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A Crosslinguistic Perspective on Pseudoclefts

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1. Two types of pseudoclefts

A pseudocleft construction is an ordinary copular sentence with a free relative in one of the copular positions and a phrase in the other copular position modifying that free relative. Examples such as the following are typically called pseudoclefts:

- (1) [What he ate] was an apple
- (2) [What John did] was shave himself
- (3) [What they are] is silly

Since Akmajian (1970) pseudoclefts are divided into two types: 'predicational' and 'specificational'. Many pseudoclefts are ambiguous between the two types and their interpretations vary according to the type. Consider example (4):

- (4) What John is is silly

On the specificational reading the sentence says 'John is silly', that is, a property is predicated of John directly. On the predicational reading the *wh*-phrase may refer to some job or position that John holds, and the sentence says of it that it is silly. Hence, the sentence says nothing about John directly. Instead, a property is predicated of a property of John.

Given the ambiguity arising in these cases, the question is how we can tell the two types apart. This question is discussed extensively in Higgins (1979), according to whom only specificational pseudoclefts exhibit the phenomenon of 'connectedness'. Connectedness refers to "certain types of cooccurrence restrictions [that] obtain between elements in the subject clause of the pseudocleft sentence and elements in the focus constituent" (p.22). Informally, 'connectedness' is exhibited by a pseudocleft (which is a "disconnected" or "broken up" sentence) when it behaves with respect to certain syntactic phenomena like its "connected" counterpart (e.g. the "connected" counterpart of (4) is *John*

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is *silly*). One such diagnostic, and the one that Higgins relies on the most, involves binding. In particular, only specificational pseudoclefts exhibit connectedness with respect to binding:

- (5) What John is is important to himself (specificational only)
= John is important to himself

Note that binding of the reflexive in (5) is not expected since it is not c-commanded by its antecedent. Essentially the reflexive in (5) acts as if it was inside the free relative in terms of binding; and this is what Higgins (1979) means by syntactic connectedness.¹ On the other hand, no such connectedness is observed in predicational pseudoclefts, as shown in (6):

- (6) What John is is important to him (predicational only)
= some property which John has is of importance to him

The reader is referred to Higgins (1979) for more behavioral differences between the two types and for his proposal that specificational pseudoclefts are essentially lists (i.e., (4) on the specificational reading is argued to mean *John is the following: silly*).

Higgins discusses the two readings of pseudoclefts in English and his assumption is that the two readings are universally available. However, we have found that there is crosslinguistic variation with respect to the availability of the specificational reading. Languages that behave like English are German, Welsh, Brazilian Portuguese, Galician, and Spanish. However, in Modern Greek (MG), Italian, Catalan, Finnish, Bulgarian, and Polish, a sentence like (4) is not ambiguous and has only the predicational reading. We argue that this lack is the result of the particular lexical items which these languages use to form pseudoclefts. Our discussion will focus primarily on MG, but our proposal can be extended to the other languages of this group.

2. Pseudocleft constructions in MG

There are two ways to form a pseudocleft in MG². The first one is with the pronoun used in free relatives³, which we will retain unglossed for the time being:

- (7) [oti kani] ine xazo
OTI (s/he) does is silly

The second way is with the form *afto pu*, which is composed of the neuter demonstrative pronoun *afto* plus the relative complementizer *pu*, and which literally means 'this which':

¹ Higgins has no explanation for the connectedness effects. Kroch and Heycock (1995) discuss the puzzle imposed by the binding properties of specificational pseudoclefts and show that these cases cannot be reduced to reconstruction.

² It should be made clear at this point that sentences like (i) are not pseudoclefts but embedded interrogatives:

- (i) [To ti ine o Kostas] ine fanero
the what is Kostas is obvious
'What Kostas is is obvious'

(i) does not mean that Kostas's profession or function is obvious but that the answer to the question "What is Kostas?" is obvious. This is exactly the semantics of an embedded question.

³ For the purpose of this paper we will confine ourselves to the free relative pronoun in the neuter.

