WHEN BETTER WORLDS COLLIDE

HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

신세계의 충돌: 국제개발과 사회과학의 사상사 속 지정학의 궤적

Albert Sanghoon PARK

박상훈〈朴相薰〉

(legal: Albert Hoon PARK)

GIRTON COLLEGE

March 2020

This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my thesis has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee.

When Better Worlds Collide

Historical essays on the politics of international development and social science

Author. Albert Sanghoon Park

Abstract. This thesis is on politics, but of a very particular type. Tied to our very perceptions of existence and ways of life, it stems from deeper differences and entanglements. Exacerbated by post-Cold War globalisation, said politics is explored here in the contexts of international development. Positing a *better worlds problem*, it asks how to realise a better world amidst a conflicting plurality of them. Whose ideas matter? Is it more reason or might that define whose better world is right?

Structured into three essays, it trials a historical approach using development's English-language academic historiography as an intellectual history archive. Capturing better worlds as ontological, moral, and epistemological systems or *logic scaffolds,* essay one thus finds a growing *liberal scientific positivist scaffold* underlying historical development journal articles. In contrast, essay two traces distinctly *Marxist scientific positivist scaffolds* underwriting Cold War-era development history books. Finally, essay three adds a new *post-structuralist scaffold* that manifests in post-Cold War postdevelopment theory.

Constituting the most extensive study of the Anglophone development historiography to date, these essays produce three overarching findings. First is the dominant influence of the three observed scaffolds, which reflect the politics surrounding their own places and times. Resulting in a highly fragmented and polemical historiography, its visions privilege local over global priorities; more about a Western New Left than a purported Third World. The second finding thus illustrates an *embedded development.* Resituating its theories in society highlights their production in Western social science for consumption around the world. Extended to the third finding of a *development game,* it highlights a politics inextricable from development theory as well as its underlying social sciences.

Culminating in a larger *metaphysical geopolitics* at play, it ties to a politics of science, knowledge, truth, and expertise—including the political role of the university. The thesis thus closes by outlining a larger programme across interdisciplinary, international, and theory-practice divides. Ultimately, it entails returning with greater hindsight to the start: the search for a way to navigate our deeper entanglements and rising tempers in the twenty-first century.

IN MEMORIAM

Giulio REGENI

1988, Italian Republic

−2016, Republic of Egypt

KWON Sook Ha

1919, Chosun (colonial period)

−2017, Republic of Korea

죽는 날까지 하늘을 우러러

한 점 부끄럼이 없기를,

잎새에 이는 바람에도

나는 괴로워했다.

별을 노래하는 마음으로

모든 죽어 가는 것을 사랑해야지

그리고 나한테 주어진 길을

걸어가야겠다.

오늘 밤에도 별이 바람에 스치운다.

윤동주, <서시(序詩)>, 1941

May I, til the day I die, gaze up at the heavens

with nary a drop of dishonour nor shame,

for even slight winds borne by a leaf

have brought me turmoil and pain.

With a heart set on singing of the stars

I will love all that which is dying away,

and down the path that has been set for me

I shall walk.

Tonight the stars, once again, brush against the wind.

YUN Dong-ju, <Prologue>, 1941

(translation by PhD author)

Contents

Contents (extended)

Acknowledgments

This PhD was made possible with the help of many others. First, I must thank my supervisors. Shailaja Fennell has been beyond generous with her wide knowledge, moral support, and time, with Flavio Comim also providing this PhD an early academic home. Amidst the many costs associated with a PhD, one further cannot ignore the financial burdens of higher education. Here, I thank Girton College, whose generous endorsement and financial support through a PhD scholarship has been instrumental in making this work possible.

Taking a slight turn, one aspect of academia not often seen from outside is the bleakness and isolation—and depression—that can come with this form of intellectual life. In the many winters that have since passed, I have learned the hard way of the vital importance of both intellectual *and* moral support. In this respect, I could not have asked to be institutionalised in a better place. Gay Meeks and her course on philosophical issues in development was a key driver in coming to Cambridge, and has continued to be a source of support through the years. David Clark, my MPhil supervisor, has also been a source of unceasing support—not only for me, but also for the many PhD students at the Centre. Michael Shin has been another important yet unrecognised pillar of support. Key to opening new doors into Korean studies and archival research, I hope to repay his generosity over what I hope to be a long history of interaction and collaboration to come. Last but certainly not least, a thank you to our administrators—Dawn Bradley, Emma Cantu, Nathalie Henry, Élise Lapaire, Annabel Sherwood, and Doreen Woolfrey—who stand at the front lines in making the Centre a home.

Countless others at the University of Cambridge have contributed to this work through the years. At the Centre of Development Studies, I thank Peter Nolan for his time and support since first arriving at Cambridge. I have also benefitted from the lectures of Ha-Joon Chang, Solava Ibrahim, Gabriel Palma, John Rapley, and others at the Centre since a preceding MPhil. At the Department of History and Philosophy of Science, I thank Anna Alexandrova for her critical advice, also dating back to the MPhil. Also at the department, I thank Hasok Chang, whose ideas on philosophical pluralism and complementary science have offered an example

In my private life, I must start by thanking Juan Prajogo and Sungyon Lee, who have both been anchors in these unstable times and whose presence has blurred the lines between friends and family. To Olivia Kim and Øyvind Thomassen, I eagerly look forward to the day when I rejoin you in Seoul. My relatives in Korea have been a second home, and this holds especially true with my youngest aunt and family (Kyung Kwon, Eunho Choi, Eunice Go-Eun Choi, Jay Jae-Min Choi), who took me in upon a sudden arrival many years ago and have been a source of emotional support ever since. Saving the most important for last, thank you to my sister, Julie Hyun-Joo Park, and my parents, Kyoung-Bog Park and Sung-Keun Park. I would not be here without them, and they have my undying gratitude and respect.

This thesis is dedicated to two individuals whose lives have embodied development's ideals and tragedies—each in their own way—and who have passed away during the PhD. To my classmate, **Giulio Regeni**, your presence lingers, like smoke, indelibly burned into my mind. The world has shown its cruel face; once seen, never forgotten. You live on in those left behind. *Memento mori,* we will catch up with you soon enough. To my grandfather, **Kwon Sook Ha**, how frustrating it is to know that our farewell was truly our last. Though I was unable to return in time, I strive to live without shame in honour of your memory, this family, nation, and world. You witnessed both tragedies and miracles in the twentieth century. I wish you were here to watch what your grandson will do in the twenty-first.

This work was made possible by all those above, but it must finally be stated that its contents—and importantly, its mistakes—are mine alone. Following university regulations, I declare this thesis as written under sole authorship, with no instances of joint authorship to disclose. Further, this dissertation has not been submitted for consideration under any other degree, diploma, or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution. For full disclosure, part of Chapter 1 has already been submitted and published in World Development.[1] Lastly, the length of this dissertation does not exceed the 80,000-word limit set by the Degree Committee for the Centre of Development Studies in the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge.

---

[1] A.S. Park, 'Does the development discourse learn from history?', *World Development* 96.1 (2017), 52-64.

Introduction

1. The Better Worlds Problem ('BWP')

This PhD introduces a new research problem called the **better worlds problem**. Namely, it asks how to build a better world when faced with a conflicting plurality of them. Amidst our human diversity, whose idea of the better world matters? Can science, for example, answer with a universal progress? Or is it less reason and more might that defines right?

This better worlds problem (henceforth **'BWP'**) is thus a **political** problem. Echoing Lenin's maxim, *kto kovo?,* politics is defined by the power relations mediating human society.[2] Manifest here between humankind's diverse perceptions or worldviews, its politics hence trace to a deeper *ideational* realm. Consider, for example, the colliding religious versus scientific worldviews manifest in the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions.[3] Or the new worlds or *Weltanschauung* of new nations or *Volksgeist* forged in the wake of the French Revolution— or in East Asia, with the arrival of barbarians and black ships heralded by the Opium Wars.[4] Seated in human perception or thought, each better world captures an oft-unseen ideational dimension underlying real-world politics.

The BWP is hence simultaneously a **philosophical** problem. Its politics manifests on a *metaphysical* plane; that is, a plane populated by humanity's diverse *perceptions of existence,* itself. Each better world, after all, bears a perceived future, born out of a particular present and past. Their collisions involve parallel realities or timelines; each a window into its own space and time. While this may all seem abstract if not fantastical, it captures a fundamental tension in present times. Best observed across normative divides, these metaphysical collisions remain invisible when conditioned to only one reality. Consider, for example, the following allegory from writer David Foster Wallace:

---

[2] That is, 'who whom?' ('кто кого?') or 'who will control whom?'; see R. Guess, *Philosophy and real politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 23-6.

[3] See, for example, T. Kuhn, *The Copernican revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

[4] See D. Kim, 근대와 식민의 서곡 *<Prelude to modernity and colonisation>* (Paju: Changbi, 2009).

There are these two young fish swimming along and they happen to meet an older fish swimming the other way, who nods at them and says, "Morning, boys. How's the water?" And the two young fish swim on for a bit, and then eventually one of them looks over at the other and goes, "What the hell is water?"[5]

If we in this story are the fish, then this present treatise is on water. It dives into those aspects of reality that are taken to be so obvious or self-evident as to be taken for granted. Like the water and air around us, however, a closer look may reveal complex realities that are wholly otherwise.[6] Encompassing our diverse worldviews and associated ways of life, it is here in these metaphysical waters of humankind that our BWP and its better worlds reside.

The BWP thus starts in a state of metaphysical uncertainty. Like a fish out of water, one faces the existence of not one, but many simultaneous worlds. This dissociated view of our kaleidoscopic perceptions, in turn, enables a deeper understanding of human politics. Indeed, these ties between human perceptions and human politics may not be altogether unfamiliar. The Cold War, for example, is often framed as a war of ideologies. History offers further examples of these ties between our ideas and our realities. Consider the following excerpts from two seminal works by Isaiah Berlin and J.M. Keynes, starting with Berlin:

Over a hundred years ago, the German poet Heine warned the French not to underestimate the power of ideas: *philosophical concepts nurtured in the stillness of a professor's study could destroy a civilisation*. He spoke of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* as the sword with which German deism had been decapitated, and described the works of Rousseau as the blood-stained weapon which, in the hands of Robespierre, had destroyed the old regime; and prophesied that the romantic faith of Fichte and Schelling would one day be turned, with terrible effect, by their fanatical German followers, against the liberal culture of the West. *[…]*

Our philosophers seem oddly unaware of these devastating effects of their activities. It may be that, intoxicated by their magnificent achievements in more abstract realms, the best among them look with disdain upon a field in which radical discoveries are less likely to be made, and talent for minute analysis is less likely to be rewarded. Yet, despite every effort to separate them, conducted by a blind scholastic pedantry, politics has remained indissolubly intertwined with every other form of philosophical enquiry.[7]

---

[5] D.F. Wallace, *This is water: some thoughts, delivered on a significant occasion, about living a compassionate life* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2009), pp. 3-4.

[6] Philosopher Hasok Chang offers a fitting example in the historical debates over the nature of water in the natural sciences; see *Is water H₂O? Evidence, realism and pluralism* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012).

[7] Italics added; I. Berlin, 'Two concepts of liberty', in *Four essays on liberty,* ed. I. Berlin, 118-72 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 119. See also the 'chairborne division', nickname of the

And from Keynes:

> *[…]* the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.[8]

Simply put, **ideas matter**—and not just in some pedantic sense, but for their pervasive effects in fundamentally shaping (and being shaped by) reality. Further recognition of said ties can be found in the politics of identity, race, and gender (e.g. intellectual colonialism, standpoint theory).[9] Their treatment of our entwined internal and external realms is further compelled by the explicit hazards involved (e.g. violence, oppression, war).

Less obvious, however, is a recognition of such hazards in commonly perceived goods (e.g. health, science, education, development). In light of their inherent virtues, such goods may not attract as much scrutiny as less-benevolent domains. Their purportedly uncontested nature may further serve as pretence for arguing the irrelevance of politics in said domains (e.g. health or science as technical and thus apolitical). However, to associate political hazards only with social ills or evils—as opposed to social goods—would be to grossly underestimate the problem at hand. As long highlighted by moral philosophers, the very nature of 'good' is subject to contestation, itself.[10]

The notion of a better world is thus chosen as one such good with especial relevance in present times. As with peace, justice, or liberty, it holds the status of an obvious or self-evident good. It serves as a mantra, for example, for technology companies in Silicon Valley—a point so satirised that some now forbid its use.[11] The better world's use as a modern-day clarion call belies a deeper utopian faith in science and technology as the solution to social problems. An example can be seen in a 2016 campaign by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). A flagbearer for science and technology worldwide, its *Campaign for a Better World* aims 'to

---

Research and Analysis Branch of the wartime Office of Strategic Services (predecessor to the CIA) in D.C. Engerman, 'Social science in the Cold War', *Isis* 101.2 (2010), 393-400, p. 396.

[8] J.M. Keynes, *The general theory of employment, interest and money* (London: Macmillan, 1936), p. 383.

[9] See, for example, O. Fals-Borda and L.E. Mora-Osejo, 'Context and diffusion of knowledge: a critique of Eurocentrism', *Action Research* 1.1 (2003), 29-37; S.G. Harding (ed.), *The feminist standpoint theory reader: intellectual and political controversies* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

[10] See, for example, F.W. Nietzsche, *On the genealogy of morals*, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1967[1887]); J.L. Mackie, *Ethics: inventing right and wrong* (London: Pelican Books, 1977); H. Putnam, *Ethics without ontology* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).

[11] See A. Marantz, 'How "Silicon Valley" nails Silicon Valley', *The New Yorker,* 9 June 2016.

raise \$5 billion to take on some of humanity's most urgent global challenges' in a self-ascribed 'mission to make a better world':[12]

> Since MIT was founded to help a young nation seize its future as an industrial powerhouse, the people of MIT have been busy solving hard problems and answering big questions, and they have left society transformed. Today, everyone at MIT is hacking societal problems. And we see humanity's pressing global challenges as invitations to action.[13]

A more overtly political example of this deep sense of mission is found in *The Better World Campaign.* Founded in 1999 by US billionaire Ted Turner, it aims to 'foster a strong, effective relationship between the United States and the United Nations to promote core American interests and build a more secure, prosperous, and healthy world'.[14]

Amidst such talk, the virtue of a better world may appear obvious or self-evident. Its urgent challenges and goals of a more secure, prosperous, and healthy world seem to offer little space for political controversy or conflict. Yet, it is precisely due to this façade that the BWP is posed. For when viewed through humanity's kaleidoscopic perceptions of reality, it gives way to the existence of not one, but many better worlds. Delving beyond the pleasantries of mere talk, the BWP lays bare a basic dilemma between a shared desire for better and diverse views of what *exactly* 'better' and 'world' mean.

At this point, the discerning reader might raise an objection to an implicit focus on our differences over similarities. The latter, for example, could trace to a common human nature (e.g. desire for food, warmth) or constructed norms (e.g. international law, human rights). One might further point out that the existence of differences does not *necessarily* entail conflict. A rabbi does not *have* to come to fisticuffs with a monk (or an economist, for that matter) over their differing metaphysical worldviews. The existence of diverse better worlds is rather a boon for enriching creativity and sustaining human life. If nothing else, the buffers afforded by geographical space and the human capacity for mutual understanding help prevent abstract metaphysical conflicts from manifesting into more violent physical ones.

This work does not object to the above counterarguments. Indeed, it is with the aim of a greater mutual understanding that the BWP is proposed. However, the path taken here runs *through*—not *despite*—our differences. That is, the basis for mutual understanding proposed

---

[12] MIT, 'MIT Campaign for a Better World ends FY2017 with \$3.6 billion', *MIT Campaign for a Better World* [http://betterworld.mit.edu/mit-campaign-better-world-ends-fy17-3-6-billion, accessed 2 May 2018]; MIT, 'About the campaign', *MIT Campaign for a Better World* [https://betterworld.mit.edu/about-the-campaign, accessed 2 May 2018].

[13] MIT, 'About the campaign'. Note, the campaign is still ongoing as of October 2019.

[14] The Better World Campaign, 'Our mission', *The Better World Campaign* [https://betterworldcampaign.org/about-bwc/our-mission, accessed 2 May 2018].

here entails recognising and reconciling with our differences, not skirting or avoiding them. To borrow a phrase from the Black Lives Matter movement, 'the new racism is to deny that racism exists'.[15] An emphasis on human commonality can become dangerous if it supresses or marginalises our differences in lived realities—regardless of whether rooted in benign or malevolent intent.

As such, while there is indeed a great deal of good to be found in diversity, it would be all-too-naïve to assume it free of any bad. For one, the reverse statement that our differences *never* entail conflict also does not hold true. The continuing realities of conflict and insecurity in domestic and international politics evidence the difficulties—if not the dangers—of such idealistic beliefs. As noted by Berlin, conflicts arise between even our most cardinal virtues.[16] Freedom can conflict with security, just as the demands of justice can conflict with mercy. Even the enlightened call for *liberté, égalité et fraternité* carries no guarantee of perfect compromise. Indeed, the past three centuries offer sober testament to the tragedies that arise when its better worlds collide (e.g. liberalism's *liberté*, socialism's *égalité*, fascism's *fraternité*). Reflecting on the aftermath in 1945, Karl Popper thus writes:

> I see now more clearly than ever before that even our greatest troubles spring from something that is as admirable and sound as it is dangerous—from our impatience to better the lot of our fellows. For these troubles are the by-products of what is perhaps the greatest of all moral and spiritual revolutions of history, a movement which began three centuries ago.[17]

Hegel's notion of tragedy, formed amidst some of these very moral, spiritual, or *metaphysical* revolutions, offers a fitting summation to the BWP.[18] Tragedy is defined here by *when two goods collide;* social duty versus individual liberty, pursuit of truth versus pursuit of happiness, love for one's own versus love for thy neighbour. Each actor in this play follows their own vision of the good. Further, in staying true to each own's vision, each remains in the right— only to end in fatal consequences.[19] Correspondingly, the idea of a better world may be one that few will deny. However, in the absence of perfect compatibility or compromise, how do we deal with the tragedies that arise when our visions of a better world collide?

---

[15] Quote from a 2016 music video by rapper T.I. (full name Clifford Harris); see C.J. Harris, *Warzone* [video, accessible at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VKcw35_saLY].

[16] I. Berlin and S. Lukes, 'Isaiah Berlin: in conversation with Steve Lukes', *Salmagundi* 120.1 (1998), 52-134, p. 101.

[17] K. Popper, *The open society and its enemies, volume one: the spell of Plato* (London: Routledge, 2003[1945]), p. xii.

[18] Hegel (1770-1831) famously completes *Phenomenology of spirit* in Jena just as Napoleon (elevated by Hegel as a *Weltseele* or 'world-soul') takes over the city; see G.W.F. Hegel, *The phenomenology of spirit,* trans. Terry Pinkard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. xi.

[19] See T. Pinkard, *Hegel's Phenomenology: the sociality of reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 144-6.

2. Present Significance

2.1 The BWP in (inter)national politics

Despite its philosophical content, the BWP is a *practical* problem. To echo a pragmatic ethos, philosophy comes into significance when it speaks to the problems of its times.[20] The BWP correspondingly responds here to the **political consequences of post-Cold War globalisation**. Juxtaposing globalisation with an incumbent human diversity, the BWP highlights tragedies latent in our increasingly enmeshed and entangled lives. To illustrate, these consequences can be drawn across external (e.g. material) and internal (e.g. mental) realms.[21]

In an external realm, an information and communications technology (ICT) revolution and the end of the Cold War paved the way for a new phase of globalisation.[22] The ensuing fall of Cold War political barriers and expansion in sociotechnical capabilities brought a world enmeshed in a thickening web of technological, regulatory, and physical infrastructure. One now has an arguably unprecedented wealth of information and goods at one's fingertips.[23] Captivating academic and broader public audiences alike, globalisation has thus been equated to a compression of space and time.[24] An expanding human grasp has, in turn, spurred visions of global progress and integration [for globalisation's winners] since the turn of the century—as exemplified in popular narratives of a 'flat world' and the 'end of history'.[25]

In internal realms, however, external integration has outpaced internal adaptation to our increasingly enmeshed lives. One might say that the consumption of more cosmopolitan materials has not necessarily produced more cosmopolitan minds. Jeans sewn in Bangladesh, iPhones assembled in China, and wine bottled in Chile may have brought many benefits to global consumers, but a deeper cross-cultural awareness does not seem to be one of them. A dearth in mutual understanding amidst growing ties and entanglements, however, can prove dire for sustaining global coordination and coexistence.

---

[20] From Hilary Putnam commenting on John Dewey in Putnam, *Ethics without ontology,* p. 31:

'The philosopher who wrote that "Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men" emphasized throughout his long life that philosophies arise out of time-bound reactions to specific problems faced by human beings in given cultural circumstances. If a philosopher can contribute to the reasoned resolution of some of the problems of his or her time, that is no small achievement...'

[21] Alternatives to this internal/external dichotomy include inner/outer, ideal/material, mental/material, psychological/physical, metaphysical/physical, and subjective/objective.

[22] R. Baldwin, *The great convergence: information technology and the new globalization* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016); A.S. Blinder, 'Offshoring: the next industrial revolution?', *Foreign Affairs* 85.2 (2006), 113-28; A. Park, G. Nayyer and P. Low, *Supply chain issues and perspectives: a literature review* (Geneva: World Trade Organisation, 2013).

[23] See, for example, M. Levinson, *The box: how the shipping container made the world smaller and the world economy bigger* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); P. Rivoli, *The travels of a t-shirt in the global economy* (Hoboken: Wiley, 2005).

[24] See Part III of D. Harvey, *The condition of postmodernity: an enquiry into the origins of cultural change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); D.H. Whittaker, T. Zhu, T. Sturgeon, M.H. Tsai, and T. Okita, 'Compressed development', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 45.4 (2010), 439-67.

[25] T.L. Friedman, *The world is flat: a brief history of the twenty-first century* (New York: Macmillan, 2005); F. Fukuyama, *The end of history and the last man* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992).

In international security, for example, a 'war on terror' continues to spur negative spill-overs for geopolitical stability, migration, and humanitarian crises—plus a radicalisation of sentiments around the world (*á la* Huntington's 'clash of civilisations').[26] In global finance, recent failures include the 2008 global financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis following in its wake. It would further be remiss not to mention the beleaguered contexts of environmental sustainability and the possibility of a coordinated response. The list of examples goes on, from entangled 'spaghetti bowl' trade policies to the expanded threat of global epidemics and the continued underestimation of technology's political effects (e.g. in domestic and international employment, privacy and surveillance, political sabotage).[27]

Globalisation thus exacerbates frictions between our diverse metaphysical perceptions and associated ways of life. When premised upon ***particular* universals** (e.g. utopian visions of science, politics, society), it can spur more insecurity than empowerment. Ties that unite, after all, are also ties that bind. Resistance from the Global South (e.g. the WTO's long-stalled Doha Round) has thus found unexpected bedfellows in the Global North (e.g. Brexit, Trump). Greater global access has meant greater entanglements and threats—whether in offshored profits and jobs or onshored foreign influences in the living room and marketplace. Integration across an uneven political terrain hence raises the risks of particular universals, emboldened by power, being enforced as *de facto* ones (e.g. faith in globalisation, free markets, natural or social science experts)—and with equally violent counter-reactions.

Isaiah Berlin thus warns of a backlash from suppressed nationalism (i.e. Schiller's 'bent twig'), noting elsewhere that 'freedom for the wolves has often meant death to the sheep'.[28] Though the latter refers to an earlier breed of unbridled economic liberalism, it remains just as apt today. For those who cannot afford more cosmopolitan virtues, globalisation can spell en-trapment at the hands of more privileged truths; a new meaning behind 'knowledge is power'. Globalisation's repercussions hence travel far deeper than an economic or material plane. Breaching the **metaphysical realm of truth/dogma**, globalisation leaves the roots of culture, identity, and our sense of *existential security* increasingly exposed. Is it so surprising, then, to see a turn to the nation-state—oh cumbrous dreadnought, oh violent leviathan—if its walls shelter against even more volatile, apathetic, and alien winds?

---

[26] S.P. Huntington, *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

[27] Reference to 'spaghetti bowl' trade policies from J.N. Bhagwati, 'US trade policy: the infatuation with FTAs', Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 726, Columbia University (1995). See also M. Hallward-Driemeier and G.N. Nayyar, *Trouble in the making: the future of manufacturing-led development* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2017).

[28] Schiller's 'bent twig' is cited in I. Berlin, 'The bent twig: a note on nationalism', *Foreign Affairs* 51.1 (1972), 11-30. The sheep and wolves, referring to Great Depression-era 'economic individualism and unrestrained capitalist competition', is from I. Berlin (ed.), *Four essays on liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. xiv.

Globalisation may have brought human lives closer together, but we do not yet seem to know *how* to live so close to one another. Growing complexity and geopolitical shifts call for new ways of *thinking* about the world. The risks and repercussions of policy entanglements, collective action traps, and other coordination failures now travel faster and farther than before. Otherwise, an unmitigated globalisation can stoke fears of domination or extermination (*á la* homogenisation), spurring deeper divisions and distrust across a diverse humankind. Such divides are rife: Global North versus Global South, Islam versus Christianity, the West versus the Rest, US versus China, elitist cosmopolitanism versus fascist populism, Left versus Right, snowflakes and safe spaces versus racists and fake news. Regardless of where one draws the battlelines, it is hard to ignore the unideal realities being born out of such polarising divides. The darker consequences of the ensuing distrust can be found preserved in UNESCO's 1945 constitution:

> That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed; *[…]* ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war.[29]

If we humans are to sustain the possibility of progress in the twenty-first century, then our greater *sociotechnical* powers require greater *empathetic* and *ethical* powers, in kind. The BWP offers one response, highlighting the role of our *metaphysical* differences in present political divides. In the search for a way to live with each other without destroying the planet or foreign others, it illuminates our deeper political entanglements at hand. Faced with these Gordian knots proliferating in present times, the BWP thus helps map and navigate humanity's metaphysical geography and the potential tragedies latent in twenty-first-century life.

To be clear, this does not imply some *utopian* politics, where all such potential tragedies can be avoided and perfect solutions to all better world conflicts exist. Rather, it aims for a *pragmatic* politics in the sense of Otto von Bismarck's politics as the art of the possible or the next best. Mapping the very existence of a BWP, itself, thus sheds light on *possible* (and not *perfect*) political responses. With this metaphysical approach again echoing Berlin: 'The goal of philosophy is always the same, to assist men to understand themselves and thus operate in the open, and not wildly, in the dark'.[30]

---

[29] UNESCO, 'Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation', 16 November 1945.

[30] I. Berlin, 'The purpose of philosophy', in *Concepts and categories: philosophical essays,* 2nd edition, ed. Henry Hardy, 1-14 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013[1978]), p. 14.

2.2 The BWP in (inter)national development

Beyond its larger relevance in contemporary politics, the BWP finds one of its most direct manifestations in the contexts of (inter)national development.[31] Indeed, development's *raison d'être* can be said to centre on the very idea of a better world. For more than 70 years, its ideas and institutions have been pitted against some of humankind's most challenging problems. From global poverty to inequality, democracy, health, and human rights, its cause has rallied substantial resources in the name of social progress. With a broad remit expanded under de-colonisation and postwar reconstruction, development stands as one of the most ambitious endeavours to improve the human condition in contemporary history.

However, development remains particularly susceptible to the BWP in light of its global mission and scope. For one, it aims to improve lives across the breadth of human diversity. Added to this is a diversity in conceptions of development, itself (e.g. economic growth, good governance, basic needs). Necessary to *all* such definitions are basic metaphysical premises defining 'better' and 'world'. However, the legitimacy of such premises can severely deteriorate in foreign metaphysical or normative waters. As warned earlier by Popper, good intentions are no guarantee of good outcomes.[32]

Indeed, development already bears the scars of past conflicts and tragedies. As argued by postdevelopment critics, its capacity to do good is also used to do evil.[33] With past cases including the Washington Consensus, development dictatorships, and the tyranny of experts, development is posed as not a solution but a *source* of contemporary social problems. Notably, recent decades have seen critiques coalesce around 'neoliberalism' as a key antagonist.[34] How-ever, one does not even need an antagonist to imagine tragic outcomes; for all that is required (*à la* Hegel and Berlin) are conflicting notions of the good.

Yet, despite its controversies, development continues to carry real-world significance amidst the sheer scale of its institutional machinery. From the UN to the World Bank, NGOs, and government ministries, the institutional trappings of the idea of development continue to command sizeable resources into the twenty-first century. The UN Development Programme (UNDP), for example—just one of 32 agencies in the wider UN Development Group—has

---

[31] Some scholars prefer the use of 'global development' due to purportedly state-centric connotations in 'international development' (even more-so in 'national development'). Given the ambiguity of the term 'development', however, this work defaults to 'international' given its wider recognition. See R. Horner and D. Hulme, 'From international to global development: new geographies of 21st century development', *Development and Change* (2017), DOI: 10.1111/dech.12379. Unless specified or made clear from the contexts of its discussion, 'development' will generally refer to development, *in toto*, for the purposes of this thesis. This includes its ideas, institutions, and associated actors and efforts.

[32] Popper, *The open society*, p. xii.

[33] See, for example, A. Escobar, *Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); M. Rahnema and V. Bawtree (eds.), *The post-development reader* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); W. Sachs (ed.), *The development dictionary: a guide to knowledge as power* (London: Zed Books, 1992).

[34] For a semantic history, see T.C. Boas and J. Gans-Morse, 'Neoliberalism: from new liberal philosophy to anti-liberal slogan', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44.2 (2009), 137-61.

nearly 6,000 officers posted in 149 countries worldwide.[35] As a further indication of its status, the head of UNDP is accorded the third-highest-ranking seat in the UN. In terms of financing, the 29 countries constituting the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) contributed more than $315 billion USD in development assistance in 2015, alone.[36] This volume was on par with the economic output (in GDP) of the 32nd largest country in the world. Notably, this figure does not include the sizable and growing volume of development assistance from China and other non-DAC members (e.g. in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank). Nor does it include the institutional capacities manifest in a vast network of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and academic bases (e.g. university programmes, experts) around the world. Thus, while development may be cast as ineffective, its ideas and institutions can hardly be described as irrelevant—much to postdevelopment theory's dismay.

Consequently, development is caught in a dilemma. On one hand, it is charged with the mandate and resources to realise a better world. On the other, it stands charged of destroying them. The BWP lays bare this fundamental impasse via its notion of plural and conflicting better worlds. Development may not offer the straight path to progress that some—including its critics—seem to expect. As Robert Packenham unpacks in an early work, an optimistic but naïve faith that 'all good things go together' premised US political development theories.[37] Similar assumptions can be found in a faith in purely rational, quantitative methods in US (and increasingly global) forms of social science. But as Berlin often warns, borrowing from Kant, 'out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made'.[38]

By highlighting our deeper human diversity, the BWP enables a greater recognition of the philosophical-*cum*-political dilemmas inextricable to development. This is a recognition that continues to defy much of development theory, policy, and practice—just as it escapes Berlin's aforementioned philosophers and Keynes' practical men.[39] What lies at stake then are the future prospects of one of the most ambitious—and equally controversial—endeavors to realise a better world in the twenty-first century.

---

[35] Figures for 2015 were 5,912 staff spread across 207 cities in 149 countries; see UN Chief Executive Board, 'UN System HR statistics report - 2015', Ref: CEB/2016/HLCM/HR/20.

[36] Note that the OECD DAC now has 30 member countries, following the addition of Hungary in 2016. OECD, 'Total flows by donor (ODA+OOF+Private) [DAC1]', OECD.Stat [database, 2017].

[37] This refers not to more recent US mishaps in foreign statecraft, but to older Vietnam War-era political development precedents from the 1950s and 1960s. Scholars here include W.W. Rostow, Gabriel Almond, Samuel Huntington, and Lucian Pye. See R.A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: political development ideas in foreign aid and social science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

[38] See I. Berlin, 'The pursuit of the ideal', in *The proper study of mankind: an anthology of essays,* eds. Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer, 1-16 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1997), p. 16.

[39] Berlin, 'Two concepts of liberty', p. 119; Keynes, *The general theory,* p. 383.

3. A Problem Unrecognised

The BWP has thus been introduced as a political-*cum*-philosophical problem responding to post-Cold War globalisation and humanity's increasingly entangled lives. How, then, does this work plan on addressing it?

To start, addressing this problem faces the rather awkward fact that the BWP does not yet formally exist. Despite tangentially-related works across the humanities and social science (as seen in citations thus far), no direct equivalent in form or substance was found. Indeed, searching for 'better worlds problem', 'better world problem', and even 'better world collisions' found no matching results in Google Book's database of English-language works covering all countries from 1900-2008.[40] This is in contrast to the prevalence of 'better world' in these very same semantic contexts (see Figure 1).

As such, attempting to solve the BWP may be futile if no one recognises that it exists. A problem unrecognised goes unsolved, so to speak. Without first establishing the existence of a problem, any ensuing results risk falling on deaf ears. As such, this work turns to history— more precisely, the **intellectual history of international development—**to explore the very existence of a BWP. To recall, its significance was tied here to (inter)national politics and development. It is in the latter domain that ideal empirical grounds are found for this present study. This choice of development can be traced to two factors: *(i)* theoretical compatibility and *(ii)* practical significance.

Figure 1. The frequency of *'better world'* (in blue), *'better worlds'* (in red), and *'worlds collide'* (in green) in Google Books' indexed English-language works published between 1900-2008. Values for the bottom two lines are **multiplied twenty-fold** in order to enable visual comparison with the 'better world'. Values display three-year moving averages (i.e. a smoothing factor of 1).

---

[40] Exact search query: 'Better World+Better world+better world,(Better Worlds+Better worlds+better worlds)*20,(Worlds Collide+Worlds collide+worlds collide)*20'; see Google, 'Google Books Ngram Viewer', 2012 Database (ID: 'googlebooks-eng-all-20120701') for books predominantly in English published in any country [https://books.google.com/ngrams/, accessed 8 March 2019].

As highlighted by critics, development is highly susceptible to better world collisions. For one, its global mission and scope invoke the breadth of humankind's cultural diversity. Development further holds the status of an obvious or self-evident good. Its conflicts thus echo Hegel's tragedies of two goods coming to collide. This species of tragedy departs from old narratives of *good versus evil*—the value of which grows increasingly dim in globalising times. Furthermore, development's tragedies invoke the metaphysical perceptions generated by its academic scholars. Their highly formalised theories enable precise documentation of what *exactly* is meant by development and its better world. As noted by pioneering development economist and policymaker Paul Streeten:

> Practical men reach agreement by blurring distinctions, academics by sharpening them. If you spell out your meaning too clearly, there will be some interests that will object. The academic reaches agreement by clarifying his meaning, by heightening distinctions, so that he knows what the difference is about.[41]

Development's academic discourse thus offers ideal grounds relative to policy or even broader public discourses, where explicit theoretical premises underlying talk of a better world may remain difficult to identify.

Second, the choice of development brings the possibility of producing immediate, real-world impact. To recall, the idea of development continues to wield sizeable influence as one of the most ambitious endeavours to improve the human condition in contemporary history. This study, in resituating development ideas in their geopolitical realities, stands to offer direct insights for the reform of development theory, policy, and practice. This is made all the more relevant in light of present concerns regarding the efficacy of development ideas and institutions amidst marked geopolitical shifts. Development thus offers both theoretical and practical value; a proverbial opportunity to hit two birds with one stone.

As such, this thesis takes a historical approach to the BWP, exploring its problem *(i.e., how to build a better world amidst a conflicting plurality of them)* through past lessons derived from the many ways in which development scholars have attempted to define said better world. In effect, the BWP is thus divided into *(i)* descriptive and *(ii)* prescriptive orientations; that is, *(i)* how *have* we defined a better world versus *(ii)* how *should* we define a better world. Only with the benefit of hindsight in the former does it become profitable to return to the prescriptive aims in the latter. This interdisciplinary problem tied to politics and philosophy now finds history added to the mix. What, then, has already been written of past better worlds in the intellectual history of international development?

---

[41] R. Jolly and P. Streeten. 'Transcript of interview of Paul Streeten by Richard Jolly', United Nations Intellectual History Project, Spencertown, New York, 28-29 May 2001, p. 127.

4. Situating the BWP in history and historiography

Yet another roadblock is faced here, as the intellectual history of international development *also* does not yet formally exist.[42] As such, the ensuing sections turn to three bodies of prior work that offer perhaps the closest precedents in substance, if not form, to be found:

> ***4.1*** Historians writing the history of development (1990s-2010s)
>
> ***4.2*** Development scholars writing the history of development (1970s-2010s)
>
> ***4.3*** Historians writing the history of progress (1910s-1980s)

The first comes from a group of *academic* historians (i.e. those formally trained in the field of history), who have begun to amass a substantial historiography on development. Second is an older, substantial, but fragmented historiography from development scholars located in the social sciences. Third is the historiography on the idea of progress. Referring to a particular Western concept, its reincarnation is foreseen in the idea of development. Altogether, these works chart some ideal metaphysical waters in which the BWP might be planted.

4.1 Historians writing the history of development (1990s-2010s)

Recent decades have brought rapid proliferation in research on development's history within the academic field of history, itself. When tracing its intellectual genealogy, three subsets of work can be identified. The first is tied to a group of US diplomatic historians, largely centred around the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) and its journal, *Diplomatic History*. Part of a self-labelled 'first wave', their work in the 1990s and 2000s lay grounds for the broadening scholarship to come.[43]

Second is a smaller group of German international historians. Their English-language publications contribute a distinct but complementary set of historiographical views missing from the first wave. Trained in Germany and based in European universities, their surrounding contexts add an important foil to those framing their US counterparts.

Third is the amalgamated body of works from historians (both new and old, US and European) in the past decade. Shaped by internal reflection, international debate, and new additions between the preceding two bodies, they capture a shift towards a more inclusive historiography. The following subsections unpack each set of scholars and scholarship in turn (see also Tables 1,3, and 4 for the list of reviewed scholars).

---

[42] The same applies to the 'history of the idea of development'.

[43] See D.C. Engerman, 'The Second World's Third World.' *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12.1 (2011) 183-211; J.M. Hodge, 'Writing the history of development (part 1: the first wave)', *Humanity* 6.3 (2015), 429-63; J.M. Hodge, 'Writing the history of development (part 2: longer, deeper, wider)', *Humanity* 7.1 (2016), 125-74.

4.1.1 US diplomatic histories (1990s-2000s)

A concerted historiography on development from professional historians largely coalesces by the 2000s.[44] Its arrival is perhaps best captured in Nick Cullather's oft-cited 2000 research note, entitled 'Development? It's history'.[45] Based on US shores, the following six scholars contribute a first wave of works in the wake of the Cold War.[46] In order of PhDs, they include Nick Cullather (1992), Michael E. Latham (1996), David C. Engerman (1998), Joseph M. Hodge (1999), Nils Gilman (2000), and David Ekbladh (2003) (see Table 1).

Historian	PhD Location	PhD Title
Nick Cullather	**1992** History, Univ. Virginia	A Cold War partnership: the politics of United States-Philippines relations, 1941-1960
Michael E. Latham	**1996** History, UCLA	Modernization as ideology: social scientific theory, national identity, and American foreign policy, 1961-1963
David C. Engerman	**1998** History, UC Berkeley	America, Russia, and the romance of economic development
Joseph M. Hodge	**1999** History, Queen's Univ. Kingston	Development and science: British colonialism and the rise of the 'expert', 1895-1945
Nils Gilman	**2000** History, UC Berkeley	Paving the world with good intentions: the genesis of modernization theory
David Ekbladh	**2003** History, Columbia Univ.	A workshop for the world: modernization as a tool in U.S. foreign relations in Asia, 1914-1973

Table 1. US diplomatic historians of development (in order of PhD completion).

Cullather starts in the 1990s with an early focus on US Cold War relations with the Philippines.[47] Built on archival research partly enabled by an early role as CIA staff historian, these expand to other Cold War hotspots in US foreign policy (e.g. Taiwan, Guatemala).[48] With the benefit of distance offered by the end of the Cold War, Cullather's works critically reassess Cold War narratives from prior US diplomatic historians. By the 2000s, this critical

---

[44] Notable works here include M.E. Latham, *Modernization as ideology: American social science and "nation building" in the Kennedy era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); D.C. Engerman, *Modernization from the other shore: American intellectuals and the romance of Russian development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); N. Gilman, *Mandarins of the future: modernization theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); D.C. Engerman, N. Gilman, M.H. Haefele, and M.E. Latham (eds.), *Staging growth: modernization, development, and the global Cold War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003); J.M. Hodge, *Triumph of the expert: agrarian doctrines of development and the legacies of British colonialism* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007).

[45] N. Cullather, 'Research note: development? It's history', *Diplomatic History* 24.4 (2000), 641-53.

[46] Note that this is slightly different from the 'first wave' proposed by Engerman and Hodge, who add the work of anthropologists and—in Hodge's case—precludes most post-2001 works; see Engerman, 'The Second World's'; Hodge, 'Writing the history (part 1)'; Hodge, 'Writing the history (part 2)'.

[47] See N. Cullather, 'The limits of multilateralism: making policy for the Philippines, 1945-1950', *The International History Review* 13.1 (1991), 70-95; N. Cullather, 'America's boy? Ramon Magsaysay and the illusion of influence', *Pacific Historical Review* 62.3 (1993), 305-38; N. Cullather, *Illusions of influence: the political economy of United States-Philippines relations, 1942-1960* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

[48] N. Cullather, '"Fuel for the good dragon": the United States and industrial policy in Taiwan, 1950-1965', *Diplomatic History* 20.1 (1996), 1-26; N. Cullather, *Secret history: the CIA's classified account of its operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

approach finds fuller form under post-structuralist influences. Citing the likes of James C. Scott and Foucault, ensuing works evoke a shift from the history of US foreign policies to the history of the *ideas* underlying them (e.g. ideas of modernity underpinning Philippines' Green Revolution or dam-building in Afghanistan).[49] Adding to critical views is the post-9/11 US war on terror, which breathes new life into old development or modernisation ideas.[50]

Latham adds a focus on US-Vietnam Cold War relations to Cullather's US and Philippines, framed—like Cullather—in terms of 'modernization'.[51] Examining Vietnam War-era policies under US presidents Kennedy and Johnson, these policies and surrounding politics are explicitly tied to ideas originating from US social science.[52] In particular, Latham frames modernisation ideas as an *ideology* or, citing Edward Said, a part of 'the "impressive ideological formations" that support and define "a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society".'[53] Echoing Cullather's critical reflections of prior US historiography, this theoretical framing engenders an analytical focus on the *de facto* imperialist aspects colouring US Cold War policies.

Gilman adds to the explicit ties between US social science and US foreign policy during the Cold War. Presented in a sole 2000 monograph, Gilman traces the rise and fall of US modernization theory in the 1950s and 60s.[54] Designed in the halls of MIT and Harvard, it travels to the CIA and White House for export to Cold War battlefields around the world. The resulting morals of this history resonate with the critiques of Cullather and Latham of an American hubris underwriting its Cold War-era foreign policies.[55] But if the early works of Gilman, Latham, and Cullather highlight common strands in this first wave of literature, then the latter three historians highlight its internal diversity and future directions to come.

Ekbladh continues the focus on modernisation to frame US foreign relations around the world, particularly in East Asia. However, works here strike a temporal shift. Namely, the

---

[49] N. Cullather, 'Damming Afghanistan: modernization in a buffer state', *Journal of American History* 89.2 (2002), 512-37; N. Cullather, 'Miracles of modernization: the Green Revolution and the apotheosis of technology', *Diplomatic History* 28.2 (2004), 227-54; N. Cullather, 'The foreign policy of the calorie', *American Historical Review* 112.2 (2007), 337-64.

[50] Cullather, 'Damming Afghanistan'; N. Cullather, 'Bombing at the speed of thought: intelligence in the coming age of cyberwar', *Intelligence and National Security* 18.4 (2003), 141-54.

[51] M.E. Latham, 'Modernization theory', in *Explaining the history of American foreign relations,* eds. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson, 212-20 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); M.E. Latham, 'Modernization', in *The Cambridge history of science (part IV),* eds. Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy Ross, 721-34 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[52] See M.E. Latham, 'Ideology, social science, and destiny: modernization and the Kennedy-era Alliance for Progress', *Diplomatic History* 22.2 (1998), 199-229; Latham, *Modernization as ideology*; M.E. Latham, 'Imperial legacy and Cold War credibility: Lyndon Johnson and the Panama Crisis', *Peace & Change* 27.4 (2002), 499-527.

[53] Excerpt from Said in Latham, 'Imperial legacy', p. 500; original in E. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), p. 9. See also references to precedents in the works of E.S. Rosenberg, R.A. Packenham, W.A. Williams, and others in footnote [10] of Latham, 'Ideology, social science', p. 206.

[54] Gilman, *Mandarins of the future.*

[55] See N. Gilman, 'Modernization theory, the highest stage of American intellectual history', in *Staging growth: modernization, development, and the global Cold War,* eds. David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael E. Latham, 47-80 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).

Magic Letters – The TVA model's global reach, *1959* (*Milwaukee Journal*)

Figure 2. Global expansion of the US Tennesse Valley Authority project as a development idea or ideal (figure from Ekbladh, 'Mr. TVA', p. 354).

prior motif of 'US in the world' now finds itself in *pre-Cold War* contexts.[56] Ekbladh's early works thus add accounts set in 1920s China and the US. Further, in the place of modernisation theory, it is an earlier 1930s vintage of social engineering—the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)—that occupies the limelight. Exported as a template for development projects around the world, they trace broader intellectual and political terrain in which to situate Cold War development (or 'modernization'; see Figure 2, above).

Hodge departs not only the Cold War, but also US shores—examining instead the explicit imperialism of British Empire at the turn of the nineteenth century.[57] A key feature here is the role of scientific or bureaucratic expertise in British ideas of colonial development. Hodge's works thus enable a striking comparison to neighbouring US histories. Though offset in space and time, one finds a similar cast of ideas and actors, whether in the Colonial Office over the CIA, a focus on agricultural policy over high modernity, or the role of Cambridge academics instead of MIT or Harvard. Common to all, however, is a core narrative tracing particular forms of technical knowledge to flawed if not imperialistic foreign policies.

Finally, **Engerman** is reserved for last due to his key role in charting research directions to come. Like Hodge and Ekbladh, Engerman's early work starts in pre-Cold War contexts.

---

[56] D. Ekbladh, '"Mr. TVA": grass-roots development, David Lilienthal, and the rise and fall of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a symbol for US overseas development, 1933-1973', *Diplomatic History* 26.3 (2002), 335-74; D. Ekbladh, 'To reconstruct the medieval: rural reconstruction in interwar China and the rise of an American style of modernization, 1921–1961', *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 9.3-4 (2000), 169-96.

[57] J.M. Hodge, 'Science, development, and empire: the colonial advisory council on agriculture and animal health, 1929-43', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 30.1 (2002), 1-26; Hodge, *Triumph of the expert;* J.M. Hodge, 'British colonial expertise, post-colonial careering and the early history of international development', *Journal of Modern European History* 8.1 (2010), 24-46.

Complementing Ekbladh's account of US-China relations in the 1920s, Engerman writes of US-Soviet relations post-1917 Russian Revolution.[58] Like Hodge and Gilman, Engerman also focuses on the role of academia in development history; in this case, the career of Soviet Studies in the US since the 1920s.[59] Perhaps most marked, however, is the lineage of the ideas in question. Though seen through the eyes of US scholars and officials, it is a *Soviet* vision that takes centre stage; or 'the romance of economic development', citing US diplomat George Kennan.[60] With Hodge, this adds to an early geography of development ideas (i.e. 'modernisation from the other shore'). Together, these works on Soviet development and Soviet studies lay out Engerman's twin strands in international and intellectual history.

Ekbladh, Engerman, and Hodge thus expand beyond the early grounds laid by Cullather, Gilman, and Latham. Engerman, in particular, has been prolific in mapping past, present, and future directions.[61] A 2009 introduction written with Corinna Unger (a German historian soon to be discussed) thus prefaces a shift towards a more global historiography.[62] Before proceeding to German historians, however, two salient features can be highlighted in this first wave.

First is the extent to which it represents a unified corpus of works. Hardly the work of disparate historians in isolation, they reflect concerted efforts within the US diplomatic history community. One indication is their shared origins in early post-Cold War political contexts, rendering critical views of past US ideas and Cold War policies. Highlighting a post-Cold War US hubris, Gilman offers some insight in the 2003 preface to *Mandarins of the future:*

> This project was conceived and researched during the Clinton years. At that time, I was struck by how much modernization theory's relentless optimism and self-congratulation reminded me of the dominant emotional tone of Clintonian America. I considered Francis Fukuyama's success in revivifying modernization theory a result of the theory's comfortable fit with the emotional-intellectual landscape of the 1990s. If "The End of History" was modernization theory redux, it made

---

[58] D.C. Engerman, 'Economic reconstruction in Soviet Russia: the courting of Herbert Hoover in 1922', *The International History Review* 19.4 (1997), 836-47; D.C. Engerman, 'Modernization from the other shore: American observers and the costs of Soviet economic development', *The American Historical Review* 105.2 (2000), 383-416; D.C. Engerman, 'John Dewey and the Soviet Union: pragmatism meets revolution', *Modern Intellectual History* 3.1 (2006), 33-63.

[59] D.C. Engerman, 'New society, new scholarship: Soviet studies programmes in interwar America', *Minerva,* 37.1 (1999), 25-43; D.C. Engerman, 'The ironies of the Iron Curtain: the Cold War and the rise of Russian studies in the United States', *Cahiers du monde russe* 45.3-4 (2004), 465-95; D.C. Engerman, *Know your enemy: the rise and fall of America's soviet experts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

[60] Engerman, *Modernization from the other;* D.C. Engerman, 'The romance of economic development and new histories of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History* 28.1 (2004), 23-54.

[61] See, for example, Engerman, 'The romance of economic'; D.C. Engerman, 'Bernath Lecture: American knowledge and global power', *Diplomatic History* 31.4 (2007), 599-622; D.C. Engerman and C.R. Unger, 'Introduction: towards a global history of modernization', *Diplomatic History* 33.3 (2009), 375-85; D.C. Engerman, 'The Second World's Third World', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12.1 (2011), 183-211.

[62] Engerman and Unger, 'Introduction'.

sense that this rehabilitation would take place at a time when America felt confi-
dent in its economic, political, and ideological superiority. The celebrators of
globalization were the heirs of modernization theory.

Then 9-11 happened and everything changed.

Yet somehow the discourse on modernization continued the comeback it
had begun with the end of the cold war. Except now the renewed discourse of
modernity, instead of representing conservative self-congratulation, became the
position of liberal internationalists who hoped to add some carrots to the bag of
sticks that the Bush regime presented as its main approach for dealing with the
post–9-11 world. The middlebrow media, doing their bit, relentlessly contrasted
America's "modernity" to the barbarism of its enemies.

While many Europeans and other foreigners took this American auto-cel-
ebration to be a sign of unreflective, crude American neo-imperialism, the reality
seemed to me to be that all the celebration of America's wonderful modernity
was, in fact, a thin cover for a deep-seated anxiety about the state of the world
and about America's role in it. That combination of anxiety and a desire to deny
that anxiety by shouting to the world how great we are in turn reminded me of
something else about the 1950s.[63]

The ensuing US war on terror incites explicit reactions from every historian (save for Hodge),
who see the return of past mishaps in US foreign policy.[64] It is perhaps unsurprising, then, to
note that all are also based in US universities. It is also telling that Hodge, the only foreign
PhD holder (harkening from Canada) is the only *not* to focus on the US. Another institutional
base is the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). In addition to
many works appearing in its journal, *Diplomatic History,* Cullather serves as journal co-editor
and Engerman as a former president. Added to the many cross-acknowledgements in these
works, they evidence a distinct epistemic community based in US diplomatic history.[65]

Second is the *distinct style* of development historiography that emerges in these works.
Leveraging Cold War archives, their works skilfully weave political and intellectual strands
in development's history. Another aspect is the shared spatial-temporal contexts of not only
these historians, but of their histories, as well. That is, they remain largely centred on the US

---

[63] Gilman, *Mandarins of the future*, p. ix.

[64] Sample works responding to post-9/11 US foreign interventions: Cullather, 'Damming Afghanistan';
Cullather, 'Bombing at the speed'; Gilman, *Mandarins of the future;* M.E. Latham, 'Redirecting the
revolution? The USA and the failure of nation-building in South Vietnam', *Third World Quarterly*
27.1 (2006), 27-41; D. Ekbladh, 'From consensus to crisis: the postwar career of nation-building in
US foreign relations', in *Nation-building: beyond Afghanistan and Iraq,* ed. Francis Fukuyama, 19-41
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); Engerman, *Know your enemy.*

[65] See, for the example, cross-acknowledgements in: Engerman, 'Modernization from the other shore';
Ekbladh, 'Mr. TVA'; Latham, 'Imperial legacy'; Cullather, 'Damming Afghanistan'; Engerman, 'Ber-
nath Lecture'; Cullather, 'The foreign policy of the calorie'.

in Cold War contexts (see Table 2). Here, the works of Ekbladh, Engerman, and Hodge again provide early precedents for expansion beyond the US into broader global views.

Primary historiographical era

		pre-Cold War	Cold War
Imperial power	**US**	Ekbladh, Engerman	Cullather, Engerman, Gilman, Latham
	UK	Hodge	

Table 2. Temporal-geographical focus of first-wave post-Cold War US diplomatic historians

A final point regarding historiographical methods is the influence of **post-structuralism**. One analytical inheritance is the focus on knowledge tied to power; most notably seen in the ties between US social science and US foreign policy. Another inheritance is seen in the focus on an inherent violence and the repeated failings of power; again, focusing on a Cold War US imperialism. When inspecting these works, however, there is little sign of a direct inheritance or formal training in, say, Foucault, Derrida, or Heidegger. Rather, this influence seems to be more of an *indirect inheritance* via *double translation* from anthropology (e.g. Arturo Escobar, James Ferguson, James C. Scott).[66] At the same time, as Hodge's critiques make clear, this is not a wholesale or uncritical adoption from their ethnography-centric brethren (note the all-male scholars thus far).[67] As such, it would be more accurate to situate these US diplomatic historians and anthropologists in a shared intellectual or academic *milieu* more than as formal branches in post-structuralism's family tree.

---

[66] A. Escobar, *Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); J. Ferguson, *The anti-politics machine: "development," depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho* (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1994); J.C. Scott, *Seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

See also anthropologists and first-wave historians cited by Engerman, 'The Second World's', p. 187:

'Scholarship on American modernization and development programs has both expanded and transformed in the last decade. Pioneering accounts on the topic were written by anthropologists who were deeply critical of U.S. aid. A first wave of historical work analyzed the projects using documents from official U.S. archives to show how ideas about modernization shaped American policy discussions.'

[67] See Hodge's critical assessment of post-structuralist narratives when introducing the present state of the field in *Triumph of the expert,* pp. 2-3.

4.1.2 German global histories (2000s-2010s)

A small group of German historians stage an intervention in the US historiography by 2010. Publishing in English since the 2000s, their works ballast those of their US counterparts.[68] These historians, all trained in German universities and now based in European institutions, include Marc Frey (2004), Corinna R. Unger (2005), and Sönke Kunkel (2011) (see Table 3).

Historian	PhD Location	PhD Title
Marc Frey	**2004** History, Univ. Cologne	Decolonization in Southeast Asia, the United States, and the dissolution of European colonial empires
Corinna R. Unger	**2005** History, Univ. Freiburg	East research in West Germany: the exploration of the European East and the German Research Foundation, 1945-1975
Sönke Kunkel	**2011** History, Jacobs Univ. Bremen	Iconic empire: the United States and the rise of the visual age, 1961-1974

Table 3. German international historians of development (in order of PhD completion).[69]

    Frey works on development history since the early 2000s, focusing on decolonisation.[70] Looking to Europe, the US, and Southeast Asia, references to Cullather and Latham and work in *Diplomatic History* evidence an early familiarity with the US historiography.[71] However, this engagement takes a brief hiatus amidst a focus on German-language publications.[72] It is not until 2011 that Frey re-enters the Anglophone stream, parlaying prior work on population into a global history of neo-Malthusianism in development theory and practice.[73] Published alongside it is a historiographical critique written with Sönke Kunkel, which lays out a point of (re-)entry. Commenting on the burgeoning US historiography, Frey and Kunkel write:

---

[68] Notable works here include: C.R. Unger, 'Histories of development and modernization: findings, reflections, future research', *H-Soz-Kult* 09.12.2010 (http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum/2010-12-001); M. Frey and S. Kunkel, 'Writing the history of development: a review of the recent literature', *Contemporary European History* 20.2 (2011), 215-32; M. Frey, S. Kunkel, and C.R. Unger (eds.), *International organizations and development, 1945-1990* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); C.R. Unger, *International development: a postwar history* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018).

[69] German titles: (Borowy) *Diplomatie als Balanceakt: die Nahostpolitik der Eisenhoweradministration 1953-57 im Schatten der Suezkrise;* (Frey) *Dekolonisierung in Südostasien: die Vereinigten Staaten und die Auflösung der europäischen Kolonialreiche;* (Unger) *Ostforschung in Westdeutschland: die Erforschung des europäischen Ostens und die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 1945-1975.*

[70] See M. Frey, 'Control, legitimacy, and the securing of interests: European development policy in Southeast Asia from the late colonial period to the early 1960s', *Contemporary European History* 12.4 (2003), 395-412; M. Frey, 'Tools of empire: persuasion and the U.S. modernizing mission in Southeast Asia', *Diplomatic History* 27.4 (2003), 541-66; M. Frey, 'Visions of the future: the United States and colonialism in Southeast Asia, 1940-1945', *Amerikastudien* 48.3 (2003): 365-88; M. Frey, 'Decolonization in Southeast Asia, the United States, and the dissolution of European colonial empires, PhD dissertation, University of Cologne, 2005.

[71] See Frey, 'Tools of empire'; Frey, 'Control, legitimacy, and the securing'.

[72] See, for example, M. Frey, *Dekolonisierung in Südostasien: Die Vereinigten Staaten und die Auflösung der europäischen Kolonialreiche, 1930-1961* (München: Oldenbourg, 2006) [Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: the United States and the dissolution of European colonial empire, 1930-1961]; M. Frey, 'Experten, Stiftungen und Politik: Zur Genese des globalen Diskurses über Bevölkerung seit 1945', *Zeithistorische Studien* 4.1-2 (2007), 137-59 [Experts, foundations and politics: on the genesis of the global discourse on the population since 1945].

[73] See M. Frey, 'Neo-Malthusianism and development: shifting interpretations of a contested paradigm', *Journal of Global History* 6.1 (2011), 75-97; Frey and Kunkel, 'Writing the history'.

They have *[...]* appropriated as genuinely American the concept of modernisation as well as the practices and discourses of development and development assistance to a point where one could speak of a hegemonisation of the history of development. According to their master narrative, the Point Four Program, initiated by President Harry S. Truman in 1949, inaugurated the development era.[74]

This critique is not without problems. For one, some of the offending narratives cited come from the social sciences more than history (Escobar and Rist are erroneously grouped under the latter).[75] However, its premise of a preoccupation in the US historiography with US-centric Cold War narratives certainly falls in line with the observed prior works.

Unger predates Frey and Kunkel in two historiographical critiques; one co-authored with Engerman in 2009 and another written in 2010.[76] Resonating with the arguments above, Unger observes a 'transatlantic divide' in the US versus German historiography.[77] Commenting elsewhere on a sort of 'methodological nationalism' manifest in its implicit biases, Unger adds to calls for a more globally-inclusive development historiography.[78] Unger further contributes her own pieces to this incomplete larger puzzle. One is in works on West German and US visions, as they cooperate and compete in the arena of Indian development.[79] Another lies in Unger's German-language works investigating German social science and knowledge production under Cold War contexts.[80] Alongside Frey, they add emphasis on the role of decolonisation and European empires, often overlooked in the US historiography (Hodge again being a notable exception).

---

[74] Frey and Kunkel, 'Writing the history', p. 217.

[75] Ibid., p. 217, footnote [10] cites D. Ekbladh, *The great American mission: modernization and the construction of an American world order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Escobar, *Encountering development*; G. Rist, *The history of development: from Western origins to global faith, revised edition* (London: Zed Books, 2002).

[76] See Engerman and Unger, 'Introduction: towards a global'; Unger, 'Histories of development'.

[77] Unger, 'Histories of development'.

[78] C.R. Unger, 'Comment on Joseph Hodge, on the historiography of development (part I and II)', *Humanity,* Joseph Hodge Roundtable 28 April 2016 (http://humanityjournal.org/blog/comment-on-joseph-hodge-on-the-historiography-of-development-part-i-and-ii/).

[79] C.R. Unger, 'Modernization à la mode: West German and American development plans for the Third World', *Bulletin of the GHI Washington* 40 (2007), 143-59; C.R. Unger, 'Industrialization vs. agrarian reform: West German modernization policies in India in the 1950s and 1960s', *Journal of Modern European History* 8.1 (2010), 47-65; C.R. Unger, 'Towards global equilibrium: American foundations and Indian modernization, 1950s to 1970s', *Journal of Global History* 6.1 (2011), 121-42.

[80] C.R. Unger, 'Objektiv, aber nicht neutral: Zur Entwicklung der Ostforschung nach 1945', *Osteuropa* 55.12 (2005), 113-31 *[Objective but not neutral: on the development of Eastern research after 1945];* C.R. Unger, 'Cold War Science: Wissenschaft, Politik und Ideologie im Kalten Krieg', *Neue Politische Literatur* 51.1 (2006), 49-68 *[Cold War science: science, politics and ideology in the Cold War];* C.R. Unger, *Ostforschung in Westdeutschland: Die Erforschung des europäischen Ostens und die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 1945-1975* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2007) *[Ostforschung in West Germany: research of the European East and the German Research Foundation, 1945-1975].*

Kunkel, working alongside both Frey and Unger, approaches development and modernisation via global history, postcolonial history, international politics, and international organisations.[81] A unique aspect here is a layering of visual history with the history of empire, as seen in Kunkel's PhD and subsequent monograph.[82] Countering prior top-down narratives of US-enforced modernity with the bottom-up reception of imperial ideas of progress in the Global South, it offers perspective overlooked in the incumbent historiography.[83]

Together, Frey, Unger, and Kunkel add important **historical** and **historiographical** contributions. In the former are new accounts of development that afford greater recognition to colonialism and European empire. Their ensuing policies (e.g. West German for Unger; British, Dutch, and French for Frey) greatly expand the geographical map of development.[84] In particular, they contrast accounts charting the rise of US empire with a fall or controlled descent of European empires amidst post-World War reconstruction and decolonisation.

These historiographical contributions shed light on important biases and blindspots in prior first-wave histories.[85] Countering US narratives with European ones, they highlight broader directions to be explored. Examples include a shift from a US to a global Cold War, closer study of the role of experts and knowledge production, and the addition of missing actors and arenas (e.g. in gender, environment, health). A note must also be made of the many works *not* in English, which may offer much value.[86] They remind that the US historiography is but one of many silos in development's interdisciplinary and international landscape. When adding a transnational turn in broader German historiography to post-structuralist influences imported via anthropology in the US, they also remind that the field of history, too, is shaped by and subjected to the currents of its own times.[87]

---

[81] See S. Kunkel, 'Trajectories of decolonization: elites and the transformation from the colonial to the postcolonial', *Bulletin of the GHI Washington* 44 (2009), 95-9; Frey and Kunkel, 'Writing the history of development'; Frey, Kunkel, and Unger, *International organizations and development.*

[82] S. Kunkel, 'Iconic empire: the United States and the rise of the visual age, 1961–1974', PhD Dissertation, Jacobs University Bremen, 2011; S. Kunkel, *Empire of pictures: global media and the 1960s remaking of American foreign policy* (New York: Berghahn, 2016).

[83] See chapter 4 of Kunkel, *Empire of pictures*, p. 80-103.

[84] Frey, 'Control, legitimacy, and the securing'; Unger, 'Modernization à la mode'.

[85] Engerman and Unger, 'Introduction'; Unger, 'Histories of development'; Frey and Kunkel, 'Writing the history'.

[86] Examples include: M. Frey, 'Experten, Stiftungen und Politik' *[Experts, foundations and politics]*; S. Kunkel, 'Systeme des Wissens, Visionen von Fortschritt Die Vereinigten Staaten, das Jahrzehnt der Modernisierungstheorie', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 48 (2008), 155-82 *[Systems of Knowledge, Visions of Progress The United States, the Decade of Modernization Theory]*; C.R. Unger, *Entwicklungspfade in Indien: Eine internationale Geschichte, 1947-1980* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2015) *[Development paths in India: an international history, 1947-1980]*; C.R. Unger, 'Knappheit—Hemmnis oder Sprungbrett? Indische Entwicklungsstrategien zwischen Intervention und Eigensinn', *Zeitschrift für Kulturwissenschaften* 1 (2011), 45-54 *[Scarcity —obstruction or stepping stone? Indian development strategies between intervention and attachment]*; C.R. Unger, 'Rourkela, ein "Stahlwerk im Dschungel": Industrialisierung, Modernisierung und Entwicklungshilfe im Kontext von Dekolonisation und Kaltem Krieg (1950-1970)', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 48 (2008), 367-88 *[Rourkela, a 'steelworks in the jungle': industrialization, modernization and development assistance in the context of decolonization and the Cold War (1950-1970)]*; C.R. Unger, 'Cold War Science'.

[87] See J.L. Jenkins. K. Manjapra. H-E Kim, Y-S Hong. C.R. Unger, and B. Naranch. 'Forum: Asia, Germany, and the transnational turn', *German History* 28.4 (2010), 515-36, p. 519.

4.1.3 New global histories (2010s-..)

Works since 2010 evidence a new expansion in the development historiography. If Cullather's 2000 article heralds its entrance, then the critiques of Cullather, Engerman, Frey, and Kunkel around 2010 galvanise a new phase of scholarship.[88] Its expanded scope is partly enabled by the entrance of a number of new historians, including Iris Borowy (1997), Alessandro Iandolo (2011), Daniel Immerwahr (2011), and Stephen Macekura (2013) (see Table 4).

