70 (BMD), <http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/9/13617765900.pdf>.

⁶⁹⁴ “Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiiskoy Federatsii, utverzhdena Prezidentom Rossiiskoy Federatsii V.V. Putina 12 fevralya 2013 g.,” paragraph 20; Aleksandr Lukyanov, “Front-View Mirror,” *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, translated in *CDSP* 65, No. 10, 4 March 2013, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/29455265>.

approach from partners, and dedication to negotiating new agreements “on the basis of the principles of equal rights and indivisible security”) and the importance of advancing the European conventional arms control regime “in accordance with contemporary realities.” As for relations with NATO, as was the case in 2008, they would be conditioned on the alliance’s fulfillment of commitments to restraint in the deployment and stationing of forces and capabilities. Russia, of course, retained its negative view of NATO expansion (although the concept did not mention possibility of Georgia and Ukraine’s accession to the alliance).⁶⁹⁵

Two changes in the 2013 concept had potential implications for Russia’s foreign and security policy and the CFE Treaty, on the off-chance Moscow decided to re-engage with the treaty. First, the concept included Russia’s interest to normalize relations with Georgia, “taking into account the political realities in the Transcaucasus,” in other words, Russia’s recognition of the independence of the “republics” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A priority of Russia’s foreign policy was to assist their establishment as “modern democratic states” and to “strengthen their international position and guarantee their reliable security and social-economic status.”⁶⁹⁶ This provision left no doubt that Moscow had closed the door to returning these territories to Tbilisi’s control and completing the fulfillment of the Istanbul Commitments vis-à-vis Georgia. The “Foreign Policy Concept” also added the Arctic as a region in which Russia intended to establish cooperative relations with regional actors. Although not specifically mentioned, the possibility of stationing elements of the armed forces there implied the Russians were washing

⁶⁹⁵ “Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiiskoy Federatsii, utverzhdena Prezidentom Rossiiskoy Federatsii V.V. Putina 12 fevralya 2013 g.,” paragraphs 32a, 32л, and 63.

⁶⁹⁶ “Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiiskoy Federatsii, utverzhdena Prezidentom Rossiiskoy Federatsii V.V. Putina 12 fevralya 2013 g.,” paragraphs 51-52.

their hands of the CFE Treaty, whose flank limits, which remained in the A/CFE, could constrain such a force posture.

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, December 2014

By late 2014, in reaction to developments in the security environment, most significantly the situation in Ukraine, an interdepartmental group working under the auspices of the Security Council had begun to reconsider the military doctrine of 2010. Secretary of the Security Council Patrushev described the conditions that had precipitated this reexamination: multiple examples of violations by the U.S. of the UN Charter (Former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya), activities of foreign intelligence agencies against Russia, economic sanctions against Russia designed to worsen the quality of life and provoke protest movements, and the raising of new barriers in Europe. These conditions, as well as the events in Ukraine, signaled the rise of new military dangers and threats that included the increasing aggressiveness of the U.S. and NATO toward Russia, the growth of NATO's offensive potential along Russia's borders, and measures to deploy a BMD system. In the opinion of Yuriy Baluyevskiy, former Chief of the General Staff, some key components of the 2010 doctrine, like the identification of NATO as a "military danger" and the provisions on the role of nuclear weapons and deterrence, did not require adjustment. Non-nuclear deterrence, however, needed to be added to the military doctrine (the role of conventional forces should therefore be increased). As was evident from the events in Ukraine, the military doctrine also needed to better address the threat of the escalation of internal problems into conflicts, with the aid of outside forces. Finally, according to Baluyevskiy, the military doctrine also needed to

account for the effect of “informational-psychological operations” on Russia.⁶⁹⁷ The revised doctrine of 2014 accounted for internal dangers and informational threats like those Putin and his security aides saw at work in the “color revolutions” and in Ukraine. Nonetheless, as some commentators rightly observed, it offered no real guidance about the role of the armed forces in tackling such domestic challenges.⁶⁹⁸

President Putin approved the update to the military doctrine at a meeting of the Security Council on 19 December 2014.⁶⁹⁹ While it took account of new threats and dangers, the “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” changed very little; in fact, a statement from the Kremlin at the time used the terms “updated” and “amendments” to describe it. The doctrine retained its defensive character and did not change the principles for the use of the Russian armed forces and nuclear weapons.⁷⁰⁰ Although one European report on the new doctrine ascribed to it an “alarmed tone” that labeled NATO “a fundamental threat” to Russian security, the doctrine’s provisions on military dangers and threats, with its inclusion of NATO among the former, remained unchanged from its predecessor of 2010.⁷⁰¹ One Russian military commentator

⁶⁹⁷ The Security Council of the Russian Federation, “Stat’ya N.P. Patrusheva v gazete ‘KZ’,” 6 May 2015, <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/allnews/892/>; Yuriy Baluyevskiy, “Novye smysly voennoy doktriny,” *VPK*, 12 November 2014, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/42588834>.

⁶⁹⁸ Vladimir Mukhin, “Moscow Tweaks Military Doctrine,” *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, translated in *CDS&P* 66, No. 31, 28 July 2014, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/42261976>; Konstantin Sivkov, “Khaltura v otvet na vyzovy – Voennaya doktrina ostalas’ deklaratsiey, maloprigodnoy dlya prakticheskogo primeneniya,” *VPK*, 4 February 2015, <https://vpk-news.ru/articles/23673>; Aleksandr Golts, “Russia’s New Military Doctrine All Bark, No Bite,” *Moscow Times*, translated in *CDS&P* 67, No. 1, 1 January 2015, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/43089750>.

⁶⁹⁹ President of the Russia, “Operativnoe soveshchanie s postoyannymi chlenami Soveta Bezopasnosti,” 19 December 2014, <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47262>.

⁷⁰⁰ “Putin Endorses New Edition of Russia’s Military Doctrine,” *Interfax*, 26 December 2014, accessed through the Open Source Center (OSC).

⁷⁰¹ “Kremlin Publishes Revised Military Doctrine Labeling NATO ‘Fundamental Threat to Russian Security,’” *Agence France Press (AFP)*, 26 December 2014, accessed through the OSC.

found the updated doctrine so unsatisfying, he observed that a “mountain had made a molehill” (literally: *Gora rodila mysh’* - A mountain birthed a mouse). He concluded:

As the result of a year and a half’s work, unsubstantial and sometimes quite dubious changes were made...The doctrine remained unsuitable for practical employment, a purely declarative document. It remained only to wonder – what was such a large number of responsible people doing for almost a year and a half?⁷⁰²

Although the update of “Military Doctrine” was light on substantive changes, a major addition was the introduction of the concept “non-nuclear deterrence” as one of the peacetime tasks of the Russian armed forces. While the concept itself lacked definition, “system of non-nuclear deterrence” was included among the doctrine’s definitions as “a complex of foreign policy, military and military-technical measures, aimed at prevention of aggression against the Russian Federation by non-nuclear means.”⁷⁰³ By implication, this concept entailed a greater role for the conventional (non-nuclear) armed forces, however, the doctrine offered no clarity on this point. The inclusion of non-nuclear deterrence might have been a cautious recognition of the ongoing reforms of the conventional armed forces and the possibilities for their future development and use, while bearing in mind that only a small and specialized portion of them were employed in Russia’s operations in Crimea.⁷⁰⁴

⁷⁰² Sivkov, “Khaltura v otvet na vyzovy – Voennaya doktrina ostalas’ deklaratsiey, maloprigodnoy dlya prakticheskogo primeneniya.” Military analyst Aleksandr Golts also panned the military doctrine as the “equivalent of a little mouse – albeit a rather vicious one.” Golts, “Russia’s New Military Doctrine All Bark, No Bite.”

⁷⁰³ “Voennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” *RG*, 30 December 2014, paragraph 326, <https://rg.ru/2014/12/30/doktrina-dok.html>.

⁷⁰⁴ Polina Sinovets and Bettina Renz, *Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine and Beyond: Threat Perceptions, Capabilities and Ambitions* (Rome: NATO Defense College, July 2015): 4-7.

Another amendment to the doctrine was the inclusion of cooperation with “the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia” as one of the basic tasks of the Russian armed forces in deterrence and conflict prevention.⁷⁰⁵ This amendment, like a similar provision of the “Foreign Policy Concept” of 2013, marked the burning of one more bridge between Russia and Georgia, Russia and NATO, and Russia and the A/CFE. Finally, the “Military Doctrine” added the protection of Russia’s national interests in the Arctic as a peacetime task. The same critical commentator cited on the preceding page questioned the benefit of including this region in the doctrine, arguing that the armed forces generally were assigned to defend the nation’s interests in regions of the world “where they have a place to be,” and to view the Arctic as such a region was purely aspirational.⁷⁰⁶ The Russian government’s investments in military infrastructure and forces in the Arctic over the succeeding years, though, would validate this addition to the doctrine. On the day he approved the “Military Doctrine,” Putin told the collegium of the MOD that one of the priority tasks for the development of the armed forces would be the establishment of military infrastructure at four sites in the Arctic.⁷⁰⁷

Having examined the Russian Federation’s foreign and security policy during this period, this chapter now turns to the second of the dissertation’s narratives, Russia and the CFE Treaty.

⁷⁰⁵ “Voennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” paragraph 213.

⁷⁰⁶ Sivkov, “Khaltura v otvet na vyzovy – Voennaya doktrina ostalas’ deklaratsiey, maloprigodnoy dlya prakticheskogo primeneniya.”

⁷⁰⁷ President of Russia, “Rasshirenoe zasedanie kollegii Ministerstva oborony,” 19 December 2014, <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47257>.

Russia and the CFE Treaty – 2007-2015

The period of time covered in this chapter encompassed the final act in the Russian Federation's relationship with the CFE Treaty. By the end of 2015, the treaty was dead to Russia. Despite this gloomy outcome, two Russian studies of the treaty framed the period in more positive terms, with a focus on process rather than the outcome. Arms control expert and former Russian representative to the JCG Anton Mazur titled a chapter he wrote about this stage of the CFE Treaty's life, "From Suspension of the Operation of the CFE Treaty to the Revival of the Viability of the Conventional Arms Control Regime in Europe." Two experts from the think tank PIR Center used "Suspend to Save" to describe this period.⁷⁰⁸ These years began with a flurry of activity by the Russians that culminated in their suspension of implementation of the treaty, then shifted to less intensive activity aimed at saving the treaty, and eventually reached an anticlimax when Mazur, as the Russian representative to the JCG, announced his country's departure from that body.

Case Study: 2007

The case study appears chronologically at the beginning of Chapter 6, rather than at the end or middle as in the preceding two chapters. As in the earlier case studies, the decision Moscow took regarding the CFE Treaty in this chapter, suspension of its implementation, kept the treaty alive, albeit in this instance, on life support. In tracing the process that culminated in Putin's signing of the law that suspended Russia's implementation of the CFE Treaty in November 2007, the goal of the case study is to identify the factor(s) that led Moscow to this

⁷⁰⁸ Mazur, "Rossiya i kontrol' nad vooruzhennyami v Evrope," 283. Anin and Ayumov, "DOVSE – Vchera...Segodnya... Zavtra?..stat'ya vtoraya:" 24.

point, which signaled the beginning of the end of the CFE Treaty for Russia. A record of statements and speeches by Putin and other officials, transcripts of hearings in the two houses of the Federal Assembly, and the record of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty that took place at Russia's request in June 2007 offer direct insights into and proxies for the decision-making process for policy toward the CFE Treaty. From almost the very beginning of the year, Putin and his government signaled that changes were afoot in Russia's approach to the world. Moscow would challenge the existing system and elevate the role of the armed forces as an instrument of foreign and security policy. These changes would have significant implications for Russia's approach to the CFE Treaty.

Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference on 10 February 2007 has acquired an almost mythical status. His blunt assessment of the international security environment and strident comments addressed to the West, NATO, and the U.S. in particular, jolted the audience in Munich and resonated beyond the meeting room. Few, if any, of his points, however, were new. His message, as Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, one of his closest advisors, explained, was, "Gentlemen, Russia is back. And you must take account of her." As for why, after seven years as president, Putin spoke as he did in 2007, the world and the rules of the game had changed, especially in the economic arena. Russia had achieved significant economic growth, accumulated currency reserves, and paid off Soviet debt, thanks to the growth of the energy sector.⁷⁰⁹

⁷⁰⁹ Vitaliy Dymarskiy, "Sergey Yastrzhembskiy: Gospoda, Rossiya vernulas'!" *RG*, 22 February 2007, <http://www.rg.ru/2007/02/22/ystrgemsky.html>.

The CFE Treaty did not escape Putin's attention in Munich.⁷¹⁰ His comments about the "pitiable condition" of the treaty were wedged between blasts at U.S. plans for a BMD system in Europe and the expansion of NATO. His critique of the CFE Treaty sounded familiar themes: non-ratification by NATO states of the A/CFE, artificial linkage of ratification to Russia's fulfillment of commitments to Georgia and Moldova, and the approach of NATO infrastructure to Russia's borders. Although Putin did not threaten any action against the CFE Treaty, his statement hinted at a loss of patience: "It turns out that NATO has put its frontline forces at our borders, and we continue to strictly fulfill the treaty obligations and do not react to these actions at all." Implicit in this comment was the prospect of some reaction should the situation not improve.

Within a week of the Munich Security Conference, Putin advanced the process of military reform and representatives of the MFA hinted at changes in Russia's policy toward the CFE Treaty. In a meeting with senior military officials on 15 February, Putin "promoted" Sergey Ivanov from defense minister to a position with responsibility for innovation in the economy. He appointed Anatoly Serdyukov, the head of the tax police, as Minister of Defense, "to use his economic and financial knowledge" to help carry out reform. The General Staff, led by General Baluyevskiy, as the "military component" of the defense enterprise, would be "more important now than ever."⁷¹¹

In separate interviews published on 16 February, Foreign Minister Lavrov and Director of the MFA's Security and Disarmament Department Anatoliy Antonov signaled that Moscow

⁷¹⁰ Anton Mazur identified Putin's speech as the start of the "fifth stage" of the life of the CFE Treaty. Mazur, "Rossiya i kontrol' nad vooruzhenniyami v Evrope," 283.

⁷¹¹ President of Russia, "Meeting with Defence Ministry Senior Officials and Collegium Members," 15 February 2007, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24045>.

was contemplating a new approach to the CFE Treaty in light of the western states' refusal to ratify the A/CFE. According to Lavrov, the MFA had come to share the view of outside analysts that the true reason behind the delay in ratification was that other parties to the treaty had concluded that they did not need the A/CFE. Given that situation, it was necessary "to stop playing these games" and "let each country independently take the decision on how it intends to use its own territory for the deployment of its own armed forces and armaments."⁷¹² Antonov echoed Lavrov's comment about the NATO states' lack of interest in updating the CFE Treaty, and observed that the current situation, which could not continue for long, was damaging Russia's security and "the new atmosphere of trust, that we are all trying to create in Russia-NATO relations." He suggested a menu of options from which Russia could choose:

In the CFE Treaty is a whole selection of instruments that permit its participants to defend their interests – from presenting the concerns that have arisen over problems in the Joint Consultative Group to summoning an extraordinary conference and withdrawal from the Treaty in the case of exceptional circumstances that threaten their supreme interests. *Finally, other norms of international law exist, which are applicable in the given circumstance* [emphasis added].⁷¹³

Antonov's comment, especially the final sentence, indicated that the MFA was already working on an international legal justification for Russia's eventual suspension of implementation of the

⁷¹² MFA RF, "Stenogramma otvetov na voprosy rossiiskikh SMI po aktual'nym problemam vneshney politiki Ministra innostrannykh del Rossii S.V. Lavrova, Abu-Dabi – Moskva, 16 fevralya 2007 goda," http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/AEA0D973A0BAFE69C3257284005BE91B.

⁷¹³ "MID Rossii: Fakty i kommentarii. Anatoliy Antonov: Chleny NATO, ochevidno, ne zainteresovany v tome, chtoby DOVSE byl obnovlen i effektivno rabotal," *Interfax*, 16 February 2007, http://www.Interfax.ru/r/B/mid-politika/375.html?id_issue=11674181.

CFE Treaty. It is not clear, however, that a decision had been taken at the time. Antonov might have been musing about the range of options available to the Russian leadership rather than telegraphing an impending action.

Foreign Minister Lavrov hinted at a broader political strategy Russia might pursue in Europe, one that could include some action vis-à-vis the CFE Treaty. Speaking with journalists on 21 February about plans by the U.S. to deploy components of a BMD system in Poland and the Czech Republic, he drew attention to segments of public opinion in both countries that showed opposition to the deployments. He also cited the German foreign minister as calling for Russia to be consulted on such matters that affected strategic stability.⁷¹⁴ Although Lavrov did not explicitly mention it, Russia might have considered some action toward the CFE Treaty as an “asymmetric” response to split some allies from the U.S. over the BMD deployment. By mid-March, Lavrov had lumped the CFE Treaty together with NATO and the OSCE as relics that were being restored (by the West) as parts of a bloc structure oriented against Russia.⁷¹⁵

The MFA’s flagging interest in the fate of CFE Treaty was evident when the ministry issued the “Review of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” on 27 March. This 100-page document, the likes of which had never been issued by the MFA, was the product of work that Putin had directed in June 2006, and which had been revised by the Presidential Administration in February 2007.⁷¹⁶ The CFE Treaty appeared twice in the Review, once to note that its EIF had been “put on the back burner” [*otlozheno v “dolgii yashchik”*] and the second

⁷¹⁴ Vladislav Vorob’ev, “Sergey Lavrov: Otvetom bez isteriki,” *RG*, 21 February 2007, <http://www.rg.ru/2007/02/21/lavrov.html>.