- (8) [afto pu kani] ine xazo
this which (s/he) does is silly

With neither form is it possible to construct a sentence like (4) with the specificational meaning, that is with the meaning *John is silly*. The same holds in Italian, Finnish, etc. Moreover, MG lacks connectivity effects, which puts syntactic support behind the position that the specificational pseudocleft is absent. However, we don't have space here to show this.

3. But Why?

3.1. Background assumptions

Before we proceed to discuss the reasons for the observed behavior in MG, we need to lay out some of our background assumptions.

Assumption 1: Williams (1983) and following him Partee (1986), Heggie (1988), and Heycock (1991), among others, argue that in the specificational pseudocleft the *wh*-constituent is the predicate, whereas in the predicational pseudocleft the *wh*-phrase is the subject of predication (the reader is referred to these works for the arguments, which we cannot reproduce here for reasons of space):

- (9) a. Specificational pseudocleft: [Wh.....] predicate BE XP subject
b. Predicational pseudocleft: [Wh...] subject BE XP predicate

For the time being, we will assume that (9a) exhaustively describes specificational pseudoclefts. However, in the last section of the paper we will come back to this point.

Assumption II: Quantifiers⁴ cannot function as predicates, following Barwise and Cooper (1981) as well as Keenan and Stavi (1986), among others:

- (10) *John is every student in my class (from Partee (1986))⁵

The reader is referred to the aforementioned references for why quantificational phrases are unable to function as predicates. For present purposes we will take "predicate" to mean a constituent which contributes a variable to the representation and over which lambda abstraction can occur. It is easily shown that quantifiers cannot do this:

- (11) *In Semantics II, all the/most students are usually tall
(12) *In Semantics II, every student is usually tall

⁴ Here we adhere to the position that not everything with a determiner is a quantifier; within this view, nonspecific indefinites contribute a variable to the representation, as in, among others, Heim (1982).

⁵ But Partee (1986) also notes that property quantification (as she puts it, with "property-denoting NPs") is possible:

(i) John is everything his mother wanted him to be

What is the difference between (10) and (i)? Possibly the difference lies in that in (i), the variable left after quantifier raising ranges over properties and is therefore of the appropriate type to be in the frame. On the other hand, the variable left after QR in (10) ranges over individual students in my class. What is wrong about such a variable in the frame *John is x*? If *x* received the value of each student per individual assignment, shouldn't (10) be grammatical and have the interpretation that John is the only student in my class? But that's not what happens and we don't know why. What is relevant for present purposes is that the existence of sentences like (i) should not serve as a general counterexample to our Assumption II, since their quantification is restricted to nouns that range over properties only.

In (11,12) the QPs *Q student* cannot restrict the adverb and since *tall* is not interpretable as varying over time, the temporal meaning of the adverb is also unavailable, resulting in ungrammaticality.⁶

We will hence be assuming that quantifiers cannot be predicates.

Assumption III: Free relative pronouns *what* and *whatever* do not have the same meaning, following Bresnan and Grimshaw (1979), Larson (1987), Tredinnick (1995), but contra Jacobson (1993), Rullmann (1995). Unlike *what*, *whatever* has been argued to have universal quantificational force. This position, in combination with Assumption I and II predicts that *whatever* free relatives will not be able to participate in the formation of specificational pseudoclefts, since, as quantificational elements they will not be able to behave predicatively, a prerequisite for the free relative component of a specificational pseudocleft. This prediction is borne out:

- (13) a. What(*ever) John is is proud (specificational pseudocleft)
b. Whatever John is is worthwhile/rare (predicational pseudocleft)

The status of (13a) shows that *whatever* cannot participate in the formation of specificational pseudoclefts, while *what* can. This is a very significant difference between them and it would be inexplicable if indeed their semantics were the same.^{7, 8} The reader is referred to the works cited earlier for arguments in favor of the position that *whatever* is a universal quantifier.⁹ Here, we will only discuss the arguments from Jacobson (1993), which are meant to show that *whatever* does not behave like a universal quantifier and we show that they can, and in one case, must be explained differently, permitting us to adopt the earlier claim about *whatever* having universal force. The following are, according to Jacobson, the differences between *whatever* and a universal quantifier (all the examples are taken from Jacobson (1993)):