Historian	PhD Location	PhD Title
Iris Borowy	**1997** History, Univ. Rostock	Diplomacy as a balancing act: the Middle East policy of the Eisenhower administration 1953-57 in the shadow of the Suez crisis
Alessandro Iandolo	**2011** International Relations, Univ. Oxford	Soviet policy in West Africa, 1957-64
Daniel Immerwahr	**2011** History, UC Berkeley	Quests for community: the United States, community development, and the world, 1935-1965
Stephen J. Macekura	**2013** History, Univ. Virginia	Of limits and growth: global environmentalism and the rise of "sustainable development" in the twentieth century

Table 4. Recent additions to the ranks of historians of development (in order of PhD completion).

Borowy is not a new historian, *per se,* but rather new to development contexts. Working since the 2000s on the intersection of health, international politics, and international organisations, the addition of sustainability brings a subsequent turn to development.[89] Adding to the ranks of German historians, Borowy spotlights the complex interplay of European and non-European ideas in international organisation—whether in forging consensus on sustainable development or in Northern ideas of public health framing development in the Global South.[90] Incidentally, interest in international organisations appears to be a shared trait in the German historiography; perhaps a reflection of respective multilateral versus US unilateral contexts.[91] To this, Borowy's novel viewpoints from health and sustainability add further facets missing in development's historiography and explicitly highlighted in prior German critiques.

---

[88] Engerman, 'Bernath lecture'; Engerman and Unger, 'Introduction'; Unger, 'Histories of development', Frey and Kunkel, 'Writing the history'.

[89] Sample works on development: I. Borowy, 'Global health and development: conceptualizing health between economic growth and environmental sustainability', *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 68.3 (2012), 451-85; I. Borowy, 'The Brundtland Commission: sustainable development as health issue', *Michael Quarterly* 10.2 (2013), 196-206; I. Borowy, 'Sustainable health: the need for new developmental models', *Bulletin of the WHO* 92 (2014), 699; I. Borowy, 'Medical aid, repression, and international relation: the East German hospital at Metema', *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 71.1 (2015), 64-92; I. Borowy, 'Negotiating international development: the making of the Millennium Development Goals', *Regions and Cohesion* 5.3 (2015), 18-43; I. Borowy, 'East German medical aid to Nicaragua: the politics of solidarity between biomedicine and primary health care', *História, Ciências, Saúde* 24.2 (2017), 411-28; I. Borowy, 'Science and technology for development in a postcolonial World: negotiations at the United Nations, 1960-1980', *NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin* 26.1 (2018), 31-62.

[90] I. Borowy, *Defining sustainable development for our common future: A history of the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission)* (London: Routledge, 2013); I. Borowy, 'Road traffic injuries: social change and development', *Medical History* 57.1 (2013), 108-38.

[91] See, for example, Frey, Kunkel, and Unger, *International organisations and development.*

Iandolo, while operating within the bounds of diplomatic history, breaks the mould of its template of US-[*insert country*] relations. Researching Soviet development policy in West Africa in the 1950s and 60s, Iandolo also contrasts Soviet views with US and broader UN positions (most notably in the case of the 1960s Congo crisis).[92] Amidst a plethora of First-Second and First-Third World views, this work is striking in marking possibly the first dedicated Second-Third World narrative in this historiography. Also holding twin interests in political and intellectual history, Iandolo thus offers an important complement to Engerman's work on Soviet ideas in the US.[93] It is perhaps unsurprising, then, to note Iandolo's location on European shores, with graduate training in the UK and education in Italy prior.[94] Along with Borowy, the two bring important additions to this historiography's bases outside the US. The next two scholars add further developments, returning to earlier American roots.

Immerwahr marks the arrival of a new generation of US historians. If the old guard emerges amidst a post-Cold War hubris, then the new face its fall amidst failed foreign interventions and global crises. In this climate, Immerwahr adopts a focus on bottom-up views of power—a departure from the top-down views of prior historians.[95] Also hinted in a 2012 historiographical critique is Immerwahr's interest in overcoming a 'modernization consensus' laid by the first wave.[96] A PhD at UC Berkeley (also *alma mater* to Engerman, Gilman) and ensuing monograph thus trace the intellectual and political life of 'community development'.[97] Tracing a cast of US and local actors in India, it adds to development's mosaic; the US-India 'lure of community development' joining the US-USSR 'romance of economic development'. Further contexts can be observed in Immerwahr's recent (re)turn to US history. Bringing the self-critical views of first-wave historians full circle, they present an explicit re-reading of contemporary US history as one of *de facto* empire.[98]

---

[92] A. Iandolo, 'The rise and fall of the "Soviet model of development" in West Africa, 1957–64', *Cold War History* 12.4 (2012), 683-704; A. Iandolo, 'Imbalance of power: the Soviet Union and the Congo crisis, 1960–1961', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16.2 (2014), 32-55; A. Iandolo, 'Beyond the shoe: rethinking Khrushchev at the fifteenth session of the United Nations general assembly', *Diplomatic History* 41.1 (2017), 128-54.

[93] A. Iandolo, 'De-Stalinizing growth: decolonization and the development of development economics in the Soviet Union', in *The development century: a global history,* eds. Stephen J. Macekura and Erez Manela (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); A. Iandolo, 'Unforgettable 1956? The PCI and the crisis of communism in Italy', *Contemporary European History* 23.2 (2014), 259-82.

[94] A. Iandolo, 'Soviet policy in West Africa, 1957-64', PhD dissertation, University of Oxford, 2011.

[95] See D. Immerwahr, 'The politics of architecture and urbanism in postcolonial Lagos, 1960–1986', *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 19.2 (2007), 165-86; D. Immerwahr, 'Caste or colony? Indianizing race in the United States', *Modern Intellectual History* 4.2 (2007), 275-301.

[96] The 'first wave' that Immerwahr presents here is bounded by Latham's 2000 and 2011 monographs (*Modernization as ideology* and *The right kind of revolution,* respectively); see Immerwahr, 'Modernization and development in US foreign relations', *Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review* 43.2 (2012), 22-5.

[97] D. Immerwahr, 'Quests for community: the United States, community development, and the world, 1935-1965', PhD dissertation, UC Berkeley, 2011; D. Immerwahr, *Thinking small: the United States and the lure of community development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).

[98] D. Immerwahr, 'Bernath lecture: the greater United States: territory and empire in U.S. history', *Diplomatic History* 40.3 (2016), 373-91; D. Immerwahr, *How to hide an empire: a short history of the greater United States* (New York: Random House, 2019).

Macekura's earliest works belie clear roots in the first-wave US diplomatic historiography.[99] Like Borowy, however, Macekura soon turns to examining development in the contexts of sustainability. A PhD at the University of Virginia (*alma mater* of Cullather) and subsequent monograph thus trace the rise of sustainable development out of a concert of three worlds in decolonisation and the Cold War.[100] Adding to Borowy's focus on the history of sustainable development *vis-à-vis* economic growth, Macekura traces how First and Second World views come to frame the Third.[101] This extends not only to their theories and histories, but also to the very measures of development, itself.[102] Also adding to the effort to broaden development's historiography, Macekura's most recent contributions include a curated volume geared towards surveying its larger intellectual, temporal, and spatial breadth.[103] Since the first wave, the works of these five European and two US historians highlight its rapid growth in the past decade.[104] However, the original historians behind the first wave have hardly remained silent, with a second wave of works warranting attention here.[105]

Cullather since adds work on the theme of hunger, politics, and agricultural technology. Consolidated in a 2010 monograph on the green revolution, it departs modernisation theory to add an account this time of some *literal* seeds born out of US academia (e.g. miracle rice).[106] Presented in an account that travels back and forth from the US across the world (e.g. China, South Korea, India, Philippines), the ensuing view is not unlike Hodge's hub-and-spoke view of the TVA in Figure 3. It also travels beyond the Cold War, from the green revolution's early

---

[99] S.J Macekura, 'The point four program and the origins of international development policy', Master's dissertation, University of Virginia, 2008; S.J. Macekura, 'The point four program and US international development policy', *Political Science Quarterly* 128.1 (2013), 127-60.

[100] S.J. Macekura, 'Of limits and growth: global environmentalism and the rise of "sustainable development" in the twentieth century', PhD dissertation, University of Virginia, 2013; S.J. Macekura, *Of limits and growth: the rise of global sustainable development in the twentieth century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[101] S.J. Macekura, 'The limits of the global community: the Nixon administration and global environmental politics', *Cold War History* 11.4 (2011), 489-518; S.J. Macekura, 'Crisis and opportunity: environmental NGOs, debt-for-nature swaps, and the rise of "people-centred" conservation', *Environment and History* 22.1 (2016), 49-73; S.J. Macekura, 'Development and economic growth: an intellectual history', in *History of the future of economic growth: historical roots of current debates on sustainable degrowth*, eds. Iris Borowy and Matthias Schmelzer, 110-28 (London: Routledge, 2017).

[102] S.J. Macekura, 'Whither growth? International development, social indicators, and the politics of measurement, 1920s-1970s', *Journal of Global History* 14.2 (2019), 261-79; see, as a complement; Borowy, 'Road traffic injuries'.

[103] See S.J. Macekura and E. Manela, 'Introduction', in *The development century: a global history,* eds. Stephen J. Macekura and Erez Manela, 1-17 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

[104] Note, Iris Borowy has since moved to Shanghai University in 2016, establishing a new Centre for the History of Global Development.

[105] N. Cullather, *The hungry world: America's Cold War battle against poverty in Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); D. Ekbladh, *The great American mission: modernization and the construction of an American world order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); M.E. Latham, *The right kind of revolution: modernization, development, and U.S. foreign policy from the Cold War to the present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); D.C. Engerman, *The price of aid: the economic Cold War in India* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).

[106] Cullather, *The hungry world.* Precursors include Cullather, 'Miracles of modernization'; Cullather, 'The foreign policy of the calorie'; N. Cullather, 'Hunger and containment: how India became "important" in US Cold War strategy', *India Review* 6.2 (2007), 59-90. Recent work continues this theme; see N. Cullather, '"Stretching the surface of the earth": the foundations, neo-Malthusianism and the modernising agenda', *Global Society* 28.1 (2014), 104-12.

twentieth-century roots in food as a tool for scientific diplomacy to its latest reincarnation under Obama. In the process, it sheds new light on old territory; namely, on US governmental and NGO actors in a Third World arena of Cold War contestation for control.

Latham's 2000 monograph laid out a key framework for understanding modernisation as not just theory, but as *ideology*. By 2011, the expanding scope of the prior decade enables a new synthesis, going well beyond old grounds in US-Vietnam Cold War relations.[107] Instead, modernisation is traced to roots in the European enlightenment and US imperialism in the Philippines and Latin America. Closing with its latest revival in Afghanistan and Iraq, Latham argues that 'rumors of its demise have been greatly exaggerated'.[108] This expanded scope of modernisation's history echoes that of Cullather's 2010 work. Combining bilateral narratives to assemble a more global view, it yet remains US-centric; more hub-and-spoke than a *bona fide* multilateral narrative in its constituent views (see, for example, Figure 2).

Engerman maintains a prolific output from the 2000s straight into the 2010s. Working simultaneously on two fronts (diplomatic history and disciplinary history), they warrant initial treatment separately. The latter expands from prior work on Soviet studies to the larger history of social science. Reassessing the relationship between Cold War politics and its concurrent social sciences, Engerman examines the ties between *(i)* multiple disciplines, *(ii)* disciplines and funding, and *(iii)* disciplines and their broader sociopolitical contexts.[109] Countering simplistic notions of a wholly politicised Cold War social science, they illustrate the complex ways in which academia have engaged with the political agendas of its day.

Added to *interdisciplinary* is *international* expansion, as seen in a 2011 call for more work on Second-Third World relations beyond First-Second and First-Third World views.[110] Perhaps finding a reply in Iandolo's work, Engerman adds his own contributions in studies of Soviet-Indian relations.[111] Culminating in a 2018 monograph, its trilateral account of Indian development (India, US, USSR) departs from prior US hub-and-spoke narratives—perhaps more European in historiographical style.[112] In turn, it lays out a new vision of 'development politics' as a pervasive mode or paradigm of Cold War international relations.

---

[107] Latham, *The right kind of revolution.* On prior scope, see Latham, 'Ideology, social science'; Latham, 'Imperial legacy'; Latham, *Modernisation as ideology.*

[108] Latham, *The right kind of revolution,* p. 7.

[109] Note the concerted change in target journals for these articles: Engerman, 'Social science in the Cold War' in *Isis*; D.C. Engerman, 'The price of success: economic sovietology, development, and the costs of interdisciplinarity', *History of Political Economy* 42 (2010), 234-60; D.C. Engerman, 'The pedagogical purposes of interdisciplinary social science: a view from area studies in the United States', *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 51.1 (2015), 78-92.

[110] Engerman, 'The Second World's Third World'.

[111] D.C. Engerman, 'Learning from the East: Soviet experts and India in the era of competitive coexistence', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 33.2 (2013), 227-38; D.C. Engerman, 'Development politics and the Cold War', *Diplomatic History* 41.1 (2017), 1-19.

[112] D.C. Engerman, *The price of aid.*

Hodge's work subsequent to *Triumph of the expert* (2007) maintains development's ties to pre-Cold War science and colonialism.[113] A further contribution can also be noted in a two-part historiographical essay published in 2015 and 2016.[114] Synthesising across an extensive set of sources within and beyond academic history, it offers one of the most comprehensive views of the development historiography to date. However, its views have not come without debate, as seen in a roundtable of responses provoked since.[115] Notably under-appreciated are the contributions found in the non-US historiography and the interdisciplinary contributions outside of academic history, which continue to remain underrecognised.

Gilman, like Hodge, contributes to historiographical organisation and oversight since *Mandarins of the future.* Indeed, Gilman is a driving force behind Hodge's historiographical essays, serving as co-editor of the *Humanity* journal in which it was published.[116] Adding to *Diplomatic History* as a new forum, another example is found in a special issue of *Humanity* on the New International Economic Order (NIEO).[117] Gilman further offers work on the historiography on social science.[118] Commenting on its contested ties to the Cold War, Gilman joins Engerman in drawing attention to the politics surrounding social science.

Ekbladh, in turn, brings a decade of work to a culmination in a new 2010 monograph.[119] Couching the TVA in a larger US history, development is traced back to nineteenth-century US reconstruction post-civil war and to early twentieth-century Philippines and China. Its Cold War narrative closes with the fall of US visions of liberal development by the 1970s and a denouement in the post-9/11 war on terror. Since then, Ekbladh has expanded into research on the interwar origins of US security studies, echoing Engerman's work on another major Cold War field (i.e. Soviet studies).[120] More recently, work has shifted further from US visions of liberal development to broader liberal internationalism. Employing a similar set of aspects and actors—from the role of NGOs (e.g. Rockefeller Foundation, Carnegie Corporation) to economists as technical experts and engineers of world order—it brings the larger political contexts of development into view.[121]

---

[113] See B.M. Bennett and J.M. Hodge (eds.), *Science and empire: knowledge and networks of science across the British Empire, 1800-1970* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); J.M. Hodge, G. Hödl, and M. Kopf, *Developing Africa: concepts and practices in twentieth-century colonialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014).

[114] Hodge, 'Writing the history (part 1)'; Hodge, 'Writing the history (part 2)'.

[115] See Joseph Hodge Roundtable (2016) at: http://humanityjournal.org/joseph-hodge-roundtable/.

[116] For comments on Gilman's involvement in Hodge, see Hodge, 'Writing the history (part 1)', p. 455.

[117] N. Gilman, 'The new international economic order: a reintroduction', *Humanity* 6.1 (2015), 1-16.

[118] N. Gilman, ' The Cold War as intellectual force field', *Modern Intellectual History* 13.2 (2016), 507-23.

[119] Ekbladh, *The great American mission.*

[120] D. Ekbladh, 'Present at the creation: Edward Mead Earle and the depression-era origins of security studies', *International Security* 36.3 (2012), 107-41; D. Ekbladh, 'The interwar foundations of security studies: Edward Mead Earle, the Carnegie Corporation and the depression-era origins of a field', *Global Society* 28.1 (2014): 40-53.

[121] D. Ekbladh, 'American asylum: the United States and the campaign to transplant the Technical League, 1939–1940', *Diplomatic History* 39.4 (2014), 629-60.

4.2 Development scholars writing the history of development (1970s-2010s)

The prior review of academic historians notes a dearth in coverage of development's social science literature. What, then, might be found in the social sciences that remains missing in academic history? Given the immense literature at hand, a brief but reasonably comprehensive survey proves infeasible. This is all the more due to a dearth in prior historiographical analyses to serve as precedents, unlike in academic history. As such, this section resorts to selecting some more prominent examples to serve as a foil to prior academic histories. Sampled across the social sciences, they offer a limited but valuable glimpse of the potential temporal-spatial contexts encompassed by development's historiography (see Table 5).

Discipline	Scholar	History (date of publication)
Anthropology	Gilbert Rist	The history of development: from Western origins to global faith (1997[1996])
Economics	H.W. Arndt	Economic development: the history of an idea (1987)
Geography	Richard Peet & Elaine Hartwick	Theories of development: contentions, arguments, alternatives (1999)
Politics	Robert Packenham	Liberal America and the Third World: political development ideas in foreign aid and social science (1973)
Sociology	Jorge Larrain	Theories of development: capitalism, colonialism and dependency (1989)

Table 5. A cross-disciplinary sample of the social science-based development historiography

In **development anthropology**, Gilbert Rist offers a seminal 1996 history in French (1997 in English; fifth edition due 2019).[122] Based out of the Graduate Institute, Geneva, Rist's PhD in political science belies ensuing aims to 'construct an anthropology of modernity'.[123] A seminal figure in the *postdevelopment school*, Rist's ensuing history presents a *longue durée* narrative grafted onto the history of the *idea of progress* (covered in Section 3.3). Starting in ancient Greece, 'progress' lays grounds for the birth of 'development' in US president Truman's 1949 Point Four speech. The decades to follow entail failed First and Third World attempts to realise what is but a semantic illusion. Built upon lies and contradictions, Rist thus calls for an end to this hegemonic facade. Doing so requires 'preferring knowledge to belief, in looking reality in the face rather than clinging to illusions, in understanding the world as it is instead of imagining it as we would like it to be'.[124] Put simply, it calls for an end to the idea (and ensuing practice) of development.

---

[122] G. Rist, *The history of development: from Western origins to global faith* (London: Zed Books, 1997); originally published as G. Rist, *Le développement: histoire d'une croyance occidentale* [Development: the history of a Western belief] (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1996).

[123] See 'About the author' blurb in Rist, *The history of development,* [no page number]. Rist's 1977 PhD in political science is also from the Graduate Institute, Geneva; see CV, available at: http://graduateinstitute.ch/sites/default/files/2019-05/CVGilbert.Rist_.pdf.

[124] G. Rist, *The history of development: from Western origins to global faith (3rd ed.)* (London: Zed Books, 2002), p. 263.

In **development economics,** Heinz Wolfgang Arndt offers a series of key works in the history of economic thought.[125] An economist based out of Australia National University, Arndt joins the likes of Gerald Meier, Dudley Seers, and John Toye as an authority on the history of development economics. A 1987 history thus traces numerous shifts already in its short postwar career. Origins here trace to colonialism, reactive nationalism against the West (e.g. in China, India, Japan), and foundations in economic thought (e.g. classical, neoclassical, wartime planning). A postwar consensus on economic growth is then followed by challenges in the 1960s and 70s coming from radical shifts in both the political Left and Right. As such, Arndt clarifies that this history is not a history of economic thought, alone. Acknowledging the broader scope of development's academic and public debates, Arnd adds:

> I am conscious of two debts I should have incurred but did not—to authorities on the politics and sociology of development and to writers on development in languages other than English. Had I attempted to fill these two gaps, the book would have never been finished. I can only hope other studies will complement this one in both respects. Even within the narrower confines of writings in English on economic development—a vast literature—I cannot pretend to have read and digested more than a fraction.[126]

In **development geography**, Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick offer a 1999 history, now in its third edition.[127] Peet, a UK-born geographer with a PhD from UC Berkeley in 1968, is a founding member of the radical geography movement, centred around its *Antipode* journal.[128] Written with Hartwick, a US geographer and former pupil, its development history is split into 'conventional' (economics, modernisation theory) and 'critical' (Marxism, post-structuralism, gender theory) streams. Tracing their roots back to nineteenth-century political economy, the ensuing narrative is decidedly opposed to the conventional or mainstream. In this, it shares with anthropology a focus on the salvation (or 'conversion', to cite Rist) found in bottom-up views.[129] Contrary to calling for development's demise, however, it closes with an alternative development prescription (*à la* radical democracy) that is explicitly Marxist in form.[130]

---

[125] See H.W. Arndt, *The rise and fall of economic growth: a study in contemporary thought* (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1978); H.W. Arndt, 'Economic development: a semantic history', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 29.3 (1981), 457-66; H.W. Arndt, 'The origins of structuralism', *World Development* 13.2 (1985), 151-59; H.W. Arndt, *Economic development: the history of an idea* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

[126] Arndt, *Economic development,* p. vii; see also Ibid., p. 5.

[127] R. Peet and E. Hartwick, *Theories of development: contentions, arguments, alternatives* (New York: Guildford Press, 1999); third edition published under the same title in 2015.

[128] See R. Peet, 'Reminiscencing the Early Antipode', Past Editors' Reflections, *Antipode,* available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/page/journal/14678330/homepage/editor_s_past_reflections.htm#Peet.

[129] Rist, *The history of development (3rd ed.),* p. 263.

[130] See Peet and Hartwick, *Theories of development,* pp. 17-19, 288-91.

In **development politics**, Robert Packenham writes a history of political development ideas.[131] Published in 1973 while based at Stanford University, it too finds many shifts in its short postwar history. Structured around US political development *doctrines* and *theories,* the former ties to policymakers while the latter ties to social scientists. Its core thesis is not one of an opposition between the two, but rather of a consonance that evidences a deeper shared US liberal tradition. These political development ideas thus open 'a window on the nature of American political values and ideology'.[132] Highlighted are four key premises shared across these political development ideas: *(i)* change and development are easy; *(ii)* all good things go togethers; *(iii)* radicalism and revolution are bad; and *(iv)* distributing power is more important than accumulating power. Studying this theoretical community from within, Packenham's close ties with key figures in this history (e.g. Gabriel Almond, Samuel Huntington), evidence an early awareness of its contentious premises that far predates similar arguments presented in diplomatic history's 'first wave'.[133]

Finally, in **development sociology,** Jorge Larrain adds a 1989 history of development thought.[134] Influenced by historical materialism, its narrative is structured into eras of early capitalism, capitalist expansion under colonialism and imperialism, and late capitalism in the wake of the World Wars. A Chilean sociologist and director of the department of cultural studies, University of Birmingham (former home of Stuart Hall), the history holds explicit aims of preserving Latin American thought. This is amidst overzealous European critics of dependency theory in the 1980s, who threaten 'to throw the baby out with the bathwater'.[135] Notably, these are critiques not from the mainstream, but from within the same Marxist camp. Amidst the ensuing fallout or hollowing out of development sociology, the history chronicles past theoretical contributions 'to be rescued from the passing of dependency theory'.[136] All the while, Larrain warns that 'while Marxists *[...]* are busy dismantling "underdevelopment and dependency theory", neoliberals take advantage of their aid and sing the praises of capitalism'.

Altogether, these five works—though hardly comprehensive in coverage—help to demonstrate a number of key points. Namely, three observations can be highlighted regarding its *(i)* expansive interdisciplinary breadth, *(ii)* preserved intellectual and political contexts, and *(iii)* consequences for this present study.

---

[131] R. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: political development ideas in foreign aid and social science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

[132] Ibid., p. 315.

[133] Packenham is hardly alone. See also: I. Gendzier, *Managing political change: social scientists and the Third World* (Boulder: Westview, 1985); A. Wood, *From Marshall Plan to debt crisis: foreign aid and development choices in the world economy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); A.H. Somjee, *Development theory: critiques & explanations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991).

[134] J. Larrain, *Theories of development: capitalism, colonialism and dependency* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).

[135] Ibid., p. 210.

[136] Ibid., p. viii.

First, these works stake out some of the expansive disciplinary space encompassed by development's social science historiography. Extending across the twentieth century's social sciences and its precursors (e.g. in classical sociology, political economy), they evidence the extensive development role played by academia. Providing more interdisciplinary coverage than academic historians, these social scientists offer fragments of development's intellectual history as seen from eye level, as opposed to through archives. While this introduces its own methodological hazards, it also engenders a second unexpected benefit.

Second is the history (or sort of meta-history) chronicled by this historiography, itself. Not only do these works sample a disciplinary diversity, they also evidence its breadth across time and geographical space. In contrast to tight-knit clusters in US and German academic history, these five histories are written from the 1970s to the 2010s in French and English by Australian, Chilean, Swiss, UK and US scholars. Though intentionally chosen to showcase a historiographical breadth, they yet offer a testament to its potential wealth.

Third is the direct consequences rendered by this social science historiography for this present work's very own methods. If the space covered by prior academic historians proves more rigorous but narrowly-focused in empirical breadth, then this social science literature offers a much less orderly but potentially more rewarding terrain for empirical investigation. And indeed, there are synergies to be found here between these two bodies literature (i.e. social science and academic history). Greater systematisation and reflection across the social science historiography could potentially open new vistas for historians, while enhancing the efficacy of development's social sciences (e.g. less reinventing of the wheel, unconscious reliance on flawed premises).

A note must also be made of such vistas expanding across interlinguistic terrain, as well. As noted by the cosmopolitan scholars in this brief sample (e.g. Rist in Francophone contexts, Larrain in Latin America, and Arndt in Australian-Asian), language entails its own silo in theoretical of views. Similarly noted by German historians (e.g. in Unger's methodological nationalism), development offers potential greater insight into cross-linguistic and associated cross-cultural better world visions that might otherwise escape the US historiography.

Altogether, development's social science historiography offers compelling terrain; both rich in past better world visions and yet relatively—no, almost entirely—unexplored. Indeed, just as there is no formal 'intellectual history of international development', the notion of a 'historiography of development' remains alien in development's social sciences. As such, the social sciences are added here as empirical subjects joining politics, philosophy, and history in the BWP's decidedly interdisciplinary—and interlinguistic/international—space.

4.3 Historians writing the history of progress (1910s-1980s)

Beyond the **idea of development**, another close analogue to the idea of a better world is the **idea of progress**. Indeed, there already exists a formal historiography on the idea of progress, which predates the more recent historiography on development (see Table 6).[137]

Historian	Institution	Sample Works
F.J. Teggart	UC Berkeley	The circumstance or substance of history *(1910);* The humanistic study of change in time *(1926);* War and civilisation in the future *(1941)*
J.B. Bury	Univ. of Cambridge	The idea of progress: an inquiry into its origin and growth *(1920)*
J.H. Plumb	Univ. of Cambridge	The historian's dilemma *(1964)*
S. Pollard	Univ. of Sheffield	The idea of progress: history and society *(1968)*
R. Nisbet	Columbia Univ.	History of the idea of progress *(1980)*

Table 6. Institutional locations and sampled works in the historiography of the idea or progress

An early landmark in this literature is a seminal 1920 history by J.B. Bury, which offers a magisterial view of the idea of Progress (with a capital 'P') from ancient Greece to medieval Christianity and the Enlightenment. Posed as *the* foundational idea underpinning modern Western civilisation, it is a *faith* 'that civilisation has moved, is moving, and will move in a desirable direction'.[138] Usurping the role of divine Providence, it amounts to nothing less than a new teleological faith for a secular, scientific, and rational age.[139]

> The idea of human Progress then is a theory which involves a synthesis of the past and a prophecy of the future. It is based on an interpretation of history which regards men as slowly advancing—*pedetemtim progredients*—in a definite and desirable direction, and infers that this progress will continue indefinitely.[140]

The semantic trimmings of Progress notably echo those of the better world. As Bury writes, the 'phrase *civilisation and progress* has become stereotyped', and 'conjunctions of "liberty and progress," "democracy and progress," meet us at every turn'.[141] This faith in progress is further borne by a faith in human reason. Namely, the rise of rationalism and science excites a faith in reason as the key to solving the riddles of nature—including those of *human* nature

---

[137] See J.B. Bury, *The idea of progress: an inquiry into its origin and growth* (London: Macmillan, 1920); F.J. Teggart, 'The humanistic study of change in time', *The Journal of Philosophy* 23.12 (1926), 309-15; J.H. Plumb, 'The historian's dilemma', in *Crisis in the humanities,* ed. J.H. Plumb, 24-44 (London: Penguin, 1964); S. Pollard, *The idea of progress: history and society* (London: C.A. Watts, 1968); R. Nisbet, *History of the idea of progress* (London: Heinemann, 1980).

[138] Bury, *The idea of progress*, p. 2.

[139] See ibid., pp. 334-5 for a brief outline of the idea's emergence. Also from ibid., p. 4: 'the Progress of humanity belongs to the same order of ideas as Providence or personal immortality. It is true or it is false, and like them it cannot be proved either true or false. Belief in it is an act of faith'.

[140] Ibid., p. 5.

[141] Italics in original; Ibid., p. vii.

(e.g. via social science).[142] Buoyed by conquests of Western reason over nature, the history of humanity is one of unending progress towards a more happy, free, and perfect humankind.[143] This blinding history of Progress, however, is also framed by Bury as a tragic source of a present darkness. Composed in the wake of the First World War, Bury thus writes:

> *[…]* many people, to whom six years ago the notion of a sudden decline or break-up of our western civilisation, as a result not of cosmic forces but of its own development, would have appeared almost fantastic, will feel much less confident to-day, notwithstanding the fact that the leading nations of the world have instituted a league of peoples for the prevention of war, the measure to which so many high priests of Progress have looked forward as a long stride forward on the road to Utopia.[144]

Just as divine *Providence* fanned the flames of the Crusades, *Progress* is tied to the senseless destruction of the First World War.[145] In closing, Bury ponders that if Providence was the faith of medieval ancestors and Progress the faith of Western civilisation today, will disenchantment not lead to the birth of a new North star?[146]

Joining Bury are the works of F.J. Teggart, who delineates the methodological-*cum*-political implications of Progress *vis-à-vis* social Darwinism. A 1910 critique is thus directed at academic historians spellbound by a (pseudo-)scientific faith in Progress.[147] The detrimental metanarratives imported from Darwinism (i.e. *progress, evolution, development*) are traced in

---

[142] Ibid., p. 348: 'Within the last forty years nearly every civilised country has produced a larger literature on social science, in which indefinite Progress is generally assumed as an axiom. *[…]* we note how the history of the idea has been connected with the growth of modern science, with the growth of rationalism, and with the struggle for political and religious liberty.'

[143] Ibid., p. 349: 'We have seen how the belief that our race is travelling towards earthly happiness was propagated by some eminent thinkers, as well as by some "not very fortunate persons who had a good deal of time on their hands." And all these high-priests and incense-bearers to whom the creed owes its success were rationalists, from the author of the *Histoire des oracles* to the philosopher of the Unknowable.' *(The veiled references refer to Fontanelle, emblematic of the seventeenth century, and Herbert Spencer, emblematic of the nineteenth.)*

[144] Ibid., p. x.

[145] Ibid., pp. ix-x: 'In the recent war that idea, involving the moral obligation of making sacrifices for the sake of future ages, was constantly appealed to; just as in the Crusades, the most characteristic wars of our medieval ancestors, the idea of human destinies then in the ascendant lured thousands to hardship and death.'

[146] Ibid., p. 352: 'Will not that process of change, for which Progress is the optimistic name, compel "Progress" too to fall from the commanding position in which it is now, with apparent security, enthroned? *[…]* A day will come, in the revolution of centuries, when a new idea will usurp its place as the directing idea of humanity. Another star, unnoticed now or invisible, will climb up the intellectual heaven, and human emotions will react to its influence, human plans respond to its guidance. It will be the criterion by which Progress and all other ideas will be judged. And it too will have its successor.'

[147] F.J. Teggart, 'The circumstance or substance of history', *The American Historical Review* 15.4 (1910), 709-19. As written on p. 711: 'The most important effect upon historians of the spread of modern biological ideas has been the incorporation into their vocabulary the words "evolution" and "development". As a consequence the historian, while believing himself the single-eyed servant of fact, *[…]* has come to accept a theory of history without critical examination of its claims.'

a 1926 critique to the social sciences, as well.[148] Highlighted here is a false dichotomy in the search for presupposed *natural* (i.e. deterministic) events and laws, as opposed to *historical* (i.e. random, inconsequential) ones.[149]

By the 1940s, however, Teggart's aim of extricating Darwinism from history and social science takes on added significance. After a first 'war to end all wars', Teggart confronts the reality that 'war again envelops the world'.[150] Just as Bury finds Progress at the roots of the First World War, Teggart finds it again in the Second. Under the blessings of Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, and Karl Marx, belief in a 'natural order of things' masks violence as but rational human nature—just the natural principle of a survival of the fittest in action.[151]

> Darwinism may be said to have joined hands with the German theory of the War-State and to have supported the view that possession of superior military equipment demonstrates the cultural superiority of those who have acquired it. *[…]* from 1860 to 1900 the intellectuals of France, England, and America accepted the domination of the doctrine of struggle and violence inherent in Darwinism.[152]

If Bury and Teggart provide a glimpse into the groundwork and surrounding contexts of this World War-era historiography, then the works of Plumb (1964), Pollard (1968), and Nisbet (1980) offer a view of the historiography on Progress in the decades to come.

To start, its definition and lineage (ancient Greece, the Middle Ages, the Enlightenment) remain much the same. Also preserved is the dichotomy between nature and civility, famously up-ended by Rousseau's *noble savage*. Plumb thus ties the idea to 'man's increasing control over his environment', enabling a species 'more numerous, more firmly established, more in control of the physical world'—claiming even 'an increase in *civility*'.[153] As written by Nisbet, '*the idea of progress holds that mankind has advanced in the past—from some aboriginal condition of primitiveness, barbarism, or even nullity—is now advancing, and will continue to advance through the foreseeable future'*.[154]

---

[148] See Teggart, 'The humanistic study'.

[149] Ibid., pp. 314-5: 'The assumptions which we have found at the foundation of the "social sciences" may be stated briefly as follows: It is assumed that progressive change is a "natural" movement, which is always slow, gradual, and continuous; it is assumed that the laws of Nature represent the orderly provisions which Nature has made for the attainment of a specific purpose, the happiness of mankind; it is assumed that the purpose of scientific inquiry is the determination of the "natural" or normal course of change in time, and hence that the investigator should ignore, or rather eliminate from consideration, the intrusive influences which have interfered with the operation of the "natural order." The consequences of these assumptions is that historical events become unimportant and indeed irrelevant for the purposes of scientific inquiry in the investigation of "progress" and of "evolution".'

[150] F.J. Teggart, 'War and civilization in the future', *American Journal of Sociology* 46.4 (1941), 582-90, p. 582.

[151] Ibid., p. 587.

[152] Ibid., pp. 589-90.

[153] Italics in original; Plumb, 'The historian's dilemma', pp. 36-7.

[154] Italics in original; Nisbet, *History of the idea of progress,* pp. 4-5

Its ties to science and religion (or science *as* religion) also remain. Pollard thus ties Progress to 'belief in a rational understanding, a "science" of history, a possibility of deducing generalizations *[...]* and therefore a degree, at least, of determinism'.[155] Implying 'a scale of values outside the areas of history itself', this transcendental idea 'has been called the modern religion, or the modern substitute for religion, and not unjustly so'.[156] Or as Plumb summarises, 'Man's history was wrenched out of the hands of the theologians *[...]*. Yet a great deal of the old **theological attitude** reappeared in **rational guise**'.[157]

Most striking in these works, however, is not their *sustained premises*, but rather their *radically different conclusions*. That is, a **generation gap** emerges in the historiography, hewn by a postwar gloom evoked by Spengler's *The decline of the West*.[158] As Nisbet observes:

> Although the dogma of progress held magisterial status during most of its Western history, it has obviously fallen to a low and sorely beset status in our century. Its future *[...]* is cloudy to say the least. One conclusion, though, may be stated confidently. If the idea of progress does die in the West, so will a great deal else that we have long cherished in this civilization.[159]

Plumb and Pollard add similar laments, but Nisbet's is especially revealing.[160] Nisbet, whose PhD was supervised by Teggart, opposes Bury and his former teacher's World War-induced scepticism.[161] This is a scepticism colouring not the general public, but rather the *academy*. As Plumb writes, 'Large sections of Western society act as if the idea of progress was a part of the built-in mechanism of modern history, yet the historians, philosophers, and popular prophets of history avoid the idea like the plague'.[162] Pollard adds, 'The world today believes in progress. Indeed, so widespread is this belief among modern nations, that Governments will

---

[155] Pollard, *The idea of progress*, p. vi.

[156] Ibid., pp. vi, x.

[157] Emphasis added; Plumb, 'The historian's dilemma', p. 26.

[158] O. Spengler, *The decline of the West: form and actuality,* trans. C.F. Atkinson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1926[1918]); O. Spengler, *The decline of the West: perspectives of world-history,* trans. C.F. Atkinson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928[1922]).

[159] Nisbet, *History of the idea*, p. ix.

[160] From Plumb, 'The historian's dilemma', p. 42: 'But events too gave it hammer blows: the First World War, the Somme, Verdun, Passchendaele, millions of slaughtered men; the Second World War with millions more and the interval made macabre by Hitler and his maniac persecution of the Jews; the monomania of Stalin and his purges. And, let us face it, Hiroshima. These events have made it doubly hard to cling to the idea of progress in human affairs.'

From Pollard, *The idea of progress,* p. 145: 'Widespread pessimism began to appear in the West only towards the end of the nineteenth century, when it became clear that the social problem had not been solved and there was no sign of a solution; when the leading bourgeois nations, having divided the world among themselves, began to feel claustrophobic and turn inward on each other; and when a particular phase of history appeared to have run its course. The clashes, the destruction, and the failures of the years 1914-45, a virtually continuous period of wars and depressions, were as traumatic for the West as the years 1789-1815 had been for those nurtured on the Enlightenment *[...]*.'

[161] See Nisbet, *History of the idea,* pp. x, 321-3.

[162] Plumb, 'The historian's dilemma', p. 36.

ignore it at their peril, and the world "progress" itself has become an unqualified term of praise'.[163] And yet, 'those who might be expected to have devoted most time to its consideration, the historians and philosophers of history, are the least certain of its validity'.[164]

So a clear sense of dismay over the demise of Western progress (i.e. Progress) emerges. However, if Pollard and Plumb note a popular rise and even postwar resurgence in the idea, then why is it only intellectuals who find themselves in purported agony?[165] Herein lies the reason for setting apart Nisbet's excerpt, for it betrays an *existential dread regarding the fate of Western civilisation*. Unseen by the public but already afflicting its intellectual core, the fall of Progress *must* mean regress. This postwar argument can be unpacked as follows:

> *(a)* the idea of progress (not just Progress) is ours [the West], not theirs;
>
> *(b)* we [Western scholars] have disowned it in a sort of self-inflicted wound;
>
> *(c)* all the while, others [outside the West] are using our idea against us;
>
> ***thus (d)*** faith in the idea of progress must be restored [in the West].

In the first, this particular Western idea (thus capitalised by Bury as *Progress*) undergoes a semantic transformation. The idea of **Progress** (i.e. a particular Western idea) is conflated as **progress** (i.e. a general concept), writ large. The Western *origins* of Progress thus transform into postwar claims of Western *ownership* of progress. To illustrate, consider Plumb's take on progress (written now with a *lowercase* 'p'):

> It is a purely Western idea; neither Islam nor Classical China nor India possessed any similar concept. It began to emerge in the sixteenth century: and the writers who began to formulate it—Bodin, Bacon, and their followers—gave their reasons quite simply: the discovery of the New World, the mariner's compass, the invention of printing and gunpowder—to their minds these represented a triumph over all previous ages and presaged future victories.[166]

These triumphs and their Western monopoly, unsurprisingly, go invoked with little mention of the darker consequences for other races. To Plumb, Nisbet adds furthers emphasis on the nobility and even superiority of Western progress (again, with a lowercase 'p'):

---

[163] Pollard, *The idea of progress*, p. v.

[164] Ibid., p. v.

[165] Pollard, *The idea of progress,* p. 183: 'In the years since the end of the Second World War, the conversion of the world's mood towards human progress has been quite startling in its extent from the depth of the despair of the generation after 1914. *[…]* then the second war greatly stimulated a revival of belief in the ideas of the Enlightenment, and at its end, somewhat to its surprise, the West found itself on a steeply rising curve of material prosperity, technical innovation and social peace such as it had not even conceived possible in the 1930s.'

[166] Plumb, 'The historian's dilemma', pp. 34-5.

Its flaws and corruptions understood, the idea of progress has been overwhelmingly a noble idea in Western history *[…]*.[167]

There are at least five major premises to be found in the idea's history from the Greeks to our day: belief in the value of the past; *conviction of the nobility, even superiority, of Western civilization;* acceptance of the worth of economic and technological growth; faith in reason and in the kind of scientific and scholarly knowledge that can come from reason alone; and, finally, belief in the intrinsic importance, the ineffaceable *worth* of life on this earth.[168]

What starts as a historiography on a specific Western idea thus slides into a larger stance on Western exceptionalism. Here, [Western] **Progress** is promoted as [human] **progress**—neatly overwriting the existence of non-Western ideas and agency in a single stroke.

Second is the fall of Progress being a self-inflicted wound. Led by Western scholars, Nisbet asks, 'Will the historic idea of progress be driven entirely from the intellectual field by the massed forces of pessimism *[…]* with our own Western civilization even now hastening toward the bottom of the downswing?'[169] Plumb further elaborates in a 'historian's dilemma', which traces to 'two major developments—the growth of scientific historiography and the development of "historicism"'.[170] Scientific historiography refers to methods epitomised by Leopold von Ranke's edict to confine oneself 'solely to the exposition of positive facts without attempting to draw from them inductions'.[171] This focus enables a 'monumental' contribution to academic history, but comes at a heavy cost; namely, the historian's isolation and captivity in an endless sea of facts.[172] Compounding this is a growing *historicism,* which recognises that a perfect or total detachment in judging facts is impossible to achieve.[173] The outcome, then, is Plumb's *historian's dilemma:*

---

[167] Nisbet, *History of the idea*, p. 296.

[168] Emphasis on *'conviction […] civilization'* added; Ibid.*,* pp. 317-8.

[169] Ibid., p. 4.

[170] Plumb, 'The historian's dilemma', p. 26.

[171] See ibid., pp. 26-7; von Ranke quote from Teggart, 'The circumstance', p. 709.

[172] Plumb, 'The historian's dilemma', p. 25: 'This century has witnessed "the brilliant conquest of the most distant frontiers of historical knowledge', yet fewer and fewer historians believe that their art has any social purpose: any function as a coordinator of human endeavour or human thought.'

Ibid., pp. 27-8 'The contribution of the scientific attitude to history has been monumental. It has given the subject an intellectual discipline which it had never previously possessed, and it has multiplied the material of history a millionfold. *[…]* The trained professional historian now has at his disposal an extraordinarily rich material, which can and does illuminate almost every aspect of the past. But each study is largely an end in itself, a pursuit by professionals for professionals. History is now strictly organized, powerfully disciplined, but it possesses only a modest educational value and even less conscious social purpose. *[…]* In spite of the myriads of monographs, the positivist dilemma is still with us—generalizations must, it would seem, be put off until the buried facts, billions of them, are brought back into academic light.'

[173] Ibid., p. 29: 'All historical interpretation and presentation is personal to the historian. There is no escape from self. To such thinkers as Collingwood in Britain, Croce in Italy, Becker and Bear in America, Aron in France, "the world of history", to quote on of these, Becker, "is an intangible world,

[...] the modern historian is crucified by this dilemma: he must act like a scientist although historical objectivity cannot exist. His work can have no validity except for himself, and, perhaps, for fellow historians playing the same game by the same rules or perhaps for those men of his age who think and feel like himself.[174]

The postwar historian has abandoned progress and public duty at a gain in gross knowledge—but at what cost? The argument here is that it is Western civilisation that pays the price. Not only are such historians guilty of 'a flight from moral obligation to society' (Pollard), they eat at the social fabric 'like death-watch beetles, sapping the strength and confidence that history should give to leaders of society' (Plumb).[175] Or as Nisbet bitterly remarks, 'We appear to be destitute of any reigning intellectual class'.[176]

If *(a)* progress is Western and *(b)* it has been forsaken in the West by intellectual leaders (or a lack thereof), one can certainly see *valid* (but not necessarily *sound*) reason for concern.[177] However, these fears are not just domestic. Rather, they are stoked by larger Cold War contexts. Plumb offers one hint in an evident distaste for Marxist neighbours, who 'have appropriated the idea so vociferously that the taint of Marxism *[...]* has rendered it intellectually suspect'.[178] Their corruption of progress, feeding on pre-existing (and also illegitimate) discontents in industrial society, is 'why the idea of progress has in most European countries at least developed such a pink glow'.[179] It is Nisbet, however, who offers the most explicit account of this noble Western idea stolen or appropriated by the *other*—not unlike Prometheus stealing fire from Zeus.[180]

---

re-created imaginatively, and present in our minds". All history must be contemporary history, and so constantly rewritten: "the greatest historians", according to M. Aron, may "comprehend different perspectives even when they seem contradictory and see in their multiplicity a sign not of defeat but of the richness of life".'

[174] Ibid., p. 30.

[175] Ibid., p. 36; Pollard, *The idea of progress,* p. 180.

[176] Nisbet, *History of the idea,* p. 354; this is followed by: 'There isn't a true culture hero in the lot; nothing to compare with what we knew a mere half-century ago. The reason for this condition, this debasement of literature and estrangement of writer and public, is our lack of a true culture. And fundamental to this lack is the disappearance of the sacred, always at the heart of any genuine culture—from ancient Athens to Victorian England.'

[177] Note that *valid* does not equal *sound*. As set in formal logic, an argument is **valid** *if and only if* it is true when its premises are true. It is **sound** when it is not only valid, but the premises are *actually* true. For example, *(a)* blue is 55 and *(b)* 55 is a number. Thus, *(c)* blue is a number. This is a valid argument, but it is not sound—at least not by conventional definitions of 'blue', '55', and 'number'.

[178] Plumb, 'The historian's dilemma', p. 36.

[179] Ibid., p. 38. Also from pp. 38-9: '*[...]* the immense social distaste for industry is clear to anyone who reads the literature of the twentieth let alone the nineteenth century: and that certainly is true of New England, and perhaps of America as a whole. Even if itself not radical the idea of progress implied, or seemed allied to, a radical attitude towards the structure of society. Also this assumption *[...]* was strengthened by the dogmatic assertions of the Marxists that progress was inevitable but could take place only through their kind of revolution. Then, and then only, could the material condition of society take a great leap forward. *[...]* there can be no doubt that constant iteration by Marxists of the inevitability of dialectical materialism has given a bad smell to the idea of progress.'

[180] Pollard, pp. vi-vii, '*[...]* this process is making, in Dr. Leach's phrase, men like gods, with powers over their environment even greater than those with which the Greeks endowed their Olympians.'

Our problem in this final part of the twentieth century is compounded by the fact that the dogma of progress is today strong in the official philosophies or religions of those nations which are the most formidable threats to *Western culture* and its historical *moral and spiritual values*—one more instance of the capacity for Western skills and values to be exported, corrupted, and then turned against the very West that gave them birth.[181]

While Plumb subtly infers other nations, Nisbet makes the source of the threat explicitly clear:

True progress, it is argued, is to be seen in the non-Western socialisms, so-called, especially in those of the Third World. These are the peoples, it is declared, who provide us with the spectacle of the true march of progress, a march that has China or the Soviet Union at the head of the column.[182]

The tragedy is that today there is a great deal more conviction of the reality of progress in some of the unfree nations of the world, beginning with the Soviet Union, than there is in the free Western nations.[183]

A First World thus stands alone against an illiberal Second and Third. The motor of Progress, corrupted as it may be, drives the Second and Third forward, while the First remains not just stagnant but in decline. The idea of Progress, which 'led Western man from the time of the Greeks to the magnificent accomplishments which give substance and historical identity to Western civilization', now finds itself at the brink of collapse.[184]

To recap, *(a)* the idea of progress is Western, *(b)* it has gone into decline in the West, and *(c)* non-Western nations now use it to threaten the West. What, then, ought to be done? These postwar authors' responses are unanimous: *(d)* we must reinstate the idea of progress. *Then and only then* can the West halt its decline. At stake is its very survival, 'which has made such great contributions to the happiness and well-being of millions of men', but which now threatens to be sunk by the twin threat of *domestic* pessimism and *foreign* progress—however perverted, illiberal, or illegitimate.[185] The latter foreign threats certainly add urgency to this prescription. However, it is the first premise that is key to understanding *why Progress over all else*—even despite their acknowledgement of the methodological and political flaws high-lighted prior by their World War-era predecessors.

---

181 Italics added; Nisbet, *History of the idea*, p. 9.
182 Ibid., p. 308.
183 Ibid., p. 318.
184 Ibid., p. 318.
185 Plumb, 'The historian's dilemma', p. 32.

That is, in conflating [Western] **Progress** as [human] **progress**, a lack thereof can only mean regress or stagnation, at best. Preceding excerpts illustrate how this **semantic conflation** leads to a fierce rejection of progress in any other form. The totality of the Western definition can further be seen in a unanimous warning against its only alternative: **nihilism**. The absence of Progress thus leads to an *inevitable* slide into nihilism that endangers Western culture and civilisation. Consider the following illustrations of this binary and deterministic distinction:

> So there we have them. The idealists insisting that history is merely a present world, ever changing, never static; the academic positivists burrowing like boll-weevils in the thickets of facts, mindless, deliberately, of purpose and meaning outside the orbit of their own activity; the public prophets using pseudo-science to justify a repetitive, cyclical interpretation of history, and the littérateurs preoccupied with evocation and exercise of the imagination. The result is nihilistic and socially impotent. All are equally guilty I think of wilfully rejecting the one certain judgement of value that can be made about history, and this is *the idea of progress*. If this great human truth were once more to be frankly accepted, *[…]* history would not only be an infinitely richer education but also play a much more effective part in the culture of western society.[186]

> *[…]* without the conviction of progress, there is no alternative to an inevitable despair in reason and in a rational, scientific approach to society, and to the decline into the mythology of nihilism.[187]

> *[…]* the result of ceasing to believe in God is not that one will then believe nothing; it is that one will believe anything. Clearly, any faith, belief, or interest in progress is utterly impossible under such circumstances.[188]

Consequently, the only way to solve this problem is a restoration of the idea of Progress, itself. Further suggestions are offered on how, exactly, this might be done. Plumb thus calls for a reinstatement of the academic historian's 'social function, in government, in administration, in all the manifold affairs of men'.[189] Pollard also calls for a re-embrace of Progress as not just a historical idea, but as a practical challenge—once again warning of the bleak and inevitably nihilistic alternative:

---

186 Ibid., pp. 34-5. Italics in original.
187 Pollard, The idea of progress, p. 181.
188 Nisbet, History of the idea, p. 351.
189 Plumb, 'The historian's dilemma', p. 44.

Progress, like history itself, is not just an object of study: it is also a challenge. For those who are in the van of humanity, groping forward into the dark, the belief that they are moving in an upward direction is also a necessity. Today, the only possible alternative to the belief in progress would be total despair.[190]

Finally, Nisbet suggests that restoring faith in Progress may require a *religious* reformation. Premised upon its historical ties to religion, Nisbet closes with a guarded optimism regarding a possible *Judeo-Christian* resurgence in an increasingly nihilistic and anarchic West:

What is the future of the idea of progress in the West? Any answer to that question requires answer to a prior question: what is the future of Judeo-Christianity in the West? For if there is one generalization that can be made confidently about the history of the idea of progress, it is that throughout its history the idea has been closely linked with, has depended upon, religion or upon intellectual constructs derived from religion.[191]

With this informative—if not fascinating—historiography reviewed, what does it offer for this PhD? For one, it helps situate the BWP in present historiographies on the idea of progress and development. Many of these works hint at the very existence of a BWP, often in politically charged forms (e.g. civilised Western progress versus its non-Western perversions, deeper methodological nationalism). In doing so, they also offer a hint as to why the notion of a BWP does not yet exist. Namely, **historiography is part of the problem**, itself.

Despite affectations of historical objectivity, these historiographies (i.e. on progress and development) are not just political observers, but political participants in its very better world collisions. Invested in the very conflicts they trace, this bears a silver lining for these present essays. One is the existence of immediate audiences to be found in history and the social sciences. Added to this are further methodological hints and precautions regarding the potential value that lies in researching historiography. These, in turn, feed directly into this project's ensuing interdisciplinary methods.

---

[190] Pollard, *The idea of progress*, p. 203.

[191] Nisbet, *History of the idea,* p. 352. See also ibid., p. 355: 'It was belief in the sacred and the mythological that in the beginning of Western history made possible belief in and assimilation of ideas of time, history, development, and either progress or regress.'

And ibid., p. 356: '*[…]* it is impossible to overlook at the present time a phenomenon that as recently as the 1940s we thought so improbable as to be unworthy of serious thought or discussions. I refer to the faint, possibly illusory, signs of the beginning of a religious renewal in Western civilization, notably in America.'

And ibid., p. 357: 'This idea or dogma is bound to remain moribund, likely indeed to go all the way over the brink, so long as, citing Yeats again, "Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world." Only, it seems evident from the historical record, in the context of a true culture in which the core is a deep and wide sense of the *sacred* are we likely to regain the vital conditions of progress itself and of faith in progress—past, present, and future.'

5. Project Methodology

Having traversed a fairly substantial body of literature, what is this PhD's ensuing approach? To recap, the problem addressed here is the **better worlds problem (BWP)**, asking how to reconcile with a conflicting plurality of better worlds. Its **political-*cum*-philosophical facets** reflect present circumstances in post-Cold War globalisation. Spurring metaphysical collisions and ensuing tragedies across our human diversity, it highlights the deeper politics born out of conflicts between *good-versus-good* (over *good-versus-evil*).

A lack of formal recognition of the BWP, however, motivates a proposed pilot study. Geared towards evidencing the very existence of a problem, itself, it targets better worlds in the **intellectual history of international development**. Yet another problem arises here in the highly fragmented state of its literature. A silver lining, however, is identified in the relatively uncharted space of its social science historiography. Its highly formalised theories preserve past visions of development's better worlds. Further finding a research audience through the reviewed historiographies, the following sections detail a target body of empirical data and ensuing theoretical framework used to structure this project's analyses. To help understand its highly unusual mix of methods, however, it opens with a brief exposition of the author's own subjective standpoint.

5.1 Reflexivity and positioning

As with even the most scientific and scholarly works, this thesis is shaped by the author's own experiences and views. In the present case, its contents and aims may be even more autobiographical than most. Driven less by pure intellectual curiosity and more by immediate practical political concerns, its origins trace to present contexts in post-Cold War globalisation.

Namely, this thesis is one product of a seven-year-long struggle to find a way back into the world. By 'the world', I refer to contemporary human society at the turn of the twenty-first century. Having inhabited said world for thirty-odd years, recent experiences necessitated a withdrawal from larger society. Namely, time was needed away from outside noise in order to attempt a sort of mental operation and recovery. Five years working around the world had brought a succession of culture shocks, resulting in a torn mental retina. Youthful convictions to change the world and a naïve faith in cosmopolitanism clashed with alien realities until my ability to make sense of the world corroded to the point of disrepair. Though the capacity for bare perception remained, quarantining my faculties for interpretation and moral judgement had set me adrift in a sea of noise. My bridge to the external world had snapped.

Old maps and moral compasses no longer made sense. Undergraduate training as what Thomas Kuhn might call a 'normal' natural scientist laden with particular US worldviews malfunctioned in foreign normative environments. But when one becomes aware of dogmas unconsciously anchoring one's metaphysical worldviews, one begins to question everything.

In the loss of faith following a less-than-romantic awakening from dogmatic slumber, one risks slipping into solipsism or a self-annihilating scepticism. Thus began a desperate search for answers combing through libraries in Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea. Here, I found solace in the works of philosophers and other philosophically-minded authors. Though most had long passed, their written experiences gave life-preserving affirmation that in my isolation and loneliness, I had become alienated but not yet insane. In particular, I found a camaraderie with those who had lived in times—largely during the nineteenth century, but also during the World Wars and the Cold War—that saw their own worldviews and ways of thinking torn apart and sown anew. Even if our views clashed, their reconstruction seemed to take place on a common plane that enabled meaningful discourse, in the first place. This, no less, in a time when the meaning of normal interaction was rapidly fading into the background. One could talk, but there was no sound.

It thus follows that this PhD and its motivating concerns are deeply personal. They document the attempts of an individual struggling to recognise and reconcile with the unfolding realities of the twenty-first century. More specifically, they document a Korean son, born and raised in a triumphant post-Cold War US, who realised his dreams of a cosmopolitan life under globalisation—only to become disillusioned by its emptiness and unsustainability. At the same time, these experiences do not exist in isolation. Following the notion that humans are, in part, products of our times, these personal experiences are posed as but a microcosm of larger political and intellectual currents.

Born in US contexts, the Cold War had been won, a digital revolution had come, and with it came a new age: a 'new world order', the 'end of history', and a new phase of globalisation had begun.[192] After studying science and entrepreneurship at MIT during the mid-2000s, I sought to spread the fruits of technology-driven modernisation in a newly-flattened world. Influential readings during this time included the likes of Thomas Friedman, Francis Fukuyama, Jim Rogers, and George Soros.[193] A stint in venture capital was thus followed by a jump into global supply chains, linking developing country factories with retailers around the world. With it came the realisation of a cosmopolitan dream. Stateless and unable to identify as a 'proper' American nor Korean, globalisation and the purported demise of the nation-state opened up the possibility of becoming a citizen of the world, instead.

Unfortunately, this cosmopolitan dream rapidly dissolved into emptiness when exposed too long to the outside (i.e. local, non-expat) air. For one, it was a 'rootless' cosmopolitanism

---

[192] 'New world order' refers to [the elder] US President Bush's 11 September 1990 speech to Congress; see H.W. Bush, 'Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit', George Bush Presidential Library and Museum [https://bush41library. tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2217, accessed 13 February 2019]. 'End of history' refers to the seminal work by F. Fukuyama, *The end of history and the last man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

[193] T.L. Friedman, *The world is flat: a brief history of the twenty-first century* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2005); Fukuyama, *The end of history*; J. Rogers, *Adventure capitalist: the ultimate road trip* (Sussex: John Wiley, 2003); G. Soros, *The alchemy of finance* (Hoboken: John Wiley, 1987).

forewarned by Dag Hammarskjöld, which held internationalism as mutually exclusive to nationalism and the nation-state.[194] It was also an elitist cosmopolitanism that was disconnected from the realities of the urban and rural 'masses'. The ensuing social rifts have more recently come to the fore with the rise of populist movements, emblematic in Brexit and Trump. Far from being isolated events, however, they are seen here as but one manifestation of a deeper current of social polarisation and coinciding dogmatic faiths—including a quasi-religious faith in science and technology—colouring our times. Felt in the pit of the stomach as much as the mind, it stirs a deep dread that defies mere intellectual curiosity. A dream turned nightmare, old spectres stir and tragedies unfold—quietly, hauntingly, unnoticed—over both the elite and the many in present realities.

The motivations underlying this PhD thus trace to a rude awakening in un-ideal realities and an ensuing loss of faith in incumbent paradigms regarding social progress. Thus began a process of mental deprogramming and a desperate search for another way to envision a better world in the twenty-first century. Fundamental to this was a discontent not so much with the present world, itself, but with our present ways of *thinking* about the world. A forest of old faiths had burned down. Out of the detritus, this PhD and the better worlds problem to follow has entailed clearing a path for the new. Eight years have thus passed, with the last seven institutionalised in the quiet seclusion of the university.

In light of the politically sensitive nature of the ensuing contents, it is worth adding a disclosure of personal political leanings to ward off potential misreadings. In locating this work in post-Cold War geopolitics, it is apt to start with the US. To cite its late Senator J. William Fulbright, there exists two Americas in constant tension; one that is self-righteous and egotistical, and one that is self-critical and humane.[195] One would hope that it requires little stretch of the imagination—for Americans, as well—to acknowledge that recent decades have entailed much of the former on the world stage. At the same time, despite structural features enabling such unilateral action, I see little to be gained from polemical denials of a possible US of the reverse type; that is, more humane and less egotistical in its might. Correspondingly, the stance adopted here is not anti-American, but rather anti-imperialist or anti-hegemonic in its core political sentiments. That the US happens to presently occupy these sentiments does not necessarily mean that it always has—nor always will.

Put more constructively, this work is driven by a strong desire for a more multipolar world order, where principles of national sovereignty and a balance of powers offer a more sustainable basis for human cooperation and coexistence. This is all-the-more informed by Korean realities, in which bitter past lessons on geopolitics and tragedy continue to shape and

---

[194] See p. 242-3 in D. Hammarskjöld, 'Know yourself—know your world', in *The servant of peace: a selection of speeches and statements of Dag Hammarskjöld,* ed. W. Foote, 242-50 (London: Bodley Head, 1962).

[195] J.W. Fulbright, *The arrogance of power* (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 245.

divide the nation today. The resulting views arrived at here (e.g. of a nationalism integral to internationalism, of truth—scientific or otherwise—as political, and of politics as the art of the possible) may present an alien mix amidst present Anglophone debates. This is a major reason for enunciating them here—not just for the sake of reintroducing such ideas, but to add awareness of the very insularity of said debates (*à la* 'echo chambers'—or in Korean, 'frogs in a well').[196] For those frogs or fish born out of water—not American, not Korean, not British, nor even human—this eyesight into others' metaphysical waters/linguistic wells and the amphibious ability to cross them is a consolation prize, if not a requirement to survive.

This linguistic aspect of politics is mentioned, for as many international scholars know well, I write this at a time when representation and legitimacy across humankind's diverse ideas and realities are disproportionately moderated by the English language. Amidst post-Cold War geopolitical shifts, these discourses are especially moderated by well-funded and hard power-backed US ideals, interests, and institutions (e.g. in academia, public policy, the private sector). Notably, recent years suggest that rising and returning powers are hardly averse to responding in kind—whether through formal means (e.g. via the UN, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) or informal ones (e.g. fake news in Western media).

Amidst the geopolitical volatility born out of this ongoing struggle for recognition in both domestic and international realms, this dissertation attempts to raise a mirror to reflect on the shape of ongoing debates and their unrecognised potential for tragedy. A hybrid born out of both insider and outsider views, it warns of a *vital need to foster greater capacities for mutual understanding amidst our increasingly entangled lives*. Otherwise, present inequities and growing self-destructive capabilities (whether wrought through nature or directly through ourselves) pose fundamental risks for sustaining coexistence into the twenty-first century. Mindful of the deep geopolitical fault lines in this power struggle over truth, knowledge, and recognition, an explicit choice was thus made to plant this study under the aegis of an older empire, perhaps more worldly or wisened—if not more wary—than the new.

5.2 Historiography as intellectual history archive

Returning now from this subjective standpoint to the surrounding literature, two significant limitations become clear in the prior review of development's historiography. One is a limitation in the empirical scope of recent academic historians. Their works contribute a level of detail or texture that defies most social science accounts. However, a prioritisation of detail over temporal-spatial scope limits its value for observing our focal better worlds. At the same time, development's social sciences—though less systematic in its analyses—bring a scope of ideas that still escapes academic history. However, it comes with significant biases framing its

---

[196] The saying '우물 속 개구리' refers to a frog in a well who believes the air above and water below to be representative of all the world's skies and oceans. (Its historical origins vary from the warring states period in China to ancient sanskrit in India.)

respective accounts—particularly if regarding any ideological enemies. As such, their reliability as historical sources remains in question. What, then, can be done?

Thus enters this work's turn to **historiography**, or the particular methods and narratives associated with a particular historical subject—in this case, development. In a strange twist, it is *thanks to* their biases that prior works evidence past better worlds. Juxtaposing their biases with respective locations in geographical/disciplinary space and time renders an alternative record. Thus, the very same biases that impair this historiography's use as *secondary sources* ends up enabling its use as *primary sources,* instead. Preserving not only past visions but also their surrounding politics in their implicit (and explicit) biases, these diverse and comparatively undisciplined accounts preserve development's history from eye-level, so to speak.[197] As such, **development's social science historiography** is used here as a sort of *intellectual history archive*. This carries an additional set of benefits.

Witness to (if not part of) development's history as it unfolds, its social science scholars preserve seminal ideas and shifts missed by external historians. As such, they contribute not only further sources on development's history, but also a foil to reflect on cross-disciplinary interpretations. Striking a contrast to the historian's pursuit of fine detail, these larger (but perhaps lighter) histories still render a valuable comparative perspective. Historians, after all, are not immune to implicit biases of their own; their field likewise built upon philosophical premises. Example issues already documented in the prior review include arguments from Teggart and Plumb on the proper role and methods of historians on progress. In development contexts, German historians have also been key in highlighting such biases; what Unger has highlighted prior as 'methodological nationalism'.[198]

As such, the present state of the field—both in social science and in history—lends itself well to historiographical analysis. First and foremost is in enabling documentation of past better worlds, as seen through both its substantive narratives and its surrounding biases. Thus labelled as *historiographical,* this approach is unconventional but not entirely unprecedented. Packenham, for example, adopts a similar approach and aims, utilising the history of political development ideas explicitly as a window into 'American values and ideology'.[199]

Adding to this primary aim are secondary benefits from historiographical systemisation and analysis. As argued by David Ekbladh, 'a well-conceived and executed *[historiographical]* essay has potential *[sic]* reframe a whole field'.[200] The ensuing addition of a massive body of

---

[197] Observation on 'eye-level' accounts attributed to conversations in Lent Term 2017 with Raymond Apthorpe, made in relation to John Toye's historiographical contributions.

[198] C.R. Unger, 'Comment on Joseph Hodge, on the historiography of development (art I and II)'. *Humanity,* 28 April 2016 (http://humanityjournal.org/blog/comment-on-joseph-hodge-on-the-historiography-of-development-part-i-and-ii/).

[199] See extended discussion on pp. 319-22 and following examples from Packenham, *Liberal America:*

'[...] comparison of the largely implicit notions of the policymakers (the doctrines) with the explicit notions of the social scientists (the theories) makes possible an assessment of the utility and the limitations of social science for public policy. The central focus throughout is always on the notions of

social science ideas to more concerted historical efforts hold significant potential for expanding the scope and accuracy of present interpretations. And to recall the merits of selecting development in the first place, this carries the potential for rendering immediate, real-world impact amidst present controversies in development theory, policy, and practice.