⁷¹⁵ MFA RF, “Vystuplenie Ministra innostrannykh del S.V. Lavrov na XV Assamblee Soveta po vneshney i oboronnoy politiki,” 17 March 2007, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4nsf/0/F3C5EDC2DADB268DC32572A10041ED8F.

⁷¹⁶ Elena Suponina and Petr Iskenderov, “Rossiyskie diplomaty obozreli – 100 stranits vneshnepoliticheskikh prioritetrov,” *Vremya novostey On Line*, 28 March 2007, <http://www.vremya.ru/print/174957.html>.

time to include its non-ratification among the factors that complicated Russia's relations with NATO. No policy recommendations in the document included the CFE Treaty.⁷¹⁷

On the same day the MFA released the "Review of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation," the Russian delegation to the JCG offered a sobering assessment of the treaty's prospects and a preview of things to come, under the guise of reporting the results of the Russian government's analysis of the situation surrounding the treaty that had been promised at the end of the Third REVCON in 2006. In some respects, the analysis offered old news (the existing CFE Treaty was "hopelessly outdated" and becoming less and less viable). It also included the same menu of options that Antonov had previewed in his interview with *Interfax* in February. The delegation described several actions by NATO and the U.S. that would later be included in the list of extraordinary conditions that precipitated the call for an extraordinary conference in May. One new development was an assessment that even the A/CFE, which had been negotiated before the first round of NATO expansion, was becoming outdated. Finally, the influence of the armed forces was evident in two points of the analysis. First, the assessment asserted that the existing CFE Treaty remained alive "solely thanks to the information exchange and inspections," never a favorite topic for the armed forces. The provisions for information and exchange and inspections, however, did not constitute an end themselves, rather, they served the interests of guaranteeing compliance with the "substantive" provisions of the treaty, which were being eroded. Second, a specific part of even the A/CFE that was becoming "especially" outdated was the flank limits that pertained to Russia.⁷¹⁸

⁷¹⁷ MFA RF, "Obzor vneshney politiki Rossiiskoy Federatsii," http://www.mid.ru/brp_4nsf?sps/3647DA97748A106BC32572AB002AC4DD.

⁷¹⁸ OSCE Secretariat, "Vystuplenie rukovoditelya Delegatsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii na peregovorakh v Vene po voprosam voennoy bezopasnosti i kontrolya nad vooruzheniyami M.I. Ulyanova na zasedanii Sovmestnoy konsul'tativnoy gruppy (Vena, 27 marta 2007 goda," JCG.DEL/5/07, 27 March 2007. The unjust character of the

By the end of the first quarter of 2007, the Russians ascribed little value to the CFE Treaty as a means to protect their security interests and leaned toward assigning the armed forces a greater role in this task. They seemed to perceive that the NATO states would not ratify the A/CFE, and therefore the system of national and territorial limits adopted at Istanbul would not come into effect. Likewise, neither could Moscow count on the accession clause of the A/CFE that would bring the Baltic states and the other non-CFE new members of NATO under the treaty's limitations. Simultaneously, adherence to the provisions of the treaty potentially obstructed military reforms and the posturing of the Russia's armed forces to support their national interests, particularly in the Transcaucasus region. As to what they might have lost by suspending their implementation of the treaty, the Russians seemed to have calculated – correctly, as it turned out – that the NATO states would nonetheless continue to adhere to the treaty's provisions (limitations and information exchange). By the end of March or early in April, Moscow had taken the decision to proceed with the suspension of the treaty, while retaining the flexibility to revisit it, should circumstances change. As the Russian delegation confirmed to the JCG in December, when they formally announced the beginning of the suspension of the operation of the CFE Treaty, preparation for the suspension was already underway in April.⁷¹⁹

flank limits came to be the go-to example for the Russians. Ulyanov invoked it in an interview with an Austrian newspaper in July 2007, after Putin signed the decree on suspension of the CFE Treaty, asking rhetorically whether the interviewer would be happy with a prohibition on stationing his country's forces in various regions of the country. Markus Bernath, "We Continue to Bank on Dialogue," *Der Standard* (Vienna), 19 July 2007, translated by *BBC Monitoring European*, 20 July 2007 and accessed through ProQuest.

⁷¹⁹ OSCE Secretariat, "Vystuplenie rukovoditelya Delegatsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii na peregovorakh v Vene po voprosam voennoy bezopasnosti i kontrolya nad vooruzheniyami M.I. Ulyanova na zasedanii Sovmestnoy konsul'tativnoy gruppy (Vena, 18 dekabrya 2007 goda," JCG.DEL/47/07, 18 December 2007. Ulyanov mentioned the "period of preparation for the suspension of the operation of the CFE Treaty (*from April of this year*)" [emphasis added].

Having set the stage and taken the decision to act, Moscow moved to force the issue of the fate of the CFE Treaty and the A/CFE. President Putin, in his annual address to the Federal Assembly on 26 April, chastised NATO states for delaying ratification of the A/CFE in a quest for “unilateral advantage.” He used a fairly lengthy discussion of the problems with the CFE Treaty as the segue from his report on the need to strengthen the armed forces to an overview of foreign policy, thereby explicitly linking his government’s obligation to “strengthen our armed forces” with the situation surrounding the treaty. He emphasized that “on the territory of our own country we are limited on issues of the deployment of conventional Armed Forces” (by the flank limits)⁷²⁰ He warned that if the situation did not soon change, Russia would not feel the need to meet its obligations under the CFE Treaty.⁷²¹ The following month, the MFA began the process of turning the warning into action.

Russia’s first step was to request an extraordinary conference of the parties to the CFE Treaty. On 23 May, Foreign Minister Lavrov challenged the OSCE to tackle “topical problems in ensuring stability and security in Europe,” such as the U.S. plans for a BMD system in Europe and “the situation where the regime of control over conventional arms in Europe” that was based on the CFE Treaty, “had lost all connection with reality and had come into contradiction with the

⁷²⁰ President of Russia, “Poslanie Federal’nomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” 26 April 2007, <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24203>. Lieutenant General Buzhinskiy of the MOD International Treaty Directorate later noted that it was “this absurdity of the current treaty that the president noted in his Message to the Federal Assembly.” Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy, “One Step from a Moratorium: Why the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Does Not Suit Russia,” *RG*, 15 June 2007, translated by the OSC as “Russian Defense Official Specifies Objections to CFE, Urges Update.”

⁷²¹ Jean-Christophe Peuch, “Russia: Moscow ‘Unhappy’ with Outcome of CFE Conference,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/06/0530af8d-56eb-456b-8300-fba79d2fcf71.html>. Mazur, “Rossiya i kontrol’ nad vooruzhenniyami v Evrope,” 283. Putin was unclear on this point. First, he found it “appropriate” to declare a “moratorium” on Russia’s implementation of the treaty. On the other hand, he proposed to discuss the issue at the NRC. In the absence of progress there, Russia would “examine the possibility of ceasing our CFE Treaty obligations.” “Poslanie Federal’nomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoy Federatsii.”

security interests of Russia.” Lavrov declared Russia’s intention to request an extraordinary conference, “based on whose results decisions would be taken on... further steps and their timeframes.”⁷²² On 28 May, Russia requested that the depository state for the CFE Treaty, the Netherlands, convene an extraordinary conference of the CFE Treaty states parties, in accordance with Article XXI of the treaty. The request listed a number of “exceptional circumstances” surrounding the treaty, specifically “the serious problems that have arisen with the NATO nations’ implementation of the Treaty as a result of its enlargement and NATO foot-dragging” on ratification of the A/CFE. Moscow hoped that solutions might emerge from the conference that would help to end “the present crisis of the CFE Treaty.”⁷²³ Should such solutions not present themselves, then the Russians would be able to argue that they had done all that was possible – even the impossible, as Antonov would later assert (see page 327-328 and footnote 729, below) – to restore the treaty’s viability.

The Extraordinary Conference of the CFE States Parties – June 2007

The Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe took place in Vienna, 12-15 June, under the chairmanship of Luxembourg.⁷²⁴ Its task was to “consider the circumstances set forth in the request of the Russian Federation” to

⁷²² MFA RF, “Press Release – Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov Delivers a Speech at a Special Joint Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council and the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation,” 23 May 2007, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/372828.

⁷²³ MFA RF, “Press Release – Convening an Extraordinary Conference to Discuss CFE Treaty,” 28 May 2007, http://mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a480790f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/2e0b88fe13533efbc32572ea00419155?

⁷²⁴ The chairmanship of conferences associated with the CFE Treaty rotates among parties to the treaty by French alphabetical order. Kazakhstan had chaired the Third Review Conference in 2006, so it was Luxembourg’s turn.

convene the conference “and their effect on the operation of this Treaty.”⁷²⁵ In fulfilling this task, the conference was a success. In meeting Moscow’s demands and addressing the “extraordinary circumstances” surrounding the CFE treaty, it was a failure.

The Russian delegation, led by Anatoliy Antonov, came to Vienna well prepared to argue their case about the CFE Treaty. Shortly before the conference, the Russians had proposed in the JCG a series of measures that could have been taken to restore the treaty’s viability:

- The return of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to the treaty framework;
- The reduction of the total permitted levels and holdings of TLE of the NATO countries with a view to offsetting the potential acquired by the alliance as a result of two “waves” of expansion;
- The adoption of a political decision to abolish flank limitations for the territory of Russia;
- The elaboration of a common understanding of the term “substantial military forces” and the exercise of appropriate restraint while this term was being agreed upon;
- The EIF or, at least, the start of the temporary application of the A/CFE by no later than 1 July 2008;
- The elaboration of conditions for the accession of new States Parties to the CFE Treaty and the further modernization of the treaty itself.⁷²⁶

The NATO allies in the JCG, however, “ignored” these proposals and would only promise to discuss them later, after the EIF of the A/CFE.⁷²⁷ Despite this rejection, Foreign Minister Lavrov stated the week before the extraordinary conference that Russia would not raise the issue of withdrawing from the treaty, but would use the conference to once again spell out

⁷²⁵ Joint Consultative Group, “Decision No. 2/07, Work Plan of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” JCG.DEC/2/07, 5 June 2007.

⁷²⁶ “Statement by Mr. Anatoliy Antonov, Head of The Delegation of The Russian Federation, at The Extraordinary Conference of The States Parties to The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” CFE-EC.DEL/6/07, 12 June 2007. The Russians included a detailed analysis of these measures in a draft of a concluding document for the conference. “Proekt osnovnykh polozheniy Zaklyuchitel’nogo dokumenta Chrezvychaynoy Konferentsii gosudarstv-uchastnikov Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhennykh silakh v Evrope,” CFE-EC.DEL/5/07, 12 June 2007.

⁷²⁷ Mazur, “Rossiya i kontrol’ nad vooruzhenniyami v Evrope,” 286.

concerns about it.⁷²⁸ At the opening session of the conference, Antonov summed up all of Russia's frustrations with the CFE Treaty (an account of political and substantial sacrifice by Russia that NATO had thrown back in Moscow's face), which seemed to have reached a boiling point.

...Russia, at the cost of considerable efforts and sacrifices, has done everything possible — and sometimes even the impossible — to ensure the implementation of the Treaty. Of all the States Parties we have carried out the most significant reductions in conventional armaments, including outside the area of application of the Treaty; we have respected and still continue to respect flank limitations that are discriminatory and clearly not in our interests and that prevent the movement of Russian forces on our own territory. Furthermore, even outside the framework of the Treaty we have withdrawn practically all our conventional armed forces from foreign countries. And how have our partners responded to this? By building up their combined military potential as a result of the expansion of NATO and with plans to establish new military bases close to our borders. In a word, everything possible has been done to upset the balance that once provided the basis for the CFE Treaty. We have spoken publicly of this on more than one occasion, but in reply we have heard only one answer — Russia must implement the notorious “Istanbul commitments” for this, it is said, will make it possible for the adapted Treaty to be brought into operation and everything will be fine.⁷²⁹

⁷²⁸ Reuters, “Russia Not Planning to Quit CFE for Now: Lavrov,” *The New York Times*, 6 June 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/world/international-russia-treaty.html?pagewanted=print>.

⁷²⁹ “Statement by Mr. Anatoly Antonov, Head of The Delegation of The Russian Federation, at The Extraordinary Conference of The States Parties to The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” CFE-EC.DEL/6/07, 12 June 2007.

He also explained the six “extraordinary circumstances” behind Russia’s request for the convocation of the extraordinary conference, which are shown in Figure 6.1.

1. The refusal by Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic to agree to a change to the groups of states parties to the CFE Treaty in connection with their accession to NATO.
2. The states parties to the CFE Treaty that were members of NATO having exceeded the group limits in the treaty as a result of the alliance’s expansion.
3. The negative effect of the planned deployment of U.S. conventional armaments on the territory of Bulgaria and Romania on observance of the group limits of the CFE Treaty.
4. The non-fulfillment by a number of states parties to the CFE Treaty of their political commitment made at Istanbul to the accelerated ratification of the A/CFE.
5. The failure of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia to implemented commitments made at Istanbul to adjust their territorial ceilings for TLE downward.
6. The negative effect of the non-participation in the CFE Treaty of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia on the fulfillment of Russia’s political commitments for military restraint in the northwestern part of the Russian Federation.

Figure 6.1. The Extraordinary Circumstances Behind Russia's Consideration of Suspension of the CFE Treaty

Sources: “Statement by Mr. Anatoly Antonov, Head of The Delegation of The Russian Federation, at The Extraordinary Conference of The States Parties to The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” CFE-EC.DEL/6/07, 12 June 2007; “Analiz isklyuchitel’nykh obstayatel’stv, otnosyashchikhsya k Dogovoru ob obychnykh vooruzhennykh silakh v Evrope,” CFE-EC.DEL/4/07/Coor.1, 12 June 2007.

The failure of the participants at the conference to agree to a concluding document along the lines Russia had proposed seemed to come as no surprise.⁷³⁰ In his closing statement, Antonov told the conference the outcome had confirmed “the well-founded nature of the conclusions drawn by the Russian Federation on the basis of the analysis of the situation

⁷³⁰ The NATO states that were parties to the treaty offered their own draft statement, which was more optimistic and less detailed than the Russians’. The text of the NATO proposal, along with the closing statement delivered by the Italian delegation on behalf of the alliance, is in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “CFE Extraordinary Conference Concludes,” 15 June 2007, <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2007/06-june/e0615a.html>.

concerning the CFE Treaty and its impact on the security of our country.”⁷³¹ Based on this lack of surprise and the various statements by Russian officials, including President Putin, in the months leading up to the Extraordinary Conference, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that, in requesting the conference, Moscow was “checking the box” on a formality and demonstrating the political superiority of their position regarding a treaty that they were already writing off. The seemingly preordained result of the conference might also have been indicative of the MFA’s waning influence in comparison to the military’s. The convening of the Extraordinary Conference, reportedly at the behest of the MFA, might have been the last hurrah for the ministry’s influence over this aspect of Russia’s foreign and security policy.⁷³²

After the failure of the extraordinary conference, the Russians wasted no time moving away from the CFE Treaty. Diplomatic and military officials spun the narrative in support of Moscow’s position at the conference and speculated about Russia’s next steps. Anatoliy Antonov and Aleksandr Grushko of the MFA stressed that the unsatisfactory outcome of the conference, and even a moratorium on implementation of the treaty, were not “a tragedy or the end of history,” and dialogue with Russia’s treaty partners would continue.⁷³³ Lieutenant General Buzhinskiy of the MOD and Antonov both provided assurances that subsequent actions

⁷³¹ “Statement Delivered by the Russian Federation at the Closing Session of the Extraordinary Conference of The States Parties to The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” CFE-EC.DEL/37/07, 15 June 2007.

⁷³² On the MFA’s role in convening the conference, see Vladislav Vorob’ev, “CFE Treaty’s Second Chance: NATO’s Radical Rethink on Conventional Arms Treaty,” *RG*, 8 June 2007, translated by *BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union*, 11 June 2007, accessed through ProQuest. In the context of interdepartmental dynamics between the armed forces and the MFA, it is worth noting that the Russian delegation to the conference included two general officers from the General Staff, Lieutenant General Buzhinskiy and Major General Vladimir Nikishin, as well as two colonels, among the ten members of the delegation. OSCE, “Provisional List of Participants for the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Vienna 11-15 June 2007, Hofburg,” CFE-EC.INF/4/07/Rev. 1, 12 June 2007.