-universals can be modified by *nearly*, or *almost* (as in Carlson (1981)), but *whatever* cannot:

⁶ The discussion here should not be confused with the weak/strong distinction of quantifiers as defined by their (in)ability to appear in the *there is...* frame (Milsark (1977)). For example, a definite marked NP like *the students* can restrict an adverb, i.e., (i) can mean that most students are tall:

(i) In Semantics II, the students are usually tall

This would indicate that the open position of *students* does not get closed off by the definite determiner. The fact that *the students* cannot appear in *there is* constructions can be attributed to a variety of factors; e.g. it could be argued that *there is* requires not just a variable, but a variable whose content is new and not presupposed. See Prince (1992) for arguments in favor of the position that the *there is* construction is restricted to constituents with new information. See Heim (1982) for arguments in favor of the position that both indefinite and definite marked NPs can contribute a variable, for the former the content of the variable is asserted, for the latter it is presupposed.

⁷ Jacobson (1993) notes that *whatever* free relatives cannot function as predicates but does not claim to know why, although she does claim that "this restriction seems to be orthogonal to their quantificational force". Rullmann (1995) does not mention that *whatever* cannot appear in free relatives contained in specificational pseudoclefts. He explicitly says that *what* and *whatever* free relatives are the same for him, they both contain a maximality operator. He then has a type-shifting rule which permits them to become predicates to form specificational pseudoclefts; however, when he shows examples of this, he does not show that *whatever* cannot undergo his type-shifting rule.

⁸ This leaves open the following possibilities, which we will not discuss in more detail: *what* never contains a universal quantifier and its exhaustive meaning comes e.g. from sum formation, as in Jacobson (1993), or a maximality operator, as in Rullmann (1995). Alternatively, *what* can be said to be ambiguous between a definite and a universal quantifier (as argued by Tredinnick (1995)).

⁹ For a discussion (1994) for additional arguments in favor of *whenever* having quantificational force on its own.

- (14) a. For years, I did nearly/almost everything/anything you told me to do
 b. *For years, I did nearly/ almost whatever you told me to do

-universals license NPIs, *whatever* does not:¹⁰

- (15) a. I can read everything/anything that Bill ever read
 b. *I can read whatever (books) Bill ever read

-universals do not support anaphora by *it* in environments like (16), *whatever* does:¹¹

- (16) a. *Everyone who went to every/any movie the Avedon is now showing said it was boring
 b. Everyone who went to whatever movie the Avedon is now showing said it was boring

Let us look at these arguments in turn. First of all, there are other quantifiers with universal force which behave like *whatever* with respect to the first two points. Such quantifiers are *each* and *both*. They cannot be modified by *nearly* or *almost*:

- (17) a. *For years, I did nearly/almost each thing you told me to do
 b. *I did almost/nearly both things you told me to do

At the same time, there are non-universals that do permit modification by *almost* (Tim Stowell, p.c.):

- (18) Almost thirty people came to my party

Moreover, *each* and *both* do not license NPIs (but see footnote 10):

- (19) a. *I can read each book that Bill ever read
 b. *I can read both books Bill ever read

So even though we do not know (and will not address here) what explains this property of *each* and *both*, what is relevant for us is that it shows that we do not necessarily need to conclude on the basis of (14,15) that *whatever* lacks universal force.

What about the contrast in (16)? Free relatives with *-ever* display a known ambiguity. According to Tredinnick (1995), (20a) is ambiguous between what she calls the 'don't know' reading of *whenever*, represented in (20b), and the 'quantificational' reading, represented in (20c):

¹⁰ However, according to Tredinnick (1995), NPIs are possible in *whatever* free relatives:

(i) He got into trouble for what*(ever) he ever did to anyone
 (ii) I will go where*(ever) the hell you go

We will not address the disparity in judgments.