The second methodological limitation has remained largely tacit up to this point; namely, an implicit linguistic focus on English-language or Anglophone sources. A disclaimer must thus be made that the ensuing essays focus on the ideas of a better world in development's *Anglophone academic historiography*. With it comes biases in research questions, empirical data, and analytical standpoints. An awareness of these linguistic borders, however, offers a silver lining. After more than three centuries of British and American empire, the English language has become a present-day *lingua franca.* In theory, representation in the Anglophone development literature should thus extend well beyond native English-speaking countries. The ensuing studies will offer some evidence of the extent to which it does so in reality.

If this Anglophone discourse is indeed reflective of our human diversity, then it carries the upside of this essays' findings pointing to not just Anglophone, but broader global views. Its better world collisions would similarly relate more to global than to Western politics. If the Anglophone discourse, however, does *not* capture this diversity, then an upside still remains. For one, it would help gauge the extent to which its works represent local versus global views. This would add an important piece for future comparative studies involving the Anglophone case. In doing so, it simultaneously speaks to the broader spaces and research directions to be pursued within and beyond the Anglophone development discourse.

To be clear, these considerations do not imply a hard linguistic relativism (e.g. different languages entailing *wholly* divorced realities). For one, globalisation works against such hard divides, as reflected in this work's *shared* geopolitical realm and its ensuing frictions. Rather, this work treats languages as metaphysical silos (or 'echo chambers') in geopolitical space; but one of many such aspects shaping this terrain (e.g. race, class, nation, gender).

---

the officials and social scientists concerning political development: the nature of these ideas, their roots in American values and ideology, and their virtues and defects.' (p. xvi)

'[...] the book is not mainly about political development per se in the Third World, or in the United States, nor about the domestic politics of foreign aid, nor the impact of U.S. aid on Third-World countries—even though each of these subjects receives some attention. It is not so much a study of foreign aid as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, where the stress is on aid as an element of international relations, as it is a study of American values and ideology.' (p. xxi)

'The intention here, then, is not to deny that the roots of American policies and activities toward the Third World are many and complex. Rather, it is to establish the existence of a powerful and hitherto ill-understood relationship between a cultural tradition, on the one hand, and ideas and policies about political development in other cultures, on the other.' (pp. xxi-xxii)

[200] D. Ekbladh, 'The stages of development's history?', *Humanity,* Joseph Hodge Roundtable, 30 April 2016, available at: http://humanityjournal.org/blog/the-stages-of-developments-history/#_ftn1.

5.3 Analytical framework: sagobangsik theory

With empirical grounds located in its social science historiography, how *exactly* can development's better worlds be captured? Given the novelty of the BWP, a similarly novel analytical framework was synthesised for this work. Tentatively labelled **sagobangsik theory**, it entails a *metatheoretical* framework that takes ideas or theories as its focal unit of analysis; in this case, ideas or theories of development's better worlds.[201]

This framework is the product of an interlinguistic synthesis. As argued in linguistics and philosophy, language offers basic building blocks for the social construction of reality.[202] It endows a conceptual vocabulary used to interpret existence and grammatical rules for reasoning and communicating through them. Easily forgotten when immersed within, language is a form of symbolic logic—another part of our metaphysical waters often taken for granted. Different languages hence offer different ways of thinking through or about things (e.g. ideas, emotions). Further, some languages are more adept at discussing some things over others. Poetry and maths, for example, both involve their fair share of suffering, but the language of one may be more adept at expressing it than the other.

Such is the case when thinking through the BWP in Korean and English. Namely, the present-day English lexicon does not lend itself well to discussing plural forms of reasoning and parallel metaphysical worldviews. The idea of plural, non-universal forms of reason that are valid and yet conflict may rather sound strange or even paradoxical in English. Enunciation thus requires specialised if not archaic terms and definitions that defy easy comprehension. In contrast, the notion of plural systems of reasoning/belief can be relatively easily discussed in Korean using what philosopher Bernard Williams' advocates as 'moderately plain speech'.[203] The following sections lay out these terms used to synthesise a framework.

5.3.1 Laying out the basic Korean concepts

A key example is the framework's namesake, **sagobangsik**.[204] It means a way of thinking or form of reasoning, but can also mean mindset, mentality, philosophy, or paradigm. The closest analogue in the Romance languages is in German, *Gedankengang*, fusing *Gedanken* (thought) and *Gang* (way). German indeed offers a tempting alternative. The present work might otherwise have been on *Weltgeist, Weltanschauungen und Wissenschaft* (world spirit, worldviews, and science), borrowing from Hegelian and early post-Kantian German thought.

---

[201] The chosen Korean translation is 사고방식론 <思考方式論>. As a note on linguistic conventions, all Korean words transcribed in English from henceforth follow the guidelines set out by the 2000 Revised Romanization of Korean set out by the South Korean Ministry of Culture.

[202] See the notion of linguistic relativity in the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, Wittgenstein's non-representationalist concept of language games, and the sociological role of language in social constructivism.

[203] B. Williams, *Ethics and the limits of philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 6.

[204] Written in Korean as 사고방식 <思考方式>. Readers of Chinese or Japanese may recognise its etymological roots, which combine 'thought' *(sago)* with 'method' or 'way of doing things' *(bangsik)*.

Implicit in *sagobangsik* is the plurality and subjectivity of our forms of reason. It does not have to be argued or belaboured. It is there by default. This in contrast to a strong tendency to **objectify** or **essentialise** individual ideas in Western thought (e.g. on liberty, truth, justice). Instead, atomistic ideas are deflated and resituated here in larger systems of reason and belief. Capturing humankind's kaleidoscopic views of reality, each fragment or face offers a window into one of many worlds—each seated in a *sagobangsik* or mind. Whether it be Korean versus British ways of thinking or the norms imprinted in (and by) social theories, the notion enables one to grasp our plural forms of reason with relative ease.

To this, two more layman's terms enable a simple deconstruction of the better world. Namely, **sehgyegwan** means a view of the world, while **gachigwan** means a view on values.[205] As with *sagobangsik,* both are subjectively held—though this does not preclude the possibility of universal or objective contents. This contrasts with a strong affinity in Western philosophy to cast its ideas and categories as universal. Anscombe offers one explanation, tracing moral philosophy's monism to historical roots in Judeo-Christianity; visible in Kant's heavenly *Reich der Zwecke* (kingdom of ends) or Nietzsche's *Gott ist tot* (God is dead).[206] Also found in Sen's critique of Rawls' *transcendentalism*, this preoccupation with absolute and objective truths is also tied to the Ancients.[207] R.G. Collingwood thus critiques Aristotelean metaphysics for its transcendental grounds in 'pure being', while Popper critiques objective or essential Platonic ideals as the paving stones for political absolutism.[208]

Finally, **insikron** is the one specialised Korean term used.[209] It means epistemology, but carries important differences. In English, epistemology entails *theories on knowledge*, with knowledge implicitly tied to truth and objectivity. However, the Korean root, *insik*, refers to not just knowledge, but awareness, recognition, and perception. Rendering fuzzy borders between knowledge and perception, this contrasts with a sharp but possibly false categorical divide when thought through English-language terms.

Korean thus offers an apt alternative to English categorical waters. Though laden with a baggage of its own, it endows a way to think through the BWP, less encumbered by false distinctions and the defence of basic presuppositions. But if Korean was used to lay out in broad strokes this *sagobangsik* framework, then English was used to carve out its details. This was made possible by the precise (albeit more abstract) terms available in Western philosophy. Consequently, *sehgyegwan* transforms into **ontological propositions**, *gachigwan* into **moral propositions**, and *insikron* into **epistemological propositions**.

---

[205] Written as 세계관 〈世界觀〉 and 가치관 〈價值觀〉, respectively. Their shared etymological root, *gwan* (관 or 觀), indicates a subject's perspective or view.

[206] G.E.M. Anscombe, 'Modern moral philosophy', *Philosophy* 33.124 (1958): 1-19.

[207] See A. Sen, *The idea of justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

[208] R.G. Collingwood, *An essay on metaphysics* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998[1940]); K. Popper, *The open society and its enemies, volume one: the spell of Plato* (London: Routledge, 1945).

[209] Written in Korean as 인식론 〈認識論〉.

5.3.2 Translation and expansion in English categorical space

As the chosen terms can mean very different things to different thinkers, some exact definition is warranted. To start, **ontology** and **morality** are thinly defined to refer to *descriptive* and *prescriptive* beliefs on what *is* and what *ought to be,* respectively. Though 'normative' is used at-times instead of 'prescriptive', this is avoided here. It risks conflating 'descriptive' as 'non-normative'; thus relating only to objective facts, not subjective values. This is unhelpful, as a contention here is that what one holds as objective fact may be but a subjective value—the confusion of which can birth much larger tragedies.[210]

Another source of confusion lies in **ontology** versus **metaphysics**. Ontology carries the above thin definition, referring to *descriptive* propositions on what *is.* In contrast, metaphysics invokes a space, realm, or plane encompassing humanity's very perceptions of existence. Here, it adopts a stance of *fallibility;* that is, the possibility that what we know is wrong (e.g. to err is human). Beyond this, it bears no judgment on the truth or falsity of any one vision. Its main function is rather to provide a space in which to detach from and reflect upon one's worldviews and the possibility of other worldly configurations.

This conception owes in part to Terry Pinkard's work on Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Its ideas on presuppositionless beginnings and the decay of certainty into stoicism and skepticism help enunciate the above.[211] To this, Collingwood further adds a methodological orientation, defining metaphysics as the study of historical systems of reasoning or *catalogue raisonné* ('explanatory or systematic catalogue').[212] Thus framing metaphysics as a 'historical science', it applies here to *catalogue raisonné* capturing development's better worlds.[213]

Following this detour into metaphysics, we turn now to **morality** versus **ethics**. Used as simple synonyms, both entail prescriptive orientations centred on determining right/wrong or good/bad (and evil, if using Nietzsche's genealogy).[214] This work will default to 'morality' only for the sake of consistency. Finally, **epistemology** questions the nature and possibility of knowledge, itself. *What* and *how* do we know? Epistemological propositions thus underpin ontological and moral ones in detailing the *nature* and *possibility* of ontological and moral knowledge. Like ontology and morality, however, epistemological propositions also lie engulfed within the larger space of metaphysics.

---

[210] See the critique of the fact/value dichotomy in Part I of H. Putnam, *The collapse of the fact/value dichotomy and other essays* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

[211] Refer to section 3.3 ('Stoicism, skepticism, and the unhappy consciousness') in Pinkard, *Hegel's Phenomenology,* pp. 63-78.

[212] *Catalogue raisonné* in R.G. Collingwood, 'Function of metaphysics in civilization', in *An essay on metaphysics,* ed. Rex Martin, 379-421 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998[1940]), p. 383.

[213] See Part I—particularly essays on 'The science of absolute presuppositions' and 'Metaphysics an historical science' [sic]—in Collingwood, *An essay on metaphysics,* pp. 34-57. Note that 'sociality of reason' is the subtitle of Pinkard, *Hegel's Phenomenology.*

[214] For this metaethical account (via semantic history) of 'good', 'bad', and 'evil', see F.W. Nietzsche, *On the genealogy of morality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006[1887]).

Sehgyegwan, *gachigwan*, and *insikron* hence translate here into ontological, moral, and epistemological propositions situated in metaphysical space. Only *sagobangsik* now remains. In theory, *metaphysical paradigm* can be used, using metaphysics as defined here. In practice, however, the contested use of 'metaphysics' and 'paradigm' renders the term unreliable, with explanation required regardless of whether using English or Korean.[215] Korean, at least offers more brevity and a clean slate within the English lexicon. As such, *sagobangsik* will simply remain sagobangsik—a loanword that may offer value in its new linguistic waters.[216]

5.3.3 Putting the pieces together: logic scaffolds as the basic unit of analysis

The pieces are now in place to construct the sagobangsik framework's basic unit of analysis, called a ***logic scaffold***.[217] Borrowed from 'tissue scaffolds' in biological engineering, each captures a bare form, system, or pattern of reasoning. Constituted by ontological, moral, and epistemological propositions—or **{ω, μ, ε}-propositions**—they are used to capture particular ideas of a better world.[218] Hence also referred to as *better world scaffolds* (or *BW-scaffolds*), they capture systemic arguments regarding what the better world is, what it ought to be, and how this can all be known (see Table 7).

To return full circle to this introduction's opening pages, the above tools or theoretical instruments offer a concrete means to document *exactly* what we mean when we talk about development or the better world. Rendering a decentred view of humanity's diverse better worlds, these logic scaffolds enable more granular analysis of *particular* development perceptions and their surrounding politics. Populating the metaphysical waters of a diverse humankind, this renders a sort of gestalt shift. Namely, it orients analysis towards not the truth or falsity of any one particular scaffold or vision, but rather towards a more basic understanding of this logical diversity's constitution, origins, and effects. The final remaining sections hence outline the implementation of this sagobangsik analysis.

Korean term	Chosen English translation	Symbol	Description
세계관	Ontological propositions	ω	Propositions on what *is*
가치관	Moral propositions	μ	Propositions on what *ought to be*
인식론	Epistemological propositions	ε	Propositions on what *can be known*

Table 7. Three key types of propositions constituting particular ideas of a better world

---

[215] 'Metaphysics', as it is used here, departs from present forms in philosophical and broader public use. 'Paradigm' also departs here from the meaning and scope set out by Kuhn within natural science.

[216] From henceforth, 'sagobangsik' remains unitalicised to signify its import into English.

[217] The chosen Korean translation for 'logic scaffold' is 논리비계 〈論理飛階〉.

[218] This annotation is a small homage to Collingwood, who abbreviates **metaphysics** as **μ** in written manuscripts; see *A note on provenance* in Collingwood, 'Function of metaphysics', pp. 420-1.

5.4 Structure: three case studies

The ensuing chapters explore three case studies of the BWP, as it manifests in three distinct empirical samples. Hence structured in a three-essay format, each chapter of this thesis hence corresponds to an essay.

Essay one (i.e. chapter one) opens with an examination of the historiography manifest in development's English-language journal articles. Leveraging digital tools to amass a large longitudinal sample ('big data analysis' or 'semantic analysis', if one will) of history-centric articles, they reveal how and why development scholars have utilised history since the 1950s. In the process, they trace the emergence of what will come to be called a *scientific positivist logic scaffold*; one of a particular *liberal* (or 'neoliberal') type. Closing with calls for greater historiographical awareness and interdisciplinary dialogue, it observes fundamental problems with the accumulation of development knowledge (or a lack thereof).

Essay two (i.e. chapter two) takes a complementary shift towards development studies' English-language history books. Amidst a lack of direct precedents, it utilises similar tools as in essay one to compile a new database of development history books. Producing a penultimate sample of only comprehensive, dedicated historical narratives, it reveals a striking historical turn in the transition from development's Cold War-era to post-Cold War-era historiography. Taking its lesser known and, indeed, largely forgotten Cold War narratives as its focal sample, essay two recovers a highly variegated and politically charged intellectual field. Centred on Cold War social science, these histories add to essay one's findings with an ensuing scientific positivist scaffold of a *Marxist* type. Tracing its many political origins, actors, and effects, essay two recounts the circumstances surrounding the deserted logic scaffolds or shells that remain by the 1980s. It thus closes with an open-ended agenda, highlighting the many ensuing intellectual streams to be followed.

Essay three (i.e. chapter three) finally closes by following up one of these streams; that is with the rise of a new *post-structuralist logic scaffold* that fills a void left by prior Marxist types. Having laid substantial empirical grounds in the first two essays' historiographies, it also marks a departure in shifting to more concerted philosophical and political analyses. In addition to unpacking postdevelopment's post-structuralist scaffold, it presents a synthesis of findings across all three essays. Highlighting the dominance of these observed scientific positivist (liberal and Marxist) and post-structuralist logic scaffolds, they render a view called *embedded development.* Derived from the circumstances surrounding these particular forms of development thought (i.e. logic scaffolds), it illustrates the social origins and effects of development knowledge. Added to this is the ensuing politics of a *development game,* which mediates development knowledge across not only theoretical, but also larger university and public policy arenas.

In addition to the substantive content of these essays, their structure is also informed by their formal audiences. All three essays, despite their theoretical beginnings, ultimately close with practical implications or ends. However, their starting orientations and target audiences vary, in light of the BWP's own interdisciplinary terrain (see Table 8). Essays one and two thus centre on development's history or, more precisely, development studies' Anglophone historiography. While essay one addresses social scientists within development studies, essay two adds historians in its attempt to extend an interdisciplinary bridge. Together, they constitute the most extensive study of the English-language development studies historiography known to date. As hinted prior, essay three then adds a shift to more philosophical and political analyses. Partly reflecting its target audiences, it departs the narrow realms of academic theory to add policymakers as part of its intended beneficiaries.

Chapter research question	Orientation	Target audience
1. Does the development discourse learn from history?	History and public policy	Social scientists *(development)*
2. Development's historiography: missing voices, forgotten worlds	History and public policy	Historians *(diplomatic, intellectual, international)*
3. Does postdevelopment theory help or hurt the Global South?	Philosophy and public policy	Social scientists, policymakers *(development)*

Table 8. A breakdown of research orientations and target audiences, by chapter.

As such, each essay starts under quite different premises; whether in their questions, empirical subjects, or target audiences. Like an undercover agent, each standalone essay engages with its respective corners or debates, but they also carry a larger agenda in the BWP set out here.

The conclusion thus finally returns to these big picture contexts laid out here in the introduction. Synthesising findings from across each essay, it reframes them in the contexts of the BWP and its deep-rooted politics. Thus also offering responses to the larger historiographical contexts traced here (e.g. historians of development, the idea of progress), it closes with an agenda for future research directions.

Despite these multiple levels of analysis and moving parts, this thesis in its totality yet remains severely limited. Relative to the vast scope of the research problem and its territory, there is only so much that can be done here. To recall a caveat from H.W. Arndt:

> I am conscious of two debts I should have incurred but did not—to authorities
> on the politics and sociology of development and to writers of development in
> languages other than English. Had I attempted to fill these two gaps, the book

would never have been finished. I can only hope other studies will complement this one in both respects.[219]

This work, more than three decades later, thus follows Arndt's footsteps in attempting to fill some of the *interdisciplinary* gaps escaping Arndt's grasp. However, much work still remains in addressing the interlinguistic gaps if we are to speak of an *international* (or global) understanding of development and its better worlds.

Consequently, the seven years of the PhD give way here to an agenda more appropriate for seventy. Given its scope, any semblance of a conclusive answer to the BWP requires more time and space than can be afforded to a PhD. What *can* be offered, however, is an attempt to place such questions on more solid footing. As argued, new circumstances in the twenty-first century call for new ways of thinking about the world. The contribution of this work thus lies in the new framings or views of not only international development, but also of twenty-first-century politics that may emerge along the way.

---

[219] Arndt, *Economic development*, p. vii.

Chapter 1

Does the development discourse learn from history?

1. Introduction

What is the nature and extent of historical awareness in the development discourse? Does the development discourse learn from history, or does it ignore the past to be, in George Santayana's words, 'condemned to repeat it'?[220] These questions carry particular significance in light of two present contexts. The first is a development enterprise (encompassing both theory and practice) that has marked 70 years in its post-World War history. As it now enters its eighth decade, it seems fitting to reflect upon the history of development—and upon development's own awareness of it.

The second context motivating this work is a geopolitical climate that is markedly different from the one in which the post-World War development enterprise was originally built. Old geopolitics of decolonisation and the Cold War have been replaced by narratives on hegemony and rising powers. Further, a grand optimism and early hopes in development have been replaced by a more reserved sort of development buffeted in a sea of discontent. Recent years, in particular, speak volumes about such discontents—with globalisation and elite cosmopolitanism, prolonged economic and humanitarian crises, and rising insecurities for countries both 'developing' and 'developed'. Changing operational contexts have, in turn, spurred calls for reform (e.g. Malloch-Brown; Weiss and Abdenur) and even wholesale abandonment (e.g. Escobar, Sachs) of the development enterprise.[221]

---

[220] G. Santayana, *The life of reason* (New York: Scribner, 1905), p. 284.

[221] A. Escobar, *Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); M. Malloch-Brown, 'Foreword', in *Post-2015 UN development: making change happen?,* eds. S. Browne and T.G. Weiss (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. xv-xvi; W. Sachs (ed.), *The development dictionary: a guide to knowledge as power* (London: Zed Books, 1992); T.G. Weiss and A.E. Abdenur, 'Introduction: emerging powers and the UN–what kind of development partnership?', *Third World Quarterly* 35.10 (2014), 1749-58.

Altogether, these contexts raise serious concerns in regard to development's future. What will become of development? What should it be? How can it be changed? When faced with such uncertainties about the future, it is useful to reflect upon the past. How did we get here? Why are things done the way they are? What have we learned? It is with such questions in mind that this work delves into the history of development. It cannot provide a comprehensive answer, being limited in a number of aspects. Most tellingly, it comments only on the peer-reviewed English-language journal literature. The aim is thus to provide but a glimpse into the development discourse's knowledge of the past. In light of the timeliness of such a work, however, even a brief glimpse may yet be a valuable one.

The remainder of this work proceeds as follows. Section two explains the study's methodology and associated limitations. Section three summarizes findings from our survey of the journal literature. Section four then discusses the broader significance of said findings. Finally, section five concludes with a summary and suggestions for future work.

2. Methodology

The methods of this work borrow from intellectual history to examine how the development discourse engages with history, writ large. Namely, it engages in a form of discourse analysis that traces not a pre-determined school of thought or thinkers, but rather the broader flow of arguments across a number of arenas or sub-streams in development thought. The methods and underlying rationale are presented at length, below.

2.1 Discourse analysis

First of all, how are we to answer the question of whether the development discourse learns from history? Let us first begin with some groundwork: (1) what exactly do we mean by *the development discourse*, and (2) what exactly do we mean by *learning from history*?

For (1), we define the *development discourse* as the collective stream of ideas or thought engaging with development theory and practice. In this work, we focus on the academic discourse of development studies. This includes contributions from across the social sciences (e.g. anthropology, economics, geography, politics, sociology) and other allied disciplines (e.g. history, philosophy, gender studies, environmental studies). Further, we focus on this discourse as it manifests in written form. This allows us to subdivide the field into journals, books (e.g. monographs, edited volumes, textbooks), and the so-called grey literature (e.g. working papers, reports, conference proceedings, dissertations). This study focuses on journals, but for reasons that first require us to specify what we mean by 'learning from history'.

For (2), we adopt a rather minimalist stance on *learning from history*. 'Learning' in a discourse could be evidenced in any number of ways, from the gradual accumulation and refinement of some store of knowledge to the drastic paradigm shifts in scientific revolutions

and overturned worldviews. Here, we adopt a bare and open-ended conception of learning in asking how and to extent the development discourse derives knowledge from history, writ large. Beyond this, we find little need to ascribe to any one particular mode of learning; for doing so, in a way, defeats the very purpose of this present exercise.

Having specified our aims, we now return to explaining our choice in (1) to focus on journal articles. To be explicit, journal articles are hardly chosen here to be representative of the development discourse in its entirety. However, journal articles offer two key benefits when investigating how development learns from history.

First, journal articles enable a level of temporal-spatial resolution for our survey that is difficult to achieve with the book-format literature. The latter entails comparatively large commitments of time and energy, which carry disadvantages in terms timely and comprehensive representation. The obvious drawback here is the exclusion of a sizeable body of historical works. Example authors include Arndt, Leys, Meier, Preston, Rapley, Rist, Pieterse, and Ziai.[222] These sources warrant a separate study of their own, but journal articles prove more optimal for an initial survey. That said, these very advantages can be attributed to the grey literature, as well. It is here that the journal literature's second benefit comes to the fore.

Namely, journal articles allow us to note the relative influence of certain arguments in the broader politics of development thought. This stems from the academic journal's key role in mediating development knowledge. That is, academic journals entail distinct (but frequently overlapping) sub-streams or sub-discourses in terms of the sociology and politics of knowledge. This is rendered by the selection or curation process of each journal's editorial staff and peer-review community, which in turn imparts published articles with an implicit measure of value or recognition. This process is further reinforced by the key role of journal publications—particularly journal impact factors and article citations—when it comes academic hiring and promotion. Ultimately, this dissemination and competition of ideas across what Randall Collins refers to as a 'limited attention space' also come to influence the very ideas that matter in the realm of development policy and practice.[223] This legitimacy and influence is where our *comparatively* unregulated grey literature falls short. This is not to say, however, that such literature has not been influential (e.g. the UN Brundtland Report on sustainable development), and entails yet another limitation to this study.[224]

---

[222] H.W. Arndt, *Economic development: the history of an idea* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); C. Leys, *The rise and fall of development theory* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996); G.M. Meier, *Biography of a subject: an evolution of development economics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); J.N. Pieterse, *Development theory: deconstructions/reconstructions* (London: Sage, 2001); P.W. Preston, *Development theory: an introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); J. Rapley, *Understanding development: theory and practice in the Third World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996); G. Rist, *The history of development: from Western origins to global faith* (London: Zed Books, 1997); A. Ziai, *Development discourse and global history: from colonialism to the Sustainable Development Goals* (London: Routledge, 2016).

[223] R. Collins, *The sociology of philosophies* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).

[224] United Nations, *Our Common future: Brundtland report* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

Finally, when it comes to methodological limitations, it must also be pointed out that this study can only speak of the English-language development discourse. Little can be said of the ideas and debates occupying other development discourses (e.g. Spanish, French, German, Korean); nor of the international flow of ideas and the political relations to be observed between them. With that said, the English-language discourse is hardly exclusive to Anglo-American views. As a de facto *lingua franca*, many 'foreign' (e.g. non-Anglophone, non-Western) perspectives are to be found. Indeed, foreign-language monographs are often translated and abridged into journal articles for wider dissemination in the English-language discourse. This possibly adds another benefit to surveying journal articles over books. Nevertheless, while the English-language development discourse may be *relatively* inclusive, it is not held to be representative of the global development discourse, on the whole. Consequently, some level of Anglo-American bias is to be expected.

2.2 Data selection

The basic approach for gathering survey data was to compile journal articles with some variant of the term 'history' (e.g. historic, historical, histories, historiography) in the title and/or keywords. This was conducted using a wildcard search term ('histor*'), but required—due to pure volume—further culling of search results. Given the aim of this work to identify representative or, alternatively, predominant ways in which history has been used in the development discourse, a second selection criterion was introduced: journal impact factors.

Journal impact factors were referenced from the latest Journal Citation Reports© Social Sciences Edition, published annually by Thomson Reuters.[225] Journals were then retrieved from the category of 'Planning and Development' and filtered to remove those on planning, as opposed to development (e.g. management science, public administration).[226] As a caveat, this is but one of many possible categorisations, and may not cover all journals that one might allocate under the expansive field of development (e.g. journals on population/demography, public health). Of the remaining journals, the top 10 were selected based on highest 5-year impact factors (encompassing 2011–2015; see Table 1).

With the search domain narrowed down to what might be characterised as the most frequently cited or most 'mainstream' journals in the development discourse, a new search produced a more manageable but sufficiently large sample set (n=136) of original research articles, editorials, and special issue introductions. Table 2 (following page) provides an overview of their distribution across journals and across time.

---

[225] Thomson Reuters, 'Journal citation reports© social sciences edition 2016' [http://ip-science.thomsonreuters.com/cgi-bin/jrnlst/jloptions.cgi?PC=K].

[226] 'Planning and Development' is defined by Thomson Reuters (2016) as 'concerned with resources on the economics and social development of both underdeveloped and industrialized areas. The resources in this category focus on subjects such as economic forecasting, development studies, policy-making strategies, theories of planning, and the growth of the third world'.

Table 1. *Survey panel of ten top development journals (by 5-year impact factor)*

5-year Impact Factor (2011–2015)	Journal Title	First Issue
3.102	World Development	1973
2.268	Sustainable Development	1993
2.251	Development and Change	1970
2.075	World Bank Research Observer	1986
2.057	World Bank Economic Review	1986
1.638	Economic Development and Cultural Change	1952
1.381	Third World Quarterly	1979
1.253	Journal of Development Studies	1964
1.245	Studies in Comparative International Development	1965
1.178	Progress in Development Studies	2001

Source: 2015 Journal Citation Reports® Social Science Edition (Thomson and Reuters. 2016)

Table 2. *Distribution of surveyed articles (by journal, time)*

Est.	Journal	1951–1955	1956–1960	1961–1965	1966–1970	1971–1975	1976–1980	1981–1985	1986–1990	1991–1995	1996–2000	2001–2005	2006–2010	2011–2015	2016	tot
1952	Economic Development and Cultural Change	3	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	11
1964	Journal of Development Studies			0	1	0	0	3	1	0	1	1	1	4	0	12
1965	Studies in Comparative International Development			0	0	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	0	0	9
1970	Development and Change				0	1	1	1	1	1	6	5	0	1	0	17
1973	World Development					1	1	1	3	4	5	2	7	8	1	33
1979	Third World Quarterly						0	2	0	3	5	8	9	10	0	37
1986	World Bank Economic Review								0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2
1986	World Bank Research Observer								2	0	0	2	0	0	0	4
1993	Sustainable Development									0	1	1	0	3	0	5
2001	Progress in Development Studies											0	1	5	0	6
	TOTAL (n=136)	3	0	1	1	5	4	9	9	10	19	22	21	31	1	

Note: Establishment year corresponds to the year of each journal's first issue; publication statistics for 2016 are incomplete, and cover only the period from January 1 – September 19, 2016.

3. Survey Findings

Perhaps the most immediate finding of our survey was the sheer variety of historical works found in the development literature. Example dimensions of variation included subject matter, geographical focus, time period, research methods, and intellectual or ideological stance. Further compounding this variety were multiple senses in which a work could be referred to as 'historical'. Specifically, three types of historical analysis were found.

The first type consisted of *descriptive historical accounts* of some form. Example works include a history of migrant labour in Mauritius (e.g. Kothari) or the history of the idea of agricultural self-sufficiency (e.g. Morrissey).[227] Such works were typically—though not necessarily—followed by a second type of historical analysis.

---

[227] M. Morrissey, 'Agricultural self-sufficiency: the recent history of an idea', *Studies In Comparative International Development* 17.1 (1982), 73-95; U. Kothari, 'Geographies and histories of unfreedom:

This second type entailed historical lessons or *first-order historical analyses* that were often derived from descriptive historical accounts. Examples include historical lessons for monetary and fiscal policies to counter hyperinflation (Solimano) and guidance on land reform for post-apartheid South Africa (Binswanger and Deininger).[228]

Finally, the third type of history is referred to as historiographical or *second-order historical analysis*, in reference to its greater abstraction or critical reflection relative to the previous two types. Second-order analyses often addressed broader questions on how and why to do development history. Examples include arguments on what development stands to gain from history (e.g. Adelman and Morris; Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao) and on how *not* to do history (e.g. Hopkins, Niemeijer, Leach and Fairhead).[229] Second-order analysis was often premised on descriptive and first-order arguments, though the direction across types was rather cyclical and could go both ways (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. *Typology of historical analyses rendered from surveyed works*

The survey findings that follow are structured according to this basic typology. Works that included multiple types of analysis (which was typically the case) were disaggregated and reviewed accordingly. Thus, section 3.1 presents a review across all of the survey's descriptive accounts. Section 3.2 follows with a review of first-order lessons, while section 3.3 closes with second-order historiographical arguments.

---

indentured labourers and contract workers in Mauritius', *Journal of Development Studies* 49.8 (2013), 1042-57.

[228] A. Solimano, 'Inflation and the costs of stabilization', *World Bank Research Observer* 5.2 (1990), 167-85; H.P. Binswanger and K. Deininger, 'South African land policy: the legacy of history and current options', *World Development* 21.9 (1993), 1451-75.

[229] A.G. Hopkins, 'The World Bank in Africa: historical reflections on the African present', *World Development* 14.12 (1986), 1473-87; D. Niemeijer, 'The dynamics of African agricultural history: is it time for a new development paradigm?', *Development and Change* 27.1 (1996), 87-110; I. Adelman and C.T. Morris, 'Editorial: development history and its implications for development theory', *World Development* 25.6 (1997), 831-40; M. Leach and J. Fairhead, 'Fashioned forest pasts, occluded histories? International environmental analysis in West African locales', *Development and Change*, 31.1 (2000), 35-59; M. Woolcock, S. Szreter, and V. Rao, 'How and why does history matter for development policy?', *Journal of Development Studies* 47.1 (2011), 70-96.

3.1 Descriptive historical analysis

3.1.1 Variation across development topic

The surveyed histories reflected the wide variety of topics covered in development, with a sample of recurring themes presented in Table 3. Of these, particular subjects received more attention than others. Six prominent themes are highlighted here: (1) agricultural/rural and industrial/urban development; (2) land/property rights; (3) colonialism; (4) technology and innovation; (5) the global economy; and (6) migration. First was the broad area of agricultural/rural development, industrial/urban development, and the relationship between the two. This arguably classic question in development studies was addressed widely across journals (e.g. *Development and Change*, *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, *Journal of Development Studies*, *Progress in Development Studies*, and *World Development*) and across time (e.g. from Lampard and Arrighf to Wood and Jordan; Iversen, Palmer-Jones, and Sen).[230]

Second was the subject of land reform and property rights. This included a variety of sub-topics, from the history of common property resources (e.g. Mosse, Johnson) to case studies of land reform (e.g. Binswanger and Deininger; Logan, Tengbeh, and Petja), global land grabs (e.g. Edelman and León; Edelman, Oya, and Borras), and intellectual property rights (e.g. Runge and Defrancesco).[231]

Third was the frequent study of colonialism's impact on development. Following the distinction between *economic history* and *the history of economic thought*, these studies reflect the distinction between *development history* and *the history of development thought*. Works falling under the former largely stemmed from historical institutionalist approaches popularized by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, as well as Engerman and Sokoloff.[232] Examples

---

[230] G. Arrighf, 'Labour supplies in historical perspective: a study of the proletarianization of the African peasantry in Rhodesia', *Journal of Development Studies* 6.3 (1970), 197-234; E.E. Lampard, 'The history of cities in the economically advanced areas', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 3.2 (1955), 81-136; V. Iversen, R. Palmer-Jones, and K. Sen, 'On the colonial origins of agricultural development in India', *Journal of Development Studies* 49.12 (2013), 1631-46; A. Wood and K. Jordan, 'Why does Zimbabwe export manufactures and Uganda not? Econometrics meets history', *Journal of Development Studies* 37.2 (2000), 91-116.

[231] Binswanger and Deininger, 'South African land policy'; M. Edelman and A. León, 'Cycles of land grabbing in Central America: an argument for history and a case study in the Bajo Aguán, Honduras', *Third World Quarterly* 34.9 (2013), 1697-722; M. Edelman, C. Oya, and S.M. Borras, 'Global land grabs: historical processes, theoretical and methodological implications and current trajectories', *Third World Quarterly* 34.9 (2013), 1517-31; C. Johnson, 'Uncommon ground: the "poverty of history" in common property discourse', *Development and Change* 35.3 (2004), 407-34; B.I. Logan, G. Tengbeh, and B. Petja, 'Towards a reorientation in land reform: from a market to locality-driven approach in South Africa's land restitution programme', *Progress in Development Studies* 12.2-3 (2012), 173-91; D. Mosse, 'The symbolic making of a common property resource: history, ecology and locality in a tank-irrigated landscape in South India', *Development and Change* 28.3 (1997), 467-504; C.F. Runge and E. Defrancesco, 'Exclusion, inclusion, and enclosure: historical commons and modern intellectual property', *World Development* 34.10 (2006), 1713-27.

[232] D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. Robinson, 'The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation', *American Economic Review* 91.5 (2001), 1369-402; D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. Robinson, 'Reversal of fortune: geography and institutions in the making of the world income distribution', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117.4 (2002), 1231-94; S. Engerman and K. Sokoloff, 'Factor endowments, inequality, and paths of development among New World economies', *Economica* 3.1 (2002), 41-109; S. Engerman and K. Sokoloff, 'Debating the role of institutions in political and economic development: theory, history, and findings', *Annual Review of Political Science* 11.1 (2008), 119-35.

Table 3. *Survey of development histories*

Historical Subject	Sample References
agricultural and/or rural development	Graulau, 2008; Lu & Lora-Wainwright, 2014; Wiemers, 2015
industrial and/or urban development	Lampard, 1955; Schmitz, 1984; Wood & Jordan, 2000
— on the relationship between the above two	Arrighf, 1970; Harriss & Harriss, 1984; Udall, 1980
land reform, common property, property rights	Edelman & León, 2013; Johnson, 2014; Runge & Defrancesco, 2006
ecology, environment, and sustainability	Goossens, 1997; Hayami, 2001; McDaniel, 2003
technology and/or innovation	Binswanger, 1986; Lybæk, Christensen, & Kjær, 2013; Parker, 1961
trade and development	Mushtaq, 2015; Özler, Taymaz, & Yilmaz, 2009; Sandberg, Seale, & Taylor, 2006
macroeconomic policy	Dooley, Fernandez-Arias, & Kletzer, 1996; McLure, 1992; Solimano, 1990
development administration	Goode, 1993; Hirschmann, 1999; Singer, 1953
poverty and/or inequality	Logan, Tengbeh, & Petja, 2012; Ludden, 2012; Williamson, 1979
public health and welfare	Bishai & Nalubola, 2002; Chaiken, 1998; Gooch, 2016
education and development	Gellman, 2015; Wietzke, 2014, 2015
gender and development	Benjamin & Brandt, 1995; de Haan, 2002
internal colonialism	Alcántara, 1974; Love, 1989; Peralta & Hollenstein, 2015
globalisation	Broad & Heckscher, 2003; Bunker & Ciccantell, 2003; Cardoso, 2009
migration	Dobby, 1952; Gottschang, 1987; Hatton & Williamson, 2008
human rights and law	Dawson, 2013; Robertson, 1982; Szreter, 2007; Waltz, 2002
NGOs and civil society	Beauchemin & Shoumaker, 2009; Fowler, 2000; Lewis, 2008
democracy and development	Blaney & Pasha, 1993; Gerring, Kingstone, Lange, & Singha, 2011; Omgba, 2015
institutions and development	Hoff, 2003; Iverson, Palmer-Jones, & Sen, 2013; North, 1989; Wietzke, 2015
peace and security	Akhavi, 2003; Arquilla, 2007; Bieber, 2000
US hegemony	Beeson & Higgott, 2005; Connell-Smith, 1984; Munro, 2014
state- or nation-building	Bilgin & Morton, 2002; Dodge, 2006; Hawkins, 2014
socialism and development	Gills, 1992; Iliev & Putterman, 2007; Wu, 2008

Table 4. *Survey of histories of development thought*

Historical Subject	Sample References
the idea of...	
development	Arndt, 1981; Grampp, 1972; Ruttan, 1984; Watson, 2012
failed states	Bilgin and Morton, 2002
fair trade	Low & Davenport, 2005
globalisation	Robertson, 2004
nationalism	Desai, 2008
self-sufficiency	Morrissey, 1982
sustainability	Harlow, Golub, & Allenby, 2013
third world/South	Berger, 2004; Korany, 1994; Solarz, 2012
false histories of...	
Africa	Chauveau & Samba, 1989; da Silva, 2005; Fairhead & Leach, 1995; Niemeijer, 1996
Asia	Grabowski, 1985; Mosse, 1997; Naik, 2014; Sivaramakrishnan, 2000
US	Peloso, 1972

here include Hoff, Wietzske, and Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao.[233] In the latter category are a number of works that trace 'false' (e.g. colonial, imperial, modernist) histories underlying development thought. These were most commonly found in reference to colonial historiographies of Africa (e.g. Chauveau and Samba, Fairhead and Leach, da Silva) and Asia (e.g. Grabowski, Sivaramakrishnan, Naik).[234] These works, along with a number of histories on particular development ideas, present a corpus of works on the history of development thought (see Table 4).

Fourth was the historical role of technology and innovation in development, with these subjects taking on a wide variety of forms. Examples included agricultural technology (e.g. Binswanger, Goossens) and innovation models for sustainable development (e.g. Lybæk, Christensen, and Kjær).[235] Parker's striking example from development's earlier years even details an explicit form of 'technological determinism' driving development.[236] Fifth was development history in the contexts of the global economy. Examples ranged from histories of globalization (e.g. Robertson) and the capitalist world system (e.g. Bunker and Ciccantell, Cardoso) to econometric studies characterizing development and trade (e.g. Sandberg, Seale, and Taylor; Özler, Taymaz, and Yilmaz).[237]

Finally, a sixth theme was found in historical studies of migration and development. These included perspectives from both origin countries (e.g. Beauchemin and Schoumaker)

---

[233] K. Hoff, 'Paths of institutional development: a view from economic history', *World Bank Research Observer* 18.2 (2003), 205-26; Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao, 'How and why does history matter'; F.B. Wietzke, 'Long-term consequences of colonial institutions and human capital investments: sub-national evidence from Madagascar', *World Development* 66 (2015), 293–307.

[234] J.P. Chauveau and A. Samba, 'Market development, government interventions and the dynamics of the small-scale fishing sector: an historical perspective of the Senegalese case', *Development and Change* 20.4 (1989), 599-620; J. Fairhead and M. Leach, 'False forest history, complicit social analysis: rethinking some West African environmental narratives', *World Development* 23.6 (1995), 1023-35; R. Grabowski, 'A historical reassessment of early Japanese development', *Development and Change* 16.2 (1985), 235-50; P. Naik, 'The case of the "other India" and Indian IR scholarship', *Third World Quarterly* 35 (2014), 1496-508; K. Sivaramakrishnan, 'State sciences and development histories: encoding local forestry knowledge in Bengal', *Development and Change* 31.1 (2000), 61-89; T.S. da Silva, 'Narrating a white Africa: autobiography, race and history', *Third World Quarterly* 26.3 (2005), 471-8.

[235] H. Binswanger, 'Agricultural mechanization', *World Bank Research Observer* 1.1 (1986), 27-56; F. Goossens, 'Failing innovation in the Zairian cassava production system: a comparative historical analysis', *Sustainable Development* 5.1 (1997), 36-42; R. Lybaek, T.B. Christensen, and T. Kjaer, 'Governing innovation for sustainable development in the Danish biogas sector: a historical overview and analysis of innovation', *Sustainable Development* 21.3 (2013), 171-82.

[236] W.N. Parker, 'Economic development in historical perspective', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 10.1 (1961), 1-7.

[237] S.G. Bunker and P.S. Ciccantell, 'Generative sectors and the new historical materialism: economic ascent and the cumulatively sequential restructuring of the world economy', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37.4 (2003), 3-30; F.H. Cardoso, 'New paths: globalization in historical perspective', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44.4 (2009), 296-317; R. Robertson, 'The historical context and significance of globalization', *Development and Change* 35.3 (2004), 557-65; H.M. Sandberg, J.L. Seale, and T.G. Taylor, 'History, regionalism, and CARICOM trade: a gravity model analysis', *Journal of Development Studies* 42.5 (2006), 795-811; Ş. Özler, E. Taymaz, and T. Yilmaz, 'History matters for the export decision: plant-level evidence from Turkish manufacturing industry', *World Development* 37.2 (2009), 479-88.

and destination countries (e.g. Kothari).[238] Alternatively, Baldwin-Edwards presented a historical interpretation of migration as a structural feature and not just a temporary abnormality in modern capitalism.[239] Dobby's early study on internal resettlement in Malaysia also provided an intriguing glimpse into some of the anti-communist and pro-colonial sentiments colouring early development thought.[240]

A number of less common aspects or dimensions of study—typically limited to only one or two works—were also found. Some of these were rather eclectic, such as Giulianotti and Armstrong's history of military peace-making initiatives through sporting activities.[241] Another was Rogers' study on the link between urban development and crime.[242] Other subjects, however, were surprising in light of their prominence in the wider development discourse. Three examples stand out here: gender, education, and human rights.

In the case of gender, Benjamin and Brandt's study of women's economic roles in pre-1949 China provided the only concerted history on gender and development.[243] Other studies referenced gender, but as a secondary focus or factor, such as de Haan's case history on labour migration in Bihar, India.[244] Peluso provided another example, using a feminist political ecology framework for a history of rubber as a socio-natural commodity.[245] Similarly, education often played a sideline role in historical analyses, and was rarely the concerted subject of study. Gellman offered one of the exceptions, focusing on national history education in post-conflict societies.[246] Wietzske provided the others, with studies on the long-term consequences of colonial missionary education in Madagascar.[247]

Finally, the subject of human rights continued the above pattern. Fifteen works made reference to human rights, but only three discussed the subject at length. Waltz and Szreter were two of the exceptions, with histories on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and

---

[238] C. Beauchemin and B. Schoumaker, 'Are migrant associations actors in local development? A national event-history analysis in rural Burkina Faso', *World Development* 37.12 (2009), 1897-913; Kothari, 'Geographies and histories'.

[239] M. Baldwin-Edwards, 'Towards a theory of illegal migration: historical and structural components', *Third World Quarterly* 29.7 (2008), 1449-59.

[240] E.H.G. Dobby, 'Resettlement transforms Malaya: a case-history of relocating the population of an Asian plural society', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 1.3 (1952), 163–89.

[241] R. Giulianotti and G. Armstrong. 'Sport, the military and peacemaking: history and possibilities', *Third World Quarterly* 32.3 (2011), 379-94.

[242] J.D. Rogers, 'Theories of crime and development: an historical perspective.' *Journal of Development Studies* 25.3 (1989), 314-28.

[243] D. Benjamin and L. Brandt, 'Markets, discrimination, and the economic contribution of women in China: historical evidence', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 44.1 (1995), 63-104.

[244] A. de Haan, 'Migration and livelihoods in historical perspective: a case study of Bihar, India', *Journal of Development Studies* 38.5 (2002), 115-42.

[245] N.L. Peluso, 'What's nature got to do with it? A situated historical perspective on socio-natural commodities', *Development and Change* 43.1 (2012), 79-104.

[246] M. Gellman, 'Teaching silence in the schoolroom: whither national history in Sierra Leone and El Salvador?', *Third World Quarterly* 36.1 (2015), 147-61.

[247] F.B. Wietzke, 'Historical origins of uneven service supply in Sub-Saharan Africa: the role of non-state providers', *Journal of Development Studies* 50.12 (2014), 1614-30.

the right to identity registration, respectively.[248] The third (Emmerij, Jolly, and Weiss) discussed human rights at length, but within the contexts of UN intellectual history.[249]

3.1.2 Variation across temporal coverage

In addition to subject matter, the descriptive histories can also be characterised according to their variation in temporal bounds. Some histories, for example, concentrated on very short periods of time. Dooley, Fernández-Arias, and Kletzer was one example, examining the 1980s debt crisis between 1986 and 1992.[250] Others took a longue durée approach, spanning several centuries or more. Runge and Defrancesco, for example, offer a history of common property tracing back to the eleventh-century Norman conquest of England.[251] Meanwhile, Akhavi's history of Islam-West relations starts with seventh-century Islamic communities.[252] Finally, Arquilla's history of unconventional warfare and terrorism was perhaps the longest, going back to the Roman Empire and through the Middle Ages.[253]

Not all of the surveyed histories, however, adopted such a long-term perspective. When disaggregated according to historical start dates, only five per cent of the works reached back prior to the fifteenth century (see Figure 2). Another nine per cent reached back to between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries— often in reference to Western colonialism or globalisation (e.g. Bunker and Ciccantell, Robertson).[254] The second most frequently referenced starting period rested between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, correlating to 35 per cent of the surveyed works. These often described Western historical precedents, non-Western histories, and/or particular aspects of colonialism. Humphries, for example, examines the Western history of child labour

Interval	Starting Period	# of works	% of works
T0	pre-15th century	6	5%
T1	15th century	12	9%
T2	18th century	46	35%
T3	20th century	12	9%
T4	post-WWII	56	42%

Figure 2. *Temporal coverage of surveyed works (n=132, four works did not apply)*

[248] S. Waltz, 'Reclaiming and rebuilding the history of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights', *Third World Quarterly* 23.3 (2002): 437-48; S. Szreter, 'The right of registration: development, identity registration, and social security-a historical perspective', *World Development* 35.1 (2007): 67-86.

[249] L. Emmerij, R. Jolly, and T.G. Weiss, 'Economic and social thinking at the UN in historical perspective', *Development and Change* 36.2 (2005), 211-35.

[250] M. Dooley, E. Fernandez-Arias, and K. Kletzer, 'Is the debt crisis history? Recent private capital inflows to developing countries', *World Bank Economic Review* 10.1 (1996), 27-50.

[251] Runge and Defrancesco, 'Exclusion, inclusion, and enclosure'.

[252] S. Akhavi, 'Islam and the West in world history', *Third World Quarterly* 24.3 (2003), 545-62.

[253] J. Arquilla, 'The end of war as we knew it? Insurgency, counterinsurgency and lessons from the forgotten history of early terror networks', *Third World Quarterly* 28.2 (2007), 369-86.

[254] Bunker and Ciccantell, 'Generative sectors'; Robertson, 'The historical context'.

as a foil for today's industrial economies.[255] Similarly, Williamson references the Kuznets growth-versus-equity relationship in US history.[256] In contrast, Hopkins and Sivaramakrishnan document local African and Indian histories, respectively, and the effects of European colonial historiographies.[257]

Over half (51 per cent) of the works, however, began in the twentieth century, with the majority (42 per cent) situated in the post-World War II era. These can be further sub-divided into the Cold War (1945–1991) and post-Cold War (1991–) periods. Many histories produced during the Cold War reflect that era's geopolitics. Examples include Dobby's study of anti-communist resettlement in Malaysia, Sauvant's analysis of the New International Economic Order, and Connell-Smith's study on the US invasion of Grenada.[258]

Histories post-1991 evidenced a number of efforts to reconcile with the sudden shifts following Soviet collapse. Gills, for example, addressed speculation on socialist collapse in North Korea, while Utting described historical precedents for post-Soviet state reform.[259] Korany, meanwhile, offered a historical perspective on the new geopolitical challenges faced by the Third World.[260] Finally, recent years have marked yet another shift, with histories on structural adjustment (e.g. Gills and Philip, Berry), US hegemony (e.g. Beeson and Higgott, Munro), and civil society (e.g. Fowler, Lewis).[261]

3.1.3 Variation across geographical coverage

Finally, the variety of historical subjects and time periods is further complemented by the broad geographical coverage of the surveyed works. When excluding histories that adopted either an explicit global scope or no explicit scope at all, we were left with a sample set 75

[255] J. Humphries, 'Child labor: lessons from the historical experience of today's industrial economies', *World Bank Economic Review* 17.2 (2003), 175-96.

[256] J.G. Williamson, 'Inequality, accumulation, and technological imbalance: a growth-equity conflict in American history?', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 27.2 (1979), 231-53.

[257] Hopkins, 'The World Bank in Africa'; Sivaramakrishnan, 'State sciences'.

[258] Dobby, 'Resettlement transforms; K.P. Sauvant, 'From economic to socio-cultural emancipation: the historical context of the New International Economic Order and the New International Socio-cultural Order', *Third World Quarterly* 3.1 (1981), 48-61; G. Connell-Smith, 'The Grenada invasion in historical perspective: from Monroe to Reagan', *Third World Quarterly* 6.2 (1984), 432-45.

[259] B. Gills, 'North Korea and the crisis of socialism: the historical ironies of national division', *Third World Quarterly* 13.1 (1992), 107-30; P. Utting, 'From orthodoxy to reform: historical experiences of post-revolutionary societies', *Third World Quarterly* 13.1 (1992), 43-65.

[260] B. Korany, 'End of history, or its continuation and accentuation? The global South and the "new transformation" literature', *Third World Quarterly* 15.1 (1994), 7-15.

[261] B. Gills and G. Philip, 'Editorial: towards convergence in development policy? Challenging the 'Washington Consensus' and restoring the historicity of divergent development trajectories', *Third World Quarterly* 17.4 (1996), 585-91; S. Berry, 'Tomatoes, land and hearsay: property and history in Asante in the time of structural adjustment', *World Development* 25.8 (1997), 1225-41; A. Fowler, 'NGDOs as a moment in history: beyond aid to social entrepreneurship or civic innovation?', *Third World Quarterly* 21.4 (2000), 637-54; M. Beeson and R. Higgott, 'Hegemony, institutionalism and US foreign policy: theory and practice in comparative historical perspective' *Third World Quarterly* 26.7 (2005), 1173-88; D. Lewis, 'Crossing the boundaries between 'third sector' and state: life-work histories from the Philippines, Bangladesh and the UK', *Third World Quarterly* 29.1 (2008), 125-41; J. Munro, 'US foreign policy, intersectional totality and the structure of empire', *Third World Quarterly* 35.9 (2014), 1566-81.

historical accounts covering every inhabited continent. That being said, there were some conspicuous absences found in the geographical coverage. The first and perhaps most prominent is the absence of historical accounts on Russia and Central Asia. Documentation of and lessons from the Russian historical experience—before, during, or after the Soviet period—were nowhere to be found in the surveyed literature. Even the consideration of post-Soviet state reform by Utting looks elsewhere (in this case, Mozambique, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Cuba) for historical content.[262] A second conspicuous absence is Canada, which is perhaps overshadowed by the US and Europe in attracting historical research interest (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Distribution of geographical focus of surveyed works

In addition to the gaps in the survey's historical record, there was also variation in the distribution of regional interests that emerged. One in three or 33 per cent of these regional works provided a historical account of Africa. A closer look at these African histories, which range from environmental to agricultural and industrial histories, reveals a possible cause for its prevalence. Namely, a number of these histories respond to Eurocentric colonial legacies still colouring prior historical accounts (e.g. Hopkins, Fairhead and Leach, Niemeijer, Leach and Fairhead).[263] The next largest concentrations of interest focused on Latin America and Europe, which were addressed by 19 and 20 per cent of the works, respectively. On the opposite end of this geographical distribution was the relative dearth of histories on the Middle East (four

---

[262] Utting, 'From orthodoxy to reform'.

[263] Hopkins, 'The World Bank in Africa'; Fairhead and Leach, 'False forest history'; Niemeijer, 'The dynamics of African'; Leach and Fairhead, 'Fashioned forest pasts'.

works—one of which is on Turkey) and Oceania (one work), which includes here Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific islands.

3.2 First-order historical analysis

Histories often contain, whether implicit or explicit, a moral to their stories; that is, lessons derived through causal analysis across time and space. In this survey, the majority (89 per cent) of works contained such prescriptive arguments. The few exceptions here include what might be termed 'pure descriptive histories'. Examples include Arndt's semantic history of development or Berger's overview of Third World history.[264] Similar to the descriptive histories, prescriptive arguments surveyed here also reflected a wide variety in subject matter. To abstract from particular focal topics, however, most of these historical lessons attempted to revise purported errors in theory and practice.

In terms of theory, Lybæk, Christensen, and Kjær provide one example that offered a model of innovation that argued against gradualist and linear assumptions to emphasize dynamic processes across multiple actors.[265] Another was Reid's warning against assuming that democracy would entail the resolution of class conflicts and structural inequities, as argued with a case history of the Philippines.[266] Finally, Forsyth critiqued prior assumptions of political unity within environmental movements, via examples from Thai history.[267]

Lessons were also offered for development policy and practice. For example, Bishai and Nalubola stress the importance of cultural integration and public-private partnership when implementing food fortification efforts.[268] Another was Emmerij, Jolly, and Weiss, suggesting a number of ways in which the UN, as an institution, might contribute to the future of development thought and action.[269] It is also worth noting the many references to local knowledge and its practical significance. Some of these arguments stemmed from aforementioned works on false history (e.g. da Silva, Naik).[270] Here, colonial biases trace to development prescriptions that harm instead of help. In terms of first-order lessons, these studies emphasised the importance of local knowledge in not just implementation, but also the very conceptualisation of development. Astone thus argues for closer integration of local knowledge in the planning

---

[264] H.W. Arndt, 'Economic development: a semantic history', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 29.3 (1981), 457-66; M.T. Berger, 'After the Third World? History, destiny and the fate of Third Worldism', *Third World Quarterly* 25.1 (2004), 9-39.

[265] Lybæk, Christensen, and Kjær, 'Governing innovation'.

[266] B. Reid, 'Historical blocs and democratic impasse in the Philippines: 20 years after 'people power'', *Third World Quarterly* 27.6 (2006), 1003-20.

[267] T. Forsyth, 'Are environmental social movements socially exclusive? An historical study from Thailand', *World Development* 35.12 (2007), 2110-30.

[268] D. Bishai and R. Nalubola, 'The history of food fortification in the United States: its relevance for current fortification efforts in developing countries', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 51.1 (2002), 37-53.

[269] Emmerij, Jolly, and Weiss, 'Economic and social thinking'.

[270] da Silva, 'Narrating a white Africa'; Naik, 'The case of the "other India"'.

process, based on past shortcomings in participatory development.[271] Finally, both Graulau and Logan, Tengbeh, and Petja advise for greater local engagement, as argued from the standpoint of correcting the excesses of neoliberalism and modernist 'mega-narratives'.[272]

3.3 Second-order historical analysis

Having summarized our findings across descriptive and first-order analyses, we now move on to our final category of second-order historiographical arguments. These moved beyond narrowly-specified descriptive and prescriptive topics to address development history at the general level. Namely, we find two broad sets of arguments responding to the questions of (a) *why to do development history*, and (b) *how to do development history*.

3.3.1 Why to do development history

Arguments here entailed variants of the claim that 'history matters' (e.g. 'institutions matter', 'culture matters', 'environment matters'). Hoff, for example, argues in support of the research agenda within economics to establish that institutions matter, in contrast to prior ahistorical premises.[273] In the practical domain, McDaniel argues that history matters by showing how development practitioners have to operate in two overlapping institutional contexts.[274] His case study on Chiquitano culture in Bolivia further extends into arguments that culture matters, demonstrating how culture can shape local distribution patterns for development aid. Mosse also comments on how culture matters through the use of a cultural ecology framework to explain common property history.[275]

Further, arguments could be subdivided according to whether they appealed to development theory or to development practice. Johnson provided an example for development theory, calling for more history amidst an over-reliance on positivism, methodological individualism, and formal modelling in US political science.[276] Bhatt presented complementary arguments for the field of economics.[277] Here, history's significance was premised on the bounded nature of economic observations, the limited scope and stability of economic laws, a tendency towards over-simplified and static explanations, and the risk of fostering ideological biases. Edelman and León and Edelman, Oya, and Borras further argued for the necessity of

---

[271] J. Astone, 'Incorporating local history into planning documents: a case study from Guinea, West Africa', *World Development* 26.9 (1998), 1773-84.

[272] J. Graulau, 'Is mining good for development? The intellectual history of an unsettled question', *Progress in Development Studies* 8.2 (2008), 129-62; Logan, Tengbeh, and Petja, "Towards a reorientation'

[273] Hoff, 'Paths of institutional development'.

[274] J.M. McDaniel, 'History and the duality of power in community-based forestry in southeast Bolivia', *Development and Change* 34.2 (2003), 339-56.

[275] Mosse, 'The symbolic making'.

[276] Johnson, 'Uncommon ground'.

[277] V.V. Bhatt, 'Economic development: an analytic-historical approach', *World Development* 4.7 (1976), 583-92.

history when it came to understanding long-term phenomena, such as land grabbing.[278] This was also echoed by Peluso, arguing that history enables views of a particular subject's time and space that might otherwise be missed in scientific analyses.[279] History thus helps to overcome some of the blind spots found across various epistemic frameworks in the social sciences (e.g. Robertson).[280] In summary, Adelman and Morris highlight the misplaced universality and the tunnel vision that arises in the absence of history. History, then, is a necessary complement to the social sciences when investigating and understanding development.[281]

In terms of practice, Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao argued that an appreciation of history fosters a greater awareness of contexts and complexity for development action.[282] More specifically, McDaniel and Mosse described the challenge presented by dual contexts in development scenarios (i.e. that of the development practitioner and that of the recipient).[283] Here, history was necessary for identifying path-dependencies or development trajectories in their target contexts (e.g. Grampp, Gills and Philip, Edelman and León)[284]. Further, as Adelman and Morris argued, development theories and policies each have their appropriate time and place. Thus, history plays a key role not only for theory building, but also for application.[285] Lastly, Edelman and León and Edelman, Oya, and Borras offered a specific point on the significance of history in determining appropriate baselines for impact evaluation.[286]

3.3.2 How to do development history

Having addressed arguments on *why* to do development history, we now proceed to arguments on *how*. Most of the arguments surveyed here seemed to reflect lessons on how *not* to do history. For example, two common arguments were to be wary of over-simplification (Bhatt 1976, Bernard 1996, Adelman and Morris 1997) and over-rationalisation (Grampp 1972, Kaviraj 1992, Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao 2011).[287] Highlighted was the danger of over-zealously positing correlations and causations in historical analysis. For example, Grampp argued that Lord Robbins' history of economic development theory 'misconceives the past because

---

[278] Edelman and León, 'Cycles of land grabbing'; Edelman, Oya, and Borras, 'Global land grabs'.

[279] Peluso, 'What's nature got to do'.

[280] A.F. Robertson, 'Abusa: the structural history of an economic contract', *Journal of Development Studies* 18.4 (1982), 447-78.

[281] Adelman and Morris, 'Editorial: development history'.

[282] Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao, 'How and why does history matter'.

[283] McDaniel, 'History and the duality of power'; Mosse, 'The symbolic making'.

[284] W.D. Grampp, 'Robbins on the history of development theory', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 20.3 (1972), 539-53; Gills and Philip, 'Editorial: towards convergence'; Edelman and León, 'Cycles of land grabbing'.

[285] Adelman and Morris, 'Editorial: development history'.

[286] Edelman and León, 'Cycles of land grabbing'; Edelman, Oya, and Borras, 'Global land grabs'.

[287] Grampp, 'Robbins on the history'; Bhatt, 'Economic development', S. Kaviraj, 'Marxism and the darkness of history', *Development and Change* 23.3 (1992), 79-102; M. Bernard, 'States, social forces, and regions in historical time: toward a critical political economy of Eastern Asia', *Third World Quarterly* 17.4 (1996), 649-66; Adelman and Morris, 'Editorial: development history'; Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao, 'How and why does history matter'.

he sees it from the present and not in the way it saw itself. *[…]* He sees relations where they are not and does not notice them where they are'.[288] There are limits to the power of reason in comprehending the complexity of the past. In doing development history, one is thus exhorted to mind the biases resulting from their own particular time and space. Accordingly, repeated calls were made to strive towards *diachronic* versus *synchronic* histories (e.g. Casanova, Stump, Jacoby and Kothari, Lu and Lora-Wainwright).[289]

Finally, multiple works argued for vigilance in the interpretation and production of development history, as perspective biases may also hide political biases tying knowledge to power. Peluso, for example, investigated the politics of knowledge production, legitimisation, and mobilisation through case histories on how aspects of nature are commoditised and appropriated in varying social contexts.[290] Further, the way that development concepts and the very notion of development are defined can be linked to hidden political motives. For example, Sivaramakrishnan drew links between the development discourse within forestry management and environmental histories reflecting colonial interests from nineteenth- and twentieth-century Bengal.[291] In another, Leach and Fairhead drew from the sociology of science and public policy to show how false twentieth-century histories on African deforestation have influenced present statistics, scientific analyses, and aid flows.[292] Finally, Bilgin and Morton linked US intellectual hegemony in the social sciences to the rise of notions such as 'failed states' or 'quasi-states' as legitimate subjects of academic study.[293] In all, these historiographical arguments warn that development history is not immune from the social, political, and intellectual climates in which they are produced. While there were no sure solutions offered (nor suggestions that they exist), it was a methodological dimension highlighted for greater awareness.

---

[288] Grampp, 'Robbins on the history', p. 1072.

[289] P.G. Casanova, 'Historical systems and social systems', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 8.3 (1973), 227-46; D. Stump, 'Ancient and backward or long-lived and sustainable?', *World Development* 38.9 (2010), 1251-62; T. Jacoby and U. Kothari, 'Introduction: bringing social theory back into issues of development', *Progress in Development Studies* 14.3 (2014), 215-20; J. Lu and A. Lora-Wainwright, 'Historicizing sustainable livelihoods: a pathways approach to lead mining in rural central China', *World Development* 62 (2014), 189-200.

[290] Peluso, 'What's nature got to do'.

[291] Sivaramakrishnan, 'State sciences'.

[292] Leach and Fairhead, 'Fashioned forest pasts'.

[293] P. Bilgin and A.D. Morton, 'Historicising representations of "failed states": beyond the Cold-War annexation of the social sciences?', *Third World Quarterly* 23.1 (2002), 55-80.

4. Discussion

4.1 Does the development discourse learn from history?

Having presented our survey findings, we now return to our original question: does the development discourse learn from history? The survey certainly finds evidence of substantial interest in history within said discourse. However, the resulting variety and types of studies lead us to first distinguish between two different modes in which the development discourse attempts to learn from history.

In the first mode, studies look outward to external histories as a source of data. Such studies reference, for example, historical accounts of globalisation, colonisation, or migration to evaluate some aspect of development theory or practice. Indeed, the surveyed works excelled at this mode, with the majority of works utilising historical accounts in this manner. If Section 3.3's surveyed critiques of a dominant positivist tendency in economic and political science are to be believed, then this result is of little surprise. This first mode of learning is highly compatible with scientific methods of investigation, in which history serves as a rich source of empirical data for theory building and evaluation.

In contrast to the first mode's outward focus on external histories, the second mode looks inward to reflect upon the history of the development discourse, itself. Examples include Grampp's critique of Robbins' history of economic development, Arndt's semantic history of economic development, and—most recently—Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao's analysis of how and why history matters for development policy.[294] Such works, however, were few and far in between. Further, while many of the surveyed works were critical of some aspect of development (often a form of neoliberalism or Western imperialism), critical theory did not necessarily entail critical historiography. The notable exception here and our second body of evidence were the works engaged in disentangling past ecological historiographies used to premise colonial and post-colonial development. Beyond these two sets of works, however, there was little indication of broader engagement with the history of the development discourse, itself.

With this in mind, does the development discourse learn from history? Evidence certainly suggests that it does do so in the first outward sense. That is, the discourse actively incorporates external histories as empirical evidence for development theory and practice. However, historical study of the idea of development and the discourse, itself, was rare. Consequently, this suggests that a limited but influential segment of the development discourse actively engages with external histories, but not necessarily with its own.

---

[294] Grampp, 'Robbins on the history'; Arndt, 'Economic development'; Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao, 'How and why history matters'.