⁷³³ “Russia Not Satisfied with Results of CFE Emergency Conference,” *RIA-Novosti*, 15 June 2007, OSC Translation. “Moscow Willing to Continue Dialogue on CFE Treaty,” *Interfax*, 19 June 2007, OSC translation.

by Russia, even withdrawal from the treaty, would not include exceeding limits for TLE. Exchange of information on Russia's armed forces might continue, although a moratorium on inspections might "lead to a reduction in confidence-building measures."⁷³⁴ Buzhinskiy also offered insight into Moscow's thinking about international legal aspects of continued adherence to the CFE Treaty and related obligations and commitments. He wrote that any actions Russia might take would not be "a matter of Moscow toughening its position but a matter of finding legal ways of bringing the CFE in line with...reality. International agreements cannot operate in circumstances radically different from those they were concluded in."⁷³⁵ In Moscow's view, the security environment had changed since the signing of the original CFE Treaty in 1990 and the A/CFE in 1999. As for the Istanbul Commitments regarding the final withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova, Buzhinskiy denied suggestions that Yeltsin had agreed to link them to ratification of (or at least the conclusion of negotiations on) the A/CFE, because "Yeltsin never signed any papers on the matter." In reality, "the promise 'to start negotiations concerning the future withdrawal' of Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova allowed for a very broad interpretation and was signed by a minor member of the Russian delegation in Istanbul, not by Yeltsin himself."⁷³⁶ On the key issue that the NATO states invoked to delay the ratification of the A/CFE, Buzhinskiy not only denied the linkage of the commitments to Georgia and Moldova to the CFE Treaty (which was not a new position), but he also walked back the commitments,

⁷³⁴ Evgeniy Buzhinskiy, "One Step from a Moratorium: Why the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Does Not Suit Russia," *RG*, 15 June 2007, translated by the OSC as "Russian Defense Official Specifies Objections to CFE, Urges Update." Dmitriy Babich, "The End of Arms Control," *RIA-Novosti*, 19 June 2007, published by the OSC as "Russia's Attempts to Renegotiate the CFE Treaty Have Yet to Produce Results." The Russians' eventual suspension of implementation of the CFE Treaty also included the exchange of information.

⁷³⁵ Evgeniy Buzhinskiy, "One Step from a Moratorium: Why the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Does Not Suit Russia."

⁷³⁶ Dmitriy Babich, "The End of Arms Control."

themselves (a novel position). The Russians took the next step about a month later when Putin began the formal process of suspending Russia's implementation of the CFE Treaty.

The Suspension of Implementation of the CFE Treaty – July-November 2007

On 17 July 2007, President Putin issued the “Decree on the Suspension by the Russian Federation of the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Associated International Agreements.” The Russian Federation would suspend its implementation of the CFE Treaty, the Budapest Agreement that had apportioned maximum levels of holdings of TLE among the states of the WTO, and the flank agreement that had granted Russia some relief from meeting the flank limits of the CFE Treaty. The suspension would take effect 150 days after the MFA notified the treaty's depository state, the Netherlands, of the decree.⁷³⁷ In the immediate aftermath of Putin's issuance of the decree, the Russians assured treaty partners that they would not take any precipitous actions that would affect the treaty's operation. According to the Russian representative to the JCG, they would continue to provide notifications required by the treaty and to receive inspections, and had, in fact provided information on TLE holdings in the flank area as required by the flank agreement of 1996.⁷³⁸

To implement the decree, Putin officially informed the Federal Assembly about the suspension and pledged to submit a corresponding draft law. The legislature had ratified the CFE Treaty and the accompanying agreements, so it would have to enshrine into law their

⁷³⁷ President of Russia, “Ukaz ‘O priostanovlenii Rossiiskoy Federatsiey deystviya Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhenykh silakh v Evrope in svyazannykh s nim mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov,’” 14 July 2007, <http://president.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2007/07/137830.shtml>.

⁷³⁸ Bernath, “We Continue to Bank on Dialogue.” When the Russians implemented the suspension in December 2007, however, they also ceased providing annual data in the format and degree of detail set out in the treaty, stopped providing notifications of changes to the data, and ended inspection activity. In one instance they also appeared to deliberately disregard the flank limits (see page 342 of this dissertation).

suspension.⁷³⁹ The domestic legal requirements and applicable provisions of the Federal law “On International Agreements of the Russian Federation” were quite clear. The international legal justification for the suspension, however, was not as cut and dry.

In making an international legal case for the suspension, the president’s office first noted that the CFE Treaty included a provision for a state’s *withdrawal* from the treaty in order to protect its national sovereignty. This provision of the treaty (Article XIX) included the 150-day advance notice for *withdrawal*. The president’s office further explained:

The *suspension* [emphasis added] of the operation of the Treaty in relations between the Russian Federation and CFE states-parties is being carried out in accordance with international law. The operation of CFE *is suspended* [emphasis added] 150 days from the date of receipt by its depository and the states-parties of the notification of the Russian side of having taken the specified decision.⁷⁴⁰

However, the CFE Treaty allowed for “withdrawal” (*vykhod*) from the agreement, not “suspension” (*priostanovlenie*) of its implementation.⁷⁴¹ Therefore, the Russian Federation’s action was inconsistent with the provisions of the treaty and, in the view of two legal analysts, a violation of not only the CFE Treaty but also the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.⁷⁴²

⁷³⁹ President of Russia, “Spravka k Ukazu ‘O priostanovlenii Rossiiskoy Federatsiey deystviya Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhenykh silakh v Evrope in svyazannykh s nim mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov,’” 14 July 2007, <http://president.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2007/07/137831.shtml>.

⁷⁴⁰ President of Russia, “Spravka k Ukazu ‘O priostanovlenii Rossiiskoy Federatsiey deystviya Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhenykh silakh v Evrope in svyazannykh s nim mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov.’”

⁷⁴¹ The Russians also used “moratorium” (*moratoriya*) to refer to their action.

⁷⁴² See U.S. Department of State, “Statement Regarding Russian ‘Suspension’ of the CFE Treaty, 12 December 2007, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/dec/97151.htm>; “Statement by the Delegation of the United States of America to the Joint Consultative Group.” Joint Consultative Group, 682nd Plenary Meeting, Agenda Item 2(b), 9 December 2008, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/138820.pdf>. For legal analyses, see Duncan B. Hollis, “Russia Suspends CFE Treaty Participation,” *Insights*, American Society of International Law, 23 July

In the face of criticism from NATO as early as June that a unilateral suspension (as Putin had called for in April) would be a “direct violation” of the CFE Treaty, Antonov deployed the legal justification the MFA had developed: given that the CFE Treaty included a provision for withdrawal by a state, in the event Russia suspended implementation, they would be “true to the principle of international law that states: ‘If the larger is allowed, then the lesser is permitted.’ In this case, the larger is withdrawal from the Treaty, and the lesser is its suspension.”⁷⁴³ Foreign Minister Lavrov explained several months later, during the debate in the Federation Council about the suspension, that the MFA’s lawyers had found a precedent for such a move in 1870, when Foreign Minister Aleksandr Gorchakov recommended that Russia reject the “discriminatory statements” in the treaty “imposed” on it as a result of the Crimean War.⁷⁴⁴ Armed with this legal justification and cognizant of the requirements set out in the constitution and federal legislation (and enjoying wide-spread support, to include from Mikhail Gorbachev, whose government had negotiated the original treaty), the government shifted the locus of work on the suspension of the CFE Treaty from the Kremlin to the White House, the home of the Russian parliament.⁷⁴⁵

2007, <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/11/issue/19/russia-suspends-cfe-treaty-participation>, and Adam Collicelli, “Frozen Obligations: Russia’s Suspension of the CFE Treaty as the Potential Violation of International Law,” *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review* 32, No. 2 (2009), <https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1110&context=iclr>.

⁷⁴³ “Russia Has the Right to Unilaterally Suspend CFE – Foreign Ministry,” *Interfax via Daily News Bulletin*, 9 June 2007, accessed through ProQuest. Foreign Minister Lavrov reiterated this point and criticized the “legal illiteracy” of those who challenged it. “CFE Treaty Contains Provision Allowing a Moratorium,” *Interfax via Daily News Bulletin*, 16 November 2007, accessed through ProQuest. The genesis of this legal rationale in the MFA was confirmed to the author by an official of the Russian MFA in a conversation held on 15 August 2019.

⁷⁴⁴ “Russian FM, Chief of Staff Explain Stance on CFE Treaty,” *Zvezda TV*, 16 November 2007, translated by *BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union*, 16 November 2007, accessed through ProQuest.

⁷⁴⁵ On Gorbachev’s endorsement of Putin’s “logical” step “to save this Treaty and to keep the principle of equality,” see “Gorbachev Backs Putin’s Move to Suspend CFE Treaty,” Gorbachev Foundation, 17 July 2007, https://www.gorby.ru/en/presscenter/publication/show_25649/.

The next step in the process of suspending the operation of the CFE Treaty was approval by both houses of the Federal Assembly. The chairmen of the Federation Council's committees on defense and security and international affairs had made clear, on the day Putin signed the decree, that the proposal would find a sympathetic audience in the parliament.⁷⁴⁶ On 23 July Putin transmitted to the State Duma a draft federal law that would implement the terms of his decree. Over the course of slightly less than five months (23 July-29 November), the law made its way through both houses of the Federal Assembly and landed on Putin's desk for signature, as shown in Figure 6.2 on the following page. The Chairman of the State Duma, Boris Gryzlov, said at the time of the draft law's introduction into the Duma that it was of "priority significance," but that the pace of work on its passage would take into account how Russia's CFE Treaty partners addressed the conditions for the continued operation of the treaty that Moscow had set out in Putin's speech to the Federal Assembly in April and at the Extraordinary Conference in June.⁷⁴⁷

⁷⁴⁶ "Russia Could Leave CFE Treaty Altogether if West Fails to Act – Senators." *Interfax*, 14 July 2007, translated by *BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union* and accessed through ProQuest.

⁷⁴⁷ "Predsedatel' Gosudarstvennoy Dumy Boris Gryzlov prokommentiroval parlamentskim zhurnalistam vnesenie v Gosudarstvenuyu Dumu zakonoproekta 'O priostanovlenii Rossiiskoy Federatsii deystviya Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhenykh silakh v Evrope,'" 24 July 2007, http://www.duma.gov.ru/news/274/55874/?sphrase_id=2298722.

Location	Event	Date
Duma	Draft law introduced and registered; passed to Chairmanship	23 Jul 2007
Duma	Draft law passed from Chairmanship to committees (International Affairs, Security, Defense)	24 July 2007
Duma	Preliminary examination of the draft law, including committee hearings, reviews, comments, proposals	3-21 Sep 2007
Duma	Draft law reviewed by Council of the State Duma; formal tasking to committees	6 Sep 2007
Duma	Committees propose adoption of the draft law	10 Oct 2007
Duma	Council of the State Duma considers draft law from committees, introduces draft law for consideration by State Duma	6 Nov 2007
Duma	Passage of law (on first reading)	7 Nov 2007
Federation Council	Law received from Duma, passed to committees (International Affairs, Defense and Security)	8 Nov 2007
Federation Council	Preliminary consideration of law; proposal to adopt law (based on conclusions of Committee on International Affairs, Legal Directorate of the Apparatus of the Federation Council, and Committee on Defense and Security)	14 Nov 2007
Federation Council	Consideration of law, adoption of law, transmission of law to the President	16 Nov 2007
President	Law signed	29 Nov 2007
Official Newspapers	Law published (<i>Rossiiskaya gazeta</i> , <i>Parlamentskaya gazeta</i>)	3-4 Dec 2007

Figure 6.2. Legislative Journey of the "Law on the Suspension by the Russian Federation of the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe"

Source: Table created by the author, based on: “Elektronaya registratsionnaya karta na zakonoproekt No. 456987-4 O priostanovlenii Rossiiskoy Federatsii deystviya Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhenykh silakh v Evrope,” www.duma.gov.ru.

The Council of the Duma placed the draft legislation on the calendar for the lower house’s fall session. In announcing the Duma’s plan for debating the law, the Council chose to highlight that the president would retain authority to decide to reestablish Russia’s implementation of the CFE Treaty.⁷⁴⁸

⁷⁴⁸ “Sovet Dumy prinyal k rassmotreniyu zakonoproekt o priostanovlenii deystviya Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhennykh silakh v Evrope,” 6 September 2007, Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, State Duma Official Site, http://www.duma.gov.ru/news/273/55970/?sphrase_id=2298722. Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak later explained that this flexibility was needed in case the western parties to the treaty took the requisite actions to enable the A/CFE to enter into force. “Zdanie Gosudarstvennoy Dumy. Bol’shoy zal. 7 noyabrya 2007 goda,” *Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Stenogramma zasedanii*, No. 255, 2007: 52, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/12968827>.

Speakers from the government and the Duma echoed familiar themes at a hearing of the Committee on International Relations on 19 September and a plenary session of the Duma on 7 November. The chairman of the committee, Konstantin Kosyachev, noted the Duma's ratification of the A/CFE in 2004 and the subsequent "three-year pause" during which other parties to the treaty failed to follow suit.⁷⁴⁹ Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak, the MFA's point person for the draft law, emphasized diplomatic equities: Russia was not leaving the treaty, but was merely "freezing" its operation on Russia's territory; Russia had fully met its Istanbul Commitments related to the CFE Treaty, while the NATO allies had not met their commitment to quickly ratify the A/CFE; and it seemed that some states found the extant situation satisfactory, in that it conferred advantages for them over Russia. Kislyak also explained that the suspension, or "freeze," pertained to the original CFE Treaty (of 1990). Russia would not return to this treaty, but would only observe the A/CFE, in the event the NATO states met the conditions Russia had set.⁷⁵⁰ The Chief of the General Staff, General Baluyevskiy, addressed three military equities, starting with the flank limits, "a paradox of the outdated treaty," that denied to Russia the freedom to reconfigure its armed forces as it chose.⁷⁵¹ He also complained about transparency in the form of the "permanent monitoring" of the disposition and composition of Russia's armed forces in Europe (forty-six annual inspections by NATO states on Russian

⁷⁴⁹ Kosyachev also affirmed to the Duma that Russia was acting in full compliance with international law, specifically the Vienna Convention on the Law of International Treaties, the CFE Treaty, itself, as well as Russian law on international agreements. "Zdanie Gosudarstvennoy Dumi. Bol'shoy zal. 7 noyabrya 2007 goda" No. 255, 2007: 64.

⁷⁵⁰ "Zdanie Gosudarstvennoy Dumi. Bol'shoy zal. 7 noyabrya 2007 goda" No. 255, 2007: 68.

⁷⁵¹ The injustice of the flank limits was the first specific issue Baluyevskiy raised in his testimony at the plenary session on 7 November. His statement ran so long that his microphone was cut off until the chairman granted him extra time to conclude. In answering a deputy's question, he returned to the flank limits and called their elimination the first change that would be required in a modernized (beyond the A/CFE) CFE Treaty. "Zdanie Gosudarstvennoy Dumi. Bol'shoy zal. 7 noyabrya 2007 goda" No. 255, 2007: 55, 61, 72.

territory and five in Belarus), and the imbalance between the forces of NATO and Russia that resulted from the allies' alleged breach of the treaty's group limits on TLE. Baluyevskiy emphasized,

Russia repeatedly warned the West of our steps. The resource of good will is exhausted. Russia has a sufficient arsenal of forces, means and capabilities to guarantee its security and national interests. The breakdown [*razrushenie*] of the CFE Treaty, if it happens, will happen not through the fault of Russia and will not be an irreplaceable loss for our state.⁷⁵²

The Duma adopted the law on the suspension of the operation of the CFE Treaty on 7 November in a vote of 418-0, with thirty-two deputies not voting. The vote was a “record of unanimity” for the lower house’s membership at the time.⁷⁵³ This unanimity was apparently not shared by the members of the Committee on International Relations when they conducted a hearing on the draft law on 19 September. According to records of the proceedings of the Duma, the “overwhelming” majority of participants supported the proposal to suspend the operation of the CFE Treaty, but the committee did not make any recommendations.⁷⁵⁴

The upper house of the Federal Assembly, the Federation Council, quickly followed the Duma and took up the draft law. The Committee on International Affairs held a hearing on 13

⁷⁵² “V Gosdume proshli parlamentskie slushaniya o priostanovlenii deystviya Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhenykh silakh v Evrope,” 20 September 2007, Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, State Duma Official Site, http://www.duma.gov.ru/news/273/55925/?sphrase_id=2298722. “Gosduma prinyala zakon o priostanovlenii deystviya DOVSE,” 7 November 2007, http://www.duma.gov.ru/news/273/56163/?sphrase_id=2298722.

⁷⁵³ Nikolay Dorofeev, “Kazhdomu – Svoye,” *Parlamentskaya gazeta*, 9 November 2007, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/12927943>.

⁷⁵⁴ “Parlamentskie slushaniya v Gosudarstvennoy Dume (sentyabrya-noyabrya 2007 goda),” *Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Parlamentskie slushaniya* 26 (2007), <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/19156527>.

November and the Federation Council met in plenary session three days later to approve the measure 137-0, with thirty-nine not voting.

What was remarkable about the session of the Federation Council was the performance of Chief of the General Staff Baluyevskiy, who asserted the predominance of the armed forces and priority of military equities in Moscow's approach to the CFE Treaty. Neither Baluyevskiy nor Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak delivered statements; however, in responding to questions, the Chief of the General Staff aggressively set out the positions of the armed forces and did not hesitate to address political matters that were more appropriate for Kislyak. Starting with a declaration that suspension of the CFE Treaty was "from political and military points of view a fully correct and logical step" by the country's leadership, Baluyevskiy on six occasions either spoke for the military *and* political sides of the government or addressed military *and* political aspects of the issue. He also aggressively defended familiar military equities. Twice in replies to questions, he raised the military's objections to the flank limits and their retention in the A/CFE. On this point, he contrasted the current decision by the government with the approach by the government in 1999 and its "arm-twisting" that had led to the A/CFE, in which the flank limits – "with which we did not agree" – had been preserved. A comparison of the entirety of this comment to the Federation Council and a similar one he made to the Duma, as shown in Figure 6.3, illustrates Baluyevskiy's unabashed boldness in asserting the predominance of the armed forces over the political authorities. In both cases, Baluyevskiy was replying to a question about the timing of the decision to suspend the operation of the CFE Treaty. Whereas in his first comment, Baluyevskiy stayed inside his lane, so to speak, and limited himself to addressing the

Reply to Question State Duma, 7 November 2007	Reply to Question Federation Council, 16 November 2007
I can only add that, if one speaks of 1999, then it is necessary to say that, surely, conditions were different. Then the Russian army by and large stood on its knees, and now from this tribunal I can say that today, the Russian army has risen from its knees and at least sufficiently strongly stands on its feet...	I would say, our legitimacy today allows us to at least view the Treaty not from those positions, as they were in 1999 when, by and large, by arm twisting our leadership led us to [fooled us into – <i>nas podveli k</i>] the agreement on the adapted Treaty, in which was preserved that with which we disagreed in principle – the flank limits.

