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Causative have*

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1. Introduction:

Have can function as an auxiliary verb, a semi-modal, a light verb, and a main verb with a wide range of interpretations because it has no inherent meaning or event structure. In this paper, we focus on the causative use of have, illustrated in (1) and show how it extends to the experiencer use of <u>have</u> illustrated in (2).

- (1) a. Sheila had Ralph pick up the kids.
 - b. Margaret had Dennis wash the car.
 - c. Brian had George call up the reserves.
- (2) a. Ralph had his wife walk out on him last week.
 - b. Jim had someone leave an obscene message on his answering machine.

We will argue that the causative and experiencer readings of <u>have</u> are possible precisely because of an underlying lack of specification in this verb. <u>Have</u> is fundamentally different from <u>make</u>, for example, which is inherently causative. Because <u>make</u> is inherently a causative verb, it has no experiencer use, so a sentence like (3a) can only have a causative interpretation.

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- (3) a. Sheila made Ralph pick up the kids.
 - b. Margaret made Dennis wash the car.
 - c. Brian made George call up the reserves.

In the lexicon, the core meaning of these two verbs must be distinguished. Let us suppose that <u>make</u> is always a causative verb because its lexical entry contains a causative component. <u>Have</u> has a broad range of meanings, because its lexical entry does not include a causative component. In fact, the Lexical Conceptual Structure of <u>have</u> is virtually unspecified. We know very little else about the lexical entries of these two verbs. In particular, it is not clear what have means. But it is clear that <u>have</u> does not mean CAUSE.

- (4) Lexical Conceptual Structure
 - a. make: ... x CAUSE y ...
 - b. have: ... x ??? y ...


This fundamental difference between <u>have</u> and <u>make</u> has consequences for all levels of representation. We will focus on differences between the two verbs at the level of argument structure and at the level of syntactic structure. Specifically, <u>have</u> forms a complex predicate with the embedded verb in the argument structure, and consequently, <u>have</u> selects a VP complement in the syntax. In contrast, <u>make</u> is a fully specifed causative verb: It has an independent argument array and event specification at the level of argument structure and selects a complement headed by an inflectional category in the syntax.

2. Structural differences between have and make


We begin by investigating the structural differences between the two verbs. From the examples in (5), it appears that the category of the complement could be identical for causative <u>have</u> and <u>make</u>. However, we will argue that despite appearances, the complement of <u>have</u> is a VP, while the complement of <u>make</u> is an inflectional category.

- (5) a. John had Bill read the article.
 - b. John made Bill read the article.

The structure we propose for <u>have</u> is depicted in (6). Note that the subject of this VP complement appears inside its maximal projection.



The structure for <u>make</u> is illustrated in (7). The subject of its complement appears outside the embedded VP in the specifier of an inflectional projection. We will not be making a specific proposal as to the label of this category. Rather we will use Iⁿ to indicate that it is one of the inflectional categories (Tense, AGR, etc.) dominating VP.



We now present three types o tactic evidence that show that the clausal complement of have is a while the clausal complement of make is an inflectional category: (i) The presence or absence of inflectional elements in the clausal complements, (ii) the availability of individual level predicates in the clausal complements, and (iii) the availability of non-thematic subjects in the clausal complements.

2.2. Infl Elements in the complement

Inflectional projections are outside VPs; thus, if the complement of <u>have</u> is a VP, we expect it to contain no inflectional material. No such restriction applies to the complement of <u>make</u>.

We adopt Pollock's (1989) proposal that IP contains more than one functional projection dominating VP. For purposes of this paper, 326

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the order and specific labels are immaterial. In the representations given here, I¹ is the inflectional head which selects VP; Iⁿ is the topmost inflectional head.

(8) $I^{n}P$ $SPEC I^{n'}$ $I^{1}P$ $SPEC I^{1'}$ $I^{1} VP$

Under the assumption that auxiliary verbs are in Infl, we predict that they will be impossible in the bare VP complement of <u>have</u>. The examples in (9) show that progressive and passive <u>be</u> are at best marginal in the complement of <u>have</u>. The examples in (10) show that progressive and passive <u>be</u> are obligatory in the complement of <u>make</u>.