4.2 Why does this matter?

If the development discourse does indeed fail to actively learn from its own history, then what are the consequences? Why does it matter? Here, the answer is simple: it endangers the efficacy and sustainability of development theory and practice.

For one, limited awareness of development's own history impairs the ability to learn from past successes and failures. It also fosters intellectual dogmas that may impair the very ability to recognise success or failure, in the first place. Thus, claims of progress in development studies should be viewed with some scepticism if absent of historical evidence. Conceptual innovations, for example, may entail the unwitting rediscovery of old development ideas. Such claims may, even worse, belie less than benign attempts to repackage old wine in new bottles. A lack of broader historical reflection further impairs awareness of structural issues in the sociology and politics of development knowledge. The potential result is an ineffective discourse characterized by palliative measures and recurring crises, due to the inability to recognise and resolve more deep-rooted problems.

It is in light of this danger that historiographical research holds strategic importance for sustaining the development enterprise. Ultimately, its absence may jeopardize the development discourse and its very reason for existence—to realise the possibility of progress or development.

4.3 What does development history do well?

The above critique, however, should not be conflated to be an all-encompassing denouncement of the present state of development history. While it raises the possibility that influential segments of the development discourse remain largely unconscious of its own history, this does not invalidate the areas of history that the discourse does well. Namely, our survey reveals two aspects in which the development discourse excels.

First, the surveyed histories evidence a very responsive discourse. This can be seen in the breadth and timeliness of historical subjects surveyed in the aforementioned Cold War and post-Cold War periods. These included historical analyses responding to the radical shifts in the role of NGOs (e.g. Fowler, Lewis) or the pressing concerns with terrorism, religious fundamentalism, and multiculturalism (e.g. Akhavi, Dodge, Arquilla).[295] Thus, while the surveyed discourse may fall short in sustaining research on its own history, it has been expedient in incorporating external histories across a wide variety of concerns.

Second, this responsiveness is perhaps enabled by the diverse intellectual and multidisciplinary perspectives evidenced in the survey. This can, at least in part, be attributed to the

---

[295] Fowler, 'NGDOs as a moment'; Akhavi, 'Islam and the West'; T. Dodge, 'Iraq: the contradictions of exogenous state-building in historical perspective', *Third World Quarterly* 27.1 (2006), 187-200; Arquilla, 'The end of war'; Lewis, 'Crossing the boundaries'.

multiple journals constituting the survey. Table 5 (below), for example, summarises some of the distinguishing features observed across journals.

Development and Change, for example, was marked for its critical analyses of colonial historiographies since the 1980s (e.g. Grabowski, Chauveau and Samba).[296] These included many of the critical environmental historiographies of Africa and Asia produced since the mid-1990s (e.g. Niemeijer, Leach and Fairhead, Sivaramakrishnan, Murray Li, McDaniel, Peluso).[297]

Economic Development and Cultural Change (EDCC) was the oldest journal surveyed, dating back to 1952. Interestingly, its works exhibited notable methodological shifts over the decades. Early examples relied heavily on qualitative and historical methods, and are notable for their Western modernist biases (e.g. Dobby, Lampard, Parker, Williamson).[298] Literature from the 1970s and early 1980s, however, produced some of the most compelling historio-graphical analyses in the entire survey (e.g. Grampp, Arndt).[299] Literature since the late 1980s, however, exhibited a shift away from historiography and towards econometric analysis, along-side diversification in subject matter (e.g. Gottschang; Benjamin and Brandt; Molini, Keyzer, van den Boom, Zant, and Nsowah-Nuamah).[300]

Table 5. *Some distinguishing methodological and subject features across journals*

Journal	# of works	Prominent Features	
Development and Change	17	*Methods*	intellectual history, critical theory, in-depth case history
		Subjects	environmental history, methodology, globalization, common property
Economic Development and Cultural Change	11	*Methods*	intellectual history, economic history, econometrics
		Subjects	social welfare, inequality, migration, Western history
Journal of Development Studies	12	*Methods*	in-depth case history, ethnography, comparative history, econometrics
		Subjects	industrial development, migration, trade, institutions
Progress in Development Studies	6	*Methods*	critical theory, sociology
		Subjects	social theory, rural development
Studies in Comparative International Development	9	*Methods*	intellectual history, in-depth case history, econometrics
		Subjects	globalization, national development, political issues
Sustainable Development	5	*Methods*	in-depth case history, intellectual history
		Subjects	sustainability, innovation, enviroment
Third World Quarterly	37	*Methods*	comparative politics, in-depth case history, intellectual history
		Subjects	political issues, cultural issues, non-Western perspectives
World Bank Economic Review	2	*Methods*	economic history, econometrics
		Subjects	debt crisis, child labour, policy advice
World Bank Research Observer	4	*Methods*	economic history, econometrics
		Subjects	hyperinflation, institutions, policy advice
World Development	33	*Methods*	intellectual history, comparative history, ethnography, econometrics
		Subjects	rural development, colonialism, law, environmental history, policy advice

---

[296] Grabowski, 'A historical reassessment'; Chauveau and Samba, 'Market development'.

[297] Niemeijer, 'The dynamics'; Leach and Fairhead, 'Fashioned forest pasts'; Sivaramakrishnan, 'State sciences'; T. Murray Li, 'Local histories, global markets: cocoa and class in upland Sulawesi', *Development and Change* 33.3 (2002), 415-37; Peluso, 'What's nature got to do'.

[298] Dobby, 'Resettlement transforms'; Lampard, 'The history of cities'; Parker, 'Economic development'; Williamson, 'Inequality, accumulation'.

[299] Grampp, 'Robbins on the history'; Arndt, 'Economic development'.

[300] T.R. Gottschang, 'Economic change, disasters, and migration: the historical case of Manchuria', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 35.3 (1987), 461-90; V. Molini, M. Keyzer, B. van den

Journal of Development Studies was notable for its strong social anthropology and geography perspectives alongside emphasis of anti-reductionist and pro-historical views during the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Arrighf, Harriss and Harriss, Schmitz).[301] Similar to the EDCC literature, works surveyed since the 1990s exhibited a diversification in development topics and increased prevalence of econometric methods—though not to the extent of EDCC.

Progress in Development Studies was the newest journal surveyed, with its first issue published in 2001. Partly due to a special issue that produced three out of six of the journal's surveyed works, its works carried a heavy emphasis on sociology and critical theory.

Studies in Comparative International Development produced a rather eclectic mix of methodological approaches in its historical works. The most distinguishing feature observed here was a responsiveness to political contexts, such as Peloso's (1972) questioning of US historiography amidst third world objections, Morrissey's (1982) history of agricultural self-sufficiency amidst the shift to basic needs, and Allende (1988) on the tension between Pinochet's neoliberal views versus incumbent Latin American attitudes towards privatization.[302]

Sustainable Development was the second most recent journal published, dating back to 1993. Here, our survey found relatively few historical works. Common to the works that were found was a relative emphasis on innovation and technology, in addition to environmental and broader ecological perspectives (e.g. Goossens 1997, Lybæk, Christensen, and Kjær 2013).[303]

Third World Quarterly produced the most historical works in the survey, with a total of 37 articles. In contrast to the predominance of economics in development studies, this journal was marked for its pronounced emphasis on politics, foreign policy, and international relations. Economic issues were invariably treated in political or social contexts, with a complete absence of econometric studies. In contrast to early EDCC works, the literature here predominantly gave voice to non-Western perspectives, though Western historical views were not entirely absent (e.g. Arquilla 2007, Watson 2012).[304]

The *World Bank Research Observer* and the *World Bank Economic Review* produced the fewest results despite publication since 1986. Early works provide some of the few mac-

---

Boom, W. Zant, and N. Nsowah-Nuamah, 'Safety nets and index-based insurance: historical assessment and semiparametric simulation for northern Ghana', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 58.4 (2010), 671-712.

[301] Arrighf, 'Labor supplies'; B. Harriss and J. Harriss, ''Generative' or 'parasitic' urbanism? Some observations from the recent history of a south Indian market town', *Journal of Development Studies* 20.3 (1984), 82-101; H. Schmitz, 'Industrialisation strategies in less developed countries: some lessons of historical experience', *Journal of Development Studies* 21.1 (1984), 1-21.

[302] V. Peloso, 'A Third World perspective on the writing of United States history for the 1970s', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 7.1 (1972), 85-90; Morrissey, 'Agricultural self-sufficiency'; J.A. Allende, 'Historical constraints to privatization: the case of the nationalized Chilean copper industry', *Studies In Comparative International Development* 23.1 (1988), 55-84.

[303] Goossens, "Failing innovation"; Lybæk, Christensen, and Kjær, "Governing innovation"

[304] Arquilla, 'The end of war'; M. Watson, 'Friedrich List's Adam Smith historiography and the contested origins of development theory', *Third World Quarterly* 33.3 (2012), 459-74.

roeconomic and finance-oriented works surveyed here (e.g. Solimano 1990. Dooley, Fernández-Arias, and Kletzer 1996).[305] This is perhaps of little surprise given the World Bank's historical preference for neoclassical economic methods and subject matter. More recent works, however, evidence a broadening in perspectives (e.g. Hayami 2001, Humphries 2003).[306] Though few in number, these works held merit in presenting clear guidance for policy and practice.

Finally, *World Development* produced the second most number of works, with a total of 33 articles. These exhibited diverse methodological approaches, similar to *Journal of Development Studies*, though with more comparative analyses. Early volumes from the 1970s and 1980s produced relatively few historical works. However, the late 1980s mark a turning point, with historical works growing in frequency across subsequent decades. The subjects of study proved diverse, covering not only economic (e.g. trade, fiscal policy) and social issues (e.g. migration, social welfare), but also political subjects, as well (e.g. democracy, civil society). Noted here were a number of critical environmental historiographies, joining those found in *Development and Change* (e.g. Fairhead and Leach, Stump).[307]

Though some journals seemed to favour certain subjects or approaches over others, their combined output evidences a diverse and responsive discourse, on the whole. Thus, despite the more obvious methodological conflicts between 'scientific' versus 'situated' views, the histories observed here represented an impressive breadth of epistemological orientations from across the social sciences. Accordingly, it would be another kind of failure in critical reflection to disregard such strengths and overzealously throw the baby out with the bathwater, so to speak.

4.4 What now?

To be clear, we do not wish to pose historical self-consciousness within development studies as the next cure-all for development problems. Rather, the above arguments have attempted to illustrate history's more subtle but far-reaching benefits for development theory and practice. As argued in the history and philosophy of science, history can serve a highly complementary role in advancing theory (e.g. Hasok Chang).[308] In particular, it can help recover overlooked ideas and lessons in development's past, while moderating theoretical dogmas and their consequent polemics. What needs to be done, then, to realize such benefits?

We thus close with two suggestions for future work. The first is further investigation to examine whether other sectors of the broader development discourse also remain similarly

---

[305] Solimano, 'Inflation'; Dooley, Fernández-Arias, and Kletzer, 'Is the debt crisis history?'.

[306] Y. Hayami, 'Ecology, history, and development: a perspective from rural Southeast Asia', *World Bank Research Observer* 16.2 (2001), 169-98; Humphries, 'Child labor'.

[307] Fairhead and Leach, 'False forest history'; Stump, 'Ancient and backward'.

[308] H. Chang, *Inventing temperature: measurement and scientific progress* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

unengaged with the development discourse's past. Corollary to this is further consideration of the concrete ways in which development theorists, policymakers, and practitioners stand to gain from reflective histories of development thought. If history is to occupy space in the development discourse, it ought to make clear its value for neighbouring efforts and its commitment to proving its worth. In this respect, the surveyed work by Simon, Szreter, and Rao stands out as an exemplary step in this direction.[309] Alongside such works as Grampp, Arndt, and Adelman and Morris, there are a number of opportunities for continuing this conversation.[310]

The second suggestion for future work lies in the organization of concerted historical dialogue within the larger development discourse. This is an area where opportunities lie for those willing to bring together the various efforts scattered across time and disciplinary space. Some of the precedents and original researchers to constitute this specialised discourse have already been identified in this survey. Many other individuals and works exist, however, in the broader development discourse and in neighbouring domains (e.g. Cullather, Cooper, Frey and Kunkel).[311] Such efforts would need to be brought together not only in the literature, but also in person (e.g. conferences, seminars, workshops). Otherwise, past, present, and future efforts may end up lost in relative obscurity—like ships passing each other in the night.

5. Conclusion

Amidst a development enterprise now more than 70 years in the making and not without signs of institutional aging, we have examined here whether development learns from history. To do so, we surveyed 136 articles from 10 leading development studies journals spanning the period from 1952 to 2016. We found significant diversity and interest in historical research within this literature. Through the survey, we produced a basic typology distinguishing between descriptive historical accounts, first-order historical lessons, and second-order historiographical arguments. After reviewing each type of historical analysis, we found a very active use of history to respond to pressing issues of the times. Further, the multidisciplinary nature of these efforts produced a diversity of views and methodological approaches.

However, while the survey evidenced an active use of external histories, it did not necessarily find the same when it came to development's own. The two notable exceptions were an eclectic mix of intellectual histories of particular development ideas and the critical investigations on colonial historiography. In the overall survey, however, such works were few and far in between—though highly insightful when found. Consequently, there was little evidence

---

[309] Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao, 'How and why history matters'.

[310] Grampp, 'Robbins on the history'; Arndt, 'Economic development'; Adelman and Morris, 'Editorial: development history'.

[311] N. Cullather, 'Development? It's History', *Diplomatic History* 24.4 (2000), 641-53; F. Cooper, 'Writing the history of development', *Journal of Modern European History* 8.1 (2010), 5-23; M. Frey and S. Kunkel, 'Writing the history of development: a review of the recent literature', *Contemporary European History* 20.2 (2011), 215-32.

of *sustained* dialogue reflecting upon the broader history of the development discourse, itself. This suggests a relative unconsciousness about the myriad ways in which we have talked about and engaged with the idea of development in the past up to the present. The practical consequence of this is the risk of repeating past proposals, past mistakes, and past critiques without realizing it—a sort of institutional amnesia inhibiting the efficacy, legitimacy, and sustainability of the development endeavour.

The major disclaimer here, of course, is whether the study's findings are indeed true. Methodologically, the study can only comment on a narrow—though influential—slice of the development discourse as it flows through leading peer-reviewed English-language journals. Further work is warranted to examine other strands in the development discourse, whether in the realm of theory, policy, or practice. If it does hold true that the development discourse remains largely unreflective of its past, then this paper calls for two actions. The first is for more in-depth investigation as to why the more historically enlightened arguments evidenced here have not garnered more attention in the past and the present. The second is for organisation across past and present efforts to sustain a concerted discourse on development's own history and to provide insights for theorists, policymakers, and practitioners, alike.

A development discourse that is largely unaware of its past bodes poorly for its future. For better or worse, development is now part of twentieth-century history. If it is to be effective and sustainable in the twenty-first, then it will need to reflect upon this past in order to envision its better future. The present survey finds that it generally does not. The presence of some exceptional past works suggests that it can. A case has been made here for why it must, ultimately resting on development's efficacy and the possibility of progress.

Chapter 2

The historiography of development: missing voices, forgotten worlds

1. Introduction

Recent decades have been marked by growing interest in development from historians across diplomatic, environmental, and international history. To echo Nick Cullather's 2000 research note, 'Development? It's history'.[312] Its twentieth and twenty-first-century visions of progress and ensuing interactions across space and time offer a compelling window into contemporary global history and politics. Cullather thus warns that the field of US diplomatic history 'must sooner or later grapple with this immense literature and the ideas behind it'.[313] Indeed, the burgeoning literature on development from historians since 2000 offers testament to the speed in which they have responded—whether intentionally or inadvertently—to Cullather's call.[314]

However, historians are not the only ones interested in development's past. Namely, their counterparts in development studies have long held interest in the history of their own profession. Whether written by so-called development pioneers (e.g. Albert Hirschman, W.W. Rostow, Dudley Seers) or by development scholars dedicating their efforts to documenting them (e.g. H.W. Arndt, Gerald Meier), the academic field of development studies has amassed a historiography of its own.[315] Consequently, the purpose of this work is to offer historians a segue into this immense literature encompassed within development studies. The underlying motives for doing so are three-fold.

---

[312] N. Cullather, 'Development? It's history', *Diplomatic History* 24.4 (2000), 641-53.

[313] Ibid.*,* p. 641.

[314] Examples include D.C. Engerman, *Modernization from the other shore: American intellectuals and the romance of Russian development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); E. Helleiner, *Forgotten foundations of Bretton Woods: international development and the making of the postwar order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); S.J. Macekura, *Of limits and growth: the rise of global sustainable development in the twentieth century* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2015).

[315] See, for example, H.W. Arndt, *The rise and fall of economic growth: a study in contemporary thought* (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1978); D. Seers and G.M. Meier (eds.), *Pioneers in development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

For one, there is little need to re-invent the wheel. Bridging these two academic fields (i.e. history and development studies), reduces the risk of duplicating or replicating past efforts. Second, this development literature offers a wealth of valuable primary accounts from notable theorist-*cum*-practitioners. At the same time, however, this historiography is also marked by a dearth in systematic organisation and analysis, as highlighted by Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao in 2011 and Park in 2017.[316] As such, the third aim is to establish a beachhead, of sorts, for historians into this literature through one possible systemisation of this development studies historiography. This is further pursued amidst prior calls by Woolcock, Szreter, Rao, and Park for greater engagement between historians and development scholars. In doing so, it is not only historians, but also development that stands to benefit from stronger historical grounds informing pedagogy, policy, and practice.

2 . Methodology

In excavating development studies' historiography, the question asked is as follows: *'How has the history of development been written by development [studies] scholars?'* To answer, this work identifies and reviews development studies history textbooks, compiling a new historio-graphical database with more than 200 works amidst a dearth in direct precedents. Offered in the appendices, a penultimate sample of only the most comprehensive development history books are selected for this essay. Revealing historiographical borders between its Cold War and post-Cold War works, the former Cold War and largely Marxist historiography are un-packed here for closer examination. Before diving into concerted analysis, however, some methodological explanation is warranted to *(i)* define development studies and *(ii)* compile a historiographical database.

2.1 Development studies and its history

It is worth introducing development studies, as its existence as an academic field may be less familiar outside European and Commonwealth academic contexts. One cause is a disciplinary history closely tied to European (de)colonisation. Gerald Meier, for example, traces a lineage for development studies at Oxford University that traces back to commonwealth studies and colonial studies, before that.[317] Just as Nils Gilman ties US area studies to US interests during the Cold War, so too can development studies be tied to European interests after the World Wars.[318] Amidst the rapid decolonisation to follow, dedicated institutes such as the Institute

---

[316] See M. Woolcock, S. Szreter, and V. Rao, 'How and why history matter for development policy?', *Journal of Development Studies* 47.1 (2011), 70-96; A.S. Park, 'Does the development discourse learn from history?', *World Development* 96 (2017), 52-64.

[317] G.M. Meier, *Biography of a subject: an evolution of development economics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 51.

[318] N. Gilman, *Mandarins of the future: modernization theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

for Development Studies (IDS) in Sussex, the Institute for Social Studies (ISS) at the Hague, and the Graduate Institute for Development Studies in Geneva were established to train a new generation of development administrators and experts.[319] As such, it may be of little surprise to note that nineteen of the top twenty-five development studies programmes in recent world rankings are located in either Europe or the Commonwealth, which host academic centres, departments, and institutes wholly-dedicated to the field.[320]

At the same time, it would be erroneous to view development studies as entirely non-existent outside of Europe and the Commonwealth, for it is often found abroad under a slightly different guise. Case in point, another five of the twenty-five development studies programmes are based in the US, where the field's multidisciplinary nature comes to the fore.[321] In contrast to European and Commonwealth programmes that often recognise development studies as its own distinct field, US universities exhibit a much stronger tendency to divide and subsume it within its social sciences (e.g. degrees on development economics, development sociology, or development anthropology more than development studies).

Development studies thus encompasses here a wide body of scholarship tied to not only development studies as a distinct field, but also to its manifestations in the social sciences. Notably, overlaps with the humanities (e.g. development history, development philosophy) remain relatively scarce—thus leading to Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao and Park's prior calls.[322] Shared across this wide body of work is an explicit focus on the idea of development as a core unifying strand. This stands in contrast with works external to development studies, which often refer to development in more tangentially-related terms (e.g. histories on modernity, Cold War foreign policy).

Perhaps most significant when speaking of methodological disclosures, however, is a linguistic concession made for this work. In speaking of development studies' historiography, this study can comment only on the narratives found in English-language works. On one hand, this linguistic choice can be viewed as pragmatic, given the outsized influence of the Anglophone development discourse and the already pre-existing dearth in historiographical analyses. The English-language literature hence offers a sensible place to start—just as long as it's not the end. Otherwise, there remains large swathes of work (e.g. on *desarrollo, entwicklung, gaebal*) not captured here and at risk of remaining buried amidst the influence of said Anglophone works.

---

[319] IDS was founded in 1966. ISS was founded in 1952. The Graduate Institute for Development Studies was founded as the Africa Institute of Geneva *(Institut Africain de Genève)* in 1961. In 2008, it merged with the Graduate Institute of International Studies to form the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (*Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement*).

[320] This figure includes Hong Kong, a former Commonwealth territory; QS World University Rankings, 'Development studies', 2017 [https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rnkings/uiversity-subject-rankings/2017/development-studies, accessed 14 November 2017].

[321] Ibid. The leading US programmes were at Harvard (ranked 2nd), UC Berkeley (5th), Stanford (8th), UCLA (20th), University of Chicago (23rd), and Brown (25th).

[322] Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao, 'How and why'; Park, 'Does the development discourse'.

Consequently, future analysis of development's multilingual historiography is tapped as yet another important direction for future work.[323] Amidst this essay's attempt to extend an *interdisciplinary* bridge between historians and development scholars, the task of furthering *international* bridges across development's historiography yet remains. As such, the caveat is offered that this essay on the English-language historiography offers but one of many possible entryways into the global historiography on development.

2.2 Compiling a historiographical database

With development studies thus defined, a search was conducted to compile its historiography. The resulting database was necessary due to the dearth in prior works offering a comparable dataset as a point of departure. The approach adopted here starts by *(i)* casting a wide net to identify past works, followed by *(ii)* classification and filtering of the ensuing results.

Given this study's focus on more comprehensive historical narratives (as opposed to micro-histories, for example), a starting choice was made to focus exclusively on book-format sources—as opposed to journal articles or other short-form works.[324] The ensuing approach entails a rather unconventional mix of methods old and new. First, a large-scale search was conducted using two online databases: *WorldCat.org* and *Google Books*. Search parameters centred on the keywords 'development' and 'history', but were tailored to utilise the custom parameters offered with each database (see Table 1, next page). Using a technique called 'web scraping', bibliographic metadata was downloaded (i.e. scraped) from these online databases using publicly-available tools. This entailed the use of ParseHub for WorldCat.org and Mendeley for Google Books to record the first 300 books retrieved from each database.[325] Searches were further run while logged out each databases and with web tracking disabled.[326] A large sample size (n=600) was thus used in light of the crude parameters relied upon for the search.

To this, another 158 works were added through manual, on-site searches of physical library collections. Conducted over the course of three years (2014–2017), this encompassed collections at three institutions: the University of Cambridge (UK); the Graduate Institute, Geneva (Switzerland); and Seoul National University (South Korea). These professionally

---

[323] Corinna Unger offers one rare example in bridging German and English-language historiographies. See C. Unger, 'Histories of development and modernization: findings, reflections, future research', H-Soz-Kult, 9 December 2010 [http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum/2010-12-001].

[324] Note, Park addresses development studies journals in 'Does the development discourse'.

[325] Recorded metadata includes title, author(s), publisher, year of publication, edition, table of contents, and summaries (where available). Mendeley was used alongside its Google Chrome extension.

[326] Web tracking was disabled by using Google Chrome's 'incognito mode', but is not fool proof given the ability of web services to track even anonymous users (e.g. IP address-based location tracking).

Database	Search Parameters
WorldCat.org *(retrieved 20 Mar 2017)*	Subject: *development history* Keyword: *-child -curriculum -biology* Content: *non-fiction* Format: *print book, ebook* Language: *english* Sort: *by relevance only* (31,831 results) » first **300 results** recorded
Google Books *(retrieved 20 Mar 2017)*	Boolean Search: *development AND history OR theory OR thought OR* *introduction -child -curriculum -biology* Search domain: *all books* Language: *english* Sort: *by relevance only* (¬7,000,000 results) » first **300 results** recorded
Library Collections *(retrieved Nov 2013–* *Oct 2017)*	Site: *Univ. of Cambridge; Graduate Institute, Geneva; Seoul National Univ.* (digital + manual *in situ* browsing) » additional **158 results**

Table 1. Database search parameters. Note: Arturo Escobar's Encountering development was republished in 2012 with a new preface, but will be generally counted here as a second edition.

managed collections proved valuable for identifying older works and difficult titles not captured in online database searches. One example is Peter W. Preston's 1982 book, *Theories of development*, which ended up being the oldest first edition in the final sample.[327] Another is Gerald Meier's disciplinary history, with its unassuming main title: *Biography of a subject*.[328]

These two methods—though not exactly elegant—proved functional, nonetheless. From a raw set of 758 sources, filtering for off-topic results, grey literature (e.g. dissertations, reports), and duplicates produced a refined set of 388 sources. Given the large volume, several filters were implemented in order to further cull search results. First, the whole book—not just a part or section—had to be dedicated to development's history. This removed many textbooks with only specific chapters allocated to history (see Appendix A5). Second, compiled works (e.g. edited volumes, anthologies) were removed. Valuable works from likes of Cooper and Packard, Kothari, and Srivatsan are listed in Appendix A1, instead.[329] Finally, books had to be arguably comprehensive in temporal and topical scope. Eliminated here were many excellent but more narrowly-focused period histories, disciplinary histories, and organisational histories (Appendices A2–A4). When in doubt, however, borderline cases were kept in the sample.

This process resulted in a penultimate sample of twenty-one works, written by twenty-three authors across thirty-seven editions from 1982–2017 (see Tables 2 and 3). These enable

---

[327] P.W. Preston, *Theories of development* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982).

[328] Meier, *Biography of a subject*.

[329] F. Cooper and R. Packard (eds.), *International development and the social sciences: essays on the history and politics of knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); U. Kothari (ed.), *A radical history of development studies: individuals, institutions and ideologies* (London: Zed Books, 2005); R. Srivatsan (ed.), *History of development thought: a critical anthology* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2012).

a preliminary analysis, which reveals the existence of a Cold War divide in the development studies historiography. Outlining an expansive political and intellectual terrain, the present essay will focus on the early and largely forgotten works constituting the Cold War-era historiography. In doing so, it also prepares the grounds for a subsequent turn to post-Cold War narratives in future works.

Given the nature and limits of this study, it should also be clarified that the following sections do not aim for in-depth analysis of these books. One would be better served by book reviews or, better yet, the original texts in this regard. Rather, it focuses on *how* scholars have written development's history and *why*. How do they periodise their narratives? What are the focal actors, places, and times? Further, what causal relations and moral lessons do they imply? The ensuing sections thus skein only the most salient characteristics underlying these works. Centred on the theoretical frameworks or logic scaffolds underlying their narratives, these are recovered from a closer scrutiny of ontological, moral, and epistemological premises. In simpler terms, these correspond to the basic categories used to structure these narratives, moral lessons for how they ought to apply to the present, and how this is all known to be true. To

Year	Title	Author(s)
1982	Theories of development	P.W. Preston
1984	Development theory in transition: the dependency debate & beyond: Third World responses	M. Blomström, Björn Hettne
1989	Theories of development: capitalism, colonialism and dependency	Jorge Larrain
1990	Development theory and the three worlds	Björn Hettne
1991	Development theory: critiques and explorations	A.H. Somjee
1995	Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World	Arturo Escobar
1996	Development and social change: a global perspective	Philip McMichael
1996	Development theory: an introduction	Peter W. Preston
1996	Doctrines of development	M.P. Cowen, R.W. Shenton
1996	The rise and fall of development theory	Colin Leys
1996	Understanding development: thinking and practice in the Third World	John Rapley
1997	Development and disorder: a history of the Third World since 1945	Mike Mason
1997	The history of development: from Western origins to global faith	Gilbert Rist
1999	Theories of development: contentions, arguments, alternatives	Richard Peet, Elaine Hartwick
2001	Development theory: deconstructions/reconstructions	J.N. Pieterse
2005	Theories and practices of development	Katie Willis
2007	Challenging global inequality: development theory and practice in the 21st century	Alastair Greig, David Hulme,
2009	Thinking about development	Björn Hettne
2012	International development and global politics: history, theory and practice	David Williams
2013	Re-envisioning global development: a horizontal perspective	Sandra Halperin
2016	Development discourse and global history: from colonialism to the Sustainable Development Goals	Aram Ziai

Table 2. The final sample of 21 comprehensive development history books, in order of first editions.

Authors	Precursors			Editions					
	P-3	P-2	P-1	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th
Preston			*1981*	1982					
Blomström & Hettne			*1981*	1984					
Larrain				1989					
Hettne	*1977*	*1978*	*1982*	1990	1995				
Somjee				1991					
Escobar			*1987*	1995	2012				
Cowen & Shenton				1996					
Leys				1996					
McMichael				1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2017
Preston				1996					
Rapley				1996	2002	2007			
Mason				1997					
Rist			*1996*	1997	2002	2008	2014		
Peet & Hartwick			*1991*	1999	2009	2015			
Pieterse				2001	2010				
Willis				2005	2011				
Greig, Hulme, & Turner			*1990*	2007					
Hettne				2009					
Williams				2012					
Halperin				2013					
Ziai			*2004*	2016					

Table 3. Reviewed history books, ordered by publication year of first edition; corresponds to Figure N, below.

preface this analysis, we first start with a larger periodisation or orientation rendered across the penultimate sample of only the most comprehensive, dedicated historical narratives.

3. Three periods in development's historiography

Placing the collected development history books into historical context, themselves, unveils a first key characteristic that informs and structures the historiographical analysis to follow. To start, Table 3 provides a comprehensive layout of the sample's publication history, listed in chronological order of first editions. In addition, a further ten precursors were identified in association with eight of the twenty-one works.

The earliest precursors trace to a series of reports published by Hettne for the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries (SAREC).[330] Published in 1977, 1978, and 1982, they lead to *Development theory and the three worlds* (1990, 1995). Hettne's 1984 *Development theory in transition*, co-authored with Magnus Blomström, also stems from

---

[330] These include B. Hettne, 'Emerging trends in development theory: report from a SAREC workshop on development theory', SAREC conference proceedings, Västerhaninge, August 8-12, 1977; B. Hettne, 'Current issues in development theory', SAREC report (Stockholm: SAREC, 1978); B. Hettne, 'Development theory and the Third World, SAREC report (Stockholm: SAREC, 1982). Attribution in B. Hettne, *Development theory and the three worlds* (Essex: Longman Scientific & Technical, 1990), p. xi.

a 1981 book published only in Swedish.[331]Around the same time, Preston converts a 1981 PhD dissertation at the University of Leeds into the 1982 publication captured here.[332]

Escobar's 1995 book traces to a PhD dissertation, completed in 1987 at UC Berkeley.[333] Adding further geographical diversity is Ziai's 2016 book, tracing to a 2004 PhD dissertation submitted at the University of Kassel.[334] To German and Swedish-language precursors, Rist adds the only first edition *not* published in English.[335] Published in French in 1996, *The history of development* was released in English the following year. The two remaining precursors are particularly revealing. Entailing works originally intended as first editions, ensuing events and revisions lead to their re-publication under entirely new names. Originating in 1990 and 1991, they do not find new life until 1999 and 2007—both with the help of a new co-author.[336]

When mapped across time, these ten precursors and thirty-seven editions reveal a sharp increase in publications during the mid-1990s (Figure 1, opposite page). The three years from 1995 to 1997 account for nearly 40% of the first editions in a thirty-six-year span (forty-one when counting precursors). As a measure of their continued presence, the majority (73%) of revised editions published after 1997 stem from these mid-1990s works. Less a matter of pure coincidence, these metrics reflect the influence of their particular surrounding contexts. Namely, closer examination reveals shared drivers for this mid-1990s spike in the intellectual and political fallout of a 1980s theoretical impasse for Leftist scholars and the ensuing end of the Cold War—as will soon be unpacked.

This essay's opening finding thus lies in the existence of a mid-1990s *historical turn* in development studies. Accordingly, the penultimate set of collected works can be subdivided into the *late Cold War (1982-1991), historical turn (1995-97),* and *post-Cold War (1999-2017)* historiography. Together, they constitute a periodisation not so much with hard breaks, but

---

[331] M. Blomström and B. Hettne, *Beroende och underutveckling: den latinamerikanska beroendeskolans bidrag till utvecklingsteorin* [Underdevelopment and dependency: Latin American contribution to development theory] (Stockholm: Prisma, 1981). Attribution in M. Blomström and B. Hettne, *Development theory in transition: the dependency debate and beyond* (London: Zed Books, 1984), p. vii.

[332] P.W. Preston, 'An analytical and historical survey of theories of development in the period 1945-1975', unpublished PhD thesis, University of Leeds (1981). In Preston, *Theories of development,* p. xi.

[333] The PhD dissertation is not mentioned by Escobar in *Encountering development*, but much of its structure, content, and sources carry directly over—albeit with significant additions by 1995. See A. Escobar, 'Power and visibility: the invention and management of development in the Third World', unpublished PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley (1987); A. Escobar, *Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[334] A. Ziai, 'Entwicklung als ideologie? das klassische entwicklungsparadigma und die post-development-kritik; ein beitrag zur analyse des entwicklungsdiskurses' [Development as ideology? The classical development paradigm and post-development critique; a contribution to the analysis of the development discourse], unpublished PhD thesis, University of Kassel (2004). See A. Ziai, Development discourse and global history: from colonialism to the Sustainable Development Goals (New York: Routledge, 2016), p. 2.

[335] G. Rist, *Le développement: histoire d'une croyance occidentale* [Development: the history of a Western belief] (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1996).

[336] See R. Peet, *Global capitalism: theories of societal development* (London: Routledge, 1991); R. Peet and E. Hartwick, *Theories of development* (New York, Guilford Press, 1999), p. ix; D. Hulme and M. Turner, *Sociology and development: theories, policies and practices* (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990); Greig, Hulme, and Turner, *Challenging global inequality,* p. xii.

Figure 1. Publication history of reviewed history books across time

rather reflecting a series of unfolding shifts in surrounding motivations and concerns over time. Namely, they reflect political currents pervading development theory and broader international academia from the 1960s to the 2010s. Combined, they chronicle the efforts of roughly two generations of development scholars, who have repeatedly looked to the past for new ways forward.

The close examination to follow thus revisits some of their origins in a now largely forgotten corpus of Cold War works. Spanning the 1950s to the 1990s, their personal accounts of development history, seen first-hand, offers a testament to the diversity to be found within development's intellectual terrain. Evidencing the outsized role of a neo-Marxist scaffold or template, in particular, it recovers some of the complex intellectual and political contexts since lost or easily forgotten in a present post-Cold War era.

4. Unpacking the late Cold War historiography (1982-1991)

Year	Title	Author(s)
1991	Development theory: critiques and explorations	A.H. Somjee
1990	Development theory and the three worlds	Björn Hettne
	Development theory and the three worlds: towards an international political economy of development (2nd. ed., 1995)	
	Development theory in transition: the dependency debate and beyond: Third World responses (1984, Blomström and Hettne)	
	Development theory and the Third World (1982, Hettne)	
	Beroende och underutveckling: den latinamerikanska beroendeskolans bidrag till utvecklingsteorin (1981, Blomström and Hettne)	
	Current issues in development theory (1978, Hettne)	
	Emerging trends in development theory (1977, Hettne)	
1989	Theories of development: capitalism, colonialism and dependency	Jorge Larrain
1982	Theories of development	P.W. Preston
	An analytical and historical survey of theories of development in the period 1945-1975 (1981, Preston)	

Table 4. Sampled works in the late Cold War historiography *(precursors and new editions in italics)*

Peter W. Preston offers this study's first history book, published in 1982. Stemming from Preston's PhD, it responds to an observed post-1968 'renaissance' in Marxist scholarship and tied claims equating the 'discovery of the Third World' to the 'discovery of industrialization' in its impact on social science.[337] This history on the postwar 'career of development studies' is thus written as a study on the social contexts of social theories or ideologies, themselves.[338]

The ensuing narrative centres on three streams ('positivists', 'radicals', and 'marxists') in development's intellectual history. Spanning the 1940s–1970s, they are briefly prefaced by the Renaissance idea of progress.[339] Reforged under a 'positivist' postwar Keynesian consensus, development is solved by the 'positivistic empiricism of orthodox policy science'.[340] Namely, it entails the deployment of economic models (e.g. Harrod-Domar, Solow) and modernisation theory's interdisciplinary 'master-scientist' to drive economic growth.[341] Finding reason in a newly minted Third World, they prevail over 1950s-60s development theory and policy.

However, dissent from 'radicals' coalesce by the 1960s in Europe (e.g. Myrdal, Seers, Streeten), Latin America (e.g. Prebisch, Furtado), and the US (e.g. Frank).[342] Common to each is a critique against the purely technical premises underlying economic growth. In Europe, this

---

[337] Ibid., pp. 3, 6-7, 186-7.

[338] Preston, *Theories of development,* pp. 3, 16. This is referenced throughout the text in terms of the 'sociology of knowledge' and interests in the 'nature of social theorizing'. See also the methodological focus on ideology attributed to Berstein, Giddens, and Habermas in section 3.33 ('Ranking ideologies'); Ibid., pp. 176-81.

[339] See Ibid., p. 18 and endnote [2], p. 265, where Preston relies heavily upon John Passmore's account in *The perfectibility of man* (London: Duckworth, 1970).

[340] Ibid., p. 70.

[341] See chapter 3 on early economists and chapter 4 on US modernisation theory.

[342] See chapter 5 for European 'radicals' and chapter 6 for Latin American and US critiques.

manifests in neo-institutionalism—a reformist, non-Marxist, re-'sociologized economics'. Shaped by its social milieu in European decolonisation, it employs a subtler view of the backwards society. To this, the Latin American line adds a 'populist' orientation in dependency, cast across a centre and periphery informed by domestic inequality and political instability.[343] Returning to the US, A.G. Frank offers a third line in Marxist underdevelopment theory and its 'only true development strategy: armed revolution and the construction of socialism'.[344] These stances all eschew the excessive formalisation or generalisation of postwar orthodoxy. Yet, they remain anchored to empiricist and authoritarian-interventionist presuppositions.

Thus closing with the rise of neo-Marxism, it is treated in both its Western New Left (e.g. Baran, Sweezy, Frank) and Third World forms (e.g. Fanon, Debray, Cardoso, Faletto). Their debates over 'proper' neo-Marxist theory raise ensuing questions on 'the proper nature of the "Western" intellectual's involvement with the Third World'.[345] Tracing a New Left that has co-opted Third World 'liberation struggles' for domestic political ends, Preston instead highlights the value of Third World theories more grounded in Third World realities.[346]

Development thus entails a largely Western history of ideologies or 'Western efforts to make sense of the Third World'.[347] Their repeated failures in both the political Left and Right spurs a diversity of approaches as positivistic schemas unravel.[348] The ensuing consequences are two-fold. First is the problem of particular interests posing in development as technical, scientific and universal values for all (i.e. the 'slide to the general').[349] Development theory is a social construct that carries a host of interests and concerns that lie beyond the remit of its target subjects. Second is the solution to be found in democratic-critical engagement from Western scholars working on Third World matters. Development must be taken 'as a politico-ethical notion and not a technical one'.[350]

---

[343] See pp. 158-61.

[344] Cited in Ibid., p. 175; original from A.G. Frank, *Lumpenbourgeoisie: lumpendevelopment: dependence, class, and politics in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 145.

[345] Ibid., pp. 224-6.

[346] Ibid., pp. 206-7.

[347] Ibid., p. 181.

[348] From Ibid., p. 261: 'The worst case of what might be called 'left-scientism' was exemplified by *[...]* Taylor's self-conception of academic inquiry as being concerned with the provision of the best possible tools of revolutionary analysis to the theoretically under-developed revolutionists of the Third World. This problem of the ease with which the 'slide to the general' can be effected—even if we do not, like Taylor, embrace it—crops up in our last issue *[...]*.'

Also from p. 245: 'The sequence 'orthodox', 'radical', 'marxist' is taken by us to represent an increasing richness of elements of categorical frame. The ideological schemes become subtler as attempts to constitute an autonomous discipline of 'development studies' fail.'

[349] Ibid., p. 261.

[350] Ibid., p. 31. See also Ibid., pp. 257-63. From Ibid., p. 261: 'social theoretic efforts needs *[sic]* must be sensitive to what makes sense to say. In political economy this rather implies, in respect of Third World material, adopting a role of commentator and eschewing claims to status of superior theorist. *[...]* if we sharpen this engagement and affirm our insistence on specificity of engagement, then the extended scheme of critical-theory invites study of the obfuscating character of the common-sense view of matters of the development of the Third World. The themes are familiar: the Third World is starving, incompetent, tribal, ungrateful, etc. It would seem to be appropriate to ask: from whence came these images? How are they maintained, and whose interests do they serve?'

Rebuking the excesses of both old (positivist) and new (Marxist) development ortho-doxies, Preston thus closes by calling for theories grounded more in Third than First World realities. Examples are hence found in political economy from Latin American scholarship (e.g. Cardoso, Faletto, Palma) and the more 'humanist' Marxisms addressing the role of ideology and the role of the theorist in the world (e.g. Habermas).[351]

Jorge Larrain shares this focus on ideology and the social nature of knowledge, framed by Marxist proclivities. However, this 1989 history strikes a contrast in the Marxist implosion and not a renaissance spurring Larrain to action.[352] Driven by European Marxist critics who threaten to take dependency theory down with them, Larrain thus aims to preserve past Latin American contributions. Fulfilling long-held interests in development's intellectual history, it is further interpreted through the lens of historical materialism.

Larrain's narrative is thus structured into eras of early capitalism (1700-1860), capitalist colonial expansion (1860-1945), and late capitalism (1945-1980). Each bears its own ideas of development, attributed to the centre or periphery (see Table 5). Early capitalism thus ties to 'classical political economy' (e.g. Smith, Ricardo) and 'historical materialism' (e.g. Engels, Marx). Here, the idea of development or 'progress' is born from capitalism's productivity versus feudalism's relative stagnation.[353] Defined by growing trade and industrial productivity, its scientific (versus 'vulgar') bourgeoisie principles are eternal or ahistorical.[354] Thus enters Marx, who reduces their status to historical laws and recognises the class conflicts that result. Here, development is still defined by growing productivity, but this renders conflicts with capitalist aims to expand one's existing share.[355] Amidst ensuing class tensions at home, capitalism hence expands abroad in search of greater profits.

---

[351] See Ibid., pp. 181, 245, 257-61. From p. 99: 'It is our view that particular marxian-inspired schemes of social theorizing are the appropriate vehicles for further inquiry of this sort.' (In reference to social theorising in regard to the Third World).

[352] From Larrain, pp. vii-viii: 'On the one hand, I detected a growing sense of crisis within development studies. Dependency theory had been an attempt to criticize and replace both orthodox Marxism and modernization theory, which seemed equally to operate with a simple logic of determination. And yet its promise had foundered [...] it had ended up falling into a new kind of simple determinism. [...] Development studies seemed to be swinging from one unsatisfactory extreme to the other. On the other hand, the 'demise of dependency theory', acknowledge by almost everyone [...] personally challenged me in two ways. First, the most articulate critics of dependency theory were European Marxists who rarely distinguished between its various strands and carried out their critique from a very orthodox and/or Althusserian position which I found profoundly mistaken. At the centre of their onslaught was a refusal to see anything specific in the situation of 'peripheral countries'. Second, the best of dependency theory came from Latin America, my own continent, and I felt that although it had to be examined critically, greater care and attention had to be used in the task. if that was done, i hoped, perhaps one would find that the reports about its death had been greatly exaggerated.'

[353] From Ibid., p. 1: 'The very concept of development appears rather late, in close connection with the emergence of capitalism and the critique of feudal society. This is because, before the arrival of capitalism, there existed mainly agricultural societies whose productive forces—limited by feudal property relations—changed very slowly over the years and whose economic output was consequently relatively stagnant.'

[354] See Ibid., pp. 19-22.

[355] Ibid., pp. 41-4.

CENTRE	*PERIPHERY*
Competitive Capitalism (1700–1860)	
Classical political economy (Smith, Ricardo)	
Historical materialism (Marx, Engels)	
Age of Imperialism (1860–1945)	
Neo-classical political economy (Marshall, Walras, Jevons)	
Classical theory of imperialism (Hilferding, Bukharin, Luxemburg, Lenin)	
Late Capitalism (1945–1980)	
1945–1966 Expansion	
Theories of modernization (Hoselitz, Rostow)	ECLA's analysis (Prebisch)
Theory of imperialism refurbished (Baran)	
1966–1980 Deceleration and Crises	
Neo-liberalism (Friedman)	Dependency theories (Frank, Cardoso)
World system and unequal exchange theories (Wallerstein, Emmanuel)	Unequal exchange theories (Amin)
Articulation of modes of production (Rey)	

Table 5. An outline of Larrain's 1989 development history (source: Larrain, 1989, p. 4)

The ensuing colonial expansion brings 'neo-classical political economy' (e.g. Marshall, Walras, Jevons) and 'classical theories of imperialism' (e.g. Bukharin, Lenin). The former recasts development in terms of sustaining equilibrium. Serving the interests of an established bourgeoisie, it centres on perfect markets, rational choices, and stable growth over class and/or sociopolitical issues and reforms.[356] The converse is found in theories of imperialism. Extending Marxism across complex national and international divides, development manifests in a paradoxical form. That is, imperialism is *good* for the colonies and *bad* for central capitalism, but with its theories decidedly more interested in the welfare of workers in the latter.[357]

---

[356] Ibid., pp. 7-9.

[357] From Ibid., p. 70: 'Much as these classical theorists criticize the race to conquer foreign territories and the dangers of corruption and war that this brings about, they still feel that this process is not only inevitable but actually necessary for the development of peripheral areas. Paradoxically, it is this very

However, late capitalism brings tectonic shifts in development's surrounding contexts. Assumptions of a neo-classical equilibrium and a benevolent imperialism collapse amidst the Great Depression and two World Wars. Subdivided into eras of expansion (1945-1966) and deceleration/crises (1966-1980), the former brings US modernisation theory (e.g. Hoselitz, Rostow), neo-Marxist theories (e.g. Baran), and Latin American structuralism (e.g. Prebisch).

Modernisation theory revives a classical focus on institutions to define development in terms of the transition from tradition to modernity, entrepreneurial agency, and economic growth. In contrast to this rehash of Western history, neo-Marxist theories of imperialism are recast here in non-Eurocentric form.[358] Development now goes from being a pre-determined outcome to a determined struggle in the colonies. To this, Latin American structuralism adds to the non-homogenous nature to capitalism and underdevelopment. Borrowing from Marxist and conservative views, its synthesis reflects Latin American contexts in its centre-periphery divide in an uneven capitalist system.[359]

Economic deceleration and political crises from 1966-1980 bring a further polarising set of development ideas, including neoliberalism (e.g. Friedman), world system theories (e.g. Wallerstein), modes of production (e.g. Rey), peripheral theories of dependency (e.g. Frank, Cardoso), and unequal exchange (e.g. Amin). Neo-liberalism represents a conservative line, defining development as economic liberty from state interference.[360] In contrast lies a complex variety of dependency theories grouped under neo-Marxism. They mark a key departure from precedents in their scepticism of industrialisation and the postcolonial bourgeoisie.[361]

Together, these phases illustrate a social determination of development knowledge in capitalism's unfolding contexts. In particular, three key findings can be identified. First is the value of historical materialism when used in particular, non-teleological form.[362] In present contexts, it reveals how development theory is 'closely bound up with the evolution of the

---

process of peripheral development, which is taken for granted, that the theory of imperialism sees as the main problem for central capitalism: either the realization of surplus-value becomes impossible or investment and expansion is rechannelled to the benefit of the periphery. Imperialism is bad for Europe but ultimately good for the colonized peoples.'

[358] Paul Baran is attributed as instrumental to this reformulation; see Ibid., pp. 12, 77-84. From p. 84: 'Baran's theory marks the transfer of the geographical axis of the theory of imperialism from Europe to the third world.'

[359] From Ibid., p. 86: 'The Latin American economists and intellectuals working within it or under its auspices developed a distinctive approach which borrow from both paradigms but refused to go all the way with either of them. From development economics they took some central economic concepts and categories and, especially, quantitative methods of analysis. The language of the ECLA was in this respect quite orthodox and technical. They also shared a more fundamental assumption, namely, the idea that development, at least for the Latin American nations, must take place within the capitalist system. [...] From the theory of imperialism they took, without ever mentioning it directly, the idea that industrial nations take advantage and get the better of underdeveloped nations, especially through unequal exchange. Their point was to argue such a case without resorting to Marxist jargon but using the same logic, language and methodology as that accepted in the mainstream academic world.'

[360] Larrain's treatment of neo-liberalism is markedly sparse; see Ibid., pp. 13-4.

[361] Ibid., p. 14.

[362] As set out from Larrain's opening line, p. 1: 'Any study of the concept of development must take into account its historically determined character.'

capitalist system'.[363] This leads to Larrain's second point on the value of dependency theory. Despite attempts to 'throw away the baby with the bathwater', its views still hold merit in upholding the particularities of capitalism and Third World development. Final is the real and present danger left by the void left by Marxism; 'a vacuum which neo-liberal theories are only too happy to fill'.[364] Larrain's history thus closes by warning that European Marxist critics are only aiding neo-liberalism as it goes unhindered, singing 'the praises of capitalism, the free market forces, and the brilliant industrial prospects of the whole of the third world'.[365]

Björn Hettne's 1990 history builds on efforts since a 1978 PhD and work for SAREC (the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries).[366] Reflecting long-held interests in the 'new and fascinating field' of development studies, the history is further motivated by immediate crises.[367] One is a 'fundamentalist, monodisciplinary trend in the academic world, and a neoconservative trend in politics'.[368] Added to this are a crisis for the Keynesian welfare state in the First World, a crisis for the socialist project in the Second, and debt, food, and ethnic crises in the Third.[369]

The ensuing history turns to the past in search of 'a way out of the present confusion'.[370] Structured into historical episodes, it starts with development economics and modernisation theory. Set in the backdrop of European industrialisation and its ideas of growth and progress, they are cast as Eurocentric in deriving from particular Western historical experiences.[371] Both emerge 'riding the crest of the wave' of decolonisation and the Cold War in the 1940s-50s.[372]

---

[363] Ibid., p. 3. Also from Ibid., pp. 2-3: 'as capitalism becomes increasingly internationalized and a thoroughly integrated world market is created, development theories will respond not just to the class struggles and social contradictions of isolated capitalist countries but to the contradictions and conflicts emerging in the world capitalist system, especially those derived from the decolonization process, the emergence and challenge of socialist countries and the increasing separation between peripheral and central capitalist countries.'

[364] Ibid., p. 211.

[365] From Larrain's closing paragraph; Ibid., p. 211.

[366] Hettne, Development theory, p. xi. For Hettne's, PhD, see B. Hettne, 'The political economy of indirect rule: Mysore 1881-1947', unpublished PhD thesis, University of Göteborg (1978). Also published as B. Hettne, *The political economy of indirect rule: Mysore 1881-1947* (Malmö: Curzon Press, 1978). From Hettne, *The political economy,* p. 7: 'Thus, our study is not meant to be an economic history of Karnataka (which still has to be written) but will, if anything, trace the *history of development policies* during a period when the main question was how to evolve a development strategy more concomitant with Mysorean interests.'

SAREC reports include B. Hettne, 'Current issues in development theory', SAREC Report R5: 1978; and B. Hettne, 'Development theory and the Third World', SAREC Report R2: 1982.

See also M. Blomström and B. Hettne, *Beroende och underutveckling: Den latinamerikanska beroendeskolans bidrag till utvecklingsteorin* (Stockholm: Prisma, 1981); subsequently published as B. Hettne and M. Blomström, *Development theory in transition: the dependency debate and beyond: Third World responses* (London: Zed Books, 1984); and B. Hettne, 'The development of development theory'. *Acta Sociologica* 26.3/4 (1983): 247-46.

[367] Hettne, Development theory, p. xi.

[368] Ibid., p. 9.

[369] Ibid., pp. 16-27.

[370] Ibid., p. 4.

[371] Ibid., pp. 37-46.

[372] G. Myrdal, *Asian drama* (New York: Pantheon, 1968), p. 8; in Hettne, *Development theory,* p. 46.

In the former, development entailed 'an art of large-scale social engineering' built on now-embarrassingly simplistic and optimistic scientific models.[373] Modernisation theory expands upon these naturalistic assumptions, but across the social sciences. Illustrated in the sociology and politics of development, they derive from an ontological distinction between tradition and modernity and ensuing stages of growth. Reflecting liberal Western institutions and values, they reflect a short-lived optimism in the 1950s-60s—recalled by pioneering theorist Gabriel Almond as a 'missionary and Peace Corps mood'.[374]

Adding to Western critics (e.g. P.T. Bauer, Anne Kreuger on the Right; A.G. Frank on the Left) are Third World theories. One theory, in particular, stands out above the rest: Latin American dependency.[375] Emerging out of a confluence of Marxisms (classical, Leninist, neo-) and Latin American structuralism (Prebisch, Furtado), it originates from the latter's centre-periphery model, strategy of import substitution industrialisation, and ideology of economic nationalism.[376] Since then, its diverging Marxist forms and engagement with Western scholars (e.g. Frank, Leys) present more of a 'new point of departure' than a distinct, unified theory.[377] It yet highlights the presence of Third World attempts to indigenise Western social science—as seen in Indian and Chinese sociology and African socialism (e.g. Nkrumah, Touré, Kenyatta, Senghor, Mboya, Nyerere).[378] Yet, these attempts fade by the 1980s due to a countervailing trend; not in an indigenization, but the globalisation of development knowledge.[379]

By the 1970s, new global challenges spur another stream of development approaches. Amidst oil crises, the end of the Bretton Woods system, transnational corporations, and newly industrialised countries, new calls are lodged for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) amidst a North-South divide highlighted in the Brandt Reports.[380] If prior theories centre on endogenous/exogenous factors, then the new centres on an interdependence in development. This includes new Marxist approaches, from world-system theory (Wallerstein) to a revised neostructuralism (Sunkel, Fuenzalida). Added to this is are development's expanding frontiers

---

[373] Hettne, *Development theory,* pp. 48-56. From p. 56: 'The simple formula was: just find out the incremental capital-output ratio and the desire rate of growth. Then you can (after due consideration of the rate of population growth) arrive at the appropriate level of investment. Growth was thus seen mainly as a function of investment and very few doubted that a process of economic growth through a series of 'stages' ultimately would benefit the whole nation. The 1960s were proudly given the name of the First Development Decade *[...]* Those were truly innocent years.'

[374] G. Almond, *Political development: essays in heuristic theory* (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), p. 21; cited in Hettne, *Development theory,* p. 66.

[375] Example research bodies include Consejo Latino-Americano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO), the Association of Development Research and Training Institutes of Asia and the Pacific (ADIPA), and the Council for Development of Economic and Social research in Africa (CODESRIA); see Hettne, *Development theory*, pp. 80-1.

[376] Ibid., pp. 86-7.

[377] Ibid., p. 93.

[378] Briefly introduced in Ibid., pp. 103-12.

[379] From Ibid., p. 112: 'One reason was probably that the project of indigenization was based on the assumed existence of more or less homogenous national cultures. In many cases this proved to be an erroneous assumption. The nation state has been fundamentally challenged in different ways. The major trend during the 1980s has not been indigenization but globalization.'

[380] Ibid., pp. 114-22.

in human welfare (the basic needs approach), political agency (self-reliance), the environment (ecodevelopment), and cultural identity (ethnodevelopment).

The 1970s-80s also bring a return of development theory back home to Europe. As noted by Dudley Seers, the question of whether Western theories have anything to say about the Third World also brings the question of whether Third World theories can say anything about Western development. Examples are thus highlighted in old development ideologies renewed in neoliberalism, neomercantilism, and neopopulism. Tied to competing paradigms for the future of Europe (e.g. 'Fortress Europe', 'superpower Europe', 'the Atlantic project'), it also observes a pivot towards the market in the Second World.[381]

Having come full circle, Hettne's history offers a number of overarching findings. One is a development field in increasing disarray amidst external challenges and internal critics.[382] One cause is attributed to misled premises in Western social science. An elusive progress in development knowledge drives diverging responses, from a redoubling of abstract formalised efforts to an indigenisation of development theory in non-Western forms.[383] With Hettne's hopes placed in the latter, this globalisation of development theory is pivotal for addressing increasingly global challenges beyond the nation-state. This present state of disarray hence brings an opportunity: 'the crisis in development theory […] is not an end but a transition'.[384] Development studies is but a catalyst for the 'revival of the classical tradition of a unified historical social science'.[385] With Hettne's very history posited as a contributor, it also serves as a vault or archive of past development ideas amidst attacks from both the Left (e.g. Booth) and Right (e.g. Bauer, Lal):

> *[...]* the tragedy of the present stage of its intellectual history is that the attacks on
>
> what we now may call classical development theory—whether in its reformist or

---

[381] See Ibid., pp. 214-31 and Figure 6.1 ('The relation of the seven social projects to state-market and the functional-territorial principle'), p. 213.

[382] Ibid., p. 232: 'I maintain that the career of development studies is intellectually exciting, and that it has brought back important and forgotten issues in social science theorizing. It is, however, hard to see this intellectual process as an accumulation of wisdom. More appropriately, one could speak of an accumulation of 'social science sects' (Gareau 1987). This process can be conceived of as one single theoretical project, even if its participants do not appear to pursue a common cause, and many babies are carelessly thrown out with the bath water.'

Also from Ibid., p. 5: 'The development of development theory has not been a smooth and evolutionary process. rather it has been characterized by theoretical contradictions and ideological polarizations, at least after the pioneering years (late 1940s and early 1950s) were over.'

[383] See Figure 7.2 ('The universalization of development theory'), Ibid., p. 242.

[384] Hettne, *Development theory*, p. 35.

[385] Ibid., p. xi: 'development studies as a specific social science tradition may in fact not survive for long. It is at least my belief that its function has been that of a catalyst, in forcing the excessively specialized and static social sciences to focus on development and change, history and future, to borrow from each other, and—as a consequence—contribute to a revival of the classical tradition of a unified historical social science.'

From Ibid., p. 7: 'a field which admittedly is less well-structured today compared with when I made my first survey in the mid-1970s. I have nevertheless maintained more or less the same framework as was used in the 1982 book for the reason that I am still committed to the project of *one*—albeit pluralistic—research territory, in spite of the obvious disintegration and polarization of theoretical positions. *[...]* only through communication is it possible to transcend blocked positions and move towards convergence.'

in its radical form—rest on even more simplistic assumptions. For that reason I think it has been meaningful and worthwhile to give an account of this tradition from the point of view of the present 'losers'. History is already being written by those who for the time being enjoy the monopoly of definition.[386]

A.H. Somjee's 1991 history entails a borderline case, given its substantial prescriptive content. Its aim is to recover development from Western social science and its Eurocentric theories.[387] Delving into the philosophical premises underpinning social science, the ensuing narrative is structured two ways: *methodological* and *geographical*.

The first traces competing paradigms for organising development studies (i.e. 'purists', 'interrelationists', 'integrationists', 'expatriates'). The 'purists' (e.g. Samuelson, Pye, Parsons), traced to economics, politics, and sociology, entail a development subsumed within 'pure' disciplinary traditions.[388] Their knowledge is tied to long disciplinary lineages of 'rigorous'—and later, 'scientific'—scholarship, ensuring their validity across space and time.[389] In contrast, 'interrelationists' (e.g. Hagen, Moore, Lipset) highlight the interdisciplinary nature of development phenomena. However, they face a methodological hurdle. Their interdisciplinary studies are hindered by the very particular and oft-unrelatable forms in which respective bodies of empirical data manifest. The result is a heavy setback for the possibility and energy required for these less-expedient investigations of development.[390]

In contrast, the development 'integrationists' (e.g. Myrdal, Hirschman, Hoselitz) move beyond self-imposed borders to study development as its own phenomenon. 'Instead of viewing development as economic growth, political development, or social change, as we are used to doing, and then worrying about interrelations among them, why not view development as

---

[386] Ibid., p. 251.

[387] Somjee, *Development theory,* p. ix: 'This book is about the deep inroads which the social sciences, with their specific approaches and theories, have made into development studies, thereby preventing the latter from addressing themselves to different and, in some cases, unique problems of their own. *[...]* the existing development studies, and their corpus of theoretical knowledge, which has largely come from the social sciences, show little or no sensitivity to the basic differences in development experiences of different societies. The net result of this is that we are often unable to pay sufficient attention to some of their crucial problems.'

[388] Ibid., pp. 17-8: 'In a sense what they were doing was not development studies but incorporating chunks of them into their respective territories and then examining them as parts of their own disciplines. *[...]* they either ignored or derided the scholars across the disciplinary fence even when the latter, *[sic]* were dealing with closely related or similar issues. And those who dared defy such rigid boundaries risked intellectual isolation. Only the few with high intellectual stature were forgiven for wanting to cross the disciplinary fence.'

[389] Ibid., pp. 4-5. Also from Ibid., pp. 23-4: 'To Hagen, part of the problem was in the fact that social scientists, in particular in economics, keep looking at the natural sciences as the model of advancement of knowledge. But the natural sciences as compared to the social sciences are 'absurdly simple'. Moreover, the social sciences as compared to the natural sciences are still in their infancy.'

[390] Ibid., pp. 24-5: 'And so far as causal relationships in development studies are concerned, scholars in the field, realising the need to know much more about the complex terrain of the development process, and also the need to develop adequate conceptual tools to study it, have learned to regard them as a distant, very distant, goal.'

something that falls within its own inclusive category?'[391] Inherently defying disciplinary classification, their approaches share in a broader, inclusive view of development.

Finally, oft-unrecognised 'expatriates' are a another key source of inclusive views.[392] New but often nameless, Somjee highlights a community faced with disadvantages over the mainstream 'development academic establishment'.[393] Non-Western scholars face 'a twofold problem: of having to survive [...] if they went against the mainstream and the establishment; and of having to put together, often hurriedly, a respectable theoretical critique to back up their distancing and repositioning'.[394] Nonetheless, expatriate scholars from Latin America, Africa, and Asia have highlighted development's Eurocentric modernities in light of the complexities of their own societies.

These parallel streams in development studies are further complemented by Somjee's second dimension of development's non-Western historiographies. Covering Western Europe, Latin America, and Asia, the Western historiography starts in European industrial experiences. Centred on social and economic factors (e.g. Weber's protestant revolution, Marx's capitalism, Karl de Schweinitz's democratic industrialisation), they supply standard measures applied to development abroad.

In contrast, Latin American experience has rendered greater emphasis on 'economic dependency, political authoritarianism, and social corporatism'.[395] Tied to ECLA scholars (e.g. Prebisch, Cardoso, Faletto), its distinct reflections of particular Latin American contexts are often lost amidst dependency's wider debates. Indeed, its popular reception abroad belies its co-option by Western scholars—echoing Preston's New Left appropriation of the Third World amidst Almond's 'missionary and Peace Corps mood'.[396] In the case of India, development is instead cast as a problem of rigid and corrupt bureaucracy—despite dependency precedents in colonial India (i.e. Dadabhoy Naoroji's 'drain theory').[397]

---

[391] Ibid., p. 27.

[392] Ibid., p. 40: 'What they nevertheless brought to bear on development studies was a first-hand knowledge of the complexity of their own societies. they thereby not only helped development studies by questioning the ethnocentric biases in them, but also enriched them with a variety of hitherto unexplored perspectives.'

[393] Ibid., p. 37.

[394] Ibid., p. 37.

[395] Ibid., p. 51.

[396] G. Almond, *Political development*, p. 21; see also Somjee, *Development theory*, p. 54: 'A generation of young American scholars *[...]* rushed to embrace the dependency theory and its populariser in the US, namely Gunder Frank. Frank, in this case being in the centre, the US, and the Latin American scholars, being on the periphery, reillustrated the centre-periphery thesis in the scholarly domain. On the American campuses, one rarely heard the name of Raul Prebisch who was the father of the theory. Moreover, the American scholars, influenced by the reductionist approaches of the popularisers, did not want to prove deeper into the nuances of dependency theory which appeared in the writings of Latin American scholars. Apart from the intern dissensions, dependency theorists were not looked upon kindly by the Marxist fundamentalists. For them the former were simply vulgarising Marxian class analysis and the theories of imperialism of Marx and Lenin.'

[397] See Ibid., pp. 51-2, 55-6.

Finally, Japanese contexts add to the complexities of industrial modernity. Highlighting Japanese scholarship on its persisting social and cultural structures, (e.g. Chie Nakane, Michio Morishima), they cast further doubt over the universality of Western forms of tradition and modernity.[398] The extraordinarily long history of China and colonial contexts of India only add to the diversity of development's realities. This entails not only a diversity in historical contexts, but also a diversity in associated historical *interpretations* at play. Complementing the prior array of epistemological orientations in Western social science, it illustrates a deeper contestation manifest in development theory.

All this serves to demonstrate Somjee's final point on the need for a new development studies, freed from narrow, self-imposed categorical views.[399] At the heart of the problem is a 'theory culture' that insists on a very particular Western way of doing social science.[400] This entails an insistence on Western categories framing not just disciplinary analysis, but the very disciplines, themselves. The price of its overgeneralisations is paid by its subjects; that is, non-Western developing societies.[401] Producing a sort of methodological 'schizophrenia' born out of an 'unmistakable positivistic tendency', it silos development theory from reality.[402] The solution, then, is a grassroots approach termed 'ethnodevelopment'. Entailing empirical re-engagement and theoretical reconciliation with development's diverse realities, this base recognition is a necessary prerequisite if development theory is to progress.[403]

---

[398] From Ibid., p. 65: 'at an intellectual level, she has forced the Western academia to enter into what Kinhide Mushakoji called an 'inter-paradigmatic dialogue', taking seriously the body of ideas other societies have produced so as to justify claims to universal validity.'