Figure 6.3. General Baluyevskiy's Comparison of Circumstances in 1999 and 2007⁷⁵⁵

Source: Transcripts of sessions of the State Duma and Federation Council.

state of the armed forces, in the latter instance, he openly blamed “the leadership,” which could have meant his predecessor or the political leadership (or both), for what he saw as a flawed decision they took in 1999. Baluyevskiy agreed with one legislator about another of the military’s equities, ending the provision of information and hosting of inspections of Russian forces. For Russian forces to continue to be inspected twice or three times a month was “not entirely correct” in the current situation. Finally, as for the next steps, Baluyevskiy explained that the programs for the development of the armed forces to 2016 and to 2020 had already been prepared and they would guarantee the development of the conventional forces. These programs would not require significant change as a result of the suspension of the operation of the CFE Treaty.⁷⁵⁶ In other words, the General Staff had anticipated being freed from the constraints of the treaty and had prepared plans for force structure and budgets accordingly.

⁷⁵⁵ Sergey Karaganov, Deputy Director of the Europe Institute at the Russian Academy of Sciences, echoed Baluyevskiy’s point about Russia’s weakness having allowed others to impose “old rules” and “conditions of the kind in the Istanbul agreement.” With the suspension of the CFE Treaty, Russia would have a “free hand.” “Russian Pundit Sees CFE Treaty Ending Up on ‘Scrap Heap of History,’” *RIA Novosti* 15 July 2007, translated by *BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union* and accessed through ProQuest.

⁷⁵⁶ “Stenogramma Zasedaniya Soveta Federatsii,” *Sovet Federatsii. Stenogrammy zasedanii* 16 November 2007: 12-30, <https://dlib.eastview.com.browse/doc/13138549>. See also Nikita Vyatchanin and Aleksandr Rzheshhevskiy, “V Sovete Federatsii,” *Parlamentskaya gazeta*, 20 November 2007, <https://dlib.eastview.com.browse/doc/12977530>.

In the wake of Putin's decree, and as the Federal Assembly was considering the law on the suspension of the operation of the CFE Treaty, the western states, led by the U.S., engaged Russia in a variety of forums in an attempt to preserve the treaty. These efforts centered around a program of "parallel actions," whereby NATO allies would move to ratify the A/CFE by the spring of 2008 while Russia would meet their Istanbul Commitments to Georgia and Moldova. Among the forums for discussion and negotiation were the JCG, meetings of the thirty states parties to the CFE Treaty plus the three Baltic states and Slovenia held in Germany and France, and a "two-plus-two" meeting of the Russian foreign and defense ministers with their counterparts from the U.S.⁷⁵⁷ Although the Russian side detected some fleeting flexibility in the position of the U.S. regarding the Istanbul Commitments, both sides were unable to reach an agreement that would have set aside the suspension of the CFE Treaty in December 2007. The sticking points remained differences over the Istanbul Commitments and Russia's demand for the elimination of the flank limits.⁷⁵⁸

It fell to the MFA to deliver the message that the efforts of the U.S. and other NATO allies had not produced a solution that met Moscow's demands and, therefore, the suspension of the CFE Treaty would come into effect on 12 December as per Putin's decree. Moscow's diplomats not only recited the well-known litany of flaws with the existing CFE Treaty and various actions by NATO that further undermined it, but also became advocates for the armed

⁷⁵⁷ In the JCG, the U.S. delegation introduced the "parallel actions" program at the first meeting of the fall session on 10 September. U.S. Delegation to the Joint Consultative Group, untitled statement, JCG.DEL/22/07, 11 September 2007. The delegations of the United Kingdom (JCG.DEL/25/07, 29 October 2007) and Germany (JCG.DEL/27/07/Add.1, 5 November 2007) also delivered detailed presentations on "The Value of the CFE Treaty" and "CFE Limitations in Transition and Current Force Level Trends," respectively.

⁷⁵⁸ Zdzislaw Lachowski, "Conventional Arms Control," in SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (London: Oxford University Press, 2008): 479-480; Mazur, "Rossiya i kontrol' nad vooruzhenniyami v Evrope," 290; Anin and Ayumov, "DOVSE – Vchera...Segodnya... Zavtra?...stat'ya vtoraya:" 26.

forces' favorite cause, the elimination of the flank limits. Foreign Minister Lavrov delivered the bad news in his intervention at the meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, which was held in Madrid, 29-30 November 2007. He claimed that the NATO allies had actually imposed a moratorium on the treaty beginning in 2001. Despite the fact that Russia had met all its Istanbul Commitments that pertained to the CFE Treaty, the allies linked ratification to Russia's fulfillment of commitments that were entirely unrelated to the treaty. Moscow had been left with no choice but to suspend the operation of the treaty, although Russia remained open to dialogue and efforts towards the "soonest entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty."⁷⁵⁹ Conspicuously absent from Lavrov's statement, however, was the legal justification for suspension, an action not provided for in the CFE Treaty, that his own ministry had formulated.

Russian diplomats continued to carry the armed forces' water on the elimination of the flank limits. Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak told an interviewer for the armed forces' newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* that Moscow would insist, in future efforts to resurrect the CFE Treaty, that the flank limits, "an anachronism and clear discrimination against the Russian Federation...a degradation of her sovereignty," be eliminated.⁷⁶⁰ In announcing the beginning of the suspension, the MFA highlighted the flank limits among those provisions that would no longer govern the Russian armed forces and included the elimination of those limits as a

⁷⁵⁹ "Vystuplenie Ministra innostrannykh del Rossiiskoy Federatsii S.V. Lavrova na 15-m zasedanii SMID OBSE, Madrid, 29 noyabrya 2007 goda," 29 November 2007, MC.DEL/34/07, <https://www.osce.org/ru/mc/29331?download=true>.

⁷⁶⁰ MFA RF, "Interv'yu zamestitelya Ministra innostrannykh del Rossii S.I. Kislyaka po problematike DOVSE, opublikovannoe v gazete 'Krasnaya Zvezda' 14 dekabrya 2007 goda," 14 December 2007, https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/obsie-voprosy-mezdunarodnoj-bezopasnosti-i-kontrola-nad-vooruzheniami/-asset_publisher/6sN03cZTYZOC/content/id/354110.

condition for the restoration of the CFE Treaty.⁷⁶¹ Finally, in a lengthy statement to the JCG, Russian head of delegation Ulyanov mentioned the flank limits three times, twice as an obstacle to the fight against terrorism.⁷⁶² The MFA had assumed the mantle for tackling the military's most pressing objections to the CFE Treaty.

Russia's suspension of the implementation of the provisions of the CFE Treaty was far reaching, yet not all encompassing. Its effects were evident immediately. The Russian armed forces would no longer be subject to the treaty's limitations on the numbers and location of TLE, although there were no plans at the time to increase their levels in areas adjacent to Russia's neighbors. The treaty's provisions for transparency, i.e. exchange of detailed information on conventional armed forces and armaments, updates to that information, as required, and the receipt and conduct of inspections to verify the information, were halted. The suspension thereby addressed another of the pet peeves of the armed forces about the CFE Treaty, transparency. An immediate effect of the suspension was Russia's absence from the annual exchange of military information held in mid-December at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna.⁷⁶³ Within days of the implementation of the suspension on 12 December, the other parties to the treaty for the first time did not receive detailed information on Russia's conventional armed forces in the ATTU region, although they provided this information on their own forces to the Russians. At a meeting of the JCG on 18 December, the Russian delegation circulated "in the

⁷⁶¹ MFA RF, "Zayavlenie Ministerstva innostrannykh del Rossii v svyazi s priostanovleniem Rossiiskoy Federatsiey deystviya Dogovora ob obychnykh vooruzhennykh sil v Evrope (DOVSE)," 12 December 2007, https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/obychnye-vooruzhenia/asset_publisher/MIJdOT56NKIk/content/id/354334.

⁷⁶² "Vystuplenie rukovoditelya Delegatsii Rossiiskoy Federatsii na peregovorakh v Vene po voprosam voennoy bezopasnosti i kontrolya nad vooruzheniyami M.I. Ulyanova na zasedanii Sovmestnoy konsul'tativnoy gruppy (Vena, 18 dekabrya 2007 goda)," JCG.DEL/47/07, 18 December 2007.

⁷⁶³ "Russia to Miss Annual CFE Treaty Meeting in Vienna," *ITAR-TASS* through *BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union*, 14 December 2007, accessed through ProQuest.

interest of good will” generalized data on TLE in the Russian armed forces. In providing this generalized information, the Russians avoided disaggregating the data to the level of command required by the treaty (brigade or regiment), associating numbers of TLE with units and their locations (e.g. in the flank zone), and reporting on TLE in units such as naval infantry and internal security forces, in accordance with agreements and understandings reached throughout the life of the CFE Treaty.⁷⁶⁴

The suspension of the CFE Treaty was not all encompassing in that Russia remained in the JCG. Their continued participation allowed them to retain a voice in discussions about the operation of the treaty’s provisions and, more importantly, to continue to engage in efforts toward reaching agreement on Moscow’s demands for the restoration of the conventional arms control regime, specifically a continuation of the negotiations on a “parallel actions” package. From a practical standpoint, Russia’s continued participation in the JCG would ensure that no changes were made in the body’s membership, procedures, or – always an important consideration for the Russians – scale of assessment of costs among the parties to the treaty.⁷⁶⁵ Not even the smallest details escaped Moscow’s attention as the JCG completed its work for 2007 and the Russians’ participation in the CFE Treaty took on a new character.

The aim of the case study was to illuminate factors that led the Russian government to take a first step away from the CFE Treaty. Why, in 2007, did they take action they had

⁷⁶⁴ On the Russians’ “good will,” see “Vystuplenie rukovoditelya Delegatsii Rossiiskoy Federatsii na peregovorakh v Vene po voprosam voennoy bezopasnosti i kontrolya nad vooruzheniyami M.I. Ulyanova na zasedanii Sovmestnoy konsul’tativnoy gruppy (Vena, 18 dekabrya 2007 goda).” On the implications of only providing generalized data, see Crawford, *Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements*: 32.

⁷⁶⁵ “Vystuplenie rukovoditelya Delegatsii Rossiiskoy Federatsii na peregovorakh v Vene po voprosam voennoy bezopasnosti i kontrolya nad vooruzheniyami M.I. Ulyanova na zasedanii Sovmestnoy konsul’tativnoy gruppy (Vena, 18 dekabrya 2007 goda).”

threatened, yet avoided, earlier? Why just suspend implementation of the treaty instead of withdrawing from it? As was the case with the preceding chapter, this case study found more than one process at work. The first was the path toward the entry into force of the A/CFE, which shifted course in the direction of restoring the general viability of conventional arms control in Europe. The second process was one of reasserting Russia's influence in changed global and European security environments, a process that would include a greater role for rearmed and reformed armed forces in safeguarding Russia's security. The key factor that emerges from the analysis of the case is the Russian leadership's (primarily Putin's) renewed confidence that was grounded in economic growth and military assertiveness.⁷⁶⁶ Moscow determined that adherence to the CFE Treaty had become an impediment and its downfall would not be a tragedy for Russia.

At roughly the same time in early 2007 that Putin announced to the Munich Security Conference Russia's return, his government adopted a seven-year \$200 billion-dollar rearmament plan that "certainly suggested a new self-confidence."⁷⁶⁷ The timing of the adoption of this plan suggests that a reason behind Moscow's "suspension" of CFE Treaty obligations was to remove certain limits, e.g. in the flank zone, and transparency measures that would have impeded the implementation of the plan. President Putin confirmed this hypothesis in a speech to the leadership of the armed forces on 20 November, in which he described a series of measures aimed at the further modernization of the armed forces. One of the "adequate

⁷⁶⁶ On this point, see, for example, IISS, "Russia," *The Military Balance 2008*, 108:1: 205, DOI: 10.1080/04597220801912770.

⁷⁶⁷ Richard Sakwa, ""New Cold War' of Twenty Years' Crisis? Russia and International Politics," *International Affairs* 84, No. 2 (2008): 251.

measures” he mentioned was the suspension of Russia’s participation in the CFE Treaty.⁷⁶⁸ In a similar vein, recall that Chief of the General Staff Baluyevskiy, while answering a question from a Duma deputy about the timing of the decision to suspend the treaty, said that, while in 1999, “the Russian army to a great extent was on its knees, now...I can say that today the Russian army rose from its knees and at least sufficiently strongly stands on its feet.” While Baluyevskiy denied that the Russian armed forces would quickly be strengthened in the event the limits imposed by the CFE Treaty did not apply, he added that Russia should have the right to do so and would use that right “to redeploy, move and create forces and troops where necessary.”⁷⁶⁹ At the same time, First Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel General Aleksandr Kolmakov told journalists that the MOD was considering increasing the armed forces in the western part of the country after the suspension of the CFE Treaty, but had not yet made a decision to do so.⁷⁷⁰ The Russian army exercised the new freedom from the flank limits quickly by deploying two motorized rifle brigades to the North Caucasus in December 2007. Their deployment might have been a first step in the army’s shift from a division-centric to a brigade-centric organization as part of the general program of military reform. A source within the MOD characterized the move as a part of “measures...that do not match the framework of flank limitations stipulated by the CFE Treaty.”⁷⁷¹ Whether the deployment of the brigades exceeded the flank limits depended

⁷⁶⁸ President of Russia, “Vstupitel’noe slovo na soveshchaniy s pykovodyashchim sostavom Vooruzhennykh Sil,” 20 November 2007, <http://president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2007/11/151683.shtml>.

⁷⁶⁹ “Zdanie Gosudarstvennoy Dumy. Bol’shoy zal. 7 noyabrya 2007 goda” No. 255, 2007: 77. “Russia Not to Blame Regarding CFE Treaty,” *REN TV, Ekho Moskvyy, ITAR-TASS, RIA Novosti*, 7 November 2007, translated by *BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union*, 7 November 2007, accessed through ProQuest.

⁷⁷⁰ “Russia May Beef Up Troops in Western Part of Country After Suspending CFE Treaty,” *Interfax in Daily News Bulletin*, 7 November 2007, accessed through ProQuest.

⁷⁷¹ “Russia De-Facto Withdrew from CFE Treaty by Deploying Alpine Brigades – Source,” *Interfax in Daily News Bulletin*, 12 December 2007, accessed through ProQuest. The deployment of the 33rd and 34th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigades to Dagestan and Karachay-Cherkessia was reported in IISS, “Russia,” *The Military*

on the amount of TLE assigned to each one. Nonetheless, the fact that a representative of the MOD would tout a blatant disregard for limits that the Chief of the General Staff had targeted was another indicator that the military was calling the shots in this area of foreign and security policy.

During 2007, the CFE Treaty fell victim to a convergence of its declining value as a political tool, especially in terms of its contribution to managing the influence of NATO in the European security environment, and its deleterious effects on Moscow's reassertion of influence through a reforming military grounded in (and funded by) a strong economy. This convergence was particularly evident in Russia's near abroad, especially on its southern flank, where, despite progress in the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia (for the most part completed during 2007, with the exception of the Gudauta base in Abkhazia), Moscow continued to face security competition from the U.S. and the prospect of Georgia's accession into the alliance. The NATO allies' insistence that Russia fulfill commitments to Georgia and Moldova made at Istanbul in 1999, which it viewed as irrelevant to the treaty, and to retain the "discriminatory" flank zone limits that impeded the Russian armed forces' ability to combat "terrorists" in the Transcaucasus region militated against compromise over Moscow's conditions for bringing into force the A/CFE and made the suspension of its implementation a foregone conclusion.

Why suspension and not withdrawal from the CFE Treaty in 2007? Suspension, although suspect in terms of international treaty law (as discussed above, see page 333 and footnote 741), allowed the Russians to remain engaged in the conversation about conventional arms control in Europe and, perhaps, pursue linkages between it and other pressing security matters, such as U.S.

Balance 2008, 108:1: 208, DOI: 10.1080/04597220801912770. The linkage to military reform is in International IISS, "Russia," *The Military Balance 2009*, 109:1: 208, DOI: 10.1080/04597220802709886.

plans to deploy BMD assets to Europe. The Russians might also have concluded that keeping the debate about the CFE Treaty alive could also serve to drive wedges between NATO allies, based on their experience in the negotiations over the “parallel actions” program. Nonetheless, developments in the European security environment and in the implementation of the CFE Treaty would, in the course of a few years, lead the Russians to de facto, if not de jure, withdraw from the treaty.