- (9) a. ??John has Bill <u>be</u> shelving books whenever the boss walks in.
 - b. ??John had Bill be arrested.
 - c. John has Bill shelving books whenever the boss walks in.
 - d. John had Bill arrested.
- (10) a. John makes Bill <u>be</u> shelving books whenever the boss walks in.
 - b. John made Bill be arrested.
 - c. *John makes Bill shelving books whenever the boss walks in.
 - d. *John made Bill arrested.

Pollock (1989) analyzes clausal negation as an inflectional head dominating VP. Assuming this analysis, we predict that negation should be acceptable in the complement of <u>make</u>, but impossible in the complement of <u>have</u>. The examples in (11) show that this is the case.

- (11) clausal negation
 - a. *Bill had Ralph not marry Sheila.
 - b. Bill made Ralph not marry Sheila.
 - c. *John had Sheila not write the editorial.
 - d. John made Sheila not write the editorial.

Clausal negation has scope over the entire clause. There is another type of negation which only has scope over the predicate. Predicate negation is not an inflectional head. Moreover, it must be stressed. As expected, predicate negation may appear embedded under both have and make.

- (12) VP negation
 - a. Bill had Ralph [VP NOT marry Sheila].
 - b. Bill made Ralph [VP NOT marry Sheila].
 - c. John had Sheila [VP NOT write the editorial].
 - d. John made Sheila [VP NOT write the editorial].

The last inflectional element we consider is the infinitival marker, <u>to</u>. If <u>to</u> is an inflectional head, then it should only be available in the complement of <u>make</u>. As expected, the infinitival marker is never possible in the complement of <u>have</u>.


- (13) a. *John had Bill to leave.
 - a. *Bill was had to leave.

With <u>make</u>, <u>to</u> only shows up when the matrix verb is passivized, as shown in (14). The availability of <u>to</u> in this construction can only mean that the complement of passive <u>make</u> is larger than a VP.


- (14) a. Bill was made to leave.
 - b. *John made Bill to leave.

Although <u>to</u> is not possible under non-passive <u>make</u> (as shown in (14b)), we expect consistency between passive and non-passive forms of the same verb with respect to categorial selection. The conclusion that the complement is an I^n projection can be extended to non-passive <u>make</u>, because the category of the complement should not be dependent upon grammatical voice.

(15) a. active make



b. passive make



2.3 Stage level and individual level predicates

A distinction in the semantic type of the predicate, originally due to Carlson (1977), gives us further motivation for the structural difference between <u>have</u> and <u>make</u>. Carlson classified predicates as either stage level or individual level. A stage level predicate denotes an action or temporary property of the subject. An individual level predicate denotes a permanent property of the subject. A few examples of stage level and individual level predicates are given in (16) and (17), respectively.

(16) Stage level predicates

- a. Firemen are available.
- b. Mary spoke French today.
- c. Fred is sitting on that chair.

- (17) Individual level predicates
 - a. Firemen are altruistic.
 - b. Mary knows French.
 - c. Fred has blond hair.

Diesing (1988) and Kratzer (1988) have argued that this semantic classification has syntactic ramifications. In particular, they hypothesize that the subject of a stage level predicate is basegenerated inside the VP, and (in some languages) may remain in its base position throughout the derivation. In contrast, the subject of an individual level predicate is outside the VP at all levels of representation.

This syntactic distinction between stage level and individual level predicates makes a strong prediction concerning the complements of have and make. If have only takes a VP complement, then it should only allow stage level predicates. On the other hand, make should allow both stage level and individual level predicates because its complement includes some inflectional projection. As shown by the ungrammatical examples in (19), this prediction is borne out. Have does not take individual level predicates.

- (18) Stage level predicates
 - a. The photographer had Dan wear his dress uniform.
 - b. The photographer made Dan wear his dress uniform.
 - c. Brian had Mila write the French exam.
 - d. Brian made Mila write the French exam.
 - e. Barbara had George take a shower.
 - f. Barbara made George take a shower.
- (19) Individual Level Predicates
 - a. *John had Bill like French cooking.
 - b. John made Bill like French cooking.
 - c. *John had Bill want to learn French.
 - d. John made Bill want to learn French.
 - e. *John had Bill know French.
 - f. ??John made Bill know French.