Also from Ibid., p. 83: 'The Latin American scholars with their economy history and theories of political economy, and the Asian scholars with their nuanced social analysis of the complexity of cultural life in their regions (which deeply affects their development process), have together posed certain fundamental challenges for the corpus of theoretical knowledge and its claims to universal validity in development studies.'

[399] From Ibid., p. xix: "In development studies we need to go back, once again, to the theoretical drawing board for yet another round of cognitive effort. This has now become a necessity because we have come to realise that we can neither get by with the segmented theories of the social sciences nor with those theoretical constructs which are entirely based on the social and historical experiences of a few industrialised Western societies.'

[400] Ibid., p. 128.

[401] From Ibid., pp. 127-8: 'But what is worse, in order to perpetuate their approaches, even when they are extended to development studies, justifiably or otherwise, the proponents of the main body of theoretical knowledge in the social sciences tend to look down upon anything 'interdisciplinary' as not rigorous enough, and therefore devoid of intellectual respectability. Such notions of academic respectability have often discouraged scholars from looking into the complexity of development processes'.

[402] Ibid., pp. xii-xiv.

[403] Ibid., pp. 172-3: 'We shall have to build, incrementally, and continually test, our theory constructions in development studies. For this we need to go back, again and again, to the actuality and diversity of development processes at a level, preferably grassroots, at which we can get an increasingly deeper understanding of them. *[...]* This will also mean that we shall periodically pass through a phase when we do not trust the old theories of development but at the same time do not have the new ones to replace them. Such a situation of theoretical unsettlement is unavoidable. But that is the price development theory will have to pay for rediscovering the non-Western world and becoming an integral part of its development effort.'

Also from p. xii: 'One of the concerns of this book, therefore, is to critique the various social science-embedded approaches, and to explore the possibility of different approaches, taking into account the actualities of grassroots development experiences. There is much to be learnt from the past development experiences of developing societies themselves. they, in fact, have much more to teach us, at least at this stage, than our segmented, and Western development experience-based, social science theories.'

5. Putting the pieces back together

5.1 Historical landmarks and moral lessons

By now, a number of features will have become familiar in the Cold War historiography. Juxtaposing its narratives reveals recurring temporal, geographical, and intellectual demarcations, starting with common origins in European modernity. Associated with the Renaissance, European industrialisation, the birth of capitalism, and the spread of colonialism, this period largely centres on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Located in its intellectual space are key precursors in the idea of progress and 'classical' social science (e.g. political economy, sociology, anthropology). Laying Eurocentric foundations for the development theories to come, this era closes with the events of 1914-1945.

The crucible of the Great Depression and the World Wars brings a new epoch—albeit within the microcosm of development's history. Here, its first postwar theories emerge out of a foment of Keynesianism, Soviet industrialisation, decolonisation, and Cold War divides. Recurring in these histories are development economics—manifest in positivistic Western and more political Latin American forms—and US modernisation theory. However, the groundwork laid in the 1940s-50s is soon flooded by dynamism and instability in the 1960s-70s. From a neo-Marxist renaissance to political Right reactions and attempts to address complex globalising contexts, they present an expanding array of development approaches.

Fuelling this creativity, however, is a 'development fatigue' as First World techniques run afoul in Third World realities.[404] Added to this are Cold War coups and conflicts, the end of the Bretton Woods system, oil crises, stagflation, New Left radicals, and Third World calls for a New International Economic Order. By the 1980s, old visions of development are just that; old visions, no more. Yet, while few elegies are offered for the passing of development economics or modernisation theory, the case differs with neo-Marxism.

Highlighting a *development impasse*—coined by David Booth's 1985 article, 'Marxism and development sociology: interpreting the impasse'—this bubbling field collapses under the weight of its own critiques.[405] Retraced here are three factions: *(i)* Third World neo-Marxists, *(ii)* First World neo-Marxists, and *(iii)* First World *classical* Marxists. The ensuing deadlock marks a culmination of discontents. At its crux are teleological or *necessary* presumptions of a universal progress.[406] Hidden within the fundamental categories framing Marxist analyses, they render its theories unable to cope with outside realities.

---

[404] Hettne, *Development theory,* pp. 9-11.

[405] D. Booth. 'Marxism and development sociology: interpreting the impasse', *World Development* 13.7 (1985): 761-87. From Ibid., p. 761: 'There is an increasing sense that the 'new' Marxist-influenced development sociology which emerged in the early 1970s has reached some kind of impasse.' See also S. Corbridge, *Capitalist world development: a critique of radical development geography* (Totowa, NJ: Rowan & Littlefield, 1986).

[406] From Booth, 'Marxism and development', p. 775: 'The interest in discovering a 'deeper'—effectively more teleological—set of reasons for the way the world is, is what lies behind the persistence in analyzing development problems in certain kinds of ways even when they can be explained well or better in other terms.'

This impasse marks an inflection point in the trajectory and career prospects of neo-Marxist development theory (and its theor*ists*). To be clear, it does not emerge overnight. Early discontents are noted by the late 1970s, with Hettne's 1982 SAREC report containing a chapter on 'The rise and fall of dependency theory' (entitled 'The breakthrough of the dependence paradigm' in Hettne's 1978 report).[407] By 1984, Blomström and Hettne note that 'Judging from the current debate in development theory, the demise of the dependency school has left an awkward theoretical vacuum'.[408] In light of these surroundings, Booth's seminal 1985 article marks more a denouement than a sudden surprise. It would similarly goes that the implosion of Marxist theory well predates the fall of the Berlin Wall.[409] From the standpoint of post-1968 radical scholars, their Berlin Wall had already fallen by the mid-1980s, dismantled by their very own. It is somewhat ironic (or perhaps telling), in hindsight, to note the largely absent Second World in these debates.[410]

Two causal relations are then derived from these narratives. *First* is the social nature of development knowledge, whether couched in historical materialism (Larrain), intellectual history (Hettne), the sociology of knowledge (Preston), or the philosophy of science (Somjee). Underlying them is a basic notion that ideas are shaped by their surrounding social contexts—no matter how scientific/technical they purport to be. *Second* is an ensuing politics manifest in development theory and the university. Preston thus highlights a New Left steering views of the Third World, which Larrain points to in European Marxist critiques of Latin American dependency. The New Left and its 'generation of 1968' may entail a political movement, but

---

Also from Ibid., p. 777: 'Development sociology does not need to be purged wholesale of questions and lower-order concepts derived from Marx, but specifically of abstract entities conceived of having 'necessary effects inscribed in their structure' or as being endowed with the capacity to shape socio-economic relations in accordance with their 'needs.' Curiosity about why the world is the way that it is, and how it may be changed, must be freed not from Marxism but from Marxism's ulterior interests in proving that within given limits the world *has* to be the way that it is.'

[407] Hettne, 'Current issues', p. 16; Hettne, 'Development theory', p. 39. See also C. Leys, 'Underdevelopment and dependency: critical notes.' *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 7.1 (1977), 92-107, p. 92: 'It is becoming clear that underdevelopment and dependency theory is no longer serviceable and must now be transcended.'

In A.G. Frank, 'Crisis of ideology and ideology of crisis', in *Dynamics of global crisis,* eds. Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andrew Gunder Frank, and Immanuel Wallerstein, 109-166 (New York: Monthly Review, 1982), p. 135: 'the usefulness of structuralist, dependence, and new dependence theories of underdevelopment as guides to policy seems to have been undermined by the world crisis of the 1970's. *[...]* the Achilles' heel of these conceptions of dependence (or these dependent conceptions), has always been the implicit and sometimes explicit notion of some sort of "independent" alternative for the Third World. This theoretical alternative never existed in fact, certainly not on the "noncapitalist" path *[...]* and now apparently not even through "socialist revolutions" as we have known them. The new crisis of real world development now renders our partial development and parochial dependence theories, as well as their related apparent policy solutions, invalid and inapplicable.'

[408] M. Blomström and B. Hettne, *Development theory in transition: the dependency debate and beyond: Third World responses* (London: Zed Books, 1984), p. 163.

[409] The Berlin Wall and end of the Cold War goes unmentioned in the three later histories. Indeed, the fall of the Berlin Wall is cited as one of the (three) reasons motivating Hettne's second edition in 1995. See B. Hettne, *Development theory and the three worlds: towards an international political economy of development* (Essex: Longman Scientific & Technical, 1995), pp. xi-xii.

[410] Hettne offers the most concerted coverage of Second World development of these works, though Larrain also addresses precedents in Soviet Marxism-Leninism at length.

it manifests here in distinctly academic form.[411] Added to this is Hettne's chronic Eurocentrism in development theory, producing deeply-engrained barriers faced by Somjee's expat scholars in development's Western academic bases.

Three moral lessons are then derived from these causal relations. *First* is the need to treat development as a particular and not an essential, objective, or universal notion. This slide towards generality and subsequent loss of specificity undermines development, from its early technical formulations to its Marxist impasse and returning Right's neoliberal forms. As opened by Hettne, 'My intention *[...]* is not to propose new definitions but merely to stress one important point: *There can be no fixed and final definition of development, only suggestions of what development should imply in particular contexts*'.[412] The lure of objective science is what drives, not dispels, development's politics. Its Eurocentric categories, histories, and aims hold asymmetric power over Third World trajectories. Development is hence neither constant nor essential so much as it is political. Social science is not a cure, but a source of its players and problems. Producing an intellectual dependency, Cold War power relations are mirrored here in the Third World approaches overshadowed by First World methods and goals.

Second is the merit still held by context-specific forms of Marxist theory, in light of its gross collapse. The politics of development thought and fall of a major alternative endangers non-Western theories and realities. Preston thus upholds the model of Cardoso and Faletto's political economy, while Larrain recovers other Latin American accounts being thrown out with Marx's teleological bathwater. Hettne and Somjee also come to the defence of past Latin American contributions, but add further views regarding Western social science. Highlighting the greater potential of development studies, it entails a *sacrificial* role as a catalyst (Hettne) towards a global form of social science. And while Somjee is more likely to cast Western social science as catastrophic more than catalytic, he arrives at similar ends in a more globally-inclusive development theory.[413] Hettne's push for a 'unified historical social science' and

---

[411] Blomström and Hettne, *Development theory,* p. 197: ''This book is not the right vehicle for an analysis of the generation of 1968—the "new left". However, this new left might, without exaggeration, be said to have influenced the political climate also in the industrialized countries during the latter part of the 1960s—an influence that is still prevalent in various, often abstrue, political forms. In our opinion, the dependency school should be seen as an important part of our modern intellectual history, whose significance has been particularly strongly felt in the social sciences.'

And from Ibid., p. 198: 'Focusing on the university milieu, we find that the dependency approach served as an effective weapon in the hands of younger, more radical scholars demanding jobs and more influence, cheered on by a growing number of students with an increasingly uncertain futrue. Paradigm changes seem to imply both power struggles and power shifts—even at the unveristy level. Thus, the underlying current of academic conflicts, intrigues and power struggle must also be seen in relation to the general political climate.'

[412] Italics in original; see Hettne, *Development theory,* p. 2.

[413] Somjee, *Development theory,* pp. 41-2: 'Regardless of the future of a more inclusive approach to development studies, the disciplinary and segmented approaches, which serve their own purpose, are likely to continue unabated. This is because the very notion of scholarly excellence, and of science, is tied up with specialisation, and the knowing of more and more about the less and less. Thus the disciplines which have lived in isolation from one another, and developed their own independent 'scientific' character, are not going to give up what they are used to even when applied to development studies, the demands of which on our cognitive efforts, as we saw earlier, are different.'

Ibid., pp. 2-3: 'As a rule, the social sciences respond to any new area in which they take interest, as their 'new field', and depending upon the extent of interest in it among the scholarly community, the 'new

Somjee's push for 'ethnodevelopment' are hence closely aligned—despite more obvious disagreements (e.g. the redeemability of Western social science) and semantic differences.[414] As always, the devil is in the details, but they point to the possibility of progress in development knowledge, itself.

5.2 From historical narratives to the history OF these narratives

A final set of findings derive from a *historiographical* record placing each history into historical context, itself. For one, it highlights the interdisciplinary remit of development's intellectual history. The formal training of their authors in economics, politics, and sociology evidences the wide reach of development's theories (see Table 6). Compounding this are their international and intergenerational contexts.

Author	Year	University	Subject	Dissertation Title
P.W. Preston	1981	Univ. Leeds	Sociology	An analytical and historical survey of theories of development in the period 1945-1975
Björn Hettne	1978	Univ. Göteborg	Economic history	The political economy of indirect rule: Mysore, 1881-1947
Jorge Larrain	1977	Univ. Sussex	Sociology	The concept of ideology: some theoretical and methodological questions
A.H. Somjee	1955	LSE	Political science	Some methodological aspects of John Dewey's political philosophy

Table 6. PhD backgrounds of authors in the late Cold War historiography

Larrain's focus on Latin American dependency is explicitly framed as a Chilean scholar, and indeed the 1989 history was partly written on study leave at the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) in Chile.[415] Coming to the UK in the 1970s for a PhD at the University of Sussex under eminent Marxist sociologist T.B. Bottomore, the 1989 history finds Larrain serving as director of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham—home to Stuart Hall and a major hub for the British New Left.[416]

---

field' may then become a disciplinary sub-field. Excursions into sub-fields, initially, almost always take place with the help of the existing theoretical resources of the discipline, resulting in an annexation of the new territory into the existing one. That is what has happened to development studies.'

[414] Hettne, *Development theory,* p. xi.

[415] Larrain, *Development theory,* p. ix.

[416] J. Larrain, 'The concept of ideology: some theoretical and methodological questions', unpublished PhD thesis, University of Sussex (1977). Larrain also completed a masters degree at the University of Sussex, following an undergraduate in sociology at *Pontificia Universidad Católica* in Chile.

For Larrain's departmental contexts, see N. Shulman, 'Conditions of their own making: an intellectual history of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham', *Canadian Journal of Communication* 18:1 (1993), 51-73.

Somjee also comes to the UK for a PhD, but in the 1950s. Taught by N.C. Chatterjee in India, Somjee arrives in the wake of independence to study at the LSE.[417] Slated to study under British Labour Party leader Harold Laski, Laski's sudden passing leaves Somjee under the tutelage of Michael Oakeshott and others, including Karl Popper.[418] Hired by T.B. Bottomore to teach at the LSE and then in 1965 at Simon Fraser University, Somjee lands in a key hub of radical activity in Canada, akin to a 1960s Berkeley in the US.[419] Witness to Western New Left radicalism (the 'PSA affair') and his own Third World realities, Somjee works to recast development politics in non-Western and especially Indian perspectives.[420]

India also draws Hettne from Sweden into the development fray. Doing a PhD relatively later in life, Hettne (born 1939) traces its origins to travels as a student in India in 1961.[421] A grant from the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) in 1971 and ensuing PhD in 1978 is soon followed by appointment as head of the department of peace and conflict research at the University of Göteborg.[422] Also publishing on the history of Swedish economic thought and a pioneer of peace research in Sweden, Hettne is no stranger to the intellectual diversity to be found beyond Anglo-American contexts—notably within Europe, itself.[423]

---

[417] The 1991 history, for example, is dedicated to N.C. Chatterji (Somjee's teacher during a 1940s masters at Indore Christian College), 'who stimulated an interest in social and political theory in a generation of students and made them aware of the work to be done before it can claim to be universally valid'. See dedication to Somjee, *Development theory*, (no page number); A.H. Somjee, 'Remembering S.P. Varma and N.C. Chatterjee', India of the Past (2012) [http://www.indiaofthepast.org/images/pdf/somjee/spvarma.pdf, accessed 9 October 2017].

[418] Somjee notes graduate seminars under Karl Popper, who figures notably in Somjee's 1991 history; see Somjee, *Development theory,* pp. xiii-xiv, 135-6; Somjee, 'Remembering'; Canadian friends of LSE, 'Alumni Reflections', LSE Alumni Association (2015) [http://www.cflse.com/2015/11/22/alumni-reflections, accessed 22 April 2018].

[419] Somjee, for example, speak of the 'utopian' visions of its early faculty; see H.J.M. Johnston, *Radical campus: the making of Simon Fraser University* (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 2005)*,* p. 226.

[420] Examples include A.H. Somjee, 'Problems confronted in the rejuvenation of political theory', *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 21:2 (1960), 130-42; A.H. Somjee, *Democracy and political change in village India: a case study* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1971); A.H. Somjee, 'Ethnocentricity and value ambiguity in political development studies', *Political Studies* 26:2 (1978), 256-61; A.H. Somjee, *Parallels and actuals of political development* (London: Macmillan, 1986).

[421] From Hettne, *The political economy,* p. 3: 'My first experience of Mysore (or Karnataka, as the State is called today) goes back to 1961 when as a confused student 1 went about 'discovering' India and then came to develop a special liking for Mysore, "the many-splendoured state" as the tourist brochure put it. My later academic studies in political. science, economic history and social anthropology all centred on India and when in 1971 I received a grant from the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) to undertake fieldwork in India my choice naturally was Mysore.'

[422] See back cover of Hettne, *The political economy*. From N.P. Gleditsch, 'Peace research and international relations in Scandinavia. From enduring rivalry to stable peace?', in *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research*, eds. Stefano Guzzini, Dietrich Jung, 15-26 (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 21:

'the government found a 'solution' that conceded a point to the peace research community while not running too directly counter to the autonomy of the university: it cancelled the original position in Uppsala and reverted to the idea of having two positions in peace research, one in Uppssala (with an orientation towards war and disarmament) and one in Gothenburg (with an orientation towards development and the environment). Kjell Goldman refused to apply and the field was open to two of the original three Swedish peace research entrepreneurs. In 1985 Peter Wallensteen and Björn Hettne assumed the chairs in Uppsala and Gothenburg respectively.'

[423] See B. Hettne, *Ekonomisk historia i Sverige: en översikt av institutionell utveckling, forskningsinriktning och vetenskaplig produktion* [Economic history in Sweden: an overview of institutional development, research focus, and scientific production] (Lunds universitets historiska institution, 1980).

Preston's 1981 PhD and ensuing 1982 history also grapples with the contentious role of Western scholars exploring what is, for them, a new Third World frontier.[424] The only native British scholar in the sample, Preston does a PhD at the University of Leeds under (now disavowed) Marxist sociologist and noted Koreanist Aidan Foster-Carter.[425] Finding, like Hettne, possible inspiration in the precedents of classical social science, Preston's historical analysis is also highly attuned to the politically laden content of Western development theories. Indeed, Preston departs the UK for continental Europe and Asia (Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan) soon after the PhD, becoming a development expatriate in his own right before ultimately returning to the University of Birmingham in the 1990s.[426]

Combined, these authors span two generations of interdisciplinary and international scholars, who witness first-hand the rise of Third World development and its volatile political and intellectual debates. Their histories are very much *lived* histories. Recovered not from traces in the archives, they entail their own attempts to reconcile development in theory with the development they know in reality. As such, their histories are not so much 'professional' histories so much as histories written from eye-level, so to speak. Yet, they remain, in many regards, more qualified than academic historians to speak on matters in development's history. Having been witness to key events and actors, they are not restricted to the partial records and implicit sample set biases manifesting in the archives. Of course, this bears a double-edged sword, absent of the detachment or outside perspective that come with the distance of time. But as made clear in their motivations and closing remarks, these histories are attempts to *make sense of* development amidst its dynamism and disarray by the 1980s.[427]

Further, while their histories remain critical of Western social science and its positivist forms (both Left and Right), their authors' own locations offer a glimmer of hope. Namely, this international cast is primarily based in Western universities—notably in the UK. Yet their critiques come to fruition despite—or perhaps due to—their locations in social science and the Western academy. Even more, these are not histories written by 'nobodies', for lack of a better term. Preston's supervisor, Foster-Carter, is one of the most prominent British contributors to Marxist dependency debates.[428] Hettne is also head of department and maintains ties with not

---

[424] Ibid., pp. 224-6.

[425] Preston, 'An analytical and historical survey'. Foster-Carter is listed as 'disavowed' due to an explicit renunciation of former Marxist views; see A. Foster-Carter, 'Beliefs', Aidanfc.net [http:// www.ai-danfc.net/beliefs.html, accessed 14 January 2019].

[426] See the list in Acknowledgements of P.W. Preston, *Singapore in the global system: relationship, structure and change* (London: Routledge, 2007): 'I first travelled to Singapore in 1982. It was my first experience of living and working outside of England. It was a delight. Over the years it has been my good fortune to be able to live and work in several other countries in Asia and Europe *[...]*.'

[427] Indeed, Preston publishes a lesser-known book in 1986 entitled *Making sense of development: an introduction to classical and contemporary theories of development and their application to Southeast Asia* (London: Routeldge, 1986).

[428] Some of the more influential works include A. Foster-Carter, 'Neo-Marxist approaches to development and underdevelopment', *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 3.1 (1973): 7-33; A. Foster-Carter, 'From Rostow to Gunder Frank: conflicting paradigms in the analysis of underdevelopment', *World*

only academia, but also to the Swedish policy space. Larrain, an eminent Chilean sociologist and scholar of Marxist ideology in his own right, falls under the academic genealogy or family tree of Bottomore—an eminent British Marxist scholar and interlocutor of Marx's original works.[429] Finally, Somjee, also taken under Bottomore's wing, it very much tied to the political and intellectual elite in the UK (e.g. Laski, Oakeshott, Popper) and India (e.g. Chatterjee).

Despite this limited sample, this historiographical record thus renders a loose academic network of Western (notably British) universities and more cosmopolitan scholars. Writing in the 1970s and 80s, their histories reflect their own experiences of Cold War development since the 1950s (Somjee), 60s (Hettne), and 70s (Larrain, Preston). Their prominent locations and roles during the Cold War raise only further questions about why their works remain in relative obscurity in the present.

In classifying these histories, the label of Marxist historiography may come to mind. In a sense, the label is not be entirely unwarranted, given the marked influence of British Marxist sociology both *in* and *on* these narratives. However, it yet seems unjust to cast their works as Marxist in light of present critiques of New Left theories. Despite what might be characterised in present British contexts as broadly left-of-centre aims (even more-so in the US), its affiliation would be better described as a sort of non-doctrinal or heterodox Marxism. In particular, their ubiquitous warnings of an overbearing tendency of Western Marxists (neo- *and* classical) to co-opt and bury non-Western perspectives comes to mind. This may hold all the more true in the present post-Cold War era, where the Marxist label is even more likely to distort if not discredit their contributions.

This late Cold War historiography is hence labelled a *pro-Third World historiography* instead. In addition to a positive stance on the value of Third World theories and realities, they bear an *anti-positivist* stance against both New Left and neoliberal social sciences. From a Western perspective, it might thus be perceived as an anti-establishment, populist, or subaltern historiography. Its calls for decentering development's worldviews render a prescient call for a more global development historiography—an orientation that has notably (re)gained traction only in recent decades in both the fields of history and development studies.

Development 4.3 (1976): 167-80; A. Foster-Carter, 'The modes of production controversy', *New Left Review* 107.1 (1978): 47-78.

[429] Larrain is also well known for *The concept of ideology* (London: Routledge, 1979). Larrain also acknowledges support from Anthony Gidden in *Development theory,* p. ix: 'I owe special thanks to Professor Anthony Giddens for his early comments and suggestions on the first outline of the book, for his valuable editorial advice and for his constant encouragement.'

6. The late Cold War historiography in bigger picture

This Cold War historiography thus opens a sort of time capsule into development studies' Cold War contexts, from its Eurocentric and interwar precedents to an outspoken generation of '68 and the ensuing uncertainties of the 1970s and 80s destabilising politics across the Cold War's three worlds.

Now returning to the present, what sort of second-order findings can be derived from this historiography in regard to its larger contexts in development studies? Reintroducing some of the more recent historiography to be found, this section highlights key contributions and limits faced within development studies. In addition to promoting reflection in development studies, it may also help outside historians understand what to make of this possibly foreign or unfamiliar field.

6.1 Contributions from development studies

Two overarching contributions can subsequently be highlighted in the development studies historiography. The first lies in its sheer diversity of historical narratives. Here, it may be worth recalling a poem by Sir Richard Francis Burton—cited by Kwame Anthony Appiah—on the plurality of truths:

‘All Faith is false, all Faith is true: Truth is the shattered mirror strown

In myriad bits; while each believes his little bit the whole to own.’[430]

If historical truth follows Burton's analogy of a shattered mirror in its plural reflections, then the development studies historiography offers a wealth of said mirror shards. Each narrative here offers its own angle or view of development's history, which—when viewed together— enable a multifaceted picture of the whole. This particularly stems from its diverse standpoints in time and space (disciplinary and geographical). Figure 2 illustrates some of this diversity in periodisations to be found across both Cold War and post-Cold War works. The temporal range here spans anywhere from seven decades (e.g. Williams) to seven centuries or more.[431] In the latter, one can find the idea of progress (Preston, Rist), Latin American theological ideas of development (Cowen and Shenton), and non-Western empires in world trade during a long sixteenth century (Halperin).[432]

To this, one can add the range of actors or units of analysis populating these periods. On the more granular end are the inter- and intra-group relations between theoretical schools

---

[430] Citing R.F. Burton, *The kasîdah of Hâjî Abdû El-Yezdî* (1880), from K.A. Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), p. 5.

[431] Williams, International developmen.t

[432] Cowen and Shenton, *Doctrines;* Halperin, *Re-envisioning global development*; Preston, *Theories*; Rist, *The history.*

Figure 2. *Sample periodisations for structuring the history of international development*

 (e.g. in classical political economy, development economics, neo-Marxism) and tied policy regimes (e.g. Latin American import substitution, Western neoliberalism). One the other end are larger units of analysis treating development as a wholesale discourse (e.g. Escobar, Ziai), international system (e.g. McMichael, Williams), or capitalist phases (e.g. Larrain, Halperin).

Contrary to 'pure' scholarship (to the extent that pure detachment is possible), these narratives further remain strongly coloured by their respective contexts. On one hand, this entails clear hazards for maintaining a grounded and self-critical historiography. In this regard, Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao's call for greater engagement with academic history gains added merit here.[433] A more disciplined and reflective use of historical methods may help mitigate the risk of arriving at more expeditious and polemical views.

On the other hand, the explicit normative aims of many of these works offer a silver lining; for each offers a sort of time capsule into their originating space and time. Dating back to the 1970s–80s, they preserve past contexts surrounding development theories in Western

---

[433] Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao, 'How and why'.

social science and Cold War geopolitics. Of particular note are the rise of Third Worldism and Cold World volatility (e.g. post-1968 Western radicalism, emerging market debt crises and structural adjustment, global interdependencies, and the 1980s swing to a neoliberal Right). If the Third World is commonly presented as battlegrounds for the Cold War's ideological war, then this historiography preserves development theory as a site for the proxy wars fought between competing political camps in the intellectual space of the university.[434]

Fought across the intellectual terrain of economics, politics, sociology, anthropology, and geography, these collective narratives juxtapose domestic and international politics with domestic and international academia. If US president Eisenhower noted a military-industrial complex driving politics and public policy, then this historiography exposes a tripartite relationship between geopolitics, international development, and Western social science. A sort of weaponisation of development knowledge, it relocates the university in political contexts. In the process, this historiography also reminds of a time when past strands of development studies (e.g. development sociology, political development, dependency theory) were highly visible and influential, unlike their faded forms today.

Consequently, these narratives unbury deeper structural aspects of development theory and practice that escape more superficial or narrow analyses. Proposed configurations in its intellectual politics vary, with narratives often staging development actors in some variation of good versus evil.[435] The cast of development antagonists, for example, includes capitalism, neoliberalism, the state, and Eurocentric social science (especially economics). Conversely, protagonists include local movements, sustainability, classical political economy, pluriversal studies, radical democracy, liberal international order, and traditional knowledge. Beyond the more controversial interpretations of development, however, remain key contributions in the link between development ideas and their surrounding realities. Echoing the aforementioned political contexts of development theory and practice, they shed light from multiple angles on the specificity of knowledge production to particular social contexts. This is what Larrain explicitly points as the social determination of knowledge, otherwise referenced in terms of the sociology of knowledge, Kuhnian paradigms, and the career of development studies.[436]

Findings on the *sociology* (or *sociality*) of development knowledge further extend into the *politics* of development knowledge. In light of the specificity of knowledge production, this entails the politics arising from the application of particular forms of development knowledge to foreign space and time. Thus, a common theme that arises across many of these

---

[434] Examples of the transnational ties found here include the deepening conflicts between US and Latin American development economists from the 1940s to the 1980s and the export of US styles of economics abroad (e.g. Pinochet's 'Chicago Boys', Suharto's 'Berkeley Mafia'). In domestic contexts, McCarthyism in the US is one prominent example of these ties between politics in the public sphere and politics in the intellectual sphere of academia or the university.

[435] To recall, works especially notable for their pronounced moralising tendencies include Escobar, *Encountering development;* Peet and Hartwick, *Theories;* and Rist, *The History.*

[436] Larrain, *Theories;* for the latter, see Preston, *Theories,* Rapley, *Understanding,* Hettne, *Thinking.*

works is the prevailing and continued Western or Eurocentric biases embedded within development theory, policy, and practice.[437] This offers an opposite but complementary perspective to parallel efforts from historians, who have tended to approach academia from more overt forms of politics (e.g. political elites, policy regimes).[438] In contrast, these narratives approach politics from the view of academic development scholars, where they offer a comparative advantage relative to their historian counterparts.

Beyond its wealth in substantive narratives, this key juncture between development's ideational and external sociopolitical realms thus stands as an important area illuminated by development studies' historiography. Their insider views preserve lived histories composed from eye-level, as opposed to being reconstructed from a greater distance (e.g. via archives).[439] While the development studies historiography thus stands guilty of hosting some hasty or expeditious examples of writing history, it preserves a wealth of past experiences and insights of value for outside historians, in spite of—and in some respects, *due to*—the biases that manifest in their narratives.

6.2 Limits of the development studies historiography

The base contribution of diverse historical facets in this development historiography is also a double-edged sword that bears inherent limitations in its analyses. While a positive view may emphasise its diversity, a more critical view could highlight its internal division and conflicts. Namely, the flip side of its rich diversity can be conversely described as a highly fragmented and at-times polemical historiography.

Intellectual diversity promotes understanding and problem-solving when there is some cooperation or, at the very least, communication across said diversity. Unfortunately, this is not always the case here. While these amassed works certainly render the *possibility* of transcending the siloed and conflicting efforts that populate their narratives, the reality of their present role is one more mirroring or extending these very conflicts into the historiographical realm. This carries the upside here of serving as an indirect historical record, themselves, of development's past visions of the better world. However, it comes with the sacrifice of history's diplomatic potential for promoting a shared or mutual understanding.

The result is a somewhat ironic if not tragic state, where the interdisciplinary and international battle lines drawn across these histories closely resonate with each other. They draw a common intellectual (and associated real-world) battlefield. The main features are by now familiar (e.g. European origins, concerted start in postwar contexts, New Left and Right, state

---

[437] A short list of examples includes Escobar, *Encountering development*; Halperin, *Re-envisioning*; Hettne, *Development*; Larrain, *Theories*; Leys, *The rise and fall*; Rapley, *Understanding*; Somjee, *Development*; Ziai, *Development*.

[438] For example, Gilman, *Mandarins*; Helleiner, *Forgotten foundations;* Immerwahr, *Thinking small.*

[439] The author credits this observation to a conversation with Raymond Apthorpe, with regards to past observations made by John Toye.

versus market). Yet, a closer look at their moral and political stances reveal their locations on opposing fronts of this multipolar battle. Whether espousing radical revolution (e.g. Escobar, Rist), moderate reforms (e.g. Preston, Hettne), or even a conservative stance (e.g. Williams), history becomes yet another tool or extension of real-world politics.

From a realist standpoint, this notion of a politicised historiography may not be an exception, but rather the norm.[440] To cite Ernest Renan, getting history wrong is an essential part of being a nation.[441] Just as these authors point to social theory as an instrument or tool for political purposes, so too does history fall under its remit. Notions of an objective history are only extensions of now-familiar arguments of an objective science—pure in theory but invariably political in reality. However, a greater awareness of these dangers entails a greater ability to combat or mediate them. That history (or social science or development) is political does not necessitate its wholesale abandonment. This argument—promoted by both positivists *and* their radical critics—are only sustainable in the rarefied atmospheres of their ivory towers. The politicised nature of this historiography may thus be inextricable, but inextricable does not mean unsalvageable, useless, or irredeemable.

Case in point, one basic limitation that could feasibly be overcome is a lack of awareness of development's historiography, itself. The very notions of a subject or field known as the 'intellectual history of development' or 'historiography of development' do not yet exist—thus enabling scholars to rewrite development's history as deemed fit. As Hettne writes in his closing 1990 lines, 'History is already being rewritten by those who for the time being enjoy the monopoly of definition'.[442] Greater awareness of a prior literature, here, would at least temper overly expeditious or opportunistic attempts to abuse or misuse history. At the very least, the base recognition of a pre-existing corpus would reduce the inefficiencies that come with having to rediscover its sources and rewrite its past events over and over again.

---

[440] This is certainly the norm for the author, given continuing Korean, Japanese, and broader East Asian historiographical conflicts.

[441] From E. Renan, 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?' *{What is a nation?]*, conférence faite en Sorbonne, le 11 Mars 1882 (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1882), p. 7-8: 'L'oubli, et je dirai même l'erreur historique, sont un facteur essentiel de la création d'une nation, et c'est ainsi que le progrès des études historiques est souvent pour la nationalité un danger.'

[*Forgetfulness, and even historical error, are an essential element in the creation of a nation, and it is thus the progress of historical studies that is often for the nation a threat.* (translated by PhD author)]

[442] Hettne, *Development theory,* p. 251.

7. Conclusion: a historiographical turn?

This study has reassembled a sizeable corpus of past works in attempt to assess the presently accumulated development historiography. In doing so, it attempts to build greater awareness of past and present efforts both within development studies and with the neighbouring (and increasingly overlapping) field of history.

In light of the fragmented and polemical nature of the resulting historiography, however, it could be considered fortunate if its authors—whether in development studies or in history— ever collide. The present state is rather one akin to ships passing in the night; a fear posited in essay one that, at least in the present historiography, very much comes to life. Thus echoing a call for greater historiographical awareness and cross-disciplinary engagement (e.g. Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao; Park), this study offers a sort of map of past and present efforts in time and space (geographical, disciplinary). For development scholars, it offers a larger map of their own historical narratives; diverse swathes of which continue to go unseen. Functioning as a sort of look in the mirror, it enables reflections upon not only development's history, but the many ways in which its past has been written in service of particular futures; whether Marxist, neoliberal, or post-developmental in flavour.

For historians, the existence of this sizeable body of prior works is a boon for their own investigations. They offer a wealth of primary sources—both in their bibliographies and as a set of 'biographies of a subject' more than as rigorous secondary sources.[443] Reframing expectations as such allows the historian a glimpse into several standpoints within development's multifaceted intellectual history. It may also offer substantial critiques and revisions of present historiographical narratives within the field of history, itself.[444] It also emphasises the value of historiographical analyses, which often remain looked down upon or overlooked within the field of history for not being 'proper' archival-based research. But as remarked by another development historian, David Ekbladh, historiographical work 'has potential [to] reframe a whole field'.[445] Applicable in this case to both history and in development studies, the two fields stand to gain much from greater cross-disciplinary fertilisation between the two.

The potential to be found within historiographical research is only emphasised by the larger empirical terrain that still remains. As outlined in the historical turn and ensuing post-Cold War historiography, there remains significant grounds upon which to work towards a deeper understanding of development. As proposed within the field of history by Hodge, much work remains to be done for 'a truly global and transnational history of development, one that brings together the literature on late colonialism and decolonization with the new international

---

[443] As personified in Preston's 'career of development studies' and Meier's 'biography of a subject'; Preston, *Theories of development;* Meier, *Biography of a subject.*

[444] See, for example, Hodge, *Writing the history of* development (part 1); Hodge, *Writing the history of development (part 2).*

[445] D. Ekbladh, 'The stages of development's history?', *Humanity*, Joseph Hodge Roundtable, 30 April 2016 [http://humanityjournal.org/blog/the-stages-of-developments-history].

history of the Cold War, and that offers a more diverse, refined, and historically-informed reading of international development'.[446]

Extending upon these lines, this study closes with a call for a **historiographical turn** in development studies to promote a more critical understanding of not only development's history, but the very way in which it is interpreted and used—both within development studies and beyond. This includes the potential control and abuse of development's history by those outside of developments studies itself. History, after all, is not immune to the same waves of normativity and politics that pervades this historiography's observed development theories and its social sciences. Towards this end, two opportunities are highlighted here for bringing about a historiographical turn within development studies.

Bridging across past and present works

The first opportunity lies in bridging across development's interdisciplinary and international divides. The rich diversity in historiographical accounts gathered here (including in the Appendices) offer little value if absent of a cross-communication or cross-pollination of results. This is put into further relief when considering that the sample here can be seen as but one of six pockets of work that can be highlighted in development's broader historiography.

A *second pocket* lies in the post-Cold War historiography identified here. Though much better known within development studies today relative to their late Cold War counterparts, a closer examination of their own narratives and surrounding contexts are warranted. Indeed, much of the groundwork in identification and segmentation of these newer works has been done in the historiographical periodisation of Section 3. Here, two sets of histories can be identified; one in the burst of publication activity centred on 1995–1997 (Table 7) and another on the recent publications and new scholars that follow from 1990 onwards (Table 8).

A *third pocket* lies in the burgeoning works coming from the aforementioned historians—particularly, since the 2000s (see Appendix A3). Some of these are already well-known and well-received in development studies (e.g. Gilman's *Mandarins of the Future*), but the pace of recent contributions (e.g. Engerman, Immerwahr, Macekura) means that much has likely yet to make its way over to development audiences.[447]

A fourth pocket lies in the large body of works that emerged from the United Nations Intellectual History Project (UNIHP), which ran from 1999 to 2010. This encompasses 17 volumes and 79 in-depth interviews (all transcribed) with key figures in UN history. Though centred on the UN, it adds a wealth of historical data on development's intellectual history and

---

[446] Hodge, 'Writing (part 1)', p. 430.

[447] Examples include D.C. Engerman, *Modernization from the other shore: American intellectuals and the romance of Russian development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); D. Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: the United States and the lure of community development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); S.J. Macekura, *Of limits and growth: the rise of global sustainable development in the twentieth century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

Year	Title	Author(s)
1997	Development and disorder: a history of the Third World since 1945	Mike Mason
1997	The history of development: from Western origins to global faith	Gilbert Rist
	"[same title as above]" (5nd ed., 2019)	
	"[same title as above]" (4nd ed., 2014)	
	"[same title as above]" (3nd ed., 2008)	
	"[same title as above]" (2nd ed., 2002)	
	Le développement: histoire d'une croyance occidentale (1996, Rist)	
1996	Development and social change: a global perspective	Philip McMichael
	"[same title as above]" (6nd ed., 2017)	
	"[same title as above]" (5nd ed., 2012)	
	"[same title as above]" (4nd ed., 2008)	
	"[same title as above]" (3nd ed., 2004)	
	"[same title as above]" (2nd ed., 2000)	
1996	Development theory: an introduction	P.W. Preston
1996	Doctrines of development	M.P. Cowen and R.W. Shenton
1996	The rise and fall of development theory	Colin Leys
1996	Understanding development: theory and practice in the Third World	John Rapley
	"[same title as above]" (3nd ed., 2007)	
	"[same title as above]" (2nd ed., 2002)	
1995	Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World	Arturo Escobar
	"[same title as above]" (2nd ed., 2012)	
	Power and visibility: the invention and management of development in the Third World (1987, Escobar)	

Table 7. Sampled works in the historical turn *(precursors and new editions in italics)*

Year	Title	Author(s)
2016	Development discourse and global history: from colonialism to the Sustainable Development Goals	Aram Ziai
	Entwicklung als Ideologie? Das klassische Entwicklungsparadigma und die Post-Development-Kritik (2004, A. Ziai)	
2013	Re-envisioning global development: a horizontal perspective	Sandra Halperin
2012	International development and global politics: history, theory and practice	David Williams
2009	Thinking about development	B. Hettne
2007	Challenging global inequality: development thoery and practice in the 21st century	Alastiar Greig,
	Sociology and development: theories, policies and practices (1990, D. Hulme and M. Turner)	David Hulme, Mark Turner
2005	Theories and practices of development	Katie Willis
	"[same title as above]" (2nd ed., Willis, 2011)	
2001	Development theory: deconstructions/reconstructions	J.N. Pieterse
	Development theory: deconstructions/reconstructions (2nd ed., 2001)	
1999	Theories of development: contentions, arguments, alternatives	Richard Peet and
	"[same title as above]"(3rd. ed., 2015)	Elaine Hartwick
	"[same title as above]"(2rd. ed., 2009)	
	Global capitalism: theories of societal development (1991, R. Peet)	

Table 8. Sampled works in the post-Cold War historiography *(precursors and new editions in italics)*

its surrounding politics, which warrant more concerted examination and deeper integration into development's historiographical record.

A *fifth pocket* lies in recovering insights from what can arguably be seen as a prior historical turn in development studies in the 1970s and 80s. Circumstances here include the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the oil crisis and US withdrawal from the Vietnam War in 1973, and the call for a new international economic order (NIEO) in 1974. One strand can be found on the demise of development economics (e.g. Seers, Hirschman, Lal).[448] To these, we add the World Banks' valuable two-volume series on *Pioneers in Development* by Seers and Meier.[449] Beyond economics lies works in the seemingly forgotten field of political development (e.g. Gendzier, Huntington, Packenham, White, Wood).[450]

Finally, the *sixth pocket* is somewhat deceptive, as it entails less a pocket and more a portal into further worlds. Echoing Arndt (1987), we point to the international bridges that need to be laid in referencing non-Western and non-Anglophone historiographies. As argued by many in this study's sample, international development is often guilty of relying on an international history that largely reflects Western historical worldviews and experiences. It only follows, then, that a more inclusive and accurate global historiography requires the inclusion of missing historical perspectives. Doing so may carry the added benefit of addressing some of the whitespaces in development's historiography, detailed below.

Whitespaces in development historiography

A second opportunity thus lies in the whitespaces or blindspots observed in historiographical coverage. Three areas, in particular, can be spotlighted here. One is the conspicuous absence of Soviet and Third World development thought. Indeed, one might wonder whether significant or novel forms of Soviet or Third World development thought had even existed. However, the notable exception of Latin America points to the possibility of otherwise, in addition to scattered mentions of the Bandung Conference, Tanzanian *ujamaa*, or the NIEO. Fortunately, this is an area that has attracted increasing attention from historians—most notably Engerman and Iandolo.[451] However, a recovery of views from past development literature—in addition

---

[449] D. Seers and G.M. Meier, *Pioneers in development* (World Bank, 1984); G.M. Meier, *Pioneers in development: second series* (World Bank, 1987).

[449] D. Seers and G.M. Meier, *Pioneers in development* (World Bank, 1984); G.M. Meier, *Pioneers in development: second series* (World Bank, 1987).

[450] See I. Gendzier, *Managing political change: social scientists and the Third World* (Boulder: Westview, 1985); S.P. Huntington, 'The change to change: modernization, development, and politics', *Comparative politics* 3.3 (1971): 283-322; S.P. Huntington, 'One soul at a time: political science and political reform', *American Political Science Review* 82.1 (1988): 3-10; R. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: political development ideas in foreign aid and social science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); J. White, *The politics of foreign aid* (London: Bodley Head, 1974); A. Wood, *From Marshall Plan to debt crisis: foreign aid and development choices in the world economy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

[451] Engerman, *Modernization; D.C. Engerman, Know your enemy: The rise and fall of America's Soviet experts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); A. Iandolo, 'The rise and fall of the "Soviet model of development" in West Africa, 1957–64', *Cold War History* 12.4 (2012), 683-704; A. Iandolo, 'Imbalance of power: the Soviet Union and the Congo crisis, 1960–1961', *Journal of Cold War Studies*

to the insights contributed by historians—have yet to find their way in the historiographical record examined thus far.

A second absence is in in-depth coverage of pre-Cold War historical contexts. While almost all of the sampled works acknowledge the significance of pre-1945 contexts, only six out of 20 address the period in depth. However, they point to the insights to be gained from looking further back, whether in Halperin's *longue durée* views or Cowen and Shenton's ideas from Latin American theology and British Fabianism. Added to this are outside works from beyond development studies, which also reassess or reintegrate this historiographical divide between pre- and post-1945 (i.e. the divide between 'modern' and 'contemporary' history).[452]

A final absence can be found amidst not the historical subjects, but rather amidst development studies' *de facto* historians, themselves. Namely, this sample attests to the influence of the author's background on their consequent narratives. For example, Larrain provides the sample's most nuanced analysis of Latin American dependency theory, while Somjee explicitly addresses the intellectual contributions of 'development expatriates'. However, authors based outside of Western academia remain largely absent. There are notable reasons for why this may be (e.g. language selection biases, historical precedents). However, this risks what Corinna Unger has referred to as a 'kind of methodological nationalism' in development's historiography.[453] With that said, the open-minded orientation evidenced in this study's historiography would seem to suggest that the inclusion of more representative viewpoints is something that would be not only necessary, but also most welcomed.

Closing remarks

Altogether, a historiographical turn may enable more effective theories and greater political agency for those attempting to realise development. While this historiography unveils the many constraints faced by developing countries (including their scholars), greater knowledge of said constraints would also enable more effective ways to play the development game. This not to justify the present state of affairs, but rather to highlight the consequent value of a pragmatic response (i.e. playing the development game) when attempting reforms or change. Or if preferring post-structuralist terms, a better awareness of development's historiography promotes a more 'polyvalent' use of the development discourse, to borrow from Ziai.[454] Thus, development may entail a history of oppression, but a deeper understanding of its various

---

16.2 (2014), 32-55; A. Iandolo, 'Beyond the shoe: rethinking Khrushchev at the fifteenth session of the United Nations general assembly', *Diplomatic History* 41.1 (2017), 128-54.

[452] See, for example, E. Helleiner, *Forgotten foundations of Bretton Woods: international development and the making of the postwar order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); D. Plesch, *America, Hitler and the UN* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).

[453] C.R. Unger, 'Comment on Joseph Hodge, on the historiography of development (part I and II)', *Humanity,* Joseph Hodge Roundtable, 28 April 2016 [http://humanityjournal.org/blog/comment-on-joseph-hodge-on-the-historiography-of-development-part-i-and-ii].

[454] Ziai, *Development discourses.*

forms and tactics also offers a source of empowerment. As more eloquently put by the late UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld: *'We are not permitted to choose the frame of our destiny. But what we put into it is ours'.*[455]

This call for a historiographical turn, then, entails an acknowledgement and embrace of development's inescapable politics—and of history's role in mediating it. The examples here tell not only histories of development's politics, but also the politics of development's history. Greater historiographical awareness promoted in the suggested turn cannot ensure against future abuses or development failures. When it comes to human society, it would seem unwise to suggest that such solutions or political cures even exist. 'Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made,' as Isaiah Berlin often quotes, citing Kant.[456]

However, amidst present uncertainties, what a more diplomatic and inclusive historiography *can* do is to illuminate politics and its unfolding possibilities for progress. Doing so requires a restoration of its presently missing voices and forgotten worlds. Their past and present visions of the future are instrumental in making a proverbial 'learning from history' in development possible. Otherwise, as Hettne and Somjee warn, to the victor goes the spoils, including the remit to write history as one pleases. In this regard, Marx was wrong to claim that philosophers have only interpreted the world without changing it.[457] Interpretation *itself* is a powerful mode of change—and historiography is one place where it starts.

---

[455] D. Hammarskjöld, *Markings,* trans. W.H. Auden and Leif Sjöberg (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), p. 63.

[456] I. Berlin, *The proper study of mankind: an anthology of essays,* ed. Roger Hausheer, Henry Hardy (London: Chatto & Windus, 1997), p. 16.)

[457] In K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German ideology: parts I & III* (New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 19: 'philosophers have only *interpreted* the world differently, the point is, to *change* it.'

Chapter 3

Understanding postdevelopment: philosophy, history, and practice

1. Radical gone mainstream

'The last 40 years can be called the age of development. This epoch is coming to an end. The time is ripe to write its obituary'.[458]

This opening volley from Wolfgang Sachs heralds the rapid ascent of postdevelopment theory.[459] Striking with the force of an intellectual thunderbolt, its critiques electrified 1990s development debates. Critically, it also offered shelter from new neoliberal spectres amidst the intellectual fallout of the Cold War. The casualties, to recall, were numerous. Perhaps more dormant than dead, they include dependency theory, neo-Marxism, Third World self-reliance and non-alignment, and Western New Left movements—to name but a few. As grimly put by one geographer, 'The Enlightenment is dead, Marxism is dead, the working class movement is dead... and the author does not feel very well either'.[460]

Returning now to 2020, postdevelopment has since grown into a major stream of post-Cold War development thought; hence, 'radical gone mainstream' (see Figure 1). Yet, Sachs' doomed age of development still remains. What happened? How do we make sense of this success in theory but shortfall in reality? Has postdevelopment been co-opted by its status in development studies—intellectual metropole to development's empire? Or has it laid grounds for a *coup d'état;* that is, a postdevelopment era?

This essay reckons with these present quandaries. Has postdevelopment unwittingly contributed more to the life than the death of development? To what extent is it still valid or

---

[458] W. Sachs, ed., *The development dictionary: a guide to knowledge as power* (London: Zed Books, 1992), p. 1.

[459] While semantic conventions vary (e.g. 'postdevelopment', 'post-development', 'anti-development'), this study will simply refer to 'postdevelopment' for the sake of consistency and brevity.

[460] Neil Smith, as quoted by D. Harvey, *The condition of postmodernity: an enquiry into the origins of cultural change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 325.

Figure 1. Semantic use of (neo-)Marxist development and postdevelopment in English-language works, 1900–2008 (Google Ngram)[461]

useful? To answer, this work starts with its basic philosophical premises. What *exactly* does postdevelopment entail? Then, when resituated in historical and practical contexts, from where did it come and to where might it go?

Given postdevelopment's controversial stance, it may be unsurprising to note its many past appraisals. Spurring a veritable cottage industry in the development literature, examples include late 1990s critiques from Corbridge, Kiely, Pieterse, and Schuurman.[462] Their decidedly critical remarks raise a case *against* postdevelopment. At the same time, their critiques have not gone unanswered. Spurring others to postdevelopment's defence, notable rebuttals are lodged by Brigg, Nustad, and Ziai.[463] Pointing to foundational contributions to be found, the ensuing back and forth has produced a lively debate. Its continuing vitality can be observed in what Ahorra notes as a 'second wave' of postdevelopment literature since the 2000s—thus leading Ziai to frame earlier critiques as a 'premature burial' of postdevelopment. [464]

---

[461] Terms captured in '(neo-)Marxist development' entail 'Marxist development', 'neo-Marxist development', and 'neomarxist development' (case insensitive). Terms captured in 'postdevelopment' include 'postdevelopment theory', 'post-development theory', 'postdevelopment school', 'post-development school', 'postdevelopmentalism', and 'post-developmentalism' (case insensitive). Including 'postdevelopment' and 'post-development' retrieves too many unrelated uses of said terms. Note, all search terms with a hyphen ('-') must be replaced with an en dash ('–') in order to not be mistaken as a mathematical operator. Graph displayed with a smoothing factor of '2' (i.e., five-year moving averages), with Y-axis values plotted in both lines multiplied by a factor of 10^6 in order to reduce visual clutter (e.g., Y-axis labels listing 0.000000100%). Utilised 2012 English database of English-language publications compiled across all counties (accessible at http://books.google.com/ngrams/).

[462] S. Corbridge, ''Beneath the pavement only soil': The poverty of post-development', *The Journal of Development Studies 34*.6 (1998): 138-48; R. Kiely, 'The last refuge of the noble savage? A critical assessment of post-development theory', *The European Journal of Development Research* 11.1 (1999): 30-55; J.N. Pieterse, 'My paradigm or yours? Alternative development, post-development, reflexive development'. *Development and Change 29*.2 (1998): 343-73; J.N. Pieterse, 'After post-development', *Third World Quarterly 21*.2 (2000): 175-91; F.J. Schuurman, 'Paradigms lost, paradigms regained? Development studies in the twenty-first century', *Third World Quarterly* 21.1 (2000): 7-20.

[463] M. Brigg, 'Post-development, Foucault and the colonisation metaphor', *Third World Quarterly* 23.3 (2002): 421-36; K.G. Nustad, 'Development: the devil we know?', *Third World Quarterly* 22.4 (2001): 479-89; A. Ziai, 'The ambivalence of post-development: between reactionary populism and radical democracy', *Third World Quarterly* 25.6 (2004): 1045-60.

[464] J. Ahorro, 'The waves of post-development theory and a consideration of the Philippines'. Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Conference, University of British Columbia

Much has already been written of these debates, so there is little need to re-tread familiar territory here (see, for example, works by Pieterse and Ziai).[465] Instead, the value of this work lies in its novel (de)construction of postdevelopment's key tenets, origins, and effects. Further distinguishing it are its descriptive more than prescriptive aims. That is, unlike past works, it is not geared towards *a priori* arguments in favour or against postdevelopment. Though hardly value-*free*, it yet remains *comparatively* less value-laden. Producing a more balanced assessment of postdevelopment in theory and practice, this task may thus seem rather dry and/or trivial. Such a divested perspective further risks inadvertently offending members on both sides. However, this task comes at an important time.

Sach's proposed death of a then forty-year-old development era is now thirty years in the waiting. Given that development has not yet died—nor arguably shown signs of abating, questions arise regarding postdevelopment's original claims. At the same time, postdevelopment scholars have not sat idle all the while. Postdevelopment may not have (yet) brought an end to development, but it has had a remarkable career within the field of development studies. Its stellar rise as a major alternative in the wake of Marxism's fading light has made it nigh unignorable for those studying development. Whether one agrees with its tenets or not, it has contributed some of the most influential histories and taught narratives in development studies today (e.g. Escobar's *Encountering development*, Rist's *The history of development*).[466] This key role in development pedagogy warrants a careful review of its views and outcomes—one more external to and less vested in its present debates. Useful for development scholars and students, both old and new, it holds further value for a second audience.

Namely, interest in development grows beyond development studies, itself. Outside the walled gardens of social science, historians have taken growing interest in development's past. Key historians have further credited postdevelopment as representative of a 'first wave' of 'proper' historical research on development (see Engerman, Hodge, and Immerwahr).[467] This privileged status both *in* and *beyond* development studies adds to the present significance of understanding postdevelopment—in this case, as an important school in intellectual history.

Now is thus an opportune time to attempt such a retrospective, given postdevelopment's significant impact and the distance afforded by time. Indeed, a 2017 special issue of *Third*

(4–6 June 2008). http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Ahorro.pdf; A. Ziai, 'Post-development: Premature burials and haunting ghosts', *Development and Change* 46.4 (2015): 833-54.

[465] J.N. Pieterse, *Development theory: deconstructions/reconstructions* (London: Sage, 2001); J.N. Pieterse, 'Discourse analysis in international development studies', *Journal of Multicultural Discourses* 6.3 (2011): 237-40; A. Ziai, *Exploring post-development: Theory and practice, problems and perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2007); Ziai, 'Post-development'

[466] A. Escobar, *Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); G. Rist, *The history of development: from Western origins to global faith* (London: Zed Books, 1997).

[467] D.C. Engerman, 'The Second World's Third World', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12.1 (2011): 183-211; J. Hodge, 'Writing the history of development (part 1: the first wave)', *Humanity* 6.3 (2015), 429-63; D. Immerwahr, 'Modernization and development in US Foreign Relations', *Passport* 43.2 (2012): 22-5.

World Quarterly calls for such reflection at the 25th anniversary of Sachs' *The development dictionary*. Indeed, this work starts where many of its papers leave off—with foundational questions regarding postdevelopment's role and legacy (e.g. Andreasson, Matthews, Ziai).[468] This essay hence unpacks postdevelopment as a philosophy holding significant implications for development history and practice. Focusing on a set of seminal works and authors from the 1990s, it recounts major political and intellectual shifts in development from the 1980s to the present day. In the process, it restores a facet of development's global history at a critical juncture marked by the end of the Cold War and a new post-Cold War era.

2. Methodology

From the 'why' of studying postdevelopment, we now turn to the 'how'. The ensuing methods can be divided into three parts: *(i)* the research territory, *(ii)* empirical sources, and *(iii)* a theoretical framework.

First is the research territory. What exactly does this essay refer to by postdevelopment? To start, postdevelopment is treated here as a school of thought. More pointedly, it entails a wide variety of participants that cannot be taken as a homogenous nor static whole. From gender theory to postcolonial theory, *buen vivir* to *ubuntu*, and even Gandhi to Foucault, the task of definition is not such an obvious one. At the same time, examining it as a discourse reveals shared characteristics (e.g. themes, concepts) across its vast intellectual terrain. For example, Rahnema highlights its 'radical', 'subversive', and 'human-centred' orientations.[469] Added to this is the existence of seminal contributions and contributors that have served as intellectual cornerstones for postdevelopment since the 1990s. While many flowers may have since bloomed, they still share common roots in an original body of canonical works.

Consequently, this study does not attempt an exhaustive survey of postdevelopment thought. Rather, it selectively focuses on the founding contributions and contributors that have anchored postdevelopment since the 1990s. To delineate its intellectual boundaries, this essay thus focuses on what might be termed *orthodox, classical,* or *first-generation* postdevelopment. Consequently, four seminal works are used here to reference its mainstream canon: Escobar's *Encountering development*, Rist's *The history of development*, Rahnema and Bawtree's *The post-development reader*, and Sachs' *The development dictionary*.[470] Constituting the empirical core of this work, some explanation of this sample set is warranted.

---

[468] S. Andreasson, 'Fossil-fuelled development and the legacy of post-development theory in twenty-first century Africa', *Third World Quarterly* 38.12 (2017): 2634-49; S. Matthews, 'Colonised minds? Post-development theory and the desirability of development in Africa', *Third World Quarterly* 38.12 (2017): 2650-63; A. Ziai, 'Post-development 25 years after The Development Dictionary', *Third World Quarterly* 38.12 (2017): 2547-58.

[469] M. Rahnema, 'Introduction', in *The post-development reader,* Eds. Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree, ix-xix (London: Zed Books, 1997), p. xi-xii.

[470] Escobar, *Encountering development*; M. Rahnema and V. Bawtree, Eds., *The post-development reader* (London: Zed Books, 1997); Rist, *The history of development*; W. Sachs, Ed., *The development dictionary: a guide to knowledge as power* (London: Zed Books, 1992).

First are two postdevelopment history textbooks. Escobar's 1995 history, *Encountering development*, traces to a 1987 PhD dissertation at UC Berkeley and was re-issued in 2012 with a new preface.[471] One indicator of the scale and multidisciplinary scope of its influence is its unprecedented number of citations. With nearly 14,000 citations to its name, it surpasses the other seminal works here by an order of magnitude.[472] As a point of reference, this puts *Encountering development* in the orbit of other highly influential books, such as Acemoglu and Robinson's *Why nations fail* (9,184 citations); Ferguson's *The anti-politics machine* (8,681); Scott's *Seeing like a state* (20,429); and Fukuyama's *The end of history* (23,289).[473]

In the case of Rist's *The history of development,* its pedagogical influence is best seen in its extensive publication record. First published in French in 1996, it was translated by Patrick Camiller into English soon after in 1997. Since then, it has become a mainstay in the literature on development's history. A self-professed postdevelopmentalist, Rist has released revised editions roughly every five years, with its latest (fifth) edition published in 2019.[474]

The latter two works are edited volumes, covering more than fifty shorter works combined. One is Sachs' aforementioned *The development dictionary.* First published in 1992, it has since been revised in 2009. Most notably, its contributors cover a cast of some of postdevelopment's most notable pioneers, including Escobar, Esteva, Illich, and Rahnema—in addition to Sachs. That its 25th anniversary forms the basis of the aforementioned *Third World Quarterly* special issue speaks to its place in postdevelopment canon.

Rahnema and Bawtree's 1997 *The post-development reader* is notable for its wide breadth of contributors. Published in 1997, this volume encompasses roughly forty authors and works. As indicated by its title, this work was explicitly published as a reader—that is, a collection of works intended for teaching purposes. Originating from a course on 'The Myth and the Reality of Development' at UC Berkeley, Rahnema brought together the reader with Victoria Bawtree and Robert Molteno (editor at Zed Books) for an audience of students and activists.[475] It casts a wide net, including Václav Havel, Gandhi, and Dadacha—a tribal elder from Ethiopia highlighted by Rahnema as 'an "illiterate" sage'.[476] Rahnema and Bawtree's reader hence restores some of the diversity found in broader postdevelopment thought.

---

[471] Escobar, *Encountering development.*

[472] A recent search of Google Scholar finds 13,826 citations for Escobar's *Encountering development.* By comparison, *The history of development* holds 2,581; *The development dictionary* has 3,446; and *The post-development reader* another 1,298. All citation figures as of 28 February 2020.

[473] All citation figures as of 28 February 2020 from Google Scholar.

[474] For self-attribution as a postdevelopment theorist, see Rist, *The history of development,* third edition (London: Zed Books, 2008), p. 257, footnote 2: 'There is not space here to name everyone, but let us at least mention: François Partant, Serge Latouche, Wolfgang Sachs, Helen Norberg-Hodge, Stephen A. Marglin, Frédérique Apffel-Marglin, Marie-Dominique Perrot, Jeremy Seabrook, Ivan Illich, Gustavo Esteva, Arturo Escobar, Ashis Nandy, Smitu Kothari, Vandana Shiva, Claude Alvares, Majid Rahnema, Emmanuel Ndione, Robert Vachon, Silvia Perez-Vitoria, Raimundo Panikkar…. And the author of these lines!'\

[475] See Rahnema, 'Introduction', p. xi.

[476] Ibid., p. xii

This essay thus centres on these four canonical postdevelopment texts (Escobar, 1995; Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997; Rist, 1997; Sachs, 1992). With its empirical boundaries traced to postdevelopment orthodoxy, what remains is a theoretical lens. The analytical framework used here to deconstruct (in a general, non-Derridean sense) postdevelopment takes the form of a so-called *logic scaffold*. Taking ideas or theories as its unit of analysis, it offers a novel metatheoretical framework that captures how one sees, perceives, or interprets the world—and consequently interacts with it.

These logic scaffolds are constituted by *ontological, moral,* and *epistemological* premises. In simpler terms, they entail views on what *is*, what *ought to be*, and how this is all *known*. Working in concert together, they are applied here to capture postdevelopment as a particular system of reasoning or theoretical worldview. For readers in development studies, this notion of a logic scaffold may echo the notion of Foucauldian discourses or Kuhnian paradigms. The former discourses can be said to capture logic scaffolds (or sets of logic scaffolds) in action; a proverbial language game in motion. The latter Kuhnian paradigms are thus perhaps more closely related, though their application to the social sciences remains a controversial endeavour—not least of all, due to Kuhn's own objections to its applications to social science.

For readers in the humanities, the aforementioned concept of language games may have triggered associations to Wittgenstein. Indeed, his instrumentalist account of language can be seen here in the conceptual (i.e. moral, ontological) vocabulary and grammatical rules (i.e. epistemologies) guiding postdevelopment's use. The best precedent of all, however, may lie with historian and philosopher R.G. Collingwood; namely, in conceiving metaphysics as the study of *catalogue raisonné* (i.e. systemic and historically situated catalogues of reasoning or thought).[477] Thus posing metaphysics as a 'historical science', its *catalogue raisonné* refer here to postdevelopment's metaphysical worldview or way of thinking.

Consequently, if not made clear already, this study does not offer an exhaustive survey of postdevelopment thought. What it *does* offer, however, is a detailed account of its original canon; the proverbial seeds of the flowers that have since blossomed. Offering a timely retrospective on postdevelopment, the ensuing sections are structured as follows:

(1) a layout of postdevelopment's epistemological, ontological, and moral views;

(2) historical contextualisation of postdevelopment's origins and significance;

(3) a larger map of development made possibly by these postdevelopment views;

(4) ensuing practical implications for scholars, policymakers, and civil society;

(5) closing considerations on postdevelopment's future directions.

---

[477] *Catalogue raisonné* from R.G. Collingwood, 'Function of metaphysics in civilization', in *An essay on metaphysics,* Ed. Rex Martin, 379-421 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998[1940]), p. 383. See also Part I—particularly essays on 'The science of absolute presuppositions' and 'Metaphysics an historical science' [sic]—in Collingwood, *An essay on metaphysics,* pp. 34-57.

3. Postdevelopment as a philosophy: unpacking its logic scaffold

Perhaps one of the most impressive—or at the very least, ambitious—aspects of postdevelopment is the extent to which it delves into philosophical territory to derive or otherwise ground its views. It is certainly not the only development theory to do so (e.g. development ethics, the capability approach). However, the particular *style* of philosophy that it adopts is notable. Namely, the establishment of postdevelopment theory marks the concerted introduction of poststructuralism in the arena of development studies.[478]

Though philosophers in the Anglo-American analytic tradition may be disinclined to view postdevelopment and post-structuralism as valid, its attribution here as a philosophy is made in light of the problems that it addresses. Namely, postdevelopment adopts philosophical positions on the nature of knowledge, language, and power in relation to development ideas or ideals. Borrowing heavily from namesake post-structuralist precedents, postdevelopment's ensuing system of thought is laid out here in its epistemological, ontological, and moral views. Constituting a postdevelopment logic scaffold, it contains views on what one can know about the world *(epistemological views)*, what the world actually is *(ontological views)*, and what the world ought to be *(moral views)*. Working in concert, these epistemological, ontological, and moral standpoints illustrate postdevelopment's particular way of seeing and engaging with the world—what might otherwise be referred to as the postdevelopment gaze.

3.1 Epistemological views

Postdevelopment adopts an intricate conception of knowledge in relation to language and power. Found underlying its metaphysical and moral arguments, three of its tenets—corresponding to the *nature, function,* and *production* of knowledge—are highlighted here.

First, in regard to the *nature of knowledge*, postdevelopment shares post-structuralism's rejection of universal and pre-existing or *a priori* truths. It follows, then, that knowledge claims that uphold or are otherwise premised upon the existence of such *a priori* truths are similarly unsound. This is in patent rejection of prevailing epistemological fashions in the West during the first of half of the twentieth century—some of which continue on to this day. Namely, structuralism and realism in Western philosophy and social science—despite their differences—rely on the existence of objective knowledge or truth. This could be attributed to an experiential realm (e.g. structuralism, phenomenology), just as it could to a natural or material one (e.g. scientific realism).