From Suspension to Withdrawal (2008-2015)

Over the course of seven years after their suspension of the operation of the CFE Treaty, the Russians retained (or perhaps just feigned) interest in the treaty but followed an overall trend toward allowing it to fade away. Episodic efforts by NATO allies, especially the U.S., to induce Russia to return to implementation of the CFE Treaty in 2008 and 2010-2011 showed promise, but in the end failed. The war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 dealt a major blow to these endeavors. The decision by NATO allies, led by the U.S., in November 2011 to cease providing data on their armed forces to the Russian Federation, which followed an inconclusive Fourth REVCON in September 2011, signaled the end of any serious attempts to resurrect the treaty. After another three and a half years, and against the backdrop of Russia’s so-called annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Russia left the JCG and abandoned the CFE Treaty.

The Russians’ continuing attention to the CFE Treaty following the formal suspension of its implementation in December 2007 pointed to some hope on Moscow’s part that the action would induce the NATO allies to adjust their position toward the treaty and Moscow’s well documented conditions for its revival. Early in 2008, Russia’s ambassador to NATO, Dmitriy

Rogozin, exceeded even those conditions and suggested that a new treaty on conventional armaments also include naval forces, thereby addressing a shortcoming in the CFE Treaty and, from Moscow's perspective, a general blank spot in the arms control landscape.⁷⁷² The Russians found some promise in a statement on CFE the NAC issued on 28 March 2008, which, among other things, acknowledged Russia's concerns about the treaty (the flank limits, allies' levels of TLE, and accession to the treaty) and endorsed the "parallel actions" process that had begun in 2007. The NAC's inclusion of the "resolution" of Russia's commitments to Georgia and Moldova, however, proved to be a showstopper for Moscow in negotiations that made little progress from March to August 2008 and were interrupted by the Russo-Georgian war.⁷⁷³

Outside the negotiations on the parallel actions package, the flank limits remained the bête noir of the CFE Treaty. In an extensive critique of the CFE Treaty and NATO's approach to it at the alliance's Bucharest Summit on 4 April 2008, Putin took aim at the limits, thanks to which Russia was the only country that faced restrictions on the transfer of armed forces on its own territory, and their "colonial character." He explained that he had asked U.S. President George W. Bush whether the movement of U.S. troops from California to Texas or from Texas to Maine could be similarly restricted.⁷⁷⁴ At the time, the invitations to Albania and Croatia, which were not parties to the CFE Treaty, to join the alliance received no attention from either

⁷⁷² "New CFE Treaty Must Take Naval Forces into Account – Russian Envoy to NATO," *Interfax Daily News Bulletin*, 24 January 2008, accessed through ProQuest.

⁷⁷³ "NAC Statement on CFE," 28 March 2008, Press Release (2008) 047, <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-047e.html>; Zdzislaw Lachowski and Svenja Post, "Conventional Arms Control," in SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (London: Oxford University Press, 2009), 446-447; Jeffrey McCausland, "European/Eurasian Security and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Conference Paper," https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/0100.

⁷⁷⁴ "Vystuplenie Vladimira Putina na sammite NATO (Bukharest, 4 aprelya 2008 goda)," *Unian*, 18 April 2008, <https://www.unian.net/politics/110868-vyistuplenie-vladimira-putina-na-sammite-nato-buharest-4-aprelya-2008-goda.html>.

Putin or the Russian press, in contrast to the Baltic states and Slovenia when they joined the alliance in 2004, also as non-CFE states.⁷⁷⁵ The following month, also at a meeting of the NRC (at the level of chiefs of defense), General Baluyevskiy proposed a “compromise” on the CFE Treaty: the removal of the flank limits and the application of the “understanding of the flank” to the entire territory of the Russian Federation inside the ATTU in exchange for an end to Russia’s “moratorium” on the implementation of the CFE Treaty. Baluyevskiy explained that this proposal had not yet officially been formulated by the Russian government and was intended as a starting point for discussion.⁷⁷⁶ The lack of follow-up from the Russian side to Baluyevskiy’s initiative indicated that he was either free-lancing or floating a trial balloon. Given that he was less than a month from mandatory retirement at age sixty and had butted heads with Defense Minister Serdyukov over military reform, it is possible that he saw this as a last opportunity to advocate for the armed forces’ key equity in Russia’s policy toward the CFE Treaty.⁷⁷⁷ The war in Georgia and the resulting interruption in relations between NATO and Russia preempted any further negotiations between Russia and the allies.

The war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 had significant implications for the CFE Treaty and Russia’s relationship to it. One commentator even posited a linkage between the timing of the suspension of implementation of the treaty and the conflict. Andrey Illarionov, in his contribution to an edited collection of essays on the war in Georgia published in 2009,

⁷⁷⁵ Only in retrospect would Russian analysts and commentators pick up on this point. See, for example, Mazur, “Rossiya i kontrol’ nad vooruzhenniyami v Evrope,” 295; Anin and Ayumov, “DOVSE – Vchera...Segodnya... Zavtra?...stat’ya vtoraya:” 29.

⁷⁷⁶ “Genshtab predlagaet NATO kompromiss po DOVSE,” *RIA-Novosti*, 25 May 2008, <https://ria.ru/20080515/107488500.html>; “Nachal’nik General’nogo shtaba Vooruzhennykh sil RF general armii Yuriy Baluyevskiy predlozhl NATO kompromiss po Dogovoru ob obychnykh vooruzhenykh sil v Evrope (DOVSE),” *RBK*, 15 May 2008, <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/15/05/2008/5703cc899a79470eaf76a9eb>.

⁷⁷⁷ Baluyevskiy was succeeded in June 2008 by General Nikolay Makarov.

asserted that Putin's signing of the decree on suspension of the CFE Treaty in July 2007 and the adoption of the corresponding law that December were two of a series of actions the Russian government and armed forces had taken since 1999 to prepare the ground for the war. By this line of reasoning, the fact that Putin cited U.S. plans for a BMD system in Europe as *the* reason for the moratorium on CFE, although no decision had been taken on the deployment and no part of the system had been built, was proof that some other reason was behind the moratorium. Only when the war occurred in August 2008 did the "true motive" behind Putin's decision become clear. Putin's approval of the law that formalized the suspension of compliance with the CFE Treaty in December "removed all limits on the deployment of Russian heavy military equipment on the southern flank of the European theater" and was quickly followed by the deployment of Russian troops and equipment into Abkhazia.⁷⁷⁸ Illarionov's case suffers from three flaws, however. First, it is purely circumstantial. He offered no evidence that Putin and the Russian military or civilian leadership made these connections. Second, Putin cited several reasons that were directly related to the CFE Treaty, rather the planned U.S. BMD system, when he issued his decree in July 2007. Finally, up to 2007, Moscow had shown little concern for meeting CFE Treaty-related obligations in and around Georgia, so it was unlikely that the Russians would take

⁷⁷⁸ Andrey Illarionov, "The Russian Leadership's Preparation for War, 1999-2008," in Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, eds., *The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia*, Routledge, 2009: 66-67. ProQuest Ebook Central, <http://ebookcentral.ProQuest.com/lib/ksu/detail.action?docID=1968809>. Stephen Blank offered a similar argument in 2007, but rather than limiting Moscow's motive to preparation for a war against Georgia, he linked the suspension to the threat the CFE Treaty posed to Moscow's "ability to dominate the Caucasus and the Black Sea" and their ability to respond to Kosovo's likely independence. Stephen Blank, "The CFE Treaty Moratorium and Its Impact on The Caucasus' Frozen Conflicts," *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst*, 25 July 2007, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/ewsite/?q=node/4667/print>. A Russian analyst echoed Blank's point when he wrote that Russia's "concessions" in reducing their presence and TLE in Georgia and Moldova had "significantly weakened Russia's position in the Caucasus and Black Sea region." Andrey Arashev, "CFE: An Archaic Treaty and New Reality," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 54, No. 1 (2008): 15.

a step such as suspending the treaty out of concern for being limited by its provisions in the planning and execution of a war there.

Regardless of whether or not the suspension of the CFE Treaty was a conscious step in preparation for a war with Georgia, the conflict and its aftermath reduced the prospects for Russia's return to it. As Ulrich Kuehn observed in 2010, Russia's prosecution of the war and subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states seemed to be "the final nail in the coffin of CFE."⁷⁷⁹ Ironically, Russia created a "grey zone" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia similar to the one they decried in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia when those three states joined NATO while remaining outside the CFE Treaty. The Russians could – and did – introduce TLE that was unaccounted for in information exchanges and not subject to inspection into this region, over which the Georgian government did not exercise control.⁷⁸⁰ On a more fundamental level, Russia acted in contravention to two basic provisions of the CFE Treaty: the pledge by the states parties "to refrain in their mutual relations...from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State" and the requirement for host-nation consent for the stationing of armed forces on another state's territory.⁷⁸¹ The

⁷⁷⁹ Ulrich Kuehn, "CFE: Overcoming the Impasse," *Russia in Global Affairs*, 7 July 2010, <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/cfe-overcoming-the-impasse/>.

⁷⁸⁰ Speaking at the annual Munich Security Conference in 2011, Foreign Minister Lavrov mused about including Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Moscow recognized as independent states, in negotiations on the CFE Treaty. "Talks on CFE Treaty Could Involve Abkhazia, South Ossetia – Lavrov," *Interfax Daily News Bulletin*, 5 February 2011, accessed through ProQuest. Two years later, again speaking at the Munich conference, Lavrov expressed interest in new talks on conventional arms control, but warned against preconditions, in particular Russia's reversal of its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. "Russia Does Not Object to New CFE Talks without Preconditions – Lavrov," *Interfax Daily News Bulletin*, 2 February 2013, accessed through ProQuest.

⁷⁸¹ The pledge is in the Preamble to the CFE Treaty and the requirement for host-nation consent is in Article IV, paragraph 5. U.S. Department of State, *Compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe – Condition (5)(c) Report*, August 2011: 9, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/170654.pdf>.

requirement for host-nation consent would prove to be an insurmountable obstacle in subsequent efforts to bring Russia back into the treaty fold.⁷⁸²

President Dmitriy Medvedev's proposal in 2008 for a legally binding European Security Treaty to address the need for a new security architecture offered some hope for the future of the CFE Treaty. He told Russia's diplomats that "the crisis created by the attempt to ratify the [A/CFE] and the further modernization of this protocol are a clear sign of the flaws in the architecture of European security. I wouldn't want to think that it would take the treaty's complete and final collapse to convince everyone of the non-viability of an unfair arms-control agreement or the need to create in a Euro-Atlantic area a truly open and collective security system..."⁷⁸³ In March 2009, Vladimir Voronkov, the Director of the MFA's Department for Pan-European Cooperation, identified "the CFE crisis" as a sign "that the contemporary European architecture [was] fairly wobbly." Along with NATO expansion and the plans for the deployment of U.S. BMD assets in Europe, this crisis was a source of mutual distrust, for which Medvedev's proposed European Security Treaty was a solution. One of the goals of the treaty, which was not meant to replace the CFE Treaty, would be to "reach agreement on the 'umbrella' principles of arms control...[which] cannot, and should not, rule out the efforts to restore the CFE regime."⁷⁸⁴ Medvedev's legally-binding treaty, however, failed to gain traction as either a

⁷⁸² For example, on 5 November 2012, Russia's Ambassador to NATO (and former representative to the JCG) Aleksandr Grushko said Russia was prepared to discuss the CFE Treaty, if there was no linkage to "political issues," i.e. Russia was not prepared to include the issue of host-nation consent for the presence of Russian forces in Georgia and Moldova. U.S. Department of State, *Compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe – Condition (5)(c) Report*, January 2013: 8, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/212096.pdf>.

⁷⁸³ "Meeting of the President Dmitriy Medvedev with Russia's Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to International Organizations," *International Affairs* (Moscow) No. 5 (2008), 4, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/19391980>.

⁷⁸⁴ V. Voronkov, "New Security Architecture in Europe – Moving Ahead," *International Affairs* (Moscow) No. 4 (2009): 13-14, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/20578139>. On Medvedev's proposed treaty and the CFE

new conventional arms control regime or a broader conceptualization of the security architecture in Europe. The CFE Treaty, however, gained new life.

The post-Georgia conflict interregnum in activity pertaining to the CFE Treaty was relatively short-lived. On 9 May 2009, the Russian delegation delivered a memorandum to the JCG, “The Restoration [*vosstanovlenie*] of the CFE Treaty: A Way Forward.” According to one account from a Russian think tank, the Russians saw some “light of hope” in the change of administrations in the U.S. and took action to “stimulate the developing dialogue.”⁷⁸⁵ The proposals also reflected Moscow’s dissatisfaction with the program of “parallel actions” the NATO states, led by the U.S., had pursued from 2007-2008, and which Foreign Minister Lavrov had described in late 2008 as a “disbalance” of detailed actions by Russia and “amorphous promises” by NATO.⁷⁸⁶ The Russians’ proposals consisted of a series of steps to be taken over time in the framework of a “package” whose definition would be clear to all and not subject to varying interpretations. Not surprisingly, the steps that would lead to the goal of restoring the viability of the conventional arms control regime were the same conditions the Russians had set for the allies starting at the Third REVCON in 2006.⁷⁸⁷ No room for compromise was evident on two key issues: the flank limits, whose elimination was “an absolutely necessary precondition

Treaty, see also Aleksandr Grushko, “We Should Clean Up Our Relations from the Cold War Legacy...,” *International Affairs* (Moscow) 57, No. 5 (2011): 4, <https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/43186959>.

⁷⁸⁵ Antonov and Ayumov, *Kontrol’ nad obychnymi vooruzheniyami v evrope – konets regima ili istoriya s prodolzheniem*, 38-39.

⁷⁸⁶ MFA RF, “Vystuplenie Ministra innostrannykh del Rossii S.V. Lavrova na 16-m zasedanii SMID OBSE, Khelsinki, 5 dekabrya 2008 goda,” https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/rso/osce/-asset_publisher/bzhxR3zkq2H5/content/id/302982.

⁷⁸⁷ Mazur, “Rossiya i kontrol’ nad vooruzhenniyami v Evrope,” 292-299; Anin and Ayumov, “DOVSE – Vchera...Segodnya... Zavtra?...stat’ya vtoraya:” 27-32.

[*predposylka*],” and the Istanbul Commitments.⁷⁸⁸ The Russian initiative of May 2009 did not induce progress toward resolving the deadlock over the CFE Treaty or moving the NATO allies toward satisfying Russia’s demands. Near the end of the year, at the OSCE Ministerial meeting, Foreign Minister Lavrov lamented the “past two years, which were effectively lost.”⁷⁸⁹

The last period of activity by the Russians toward reviving the CFE Treaty was from 2010 to 2011. The NATO allies, led by the U.S., initiated consultations at “30 + 6” (the thirty states that were parties to the CFE Treaty plus the six allies – the three Baltic states, Slovenia, Albania and Croatia - that were not parties to the treaty). The process began in June 2010, when the allies introduced a proposal for a framework agreement and follow-on negotiations in 2011. The Russians showed some flexibility in the talks and President Medvedev expressed to his counterparts at the OSCE Summit meeting held in Astana, Kazakhstan in December 2010 his hope that the “deadlock” on conventional arms control might be broken and Russia’s commitment to work actively toward a solution. Over the course of approximately fifteen rounds of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, most of which took place in Vienna, all the participants except the Russian Federation reached agreement on a way forward to salvage the treaty.⁷⁹⁰

The informal negotiations at “30 + 6” ended in May 2011, having achieved an agreement on a framework document among all the parties *except Russia*. The stumbling block for Moscow

⁷⁸⁸ Mazur, “Rossiya i kontrol’ nad vooruzhenniyami v Evrope,” 297 (flank limits) and 301 (Istanbul commitments to Georgia and Moldova).

⁷⁸⁹ MFA RF, “Vystuplenie Ministra innostrannykh del Rossii S.V. Lavrova na 17-m zasedanii SMID OBSE, Afiny, 1 dekabrya 2009 goda,” 1 December 2009, https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/rso/osce/-/asset_publisher/bzhxR3zkq2H5/content/id/271322.

⁷⁹⁰ Oral history interview conducted telephonically by the author with a Former Senior State Department Official, 2 August 2019. See also U.S. Department of State, *Compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe – Condition (5)(c) Report*, August 2011, 12.

was host-nation consent for the presence of foreign forces, specifically for Russian forces on the territories of Georgia and Moldova. According to an American official, the Russians sought a *droit de regard* on the presence of their forces in these two countries and therefore avoided talks on this issue. The same official questioned how seriously the Russian delegation, which was led by Anatoliy Antonov, really approached the negotiations, because they raised issues such as BMD and NATO enlargement more as debating points than serious issues and seemed to enjoy seeing how much they could gain from the negotiations.⁷⁹¹ From Moscow's perspective, they bore no blame for the talks' failure. Mikhail Ulyanov, the senior arms control official in the MFA, implied in 2015 that the appointment of a "notorious" chief U.S. negotiator was a cause of the "complicated" negotiations and the "dead end" they reached. Ulyanov later explained that two preconditions precluded Russia's agreement: Georgia's insistence (with the support of the U.S.) on inclusion of the principle of host-nation consent for the presence of foreign forces "within internationally recognized borders" (thereby undermining Russia's recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and NATO allies' insistence on "transparency" during the negotiations, which would have required Russia to share data and, likely, receive inspections in contravention to the suspension of the operation of the CFE Treaty that had been in effect since 2007. Under such conditions, "there could be no talk of any negotiations."⁷⁹²

⁷⁹¹ Oral history interview conducted telephonically by the author with a Former Senior State Department Official, 2 August 2019.