2.4 Expletive Subject in Complement Clause

Finally, notice that expletives like <u>it</u> and <u>there</u> can appear as the subject of the complement of <u>make</u> but not that of <u>have</u> (20a,b). This contrast is expected given the structural difference we have proposed. Spec of an inflectional projection can be a non-thematic position, and therefore, the subject embedded under <u>make</u> can be an expletive. But the VP internal subject position is always thematic, and therefore the subject under <u>have</u> can not be an expletive.


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- (20) a. *John had it seem that Bill was guilty.
 - b. John made it seem that Bill was guilty.
 - c. *John had **there** be computers available for all the students.
 - d. John made **there** be computers available for all the students.


2.5 Summary

To summarize the discussion so far, we have presented evidence that <u>have</u> is syntactically distinct from <u>make</u>. In particular, we have argued that causative <u>have</u> selects a VP complement, whereas causative <u>make</u> selects a complement headed by an inflectional category. The structures for the complements of <u>have</u> and <u>make</u> are depicted in (21) and (22).

(21) <u>have</u>



(22) make



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3. The Model


3.1. The event analysis of <u>have</u>

The structural difference between <u>have</u> and <u>make</u> ultimately derives from differences in the lexical representation of the two verbs. Intuitively, this difference is that <u>make</u> means something like "cause", but <u>have</u> means virtually nothing. This information is encoded in the LCS representation, and has consequences for all subsequent levels of representation.

The model of the grammar we are assuming is represented in (23).

(23) LCS
$$\rightarrow$$
 Arg Str \rightarrow D-str \rightarrow S-str \searrow PF

Syntactically relevant information projects from the LCS into the argument structure. Minimally, there are two distinct types of information encoded in the argument structure; (i) the thematic arguments, and (ii) the event type. By event type, we mean the stage level/individual level distinction. (It may also include more detailed information concerning the event analysis of the verb in the sense of Grimshaw (1990), Pustejovsky (1988), Tenny, (1989), van Voorst (1988), and references cited therein.) The temporary state or event denoted by a stage level predicate is formally represented in the argument structure by an <E>. We propose that the permanent property denoted by an individual level predicate is represented as <P>. Thus, the two types of predicates are distinguished by the specification <E> versus <P>.




Make is a prototypical verb. In a sentence like (25), <u>make</u> is a stage level predicate which takes two arguments, the subject and the sentential complement. The predicate in the embedded complement has its own argument structure representation. In this example, "eat" is also a stage level predicate with two NP arguments.

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
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(25) Jeff made Katie eat her vegetables.



On the other hand, <u>have</u> lacks inherent meaning. It is our claim that, at the level of argument structure, this deficiency results in a lack of event specification. Now, if all verbs must have an event specification at this level, the defect in <u>have</u> will force it to associate with the <E> or <P> of another predicate. We represent this association process as in (26).

(26) Jeff had Katie eat her vegetables.



What does it mean for a verb to have an event specification <E>? It means that the verb denotes an event. If two verbs share a single <E>, there is still only one event. Therefore, sentences containing causative <u>have</u> should denote only one event, whereas analogous sentences with <u>make</u> should denote two independent events. The evidence indicates that this is correct.

Consider the contrast in (27). When <u>make</u> is negated, as in (27a), there is no implication as to whether or not the <u>writing</u> event takes place. Consequently, it is possible to add the "but" clause, saying that the <u>writing</u> took place even though the causation did not. This is because <u>make</u> and <u>write</u> denote two distinct events. The same is not true for <u>have</u>. The ungrammaticality of the "but" clause in (27b) follows from the assumption that <u>have</u> shares an <E> specification with the embedded verb. In other words, <u>have</u> and <u>write</u> are part of the same complex event. Therefore, the <u>writing</u> must be negated along with the causation.

- (27) a. The teacher didn't make Bill write the article, but he did it anyway.
 - b. *The teacher didn't have Bill write the article, but he did it anyway.

Further evidence that <u>have</u> sentences contain a single event comes from the examples in (28). Our intuition concerning (28a) is that when the doctor <u>had</u> Fred drinking decaf, he drank decaf for a limited period of time, for the period of time in which Fred's doctor has some authoritative hold over him. Again, this interpretation obtains because the two verbs are in fact part of the same complex event. So, when the event denoted by <u>have</u> is completed, the event denoted by the embedded verb is also completed.