Further, language was frequently seen as a means of formalising or accurately representing such truths. Words offered reliable vessels or forms which could contain objective

---

[478] This 'post-structuralist turn' can be loosely associated to the 'postmodern turn' and the 'cultural turn' that emerged in Western arts, humanities, and social science during the 1960s and 1970s.

truths.[479] In contrast, postdevelopment rejects these notions to restore the *subjective nature of knowledge.* By extension, this de-problematises the existence of diverse and conflicting knowledge claims. Resulting in a type of pluralist stance, the existence of two conflicting claims on what is true or right no longer *necessarily* means that at least one is wrong.

Second, in regard to the *function of knowledge*, postdevelopment rejects the possibility of an apolitical epistemology. That is, *knowledge is inherently political*—and not just in the sense of empowerment implied by the axiom 'knowledge is power'. While knowledge may indeed endow one with greater power, greater power also endows one with the ability to manipulate knowledge. Given the subjectivity of knowledge, claims of objective knowledge—most notably in science—are viewed in postdevelopment as inherently political acts. This is a relationship, moreover, that can be exercised and traced through language. That is, language offers the basic building blocks for the social construction of reality. If one can control language, then it follows that one can, in effect, control reality. Orwell illustrates one famous example in *Nineteen eighty-four* via the 'Ministry of Truth' and its control over society through the control of language (i.e. 'Newspeak').[480]

Postdevelopment's preoccupation with the politics of development knowledge thus manifests in distinctly linguistic form. As foreshadowed in Escobar's subtitle in *Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World,* the 'Third World' was a political invention meant to demean and control those caught under its umbrella. In the case of Sachs, this semantic focus becomes eminently clear in the title, itself—*The Development dictionary: a guide to knowledge as power*. This focus on language as a key mechanism in the politics of development knowledge thus entails a critical element in the postdevelopment gaze.

Third, in regard to the *production of knowledge*, the two prior epistemological premises produce a distinct methodological orientation in postdevelopment. For one, the rejection of *a priori* truths is accompanied by a shift in methods away from the discovery of general propositions and towards the understanding of particular contexts. For example, the seminal postdevelopment works here rely heavily on qualitive (i.e. non-cliometric) histories and ethnographies, while generally abstaining from the use of statistical models and other quantitative methods. Furthermore, the aforementioned importance attributed to language manifests here in the centrality of *discourse analysis* as an overarching methodological frame. Whether integrated into history or ethnography, the development discourse offers fertile grounds for observing the power relations pervading development. Indeed, this systemic approach may be the only way to observe the endemic, structural aspects of development's politics missed in more narrow analyses.

---

[479] See, for example, Bertrand Russel's realist programme in philosophy, oriented around propositional logic and atomistic truth-statements; B. Russell, *Our knowledge of the external world as a field for scientific method in philosophy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1922 [1914]).

[480] Orwell, *Nineteen eighty-four.*

3.2 Ontological views

If epistemological views address the possibility of knowledge regarding the world, then ontological views point to descriptive views regarding the world, in itself. This ontological frame orienting postdevelopment thought is divided here into its temporal and spatial dimensions. These, in effect, entail postdevelopment's historical worldview and geographical map of the world.

To start with postdevelopment's historical worldview, three landmarks can be identified here. The first is European colonialism. Though many postdevelopment scholars reach further back, it is the spread of European colonialism that marks a turning point in development's history.[481] While the Europeans are hardly the first builders of empire, the unprecedented scale of their global reach established a world system—the legacies of which continue to live on to this day. The temporal placement of European colonialism, however, is not always consistent nor made explicitly clear. Sample references here range from Columbus' discovery of the 'New World' to the rise of Enlightenment social science to the re-invigorated push to spread 'civilisation' during nineteenth-century colonialism.[482]

In contrast, the second landmark can be pinned down to one specific date: 20 January 1949. On this day, in the postdevelopment historical worldview, the idea of development was born into the public imagination through US President Harry Truman's Point Four speech.[483] It marks the end of one era—an 'official proclamation of the end of the colonial age'—and the start of a development age.[484] Or in the words of Esteva, 'On that day, 2 billion people became underdeveloped'.[485] Amidst the backdrop of two World Wars, the Great Depression, and the rapid decolonisation to come, the prior colonial discourse was buried and reformed into the development discourse, with its associated ideas of underdevelopment, backwardness, and the Third World.

Finally, the third historical landmark is somewhat strange to call historical; for it has yet to actually happen. Namely, the postdevelopment worldview presages an impending end to development and the coming of a postdevelopment age.[486] Suffering under the weight of its unsustainability and contradictions, the development era is viewed as in its last throes. As opened by Sachs: 'This epoch is coming to an end. The time is ripe to write its obituary'.[487] Despite the decades that have since passed, it is worth noting that the three works with revised

---

[481] For examples of long-term approaches reaching back before colonialism, see Rist, *The history of development;* Sahlins, 'The original affluent society'.

[482] See Cleaver, 'Socialism'; Escobar, *Encountering development*; Rist, *The history of development.*

[483] This turning point is particularly pronounced in Escobar, *Encountering development*; Rist, *The history of development*; and Sachs, *The development dictionary.*

[484] Ullrich, 'Technology', p. 308.

[485] Esteva, 'Development', p. 2.

[486] Ibid.; Sachs, 'Introduction'; Rist, *The history of development.*

[487] Sachs, 'Introduction', p. xv.

editions since have all maintained a steadfast adherence to development's forthcoming de-mise—a curious echo of the teleologies underlying neo-Marxism's former impasse.[488]

Working in complement with this historical worldview is a spatial or geographical map framing postdevelopment thought. Here, borders can be drawn between three levels: global, national, and local. These levels embody development's uneven power relations, with the local level representing the vulnerable and oppressed. Standing opposite are national and global forces (e.g. states, elites, capitalism, neoliberalism), in a sort of David-versus-Goliath standoff. When speaking of this geographical confrontation, however, it is not sufficient to speak only in terms of physical space.

Namely, postdevelopment theory traces its unequal power relations to the ideational sphere. It is not Marx's material sphere (e.g. modes of production) that drives development injustices, so much as it is development's success in colonising or indoctrinating the mind. As foreshadowed in Rist's subtitle, 'from Western origins to global faith'.[489] Correspondingly, postdevelopment's geographical worldview entails an ideological struggle over the determination of knowledge, itself. In it, it pits local diversity against monolithic national and global hegemony, as manifest in public and private forms (e.g. empires, transnational corporations). This geopolitical map, combined with the aforementioned historical worldview, offers a basic ontological framework for interpreting postdevelopment's perceived realities.

3.3 Moral views

Building on postdevelopment's ontological views regarding what the world *is*, we arrive at its moral views regarding what the world *ought to be.* Here, one can find recurring moral proper-ties (e.g. good/bad, right/wrong) attributed to particular ideas and actors in development. Though a comprehensive set would be vast (nor entirely consistent), a shortlist of some of its recurring antagonists and protagonists is provided in Table 1 (next page).

These moral dichotomies (e.g. technocrats versus activists, growth versus sustainability) produce a sort of postdevelopment moral compass. At the same time, they also combine to form larger prescriptions regarding what one *ought to do* about development. Amidst its axes of good-versus-evil, two particular prescriptions emerge regarding *(i)* what to do with devel-opment and *(ii)* its alternatives. In the first, the idea of development and its ensuing discourse are deemed to be *irredeemable*. No matter how well-meaning its participants may be, deeper structural aspects ingrained in its discourse *inevitably* lead to a hegemonic system. Injustices committed in the name of development are not mere accidents, but part of its *essential nature.*

---

[488] See updated prefaces to all revised editions for Escobar, *Encountering development*; Rist, *The history of development;* and Sachs, *The development dictionary.*

For the development impasse, see D. Booth, 'Marxism and development sociology: interpreting the impasse', *World Development* 13.7 (1985): 761-87; F.J. Schuurman, Ed., *Beyond the impasse: new directions in development theory* (London: Zed Books, 1993).

[489] Rist, *The history of development.*

Axis of goods	«—»	Axis of evils
Postdevelopment		Development
Local knowledge		Western social science
Grassroots movements		Hegemonic discourses
Southern and subaltern actors		State and corporate actors
Cultural diversity		Globalisation
Ecological sustainability		Economic growth
Vulnerable, oppressed populaces		Political, intellectual elites
Bottom-up political processes		Top-down political processes

Table 1. Recurring moral dichotomies in the postdevelopment worldview

As an idea, development thus entails an oppressive and unsustainable paradigm that has colonised not just profits or modes of production, but the very mind. To simply suggest a new definition or theory of development is to grossly under-estimate the problem at hand. Namely, it fails to recognise development as a larger discourse, governed by rules, which are in turn dictated by power. Specifically, this is a discursive structure that has been irretrievably corrupted by hegemonic power. Consequently, an elimination of the problem requires not just the elimination of one particular theory or idea, but the entire discourse of development, itself. Only then can postdevelopment's core prescription inferred by its namesake be realised; that is, to move *beyond* development to a post-development era.

Eliminating development, however, then leads to the ensuing question of what is to take its place. While the condemnation of development is made eminently clear across these seminal works, the question of alternatives remains less so. Possibly the closest candidate to an explicit alternative can be found in Escobar's call for a *pluriverse* to replace development, as laid out in an updated 2012 preface.[490] In contrast to development, which is tied to hegemonic and Eurocentric forms of reasoning, a pluriverse entails the coexistence of multiple cultures without universalising or homogenising tendencies. At the global level, this pluriverse is argued to entail a mutual respect for ecology and the realisation of a more sustainable world. Departing from the nation-state system of today, it further differs in being organised around dispersed, non-state forms of power.

Escobar thus cites the case of Zapatista communities in Mexico, which illustrate the possibilities of 'radical democracy, cultural self-determination, and self-governance'.[491] This deep distrust of centralised power entails a postdevelopment alternative that requires a radical redistribution of the violent power emblematic in state oppression and global hegemony. It

---

[490] Escobar, *Encountering development.*
[491] Ibid., p. xxix.

conversely entails a celebration of the local, traditional, grassroots, and radical. It thus seems fitting to close with Rahnema's citation of Foucault on the dangers of power, which many of these postdevelopment scholars seem to take to heart:

> My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not the same thing as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. *So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism.*[492] [italics not in original, see footnote for details]

4. Postdevelopment in historical context

While philosophical analysis enables a relatively clear-cut arrangement of postdevelopment's logic scaffold, its actual emergence was not necessarily such a logical or orderly one. To better understand not just *what* or *how* postdevelopment sees but *why*, it is useful to resituate these philosophical commitments back into their historical contexts.[493] Consequently, this section complements the prior philosophical analysis by briefly revisiting postdevelopment's past.

To set the stage for postdevelopment's arrival, it is useful to refer back to the political and intellectual contexts of the 1960s and 70s. Relevant landmarks colouring these times include the generation of 1968 and its anti-Vietnam War and civil rights movements, oil crises and stagflation, the end of the Bretton Woods system, and the UN call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Rising in conjunction with these surrounding events were overlapping domains in dependency theory and neo-Marxism within development theory, closely tied to Western New Left political movements.[494]

---

[492] Note that Rahnema's excerpt from Foucault proceeds as follows in 'Towards post-development: searching for signposts, a new language and new paradigms', in *The post-development reader,* Eds. Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree, 377-403 (London: Zed Books, 1997), p. 377:

'My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not the same thing as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do… I think that the ethico-political choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the main danger.'

In leaving out the italicised sentence and closing with what is actually the opening sentence of a new paragraph, Rahnema's citation of Foucault may be liable to be misread.

Original quote from interview with M. Foucault, 'On the genealogy of ethics: an overview of a work in progress', in *Michel Foucault: beyond structuralism and hermeneutics,* 2nd edition, Eds. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, 229–252 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 231-2.

[493] Appiah makes this very point when referring to Sen's approach to understanding inequality; see K.A. Appiah, *The honor code: how moral revolutions happen* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), p.127:

'A number of philosophers have recently argued that it is always a good idea, in discussions of equality, to ask, first, "equality of what?" This view has a great deal of merit as a philosophical proposal, but I think it is the wrong place to start historically. When equality became, with liberty and fraternity, one of the three great slogans of the French Revolution, it was not because people had a clear idea what it was they wanted equality of. What they knew for sure was what they were against: treating people badly merely because they were not born into the nobility, looking down your nose at the common people. The ideal of equality in modern times begins, in short, with the thought that there are certain things that are not a proper basis for treating people unequally, and only gradually moves on to identify some things that are.'

[494] See Preston, *Theories of development;* Rapley, *Understanding development;* Hettne, *Development theory and three worlds;* Larrain, *Theories of development.*

At the same time, upheavals were also occurring in broader intellectual contexts. Here, the focus on objective and universal truths (e.g. in structuralism, philosophical realism, logical positivism) predominant in the Western arts, humanities, and social science was giving way to a rediscovery or turn to subjectivity, relativity, and culture (e.g. the cultural, postmodern, and/or post-structuralist turn). The ensuing erosion of certainty and lost confidence is observed in prior critiques of a 'nihilism' amidst the death of not development, but its predecessor—the idea of progress.[495] While this broader nihilistic, postmodern, post-structuralist, and/or cultural turn had been permeating through philosophy and social science since the 1960s and 70s, it is postdevelopment that would bring post-structuralism's concerted entrance into the development discourse in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Early precedents can be noted, for example, in Rist and Sachs' PhDs from the 1970s.[496] These PhD precursors are all the more notable in Escobar's case, whose 1995 *Encountering development* had already been drafted in large part in a 1987 PhD at UC Berkeley.[497] Evidence here points to an early postdevelopment network coalescing by the 1980s. For example, Escobar was already on familiar terms with Majid Rahnema during the PhD, who was a visiting professor at UC Berkeley at the time.[498] It is also telling to note that Escobar's PhD opens with two quotes: one from post-structuralist flagbearer Michel Foucault, and one from fellow Latin American postdevelopment scholar Gustavo Esteva.[499]

The former, introduced through seminars by Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus (key US interlocutors for Foucault at UC Berkeley), offers a theoretical path forward. The latter, a self-described Mexican 'deprofessionalized intellectual', offers a new Latin American radicalism post-dependency.[500] It would be a year later in 1988 when a meeting including Escobar, Esteva, Ivan Illich, and Wolfgang Sachs at Pennsylvania State University in the US would mark the beginnings of *The Development Dictionary,* published in 1992.[501] Underlying postdevelopment's rapid ascent in the 1990s are thus clear formative precedents dating back to the 1980s and even the 1970s.

---

[495] See crtiques from Plumb, 'The historian's dilemma' and Nisbet, *History of the idea of progress* in this thesis' Introduction, Section 4.3.

[496] G. Rist, 'Image du Tiers Monde et conceptions du développement: une étude des documents des organisations suisses de coopération au développement' *[The image of the Third World and conceptions of development: a study of documents of Swiss development cooperation organisations].* PhD thesis. Graduate University, Geneva, 1977; W. Sachs, 'Schulzwang und soziale Kontrolle: Argumente für eine Entschulung des Lernens' *[Compulsary schooling and social control: arguments for a deschooling of learning].* PhD thesis. University of Tübingen, 1975.

[497] See Escobar, 'Power and visibility'.

[498] See Escobar's PhD acknowledgements in Ibid., p. vi; Rahnema's career background can be found in Rahnema and Bawtree, *The post-development reader*, pp. ii, xi; and Sachs, *The development dictionary,* p. 324;

[499] See Escobar, 'Power and visibility', p. 1.

[500] From G. Esteva and M. Suri Prakash, 'From global thinking to local thinking', in *The post-development reader,* Eds. Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree, 277-289 (London: Zed Books, 1997), p. 277.

[501] From Esteva and Escobar, 'Post-development @ 25', p. 2559: 'It's been almost 30 years since that memorable week of September 1988, when we sat around the convivial table at Ivan Illich's house on Foster Avenue in University Park (where Penn State University is located), summoned by Wolfgang Sachs and Ivan. Out of the intense and enjoyable discussions of those days there emerged the task of

Contemporaneously, the 1980s brought major shifts to the development landscape preceding—and enabling, as argued here—the rise of postdevelopment. After the turmoil of the 1970s, the 1980s brought the return of the political Right (e.g. Thatcher in the UK, Reagan in the US). In addition, the 1982 emerging market debt crisis would bring devastating impacts to Latin American and African (particularly sub-Saharan) countries. To this, David Booth's seminal article in 1985 on the development impasse marks an implosion of political Left-oriented development theories.[502] All of a sudden, the spectrum of development options seemed to be rapidly shrinking. By the mid-1990s, the end of the political Left had already been written into development's history books. As opened in Rapley's 1996 history, 'The left is dead; long live the left'.[503]

The 'lost decade' of the 1980s, in turn, paved the way for neoliberalism's Washington Consensus and ensuing anxieties of a shrinking policy space. It is precisely in these contexts that postdevelopment offers another historical contribution. Amidst the creation of a sudden political and intellectual vacuum in the mid to late 1980s, postdevelopment would step in during the late 1980s and early 1990s to preserve a space for alternatives. Examples include notions of *buen vivir* in Latin America and *ubuntu* in Africa. Whereas Third World thinkers had previously found shelter under the aegis of neo-Marxism's broad umbrella, its ensuing collapse endangered the legitimacy of its non-Western concepts. This is particularly noted in the reflections of dependency theory and its wholesale dismissal (i.e. 'throwing the baby out with the bathwater') amidst a neo-Marxist implosion by the 1980s.[504]

Once again, postdevelopment does not mark the *only* alternative able to resist a new post-Cold War orthodoxy (i.e. 'neoliberalism'). For example, one can point to sociologists and heterodox political economists working on state-driven development, in addition to capability approach theories and development ethics. However, postdevelopment's particular approach based on culture and power in an ideational over material sphere helps ringfence a space for not only theoretical alternatives, but also subaltern voices in the decades to follow. Instead of the banner of Marxism and a radical democracy, a new radicalism is born under the banner of Foucauldian post-structuralism (e.g. discourse analysis, deconstruction, hyper- or pessimistic activism). Reviving an old sanctuary under new radical Western figureheads (albeit now of an idealist versus materialist type), it yet serves to harbour non-Western ideas in post-Cold War contexts.

---

writing our respective chapters for what a few years later would emerge as The Development Dictionary.'

[502] See Booth, 'Marxism and development sociology'; Schuurman, *Beyond the impasse.*

[503] Rapley, *Understanding development*, p. 1.

[504] See, for example, Larrain, *Theories of development;* Hettne, *Development theory.*

5. Stepping back: postdevelopment as *part* of development

Having unpacked some of postdevelopment's key historical and philosophical features, its resulting logic scaffold or way of thinking raises fundamental questions regarding development. In an unconventional twist, however, this section applies some of postdevelopment's very own critiques and questions to postdevelopment, itself. Namely, it does so by considering the broader theoretical implications rendered by postdevelopment's role as part and parcel of the very development discourse it critiques.

This exercise is particularly valuable for two main reasons. First is as an approach that postdevelopment theorists would be reticent to try. The critical views constituting its logic scaffold or way of seeing render the image of an outside critic looking in—in this case, into the development discourse. As seen in its prior moral and ontological distinctions, its better world (i.e. a postdevelopment era) is mutually exclusive from presently-existing development. However, the present essay has no need nor vested interest in committing to such a divide. While recognising the distinct contributions of postdevelopment's post-structuralist scaffold, it is yet treated here as a scaffold *within*—and not outside—the development discourse.

Understandably, postdevelopment standpoints may not take kindly to such an affiliation. Yet, while postdevelopment may subject development to deconstruction, so too is it a subject or construct within development, itself. A sort of Oedipal product of the very subject it wishes to destroy, its estranged family ties in development's intellectual genealogy become especially clear in its historical contexts. As highlighted in its formative 1970s and 80s, its pioneering scholars were involved with development from the start.

Escobar offers one example of this early engagement, set out in his 1995 preface (also echoed in the 1987 PhD introduction): 'This book grew out of a sense of puzzlement' with development and the 'so-called Third World'.[505] To recall, Escobar, Rist, and Sachs all arrive at postdevelopment from their respective academic locations working on development theory; albeit in critical perspective. To this, Rahnema and Bawtree add respective backgrounds in development policy from their former careers at the United Nations.[506] Their purported standpoint outside of the development discourse in theory thus stands at odds with their roles *within* the development discourse in reality; hence, questions of co-option or *coup d'état.*

As such, despite likely objections, postdevelopment is couched here as an instrumental part of the development discourse. Whether this is a sign of failure or success remains entirely open to interpretation, but it is at present beside the point. Of more interest here, rather, are the

---

[505] Full excerpt from Escobar, *Encounter development,* p. vii: 'This book grew out of a sense of puzzlement: the fact that for many years the industrialized nations of North America and Europe were supposed to be the indubitable models for the societies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the so-called Third World, and that these societies must catch up with the industrialized countries, perhaps even become like them. This belief is still held today in many quarters. Development was and continues to be—although less convincingly so as the years go by and its promises go unfulfilled—the magic formula. The presumed ineluctability of this notion—and,for the most part, its unquestioned desirability—was most puzzling to me.'

[506] See opening section on 'About the editors' in Rahnema and Bawtree, *The post-develoment reader.*

corollary views of development's discourse that can be observed when resituating postdevelopment back into its broader discursive contexts. Namely, adding it as another branch in development theory's family tree enables a bigger picture of the nature and operations of the development discourse, in which postdevelopment now plays a prominent part.

It is in these contexts that a final reason for this big picture examination is found. Namely, it recovers a view of not just the radical departures marked by postdevelopment, but also the striking similarities to be found with its Cold War-era radical precedents. Forgotten when separating postdevelopment from its home contexts, this consideration of recurring dynamics enables a larger map of the diverse actors and implicit rules animating development. In order to do so, the following sections reintroduce some of the larger intellectual terrain covered in the two essays prior. Placing postdevelopment's post-structuralist scaffold alongside their liberal (essay one) and Marxist (essay two) scientific positivist scaffolds, they shed light on the deep-rooted social and political nature of development. Post-development hence holds polyvalent uses, itself; here, as but a part or pawn in development's larger political-*cum*-intellectual terrain.

5.1 Three development super-scaffolds

Postdevelopment has thus introduced the entry of a concerted post-structuralist approach in development studies, but it is hardly the only scaffold to be found. Foreshadowed in the prior analyses, its neighbours include two notable alternatives scaffolding development's diverse better worlds of a *scientific positivist (SP)* type. Manifesting in two distinct and conflicting forms, essay one evidences a liberal variant in the increasingly quantitative, scientific, and Western-defined approaches in development's journal literature. Critiqued in essay one's sample as a growing positivist tendency (and later on as 'neoliberalism'), it is hence termed a *liberal* scientific positivist (SP_L) scaffold.

In turn, essay two adds a distinctly *Marxist* scientific positivist (SP_M) scaffold to the mix. Though host to a wide internal diversity that partly leads to its own downfall, it too shares in a faith in a scientifically deducible and practically achievable real-world development. The end visions may be antithetical to its liberal counterparts, but its methods share more than either side may be willing to admit. Namely, they both share in a positivist faith, whether it be the possibility of development, the positive role of science, or their justification based in an empiricism centred on the material realm (e.g. Malthusian limits, modes of production).[507] Founded upon an aforementioned faith in philosophical realism and positivism, development

---

[507] A similar observation has been made prior by Dudley Seers; see D. Seers, 'The congruence of Marxism and other neoclassical doctrines' in *Toward a new strategy for development: a Rothko Chapel colloquium*, pp. 1-17 (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979).

is rooted in scientific, technical, and hence *apolitical* knowledge—despite being wielded in conflicting Cold War forms.[508]

When combined, these three essays thus unveil the presence of three dominant logic scaffolds (or **super-scaffolds**) inherited from Western social science. Flying under the banners of their most prominent academic figureheads, examples include Keynes (and later Friedman and Hayek) for development's 'mainstream' and Marx (and now Foucault) for its 'radicals'. Essays one and two thus recover competing Marxist versus liberal (or *bourgeois*) versions of social science manifesting in development. Very much a reflection of their surrounding Cold War geopolitical climates, they are now joined by a new post-structuralist scaffold traced in the present essay.

When considered in larger geopolitical contexts, postdevelopment arguably plays a pivotal role—one which even its own members may not deny—in filling a vacuum left by neo-Marxism. This is not significant due to some intrinsic value to this space, but rather due to its instrumental role in ballasting or countering an otherwise unipolar mainstream. As such, it strikes a new post-Cold War ideological divide; this time, between a new or arguably returning mainstream (i.e. neoliberal development) and a new type of radicalism (i.e. post-development). Evidence of this divide is further cast in development's own social sciences (e.g. neoliberal economic and political science versus post-structuralist anthropology and geography) and its new politically correct geographical categories (i.e. a Northern neoliberalism versus a purportedly Southern postdevelopment). An old liberal versus Marxist competition is thus reborn in a post-Cold War neoliberal versus postdevelopment divide.

To be clear, this trifecta of super-scaffolds is hardly the *only* set of better worlds populating development (nor social science). As will be argued here, they hide a much greater diversity—especially in non-Western views—under their banners. Yet, these $\{SP_L, SP_M, PS\}$ scaffolds remain *the most dominant* or influential paradigms observed in development's crowded field (one that, it should be reminded, is also at present a limited Anglophone sample).

As such, postdevelopment and its scientific positivist neighbours capture particular patterns or paradigms framing how development's social science scholars interpret and hence shape interaction with outside realities. It also reanimates their own internal politics, captured in their better world conflicts or collisions. In addition to tracing their visions used to shape society, they expose how theories and theor-*ists* are shaped by their local spaces and times. Together, they enable an ensuing discussion of the social and political dynamics that can be observed both in and around the (post-)development discourse.

---

[508] For examples of its philosophical understructure, see B. Russell, *Our knowledge of the external world as a field for scientific method in philosophy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1922[1914]); A. Comte's *A general view of positivism* (London: Trübner and Co., 1865[1848]).

5.2 The sociality of development knowledge: embedded development

A key finding thus emerges here on the *sociality* or *social nature* of development knowledge. Synthesised across these logic scaffolds, the ensuing view of an **embedded development** restores the social contexts of development knowledge—much as Polanyi's *embedded market* resituates the economy (over international development and the university) in society.[509]

The basis of embedded development lies in the *normativity of development knowledge*. Despite academic ideals, development knowledge is not hermetically sealed in a vacuum of objectivity. Rather, it remains highly subject to outside influences, both within and beyond its ivory towers. Yet another manifestation of our social norms, essay one finds a journal literature that remains highly responsive to outside issues or contexts. Essay two further retraces how the Cold War's geopolitics extends to the university. Its Marxist development theories, for example, remain subject more to Western New Left than purported Third World realities; more about Mao-*isms* than about Mao, so to speak. With Marxism's fall spurring a post-Cold War historical turn and the PS-scaffolds captured here in essay three, the knowledge examined here is heavily influenced by their creators' milieu.

To be clear, this does not imply some sort of reductionism or determinism that overwrites the agency of (post-)development scholars. They may be spurred by their contexts, but the choice of how to respond remains their own. (To recall the quote from Dag Hammarskjöld, 'We are not permitted to choose the frame of our destiny. But what we put into it is ours.')[510] Common drivers thus still produce diverging methods and morals. The 1980s development impasse may have led scholars like Larrain and Peet to reaffirm the value of Marx, but it also spurs the postdevelopment scholars noted here to establish a new radical alternative. Leading to the basic observation of a highly fragmented and at-times polemical historiography, it reflects its disciplinary divides—both *interdisciplinary* (e.g. anthropology versus economics) and *intradisciplinary* (e.g. neo- versus classical Marxists, Escobar versus Ziai's interpretation of Foucault).

The divides regarding what *is* and *is not* considered legitimate development knowledge expose an ensuing *structure and location* of this embedded development knowledge. Building on its baseline normativity, its structure entails a multidisciplinary field grafted onto social science. Contributions are thus observed here across anthropology, economics, geography, politics, sociology and other multidisciplinary fields (e.g. environmental, gender, global, peace, postcolonial studies). Contrasting this was the relative absence from the humanities (e.g. history, philosophy)—rather conspicuous given our focus on history and historiography. Instead,

---

[509] K. Polanyi, *The great transformation: the political and economic origins of our times* (Toronto: Rinehart, 1944). See also related extensions in P.B. Evans, *Embedded autonomy: states and industrial transformation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); J.G. Ruggie, 'International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order', *International organization* 36.2 (1982): 379-415.

[510] Hammarskjöld, *Markings,* p. 63.

history and philosophy more often enter development studies via social science. In the present case, post-structuralism is imported here by scholars with explicit anthropological interests if not affiliations. Rist and Escobar, for example, both frame their histories in terms of the 'anthropology of modernity'.[511] Similarly, essay two finds a historical materialism imported via Marxist sociology, just as essay one finds the growing use of cliometric methods imported via economics. Despite postdevelopment's likely dissatisfaction, postdevelopment and its surrounding development discourse are hence framed here as an *applied social science.*

Added to this is the location of development's social sciences and scholars, themselves. Following its categorical schema of developed versus developing societies, the former is the site of knowledge production; the latter the site of its consumption. This divide is especially evident when comparing the *geography examined* to the *geography of its examiners*.

Little on Earth seems to escape development studies' grasp, but its reach is testament to not some global forum of scholars so much as to the great heights of its ivory towers. Namely, it is Western watchtowers that dominate this scene, with even the non-Western scholars seen here overwhelmingly based in Western universities (e.g. Escobar in the US, Rahnema in the US and France, Larrain in the UK, Somjee in the UK and Canada). Thus leading to Somjee's description in essay two of 'development expatriates' in development's intellectual history, this Anglophone historiography's cosmopolitan ranks belie clear institutional roots in the West—including postdevelopment's own scholars, themselves. Beyond Escobar (US) and Rahnema (US, France), Rist is based at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, Sachs at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Essen, Germany, and Bawtree independently in France. Notably, Escobar, Rahnema, and Sachs all share roots in UC Berkeley, but not a single member is primarily based in non-Western academic institutions. Whether this is a sign of its culpability/co-option in an ivory-clad Western echo chamber or an intentional strategy to subvert Western academic discourse, again, remains wholly open to interpretation.

To recap, this view of embedded development highlights the *normativity, structure,* and *location* of academic development knowledge. Recast as an applied social science produced in Western institutions and forms, it upends the common view of development as the application of global knowledge to local contexts. Rather, it entails more the export of local knowledge to global contexts. In an ironic twist, so too does this apply to postdevelopment theory, itself. If postwar development pioneers had their backward economies and Marxist New Left intellectuals had their Third World, then new Foucauldian radical intellectuals now have the Global South. An old wine finds itself in new bottles—including those drunk in postdevelopment, itself. The ensuing reproduction of a fragmented and polemical development

---

[511] See 'About the author' in Rist, *The history of development* (no page number): 'One of his principle intellectual interests has been to construct an anthropology of modernity in which he sees Western society as being every bit as traditional and indeed exotic as any other.'

See also the first chapter ('Introduction: development and the anthropology of modernity') of Escobar, *Encountering development,* pp. 3-20.

literature illustrates the extent to which its knowledge (both mainstream *and* critical/radical) remains subject to immediate disciplinary and geographical biases—albeit in diverse and non-deterministic ways.

Development studies is consequently framed here as a dynamic (if not forgetful) and loosely-knit enterprise. Its fragmentation adds hazards of institutional amnesia, lost research efficiencies, and rebottled development panaceas. The ensuing polemics further speak of an unwitting (or perhaps even willed) negligence when utilising development's past. This applies to postdevelopment narratives, as well, which decidedly distance postdevelopment from prior radical neo-Marxist predecessors. Far from ideal visions of interdisciplinary, international, and intergenerational communication, these essays thus instead find closed or siloed efforts in development's historiography. Laden with implicit *a priori* aims (e.g. policy-based evidence versus evidence-based policy; deterministic views of development in all its liberal, Marxist, and post-structuralist flavours), its interdisciplinary rifts are only compounded by international and intergenerational divides.

Embedded development and what can also be termed the **embedded university** hence outline a normative and highly contested development knowledge. From its problems to its approach and answers, its knowledge is conditioned by the waters in which it originates. Traced here to social science and a Western constellation of ideas and institutions, who does development serve? With its ivory towers cast less as global observatories and more as echo chambers, claims of its global remit are deflated as *particular* and not *de facto* universals. This view of embedded development thus exposes an ensuing *politics* manifest in struggles over the control of development knowledge. Amidst development's many societies, whose ideas matter? Or to recall Robert Chambers, who shares a critical epistemology but not the moral renunciations of postdevelopment, whose reality counts?[512]

---

[512] Chambers, *Whose reality counts?*.

6. Postdevelopment in practice

The social nature of development knowledge informs a deeper appreciation—both in its contributions and limits—of postdevelopment's past and present significance. With this deeper understanding in hand, we now turn to the final consideration of its practical implications. As cast in postdevelopment critiques, development encompasses a broad base of stakeholders. From its ivory tower scholars to state technocrats, tribal elders, and grassroots activists, the observed development discourse is host to a diversity of practical standpoints. In order to attempt a more nuanced analysis, the following considerations are thus disaggregated across three key stakeholders populating postdevelopment views; namely, that of development scholars, policymakers, and civil society. Further, its implications are considered in the contexts of those that postdevelopment theorists intend to benefit the most; that is, Southern and broader subaltern actors.

6.1 Implications for development scholars

To start, postdevelopment's views on power and knowledge render powerful implications for development scholars. Manifest in two forms, the first practical implication lies in exposing the hidden contours and ingrained politics of the development discourse. Enabled through an epistemological lens tracing knowledge to power, it offers a valuable exercise in *mapping development theory's uneven and unseen political terrain.*

In particular, it sheds light on tacit rules in the development discourse, which enforce an adherence to Western norms. Manifest in development's ideas or ideologies, this reveal is especially valuable for outside scholars not yet initiated in development's highly formalised (i.e. esoteric) language and rules; a warning for those unknowingly diving into the Western 'development game'.[513] Even if able to engage fluently with development's language games, their geographical and institutional affiliations may render further handicaps in the reception and perceived legitimacy of their ideas.

By dispelling some of development's rosy glow, postdevelopment's critiques thus foster the possibility of 'polyvalent' uses of the development discourse.[514] In non-Foucauldian terms, it paves the way for non-conventional tactics and possible loopholes to harness, hijack, or exploit the development discourse in unanticipated ways. Amidst Southern and subaltern struggles for recognition, it offers a rare tool to help navigate development's global discourse. At a minimum, it inoculates against a falling out or disenchantment with development; for it entails an illusion from the very start. Mapping a development discourse that was always more

---

[513] See L. Frank, 'The development game', in *The post-development reader,* Eds. Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree, 263-73 (London: Zed Books, 1997).

[514] A. Ziai, *Development discourses and global history: from colonialism to the Sustainable Development Goals* (London: Routledge, 2016).

about the 'First World' than the 'Third', it tempers expectations to foster more critical (and potentially productive) points of departure.

In particular, its 'subversive' methods prove valuable by opening the door to deeper questions regarding the nature and politics of not only international development, but also its underlying social sciences. Regardless of where one stands in regard to its moral dichotomies (e.g. the irredeemability of development, the insidious nature of economic science), it opens an important space for scrutiny. Namely, it steers attention to not just development countries or societies, but also to the embedded role of development studies, itself. To what extent is it an effective (or alternatively, misled) endeavour? Stimulating more reflection or reflexivity on how development scholars have theorised development and why, it swaps development societies for development studies, itself, as the key source of problems and site for necessary interventions.

Whether this reflection on development theory, itself, culminates in prescriptions for more reformist versus radical/revolutionary changes is, of course, a central topic of debate. Yet, these discussions alone are already valuable, in bringing deeper and discomforting issues to surface. Particularly for those operating beyond its Western bounds (e.g. non-scientific, non-Western, and/or un-'disciplined' scholars), its critiques illuminate an uneven playing field. In doing so, it aids development expats, to borrow from Somjee, in overcoming unspoken methodological barriers faced within the subject, itself. Such debates further seem increasingly necessary, given the chronic trials and travails that persist in a tenacious development age.

The second practical implication of this lies in *ringfencing a space for development alternatives*. Amidst these geopolitical contexts, Southern scholars occupy the unenviable position of standing at the periphery of a global academic arena. Here, postdevelopment's achievements in establishing a radical space for theoretical alternatives serves an instrumental role not unlike that of neo-Marxism during the Cold War. Its diversity of encompassed actors and theoretical perspectives reveals its use, at times, as a catch-all for critical, radical, or heterodox approaches. Thus the need from the beginning of this essay to explicitly define its empirical bounds in *first-generation* postdevelopment. Again, it does not hold a monopoly on critical, radical, or heterodox views (e.g. critical geography, heterodox economics).[515] Yet, it has served to offer a rare shelter for non-mainstream views—albeit of a certain type.

Preferencing views that align with its own ontological and moral perspectives (e.g. subaltern over elites, activists over technocrats, local over scientific knowledge), its criteria seem to shift when it comes to epistemologies. Namely, its methodological criteria for entry into the postdevelopment club seem comparatively open or lax. Thus, debates over whose version of

---

[515] See, for example, alternative approaches in the *radical geography* of Peet, the *critical geography* of Harvey, and the *heterodox economics* of Chang. In H.J. Chang, *Kicking away the ladder* (London: Anthem Press, 2003); D. Harvey, *The condition of postmodernity: an enquiry into the origins of cultural change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); R. Peet, *Global capitalism: theories of societal development* (London: Routledge, 1993).

Foucault is more faithful or rigorous come juxtaposed with Rahnema's boasts of 'an "illiterate" sage' or tribal elder ('one of our most exceptional guests') in *The post-development reader*.[516] On one hand, this offers both shelter and a more inclusive point of entry into an otherwise scientific and exclusionary academic discourse. On the other, it renders major challenges for maintaining consistency and coherency across its many debates—not unlike those faced in (and felling) neo-Marxist theory. A double-edged sword, postdevelopment's defence of local grassroots knowledge and Southern perspectives offers an inclusive space for under-represented voices, nonetheless.

In the wake of the implosion of neo-Marxism, postdevelopment's remarkable success within development studies thus spells security for the diverse scholars falling under its aegis; a success that again brings the paradox of whether postdevelopment has contributed more to development's life than death. Yet, amidst the uneven geopolitical terrain of global academia, the matter of postdevelopment's survival may be less concerning than their own. In an arena where the rules are predominantly determined by those tied to power, postdevelopment offers a basic but valuable means for getting one's voice heard. Examples can thus be cited in the 'foreign' (i.e. non-Anglophone) ideas found across its periphery of non-Western thought— from the aforementioned *buen vivir* and *ubuntu* to *swaraj* and *décroissance*.

6.2 For development policymakers

In contrast to the prior scholars, tracing postdevelopment's implications for policymakers leaves one in a rather awkward bind. On one hand, Southern policymakers also face inherent barriers and constraints in the development discourse—albeit, of a more concrete and less theoretical type. This includes constraints in finances, institutional capacity, natural resources, technological capabilities, and general limits in available space to manoeuvre in domestic and foreign policy. Yet, amidst these suboptimal contexts, Southern policymakers face a rather cold reception in postdevelopment's worldview; namely, as a face of the enemy.

In contrast to an embrace of Southern scholars, policymakers ally to a more technocratic class. Along with their scientific scholarly accomplices and their patron elites, they appear to bear the brunt of postdevelopment's wrath. From a postdevelopment perspective, this may be obvious. Policymakers, after all, are state actors. By definition, they are antithetical to the postdevelopment's subaltern interests. A development policymaker's Southern location only attests to the global reach of this postcolonial illusion. As cast in Escobar and Rist's historical narratives, Southern elites are just as culpable for evangelising the development myths of their First World counterparts. Enforcing top-down views that oppress those below, they stand at the opposite end of a moral axis favouring bottom-up politics. Part of the bureaucratic machine, Southern policymakers have a role in the suppression of subaltern voices.

---

[516] Rahnema, 'Introduction', p. xii.

It would thus seem that 'Southern' falls beneath 'subaltern' in postdevelopment's list of priorities, recalling familiar echoes in Northern versus Southern feminist perspectives or former New Left versus Third World politics. As such, it is difficult to skein explicit practical contributions for the policymaker. This is, not least of all, due to postdevelopment not being designed *for* the policymaker; rather, more *against*. Yet, value may still remain if removed of its less sympathetic moral judgments. In particular, its ontological mapping of local, national, and global actors across both material *and* mental domains offers yet another guide—as was the case for scholars—for deriving practical action. This is furthered by the comprehensive histories contributed by postdevelopment scholars, which highlight the discursive politics that Southern policymakers engage in—whether knowingly or not. Bolstered by epistemological views tying knowledge to power, it contributes to the policymaker's ability to find polyvalent uses of the development system.

There is hence nothing stopping policymakers from utilising postdevelopment for their own ends—a polyvalence turned on postdevelopment, itself. Yet, it should also be reminded that its critiques are not entirely exclusive to postdevelopment. Just as postdevelopment does not hold a monopoly over critical, radical, or otherwise heterodox development thought, so too can alternative heuristic frameworks be found to guide policy decisions. Examples from the prior essays include those of dependency theory, world-systems theory, and broader neo-Marxist analyses of ideology. One can even point to eerily similar precedents to be found in Somjee's concept of 'ethnodevelopment' from essay two. As such, there would seem to be little need to deal with postdevelopment's limitations amidst less punitive alternatives.

These less-than-ideal circumstances spur further questions on how to operationalise postdevelopment. For one, where do the boundaries lie between the global and national versus the local? For example, while a minister or high-level bureaucrat may make for an obvious target, what about local officials or appointed community leaders? How local is local enough, and where do the borders of the subaltern begin and end? Further, to what extent are government and grassroots interests inimical or mutually exclusive? If their interests align or overlap, to what extent is collusion with what is essentially the enemy permissible? How much radicalism or grassroots character is warranted to be enough?

An example of these dilemmas can be illustrated in the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Critiqued for being derived through a highly exclusionary and non-transparent process, postdevelopment highlights its failures to engage with global civil society. Rist thus casts the MDGs as but a reincarnation of old development ideologies in a new superficial semantic form.[517] And indeed, such critiques inform the ensuing Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that subsequently replace the MDGs, from its 2002 Johannesburg

---

[517] See chapter 13 (' From the Struggle against Poverty to the Millennium Development Goals') since added in revised editions; G. Rist, *The history of development,* 3rd edition (London: Zed Books, 2008), pp. 226-39.

Declaration from the World Summit on Sustainable Development to the decentralisation or devolution of its consultative process via an open 30-member working group.

Yet, this is not deemed sufficient nor noteworthy, with the SDGs this time cast by Sachs as 'delusional' and a capitalist 'self-illusion'.[518] How far, then, must policymakers go to satisfy their postdevelopment critics? To what extent must (inter-)national policy be devolved to the people? To what extent is it politically feasible, and will it only be sufficient if the state gives up control in its entirety? Or are the MDGs, SDGs, and other policies deemed futile simply due to their affiliations to the UN; doomed from the start? Can states satisfy postdevelopment demands for local empowerment, or is the very idea inimical or deemed impossible in postdevelopment's worldviews? Beyond what this says of development's policymakers, what does this say about postdevelopment's own theorists, themselves?

All considered, Southern policymakers may thus have less to gain and more to lose from postdevelopment's success. In painting policymakers as an antagonist, postdevelopment adds further constraints to the already-limited political resources of Southern states. This, again, would be of no surprise to postdevelopment arguments; rather, one of the aims. But if embraced by both scholars and civil society, would this not translate into a call to devolve state power in a geopolitical arena where Southern governments already face disadvantages against external threats?

In this regard, postdevelopment shares an uncanny similarity with their neoliberal archenemies in a shared distaste for state power. Though framed in different terms (e.g. deadweight loss and economic freedoms versus structural violence and grassroots movements), the state presents a barrier to the better worlds envisioned by both postdevelopment and neoliberalism. Proposed here is some utopian form of democracy, albeit suspended in different ontological, moral, and epistemological scaffolds (i.e. scientific, technical, and universal solutions versus local, subjective, and pluriversal ones).

Caught in the crossfire, Southern policymakers thus risk fighting an uphill battle on two fronts—domestic and international—at the same time. Amidst external constraints, such an insistence on anti-state views at home leaves policymakers with not one, but both hands tied behind their backs. And all the while, 'neo-liberals take advantage of their aid and sing the praises of capitalism, the free market forces and the brilliant industrial prospects of the whole of the third world'.[519]

---

[518] See W. Sachs, 'The Sustainable Development Goals and *Laudato si*: varieties of post-development?', *Third World Quarterly* 38.12 (2017): 2573-87.

[519] To echo Larrain's closing lines in *Theories of development,* p. 211.

6.3 For grassroots activists and civil society

The final standpoint of civil society offers perhaps the most interesting contexts of the three. If policymakers are cast as the enemy, then civil society—in particular, grassroots movements and social activists—are cast as the protagonists in postdevelopment's play. As with both prior contexts, postdevelopment stands to offer valuable insights here for navigating the development discourse. In particular, its explicit adoption of grassroots interests offers academic *hinterland* to counter subaltern constraints.

One such manifestation is in offering political legitimacy and in training new students and anti-development activists. In this regard, postdevelopment has been a remarkable success in its pedagogical achievements in development studies curricula and classrooms. This can further be offered as evidence of its powerful ability to subvert its target: the development discourse. At the same time, the same moral critiques of development working against state power and global hegemony and in favour of civil society may offer but a siren call—as seductive as it is fatal. Although Southern and subaltern activists may be the heroes in postdevelopment, its moral commitments risk leaving civil society more disempowered and vulnerable than before. Namely, three challenges are highlighted here.

One is an idealistic conception or romanticisation of local actors and local knowledge. When taken to the extreme, its reliance on grassroots and popular movements for political solutions is incongruous to the unideal political realities that they face. 'Local' or 'grassroots' risks becoming just another development panacea amidst an international system of unequal nation-states—a system that postdevelopment is quick to highlight, itself. Added to its prophesied development demise, one can note teleological strands underlying postdevelopment's historical and moral worldviews and an abstract 'radical activism' as the source of forthcoming liberation (i.e. a postdevelopment era).

Second is a persistent scepticism or fear of centralised power that, on its own, is not necessarily problematic. However, its particular manifestation here in an *essential* standoff between politics at the local level versus national and international levels can lead to a dangerous depoliticisation of its own. By holding the two sides in constant and *necessary* conflict, an ensuing hazard arises in fostering the false notion that local movements can be divorced from national and global ones. This, in turn, can render self-defeating forms of politics, which deny the possibility and need for political coordination and collective action beyond the local level. As addressed in the earlier uncanny similarities with neoliberalism, both hold a deep scepticism of centralised state power.

Finally, the third and most fundamental risk lies in a postdevelopment stance that might be described as passionate or driven on one hand, yet polemical or dogmatic on the other. The risk, here, is of postdevelopment activists falling into ideological commitments as dogmatic as their neoliberal arch-enemies (and oft-forgotten neo-Marxist predecessors). Coinciding

with the risks of engendering a fatalism with regards to larger political institutions, left at stake is the ability to be flexible or pragmatic in the face of unideal political realities beyond the classroom. Consequently, while Southern and subaltern local actors should gain the most from postdevelopment in theory, its theoretical commitments render potential dangers of falling into another dogmatic radicalism with fatalistic, self-annihilating practical implications.

7. Conclusion

Starting in postdevelopment's philosophical and historical premises, this retrospective has re-situated it in not only its own philosophical and historical contexts, but also in those of its surrounding development discourse. Rendering a view called embedded development, it bears a deeper appreciation for postdevelopment's contributions and ensuing conundrums. Explored here in its practical implications for development scholars, policymakers, and civil society, a recurring theme has been an intrinsic value attributed to its post-structuralist framing and an instrumental value attributed to its larger role in buttressing a space for alternative in a post-Cold War intellectual space.

It potential implications, however, remain decidedly mixed. Its moral, ontological, and epistemological commitments render a postdevelopment logic scaffold or worldview that offer a sort of double-edged sword. As with any tool, its effects very much depend on how it is wielded. Despite its particularly controversial moral commitments, its latter ontological and epistemological premises offer a novel—if not provocative—take on development. Explicitly tying together political relations across development's material and ideational spheres, it especially promotes awareness of the deeper barriers faced by Southern and subaltern actors.

On the other hand, however, its particular way of framing and moralising development actors and their ensuing conflicts may ultimately prove less than practical. To cite one critic:

> These discourses usually have a prophetic connotation, which makes it possible to accept an indefinite postponement of the achievements that they have predicted and are continuing to pursue. But, as development as an objective does not seem to materialize, the obstacles are presented as justifying *a fortiori* the existence of these very development organizations, at the same time as bestowing the aura of heroes upon them. *[...]* Given all the phenomena that can be considered as 'obstacles', the organization's image appears both more impressive (hence acquiring more legitimacy) and more vulnerable (therefore needing more support). The ambivalence of this image helps it to organize its own reproduction successfully.[520]

---

[520] In Rahnema and Bawtree, *The post-development reader,* p. 84. Original by Marie-Dominique Perrot, in G. Rist and F. Sabelli, *Il était une fois le développement* (Lausanne: D'en Bas, 1986), p. 104-6

This *postdevelopment* critique strikes an unsettling cognitive dissonance; not for what it says, but by *who* says it and about *whom*. In this case constituting a postdevelopment critique of the development discourse, it could just as easily be mistaken with the modification of a few terms to a critique of postdevelopment's own discourse, itself.

Like past attempts to deduce a logic in history (e.g. Rostovian modernisation theory, Marxist historical materialism), past phases of takeoff/growth or capitalism/socialism are echoed in postdevelopment's own vision of a development/postdevelopment era. Indeed, switch 'development' for 'postdevelopment' and 'development organisations' for 'postdevelopment ideas' in the prior excerpt, and it could be easily misread as a critique of postdevelopment's own reproductive cycle, itself.

This is not to fall into categorical judgements in either direction, but rather to highlight the productive and the potentially problematic premises to be found within postdevelopment. Regardless of one's intellectual or political affiliations, postdevelopment opens the door to deeper questions and structural problems in international development and social science. And indeed, as postdevelopment analyses warn, an accompanying hyper- and pessimistic activism also lends well to mediating the risks of producing a (post)development discourse that can, at-times, seem designed to serve but not necessarily *listen* to its Southern and subaltern actors.[521]

There are of course many caveats to point out in regard to this essay's assessment. For one, the starting philosophical premises in postdevelopment's epistemological, ontological, and moral views are open to contestation. Further, in being limited to the orthodox or classical postdevelopment, there is no reason to believe that present and future forms of postdevelopment are not open for modification. Correspondingly, this essay closes with a consideration of potential future direction for postdevelopment. Its contributions and controversies thus considered, this essay highlights four potential trajectories for postdevelopment theory:

(1) One is a baseline conservative approach, wherein postdevelopment stays as it is. Development may not have died yet, but it is coming. One might place Escobar, Esteva, Rist, and Sachs here.

(2) A second is a reformist approach, wherein parts of postdevelopment are revised or refined in order to be more efficacious. Here, one might locate Ziai, who has refined the post-structuralism bases of discourse analysis relative to Escobar, and has thrown out some of its prescriptive arguments in the process.[522]

---

[521] See, for example, T. Mkandawire, 'Running while others walk: knowledge and the challenge of Africa's development', *Africa Development* 36.2 (2010): 1-36.

[522] Ziai, *Development discourse;* Ziai, 'The ambivalence of post-development'.

(3) A third approach would entail salvaging sections of postdevelopment theory for use elsewhere. This could entail just partially abiding by postdevelopment theory, or explicitly integrating it into other theories. An example here might be found in recent work by Kapoor, who finds value in postdevelopment's understanding of power and discourse production, but finds the approach, on the whole, unprofitable.[523]

(4) Finally, a fourth approach might be to let postdevelopment expand as a wider space for critical and creative theory. Here, one might locate scholars who have engaged with postdevelopment from the periphery and find some creative stimulus from it. Pieterse stands as one example of such an approach.[524]

Much of the contributions traced here can be attributed to the efforts of postdevelopment pioneers blazing the first path. Viewed in historical context, they have done a great service; for they have opened the door to new development alternatives (or alternatives *to* development) in a time when said space seemed to be rapidly closing. Ultimately, however, its predominant focus on development critiques is not enough if one is to construct new possibilities beyond deconstructing the old.

Given the practical limits faced in its more canonical views, this essay thus suggests a greater need to allocate efforts toward the latter three paths in order to deepen its search for more *practical* alternatives. Possible contributions have thus been noted from not only postdevelopment, but also across the contributions to be found in development's longer intellectual history. As such, further work in the direction may entail a departure from some of postdevelopment's more orthodox views. In this regard, paying respect to postdevelopment's pioneers for their significant contributions may also entail stepping through the door to new possibilities that they have held open all this time—and in doing so, saying thank you and leaving them behind.

---

[523] Kapoor, 'Cold critique'.

[524] Pieterse, 'After post-development'; Pieterse, *Development theory;* Pieterse, 'My paradigm or yours?'.

Conclusion

1. Seeing the forest (森) **for the trees** (木)**: a retrospective**

Having sifted through these chapters, what can be drawn from them as a whole? Stepping back from their fine-grained analyses, this section presents a larger retrospective. More than a mere summary, it highlights three cross-cutting findings synthesised across these respective works. Extending into the social and political nature of development knowledge and into the broader historiography, it starts with a big picture view of their collective empirical grounds.

1.1 A bird's-eye view of the empirical terrain

These essays' extensive forays into the English-language development literature warrant a brief recap here. Faced with a dearth in reliable and comprehensive development histories, essay one (i.e. chapter one) thus starts by asking how development scholars use history. *What is the nature and extent of historical awareness in the development discourse? Does the development discourse learn from history, including its own?* To respond, it samples 136 history oriented articles from ten top development journals. Spanning 1952–2016, they evidence how historical aims, ensuing methods, and host journals change over time. Altogether, they evidence two modes in which the development discourse attempts to learn from history. The first lies in a positivistic use of external histories as empirical evidence for a variety of development issues. This is the predominant mode exhibited in the survey. A second mode lies in the use of internal histories of the development discourse, itself. Producing its sampled anti-positivist critiques, the essay closes with the image of an agile but forgetful discourse with a growing positivist (e.g. 'neoliberal', 'quantitative') orientation. A number of consequences are considered, ultimately responding to the legitimacy, efficacy, and sustainability of development action. It thus finds a development journal discourse that is adept at learning from histories of developing societies, but necessarily from development studies' own. Disparate past works, however, suggest it can, and a case is made for why it must if the field is to speak of a progress in development knowledge.

Essay two (i.e. chapter two) complements the above journal articles with a set of history textbooks. Asking *how development scholars have written the history of development, itself,* this study compiles an extensive historiographical database of development studies history books. It then produces preliminary findings of a sudden historical turn in publication activity in the mid-1990s and the existence of a lesser known body of work prior to that. Focusing on the latter Cold War works given the dominance of the former post-Cold War historiography, it examines a core sample of four history books and authors spanning 1982–1991. Resituated in the larger contexts shaping not only their narratives but also their authors since the 1950s, it recovers the forgotten significance of prior debates regarding the Third World. In particular manifest in a wide umbrella of neo-Marxist development theories, they illustrate the complex international and interdisciplinary ties underlying this historiography's political divides (e.g. New Left versus Third World versus neoliberalism). In particular, these histories reanimate a geopolitics in development theory channelled through Western social science. Yet, these features and indeed their host histories, themselves, go forgotten and unknowingly rediscovered amidst this fragmented and polemical development historiography. Consequently, the essay closes with a call for a historiographical turn. Bridging history and development studies, it highlights the need for greater historical awareness or reflexivity if development studies is to reign in its uses (and abuses) of history.

Essay three (i.e. chapter three) finally closes with a more philosophical turn, focusing on unpacking the key premises or logic scaffold underpinning postdevelopment. It opens under the premises of a curious state in postdevelopment theory; one in which it has succeeded to rapidly establish itself in the very subject which it purportedly seeks to end. *Calling for the death of development while simultaneously contributing to its life, how is one to make sense of this seeming contradiction?* Does postdevelopment's high status in development studies, intellectual metropole to its purported development empire, spell its co-option or a successful *coup d'état*? To respond, this essay deconstructs postdevelopment theory, unpacking the philosophical tenets in its logic scaffold to its historical contexts and practical consequences. Centred on four canonical texts in classical postdevelopment from 1992–1997, they retrace a set of seminal (post-)development scholars as they formulate a response to unfolding post-Cold War contexts. The ensuing retrospective of its contributions (e.g. development's discursive formations, ties between knowledge and power) enables an ensuing view of an embedded development—shortly to be revisited. Presenting a novel post-structuralist approach within development studies contexts, the essay then considers its effects for academia, public policy, and civil society. Noting contributions to be found from the stance of Southern and subaltern scholars, postdevelopment's moral commitments yet remain highly problematic for policy-makers and civil society. It thus closes with some inherent ironies, whether in potentially disempowering its very own heroes (e.g. grassroots movements, activists), its echoes of past and

present teleological commitments (e.g. anti-state views of neoliberalism, historical phases of capitalism), and the Western social science origins of its anti-Western and anti-social science critiques (e.g. Foucauldian post-structuralism in anthropology). Added to starting observations of its success in a field which it seeks to end, the essay thus considers some potential directions for building *upon*—but not necessarily from *within*—postdevelopment's notable contributions.

Together, these chapters offer *the most extensive study of the Anglophone development historiography to date*. This statement will hardly excite many, be it in indignation or praise. Indeed, PhDs are known for their narrow expertise on esoteric topics. Yet, big things come from small beginnings. The densely packed analyses and empirical grounds amassed here give rise to larger findings—the silhouettes of which will now return to view.

1.2 A geography of knowledge: super-scaffolds and embedded development

A first key finding is observed in a dominant trifecta of logic scaffolds (or **super-scaffolds**) in development's social sciences. Driving its historiographical fragmentation and polemics, they were classified into *scientific positivist (SP)* and *post-structuralist (PS)* scaffolds, with the former divided into *Marxist (SP_M)* and liberal *(SP_L)* types. Rooted in competing Marxist versus liberal (or bourgeois) conceptions of social science, essay one thus documents the growing presence of SP-scaffolds in development's journal literature. Seen in its anti-positivist critiques against both Marxist and liberal types, they betray development's Cold War political-*cum*-intellectual affiliations. Yet, these rival liberal and Marxist scaffolds still share in a positivist faith. Traced in more detail in essay two, this entails not just the possibility of development, but the possibility of an objective knowledge *of* it. Echoing precedents in philosophical realism and positivism, the path to said knowledge is further blazed by *science*—albeit manifesting here in conflicting forms.[525]

With essay two tracing the rise and fall of Marxist (SP_M) scaffolds, its dismantlement by internal academic critiques is well over by the time the Berlin Wall falls. The ensuing political and intellectual vacuum then finds new life in a post-structuralist scaffold imported by postdevelopment. Traced in detail in essay three, this entails a deliberate subversion or reversal of scientific positivist positions. Development hence flips from being good to evil, with the possibility of development and a universal scientific knowledge deemed as futile. This antithetical faith renders a scepticism, at-times bordering on nihilism, echoing the idea of progress reviewed in the introduction. Here, it entails a denouncement of development as imperialistic and irredeemable. It also marks a handover from Marx to Foucault as Western academic radicalism's new intellectual-political figurehead.

---

[525] See B. Russell, *Our knowledge of the external world as a field for scientific method in philosophy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1922[1914]); A. Comte's *A general view of positivism* (London: Trübner and Co., 1865[1848]).

The entrance of postdevelopment thus casts a new post-Cold War ideological divide; its 'mainstream' SP-scaffolds (e.g. in economics, political science) finding a new archnemesis in 'critical' PS-scaffolds (e.g. in anthropology, geography) in development's social sciences. These three {SP_L, SP_M, PS} super-scaffolds thus sample particular patterns, paradigms, or *sagobangsik* framing how social science scholars view and consequently affect the world. Though not the *only* better worlds populating development and social science, they are by far the *most predominant* within the limited Anglophone scholarship examined here.

This trifecta of super-scaffolds in development theory and Western social science then open a window into how these ideas and architects of the better world were not only shaping, but also shaped *by* their times. Cast in essay three's **embedded development**, it emphasises the sociality or social nature of development knowledge—much as Polanyi's *embedded market* resituates the economy (over international development and the university) in society.[526]

Despite its seemingly consistent semantic form (i.e. 'development'), its contents remain anchored *in* (and not *outside* of) development's diverse social contexts. What we humans call 'development' is but a semantic vessel in which we place all manner of things—good, bad, or evil. 'There are absolutely no moral phenomena, only a moral interpretation of the phenomena', to borrow from Nietzsche.[527] These three super-scaffolds offer a concrete demonstration of this inner diversity in the moral phenomenon known as 'development'. The circumstances observed here surrounding these three super-scaffolds further enable observations regarding the social and political contexts in its social sciences.

Examples manifest here in a Western New Left appropriating Third World contexts; more about Mao-*isms* than about Mao, so to speak. Or in the contexts of dependency theory, ultimately boiling down more to competing Marx-*isms* (e.g. neo-, classical) than about their purported Third World contents. The ensuing debates regarding what *is* and *is not* considered legitimate development knowledge (e.g. social scientists versus tribal elders; competing versions of Smith, Marx, or Foucault) reveal an ensuing structure and location of this embedded development knowledge. Namely, embedded development is cast as an applied social science, operating in Western academia and applied to developing societies (Figure 1, next page).

The social norms tied to both development theory's production and its consumption thus extend across both interdisciplinary and international terrain. Here, Western social science acts as a key interlocutor of 'proper' development ideas, based on historical and philosophical premises that rely heavily on Western realities. Manifesting in a highly fragmented and at-times polemical historiography, their underlying logic scaffolds are further affiliated to particular

---

[526] K. Polanyi, *The great transformation: the political and economic origins of our times* (Toronto: Rinehart, 1944). See also related extensions in P.B. Evans, *Embedded autonomy: states and industrial transformation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); J.G. Ruggie, 'International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order', *International organization* 36.2 (1982): 379-415.

[527] F.W. Nietzsche, *Beyond good and evil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001[1886]), p.64.

social sciences. Thus, sociology becomes a conduit for Marxist historical materialist views in development, just as economics brings in the scientific historian's cliometrics and anthropology, the post-structuralism manifest in postdevelopment.

Figure 1. A basic schematic of the structure and location of development studies knowledge

The geographical location of this embedded development becomes especially notable when revisiting the *geography examined* to the *geography of examiners.* While little on Earth may escape development studies' grasp, its reach is testament more to the great heights of its ivory towers than to some inclusive forum of global scholars. Namely, it is Western watchtowers that dominate this scene, with even the non-Western scholars here based primarily in Western universities (e.g. Escobar in the US, Larrain in the UK, Rahnema in the US and France, Somjee in the UK and Canada). Thus leading Somjee to dedicate a category to 'development expatriates' in his intellectual history, this Anglophone historiography's cosmopolitan ranks belie its location in a Western constellation of ideas and institutions.[528]

In a way, these views of an embedded development may seem rather obvious. Is it not sensible for those who have succeeded at development to teach it? Their universities offer greater capacity for knowledge production—otherwise infeasible, if not inefficient, amidst developing society constraints. Hence, the remit of development assistance, transferring not only money and material goods, but also knowledge (i.e. 'technical assistance'). There is thus little reason to find its basis in Western institutional contexts *necessarily* problematic. Indeed, in an ideal world, this should pose no problem; a world with a free exchange of ideas, equality in opportunities to be heard, and a meritocratic means to adjudicate knowledge. But to cite an apocryphal quote from Yogi Berra, 'In theory, there is no difference between theory and reality. In reality, there is.' The crux of embedded development is to bring society back in, and doing so reminds of the many realities bound to the life of development knowledge.

---

[528] Somjee, *Development theory.*

For one, its normativity destabilises the notion that those who succeed in development are best fit to teach it, for its very goalposts and social grounds shift across space and time. What one defines as development holds no guarantee of applying for others. 'But that is fine,' one might respond, 'then just bring other societies back in'. If the past offers any indication, however, this is more easily said than done. Geared towards *one-way* flows of knowledge from developed to developing, development studies was hence termed an *applied* (versus *practical)* social science. Much less prevalent is an unfettered import of 'developing' realities back into 'developed' social science theories. This is not to say that global development knowledge is impossible, but rather that it is far more problematic than it may first seem.

Alternatively, one could also point out inherent sample set biases in the Anglophone literature. Of course its ideas will reflect more Western contexts, given the sources involved. These findings do, indeed, agree with the above statement. However, this would then imply limits to the notion of an English-language academic scholarship as being globally inclusive as a present-day *lingua franca*. On the contrary, it can raise borders (e.g. for 'foreign' scholars) just as it might elsewhere lower them (e.g. for native English-language scholars) in the world of academic development ideas. As highlighted prior, even a more cosmopolitan authorship does not imply cosmopolitan operating grounds; hence, Somjee' s 'development expatriates'.

The operations of an embedded development observed in these three essays thus raise fundamental concerns regarding *the present state of development knowledge*. Deviating from optimistic or Whiggish notions of an inexorable growth in knowledge over time, these studies find more evidence of collapse (e.g. the Marxist impasse and fall of dependency theory; birth, life, and death of development economics).[529] Neither monolithic nor static, development knowledge stems from a vast and dynamic array of efforts. Rather than unified, constructive swells in the accumulation of knowledge, it bears more semblance to raindrops on the surface of a pond. A scattering of ripples across space and time, they evoke a transience in development knowledge. Beneath the surface of common-sense talk of development thus lies an unspoken volatility in the very meaning of the term. Stirred by deeper sociopolitical currents, this is most evident here in the Cold War geopolitics coursing through development's veins. Trying to grab a hold of its stable semantic form thus only gives way to its fluid meanings or substance, easily slipping through one's grasp.

All combined, these particular liberal, Marxist, and post-structuralist manifestations of development flip a common view of development on its head. Namely, these essays trace not the local application of a global development knowledge. Rather, they trace the global export of a *local* development knowledge. More pointedly, its social science genealogies place its

[529] D. Booth, 'Marxism and development sociology: interpreting the impasse', *World Development* 13.7 (1985): 761-87; C. Leys, *The rise and fall of development theory* (London: James Currey, 1996); D. Seers, 'The birth, life and death of development economics (revisiting a Manchester conference)', *Development and Change* 10.4 (1979): 707-19.

predominating ideas in a Western constellation of institutions and ideologies. As seen in this historiography's fragmentation and polemics, its knowledge remains highly subject to local disciplinary and geographical biases (e.g. methodological nationalism). Hardly produced in some vacuum of objectivity, these narratives are very much shaped by their narrators' places and times. As concluded in essay two, these histories of development's politics unwittingly serve to illustrate said politics through its historiography, itself. As time capsules preserving the metaphysical waters of their respective times, they thus enable a larger view of an ensuing politics in development knowledge.