⁷⁹² MFA RF, "Inter'vyu direktora Departamenta po voprosam nerastrostraneniya i kontrolya nad vooruzheniyami MID Rossii M.I. Ulyanova agenstsvu 'Interfaks', 11 marta 2015 goda," 11 March 2015, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newslines/15C1BBE407BF80BB43257E0500527023; Mikhail Ulyanov, "O nelegkoy sud'be kontrolya nad obychnymi vooruzheniyami salami v Evrope (KOVE)," *Evropeyskaya bezopasnost': Sobytiya, Otsenki, Prognozy* (June 2016), Vol. 57, No. 41: 4. Deputy Foreign Minister Grushko said at the time that the presence of Russian bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia should not be a topic for discussion, because the bases had been established with the consent of those "states." "Russia Against Linking Arms Treaty Talks with Georgia's Territorial Integrity," Interfax, 2 October 2010, translated by *BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union* and accessed through ProQuest. Two accounts of the talks published by the PIR Center think tank in 2011 and 2012 – one of whose co-authors was the Russian lead negotiator, Antonov – offered a less jaded view of the talks. See Anin and Ayumov, "DOVSE –

The Fourth CFE Treaty REVCON, which took place on 29 September 2011 in Vienna, confirmed for the Russians the impossibility of moving forward. Deadlock was the order of the day, and the participants failed to achieve consensus on a concluding document. The Russians rejected a chairman's summary of the REVCON that the delegation of Moldova, which had chaired the conference, delivered to the OSCE FSC on 19 October. They made clear that the summary reflected only the chairman's "personal opinion and strictly personal assessments" and presented a "not entirely balanced" depiction of the results of the REVCON. The Russians must have been especially peeved by the account of the participants' concern over the suspension of the treaty's provision "by one State Party in 2007" and forces deployed on some states' territory "without their free consent."⁷⁹³ The Fourth REVCON, while required by the treaty, became but a footnote in the story of Russia's drift away from the CFE Treaty.

The Russians found themselves further removed from the CFE Treaty in late November 2011, when NATO allies stopped sharing their annual information on military forces, a practice they had continued even after Russia stopped doing so in 2007. The MFA offered a low-key assessment of the move and rejected the allies' assertion that it was a reaction to Russia's suspension of the CFE Treaty since 2007. To emphasize that the action did not damage Russia's interests, the MFA noted that other mechanisms for exchanging data on military forces, the Vienna Document on CSBMs in Europe (VDOC) and the OSCE's Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI), provided "necessary and sufficient transparency."⁷⁹⁴ Although the MFA

Vchera...Segodnya... Zavtra?...stat'ya vtoraya:" 32-33; Antonov and Ayumov, *Kontrol' nad obychnymi vooruzheniyami v evrope – konets regima ili istoriya s prodolzheniem?*, 46.

⁷⁹³ OSCE, Forum for Security Cooperation, "660th Plenary Meeting of the Forum," FSC.JOUR/666, 19 October 2011, <https://www.osce.org/fsc/84267?download=true>.

⁷⁹⁴ MFA RF, "Kommentariy Departamenta informatsii i pechati MID Rossii v svyazi s resheniem ryada stran NATO po DOVSE," 23 November 2011, https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/obsie-voprosy-mezdunarodnoj-bezopasnosti-i-kontrola-nad-vooruzheniyami/-/asset_publisher/6sN03cZTYZOC/content/id/181510. Neither the VDOC nor the

asserted that Russia had never purported to accept the data other CFE Treaty states parties had continued to provide after the suspension in 2007, Moscow responded in kind and stopped providing a one-page overview of its TLE in the AOA, as it had from 2007-2010.⁷⁹⁵ Thereafter, Moscow's only remaining tie to the CFE Treaty was the JCG.

Starting in 2012, the Russians' approach to the CFE Treaty shifted from attempts to revive it to efforts to replace it. Moscow, it seems, was through with parallel actions and package deals. The CFE Treaty was moribund and a new arrangement was needed, one that would fit better into a broader concept of European security (like Medvedev's European Security Treaty) and would require "a radical revision of the existing system of constraints" to include weapons that had proven their worth in combat, e.g. unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), carrier-based aircraft and naval forces (types of systems for which NATO forces held an advantage).⁷⁹⁶ Russia's seizure and so-called annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, followed by the outbreak of the conflict in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine, doomed any attempts at restoring a conventional arms control regime, be it the A/CFE or some successor agreement. In early 2015, Antonov, who had moved from the MFA to the MOD, summed up Moscow's position as Russia prepared to take its next step away from the treaty. The CFE Treaty was a relic of the Cold War without any future. "I said, I say, and I will say that this treaty is dead and

GEMI offers the detail and level of disaggregation of information or scope of verification of the CFE Treaty (the GEMI lacks a mechanism for verification of data).

⁷⁹⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe – Condition (5)(c) Report*, January 2013, 8.

⁷⁹⁶ Evgeniy Buzhinskiy, "Moscow Takes Another Step Away from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," *PIR Center*, 11 March 2015, <http://www.pircenter.org/en/blog/view/id/197>; "Vystuplenie starshogo vitse-prezidenta Tsentra politicheskikh issledovaniy Rossii (PIR-Tsentr) E.P. Buzhinskogo na plenarnom zasedanii Foruma po sotrudnichestvu v oblasti bezopasnosti OBSE, 13 fevralya 2013 goda," email from Buzhinskiy to the author, 21 February 2013.

there are no prospects for its resurrection.” What to create from the remains of the treaty was another question.⁷⁹⁷

The Russians took their final step toward abandonment of the CFE Treaty when they left the JCG effective 11 March 2015. In his statement to the JCG, the head of the Russian delegation, Anton Mazur, noted that Russia’s hopes that the JCG would have remained a forum for developing a new conventional arms control regime, the reason Moscow had remained in the JCG when it suspended the implementation of the CFE Treaty in 2007, had been dashed. The JCG had become nothing more than a forum for the western states to pressure Russia to end its suspension, and meetings consisted of no more than a reading of the agenda and then adjournment. Under such circumstances, from political, practical and financial perspectives, it made no sense for Russia to continue to participate in the JCG. With this step, Russia’s suspension of the implementation of the CFE Treaty was complete.⁷⁹⁸ The senior MFA official for arms control, Mikhail Ulyanov, tied the decision to the publication by Wikileaks of U.S. State Department cables that indicated the U.S. had pressured NATO allies not to discuss substantive issues in the JCG. “In that situation, there was not much point in our further participation in the work of the [JCG].” Ulyanov also denied any linkage between the decision and the extant state of relations between Russia and western states over the situation in

⁷⁹⁷ Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (MOD RF), “Zamestitel’ Ministra oborony Rossii Anatoliy Antonov vstretilsya s zhurnalistami,” 5 March 2015, http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12009584@egNews. Less than two weeks later, however, while calling the treaty “outdated and archaic,” Antonov said that its *suspension* would remain in place “until such time as the President of Russia takes another decision,” thereby leaving the door open to the CFE Treaty’s revival (or at least not getting ahead of the president on the fate of the treaty). MOD RF, “Zamestitel’ Ministra oborony Rossii Anatoliy Antonov vstretilsya s zhurnalistami,” 17 March 2015, http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12010643@egNews.

⁷⁹⁸ MFA RF, “Zayavlenie rukovoditelya Delegatsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii na peregovorakh v Vene po voprosam voennoy bezopasnosti i kontrolya nad vooruzheniyami A. Yu. Mazura na plenarnom zasedanii Sovmestnoy konsul’tativnoy gruppy po Dogovoru ob obychnykh vooruzhenykh silakh v Evrope, Vena, 10 marta,” 10 March 2015, https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/bulletins/-/asset_publisher/i4uOWcG8W4iA/content/id/1149278.

Ukraine.⁷⁹⁹ The Russians still refused to characterize their stance as a “withdrawal” from the treaty. Deputy Defense Minister Antonov called the end of Russia’s participation in the JCG the completion of the process of suspending the treaty, although, “in legal terms we remain in the treaty.”⁸⁰⁰ Even the agreement by Belarus to protect Russia’s interests in the JCG going forward seemed designed to preserve the patina of Russia’s continued status as a party to the treaty.⁸⁰¹ Regardless, Russia’s days as a state party to the CFE Treaty had effectively ended.

The CFE Treaty and Russian Foreign and Security Policy

The analysis of the ties between the CFE Treaty and Russia’s foreign and security policy from 2007 to 2015, as was the case with the preceding two chapters, is guided by the conceptual framework set out in Chapter 1 (pages 23-24). The assessment draws on the content of policy documents and the effects (desired and undesired) of concrete actions and policies to identify connections between the CFE Treaty and Russian foreign and security policy.

⁷⁹⁹ MFA RF, “Inter’vyu direktora Departamenta po voprosam nerastrostraneniya i kontrolya nad vooruzheniyami MID Rossii M.I. Ulyanova agentstvu ‘Interfaks’, 11 marta 2015 goda,” 11 March 2015, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newline/15C1BBE407BF80BB43257E0500527023. During a conversation about the CFE Treaty with the author on 15 August 2019, an official of the Russian MFA offered a copy of a cable from Wikileaks, which the author declined to accept.

⁸⁰⁰ Russia Says It Has Not Technically Withdrawn from the CFE Treaty,” *Interfax*, 17 March 2015, translated by *BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union* and accessed through ProQuest. This translation of the dispatch from Interfax refers to the end of membership in the “JCG.” The original Russian-language press release from the MOD, however, refers to *priostanovka nashogo chlenstva v DOVSE* [suspension of our membership in the CFE Treaty]. MOD RF, “Zamestitel’ Ministra oborony Anatoliy Antonov vstretilsya s zhurnalistami,” 7 March 2015, http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12010643@egNews. Regardless, the timing of Antonov’s remarks so soon after Russia’s withdrawal from participation in the JCG makes their meaning clear.

⁸⁰¹ “Belarus Will Represent Russia’s Interests in JCG on CFE Treaty,” *Interfax: Russia and CIS General Newswire*, 11 March 2015, accessed through ProQuest.

The CFE Treaty is noticeably absent from the content of the documents on foreign and security policy the Russian government issued from 2007 to 2015: “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” (2008 and 2013), “The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020” (2009), and “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (2010 and 2014). This omission is logical because President Putin had suspended Russia’s implementation of the treaty in 2007. Nonetheless, portions of the contents of these documents apply to the CFE Treaty. In the first instance, according to “The Foreign Policy Concept,” “Russia consistently supports the strengthening of the legal basis of international relations and complies with its international legal obligations...unswervingly fulfills its international obligations under international treaties in the sphere of...arms control and disarmament.”⁸⁰² This concept of the supremacy of international law found expression in the series of legal wickets the Russians passed through on the path to the suspension of the operation of the treaty in 2007 and eventual withdrawal from the JCG in 2015, as well as in the explanation of the suspension (an action not provided for explicitly in the treaty text) from the standpoint of international treaty law. In the second instance, although not an explicit reference to the CFE Treaty, one of the “military challenges” (*voennaya opasnost’*) in the 2010 “Military Doctrine” was the violation or non-observance of international agreements in the field of arms control. As one Russian commentator observed, this could only refer to either the withdrawal by the U.S. from the ABM Treaty or the refusal by the NATO allies to ratify the A/CFE.⁸⁰³

The undesired effects of participation in the CFE Treaty on Russia’s foreign and security policy came to the fore during the period covered in this chapter and finally pushed Moscow to

⁸⁰² “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” (2008): 14-15. The same language appears in the 2013 issuance of the foreign policy concept.

⁸⁰³ Aleksandr Khranchikhin, “Starie osnovy novoy doktriny.”

act on its warnings that it would de facto withdraw from the treaty. In all the categories of effects that are included in this dissertation's conceptual framework – mitigation of threats, shaping the security environment, and costs (limits on one's own capabilities, transparency of military forces and activities, and expenditure of fiscal resources) – the CFE Treaty was exercising an undesired influence that Russia no longer needed to tolerate.

The CFE Treaty failed to mitigate the military threats and dangers to Russia's national security interests. In particular, the expansion of NATO and development of the alliance's infrastructure in areas closer to the Russian Federation remained unconstrained by the treaty's limitations. The alliance's activity in the Baltic states and the use by the U.S. of bases in Bulgaria and Romania, all of which took place in or adjacent to the CFE Treaty's northern and southern flank regions, exemplified this shortcoming of the treaty. The prospect of the entry of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO at some undetermined date, as agreed by allies at the Bucharest Summit in March 2008, added to this perception of threat by Moscow. Even Russia's suspension of implementation of the treaty in 2007 did not seem to bring the U.S. and the NATO allies around on this issue. The U.S. program to deploy BMD assets to Europe and other U.S. defense programs, for example conventionally armed prompt global strike capabilities, as identified in the "Military Doctrine" of 2014, also highlighted the limitations of the CFE Treaty. The treaty's five categories of TLE (tanks, ACVs, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters) must have seemed quaint and anachronistic, in that they excluded advances in conventional warfare capabilities that exceeded those of the Russian armed forces and potentially threatened Russia's national security.⁸⁰⁴

⁸⁰⁴ On this last point, see Sinovets and Renz, *Russia's 2014 Military Doctrine and Beyond: Threat Perceptions, Capabilities and Ambitions*, 6-7; "Vystuplenie starshego vitse-prezidenta Tsentra politicheskikh issledovaniy Rossii (PIR-Tsentr) E.P. Buzhinskogo na plenarnom zasedanii Foruma po sotrudnichestvu v oblasti bezopasnosti OBSE, 13 fevralya 2013 goda;" and Yuri Nadochei, "Farewell to Arms: CFE Treaty and Russia's Withdrawal," *Russian*

Another undesired effect of the CFE Treaty was the way it shaped the security environment to Russia's disadvantage. The "discriminatory" flank limits restricted the stationing and deployment of forces, in particular to the Transcaucasus region, which the Russians saw as a source of threats to the state's national security. From the perspective of Moscow, and the armed forces in particular, a very desirable effect of Russia's suspension and de facto withdrawal from the obligations of the CFE Treaty was the restoration of Moscow's independence in determining the size and composition of the armed forces. Some members of the military leadership might have found the situation under Moscow's suspension of the operation of the CFE Treaty (as opposed to a complete breakdown of the treaty) quite satisfactory, in that limits on NATO remained in place while the Russian armed forces were free of constraints in the southern flank region.⁸⁰⁵ As two Russian analysts observed, "The moratorium on CFE would allow for the complete departure from the outdated logic of the permanent correlation of the potentials of Russia and the West and transition to full freedom in the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, relying on purely national interests and answering the concrete threats of the time."⁸⁰⁶ Perhaps the CFE Treaty had also obstructed the modernization of Russia's armed forces and their restoration as a key instrument of Moscow's foreign and security policy. As military analyst Pavel Felgengauer wrote in 2015,

after the elapse of time, it is obvious that Putin's famous speech in Munich in February 2007 and the subsequent dissolution of the

International Affairs Council, 17 March 2015, <https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/farewell-to-arms-cfe-treaty-and-russia-s-withdrawal/>.

⁸⁰⁵ Ulrich Kuehn, "CFE: Overcoming the Impasse."

⁸⁰⁶ S.V. Arapina and S.A. Pfettser, "Moratorii na DOVSE kak prodolzhenie 'Myunkhenskoy rechi' V.V. Putina," *Vestnik Kemerovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta kul'tury i isskusstv*, <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/moratoriy-na-dovse-kak-prodolzhenie-myunhensoy-rechi-v-v-putina/viewer>.

CFE were not, as was hoped at that time, merely threatening rhetoric for internal Russian consumption. The top brass was preparing to consistently employ military force to confirm regional domination, and CFE was definitely in the way.⁸⁰⁷

The Russian government's plans to strengthen the capabilities of the armed forces in the western part of the country and, in particular, near Ukraine, would likely have faced obstacles as the result of two undesired effects of the implementation of the CFE Treaty, limits on TLE and transparency. In July 2015, the MOD announced plans to establish two large groupings of conventional armed forces in the western part of Russia, the 20th Guards Combined Arms Army and the 1st Guards Tank Army.⁸⁰⁸ Both large formations would include multiple brigades of armor and therefore significant quantities of TLE, to include new types of tanks and ACVs that were not yet in the CFE Treaty's Protocol on Existing Types (POET) of TLE. Under the terms of the CFE Treaty, the Russians would have had to provide information about these systems, which would then be exposed to personnel from NATO states during inspections. Similarly, the construction of two new bases for conventional forces near the border with Ukraine, in the Belgorod and Voronezh regions, could also have had treaty implications. Given that one was designed to accommodate more than 1300 armored vehicles, the levels of TLE associated with them might have affected Russia's ability to remain within treaty limits. Nonetheless, as was pointed out in an article published at the time, "Russia has pulled out of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, so it is free to move extra troops and hardware to its

⁸⁰⁷ Pavel Felgengauer, "Ritual Burial: Why Russia Has Finally Pulled Out of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," *Novaya gazeta*, 13 March 2015, translated by *BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union* and accessed through ProQuest.