¹¹ Actually, Jacobson's example with *any* is somewhat misleading because this item could function as an NPI in this environment. On the other hand, if *any* was meant to be an instantiation of free relatives, the example is not licensed in this environment and the sentence is bad independently of the anaphora.

- (20) a. John jumped whenever the fire alarm went off
 b. \exists time t [the fire alarm went off at t & jumped at t & speaker does not know the value of t]
 c. \forall times t [the fire alarm went off at t] John jumped at t

According to Tredinnick, the meaning of *whatever* on the don't know reading is similar to that of *a certain*, that is, a specific indefinite. In other words, the don't know reading has, as Tredinnick puts it, an existential presupposition associated with it, which is lacking in the quantificational use of *whatever*. We will retain this description of the difference between the two readings but we cannot retain Tredinnick's terminology because, as we will show later, *whatever* behaves quantificationally on both readings. For this reason we will refer to (20b) as the 'speaker's ignorance' reading and to (20c) as the 'conditional' reading.

Let us now consider again the contrast in (16). On a closer look, it becomes evident that (16b) has the speaker's ignorance reading of *whatever*, not the conditional reading. If we construct an example with *whatever* but without the speaker's ignorance reading, anaphora becomes impossible and Jacobson's sentence becomes bad (contrast (16b) to (21)):

- (21) *Everyone who talks to whatever woman he meets on the street says she is beautiful

In other words, pronominal anaphora is possible only with the speaker's ignorance reading of *whatever*. In (16b) the sentence has as part of its presupposition that the Avedon is, indeed, showing some (of course, specific) movie. It is this presupposition that licenses the pronoun; i.e., we are dealing with a referential pronoun, not a bound variable. On the other hand, (21) does not presuppose that there is a woman on the street. Hence in (21) the pronoun could connect to the quantifier only as a bound variable (not as a referential pronoun), but the requisite c-command configuration is not met. (And donkey-pronouns are not possible with strong quantifiers as putative antecedents). In other words, the conditional use of *whatever* behaves exactly like a strong quantifier with respect to anaphora.

In sum, we do not consider the arguments in Jacobson (1993) sufficient to destroy earlier claims that *whatever* has quantificational properties.

Interestingly, specificational pseudoclefts with *whatever* are ungrammatical not only on the conditional reading of *whatever*, but also on its speaker's ignorance reading:

- (22) *Whatever I like about John is not his sense of humor

The intended reading in (22) is 'whatever it is that I like about John, it isn't his sense of humor'.¹² Why should (22) be impossible? We argue that this is still the result of the quantificational force of *whatever*. In the speaker's ignorance reading, *whatever* quantifies over epistemic worlds. So in a sentence like 'whatever I cooked is green' on the reading 'whatever it is that I cooked, it is green', *whatever* quantifies over the worlds that are compatible with the thing that I cooked being green. Such worlds include this thing being green and a tomato, it being green and a potato, etc. In other words, *whatever* retains its quantificational force on the speaker's ignorance reading and therefore on this reading it

¹² The ungrammaticality of specificational pseudoclefts with *whatever* on the speaker's ignorance reading is the reported judgment in, among others, Jacobson (1993). However, we have found speakers for whom sentence (22) is good on the intended reading.

cannot participate in the formation of specificational pseudoclefts. (However, this does not mean that in Jacobson's sentence (16b) the pronoun is licensed by the quantificational force of *whatever*. As we already said the pronoun in that example is a referential pronoun).

Having argued that *whatever* cannot participate in the formation of specificational pseudoclefts because it cannot function predicatively, we should point out that there are environments in which *whatever* pseudoclefts appear in the *positions* of predicates. However, these are exactly the environments in which *every N* can appear, namely when the quantification is over properties (see footnote 5):

- (23) a. I consider John to be whatever you consider him to be¹³
b. John is everything I want him to be

But this pair of sentences points to a similarity between *whatever* and *every* rather than a dissimilarity between the two.