1.3 The politics of development knowledge: the development game

The social contexts of embedded development help parse an ensuing *politics* of development knowledge. Politics, to recall, is defined here by the *power relations* inextricable from society. As introduced in Lenin's *kto kovo,* who controls whom? Adding an important causal element to understanding development's origins and effects, its power relations are laid out here in the form of a multilayered **development game**.

This attribution as a game is hardly to belittle development's real-world significance. Rather, it serves to deflate and resituate its academic visions and knowledge-claims; bringing development and its social sciences back down to Earth, so to speak. It thus does not entail a scientific or rational mission, imbued with moral clarity and a universal will. Development is rather a game; yet another arena in which human politics is played. Its recognition as such can help capture and reanimate the power relations governing and governed by development.

This development game most notably manifests here as an academic *language game.* Captured in the form of logic scaffolds, they encompass moral and ontological vocabularies and epistemological (i.e. grammatical) rules guiding their use. Echoing Wittgenstein's instru-mentalist account of language as but a practical means of engaging with reality (and not an objective representation of it), they manifest here in the distinct schools or streams traced in development's intellectual history.[530] Each game thus operates under a set of shared rules and premises, whether it be in terms of an economic backwardness and growth, a dependent or peripheral capitalism, or an insidious power manifest in its discourses.

Correspondingly, its players are not just any individuals, but rather accredited members of a disciplinary language. Whether it be the language of Smith, Marx, or Foucault, its players share a particular language/logic scaffold and its associated worldviews. Yet, despite their orderly visions of a better world, their contents remain tethered to an all-too-human politics. This extends not only to the interdisciplinary conflicts endogenous to academia, but also to the international conflicts exogenous to each language game. As captured by Max Weber:

---

[530] For a sample representationalist account, see B. Russell, *Our knowledge of the external world as a field for scientific method in philosophy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1922).

The fate of an epoch that has eaten at the tree of knowledge is that it must *[...]* recognize that general views of life and the universe can never be the products of increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest ideals, which move us most forcefully, are always formed only in the struggle with other ideals which are just as sacred to others as ours are to us.[531]

Echoing Karl Popper's views post-1945, the insular realities contained in each language game presents but one possible—and potentially conflicting—view of the better world.[532] Yet, despite the critiques against a growing positivism and synchronic historicism (essay one), an ensuing need for context-specific and non-Eurocentric theories (essay two), and the underlying powers driving it all (essay three), why does such a recognition of said explicit politics and productive engagement with it not persist? Instead, efforts reappear across time and space, raising similar calls only to be forgotten and reinvented again under 'neo-'fied banners.

One reason that appears possible here is that such political inefficiencies are part of its design. Echoing postdevelopment and prior neo-Marxist ontological and epistemological (but not their moral) premises documented here, an unawareness or obliviousness to other realities comes part and parcel with development's academic game. Its walls remain reinforced by its exclusionary language—especially those backed by power (e.g. neoliberal economics and capitalism; political scientists and the foreign policy establishment; Anglophone academic ideas versus 'foreign' academia, writ large). A positive can be noted in the greater space for abstract and highly ordered reasoning. Indeed, it can be posed as a source of originality and creative conflict. Yet, the downside, as noted in Berlin's politically oblivious philosophers, is also noted by Plumb in regard to the historian:[533]

[...] the modern historian is crucified by this dilemma: he must act like a scientist although historical objectivity cannot exist. His work can have no validity except for himself, and, perhaps, for fellow historians playing the same game by the same rules or perhaps for those men of his age who think and feel like himself.[534]

---

[531] From Max Weber, as cited by David Harvey in the opening to Part I of D. Harvey, *The condition of postmodernity: an enquiry into the origins of cultural change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 1.

[532] K. Popper, *The open society and its enemies, volume one: the spell of Plato* (London: Routledge, 2003[1945]), p. xii: 'I see now more clearly than ever before that even our greatest troubles spring from something that is as admirable and sound as it is dangerous—from our impatience to better the lot of our fellows.'

[533] To recall from Berlin, 'Two concepts of liberty', p. 119: 'Our philosophers seem oddly unaware of these devastating effects of their activities. It may be that, intoxicated by their magnificent achievements in more abstract realms, the best among them look with disdain upon a field in which radical discoveries are less likely to be made, and talent for minute analysis is less likely to be rewarded. Yet, despite every effort to separate them, conducted by a blind scholastic pedantry, politics has remained indissolubly intertwined with every other form of philosophical enquiry.'

[534] Plumb, 'The historian's dilemma', p. 30.

These isolated language games in academia's disparate intellectual fiefdoms are thus risk to what Wittgenstein calls the 'engine running idle'. At worst, it engages with society, but as a driver or engine of conflicts or a reproducer of uneven power relations. In the case of development, its academic games serve as a social engine and not just a camera capturing society.[535] An unawareness of such leads to perverse outcomes in policy and practice, as documented in a prior postdevelopment account by the same namesake of 'the development game'.[536]

When juxtaposed with their home arenas in Western academia, the resulting image of this development game is thus one of *Northern rules and Southern players.* Adding a political layer on top of embedded development, it extends development's politics to the ideational, intellectual, or academic realm. Ideas matter, and not just in a trivial way. If development is a game, then it harkens here to an imperial and colonial *Great Game* in the nineteenth century. Fought over the control of academic centres, its abstract conflicts metastasise in the real lives outside its ivory towers—carrying along with it mortal and lasting consequences.

Situated in this PhD within the larger contexts of cultural diversity and post-Cold War globalisation, it offers a glimpse extending into the deeper and broader dimensions manifest in development. Correspondingly, it opens up or reintroduces the many stakeholders involved in the broader development game—with the academic and the university this time playing a critical, albeit oft-hidden and unrecognised role (Figure 2).

G^n: a government

C^n: a civil society

IGO: intergovernmental organisations
   (e.g. the United Nations)

NGO: non-governmental organisations
   (both non-profits, private sector)

AC: academia

Figure 2. A broader network of actors in embedded development and the development game

---

[535] See a similar argument raised in regard to economic models in D. MacKenzie, *An engine not a camera: how financial models shape markets* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).

[536] See L. Frank, 'The development game', in *The post-development reader,* Eds. Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree, pp. 263-73 (London: Zed Books, 1997).

2. The PhD as a proof of concept

Thus far, this conclusion has gradually stepped back from the essays' more granular analyses to recover a bigger picture. Thus came a recap of three super-scaffolds observed here, which in turn produce views of a socially embedded development and a political development game. When added to each essays' practical implications, they bring together a densely-packed view of development and its academic knowledge production. Highlighting fundamental issues in the accumulation of development knowledge (or lack thereof), consequent concerns are raised in the contexts of development theory, policy, and practice. However, this alone is not the main reason motivating these studies. While they offer a (minute) contribution to human knowledge—one of the requirements or tests of a PhD, they also sit in larger contexts, themselves; a smaller thicket within the larger forest.

Namely, this PhD serves more practical demands as a proof of concept; to prove a point. The reasons behind the contortions and unconventional methods trialled here stem from more practical and less pure scholarly desires. This section thus revisits the larger contexts set out in the introduction and the higher-level implications of these essays' results (Figure 3).

Figure 3. A map of the big picture contexts of this thesis and its better worlds problem.

2.1 Metaphysical geopolitics and the BWP

The contexts of international development and social science are but the penultimate aim—albeit still an incredibly important one—of this PhD thesis. The ultimate aim, to recall, is to establish the very existence of a problem, itself; namely, a *better worlds problem ('BWP')* on how to reconcile, however imperfectly, with a conflicting plurality of better worlds.

Beyond its essay-level findings, the thesis-level task at hand thus lies in establishing a *new* problem (as opposed to solving a *known* one). More than just an abstruse philosophical problem, it is posited as a key driver of post-Cold War geopolitics. Derived from personal experiences in the author's own world—and an ensuing falling out of it, these essays thus also serve to establish the very existence of a BWP on firmer empirical ground.

Amidst the paralysing scale of the posited phenomena at hand, these essays' ensuing forays into the Anglophone development historiography illustrate in finer detail the complex, two-way ties between the BWP's posited ideal and material realities. Manifest here in Cold War and post-Cold War development ideas, its liberal, Marxist, and post-structuralist visions shed light on the depth of their politics. Extending into the realm of philosophical dogmas, their surrounding politics are recovered here in epistemological, ontological, and moral forms.

Mapped across an embedded development and its ensuing development game, the diverse intellectual geography and their internal and external politics restore an ideational or ideological dimension to the BWP's geopolitical realm. While the Third World is often cast as a site of Cold War proxy battles, these essays highlight Western social science and Western academia, writ large, as one of its crucial yet oft-unrecognised drivers. Spurring new questions on the nature and role of social science and the university, these findings in the microcosm of development offer but a grain of sand. Yet, it still entails a seed for crystallising a larger set of views. Leading back into deeper metaphysical waters, it returns to the original concerns of this PhD; the growing need for a new way of seeing the [better] world in the twenty-first century.

As such, these findings in regard to the BWP hint at a larger **metaphysical geopolitics** at play. Adding substance to the many ways in which post-Cold War globalisation can interact with human diversity in less than optimal ways, these better worlds in development animate collisions between **good versus good** rather than **good versus evil**. While each scaffold and scholar here may attribute themselves as the good, the problem that emerges here is that so, too, do all the others. Despite the purportedly sinister character attributed to opponent ideologies (neoliberal, Marxist, post-structuralist, or otherwise), an appreciation for the origins and aims of their respective views dispels such simplistic moral caricatures. Indeed, to harken back to Appiah's mirror shards in essay two, the fragmented and polemical historiography traced here offers a shattered mirror of development's kaleidoscopic visions of the 'good'.

Hence, the geopolitics faced in the BWP is not driven by just modes of production or material goods. It is also born out of colliding *perceptions* of the world and its betterment.

Echoing a Hegelian tragedy, the historiography illustrates its many visions of the good coming to collide (e.g. the birth, life, and death of development economics; dependency theory babies being thrown out with Marxist bathwaters). In this regard, it may be worthwhile to restore the importance of the very notion of metaphysics, itself. Though it also goes oft forgotten in the present, its past was one very much formative to the social sciences. As Kant reminds:

> 'There was a time when metaphysics was called the queen of all the sciences, and if the will be taken for the deed, it deserved this title of honor, on account of the preeminent importance of its object. Now, in accordance with the fashion of the age, the queen proves despised on all sides; and the matron, outcast and forsaken, mourns like Hecuba: *Modo maxima rerum, tot generis natisque potens—nunc trajor exul, inops—*Ovid, *Metamorphoses.'* ('Greatest of all by race and birth, I now am cast out, powerless', Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 13: 508-10).[537]

These deeper considerations, which may otherwise be cast as overly abstract or philosophical, is very much suggested due to present times. As development's own scholars increasingly highlight since the 1970s, humanity faces increasingly interdependent lives. In such contexts, it grows increasingly hazardous to think of the world in such neat categories—or more pointedly, to think that the world reflects one's own (à la frogs in a well). Phrased in neopragmatism as a 'postmodern problem of knowledge' and in Hegelian philosophy as the 'sociality of reason', present notions such as a post-truth politics only make sense to those who thought there was a monolithic truth to begin with.[538] Whether voiced in Marxist waters regarding more context-specific social theorising or postdevelopment's valorisation of local or traditional knowledge, humankind's very interpretations of the world, itself, present a hurdle for development from the very start.

Cast within these larger contexts, these essays thus illustrate the potential for unwitting tragedies in a domain as innocuous as international development. The two-level illustration here unfolds across not only the tragedies written *in* its histories, but also the tragedies that arise *between* them (e.g. the political disappearance of past books, an amnesia in development knowledge). Extending into the realms of science, academic theory, and the university, itself, they shed light on the deep roots of present geopolitical frictions. Even the most rational or scientific theories ultimately find themselves locked in political struggles for recognition—if not beyond the ivory towers, then at minimum within.

---

[537] Full quote from I. Kant, *Critique of pure reason,* trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: CUP, 1998), p. 99.

[538] A 'postmodern problem of knowledge' from Allen, *Vanishing into Things: knowledge in Chinese tradition* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015)*,* p. 5. The 'sociality of reason' refers to the subtitle of Pinkard, *Hegel's Phenomenology: the sociality of reason.*

2.2 The struggle between development pessimism and optimism

These findings on *metaphysical geopolitics, embedded development,* and a *development game* revive deeper concerns regarding progress (or a lack thereof) in development knowledge. Like its antecedent idea of progress, the idea of development has attracted academic commentators arguing both *for* and *against* development. The development journals and history books here offer evidence of the long precedents for such debates.

On one extreme, which might be labelled as development pessimism, are claims of an *essential hegemony* steering development. Such arguments have tied said hegemony to a party within the development discourse (see Marxist scaffolds), as well as to the entire discourse, itself (see post-structuralist scaffolds). Here, development's many failures and missteps render a narrative of development's past as a history of violence.

On the other extreme, which might be labelled as development optimism, are claims of an *essential benevolence* guiding development. Its mission has been seen here attached to both Marxist and liberal creeds, but both uphold development as good and possible. In extreme cases, development is promoted as *necessary.* Hence leading to critiques of a teleology underpinning development theory (e.g. US modernisation theory's stages of growth, neo-Marxism's development impasse), there yet remains a basis for its more optimistic orientations.

Here, one might point to undeniable improvements made in human welfare in post-1945 history.[539] Annual development reports from the likes of the UN Development Programme and the World Bank remind of the gains made in basic measures, such as child mortality, life expectancy, and access to education. Indeed, the expanded facets examined in the UN Human Development Index and its companion Human Freedom Index, Gender-related Development Index, and Human Poverty Index point to the many facets in which progress can be found.[540] These do not attest to an unconditional progress, with the latest 2019 UN Human Development Report notably highlighting growing inequality in a sort of two steps forward, one step back.[541] Yet, real evidence of the possibility of progress in international development remains.

---

[539] For example, see Pinker, S. *Enlightenment now: the case for reason, science, humanism and progress* (New York: Viking, 2018).

[540] For the original Human Development Index, see UNDP, *Human development report 1990: concept and measure of human development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

For the Human Freedom Index and ensuing Political Freedom Index, see UNDP, *Human development report 1992: global dimensions of human development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); UNDP, *Human development report 1993: people's participation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

For the Gender-related Development Index and ensuing Gender Empowerment Measure and Gender Inequality Index, see UNDP, *Human development report 1995: gender and human development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); UNDP, *Human development report 2010: the real wealth of nations: pathways to human development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)

Finally, for the Human Poverty Index, see UNDP, *Human development report 1997: human development to eradicate poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997)

[541] UNDP, *Human development report 2019: Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: inequalities in human development in the 21st century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

Another notable example of progress in development policy and practice lies in the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). For one, it demonstrates the possibility of reform, in learning from past mistakes in the highly exclusionary process used to derive the preceding UN Millennium Development Goals. Relying instead on a participatory process through both governmental and non-governmental bodies, it reflects the shared wishes of all 193 member states of the UN.[542] Its set of 17 goals and 169 targets thus strive for a universally agreed upon agenda covering all peoples in its applicable times (i.e. from 2015-2030).

These more positive aspects warrant some consideration, in light of the decidedly critical assessments found in (and derived from) the empirical works in this thesis. Have the trials and travails seen here in development knowledge gone two steps forward and one step back, or more one step forwards and two steps back? The response offered here is as sober as it is unsatisfying: it depends. It depends not only on one's standpoint within the development game, but also upon the definition of development pursued and the dimensions of assessment used (e.g. local, national, global; short term, long term; economic, political, cultural). As Keynes dryly reminds, 'In the long run we are all dead'.[543]

There is hence not enough evidence here to attest to an all-encompassing condemnation nor praise of international development. If anything, the slippery or dynamic nature of the idea of development, itself, suggests that such truths or absolute statements might not even apply (i.e. not 'truth-apt', in philosophical terms). Yes, past ideas of development have been shaped by often tacit political motives. Yes, past ideas of development may have still been effective to varying degrees in improving human welfare. Whether this is supposed to then mean that development is *essentially* good or bad (e.g. a truly noble endeavour versus a truly hegemonic one), however, would be to miss the point.

Namely, the idea of development emerges here as but one of many political tools used to build a particular better world. The goodness or badness of development is thus a trait that is better attached to the wielder than it is to the tool (i.e. development ideas). To cite a crude analogy, guns don't kill people: people kill people. To assume that the various structures or logic scaffolds in development are to blame would be to forget the many political agencies both shaping and shaped by these structures. Part of the larger metaphysical geography and ensuing politics (hence *metaphysical geopolitics*) drawn through human life, development is morally ambiguous if removed from a target and a wielder. To recall again from Nietzsche, 'There are absolutely no moral phenomena, only a moral interpretation of the phenomena'.[544]

---

[542] See United Nations, Transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development. Resolution A/RES/70/1, Seventieth United Nations General Assembly, New York, 21 October 2015.

[543] J.M. Keynes. *A tract on monetary reform, the collected writings of John Maynard Keynes, volume IV* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013 [1923]), p. 65.

[544] F.W. Nietzsche, *Beyond good and evil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 [1886]), p. 64.

2.3 Plugging back into the surrounding historiography

Having returned to the PhD's originating contexts, the following sections take the opportunity to respond, now with the benefit of hindsight, to these essays' surrounding historiography. Adding further cases in which to explore the BWP and the metaphysical geopolitics manifest in academic knowledge, the following sections preview the implications and opportunities to be found—this time in the field of history, as opposed to development's social sciences.

2.3.1 Regarding historians working on development history

To recall, academic historians have shown increasing interest in development. How do their works now compare to development's own—and in the larger contexts of the BWP? Here, three salient contributions are highlighted in (i) evidencing the BWP, *(ii)* laying methodological complements, and *(iii)* offering a research community.

First are contributions in evidencing the existence of a BWP—though never tackled headfirst, *per se.* Rather, in typical historical fashion, it arrives at its existence by walking backwards. That is, it starts with fine details in focused cases (e.g. modernisation theory, TVA, the green revolution) until a trail of crumbs begins to appear. As such, it is only recently that works have begun to approach the BWP in its full breadth, whether in Ekbladh's expanded contexts of international relations or in the deeper role of social science addressed by Engerman, Gilman, and Hodge. Enabled by growing temporal, geographical, and intellectual scope, the historiography offers glimpses of development's BWP as 'American modernizers confronted a Cold War world that frequently defied their expectations'.[545]

After two decades, however, works have yet to breach philosophical terrain. Though gradually walking backwards into deeper metaphysical waters, there has yet to be a concerted discussion of the philosophical quandaries encountered. Examples of these close encounters include the politics underlying social science, technology, and even this historiography, itself (e.g. Unger's point on methodological nationalism).[546] Like its arms-length adoption of post-structuralist views, works continue to brush with but not enter philosophical terrain. Reasons for this remain speculative. Perhaps it is due to the historian's rigorous but laborious and piece-meal methods. Perhaps it is an unfamiliarity, unwillingness, or plain lack of interest in entering philosophical territory. Regardless, their accounts of past better world collisions offer valuable empirical precedents for the present dissertation.

Second is the complementary methodologies explored by this historiography. On one hand, its use of Cold War archives has enabled nuanced analyses of a growing array of better worlds. However, it bears a cost; the first being a liability to miss the bigger picture amidst a

---

[545] M.E. Latham, 'Introduction', in *Staging growth modernization, international history, and the global Cold War,* eds. David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael E. Latham, 1-22 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), p. 2.

[546] See Unger, 'Histories of development'.

focus on detail (see the above on missed philosophical contours). Added to this is a relative neglect of what Cullather highlighted early on as the 'immense literature' on development.[547] Amidst a predominant focus on archives, there remain vast swathes of its intellectual history that remain untouched. Beyond well-trod territory in US modernisation theory, this includes the extensive literature on development anthropology, economics, geography, politics, and sociology (see Section 3.2, upcoming).

To this, cross-linguistic aspects further compound the above disciplinary limitations. One example highlighted in these works is the works and associated sources to be found in the German-language historiography.[548] To be clear, this is not to say that all US historians rely solely on English-language archives. Engerman, for one, makes extensive use of Russian-language sources. However, the sceptical observer may wonder whether the outsized presence of India and the Philippines in this historiography is not due—at least in part—to the relative ease of reading its archives.

In contrast to the methodological limitations of these archival analyses, their surrounding *historiographical* analyses may be of more value to this present work. Namely, it offers a means to assess the philosophical premises needed to render clear views of the focal visions of a better world occupying this PhD. Indeed, example visions can already be found in the post-structuralist anthropology narratives so often cited in this historiography. Yet another is the methodological nationalisms and ensuing biases observed in how different parties write development's history.

Third is the community surrounding this historiography. This encompasses not only an international network of historians, but also associated institutional bases. The latter includes both journals (e.g. *Diplomatic History, Humanity, GHI Bulletin*) and scholarly associations (e.g. Iris Borowy's Centre for the History of Global Development in Shanghai, the German Historical Institute, and of course the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations). Given the lack of institutional bases for—not to mention basic recognition of—the BWP, the existence of such precedents is of significant value. It entails not just intellectual, but also institutional grounds in which the BWP might find some footing.

Correspondingly, the various limitations highlighted above are not presented as pure critiques, but rather as practical opportunities to contribute to and engage with this particular historiography. Though differences in methods and aims remain, its directions towards a more inclusive historiography closely align with the philosophical investigations of the BWP. In hindsight, such overlaps may indeed not be so surprising, given a long-standing tradition of

---

[547] Cullather, 'Research note', p. 641.

[548] Especially prominent in Unger, 'Histories of development'; Frey and Kunkel, 'Writing the history'. Analogous observations in the Korean- versus English-language historiography on Korea can be noted in T.G. Park, '미국의 한국사 교재 분석', *역사비평* 59.5 (2002), 8-75 [An analysis of US textbooks on Korean history]; M.D. Shin, 'Major trends of Korean historiography in the US', *Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies* 3.1 (2003), 151-75.

scholars crossing between historical and philosophical grounds (not to mention fields in social science and policy/practice).[549]

2.3.2 Regarding historians working on the idea of progress

What, then, can be skeined from the broader historiography on the idea of progress? Three contributions are highlighted here in *(i)* their documentation of past better worlds, *(ii)* insights into a surrounding politics, and *(iii)* added methodological precautions.

First, these works provide sample documentation of the better worlds found in and around the idea of Progress. Their historical genealogies, for example, set *Progress* apart from *Providence* and other cyclical or degenerative metaphysical views; the latter tied to ancient and contemporary but backwards (as opposed to modern) civilisations. As made clear in later critiques of socialist perversions of Progress, this historiography also addresses the better worlds found on other shores—albeit in a decidedly limited and biased manner.

Second, the sociopolitical contexts of this historiography reveal a deeper politics at play. This can be seen at both metaphysical and political levels. The World War historiography, for example, traces the metaphysical import of Darwinist metanarratives into the social sciences and humanities. Highlighted are their consequences for not just academic scholarship, but for a world engulfed in depression and war. The postwar historiography adds the political and intellectual fallout amidst unfolding Cold War geopolitical shifts. Here, an internal nihilism is compounded by the external threat of Second and Third World progress. These works thus chronicle *a turbulent shift as the solid ground of modernity gives way to postmodernity* and its 'postmodern, or perhaps post-Western, problem of knowledge'.[550] Notably, it is a problem highlighted in not just the social sciences, but in the field of history, itself.

Third, this historiography offers guidance through the methodological controversies animating it authors. At a basic level, they introduce multiple approaches to writing history. Teggart thus highlights the importance of scrutinising historiographical premises (e.g. casual relations, categorical distinctions). This extends to the teleological or deterministic narratives derived from false dichotomies.[551] If history is not linear, then it is cyclical. If civilisation does not move forwards, then must move backwards. These false dichotomies hold the mind captive to one of only two options—neither of which may be desirable, necessary, or even true.

At the same time, the postwar works highlight the dangers of a 'pure' scholasticism in history. Seen in Plumb's *historian's dilemma*, it risks denuding the historian of any practical role or significance. These methodological tensions bear major consequences that inform this

---

[549] Prominent examples range from Kwame Anthony Appiah, Isaiah Berlin, and R.G. Collingwood to Hegel and Nietzsche to Bertrand Russell—to sample a variety of theoretical positions.

[550] Allen, *Vanishing into things,* p. 5.

[551] See Teggart, 'The circumstance or substance of history'; Teggart, 'The humanistic study of change; F.J. Teggart, 'A problem in the history of ideas', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 1.4 (1940), 494-503.

work's own questions and approach. Do two conflicting rights mean at least one must be wrong? Is it possible to accept multiple truths without falling into despair or nihilism?

Taking a step back to view this historiography as a whole adds a final point of guidance. Though these authors make ubiquitous reference to 'the West', it might be misleading (though not *necessarily* wrong) to describe their works as a Western historiography. Rather, it might be more precise to describe them as an *Anglo-American* (or perhaps *Irish-Anglo-American*) historiography. To illustrate, consider the respective place of each of these authors.

Bury was Regius Professor of Modern History at the University of Cambridge at the time of his seminal 1920 work. His Irish heritage and training at Trinity College Dublin is shared by Teggart. However, Teggart departs for US shores, heading the Department of Social Institutions at UC Berkeley (created expressly for Teggart).[552] Plumb, like Bury, was based at the University of Cambridge, and was Reader of Modern English History at the time of his 1964 work.[553] Promoted to Professor soon thereafter, Plumb also served as Master of Christ's College at Cambridge.[554] Pollard adds to these historiographical roots on British shores. Immigrating from Austria at an early age, Pollard was Professor of Economic History at the University of Sheffield by the time of his 1968 publication.[555] Finally, Nisbet, whose PhD was supervised by Teggart at UC Berkeley, adds to the US side of this historiographical family tree. With his 1980 history written as Albert Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities at Columbia University, Nisbet was a leading intellectual figure in US political conservatism.[556] And while Nisbet is perhaps more popularly known as a sociologist than a historian, to have the former cancel his admission into the latter would seem unnecessary, if not unkind.

This intellectual genealogy is not traced to say that the idea of Progress (nor progress) is exclusively Anglo-American (nor masculine for that matter), but rather to clarify that the ideas constituting it must be seen as couched in particular intellectual and political contexts.[557] This socially-embedded or situated aspect of this historiography will come to explicitly inform this work's own methods to follow. Indeed, a resituated view of this historiography reveals explicit ties between 'development' and 'progress'.[558] With the former noted as a prime candidate to succeed the latter, it adds yet another precedent in development's long historiography

---

[552] R.A. Nisbet, W. Popper, E.W. Strong, 'In memorium: Frederick John Teggart', University of California Academic Senate (1946).

[553] J.H. Plumb (ed.), *Crisis in the humanities* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964), p. 6.

[554] Christ's College, 'Jack Plumb (1911-2001)', Christ's College Cambridge Alumni [https://alumni.christs.cam.ac.uk/professor-sir-john-plumb, accessed 26 March 2019].

[555] C. Holmes, 'Sidney Pollard: 1925-1998', *Proceedings of the British Academy* 105 (2000), 513-34.

[556] R. Thomas, 'Robert Nisbet, 82, sociologist and conservative champion', *New York Times* 12 Sep 1996, p. D00019.

[557] Bury, for one, attributes France as the origins of Progress; see Bury, *The idea of progress,* pp. x-xi.

[558] See ibid.; Nisbet, *History of the idea;* R. Nisbet, *Social change and history: aspects of the Western theory of development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

overlooked by recent historians. To close with an excerpt from Nisbet—who, appropriately enough, also authors a history of development:[559]

> *[...]* the idea of progress has at this very moment a substantial following in the social sciences by those committed, by moral faith as well as intellectual interest, to one or other scheme of social evolution. Marxists and other radicals, liberals old and new, and even conservatives must be counted among the adherents to this current manifestation of the philosophy of progress.
>
> Continuing belief in this philosophy may be seen, in significant degree, in Western (and especially American) contemplation of the rest of the world. More specifically the philosophy of progress is observable at the roots of our foreign policy and of our sense of mission in the world. *[...]* The abundance in the social sciences of foundations and government agencies dedicated to such concepts as "underdeveloped" "modernization" and "developed" is tribute to the persisting hold of the idea of progress in the West.[560]

2.3.3 Regarding Hodge's new historiographical narrative

During the years of this thesis, Hodge published a two-part review of development's historiography.[561] Given its close alignment in coverage and its notable traction amongst historians since, it is worth dedicating some consideration to how it compares with this PhD's findings.

Hodge's work was born out of initial conversations with Nils Gilman five years prior to its 2015 publication, with Gilman commissioning the study for the journal *Humanity*.[562] Beyond disciplinary ties to history, Hodge is no stranger to development studies, with a master's degree on the subject from the University of Guelph in Canada. Enrolling in 1990, Hodge recalls exiting the programme disenchanted with development amidst the crisis of the development impasse.[563] The underlying aim for Hodge's essay, then, is to document the relationship between history and development—particularly in concern to a perceived reconfiguration in the 1990s.[564] Though the ensuing findings contain significant overlaps with this study's own, important differences can be noted in its broader framing and interpretation. To start, it is worth briefly revisiting Hodge's tri-part periodisation of development's historiography.

---

[559] R. Nisbet, *Social change and history: aspects of the Western theory of development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

[560] Nisbet, *History of the idea,* p. 308.

[561] J.M. Hodge, 'Writing the history of development (part 1: the first wave)', *Humanity* 6:3 (2015), 429-63; J.M. Hodge, 'Writing the history of development (part 2: longer, deeper, wider)', *Humanity* 7:1 (2016): 125-74.

[562] See J.M. Hodge, 'Response to the commentators, part one', *Humanity,* Joseph Hodge Roundtable, 9 May 2016 [http://humanityjournal.org/blog/response-to-the-commentators-part-one].

[563] Ibid., p. 430.

[564] Ibid., p. 431.

The first period is not considered to constitute a proper historiography on development, offering only lesser 'precursors' in Hodge's historiographical narrative.[565] This is attributed to their failure in propagating a larger literature on development history that could move beyond its respective disciplinary silos. For example, Hodge explains that such works 'formed part of an internal disciplinary critique, written from the inside with the intent of reforming rather than radically overturning the structure' of development.[566] Summarised across three pages, example precursors include histories on the idea of progress (Robert Nisbet), development economics (H.W. Arndt, Albert Hirschman), and political development theory (Robert Packenham, Irene Gendzier). For Hodge, however, it is not until the end of the Cold War that a 'watershed moment' would arrive for the emergence of a fully-fledged historiography.[567]

The first proper works (i.e. the 'first wave') in development's historiography consequently emerge during the 1990s. The primary feature that Hodge highlights here is the historical treatment of development as broader 'discourses, ideologies, doctrines, texts, and so on'.[568] This approach is adopted by two bodies of work. One is constituted by post-structuralist historical narratives, associated with James Ferguson, James C. Scott, and postdevelopment scholars (e.g. Arturo Escobar, Gilbert Rist, Wolfgang Sachs). The other is constituted by historians of US foreign relations, including Nick Cullather, David Ekbladh, Nils Gilman, and Michael Latham. Largely focused on development's Cold War contexts, this first wave would soon be followed by a shift towards new temporal and spatial frontiers.

Hodge thus follows the 'first wave' of the 1990s development historiography with the new development historiography emerging since the 2000s. Here, the key turning point is posited as the September 11 attacks in the US. Namely, the 'post-9/11 preoccupation with issues of security and empire ignited a quest for more long-term and contextualized histories of development'.[569] Moving beyond the binary moral distinctions characterising the first wave of development historiography, these newer works represent a more nuanced effort to understand the many realities and ensuing complexities caught up in development—as indicated in Hodge's subtitle ('longer, deeper, wider'). Though earlier precedents are traced in the works of Cowen, Shenton, and Cooper, recent decades are noted for their decisive shift towards more comprehensive views of development across space (e.g. non-Western, transnational views) and time (e.g. Cold War, colonialism).[570]

---

[565] Hodge, 'Writing (part 1)', p. 432.

[566] Ibid., p. 434.

[567] See Hodge, 'Writing (part 1)', p. 434; 'Writing (part 2)', p. 125.

[568] Hodge, 'Writing (part 1)', p. 438.

[569] Hodge, 'Writing (part 2)', p. 129.

[570] See Hodge, 'Writing (part 1)'; Cowen and Shenton, *Doctrines*; F. Cooper, *Decolonization and African society: the labor question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Hodge thus concludes an extensive sweep of recent scholarship from both history and development studies with a number of opportunities gathered over the course of the review. Centred on chronic gaps and consequent opportunities for cross-pollinating across international, interdisciplinary, and theory-practice divides, Hodge arrives at a standpoint similar to this study's own.[571] Hodge's contrasting approach and findings relative to this present study, however, enables observation of some potential issues. Namely, four issues are raised here in: *(i)* a cursory view of development's Cold War historiography, *(ii)* missed significance of the development impasse, *(iii)* a privileging of post-structuralist narratives, and *(iv)* propagation of US-centric historiographical narratives despite well-meaning attempts otherwise.

(i) The lost significance of development's Cold War historiography
Hodge offers a relatively cursory treatment of development's Cold War historiography. Covering aforementioned works on the history of idea of progress, development economics, and political development theory, this literature fails to meet Hodge's requirement of historicising development at a sufficient level. Further, Hodge points to a second reason in surrounding conditions not yet being ripe for the emergence of such a historiography:

> These earlier internal critiques failed to spark wider interest or a broader literature on the history of development. The moment, it seems, was not yet ripe for these ideas to be taken up in force by other scholars and professional historians. It would take the rupture of the collapse of communism in 1989–90 and the demise of the Cold War to create the intellectual conditions for a critical deconstruction and historicization of development. As long as one could still point to "actually existing socialism" as an ideological alternative to market capitalism, the basic premises and logic that had underpinned state-led development since World War II remained intact.[572]

Hodge's reasons for excluding much of the Cold War works is understandable to an extent. As with any history, one cannot chronicle a historiography without relying on at least a modicum of categories and dividing lines—knowing full well the imperfections they bring along. However, drawing a dividing line in development's historiography at the end of the Cold War causes two particular problems.

First, it overlooks the historiographical contributions and underestimates the state of critical reflection within development already present during the Cold War. As evidenced here,

---

[571] Hodge, 'Writing (part 2)', p. 159.

[572] Hodge, 'Writing (part 1)', p. 434. Also from Ibid, p. 434: '*[…]* as social scientists operating within their respective disciplines (sociology, economics, political science), they wrote for a fairly specialized audience. It formed part of an internal disciplinary critique, written from the inside with the intent of reforming rather than radically overturning the structure.'

many of the historical works from the 1980s offer insights that have continued to be re-discovered by newer histories. For example, Hodge's very call for greater consideration of non-Western agency is already eminently clear in earlier works by Hettne, Larrain, and Somjee.[573] The more profitable question here may be to ask not whether said 'precursors' were sufficiently reflective or not, but rather why their reflections did not garner more traction and continue to be re-invented up to the present day—including in Hodge's own work.

Second, in discounting the Cold War historiography, Hodge unnecessarily disregards work containing valuable insights in light of the shift in historiographical concerns that comes in the 1990s. The ensuing narratives thus turn away from older aspects of development's history—only for said past findings to be re-discovered or, worse, forgotten by later works. Aspects of these earlier works that largely fade from the historiography include, for example, Preston's (1982) observations of the renaissance in Marxian scholarship by the 1970s or the larger social (e.g. decolonisation, civil rights movements) and political currents (e.g. Western New Left movements, rising powers in the Third World, the return of the Right) surrounding Cold War development. It is thus telling to note that Hodge's review makes almost no mention of neo-Marxism, Latin American dependency theory, or the development impasse—points which are nigh impossible to ignore when reading the Cold War-era historiography. Indeed, Cooper (author of a key aforementioned edited volume) also points out this problematic loss in a rebuttal to Hodge, highlighting the presence (or in this case, lack thereof) of early critical development thinkers like W. Arthur Lewis and Raúl Prebisch.[574]

Consequently, while this study's own analysis agrees in Hodge's assessment of an important turn in the 1990s literature, it cannot agree with the converse discounting of development's earlier works. Doing so poses the risk of losing important insights preserved in development's Cold War historiography, either forgotten or otherwise re-bottled as new wine in histories emerging in the present.

(ii) The missed significance of the development impasse

Corollary to Hodge's dismissal of the Cold War historiography is a curious absence of neo-Marxism and its development impasse.[575] This is all the more surprising, given Hodge's brief mention of said impasse in personal recollections of doing a masters in development studies in the early 1990s.[576] Yet, no-where in the actual analysis is it afforded its due significance. Instead, Hodge relies on the standard Western historiographical boundaries of the end of the

---

[573] Hettne, *Development theory*; Larrain, *Theories*; Somjee, *Development.*

[574] F. Cooper, 'Commentary on the essay of Joseph Hodge', *Humanity,* Joseph Hodge Roundtable. 3 May 2016 [http://humanityjournal.org/blog/commentary-on-the-essay-of-joseph-hodge].

[575] To recall, this impasse can be traced to Booth's seminal 1985 *World Development* article and endcapped by Schuurman's 1993 edited volume. See Booth, 'Marxism and development'; F.J. Schuurman, *Beyond the impasse: new directions in development theory* (London: Zed Books, 1993).

[576] Hodge, 'Writing (part 1)', p. 430.

Cold War to mark the arrival of the 1990s historiography. At times, this is given a more nuanced presence by pairing it alongside the 'global debt crisis' (i.e. the 1982 emerging market debt crisis), the demise of state-driven development, and the rise of neoliberalism.[577]

By and large, however, the reliance on the end of the Cold War as a watershed moment is not entirely accurate in the case of the development studies historiography. As evidenced here, the implosion and fallout from the development impasse had already started to settle by the time the Berlin Wall came down. In this regard, the end of the Cold War marks more of a proverbial last straw that breaks the camel's back, and offers only a superficial understanding of development's own historical turn in the 1990s. This is further pointed out in a response to Hodge by Packenham—though even Packenham misleadingly highlights a later 1992 work instead of Booth's original 1985 article.[578] This perhaps goes to further demonstrate the international and interdisciplinary fragmentation that persists in development's historiography.

Amidst this impasse and the critical scholarship already circulating before the end of the Cold War, it is also worth noting that the postdevelopment authors, who play an instrumental role in Hodge's first wave, were also active in the 1980s. This includes the works of Ivan Illich, Majid Rahnema, Wolfgang Sachs, and Arturo Esteva. As pointed out here, Escobar's 1995 work traces back to a PhD dissertation completed by 1987, which evidences early relationships with Rahnema and influence from Esteva.[579]

The political and intellectual vacuum that the postdevelopment school comes to fill may have been set in stone by the end of the Cold War, but the existence of this void was already clear by the mid- to late-1980s. Example signs cited in the historiography include the implosion of neo-Marxism, dependency theory, and development sociology; the failure of the 1974 push for a New International Economic Order; the 1982 emerging market debt crisis; and the ensuing Western political Right-led agendas of deregulation and structural adjustment. Already clear before the formal end of the Cold War, the ensuing sense of loss is relayed well by Hettne's closing paragraph:

> Development is more complicated than its many doctrines, but the tragedy of the
> present stage of its intellectual history is that the attacks on what we now may
> call classical development theory—whether in its reformist or in its radical
> form—rest one even more simplistic assumptions. For that reason I think it has
> been meaningful and worthwhile to give an account of this tradition from the

---

[577] Hodge, 'Writing (part 1)', p. 451; Hodge, 'Writing (part 2)', pp. 125-6.

[578] Packenham writes: 'One of the latter is related to the important notion of an impasse in development studies. Hodge mentions the idea of impasse but his usage of the term is idiosyncratic and flawed and the difference between his and the conventional usage matters considerably. So far as I know, this idea was first advanced in print in 1992.' See R.A. Packenham, 'A comment on Professor Hodge's articles', *Humanity,* Joseph Hodge Roundtable, 29 April 2016 [http://humanityjournal.org/blog/a-comment-on-professor-hodges-articles].

[579] Escobar, 'Power and visibility', pp. vi,1..

point of view of the present 'losers'. History is already being rewritten by those who for the time being enjoy the monopoly of definition.[580]

Drafted before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War had come into play, this intellectual void also strongly colours Larrain's 1989 work.[581] Consequently, the existence of this intellectual void had already become clear by the late 1980s, which would then be partly occupied by the radical development anthropologists driving 1990s postdevelopment. This latter disciplinary affiliation further poses the third problem—this time moving forward to Hodge's 'first wave'

(iii) The privileged status of post-structuralist narratives
In illustrating the 'first wave' of development's historiography, Hodge places particular emphasis on two bodies of work; those of post-structuralist authors and those of US diplomatic historians. It is in Hodge's treatment of the former that conflicts emerge with this study's own findings. First is the privileged status afforded to these post-structuralist narratives in representing contributions from development studies. Associated with the works from not only James Ferguson and James C. Scott, but also postdevelopment scholars (e.g. Arturo Escobar, Gilbert Rist, Wolfgang Sachs), these are the first narratives that Hodge considers as sufficiently historicising development. Beyond denying the presence of qualifying past works, this characterisation is problematic in holding a particular (and particularly vocal) set of radical anthropologists as representative of the development studies historiography, as a whole.

For one, this presents a misleading implication that said narratives have transcended development's prior disciplinary divides, which have led Hodge to disqualify preceding works. In reality, however, postdevelopment scholars are but another manifestation of development's disciplinary divides (i.e. radical anthropology). Following Hodge's criteria, this should either lead to the disqualification of said narratives as sufficiently historiographical (in which even more past contributions are lost) or otherwise restoring the status of its precursors.

The wider disciplinary participation evidenced in this study not only emphasises the particular disciplinary location (and associated biases) of postdevelopment histories, but also reveals the presence of neighbouring present (and not just past) cross-disciplinary contributions. This includes the work of sociologists (e.g. McMichael), geographers (e.g. Peet, Hartwick), political scientists (e.g. Rapley, Williams), historians (e.g. Shenton, Mason) and other multidisciplinary affiliations (e.g. global studies for Hettne, Pieterse; postcolonial studies for

---

[580] Hettne, *Development* (1st ed.), p. 251.

[581] See Larrain, *Theories*. Note that the fall of the Berlin Wall is not noted by Hettne until a second edition published in 1995, in which the preface makes explicit attribution to the fall of the Berlin Wall as one of three 'remarkable events' influencing the revised edition; see Hettne, *Development (2nd ed.),* p. xi.

Ziai).[582] Hodge's interpretation thus risks reducing development studies' diverse historiography, warts and all, into a monolithic identity that is only representative of a notably provocative and polemical—but ultimately partial—segment of development scholarship.

(iv) Propagation of US-centric historiographical biases

Finally, one of the most apparent issues that arise when comparing across these two historiographical analyses is the strong US-centric bias that emerges in Hodge's periodisation. To be clear, this is hardly to accuse Hodge of any intentional misdeed—particularly in light of Hodge's coinciding arguments explicitly warning against such biases. Rather, it is suggested here as more of an ironic slip back into unconscious US historiographical biases, which go to demonstrate the value and need for more comparative historical (and historiographical) views.

One example of said bias was addressed in the undue significance attached to the end of the Cold War as a cause for the historical turn in the 1990s. Though understandable given its default significance in Western historiographical conventions, it proves problematic in the contexts of the development studies historiography. Where US-centric biases particularly stand out, however, is in the association of a second shift in Hodge's periodisation with the September 11 attacks in the US. In introducing its significance, Hodge writes, 'Like a crucible, 9/11 awakened both policy makers and scholars to the realities and rising instabilities of the new, post-Cold War order'.[583] Amidst heightened awareness of newly alien realities, the ensuing historiography would extend its analyses beyond the boundaries of its predecessors (i.e. Hodge's subtitle, 'longer, deeper, wider').

However, this central divide between a pre- and post-9/11 historiography reflects US standpoints and interests. Hodge fails to note this geographical specificity, however, instead implying its broader relevance. Indeed, this work's own analysis finds little significance attributed to the 9/11 attacks in motivating the sampled historiography. A re-examination of all works published from 2001 onwards found no mention of said attacks as a key driver.[584] The few mentions found in their substantive narratives remained extremely limited.[585] Amidst a history already subject to Western biases, as argued by both Hodge and this present study, this risks over-inflating the works of US historians as globally representative. Running counter to

---

[582] Cowen and Shenton, *Doctrines*; Halperin, *Re-envisioning*; Hettne, *Development Theory*; Mason, *Development*; McMichael, *Development*; Peet and Hartwick, *Theories*; Pieterse, *Development*; Williams, *International development*; Willis, *Theories*; Ziai, *Development*.

[583] Hodge, 'Writing (part 2)', p. 126.

[584] The closest instances were found in the Hettne's 2009 introduction, which mentions September 11 in outlining its final chapter; and in Rist's second edition preface, which cites the September 11 attacks as but one example of contemporary global networks. See Hettne, *Thinking,* p. 7; Rist, *The history (4th ed.),* p. xv.

[585] For references of the 9/11 attacks, see Hettne, *Thinking,* pp. 7,102; McMichael, *Development (3rd ed.),* pp. 239-43 (since in the sixth edition); Peet and Hartwick, *Theories (3rd ed.),* pp. 132,155; Pieterse, *Development (2nd ed.),* p. 205; Willis, *Theories (2nd ed.),* p. 204.

Hodge's hoped directions, this correspondingly risks ignoring the larger body of present, past, and potential future participants in development's global historiography.

In this respect, Hodge's call for a global historiography of development rid of Western biases is, ironically, premised upon Western biases from the start. For the record, the findings of this present thesis are in strong agreement with Hodge's own findings of significant gaps and a corresponding lack of representation in development's English-language historiography. However, Hodge's historiographical narrative stands at odds with its owns conclusions. While there may indeed be a strong basis for highlighting a post-9/11 turn in the US historiography, geographic specification as such may enable stronger grounds for both Hodge's conclusion and its envisioned paths forwards. Namely, its views are better understood when located to a particular group of US historians with their particular interests and anxieties constituting Hodge's second wave. Less involved here, then, are the respective interests and anxieties that have populated other sectors of the development discourse, whether in the English-language development studies historiography examined here or beyond.

It is somewhat ironic that the same critiques of an improper or insufficient historicisation of development lodged against earlier development scholars is just as applicable to the very historians who have lodged the complaint, itself. The essays here thus restore some of the more conspicuous past and present voices missing from Hodge's analysis—and the consequent standpoints and subjective worlds that are lost because of it.

Nonetheless, the active efforts of present historians and development scholars offer the possibility of more productive engagement in the future. As such, it should be made explicit that this work is complementary to Hodge's own and not an invalidation of it. If Hodge presents the view of a US-based historian researching development, then this work presents the view of UK-based development scholar researching history. While Hodge places relative emphasis on how historians have written about development, this work places emphasis on how development scholars have written history themselves. As has been argued here throughout these essays, the two sides stand to gain much from each other.

3. Brave new worlds (멋진 신세계): elements of a larger research programme

In many ways, the findings of this PhD raise more questions than answers. A consequence of its relatively uncharted research space, this final section thus marks less a dénouement and more of a brief intermission before work on an expanded programme begins. The ensuing agenda can tentatively be divided here into four elements (Table 1, following page). Together, they lay interconnecting pieces or the groundwork for a move from theoretical contexts back to the practical implications of the metaphysical geopolitics captured in the BWP.[586]

---

[586] This section's title refers not just to Aldous Huxley's *Brave new world,* but to the Korean translation of it (멋진 신세계)—which ties directly to the chosen Korean title for the BWP (신세계의 충돌), along with shared themes on the politics of science and progress.

		Research Domain	
		Development	**Geopolitics**
Research Orientation	**Theory-facing**	1. Towards a global development historiography	2. The geopolitics of knowledge: social science *as* public policy
	Practice-facing	3. Development pragmatism and the politics of development	4. Towards multipolar world order: ideas and institutions for reform

Table 1. Four elements in future research programme

3.1 Towards a global development historiography

The first direction extends from a proposed historiographical turn. With it comes a greater recognition of development's geographical and temporal contexts. Here, two themes here can be highlighted in *(i)* the need to recover transnational and non-Western historiographical perspectives; and *(ii)* a focus on the gap from 1890–1940 dividing development's colonial and Cold War historiographies.

These continue the approach trialed here on studying *historiography* amidst the volume of relevant historical works that goes written and then forgotten; thus, historiography as an intellectual history archive. And indeed, it serves a practical purpose. As pointed out by Nisbet, 'For those who wish to know whither they are going, it may not come amiss to know something about those who helped to draw the map on which they rely'.[587] Added to this are the ideological swings observed in these works, which echo Teggart's own concerns regarding intellectual history: 'without the conscious use of the history of ideas as a discipline, we go on generation after generation, not swinging between two extremes, but echoing confusedly the conflicting views which have been accumulated by our predecessors in the course of centuries'.[588]

Very much applicable to the development historiography examined here, an obvious path thus lies in re-integrating non-Western actors and their ideas on development, alongside development ideas prior to the Cold War. Of key importance here are the reactions to encroaching Western empire and the countering ideas and policy responses involved. Moving towards more global representation within development's historiography, so too is it aligned with calls to decolonise history and the larger university curriculum.

---

[587] Nisbet, *History of the idea,* p. x.

[588] F.J. Teggart, 'A problem in the history of ideas', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 1.4 (1940), 494-503.

Of particular interest is thus the Korean development historiography, especially in the contexts of *(i)* late nineteenth century Korean modernity and *(ii)* a comparative examination of North and South Korean development ideas. Notably, this includes the inclusion of non-English-language works. Added to this is the work that remains in bringing together the colonial versus Cold War historiographies. A result of history's common 'modern' versus 'contemporary' periodisation, reintegrating the two periods may offer new views on the larger origins and precedents of the idea of development.

3.2 The geopolitics of knowledge: social science as public policy

A second direction can be highlighted in the broader historiography surrounding the idea of development; namely, the historiography on social science. Given the key emphasis on the role of social science in these essays, a question then arises as to whether the present findings are reflective of broader social science. Of particular emphasis, again, is the examination of politics and how it manifests within social science's disciplines.

In expanding to the broader historiography of social science, this also allows for a re-examination of the metaphysical geopolitics posited here. Allowing for further investigations of the formal ties between the social science and, in particular, public policy, it would serve to complement (or possibly critique) the development historiography's own accounts of Western social science. Corollary to this are questions regarding the very possibility of international social science and a broader international academia.

Also tying here are thus histories of Western social science to be found in non-Western contexts, whether in Korea (e.g. Kim Dong-no, Jeon Sang Sook), Latin America (e.g. Gabriel Palma), or Africa (e.g. Thandika Mkandawire). Extending considerations of how global governance is tied to academia's legitimation of knowledge, it returns to the questions posited here of whether power or might ultimately defines what is right. Can science provide the key to dissolving political problems, or does it fan the flames? What are the ensuing implications for the possibility of moderating its metaphysical politics?

Though taking a critical look at social science, this approach acknowledges the possibility of a pragmatic reconciliation with or embrace of its politics. Again, this reconciliation hardly implies a perfect response. Rather, it entails an acceptance of development's politics and an ensuing attempt to make the most out of its inherently imperfect contexts. In this regard, it may have been a fatal flaw of past thinkers, whether in the halls of academia or governments, to believe in the promise of an absolute (i.e. apolitical) truth packaged as science. However, an opposite vilification of scientific knowledge can render dangers of its own. As such, a deeper understanding of the complex ties between science and politics would allow for the possibility of a more productive (again, not to be misread as perfect) relations between the two, whether in academia theory or public policy and practice.

3.3 Development pragmatism and the politics of development

The third direction thus entails a shift towards more practice-oriented research. Building on elements one and two, it explores this possibility of reconciling with development's politics. Building on the premises of critical development scholars (most notably in postdevelopment theory), it yet entails a somewhat different approach. Namely, instead of casting politics (and especially the state) solely as a source of political violence, the approach here entails a more pragmatic approach.

Echoing Otto von Bismarck's notion that politics entails the art of the possible or the attainable, what possible solutions to the BWP emerge when letting go of its particular moral commitments? Contrary to implying the falsifiability of any one set of views, it rather entails a stance of epistemic fallibility. Accepting the possibility that development's moral truths may not be knowable then promotes the notion of a more **diplomatic scholarship**.

The extent to which such a configuration would be possible relies on findings from elements one and two (e.g. the possibility of an international social science or global scientific knowledge). Understandably, in present climates, the notion of a diplomatic scholarship may strike some as a contradiction. One is *either* a diplomat *or* a scholar, not both, and the extent to which academia's surrounding politics is conducive to such diplomacy remains to be seen. Indeed, as observed by development economist Paul Streeten, 'Practical men reach agreement by blurring distinctions, academics by sharpening them'.[589]

However, 'diplomatic' contradicts 'scholarly' *if and only if* scholarship is viewed as separable from politics, in the first place. This is a premise that has, time and time again, shown to be false. A diplomatic scholarship thus entails a recognition of the inextricably political role played by academia and academics. This especially applies to the social sciences and the humanities, given their influence in public policy and public thought. Amidst growing talk of global knowledge (e.g. global history, global/international studies), such knowledge requires scholars who can cross national and disciplinary boundaries. Thus requiring more multilingual scholars (e.g. whether in disciplinary or national languages), this basic ability to communicate across global academia's divides is posed as a basic prerequisite for the creation of a more genuinely global body of knowledge.

Echoing Dag Hammarskjöld's prior call for an internationalism *through* nationalisms, this entails an approach to global knowledge *through* a recognition of present nationalistic bodies of knowledge inherent in global academia.[590] Referred to multiple times here in terms of academia's implicit methodological nationalisms, a diplomatic scholarship thus recognises these particular biases in order to navigate and communicate across them.

---

[589] Jolly and Streeten, 'Transcript of interview', p. 127.

[590] D. Hammarskjöld, 'Know yourself—know your world', in *The servant of peace: a selection of speeches and statements of Dag Hammarskjöld,* ed. W. Foote, 242-50 (London: Bodley Head, 1962), p. 242-3.

Somewhat paradoxically, this also means a maintenance of regional biases within the academic literature. Some regional variation may arguably be necessary, given academia's role in responding to its surrounding contexts. What it instead seeks to moderate is a tacit politics for control across them. Prior examples here include the politics embedded in US versus Latin American development thought or in German versus US development historians. However, attempts to moderate said politics are futile if players do not recognise the existence and/or significance of said politics from the start.

This notion of diplomatic scholarship and scholars thus entails a fairly major cultural shift within academia. The extent to which this is even possible hence relies on exogenous geopolitical factors (e.g. the ability for present academic orders to maintain global dominance). Nor would more favourable exogenous geopolitical factors guarantee some perfect diplomacy. Reminding again of the more pragmatic aims of not perfection but of the possible, endogenous preparation within academia (e.g. decolonising the curriculum, critical international studies) may still shed light on possible alternatives if and when the opportunity should strike.

3.4 Towards multipolar world order: ideas and institutions for reform

The final direction hence briefly highlights the potential implications of a more diplomatic academic politics for enabling a more sustainable multipolar world order. Indeed, the recovery of a global historiography and the ensuing ties between science and politics are sought with twenty-first-century geopolitics in mind. However, its highly speculative nature limits the amount of detail than can be offered at this primitive stage.

Thus described in the broadest strokes possible, a more multipolar system of academic knowledge production may enable a more faithful representation of the diverse human stand-points across the world. This is not to imply yet another slide into some form of objective truth or knowledge. Hinging, instead, on the relativity of such truths across space and time, this dynamic knowledge of humanity's diverse views then enables a better understanding of how to navigate across them. Once more, given the risks of being misinterpreted, this does not imply an *a priori* solution to all potential conflicts. Some colliding worldviews may ultimately collide, and operating on the assumption that all tragedies can be avoided may just spur further tragedies of its own.

Once more invoking a pragmatic approach to politics as the art of the possible, doable, or next best, an understanding of diverse human views—whether in regards to development, religion, science, or otherwise—then grounds more productive considerations of when, where, and how it might be possible to govern (or *not*) across them. Driven by the need for great global coordination amidst post-Cold War globalisation, a de-globalisation or de-linking in the coming decades could arguably negate the need for such politics.

Figure 4. Possible elements in a larger field centred on metaphysical geopolitics

Yet, pandora's box has already been opened, and humanity's expanded sociotechnical capabilities to affect (and be affected by) others around the world is a root issue that is not likely to easily disappear. Thus, a more inclusive body of ideas and associated views may offer foundational contributions towards envisioning possible configurations for multipolar world order amidst present and future challenges in the twenty-first century.

Complementing or aiding these considerations are what might be posited as a new subject or even field centred on understanding the posited metaphysical geopolitics. In this regard, the present thesis offers but one piece of its larger puzzle (Figure 4, above). With complementary fields to be noted in neighbouring disciplines (e.g. economics' social ontology, the history and philosophy of science, the sociology of knowledge), it points to the possibility of finding allies for a new subject or field of investigation.

3.5 Closing note

In exploring international development and social science, the goal has thus been to sketch an outline—however broad (or narrow) the strokes—of a much larger field. Centred on the BWP and a larger metaphysical geopolitics at play, the author is all too aware of the magnitude of the proposed endeavour. However, if one must start anew, then history offers a valuable place to start—as many scholars here have done before. As argued by Collingwood:

> If we want to abolish capitalism or war, and in doing so not only to destroy them
> but to bring into existence something better, we must begin by understanding
> them: seeing what the problems are which our economic or international system
> succeeds in solving, and how the solution of these is related to the other problems

which it fails to solve. This understanding of the system we set out to supersede is a thing which we must retain throughout the work of superseding it, *as a knowledge of the past conditioning our creation of the future*. It may be impossible to do this; our hatred of the thing we are destroying may prevent us from understanding it, and we may love it so much that we cannot destroy it unless we are blinded by such hatred. But if that is so, there will once more, as so often in the past, be change but no progress; we shall have lost our hold on one group of problems in our anxiety to solve the next. And we ought by now to realize that no kindly law of nature will save us from the fruits of our ignorance.[591]

And so this thesis is my answer, a response to the BWP and a path to return from self-exile; or to revive old Kantian parlance, a prolegomenon to a future—to any future metaphysics.[592] Illuminating present metaphysical-*cum*-political waters, born with it is the renewed possibility of a meaningful life. A reason and path to keep living. A courage to embrace all that is dying. The possibility of a different future. A way back into the world.

> *Miranda.* O, wonder!
>
>   How many goodly creatures are there here!
>
>   How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world,
>
>   That has such people in't!
>
> *Prospero* [*smiling sadly*]. 'Tis new to thee.

> William Shakespeare, *The Tempest*, 1623
> *(edited by John Dover Wilson, 1921)*

---

[591] Italics added, R.G. Collingwood, *The idea of history* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 334.

[592] I. Kant, *Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as science,* trans. Gary Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004 [1783]).