⁸⁰⁸ "Two New Armies to Be Set Up in Western Russia by End of 2015," *TASS*, 29 July 2015, OSC translation.

western border.”⁸⁰⁹ Defense Minister Shoygu took note at a meeting of the Collegium of the MOD in December 2015 of one of the “priority tasks” Putin had set for the armed forces, to further develop the combat capability of the armed forces, which would include strengthening military formations in the “western, southwestern and arctic strategic areas.”⁸¹⁰ The entirety of the first two areas and a portion of the third fell within the AOA of the CFE Treaty, therefore any changes to force structure and stationing of TLE there would have been subject to the limits and transparency measures of the treaty. Given the credible reports that Russian forces had been involved in operations in eastern Ukraine, the additional transparency provided by inspections under the CFE Treaty at those bases might have proven disadvantageous for Russia and its denials of involvement in the conflict.

The undesired effects of transparency and limits on Russia’s armed forces finally came to outweigh the gains to be derived from continued participation in the CFE Treaty. In an interview published in the journal *Indeks bezopasnosti* in August 2015, the director of the MFA’s Pan-European Cooperation Department (and former Russian ambassador to the OSCE) succinctly captured his government’s position, which focused on the undesired effects of transparency and limits on armaments and reflected the perspective of the armed forces. During the conflict in Ukraine, the U.S. and Ukraine had “abused” the provision for inspections in the VDOC (he did not address the CFE Treaty, which Russia was not implementing) by requesting inspections in border regions. As for negotiation of new limits on conventional armaments,

⁸⁰⁹ Anton Zverev, “Russia Plans Second Big Military Base Near Ukrainian Border,” *Reuters*, 23 September 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/23/us-ukraine-crisis-base-idUSKCN0RN1P120150923?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=*Situation%20Report.

⁸¹⁰ “Putin and Defence Minister Address Russia’s Defence Chiefs on 11 December,” *President of Russia* in English, 12 December 2015, accessed through the OSC; “Russia: Key Points from Russian Defense Minister at Extended Session Russian Defense Ministry Board,” *Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation* in English, accessed through the OSC, 14 December 2015.

after a long period of development and modernization of the armed forces, it would be unrealistic and groundless to say that we are already prepared to limit them. Only when we achieve the targets set by the leadership and feel that we have the possibility to speak about conventional arms control from a position of strength will we be able to transition to the next stage.⁸¹¹

Speaking for the MOD, Sergey Ryzhkov, the director of the International Treaty Directorate, offered a similar perspective on the downsides of arms control. First, in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, western states were using arms control agreements as tools of information warfare, i.e. using verification activities to support their own narratives. Second, verification measures interfered with the training of the armed forces and their daily work. This, of course, was “not normal.”⁸¹² Addressing the OSCE FSC in 2013, Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy took this point further and described a disbalance in the treaty’s verification regime that was the result of the “collective verification” by the NATO allies of Russia’s armed forces. Verification was “collective” in that the allies did not conduct inspections of each other and therefore, as more former WTO states joined NATO, there were fewer opportunities to inspect their armed forces. The NATO allies also coordinated their inspection activity in Russia, thereby allowing for more effective coverage of OOVs without duplication.⁸¹³ Russia did not enjoy this collective verification arrangement with, for example, the member states of the CSTO.

⁸¹¹ Andrey Kelin, “OBSE nakonets-to rabotaet tak, kak dolzhna byla rabotat’ vsegda,” *Indeks bezopasnosti* (Fall 2015), No. 3 (114): 20.

⁸¹² Oleg Falichev, “Oruzhie doveriya,” *VPK*, 20 May 2015, <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/25265>.

⁸¹³ “Vystuplenie starshego vitse-prezidenta Tsentra politicheskikh issledovaniy Rossii (PIR-Tsentr) E.P. Buzhinskogo na plenarnom zasedanii Foruma po sotrudnichestvu v oblasti bezopasnosti OBSE, 13 fevralya 2013 goda.”

Was transparency inconvenient for the Russian military? The Russian expert community offered a variety of perspectives on this point. One commentator, writing in the MFA's journal, suggested that the sharing of treaty-related notifications between Russia and the NATO states, which ceased with Russia's suspension of implementation of the treaty, had "long been an anachronism, typical more of the 1990s." Its cessation, therefore, was a codification of the status quo and a formal recognition of the doubtful efficacy of the treaty's provisions on information exchange and inspections.⁸¹⁴ Andrey Zagorski hinted at this situation when he noted that transparency regarding Russian forces in the southern flank area had decreased as the results of Moscow's suspension of exchanges of information and inspections in 2007 and the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, followed by the establishment of Russian military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.⁸¹⁵ In the view of the authors of one Russian analysis, the treaty's provisions for exchange of data and inspections were also "not entirely satisfying" for the Russian Federation. Given the traditional openness of western institutions, to include the military, the Russians gained much less through these provisions than did the western states, which "received a unique opportunity to receive information directly from the Russian Ministry of Defense."⁸¹⁶ Military analyst Pavel Felgengauer went a step further and argued that the "real point" of the CFE Treaty had been in its provisions for exchange of military information and inspections. In December 2007, when Russia's suspension of the CFE Treaty took effect and "less than nine months...until the Russian invasion of Georgia," these provisions for "permanent monitoring" of Russia's

⁸¹⁴ Arashev, "CFE: An Archaic Treaty and New Reality:" 20.

⁸¹⁵ Andrey Zagorski, "Strengths and Weaknesses of the Current Arms Control Regimes and CSBMs," in Wolfgang Zellner, Hans-Joachim Schmidt and Goetz Neuneck, eds., *The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009): 91.

⁸¹⁶ Arapina and Pfttser, "Moratorii na DOVSE kak prodolzhenie 'Myunkhenskoy rechi' V.V. Putina."

armed forces had lost their purpose.⁸¹⁷ For a variety of reasons, the undesired effects of the transparency inherent in the CFE Treaty had come to outweigh any benefits the Russian armed forces derived from them.

Transparency is a two-way street, however. Beginning with the suspension of the implementation of the CFE Treaty in December 2007, the Russian armed forces lost some of the ability of to “assess and predict the development of the military-political situation on the global and region level.”⁸¹⁸ The cessation of inspections of other states’ armed forces and exchange of data reduced this capability, although it had to be assumed that a cooperating state that remained active in CFE, i.e. Belarus or perhaps Armenia, would share data and inspection results even after the NATO states stopped providing annual data to the Russians in 2011 and the Russians withdrew from the JCG in 2015. Nonetheless, the Russians seemed to be content with the remaining transparency regimes - the VDOC, GEMI and the Open Skies Treaty - to meet their needs for information on other states’ military activities.

In the final analysis, the political and military costs of remaining in the CFE Treaty or, after 2007, ending the suspension of its operation, became too great, in terms of both Russia’s relations with other states and among the players in Russia’s foreign and security policy enterprise. The two conditions the NATO states proffered in the talks on the CFE Treaty that took place from 2010 to 2011, the last real attempt to salvage the treaty, would have required Moscow to walk back from two significant positions: recognition of the independence of

⁸¹⁷ Pavel Felgengauer, “Ritual Burial: Why Russia Has Finally Pulled Out of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.”

⁸¹⁸ “Voennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” *RG*, 30 December 2014, paragraph 21a.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia and suspension of the operation of the CFE Treaty.⁸¹⁹ From a political perspective, such a move would have undermined Moscow's reassertion of its role as a global and European power, which Putin had signaled in his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. It also would have conveyed a retreat from Russia's position of influence in its "zone of privileged interests," the near abroad, especially the Transcaucasus region. From the armed forces' standpoint, the suspension of the operation of the CFE Treaty in 2007 was a point of no return. As subsequent events, in particular the conflict with Georgia in 2008 and the seizure of Crimea in 2014 and conflict in eastern Ukraine, demonstrated, Moscow had come to rely on the armed forces as a major tool of foreign and security policy. It is difficult to conceive the armed forces, having been given this role and in the midst of an extensive program of modernization and development, being once more subjected to the obligations of the CFE Treaty, with all their undesired effects.

⁸¹⁹ By 2011, Russia's negotiators also would have had to obtain new instructions from Moscow, but "CFE issues did not appear to be high enough on the list of Russian priorities." Tom Z. Collina. "CFE Treaty Talks Stall," *Arms Control Today*, September 2011. http://www.armscontrol.org/2011_09?CFE_Treaty_Talks_Stall.

Chapter 7 - Conclusions

The primary research question for this dissertation is: to what extent has the CFE Treaty served the national security interests of the USSR and the Russian Federation? Secondary research questions are: What has been Moscow's approach to the negotiation and implementation of the CFE Treaty? What have been the foreign and security policies of the USSR and the Russian Federation? What actors have determined Soviet and Russian foreign and security policy, and through what processes have they done so? This chapter will, first, address the secondary questions collectively, based on the historical narratives (CFE Treaty, Russian security policy) and the three case studies (1999, 2004, 2007) presented in the preceding chapters. It will conclude by answering the primary research question.

To answer the secondary research questions, a good starting point would be 1856. Russia's foreign and security policy up to 2007, like that of the USSR under Gorbachev, followed the course set out by Prince Aleksandr Gorchakov, foreign minister to Tsar Alexander II, after Russia's defeat in the Crimean War. Gorchakov instructed Russia's diplomats to keep Russia out of foreign entanglements in order to build up the country, work toward a Europe without territorial changes or changes in the balance of power or influence that might damage Russia's interests, so that Russia would then find itself in a position to take its place again among the great powers. Yeltsin's foreign and security policies (e.g. the 1993 Military Doctrine and his 1996 Speech to the Federal Assembly) focused on Russia's internal development in a transitional period and the demilitarization of international relations.⁸²⁰ Colonel General Anatoliy

⁸²⁰ See Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, "Past and Future Meet: Aleksandr Gorchakov and Russian Foreign Policy," *Europe-Asia Studies* 54, No. 3 (May 2002), 388. Splidsboel-Hansen attributed "the wide currency of Gorchakovism" in Russia at the time (2002) to a similarity of circumstances in the post-1856 period and the late

Mazurkevich, Chief of the MOD's Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation, even invoked Gorchakov in 2006 to extoll the value of international military cooperation.⁸²¹ During this period, Moscow attempted, albeit only partially successfully, to use the CFE Treaty to shape the European security environment in favor of its national interests, specifically regarding the enlargement of NATO and the division and posture of the former Soviet armed forces in the near abroad.

Putin's speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference signaled the end of this period, and a change in Russia's approach to the CFE Treaty followed as Moscow suspended its implementation of the treaty. Russia's new approach to foreign and security policy featured a shift toward a preference for the military instrument of power, especially in the near abroad. As Aleksandr Golts wrote in 2015, Moscow's suspension of the implementation of the CFE Treaty in 2007, "almost simultaneously" with Putin's speech in Munich was not coincidental.

From that moment on, the Kremlin began systematically working to achieve its objectives through military means. The Russia-Georgia war of 2008 provided proof of this shift...In hindsight, it is clear that Russia achieved a military advantage by refusing to comply with the CFE, enabling it to deploy troops to Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian border. That is, it could accomplish precisely what the CFE was supposed to guard against: the secret concentration of forces as a prelude to aggression.⁸²²

1990s/early 2000s. Medvedev established a "Gorchakov Fund" for public diplomacy in 2002. As late as 2012, Putin invoked Gorchakov in an article published in his name during the presidential election campaign. Vladimir Putin, "Rossiya sosredotachivaetsya – vyzovy, na kotorie my dolzhny otvetit'," *Edinaya Rossiya* [United Russia], 16 April 2012, <http://er.ru/news/71745/>.

⁸²¹ Aleksey Lyashchenko, "Krepit' avtoritet i bezopasnost' Rossii."

⁸²² Aleksandr Golts, "CFE Is Dead, Military Deterrence Is Back," *Moscow Times*, 16 March 2015, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/cfe-is-dead-military-deterrence-is-back/517498.html>.

The influence of the military on Russia's foreign and security policy, especially in comparison to the MFA, had increased by 2007. This situation accounted for the suspension of the CFE Treaty, "a drastic reorientation of arms control policy."⁸²³

The three case studies in Chapters 4-6 of the dissertation revealed several factors that influenced the outcome of interest (or de facto dependent variable), an action or decision by the Russian Federation regarding the CFE Treaty. As depicted in Figure 7.1. Cross-Case Comparison (1999, 2004, 2007), these factors are NATO, the near abroad, the domestic situation in Russia, and the status and composition of Russia's national security enterprise. The first two factors, NATO and the near abroad, which are evident in the dissertation's CFE Treaty narrative, had a direct effect on the de facto dependent variable in all three cases. The second two factors, domestic situation and national security enterprise, were more evident in the foreign and security policy narrative, and thereby had an indirect effect on the de facto dependent variable. By 2007, Russia's post-crisis economic situation, more centralized governance, and improving military capabilities provided the foundation for a more assertive foreign and security policy. At the same time, NATO's gradual enlargement from 1999 and perceived disregard for Russia's security interests, both of which Moscow saw as encroaching on its influence in the near abroad, produced a situation in which the undesired effects of the CFE Treaty came to outweigh its desired ones.

⁸²³ Lionel P. Fatton, "The Impotence of Conventional Arms Control," *Contemporary Security Policy* 37, No. 2 (2016): 214, DOI: 10-1080/13523260.2016.1187952.

		1999	2004	2007
CFE Treaty Action (de facto D.V.)		Accept and sign the A/CFE	Ratify the A/CFE	Suspend the CFE Treaty
Factors (de facto I.V.)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1st tranche of enlargement; • ALLIED FORCE vs. FRY; • New Strategic Concept; • PJC/commitment on “no substantial combat forces” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2nd tranche of enlargement (incl. Baltics); • Iraq invasion by U.S. and UK; • NRC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prospect of GG and UA membership; • Putin’s warning shot at Munich Security Conference
CFE Treaty	NATO			
	Near Abroad	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Istanbul Commitments to reduce presence in GG and MD; • “Peacekeepers” in GG and MD; • 2nd Chechen conflict 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some progress in reduced presence in GG, MD; • Pressure to fulfill Istanbul Commitments; • Terrorist attacks from Caucasus (Moscow 2002, Beslan 2004) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rising tensions with GG; • Slowdown of withdrawals from MD; • U.S. security competition in GG
Foreign and Security Policy	Domestic Situation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weaknesses in governance, economics, society (transition) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stronger governance; • Economic challenges 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Centralized governance; • Oil income; • Foreign debt paid off
	National Security Enterprise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yeltsin transitioning rule to Putin; • Military struggling (Chechnya, reform, resources); • MFA benefits from focus on Europe 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Centralization of policy in the Kremlin (Security Council); • Some military reform as reaction to Iraq invasion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuity of centralization, despite Putin-Medvedev transition; • Investment and reform in armed forces; • More assertive military
Abbreviations: A/CFE - Agreement on the Adaptation of the CFE Treaty D.V. – Dependent Variable PJC – NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (1997) I.V. – Independent Variable NRC – NATO-Russia Council (2002) GG – Georgia MD – Moldova UA - Ukraine				

Figure 7.1. Cross-Case Comparison (1999, 2004, 2007)

It all boiled down to the Russians' perception of their right to exercise influence over portions of the post-Soviet space. The foreign and security policies of the Russian Federation consistently placed an emphasis on relations with the states of the CIS. As most explicitly stated by Dmitriy Medvedev when he spoke in 2008 about Russia's "zone of privileged interests," these relations implied a relatively free hand, or *droit de regard*, for Moscow.⁸²⁴ The presence or proximity of Russian military forces, for instance in Georgia and Moldova, became a key tool in these relations. In terms of the CFE Treaty, the sticking point proved to be the concept of host-nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces on one's territory, which Tbilisi and Chisinau refused to grant.

The Russians emphasized their fulfillment of the Istanbul commitments that directly related to the CFE Treaty, i.e. those that involved TLE. Without those commitments, the A/CFE likely would have not been signed at Istanbul in 1999.⁸²⁵ The Russians needed the A/CFE because they perceived it would mitigate the consequences of the first wave of the enlargement of NATO. Once it became evident that this would not be the case and, in fact, further waves of enlargement would follow, the Russians proved more willing to disengage from some of their Istanbul commitments. They chose to separate the remaining commitments to Georgia and Moldova, which involved bases and personnel, from the whole process associated with the CFE Treaty, specifically the A/CFE. As Wolfgang Zellner noted, the NATO allies' attempt to use the

⁸²⁴ "Interview Given by Dmitry Medvedev to Television Channels Channel One, Rossiya, NTV," 31 August 2008, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/48301>.

⁸²⁵ Although, according to one group of Russian academics from IMEMO, these commitments and the Russian-Georgian and Russian-Moldovan agreements "appeared accidentally" during the Istanbul Summit in 1999, and "these two short documents containing unspecified obligations and adopted, as diplomats say, 'on the margins' of the Summit, should not have been considered as a serious obstacle" to strengthening European security." The author has not encountered this unique characterization of the commitments elsewhere. See Aleksey Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, Sergey Oznobishchev and Aleksander Pikaev. *NATO-Russia Relations (Prospects for New Security Architecture, Nuclear Reductions, CFE Treaty)*. Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2010: 53.

CFE Treaty to induce Russia to settle its disputes with Georgia and Moldova failed. At the same time, Russia “followed the western model” and tried to link the treaty to subregional issues by seeking the abolition of the flank limits.⁸²⁶ Ironically, the Russians took the opposite approach toward commitments NATO made outside the CFE Treaty, such as the pledge the alliance first made in 1997 and repeated several times thereafter regarding the stationing of “substantial combat forces” on the territory of new members.