In summary, we assume that *-ever* wh-words cannot function predicatively. As a result, they cannot participate in specificational pseudoclefts, where the free relative must function as predicate.

3.2. Modern Greek

3.2.1. *Oti* pseudoclefts

Recall from section 2 that one way to form a pseudocleft in MG is with the (neuter) free relative pronoun *oti* and that *oti* free relatives can only form predicational pseudoclefts.

It can be shown that *oti* behaves like *whatever*, not like *what*.¹⁴ Some similarities will be discussed later in the paper, for the time being, note that, for example, *oti* constituents cannot restrict adverbs of quantification:¹⁵

- (24) **Oti* agorazi ine spania akrivo
whatever (s/he) buys is rarely expensive

Also, *oti* constituents are incompatible with epistemic modality, which Tredinnick (1995) shows to be the case with *whatever* but not with *what* free relatives (*' indicates inability of epistemic interpretation of the modal):

¹³ It has often been argued (including in Williams (1983) and Moro (1992)) that when predicate inversion takes place below *consider*, *to be* must appear overtly:

- (i) I consider John (to be) the captain
(ii) I consider the captain *(to be) John

Independently of the validity of this diagnostic or any explanation for it, it should be noted that the preference for many speakers of 'to be' in (23a) should not be taken to indicate that inversion has taken place. If predicate inversion had indeed taken place in (23a), the "uninverted" clause should be acceptable, but it is not --with or without *to be*: *I consider whatever you consider him (to be) John.

¹⁴ Throughout this section we will be pointing to distributional similarities between *oti* and *whatever*. For reasons of space we will not discuss what would underlie these similarities, beyond what is necessary for our main purpose. For some cases, the (universal) quantificational force of the two items will appear to be the first factor that comes to mind.

¹⁵ Tredinnick (1995) has similar data:

- (i) When I go to the store I mostly buy potatoes
(ii) Whenever I go to the store I mostly buy potatoes

(i) has a reading under which the *when* clause restricts the adverb *mostly*. Such a reading is absent in (ii), indicating that the *whenever* clause lacks the variable necessary to function as a restrictive clause. (ii) means

- (25) a. He does what(*ever) must be a difficult job (Tredinnick (1995))
- b. *Kani oti prepi na ine dhiskolo
(s/he) does whatever must be difficult
- c. *Oti prepi na simveni eki ine fovero
whatever must happen-3Sg there is horrible

Incidentally, the pattern in (25) also confirms the similarity between *oti/whatever* and elements with universal force. Notice the absence of the epistemic reading in *He does everything that must be a difficult job*.

We conclude, then, that *oti* behaves like *whatever* in a variety of ways and it is therefore not surprising that, like *whatever*, it cannot participate in the formation of specificational pseudoclefts. We argue that this is due to their universal force, which effectively blocks them from functioning as predicates. The difference between *oti* and *whatever* is that the latter, unlike the former, 'contains' plain *what*, which does not have universal force, or at least, does not have to (see footnote 8).

3.2.2. *Afto pu* pseudoclefts

The other way of forming pseudoclefts in MG is with *afto pu*, 'this which'. *Afto pu* pseudoclefts cannot be specificational either, as we have seen. We argue that the reason that *afto pu* relatives cannot form specificational pseudoclefts, that is, cannot function as predicates, is because of the head *afto*, which is a demonstrative. Demonstratives, which are referential items¹⁶, cannot be predicates (see Higgins (1979: chapter 5), Enç (1991)).¹⁷

Moreover, there might be another reason for why *afto pu* is excluded from the formation of specificational pseudoclefts. In particular, Higgins (1979: 236) argues that the free relative part of the specificational pseudocleft must be inherently cataphoric, that is, forward referring (this relates to his conception of specificational pseudoclefts as lists). Unlike English *this*, which can be both anaphoric and cataphoric (Halliday (1976)), MG *afto* (this) is like English *that* in that it can only be anaphoric:

¹⁶Unlike deictic elements, the definite article can sometimes be stripped of its function of marking old information, if its presence is required for other reasons. This can be seen by the fact that it can sometimes appear in existential constructions (see Prince (1992)):

- (i) a. There is the tallest girl you ever saw in the room next door
b. There was the usual/same crowd at the beach today

In (ia) the article is used because of the uniqueness associated with the superlative; in (ib) it is required by the adjectives *usual* and *same* which cannot be used without the article. However, the demonstrative never loses its marking of old information/specificity and therefore is never able to function as predicate. The aforementioned differences between demonstratives and definite articles also appears in their interaction with adverbs of quantification, which the former cannot restrict (since deictics are referential), but the latter can.

¹⁷ Karina Wilkinson (p.c.) has brought the possibility of B as a counterexample to the position that demonstratives cannot be predicates:

- A: John is tall
B: Yes, he is that

It is unclear whether *that* in B actually is a demonstrative, rather than a proform for a predicate. In addition, B is not possible in other languages, but also within English, its distribution seems very restricted. For example, it cannot appear with verbs like *seem*: **John seems/sounds/etc. that*.

(26) John bought a new car but I would do this/*that: lease a new one

(27) O Kostas agorase kenurgio aftokinito ala ego tha ekana
 Kostas bought new car but I would do

to eksis/*afto/*ekino: tha nikiaza ena
 the following/*this/ *that: (I) would rent one

In other words, within this line of reasoning, since *afto pu* is only anaphoric it cannot form specificational pseudoclefts. Such a line of reasoning might also point to an interesting difference in the use of demonstratives in pseudoclefts in MG and Italian. The former uses the equivalent of *this*, the latter *that*. Unlike in MG, in Italian, *this* can be cataphoric. It seems that Italian behaves as if it chooses the element that REALLY resists forming specificational pseudoclefts. If both Higgins and Williams are right, a specificational pseudocleft needs a constituent that is both cataphoric and a predicate. Italian *this*, being a strong determiner, cannot head a predicate, but since it is cataphoric, it fulfills one of the two prerequisites. Italian seems to behave as if it wants to avoid the conflict of which of the two properties of *this* will override the other. Instead, it uses *that*, which fills neither prerequisite.

Preliminary conclusion: the availability of the specificational reading in a language depends on the ability of what in English surfaces as the *wh*-constituent to function as a predicate, and this is not possible in MG (the way it isn't possible with *whatever* in English). Catalan, Italian, Bulgarian, Polish, and Finnish are like MG.

4. Some harder cases...

According to Higgins (1979), the sentence in (28) is a specificational pseudocleft, based on its binding behavior exemplified in (29a), which is similar to that of the "connected" (29b) (Higgins does not discuss why such sentences do not permit the predicational reading).

(28) What John claimed/said was that the earth is flat

(29) a. *What he_j believed/claimed was that John_j is innocent
 b. *He_j believed/claimed that John_j is innocent

The status of (28) is of particular interest in the present discussion because MG and the other languages which in the discussion so far behaved as if they lacked specificational pseudoclefts, do have sentences like (28), which we will henceforth refer to as "CP-pseudoclefts", since the second constituent of the copula is a CP:

(30) Afto pu ipe o Kostas ine oti i gi ine epipedhi
 this which said Kostas is that the earth is flat
 'What Kostas said is that the earth is flat'

So how do we state the crosslinguistic generalization? Do we say that MG, etc. lacks some specificational pseudoclefts but it has some others, e.g. the CP-pseudoclefts? Alternatively, one might wonder whether Higgins was wrong about CP-pseudoclefts being only specificational and attempt to show that they can also be predicational. There are reasons to believe that the status of CP-pseudoclefts is not that uncontroversial, given that

they pattern with the predicational pseudoclefts on Williams's tests¹⁸ and at least on one of Higgins's own tests, as in (32):

- (31) a. What John claimed/said/believed seems to be/entail that the earth is flat
 b. Is what John believes that the earth is flat?
 c. Does what John claimed/etc. entail that the earth is flat¹⁹