Appendices

[List of appendices]

A1. *Compilations (edited volumes, readers, handbooks, etc.)*

A2. *Disciplinary Histories*

A3. *Policy Histories, Diplomatic Histories, International Histories*

A4. *Organisational Histories*

A5. *Related Textbooks*

APPENDIX A1. *Compilations (edited volumes, readers, handbooks, etc.)*

Year	Editor(s)	Title
AREA & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES		
1988	Harvey Glickman	The Crisis and Challenge of African development
1995	Margaret C. Snyder, Mary Tadesse	African Women and Development: A History
1999	Carlos Dávila, Rory Miller	Business History In Latin America: The Experience Of Seven Countries
2003	David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, Michael E. Latham	Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War
2003	Ronald H. Chilcote	Development in Theory and Practice: Latin American Perspectives
2004	Yves Berthelot	Unity and Diversity in Development Ideas: Perspectives from the UN Regional Commissions
2005	Margaret A. Majumdar, Mohammed Saad	Transition and Development in Algeria: Economic, Social and Cultural Challenges
2011	Lansana Keita	Philosophy and African Development: Theory and Practice
ECONOMICS		
1972	Walter L. Johnson, David R. Kamerschen	Readings in Economic Development
1975	H.W. Singer	The Strategy of International Development: Essays in the Economics of Backwardness
1979	Albert O. Hirschman, Dudley Seers, Paul Streeten	Toward a New Strategy for Development: A Rothko Chapel Colloquium
1981	Albert O. Hirschman	Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond
1994	Gerald M. Meier	From Classical Economics to Development Economics
1995	Paul R. Krugman	Development, Geography, and Economic Theory
2005	Gerald M. Meier, James E. Rauch	Leading Issues in Economic Development *(8th ed.)*
2005	K.S. Jomo, Erik S. Reinert	Origins of Development Economics: How Schools of Economic Thought Have Addressed Development
2005	Silvana De Paula, Gary A. Dymski	Reimagining Growth: Towards a Renewal of Development Theory
2006	Yiorgos Stathakis; Gianni Vaggi;	Economic Development and Social Change: Historical Roots and Modern Perspectives
2009	James E. Rowe	Theories of Local Economic Development: Linking Theory to Practice
2015	S. Sugiyama	Economic History of Energy and Environment
GENDER STUDIES		
1995	Margaret C. Snyder, Mary Tadesse	African Women and Development: A History
2002	Kriemild Saunders	Feminist Post-Development Thought: Rethinking Modernity, Post-Colonialism and Representation
2006	Jane S. Jaquette, Gale Summerfield	Women and Gender Equity in Development Theory and Practice
2016	Wendy Harcourt	Palgrave Handbook of Gender and Development: Critical Engagements in Feminist Theory & Practice
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (GENERAL/OTHER)		
1970	S.N. Eisenstadt	Readings in Social Evolution and Development
1979	David Lehmann	Development Theory: Four Critical Studies
1982	Anthony Jennings, Thomas G. Weiss	The Challenge of Development in the Eighties: Our Response
1983	Peter Limqueco, Bruce J. McFarlane	Neo-Marxist Theories of Development
1984	Gerald M. Meier, Dudley Seers	Pioneers in Development
1985	P.W. Preston	New Trends in Development Theory: Essays in Development and Social Theory
1986	Alec Nove	Socialism, Economics and Development
1987	Gerald M. Meier	Pioneers in Development: Second Series
1987	Myron Weiner, Samuel P. Huntington	Understanding Political Development
1988	P. F. Leeson, Martin Minogue	Perspectives on Development: Cross-disciplinary Themes in Development Studies
1993	Frans J. Schuurman	Beyond the Impasse: New Directions in Development Theory
1994	David A. Booth	Rethinking Social Development: Theory, Research and Practice
1994	Leslie Sklair	Capitalism and Development
1996	Jo Marie Griesgraber, Bernhard G. Gunter	Promoting Development: Effective Global Institutions for the Twenty-First Century
1997	Frederick Cooper, Randall M. Packard	International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge
1999	Ronaldo Munck, Denis O'Hearn	Critical Development Theory: Contributions to a New Paradigm
2000	Finn Tarp	Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learned and Directions for the Future
2001	J.K. Coetzee, J. Graff, F. Hendricks, G. Wood	Development: Theory, Policy and Practice
2001	Uma Kothari, Martin Minogue	Development Theory and Practice: Critical Perspectives
2003	Nigel Cross	Evidence for Hope: The Search for Sustainable Development.
2004	Tim Forsyth	Encyclopedia of International Development
2005	Jeffrey Haynes	Palgrave Advances in Development Studies
2005	Uma Kothari	A Radical History of Development Studies: Individuals, Institutions and Ideologies
2006	David A. Clark	The Elgar Companion to Development Studies
2007	Aram Ziai	Exploring Post-Development: Theory and Practice, Problems and Perspectives
2008	Gary Craig, Keith Popple, Mae Shaw	Community Development in Theory and Practice: An International Reader
2010	Andrea Cornwall, Deborah Eade	Deconstructing Development Discourse: Buzzwords and Fuzzwords
2010	Sing C. Chew, Pat Lauderdale	Theory and Methodology of World Development: The Writings of Andre Gunder Frank
2010	Wolfgang Sachs	The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power *(2nd ed.)*
2011	Henry Veltmeyer	The Critical Development Studies Handbook: Tools for Change
2011	Jerry W. Robinson, Jr., Gary Paul Green	Introduction to Community Development: Theory, Practice, and Service-Learning
2012	R. Srivatsan	History of Development Thought: A Critical Anthology
2014	B.Currie-Alder, R.Kanbur, D.Malone, R.Medhora	International Development: Ideas, Experience, and Prospects
2014	David Simon, Anders Narman	Development as Theory and Practice: Current Perspectives on Development and Development Co-op…
2014	Vandana Desai, Robert B. Potter	The Companion to Development Studies *(3rd ed.)*

APPENDIX A2. *Disciplinary Histories*

Year	Author(s)	Title
ANTHROPOLOGY		
1996	Katy Gardner, David Lewis	Anthropology, Development and the Post-Modern Challenge
2015	Katy Gardner, David Lewis	Anthropology and Development: Challenges for the Twenty-First Century
COMMUNICATIONS		
2009	John V. Vilanilam	Development Communication in Practice: India and the Millennium Development Goals
2012	Emile G. McAnany	Saving the World: A Brief History of Communication for Development and Social Change
ECONOMICS		
1968	Lionel Robbins	The History of Economic Development in the History of Economic Thought
1978	Heinz Wolfgang Arndt	The Rise and Fall of Economic Growth: A Study in Contemporary Thought
1982	Ian Malcolm David Little	Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and International Relations
1983	Deepak Lal	The Poverty of 'Development Economics'
1987	Heinz Wolfgang Arndt	Economic Development: The History of an Idea
1992	Berch Berberoglu	The Political Economy of Development: Development Theory and the Prospects for Change in the Third World
1999	Keith B Griffin	Alternative Strategies for Economic Development
1999	Ozay Mehmet	Westernizing the Third World: The Eurocentricity of Economic Development Theories
2002	Ha-Joon Chang	Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective
2005	Gerald Meier	Biography of a Subject: An Evolution of Development Economics
2009	Shahid Yusuf	Development Economics through the Decades: A Critical Look at 30 Years of the World Development Report
2014	Shahrukh Rafi Khan	A History of Development Economics Thought : Challenges and Counter-Challenges
2015	Eiman O. Zein-Elabdin	Economics, Culture and Development
GENDER STUDIES		
1994	Naila Kabeer	Reversed Realities: Gender Hierarchies in Development Thought
2005	Devaki Jain	Women, Development, and the UN: A Sixty Year Quest for Equality and Justice
POLITICS & SOCIOLOGY		
1973	Robert A. Packenham	Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science
1983	Richard A. Higgott	Political Development Theory: The Contemporary Debate
1988	David Harrison	The Sociology of Modernization and Development
2003	Nils Gilman	Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America
POPULATION STUDIES		
1988	Ozzie G. Simmons	Perspectives on Development and Population Growth in the Third World
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (GENERAL/OTHER)		
1973	Robert S. McNamara	One Hundred Countries, Two Billion People: The Dimensions of Development
1984	A.F. Robertson	People and the State: An Anthropology of Planned Development
1984	Magnus Blomström, Björne Hettne	Development Theory in Transition: The Dependency Debate and Beyond: Third World Responses
1985	Dieter Senghaas	The European Experience: A Historical Critique of Development Theory
1992	Benjamin Howard Higgins	All the Difference: A Development Economist's Quest
1994	Richard B. Norgaard	Development Betrayed: The End of Progress and a Coevolutionary Revisioning of the Future
1996	John Brohman	Popular Development: Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Development
1997	Rune Skarstein	Development Theory: A Guide to Some Unfashionable Perspectives
2008	Robin Broad, John Cavanagh	Development Redefined: How the Market Met Its Match
2009	E.A. Brett	Reconstructing Development Theory: International Inequality, Institutional Reform and Social Emancipation
2014	Rosalind Eyben	International Aid and the Making of a Better World: Reflexive Practice
2014	William Easterly	The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor
2015	Myles A Wickstead	Aid and Development: A Brief Introduction

APPENDIX A3. *Policy Histories, Diplomatic Histories, International Histories*

Year	Author(s)	Title

ENVIRONMENTAL & SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Year	Author(s)	Title
1970	H.V. Nelles	The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines & Hydro-electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941
2010	Nico Schrijver	Development without Destruction: The UN and Global Resource Management
2011	Jessica B. Teisch	Engineering Nature: Water, Development & the Global Spread of American Environmental Expertise
2013	Anne E. Egelston	Sustainable Development: A History
2014	Iris Borowy	Defining Sustainable Development for Our Common Future: A History of the World Commission on Environment
2014	F.Dodds, J.Laguna-Celis, L.Thompson	From Rio+20 to a New Development Agenda: Building a Bridge to a Sustainable Future
2015	Stephen Macekura	Of Limits and Growth: The Rise of Global Sustainable Development in the Twentieth Century

FOREIGN AID -- UK COLONIAL POLICY

Year	Author(s)	Title
2006	Jeff D. Grischow	Shaping Tradition: Civil Society, Community and Development in Colonial Northern Ghana, 1899-1957

FOREIGN AID -- US COLD WAR POLICY

Year	Author(s)	Title
1959	P.T. Bauer	United States Aid and Indian Economic Development
1973	Robert A. Packenham	Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science
1986	Robert E. Wood	From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World Economy
2002	Yves Dezalay, Bryant G. Garth	The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin American States
2003	David C. Engerman	Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development
2003	Nils Gilman	Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America
2004	Samuel Hale Butterfield	U.S. Development Aid--An Historic First: Achievements and Failures in the Twentieth Century
2007	Alice Amsden	Escape from Empire: The Developing World's Journey through Heaven and Hell
2007	Jeffrey F. Taffet	Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America
2014	Thomas C. Field, Jr.	From Development to Dictatorship : Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era
2015	Daniel Immerwahr	Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development

FOREIGN AID -- CHINA CONTEMPORARY POLICY

Year	Author(s)	Title
2009	Deborah Brautigam	The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa
2009	Jamie Monson	Africa's Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania
2013	Emily T. Yeh	Taming Tibet: Landscape Transformation and the Gift of Chinese Development

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Year	Author(s)	Title
1978	Gary W. Wynia	The Politics of Latin American Development
1994	James Ferguson	The Anti-politics Machine: "Development", Depoliticisation and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho
1996	Claude Ake	Democracy and Development in Africa
1996	Toyin Falola	Development Planning and Decolonization in Nigeria
1998	Clyde Adrian Woods	Development Arrested: The Blues and Plantation Power in the Mississippi Delta
1998	James Scott	Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed
2002	Timothy Mitchell	Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity
2006	Pietro P. Masina	Vietnam's Development Strategies
2011	C.Y. Kim	From Despair to Hope: Economic Policymaking in Korea, 1945-1979
2012	Susan Vincent	Dimensions of Development: History, Community, and Change in Allpachico, Peru
2014	Rafael Rossotto Ioris	Transforming Brazil: A History of National Development in the Postwar Era

APPENDIX A4. *Organisational Histories*

Year	Author(s)	Title
ORGANISATIONAL HISTORIES -- FOREIGN AID AGENCIES		
1976	William Rendell, Sir	The History of the Commonwealth Development Corporation, 1948-1972
1998	David R. Morrison	Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance
2001	Michael McWilliam	The Development Business: A History of the Commonwealth Development Corporation
2010	Inge Brinkman, Anne-Lot Hoek	Bricks, Mortar and Capacity Building: A Socio-cultural History of SNV Netherlands Development Org…
2013	Barrie Ireton	Britain's International Development Policies: A History of DFID and Overseas Aid
2015	Patrick Kilby	NGOs and Political Change: A History of the Australian Council for International Development
ORGANISATIONAL HISTORIES -- INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS		
1985	UNCTAD	The History of UNCTAD, 1964-1984
2001	L. Emmerij, R. Jolly, T.G. Weiss	Ahead of the Curve? UN Ideas and Global Challenges
2004	John Toye, Richard Toye	The UN and Global Political Economy: Trade, Finance, and Development
2004	R. Jolly, L. Emmerij, D. Ghai, F. Lapeyre	UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice
2004	UNCTAD	Beyond Conventional Wisdom in Development Policy: An Intellectual History of UNCTAD 1964-2004
2004	Michael Ward	Quantifying the World: UN Ideas and Statistics
2005	T.G.Weiss, T.Carayannis, L.Emmerij, R.Jolly	UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and Social Justice
2006	Craig Murphy	The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way?
2007	Ian Taylor, Karen Smith	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
2008	Digambar Bhouraskar	United Nations Development Aid: A Study in History and Politics
2009	Olav Stokke	The UN and Development: From Aid to Cooperation
2009	Richard Peet	Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO *(2nd ed.)*
2011	Dan Plesch	America, Hitler and the UN: How the Allies Won World War II and Forged a Peace
2013	Digambar Bhouraskar	United Nations Development Aid: A History of UNDP
2014	Eric Helleiner	Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order
2014	UNCTAD	UNCTAD at 50: A Short History

APPENDIX A5. *Related Textbooks*

Year	Author(s)	Title
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (GENERAL)		
1997	John Martinussen	Society, State and Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development
2000	Frik de Beer, Hennie Swanepoel	Introduction to Development Studies *(2nd ed.)*
2003	Barbara P. Thomas-Slayter	Southern Exposure: International Development and the Global South in the Twenty-First Century
2005	Adam Szirmai	The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Development: An Introduction
2007	Maggie Black	The No-Nonsense Guide to International Development *(2nd ed.)*
2008	Andy Sumner, Michael Tribe	International Development Studies: Theories and Methods in Research and Practice
2009	Arjan de Haan	How the Aid Industry Works: An Introduction to International Development
2016	B.K. Pattanaik	Introduction to Development Studies
2016	D.Kingsbury, J.McKay, J.Hunt, M.McGillivray, M.Clarke	International Development Issues and Challenges *(3rd ed.)*
2017	Paul Haslam, Jessica Shafer, Pierre Beaudet	Introduction to International Development: Approaches, Actors, and Issues *(3rd ed.)*
ANTHROPOLOGY		
1984	Lucy Mair	Anthropology and Development
2005	Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan	Anthropology and Development: Understanding Contemporary Social Change
2012	Emma Crewe, Richard Axelby	Anthropology and Development: Culture, Morality and Politics in a Globalised World
ECONOMICS		
1957	Gerald M. Meier, Robert E. Baldwin	Economic Development: Theory, History, Policy
2012	E. Wayne Nafziger	Economic Development *(5th ed.)*
2012	Edward J. Blakely, Nancey G. Leigh	Planning Local Economic Development: Theory and Practice *(5th ed.)*
2012	Subrata Ghatak	Introduction to Development Economics *(4th ed.)*
2013	D.H.Perkins, S.Radelet, D.L.Lindauer, S.A.Block	Economics of Development *(7th ed.)*
2014	Julie Schaffner	Development Economics: Theory, Empirical Research, and Policy Analysis
2015	Michael P. Todaro, Stephen C. Smith	Economic Development *(12th ed.)*
2016	Alain de Janvry, Elisabeth Sadoulet	Development Economics: Theory and Practice
2017	A.P. Thirlwall, Penélope Pacheco-López	Economics of Development: Theory and Evidence *(10th ed.)*
GEOGRAPHY		
1998	Arthur S. Morris	Geography and Development
2000	Rupert Hodder	Development Geography
2003	Marcus Power	Rethinking development geographies
2017	R.Potter, T.Binns, J.A.Elliott, E.Nel, D.W.Smith	Geographies of Development: An Introduction to Development Studies *(4th ed.)*
POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS		
1999	Olle Törnquist	Politics and Development: A Critical Introduction
2013	Brian C. Smith	Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development *(4th ed.)*
2015	Danielle Beswick, Paul Jackson	Conflict, Security and Development: An Introduction *(2nd ed.)*
SOCIOLOGY		
1988	Tony Barnett	Sociology and Development
1990	Andrew Webster	Introduction to the Sociology of Development *(2nd ed.)*
2001	Norman Long	Development Sociology: Actor Perspectives
OTHER (Communcations, Education, Environmental Studies, Gender Studies, Law, Regional Planning)		
2001	Srinivas R. Melkote, H. Leslie Steeves	Communication for Development in the Third World: Theory and Practice for Empowerment
1989	Ingemar Fägerland, Lawrence J. Saha	Education and National Development: A Comparative Perspective *(2nd ed.)*
1993	Caroline O.N. Moser	Gender Planning and Development: Theory, Practice and Training
2014	Michael J. Trebilcock, Mariana Mota Prado	Advanced Introduction to Law and Development
2006	Peter P. Rogers, Kazi F. Jalal, John A. Boyd	An Introduction to Sustainable Development
2013	Jennifer A. Elliott	An Introduction to Sustainable Development *(4th ed.)*
1984	Charles Gore	Regions in Question: Space, Development Theory and Regional Policy
2001	Jayasri Ray Chaudhuri	An Introduction to Development and Regional Planning: With Special Reference to India

Consolidated bibliography

Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson. 'Reversal of fortune: geography and institutions in the making of the world income distribution', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117.4 (2002), 1231-94.

Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson. 'The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation', *American Economic Review* 91.5 (2001), 1369-402.

Adelman, I. and C.T. Morris. 'Editorial: development history and its implications for development theory', *World Development* 25.6 (1997), 831-40.

Ahorro, J. 'The waves of post-development theory and a consideration of the Philippines'. Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Conference, University of British Columbia (4–6 June 2008). http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Ahorro.pdf.

Akhavi, S. 'Islam and the West in world history', *Third World Quarterly* 24.3 (2003), 545-62.

Allen, B. *Vanishing into things: knowledge in Chinese tradition* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).

Allende, J.A. 'Historical constraints to privatization: the case of the nationalized Chilean copper industry', *Studies In Comparative International Development* 23.1 (1988), 55-84.

Almond, G. *Political development: essays in heuristic theory* (Boston: Little Brown, 1970).

Andreasson, S. 'Fossil-fuelled development and the legacy of post-development theory in twenty-first century Africa', *Third World Quarterly* 38.12 (2017): 2634-49.

Anscombe, G.E.M. 'Modern moral philosophy', *Philosophy* 33.124 (1958): 1-19.

Appiah, K.A. *Cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006).

Appiah, K.A. *The honor code: how moral revolutions happen* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011).

Arndt, H.W. 'Economic development: a semantic history', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 29.3 (1981), 457-66.

Arndt, H.W. *Economic development: the history of an idea* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

Arndt, H.W. 'The origins of structuralism', *World Development* 13.2 (1985), 151-59.

Arndt, H.W. *The rise and fall of economic growth: a study in contemporary thought* (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1978).

Arquilla, J. 'The end of war as we knew it? Insurgency, counterinsurgency and lessons from the forgotten history of early terror networks', *Third World Quarterly* 28.2 (2007), 369-86.

Arrighf, G. 'Labour supplies in historical perspective: a study of the proletarianization of the African peasantry in Rhodesia', *Journal of Development Studies* 6.3 (1970), 197-234.

Astone, J. 'Incorporating local history into planning documents: a case study from Guinea, West Africa', *World Development* 26.9 (1998), 1773-84.

Baldwin, R. *The great convergence: information technology and the new globalization* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016);

Baldwin-Edwards, M. 'Towards a theory of illegal migration: historical and structural components', *Third World Quarterly* 29.7 (2008), 1449-59.

Beauchemin, C. and B. Schoumaker. 'Are migrant associations actors in local development? A national event-history analysis in rural Burkina Faso', *World Development* 37.12 (2009), 1897-913.

Beeson, M. and R. Higgott. 'Hegemony, institutionalism and US foreign policy: theory and practice in comparative historical perspective' *Third World Quarterly* 26.7 (2005), 1173-88.

Benjamin, D. and L. Brandt. 'Markets, discrimination, and the economic contribution of women in China: historical evidence', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 44.1 (1995), 63-104.

Bennett, B.M. and J.M. Hodge. (eds.), *Science and empire: knowledge and networks of science across the British Empire, 1800-1970* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

Berger, M.T. 'After the Third World? History, destiny and the fate of Third Worldism', *Third World Quarterly* 25.1 (2004), 9-39.

Berlin, I. 'The bent twig: a note on nationalism', *Foreign Affairs* 51.1 (1972), 11-30.

Berlin, I. 'The purpose of philosophy', in *Concepts and categories: philosophical essays,* 2nd edition, ed. Henry Hardy, 1-14 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013[1978]).

Berlin, I. 'The pursuit of the ideal', in *The proper study of mankind: an anthology of essays,* eds. Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer, 1-16 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1997).

Berlin, I. 'Two concepts of liberty', in *Four essays on liberty,* ed. I. Berlin, 118-72 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

Berlin, I. (ed.). *Four essays on liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969),.

Berlin, I. *The proper study of mankind: an anthology of essays,* ed. Roger Hausheer, Henry Hardy (London: Chatto & Windus, 1997).

Berlin, I. and S. Lukes. 'Isaiah Berlin: in conversation with Steve Lukes', *Salmagundi* 120.1 (1998), 52-134.

Bernard, M. 'States, social forces, and regions in historical time: toward a critical political economy of Eastern Asia', *Third World Quarterly* 17.4 (1996), 649-66.

Berry, S. 'Tomatoes, land and hearsay: property and history in Asante in the time of structural adjustment', *World Development* 25.8 (1997), 1225-41.

Bhagwati, J.N. 'US trade policy: the infatuation with FTAs', Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 726, Columbia University (1995).

Bhatt, V.V. 'Economic development: an analytic-historical approach', *World Development* 4.7 (1976), 583-92.

Bilgin, P. and A.D. Morton. 'Historicising representations of "failed states": beyond the Cold-War annexation of the social sciences?', *Third World Quarterly* 23.1 (2002), 55-80.

Binswanger, H. 'Agricultural mechanization', *World Bank Research Observer* 1.1 (1986), 27-56.

Binswanger, H.P. and K. Deininger. 'South African land policy: the legacy of history and current options', *World Development* 21.9 (1993), 1451-75.

Bishai, D. and R. Nalubola. 'The history of food fortification in the United States: its relevance for current fortification efforts in developing countries', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 51.1 (2002), 37-53.

Blinder, A.S. 'Offshoring: the next industrial revolution?', *Foreign Affairs* 85.2 (2006), 113-28.

Blomström, M. and B. Hettne. *Beroende och underutveckling: den latinamerikanska beroendeskolans bidrag till utvecklingsteorin* [Underdevelopment and dependency: Latin American contribution to development theory] (Stockholm: Prisma, 1981).

Blomström, M. and B. Hettne. *Development theory in transition: the dependency debate and beyond* (London: Zed Books, 1984).

Boas, T.C. and J. Gans-Morse. 'Neoliberalism: from new liberal philosophy to anti-liberal slogan', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44.2 (2009), 137-61.

Booth, D. 'Marxism and development sociology: interpreting the impasse', *World Development* 13.7 (1985): 761-87.

Borowy, I. *Defining sustainable development for our common future: A history of the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission)* (London: Routledge, 2013).

Borowy, I. 'East German medical aid to Nicaragua: the politics of solidarity between biomedicine and primary health care', *História, Ciências, Saúde* 24.2 (2017), 411-28.

Borowy, I. 'Global health and development: conceptualizing health between economic growth and environmental sustainability', *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 68.3 (2012), 451-85.

Borowy, I. 'Medical aid, repression, and international relation: the East German hospital at Metema', *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 71.1 (2015), 64-92.

Borowy, I. 'Negotiating international development: the making of the Millennium Development Goals', *Regions and Cohesion* 5.3 (2015), 18-43.

Borowy, I. 'Road traffic injuries: social change and development', *Medical History* 57.1 (2013), 108-38.

Borowy, I. 'Science and technology for development in a postcolonial World: negotiations at the United Nations, 1960-1980', *NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin* 26.1 (2018), 31-62.

Borowy, I. 'Sustainable health: the need for new developmental models', *Bulletin of the WHO* 92 (2014), 699.

Borowy, I. 'The Brundtland Commission: sustainable development as health issue', *Michael Quarterly* 10.2 (2013), 196-206.

Brigg, M. 'Post-development, Foucault and the colonisation metaphor', *Third World Quarterly* 23.3 (2002): 421-36.

Bunker, S.G. and P.S. Ciccantell. 'Generative sectors and the new historical materialism: economic ascent and the cumulatively sequential restructuring of the world economy', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37.4 (2003), 3-30.

Bury, J.B. *The idea of progress: an inquiry into its origin and growth* (London: Macmillan, 1920).

Bush, H.W. 'Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit', George Bush Presidential Library and Museum [https://bush41library. tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2217, accessed 13 February 2019].

Canadian friends of LSE. 'Alumni Reflections', LSE Alumni Association (2015) [http://www.cflse.com/2015/11/22/ alumni-reflections, accessed 22 April 2018].

Cardoso, F.H. 'New paths: globalization in historical perspective', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44.4 (2009), 296-317.

Casanova, P.G. 'Historical systems and social systems', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 8.3 (1973), 227-46.

Chang, H. *Inventing temperature: measurement and scientific progress* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

Chang, H. *Is water H$_2$O? Evidence, realism and pluralism* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012).

Chang, H.J. *Kicking away the ladder* (London: Anthem Press, 2003);

Chauveau, J.P. and A. Samba. 'Market development, government interventions and the dynamics of the small-scale fishing sector: an historical perspective of the Senegalese case', *Development and Change* 20.4 (1989), 599-620.

Christ's College. 'Jack Plumb (1911-2001)', Christ's College Cambridge Alumni [https://alumni. christs.cam.ac.uk/professor-sir-john-plumb, accessed 26 March 2019].

Collingwood, R.G. *An essay on metaphysics* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998[1940]).

Collingwood, R.G. 'Function of metaphysics in civilization', in *An essay on metaphysics,* Ed. Rex Martin, 379-421 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998[1940])

Collingwood, R.G. *The idea of history* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 334.

Collins, R. *The sociology of philosophies* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).

Comte, A. *A general view of positivism* (London: Trübner and Co., 1865[1848]).

Connell-Smith, G. 'The Grenada invasion in historical perspective: from Monroe to Reagan', *Third World Quarterly* 6.2 (1984), 432-45.

Cooper, F. 'Commentary on the essay of Joseph Hodge', *Humanity,* Joseph Hodge Roundtable. 3 May 2016 [http://humanityjournal.org/blog/commentary-on-the-essay-of-joseph-hodge].

Cooper, F. *Decolonization and African society: the labor question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Cooper, F. 'Writing the history of development', *Journal of Modern European History* 8.1 (2010), 5-23.

Cooper, F. and R. Packard. (eds.) *International development and the social sciences: essays on the history and politics of knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

Corbridge, S. ''Beneath the pavement only soil': The poverty of post-development', *The Journal of Development Studies 34*.6 (1998): 138-48.

Corbridge, S. *Capitalist world development: a critique of radical development geography* (Totowa, NJ: Rowan & Littlefield, 1986).

Cullather, N. 'America's boy? Ramon Magsaysay and the illusion of influence', *Pacific Historical Review* 62.3 (1993), 305-38.

Cullather, N. 'Bombing at the speed of thought: intelligence in the coming age of cyberwar', *Intelligence and National Security* 18.4 (2003), 141-54.

Cullather, N. 'Damming Afghanistan: modernization in a buffer state', *Journal of American History* 89.2 (2002), 512-37.

Cullather, N. '"Fuel for the good dragon": the United States and industrial policy in Taiwan, 1950-1965', *Diplomatic History* 20.1 (1996), 1-26.

Cullather, N. 'Hunger and containment: how India became "important" in US Cold War strategy', *India Review* 6.2 (2007), 59-90.

Cullather, N. *Illusions of influence: the political economy of United States-Philippines relations, 1942-1960* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

Cullather, N. 'Miracles of modernization: the Green Revolution and the apotheosis of technology', *Diplomatic History* 28.2 (2004), 227-54.

Cullather, N. 'Research note: development? It's history', *Diplomatic History* 24.4 (2000), 641-53.

Cullather, N. *Secret history: the CIA's classified account of its operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

Cullather, N. '"Stretching the surface of the earth": the foundations, neo-Malthusianism and the modernising agenda', *Global Society* 28.1 (2014), 104-12.

Cullather, N. 'The foreign policy of the calorie', *American Historical Review* 112.2 (2007), 337-64.

Cullather, N. *The hungry world: America's Cold War battle against poverty in Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

Cullather, N. 'The limits of multilateralism: making policy for the Philippines, 1945-1950', *The International History Review* 13.1 (1991), 70-95.

Dobby, E.H.G. 'Resettlement transforms Malaya: a case-history of relocating the population of an Asian plural society', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 1.3 (1952), 163–89.

Dodge, T. 'Iraq: the contradictions of exogenous state-building in historical perspective', *Third World Quarterly* 27.1 (2006), 187-200.

Dooley, M., E. Fernandez-Arias, and K. Kletzer. 'Is the debt crisis history? Recent private capital inflows to developing countries', *World Bank Economic Review* 10.1 (1996), 27-50.

Edelman, M. and A. León. 'Cycles of land grabbing in Central America: an argument for history and a case study in the Bajo Aguán, Honduras', *Third World Quarterly* 34.9 (2013), 1697-722.

Edelman, M., C. Oya, and S.M. Borras. 'Global land grabs: historical processes, theoretical and methodological implications and current trajectories', *Third World Quarterly* 34.9 (2013), 1517-31.

Ekbladh, D. 'American asylum: the United States and the campaign to transplant the Technical League, 1939–1940', *Diplomatic History* 39.4 (2014), 629-60.

Ekbladh, D. 'From consensus to crisis: the postwar career of nation-building in US foreign relations', in *Nation-building: beyond Afghanistan and Iraq,* ed. Francis Fukuyama, 19-41 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

Ekbladh, D. '"Mr. TVA": grass-roots development, David Lilienthal, and the rise and fall of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a symbol for US overseas development, 1933-1973', *Diplomatic History* 26.3 (2002), 335-74.

Ekbladh, D. 'Present at the creation: Edward Mead Earle and the depression-era origins of security studies', *International Security* 36.3 (2012), 107-41.

Ekbladh, D. *The great American mission: modernization and the construction of an American world order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010

Ekbladh, D. 'The interwar foundations of security studies: Edward Mead Earle, the Carnegie Corporation and the depression-era origins of a field', *Global Society* 28.1 (2014): 40-53.

Ekbladh, D. 'To reconstruct the medieval: rural reconstruction in interwar China and the rise of an American style of modernization, 1921–1961', *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 9.3-4 (2000), 169-96.

Ekbladh, D. 'The stages of development's history?', *Humanity,* Joseph Hodge Roundtable, 30 April 2016, available at: http://humanityjournal.org/blog/the-stages-of-developments-history/#_ftn1.

Emmerij, L., R. Jolly, and T.G. Weiss. 'Economic and social thinking at the UN in historical perspective', *Development and Change* 36.2 (2005), 211-35.

Engerman, D.C. 'Bernath Lecture: American knowledge and global power', *Diplomatic History* 31.4 (2007), 599-622.

Engerman, D.C. 'Development politics and the Cold War', *Diplomatic History* 41.1 (2017), 1-19.

Engerman, D.C. 'Economic reconstruction in Soviet Russia: the courting of Herbert Hoover in 1922', *The International History Review* 19.4 (1997), 836-47.

Engerman, D.C. 'John Dewey and the Soviet Union: pragmatism meets revolution', *Modern Intellectual History* 3.1 (2006), 33-63.

Engerman, D.C. *Know your enemy: the rise and fall of America's soviet experts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Engerman, D.C. 'Learning from the East: Soviet experts and India in the era of competitive coexistence', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 33.2 (2013), 227-38.

Engerman, D.C. *Modernization from the other shore: American intellectuals and the romance of Russian development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

Engerman, D.C. 'Modernization from the other shore: American observers and the costs of Soviet economic development', *The American Historical Review* 105.2 (2000), 383-416.

Engerman, D.C. 'New society, new scholarship: Soviet studies programmes in interwar America', *Minerva,* 37.1 (1999), 25-43.

Engerman, D.C. 'Social science in the Cold War', *Isis* 101.2 (2010), 393-400.

Engerman, D.C. 'The ironies of the Iron Curtain: the Cold War and the rise of Russian studies in the United States', *Cahiers du monde russe* 45.3-4 (2004), 465-95.

Engerman, D.C. 'The pedagogical purposes of interdisciplinary social science: a view from area studies in the United States', *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 51.1 (2015), 78-92.

Engerman, D.C. *The price of aid: the economic Cold War in India* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).

Engerman, D.C. 'The price of success: economic sovietology, development, and the costs of interdisciplinarity', *History of Political Economy* 42 (2010), 234-60.

Engerman, D.C. 'The romance of economic development and new histories of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History* 28.1 (2004), 23-54.

Engerman, D.C. 'The Second World's Third World', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12.1 (2011), 183-211.

Engerman, D.C. and C.R. Unger. 'Introduction: towards a global history of modernization', *Diplomatic History* 33.3 (2009), 375-85.

Engerman, D.C., N. Gilman, M.H. Haefele, and M.E. Latham. (eds.). *Staging growth: modernization, development, and the global Cold War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).

Engerman, S. and K. Sokoloff. 'Factor endowments, inequality, and paths of development among New World economies', *Economica* 3.1 (2002), 41-109.

Engerman, S. and K. Sokoloff. 'Debating the role of institutions in political and economic development: theory, history, and findings', *Annual Review of Political Science* 11.1 (2008), 119-35.

Escobar, A. *Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995)

Escobar, A. 'Power and visibility: the invention and management of development in the Third World', unpublished PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley (1987).

Esteva, G. and M. Suri Prakash. 'From global thinking to local thinking', in *The post-development reader,* Eds. Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree, 277-289 (London: Zed Books, 1997).

Evans, P.B. *Embedded autonomy: states and industrial transformation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

Fairhead, J. and M. Leach. 'False forest history, complicit social analysis: rethinking some West African environmental narratives', *World Development* 23.6 (1995), 1023-35.

Fals-Borda, O. and L.E. Mora-Osejo. 'Context and diffusion of knowledge: a critique of Eurocentrism', *Action Research* 1.1 (2003), 29-37.

Ferguson, J. *The anti-politics machine: "development," depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho* (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1994).

Forsyth, T. 'Are environmental social movements socially exclusive? An historical study from Thailand', *World Development* 35.12 (2007), 2110-30.

Foster-Carter, A. 'Beliefs', Aidanfc.net [http:// www.aidanfc.net/beliefs.html, accessed 14 January 2019].

Foster-Carter, A. 'From Rostow to Gunder Frank: conflicting paradigms in the analysis of underdevelopment', *World Development* 4.3 (1976): 167-80.

Foster-Carter, A. 'Neo-Marxist approaches to development and underdevelopment', *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 3.1 (1973): 7-33.

Foster-Carter, A. 'The modes of production controversy', *New Left Review* 107.1 (1978): 47-78.

Foucault, M. 'On the genealogy of ethics: an overview of a work in progress', in *Michel Foucault: beyond structuralism and hermeneutics,* 2nd edition, Eds. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, 229–252 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

Fowler, A. 'NGDOs as a moment in history: beyond aid to social entrepreneurship or civic innovation?', *Third World Quarterly* 21.4 (2000), 637-54.

Frank, A.G. 'Crisis of ideology and ideology of crisis', in *Dynamics of global crisis,* eds. Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andrew Gunder Frank, and Immanuel Wallerstein, 109-166 (New York: Monthly Review, 1982)

Frank, A.G. *Lumpenbourgeoisie: lumpendevelopment: dependence, class, and politics in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972.

Frank, L. 'The development game', in *The post-development reader,* Eds. Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree, 263-73 (London: Zed Books, 1997).

Frey, M. 'Control, legitimacy, and the securing of interests: European development policy in Southeast Asia from the late colonial period to the early 1960s', *Contemporary European History* 12.4 (2003), 395-412.

Frey, M. 'Decolonization in Southeast Asia, the United States, and the dissolution of European colonial empires, PhD dissertation, University of Cologne, 2005.

Frey, M. *Dekolonisierung in Südostasien: Die Vereinigten Staaten und die Auflösung der europäischen Kolonialreiche, 1930-1961* [Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: the United States and the dissolution of European colonial empire, 1930-1961] (München: Oldenbourg, 2006).

Frey, M. 'Experten, Stiftungen und Politik: Zur Genese des globalen Diskurses über Bevölkerung seit 1945' [Experts, foundations and politics: on the genesis of the global discourse on the population since 1945], *Zeithistorische Studien* 4.1-2 (2007), 137-59.

Frey, M. 'Neo-Malthusianism and development: shifting interpretations of a contested paradigm', *Journal of Global History* 6.1 (2011), 75-97.

Frey, M. 'Tools of empire: persuasion and the U.S. modernizing mission in Southeast Asia', *Diplomatic History* 27.4 (2003), 541-66.

Frey, M. 'Visions of the future: the United States and colonialism in Southeast Asia, 1940-1945', *Amerikastudien* 48.3 (2003): 365-88.

Frey, M. and S. Kunkel. 'Writing the history of development: a review of the recent literature', *Contemporary European History* 20.2 (2011), 215-32.

Frey, M., S. Kunkel, and C.R. Unger. (eds.). *International organizations and development, 1945-1990* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

Friedman, T.L. *The world is flat: a brief history of the twenty-first century* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2005.

Fukuyama, F. *The end of history and the last man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

Fulbright, J.W. *The arrogance of power* (New York: Random House, 1966).

Gellman, M. 'Teaching silence in the schoolroom: whither national history in Sierra Leone and El Salvador?', *Third World Quarterly* 36.1 (2015), 147-61.

Gendzier, I. *Managing political change: social scientists and the Third World* (Boulder: Westview, 1985).

Gills, B. 'North Korea and the crisis of socialism: the historical ironies of national division', *Third World Quarterly* 13.1 (1992), 107-30.

Gills, B. and G. Philip. 'Editorial: towards convergence in development policy? Challenging the 'Washington Consensus' and restoring the historicity of divergent development trajectories', *Third World Quarterly* 17.4 (1996), 585-91.

Gilman, N. *Mandarins of the future: modernization theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

Gilman, N. 'Modernization theory, the highest stage of American intellectual history', in *Staging growth: modernization, development, and the global Cold War,* eds. David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael E. Latham, 47-80 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).

Gilman, N. 'The Cold War as intellectual force field', *Modern Intellectual History* 13.2 (2016), 507-23.

Gilman, N. 'The new international economic order: a reintroduction', *Humanity* 6.1 (2015), 1-16.

Giulianotti, R. and G. Armstrong. 'Sport, the military and peacemaking: history and possibilities', *Third World Quarterly* 32.3 (2011), 379-94. Goossens, F. 'Failing innovation in the Zairian cassava production system: a comparative historical analysis', *Sustainable Development* 5.1 (1997), 36-42.

Gleditsch, N.P. 'Peace research and international relations in Scandinavia. From enduring rivalry to stable peace?', in *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research*, eds. Stefano Guzzini, Dietrich Jung, 15-26 (London: Routledge, 2004

Gottschang, T.R. 'Economic change, disasters, and migration: the historical case of Manchuria', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 35.3 (1987), 461-90.

Grabowski, R. 'A historical reassessment of early Japanese development', *Development and Change* 16.2 (1985), 235-50.

Grampp, W.D. 'Robbins on the history of development theory', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 20.3 (1972), 539-53.

Graulau, J. 'Is mining good for development? The intellectual history of an unsettled question', *Progress in Development Studies* 8.2 (2008), 129-62.

Guess, R. *Philosophy and real politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

de Haan, A. 'Migration and livelihoods in historical perspective: a case study of Bihar, India', *Journal of Development Studies* 38.5 (2002), 115-42.

Hallward-Driemeier, M. and G.N. Nayyar. *Trouble in the making: the future of manufacturing-led development* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2017).

Hammarskjöld, D. 'Know yourself—know your world', in *The servant of peace: a selection of speeches and statements of Dag Hammarskjöld,* ed. W. Foote, 242-50 (London: Bodley Head, 1962).

Hammarskjöld, D. *Markings,* trans. W.H. Auden and Leif Sjöberg (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), p. 63.

Harding, S.G. (ed.). *The feminist standpoint theory reader: intellectual and political controversies* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

Harriss, B. and J. Harriss. ''Generative' or 'parasitic' urbanism? Some observations from the recent history of a south Indian market town', *Journal of Development Studies* 20.3 (1984), 82-101.

Harris, C.J. *Warzone* [video, accessible at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VKcw35_saLY].

Harvey, D. *The condition of postmodernity: an enquiry into the origins of cultural change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990)

Hayami, Y. 'Ecology, history, and development: a perspective from rural Southeast Asia', *World Bank Research Observer* 16.2 (2001), 169-98; Humphries, 'Child labor'.

Hegel, G.W.F. *The phenomenology of spirit,* trans. Terry Pinkard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Helleiner, E. *Forgotten foundations of Bretton Woods: international development and the making of the postwar order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).

Hettne, B. 'Current issues in development theory', SAREC report (Stockholm: SAREC, 1978).

Hettne, B. 'Development theory and the Third World, SAREC report (Stockholm: SAREC, 1982).

Hettne, B. *Development theory and the three worlds* (Essex: Longman Scientific & Technical, 1990).

Hettne, B. *Development theory and the three worlds: towards an international political economy of development* (Essex: Longman Scientific & Technical, 1995).

Hettne, B. *Ekonomisk historia i Sverige: en översikt av institutionell utveckling, forskningsinriktning och vetenskaplig produktion* [Economic history in Sweden: an overview of institutional development, research focus, and scientific production] (Lunds universitets historiska institution, 1980).

Hettne, B. 'Emerging trends in development theory: report from a SAREC workshop on development theory', SAREC conference proceedings, Västerhaninge, August 8-12, 1977.

Hettne, B. 'The development of development theory'. *Acta Sociologica* 26.3/4 (1983): 247-46.

Hettne, B. 'The political economy of indirect rule: Mysore 1881-1947', unpublished PhD thesis, University of Göteborg (1978).

Hettne, B. *The political economy of indirect rule: Mysore 1881-1947* (Malmö: Curzon Press, 1978).

Hodge, J.M. 'British colonial expertise, post-colonial careering and the early history of international development', *Journal of Modern European History* 8.1 (2010), 24-46.

Hodge, J.M. 'Response to the commentators, part one', *Humanity,* Joseph Hodge Roundtable, 9 May 2016 [http://humanityjournal.org/blog/response-to-the-commentators-part-one].

Hodge, J.M. 'Science, development, and empire: the colonial advisory council on agriculture and animal health, 1929-43', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 30.1 (2002), 1-26

Hodge, J.M. *Triumph of the expert: agrarian doctrines of development and the legacies of British colonialism* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007).

Hodge, J.M. 'Writing the history of development (part 1: the first wave)', *Humanity* 6.3 (2015), 429-63.

Hodge, J.M. 'Writing the history of development (part 2: longer, deeper, wider)', *Humanity* 7.1 (2016), 125-74.

Hodge, J.M. G. Hödl, and M. Kopf. *Developing Africa: concepts and practices in twentieth-century colonialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014).

Hoff, K. 'Paths of institutional development: a view from economic history', *World Bank Research Observer* 18.2 (2003), 205-26.

Holmes, C. 'Sidney Pollard: 1925-1998', *Proceedings of the British Academy* 105 (2000), 513-34.

Hopkins, A.G. 'The World Bank in Africa: historical reflections on the African present', *World Development* 14.12 (1986), 1473-87.

Horner, R. and D. Hulme. 'From international to global development: new geographies of 21st century development', *Development and Change* (2017), DOI: 10.1111/dech.12379.

Hulme, D. and M. Turner. *Sociology and development: theories, policies and practices* (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990).

Humphries, J. 'Child labor: lessons from the historical experience of today's industrial economies', *World Bank Economic Review* 17.2 (2003), 175-96.

Huntington, S.P. 'One soul at a time: political science and political reform', *American Political Science Review* 82.1 (1988): 3-10.

Huntington, S.P. 'The change to change: modernization, development, and politics', *Comparative politics* 3.3 (1971): 283-322.

Huntington, S.P. *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

Iandolo, A. 'Beyond the shoe: rethinking Khrushchev at the fifteenth session of the United Nations general assembly', *Diplomatic History* 41.1 (2017), 128-54.

Iandolo, A. 'De-Stalinizing growth: decolonization and the development of development economics in the Soviet Union', in *The development century: a global history,* eds. Stephen J. Macekura and Erez Manela (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

Iandolo, A. 'Imbalance of power: the Soviet Union and the Congo crisis, 1960–1961', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16.2 (2014), 32-55.

Iandolo, A. 'Soviet policy in West Africa, 1957-64', PhD dissertation, University of Oxford, 2011.

Iandolo, A. 'The rise and fall of the "Soviet model of development" in West Africa, 1957–64', *Cold War History* 12.4 (2012), 683-704.

Iandolo, A. 'Unforgettable 1956? The PCI and the crisis of communism in Italy', *Contemporary European History* 23.2 (2014), 259-82.

Immerwahr, D. 'Bernath lecture: the greater United States: territory and empire in U.S. history', *Diplomatic History* 40.3 (2016), 373-91.

Immerwahr, D. 'Caste or colony? Indianizing race in the United States', *Modern Intellectual History* 4.2 (2007), 275-301.

Immerwahr, D. *How to hide an empire: a short history of the greater United States* (New York: Random House, 2019).

Immerwahr, D. 'Modernization and development in US foreign relations', *Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review* 43.2 (2012), 22-5.

Immerwahr, D. 'Quests for community: the United States, community development, and the world, 1935-1965', PhD dissertation, UC Berkeley, 2011.

Immerwahr, D. 'The politics of architecture and urbanism in postcolonial Lagos, 1960–1986', *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 19.2 (2007), 165-86.

Immerwahr, D. *Thinking small: the United States and the lure of community development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).

Iversen, V., R. Palmer-Jones, and K. Sen. 'On the colonial origins of agricultural development in India', *Journal of Development Studies* 49.12 (2013), 1631-46.

Jacoby, T. and U. Kothari. 'Introduction: bringing social theory back into issues of development', *Progress in Development Studies* 14.3 (2014), 215-20.

Jenkins, J.L. K. Manjapra. H-E Kim, Y-S Hong. C.R. Unger, and B. Naranch. 'Forum: Asia, Germany, and the transnational turn', *German History* 28.4 (2010), 515-36.

Johnson, C. 'Uncommon ground: the "poverty of history" in common property discourse', *Development and Change* 35.3 (2004), 407-34.

Johnston, H.J.M. *Radical campus: the making of Simon Fraser University* (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 2005).

Jolly, R. and P. Streeten. 'Transcript of interview of Paul Streeten by Richard Jolly', United Nations Intellectual History Project , Spencertown, New York, 28-29 May 2001.

Kant, I. *Critique of pure reason,* trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: CUP, 1998.

Kant, I. *Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as science,* trans. Gary Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Kaviraj, S. 'Marxism and the darkness of history', *Development and Change* 23.3 (1992), 79-102.

Keynes, J.M. *A tract on monetary reform, the collected writings of John Maynard Keynes, volume IV* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013 [1923]), p. 65.

Keynes, J.M. *The general theory of employment, interest and money* (London: Macmillan, 1936).

Kiely, R. 'The last refuge of the noble savage? A critical assessment of post-development theory', *The European Journal of Development Research* 11.1 (1999): 30-55.McDaniel, J.M. 'History and the duality of power in community-based forestry in southeast Bolivia', *Development and Change* 34.2 (2003), 339-56.

Kim, D. 근대와 식민의 서곡 *<Prelude to modernity and colonisation>* (Paju: Changbi, 2009).

Korany, B. 'End of history, or its continuation and accentuation? The global South and the "new transformation" literature', *Third World Quarterly* 15.1 (1994), 7-15.

Kothari, U. (ed.). *A radical history of development studies: individuals, institutions and ideologies* (London: Zed Books, 2005).

Kothari, U. 'Geographies and histories of unfreedom: indentured labourers and contract workers in Mauritius', *Journal of Development Studies* 49.8 (2013), 1042-57.

Kuhn, T. *The Copernican revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

Kunkel, S. *Empire of pictures: global media and the 1960s remaking of American foreign policy* (New York: Berghahn, 2016).

Kunkel, S. 'Iconic empire: the United States and the rise of the visual age, 1961–1974', PhD Dissertation, Jacobs University Bremen, 2011.

Kunkel, S. 'Systeme des Wissens, Visionen von Fortschritt Die Vereinigten Staaten, das Jahrzehnt der Modernisierungstheorie' *[Systems of Knowledge, Visions of Progress The United States, the Decade of Modernization Theory]*, *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 48 (2008), 155-82.

Kunkel, S. 'Trajectories of decolonization: elites and the transformation from the colonial to the postcolonial', *Bulletin of the GHI Washington* 44 (2009), 95-9.

Lampard, E.E. 'The history of cities in the economically advanced areas', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 3.2 (1955), 81-136.

Larrain, J. *The concept of ideology* (London: Routledge, 1979).

Larrain, J. 'The concept of ideology: some theoretical and methodological questions', unpublished PhD thesis, University of Sussex (1977).

Larrain, J. *Theories of development: capitalism, colonialism and dependency* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).

Latham, M.E. 'Ideology, social science, and destiny: modernization and the Kennedy-era Alliance for Progress', *Diplomatic History* 22.2 (1998), 199-229.

Latham, M.E. 'Imperial legacy and Cold War credibility: Lyndon Johnson and the Panama Crisis', *Peace & Change* 27.4 (2002), 499-527.

Latham, M.E. 'Introduction', in *Staging growth modernization, international history, and the global Cold War,* eds. David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael E. Latham, 1-22 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).

Latham, M.E. 'Modernization', in *The Cambridge history of science (part IV),* eds. Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy Ross, 721-34 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Latham, M.E. *Modernization as ideology: American social science and "nation building" in the Kennedy era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

Latham, M.E. 'Modernization theory', in *Explaining the history of American foreign relations,* eds. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson, 212-20 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Latham, M.E. 'Redirecting the revolution? The USA and the failure of nation-building in South Vietnam', *Third World Quarterly* 27.1 (2006), 27-41.

Latham, M.E. *The right kind of revolution: modernization, development, and U.S. foreign policy from the Cold War to the present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

Leach, M. and J. Fairhead. 'Fashioned forest pasts, occluded histories? International environmental analysis in West African locales', *Development and Change*, 31.1 (2000), 35-59.

Levinson, M. *The box: how the shipping container made the world smaller and the world economy bigger* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

Lewis, D. 'Crossing the boundaries between 'third sector' and state: life-work histories from the Philippines, Bangladesh and the UK', *Third World Quarterly* 29.1 (2008), 125-41.

Leys, C. *The rise and fall of development theory* (London: James Currey, 1996);

Leys, C. 'Underdevelopment and dependency: critical notes.' *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 7.1 (1977), 92-107.

Logan, B.I., G. Tengbeh, and B. Petja. 'Towards a reorientation in land reform: from a market to locality-driven approach in South Africa's land restitution programme', *Progress in Development Studies* 12.2-3 (2012), 173-91.

Lu, J. and A. Lora-Wainwright. 'Historicizing sustainable livelihoods: a pathways approach to lead mining in rural central China', *World Development* 62 (2014), 189-200.

Lybaek, R., T.B. Christensen, and T. Kjaer. 'Governing innovation for sustainable development in the Danish biogas sector: a historical overview and analysis of innovation', *Sustainable Development* 21.3 (2013), 171-82.

Macekura, S.J. 'Crisis and opportunity: environmental NGOs, debt-for-nature swaps, and the rise of "people-centred" conservation', *Environment and History* 22.1 (2016), 49-73.

Macekura, S.J. 'Development and economic growth: an intellectual history', in *History of the future of economic growth: historical roots of current debates on sustainable degrowth*, eds. Iris Borowy and Matthias Schmelzer, 110-28 (London: Routledge, 2017).

Macekura, S.J. 'Of limits and growth: global environmentalism and the rise of "sustainable development" in the twentieth century', PhD dissertation, University of Virginia, 2013.

Macekura, S.J. *Of limits and growth: the rise of global sustainable development in the twentieth century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

Macekura, S.J. 'The limits of the global community: the Nixon administration and global environmental politics', *Cold War History* 11.4 (2011), 489-518.

Macekura, S.J. 'The point four program and the origins of international development policy', Master's dissertation, University of Virginia, 2008.

Macekura, S.J. 'The point four program and US international development policy', *Political Science Quarterly* 128.1 (2013), 127-60.

Macekura, S.J. 'Whither growth? International development, social indicators, and the politics of measurement, 1920s-1970s', *Journal of Global History* 14.2 (2019), 261-79.

Macekura, S.J. and E. Manela. 'Introduction', in *The development century: a global history,* eds. Stephen J. Macekura and Erez Manela, 1-17 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

MacKenzie, D. *An engine not a camera: how financial models shape markets* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).

Mackie, J.L. *Ethics: inventing right and wrong* (London: Pelican Books, 1977).

Malloch-Brown, M. 'Foreword', in *Post-2015 UN development: making change happen?,* eds. S. Browne and T.G. Weiss, xv-xvi (New York: Routledge, 2014).

Marantz, A. 'How "Silicon Valley" nails Silicon Valley', *The New Yorker,* 9 June 2016.

Marx, K. and F. Engels/ *The German ideology: parts I & III* (New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 19: 'philosophers have only *interpreted* the world differently, the point is, to *change* it.'

Matthews, S. 'Colonised minds? Post-development theory and the desirability of development in Africa', *Third World Quarterly* 38.12 (2017): 2650-63.

Meier, G.M. *Biography of a subject: an evolution of development economics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

Meier, G.M. *Pioneers in development: second series* (World Bank, 1987).

MIT. 'About the campaign'. Note, the campaign is still ongoing as of October 2019.

MIT. 'MIT Campaign for a Better World ends FY2017 with $3.6 billion', *MIT Campaign for a Better World* [http://betterworld.mit.edu/mit-campaign-better-world-ends-fy17-3-6-billion, accessed 2 May 2018]; MIT, 'About the campaign', *MIT Campaign for a Better World* [https://betterworld.mit. edu/about-the-campaign, accessed 2 May 2018].

Mkandawire, T. 'Running while others walk: knowledge and the challenge of Africa's development', *Africa Development* 36.2 (2010): 1-36.

Molini, V., M. Keyzer, B. van den Boom, W. Zant, and N. Nsowah-Nuamah. 'Safety nets and index-based insurance: historical assessment and semiparametric simulation for northern Ghana', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 58.4 (2010), 671-712.

Morrissey, M. 'Agricultural self-sufficiency: the recent history of an idea', *Studies In Comparative International Development* 17.1 (1982), 73-95.

Mosse, D. 'The symbolic making of a common property resource: history, ecology and locality in a tank-irrigated landscape in South India', *Development and Change* 28.3 (1997), 467-504.

Munro, J. 'US foreign policy, intersectional totality and the structure of empire', *Third World Quarterly* 35.9 (2014), 1566-81.

Murray Li, T. 'Local histories, global markets: cocoa and class in upland Sulawesi', *Development and Change* 33.3 (2002), 415-37.

Myrdal, G. *Asian drama* (New York: Pantheon, 1968).

Naik, P. 'The case of the "other India" and Indian IR scholarship', *Third World Quarterly* 35 (2014), 1496-508.

Niemeijer, D. 'The dynamics of African agricultural history: is it time for a new development paradigm?', *Development and Change* 27.1 (1996), 87-110.

Nietzsche, F.W. *Beyond good and evil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001[1886]), p.64.

Nietzsche, F.W. *On the genealogy of morals*, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1967[1887]).

Nietzsche, F.W. *On the genealogy of morality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006[1887]).

Nisbet, R. *History of the idea of progress* (London: Heinemann, 1980).

Nisbet, R. *Social change and history: aspects of the Western theory of development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

Nisbet, R.A., Popper, W. and E.W. Strong. 'In memorium: Frederick John Teggart', University of California Academic Senate (1946).

Nustad, K.G. 'Development: the devil we know?', *Third World Quarterly* 22.4 (2001): 479-89.

Özler, Ş., E. Taymaz, and T. Yilmaz. 'History matters for the export decision: plant-level evidence from Turkish manufacturing industry', *World Development* 37.2 (2009), 479-88.

Packenham, R.A. 'A comment on Professor Hodge's articles', *Humanity,* Joseph Hodge Roundtable, 29 April 2016 [http://humanityjournal.org/blog/a-comment-on-professor-hodges-articles].

Packenham, R.A. *Liberal America and the Third World: political development ideas in foreign aid and social science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

Park, A.S. 'Does the development discourse learn from history?', *World Development* 96.1 (2017), 52-64.

Park, A., G. Nayyer and P. Low. *Supply chain issues and perspectives: a literature review* (Geneva: World Trade Organisation, 2013).

Park, T.G. '미국의 한국사 교재 분석', *역사비평* 59.5 (2002), 8-75 [An analysis of US textbooks on Korean history].

Parker, W.N. 'Economic development in historical perspective', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 10.1 (1961), 1-7.

Passmore, J. *The perfectibility of man* (London: Duckworth, 1970).

Peluso, N.L. 'What's nature got to do with it? A situated historical perspective on socio-natural commodities', *Development and Change* 43.1 (2012), 79-104.

Peet, R. *Global capitalism: theories of societal development* (London: Routledge, 1991).

Peet, R. 'Reminiscencing the Early Antipode', Past Editors' Reflections, *Antipode,* available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/page/journal/14678330/homepage/editor_s_past_reflections.htm#Peet.

Peet, R. and E. Hartwick. *Theories of development: contentions, arguments, alternatives* (New York: Guildford Press, 1999).

Peloso, V. 'A Third World perspective on the writing of United States history for the 1970s', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 7.1 (1972), 85-90.

Pieterse, J.N. 'After post-development', *Third World Quarterly 21*.2 (2000): 175-91.

Pieterse, J.N. *Development theory: deconstructions/reconstructions* (London: Sage, 2001).

Pieterse, J.N. 'Discourse analysis in international development studies', *Journal of Multicultural Discourses* 6.3 (2011): 237-40.

Pieterse, J.N. 'My paradigm or yours? Alternative development, post-development, reflexive development'. *Development and Change 29*.2 (1998): 343-73.

Pinkard, T. *Hegel's Phenomenology: the sociality of reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Pinker, S. *Enlightenment now: the case for reason, science, humanism and progress* (New York: Viking, 2018).

Plesch, D. *America, Hitler and the UN* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).

Plumb, J.H. (ed.) *Crisis in the humanities* (London: Penguin, 1964).

Plumb, J.H. 'The historian's dilemma', in *Crisis in the humanities,* Ed. J.H. Plumb, 24-44 (London: Penguin, 1964).

Polanyi, K. *The great transformation: the political and economic origins of our times* (Toronto: Rinehart, 1944).

Pollard, S. *The idea of progress: history and society* (London: C.A. Watts, 1968).

Popper, K. *The open society and its enemies, volume one: the spell of Plato* (London: Routledge, 2003[1945]).

Preston, P.W. 'An analytical and historical survey of theories of development in the period 1945-1975', unpublished PhD thesis, University of Leeds (1981).

Preston, P.W. *Development theory: an introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).

Preston, P.W. *Making sense of development: an introduction to classical and contemporary theories of development and their application to Southeast Asia* (London: Routeldge, 1986).

Preston, P.W. *Singapore in the global system: relationship, structure and change* (London: Routledge, 2007

Preston, P.W. *Theories of development* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982).

Putnam, H. *Ethics without ontology* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).

Putnam, H. *The collapse of the fact/value dichotomy and other essays* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

QS World University Rankings. 'Development studies', 2017 [https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rnkings/uiversity-subject-rankings/2017/development-studies, accessed 14 November 2017].

Rahnema, M. 'Introduction', in *The post-development reader,* Eds. Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree, ix-xix (London: Zed Books, 1997).

Rahnema, M. 'Towards post-development: searching for signposts, a new language and new paradigms', in *The post-development reader,* Eds. Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree, 377-403 (London: Zed Books, 1997).

Rahnema, M. and V. Bawtree. (eds.). *The post-development reader* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

Rapley, J. *Understanding development: theory and practice in the Third World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996).

Reid, B. 'Historical blocs and democratic impasse in the Philippines: 20 years after 'people power'', *Third World Quarterly* 27.6 (2006), 1003-20.

Renan, E. 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?' *{What is a nation?]*, conférence faite en Sorbonne, le 11 Mars 1882 (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1882).

Rist, G. 'Image du Tiers Monde et conceptions du développement: une étude des documents des organisations suisses de coopération au développement' *[The image of the Third World and conceptions of development: a study of documents of Swiss development cooperation organisations].* PhD thesis. Graduate University, Geneva, 1977.

Rist, G. *Le développement: histoire d'une croyance occidentale* [Development: the history of a Western belief] (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1996).

Rist, G. *The history of development: from Western origins to global faith* (London: Zed Books, 1997).

Rist, G. *The history of development: from Western origins to global faith, revised edition* (London: Zed Books, 2002).

Rist, G. *The history of development,* 3rd edition (London: Zed Books, 2008).

Rist, G. and F. Sabelli. *Il était une fois le développement* (Lausanne: D'en Bas, 1986).

Rivoli, P. *The travels of a t-shirt in the global economy* (Hoboken: Wiley, 2005).

Robertson, A.F. 'Abusa: the structural history of an economic contract', *Journal of Development Studies* 18.4 (1982), 447-78.

Robertson, R. 'The historical context and significance of globalization', *Development and Change* 35.3 (2004), 557-65.

Rogers, J. *Adventure capitalist: the ultimate road trip* (Sussex: John Wiley, 2003).

Rogers, J.D. 'Theories of crime and development: an historical perspective.' *Journal of Development Studies* 25.3 (1989), 314-28.

Runge, C.F. and E. Defrancesco. 'Exclusion, inclusion, and enclosure: historical commons and modern intellectual property', *World Development* 34.10 (2006), 1713-27.

Ruggie, J.G. 'International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order', *International organization* 36.2 (1982): 379-415.

Russell, B. *Our knowledge of the external world as a field for scientific method in philosophy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1922[1914]).

Sachs, W. 'Schulzwang und soziale Kontrolle: Argumente für eine Entschulung des Lernens' *[Compulsary schooling and social control: arguments for a de-schooling of learning]*. PhD thesis. University of Tübingen, 1975.

Sachs W. (ed.). *The development dictionary: a guide to knowledge as power* (London: Zed Books, 1992).

Sachs, W. 'The Sustainable Development Goals and *Laudato si*: varieties of post-development?', *Third World Quarterly* 38.12 (2017): 2573-87.

Said, E. *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993).

Sandberg, H.M., J.L. Seale, and T.G. Taylor. 'History, regionalism, and CARICOM trade: a gravity model analysis', *Journal of Development Studies* 42.5 (2006), 795-811.

Santayana, G. *The life of reason* (New York: Scribner, 1905), p. 284.

Sauvant, K.P. 'From economic to socio-cultural emancipation: the historical context of the New International Economic Order and the New International Socio-cultural Order', *Third World Quarterly* 3.1 (1981), 48-61.

Schmitz, H. 'Industrialisation strategies in less developed countries: some lessons of historical experience', *Journal of Development Studies* 21.1 (1984), 1-21.

Schuurman, F.J. *Beyond the impasse: new directions in development theory* (London: Zed Books, 1993).

Schuurman, F.J. 'Paradigms lost, paradigms regained? Development studies in the twenty-first century', *Third World Quarterly* 21.1 (2000): 7-20.

Scott, J.C. *Seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

Seers, D. 'The birth, life and death of development economics (revisiting a Manchester conference)', *Development and Change* 10.4 (1979): 707-19.

Seers, D. 'The congruence of Marxism and other neoclassical doctrines' in *Toward a new strategy for development: a Rothko Chapel colloqium*, pp. 1-17 (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979).

Seers, D. and G.M. Meier. (eds.) *Pioneers in development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

Sen, A. *The idea of justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

Shin, M.D. 'Major trends of Korean historiography in the US', *Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies* 3.1 (2003), 151-75.

Shulman, N. 'Conditions of their own making: an intellectual history of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham', *Canadian Journal of Communication* 18:1 (1993), 51-73.

da Silva, T.S. 'Narrating a white Africa: autobiography, race and history', *Third World Quarterly* 26.3 (2005), 471-8.

Sivaramakrishnan, K. 'State sciences and development histories: encoding local forestry knowledge in Bengal', *Development and Change* 31.1 (2000), 61-89.

Solimano, A. 'Inflation and the costs of stabilization', *World Bank Research Observer* 5.2 (1990), 167-85.

Somjee, A.H. *Democracy and political change in village India: a case study* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1971).

Somjee, A.H. *Development theory: critiques & explanations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991).

Somjee, A.H. 'Ethnocentricity and value ambiguity in political development studies', *Political Studies* 26:2 (1978), 256-61.

Somjee, A.H. *Parallels and actuals of political development* (London: Macmillan, 1986).

Somjee, A.H. 'Problems confronted in the rejuvenation of political theory', *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 21:2 (1960), 130-42.

Somjee, A.H. 'Remembering S.P. Varma and N.C. Chatterjee', India of the Past (2012) [http://www.indiaofthepast.org/images/pdf/somjee/spvarma.pdf, accessed 9 October 2017].

Soros, G. *The alchemy of finance* (Hoboken: John Wiley, 1987).

Spengler, O. *The decline of the West: form and actuality,* trans. C.F. Atkinson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1926[1918]).

Spengler, O. *The decline of the West: perspectives of world-history,* trans. C.F. Atkinson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928[1922]).

Srivatsan, R. (ed.) *History of development thought: a critical anthology* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2012).

Stump, D. 'Ancient and backward or long-lived and sustainable?', *World Development* 38.9 (2010), 1251-62.

Szreter, S. 'The right of registration: development, identity registration, and social security-a historical perspective', *World Development* 35.1 (2007): 67-86.

Teggart, F.J. 'A problem in the history of ideas', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 1.4 (1940), 494-503.

Teggart, F.J. 'The circumstance or substance of history', *The American Historical Review* 15.4 (1910), 709-19.

Teggart, F.J. 'The humanistic study of change in time', *The Journal of Philosophy* 23.12 (1926), 309-15.

Teggart, F.J. 'War and civilization in the future', *American Journal of Sociology* 46.4 (1941), 582-90.

The Better World Campaign. 'Our mission', *The Better World Campaign* [https://better-worldcampaign.org/about-bwc/our-mission, accessed 2 May 2018].

Thomas, R. 'Robert Nisbet, 82, sociologist and conservative champion', *New York Times* 12 Sep 1996, p. D00019.UN Chief Executive Board, 'UN System HR statistics report - 2015', Ref: CEB/2016/ HLCM/HR/20.

Thomson Reuters. 'Journal citation reports© social sciences edition 2016' [http://ip-science.thomsonreuters.com/cgi-bin/jrnlst/jloptions.cgi?PC=K].

UN, Transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development. Resolution A/RES/70/1, Seventieth United Nations General Assembly, New York, 21 October 2015.

UNDP, *Human development report 1990: concept and measure of human development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

UNDP, *Human development report 1992: global dimensions of human development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

UNDP, *Human development report 1993: people's participation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

UNDP, *Human development report 1995: gender and human development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

UNDP, *Human development report 1997: human development to eradicate poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

UNDP, *Human development report 2010: the real wealth of nations: pathways to human development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

UNDP, *Human development report 2019: Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: inequalities in human development in the 21st century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

UNESCO. 'Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation', 16 November 1945.

Unger, C.R. 'Cold War Science: Wissenschaft, Politik und Ideologie im Kalten Krieg' *[Cold War science: science, politics and ideology in the Cold War]*, *Neue Politische Literatur* 51.1 (2006), 49-68.

Unger, C.R. 'Comment on Joseph Hodge, on the historiography of development (part I and II)', *Humanity,* Joseph Hodge Roundtable 28 April 2016 (http://humanityjournal.org/blog/comment-on-joseph-hodge-on-the-historiography-of-development-part-i-and-ii/).

Unger, C.R. *Entwicklungspfade in Indien: Eine internationale Geschichte, 1947-1980 [Development paths in India: an international history, 1947-1980]* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2015).

Unger, C.R. 'Histories of development and modernization: findings, reflections, future research', *H-Soz-Kult* 09.12.2010 (http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum/2010-12-001).

Unger, C.R. 'Industrialization vs. agrarian reform: West German modernization policies in India in the 1950s and 1960s', *Journal of Modern European History* 8.1 (2010), 47-65.

Unger, C.R. *International development: a postwar history* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018).

Unger, C.R. 'Knappheit—Hemmnis oder Sprungbrett? Indische Entwicklungsstrategien zwischen Intervention und Eigensinn' *[Scarcity —obstruction or stepping stone? Indian development strategies between intervention and attachment]*, *Zeitschrift für Kulturwissenschaften* 1 (2011), 45-54.

Unger, C.R. 'Modernization à la mode: West German and American development plans for the Third World', *Bulletin of the GHI Washington* 40 (2007), 143-59.

Unger, C.R. 'Objektiv, aber nicht neutral: Zur Entwicklung der Ostforschung nach 1945' *[Objective but not neutral: on the development of Eastern research after 1945]*, *Osteuropa* 55.12 (2005), 113-31.

Unger, C.R. *Ostforschung in Westdeutschland: Die Erforschung des europäischen Ostens und die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 1945-1975 [Ostforschung in West Germany: research of the European East and the German Research Foundation, 1945-1975]* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2007).

Unger, C.R. 'Rourkela, ein "Stahlwerk im Dschungel": Industrialisierung, Modernisierung und Entwicklungshilfe im Kontext von Dekolonisation und Kaltem Krieg (1950-1970)' *[Rourkela, a 'steelworks in the jungle': industrialization, modernization and development assistance in the context of decolonization and the Cold War (1950-1970)]*, *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 48 (2008), 367-88.

Unger, C.R. 'Towards global equilibrium: American foundations and Indian modernization, 1950s to 1970s', *Journal of Global History* 6.1 (2011), 121-42.

United Nations. *Our Common future: Brundtland report* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

Utting, P. 'From orthodoxy to reform: historical experiences of post-revolutionary societies', *Third World Quarterly* 13.1 (1992), 43-65.

Wallace, D.F. *This is water: some thoughts, delivered on a significant occasion, about living a compassionate life* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2009).

Waltz, S. 'Reclaiming and rebuilding the history of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights', *Third World Quarterly* 23.3 (2002): 437-48.

Watson, M. 'Friedrich List's Adam Smith historiography and the contested origins of development theory', *Third World Quarterly* 33.3 (2012), 459-74.

Weiss, T.G. and A.E. Abdenur. 'Introduction: emerging powers and the UN–what kind of development partnership?', *Third World Quarterly* 35.10 (2014), 1749-58.

White, J. *The politics of foreign aid* (London: Bodley Head, 1974).

Whittaker, D.H., T. Zhu, T. Sturgeon, M.H. Tsai, and T. Okita. 'Compressed development', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 45.4 (2010), 439-67.

Wietzke, F.B. 'Historical origins of uneven service supply in Sub-Saharan Africa: the role of non-state providers', *Journal of Development Studies* 50.12 (2014), 1614-30.

Wietzke, F.B. 'Long-term consequences of colonial institutions and human capital investments: sub-national evidence from Madagascar', *World Development* 66 (2015), 293–307.

Williams, B. *Ethics and the limits of philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).

Williamson, J.G. 'Inequality, accumulation, and technological imbalance: a growth-equity conflict in American history?', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 27.2 (1979), 231-53.

Wood, A. *From Marshall Plan to debt crisis: foreign aid and development choices in the world economy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

Wood, A. and K. Jordan. 'Why does Zimbabwe export manufactures and Uganda not? Econometrics meets history', *Journal of Development Studies* 37.2 (2000), 91-116.

Woolcock, M., S. Szreter, and V. Rao. 'How and why history matter for development policy?', *Journal of Development Studies* 47.1 (2011), 70-96.

Ziai, A. *Development discourses and global history: from colonialism to the Sustainable Development Goals* (London: Routledge, 2016).

Ziai, A. 'Entwicklung als ideologie? das klassische entwicklungsparadigma und die post-development-kritik; ein beitrag zur analyse des entwicklungsdiskurses' [Development as

ideology? The classical development paradigm and post-development critique; a contribution to the analysis of the development discourse], unpublished PhD thesis, University of Kassel (2004).

Ziai, A. *Exploring post-development: Theory and practice, problems and perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2007).

Ziai, A. 'Post-development: Premature burials and haunting ghosts', *Development and Change* 46.4 (2015): 833-54.

Ziai, A. 'Post-development 25 years after The Development Dictionary', *Third World Quarterly* 38.12 (2017): 2547-58.

Ziai, A. 'The ambivalence of post-development: between reactionary populism and radical democracy', *Third World Quarterly* 25.6 (2004): 1045-60.