To what extent, then, has the CFE Treaty served the national security interests of the USSR and the Russian Federation? The Russians’ perseverance in sticking with the treaty has to count for something. Despite the treaty’s near-obsolescence when Gorbachev signed it in 1990, they labored for six years to gain some relief from the flank limits at the First REVCON, negotiated for three years after that to achieve an agreement to adapt the CFE Treaty in 1999, ratified the A/CFE in 2004 despite the NATO allies’ failure to do so, endured another three years of allies’ inaction on ratification and criticism from them over the Istanbul Commitments before suspending implementation of the treaty in 2007, and, finally, waited another eight years before de facto abandoning the CFE Treaty when they withdrew from the JCG. By 2006, the Russians must have concluded that the CFE Treaty, whether in its original or adapted form, was an ineffective tool for shaping the military aspect of the European security landscape. From that point on, the treaty played a bit part in, for example, Moscow’s attempts to reset the relationship with Washington or to cultivate bilateral relations with states such as Germany. The turn to reliance on the armed forces to exercise Russia’s great-power influence on its neighbors in the near abroad, first in Georgia in 2008 and then in Ukraine beginning in 2014, finally closed the

⁸²⁶ Wolfgang Zellner, “Can This Treaty Be Saved? Breaking the Stalemate on Conventional Forces in Europe.” *Arms Control Today*, September 2009, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009-09/this-treaty-saved-breaking-stalemate-conventional-forces-europe>.

book on Russia's use of the CFE Treaty or acceptance of its constraints in support of its national interests.

The research presented in this dissertation contributes to the study of two phenomena, the (re-)militarization of Russian foreign and security policy and the deterioration of arms control regimes, particularly in the European security environment. Both phenomena are relevant to the academic and policy communities. Moscow has turned to the armed forces in support of key interests in its immediate neighborhood (e.g. in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine since the dissolution of the USSR and more acutely since 2014) and farther afield (e.g. in Syria and Libya). By freeing themselves from the limits and transparency of the CFE Treaty, the Russians removed potential international legal obstacles to their use of this instrument of national power. They also avoided a potentially uncomfortable conversation about another means of employing military power, the use of private military companies (PMCs) such as the Wagner Group, which has reportedly participated in conflicts in Eastern Ukraine, Syria and Libya. Given reports that Wagner forces in Libya have been supplied with combat aircraft (e.g. Mig-29 fighters and SU-24 fighter bombers) and the likelihood that they used other TLE, such as tanks, ACVs and artillery, in Ukraine, the applicability of the CFE Treaty to such forces and their armaments presents a challenge to policymakers and offers a topic for further academic study.

As for the deterioration of arms control regimes, Russia's de facto withdrawal from the CFE Treaty was the second blow, after Washington's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Since then, Moscow has seemed content to let the U.S. take the political heat for torpedoing the INF Treaty and diminishing the Open Skies Treaty by announcing its withdrawal from them, thereby diverting attention from issues with the Russians' own implementation of these agreements. The research in this dissertation contributes to an understanding of the Russians' approach to arms

control and its place in foreign and security policy, and is thereby relevant as Washington explores the possibilities for renewing the New START agreement and possibly expanding it to a trilateral pact that would include China, and as delegations to the OSCE seek to update and enhance the effectiveness of the confidence- and security-building measures in the Vienna Document.

Based on this research, one could also reasonably conclude that Moscow's embrace of the CFE Treaty was an end-of-the-Cold War phenomenon whose shelf life was limited. Once Russia entered a post-post-Cold War period under Vladimir Putin's leadership and emerged from its Gorchakov moment to reclaim its place as a great power (*derzhava*) in 2007, the CFE Treaty became a relic of a difficult time that began with "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century," as Putin termed the collapse of the USSR. This dissertation therefore contributes to the study of this period of history.

Finally, the Russians' beating of the dead CFE Treaty horse, which has continued to mid-2020 as this dissertation neared its completion, also offers fodder for the study of the cohort effect. This most recent invocation of the CFE Treaty, as part of a description of the sins of the U.S. in implementation of arms control agreements, was made by Aleksandr Grushko, the deputy foreign minister whose career has been closely tied to the CFE Treaty and who served as Moscow's lead negotiator for the A/CFE. As with the other phenomena described above, this aspect of the relationship of the CFE Treaty to Russia's foreign and security policy bears further inquiry.

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
Appendix A - Unilateral Reductions of Soviet Forces

Date	Source	Details
7 Dec 88	Gorbachev/UN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reduce 500K personnel - Withdraw 6 tank divs from GDR, CZ, HU - Withdraw assault landing & river crossing units from E. Europe - Reduce 50K personnel and 5K tanks in E. Europe - Restructure force in E. Europe to be "defensive" - Reduce forces in E. Europe and Eastern USSR by 10K tanks, 8500 arty, 800 cbt a/c - Reduce forces in Asia/Mongolia
22 Dec 88	MajGen Lebed, Gen'l Staff/Press conference	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Entire units to be withdrawn from E. Europe - Units will be disbanded; equipment scrapped
28 Dec 88	MajGen Kuklev, Gen'l Staff/ <i>Red Star</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gorbachev's proposed reductions (7 Dec 88) will be done transparently and witnessed by foreign observers
4 Jan 89	PL DefMin Siwicki	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 15K personnel and older equipment cut in past 2 years - 1989 def budget 4% less than 1988
6 Jan 89	MajGen Batenin, CPSU CC expert/Radio Moscow	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unilateral reductions will involve 45 divs/15% of armed forces - Foreign observers to monitor withdrawal from E. Europe
10 Jan 89	HU DefMin Karpati	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ¼ of Soviet forces will be withdrawn from HU (tank div, air force units, commando bn)
16 Jan 89	Soviet DepDefMin Shabanov/Austrian radio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - troop withdrawals from E. Europe in 2 stages (1989, 1990) - 1st stage begins April 1989
19 Jan 89	Soviet ForMin Shevardnadze/CSCE Vienna meeting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Soviet units withdrawing from E. Europe will take all organic equipment, including tactical nuclear systems (arty and missiles)
23 Jan 89	PL (NFI) GDR (NFI)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 4 divs converted to log bases in 1988/1989 - Force reductions by end of 1990: 10K troops, 600 tanks, 50 cbt a/c, 10% defense budget
25 Jan 89	HU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Soviet tank div, tank training regt, assault bn to leave in 1989 - Chemical defense bn and NCO school to leave in 1990
27 Jan 89	CZ BU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 15% cut in defense spending 1989-90 - 12K personnel, 850 tanks, 165 APCs, 51 a/c cut - 12% defense budget cut 1989 - 10K personnel, 200 arty, 20 a/c, 5 naval units cut
30 Jan 89	HU WTO DefMin Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 9% reduction in Army 1989-90 - 9K personnel, 251 tanks, fighter sqdn cut - Detailed info on personnel, tanks, arty, combat aircraft and comparison with NATO numbers
31 Jan 89	PL HU CZ Army Chief of Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 3 Soviet regt's leaving in 1989; 1 regt leaving 1990 - More details on cuts announced 30 Jan 89 - No cuts to CZ Army personnel – transfer of 20K to construction units
2 Feb 89	Soviet DepForMin Karpov	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Emphasized openness of all withdrawals from E. Europe; deadlines to be announced; foreign observers
3 Feb 89	CZ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Soviets to withdraw 1.5K personnel, 192 tanks, 20 cbt a/c - 1990 withdrawal of 1 tank div (3.8K personnel and 516 tanks)
9 Feb 89	Soviet DefMin Yazov/ <i>Pravda</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Divs in E. Europe restructured: 3 tanks cut, more AT, AA, engr systems to make "clear-cut defensive structure" - Unilateral E. Europe cuts total 56K personnel, 1.9K tanks, 130 a/c, average def spending cut 15.6% - With Soviet cuts, total WTO cuts 296.3K personnel, 11.9K tanks, 930 a/c, >8.7K arty
14 Feb 89	PL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Def spending cuts - Forces reduced 15K personnel, 419 tanks, 225 ACVs, 194 a/c over past 2 years
18 Feb 89	MajGen Tatarnikov, Soviet Gen'l Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Withdrawals from E. Europe (1989/1990): - GDR: 2 tank divs, 2 independent tank tng regts, 8 independent bns/2 tank divs, assault landing bde, 3 tng regts, tank tng regt, independent bns - CZ: 2 independent bns/tank div, landing assault bn, cbt engr regt HU: tank div, tank tng regt, ftr avn regt, landing assault bn PL: tank regt, AA missile regt, independent helo regt
22 Feb 89	Gen Moiseyev, Chief of Soviet Gen'l Staff/ <i>Red Star</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reduction in MDs, armies, divs; MRDs and TDs restructuring for defensive (30-35% cut in tanks, arty, assault crossing means; increase in AT and ADA)
26 Feb 89	PL DefMin Siwicki/Warsaw TV	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2 divs to be eliminated and 2 divs reduced in next 2 years - 12 or so regts to be eliminated; other units converted to civil defense - 1989-90: 40K personnel, 850 tanks, 900 arty, 700 APCs, 80 cbt a/c to be cut

Date	Source	Details																																																												
27 Feb 89	Soviet DefMin Yazov/ <i>Izvestiya</i>	- Same data as 9 Feb 89 above - 5.3K modern tanks withdrawn from E. Europe; tank divs being disbanded, not redeployed - All forces being withdrawn from GDR and CZ will be removed by end of 1990 - Tank regt being removed from each MRD and TD in GDR and CZ - Some MRDs in southern and eastern USSR to be converted to machine gun and arty formations																																																												
4 Mar 89	PL	2 armored regts "dissolved"																																																												
6 Mar 89	Soviet ForMin Shevardnadze/Vienna Ministerial	- WTO initial proposal for CFE negotiations - 1989: 20K personnel, 2/7K tanks, 300 cbt a/c, 24 tactical missile launchers to be withdrawn from GDR																																																												
11 Mar 89	Marshal Akhromeyev	- Withdrawal of Soviet forces from GDR would begin in May - Soviet forces in E. Europe to be reduced by 120K each in 1989 and 1990																																																												
13 Mar 89	Gen Moiseyev, Chief of Soviet Gen'l Staff/ <i>Pravda</i> ForMin Spokesman Gerasimov	- 820 a/c to be cut - Leningrad MD and Northern Flt to be cut by 20K personnel - 700 tanks withdrawn from northern European USSR 1986-87																																																												
21 Mar 89	Gorbachev	- Signed decree implementing cuts announced at UN 7 Dec 88 - Create more defensive structure; maintain def structure at level of reasonable and reliable sufficiency																																																												
3 Apr 89	PL	- Amphib tank bn disbanded																																																												
6 Apr 89	HU	- Withdrawal of Soviet forces to begin 25 Apr, end by Jun																																																												
7 Apr 89	Gorbachev/Guildhall address, London	- USSR armed forces strength at 4.258 million – after unilateral cuts will be at 3.76 million - USSR "prepared to go a very long way in the demilitarization of Europe"																																																												
10 Apr 89	Soviet MajGen Batenin	- Soviet military to be reduced 530K over 2 years																																																												
17 Apr 89	Gen Snetkov, Cdr GSVG	- Withdrawal from GDR to begin 11 May (2 tank divs, tank tng regts, assault landing and crossing units) - Restructuring or remaining divs in GDR (fewer tanks, more defensive) - By mid Aug 1K tanks, 330 arty, >10K personnel, 5K vehicles to be removed from GDR. Tanks to be withdrawn east of Urals for storage or conversion ("Snetkov's statement that some tanks will be placed in storage is at variance with earlier statements by Soviet spokesmen that many of them would be destroyed.")																																																												
<p>Abbreviations:</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>AA</td> <td>anti-aircraft</td> <td>ForMin</td> <td>Foreign Minister/Foreign Ministry</td> </tr> <tr> <td>AT</td> <td>anti-tank</td> <td>fr avn</td> <td>fighter aviation</td> </tr> <tr> <td>amphib</td> <td>amphibious</td> <td>Gen</td> <td>General (rank – 4 star)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>arty</td> <td>artillery</td> <td>Gen'l</td> <td>General (General Staff)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>a/c</td> <td>aircraft</td> <td>GDR</td> <td>German Democratic Republic (East Germany)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>bn</td> <td>battalion</td> <td>GSFG</td> <td>Group of Soviet Forces [East] Germany</td> </tr> <tr> <td>cbt</td> <td>combat (cbt a/c – combat aircraft)</td> <td>helo</td> <td>helicopter</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cdr</td> <td>Commander</td> <td>HU</td> <td>Hungary</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CZ</td> <td>Czechoslovakia</td> <td>K</td> <td>1000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DefMin</td> <td>Defense Minister</td> <td>MajGen</td> <td>Major General (1 star)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DepDefMin</td> <td>Deputy Defense Minister</td> <td>MD</td> <td>Military District</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DepForMin</td> <td>Deputy Foreign Minister</td> <td>PL</td> <td>Poland</td> </tr> <tr> <td>div</td> <td>division</td> <td>sqdn</td> <td>squadron</td> </tr> <tr> <td>enrg</td> <td>engineer</td> <td>regt</td> <td>regiment</td> </tr> <tr> <td>flt</td> <td>fleet</td> <td>tng</td> <td>training</td> </tr> </table>			AA	anti-aircraft	ForMin	Foreign Minister/Foreign Ministry	AT	anti-tank	fr avn	fighter aviation	amphib	amphibious	Gen	General (rank – 4 star)	arty	artillery	Gen'l	General (General Staff)	a/c	aircraft	GDR	German Democratic Republic (East Germany)	bn	battalion	GSFG	Group of Soviet Forces [East] Germany	cbt	combat (cbt a/c – combat aircraft)	helo	helicopter	Cdr	Commander	HU	Hungary	CZ	Czechoslovakia	K	1000	DefMin	Defense Minister	MajGen	Major General (1 star)	DepDefMin	Deputy Defense Minister	MD	Military District	DepForMin	Deputy Foreign Minister	PL	Poland	div	division	sqdn	squadron	enrg	engineer	regt	regiment	flt	fleet	tng	training
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Source: "The Soviet and East European Force Reductions: A Chronology of Key Events," Unattributed, undated paper [Note: Judging by the style, organization and fonts, this document appears to be a product of the intelligence community, likely the CIA], George H. W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Wilson, Heather, Files, CFE Files, Soviet Reductions [2], [OA/ID CF00286-010].

Appendix B - CFE Treaty Zones and Limitations



Source: Dorn Crawford, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2010),

Appendix C - Transfers of Conventional Armaments East of the Urals and CFE Treaty Levels

	Tanks	Armored Combat Vehicles	Artillery
<u>Present in Europe on 1 July 1988</u>	41580	48900	42400
Total removed from combat holdings in Europe	20886	19272	28572
Including:			
- Sent to the Asian part for rearmament and reinforcement	8000	11200	1610
- Posted to storage bases in Western Siberia and Central Asia	8392	4300	23562
- Written off for scrapping and conversion to civilian use	1101	3772	3100
Planned for Destruction in 1991-1995 in the Asian part of the USSR	6000	1500	7000
Total planned increase in the groupings in the Asian part of the USSR	10392	14000	18172
<u>Availability in active forces in Europe on 19 November 1990</u>	20694	29628	13828
Of which the planned quantity:			
- to be destroyed	6794	6628	760
- to be converted for civilian use	750	3000	
<u>Planned to have per the Vienna agreement</u>	13150	20000	13175

Source: “Reference on the Quantity of Conventional Armaments Moved from Europe to the Asian Part of the USSR” [undated chart – probably late 1990, because it includes data on holdings in Europe on 19 November 1990 (date of signing of the CFE Treaty)], Kataev Papers, Box 8 Folder 21.

Appendix D - The Flank Agreement (Annex A to the Final Document of the First CFE Review Conference, 31 May 1996)

CFE TREATY REVIEW the 'flank' agreement, 31 May 1996

new limits under the agreement:

Russia: original 'flanks'			
tanks	artillery	ACV	
1800	2400	3700	and individual oblast caps shown on the map


Ukraine: Odessa Oblast			
tanks	artillery	ACV	
400	350	400	

residual Treaty limits:

Russia: [*] Zone 4.2			
tanks	artillery	ACV	
5700	5135	10900	
remaining 'flanks'			
tanks	artillery	ACV	
1300	1680	1380	

Ukraine: Zone 4.3			
tanks	artillery	ACV	
3400	3150	4700	
former Kiev MD			
tanks	artillery	ACV	
2250	1500	2500	
remaining 'flanks'			
tanks	artillery	ACV	
680	890	350	

until 31 May 1999:		
tanks	artillery	ACV
1897	2422	4397



* Sums of these limits exceed maximum levels for holdings because Russia declared duplicate figures for DPSS in zone 4.2 and the 'flanks'

- Treaty 'flexibilities' cited in the agreement:
- consultations to convert DPSS to active unit accounts for Russia:
 - maximum use of temporary deployments, with host consent
 - maximum use of TLE reallocations, as freely negotiated
 - accounting for equipment listed as "to be removed" (actually reverses a "flexibility" claimed as of 1 Jan 96)

- Additional transparency measures:
- for Russia:
 - semiannual information exchange on original 'flanks' areas: quarterly for Kuzhchevskaya depot facility
 - up to 10 added inspections a year in areas removed from the 'flanks', or sites holding equipment listed as "to be removed"
 - for Ukraine:
 - unit strength changes in Odessa oblast notified at 5% level
 - one added inspection a year in Odessa oblast

Notes: (1) TLE – Treaty Limited Equipment
(2) DPSS – Designated Permanent Storage Site

Source: Dorn Crawford, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2010), 13.