(32) What John believes turns out to be that the earth is flat

If, in fact, CP-pseudoclefts permit predicational readings, what would their interpretation be? A CP-pseudocleft like (28) should be paraphrased as 'the content of John's belief/claim etc. consists of Y' and Y is 'The earth is flat'. In order for the predicational reading of a CP-pseudocleft to be possible, the free relative must be able to function as subject, that is, it must be able to function as a denoting NP. This NP would denote a proposition. And there is evidence that this is, in fact, the case. First of all, such a free relative can be modified by propositional predicates, indicating it can stand for a proposition:

(33) [What John said] is unlikely to be true/impossible

-It can entail other propositions:

(34) [What John said/believes/etc.] entails that the earth is flat

-It can participate in entailments like referential items. Entailments like that in (35a) are only possible when at least one of the two premises contains two referential items. If this fails to be the case, as in (35b), the entailment does not go through:

- (35) a. [What John said/believes/etc.] is that Mary stole the tapes.
 [What Susan said/believes/etc.] is that Mary stole the tapes.
 Therefore, what John said is what Susan said.
 b. John is sick. Susan is sick. #Therefore, John is Susan.

To sum up, *what John believes* free relatives can behave as denoting NPs (they stand for a proposition). They can, therefore, participate in the formation of predicational pseudoclefts and they can do this also with CP-pseudoclefts. The latter probably are equative sentences, i.e., the free relative is a referring expression and the CP after the copula is too.

¹⁸ Williams (1983) provides a series of tests to prove his claim that the free relative part is the predicate in the specificational reading and the subject in the predicational reading. One of these tests is the so called Subject-Aux inversion which basically predicts that the free relative part should be able to invert only in the predicational reading and not in the specificational:

- (i) a. Is what John is important to him (predicational)
 b. *Is what John is important to himself (specificational)

Another test has to do with Raising, i.e., it is only the free relative of the predicational reading that can raise:

- (ii) a. What John is seems to be important to him (predicational)
 b. * What John is seems to be important to himself (specificational)

¹⁹For Higgins (1979), the copula is just one of the ways to form a specificational sentence. Some other verbs that can do the same things are *entail*, *amount to*, *consists of*. So if Williams's diagnostics test for specificational sentences proper, there should be no difference among those verbs.

If the above argumentation in favor of CP-pseudoclefts being (also) predicational pseudoclefts is correct, then we have no reason to claim that MG, Bulgarian, etc. have any specificational sentences at all (although see the last section of this paper).²⁰

The claims in the section so far might appear to make a prediction that is not verified. Recall that we claimed that (28) can have a predicational reading. One would therefore be lead to expect that *whatever* can appear in it but this is not so:

(36) *Whatever John said/claimed/believed was that the earth is flat

In fact this sentence is bad in MG if the relative part is *oti* instead of the demonstrative.

(37) *Oti pistevi o Yanis ine oti i gi ine epipedhi
whatever believes John is that the earth is flat

This in itself is not surprising given that *oti* and *whatever* have been shown to behave alike. So what is the reason that *whatever/oti* cannot appear in the CP-pseudoclefts if the later are predicational? We argue that this is the result of the combination of the properties of the copula and quantificational sentences. We argued previously that (28) is an equative sentence and equative sentences cannot contain certain quantificational elements:²¹

(38) a. *Everything I cooked is this hamburger
b. *Every student in my class is John²²

The same holds when we have equative sentences with propositional arguments:

(39) a. *Every claim that I made is that the earth is flat
b. *Every claim that Bill and Sam made is that the earth is flat

The sentences in (39) in addition show that a certain proposition however many times it was claimed and however many people it was claimed by, it is treated as one proposition (by grammar or the ontology of propositions. It is irrelevant for us which). Therefore, the fact that (36,37) are ungrammatical cannot be used as an argument against CP-pseudoclefts being predicational. The ungrammaticality of (36,37) is due to the fact that equative sentences cannot contain quantificational elements in their subject position.