With (28b) we get a different interpretation. In this case, when the doctor got Fred drinking decaf, a property of Fred was changed -- he became a decaf drinker. If get, like make has its own independent event specification, the causing event need not be the same as the drinking event in this example. Thus, termination of the causing event does not imply termination of the drinking of decaf.

- (28) a. Fred's doctor had him drinking decaf.
 - b. Fred's doctor got him drinking decaf.

4.2. Interpreting <u>have</u> as experience or cause

If <u>have</u> does not inherently mean "cause", then where does the causative interpretation come from? Stated slightly differently: How does the subject of <u>have</u> get interpreted as causer? And similarly, where does the experiencer interpretation mentioned earlier come from? We will demonstrate that the causer and experiencer roles can be assigned even though they are not encoded in the LCS of <u>have</u>. More examples of these two uses are given in (29) and (30).


- (29) Causative <u>have</u>
 - a. David had Sam wash behind his ears.
 - b. Brenda has Katie put on her helmet whenever she bikes.
 - c. Jason had Monica practice the piano before she went out to play.
- (30) Experiencer have
 - a. Have you ever had someone pick your pocket?
 - b. The teacher had three students walk out on her.
 - c. I had a total stranger kiss my hand this morning.

It is our claim that complex predicate formation in the argument structure plays a crucial role in the interpretation of the

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subject of <u>have</u>. Suppose that one consequence of <E> association in the argument structure is the concomittant merger of the argument arrays of the component verbs. What this means for the analysis of <u>have</u> is that one of its arguments is satisfied by the argument array of another predicate. This complex predicate formation is exemplified in (31).

(31) Jeff had Katie eat her vegetables.



The association of the event specification and the merger of the argument arrays derives a complex predicate. In this example, we get the complex <u>have eat</u>, which takes three arguments (<u>Jeff</u>, <u>Katie</u> and <u>her vegetables</u>).

One way of looking at the function of <u>have</u> is to say that it adds an extra participant to the event or temporary state denoted by its complement. For example, the sentence in (32) contains all the participants directly involved in the event of walking out. When this clause is embedded under <u>have</u>, it likewise contains all the participants directly involved in the event of walking out, but <u>have</u> adds one participant, <u>John</u>.


- (32) Half the students walked out of John's lecture.
- (33) John had half the students walk out of his lecture.

In (33), <u>John</u> can be interpreted as either the causer or the experiencer of the students' walking event. These two readings are available because <u>have</u> is adding a participant to the core event. In the argument structure, a complex predicate is formed with the arguments of <u>walk out</u> plus <u>John</u>, the argument contributed by <u>have</u>. This extra argument must be interpreted as a remote (or indirect) participant in the walking event. It is our claim that there are only two ways to add a remote participant to an event: (i) The additional participant can affect the event, causing it. (ii) The additional participant can be affected by the event, experiencing it.

This is so because events are measured out over time. Recall that <u>have</u> does not take an independent event. But we submit that it has the capacity to extend the duration of the existing event. The causer interpretation is available when the event is extended back in time. The experiencer interpretation is available when the duration

of the event remains unchanged, or is extended forward in time. There are no other interpretations available for an argument which does not participate in the core event.

(33) John had half the students walk out of his lecture.



Finally, having said why the subject of <u>have</u> is a causer or experiencer, we would like to suggest that this subject gets interpreted at LF. This is because <u>have</u> has no inherent meaning and therefore can assign no semantic role to its subject argument. More specifically, there is no thematic information in the LCS of <u>have</u>. We have also suggested that <u>have</u> combines with another verb to form a complex predicate. Consequently, the subject of <u>have</u> is really the subject of the complex predicate. Still, the lexical representations of the component verbs do not give us any information as to the thematic role of the subject of have.

Therefore, the phrase structure must bear the full burden in assigning an interpretation to this argument. The interpretation of the matrix subject is largely determined by the embedded VP because have contributes so little to the semantic interpretation. Since all participants in the core event have been satisfied within the embedded VP, the subject of have is only interpretable as the causer or experiencer of this core event. The matrix subject is interpreted at LF because LF is the only interpretive component with access to the derived predicate and all its arguments.

Notes

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