5. How does the MG situation generalize?

The languages that have specificational pseudoclefts form free relatives either with the items used in headed relatives or the items used in questions. In other words, they form free relatives with items that participate in predicative structures. For example, in English, free relatives are formed with a subset of interrogative words, like *what, when, etc.*

²⁰ This means that we have disregarded the significance of the binding facts shown in (29), which obtain, equally mysteriously, in a different type of sentence:

(i) a. *The claim that he_i made was that John_i was innocent
b. *The belief that he_i has is that John_i was innocent

Since it is not clear to us how such connectedness effects are obtained, we are hesitant to have them override the conclusion reached on the basis of (31-35). However, we would like to point out the significance of the class of CP-pseudoclefts, which pattern with the predicational pseudoclefts on all but the binding tests.

²¹ And for the same reason *whatever* cannot participate in equative sentences:

(i) What(*ever) I cooked is this hamburger

²² Partee (1986) and others worry about why *every student in my class* cannot be a predicate. The point here is that *every student in my class* cannot participate in equative sentences even as a subject.

On the other hand, MG has a different lexical paradigm for free relatives and this paradigm does not draw from the pool of interrogative words or (headed) relative pronouns. For example, in MG the neuter singular of the form used in free relatives is *oti*; the one used in headed relatives is *to opio* (or *pu*), and the one used in questions is *ti*.

The other way MG and some of the other languages in this group form pseudocleft is with demonstratives and these elements are also not amenable to a predicative function. Note, for example, the difference between Italian, which lacks specificational pseudoclefts and Spanish which has them. In Italian they are formed with *quello che* ('that which') and in Spanish with *lo que* ('the which') -- recall that the definite determiner does not prevent an NP from functioning as a predicate.

A question that arises is the following: why should a language not have a separate morphological paradigm for free relatives but with those lexical items still being able to function as predicates and participate in specificational pseudoclefts? We have not found a language that takes this strategy, which, of course, does not mean that it does not exist. But if, in fact, the situation generalizes the way the small group of languages that we have looked at does, the question is why that should be the case. We do not have anything significant to say to this, although there may be some notion of functional economy or blocking effect at play: if a predicative element is going to be used, the language is going to use one that it uses in other predicative constructions anyway.

6. Afterthoughts.....

Throughout the paper we have been relying on Assumption I, taken from Williams (1983), according to which in specificational pseudoclefts the free relative part is functioning as the predicate, while in predicational pseudoclefts it is functioning as the subject of predication. In fact, following Williams and the authors quoted in the relevant section, we have practically defined specificational pseudoclefts that way. We also showed that MG lacks the pseudoclefts where the free relative part should function as a predicate, exactly because MG free relatives are unable to function as predicates. But what reason is there to believe that there is a complete overlap between the pseudoclefts that Williams called specificational and the ones Higgins originally gave this name to? Williams (1983) and the other authors following him assumed that the overlap is complete. We already saw that there is one class of pseudoclefts, namely, what we called CP-pseudoclefts, which behaves like predicational with respect to Williams's tests (see footnote 18) and for which we argued that the free relative component can be a referential NP, an interpretive characteristic of predicational pseudoclefts. However, for Higgins, CP-pseudoclefts come out as specificational on the basis of their binding properties and the fact that the CP specifies the content of the free relative. In fact, Higgins already had described predicational pseudoclefts in the way Williams did, but his specificational ones were different (Higgins (1979) p. 264):²³

(40)	<u>Type</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Predicate</u>
	a. Predicational	Referential	Predicational
	b. Specificational	Superscriptional	Specificational

²³ In fact, Higgins's classification of copular sentences is richer and it has additionally two types:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Predicate</u>
Identificational	Referential	Identificational
Identity	Referential	Identity

This means that saying about CP-pseudoclefts that its free relative part behaves like a referential NP, is not in itself sufficient to determine the type; such a statement amounts to saying that the sentence is not (or does not have to be) just specificational, which, with the caveat in Section 4,

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